E S M A Y 
 
 O N T H E 
 
 ORIGIN of E V I L. 
 
 By Dr. William King, late Lord 
 Archbifhop of DUBLIN. 
 
 Translated from the Latin, with large Notes; tending 
 to explain and vindicate fome of the Author's Principles Againft 
 the Objections of Bayle, Leibnitz, the Author of a Philofophtcal 
 Enquiry concerning Human Liberty j and others. 
 
 ^To which is prefix'd 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 Concerning the 
 Fundamental Principle and immediate Criterion of Virtue, 
 
 AS ALSO, 
 
 The Obligation to, and Approbation of it. 
 
 With fome account of 
 
 The Origin of the TaJJions and Aftettims. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for W. Thurlbourn Bookfeller in Cambridge; and fold by 
 R. Knaplock, J. and J. Knaptcn, and W. Innis in St. Paul's 
 Church-Tard London. M.DCC.XXXI. ,
 
 3^ 
 
 \ 
 
 THE 
 
 Tranflator's Preface. 
 
 mn'^i 
 
 i,Have always look'd upon an Enquiry into the Caufe 
 and Origin of Evil, as one of the noblefl and mod 
 important Subje&s in Natural Theology : It leads 
 us into the moft exalted Speculations concerning 
 the Exiftence and Attributes of God, and the Ori- 
 ginal of Things. It jBrfl difcovers the true Intent 
 of the Deity in creating any Beings at all, and then 
 purfues that Intent thro' the feveral Works of his Creation: it {hews 
 how this is fully anfwer'd by the Inanimate and Brute Part, and how 
 it might and fhould be, and why, and in what refpedt it is not by 
 the Rational. It contemplates the Divine Oeconomy in the Govern- 
 ment of the Univerfe, fearches into the various Schemes of Provi- 
 dence, and takes in the whole Compafs of Nature. Neither is its 
 Uf'efufaefs inferior to its Extent. It concerns every Man who pretends 
 to act upon any ferious Views here, or to entertain any folid Hopes of 
 
 a 2 Futuritv.; 
 
 363Y50
 
 iv. PREFACE. 
 
 Futurity. The Knowledge of it, in fome degree, is abfolutely ne- 
 ceflfary in order to the fettling in our Minds right Notions of the 
 Nature and Will of God, and the Duties we owe him j in order to 
 the due Apprehenfion of his Defign in creating, preferving, and di- 
 4 recting us, and to the regular Conduct of our Lives, and Enjoyment 
 of ourfelves in that State and Condition wherein he has placed us. 
 Nay, while we are ignorant of this one Point, what rational Plea- 
 fure can we take in knowing any other ? When I enquire how I 
 got into this World, and came to be what I am j I'm told that an 
 abfolutely perfect: Being produced me out of Nothing, and placed me 
 here on purpofe to communicate fome Part of his Happinefs to me-, 
 
 and to make me, in fome meafure, like himfelf.- This End is not 
 
 obtain'd; the direct: contrary appears; )I find myfelf furrounded 
 with nothing but Perplexity, Want and Milery ; by whofe fault I 
 know not, How to better myfelf I cannot tell. What No- 
 tions of God and Goodnefs can this afford me? What Ideas, of 
 
 Religion ? What Hopes of a future State ? For,, if 
 
 God's Aim in producing me be entirely unknown ; if it be neither 
 his Glory, (as fome will have it) which my prefent State is far from 
 
 advancing ; nor mine own Good, which the fame is equally in- 
 
 conhttent with - f how know I what I'm to do here, and in what man- 
 ner I mutt endeavour to pleafe him ? or why (hould I endeavour it 
 at all ? For, if I mult be miferable in this World, what Secu- 
 rity have I that I mail not be fo in another too j (if there be one) 
 fince, if it were the Will of my Almighty Creator, I might (for 
 
 ought I fee) have been happy in both? Such Thoughts as 
 
 thefe mult needs difturb a Perfon that has any Concern for his Ma- 
 ker's Honour, or his own Happinefs; that defires to pay him a reafo- 
 nable Service, and anfwer the End of his Creation : in fhort, that 
 happens either to think at all upon thefe things, or to think for him- 
 felf. And therefore an Endeavour to rid the Mirld of fome of thefe 
 Perplexities, cannot fure be unacceptable, and a Solution of any one 
 of thefe Doubts, is doing a piece of Service to Mankind, which can 
 never be unfeafonable. But the Ufefulnefs, as well as Antiqui- 
 ty, of the prefent Debate ; and the Abfurdity of the Manichean 
 bcheme of accounting for Evil, have been often explain'd, and need 
 
 not 

 
 PREFACE. v. 
 
 not here be infifted on: all that ever feem'd wanting to an entire 
 Conquefl over thefe Hereticks, and their abfurd Hypothefis, was on- 
 ly a. tolerable Solution of the many Difficulties which drove them 
 into it: and this our Author has effected, as I hope to make appear 
 before I have done. 
 
 There . are two general ways of Reafoning, called Arguments 
 a Prior?, and a Pojieriori ; or, according to what Logicians com- 
 monly flile the Synthetical and Analytical Method: The former lays 
 down fome evident Principles, and then deduces the feveral Confe- 
 quences neceffarily refulting from them : The latter begins with the 
 Phcene?nena themfelves, and traces 'em up to their Original, and 
 from the known Properties of thefe Phcenomena arrives at the Na- 
 ture of their Caufe. Now the former of thefe is evidently prefera- 
 ble, where it can be had, (and I think it may be had almoft every 
 where, but in the firft Gaofe) fince the Utter muft depend upon a 
 large Induction of Particulars, any of which, when failing, invali- 
 dates the whole Argument, and quite fpoils a Demonflration. " It is 
 ' ; very true (fays Dr. J. Clarke on Natural Evil, p. 79.) that this is- 
 " not a ftrict Demonflration of the general Conclufion, becaufe that 
 " can be had no other way than by trying all the Experiments 
 " that can poffibly be made every where, which is infinite and 
 " endlefs; but it is the beft that the Nature of the thing is capa- 
 " bk of." 
 
 Now, if the Thing before us will admit of the former Method, 
 then I think it is capable of a much better; and an Attempt to mew 
 that it is fo, mufl be very defirable : And this our Author feems to 
 have done, without any precarious Syflem, or ill-grounded Hypo- 
 thefis whatfoever. His fuperior Excellence (as I apprehend) confifls 
 in having laid down, and previoufly eftablifh'd fuch folid fubftantiar 
 Principles as may be drawn out in infinitum, and eafily apply' d to all 
 the Difficulties that attend the prefent Queftion. He firft of all en- 
 quires into the Nature and Perfections of the Deity, and his Defign 
 in the Creation ; fettles the true Notion of a Creature, and examines 
 whether any could be perfect j and if not, whether all mould have 
 
 been
 
 vi. T R E F A C E. 
 
 been made equally imperfect ; or feveral in very different Gaffes and 
 Degrees. Having proved the laft of thefe Opinions to be the true one, 
 he proceeds to the lovvelt Clafs of Beings: viz. Material Ones: He 
 enquires into the Nature and effential Properties of Matter, and the 
 Laws of its Motion, and thereby eftabliffies fuch Rules as direct us 
 to the Solution of all the Difficulties attending it, as distributed in- 
 to various Maffes, Syftems and Animated Bodies. He fhews the una- 
 voidablenefs, and abfolute neceffity of contrary Motions in Matter, for 
 the fame Reafons that it had any Motion at all, and confequently 
 of Attrition, Corruption and Dijjolution, and all the Natural Evils 
 that attend them. In the next place, from the Nature of a Self- 
 moving Principle, and the manner of its Operation, he deduces all 
 the Irregularities incident to Volition, and the Actions confequent 
 thereupon. He ffates at large the true Notion of Free-Will, aiid 
 demonftrates the abfolute Neceffity for it in every Rational Being, 
 in order to its Happinefs. Then accounts for the feveral Abules of 
 it, and the Moral Evils arifing from thence, and examines all the 
 poffible Ways of preventing them ; and upon the whole makes it ap- 
 pear, that none of thefe could have been originally avoided, or can 
 novv be removed, without introducing greater; and confequently 
 that the very PermifTion of thefe Evils, and the Production and Pre- 
 fervation of thefe Beings, in the pref^nt State, is the higheft In- 
 ffance of infinite Wifdom, Power and Goodnefs. Now thefe are 
 not mere Arguments ad ignorantiam : This is not telling us, that 
 we muft believe fuch and fuch things to be the fure Effects of an 
 infinitely wife and good God, tho' no Marks of either Wifdom or 
 Goodnefs appear in them ; which, tho' it may be true, and all that 
 perhaps can be faid in fome particular Cafes, yet has, I think, but 
 very little Tendency towards either the Conviction of an Infidel, or 
 the Satisfaction of a true Believer. When a Perfon is ieriouily con* 
 templating any Parts of Nature, and folicitouily enquiring into their 
 feveral Ends and Ufes, no Pleafure furely can arife to himfelf, nor 
 Devotion toward the Author of it, merely from the Perplexity and 
 Unaccountable nefs of thofe Parts. Nay every fuch lnitance, one 
 would think, in u it caff a damp upon his Spirits, and prove an un- 
 grateful
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 grateful Reflection on his Weaknefs, a mortifying Argument of his 
 Imperfection. Whereas one fingle Perplexity clear'd up, or Ohiec- 
 tion anfwer'd, is a piece of real Knowledge gain'd, upon which he 
 
 can congratulate himfelf, ard glorify his Maker. Our Author 
 
 therefore was not content with mere Negative Arguments, and bare- 
 ly avoiding Difficulties, by removing all Defecls from external things 
 to ourfelves, and multiplying Inftances of the Narrovvnefs and Weak- 
 nefs of Human Underftanding : (which any one that thinks at all 
 will foon be convinced of, and heartily defirous of having it fome- 
 what enlarg'd and improved, to which this manner of Argumen- 
 tation, I fear, contributes very little.) But he attacks his Adverfarics in 
 their ftrongeft. Holds, and plucks up the Manickean Hcrefy by the 
 Roots : he fhews by certain pre-eftabliuYd Rules, and neceflary Con- 
 fequence, that we can eafily reduce all to one fupreme Head, and 
 clearly comprehend how the prelent ftate of things is the very 
 belt, in all refpects, and worthy of a mofl wife, powerful, and be- 
 neficent Author : And why, taking the whole Syilem of Beings to- 
 gether, and every Clafs of them in its own Order, none could pof- 
 fibly have been made more perfect, or placed in a better. He 
 proves, in the firft place (as we obferv'd) that no created Beings 
 could be abfolutely perfect, and in the next, that no manner of E- 
 vil, or Imperfection, was tolerated in them, but what was, either 
 in their Clafs and manner of Exiftence, abfolutely unavoidable, or 
 elfe productive of fome Good more than equivalent : In both 
 which Cafes there will be the fame Reafons for the Creation of 
 fuch Beings in fueh Circumftances, together with their concomi- 
 tant Evils, as there was for any Creation at all : For which the 
 fole Reafon will appear to be an Intention in the Creator of com- 
 municating Happinefs to as many Beings as could be made capa- 
 ble of it, on the very bell: Terms j or a Refolution not to omit the 
 lean: Degree of pure Good on account of fuch Evils, as did not 
 counterbalance it: Or (which is the very fame, (ince 'twill be c- 
 vident, that the Prevention of all the prefent Evils in any concei- 
 vable Manner, would have been of worfe Confequence than the 
 Permiffion of them) an Intention always to choofe the leaft of two 
 
 Evils, 
 
 vn.
 
 viiL ? R E F A<C E. 
 
 Evils, when both cannot be avoided. This mutt, be granted, 
 
 to come up to the Point; and when it is once made apparent, 
 will be a full and fufficient Anfwer to that old triumphant Que- 
 ftion, u&v to kaW ; 'twill be an ample Vindication of the Di- 
 vine Providence, a Demonftration of the Power, and Wifdom, 
 and Goodnefs of God, in the Production, Prefervation, and Go- 
 vernment of the Univerfe ; and as much as a reafonable Man can 
 either expect or defire. And I heartily wiih this Method had 
 been taken by more of thofe Authors that have wrote on the pre~ 
 lent Subject, and the Argument purfued a little farther by Natu- 
 ral Light, in order to give fome Light and Confirmation even to 
 Revelation itfelf, in thefe inquifitive Days, wherein a great many 
 feem unwilling to be determined by its fole Authority; wherein 
 Men are not a little inclined to call every thing into queftion ; 
 
 and a weak Argument is fure to be exploded.- Even the moft 
 
 learned and ingenious Writer on this Subject often flies to Scrip- 
 ture when a Difficulty begins to prefs him : which, in my Opi- 
 nion, is deferting the Argument, and owning, with Mr. Bay le (in 
 his Explanation touching the Manichees at the End of his Dictio- 
 nary) " that the Queftion cannot be defended on any other foot." 
 
 Whereas, if the Difficulty be really unanfwerable by Reafon, 
 
 or a plain Contradulion to our natural Notions of God; if (as 
 the fore-mentioned Author often urges) " we perceive by our 
 " clear and diftinct Ideas, that fuch a thing is entirely repugnant 
 
 * to his Nature and Attributes," referring us to Scripture, which 
 
 declares that an infinitely perfect Being did conftitute it thus, will 
 be no manner of Satisfaction, fince (upon this Suppofition) we can- 
 not have greater AfTurance that this Scripture comes from him, than 
 we have that the Dotirine therein contain'd is abfurd and impof- 
 fible. And what that ingenious Perfon's Intent might be in repre- 
 fenting the Matter thus, and then referring us to Scripture for an 
 Anfwer, I cannot determine. But fure I am, that his Account of 
 it ferv.es rather to betray the Caufe, and undermine the Authority 
 of both Reafon and Revelation, and is enough (if no better could 
 be given) to make a Perfon that argues confequentially reject all 
 kinds of Religion. Farther, every one muft have obferv'd, that moft 
 Authors upon this Subject treat of God's Difpenfations toward Man, 
 
 as
 
 TREFACE. i x . 
 
 as if they were fpeaking of one Man's Behaviour toward ano- 
 ther. They think it fufficient to make the Almighty choofe the 
 moft prudent, likely Means of bringing Man to Happinefs; and 
 act upon the higheft Probability, tho, upon what account foever 
 it matters not, he fail of his End. This may indeed be the beft 
 manner of acting in all finite, imperfect Beings, and fufficient to 
 acquit theGoodnefs and Juftice of God, but is very far from fatisfy- 
 ing his Wifdom. To a perfect Being who forefees the Effects of all 
 poflible Caufes and Means, as the fame Authors allow God to do, 
 thefe only appear fit and eligible for the effects and Ends which they 
 will certainly produce. Nor is it any reafon why I mould purfue a 
 Method which is apt and wont to fucceed in moft Cafes, if I know ir 
 will fail in this. To a Perfon therefore that takes all the Attributes of 
 God together, and confiders the whole Scheme of Providence from 
 end to end, it will not appear a complete and fatisfactory Vindication 
 of them, to aflert that God either now makes Men, or fuffers them 
 to make themfelves miferable, for rejecting that Happinefs which he 
 at firft made them capable of, and endow'd them with fuch Powers, 
 and placed them in fuch Circumftances as render'd it naturally poflible 
 and even eafie to be attain'd by them: tho' this may indeed clear his 
 Juftice and lay the Blame upon ourfelves : And yet thefe Writers ge- 
 nerally content themfelves with going thus far: They bring all our 
 Sin and Mifery from the abufe of Free- Will, i. e. a Power whereby 
 Man might have acted otherwife, and prevented it j without ever ex- 
 plaining the Nature of this Principle, or (lie wing the Worth and Ex- 
 cellence of it, and proving that, as far as we can apprehend, more 
 Good in general arifes from the donation of fuch a Self-moving Po- 
 wer, together with all thefe forefeen Abufes of it, than could poffibly 
 have been produced without it. To demonftrate this was an Attempt 
 worthy of our Author, who has at leaft laid a noble Foundation for 
 it, and feems to be the firft that has propofed the true Notion of hu- 
 man Liberty, and explained it confidently: All the Doubts and Diffi- 
 culties attending which intricate Queftion, will, I hope, be tolerably 
 cleared up ; or at leaft, fuch Principles eftablifh'd as may he fufficient 
 for that Purpofe, by this Treatife of his, and the Notes upon it. But 
 fo much for the Subject and our Author's way of treating it. 
 
 As for the Tranjlation, 'tis barely Literal : I endeavour'd to keep 
 clofe to the Author's Senfe, and generally to his very Words : fo that the 
 
 b Reader
 
 x. T R E FA C E. 
 
 Reader may be pretty fure of finding Dr. King here at leaft. I once 
 intended to have cut off every thing that 1 could not defend, efpvrially 
 about the Beginning (which ufed to difcourage moft Readers from per- 
 ufing the reft of his valuable Book, and might perhaps as well have 
 been omitted;) but coniidering that he h.\d involv'd it fo clofely in 
 the reft of his Scheme, that the whole would feem confufed without 
 
 it that others might perhaps have a different Opinion of it and 
 
 that fome, probably, would be defirous of feeing even the moft im- 
 perfect Notions of fo great a Philofopher ; I contented myfelf 
 
 with omitting only part of his firft Note, and obviating the reft all a- 
 long, both from other Authors, and fuch Obfervations of my Ovvn as 
 occurr'd upon the Subject. 
 
 Some perhaps may think the frequent and long Quotations very te- 
 dious, and introduced only to fluff up. 1 can only anfxver, that I 
 
 intended the Notes, and References together, to point out a fort of 
 Compendium of Metapfjyfics, or Speculative Divinity; by directing the 
 Reader to a Set of true Notions on the various Subjects which our Au- 
 thor touch'd upon; and which could not be found in any one particular 
 Book, nor collected from feveral, without much Trouble and Confufi- 
 on, and unneceffary Reading. I chofe rather to quote the very Words 
 of the Authors, than either ufe worfe of my own, or pretend todifcover 
 what had been often difcovered before; or repeat the fame things over 
 and over again, which is endlefs. I hope the Reader will find that a 
 citation of two or more Authors on the fame Point is not always tauto- 
 logy : and I believe it will appear, that in the multitude of References 
 more than one is fcarce ever made to the fame Place, except upon a ve- 
 ry different Occafion, or in fome different Light. A Writer feems to 
 me to do more good to the Public by (hewing the ufe of fome of thofe 
 many Volumes which we have already, than by offering new ones; tho' 
 this be of much lefs Advantage to his private Character. I determin'd 
 therefore not to fay any thing myfelf where I could bring another con- 
 veniently to fay it for me; and tranferibed only fo much from others as 
 I judg'd abfolutely neceffary to give the Reader afhort View of the Sub- 
 ject we were upon, and by that Sketch to induce thofe who have leifure, 
 opportunity and inclination to go farther, and confult tpe Originals ; and 
 to afford fome prefent Satisfaction to thofe who have not. 
 
 But how judicioufly this is perform'd, the Notes themfelves muft te- 
 ftify, for all that I can fay by way of Preface will never mend the matter.
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 iitjofniv, 
 
 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 Concerning the 
 
 Fundamental Principle 
 
 o F 
 
 VIRTUE or MORALITY. 
 
 HO' all Writers of Morality have in the main agreed what 
 particular Actions are virtuous and what otherwife ; yet they 
 have, or at leaft feem to have difTer'd very much, both con- 
 cerning the Criterion of Virtue, viz. what it is which denomi- 
 nates any Action virtuous j or, to fpeak more properly, what it is by 
 which we muit try any Action to know whether it be virtuous or no; 
 and alfo concerning the Principle or Motive by which Men are indu- 
 ced to purfue Virtue. 
 
 As to the former, fome have placed it in acting agreeably to Na- 
 ture, or Reafon j others in the Fitnefs of things ; others in a Conformi- 
 ty with Truth j others in promoting the Common Good ; others in the 
 Will of God, &c. This Difagreement of Moralifts concerning the 
 Rule or Criterion of Virtue in general, and at the fame time their 
 almoft perfect Agreement concerning the particular Branches of it, 
 would be apt to make one fufpect, either that they had a different 
 Criterion (tho' they did not know or attend to it) from what they 
 
 b 2 profefs'd ;
 
 xii. 'Preliminary ^Diffcrtation. 
 
 profefs'd; or (which perhaps is the true as well as the more favoura- 
 ble Opinion) that they only talk a different Language, and that all of 
 them have die fame Criterion in reality, only they have exprefs'd it in 
 different Wotds. 
 
 And there will appear the more room for this Conjecture, if we 
 confider the Ideas themfelves about which Morality is chiefly conver- 
 fant, viz. that they are all mixed Modes, or compound Ideas arbitrarily 
 put together, hating at nrft no Archetype or Original exifting, and af- 
 terwards no other than that which exifts in other Mens Minds. 
 Now fince Men, unlefs they have thefe their compound Ideas, which 
 are fignify'd by the fame Name, made up precifely of the fame Am- 
 ple ones, mufl neceffarily talk a different Language j and fince this dif- 
 ference ic fo difficult, and in fome Cafes impofiible to be avoided, it 
 follows that greater Allowance and Indulgence ought to be given to 
 thefe Writers than any other: and that (if we have a mind to under- 
 stand them) we mould not always take their Words in the common 
 Acceptation, but in the Senfe in which we find that particular Au- 
 thor which we are reading ufed them. And if a Man interpret the 
 Writers of Morality with this due Candor, I believe tbeir feeming In- 
 confiftencies and Difagreements about the Criterion of Virtue, 
 would in a great meafure vanifh ; and he would find that aBing a- 
 greeably to Nature^ or Reafon, (when rightly understood) would per- 
 fectly coincide with the Fitnefs of things j the Fitnefs of things (as far 
 as thefe Words have any meaning) with Truth', Truth with the Com- 
 mon Good ; and the Common Good with the Will of God. 
 
 But whether this Difference be real, or only verbal, a Man can fcarce 
 avoid obferving from it, that Mankind have the Ideas of moil par- 
 4 ticular Virtues, and alfo a confufed Notion of Virtue in general, be- 
 fore they have any Notion of the Criterion of it, or ever did, neither 
 perhaps can they, deduce all or any of thofe Virtues from their Idea 
 of Virtue in general, or upon any rational Grounds fhew how thole 
 .ions fwhich the World call Moral, and moft, if not all Men evi- 
 dently have Ideas of) are diftinguifh'd from other Actions, or why 
 they approve of thofe Actions call'd Moral ones, more than o- 
 
 ther 
 
 But
 
 Preliminary THjfcrtation. 
 
 xiii. 
 
 But fince the Idea of Virtue among all Men (however they differ 
 in other refpects) includes either tacitly or exprefly, not only the Idea 
 of Approbation as the Confequence of it j but alfo that it is to every 
 one, and in all Circumflances, an Object of Choice ; it is incumbent 
 on all Writers of Morality, to (hew that that in which they place 
 Virtue, whatever it be, not only always will or ought to meet with 
 Approbation, but alfo that it is always an Object of Choice j which 
 is the other great Difpute among Moralifts, viz. What is the 
 Principle or Motive by which Men are induced to purfue Vir- 
 tue. 
 
 For fome have imagin'd that that is the only Object of Choice 
 to a rational Creature, which upon the whole will produce more 
 Happinefs than Mifery to the Choofer ; and that Men are and ought 
 to be guided wholly by this Principle ; and farther, that Virtue will 
 produce more Happinefs than Mifery, and therefore is always an 
 Object of Choice : and whatever is an Object of Choice, that we ap- 
 prove of. 
 
 But this, however true in Theory, is infufficient to account for 
 Matter of Fact, i. e. that the generality of Mankind do approve of 
 Virtue, or rather virtuous Actions, without being able to give any 
 Reafon for their Approbation; and alfo, that fome purfue it with- 
 out knowing that it tends to their own private Happinefs ; nay even 
 when it appears to be inconfiflent with and deftructive of their Hap- 
 pinefs. 
 
 And that this is matter of Fact, the ingenious Author of the En- *v 
 quiry into the Original of our Idea of Virtue has fo evidently made 
 appear by a great Variety of Inftances, that a Man muft be either 
 very little acquainted with the World, or a mere Hobbifi in his Teiri- 
 per to deny it. 
 
 And therefore to folve thefe two Difficulties, this excellent Au- 
 thor has fuppofed (without proving^ unlefs by mewing the ineffici- 
 ency of all other Schemes) a Moral Senfe to account for the for- 
 mer, and a public or benevolent Aff'eclion for the latter: And thefe, 
 <uiz. the Moral Senfe and Public Affection, he fuppofes to be im- 
 planted in us like InfincJs, independent of Rea/on, and previous to 
 
 any
 
 xiv. Trclimtnary Dijjcrtation. , iY 
 
 any Inftruclion; and therefore his Opinion is, that no account can 
 be given, or ought to be expected of them, any more than we 
 pretend to account for the Pleafure or Pain which arifes from 
 Seniation ; i. e. Why any particular Motion produced in our Bo- 
 dies mould be accompany'd with Pain rather than Pleafure, and vi- 
 ce verfa. 
 
 But this Account feems ftill infufficient, rather cutting the Knot 
 than untying it, and if it is not a-kin to the Doctrine of Innate Ideas, 
 yet I think it relifhes too much of that of Ocult Qualities. This in- 
 genious Author is certainly right in his Obfervations upon the Inef- 
 ficiency of the common Methods of accounting for both our EkStion 
 and Approbation of Moral Actions, and rightly infers the Neceflity of 
 fuppofing a Moral Senfe (i. e. a Power or Faculty whereby we may 
 perceive any Action to be an Object of Approbation, and the Agent of 
 Love) and public Affections, to account for the principal Actions of 
 human Life. But then by calling thefe Injlincls, I think he flops too 
 foon, imagining himfelf at the Fountain-head, when he might have 
 traced them much higher, even to the true Principle of all our Ac- 
 tions, our own Happine/s. 
 
 And this will appear by mewing, that our Approbation of Mo- 
 rality, and all Affections whatfoever, are finally refolvable into Rea- 
 fon y pointing out private Happinejs y and are converfant only about 
 things apprehended to be means tending to this end; and that when- 
 ever this end is not perceiv'd, they are to be accounted for from 
 the Ajjbciation of Ideas^ 4nd may properly enough be call'd Habits. 
 
 For if this is clearly made out, the Neceflity of fuppofing a Mo- 
 . ral Senfe, or public Affections to be implanted in us, iince it arifeth 
 only from the Infuificiency of all other Schemes to account for hu- 
 man Actions, will immediately vanifh. But whether it be made out 
 or no, we may obferve in general, that all Arguments ad Ignoran- 
 tiam y or that proceed a Remotione only (as this, by which the Moral 
 Senfe and public Affections are eftablifh'd to be Inftincts, evidently 
 does) are fcarce ever perfectly fatisfactory, being for the moft part 
 fubject to this Doubt, viz. Whether there is a full Enumeration of 
 all the Parts j and liable alfo to this Objection, viz. That tho' lean- 
 not
 
 'Preliminary Qiffertation* 
 
 not account for Phenomena otherwife, yet poffibly they may be-o- 
 therwife accounted for. 
 
 But before we can determine this Point, it will be neceflary to 
 fettle all the Terms : We fhall in the firft place therefore enquire 
 
 what is meant by the Criterion of Virtue. 
 
 . 
 
 
 __ . 
 
 
 tO \{3lHa:yl 
 
 
 S E C T. I. 
 
 Concerning the Criterion of Virtue 
 
 
 
 ' 1 x H E Criterion of any rhing is a Rule or Meafure by a Con- 
 L formity with which any thing is known to be of this or that 
 fort, or of this or that degree. And in order to determine the Cri- 
 terion of any thing, we muft firft know the thing whofe Criterion 
 we are feeking after. For a Meafure prefuppofes the Idea of the 
 thing to be meafured, otherwife it could not be known (fince what 
 is the proper Meafure of one thing is not fo of another) whether it 
 was fit to meafure it or no. Liquids, Cloth, and Flefh, have all 
 different Meafures ; Gold and Silver different Touchftones. This is 
 very intelligible, and the Method of doing it generally clear, when 
 either the Quantity or Kind of any particular Subftance is thus to be 
 afcertain'd. 
 
 But when we extend our Enquiries after a Criterion for abftracT:, 
 mix'd Modes, which have no Exiftence but in our Minds, and are 
 fo very different in different Men ; we are apt to be confounded, 
 and fearch after a Meafure for we know not what. For unlefs we 
 
 are 
 
 XV.
 
 mi. Trcliminary 'Differ tat ion. 
 
 are firfl agreed concerning the thing to be meafur'd, we fhall in vain 
 expect to agree in our Criterion ot it, or even to underftand one a- 
 nother. 
 
 But it may be faid, if we are exactly agreed in any mix'd Mode, 
 what need of any Criterion, or what can we want farther ? What 
 we want farther, and what we mean by the Criterion of it is this j 
 viz. to know whether any inferior or particular thing do belong to 
 this mix'd Mode or no. And this is a very proper Enquiry. For 
 let a Man learn the Idea of Intemperance from you never fo clear- 
 ly, and if you pleafe let this be the Idea, viz. the Eating or Drink- 
 ing to that degree as to injure his Understanding or Health ; and let 
 him alfo be never fo much convine'd of the Obligation to avoid it ; 
 yet it is a very pertinent Queftion in him to afk you, How fhall I 
 know when I am guilty of Intemperance ? 
 
 And if we examine this thoroughly, we fhall find that every little 
 difference in the Definition of a mix'd Mode will require a diffe- 
 rent Criterion, e. g. If Murder is defined the wilful taking away 
 the Life of another, it is evident, that to enquire after the Criteri- 
 on of Murder, is to enquire how we fhall know when the Life of 
 another is taken away wilfully ; i. e. when one who takes away the Life 
 of another does it with that malicious Defign which is implied by 
 Wilfulnefs. But if Murder be defined the Guilty taking away the 
 Life of another, then to enquire after the Criterion of Murdet, is to 
 enquire how it fhall be known when Guilt is contracted in the ta- 
 king away the Life of another. So that the Criterion of Murder, 
 according to one or other of thefe Definitions, will be different. 
 For Wilfulnefs perhaps will be made the Criterion of Guilt, but 
 Wilfulnefs itfelf, if it want any, muff have fome farther Crite- 
 rion, it being evident that nothing can be the Meafure of it- 
 felf. 
 
 If the Criterion is contained in the Idea itfelf, then it is merely 
 nominal , e. g. If Virtue is defined, The acting agreeably to the 
 Will of God : To fay the Will of God is the Criterion of Virtue, 
 is only to fay, what is agreeable to the Will of God is call'd Vir- 
 tue. But the real Criterion, which is of fome ufe, is this, How fhall 
 I know what the Will of God is in this refpect ? 
 
 From
 
 'Preliminary 7)iJfertation xvii. 
 
 From hence it is evident, that the Criterion of a mix'd Mode is 
 neither the Definition of it> nor contain'd in it. For, as has been 
 fhewn, the general Idea is necerTarily to be fix'd ; and if tr.e Par- 
 ticulars comprehended under it are fix'd or known alfo, there re- 
 mains nothing to be meafured, becaufe we meafure only things un- 
 known. The general Idea then being fix'd, the Criterion which is 
 to meafure or determine Inferiors, mull: be found out and proved 
 to be a proper Rule or Meafure, by comparing it with the gene- 
 ral Idea only, independent of the inferior things to which it is to 
 be apply'd. For the truth of the Meafure muft be proved inde- 
 pendently of the Particular to be meafured, otherwife we mail prove 
 in a Circle. 
 
 To apply what has been faid in general to the Cafe in hand. 
 Great Enquiry is made after the Criterion of Virtue ; but it is to 
 be fear'd that few know diftinctly what it is they are enquiring 
 after ; and therefore this muft be clearly ftated. And in Order to 
 this, we muft (as has been (hewn) firft fix our Idea of Virtue, and 
 that exactly; and then our Enquiry will be, how we fhall know 
 this or that lefs general or particular Action to be comprehended under 
 Virtue. For unlefs our Idea of Virtue is fix'd, we enquire after the 
 Criterion of we know not what. And this our Idea of Virtue, to give 
 any Satisfaction, ought to be fo general as to be conformable to that 
 which all or moft Men are fuppofed to have. And this general I- 
 dea, I think, may be thus exprefs'd. 
 
 Virtue is the Conformity to a Rule of Life, directing the ABions of 
 all rational Creatures with refpett to each other's Happinefs ; to which 
 Conformily every one in all Cafes is obliged: and every one that does fo 
 conform, is or ought to be approved of- ejlee?ned and loved for fo doing. 
 What is here exprefs'd, I believe every one, or moft, put into their 
 Idea of Virtue. 
 
 For Virtue, among all, or moft, does imply fome relation to others : 
 where Self is Only concern'd, a Man may be prudent but not virtuous; 
 and an Action which relates immediately to God, is ftiled Religi- 
 ous. 
 
 I think alfo that all Men, whatever they make Virtue to confift in, 
 yet always make it to imply Obligation and Approbation. 
 
 c The
 
 xviii. Preliminary %)if[ertation. 
 
 The Idea of Virtue being thus fix'd, to enquire after the Criterion 
 of it, is to enquire what that Rule of Life is to which we are obligd 
 to conform or how that Rule is to be found out which is to direct 
 me in my Behaviour towards others, which ought always to be pur- 
 fucd, and which, if purfued, will or ought to procure me Appro- 
 bation, Efteem, and Love. 
 
 But before I can anfwer this Enquiry, I muft firft fee what I mean 
 by Obligation. 
 
 . 
 
 S E C T. II. 
 
 Concerning Obligation. 
 
 ligation is the necefjity of doing or omitting any ABion in order to 
 'be happy : L e. when there is fuch a relation between an Agent 
 and any Action that the Agent cannot be happy without doing or o- 
 mitting that Action, then the Agent is fa id to be obliged to do or o- 
 mit that Action. So that Obligation is evidently founded upon the 
 profpect of Happinefs, and arifes from that neceflary Influence which 
 any Action has upon prefent or future Happinefs or Mifery. And no 
 greater Obligation can be fuppofed to be laid upon any free Agent 
 without an exprefs Contradiction. / 
 
 This Obligation may be confider'd four ways, according to the four 
 different manners in^which it is induced : Firft, that Obligation which 
 arifeth from perceiving the natural Confequences of things, i. e. the 
 Confequences of things acting according to the fix'd Laws of Nature, 
 may be call'd Natural. Secondly, that arifing from Merit or Deme- 
 rit, as producing the Efteem and Favour of our Fellow-Creatures ) 
 or the contrary, is ufually ftiled virtuous. Thirdly, that arifing from 
 the Authority of the Civil Magiftrate, Civil. Fourthly, that from the 
 Authority of God, Religious. 
 
 Now
 
 Treliminary Differtation. xix. 
 
 Now from the Confederation of thefe four forts of Obligation 
 (which are the only ones) it is evident that a full and complete Obli- 
 gation which will extend to all Cafes, can only be that arifing from 
 the Authority of God-, becaufe God only can in all Cafes make a Man 
 happy or miferable : and therefore, fince we are always obliged to 
 that conformity call'd Virtue, it is evident that the immediate Rule or 
 Criterion of it is the Will of God. But is the whole Will of God the 
 Criterion of Virtue ? No. For tho' the whole Will of God is equal- 
 ly obligatory; yet, fince Virtue was defined to be the conformity to 
 a Rule directing my Behaviour with refpect to my Fellow-Creatures, 
 the Will of God can be no farther concern'd about Virtue, than as it 
 directs me in that Behaviour. 
 
 The next Enquiry therefore is, what that Will of God in this par- 
 ticular is, or what it directs me to do ? 
 
 Now it is evident from the Nature of God, viz. his being infinite- 
 ly happy in himfelf from all Eternity, and from his Goodnefs mani- 
 fefted in his Works, that he could have no other Defign in creating 
 Mankind than their Happinefs; and therefore he wills their Happi- 
 nefs ; therefore the means of their Happinefs : therefore that my Be- 
 haviour, as far as it may be a means of the Happinefs of Mankind, 
 fhould be fuch. Here then we are got one Step farther, or to a new 
 Criterion: not to a new Criterion of Virtue immediately, but to a 
 Criterion of the Will of Gcd. For it is an Anfwer to the Enquiry, 
 How fhall I know what the Will of God in this particular is? Thus 
 the Will of God is the immediate Criterion of Virtue, and the Hap- 
 pinefs of Mankind the Criterion of the Will of God ; and therefore 
 the Happinefs of Mankind may be (aid to be the Criterion of Virtue, 
 but once removed. 
 
 And fince I am to do whatever lies in my Power towards promot- 
 ing the Happinefs of Mankind, the next Enquiry is, what is the Cri- 
 terion of this Happinefs: i.e. how fhall 1 know what in my Power 
 is, or is not, for the Happinefs of Mankind ? 
 
 Now this is to be known only from the Relations of things, (which 
 Relations, with refpect to our prefent Enquiry, fome have call'd their 
 Fitnefs and Unfitnefs.) For lome Things and Actions are apt to pro- 
 duce Pleafure, others Pain; fome are convenient, others inconvenient 
 
 
 c 2 for
 
 i 
 
 xx. Preliminary c Differtation. 
 
 for ft Society ; .fome are for the good of Mankind, others tend to the- 
 detriment of it : therefore thofe are to be chofen which tend to the 
 good of Mankind ; the others to be avoided. 
 
 Thus then we are got one ftep farther, viz. to the Criterion of the 
 Happinefs of Mankind. And from this Criterion we deduce all parti- 
 cular Virtues and Vices. 
 
 The next Enquiry is, How fhall I know that there is this Fitnefs 
 and Unfitnefs in things ? or if there be, how fhall I difcover it in par- 
 ticular Cafes ? And the Anfwer is, Either from Experience or Reafon. 
 You either perceive the Incnveniencies of fome Things and Actions 
 when they happen j or you forefee them by contemplating the Nature 
 of the Things and Actions. 
 
 Thus the Criterion of the Fitnefs or Unfitnefs of things may in general', 
 be faid to be Reafon : which Reafon, when exactly conformable to the 
 things exifting, /'. e. when it judges of things as they are, is called 
 Right Reafon. And hence alfo we fometimes talk of the Reafon of 
 things, i. e. properly fpcaking, that Relation which we mould find out 
 by our Reafon, if our Reafon was right. 
 
 The expremng by outward Signs the Relations of things as they 
 really are, is called Truth; and hence, by the fame kind of Meta- 
 phor, we are apt to talk of the Truth, as well as Reafon of things. 
 Both Expreffions mean the fame : which has often made me wonder 
 why fome Men who cry up Reafon as the Criterion of Virtue, 
 fhould yet diflike Mr. Wollajion's Notion of Truth being its Crite- 
 rion. 
 
 The Truth is, all thefe juft mention'd, viz. the Happinefs of Man- 
 kind ; the Relations, or Fitnefs and Unfitnefs of things ; Reafon and 
 Truth ; may in fome fenfe be faid to be Criterions of Virtue ; but 
 it mutt always be remember'd that they are only remote Criterions of 
 it, being gradually fubordinate to its immediate Criterion, the Will 
 of God. 
 
 And from hence we may perceive the Reafon of what I fuggefted 
 in the beginning of this Treatife, viz. That the Difpute betw een 
 Moralifts about the Criterion of Virtue, is more in Words than Mean- 
 ing ; and that this Difference between them has been occafion'd by 
 their dropping the immediate, Criterion, and choofing fome a more. 
 
 remote,
 
 'Preliminary Differtation. xxi. 
 
 remote, fome a lefs remote one. And from hence we may fee alfo 
 the Inconvenience of defining any mix'd Mode by its Criterion. For 
 that in a great meafure has occafion'd all this Confufion, as may ea- 
 fily he mads appear in all the pretended Criterions of Virtue aboye- 
 mention'd. 
 
 Thus thofe who either exprefly exclude, or don't mention the Will 
 of God, making the immediate Criterion of Virtue to be the Good 
 of Mankind; mult either allow that Virtue is not in all Cafes obliga- 
 tory (contrary to the Idea which all or moft Men have of it) or they 
 mull fay that the Good of Mankind is a fufficient Obligation. But 
 how can the Good of Mankind be any Obligation to me, when per- 
 haps in particular Cafes, fuch as laying down my Life, or the like, it 
 is contrary to my Happinefs. 
 
 Thofe who drop the Happinefs of Mankind, and talk of Relations, 
 the Fitnefs and Unfitnefs of Things, are flill more remote from the 
 true Criterion. For Fitnefs without relation to fome Efid, is fcarce 
 intelligible. 
 
 Reafon and Truth comc 1 pretty near the Relations of things, be- 
 caufe they manifeftly prefuppofe them ; but are ftill one ftep farther, 
 from the immediate Criterion of Virtue. 
 
 What has been faid concerning the Criterion of Virtue as inclu- 
 ding our Obligation to it, may perhaps be allow'd to be true, but 
 ftill it will be Org'd, that 'tis infufficient to account for matter of 
 Fact, viz. that molt. Perfons, who are either ignorant of, or never 
 conlider'd thefe Deductions, do however purfue Virtue themfelves, 
 and approve of it in others. I fliall in the next place therefore give 
 fome account of our Approbations and Affections. 
 
 SECT.
 
 xxii. Preliminary Dijfertation. 
 
 aoqu^i 
 
 ' " 
 
 j 
 
 rt ti p rp TTf 
 
 O Ca \j 1 111. 
 
 Concerning Approbation and Affe&ion. 
 
 MAN is not only a fenfible Creature, not only capable of Plea- 
 fure and Pain, but capable alfo of forefeeing the Pleafure and 
 Pain in the future confequences of Things and Aclions; and as he 
 is capable of knowing, fo alfo of governing or directing the Caufes 
 of them, and thereby in a great meafure enabled to avoid the one 
 and procure the other: whence the Principle of all Action. And 
 therefore, as Pleafure and Pain are not indifferent to him, nor out 
 of his Power, he purfues the former and avoids the latter ; and there- 
 fore alfo thofe things which are Caufes of them are not indifferent, 
 but he purfues or avoids them alfo, according to their different 
 Tendency. That which he purfues for its own fake, which is on- 
 ly Pleafure, is called an End ; that which he apprehends to be apt to 
 produce Pleafure, he calls Good, and approves of, i. e. judges a pro- 
 per means to attain his end, and therefore looks upon it as an Ob- 
 ject of choice j that which is pregnant with Mifery he difapproves of 
 and ftiles Evil. And this Good and Evil are not only barely approved 
 of, or the contrary, but whenever view'd in Imagination (fince Mancon- 
 fiders himfelf as exiffing hereafter, and is concern'd for his Welfare 
 then as well as now) they have a prefent Pleafure or Pain annex'd to 
 ihem, proportionable to what is apprehended to follow them in real 
 Exiflence j which Pleafure or Pain arifing from the profpect of future 
 
 Pleaiure
 
 Preliminary Diffcrtation. 
 
 Pleafure or Pain is properly call'd Paffon, and the Defire confequen t 
 thereupon, AffeSlion. *, 
 
 And as by reflecting upon Pleafure there arifes in our minds a De- 
 fire of it ; and on Pain, an Averjion from it (which necefTarily follows 
 from fuppofing us to be fenfible Creatures, and is no more than fay- 
 ing, that all things are not indifferent to us) fo alfo by reflecting up- 
 on Good or Evil, the fame Defires and Averfions are excited, and are 
 diftinguifh'd into Love and Hatred. And from Love and Hatred va- 
 rioufly modify 'd, arife all thofe other Defires and Averfions which are 
 promifcuoufly {tiled Paffions or Affections j and are generally thought 
 to be implanted in our Nature originally, like the Power of receiving 
 Pleafure or Pain. And when placed on inanimate Objects, are thefe 
 following, Hope, Fear, Defpair and its oppofite, for which we want 
 a Name. 
 
 
 
 
 S E C T. IV. 
 
 Approbation and Affeffion confided d with regard 
 to Merit, or the Law of Efteem. 
 
 IF a Man in the purfuit of Pleafure or Happinefs (by which is meant 
 the Sum total of Pleafure) had to do only with inanimate Crea- 
 tures, his Approbation and Affections would be as defcribed in the 
 foregoing Section. But, fince he is dependent with refpect to his 
 Happinefs, not only on thefc, but alfo on rational Agents, Creatures 
 like himfelf, which have the Power of governing or directing Good 
 
 and
 
 Preliminary 7)ijfertation. 
 
 and Evil, and of acting for an End $ there will arife different means 
 of Happinefs, and confequently different Purfuits, tho' tending to the 
 fame End, Happinefs; and therefore different Approbations and Af- 
 fections, and the contrary ; which deferve particularly to be con- 
 fider'd. 
 
 That there w ill arife different means of Happinefs, is evident from 
 hence, viz. that Rational Agents, in being fubfervient to our Happi- 
 nefs, are not paffive but voluntary. And therefore fince we are in 
 purfuic of that to obtain which we apprehend the concurrence of 
 their Wills neceffary, we cannot but approve of whatever is apt to 
 procure this Concurrence. And that can be only the Pleafure or 
 Pain expected from it by them. And therefore, as I perceive that 
 my Happinefs is dependent on others, I cannot but judge whatever I 
 apprehend to be proper to excite them to endeavour to promote my 
 Happinefs, to be a means of Happinefs: i. e. I cannot but approve it. 
 And fince the annexing Pleafure to their Endeavours to promote my 
 Happinefs is the only thing in my power to this end, I cannot but 
 -approve of the annexing Pleafure to fuch Actions of theirs as are un- 
 dertaken upon my account. Hence to approve of a Rational Agent 
 as a means of Happinefs, is different from the Approbation of any o- 
 ther means, becaufe it implies an Approbation alfo of an Endeavour 
 to promote the Happinefs of that Agent, in order to excite him and 
 others to the fame concern for my Happinefs for the future. 
 
 And becaufe what we approve of we alfo defire (as has been fhewn 
 above) hence alfo we defire the Happinefs of any Agent that has done 
 us good. And therefore Love or Hatred, when placed on a rational 
 Object, has this difference from the Love or Hatred of other things, 
 that it implies a defire of, and confequently a pleafure in the Happi- 
 nefs of the Object beloved ; or, if hated, the contrary. 
 
 The Foundation of this Approbation and Love (which, as we have 
 feen, confifls in his voluntarily contributing to our Happinefs) is cal- 
 led the Merit of the Agent fo contributing, i. e. that whereby he is 
 entitled (upon fuppofition that we act like rational, fociable Crea- 
 tures, like Creatures whofe Happinefs is dependent on each other's 
 Behaviour) to our Approbation and Love: Demerit the contrary. 
 
 And
 
 Preliminary < Differtation. xxv- 
 
 And this Affection or Quality of any Action which we call Merit is 
 very coniiftent with a Man's acting ultimately for his own private 
 Happinefs. For any particular Action that is undertaken for tie fake 
 of another, is meritorious, i. e. defer ves Efteem, Favour, and Appro- 
 bation from him for whofe fake it was undertaken, towards the 
 Doer of it. For the prefumption of fuch Efteem, &c. was the only 
 Motive to that Action ; and if fuch Efteem, &c. does not follow, or 
 is prefum'd not to follow it, fuch a Perfon is reckon'd unworthy of 
 any favour, becaufe he {hews by his Actions that he is incapable of 
 being obliged by Favours. 
 
 The Miftake which fome have run into, viz. that Merit is incon- 
 fiftent with acting upon private Happinefs, as an ultimate End, feems 
 to have arifen from hence, viz. that they have not carefully enough 
 diftinguiih'd between an inferior and ultimate End 3 the end of a par- 
 ticular Action, and the end of Action in general : which may be ex- 
 plained thus. Tho' Happinefs, private Happinefs, is the proper or 
 ultimate End of all our Actions whatever, yet that particular means 
 of Happinefs which any particular Attion is chiefly adapted to pro- 
 cure, or the thing chiefly aim'd at by that Action j the thing which, 
 if poflefs'd, we would not undertake that Action, may and generally 
 is call'd the End of that Action. As therefore Happinefs is the ge- 
 neral End of all Actions, fo each particular Action may be faid to 
 have its proper and peculiar End: Thus the End of a Beau is to 
 pleafe by his Drefs; the End of Study, Knowledge. But neither 
 pleafing by Drefs, nor Knowledge, are ultimate Ends, they ftill tend 
 or ought to tend to fomething farther ; as is evident from hence, viz. 
 that a Man may afk and expect a Reafon why either of them are 
 purfued : Now to afk the Reafon of any Action or Purfuit, is only 
 to enquire into the End of it : But to expect a Reafon, i. e. an End 
 to be alTign'd for an ultimate End, is abfurd. To afk why I purfue 
 Happinefs, will admit of no other Anfwer than an Explanation of 
 the Terms. 
 
 Why inferior Ends, which in reality are only Means, are too often 
 look'd upon and acquiefc'd in as ultimate, fliall be accounted for 
 hereafter. 
 
 d Whenever
 
 vi. Preliminary Diffcrtatian. 
 
 Whenever therefore the particular End of any Action is the Hap- 
 pinefs of another (tho' the Agent defign'd thereby to procure to him- 
 felf Efteem and Favour, ar.d lcok'd upon that Efkem and Favour 
 as a means of private Happincfs) that Aciion is meritorious. And 
 the fame may be faid, tho' we defign to pleafe God by endeavouring 
 to promote the Happinefs of others. But when an Agent has a view 
 in any particular Aciion diftincl from my Happinefs, and that view 
 is bis only Motive to that Aciion, tho' that Adtion promote my Hap- 
 pinefs to never fo great -a Degree yet that Agent acquires no Me- 
 rit ; /. e. he is not thereby entitled' to any Favour and Efteem: Be- 
 c.aufe Favour and Eileem are due from me for any Aciion, no far- 
 ther than that Aciion was undertaken upon my account. If there- 
 fore my Happinefs is only the pretended End of that Aciion, I am 
 impofed on if I believe it real, and thereby think myfelf indebted 
 to the Agent; and amdifcharg'd from any Obligation asfoon as I finch 
 out the Cheat. 
 
 But it is far otherwife when my Happinefs is the fole End of that 
 particular Aciion, i.e. (as I have explain'd myfelf above) when the 
 Agent endeavours to promote my Happinefs as a Means to procure 
 my Favour, i. e. to make me fubfervient to his Happinefs as his ul-- 
 timate End: Tho' I know he aims at my Happinefs only, as a means 
 of his own, yet this lefTens not the Obligation. 
 
 There is one thing, I confefs, which makes a great alteration in 
 this Cafe, and that is, whether he aims at my Favour in general^ 
 ox only for fome particular End. Becaufe, if he aim at my Hap- 
 pinefs only to ferve himfelf in fome particular thing, the Value of 
 my Favour will perhaps end with his obtaining that particular 
 thing : And therefore I am under lefs Obligation (ceteris paribus). 
 the more particular his Expectations from me are; but under Obli- 
 gation I am. 
 
 Now from tiie various Combinations of this which we call Me- 
 rit, and its contrary, arife. all thofe various Approbations and A- 
 verfions ; all thofe Likings and Diilikings which we call. Mo- 
 ral 
 
 As therefore, from confidering thofe Beings which are the in- 
 voluntary means of our Happinefs or Mifery, there were produced 
 
 in
 
 
 * 
 
 Preliminary Differtation. xxvii 
 
 in ns the Pamons or Affections of Love, Hatred, Hope, Fear, De- 
 fpair, and its contrary: So from confidering thofe Beings which 
 voluntarily contribute to our Happinefs or Mifery, there arife thefe 
 following. Love and Hatred, (which are different from that Love 
 or Hatred placed on involuntary Beings; that placed on involuntary 
 Beings being only a Defire to poffefs or avoid the thing beloved or 
 hated ; but this on voluntary Agents being a Defire to give Pleafure 
 or Pain to the Agent beloved or hated) Gratitude, Anger, (fome- 
 times call'd by one common Name, Refentment) Generofity, Am- 
 bition, Honour, Shame, Envy, Benevolence : and if there be any o- 
 ther, they're only, as thefe are, different Modifications of Love and 
 Hatred. 
 
 Love and Hatred, and the Foundation of them, (viz. the Agent 
 beloved or hated being apprehended to be inftrumental to our Hap- 
 pinefs) I have explain'd above. Gratitude is that Defire of promot- 
 ing the Happinefs of another upon account of fome former Kindnefs 
 receiv'd. Anger, that Defire of thwarting the Happinefs of ano- 
 ther, on account of fome former Difkindnefs or Injury recei- 
 ved. And both thefe take place, tho' we hope for, or fear no- 
 thing farther from the Objects of either of them,, and this is 
 ft ill confident with acting upon a Principle *rf private Happi- 
 nefs. 
 
 For tho' we neither hope for, nor fear any thing farther froth 
 thefe particular Beings ; yet the Difpofition fhewn upon thefj Oc- 
 cafions is apprehended to influence the Behaviour of other Beings 
 towards us; /. e. other Beings will be moved to promote our Hap- 
 pinefs or otherwife, as they obferve how we refent Favours or In- : 
 juries. 
 
 Ambition is a Defire of being efteem'd. Hence a Defire of being 
 thought an Object of Efleem ; hence of being an Object of Efleem, 
 hence of doing laudable, i. e. ufeful Actions. Generofity and Benevo- ; 
 lence are Species of it. Ambition in too great a Degree is called 
 Pr'ulc, of which there are feveral Species. The Title to the Efleem 
 of others, which arifeth from any meritorious Action, is called Hq- 
 tiour. The Pleafure arifing from Honour being paid to us, /'. e. from 
 others acknowledging that we are entitled to their Efleem, is with* 
 
 d 2 ouc
 
 xxviiL 'Preliminary Differtation. 
 
 out a Name. Modcfty is the fear of lofing Efteem. The Uneafinefs 
 or PatTion which arilcth from a Senfe that we have loft it, is called 
 Shame. So that Ambition, and all thofe other Paflions and Affec- 
 tions belonging to it, together with Shame, arife from the Efteem 
 of others: which is the Reafon why this Tribe of Affections ope- 
 rate more ftrongly on us than any other, viz. becaufe we perceive 
 that as onr Happinefs is dependent on the Behaviour of others, fo 
 we perceive alio that that Behaviour is dependent on- the Efteem 
 which others have conceiv'd of us; and confequently that our acqui- 
 ring or lofing Efteem, is in effect acquiring or lofing Happinefs, and 
 in the higheft Degree. And the fame may be faid concerning all our 
 other A flections and Paflions, to enumerate which, what for want of 
 Names to them, and what by the confufion of Language about them, 
 is almoft impoflible. 
 
 Envy will be accounted for hereafter, for a Reafon which will then 
 be obvious. 
 
 Thus having explain'd what I mean by Obligation and Approba- 
 tion ; and fhewn- that- they are founded on and terminate in Happi- 
 nefs: having alfo pointed, out the. Difference between our Approba- 
 tions and Affections as placed on involuntary and voluntary Means- 
 of Happinefs; and- farther, that thefe Approbations and Affections. 
 are not innate or implanted in us by way of InJiineJ, but are all ac- 
 quired^ being fairly deducible from fuppofing- only fenfible and ra- 
 tional Creatures dependent on each other for their Happinefs, as ex- 
 plain'd above : I fhall in the next place endeavour to anfwer a grand 
 Objection to what has here been faid concerning Approbations and; 
 Affections arifing from a profpect of private Happinefs. 
 
 The Objection is this. 
 
 The Reafon or End of every Action is always known to the A- 
 gent ; for nothing can move a Man but what is perceiv'd : but the 
 generality of Mankind love and hate, approve and difapprove, im- 
 mediately, as foon as any moral Character either occurs in Life, or 
 is propofed to them, without confidering whether their private Hap- 
 pinefs-
 
 Preliminary Differtation. xxix. 
 
 pinefs is affected with it, or no: or if they do confider anv Moral 
 Character in relation to their own Happinefs, and rind themfelves, as 
 to their private Happinefs, unconcern'd in it, or even find their pri- 
 vate Happinefs leifen'd by it in fome particular Inflance, yet they 
 ftill approve the Moral Character, and love the Agent ; nay they 
 cannot do otherwife. Whatever Reafon may be affgn'd by fpecu- 
 lative Men why we mould be grateful to a Benefactor, or pity the 
 Diitrened \ yet if the grateful or companionate Mind never thought 
 of that Reafon, it is no Reafon to him. The Enquiry is not why 
 he ought to be grateful, but why he is fo. Thefe after-reafons there - 
 fore rather mew the Wifdom and Providence of our Maker in im- 
 planting the immediate Powers of thefe Approbations (i. e. in Mr. 
 Hiitcbejbn's Language, a Moral Senfe) and thefe Public Affections in 
 us, than give any fatisfactory account of their Origin. And there- 
 fore thefe Public Affections, and this Moral Senfe, are quite inde- 
 pendent on private Happinefs, and in reality act upon us as mere 
 Inftincts. 
 
 Anfwer. 
 
 The Matter of Fact contain'd in this Argument, in my Opinion, is 
 not to be contefted j and therefore it remains either that we make 
 the matter of Fact confident with what we have before laid down, 
 or give up the Caufe. 
 
 Now, in order to fhew this Confiftency, I beg leave to obferve, 
 that as in the purfuit of Truth we don't always trace every Propo- 
 rtion whofe Truth we are examining, to a firft Principle or Axiom, 
 but acquiefce, as foon as we perceive it deducible from fome known 
 or prefumed Truth j fo in our Conduct we do not always travel to 
 the ultimate End of our Actions, Happinefs : but reft contented, as 
 foon as we perceive any Action fubfervient to a known or prefumed 
 Means of Happinefs. And thefe prefumed Truths and Means of 
 Happinefs, whether real or otherwife, always influence us after the 
 fame manner as if they were real. The undeniable Confequences of 
 Prejudges are as firmly adhered to as the Confequences of real truths 
 
 or
 
 jgS. Trcliminary Differ I at ion. 
 
 or arguments; and what is fubferv'ent to a falfe (but imagin'd) 
 means of Happinefs, is as induftrioufly purfued as what is fubfervient 
 to a true one. 
 
 Now every Man, both in his Purfuit after Truth, and in his Con- 
 duit, has fettled and fixed a great many of thefe in his Mind, which 
 he always acts upon, as upon Principles, without examining. And 
 this is occaiion'd by the Narrownefs of our Understandings : We can 
 confider but a few things at once; and therefore, to run every thing 
 to the Fountain-head would be tedious, thro' a long Series of Con- 
 fequences. To avoid this we choofe out certain Truths and means 
 of Happinefs, which we look upon as RESTING PLACES, which 
 . we may fafeiy acquiefce in, in the Conduct both of our Underftan- 
 ding and Practice, in relation to the one, regarding them as Axi- 
 oms ; in the other, as Ends. And we are more eafily inclined to 
 this by imagining that we may fafeiy rely upon what we call Ha- 
 bitual Knowledge, thinking it needlefs to examine what we are al- 
 ready fatisfy'd in. And hence it is that Prejudices, both Speculative 
 and Practical, are difficult to be rooted out, viz. few will examine 
 them. 
 
 And thefe RE ST I NO PLACES are fo often ufed as 
 Principles, that at laft, letting that flip out of our Minds which 
 firft inclined us to embrace them, we are apt to imagine them, 
 not as they really are, the Subjlitutes of Principles, but Principles 
 themfelves. 
 
 And from hence, as fome Men have imagin'd Innate Ideas, becaufe 
 forgetting how they came by them ; fo others have fet up almoft as 
 many diftintt. InfiinSls as there are acquired Principles of acting. And 
 I cannot but wonder why the Pecuniary Senfe, a Senfe of Power and 
 Partv. &c. were not mention'd, as well as the Moral, that of Ho- 
 ttour, Order, and fome others. 
 
 The Cafe is really this. We firft perceive or imagine fome real 
 Good, if. e. fitnefs to promote our Happinefs in thofe things which 
 we love and approve of. Hence (as was above explain'd) we annex 
 Pleafure to thofe things. Hence thofe things and Pleafure are fo 
 ty'd together and allociated in our Minds, that one cannot prefent 
 
 itfelf
 
 Treliminary c Dijfcrtation> 
 
 itfelf but the other will alio occur, And the AJJociation remains e- 
 ven afrer that which at firft gave them the Connection is q.:ite for- 
 got, or perhaps does not exilT, but the contrary. An Initarce or 
 two may perhaps make this clear. How many Men are there in the 
 World who have as ftrong a tafte for Money as others have for Vir- 
 tue; who count fo much Money, fo much Happinefs; nay, even 
 fell their Happinefs for Money ; o r , to fpeak more properly, make 
 the having Money, without any Deilgn or Thought of uiing it, 
 their ultimate End ? But was this Propen ty to Money born with 
 them ? Or rather, did not they at firft perceive a great many Ad- 
 vantages from being pouefs'd. of Money, and from thence conceive 
 a Plcafure in having it, thence deiire it, thence endeavour to ob- 
 tain it, thence receive an actual Pleafure in obtaining it, thence de- 
 fire to prefer ve the Poffefiion of it ? Hence, by dropping the inter- 
 mediate Means between Money and Happinefs, they join Money and 
 Happinefs immediately together, and content themfelves with the 
 phantafticaL Pleafure of having it, and make that which was at nrft 
 purfued only as a Means, be to them a real End, and what their real 
 Happinefs or Mifery confifts in. Thus the Connection between Mo- 
 ney and Happinefs remains in the Mind; tho' it has long fince ceafed 
 between the things themfelves. 
 
 The fame might be obferv'd concerning the Third after Know- 
 ledge, Fame, &c. the delight in Reading, Building, Planting, and 
 moil: of the various Exercifes and Entertainments of Life. Thefe 
 were at nrft. enter'd on with a view to fome farther End, but at 
 length become habitual Arnufements; the Idea of Pleafure is affo- 
 ciated with them, and leads us on ftill in the fame eager Purfuit of 
 them, when the nrft Reafon is quite vanifh'd, or at leaft out of our 
 Minds. Nay, we find this Power of Ajjbciotion fo great as not only 
 to tranfport our Paffions and Affections beyond their proper bounds, 
 both as to Intenfenefs and Duration; as is evident from daily In- 
 ftances of Avarice, Ambition, Love, Revenge, &c. but alfo, that it 
 is able to transfer them to improper Objects, and fuch as are of a 
 quite different Nature from thofe to which our Reafon had at firft 
 directed them. Thus being accuftom'd to refent an Injury done to 
 
 our 
 
 xxxi.
 
 
 ^xxli Preliminary 'Diffcrtqtion* 
 
 our Body by a Retaliation of the like to him that offer'd it, we nre 
 apt to conceive the fame kind of Refentment, and often exprefs it in 
 the fame manner, upon receiving hurt from a Stock or Stone, where- 
 by the hatred which we are ufed to place on voluntary Beings, is 
 fubftituted in the Room of that Averfion which belongs to involun- 
 tary ones. The like may be obferv'd in moll of the other Paflions a- 
 bove-mention'd. ^. 
 
 Fromlience alfo, viz. from the continuance of this AJfociation of 
 Ideas in our Minds, we may be enabled to account for that (almoft 
 diabolical) Paflion called Envy> which we promis'd to confider. 
 
 Mr. Locke obferves, and I believe very juftly, that there are fome 
 Men entirely unacquainted with this Paffion. For moil Men- 
 that are ufed to Reflection, may remember the very time when 
 they were firfl: under the dominion of it. 
 
 Envy is generally defined to be that Pain which arifes in the Mind 
 from obferving the Profperity of others ; not of all others indefinite- 
 ly, but only of fome particular Perfons. Now the examining who 
 thofe particular Perfons whom we are apt to envy are, will lead us 
 to the true Origin of this Paflion. And if a Man will be at the Pains 
 to confult his Mind, or to look into the World, he'll find that thefe 
 particular Perfons are always fuch as upon fome account or other he 
 has had a Rivaljhip with. For when two or more are Competitors 
 for the fame thing, the Succefs of the one muft neceffarily tend to 
 the Detriment of the other, or others : hence the Succefs of my Ri- .. 
 val and Mifery or Pain are joined together in my Mind j and this 
 connection or afibciation remaining in my Mind, even after the Ri- 
 vallhip ceafes, makes me always affected with Pain whenever I hear 
 of his Succefs, tho' in Affairs which have no manner of Relation to 
 the Rivalfhip, much more in thofe that bring that to my Remem- 
 brance, and put me in mind of what I might have enjoy'd had it 
 not been for him. This may poifibly caft fome Light upon the 
 black Defigns and envious Purpofes of the fallen Angels. For why 
 might not they have formerly had fome Competition with their 
 Fellows ? and why may not fuch Affociations be as flrong in them 
 as us ? 
 
 Thus 
 
 i
 
 Preliminary Dijfertation. 
 
 xxxm. 
 
 Thus alfo we are apt to envy thofe Perfons that refufe to be gui- 
 ded by our Judgments and perfuaded by us. For this is nothing elfe 
 than a Rivalfhip about the Superiority of Judgment ; and we take a 
 fecret Pride both to let the World fee, and in imagining ourfelves, 
 that we were in the right. 
 
 There is one thing more to be obferv'd in anfwer to this Objec- 
 tion, and that is, that we do not always (and perhaps not for the 
 moit part) make this Aflcciation ourfelves, but learn it from others: 
 i. e. that u e annex Pleafure or Pain to certain Things or Actions be- 
 caufe we fee others do it, and acquire Principles of Action by insta- 
 ting thofe whom we admire, or whofe Efteem we would procure : 
 Hence the Son too often inherits both the Vices and the Party of his 
 Father, as well as his Eftate : Hence National Virtues and Vices, 
 Difpofitions and Opinions : And from hence we may obferve how 
 eafy it is to account for what is generally call'd the Prejudice of E- 
 ducation j how foon we catch the Temper and Affections of thofe 
 whom we daily converfe with; how almoft infenfibly we are taugltf 
 to love admire or hate -, to be grateful, generous, companionate or 
 cruel, &c. 
 
 What I fay then in anfwer to the Objection is this : " That it is 
 " neceflary in order to folve the principal Anions of human Life to 
 fuppofe a Moral Senfe (or what is fignify'd by that Name) and 
 alfo 7 public AffeHons; but I deny that this Moral Senfe, or thefe 
 public Affections are innate, or implanted in us : they are acquired 
 either from our own Obfervation or the Imitation of others. But 
 whether I have rightly deny'd it or no muft depend upon the Argu- 
 ments, and the Reader is to judge impartially for himfelf. I think 
 this Matter deferves a fair Examination j and if what has been faid 
 already put others upon thinking of it I have my End. 
 
 Contents
 
 
 
 
 l> .. I I.. . . > 
 
 (XJ 
 
 
 Hfnn t 
 
 T 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 / 
 
 
 ] 

 
 
 XXXV. 
 
 1 . 
 
 
 
 Contents of the Book. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Containing Jo me Principles necejfary to be known in order to the Under ~ 
 jlanding and Solution of the Difficulty about the Origin of Evil, 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of the Knowledge of External ObjetJs. 
 Par. 
 i np Hat Senfations reprefent external things to us, or at leaft difcover 
 I the prefcnce of them. Page i 
 
 2 That thefe are confufed and complicated, but afterwards feparated and 
 
 diftinguifh'd by the Underftanding : an inftance of this in Burning- 
 Wax, ibid. 
 
 3 The firft Diftrnction of our Conceptions into fenfible Qualities and Sub- 
 ftance. 2 
 
 4 How we know that there is any fuch thing as Matter. 3 
 
 5 What it is. 4 
 
 6 That this Definition does not reach the Idea of Matter, but only ihews 
 
 us the Mark to diftinguiih it by. ibid. 
 
 7 How we come to the Knowledge of Space. 8 
 
 8 What it is- 9 
 
 9 Thcfc three Conceptions, viz. of fenfible Qualities (v. g. Motion, &V.) of 
 
 Matter and Space fcem to be the chief of thofe that are external. fco 
 
 Of the Enquiry after the Firft Caufe. 
 
 f.i An Enquiry concerning Motion, Matter, and Space, whether they escift 
 pf themfelves. *5 
 
 e 2 2 We
 
 vi. CONTENTS. 
 
 z We are to form our Judgment of things whether they exift of theinfirlves 
 
 or require a Caufe, from our fimple Conceptions, when there is no 
 
 i nuifi. Ground to fufpect a Fallacy. baa xh in. *5 
 
 3 *Tis proved that Motion requires a Caufe, tho' it be fuppoied Eternal, 
 
 and that Matter is not the Caufe of it. 22 
 
 4 That Matter requires a Caufe of its Exiftence. 25 
 
 5 That it is nor neceflarily exiftenr, as appears from the Confeflion of thofe 
 
 Perfons who fuppofe Space to be the Image of Body. 26 
 
 6 And of thofe who deny Space to be diftinguifhable from Matter any o- 
 
 therwife than as Extenfion in general is from a particular Extension. 
 
 29 
 
 7 That Space feems at fir ft Sight infeparable from Exiftence. 30 
 
 8 'Tis fliewn that this may arife from Prejudice. ibid. 
 
 9 Without \ fuppofes Space ; while therefore we conceive fomething to exift 
 
 without us, we cannot annihilate Space in Thought. 3 1 
 
 10 Things are conceiv'd to be annihilated by fubftituting fomething elfe in 
 
 the room of tbem ; but we have nothing to fubftitute for Space. 3 2 
 
 1 1 We attempt to annihilate Space while thofe things continue which fup- 
 
 pofe Space, and therefore it cannot be annihilated. ^2 
 
 12 God cannot be conceiv'd not to exift. 34 
 
 13 Becaufc we are confeious that we do not exift of ourfelves. 35 
 
 14 Smell, Tafts, Hearing, do not give us any notice of Space. ibid. 
 
 15 The Mind reflected upon itfelf has no relation to Space, nor any necef- 
 
 fity for it. 36 
 
 1 6 We may conceive Space to be annihilated altogether, but not by Parts. 
 
 17 Hence arofe the Prejudice for its Self-Exiftence. 41 
 
 1 8 We are certain of a firft Caufe in what manner foever the Difpute about 
 
 Space be determin'd. ibid. 
 
 S E CT, III. 
 
 - 
 
 
 Of the Firft Caufe. 
 
 f .1 Gut Reafonings about the Firft Caufe are like thofe of a blind Man about 
 
 Light, fince it is not an Object, of Senfe. 43 
 
 2 Yet we know a great many things concerning it. 44 
 
 3 That all other xhings proceed from it. ibid. 
 
 4 That it is One. 45 
 - 5 Infinite in Nature and Power. 4.6 
 
 6 Free. % 
 
 7 That
 
 c 
 
 CONTENTS. skvu. 
 
 7 That he is a confcious, intelligent Being. 51 
 
 8 That he ads for an End. ibid. 
 9. That the end of Creation was to exercife the Power, and to communi- 
 cate the Goodnefs of the Deity. 52 
 
 10 When the World is faid to be created for God's Glory, 'tis after the man- 
 
 ner of Men. 34 
 
 1 1 That God made the World as well as it could be made by the higheft 
 
 Power, Wifdom and Goodnefs. 55 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Concerning the Nature and Divifon of Evil, and the Difficulty of 
 
 tracing out its Origin. 
 
 Cj By Evil we underftand whatever is incomodious, inconvenient, or trou- 
 blefome. 73 
 
 2 Evils are of three kinds, thofe of Imperfection, Natural, and Moraf. 
 
 ibid. 
 
 3 The Difficulty is, how thefe come into the Works of a God of the high- 
 
 eft Goodnefs and Power. ibid. 
 
 4 Some that were unable to folve this Difficulty have deny'd the Exiftence 
 
 of a God, others have fuppofed a double one. 74 
 
 5 There are fome of Opinion that it is unanfwerable, and that the Mani- 
 
 chees offer'd a better Solution by fuppofing two Principles, than the Ca- 
 tholics do by owning only one. 74 
 
 6 This Difficulty has exercifed the Philofophers and Fathers of the Church, 
 
 and fome deny that it is anfwer'd yet. 78 
 
 7 There is more Good than Evil in the World. ibid. 
 
 8 'Tis no lefs repugnant to infinite Goodnefs to have created thofe things 
 
 which he faw would be corrupted by another, than fuch as would cor- 
 rupt themfelves. The Suppofition of a double Principle is therefore 
 of no Service toward the Solution of this Difficulty. ibid! 
 
 9 If it can be fhewn that it does. not contradict infinite Power and Good- 
 
 nefs to permit Evils, or that thefe neceflarily arife from the Exercife of 
 them, then may this Difficulty be anfwer'd. 80 
 
 
 1 CHAP.
 
 mviii. CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 
 Of the Evil of Defeat. 
 
 f .1 Things can be no otherwifc than as God pleafed. 81 
 
 2 All created things are necefiarily imperfect fince they do not cxift of 
 
 themfelves. " ibid. 
 
 3 'Tis to be determin'd by the Divine Pleafure what degree of Perfection 
 
 every thing muft have, fince all things are necefifarily at an infinite Di- 
 ftance trom the higheft Perfection. 83 
 
 4 All things could not be equally perfed fince fomc are Parts of others. 
 
 5 Things are neceffarily of unequal Perfections with regard to their At- 
 
 tributes ; but it is agreeable to the higheft Goodnefs to create thofe which 
 are leaft perfect, if they be no hindrance to the Number or Convenience 
 of the more perfect ones. 90 
 
 6 This confirmed by an Inftance of Matter, which is no Impediment to pure 
 
 Spirits. 9 1 
 
 7 'Tis lefs agreeable to the Divine Goodnefs to have omitted, than to have 
 
 created thefe more imperfect Beings. 9$ 
 
 c hap. rw 
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 SEC T. I. 
 
 Of Generation and Corruption. 
 
 q.i A Creature cannot complain of its Fate tho it be lefs perfect than others. 
 
 96 
 
 2 The Origin of things from Matter is the Source of Natural Evils, as 
 
 their Rife from nothing is the Caufe of thofe of Imperfection. ibid. 
 
 3 Matter is ufelefs except it have Motion. 97 
 
 4 Such Motion was to be rais'd in Matter as might feparate it into Parts. 
 
 Hence the Generation and Corruption of Bodies naturally arifcs. 98 
 
 5 Motion under certain Laws, tends more to the Prefervation of things, 
 - than if it were left at random ; hence God has diftribu ted Bodies into 
 
 various Sy Items. 99 
 
 6 It
 
 CON T E NTS. xKxix:- 
 
 6 It appears from Light and other Phaenomena, that the Syftem of this 
 
 World is the very beft and moft beautiful. ioo 
 
 7 *Tis rafh to affirm that Matter might be diftributed into better Syftems, 
 
 fince wc do not thoro' y underftand the prefent. ibid. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Qonceaning Animals and the Variety of them. 
 
 %.i Motter does not fcem to be made for its own fake, fince it is notfelf- 
 confcious ; 'tis therefore defign-'d for the ufe of Animals. 101 
 
 2 'Tis probable that Animals vary according to the Variety of thofe Re- 
 
 gions which they are deftin'd to inhabit. Therefore the JEther and 
 Air, in all probability, have their proper Inhabitants as well as the 
 Earth. 102 
 
 3 The Earth, as being the leaft part of the Mundane Syftem, is not to be 
 
 chiefly regarded, but yet is not made to no Purpofe, or without Defiga. 
 
 104 
 
 4 The Earth may be conceiv'd as a Wheel in this great Automaton of the 
 
 World, without which its Motion would be defective : in the interim it 
 affords an habitation and food for Animals. 105 
 
 5 The Earth is made not for Man alone but for the Univerfe : to think o- 
 
 therwife favours of human Pride. 106 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of Death. 
 
 ^f.i 'Tis probable that the So^ity of our Bodies is the Caufe why we caraiot 
 move them whither we pleafe. 109 
 
 2 A Soul united to a Portion of ./Ethereal Matter, &c. can move it whi- 
 ther it will and preferve its Union ; fuch a Body therefore is immortal. 
 
 ibid, 
 
 3 The Body of a terreftrial Animal is a kind of Vefifel which may be bro- 
 
 ken, the humours may flow out, and the circular Motion ceafe, fuch A7 
 nimals then are naturally mortal. no 
 
 4 This Hypothecs reconcll'd with facred Hiftory concerning the Mortality 
 
 of the firft Man. in 
 
 SECT
 
 s 
 
 C O NT E NT S. 
 
 ^ 
 
 I;, SECT IV. xibixz 
 
 Of the PaJJiom. 
 
 C.r Our Souls require Bodies of a peculiar Cra/is, when that is diforder'd the 
 Operations of the Soul are either hinder*d or deftroy'd,,. > 112 
 
 2 The Soul and Body admit of a mutual Sympathy: hence it is the firft care 
 
 of the Soul to keep the Body free from harm. ibiJ. 
 
 3 The Senfe of Pain is neceflary to preferve Life, as alfo the dread of Death. 
 
 4 The reft of } the Pafllons are connected with thefe. 1 1 5 
 
 5 The Pafiiohs could not be avoided otherwife than by ordering that the 
 
 Soul fhould not be affected with the Motions of the Body. By this 
 means Animals would be very fhort lived. ibid. 
 
 6 It is not contrary to the Divine Goodnefs to permit thefe Inconveniencies, 
 
 fince they aould not be avoided without greater. 116 
 
 J God therefore compared the Good in things with the Evils which neceffa- 
 
 rily attend them, and tolerated thofe Evils which were infeperable from 
 
 the Good. ibid. 
 
 8 The Axiom about not doing Evil for the fake of Good, does not take 
 
 place where the leaft Evil is chofen. ibid. 
 
 SECT V 
 
 Of Hunger, 'Thirji and Labour. 
 
 %.i The Parts of the Body fly off, it ftands in need therefore of Reparation, 
 
 viz. by Food. 1 1 7 
 
 2 Choice muft be had in Food, fince all things are uot equally proper. 
 
 'ibid. 
 .3 The Materials of Food are foon corrupted, they cannot therefore be pro- 
 cured without Labour. ibid. 
 
 4 Every Animal is placed by God where it may have its proper Nnurifh- 
 
 ment, hence almoft every Herb maintains its proper Infect. 118 
 
 5 Some Animals are made for Food to others, and would not have exifted 
 
 on any other Terms. ibid. 
 
 6 All Parts of the Earth cou'd not have afforded Nourifhment and Re- 
 
 ception for Men, 1 whatever Situation they had been placed in. 1 20 
 
 7 Of EartbqnakeSy Lightnipg and Deluges. 121 
 
 8 The
 
 CONTEN*^ fe 
 
 
 8 The number of Animals to be fed, was to be proportioned to die ^obd, 
 and not the Food to the Animals. 1 23 
 
 '9 The hundredth part of Mankind which might live upon the Earth does 
 not yet inhabit it : vain therefore is the Complaint about Seas and De- 
 farts. 1 24 
 
 10 'Tis abfurd for any one to defire a different Station from that which is al- 
 lotted him, fince he was made to fill that Place, and would otherwife 
 have had none at all. ib. 
 
 S C T. VI. 
 
 - ' 
 
 Concerning Propagation of the Species, Cbild-hocd, and Qld^Agt. 
 
 f[. 1 Animals may be repair'd three Ways : ift. If Death were prevented by 
 Omnipotence. idly. By Creation. 3 dly. By Propagation. 126 
 
 2 This 3d Method is the beft, becaufe it may be effected without doing 
 
 Violence to the Laws of Nature. ibid. 
 
 3 The Divine Wifdom and Goodnefs admirable in the Contrivance of it. 
 
 j 27 
 
 4 Why Men are tormented with the continual dread of Death, while the 
 
 Brutes are not at all concem'd about it. ibid. 
 
 5 This is a Sign that the prefcnt Life is a Prelude to a better. 128 
 
 6 'Tis expedient for Men to be born weak and helplefs, hence the Founda- 
 
 tion of focial Life, &c. 1 29 
 
 7 The chief Appetites are thofe of Self-prefenration, and Propagation of 
 
 the Species. iso 
 
 S EC T. vii. 
 
 Of DifeafeSy Wild-Beajls, and Venomous Creatures. 
 
 'If. 1 Bodies are liable to Diifolution, and Humours to Corruption. Hence 
 Pains and Difeafes. 1 30 
 
 2 The ftrength of Poifons and fuch Juices as are noxious to Animals arifes 
 from the contrariety of things, which could not be removed without ta- 
 king away Motion. ibid. 
 
 ? Of Epidemical Difeafes. 131 
 
 4 Rocks and Defans are not given to Man, but other Animals for their 
 Habitation. 132 
 
 % Ancient Hiftories declare, that Wild-Beafts and Venomous Creatures were 
 made for the Punifhment of Mankind. 133 
 
 f 6 'Tis
 
 xlii. CONTENTS. 
 
 ' 6 *Tis the fault of Mankind that thefe multiply : Countries laid, wafte by 
 War, &c. to thedifgrace of Man, of right belong to them. 13 j 
 
 7 Wc may more eafily avoid Wild-Beafts and Venomous Creatures that\ 0- 
 ther Inconveniencics of Life about which we never quarrel with Provi- 
 dence. ; ibid. 
 8 All Animals are under the Divine Care, to think otherwife favours of 
 Pride. ' " , 134. 
 9 Wild-Beafts and Venomous Creatures are of ufe to,]Men.. ibid, 
 \ 
 
 s e c t, mi 
 
 Concerning the Errors and Ignorance of Man. 
 
 f .j Human Underftanding is neceflarily ignorant of many things. 1^5 
 
 2 We are fometimes forced to make ufe of Conjectures, therefore we may 
 
 not only.be ignorant* but alfo.miftake, ib. 
 
 3 God could not guard us always from Errors, without Violence, done to 
 
 Nature. 136 
 
 4 Man is not therefore miferable becaufe expofed to Errors. ib, 
 
 5 Thofe Errors .which we foil in to without our Fault, are feldom pern iciqus. 
 
 137 
 6". Our Knowledge is adapted to our State., 138 
 
 7 We prefer Life with all its Inconveniencies before Eteath. 140 
 
 8 Some put themfelves to Death, not on account of Natural but voluntary 
 
 Evils.. 14.1 
 
 9 Thofe" Errors which we fall into by our own Fault, are to, be reckqn'd a- 
 
 mong Moral Evils, ibid. 
 
 
 
 S E C T. IX. 
 
 Containing the Sum of what has been faid on Natural Evils. 
 
 <f.i The whole Univerfe one Syftem, of which every thing is a part. 142 
 
 2 If the whole and all its Parts.bc taken together,, none could be chang'd 
 
 but for the worfe. 1 43 
 
 3 Hence the Error of the Epicureans who knew only the leafb and worft 
 
 part of it. 144 
 
 4. Hence a Reply to the Difficulty, Whence comes Evil ? fince it arifes from 
 
 the very Nature of created Beings, and cou'd not be avoided without a 
 
 Cojittadiclion. 145 
 
 5 This.,, 

 
 CONTENTS. xliii. 
 
 5 This reconril'd with the Mofaic Hiftory, which does not attribute afl 
 
 kinds of Natural Evil to the Fall of the firft Man. 145 
 
 6 The Evils which do arife from thence are permitted for the Good of the 
 
 Unive rfe, and alio of Man hirhfelf 1 47 
 
 7 Mortality, Hunger, Thirft, Difcafes, csV. are for the Good of the World 
 
 in this corrupt Eftate. iBid. 
 
 n xi a p \r 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 Introduction containing the Sub/lance of the Chapter. 
 
 SEC T. I. 
 
 - 
 
 -Concerning the Nature of Elections. 
 
 1 II R *? FT T T 
 A View of their Opinion who admit of Liberty from Compulfion only, 
 
 
 but not from Necefjity. 
 
 \\ That it is not eafy to underftand or give a true Representation of the O- 
 piniohs concerning Liberty. Some acknowledge a Liberty from Com- 
 pul/ion only, others from NeceJJily alio. 150 
 
 2 The Authors of the former Opinion fuppofe that there are Appetites im- 
 
 planted in us by Nature ; what is agreeable to thefe is called Good, the 
 contrary Evil. I 5 I 
 
 3 Things are agreeable to the Appetite in a threefold refpect , hence three 
 
 kinds of Good. ibid, 
 
 4 That which is actually agreeable to the Appetite is called Pleafant. ib. 
 
 5 That which is connected with fomething which is of itfclf agreeable, is 
 -called Profitable. ibid. 
 That which is judg'd by the Under ftanding to be the belt, all things con- 
 
 iider'd, is abiblutely good, and called Honejl. ibid. 
 
 7 Inftances in Health, Medicines, and fuch things as are agreeable to. the 
 
 Rational Appetite. x 5 2 
 
 $ He that can act as his own Judgmenrdirecls, is free according. to thefe 
 I Men. ib. 
 
 f 2 9 But
 
 xliv. CONTENTS: 
 
 9 But they fuppofe that we arc determin'd to-choofe either from -the Good- 
 nefs or Difigrecableneft of Obje&s perceiv'd by the Intellect or Senfes, 
 and that therefore we are not free as to the Acts of the Will, but only 
 of the inferior Faculties which are fubject to the Determination of the 
 Will. \ eSifojil ibid. 
 
 10 If this be fo, all our Actions are abfolutely necefTary. 154 . 
 
 1 1 That human Actions are free, not from Necefjky but Connpulfion. 1 5$ 
 
 12 According to their Opinion there is no Contingency in things, nor could a- 
 
 ny thing be done other wife than it is. .156 ., 
 
 13 By Evil they underftand nothing more than hurtful. ib. 
 
 14 Villanics arc to be placed to the Account of human Miferies, and not. 
 
 look'd upon as Crimes, properly Jo call'd. 157 
 
 1 5 A Malefactor is .reproved, not becaufe he deferv'd it,, but becaufe Reproof 
 
 may drive him from Evil. luowii ib. 
 
 16 Punifhments are apply*d as Medicines to the Sick, neither, are Laws ufe- 
 
 lefs fince they prevent Vice. 158 
 
 17 We are obliged to be grateful only in profpect of a future Benefit. ibid. 
 1.8 According to this Opinion human Happinefs is impoflible, fince it depends 
 
 upon things which are not in our Power. ibid. 
 
 19 Its Confequences are hard, and tho' the Argument from. Confequences be. 
 
 generally a bad one, yet thefe bring fome Prejudice againft an Opinion 
 
 which feems to be attended with them, efpecially if they be acknowledg'd 
 
 l 59 
 20. All .thole who declare that the Will is ..pqfive. in its Operations, will be e~ 
 
 fteem'd to be of the fame Opinion with the former, and are prefs'd with 
 
 the fame Confequences. ibid. 
 
 
 
 SUBSECT. IJL 
 
 An Opinion is propofed in general, ajferting a Liberty from Ntcefjity as 
 
 well as Compulficn. 
 
 %.i This agrees with the former in moft Cafes, efpecially in thole relating to , 
 the Appetites, to good, pleafant, profitable, and boneft \ but determines 
 this to be the difference between a Man and Brute, viz. that the one is 
 determin'd by his Bodily Appetite, the other by himfelf. 161 
 
 2 The chief Good is neceffarily defired, but others are not, becaufe they may 
 be reprefented by the Underftanding in different Lights. 162 
 
 j Tho' therefore the Will follows fome Judgment of the Underftanding, 
 yet it is not neceffarily determin'd by it. 164 
 
 4 This 

 
 It takes place only in doubtful Matters, and then 'tis of no ufc or impor- 
 tance. ' 1 68 
 7 We arc left in douhr concerning the way which leads to Happinefs, 
 ~ I'm can have no Help from Liberty. 
 
 :IC N'T E NT S. 
 
 i^This Opihion eftabliflies Liberty, but there are feme things in it not Yuf- 
 
 t ?.9tr: ficiently cxplain'd. 166 
 
 5 Such a Liberty as this feems to be of more Prejudice than Benefit to Man* 
 
 srfo'i kind. ib. 
 
 6 
 
 and 
 ibid. 
 S Since that is Good which is agreeable, and this is to be judg'd of by the 
 Undcrftanding, if the Will follow this Judgment it is not free, if it does 
 not, it acls againft Reafon. We had better therefore be without fuch. 
 Liberty. 169 
 
 9 If the Will could fufpend its Act contrary to the Judgment of the Under- 
 ftanding, it would run directly into Evil ; it feems therefore necefiary for 
 it CD act at the time, and m the manner which the Underftending directs. 
 
 170 
 io There are Anfwers offer'd to thefe Difficulties, but fuch as are far from be- 
 ing clear. On this account many have gone over to the former Opinion. 
 
 * * 
 
 
 
 
 SUB SECT. nr. 
 
 .#. 
 
 
 Another Notion of Liberty and Elc&ion is p'opofed. 
 
 %i\ The Appetites and Powers attain their proper End by exercife, which is 
 the greateit Perfection of them, and their beft Eftate. 172 
 
 2 There is a certain agrecablenefs fixt by Nature between fome Appetites, 
 
 and their Objects, whereby they act upon the prefence of them, and 
 ceafe from Action upon the Removal of them. ib. 
 
 3 Liberty would be of differvice to an Agent endow'd with fuch Appetites, 
 
 (s?c. as thefe only. 173 
 
 4 We may conceive a Power between which and any particular Object there 
 
 is naturally no other Agreeablcnefs but what may arife from the deter- 
 mination of the Power itfelf. ib. 
 
 5 Such a Power as this cannot be determin'd by any Goodnefs in Objects, 
 
 fince the Goodnefs of 'em depends upon the determination. ; 175 
 
 6 Nor by any Uneafmefs. 1 ib. 
 
 7 Nor by the Under/landing. 176 
 3 Yet fuch an Agent has need of Underftanding in order to diftinguiihp of- 
 fice things from impofllble. 177 
 
 If 
 
 V.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 9 If the Agent be of infinite Power, he needs no other -Limitation. 477 
 
 10 But an Agent of finite Power muft alfo confult his Abilities. ib. 
 
 1 1 Such an Agent cannot be determin'd by his other Appetites. 178 
 
 1 2 This Power is fuperior to all the Appstites, and fubdued by none. ib. 
 
 13 It leems to be given for this End, that the Agent might have fomething 
 
 to delight himfelf in when the natural Appetites muft necefiarily be fru- 
 ftrated. ib. 
 
 14 This Power, by its acceflion, increafes the Pleafure of the other Appe- 
 
 tites j by oppofition removes, or at leaft alleviates the Pain. 1 79 
 
 15 The reft of the Appetites are not to be baulked unnecefiarily. 180 
 
 1 6 Such an Agent as this is Self-active. ib. 
 
 17 Is determin'd by himfelf, and things are not chofen becaufe they pleafe 
 
 him, but pleafe him becaufe they are chofen. i8r 
 
 1 8 Yet he is not determin'd by chance. ib. 
 
 1 9 Is the true Caufe of his Actions. 182 
 
 20 Is capable of Happinefs. ib. 
 
 21 An imperfect Underltanding is fulficient for his Happinefs, if he do but 
 
 diftinguiih between PoJTibilities and Impoffibilities, things agreeable and 
 difagreeable to the Senfes, and confult his Abilities. 183 
 
 2*2 Tho' Liberty would be a Prejudice to other Agents, yet it is a fure foun- 
 dation of Happinefs to -this, whofe convenience depends not on Objects 
 but Election. * 1 84 
 
 23 Thefe things are clear enough, tho' they may appear to be a little too 
 fubtle. ib. 
 
 S U B 5 E C T. IV. 
 
 'That there is an Agent who is pleafed with Objects only becaufe he 
 
 choofes them. 
 
 
 
 ^f.i God is fuch an Agent as this. 18$ 
 
 2 Becaufe nothing external is either good or bad -to him before Election. 
 
 ib 
 
 L 11/. 
 
 3 Becaufe his own Will is the Caufe of Goodnefs in the Creatures. ib. 
 4 They are not to be regarded who declare that thisGoodnels determines the 
 
 Will of God. 186 
 
 5 If he had not a Power of pleafmg himfelf in Election, he could never 
 
 have made any thing. 1 8 7 
 
 6 If he were moved by the Goodnefs of things to create the Worl'd, he 
 
 .would be *a neceffary Agent. 1 8.8 
 
 7 But
 
 CONTENTS. ^vii. 
 
 7 .But if. things are good becaufe he has chofen to make them, his whoje 
 
 Work will be free. i8"8 
 
 88b External things are in themfelves abfolutely indifferent to God, but he 
 
 has a Complacency in his Choice. ib. 
 
 9 And determine himfelf to Action. 189 
 
 10 The Difficulty of conceiving how a Power can determine itfelf to Action 
 
 ought not to hinder; our, aflent to the truth of the Propofition. 190 
 
 xi 'Tis as difficult to conceive how a thing can be moved by another, as by 
 on itfelf, we are prejudiced by being accuftomed to material, i.e. paflive 
 
 Agents. ib. 
 
 12 What is faid about indifference, with refpect to the Will of God, takes 
 
 place in his primary Elections. 191 
 
 13 God may have all things at once in his view which are connected with the 
 
 thing chofen, and either will or refufe them by one fimple Act. ib. 
 
 j 4 As he is of infinite, Goodnefs, he alfo wills the Good of all things which he 
 
 has determin/d to create, as far as poffible. 192 
 
 15 When the World therefore is once made, it is impoflible that thofe things 
 
 fhould pleafe him which tend to the confufion, fcrV. of his Work. ib. 
 
 16 When Man is made of fuch a Nature as requires him to be jult, fober,. 
 
 &c. God is not at Liberty not to will thefe things. 1 94 
 
 1 7 This is no bar to the Divine Liberty. ib. 
 
 18 A Being endow'd with this Power is more perfect than one that wants it : 
 
 yejt .this does not imply infinite Perfection, therefore it is communicable 
 
 196 
 
 SUBSEC.T. V. 
 
 'That Man partakes of this Principle of pleafing himfelf by Election. 
 
 %><<i Some Reafons are offer'd to fhew this. 197 
 
 2 Firft, Experience. 198 
 
 3 The Vulgar often judge better of nutters.of Fact than Philofophers. ib. 
 
 4 J Tis proved that we partake of this Power, becaufe we difcover the 
 
 Marks and Properties of it in ourfelves. 200 
 
 5 In the firft place, we impute our Actions to ourfelves, whereby we own 
 
 ourfelves to be the true Caufes of them. Hence it i"s that we diftinguiirf 
 Misfortunes from Crimes. ib. 
 
 6 This is a molt certain Sign that we are confeious of our Liberty. 201 
 
 7 The fecond Token of this Power, that it can go againft the Appetites, 
 
 tc. 202 
 
 8 'lis fhewn that we can do this in regard to our Appetites, ib. 
 
 9 That
 
 xlviii. CONTENTS. 
 
 9 That we' can eld it alfo in our Senfes, and in a manner change the Nature 
 
 of things by an obftinate Election. 203 
 
 16 That we : can conquer not only our Appetites and Senfes, but arfo our 
 
 'Reafon by the force, of Election . 204 
 
 11 This appears from Inftances. 205 
 
 1 2 That the Underftanding admits not only Evil things for Good, but Falii- 
 
 ties for Truths, viz. being under Subjection to the Will. ib. 
 
 13 'Tis prov'd that we have this Power from a Confideration of thefe Rea- 
 
 sons which are fuppofed to determine the Will. 206 
 
 14 Thefe are enumerated. ib. 
 
 15 Firft, Errors of the Underftanding : thefe are fhewn to depend upon de- 
 
 prav'd Election rather, than caufe it. 207 
 
 16 Secondly, Obftinacy : which is fhewn to be nothing elfe but perfevering 
 
 in a deprav'd Election. ib. 
 
 17 Thirdly. The violence of Paflions, viz. efire of Fame and Glory, &c. 
 
 all which are prov'd to derive their inordinate force from Election. 208 
 
 1 8 The fame is ftiewn of Hatred, Love, &V. , 209 
 .19 Of Envy and Revenge. ib. 
 
 20 Fourthly, Madttefs: 'tis prov'd on the contrary, that thefe Men are in 
 
 their Senfes who choofe abfurdly. 2 1 o 
 
 2 1 All thefe things cannot be explained otherwife than by admitting a Prin- 
 
 ciple of this kind inourfelves. ib. 
 
 22 As much Good arifes from this Principle, fo it is attended with this Evil, 
 
 viz. a Power of finning. 211 
 
 23 This miftake, that the Will follows the Judgment of the Underftanding 
 
 arofe from hence, viz. that it would b& imprudent in us to act without 
 confulting the Underftanding. ib. 
 
 24 We can act in order to lhew our Liberty, which is prov'd to be the fame 
 
 as acting without any reafon at all. 21 2 
 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Where it is Jhewn that Happinefs confijis in Elections. 
 
 f.i The more free any Being is, the lefs he is expos'd to external Motions 
 from without, and meets with lefs Inconvenience. 215 
 
 2 Happinefs arifes from the proper ufe of the Faculties, CsrV. If therefore a 
 
 Power of choofing be die meft noble of all, the greateft Happinefs will 
 confift in the Exercife of it, r. e. in Elections. 3 ib. 
 
 3 Election is the Caufe why tilings pleafe us. 216 
 
 4 He
 
 CO NT. E NT S. xli*. 
 
 4 He therefore that has a free power of choofing, can always pleafe himfelf 
 
 v<sfi i'cLOj'H all 2I ' 
 
 5 We can change our Elections to make them conformable to things, and fo 
 
 can attain Happin efs. 217 
 
 6' Care of the Body, and the natural Appetites difturb Elections in this prefenc 
 
 ftatc, and hinder ourHappinefs from being perfect ib. 
 
 7 We have reafon to admire the Divine Wifdom which created an Appetite 
 
 that has wherewith to pleafe itfelf in ks own Nature, howfoever external 
 
 "things be difpofe'd. 218 
 
 S E C T III 
 
 Concerning undue Elections. 
 
 f .1 To fall fhort of what we choofe is Mifery ; we choofe amifs therefore 'when 
 we choofe what cannot be enjoy'd ; This is done ijl- when fuch things are 
 chofen as are impojjible. 2 19 
 
 2 idly. When thofe things are chofen which are 'inconfiftent with each 'Other. 
 
 220 
 
 3 %dly.' If the things chofen be not in the Power of the Elector. ib. 
 
 4 4tbly. If any choofe that which is pre-Occupy'd by the lawful Choice of o- 
 
 thers. ib. 
 
 5 $tbly. When thofe things which tend to Natural Evils are chofen without 
 
 any Neceffity. 221 
 
 sect iv. 
 
 How it is pojftble for us to fall into undue Elections. 
 
 
 f .1 This is done five ways. 222 
 
 2 Firft, by Error or culpable Ignorance. ib. 
 
 3 Secondly, By Negligence. 223 
 
 4 Thirdly, By giving too great indulgence to the exercife of Election, ib. 
 
 5 Fourthly, By Objlinacy, or a Habit. ib, 
 
 6 Fifthly, By the importunity of the natural Appetites. J , ib* 
 
 7 Why every thing ought not to be chofen, and why Elections are not eafily 
 
 chang'd. 224 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 -g S E v T.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 How Evil Elections are confijlent with the Power and Goodnejs of God. 
 
 SUB-SEC T. I. 
 
 
 
 Propofcs the Difficulty , with a Preparative to the Solution of it. 
 
 4.1 The Evils of Free- Agents are not necefTary, and therefore feem to be 
 permitted by God voluntarily. 226 
 
 2 Moral Evils have no neceflary Connection with a free Nature, nor are of 
 
 any Advantage to it. 227 
 
 3 Here then lies the ftrefs of the Difficulty, viz. why did God permit thofe 
 
 Evils which are neither necefTary nor ufeful I ib. 
 
 4 We don't know fo much of the Nature of thinking Beings, as of, material 
 
 ones, and therefore are lefs prepared for an Anfwer to this Difficulty than 
 to the former. ib. 
 
 The abufe of Free-Will may be conceiv'd to have been prevented three 
 ways, which are confider'd in the three following Subjections. 22& 1 
 
 
 SV BS E C T. B. 
 
 Why God has created Free-Agents. 
 
 fl God might have prevented Moral Evils if he had refufed to create any free 
 Beings 229 , 
 
 2 But without thofe the World would have been a mere Machme, and e- 
 
 very thing pafTrve. ib. 
 
 3 Objection from thefe who declare that the Underftanding is active, tho' it 
 
 be necefTary, as alfo God himfelf. 230 
 
 4. Anlwer to the former part of the Objection. ib. 
 
 5 Anfwer to the latter. ib. 
 
 % God has a Complacency in his Works, and. if nothing were free, that woo'd 
 
 be wanting in them which is moft agreeable to the Deity. 221 
 
 J NecefTary Evils do not always hinder the Creation of things, much lefs 
 
 thofe which are only pofliple. ib. 
 
 % Natural Evils are greater than Moral ones, and Free-Will a greater Good 
 
 than the Natural Appetites. 232 
 
 9 The ftafce of Man wou'd be worfe if Free-Will were talcen away. 233 
 
 10 Free- .
 
 CONTENTS. fc 
 
 10 Free Agents are capable of perfect Happincfs, therefore it is better to en- 
 joy Liberty. 234 
 U The Benefits of Free- Will cou'd not be had without a Power of finning. 
 
 2 35 
 
 12 The Will could not be determin'd to Good by Objects, fince the Good- 
 
 nefs of them generally proceeds from Election. 236 
 
 13 The Intellect often finds nothing good in things, except that they help to- 
 
 wards the attainment of an Election, the Will therefore could not be 
 determin'd to Good by the Under (landing. ib. 
 
 14 The Goodnefs and. Wifdom of God being equal to his Power, hinders him 
 
 from choofing amifs. 238 
 
 15 But Man may choofe amifs, fince His Goodnefs and Wifdom neither are 
 
 nor can be adequate to his Power. 239 
 
 1 6 'Tis better to be fometimes deceiv'd with Pleafure, than to be always fe- 
 
 licitous. 240 
 
 17 'Tis better to be in danger of finning than to ceafe from Election. ib. 
 
 IS U B S E C T. III. 
 
 Why God does not interpofe his Omnipotence, and occasionally reftrain the 
 Will from depravd Elections. 
 
 v f . 1 More and greater Evils would arife from thence than from the abufe of 
 Free- Will. 242 
 
 2 It would be as much Violence to prevent the Action of Free- Will, as the 
 
 Motion of the Sun. ib. 
 
 3 God, by interpofing in the Elections of his Creatures, would quite in- 
 
 vert the Method of treating Free-Agents. 244 
 
 4 He would take away that which is the mod agreeable to us in Elections, 
 
 viz. a Confcioufnefs that We might have not chofen. 245 
 
 5 Free- Agents are placed as it were out of the reach of Divine Power , the 
 
 Government of thefe therefore is the proper Exercife of the Divine 
 Wifdom, wherein God delights. 248 
 
 6 It would therefore be neither agreeable to God, nor ufeful to us, that God 
 
 mould always hinder bad Elections. 251 
 
 SUBSECT. IV. 
 Concerning the Efficacy of Prayer. 
 
 4.1 Devout Men hope for a Change in the Courfe of Nature, through their 
 Prayers. 252 
 
 g 2 2 God
 
 lii. CO NT E NT S. 
 
 2 God does not hear all Prayers. 253 - 
 
 3 God is obliged to the Creatures by his Goodnefs and by Covenant. il\ 
 
 4 What may be requefted of the Deity relates either to the Mind, the Body 
 
 or external things. ib. 
 
 5 God does not give afliftance to our Minds at random, but under as cer- 
 
 tain Laws as thofe of the natural World. 254 
 
 6 The Aid Of the. Holy Spirit is not miraculous. 255 
 
 7 Prayers naturally tend to pei feci the Mind, 257 
 
 8 And to.fubdue the Affections. 25k 
 
 9 The Actions of free Beings will produce a Contingency in material things, 
 
 yet this does not offer any Violence to Nature. 26q 
 
 10 There is a Syftem of intellectual as well as material Beings, which act as 
 
 much upon each other. 26 l 
 
 1 1 God makes ufe of the Miniftry of Angels in the Government of Man- 
 
 kind, nor is this any Violence to Nature. s 262, 
 
 12 God is not obliged to take away the abufe of Free- Will, fince he has e- 
 
 ftabliftYd a Method of aflifting his Worfhippers. 263 
 
 13 The Efficacy of Prayers cannot be accounted for if all things be left to ne- 
 
 ceflary Caufes. 264, 
 
 14 An Intimation that ,tbis, is not r.epugnant to .the Divine Prefcience. 267 
 
 S-.U BS E C T. V: 
 
 V 
 
 Why God- does not tranjlate Man to fome other Place, where nothing 
 would occur that could temp him to choofe ami/'s, 
 
 %.i This is the fame as if it were afk'dj why God did not give the Earth to 
 be inhabited by the Brutes only. - ' 270 , 
 
 2 This is totally to extirpate Mankind 271 
 
 3 God will in due time tranflate good Men to a better State, but the prefent 
 
 is as necefiary as Seed-time is to Harveft. ib* 
 
 . 
 
 SUB3ECT. VI. 
 
 Concerning the Scarcity of. happy Perfons, and t the general Corruption of 
 
 'Mankind. 
 
 %.i. Some Objections propofed concerning the Rarity of happy Perfons. 273 
 2 That-the Power of Election is not regarded. & 
 
 3. That there is an Univerfal Corruption. 274 
 
 4 Thefe
 
 CONTENTS. liii. 
 
 4 Thefe are beft anfwer'd by Reveal'd Religion., 27 4 
 
 5 Many attain to a moderate Happinefs. " **& b^S {b, 
 
 6 Men make ufe of this Elective Power tho' they do not obferve it. 276 
 
 7 Elections produce the fame Effect in the Moral World as Motion does in 
 
 the Natural. 278 
 
 8. Things are connected together, and a defect in one affects many others.' #. 
 9 Vice and Wickednefs, tho deform'd in themfelves, do not impair the Beau-. 
 ty of the whole. 279 
 
 10 If this -be apply'd to particular Cafes, it accounts for the Univerfal Cor- 
 ruption. 282 
 
 S U B S E C T. VII. 
 
 Wlxrein th? Principles before laid down are applfd to the Solution of 
 
 feme Objections. 
 
 %.i Moral Evils are not necefTary in refpect of Free-will, but they are necef- 
 fary with regard to God, fo tbat he mult either tolerate thefe or greater. 
 
 288 
 
 2 Cicero's Objection propofed, which is taken from a Phyfician who gives 
 
 his Patient Wine when he knows that he will die of it. Or a Father who 
 leaves his Eftate to a Prodigal Son. 289 
 
 3 'Tis fhewn that the Comparifon is ill put between Reafon and Free-will, 
 
 and the giving of Wine y and that God,, if he took away Liberty for fear 
 we fhou'd fin, wou'd be like a Man that kills his Son for fearhe fhou'd 
 be fick. 290 
 
 4 Reafon is no lefs improperly eompar'd to an Eftate. 291 
 
 5 It tends to the Good of the whole, and of ourfelves alfo, that we mould 
 
 have the ufe of Free-will : for we had rather be what we -are than in the 
 Condition of Brutes, or without Reafon. ib. 
 
 6 Cicero has neither brought oppoiite Similes,, nor given good Advice to 
 
 Providence. 293 
 
 7 The Objection of Epicurus propofed, which charged God with Weaknefs 
 
 if he was not able ; or. Envy if he was able to remove Evils. 294 
 
 ' f 'Tis a Contradiction that all Evils be removed from created Beings, God 
 is not impotent therefore becaufe he does not remove them. ik* 
 
 9 God always choofes the lead of Evils, and therefore is not envious. 295 
 10 God cou'd neither be conceiv'd to be infinitely powerful, if he were not 
 able to create imperfect Beings, i. e. Creatures ; or things that are con- 
 trary to each other, /'. e. Evils; nor infinitely good if he had been con- 
 tented in himfejf, and depy'd Exiftenc to every thing elfe. 296 
 
 it Epicurus
 
 liv. CONTENTS. 
 
 
 1 1 Epicurus therefore is deceiv'd, who endeavours to attribute Impotence and 
 Envy to the Deity i whereas he ought to have infcrr'd the higheft Po- 
 wer and Goodnefs. 296 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 Concerning the Divine Laws. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Why Xjod made Laws when he knew that they would not be obferv'd. 
 
 f .1 The Divine Laws are either natural or pofitive. 298 
 
 2 Particular Laws ought to give place to more general ones, fince all kind 
 
 of repugnancy couM not be avoided. 299 
 
 2 The lame mull be faid of thofe Laws which relate to the Moral World. 
 
 ib, 
 
 4 Why God is faid to be angry with Sinners fince his Will is always done. 
 
 300 
 
 5 God may alter or add to the Laws of Nature, and give us aflurance that 
 
 he intends to do fo , hence the Origin of pofitive Laws, and a Revela- 
 tion, ib. 
 
 6 Laws are the means of informing free Agents of what is ufeful or pre- 
 
 judicial to them. ib. 
 
 SECT II 
 
 Concerning Divine Rewards and Tunijhments. 
 
 <.i Punifhraent is a natural Evil annexed to adeprav'd Choice. 303 
 
 2 Evil is Violence done to Nature ; but every natural Action has Re-adlion 
 
 correfpondent to it : therefore he that does Violence mult ncceffarily fuf- 
 
 fer ir, that no Tranfgrefior may go unpunifh'd^ ib. 
 
 3 Pofitive Laws inform us of the Punifhments which attend depraved E- 
 
 lections, from the Nature of the thing rather than inflict new ones. 
 
 4 That the decreeing and inflicting Punifhments prevents greater Evil. 
 
 5 'Tis ask'd in the firft place, how this can be reconciled with eternal Pu- 
 
 niihments, which don't feem to be capable either of reforming the pu- 
 nifh'd, or of being a Warning to others. ib. 
 
 6 'Tis
 
 
 - 
 
 CONTENTS. Iv. 
 
 I 5 Tis afk'd in the ad place, how Punifhments can be eternal, fince it 5 
 agreeable to Goodnefs to have created all things in fuch a manner that 
 nothing might repent of its being created. 305 
 
 7 'Tis ask'd 3dly, how eternal Punifhments can fubfift without a Natural 
 
 Caufe. 306 
 
 8 To the firft *tis anfwer'd, that eternal Puni foments are made known to us 
 by Revelation, and that God is not therefore obliged to reveal how or 
 why they are fo j for perhaps the Reafon is above our Comprehenfion. 
 
 307 
 
 9 It does not appear but that the Puniihments of the Wicked may be of ufe 
 
 to the Good. ib* 
 
 10 To the 2d 'tis reply'd, that the Matter is yet in debate whether is prefe- 
 rable, to be miferable, or not to be at all. The Mifery of the Dam- 
 ned may be like that of Mad-men. 308 
 i.-j The Damned choofe their miferable State, . as Lovers, angry, ambitious, 
 envious Perfons indulge themfelves in thofe things which increafe their 
 Mifery. 309 
 
 1 2 Such Punifhment is very great, and very well anfwers the End of Divine 
 
 Punifhments. 3,1 r 
 
 13 God ought to prefer the common Salvation to that of Particulars. ib, 
 
 14 Anfwer to the 3d Objection. *Tis probable that the Mifery of the Wick- 
 
 ed arifes from the very Nature of Sin. 3 1 2 
 
 15 The Wicked will 1 , thro' Ignorance and Error, delight in fuch things as 
 
 they cannot enjoy, and may not know how to take delight in any thing, 
 elfe. . 313 
 
 1 6 The Wicked are confined to certain Places and Companions by the Laws 
 
 of Nature, as we are to the Earth. 314 
 
 ij The Difpute about Moral Evil relates to the Mind and its Operations, 
 
 and on that account, muft neceflarily be fomewhat fubtlc. 315 
 
 SE C T. HI. 
 
 Concerning the * QueJtion y why bad Men are happy, and good Men mi- 
 ferable. 
 
 \a This Queftion has been fo well 'treated of by many, that there isfcarce 
 any room for Scruple. 317 
 
 2 The matter of Fact is often doubtful, for it is not good Men that are mi- 
 ferable, but rather referm'd by Adverfity. Nor are bad Men profpe- 
 r<?us, but made bad by their Prosperity. ib. 
 
 3 We
 
 hi. CONTENTS. 
 
 2 We are partial Judges of Merit, from the inftance of Hannibal &nd' Scific. 
 
 3 11 
 
 4 We are bad Judges of the Happinefs of Men, for thofe are often the moft 
 
 miferable whom we efteem happy ; and the contrary. ib. 
 
 5 T4*e-d\ief Happinefs here confifts in hope ; which is a fign that perfect 
 
 Happinefs is referVd for another Life, and all thefc things which befal 
 
 good or bad Men, are means to it. 319 
 
 "6 -Conclufion of the whole. ib. 
 
 
 I '' 
 
 1 

 
 
 
 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Containing fornc Principles ncceffary to be known in order to 
 the Under/landing and Solution of the difficulty about the 
 Origin of Evil. 
 
 . 
 
 -- ..... . . 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of the knowledge of External ObjeBs. 
 
 I. ^f | SIS allow'd that external Objects are made known to us That fen fa n- 
 from without by the Senfes; but we have entirely forgot ons re P* efent 
 JL how Light , Colours, and other external Things at firft af- SngTto m, 
 fected our Senfes and Minds j nor can we eafily recollect or at leaft 
 the rife and progrefs of our Knowledge concerning thefe things. defence of 
 
 However 'tis agreed that the Conceptions which we have of thefe them. 
 either reprefent to us the things therrtfelves, or at leaft difcover the 
 prefence and operations of them: That the fenfation of Light, for in- a re*confufed 
 fiance, arifes from its being prefented to the Eye j and fo in all other an< l compli- 
 Objefts of the Senfes. S*S? 
 
 II. But it is to be obferv'd that the Reprefentations of things, which panted and 
 we have from the Senfes, are by no means fimple, but very much con- b ft t he S under- 
 fufed and complicated j for Example, the Eye reprefents to the Mind Ending ; an 
 burning Wax, i. e. a thing that is hard, round, capable of being melted '"^ a " cc b of 
 
 B injngWax.
 
 - Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 in the Fire, red, and when foftened by heat, changeable into any Fi- 
 gure, fufceptible alfo of various colours, and laflly refolvable inra 
 Smoke. The Eye exhibits all thefe properties in the burning Wax al- 
 moft at one glance, but the under/landing feparates thofe things by 
 Reflection, which the fight had convey'd to the Mind collectively. 
 For it perceives that the Wax preferves its Effence and Denomination, 
 tho' from round it be turn'd into fquare, from hard and red, into foft 
 and black. From whence it appears that all thefe properties are ex- 
 trinfecal to it, but that which continues under all thefe changes is call'd 
 its Nature and Subflance. 
 The firft di- III. By Subflance I here underftand a thing which the Mind can 
 nm&ion of CO nceive by itfelf as diflintt and feparate from all others : For that 
 
 our concep- ,. , J J J . > i i 1 i i 
 
 tions into tn i n g> the conception or which does not depend upon another, nor does 
 ftnfibie Qua- include or fuppofe any other, is to us a Subflance ; (i) and according- 
 SaMtmce, ty we diftinguifh it by that name: But that which implies dependence 
 
 m 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (i) Subftance in general is a tiling or being 
 TV'hicb can fubfift by itfelf without dependence 
 on any other thing as a Subject. Our Idea of 
 the word Subftance, according to Mr. Locke, is 
 only a fuppofition of we know not what fub- 
 Jlratum or jupport of fuch Qualities as we have 
 obferved to exift united together, and are ca- 
 pable of producing fimple ideas in us, which 
 qualities are commonly call'd accidents. Now 
 becaufe we cannot eafily concei-ve how thefe ac- 
 cidents mould fubfift alone or in one another, 
 we fuppofe them exifting in, and fupported by, 
 Ibme unknown common fubjlratum which in- 
 heres not in any thing elfe, and which we de- 
 note by the name Subflance. See his Eflay, B. 2. 
 C. 23. ^. 2. and the Notes annex'd. 
 
 This is our ufual manner of conceiving 
 things as they are diftinguifh'd into Subftance 
 and Accidejit: But what foundation there is in 
 nature for fuch a diftinftion I know not : In 
 particular what this fame Subftance is, or whe 
 ther it. be really any thing at all different from 
 Jhefe Accidents, or only a relative Idea found- 
 ed on the modus of their exiftence, or rather 
 on the manner of our confidering their ex- 
 iftence, wc fhall not pretend to determine 
 
 *B*2. C. 13. S. 18. 19. 20.) 
 
 / Mr. Locke, who does not not much approve of 
 (the foregoing diftinftion between fubltance and 
 accident, * feems generally to take it for an un- 
 known Caufe of the union of what we call Pro- 
 perties or Accidents. The Author of the Pro- 
 cedure, Extent, and Limits of H. U. fuppofes it 
 to be nothing but the union of thefe very Pro- 
 perties, or all thefe conftituent Properties col- 
 lected together. " As far as we directly 
 " know the Eflential properties of any fub- 
 " ftance fo far we have a direft knowledge 
 " of the Subftance itfelf: And if we had a di- 
 " reft knowledge of all the eflential proper- 
 " ties of any Subftance, we fhould have an 
 " adequate knowledge of that Subftance ; for 
 " furely, if there be any meaning in words, 
 * the knowing any of the eflential properties 
 " of a thing, is knowing fo much of its very 
 " Subftance or Eflence." B. 1. C. 3. p. 80, 
 81. 
 
 Whatever is meant by the word Subftance, 
 Mr. Locke thinks it ought not to be apply'd to 
 God, Spirits, and Body, in the fame Senfe f and 
 the Author of the procedure, &c. would have 
 us when we talk of Spirits to fubftitute the 
 word Being inftead of it || and I mult believ* 
 
 t Ibid. *. 18: 
 
 Pa. 77,78. 
 
 that
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 3 
 
 in the conception of it we call a Mode, or Accident. For inftance, we 
 can conceive a certain portion of matter, fuch as Wax is, fetting afide 
 all others, and alfo without any particular Figure : But are not in like 
 manner able to conceive any particular Figure without matter. Wax 
 therefore is a Subfance, for our conception reprefents it as diftintJ, di- 
 vided from, and independent of, all other things : Nor is it neceflary 
 to the knowledge thereof, that we join the conceptions of other 
 things when we think of it ; for the conceptions of that and thefe, 
 contribute nothing to, nor ftand in need of, each other in order to their 
 being underftood. But Colour, Figure, foftnefs and hardnefs are modes 
 or accidents, fince they cannot be conceiv'd without fomething that is 
 coloured, figufd, foft, or hard -, but they enter not into the Subfance 
 r nature of Wax, for that remains, whatever may become of thefe. 
 
 IV. But when this is refolv'd into fmoke, or fame it has no longer How we 
 the name of Wax given to it ; we call the thing Wax, which is appli- know that 
 
 o * o ' i i there is any 
 
 cable to a certain peculiar ufe ; but when it is once refolved into f uc h tn i n g as 
 fmoke or flame, it becomes unfit for that ufe to which Wax is fubfer- matter. 
 v lent j and therefore changes its Efence, and appellation, and is no 
 longer to be called Wax. What therefore does it carry along with it 
 under all mutations ? 'Tis always extended, and capable of motion or 
 refi j and has always parts which are feparable, and exclude one ano- 
 ther out of the fame place; the Subftance therefore which carries 
 along with it thofe Qualities and Properties is called Matter. (2). 
 
 B 2 V. What 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 that thefe and the like terms, efpecially Sub- 
 jlratum, are very apt to miflead us in thefe in- 
 quiries and confine our Imagination to fomc 
 grofs Properties which belong to Matter only. 
 See alfo Watti y % Logic, Pt. I. C. 2. '\. 2 and 3, 
 and N. 13. 
 
 (2) This comes nearer to the Idea of Body, 
 according to Mr. Locke, than that of Matter. 
 " Body, fays he * Hands for a folid, extended,* 
 " figured Subitance, whereof Matter is but a 
 " partial, and more confufed conception; it 
 " feeming to me to be ufed for the Subftance 
 ' and folidity of Body, without taking in its 
 ** Extenfion and Figure.'' Tho' it muft be 
 
 confefs'd that thefe two words are often ufed 
 promifcuoufly. It may not be improper to ob- 
 fcrve here that the various fignifications of thefe 
 general Terms Body, Matter, EJfence, Sec. in 
 different Authors, as well as the uncertainty of 
 what thefe Authors intend to fignify by them, 
 will ferve to convince us, in the firft place, 
 that thefe words don't denote the manner Ikw 
 things really exilt, but only our manner of 
 conceiving them ; and Secondly, that there are 
 no real Existences ftriftly conformable to this 
 our way of conceiving them, /'. e. in generals. 
 For if either thefe general terms Hood for real 
 things, or this our way of" conceiving things 
 
 k *B. 3. C. 10. ^.15. 
 
 in)
 
 What it is. 
 
 That this 
 Definition 
 decs not 
 reach the 
 Idea of Mat- 
 ter, but only 
 ihews us the 
 Mark to di- 
 iiinguifh it 
 by. 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 V. What is obfervable in Wax, may alfo be obferv'd in every other 
 Subftance, which we know by the Senfes. For all things that are 
 perceiv'd by the Senfes admit of the like changes, and the above men- 
 tion *d properties continue both under, and after all thefe motions and 
 mutations. Any fenfible Object, howfoever chang'd, is always extend- 
 ed, moveable, conjifting of Jblid, dijlincJ and divifible parts. 
 
 VI. Not that this is a Definition, A. or Idea (4J of Matter, any 
 
 more 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (in Generals) was fix'd by nature, neither of 
 them would be fo various and uncertain as we 
 find they are. But as thefe terms fland only 
 for our conceptions, and our fixing them to 
 this or that conception, is merely arbitrary ; 
 the lame term may often be apply'd to different 
 conceptions, or feveral terms to the fame con- 
 ception. Thefe Conceptions alfo, as they are 
 not of nature's forming, mull be form'd by the 
 Mind itfelf, and of confequence are arbitrary 
 too, and fo may eafily be different from each 
 other, in different Men, and perhaps different 
 from the real nature of things in all Men. The 
 end of making thefe general conceptions is to 
 range things into forts, for the convenience of 
 Language. The manner of acquiring them is 
 as follows. 
 
 We are at firft acquainted only with parti- 
 cular fubftances, but obferving, that as thefe 
 particular fubftances differ in fome Ideas, fo 
 they agree in others (/'. e. tho' this particular 
 excites in the Mind fome Idea or Ideas, which 
 another doe. not, yet there are fome Ideas ex- 
 cited equally from both of them) we take no 
 notice of thofe Ideas in which two or more 
 particular Subftances differ, but feleft thofe on- 
 ly in which they agree, and connect them into 
 one complex Idea, by giving them one name. 
 Which complex Idea becomes general, /'. e. it 
 may be affirm' d of, or belongs to, or is found 
 in, more than one particular fubftance. And 
 the Subftances of which it is affirmed, tzfe. are 
 laid to be contain 1 d under that generaT Idea. 
 General Ideas of Subftances are made therefore 
 by leaving out thofe Ideas in which two or 
 more particular Subftances differ, and retain- 
 ing thofe in which they agree. And from Ge- 
 neral Ideas thus made we may proceed to more 
 
 general ones, in the fame way, viz. by always 
 leaving out the particulars wherein they differ. 
 Thus by obferving a certain agreement among 
 Individuals, and leaving out the reft, we form 
 an Idea of the feveral Species. In like man- 
 ner, by leaving out the diftinguilhing marks of 
 each fpecies we get the Idea of Animal in ge- 
 neral : And again, by dropping that by which 
 Animals are diftinguifh'd from all other things 
 which are the obje&s of our Senfes, we acquire 
 the Idea of Matter or Body: and fo on. 
 When any of thefe General Ideas are found in 
 a particular thing, 'tis call'd the EJJence of that 
 thing ; EJJ}nce therefore is only that general 
 abftradl Idea in the Mind by which we deter- 
 mine any thing to be of this or that fort ; and 
 which we fignify by fuch a general Name as 
 Animal or Matter. So that the fame Quality 
 may be EiTential or not Effential to any thing, 
 according as that thing is rank'd under a diffe- 
 rent Sort. This fhews us both the abfurdity of 
 taking thefe general terms for figns of real 
 Exiftences, which, we fee, arc figns of our 
 Ideas only; and alfo the neceffity for diftin- 
 guilhing between a Collection or Combination 
 of our own Ideas, and real Qualities, as they 
 are found in Nature ; between Thoughts and 
 Things. If this laft Diftinftion were fufficiently 
 attended to, I believe we fhould not be fo rea- 
 dy to conclude from any Ideas which we may 
 have of infinite [pace, Infinite Duration, &c. that 
 thefe muft needs be real Properties, or Attributes 
 of fome Being. Of which hereafter: See 
 N.5. 
 
 A. God feems to have endowed us with 
 fenfes and underftanding in order to diftinguifh 
 things from one another, and to perceive the 
 prefence and ufes of them. It is not therefore 
 
 neceflary
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Tieceflary that they fhoukl be made known to 
 us as they are in themfelves, but only fo far as 
 they regard and can affect us : For it fignifies 
 nothing to us what they are in themfelves, but 
 only what effects they may have upon us : And 
 the report of the fenfes mull be looked upon as 
 true, when they reprefent thefe effects to us 
 uniformly, ;'. e. when the Objeft, Medium and 
 Organ continuing in the fame ftate, they pro- 
 duce the fame fenfation in us : For by this 
 means we may perceive the prefence of fenfi- 
 ble things, and the diftinction of them from 
 each other, which feems to be the end for 
 which we had fenfes given by nature.* 
 
 We come then to the Knowledge of things 
 two ways, by Senfation and Reflection. We 
 are confcious to ourfelves that we exift, from 
 thence we have the notion of Exijlence. f Nor 
 do we feem to mean any thing elfe when we 
 call a thing a Being or Thing, than that it is like 
 us in that whereof we are felf-confcious, viz. 
 Exijlence. For Univerfals are, I think, neither 
 to be interpreted by words alone", nor by con- 
 ceptions, nor by the particular things them* 
 felves, but ly Analogy, For Example, when 
 one affirms that Peter is a Man, he obferves the 
 Idea of fome particular Man, perhaps of him- 
 felf, or the Neighbour he faw laft ; .and when 
 he affirms Peter to be a Man, he means nothing 
 elfe but that Peter is like himfelf or his Neigh- 
 bour, (and he calls thofe things alike which 
 have the fame- effects as to him) After the fame 
 manner he that fays Man is an Animal, mud be 
 fuppofed to have the Idea of fome particular 
 Man and Brute in his Mind, 2nd to mean no- 
 thing more when he fays, Man is an Animal, 
 than that this particular Man and thofe that are 
 like him, are in fome reipe&s alfo like the par- 
 ticular Brute, the Idea of which he had in his 
 Mind. Thus we learn the Analogy of things 
 by Reflection, but are acquainted with all ex- 
 ternal things by the fenf3tions or Conceptions 
 which they produce in us ; and according to 
 thefe various Conceptions we diltinguifh them 
 from each other, and divide and define them 
 
 into various Species. Now we come to the 
 Knowledge of fome things by immediate Sen* 
 fation, Proportion, or Connection with what 
 we perceive by the Senfes^ ||When we perceive 
 any thing in the former way, we are faid to 
 know it by Idea; when in the latter, not by 
 Idea, but Reafon. The Cafe will be cleat er 
 perhaps by an Inftance : I know a certain King, 
 becaufe I have feen and heard him, and his 
 Countenance and Voice are fixed in my Mind ; 
 by thefe therefore I can diftinguifh him from 
 others, and know him again when I fee him; 
 for he is known to me by immediate fenfation, 
 that is, by Idea. But I know Cafar only by 
 his actions, /'. e. by Similitude and Connection 
 with -the things of which I have a Senfation ; 
 nor fhould I know him again if I met him ; 
 for immediate fenfation has not imprefs'd thofe 
 marks upon me whereby I might diftinguifh 
 him from other Men. I affirm therefore that I 
 have no Idea of him. I know him (as far as is 
 neceffary) by reafon alone, /'. e. from Simili- 
 tude and Connexion with thofe things which I 
 perceive by my Senfes. 
 
 Thus the Vulgar fhew us fufficiently, that 
 they diftinguifh between Idea and Reafon, when 
 they deny that they have any Ideas of God, In- 
 finite, Spirit, and Subftance. And yet they 
 don't difown all manner of knowledge of thole 
 things; for they can't deny "but that they have 
 certain Marks from the Similitude or Relation 
 to, Or connection with, fenfible things where- 
 by they may diftinguifh Finite from Infinite, 
 Subftance from Accident, and Soul from Body. 
 When therefore they deny that they have any 
 Ideas of them, they fhew that they mean no 
 more than that thefe are not yet made known 
 to them by immediate fenfation. For they look 
 upon fuch a perception of a thing as this only, 
 to be the Idea of it; but reckon what they ac- 
 quire by fimilitude, proportion or connection, 
 no more an Idea, than Algebraic fpecies are Ideas 
 of Quantity, for which they arc ufed, and by 
 the afliftance of which we know feveral things 
 of infinite quantities whereof we can have no 
 
 * Concerning the reality of our fenfitive Knowledge in general, and how far it reaches, fee 
 i.ocke, B. 4. ch. 2. S- 4- anc * C. ii. For inftances wherein the Senfes arc not to be depended 
 on, fee N. 6. f See Locke's Effay, B. 2. C. 7. V 7. 
 
 Effay on tie nature and conduct of the Paffions, {$(. p. 3. N. f. 
 
 B 3 Ideas , 
 
 || Sec Mr. Hutchcfon's
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Ideas ; except we will abufe the word Idea con- 
 trary to the common Senfe of" Mankind. 
 
 Neither are thofe Men excufeable who fpeak 
 othenvife. They pretend indeed that they may 
 ufe words in their own Scnfe ; but they have 
 no right to do it; for we are oblig'd to fpeak 
 with the Vulgar, fince they are to prefcribe 
 the Rules of Speech ; nor muft we expect that 
 Readers fhould change the Notions which have 
 been joined to Words from their Childhood, 
 and approved by common ufe, at the pleafure 
 of every Writer. Tis to be obferv'd farther, 
 that thefe Men generally put a trick upon us, 
 for they define Words in their own Senfe, but 
 in difcourfing ufe them in the common one; 
 hence proceed quarrels among the learned, and 
 among the half-learned, moft pernicious Er- 
 rors: For hearing from celebrated Writers, 
 that all Knowledge is by Ideas, and taking an /- 
 dea with the Vulgar, for a Mark imprinted on 
 the Mind by immediate Senfation, when they 
 find no fuch Mark imprefled on their Minds by 
 Cody by Sub/lance, by Infinite, by the Myjleries 
 of Religion, they deny that we have any 
 Jknowledge at all of thefe things. 
 
 But we are to obferve, that things are as pro- 
 perly known by Reafon as by Ideas; for the 
 Marks which things imprint on the Mind by 
 immediate fenfation are not the things them- 
 felves, but the effects of them upon the Mind 
 and Senfes; by thefe then we only know what 
 Effects a thing has upon us, not what it is in 
 itfelf. Now the things which are known, by 
 reafon are alfo difcovered by their Effects,, not 
 produced in us by immediate fenfation,. but 
 in other things that are connecled: with what we 
 perceive by the Senfes. For inftance; that is 
 Lucid which produces the fenfation of Light in 
 me; Sweet,, which produces that of Sweetnefs , 
 But it is the Sun which emits the Light, and 
 God that made the Sun, i. e. I know Light by 
 its effect upon me ; the Sun by its effect upon 
 the lucid Body; God by his effect upon the Sun. 
 Thus a Man knows his Father by immediate 
 fenjationy or by Idea ; the Man that begot hisj 
 Father, is his Grandfather; and the Perfon J 
 that begot his Grand-Father is his Great-Grand 
 
 Father-. Thefe then are known by ret/on, and 1 
 as properly as the Father is, tho' never feen by 
 him. 
 
 When therefore one asks the Gcws of any 
 thing, he defircs the Perfon ask'd to fhew fome 
 thing or things which the A'Litter enquired af- 
 ter refembles: When he enquires into the Dif- 
 ference, he" defires to have that fenfation lh^wn 
 him, which the thing fought, if prefent, would 
 produce in him, and which would diitinguifh 
 it from any thing elfe : And if this cannot be 
 done, that at leaft a Mc<rk may be produced 
 which is in fome manner connected with the 
 fenfation. Definitions therefore regard our- 
 felves, and the effect which things have upon 
 our Senfes and Minds. When we have the 
 Charailtr or Murk of any thing whereby the 
 fenfation or conception produced in us by it, 
 may be diflinguifhed from the fenfition or con- 
 ception of other things, and by which we cer- 
 tainly know for the prefent that it is here, and 
 are informed what to do or expect upon the 
 prefence of it, we know as much of it, as our 
 imperfect State requires. Nay, fuch Knowledge 
 is of much more ufe than the Philofophical 
 difcovery of Genus and Difference. He has a 
 far more ufeful Knowledge of a Man that 
 knows hia Countenance, Name, Temper and 
 Condition, than he that is acquainted with the 
 Principle of Individuation*. Tho* therefore I 
 have no Idea of Subftance, nor can afhgn a de- 
 finition which will explain the Effence of it ; 
 yet if I can produce a Mark, whereby I may 
 diftinguifh it for the prefent from every other 
 thing that I meet, I muft be judged to know it 
 fufficiently. Now fuch a Mark I think 1 have 
 already given. (3 ) 
 
 (3.) I omit the reft of our Author's long 
 Note, fince it contains only fome Arguments 
 for innate Ideas ; which Hypothefis is now 
 almoft univerfally exploded. We may obferve, 
 that moft of his Reafoning is built on a diffe- 
 rent Signification of the Word Idea. He will 
 ufe it in the old Planotic meaning for a Species, * 
 Phantafm, or Corpsreal Image, as it were painted 
 on the Brain: The Application of the Mind 
 to which is properly call'd Imagination, and 
 
 comes 
 
 * See Locke's Eflay, B. 2. C. 27. V %*
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 N O Hi E S. 
 
 comes far fhort of 'Knowledge. Whereas, if we 
 take the Word Idea in the more enlarged mo- 
 dern Senfe, as it commonly ftands for a Repre- 
 fentation of any Thing in the Mind, or whatfo- 
 cver is the immediate Object of the Unierjland- 
 ing when a Man perceives or thinks ; we can 
 have no manner of Knowledge without both the 
 actual Perception of Ideas, and alfo of their 
 connexion with, or repugnancy to, each other. 
 
 According to Mr. Locke, our Apprehenfion 
 of the Exiiience of any Being (befide ourfelves) 
 which we have fee n, felt, or beard, may very 
 properly be call'd fenjitive Knowledge. But our 
 Affurance of the Exiftence of any other (except 
 God) which we do not fo perceive by the Sen- 
 fes, is no Knowledge at all, but only Faith, 
 Preemption, or Probability, &c. 
 
 Our Author's Method of forming Univerfals, 
 or (as we commonly term them) abjlracl Ideas, 
 by making the Idea of one particular Thing 
 ftand for all of the fame Kind, will appear to 
 be wrong, I think, from this fingle Argument, 
 viz. that according to the foremention'd 
 Scheme Univerfals, fuch as Animal, Genus, &c. 
 would have a real Exiftence in Nature, where- 
 as they are evidently the Creatures of our own 
 Minds, and can exift no where elfe. We have 
 therefore nothing at all to do with Analogy in 
 forming general Ideas, we can never come at 
 them by fubftituting one Particular for another, 
 but muft rather conceive them to be made by 
 removing all Particularities of Exiftence, and 
 leaving only what remains in common; ac- 
 cording to Lockers Account of Abjlracl ion, B. z. 
 C n. V9- See alfo fVatts's Logic, Pt. I. 
 C. 3. V 3. or N. 2. 
 
 By a due Attention to the Nature of thefe 
 abftract Ideas, and our Way of acquiring them, 
 we fhall find that they are all mere entiaRationis, 
 or form'd by the Mind alone, and of courfe 
 will perceive that Duration, Space, Number, 
 &c. which evidently are fuch, can have no 
 real Exiftence in Nature, no proper Ideatum or 
 Objective Reality, nor confequcntly be a Proof 
 of any Thing befide that Power which the 
 Mind has to form them, as will be ihewn be- 
 low. 
 
 To return : Our Author, in the fame Place 
 alfo doubly mifapplies the Word Refleilion, firft, 
 by making it ftand for that particular Operation 
 of the Mind call'd Reafoning, wbjereas we now 
 commonly ufe it for the internal Senfe or Confci- 
 eufnefs both of the Exiftence of the Mind, and 
 of all its Operations f: And, fecondly, by 
 making this Reflection or Reafoning to be with- 
 out Ideas-, Whereas, according to the prefent 
 Senfe of the Word Idea, 'tis abfurd to fuppofe 
 the Mind to reafon, imagine, apprehend, or 
 think at all, without them. 
 
 Tho' the Novel ufe of thefe terms might (ag 
 he here complains) occaflon fome diforder and 
 corifufion at their firft introduction, yet fince 
 the Authority of Mr. Locke has chang'd the cu- 
 ftom, and happily determin'd their fignification, 
 we have nothing to do now with the old one ; 
 but muft take them in his fenfe if we would be 
 underftood. And fince it is often impoflible 
 for an Author to find old words exactly corre- 
 fpondent to the Ideas which he wants to ex- 
 prefs; and very difficult to invent new ones'. 
 Every Man is certainly at liberty to fix what 
 Senfe to his words he pleafes and finds rnoft 
 convenient for his purpofe, tho' never fo diffe- 
 rent from the derivation and original Senfe of 
 them, provided he at firft fufficiently explains 
 them, and flicks to that Explanation : Which 
 I think Mr. Locke has generally done. 
 
 He has alfo put it paft difpute, in oppofition 
 to Des-Cartes and others, that thefe Ideas are 
 not innate and pre-exiftent in the Mind, and (o 
 only raifed and refreftTd by the prefence of 
 external Objects; but that they are entirely 
 form'd and produced de novo by them ; or at 
 leaft, that thefe Objects give occafion to . the 
 forming of them ; that there is no manner of 
 innate, (or as fome will have it,} connate Idea, 
 no general Truth, or firft Principle inherent 
 in the Soul and created with it (and the fame I 
 think may be affirm 'd of Paffion, Appetite, Af- 
 fection, iffc.) at leaft none that ever appears in 
 our prefent State ^ no immediate Object of the 
 Mind before external things offer themfelves 
 to it, and it perceives, or becomes confeious 
 of them. 
 
 Our 
 
 f See Lute, B.z. C.i. 4.4. 
 
 See Locke, B. 2. C. 9. $. 4> 

 
 s 
 
 Concerning 
 
 "How we 
 
 the Origin of Evii. 
 
 r more than the former was of Sub/lance, but that hereby we are ac- 
 quainted with its prefence, and diftinguifh it from every other thing j 
 . as we know a Man by his Countenance, and other Circumftances: 
 Nor is it necefTary that thefe mould be applicable to all Subjlance y at 
 all times, and to that alone: For it is enough if for this particular 
 Time and Occafion we know the peculiar Subjiance we are talking of 
 by them ; and fufficiently diftinguifh it from other things. 
 
 VII. It is to be obferved farther, that when a part of this matter 
 SowieVe* 1S remove d another fucceeds into its Place, but is not in the fame 
 of Space. Place confiftent with it. Place therefore feems to be fomething be- 
 yond, befide and diftinct from, the Matter which it receives. For 
 as from hence that Wax was fucceflively capable of different forms, 
 .figures, colours and changes, it appears that fomething is in it befide, 
 and different from all thefe, which we call the Matter of the Wax : 
 So in like manner from hence that the fame Place or Space receives 
 more and different Bodies and Particles of matter fucceffively, but 
 eannot admit more than one at the fame time, it will appear that Place 
 .or Space, is as diftinct from Matter or Body, as Wax is from the Co- 
 ntours fucceffively received j nor is dependent on them any more than 
 Wax is on any particular Form. 
 
 VIIL 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 ' Our Author's chief Objection againft this is, 
 ' that there feems to be no manner of relation, 
 refemblance or conneclion, between the parts and 
 motions of external Objects ; and thoie Ideas, 
 which they are faid to produce in the Mind. 
 But is there any more connection between the 
 raifing and recalling an old Idea by thefe moti- 
 ons, than producing a new one ? Is it harder 
 to conceive how they may generate frejb Ideas, 
 than how they can excite the latent ones. [See 
 N. 7 .] 
 
 (4^ By the word Idea the Author feems here 
 to mean immediate, intimate, perception, or 
 the fame with intuition, as he explains himfelf 
 in his Note, B ; but this, as we have obferv'd, 
 is much better explain'd by Locke, who com- 
 prehends all our Author's Notes, Marks, Cha- 
 racters, and Conceptions, as well as his Images 
 
 and Ideas, under that general word Idea. This 
 was much more convenient for Mr. Locke's Sy- 
 ilem, and the liberty, I apprehend, ought to be 
 allow'd him till a better Syftem be produced 
 on fome other Principles. But his, I fancy, will 
 yet be generally embraced, notwithftandiKg 
 what the ingenious Author of the EJay on the 
 Imagination, and fome others, have of late 
 advane'd to the contrary. As for my part, I 
 cannot conceive what occafion we have to quar- 
 rel, as fome do, with the grot Author above - 
 mention'd for not diftinguifhing between an 
 Idea and a Notion, Sec. when one and the fame 
 word if we pleafe may eafily ferve for all. 
 For an account of the different Opinions of 
 Philofophers about Ideas and their Origin, 
 fee the .word Idea in Chambers's Cyclope- 
 dia* 
 
 (v)Tho' 
 
 Mfc
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 9 
 
 VIII. If therefore we fet afide, or annihilate Matter ', whatfoever what it is.' ~ f 
 ftill remains will all belong to the nature of Space; as in the former 
 cafe when we had fet afide the Properties of Wax, that which belong'd 
 to the Matter or fubftance of it remain'd. If you ask what that is ? 
 I anfwer, firft Local Mobility is to be fet afide, for that feems peculiar 
 to Matter. Secondly, an adtual feparation of Parts, for what is im- 
 moveable cannot be divided. Thirdly, Impenetrability, or Solidity, 
 for that fuppofes Motion, and is neceflary to the Production of it. It 
 remains therefore that Space (as we conceive it) be fomething extend- 
 ed, immoveable, capable of receiving or containing Matter, and pene- 
 trable by it. Tho' therefore we have not a Definition or Idea * of ;.,. ;},;, 
 Space, properly fo call'd ; yet we can hereby fumciently diftinguifh own Senfe 
 it from every other thing, and may reafon about it as much as we h * swjvi 
 have occafion. (5) or N. 4. 
 
 IX. Thefe 
 
 NOTE S. 
 
 (5) Tho' fo much noife has been made about 
 Space, which Leibnitz juftly calls an Idol of 
 fome modern Englijh Men ; and fo great ufe 
 has been made of it in demcnftrating the di- 
 vine Attributes, in a way which fome ftile 
 a Priori; yet, I'm fore'd to confefs that I can- 
 not poffibly frame any other Notion of it, than 
 either,' firft, as the mere negation or a'fence of 
 Matter, or fecondly, as the extenfion of Body, 
 conlider'd abfirailly, or feparate from any parti- 
 cular Body: As zvbitenefs without a white 
 Body, Sec. or thirdly, as a Subject or Subfita- 
 tum of that fame extenfion in abjlraclo, for which 
 laft Notion, See N. 16. 
 
 Now according to the firft Suppofition we 
 may indeed have a pofitive Idea of it, as well as 
 of Silence, Darknefs, and many other Privati- 
 ons ; as Mr. Locke has fully proved that we 
 have, and (hewn the Reafon of it. B. 2. C. 8. 
 ^. 4. But to argue from fuch an Idea of Space, 
 that Space itfelf is fomething external, and has 
 a real exiftence, feems altogether as good Senfe 
 as to fay, that bee? ufe we have a different Idea 
 of Darknejs from that of Light ; of ft 'fence from 
 that of found; of the abfence of any thing, from 
 that of its Prejence ; therefore Darknefs, &c. 
 muft be fomething pofitive and different from 
 Light, crV. and have as real an Exiftence a> 
 Light has. And to deny that we have any 
 
 pofitive Idea, or, which is the very fame, any 
 Idea at all, of the Privations above-mention'd 
 (For every Idea, as it is a perception of the 
 Mind, muft neceffarily be pofitive, tho' it arife 
 from what Locke calls a privative Caufe) To de- 
 ny, I fsy, that we have thefe Ideas, will be to 
 deny Experience and contradict common Senfe. 
 There are therefore Ideas and fimple ones too, 
 which have nothing ad extra correfpondent to 
 them, no proper Ideatum, Archetype, or ob- 
 jective reality, and I don't fee why that of fpace 
 may not be reckon' d one of them. To fay that 
 Space muft have exiftence, becaufe it has fome 
 properties, for inftance, Pcnetr ability, or a capacity 
 of receiving Body, feems tome the fame as to 
 urge that darknefs muft be fomething becaufe it 
 has the power or property of receiving Light ; 
 Silence the property of admitting Sound ; and Ab- 
 fence the property of being fupply'd by Prepuce, 
 i. e. to afiign abfolure Negations, and fuch as 
 by the fame way of reafoning, may be apply'd 
 to nothing, and then call them pofitive proper- 
 ties ; and fo infer, that the Chimera thus cloath- 
 cd with them, muft needs be fomething. Set- 
 ting afide the names of its other pretended pro- 
 perties (which names alfo are as merely nega- 
 tive as the fuppofed properties to which they 
 belong) thofe that attribute extenfion to fpace 
 feera not to attend to the true notion of that 
 C Property,
 
 IO 
 
 Thefe three 
 Concepti- 
 ons, viz. of 
 fenfible 
 Qualities 
 (v. g. Mo- 
 tion, &c.) of 
 Matter and 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 IX. Thefe three conceptions, namely, of fenfible Qualities (viz* 
 Metion, &c.) of Matter and Space, feem to be the chief of thofe 
 
 which 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Space, 
 
 Property, which, as the School-men define it 
 (and let them who like not this definition try 
 
 that are ex 
 'ernaL 
 
 feem 
 
 chieT f th f l ^' Ve us a ^ etter ^ ls t0 n * ve P artes extra P artei > 
 c and as fuch, /'. r. as including farts (which 
 parts, as they differ in fituation from each other, 
 nuyi have things predicated of fome of them 
 different from thofe which can be predicated of 
 others) it appears plainly inconfxflent with their 
 own Idea of" fimple, uniform, indivifible fpace, 
 and applicable to Matter only : And to. attri 
 bute Extenfion, or parts, to fpace, according n 
 the firft notion of it hid down by us, will be 
 the fame as to talk of the extenlion or parts of 
 Abjence ; of Privation, or of mere 'Nothing. Laft 
 ly, to ask if Space under the fecond Notion of 
 that word, i.e. as Extenfion in the Abftract, be 
 extended, or have parts, is apparently abfurd ; 
 'tis the fame with that noted Queftion cf the 
 Man, who being told that to have Riches was 
 to be rich, ask*d if Riches then themielves were 
 Rich ? Well, but tho' we can't affign any po- 
 fitive or confiftent properties to fpace, yet, fay 
 they, we have a Clear Idea of Dijlance itfelf, 
 and of different diftances one greater than ano- 
 ther, which proves that this is fomething real. 
 Let us examine our Idea of Dijlance a little far- 
 ther, and I believe, we (hall And it to be only 
 the Conception . of a mere pojjibility for a line 
 of fuch a certain length, or a Body of fuch di- 
 menfiens, to be contain'd between two other Bo- 
 dies, by mentally applying a material meajure of 
 fo many inches, feet, isc. to the fuppofed di- 
 jlance between thefe two bodies ; of which ma- 
 terial meafure, and of its increafablenefs, we have, 
 indeed, a clear Idea, as alfo of the poflibility 
 of its being placed between thefe two bodies, 
 tho* at prefent it be not fo placed : And this 
 feeras to me to be all the conception or Idea, 
 th3t -we can pofiibly frame about it. Well,' 
 then, according to the firft Suppofition, Space' 
 will be mere non entity, or nothing, n e. no-| 
 thing can be affirmed, but every thing deny'd! 
 of it : According to the fecond, it will be on-' 
 Jy an abjlratt Idea form'd in the mind from a 
 
 property peculiar to matter,, which property 
 abftrafted in Idea cannot itfelf admit of any 
 other properties, nor be applicable to the Di- 
 vine Nature, nor capable of pofitive Infinity in 
 any refpedl. 
 
 " If Space, fays Dr. Cudtoorth, be concluded 
 " to be nothing elfe but the -Exte njien and Di- 
 *' Jlance of body, or matter confidered in general 
 *' (without refpedl: to this or that particular 
 " body) and abjlraclly in order to the Con- 
 " ception of Motion, and the menfuration of 
 " things, then do we fay that there appeareth 
 " no fuffieient grounds for this pofitive lnjinity 
 " of Space, we being certain of no more than 
 " this, that be the World, or any figurate bo- 
 " dy, never fo great, it is not impoffible but 
 " that it might ftill be greater and greater 
 " without end. Which Indefinite increajab/e- 
 " nejs of body and fpace feems to be miftaken 
 " for a pofitive infinity thereof. Whereas for 
 n this very Reafon, becaufe it can never be fo 
 "great, but that more magnitude may ftill be- 
 " added to it, therefore it can never be pofi- 
 " tively Infinite. 
 
 *' To conclude therefore, by Space without 
 " the finite World, is to be underltood nothing 
 " but the poflibility of body farther and far- 
 " ther, without end, yet fo as never to reach 
 " to Infinity. " 
 
 Hence appears the Weaknefs of that common 
 Argument urg'd by GaJJendus, Dr. Clarke, and 
 Raphjon, for the abjohiie infinity of Space, viz. 
 From the impoflibility of letting bounds or // 
 mits to it; fince that, fay they, would be to 
 fuppofe Space bounded by fomething which it* 
 felf occupies Space, or elfe by nothing, both 
 which are-contradictions. 
 
 Which Argument, either firft of all fuppofes 
 that Space is really fome thing, or fome pofitive 
 Quality ; which wants to be proved : Or elfe 
 improperly applies bounds and bounders to 
 mere non-entity, or bare poflibility; which 
 has nothing to do with the Idea of Bounds. 
 
 * True Iff/ell. Syfitm, p. 644 & 766^ 
 
 X.
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 which we have from without, and fo natural to us that there is no rea- 
 sonable Man but perceives them in himfelf. There are fome who deny 
 
 C 2 . that 
 
 N 7 E s. 
 
 XX 
 
 If therefore we take Space in the firft Notion 
 laid down, then its unboundednefs, will (as 
 Dr. Cudwortb fays) fignify nothing but the 
 poffibility of Body farther and farther with 
 out end ; according to which Senfe, Let us 
 itate their ufual Queition in other Words, and 
 the great fallacy and impropriety of it will ap- 
 pear. What is there, fay they, beytnd this 
 Space? You mud either imagine more fuch 
 Space or nothing. What is there, fay we, be- 
 yond this pojfibility of Exigence ? You muft ei- 
 ther imagine mtre fuch pojfibility of Exijlence or 
 mere nothing, i. e. non Exijlence. What Confe- 
 quence can poflibly be drawn from fuch an odd 
 kind of Argumentation ? 
 
 But if Space betaken in the fecond Senfe, 
 i. e. as Extenfion \n abfiraclo, then the meaning 
 of our not being able to Jet bounds to it will only 
 be, that we have a power of enlarging our ab- 
 ftradl Idea in Infinitum, or that we always find 
 rn our felves the fame ability to a<ld to, or re- 
 peat it, and if we always find that we can add, 
 we fhall never find that we cannot add, which 
 (as a very eminent Writer on the Subject ob 
 lerves) is all the Myftery of the Matter, and 
 all that can be underftood by infinite Space. 
 But it is farther urg'd that there muft be fome 
 thing more in the prefent Cafe ; for we fine 
 not only a Power of enlarging the Idea, but find it 
 impofiible to fet bounds to the thing ; whereas, wc 
 tan enlarge the Idea of Matter to infinity, but can 
 alfo jet bounds to the thing it J elf. Jn anfwer to 
 the firft part of this Objection 'tis ask'd, What 
 thing, 1 pray you, but the thing in your own 
 mind, that is, the Idea ? Prove it to be thing; 
 and then we'll enquire whether it has bounds 
 or not; but to fay the thing is infinite or 
 boundlefs, before you have prov'd it to exift, 
 or to be a thing, is too large a ftep to take. 
 The abovc-memion'd excellent Writer folves 
 the Difficulty arifing from the fecond part of 
 the Objection by another parallel Cafe. " When 
 " I confider the number of the Stars, I can go 
 " numbering on in my thoughts ftill more and 
 " more Stars in Infinitum, But I can alfo fet 
 " bounds to them, can fuppofe their numbers 
 
 finite, but to number itfelf I can fet no 
 bounds. Yet what is Number ? Nothing 
 but an Abftraft Idea, nothing ad extra, _and 
 to fay to that number is infinite, comes only 
 to this, that we cam fet no bounds to our 
 Faculty of Numbering, it being always as 
 eafy to add to a thoufand, or a Million, one 
 more, CSV. as to One. Well then, to fet 
 bounds to number in the abftradt, is to fet 
 bounds to the Faculty itfelf, and to deny that 
 it is in my Power to add, when I plainly 
 perceive that I can ; and fo is a direct Con- 
 tradiction. But as to the Number of Stars, 
 or Hairs, or Men, or any thing, I can fet 
 bounds to that, without any contradiction, 
 becaufe it ftill leaves me in pofTeflion of the 
 power of numbering, which I find I have ; 
 and which does not require any fubjeel ad 
 jextra, but may go -on independent of any, 
 and indifferent to all. Now to apply this to 
 other cafes : the Mind finds in itfelf the far 
 culty of enlarging and extending its Idea of 
 extenfion. 'It can apply it to Matter, or can 
 let it alone; can fuppole Matter infinitely ex- 
 panded, or can fet bounds' to it: But to fet 
 bounds to all Extenfion, as well imaginary 
 as real, is cramping the Faculty, is denying 
 it the power of enlarging, which is always 
 prefent to the mind, and which fhe can ne- 
 ver lofe; and, in a word, is a contradiction. 
 Any, either imaginary, or real> Subject is 
 fufficient for the mind to exercife its Facul- 
 ties upon; and fo if you either fuppofe God 
 or Matter, or Space to be infinitely extend- 
 ed, it is equally fatisfied with any. All 
 that fhe requires is that fhe may be able to 
 enlarge the Idea of Extenfion. But, if you 
 take from her Extenfion itfelf, that is the 
 Idea of it, and the Power of adding to it, 
 you deprive her of her Faculty, and deny 
 her a power which fhe finds fhe has. In a 
 word, wc can fet bounds to any thing that 
 ftill leaves the power of enlarging or ex- 
 tending infinitely, as we find, we always 
 fcm: and if we would fpeak ftrictiy, it is 
 not number that is infinite nor extenfion infi- 
 
 " nite.
 
 1 5 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 that Space is any thing diftinct from Matter, nor. is it much to our 
 
 purpofe 
 
 n o r E S. 
 
 nite, which are nothing but nitions abftracTed 
 from things: But the mind of Man is able 
 to proceed numbering or extending infi- 
 nitely, that is, without ever coming to any 
 Stop or Bounds. For to fet bounds is to 
 deny and deftroy the Faculty itfelf: if it 
 could not always do it, it could not do it at 
 all. He that can add one to one, as often 
 as he will, can never find an end of num- 
 bering, nor he that can double an Inch as 
 often as he will, find an end of enlarging ; 
 itisall nothing more than repening one of 
 the eafieft operations or exercifes of the 
 mind, and it will always be a contradiction 
 
 for any rational Mrnd to want it: The 
 
 Cafe being plainly thus, I think it fhould 
 not be ask'd, why a Man cannot fet bounds 
 to Number or Extenfion, but how he comes 
 to have the Faculty of Counting and Re 
 peating, which is really tantamount to the 
 other, and what it ultimately refolves into. 
 And then, I fuppofe, the Anfwer is very 
 eafy, and'we need not go to the utmoft 
 Limits of the World to enable us to refolve 
 the Riddle. - '--_ . 
 
 " f cannot but (mile to obferve how grofly 
 we are.impofed upon by Words ftanding for 
 abftraft Ideas, for want of confidering how, 
 and upon what Occafions, thefe abftracl: 
 Ideas were invented for the Help* of weak 
 and narrow Conceptions, and have been ufed 
 fo long till they are thought to ftand for real 
 Things. - ~ I forgot to add, that we find 
 much the fame Cafe with refpeft to the Di- 
 vifibility of Extenfion, as in regard to the 
 other.. For when we h*ve mentally divided 
 our imaginary Space into 10, 20, or 30 
 parts, we are not in the leaft hinder' d from 
 dividing and ; fubdividing every part, as 
 often and as long as we pleafe< For by this 
 Artifice of the Mind, Divifibility is brought 
 under Addition, and there is no End of that. 
 We can always be adding to the number of 
 divifible parts one way, as well as to en- 
 larged parts the other. They are both but 
 the fame work of the Mind. And hence 
 come many notable demonftrations of the 
 
 w Dfaiflbtlity of Extenjitn (and fometimes, 
 " Matter) in infinitum : the Englilh of. all 
 " which is no more than this, that whenever. 
 " we begin to add, we know not when to 
 " have done becaufe its nothing elfe but do- 
 ** ing the fame over and over again, and we 
 u do not lofe, but rather improve, our Facul- 
 " ties by the Exercife of them 
 I " To conclude this Point: I hope it fuffi- 
 " ciently appears that the Power the Mind" ha*- 
 " of adding and repeating does abundantly 
 " account fot our not being able to fet bounds 
 " to Ideal Extenfion, any more than to N;.mler, 
 " in the abiiract, or to Divifibility, all arifing 
 *) from one and jhe fame Principle, and owing 
 " to the fame Caufe:" - 
 
 A This, I think, is a folid "and ample confuta- 
 tion of the Argument drawn from the Idea of 
 Space and its imaginary infinity. We (hall only 
 add a Word or two to fhew that Duration, as 
 well as Space, Number, and all Quantity ; Any 
 thing which can be confidered only by way of 
 parts, or in fucceffion ; is abfolutely repugnant. 
 to, or incapable of, true pofitive infinity in: 
 any refpect. Now by a pofitive, or Met 'a phy- 
 fua 1 , Infinite we always mean that which is ab- 
 folutely Perfeft in its kind, which cannot ad- 
 mit of Addition, or Increafe. 'Tis an Idea of a 
 certain Quality in the Abftrael, which has no 
 mixture of the contrary Quality in it, no fai- 
 lure or defeel : and which therefore is our Stan- 
 dard to which we always refer, and by which 
 we try, all imperfeftions, all mix'd or finite 
 Qualities, which are for this reafon called im- 
 perfect., becaufe they fall fhort of our original 
 Standard, and are properly negations of it: 
 Confequently our Idea of Perfection muft be a 
 pofitive one, and prior fo that of Imperfetlion ; 
 as will appear from Cudworth cited in X e, 
 where the Reader may find a full account of 
 this pofitive Infinity, and how we get the Idea 
 of it, and are able to diftinguilh it from that 
 negative one explain'd by Mr. Locke, which is 
 frequently confounded with it. 
 
 To return. If then a Metaphyfical Infinite 
 means per/eel, or that to which nothing can be, 
 added, 'tis plain that Duration,. Number, and, 
 
 all
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 purpofe whether it be or no : yet we cannot without offering Vio- 
 
 C 3 lence 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *i 
 
 sH Quantity, the very Nature and Idea of 
 which includes perpetual Increafe ablenefs ox Ad- 
 dibility, muft be efTentially incapable of this 
 abfolute or pofitive Infinity, in like manner as 
 Cudzvortb has {hewn of Space and Body in the 
 PafTage referr'd to above. Farther, if we 
 attend to the Notion of an Infinite Series, and 
 take a view of the manifold Abfurdities which 
 accompany it, in any manner of conception 
 (from which abfurdities we draw our only 
 Proof of afirfiCaufe, or God) we mail be ne- 
 ceflarily led to exclude from Infinity all fuch 
 things as exift Seriatim, or mull be conceiv'd as 
 confining in, and compofed of, faccejjive parts, 
 i. e. fuch as Duration, Number, Space, Motion, 
 Magnitude, sV. all which, when faid to be 
 infinite, are nothing but fo many infinite Series, 
 and therefore liable to the fame abfurdities ; 
 as the abovemention'd Author has demonftrated 
 of them altogether. Intell. Syfism, p. 643, &c 
 and of Motion in particular, p. 843. The fame 
 is fhewn of Duration or Time, by Dr. Bent ley, 
 Boyle"*! Left. Serm. 3. p. 104, 105, 5th Edit. 
 Where fpeaking of Infinite Generations of Men 
 fuppofed to be already pafi (and the Argument 
 is the very fame in Years or Ages) " What- 
 " foever, fays he, is now paft, was once aftu- 
 " ally prefent ; fo that each of thofe infinite 
 " Generations, was once in its turn actually 
 " prefent, therefore all except one Generation 
 " were once future ; and not in being, which 
 *' deftroys the very Suppofition : For either that 
 ** one Generation muft itfelf have been infi- 
 * nite, which is nonfenfe ; or it was the finite 
 * beginning of infinite Generations, between 
 " itfelf and us, that is, infinity terminated at 
 " both ends, which is nonfenfe as before. A- 
 " gain, Infinite pad Generations of Men have 
 " been once actually prefent, there may be 
 " fome one man, fuppofe then, that was at 
 " infinite diftance from us now, therefore that 
 " man's fon likewife, 40 years younger, fup- 
 " pofe, than his father, was either at infinite 
 '* diftance from us, or at finite : if that Son 
 " too was at infinite diftance from us, then one 
 u infinite is longer by 40 years than another; 
 " which is abfurd : if at finite, then 40 years 
 
 u added to finite makes it infinite, which is as 
 " abfurd as the other. " 
 
 Thefc and a great many more Arguments of 
 the fame kind occur in Sir M. Hale's Primitive 
 Origination of Mankind, \ I. c. 4. and Stil- 
 lingfieefs Origines Sacrse, B. 3. C. l prop. 7, 
 8. See alfo the Confutation of an Infinite Se- 
 ries offucceffive Beings in the beginning of 
 N. 18. and Xb. (How this Realbning is 
 confident with the Eternity of God, and what 
 the true meaning of that Attribute is, fee N. 1 8. 
 X. c. or Dr. Bentley's 3d Sermon at Beyle's Lec- 
 ture, prop. 1. or A. Bp King's Sermon on Pre- 
 deftination, 3V.) The like is fhewn oi Number 
 and all Quantity, by the ingenious Author of 
 the Impartial Enquiry into the exiflence and na- 
 ture of God, p. 24, f3V. " If any Number 
 " be abfolutely or infinitely great, it can be 
 " for no other reafon than becaufe 'tis abfolute-. 
 ** \y or in its very nature incapable of increafe 
 " without an abfolute contradiction. But the 
 " very nature of all Quantity infers on the 
 " contrary a neceffify of the increafe of its 
 " Greatnefs on the fuppofition of the leaft ad- 
 " dition : For fince no Quantity is more or. 
 " lefs fuch, or poflefTes more or lefs of the 
 " nature of Quantity, than another, it fol- 
 " lows, that all Quantities being of the 
 " fame general Nature muft feverally bear a 
 " proportion to each other. For example, 
 " that can be no Unit which by the addition 
 " of an Unit will not become two: and by 
 " parity of reafon, that is no Million which 
 " by the addition of a fingle Unit will not 
 " increafe to the greatnefs of a Million and an 
 " Unit. For if it bebut a Million after the 
 " Addition of an Unit, 'tis plain it muft be- 
 " fore that Addition have been lefs than a 
 
 " Million by an Unit The like may be 
 
 " faid of all other Quantities, p. 25. " 
 
 The Learned Dr. Clarke endeavours to evade 
 all thefe Arguments about Parts, &c. by 
 denying that any Number of Years, Days, 
 and Hours; or of Miles, Yards, or Feet, 6v. 
 " can be confider'd as any aliquot, or confli- 
 " tuent parts of infinite Time or Space, or be 
 ' compared at all with it, or bear any kind: 
 
 " bi)
 
 ijj. Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 lenee to our Underftandings, deny but that the conception of Space 
 is diftindt from the conception of Matter. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 AT T E S. 
 
 " of proportion to it, or be the foundation of 
 " any Argument in any Queftion concerning 
 " it. Demsnfir. of the Divine Attr. p. 37, 
 38. 5th Edit. But does not this look fome- 
 thing like avoiding one great difficulty by 
 admitting a greater f For how do we come 
 at our confufed Idea of infinite Quantity But by 
 firft having a clear Idea of fome certain part of 
 that Quantity, in Space, For inftance, of fuch 
 a Hated Length, as a Foot ; in Time, of an Hour, 
 itfc. and then by doubling, trebling, or any 
 way multiplying, that fame Idea as long as we 
 pleafe, and ftill findin as much room for, or 
 poffibility of, multiplying it as we did when 
 we began: "After the utmoft enlargement of 
 " that Idea w can poffibly make, we find 
 " no more reafon to ftop, nor are one Jot 
 " nearer the End of fuch enlargement, than 
 " we were when we firft fet out. Locke B. 2. 
 c. 17. ^3. >Bnt does this Idea of Infinite 
 (which feems to be the only one the Do&or 
 ever thought of ) when applied to Time or Space, 
 alter the very nature, ejfence, and idea of that 
 Time and Space ? Don't we ftill confider it as 
 an infinity of the fame Time and Space; or as 
 confifting in a continual addibility of fuch por- 
 tions of Time and Space; or as a Whole (if 
 that word did not imply limitation) made up of 
 numberlefs fuch parts of time and fpace as are 
 of the fame kind with thefe hours and feet ? 
 To fay that infinite Space has no parts, is (as 
 Leibnitz urges in his fourth Letter to Dr. Clarke 
 N. 11. p. 99.) " to fay that it does not confift 
 " of finite Spaces ; and that infin'rte Space 
 ' might fubfift, tho' all finite fpaces mould be 
 " reduced to nothing. It is as if one mould 
 " fay, in the Cartefian fuppoikion of a mate- 
 " rial, extended, Unlimited World, that 
 " fuch a World might fubfift, tho" all the Bo- 
 " dies of which it confifts, fhould be reduced 
 " to nothing." 'Tis therefore impoflible to 
 conceive, that hours and feet, &c. fhould not 
 be aliquot parts of infinite Time and fpace, and 
 that thefe parts fhould not bear fome kind of 
 Proportion to this Infinity. Thefe parts in- 
 deed will never reach our pojitive abjulute Lnfi- 
 
 nity (i. e. that to which nothing can poffibly 
 be added) becaufe they include a perpetual ad- 
 dibility, as we obferv'd, which is call'd their 
 Infinity, and which is a direct contndi&ion to 
 what we call a pofitive Infinite : And therefore 
 pofitive Infinity apply'd to them is very wrong 
 apply'd, and a pofitive infinity of Matter, num- 
 ber, time, fpace, any quantity or quality that 
 confifts of parts, or muft be confider'd in fuc- 
 ceffion, i. e. to which this negative infinite, and 
 this only, is and muft be apply'd, are all con- 
 tradictions. Now inftead of anfwering this 
 Argument againft the abfolute Infinity of Time 
 and Space, Dr. Clarke firft of all fuppofes that 
 time and fpace are abfolutely infinite, and the* 
 becaufe, according to this our way of conceiv- 
 ing infinity, (v$iich yet is the only way we 
 have of conceiving it in thefe things) they 
 could not poffibly be infinite: He argues that 
 we muft not confider them in this way, namely 
 as if their parts had any relation at all to their 
 Infinity. But fhould not the Argument rather 
 be revers'd, and the confequence of it ftand 
 thus ? This is our only way of conceiving any 
 infinite applicable to thefe Things, but this way 
 we cannot conceive thefe to be pofitively infi- 
 nite (or pofitive Infinity cannot be apply'd to 
 thefe) without a contradiction ; therefore we 
 cannot at all cone?iv r e thefe to be pofitively 
 Infinite without a contradiction, or therefore 
 thefe are not pofitively infinite. 
 
 There is indeed a certain ufe of the term in- 
 finite among Mathematicians, where this rea- 
 foning of Dr. Clarke** might be admitted, but 
 that is only where they confider Quantities, re- 
 latively, and not abfolutely, and therefore that 
 can have no place where we are confidering 
 real Exiflences. Thus when Geometricians 
 fay that one Quantity is infinitely lefs than a- 
 nother, they mean that their infinitely fmall 
 Quantity is no aliquot part of, bears no pro- 
 portion to, or cannot be compared with the 
 other ; but proportion is (nothing Teal but) 
 purely relative, and therefore the "term infinite 
 apply'd-here muft be fo too. Thus for inftance, 
 the Angle of Contadl made by a Curve and its 
 
 Tangent
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil 
 
 i* 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of the Enquiry after the Firfl Caufe. 
 
 I. Suppofing thefe three, viz. Motion , Matter, and Space, we are in An enquiry 
 the next place to examine whether they be of themielves, or of fome- concerning 
 thing elfe? If of themfelves, the thing is done, and we are to enquire Matter%nd ' 
 no farther about it. For tiiofe things that exift by Nature are caufes s P ace ; whe * 
 of Exiftence to themfelves, i. e. do not ftand in need of any external [ft"/ thenk*"" 
 caufe - y if they depend on fomething elfe, there will be a queftion about klves. 
 that alfo, what it is, and what are its properties. 
 
 II. We muft prefume that all our conceptions of fknple Objecls We are to 
 without us are true, that is, reprefent the things as God would have ^ orm our 
 them known to us, except we elfewhere difcover fome Fallacy or Pre- thinfTwhe - 
 judice adhering to them. (6) For we can judge of things no otherwife ^ her the y *- 
 than from our Conceptions. Nor are we to feek for any other (B.) l ^ s th{ 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Tangent is infinitely lefs than any rectilinear 
 Angle, i. e. bears no proportion to it, is no 
 mcafure of it, or cannot any ways be compared 
 with it. If this were not the fenfe of Ma- 
 thematicians here, I cannot fee how there could 
 be a difference of Infinites amongft them, but 
 'tis well known that they have infinitely little 
 quantities, which yet are infinitely great ones, 
 i. e. with refpeft to other Quantities : And 
 thus they may have an infinite fuccefhon of in- 
 creafing quantities, every one of which fhall 
 be infinitely greater than the other that is low- 
 r in the feries : * But all this is nothing to ab- 
 folute Metaphyfical Infinite which cannot be 
 confider'd in that manner, and therefore what 
 relates to the former infinites cannot be the 
 foundation of any Argument concerning this. 
 The equivocal ufe of the word Infinite in thefe 
 different fenfes by jumbling Mathematics and 
 Metaphyfics together, has, I believe, occafion'd 
 moft of the Confufion attending Subjects of 
 this kind. 
 
 Criterion require a 
 
 Caufe, front 
 our fimple 
 
 (6.) Thus in Sight we find the fhapt nn&ftze ^"nTher"* 
 of a vifible objett are very much varied upon j s no eroun( j 
 
 to fufpeft a 
 Fallacy. 
 
 us according to its diftance, and the fituation of 
 the place from whence the profpeel is taken. 
 When the Picture of Objefts being prick'd 
 out by the Pencils of rays upon the Retina of the 
 Eye do not give the true Figure of thofe Ob- 
 jects (as they not always do, being diverfely 
 projected, as the Lines proceeding from the fe- 
 veral points happen to fall upon that concave 
 fur/ace) this, tho' it might impofe upon a Being 
 that has no faculty fuperior to fenfe, does not 
 impofe upon our Reafon, which knows how the 
 appearance is alter'd, and why. Reafon may be 
 apply'd to over-rule and correct fenfe in this 
 and the like cafes. Wollafion Re/. Nat. delin. 
 p. 54, ci>V. fee more impofitions of this kind 
 in Locked EJ'ay, B. 2. C 9. . 8, 9. 
 
 (JS) They who look for any other Criterion 
 of Truth or Certainty lofe their Labour; they 
 who fay that a Clear, diftintl, or determinate Idea 
 is the Criterion, are never the nigher, for the 
 
 Qijefrw n 
 
 * Vid. Ntvittn Princ. Math. L. 1.^.1. Keil Introd. *d ver. Phyf. $ 3. and Hayes's Fluxions ad, 
 Jrincip,
 
 l4 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 Criterion of Truth than that a Conception of any thing offered to the 
 
 Mind 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Qucftion returns, viz: by what Criterion are 
 we certain that this Jdea is clear, dijluiQ or de- 
 terminate, or that this is to be look'd upon as 
 the Criterion ; aad fo on in infinitum : we muft 
 therefore flop fome where, and determine of the 
 lirtellecl, as of the fenfes, that an Object by its 
 prefence, according as it is reprefented to the 
 Mind, whether it be dear, or objcure, diftintl or 
 eonfufed; whether it be determinate ox indeter- 
 minate, effectually determines that to exert the 
 aft it fhould exert, and that there is no need of 
 any Criterion. For inftance, if any one would 
 be certain whether the Sun fhines, whether the 
 Light be clear, or obfeure, he need ufe no o- 
 ther Criterion befide his Eyes, let him open 
 them, and whether Tie will or no, he'll per- 
 ceive whether. it fhines -or not, and alfo what 
 that Light is, nor can he otherwife avoid per- 
 ceiving this, and -being certain of it, than by 
 Slutting or turning away his Eyes. The fame 
 Method is to be obferved in Intellectuals. Let 
 him that wants to know whether any Propor- 
 tion be true or falfe, apply it to his Mind, with 
 the Reafons which prove or difprove it (if there 
 need any Reafons) and he'll be fore'd whether 
 he will or no, to affent or dijfent, or fufpend his 
 afTent, according as the Condition of the ob- 
 ject requires; nor can he avoid paffing his 
 Judgment but by diverting his Intellect. For 
 fince perception of Objedts is an Ad of the. 
 Mind itfelf, and clear nefs or obfeurity, determi- 
 natenefs or undeterminaienefs, are modes or affec- 
 tions of this Ael of conceiving Objects, not of the 
 Objecls themfelves, we can judge of the AcTs of 
 our Minds and their affections no otherwife 
 than from the Senfe and Indication of the Mind 
 itfelf. For as by a power of the Mind we are 
 confeious that we perceive a thing, fo by the 
 very fame power we are no lefs confeious whe- 
 ther we perceive the thing obfeurely or clearly, 
 determinately or indeterminately. 
 
 Nor do they come off better who put the 
 Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas for a Crite- 
 rion ; nay worfe, for they think to difpatch a 
 matter of the greateft Confequence by a Meta- 
 phor, which is unworthy of Philofophers. Nor 
 
 yet do they attain their End ; for the Queftion 
 recurs as before, by what Criterion are they 
 affur'd of the Agreement or Difagreement of 
 Ideas, or whence did they learn the Truth of 
 this proportion, viz. That this is the Criterion of 
 Truth? If they fay, 'tis evident to the Mind of 
 itfelf and needs no other Criterion, why are 
 not other Truths after the fame manner difco- 
 vered without a Criterion ? Setting afide Cri- 
 terions therefore, we muft neceffarily attend to 
 the Conceptions themfelves, and in all things 
 fellow the Guidance of our Mind. For it will 
 as certainly embrace Truth duly offer'd to it, as 
 Fire will confume combuftible Matter : And 
 there's no more neceffity for a Criterion for the 
 Under/landing to diftinguifh Truth from Falfe- 
 hood, than for the Fire to diftinguifh between 
 combuftible and incombuftible Matter : Apply 
 an Objeft, and the thing will be done of itfelf. 
 A Perfon imy reply, that there is fomething in 
 the combuftible Matter which fits it for the re- 
 ception of the Flame, namely fulphur, or fome- 
 thing of that nature; after the fame manner 
 alfo there is fomething in things whereby they 
 are naturally fitted to determine the Affent of 
 Underftanding, and this is the Agrecm:nt or 
 Conformity of Ideas, which therefore difcovers 
 the Truth, and is the Criterion by which the 
 Underftanding is determined. I anfwer, all 
 Logicians (as far as I remember^ u.ed to found 
 Affirmation in the Agreement, Negation in the 
 Difagreement of the Terms between themfelves, 
 and Illation, in their Agreement in/fJie fame 
 third. But fince this Conformity or Agree- 
 ment of the Terms may be either real or appa- 
 rent, here is the proper place and ufe of a Cri- 
 terion, namely to diftinguifh the apparent from 
 the real: For a verbal affirmation of the agree- 
 ment between the Terms, when the Mind per- 
 ceives none, is a lye ; when 'tis only apparent, 
 an Error ; but in both a Falfity. 
 
 If any one can produce any other Criterion 
 to diftinguifh this apparent conformity, or dif- 
 agreement, from the real, befide the-application 
 and attention of the Mind, he might be thought 
 to have difcover'd fomething truly ufeful to 
 
 Mankind.; 
 
 I
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 Mind forcibly extorts affentj as there is no other Criterion of Ob- 
 jects perceived by the Senfes, than that an Object, by its prefence for- 
 ces us to perceive it even againft our Wills. If therefore the Concep- 
 tions 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *7 
 
 Mmkind; but inftead of that to put upon us 
 the very Agreement or difagreement of Ideas, 
 is to lay down the thing itielf as done, about 
 which the Query is how it can be done ? For 
 that is what we enquire after, i. e. how we may 
 be certain that we are not deceiv'd in taking 
 apparent Conformity for real. I know, there 
 is a certain Art of propofing Truths to the Un- 
 derfhnding by which it may more eafily per- 
 ceive and judge whether they really agree or 
 no ; as there is an art of placing the Fuel fo as 
 to take Fire more readily, but this is nothing 
 to the Criterion of Truth; nay it proves that 
 there is none other befide the Mind duely ap- 
 ply'd. 
 
 'Tis to be obferv'd alfo that the Antients 
 placed Affirmation in the Agreement of the 
 Terms, much more properly than the Moderns 
 do in the Agreement of Ideas'. For as we 
 have (hewn before, * we know feveral Truths 
 of things whereof we have properly no Ideas ; 
 unlefs they will abufe the Word Idea contrary 
 to common ufe, and the fenfe of Antiquity. 
 For according to Plato, who feems to have been 
 the firft that introduced Ideas into Philofophy, 
 Knowledge by Ideas is peculiar to God, who 
 alone perceives thing3 immediately by their Ef- 
 fences : But we (as was fhewn before, f) by 
 Marks and Characters, which whether they be 
 imprefs'd on the Mind by immediate fenfation 
 from the Things themfelves, or colleftcd from 
 the fimilitude, proportion, or relation to the 
 Things which are perceived by the Senfes, can- 
 not more properly be calTd the Ideas of Things, 
 than the very Words can : For they are often 
 no more like the Effences of things, nor is it 
 neceffary that they mould ; fince they fuffici- 
 ently anfvver the ends for which Knowledge 
 was given us, if they diftinguifh things from 
 one another and difcover their Ufes. 
 
 And in reality this feems to be the only dif- 
 ference between Words and thefe Maris, that 
 
 D 
 
 we connect Sounds with the things by volun- 
 tary impofition, but the fen/at ions of the Mind, 
 which itt the Marks whereby the Underftani- 
 ing ditlinguifhes things from each other, arc 
 join'd by Nature to the Prefence of them. 'Tis 
 from Inftitution, for Inftance, that we call a 
 Body from which Light is diffufed, the Sun : 
 But nature imprints the fenfation of Light, and 
 a Globe of two Foot upon the prefence of it, 
 which are the marks from whence the Mind 
 reafons about it, and perhaps refemble its Ef- 
 fence no more than that very found of the 
 Word Sun does. 
 
 'Tis to be obferv'd farther, that thefe Marks 
 are produced in us at various times, and by 
 different Faculties, and fometimes have no 
 manner of connection with each other. When 
 this happens, we are in doubt whether they 
 belong to the fame thing: fometimes alfo they 
 are equivocal, and belong to more things, and 
 then we enquire whether the things with 
 which they are connected be different. That 
 we be not impofed upon by thefe, there's need 
 of Enquiry, Attention, Obfcrvation and Re-fear cb; 
 By application to thefe, the Underltanding 
 difcovers Truth, and embraces it when dif- 
 cover'd, without any Criterion, belide the 
 Power implanted in it by Nature, whereby 'tis 
 naturally adapted to perceive the Truth duly 
 propofed (as the Sight does Colours, the Tafte 
 favours) and to diftinguifh, by Marks, the real 
 from the apparent Congruity of Things. (7) 
 
 (7) Tho' our Author feems to have been ar- 
 guing flrenuoufly againft Locke in moll of this 
 Note; yet the whole, I think, is a difpute on- 
 ly about Words, and will come to the very 
 fame thing, whether we take his, or Locke's 
 Account of it. Our Author fays, a Concep- 
 tion offer'd to the Mind forces its affent, with- 
 out any other Criterion of its reality or con- 
 formity to the Thing. Locke tells us, that 
 Truth, or Certainty, confifts entirely in the 
 
 Con- 
 
 * Note A: 
 
 f Note A.
 
 j 8 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 tions which we have of thefe three before mention'd, reprefent them 
 to us as exifting necejj'arily, fo that they cannot be feparated from Ex- 
 igence (C) even in Thought, we muri affirm that thefe exift of them- 
 
 f elves, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Connexion, Relation or Agreement of our I- 
 deas, of which connection, &c. we have no 
 other evidence than the real perception of it 
 by the Mind. Our Author affirms, that the 
 Application or Attention of the Mind is fuffi- 
 cient to diftinguifh Truth from Falihood. Locke 
 <ys, a clear perception of the Mind is all that 
 is required to that -end.; Our Author tells us, 
 in the tail place, that Truth or Affirmation was 
 much better placed in an agreement of Terms, 
 Marks, or Charaelers, than of Ideas. Locke di- 
 ftinguifhes. Truth into Verbal (which is the 
 conformity of Ideas to the Terms) and Mental 
 (which is the conformity of Ideas to each o- 
 ther) and Metaphyseal, or real, (which is their 
 conformity to the real exiftence of things) of 
 which laft kind of Truth we have no Criteri- 
 on, fo that there feems to be no other diffe- 
 rence between thefe two Authors, than what 
 lies in the different ufe of the Word Idea (as 
 was above mentioned in the Notes 3 and 4.) 
 which, according to the Latitude 'tis ufually 
 taken in by Mr. Locke and his Followers, com- 
 prehends all our Author's Marks, Charaelers, 
 Senfattons, and Conceptions, Sec. For a more 
 compleat anfwer to that old Queftion, What is 
 the General Criterion of Truth ? fee Mr. Wattsh 
 Logic, P. 2. c.2. V7. P- 1 73, 174- 2d. Edit. 
 (C.) This way of Reasoning is different 
 from that of Des Cartes : for he applies this Ar- 
 gument to Complex Ideas made by the Mind 
 out of fimple ones, but this proceeds upon 
 fimple ones only. The ground of the diffe- 
 rence lies in this, the Mind may erroneoufly 
 join fuch things together as neither are nor can 
 be join'd in nature: for* example, the moil 
 perfect Being is made up of a Collection of all 
 the Perfections which the Mind has obferv'd 
 difperfed all over Nature: But whether fuch a 
 Collection does really exift any where may well 
 be queftion'dj (8.) nor can it be proved from 
 that very collection or Idea, which is a Work 
 of the Mind alone. But the cafe is different 
 in a fimple Idea produced by the Objett itfelf. 
 
 .For fince this comes not from elfewhere, we 
 cannot attribute any other manner of Exiftence 
 to it than that which it brings along with it 
 into the Mind. 
 
 When I think of a Man prefent, I cannot 
 but believe that he exiils, /. c. I attribute aHual 
 Exiftence to him ; but that he will exift for the 
 future, I perceive, may either be or not be, 
 ./. e. I affign him poftible Exiftence j but if there 
 be any thing, which, from the lde\ that I have 
 of it, I cannot confider otherwife than as ex- 
 ifting, lam as certain that it does always exift, 
 as that the Man exifts when I fee him. For, 
 the reafon why I believe the Man that is pre- 
 fent to exi It, is, becaufe I cannot even in my 
 Mind conceive him not to exift, while I per- 
 ceive that he is prefent. If therefore there be 
 any thing which I cmnot fo much as conceive 
 in my Mind not to have exifted, or not to ex- 
 ift for the future, 'tis manifeft that I believe this 
 to have exifted always, for the very fame rea- 
 fon that I believe the Man to exift who, is now . 
 prefent. 
 
 Now it is to be obferved, that fomething 
 muft exift of itfelf and include neceftary Ex- 
 iftence in its Nature; in the next place we en- 
 quire what that is j nor can it be determin'd 0- 
 therwife, than by the conceptions which we 
 have of things: If any thing which we know 
 to exift, implies Exiftence in its very notion, 
 and cannot mentally be feparated from it, we 
 muft conclude, that this hath always exifted, 
 and does not require a Caufe diftinft from it- 
 felf. .. But if I have any reafon to fufpeft that, I 
 do not fee the pre fence of a Man, but a Statue, 
 and fo may be miftaken ; I find this Is poffible, 
 and in that cafe would not attribute atlual Ex- 
 iftence to it without Examination. So if there 
 be any reafon why I cannot conceive a thing 
 not to have exifted, or not to exift for the fu- 
 ture, tho' in reality it once did not exift, and 
 perhaps does not now; in this cafe I may fufpeft 
 myfelf to be miftaken, and to attribute neceffary 
 Exiftence to it from an erroneous Conception 
 
 It:
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 fehes, and require no Caufe of their Exiftence. But if we can conceive 
 thefe once not to have been, to have begun to be, or to be capable of 
 Annihilation, 'tis plain that NeceJJ'ary Exiftence belongs not to them, 
 nor are they of themfelves, they muft therefore have their Being from 
 
 D 2 fome- 
 
 '9 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 It muft be confeft, this Sufpicion is ftronger 
 in Complex Ideas form'd by the Mind, than in 
 thofe fimple ones that are produced in it by the 
 very Objects themfelves, and without its affi- 
 ftance ; yet it may have place in both, as may 
 be feen below. Care alio muft be taken, that 
 we do not rob thiugs of their exiftence rafhly, 
 and without Examination ; for who doubts but 
 we may be miftaken in feparating Exiftence 
 from, ab well as attributing it to, them. But 
 if, after due Attention, 'we plainly find that 
 our Conceptions of certain things do not at- 
 tribute necefTary Exiftence to them, we muft 
 conclude, that we are either miftaken in every 
 thing, or not miftaken here. If then we find 
 that neither the Idea of Motion, nor of Matter, 
 includes Exiftence in itfelf, nor is connected 
 with it; nay, if after our grcateft diligence and 
 enquiry, they appear plainly feparable, it is as 
 certain that Matter and Motion do not exift of 
 themfelves, as any thing can be: For nothing 
 is otherwife certain than from the conceptions 
 which we have of every thing. 
 
 It may be objected, that there are fome who 
 doubt of, fome who deny, the Being of a God ; 
 we cannot therefore conclude, becaufe we may. 
 conceive Something not to exift, that Exiftence 
 is not included in its nature; For, by thh 
 Means, not only Space and Matter, but alfo 
 God himfelf, would not be felf-exijlent, fine; 
 we fee fome bereaving him of his Exiftence, i.e. 
 conceiving him not to exift, whereas he ne- 
 ceflarily muft be felf-exiftent : 'Tis not a right 
 ConclufiOn therefore, that Space, tftc. do not 
 exift of themfelves, becaufe we can in our 
 Minds feparate Exiftence from them. 
 
 There are, I own, who -deny the Being of a 
 God, (for what is there fo'abfurd that fome 
 may not imagine?) but in the interim, that 
 thev really believe him not to exift, I very 
 much doubt. However, fuppofing God to 
 have exiftence, there are none but do acknow- 
 
 
 ledge that he exifts neceflariJy ; nor do any feek 
 for a caufe of his Exiftence: all fee that 'tis of 
 fuch a nature as excludes a Caufe. 
 
 But in Space, Matter, and Motion, ''tis quite 
 another thing ; almoft all Men grant that thefe 
 do now exift, yet thefe fame Men own that 
 they may not exift ; which cannot be faid of 
 God, if He be but granted to exift. Why can 
 I, mentally at leaft, deprive Space, cirV. which, 
 are conceiv'd actually to exif, of their Exi- 
 ftence, and confider them for the future as 
 non-exiftent, but cannot feparate the Idea of 
 God from Exiftence even in thought, if I once 
 grant that he does exift ? There's certainly no 
 other reafon, but that the Divine Nature iri 
 eludes Exiftence in itfelf; whereas the nature 
 of Space, Matter and Mstion does not. 
 
 For ' tis to be obferv v d, that we are^'no farther 
 folicitous about the Caufe of things, than as 
 the nature of them appears to be fuch as muft 
 require a Caufe: VVe enquire, for inftance, 
 from whence the Tide, and Saltnefs of the Sea 
 proceed, and fearch for the caufes of them : 
 But why do we fufpect that thefe really have a 
 Caufe ? Is it becaufe we obferve the Sea 
 fometimes tofs'd with the Tide, or Salt; and 
 femetimes ftill, or fweet ? Nothing like it: 
 For, who ever fa'w the Sea perfectly ftill, or 
 fweet, fo as from thence to raife a doubt about 
 the Caufe? Why then don't we reft without 
 enquiring after Caufes, perfuaded that things 
 have always been as they are, and that thofe 
 which are Eternal require no Caufe ? Whence 
 is it, that the Mind does hot at all acquiefce in 
 this, nor is any one fo ftupid, as to be moved 
 by it to lay afide the Search o Caufes ? Is it 
 not from hence that the Mind rcmonftrates a- 
 gainft it, and declares to us, even ag.iinft our 
 Wills, that the Tide, or Saltnefs of the Sea, 
 is not efTential to it? Nor does it otherwife 
 diftinguifh whether anJfetlion, Mode, ox S>ua- 
 /./y, be extrinfical to the thing, or require a 
 
 Graft
 
 2 c Concerning the Origin of Evil 
 
 fomething elfe. For, fince they may either exift, or not exift, Exi- 
 gence is not of their Nature, and if it be not of their Nature they rnufl 
 have it from without ; and there wants aCaufe by which the Indiffe- 
 rence, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Caufe, than as this is not included in the Ef- 
 fcncc of that thing in which it happens to in- 
 here. This appears plainly enough from hence, 
 that it troubles not itfelf about the Sea's being 
 extended, fince it fees that iseflential to it, but 
 is in the interim folicitous why it is Salt ; for 
 no other reafon, but becaufe it can conceive 
 that it may be either fait, or fweet. 
 
 The fame mull be faid of Matter, and its^"- 
 fcftions or Modes. If any things be contain'd in 
 the conception cf its Nature, or have a necef- 
 fary connection with it, our Mind enquires 
 rot after their Caufe, but acquie r ces as foon as 
 ever it perceives that neceffity or connection : 
 but it feeksfolicitoufly after the Caufes of others, 
 and refts not till it has found them. For Ex- 
 ample, when it thinks of the Exiflence or Mo- 
 bility of Matter it looks for no Caufes of them, 
 for it perceives that thefe are included in the 
 nature of it, or flow necefTarily from it; But 
 it demands a Caufe of its Exiftence, Fluidity 
 and Motion, for it judges thefe to be as foreign 
 to Matter, as the Tide and Saltnefs are to the 
 Sea. 
 
 And if any fay thefe have been always Co, and 
 therefore require no Caufe, he'll appear to talk 
 no lefs abfurdly, than he that mould fay the 
 lame of the Tide and Saltnefs of the Sea ; nor 
 will he fatisfy our Thoughts any better: For 
 whether the Tide and Saltnefs be fuppofed e- 
 ternal or temporary, fince they proceed not 
 from the very nature of the Sea, they muft ne- 
 cefTarily have a Caufe, if we will believe our 
 own Minds. After the fame Manner, whether 
 the Exiftence, Motion and Fluidity of Matter 
 be fuppofed eternal ot temporary, fince they 
 are net included in its Nature, nor flow necef- 
 farily from it, any more than the Tide and 
 Saltnefs of the Sea do from its Nature, 'tis e- 
 qually neceflary that they have a Caufe. Either 
 all Eaquiry into the Caufes of things is entirely 
 to be rejected, orto be admitted in thefe. Either 
 we muft imagine that nothing has any Caufe, 
 or grant that thefe require one: For, 'tis un- 
 jreaforuble to expect a Caufe in fbme particular 
 
 things, and to pronounce it unneceflary in o- 
 thers, which are exactly alike. 
 
 I know, fome think that thefe things come 
 by Nature, and that we mull feek for no other 
 Caufe befide it, and I think they fay true : All 
 thefe come by Nature, but by the Nature of 
 what ? Let them tell us. Not by their own ; 
 Not by the Nature of Space, or Matter; for 
 they have no necefTary connection with thefe, 
 nor are included in them. We muft therefore 
 fuppofe another Nature from whence they pro- 
 ceed and derive their Origin. 
 
 Hence it appears, that if we will truft our 
 own Thoughts, and follow their direction, we 
 are no lefs certain of a Caufe diftinct from 
 Matter and Space, which gave Exiftence and 
 particular Qualities to each of them, than that 
 the Tide and Saltnefs of the Sea muft have a- 
 nother Caufe befide die Sea itfelf. Nay, we 
 muft either change our whole Method and 
 procedure of inveftigating caufes,. or admit a 
 Caufe of thefe, which Caufe can be no other 
 than God himfelf, in whofe Nature the caufali- 
 ty of all things is contain'd. (9.) 
 
 (8.) That is, might be queftion'd, if there 
 were no better proof of its Exiftence than that 
 Conception only. However, this Notion has 
 been very much infilled on, both by the Carte- 
 fian and feveral of our own Philofophers, who 
 were not willing to part with any one Argu- 
 ment which feem'd to have the leaft tendency 
 towards the fupport of fo good a Caufe. The 
 Sum of their Argumentation feems to be this. 
 We can have no Idea of any thing, but what 
 has either an afiual or a poflible Exiftence; but 
 we have an Idea of God, /'. e. of a Being of 
 Infinite Perfections, which might poflibly ex- 
 ift ; therefore he muft have an aclual Exiflence: 
 For actual Exiftence is a degree of Perfection, 
 and the foremention'd Idea, according to 
 ihe Suppofition, includes all poflible Perfecti- 
 on, therefore it muft include that, otherwife 
 we ftiould have an Idea of fomething abfo- 
 lutely perfect without one poflible Degree of 
 Perfection, which is a contradiction in terms. 
 
 But
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil 
 
 fence or PofTibility of Exiftence, or non-exiftence, may be determin'd. 
 Nor do we judge a Caufe in things to be otherwife neceflary than as 
 they are in their own Nature indifferent, that is, pajjive, in regard to 
 Exiftence. For, if our Conceptions reprefent fomething to us as ne- 
 ceflary in its own nature, we enquire no farther about the Caufe 
 whereby it exifts. 
 
 D 3 III. If 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 71 
 
 But this is all begging the Queftion. For 
 it is not the bare poffibility of juppofing it to 
 have all poffible perfe&ions that infers its 
 attual exiftence, but the proving it to have 
 them. Indeed if we fuppofe it to have all pof- 
 fible perfections, we mull at the fame time ne- 
 cefTarilv fuppofe it to exift, fince Exiftence is 
 a poffible perfection ; otherwife we fhould fup- 
 pofe it to have all poffible perfections, and yet 
 to want one, which is a Contradiction. But 
 Hill this is only an Exiftence, ex Hypotbeji, a 
 true confequence from doubtful prernifes, and 
 which will as eafily follow from the fuppofal of 
 its having but any One perfection, fince that 
 muft neceflarily imply exiftence. The certainty 
 then of fuch actual exiftence, does by no means 
 follow from the fuppofed poffibility of it, as 
 thefe Men would be underftood : This Con- 
 clufion will never held good ; what cannot be 
 fuppofed without a Contradiction certainly 
 does not exift, therefore what can be fuppo- 
 fed without a Contradiction ceitainly does. 
 
 Others endeavour to prove the exiftence of 
 God from our Idea of him after this manner. 
 Whatever we have an Idea of, that either is, or 
 if it be not, it is poffible for it to be ; but we 
 have an Idea of an Eternal and neceffarily Exi- 
 gent Being ; therefore fuch a Being either /'/, or 
 it is poffible for it to be. But if fuch a Being 
 either now is not, or once was not, or ever will 
 not actually be, it would not be poffible for it to 
 be at all (except it could make itfelf, or be 
 made by Nothing) contrary to the former part 
 of the Suppofition ; nor would it be either 
 Eternal or neceffarily Exiftent, contrary to the 
 latter. Therefore fuch a Being now is, and 
 
 always was, and ever will be. Or, fhorter, 
 
 thus : Our Idea of God is an Idea of fomething 
 which implies no contradiction, and therefore 
 
 fuch a Being may poffibly be; and therefore he 
 muft a dually be, or elfe he could not poffibly be, 
 which is contrary to the Hypothefis. Now to 
 make this and the like Argument of any force, 
 it muft be clearly prov'd, that we have fuch an 
 Idea of a neceffarily Exiftent Being, as will infer 
 its actual exiftence; (which may perhaps appear 
 to be fomething doubtful from Note 14.) and 
 alfo, that this Idea is ftriiily innate ox connate 
 with us, and confequently capable of being 
 urged a Priori, for a Proof of the Exiftence of 
 fome Being correfpondent to fuch an Idea 
 (which is now generally given up) For if this 
 Idea be only gathered a pofteriori, viz. by a 
 deduction of Arguments from our own Exi- 
 ftence, then it is only a Confequence of thefe 
 Arguments, and cannot of itfelf be alledg'd as 
 a diftinct one. For how can any Idea confe- 
 quent upon fome certain proofs of fomething 
 a Pofteriori, be an antecedent, independent 
 proof of the fame thing a Priori ? Befides, ei- 
 ther thefe arguments are enough to convince a- 
 ny Man of the Exiftence and Perfections of 
 God, or they are not; if they are, this is unne- 
 ceffary ; if they are not, this is infuffcient; nay, 
 it is none at all, fince 'tis a bare confequence of 
 thefe, and entirely founded in them, and there- 
 fore muft ftand or fall with them. But there is 
 no occafion for this or any fuch Quibble, a 
 Priori, in order to demonftrate the Being and 
 Attributes of God, fince numberlefs irrefra- 
 gable Arguments occur, a pofteriori, and fuch 
 as are obvious to all capacities. [ For a parti- 
 cular Deduction of the Divine Attributes, fee 
 N. 18. Thofe that have a Mind to be farther 
 acquainted with the proofs of a Deity drawn 
 from the Idea, may find the Queftion fully dif- 
 cufsd in Cudtoortb, p. 721, &c. or, in Fiddes't 
 Tbeol. Spec. B. 1. P. 1. C.9. or, in the impar- 
 
 tbl
 
 11 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 Tisprov'd HI. If we apply this to our Conceptions of the Things in Qucftion-, 
 ttnJntV xt w ^ appear whether they be felf-exiftent, or require a Caufe. In 
 Caufe, tho' it the firft place, let us examine Motion, which is really ASiion, but in 
 be iuppos'd jjj Action it is neceflary, if we may truft our thoughts, that there be 
 that Matter is an Agent and a Patient, without thefe we have no Notion of Action, 
 notthe Caufe i n Motion therefore, fince that is Adtion, there is required an Agent 
 and a Patient. We have indeed thePatient, namely Matter $ we mull 
 
 in 
 
 NOTE S. 
 
 tial Enquiry into the Exigence, &c. of God, 
 B. 2. P. I.] 
 
 (o/J What our Anchor has been endeavou- 
 ring to prove in all this Note, is, That we 
 cannot apprehend either Matter or Motion (and 
 he will fhew the fame by and by of Space) to 
 be independent or felf-exiftent, and confequent- 
 Jy that they require force caufe of their Exi- 
 gence diftinct from and antecedent to them- 
 felves: . And tho' he frequently makes ufe of 
 . that confufed equivocal Term, necejjary Exi- 
 gence, yet he feems to apply it only in a nega- 
 tive fenfe for Self-Exifence, or Exiflence with- 
 out a Caufe, as appears from the latter end of 
 the fecond andfixth paragraphs of this Section, 
 and which is as much as his Argument re- 
 quires. For, where a"ny thing appears to be 
 an effect, as Matter and Motion do, we muft 
 . require a Caufe ; where no fuch Caufednefs can 
 be difcovered, we call the Thing Selfexifcnt, 
 tho' perhaps it really be not fo, but did pro- 
 . ceed from fomething elfe ; and where an abfur- 
 dity would follow from fuppofing any Being 
 not to have exifted once, or not to exift for 
 the future, we fay there's a neceffity for fuppo- 
 fing that it did and will always exift: or we 
 ftile that Being neceffarily Exift ent: which is 
 perhaps as far as we can go. But as thefe 
 Words, Necejjary, Neeefjity, &c. feem to have 
 been taken to denote fome pofitive, txtrinjic 
 Principle of Exiftence; and which accordingly 
 is often ftiled antecedent, abjolute, original Ne- 
 tefftty, a Necejftty fmple, and uniform, and abfo- 
 lutely fuch in its own nature, in itfelf, Sec. It 
 may be of fome ufe to coniider the feveral 
 Things to which thefe Terms are apply'd, and 
 what Ideas we fix to them ; which may per- 
 haps convince us that they are all merely re- 
 ht'w. 
 
 Neceflity is chiefly and perhaps primarily ap- 
 ply'd to Means: and when it ia thus apply'd, it 
 evidently has Relation to fome E"d to be attain'd 
 by thofe Means of which its afiirm'd. Thus, 
 when we fay fuch a thing is neceflary, we 
 mean, that fome End cannot be attain'd with- 
 out the Exiftence of that thing. Thus Reli- 
 gion is necejfary to a Rational Creature, or 
 more properly, to the Happinefs of a Rational 
 Creature, i. e. a Rational Creature cannot at- 
 tain Happinefs, its ultimate End, without Re- 
 ligion. Farther, Mean? being a Relative Idea, 
 whatever is affirm' d of Means as Means, muft 
 be Relative alfo ; or which is much tta fame, 
 muft be an Affection of a Relative Idea. v. g. 
 When we fay, any Action is Good, Fit, Right, 
 Reafonable, &c. all thefe terms are apply'd 
 to it, as it is conceiv'd to be a Means to fome 
 End, and confequently are relative ; therefore 
 to call any AdYion fit, &c. in itfelf, will be 
 the fame as to affirm any thing to be relative in 
 itfelf, which is nonfenfe. 
 
 Neceflity is alfo apply'd to Truth, and then it 
 has relation to fome other Truths, either ante- ' 
 cedent or confequential,- according to the diffe- 
 rent manner in which that Truth is prov'd to 
 be neceffarily true, i. e. according as the Proof 
 is direct or indirect. When the proof is di- 
 rect, i. e. when the truth of any proportion 
 is fhewn to follow by unavoidable Co nfequence, 
 from fome other truth before known ; then;the 
 Nccefftty of that Truth arifeth from the Rela- 
 tion which that Truth has to fome antecedent 
 Truth: When the proof is indirect, /'. e. when 
 the Truth of any Proportion is fhewn, by 
 fhewing that the fuppofition df the contrary to 
 that Truth, i. e. the Denying that Truth, would 
 imply the Negation of, or beinconfiftent with, 
 
 fome
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 in the next place fee what is the Agent: viz. Whether Matter produ- 
 ces Motion in itfelf ; or (to fpeak properly) Whether Motion be coeval 
 with it, natural, and neceflarily adhering to its EfTence, as Figure 
 is to Body. But if we remember what was laid down above -j 
 and carefully examine the Sentiments and Conceptions of our 
 Mind, it will appear that the nature of Matter (as far as we know 
 of it) is indifferent to Motion, or Reft, and moves not except it be mo- 
 ved. 
 
 N O 7 E S. 
 
 n 
 
 fome other known Truth ; then the Neceffity of 
 that Truth arifes from the Relation which that 
 Truth has to fome confequential Truth. Necef- 
 fity is alfo apply'd to Axioms ; and then it has 
 Relation to the terms themfelves, i. e. it ari- 
 feth from the Relation which is between the 
 terms themfelves ; and means, that fuppofing or 
 laying down thofe Terms, that Relation or 
 Connection between them cannot but be. Far- 
 ther, the fame may be-faid of Truth, as of Means, 
 Truth being relative alfo; confequently fuch 
 Phrafes as thefe, true, or falfe in itfelf, a con- 
 tradiction in itfelf \ or abfolutely fuch, &c. are 
 very abfurd ones. 
 
 Neceffity is alfo apply'd to Exiftence, and 
 then it arifeth either from the relation, which 
 the Exiftence of that thing of which it is af- 
 firm'd has to the Exiftence of other things ; or 
 it arifeth from the relation which the Exiftence 
 of that thing, of which it is affirm'd has to the 
 Manner of its own Exiftence. In the former 
 Signification, when Neceffity of Exiftence has 
 Relation to the Exiftence of other things, it 
 denotes, that the Suppofition of the Non-exi- 
 ftence of that thing of which Neceffity is af- 
 firm'd, implies the non-exiftence of things 
 which w know to exift. Thus fome Indepen- 
 dent Being does neceffarily Exifl. Becaufe to 
 fuppofe no independent Being implies that there 
 are no Dependent Beings ; the contrary of which 
 we know to be true, fo that Neceflity of Exi- 
 ftence, in this Senfe, is nothing clfe but Ne- 
 ceffity of Truth as related to Confequential 
 Truth. And this fort of Proof is call'd, De- 
 pwn/iratio a Pofieriori. 
 _ When the Neceffity of Exiftence arifes from 
 the Relation which the Exiftence of any thing 
 has to the Manner of its own Exiftence ; then 
 
 Neceffity means, that that thing of which it is 
 affirm'd exifts after fuch a Manner that it never 
 could have not exifted. Thus every Indepen- 
 dent Being, or every Being exifting without a 
 Caufe, is neceffarily exifting. Becaufe fuch a 
 Being, from the very manner of its exifting, 
 could not begin to exift, therefore muft always 
 have exifted, i. e. does neceffarily exift. For 
 to fuppofe a Being to begin to exift, is to fup* 
 pofe a Mutation, viz. from Non-Entity to En- 
 tity ; and to fuppofe a Mutation is to fuppofe a 
 Caufe; For if there's no Caufe, every thing 
 muft continue as i t was : Therefore every Being 
 which had no Caufe of Exiftence, i.e. which 
 is Independent, cannot begin to exift, confe- 
 quently cannot be fuppofed not to exift, i.e. is 
 neceffarily exiftent *. Whether this is Demm- 
 flratio a priori I leave to be determin'd by the 
 learned. I think it is; becaufe Neceffity of 
 Exiftence follows from Independency, or Ex- 
 ifting without a Caufe. No matter whether 
 Independency is prov'd a Pofieriori, or a Pri- 
 ori. 
 
 N. B. Neceffity, as apply'd to Exiftence in 
 thefe two ways, muft carefully be diftlnguifhedv 
 For tho' an Independent Being cannot be ne- 
 ceffarily exiftent in the former Senfe, without 
 being fo in the latter alfo: yet it may be ne- 
 ceffarily exiftent in the latter Senfe, without 
 being fo in the former. There may be two or 
 more neceffarily exiftent Beings in the latter 
 Senfe, though in the former there can be but 
 one neceffarily exiftent Being : which fhewsthe 
 inconclufivenefs of Dr. Clarke's feventh projo- 
 fition. And upon the whole, I think we may be 
 convine'd, that no Ideas can poffibly be fix'd 
 to this Propofition, Necejfity abfolutt in Hftlf, 
 [ See alfo the Notes 14, and 18. J 
 
 f In the Author's laft Note. 
 
 See Note 14.
 
 2 4- Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 ved. Motion therefore does not follow from its nature, nor is it con- 
 tained in its Effence, nor do we conceive it to arife from thence j 
 Matter is therefore merely paffive in regard to Motion, and an Agent 
 muft. be fought elfewhere. If you fay it has been in Motion from E- 
 ternity, you'll be never the nearer; for Duration alters not the nature 
 of things. If it has been mov'd from Eternity, it has had an eternal 
 Caufe, and fince Matter is only paflive with refpect to the Motion 
 which is in it, if it was from Eternity, it was ftill, pajjive, only, and 
 there wanted an eternal Agent to produce eternal Motion (io.) in it: 
 for eternal Action cannot be more eafily conceived, without an eternal 
 Agent, than temporary, without a temporal one. But, you'll fay, 
 what is eternal, fmce it was never made, requires no Caufe. Does ic 
 not fo? Suppofe the Sun to have min'd from Eternity, and the 
 Earth, nourimed by its heat, to have undergone eternal vicilTitudes of 
 Seafons; had thofe vicimtudes therefore no Caufe? Would they be 
 ever the lefs dependent on the Sun as their Source and Original ? 
 Hence it appears that Eternity of Action does not exclude an ac- 
 tive Caufe ; and it is fo far from truth that fuch Action was never 
 produced, becaufe it is conceiv'd to have been from Eternity, that 
 we muft rather fay it has always been produced. For, in the Inftance 
 given, it appears that the Sun did always, and from eternity, caufe 
 the change of Seafons : Not that I think the Sun really was, or could 
 be eternal, but if Motion mould be fuppofed eternal (which is the 
 only fubterfuge left to them that deny the neceffity of an Agent, in 
 order to the existence of Motion) the Sun might equally be eternal 
 with its light and their effects. And if this be granted, it will plain- 
 ly appear, that Eternity of Affiion does not exclude an affive Caufe. 
 If then we follow the guidance of our thoughts, we mufl acknow- 
 ledge 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (10.) Eternal Motion feerrH to be a contra- 
 diction, [ See Infinite Series in N. 5. and 
 S. C' 5 Impartial Enquiry, c.j. and x b. ] un- 
 lefs we could conceive two Eternals, one be- 
 fore the other; as every mover muft, in the 
 order of our Ideas, neceffarily operate before 
 ihey moved : Thefe things therefore which im- 
 
 ply Beginning, Change, Succeffion, or In- 
 creafe, are finite as well as in Duration, as in 
 any other refpecl, and confequently the Suppo- 
 fitions here and below are all impoffiblc ones. 
 Concerning the Equivocation which arifes 
 from ufmg the Words Motion and A SI ion promif- 
 cuoufiy, as our Author feems to do, fee N. 62,
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 ledge that there is fomething befide Matter and Motion, which mufl 
 be the Caufe of Motion. 
 
 IV. Secondly, as to Matter itfelf, if we may fuppofe it to have had 
 a beginning, or to be annihilated; neceffary Exigence will manifeftly 
 not be imply'd in its Nature, for that may be taken from it, at leaft 
 in thought ; but a thing, cannot be feparated from its Nature or Ef- 
 fence even by the Mind : If therefore Exiftence were ejjentlal to Mat- 
 ter, it could not be divided from it even in thought, that is, we could 
 not conceive Matter not to exift. . But who doubts whether he can do 
 this? Is it not as eafy to conceive that Space which the Material 
 World occupies to be empty, that is, void of Matter ; as full? Can- 
 not the Understanding affign to the Material World a beginning and 
 an end? They who admit of Space, or a Vacuum (n.) cannot deny 
 
 but 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 *$ 
 
 That Matter 
 requires a 
 Caufe of its- 
 exiftence. 
 
 11. Thefe two Words, Space and Vacuum, 
 tho' they ought perhaps to have both the fame 
 meaning, i.e. neither of them to mean any 
 real thing or quality exifting in Nature, but 
 only a Negation of Matter and its Qualities, 
 yet as the former is more evidently a pofitive 
 term, it is apt to convey an Idea of fomething 
 pofitive, and thereby leads us to frame fome 
 imagination of that fomething, and fo at 
 length draws into a Notion quite different 
 from that, which the latter Word more natu- 
 rally offers, and which comes nearer to the 
 truth of the Cafe ; and therefore I think it not 
 quite fo convenient to ufe thefe two Words 
 promifcuoufly. It may be doubted whether our 
 fubftituting the former of thefe terms for the 
 latter, when tho Ideas ufually fixt to them have 
 in reality nothing to do with one another, may 
 not have given rife to moft of the Difputes a- 
 gainft a Vacuum, which have been carried on 
 by many able Writers. Vacuum, in Natural 
 Philofophy, is (according to the true import 
 of the Word) only Emptinefs, or abfence of 
 Matter, r. e. a Term that implies mere Nega- 
 tion ; tho', when we come to prove that Mat- 
 ter exifts not every where, or that there is real- 
 ly any fuch emptinefs or abfence of Matter, we 
 are obiig'd, thro' the defect of Language, to 
 
 make ufe of pofitive Terms about it, viz. that 
 there is a Vacuum in this or that place, or that 
 there is a real foundation in Nature for fuppo- 
 fing it, &c. Hence, probably, Metaphyficians, 
 when they come to confider it, being ufed to 
 contemplate real Effences, are led to under- 
 ftand it, as fomething ptfitive ; which might 
 properly be faid to be here mi. there, &c. Their- 
 nextftep is, to bring it under the Imagination, 
 and fo finding the Idea of Space, or Extenfion, 
 in fome meafure connected with this Emptinefs, 
 they eafily fubilitute one for the other, and of- 
 ten change the negative Idea into a pofitive 
 one, and define Vacuum to be Extenfion void of 
 Solidity, or Space vnthout Body*, Whereas the 
 Ideas of Vacuity and Extenfion have no real 
 connection with each other, as was faid before, 
 tho' they be very apt to go together. Well 
 then, thefe two diliintt Ideas being both in- 
 cluded under the Word Vacuum, it becomes e- 
 quivocal, and confequently that may be affirm'd 
 or deny'd of it according to the one Idea, 
 which cannot according to the other, and 
 here's room forendlefs Juggle. z. . It may- 
 be faid that there is a real foundation in Na- 
 ture for fuppofing a Vacuum in the negative 
 fenfe of the Word, /'. e. as fignifying mere em- 
 ptinefs ; but th fame thing may be deny'd of it 
 E i 
 
 Locke, B. t\ C.13; fc.
 
 2 6 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 but Matter is at leaft mentally feparable from Exigence. For Space 
 may be conceived either full or empty j that is, with Matter, or 
 without it. The Notion therefore of the Creation of Matter, is no 
 more repugnant to our Conceptions, than the Creation of Space. 
 
 V. But whether there be any fuch thing as Space or no, we are 
 rily exiftent, certain that we have an Idea of it, tho' whence we had it, Philofo- 
 fromd!" pkers..are not agreed. Thofe that deny any diftin&ion between it and 
 
 Confeflion Body, 
 
 of thole Perfons who fuppofc, Space to be the Image of the Body. 
 
 That it is 
 not necelTa 
 
 AT O T E S. 
 
 in the pofitive, i. e. as (landing for pure exten- 
 fion, which is an abjlrael Idea, form'd by the 
 mind itfelf, and, as fuch, has no foundation 
 any where elfe. Again, Philofophers, who 
 take a Vacuum for Space or Extenfion In the 
 abftract, ftifly deny that there is a Vacuum in 
 Nature, ' which is true indeed of abfolute 
 Space, which exifts only in the Mind, but is 
 not fo of Vacuity or abfence of Matter, which 
 has as real a foundation in nature as Matter it- 
 felf has : except we'll argue that it cannot be 
 faid to be cr.to have exifience predicated of it, 
 becaufe 'tis only a negation ; which is playing 
 upon, and puzzling one another with words. 
 To illuftrate what has been faid of the difputes 
 about a Vacuum, I fhall prefent the Reader 
 with Tome Arguments brought againfl it by 
 Mr. Green znd Bay/e; which may be of ufe to 
 us, fo far as they overthrow the Reality of ab- 
 folute, fimple Space, which they do effectually, 
 tho' I take them to be mere quibbles with re- 
 gard to the End for which thefe Authors feem 
 to have urged them. They may ferve alfo for 
 another Inltance of the great confufion caus'd 
 by a jumble of Mathematics and Metaphyfics 
 together : an Example of which was given be- 
 fore in the Word Infinite, N. 5. 
 
 " Extenfion into Length, Breadth and 
 '* Thicknefs, or what is call'd mere Space, or 
 " Diftance, is a Quantity abftracted by the 
 " Mind, as all other Mathematical Quantities 
 " are; as a Line, or Superficies; andean be 
 " no more imagin'd to exift in nature alone, 
 " than Length or Breadth can. A Line is 
 " produced from the flowing of a point ; a 
 '* Surface from the flowing "of a Line; and a 
 
 Space or Mathematical Solid from tie flow- 
 : ing of a Surface : But 'tis own'd that there 
 is no fuch real point, and confequently no 
 fuch Line in being, therefore no fuch Sur- 
 face. And what reafon can there be affign'd 
 why we may not go one Step farther, and 
 from the fame principles conclude there is 
 no fuch Solid. For how is it poflible for a 
 Superficies which has not a being, and is i- 
 maginary and abftn&ed, to produce an ef- 
 fect which is not equally fo t 
 " We have faid, that Length, Breadth, and 
 Thicknefs, is the Definition of Imaginary 
 Space ; and it is likewife the Notion we 
 have of a Vacuum, as to the nature and efience 
 of it: for the foreign properties of Light, 
 or Heat, or Sound, &c. are not included in 
 the conceptions our Minds have form'd of 
 Room to move in, or fimple Space. If 
 therefore the Definition of Imaginary Space 
 and a Vacuum, are the fame, and a Vacuum 
 is real Space, it follows, that real Space and 
 imaginary are the fame, which is a contra- 
 diction. Since to abftract any thing in the 
 Mind from Beings as they really exift, is 
 not to confider Beings as they really ex- 
 ift. 
 
 " From this Idea of Space, being only an 
 abftrafted one, it is eafy to give an account 
 of what Place is, namely, that it is only a 
 portion of this abftracted Space, we have 
 mentioned, feparated from the reft, and ap- 
 ply'd to that body which it confiders as a 
 meafureof its capacity. Therefore primary 
 or abfolute Place alfo, as well as Space, is a 
 creature of the mind, and nothing really 
 
 " exifting,
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 Body, bid us imagine Matter or the World to be annihilated ; and 
 then, if w& remember the things that did exift, without confidering 
 of what kind they were, but only that they were without the Mind, 
 we have, what we call Space. If this be true,, then it will be certain 
 
 E, 2 that 
 
 *? 
 
 notes:. 
 
 " exffting, as fome Philofophers imagine." 
 Mr. Green's Principles of Natural Pkilofphy, 
 B. i. C.4. V8, 18. 
 
 " Let us rummage as much as we pleafe into 
 " all the recefles of our Mind, we fhall never 
 " find there any Idea of an unmoveable, indi- 
 " vifible, and penetrable extenfion. And yet 
 " if there is a Vacuum, there muft exift an 
 " Extenfion effentially endued with thefe three 
 " Attributes. It is no fmall difHculty to be 
 " forced to admit the exiftence of a Nature, of 
 " which we have no Idea, and is befides re- 
 " pugnant to the cleared Ideas of our Mind. 
 " But there are a great many other inconve- 
 " niencies which attend this. Is this Vacuum, 
 " or immoveable, indivifible, and penetrable 
 " Extenfion, a Subftance or a Mode? Itmuft 
 " be one of the two, for the adequate Divi- 
 ' fion of Being comprehends but thefe two 
 " Members. If it be a Mode, they mull then 
 " define its Subftance; but that is what they 
 "- can never do. If it be a Subftance, I ask 
 " whether it be created or uncreated ? If crea- 
 ** ted, it may perifh without the Matter, from 
 " which it is diftinft, ceafing to be. But it is 
 '* abfurd and contradictory, that a Vacuum, 
 *' that is, a Space diftin& from Bodies, fhould 
 " be deftroy'd, and yet that Bodies fhould be 
 ** diftant from each other, as they may be af- 
 " ter the deftruclion of the Vacuum. But if 
 " this Space diftinft from Bodies is an uncrea- 
 ** ted Subftance, it will follow either that it 
 " is God, or that God is not the. only Sub- 
 4< ftance which neceflarily exifts. Which part 
 " foever we take of this Alternative, we mail 
 " find ourfelves confounded. The laft is a 
 " formal, and the othej, at leaft, a material 
 " Impiety: for all extenfion is compofed of 
 " diftindi parts, and confequently feparable 
 M from each other ; whence it refults, that if 
 i* God was extended he would not be a fim- 
 
 ple, immutable, and properly infinite Be- 
 ing, bat a Mafs of Beings, Ens per aggrega- 
 tionem, each of which would be finite, tho' 
 all of them together would be unlimited; 
 He would be like the Material World, which 
 in the Cartefian Hypothefis, is an infinite 
 Extenfion. And as to thofe who fhould 
 pretend that God may be extended without 
 being material or corporeal, and alledge, as 
 an Argument, his Simplicity, you will find 
 them folidly refuted in one of-Mr. Arnaulfl's 
 Books, from which I fball cite only thefe 
 Words : So far is the Simplicity of God from 
 allowing us room to think that he may be ex- 
 tended, that all Divines have acknowledged, 
 after St. Thomas, that it is a neceffary confe- 
 quence of the Simplicity ef God, not to be ex- 
 tended. Will they fay, with the School- 
 Men, that Space is at moft no more than a 
 privation of Body ; that it hath no reality, 
 and that,, properly fpeaking, a Vacuum is 
 nothing? But this is fuch an unreafonable 
 Aflertion, that all the modern Philofophers 
 who declare for a Vacuum, have- laid it afidd, 
 tho' never fo convenient in other refpefts. 
 Gaffendus carefully avoided' any reliance on 
 fuch. an abfurd Hypothefis; but chofe ra- 
 ther to plunge himfelf. into the moft hideous 
 abyfs of conjecturing, that all Beings are not 
 either Subftances or Accidents, and that all 
 Subftances are- not ^either Spirits or Bodies, 
 and of placing the extenfion of Space a- 
 mongft the Beings, which, are neither Cor- 
 poreal nor Spiritual, neither Subftance nor 
 Accidents. 
 
 " Mr.- Locke, believing that he. could hot 
 define what a Vacuum is, hath yet given ua 
 clearly to underftand, that he took it for a 
 pofitive Being. He had too clear a Head 
 not to difcern, that nothingnefs cannot be 
 extended in length, breadth, and depth.
 
 2 8 Concerning the Origin of Evil 
 
 that Matter is not Self-exiftent: for we may confider it as annihila- 
 ted, neither can we attribute any ether nature to it, than fuch as an- 
 fwers to our Conceptions of it. If Space therefore, according to 
 them, be a Phantafm of the Body, that is, an Idea of Body recall'd 
 to mind, which formerly was, but now is not, or is not fuppos'd to 
 be, 'tis certain, that Body or Matter, fo far as we know any thing of 
 
 its 
 
 2v o r E S. 
 
 Mr. Hartfoeker hath very clearly apprehended 
 this Truth. There is no Vacuity in nature, 
 faith he, this ought to be acknowledged without 
 difficulty, becaufe it ~is utterly contradictory to 
 conceive a mere non-entity, with all the proper- 
 ties which can only agree to a real Being. But 
 if it is contradictory, thatnothingnefsfhould 
 be endued with extenfion or any other Qua- 
 lity, it is no lefs contradictory, that Exten- 
 fion fhould be a fimple Being, fmce it con- 
 tains fome things of which we may truly 
 deny what we may truly affirm of fome o- 
 thers, which it includes. The Space fill'd 
 up by the Sun is not the fame Space that is 
 taken up by the Moon ; for if the Sun and 
 the Moon fill'd the fame Space, thofe two 
 Luminaries would be in the fame place, and 
 penetrated one with another, fince two 
 things cannot be penetrated with a third, 
 without being penetrated betwixt them- 
 felves. It is moll evident, that the Sun and 
 Moon are not in the fame place. It may 
 then be faid truly of the Space of the Sun, 
 that it is penetrated by the Sun ; and it may 
 as truly be deny'd of the Space penetrated 
 by the Moon. There are then two portions 
 of Space, really diftincl: from one another, 
 by reafon that they receive two contrary de- 
 nominations of being penetrated and not be- 
 ing penetratted by the Sun. Which fully 
 
 " confutes thdfe who venture to affert tnat 
 " Space is nothing but the immenfity of God: 
 " and it is certain that the Divine Immenfity 
 " could not be the place of Bodies, without 
 u giving room to conclude that it is compofed 
 " of as many real diftincl parts as there ate 
 " Bodies in the World. 
 
 ** It will be in vain for you to alledge, that 
 " Infinity hath no parts ; this mufl necefTarily 
 " be fa He in all infinite Numbers, fince Num- 
 " ber effentially includes feveral Units. Nor 
 " will you have any more reafon to tell us 
 *' that incorporeal extenfion * is wholly con- 
 ** tain'd in its Space, and alfo wholly contain'd 
 " in each part of its Space : for it is not only 
 " what we have no Idea of, and befides, 
 " thwarts all our Ideas of Extenfion ; but alfo 
 " what will prove that all bodies take up the 
 " fame place, fince each could not take up its 
 " own, if the Divine Extenfion was entirely 
 '^penetrated by each Body numerically the 
 " fame with the Sun and with the Earth. You 
 " will find in -f- Mr. Arnauld, a folid refuta- 
 " tion of thofe who attribute to God the diffu- 
 " fing himfelf throughout infinite Space. Cril. 
 Ditl. p. 3083, 3084. See alfo Epi/ccp. p. 294. 
 If any Perfon wants any more Arguments a- 
 gainfl the Exiftence of fimple Extenfion, or 
 the application of it to a Spirit, he may find 
 enough in Bayle, p. 2790, 3P77, &c 
 
 Tota in toto, & lota in fingulis partibus: that is, what the School-Men fay of the prefence of 
 the Soul in a human Body, and of the prefence of Angels in certain places. 
 
 f Arnauld, Letter 8 and 9 to Father Malebranche. See alfo a Book of Peter Petit,^ de Exten- 
 Jione Animee fcf rerum incorporearum natura. And M. de la Chambre's Anfwer to it, which he pub-' 
 Jifh'd at Paris, Anno 1666. 4/fl. with this Title, Defence de F Extenfion fcf de partes libres de fame, 
 all the reafons he alledges to fhew, that extenfion and Spirituality may bc^together, are fo we*k, 
 tiut-they are only good to fhew the falfity of his Aflertion.
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. a-9 
 
 its nature is indifferent to exiftence or non-exiftence. It has not 
 therefore Exiftence of itfelf j for that which exifts by neceffity of 
 nature, Exiftence enters into its Idea (12.), nor can it be conceiv'd o- 
 therwife than as exifting. 
 
 VI. Others deny that Space is diftinguifhable from Matter, any o- And of thofe 
 ther way than as a general Quantity is from a particular one j For, j" y be 
 as when Individuals are changed, the Nature of Man or Animal *v-diftmguifha- 
 Jnains unchanged: Jb when Body is chang'd ar tranjlated into an other ^^ e u fro r m 
 
 E 3 place, otherwife 
 
 than as Ex- 
 tenfion in general is from a particular Extenfion. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (12.) We cannot allow of this or any fuch 
 Argument drawn from this necejjity of nature, 
 taken in a pofitive fenfe, for the reafons which 
 will be given in Note 14. And tho' Matter it- 
 felf perhaps cannot ftr;rly be prov'd not to be 
 Eternal, yet 2hy Body, or Syflem of Bodies, for 
 med out of it, as the ingenious Author of the 
 Enquiry into the Evidence of the Chrijlian Reli- 
 gion has fully prov'd * muft necefarily have baa 
 a beginning ; and that matter, or any material 
 fubftance, is not eternal, independent, &c. maybe 
 made probable from feme fuch Argument as 
 this. We conclude from the faculties of our 
 mind (viz. thinking, volition, cjfrv all which 
 are in a perpetual flux, and as it were made up 
 of Succefiions, and confequently incapable of 
 Eternity, by Notes 5, and X. c) that it diC 
 not exift from Eternity, therefore it had its ex- 
 iftence from fome Caufe, (which Caufe, if itfelf 
 was not eternal and independent, had its exi- 
 ftence from another, and that from another, 
 and fo on till we come at one which was) from 
 the fame caufe that it had its exiftence, it had alfo 
 all its faculties; the perception or knowledge 
 of matter is one of thefe Faculties, therefore it 
 nad the perception of matter from the above 
 mention'd caufe. Now it could not have the 
 perception of Matter from the foremention , d 
 caufe, unlefs the caufe itfelf had it, therefore 
 that caufe alfo had the perception of matter. 
 But if matter was eternal, independent, fcsV. 
 that caufe, as far as we can apprehend, could 
 
 not have any perception of it: for as that cau'e 
 itfelf was alfo eternal, independent, &c. it 
 could not poflibly be any ways affedled ab ex- 
 tra, nor confequently by matter, nor confe- 
 quently have any notices or perceptions of matter, 
 unlefs matter proceeded from that caufe itfelf, 
 and was created by it, which is contrary to the 
 Suppofition of its Eternity. But that caufe 
 has the perception of matter, becaufe we have, 
 therefore matter muft have proceeded from that 
 caufe, or been created by it, and confequently 
 was not eternal, independent, &c. Or thus: 
 
 If Matter were an eternal, independent prin- 
 ciple, it feems impoflible for God to have haH 
 any manner of knowledge of it, becaufe it 
 could no ways affe6t him ; fince he alfo is in- 
 dependent: but he has knowledge of it, becaufe 
 we have ; therefore it is not an eternal inde- 
 pendent Principle. 
 
 'Tis here taken for -granted, that Matter, is 
 efiehtially incapable of thought, nor can poflibly 
 have any thinking Quality fuper-added to it, and 
 confequently that the firft Caufe cannot be Ma- 
 terial; which will appear by the fame Argu- 
 ment which is brought to prove a thinking Be- 
 ing incapable of Extenfion, in Note n. Be- 
 fides, from all the proofs of a Vacuum, both 
 external and inter fperfed,\t appears that all Matter 
 is every way limited or defective, and confe- 
 quently requires a Limit erovExternal Caufe, and 
 therefore cannot belong to the firft Caufe. Sec 
 Xf. 
 
 * -Sec the Note X d.
 
 30 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 place, the Ex ten/ion of the place which it occupied remains unchanged, 
 namely empty ', or filfd with another Body. I would not fpend a Cen- 
 fure on this reasoning j but granting it to be true, it would follow, 
 that Body or Matter contains nothing in the Idea of it, which might 
 induce us to believe, that it is of itfelf, or exifts by the . Neceffity of 
 its Nature : but on the contrary, that it may be annihilated at leaft. in 
 Conception. 
 
 If therefore wc confult our Ideas, we muft confefs that Matter 
 does not exift necerTarily, but is as indifferent to Exigence, or Non- 
 existence, as to Motion or Reft, i. e. is in that refpect merely paffive. 
 It requires a Caufe then which may determine it to Exijlence no lcfs 
 than to Motion. For that which is not of itfelf muft neceffarily be of 
 another, nor can we know that any thing is of itfelf, otherwife tharv 
 . from the Ideas which we have of its nature., ,if thefe reprefent , the 
 nature of any thing as necejjarily exifting, fo that we cannot conceive 
 it not to be, we enquire no farther about its caufe y if not, we fly 
 to a Caufe ; nor is the Underftanding fatisfy'd. till it Jias found one. 
 Why are we inquifitive about the Original of. Man, oe any thing 
 elfe? but only becaufe out. Conceptions reprefent thefe "as indifferent 
 in themfelves to Being, and ; therefore,:, as requiring, fome Caufe of 
 their being diftincl: from themfelves. From the Nature then of Mat- 
 ter as well as Motion^ we^are forc'al. to admit of another Principle to 
 be the Caufe of both; 
 That Space VII. Thirdly. As to Space, many doubt whether ,its Nature be di- 
 fecms at firft ftinguifhabk .from Exiftence.- Whether it. can be . annihilated even 
 Ve from m tnou g$t, conceived not to, have been,_ ; For when the whole ma- 
 Exiftence. terial World is annihilated . in the Mind, the Idea of Space remains, 
 as of a thing yet exifting-3 k obtrudes itfelf upon the Underflanding, 
 and fuffers us not to^aflign any beginning or end of its Exiftence. It 
 forces us therefore to -confefs," whether we will or no, that it exifts ; 
 nor does it feem to require a Caufe why it exifts, fince it is of fuch 
 a Nature as, being felf-fufftcient, muft have exiftence of itfelf. For 
 what will' be felf-exiftent, if that be not, which cannot even be con- 
 ceiv'd not to exift ? 
 'Ti* ffiewn, VIII. This feems to argue ftrongly for the Self -exijlence of Space, 
 that this may Yet a doubt may arife, whether this Inability of our Underflanding, 
 Sejiiflcc. to feparate the Nature of Space from Exiftence, proceed from that.
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 fame Nature of Space, or rather from the imperfection of our Reafon. 
 For, tho' all our fimple Conceptions muft for the molt part be 
 look'd upon as true, as we faid before * yet thefe are to be excepted 
 from this Rule in which we find any grounds of fallacy or prejudice. 
 And in this reafoning about Space, it is to be fufpected that we con- 
 nect Exiftence with its Nature merely out of prejudice. 
 
 IX. We may underftand how this comes to pafs, if we confider, 
 i//. That our Conceptions come for the moft part from without, when 
 therefore fomething is prefented to our minds, we always conceive it 
 as without us : this Notion therefore of external and internal adheres 
 to all our Conceptions, and we continually affign a Place to every 
 thing which we happen to think of, but that there mould be any 
 thing external, or which has a Place, and no Space, is inconceivable. 
 As long then as we think of any thing external, we cannot but at 
 the fame time believe that Space exifts, in -which Space we con- 
 ceive that thing to exift. For while we fuppofe any thing exifting 
 befidc ourfelves, that neceflarily feems to be without us; 'but ima- 
 gine all externals removed, and turn the Mind upon itfelf, and that 
 without will be taken away, and, together with it, the neceflity of 
 Space or Place. For, while we conceive nothing to exift befide our- 
 felves, /. e. our Minds, we don't think of this without, that is, of 
 Space, nor fee any neceflity for its Exiftence (13.). 
 
 -A., It 
 
 N Of E S. 
 
 3i 
 
 Without, fup- 
 pofes Space ; 
 while there- 
 fore we con- 
 ceive fome- 
 thing to exift 
 without us, 
 we cannot 
 annihilate 
 Space in 
 Thought. 
 
 "(3) From hence, I think, it appears fuffi- 
 ciently that Space, were it granted to have any 
 real Exigence at all, I mean, to be any thing 
 more than an Idea in our Minds, (which fome 
 perhaps will not be very ready to grant, from 
 an attentive confideration of the Notes, 5 and 
 11.) yet it cannot be fuppofed to exift necefla- 
 rily, in Dr. Clarke'' s fenfe of necrjpiry Exi- 
 gence. For, according to him, " f Whatever 
 " is neceflarily exifting, there is need of its 
 " exiftence, in order to the fuppofal of the 
 " exiftence of any other thing; Co that nothing 
 " can poflibly be fuppos'd to exift, without 
 " prefuppofing and including antecedently, 
 ' the Exiftence of that which is necefiary. 
 
 Therefore, the fuppofing any thing pofli My 
 to exift alone, fo as not neceflarily to in- 
 clude the prefuppofal of fome other thing, 
 proves demonfmbly, that that other thing 
 is not neceflarily exilting : becaufc, whatfoc- 
 ver has neceflary Exiftence, cannot poflibly, 
 in any conception whatfoever, be fuppofed 
 away. There cannot poflibly be any notion 
 of the exiftence of any thing, there cannot 
 poflibly be any notion of exiftence at all, 
 but what fliall neceflarily preinclude the 
 notion of that which is neceflarily exi- 
 ftent. 
 
 Now, if we can confider our own Souls as 
 lifting alone, and without this Space, with- 
 out 
 
 fa. II. paragr, II. 
 
 f Anfuier to the firji Letter, p. io
 
 3* 
 
 That things 
 are conceived 
 to be annihi- 
 lated by 
 fubfti tuting 
 Something 
 elfe in the 
 Room of 
 them ; but 
 we have no- 
 thing to fub- 
 fti rute for 
 Space. 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 X. It is to be obferved farther, that when we would annihilate a-, 
 ny thing in our Mind, we confider it as fomething evanefcent, and' 
 remov'd out of fight; but yet we look upon fome other thing as 
 fubflituted in the room of that which difappeared; thus when Acci- 
 dents are removed, we conceive the Sub/lance remaining ; fetting aiide 
 Matter, we fubftitute Space, but when Space is removed, we have-, 
 nothing to fubftitute in its ftead, except material or external things;, 
 but all thefe fuppofe Space, and cannot be conceiv'd without it; no, 
 wonder then that we cannot annihilate Space, while we conceive 
 thefe as exifting. If therefore we would come at a right underilan-. 
 ding of the nature of Space, we muft not apply our Minds to any 
 tiling material or external, bq& attend to our own thoughts and fenfa- 
 tions, which have no relation ta external things, or to Quantity: 
 And when our Minds are thus employed, there will appear to be no 
 more neceflity for the exiftence of Space than of Matter. 
 
 XI It, 
 
 * NOTES: 
 
 out confider! ng it as. a exufa fine qua son, or in 
 2Dy ; oth%r refpeel; without prejitppojing, or any 
 wjys iniluijig it : Thi$ (according to the Dr. 
 himfelf) will prove demonftrably, that Space 
 is not neceffar.ly exiltent. But let any one 
 Ihew us whit neceffity there is for the exiftence 
 oiSpace, in order to the fuppofal of the exi- 
 ltence of a Spirit. Let him try whether he 
 cannot conceive jn immaterial, thinking fub- 
 Ibtnce, without the ldn of Space or Extenfion ; 
 nay, whether he can poffibly conceive it with 
 them ; whether thefe Ideas .ire atall appficahle 
 to an immaterial Being, and not rather repug- 
 nant and contradictory to the very notion of 
 it; whether they belong not folely to matter, 
 and if that were annihilated, might not eafily 
 be fuppofed away. Few, I believe, befide Dr. 
 Clarke, can apprehend how Space is (as he calls 
 it in his 4th Reply to Leibnitz, N c . 29. p. 141.) 
 the Place of all Ideas. I'm fure, Space and Spi- 
 rit, and the diftinft properties of each, appear 
 to me as diftant and incompatible, as the moil 
 remote and inconfiftent things in nature; and 
 ari extended Soul feems juft fuch anothpr propo- 
 rtion, as a green found, an EJl of Confcioufnefs, 
 
 or a Cube of Virtue. Dr. Clarke grants *, that 
 Extenfot dc.es not belong to Thought, (as our Au- 
 thor has inceid prov'd in many of its Modes, 
 in paragr. XIV. and. XV.) and at the fame time 
 endeavours to ftiift-off the confequence by an- 
 Twering, that Thought is not a Being. But 
 where's the difference in this refpect? Don't 
 we frame our Idea of the Being from its effen- 
 tial Properties ? and if thefe have no manner of 
 relation to Extenfion, why fhould the Being 
 to which thefe Properties belong have any? \ 
 Fm apt to think, that our conceiving Subjfancf 
 by way of fome Subflratum (concerning which, 
 fee Note 1.) has led us into the Notion, that 
 all kind of Subftances muft be extended; and 
 'tis perhaps impoffible for u.s to imagine any 
 fuch thing as an Unextended Subftance ; but yet 
 reafon convinces us, that there are many real 
 things of which we can form no imagination. 
 And that there are Beings in nature to which 
 no manner of extenfion can poffibly be apply' d, 
 we find fufficiently prov'd by Cudworth, from 
 p. 823 to 832. Among the various arguments 
 there, produced, this is the Subftance of one. 
 " If the Soul be an extended Supjiance, then it 
 
 muft 
 
 * Anfwer to the fecond Letter, p. 1 6: 
 
 f SeeX.h. at the end of this Chapter.
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. frj 
 
 XL It proceeds therefore from Prejudice, and an unwary way of We attempt 
 thinking, that we couple neceffity of 'Exijience with Space ; neither do L^ethi [e 
 we obferve, that for this very reafon we cannot conceive Space not thofe things 
 to exift, becaufe we imagine thofe things ftill exifting, which cannot ^^fSS 
 exift without Space: which is no greater a Wonder than if any one ia-pofeSmc 
 tent upon the Mobility of the Heavenly Bodies, mould complain that and tnerefore 
 he could not annihilate the Matter of them, while the Motion conti- annihilated! 
 nued ; for material and external things, have no lefs dependence on, 
 and connection with, Space, than Mobility has with Matter j if then 
 we conceive God only to exift, while He contemplates himfelf as ex- 
 iting alone, he can no more be judg'd to ftand in need of Space, or 
 
 be 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 muft of neceffity be either a Phyfical point 
 
 ** (for a Mathematical point has no extenfion) or " Perfons in every Alan. Neither can there be 
 
 minimum, the leaft extenfion that can poffibly 
 be ; or elfe it muft confift of more fuch Phy- 
 jical pohits join'd together. As for the for- 
 mer of thefe, it is impoffible that one Jingle 
 Atom, or fmallejl point of extenfion fliould be 
 able to perceive diftin&ly all the variety of 
 things, /'. e. take notice of all the dijlintt and 
 different parts of an extended Objecl, and have 
 a description or delineation of the whole of 
 them at once upon itfelf, (for that would be 
 to make it divilible and indwifible at the fame 
 time) As for the latter, if the Soul be an 
 extended Subftance confifting of more points, 
 one without another, all concurring in eve- 
 ry fenfatian, then muft every one of thofe 
 points either perceive a point and part of the 
 Object only, or elfe the whole Object : Now 
 if every point of the extended Soul perceives 
 only a point of the Objecl, then is there no 
 one thing in us that perceives the whole; or 
 which can compare one part with another. 
 But if every point of the extended Soul, 
 perceives the whole Objeft at once confifting 
 of many parts, then will the former abfurd- 
 ity return : and alfo there would be innume- 
 rable Percipients of the fame Objecl in every 
 fenfation, as many as there are points in the 
 extended Soul : And from both thefe fuppo-| 
 fitions it would alike follow, that no Man 
 is one fingle Percipient, or Perfon, but that 
 
 there are innumerable diftinct Percipients or 
 
 " any other fuppofition made befides thofe 
 " three foremention'd : As that the whole ex- 
 " tended Soul fhould perceive both the whole 
 " f en fible objecl^ and all its feveral parts, no 
 " part of this Soul in the mean time having a* 
 " ny perception at all by itfelf ; becaufe the 
 " whole of an extended Being is nothing but 
 " all the parts taken together ; and if none of 
 " thofe parts have any life, Jenje, or perception 
 " in them, it is impoffible that there mould be 
 " any in the whole. But in very truth> to fay 
 " that the whole Soul perceiveth all, and no 
 " part of it any thing, is to acknowledge it 
 " not to be extended, but to be indtvijible, 
 " which is the thing we, contend for." 
 
 From hence alfo, that an indivifible Being or 
 Subftance, is not capable of receiving a Divi- 
 fible Quality, nor a Divifible Subftance an indi- 
 vifible Ota, he makes it fully appear, that nei- 
 ther Matter can poffibly think, nor Spirit be ex- 
 tended. Ibid. p. 827, 828, 829. 
 
 Where S. C. might have found a fufficient 
 anfwer to his Argument for the Soul's extenj;- 
 on, from its receiving Ideas oj' extended Things. 
 Impartial Enquiry, p. 222. And to his Maxim, 
 that like is known by like, and by cohfequence % 
 Subject absolutely void of extenfion could have 
 no Ideas of extended things, p. 223. 
 
 M Nay the Soul (fays Cudworth) conceives 
 " extended things themfelvcs tmextendcdly and 
 F indi-
 
 3ft 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evik 
 
 he confcious of it as, actually cxifting, than we are, while we- con* 
 template only the rcfiex ads of the Mind. But when he vyill'd exter- 
 nal things, he madp Place or. Space for them to exift in f. 
 God cannot XII. It may be objected, that ive can feparate Exijlence frm God 
 
 nu: C n criT ! aftCr r . he faI ^ e manner as we endeavour to remove it from Space. For,, 
 the mind being reflected on itfelf, and folely intent upon contempla- 
 ting its operations, may deny God to exifl as well as Space.. If there- 
 fore we deny Space to be felf-exiitent, becaufe we can confider our 
 mind as exiftipg alone in. nature, and. confe.quently Space as. not exe- 
 rting; why may not we, by the fame way of reafoning, deny that 
 God is jelf-exifient. lanfwer, we are confeious that we do not exifl 
 qf ourfelves, while therefore we contemplate ourfelves, and our in- 
 tellectual operations, we are neceiTarily carried to fome Caufe -, being 
 certain that we have Exigence from another, and npt of ourfelves ; 
 
 we 
 
 N O T E Si 
 
 " indivifibly ; for as the difference of the whole 
 H Hemiphere is contracted into a narrow com- 
 " pafs in the pupil of the eye, fo are all difian- 
 " ces yet more contracted in the Soul itfelf, 
 *' and there underftood indijlantly : for the 
 thought of a Mile diftance, or 10,000 Miles, 
 " or femi-diameters of the Earth, takes up no 
 " more room in the Soul, nor ftretches it any 
 *' more than does the thought of a. foot or inch, 
 K or i ndeed of a Ma thematical point" p. 827, 
 829, C3V. 
 
 The foragoing Arguments, againfl: the fim- 
 plicity of extenfion, as well as thofe in N. 5 
 and 11. conclude equally ngainlt S. Cs Ampli- 
 tude or Expanfov.f Since, if it be. any thing real, 
 it mud have parts really diftincTb from one ano- 
 ther; which .diftinet parts can,. never , be the 
 fubjeft of an -undivided Quality,, nor any addi- 
 tion of them ever reach. a ppfitive Infinity. 
 But in -truth, thefe Words Expanfion^, Ampli- 
 tude, &e. don't feem to imply, any. pofitive 
 thing or quality, or indeed to have. any deter- 
 minate meaning at all ; like the Ubi of the 
 School-men, which was not place but fome- 
 thing elfe, they did not know what, and muff 
 belong to. Spirits,, tho' how or why they could 
 not tell. 
 
 The abovemention'd S. C. has a fecond Ar- 
 gument for the Amplitude cr Expanfion of the 
 Divine Nature grounded on another Maxim, 
 viz. Nothing can bejiow what it has net in itfelf: 
 but God has created material expanfion, there- 
 fore he muft be expanded himfelf, p. 223. 
 Which Argument he may fee anfwer'd by our 
 Author in the 18th Paragn and Note D. who 
 fliews that fuch Expanfion is a mere imperfecliou- 
 as well as .materiality^ and confequently is e- 
 qually inconfiftent with the perfection of the 
 Divine Being. See alfo X h. 
 
 That no Collection or Combination of A- 
 toms can think, and the fame reafon holds a- 
 gainft any thing which can be conceiv'd by 
 .way of parts, fee proved at large \n Bay fas 
 -Dicl. p. .1924. under the Article Leucippus, . 
 Remark E. See. alfo Dr. Clarke's Letters to 
 Dodwell concerning the immortality of the 
 Soul, cifr. or Religion of Nature, Delhi, p. 1 86, 
 &c. or H. Dittoes appendix. to his Excellent 
 JDifcourfe concerning the Refurreclion. 
 
 * We conceive Space to have no real Exi- 
 gence, and therefore think that it cannot pro* 
 perly be faid either to be made, annihilated* 
 bounded or meafured, &c. 
 
 f Impartial Enquiry, &c, p. 212.
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. ?$ 
 
 we cannot therefore exert even one act of the Understanding but 
 it muft have a necefTary connection with fome Caufe diftinct from 
 
 XIII. We cannot therefore conceive ourfelves as the only Beings in Becaufe we 
 nature, for we rnuft admit, along with us, the Caufe from which we^Te^o^ 
 derive Exiftence, which is a confufed conception of God. But the not cfi of 
 fame cannot be faid of Space, for the operations of our mind are fo in- ourfelvcs - 
 timately perceivM by us as to have no necefTary connection with Space, 
 
 and we underftand clearly enough that thefe may be, tho' there were 
 no Space, and do not ftand in need of it for their Exiftence. If we 
 conceive ourfelves as confifting of both Body and Mind, 'tis certain we 
 ftand in need of Space for our Exiftence, and during that concep- 
 tion, 'tis impoflible for us to conceive Space to be annihilated ; viz. 
 becaufe fuch a Conception has a necefTary connection with Space. 
 After the fame manner, if we conceive ourfelves to be Mind only, yet 
 we muft own the Exiftence of God. For a finite Mind requires a 
 Caufe from which it may exift, no lefs than a Body does a Place in 
 which it may exift ; and from hence, in reality, it is that we attri- 
 bute Self-exijlence to Space, becaufe, whenever we think of ourfelves, 
 we imagine ourfelves to confift of both Body and Mind. While there- 
 fore we are confeious of our own Exiftence, we form our Belief of 
 Space alfo as necefTarily exifting, infomuch as it is connected with the 
 conception of Body, i.e. of ourfelves. 
 
 XIV. Secondly. It is remarkable, that the Conceptions which we Smell, Tafte, 
 have from hearing, fmelling, or tajling, tho' they be produced in us J^""?'^ 3 
 by external Objects, yet have no connection with the conceptions of any notice of 
 Space; for, who can imagine the longitude, latitude, or profundity of^. c s c *| nce 
 Sound, Smell, or Tajle? If then we had only thefe three Senfes, we 
 
 mould not fo much as imagine that there was any Space. Our Con- 
 ceptions therefore abftract from all Exteniion, nor do the notions of 
 external and internal adhere fo clofely to our thoughts but we may 
 lay them afide ; and if we fet thefe afide, the Self- exiftence of Space 
 does not neceflarily obtrude itfelf upon us. Now, as the common 
 People attribute Smells, T-afes, Colours, and other fenjible Qualities to 
 the Objects themfelves, and believe that they exift in them ; while- 
 they who attend better to their thoughts, know that thefe exift only" 
 in the Mind, and are nothing in the things by which they are ip'rodu-' 
 
 F 2 ced,
 
 3 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil.. 
 
 ced; befides the peculiar Motion and Texture of their parts : after the 
 fame manner, 'tis probable, we are impofed upon in attributing necef- 
 fary exigence to Space, becaufe we obfervc, that almoft all our 
 Thoughts are produced in us from without, and thereby- accuftoming 
 urfelves to join Space with them, while we are confcious that we 
 think we conceive alfo that Space exifts; whereas, if we remember- 
 that all our fenfations, even thofe produced by external, things, fucli. 
 as Smells, &c. do not bring along with them the notion of Space, we 
 may eafily lay afide this prejudice, and, with drawing our thoughts 
 from the contemplation of Space, may conceive it not to be. 
 
 XV. And this will appear 3dly. if by a reflex act we view the 
 >nTtfdfhfs Mind itfelf and its operations; for nothing of Extenfion or Space, offers, 
 no relation itfelf in thefe; nor does the Mind, when employ 'd about them, think 
 aHy P nec;ffirJ at a ^ ^ Sp ace > nor is it confcious that it occupies Space ; it withdraws, 
 for it. ' therefore from the conceptions of i?itemal and external, and may con- 
 ceive nothing to, be in the world. befides itfelf, and its Caufe; i. e. can, 
 imagine Space to be non-exiftent. Thinking Beings then may exift, 
 without Space; it proceeds therefore from Prejudice that we joinAfc-. 
 cejfary Exijlence with k ( 14.). 
 
 XVI; 
 
 N f B SE 
 
 The Mind 
 reflected up- 
 
 (14.) As to that neeejjtty of exijlence which, 
 the learned Dr. Clarke and others have fo large- 
 ly infilled on, I muft confe/s that I was never 
 able to confider it in any pofitive fenfe, nor to 
 form any clear argument from it, which could 
 either affett the nature of Space, Matter, &c. 
 or help to. demonftrate the exijlence and attri- 
 butes of God a priori. With regard to the 'firft 
 of thefe perhaps too much has already been 
 faid, in Notes 5, n and 13. As to the laft, 
 we gather indeed a Po/lericri that an infinite, i.e. 
 an abjolutely perfecl Being, muft necejfarily have 
 exifted always, becaufe it would have been'al 
 Ways a Contradiction for him not to have exi- 
 fted; namely, he himfelf, and all the things 
 that are, muft have arofe. from nothing. But 
 this is only a Confequential Neeeffity, and from 
 hence to. infer any thjng concerning the Man-- 
 jBf-r of his exijlence feems to be building a great 
 4eal more on this argument than it will bear. 
 TJiis is indeed-a 'Reafon by which we find, and : 
 
 for which we believe, that he tnujl have exifted 
 always, but it is a reafon to us only, and does 
 not affeft bis nature, or the caufe of it, and 
 when it is.apply'd to that, I think 'tis ufed ; 
 equivocally. Conceiving that he cannot pof- 
 iibly be fappofed not 'to Exift, is;far from con- 
 ceiving bow ox why he actually does exijl ; we 
 can, eafily fhew a reafon for the one, but it 
 feems above human comprehenfion to account 
 in any refpeft for the other : Nay, the attempt > 
 to do it feems altogether as abfurd and ufelefs, 
 as endeavouring to (hew how or why a thing 
 is whit it is . how or why a Firft Caufe is a 
 Firft Caufe ; How a Tfi angle i* a Triangle, 
 or why Truth is Truth. 
 
 Farther: This eternal Being, we fay, is In- 
 dependent ; or, which is the fame thing, Self- 
 exijlent, i. e. his Exiftence depends upon no- 
 thing bfjide himfelf ? But does it therefore po*> 
 fitively depend'*^/? himfelf ? Will it follow, 
 that becaufe he has no external Caufe, therefore 
 5 he
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 XVI. Fourthly. It is to-be remark'd that Space, fo far as it appears 
 to our Conceptions, is of fuch a Nature as cannot be annihilated by 
 Parts, for they are in fuch a manner united to, and dependent upon 
 one another, that if we fuppofe one part, it will imply a contradic- 
 tion for the others not to exift. We can in Thought remove all Mat- 
 ter out of a Veflel, or Chamber, and the Space interjacent between 
 
 the: 
 
 NO TE S. 
 
 37 
 
 Wc may con- 
 ceive Space 
 to be annihi- 
 lated altoge- 
 ther, but not. 
 by parts.. 
 
 he mud have an interna! one ? Or, becaufe no 
 ground or reafon of his Exigence can be 
 drawn from any other Subftance, therefore one 
 muft be contain'd in his own Sub/tana or felf? 
 This is ufing the Word Self -exiftence in two 
 different Sen fes, both as negative and pofttive, 
 which have no manner of conne&ion witheach 
 other,and the latter of which will perhaps appear 
 to be no very good one. It is not then appa- 
 rent yet that there needs any Phyftcal reafon at 
 all for the exiftence of the eternal, independent 
 Being. Nor, 2dly, if there did, would this 
 NeceJJity of Natt/re ufually affign'd as* fuch, 
 ferve for that purpofe. For, firft, it is not the 
 Sr/bftance itfelf, that would be to make the fame 
 thing the ground of itfelf; which is nonfenfe. 
 'Tis therefore a perfeclion, property or attribute 
 of that Subftance ( we know no other di- 
 ftin&ion ) and as fuch. muft, in the Order of 
 our Ideas, be Confequent upon the exiftence 
 of that Subftance in which it inheres. What- 
 ever it is, it has in fome refpecl: or other a Re- 
 lation to the Subject, to which it belongs. Let 
 it then be an- Attribute, fui Generis, cujus cunq\ 
 generis (if we mean any thing at all by this 
 word) it muft be predicated of, and prefuppofe 
 itfrSubjeft, and confequentlv cannot, according 
 to our Ideas, be the antecedent ground 'or foun- 
 dation of it. And to endeavour to clear it (as 
 fame do) by mating it not an attribute of the 
 Subftance, but of the attribute of the Subftance ; 
 or as they phrafe it, a Property of a Property ; is 
 onlythrufting it ftill farther back, and making 
 it pofterior in conception to both the Subftance 
 and its Attribute or Property. 
 
 But idly, fuppofing this Necejftty, this Ground 
 or Reafon, could be confider'd as antecedent to 
 the Divine Nature, and inferring its actual ex- 
 iftence, we are got but one Step farther yet ; 
 for, will there not be the fame neceffity for 
 
 demanding a reafon for that reafon, a grounl 
 for that ground, and fo on in infinitum ? And 
 what fhall we get by fuch an endlefs progreffi- 
 on ? Why fhould we not ftop at a firft BeiOg, 
 as well as at this Ground, which muft itfelf 
 want a foundation if the other does, fince there 
 cannofbe any intuitive knowledge in either; and 
 the fame teafons which are given for flopping at 
 this ground will hold equally forftopping be- 
 fore- we come at it, and convince us, that we 
 might as well, or perhaps better, acquiefce in 
 the a&ual Exiftence of the firft Being. We 
 muft then reft fome where : We muft either ad- 
 mit one firft caufe of all Things and Qualities, 
 itfelf exifting without caufe (for that is imply'd 
 in its being called the firft) or an infinite feries 
 of Beings exifting without any original Caufe 
 at all ; i. e. cither fome one thing muft be with- 
 out a Caufe, or every thing. 
 
 Here then are two difficulties- the lefe is to 
 be chofen ; let us fee which' that is. Now, if 
 the Manner of exiftence in all thefe Beings were 
 entirely the fame, I grant it would be as eafy 
 to fuppofe all of them exifting without a Caufe, 
 as One: But here I think lies the difference : 
 There was a time when all of them, except one, 
 were indifferent either to exiftence or non-exi- 
 ftence; were nothing. Therefore for them that 
 were once indifferent to exiftence or non-exi- 
 ftence, to be actually determin'd into Exiftence, 
 to be brought from nothing into fomething, or 
 made what they once were not ; is a real cb.mge,. 
 an atlion, an effeel, and as fuch, muft require 
 fome changer, agent, caufe. But on the other 
 hand, all that wc know of this one Beinfi;, is, 
 that it now exifts, and' always did fo ; that it- 
 never had a Beginning of its exiftence, was ne- 
 ver changed from what it is, never made or pro- 
 duced; Here is no ejfefl, and therefore no rea^ 
 
 fo.i 

 
 gS Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 the Walls remains extended in length, breadth, and depth : But the 
 Space cannot be removed, fince it is of its own Nature immove- 
 able, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 fen, nor room, fcr a. ground r caufe. Nay, to 
 jslGgn one in any refpect prior to its exiftence, 
 as it mult be fuppos'd to be if confider'd as a 
 Caufe ; (and it mull be confider'd as a Caufe, 
 or extrinfic Principle, if confider'd at all: J 
 mean, fo as to be made any ufe of in the pre- 
 sent Queftion, or to infer anything concer- . 
 ning actual Exiftence) I fay, to affign any 
 Ground prior to the exiftence of this Being, 
 would be to prove this Being not eternal, nor , 
 the firjl Cauje : as attempting to prove a felf- , 
 evident proportion is endeavouring to fhew 
 that proportion not to be felf evident by affign- 
 ing a clearer. 
 
 Now to lay down fome necejjity, ground, or 
 reajon of Exiftence, muft either be to propofe 
 it by way of Caufality, or to fix no manner of 
 -Idea at all to thefe Words : and indeed no 
 -manner of Idea feems poffible to be fix'd to 
 them (as has been obferv'd by the Ingenious 
 Author of the Enquiry into the Evidence of the 
 Cbriftian Religion) which is not utterly incon- 
 iiftent with exifting without Caufe, as that Be- 
 ing is prov d to^exift. For, why do we con- 
 fider that Ground or Reajon in the Order of our 
 Ideas, as antecedent to the Exiftence of the Be- 
 ' ing, otherwife than as it feems in the Order of 
 Nature antecedently necejfary to the Exiftence of 
 that Being ? To which neverthelefs we allow, 
 that no Thing, Mode, Quality, &c. can be real- 
 ly antecedent. The Cafe will be no better, if 
 we imagine this neceflity co-etantous, or co-exi- 
 Jlent with the Exiftence of the Being which is 
 Supported by it ; Since this is to fuppofe that 
 actually exifting already, in order to the Exi- 
 ftence of which this neceflity is introduced : 
 and alio feems much the fame as an effect eo- 
 exiftent with its Caufe. For, as was faid be- 
 fore, this Necejjity muft either be a Caufe, or 
 nothing at all to the prefent purpofe. And that 
 it was piopofed, by the forcmention , d Author, 
 as fome fort of a Caufe (if he would have fpokc 
 out) is I think pretty plain. 
 . The whole Cafe then feems to ftand thus. 
 Qn the one. hand here is a certain alteration 
 
 made, a pofitive effetl produced, without a 
 Cauje ; which is a clear contradiction. On 
 the other hand there is a difficulty indeed, but 
 not an apparent contradiction : There is fome- 
 what exifting of which we can give no account 
 (the manner of whofe Exiftence is different from 
 that of any thing elfe) which will admit of no 
 Caufe, the Idea of which is entirely repug- 
 nant to that of Caufality. 
 
 This may be hard to conceive, but cannot 
 be deny'd without affirming fomething worfe, 
 namely, an exprefs contradiction, as has been 
 (hewn above. In order to fet this in as clear a 
 light as is poffible, I fhall take the Liberty to 
 infert a paffage from the learned Writer cited 
 in Note 5, fe. " The Idea of aSelf-Exiftent 
 " Being is the Idea of a Being that always was, 
 ** is, and will be, becaufe he always was, is, 
 " and will be infinitely able to be. If you a*k 
 " why he is fo, I know not ; Why I believe 
 " fo, I think I know ; it is, becaufe he has in 
 " fail exifted from all Eternity, which he 
 " could not have done, had he not been in- 
 " finitely able to exift. If you ask after the 
 " ground or foundation of this infinite Ability, 
 u it is the fame that is the ground or founda- 
 " tion of all his other Perfections, his Infinite 
 " Nature, Eflence or Subftance, if you ask far- 
 *' ther for the ground of that, I muft call it 
 " trifling: if you affign abfeiute necejjity, I 
 11 muft ask what's next ? Or what that means? 
 '* or refer you to the Indian Philofopher's Ele- 
 " phant and Tortoife, as the beft comment upon 
 M abfolute, antecedent Necejjity." 
 
 Neither need we run ourfelvcs into fuch ab- 
 surdities as thefe : This Independent Being ex- 
 i/ls becaufe it does exift ; or, it exifts by chance. 
 Since it is enough for us to fay, Tiiere can be no 
 Reafon why it does exijl; or, which is the very- 
 fame thing frill, no Caufe, no Caufal Neceflity, 
 or antecedent Ground of its Exiftence. 
 
 But if we grant the firft Being to be now 
 exifting, there will be a reafon (contrary to 
 what Dr. Clarke zttcrts in his Lift Letter) why 
 he (bould *xy!? to morrow, and to all Eternity, 
 
 fince
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil, 
 
 able, (1-5.) nor can it be annihilated \ for diftance would' fHll remain 
 between the bounds which cannot be without Extension, nor Exten- 
 sion without a Subject,;, but. Space, as far. as. we can. conceive it, is the 
 
 primary 
 
 35 
 
 NOTE- s. 
 
 fince ceafihg to be is- an alteration from Ex 
 Htence to Non-exiitence, /'. e. a Poftixre Effefl, 
 and confequently muft require a Caufe', unlefs 
 it can be effected and not effected at the fame 
 time. Now, as the exiftence of this Being de- 
 pends upon no caufe, no caufe can ever affect or 
 deftroy it, and for h\m to dejlroy himfelf, will 
 be the fame abfurdity, as to fuppofe him to 
 make himfelf: therefore he muft always exift, 
 and in the fame manner that he does *. The 
 reft of the learned Dr's Arguments contained 
 in the fame Letter, will be confidered in the 
 Notes to the 3d Section of the firfr Chapter of 
 this Book -h I mall only beg leave to obferve 
 one thing more in this place, namely-, that all 
 the above mention'd reafoning about neceffary 
 exiftenct 'feems to be built upon that falfe Max- 
 im which Leibnitz, lays down as the foundation 
 of all Philofophy, (and which Dr. Clarke was 
 very ready to grant him, fince it was the foun- 
 dation of his own Book on the Divine Attri- 
 butes) namely, that Nothing is without a reafon, 
 why it is rather than not, and why it is fo rather 
 than otherwife. Tho' the Dr. is foon forced to 
 deny this very Principle, when (in his way of 
 confidering Time and Spate) he propofes the 
 mere Will of God, as the only reafon why the 
 World was created at fuch a certain period of 
 time, and in fuch a particular pointof Space |j. 
 Of which Divine Will, or-of its determination, 
 according to himfelf, there can pofiibly be. no 
 manner of reafon,. fince he fuppofes thefe effects 
 of the Divine Will to be, in every polfible 
 Manner of Conception, ahfolutely equal and 
 indifferent, and confequently it would be ab- 
 l'urd to fuppofe any reafon of fuch fpecial Will, 
 or fuch particular determination. If then we 
 may fuppofe two things in nature absolutely, 
 and in evej-y refpeft, equal, (which Leibnitz, to 
 
 be confident with himfelf, and I" believe for 
 no fufficient reafon elfe, found it neceffary to- 
 deny) the preference of one of thefe before the- 
 other muft be abfolutely without a reafon. And 
 tho' there may be a fufficient reafon fof a per- 
 Con'safling in general, rather, than not acting ?X 
 all, yet (as Leibnitz well obferves * m ) except 
 there be one alfo for- his- acting in a certain 
 particular manner, which in the prefent cafe 
 there cannot be (according to- Dr. Clarke's, 
 conceflion f4-) the above mention'd principle 
 is entirely overthrown. See more of this in 
 the latter end of Note 1 8. and Note 62* 
 
 The fame Argument will hold againft Locke's 
 Hypothefis of Anxiety, if i t be confider'd 1 as -the 
 fole and- abfolute determiner to all Action j| |j, 
 fince it can never determine the Mind to Will 
 one AdHon before anothery where both are en- 
 tirely equal ; of which kind numberlefs occur 
 in life, as will be ihewn at 'large in. its proper 
 place.- 
 
 (.1 5.) That is, as Ihave often hinted, if we 
 fuppofe it to have any real Nature, or to Exi/f 
 at all, it muft, as our Author fays, exift every- 
 where, and cannot be remov'd by parts. And 
 in this Senfe fhould the Words of Sir Ifaae 
 Newton be underftood f -j/f. " The order of the 
 '* parts of Space is immutable ; remove thefe front 
 " their places, and you zvtll remove them, as I 
 " may fay, from them/elves." For to fuppofe it 
 at all once away, feems fo far from amounting 
 to that abfurd Suppofition mention'd by Dr 
 Clarke || || \\\, that it is no more than. what muft 
 be conceiv'd in every Annihilation of any thing* 
 which is the total deftruction or taking away of 
 its Exiftcnce, the removal of it, as -we may- 
 fay, from it/elf, or from Being: which is a 
 Suppofition that is generally thought to "carry* 
 no abfurdity along, with, k. 
 
 * See X e. at the end of Chap. I. f See the latter end of Note 1 8. \\ 3d Reyly, N. 5. p. 8 1 
 
 \ $th Letter, N. 17. p. 169. f4- N. 1, 2. p. 12. of bis ^b Reply. 
 
 J| U See Note 65. -f+f Princ Schol. ad' M. 8. || || || Jnjwr to the bib Lei. p. 39.
 
 4o 
 
 Concerning 
 
 tbt 
 
 Origin 
 
 of Evil. 
 
 primary Subject (16.) of Extenfion, therefore it necefTarily continues 
 with Diitance, nor can it be annihilated, unlefs we would have Ex- 
 tenfion without a Subject, that is into Length, Breadth, and Depth, 
 without any thing Long, Broad and Deep. Hence it appears that 
 Space cannot be partially annihilated, and from hence the Opinion 
 - of its felf-exijlence might arife. 
 
 XVII. For 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (16.) Dr. Clarke affirms f, that Space is not 
 a Subftance j and yet declares that it has real 
 Qualities ||. Is not this either to fuppofe quali- 
 ties or properties inherent in one another ? or 
 elfe, with Gajfendus, to imagine fome middle 
 thing between Subftance and Accident ', which 
 is neither of them, but partakes of both ? 
 
 The learned Writer refer'd to in Note 5. is 
 of the fame opinion with our Author in this 
 place, viz. thac we are apt to conceive Space 
 to be a fort of Subftance, or Subjlratum of Ex- 
 tenfion, and fo are ufed to attribute that and o- 
 ther imaginary Qualities to it. M The Idea 
 
 * of Space is not the Idea of Extenfion, but 
 *' of fomething extended, it is the Subjlratum 
 M of Extenfion, and not Extenfion itfelf. But 
 *' when I fay it is the Subjlratum, do not ima- 
 " gine t make it to be any thing without ; it 
 " is an Ideal Subjlratum, and nothing more. 
 *' When the Mind his been confidering the I- 
 " dea of Extenfion abftradted from the ex- 
 ** tended Bodies, from whence it firft receiv'd 
 ** the Idea, (whether as they are caujes or oc- 
 " cafions of it I coniider not now) it is a very 
 " eafy Step for the Mind to make farther, to 
 
 * frame an imaginary Subjlratum to fupport an 
 " imaginary Extenfion. And this is the more 
 * eafy, becaufe the Idea we have of a real Sub- 
 * l Jlratum or Subftance, the fupport of real 
 ' Qualities is dark and confufed, an Idea of 
 " fomeiohat, and that's all. Now it is bin 
 " joining the Idea of fomezvhat with the Idea 
 '* of one Quality only, namely Extenfion, and 
 ** we have an imaginary Subjlratum prefently 
 *' formed, that is, an Idea of Space, or an I- 
 J* deal extended fomething. Whether this be 
 
 il not the very Cafe, I muft leave to any Man 
 *' to judge, by reflecting on his own Ideas. 
 
 Again: To this Queftion, Why may not 
 Space be rather defiri'd Extenfion in the Abjlrael, 
 or imaginary Extenfion, rather than the imaginary 
 Subjlratum of imaginary Extenfion? He an- 
 fwers, " Extenfion in the general, or in the 
 '* abftracl, is an Idea of pure Iniellecl, i.e. is 
 " to be underftood, but cannot be imagined a- 
 " ny more than Whitcnefs in the general : or a 
 " thoufand other the like abftraft Ideas. But 
 '* as foon as imagination comes to deal with this 
 " general abftracl Idea (or Ideas) it fupplies it 
 '* with an imaginary Subftratum, and fo makes 
 " the general, which was invifibk, be conceiv'd 
 " as a particular, for the help of the Underftan- 
 ding. So if the imagination comes to con- 
 ' ceive any certain degree of Whitenefs, it fup- 
 w plies the Mind wiih fome imaginary white 
 '* Sutface, and brings down the general Idea 
 " to a particular Object. In like manner, 
 " when it comes to conceive a Length, a 
 " Breadth, a Thicknefs, it fupplies the Mind 
 " with'a Subftratum, pro hac vice, fuch as may 
 '* ferve the purpofe, otherwife the Mind m-rfc 
 "reft in pure intellect only, as in numbers; 
 " and there is nothing more tedious or uneafy 
 t( to the Mind generally than to be wholly ab- 
 " Jlracled; which is the reafon, by the wav, 
 " that Arithmetical Demonftrations, tho' as 
 " clear and certain as any, are lefs delightful 
 *< than Geometrical, and nothing more irkfome 
 " than abftracl numbers. Nov/ Space being 
 " the Object of the Imagination, and not of pure 
 * Intellect, as are all general, abftracl Ideas, it 
 *' is properly the imaginary Subftratum of an ima- 
 ginary 
 
 f Anftser to the ^d Letter, p. 22. dndto tie \th. p. 28. 
 I) Anjtver to the 6th Letter, p. 38.
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. aft 
 
 XVTI. For fince it is of fuch a Nature as mud be annihilated either Hence arofc 
 altogether, or not at all, they that attempted to annihilate it only by fo^Tif-" 
 Paris, faw that it was impomble to be done, the nature of the thing exigence. 
 remonftrated againft a partial annihilation, and if one part be fuppo- 
 fed, all others might be demonftrated to exift by neceiTary connection. 
 But if any one mould fuppofe all extended things to be removed toge- 
 ther and at once, he would find nothing impomble in that fuppofi- 
 tion : For one may imagine nothing to exift in Nature befide his own 
 Soul, and the caufe on which it depends j which, as a thinking Being, 
 includes nothing of Extenfion in it : every thing that is extended may 
 therefore be feparated from Exiftence. But they that attempted this 
 by parts, when they found it impomble, did not fcruple to refolve the 
 Caufe into the felf-exiftence of Space, tho' in reality it did not arife 
 from thence, but from this, that they attempted to feparate things na- 
 naturally infcparable, namely, the parts of Space one from ano- 
 ther. 
 
 XVIII. But whether there be any fuch thing as Space, or no ; whe- We are cer- 
 ther its Extenfion be diftinguifh'd from the Extenfion of Body, or not : q\*J *^ rit 
 Be it nothing at all : Be it mere privation of Contract, as fome are what man- 
 pleas'd to term it ; be it mere Pojjibility or Capacity of exifting, as o- ner j e f ver 
 thers ; be it, laftly, either fomething created, or of it/elf, and necef- about'space 
 farily exifting, yet frill, as far as we know any thing of the nature of bedetermin'd 
 it. 'tis an indolent thing, it neither acJs^ nor is in the leafl acted up- 
 on % 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 " ginary Extenfion, or the general Idea of Ex- 
 " tenfion particulariz'd in an imaginary Subjecl; 
 " and hence it is that Space is faid to be exten- 
 " ded, which would be nonfenfe to fay of Ex- 
 " tenfion itfelf : and Bodies are faid to be in 
 ** Space, which would likewife be nonfenfe to 
 ** fay of Extenfion. And fo it is conceiv'd as 
 " immoveable, indivifible , infinite, lmmovea- 
 M ble, iffc. all properties of Subllances ; which 
 * makes it plain that it is conceiv'd after the 
 " manner of Subitance, and therefore is, be- 
 * caufe it can be nothing elfe, an imaginary 
 * Subjlratum, which the Mind takes to parti - 
 
 '* cularize, and thereby render conceivable, its 
 " general Idea of Extenfion ; which could 
 ' not otherwife fall within the Imagination, 
 " nor be eftimated any way but by abllracl 
 " numbers, fo many Yards, or fo many Miles, 
 " 10, 20, 30 j without attending to any thing 
 " but the numbers, and the meaning of the 
 " Words, Yards, Miles, iffc. as it is when we 
 " reckon Ounces, Pounds, &c. of Weight. ~ 
 " Thus then you fee how we come by the 
 ** notion of Space, and what it is." See alfo 
 Note 5.
 
 ai Concerning the Origin of Evil 
 
 Oft; it cannot therefore, as mere Extenjton, under which notfon onfy- 
 it appears to us, be the Caufe of Matter > or imprefs Motion on it, (D.) 
 
 There 
 
 N t E SI 
 
 (D.) There are Tome, who confidering Space 
 a? ff/f-xincnt, imagine it to be the immenfity 
 f God; And indeed, if we grant it to exiit 
 of itfelf, it muft neceffarily be refer'd to God. 
 For wh tever has felf-exijlence, muft at the 
 f me time be believ'd to have all Perfieclisn. 
 For what can limit a felf-exiftent Being ? Self- 
 exiftence is the greateft perfection, and no rea- 
 fon can be conceiv'd why all perfections 
 fhould not be afcribed to him who has that. 
 We muft therefore entirely deny Space to be 
 felf-exifient, or elfe refer it to God J Thefe 
 Men urge farther, in defence of their Opinion, 
 that every Fatuity which is in any degree con- 
 fcious, is to be refer'd to God, and has him in 
 fome refpect for its Object. For they think it 
 abfurd to fuppofe, that the Creatures fhould be 
 perceiv'd*. and the Author, whofe Workman- 
 ihip they' are, not perceiv'd in the leaft. AH 
 Faculties therefore which are in any refpect 
 perceptive, perceive God fome way or other: 
 fome in a greater degree and more clearly, o- 
 thers lefs and more obfcurely, according to 
 their native Perfection. Now our fenfes being 
 yery imperfect, can apprehend nothing in God 
 befide his Immetifity, and that very obfcurely : 
 But our Under/landing perceives his intellectual 
 Attributes, namely, Wifdcm, Geodnefs,. C3V. and 
 an Intel left more perfect than that of Man 
 may apprehend fome properties as much un- 
 known to us as Wifdom and Goodnefs are to 
 the Senfes : Nay, pious Men, and fuch as are 
 cndow'd with the Holy Spirit, especially the 
 infpired Prophets, behold fuch Marks of the 
 Divine Prefence* as neither can be perceiv'd 
 nor believ'd by the Impious. 
 
 When they are ask*d how Space, to which no 
 Jftion can be attributed (as far as we know any 
 thing of its nature) may belong to God> who 
 is entirely and effentially aclivei they reply, 
 that an Object, when perceiv'd by different 
 Faculties, leaves Tokens of itfelf, which have 
 ao more connection with one another, than if 
 
 they proceeded from the moft different Objects, . 
 and hence it comes to pafs, that we often take 
 a thing which is perceiv'd by many Faculties, 
 to be more than one. A blind Man that felt 
 Snow to be cold, and when his eyes were o- 
 pen'd, perceiv'd the fame under the appearance 
 of white, would not know it to be the fame, 
 without a new Experiment. But, after com- 
 paring and examining it, he would eafily ap- 
 prehend that the fame thing feemed cold to the 
 touch, mi white to the Eyes, tho' Cold and' 
 Whitenefs have no more connection with each 
 other than the Mind and Space. He therefore 
 that apprehends God by his Senfes as extended,. 
 by his Reafon as a Spirit, may not obferve with- 
 out Examination, that thefe tokens belong to 
 the fame Being, any more than the Man that 
 was lately blind, but now fees, can perceive 
 that the tangible and vifible Qualities inhere 
 in the fame Subftance j namely, the Snow : 
 but upon Examination he will find, that this 
 Space is felf-exifient, and alfo eternal, infinite, 
 immoz'eable ; and that an infinite Mind, fuch as 
 God is, has the very fame Attributes. Since 
 then there cannot be two Infinite and Self-exi- 
 ftent Beings, they will have it to be plain, that 
 thefe are partial perceptions of the fame thing, . 
 and belong to the fame Subftance, no lefs than 
 Cold and Whitenefs to thcStfw. 
 But to thefe we reply, 
 
 \ft. That the Self-exiftence of Space is not 
 certain, which being taken away, the whole 
 Reafoning falls to pieces. 
 
 zd/y. 'Tis affirm 'd, without a Reafon, that 
 every perceptive Faculty has God in fome man- 
 ner for its Object: for how caa they prove 
 this in Hearing, Smell, or Tafle, fince Space is 
 not perceiv'd by them, nor any thing that can. 
 be refer'd to God? 
 
 $dly. Tis true, a thing may be apprehended 
 by different Faculties, under Tokens that have 
 no connection with one another, and thereby 
 we are often deceiv'd, believing that there are 
 
 difFerent
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 There mufl then necefTarily be another Caufe of Matter and Motion, 
 that is, active, felf-exijlent, and the Caiife of all things and Ac- 
 tions, which, fince they are not of themfelves, require a Caufe. 
 
 N ?E S. 
 
 H 
 
 different Objedls perceived by our Faculties, 
 when it is but one and the fame. But tho' 
 thefe Tokens be difperate, yet they are not con- 
 trary and inconfiftent: Whereas Space and Spi- 
 rit feem entirely inconfiftent; fince one appears 
 by its nature equally incapable of afting or be- 
 ing acled upon ; the other felf-attive, and infe- 
 parable from AcYion. 
 
 \thlj. Thofe Objects that are perceiv'd by 
 different Faculties, under Tokens which have 
 no connection with one another, may alfo be 
 actually feparated ; for inftance, a thing may 
 be cold and not white, white and not cold; 
 and fince Space and Spirit are in the Mind as 
 
 independent as Cold and White, they may 
 be feparated, and have a feparate Exiftence, 
 which cannot be faid of any Divine Attri- 
 bute. 
 
 ybhf. It feems ufekfs, and to no manner of 
 purpofe, that God fhould be the Objecl of the 
 Senfes, for Brutes, that are held thus to per- 
 ceive him, worlhip him not, nor acknowledge 
 him as the Author of their Beings, which muft 
 be efteem'd to be the only End of perceiving 
 the Creator. From hence, I think, it ap- 
 pears, that this Opinion is by no means pro- 
 bable. 
 
 SEC T. III. 
 
 Of the Firft Caufe. 
 
 ! \\ THAT this active Principle is we cannot apprehend other- Our Reafo- 
 
 V V wife than by Reafon, for it occurs not to the Senfes, un- n h in f ft a c out fe 
 lefs by its Effects, nor is it perceived by them any more than Light is arc like thofe 
 by the Ears: our Reafonings therefore about this Principle will be ofa blind 
 like thofe of a blind ^ Man about Light. A blind Man may be affur'd KghUtoa 
 that there is a certain thing eall'd Light, which the Eye can perceive, it is not an 
 as the Nofe can Smells j he may be taught alfo by them who fee, to ; g^ of 
 under/land many Advantages of Light, namely, that it can direct the 
 Steps, that it can warm, that it derives its Origin from a large remote 
 
 G 2 Body,
 
 H 
 
 ings 
 cerning it 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 Body, /. e. the Sun (17.), that by the help of it very difiant Bodies 
 may be perceiv'd, with their Forms and other Qualities unknown to 
 him ; and that Fire which affords only heat to him, can give light al- 
 io to them who fee: Laftly, that it arifes from fome Motion in the 
 minuteft Particles of a Fluid (17.). 
 Vet we know IL From thefe external Properties he might difcourfe of Light, 
 a great many and in fome meafure underftand the reafonings of other Men upon. 
 it : he would believe it to be diftinct from Heat ; he would eagerly 
 defirc, and willingly undergo many hardships, to enjoy the benefit of 
 it j yet would he never have any fuch fenfe of it as thofe who fee. 
 After the fame manner we may know many things about this active 
 Principle, which we are conudl'd, by the force of Reaibns, to be- 
 lieve certainly to exift, tho' we are no lefs ignorant of what it is in 
 itfelf, than the blind Man is of the Senfation which Light produces 
 in thofe who fee *^ 
 
 III. For inftance ; In the fir/? place we are certain, that aft 1 other 
 things come from this adfpve Principle : For nothing elfe, as we have 
 procee rom f^ewn b e f ore ^ contains in itfelf NeceJJary Exiftence, or active Power, 
 entirely independent of any other j as therefore itfelf is from none, 
 fo all others are from it. For from hence we conclude, that this 
 Principle does Exift ; becaufe, after confidering the reft of the things 
 which exift, we perceive that they could neither be nor 40 t if that had 
 not exifted, and excited Motion in them.. 
 
 That all o- 
 ther Beings 
 
 IV. Se+- 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (1 7.) Thefe two particulars feem neither ne- 
 ceflary to be mentioned here among the advan- 
 tages that Light affords, nor will the latter of 
 them be thought to be exactly true, if under- 
 ftood of the Cartefian Subtle Fluid. Tho' per- 
 haps in effect the Cartefian and Newtonian doc- 
 trines of Vifion may in this refpect be confi- 
 dent. For, Sir Ifaac Newton fuppofes, that 
 Vifitn is perform'd chiefly by the vibrations of 
 a fine Midtum, which penetrates all Bodies, ex- 
 
 cited in the bottom of the Eye by. the rays of. 
 Light, and propagated thro' the Capillaments 
 of the Optic Nerves to the Senforium: and Des 
 Cartes maintains, that the Sun preffing the 
 Materia Subti/is, wherewith the World is fill'd 
 every way, the Vibrations or Pulfes of that 
 Matter reflected from Objects are communica- 
 ted to the Eye, and thence to the Senfory. So 
 that the Action or Vibration of a Medium \% 
 equally fuppofed in both, Chambers., 
 
 * This Compart fon is farther illujlrated by the Author of the Procedure of Human Underftarv, 
 ding, in bis Introduction. 
 f t Vz. (aragr. 3, 4, 5, &c. and Note L4.
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evih k^ 
 
 IV. Secondly \ we are certain that this Principle is One, Similar and Thatitifi0 ^ 
 Uniform ; For Matter is, as to its Ejjence, every where One and a- 
 like ; the fame mud be faid of Space, if we grant it to be any thing 
 diftinct from Matter : much more mult the Caufe, which fills Space 
 with Matter be One, fimple and uniform (18.). 
 
 G 3 , Vr Thirdly . 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (18".) This Argument, (as well as fome o- 
 thers hereafter mention' d) were the foundation 
 of ir true, can but be call v d a probable,, pre- 
 emptive one at belt : nay, the contrary will 
 rather follow from the multiplicity and diver City 
 of created Subftances. We fhall therefore en- 
 deavour to give a diftinft proof of the Being 
 and Attributes of God, fo far, at leaft, as the 
 knowledge of them may affect our prefent Sub- 
 let. 
 
 Now thefefeem capable of a clear deduction 
 from this one f elf-evident Principle*, I Exif. 
 I my felf exif : therefore fome thing exifts. If 
 fomething exifts now, then fomething has exifted 
 Always, otherwife, that fomething which now 
 exifts, muft once either have been made by no- 
 thing, i. e. been caufed by no Caufe, which is 
 abfurd; or elfe have made itfelf, u e. have ailed 
 before it exifted, or been at once both Effeil 
 and Caufe', which is alfo abfurd ; or, laftly, 
 (which is the only fuppofition left) it muft 
 have been produced by fomething, which had 
 its Exiftence from fomething elfe, which alfo 
 depended on fome other Caufe, and fo on in an 
 infinite Series of Caus'd or Succeflive Beings, 
 without any eternal or firft Caufe, which is al- 
 fo abfurd. For either fome one part of this in- 
 finite Series has not been fucceffive to any other, 
 or elfe all the feveral parts of it have been fuc- 
 ceflive : if fome one part of it has not, then 
 there was a firft, which deftroys the Suppofi- 
 fition ; if all the feveral parts of it have been 
 fucceffive to each other, then they have all 
 once been future, and if they have been once 
 all future, then there was a time when none of 
 them exifted; and if there was a time when 
 none of them exifted, then either all the parts 
 of this Infinite Series, and confequcntly the 
 
 See X a; at the end *f Chap. I. 
 
 whole, muft have arifen from nothing j which isj 
 abfurd; or elfe there muft be fomething in the* 
 whole befide what is contain'd in all the parts ; 
 which is alfo abfurd. This infinite Series there- 
 fore is, in the whole, and in every part, an 
 exprefs contradiction. Or thus-: Since all the 
 parts of this infinite Series arc fucceffive or fa 
 tare to one another, they muft once either 
 have been all future, i. e. non-exifient, (and 
 then the fecondabfurdity will follow, /'. e. tbit y 
 this whole Series arofe from nothing) or elfe r.ll " 
 but fome one, (and then the firft will follow, i.e; 
 that it had a beginning} lvhich one added to the * 
 reft, either makes them infinite, which is ab- 
 furd, or they are infinite without that one, and' 
 then that one added to them makes one more 
 than infinite, which is alfo abfurd^. 
 
 Hence we gather the Eternity || of fome one 
 Thing or Being. That every one is not in like 
 manner -Eternal a parte ante, (as the School- 
 men improperly fpeak) or, never had a Begin- 
 ning', particularly, that no Body or material Sy- 
 ftem can be fo (and the fame reafons hold e- 
 qually againft any finite immaterial Subftance) 
 is fufficiently prov'd in the Enquiry into the E~ 
 vidence'of the Chriftian Religion f4- 
 
 From Eternity comes Independence or Self- 
 Exiftence. For thatwhich never had a begin- 
 ning of Exiftence, could not poffibly have any 
 Caufe of that exiftence (for then ir would nor 
 be theory? Caufe, contrary to what we have 
 prov'd above) or. could depend upon no other 
 thing for it, i. e. muft be independent of all o- 
 thers; or, which is the fame thing, muft exiftr 
 of itfelf, i. e. be felf-exiftent || ||. 
 
 Eternity a parte poft, or necejjary Exiftence, 
 or an iinpoflibility of ever ceafing to be, is a 
 neceflary confequencc of Independence. For, 
 
 wiut 
 
 fXb. jfX-c. f-rXd. |l! X*
 
 4 6 
 
 Infinite in 
 Nature and 
 Power, 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 V. Thirdly, That it is Infinite both in Nature and Power : For fince 
 ic exifts of itjelf t there is nothing that can bound its Nature o$ 
 
 Power, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 what depends upon no Caufe can never be al- 
 ter'd or deftroy'd by any, as was (hewn in 
 Notes 9 and 14, and X e. 
 
 From Independence comes alfo Omnipotence. 
 For a Being thut depends upon no external 
 Caufe for his Exiftence, and has active Power, 
 (as was fhewn at the fame time that we prov'd 
 his Exiftence, and by the fame Medium) can- 
 not depend upon any for the exertion of that 
 power, and confequently no limits or defeft can 
 be apply'd to either his Exiftence or Power. 
 For Limitation is an effect of fome fuperior caufe, 
 which in the prefent cafe there cannot be: con- 
 sequently to fuppofe limits where there can be 
 no limiter,- is to fuppofe an Effeel without a 
 Caufe ; which is a. Contradiction f. 
 
 To fuppofe this. Being limited in or by its 
 own Nature, is to fuppofe fome Nature antece- 
 dent, or limiting Quality fuperior, to that Being, 
 to the Exiftence of whom, no Thing, no Qua- 
 lity, is in any refpeft antecedent, or fuperior : 
 which is another Contradiction. And to fup- 
 pofe that there is no fuch thing as action or 
 power in a Being which appears to be the 
 fountain of all aftion and power, is (if pof- 
 fible) the worft fuppofition of all. 
 
 Liberty is alfo included in the Idea of Om- 
 nipotence : Active Power implies Freedom . Infi- 
 nite Power is abftlute Freedom. What therefore 
 has no bounds fet to its power, what can have 
 no oppofition made to its Will, nor reftraint 
 laid on its Actions, muft both will and aft 
 freely. This Attribute is alfo prov'd from the 
 beginning of Motion, and the creation and 
 difpofition of indifferent things ||. But tho' 
 this Being Is free, and as fuch, the Author of 
 Change in othej Beings, yet he muft himfelf be 
 Unchangeable. For all changes have a begin- 
 ning, and confequently are Effefts of fome 
 prior Caufes: But there can be nothing prior to 
 the Exiftence of this Being, as he is Eternal, 
 neither any Caufe of it, as he is independent ; 
 
 nor confequently any change in it: except we 
 could fuppofe him to change himfelf, which is 
 the fame abfurdity as to produce himfelf, i, e. to 
 be at the fame time both Effect and Caufe. 
 
 Thus we come to the Knowledge of an E- 
 ternal, Independent, Omnipotent, Free, and Un~ 
 changeable Being. 
 
 'Omnifcience, as well as fome of the foregoing 
 Attributes, may be more eafily deduced thus* 
 We find in ourfelves fuch Qualities as Thought 
 and Intelligence, Potver, Freedom, &c. of which 
 we have intuitive Knowledge, as much as of our 
 own Exiftence', and that to have thefe is a per- 
 fection, or, better than to be without them: 
 We find alfo, that thefe have not been in us 
 from Eternity, confequently they muft have had 
 a Beginning, and confequently fome Caufe, (for 
 the fame reafon that a Being, beginning to exift 
 in time, requires a Caufe) which Caufe, as it 
 muft be fuperior to its Effeel, has them in a fu- 
 perior Degree f4- ; and if it be the fir (I Caufe, as 
 itfelf can depend upon no other, muft have them 
 in perfection, or in an infinite or unlimited 'De- 
 gree (if thefe Words can properly be here ap- 
 ply'd || ||.) Since Bounds or Limitation would be 
 without a Limiter (as has been fhewn) i. e% an 
 Effeft, without a Caufe. 
 
 The Phenomena of Nature alfo lead us up to 
 one, fuch firft Caufe, which is fufficient for 
 their produftion, and therefore none elfe are 
 necefjary ; and tho' feveral more independent Be- 
 ings might poflibly exift, yet would they be no 
 Gods to us ; for they would have no manner of 
 Relation to us, nor we any thing to do witlt 
 them *, Since therefore the fame reafon holds 
 for no more than One fuch, to fuppofe more 
 than one is at leaft unreafonable. 
 
 Thefe feem to be all the fimple Attributes 
 obfervable in the Divine Nature, which, as 
 they are differently combin'd by us, come un- 
 der different names. Thus the unlimited ex- 
 ercife of Gods Knowledge and Power demon- 
 strates 
 
 tXf. 
 part ofXk. 
 
 |J See Note 20. and our Author's Note F. and the rfferences. f | See the latter 
 
 ill^Xl. *Xg. . +
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 'Bower. Tis to be obferv'd farther, that the number of pojjible things 
 is conceiv'd by us to be infinite at leaft in Power, but nothing can be 
 
 poffible, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 47 
 
 ftrates him Omniprejent, i. e. at all times and in 
 all places fo prefent with every Creature, as to 
 have an abfolute Knowledge of, and Power over 
 it ; always to fupervife and govern it \\ 
 
 His enjoying all conceivable perfections in 
 an entire abfolute manner, denotes him infi- 
 nite, or abfolutely perfeel ||; and, which is the 
 feme thing, his being capable of no want, de- 
 fe", or utihappinefs whatsoever, defines him all 
 uffcient. 
 
 And fince we can never fully comprehend 
 the nature of fuch an infinite or perfect. Being, 
 nor conceive the manner of his Exiflence, we 
 ftile him Incomprehenfible. To doubt whether 
 his Nature, and manner of Exillence may be in 
 reality thus incomprehenflble to us, is to doubt 
 whether the lefs may not contain the greater -, 
 and whether our Ideas of things all exiiling 
 with a Caufe, may not fhew us the manner of a 
 thing's exiiling without a Caufe, exifting in a 
 manner quite different from every other thing. 
 He that can doubt of this, may doubt alfo, 
 whether twice two may not be equal to twen- 
 ty ; and whether he may not know how the 
 Sun mines by his being always in the Dark. 
 
 The Moral Attributes of God, are deducible 
 after the fame manner from his Natural ones. 
 All of them (except Goodnefs) are cohfider'd 
 only as confequences of the former, when ex- 
 ereifed on fome other Beings, and feem to be 
 the Perfections of his External Atts, rather 
 than any new internal perfections of his Nature 
 or Eflence ; and are very properly term'd, his 
 feeondary, relative Attributes *. 
 
 And tho' the Exiflence of any moral Quali- 
 ty or Action is not capable of ftrict Demon- 
 ftration, becaufe every moral Action or Quali- 
 ty, as fuch, depends upon the Will of the A- 
 gent, which is abfolutely free. Yet, we have 
 as great an Affurance that there are Moral Qua- 
 lities in God, and that he will always Aft ac- 
 cording to thefe Moral Qualities, as the nature 
 
 t X h. || See Wollafton, /. 70, 93, 
 
 14- See Ditton on Moral Evidence, /. 1, 2. 
 
 of the thing admits, and may be as abfolutely 
 certain of it, as if we could demonftrate it +4 
 
 I fhall begin again, with a Self-Evident 
 Propofition : 
 
 Pleafure indifferent from Pain ; confequent- 
 ly there's zj^fference in things. Pleafure is 
 fit for, or agreeable to, the Nature of a fenfible 
 Being, or is a natural Good ; Pain is unfit, or is 
 a natural Evil: confequently, there's a natural 
 fitnefs and unfitnefs of things ; or (which is the 
 very fame, and what thefe terms fhould always- 
 mean) Natural Good and Evil. 
 
 The voluntary application of this fitnefs and 
 unfitnefs to any Rational Being, or the Produc- 
 tion || (I of this Natural Good and Evil by a 
 Rational Being, is M<ral Fitnefs and Unfitnefs, 
 or Moral Good and Evil : confequently there 
 is fuch a thing as Moral Good and Evil* An 
 Inclination to, and Approbation of, this Moral 
 Good, is implanted in every rational Creature, 
 and is perfective of its Nature, and therefore it 
 muft be communicated by, and confequently 
 be inherent in, the Creator -f\|.-f\ 
 
 To Will and Act agreeably to this Affection 
 and Approbation, is alfo a Perfection; the con- 
 trary an imperfectionr confequently the for- 
 mer, as it is a Perfection found in. fome degree 
 in the Creature, muft belong to, and be, ia 
 the higheft degree, in the. Creator, who has 
 been already proved to exift in the beft man- 
 ner poffible, or to have all natural perfections 
 in an infinite or perfect Degree || || || ; and there- 
 fore he muft have all moral ones fo too. 
 
 As his Knowledge and Power are perfeel, he 
 muft always both perceive and be able to pur- 
 fue this Moral Good, And as his Happinefs is 
 complete, there can be no poffible reafon why 
 he fhould ever will the contrary ; nay, there is 
 a good reafon why he fhould not, namely, o- 
 therwife a perfect Thing would contradict it- 
 felf, and will a defecl or imperfeelion, i. e. be 
 be perfeft and not' perfect at the fame time: 
 
 And 
 
 * See Impartial Enquiry, /. 29, 68, &t, 
 
 UK XL f-rtXk. iimxi.
 
 ** 
 
 concerning 
 
 the Origin of Evil. 
 
 fqflible, to which there is not fome Power correfpondefit, that might 
 actually. .effect it, fince therefore the things that are poflible, cannot 
 
 be 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Arid a Being infinitely happy, and who loves 
 and approves himfelf, becaufe he is fo, would 
 Jute and difipprove the very fame thing in o- 
 thers, /. e. would love his ownd^ature, and 
 yet hate any thing that refembleffit ; which is 
 ablurd *. It follows then, tha# he muft al- 
 ways know, be able, and willing to do, and 
 therefore aSually do what is abfolutely bejl to 
 be done, /. e. produce the greateft Sum of 
 Happinefs, or be abfolutely and completely 
 'Good. This alfo was included in Benevo- 
 Jence, and the moral Scnfe above mentio- 
 ned f. 
 
 For if he has implanted Benevolent Affec- 
 tions in us, and a Senfe which approves them, 
 he muft himfelf have both the fame Affections, 
 and the fame Senfe of .them ||. 
 
 Again: The Idea of Goodnefs properly im- 
 -plies an inclination of communicating happi- 
 nefs to others ;- if then this .Being be Good, he 
 muft aftually have communicated happinefs-to 
 others. ; and vice verfa y if he have communica- 
 ted happinefs to others, he muft be good : But 
 this Being has communicated diappinefs'to o- 
 thers, therefore he is Good. 
 
 The Idea of Wifdom implies his knowledge 
 and obfervance of the moft proper methods of 
 effecting this, and is included in his Omnifci- 
 ence; it being nothing but that very knowledge 
 confider'd, with relation to practice. It ap- 
 pears farther, from confidering the only caufes 
 of imprudence in Men, which are either Igno- 
 rance, Partiality, or, Inattention', none of which 
 can have place in God: He cannot be igno- 
 rant of any thing, fince both all things, and 
 their Relations to each other, proceed from him : 
 he cannot be auPd by any Power, ot fwafd by 
 any intereft, fince (as has been fhewn^ he is 
 independent and all-fufficient j and he cannot be 
 inattentive, fince he always fees everything in- 
 tuitively and at once; and confequently he 
 
 muft always know arid do what is fittefl and wi- 
 fejl to be done. 
 
 From which alfo follows his Jufiice : For 
 he that fees all the circumjiances of things, and 
 the qualifications of pcrfons, and' has ability to re- 
 gulate thefe, and no manner of temptation to do 
 otherwife, -muft certainly fuit thefe Circum- 
 ftances to thofe Qualifications, or, provide that 
 perfons receive the natural and proper confe- 
 quence of their Actions; or (which is the fame) 
 do with. every perfon what -is exactly juft and 
 right. 
 
 The fame alfo holds for his Holinefs and Ve- 
 racity, or rather Faithfulnefs. As to the former, 
 he muft always diflike and deteft Evil, fince it 
 can never become in the leaft agreeable to his 
 Perfections, or ferviceable to his Ufe: As to the 
 latter, he muft adhere to Truth, as it is a Per- 
 fection, and co-incident with Good, &c* fince 
 he can have no pofnble reafon or motive to de- 
 viate from it. " The reafon why Men break 
 " -their Words (fays Bp. Wilkins) is either be- 
 " caufe of their rajhnefs and inconfidcratnefs 
 "in making Promifes, or their firgetfulnefs 
 " in not minding them, or their inconflancy in 
 '* not keeping them, or their impotence to per- 
 " form them : But now the Divine Nature be- 
 " ing infinitely wife, and all-fufficient, can have 
 " no temptation to be otherwife than true and 
 ** faithful, his infinite knowledge and wifdom fe- 
 " cures him from being deceiv'd himfelf, his 
 " Omnipotence doth exempt him from ftanding 
 " in need of deceiving others, and his Goodnefs 
 " fecures us from the leaft fufpicion of any in- 
 " cli nation thereto - r -f\' ' 
 
 Thus may we reafon about the feveral per- 
 fections of the fupreme Being, but that which 
 fhould chiefly direct us in thefe our Enquiries, 
 is the Idea of his Infinite Goodnefs. " This 
 " (f a y s f b e f ame learned Perfon || j| ) is the firft 
 " and cleared Notion we have of him, the 
 
 ioun- 
 
 Set Scot'/ Works, Vol.2. DifcXIV. p. 303. + See Xi. 
 
 M Nat. Relig. Ch. 10. p. 142. 6th Edit; " || \\ Ibid. p. 138. 
 
 Ibid.
 
 Concerning the Origin of RviL 
 
 o o J 
 
 be limited, there mufl alfo be a Caufe infinitely powerful. For as one 
 
 Poffibility 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 49 
 
 " dationof all our Worfhipand Religion ; and 
 " without which all his other Attributes 
 " would not afford fufficient grounds for our 
 " Love and Adoration." Power without Good- 
 nefs is attended only with the Idea of Terror ; 
 jujlice, of Rigour and Severity ; IVifdom, of Ar- 
 tifice and Cunning; and Truth will be nothing 
 but rigid Inflexibility in arbitrary Decrees*. 
 So that there is no other Attribute, when con- 
 f;der'd feparately from it, capable of giving the 
 Heart any kind or amiable impreffions; and all 
 the other moral Attributes (if they can proper- 
 ly be call'd Attributes) are fo far from exilting 
 apart from it, that they may be confider'd only 
 as fo many different Views of the fame Goodnefs 
 in the Creator, and various Sources of Happinef 
 to the Creature. Nay, farther, the reft of the 
 moral Attributes feem as it were fub-ordinateto, 
 and regulated by, this one principal Perfection, 
 and brighteft ray of the Divinity. Thus we 
 conceive his Jujiice to be exerted on any Being 
 no farther than his Goodnefs necefTarily re- 
 quires, in order to the making that Being, or 
 ethers, fenfble of the heinous nature and perni- 
 cious effecls of Sin ; and thereby bringing either 
 it, or fome others, to as great a degree of Hap- 
 pinefs, as their feveral Natures become capable 
 off. His Holinefs hates and abhors all Wicked- 
 vefs, only as the necrffary Confequence of it is ab- 
 folute and unavoidable Mifery ; and his Veracity 
 or Faithfulnefs, fecms to be no more concern' d 
 for Truth, than as it is connected with, and 
 productive of, the Happinefs of all rational 
 Beings ; to provide the propereft Means for at- 
 taining which great end, is the exercife of his 
 Wifdom. Thus, tho' we are certain, that all 
 the Divine Attributes proceed equally from one 
 and the fame principle, and are united in one 
 TLJfence; yet when we conftder that Eflence as 
 exhibited to us in different refpe&s; we alfo 
 conceive it partially under the d^fmct Ideas of 
 Superior, and Inferior, antecedent and confequent, 
 
 &c. In which Senfe, Goodnefs is fuperior 
 and antecedent to, and as it were, the root and 
 foundation of, all the Moral Attributes. 
 
 I have all along declin'd the Argument a pri- 
 ori, drawn from the antecedent neceffity of Exi- 
 gence, as well for the reafons given above in 
 Note 14. as alfo, becaufe it feem'd not to car- 
 ry fome Attributes, fo far as they might be de- 
 duced a Pofleriori, and to be fcarce conliftent 
 with others. That the Self-exiflcnt Being, for 
 inftance, is not a blind, unintelligent Neceffity, 
 but in the mod proper Senfe, an underflanding 
 and really attive Being, cannot be demonftrated 
 ftriftly and properly a priori, as Dr. Clarke 
 fays ||, with a great deal of reafon ; and how 
 abfolute Neceffity is reconcileable with abfolute 
 freedom, feems hard to conceive. For why 
 fhould not this neceffity extend to all the Ope- 
 rations, the Will, the Decrees, as well as the 
 Exifience of the firft Caufe : and take away that 
 Freedom of determination, that entire Liberty 
 of Indifference, which our Author has fufficient- 
 ly proved +4-> t0 De a property of God himfelf, 
 as well as Man ? And, if we cannot admit it 
 in one cafe, why fhould we in the other ? I 
 don't fay this Neceffity is inconfiflent with pci*- 
 feft Freedom, as the former is an Impcrfcclion, 
 fince we do not conceive it to be fuch, any 
 farther, than as it proceed.% ab extra, from fome 
 fuperior Caufe impofing it. But, this I fay, 
 that, be it what you pleafe, the very Nature and 
 Idea of it feems repugnant to that of Freedont, 
 i. e. the power of determining in cafes abfolute- 
 ly indifferent, without any previous reafon, or 
 neceffity whatfoever ; and cdnfequently thefe 
 two can never be co-exifient in the fame Caufe: 
 He that confiders this attentively, will, I be- 
 lieve, find it to be more than a mere quibble on 
 the Words || j|. 
 
 Laftly, This Neceffity of Exigence, being 
 (as Di. Clarke contends * m ) Simple and Uniform^ 
 without any poftiblc difference or variety, fhould 
 
 admit 
 
 * See TiWotCon^s ()o Serm. vol.2. Fol. 
 jv|. Chap. 5. $. 1. Subj. 4. and elfewhere. 
 
 p. 679. f X m. 
 
 II" SeeNttes 14&62. 
 
 H 
 
 II Demon fir. p. 52. 
 Dewj.ifir. Prr.p. -,
 
 jo Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 PoQibility requires a Caufe, fo infinite Poflibilicies require a Caufe in- 
 finitely powerful (19.). 
 Free. VI. Fourthly, Since Space is conceiv'd as merely idle and indiffe- 
 
 rent ', with refpecl: to Repletion or Vacuity; fince the Matter which 
 fills Space, is in like manner merely patfive and indifferent- with re- 
 fpect to Motion and Reft-, it follows, that the Caufe which fills Spac? 
 with Matter, and produces Motion in that Matter, is perfectly free; 
 fo that the Creation and Motion of Matter ^muft be Works of free 
 Choice, and not Neceflity,. in the Agent. For, if the Agent effec- 
 ted thefe by -Neceflity, they would alfo be neceffary Effects, and 
 could not be conceiv'd to be. in themfelves indifferent to Exi- 
 stence 
 
 no r E S.\ 
 
 adnfiit of no difference or variety of aay fort,- 
 or in any refpedt, and confequently muft ex- 
 clude all diverfity, or different kinds of ' .perfection 
 (a,s well as different Perfons) from the Divine 
 Nature, which is fuppos'd to exift thereby. It 
 muft be utterly inconfiftent with that Variety 
 of Attributes, fuch as Knowledge and Power, Sec. 
 which we conceive to be very diflintt Proper- 
 ties, and which Dr. Clarke, and every one elfe, 
 concludes to be eflentially in God. 
 
 If the Learned Do fiefs Notion of abfolute Ne- 
 cejfity proves all this, I humbly conceive it 
 proves too much, and if it does not prove this 
 I cannot apprehend how it proves any thing at 
 all. See S. C's Impartial Enquiry, &c. p. 
 170. 
 
 (19 ) I fhall give the Reader this Argument 
 as it is propos'd after another manner by J)f. 
 Fiddes, and the Anfwer to it, by S. G v 
 
 " To fay a thing is poffible, is to fay, there 
 " is fome thing, fome power or other capable 
 "of producing it.. For nothing,, oriwhat-has 
 "no power, can produce no effeft. The 
 " power therefore, which is to-bring what is 
 ** poffible into Being, is neceflarily fuppofed al- 
 " -ready to exift; other wife a Perfeclion might 
 "arife out of non-entity, or without a Caufe; 
 
 u and what we conceive poffible, would' \J6 
 " really impoffible *." - 
 
 Which the Author of thtf Impartial Enquiry, 
 cjrV. confutes, by a parallel inftance. 
 
 " If a perfon having firft proved the exi- 
 " ftence of a Power tint is perfeft, and made 
 " it appear*- -that a perfeft power cannot but 
 " extend to whatever is a capable object, of 
 " power,- -or includes not, a contradiction *; 
 " fhould proceed to prove, that the Aft o/Cre- 
 " ation implies no contradiction, and then at 
 " -/^fhould conclude, that therefore Creation 
 " isapoffibility (i.e. effeftible by the exer- 
 " eife .of that perfect or almighty power, whofe 
 " Exiftence he- had before demonftrated) I 
 "conceive there could be no reafonable cx- 
 " ception againft fuch a method of Arguing. 
 "But if,, on- the. contrary, he fhould fay, I 
 " plainly perceive there's no contradiction in 
 " the Suppofition of the Creation, or produ T 
 " ftion of a thing that was not, and fhould 
 " from thence immediately infer, that a poweF 
 " capable of Creation exifts, this would be a 
 " very prepofterous way of Demonftrating : 
 " which yet is the. fame method with. that of 
 " the prefent Argument ||." 
 
 *~Theolog. Spec. p. 15. 
 || Impartial Enquiry, p. 178..
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 5 I 
 
 {fence or Non-Exiftence, as proceeding from a neceffary Caufe, 
 
 (20..) 
 
 VII. Fifthly : Tho* by our outward Senfes, and the notices which That it is * 
 they convey to us, we cannot go beyond Space, Matter, Motion, fen- con fij ous > >- 
 
 Jible Qualities, and this Active Principle which we are fpeaking of; [ng! 8 and om 
 yet, if we infpcct our own Minds, we may contemplate a Self-con- nifcient. 
 fcious and thinking Principle within us, whofe Actions are, to will, 
 refufe, doubt, reafon, affirm and deny, which carry nothing of Exten- 
 fion along with them, nor neceflarily include it in them, nor have 
 any relation to Place or Space-, but are entirely abftracted from the 
 Notions of external or internal. That there is fuch a Principle in us 
 we are certain, not only from our fenfes, or the impulfes of external 
 objects, but alfo from Reflection and Self-Confcioufnefs. 'Tis to be 
 obferv'd farther, that we can at our pleafufe -move fome parts of 
 Matter, and make the Limbs of our Body by thought only, that is, 
 by Volition *, whence it appears, that Motion may be produc'd in 
 Matter by thought j and that fomething of this kind is to be attri- 
 buted to the firft Caufe, in order to put Matter into Motion, nay, to 
 bring it into Being. Cogitation alfo, Will and Confcioufnefs, or Fa- 
 culties equivalent to thefe, are neceffary to a free Caufe, and on that 
 account to be attributed to the firft Caufe, being (as mail be fhewn 
 below) perfectly Free: which Caufe, fince it is infinite (as we have 
 proved) in its Eflence and Power, it mufl be fo likewife in Intelligence % 
 viz. Omnipotent and Omnifcient. 
 
 VIII. Sixthly : Since this Principle (which we call God) is the That he afis 
 Caufe of all things, and infinite in Knowledge as well as Power, it for an End ' 
 follows, that he ads, not by blind impulfe but, for an End-, and has 
 order'd his Works by fuch Wifdom, as to be confident with them- 
 
 felves, and not deftructive of each other. 
 
 H 2 IX. Sc- 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (20.) For an excellent illuflration of this 
 Argument, fee Dr. Clarke's Demonjirat. p. 24, 
 25, 26. and 65, 66, 67. cth Edit. Sec alfo 
 Cudwortb, p. 667, &c. and the Impartial En- 
 quiry, p. 31, 32, sV. 
 
 * That Volition r and Anion are perfectly di* 
 ftindt, and malt proceed from two different 
 
 Powers, Sec Note 61 
 two-fold, Sec Note 62. 
 
 That Aft ion alio is
 
 5* Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 IX. Seventhly: Since God is perfect in himfelf, fince all things, 
 of Creation fubfift by his Providence, and ftand in need of him, but he of none ; 
 wnstoexer- &n ^ f ince h e can neither be profited nor incommoded by his Works, 
 er.'and P to W " nor a fi~ e & e d hy their Good or Evil; it follows, that he made thefe 
 communi- things for no Advantage of his own, and that he neither receives 
 Goodnefs f nor ex P e< ^ s anv Benefit f r0 m them. For by creating things with- 
 thc Deity, out himfelf, he mufl neceffariiy have fought either their Benefit or 
 his own; but what Benefit can God feek for himfelf, who poffeffes 
 all Good ? That certainly which was wanting to him, and necefTa- 
 riiy mufl be wanting, to a Being even abfolutely perfect, till he has 
 created fomething; I mean the Exercife of his Attributes without the 
 communicating of his Power and Goodnefs: That therefore only 
 muft he be fuppofed to have fought in the Creation and Difpofal 
 of his Works (21.), Not that Externals can add any thing to Go J, 
 
 for 
 
 NOTE & 
 
 (21.) Some hive objected': here, that accor- 
 ding to this Notion, there muft have been a 
 Time before the exiftence of any created Be- 
 ings, when God was neither infinitely happy, 
 nor abfolutely Good *. But the one part of this 
 objection evidently arifesfrom a miftake of our 
 Author's Notion, who has often told U3-, that 
 he does not fuppofe any thing external to the 
 Deity, to add the leaft to his own- Happinefs, 
 or EfTential Perfections ; (and indeed, to think 
 otherwife, would be worfe thin to imagine 
 the Fountain fed by its own Streams ; or the 
 Sun enlightened by its own Rays) but only to 
 manifej} them to us his Creatures, and encreafe 
 our happinefs and perfection, by our knowledge 
 and imitation of them- The other part cannot 
 be of force againft Creation in any particular 
 time; becaufe it will hold equally againft it 
 in all times: Againft the very poffibility of 
 Creation in General, fioce with God there is 
 no prior and poflerior, no difference of timeap- 
 plicable to his Exiftence, as we have endea- 
 vour'd to prove in X c. Befides, is it not 
 abfurd to talk of time, before the beginning 
 of things, which time (as we have fliewn in 
 
 the fame place) can only be-conceiv'd as co~ 
 exijlent with, or rather cevfequential to, the Be- 
 ing of thefe things ? 'Tis in vain therefore to 
 ask, why were not Beings created fooner ? 
 Since no part of Duration conceivable can e- 
 ver be affign'd, when fome were not Created, 
 and every period of time has equal relation to 
 Eternity. " As to the fecond Senfe of the 
 " Queftion (fays Cudzvorth) Why the World, 
 " tho' it could not poffibly be from Eternity,. 
 " yet was no fooner, . but fo lately made ? We 
 " fay, that this is an abfurd Queftion, both be- 
 " caufe Time was made together with the 
 " World, and there was no fooner or later be- 
 " fore Time\ and alfo, becaufe whatfoever had 
 " a beginning, muft of neceffity be once but a 
 " day old. Wherefore, the World could not 
 " poffibly have been fo made by God in time,. 
 " as not to be once butjfoe ox fix thoufand 
 " Years old and no more, as now it is." p. 887 
 See the fame more at large in Fiddes's Tbeolog, 
 Spec. B. 3. Part I. Ch. 2. and in Bentlefs 
 Boyle's Left. p. 232, 235. 5th Edit, orjenkin's 
 Reafonablenefs of Ckrifliamty, Vol. 2. C. 9. or 
 Sir MMale's Prim.Originat. of Mankind, S. I. C.6. 
 
 Whew 
 
 vSft Bp. Pearftm on the Cre$d, zd Edit. p. 62, 63,
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 for they have no manner of Proportion to his Power or Nature: but 
 he has in himfelf the^adequate Exercife of his Powers, namely in 
 the Contemplation and Love of himfelf. Externals therefore can 
 neither encreafe nor diminifh the Exercife of his Powers, which be- 
 fore was infinite (22.) God is indifferent therefore as to thefe, nor 
 does his Exercife without pleafe him, otherwife than as he has chofen 
 to exercife himfelf thus ; as will be fhewn below *. And hence it 
 manifeftly follows, that the World is as well as it could be made by 
 infinite Power and Goodnefs. For fince the Exercife of the Divine 
 Power, and the Communication of his Goodnefs, are the Ends for 
 which the World is fram'd, there is no doubt but God has attain'd 
 thefe Ends* 
 
 H 3 X. I 
 
 53 
 
 NOTE S. 
 
 Where you have all the abfurd Queries of that 
 kind folidly and acutely anfwer'd. 
 
 (22.) The Powers or Attributes th'emfelves 
 were in fome Senfe Infinite, . but I don't appre- 
 hend how the Exercife of them can properly be 
 faid to be fo. It fecms impoffible to fuppofe a- 
 ny Divine Attribute, either Natural or Moral, 
 to be exerted infinitely on a finite Subject, fince 
 that Subject muft neceflarily be incapable of 
 receiving it. Whence appears the abfurdity of 
 imagining any Man-to be the objedt of God's 
 infinite Jujlice, and at the fame time*, of his in- 
 finite Mercy too, in an infinite manner, as fome 
 love to fpeak; which with them raifes a migh- 
 ty difficulty about Hell Torments : Whereas, if 
 we fhould allow that the Divine Juftice is an 
 Attribute entirely diftinct from Goodnefs, and 
 alfo, that a perfon may be at the fame time the 
 object of both ; concerning which fee X m. 
 Yet ftill we can eafily fuppofe thefe two Attri- 
 butes in fuch a Cafe bounded and balanced, as it 
 were, by each other, without any defecl in ei- 
 ther; all the limitation here only rifmg from 
 the limitation or finitenefs of the Subjeil on 
 which they are fuppos'd to be exerted; which, 
 as 'tis finite, manifeftly cannot receive an in- 
 finite Exercife of an infinite Power. 
 
 The fame Gbfervationwill help us to folve 
 the Difficulty which fome bring againft the 
 very notion of infinite Power in God, which, 
 fay they, implies this Contradiction, viz. that' 
 he cannot do all that he can do: He could not 
 rrake the World ever fo foon, but- that it was 
 poflible for him to have made it. fooner: he 
 can never make it fo large, that it will be im- 
 poflible for- him to make it larger: which is 
 abfurcL To which we anfwer, If thefe terms, 
 can and cannot, were applied to the fame thing, 
 in the fame rejpecl, it would indeed be a plain 
 contradiction ; but in the prefent cafe 'tis o- 
 therwifc. The former is apply'd to the Ob' 
 jecls of power in general, which are included 
 in this Idea, i.e. 'tis affirm'd, that the Power 
 of God is perfect, or extends, and is com- 
 menfurate, to all objecls of Power, or that he 
 can do whatever is in the nature of things pof- 
 fible to be done. The latter is affirm'd only of 
 fome particular Subjeft, which is in its own na- 
 ture incapable of Perfection, or incommenfu- 
 rate to this infinite Power, and on which there- 
 fore we may truly fay, that this infinite Power 
 cannot be employ'd, or that this Perfection can 
 never be completely exhibited, or exhaufted ire 
 it. So that in the prefent Cafe, thefe two. 
 
 Words 
 
 See Chap. 5. ^ 1. Subj. 4.
 
 5+ 
 
 When the 
 World isfaid 
 to be created 
 for God's 
 Glory, 'tis 
 after the mail' 
 mrtfbl&i. 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 X. I know 'tis commonly faid, that the World was made for the 
 Glory of God : but this is after the manner of Men. For Defire of Glo- 
 ry is attributed . to God in the fame maimer as Anger \ Love, Re~ 
 venge, Eyes, and Hands. When therefore the Scripture teaches us, 
 that the World was created for the Glory of God, 'tis to be under- 
 ftood, that the Divine Attributes, namely, Power, Goodnefs and JVif- 
 dom, thine forth as clearly in his Works, as if he had no other in- 
 tent in making them, belide the Oftentation of thefe Attributes ; nor 
 could they have -anfwer'd that End more fitly, if they had been de- 
 fign'd for Glory : but, ftriclly fpeaking, the Power of God is infi- 
 nite, aad when he adts for the Good of his Creatures according to 
 that infinite Power, he is infinitely Good. Infinite knows no bounds, 
 nor has the Goodnefs of Gcd any other bounds belides his Wifdom 
 and Power, which are alfo infinite. And in reality, this makes moft 
 for the Glory of God, viz. to have created a World with the greateft 
 Goodnefs. (23.) 
 
 XL By 
 
 N O t E S. 
 
 Words may be ufed, without any Contradiction; 
 and infinite, or rather perfect, Power may pro- 
 perly enough be term'd, not able to do feveral 
 things without fuppofing a defect in that pow- 
 er, but only in the Subjects which are incom- 
 menfurate to it, or eflentially incapable of re 
 ceiving it. Now, that the Material World, 
 and every part or property thereof is, in eve- 
 ry refpect, incapable of this Infinity, has, I 
 think, been prov'd in Note 5. and that no crea- 
 ted Being whatfoever can be capable of it, will 
 be fhewn in Note 28. . 
 
 (23.) " The reafon why God made the 
 " World (fays the learned Per/on fo often cited 
 11 above) was from his own overflowing and 
 " communicative Goodnefs ; that there might 
 " be other Beings alfo happy befide himfelf, and 
 " enjoy themfelves.'' And afterwards, " God 
 ** did net make the World merely to oflentate his 
 " Skill and Power, but to communicate bis Good- 
 " nefs, which is chiefly and properly his Glory, 
 
 " as the Light and Splendor of the Sun is the G/o- 
 " ry of it -f\" 
 
 We have a fine Paragraph or two to the fame 
 purpofe in Mr. Wollafiori'% Delin. of the Religion 
 of Nature, p. 1 1 5 1 20. 
 
 The fame Notion is well ftated in Scott\ Chri- 
 stian Life: where the Glory of God and the 
 Happinels of Man are fhewn to be co-incident II. 
 As this feems to be very often mifunderftood, 
 it may not be improper to mfert a Paffage or 
 two from that excellent Author. " *A true Sur- 
 " vey and Infpection of God's Nature, will 
 " inttruct us, that being infinitely perfeel, as 
 " he is, he mult be infinitely happy within him- 
 " felf ; and fo can defign no felf-end without 
 " himfelf ; and confequently, that the end for 
 " which he requires our Service, is not any 
 " advantage he expects to reap from it, or 
 " farther addition to his own happinefs, he be- 
 '" ing from all Eternity pafl, as completely 
 " happy as he can be to all Eternity to, come ; 
 
 " and 
 
 f Intell. Spfiem, p. 886. 
 
 (I See Vol. 1. p. 4, 5. 
 
 * Vol. 2. Chap. 6. p. 434, 435.
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 XI. By Good, here underftand that 
 
 55 
 
 which is convenient and That Goi 
 commodious, that which is correfpondent to the Jppetite of every Crea- w^ d th a " s 
 Mirf Onrl rhprpfore rrpaffv! the. World with ns prear convenience. w.ll a 
 
 ture. 
 
 God therefore created the World with as great convenience, well as it 
 and fitnefs, with as great congruity to the Appetites of things, a3Coa H b bc the 
 could be effected by infinite Power, Wifdom, and Goodnefs. If then w^d 
 any thing inconvenient or incommodious be now, or was from the Power, 
 beginning in it, that. certainly could not be hindered or removed even an awffdom; 
 by infinite Powerj Wifdom, and Goodnefs (24.). 
 
 NO r E s. 
 
 ** and therefore, what other end can he be fup- 
 " pos'd to aim at, than our Good and Happi- 
 ** nefs ? It is true indeed, he defigns to Glo- 
 *' rify himjelf in our Happinefs; but how? 
 " Not to render himfelf more glorious by it 
 *' than he is in himfelf, for that is impoffible; 
 *' but to difplay, and fhew forthhis own eflen- 
 " tial Glory to all tint are capable of admi- 
 " ring and imitating \\\m, that thereby he 
 " might invite them to tranfcribe that Goodnefs 
 *' of his into their Nature, of which his Glo- 
 " ry is the Shine and Lufire,- and thereby to 
 * Glorify themfelves ; and what can more ef- 
 '* feftually difplay the Glory of a Being- who 
 ** is infinitely wife, and powerful, and good, 
 ** than to contrive and effeel the Happinefs of 
 ** his Creatures, and efpecially of hisrational 
 ** Creatures, who, of all others, havethe moil 
 " ample capacity of Happinefs? 
 
 And again : " f But,, doth not the Scripture 
 " tell us, that be doth all things for his own 
 " Glory, and that he obtains this end, as well" 
 " by punifhing, as by rewarding, his Creatures ? 
 *' very true; but then it is to be confiderkl, 
 " that the Glory he aims at, confiftsnot iin 
 " receiving any Good from u, but in doing 
 *' and communicating all Good to us. For 
 ** infinite -Goodnefs can no otherwife be glori- 
 f fed, than by its own overflowings and free 
 " communications, and it can nootherwife be 
 44 glorified in the puniflimerrt of its Creatures; 
 " but only as it doth good by it : For,- fhould 
 * it punifh without good reafon, it would re- 
 14 proach and vilify itfelf ; but if it doth it 
 
 " for good reafon, it mull be becaufe it is - 
 " good either for itfelf, ox others: for itfelf it 
 " cannot be ; for how can an infinitely happy 
 " Being, reap any Good from another's Mife- 
 " ry ? And therefore it mull be for the Good 
 " of others, either to' reduce thofe who are pu- 
 " rrifn'd, or towarn others, by their: Example, 
 " from running away from their Duty and 
 " Happinefs. So that to do Good As the-endof 
 " God's Punifhment; and becaufe it is fo, he 
 " is gloriffd by it : and confidering that he is 
 " fo infinitely happy, that he can no ways ferve 
 " himfelf by our Miferies, io is impoffible he 
 "fhould have any other end in ^concerning 
 " himfelf about us, i but oniy the * Great; God- 
 " like one of doing us Good, and making us 
 " happy." Seealfo Difcomrfe *14 in the fame 
 Vol. p; 302; . 
 
 1 To the feme purpofe is Smith's Excellent 
 Difcourfe of the Exiftence and Nature of God, 
 Ch. 4 and 7; || : And- D'Oylfs faft'Difertation, 
 p. 122. mcr Rymer's General Rtprefentation of 
 Reveal 'd Religion, p. 2 60 267. and p. 511. 
 and Bp. Burners Expofition of the Articles, p. 27. 
 4th Edit, and our Author's Sermon on Divings 
 Predeftmation, Sec. . 33. For a fufficient An- 
 fwer to the Objection drawn from Prov,. 16. 4. 
 fee Ttllotfoii'si vol. of Sermons, Fol.-'p. 68 1. 
 
 (24.) Oar- Author rightly concludes from the 
 Nature and Will of God, as difcover'd above, 
 that .nothing can be made, by him (by whom - 
 are all things made) really unworthy of, or in- 
 confiflent with, thefe ; however unaccountable- 
 and irregular things may at prefent feem to us: 
 
 For 3 ; 
 
 t -Vol. 2; p. 2*04. Fol. 
 
 [I Su Seleft Difcourfts, p._. 13 6,. and 147.
 
 56 
 
 Concerning the Origin of RvtL 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 For, having demonftrated the Divine Perfec- 
 tions in one Senfe a Priori, i.e. prior to the 
 Examination of particular Phenomena, no 
 feeming difficulties or objections whatfoever 
 a Pofurior'i, i. e. from thefe Phaenomena, ought 
 to invalidate the belief of them, but ihould be 
 all over-ruled by, and give way to, thefe ; ex- 
 
 cept they amount to an equal degree of Clea^ 
 nefs and Certainty, with the proofs of thefe 
 themfelves; and alfo cannot poffibly admit of 
 any manner of Solution confident with them; 
 neither of which Cafes can ever be rmdc out, 
 as will, I hope, appear in the following 
 Chapters of this Book. 
 
 REMARKS, referr'd to in Note 18. 
 
 [Xa.] That this Propofition muft be al- 
 low'd for felf-evident , and as fuch, incapable 
 of proof, appears from the abfurdities which 
 all run into who attempt to prove their 
 own Exiftence from any other medium, viz. 
 from any of their operations. I think, fay they, 
 therefore lam, i.e. /, who am, think; there- 
 fore, /, who think, am. I being fuppofed to 
 exift, do think, therefore this thinking proves 
 that Exiftence. Is not this plainly arguing in a 
 circle, and proving a thing by prefuppofivg it ? 
 And is it not full as clear to me that I am, as 
 that / think ? Tho' perhaps I could not be 
 certain of my Exiftence except I perceived fome- 
 thing : yet fure the perception of my own Ex- 
 iftence muft be both as early and as evident as 
 any other perceptions. The firft Propofition 
 therefore is felf-evident, and if the fecond be 
 not fo too, 'tis however neceflarily connected 
 with one. I begin with our own Exiftence, 
 becaufe we have Intuitive Knowledge of no o- 
 ther. \ 
 
 [ X b. j See the abfurdity of this Infinite 
 Series, as to Generations, Motion, Number, 
 Magnitude, lc. in the Notes 5, and X d 
 All, or any of which Arguments demonftrate 
 the Abfurdity of it, as it is fairly and fully 
 Mated by Dr. Green in his late Phikfopby * 
 Where you fee the true old Atheiftic Series in a 
 different drefs from that in Dr. Clarke's 2d Pro- 
 portion. 
 
 The fame way of reafoning is made ufe of 
 i n a Philofophhal Effay tewards an Eziclion of the 
 Being and Attributes of God, by S. W\. " That 
 <; the World was not eternal, but created, is 
 " demonftrable from things that are vifible : 
 " Our Argument Khali be from Generation. 
 " Whatfoever is begotten, was begotten of 
 " fome other ; for nothing can poffibly beget 
 " or make itfelf, otherwife it will follow, 
 " that the fame thing i?, and is not, both at 
 " one inftant, feeing it is both the producer, 
 " and the thing to be produced. It is to be 
 " produced, and fo it is not yet, it is lifce- 
 " wife a producer, and thnt fuppofeth thst it 
 " is in Being: It is therefore in Being, and 
 " it is not in Being, that's a manifeft contra- 
 * l diclion. Wherefore, nothing can generate, 
 **. make, or produce itfelf: wherefore, every 
 " thing that is begotten, is begotten of fome 
 " other, and then the other which begot it, 
 " either was itfelf in the fame manner begot- 
 " ten, or it was not ; if it was not, we are al- 
 y ready come to the firft Principle, which 
 " was, unbegotten, and fo have difcover'd a 
 " God-head. If it was begotten, either we 
 " muft follow up the Courfe of fucceffive Ge- 
 " neraticn to fome firft Production from a 
 " Caufe eternal, or elfe we muft neceffarily 
 " fay, that the Courfe of Generations had no 
 " beginning, and confequently, that infinite 
 " Succeffions are already paft, which is as 
 " much as to acknowledge, that an infinite 
 
 Number 
 
 * B.6. C.5. *.8. p. 763. 
 
 f 2d EJit. Oxford, 1655.
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 57 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 ' Number of Succeflions, are pall, and if paft, 
 *' then they are at an end; So we have found 
 *' an infinite Number, which hath had an 
 ** end, that is another Contradiction. Again : 
 ** if any lhall affirm, that the courfe of Gene- 
 " ration had no beginning, but that the num- 
 " ber of them hath been Infinite : let us put a 
 " Cafe, and reafon with him. We will ima- 
 " gine the Generations of Abraham, for ex- 
 *' ample, and Jofeph xht Son of Jfaac, the Son 
 ** of Abraham. I demand therefore, whether 
 ** before the birth of Abraham there had paft 
 " an infinite Series of Generations, or not ? 
 " If the Series was finite, the Work of Gene- 
 V ration had beginnings which is the Conclu- 
 " fion I contend for : if the Series paft was in- 
 " finite; then, at the birth of Jofeph, 'tis evi- 
 " dent, that more Generations were paft, fo 
 " wc have found a Number greater than that 
 u which was ftfppos'd to be Infinite : and con- 
 " fequently that was not Infinite; fo it was 
 " both Infinite and not Infinite, a manifeft 
 A( contradiclion. 
 
 ** But if we fay that Abraham's was Infinite, 
 " and that fo was Jofepb's alfo, then it will 
 " follow, that the Number of Abraham's was 
 " equal with the number of Jofeph's, but A- 
 " braham's was but a part of Jofeph'' s, where- 
 *' fore the part is equal to the whole. Elfe ad- 
 " mit that Abraham's was finite, but when it 
 *' came to Jofeph, that then the number was 
 *. Infinite, it follows then, that a finite num- 
 " ber added to a finite, fhall make an Infinite, 
 '.' which likewife is againft the common light 
 " of reafon. We fee therefore, that fuppofing 
 " the Eternity of the World, or the Infinity 
 " of Generations, doth force the Mind to con- 
 " tradi&ions, and confequently the Fiction is 
 " vain and utterly irnpofnble. And, as we 
 "have argued in the way of Generation, fo 
 ** we may likewife in every thing where there 
 " is a Motion, or Mutation, that is, in all the 
 " parts of the vifibJe World. The Creation 
 " therefore of the World, from the viable 
 " things thereof, is manifeft. Q^E. D." p. 19. 
 And again, p. 22. Well, having concluded 
 " the Creation and Beginning of the World, 
 " we fee it follows, that thence we conclude 
 
 I 
 
 " the Eternal Power and God-head ; that is, 
 44 the Eternity and Power of the God-head. 
 " As for Eternity, we have, by undeniable 
 " confequence, refolv'd all Motions in the 
 ** World into the bofom of a firft Mover, and 
 " if we fuppofe him a firft Mover, the Suppo- 
 " fition will evidently conclude, that he is E- 
 " ternal, *'. e. that he is without Beginning of 
 " Eflence, or without any term or limit of 
 " Duration. For if it had any beginning of 
 " Eflence or Duration, that beginning of Be- 
 " ing prefuppofeth a priority of not-being, 
 * c (that is, aftual Being is not of the Eflence of 
 " it) and fo that we may, without anycontra- 
 " diclion, fuppofe it not to be yet in Being; 
 * that is, we may bring our Underftandings, 
 " without error, to the apprehenfion of it, as 
 M being yet in the State of Power only, or 
 ** Potential-being, fo as things are in their 
 M Caufes. So then, let us conceit it in this 
 <l State, and compare this State with the other 
 " when it had Being ; and it is evident, that 
 " this paflage, or tranfition from want of Be- 
 41 ing to a Being, cannot be without a Mo- 
 ** tion, nor Motion without an adlual Mover : 
 ** but that which moves a thing from not be- 
 *' ing to a State of Being, is neceflarily a pre- 
 " cedent Mover to that which from it receives 
 " its Being : So then that which is fuppofed 
 * to be the firft original Mover will have a 
 ** Mover, which fhall of necelfity have gone 
 M before it, and confequently it will be both a 
 '* firft and not a firft Mover, which is a plain 
 " Contradiclion. Inftead of multiplying Ar- 
 ** guments without -neceflity, we will only re- 
 ** turn by the Footfteps of our Analyfis, and fo 
 " from the Being of a firft Mover, conclude 
 H the Eternity. If it be a firft Mover, then it 
 '* hid no former Mover ; and if fo, then it ne- 
 ** ver was produced from Nothing into Being; 
 M and if fo, then it never had any beginning of 
 " its Being, then it is Eternal. Therefore, 
 '* whatfoever is the firft Mover, it mull of 
 " neceflity likewife be eternal: but from the 
 " common affeftions of things vifible, wc did 
 ** before demonftrate an Original and firft 
 ** Mover: Wherefore, the vifible things of this 
 
 World,
 
 58 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 '* World, they likewife do evict the Eternity 
 of the God-head *. 
 
 u And that God was a God of Power, it 
 u was demonftrated then, wlien we found him 
 ** to be the firft Caufe, and Original Mover, 
 " and Creator of the World +." 
 
 [ X c. ] The generally receiv'd Notion of 
 Eternity, as confiding in a continual addibility 
 of JucceJJive Duration, is, I think, the very fame 
 thing as an infinite Series, and confequently fia- 
 ble to the fame objections: We muft therefore 
 try to rcfcue this Divine Attribute from fuch which is complete without it. Time then, or 
 
 an abfurd interpretation 
 
 Now, if we attentively examine our Idea of 
 Eternity, I believe we fhall find that it amounts 
 to thus much: viz. uniform, invariable Exi- 
 gence : or, fimple Exijlence join*d with Necef 
 Jity : by which laft Word we only underftand 
 an Impojfibility of having ever begun, or of ever 
 ceajing. This I apprehend to be all that can 
 confiftently be affirm 'd of the Divine Exiftence 
 in this refpect, and perhaps we may more eafi- 
 ]y and fafely determine what the manner of it 
 is not, than what it is* v. g. that it continues 
 not by time,, or in place : Indeed local Extenfion 
 and fuccejfwe Duration, are modes of the Exi- 
 ftence of moft Beings, and therefore we find it 
 very difficult to confider any exiftence without 
 them : But as we have endeavour'd to fhew the 
 poffibility of removing the former from the 
 Divine Eflence, in Notes 5,. 11, & 13. So 
 here, I think, it may be ftiewn alfo, that the 
 latter has no neceflary connection with it, but 
 rather the contrary. i 
 
 In order to do this, it will be neceflary to 
 explain what we mean by Time, which (accor- 
 ding to Mr. Locke) is of the very fame kind 
 with Duration ; and may properly be term'd a 
 part of it. This is very well defin'd by Leib- 
 nitz, to be the Order of Succejjion of Created Be- 
 ings. We manifeftly get the Notion of it, by 
 reflecting on the Succeffion of Ideas in our 
 Minds, which we are apt to conceive as a \ 
 
 without any fuch Succeifion of Ideas in our- 
 Minds, we could have no fuch notion as this 
 of Duration, but that of pure Exijlence only. 
 I Now Ex : Jlence being evidently a fimple Idea, 
 (tho' perhaps Duration be not)' is confequently 
 incapable of a Definition, and we need, I 
 think, only obferve of it here, that if we join 
 our Idea of Duration to it, we ftfll add nothing 
 to the Idea ofit as it is in itfelf, but merely a 
 relation to external things; which Idea of Du- 
 ration therefore feems purely accidental to it, 
 and no neceflary Ingredient of the former Idea, 
 
 Duration, is an Idea entirely refulting from our 
 Confideration of the Exiftence of Beings, with 
 reference to a real or imaginary SucceJJion^ 
 Whence it will follow in the firjl place, that 
 we cannot poflibly frame any Idea of this kind 
 of Duration, without taking in Succeffion ; and. 
 fecondly, that we can't eafily feparate the Exi- 
 gence of any finite, changeable Beings from this 
 kind of Duration. 
 
 Our next Enquiry muft be, whether this 
 Idea of Duration be connected with the Exi- 
 ftence of thofe Beings entirely as they exijl, or 
 only as they exift in fuch a particular manner ; 
 Whether it belongs to all Exijlence, as Exi- 
 jlence, or only to a particular Sort of Exiftence*. 
 viz. that Exiftence which includes the fore- 
 mention'd relation to Succeffion. The latter, 
 I think, will appear more probable, when we 
 -reflect that it is only from the variablenefs and 
 contingency of our own Exiftence, that all our 
 Succeffions fpring : whereas, were we entirely 
 indt pendent, we muft be abfolutely immutable, 
 and invariably permanent; and alfo, that we 
 can contemplate even this Exiftence of ours 
 without any Succeffion, i. e. we have a power 
 of confining our thoughts and attending to this 
 Idea alone for fome fmall time (if that Word be 
 excufeable here) exclufive of all other Ideas, 
 and confequently exclufive of Succeffion. This 
 Mr. Locke allows, being what he calls an In- 
 fant, which, fays he, " is that which takes up 
 
 Chain drawn out in length, of which all the I;" the time only of one Idea in our Minds, without 
 particular Ideas are confider'd as the Links, I " the Succeflion-of any other, wherein there- 
 Whereas, hid we but one invariate perception, y " fore we perceive no Succeffion at all ||." 
 
 Succeffion 
 
 D.25, 
 
 t B- 3* 
 
 H Effay on Human Vnderjlandingy B. 2. Ch. 14.. $. 10.
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 5? 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 Succefiion therefore does not appear to be 
 receffarily join'd with the Idea of abfolute exi- 
 gence, fince we can confider one (for how fmall 
 a time foever) without, and independent of, the 
 other. Nay, laftly, there is a certain Exiftence 
 to which it cannot poffibly be in any fenfe ap- 
 ply'd, and that is a Perfecl one. Suppofe 
 this perfeel Eeing alone in nature, as we muft 
 believe him once to have been, and then what- 
 change of Nature, or Succefiion of Ideas can be 
 found ? What fiux of Moments, what altera- 
 tion or increafe can we imagine in his own uni- 
 form, invariable Eflence? What Idea have we 
 of Duration as apply'd to his Exiflence, ante- 
 cedent to his Willing and Creating External 
 things? Such Duration then as we are ac- 
 quainted with, can, I humbly apprehend, have 
 no manner of relation to this immutable Be- 
 ing, while fuppos'd to exift alone : But as foon 
 as he determin'd to exercife his feveral Attri- 
 butes in the production of fomething without 
 himfelf, then we have reafon to think, that 
 Time, Succefiion, and Increafe began. " Tho' 
 *' the Eternal Being had no neceflary Succef- 
 " fion in his own Nature, yet being perfedly 
 * l Selfaclive and free, thence it proceeded, 
 *' that the exercife of his freedom in decreeing 
 ** and producing the Creatures, in fuch a 
 " manner and order as was judg'd fit by his 
 ** moft perfeel Wifdom, became the Original 
 " of whatever real Succefiion has been in Na- 
 4( ture, and fuch Succefiion as we are apt to 
 " conceive to liave proceeded, is ho other than 
 " imaginary. " Impart. Enq. p. 208. 
 
 To the feveral Objections againft this No- 
 tion drawn from God's Eternal Wifdm, Ideas, 
 Decrees, &c. fee a fufficient Anfwer in the fame 
 place. 
 
 I fliall tranferibe this excellent Author's 
 reply to the moft common and confidcrable one 
 about tho Schoolman's punclum flans, which 
 we alfo efteem as indefenfiblc an Hypothefis as 
 the other. 
 
 " Some will poflibly objeft, that if there 
 H was once no real Succefiion in Nature, it 
 '* will follow, that the Divine Exiftence was 
 ** then at leaft (as 'tis ufualJy faid to be) In- 
 
 It 
 
 u Jlantaneous. But to this it may be reply 'd, 
 " that Exiflence is nothing, if difttnguifti'd 
 " from the Being which exifts. Confequently, 
 " there can no real quantity belong to it as ib 
 " diftinguifh'd. Wherefore it cannot properly 
 " be denominated either finite or infinite, fete- 
 
 * cefiive or infiantaneous. For thefe are Attri- 
 " butes which have a Reference to Quantity, 
 '* and can no more agree to exiflence, which 
 ** is but a Mode of Beings, than they can to 
 " Neceflity, or Contingence, which are Modes 
 
 * of Exiftence. To define Eternity or Ne- 
 *' cefiary Exiftence by Infinity or the Negation 
 ** of Limits, feems to be no lefs impertinent, 
 ** than to define Virtue by the Negation of 
 *' Red or Blew. For Exiftence (which has no 
 " Quantity or Dimenfions) hath no more Ana- 
 <{ logy to Extenfion and Limits, than Virtue 
 ' (which hath no Colour) hath to Red or 
 * Blew. And, for the fame reafon, it is no 
 ** lefs improper to define it to be infiantaneous, 
 " fince even an Inftant (as likewife an Atom) 
 14 is conceiv'd as quantity, tho' the minuteft i- 
 maginable. But if it cannot properly be 
 * denominated infiantaneous, much lefs can 
 ** it be fuccefiive *." 
 
 See alfo Epifcop. Infi. Tbeol. L. 4. C. 9. 
 To which give me leave to add the Tefli- 
 mony of Cudworth, Trite bit ell. Sy/t. p. 644.) &e. 
 Where, having confuted the abfurd Notion of 
 the World's Eternity, he adds : " Here will 
 ** the Atheift think prefently he has got a great 
 '* advantage to difprove the Exiflence of a God. 
 " Do not they who thus defiroy the Eternity of the 
 " World at the fame time alfo defiroy the Eter- 
 ** nity cf the Creator ? For, if Time itfelf were 
 " not Eternal, then, how could the Deity or any. 
 " thing elfe be fo? The Atheift fecurely ta- 
 ** king it for granted, that God himfelf could 
 u not be othcrwife Eternal than by a fuccefiive 
 " flux of infinite Time. But we fay, that this 
 " will on the contrary afford us a plain Dc~ 
 " monfiration of the Exiftence of a Deity. For, 
 " fince the World and Time itfelf were not in* 
 " finite in their pafi Duration, but had a Begin- 
 " ning, therefore were they both certainly 
 ** made together, by fome other Being, who 
 
 is 
 
 Impartial Enquiry, p. 2 
 
 ,0.
 
 6o 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 * is, in order of Nature, fenior to Time, and fo 
 " without Time before Time: He being above 
 " that fucceffive Flux, and comprehending in 
 * thcS?abi ; ity and immutablePerfeilisn of his own 
 *' Being, his Tefierday, and to Day, and/cr ever. 
 '* Or thus: Something was of neceflity infinite 
 ** in Duration, and without a Beginning; But 
 * neither the World, nor Motisn, nor Time, i.e. 
 *' no Succejfsve Being was fuch ; therefore is 
 * there fomething clfe, who r e Being and Dura- 
 44 tion is not fuccejjive and jVxoing, but perma- 
 44 nent, to whom this Infinity belongeth. The 
 ' Atheifls here cm only fmile, or make faces; 
 *' and fhew their little Wit in quibbling upon 
 11 nunc Jlam, or a (landing Now of Eternity ; as 
 44 if this ftanding Eternity of the Deity (which 
 44 with fo much reafon hath been contended 
 44 for by the antient genuine Theijls) were no- 
 44 thing but a pitiful fmall moment of Time ft an- 
 *' ding Jlill ; and as if the Duration of all Be- 
 44 ings whatfoever muft needs be like their 
 '* own: whereas the Duration of every thing 
 " muft of neceflity be agreeable to its nature: 
 44 and therefore, as that whofe imperfetT. nature 
 H is ever flowing like a River, and confifts in 
 ** continual Motion, and changes one after ano- 
 " ther, muft needs have accordingly a fuccef- 
 ' five and flowing Duration, Aiding perpetually 
 from prefent into pafi tl and always polling 
 44 on towards the future, expecting fomething 
 44 of itfelf which is not yet in Being:, but to 
 41 come ; fo muft that whofe perfeel Nature is 
 44 ejentially immutable, and always the fame, 
 44 and neceffarily exifient, have a permanent Du- 
 < ration ; never lofing any thing of itfelf once 
 44 prefent, as Aiding away from it ; nor yet 
 44 running forwards to meet fomething of it- 
 44 felf before, which is not yet in Being, and 
 44 it is as contradictious for it ever to have, be- 
 44 gun, as ever to ceafe to be." 
 
 After all, it muft be again confefs'd, that the 
 Idea of Succeffion (as S. C. obferves) fo infi- 
 nuates itfelf into our Idea of Exiftence, and is 
 /o clofely connected with the exiftence of all 
 finite Beings, that we find it extremely diffi- 
 cult to imagine the Eternal Exiftence of God, 
 any otherwife than as an Eteraal continued 
 Series or Succeffion.' 
 
 Our conftant conversation with material Ob- 
 'jets, makes it almoft impoflible for us to con- 
 fider things abftracted from time and placr, 
 which (as we obferv'd before) are Modes of 
 the exiftence of moil things, and therefore we 
 are apt rafhly to apply thefe confiderations to> 
 the great Author and Prefervcr of all things. 
 We feem to think, that as the moft exalted I- 
 dea we can form of God's Eternity and Omni- 
 Prefence muft be infinite Duratkn, and unboun- 
 ded Extenfion, fo thefe are to be flriclly and 
 pofitively attributed to him ; whence muft fol- 
 low all the abfurdities of paft, and future, Ex- 
 tenfion in this and that place, as compatible 
 with the Divine E {fence. Whereas abfolute po~ 
 fitive Infinity (fuch as belongs to God *) does, 
 in its very notion exclude the confideration of 
 Parts', finceno addition of any parts whatfo- 
 ever can amount, or in the leafl degree ap- 
 proach to it. (Tho'fuch negative Infinity as 
 belongs to all Quantities, cannot poflibly be 
 confider'd otherwife f .) So that whofoever ac- 
 knowledges God's perfections to be ftriftly in- 
 finite, does, by that confeffion, deny that they 
 maybe confider'd as made up of parts : that 
 Immenfity can. be compofed of any finite Extew 
 fions, or Eternity confift of multiply'd Dura- 
 tions, and confequently, that there can be 
 Length or Space,. Diflante or Time, pafi or future, 
 with the Eternal God ||. When therefore we fay 
 that God always was, or ever will be, we don't 
 mean, by thefe and the like Words, that his 
 Exiftence has flriclly any relation to times paft. 
 or future, that it is at all increas'd, alter'd, or 
 afFefted thereby ; but only thus much is inten- 
 ded', viz. that whenever we fuppofe any other 
 Beings exifting, or time and Succeffion begun, 
 then it was, is, or will be proper for thefe 
 Beings to affirm in any part of this their Time 
 or Succeffion, that God alfo exifts. In the fame 
 manner as it may be affirm'd of fome Propofiti- 
 I ons, that they always were and will be true, 
 i that they are true in this or that, and every 
 place: tho' fuch affertions are exceedingly im- 
 proper, becaufe Propofitions, or neceflary 
 Truths, have no manner of Relation to either 
 time or place. All Expreffions therefore- 
 
 which 
 
 * Se Note 5, and X I t . 
 
 i Ibid. 
 
 || See Ucke on H. II. B, 2.C. 15. V 
 
 12,
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 REMARKS. 
 
 61 
 
 which imply Succeffion, fuch as, was, will be, I 
 always, when, &o as well as thofe that imply 
 Locality, fuch as, Ubi, where, &c. *, can only 
 be apply'd to finite temporary things, which 
 exift in time and place : with which things 
 fo exifting, as well as every point of time 
 and place, the Deity 
 exiftent, or commenfurate ; 
 
 vellers fucceeding one another. Bat this, I 
 think, is fo evident in itfelf, that neither Ar* 
 gument nor Simile can make it more fo. 
 
 Hence then appears the impropriety of thofe 
 
 terms, Divine Preference, Predcflination, cjJV. 
 
 which have fo long puzled the World, to no 
 
 fuppos'd to be c*> ' manner of perpofe: and the only conclufion at 
 
 tho' his own Na- 1 IaTrmuft be, that all things which ever were. 
 
 ture and Eflence.be very different from thefe, I or will he, which, with refpect to fome former 
 and have properly no manner of relation to, or or latter times, and to peribns placed therein, 
 connection with them. If then we will attri- may be call'd pajl or future, are always equally 
 bute Duration to him, it muft be permcn'nt, un- \ and at once prefent to the view of God ; that to 
 
 fuccejfive Duration, /'. e. Duration of a quite dif- 
 ferent kind from what we meet with here. But 
 it is to be remember'd, that we don't pretend 
 to explain the Nature of Eternity, or to deter- 
 mine the manner of fuch Exiftence as excludes 
 all SuccrJJion ; fince it is fufficient for us here to 
 fhew the poflibility of conceiving the thing in- 
 general, the certainty of it having been de- 
 monftrated already, when we prov r d that fome- 
 thing muft be Eternal, having alfo fhewn, that 
 Eternity could not confift in fucceflive Dura- 
 tion. 
 
 If then the Divine Exiftence cannot include 
 focceffion of parts, or our kind of Duration, 
 (which perhaps by this time may not feem al- 
 together improbable) neither can his ejfential 
 Attributes. His Knowledge, v. g. can have no 
 relation to times pajl or future, to fore or. after; 
 nor can any object be faid to be at a Diftance 
 from it, or any imaginary diftance fet bounds to 
 it. 
 
 The chief reafon why we don't perceive and 
 know any thing that has a real Exiftence, is, 
 becaufe that Exiftence is remov'd from us by 
 the diftance of time or place : But this reafon 
 cannot hold with God, who is (tho' ' in a 
 manner far different from his Creatures) always 
 frefent to all times and places, and confequent- 
 ly muft behold all things exifting therein, as 
 well as we fee any object at due diftance direct- 
 ly before us. Thus he that is travelling on a 
 Road cannot fee thofe who come behind, or 
 are gone far before him ; but he who from 
 forac Eminence beholds the whole Road, from 
 end to end, views at once all the. diftant tra- 
 
 him, ftridtly and abfolutely, a thoufand Years 
 are as one Day, and one Day as a thoufand Tearsi 
 and that whatever difficulties feem to attend" 
 this conception of things being fucceflive to 
 us, and! not' fo to him, can be no Argument 
 againft the matter itfelf, which is demonftra- 
 ble ; but only one of the many Inftancesof the* 
 Weaknefs of Human Underftanding in things 
 pertaining unto God. 
 
 Againft the common Notion of Eternity, fee 
 the Speclator, N* 590. or Sir M* Hale's Prim 
 Orig. of Mankind, ^. 1. c. 6. p. 123. or a Phi-' 
 lofophical Effay, 6fV. by Setb Ward, p' 23. or 
 Grew's Cofmologia Sacra, B. 1 . c. 1 . par. 9. 
 
 Both this Attribute and Omniprefence are 
 alfo well treated of by J. Smith, in his Dif* 
 courfe concerning the Exiftence and Nature of 
 God, C. 2. ^4, 5. SelecJ Difceurfes, p. 125, 
 1 26, &c. 
 
 [Xd. ] " Here we find certain Chains of 
 " Caufes and Ejfefts, and many parts of this 
 ** Syftem- owing their Exiftence, and the manner 
 '* of their Exiftence, to a preceeding Caufe, 
 " confequently we can't, with any poffibility 
 " of reafon, affert, that the whole Syftem ex- 
 ' ift without a Caufe ; for this is the fame as 
 11 to affert, that the parts do not belong to 
 * the whole. Again, a material Syftem com- 
 M pos'd of parts that are changeable, cannot ex- 
 ' ifts without a Caufe diftincl from, and prior 
 u to fuch a Syftem. For, wherever there is a 
 " Change, there muft be a Caufe of that Change, 
 " otherwife there would be a Beginning without 
 a Caufe* The Caufe of this Change cannot 
 .3. b* 
 
 'See. Xk
 
 62 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 REMARKS. 
 
 u be in the materials of this Syflem for the ve- 
 " ry fame reafon : therefore it muft be in fome- 
 ** thing diflintl from, and prior to, the Syflem 
 ' itfelf. The fame will be the Cafe as to 
 '* Motion in a Material Syflem; there isnoMo- 
 * tion but what is the effect of a former Mo- 
 ** tion, confequently there is no Motion in 
 H fuch a Syflem which has been from Eternity, 
 " or which has not been Caufed, &c. * 
 
 * From the Imperfeclion alfo, or Unbappinefs, 
 u which we fee in this Syflem, in Man parti- 
 cularly ; from the frame and con/1 itut ion of 
 4t it, 'tis evident that it did not exifl without 
 " a Caufe. 
 
 " The Queflion then will be, What is the 
 ** Caufe of its Exiflence ? Now that cannot 
 ** be in itfelf for then a thing would be be- 
 ** fore it was, which is a contradiction. It 
 ** follows then, that fome other Being is the 
 *' Caufe of its Exiflence ; and the next Quc- 
 " ftion will be, who is this Being? Now as 
 <* whatever began to exifl, mufl owe its Exi- 
 *' flence to fome preceeding Caufe ; fo that Caufe 
 u if it has not cxilled eternally, mull likewife 
 '* owe its Exiflence to fome other preceeding 
 ** Caufe, and that to another, and fo on till we 
 " afcend to (the firft Cau'e, or to) a Being that 
 " is Eternal, and exifls abfolutely without Caufe. 
 " And- that there is fuch a Being is evident, 
 " otherwife, as nothing could begin to exifl 
 " without a Caufe, fo nothing that is not E- 
 temal could ever have exiiled f . 
 
 [X e.] That the Idea of Self Exigence can 
 imply nothing more than a Negation of Depen- 
 dence on any External Caufe; and that there 
 can be neither external nor internal Caufe of 
 the Exiflence of an Eternal Being, neither 
 antecedent nor concomitant Neceifity, nor any 
 pofitive permanent Grsund or Reafon whatfoever, 
 See Note 1 4. 
 
 To what has been faid already on the head 
 of NeceJ//ty, I fhall add a Paflage from the Philo- 
 fophical Effay, &t. from which we may perceive 
 
 what was formerly und^rftood by that Attri- 
 bute, and how it was us'd to be prov*d. " I 
 " fay then that the Godhead is a Necejfan Be- 
 ing, that is, that it is impoffible it fhould 
 " fail, and implies a Contradiction, that it 
 fhould not be. That is it which Divines 
 mean, when they fay it is Eternal a parte 
 pojl, as well as a parte ante: for if it be not 
 " a Neceffary Being, that is, if Neceffity of 
 " Being be not included in the EfTence of the 
 God-head, then it is not impoflible that it 
 fhould lofe its Being, i. e. it is in the power 
 " of fomething to caufe it to lofe its Being : 
 But nothing can pafs from Being to not Be- 
 u ing, without Change, or Motion; fo then, 
 " the Motion of it is in the power of fome o- 
 ther, and confequently, this is not the Ori- 
 ginal of Motion, but that other; but we 
 fuppos'd that to be the Original of Motion, 
 confequently, it is not poffible it fhould be 
 " depriv'd of its Being, that is, it is a necef- 
 fary Being in refpedt of others: and as im- 
 " poffible it is that it mould lofe its Being of 
 " itfelf. Indeed it is a manifefl Contradiction, 
 H that any thing fhould have a power over its 
 ** own EfTence, and needs no farther convic- 
 " tion, or oppofition, feeing the active power 
 " of any thing is founded in the EfTence of it, 
 and confequently cannot exceed the EfTence, 
 or bring it not to be ||." 
 
 [X f. ] For a Being to be limited, or defi- 
 cient in any refpedt, is to be dependent on fome 
 other Being in that refpedt, which gave it juft 
 fo much and no more * m ; confequently, that 
 Being which in no refpedt depends upon any. 
 other, is not limited or deficient at all. For 
 tho' Figure, Divifibility, &c. and all manner 
 of Limitation, is in one Senfe (viz. in Beings 
 efentially Imperfect) as Dr. Clarke obferves -f\}-, 
 properly a mere Negation or Defeel; yet in ano- 
 ther, viz. in a Being eflentially and abfolutely 
 perfeel, Finitenefs muft be conceivd as a pofi- 
 tive Effccl of fome Caufe, reftraining it to a 
 
 certain 
 
 * See S. C's Impartial Ejjqu.'ry, p. 31,32, cift-. 
 
 f Enquiry, p. 1 1, 1 2, 1 8, &c. See alfo Dr. Bentley'-f BoyleV Ledt. Serm. 6. p. 127, &c. yh 
 Edit, and the other Authors refer'd to in Note 5. 
 ]j Philofoph. Efijay, p. 26, &e. % See Scott, in Note 32. f-j. Demonft. p. 56,57, $tb Edit.
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 61 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 certain Degree. InallBeings capable of Quantity, 
 Increafe,cifr. and confequently uncapable of Per- 
 fection or abfolute Infinity, Limitation or Defecl, is 
 there a neceffary confequence of Exiftence, and 
 clofely connecled with it, and is only a Negation 
 of that Perfection which is entirely incompatible 
 with their Effence; and therefore in thefe it 
 requires no farther Caufe. But in a Being na- 
 turally capable of Perfection or ftrict Infinity, all 
 Impcrfeilion or Finitenefi, as it does not neceffi- 
 ri/y flow from the Nature of it, muft have fome 
 ground or reafon, which reafon muft therefore 
 be foreign to it, and confequently is an effect 
 of fome other external Caufe, and confequently 
 cannot have place in the Firft Caufe. Tint 
 this Being is capable of Perfection, or abfolute 
 Infinity, appears, I think, from hence, that he 
 is manifeftly the Subject: of one Infinite or per- 
 fect Attribute, viz. Eternity, or abfolute Exi- 
 ftence. His Exiftence has been fhcwn to be 
 perfect in this one refpect, and therefore itmay 
 be perfect in every other alio. Now that which 
 is the Subject of one Infinite Attribute or Per- 
 fection, and may have others fo too, mujl 
 have all of them Infinitely or in Perfection : 
 Since, to have any Perfections in a finite li- 
 mited manner, when the Subject and thefe 
 Attribures afe both capable of ftrict Infinity, 
 would be the foremention'd abfurdity of pofi- 
 tive Limitation without a Caufe. This method 
 of arguing, will prove any Perfection to be in 
 the Deity infinite modo, when we have once 
 lhcwn that it belongs to him at all : at leaft, 
 will (hew that it is unreafonable for us to fup- 
 pofe it limited, when we can find no manner 
 of Ground for any Limitation, which is per- 
 haps as far as we can go. 
 
 [Xg.] That the Word God is- relative, fee 
 Jfewton Princ Scbol. Gen. fub. fin. p. 525, &c. 
 3d Edit, or Maxwell's Appendix to Cumber- 
 land, p. 106. 
 
 To fhew that there is only one Eternal Self- 
 Exiftent Being, which bears the Relation of 
 God to us, fcems to be going as far as either is 
 
 neceflary, or natural Light will lead vs. As 
 Dr. Clarke's Demonftration of this and feveral 
 other Attributes is entirely founded on his Idea 
 of Necejfity of Exiftence, of Space, &c. *, they 
 muft ftand or fall together. They who endea- 
 vour to deduce it from Independence or 0!/- 
 #<* evidently prefuppofe it in their definition 
 of thefe Attributes. 
 
 [X h.] We cannot include any fuch Notion 
 in Omnipre fence, as makes the Deity prefent in 
 his fimple Effence to (or co-extended with) every 
 point of the bound fefs Immenfityf; Since this Idea 
 of Extenfion or Expanfion, feems plainly in- 
 confiftent with that fimple Effence ||. Not that 
 we fuppofe thefe Attributes of Knowledge and 
 Power acting feparate from his Effence, but 
 we fuppofe his Effence to have no more rela- 
 tion to the Idea of Space, Place, where, &c. than 
 either of thefe Attributes has *^. 
 
 Dr. Clarke's Query, " How it can be fhewn 
 " upon any other Principle than that of Ne~ 
 " ceffary exiftence, that his governing Wifdom 
 " and Power muft be prefent in thofe boundlefs 
 " Spaces where we know of no Phenomena or 
 * Effetls to prove its exiftencef-J-?" is well 
 anfwer'd by Epifcopius: I mall give it in his 
 own Words. " Hot (nempe Deum effe extra 
 " mundum) non modo prorfus eft aKAl<tK7r\ov fed 
 " etiam valde abfurdum, quia tot urn at que omne 
 " illud fpatium quod extra hunc mundum effe di- 
 " citur, nihil omnino re ale eft, fed pure pute /- 
 " maginarium, cif prorfus nihilum; ut nut em 
 " Deus effe dicatur in pure pute imaginario, cif 
 " prorfus nihilo, per fe abfurdum eft ; quia effe in 
 " dicit realem habitudinetn aut denominationem ab 
 " eo in quo quid exiftit : Realis autem habitudo 
 " & denominatio a nihilo, five ab eo quod nihil re- 
 '* ale eft, ace i pi nullo modo pot eft. Die ere Deum 
 " ibi habere intrinfecam cif abfolutam prefentiam 
 " qua in feipfo realiter Exiftit,- eft fingcre prar- 
 " fentiam fine Relatione aut denomination ad id, 
 " cut quod prafens effe dicit ur, -quod implicat con" 
 " tradiclionem. Intrinfica enim five abfoluta prat- 
 " fentia, qua quid in feipfo realiter exiftit, non eft 
 " pr a fentia in nihilo; fed mera effentia five exi~ 
 
 ticu 
 
 *See Notes 5 & 14. f Dr+ ClarkeV Demcnft, p.47. 
 II Anfwer to -tb Letter, p.49/;. 
 
 (( See Note 1 1 : * n See Note 1 3 i.
 
 H 
 
 Concerning the Origin of EviU 
 
 R E M Alt K & 
 
 f* flentia extra nihilum. Nihil enim fibi ipft pra- 
 fens rffe poteft ||." 
 
 Now to urge upon us the old Maxim, that 
 nothing can aft where it is not, is ftill fuppofing 
 a Spirit exifting fomewhere, or in fome USi, or 
 to-extended, or co-expanded, with fome part of 
 Cpace, and ailing in fome other part of fuch i- 
 maginary Space (which Suppofitions we have 
 long ago difcarded) 'Tis confining its exi- 
 stence to one particular Modus ; and, as we 
 conceive, to a wrong one : concerning the Mo- 
 dality of whofe exiftence we can only think and 
 argue negatively : viz. that it is not by way of 
 Extenfton in any fenfe. 
 
 To the trite Objection, that what has no 
 magnitude, or is no where, is therefore Nothing, 
 fee a fufficient Anfwer in Cudworth, p 770, to 
 778, &c. How this agrees with Phild's Para- 
 dox, that God is every where and yet no where, 
 {ceiiid. p. 773. But the ftrongeft confirmation 
 of this Opinion, which Dr. Moore ftiles Nulli- 
 bifm, may be drawn from the learned Dr's Ar- 
 guments againft it in his Enehir.Metapb. C. 27. 
 
 [ X i. ] By the above mentioned pleafure or 
 natural Good, I mean that pleafure which every 
 one feels in himfelf. By the produclion of it 
 here, I underfland both the producing fuch in 
 himfelf, and alfo in others: to both which he 
 is equally determin'd by his Nature, tho' from, 
 quite different Principles. To the former he 
 n directed by Self- Love : To the latter by a 
 certain difinterefted Benevolent InftincT: or Af- 
 fection, and that which determines him to ap 
 prove the Affection and the Attions flowing 
 from it is called his Moral Senfe. The former 
 of thefe Inftincts, as it implies increafe of 
 Happinefs, is only applicable to finite, imper- 
 fect Creatures: the latter feems to be common 
 to us and the Deity. Who could have been 
 determin'd to create us only by fuch a difinte 
 refted Benevolent Affedlion, as this is fuppofed 
 to be. This is always approv'd b; the Moral 
 Senfe; tho' it may be doubted whether that be 
 confined entirely to it. 
 
 The Object of both thefe Inftinfts is natural 
 Good', and, I think, moral Good may be al- 
 
 ti InfiV Theol. L.4. c. 13. p. 294. 
 
 * See Mr. Jackfon'; Defence of Human Liberty, p. 
 
 low'd to confift in the profecution of either, or 
 both of them together, fo long as the former is 
 in due fubordinatiop to the latter. As for my 
 part, I cannot extend the Notion of Virtue fo 
 far, as totally to exclude all manner of regard 
 to Self, or private Good, confider'd as fuch, 
 and therein to overlook the tendency of all 
 fuch private Affections as the All-wife Author 
 of our Being has thought fit to implant in us, 
 as neceffary helps and inducements to Self- 
 Prefervation. I fee no reafon why a particu- 
 lar endeavour in any Man to perfect his Facul- 
 ties both of Body and Mind, to improve and 
 advance his own Happinefs in the whole, 
 (which is in fome refpect anfwering the End 
 of his Creation and co-operating with the Will 
 of his Maker) may not deferve the Name of 
 Virtue; at leaft of Duty ; the difcharge of which 
 will make a Perfon the proper Subject of Re- 
 ward, even abftractedly from Benevolent or 
 Publick Affeftions*. Tho' thefe indeed are 
 intitled to it in a much higher and fublimer 
 degree, becaufe they are productive of more 
 universal Good. Nay, the kind Author of 
 Nature has infeparably annex'd fuch a pleafing 
 Senfation, or agreeable Confcioufnefs, to the 
 Performance, or even Remembrance of thefe 
 Benevolent Actions, as is fcarce diftinguifhable 
 from the JnftincT: or Affection itfelf, which im- 
 pels us towards them: and therefore to have 
 :bme attention to this Self -complacency, this in- 
 ward Satisfaction, and Delight, which accom- 
 panies our nobleft Actions ; to be in fome de- 
 gree directed by it in the performance of them, 
 docs not appear to detract from their Worth, 
 and moral Excellency. For a full proof, as 
 well as a beautiful Explication of this moral 
 Senfe, fee Mr. Hucbefoffs Enquiry into the Origin 
 f our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good, together 
 with his I 11 ujf rat ions. 
 
 Th. t all the-Notion we can poffibly frame of 
 I'cral Good or Evil, of Virtue or Vice, &c. con- 
 fifis entirely in promoting or procuring this na- 
 tural Good or Evil, fee fufficiently confirmed 
 b/ Sherlock-^. " Whereas, fays he, we diftin- 
 " guifh between Moral and Natural Good and 
 " Evil; the only difference between them is 
 
 " this, 
 
 7. f On Judgment, p. 20 to 25.
 
 Concerning the Origin of EviL 
 
 *5 
 
 RE M AR K S. 
 
 * this, that Moral Good ind Evil is \n the Will 
 * f and Choice, Natural Good and Evil, is in the 
 '-' Nature of things \ that which is good or hurt - 
 " ful to ourfelves or others, is naturally Good 
 ** or Evil ; to love, to chufe, to </$ that which is 
 * <wi or hurtful to ourfe\v;s or *A&m, is morally 
 ** Good or Evil; oris the Good or Evil of our 
 ** Choice or Aclions. If you will but recoiled your 
 f telves, you will find that you have no other 
 * notion of Good or Evil but this: when you 
 ** fayfucha Man has done a very Good or very 
 *' Evil AfXion, what do you mean by it? Do 
 * you not mean, that he has done fomething 
 u ver y good or very hurtful -to himfelf or i- 
 *- thers? When you hear that any Man lias 
 " done Good or Evil, is not the next QuelUon, 
 ** what good or what hurt has he done ? and 
 u do you not mean by this, Natural Good or 
 u Evil? which is a plain Evidence, that you 
 * judge of the Moral Good or Evil of Actions, 
 " by the Natural Good orEvil, whichthey do." 
 See more on this Subject, deliver'd in the fame 
 place, with an Elegance and Perfpicuity pecu. 
 liar to that Author. 
 
 To the fame purpofe is Turner's excellent 
 Difcourfe of the Laws of Nature, and the reafon 
 of their Obligation. 
 
 This feems to be the ultimate Criterion of 
 that Fitnefs, Congruity, Reafonabknefs and Rela- 
 tion of Things, fo often repeated by fome late 
 Writers, without or beyond which I can fix no 
 meaning at all to thefe Words. And this Cri- 
 terion mould, I think, have been more diftincV 
 ly fpecify'd. For when you fay any thing is 
 // ; muft we carry our enquirys no farther I 
 is it not a very proper Queftion, to ask, for 
 what is it fit? Fit, Congruous, &c (as well as 
 the Word Neceffary) are mere relative terms 
 (as we obferv'd in Note 9 ) and evidently refer 
 to fome End, and what can the end be here but 
 Happineft? Thefe Relations, &c. may perhaps 
 in fome tolerable fenfe be call'd Eternal and 
 Immutable, becaufe, whenever you fuppofe a 
 Man in fuch certain Circumftances* fuch Con- 
 
 fequences and Obligations, did, or will, al 
 ways certainly follow *. 
 
 What is good for me now rn thefe Circum- 
 ftances and dRefpects, will always be fo in the 
 fame Circumftances and Refpecls, and can ne- 
 ver be alter'd without altering the Nature of 
 things, or the prefent Syftem : but we cannot 
 imagine thele Relations therefore to be any rer.l 
 Entities, or to have exifted from all Eternity, 
 or to be antecedent to, or independent of the 
 Will of God himfelf; as fome Writers feenvto 
 have done, if they had any determinate mean- 
 ing at all f. We cannot, I fay, imagine them 
 to be either ftridiiy eternal or independent of the 
 Will of God, becaufe they muft neceffarily 
 prefuppofe a determination of that Will, and 
 are in truth only confequences of the exiftence 
 of things, which things proceed entirely from 
 that determination ||. Much lefs can we ap- 
 prehend how thefe Relations, &c. " Are to be 
 " chofen for their own Sokes and intrinfic Worth ; 
 " or have a full obligatory power antecedent to a- 
 " ny reward or punifhment annexed either by na- 
 " tural Confequence or poftive Appointment to the 
 " Obfervance or Negletl of them m *." Since the 
 Natural Good or Happinefs, confequent upon, 
 and connected with, the obfervance of them, 
 or the immediate rational pleafure which they 
 produce, is to us the grand Criterion of them ; 
 the Argument and Indication of their Worth, the 
 Ground of all their Obligation. 
 
 This Notion is pretty well handled by Tur- 
 ner. u The Laws of Nature [or, which is the 
 " fame, Natural Right and Wrong] are fuch 
 " Laws and Rules of Life, as to the breach of 
 " which there is a natural Punilhmenc annexed. 
 " For to fay a thing is efientially good ok evil, 
 " to call it by hard Names, and to affirm th.it 
 " it hath a Natural Turpitude ; or, to pals a 
 " Compliment upon it, and call it a Moral 
 " Rectitude, and fuch like fine Scholaftic 
 " Terms without affigning a particular Rea- 
 " fon of Intereft, why we mould do the one 
 " or avoid the other, is as much as to fay, a 
 
 thing 
 
 * Ste I^ckeV EJ}ay, B. 4. C. II. fr. 14. or Turner m the Laws of Nature, and their Oblii*tnn t 
 
 20. or N. 76. 
 
 f See Hutchefon'j lllufirat, $. 2. p. 250,251. 
 
 |i See our Author, C. 1. $.3. par. 9. and C. 5. $.1. par. 23, &c. and Notes 75, 76. 
 
 * # Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion, prop. 1-4-7- P- 2 * 8. 
 
 K
 
 a 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil* 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " thing is good--for nothing ; or, it is bad, 
 " but we know not why 5 or, it is pood or 
 " bad, for a Woman's Reafon, becauie it is: 
 *' and this Reafon will ferve as well to prove, 
 u that Murder or Adultery are good things, as 
 " that they are bad ones 44*. 
 
 44 The Laws of Nature, therefore, have o- 
 ** very one of them their Sanction in them- 
 '-' felves*, i.e. fome things naturally tend to 
 44 our Happinefs, and others to our Mifery, 
 and for that Reafon they become natural Laws 
 to us, or are Rales to dirett our Actions by; 
 and we arc cb/ig'd to do the one and avoid the 
 other, M Upon a Principle of Self-happinefs, 
 44 and Self prefervation, which is the very root 
 44 and fpring of all Obligation whatfoever f, 
 
 44 From whence we may difcern the Vanity 
 *' and Folly of thofe learned Men, who are u- 
 " fed to talk fo loudly of ejfential Reclitudes, 
 *' and eternal Ntions, and I know not what 
 44 phantaftical /</?/,. in an abftradted way; where 
 " as there is indeed nothing which is either 
 44 good or bad merely by itfelf, but every thing 
 44 which is good, is* good, that is, ufeful to 
 fomething; and every thing which is bad, 
 * is fo with reference to fome Nature or other, 
 44 to which it is more or lefs pernicious and 
 ** deftruc~live: from whence it follows (the 
 4 nature of Obligation being a refult arifing 
 44 from the ufeful nefs or hurtfulnefs of a thing 
 propofed to be the object of a free Agent's 
 44 choice, with refpect to that Agent which is 
 '* converfant about it) that all Obligation muft 
 * 4 be not of a fimple, but of a compound, or 
 *' concrete nature, and. muft always have an in- 
 * l feparable refpect to the Intereft or Happinefs 
 u c/ thofe to whom that Obligation is bind- 
 ** ing. And it is not only true, that our Inte- 
 * reft and our Duty are both-of them the fame, 
 44 but that it is abfolutely impoffible any thing 
 *' fhouid be our Duty, which is not our Inte- 
 *' reft into the Bargain; for no Man can pof- 
 libly be obliged to that which, all things con- 
 ** fidered, will be to hisDifadvantage ||." 
 
 Farther, moft Authors who treat of the Pro- 
 duction of this Natural good or evil in fuch a 
 manner as to conftkute Right or Wrong, mo- 
 
 4-t Laws of Nat. &c. . 1. * Ibid. $.2. + 
 foundation if Morality, Sec. ||| Serm. 2d and 3d. 
 V$ 5- Note 4. and $. 8,. Note. i f . 
 
 ral good or evil, fcfr. appear either to equivo- 
 cate in a double meaning of the Words : viz. 
 as they imply producing Happinefs either in 
 ourfelves alone, or in others, (which are two 
 very different things, and fhouid accordingly 
 be always diftinguifh'd) or elfe to be deficient 
 in pointing out a Rule, and proving znObliga- 
 tion to it in the latter Senfe, viz. with regard 
 to others. This great defect in their Syltems, 
 feems to arife from not fufficiently attending to 
 the above mention'd Moral Senfe or Confcience, 
 (as the meaning of that Word is well fix'd by 
 Mr. Butler\\\\) which is of itfelf both Rule and 
 Obligation. As an Injlincl, it directs us to ap- 
 prove fuch Actions as tend to produce Happi- 
 nefs in others, and fo is a Rule whereby we de- 
 termine all fuch Actions to be virtuous ; as it 
 gives us pain, or makes us uneafy at the neglect 
 of thefe Actions, or at the Pr < ice of the con- 
 trary ones; it obliges us *o purfue them, or 
 makes the practice of them absolutely neceffary 
 to our Happinefs: whkh is the true meaning 
 of the Word Oblige, as w.sfhewn in the ftn 
 liminary DiJJ&rtation ; nd is proved more at 
 large by Cumberland # *. 
 
 that therefore, and that only, mufi be faid 
 to oblige us, which is neeeJJ'ary to our Hfippineh 
 Now, as the Sum of our Happinefs depends 
 upo~ the whole of our Exiftence, that only can 
 be a complete 2nd indifpenfible Obligation, 
 which is equal and commenfurate to the Sum 
 total of our Happinefs. Or, that Being only 
 can, abfolutely and effectually, oblige us, who 
 has it in his Power to make our whole Exi- 
 ftence happy or miferable; and of confeqnence,. 
 the DJty, who alone has that Power, muft 
 neceffarily be taken into all Schemes of Mora- 
 lity, in order to fuper-induce a full, adequate 
 Obligation, or fuch an one as will hold at all 
 times, and extend to every action ; and an en- 
 deavour to exclude the Confederation of his 
 Will, or to deduce all Obligation from any 
 Principles independent of it, has, I think, oc- 
 cafion'd another great defect in moft of our 
 modern Syftems. 
 
 That this Moral Good is a PerfeSlion in any 
 Being, i. e. agreeable to, or perfective of, its 
 
 Nature, 
 
 Ibid. $.6. || Bid. V- 1* Seedfo Mr. Clarke**/ 
 C>5- V*M***0&Eafiendorf, B - c - 6 -
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 *7 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 Nature, appeaTs by the very Terms : alfo, that 
 this Moral Senfe is the greateft Perfection of 
 Human Nature, and that there is fomething ana- 
 logous to it, in the Divine Nature, may be 
 feen in the above mention'd Enquiry, and 
 Illuf rations of the Moral Senfe, p. 239, &c. 
 See alfo Scott's Chriflian Life, Vol/ 2. p. 33, 
 
 37 > & 
 
 N. B. What has been here faid about In- 
 jjincl, Sffeclion, Moral Senfe, Sec. may feem to 
 imply, that thefe are all innate; contrary to 
 what was proved in the Preliminary DifJ'erta- 
 tion: and indeed this was drawn up at fir/1 up- 
 on the fuppoled Validity of that Notion, which 
 many may, perhaps, efteem valid itill, and 
 therefore I let the Argument ftand in the old 
 Terms ; efpecially as it is not at all afte&ed 
 by the Truth or Falfity of that Notion; fince 
 it will really come to the fame thing, with re- 
 gard to the Moral Attributes of God, and the 
 Nature of Virtue and Vice, whether the Deity 
 has implanted thefe Paffions, Inftincts, and Af- 
 fections in us, or has framed and difpofed us 
 in fuch a manner; has given us fuch Powers, 
 and placed us in fuch Circumftances, that we 
 fhall neccflari ly acquire them; they'll be alike- 
 natural in either Senfe, juft as all moral Ax- 
 ioms, &e. are equally certain upon Locke's 
 Hypothecs, as upon the old footing of innate 
 principles. 
 
 And tho' I take implanted Senfcs, lnflinfis, 
 Appetites, Paffions, Affeclions, &c. to be a rem- 
 nant of the Old Philofophy, which ufed to call 
 every thing Innate that it could not account 
 for ; and therefore, I heartily wifh that they 
 were all eradicated, (which was undoubtedly 
 the aim of that great Author lart mention'd ; as 
 it was a natural Confequence of his firlt Book, 
 tho' he might not then think proper to fpeak 
 out ; ) vet, as common ufe has fix'd this No- 
 tion of Innatenefs to them, I am obliged to 
 follow my Author, and treat of them in the 
 common Language. Only let it be obferved 
 here once for all, that every Argument which 
 is built upon thefe Pillions, Senfes, iffc. will be 
 
 or acquired. As to the prefent point in parti- 
 cular, Mr. Hucbefon has fully proved, that we 
 are led infenfibly, and by the conflitution and 
 circumftances of our very Being, to love and 
 approve certain Actions, which we call Vir- 
 tuous : which is enough for my purpofe. as 
 was hinted above. Againft the Notion of im- 
 planted Inflinfts,- fee Felt buy fon a r e Principiis jujii 
 & decor i, p. 73, &c. Amflel. 1651. 
 
 [XL] That God mnft have the fame 
 Judgment and Approbation of this Moral 
 Good, which all Rational Beings naturally 
 have * ; and that we mud judge of the Nature 
 and Perfections of the Deity, only by that 
 Nature and thofe Perfections which we derive 
 from him, is, I think, very plain : I mean, 
 that we mull not endeavour to conceive the 
 feveral Attributes of God by fubflituting fome- 
 thing in him of a quite different hind, and total- 
 ly diver fe from that which we find in ourfelves, 
 (as the learned Author of the Procedure of Hu- 
 man tJnderftanding, feem s to declare, p. 138, 
 and elfewhere) tho' that be in fome refpects fi- 
 milar and analogous to this: But we are to 
 fuppofe fomewhat of the very fame kind and 
 fort, the fame Qualities or Properties in gene- 
 ral to be both in him and us, and then remove 
 all manner of defeel or imperfecJion which at- 
 tends the particular Modus only of their Exi- 
 ftence, as they are in us. Thus we afcribe to 
 God all kinds and degrees of apparent Perfec- 
 tion obfervable in his Creatures, except fuch as 
 argue at the fame time Imperfection (v. g. Mo- 
 tion, which neceffarily implys Limitation) or 
 are inconfifient with fome other and greater 
 Perfection (v. g. thcExcrcife of punitive Juftice 
 in fuch a degree as would exclude Mercy; or, 
 Materiality, which excludes Knowledge and 
 Liberty -j\) We alfo remove from him all 
 want, dependence, alteration, uneafir.cfi, &c. In 
 fhort, all that refults either from fimple fi- 
 nitenefs, or from the mere Union of two finite 
 imperfect Subltances, fuch as conltifute Man. 
 And when we have thus apply'd every thing 
 
 equally conclufive, whether they be implanted in every manner of exiftence which feems to 
 
 K 2 imply 
 
 * See ScottV Chrijlian Life, Part 2. C. i. p. 21, 22. ift Edit. 
 f See A. Bp. Tillotfon, Scrm.jS. 2d Vol. Fol. p. 569, cj'r. Dr.] Clarke on Miral E>v.\ 
 
 P- 95. fife, and Scott'; Cbrifl. Life, Part 2. C. 6. $. 2. p. 447, ciJV. ill Edit.
 
 68 
 
 Concerning the Origin of EviL 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 imply Perfection, snd excluded every, thing in 
 every manner of Exiftence which implies or 
 includes the contrary, we have got our Idea of 
 an abfolutely perfect Being,, which we call 
 God. 'Tis therefore attributing to God fome 
 real Qualities of a certain determinate kind,. 
 (v. g. Knowledge or Power, Goodnefs or 
 Truth) the nature of which Qualities we do 
 perceive, are directly confcious of, and know, 
 which gives us an Idea or Conception of him, 
 and a proper one too, (if any fuch diftinction 
 of Ideas are allow'd) and not imagining fome 
 others, we cannot tell of what fort, totally 
 different in nature and kind from any that we 
 ever did perceive or know ; which would give 
 us no Idea or Conception at all of him, either 
 proper or improper. 
 
 In like manner we frame a partial concep- 
 tion of a Spirit in general (which we confef- 
 fedly have) not by fubftituting fome properties 
 different in < kind from thofe which we perceive 
 in out own Spirit; but by fuppofing the very 
 fame properties, /'. e. in kind, (viz. Cogitation, 
 and a power of producing Motion) to be. alio 
 inherent in fome other immaterial Beings 
 which we therefore call by the fame Names. 
 Now this is (as far as it goes) true, real know- 
 ledge, and may be apply'a and argu'd on intel- 
 ligibly : but the other would, I fear, take a- 
 Way all poflibility of arguing from the feveral 
 Attributes or Properties of the Deity, to thofe 
 ofourfelves, and vice verfa, all our reafonings 
 upon them (as the learned Author expreffes it, 
 p> 1 34 ) would be precarious, and without any. 
 fclid. foundation in the Nature of things. Such 
 analogical Knowledge thenas that, is (accor- 
 ding to my Notions of Knowledge) ftrictlyand 
 pft>perly none at all j and if the Author nfes 
 analogy in that Scnfe, 'twill, I believe, be 
 ttjll taken only for a fort or degree of Metaphor, 
 after all he has faid in the laft Chapter of hit 
 n>lt Book, to diitinguijh them. 
 
 I would here be underftood to affirm thus 
 much of the {\nvp\e Nature only, or Kind, or our 
 abftratl Idea of thefe Qualities themfehes, and 
 not of the manner of their Exiftence: which 
 two (tho' this Author is pleas'd to ufe them 
 Pfomifcuoufly in p. 84, cirV.) feem yet very di- 
 &ttt Confide rations km we .apprehend Icye- 
 
 ral Properties,, or Quali<*>, as exifting in osr 
 own Nature, independent of any particular 
 manner; nay, in very different manners : v. g. 
 Knowledge, either by Senfation or Reflection, 
 by Deduction or immediate Intuition: Love 
 attended with a certain degree of Pleafure or 
 Pain, &c. and therefore we fuppofe that thefe. 
 Qualities may exift in the Divine Nature, in a 
 manner entirely different from what they do in 
 us, and yet be the very fame Qualities itill ; 
 which Modus of the Divine Being, or of any 
 of his Attributes, is totally unknown to us, 
 and we can only guefs at it by fome dir 
 ftant refemblance or Analogy ; which Analogy 
 I would therefore apply to this Modus of Exi- 
 ftence, and to this only ;.- which feems fufflcient 
 for all the great Purpofes of Religion, and in 
 which Senfe the Notion may perhaps be jujl 
 and ufeful, but cannot, I think, be extended to 
 our Idea of the whole Nature and Genus of the 
 Attribute itfelf. For, if the Divine Attributes 
 be, toto genere, diftinct and different from thofe. 
 Qualities which we elteem perfections in ourr 
 felves or others, if (as the fame Author urges,, 
 pi 82.) the greateft perfections of thofe Crea- 
 tures which fall under our Obfervation, (and 
 thefe he will grant to be all that we have any 
 Idea of ) are really " but fo many Imferfeelicns,. 
 .-' when referred or attributed to the Divine Na- 
 " tttre, as it is in itfelf, in any meaning wbatfir 
 '* eviTi even with the mofi exalted meaning we 
 " can poffibly annex to them,' 1 '' (the Author un- 
 derstanding, I fuppofe, as ufual, the whole Na- 
 ture and diflinguijhing kind of thofe Qualities in 
 themfelves.) Then, how fliall we difcover 
 which kind of Qualities God prefers before the 
 contrary? How can we be certain that thefe 
 in particular are agreeable to him ? 01 how fhall 
 we hope and endeavour to make ourfelves like 
 him ? Can we know the nature of one thing by 
 another, entirely different from it? or can we i- 
 mitate what we don't at all apprehend. '* It 
 " is foolifh ffays A: Bp. Tillotfon) for any Man 
 " to pretend that he cannot know what Jufice, . 
 " and Goodnefs, and Truth in.God are ; for, if we 
 " do not know this, ''tis all one to us whether God 
 '** be good ir not ; nor could we imitate his Good- 
 " nefs : for,, be that imitate: y endeavourj to b;Jike> 
 fomething that he knows, and mufl of necefjity 
 
 ** have
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil; 
 
 H 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 ** baz'e fome- Idea-cf that- ts zi'hich be aims to be 
 ** /tie ; fo that if we bad no certain and fettled 
 *' Notion of the Jujlice and Goodnefs and Truth of 
 "God, be would be altogether an unintelligible 
 ** Being: and Religion, which cwjifts in the Imi- 
 " tation of him, would be utterly impojftble V ' 
 Which deftroys the Notion of Analogy (as was 
 obferv'd long ago by the Free-thinker, p. 50, 
 C3V.) as it J6 beautifully deliver'd by our Au- 
 thor in his Sermon on Divine Predeflination 
 cjfr.ifhe did not intend by thatWord'fomething 
 in God re.\Dy parallel and equivalent to what we 
 find in fome of his Works, and fo very like it, 
 that nothing can be liker, except that which 
 exifts ia the very, fame manner too, /'. ;. in a 
 perfect one If this could' be has meaning, 
 (which may not appear improbable from his 
 Anfwer to the like Objection, * 22. where he 
 declares, that thefe Attributes have much more 
 Reality ard Perfeelion in them, than the things 
 by which we reprefent them, &c.) then is he 
 perfectly confident with- the other great Au- 
 thor cited above. I wifh the molt learned Au- 
 thor of the Procedure, &c were fhewn to be fo 
 too, who is fuppofed to havepurfued this No- 
 tion of Analogy farther than.at'moft any will'be. 
 able or willing to follow him. 
 
 But this is no place for a full Examination 
 either of that Notion, or this learned Author's 
 Application of it. I fhall only add an Obfer- 
 vation, which perhap? raw ferve in fome mea- 
 fure to fhew direftly (as he is pleas'd to re- 
 quire, lntrodutl. p. 17.) that the Foundation up- 
 on which' he has placed his Analogy is falfe and 
 groundlefs: which Foundation is, as I appre- 
 hend, the Nature of the Being, inflead of the 
 Modus of its Exiflence. To carry the face of 
 an Argument, let it fland thus. The Nature 
 of the foremen tiorr'd Qualities is either wholly 
 the fame in God and us, or wholly different : 
 if the former be maintain'd, then this analogi- 
 cal Senfe is turn'd into an Identical one ; if the 
 latter, then can n manner of Refemblance or 
 Analogy be drawn between them ; fince.one na- 
 ture (as has been obferv'd) cannot in the leafl 
 help to -reprefent or explain another quite diffe- 
 rent from it, I mean, in thofe \cry points 
 
 wherein they differ ; for that is to be different 
 and not different, alike and unlike in the very 
 fame refpeft, at the fame time : And then this 
 analogical Senfe is turn'd into a difperate or 
 quite oppofite one, i. e. into no analogy at all: 
 Or, laitly, they mull be p/trtly the fame, and 
 partly different, or alike and unlike in different 
 refpeels, (which is the thing we contend for) 
 viz. alike in Perfeelion, unlike in Defeel, or im- 
 perfection; or the fame in Nature, or Effence,. 
 and different in Degree, or the manner of ^ Exi- 
 gence. If therefore the Author founds this. 
 Analogy on the very Nature of the thing, he 
 feems to incur the foremention'd abfurdity, of 
 Tuppofing a nature contradictory to itfelf; if, 
 ;with us, he will'pleafe to diitinguifh between 
 'the Nature of the thing in general, and the 
 particular Modus of its Exiflence, he mult with 
 as al-fo remove this analogy from the former" 
 foundation, and' fix it upon the latter. Far* 
 ; ther, no Similitude whatsoever, whether dedu- 
 ced from human Reafon or Holy Scripture,, 
 can have, force enough to perfuade us, that the 
 whole nature of thefe things is quite different 
 from what we apprehend or can conceive them 
 to be ; fince it is univerfally fllow'd, that no 1, 
 comparifon can (as we commonly fay)' run upon 
 all four; or (whichis the very foundation and 
 defign of this whole analogical Scheme) can 
 ever conflitute a proper and ' c onclufive Argu- 
 ment, in order to prove to us fuch a paradox : 
 andif fo great Strefs is to be laid on any, v. g. 
 that of a Looking-Glafs, ufed in a ftrict Philofo- 
 phical manner, (as the Author of the Procedure ' 
 feems to do, p. 112, cifr.) why may not fome 
 urge it flill farther, and argue, that as the I- 
 magc of your Face fuppofed to be feen in the 
 Glafs, is nothing real, folic!, and fubffantial 
 contain'd in the Glafs itfelf, but barely an ap- 
 pearance exhibited in the Brain; fo all the- 
 conceptions which we pretend to have of the* 
 Divine Nature and Attributes, are nothing at 
 all in God himfelf, but mere Phantafms and. 
 delufive Images, exifling only in our own 
 Mind. This, will thefe Men fay, mufl appear 
 abfurd at firfl Sight, and yet may be drawn 
 from the Similitude with as much Propriety as 
 
 the 
 
 *&/^5.TillQtfon'/$m. 76. V0I.2. Fol p. 572. and p. 678.
 
 7o 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 the reft ; confequcntly the whole Scheme of 
 this Analogy is to be rejected as entirely falfe, 
 and at laft the true Medium of all our Know- 
 ledge in the Nature of thcfe things, will be 
 what we truly and properly perceive of them, 
 in fome fmafl degree in ourfielves : If it be ob- 
 je&ed here, that the Nature and Modus of any 
 thing muft be the very fame, fince by different 
 Natures are only meant different Mariners of 
 Exiftence. 
 
 I anfwer : By the Nature of any thing, I un- 
 derftand its feveral difiinguijbbtg Properties. By 
 the Nature of any Property, I underftand fome 
 certain po&tive Mark or Charader which diftin- 
 guifhes that property from any others. Thus, 
 by the nature of Body, I mean folid, diviii- 
 ble, figured and moveable Extcnfion. By the 
 T*Jature of Solidity, I mean Refiftence, or a 
 power of excluding other Bodies out of its 
 place; which Mark fufficiently diftinguifhes it 
 from Divifibility, or any other property be- 
 longing to the fame Body, as well as all the 
 foremention'd properties diftinguilh a Body 
 from fomething elfe : both which we may 
 therefore property enough be faid to perceive 
 or know, tho' perhaps we may never in like 
 manner, know how thefe feveral Properties are 
 united together, and come to form one Aggre- 
 gate or Subftance ; nor whence this Power or 
 Property of Refiftence proceeds, or how it is 
 caus'd, wnich is what we underftand by the 
 Modus of each. So that, knowing or having 
 a clear determinate Idea of a certain Thing or 
 Quality, fo as to be able to diftinguilh it from 
 another Thing or Quality, and always to per- 
 ceive it to be reaWy thus ; is quite different 
 from knowing how the faid Thing or Quality 
 comes to be thus : How or Why it is, are Modes 
 of Exiftence, and differ plainly from what it 
 is, or what Idea we have of it, which denotes 
 its Nature or EJfe nee. But any Man, I think, 
 hat has a mind, may apprehend what we mean 
 :,y this diftinction without any more Words, 
 whether he will approve of it or not, is ano- 
 ther Queftion. 
 
 Againft this Notion of Antilogy, as apply'd 
 to the whole Nature of the Attributes of God, \ 
 
 fee Fiddes's Body of Divinity, B. I. Part 2. c.13 
 and his Practical Dfcourfies, Fol. p. 234, &Y. 
 or, J. Clarke on Moral Evil, p. 95, &c. or 
 Chubb' $ Trails, p. 146, &e. or, the present State 
 of the Republic of Letters for July 1728; or, ti 
 Vindication of the Divine Attribute's, London 
 1710. 
 
 [X 1. ] By the Words, Infinite Degree, here 
 and above, we don't mean any indefinite Addi- 
 tion, or encreafablenefs of thefe feveral Attri- 
 butes partially confider'd (to which fuch terms 
 are vulgarly, tho' not fo properly apply'd) but 
 only an entire abfolute Perfiedion, without any 
 kind of failure or deficiency in thefe refpects : 
 which we nave intimated in Note 5, and elfe- 
 where, to be our Notion of Infinity, as ap- 
 ply'd to any of the Divine Attributes. " Thus 
 " Infinite Under/landing and Ktmvledge, is no- 
 " thing elfe but perfied Knowledge, thatwhich 
 "*' hath no defect or mixture of Ignorance 'in it, or 
 " the knowledge of whatfoever is knowable. 
 " Infinite Power is nothing elfe but perfeel 
 " Power, that which hath no defect or mix- 
 r ture of Impotency in it: a Power of produ- 
 " ring and doing all whatfoever \s pojfib'e, i. e. 
 " whatfoever is conceivable, and fo of the 
 ' reft *. 
 
 ** Now, that we have an Idea or Concep- 
 f* tion of Perfiedion, or a perfeel Being, is evi- 
 " dent from the Notion that we have of Im- 
 " perfeilion, fo familiar to us : Perfeilion being 
 *' the Rule and Mcafure of Imperfeilion, and not 
 " Imperfeilion of Perfeilion, as a fir -aight Line is 
 " the Rule and Meafure of a Crocked, and net 
 ** a Crooked Line of a Straight. So that Per- 
 " fection is firft Conceivable in order of nature, 
 '' * before Impcrfeelion, as Light before Darknefs, 
 " a pofitive before the privation or defied. For 
 <c Perfection is not properly the want of 1m- 
 ' perfection, but Imperfection of Perfec- 
 " tion. 
 
 u Moreover, we perceive feveral Degrees of 
 " Perfection in the Effences of things, and 
 *' confequently a Scale or Ladder of Perfections 
 " in Nature, one above another, as of Iving 
 " ad animate things above fenfickfis and i /ani- 
 mate, 
 
 Cudwortb, p. 647
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil. 
 
 7* 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 ** mate, durational things above fen/itive; and 
 " that by rcafon of that Notion or Idea, which 
 " we firft have of that which is ebfolutely per- 
 *' feci, as the Standard, by comparing of things 
 " with which, and meafuring of them, we 
 " take notice of their approaching more or lefs 
 " near thereunto. Nor indeed could thefe 
 " gradual A/cents be infinite, or without End, 
 M but they muft come at laft to that which is 
 ** absolutely perfect, as the top of them all. 
 * Laftly, we could not perceive Imperfection 
 ** in the moft perfect of all thofe things which 
 " we ever had Senfe or Experience of in our 
 " Lives, hid we not a Notion, ox Idea of that 
 ** which is abfolutely perfcil, which fecretly 
 " comparing the fame with, we perceive it to 
 ' come fhort thereof*. 
 
 " Wherefore, fince Infinite is the fame with 
 " abfolutely perfetl, we having a Notion or I- 
 " dea of the latter, muft needs have of the 
 ** former. From whence we learn alfo, that 
 " tho' the Word Infinite be in the form there- 
 " of Negative, yet is the Senfe of it, in thefe 
 " things which are really capable of the fame, 
 " pofitive, it being all one with abfolutely per- 
 ** fell: as likewile, the Senfe of the Word 
 ** Finite is negative, it being the feme with 
 " Imperftl : So that finite is properly the 
 " Negation of Infinite, as that which in order 
 ** of nature is before it, and not Infinite the 
 ** Negation oi' Finite. However, in thofe things 
 " which are capable of no true Infinity, be 
 " caufe they are effentially finite, as Number, 
 " corporeal Magnitude, and time; Infinity being 
 " there a mere imaginary thing, and a non- 
 " entity, it can only be conceiv'd by the Ne- 
 ** gation of Finite, as we alfo conceive Nothing 
 " by the Negation of Something, that is, we 
 " can have no pofitive Conception at all there- 
 " off." 
 
 Now, all this, is not attempting to make 
 the Attributes of God pofitively Infinite, by 
 fbperadding a Negative Idea of Infinity to them 
 (as the Author of the Procedure, &c, juftly ur- 
 ges againft Mr. Locke, in B. I. c. 3. p. 82. 
 and* the fame might with equal Juftice be ob- 
 jected co Dr. Clarke, when he applies infinite 
 
 *-Cudwortby^, 648, 
 
 f. Ibid, 649. 
 
 Space and infinite Duration to the Deity, and 
 calls one his Immenfity, and the other his E- 
 iernity.) But it is making them pofitively and 
 abfolurely perfetl, by firft proving them to 
 have fome real Exiftence in the Divine Nature,- 
 and then by removing from it all Pofilbility of 
 Want, or Deficiency, Mixture, or Allay ||. 
 
 [X m. ] By the Word Juftice, as it relates 
 to Punilhment, we mean, the Exercife of a 
 Right, or doing what a Perfon has a Moral 
 Pozeer to do. Mercy implies his receding from 
 that Right, or not exerting that moral power. 
 When we apply thefe Terms to the Deity, wt 
 confider his Difpenfations in a partial View, 
 viz. only with Relation to the Perfon offen- 
 ding, and himfelf the offended, or as mere 
 Debtor and Creditor, exclufive of all other 
 Beings, who may be affefted thereby, and 
 whom therefore we fhould fuppofe to be re^ 
 garded in thefe Difpenfations. In this Senfe, 
 thefe two Attributes have a diftindt Meaning, 
 and may both be always fubordinate to Good- 
 nefs, but can never be repugnant to each o- 
 ther. Thus, where a Creature has forfeited 
 its Right to a Favour, orincurr'd a Penalty, by 
 the breach of fome Covenant, or the Tranf- 
 greffion of fome Law, the Creator, confider'd 
 with refpeft to that Being alone, andin thofe 
 Circumftances, has always a Right to with- 
 draw the Favour; or to inflift a Penalty ; and 
 will profecute that Right, whenever he finds 
 it neceffary, to fome farther End : But yet his 
 Goodnefs may incline him often to remit it, 
 on fome foreign Motive, viz. on account of 
 the prefent Relation between the Criminal 
 and other Men, in very different Circumftan- 
 ces, or in view of a future Alteration in the 
 Circumftances of the Criminal himfelf. Now 
 as thefe Motives belong to, and are generally 
 known by, God alone, tho* they may influ- 
 ence his Aclions towards us, yet they don't at 
 all affecl: his Right over us, and therefore, 
 ought not to diminifh our Love, Gratitude, 
 3V. to him in any particular Inftance, eithr 
 of Judgment or of Mercy. Whenever we fuffer 
 for our Crimes, we have no Rcafon to com- 
 plain
 
 7 
 
 Concerning the Origin of Evil 
 R E M ARK S. 
 
 plain of any Injury, nor can he, when, upon 
 the formention'd Motives, he forgives us, ever 
 injure himfelf. For Juftice, confider'd barely 
 as a Right or Moral Power, evidently demands 
 nothing, nor can properly be faid to oblige one 
 way or other : and therefore, the Being pof- 
 fefs'dof it, is at liberty either to fufpend or 
 exert it ; but he will never ufe this Liberty, 
 otherwife than as his Goodnefs requires, con- 
 sequently Juftice and Mercy in . fuch a Being 
 can never clafli. 
 
 Whether this way of conceiving thefe Di- 
 vine Attributes be not attended with lefs Dif- 
 ficulty than the common manner of treating 
 them, under the Notion of two Infinites dia- 
 metrically oppofite, mull be left to the Judg- 
 ment of the Reader. 
 
 As to the Nature of Diftribut'we Juftice, or 
 the true Reafon of Rewards and Punijbments, 
 fee S. C's Impartial. Enquiry, &V. B. i . c. 1 1 . 
 prop. I2i 
 
 
 
 CHAP.
 
 n 
 
 CHAP. It 
 
 Concerning the Nature and Divifion of Evil, 
 and the Difficulty of tracing out itt Origin. 
 
 I. f*\ OOD and Evil are Oppofites, and arife from the Relation By Evil we 
 f which things have to each other: For, fince there are fome undcribnd 
 V^>J things which profit, and others which prejudice one ano- ^commo-' " 
 therj fince fome things agree, and others difagree ; as wedious.incon- 
 call the former Good, fo we ftilc the latter Evil. Whatever, there- J^SSSfc 
 fore, is incommodious or inconvenient to itfclf, or any thing elfe ; what- 
 ever becomes troublefome, or frustrates any Appetite implanted by 
 God ; whatever forces any Perfon to do or furTer what he would not, 
 that is Evil. 
 
 II. Now thefe Inconveniencies appear to be of three kinds, thofe of E v 'is are of 
 Imperfection, Natural and Moral ones. By the Evil of Imperfection, *JJ? j^* 
 I underftand the Abfence of thofe Perfections or Advantages which perfea ion, 
 exift elfewhere, or in other Beings : By Natural Evil, Pains, Uneafi- JJ atU j 41 ' anti 
 nefies, Inconveniencies and Difappointments of Appetites, arifing from 
 natural Motions : By Moral, vicious Elections, that is, fuch as are 
 hurtful to ourfelves, or others. 
 
 III. Thefe Evils muft be confider'd particularly, and we are to fhew The difficul- 
 how they may be reconcil'd with the Government of an infinitely^ " how 
 
 j j j tnclc come 
 
 powerful and beneficent Author of Nature. For, fince there is fuch into the 
 a Being, 'tis ask'd, as we faid before, Whence come Evils ? Whence Work o( 
 fo many Inconveniencies in the Work of a molt good, moft powerful h h 
 God ? Whence that perpetual War between the very Elements, be- Goodnefs 
 tween Animals, between Men t Whence Errors, Miferies and Vices, and Powcr - 
 the conftant Companions of human Life from its Infancy ? Whence 
 
 L GooJ
 
 74 
 
 Some that 
 were unable 
 to folve this 
 difficulty, 
 have deny'd 
 theExiitence 
 of a God, 
 others have 
 iuppofed a 
 double One. 
 
 Concerning the Nature and Divifion of EviL 
 
 Good to Evil Men, Evil to the Good ? If we behold any thing ir- 
 regular in the Works of Men, if any Machine anfwers not the End 
 it was made for ; if we find fomething in it repugnant to itfelf or o- 
 thers, we attribute that to the Ignorance, Impotence, or Malice of 
 the Workman : but fince thefe Qualities have no place in God, how 
 come they to have place in any thing ? Or, Why does God fuffer his 
 Works to be deform'd by them ? 
 
 IV. This Queftion has appeared fo intricate and difficult, that fome 
 finding themfelves unequal to the Solution of it, have deny'd, either 
 that there is any God at all, or at leaft, any Author or Governor of the 
 World. Thus Epicurus, and his Adherents: nor does Lucretius bring 
 any other Reafon for his denying the Syjlem of the World to be the 
 Ejj'ecl of a Deity, than that it is fo very faulty *. Others judg'd it, 
 to be more agreeable to Reafon, to afTign a double Caufe of things, 
 rather than none at all. Since it is the greateft Abfurdity in Nature, 
 to admit of Actions and Effects, without any Agent and Caufe. Thefe 
 then perceiving a Mixture of Good and Evil, and being fully perfua- 
 ded, that fo many Confufions and Inconfiftencies could not proceed 
 from a good Being, fuppofed a malevolent Principle, or God, direct- 
 ly contrary to the good one; and thence derived Corruption and 
 Death, Difeafes, Griefs, Miferies, Frauds and Villanies j from the 
 good Being nothing but Good: nor did they imagine, that Contra- 
 riety and Mifchief could have any other Origin than an Evil Prin- 
 ciple. This Opinion was held by many of the Ancients, by the 
 Manicheans y Paulicians, and almoft all the Tribe of ancient Here- 
 tics, (25.). 
 
 V.And 
 
 NOTE S. 
 
 (25.) In order to give fome light into the 
 Opinions of thefe "Men, concerning the Ori- 
 gin of Evil, I fhall tranferibe a Paragraph 
 from Bay/e's Dictionary, in the Article Mani- 
 tbeesy. Remark. D. whers he introduces Zoroa- 
 fier defending the two oppofite Principles a- 
 Dovo- niention'd. " Zoroafler, fays he, would 
 ** go back to the time of the Chaos, which is 
 * a State as to his two Principles, \cry^ like 
 
 that which Hobbs calls th State of Nature, 
 axd which he fuppofes to have preceded the 
 firft Eflablifhment of Societies. In this 
 State of Nature, . one Man was a Wolf to &r 
 nother, and every thing belong'd to the firlt 
 Pofleffor; none was Matter of any thing, 
 except he was the ftrongeft. To get out of 
 this Confufion, every one agreed to quit his. 
 Right to the whole, that he might have a 
 
 ** Property 
 
 * S, t, *,j8o.
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Concerning the Mature and Divipon of Evil. n 5 
 
 V. And there are ibme ftill who think this Difficulty unanfwerable. There are 
 They confefs, indeed, the Suppofition of a double Principle to be ab- fome . whoare 
 
 /j ii- 1 n 1 -i a 1 ^or opinion, 
 
 iurd, and that it may be demonftrated that there is but one Author of that it is un- 
 all things, abfolutely perfect and good j yet there is Evil in things, an j V f rab ! e ' 
 and this they fee and feel : but whence, or how it comes, they are Mamchea of- 
 emirely ignorant; nor can human Reafon (if we believe them, in a- fer ' d * better 
 
 |- folution, by 
 
 *-* 2 n y fuppofingtvvo 
 
 Principles, 
 than the Ca- 
 tholics do by 
 owning only 
 " afide all thofe Fights and Prifoners which One 
 '" the Manicbeans fpeak of. The whole might 
 " be reduced to the certain Knowledge of the 
 " two Principles, that one could never obtain 
 ' from the other but fuch and fuch Conditi- 
 " oqs: and thus an Eternal Agreement might 
 " have been made upon this Foot. 
 
 For a farther Explication and Amendment 
 of their Hypothefis, and Replies to feverai 
 Arguments urg'd againll it, fee the Words, 
 Manicbeans, Marcionites, Pau/icians, Origen and 
 Zoroa/fcr, in the abovemention'd Dictionary. 
 
 That there is no Occafton for any Hypothefis 
 of this kind, will be fliewn in the following 
 Chapters. Let it fuffice in this place, to point 
 out the abfurdities of the Hypothefis itfelf. 
 And firft, it may be obferv'd, that the Suppofi- 
 tion of an ubfolute and infinitely Evil Principle 
 (if thefe Words mean fuch a Being as is totally 
 oppolite to the Good One) is an exprefs con- 
 tradiction. For as this Principle oppofes and 
 refills the infinitely Good One, it alfo muft be 
 independent and infinite : It muft be infinite 
 or abfolute in Knowledge and Power. But the 
 notion of a Being infinitely Evi), is of one in- 
 finitely Imperfedt; its Knowledge and Power 
 therefore mull be infinitely Imperfedl; i. e. ab- 
 folute Ignorance and Impotence, or no Know- 
 ledge and Power at all. The one of thefe Be- 
 ings then is abfolutely perfect, or enjoys all 
 manner of pofitive Perfections, confequently 
 the other, as it is directly the Rcverfe, muft be 
 purely the negation of it, as Darknefs is of 
 Light; i. e. it muft be an infinite Defccl, or 
 mere nothing. Thus, this Evil Being muft have 
 fome Knowledge and Power, in order to make 
 
 any 
 
 u Property in fomething, they tranfadted one 
 * with another, and fo the War ceas'd. Thus 
 " the two Principles weary of this Chios, 
 w wherein each confounded and overthrew 
 11 what the other would do, came at laft to an 
 xt Agreement; each of them yielded fomething, 
 * each had a fhare in the Production of Man, 
 " and the Laws of the Union of the Soul : 
 ** The good Principle obtain'd thofe which 
 " procure to Man a thoufand Pleafures, and 
 " confented to thofe which expofe him to a 
 ** thoufand Sorrows : and if it confented that 
 " Moral Good mould be infinitely lefs in 
 " Mankind than Moral Evil, he repair'd the 
 ** Damage in fome other kind of Creatures, 
 * wherein Vice fliould be much lefs thanVir- 
 *' tue. If many Men in this Life have more 
 " Mifery than Happinefs, this is recompene'd 
 " in another State ; what they hae not under 
 " an human Shape, thcyfhall recover under a- 
 " nother. By means of this Agreement, the 
 Chaos was a paffive Principle, which was 
 M the Field of Battle between thefe two ac- 
 *' live Principles. The Poets * have reprefen- 
 *' ted this difentangling under the Image of a 
 " Quarrel ended. This is what Zoroajler 
 ** might alledge, boafting that he does not at- 
 *' tribute to the Good Principle the produc- 
 " tion of a Creature at his own Pleafure, 
 ** which was to be fo wretched and miferable ; 
 " but only, after he had found by Experience 
 * that he could do no better, nor better oppofe 
 " the horrible Defigns of the Evil Principle. 
 11 To render his Hypothefis the lefs often five, 
 * he might have deny'd that there was a long 
 " War between the two Principles, and lay 
 
 Hanc Deus i& Melicr Litem Natura diremit. Ovid. Met. 1. 1. 

 
 76 Concerning the Nature and Divifion ofEviL 
 
 ny meafure difcover. Hence they take Occafion to lament our Un- 
 happinefs, and complain of the hard Fate attending Truth, as often 
 as a Solution of this Difficulty is attempted unfuccefsfully. The Ma- 
 nicheam folve the Phenomena of things better, a hundred times bet- 
 ter (as thefe Men think) with their moll: abiurd Hypothefis of two 
 Principles, than the Catholics do with their mod true Doctrine of 
 
 One 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 :ny opjx fition at all to the Good One ; but as he 
 is directly opposite to that Good or Perfedt One, 
 he car, not have the lea it degree of Knowledge* 
 or Pmter, fince thefe are Perfections : therefore, 
 the Suppofition of fuch an Exiitence as this, 
 implies a contradiction. 
 
 But fuppofing thefe Men only to mean (what 
 any undcrftanding Perfon among them muft 
 mean) by tins Evil Principle, an abfolutcly 
 Malevolent Being, of equal Power, and other 
 natural Perfections with thofe of the Go>.d 
 One, " It would be to no pnrpofe (fays Til- 
 u lot/on*,) to fuppoftf two fuch oppofite Prin- 
 ciples. For, admit that a Being infinitely 
 " Mifchievous, were infinitely cunning, and 
 ** infinitely powerful, yet it could do no Evil, 
 becaufe the oppofite Principle of infinite 
 * Goodnefs, being alfo infinitely wife and 
 " powerful, they would tye up one another's 
 * Hands : fo that upon this Suppofition, the 
 <l Notion of a Deity would fignify juft no- 
 * thing, and by virtue of the Eternal Oppo- 
 u fition and Equality of thofe Principles, they 
 would keep one another at a perpetual Bay, 
 * and being an equal Match for one another, 
 ** inftead of being two Deities, they would 
 be two Idols, able to do neither Good nor 
 * Evil. 
 
 I fhall only produce one argument more as to 
 Moral Evil, out of Simplicius^s Comment on E- 
 fitletus, which,, by the Confeffion of Bayle 
 Jbimfelf, ftrikes home at the Doftrine of Two 
 Principles, tho' it be confider'd with the grea- 
 teft Simplicity. 
 
 He fays f, * // entirely definys the Liberty 
 " tf cur Souls, and neceffitates them to Sin, and 
 
 8 confequently implies a ContradiBhn. For, fintt 
 u the Principle of Evil is eternal and incorrupt i- 
 " ble, and fo potent that God hhnfeif cannot con- 
 a quer him, it fellows, that the Soul of Man can- 
 11 not rejijl the lmpufe, with which he mwes it t* 
 B Sin. But if a Man be invincibly driven to it y 
 '* he commits no Murder or Adultery, &c. by his 
 " own Fault, but by a fuperior eternal Fault, and 
 *' in that Cafe he is neither guilty nor punifhable.. 
 * Therefore, there is no fuch thing as Sin, and 
 " confequently this Hypothefis defrays itfelf; fince 
 ** if there be a Principle of Evil, there is no long- 
 41 er any Evil in the World. But if there be m. 
 " Evil in the World, it is clear there is no- 
 " Principle of Evil; whence we nay infer, that 
 '* thofe who fuppofe fuch a Principle, tiefiroy, by 
 " a neceffary Confequence, both Evil and the Prin* 
 " ciple of it." 
 
 More of this may be feen in Bayle's Explana- 
 tion concerning the Manichees, at the End of 
 his Dictionary, p. 66, &.c See alfo Mr. Gur- 
 don's Boyle's Leclure, Serm; 5. or Stilling fleet's 
 Orig. Sacra?, B. 3.. C. 3. V 10, 12. See alfo 
 Sherlock on Judgment, ift Edit, p; 173. 
 
 Neither does Mr. BayWs amendment of this 
 Hypothefis free it from the Difficulty. He 
 fuppofes the two Principles to be fenfible of 
 the above mention'd Confequence arifing from 
 their Equality of Power, and therefore,, 
 would compound the Matter, by allowing an 
 equal Mixture of Good and Evil in the 
 intended Creation. But if the Quantity of 
 Good and Evil in the Creation be exactly 
 equal, neither of the Principles has attain'd, or 
 could expeft to attain, the End for which it 
 was fuppos'd. to aft. The Good Principle de- 
 
 fign'd 
 
 2 Vol:, of Sena. Fol. p. 690, 
 
 f p. \$z. Ed. Lend. 1 670*
 
 Concerning the Nature and Divifion of Evil. 
 
 One perfect, abfolutely powerful and beneficent Author of Nature. 
 For the Manicbeans acquit God from all manner of Blame, as he was 
 compelPd by the contrary Principle to fuffer Sin and Mifery in his 
 Work, which in the mean while he oppofes with all his Power. 
 But, according to the Catholics, as their Adverfaries object, he per- 
 mits thefe voluntarily, nay, is the Caufe and Author of them. For 
 if, as thefe Men argue, there be but one Author of all Things, Evils 
 alfo fhould be refer'd to him as their Original ; but it can neither be 
 explain'd nor conceiv'd, how infinite Goodnefs can become the Ori- 
 gin of Evil. If God could not hinder it, where is his Power? If 
 he could, and would not, where is his Goodnefs? If you fay, that 
 Evil neceffarily adheres to fome particular Natures ; fince God was 
 the Author of them all, it would have been better to have omitted 
 thofe with the concomitant Evils, than to have debafed his Work- 
 manfhip with an Allay of thefe Evils, (26.). 
 
 L 3 VI. It 
 
 77 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 fign'd to produce fome abfolute Good, the E- 
 vil One fome abfolute Evil ; but to produce 
 an equal Mixture of both, would be in effect 
 producing neither: One would juft counter- 
 balance and dellroy the other; and all fuch 
 a&ion would be the very fame as doing no- 
 thing at all : and that fuch an exact Equality 
 f Good and Evil muft be the Refult of any 
 agreement between them is plain: For, as 
 they are by Suppofition perfectly equal in In- 
 clination, as well as Power, neitlier of them 
 could poflibly concede, and let its oppofite 
 prevail: The Creation therefore cannot be 
 owing to fuch a Compofition. 
 
 But the beft Confutation of this Scheme may 
 be found in the Chapter before us; where our 
 Author fhews, that it does not at all anfwer the 
 End for which it was introduced. This com- 
 pletes the abfurdity of it. 
 
 (26.) Since this Objection contains all that 
 can be faid upon Evil in general ; and it ap- 
 pears tome abfolutely neccflary for every Man 
 
 to do Juftice to Objections, who expects that 
 others fhould receive any Satisfaction from his 
 anfwers, I fhall infert it, as it is propofed in 
 its full force, by Cud-worth*. " The fuppo- 
 ** fed Deity and Maker of the World, was ei- 
 " ther willing to abolilh all Evils, but not 
 " able, or he was able and not willing : or, 
 ' thirdly, he was neither willing nor able: 
 <l or, laftly, he was both able and willing. 
 * This latter is the only thing that anfwers 
 lt fully to the Notion of a God. Now, that 
 M the fuppofed Creator of all things was not 
 " thus both able and willing to aboliih all E- 
 " vils, is plain, becaufe then there would have 
 w been no Evils at all left. Wherefore, fince 
 li there is fuch a Deluge of Evils overflowing 
 " all, it muft needs be, that either he was 
 " willing and not able to remove them, and 
 ** then he was impotent ; or elfe he was able 
 " and not willing, and then he was envious ; or 
 laftly, he was neither able nor willing, and 
 then, he was both impotent and envious." 
 
 Almoft 
 
 * True IntelLSyJl. p* 78, 79.
 
 Concerning the Nature and Divifwn of Evil. 
 
 78 
 
 ThJsdifficul- yi j t i s we n known, that this Difficulty has exercifed both the 
 cite J thcPhi ancient Philofophers and Fathers of the Church (27.): and there are 
 loiophcrsandfome who deny that it is yet anfwer'd; nay, who undertake to refute 
 the Church a ^ tne Solutions hitherto offer'd; nor do I promife a complete one in 
 and fomede every Refpect, tho' I hope to fhew, in the following Part of theTrea- 
 m- thu it s t |^ ^ at - t - not w } 10 Uy unanfwerable. 
 
 anlwer dyec. ** 
 
 T,, VII. It is manifeft, that tho' Good be mix'd with Evil in this Life, 
 
 I nerc is 
 
 more Good yet there is much more Good than Evil in Nature, and every Animal 
 !"" Ev , !1 . provides for its Prefervation by Inftinct or Reafon, which it would ne- 
 ver do, if it did not think or feel its Life, with all the Evils annex'd, 
 to be much preferable to Non-exiftence. This is a Proof of the Wif- 
 dom, Goodnefs, and Power of God, who could thus temper a World 
 infefted with fo many Miferies, that nothing fhould continue in it 
 which was not in fome meafure pleafed with its Exigence, and which 
 would not endeavour by all poffible Means to preferve it. 
 repugnant to 3/JIL Neither does the Supposition of an Evil Principle help any 
 Infinite thing towards the Solution of this Difficulty. For the AlTerters of 
 Shave eIS two Principles maintain, that the great and good God tolerates E- 
 created thefc vil, becaufe he is forced to it by the Evil One, and that either from 
 things which an Agreement between themfelves, or a perpetual Struggle and Con- 
 would be 'tefl with each other. For, fince the Beneficent Author of Nature 
 
 corrupted by was 
 
 another, 
 
 n j 1 1 S w o u 'd corrupt themfelves. The Suppolkion of a double Principle is therefore of no Service 
 toward the Solution of this Difficulty. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Almoft the fame occurs in Laelantius *, and 
 is cited, and fufficiently refuted by our Author 
 in C. 5. S' ? Sub. the laft : See alfo Prudentius 
 in Hamurtigcnia, v. 64c. 
 
 The Subftance of all Bay/e's Objections may 
 be feen in a Book call'd Free Thoughts on Re- 
 ligion, &c. C. 5. p. 104, &*. See alfo the fol-' 
 lowing Note. The Anfwcrs to them will fol- 
 low in their proper places. 
 
 (27.) Any one thar wants to be acquainted 
 with the Antiquity of this Difpute, -or the 
 Tertians engaged in it, or the way of managing 
 
 it, made ufe of by the Fathers, may confult the 
 beginning of Dr. J. Clarke's Enquiry into the 
 Caufe and Origin of Evil : and Bayle's Dictio- 
 nary, in the Articles Minicheans, Remark B. 
 Marcionites, Remarks F, and F A- Paulicians, 
 Remarks K, and K A. and Zorcajler, Remark 
 E. Or Cudwtrth, from p. 213, to p. 224. or 
 Stilling fleet's Orjgines Sacra, B. 3 C. 3. (j. 8, 
 9, 11, 12, &c. or Fabric ij Biblioth. Grcec. v- 5. 
 p. 287, &c. or Deleft us ArgumeKtorum, &c. 
 C. ic. 
 
 * De Im Dei, >C. 13. p. 4351 Edit. Cant.
 
 Concerning the Nature and T)ivifion of Evil. 79 
 
 was hinder'd by the Evil Principle, from producing all the Good he 
 was willing to produce, he either made an Agreement with it, to pro- 
 duce as much as he was allow'd, but with a Mixture of Evil, accor- 
 ding to the Agreement between them; or elfe there is a Mixture of 
 Good and Evil proportionable to the Power which prevails in either. 
 Hence they think the good God excufable, who confer'd as many 
 BleMlngs on the World as his Adverfary permitted, and would have to- 
 lerated no manner of Evil, unlefs compell'd to it by the adverfe Po- 
 wer. So rhat he-muft either create no Good at all, or mffer an Allay 
 of Evil. All which very great Abfurdities have this farther Inconve- 
 nience, that they do not anfwer the End for which they were inven- 
 ted. For he is no lefs. culpable who created any thing which he knew 
 would be render'd miferable by another, than if he had made that 
 which he forefaw would bring Mifery upon itfelf. If therefore God 
 might, confidently with Goodnefs, create Things which he knew the 
 Evil Principle could and would corrupt, as the Manicheans aflerted ; 
 then he might, confidently with the fame Goodnefs, have created 
 Things that would corrupt themfelves, or were to perifh in a Tract 
 of Time. If then, according to the Defenders of this Hypothefis, 
 God ought to have omitted, or not created thofe Beings, in whofe Na- 
 tures Evil or Contrariety is inherent, he ought alfo to have omitted, 
 thofe, whofe Natures he forefaw the Evil Principle would corrupt. 
 And if there was fo much Good in thefe, as made him think it better 
 to create them, tho' they were to be corrupted fome time or other by 
 the oppofite Principle, he might alfo judge it preferable to produce 
 the fame, tho' they were at length to perifh by their inherent E- 
 vils. Nor will God tolerate Evil in his Works, as forced to it more, 
 according to the Manicheans, than the Catholics. For, as he might 
 have not made thofe Beings which have Evils neceffarily adhering ta 
 them, fo he might alfo have not made thofe which he foreknew the 
 contrary Principle would corrupt. After the fame manner in both 
 Cafes he could have prevented Evil, and fince he could, why did He 
 not ? The Suppofition of two Principles conduces nothing at all 
 therefore to the Solution of this Difficulty. 
 
 IX. But
 
 So Concerning the Nature and Tiivifion of Evil. 
 
 If it can be IX. But if we can point out a Method of reconciling thefe Things 
 incwn, that w ' lX h t ] le Government of an abfolutely perfect Agent, and make them 
 contradia not only confiftent with Infinite Wifdom, Goodnefs and Power, but 
 infinite Po- neceffarily refulting from them (fo that thefe would not be Infinite, 
 Goodnefs to *f thofe did not or could not porTibly exift) then we may be fuppo- 
 permit Evils, fed to have at laft difcover'd the true Origin of Evils, and anfwer'd all 
 ec^LiW^* Difficulties and Objections that are brought on this Head, a- 
 rife from the gainft the Goodnefs, Wifdom, Power, and Unity of God. Let us try 
 exercife of therefore what can be done in each kind of Evil ; and firft. concerning: 
 
 them, then , ^ ., r T . r <-* * 
 
 may the Dif- the Evil of Imperfection. 
 
 ficulty be 
 ;nf\arcr'd. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 8i 
 
 CHAP. IIL 
 
 Of the Evil of Defeft. 
 
 A 
 
 I. a. S for the Evil of ImperfeBion, it is to be confider'd, that be- 
 fore the World was created God exifted alone, and nothing 
 befide him. All things therefore are out of nothing, and 
 whatfoever exifts, has its Exiftence from God j neither can 
 that Exiftence be different either in Kind or Degree from what he 
 gave *. 
 
 II. Secondly, God, tho' he be omnipotent, cannot make any crea- 
 ted Being abjolutely perfe6i i for whatever is abfolutely perfect, muft ne- 
 ceffarily be Self-exiftent. But it is included in the very Notion of a 
 Creature, as fuch, not to exift of itfelf, but from God. An abfolute- 
 ly perfect Creature therefore implies a Contradiction. For it mould 
 be of itfelf, and not of itfelf, at the fame time (28.). Abfolute Per- 
 fection is therefore peculiar to God, and if he would communicate his 
 own peculiar Perfection to another, (E.) that other would be God. 
 
 The 
 
 N O t E S. 
 
 Things can 
 be no other- 
 wife than as 
 God pleafed. 
 
 All Created 
 things are 
 neceflarily 
 imperfect, 
 fince they do 
 not exift of 
 themfelves. 
 
 (28.) A perfeti Creature is a contradiction in 
 terms. For if it be per/eft it is independent ; 
 and if it be independent, it is no Creature. A- 
 jjain ; to fuppoie a created Being infinite in any 
 refpect is to fuppofc it equal to its Creator in that 
 refpecl; and if it be equal in one refpect, it 
 muft be fo in all, fince an Infinite property 
 cannot inhere in any finite Subject, for then 
 the Attribute would be more perfect than its 
 hibject, all which is abfurd. Granting, there- 
 lore, this one Principle, which cannot be de- 
 
 * See Scott in Note 32. 
 
 ny'd, (ziz. that an Effect muft be inferior to 
 its Caufe) it will appear, that the Evil of Im- 
 perfection, fuppofing a Creation, is necefTary 
 and unavoidable; and confequently, all other 
 Evils which neceflarily arife from that, are un- 
 avoidable alfo. What our Author has advan- 
 ced upon the following Head, feems perfectly 
 conclufive. 
 
 (E.) This Pofition feems very agreeable to 
 the Catholic Faith, which teaches that the Fa- 
 ther did communicate his Nature, and all his 
 
 Pcr- 
 
 M
 
 8 a Of the Evil of <?/,?. 
 
 The Evil of Imperfection muft therefore be tolerated in Creatures, not-- 
 whhftanding the Divine Omnipotence and Goodnefs: for Contradic- 
 tions are Objects of no Power. God might indeed have refrain'd from 
 creating, and continu'd alone, Self-fufficient, and perfect: to all Eter- 
 nity, but his Infinite Goodnefs would, by no means allow it 5 this ob- 
 lig'd him to produce external things ; which things, fince they could 
 
 nee 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Perfections to the Son, and with him to the 
 Holy Ghofl: each of them therefore is very God 
 under a different Subfiflenic. The Divine. Na- 
 ture which is inherent in them, may be con- 
 ceiv'd to be of itfelf, but the Modus of Exi- 
 gence cannot. Now the Church looks upon 
 the Nature thus iiibnlling, as a Per/on. Not 
 that it is a Perfon in the fame manner as the 
 human Nature fubfifting by itfelf, but by Rea- 
 fbn of a certain Similitude and Analogy which 
 they have between them. Since Divine Mat- 
 ters are not obiefts of the Senfes, they cannot, 
 as we faid before *, be known by Maiks im- 
 prefs'd upon us by Senfation; they are there- 
 fore conceiv'd by a Similitude, Relation, Pro- 
 portion, or Connexion with fenfible things-: 
 The Paffions, Affections Intellect. and.Will, 
 are the Principles of our Actions, and therefore 
 we attribute thefe to God. For if we were to 
 do thofe things which God performs, thefe 
 would be the Principles and Caufes of them : 
 We attribute therefore to God fomething ana- 
 logous, or equivalent to thefe, but we know 
 that it is as diftant as finite is from Infinite 
 Nay, 'tis demonflrable, that neither Will, nor 
 Love, nor Anger, nor Juftice, nor-Mercy, are 
 in God, after the. fame manner, as they exift 
 in, and are conceiv'd by, usf. But we muft 
 make ufe of thefe Words, becaufe we have, no 
 better, and they fofficiently anfwer the End 
 for which God would have us to know him. 
 Now, after the fame manner we point out the 
 diftin&ion declaied in Scripture between the 
 Father, Son, and Holy Ghoji, by the Word Per- 1 
 Jon, becaufe we have. nothing neater, to compare J 
 
 * Note A: 
 
 f See Woelafton, p. 1 1 5, 11 6. and Epifcopius 
 S/rmon on Predeflination, &c. 
 |= S>ualem autem J)eum, tsfc (C/V. de Nat. Devr. 
 
 them by; and the. RepccfenUtion under thi# 
 Analogy fhews us very-well what we may hope- 
 for from each of them, and what WorflHp we 
 ought to pay them. Tho'at the fame tirrje we 
 are certain, that thefe differ no lefs from hu- 
 man Perfons, than the Divine Intel left does 
 from human, or the Principles of Divine Ac- 
 tions from human Pdffions ; for inftance, An- 
 ger, Hatred, and the like. 'Tis ftrange there- 
 fore, that Men who- would bcefteenVd learned, 
 fhould difpute againft a Plurality of Perfons in 
 the Deity, after the very fame Way of Re:foning 
 with which Cotta in Gicera argues againft the 
 Intelligence, Prudence, and Juftice of God |j, 
 namely, beciufe they cannot be in God after 
 the fame manner as we conceive them to be in 
 Men; forgetting, in the mean time, that rhefe 
 are attributed to God by a kind of Anahgy and 
 ^Accomodation to our Capacity, and rather from 
 the refemblance of- things done by God, to 
 thofe done by us, than of the Principles from 
 which they proceed. But the Scriptures and 
 the Church have fuffieiently forewarn'd us to 
 "beware of this erroneous Way of Reafoning. 
 For when God is defcrlbed under thefe Fi- 
 gures, Similitudes, and Analogies, . left we 
 fhould take Images of things for the things, 
 themfelves, and fo fall into abfurd Reafonings 
 about them, the fame things are deny'd of God 
 in one Senfe, that are. affirm'd of him in ano- 
 ther. Thus God is often faid to repent, and. 
 in another place 'tis deny'd- that he repents as a . 
 Man. Thus Light is afcribed to God, as his 
 habitation, and elfewhere, Thick Darknefs. 
 He is often faid to be feen, and yet is call'd In- 
 
 vifible. 
 
 Inft.Thetl. L. 4. C. 22. p. 310. er^our Authors 
 
 V. 1 5 Ed. Lond. See our Author's Strm* ; 37. .
 
 Of the Evil of D'efcS. 
 
 not poflibly be perfect, the Divine Goodnefs preferr'd imperfect ones 
 to none at all. Imperfection then arofe from the Infinity of Divine 
 Goodnefs. Had not God been infinitely Good, perhaps he might not 
 have furfer'd imperfect Beings j but have been content in himfelf, and 
 created nothing at all. 
 
 III. Thirdly, There are infinite Degrees of Perfection between a 
 Being abfolutely perfett and Nothing : of which, if Exiftence be con- 
 ceiv'd as the Firft, every thing will be fo many degrees diftant from 
 nothing, as there are Perfections to be found in it joined with Exi- 
 ftence. In this Scale then God will be the Top, and Nothing the Bot- 
 tom-, and how much farther any thing is diftant from nothing, it is 
 fo much the more perfect, and approaches nearer to God. How much 
 any thing can refemble God in Perfection, or how nearly approach to 
 him (F.) we know not.; but we are certain that there is always an in- 
 
 M 2 finite 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 8? 
 
 'Tis to he 
 determin'd 
 by the Di- 
 vine Plea Cure 
 whatDegrees 
 of Perfection 
 every thing t 
 muft have, 
 fince all 
 things are 
 neceffarily at 
 an Infinite 
 diftance from 
 the higheft 
 Perfe&ion. 
 
 vifible. The Father is God and Lord, and al- 
 fo the Son and the Holy Ghoft, and yet it is 
 faid there is but one God and Lord. All which 
 and more of the fame kind, we muft believe to 
 be thus exprefs'd, for no other Reafon, but to 
 hinder us from imagining them to be afcribed 
 to God in the fame manner as they are in us, 
 (29). But Smatterers in Learning; rejecl and 
 ridicule thefe forms of Speech as Enigmas, be- 
 ing ignorant of both the Sacred and Ecclefiafti- 
 cal Dialeft, which they refufe to learn, tho' 
 we muft make ufe of it in Divine Matters, or 
 elfe ent ; rely refrain from all Reafoning about 
 them. For fince they are known no otherwife 
 than by fimilitude and analogy, they cannot 
 be defcribed otherwife, as any one will find 
 who tries. But it is no wonder if thefe Men, 
 while they take fimilies for the things them- 
 felvcs, mould eafily imagine that they difedver 
 abfurdities in them. If they do this on pur- 
 pofe, cunningly, and with an ill Intent, they 
 are Villains ; but if thro' Ignorance or Error, 
 they deferve Pity, if they did not fwell with a 
 
 proud conceit of Science, and exalt themfelves 
 above the Vulgar ; who yet are much wifer 
 than thefe Philofophers. For they fear the 
 Anger of God, love his Goodnefs, embrace 
 his Mercy, adore his Jufticc, and give Glory 
 to the Father, Son and Holy Ghoft, and yet 
 believe in and worfhip one God, moft perfect, 
 and free from Paflions. Whereas, the Smatter- 
 ers in Science have got nothing to pliKre in 
 the Room of thefe, which they themfelves, 
 much lefs the Vulgar, can underftand ; or, 
 which can equally excite the Affections of the 
 Mind, or promote Piety. 
 
 (F) Suppofing the World to be Infinite, 
 there would be, as far as appears to us, Infi- 
 nite Orders of Creatures descending gradually 
 from God to Nothing: but fince neither our 
 Underftanding can comprehend, nor does the 
 Nature of Quantity and Motion feem to admit 
 of Infinity or Eternity ; 'tis better to refer the 
 Matter to the Dirine Will. For if an Infinity 
 in Creatures be impoflible, 'tis the fame thing 
 wherever we ftop. For all Finites are equally 
 
 diftant 
 
 (29) This is a good Inference from thefe and the like Exprtfftons, but ean hardly be fuppofed to have 
 'been the principal defign, much lefs the only reafon, f them. For more inflames of this kind, fee the 
 fsremen/icn'J Sermon, . 23, 27. 

 
 84 Of the Evil of VefcB. 
 
 finite diftance between them. It muft have been deter mm a therefore 
 bv the Will of God, where he would ftop, fince there is nothing but 
 his own Will to bound his Power. Now it is to be believ'd, that the 
 prefent Syftem of the World was the very beft that could be, with re- 
 gard to the Mind of God in framing it (30.). It might have been bet- 
 ter. 
 
 NOTE iL 
 
 djfbnt from Infinite. If therefore God had 
 created twice, thrice, or a thoufand thoufand 
 times as great, and as many Beings, and a thou 
 land thoufand Ages fooner than he has, the 
 fame, objections might be made, Why not be- 
 fore ? Why not more ? The World there- 
 fore muft either have been created Infinite and 
 irom Eternity, which the very Nature of the 
 thing feems not to allow, or it is all one when 
 and how great it might be, and not determi- 
 nable by any thing befides the Divine Pleafure. 
 See Chap. 5. . 1. Subf. 4. and % Clarke on 
 Nat. Evil, p. 90, 93, 280, ci>V. 
 
 (30.) In order to confirm this belief, and 
 come to a right Knowledge of the whole Que- 
 ilion before us, it is neceflary to enquire a lit- 
 tle into the meaning of thefe Words ; to confi- 
 der (with reverence^ what this Mind of God 
 might be in framing the World, and what was 
 the moft proper Method of anfwering it. Now 
 it appear'd from the Conclufion of the firft 
 Chapter, and Note 23. that the fole Defign of 
 Almighty God in creating the Univerfe, was 
 to impart Felicity to other Beings : and in the 
 beginning of this Chapter it was proved, that 
 any Happinefs thus communicated could not be 
 Infinite. His Defign then is completely an- 
 swer 'd, if the greateft - Degree of Happinefs be 
 imparted, of which created Beings are capa- 
 ble, confident with One another ; or when the 
 utmoft poffible Good is produced in the Uni- 
 verfe collectively. This alfo fhew.s us what- 
 we are to understand by the very beft Syftem, viz. 
 one that is fitted for, and productive of, the 
 greateft abfolute general Good: The manner of 
 effecting which comes next under confidera- 
 rion. As to this, it is queried in the firft 
 place, whether all Animals ought to have been 
 created equally perfect j or fe vera! indifferent 
 
 Ranks and Degrees of Perfection ; and fecond- 
 ly, whether God may be fuppofed to have pla- 
 ced any Order of Beings infuch a fix'd unal- 
 terable condition, as not to admit of advance- 
 ment: to have made any Creatures as perfect 
 at firitas the Nature of a created Being is ca- 
 pable of. The former of thefe doubts is fully 
 difcuG'd in this and the following Chipter, 
 V 2. The latter feems not fo eafy to be deter- 
 min'd. They who hold the affirmative argue 
 from our notion of Infinite or abfolute Goodnefs, 
 which muft excite the Deity always to commu- 
 nicate all manner of Happinefs, in- the very high- 
 eft Degree, for the fame reafon that it prompts 
 him to communicate it ever in any degree. But 
 this, fay they, he has. not done, except he at 
 firft endow'd fome Creatures with all the Per- 
 fection a Creature could poflibly receive, and 
 gave to every fubordinate Clafs of Beings *, 
 the utmoft Happinefs their feveral Natures were 
 capable of. Neither can this Opinion be con- 
 futed from Holy Scripture, which declares that 
 God made innumerable glorious Orders of 
 Cherubim and Seraphim., all far above our Com 
 prehenfion, and fome, for any. thing that we 
 know, in the very next Step to the Top of the 
 great Scale of Beings, and only Second to the 
 Almighty. Thofe that hold thecontrary Opi- 
 nion, diftinguifh between Happinefs and Per- 
 fection, and think that thefe do not either ne- 
 ceffarily imply, or infeparably attend each o- 
 ther. They deny therefore the confequence of 
 I the former Argument, and affign this Reafon 
 J for it, viz. becaufe a Being produced in the 
 ! higheft degree of natural Perfection which a 
 1 Creature is capable of, and ftill continued in 
 the fame, will not receive as much Happinefs . 
 in the main, as others that were placed in a 
 I mucJunieriai State. at- the firft. Tnis, tho' it 
 
 a* 
 
 ' Cmtrntitg thefe Clajes, ft< Note*- 33 and 35; .
 
 Of the Evil of Defctt. 
 
 ter perhaps in fome Particulars, but not without fome new, and pro- 
 bably greater Inconveniencies, which mud: have fpoil'd the Beauty, 
 either of the whole, or of fome chief Part. 
 
 IV. Fourthly ; From hence ic appears alfo, that all Beings cannot 
 liave equal Perfections* For die World muft necef-ariiy be compos'd 
 
 M 3 of 
 
 85 
 
 All th ; gs 
 could not 
 ] ic equally 
 >erfet, 
 fincc fome 
 are Parts of others. 
 
 N O 2* E S. 
 
 may appear fomething like a Paradox, yet, up- 
 on farther confederation, will perhaps be judg'd 
 not improbable. Thus, for a Creature confci- 
 ous of no deficiency of any thing necefTary to 
 its well-being, to meet with a perpetual accef- 
 fion of new, unknown Pleafure, to refieftwith 
 comfort on its paft Condition, and compare it 
 with the prefent, to enjoy a continued Series 
 of freih Satisfaction and Delight, and be al- 
 ways approaching nearer and nearer to Perfec- 
 tion, this mull certainly advance the Sum of 
 its Happinefs, even above that of others, whofe 
 condition is fuppofed to h?.ve begun and to 
 continue in that degree of perfection, where 
 this will end (if there could ba any end in ei- 
 ther) and which never knew defied, variety, or 
 incrcafe. A finite Being fix'd in the fame 
 State, however excellent, muft, according to 
 all our Conceptions (if we be allow'd to judge 
 from our prefent Faculties, and we can judge 
 from nothing elfe) contrail a kind of Indolence 
 or lnfenfibility (i. e. cannot always be equally 
 affected by an equal degree of Good in the Ob- 
 ject) which lnfenfibility, nothing but altera- 
 tion and variety can cure. It does not there- 
 fore feem probable, that God'has actually fix'd 
 any created Beings whatfoever in the very high- 
 ell degree of Perfection next to himfelf. Nay, 
 it is impoffible to conceive any fuch higheft 
 Degree, and the Suppofition is abfurd. That 
 which admits of a continual addibility, can 
 admit of no higbeft ; and to ask, why God 
 created not all Beings with the very higheft 
 Perfection ? is the fame abfurdity as to ask, 
 why he did not make as many Creatures, or as 
 many Worlds as he could ? For whkh fee 
 
 Note 22. Since then the Creation cannot be 
 Infinite; and finites, how much foever ampli- 
 fied, can never reach Infinity or abfolute Per- 
 fection*, we can fet no manner of bounds to the 
 Creating Power of God : but muft refer all to 
 his Infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs: which At- 
 tributes we know can never be exhaufted, nor 
 will, we believe, produce any Beings in fuch 
 a State, as fhall not leave room enough for 
 them to be ftill growing in Felicity, and fore- 
 ver acquiring new Happinefs, together with 
 new Perfection. 
 
 This notion of a growing Happinefs is em- 
 braced by moft Divines, and affords the ftrong- 
 eft Motive for endeavouring to improve and- 
 excell in every Chriftian Grace. 'Tis beauti- 
 fully touch 'd upon by Mr. Addifon, Spectator" 
 N. 1 1 1 . " There is not, in my Opinion, a more 
 " p leafing and triumphant Conftderation in Reli- 
 " gion, than this of the perpetual Progrefs which 
 " the Soul makes toward the Per/eel ion of its Na- 
 " tare, without ever arriving at a Period in it. 
 " To look upon the Soul as going on from Strength 
 *' to Strength ; to con/ider, that She is to Jhine 
 " for ever with new Accejftons of Glory, and' 
 ," brighten to all Eternity ; that She will be ftill 
 " adding Virtue to Virtue, and Knowledge to 
 " Knowledge, carries in it fomething wonderfully 
 " agreeable to that Ambition which is natural to 
 " the Mind of Man'. Nay, H muft be a Pro/fiefF 
 ," pleaftngto God himfelf, to fee his Creation for 
 f* ever beautifying in his Eyes, and drawing nearer 
 " to him- by degrees of Refemblance.** 
 
 That the Happinefs of Saints and Angels may 
 be continually increafing, fee TWotfen's 77th 
 [Sermon, Vol. 2d Fol. p. 578, cjfr. 
 
 From 
 
 'See Note F; and Dr. BentleyV Boyle 's Le8> Serm. 6; p. 336, 237. cth Edit.
 
 &6 Of the Evil of T>efecl. 
 
 of various Parts, and thefe parts of others, and fo on. But a Part 
 muft needs come lhort, both of the Divine Perfection, and the Per- 
 fection of the whole. For it is nothing with regard to all the Perfec- 
 tions which it has not, whether thefe be Divine, or Created -, and 
 fince one Part is not another, nor the whole, 'tis plain, that every part 
 wants the Perfections not only of the whole, but of other Parts alfo. 
 And that the whole is more perfect than a part, is evident from hence, 
 that it neceffarily includes the multiplied Perfection of every part; 
 
 and 
 
 NOTE &. 
 
 From thefe Confederations, and fome which 
 fellow in the remainder of this Note, it may 
 perhaps fcem probable, that in u?, and all Be- 
 ings of the like nature, changes from worfe to 
 better, muft be attended even with greater de- 
 grees of Pleafure lhan a fettled permanence in 
 any, the higheft State of Glory or Perfection, 
 andconfequently become neceflary to the com- 
 pletion of all finite Happinefs. But in oppo- 
 fition to all this, liayle urges, that encreafe or 
 alteration is not in the leaft requifite to a la- 
 fting Felicity even in ourfelves. 
 
 4f That 'tis no ways necefTary that our Soul 
 H fhould feel Evil, to the end it may relifh 
 w what is Good, and that it fhould pafs fuc- 
 " ceffively from Pleafure to Pain, and from 
 " Pain to Pleafure, that it may be able to dif- 
 " cern that Pain is an Evil, and that Pleafure 
 *' is a Good thing. We know by Experience, 
 " that our Soul cannot feel, at one and the 
 " fame time, both Pleafure and Pain; it muft 
 H therefore at firft. either have felt Pain before 
 * Pleafure, or Pleafure before Pain. If its 
 ' firft. Senfation was that of Pain, it found that 
 41 State to be uneafy, altho' it was ignorant of 
 tl Pleafure. Suppofe then that its firft Senfa- 
 ** tion lafled many Years, without Interrup- 
 * tion, you may conceive that it was in an 
 " eafy Condition, or in one that was uneafy. 
 '* And do not alledge to me Experience, do 
 * not tell me that a pleafure which lafls a long 
 *' time becomes infipid, and that a long pain 
 ** becomes infupportable : For I will anfwer 
 * you, that this proceeds from a Change in 
 ** the organ which makes that pain, which con- 
 
 * c tinues the fame as to kind, to be difFerent as 
 * to Degrees. If you have had at firft a Sen- 
 " fation of fix Degrees, it will not continue 
 ** of Six to the end of two Hours, or to the 
 c< end of a Year, but only either of one De- 
 " gree, or of one Fourth part of a Degree, 
 " Thus Cuflom blunts the Edge of our Senfa- 
 ** tions; their Degrees correfpond to the Con- 
 " cufuons of the parts of the Brain, and this 
 " Concuffion is weaken'd by frequent Repeti- 
 " tions: from whence it comes to pafs, that 
 the Degrees of Senfation are diminifh'd. 
 " But if Pain or Joy were communicated to 
 " us in the fame Degree, facceffively, for an 
 " hundred Years, we fhould be as unhappy, or 
 '* as happy in the hundredth Year, as in the 
 ' firft Day; which plainly proves, that a 
 * Creature may be happy with a continued 
 " Good, or unhappy with a continued Evil, 
 ** and that the Alternative, which Laftantius 
 M fpeaks of*, is a bad Solution of the Diffi- 
 " culty. It is not founded upon the nature of 
 " Good and Evil, nor upon the Nature of 
 " the Subject which receives them; nor upon 
 " the nature of the Caufe which produces 
 * them. Pleafure and Pain are no lefs proper 
 ' to be communicated the fecond Moment than 
 " the firft, and the third Moment than the fe- 
 rt fecond, and fo of all the reft. Our Soul is 
 ** alfo as fufceptible of them after it has felt 
 " them one Moment, as it was before it felt 
 " them, and God who gave them, is no lefs 
 " capable of producing them the fecond Mo- 
 " ment than the firft +.*' 
 
 As 
 
 Note 103. 
 
 f Critical Difl. p. 2486;
 
 Of the Evit of Defca: 
 
 and befides the parts when join'd together, and conne&ed, acquire a 
 new and peculiar Perfection, whereby they anfwer their proper Ends, 
 which they could not do afunder, they defend themfelves much bet- 
 ter, and affift each other. The Perfection of the whole therefore, is 
 not only more extenjive than that of the parts, by the accumulation 
 of many parts, perhaps equal to one another j but more intenfe alfo; 
 
 N O 1" E & 
 
 As this is one of the ftrongeft obje&ions, [Brain by frequent Repetitions ; then- we fay, 'tis 
 
 J i*ii 11 l* i r -*->_!. t l __ __1"1 n-i 1 ^ .i* ..i r _ t** _ _ /-i ii 
 
 7 
 
 and applicable to all kinds of Evil; I have 
 quoted it at length (tho' fome partb may not re- 
 late immediately to our prefent purpofe) and 
 fhall endeavour to give a full anfwer to it in 
 the following Notes. It will be confider'd 
 with refpedl: to Moral Good and Evil, in 
 Notes 90, 106, and. 10 S. Let us confine our- 
 felvesat prefent to Natural Good, which may 
 be divided into fenfiHve and intellectual. As 
 to the former, we perceive that the Mind, for 
 the augmentation of its Happinefs, is endow'd 
 with various Senfes, each of which is enter- 
 tain'd with a variety of Objefts ; now, any 
 one of thefe Senfes can convey fo much Plea- 
 fure for fome time,., as is fufficient to fill' our 
 prefent narrow Capacity, and engrofs the 
 whole Soul. She can be entirely-happy in the 
 Satisfaction arifing from the Sight, Hearing, 
 &c or from the Memory, or any other Mode 
 of Perception by itfelfl If therefore any one 
 of thefe Organs could (as Bayle fuppofes) con- 
 tinue to communicate the fame Degree of Plea- 
 fure to us for an hundred Years, all the reft 
 would be unneceffary: but an All- wife Be- 
 ing, who cannot ad in vain, has implanted 
 this Variety of Senfes in us; this then is a 
 good Argument, that none of thefe particular 
 Senfes could continue in its prefent State, and 
 always communicate the fame Degree of Hap- 
 pinefs. Farther, this Supposition will appear 
 to be impoffible, from confidering.the Nature 
 and Properties of that Matter of which the 
 fenfitive Organs are compofed If there be (as 
 Bayle maintains) fo clofe a connexion between 
 the Soul and certain Modifications of Matter, 
 as that the Degrees of fenfitive Pleafure are di- 
 minifh'd by a Change in the Organ, by wea- 
 kening the Concuftion of fome parts of the 
 
 plainly impoffible, that the Tame Degrees fbould 
 be continued by this Organ, which, as it is 
 material, is perpetually expofed to this Change, 
 ind liable to Diflblutron, and necelfarily wea- 
 ken'd by thefe frequent Conct/JJtvns. Every Mo- 
 tion in it muft in time be ftop'd by contrary 
 ones, as our Author has fully fhewn in Chap. 
 4. V 1 . 
 
 If he fuppofes that the fame Degree of Plea- 
 fure may ftill be communicated tho' the Organ 
 liters, he fuppofes that there is no fuch Con- 
 nection between any portion or pofition of 
 Matter, and our Spirit; which is direftly con- 
 trary to his former Suppofition, and alfo to 
 Truth, as will perhaps appear from the fol- 
 lowing Chapter. If then Bayle imagines, thaf 
 the fame, or different Mater, when moved or 
 at reft ; or when moved in different Directions, 
 may ftill affeel the Mind in the very fame 
 manner, he mult either take it for granted that 
 the AffecYions of Matter are no Caufes of the 
 Senfations of the Mind, that is, contradict his 
 former Suppofition ; or elfe he muft fuppofe 
 the fame Effeft to proceed from different Cau- 
 fes ; either of which will tend equally to ad- 
 vance his Syftem. But in reality, this decreafe 
 of Pleafure in Familiarity and Cuftom, does 
 not entirely depend on any Change of the cor- 
 poreal Organs, but on the original Faculties of 
 the Soul itfelf, as may be gathered from fome 
 fuch Obfervations as this which follows. View 
 a delightful Landskip, a pleafant Garden, or 
 any of thofe Figures which appear moft beauti- 
 ful, renew the Profpeft once, or twice, to Day, 
 to Morrow, and at feveral diftant Periods ; it 
 fhall afford a great degree of Pleafure for fome 
 time, while any Novelty may be fuppofed to re^ 
 main ; but that Pleafure perifhes together with 
 
 this
 
 88 Of the Evil of VefrB. 
 
 by the Addition of certain Degrees, whereby the whole muft of Ne- 
 ceflity excell the Parts. As therefore we have proved, that an abfo- 
 lutely perfect Creature is an Impoflibility, fo it may be proved from 
 hence, that all cannot have an equal Degree of Perfection. For the 
 World confifts of Parts, and thofe again of others, perhaps divifible 
 in infinitum : but that every fingle Part mould have the Perfection of 
 
 all, 
 
 N O f E S. 
 
 this Novelty, tho' the external Organs of Vi- 
 fion itill continue perfect, and your Senfations 
 are moll evidently the fame the laft Day as the 
 flrft. You are able to behold the fame Scenes 
 over again, with the fame eafe and accutcnefs. 
 but not with the fame Intenfenefs of Delight 
 To attempt a Mechanical Solution of this by 
 a fuppofed alteration of fome imaginary Trace. 
 in the Brain (which yet, if they were allow'd, 
 cannot mend the matter a jot, as was juft now 
 (hewn) will only throw us into flill greater 
 difficulties, as any one that attentively confi- 
 ders the whole of that Chimerical Hypothecs, 
 mull conclude, and of which Bayle, who foon 
 perceiv'd the Defetts and Abfurdities of moil 
 other Syftems, was undoubtedly convine'd. It 
 feems to me much more properly refolvable 
 into a native Property of the Soul itfelf. Is it 
 not probable, th it the mind of Man is origi- 
 nally framed with an Appetite or Difpofition 
 for Variety? that it cannot be always on the 
 lime Bent, but as it is endow'd with different 
 Faculties fo thefe relieve one another by 
 turns, and receive an additional Pieafure from 
 the Xcvelty of thofe Objects about which it is 
 converfant; and that by this means it enjoys a 
 greater Sum of Happinefs than it could other 
 ways attain to ? See the Speftjtor, N. 600. 
 N*. 626. or N. 412. or Watti on the Paffions, 
 S- 4- 
 
 I (hall only add an Obfervation on this Head 
 from the ingenious Author of the Vindication tf 
 Gofs Mural Character, p 2 1 . which fhews us 
 the neceffity for this Variety or Increafablenefs 
 of Perfeftion, in order to our Intellectual Hap- 
 pinefs, fmce moll of that arifes from our paft 
 Defects. " By Intellectual Happinefs, / man 
 " the Difcovery and Contemplation of Truth, 
 " Kith regard to which I have this to obferve, 
 " that all the Pieafure s we tajle of this kind art 
 
 " owing either to our preceding Ignorance, to the 
 " care and Pains we take in the Difcovery of 
 " Truth, or to the Degree of our Knowledge, 
 ** when we attain to a greater merfure than 0- 
 " ther Men. All Truth, when confuier'd fepa- 
 " rate from thefe, is alike as Truth {tho not of 
 " the like Importance to uf) the Ob j eel of the U/t- 
 " derflandivg, and as filth, it muf} afford the 
 " fame Delight. If we all could, with equal eafe 
 '* and clearnefs, fee all the Relations of things, 
 " they muf} all in the nature of the thing equally 
 " off eel us. We pould tajle as much Pieafure M 
 " knozoing or contemplating that tzvo and two makes 
 " four, as in knowing or contemplating anyP ropofition 
 " which now appears the nufl difficult,*//*//^ affords 
 " the mojl Pieafure: or rather,- we fhould not 
 " have Pieafure from any of them. Now if this 
 " be the Cafe, then it is evident, that the 'Capa- 
 " city we have for tafling this kind of Pieafure, 
 " renders uj capable of its contrary. We could 
 " not be delighted in the Difcovery or Contempla' 
 " tion of Truth, if we were not capable of being 
 u ignorant, and of the Unhappine/s which arifes 
 "from it:'" 
 
 This is the Ccnfequence we would draw 
 from all that went before : but of this more at 
 large under the head of Moral Evil. 
 
 We reply then to Bayle, that this Alternative 
 or Variety of either Good or Evil, as far as 
 concerns the prefent Argument, is founded on 
 the Nature of the Subjecl which receives them, 
 and that our Soul in its prefent State, is not 
 fo fufceptible of them, after it has felt them 
 two or three times as at firft. What it might 
 have been made capable of, is nothing to the 
 Purpofe, fincc (as it was obferv'd before, and 
 muit often be repeated) we are to confider Man 
 as we find him at prefent ; and draw all our 
 Arguments, not frem fuch Faculties as are 
 
 per-
 
 
 Of the Evil of TtefetL 
 
 or many, 16 impoflible ; and we are not to arraign the Power or Good- 
 nefs of ( God for not working Contradictions. There muft then 'be 
 many, perhaps infinite (31.) Degrees of Perfection in the Divine 
 Works ; for whatever arifes from Nothing is neceiTarily imperfect ; and 
 the lefs it is removed from nothing (taking Exiftence for one Degree, 
 as we faid before) the more imperfect it is. There is no occafion 
 therefore for an Evil Principle to introduce the Evil of Defect, or an 
 Inequality of Perfections in the Works of God : for the very nature 
 of created Beings neceflarily requires it, and we may conceive the 
 place of this Malicious Principle to be abundantly fupplied from 
 hence, that they derive their Original from Nothings (32.). 
 
 V. Fifthly, 
 
 NGTES. 
 
 
 perhaps in other Beings, but, from thefe onl. 
 which we perceive and experience in him. If 
 thefe cannot be alter'd and improved confi- 
 ftently with each other *, nor fubjected to any 
 general Laws more fuitable to his prefent cir- 
 cumlta-nce?, and -productive of more good to 
 the whole Syftem f, then, all. Arguments built 
 on thts Topic againft the Divine Attributes, 
 mult fell to the Ground. Thefe and the like 
 Suppofitions therefore, viz. that the fame De-, 
 gree of Pieafure might be communicated to us fjc- 
 cefftveh for a hundred Years; if understood of 
 one uniform Caufe pi oducing it : That our Plea- 
 sures, meaning jenj.tive ones, might not depend 
 upon the Fibres of the Brain, and, That thefe 
 Fibres fhouid not ur,:r out ,;t all ||, or, if thefe 
 Fibres did not wear out, that the Pieafure 
 jkould never decay, are all unreafonable Suppo- 
 fitions : They offend againft the Rule laid 
 down above, and always to be remember'd, 
 of taking the whole of human Nature as it 
 is; of confidering our prefent Body and Spi- 
 rit, and the obvious Properties of each, and 
 the known Laws of their Union together. All 
 aich Objections therefore are befide the Que- 
 ltion ; and founded upon the old abfurdity of 
 reducing us to a different Clafs of Brings, 
 when (as will appear prefenrly) all conceiva- 
 ble Clares and Orders are already full. 
 
 Thus much for one Qnery about the. manner 
 of Creating things, viz. Whether any fhouid 
 have been fix'd immutably in a certain Degree 
 of Perfection : Our Author proceeds to exa- 
 mine the other, viz. Whether all things could 
 and ought to have been at firft created in the 
 fame Degree of Perfection ? 
 
 (31.) That is Indefinite, or greater than any 
 aflignable Number ; for neither the Univerfe 
 itfelf, nor any thing that belongs to it, can be 
 properly and abfolutely Infinite, as our Author 
 maintains in his Note F, and we have largely 
 proved from Cudzoerth, &c. in the -former 
 Chapter. 
 
 (32.) It is fcarce neceffary to obferve, that 
 this muft all along be underitood only Materi- 
 ally, i. e. that thefe things were not produced 
 from any matter pra-exiftent, but were made 
 kE ix, ieT&tf', and brought into Being from 
 mere Non-Exiflrnre. For the poffibility of 
 which, and the Opinion of the Antients on 
 this Subject, fee Cvd~i>tnh, C. 5. V 2. p. 738, 
 65V. The other Scnfes of the Words, viz. 
 That any thing can come from nothing, cau- 
 [ally, or be produced by nothing, or by itfelf % 
 or without an Efficient Caufe, arc manifeltly. ab- 
 furd, as is demonitrated at large in. the fanne. 
 excellent Seition. For an Illuftration of our. 
 Author's Notion before us, fee Scott's Chilian 
 
 . . .: *M 
 
 Ste Note 421 
 
 f- See Note 37. 
 
 N 
 
 See BayicV,'Z).:V?. r. 24.87.
 
 jo Of the Evil of 3)cfe3. 
 
 Things ne- V. Fifthly: 'Tis plain, that Creatures are not only unequally im^ 
 ceffarily are pcr f e ft ' m re fpect. f t h c ir Parti and Under-parts t and fo on, which 
 
 Ot UnCUQ.ll \ i rT i * /- t.' I 
 
 Pcrfeaions by continual Sub-divinon, approach in a manner to nothing; but a 
 with regard neC efTary inequality arifes among them alfo in refpect of their At- 
 tributes! but tributes. For a confcious or thinking Subflance is more perfect than 
 it is agrtea- ne that wants Senfe or Underftanding. If it be ask'd, How is it a- 
 h!jheft hc greeable to the Divine Goodnefs to have created thefe alfo ? I an- 
 Goodnefi to fwer, If the Creation of thefe be no impediment to the production 
 which arc" 6 ^ tne more perfect; if neither the Number nor Happinefa of the 
 lead perfect, more perfect be diminished by the Creation of thofe that are lefs per- 
 iftheyarenof e ft j why will it be unfit to create thefe too? Since God does 
 the number what is beft. to be done, nothing more or greater can be expected 
 orconveni- from the moft benevolent and powerful Author of Nature. If 
 Perfect therefore it be better, cater is paribus, that thefe more imperfect: Be- 
 ings fhould exirt, than not, it is agreeable to the Divine Goodnefs,, 
 that the bell that could be mould be done. If the Production of 
 a lefs perfect Being were any hindrance to a more perfect one, it 
 would appear contrary to the Divine Goodnefs, to have omitted the 
 more perfect and created the lefs ; but fince they are no manner of 
 hindrance to each other, the more the better, (33.). 
 
 VI, An 
 
 NOTE S. 
 
 more 
 ones. 
 
 fifty Part 2. Vol. 1. G. 6. V- 2. p. 446, 447. 
 I ft Edit. God is the Caufe of Perfeclion on- 
 " ly, but not, of" De fed, which fo far forth as 
 " it is natural to created Beings hath no Caufe 
 ** at all, but is merely. a Negation or Non-entity. 
 " For every created thing was a Negation or Non- 
 " entity before ever it had a poftive Being, and 
 *' it had only fo much of its primitive Negation 
 " taken away from it*, as it had poftive Being 
 " conferr'd upon it; and therefore, fo far forth 
 " a it is, its Being is to be attributed to the 
 *' Sovereign Caufe that produced it ; butfo.far 
 ** forth as it is not, its not being is to be at- 
 ** tributed to the Original Non-entity, out of 
 H which it was produced. For that which 
 ft was once. Nothing, would fill have been 
 *' Nothing, had it not been for the Caufe that 
 H gave Being to it, and therefore, that it is fo 
 *t far Nothing ftill, i. e. limited and defeclive, 
 * is. only to. be attributed to its own* primitive 
 
 " Nothingnefs.. As for inftance, If I give a 
 " poor Man a hundred pounds, that he is- 
 " worth fo much Money is wholly owing to 
 " me, but that he is not worth a hundred 
 " more, is owing only to his own Poverty, 
 ** and juft. fo, that I have fuch and fucb Per- 
 ,** fetlions of Being is wholly owing to God 
 '" who produced me out of Nothing; but 
 " that I have fuch and fuch Defecls of being, 
 " is only owing to that Non-entity out of which, 
 " he produced me."- 
 
 The fame Notion is alfo largely difcufs'd^ 
 in Eilhardi Lubini Phofphorus, cjfr. Chap. 6, 7, 
 and 17. From whom it appears, that moft 
 of the ancient Philofophers meant no more 
 than- this by their Evil Principle. 
 
 (33-) A good Illuftration of this occurs in 
 Dr. /. C/arie % s Difcourfe on Nat. Evil, p. 289, 
 ts"<. Now from the Suppolitioa of a Scale of 
 
 Beings
 
 Of the Evil ofDefcB. 9 1 
 
 VI. An Inftance will make this more clear, Suppofe that God This con- 
 made the World finite ; fuppofe that Spirits, or pure immaterial firm ' d ty a * 
 thinking Beings, are the mojl perfect Species of Subftances : fuppofe, u-^^ 
 in the laft place, that God created as many of this fort as were con- which is no 
 venient for the Syftem he had made, fo that if there were more, they J^EJ^g^ 
 would incommode one another j yet there would be no lefs Room rits. 
 for Matter, than if there were none at all. This Suppofition is by no 
 means abfurdj for fince thefe may be conceiv'd without local Exten- 
 Jion, and have no relation to Space or Place, as Bodies have * in what- 
 ever Number they were created, they would contribute nothing at all 
 
 N 2 either 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Beings gradualy defcending from Perfection to 
 Non-entity, and compleat in every intermediate 
 Rank and Degree (for which fee Note 35 ) we 
 fhall foon perceive the abfurdity of fuch Que- 
 flions as thefe, Why was not Man made more 
 perfedr ? Why are not his Faculties equal to 
 thofe of Angels ? Since this is only asking 
 why he was not placed in a quite different 
 Clafs of Being?, when at the fame time all o- 
 ther Gaffes are fuppofed to be already full. 
 From the fame Principle alfo, we gather the 
 Intent of the Creator in producing thofe fe- 
 vcral inferior Orders under our View. They 
 who imagine that all things in this World 
 were made for the immediate ufe of Man a- 
 lone, run themfejves into inextricable Diffi- 
 culties. Man indeed is the Head of this low- 
 er part of the Creation, and perhaps it was de- 
 fign'd to be abfolutely under his command. 
 But that all things here tend diredtiy to his 
 own ufe, is, I think, neither eafy nor ncceffa- 
 ry to be proved. Some manifeftly ferve for 
 the food and fupport of other?, whofe Souls 
 may be neceffary to prepare and preferve their 
 Bodies for that Purpofe, and may at the fame 
 time be happy in a Confcioufnefs of their own 
 Rxiftence. Tis probable, that they are inten- 
 ded to promote each others Good reciprocal- 
 ly : Nay, Man himfelf contributes to the Hap- 
 
 pinefs, and betters the Condition of the Brutes 
 in feveral refpedls; by cultivating and impro- 
 ving the Ground, by watching the Seafons, by 
 protecting and providing for them, when they 
 are unable to protect and provide for them- 
 felves ||. Others of a much lower Clafs, may, 
 for ought we know, enjoy themfelves too in 
 fome degree or other; and alfo contribute to 
 the Happinefs even of fuperior Beings, by a 
 difplay of the Divine Attributes in different 
 ways, and affording ample matter of Reflec- 
 tion on the various Ranks and Degrees of Per- 
 fection difcoverable in the animal World ; 
 wherein the higheft order may with pleafure 
 contemplate numberlefs Species infinitely be- 
 low them : and the lower Clafs can admire 
 and adore that Infinity of Divine Wifdom and 
 Goodnefs and Power which fhines forth in fo 
 many Beings vaftly above them. They may 
 conduce to the Beauty, Order, and Benefit of 
 the whole Syftem, the general Good of which 
 was the aim of its Creator, and with regard to 
 which, every part is chiefly to be efteem'd f. 
 They may have Ten thoufand Ufes befide what 
 relates to Man, who is but a very fmall part of 
 it : Several Inftances might be given, which 
 would make this very probable ; at leaft, the 
 contrary, I think, cannot ever be proved. Sec 
 C. 4. ^. 2. Subf. 4^ 5. 
 
 * See Note 13. 
 
 || See Chubb' s Supplement, c^r. p. \z\ and Dr. J Clarke, p. 284, 285. 
 
 f See Cudworth, p. 875, 876.
 
 9 0r Of the Evil of Defeft. 
 
 cither to the filling up of Space, or excluding. Bodies out of ir, yet 
 
 they would have a certain Sxjlem or Society among themitlves, which 
 
 mieht require a determinate Number, which if it were exceeded^ they 
 
 muft become troubleibme to one another, by too- great a. Multitude in. 
 
 a- fiiitte World. Nay, if the World Were iiippofed to be infinite, 
 
 and- as many fuch Spirits created as were pofiible, yet would they be 
 
 no impediment to Matter, nor xMattcr to them, neither would their 
 
 Number be leisj nor their Conveniences fewer, becaufe Matter did 
 
 or did not exift. Since then material, and immaterial Beings ccnfiit 
 
 fo well together, is it not agreeable to* the greateft Goodnefs to have 
 
 created both? Let Matter be ftupid and devoid of Senfe, as it is; 
 
 let it be the moft imperfect of all Subftances, and next to nothing, . 
 
 (f nee not to perceive its Exiftence is. little different from Non-exi- 
 
 flence) 'tis better to be even fo, than not at all; for Eyiftence is, as 
 
 we faid, the Foundation, or firft Degree of Perfection, and the next, 
 
 as it were, to this, the fecond, is perception of Exiftence. But you'll 
 
 fay, Why did not God add this fecond Degree to Matter ? I anfwer, 
 
 if that could, it is probable it would, have been done: But fince 
 
 we fee that Matter is in itfelf a paffive, inert Subftance, we muhV 
 
 believe that its Nature would not admit of Senfe, or if it had been 
 
 capable of Senfe, that greater Inconveniencies would have flow'd 
 
 from thence, than if it had been made infenfible, as it is, (34.). 
 
 However 
 
 NOTE S. 
 
 (34.) Matter, as fuch, is at present incapa- 
 ble of, or has Properties totally inconfiftent 
 with thought and felf-motion, (as is at large 
 demonstrated by the Authors referr'd to in 
 Note 13.) it is therefore in a Degree below 
 Animals, or (as our Author fays) next to No- 
 thing. But yet, fuch as it is, 'tis firft, ab- 
 solutely neceffary to many Animals, and fe- 
 <fndly, would not be. fo convenient fo their 
 ufcs, if it could think. It is the BJis or Sup- 
 pert of Animals in this our Syftem-; it is, as we 
 may fay, the cafe and covering of their feveral 
 Souls; it ferves for the clothing of that Cafe, 
 fcr their Fwd, thejr Defence, and various ufes, 
 
 But were it all Life, or confeious (not to in- 
 fill on the Absurdities of fuch a Supposition in 
 itfelf) what Mifery and Confufion would a- 
 rife? If all were Animals, what muft thefe 
 Animals fubfift on ? If they were q the fame 
 Nature with fuch as we are acquainted with, 
 fhey muft alfo be fuftain'd after the fame man- 
 ner, /. e. they muft live by Food, and confe- 
 quently live upon, and continually torment 
 and confume one another ; and confequently 
 more Happinefs would be loft than gorby fuch 
 Life, which is as plentiful at prefent *", as 
 feems agreeable to the Syftem. If Matter, as 
 Matter, were.endow'd with the Power of Self- 
 
 Mathri+ . 
 
 * &*Note 39;.
 
 Of the Evil of fkfefa. 
 
 93 
 
 Ti'o'ttzier, without this, there would be a kind oiVotdin t!5e Univerfe, 
 and fomething wanting which might exiit: bur it was better that 
 there mould be Matter than, nothing at all,., and fince one Side was to 
 be chofer>, the Divine Gbodnefs preferr'd Matter, . becaufe that was 
 the greater Good, For, fince it is no hindrance to the multiplica- 
 tion or convenience of thinking Beings, nor diminilhes the number of 
 the more perfect, 'tis plain it adds to the perfection of the Univerie, 
 and whatever it be, tho' the moffc imperfect thing in Nature, 'tis 
 gain to the whole. It was therefore agreeable to the greatefl Power 
 and Goodnefs to have created this alfo ; nor need we the Demiurgus 
 of the antient Heretics to produce it, as if unworthy of the great and 
 good God. The Evils of Imperfection then muft be permitted in 
 the Nature of things ; and inequality of Perfections mult be permit- 
 ted alfo, fince it is impoffibl'e that all the Wacks of God mould be 
 endow'd with equal Perfections. 
 
 VII. If you fay, God might have, omitted the more imperfect ' TisIefsai 
 Beings, I grant it, and if that had been beft he would undoubtedly fhTl)ivine 
 have done it. But it is the part of infinite Goodnefs to choofe the Goodnefs to 
 very belt j from, thence it proceeds therefore, that the more imperfect ^^^0 
 Beings have Exiftence; for it was agreeable to that, not to omit the hav'c created,, 
 very leaft Good which could be produced. Finite Goodnefs might . thefe re 
 poffibly have been exhaufted in creating the greater Beings, but Inji- \^ 
 nite extends to all. The infinite Power and Goodnefs of God then 
 were the Caufe why imperfect Beings had Exiftence together with 
 the more perfect. 'Tis plain therefore that the Syflem of the World, 
 may be. xhoJFork of a Deity, tho' it has this. Fault. Nay, that it was 
 
 N 3 created. 
 
 notes: 
 
 Motion, what ufe could we put if'to "? Whrt 
 clothing or Habitations ? What Jnftruments or 
 Uteiifils could we make of it? But this, I 
 think, needs no farther Explanation. Matter 
 then, in its prelent State, as united with, and 
 fnbfervient to, fuch Spirits as we conceive 
 ors to be, is in general more conducive to 
 the Good and Happinefs of the whole, than it 
 would be in any other conceivable manner of 
 Exiitence. To ask yet why fome certain Po- 
 tiona or Syftcms of it might not have been 
 
 made more perfect, or why it was not farther 
 fublimated, refined, and fo unaccountably mo- 
 dify'd, as to be render'd capable of Thought ; 
 is the abfurd Queftion above mend on' d, vix. 
 why was it not made fomething elfe, or remo-. 
 ved into a higher Clafs? when at the fame time 
 there appears Co much reafon for the Exiitence 
 of fuch a thing as this now is; and all the fu* 
 perior ClafTcs are concluded to be full. What 
 reafon there it for this laft conclufiofl may be 
 feen in the following Note.
 
 9 Of the Evil of T>cfaH. 
 
 created is evident for this very Reafon, becaufe it is imper/eft-, for if 
 it were Self-exiftent, it would be abfolutely perfeft. (35.) 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (3 v) The chief Argument of the foregoing 
 Chapter is beautifully illuftrated by Mr. Addi- 
 /fain the Spectator, N. 519. As frequent ufe 
 will be made of this Observation concerning 
 -the Scale of Beings, 1 hope the Reader will ex- 
 cufe my tranferibing fo much of the above men- 
 tion'd Paper as is neceiTary to explain it. 
 
 * Infinite Goodnefs is of fo communicative 
 ** a Nature, that it feems to delight in the con- 
 44 ferring of Exiflence upon every Degree of 
 44 perceptive Being. As 'his is a Speculation 
 * which I have often purfued with great 
 '* pleafure to my felf, I fhall enlarge farther 
 "" upon it, by confidering that part of the 
 * Scale of Beings which comes within our 
 44 Knowledge. There are fomc living Crea- 
 *' tures which are raifed juft above dead Mat- 
 44 ter. To mention only the Species of Shell- 
 44 Fim, which are formed in the fafhion of a 
 " Cone, that grow to the furface of feveral 
 44 Rocks, and immediately die upon their be- 
 " ing fever' d from the place where they grow. 
 ** There are many other Creatures, but one re- 
 44 move from thefe, which have no other Sen- 
 ' fes befides that of feeling and tafte. Others 
 " have Hill an additional one of Hearing . o- 
 44 thers of Smell, and others of Sight. It is 
 ** wonderful to obferve, by what a gradual pro- 
 * 4 grefs the World of Life advances thro' a pro- 
 ** digious variety of Species, before a Creature 
 ** is form'd that is compleat in all its Senfes ; 
 ** and even among thefe is fuch a different De- 
 n grce of Perfection, in the Senfe which one 
 44 Animal enjoys beyond what appears in ano- 
 44 ther, that tho' the Senfe in different Ani- 
 *' mals be diftinguifh'd by the fame common 
 44 denomination, it feems almoft of a different 
 44 Nature- If after this we look into the fe- 
 4 veral inward Perfections of Cunning and 
 44 Sagacity.or what we generally call Inftintt |), 
 41 we find them rifing after the fame manner 
 ** imperceptibly one above another, and re- 
 44 ceiving additionallmprovements according 
 M to the Species in which they are implanted. 
 
 '* This Progrefs in Nature is fo very gradual, 
 " that the moll perfeft of an inferior Species 
 " comes very near to the moftimperfett of that 
 " which is immediately above it. The exube- 
 t rant and overflowing Goodnefs of the fu- 
 " preme Being, whofe Mercy extends to all 
 *' his Works, is plainly feen, as I have before 
 *' hinted, from his having made fo little Mat- 
 A ter, at leaft what falls within our Knowledge, 
 ** that does not fwarm with Life: nor is his 
 " Goodnefs lefs feen in the Diverfity than in 
 ' the Multitude of living Creatures. Had he 
 " only made one Species of Animals, none of 
 '* the reft would have enjoy 'd the Happinefs 
 " of Exiftence, he has therefore fpecified in 
 * his Creation every Degree of Life, every 
 44 Capacity of Being. The whole Chafm in 
 ,4 Nature, from a Plant to a Man, is filled up 
 44 with diverfe kinds of Creatures, rifing one 
 ' over another, by fuch a gentle and eafy af- 
 44 cent, that the little tranfitions and devia- 
 * 4 tions from one Species to another, are al- 
 41 moft infenfible. This intermediate Space is 
 44 fo well husbanded and managed, that there 
 u is fcarce a Degree of Perfection which does 
 44 not appear in fome one part of the World of 
 " Life. Is the Goodnefs or Wifdom of the 
 44 Divine Being more manifefted in this his 
 44 Proceeding ? There is a Confequence, be- 
 41 fides thofe 1 have already mentioned, which 
 44 feems very naturally deducible from the fcre- 
 ' 4 going Confident! ons. If the Scale of Be- 
 14 ings rifes by fuch a regular Progrefs, fohigh 
 14 as Man, we may, by a parity of Reafon, fup- 
 44 pofe that it ftill proceeds gradually thro' 
 44 thofe Beings which are of a fuperior Nature 
 44 to him; fince there is an infinitely greater 
 t4 Space and Room for different Degrees of 
 44 Perfection between the Supreme Being and 
 44 Man, than between Man and the moft defpi- 
 44 cable Infeft. This Confequence of fo great 
 44 a variety of Beings, which are fuperior to 
 44 us, from that variety which "is inferior to us, 
 44 is made by Mr. Locke, in a paffage which I 
 
 44 fhall 
 
 || To which we may add, Will and Liberty. See Bayle'^ Did. p. 2609, 2610.
 
 Of the Evil apDefeSt. 
 NOTES. 
 
 95 
 
 " (hall here fet down, after having premifed, 
 " that notwithftanding there is fuch Infinite 
 " Room between Man and his Maker, for the 
 creative Power to exert itfelf in, it is im- 
 u poffible that it mould ever be filled up, fince 
 ** there will be itill an Infinite gap or diftance 
 " between the higheft created Being and the 
 " Power which produced him." 
 
 The fine PafTage there cited; from. Mr. Locke, 
 occurs in the 3d Book of his Effay, Chap. 6. 
 
 *. 12. 
 
 See alfo Notes 38, 39. 
 From the foregoing Obfervation, that there 
 is no manner of Cbafm or Void, no Link defi- 
 cient in this great Chain of Beings, and the 
 reafon of it, it will appear extremely proba- 
 ble alfo, that every diltinft Order, every Clafs 
 or. Species of them, is as full as the Nature of 
 it would admit, and God faw proper. There 
 are (as our Author fays) perhaps {o many in 
 each Clafs as could exilt together without fome 
 inconvenience or uneajinefs to each other. This 
 
 is eafily conceivable in Mankind, and may be 
 in fuperior Beings, tho\ for want of an exaft 
 knowledge of their feveral Natures and Orders, 
 we cannot apprehend the manner of it, or con- 
 ceive how they afFecl: one another ; oaly this 
 we are fure of. that neither the Species nor the 
 Individuals in each Species, can poflibly be In- 
 finite ; and that nothing but an ImpoJfibiTity in 
 the Nature of the thing, or fome greater incon- 
 venience, can reflxain the exercife of the Power 
 of God, or hinder him from producing ftill 
 more and more Beings capable of Felicity. 
 When we begin to enquire into the Number of 
 thefe and the Degrees of their Perfection, we 
 foon lofe ourfelves, and can only refer all to 
 the Divine Wifdom and Goodnefs: from our 
 previous Notices of which Attributes, we 
 have the higheft reafon to conclude, that eve- 
 ry thing is as perfect as poffible in its own 
 kind, and that every Syftem is in itfelf full; 
 and complete. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 9 6 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 s E c T. I. 
 
 Of Generation and Corruption, 
 
 A Creature I, tT appears from the foregoing Obfervations, that created Be- 
 pSnof ?m" * n S s mu ^ neceffarily be defective, i. e. fome mult want 
 
 F?te, tho'it JL the Perfections which others have, and that it was impoffible 
 beiefsperfaa f or mem to en j y either an abfolute or equal Perfection ; alfo, 
 
 that there is no occafion for an Evil Principle oppofite to Infinite 
 Goodnefs and Power. And from hence we may affirm, that God, 
 tho' infinitely good and powerful, could not feparate things from the 
 concomitant Evils of Imperfection, and did not efteem it unbecom- 
 ing himfelf to create the .Good, tho' that brought fome Evils along 
 with it, fo long as thefe Evils are lefs than the Good with which 
 they are connected. Nor can the Creature juftly complain of its 
 Condition, if it have not all, or equal Perfection, with fome others; 
 fince 'twas neceffary that it mould fill the Station wherein it was 
 placed, or none at all. This we have fhewn fufficiently, I think, in 
 the former kind of Evils, viz. thofe of lmperfeftion. 
 The Origin II. The fame muft be attempted in the fecond kind, viz. the Afa- 
 from'Maner/^^- Now, as all created Beings are made out of Nothing, and on 
 
 is the Source that 
 
 of Natural . 
 
 Evils, as their rife from Nothing is the Caufe of thofe of Imperfection,
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 97 
 
 that account are neceffarily imperfect ; fo all natural things have a re- 
 lation to, or arife from, Matter, and on this account are neceflarily 
 fubjected to natural Evils : nor is the rife of all created Beings from 
 Nothing a more fruitful and certain Caufe of the Evils of Imperfec- 
 tion, than the rife of all natural things from Matter is of natural 
 Evils, (36.). If therefore we can fhew that thefe Evils are fo necef- 
 farily connected with this Origin that they cannot be feparated from 
 it, it follows, that the Structure of the World either ought not to 
 have been framed at all, or that thefe Evils mud have been tole- 
 rated without any Imputation on the Divine Power and Goodnefs. 
 But k is better that they mould be as they are, fince they could 
 not be more perfect. Let us examine the particular Sorts of natural 
 Evils, and if there be nothing in them which could be removed 
 without greater damage to Nature, and introducing a larger train of 
 Evils, the Divine Goodnefs may fecurely applaud itfelf, lince it has 
 omitted no manner of Good, nor admitted any Evil which could 
 poffibly be prevented, /'. e. hath done in every thing what was 
 beft. 
 
 III. God has accomplim'd this in the Creation of Matter, as we Matter is 
 faid before, nor has he been lefs beneficent in what relates to the ufeiefs except 
 Motion of Matter. In the firft place, Matter, tho' in itfelf unactive, 'f have M - 
 is neverthelefs capable of Action, viz. local Motion, for Motion is the 
 Action that belongs to Matter. But 'tis better that it mould act as 
 far as it is capable, than be entirely ftill and fluggim: if it were 
 without Motion, rigid and fix'd in the fame place, we cannot con- 
 ceive what benefit it could be of either to itfelf or any thing elfe : 
 But when 'tis put into Motion, it may be of ufe, as is plain from 
 Experience, tho' not always without a Mixture of Evils : But Action 
 is, cceterh paribus, preferable to Inactivity; it is therefore agreeable 
 to the Divine Goodnefs to produce Motion in Matter, if the Good 
 
 arifing 
 
 NOTE S. 
 
 (36.) From hence it may be obferv'd, that 
 there was fomc Foundation for that old and al- 
 moin univerfal Notion, that all natural Evils 
 aroic from Matter) which in effeft they do, 
 
 but not from it as an eternal independent 
 Caufe, or the Evil Principle of the Manithces, 
 as will be fhewn below. See BayJe's Did. 
 p. 978. 
 
 o
 
 o8 Concerning Natural Ev':L 
 
 from thence do but over-ballance the Evil, fo long as no Evils are 
 permitted which are feparable from Motion, nor fuch as can affect 
 Spirits, which are purely immaterial. 
 Such Motion IV. Now, if it be granted that God could, confidently with his 
 wisVUnMat- Goodnefs, both create Matter and put it into Motion, it neceffarily 
 ter, as might follows, that its Motions mull interfere with one another. If you 
 Jcparate n f fty t h at ]yi atter might move uniformly and altoo-ether, either in a 
 
 into Parts. / . . O J . o # 
 
 Hence the airecl Ltne or in a Circle, and the contrariety of Motions by that 
 Generation means be prevented : I anfwerj The whole Mafs of Matter would be no 
 ofBo- P kfs rigid andufelefs with fuch a Motion as this, than if it were entirely 
 
 tion 
 
 dies natural- at reft; it would neither be more fit for Animals, nor more adapted to 
 the ufes which it now anfwers. Such a Motion therefore was to be 
 excited in it, as would feparate it into parts, make it fluid, and ren- 
 der it an Habitation fit for Animals. But that could not be without 
 contrariety of Motion, as any one that thinks of it at all will perceive : 
 and if this be once admitted in Matter, there neceffarily follows a Di- 
 vijion and Difparity of parts, Clajking and Oppojition, Comminution, 
 Concretion and Repuljion, and all thofe Evils which we behold in Ge- 
 neration and Corruption. God could indeed have removed all thefe 
 from Matter, by taking away its Motion, but they are either to be 
 tolerated, or Matter muft remain fix'd and immoveable in the fame 
 Situation. Some may afk, why God would not produce fuch Motion 
 in Matter as migh render all its Concretions fo perfect as not to be 
 liable to Diffolution or Corruption. For, fince the Power of God is 
 infinite, nothing on his fide hinders this from being done, what hin- 
 ders therefore on the fide of Matter ? I anfwer ; Its Motion and Di- 
 vifibility. For, if you fuppofe any fort of Motion in Matter, it 
 muft neceffarily be either ufelefs, as we faid before, or in oppojite Di- 
 rections. The mutual clafhing of thefe Concretions could therefore 
 not be avoided, and as they flrike upon one another, whether we 
 fuppofe them hard or foft, a concuffion of the parts, and feparation 
 from each other, would neceffarily be produced : But a Separation or 
 Diffipation of the parts is Corruption. This therefore could not be 
 avoided without violence done to the Laws of Motion and the Nature 
 of Matter, For, to hinder moveable things from interfering, and the 
 
 Parts,
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 99 
 
 Parts which are feparable in themfelves, from feparating fey mutual 
 repul/ions, would require a perpetual Miracle, (37.). 
 
 V. Secondly; Since it is proper that Matter mould be put into Mot}onundcr 
 Motion, 'tis better that this mould be done according to fome cer- certain Laws 
 tain Laws, and in an orderly Courfe, than at random, and as it were tenc j s mor f 
 by chance. For by this means, the Syftems compofed of Matter will nation of *' 
 have both more durable and more regular Periods. The firft Evil a- things, than 
 rifing from Matter was, we faid, the jarring of Elements; from It randan: 
 whence comes their Corruption and DifTolution, Inftability and Vicif- hence God 
 fitude. It may be furprifing, that all thefe mould proceed from a ?e" Bodies 1 " 
 ftable, fix'd and uniform Good. But we have made it appear, that into various 
 Matter could not move at all without thefe, and it was more eligi- s y ftcn - 
 ble that the World mould be liable to them, than deftitute of Ani- 
 mals. And that thefe Evils mould not multiply beyond Neceffity, 
 the Divine Goodnefs has taken care, by retraining its Motion under 
 certain Laws, fo as to make it fteady, and as conftant as could be ; 
 fo that the Machines compofed of it might be as little fhock'd with 
 contrary Motions as pomble, and endure for a long time ; nay, fome 
 of them in certain places and circumftances forever. For if no par- 
 cels of Matter were directed by any certain and determinate Rule, 
 fuch a confufed Motion would jumble every thing together, nor could 
 any thing laft for ever fo fhort a time. On this account God efla- 
 blifh'd certain Laws of Motion, and perpetual Rules ; and framed 
 
 O 2 the 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (37.) That is, there could be no general pre- 
 eltablifh'd Laws of Nature but God rauft conti- 
 nually intcrpofc, and effeft every thing by his 
 own dirett and immediate Power : The bad 
 confequenccs of which are very obvious. There 
 could be no Arts and Sciences, no Skill or Indu- 
 ftryi no regular Methods of providing for our 
 Bodies, or improving our Minds in the Know- 
 ledge of things. All which evidently prefup- 
 pofc, and are entirely founded on, fome fet- 
 tled, certain Laws of the Univerfe difcoverable 
 by us. 
 
 " We are fo far acquainted (fays the Author 
 " of the Religion of Nature Dclin. p. 96.) 
 
 " with the Laws of Gravitation and M tion, 
 " that we are able to calculate their Effects, 
 f and ferve ourfelves of them, fupplying up- 
 ' on many occafions the defect of Power in 
 " ourfelves by Mechanical Powers, which ne- 
 " ver fail to anfwer according to the Efta- 
 " bliihment, C5V." What the known Laws of 
 Nature are, fee in Cbeytie's Phil. Prin. Keil'a 
 Introd. to Phyf. &c. Concerning the neccflity 
 of the prefent Laws of Motion, and the fit- 
 nefe of them to attain the intended Ends, fee 
 Dr. J.Clarke on Natural Evil, p. 92, &c. and' 
 150,158.
 
 i oo Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 the great Mafs of Beings into certain Machines and Syftems, which 1 
 have fuch an exact correfpondence, as to contribute their mutual 
 Affiftance towards preferving die. Motion and Order prefcribed by the 
 Deity. Neither was it convenient that Matter mould every where- 
 confift of the fame kind of parts ; but rather that it mould be in one 
 place very fluid, fimilar and homogeneous, fuch as we believe the 
 /Ether to be j in another, folid and compact, as the Earth is, and per- 
 haps the Stars ; in another, mix'd with heterogeneous Particles, fuch 
 as we find the Air and Water. 
 
 VI. We muft confefs, that fuch a Mafs as the Earth is, feemsrnotT 
 LmLi'ht f beautiful, or fo fit for Motion, as the pure fluid ^Ether, 'tis alfo 
 and other more liable to Corruption and Changes; yet it is moft certain, that 
 K*nmen:i, the Earth was not.conftituted in this manner for no reafon at all, or 
 fcmofthu unneceffarily : perhaps the Mundane.. Syftem could no more confift 
 World is the without thefe folid Manes, than, the human Body without Bones. 
 
 oS b iauri? No fober Man doubts > but God could have dHpofed- this, Material 
 id. V/orld into other Syftems ; and of what kind foever thefe had been, 
 
 our Reafon could never have comprehended the contrivance of them. 
 For, fince our Planetary Syftem is incomprehensible to us, much more 
 will the Fabric of the whole Univerfe be fo ; but, as far as we do un- 
 derftand the difpofition of it, all is well, elegant and beautiful : and 
 if, among all the Phenomena of Nature, we were only acquainted 
 with Light, that would mew us ; the juft and admirable Structure o 
 it. It is reafonable therefore to believe, that this is the very beft, and 
 attended with the leaft Inconveniencies. 
 
 VII. You'll fay that fome particular things might have been bet- 
 affinnriut *** But, ^ nce y ou do not thoroughly underftand the whole, you 
 Mattermigbt have no right to affirm thus much. We have much greater Reafon 
 i'nrt better^ to P reujme > tnat no one part; of it. could be chang'd for the better, , 
 Syftems.fince without greater detrimentno the reft, which it would either be in- 
 wedonot CO nfiftent with, or difligure by its Difproportion *: For we have 
 derftand the fhewn before, that, all manner of Inconveniencies could not be a- 
 prefcnt, voided, becaufe of the Imperfection of Matter, and the Nature of 
 
 Motion. That State of things was therefore preferable, which was 
 attended 'with the feweft and leaft Inconveniencies. And who but a 
 very rafb> indifcreet Perfon will affirm, that God has not actually 
 
 made 
 
 S& Note, 42..
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 1^1 
 
 made choice of this ? Nay, who can do it with any fhadow of Rea- 
 fon, unlefs he throughly underftands both this and that other which 
 he would prefer to it? Whoever pronounces upon them before this, 
 gives Sentence before he has look'd into the Caufe, and is at the fame 
 time both a partial and an incompetent Judge. 
 
 It concerned us the more to have this well explain'd, that being con- 
 vinc'd of the Convenience or Meliority of the whole Material Syftem, 
 we may more eafily perceive the Origin of thofe Evils which neceflariiy 
 follow fromthe Contrariety of Motion, and the Corruption of things. 
 
 S E C T. n. 
 
 Concerning Animals and the Variety of them. 
 
 Ti Qlnce Matter is not Self-confcious, nor able to enjoy itfelf, norca- Ma " er doe * 
 O pable of receiving any benefit from itfelf, it follows, that it be made for 
 was not made for itfelf, but for fomething elfe, to which it was to its own fake, 
 be fubfervient in Senfation, Thought, or Fruition. We find by Expe- sdf confcu 
 rience, that Matter can be thus ferviceable to a thinking Being, tho > ous, , tisthere- 
 ftupid and infenfibk itfelf: 'Tis probable therefore that God defign'd^^f^ ' 
 and diredted all Matter to this end as far as was poflible. Hence of Animals. 
 comes the Union of fenfible and thinking Beings with the Particles 
 of Matter, as we experience in ourfelves. The fame may be faid of 
 all its parts, as far as the order and constitution of things allow'd. 
 There is nothing therefore in vain, nothing idle, nor any Region with- 
 out its Animals. For fuppofing, as we faid, fo many pure Spirits, fe*- 
 parate from Matter, to be made as were convenient ; as thefe occupy' 
 no. Place.*, there would be no lefs Room for other thinking fenfible:- 
 
 O 3. SuManceS'
 
 103 
 
 'Tis provable 
 th.it Animals 
 vary accor- 
 ding to the 
 variety of 
 thole regions 
 which they 
 are deflin'd 
 to inhibit : 
 Therefore 
 the .flither 
 and Air, in 
 all probabi- 
 lity, have 
 their proper 
 inhabitants, 
 as well as the 
 Earth. 
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 Subftances devoid of Matter to exercife their Faculties, and enjoy 
 themfelves, which for the future let us call Souls, (38.). 
 
 II. Now, fince the Structure of this vifible World confifts of vari- 
 ous Bodies, viz. pure ./Ether, Air, Earth, &c. 'tis highly probable, as 
 we faid before, that each of thefe has its proper Inhabitants, viz. by 
 the Union of Souls with the Particles of Matter. Without fuch an 
 Union, we cannot apprehend how there fhould be either ^Ethereal or 
 Aerial Animals. For the moft fluid 3odies, if not united to an im- 
 material Soul, or compacled'fogether, would be immediately difTolv'd, 
 and every blaft of Wind would diffipate fuch Animals: either then 
 thefe vafl Fields of Air or ./Ether muft be entirely deftitute of Inhabi- 
 tants, which very few will believe, who behold every clod of Earth 
 ftock'd with Animals, or furninYd after fome fuch Manner as We 
 
 con- 
 
 N O <T E S. 
 
 (38.) " God, if he pleafed, could have made 
 ,c nothing but immortal Spirits: and he could 
 *' have made as many of thefe as there are indi- 
 " vidual Creatures of all forts in the World j 
 * but it feem'd good to the wife Architect, to 
 " make feveral Ranks and Orders of Beings, 
 " and to difplay his Power and Goodnefs and 
 " Wifdom, in all imaginable variety of Crea- 
 '* tures ; all which fhould be good in their 
 " kind, tho' far fhort of the perfection of An- 
 *' gels, a?.d immortal Spirits. He that will 
 * build a Houfe for all the Ufes and Purpofes 
 " of which an Houfe is capable, cannot make 
 ** it all Foundation, and great Beams and 
 * Pillars; muft not fo contrive it, as to make 
 ** it all Rooms of State and Entertainment : 
 ** but there muft of neceflity be in it meaner 
 * Materials, Rooms, and Offices, for feveral 
 " ufes and purpofes, which, however inferior 
 " to the reft in Dignity and Degree, do yet 
 u contribute to the beauty and advantage of 
 " the whole : So in this great Frame of the 
 " World, it was fit there fhould be variety 
 " and different Degrees of Perfection in the 
 11 feveral parts of it: and this is fo far from 
 " being an impeachment of the Wifdom and 
 M Goodnds of him that made it, that it is an 
 
 " evidence of both. For, the meaneft of all 
 " God's Creatures is good, confidering the 
 " Nature and Rank of it, and the end to which 
 ' it was defign'd; and we cannot imagine 
 ; * how it could have been order'd and framed 
 " better, tho' we can eafily tell how it might 
 " have been worfe : and that if this or that had 
 * been wanting, or had been otherwife, it had 
 " not been fo good ; and thofe who have been 
 " moft conversant in the contemplation of na- 
 4 ture, and of the Works of God, have been 
 " moft ready to make this acknowledgment *, 
 * But then if we confider the Creatures of 
 '* God with relation to one another, aud with 
 '* regard to the whole frame of Things, they 
 ** will all appear to be very good ; and not- 
 ** withftandtng this or that kind of Creatures 
 " be much lefs perfedl than another, and there 
 " be a very great diftance between the Per- 
 ** feftion of a Worm, and of an Angel, yet 
 " confidering every thing in the fame Order 
 " which it hath in the Creation, it is as good 
 ** as could be, confidering its Nature and 
 " Ufe, and the Place allotted to it among the 
 "Creatures." lillotfon, Serm. 91. p. 683. 
 Vol. 2. Fol. See alfo Ray on the Creation, 
 Part 2. P.4Z3. 4th Edit. 
 
 v. g. Boje, Wilkim, Cbeyne, Derbam, Grew, Ray, Newentyt, &c.
 
 Concerning Natural EiiL 
 
 o 
 conjecture. (39.) If you fay 5 here's Room for pure Spirits, I an- 
 fwer; Since thefe do not fill up Place, nor have any Relation to it, 
 'tis the fame thing wherever they be, and Material Subftances have 
 nothing at all to do with them : It is not therefore neceiTary to fup- 
 pofe fuch large tracts of Air or ^ther void of Animals, in order to 
 make Room for thefe, for which it would be no lefs commodious, 
 if repleniuYd with, than if deftitute of Animals. If then this be gran- 
 ted us, we mufl affirm, that there is as great variety of Souls, as of 
 Animals, and that it is one Species which exerts its Operations by the 
 help of ^Ethereal Matter, and another which ftands in need of Ae- 
 real, and a third of Terreftrial. Neither will every Element be fit 
 for every Animal, but each will have its proper Inhabitants: Nor can- 
 there be any jufr. caufe of Complaint that they are uneafy out of their 
 proper Element, that Men cannot live any while commodioufly in 
 -/Ether, nor perhaps ./Ethereal Animals upon the Earth : For 'tis furli- 
 
 eient 
 
 10? 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (39.) We have a beautiful Defcription of 
 what our Author here conjectures, in the Spec- 
 tator, N. q 1 9. " If we confider thofe parts 
 " of the Material World which lye the near- 
 " eft to us and are therefore fubjedl to our 
 " Obfervations and Enquiries, it is amazing 
 ** to confider the Infinity of Animals with 
 m which it is ftock'd* Every part of Matter 
 " is peopled; every green Leaf fwarms with 
 " Inhabitants. There, is fcarce a {ingle hu- 
 ** mour in the Body of a Man, or of any o- 
 " ther Animal, in which our GlafTes do not 
 " difcover myriads of living Creatures. The 
 " Surface of Animals is alfo covered with o- 
 *' ther Animals, which are, in the fame man- 
 " ner, the Bafis of other Animals that live up- 
 " on it ; nay, we find in the moft folid Bodies, 
 * as in Marble itfelf, innumerable Cells and 
 *' Cavities that are crowded with fuch imper- 
 M ceptible Inhabitants, as are too little for the 
 M naked Eye to difcover. On the other hand, 
 " if we look into the more bulky parts of 
 " Nature, we fee the Seas, Lakes and Rivers, 
 *' teeming with numberlefs kinds of living 
 " Creatures: we find every Mountain and 
 u Marfh, WUdernefs aiid Wood, plentifully 
 
 " ftocked with Birds and Beafts, and every 
 " part of Matter affording proper necefiaries 
 ' and conveniences for the Livelihood of Mul- 
 ** titudes which inhabit it. The Author of 
 " the Plurality of Worlds draws a very good 
 '** Argument from this Confideration, for the 
 " peopling of every Planet ; as indeed it feems 
 ** very probable from the analogy of Reafon, 
 " that if no part of Matter which we are ac- 
 " quainted with, lies wafte and ufelefs, thofe 
 " great Bodies which are at fuch a diftancc 
 " from us, fhould not be defart and unpeopled, 
 " but rather that they fhould be furnifhed 
 " with Beings adapted to their refpective Si- 
 ' tuations. Exigence is a Bleffing to thofe Be- 
 M ings only which are endowed with Percep- 
 " tion, and is in a manner thrown away upon 
 " dead Matter, any farther than as it is fubfer- 
 " vient to Beings which are confeious of their 
 " E'xiftence. Accordingly we find, from the 
 " Bodies which lie under our Obfervatidn, 
 " that Matter is only made as the Bafis and- 
 " Support of Animals, and there is no more of 
 " the one than what is necefTary for the Exi* 
 " ftence of the other." See alfo Dr. Scott's 
 Works, Vol. 2. Difcourfe 1$, p. 308, ci)V.. Fol.
 
 'io4- 
 
 The Earth, 
 
 -Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 cient if- every one nourifhes its proper Inhabitants, according to the 
 Nature and Constitution of each. 
 
 III. That is a foolifh Objection therefore of the Epicurean Lucre- 
 aVbeing 'the tius (40.), that the World owes not its Original to a Divine Power and 
 ]rt part oi Goodnefs, becaufe Mountains, Woods and Rocks, large Fenns, and 
 Syrtcm, \l the Ocean cover fo great a fhare of it ; that the burning beat, viz. of 
 not to be tne horrid Zone, and the eternal Froji, viz. of the two Frigid, take up 
 dedf i^yll' almoft two Parts of it; fince the Sea, the Rocks, Winds, and Moun- 
 is not made tains, are not entirely ufelefs in their prefent Situation j for this was 
 l ofeo PUr "h requifite f r tne gd of the Univerfe, and the order of the Mun- 
 out defign. dane Syftem. Neither was the Earth or its Inhabitants to be regard- 
 ed in the nrfl place. For, fince it is but a fmall Part of the whole, 
 and almoft a Point, where would have been the Wonder if it had 
 not been fit for any Inhabitants at all ? if it did but promote the 
 good of the whole, while itfelf was barren and empty. If this had 
 been the Cafe, it would not have proved an ufelefs part of the World, 
 any more than a Nail is of a Man's Body ; and it is as abfurd to de- 
 lire that all parts of the Univerfe fhould immediately afford Habi- 
 tation to Animals, as that every Part and Member of an animated Bo- 
 dy fhould by itfelf conftitute an Animal ; 'tis furricient if every par- 
 ticular Member confpire with the reft, and exercife its own proper 
 Function, and confequently that the Earth, which is a member of the 
 Univerfe, have its -peculiar ufe in promoting the Good of the whole. 
 If therefore the whole Earth was ferviceable, not to preferve Ani- 
 mals, but only Motion, nothing could be objected from thence a- 
 gainft the Goodnefs of its Author. Neither would it appear ft range to 
 any that confiders the Immenfity of the Works of God, and how mi- 
 nute a Portion of them the Earth is, if it were entirely deftitute of 
 Inhabitants: nor would it therefore be in vain. How much more 
 then may we admire the Goodnefs and Wifdom of God therein, who 
 has nll'd.the whole and every part of it with Life. 
 
 IV. He 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (40.) See Dr. Bent ley's Eighth Serm. ^. 10. 
 p. 329. 5th Edit, or Bates on the Exiftcnce if 
 GU, Sec. Ch. J, 2, and 3. or Cukburn's Efftys, 
 
 ill Part, TfT. 7. par. 5, b'r. and 2d Part, Efr.4. 
 par. 5, sV. and the Authors mentioned in 
 Note 42.
 
 CQncerning Natural Evil. j Q c 
 
 IV. He knew beft what Creatures every part of It was fit for, and The Earth 
 has aflign'd to each its proper place, as is evident to every Obferver : m fy ^ e con - 
 The Mountains, the Woods, the Rocks, the Seas, have their proper wLeHn 
 Inhabitants, which they fupply with Nourifhment. The Syftem ofthisAuto- 
 of the World required a Globe of folid Matter fuch as the Earth is, ^ d f the 
 and we have reafon to believe that this is, as it were, a Wheel in the without 
 great Automaton, without which its Motion would be very imperfect. JJjJjjj* lts 
 But befides this principal End, the Divine Wifdom faw that it might would be de- 
 ferve for Nutriment to feveral kinds of Animals, that no manner of ': eai Y e: *. n thc 
 Good therefore might be omitted which was confident with the pri- a ff JdT a n 
 mary End, he filled it with all thofe Animals that it was capable of, habitation 
 nor could the Earth afford Suftenance to any fuperior or more proper A n nim s . t0 
 Beings. God has given thofe parts to the Brutes which were unfit for 
 Men ; and that thete might be nothing ufelefs, which yet could not 
 be alter'd without detriment to the whole, he has adapted Animals to 
 every Part and Region of it; and fince the Habitations could not 
 conveniently be converted into any other form, he provided fuch Ani- 
 mals as wanted, and were agreeable to thefe Habitations. Hence 
 Mountains, Woods and Rocks give Harbour to wild Beafts, the Sea 
 to Fifties, the Earth to Infects. Neither ought we to complain that 
 the whole Earth is not of ufe to Man, fince that was not the princi- 
 pal End it was made for, but on the contrary, Man was for this rea- 
 fon placed upon the Earth, becacfe it afforded a convenient Recepta- 
 cle for him. And what if it had been totally unfit for Man ? Would 
 it therefore have been in vain ? By no means. On the contrary, we 
 are certain that God would have given it other Inhabitants, to whofe 
 Maintenance it might have been fubfervient. (41.) 
 
 V. Thofe 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (41.) Our Author's Argument here might be 
 carry 'd much farther, and the Infinite Wifdom 
 of the Creator demonstrated, not only from his 
 having made nothing in vain, or ufelefs in it- 
 ft If, but alfo from the diftindi and various rela- 
 tions which every thing bears to ethers, and 
 its contribution to the good of the whole : 
 
 from the double, the manifold apparent Vfes of 
 almoft every thing in Nature. 
 
 Thus thc Mountains mention'd in the Ob- 
 jection of Lucretius, and which many Moderns 
 alfo have mifreprefented as deformities of Na- 
 ture, have not only their own peculiar Inha- 
 bitants *, but alfo aiford to other Animals the 
 
 moft 
 See V 5. par. 7. of this Chap, or DerhamV Phyfcofheof. B. 3. C. 4. 
 
 P
 
 ic6 
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 Man alone, 
 but for the 
 Univerfc: 
 to think o- 
 therwife fa- 
 vours of hu- 
 man pride. 
 
 V. Thofe therefore who urge the Unfltnefs of certain Parts of the 
 made^wfor 5 Earth for the Suftenance of Man, as a Fault and Defect of the Di- 
 vine Skill in making them, are oblig'd to prove that the Earth was 
 made for the fake of Mankind only, and not of the Univerfe, and 
 that every thing in the World is ufelefs which does not immediately 
 tend to the Ufe of Man. But this is abfurd, and what no one would 
 object, who is not blinded with Pride and Ignorance -f. We ought 
 rather to admire the Power and Goodnefs of God, who has fo tem- 
 per'd his Works, tho' they be immenfe and infinitely various, that 
 there is nothing in them which exifts not in the very beft manner 
 with refpecl to the whole^ and which he has not replenifh'd with its 
 proper Inhabitants. And fince the Variety of the conftituent Parts 
 and Regions of the Earth is no greater than the Nature of the whole 
 
 Machine 
 
 N E S. 
 
 moft commodious Harbour and Maintenance, 
 the beft Remedies and Retreats. To them Ave 
 owe the moft pleafant Profpefts, the moft deli- 
 cious Wines, the moft curious Vegetables, the 
 richeft and moft ufeful Metals, Minerals, and 
 other Foffils ; and, what is more than all, a 
 wholfome Air, and the convenience of navi- 
 gable Rivers and Fountains. 
 
 The Ocean, befides the fupport of its own 
 Inhabitants (which are, in all probability, as 
 numerous and various as thofe of the Earth) 
 provides alfo vaft Quantities of Vapours, which 
 refrefh and fructify the Earth itfelf, and nou- 
 rifh and fupport its Inhabitants, producing 
 Springs, Lakes and Rivers. The leffer Seas, 
 Jfenns and Lakes, are fo admirably well diftri- 
 buted throughout the Globe, as to afford fuffi- 
 cient Vapours for Clouds and Rains to temper 
 the Cold of the Northern Air, to cool and mi- 
 tigate the Heats of the Torrid Zone, and re- 
 fresh the whole Earth with fertile Showers: 
 As is fully proved by the excellent Author a- 
 bove mention'd*. 
 
 As to the variety of Ufes which the fame 
 thing is render'd capable of, and manifeftly de- 
 fign'd for, by its All-wife Author, fee the in- 
 genious S. C's Impartial Enqt.iry into the Exi- 
 gence, Sec. of God, p. 80. " To obtain a great 
 
 f See "Note 33. 
 
 * Fbrf# Theel. B. 2. C. 5. 
 
 ' number of Ends by as few means as may be, 
 " is the higheft point of Wifdom. But nothing 
 " can be imagin'd more admirable in this re- 
 45 fpect, than the prefent frame of things. Thus 
 ** tho' the human Body is compofed of a great 
 {i variety of Parts, yet how much more nurae- 
 ,'* rous are their Ufes? How many are the U- 
 ** fes of the Hand, which directed by Rea* 
 ** fon is infteadof all other Jnftruments ? How 
 " many Advantages do we owe to the Eye, the 
 * Ear, and the Tongue ? And if we take a 
 ** deeper View, and look into the minuter parts 
 ** of which thefe are compounded, what can be 
 " more admirable than the Variety of Aims 
 " and Intentions that may be obferv'd in 
 ** each ? The feveral Ufes of the Structure 
 " and Pofition of each ftngle Mufcle have 
 ,." been computed by Galen in his Book de For- 
 <* tnatione Foetus, to be no lefs than ten. The 
 like may be obferv'd with reference to the 
 f* Bones and other fimilar Parts, but efpecially 
 " with refpeel to the Members of fuch as are 
 " heterogeneous or diffimular." p. 81. 
 
 The fame is fhewn at large by Dr. Grew, 
 Cofmologia Sacra, B.i. C 5. par. 13, 14, &c. 
 or W. Scott on the Wifdom and Goodnefs of God, 
 Serm. 1. p. 15, cjfr. or Wilkin* Princ, of Nati 
 R elig. C 6.
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 Machine required, nor the Species of Animals fewer than the Food 
 would fupply, we mull conclude that there is nothing deficient or 
 redundant in it. (42.) 
 
 P 2 SECT. 
 
 io7 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (42.) Hence I think we may fafely conclude 
 with our Author in general, that there could 
 have been no partial alteration of this Syftem 
 but for the worfe, as far as we know, at leaft 
 not for the better. They who hold that there 
 might have been a total one, that the whole 
 Scheme of things might poffibly have been al- 
 ter'd or revers'd, and that either the direct: 
 contrary, or a quite different One, would have 
 been equally, or more worthy of God ; the 
 Men, I fay, that hold this, are oblig'd to 
 fhew the poffibility of conceiving it, and to 
 explain the manner how it may be, before we 
 are oblig'd to believe them. They muft fhew, 
 (hat the fame things which are now conducive 
 to our Happinefs, and confequently the Ob- 
 jects of out Love, might as eafily have tended 
 to our Mifery ; and confequently have been as 
 reafonably the Objects of our Averfion ; that 
 bitter might have been fweet, and fweet bit- 
 ter ; that the fame Paffions, Objects, Exercifes, 
 and Inclinations, csV. which now create Plea- 
 fure in us, might have produced a different, a 
 quite contrary effect, or no effect at all. This 
 they are oblig'd to do, and when they have 
 done all this, and completed their Syftem, and 
 made a total alteration of things, as they ima- 
 gine, for the better, they are at la ft only got 
 to the above mention'd abfurdity of putting 
 this Syftem into a higher Clafs, whereas all the 
 different Claffes in every conceivable Degree 
 of Perfection, were fuppofed to be entirely fil- 
 led at the firft. We muft therefore take things 
 as they are, and argue only from the prefent 
 Nature of them, collectively. In which View 
 we (hall find no poffible alteration of any thing 
 but what would produce greater Inconvenien- 
 ces, either in itfelf or others, to which it bears 
 a ftrict Relation. Inftances of this kind are 
 every where to be met with : particular proofs 
 of it in the natural World, occur in Dr. Ben- 
 
 tley's Boyle's Left, particularly with regard to 
 the five Senfes of the human Body, p. 95, 96. 
 fee alfo Locke on Humane Under/landing, B. 2. 
 C. 23. V 12. with refpect to the figure and 
 ftature of it, in Grac's Cofmokgia Sacra, B. ! 
 C. 5. .25, fff. and as to the feveral Parts of 
 it all over Boyle, Cheyne, Derham, Newentyt, 
 Ray, Cockburn, Edwards, W. Scott, or Petting. 
 
 The fame might eafily be fhewn in the im- 
 material World, and in the moft exceptionable 
 Part of it; viz.. the Soul of Man, its Know- 
 ledge, Freedom, Affections *. 
 
 On this occafion I fhall take the liberty to 
 borrow a Section from Mr. Maxwell's general 
 Remarks on Cumberland, C. 5. " The Nature 
 " of things in the natural World is fo exactly 
 " fitted to the natural Faculties and Difpofitions 
 " of Mankind, that were any thing in it other- 
 " wife than it is, even in Degree, Mankind 
 *' would be lefs happy than they now are. 
 11 Thus the dependence of all natural Effects 
 " upon a few Jimple Principles, is wonderfully 
 " advantageous in many refpedts. The De- 
 " grees of all the fenfible Pleafures are exactly 
 " fuited to the ufe of each : fo that if we en- 
 M joy'd any of them in a greater degree, we 
 " fhould be lefs happy ; for our Appetites of 
 ** thofe Pleafures would by that means be too 
 " ftrong for our Reafon ; and, as we are fra- 
 " med, tempt us to an immoderate enjoyment 
 " of them, fo as to prejudice our Bodies. And 
 M where we enjoy fome of them in fo high a 
 ** degree, as that it is in many cafes very diffi- 
 " cult for the ftrongeft to regulate and mode- 
 " rate the Appetites of thofe Pleafures, it is in 
 *' fuch Inftances where it was neceffary to coun- 
 " terpoife fome difadvantages, which are the 
 u confequences of the purfuit of thofe Plea- 
 ,c fures. Thus the pleafing Ideas which ac- 
 * company the Love of the Sexes, are neceffa- 
 
 M Iy 
 
 * See Sir M. Hale'; Prim. Orig. ofManh. C. 2. De Homine> p. 52.
 
 io8 
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 NOTES. 
 
 ry to bc'poflefs'd in fo high a degree, to bal- 
 lance the Cares of Matrimony, and alfo the 
 Pains of Child-bearing in the Female Sex. 
 The fame may be faid of our Intellectual 
 Pleafures. Thus did we receive a greater 
 Pleafure from Benevolence, Sloth would be 
 '* encouraged by an immoderate Bounty. And 
 * were the Pleafures of our Inquiries into the 
 ** Truth greater, we fhould be too fpeculative 
 
 * and lefs active. It feems alfo probable, that 
 ** the Degree of our Intellectual Capacity is 
 ** very well fuited to our Objedts of Knowledge, 
 * and that had we a greater degree thereof, all 
 " other things remaining as they are, we fhould 
 ** be lefs happy. Moreover, it is probably fo 
 "adapted to the inward frame of our Bodies, 
 that it could not be greater, without either 
 
 * an alteration in the Laws of Nature, or in 
 * the Laws of Union between the Soul and 
 u Body. Farther ; were it much greater than 
 " it is, our thoughts and purfuits would be fo 
 ** fpiritual and refin'd, that we fhould be taken 
 * too much off from the fenfible Pleafures. 
 * We fhould probably be confcious of fome 
 * Defecls or Wants in our Bodily Organs, and 
 <* would be fenfible that they were unequal to 
 fo great a Capacity, which would neceffarily 
 * be follow'd by uneafinefs of Mind. And 
 
 * this feems to hold in the Brute Creation : 
 1 For, methinks it would be for the difadvan- 
 4 J tagc of a Horfe to be endued with the Un- 
 
 " derftandingof a Man : fuch an unequal U- 
 a nion muft be attended with continual difquie- 
 *< tudes and difcontents. As for our Pains, 
 " they are all either Warnings againll Bodily 
 " Diforders, or are fuch as, had we wanted 
 cc them, the Laws of Nature remaining as they 
 ** are, we fhould either have wanted fome Ple:i- 
 " fures we now enjoy, or have poflefs'd them 
 " in a lefs degree. Thofe things in Nature 
 " which we cannot reconcile to the foregoing 
 " opinion, as being ignorant of their Ufe, . 
 " we have good reafon from Analogy to be- 
 " lieve, are really advantageous, and adapted 
 " to the Happinefs of Intelligent Beings of the 
 Syftem : tho* we have not fo full and com- 
 " plete a Knowledge of the entire Syftem, as 
 " to be able to point out their Particularities. 
 " From thefe Obfervations we may conclude, 
 " that all the various Parts of our Syftem are 
 " fo admirably fuited to one another, and the 
 " whole contrived with fuch exquifite Wif- 
 " dom, that were any thing, in any part there- 
 " of, in the leaft otherwife than it is, without 
 " an alteration in the whole, there would be a 
 " lefs Sum of Happinefs in the Syftem than 
 " there now is.'" 
 
 See alfo the Ingenious Author of the Nature 
 and Conducl of the PaJJions, p. 179, 201, 202. 
 
 But this will be more fully confidered in 
 the 4th Seftion. 
 
 SECT.
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 109, 
 
 SECT. IIL 
 
 Qf Death.. 
 
 'Ti . probable 
 
 I. T X 7 E know by Experience, that Souls united to Bodies move that the Soii- 
 VV them fome wav or otKer : viz. by Thought and Volition : i 1 v of . ^ 
 
 /"ui ''a 1/111 y> r Bodies is the 
 
 for thus we move our own. And 'tis probable, that the Gravity, oo- C aufe why 
 lidity, and Hardnefs of our Bodies, together with the Refiftence of we can " ot 
 the adjacent ones, are the Caufes why we cannot move them every way whTherwe. 
 as we pleafe. pieafe. 
 
 II. A Soul then united to a portion of ./Ethereal, uniform, and p er ~ ASo , v ' 
 fectly fluid Matter, free from the Impediment of Gravity and Refi- te d to a P or- 
 ftence, may in all probability move its Body whiiherfoever it pleafes. tio f ^-the- 
 Such a Body therefore would be perfectly obfequious to the thought 5* ca ^ er ' 
 and will of the Soul that inhabits it: and if it receiv'd any detrimentjnoye it 
 from the neighbouring Bodies, it could repair it by its Will alone ; ^"^^ 
 at leaft fo long as the ^ther continued in its Fluidity and Purity. Un-prefeVve its 
 lefs the Animal therefore will'd the contrary, its Body would be incor- u " n h& 
 ruptible^ and always fit for Union, /. e. immortal. If any one object, * he e re 
 that the Bodies of the Bleiled, which we call Cceleftial, need no Mo- immortal. 
 tion or Change of Condition, fince they enjoy continual Pleafure ; for 
 no one moves or changes his State, but in order to remove fome prefent 
 Uneafinefs. I anfwer ; Thefe Bodies are not therefore immortal be- 
 caufe they are naturally incorruptible (for that would be incompatible 
 with the Nature of that Matter whereof they are compofed) but be- 
 caufe they are put into fuch Places and Circumftances by the Deity, , 
 that they can, even with Pleafure, forefee and prevent all fuch things 
 as might tend to introduce either Corruption or Pain. Neither does 
 their Pleafure or Happinefs confift in Reft properly fo call'd, but in; 
 Activity, in fuch Acts and Exercifes of their Faculties as they choofe: 
 Now, fince they may exercife-themfelves perpetually according to their 
 
 awn 
 
 re is
 
 I 10 
 
 "Concerning Natural Evrl. 
 
 own Choice, and there is nothing to hinder them, they may be perpe- 
 tually happy j as will be declared below. All which are different in 
 folid Bodies. 
 , f III. We cannot certainly determine what Life is in thefe Animals 
 atcrreiir'al which have folid Bodies, but we fufficiently apprehend where it is, 
 Animal is a from certain Marks and Tokens. For where there is a circular mo- 
 fe" which x - l0n f tne Fluids, there is Nutrition and Increafe, there is, as I con- 
 maybe broke, jedture, fome fort of Life. Now, -'tis evident, that this circular mo- 
 th a h flo W UrS t ^ on ma y ^ e i nt errupted by the force of adjacent Bodies : the folid Bo- 
 o.;t, and th 2 dy of an Animal is a kind of Veflel in which the humours have a flux 
 circular mo- an d reflux thro' certain duels and channels framed by Divine Skill, in 
 Such Ani- the motion of which Life confifts. Now this Veflel may be broke in 
 mais then are pieces by the impulfe of other Bodies, fince by the native imperfection 
 niorS! 1 " 7 '** Matter it is capable of Diflblution ; but when the Veflel is broken, 
 the Fluids therein contain'd mufl: neceflarily flow out, the circular mo- 
 tion mult ceafe, and together with it animal Life. Such Animals 
 therefore as have folid Bodies, are by Nature Mortal, and cannot laft 
 for ever, without violence done to the Laws of Nature, of Matter, 
 and Motion. There mufl: then have been either none at all created, 
 or fuch as are naturally Mortal. The imperfection of Matter could 
 not fuffer it to be otherwife. For the hard and folid parts belonging 
 to thefe Bodies are of fuch a frame as mufl: neceflarily be fhaken and 
 -feparated by others of the fame bulk and hardnefs. Every thing there- 
 fore that confifts of fuch kind of Parts, may be corrupted and diflbl- 
 ved. (43.) Therefore the Divine Power and Goodnefs did the very 
 
 bell 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (43.) This point is very well illuftrated, by 
 -Dr. J. Clarke on Natural Evil, p. 245, &c. 
 whole Reafoning is entirely built upon Sir If. 
 'Newton's Experiments. "Human Bodies, as 
 *' well as thofe of all other Animals, and of 
 * Plants, are compounded of very different 
 " Materials, fix'd and volatile, fluid and folid; 
 " as appears by the refolution of them into 
 " their conftituent Parts; and they arc nou- 
 ** rifh'd in the fame manner, viz. by attrac- 
 41 tion. For, as a Spunge by Sudtion draws in 
 ' Water, fo the Glands in the Bodies of all 
 
 c< Animals, draw different Juices out of the 
 11 Blood, according to the particular Nature 
 " and conftitution of each of them : So long 
 H therefore as the nourifhment is proper to af- 
 " fimilate itfelf to thefeveral parts of the Bo- 
 H dy, as it approaches them in its feveral chan- 
 " nels; or, fo long as the folid particles (fup- 
 <c pofe of Salts, which are abfolutely neceffary 
 '* to the prefcrvation of all Creatures) retain 
 " their form and texture; fo long Life is pre- 
 " ferv'd and maintain'd. And when the nou- 
 " rifliment becomes unfit to affimilate; or the 
 
 "faline
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 feeft even in creating Beings that were mortal: for an Animal fub- 
 jedt to Death is better than none at all. 
 
 IV. But God, you'll fay, created Men at nrft immortal, as we un- 
 derftand by facred Hiftory : Mortality is not therefore an infeparable 
 attendant on folid Bodies. I anfwer j It does not appear to us of what 
 fort the Bodies of Mankind were before the Fall, and confequently no- 
 thing can be argued from thence againft the necelTary Mortality of all 
 terreftrial ones. Farther, we mould remember that our firft Parents 
 were naturally mortal, but that God covenanted with them for Im- 
 mortality as matter of Favour, and upon particular Conditions. (44.) 
 
 Not 
 
 NOTES.. 
 
 ill 
 
 This Hypo- 
 thefis recon^ 
 ciled with 
 facred Hifto- 
 ry, concer- 
 ning the im 
 mortality of 
 the firfl Man* 
 
 " faline particles (which towards the Center 
 " are very denfe, and therefore capable of 
 " ftrongly attracting the Fluids to them) lofe 
 ** their power of Attraction, either by being 
 " divided into lefs particles (as they may be 
 " by their watry parts inlinuating themfelves 
 " into their Pores with a gentle heat) or elfe 
 " by having thofe watry Parts violently fepa- 
 " rated from them : in either of thefe Cafes all 
 ** their Motion will ceafe, and end in Corrup- 
 *' tion, Confufion and Death. And this is a- 
 *' bundantly confirm'd by Experience, in that 
 ** every thing which is corrupted or putrify'd 
 ' is of a black Colour; which fliews, that the 
 ' component Particles are broken to Pieces, 
 * and reduced fo fmall, as to be unable even 
 " to reflect the Rays of Light, Thus we fee, 
 " that Death, or the DifTolution of the Body, 
 *' is the neceflary Confequence of thofe Laws 
 'by which it is framed and generated: and 
 f therefore is not in itfelf properly an Evil, a- 
 " ny more than that Fabric can be ftiled /'//, 
 " the Materials, or manner of building of 
 " which, would not permit it to laft a thou- 
 " fand Years, nor. was originally intended to 
 u continue half fo long.'* See the latter part 
 of Note 56. 
 
 (44.) See Curcellai Inft. Rel. Chrift. L. 3. C. 
 8. . 1 2, . 3, 20, &c. p. 1 10. or Limborcb, The- 
 el Chrift. L. 2. C. 24: *). 10. p. 137, 138. 
 
 From hence, I think, it will appear, that all 
 
 the Objections drawn from the Hiftory of our 
 firfl Parents in their State of Innocence, as 
 often urg'd by Mr. Bayle againft the prefent 
 Queftion, are inconclufive : Since whatever 
 State they were creited in, it was extraordina.- 
 ry, fupernatural, and peculiar to them, as the 
 firft of human Race: and what, their Creator 
 knew, would at length turn to the fame which 
 Mankind is in- at prefent. Nay, it is fcarce 
 poffible to conceive how they could have been 
 preferv'd and propagated, govern'd and direc- 
 ted by any general Laws of Nature (which yet 
 are neceflary to the whole Syftem *) in any o- 
 ther Condition than they now are. Not to 
 fpeak here of their moral Part, if they were 
 compofed of the fame Materials of which all 
 their Pofterity confift, they muft have been at 
 leaft naturally Mortal ; tho' God might, if he 
 had feen it proper, have interfered in fome 
 preternatural way, and thereby alter'd the eir* 
 cumftances of their Mortality f. And accor- 
 dingly the Sentence pronounced upon Adam, 
 (Gen. 2. 17.) In the Day that thou eateft thereof 
 thou palt dying Dye, or fhalt die a Death, might 
 not imply that he Ihould never have died at all 
 had he not eaten ; but that he fhould die both a 
 more fpeedy and a more painful Death that other- 
 wife he might have done : as that emphatical 
 Phrafe often fignifies in Scripture. See more of 
 this in V 8. par. 6. and N. 56, and at the end o 
 this Chapter. 
 
 *- See Note 3 7. 
 
 + See Sherlock on Death,. Ch. 2. fc.1,
 
 
 1 1 a Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 Not that they fhould have continued upon Earth for ever; but dm 1 
 God promifed to tranflate them at a proper time by his efpecial Fa- 
 vour, and preferve them in a place fit for the enjoyment of Eternity : 
 as we believe he did with Enoch and Eli as. But as foon as this Cove- 
 nant with God was broken by Sin, Man was reftor'd to his Native 
 Mortality, and fubjected to thofe other Inconveniencies to which the 
 order of Nature, and the chain of Natural Caufes, render'd fuch Bo- 
 dies as thefe of Mankind obnoxious. For tho' God has not fo far 
 tied himfelf up to the Laws of Nature, but that he may in many Ca- 
 fes fufpend and fuperfede them, yet this is not done frequently, nor 
 to be expected for the fake of Sinners. God can indeed preferve 
 Man from aftual Death y but that a folid Machine confining of hete- 
 rogeneous Parts, fuch as the human Body is, fhould not be naturally 
 Mortal is impoflible: 'Tis a Contradiction therefore that Man, in the 
 prefent State of things, mould be by Nature immortal. 
 
 S E C T. IV. 
 
 Of the TaJJions. 
 
 U ii?eB 3 ** O^ppofing the Union of a thinking or fenfitive Soul with Matter, 
 dies of ape- O its Thought and Will muft neceffarily be affected by the Motions 
 cuiiar Crafts, f tna t j as Body mufl be again by thefe. For, fince the Soul is of 
 difordeVd or mc h a Nature as to require Matter of a peculiar Crajis and Figure, in 
 removed, the order to difcharge its Functions, it follows, that when this Difpofiti- 
 
 thTsouTare f on * s f au l tv > or *l u * te ^ s > r ^ e Operations of the Soul muft be im- 
 either hin- peded, or entirely ceafe ; nor can it poffibly be otherwife while the 
 J' r i^ rdc ' Soul and Body are of fuch a Nature as they really are. 
 T II. Since therefore it is no diminution of the Divine Goodnefs to 
 
 and Body have affign'd fuch a Nature to them, as was fhewn before ; we mufl 
 
 admit of a alfo admit of a mutual Sympathy between them. Now, if they mu- 
 mutuai .,n 
 
 Sympathy: tUal ty 
 
 Jience it is the firft care of the Soul to keep the Body free from harm.
 
 Concerning: Natural Evil. 
 
 113 
 
 tually affect each other, the confequence will be, that it is the princi- 
 pal bufinefs of the Soul to preferve the Body from harm : In order to 
 this, 'tis necefTary that the Soul mould have a perception of what is 
 good for, or prejudicial to, the Body; and this could not be more ef- 
 fectually procured, than by providing that thofe things which tend to 
 its prefervation mould communicate an agreeable Senfation to the 
 Soul, and what is pernicious, a difagreeable one. For, otherwife, the 
 firft thing we met with might deflroy us, while we were not appre- 
 henfive, or regardlefs of it; nor mould we be folicitous to avoid a Ri- 
 ver or a Precipice. (45.) 
 
 III. Tis necefTary therefore that the Soul and Body mould afFecl: each The fenfe of 
 othermutually,that the impairing or DifTolution of the Bodymould create Pain is ne- 
 uneafinefs, which, by its importunity, might recall the Soul that was indif- pr e ferve 
 pofed or otherwife engaged, to take care of the whole; nor ought it to Life, as alfo 
 ceafe urging, till what was hurtful be removed : without this Impor- ^ e d ead of 
 tunity perhaps the ftrongeft Animal would not laft even a Day. The 
 Senfe then of Pain or Uneafinefs produced in the Soul upon the Muti- 
 lation or DifTolution of the Body is necefTary for the prefervation of 
 Life in the prefent State of things. It may be proved from the fame 
 Principles, that the averfion to, or dread of, Death is not in vain, fince 
 it cannot even be conceiv'd how a frail and mortal Body, toffed by 
 continual Motions, and tumbled among other hard Bodies, mould e- 
 
 fcape 
 
 N O t E S. 
 
 (45.) This Subject is very well handled by 
 Dr. J. Clarke, on Nat. Evil, p. 256, ciff. See 
 alfo Mr. Hucbefon on the Nature and Conducl of 
 the Pajftons, p. 5 1 , 5 2. or Watts on the Ufe and 
 Mufe of them, %. \ 3, ffV. 
 
 1 fhall tranferibe a PafTage from the Author 
 laft mention'd. " The Paflions are defign'd 
 " for the Service of the Body, becaufe they a- 
 " waken not only all the animal Powers, but 
 " the Thoughts and Contrivances of the mind, 
 " to prevent whatfoever is huitful to the Bo- 
 " dy, and to procure what is pleafant and ufe- 
 " ful for its Support and Safety ; that is, in 
 " more compendious Language, to obtain Good, 
 " or avoid Evil. While our Body is in fuch a 
 " feeble State, furrounded with Dangers, and 
 
 " liable to fo many troublefome Accidents, 
 " Diforders, and Death, God has not only 
 " furnifh'd us with the Senfations of Pleafure 
 " and Pain, to give us fpeedy Notice of what 
 " hurts or relieves the Body, but he has alfo 
 " given us the Paffions of Joy and Sorrow, of 
 " Defire and Averfion, to aflift in this Work, 
 " that the Body may be better provided with 
 " what is necefTary to its Health and Life, and 
 " may be better guarded againft the Danger of 
 " Wounds and Br uifes, Diftempers and Death." 
 Thus much for the ufe of what our Author 
 calls the Sympathy between Soul and Body, the 
 Paffions, AffeBions, 8cc. with refpeft to the Body. 
 Concerning the ufe and neceffity of them in 
 regard to the Mind, fee Note 47. 
 
 Q^ 
 
 ' 
 
 .
 
 11 + 
 
 
 Concerning Matured Evil. 
 fcape Dillblution, if the Soul which moves that Body were not fore- 
 warn'd to avoid Death by the natural horror of its approach. (46.) 
 
 IV. Now 
 
 N ? E S. 
 
 (46.) To' this Bayfir ohje&s * " That the 
 " Co nfequences above nicntion'd might as rea- 
 M dily and certainly be avoided by the fole 
 " attraction of Pleafure encreas'd ordiminifh'd 
 " in certain Proportions. Would not a Fore- 
 " tafte of more cxquifite Pleafure in removing 
 *' your Chair from a great Fire, make you 
 quit the vicinity of this great Fire, without 
 *- any neceffity foif the feeling inconvenience? 
 " Another Expedient is, That the Soul, in the 
 t( very nick of time* mould have a clear Idea of 
 U the peril which environs her Machine, that 
 " this Idea be attended with the fame Prompt- 
 " nefs of the Animal Spirits which now ac- 
 * companies the Senfation of Pain ; we fiiould 
 " then be always as far from Danger as was 
 " neceffary, in the fame manner as we fly from 
 "" it atprefent." 
 
 We reply, that according to the prefent frame 
 of human Nature in general (which Syftem 
 <5ught always to be taken together) neither of 
 thefe Expedients would anfwef the end propo- 
 fed. A.6 to the former, this Author has often 
 obferv'd in his Dictionary f, that a little Pain 
 is able to counterbalance a great deal of Plea- 
 fure ; that one hour of Sicknefs is more poig- 
 nant than feveral Days of Health. And, p. 
 1053. That four Afflictions, mix'd with twenty 
 Felicities, would befufficient to engage a Man 
 to wifli an alteration of his condition. 
 
 Whence it follows, that fuch an encreafe of 
 Pleafure could not make us avoid the many 
 Mifchiefs incident to the Body, fo readily and 
 certainly, as the Excitements of Pain. A mo- 
 derate degree of Pleafure often fatisfies the 
 whole Man, and makes him content to forfeit 
 a Superior Happinefs, or regardlefs of under^ 
 
 Soing an infinitely greater Mifery to come : 
 ut the fmalleft fenfitive-Pain immediately ur- 
 ges him to defire its removaL Four degrees of 
 Mifery therefore will, according to Bay/e him- 
 felf, , move, a Perfon more effectually, than 
 
 twenty degrees of Happinefs ; and confequent- 
 ly, fince all kinds of Mifery cannot be avoided, 
 the prefent Method of Providence is the beft, 
 as it avoids the m'ofl and grcateft. As to the 
 fecond Expedient, tho' it were granted, that 
 a clear Profpeft of enfuing Mifery would prove, 
 as effectual an Excitement of our Endeavours 
 to prevent it as a prefent Uneaiinefs, yet the 
 Mind, in order to have a clear Idea of thefe 
 Perils which environ the Body, muftalfo have a 
 completeKnowledge of the feveral properties and 
 effects of all the circumambient Bodies, which 
 -I believe, will be efteem'd fomething too much 
 for a Soul placed in this inferior Clafs of com- 
 pound Beings. And, laftly, in.anfwer to what 
 he frequently urges, that there will be no need 
 of fuch a Method of preventing Death and 
 Mifery in the future State of the Blefled, where 
 we expect pure unmix'd Felicity ; and confe- 
 quently there was no abfolute Necefiuy for 
 them here; we need only refer the Reader to. 
 the Obfervations in Notes 30 and 35. viz. that 
 there are feveral different Syftems- of rational 
 Beings, one above another, which we believe 
 to be gradually growing up, and afcending af 
 ter each ether, and acquiring new Degrees of 
 Happinefs and Perfection to all Eternity: and 
 therefore, when we fpeak of the future State of 
 the Bleffed, we fuppofe them exalted to a far- 
 nobler kind of Exigence, or placed in a quite 
 different Clafs, and confequently endow'd with 
 different Faculties from thefe which we expe- 
 rience here below: and therefore, to argue 
 from one to the other, is only confounding 
 quite different Orders of created Beings : and 
 fuppofing that what is poffible and agreeable in 
 one, may and ought to be fo in another, and, 
 by the fame way of reafoning, alike in all. 
 This Argument then drawn from that State 
 of our Fore-Father in Paradife, or us in Hea- 
 ven, is always inconclufive. See Dr. J* Clarke. 
 on Natural Evil, p. 257, &c. 
 
 * x Repen/e aux Quejliom a*un Provincial, Fol. p. 650.- 
 ft Under tb.% Article Xenopbam, particularly at p. 305 U
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. g f 5 
 
 IV. Now the reft of the Paffions are Confequences of Pain, Uneafi- The reft of 
 iiefs, and dread of Death; viz. Anger, Love, Hatred, &c. An Animal the Paffions 
 in the prefent State of things, muft therefore either be obnoxious to S S^IP* 1 
 thefe, or quickly perifh. For 'tis impoffible that the Sould mould thefe. 
 have a difagreeable Senfation, and not be angry at the Caufe which 
 produces it : and fo of the reft. 
 
 V. God could have avoided all this by ordering that the Soul The Paffions 
 mould not be affected by the Motions of the Body; or at leaft, that ^J^ ^* 
 every thing done therein ftiould be agreeable : But how dangerous this therwife, 
 would be to Animals, any one may underftand, who recollects how J an B x or * 
 very fhort their Lives muft be, if they died with the fame Pleafure t h"soui * 
 that they eat or drink or propagate their Species. If upon tearing the fhould not be 
 Body, the Soul had either no Senfation at all, or a pleafant one, we Jhe foLdon? 
 fhould be no more aware of Death than of Sleep, nor would it be of the Body: 
 more injurious to kill a Man than to fcratch him. And thus Man- ^ a ^ 
 kind would quickly fail. We muft then either have been arm'd with ma is would 
 thefe Paffions againft Death, or foon have perifh'd: But the Divine ft veryfhor 
 Goodnefs chofe that Animals fhould be fubject to thefe, rather than 
 
 the Earth be entirely deftitute of Inhabitants. (47.) 
 
 Q^2 VI. Behold 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (47.) Bcfides the Health and Prefervation of 
 the Body, the Paffions in genera! are neceflary 
 to the Happinefs and Well-being of theSWal- 
 fo : Wherein, befides the immediate Pleafure 
 which arifes from the very Exercife of them, 
 and their Power to alter even the Nature of 
 things-, or at leaft, their Relations to us, and 
 often mate thatafy and agreeable which would 
 othcrwife be diftaftful and intolerable : they 
 are farther neceffary to urge and excite the 
 Mind to laudable Enterprifes, and fo fupport 
 it in the execution of .them ; to fix and fortify 
 it againil all Difficulties and Dangers, and en- 
 able it to proceed and perfevere in the conftant 
 purfuit of ftill higher Degrees of Happinefs 
 
 ' of a remifs and fedentary Nature, flow in its 
 " Refolves, and languijhing in its Executions. 
 " The ufe therefore of the Paffions is, te fir up 
 " and put it upon Aclion, to awaken the Under- 
 11 fia-nding, to enforce the Will, and to. make the 
 " whole Man more vigorous and attetijive in the 
 " profecution of his Defigns." See alfo the Spec- 
 tator 'N 9 . 408. 
 
 For a particular Account of all the Paffions, 
 and their final Caufes, and the Neceffity of 
 each, fee Mr. Hucbefon's incomparable Effity, 
 V 2. p. 48,50.^. and . 6. p. 179. or Watts on 
 the ufe and ab ufe of them, \ 13. or Cbamb/rs's 
 Cyclopedia, under the Word Paffion, or Scott's 
 Chrifian Life, Part 2. C. 1. $.2. par. 3. Qut 
 
 and Perfection. " The Soul (fays Mr. Addi- what relates to this Subject will come more 
 " fon*) cenfidefd abftratlly from its Paffions, i>\ properly unde/ the HwdofMor'alEvi/. 
 
 Spea. N p . 255.
 
 1 1 6 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 it is not con- VI. Behold now how Evils fpring from and multiply tipon each o- 
 trary to the thcr, while infinite Goodnefs ftill urges the Deity to do the very beft. 
 nefs toremit This moved him to give Exiftence to Creatures which cannGt exift 
 thefelncon- without Imperfections and Inequality. This excited him to create Mat- 
 rather' ter an< ^ t0 P ut lt m Motion, which is neceflarily attended with Separation 
 could norbe an d Diffolution, Generation and Corruption. This perfuaded him to 
 avoided with- couple Souls with Bodies, and to give them mutual Affections, whence 
 proceeded Pain and Sorrow, Hatred and Fear, with the reft of the 
 Paffions, yet all of them, as we have feen, are necerTary. 
 
 VII. For, as created Exiftence neeefTarily includes the Evil of Im- 
 
 red the Good perfection, fo every Species of it is fubject to its own peculiar Imper- 
 
 in . r in S s fections; that is, to Evils. All the Species of Creatures then muft ei- 
 
 Kviis which t ^ ler have been omitted, or their concomitant Evils tolerated: theDi- 
 
 neceiiariiy vine Goodnefs therefore put the Evils in one Scale and the Good in 
 
 anTtolcratea tne omer : an ^ f jnc e the Good preponderated, an infinitely good God 
 
 thofe Evils would not omit that becaufe of the concomitant Evils; for that very 
 
 hire C arab! re ^ mi ^ lon would have been attended with more and greater Evils,, and 
 
 from the fo would have been lefs agreeable to infinite Goodnefs. 
 
 Good. VIII. The lean: Evil, you'll fay, ought not to be admitted for the 
 
 The Axiom &ke ^ tne greateft Good. (For to affirm that God does Evil that 
 
 about not Good may come of it, is Blafphemy.) Neither does the Diftinction 
 
 forthefakeofk etween Moral and Natural Evil help any thing toward the Solution 
 
 Good, does of this Difficulty : For what we call Moral Evil, as lhall be fhewn 
 
 wh take f lace below, is that which is forbidden ; now nothing is forbidden by God 
 
 leaft Evil is but generally, at lean:, on account of the Inconveniencies attending the 
 
 chofen. forbidden Actions : Thefe Inconveniencies are Natural Evils, therefore 
 
 Moral Evils are prohibited on account of the Natural ones, and for 
 
 that Reafon only are Evils, becaufe they lead to Natural Evils. But 
 
 that which makes any thing to be fuch, is itfelf much more fucb : 
 
 therefore the Natural, you'll fay, are greater Evils than the Moral, and 
 
 cannot with lefs Blafphemy be attributed to God. Granting all this 
 
 to be true, yet tho' Evil is not to be done for the fake of Good, yet 
 
 the lefs Evil is to be chofen before the greater : And fince Evils ne- 
 
 ceffarily furround you whether you act or not, you ought to prefer 
 
 that Side which is attended with the leaft. Since therefore God was 
 
 compell'd by the neceftary Imperfections of created Beings, either to 
 
 abftain from creating them at all, or to bear with the Evils confequent 
 
 una*
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 1 1 7 
 
 upon them ; and fince it is a lefs Evil to permit thofe, than to omit 
 thefe : 'tis plain that God did not allow of Natural Evils for the fake 
 of any Good; but chofe the leaft out of feveral Evils; i, e. would ra- 
 ther have Creatures liable to Natural Evils, than no Creatures at all. 
 The fame wilL be fhewn hereafter concerning Moral Evils- 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Of Hunger, Thirft, and Labour. 
 
 I. A Terreftrial Animal muft, as we have faid, neceffarily confift ofThe parts of 
 \ mix'd and heterogeneous Parts; its Fluids alfo are in a perpe- th Ji B ? d y ty. 
 tual Flux, and a kind of Ferment. Now 'tis plain that this cannot j n nee d there- 
 be without the Expence of thefe Fluids, and Attrition of the Solids ; fore ofRep*- 
 and hence follows Death and Dijfolution, except thefe be repair'd : a by^oj**' 
 new Acceffion of Matter is therefore neceffary, to fupply what flies 
 off and is worn away, and much more fo for the Growth of Ani- 
 mals. 
 
 II. But Animals have particular Conjlitutions, and cannot be nouriffr- Choice muff 
 ed by any fort of Matter: fome Choice therefore muft be made of it, F e 00 ^ f in * ce , 
 to which they are to be urg'd by an Importunity ftrong enough to all things are 
 excite their Endeavours after it. Hence Hunger and Thirft come to n r ot e ^ uall f 
 affect the Soul ; Affections that are fometimes indeed troublefome, but 
 
 yet neceffary, and which bring more Pleafure than Pain along with, 
 them. 
 
 III. But why, fay you, are we obliged to labour in queft of Food ? The Mate* 
 Why are not the Elements themfelves fufficient? I anfwer j they are arcfooncor- 
 fufficient for fome Animals: but Mankind required fuch a difpofitionrupted: thejr 
 f Matter as- was to be prepared by various Coctions and Changes, an ^fobe th roT 
 
 that cured with- 
 out Labour,
 
 1 1 g Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 daily, becaufe 'tis foon liable to Corruption, and if kept long, would 
 
 be unfit for Nutriment. Hence Labour becomes necerTary to provide 
 
 Victuals in this prefent ftate of things : neither could Hunger, or 
 
 Thirft, or Labour *, (which are reckon'd among Natural Evils) be 
 
 prevented without greater Inconveniencies. The Divine Goodnefs 
 
 therefore had the higher!: Reafon for affixing thefe to Animals. 
 
 IV. Now, as Animals require different forts of Food, as was fhewn, 
 
 Ewy Ani- according to their different Conflitutions, fo God has placed every one 
 
 <*dbyGod ^ them where it may find what is proper for it: on which account 
 
 where it may there is fcarce any thing in the Elements but what may be Food for 
 
 i*rNou Pr "f me - Every Herb has its InfecT: which it fupports. The Earth, the 
 
 rifhmenr, Water, the very Stones, ferve for Aliment to living Creatures -jr. 
 
 hence almoft 
 
 every herb maintains its prrper Infeft. 
 
 Some Ani- V. But fome ftand in need of more delicate Food : Now God 
 mais are pro- could have created an inanimate Machine which might have fupplied 
 Food too- tnem w * tn mcn Food j but one that is animated does it much eafier 
 thers, and and better. A Being that has Life is (ceteris paribus) preferable to 
 would not one t h at h as not . q therefore animated that Machine which fur- 
 on any other nifties out provifion for more perfect Animals ; which was both gra- 
 terms. cioufly and providently done: for by this means he gain'd fo much 
 
 Life to the World as there is in thofe Animals which are Food rjor o- 
 thers: for by this means they themfelves enjoy fome kind of Life, 
 and are of Service alfo to the reft. An Ox, for inftance, or a Calf, 
 is bred, nourimed, and protected for fome time, in order to become 
 fit Food for Man. This certainly is better and more eligible, than 
 if the Matter of its Body had been converted into an inanimate Mafs, 
 fuch as a Pompion, or continued in the ftate of unform'd Clay. Nor 
 is it hardly dealt withal, by being made for the Food of a more noble 
 Animal, fince it was on this Condition only that it had Life given, 
 which it could not otherwife have enjoy'd. Matter which is fit for 
 the Nourishment of Man, is alfo capable of Life ; if therefore God 
 had denied it Life, he had omitted a Degree of Good which might 
 have been produced without any Impediment to his principal Defign : 
 which does not feem very agreeable to infinite Goodnefs. 'Tis bet- 
 ter 
 
 * Set Note 51. f See Notes 35 and 39.
 
 Concerning Natural EviL 
 
 ter therefore that it mould be endow'd with Life for a time, tho' 'ti s 
 to be devoured afterwards, than to continue totally ftupid and ilug- 
 gifti. The common Objection then is of no force, viz. That inani- 
 mate matter might have been prepared for this Ufe; for 'tis better 
 that it fhould be animated 5 efpecially as fuch Animals are ignorant 
 of Futurity, and are neither confcious nor folicitous about their being 
 made for this Purpofe. So that fb long as they live, they enjoy 
 themfelves without anxiety j at leaft they rejoyce in the prefent Good, 
 and are neither tormented with the Remembrance of what is pari:, 
 nor the Fear of what is to come 3 and laftly, are kill'd with lefs Pain 
 than they would be by a Diflemper or old Age. Let us not he fur- 
 pris'd then at the Univerfal War as it were among Animals ; or that 
 she Stronger devour the Weaker, for thefe are made oa purpofe to 
 afford Aliment, to the others. (48.) 
 
 VI. As 
 
 
 IT9 
 
 NOT E S.. 
 
 (48.) Whit Is here hid down will, upon 
 Examination, be found to be perfe&ly confi- 
 ilent with our Obfervation in Note 34. 
 
 As the Point before us is fet in a very good 
 Light by Dr. J. Clarke*, I fhall not fcruple 
 to transcribe the whole Paragraph. ** If we 
 ** confiderthc effect of Animal Creatures being 
 u thus made Food for each other, we fhall find 
 44 that by this means there is the more Good 
 14 upon the whole: For under the prefent Cir- 
 44 cumftances of the Creation, Animals living 
 44 in this manner one upon another could not 
 M have been prevented, but a much greater E- 
 44 vil would have followed. For then there 
 * could not have been fo great a Number, nor 
 **- fo great a Variety of Animals as there are at 
 " prefent, fome of which are fo very minute, 
 44 and the Quantity of them fuch, that, mixing 
 *' themfelves with Herbs and Plants, and Grain, 
 44 on which themfelves feed, and with the Wa- 
 11 ter and Liquids which they drink, they mult 
 " neccflarily be devour'd by other larger Ani- 
 ' mals who live upon the fame Food, vvith- 
 * out fo much as being feen or any way per- 
 44 ceiv'd by them. It is therefore much better 
 ** upon the whole, that they mould live upon 
 
 one another in the manner they now do, 
 than that they fhould not live at all. For if 
 fuch Animal Life is to be eftcem'd fuperior 
 to not exiftingafal'l, or to a vegetable Life; 
 and the more there is of fuch Animal Life, 
 the more of Good there is in the World; it 
 is evident that by this means there is Room 
 for more whole Species of Creatures, at leaft 
 for many more individuals of each Species, 
 than there would otherwife be ; and that 
 the variety of the Creation is hereby much 
 enlarged, and the Goodnefs of its Author 
 difplayed. For the Conllitution of Animal 
 Bodies is fuch as requires that they fhould 
 be maintain'd by Food : Now if this Food 
 can be made capable of Animal Life alfo, it 
 is a very great Improvement of it. A certain 
 Quantity of Food is necefTary for the pre- 
 servation of a determinate Number of Ani- 
 mals: which Food, were it mere vegetable, 
 would perhaps ferve for that Purpofe only: 
 but by being fo form'd as to become Animal, 
 tho' it be in a lower Degree, and the enjoy- 
 ment of Life in fuch Creatures lefs, yet is ft 
 more perfeft than unform'd Clay, or even 
 than the moft curious PlanU Thus the A- 
 
 44 ninul 
 
 Difcourfe concerning Nattfial Evil, p. 289.
 
 i %o Concerning Natural Evil 
 
 All parts of VI. As for the Difficulty of procuring Food, and the Want of it in 
 the Earth fome Places, 'tis to be obferv'd that the ftate of the Earth depends 
 w afforded u P on &* light and heat of the Sun j and tho' we do not perfectly un- 
 Nnurifhment derftand the Structure of it, yet we have reafon to conjecture, (G.) 
 and R ec P- that it is carried about its Axis by a Diurnal, and about the Sun by an 
 whatever fi- ' Annual Motion : that its Figure is a Sphaeroid defcribed by the Revo- 
 tuationthey lution of a Semi-Ellipfe about a conjugate Axisj and that this pro- 
 ved in! nP a * ceeds from the Laws of Motion and Gravitation. Now in fuch a Si- 
 tuation, fome Parts of it muft necefTarily be unfit for fuch Inhabitants 
 as Men, fince the Parallelifm of its Axis is preferv'd in the annual 
 Motion, and the Revolution about the fame Axis in the diurnal. If 
 thefe mould undergo the very leaft Alteration, the whole Fabric of 
 *he Earth would be diforder'd ; the Ocean and Dry Land would 
 change Places to the detriment of the Animals. Since therefore nei- 
 ther the annual nor diurnal Motion of the Earth could be alter 'd 
 without harm ; 'tis plain, that fome parts of the Earth muft necefla- 
 rily be lefs convenient for the habitation of Mankind, namely thofe a- 
 ;bout the Poles j and that others muft require much Labour to make 
 them convenient, as we find by Experience in our own Climate ; but 
 it will evidently appear to any considering Perfon, that in what fitu- 
 ation or motion foever you fuppofe the Earth to be, either thefe or 
 worfe Evils muft be admitted j 'tis in vain therefore to complain of 
 thefe Inconveniencies which cannot be avoided without greater. (49.) 
 
 VII. Neither 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 ** nimal Part of the Creation has Its feveral De- 
 ** grees of Life, and as much Variety in it as 
 u is to be fond in the inanimate and vegeta- 
 * ble Part.; (o that in this refpedt there is fo 
 ** far from being any juft ground of Complaint, 
 ** that the Wifdom and Contrivance of the A- 
 " nimal World is admirable, and plain-ly fhews 
 ** the excellency of the whole, and the fubfer- 
 * viency of all the Particulars, in order to ob- 
 * tai n the greateft Good that they are capable 
 of." 
 
 See alfo the beginning of the Spetlator, 
 N. 519. 
 
 (G.) What is faid about the Motion of the 
 Earth mould be looked upon as an Hypothefis 
 
 only, and not a fundamental Principle ; that 
 the Argument might have the fame Succefs, 
 whether the Earth ftood ftill or moved; and 
 our affurance of the Divine Gocdnefs may not 
 feem to depend on the Conjectures of Mathe- 
 maticians. 
 
 (49 ) Thus if the Figure of the Earth were 
 chang'd into a perfett Sphere, the Equatorial 
 Parts muft all lie under Water. If it were of 
 a Cubic, Prifmatit, or any other Angular Figure, 
 it would neither be fo capacious for habitation, 
 nor fo fit for Motion, nor fo commodious for the 
 Reception of Light and Heat, for the circula- 
 tion of the Winds, and the Diftribution of the 
 Waters ; as is obvious to any one that is ac- 
 quainted
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. in 
 
 VII. Neither are Earth-quakes, Storms, Thunder, Deluges and /-0f Earth- 
 undations any ftronger Arguments againft the Wifdom and Goodnefs <tf2?jS" 
 God. Thefe are fometimes fent by a juft and gracious God for the luges. 
 Punifhment of Mankind j but often depend on other natural Caufes, 
 which are neceflary, and could not be removed without greater Da- 
 mage to the whole. Thefe Concuflions of the Elements are indeed 
 
 prejudicial, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 quainted with the firll Elements of Natural 
 Philofophy, and is at large demonftrated by 
 Dr. Cheyne, Mr. Derham, Ray, &c. If its Si- 
 tuation were removed, its Conftitution mull be 
 alter'd too, or elfe, if placed confiderably far- 
 ther from the Sun, it would be frozen into Ice, 
 if nearer, 'twould be burnt to a Coal. If ei- 
 ther its annual or diurnal Motion were flopped, 
 retarded, or accelerated, the ufeful and agreeable 
 Viciffitudes of Summer and Winter, Day and 
 Night, would ceafe, or at leaft ceafe to be Co 
 ufeful and agreeable as they now are. The im- 
 moderate length or fhortnefs of the Seafons 
 would prove pernicious to the Earth, and the 
 ftated times of Bufinefs and Repofe would be 
 as incommodious to its Inhabitants: as difpro- 
 portionate to the common affairs of Life, and 
 the various Exigences of Mankind +. If, in 
 the laft place, we alter the Inclination of the 
 Earth's Axis, the like Inconveniencies will at- 
 tend the Polar Parts: if we deftroy the Parallel- 
 ifm of it, befides deftroying at the fame time 
 the ufeful Arts of Navigation and Dialling, we 
 bring upon us much worfe Confequences : A 
 Defcription of fome few of them from Dr. Ben- 
 t ley's Sermon above cited may perhaps not be 
 difagreeable. " We all know, from the very 
 " Elements of Aftronomy, that this inclin'd 
 " pofition of the Axis, which keeps always the 
 " lame Direction, and a conftant Parallelifm 
 " to itfelf is the fole Caufe of thefe grateful 
 M and needful Viciffitudes of the four Seafons 
 " of the Year, and the Variation in length of 
 ' Days. If we take away the Inclination, it 
 ** would abfolutely undo thefe Northern Na- 
 " tions, the Sun would never come nearer us 
 
 " than he doth now on the loth of March, or 
 " the 1 2th of September. But would we ra- 
 " ther part with the Parallelifm? Let us fup- 
 " pofe then that the Axis of the Earth keep* 
 " always the fame Inclination towards the Bo- 
 " dy of the Sun : this indeed would caufe a. 
 " variety of Days, and Nights, and Seafons, 
 " on the Earth ; but then every particular 
 " Country would have always the fame diver- 
 " fity of Day and Night, and the fame Confti- 
 " tution of Seafon, without any alteration. 
 " Some would always have long Nights and 
 ' ftiort Days, others again perpetually long 
 " Days and ftiort Nights : One Climate would 
 " be fcorch'd and fwelter'd with everlafting 
 " Dog-Days, while an eternal December blafted. 
 " another. This furely is not quite fo good 
 " as the prefent Order of Seafons. But mail 
 " the Axis rather obferve no conftant Inclina- 
 " tion to any thing, but vary and waver ac 
 " uncertain times and places ? This would! 
 M be a happy Conftitution indeed ! There 
 u would be no Health, no Life nor Subfiftence 
 " in fuch an irregular Syftem : By thofe fur- 
 " prifing Nods of the Pole, we might be tofs'd 
 14 backward or forward, in a Moment, from 
 " January to June, nay, poffibly, from the 
 " January at Greenland, to the June of Abejfi- 
 " nia. It is better therefore, upon all accounts, 
 " that the Axis Ihould be continued in its 
 " prefent Pofture and Direction ; fo that this 
 " alfo is a fignal Character of Divine Wifdom 
 " and Ooodnefs. 
 
 See alfo CbeyneH Phil. Priitc. C. 3. 24, 
 25, 26, fcfa 
 
 + See Dr. Bentley'/ laft Sermon, p. 312, &V. 5th Edition. 
 
 R
 
 133 
 
 Concerning Natural Evil 
 
 prejudicial, but more Prejudice would arife to the Univerfal Syfiem by 
 the abfence of them. What the genuine and immediate Caufes of 
 them are I dare not determine: they feem in general to derive their O- 
 rigin from the unequal heat of the Sun, from the Fluidity, Mutabi- 
 lity, and Contrariety of things *. To thefe we may add the Afperity 
 and Inequality of the Earth's Surface, without which neverthelefs the 
 whole Earth, or the greater!: Part of it, would be uninhabitable. For 
 inftance, we complain of the Mountains as Rubbifh, as not only dif- 
 figuring the Face of the Earth, but alfo as ufelefs and inconvenient; 
 and yet without thefe, neither Rivers nor Fountains, nor the Weather 
 fpr producing and ripening Fruits could regularly be preferv'd -f\ In 
 Mountainous Countries we blame Providence for the Uncertainty of the 
 Weather, for the frequency of Showers and Storms, which yet proceed 
 from the very Nature of the Climate, and without which all the Moi- 
 fture would glide down the Declivity, and the Fruits wither away. 
 The Earth then muft either not be created at all, or thefe things be 
 permitted. (50.) 
 
 VIII. The 
 NOTE S. 
 
 (50.) The feveral Objections mention'd in 
 this Paragraph are folidly refuted by Dr. J. 
 Clarke in his Treatife on Natural Evil, part of 
 which I fhall take the Liberty to infert as ufual, 
 and refer the Reader to the Book itfelf for the 
 left. 
 
 Having defcribed the Nature and Ufe of the 
 Air's Elasticity, and the acid, nitrous, and Jul- 
 plureous Particles with which it is impregnated, 
 which are the Caufe of Fermentation, he pro- 
 ceeds to accouat for Earthquakes, C5V. p. 190. 
 " Thus the internal Parts of the Earth being 
 " the only proper Place for containing fo large 
 " a Store of Sulphur and Nitre, and Minerals 
 *' as is required for fo many thoufand Years as 
 " the Earth in its prefent State has, and may 
 *' yet continue: it muft neceflarily be, that 
 *' when that Fermentation is made in fuch fub- 
 " terraneous Caverns as are not wide enough 
 " for the particles to expand themfelves in, or 
 " have no open Paflage to rum out- at, they 
 " will, by the forementioa'd Law, {hake the 
 *' Earth to a confiderable diftance, tear thofe 
 '* Caverns to pieces; and according to, the 
 
 *See Note 50,, 
 
 f See Note 5?. 
 
 depth of fuch Caverns, or Quantity of Ma- 
 terials contain'd in them, . remove large pie* 
 ces of the Surface of the Earth, from one 
 place to another, in the fame manner, tho' to a . 
 much higher degree than artificial Explofions 
 made under Ground; the effett of which is 
 fenfible to a great diftance. If it happens 
 that thefe Fermentations are in places under 
 the Sea, the Water mixing with thefe Mate- 
 rials, increafes their Force, and is thereby 
 thrown back with great violence, fo as to 
 feem to rife up into the Clouds, and fall 
 down: again fqmetimes in very large drops, 
 and fometimes in whole Spouts, which are 
 fufficient to drown all that is near them. If 
 the Fermentation be not fo violent, but fuch 
 only as raifes large Vapours or Steams, which 
 can find their way thro' fmall occult pafla- 
 gei of the Earth ; thefe near its Surface, by 
 their continual Expirations, are at firft the 
 Caufe of gentle Winds ; and thefe afterwards 
 by their continual Increafe, become perhaps 
 Storms, and Whirl-winds, and Tempefts, 
 which rnany times, deftroy the F,ruits, tear 
 
 up
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. **3 
 
 VIII. The fame mud be faid of the Lakes and the Ocean. For 'tis The Number 
 manifeft, that Fruits, Vegetables, &c. which are the Food of Ani- o f ^ m * h 
 fnals, depend upon Moifture, and that this is exhaled frqm the Sea, r ifivd, was to 
 and watry places, by the Sun j and fince the Showers and Dews thus ** pr ? por " h 
 elevated, are not more copious than fuffice for the Vegetation of g ^ a d 
 Plants, 'tis plain that the Seas and Lakes do not exceed what is necef- not the Food 
 fary, and could not be diminifhed without detriment to the whole. Vain ^[J 1 * Am * 
 therefore is the Complaint of Lucretius, who arraigns all thefe as faul- 
 ty. Neither was the Earth too narrow, nor needed it too much La- 
 bour to fuftain its Animals : For it was fufficient for thofe Animals 
 which God had given it *. But when they multiply above the pro- 
 portion of their Food, 'tis impoffible that it fhould be fufficient ; it 
 would not be enough if it were all converted into Food. For a cer- 
 tain Proportion is to be obferv'd between the Provision and the Eat- 
 ers, which if the Number of Animals exceed, they muil at length ne- 
 
 R 2 cefTarily 
 
 n o r E S. 
 
 u up the Trees, and overthrow the Houfes : 
 " But if they be Hill more gentle, there being 
 * always fome mlphurcous Exhalations, efpe- 
 " dally if the Earth be dry, they then afc end 
 '* along with the lighter Vapours, into the up- 
 " per Region of the Air, where, when a large 
 " Quantity of them is gathered together, they 
 " ferment with the acid Nitre, and taking 
 *' Fire, caufe Thunder and Lightning, and o- 
 " thcr Meteors. This, as far as can Be gathe- 
 " thered from Experience and Obfervation of 
 " the Works of Nature, is the Origin and 
 " Caufe of thofe Imperfections and Evils, 
 * which the prcfent Conflitution of the Air, 
 " and the Laws of Motion obferved by thofe 
 " Particles mix'd with it, unavoidably fubjedt 
 " it to. They are the natural and genuin ef- 
 fedts of the Regulation it is under, and with-, 
 " out altering the primary Laws of it (that is, 
 u making it fomething elie than what it is, or 
 : changing it into another Form : the Refult 
 ** of which would be only to render it liable 
 * to Evils of another kind, againft which the 
 " fame Objections would equally lie) or in a 
 * c fupcrnatural manner, hindering it from pro- 
 
 c * ducing fuch Effects, it is impoffible to pre- 
 " vent them. And if we add to this, that thefe 
 c * Evils are the feweft that in the Nature of 
 u things could be, without hindering a much 
 " greater Good: that they are in the moft con- 
 * venient Parts, and the moft guarded againit 
 il doing Mifchief that could be; and that there 
 ** are alio good Ufes to be made of them ; we 
 " fhall have no Reafon to complain of, or find 
 " fault w ith them. Were the Quantity of Sul- 
 ' phur and Nitre much dimininVd, there would 
 " not be fufficient to fill the Region of Air 
 " for the purpofes of Vegetation and Life ; 
 " but the Ground would grow barren, and the 
 a Animals would wafte and die : And if there 
 '* were a much greater Quantity, the contrary 
 M Effect would happen, the Earth would be 
 16 too fat, the Plants would grow too grofs, 
 " and the Animals would be fuffbeated and 
 " choaked. The Temperature is therefore as 
 " exact as it could be, all Circumilances con- 
 " fider'd ; and the fmall Inconvcnicncies are 
 " nothing, compared with the general Good." 
 See alfo the Word Earthquake in Chambers^ 
 Cyc/ofrdia. 
 
 *S*?DerhamV Phyf. TkeoL B. 4. C. 11:
 
 124. Concerning Natural EviL 
 
 cefTarily perifh with Hunger. Want of Provifion then ought not to he 
 made an Objection : for if the Number of Creatures to be provided for 
 be enlarged above this Proportion, the greateil: Plenty would not fuffice , 
 if this Proportion betwixt the Food and Animals be kept up, the leaft 
 would be fufficient. 'Tis our own fault therefore, not God's, if Pror- 
 vifions fail ; for the Number of Men may be confined within the bounds 
 prefcribed by Nature, as might eafily be fhewn, if it were worth our 
 while, 
 
 IX. But there's no need of Artifice on this Occafion j for by our fault 
 drcdthprtoftJurjg 8 are come to this Pafs, that even the hundredth part of thole 
 Mankind Eatables which might be had, don't meet with any to confume them, 
 which might T ^ e )} v i ne Beneficence has therefore dealt bountifully with Mankind 
 
 Jive upon tne . _ . J 
 
 Earth, does in refpect of Proviiions. 
 
 not yet 
 abit it: 
 
 inhabit it : Vain therefore is the Complaint about Seas and Defarts. 
 
 'Tis abfurd x. 'Tis to be obferv'd in the laft place, that Animals are of fuch a 
 defaeadife- Nature as to delight in Action, or the Exercife of their Faculties, nor 
 rent place or C an we have any other Notion of Happinefs even in God himfelf *. 
 dlatwhicM? Since tnen tne Faculties of both Body and Mind are to be exercis'd in 
 allotted him; order to produce Pleafure, where's the wonder if God deftin'd that Ex- 
 flD de to fin* erc ^ e * P art f r procuring of Food, and connected this Pleafure with 
 that place, it, (5 1.). The infinite Power of God was able to produce Animals of 
 
 and would 0- filch 
 
 therwifehave 
 
 had none at & Q- * E SL 
 
 (51.) Befide the Neceflity there is for labour, 
 in order to reftrain Man in his prefent State 
 from an Excefs of Folly and Wickednefs, 
 (which our Author confiders in the two laft Pa- 
 ragraphs of this Chapter) the ufe and advantage 
 of it appears alfo from the manifeft tendency it 
 has to preferve and improve the Faculties of 
 both Body and Mind. If ufed in a moderate 
 Degree, it preferves our Health, Vigour, and 
 Activity ; gives us a quick Senfe and Relifh of 
 Pleafure, and prevents a great manyMiferies 
 which attend Idlenefs. This is well defcribed 
 by the Guardian N. 131. and the Speflater, 
 N. 115. "I confider the Body as a Syftem 
 *< of Tubes and Glands, or, to ufe a more ru- 
 
 " ftic Phrafe, a bundle ofPipes and Strainers, 
 " fitted to one another after fo wonderful a 
 " manner, as to make a proper Engine for the 
 " Soul to work with. This Defcription does 
 " not only comprehend the Bowels, Bones, 
 " Tendons, Veins, Nerves, and Arteries, but 
 " every Mufcle, and every Ligature, which is 
 " a Compofition of Fibres, that are fo many 
 " imperceptible Tubes or Pipes interwoven on 
 " all fides with invifible Glands or Strainers. 
 " This general Idea of a human Body, with- 
 M out considering it in the Niceties of AnatO' 
 *' my, lets us fee how abfolutely neceflary La- 
 ** hour is for the right Prefervation of it. There 
 " muft be frequent Motions and Agitations, to 
 
 mix* 
 Sa? Ch. 1. $3. par, a and Ch. 5. ^. 1. Sub. 4.
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 fuch Capacities ; and fince the Creation of them was no Inconvenience 
 toother Beings who might exercife themfelves in a more noble Man- 
 ner, may not the infinite Goodnefs of God be conceiv'd to have almoft 
 compelled him not to refufe or envy thefe the Benefit of Life? Some 
 of this kind were to be created, fince there was Room left for them in 
 the Work of God, after fo many others were made as was convenient. 
 But you may wifh that fome other Place and Condition had fallen to 
 your Lot ; perhaps fo : but if you had taken up another's Place, that o- 
 ther, or fome elfe,. muffc have been put into yours, who, being alike 
 ungrateful to the Divine Providence, would wifh for the Place which 
 you now have occupied. Know then that it was neceffary that you 
 mould either be what you are, or not at all. For fmce every other 
 Place and State which the Syflem or Nature of Things allow'd, was 
 occupied hy fome others, you mull of neceffity either fill that which 
 you now are in, or be banifh'd out of Nature. For, do you expect 
 that any other mould be turn'd out of his Order, and you placed in his 
 Room? that is, that God mould exhibit a peculiar and extraordinary 
 Munificence toward you to the prejudice of others. You ought there- 
 fore not to cenfure, but adore the Divine Goodnefs for making you 
 what you are. You could neither have been made othcrwife, nor in: 
 a better Manner, but to the Difadvantage of fome others, or. of the 
 whole. 
 
 pro ? E 
 
 17 
 
 mix, digeft, and feparate the Juices contain'd 
 in it, as well as to clear and cleanfe the Infi- 
 nitude of Pipes and Strainers, of which it is 
 compofed; and to give their folid Parts a 
 more firm and lafting Tone. Labour or Ex- 
 ercife ferments the Humours, cafts them in- 
 to their proper Channels, throws off Redun- 
 dancies, and helps Nature in thofe fecret Di* 
 ftributions, without which the Body cannot 
 fubfift in its Vigour, nor the Soul aft with 
 Chearfulnefs. I might here mention the 
 Effects which this has upon all the Faculties 
 of the Mind, by keeping the Underftanding 
 clear, the Imagination untroubled, and refi- 
 ning thofe Spirits that are neceffary for the 
 proper Exertion of our Intellectual Facul- 
 ties, during the prefegt Laws of Union be- 
 
 " tween Soul and Body. It is to a Neglect* 
 " in this particular that we muft afcribe, the 
 " Spleen which is fo frequent in Men of ftu- 
 " dious and fedentary Tempers, as well as the 
 " Vapours to which thofe of the other Sex are. 
 " fo often fubjea." 
 
 He proceeds to illuftrate both theWifdom 
 and Goodnefs of God, from his having fitted- 
 and obliged us to this Labour and Exercife, 
 which is To neceffary to our well-being : which 
 Obfervation will help us to account for the fc- 
 cond and third Eyil arifing from the Fa//, men-- 
 tioned in $.9. par. 5. The Fitnefs of a State, 
 of Labour for fallen Man, is fhewnat large by 
 Sherlock on Jvdgment, C. 1. $.8. p. 179. and. 
 Mr. DOy/y in his Jirjl Diftrtatien, C9. p. 98, 
 bV. 2d Edition. 
 
 SECT,
 
 1 06 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Concerning Propagation of tie Species, Child- 
 hood, and Old-Age. 
 
 Animals may * lC!7^ om w ^ lat na s been faid it appears, that Animals which have 
 be repaired J/ folid Bodies are naturally mortal ; thb' the Earth therefore were 
 d tff Dth at ^^ ^^ ft c k'd w ^ tn them, yet their Number being continually 
 were preven- diminifh'd by Death, it would at length be quite destitute of Inhabi- 
 ted by Om- tants. There might, it feems, have been a threefold Remedy for this 
 "diy^by"" Evil : Firft, if God by his Omnipotence fhould prevent the Natural 
 Creation: Effects of the mutual Percuflion of folid Bodies, viz. the Corruption 
 Propagation. am * DifTolution of themfelves, and the Change or Effufion of their 
 Fluids. For from thefe the Deftruction of Animals neceffarily arifes, 
 as thefe do from the Compofition of Bodies, and their acting on each 
 other. Secondly, by leaving Nature to itfelf, and letting it act by U- 
 niverfal Mechanic Laws ; and when thefe brought on a diffolution of 
 Animal Bodies, that others be fubftituted in their Room by Creation. 
 Thirdly, by ordering that an Animal mould generate its like, and pro- 
 vide another to fupply its Place when it declined. 
 This third D. Who does not fee that this laft is the beft Method of preferving 
 Method isthe a conftant Number of Inhabitants upon the Earth ? For 'tis the fame 
 it can bTef 6 tnm g> cateris paribus, with regard to the Syftem, whether the Earth 
 fcfted with- have thefe Inhabitants which it has at prefent, or others equal in Num- 
 vb)ence 8 to '^ er anc * Perfection: but it is not the fame thing whether the Laws of 
 the Laws of Nature be obferv'd or violated *. In the former Methods God muft 
 Nature. have interfered every Moment by his abfolute Power, he muft have 
 
 done 
 
 f See Note 37.
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 117 
 
 done infinite violence to the Laws of j> T atmre, and confounded all the 
 Conitirutions and Orders of things, and that without any Benefit; nay 
 with extraordinary detriment to the whole in the main. For fince 
 the universal Laws of Motion are the bed that could pofiibly be efta- 
 felifh'd, they would fel.dom be. i<evers'd without damage to the whole*. 
 Neither does it become the Wifdom of God to have left his Work fo 
 imperfect as to- want continual mending ev.eain, the mialleft ParticiL- 
 lars. 'Twas better therefore for it to-be made in fuch a manner as we 
 fee it is, viz. that a new Offspring mould be propagated, out of the A- 
 nimals t.hemfelves,. and by themfelves. 
 
 HL And herein we may admire the Divine Wifdom and Goodnefs The Divine 
 which hatji.fo prudently and: effectually contrived this End. For it' G J5^ s m 
 has implanted in all Creatures (as- we fee) a ftrong and almot irrefifti-!idmirabiem- 
 ble appetite of propagating their kind,, and' has rejider'd this act of c ' ie contri- 
 propagation fo ufeful and agreeable to them, who perform it, that Po- vance011 
 iterity becomes dearer to many than Life irielf, and if it were left, to 
 their Choice, they would, rather die than lofe tlieir Offspring and the 
 Rewards of Love : nay there is fcarce one that would not protect its 
 Young at the hazard of its own, Life. God has therefore, by one Angle 
 Law, and a fort of Mechanifm, replenifli'd the Earth with living Crea- 
 tures, and provided that a fufficient Number fhould never be wanting, 
 without the Intervention of a Power, which would be irregular, and . 
 an Imputation on the Skill and Wifdom of the Architect. Who would 
 not prefer fuch a piece of Mecjianifm, where one Machine generates 
 another, and continually producer a new one in its turn, without a- 
 ny new and extraordinary Intervention of the Artificer, before one 
 which would immediately and every Day require his affiftance and a- 
 mendment ? 
 
 IV. This Method, you'll fay, is fit enough for the Brutes, many of why Men are 
 which muft neceflarily die, not only by the Law of their Nature, but ^[ththcain- 
 alfo for the fake of others, for whofe ufe they were created to ferve as tinual dread 
 Food. But Man is hardly dealt withal, who from his very Infancy is ^n^Br'ate*- 
 troubled with Fear and Dread more bitter even than Death ; and who ar e not at ail- 
 frequently foretaftes, and by ruminating, thoroughly digefls, whate- concern' d *- 
 ver bitternefs there is in Death itfelf. Neither does the Hope or Care 
 of Offspring, nor the Enjoyment of thefe Pleafures, compenfate for fa 
 
 many 
 
 * Sie Note 37.
 
 ia8 
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 manyMiferies and Evils: The Divine Goodnefs might therefore have 
 either conceal'd from Man his Mortality, or elfe removed that innate 
 Terror arifing in our Minds from the profpect of Death, which is al- 
 ways dreadful. (52.) 
 Thisisafign V 'Tis to be confefs'd indeed, that thefe are indications that Man 
 that the pre- h as fome relation to Immortality, and that the State in which he is 
 prelude K) a" P^ ace ^ at prefent is not entirely natural to him, otherwife he would 
 better. not be fo uneafy in it, nor afpire fo eagerly after another. The pre- 
 fent Life of Men is therefore either affign'd them for a time, by way 
 of Punifhment, as fome think, or by way of Prelude to, or Prepara- 
 tion for a better, as our Religion teaches, and our very Nature per- 
 fuades us to hope and expect This is prefumed, you'll fay, and not 
 proved. Be it fo. But if by the Suppofition of a future State this 
 "Difficulty may be folv'd, and Providence vindicated, when it is ar- 
 raign'd as dealing hardly with Mankind, who is fo foolifh as to be wil- 
 ling to call in queftion the Power and Goodnefs of God, rather than 
 admit of fo probable an Hypothefis ? To which we may add, and be- 
 lieved by almoft all Mankind. But if it were not fo, God hasbeftow'd 
 other Benefits of Life upon us, which, in our own Judgments, are not 
 at all inferior to the prefervation of Life ; and this appears from 
 hence, that we often prefer thefe Benefits to Life itfelf, which we 
 ihould never do, if we did not fometimes efteem them dearer to us. 
 
 To 
 
 N *T E & 
 
 (52.) A fufficient anfwe? to this Objection 
 trav be found in the laft Chapter of Dr. Sher- 
 lock's admirable Treatife on Death, I (hall in- 
 fert a little of it. " There are great and wife 
 M Reafons why God Ihould imprint this aver- 
 * fion to Death on human Nature; becaufe it 
 " obliges us to to take care of ourfelves, and 
 " to avoid every thing which will deftroy or 
 " fhorten our Lives : this in many Cafes is a 
 ' great Principle of -Virtue, as it preferves us 
 " from all fatal and deltru&ive Vices ; it is a 
 " great inftrument of Government, and makes 
 " Men afraid of committing fuch Villanies as 
 *' the Laws of-their Country have made capi- 
 
 ** tal ; and therefore, fmce the natural Fear of 
 " Death is of fuch great advantage to us, we 
 " muft be contented with it, tho' it makes the 
 " thoughts of Dying a little uneafyj efpecially 
 " if we confider, that when this natural Fear 
 " of Death is not encreas'd by other Caufes, 
 ** it may be conquer'd or allay'd by Reafon 
 " and wife Confideration." p. 329. 4th Edi- 
 tion. 
 
 For a farther Account of both the rational 
 and irrational Fear of Death, what it is., and 
 what it ought to be, the Ends and Effefts, and 
 alfo the Remedies of it, fee Norm's excellent 
 Difcourfe on Heb. 2. 1 5. *. 
 
 * Prafthal Diparfes, vol. 4th.
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. tij 
 
 To come to a conclufion : Without an univerfal confufion of Nature, 
 without violence offer 'd to the Laws and Order of it, the fame Ani- 
 mals could not prolong their Life for any confiderable time, it re- 
 mained therefore that fome fupply the Place of others fucceffively, 
 and that the Species be perpetuated, fince the Individuals could not, 
 left the whol eAnimal kind mould prove a thing of but one Age's Du- 
 ration. 
 
 VI. From hence it appears, that the Race of Mortals is to be per- "^ISJfSj 
 petuated by the propagation of their Species; and lince every Animal to be bom 
 is in a perpetual Flux, and may either increafe or decay, it was pro- JjjJ ^. nd 
 per to proceed from lefs Beginnings to greater; for by this means the hence the 
 new Offspring would be lefs burthenfome to the Parents, and the foundation 
 Young and Old agree better together. I confefs indeed Men are born \^% e% 
 defencelefs and unable to protect themfelves, and lefs qualified to pro- 
 vide for themfelves than any other Animals : But God has aflign'dus 
 Parents, Guardians, and Faithful Guides, fo that we are never more 
 happy than when under their Protection. Hence Childhood, blefs'd 
 with the fimple enjoyment of good things, and void of Care, becomes 
 more pleafant to us than any other Age. Hence alfo comes Reverence 
 and Relief to the Aged, hence proceeds Comfort to the Mature, and 
 Support to the Decrepit. Nay the Seeds and Principles of Social Life 
 are all laid in this appetite of Generation. To this propenfion we 
 owe almoft all the benefits of Society. Nothing therefore could be 
 more defirable to Creatures mortal (as we are by the neceffary Condi- 
 tion of terreftrial Matter) and obnoxious to Miferies, than to be born 
 after fuch a manner as in the firft Part of Life, while we are tender, 
 unacquainted with things, and put under the Guardianfhip of others, 
 to enjoy the Sweets without the Care ; in the middle, to pleafe our- 
 felves as much in taking care of others j and in the decrepit, feeble 
 Age, to be aflifted in our turn by others whom we have educated. 
 This Part of the Divine OEconomy is fo far therefore from needing 
 an Apology, that it is rather a Demonjlration of his Goodnefs. The 
 Race of Men was to be repair'd, fince Death could not be prevented 
 without a greater Evil ; and that Reparation is order'd in fo wife and 
 beneficent a way, that nothing can be more worthy of the Divine 
 Power and Goodnef6, nothing defer vc greater Admiration. 
 
 S VII. Now
 
 1 30 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 The chief V11 * ^ ow the ** e two Appetites, viz. of Self-prefervation, and the 
 Appetites ire Propagation of our Species, are the primary, the original of all o- 
 thofe of Self- tners> From thefe fprintr Pleafure and an agreeable Eniovment of 
 
 prefervation, ,. r , r r & . _ , . P . w x - 11 J^.y" ItilL v '* 
 
 and propaga- things ; from thefe come almolt every thing that is advantageous or 
 tionofthe defirable in Life. But all thefe are mingled with fome Evils, which 
 FCaes * could not be avoided without greater. 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 Of Difeafes, Wild-Beafls, and Venomous 
 
 Creatures. 
 
 *awf to'di-: 1 - \ \ 7 E muft obferve (as before *) that our Bodies confift of fo- 
 foiution, and VV lid and fluid Parts, and that thefe folid Members may be 
 tumours to either cut or broken to Pieces, disjointed, or otherwife render'd unfit 
 *ne P Pdns for Motion : whence Weaknefs, Languijhing and Torments-, that the 
 and Difeafes. Fluids alfo are liable, not only to Confumption, but Corruption too, 
 
 to Ebullition, by too intenfe Heat, or Stagnation by Cold : whence 
 
 proceed various Maladies and Difeafes. 
 
 II. Now there are certain Juices in the Earth which we inhabit, 
 The flrength f rom a m i x ture of which arife Changes and Coagulations. There are 
 ancffadijui- other Bodies alfo which rlyafunder with greater violence when mix'd. 
 ces as are Thus Milk, by the infufion of a little Acid, turns to Cheefe and 
 AnE/a- Whey: thus Spirits of Wine and Gun-powder, when touched by the 
 rifes from the Fire, run into Flame; and there is nothing to hinder the fame from 
 ^ tr s ar ^ c h f coming to pafs in the Blood and Humours of a human Body. Now 
 
 could not be tilOlC 
 
 removed, without taking away Motion. 
 
 *Scft. 13. 

 
 Concerning Natural EviL 1 5 1 
 
 thofe things which, by being mix'd with them, refolve, coagulate, or 
 render them unfit for Circulation, we call Poifonous. And if we 
 confider thofe contraries by which we are nourifh'd, and in the Sn g- 
 gle or Oppofition of which Nature confifts, 'tis fcarce conceivable how 
 thefe mould not often happen. Nor can all contrariety be taken a- 
 way, except Motion be taken away too, as we have fhewn j nor could 
 all thefe things that are contrary to our Conftitution be removed, ex- 
 cept fome Species of Creatures were extinct, or never created ; that 
 is, our Security muft have been purchafed at too dear a Rate. For 
 if every thing that is in any refpect repugnant to us were removed, 
 it would coft either the whole Syftem, or ourfelves, more Evil than 
 we receive from it at prefent, as will fufficiendy appear to any one 
 that enumerates the Particulars. 
 
 III. 'Tis to be obferv'd, that the Parts of this mundane Syftem Qf . , 
 which are contiguous to us, viz. the Air, Waters, and the Earth it- m i ca i Dif- 
 felf, are liable to Changes ; nor could it pofTibly be other wife, if the ea le 
 whole Machine, of which thefe are but fmall Parts, be thoro'ly con- 
 fider'd : nor could thefe Changes, efpecially the fudden ones, always 
 agree with the Temperature of the Humours of human Body. For 
 they enter into the very conftitution of the Body, and infect its Fluids 
 according to the Laws of Nature: whence it is that the due Crafisof 
 the Blood, and Health of the Body, depend upon the temperature of 
 the Air and Weather. Hence arife peflilential and epidemical Difeaies; 
 nor could they be avoided, unlefs the Animals had been made of a 
 quite different Frame and Conftitution. Nay, whatever State they had 
 been placed in, they would have been fubjecl: either to thefe, or o- 
 thers no lefs pernicious. For Marble, and the very hardeft of Bodies, 
 are diflblv'd by the viciflltude of heat and cold, moift and dry, and the 
 other Changes which we are infenfible of; how much more the hu- 
 mours and animal Spirits of Man, on a right temperature of which 
 Life depends. God might indeed, by a favour peculiar to us, have ex- 
 pell'd all the contagions anting from thefe alterations, or provided 
 that they mould not hurt us. But what reafon have fuch Sinners 
 as we now are, to expect it. 'Tis more agreeable to the Ju- 
 ftice of God, to leave the Elements to themielves; to be carried 
 
 S 2 according
 
 igi 
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 according to the Laws of Motion, for our Punimmenr, (53.). Neither 
 ought we to wonder that God denies the Guilty a Favour, which even 
 the Innocent have no Right to : nay, we ought to think that he has 
 inflicted a very light Penalty on rebellious Man: for fince the Natu- 
 ral Evils we are forc'd to ftruggle with, are for the moll part of fuch 
 a nature as could not he warded off, but by the particular extraordi- 
 nary favour of the Deity, God mould feem rather to have refumed a 
 free Gift, than inflicted a Punifhment, when he is pleas'd to permit 
 them. 
 
 IV. If the Earth had been made for the ufe of Man alone, we 
 might have expected that there mould be nothing in it that was pre- 
 Snbut o- judicial or ufelefs to him ; but fince it was made, as we have obfer- 
 ther Animals ved *, for the Benefit of the Univcrfe, Man is placed therein, not 
 lor their Hi- becaufe it was created for him only, but becaufe it could afford him 
 a convenient Habitation ; for God mull be fuppofed in this cafe not 
 to have adapted the Place to the Inhabitants, but the Inhabitants to 
 the Place. If therefore Man can dwell commodioufly enough in thefe 
 Regions of the Earth which are fit for his Purpofe, he muft allow 
 God in his Goodnefs to give the Earth as many other Inhabitants as 
 it can fuftain confidently with the Good of Men. Neither is he to 
 repine, that the Rocks and Defarts, which are of no ufe to Men, fup- 
 ply the Serpents and Wild-Beafts with Coverts. But thefe, you'll fay, 
 fometimes invade the Countries which are mofl delightful, and befl 
 ftored with conveniencies for human Life, deftroy the fruits and culti- 
 vated 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Rocks and 
 Defarts are 
 
 litation. 
 
 (^3.) Our Authors Argument here feems to 
 \k framed rather in compliance with the com- 
 mon forms of fpeaking, than in Arid confor- 
 m ty to his own Scheme of the to G'iKtiov, or 
 abfolute Meliority in things: which Syftem 
 maintains that God is ftill infinitely benefi- 
 cent, or as kind as pofiible to all, or difpenfes 
 every thing for the very beft in the main. Tho' 
 what is here introduced by way of Punifhment, 
 may, if rightly underftood, be defended as an 
 inftance of thegreateft poflible Kindrrefs; fince 
 the only end of all the Divine Judgments is 
 cither the Correction and Amendment of the 
 
 Offenders themfelves, or admonition to others, 
 or both r and confequently is a means of the 
 greateil Good to Mankind in general, and the 
 very beft difpeniation towards them in this de- 
 generate corrupt Eftate, and the mofl proper 
 method of fitting them for, or di reding and 
 drawing them to a better. And if all this 
 can be effe&ed by the fame general Laws of 
 Nature, which alfo bring Plenty, Health and 
 Happinefs to the World, here is a double de- 
 monftration of the abfolute Wifdom and Good 
 nefs of its Author. 
 
 Chap. 3. Note 33.
 
 Ht- 
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 122 
 
 rated Fields, and kill the Men themfelves by Bites and Poifons. I grant 
 it; but it may be queftion'd whether it has been always fo. 
 
 V. For in the firft Place, this Evil might have had its Origin from A ;'t H 
 Man himielf; viz. Rage might be given to the Lion, and Venom to c ]" J r s ^ 
 the Serpent, for the Punifhment of Mankind, and this antient Hifto- Wiid-Be*fli 
 lies both facred and prophane declare. But fince this Queftion was JJ^J?* 
 firft agitated by fuch as either denied reveal'd Religion, or at leaft were tures were 
 ignorant of it, I would not call that in to our affirmance, nor make a- madc / or the 
 
 1 rr-^1 1 tt An punifhment 
 
 ny other ule or it tnan as a bare Hypotheiis. of Mankind. 
 
 VI. We may affirm then in the fecond Place, that thefe things hap- 
 
 pen thro' the fault of Men, who, by Wars and Difcord, make fruit- JJftnkSd 1 
 ful and rich Countries void of Inhabitants to till them, and leave them that thefe 
 to the poffeffion of Wild-Beafts and venomous Infects : Since there- ult, P I 7 : 
 fore they neither cultivate them themfelves, nor allow other Perfons la-d wake by 
 to do it, what wonder is it, if God, for the reproach of Men, give ^ u iff' m to 
 them up to be inhabited by Brutes, Wild-Beafts and Infects? TnofcpfMan,"? 
 Parts which we have deferted belong by right to them, nor do they r 'ght belong 
 otherwife multiply more than is proper. totm 
 
 VII. Thirdly: 'Tis no more repugnant to the Divine Goodnefs to Wemaymoie 
 have made an Animal, by the bite of which a Man might be deftroy'd, " fi jjj * 
 than a Precipice. There's nothing in the whole Earth but what may an d veno- 
 hurt or kill a Man, if it be not ufed with caution: Meat, Drink, mous Crea - 
 Water; Fire. Muft thefe then not be created becaufe they may hurt ^J jj^. 
 a Man ? Nor is it more difficult to be aware of Poifons and Wild- veniences of 
 Beafts than of thefe : Nay, fcarce one is killed by Poifon, or torn by Jjhfti 1 about 
 Wild-Beafts, of a thoufand that die by the Sword j and yet we don't never quarrel 
 at all blame the Divine Goodnefs for this. It may be faid, that Iron, "' ith provi " 
 Earth, Water, Meats and Drinks, are neceffary, and on that account 
 
 the Evils attending them may be tolerated. And who will undertake 
 to afTure us that venomous Animals and Wild-Beafts are not necefla- 
 ry * ? Muft we reckon them entirely ufelefs becaufe we do not know 
 the ufe of them ? Muft we fay that every Wheel in a Clock is made 
 for no manner of Purpofe, which a Ruftic underftands not the defign 
 of? But fuppofe we grant that thefe are of no Service to us, yet do 
 they not pleafe and enjoy themfelves + ? 
 
 VIH You 
 
 * See Note 54. j Su Note 33..
 
 154. Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 All Animals VIII. You may urge that thefe arc not worth the Notice of the 
 arc under the Divine Providence. Thus indeed proud Mortals, admirers of them- 
 felves alone, defpife the Works of God : But "'tis not fo with the 
 Divine Goodnefs, which chofe that fome Inconvenience mould be- 
 fal Mankind, rather than a whole Species be wanting to Na- 
 ture. 
 
 IX. If you infift that a Lion might have been made without Teeth 
 or Claws, a Viper without Venom: I grant it, as a Knife without an 
 Edge; but then they would have been of quite another Species, and 
 have had neither the nature, nor ufe, nor genius, which they now 
 enjoy. In fhort, I fay, once for all, they are not in vain. The very 
 Serpents, tho' a Race hateful to us, have their ufesj among the reft, 
 they gather the Poifon out of the Earth, (54.). Nor is the Country 
 lefs habitable where they are than where they are not. Now, ceteris 
 paribus, Animals ought to multiply j for Life is a Perfection, and fince 
 it is as noble a one as Matter will admit of, 'tis preferable to none at 
 all. 'Tis therefore the Work and Gift of God, wherever he has be- 
 flow'd it, and does not ftand in need of an Evil Principle for its 
 Author. 
 
 divine Care 
 to think o- 
 therwife fa 
 vours of 
 Pride. 
 
 Wild-Beafts 
 and veno- 
 mous Crea- 
 tures are of 
 ufe to Men. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (54.) For an account of the various ends and 
 ufes of thefe noxious Animals, poifonous Plants, 
 Minerals, effr. fee Derbarn's Anfvver to the a- 
 bove mention'd Objection, in his Pbyf. Ibeol. 
 
 B. 2. Ch. 6. with the References, and Ray on 
 
 the Creation, Part 2. p. 432, &c. 4th Edition, 
 or Chambers's Cytlopcedia, under the Word 
 Poi/in. 
 
 SECT.
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. \ 3 5 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 Concerning the Errors and Ignorance of Man. 
 
 I. Qlnce Man (nay every created Being) is necefTarily of a limited Human Un- 
 u Nature * 'tis plain that he cannot know every thins;. The demanding 
 
 _' * # j , e . u jiecelianly 
 
 molt perfect Creatures therefore are ignorant of many things : Nor ignorant of 
 can they attain to any other Knowledge than what is agreeable to man y thin^. 
 their Nature and Condition : innumerable Truths therefore lie hid 
 from every created Understanding. For perfect and infinite Know- 
 ledge belongs to God alone ; and it muft be determin'd by his Plea- 
 fure, what degree every one is to be endow'd with : for he only knows 
 the nature and necemty of each, and has- given what is agreeable there- 
 to. Ignorance is therefore an Evil of Defect, and no more to be a- 
 voided than the other kind of Imperfection ; for an imperfect Nature 
 (as that of all Creatures is) underftands alfo imperfectly. 
 
 II. As to human Knowledge, 'tis confefs'd that we acquire it by e at ? fom f" 
 
 o * x * times forced 
 
 the Senfes, and that certain Characters denote, not fo much the Na- tQ ma k e u fe 
 tures, as the XJfes and Differences of things *f-. Now, fince things very ofconjec- 
 difFerent internally, have fometimes the fame external Marks, wemuftf^emay 
 of neceflity be often doubtful, and fometimes deceiv'd by the Simili- not only be 
 tude of the Marks. IffoSfite' 
 
 Neither is it fumcient to the avoiding of Error, that we fufpend 
 our aflent in doubtful Cafes, for 'tis often necefiary for us (efpecially 
 if we have to do with other Perfons) to act upon conjecture, and re- 
 folve upon action, before we have thoro'ly difcufs'd the Point, or dif- 
 cover'd the Truth : on which account it is impoflible that we mould 
 
 totally 
 
 * See Note 28. 
 f Fcr a right Under fanning of this Seel ion, review our Jlutl.ofs Note A^
 
 I 36 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 totally avoid Errors. God muft therefore either have made no fuch 
 Animal as Man is, or one that is liable to Errors. As Contrariety re- 
 mits from Motion, which is as it were the action of Matter, fo a 
 poffibility of Error is confequent upon the Action of a finite Under- 
 ftanding. 
 God could HI. If any one reply, that God can immediately reveal the Truth 
 not guard U3 to us in fuch Cafes : I anfwer, he may fo, nor can it be denied that 
 Errors uTth- ne nas done, and will do it fometimes : but that this mould be done al- 
 out violence ways, would be a violence repugnant to the Nature and Condition of 
 done to Man, and could not poffibly be done without more and greater Evils 
 arifing from an interruption of the courfe of Nature. Now we muft 
 diftinguifh between thofe Errors which we fall into after our utmoft 
 diligence and application, and fuch as we are led into by carelefnefs, 
 negligence, and a depraved Will. Errors of the former kind are to 
 be reckon'd among Natural Evils, and not imputable to us : for they 
 arife from the very State and Condition of the Mind of Man, and are 
 not to be avoided, unlefs God would change the Species of Beings, 
 and order that different things mould not affect the Senfes in the fame 
 manner, that is, that there mould be no more Species nor Individu- 
 als, than there are Senfaiions in us: for if the Number of thefe ex- 
 ceed the Defcrimination or Combination of our Senfations, variety of 
 them muft neceflarily produce either the very fame Senfations in us, 
 'Or none at all, and a great many anfwer to the fame Senfation, fo 
 that we muft certainly be fometimes impofed upon by the fimilitude 
 of things. Either then the Diftinctions of our Senfations muft be 
 multiplied in infinitum , or the infinite variety of fenfible Objects taken 
 away. But 'tis evident that neither could have been done in this 
 prefent State. We muft therefore bear the Inconvenience, not only 
 of being ignorant of innumerable things, but alfo of erring in ma- 
 ny Cafes. 
 Idan is not IV. To this it may be replied, that Error is a Defect in that part 
 f ex ^ r ? m, "-of Man, in the perfection of which his Happinefs chiefly confiftsj if 
 caufe expo- therefore he may naturally fall into Errors, it follows, that Man may 
 fed to Errors. |> e naturally miferable without his fault. But I anfwer: Any parti- 
 cular Evil does not bring Mifery upon us, otherwife every Crea- 
 ture would be miferable, as of necefiity labouring under the E- 
 vils of Imperfection* He only therefore is to be denominated mife- 
 rable,
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. j^- 
 
 rMe, who is oppreffed with more and greater Evils than his Good 
 can requite with Happinefs. So that upon ballancing the Conve- 
 niences and Inconveniencies of Life, it were better for him not to be 
 than to be. 
 
 V. 'Tisto be obferv'd alfo, that God has in his Wifdom and Good- Thofc E . r ' 
 nefs fo temper'd our prefent State, that we very feldom, if ever, fall ^eVaii into 
 into grievous and pernicious Errors without our own fault. But if without our 
 this ever come to pafs, as foon as the Evil preponderates, Life is ta- ^0,^ r . 
 ken away together with the benefits of Nature. Now 'tis to be e- nidous. 
 fteem'd an Happinefs, and an Argument of the Divine Goodnefs, that 
 the Natural Benefits of Life cannot be taken from us, but Life is ta- 
 ken alfo. Life then can be a burden to none; nor is it necelfary that 
 any one mould withdraw himfelf from natural Evils, by voluntarily 
 putting an end to his Life. For if thefe Evils be fuch as take away 
 the Benefits of Life, they alfo bring it to an end. God produced all 
 things out of nothing, and gave us Being without our Advice, he 
 feems therefore obliged in Juflice not to fuffer us to be reduced to a 
 State that is worfe than Non-entity. (55.) When therefore any State 
 is overwhelmed with Evils which outweigh the Good, 'tis reafbnable 
 that God mould remit us to our former State, that is, let us return 
 to nothing. Neither ought we to accufe the Divine Power and Good- 
 nefs which has beftow'd as many Bleffings and Benefits upon us, as 
 either the whole Univerfc or our own Nature would admit of; and 
 fince it was impoflible but that fome time or other, upon the increafe 
 of Evils, his Gift (viz. Life) muft become burdenfome, when this 
 happens he breaks off its thread. 
 
 VI. But 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (55.) It would be fo indeed if this were our 
 only State : but as it is at prefent, I fear many 
 have nothing but the hopes and expectations of 
 another to fupport them under almolt complete 
 Mifery; to comfort and encourage them to un- 
 dergo Evils infinitely greater than all the be- 
 nefits of Life: Evils, which make Life itfelf 
 an Evil,and (as our Author fays) put them into 
 a State worfe than nothtng. Witntft the long 
 
 and acute Torments of numerous Martyrs, the 
 Pains of Confeftbrs, the Labours of commoH 
 Galley-Slaves, &c. But the lealt hint of this is 
 fufheient, and the common anfwers to it very 
 fatisfaclory : as will perhaps appear from the 
 References to the laft Chapter of the Appendix 
 to this Book, where this Queftion comes more 
 properly under confidcratioru
 
 t38 
 
 Our Know- 
 ledge is adap 
 ted to our 
 State. 
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 VI. But Man, you'll fay, is ignorant of thofe things which it was 
 his greateft Intereft to know, namely, of Truths that are neceffary 
 to the attainment of Felicity. It was convenient for our prefent 
 State to underftand thefe j and who will affirm that God has not be- 
 ftow'd upon us all the Knowledge which is agreeable to our State ? 
 We ought therefore never to be deceiv'd about fuch Truths as thefe, 
 while we apply all proper diligence to the Search. I anfwerj If this 
 be understood of the Happinefs due to us in this Life, 'tis very true ; 
 nor is our Under/landing ever fo far miftaken, as not to inform us of 
 the Truths neceffary to this, kind of Happinefs, if proper care be not 
 wanting. But, fuch Happinefs ought to fuffice us, as may ferve to 
 make Life a Bleffing, and better than the abfence of it. A greater 
 indeed was promifed to the firft Man by a gratuitous Covenant, {$6) 
 
 but 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (t;6) Tho' the firft Man might have been 
 created more perfedt in all his Faculties than a- 
 ny of his Pofierity (which, as fome think, can- 
 not be eafily proved from the account we have 
 of him in Gemfi. *)Tho' this knowledgemight 
 have been at firlt much clearer, as coming en- 
 tire and adult from the immediate hand of his 
 Creator ; yet it feems highly probable,, that 
 this could not have been propagated in a natu- 
 ral way, that is, by any general pre-eftablifh'd 
 Laws, as our prefent Faculties are, but Man- 
 kind, as a fucceflive Body, muft neeeffarily 
 have been left to the known Rules of Propaga- 
 tion, and the prefent Meth d of improving 
 their Intellects, and deriving all their Notices 
 from the common Sources of Senfation and 
 Refle&ion. And fo our bountiful Creator may 
 be fuppoed to have deprived Mankind of no 
 B'effings he could, confident with his other 
 Attribute^, and the order of the Creation, pof- 
 fibly hav>: 1 eftow'd. Nay, why may not he be 
 thought to have converted even this neceffary, 
 unavoidable Imperfection in us, compared with 
 the firft Adam, into a greater Perfe&ion arifing 
 both from our notions of his fall, and the 
 
 confequences of it, and of the wonderful Re- 
 medy prepatcd for it, and prom i led in the fe~ 
 cond AJan ? We feem to be made more high- 
 ly fenfible of the infinite Wifdom and Good- 
 nefs of God, and more thankful for our Con- 
 dition, from our knowledge of his juflperniif- 
 fion of fo deferv'd a FalJ ; and his gracious 
 undeferv'd' Ex<i/ttitii/! of us agVin to a fupcrior 
 State, than if we had conceiv'd the Mifery at- 
 tending human Nature to be (as perhips mod 
 of it was) a neceffary confequence of our being 
 created in this inferior Clafs. But whether thi* 
 Notion be allow'd or not, the Scheme of Pro- 
 vidence relating to Paradife , &c. as deliver'd in 
 Holy Scripture, if taken altogether, can be no 
 juft Objection againit the moral Attributes of 
 God. He created Man entirely innocent, and 
 abfolutely free, which Freedom was abfolutely 
 neceffary to his Happinefs (as will appear un- 
 der the head of Moral Evil.) He gave him 
 the Means and Abilities to complete his Hap- 
 pinefs, and placed him in a World every way 
 fuited to his Condition. This Liberty made it 
 poflifele for him. to lofe that Innocence, tho' he 
 had but one angle opportunity of doing it f, 
 
 and 
 
 C.8. 
 
 * See Bayle under the Word Adam, Remark D. And Curcellaei Jnjiit. Re/. Chrijl. t 3. 
 p 108, cifV. And DiJJert.de Pecc. Orig. fc . er Epifcopius Inft. Tkeol. 1. 4. C.6,7. p-35&>359- 
 f See Nichols' i Conferente with a Tbeiji, p. 220, 221. ift Edition.
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 but when that was once broken by Sin, he and his Pofterity were re- 
 manded to thofe imperfect Notices which could be had from an im- 
 perfect Understanding, and the Information of the Senfes j which yer 
 are not in the lead to be defpifed, neither had Man a Right, nor could 
 
 T 2 he 
 
 *39 
 
 N O 7* E S. 
 
 and it was highly reafbnable and neceffary that 
 he fhould have that ||. This one Opportunity 
 he embraced, (which it dees not feem poffible 
 for God himfelf, tho' he forcfaw it, to have 
 prevented, confidently with that Freedom he 
 had for good reafons given him, and determin'd 
 thus to exercife) and fo alter' d his Nature and 
 Circumftances, and confequently made it ne- 
 ceffary for God alfo to change his Place and 
 Condition, and to withdraw fuch extraordina- 
 ry favours as his infinite Wifdom and Good- 
 nefs might otherwife have thought proper to 
 bellow. Thus, with his Innocence, Man loft 
 all Title to a Continuance in Paradife, and of 
 confequence became naturally liable to the 
 common Evils and Calamities of a tranfitory 
 Life, and the Pains attending its Conclufion. 
 Thofe that defcended from him, and partook 
 of the fame Nature, muft neceffarily partake of 
 the fame Infirmities; in particular, they muft 
 inherit Corruption and Mortality. Which Evils, 
 tho we now lament them as the chief Parts of 
 our Fore-fithcrs Punifhmcnt, yet could not in 
 the prefent Circumftances of things be preven- 
 ted ; nor indeed, were fuch a Prevention pof- 
 fible, would it be in the main defirable ; as 
 will appear immediately: nay the fe, by a mod 
 wonderful Scheme of Providence, are infinite- 
 ly", out weigh' d, and made the means of bring- 
 ing us to much greater Happinef - , by Faith in 
 him who was promifed from the Beginning, 
 ani hath in thefe latter Days brought Life and 
 Inatr upttbtlity to Light. " Since the Fall of 
 Man (fays the incomparable Sherlock on Death, 
 " p. 101.) Mortality and Death is neceflary to 
 " the good Government of the World : no- 
 " thing elfe can give a check to fome Men's 
 " Wickedncft, but either the Fear of Death or 
 
 " the Execution of it : fome Men are fo otif- 
 
 " ragioufly wicked, that nothing can put a 
 
 " ftop to them, and prevent the Mifchief they 
 
 " do in the World, but to cut them off: this 
 
 " is the Reafon of Capital Punifhments among 
 
 " Men, to remove thofe out of the World 
 
 " who will be a Plague to Mankind while 
 
 " they live in it. For this reafon God de- 
 
 " ftroy'd the whole Race of Mankind by a De- 
 
 '* luge of Water, excepting Noah and his Fa- 
 
 " mily, becaufe they were incurably wicked : 
 
 " For this reafon he fends Plagues and Fa- 
 
 " mines, and Sword, to correcf the exorbi- 
 
 " tant Growth of Wickednefs, to leflen the 
 
 " number of Sinners, and to lay Reftraints on 
 
 " them. And if the World be fuch a Bedlam 
 
 " as it is under all thefe Reftraints, what would 
 
 " it be were it filled with immortal Sinners! 
 
 And again, p. 105. " When Man had fin- 
 
 " ned, it was neceffary that he fhould die, be- 
 
 " caufe he could never be completely and per- 
 
 " feflly happy in this World, as you have al- 
 
 " ready heard : and the only poffible way to 
 
 *' make him happy, was, to tranflate him into 
 
 " another World, and to bellow a better Im- 
 
 " mortality on him: This God has done, and 
 
 " that in a very ftupendous way, by giving his 
 
 " own Son to die for us; and now we have 
 
 " little reafon te complain that we all die in 
 
 " Adam, fince we are made alive in Chrift, 
 
 " Ciff." 
 
 A great many more Arguments on this Sub- 
 ject may be feen in the fame Book, Chap. 3. 
 ^ 2. All which muft be obferv'd to relate 
 chiefly to the Government of Man after hi 
 Fall : the Fall itfelf will be accounted for in 
 the next Chapter. Sec Note 106. 
 
 || See Dr. J. Clarke in Moral Evil, p. 211. &c. and Limbqrch fhtsl. Chrjjl. L. 3. C. Zt V~2 
 and Jcnkin'i Rea/on.of the Chrijf, Re!i* vol. 2. C. 13. p 253, 254. 5th Edition.
 
 j:j.o Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 he naturally attain to greater Perfection. For when the Faculties of 
 our Souls were injured, and the health and vigour of our Bodies im- 
 pair'd by our own Vices, as well a? thofe of our Parents; our natural 
 Perfections muff, necellarily be impaired alio. For fince our Know- 
 ledge is to be acquired by Care, Induftry and Inltruction, if Mankind 
 had continued innocent, and with diligent care communicated true 
 Notions of things to their Pofterity ; and had not infected their OfF- 
 fpring by Example, Infl ruction, or any Contagion attending Propa- 
 gation, we fhould have been lefs liable to Errors; nay free from per- 
 nicious ones ; and have enjoy 'd a more perfect Knowledge of things. 
 For our native intellectual Faculty would have been ftronger, and 
 being better furnifh'd both with the Means and Principles of Science 
 than we now are, we fhould more eafily have prevented the Occa- 
 fions of Err^r. All pernicious Errors therefore, at leaft in Matters of 
 Neceffity, are to be imputed to our own Guilt, or that of our Pa- 
 rents * 
 
 VII. If any be fo ungrateful as to murmur ftill, and affirm, that 
 We prefer he would not accept of Life on thefe Conditions, if he might but 
 Life, with all ^ his Choice; and that himfelf is the beft judge of his own Inte- 
 
 its mconve- Jo 
 
 niencies, be- reft, and he no Benefactor that obtrudes a Gift upon a Man againft his 
 fore Death. Will : that confequently he owes no thanks to God on accountof Life 
 which Life he would refufe : We muft reply ; that thus indeed impi- 
 ous Men and Fools are ufed to prate, but this does not come from 
 their Hearts and Confciences. For none are more afraid of Death, 
 none more tenacious of Life, than they that talk thus idly. A great 
 many of them profefs that they don't believe a future Life, and if fo, 
 they may reduce themfelves to the wifh'd-for ftate of Annihilation as 
 foon as tney pleafe, and caft off that Exijtence which is fo difagreeable. 
 No Perfon therefore, except he be corrupted in his Judgment, and in- 
 dulges himfelf in Error, can ferioufly prefer Non-exiftence to the 
 prefent Life. (57.) 
 
 VIII. But 
 NOTES. 
 
 (57.) * Self-murder is fo unnatural a Sin, 
 " that 'tis now-a-days thought leafon enough 
 " to prove any Man diitra&ed. We have too 
 
 " many fad Examples whit a difhirbed Imagi- 
 " nation will do, if that muft pafs for natural 
 " Diflrattion ; but we feldom or never hear, 
 
 that 
 
 For what retain to tbt Doiirine of Original Sin, &c. fee the latter end of the- next Seflm, 
 and Note 58;
 
 Concerning Natural E^:!. i\ 
 
 VIII. But if any one think fo from his Heart, he is not fallen into ^me Dut 
 this Opinion from any natural Evil, but from others which he brought $ e h tIves J 
 upon himielf by wrong Elections. We fee many Perfons weary of Life, account of 
 but 'tis becaufeof their bad Management, left they mould be ridicu- i y ,turaI > but 
 lous for miffing of Honour, of Riches, or fome empty End which Evils." 17 
 they have unreafonably propofed to themfelves. But very few have 
 
 been excited to Self-murder by any natural and abfolutely unavoidable 
 Evil or Error. Life therefore, of what kind foever it is, muftbe look'd 
 upon as a benefit in the judgment of Mankind, and we ought to pay 
 our grateful acknowledgments to God, as the powerful and beneficent 
 Author of it. Nor will it be any prejudice to the Divine Goodnefs, if 
 one or two throw Life away in defpair. For it is to be fuppofed, that 
 this proceeds not from the greatnefs of any natural Evil, but from 
 Impatience, from fome depraved Election; of which more hereafter. 
 For none of the Brutes which are deftitute of Free-will, ever quitted 
 its Life fpontaneoufly, thro' the uneafinefs of Grief, or a Diftemper. 
 If any Man therefore has killed himfelf voluntarily, we muft conclude 
 that he did this, as all other wicked Actions, by a depraved Choice. 
 
 IX. As to the fecond fort of Errors, into which we are led, not by Thofe Errors- 
 nature, but carelefnefs, negligence, curiofity, or a depraved will, the J to \-iir 
 number of thefc is greater, and their effects more pernicious : nay 'tis own fault, 
 thefe only which load and infeft Life with intolerable Evils, fo as to J^J^ a . 
 make us wilh that we had never been. But fince they come upon us mong Moral 
 thro' our own fault, they are not to be reckon'd among Natural Evils, Evils - 
 
 but belong to the third kind, viz. the Moral, to which we haften : 
 But we muft firft Him up what has been deliver'd in this Chapter. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 " that mere external Sufferings, how fevere fo- 
 
 " ever, tempt Men to kill themfelves. The 
 
 " Stoics themfelves, whofe Principle it was to 
 
 " break their Prifon when they found them- 
 
 M felves uneafy, very rarely put it into practice: 
 
 *' Nature was too ftrong for their Philofophy . 
 
 " and tho' their Philofophy allow'd them to 
 
 " die when they pleas'd, yet Nature taught 
 " them to live as long as they could ; and we 
 " fee that they feldom thought themfelves mi- 
 " ferable enough to die. Sherlock on Provi- 
 dence, C. 7. p. 249, 250. 2d Edition. Sec alfo 
 Note 104, andCh. 2. par. 7. 
 
 SECT.
 
 1^.2 Concerning Natural Evil 
 
 S E C T. V. 
 
 Containing the Sum of what has been /aid on 
 
 Natural Evils/ 
 
 The whole I- "I N order to give the Reader a better view of what has been faid 
 Univerfe one | already, we muft conceive this whole World as one Syftem, 
 *^ e j"' J r whereof all particular things are the parts and Members, and every one 
 thing is a has its place and office, as the Members have in our own Body, or the 
 p rt - Rafters in a Houfe, the i)oors, Windows, Chambers and Clofets : 
 
 Neither is there any thing ufelefs or fuperfluous in the whole : and 
 in order to unite all more clofely together, nothing is felf-fufficient, 
 but as it is qualified to help others, fo it ftands in need of the help of 
 others for its more commodious Subfiftence. And tho' in i^o immenfe 
 a Machine we do not clearly perceive the connection or mutual de- 
 pendence of the parts in every refpecl:, yet we are certain that the 
 thing is fo. In many Cafes 'tis fo evident, that he will be efteem'd a 
 Mad-man who denies it. Since therefore the World is to be look'd 
 upon as one Building, we muft recoiled:, how many different parts, 
 and how various, fo grand, fo magnificent an Edifice lhould confift 
 of. We may defign a Houfe, divided into Halls, Parlours and Clo- 
 fets; but unlefs there be a Kitchen too, and places fet apart for more 
 ignoble, more uncomely Offices, 'twill not be fit for Habitation. The 
 fame may be affirm'd of the World and the frame of it. God could 
 have filled it all with Suns : but who will engage that fuch a Syftem 
 would be capable of living Creatures, or proper to preferve Moti- 
 on. He cculd have made the Earth of Gold, or Gems: But in the 
 mean while dejiitute of Inhabitants, He that has lived a Day or two 
 
 without
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 14? 
 
 without Food, would prefer a Dunghill to fuch an Earth. God could 
 have created Man immortal, without Paffions, without a Senfe of Plea- 
 fure or Pain ; but he mud have been without a Jblid Body alfo, and 
 an inhabitant of fome other Region, not the Earth. He could have 
 made the whole human Body any^,but then it would have been unfit 
 for Motion, Nutrition, and all the other functions of Life. He could 
 have taken away the contrariety of Appetites, but the contrariety of 
 Motions (nay Motion itfelf) mull have been taken away with it. He 
 could have prevented the fruftrating of Appetites, but that muft have 
 been by making them not oppofite; for 'tis impofiible that contrary 
 Appetites, or fuch as defire what is at the lame time occupied by 
 others, mould all at once be fatisfied. He could, in the Ian: place, have 
 framed Man free from Errors, but then he muft not have made ufe 
 of Matter for an Organ of Senfation, which the very Nature of our 
 Soul requires. 
 
 II. In fhort, if the mundane Syftem be taken together, if all the If r the whoIe 
 Parts and Seafons of it be compared with one another, we muft be-yand all its 
 lieve that it could not poffibly be better; if any part could be f arts be '*" 
 
 r orfe ; if one aboundeq none could * 
 
 be changed 
 but for the 
 worfe. 
 
 changed for the better, another would be worfe 
 with greater Conveniencies, another would be expofed to greater E- 
 vils ; and that neceflarily from the natural Imperfection of all Crea- 
 tures. A Creature is defcended from God, a moft perfect Father ; but 
 from nothing as its Mother, which is Imperfection itfelf. All finite 
 things therefore partake of nothing, and are nothing beyond their 
 Bounds. When therefore we are come to the bounds which nature 
 has fet, whoever perceives any thing, muft neceflarily perceive alfo 
 that he is deficient, and feek for fomething without himfelf to fup- 
 port him. Hence come Evils, hence oppofition of things, and, as it 
 were, a mutilation in the Work of God. Hence, for the moft part, 
 Men fear and defire, grieve and rejoyce. Hence Errors and Dark- 
 nels of the Mind. Hence Troops of Miferies marching thro' human 
 Life : whether thefe grow for the punifhmenx of Mortals, or attend 
 Life by the neceffity of Nature j that is, whether they proceed from 
 the conftitution of Nature itfelf, or are external and acquired by our 
 Choice. Nor need we the bloody Battle of the Ancients, nor the ma- 
 licious God of the Manichees for Authors of them. Nor is it any Ar- 
 gument againft the Divine Omnipotence, that he could not free a 
 
 Creature
 
 oi -it. 
 
 144 Concerning Natural EvH. 
 
 'Creature in its own Nature neceflarily imperfect, from that native 
 Imperfection, and the Evils confequent upon it. He might, as we 
 have often laid, have not created mortal Inhabitants, and fuch as 
 were liable to Fears and Griefs: nor, as will be declared below, 
 fuch as by their depraved Elections might deferve Punifliments: but 
 with regard to the Syftem of the whole, 'twas neceflary that he fhould 
 create thefe or none at all : either the Earth muft be replenim'd with 
 thefe, or left deftitute of Inhabitants. Nor could any of the forego- 
 ing particulars be omitted, but that very Omiflion would bring along 
 with it much greater Evils. 
 Hence the W From hence fprang the Error of the 'Epicureans, who preten- 
 Errorofthe ded that this World was unworthy of a good and powerful God. 
 who knew They, we may believe, knew only the leaft part, and as it were the 
 only the Sink of the World viz. our Earth. They never considered the good 
 !"rft "** anc * b eautu<u l P art f Nature, but only contemplated the Griefs, 
 Difcafes, Death and Deftruction of Mortals, when they denied that 
 God was the Author of fo many Evils : In the interim they forgot 
 that the Earth is in a manner the Filth and OrTscouring of the 
 Mundane Syftem : and that the Workmanmip of God is no more to 
 be condemn'd for it, than a Judgment is to be form'd of the beau- 
 ty of an Houfe from the Sink or Jakes. They were ignorant alfo 
 that the Earth was made in the manner it now is, not for itfelf 
 alone, but in order to be fubfervient to the Good of the whole ; 
 and that it is filled with fuch Animals as it is capable of, with a due 
 (Subordination to the Good of the Univerfe, and the Felicity of 
 j Souls that inhabit the purer and brighter Parts of this Fabric, viz. 
 \ the /Ether and the Heavens. Thefe .are as it were the Gardens, Parks, 
 j and Palaces of the World j this Earth, the Dunghill, or (as fome will 
 I have it) the Work-houfe. Nor is it a greater wonder that God 
 I mould make thefe, than the Inteftines, and lefs comely, but yet ne- 
 x:eflary Parts of human Body. Laftly, they are unmindful that more 
 and greater Good is to be found here than Evil, otherwife they 
 .themfelves would reject Life.: and he that has more good than E- 
 vil is not miferable except he will. If therefore we would compare 
 the Good things with the Evil : if we could view the whole Work* 
 manfliip of God: if we thoro'ly understand the Connections, Subor- 
 dinations,
 
 Concerning Natural Evil. 14.5 
 
 dinations, and mutual Relations of things, the mutual afTiftance which 
 they afford each other; and laftly, the whole feries and order of them; 
 it would appear that the World is as well as it could poffibly be ; and 
 that no Evil in it could be avoided, which would not occafiona grea- 
 ter by its abfence. 
 
 IV. We have endeavour'd to clear up thefe Points, and I hope effec- pi^the" 
 tually, as to this kind of Evil. For, upon the fuppofition of our Difficulty, 
 Principles, which, by the way, are commonly acknowledg'd, fome EvuTs\Z[ 
 natural Evils mufr. inevitably be admitted; and if even one could a- it arifes from 
 rife in the Work of an infinitely wife and good God, there's no occa- jJjji/oZ "*" 
 fion for the Bad Principle as the Origin of Evil, for Evil might have created Be- 
 exifted notwithstanding the Divine Omnipotence and Infinite Good- i n 8 s and 
 nefs. The difficult Queftion then, Whence comes Evil? is not unan- avoided 
 fwerable. For it arifes from the very nature and conflitution of crea- without * 
 ted Beings, and could not be avoided without a contradiction. And ^ tra 1C ~ 
 tho' we be not able to apply thefe Principles to all particular cafes and 
 circumftances, yet we are fure enough that they may be applied. Nor 
 
 mould we be concern'd, that we are at a lofs to account for fome par- 
 ticulars; for this is common in the Solution of almofr. all natural 
 Phenomena, and yet we acquiefce. For prefuppofing fome Princi- 
 ples, fuch as Matter, Motion, &c. tho' we are ignorant what Matter 
 and Motion are in any particular Body, yet^ from the variety of thefe, 
 we take it for granted that various Compofitions and Qualities pro- 
 ceed. In like manner alfo we are perfuaded, that from the various 
 kinds of Imperfection necefiarily inherent in things, various Species of 
 Evils arife, tho' in fome the manner in which this comes to pafs does 
 not appear, agreeable to what we experience in Light and Colours ; 
 we are certain that Colours arife from the different difpofition, refrac- 
 tion and reflection of Light; but yet none can certainly tell how it is 
 reflected or refracted when it forms a blew, a green, or any other Co- 
 lour: So that I dare affirm, that the Origin of natural Evil is more 
 eafily afiign'd, and more clearly and particularly folv'd, than that of 
 Colours, Taftes, or any fenfible Quality whatfoever. 
 
 V. I confefs, that according to this Hypothefis, Natural Evils pro- Th - s recon 
 ceed from the original Condition of things, and arc not permitted by riled with 
 
 u God; *?/*/** 
 
 which docs 
 not attrilutc .ill kinds ofnatur.il Evil to the fall fcf the" full Man.
 
 i- 4 6 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 God, but In order to prevent greater, which fome perhaps may think 
 repugnant to facred Hiitory, and the Doctrine of MofeS. For they 
 will have it, that the abufe of Free-will was the Caufe of all natural 
 Evils, and that when God created every thing good and perfect in its 
 kind, it was afterwards corrupted by Sin, and fubjected to natural E- 
 vils : but this is afTerted without Proof. For the Scripture no where 
 teaches that there would have been no manner of natural Evil, if 
 Man had not finned. God indeed made all things good and perfect in 
 their kind, that is, he created and fti'll prefe'rves every thing in a flate 
 and condition fuitable to the whole Syftem Of Beings, and which it 
 need have no Reafon to repent of except it will. But neither the 
 Goodnefs of God, nor the Perfection that belongs to the Nature of 
 things, required that all natural Evils fhould be removed: for fome 
 created Beings have Evils inherent in their very Natures, ' which God 
 mull of neceffity either tolerate cr not create thofe things in which 
 they do inhere. If therefore the facred Hiftory be carefully exami- 
 ned, it will appear that fome kinds of Evils are attributed to the Sin 
 of the firfl Man, but others not. Of the former kind are, frft, the 
 Mortality of Man, who wOuld otherwife have been immortal by 
 Grace. Secondly , the Barrennefs of the Earth, and growth of noxious 
 and unprofitable Plants in the Room of fuch as were fit for Food, for 
 the punifhment of Mankind. 'Thirdly, that hard Labour neceffary for 
 providing Food, which is a confequence of the former. Fourthly, 
 that impotent AffeBion and Neceflity of Obedience whereby Women are 
 made fubject to Men. Fifthly, the pains of Child-birth. Sixthly, the 
 Enmity between Man and the Serpentine kind. Seventhly, Banifhment 
 out of Paradife, /. e. as appears to me, an Expulfion out of the State 
 of Grace, in which the Favour of God had placed Man above what 
 was due to his Nature. Thefe, and fome others, are exprefly enu- 
 merated as punifhments of the Fifft Fall. (58.) But befides thefe 
 
 there 
 
 (58.) For an account of the Scripture Hi- 
 Apry relating to the Fall of Adam, and the c:>n- 
 iequences of it, both wpon himfelf and'his Po- 
 ferity, fee ttfofs Boyle's Le& Serm. 5. 2d Set. 
 Rymffs general Reprefentation of reveal* d Kelt- ! 
 
 gun, Parti. C. 4. and Dr. J '.Clarke on Moral 16, and his Dijfert. de Pecu Originu 
 IW/p,z24, &V. or D'Oylfs fourDiflertatiohs,,] 
 
 C. 1. p. 3. Note b, and C 9. p 97, cifV. or 
 Bp. Tay^lof 's Polentical Difcourfes, p. 614, 615, 
 6z3 See alfo Limborcb's fbeol. Cbriji. L. 3.. 
 C. 3,4,5. or Epiftopiui de Libero Arbitrio, cjV. 
 or Curcellai Rel.CbriJl. Inftit. L. 3. C. 14, L5,
 
 a Of Mord Evil, iaj 
 
 tjiere are many confecruent upon the neceffity of Matter, and concer- 
 ning; which the Scripture has nothing to induce us to believe that they 
 arole from bin. 
 
 VI. Tis to be obferv'd farther, that thefe are not permitted by God The Evils 
 to no purpofe, but* for the good of the Univerfe, and at the fame which do a * 
 
 vf ' { r\c i- \ T\T , r. \1" 7 - L" '- n *' rife from 
 
 time of Man himfelf. For as to Mortality, it was by no means expe- thence are 
 dient for the Syftem, that a linful Creature mould enjoy Immortality, permitted for 
 which was not owing to its nature, butgr suftcdTby an extraormnary ^S2J^ 
 favour of the Deity. Najj God feems to have forbidden our firft Pa- andaifo of ' 
 rents the ufe of the Tree of Life out of mere Companion, left if their ^^nlumfelf. 
 Life mould by virtue of it be prolonged, they mould live for ever 
 miferable. Even this Punimment, as all others, contributes to the 
 reftraint of bad Elections, and the preparation of a new way to Hap- 
 pinefs. For when Man tranfgreffed, and a perverfe abufe of his Free- 
 Will was once introduced, there would have been no end of Madhefs 
 if the Divine Goodnefs had continued to preferve J^ife, underftanding 
 an eafy Food, and the other Gifts of the Primaeval State, to the abufers 
 thereof, as well as to the Innocent. 'Tis notorious how exorbitant bad 
 Elections are even amongft the Cares and Labours which Mortals un- 
 dergo in providing the NecefTaries of Life; and how pernicious ftrength 
 of Parts becomes, when, upon a corruption of the Will, it degenerates 
 into Cunning : how much more intolerable then would it Be if the 
 Fear of Death were away ; if the fame facility of procuring Food, 
 the fame vigour of Intellect, which our Firft Parents enjoy 'd were con- 
 tinued to their corrupt Pofterity. (59.) 
 
 VII. Nay, toconfefs the truth, it could not poffibly continue; for, Mortality, 
 let there be never fo great Plenty of Pi ovifion, it might be all corrup- TMrtt Dif 
 ted by the voluntary Act of one Man. When our Firft Parent had e*fw, &fr. 
 therefore once tranfgrerTed, what hopes could he conceive of his Po- '^J^/ 1 ^ 
 ilerity? Or, by what Right could they claim thefe fupernatural World in 
 Gifts of God ? certainly by none. All then are made mortal, not only *j c <> rrL1 pt 
 thro' the Juftice, but the Goodnefs of God. For, while Men are ob- 
 
 U 2 lig'd 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (59) *e Scerlotk upon Dintb, C 2. V 1. Ifcrr'd to in the beginning of Note 56, parti- 
 par. 3, 4, and C 3. $. 3. As to the Vigour of Icularlv Mr. D'Oy/y's firit D'flert. C. 9. 
 >ur firit Parent's Intellect, fee the Authors re- I
 
 zj. 8 Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 lig'd to ftruggle with Hunger, Thirft, Difeafes and Troubles, few of 
 them are at leifure to run quite mad, and leap over all the bounds of 
 Nature by their depraved Elections. 'Tis better therefore for us to 
 undergo all thefe Inconveniencies, than to be left to ourfelves without 
 reftraint in this corrupt Eftate. For by that means we mould bring 
 upon ourfelves ftill greater Evils. But thefe belong to reveal'd Reli- 
 gion, and this is not a proper Place to treat on them at large. (60.) 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (60.) Thus our Author has, I think, fuffi- 
 cicntly accounted for all forts of Natural Evil ; 
 and demonllrated the to GikTiov y or Melio- 
 rity of things in the Univerfe, taking the whole 
 (as we always ought) together : at leait, he has 
 laid down fuch Principles as may be eafily and 
 effectually applied to that excellent End. He 
 has clearly proved, and clofely purfued this one 
 {ingle Propofition thro' all the above mention' d 
 Particulars, viz. that not one ofthofe Evils or In- 
 conveniencies in our Syfttm could poffibly have been 
 prevented without a greater: which is an ample 
 Vindication, an evident Proof of all the Di- 
 vine Attributes, in the original Frame and 
 Government thereof. And indeed this feems 
 
 to be the bed and mod convincing, if not the 
 only proper Method of handling the Argu- 
 ment and examining the Works of God, fo as 
 to attain a due fenfe of, and regard for the Au- 
 thor of them. Which Maxim therefore, we 
 conclude from the numberlefs inflanccs of its 
 apparent Validity, ought to be allow'd, and 
 may be fafely infilled on, tho' by reafon of our 
 great ignorance of Nature, it cannot always be 
 fo clearly applied. However it has been alrea- 
 dy applied fuccefsfully to the Solution of the 
 molt material Difficulties in the present Que- 
 ttion, as may appear more fully from the Au- 
 thors referr'd to in the foregoing Chapter. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 Introduction, containing the Sub/lance of the Chapter. 
 
 HAVING given fome Account of Natural Evils, the Moral 
 come next under confederation : we are now to trace out the 
 Origin of thefe, and fee of what kind it is, whether they 
 flow from the fame Source with the Natural, viz. the necef- 
 fary ImperjeSlion of created Beings j or we are to feek for fome other 
 entirely different from it. 
 
 By Moral Evils, as we faid before, are understood thofe Inconve- 
 niencies of Life and Condition which befall ourfelves or others thro' 
 wrong Elections. For it is plain that fome inconveniencies happen 
 without our knowledge, or againft our Wills, by the very Order of 
 natural Caufes ; whereas others come upon us knowingly, and in a 
 manner with our Confent (when we choofe either thefe themfelves, or 
 fuch as are necerTarily connected with them.) The Moral are to be 
 reckon'd among the latter kind of Inconveniencies; and he muft be 
 efteem'd the Caufe of them, who knowingly, and of his own accord, 
 brings them either upon himfelf or others by a depraved or foolifl* 
 Choice. 
 
 But, 
 
 \9
 
 i c Concerning Natural Evil. 
 
 But, in order to make this whole Matter concerning Moral Evils 
 more fully underftood, we muft confider in the 
 
 i ft Place, What the Nature of Elections is. 
 
 2dly. That our Happinefs chiefly depends upon Elections. 
 
 3dly. What kind of Elections may be faid to be made amifs, or 
 
 fooliihly. 
 4thly. How we come to fall into depraved or wicked Elections. 
 5thly. How fucb Elections can be reconciled with the Power and 
 
 Go&dnefs of God. 
 
 SECT. L 
 
 Concerning the Nature cf Elections. 
 
 S U B S E C T. I. 
 
 - 
 
 jA. Jfiew of their Opinion who admit of Liberty from 
 Cpmpulfion only, hut not from NeceJJJty. 
 
 That it is not \r\ - ^ . ;< 3 
 
 eafy to under- 1. FF there be any thing obfcure and difficult in Philofophy, we 
 Strife re 8 re- C \ are mre t0 find it in that Part which treats of Elections and 
 fentation of Liberty. There is no point about which the Learned are lefs confj- 
 the Opinions n- ent w j tn themfelves, or more divided from each other. Nor is it an 
 
 concerning ,- % >r ' i n 1 i n V l - J *** Jl ' i 
 
 Liberty. eaiy Matter to underftand them, or to give a certain and true reprt- 
 Someac- fentation of their Opinions. I think they may be diflinguiih'd into 
 Libert* Iran tt^ Sorts, both admitting of a Liberty; One of them from external 
 Compuifion Qompulfion, and not from internal NeceJJity, but the other from 
 
 only, othcrs^^ 
 
 from Neccf- ' tt a 
 
 Jfoyalfo. *!. As
 
 Concerning Ntittfral EviL i $ i 
 
 II. As far as I can understand the Opinion of the former, it is this : Jf h t ^? c " 
 Firft, they obferve that there are certain Appetites implanted in us by Opinion 
 Nature, which are not to be efteerh'd ufefefs, but contributing to- fjj^ ^ that 
 ward our Prefervation, as was (hewn before; and that fome things Appetites 
 are naturally agreeable, fome contrary to thefe Appetites: that the '^planted in 
 
 former, when prefent, pleafe and imprefs a delightful Senfe of them- #Q is a a turc 
 felves ; the latter difpleafe and create uneafinefs. Thefe therefore are ereeabie to 
 called incommodious, troublefome and Evil j and thofe commodious, Jj^giodf " 
 
 Convenient artd Cood. 'he contrary, Evil. 
 
 III. Secondly, That Nature has given us Reajbn, a Mind or Intel- Things are*. 
 lecJ, whereby to difUnguiih Conveniences from Inconveniencies, s ree * blc e r . 
 Good from Evil. And firtce thefe may be confider'd by the Mind in ia threefold 
 a three-fold Refpeft, hence alfo arife three kinds of Good and Ev'A j refpea. 
 namely, Plea/ant, Profitable and Honefi. . kindsofgood 
 
 IV. For if Good be confider'd only with regard to the Appetite, 
 
 which is delighted with the Enjoyment of it, and acquiefces in $v^aiulj c V 
 'tis called Plea/ant. agreeable 
 
 to the Appetite is died Pleafant. 
 
 
 
 V. But if it be not agreeable to the Appetite of itfelf, but only That wh ich 
 co?tne5fed with fomething elfe which is of itfelf agreeable, or produces whhfome 
 Pleafure, and on that account only be defirable, then 'tis called Pro- thing which 
 
 Jitable. For tho' the Appetite cannot come at the immediate Enjoy- p S rc e f a b]e elf is" 
 ment of it, yet the Mind makes ufe of it in order to procure thole called pr'ofi- 
 things which it can enjoy, and from thence it is efleem'd convenient , table - 
 i. e. Good. 
 
 VI. But, fince that which is agreeable to one Appetite, may be re- That which 
 pugnant or lefs agreeable to others ; and that which pleafes now, may [ n i under/ 
 have fome things connected with it, which may be difpleafing after- Handing robe 
 wards, there is need of enquiry and deliberation, in order to .procure th ? beft ' al I 
 
 1 r 1 ^ '1 1 1 U a * W r ^ - , > things conli- 
 
 an ablolute Good, /. e. one which, all Appetites and Times confider d, derd.is abfo- 
 will afford as great, as certain and durable a Pleafure or Delight as ]ut * ] Y g^ d 
 pomble. For this end therefore was the Mind or Understanding gi- Honeft. 
 ven us, that we might be able to determine what appears fitted to be 
 done upon a view of all fuch things as create pleafure or uneafinefs 
 for the prefent or the future. And what is thus judg'd by the Under- 
 standing to be the beft, if there be no Error in the Cafe, muft be 
 look'd upon as Honeft, For that is honeft which is agreeable to a ra- 
 tional
 
 151 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 tional Agent ; but it is agreeable to a rational Agent, and Reafon itfelf 
 directs, that, all things confider'd, we mould prefer that which 
 brings the greater, the more certain and more durable Advan- 
 tages. 
 inftanccs in VII. The Defenders of this Opinion reckon thefe three kinds of 
 didws'.imd Good to be Moral fo far as they refpect Man, becaufe they fall under 
 fuch things the Government of Reafon. But fince all things cannot be always had 
 3 biTto ^luT t0 S etner > a ccmparifon muft be made between them, and that em- 
 Rational braced which appears to be the beft. Now the kinds may be com- 
 AppetUe. pared together, as well as the particulars of each kind. For inftance, 
 Health is a thing pleafant in itfelf, and defirable above all things that 
 relate to the Body, but for the prefervation of it Medicines muft be 
 fometimes taken, which of themfelves are far from being agreeable to 
 the Appetite, but as they are means to an End which is in itfelf de- 
 lightful, they are faid to be profitable, and on that account fit to be 
 chofen. Now the Goods of the Mind are greater, more certain and 
 more durable than thofe of the Body ; if therefore they cannot be had 
 without the Lofs of Health, or even Life, right Reafon dictates, that 
 Health, or even Life muft be defpifed in regard to thefe. For this 
 appears to be themoft convenient, all things confider'd, and on that ac- 
 count is honefi : and as Goods of a different kind may be compared to- 
 gether, fo may alfo particulars of the fame kind, as any one will find 
 that confiders it. 
 He that can VIII. As to Liberty, the Men of this Seel: will have it to confift in 
 adashisown t hi Sj that among all thofe Goods an Agent can embrace that which 
 dJre&TYs pl ea f es hi m beft, and exert thofe Actions which his own Reafon ap- 
 free accor- proves : For, according to thefe Men, he that can follow his own 
 ding to thefe j uc [g mcn t \ n Matters is free. For example, he that is found in Body, 
 and has his Faculties and Limbs entire, if all external Impediments be 
 removed, is at liberty to walk: for he can if he will, and nothing but 
 his will is wanting to exert that Action. 
 But they fup- IX. But as to the Actions of the Will itfelf, namely, to will, or to 
 e fe dJer- WC f u fP en d r ^ e Act f Volition, they think that it is determin'd to thefe, 
 min'd to not by itfelf, for that is impoilible, but from without. If you afk 
 \ hoofe h e J ther from whence? They anfwer, from the Pleafure ovUneafincfs perceiv'd 
 
 goodne.s or Dy 
 
 difag:cc.;blc- 
 
 nefsof objects, perceiv'd by the Intellect or Senfts ; and that therefore we are not free as to the Afis of the 
 
 Will, but only of the inferior Faculties, which are fubject to the det.-rmin.uion of the Will.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 by the Underfranding or the Senfes; but rather, as they imagine, from 
 the prefent or urgent Uneqfinefs : fince therefore thefe are produced in 
 us ab extra, not from the Will itfelf, and are not in its power, but a- 
 rife from the very things; 'tis manifeft, according to thefe Men, that 
 we are not free to will or not to will, at leaft from Necejfity, with re- 
 gard to the immediate Acts of the Will. Some of them therefore ex- 
 prefly deny that Liberty belongs to Man with regard to thefe Acts, or 
 that an Election can be faid to be free, or Man himfelf in that refpect: 
 They will have it therefore, that Liberty belongs to us properly with 
 refpect to the inferior Faculties which are fubject to the Government 
 of the Will, and difcharge their Functions when the Man himfelf has 
 willed: that is, a Man is free to walk who can walk if he pleafes; 
 but not to will ; for he receives the Will to walk from elfewhere : 
 neverthelefs, he that can do what he wills, according to them, is free, 
 tho' he be neceffarily determin'd to will. (61.) 
 
 X. If 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 J 53 
 
 (61.) The mod remarkable Defenders of this 
 Opinion, among the Moderns, feem to be 
 Hobbs, Locke, (if he be confident with himfelf*) 
 Leibnitz, Bay/e, the Authors of the Philofophical 
 Enquiry concerning human Liberty, and of Cato's 
 Letters. But in order to have a more diftinft 
 Notion of the different Schemes of Authors all 
 profefling to treat of Human Liberty, Free-will, 
 &c. Let us in the firft place recite the feveral 
 Powers or Modifications of the Mind, and ob 
 ferve to which of them Liberty is or may be 
 apply'd. Thefe are commonly diftinguifh'd in- 
 to Perception, Judgment, Volition and Action. 
 The two former are generally neceffary, or at 
 leaft always pajjive: For I cannot help feeing a 
 Light when my Eyes are open, nor avoid judg- 
 ing that two and two make four, whenever I 
 think of that Propofition ; tho' I may hinder 
 that Perception by fhutting my Eyes, as well as 
 prevent that Judgment by refufing to think of 
 the Propofition. The Will then may properly 
 enough be faid to influence or impede thefe -f, 
 but this does not make them lefs/^winthem- 
 
 felves ; nay, the more it does influence them, 
 the more evidently they are fo. The third 
 will appear to be the exercife of a Self-moving 
 Principle, and as fuch, cannot properly be mo- 
 ved or influenced by any thing elfe. The laft 
 is the exercife of the inferior Powers, the ac- 
 tual production of Thought or Motion : this is 
 generally directed by, and an immediate confe- 
 quence of Volition, on which account feveral 
 Authors have confounded them together; but 
 tho' they be properly both Afts of the Mind, 
 yet they are certainly diftinft ones : the for- 
 mer is an ability of chooflng fome particular 
 Thoughts or Motions, the other is a power of 
 producing thefe Thoughts or Motions purfu- 
 ant to the aft of choice, or of putting that 
 choice in execution. A careful diftinftion be- 
 tween thefe will help us to judge of all fuch 
 Authors as have either ufed them promifcuoufly 
 or been content to treat of the laft only, as 
 mod of thofe Perfons have that are cited in the 
 14th and following Pages of the Pbihfophical 
 Enquiry* 
 
 Thefe 
 
 Set Note 65. 
 
 f Seo Note 82.
 
 154 Of Moral Evil 
 
 X. If it be granted that this is the Nature of our Elections, there ,S 
 Slow Ac- no doubt but all our Actions are really and truly necefTary. For as to 
 the proper Actions of the Will, to will or fufpend the Act of Voli- 
 tion, the Men whom we are fpeakingof, give up Liberty with refpect 
 to thefe, while they affert that it does not belong to them. For they 
 are of Opinion, that when any thing is propofed by the Underftanding 
 
 to, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 tions are 
 
 abfolutely 
 
 nccefliry. 
 
 Thefe two hit. then being the only active 
 Powers, or rather the only Poteen at all, are the 
 only proper fubjects of Liberty: to which a- 
 gain it is varioufly apply'd. With regard to the 
 Willy fome content themfelves with afTerting 
 its Freedom from external Compulfion only, from 
 being forced contrary to its own bent and in 
 clination ; and indeed it would be very ftrange 
 to fuppofe itotherwife : For to fay that it may 
 fee drawn a contrary way to that which the 
 Mind prefers and directs, h to fay, that it may 
 tend two contrary ways at once, that a Man 
 may will a thing againft his Will, or be ob- 
 lig'd to will what at the fame time he does not 
 will : but then fuch a Freedom as this equally 
 belongs to the two former Powers, which can- 
 not be forced to perceive or judge otherwife 
 than they do perceive or judge, otherwife than 
 as Objects appear, and their own Natures re- 
 quire ; it may be apply'd to any thing the moft 
 necefTary, nay the more necefTary the better. 
 Others therefore have contended for an abfo- 
 lute exemption of the Will from all impercep- 
 tible Byafs or Phyfical Inclination, from all 
 internal neceffity, arifing either from its own 
 frame and conftitution, the impulfe of fuperior 
 Beings, or the operation of Objects, Reafons, 
 Motions, &c. which appear'd to them the very 
 effence of human Liberty, the fole Foundation 
 of Morality. And indeed thefe feem to be 
 the only Perfons that fpeak out, and to the 
 Point, as fhall be Ihewn in the following 
 Notes. 
 
 Laftly, a great many will confine their Idea 
 of Liberty \o Aclion only, and define it to be a 
 power of either actually taking up or laying 
 down a Thought, of beginning Motion or 
 flopping it according to the preference of the 
 Mind or. Will. Rut if this be all the Liberty 
 
 we have, 'tis of fmall confequence, fince we 
 are confeious that in fatl all fuch Actions, fup- 
 pofing the Organs to be rightly difpofed, fol- 
 low the determination of the Will ; and alfo, 
 that in reafon they are no farther moral, nor we 
 accountable for them than as they do fo; we 
 muft therefore go up higher than this before we 
 come at any valuable Liberty, and the main 
 Queftion will be, Whether Man is free to think 
 'or refolve upon, to will or choofe any thing 
 propofed, as well as to exert his other Facul- 
 ties in confequence of fuch a Refolution, Will, 
 or Choice. This is the only Point worth dis- 
 puting, and indeed if Liberty be not here 'tis 
 no where. For if the Mind be abfolutely de- 
 termin'd to choofe in a certain manner in any 
 given Circumftances, its other fubordinate Fa- 
 culties can fcarce be fuppofed to be undeter- 
 min'd ; but the feveral Actions which depend 
 thereon will all follow by necerTary confe- 
 quence. Nay, upon this Hypothefis there is 
 properly no fuch thing as choice or aclion in 
 M.n ; but all arePaffions propagated in a chain 
 of necefTary Caufes and Effects. And indeed 
 all who fuppofe any external Determination of 
 the Will (meaning always a necefTary and irre- 
 fiftible one) whether they place it in the Dejire 
 of Goood, Anxiety for the abfence of it, or the 
 I aft Determination of the Judgment, are involv'd 
 in the fame confequence, how many Steps foe- 
 ver they may take to remove the Difficulty. For 
 it is equal to me, if what Icall my Choice or 
 Action be neceflary,*wherever that Neceffity 
 be placed. 'Tis the fame thing whether I be 
 acted upon and over-ruled by one immediate 
 Caufe, or drawn on by feveral fucceffively. Sup- 
 pofe, v. g. that I am neceffitateft* to obey the 
 laft refult of my own Judgment. From the 
 Exijlenee <f things follow certain Appearances, 
 
 thofe
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 i5S 
 
 to be done, we either will it, or fufpend the Act of Volition concer- 
 ning it, according to the profpect of Happinefs or importunity of 
 the Uneafinefs which appears to the Mind, in the prefent State and 
 Circumftances j by thefe therefore our Election, according to them, is 
 determin'd. 
 
 XI. But when the Election is made, if we can effect: what we will, That huma* 
 then they fay we are free, in refpect of fuch Actions, not from necef- ^ 10 "^ re 
 fity, but only from Compulfion ; for it is plain that nothing but our from Necef- 
 will is wanting, and fuppofing us to will them, they neceflarily fol- ^J* bm 
 low. For inftance, when nothing hinders a Man from walking but 
 his own Will, fuppofing this Volition, it cannot be conceiv'd but 
 that he muft walk, nor can he reft while this continues. If there- 
 fore, according to them, all acts of the Will are neceflary (as being 
 determin'd from without itfelf, viz. by the convenience or inconve- 
 nience of things or circumftances) the actions of the inferior facul- 
 ties will be no lefs neceflary, for they will depend on the fame cir- 
 cumftances and acts of the Will, which, as they are neceflary, thefe 
 actions will be neceflary alfo. (62.) Tho, according to them, there- 
 
 X 2 fore, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 thofe Appearances caufe certain Perceptions, i.e. 
 of pleafure or pain; thefe Perceptions form a 
 Judgment, this Judgment determines the Will, 
 this Will produces Aclion. All this is nVd and 
 inevitable, every Link of the Chain is equally 
 neceflary, and 'tis all one to me on which my 
 Determinations hang: "Tis as good to take 
 them from the firft as laft, fince the fuppofed 
 choice or aclion is as much out of my power, 
 or as incapable of being alter 'd or prevented by 
 me, as the exiftence of external things. 'Tis 
 eafy to obferve how deftructive this and the 
 like Schemes muft prove, as well of Morality as 
 Liberty, both which muft ftand and fall toge- 
 ther, and can, I think, only be fe cured effec- 
 tually upon the Principles laid down by our 
 Author ; of which in their proper place. 
 
 See alfo Mr. Chubb'% Reflections on Natural 
 Liberty. Coll eel ion of Trails, p. 379, &c. or 
 Notes 65, 68, 82. 
 
 Remarks on the Philofophical Enquiry, p. 6 
 
 (62.) To call an Action neceffarj, is proper- 
 ly fpeaking to affirm, that it is no Action: For 
 by the Word Aclion we mean ah immediate ef- 
 fect of what is metaphorically ftiled a Self-mo- 
 ving Power : or, the exercife of an ability which 
 a Being has to begin or determine either thought 
 or Motion. Now, the Idea of this Power in a- 
 ny Being, and of fuch exereife of it, is directly 
 repugnant to that of NeceJJity, which fuppofes 
 the Thought or Motion to be already begun or 
 determined, and to be obtruded on this Being 
 by fomething elfe, and confequently implies x 
 Negation of any fuch Self-moving Power in 
 this Being, or of its exercife by this Being in. 
 the Cafes above mentioned. " To be an A- 
 " g*nt (fays Dr. Clarke,*) fignifies to have a 
 " Power of beginniug Motion, and Motion can- 
 " not begin neceffarily, becaufe NeceJJity of Mc- 
 " tion fuppofes an Efficiency fuperior to, and 
 " irrcfiftible by the thing moved, and confe- 
 
 " quently
 
 156 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 fore there be no Compulfron of the Will, yet there is NeceJ/ity, from. 
 which Neceflity nothing in the World will be free ; nay a great many 
 of them openly profefs to believe that this is the Cafe. 
 
 XII. Now, from this Hypothefis, which they extend to the Di- 
 vine as well as Human Will, the following Corollaries feem deduci- 
 ble. Firft, that nothing in Nature could be done otherwife than it 
 is. For, the whole Series of things being as it were connected toge- 
 ther by Fate, there's no Room for Chance or Liberty, properly fo 
 call'd : Contingency then is removed out of Nature. 
 
 According to 
 
 their opinion 
 
 there is no 
 
 contingency 
 
 in things, 
 
 nor could 
 
 any thing be 
 
 done othcrw ife than it is. 
 
 By Evil they 
 
 XIII. Secondly ; That nothing more can be underftood by wicked 
 or wrong made Elections, than that they are prejudicial to the Elec- 
 nothing more tor or fome others j which Senfe is very remote from the vulgar one; 
 
 than hurtful. q_ 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 ** quently the beginning of Motion cannot be in 
 " that which is moved neceflarily, but in the 
 '* fuperior Caufe, or in the efficiency of fome 
 " other Caufe ftill fuperior to that, till at length 
 ** we arrive at fome Free Agent" Where, 
 tho* the Doctor's Definition of Agency feems 
 to be imperfect, that Word generally includ- 
 ing the power of beginning Thought as well as 
 Motion (which are two diftinft Species of Ac- 
 tion, and proceed from different Powers, tho' 
 they be often confounded together, and com- 
 prehended under the fame general term) yet it 
 fhews us an evident contradiction in thefe two 
 Words neceffary Agent, in cither Senfe : Unlefs 
 lie ufes the Word Agent in both Senfes toge- 
 ther, and then his Reafoning will be falfe, fince 
 what is afted on and determin'd by another in 
 regard to its Thought, Will, &c. and in that 
 Senfe mov'd by a fuperior Efficiency, may yet 
 have a power of beginning real corporeal Mo- 
 tion (which is a quite different fort of Action) 
 in confequence of fuch prc-determin'd Thought, 
 Will, &c. and in that fenfe be an Agent, tho' 
 not a moral one. But what ever the Dr. might 
 mean by the Word Agent, his Argument will 
 hold in either of thefe two Senfes feparate, viz. 
 that nothing can be faid to aS cither in think- 
 ing or moving, which does does not properly 
 if gin the Thought or Motion, but is put into 
 
 Thought or Motion by fomething eife y and al- 
 fo, that every thing cannot be fo put either in- 
 to Thought or Motion ; and therefore, that 
 there muit be fome firft Caufe of both Thought 
 and Motion. 
 
 And will not the fame Argument hold equal- 
 ly for fome firft Caufe of Exiftence ? If the 
 Dr. can fuppofe a firft Caufe of all Thought 
 ad Motion (as he does here,, and we think ve- 
 ry reafonably) why may he not alfo fuppofe a 
 firft Caufe of all Exigence ; and fo entirely ex- 
 clude that antecedent Neceffity which he has often 
 Recourfe to as a kind of fupport of the exiftence 
 of the firft Caufe, but is oblig'd to exclude 
 from its Will and Actions ? Is it harder to 
 conceive how an Eternal Independent Being, 
 or Firft Caufe, may exift without any antece- 
 dent Neceflity, than how it can will or act 
 without any ? 
 
 But to return to the chief Defign of this 
 Note. We fee how neceflary it is for us to 
 fix theprecife meaning of the Word Aclion in a 
 Controverfy of this kind, and if the Significa- 
 tion of it as laid down above be allow'd, then 
 neceflary Action is the fame as paflive Action, 
 or beginning a thing and not beginning it at 
 the fame time, and in the fame refpedt ; in 
 which terms every one perceives it to be a con- 
 tradiction.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 157 
 
 for in that Evil Elections are blamed, not for being hurtful, but for 
 being hurtful without NecerTity, and becaufe they are made otherwife 
 than they ought to have been : In this Hypothefis then there is no E- 
 leftion made amifs. (63.) Nor can any thing be faid to be done other- 
 wife than it ought to be: for what could not poffibly be done other- 
 wife, is certainly done as it ought ; fince it is done according to the ex- 
 igence and neceffary order of things. 
 
 XIV. Thirdly; By the fame Principle all Evil wou'd be in the VHTaaiesare 
 ft.ric.lert. fenfe Natural* for it would derive its Origin from natural and t0 b j-P laccd 
 
 o fo the ac- 
 
 neceffary Caufes. The diftin rt ion then would be loft between natural count of hu- 
 and moral Evil, as commonly underftood. There would be no Mo- manMifer > r 
 ral Evil at all. For that only is reckon'd Moral by the common con- jook'dupon 
 fent of Mankind, of which the Man himfelf is properly the Caufe ; -<s crimes, 
 but no body looks upon himfelf as properly the Caufe of a thing ^JfJ" y 
 which he could not avoid, or to which he was neceffitated by natural 
 Caufes, and fuch as were antecedent to the Will. For every one 
 blames himfelf only on this account, becaufe he was of himfelf necef- 
 farily the Caufe of Evil to himfelf or others. Thofe Inconveniences 
 which come by Neceffity, he looks upon as Miferies, as Misfortunes, 
 but never as a Crime. Thefts therefore, Adulteries, Perjuries, nay 
 the Hatred of God himfelf, and whatever we efteem bafe in Villanies 
 (as well as the difgrace and punifhment attending them) muft be pla- 
 ced to the account of human Mifery and Unhappinefs, but by no 
 means reckon'd criminal, nor any more repugnant to the Will of 
 God, to his Juftice, Purity or Goodnefs, than Heat or Cold. 
 
 XV. Fourthly; When therefore we blame a Thief, Adulterer, Mur- A Ma]efaaor 
 therer, or perjur'd Perfon, when thefe Crimes are arraign'd asfcanda-isreprov'd, 
 lous; this is not done becaufe they have deferv'd it, or becaufe thefe P ot , b ^ cau /? 
 things are in themfelves really fhameful or culpable; but becaufe that it> but be- 
 Infamy may be a means of deterring the guilty Perfons or others from caufe reproof 
 
 * j\ may drive 
 
 the I,- ' r Mm 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 h'm from 
 Evil. 
 
 (63.) Leibnitz declares it to be his fettled O- 
 pinion *, '* That whenever we refolve or will 
 " contrary to an evident Reafon, we are car- 
 ** ricd by fome other Reafon ftronger in appea- 
 
 " ranee. 1 ' If this be always the Cafe, we cer- 
 tainly can never will amifs or unreafonably, 
 Hnce that Reafon which appears to be the 
 ftrongeft ought always to determine us. 
 
 * Rmerquts fur ULivrtde PQrigine duMal. p. 483.
 
 ijS 
 
 Punifliments 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 the like Elections. And this is the only Reafon why we reproach a 
 Thief, &c. and not a fick Perfon, with Infamy; becaufe Reproach 
 may cure a Thief, &c . but can do no Good to a fick Perfon. 
 
 XVI. Fifthly; Malefaflors are punifh'd, not becaufe they deferve 
 
 areapply'dasPunifhment, but becaufe it is expedient, and Laws are made ufe of 
 
 A * sd * ci " es te to reftrain Vices, as Medicines to expel Difeafes ; Men fin therefore 
 
 neither are after the fame manner as they die, viz. becaufe an effectual Remedy 
 
 Laws ufeiefs, W as not apply'd. And yet Laws are not entirely ufelefs, fince they 
 
 prevent vice P revent f me Vices, as Medicines protraft the Deaths of fome difeafed 
 
 Perfons : and a Perfon infecled with the Plague may be as juftly cut 
 
 off by the Law, as a Witch, when by that means there's hope of a- 
 
 voiding the Contagion. (64.) 
 
 w are }~ XVII. Sixthly ; We are oblig'd to repay good Offices, fince by be- 
 
 gr 8 tefui only m g thankful we may excite the Benefador to continue or increafe his 
 
 in profpea Benevolence, and alfo induce others to do us Service. And hence it 
 
 Benefit'^ 6 comes to P a ^ s > tnat we are oblig'd to be grateful towards God and 
 
 Men, but not to the Sun or a Horfe, namely, becaufe God and Men 
 
 may be excited by thanks to fome farther Beneficence, whereas the 
 
 Sun or a Horfe cannot. Thus no regard is to be had to a Benefit 
 
 receiv'd, but only to one that may be receiv'd ; nor are we oblig'd to 
 
 be grateful towards a mofl generous Benefalor for what is paft, but 
 
 only for the profpeft of what is to come. All fenfe of Gratitude 
 
 then, as commonly underftood, is deftroy'd, for the Vulgar reckon him 
 
 a cunning, not a grateful Perfon, who returns one favour merely out 
 
 of hopes of another. 
 
 XVIII. Seventhly ; If this Opinion be true, we mult defpair of hu- 
 man Felicity, for it will not in the leaft be in our own Power, but 
 
 entirely 
 
 According 
 to this Opi- 
 nion, hu- 
 man Hap- 
 pinefs is 
 impoffible. 
 
 f nee it depends upon things which are not in our ; Power. 
 
 N a<r $ s. 
 
 (64. 1 ) All thi.% and a great deal more Co the Jphical Enquiry,, &c. p. 91, $3& and much the 
 
 See bis Treatife on human Liberty, or Bp. BKonhaliV Works, p. 678.
 
 Of Moral Evil, i 59 
 
 entirely depend on external Objects. Our Happinefs (if there be any) 
 mull, according to them, be conceiv'd to arife from the perfect frui- 
 tion of thofe things which are agreeable to the Appetites. Where the 
 contrary to thefe are prefent, or the agreeable ablent, we muft necef- 
 farily be uneafy, and while we ftruggle with Anxieties we cannot be 
 happy. According to this Hypothecs therefore it follows, that our 
 Happinefs neceiTarily requires fuch an Enjoyment as we have fpoken 
 of, and that this is at the fame time fmpoffible. For who can hope 
 that all external things (with which he has _to do) mould be fb tem- 
 per'd as in every refpect to anfwer his Wifhes, fo as never to want 
 what he defires, or be forced to endure any thing contrary to his na- 
 tural Appetites ? If Happinefs arifes from the Enjoyment of thofe 
 things which are agreeable to the Faculties and Appetites, and which, 
 can move Defire by their innate, or at leaft apparent Goodnefs; if al- 
 fo the Will is necefTarily determin'd to thefe, according to the Judg- 
 ment of the Underftanding, or Importunity of Appetites, every Man 
 mud: necefTarily want a great many things which he has chofen, and 
 bear a great many which he willingly would not, than which nothing 
 is more inconfiftent with Felicity. For we cannot poflibly conceive 
 any State of Life wherein all things anfwer to the natural Appetites. 1 " confe-. 
 In vain then do we hope for Happinefs, if it depend upon external ^rcTand" 5 
 
 Objects. thY theArgii* 
 
 XIX. This, and a great deal more that might be added, mutt feem men f t from 
 hard and repugnant to the common Notions of Men, and cannot be hJ^eSenU^ 
 believ'd without extraordinary Prejudice to Mankind. I confefs in- a bad ne,yet 
 deed, that, for the molt, part, one cannot argue well againft an Opi- \ ^l p jjf_ 
 nion from its confequences, fince a great many things are true which dice againti 
 have confequences hard enough: not to mention how eafily we >3M* whieh'Tem* 
 ftake in deducing confequences. But yet when thefe are acknowledged to be attcn- 
 by the Authors themfelves j and, if believ'd, would prove detrimental d , ed wi * . 
 to Morality, they bring no fmall prejudice againft an Opinion which lij^ifSicy be 
 is attended with them, and recommend us to fome other as more .acknowledge 
 probable, tho' it be not fupported by any ftronger Reafons. 
 
 XX. 'Tis to be obferved alfo, that among the foregoing Authors I All thofe 
 reckon thofe who declare that the Will is determin'd by the laft J u dg-^ t t d h e e clarc 
 
 ment will ispaC 
 
 five in its 
 Operations will be elleemsd to be of the fame Opinion with the former, and are preficd with the fame coiv- 
 fequenccs.
 
 160 Of Moral Evil 
 
 ment of the Underftanding *, which has taken with a great many 
 Philofophers ; and, in fhort, all who maintain that the Will is pajjive 
 in Elections. For thefe muft be efteem'd to have the fame Sentiments 
 of Liberty with the former, which way foever they explain their O- 
 pinion ; as may appear from hence, that mofl of 'em exprefly deny 
 that Indifference belongs to the Nature of the Will ; their Opinion 
 therefore is attended with the fame confequences as the former. (65.) 
 
 S U B S E C T. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (65.) As Mr. Locke has particularly laboured 
 the point before us, and feems to defend by 
 turns the feveral Principles which our Author 
 attacks here and in the following Section, we 
 fhall examine a little into his Method of treat- 
 ing the Subject. Having firft of all defin'd 
 Liberty to be "A power in any Agent to 
 " do or forbear any particular Action, accor- 
 " ding to the Determination or Thought of 
 " the Mind, whereby either of them ispreferr'd 
 " to the other ||.'' Hetr.kes a great deal of pains 
 to prove, that fuch Liberty does not belong to 
 the Will: which is very certain, granting his 
 fenfe of Liberty to be the right and only one, 
 fince by his Definition it is evidently fubfe- 
 quent to the choice or preference of the Mind, 
 and only relates to the execution of fuch choice 
 by an inferior faculty \. But then, befide this 
 Idea of Liberty, which is nothing to the pre- 
 fent Queftion, there is another previous and e- 
 qually proper one, which regards the very de- 
 termination, preference or direction of the 
 Mind itfelf, and which could not poffibly be 
 overlook'd ; he proceeds therefore to ftate the 
 Queftion concerning that, which he would not 
 have to be put, whether the Will be fee ? but 
 whether the Mind or Man be free to will ? 
 both which I think amount to much the fame 
 thing with common Underftandings, fince in 
 the firft place we only ask, Whether this Will 
 be properly an active power ? (i.e. as oppofed 
 to Mr. Loch's paffive Power) and in the fecond, 
 Whether the Mind be active in exerting this 
 Power call'd Will ? and both which will be 
 
 equally improper Queftions with regard to his 
 former fenfe of the Word Free, i. e. as only 
 applicable to the Actions fubfequent on Voli- 
 tion. However, he goes on in the fecond 
 place to enquire, whether in general a Man be 
 free " To Will or not to Will, when any 
 " Action is once propofed to his Thoughts, as 
 " presently to be done." In which refpect he 
 determines that a Man is not at liberty, be- 
 caufe he cannot forbear Willing ^ ; which, if 
 taken abfolutely (not to mention its inconfi- 
 ilency with his notion of fufpenfion -j.f) tho* 
 it comprehends (as he fays) molt Cafes in Life, 
 yet is not of the leaft Importance. For, whit 
 does it fignifie to me that I muft neceffarily take 
 one fide or the other, right or wrong, fo long 
 as I can choofe either of them indifferently ? If 
 I can will or choofe either of the two, here's 
 full room for the exercife of Liberty ; and 
 whether I can or no, ought to have been Mr. 
 Locke's next Queftion. The Anfwer to which 
 feems pretty eafy, tho' perhaps not fo reconcila- 
 ble with his Hypothefis. However, infteadof 
 meddling with it, he flips this abfurd Query 
 into its Room, viz.. Whether a Man be at Li- 
 berty to will which of the two he pleafes ? or, 
 which is the fame, Whether he can Will what 
 Wills? Sect. 25. HI', and then, inftead of telling 
 us in which Cafes the Will is free, or the Man 
 free to Will, or whether he be fo in any Cafe 
 at all (as might have been expected) he goes 
 on to give us another Explanation of the word 
 Liberty, which is ftill confined to Action, and 
 confequently foreign to the prefent Queftion. 
 
 In 
 
 * Againft this Notion fee Sect 5- Subfect. 2. par. 13. 
 
 || Q. Of Power, .8. f See Note 6.. % * (,. 23,24: 
 
 JU See Mr. StruttV Remarks on Locke'; Chapter of Power, p. 38, l$c t 
 
 4-f *. 56. 1. M ,kV.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 161 
 
 S U B S E G T. II. 
 
 An Opinion is fropofed in general^ afferting Liberty from 
 Necejfity as "well as Compulfion. 
 
 ' |"*HIS Opinion determines almoft the fame with the former 
 
 I. 
 
 concerning the Goodnefs or agreeablenefs of Objects to the This agrees] 
 Appetites, nor is there much difference in what relates to the diftinc- J^^ * n 
 tion of Good into Pleafant, Profitable, Honeft : Except that it refers moa cafes, 
 
 Honeft? f P e ? a "y 
 
 in thoio 
 relating to 
 the Appetites, to Good, Pleafant, Profitable and Honeft; but determines this to be the difference between 
 a Man and Brute, viz. that the one is determin'd by its bodily Appetite, the other by himfelf. 
 
 n o r E s. 
 
 Tn the next place he defines the Will over a- 
 gain . " Which (fays he) is nothing but a 
 " power in the Mind to direct the operative 
 " Faculties of a Man to Motion or Reft, as far 
 ** as they depend on fuel* direction." By 
 which Words if he mean, that this Power of 
 directing the operative Faculties, is properly 
 a&ive (in the fenfe above mention'd) or Phyfi- 
 cally indifferent to any particular manner of di- 
 recting them, /'. e. is an ability to direct them 
 cither to Motion or Reft, without any natural 
 Byafs to determine it (or to determine the mind 
 to determine it) toward one fide always rather 
 than the other : If, I fiy, he intends to imply 
 thus much in this definition of Will, then may 
 Freedom be juftly predicated of that fame Will 
 (or of the Mind in theexercifeof it) not indeed 
 his kind of Freedom, i. e. that of ailing, which 
 belongs to another Faculty ; but Freedom in 
 our fenfe of the Word, /'. e. a certain phyfical 
 Indifference, or Indeterminatenefs in its own 
 exercife ; which is what moll Men undcrftand 
 
 $ 29. 
 
 by Liberum ArbitriUm ; and whether there be 
 fuch a Liberty as this in human Nature, would 
 here have been a very proper Queftion. For if 
 there be, then we have got an abfolutely felf- 
 moving Principle which does not want any 
 thing out of itfelf to determine it, which has 
 no phyfical connection with, and of confe- 
 quence, no neceffary Occafion for that grand 
 Determiner Anxiety, which he has afterward* 
 taken fo much pains to fettle and explain, and 
 which fhajl be confider'd by and by. But here 
 he flies off again, and inftead of determining 
 this, which is the main point of the controver- 
 fy, and wherein Liberty muft be found, or no 
 where, as we obferv' d in Note 61. I fay, in- 
 ftead of ftating and determining this great Que- 
 ftion, Whether the Will, or the Mind be abfo- 
 lutely independent upon, and phyfical ly indif- 
 ferent to all particular Atts, Objects, Motions, 
 &c. or neceffarily require fome foreign Mover; 
 he feems to take the latter for granted, andjm- 
 mediately proceeds to the following Queftion, 
 
 What
 
 
 1 6a Of Moral Evil. 
 
 Honed to the Duty which a Man owes to God, himfelf and v other 
 Men, as a Member of Intellectual Society, rather than to the na- 
 tural Appetites} and thinks that we are to judge of the Agreable 
 nefs of things from that, rather than from thefe. As to the Elec- 
 tion which the Will makes on account of thefe, it aflerts that 
 this proceeds from the Will itfelf, and that a free Agent can- 
 not be determin'd like natural Bodies by external Impulfes, or like 
 Brutes by Objects. For this is the very difference betwixt Man and 
 the Brutes, that'thefe are determin'd according to their bodily Appe- 
 tites, from whence all their Actions become neceffary, but Man 
 has a different Principle in him, and determines himfelf to Action. 
 That the II. This Principle whereby Man excells the Brutes is thus explain'd 
 
 Ss h neceffart ^ z ^ c Defenders of the following Opinion, if I take their Meaning 
 
 ]y defir'd, right I 
 
 but others 
 
 are not, becaufe they maybe reprefented by the Underftandirg in different refpc&s. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 t*. 
 
 What determines the Will ? The Meaning of 
 tvhich, fays he *, is this, " What moves the 
 u Mind in every particular inftance to deter- 
 " mine its general power of directing to this 
 " or that particular Motion or Reil ? " This 
 Mr. Locke calls, for (hortnefs fake, determinating 
 the Will; and declares, that what thus deter- 
 mines it either firff to continue in the fame 
 ftate or action, is only the prefent Satisfaclion in 
 it : or fecondly to change, is always fome Un~ 
 tajinefs +. By which Words if he only meant, 
 that thefe Perceptions are the common M.tives, 
 Inducement:, or Occajions whereupon the Mind 
 in fact exerts its power of willing in this or 
 that particular Manner; tho' in reality it al- 
 ways can, and often does the contrary (as he 
 feems to mean by fpeaking of a Will contra- 
 ry to Defirej}, of railing Delires by due Confi- 
 deration m m , and forming Appetites 4--f ; of a 
 Power to rufpend any Dcfires, to moderate and 
 reftrain the Paffions, and hinder either of them 
 from determining the Will and engaging us in 
 Action || |t : Then, as we faid of him before, 
 he is only talking of another Queftion, and 
 what he has advanced on this head may readily 
 
 * (f. 29. j- Ibid. [J ^ 30. ** h. 46 
 
 * fc * Concerning which Sufpenjtsn fee Note 68. 
 
 be granted, at lend: without any prejudice to 
 human Liberty. For, in this fenfe to affirm, 
 that the Will or Mind is determin'd by fome- 
 thing without it, is only faying, that it gene- 
 rally has fome Motives horn without, according 
 to which it determines the above mention'd 
 Powers, which no Man in his Senfes can dif- 
 pute. 
 
 But if he intended that thefe Motives fhould 
 be underfiood to rule and direct the Will abfo- 
 lutely and irrefiltibly in certain Cafes. That 
 they have fuch a neceffary influence on the 
 Mind, that it can never be determin'd with- 
 out or againft them; in fhort, that the Soul of 
 Man has not a phyfical Power of willing, in- 
 dependent of, and confequently indifferent to 
 all Perceptions, Reafons and Motives whatfoe- 
 ver; which the general drift of his Difcourfe 
 feems to affert, particularly ^. 47, 48, 49, 50. 
 where he confounds the Determination of the 
 Underftanding with the exertion of the felf- 
 moving Power throughout. Asalfo V 5. where 
 he afferts, " That all the Liberty we have or 
 " are capable of lies in this, that we can fuf- 
 '* fend * m * our Defires, and hold our Wills 
 
 " unde- 
 nt V- 53- ill $> 47>5 C > 53-'
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 right: In the firft place, they declare that there is fome Chief Good t 
 the Enjoyment of which would make a Man completely happy ; this 
 he naturally and neceffarily defires, and cannot reject it when duly re- 
 prefented by the Underftanding. That other things which offer 
 themfelves have a Relation to this Good, or fome Connection with it, 
 and are to be efteem'd Good or Evil, fo far as they contribute to, or 
 hinder our obtaining it ; and fince there is nothing in Nature but 
 what, in fome refpect or other, either promotes this End, or prevents 
 it ; from this Indifference they declare, that we have an Opportunity 
 of rejecting or embracing any thing. For tho' we can choofe nothing 
 but under the Appearance of Good, ;. e. unlefs it be in fome man- 
 ner connected with the Chief Good, as a Medium or Appendant; 
 yet this does not determine the Choice, becaufe every Object may 
 
 Y 2 be 
 
 61 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *' undetermin'd, till we have examin'd the 
 " Good and Evil of what we defire; what 
 " follows after that, follows in a Chain of 
 " Confcquenccs link'd one to another, all de- 
 " pending on the lall Determination of the 
 " Judgment." And when he fpeafcs of Caufes 
 not iii our Power, operating for the mod part 
 forcibly on the Will, . 57, &c. 
 
 If from theie and the like Expreffions, I 
 fay, we may conclude this to have been his O- 
 pinion, viz. that all the Liberty of the Mind 
 confiits folcly in directing the Determination of 
 the Judgment, after which Determination all 
 our Actions (if they can becall'd fuch *) fol- 
 low nccefliirily: then I believe it will appear, 
 that at the farce time that he oppofed the true 
 Notion of Free- Will, he contradicted common 
 Scnfe and Experience as well as himfelf. For 
 in the firft place, is it not felf-evidcnt, that we 
 often do not follow our own Judgment, but 
 run counter to the clear convidion of our Un- 
 derilandings, which Aftions accordingly ap- 
 pear vicious, and fill us immediately with 
 regret and the flings of Confcience. This he 
 
 allows, *). 35, 38, cjrV. to make Room for hi< 
 Anxiety. But, upon the foregoing Hypothefis, 
 How can any Adlion appear to be irregular ? 
 How can anything that is confequent upon the 
 final Refuk of Judgment, be againft Confci- 
 ence, which is nothing elfe but that final 
 Judgment f ? Nay, upon the fuppofition of 
 our being inviolably determin'd in willing by 
 our Judgment (and, according to Mr. Locke, 
 our Conftitution puts us under a neceffity of 
 being fo, V 48.) it would be really impoflible 
 for us to will amifs, or immorally, let our 
 Judgments be never fo erroneous ; " The 
 " Caufes of which (as he alfo obferves, f). 64.)' 
 " proceed from the weak and narrow confti- 
 " tution of our Minds, and are mod of them 
 " out of our Power." Farther, there are in- 
 nummerable indifferent Actions which occur 
 daily, both with refpccT: to abfolute choofing 
 or refufing ; or to choofing among things ab- 
 folutcly equal, equal both in themfelves and to 
 the Mind, on which we evidently pais no man- 
 ner of Judgment, and confequently cannot be 
 faid to follow its Determination in them. To 
 
 wiU 
 
 * See Note 62. 
 
 t See Limborch Theol CbriJI. L. 2. C. 23. V 16. and for an Anfwtr to the latter fart of LockcV 
 48th Seft. fee the fame Ch^p. S- laft.
 
 164. Of Moral Evil 
 
 be varied, and reprefented by the Underflanding under very different 
 Appearances. 
 
 III. Secondly, When therefore any Good is propofed which is not 
 Tho' there- t j ie chief, the Will can fufpend* the Action, and command the Un- 
 
 fore the J Jl * , - 
 
 will fol- demanding 
 
 lows fome 
 
 Judgment of the Ucderftanding, yet it is not neceiTariJy determin'd by it. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 will the eating or not eating of an Egg is a 
 Proof of the former; to choofe one out of two 
 or more Eggs apparently alike is a proverbial 
 Inftance of the latter: both which are demon- 
 ftrations of an aftive or felf moving Power; 
 either way we determine and aft when the 
 Motives are entirely equal, which is the fame 
 afr to aft without any Motive at all. In the 
 former Cafe I perceive no previous Inclination 
 to direft my Will in general, in the latter, no 
 Motive to influence its Determination in par- 
 ticular; and in the prefent Cafe, not to per- 
 ceive a Motive is to have none (except we 
 would be faid to have an Idea without being 
 confcious of it, to be anxious and yet infen- 
 fible of that Anxiety, or fway'd by a Reafon 
 which we do not at all apprehend.) Neither 
 is it neceffary to a true Equality or IndifFerence 
 here, that I be fuppofed to have no Will to ufe 
 any Eggs at all fas the Author of the Philofophi- 
 tal Enquiry, Sec abfurdly puts the Cafe) for, 
 granting in the firft place, that I have not a 
 Will to ufe any Eggs at all, 'tis indeed non- 
 fenfe to fuppofe afterwards that I fhould choofe 
 anyone; but, let me have never fo great an 
 Inclination to eat Eggs in general, yet that ge- 
 neral Inclination will not in the leaft oblige 
 me to choofe or prefer one Egg in particular f, 
 which is the only point in queftion. Numfeer- 
 lefs Inftances might eafily be given, where we 
 often approve, prefer, defire and choofe, and 
 all we know not why : where we either choofe 
 fuch things as have no manner of Good or E- 
 vil in them, excepting what arifes purely from 
 that Choice ; or prefer fome to others, when 
 both are equal. Means to the lame End : in 
 
 which Cafes the Judgment is not in the leaft: 
 concern 1 d, and he that undertakes to oppofe 
 the Principle by which our Author accounts 
 for them, muft either deny all fuch Equality 
 and IndifFerence, or grant the Queftion. But 
 one Inftance is as good as a thoufand, and. he 
 that defires more, may find them defcrib'd in 
 the cleared manner by Dr. Cheyne ||. Now to 
 urge, that fuch Eleftions as thefe are made on 
 purpofe to try my Liberty, which End, fay 
 fome, becomes the Motive, is in effeft grant- 
 ing the very thing we contend for, viz. that 
 the Pleafure attending the exercife of the Will 
 is often the fole reafon of Volition. Befides, 
 that Motive (if it can be call'd fuch) is one 
 of the Mind's own making ; and to be able to 
 produce the Motive for Aft ion, is the fame 
 thing with regard to Liberty, as to be able to 
 aft without one. If by trying our Liberty be 
 meant, an Experiment to aflure us that we real- 
 ly have fuch a Power ; we anfwer, that there 
 can be no reafon for trying it in this fenfe, be- 
 caufe we are fufficiently confcious of it before 
 any fuch Trial. 
 
 " The Mind (fays the Author of the EJfay on 
 " Confcioufnefs, p.308.) before ever it exerts its 
 " Will or Power of choofing, is confcious, and 
 " knows within itfelf, that it hath a Power of 
 " Choice or Preference, and this is a necefla- 
 " ry Condition of willing at all, infomuch 
 M that the very firft time I had occafion to ex- 
 " ert my Will, or make ufe of my eleftive 
 " Power, I could not poflibly exercife it, or 
 " do any voluntary Aft without knowing and 
 " being confcious to myfelf [before hand J 
 " that I. have fuch a Faculty or Power in my- 
 
 " felf. 
 
 * See Note 68.. 
 
 > See Leibnitz' s Jtftb Paper to Dr. Clarke, ^17. and 6$. 
 h.2, $,13. 
 
 B Phil. Principles, &t-
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 derflanding to propofe Tome other thing, or the fame under fome o- 
 ther Appearance : which may be always done, fince every thing ex- 
 cept the chief Good is of fuch a Nature, that the Underftanding may 
 apprehend fome refpect or relation wherein it is incommodious. Nbt- 
 withftanding therefore that the Will always does follow fome Judg- 
 ment of the Underflanding, which is made about the fubfequent Ac- 
 tions, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 u< 
 
 " felf. A thing that feems at firft fight very 
 " ftrange and wonderful ; to know I have a 
 " power of afting before ever I have afted, or 
 " had any trial or experience of it : But a 
 " little Refleftion will quickly fatisfy any one 
 " that in the nature of the thing it mud be 
 " fo, and cannot poffibly be otherwife; and 
 " which is peculiar to this Faculty: For we 
 " know nothing of our Powers of Perceiving, 
 " Underftanding, Remembring, sV. but by 
 " experimenting their Afts, it being neceflary 
 " firft to perceive or think, before we can 
 " know that we have a Power of perceiving or 
 " thinking.'' The Author proceeds to fhew, 
 that this Fore-confcioujnefs of a power of zoi/ling 
 or choofing does moft clearly demonftrate that 
 the Mind in all its Volitions begins the Moti- 
 on, or afteth from itfe/ff. 
 
 To argue ftill that fome minute imperceptible 
 Caufes, fome particular Circumftances in our 
 own Bodies, or thofe about us, muft determine 
 even thefe feemingly indifferent Aftions, is 
 either running into the former abfurdity of 
 making us aft upon Motives which we don't 
 apprehend ; or faying, that we aft mechani- 
 cally, i.e. do not aft at all : and in the laft 
 place, to fay that we are determin'd to choofe 
 any of thefe trifles juft as we happen to fix our 
 Thoughts upon /'/ in particular, at the very 
 inftant ofAftion, is either attributing all to 
 the felf-moving Power of the Mind, which is 
 granting the Queftion ; or elfc referring us to 
 the minute and imperceptible Caufes above 
 mention'd ; or elfe obtruding upon us that idle 
 unmeaning Word Chance inftead of a Phyfical 
 Caufe, which is faying nothing at all. How 
 hard muft Men be prefs'd under an Hypothefis } 
 when they fly to fuch evafive fhifts as thefe ! 
 
 How much eafier and better would it be to 
 give up all fuch blind, unknown, and unac- 
 countable Impulfes, and own what both com- 
 mon Senfe arid Experience diftate, an Inde- 
 pendent, Free, Self moving Principle, the 
 true, the obvious, and only fource ofAftion? 
 With regard to Mr. Locke's Inconfiftencies, 
 I fhall only add one Obfervation more, viz. 
 that he feems to place the Caufe (Motive, or 
 whatever he means by it) of his Determination 
 of the Will after the Effeft. The Caufe of 
 that Determination is, according to him, An- 
 xiety ', this he fometlmes makes concomitant, 
 fometimes confequent upon Defire ; and ^.31. 
 he fays the one is fcarce diftinguifhable from 
 the other. 
 
 But this fame Defire appears to me to be the 
 very Determination of the Will" itfelf; what 
 we abfolutely defire we always will, and vice 
 verfa, whether it be in our Power to purfue 
 that Will, and produce it into Aft or no ; and 
 indeed Defire feems to be no otherwife diftin- 
 guifhable from Volition, than as the latter i* 
 generally attended with the Power ofAftion, 
 which the former is confider'd without. This 
 I think is all the Diftinftion that. they arc ca- 
 pable of, which yet is only nominal : Nor do 
 his Jnftances in $. 30. prove that there is any 
 real Difference between 'em. Thus when I 
 am oblig'd to ufe perfuafions with another, 
 which I wifh may not prevail upon him, or 
 fuffer one Pain to prevent a greater, here are 
 two oppofite Wills, or a weak imperfeft Voli- 
 tion conquer'd by, and giving way <o a ftrong- 
 er : I will or defire that this Man may not be 
 prevail'd upon, but yet I will or defire more 
 powerfully and effeftually to ufe thefe perfua- 
 fions with him : Or rather, here is but one 
 
 aftual 
 
 EJJayon Confcioufnefs, p. 209. 2 10.
 
 i66 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 tions, yet it is not neceffarily determin'd by any, for it can fufpend 
 its Action, and order fome other Judgment, which it may follow. 
 Since therefore it can either exert or fufpend its Act, it is not only 
 free from Compulfion, but alfo indifferent in itfelf, with regard 
 to its Actions, and determines itfelf without neceflity. 
 
 IV. It muft be confefs'd, that this opinion eftablifhes Liberty, and 
 on that account is more agreeable to reafon, experience, and the com- 
 mon fenfe of Mankind, yet fome things in it feem to be prefum'd and 
 not explain'd clearly enough. 
 
 fufficiently explain'd in it. 
 
 Such a Li- V. For, in the firfl place, 'tis faid that the Will determines itfelf; 
 fcemstobe S ^ ut we are not m ^ orme d how that is poffible, nor what ufe fuch a 
 of more pre- Power would be of, were it admitted: nay, it feems rather prejudi- 
 nn cial than beneficial to Man. For that Goodnefs which it is fuppofed 
 to purfue, is in the things themfelves, and arifes from their connec- 
 tion with the chief Good j it is not therefore to be form'd, but dif- 
 
 covered 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 This Opi- 
 nion efla- 
 blifhes Li- 
 berty, but 
 yet there 
 are fome 
 things not 
 
 benefit to 
 Mankind. 
 
 attml Defire or Will in the Cafe, and the other 
 is only Hypothetical. Thus I fhould will to 
 be cured of the Gout, if the cure would not 
 throw me into greater Pain ; hut in the pre- 
 fers circumftances I do not really will it, nor 
 exert any one acl which may ferve to remove 
 it: nay, in this Cafe, I will or defire to bear 
 the Gout rather than a worfe Evil that would 
 attend the removal of it. His Axiom there- 
 fore, that wherever there is pais, there is a 
 defire to be rid of it, is not ablblutely true. 
 
 Again, I fhould refufe a painful Remedy or 
 oiiagreeable Potion, if I could enjoy perfcdl 
 Health without them ; but as I manifeftly can- 
 not, I choofe the lefs Evil of the two. Nor 
 can I indeed be properly (aid to choofe or de- 
 fire both in Oie prefent Circumftances, or, to 
 will one and defire the contrary, fince 1 know 
 that only one of them is pofiible, which there- 
 fore I now certainly will or defire, tho 1 1 fhould 
 as certainly havewill'd the contrary had it been 
 equally poffible. Thefe then and the like In- 
 ftances are not fufEcient to prove any oppositi- 
 
 on between Will and Defire, except the latter 
 be only taken for a mere paflive Appetite or 
 Afteaion of the Mind : in which fenfe the 
 Words choofe, prefer, &c. muft then be very 
 improperly apply'd to it. But, in reality, I 
 believe Mr. Locke here fets the Word Defire to 
 fignify what we commonly mean by Will, as 
 he does in ^.48. where 'ris call'd the Power cf 
 preferring: and puts Volition into the place of 
 Action', as feems probable from his defcription 
 of Willing in the 28th and 30th Sea. as alfo, 
 C. 23. (f. 18. where he defines the Will to be 
 a Power cf putting Body into Motion by Thought. 
 And the fame Notion, I think, runs thro' all 
 his Letters to Limborch. To conclude, what- 
 ever he means by Defire, he manifeftly poft- 
 pones it to Volition in ^. 56. " When a Man 
 " (fays he) has once chofen a thing, and there - 
 " by it is become a part of his Happinefs, it 
 " raifes defire, and that proponionably gives 
 " him uneafinefs, which determines his Will, 
 " and fets him at work in purfuit of his choice 
 il on all occafions that offer." If chofen ftand 
 
 here
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 c overed by the underftanding. If then the under/landing performs 
 its Duty right, it will difcover what is heft: but it is our Advantage 
 to be determined to that which is befl -, it had therefore been better 
 for Man, if Nature had given him up abfolutely to the determina- 
 tion of his Judgment and Underftanding, and not allow'd that Judg- 
 ment to be fufpended by the power of the Will. For by that means 
 he would have obtain'd his End with greater certainty and eafe. I 
 grant, that if a Man were abfolutely determin'd in his Actions to the 
 belt, there would be no room for virtue, properly fo call'd ; for vir- 
 tue, as it is commonly understood, requires a free Act, and this Li- 
 berty is the very thing that is valuable in virtue ; and with good rea- 
 fon, if a free Choice be the very thing which pleafes: (For thus it 
 would be imporlible to attain the end of choofing, i. e. to pleafe our- 
 felves, without Liberty, fince that very thing which pleafes in Ac- 
 tions, viz. Liberty, would be wanting.) But yet, if any thing which 
 the Underftanding can difcover, be the very befl before or independent 
 of our Choice, it were proper for us to be neceflarily determin'd to 
 it j for the fruition of it, howfoever obtain'd, would make us happy, 
 and be fo much the more valuable, as it would be certain, and not 
 
 dependent 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 167 
 
 here for willed, his ufual Method of explain- 
 ing the Caufe of Volition is inverted, and the 
 Effect comes firft ; or, if chofen be made only 
 to fignify defired, he muft fuppofe defire to 
 raife itfelf, which is bad again. How can 
 thefe Words be underftood in any Senfe 
 confiflent with V31 and 71. and with his 
 whole Hypothefis ? * 
 
 Dr. Clarke's Argument for abfolute Freedom, 
 becaufe all Motives or Senfations are mere 
 abilrac~l Notions, and have no phyfical power ||, 
 feems not conclufive, or at leaft not clear. For 
 who knows, fay the Fatalifts, how far reafons, 
 motives, sV. may affect a Spirit ? Why may 
 not one immaterial Subflance determine ano- 
 ther by means of thought, as well as a material 
 ene can move another by means of Impulfe ? 
 
 Nay, his adherent Mr. Jack/on grants f, " that 
 " abftract Notions will, by a forcible and ir- 
 " refiilible impulfe, compel the Mind to move 
 " the Body whether it will or no." Which 
 impulfe, if it were conftant, would fufficiently 
 acquit the Maintainers of Neceffity. But that 
 there can be no fuch forcible impulfe, will, 
 I hope, appear below, where it will be fhewn, 
 to be both agreeable to reafon to fuppofe that 
 there are Self-aclive Beings, which, as fuch, 
 muft have a phyfical power of refilling what 
 we call the moll cogent Motives : and to be 
 confirm 'd by Experience, that our own Minds 
 exert fuch a Power ; which is fufficient for our 
 purpofe. For an Explanation of the true No- 
 tion of Liberty, fee the following Subfe&ions 
 of this Chapter, and Note 82. 
 
 * See our Author's Subfecl. 3d. par. 6. 
 
 || Remarki on the Philofophical Enquiry, p. la 
 
 "jr Defence of human Liberty, p. 1 98.
 
 68 
 
 It only takes 
 place in 
 doubtful mat- 
 ters, and then 
 'tis of no ule 
 or impor- 
 tance. 
 
 We are 
 
 left in 
 doubt con- 
 cerning 
 the Way . 
 
 which leads 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 dependent upon Chance, as all the Actions of Free-will are in a man- 
 ner fuppofed to be: nor need we much regard the Glory arifing from 
 a well made Choice ; iince the fruition of the greateft Good would 
 give us Happinefs without it; nay fuch Glory would be vain and 
 defpicable in competition with the greateft Good. Hence it appears, 
 that Free-will, according to this Hypothefis, cannot be reckon'd any 
 Advantage. 
 
 VI. Secondly ; If it be faid, that the Underftanding is dubious in 
 many Cafes, and ignorant of what is the beft, and in thefe Liberty 
 takes place ; neither does this clear the Matter. For if the things to 
 be done be Good or Evil in themfelves, but unknown to the Intel- 
 lect, there's no help in the Will ; nor does its Liberty aflift us in dis- 
 covering or obtaining the better Side ; if they be indifferent, it is no 
 matter what we do, fince the Conveniencies and Inconveniencies are 
 equal on both Sides. If then we admit of Liberty in thefe Cafes, it 
 will be of no ufe or importance to Life or Happinefs : Nay, it muft 
 be efteem'd an Imperfection, as deriving its Origin from the Imperfec- 
 tion of the Underftanding. For if the Underftanding could certain- 
 ly determine what were beft to be done, there would be no room for 
 Liberty. (66.) 
 
 VII. Thirdly ; They are not well agreed what this Chief Good is, 
 from the connection with which the Underftanding muft judge of 
 the Goodnefs of other things, as may appear from the various and 
 contradictory Opinions about it. (67.) We muft neceilarily therefore 
 
 fluctuate, 
 
 to Happinefs, and can have no help from Liberty. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (66) Thefe, with fome of the following 
 confequences attending fuch a confufed Hypo- 
 thefis of Liberty, are well urg'd by Mr. Loch 
 (tho' I think they return upon himlelf ) in his 
 Chapter of Power, . 48,49, 50. and in the 
 Pbilofopb. Enquiry, p. 63, {5Y. and feem to be 
 unavoidable in any other Scheme but that of 
 our Author ; who fuppofes, that in moft Cafes, 
 all the Goodnefs of an Aft. or Objedl entirely 
 depends upon, and is produced merely by our 
 choofing it ; and of confequence Liberty, or a 
 power of choofing, is according to his Princi- 
 
 ples, (o far from being unneceflnrv, or rn Im- 
 perfection, that it is our nobleit Perfection ; 
 and conftitutes the greateft part of our Happi- 
 nefs: For an Explanation of this, fee . 2. of 
 this Chapter. 
 
 (67.) This uncertainty about the Summum 
 Bonum is own'd and well accounted for by Mr. 
 Locke, B. 2. C. 21. V 55- " Hence it was 
 " that the Phi lofo pliers of old did in vain en- 
 " quire, whether Summum Bcnut:i confided in 
 " Riches or Bodily Delights, or Virtue, or 
 " Contemplation ? And they might have as 
 
 " reafonably
 
 Of Moral Evil 169 
 
 fluctuate, and be folicitous, and rebel againft Nature itfelf, which has 
 neither granted us a certain End, nor certain Means thereto, but left 
 us anxious and uncertain about the way which leads to Happinefs ; 
 neither is there any help here in our Liberty, fince it is blind, and 
 can do nothing towards bringing us back into the right path. 
 
 VIII. Fourthly, 'Tis confefs'd by all, that Good in general is what Since that is 
 agrees with every one, and what all things defire. Every Good then g od wh /J ch 
 anfwers to fome Appetite, and according to thefe Authors, Objects ,nJSS is^o 
 are good on account of a natural and neceflary conformity which they b- judg'd of 
 have to our Appetites. The Understanding therefore does not make f^i jf" 
 good, but finds it in the things themfelves: and when it judges any the will' fbl- 
 thing in Nature to be agreeable, that, according to them, muft necef- j thls . 
 farily be in refpect of fome natural Appetite. All the Good then which \ 5 not free, 
 is in things will be the Object of fome Faculty or Appetite, /. e. of the'. fitdoesr ? ^ 
 Underftanding, Senfe, &c. But all thefe are determin'd by Nature in reafon^We ' 
 regard to the Appetite or Faculty to which they relate, /. e. in regard had better 
 to their Pleafantnefs, or Agreeablenefs ; and as to the relation which ^^^^h 
 they bear to each other, i. e. as to their Profit ablenefs and Honejly, they Liberty, 
 are to be judg'd of by the Understanding, and directed when and in 
 what manner they muft give place to each other, or afford their mu- 
 tual Afliftance. Free-will then appears to be of no manner of ufe; 
 for if it certainly follow the decree of reafon it is not free, at leaft 
 from neceffity, fince that very reafon which it follows is not free : if 
 it does not necefiarily follow that, we had better be without it, for it 
 perverts every thing, and difturbs the Order of Nature, which is the 
 very beft and fitteft to be follow'd, fuch a Liberty as this would there- 
 fore 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 " rcafonably difputed, whether the beft relifh 
 " were to be found in Apples, Plumbi, or 
 " Nutts, and have divided themfelves into 
 " Seh upon it. For ai pleafant Taftcs de- 
 " pend not on the things themfelves, but their 
 '* agreeablenefs to this or that particular Palate, 
 " wherein there is great variety ; fo the gre.i 
 " teft happinefs confifts in the having thofe 
 " things which produce tbe Treateft Pleafure l 
 " and in the abfencc of ti ofe which caufe any 
 " difturbance, any pain. Now thefe to diffe- 
 
 " rent Men are very different things." To 
 the fame purpofe are the 3d and 4th obfer- 
 vations in the Religion of Nature delineated, 
 p. 33. which may ferve to confirm the Notion 
 which our Author propofes in the next Subfec- 
 tion, viz. that molt of the Good or Agreeable- 
 nefs in things arifes not from their own Na- 
 tures, but our choice of them, or that Objedte 
 are not chofen becaufc they are good, but are 
 generally good only becaufe they are chofen.
 
 I 7 
 
 If the Will 
 couldfufperd 
 its adt con- 
 trary to the 
 Judgment of 
 the Under- 
 flanding, it 
 would run 
 directly into 
 Evil,itfeems 
 therefore ne- 
 cefl"3ry for it 
 to aft at the 
 time and in 
 the manner 
 which the 
 Underftan- 
 ding dire&s. 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 fore be prejudicial to Mankind ; it would make them liable to do a- 
 mifs, and produce no kind of Good to compenfate for fo great an 
 Evil. 
 
 IX. Fifthly, It is fuppofed that the Judgment of the Understanding 
 concerning the Gocdnefs of any thing, is a condition without which 
 the Will is not directed to the Object, but yet that it can either exert 
 or fufpend its act about any Good whatfoever. Let us fuppofe then 
 that the Underftanding has determin'd it to be good to exert fome 
 certain Action, and Evil to fufpend it , while this Judgment conti- 
 nues, if the Will can fufpend its Act, it choofes Evil ; if it cannot, 
 it is not free. You'll fay, it can command the Underflanding to change 
 its Judgment ; let it be fo. But it is evident, that the Man fufpends 
 his Action before he can command the Underflanding to change its 
 Judgment, i. e. he fufpends the Action while the Judgment deter- 
 mines that it is Evil to fufpend. He therefore choofes that directly 
 which his Reafon judges to be Evil, which feems to overthrow their 
 whole Hypothecs. (68.) 
 
 X. I confers 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (68.) Farther, if the Mind can fufpend the 
 Satisfaction of any urgent defire (which Mr. 
 Locke allows *, and therein places all its Li- 
 berty) then it can as eafily quite ftop, or run 
 counter to any natural Appetite, fince no grea- 
 ter Power feems to be requifite for the one than 
 for the other. If we can hinder the Will from 
 being determin'd by any defire of abfent Good 
 without any appearance of greater Good on the 
 other Side, which might raife an oppofite de- 
 fire able to counterbalance it, as our Author 
 has fhewn that we can ; then we fhall be equal- 
 ly able to prevent its following even the ulti 
 mate determination of the Judgment, without 
 any reafon for fo doing ; and confequently 
 good, whether abfolute or comparative, is nei- 
 ther the adequate efficient Caufe, nor a neceffa- 
 ry Means or Motive to the determination of 
 the Will. This aft of fufpenfon therefore muft 
 either be folely founded in the felfmoving 
 Power of the Mind, and of confequence be na- 
 turally indepndeat on all Motives, Reafons, 
 
 &t. and an inftance of the Mind's abfolute 
 Freedom from any external Determination ;. 
 which is, I believe, a contradiction to Mr. 
 Locke's general Hypothefis; or elfe itfelf muft 
 be determin'd by fome external Caufe, and then 
 it will be difficult to make it free in any fenfe. 
 Let us obferve how Mr. Locke endeavours to re- 
 concile thefe two Notions together. Our Li- 
 berty, according to him, is founded in a gene- 
 ral abfolute Inclination of the Mind to Happi- 
 ncfs, which obliges us to fufpend the Gratifica- 
 tion of our Defire in particular cafes, till we 
 fee whether it be not inconfiftent v/ith the ge- 
 neral Good. " The ftronger Ties, fays he, 
 " . 51. we have to an unalterable purfuit of 
 " Happinefs in general, which is our greateft 
 " Good, and which, as fuch, our Defires al 
 " ways follow, the more are we free from any 
 " neceffary determination of our Will to any 
 " particular Aftion, and from a neceffary com- 
 " pliance with our Defire fet upon anyparti- 
 " cular, and then appearing preferable good, 
 
 rill 
 
 * Book 2. C.2.1. V, 47, and. 50.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 171 
 
 X. I confefs, they offer fome Solutions here, but fuch as are fo fub- There are 
 tie, fo obfcure, and fo much above the comprehenfions of the Vulgar, fc^"^^ 
 that moft Perfons have taken a diftafte to them, given up the caufe of difficulties, 
 Liberty as defperate, and gone over to the former Sect: but if any one j?"^ 1 ^" 6 
 will undertake either to give a more clear and full Explication of theing clear. 
 common Opinion, or bring Solutions of thofe Difficulties which occur n this ac - 
 in it, he will find me fo far from being his Adverfary, that he may have gSSe o- 
 expect my aflent, encouragement and affiftance. This indeed were ve r to the 
 very much to be wifh'd, but in the mean time I mall try, as far as I a merOpi '" 
 am able, whether thefe things cannot be explain'd more clearly in a- 
 nother manner. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 ** till we have duly examin'd whether it has a 
 " tendency to, or be inconfiftent with our real 
 M happinefs." And again, V 52. " Whatever 
 ** Neceffity determines to the purfuit of real 
 " Blifs, the fame neceffity, with the fame force, 
 '* eflablifhes Sufpence, Deliberation and Scru- 
 " tiny, of each fucceffive deflre, whether the 
 " fatisfaftion of it does not interfere with our 
 " true Happinefs, and miflead us from it." 
 If by the Word Neceffity he means abfolute 
 pbyjical Neceffity (which it muft be, if it be any 
 at all, or any thing to the prefent purpofe) he 
 has difcover'd a pretty odd foundation for his 
 Liberty. Nay, if this force which draws us 
 towards Happinefs in general, be abfolute and 
 irrefiflible, as his Words import, it will draw 
 us equally towardi all particular appearances of 
 it, and confequently prove as bad a ground for 
 
 Sufpenfion as for Liberty. But in truth this 
 Sufpenfion is neither founded in any Neceffity 
 of purfuing Happinefs in general, nor is itfelf 
 an original power of the Mind diftinct from 
 that of Volition, but only one particular exer- 
 cife or Modification of it. " 'Tis willing (as 
 " the Author of the Pbilofophical Enquiry right- 
 " ly obferves) to defer willing about the mat- 
 " ter propofed," and is no otherwife different 
 from the common cafes of willing and choofing 
 except that it is the moft evident demonftration 
 of the Mind's perfect. Liberty in willing, and 
 fo obvious that Mr. Locke could not get over it, 
 and therefore ftiles it the fource of all our Li- 
 berty, &c. $. 47. tho' he foon explains it away 
 again, by endeavouring to force it into his 
 Syftem. 
 
 Z2 
 
 SUBSECT. 

 
 ijl Of Moral Evil 
 
 y 
 
 S U B S E C T. III. 
 
 Another Notion of Liberty and Election is p'ofofed. 
 
 . 
 I. TN order to make my meaning better underftood, we muft obferve,. 
 titesand A in the firft place, that there are certain Powers, Faculties and 
 
 Powers at- Appetites implanted in us by Nature, which are directed to certain 
 proper Erdi Actions: and when thefe exert their proper Actions about Objects, 
 by exerci e, they produce a grateful and pleafant Senfation in us. The exercife of 
 AV eateft St r C tnem therefore pleafesus; and from hence probably all our Pleafure 
 feaion of and Delight arifes ; confequently our Happinefs, if we have any, 
 t Jj e ! 11 ' and feems to coniift in the proper exercife of thofe Powers and Faculties 
 lifote. which Nature has beflow'd upon us: for they appear to be implanted 
 in us for no other end, but that by the ufe and exercife of them thofe 
 things may be effected which are agreeable. Nor can they be at reft, 
 or enjoy themfelves, other wife than as thofe things are produced by 
 or in them, for the production or reception of which they are defign'd 
 by Nature. Now every Power or Faculty is directed to the profecu- 
 tion of its proper Acts. They attain their End therefore by Exercife, 
 which muff be efteem'd the greater!: Perfection, and moft happy State 
 of any Being. For that is a State of Happinefs, if any fuch can be 
 conceiv'd, wherein every thing is done which pleafes, and every thing 
 abfent which difpleafes j neither does it fecm poffible to imagine a 
 more happy one. 
 There is a IL Secondly, It is to be obferv'd, that among our Appetites, Fa- 
 certain a- culties and Powers, fome are determin'd to their Operations by Ob- 
 St C by C Na- j ec ^ s peculiar to them. For upon the prefence of their Objects they 
 tpre be- neceffarily exert their Actions, if rightly difpos'd, and ceafe from O- 
 Ap^titcsT P erat i n u P on tne i r abfence, and have no tendency towards any o- 
 fsfr. and ' ther Objects but their own. Thus the Sight perceives nothing 
 ]ec? s r , where- ^ m Light, Colours, &c . and, upon the Removal of thefe, its Ac- 
 
 by they aft tion 
 
 upon the 
 
 prefen.ee of them, and ceafa from Aclion upon the RemovaJ of them.
 
 Of Moral Evil. i y j 
 
 tlon (69.) ceafes. The Underftanding itfelf diftinguifhes thofe Objects 
 which are communicated to it by the Senfes, or perceiv'd by reflection 
 from one another, "difpofes and repofits them in the Memory ; but yet 
 has certain bounds which it cannot exceed: andfo of the reft. There is 
 therefore a certain natural Fitnefs, a fixt conformity between thefe 
 Powers and their Objects, on which account they exert their Actions 
 upon the prefence of the Objects, and pleafe themfelves in Exercife : 
 but are uneafy at the prefence of thofe things which hinder it. If 
 then there be any natural force in any Object: to promote or hinder 
 the exercife of any Power or Faculty, that Object is to be efteem'd 
 Good or Evil in regard to it. 
 
 III. Thofe Objects which thus promote or impede the Action, are;.,, 
 fufficiently diftinguiili'd from each other by the Power or Faculty it- would be of 
 felf ; thofe that are abfent or future, are judg'd of by the Underftan- 6il - v ice to 
 ding, and what the Mind determines to be the belt in them that We dowMwid?" 
 are oblig'd to purfue. He that does otherwife difobeys the Law of^ c h Appe- 
 Reafon. If therefore all our Powers and Faculties were thus deter- ^ ^j * s 
 min'd to their proper Objects, it would feem an Imperfection for Man 
 
 to be free, and he would have been much more happy without fuch 
 a Liberty : for he receives no Benefit from it, but one of the greateft 
 Evils, viz. a Power of doing amifs. 
 
 IV. It feems not impoffible to conceive a Power of a quite different 
 Nature from thefe, which may be more indifferent in refpect of the Wbm . a x 
 Objects about which it exerts itfelf*. To which no- one thing is na-Powcr^be* 
 turally more agreeable than another, but that will be the fitteft to t^eeo which 
 which it ihall happen -j- to be apply'd : Between which and the Ob- p"? t jc"[ ar 
 ject, to which it is determin'd, by itfelf or by fomething elfe, there is Objeft there 
 naturally no more fuitablenefs or connection than between it and any I s natura J- 
 
 1 v no other 
 Other agreeablenefa 
 but what 
 mayarife from the determination of the Power itfelf. 
 
 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (69.) It may be obferv'd here once for all, I thefe fhould rather be calfd Paflioni) butgene- 
 that our Author feldom ufes this Word Atlion in I rally takes the vulgar expreffions, when they 
 a Uriel PhilofophicalScnfc (according to which 1 will ferve to explain his meaning. 
 
 * See Set. 5. Subfecl. 2. par. 12 and 15. 
 
 f That tbii Ward is not intended to imply what we commonly mean by Chance, fee par. 1 8.
 
 tj Of Moral Evil 
 
 ; other thing, but all the Suitablenefs there is, arifes from the Application 
 or Determination itfelf. For as the Earth is no Man's Right by nature, 
 
 . but belongs to the prime Occupant, and the Right arifes from that 
 very Occupation ; fo there may pombly be a Power to which no Ob- 
 ject is by Nature peculiarly adapted, but any thing may become fuita- 
 ble to it, if it happen to be apply'd j for its Suitablenefs proceeds from 
 the Application, as we faid before. Now it does not feem any more 
 .abfurd for a Power to create an Agreeablenefs between itfelf and an 
 Objeft, by applying itfelf to that Objet, or that to itfelf, than for a 
 Man to acquire a Right to a thing by occupying it. For, as in Civil 
 Laws, fome things are forbidden becaufe they are inconvenient, others 
 are inconvenient and Evil becaufe forbidden ; fo it may be in Powers, 
 .Faculties and Appetites ; viz. fome may be determin'd by the natural 
 Suitablenefs of the Objects, and in others, the Suitablenefs to the Ob- 
 jects may arife from the Determination. For this Faculty may be na- 
 turally inclin'd to Exercife, and one Exercife be more agreeable than 
 another, not from any natural fitnefs of one rather than the other, but 
 from the Application -of the Faculty itfelf: for another would often 
 be no lefs agreeable, if it had happen'd to be determin'd to that. No- 
 thing hinders then but that there may be fuch a Power or Faculty as 
 this, at leaft with refpeft to very many Objects. (70.) 
 
 V. Fourthly, 
 
 NOTE &. 
 
 (70.) Our Author's Notion of Indifference 
 lus been grofly mifunderftood by all his Adver- 
 faries, who have accordingly rais'd terrible 
 Outcries againft it, as deftroying the effential, 
 and immutable diftinttion between Good and 
 .Evil; fubverting Appetites, making Reafon 
 and Judgment ufelefs, and confounding every 
 thing. We lhall juft obferve here, that if it 
 be apply'd to the wbtle Man, it cannot poffibly 
 be extended, nor was defign'd by our Author 
 to include all manner of external Objects, Ac- 
 tions, and Relations of things, as they feem to 
 have underftood it. For every Man in his 
 Wits mull be fufficiently fenfible, that all 
 things don't affect him in the fame manner, e- 
 ven before he has will'd any of them. I can- 
 not be indifferent to Meat, or Drink, or Reft, 
 when I am Hungry, Thirfty, or Weary. Some 
 
 natural Objects are agreeable, and produce 
 pleafure in me, and others the contrary, whe- 
 ther I will or no ; and the fame may be faid 
 of the moral Senfe. Nay our Author every 
 where allows their full force to what he calls 
 the Appetites j and afferts that whatever con- 
 tradicts them mult be attended with Uneafi- 
 nefs. 'Tis not an abfolute indifference there- 
 fore of the Man or Mind in general, nor of the 
 Senfes, Perception or Judgment, which he con- 
 tends for; but it relates wholly to that parti- 
 cular Power of the Mind which we call Willing, 
 and which will appear to be in its own Nature, 
 or Pbyjically indifferent to acting or not afting, 
 notwithftanding all thefe different Affections 
 or Paffions of the Mind rais'd by the different 
 Objects. Let a thing feem never fo pleafant 
 and agreeable, never fo reafonable, fit, and eli- 
 gible
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 V. Fourthly, If then we fuppofe fuch a Power as this, 'tis plain, 
 that the Agent endow'd with it cannot be determin'd in its Operations 
 by any praeexiftent Goodnefs in the Object; for fince the agreeablenefs 
 between it and the Objects, at leaft in moft of them, is fuppofed to 
 arife from the Determination, the agreeablenefs cannot poffibly be 
 the Caufe of that Determination on which itfelf depends. But the 
 congruity of the Object with the Faculty is all the Goodnefs in it, 
 therefore there is nothing Good in regard to this Power, at leaft in 
 thefe Objects to which it is indifferent, till it has embrac'd it, nor E- 
 vil till it has rejected it: Since then the Determination of the Power 
 to the Object is prior to the Goodnefs and the Caufe of it, this Power 
 cannot be determin'd by that Goodnefs in its Operations. 
 
 VI. Fifthly, Such a Power as this, if it be granted to exift, cannot 
 be determin'd by any Uneajinefi ariiing from the things about which it 
 is converfant. For it is fuppofed to be indifferent, not only in refpect 
 of external ObjeRs, but alfo of its own Operations, and will pleafe it- 
 felf, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *75 
 
 Such a 
 Power as this 
 cannot be 
 determin'd 
 by any Good- 
 nefs in Oh- 
 jefts,fincethe 
 Goodnefs of 
 'em depends 
 upon the de- 
 termination. 
 
 Nor by any 
 Uneafoiefs. 
 
 gible to us, yet there is flill a natural poffibili- 
 ty for us to will the contrary, andconfequent- 
 ly the bare Power of willing is in itfelf indiffe- 
 rent to either Side ; which is all the indiffe- 
 rence that our Author contends for. Now fuch 
 an Indifference as this Mr. Locke allows to be 
 in the operative Powers of Man, tho' he con- 
 fines it, I think, improperly, to them alone*. 
 " I have the ability, fays he, to move my hand, 
 " or to let it reft, that operative Power is in- 
 *' different to move or not to move my hand : 
 " I am then in that refpeft perfectly free. My 
 " Will determines that operative Power to 
 " reft, I am yet free, becaufe the Indifferency 
 *' of that my operative Power to aft or not to 
 " aft flill remains; the Power of moving my 
 " hand is not at all impair'd by the determi- 
 " nation of my Will, which at prefent orders 
 " reft, the Indifferency of that Power to aft 
 " is juft as it was before, as will appear, if 
 *' the Will puts it to the trial, by ordering the 
 " contrary." The fame, I think, may be ap- 
 ply'd to the Will itfelf in regard to Motives, 
 
 &e. with much more Juftice than to thefe ope- 
 rative Powers. Nay thefe can fcarce be call'd 
 indifferent to Aftion after the determination of 
 the Will ; but follow inftantly (as we obferv'd 
 in Note 61.) in moft Cafes when they are in 
 their right State. What I Will or Refolve to 
 do, that I certainly effeft if I have Power to 
 do it, and continue in the fame Will or Refo- 
 lution. However, this Indifference of the ope- 
 rative Powers is what can never coaftitute Mo- 
 rality (as was obferv'd in the fame place) fince 
 their Operations are no farther moral than as 
 they are confequent upon, and under the direc- 
 tion of the Will. 
 
 There muft then be another Indifference pri- 
 or to them, in order to make even the exertion 
 of them indifferent, or free in any fcnfe. 
 
 For a more complete View of this Queftion, 
 fee Epifcop. Inftit. Tbeol. L 4. C 6. and <TraeT. 
 de Libero Arbitrio. There's alfo a good defence 
 of our Author's Notion of Indifference in P. a 
 Limbtrcb, Tbeol. Chrifi. L.z. C.23. $.zo,&c. 
 
 * B,z. C. 21. Seft. 71.
 
 1 76 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 felf, whether it accepts the thing or rejefls it; whether it exerts this 
 Ail or another. Thefe Objects then will neither pleafe nor difpleafe 
 till this Indifference be removed, but it is fuppos'd to be removed by 
 the Application or Determination of the Power itfelf ; therefor Anxi- 
 ety does not produce but prefuppofe its Determination. Let us fup- 
 pofe this Power to be already determin'd (it matters not how) to em- 
 brace a certain Objeft, or to exert the proper Afrions relating to it, 
 Defire manifeftly follows this Determination, and Defire is follow'd 
 by an Endeavour to obtain and enjoy the Object purfuant to the Ap- 
 plication of the Power. But if any thing mould hinder or flop this 
 Endeavour; and prevent the Power from exerting thofe Operations 
 which it undertook to difcharge in relation to the Object, then indeed 
 Uneafinefs would arife from the hindrance of the Power. Anxiety 
 would therefore be the Effefi of the Determination of this Power, but 
 by no means the Caufe of it *. 
 Nor by the VII. Sixthly, Suppofmg fuch an Agent as this to be endow'd alio 
 Underftandin* w j t h Underftanding, he might make ufe of it to propofe Matters fit 
 to be done, but not to determine whether he mould do them or not. 
 For the Underftanding or Reafon, if it fpeak Truth, reprefents what is 
 in the Objects, and does not counterfeit what it finds not in them: 
 Since therefore, before the Determination of this Power, things are 
 fuppos'd to be indifferent to it, and no one better or worfe than ano- 
 ther ; the Understanding if it performs its Duty right, will reprefent 
 this Indifference, and not pronounce one to be more eligible than ano- 
 ther; For the Underftanding direfts a thing to be done no other wife 
 than by determining that.it is better; as therefore the Goodnefs of 
 things, with refpect to this Power, depends upon its Determination, 
 and they are for the mod part good if it embraces, evil, if it rejects 
 them, 'tis manifeft that the Judgment of the Underftanding concer- 
 ning things depends upon the fame, and that it cannot pronounoe up- 
 on the Goodnefs or Badnefs of them, till it perceives whether the Pow- 
 er has embraced or rejected them. The Underftanding therefore muft 
 wait for the Determination of this Power, before it can pafs a judg- 
 ment, inflead of the Power's waiting for the Judgment of that Under- 
 ftanding before it can be determin'd. 
 
 VIII. Seventhly, 
 
 * How far this Argument will affeit Mr. Luke's Hypothefis of Anxiety, may be obferv'd 
 from the latter pirt of Not.* 65.
 
 Of Moral Evil. jny 
 
 VIII. Seventhly, But tho* this Power cannot be determin'd in its Yct ru( * ar * 
 Operations by any Judgment of the Understanding, yet the Under- 4jfofS5- 
 ftanding is neceflary, in order to propofe Matters of Action, and to di- demanding 
 ftineuifh pofTible ones from thofe that are impofiible. For tho' the V 1 # f. rder . 
 
 1L1 o i^ r # diftinguifh 
 
 Goodnefs of things with reipect to the Agent, proceeds from his De- poffibfc 
 termination, yet the Poffibility or Impoflibility is in the things them- * hin g* *" rom 
 felves, and this Agent ftands in need of the Understanding to diftin- impo * 
 guifh between Objects, left it light upon Abfurdities, and fo create 
 itfelf Uneafinefs. Not that an Object is therefore Good becaufe 'tis 
 poffible ; for if it were rejected it would be Evil ; nor will it be im- 
 mediately difagreeable becaufe impomble, for, attempting an Impof- 
 fibility may be pleafing to us, (for we may prefer the exercife of this 
 Power, which is the thing that pleafes us, as we faid before) but he 
 that makes this Attempt, muft neceffarily be unhappy in the Event ; 
 for fince the thing which the Power undertakes is impoflible to be 
 done, Uneafinefs muft neceflarily follow the hindrance of its Exer- 
 cife, 'and the final Difappointment of its End. J If the A(ycnt 
 
 IX. This then muft be aflign'd as the. Jirjl Limitation of fuch a be of infinite 
 Power, viz. that it confine itfelf to Poflibilities, and there needs no 22*1^; 
 other if the Agent be of infinite Power, in order to the obtaining of ther Limit*- 
 
 its End. t tion - 
 
 X. Eighthly, But if the Agent's Power be finite, it has need alfo But an Agent 
 to confult its Abilities, and not determine itfelf to any thing which of finite pow- 
 may exceed them, otherwife it will be as much difappointed in its confult his 
 Endeavour as if it had attempted abfolute Impoftibilities. And this is Abilities. 
 the fecond Limitation of this Power. It is impofhble, you'll fay, for 
 
 an Appetite to purfue fuch things as the Underftanding evidently de- 
 clares not to be in the Power of the Agent. I anfwer, the Senfes .and 
 natural Appetites are gratify'd with their Objects, and pleafe thcm- 
 felves, tho' Reafon remonftrate againft them, and condemn that plea- 
 fure as pernicious. How much more eafily then may this faStitiom 
 Appetite) which arifes in the Agent from Application only, be con- 
 ceiv'd to delight in its Good, tho* the Underftanding oppofe it, and 
 condemn that Delight as foolifh and of fhort Duration. Why Nature 
 granted fuch a Liberty to this Power, and how it conduces to the * 
 
 Good of the whole, will be fhewn afterwards. 
 
 A a XL Hitherto
 
 I78 Of Moral Evil 
 
 Such an A- ^* ^ Jtnert0 we have either confider'd this Power alone in the A- 
 gcnt cannot gent* or as join'd with the Understanding. But the Agent endow'd 
 Mctermin'd with it, may alfo have other Powers and Appetites which are deter- 
 Appites. er m in'd to their Objects by a natural Congruity ; yet neither can it be 
 determin'd in its Operations by thefe Appetites. Thefe, when right- 
 ly difpos'd, mull necefTarily exert their Operations upon the prefenceof 
 their Object sj but it is not at all necefTary that they mould delight 
 and pleafe themfelves in thefe Operations. For inftance, a bitter and 
 naufeous favour is difagreeable to the Tafle : but tho' this be felt, yet 
 urgent Hunger makes it pleafant, Importunity of Appetite overcom- 
 ing the Bifagreeablenefs of the Savour. This Pleafure indeed is not 
 pure, but mix'd and diluted proportionably to the Excefs of the pre- 
 vailing Appetite. For, fuppofe that there are three Degrees of Unea- 
 finefs from the Hunger, and two from the Bitter nefs^ the Agent, to a- 
 void three, mufi necefTarily bear two, which being deducl ed, there re- 
 mains only one Degree of folid Pfeafure ; whereas if he had met with 
 fuitable and fweet Food, there would have been three. 
 
 XIL Since therefore the Pleafure which arifes from the Satisfaction 
 
 is.fuperioTto ^ d&fe natural Appetites, may be overcome by a stronger Appetite, 
 
 ail the Appc- there's noReafon to doubt but this Power which is indifferent to Ob- 
 
 fcbdaedb 3 e( ^ s ma y overcome au ^ ne other Powers and Appetites. For all thefe 
 
 *Me, are limited by their Objetls, and therefore have certain Bounds and 
 
 Meafures in their Operations 5 but this Power has no Bounds *, nor is 
 
 there any thing wherein it cannot pleafe itfelf, if it does but happen 
 
 to be determin'd to it. Now fince the natural Appetites themfelves 
 
 may be contrary to each other (as we have {hewn) and one of them 
 
 be overcome by the Excefs of another, how much, more eaiily may 
 
 this Power beconcelv'd to go againft thefe Appetites, and fince it is of 
 
 a very different and fuperior kind, 'tis probable that it can conquer 
 
 all others, and be itfelf fubdued by none. 
 
 ft feems to XIII. Nay we may imagine it to be given for this very End, that 
 
 be given for the Agent might have wherein to pleafe itfelf, when thofe things 
 
 thattheAeent wmc h. are agreeable to the natural Appetites cannot be had, as it very 
 
 might have OttCIX: 
 
 fomething to dplight himfclf. in when the natural Appetites muft neceffarily be frufcrated. 
 
 * i. e. K its Objefts, fee Note.7L.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 179 
 
 often happens. As the natural Powers and Appetites receive Pleafure 
 and Pain from Obje3s, they muft necefiarily be deprived of Pleafure, 
 and undergo Pain, according to the Laws of Motion, and the order 
 of external things. Since then they are often fruitrated, they muft 
 render the Agents poflefs'd of them liable to Mifery, as well as make 
 them capable of Happinefs: But the Agent can have this always to 
 delight itfelf in -, and 'tis an advantage to it to be able to quit the o- 
 ther Appetites, and pleafe itfelf in reftraining them, or acting contra- 
 ry to them. For fince every Faculty is fatisfy'd in its exercife, the 
 Strength of this cannot be more fignally difplay'd in any thing, than 
 in running counter fometimes to all the Appetites. For this muft ei- 
 ther be fometimes done, or the Agent muft be deftitute of all manner 
 of Good, and remain entirely miferable ; namely when, according to 
 the Laws of Nature, fuch things muft be endured as are quite contra- 
 ry to the Appetites *. 
 
 XIV. And from hence it is very evident how delirable fuch a Power . * /, 
 
 1 111 //-i / 1 1 rower, 
 
 as this would be: for if it happen to be determin'd to fuch things as by its accef- 
 are agreeable to the Appetites, it augments, it multiplies the Enjoy- fion,ecreafes 
 mentj but if it fhould be determin'd to undergo thofe things which o/tL^ther 
 are repugnant to the Appetites, and which it muft neceffarily bear Appetites; by 
 fometimes, it might diminifh, nay quite remove the Uneafmefs, or f^oves n or 
 convert it into Pleafure. (7 1.) at leaft alle- 
 
 A a 2 XV. It viates the 
 
 pain. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (71.) This is not much more than what Locke 
 aflerts f in anfwer to the Enquiry, " Whether 
 it be in a Man's power to change the Plea- 
 fantnefs and Uneafinefs that accompanies any 
 fort ofAftion? And to that, fays he, 'tis 
 plain in many cafes he can. Men may 
 and fhould correft their Palates, and give 
 a relifh to what either has, or they fup- 
 pofc has none. The relifh of the Mind 
 u as various as that of the Body; and 
 ]ikc that too may be alter'd ; and 'tis a mi- 
 ilake to think that Men cannot change the 
 
 " difpleafingnefs or indifference that is in Ac- 
 " tions into Pleafure and Defire, if they will 
 " but do what is in their Power." But it is 
 objected by Leibnitz, againft our Authors No- 
 tion, that if it could create Pleafure by an ar- 
 bitrary Determination and bare Election, it 
 might for the fame reafon produce Happinefs 
 in infinitum ||, and then how could we be ever 
 miferable except we chofc to be fo ? Which 
 Argument feems to be founded on a miftake of 
 our Author's meaning, as if he had intended to 
 affert, that all the good and agreeablenefs in 
 
 every 
 
 * viz. in painful Remedies, difngreeable Potitns, &c. fee Subfeft. 5. par.c;. 
 + B. 2. C. 21. Sett. 69. || EJfah deTheodicee, p. 466, 467.
 
 I go Of Moral Evil. 
 
 The reft of XV. It muft be confefs'd, that fome kind of ftruggle will be hereby 
 
 Ire nono'bc* excited m this Agent ; but a ftruggle attended with fome Pleafure, tho' 
 
 balked unne- it be qualify'd and not perfectly pure, is better than to be under abfo- 
 
 cefHiriiy. j ute Mif e ry. Nay, the confcioufnefs of a Power to pleafe itfelf a- 
 
 gainfl the bent and Inclination of the natural Appetites, may excite a 
 
 greater* Pleafure than could arife from the fruition of thofe things which 
 
 would, if prefenr, gratify thefe Appetites. Yet this Agent is oblig'd to 
 
 have fome regard to the Appetites, and not to difturb them unnecef- 
 
 farily, nor reftrain them from a due enjoyment of their proper Objects. 
 
 He that does this will bring upon himfelf uneafinefs, and a needlefs 
 
 conteft. Tho' therefore it be not at all proper that fuch a Power 
 
 mould be abfolutely determin'd by the natural Appetites yet it is fit 
 
 that they fhould perfuade it, and that fome regard be had to them 
 
 in its Determinations. And this may be reckon'd its third Limita- 
 
 tation. 
 
 Such an A- XVI. Ninthly, An Agent poflefs'd of fuch a Principle as this would 
 
 gentasthisis fc e Self-active, and capable of being determin'd in its Operations by 
 
 itfelf alone. Now there is fometimes an abfolute neceffity for it to 
 
 be determined ; for when any thing is propos'd to be done immediate- 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Self-active. 
 
 eYery thing or aftion, proceeds abfolutely and 
 entirely from our Will : and alfo, that this will 
 is as unlimited in its Exercife as in its Ohjecls, 
 and confequently that we might have any way, 
 and at any time, as much Happinefs as we plea- 
 fed, purely by willing it ; all which Propofi 
 tions are as falfe as they are foreign to the In- 
 tention of our Author, who infills only upon 
 this, that the act of willing, like the exercife 
 of all our other Faculties, is in itfelf delight- 
 ful to a certain Degree. Thi?, when apply "d 
 to an Object which is in itfelf agreeable, mull 
 add to the Pleafure arifing from it ; when de- 
 termin'd to a contrary one (both which kind of 
 Objects he always fuppofes) mull deduct from 
 the Pain ; when to an indifferent one, it muft 
 make that pofitively agreeable, by conferring fo 
 much abfolute and folid Happinefs. 
 
 But Hill this exercife of the Will, and of 
 con.'equence the Pleafure attending it, muft in 
 all. finite Creatures be effcntially and neceffarily 
 
 finite, as weir as the exercife of all their other 
 ^Powers: and tho'' it has no bounds as to the 
 number and kind of its Objects, yet it muft be 
 limited as to its own Nature and the degree of 
 its exercife. ^his appears to me eafily concei- 
 vable, and matter of experience. We find 
 ourlelves generally able to turn our. thoughts to 
 any Object indifferently, but doea any Perfon 
 from hence imagine, that he can fix his thoughts 
 upon any particular Object, with an unlimited 
 Intenfenefs, or think infinitely? granting the 
 Words Intention and.Remifiion to be applica- 
 ble here in any tolerable fenfe-: which will 
 perhaps, upon Examination, appear very doubt- 
 ful. However, it is evidently no good confe- 
 quence to infer, that becaufe I can will, or 
 choofe a thing abfolutely and freely, therefore 
 I can will it in infinitum. May I not as juftiy 
 be faid to perceive or underftand a thing in in- 
 finitum, becaufe I perceive or underftand n at 
 all?
 
 Of Moral Evil. i8* 
 
 Iy, it muft necefTarily either ad or fufpend its action, one of them muft 
 necefTarily be * ; but when either of them is done, the Power is deter- 
 min'd by that very ad: ; and no lefs force is requifite to fufpend than 
 to exert the act, as common fenfe and experience may inform any 
 one -j\ A determination then about a thing once propofed to be done, 
 is unavoidable; and fince it can neither be determin'd by any Good or 
 Evil pre-exiftent in the Objects, nor by the natural Powers or Appe- 
 tites, nor by their Objects ; it muft of neceffity either continue unde- 
 termined, or elfe determine itfelf. But trio' it be naturally free from 
 any determination, yet the Nature of the thing requires, that it fhould 
 be determin'd on every particular occafion; and fince there is nothing 
 external to do this, it remains that it determine itfelf. We fhall call 
 th's Determination an Elediion; for as it is naturally indifferent to ma- 
 ny things, it will pleafe itfelf in electing one before another. 
 
 XVII. Nor is it a proper Queftion to afk, What determines it to an is determin'd 
 Election ? For if any fuch thing were fuppos'd, it would not be in- b y himfeif, 
 different, i. e. 'tis contrary to the Nature of this Agent, that there a! e nttcEo- 
 fhould be any thing at all to determine it. In relation to a paffive fen becaufe 
 Power -J-)-, which has a natural and neceffary connection with the Ob- ^ p jJjJ fe 
 ject, the prefence of which determines it to act, we may reafonably piea*fe him 
 enquire what that Good is which may determine it to exert any parti- bec aufe they 
 cular action; but it is not fo in an aftivt Power, the very Nature of" 
 which is to make an Object agreeable to itfelf, /'. e. good, by its own 
 
 proper act. For here the Goodnefs of the Object does not precede the 
 act cf Election, fo as to excite it, but Election makes the Goodnefs in 
 the Object; that is, the thing is agreeable becaufe chofen, and not 
 chofen becaufe agreeable : we cannot therefore j'uftly enquire after any. 
 other caufe of Election than the Power, itfelf. 
 
 XVIII. If thefe things be true, you'll fay, t this Agent willbe deter- he 
 min'd by Chance, and not by Reafon ; but in reality here's no room for determin'd 
 Chance, if by Chance be underftood that which happens befide the in- b y Chance. 
 tention of the Agent ; for this very Election is the Intention of the A* 
 
 gent, and it is impoffible that a Man fhould intend befide his Inten- 
 tion. As for Reafon, he that prefers a lefs Good to a greater, muft be 
 judg'd to act unreafonably ; but he that makes that a greater Good by 
 
 choofing 
 
 * Sea Locke, B 2. G 21. Se. 23,24. f SeeNott>63. 
 
 j.f Sec.Z^v, Ch. 21. Sefl 2.
 
 I go Of Moral Evil 
 
 choofwg it, which, before his choice, had either no Good at all iri it, 
 or a lefs, he certainly choofes with reafon. You may urge that Con- 
 tingency atleail is to be admitted; if by this you mean, that this Agent 
 does fome things which are not at all neceflary, I readily own a Con- 
 tingency, for that is the very Liberty I would eftablifh. 
 
 XIX. Tenthly, 'Tis evident that fuch an Agent as this, if it be al- 
 Caufe of his low'd that there is fuch an one, is the true Canfe of his actions, and 
 Adloos that whatever he does may juflly be imputed to him. A Power 
 which is not Matter of itfelf, but determin'd to act by fome other, is 
 in reality not the efficient Caufe of its actions, but only the injirumen- 
 tal or occqfional (if we may ufe the term of fome Philofophers) for it 
 may be faid that the thing is done in it, or by it, rather than that it 
 does the thing itfelf. No Perfon therefore imputes to himfelf, or e- 
 fteems himfelf the Caufe of thofe aclions to which he believes him- 
 felf to be necefTarily determin'd: If then any inconvenience arife from 
 them, he will look upon it as a Misfortune, but not as a Crime ; and 
 whatever it be, he will refer it to the Determiner. Nor will he be an- 
 gry with himfelf, unlefs he be confcious that it was in his power not 
 to have done them : but he cannot be confcious of this, (except thro' 
 ignorance and error) who is determin'd by another. For no others 
 ought to be look'd upon as true Caufes, but fuch as are free. For thofe 
 that operate necefTarily, are to be conceiv'd as paffive, and we muft 
 recur to fome other which impofes that neceffity on them, till we a- 
 rive atone that is free, where we may flop. Since then the Agent 
 endowed with this Power, is determin'd by himfelf and no other, and 
 is free in his Operations, we muit acquiefce in him as a real Caufe, 
 and he ought to be efteem'd the Author of whatever he does, either 
 well or ill. 
 s capable of XX. Eleventhly, 'Tis manifeft that fuch an Agent as this is capable 
 H.ppinefs. ot Happinefs. For that Perfon mull: be happy who can always pleafe 
 himfelf, but this Agent can evidently do fo. For fince things are fup- 
 pofed to pleafe him, not by any neceffiry of Nature, but by mere E- 
 le&ion, and there is nothing which can compel him to choofe this ra- 
 ther than another ; 'tis plain that the Agent endow'd with this Power 
 may always choofe fuch things as it can enjoy, and refufe, i. e. not de- 
 iire, or not choofe thofe things which are impoflible to be had. And 
 from hence it appears of how great Importance it is, whether that 
 
 whereby
 
 Of Moral Evil. x g j 
 
 whereby things become agreeable to the Appetites, be eftablim'd by 
 Nature, or effected by the Agent himfelf. For if Good and Evil pro- 
 ceed from Nature, and be inherent in Objects, fo as to render them a- 
 greeable or difagreeable, antecedent to the Election, the Happinefs of 
 this Agent will alfo depend upon them; and unlefs the whole Series 
 of things be fo>on!er'd; that nothing can happen contrary to his Ap- 
 petites, he rnuft fall fhort of Happinefs. For his Appetites will be 
 difappointed, which is the very thing that we call Unhappinefs. But if 
 Objects derive their agreeablenefs or difagreeablenefs from the Choice, 
 'tis clear that he who has his Choice may always enjoy the thing cho- 
 fen, unlefs he choofe impombilkies, &c. and never have his Appetite 
 fruftrated, /'. e. be always happy. Not that all things are indifferent 
 with refpect to this Power, for it admits of fome Limitations, as was- 
 obferv'd, beyond which it mull: necerTarily deviate from Happinefs. 
 
 XXI. Twelfthly, It is to be obferv'd, that Agents, whofe Felicity / in imperfetf 
 depends upon the agreement of external Objects to their Appetites, undcniand- 
 ftand in need of a perfect and almoft infinite Knowledge, to compre- ^ "JJ 1 *"" 
 hend diflinctly all the relations, habitudes, natures and confequences foppfoefs, if 
 of things; if they come fhort of it, it is impoffible but that they muft J|5 *J.^ t . di " 
 *>ften fall into pernicious Errors, and be difappointed of their Defires, t ween poifi- 
 that is be often miferable: Hence anxiety and difquiet of Mind muft W1W and 
 necerTarily arife, and they would be agitated with continual doubts and 52*thiM 
 uncertainty, left what they choofe fhould not prove the beft. Thefe agreeable and 
 Agents then were either to be created without a profpect of Futuri- J^rfcnfcs 
 ty, or to be endow'd with a perfect Underftanding ; if neither were and confuit ' 
 done, they muft of neceflity be very miferable; for we can fcarcecon- his Abilities. 
 ceive a greater Mifery than to be held in fufpence about Happinefs, 
 and compelled to choofe among Objects not fufficiently known, in 
 which neverthelefs a miftake would be attended with unavoidable Mi- 
 fery. There's none but is fufficiently apprehenfive how anxious, how 
 folicitous. how miferable it muft be to hang in fuch a doubt as this; 
 but if the agreeablenefs of things be fuppofed to depend upon Ele5lion y 
 a very imperfect underftanding will ferve to direct this Agent, nor need 
 he to comprehend all the natures and habitudes of things: for if he 
 do but diftinguifh poffible things from impoftible, thofe things which 
 are pleafant to the Senfes from them that are unpleafant, that which 
 is agreeable ta the Faculties from what is difagreeable, and confuit 
 
 his.
 
 i 8+ Of Moral Evil 
 
 his own Abilities, viz. how far his power reaches - y (all which areeafi- 
 
 ly difcovered) he will know enough to make him completely happy. 
 
 Nor is there need of long deliberation, whether any thing to be done 
 
 be the very beft; for if the Election be but made within thefebounds, 
 
 that will become the beft which is chofen. 
 
 Tho' Liberty XXII. He that enjoys this Principle of pleafing himfelf in his Choice 
 
 would be a carm0 t reafonably complain of Nature, tho' he have but a very imper- 
 
 other Agent*, feet Understanding ; for there will always be Objects enough ready to 
 
 vetitisafureoj^gj- themfelves within thefebounds, upon which he may exercife his 
 
 Happi'ne " to choice, and pleafe himfelf : that is, he may always enjoy Happinefs. 
 
 this, whofc Tho* Free-will then be of no ufe, as was faid before, to an Agent ca- 
 
 deKnds no* P aD ^ e f De ^ n g determin'd only by the convenience of external things, 
 
 on objefts, nay, tho* it be pernicious, as only tending to pervert Reafon and pro^ 
 
 butEiedion duce gin j yet to an Agent whofe convenience does not depend upon 
 
 the things, but the choice, it is of the greateft Importance, and as we 
 
 have feen, the fure and only Foundation of Felicity. And from hence 
 
 it appears how valuable and how defirable fuch an active Principle as 
 
 this would be. 
 
 XXIII. All this feems to be coherent enough, clear enough, and eafy 
 
 s*re dea^e- 5 * t0 ^ underftood, tho' fome may look upon it as a little too fubtle. 
 
 nough, tho' It remains that we enquire whether this be a mere Hypothecs, with- 
 
 theymayap out any Foundation in fact, or there be really fuch a Principle to be 
 
 pear to be a r / - ~ " * J 
 
 little too found in Nature. (72.) 
 
 fubtle. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (72.) For an Explanation of our Author's 
 Principle of Indifference, above what has been 
 faid in Note 70, and will be cnlarg'd on in 
 Note 82. we ihall only obferve here, thatmoft 
 of the objections brought by the Author of the 
 P kilo fopbical Enquiry, p. 69, &V. are built upon 
 the old blunder of confounding this Indiffe- 
 rence as apply' d to the Mind, in refpett of its 
 Self determining Powers of willing or ailing 
 with another, which is falfly referr'd to the 
 pailive Powers of Perception 2nd Judgment, with 
 
 refpeft to the former Faculties all things are 
 phyfically indifferent or alike, that is, no one 
 can properly affeft, incline or move them more 
 than another ; with regard to the latter, moil 
 things are not indifferent, but necefTari ly pro- 
 duce Pleafure or Pain, are agreeable or difa- 
 greeabJe, whether we choofe them or not : 
 Our Author is to be underftood only in rela- 
 tion to the former, in this and the following 
 Sections, tho* he often ufes general terms. 
 
 S U B S E C T.
 
 Of Moral Evil. iS$ 
 
 S U B S E C T. IV. 
 
 That there is an Agent <who is fleas' d "with Ofyeiis only 
 becaufe he choofes them. 
 
 I. T T 7E have feen in the former Subfe&ion, that fome things are G^isfuch 
 V V adapted to the Appetites by the conftitution of Nature it- an Agent as 
 felf, and on that account are good and agreeable to them; but that th,s - 
 we may conceive a Power which can produce Goodnefs or Agreeable- 
 nefs in the things, by conforming itfelf to them, or adapting them to 
 it : hereupon things pleafe this Agent, not becaufe they are good in 
 themfelves, but become good becaufe they are chofen. We have de- 
 monftrated before, how great a Perfection, and of what ufe fuch a Po- 
 wer would be, and that there is fuch a Power in Nature appears from 
 hence, viz. we mufl necefTarily believe that God is invefted with it. 
 
 II. For in the firft place, nothing in the Creation is either Good or Becaufe n(V 
 Bad to him before his Election, he has no Appetite to gratify with the thing exter- 
 Enjoyment of things without him. He is therefore abfolutely indif- n ^ s ^J*^ 
 
 f event to all external things, and can neither receive benefit nor harm to him before 
 from any of them. What then fhould determine his Will to acl:? Ieaion - 
 Certainly nothing without him ; therefore he determines himfelf, and 
 creates to himfelf a kind of Appetite by choofing. For when the 
 Choice is made, he will have as great attention and regard to the ef- 
 fectual procuring of that which he has chofen, as if he was excited 
 to this Endeavour by a natural and necenary Appetite. And he will 
 efteem fuch things as tend to accomplifh thefeEle&ions, Good; fuch 
 as obftruct them, Evil. 
 
 III. Secondly, the Divine Will is the Caufe of Good in the Crea- B 
 
 cures, whereon they depend, as almoft every one acknowledges. Forownwni'is 
 created Beings have all that they have from the Will of God; nor can the Caufe of 
 they be any thing elfe than what he will'd. Tis plain then dmfiSS^ 
 all thefe are conformable and confonant to his Will, either efficient or 
 permiflive, and that their original Goodnefs is founded in this Confo- 
 
 B b nancy.
 
 1 86 Of Moral Evil 
 
 nancy. And fmce all things proceed from one and the fame Will, 
 which cannot be contrary to itfelf, as it is reftrain'd within its proper 
 bounds by infinite Wifdom, 'tis alfo certain that all things are confi- 
 dent with each other, that every thing contributes as much as poflible 
 to the prefervation of itfelf and the whole Syftem j which we mud 
 reckon their J'econdary Goodnefs. All the Goodnefs then of the Crea- 
 tures is owing to the Divine Will, and dependent on it, for we cannot 
 apprehend how they could be either Good or Evil in themfelves, 
 fince they were nothing at all antecedent to the act of the Divine 
 Will : and they were as far from being good with regard to God him- 
 felf, till upon willing their Exiftence, he, by that act of Election, both 
 constituted them Good in relation to him ; and, by an unity of Will, 
 made them agreeable to one another. 'Tis evident that the Divine 
 Will was accompanied in this, as in all other Cafes, by his Goodnefs 
 and Wifdom, and the immediate confequence of this is, that things 
 pleafe God, i, e. are Good. For many things are not at all agreeable to 
 his Goodnefs and Wifdom, becaufe he did not will them,, and while 
 he does not will any thing, it cannot be good. 
 
 From whence it appears undeniably, that his Will could not be de- 
 
 termin'd to Election by any Goodnefs in the Creatures. For before 
 
 that Election which is declared to be the Caufe of Goodnefs in created 
 
 Beings, nothing could be either Good or Bad ; but when the Election 
 
 is made, that only is Evil which obftructs the execution of it ; and 
 
 that Good which promotes it. The Goodnefs of things is therefore to 
 
 be determin'd by their agreeablenefs to the Divine Will, and not that 
 
 by the agreeablenefs or goodnefs of things. 
 
 They are not W- Thirdly, We muft not therefore attend to fuch as declare that 
 
 to be minded God choofes things becaufe they are Good, as if Goodnefs and the 
 
 T h tfo*** g reater Good, which he perceives in Objects, could determine his 
 
 Goodnefs Will. (73.) If the Matterjiad flood thus, it does not feem poffible for 
 
 determines tbe 
 
 the Will of 
 God* 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (73.) This Notioo t? advanced by Dr. Clarfo j The fame is infiflcd on by Leibnitz., Grotius, 
 in his Demorfi.ation of the Divine Attributes, } Mr. Chubb, and many others. We have en 
 Prop. iz. and afterwards explain'd, as far as quired a little into it already in X i. fee more 
 it feems capable of Explanation, in his iiw'-jia Note 75, d3V. 
 dentet of Natural and Reveal d Religion , Prop.. 1. 1
 
 Of Moral hvil j j 
 
 the World to have been made at all. For they who acknowledge God to * 
 be the Author of it, confefs alfo, that he is abfolutely and completely 
 happy in himfelf, and does not Itand in the leaft need of other things. 
 Now it is inconceivable how external things can be of ufe to God, 
 who comprehends in himfelf all things which tend to perfect Hap- 
 pinefs. He muft of neceffity therefore be indifferent to all external 
 Objects, nor can any reafon be aflign'd, with regard to the things 
 themfelves, why he lhould prefer one to another. 'Tis plain that 
 things are made by God with Goodnefs, that is, with a certain con- 
 gruity to his own Nature j but they are fo far from being made on 
 account of any agreeablenefs antecedent to the Divine Will, that, on 
 the contrary, they are neceflarily agreeable and pleafant becaufe they 
 are made by his free Choice. For fince they are nothing in them- 
 felves, they muft. of neceflity have both their Exiftence and their a- 
 greeablenefs from that Will, from which they folely proceed ; and it 
 is impoffible but that they mould be conformable to the Will which 
 effected them. For God, by willing, makes thofe things pleafing to 
 him which were before indifferent. 
 
 V. Unlefs therefore we attribute to him fuch a Power as has been ff he had . ndt 
 defcribed (namely, an ability to pleafe himfelf, by determining himfelf a power of 
 to action, without any other regard had to the Quality of the Object, fefffnEieo" 
 than that it is poffible) it feems impoffible that ever he fhould begin tion,he could 
 to effect any thing without himfelf. For, as far as we can apprehend ncv . er ha V c ' 
 there can be no reafon affign'd why he fhould create any thing at thinl 3 " 7 
 all *, why a World, why at that particular time when it was created, 
 why not before or after, why in this and no other Form : he receiv'd 
 no advantage or difadvantage from thefe, no benefit or harm; in 
 fhort, nothing that could move him to choofe one before another.. 
 Except therefore we attribute to God an active power of determining 
 himfelf in indifferent Matters, upon every particular Occafion, and of 
 pleafing himfelf in that Determination according to his Choice ;, 
 he would do nothing at all, he would be for ever indolent in re- 
 gard to all external things, and the World could not poffibly havs 
 been made, fince no reafon could be imagin'd, why a God abfolute 
 
 Bb 2 Iy 
 
 * i. c. no renfm drawn from the particular Nature of the thing created. See Note 74.
 
 i88 
 
 If he were 
 moved by 
 the Goodne' 
 of things to 
 cre.ite the 
 World, he 
 would be a 
 necefTary A- 
 gent. 
 
 But if things 
 are good be- 
 caufe he has 
 chofen to 
 make them, 
 his whole 
 Work will 
 be fiee. 
 
 External 
 
 things are in 
 themfelves 
 abfolutely 
 indifferent 
 to God, but 
 he has a com- 
 placency in 
 his Choice. 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 ly perfect in himfelf, and abfolutely happy, fhould create any thing 
 without him. 
 
 VI. Fourthly, If we fuppofe that there was a reafon, and that God 
 was moved by it to produce external things, 'tis manifeft, that, ac- 
 cording to this, all things will proceed from him necefTarily. For he 
 that is determin'd ab extra to do any thing, acts by neceflity, he is 
 paffive, and mud: necefTarily both do and fuffer, not what he himfelf, 
 but what the determining Caufe has effected in him : But this Good- 
 nefs (which is fuppofed to be in things antecedent to the Divine E- 
 lection, and to determine it) is fomething External, with regard to 
 the Will of God; if therefore that be the Caufe which determines 
 the Election, it follows, that the act of Election, and every thing 
 which depends upon it is necefTary' 
 
 VII. But if things be good and agreeable to God for this only rea- 
 fon, becaufe he has chofen to make them fo, he himfelf will be at 
 liberty, his whole Work, will be free. The World will be produced, 
 not by neceffity, but choice; neither will it be impoffible to be effec- 
 ted, tho' it be in itfelf unprofitable to the Deity, for he will have a 
 complacency in his own Choice. And from hence it fufficiently ap- 
 pears of how great importance it is, that all the Goodnefs of the 
 Creatures fhould depend on the Divine Election, and not that upon 
 the Goodnefs of them, for we fee that by this means Fate is deftroy'd, 
 and Liberty eftablifh'd. 
 
 VIII. Fifthly, If he expected no advantage, you'll fay, from the 
 Objects of his Choice, why fhould he choofe them ? Is it not more 
 probable that he mould do nothing at all, than bufy himfelf in things 
 that are like to be of no benefit ? It may be anfwer'd, That it is no 
 more trouble to him to will things than not to will them ; and 
 hence it comes to pafs, that when he wills them, they exifr, ; when he 
 retracts that Will, they drop into nothing. Which reafon, as it fup- 
 pofes an indifference of things in refpect of God, fo it afferts his Li- 
 berty to produce or not produce them, and proves, that that will be 
 agreeable to him which he fhall choofe. But we have a better yet 
 at hand, viz. that God chofe to create external things, that there 
 might be fomething for him to delight in without himfelf. For e- 
 very one receives Satisfaction from the Exercife of his Powers and 
 
 Faculties.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 189 
 
 Faculties. (74.) Now God is inverted with infinite Power, which he 
 can exercife innumerable ways, not all at once indeed (for all are not 
 confident with each other) but fuch as are confiftent are for the mod 
 part indifferent, nor is there any reafon why he mould prefer one be- 
 fore another 4-j*, it muff therefore be his own Choice which makes one 
 more agreeable than another; nor is it otherwife conceivable how a 
 thing that is in itfelf indifferent to the Elector, mould prove mere 
 pleating than any thing elfe. 
 
 IX. Neither ought we to enquire for any reafon of the Election, 
 i. e. why he choofes this rather than that; for upon fuppoficion that >; ne himfelf ' 
 there is a reafon, the indifference would be deftroy'd, and the Elec- to Aaion, 
 
 tion 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (74.) This reafon is very confiftent with 
 what our Author had deliver'd in C. I. $. 3. 
 par. 9, 10. where he afferted, that the end and 
 intent of God in creating the World, was to 
 exercife his feveral Attributes, or (which is the 
 fame thing) to communicate his Perfections to 
 fome other Beings : which Exercife or Com- 
 munication could proceed from no other Caufe 
 befide his own free Choice ; and therefore he 
 muft be abfolutely and phyfically indifferent to 
 it, in the fame refpect as Man was (hewn to be 
 indifferent towards any Aftion *, only with 
 this difparity, that Man, as a weak imperfect 
 Agent, may eafily be imagin'd to will Abfur- 
 dities or Contradictions, but God can never be 
 fuppofed to will or aft either inconfiftently 
 with his Nature and Perfections, or with any 
 former Volition (as our Author obferves in the 
 1 2th and following Paragraphs) and confe- 
 quently cannot be faid to be indifferent to fuch 
 things (as fome have mifunderftood our Au- 
 'thor) any more than he is indifferent towards 
 being what he is f. Leibnitz urges farther ||, 
 that it could not be in any fenfe indifferent to 
 God whether he created external things or 
 not, fince hkGoodnefs was the Caufe (according 
 to our Author himfelf in the place above cited) 
 which detcrmin'd him to the Creation. But 
 
 what do we mean by his Goodnefs here? Is it 
 any thing more than an intent to exercife his 
 Attributes, or an Inclination to communicate 
 his Happinefs or Petfection ? And is not this 
 the very Determination or Election we are 
 fpeakingof ? To fay then that God is deter- 
 min'd by his Goodnefs, is faying, that he de- 
 termines himfelf; that he does a thing becaufe 
 he is inclined to do it ; 'tis affigning his bare 
 Will and Inclination for a Caufe of his Action; 
 which is all that we contend for. Whereas 
 they that would oppofe us fhould affign a Caufe 
 for that Will or Inclination itfelf, and fhew a 
 natural neceflity for the operation of the Divine 
 Attributes (for a moral one is nothing to the 
 prefent Queftion) a ftrict phyfical connection 
 between the Exiftence of certain Perfc&ions in 
 the Deity, and their determinate Exercife. If 
 therefore God had no other reafon for the 
 creation of any thing but his own Goodnefs, 
 he was perfectly free and naturally indifferent, 
 to create or not create that thing; and if he 
 will'd, or was inclin'd to exert his Perfections 
 thus freely, he muft be as free and indifferent 
 ftill in the actual Exercife of them. As to the 
 particular manner of his exerting them, fee the 
 following Note. 
 
 f-f In/lances of this Indifference may be feen in otir Author's Note F, and the th precedent Po 
 ragraph. 
 See Note 65, and 70. + 6V* Note 75. || Remcrques, p. 473..
 
 i jo Of Moral Evil. 
 
 tion would not be free. For if we fuppofe that there is fuch a thing 
 as better and worfe in the Objects themfelves, who would affirm that 
 the Goodnefs and Wifdom of God will not necerTarily determine him 
 to choofe the better? For who can honeftly poflpone the better, and 
 prefer the worfe ? As then in indifferent Matters there can be no rea- 
 fon why one is chofen before another, fo there is no need of any : for 
 fince the Divine Will is felf-active, and mull necerTarily be determin'd 
 to one of the indifferent things, it is its own reafon of Action, and 
 determines itfelf freely. Nay fo great is the Power of God, that what- 
 ever he mall choofe out of infinite Poffibilities, that will be the befl, 
 it matters not therefore which he prefers. 
 The difficu 1 - X. Sixthly, But you urge that you are flill unfatisfy'd how a Power 
 ty of concei can determine itfelf '; **. you are ignorant of xhz Modus-, but a thing 
 ying how a mu fl. not b e deny'd becaufe we do not know the manner how it is 
 
 power can J . . . . _ , 
 
 determine it done, we are entirely ignorant how the Rays of the Sun produce the 
 
 lel ^ aftlon Idea of Light in the Mind by moving the optic Nerves; nor is it 
 
 hmde^our better underftood how the Members of the Body can be moved by 
 
 aflcnt to the a Thought of the Mind, and at the Direction of the Will. Yet no 
 
 propoHtion? body denys thefe things, becaufe he knows not the manner in which 
 
 they are perform'd. If therefore it be manifeft that the Divine Will 
 
 does determine itfelf, we mail not trouble ourfelves much in enquiring 
 
 how it can be. 
 
 'Tisasdiffi- xi. But to confefs the truth, 'tis no lefs difficult to conceive a 
 
 cdvehow^ thing to be moved or determined by another than by itfelf; but as 
 
 thing can be we are accuftom'd to material Agents * all which are paffive in their 
 
 noTher ^s by Operations, we are certain of the Fact, and not at all folicitous about 
 
 itfelf, we a )e the manner of it: whereas, if we confider the thing thoroughly, we 
 
 prejudiced ^\\ fi n( j ourfelves as far from apprehending how Motion is commu- 
 
 DV DCin? 3C- 
 
 cuftomedto nicated from one Body to another, as how the Will can move itfelf: 
 material, i. e . but there feems to be nothing wonderful in the one, becaufe it is ob- 
 5e n e ferv'd to happen at all times, and in every Action, whereas the other 
 is look'd upon as incredible, fince it is feldom perform'd, viz. by 
 the Will alone. And tho' both Reafon and Experience prove that it 
 is done, yet we fufpect ourfelves to be impofed upop, becaufe we 
 know not the manner of it. The ground of the miftake is this, that 
 
 fince 
 
 * See N te 62 and 6
 
 Of Moral Evil i 9 i 
 
 fince the Will is the only active Power which we are acquainted 
 with, the reft being all paflive, we are not eafily induced to believe 
 it to be really fuch, but form our Judgment of it from a Compari - 
 fon with other Agents, which fince they don't move but as they are 
 moved, we require a Mover alfo in the Will of God : which is very 
 abfurd, fince it is evident, that if there were no a&ive Power in Na- 
 ture, there could not be a pa/Jive orte ; and if nothing could move 
 without a Mover, there would have been no Motion or Action at 
 all -j-. For we cannot conceive how it mould begin. Now it is 
 much harder to conceive how Motion can be without a Beginning, 
 than how an Agent can move itfelf. Since then here are Difficulties 
 on both Sides, neither ought to be deny'd, becaufe the manner of it 
 is above human Underftanding. 
 
 XII. It is to be obferv'd, that what we have faid concerning thisY 118 ! 1 - 8 Jr* 
 
 -r t*A 1 i i !- itt-ii i about mdir- 
 
 Indifference of things in regard to the Divine Will, takes place Terence, with 
 chiefly in thofe Elections which we apprehend to be the Primary ^f^V^ 
 but not always in the fubfequent ones. For fuppofing God to will takes place in> 
 any thing while that Election continues, he cannot reject either the h s primary 
 fame, or any thing neceflarily connected with it, for that would be to Elcaions - 
 contradict himfelf. In order to apprehend my Meaning the better, 
 we muft remember that the Divine Power can effect innumerable 
 things equal in Nature and Perfections. For inftance, we may con- 
 ceive numberlefs Men equal to one another in all refpects : and al- 
 fo numberlefs Species of rational Beings equilly perfect, nothing but 
 the Will of God could determine which of thefe he mould create 
 firft. But when it was determin'd to create Man fuch as he now 
 is, i. e. with the Faculties, Appetites, and integral Parts which he 
 confifts of at prefent, it is impoffible that God fhould will or 
 choofe any thing repugnant to human Nature, while that Election 
 continues. 
 
 XIII. For when we conceive any thing propofed to the Know- have y 
 ledge of God as fit to be done, he muft alfo neceflarily have under things atonce 
 his Eye, as it were at the fame Glance, all thofe things that are ne- ,n , l ?" view 
 
 ' ' . ' o which are 
 
 cefTarily connected with it, or confequent thereupon to all Eternity j connected 
 _ and thth = 
 
 thing choien, 
 and cither will or refufe them by one fimple Acl. 
 
 * See Dr Clarke'/ Dminftrat. of the Attrlbutti, p. 82, 87, &fV. or S. FancouxtV EJuj (oncer, 
 ning Liberty, ^rV. p. z8, 29, and Note 62.
 
 j 92 Of Moral Evil 
 
 and mull will or reject, them all by one fimple Act. If therefore he 
 determin'd to create Man, he muft alfo be fuppofed to will that he 
 mould confift of a Soul and Body, that he fhould be furnifh'd with 
 Reafon and Senfes, and that his Body mould be fubject to the general 
 Laws of Matter: for all thefe things are evidently included in the 
 Choice to create Man. 
 As he is of XIV. Nay this primary Act of Volition muft be fuppofed to con- 
 infinite tain not only thole things which have a neceflary connection with 
 Goodnefs, w h at is chofen, but fuch things alfo as tend to promote its benefit 
 
 he alio wills * o t , 
 
 ti* good of and happinefs, as far as they can be made connltent with the benefit 
 a1 ' l J "S s of the whole. For fince God is infinitely Good, 'tis certain that he 
 determin'd wills that his Creatures mould exift commodioufly as much as that 
 to create, they mould exiit at all. He therefore will'd fuch things as are 
 fib!e/ aSp agreeable to the Natures, and tend to preferve the Conftitutions of 
 his Creatures in the fame Election whereby he determin'd to 
 create them. 
 When the XV. We have faid before, that there is a double Goodnefs in 
 foreis one? things, the firft and principal is that which renders them well- , 
 made, it is pleafing to God, as they are conformable to his. Will : the other is 
 thauhofc t ^ iat wnereD y they agree with one another, whereby they afford each 
 things fhould other mutual Affiftance, whereby they promote the Convenience, 
 p !? f h h '"d P re f ervat i n ar, d Perfection of the whole : but both thefe proceed 
 to the confu- from the Choice and Will of God. For when the Deity had once 
 fion, &c. of determin'd to pleafe himfelf in the Creation and Prefervation of the 
 World, he muft be fuppofed at the fame time to have willed all 
 fuch things as contribute to the Benefit and Perfection of his Work, 
 otherwife he would contradict himfelf, and thereby be the Caufe of 
 frustrating his own Election. For he is now fuppofed to have cho- 
 fen that there fhould be a World, that it fhould continue as long 
 as he himfelf had determin'd, that every Being fhould attain the 
 End affign'd to it, and all things alt according to the Nature he 
 had given them, and confpire together to preferve and perfect the 
 whole. It is impoffible therefore that he fhould will the reverfe 
 of all this, or that fuch things mould pleafe him as tend to the 
 .confufion, mutilation, or detriment of his Work. For 'tis impof- 
 fible
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 fible to conceive that he mould choofe the Exigence of things, and 
 yet refufe the means necef&ry thereto. (7$.) 
 
 XVI. When 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *9? 
 
 (75). This is a fufficicnt Anfwer to Leibnitz 
 who objeft?, that it will follow upon our Au 
 thor's Principles that there is fuch an abfolute 
 Indifference in the Deity as muft make him re- 
 gardlefs whether the World were well or ill 
 made ; Mankind Happy or Miferable, &c. 
 Whereas our Author having made it appear that 
 the Exercife of his Attributes, or Communi- 
 cation of his own Perfections, is the fole End 
 of his Aftion *, it follows that whenever he 
 does aft, he mull aft agreeably to that End; if 
 he exercife thefe Attributes at all, the Effefts 
 of them mud: be conformable to the Caufe. 
 His abfolute Power can effeft nothing which 
 implies a mere defeft of Power, his Infinite 
 Goodnefs can produce nothing but Good or 
 Happinefs in general, and his perfeft Wifdom 
 muft choofe fit and proper means thereto. All 
 this is included (as our Author fays) in the very 
 firft Aft of the Deity, or rather in his Will to 
 aft at all, and to fuppofe him to will at firft, 
 or to aft afterwards in any refpeft contrary to 
 this, is fuppofing him to will and aft againft 
 his own Nature, and in contradiction to htm- 
 felf ; or, which is the fame, imagining an Ef- 
 left to be quite different from, or contrary to 
 its Caufe. The Mm/ Pcrfeftions of the Deity 
 are therefore immediate confequences, or rather 
 the genuin Exercife of his natural ones, and 
 confequently can never produce any thing in 
 the main repugnant to them. And thus, I 
 think, it may be (hewn how all the Aft ions of 
 the Deity muft certainly be Good, Juft, &c. 
 without recurring to any fuch Fitn;ts or Re la- 
 tions of things as are by fome unaccountably 
 fuppofed to be antecedent and abfoJutely necef 
 fary to the determination of the Will of God 
 himfelf. 
 
 But don't wc, when we fpeak of God's Wif- 
 cjin choofing fit and. proper means, evidently 
 luppofe, that fome things are in themfelves 
 good and eligible, and via verfa even before 
 
 any determination of the Deity about them ? 
 Where is the room for Wifdom and Preference 
 in God, if all things be alike and indifferent 
 to him ? I anfwer, firft, If by things being in 
 themfelves Evil,c5V. be only meant, that fome 
 particular ways of afting may be conceiv'd, 
 which would, if the Deity could be fuppofed 
 to will them, be neceffarily and effentially 
 oppofite, and have a tendency direftly contra- 
 ry to hisprefent method of afting: we grant 
 that fome fuch things may be imagin'd, but 
 then it will be an abfurd and impoflible fup- 
 pofition, that God fhould ever will them, as 
 he has already will'd the contrary; and there- 
 fore, in regard to him, they muft ftill be only 
 imaginary. Nay they would be fo far from 
 being independent of, or antecedent to the 
 Will of God in any fenfe, that the very Ef- 
 fence and Idea of there would proceed entirely 
 from, and prefuppofe its Determination ; fince 
 we can only conceive any Relations or Confe- 
 quences of things to be Good or Evil, fo far 
 as they are confident with, or contrary to the 
 prefent Syftem pre eftablifh'd by the Will of 
 God. I anfwer in the fecond place, that the 
 primary Intent of the Creator being, as was 
 fhewn above, to communicate his Perfeftions 
 to various Creatures (to which communication 
 he was neverthelefs abfolutaly free and indiffe- 
 rent, and therefore could be determin'd to it 
 by no external Caufe) while that Intent conti- 
 nues, the neceflary confequenco. of it is, that 
 Creatures be fo made and conftituted as to at- 
 tain that End, and endow'd with fuch Powers 
 as will make them refemble him as much as 
 pofiible in their feveral States and Orders. All 
 this is only profecuting the fame Volition, or 
 continuing to communicate himfelf: and what 
 we mean by choofing fit and proper means for 
 this, is only, that he is not a blind and unin- 
 telligent Agent, but confeious of his own Na- 
 ture and Operations, aad therefore able to aft 
 
 1* 
 
 * See the Lift Note. 
 
 C c
 
 194 
 
 When Man 
 is made of 
 fuch a nature 
 as requires 
 him to be 
 jutt,fober,ffr 
 God is not 
 at Liberty 
 not to will 
 thefc things. 
 
 This is no 
 bar to the 
 Divine Li- 
 berty. 
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 XVI. When therefore Man was made what he is, by that very Act 
 of conlKtuting him of fuch a Nature and Condition, 'tis plain, God 
 alfo willed that he lhould be pious, fober t juft. and chad. Thefe 
 and the like Laws of Nature then are immutable, viz. conformable 
 to the Will of God, and contain'd in the very firft Act of Election, 
 wherein he determin'd to create Man. Nor is God at liberty not to 
 will thefe during his purpofe to continue Man fuclx as he is: For 
 by this means the fame thing would pleafe him, as being agreeable 
 to his firft Choice of creating Man, which is fuppofed to ftand yet, 
 and difpleafe him, as being repugnant to another, which rejects the 
 very fame things that are contain'd in the firffc ; that is, he would 
 at the fame time will and not will the fame thing, which cannot 
 be attributed to God. 
 
 XVII. Yet he is never the lefs free, becaufe he cannot will that a 
 Man be perjurjd, a Murtherer, &c. for he is no otherwife determin'd 
 than by his own Choice; nor does a thing pleafe or difpleafe him on 
 any other account than becaufe it is agreeable or contrary to his 
 Will. For while that Election of the Deity which conflitutes me a 
 Man (/. e. an Animal that is oblig'd to be pious, juft and fober) re- 
 mains, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 in a certain determinate manner. Now fuch de- 
 terminate Aftion mull produce a regular Sy- 
 ftem, the feveral Parts whereof will be related 
 to, and connected with, each other, and by a 
 mutual dependency render'd fubfervient to the 
 Good and Perfection of the whole. Tho' this 
 whole Syflem might at firft perhaps be indif- 
 ferent to the Agent in regard to feveral other 
 Syftems equally poffible, and which might have 
 been made equally perfeft in its Head. It is rot 
 thenasZ,#/?/7zargues-f-,the natural and neceffary 
 Goodnefs of fome particular things reprefented 
 by the Divine Ideas which determines God to 
 prefer them to all others, if underftood of his 
 firff Aft of producing them ; but 'tis his own 
 free, arbitrary Choice which, among many e 
 qual polfibilities, makes fome things aelually 
 'food, and determines them into Exigence. 
 When thefe are once fuppofed to exilt, every 
 
 thing or aftion becomes good which tends to 
 their Happinefs and Prefervation. Hence aJfo 
 in refpeft to us certain confequences and rela- 
 tions arife, which, by the very frame of our 
 Nature and Conftitution, or by certain In- 
 iiinfts, Affeftions, ffV. we are directed to ap- 
 prove, and obliged to purfue, if we expeft to 
 be happy. Thus all moral Obligation is ulti- 
 mately referr'd to the WillofGod^ which feems 
 to be the only fure and adequate foundation of 
 it, and from which 1 think it may be deduced 
 with much more clearnefs and confiftency than 
 from that Hypothetical NeceJJity of the relations of 
 things, which evidently prefuppofes, as was 
 obferv , d before, and is itfelf only founded on 
 the Will of God. See the Preliminary Dijfer- 
 tation, and Xi. and Note 76. or PufFendorf of 
 the Law of Nature and Nation^ B. I. C 1. .43* 
 Note 7. andJB. 2. C. 3. V20. 
 
 \ $ marques, p. 447.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 mains, 'tis impoffible that He mould will me to be perjur'd, or a Mur- 
 therer ; nor can the latter Choice take place in God fo long as the 
 former ftands, fince it is repugnant to the former. When therefore 
 we acknowledge that things are good, and affert that fome AtHons 
 are grateful to Gcd,and others odious; this is not becaufe we believe 
 the Divine Elections to be determin'd by them, but becaufe we fup- 
 pofe them to be comprehended in the very firft Act of his Will of 
 creating things, and to be pleafmg or difpleafing to him, fo far as 
 they are agreeable or oppofite to that Election. Nor does thij deftroy 
 the Liberty of Good, that he muft neceffarily will thefe while he does 
 will them: For every thing, while it is ; neceffarily is; but this Ne- 
 cefiity is coniequent upon, and not antecedent to the Divine Will. 
 The Divine Election therefore is not determin'd by the Goodnefs of 
 things, but the Goodnefs and Fitnefs of them arifes from that Elec- 
 tion, and that is beft for them which is raoft agreeable to that 
 Choice of the Deity, whereby he will'd them to be what they are. 
 From hence, I think, it appears fufficiently, that God is fuch an 
 Agent as delights in things merely becaufe they are chofen. (76.) 
 
 C o 2 XVIII. Yet 
 
 *95 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (76) To what has been faid on this fubjeel 
 in the precedent Notes, I fhall only add here, 
 ~ that their Argument fcems to be of very little 
 y force againft our Author, who urge, that if all 
 ">Good and Evil depended upon the Arbitrary 
 U'jll of God, then it would not be impoflible 
 for God to will that Vice be Virtue, that two 
 and two make five, it. For allowing that 
 God at firft made all things what they are, and 
 ilill continues to them the lame Exigence, 
 (tho' perhaps no reafon a priori can be affign'd 
 why he made them in this rather than fome o- 
 ther manner) Vice rauft be Vice, cjfc that js, 
 while things are as they are, the fame Confe.- 
 quences and Relations will reiult from them ; 
 nnd to fuppofe the contrary, is to fuppofe that 
 things may be different, or have different con- 
 fcquencej, while they continue the fame; or 
 that they may be what they are and what they 
 are not at the fame time. Thus all the pre- 
 fent Relations are evidently fubfequent to the 
 
 prefent Order of Nature, and muft continue 
 with it; and this confequential Neceffity is all 
 the Fitnefs that I know of. * 
 
 To ftile this Eternal and Immutable can there- 
 fore only mean thus much, viz. fuppofe things 
 ro be at any time what they now arc, and at 
 the fame time the very fame confequences would 
 flow from them which we now find. Sup- 
 pofe a Set of Beings conflituted like ourfelves, 
 and framed with the like Capacities for Happi- 
 nefs, and the fame relative Duties muft be in- 
 cumbent on them in order to attain that Hap- 
 pinefs. If they be imperfect dependent Crea- 
 tures, and perpetually ftanding in need of each 
 others affiftance ; if alfo they have fuch Pa f- 
 fions, Inftincls and Inclinations as tend to u- 
 nitc them to each other, and oblige them to 
 aft in concert: if they be thus framed, I fay, 
 they will of confequence be thus related, and 
 fubjeft to all the moral Obligations which wc 
 now are. But ftill this nccelhjy is only Hy- 
 pothetical,
 
 i9 6 
 
 A Being en 
 dow'd with 
 this Power is 
 more perfect 
 than one that 
 w*nts it: 
 yet this does 
 not imply in- 
 finite Perfec- 
 tion, there- 
 fore it is 
 communi- 
 cable. 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 XVIII. Yet it is to be remark'd, that this felf-determining Power 
 is not of fuch a Nature as to imply infinite Perfection ; for it may- 
 be confident with an imperfect Underftanding, and other Appetites, 
 as we have fhewn before : There is no reafon therefore for us to 
 doubt whether a Creature may partake of it ; if God were pleafed 
 to communicate it, there feems to be no contradiction in the thing 
 for a Creature to be capable of it. Now that Being which has this 
 gift beflow'd upon it, will manifeftly be more noble than the reft, and 
 a more perfedt refemblance of the Deity: fince therefore God has. 
 created the lefs perfect Beings, we may, without any abfurdity, be- 
 lieve that he has not omitted the more perfecl. Let us fee then 
 whether there be any Tokens of this Power among the Divine 
 Works *, 
 
 SUBSECT 
 
 N <T E & 
 
 pothetical, and like the neceffity of any cer- 
 tain Confequcnce refusing from certain Pre- 
 mifes; which Prcmill-s being alter'd, a dif- 
 ferent, a quite contrary one will be equally 
 necefTary. Thus in the former Inftance, if a- 
 jiy rational Creatures be conftituted focial Be- 
 ings, they wi41 indeed be obliged to aft as 
 fuch ; but let fome be made independent of 
 each other, and unfociable, endowed with, or 
 fd made as neceflarily to squire Paffions, In- 
 ftinfts and Inclinations, quite oppofite to the 
 former, and their Duties will be quite the re- 
 \cr(e. The great Virtue of Selfjbnefs will then 
 occupy the place of Univerfal Benevolence, and 
 that Method of Life perhaps produce the grea- 
 teft Sum of Hnppinefs to each individual, and 
 confequently be the moft eligible to every one, 
 which hrs now the direft contrary Effect. If 
 iach a fuppofirion be conceivable, 'tis fufficient 
 to ftiew that thefe Relations are not abfilutely 
 necfffhry in themfehes, but only conditionally 
 and consequentially to the prefent Order of 
 the Creation. See Puffendorf, Ri. C. 2. ^>0. 
 and the Note 2. p. 20. 
 
 If thofe Authors who treat of the neceflary 
 Relations of things independent of the Will of 
 God, mean only, that it was always impoffible 
 for God to prevent or alter them whenever 
 the things themfelves were fuppofed to exift ; 
 this is a neceffity which may very fafery be 
 granted, but will ferve little to their purpofe; 
 'tis a neceffity which is applicable (as our Au- 
 thor obferv'd above) with equal propriety to 
 any thing. 'Tis juit as much as to affirm that 
 while a thing is,, it neceflarily is; while the 
 whole is the fame, the parts muft be fo too. 
 If the Objeftion gees yet farther, and it be 
 urg'd, that according to us it will not be 
 impoffible for God to change his primary Will 
 of creating thefe things, and fo to alter the 
 whole Syflem together. I anfwer, 'tis fcarce 
 worth difputing whether fuch a Chimerical 
 Suppofition be poffible or not, fmce however 
 things might have been at fir.ft, yet as they are 
 now conftituted, it does not at all fhake the 
 foundation of Morality, nor affsft our prefent 
 Duties to God, ourielves, 0/ one another: 
 Thefe muft all neceflarily be what they now 
 
 arc, 
 
 * Far the poffibility cf fuch a Power, and tfits- being communicated, fee Dr. Clarke*/ De- 
 munjtratisn if the Being and Attributes of God, p. 82 and 85. 7th Edit. Fir the Perfection <f 
 it, fee Mote 82. and ^ 2. -of ' 4bii Chapter.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 197 
 
 S U B S E C T. V. 
 
 That Man partakes of this V rind pie of jtleafing himfelf 
 
 by Eletlion* 
 
 I. 
 
 bl 
 
 1 
 
 e. 
 
 T appears, I think, from what has been faid, that there is fuch some reafon* 
 a Principle as this in Nature, and that it is alfo communica- " e oft j\ r ' d t(> 
 
 ihew this. 
 
 We are now to enquire whether Nature has conferr'd it upon 
 us : If we confult our own Minds, we may pombly entertain a doubt 
 whether we are always pafiive in our voluntary Acts : namely, whe- 
 ther the Goodnefs of ObjetU determines our Elections, according to 
 the Degrees of it, which are, or are believed to be in them ; or, to 
 rpeak more plainly, whether we always choofe things becaufe they 
 pleafe us, or feeui convenient; or whether they fometimes appear 
 indifferent in themfelves, or inconvenient before the Choice, and ac- 
 quire their Goodnefs from it, and are for this reafon only agreeable 
 becaufe they are chofen. We have feen that there is in Nature fuch 
 a Power as this, which can produce a Convenience or Goodnefs in 
 things by willing them ; but, whether we partake of it or no is the 
 doubt. Now, that we dp partake of it may I think be evinced from 
 the following Reafons. Firft, If we be confcious of an inherent Li- 
 berty. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 are, while this Univerfal Syftem continues as 
 it is ; which is fufficient for our Purpofe. Nay, 
 I think, we may go a ftep farther, and affert, 
 that the foremen t ion 'd fuppofition is impof- 
 fible. For God, fuppofing him to be good and 
 wife, by once choofing this Syftem (whether 
 the firft Choice were neceflary or indifFerent N 
 has demonftrated to us, that it was at leaft e- 
 qually perfect with any other which might pof- 
 fib)y have exifted ; otherwife that other would 
 hive been actually preferred to it: as therefore 
 itterc can b: no better Syftem placed iu the 
 
 room of the prefent one, there can be no rea- 
 fon in Nature for this Change, and therefore 
 there will be none, tho' fuch a Phyfical Power 
 of changing it were allow'd to be inherent in 
 the Deity : Nor need we be fo much afraid 
 to allow that Being to be in the ftrifteft fcnfe 
 Arbitrary, which we have before proved to be 
 abfolutelj perfett. 
 
 ' Upon this Subjett fee Puffendorfof the Law 
 of Nature, &c. B. 2. C. 1. V3- and C. 3* 
 $. 4, 5. with the Notes.
 
 198 
 
 Firfl, Expe 
 rience. 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 berty. Secondly, If we experience in ourfelves thofe Signs and Pro- 
 perties which have been declared to attend this Principle. Thirdly, 
 If the Caufes which are fuppofed to determine the Will be evi- 
 dently infufficient, or arife from Election, inftead of producing it. 
 
 II. As to the firfl: j We experience in ourfelves a Principle of this 
 kind, l. e. a free one, to fuch a degree of certainty, that if our Minds 
 be confulted we can hardly doubt >of it ; and from hence it is, that all 
 Men of all Nations, while they follow'd the Guidance of Nature, and 
 attended to the Perceptions of their own Minds, have conftantly af- 
 ferted their Liberty, at leaft in fome particular Actions: nor has any 
 one, unlefs he were forc'd to it, and as it were circumvented by Phi- 
 lofophical Subtilties, ever deny'd, either that he was free, or that he 
 could pleafe himfetf in choofing one or other out of many Objects 
 prefented to him, tho' that which was preferr'd were no ways prefe- 
 rable to others in refpect of any intrinfic worth. 
 
 III. In this therefore, as in many other Cafes, the Vulgar feem to 
 be much wifer, and to reafon more juftly than Philofophers. For the 
 Vulgar generally follow the natural Senfe of the Mind; and, tho' 
 they be dull enough in forming long Deductions, yet in fuch things 
 
 r as are the immediate Objezls of Senfe and Experience, they are often 
 more acute than Philofophers themfelves. For thefe being either 
 puff'd up with the Vanity of appearing wife above the Vulgar, or 
 impos'd upon by their own Subtilty, often frame Monfters of their 
 own, and deny things that are the moft manifeft: while they are 
 ftriving to purfue Truth thro' Coverts impervious and macceffible to 
 human Wit, they leave her behind their Backs, and are blind in full 
 Light. Hence fome have deny'd Motion, and others Reft, others 
 Spacer -f, others all Senfe in Brutes, and ^others all manner of Truth : 
 and on the fame account, fome have deny'd Liberty, viz, becaufe 
 they were not able to unravel the Difficulties in which they them- 
 felves, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 The vulgar 
 often judge 
 better of 
 matters of 
 Fad* th-n 
 
 1 Uy the denyers of Space our Author mould 
 only mean fuch as deny that we have an Idea 
 of it, not them who deny it to have a real. 
 Fxiftence, orherwife he himfelf will be one of 
 the Philofophers lately mention'* d, fince he has 
 
 often afferted in C. t". . 2. (and I think with 
 reafon) that we mayeafily conceive it all away: 
 whereas it mull evidently be neceffarily exi- 
 ftent, if it have any Exigence at all. 
 See Notes 5, 11, and 13.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 fclves, by their Subtilties, had involv'd it. The ignorant and un- 
 learned do much better in flighting all fuch Arguments, and judg- 
 ing of things ingenuoufly according to the dictate of their Senfes and 
 Experience; and if their Judgments be taken we have clearly gain'd 
 the Caufe : for all thefe declare that they are confcious of this free 
 Principle within them, which yet cannot, as we have fhewn, be well 
 explain'd otherwife than we have done : The Senfe of our unpreju- 
 dic'd Mind agrees with thefe, nor is the common Teftimony of Man- 
 kind to be efteem'd of little importance in a matter of Fact, (jj) 
 
 IV. Secondly, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *99 
 
 (77.) The Subftanee of what Leibnitz objefts 
 againtt this Argument*, amounts to thus much, 
 viz. That it is no proof of the non-exiftence 
 of a thing becaufe the Vulgar don't perceive it ; 
 they are no Judges of any thing but what is 
 perceiv'd by the Senfes; they believe the Air 
 to be nothing whea it is not mov'd ; they 
 know nothing of the fubtle Fluid which caufes 
 Gravity, or of the magnetic Matter, much lefs 
 of immaterial Subftances: and therefore the fe- 
 veral Caufes of Aftion, the fecret Springs, the 
 Reafons and Inclinations, may be all unknown 
 to them, and yet we be abfolutely determin'd 
 (as he believes we always are) either by the 
 conftitution of our own Bodies, or of thofe a- 
 bout us, or by a thoufand Httle things which, 
 upon due attention and reflection, we might be 
 able to difcover. We reply, that tho' in many 
 Cafes our not perceiving a thing be no Argu- 
 ment that it does not really exift, yet in fome 
 Cafes, in this particularly, it is : To feel no 
 Pain, to be confcious of no Idea, is to have 
 none: and in like manner to perceive no mo- 
 tive or reafon of Aftion, is the fame as not to 
 aft upon any, or to perceive that we aft with- 
 out one. If any one (whether Philofopher or 
 Peafant) be thinking upon a Subjeft, he mull, 
 at that inftant, know the Subjeft that he is 
 thinking on, or however, that he does think 
 on fomething: 'tis likewife felf-evident, that 
 every reafonable Man, when he refolves upon 
 fome View, or follows an Inclination, muft be 
 confcious of that View, ot at leaft be fenfible 
 
 that his Refolution was form'd upon fome 
 View or other. In thefe Cafes therefore, and 
 in all the modifications of Thought, not to be, 
 and not to be perceived, is the very fame thing. 
 But befide the abfurdity of being influene'd 
 by a Motive which we know nothing of; be- 
 fide the Impoffibility of reconciling thefe im- 
 perceptible Movers with any kind of Liberty, 
 (for which fee Note 65.) we reply, fecondly, 
 that our Author does not conclude againft the 
 Exiflence of a thing becaufe the Vulgar do not 
 perceive and take notice of it, but on the con- 
 trary argues, that there muft be fuch a thing 
 as a Liberty of Indiffrence, becaufe they do 
 continually perceive and acknowledge it; be- 
 caufe they clearly perceive and experience it in 
 themfelves, or at leaft imagine that they do fo; 
 nay, becaufe they have as great Evidence of 
 fuch a felf-determining Power, as they have of 
 any thing, even of their own Exiftence : and 
 confequently they muft either be deceiv'd in e- 
 very thing, or not deceiv'd in this f. The 
 prefent Argument is therefore built on matter 
 of Faft, and wiJl be conclufive here, tho T our 
 Ignorance be never fo great in other Cafes. 
 Our aflurance of a Truth which we do clearly 
 perceive, is not the lefs for there being a great 
 many other Truths which we do not perceive : 
 and tho' our not perceiving a thing were no- 
 Argument that it does not exift, yet our ac- 
 tual perception of it is a Demonttration that 
 it does. It is not, therefore, becaufe toe do not 
 confider the Caufes that communicate Motion to the 
 
 Remarques, p. 477. 
 
 f See Note 82.
 
 aoo Of Moral Evil. 
 
 'Tis proved jy Secondly, If we experience in ourfelves the Signs and Proper- 
 takc of this" ttcs which belong to this Power, it cannot be queftion'd but we 
 have the Power itfelf : Now thefe are a Self-confcioufnefs that we 
 are the true Caufe of our Actions ; an Ability to act and p'eafe our- 
 felves in contradicting our natural Appetites, our Senfes and Reafon. 
 perues of jf j t | evident from Experience that we can do thefe things, it will 
 * 5 be too certain that we have fuch a Power as is able to pleafe itfelf 
 barely by Election. 
 
 V. In the firft. place then, we have declared that a Being endow'd 
 with this Principle is the only true efficient Caufe of its Actions, and 
 that whatever it does can be imputed to it only. Now all Men im- 
 pute the Actions of their own Will to themfelves, and efteem them 
 truely and properly theirs, whether they be good or bad ; which is 
 a certain Sign that they do not perceive themfelves to be determin'd 
 true Cau- f rom e If e where to the Choice or Exertion of them, otherwife they 
 Hence it is would not look upon themfelves as the Caufe, but the Determiner, 
 that we di- It cannot be otherwife than from a confcioufnefs and firm perfuafion 
 Msfonunes f tm ^ Truth, that wrong Elections give us more trouble than fuch 
 from Crimes, things as proceed from Ignorance and inevitable Error. 'Tis on this 
 account only that a light Evil occafion'd by our own Choice grieves 
 and afflicts us more than a very great one from the Action of ano- 
 ther. If we expofe ourfelves to Poverty, Difgrace, or an untimely 
 End, by an Act of Choice, our Confcience remonftrates againft it, 
 Remembrance flings us, and we cannot forgive ourfelves, tho' we 
 were fecure both from human Punimment and the Wrath of God. 
 But when the fame Evils befal us by external Force or the Necef- 
 fity of Nature, we bewail our Condition indeed, and complain of 
 Fortune, but have none of that wounding Anxioufnefs, and vindic- 
 tive Reproach of Confcience, which fcourges thofe that become mi- 
 
 ferable 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Power, be- 
 caufe we dil 
 cover the 
 Marks and 
 
 In the firft 
 place, wc 
 impute our 
 Actions to 
 ourfelves, 
 whereby we 
 own our- 
 felves to be 
 
 Sou!, or are not able to delineate the precife man- 
 ner of t bet Communication, that we ajfert the Soul 
 to be jelf-tnotive (as the Author of the late iXif- 
 fertatjon on Liberty and NeteJJity argues, p. i 5.) 
 But we afiert that it is felf-motive, 'becaufe we 
 feel it to be fo, and have as great Evidence of 
 it as we could expect or conceive ourfelves to 
 
 have, were it really Co. And that Author un- 
 reafonably begs the Queftion, in fuppoliug 
 that there are fuch Caufes and Communicators 
 in a Cafe where he has, where he can have, 
 no Evidence at all of them. But this DiJJ'er- 
 tation is fully confuted by Mr. Jack/on, to whofe 
 excellent Anfwer I refer the Reader.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 sol 
 
 ferable by their own fault. As therefore he that enjoys this Princi- 
 ple muft neceflarily blame himfelf if he bring any Inconvenience up- 
 on himfelf by his own Choice ; fo he that does blame himfelf, de- 
 monitrates that he has this Principle. For as it is impoflible but 
 that he mould accufe himfelf, who believes that he is the true caufe 
 of his own Mifery, fo on the other hand, 'tis certain that he who 
 does accufe himfelf, thinks that he himfelf is the true caufe of his 
 Mifery : otherwife he would grieve, complain, and be angry with the 
 Perfon that compell'd him to commit fuch things as he finds make 
 him uneafy, but would never condemn himfelf as the Caufe and Au- 
 thor of them, unlefs he were confcious that he could have hinder 'd 
 them. If the grief arifing from a Crime be diftincl: from that which 
 is occafion'd by a Misfortune, 'tis plain that this can be on no other 
 account, than becaufe the Crime proceeds from a free Agent, i. e. 
 one who determines himfelf to Action, but the Misfortune from a 
 necelfary one. ) VI 
 
 VI. 'Tis plain then from our Confcience of Good and Evil Actions, Tkis 5j 
 that we have this adive Principle in fome refpect within us. For moft certain 
 we not only rejoice in fuch things as are done well, and grieve at s ? l gn th f " we 
 the contrary, but alfo impute them to ourfelves, and either blame. f our liberty 
 or applaud ourfelves as the Authors and true Caufes of them : which 
 is the nrft and furefr. Sign that our Minds are fenlible of their Liber- 
 ty, and that they could have pleas'd themfelves in doing otherwife 
 than they have done. (78.) 
 
 VII. The 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (78.) 'Tis pleafan't to obferve how the Au- 
 thor of the Philofopbical Enquiry endeavours to 
 unfwer this Argument, by confounding the 
 two Ideas of Sorrow and Self-accufation ; of 
 a Misfortune and a Crime, as his great Prede 
 eefibr Hobbs had done before. " Confcience 
 " (lays he) being a Man 1 sown Opinion of his 
 " Adtions, with relation to fome rule, he 
 " may at the time of doing an Action con- 
 trary to that rule, know that he creates 
 " that Rule, and confequently aft with re- 
 " lu&ance, the' not fufficient to hinder the 
 
 Adlion. But after the Aclion is over, he 
 may not only judge his Adlion to be con- 
 trary to that rule, but by the abfence of the 
 pleafurc of the Sin, and by finding himfelf 
 obnoxious to Shame, or by believing himfelf 
 liable to Puniflimeut, he may really accufe 
 himfelf; that is, he may condemn himfelf 
 for having done it, be forry he has done it, 
 and wifh it undone, becaufe of the confe- 
 quences that attend it *." Where, not to 
 infift upon the perpetual abufe of the words, 
 
 Pbihfopbicnl Enquiry concerning human Lib'rty, p. 105, 106. 
 
 D d
 
 201 ' 
 
 The fecond 
 token of this 
 Power, th.t 
 it can go a- 
 gainll the 
 AppetitcJ,rY 
 
 Tis fliewn 
 that we can 
 do this in 
 regard to our 
 Appetites. 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 VII. The fecond Sign or Property of this Power is, that it is able 
 to oppofe the natural Appetites, Senfes and Reafon, and can pleafe 
 itfelf in the Oppofition. If we experience this Ability in ourfelves > 
 we may be certain that we partake of fuch a Power. 
 
 VIIL With refpecl to the natural Appetites, we have faid before *, 
 that this Principle, when it happens to be join'd with natural Appe- 
 tites in the fame Perfon, often runs counter to them, and pleafes it- 
 felf in reftraining them ; if We find that we can do this, 'tis a Sign 
 that we have it. But who has not experiene'd this in himfelf ? who 
 has not fometimes voluntarily fufFer'd fuch things as are hard, in- 
 commodious, and painful to the natural Appetites, and taken delight 
 in fuch Sufferance, as if that were fome kind of Good fuperior to 
 
 the 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 de, *8 t csV. which upon this Hypothec's 
 mull have a Signification dire&ly oppofite 
 to that which they now commonly bear ; 
 what can we mean by a Mans accufing or 
 condemning himfelf, when he is fenfiblc that 
 be has done nothing which he could have al- 
 ter' d or avoided j or rather done nothing at all, 
 but only fuffer'd all the while from fome o- 
 ther? He may indeed perceive and judge 
 himfelf to be miferable, and be forry that he 
 is fo, and wifh himfelf otherwife ; but what 
 is all this to a Criminal Shame, Remorfe, and 
 Self-convilion ? Is this all that we under- 
 ftand by a Guilty Confcience f Can he blame, 
 reproach, or be angry with himfelf for being 
 only what another made him, and what he 
 knows he could not poffibly help ? 
 
 As this is matter of Fadt and Experience, 
 we appeal to the common Senfe of Mankind, 
 whether the Ideas of Guilt, Remorfe, c3V. be 
 not entirely different, and evidently diftingui- 
 (hable from thefe ? The fame holds with re- 
 gard to our blame or accufation of another, as 
 has been fhewn at at large by Bp. Bramball, to 
 whofe Cafligatiom of T. Holbs I muft refer this 
 
 * Subfcft.J. par. ii, 12I 
 
 Author. " I aslc'd (fays the Bp. +) why do 
 *' we blame free Agents ? fince no Man bla- 
 " meth Fire for burning Cities, nor accufeth 
 " Poifon for deftroying Men. Firft, he re- 
 '* turneth an Anfwer, We blame them becaufe 
 " they dt not pleafe us. Why ? May a Man 
 " blame every thing that doth not pleafe his 
 " Humour ? Then I do not wonder that T. 
 " Hobbs is fo apt to blame others without 
 " Caufe. So the Scholar may blame hb Ma* 
 ** Iter for correcting him defervedly for his 
 ** Good. So he who hath a vitious Stomach 
 " may blame healthful Food. So a Lethargi- 
 " cal Perfon may blame his bell Friend for 
 " endeavouring to fave his Life. And now, 
 " having (hot his bolt, he begins to examine 
 " the Cafe. Whether blaming be any thing mire 
 " than faying the thing blamed is ill or imper- 
 " feci. Yes, moral blame is much more, *tis 
 " an Imputation of a Fault. If a Man be born 
 " blind, or with one Eye, we do not blame 
 " him for it : but if a Man has loft his Sight 
 " by his Intemperance, we blame him juftly. 
 " He enquireth, May vie not fay a lame Horfe 
 " is lame ? Yes, but you cannot blame the 
 
 Horfe; 
 
 t P- 7fe
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 the Gratification of the Appetites. (79.) Nay the Pain itfelf arifing 
 from the Violence offer'd to thefe natural Appetites, if we do but 
 choofe to bear it, becomes in a manner agreeable, which would o- 
 therwife be very irkfome. From whence it is moft apparent that 
 this Pleafure depends upon the Choice for while that continues, it 
 continues too ; when that is chang'd, 'tis gone. Now fuch Elections 
 as thefe are made every Day, and none can be fo much a Stranger 
 to himfelf, as not to be confcious of them. (.80.) 
 
 IX. It is to be obferv'd farther, that we do not only embrace with 
 pleafure fuch things as the Appetites refufe, and rejeft fuch things 
 as they defire, but alter, as it were, Nature itfelf, by an obftinate E- 
 lection, and make thefe Appetites purfue what they naturally avoid, 
 and fly what by Nature they defire. And this takes place not only 
 
 D d 2 in 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 203 
 
 That we can 
 do it alfo in 
 our Senfes, 
 and in a man- 
 ner change 
 the nature of 
 things by an 
 obftinate E- 
 Ieftion. 
 
 " Horfe for it, if he was lam'd by another, 
 *' without his own Fault. May not a Man fay 
 *' ont is a Fool or a Knave (faith he) if be bi 
 fo, tbo" be could not help it ? If he made 
 " himfelf a Sot, we may blame him; tho', if 
 " he be a ftark Sot, we lofe our Labour. But 
 " if he were born a natural Idiot, it were 
 " both injurious and ridiculous to blame him 
 " for it. Where did he learn that a Man may 
 *' bt a Knave and cannot help it ? or, that Kna 
 " very is impofed inevitably upon aManwith- 
 " out his own fault ? If a Man put fire to his 
 " Neighbour's Houfe, it is the fault of the 
 " Man, not of the Fire. He hath confefs'd 
 " formerly, that a Man ought not to be punijb'd 
 " but for Crimes, the reafon is the very fame, 
 " that he mould not be blamed for doing that 
 " which he could not poffibly leave undone ; 
 H no more than a Servant whom his Mafter 
 f hath chained to a Pillar, ought to be bl.m'd 
 " for not waiting at his Elbow. No Chain 
 " is ftronger than the Chain of Fatal Dejliny is 
 " fuppofed to be." 
 
 See the fame Author's Definitions of Liber- 
 ty, Neceflity, &c. with his Defence of them, 
 " p. 756, iffc. and his Reply to all T. Hobbs's 
 Evafions (fince tranferib'd by the Author of 
 the Phi/ofopbical Enquiry, p. 91, fcfr.) in his 
 Vindication, p. 679, &fe. 
 
 (79 ) To this Leibnitz anfwers, " That it is 
 " only oppofing or ballancing one Appetite 
 " with another. We fometimes bear Incon- 
 " veniencies, and we do it with pleafure, but 
 " this is only by reafon of fome hope, or 
 " fome fatisfadion which is join'd to the E- 
 " vil, and which furpafTes it." We reply, if 
 by hope be meant an expectation of fome fu- 
 ture Good, 'tis plain that we can oppofe and 
 refift any natural Habit without any fuch Ex- 
 pedition, as may be experiene'd when we 
 pleafe, in Hunger, Thirft, &c. The profpeft 
 of the bare pleafure of willing to do (o can- 
 not be the Good hoped for, fince that is a fure 
 attendant on every, fuch Volition ; all the fatis- 
 faftion then which appears to be join'd with the 
 Evil, and to counterbalance it in any fuchCafes, 
 can only be the pleafure arifing from the ac- 
 tual Exertion of the felf-moving Power, which 
 is the thing our Author contends for. See the 
 latter part of Note 65. 
 
 (80) 'Tis a common and juft Obfcrraticn, 
 that Men as well as Children be.tr any Labour 
 or Fatigue which they undertime voluntarily, 
 with half the Uncifinefs .md Grief which the 
 very fame thing would give them, if they were 
 fore'd to undergo it ; which c.-.nnot, I think, he 
 accounted for, but upon our Author's Principle. 

 
 qo4- Of Moral Evil. 
 
 in Appetites, but alfo in the Objects of the Senfes. Some things are 
 naturally unpleafant to them, fome things bitter, naufeous, deform'd, 
 yet thefe are made tolerable by the force of Election, and by a change 
 of the natural Propenfity, at length become Delights*. On the 
 contrary, what was fweet, beautiful, &c. being rejected by the Will, 
 becomes at length difagreeable. We could not poffibly do this, if 
 we had not a Power of pleafing ourfelves by other Means, than the 
 agreement of Objects to the Appetites and Senfes. For, whence comes 
 it that fitch things as are fweet, comely, excellent, commodious -, nay, 
 all that are grateful to the Appetites and Senfes mould be rejected ; 
 and when once rejected, mould become irkfome and offenfive ? On 
 the contrary, whence is it that Griefs, Pains, Torments, nay Death 
 kfelf fhould be agreeable when voluntarily undergone, unlefs from 
 this Principle which pleafes kfelf in its Election? If it be granted 
 that we have fuch a Principle, it may be eafily fhewn how thefe 
 things can be effected ; for natural Good may, by the Power of it, be 
 chang'd into Evil, and Evil into Good : for it has a Good in itfelf 
 fiiperior to thefe, by the Power of which it can overcome and alter 
 the Nature of them: but that this cannot admit of any other Expla- 
 nation will be fhewn below f. 
 That we can x. Thefe things are generally fuppofed to be done by the Power 
 cn"you r rAp- an d Prefcription of Reafon -y and 'tis thought, that the Will is there - 
 petitesand by directed to embrace things difagreeable to the natural Appetites 
 affo our b Rea- an ci Senfes: I confefs this fometimes is, and always ought to be done 
 fon by the according to reafon j for we have hinted above, that fome regard 
 force ofEle-fhould be had to thefe things in Elections ; but very often the Cafe 
 is far otherwife. We have fhewn before, that a Power which is ca- 
 pable of pleafing itfelf by Election, cannot be determin'd by reafon;., 
 for the Underftanding depends upon it, rather than it upon the Un- 
 derflanding* 'Tis therefore the third Mark and Property of this Po- 
 wer, that it can run counter, not only to Appetites and Senfes, but 
 alfo to Reafon. If we can do this, we muft own to our Sorrow, that 
 we partake of it. But that we can, by the force of Election, con- 
 quer not only the Appetites and Senfes, but the Underftanding too, 
 
 daily 
 
 * See Mr. LockeV Chapter of Power, .69. Tho* all this may be effetted iy the file Ptzver of ,- 
 Ulion, and without the Reafons which bt there afpgns for it. 
 f See, the following SeJlitn.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 005 
 
 daily Experience teaches, and we have reafon to lament that it can be 
 prov'd by fo many inftances that we pleafe ourfelves in Elections con- 
 trary to the natural propeniity of Senfes and Appetites, and at the fame 
 time againft the dictate of Reafon. 
 
 XI. We have feen an Atheift fupported by the Obftinacy of a per- This appears 
 verfe Mind, enduring Torments, Confinement, and Death itfelf ra- from Inlbn - 
 ther than abjure his beloved Impiety : We have feen a great many ce 
 Perfons voluntarily throwing away their Fortunes, Life and Soul, 
 
 left they mould be difappointed in a foolim Choice. We have be- 
 held not a few difregarding the Intreaty of their Friends, the Advice 
 of their Relations, the Dictates of their own Mind, Dangers, Di- 
 ftrefTes, Death, the wrath of God, and the pains of Hell ; in fhort, 
 defpiling all that is Good, or could appear to be fo, when fet in com- 
 petition with fuch things as, exclufive of the Goodnefs which they 
 receive from Election, are mere Trifles, and worth nothing at all -, 
 fuch as have no manner of Good, or pretence of Good in them. 
 There have been Perfons, who knowingly, without any kind of hope,, 
 any kind of belief, have deftroy'd themfelves and their Relations, and 
 yet were in their right Mind, and coniiftent with themfelves, if a. 
 right Mind may be judg'd of by fober Words, and a ferious tenor of 
 Action. Did thefe Men follow Reafon, or any other Good befide the 
 fruition of their Choice ? We have fhewn already that this Power 
 may produce thefe and greater Abfurdities; for fince it is fuppos'd to 
 be of fuch a Nature as can alfo pleafe itfelf in its Act, wherever it 
 can exert that Act, it can pleafe itfelf, even in opposition to the 
 natural Appetites, the Senfes and Reafon. If then fuch a Principle 
 be granted to be in us, it will not feem ftrange that we mould be 
 able to do things that are repugnant to thefe; if this be not al- 
 low'd, it cannot be made appear how fo many Abfurdities, fo many 
 things difagreeable to Reafon, to Senfe ; fo many things contrary to 
 the dictate of the Mind, mould every Day be committed by Mankind. 
 
 XII. Nay, which may feem more ftrange, the Will appears to T h at the 
 have fo great a Power over the Understanding, that the latter is fo Uoderftan* 
 far fubdu'd by its Choice, as to take Evil things for Good, and forcU^^^'^.j. 
 to. admit Falfities for Truths. Neither will this appear impoffible to things for 
 
 one *? r d >. bu r c 
 
 Falfities for 
 Truths, 
 viz. being under fubjettionto the Will.
 
 2o6 Of Moral Evil 
 
 one who recollects that the Senfes are no lels natural Faculties, and 
 have by Nature as quick a Relifh of their proper Objects, and can 
 as well diftinguifh thofe that are agreeable from them that are difa- 
 greeable, as the Underflanding. If therefore we fometimes pleafe 
 ourfelves in choofing what is repugnant to the Senfes, 'tis alfo pof- 
 fible for us to take pleafure in embracing what is diffonant to Rea- 
 fon. The Senfes are forced to admit and tolerate fuch things as are 
 difguftful to them, which things they take for agreeable by ufe, ha- 
 ving as complete Enjoyment of them as of thofe that are adapted to 
 them by Nature *. The fame may happen fometimes to the Under- 
 standing, viz. to be compell'd by the Will to admit Falilties for 
 Truths, to believe them thro* cuftom, and at laft make ufe of them 
 ferioufly as Truths. Hence comes that common Saying, that we ea- 
 fily believe what we eagerly dejire ; and fome take a pleafure in fubdu- 
 ing not only Senfe but Reafon too. I confefs, he that does this, ads 
 foolimly, and is much to blame j but from this very thing, that we 
 act foolimly, that we are to blame, 'tis evident that we not only can 
 but actually do pleafe ourfelves in Elections, which are made con- 
 trary to Reafon j and that the Judgment of our Underflanding de- 
 pends upon the Will, rather than that the Will is determin'd by 
 it. From hence it is evident that all the Signs and Properties of 
 this Self-pleafing Power agree to us, and therefore we certainly par- 
 take of it. 
 *Tispro\'d XIII. The fame will appear thirdly, from confidering the Reafons 
 that we have which move us to the choice of thefe Abfurdities, according to the 
 from P aconG Op m i n f thofe Men who think that the Will is pajfhe in Elec- 
 dcration of tions. For if, while they are labouring to affign Reafons for thefe 
 th h^h eaf nS an( ^ tne ^ e Determinations, they produce nothing for Reafons, but 
 fuppofed to the very Elections themfelves, or their Effects, it will be apparent that 
 determine they are in a Miftake, and offer Effects for Caufes; which will ap- 
 pear more fully from an Enumeration of thofe Reafons which are 
 fuppofed to move the Will in fuch Cafes. 
 , XIV. The Principal of thefe Reafons are Errors of the Underftan- 
 
 fctoctatcd. && Obflinacy of the Mind, the force of Pafjiom, and Madnefs-, on 
 
 thefe 
 
 Nay grnerally more fo : "Tis a common Obfervat'on, that fuch things as were at firft the ml 
 difagreeable of all to the Pa'ate, become by ufe the mojl delightful: viz. Wines, Tobacco, Oltvis, 
 fcc.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 thefe are charg'd all the unreafonable, abfurd, and impious Actions 
 of Men ; thefe are efteem'd the Caufes of all fuch Elections as can- 
 not be allow'd to proceed from the intrinfic Goodnefs of the Objects 
 which are chofen : but this is all groundlefs. 
 
 XV. For in the firft place, as to Errors of the Under/landing, 'tispj rft) Err0 
 certain that we fometimes choofe hurtful Objects by miftake, which pf the Un- 
 we often lament, but never impute to ourfelvcs, except we be conici- ^I,^ a "^! ng r 
 ous that this Error was voluntary, /. e. in fome refpect ow'd its Ori- "hewn to de- 
 gin to Election. Election then is prior to all culpable Error, for thatP end u PJi 
 depends upon it. 'Tis not therefore always by miftake that we choofe i e aia ra-~ 
 Abfurdities, but by choofing Abfurdities we miftake the Truth. But thcr than 
 to confefs the Truth, we are hurried on in an abfurd Election, tho' ,caufclt * 
 we fee and know all that we are about to do: if then there be any 
 
 Error, 'tis only this, that we judge it better to enjoy a free Election, 
 than to be exempt from natural Evils. Hence it is evident, that there 
 arifes lb much Pleafure from Election as is able to impofe upon the 
 Underftanding, and induce it to prefer that to all kinds of natural 
 Good, nay to Life itfelf. But whether this be done erroneoufly or 
 wifely, 'tis the ftrongeft Argument that we have fuch a Self-pleafing 
 Principle as this within us. 
 
 XVI. Secondly, as for Obftinacy, by which they fuppofe that we '5jJ; . ndr ^\ 
 are moved to choofe abfurd things ; 'tis plain that this is nothing efte which!? * 
 but the perfeverance of a bad Election: neither can Obftinacy and Jftewn to be 
 Perverfenefs be explain'd otherwife than by Elections. If it be gran- but^fetl? 
 ted that things pleafe us becaufe they are chofen, we fee clearly e-ringinade- 
 nough what Obftinacy is, viz. an unneceflary adherence to an Elec- p . rav ' d Elcc " 
 tion, and a Self-complacency in it contrary to the dictate of Reafon, 
 
 and with the lofs of natural Good. (81.) But if the Will be deter- 
 
 min'd 
 
 NOTES* 
 
 (81.) Leibnitz (in his Remarks frequently ci- 
 ted above) argues *, " That Obftinacy is not 
 " barely the continuance of a bad Election, 
 " but a difpofition to perfeverc in it, proceed- 
 " ing from fome Good that a Man forms to 
 " himfelf, or from fome Evil which one fup- 
 
 " pofes to attend the change. The firft EIcc- 
 u tion, fays he, was made perhaps thro' mere 
 " Levity, but the refolution of adhering to it 
 " comes from fome ftronger Reasons or Im- 
 " preflions." But if this be all that is meant 
 by Obftinacy, how come the World, to fix fo 
 
 bad 
 
 p. 482.
 
 2 
 
 Thirdly.The 
 violence of 
 Paffions, z'iz. 
 Dcfire of 
 Fame and 
 Glory, &t, 
 all which are 
 prov'd to de- 
 rive their in 
 ordinate 
 force from 
 Election. 
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 min'd from without, there will be no fuch thing as Obftinacy. By 
 an obftinate Perfon we mall only mean one that has continued a long 
 time in a pernicious Error, without any Motive to change his Judg- 
 ment. Now he that does this is miferable indeed, but cannot be 
 call'd in the lean; degree obftinate, according to the common Notion 
 of Mankind. 
 
 XVII. Thirdly, fince neither Errors nor Obftinacy are fufficient to 
 explain the Nature of thefe Elections, they fly to the Power of the 
 Paffions ; viz. the Defire of Fame, or Glory; Anger, Hatred, &c. 
 Thefe are the Caufes, fay they, why we choofe abfurdly, and by 
 them the Choice is determin'd. But Fame, or Glory have no man- 
 ner of Good in them, efpecially to thofe who believe that they fhall 
 not exift after Death: why then are thefe Men content to purchafe 
 Glory with Life ? Certainly from no other Caufe befide Election ; 
 'tis by Election that we have form'd thefe Idols to ourfelves, and 
 from thence they derive whatever Good is in them. To be talk'd of 
 after Death, to mount upon the Wings of Fame, to extend our Name 
 to diftant Regions ; thefe things pleafe us on no other account but 
 becaufe we will them. Obfcurity, Oblivion, Retirement will be as 
 
 pleafing 
 
 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 
 bad a Notion to thatWord ? If it be a difpofition 
 always proceeding from a pro fped of Good, or 
 dread of Evil, and founded on fecond thought? 
 and flronger reafons : "how can it ever be e- 
 fteem'd a Crime? Again, if theory? Election 
 can "be made without any external Motive, 
 (-which he feems to allow by affigning Levity 
 as the fole Caufe of it) why may not the per - 
 feverance in it be fo too ? may not the fame 
 Caufe be fuppos'd to produce the fubfequent 
 Elections, as well as the firft ? -Inihort, Lcjb- 
 fiitz, after all his feeining oppofition to dur 
 Author on the head of Liberty, moll evident- 
 ly grants the Queftion both here, and p. 480: 
 where he affirms, that in effect we are able to 
 change the Natures of things, and make thefe 
 transformations above mention'd. " But this 
 " (fays he) is not as among the Fairies, by a 
 " iirople Adt of that Magic Power, but becaufe 
 " a Man darkens or fupprefles in his Mind, 
 " the reprefentations of the good or ill Qua- 
 
 " lities naturally join 1 d to certain Objects, and 
 " becaufe we only regard thofe which are a- 
 " greeable to our Tafte, or our Prepofleffions ; 
 " or even becaufe we join by force of thought, 
 " certain Qualities, which arc only found u- 
 " nited by accident, or by our cuftomary way 
 " of confidering them." Now what is it to 
 darken or fuppreCs the reprefentations of good 
 or ill Qualities,--to regard fome only and ne- 
 glect others, and to join Qualities to Objects 
 by the force of thought,--but to exert this very 
 Power in debate ? Which often choofes the 
 fruition, or even the confideration of fome one 
 out of many equal and indifferent Objects, and 
 by that fimple Act ma'-es it agreeable to our 
 Tafte, and joins fuch Qualities to it as could 
 neither proceed from Chance nor Cuflom, nor 
 any Affociation of Ideas whatsoever. See the 
 !ConcluGon of this Subject in the following 
 Note. 

 
 Of Moral Evil. 209 
 
 pleafing to the Man that choofes them, and have been*fo. Thofe 
 Perfons then who imagine that thefe determine Elections, take Ef- 
 fects for Caufes. For thefe, which are nothing in themfelves, (hew 
 us that they acquire fo much Goodnefs from Election as makes them 
 overballance all kind of natural Good. 
 
 XVIII. The fame mull be faid of Anger, Hatred, Love and De- The fame is 
 fpair, whereby many believe they are driven into Abfurdities. But fh *Y mofHa " 
 in reality all that is abfurd and pernicious in thefe Paflions proceeds &* ve ' 
 from Election. Nature has given us Paflions which are generally 
 innocent, while folicited only by their proper Objecls, and natural 
 Opportunity, as we fee in Brutes ; but they are compell'd to change 
 
 the natural Objects by the Power of Election : thus Anger and Ha- 
 tred are excited by the Will, and apply'd not to fuch things as are 
 naturally hurtful : nor Love and Defire to fuch as are naturally de- 
 firable, but to others of a quite different kind, with which they have 
 no natural Congruity, fuch as Fame and Glory after Death. Of this 
 kind alfo are moft of the Inftruments of Luxury, which are com- 
 monly faid to pleafe, purely by the ftrength of Fancy, that is in rea- 
 lity, by Election. Hence it is that Men purfue with fo great Eager- 
 nefs, and fuch an impetus of Paflion, things which are in themfelves 
 trifling, pernicious, and abfurd. Nay they barter away Life itfelf for 
 Trifles, and when they cannot enjoy them, caft off that in defpair. 
 'Tis the Election itfelf which fubftitutes thefe things as fit to be 
 profecuted by thefe Paflions inftead of their natural Objects, and 
 while they are hurry 'd on, not according to the exigence of Nature, 
 but the command of the Will, they confound every thing, tranfgrefs 
 the bounds of reafon and utility, and in defpight of thefe, rage with- 
 out limits or reftraint. 
 
 XIX. As for Envy and Revenge, they are not owing to Nature, but Of Envy and 
 the Will, and fetting afide Election, are mere nothing. For whate- Revenge * 
 ver is pretended to the contrary, there can be no other account gi- 
 ven why any one mould undergo Labours, Dangers, Griefs and Diffi- 
 culties j why he fhould lofe his Reputation, Family, Country, nay his 
 
 Life, for the Satisfaction of his Envy or Revenge, but that he refolv'd 
 within himfelf, but that he ckofc to fatisfy themv 'Tis evident that 
 the moft unexperienc'd Perfon is fufhciently convinc'd of this. But 
 thefe, when once embrac'd by Eleclion, become more agreeable than 
 
 E e thofe
 
 aio Of Moral Evil 
 
 thofe things which Nature has made neceflary. Thofe abfurd Elec- 
 tions then % are not made by the force of thefe Paflions, but the abfurd 
 and irregular force of thefe proceeds from the Elections. 
 Fourth! -^* They who perceive that thefe Caufes are infufficienr, have 
 
 M4d*efs'\\ recourfe to Madnefs and Phrenzy, in order to account for abfurd E- 
 prov'd on the | C) q J, but this is playing upon "Words, and taking Madnefs in a 
 . thef^ Men* different Senfe from that wherein it is commonly underftood. Pie 
 are in their fox is fo far diforder'd in his Mind as not to be able to deduce one 
 choo"ab h Idea from another, nor make Obfervations upon what he fees, is. 
 Airdiy. look'd upon as a Mad-man, but thefe Men who do fo many abfurd 
 things enjoy the above mention'd Powers, and have their Underftan- 
 ding and Setifes ftrong enough by Nature: what is it therefore which 
 drives them into Abfurdities? The power and prevalence of the fu- 
 pericr Faculty, viz. the Will, which has a Good peculiar to itfelf, 
 which it produces by Election. This it purfues regardlefs of all that 
 Reafon, the Body, the Condition, Appetites and natural Faculties re- 
 quire. For while it can provide for and pleafe itfelf, it is not at all 
 felicitous about any thing which may prejudice thefe, but has a cer- 
 tain Complacency in its own Exercife, and endeavours to augment its 
 Happinefs by the purfuit of fuch things as are repugnant to them. 
 For the more Difficulties and Abfurdities it encounters, the more it 
 applauds itfelf in a confcioufnefs of its own Abilities ; which feems 
 to be the very thing that we call Vanity and Pride. Hereupon it com- 
 pels the Senfes, Reafon, natural Appetites, to be fubfervient to its 
 Elections: nor can he be called a Mad-man who acts againfl: Reafon, 
 thro' the force of a fuperior Faculty, any more than he that falls 
 from a Precipice by the violence of a fuperior impulfe. For it is not 
 every one who acts againfl: reafon, that muft immediately be look'd 
 upon as Mad, but only he that acts abfurdly from fome injury 
 done to the underftanding Faculty itfelf, or an Impediment to the 
 Ufe of Reafon ; he that could have follow'd the dictate of Rea- 
 fOn, and yet knowingly violated it, muft not.be reckon'd mad, but 
 wicked, unlefs we will impofe upon ourfelves by changing the cufto- 
 mary Names of things. 
 h\\ thefe XXI. If it be granted that we have this fuperior Faculty, 'tis plain 
 
 * ! t n g on * enough that all^ thefe things may come to pafs. For he that is en- 
 
 p^ioedother- dow'd 
 
 tvife than by adaiittinga Principle of this kind in ourfelves.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 31 ! 
 
 dow *d with It, will be able to pleafe himfelf in the Profeoution of 
 his Elections, even to the detriment of both Body and Mind; to 
 the prejudice of Senfes, Appetites and ReafOn j which we often 
 fee done to our Amazement} but, unlefs we have this Faculty im- 
 parted to us, it does not feem pomble for us to create Good to 
 ourfelves by Election, and to prefer what is thus created to all na- 
 tural Good whatfoever. As much 
 
 XXII. Thefe things. I confefs, ought not to be done ; but if no- f ood a [i ies 
 
 o * J o irom tills 
 
 thing could be done which ought not, there would be no fuch Principle, fo 
 thing as a Fault. As therefore much Good arifes from this Prin- ic . is "ended 
 ciple, fo there is this Evil alfo, that by it Crimes and Follies are "\\, t /z. S a 
 committed : And it has this Inconvenience, that it can do what it Power of 
 ought not. ftnnin S- 
 
 XXIII. From thefe and other Arguments which might be brought, I Tiiimifake, 
 think it is evident that God has given us a Principle of this kind, that the ^11 
 and that our Will is only determin'd by itfelf. They are miftaken judgment of 
 therefore who affirm that either the Appecites, Pamons, or Under- the Under- 
 {landing, determine Elections. What probably gave occafion to the j^J.fiJJ,*" 
 Miftake was, that other things pleafe or difpleafe us, viz. fuch as hence, viz. 
 are agreeable to the Appetites or Senfes, befide thofe which-.we t b ha i t n ' t ^ vo d ulci 
 choofe: Now it being obferv'd that we have regard to thefe in E- i n us'to^cT 
 lections, and do not choofe any thing repugnant to them, but upon ^ ithout C0l >- 
 neceffity, and that all Men are of Opinion, that the Judgment of aScffuo- 
 the Underftanding ought to be made ufe of in choofing, and being ding. 
 accuftom'd to this kind of Choice, we become at laft perfuaded that 
 
 it is abfolutely neceffary, and that our Wills are always determin'd 
 by fome Judgment of the Underftanding : at leaft, that is is a Con- 
 dition requifite in the Object, that the Mind judge the thing cho- 
 fen to be good and agreeable to the Appetites. Whereas the con- 
 trary to all this is generally true, viz. that the Mind judges things 
 to be good becaufe we have willed them, becaufe we have form'd 
 an Appetite in ourfelves by fome antecedent Election, and thofe things 
 which we embrace by this faffitious Appetite, as we may call it, give 
 us equal Pleafure with that which we defire by the Neceflity of Na- 
 ture, 
 
 Ec2 XXIV. Nay
 
 2ll 
 
 We can aft 
 in order to 
 (hew our Li 
 bcrty, which 
 is prov'd to 
 be the fame 
 *s acting 
 without any 
 reafon at all- 
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 XXIV. Nay we choofe Objects which are contrary to all the 
 Appetites, contrary to Reafon, and deftitute of all Appearance of 
 Good, perhaps for this only Reafon, that we may aflfert our Liberty 
 of Election. 'Tis certain that every one can do this, and he that 
 does it, proves by an Experiment that he is free, and has a Power 
 of pleafing himfelf in Election. Nor can he be faid to be deter- 
 min'd by the Judgment of the Understanding ; for this reafon is made 
 by the Mind itfelf, and may ferve equally for every Election, fince 
 it is drawn from the Indifference of the Will itfelf: and he who 
 does any thing upon a reafon which is made by himfelf, and is in- 
 different to either Side, muft be efteem'd to act in the fame manner 
 as if he had done it without any reafon at all. 'Tis evident there- 
 fore that we have this Power, and make ufe of the Appetites and 
 Senfes only as Spies and Informers j of Reafon as a Counfellor ; but 
 that the Will is Matter of itfelf and creates pleafure for itfelf ia 
 Objeds bv Eledion. (82.) 
 
 SUBSECT. 
 
 NOTE & 
 
 (2.) Upon the whole it appears that the 
 true defcription of Free-will mull include thus 
 much. A Power of choofmg or not choofing, 
 or of choofing either Side in any given Cafe ; 
 naturally independent of any mediate or im- 
 mediate, external or internal force, compul- 
 fion, or neceffity; phyfically indetermin'd by 
 either bodily Senfations, Appetites, &t. or 
 mental Perceptions, Reafon, Judgment. 'Tis 
 an Ability of determining either among equal 
 and indifferent Objects, or of preferring the 
 purfuit of fome before others that are entirely 
 different from or contrary to them : or laflly, 
 of preferring the very confideration of fome 
 unknown Objects to all the reft j of delibe- 
 rating upon, or attending to fome particular I- 
 deas, and refolving to overlook others, tho' e- 
 qually prefented to the Mind, and fuppos'd to 
 be of equal Importance. 
 
 All this is contained in the very Notion of 
 a Setf-moving Power ; (tho' none perhaps have 
 given fo full and diftindt an Explication of it 
 as our Author) for that which in flri&nefs 
 moves itfelf, is properly and phyfically inde- 
 
 pendent of, and indifferent to all external Mo- 
 vers, as long as it continues to do fo ; what is 
 determin'd in certain circumftances by parti- 
 cular Senfations, Motives, &c. and cannot 
 poffibly be determin'd either without or a- 
 gainft them, is fo far, and in fuch circum- 
 fbnees, only moved, afted upon, and purely 
 paffive. If then there be any fuch thing, pro- 
 perly fpeaking, as an active Principle, it mult 
 be endow'd with fuch an abfolute Indifference 
 as our Author fuppofes : and when we fpeak of 
 the ftrangeft Motives, we don't mean fuch as ; 
 have the greateft phyfical Influence or Weight 
 in turning the ballance of the Will (fince we 
 fuppofe none of them to have any at all) but 
 only fuch as the Mind moft commonly deter- 
 mines itfelf upon in fact ; and to argue from 
 fuch determinations, that thefe Motives muft 
 have fuch an Influence both abfolutely and 
 comparatively, /. e. whether taken by them- 
 felves, or in oppofition to each other ; is ma- 
 nifeftly to beg the Queftion, and ftill to fup- 
 pofe that it cannot move or direct itfelf, not- 
 withstanding our moft evident perception and 
 
 experienoe
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 ill 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 experience of the contrary. And that we have 
 fuch experience, a little reflection on ourfelves 
 will convince us. ** I think (fays S. C.) I may 
 " appeal to any confidering Man, whether he 
 " be not in all ordinary Cafes fenlible of an 
 " ability of darting his thoughts upon any 
 " particular Object, even antecedently to any 
 " deliberation, and then, whether after deli- 
 " beration about particular Objects he cannot 
 ** refume his deliberation, and fometimes vary 
 ** his Judgment; and whether, after the clear- 
 " ell Judgment, and moil deliberate Choice of 
 " particular things or actions, he be not ilill 
 " confeious of a power of fufpending his prac- 
 " tice, of refuming the confideration of the 
 " Objects whenever he pleafes, or of imme- 
 u diately choofing or practifing the contrary, 
 ** without being determin'd by impreffions 
 " from without, or impediments from within. 
 " But we have no clearer proof of our own Exi- 
 " ftence than Confcioujnefs . and I conceive we 
 " need not expect greater Evidence of any 
 M thing than we have of our Exiftence *.'* 
 
 If then our Mind has fuch a power of felec- 
 ting fome particular Ideas out of many per- 
 ceiv'd by the Understanding, and attending to 
 them only without any previous apprehenfion 
 of their nature and tendency, without any 
 fpecial Reafon, Motive or Inclination, or any 
 Inducement whatfoever to fuch particular 
 Choice; if the Mind, I fay, does in fome 
 Cafes exert fuch a power as this, then it is in 
 thefe Cafes abfolutely free. It cannot here be 
 directed by the Judgment, fince it is fuppos'd 
 to act independently of it : nay it may be pro- 
 perly faid fometimes to influence and direct, 
 er rather to obftruct and fubvert the Judgment 
 itfelf, for as much as it confines that to fome 
 particular Objects only, and of confequence 
 renders it partial, and precipitates it in the 
 Choice of thefe, and withdraws others from 
 it, which were abfolutely neceflary to a com- 
 pleat View of the Subject, and an exact de- 
 termination about it. Hence the fpring of all 
 Errors, at lead all criminal ones, hence' viti- 
 ous, abfurd Elections, and a Labyrinth of Woe. 
 
 From the fame Power alfb duely applv'd. pro- 
 ceeds the hippy confeioufnefs of De'ert. and 
 in it is entirely founded all the reafc rt of Re- 
 ward. Its ufefulnefs then, and nccelity. ap- 
 pears both for the eftabliihment of Mrinlity, 
 the ground of all rational Happinefs ; and al 
 fo, that we might always hive wherein to 
 pleafe ourfelves, which (as our Author has 
 (hewn in the litter end of Subfect. 4.) other- 
 wife we very often could not. Hence it ap- 
 pears I think fufficiently, that this Power is one 
 of our greateft Perfections, tho' (like all other 
 Perfections that come fhort of Infinity) it be 
 liable to the greateft abufc, and Co capable of 
 being turn'd into the word of Imperfections. 
 
 It remains 10 be enquir'd with our Author, 
 whether ail the Happinefs arifing from it 
 counterbalances the Mifery, and confequently, 
 whether we and all other rational Creatures 
 might not have been as well or better without 
 it. But for this fee . 2. and <J. 
 
 We fhall here only add a Word or two in 
 vindication of this Principle, agaiftft the three 
 principal Oppofers of Liberty above mentio- 
 ned. In the firft place then, we don't aflert 
 that by this Power the Mind can choofe Evil 
 as Evil, or refufe Good as Good, i. e. that the 
 former, as fuch is or can be a Mttire for 
 Choice, or the latter for Refufal : But we fay 
 that it can choofe the one and refufe the other 
 without any particular Motive at ail \ nay, in 
 oppofition to the ftrongeft Motive (viz. that 
 Motive which prefents the greateft Happinefs, 
 and which it ufually does, and always ought 
 to follow) purely by the force of its active 
 and felf-moving Power f: 
 
 You'll fay it does this to prove its own 
 Power, and the pleafure attending fuch proof 
 is the ftrongeft Motive in thefe Cafes. I an- 
 fvver, that granting this to be fo (which yet is 
 not very probable, as appears from what was 
 obferv'd from the EJfay on Confeioufnefs in Note 
 65.) yet this, as our Author obferves, mull be 
 a Motive of its own creating, which, withre- 
 fpect to Volition, is the fame as none at all. 
 Nay this is the very thing we are endeavour- 
 
 ing 
 
 " Impartial Enquiry, &c. p. 42, 43. See alfoan Effay on Confeioufnefs, p. 205, &e. 
 + See Jackfon'j Vindication of human Liberty, p. 49, 6fr. or the beginning of E. Strutt*/ Defence 
 tf Dr. Clarke'/ Notion, &c.
 
 a 14. 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 NOTES. 
 
 ing to prove, viz. that the Soul has a power 
 of determining itfclf to will or to act, and of 
 pleafing itfclf in fuch determination, without 
 any other Motive or Reafon but what is pro- 
 duced by itfelf, and follows that very determi- 
 nation; without any external Caufe whatfoever; 
 in which Power all its Liberty confifts, and 
 the greateft Part of its Happinefs, as will ap- 
 pear in the next Section. 
 
 Nor, fecondly, will fuch a Power as this 
 only make us liable to miftake the true Good 
 which is in thing* (as the Author of the Phi- 
 loj'opb* Enquiry and Leibnitz argue) but on the 
 contrary, it often makes true Good or Happi- 
 nefs in thofe things which of themfelvs had 
 none at all ; and improves thofe things which 
 have, and alleviates thofe which have the con- 
 trary Qualities j and of confequence is not a 
 mere Imperfection, but a very valuable and ne- 
 ceflary Perfection. Our Author does not fup- 
 pofe us left to an abfolute, blind indifference 
 in all Objefts (as Leibnitz often urges) with- 
 out any Guide or Direction in the Choice of 
 them; which would indeed be an Imperfec- 
 tion ; but affirms that the Mind or Man is 
 fenfibly and neceflarily affe&cd by fome, and 
 informed by his Underftanding of the Nature 
 and Effeds of others, and fo is fufficiently di- 
 rected to the Choice of thefe which are in them- 
 felves good and agreeable to his Conftitution, 
 and vice verfa ; yet ftill with the refervation of 
 a full Power of following or not following 
 that Guide, of negle&ing or refilling that Di- 
 rection: Which Power therefore, even in thefe 
 Cafes, remains ftill unaffected. In other Ob- 
 jects, he (hews that the Man is totally indiffe- 
 
 rent, which yet, by an atbitrary Choice, ho 
 can make to be no lefs conftituent Parts of his 
 Happinefs. 
 
 Whence, in the third place, a reply may be 
 form'd to the common Queftion, If bat Benefit 
 is there in a Power of choofing freely among 
 things that are really indifferent, and exactly 
 alike ? We anfwer the Benefit of enjoying any 
 one of them ; which Enjoyment a Man could 
 not poffibly have without fuch a Liberty, but 
 muft neceflarily hang in perpetual Sufpenfe, 
 without any Choice at all ? This Leibnitz owns 
 to be an unavoidable confequence of his Opt' 
 nion*, and to avoid this Abfurdity, is driven 
 to a greater, viz. to deny that there are any 
 fuch indifferent and equal things in Nature + j 
 the contrary to which has been abundantly e- 
 vine'd already withrefpedto bothGodandMan. 
 
 Laftly, to the Argument againft the poJJibUi- 
 ty of fuch a Liberty, fo frequently repeated by 
 the two Authors above mention 1 d, viz. that 
 Aftions done without any Motive, would be 
 Effects without a Caufe. We reply, in fhort, 
 that it is a plain Petitio Principij, in fuppofing 
 Motives to be the real phyfical efficient Caufes 
 of Volition or Action, which we deny; and 
 yet are far from fuppofing thefe Ads to be ab- 
 solutely without a Caufe } nay we affign them 
 another, and, affirm that their only true and 
 proper Caufe is this felf-moving Power, and 
 the only Caufe of this is the Creator who com- 
 municated it. 
 
 On this Subjed fee Dr. Clarke\ Dtmonftrat, 
 p. 136 &e. zd Edit, or his Remark;, &c p. 38, 
 &c. or Chubb" i farther Reflections on Natural 
 liberty. Colleclion of Trails, p. 388, &fV. 
 
 * EJfais de Theodice, p. 1 61 , &c. 
 f See his 4th Letter to Dr. Clarke. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SECT.
 
 Of Moral EviL 2 j a 
 
 . 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Where it is /hewn that Happinefs confiHs in 
 
 Elections. 
 
 i 
 
 L 1 ""'ROM what has been faid above, it appears that a Being en- The more 
 dovv'd with a Power of choofing, is more excellent and per- f rec . an y de- 
 fect than one that is without it: For that which neither acts nor is he^expos'd 
 acted upon, is the fartheft from Perfection, fince it is of no more ufe |o Motions 
 in Nature than if it were nothing; at all ; that which is purely paf- J'7ZL tl l oat ' 
 
 ^v * i i- i ii'i i rtiiQ meets 
 
 live in its Operations, is one degree more perfect, but that which has with lefs in- 
 the Principle of its Actions within itfelf, fince it approaches, as- ic convenienc - 
 were, nearer to God, and is more independent, is alfo more rf itfelf y 
 i.e. it feems to be made for its own fake, and chiefly to refpect its 
 future benefit, and on that account to be more noble and perfect. 
 Nor does it feem pomble for a greater Perfection to be communi- 
 cated than the fruition of fuch a Principle. The more free any one 
 is, and the lefs liable to external Motions, the more perfect he is : 
 God has therefore multiply'd this kind of Creatures as far as the 
 Syflem and Order of his Work allow'd, and decreed, that fuch as are 
 paflive in their Operations lhould be fubfervient to thele. 
 
 II. Since therefore Happinefs, according to the common Notion of Happinefs a- 
 it, is granted to arife from a due ufe of thofe Faculties and Powers prufeof 
 which every one enjoys; and fince this Power of determining our- the Faculties, 
 iclves to Actions, and pleafing ourfelves in them, is the moft per- ^ l f p\ here " 
 
 tect of choofing 
 be the mo ft 
 noWe of all, the greatefl Happinefs, will confift in the Exercife of it, f. e. in Elections.-
 
 n6 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 feet of all, whereby we are the moil confcious of our Exiftence, and 
 our Approach towards God, our chief Happinefs will confift in the 
 proper ufe of it, nor can any thing be abfolutely agreeable to us 
 but what is chofen. It is to be confefs'd that many external Ob- 
 jects, many that are offer'd by the Senfes, pleafe us ; but if we look 
 "Into the thing more narrowly, this will appear to arife from hence 
 only, that thcfe are as Motives which induce us to exert an Act of 
 Election, whereby we embrace them as if they were agreeable to 
 the natural Appetites : for tho' the Will cannot be dstermin'd to E- 
 lection by any thing but itfelf, yet it may be perfuaded to determine 
 itfclf, in order to avoid what is abfurd and difguftful to the Natural 
 Appetites. 
 Elcaion is III. For 'tis certain that we make ufe of the Affiftance of the 
 the caufewhv Underftanding in Elections, and hold it as a Light before us to di- 
 us, ftinguifh Good from Evil ; but we ufe it as a Judge and a Counfellor, 
 
 not as a Sovereign and Dictator : and to fpeak the truth, in order 
 to avoid foolifh and hurtful things, rather than to acquire what is 
 good and agreeable. For whatever we choofe will (as was fhewn be- 
 fore) be ipfo fafto good and agreeable, except it lead us into fome- 
 thing contrary to the Appetites, or otherwife abfurd. The Under- 
 ftanding therefore points out and admonifhes us (as we faid before) 
 to avoid thefe external Evils, or to embrace the Good : but till we 
 have exerted an Act of Election about them, thefe do neither be- 
 come abfolutely agreeable, nor the other odious. We have prov'd 
 before that this is the Cafe, and it will be evident from Experience 
 to any one that confiders it. If then nothing pleafe us but what is 
 in fome refpect chofen, 'tis manifeft that our Happinefs muft be 
 fought for in Election. 
 
 I v. We have (hewn above, that an intelligent Creature, which is 
 th has" free merely paffive in its Operations, cannot be made entirely happy: for 
 power of as it is liable to external Motions, it muft neeenarily meet with 
 
 ahvavTSe hurtful as wel1 as ufeful b J e ^ s J ** a11 thin g s cannot be ufeful. 
 
 himiclf: It remains therefore, that a Creature which is to be exempt from 
 all kind of Grief mould have the Principle of his own Happinefs 
 within him, and be able to delight himfelf, in what manner foever 
 external things be difpos'd, i. e. that he have the Government of his 
 own ASions, and may pleafe himfelf by willing either this or fome- 
 
 thing
 
 Of Moral Evil i 1 7 
 
 thing elfe : Such an Agent as this is, will be fatisfy'd with any Ob- 
 ject that occurs ; fince Objects are not chofen by him becaufe they 
 pleafe him, but on the contrary, pleafe him becaufe they are chofen. 
 Whoever therefore has free Choice may make himfelf happy : viz. 
 by choofing every thing which befalls him, and adapting his Choice 
 "to things. 
 
 V. And it is by this Means only that Creatures feem capable of T e can 
 
 / j 1 chstnfic our 
 
 heing made completely happy: for fince the things themfelves are Elections to 
 neceflarily fix'd by certain Laws, and cannot be chang'd, it remains make thei " 
 that the Elections be alter'd, in orde-r to make them conformable to ^Mng^and 
 things, /'. e. to the Will of God: for thus free Agents will have afocanatt.un 
 Power in themfelves of attaining Happinefs. Hence it is that we Ha PP inef& - 
 tire fo frequently admonifh'd in Holy Scripture to be conformable to 
 God*-> on this Point our Salvation and Happinefs turn : And with 
 good reafon ; for what is Happinefs if not to be in every thing as 
 we will or choofe ? But he who choofes to conform himfelf in all 
 things to the Divine Will, muft certainly be always what he would 
 he, and will never be difappointed in his Choice: however ex- 
 ternal things fall out, a Perfon thus difpofed may enjoy Happi- 
 nefs, nor does any one feem to have been capable of it on other 
 terms. 
 
 VI. But perfect Happinefs, may fome fay, is not to be expected ; Care of the 
 for thole Beings which are united to terreftrial Matter, muft necef- ^Sturlu 
 farily be affeited with the Motions of it, as was mewn before, and Appetites dl- 
 cannot bear the diflblution of the Body, or the impairing of its Or- i | urb . E1 ": 
 gans (which yet are unavoidable) without fome Pain and uneafy Sen- pr efem due, 
 fation. I confefs, abfolute Felicity is by no Means to be hoped for and h ' nde y 
 in the prefent State : But yet the more our Elections are confor- !!f s frombe- 
 mable to things, the more happy we are; if then our Elections ingperfeft. 
 were perfectly free, we mould alfo be at Liberty to enjoy perfect 
 Happinefs: but fince the care of our Bodies, and the natural Appe- 
 
 tites difturb our Elections, and fometimes byafs them to one Side, 
 we cannot pleafe ourfelves in Eleitions abfolutely, and without a 
 Mixture of Uneafinefs. For tho' they afford Delight, and even grea- 
 ter than the natural Appetites, yet they do not remove all manner 
 
 of 
 
 * Rm. \z- 2. CJof j. 1, 2,&V. 
 
 F f
 
 i 1 8 Of Moral Evil 
 
 of Uneafinefs, nor extinguifh the fenfe of Pain. While therefore we 
 arein this State, we mud acquiefce with a mix'd and imperfect 
 Happinefs, fuch as the prefent State of things affords ; and it is plain 
 that this, fuch as it is, arifes only from Elections. For tho' we can- 
 not by mere Election always extinguish the Pain and Uneafinefs 
 which arifes from our being forc'd to bear fuch things as are dii- 
 guflful to the natural Appetites, yet we can choofe to bear thefe 
 things, and pleafe ourfelves in that Choice ; the Confcioufnefs of our 
 Powers in bearing thefe furpaffing the Uneafinefs of Pain, nay per- 
 haps augmenting the Pleafure fo far as that the Excefs of it mail o- 
 vercome the Pai ; n arifing from the fruftrated Appetites, by fo many 
 Degrees as could have been obtain'd, if there had been no contra- 
 riety between them and the Election. For inftance, if one feel two 
 Degrees of Pain from a Diftemper, and receive fix Degrees of Plea- 
 sure from an Election to bear it with Patience and Decorum j fub- 
 flracting two Degrees of Pain from thefe fix of Pleafure, he has four 
 of folid Pleafure remaining : He will be as happy therefore as one 
 that has four Degrees- pure and free from ail Pain. If this be gran- 
 ted to be poflible, we may be as happy with the natural Appetites, as 
 if we had been without them, nor (hall we have any reafon*to com- 
 plain of them. 
 
 : VII. And here, by the Way, we may admire the Divine Goodnefs 
 fon to admire and Wifdom, which (fince Objects are generally fix'd and confined 
 tkeDUine under certain Laws) could create an Appetite that fhould have where* 
 which ?rea- with to fatisfy it within itielf ; and might render any State agree- 
 t?d an Appe- able, barely by willing it. Now Free-Will lias this Effect by ac- 
 v. herewith to commojating itfelf to Obje51s, when the Objefts themfelves cannot 
 pleafe itfeif be chang'd. For the Man will be no lefs happy who choofes what- 
 xr ItS T n ^ knows will come to pafs, than he who brings that to pafs which 
 foeverexrer- he choofes j the one may be always done, the other is often impof- 
 nai things be ftble: this therefore, or none, is the Way to arrive at Happinefs. 
 'Tis hard' to comprehend how he can fail of Happinefs who has it in< 
 his Power to pleafe himfelf. This feems to have been the Opinion 
 of the ancient Stoics, who had the fame thoughts of Liberty with 
 thofe laid down above, but did net explain them diftiactly, nor com- 
 prehend the whole. Series of the Matter. 
 
 However/
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 However, ';is very plain that they placed Happinefs in the Ufe 
 and Election of fuch things a? are in our own Power, which yet 
 would be impomble, if we were not able to pleafe ourfelves in 
 Election. (83.) 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 2l 9 
 
 (83.^ Our Author's mentioning the Stoics 
 fiere, might probably give Leibnitz his reafon 
 to fufpect him of maintaining all the abfurd 
 Confequences which that Sect are faid to have 
 drawn from the above mentioned Principle. 
 They indeed (if they be not greatly mifrcpre- 
 fented) urg'd it fo far as to affert, that no- 
 thing external could hurt or incommcde us 
 except we pleas'd : That all Good and Evil 
 was entirely in oar Power, and of our ma- 
 king, and confequently that all outward things 
 were indifferent and alike to us, antecedent to 
 our own Choice. Which Notions, being con- 
 trary to every Day's Experience in Pleafure 
 and Pain, led them on to deny that the latter 
 was properly an Evil, or rather that there was 
 any difference at all between them. This 
 Doftrinc is indeed liable to Leibnitz's Objec- 
 tions of confounding all the dillinctions of 
 
 things, of contradicting the natural Appe* 
 tites, making Reafon and Underftanding ufe- 
 lefs, and fubverting all the other Faculties 
 of the Mind. Thefe and the like Reflections, 
 I fay, are jufrly made upon the Doctrine of 
 the Stoics, as they have generally exprefs'd 
 themfelves, and overthrow a total, abfolute In- 
 difference of the Mind to will in all Cafes; 
 but are nothing at all to our Author, who ne- 
 ver contended for it; but on the contrary, in- 
 fifts upon a neceffary, fix'd, and unalterable 
 difference in the Natures of things, according 
 to the prefent Syftem ; and has allow'd their 
 full force, both to Reafon and the natural 
 Appetites, all over the laft Section, as well as 
 in the foregoing Chapters of this Book. 
 
 But this has been explain'd in the Notes a- 
 bove. For an application of this Sect, fee ^.5 
 Subiect. 2. and the Notes to $. 5. Subfect. 3. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Concerning undue Elections. 
 
 1. IP^ROM hence it is fufficiently evident what kind of Elections x r al] mort 
 1/ are to be called undue ones : For it appears that God has gi- of what we 
 ven us this Faculty of choofing, that we may pleafe ourfelves in the p r y[ e w s e Ml " 
 uie of it, and be happy in the fruition of thofe Objects which we choofe amifs 
 choofe. For it is Happinefs to obtain the things chofen, and Mifery rh refore 
 
 F f 2 tO choofe what 
 
 ctnnot be 
 enjoy 'd: This is done ift. when fuch things are chofen as ixsinpoflibte.
 
 aoo Of Moral Evil 
 
 to be fruftrated and fall fhort of them. Whenfoever therefore we 
 make fuch a Choice, as not to be able to enjoy the things chofen, 
 'tis plain that we choofe foolifhly and unduely : for we bring upon, 
 ourfelves unneceffary Mifery, fince we could have chofen otherwife 
 with equal Pleafure. Whoever then choofes knowingly what he 
 cannot obtain, or what may produce unneceffary trouble to himfelf 
 or others, he muft be efteem'd to choofe unduely. And this maybe 
 done, firft, If any one choofe Impojjibilities. It may feem mange, 
 that any Perfon mould choofe a thing which is impoffible, knowing, 
 it to befb; but 'tis very probable that this has happen 'd fometimes, 
 as was faid before * 
 ,. II. Secondly, If he choofe fuch things as are incanjijient with each 
 
 When thofe other : he that does this contradicts himfelf, and evidently cuts off all: 
 things nre hopes of Enjoyment. When we will any thing, we muff take all its 
 ^ e ^S^neceffary confequences together with it. But all things here are of 
 ttitheacho- a mix'd kind, and nothing is pure from all degrees of Bitternefs: 
 ther * we often therefore will that part in a certain thing which is agreea- 
 
 ble to the Appetites, and refufe the reft: but this is in. vain, fince 
 the agreeable Parts cannot be feparated from the difagreeable ones: 
 we muft therefore either choofe or reject the whole- He that does 
 otherwife cannot poffibly fatisfy himfelf, fince he muft bear with what 
 he would; not : He is therefore voluntarily, unhappy by an undue E- 
 lection. 
 Thirdly, If III. Thirdly, he muft be efteem'd to choofe unduely, who aims at; 
 the things fc$\ things as he knows not to be in his Power. For it is a hazard 
 Shthe powe I whether he enjoys thofe things that are not in his Power; and it is 
 oftheElec- foolifh to commit our Happinefs to Chance; while therefore it is in 
 ter ' our Power to choofe only fuch things as we are certain of obtaining, 
 
 we rifk our Happinefs, or throw it away when we purfue Uncer- 
 tainties: Now we owe as much Happinefs to ourfelves as is in our 
 Power, and ought to ufe our utmoft Endeavours- to attain; it ; but we 
 lofe this by denting- thofe things which we know to be out of our 
 Power. 
 Fourthly,. IV. Fourthly, That alfo is an undue Election, which obliges us to 
 choofe that ^* ze tno ^ e 48l tnat are lawfully occupfd by the Elections of other 
 which is Men,, 
 
 pjc-occupjr'd by thejawful. Choice of others. . 
 
 * l^i. Subfeft. 5. gar*.iov .1, 12. .
 
 Of Moral Evil a2l 
 
 Men. To be difappointed of an Election is Mifery, as we faid be- 
 fore; to enjoy it, Happinefs. Every one therefore that is endow'd 
 with a Power of chooling, has a right to the enjoyment of the thing 
 chofen, fo far as is necefiary to the Exercife of his own Faculties, and 
 is no impediment to the Good of others. But he mufl be efteem'd' 
 an impediment to the Good of others, who will appropriate to him- 
 felf what is common, or arTume more and greater Advantages from 
 the common Stock, than fall to his Share. Thofe things then which- 
 are pre-occupy'd by the Choice of other Men, belong to theChoofers,. 
 and cannot juftly be taken from them: therefore he that covets them 
 would have what is not his due : i. e. endeavours by an undue Elec- 
 tion to rob others of their Right. This is to be referr'd in an efpe- 
 cial Manner to fuch things as are pre-occupy'd by the Choice of the 
 Deity;, br thefe are to be efteem'd by all as facred and prohibited: 
 nor can any one meet with Succefs that oppofes himfelf to God, and 
 choofes what God difapproves. For what God wills muft neceffarily 
 come to pafs, but God wills the Happinefs of all Men as far as it is 
 poflible ; therefore he that offends unneceffarily againft the Happinefs 
 of any one, is fuppos'd. to offend againft God, and to choofe what is 
 not his due. 
 
 V. Fifthly, On this account it is unlawful for us to defire thofe F . f , 
 things which are hurtful to ourfelves or others. By hurtful things Whe/tWe 
 I underftand thofe that lead to natural Evils, viz. fuch as are preju- thf *?p which 
 dicial to the Body or Mind. It appears from what has been faid, ."* ^h 
 that things* pleafe us becaufe they are chofen, but Reafon perfuade&are chofen* 
 us- to abftain from fuch Elections as may prove pernicious to our own ^ ho ^ t anjr 
 Minds, or thofe of others, or fuch as defraud the Appetites unnecef- 
 farily : for we owe a Gratification to thefe Appetites, when it can be 
 procured without greater Detriment. Therefore an Election oppo- 
 sed to thefe gratis, and without any reafon, muft be judg'd an undue 
 one, becaufe it deprives us of the due Enjoyment of our Appetites; 
 
 S E CT.
 
 ill Of Moral Evil 
 
 , 
 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 How it is pojfible for us to jail into undue 
 
 Elections # . 
 
 This is dene I. ' r l v I S difficult to comprehend, as was faid before, how one 
 five ways. J^ can fa\\ mor t of Happinefs who has it in his Power to 
 
 pleafe himfelf, yet if he choofe in the foregoing Manner, or the 
 'like, he muft neceffarily fail of his Choice, and his Appetite be fru- 
 itrated, i.e. he muft be unhappy. But how is it poffible, you'll fay, 
 that any one mould make fuch a Choice ? I anfwer, This may pro- 
 ceed firft, from Error or Ignorance. Secondly, from Inadvertency far 
 Negligence. Thirdly, from Levity. Fourthly, from a contracted 
 Habit. Fifthly, from other Appetites implanted in us by Nature. 
 Not that the Will can be determin'd by thefe or any thing elfe 
 which is external; but that from hence it takes an handle and oc- 
 cafion of determining itfelf, which it would not have had other- 
 wife. 
 Tirft, By Er- H. Firft, As to the firft of thefe, we have prov'd before that we 
 ror or culpa- are liable to Errors and Ignorance ; and that this is to be reckon'd 
 b]cIsnonne among the natural Evils. When therefore we are fore'd to choofe 
 among things not fufficiently known, our Errors are not to be charg'd 
 upon us, nor is it credible that God will fuffer them to prove fa- 
 tal to us. But when we are under no manner of Neceffity, an E- 
 le&ion often prefents itfelf to us in Matters fufficiently undtrftood, 
 
 and 
 
 * Sit LockeV Chapter of Power, . 57, &c.
 
 Of Moral EviL 223 
 
 and then we hurry on without a ftrict and careful Enquiry, and 
 choofe ImpofTibilities, &c. and therefore are not entirely free from 
 Fault, ilnce we ought to deliberate and examine things before E- 
 lection. 
 
 III. Secondly, Thefe undue Elections therefore happen thro* In- Secondly, By 
 advertency, for by due Care we might perceive the Good and Evil hr z li s ence - 
 which is in Objects; but being negligent and fupine, we are frequent- 
 ly impofed upon, and fuffer for our Negligence, by falling into the 
 
 fore mention'd Inconveniencies. 
 
 IV. As to the third, Since the Pleafure of a free Agent confifts Thirdly, Bjr 
 m Election, 'tis no wonder that he gives himfelf as large a Scope asj^J^Jjj. 
 he can in the Exercife of it. Neither will it be any thing furpri- gence to the 
 fing, if in this full Exercife of Election, he fometimes tranfgrefs the gJS?* f 
 Bounds prefcribed him by God and Nature j and light upon fome things 
 
 which are attended with- no very profperous IiTuc (viz. Abfurdities 
 and ImpofTibilities) fince he will attempt every thing. For he plea^ 
 les- himfelf in the Trial, tho' he be unfortunate in the Event ; but 
 this is no Excufe; for every one is oblig'd to take care of himfelf, 
 left he be too fond of indulging new Elections, and from Levity be- 
 come unduely offenfive to himfelf or others. 
 
 V. Fourthly, We fee that frequent Choice creates an Habit; this Foarthfy, By 
 feems to proceed from hence, that as we delight in an Election of- fjjfcfS* r 
 ten repeated, we are eafily indue'd to hope that the fame Pleafure 
 
 will always follow the fame Act, whereupon we grow lupine and 
 negligent, and difregard the Alterations of things; and he that does 
 this may eafily fall ; into fuch Elections as will not be attended with 
 Succefs. Belide, 'tis difficult for us to change thofe Elections, the 
 Delight of which is fix 'd and, as it were, riveted in the Mind by 
 frequent Experiment: Yet we are not excufable for rufhing upon ab- 
 furd and impoffible things, in order to avoid the Uneafinefs attending 
 the Change of Electron. And if we fearch into the Cafe more nar- 
 rowly, we mall rind that mod undue Elections arife from this unfcai- 
 fonable Perfeverance, all which come juflly under the Cenfure of a 
 culpable Obflinacy. 
 
 VI. Fifthly, It has been often hinted, that we confift of a Soul S^*(. 
 and Body,, that thefe are mutually affected by each other, and that nity t tic 
 
 fr om turaU- 
 
 , iclac.
 
 
 2 *4 Of Moral Evil 
 
 from hence various Appetites arife in us, fuch.as the Prefervation of 
 the Body, Defire of Offspring, and the like; and whatever is an im- 
 pediment to thefe, that we efteem hurtful. If therefore we be not 
 upon our Guard, we are hurried on, by the Importunity of them, to 
 Abfurdities, or when we give a loofe to our Elections, we grifp at 
 fuch things as offer an unneceffary Violence to them : hence arife an 
 immenfe train of Uneafmefles to ourfelves and others ; hence comes 
 Violence and Injury to our Nature and the Natural Appetites, to 
 which we owe at lean; a moderate Indulgence : hereupon we rafhly 
 and unlawfully feize thofc things that are pre-occupied by the E- 
 lections or Appetites of other Men ; nay, are not fo cautious as to 
 refrain from what is determin'd by the Will of God himfelf : from 
 thefe and the like Occanons it happens that we abufe our Liberty, 
 and by undue Elections bring natural Evils upon ourfelves or others. 
 For as we are endow'd with Liberty in thefe and the like Cafes, we 
 may either ufe it according to the dictate of Reafon, or abufe it : 
 this Power feems to be included in the very Notion of created Li- 
 berty. 
 VII. It appears from hence how cautioufly Elections ought to be 
 "Why every tna j e . for t b ' nothing pleafes us but what is chofen, yet we do 
 not to be not only take delight in choojing, but much more in enjoying the things 
 chofen, and chofen, otherwife it would be the fame thing whatever we chofe : 
 tionsarenot we mu ^ ta ^ e care tnen tnat our Elections be made of fuch things 
 *ifiiychang'd as we may always enjoy. For if they be of perifhable Objects, or 
 fuch as are not in the lealt anfwerable to the end of the Elector, 
 ; he that choofes them muft neceffarily grieve at the Difappointment. 
 He may avoid this, will fome fay, by changing his Election, when 
 the thing chofen periihes or fails ; but it is to be obferv'd, that E- 
 . lections are not chang'd without a Senfe of Grief and Remorfc. For 
 we never think of altering them till we are convinc'd that we have 
 chofen amifs. When therefore we are difappointed of the Enjoy- 
 ment of that which we have chofen, we defpair, become miferable, 
 penitent, and confcious of an Evil Choice, and then at laft begin to 
 alter our Choice, which cannot be done without an anxious and un- 
 .eafy Senfe of Difappointment, and the more and longer we have 
 been intent upon any Election, fo much the greater Pain it will coft 
 . . . . us
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 us to be forced to change it. Hence proceeds the Difficulty which 
 we feel in altering Elections ; hence many had rather perfirt in ab- 
 furd Elections than undergo the trouble of altering them: For things 
 pleafeusbecaufe we will them, but to reject what we have once willed, 
 is contradicting ourfelves, and cannot be done without a very difa- 
 greeable ftruggle and convulfion of the Mind: as any one may learn 
 from Experience. (84.) 
 
 225 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (84.) Any one that attentively confiders the 
 Workings of his own Mind, will foon be fa- 
 tisfy'd of the truth of all that our Author here 
 advances; he will obferve what difficulty and 
 reluctance he feels in receding from what he 
 has once firmly refolv'd upon, tho perhaps he 
 can perceive no manner of Good in jt except 
 what arifes purely from that Refolution. To 
 make a Vifit at a certain time ; to walk to any 
 particular place ; to recreate ourfelves with 
 this or that kind of Diverfion ; may be Actions 
 in themfelves perfectly indifferent and trivial: 
 but when once propofed, even upon mere 
 whim and caprice, and refolv'd on with as 
 little reafon, they become often as much the 
 Objects of our Hope and Defire ; the thoughts 
 of profecuting them give us as great pleafure 
 and fatisfaction, and we are as unwillingly 
 withdrawn from them, and as much difap- 
 pointed when we fall fhart of the fancied en- 
 joyment of them, as we fhould be in Matters 
 of the laft Importance. Every Man that has 
 taken the leaft notice of what paffes within 
 him, is able to give numberlefs Inlhnces of the 
 truth of the foregoing Obfervation: which 
 
 may ferve to convince us how great the force 
 and power of Volition is, and what excellent 
 ufe it may be of in Life. How it fupplies us 
 with courage and conftancy in the moll ar- 
 duous Undertakings, and enable us to furmount 
 the greateft Difficulties : how it qualifies and 
 illeviates ourPain, and augments theSum of our 
 Happinefs ; and makes us run contentedly the 
 Round of low and otherwife tedious purfuits, 
 and bear with pleafure the otherwife infuppor- 
 table load of human Woes. This fhews the 
 great ufefulnefs and neceffity of fuch a Princi- 
 ple, and will lead us to confider with our Au- 
 thor, in what a cautious manner it ought to 
 be exerted, left it fall upon wrong and im- 
 proper Objefts, and thereby, inftead of leffen 
 ing, increafe our Mifery, and become itfelf 
 the greateft part of it. That this Principle of 
 Liberty, tho' frequently attended with thefe 
 confequences, is yet a Gift worthy of the moft 
 beneficent Donor, muft appear from a general 
 computation of its Good and Evil Effects, 
 with regard to the whole Syftem, which will 
 be the Subject of the following Sections. 
 
 
 SECT. 
 
 Gg
 
 $16 Of Moral Evil 
 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 How Evil Elections are confident with the 
 Tower and Coodnefs of God. 
 
 ; ) 
 
 S U B S C T. I. 
 
 Propofes the Uiifficulty^ with a 'Preparative to the Solu* 
 
 tion of it. 
 
 I. T X TE have (hewn that moral Evils arife from undue Election; 
 Free- Agents V V "hat Elections are free; and that it is not at all neceffary 
 arenct-necef-for any one knowingly and willingly to purfue the worfe. Moral 
 therefore 1 *& cannot therefore be excufed by heceffity, as the natural ones, 
 feem to be %nd chofe of Imperfection are. 'Tis plain that created Nature irn- 
 God vokn by P^ cs ^P^fe^i 011 >m tnfe ver "y terms Of its bein.g created (fince what 
 tartly. is abfolutely perfect is very God) either therefore nothing at all mull 
 be created, or fomeihing imperfect: and that God, agreeably to what 
 infinite Power and Goodnefs required, permitted no manner of Evil 
 in Nature, the abfence whereof would not have introduced more or 
 greater Evil. Since therefore Inconveniencies attend either the pre- 
 fence or abfence of it, God made that which was attended with the 
 leaft. " There are no Evils then which could pofTibly be avoided, and 
 therefore they mull: be look'd upon as neceffary, fince the Imperfec- 
 tion of a Creature did not admit of pure and abfolute Good. But 
 this Neceflity does not appear in free Agents : For the Evils incident 
 
 to
 
 Of Moral Evil. 2 2j 
 
 to them feem to proceed, not from imperfection of Nature, but free 
 Choice, and are therefore permitted by God voluntarily, when nei- 
 ther the Nature of Things, nor the Good of the Univerfe require the 
 permiffion of them, that is, the World would he as well without as 
 with them. 
 
 II. 'Tis to be obferv'd, that God permitted the former kind of E- Moral Evil* 
 vils becaufe they were infeparable from things; either therefore the ha J. c no ne * 
 things muft not have been created, or their inherent Evils toleratecj. neawnwUh 
 But Evil Elections have no necefTary connection with the free Acts fceNature, 
 of the Will: neither does the Nature of Man require that he mould X'antageTo 7 
 choofe amifs : nor does any benefit accrue to him from thefe Elec- it. 
 
 tions which could not be obtained without them, as it does in Hun- 
 ger, Thirft, Fear, and the reft of the Pafiions; for without thefe Af- 
 fections, as was {hewn, the Animal would foon perifh j but no Evil 
 would befal us (nay what Good would not ? ) if we always attended 
 to Reafon, and never chofe amifs. Since therefore Man might bring 
 the greateft pleafure to himfelf, and exercife his faculties by choofing 
 always well, how comes it to pafs that God fuffers him to hurt him- 
 felf and others unnecefTarily by Evil Elections ? If it be faid that a 
 Power of choofing either Side is contain'd in the very Notion of Li- 
 berty ; this muft be allow'd, but yet there feems to be room enough 
 for the Exercife of Liberty, tho' the Will were confin'd to the choice 
 of what is lawful and convenient ; what need is there then of fuch a 
 Power as may extend to the choice of Evil ? 
 
 III. This feems to be the main ftrefs of the Difficulty, here is the Hcrc thea 
 hardeft point in this Affair, viz* Whence come Moral Evils; /. ^. lies the ftrefs 
 thofe that are not necefTary ? If they be faid to be necefTary, how are f a ^ e \^~ 
 they free? If they be not neceflary, why does God permit them? why did 
 The latter feems repugnant to the Goodnefs of God, the former to the 9^ P" 1 1 
 Nature of a free Agent. wh i c h arc 
 
 neither necefTary nor ufeftd ? 
 
 IV. It muft be confefs'd, that we are lefs prepared for a Solution of 
 this Difficulty than the former; for the Nature and Syftems of the^^ "^ 
 Intellectual World are lefs known to us than thofe of the purely Ma- jnuch of the 
 
 Gg 2 tcrial I * ,t ?r cof 1J 
 
 & thinking Be- 
 
 ings as of 
 jxu'.erial ones, and therefore are lefs prepared for an Anfwcr to this Difficulty, than to the former.
 
 ai8 Of Moral Evil 
 
 terial one : Material Objects furround us, and occupy all the Inlets 
 to Knowledge, and are the only things that immediately affect our 
 Senfes. They intrude upon us with an infinite Variety, and produce 
 many and various Senfations in us. But of intellectual Beings of 
 their Operations, or of the mutual connection between them, we 
 have but very few, and thofe very obfcure Notions, viz. fuch as a- 
 rife only from the reflection of our Understanding upon itfelf, or are 
 collected by the ufe of Reafon deducing one thing from another : 
 For, of all intellectual Beings, our own Mind alone is immediately 
 perceiv'd by us j nor can we (as in Bodies) compare the Notions a- 
 rifing from it, with them that proceed frcm other Sources : all our 
 Knowledge therefore of Spirits or thinking Beings is derived from 
 this alone. 'Tis no wonder then if we be very much in the dark in 
 our Realbnings about thefe and their Operations : and do not fo clear- 
 ly perceive the neceflity of allowing Free-Will to them, as contra- 
 riety in the Motions of Matter ; nor fo eafily apprehend what Incon- 
 venience would follow from reftraining the exercife of Liberty, as we 
 fee the confequence of taking away the morion of Matter. We know 
 that without Motion the whole Mafs of Matter would prove entirely 
 ufelefs, and that there would be no room for fo many Animals as now 
 we find receive their Origin and Subfiftence from it ; which is juftly 
 efteem'd a greater Evil, and more intolerable than all die natural E- 
 vils arifing from Matter and Motion: and we mould find the fame 
 thing in the prevention of the ufe of Free -Will, if we underftood 
 the Syftem of the Intellectual as well as that of the Material 
 World. But if we can mew that more Evils necefiarily arife from 
 withdrawing or reftraining the ufe of Free- Will, than from permit- 
 ting the abufe of it, it muft be evident that God is oblig'd to fuf- 
 fer either thefe or greater Evils. And fince the leaft of thefe ne- 
 ceffary Evils is chofen, even infinite Goodnefs could not pofiibly do 
 better. 
 
 V. Let us try then whether the abufe of Free- Will could be pro- 
 Tbe abufe of hibited with lefs detriment to the whole Syftem, than what arifes 
 ^a^bTcon- ^ rom l ^ e P crmi ^ lon f iZ - There are three Ways whereby God may 
 ceiv'd be conceiv'd able to have prevented bad Elections} firft, If he had 
 
 to have created bo Free Being; at all. Secondly, If his Omnipotence inter- 
 
 becn prcven- J x 
 
 ted three pole, 
 
 A-ays, which are ccnfidei'd in the three following Subventions.
 
 Of Moral EviL 229 
 
 po I ccafionally retrain the Will, which is naturally free, from 
 
 any wrong Electi >n. Thirdly, If he fhould change the prefent ftate 
 of things, and tranflate Man into another, where the occafions of Er- 
 ror and incite ents to Evil being cut off, he fhould meet with no- 
 thing that could tempt him to choofe amifs. 
 
 S U B S E C T. II. 
 
 * Why God has created Free Agents. 
 
 I. A S to the firft, 'Tis certain that God was not compell'd by any 
 
 ^"\ neceffity to create any thing at all, he might therefore have j^ m $f 
 prevented all Moral Evils, if he had not endow'd any Being with ted Moral E- 
 Free Choice ; for fo there would have been nothing that could fin. J" ils *J he 
 But fuch a monftrous Defect and Hiatus would have been left in Na- to create C any 
 ture by this means, viz. by taking away all Free Agents, as would free Being, 
 put the World into a worfe Condition than that which it is in at pre- 
 fent, with all the Moral Evils that attend it, tho' they were multi- 
 ply'd to a much greater Number. 
 
 II. For in the firft place, if we fet afide Free Agents, i. e. thofe jj ut without 
 which have the Principle of Action within themfelves, there is pro- thefc the 
 perly nothing at all Self-active, for all other Beings are merely paf- ^ve^ecrT^ 
 live : there is indeed fome kind of Action in Matter, viz. Motion ; but mere Ma- 
 we know that it is paffive even with regard to that; 'tis therefore ch,ne %? n(i 
 the Action of God upon Matter, rather than of Matter itfelf ; for it pa ^v e . 
 does not move itfelf, but is moved. Without Free Agents then the 
 whole World would be a mere Machine, capable of being turn'd any 
 Way by the Finger or Will of God, but able to effect nothing of it- 
 felf. Nay the whole Work of God could not of itfelf exert one 
 fingle Act or Thought, but would be totally brute and ftupid, as 
 much as a Wheel or a Stone : it would continue fluggifh and inca- 
 pable of Action, unlefs actuated by external force. Second Caufes 
 could therefore effect nothing which might be imputed to them, 
 but all would be done entirely by the firft. We need not fay, how 
 
 much.
 
 a3o 
 
 Objection 
 from theie^ 
 who declare 
 th.it the Un- 
 derilanding 
 is active, the' 
 itisneceflary 
 as al o God 
 himfelf. 
 
 Anfwer to 
 the former 
 part of the 
 Obje&ion. 
 
 'Anfwer to 
 the latter. 
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 much a World thus constituted would be inferior to the prefent, nor 
 how incommodious and unworthy of its Divine Author. 
 
 III. Man, you'll fay, neceflarily aflents to this Propofition, twice 
 two make four ; but tho' his Mind is neceflarily driven to this Affenr, 
 and confequently is not Jree y yet he is active : for it can fcarce be faid 
 that a Man is paflive in giving his Aflent *. The fame may be af- 
 firm'd of God, who, tho' we fuppofe him to be abfolutely free in his 
 primary Elections, yet when thele are once fix-d, he mull neceflarily 
 execute what he had decreed : neverthelefs he is properly Self-active 
 in all Cafes, confequently there may be fomething active in Nature, 
 tho' there were nothing free. 
 
 IV. As to the former Part of the Objection, 'tis not very clear what 
 may be the Caufe of intellectual Affent j if the Object, then the Mind 
 is merely paflive in the Act of Understanding : nor is Aflent imputa- 
 ble to it any more than Defcent to a Stone -, but if the Object be e- 
 iteem'd only a Condition upon which the Undemanding acts, we 
 (hall want a Caufe to determine the Understanding ; for that cannot 
 be fuppofed to determine itfelf, any more than the Fire determines 
 itfelf to burn combustible Matter -f*. For no body judges the com- 
 buftible Matter to be active when it is fet on Fire, or that the Fire 
 burns of itfelf without being kindled by fomething elfe. The World 
 then without Liberty will be a piece of Mechanifm, where nothing 
 moves itfelf, but every thing is mov'd by an external Caufe, and that 
 by another, and fo on till we come at the firft, namely God; who 
 will be the only Self-active Being and mult be efteem'd the real 
 Caufe of all things: neither can any thing, whether well or ill done, 
 be afcribed to others. 
 
 V. As to the latter part of the Objection, That Being mufl: be 
 denominated Free, who is held by no other tie than his own Elec- 
 tion : But God is no othcrwife oblig'd to execute his Decrees, there- 
 fore he is free, if he did but make his Decrees freely ; and is purely 
 active in every Operation wherein he executes them. For he fuffers 
 nothing by neccflity, nor from any other befide himfelf, and is deter- 
 min'd to. act by his own Liberty. 
 
 VI. Secondly, 
 
 * See Note 61 . 
 
 t S&jyir Autb,r\ Note B.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 251 
 
 VI. Secondly, We believe that God created the World in order to God has a 
 exercife the Powers he is poflefs'd of for the Good of the Univerfe ; ? ?F en , CJF 
 
 1 t-x* n i r -\ r ii'i 1 1 1 / 1 / >n his Works, 
 
 the Divine Goodnels therefore delights and applauds ltfelf in. its and if no- 
 Works, and the more any thing refembles God, and the more 'tis J> in g were 
 Self-fufficient, it is to be efteem'd fo much the more agreeable to its VVO uid be 
 Author. But any one may underftand how much a Work which wanting in, 
 moves itfelf, pleafes itfelf, and is capable of receiving and returning j^lSjJjfc 
 a Favour, is preferable to one that does nothing, feels nothing, makes able to the 
 no return, unlefs by the force of fome external Impulfe : any Perfon, Deit y- 
 I fay, may apprehend this, who remembers what a Difference there 
 is between a Child careffing his Father, and a Machine turn'd. about 
 by the hand of the Artificer. There is a kind of Commerce between 
 God, and fuch of his Works as are endow'd with Freedom ; there's 
 room for a Covenant and mutual Love. For there is fome fort of 
 Action on both Sides, whereby the Creature may in fome meafure 
 return the benefits of the Creator, at leaft make an acknowledgment 
 for them ; and if any thing in the Divine Works can be conceiv'd to 
 be agreeable to God, this muft certainly be fo. One fuch Action as 
 this is preferable to all the Sportings of Matter, or the Labyrinths of 
 Motion ; if then there had been no free Creatures, God muft have 
 been deprived of this Complacency, which is almoft the only one 
 worthy of him that he could receive from the Creation. 'Tis there- 
 fore as much agreeable to God that he mould have made fuch Be- 
 ings, as it is to the World that they mould be made : for if nothing 
 of this kind had been created, the very bell thing among the Crea- 
 tures, and that which is moft agreeable to the Deity, would have 
 been wanting. 'Tis better therefore to permit the abufe of Liber- 
 ty in fome than to have omitted fo much Good. For the De- 
 fed: and Abfence of fuch Agents is to be efteemed a greater Evil 
 than all the Crimes which are confequent upon the abufe of Li- 
 berty. 
 
 VII. Thirdly From what has been faid, we learn, that fome Evils RTeceffary 
 which neceUarily adhere to things, viz. Natural ones, and thofe of ^^j^. 9 
 Imperfection, did not hinder the Divine Goodnefs from creating the hinder the 
 Good with which they were connected, fince the excefs of Good c / c f ion 
 
 J of things, 
 
 COm-much Jeis 
 
 thofe which 
 are only poffible.
 
 3* 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 compenfated for the fewer and lefs Evils which were unavoidable : 
 Thus God chofe fuch Animals as were Mortal, afflicted with Hunger, 
 Thirft, and other Paflions, rather than none at all. If then rhofe E- 
 vils which were neceffary and forefeen did not hinder God from crea- 
 ting the Good that was annext to them, how much lefs fhould the 
 J-ojjible Evils arifing from the abufe of Free-Will hinder his Goodncfs 
 from creating Free-Agents ? To enjoy free Choice is a greater Good 
 than fimple Life, but we willingly accept this latter with all the 
 train of Natural Evils, how much more gratefully fhould we em- 
 brace the Gift of Liberty, attended only with fome Danger of E- 
 vils, but not with the Evils themfelves, as in the former Cafes, 
 
 (5-) 
 
 VIII. Fourthly, It mud be obferv'd that EleOions are therefore 
 
 ^ M -efteem'd Evil, becaufe they lead us into Natural Evils. For if an 
 ter than Mo- Election contain nothing abfurd or prejudicial, 'tis not a wrong one. 
 Fre^wiiu Hatred of God, Rebellion againfr. his Commands, Murther, Theft, 
 greater Good Lying, are Sins, becaufe they are hurtful to ourfelves or others, be- 
 turai Appe*" cau fe tne y deprive us of natural Good, and lead into Evil. Electi- 
 tites. ons therefore are wrong and undue on account of the natural Evils 
 
 which fometimes attend them j Natural Evils then are greater than 
 Moral * : For that which makes any thing bad muft necefTarily be 
 worfe itfelf : But Free-Will is better than natural Appetites, and a 
 Gift more worthy of the Deity, it is not therefore to be deny'd to 
 the Creatures on account of the concomitant Evils, any more than 
 the natural Appetites and Propenfities : both of them indeed fome- 
 times 
 
 Natural E 
 vils are 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (85.) In relation to us, indeed, a Gift which 
 is attended only with the poffibiliry of fome 
 lnconveniencies, appears to be of more digni- 
 ty and value than one that brings fome degree 
 of unavoidable Mifery along with it, and as 
 fuch it ought to be receiv'd with proportiona- 
 ble gratitude by us. But with refpeft to a 
 Being who forcfees all the Abufes of Free- 
 will, all the contingent Evils confequcnt 
 
 thereupon, are as certain as the natural and ne- 
 ceffary ones, and therefore ought to be equally 
 provided againft. This Argument therefore a- 
 bout the Contingency of Moral Evil, fo fir as 
 it relates to the Deity, need not be infilled on, 
 fince our Author allows the Divine Prefci- 
 ence, and confidently with that, offers reafons 
 fufHcient for the Vindication of the other At- 
 tributes of God in the prefent Cafe, 
 
 Set Chap. 4. $. 4. par. 8. and X i.
 
 Of Moral Evil. itf 
 
 times lead us into the fame Evils, but with this Difference, that the 
 one, Viz. the natural Appetite, loads us with fevils by neceffity; but 
 the other, "viz. Ffee-Will, not of neceffity, but only if We pleafe 1 . 
 Thefe might have been avoided fmce they are contingent, but thofe 
 could not, fmce they force therftfelves upon us againft our Wills: As 
 therefore it became God to create an Appetite which was join'd with 
 neceffary Evils ; how 7 much more agreeable was it to his Goodnefs to 
 have endow'd us with Free-Will, by which thefe may be avoided, or 
 at leaft alleviated? If the natural Appetite be a greater Good than 
 what thefe Evils which flow from it can overbalance, and therefore 
 worthy to be implanted in Animals by the Deity; how much more 
 excellent a Good will Free-Election be, by which alone we become 
 capable of Ffappinefs, tho' join'd with the danger of falling into E^ 
 viis by abufe ? 
 
 IX. Fifthly, If the State of Man would be worfe without Free- The sut of 
 Will than with it, 'tis plain that Liberty diminishes in/lead of incre'a- bfwoTf^if 
 fing the Sum of Evils, and is beftow'd upon us for that end. But Free- will 
 how much more miferable the State of Man would be without Li- weretaken 
 befty than it is with it, will appear to any one who considers what* 
 fort of Creatures We mould be Without Election. For if Man were 
 not free, he would be driven by the Violence of Matter and Motion*, 
 and fooner or later be quite overwhelmed with thofe natural Evils 
 which neceffarily arife from the Nature and Laws of Motion. But 
 it is better to ftruggle with feme of thefe with Liberty, than all of 
 them with ntc-efTity; the former is the Condition of Men, the latter 
 of Brutes *. If by being deprived of Election we mould be freed 
 from all kind of Evil, we might complain of God for giving it; but 
 feeing that whether we be free or bound by the chain of Fate (while 
 we have Bodies) we muft neceffarily endure thofe Evils which arc 
 confeqUent Upon the affections of Bodies ; (nay thofe very Evils which 
 We were afraid of falling into by a wrong Choice) 'tis in vain todefirc 
 the ribfertce Of Liberty, by relying upon which, and ufing it aright, 
 we may avoid the mofl bitter part even Of thefe neceffary Evils. 
 
 X. For 
 
 * Ok!}< ?Afo/n> D^rrr, fei tie O f jJlrvdtlcn frcfii Bayle in Note 35. 
 
 H h
 
 n\ 
 
 Free Agents 
 only are ca- 
 pable of per- 
 left H.ippi- 
 nefs, there- 
 fore it is bet 
 ter to enjoy 
 Liberty. 
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 X. For in the Sixth place, it is moft manifeft that the greateft 
 Good, and that whereby Men excel other Animals, is owing to Li- 
 berty. By the amftance of this we rife above Fate, and when at- 
 tacked from without by adverfe Fortune, we find our Happinefs 
 within ourfelves. Other Animals have nothing to oppofc to a Di- 
 ftemper, Death, or Pain, nothing to delight themfelves in, except 
 Sleep, Food, and the Appetite of propagating their Species. But a 
 free Agent, in the midft of Pains and Torments, of Hunger and 
 Thirft, nay Death itfelf, has wherewithal to pleafe itfelf, and to 
 blunt the Edge of all thefe Evils. We complain of our Bodies, that 
 by being tied to them, we are oblig'd to undergo very many and 
 great Hardfhips ; how much more full of Complaints mould we be 
 if we were entirely fubjecle^ to them, and hurried into Evils with- 
 out any Remedy or Relief? Is it not better for us to have our Hap- 
 pinefs in our own Power, than to be oblig'd to feek it elfewhere, nay 
 rather to defpair of it ? Which Happinefs is only to be found in a 
 Free Choice, as was {hewn before. From hence it appears, I hope, 
 fufficiently, why God created Free Agents notwithstanding the abufe 
 which they were liable to. For he chofe a Creature which w ould 
 fometimes do amifs, rather than that every thing mould be drawn on 
 by Fate, and a Chain of Neceffity, into inevitable Evils. (86.) 
 
 XI. But 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (86.) Our Author having fhewn in V 2. that 
 the greateft part of our Happinefs confifts in 
 this Principle of Election, here points out 
 fome of the many Inconveniencies that would 
 attend the lofs of it. Firft, If there was no 
 fuch thing as a free Agent, all would be mere 
 Mechanifm and neceflary Effedts of the firft 
 Caufe, i.e. the belt and nobleft part of Nature 
 would be cut off", that which of all others is 
 moft worthy of and agreeable to the Deity. 
 Theie would be no Creatures capable of ma- 
 king any kind of return, of paying any reafo- 
 nable Obedience and Duty to God ; no poffi- 
 bility for him to difpliy his Wifdom, Good- 
 nefs and Mercy in the Government of them, 
 nor any means of bringing them to the fubli- 
 meft Degree of Intellectual Happinefs, viz. 
 that which arifes from Morality. Secondly, 
 
 Thofe paffive Beings themfelves would be in a 
 much worfe Condition than they now are. 
 They would be deprived of all the Happinefs 
 which they now enjoy from the choice of in- 
 different Objects; they would be necefiarily ex- 
 pofed to all the natural Evils arifing from the 
 general Laws of Matter and Motion, viz. Di- 
 ftempers of the Body, Inclemency of the Sea- 
 fons, Hunger and Thirft, fff. which Liberty 
 enables them frequently to guard againft and a- 
 void, and frequently to bear with pleafure, and 
 even to convert to their fuperior Good : nay, 
 they muft inevitably undergo the greateft part 
 of thofe very Evils which at prefent, by this 
 Power, they have at moft only a pofftbility of 
 incurring. Thirdly, Without Liberty, the 
 other moft exalted Powers of the Mind would 
 be entirely ufelefs, and often aggravations of 
 
 our
 
 Of Moral Evil 225 
 
 XI. But, you'll fay, that you defire the Pleafure and Advantages a- The benefits 
 rifing from free Elections, but would not have the Power to Sin; of F'eeAViir 
 i. e. you would have a Liberty reftrain'd by Nature within cmaifch^wMw** 
 bounds, fo as never to extend to Evil. But it may be juftly doubted Power of 
 whether this w 7 as poffible in the prefent ftate of things: For Free- Slnnm S- 
 Will is naturally an active Power, and determines itfelf to Action, 
 and requires nothing more in Objects, than that they mould give oc- 
 cafion for the Exercife of Ele3ionsj 'tis therefore aQive in its own 
 Nature. Now whatfoever is limited by another admits of bounds, 
 and is therefore pafilve with refpect to the Limiter; it feems equally 
 abfurd then for a Free Agent to be thus limited, as for Matter, which 
 is in itfelf and of its own Nature paffive, to determine itfelf to Ac- 
 tion, and is perhaps no lefs impoffible. (87.) 
 
 H h 2 XII. Secondly, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 
 our Mifery. " A Faculty of Undcrflanding 
 " (fays Dr. Jenkin*) without a Will to de- 
 V termine it, if left to itfelf, mull always 
 " think of the fame ObjecT:, or proceed in a 
 " continued fcries and connection of thoughts 
 " without any Aim or End ; which would be 
 " a perpetual Labour in vain, and tedious 
 ." Thoughtfulnefs to no purpofe: but if it 
 " mould be fometimes determin'd by fome 
 " thing external to new Objects, yet what ufe 
 " of Reafon could there be in Contemplations, 
 " which were merely obtruded and fore'd up- 
 " on the Mind ? " And to forcfee a train of 
 Evils, without any power of acting againft 
 2nd oppofing them, muft be only anticipating 
 Mifery, and adding the future to the prefent, 
 and a fenfe of our Inability of ever helping 
 ourfelves to both. Thefe Confiderations are 
 fufficient to prove, that the want of Liberty in 
 general would be an irreparable Damage to any 
 confeious Syftem. 
 
 For a fuller Explication? of them fee Mr. 
 J/idfori'% Defence cf human Liberty, p. 79, &c. 
 and Scolfr- Ckriflian Life, Part 2. C. 4. V 3. 
 p. 31?, &c. 8po. or Sherlock on Providence, C. 7. 1 
 p. 240. 2d Edit, or D'Oy/y's Firjl DiJfertation,\ 
 
 C 10. or Dr. Jenhn in the Chap, above ci* 
 ted. 
 
 The next Enquiry muft be, what Confe* 
 quences would attend either the Limitation of 
 this free Power to fome particular Objecl;,. or 
 the Infringement and Sufpenfion of it on par- 
 ticular Occasions. 
 
 (87.) If Matter were made aclive, it would 
 be no longer Matter: in like manner if a felf- 
 moving or active Being were render'd paffive, 
 it would be no longer what it is. Hence ap- 
 pears the abfurdity of fuppofing a Liberty, pro- 
 pcrly fo call'd, to be determin'd to fome parti- 
 cular ways of acting, 'tis the fame as the Liberty 
 of a Stone to fome particular Ways of moving, 
 i.e. no Liberty at all. The very Eflence of Liber- 
 ty includes an abfolute Phylical Indifference to 
 either Side in any given Cafe. Such a Liber- 
 ty as this has been fhewn to belong to Min in 
 refpect of Willing. He can will or choofe any 
 thing in Nature, he can alfo either choofe or 
 refufe any thing, and therefore to determine 
 his Will to fome Objects, or incline it to one 
 Side in any given Ci re um fiances, would be fo 
 far to defiroy it. The Queftion then is not, 
 whether a Man might be neceflarily inclin'd to. 
 
 fonue. 
 
 Reafonablenefs of the Chrjftian Religion, 2d vol. C. 12. p. 238. 5th Edit,
 
 Q36 Of Moral Evil 
 
 XII. Secondly, If the Will were naturally reftrain'd to choofe 
 Tnld^not be Good only, it muft have this reftraint either from the Object or the 
 dctermin' 'd \oUnderJlandwg : But neither could be done. If fome things were in 
 G ^J^ b "themfelves always Good, and others Evil, it might be poiTible in- 
 theGoodncfsdeed that the Will mould no more admit of Evil than the Sight does 
 of them ge- f Savours 1 But Moral Good and Evil are very frequently not abfo- 
 ceedVfrom lute things, but merely relative : for there is almoft no Action which 
 Election, proceeds from Choice, but what may be Good or Evil upon a change 
 
 of Circumftances *. Even Natural Evils themfelves are fometimes 
 good and eligible. Free-Will then muft needs be indifferent to all 
 external Objects, and thofe things which are now agreeable, become 
 fhortly difagreeable, according to the infinite variety of Circumftances 
 and the Exigence of Affairs. The Will therefore cannot be deter- 
 min'd to Good by Objects. Nay, to confefs the Truth, we general- 
 ly do not choofe Objects becaufe they are Good, but they become 
 Good becaufe we choofe them. The Goodnefs of them therefore is 
 for the moil part determin'd by the Election, and not that by the 
 Goodnefs. For we have fhewn before -j-, that this is the Nature of 
 an Elective FaGulty, and fuch it ought to be, otherwife we could not 
 have the leaft pofhbility of attaining Mappinefs in fo great a variety 
 and uncertainty of outward things, |f. 
 
 XIII. Thirdly, The Will was no more capable of being determin'd 
 Ha often " perpetually to Good by the Vnderfianding^ than by Objects. For the 
 
 finds nothing Under- 
 
 good in 
 
 tilings, except that they help towards the attainment of an E'eftion, the Will therefore could not be de- 
 termin'd to Good by the Understanding. 
 
 N O fe E S. 
 
 fome particular thing ikr act, and yet continue 
 fill ; forV 
 
 to have Free-Will ; for'hat, \ think, is a con- 
 tradiction. But whether he mould have this 
 prefent power of willing deftrpy'd on fome 
 particular Occafions, or whether he mould be 
 iometimes alter'd and made what he now is 
 
 not. Whether this Change of Man's Nature M vj ryt~<*~M vrfrrr-v *"* i^w^r* 
 would in the main prove worthy of the Deity, I quences than the prefent Eltablifhment, this 
 or beneficial to the World, will be more f ul- 1 mull be a very flrong Argument againit, them. 
 
 * See Turner's Difcourfe of the Laws of Nature, and the reaftn of their Obligation, V- 23, 24. or- 
 Puffendorf of the Laws of Nature, Sff, J3. 1. C. 2. V 6. 
 i Sect. 1. Subfeft. 3. fj See par. 16 ami 17 of this Sett.. 
 
 ly examin'd in the following Subfeclion : our 
 Author now proceeds to enquire how this 
 determination could polfibly be effected in the 
 prefent State of things, and if, upon Enquiry 
 into ail the imaginable Methods of effecting 
 it, they appear to be either inefficient for the 
 Endpropofed, or attended with worfe Confe-
 
 Of Moral Evil. if 
 
 Underftanding adls neceftarily, and reprefents nothing as Good but 
 what proceeds from Objedts -, if therefore the Will were determin'd 
 by it, it would neither be free nor always able to pleafe itfelf. For 
 the Undemanding Gften reprefents all external things as fad and un- 
 profperous, and could never make us take natural Evils, fuch as 
 Death, Labours, Torments, for real Good, tho' it might induce us 
 to bear them in profpecl of a farther End. But to endure a thing in 
 view of a farther End, is to undergo prefent Miferyin hopes of future 
 Happinefs; L e. to weigh a prefent Evil againft a futu r e Good, and 
 of two Evils to choofe the lefs, which Reafon indeed perfuades us to 
 do, fince it is neceiTary that it fhould be done: but this helps no- 
 thing towards a Vindication of the Divine Goodnefs, which has im- 
 pofed this NecefTuy upon us : nor can he be happy by the Judgment 
 of his own Underftanding, who muft undergo thefe things. But if 
 it be granted that things pleafe us, not becaufe the Underftanding 
 judges them to be eligible, but becaufe we refolve to exercife our 
 Free-Will in performing them, even thefe will become agreeable by 
 Election, and the Underftanding will perceive them to be made fo 9 
 and not make them to be fo. 'Tis not therefore the Office of the 
 Underftanding to govern the Will, but to difcover means for the at- 
 tainment of that which is chofen, and to give warning when it choo- 
 fes fuch things as are abfurd or impoifible : For the Underftanding, as 
 we faid before, judges that to be good which is agreeable to our 
 Choice, except this lead us into Abfurdities. In order therefore to a- 
 void Abfurdities, we make ufe of the Underftanding as a Monitor, 
 not a Mafter. 
 
 And from hence, I think, it appears how inconvenient it would be 
 for the Choice to depend in all cafes upon the Underftanding. For 
 iince the Judgment of the Underftanding depends upon the Objeds 
 themfelves, and the natural congruity which they bear to the Appetites; 
 if the Choice were to be determin'd by its Judgment, 'tis evident that we 
 muft neceffarily want a great many things which the Underftanding 
 fudges to be good, and could never hope for folid Happinefs, (88.) 
 
 fince 
 
 N O f E S. 
 
 (88.) That is, if every thing which the Un- [always unhappy, fince I could never attain to 
 derftanding reprefented as good in itfelf, made Jail the Good I faw. Whereas by this Power 
 a necejjary Part of my Happinefs, I fhould be J of willing, I cut off K\ral of thefe apparent 
 
 I (.J0(.'J5,
 
 2 ?8 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 The Good- 
 
 fince Objects are fix'd, as we faid before**, and can never anfwer to 
 our natural Appetites in every Particular. In order therefore to the 
 attainment of continual Happinefs, it wasneceffary that we mould be 
 able to pleafe onrfelves in fome refpect, independently of the Under- 
 ftanding, and by Election to conftitute thofe things good and agree - 
 .able to us, which the Understanding, if there had been no fuch Elec- 
 tion, would have pronounced orTenlive, difagreeable and painful : From 
 hence it appears how fit it is that this Power mould be freed from 
 the Government of the Understanding ; but if it is freed, it could not 
 be determin'd by it. 
 
 XIV. Fourthly, It is to be obferv'd that the Divine Power is Infi- 
 ; andwif mte > an d that there are innumerable things poilible to ir, which are 
 dom of God repugnant to one another, and destructive of each other, and cannot 
 bang equd k v an y means b e confiftent. If therefore God fhould act according; 
 
 to his rower. J , J T - . t i 1 * 
 
 hinders him to the Infinity of his Power, without any regard to his other Attri- 
 from . chooflR ? butes, he Would effect nothing at all, or elfe immediately deftroy what 
 he had effected. His infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs therefore gave 
 bounds and reftraint to his Power, which would other wife confound 
 everything j and thefe muft of necefiity be equally Infinite with his 
 Power, otherwife infinite Evils muft certainly arife from infinite Po- 
 wer. But a Creature, as his Elective Power neceflarily extends far- 
 ther than his Wifdom and Goodnefs, is made naturally liable to fall 
 fometimes into Evils. 'Tis well known that Mathematicians fome- 
 . times fuppofe a Line to be infinite in which they may take a Point 
 .wherever they pleafe. Now fince our Election may be made as we 
 
 pleafe, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Goods, r.nd only make fach to be conftituent 
 parrs or" my Happinefs as I choofe, and if I 
 chofe only fuck as I could obtain, I might 
 be always Happy. This Propofnion, viz. that 
 all Good does not make an EJJential Part of our 
 Happinefs , Lecaufe we do not will it, is after ted 
 by Mr. Locke f , and well urg'd as a Reafon why 
 the greater Good does not abfoluiely determine 
 ihe Mind : and die fame, I think, might as 
 
 * Sea. r. Subfecl. $. par. 2. 
 f Chapter cf Power, \ 43; 
 
 juflly be afnrm'd of Pain, viz. That the remo- 
 val of all Pain does not make a part of our 
 prefent Happinefs, fince we do not always ab- 
 foluteiv will or defire to remove it. But on 
 the contrary choofe to bear it, and by that 
 Choice, ofcen produce a PleafuTe, which does 
 more than counterbalance it. See C. 5. S- 2. 
 par. 6. and Note 65.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 *i9' 
 
 pleafe, the Wifdom and Goodncfs whereby it is to be govern 'd, ought 
 to be infinite : for if the Line be finite, a Point may be pitch'd upon 
 beyond it: and in like manner, if the Goodnefs and Wifdom be finite, 
 the Choice may be made without and beyond them, that is, amifs. 
 But fince all created Wifdom and Goodnefs mutt necefTarily be finite, . 
 it follows that there wants a fufiicient reftraint upon Elections, and 
 that every free Creature is neceflarily defeffible. As then all created 
 Beings are necefTarily imperfect in general fo every one has its own 
 peculiar Defect. And this kind of Imperfection, viz. the Power of \ 
 oinning, is proper and peculiar to fuch as enjoy Free-Will : nor can - 
 they be conceiv'd feparate from each other, any more than Contrarie- 
 ty from Motion. (89.) 
 
 XV. From hence it appears that a Faculty ofpleafing itfelf by Election ButManimy 
 cannot be determin'd to Good by Objefls, in the fame manner as the choofca . mifs 
 Sight is to Light, or Tafte to Savours, (fince Goodnefs is not always Goodnefs 
 an abfolute Quality in things, like Light and the Objects of Senfe) and wifdom 
 nor by the Vnderfianding^ fince many things mutt be chofen in which no' r the a r n a be 
 the Understanding can perceive no manner of Good, except that they adequate to 
 are capable of being chofen, and when chofen pleafe, becaufe they his p ovvcr. 
 exercife the Faculty. And tho' the Objects of Election are not Infi- 
 nite, yet there are infinite refpects in which Good or Evil may be 
 produced : There's need then of infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs to 
 dire/t the Choice, left it deviate into Evil. Since therefore a Creature 
 endow'd with Wifdom is finite, it is not poflible but that it may fome- 
 times do amifs in choofing. 
 
 XVI. Fifthly, 
 
 N O <T E S. 
 
 (89) As Motion without Contrariety would 
 be of no ufe, fo Liberty without a Power of 
 doing amifs, if fuch a thing were poflible, 
 would be of no value -. it would net have the 
 good Effedls and Ends for which Liberty was 
 given: particularly it would not be attended 
 with the happy confeioufnefs of Defert, or the 
 Idea of receiving a Benefit, by way of reward, 
 conferr'd upon us for having done what was 
 right and good, and what we might as eafily 
 have not done. From which Idea, as inclu- 
 
 ding Self-Approbation, &t. we frequently feel a 
 far more exquifite Pleafure, than from the in- 
 trinfic Value of the Benefit itfelf: Nay, with- 
 out this Idea, to be loaded with Favours would 
 prove even an Uneafinefs to a generous Mind. 
 This Notion will be farther explain'd and 
 vindicated in the following Subfc&ion ; but 
 for the Truth of it we muft appeal to the con- 
 stant Experience of the ingenuous part of 
 Mankind, 
 
 *
 
 240 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 XVI. Fifthly, If the Will was confined to the Choice of t\ ~ 
 
 ^fomettmes thi^g 3 o^ty which the Understanding declares to be good, or was re- 
 decciv'dwithftrain'd from cricofing till the Goddnefs Of the Objects were apparent, 
 than'tobe al we mlt ^ ^ neGe ^ u y hefitate in many things, and be anxious and fo- 
 w.i>s folici- lieitOus in all. For fiiice things are connected together by a long 
 tons. chain of CoRfcquenceS, it is impovTible for us to form a right Judg- 
 
 ment of the abfolute Goodnefs of them, without a foreknowledge of 
 thefe Confequefrtces : we muft therefore have been oblig'd to ufe all 
 podible Difquifition before every Election, and fufpend the Choice 
 whefe any fufpicion of Error cr ground of Doubt mould appear: 
 But fueh a Difquifition and continual Solicitude would bs a greater 
 Bar to Happinefs than many Errcrs and natural Inconveniencies. For 
 if the Will can produce Good to itfelf by choofing, the Errors and 
 IrtcOnveniencies to Which it is expos'd by a bad Choice, may be com- 
 penfated by the Pleafure which atifes from the Senfe of Liberty. But 
 if we were oblig'd to all pdffible Enquiry, more inconvenience would 
 be felt from that Obligation, thaft from feme Errors in Election ; nor 
 would all of them be by this means avoided ; for after all poffrble Ex- 
 amination, a finite Undemanding maybe deceiv'd. Evil Elections are 
 -to be avoided on account of the Uneafiftefs confequent upon them, if 
 therefore fuch a Difquifition as is necefTary to difcover die Good, and 
 a Sufpenfftfn ol the kieclive Faculty till that Good be difcover'd, 
 Would bring greater Uneafmefs than fome Wrong Elections, a Man 
 will be more happy with a Power of doing amifs, than if he were 
 oblig'd to wait for the determination of the Undemanding in every 
 Cafe. For it is better that fome Perfons mould fometimes do amifs, 
 arid fuffer Uneafinefs from the -Confcicnce of having done fo, than 
 that all Men mould in every Cafe be always afraid, uncertain, and 
 folicitous, nay generally ceafe fr'Om all manner of Action. 
 TUbetterto XVII. Such is the Nature of our Will that it can pleafe itfelf in 
 be m danger Election, and by its own Power make the things chofen agreeable, 
 thantTcSic t ^ > m themfefves difagreeable to the Appetites. And tho 1 this can- 
 from Elec not fee done at all times, and in evefry Object, yet it is better to run 
 ijn * the hazard, than to be deprived Of fo ufeful a Faculty, or to be re- 
 
 ftrain'd from Ele^ion till ati imperfect Understanding, fuch as that 
 of Man neceffarily is, were clearly convinced of that Impoffibility. 
 
 It
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 It is therefore convenient for us to derive our peculiar and chief Hap- 
 pinefs from the Will itfelf j for if it depended on the Understanding, 
 it would come with Difficulty, Pains and Anxiety, and we could fel - 
 dom enjoy it pure and unmix'd. 'Tis better therefore for us to be 
 able to pleafe ourfelves without a long Speculation of Antecedents and 
 Confequences, tho' with a danger of Sinning, than to ceafe from E- 
 lection, and be reftrain'd from the Exercife of our Faculties, till a 
 whole train of thefe were perfectly apparent,- which if it could be at 
 all, yet would not be without Pain and Anxiety, as any one will find 
 that tries. (90.) 
 
 S U B S E C T. 
 
 $41 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 quainted with the Excellence of Virtue, and 
 made fenfible of the Infinite Wifdom, Power, 
 and Goodnefs of the Deity, fhewn in the Go- 
 vernment and Suppreflion of the former, and 
 in the Production and Improvement of the 
 latter: Tho, I fay, thefe exalted Beings could 
 be fuppofed to have a thorough Intuition of all 
 the Attributes of God without any fuch mani- 
 feftation of them in his Works; (againft which 
 Notion fee D'OylfsFirJi Differ tat ion, C. 8. and 
 Comlujion, p. 123.) yet it does not feem pof- 
 fible for fuch imperfett Creatures as we are, to 
 attain unto this excellent Knowledge, and en- 
 joy the happy Effects of it on any other Terms 
 than the prefent ; we could not fure have had 
 fo lively an Idea of the Mercy of God, if there 
 had never been any proper Objects of it. We 
 could not have been fo thoroughly confeious 
 of our Dependency or Danger 1 nor had fo 
 grateful a fenfe of our conftant Support, our 
 frequent Deliverances, nor confequently have 
 arrived to fo great a degree of Happinefs, ei- 
 ther in this Life or the next, by any other Me- 
 thod, as will be further fhewn in Notes 103, 
 and 108. Either then thefe Happy Beings are 
 ftill perfectly free, which Freedom conftitutes 
 the greateit part of their Happinefs j and let 
 
 any 
 
 * See bis Anfwer to the Querinofa Provincial, and Crit.Dia.ArttiU Ma/chioni tes,wr F. fcfr. 
 f See A. Bp. Daws'j $tb Setrn. p. 73, 74. 
 || See the beginning of Note 95. 
 
 I i 
 
 (90.) All that Bayfe objeb to this*, is ta- 
 ken from the Nature of Good Angels, and 
 Glorified Souls, who, according to him, are 
 no lefs happy in themfelves, nor perform a lefs 
 acceptable Service to the Deity for the want of 
 it ; and why therefore might not we ? To 
 what was obferv'd about the Inconclufivenefs 
 of all fuch Arguments as are drawn from Be- 
 ings of a different Order in Note 46, we fhall 
 here add, firit, that it is more than we are ob- 
 llg'd to grant, that either Angels or Saints in 
 Heaven are abfolutely devoid of Liberty. They 
 may have more clear Impreffions of Good and 
 Evil on their Minds, more enlarged Under- 
 ftandings, fewer and lefs Temptations, C3V. 
 without being lefs freef; nay they mull be 
 more free, the more they are fo qualify'd ||. 
 This way of reafoning therefore proceeds upon 
 a falfe, or at leaft uncertain Hypothefis. 
 
 Secondly, Tho' it fhould be granted that 
 thefe glorious Beings, fuppofing them all n- 
 ceflary, might have as ample Knowledge, as 
 ardent Love of the Divine Perfections, and 
 confequently be as happy in the Enjoyment of 
 God and themfelves, as if they were all free; 
 tho' they might have no occafion to fee or ex- 
 perience Vice, in order to their being fully ac-
 
 $41 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 SUBSECT. III. 
 
 Why God does not interpofe his Omnipotence, and occa* 
 fionally retrain the Will from dep-aved Elettions, 
 
 More and 
 greater Evilj 
 would arifc 
 from thence, 
 than from 
 the abufe of 
 Jrce-Will. 
 
 It would 
 be as much 
 Violence 
 to prevent 
 the Attion 
 of Free- 
 Will, as the 
 
 I. v I 'I S evident from what has been faid, that it was agreeable 
 | to the Divine Goodnefs to have created Free Agents, fox 
 without thefe the Syftem of Nature would have been imperfect : nor 
 could their Actions have been determin'd to Good by any natural 
 Propenfity or Limitation, in the fame manner as the Senfes are limi- 
 ted by Objects : But yet it is certain that they depend upon God for 
 their Actions, and if he mould fufpend his Influence, they would not 
 act at all. Since therefore he could fo eafily hinder the abufe of Li- 
 berty, why does he fuffer it? Why does he not reflrain Elections 
 when they tend to Vice and Abfurdity ? We grant that this Objec- 
 tion cannot be fatisfactorily anfwer'd, otherwife than by mewing that 
 more and greater Evils would befal the Univerfe from fuch an Inter- 
 pofition, than from the abufe of Free- Will. In order to which it is 
 to be confider'd, 
 
 II. In the nrft place, That this cannot be effected without Vio- 
 lence done to Nature. 'Tis allow'd that Elections ought to be free, 
 and that thinking Beings cannot otherwife be happy : God himfelf 
 in creating them has determin'd, as it were by a Law, that they 
 
 mould 
 
 Motion of the Sun, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 any Man try to prove the contrary ; or at leaft 
 they once were fo, in order to their greater 
 Perfection, and are now only alter'd by being 
 tranflated into another State, and put out of 
 
 farther Tryal ; and confequently they belong 
 to our Author's third Expedient, which will 
 be examin'd in Subfeft. 5. to which we muft 
 : refer the Reader.
 
 Of Moral Evil 24.3 
 
 fliould be free. For by giving them a Nature endow'd with Choice, 
 he allow'd them to make ufe of it. They cannot therefore be hin- 
 der'd without Violence done to the Laws of the Creation. I grant that 
 God can difpenfe with the Laws of Nature ; but who will require 
 or allow this to be done frequently ? The bounds of this World, 
 and the number of Thinking Beings are unknown to us, but we 
 believe that the Syltem of Nature will endure for ever. Now as all 
 things depend upon the Will of God, we cannot have any other Se- 
 curity of our Happinefs, and of the Duration of the World, than 
 the Divine Conftancy and Immutability: the Univerfal Laws of Na- 
 ture are the AfTurances of this Conftancy, and upon them does the 
 Security and Happinefs of the whole Work depend. It is not there- 
 fore to be expected that GoJ mould lightly difpenfe with thefe 
 Laws, much lefs alter them by his Omnipotence every Moment. 
 Since then it is provided by an Univerfal Law, that Free Agents 
 ihould procure to themfelves Happinefs by the ufe of Election, and 
 it is impomble but that thefe, being left to themfelves, mould fome- 
 times fall into depraved Elections, would it not be an Infringement 
 and a Violation of this Law, if God mould interpofe and hinder the 
 ufe of that Faculty which by the Law of Nature he had eftabli- 
 fhed ? We dont expect that the Situation of the Earth, or Courfe 
 of the Sun, mould be alter'd on our account, becaufe thefe feem to 
 be things of great Importance, and we apprehend it to be unreafo- 
 nable, that, for our private Advantage, the Order and Harmony of 
 things mould be chang'd, to the detriment of fo many Beings. But 
 to alter the Will, to ftop Election, is no lefs a Violation of the 
 Laws of Nature, than to interrupt the Courfe of the Sun. For a 
 Free Agent is a more noble Being than the Sun, the Laws of it 
 Nature are to be efteem'd more facred, and not to be chang'd with- 
 out a greater Miracle. There would then be a kind of Shock and 
 Violence done to Nature, if God mould interfere and hinder the 
 Actions of Free- Will ; and perhaps it would prove no lefs pernicious 
 to the Intellectual Syftem, than the Sun's {landing ftill would be ta 
 the Natural. His Gcodnefs therefore docs not fuffer him to inter- 
 pofe, except when he forefees that the Evils arifing from our de- 
 praved Elections are greater than thofe which would enfue upon art 
 
 I i 2 Interrupt
 
 344 
 
 God by in- 
 terpofing in 
 the Elections 
 of his Crea- 
 tures, would 
 quite invert 
 the Method 
 of treating 
 Prce Agents. 
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 Interruption of the Courfe of Nature, which he only can know who 
 knows all things. (91.) 
 
 III. Secondly, Such an Interruption as this would not only do Vio- 
 lence to Nature, but quite invert the Method of treating Free A- 
 gents. This Method is to hinder or excite Elections by Rewards and 
 Punifhments : To divert them from unreafonable or abfurd things, 
 and draw them to better by the perfuafion of Reafon. But it is 
 doubtful, whether the Nature of the thing will permit an Election 
 to be determin'd by Impulfe, or, as it were, by immediate Contact. 
 For it feems equally abfurd to attempt a change of Election by any 
 other means than thofe above mention'd, as to defire to flop the 
 Impetus of Matter by Intreaty, or offering Rewards. May we not 
 with the fame reafon expect that Matter mould l?e moved by Re- 
 wards and Punifhments, as the Will influenc'd by Phyfical Impulfe, 
 as they call it ? For it is by thefe Means that they would have God 
 to flop or alter the Choice. So prepoflerous an Interpofal would con- 
 found 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (91.) By this laft Conceffion our Author e- 
 vidently allows that God may fometimes have 
 fufficient reafon to interpofe in matters rela- 
 ting to our Elections (tho' perhaps he never 
 acts upon the Will by Pbyjital Impulfe, or ir- 
 refiflibly, which will be confider'd in the next 
 Subfection) his Defign therefore is only to 
 lhew that this ought not to be done frequent- 
 ly, or as often as Men choofe amifs. Now 
 this may be illuftrated in the fame manner as 
 we treated of the Laws of Motion, &>V. That 
 there are general Mechanic Laws in the Na- 
 tural World, the Eftablifhment and Preferva- 
 tion whereof tends more to the Happinefs of 
 the Creation, and is every way more worthy 
 of the Deity, than to aft always by particular 
 Wilh y was fhewn in Note 37. If thefe Laws 
 were frequently alter 'd and unfix'd, they would 
 ceafe to be Laws, and all Action, Labour, 
 Contrivance which depends upon the Stabili- 
 ty, and computes the future Effects of them, 
 mull ceafe, or at leafl prove infignificant. In 
 like manner Liberty has been proved to be an 
 Univerfal Law of Intellectual Beings, and the 
 great Ufe and Excellence of it evinc'd, and 
 
 therefore we have equal re.ifon to fuppofe that 
 it could not be, at leaft not frequently, fufpen- 
 ded, without as great Inconvenience as would 
 attend the Violation of thefe Laws of Mecha- 
 nifm. If this were done in the Rational 
 World, all Studies, Enterprifes, Arguments ; 
 in fhort, all kind of Reafoning would be vain 
 and ufelefs, all rewardable Action, and its 
 concomitant Happinefs (of which in Note 89, 
 and more below) muft entirely ceafe. Nay, 
 perhaps to deprive a rational Being of Free- 
 will, would be altogether as abfurd and in- 
 convenient, as to endow a Machine with Re- 
 flection, or an Edifice with Self-motion. But 
 our great Ignorance of the Intellectual World 
 muft render any Argument of this kind very 
 uncertain. However, thus much we are fure 
 of, that fo great Violence done to the Will, 
 would be directly contrary to the general Me- 
 thod of God's treating reafonable Creatures, 
 and quite oppofite to the end of all thofe Ma- 
 nifeftations he has made of his Nature and 
 Will; the very Reverfe of all thofe Argu- 
 ments, Exhortations, Promifes and Threats, 
 which are the Subject of Rcveal'd Religion : a 
 
 Man
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 found every thing, and leave nothing certain in Nature. How fatal 
 fuch an Experiment would be, and how it would effect the Minds 
 of the Obfervers, or what Sufpicions concerning God and their own 
 Security, it might fuggeit to the whole Syftem of thinking Beings, 
 God only knows. We fee that human Laws cannot be difpens'd with, 
 without very many Inconveniencies, which yet, as they are made up- 
 on an imperfect Forelight, and can provide for few Cafes, feem na- 
 turally to require fome Interpofal : how much greater Evils may we 
 apprehend from a Difpenfation with the Divine, the natural Laws; 
 on the Obfervance of which the Good of the whole depends ? This 
 feems to be the reafon why God makes ufe of fo much Labour and 
 Pains, fo great an Apparatus of Means, (92.) fo many Precepts, Per- 
 fuafions, and even Entreaties for the Amendment of Mankind ; which 
 neverthelefs he could effect in a Moment, if he were pleas'd to apply 
 force ; and he would undoubtedly do it, if he had not forefeen more 
 Inconveniencies from a Change in the Order of Nature, and Violence 
 done to Elections. 
 
 IV. Thirdly, That which gives us the greateft Pleafure in Elections^ 
 is a Confcioufnefs that we could have not chofen; without this 'tis no 
 Choice at all : but fuch is the Nature of us rational Beings, that no- 
 thing pleafes us but what we choofe. In order therefore to make any 
 
 thing 
 
 oufnefs that we might have not 
 
 H5 
 
 He would 
 take away 
 that which 
 is the moil 
 agreeable to 
 us in E- 
 leclions, viz, 
 a Confci* 
 choien. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Man that believes any thig of thefe (upon the 
 Belief of which I am now arguing) can never 
 imagine that they are all nude ufe of to no 
 purpofe, as they muil be in a great meafure, if 
 the Will could be over ruled occafionally with- 
 out any confiderable Inconvenience. This is 
 what our Author endeavours to prove in the 
 following Paragraph. 
 
 (02.) The Hiftory of the Jnciflt Nation af- 
 fords good Inftances of this. What an appa- 
 ratus of outward Means was continually made 
 ufe of in the Government of that ftiff-necked 
 People? What frequent Murmurings, Rebel- 
 lions and Apoftacys were permitted, and then 
 
 punifh'd ? What numerous Miracles, both of 
 the remunerative and vindictive kind were ap- 
 ply'd, in order to bring them to fome tolera- 
 ble fenfe of their dependence on God, and a 
 fuitable praftice of the Duties refulting from 
 it ? All which would have been unnecefTary 
 at lead, if one Miracle exerted on their Minds 
 could have done the bufinefs ; if their Under- 
 itan dings could as well hive been illumina-< 
 ted and their Wills refonn'd at once, and if 
 their Practice produced by this means, and as 
 it were, extorted from them, would have been 
 equally agreeable to the Deity.
 
 6 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 v thing agreeable to us, 'tis neceflary for us to be confcious that we 
 
 choofe it voluntarily, and could have refufed it : But if God de- 
 termine our Election extrinfically, the moil agreeable Part of all is 
 taken away. For we muft either be confcious that God determines 
 our Will or not; if we be confcious, how can that be agreeable 
 which is obtruded on us by force ? If we be not, we are deceiv'd 
 in the Operations of our own Minds ; neither can we know whether 
 the Elections be our own or God's. Nay the force of Laws, toge- 
 ther with the Efficacy of Rewards and Punifhments, would be quite 
 deftroy'd. For who would regard Laws or Rewards, when he was 
 certain that Qod would hinder him from doing any thing which 
 might occalion the Lofs of Rewards, or make him incur the Punifh- 
 ments ? But however this be, 'tis very certain that our greateft Plea- 
 fure, nay our very Reward, confifts in being confcious that we have 
 ufed our Choice aright, and done thofe things which we might have 
 not done, and which another under the fame Circumftances would 
 perhaps not have done. On the other hand, 'tis the greateft Grief 
 and Affliction to have omitted fuch things as would have tended to 
 our Happinefs, and were in eur Power; one of thefe could not be 
 had without the other, and if none were fufFer'd to grieve for a bad 
 Election, none would rejoice for a good one. But it is better that 
 fome few mould grieve for their , own folly, than that all mould be 
 deprived of the Rewards of their good Actions. That Privilege then 
 of doing well, and pleafing ourfelves in what is well done, could not 
 be had without the hazard of Sinning; if God mould take away the 
 one, the other would vanifh of itfelf. 
 
 But you would have the Pleafure which arifes from Election with- 
 out the Danger; that is, the End without the Means: Neither do 
 you obferve that the greateft Pleafure in this Cafe is, that you could 
 have done otherwiie : and this arifes from the very Nature of Plea- 
 fure, which fcems to be nothing elfe but a Senfe of the Exercife of 
 tkofe Faculties and Powers which we enjoy. The more therefore any 
 Action is ours, the more it pleafes us; and fince a Free Action (which 
 we could either exert or omit) is the moft of all ours, it muft necef- 
 farily pleafe us moil : But if the Will were confined to one Side, or 
 detain'd from the other, the Action would ceafe to be ours, and the 
 
 Pleafure
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 Pleafure would perih together with the Senfe of Liberty. A Mind 
 confcious of Virtue is the Pleafure and Reward of good Actions, but 
 unlcV. \\ w.re poffible for it to become confcious of Vice, 'tis plain 
 it cannot be confcious of Virtue. (93.) 
 
 You 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 47 
 
 (93.) In oppofition to what our Author has 
 here advane'd, Bajle * brings a great many 
 Arguments drawn from the Tenets of Cahi- 
 nifts, Spinozifts^ &c. who believe that all their 
 Actions arc neceffarily determined, and yet are 
 no le r s pleas'd with them. Nay fome, fays he, 
 rejoice in this very thing, that they are under 
 the abfolute Direction of the Deity. Dij me 
 tuentur f, and to be naturally determin'd to 
 the belt was always look'd upon as a peculiar 
 Happincfs, and they that came neareft it were 
 efleem'd the bell Men, as the known Compli- 
 ments to Cato and Fabricius declare. Some are 
 as well pleas'd with what they have by Lot or 
 Inheritance, as what they get by their own La- 
 bour : Witnefs the Pride of antient Families, 
 ciff. Gaudeant bene nati is a common Pro- 
 verb, and among the Things quce vitam fa- 
 aunt beatiorcm, Martial reckons Res non part a 
 Labcre fed relicla. And again : If, fays he, we 
 did take delight in choofing things, yet it 
 would be enough for us if God conceal'd his 
 determination from us, and we only believ'd 
 that we were free to choofe and a<t 
 
 We need not, I think, fpend much time in 
 anfwering fuch Arguments as thefe. For the 
 Cahinijls, &c. notwithftanding all their abfurd 
 Tenets, have evidently this Confcioufnefs of 
 Choice within them, which is the fecret fource 
 of the Pleafure that attends their Actions, and 
 cannot be extinguifh'd by any of their Princi- 
 ple, but overcomes them all, and conftantly 
 puts thefe Men upon fuch Endeavours as are 
 vain and ufelefs upon the Suppofition, and in 
 confident with the Belief of Fate and abfolute 
 PredclVi nation : which (hews us that thefe No 
 tions are neither acted upon in Life, nor pur- 
 fu'd to their utmoft Confequences ; that they 
 
 reft in pure Speculation, and are generally laid 
 afide in Practice; in fhort, that they are abfo- 
 lutely inconfiftent with human Nature, as well 
 as human Reafon. 
 
 Secondly, Some Perfons may rejoice in be- 
 ing under the particular Care, Protection and 
 Government of the Deity; but then their Joy 
 proceeds not fo much from a bare Contem- 
 plation of what the Deity does for them, as 
 from confidering on what account he does it, 
 viz. becaufe they are , agreeable to him, and 
 proper Objects of his Favour, and that on ac- 
 count of fomething which they themselves have 
 done. If Horact meant otherwife by his Dij 
 me tuentur, he had fmall reafon for what he 
 adds in the next Line, Diis Pittas mea cif Mufa 
 cordi eft.- But in truth this and moft other of 
 BayWs Teftimonies are Rhetorical or Poetic 
 Flourifhes, rather than Philofophic Truths, 
 and confequently not worth a ferious Exami- 
 nation. To draw any thing like an Argument 
 from another's Words, we fhould at leaft be 
 fure of his determinate Meaning, of the pre- 
 cife number of his Ideas, as well as the juft- 
 nefs of their Connection together, which we 
 muft never expect from fuch kind of random 
 Quotations. It may not therefore be improper 
 to obferve here once for all, that Bay/e's ufu.il 
 Method of reafoning from Authorities muft be 
 very weak and unphilofophical ; and calculated 
 rather to blind Mens Eyes, than to inform their 
 Underftandings. 
 
 Thirdly, We are pleas'd indeed with what 
 we call Good Fortune, when a great Sum of Mo- 
 ney comes to us by Lot, or a large Eftate, or 
 .1 Title by Inheritance; and are perhaps the 
 more delighte 1 ., the gre.uer the Change is in 
 our Circumftance* ; and the iefs Expectation 
 
 wc 
 
 * Anfwer to the Queries of a Provincial, p. 665. 
 f Horace, B. 1 . Ode 1 7. 
 
 Fol.
 
 24.8 Of Moral Evil 
 
 You may urge, that you had rather want this Pleafure .than un- 
 dergo the Danger ; that is, you had rather be a Brute than a Man : 
 neither could you by this means avoid thefe natural Evils which 
 you dread fo much as foolifhly to wifh yourfelf a Brute, left you 
 mould fall into them. But fuppofing it were convenient for you 
 to be a Brute, yet it could not be convenient for all Nature : The 
 Syftem of the Univerfe required free Agents : without thefe the 
 Works of God would be lame and imperfect; his Goodnefs chofe 
 the Benefit of the Univerfe rather than that of yourfelf j efpecially 
 when this is better for you too, tho' you be fo ungrateful as not 
 to confefs it. 
 
 V. Fourthly, As it would be prejudicial to Man, to all Nature, 
 Free Agents for God to hinder bad Elections by his abfolute Power, fo nothing 
 are placed as j^ conceiv'd to be more difagreeable to himfelf. We have faid 
 
 it were out o 
 
 of the reach that 
 
 of Divine 
 
 Pttuer, the Government of thefe therefore is the proper Exercife of the Divine Wifdom, wherein God de- 
 lights. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 we had of it f. But is this Pleafure compara- 
 ble to that Intellectual or Moral Pleafure, that 
 fublimeSatisfactionandSelf-complacency, which 
 we feel upon acquiring a like Sum of Money 
 by fome laudable Aft, or egregious Underta- 
 king, that may properly be call'd our own t Is 
 it equal to that folid Comfort, and Self-appro- 
 bation which every ingenuous Mind is fenfible 
 of from his doing what deferves an Eltate or 
 Title, and receiving thefe as the proper Re- 
 compence and due Tribute of fuch Deeds ? 
 The Man that can value himfelf more upon 
 his Defcent from an antient Family, than up- 
 on being by thefe means the Founder of a new 
 one, is a dilgrace to his Defcent, and unwor- 
 thy of the Arms he bears. But to return: 
 
 There is undoubtedly an agreeable and ex- 
 alted Confcioufnefs attending all the Bleffings 
 which we ourfelves are inftrumental in procu- 
 ring, infinitely beyond all the Satisfaction 
 which they could afford us, if we knew our- 
 felves to be unconcern'd in the Attainment, 
 and unworthy of the Enjoyment of them. 
 
 This is the great Spur and Incitement to ma- 
 ny noble Actions here, and will be part of the 
 Crown and Reward of them hereafter (as is 
 illuftrated at large by Dr. Scott in the firft Vol. 
 of his Cbrijlian Life, and by Dr. yenkin, in 
 his Reafonabhnefs of Cbri/lianity, 2d vol. C. 12. 
 prop. 2.) And tho' we cannot properly merit 
 any thing at the hand of God, yet the Con- 
 fcioufnefs of having perform'd fuch Actions 
 as are in themfelves acceptable to, and re- 
 wardable by him, and of receiving Bleffings 
 from him in return for fuch Actions, muft ve- 
 ry much increafe our Happinefs in the Enjoy- 
 ment of thefe Bleffings, both in this Work 4 , 
 and the next (ai is fhewn in the fame places] 
 Nor, laftly, could we receive this Pleafure 
 which now refults from our Choice and Ac- 
 tion, if we were determin'd in every thing by 
 the Deity, fuppofing that Determination con- 
 cealed from us, and we only made to believ; 
 that we were really free to choofe and adl. 
 For, as our Author obferves, this would be 
 
 to 
 
 f See Note 30.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 that God made the World in order to have fomething wherein to ex- 
 ercife his Attributes externally. His Power therefore exerts itfelf 
 chiefly in one thing, and his Wifdom and Goodnefs in another. He 
 exercifed his Power in creating the World, and putting it into Motion ; 
 his Goodnefs and Wifdom in the Order and Agreement of things : 
 But the Divine Wifdom feems to have fet apart the Government of 
 Free Agents as its peculiar Province. Herein it fully exercifes itfelf, 
 and acts up to its Infinity ; for if it were finite it would not be equal 
 to fo great a Tafk. It does not feem a very extraordinary thing for 
 God to be able to govern and abfolutely direct fuch Beings as are 
 merely pafiive, and deprived of all Motion of their own, whereby 
 they might make any Refinance. For thofe things obey eafily which 
 do not move but when they are moved. Neither is there need of in- 
 finite Wifdom to govern them, for infinite Power, with a moderate ufe 
 of Wifdom, would have been fufficient. That there might be a Sub- 
 ject therefore whereon the infinite Wifdom of God mould difplay it- 
 felf, he created Free Agents; which, being as it were put out of his 
 Power and left to themfelves, might act in a manner independent of 
 his Will. 'Tis evident to any Perfon how much more difficult it is, 
 and how much greater Exercife of Wifdom it requires to direct a 
 Multitude of thefe to a certain End, and make them confpire to the 
 
 common 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 49 
 
 to arrive at the End without the Means, and to 
 have the Effect without the Caufe. All our 
 Ideas of Merit arife from, and are entirely 
 founded in Free Choice : this (as far as we can 
 apprehend) is the ncceffary Medium to fuch 
 Moral Happinefs; and we can no more con- 
 ceive how one mould come without the other, 
 than how we mould fee without Eyes: and 
 for us to have this Pleafure, - tho' another 
 did the Action, would be the fame as for 
 ore Man to be confeious. of his doing 
 what fome other really did, or for him to 
 fee by fome other's Eyes. Such Suppofui- 
 ons as thefe would breed endlefs Confufion. 
 For wc muft either know whether another did 
 this Adion or not ; if we do know this, then 
 how can we attribute that to ourfelves, or 
 pride ourfelves in that which we know belongs 
 
 to another? If we do not know this, then 
 how can we attribute to ourfelves, or pleafe 
 ourfelves in anything? Since every thing in 
 and about us may, for what we know, be done 
 by another, and fo we in reality may never de- 
 krve either praife or blame. The natural con- 
 fequence of which is, that we might as well 
 never aim at Defert, or ftrive to do any thing 
 it all: and this is the genuin Product of all 
 fuch Suppofitions as queftion the Veracity of 
 our Faculties, and would make us fufpeel that 
 we may be impofed upon even in the regular 
 Operations of our own Minds. The fame 
 Arguments with thofe of Bay/e, as well as tho 
 like method of reafoning, are made ufe of by 
 the Author of the Pbihfopbical Enquiry, cifr. 
 p. 98, &c. and p. 71, 72. Where he thinks, 
 
 " It 
 
 K k
 
 250 
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 ccnunon Good, than to order Brute Beafts, and fuch as have no Po- 
 wer of themfelves, in what manner you pleafe. To them that con- 
 fider the vaft Multitude of Free Agents, which is almoft infinite, and 
 their Independence (fince every one is, at leaft in many Cafes, abfo- 
 lute Mafler of his own Actions, and is permitted by God to acl: ac- 
 cording to that Liberty) God feems to have given a Specimen of the 
 Extent of his Wifdom, whicji is able thus certainly and effectually to 
 bring to the End propofed, fo many Free Spirits, fo many Agents that 
 were in a manner fet at Liberty from his Dominion, and committed 
 every one to his own Government. Here is the proper place for 
 Wifdom, wherein (fetting alide, and in a manner fufpending the 
 Exercife of his Power) he attains his Ends by Prudence only, by mere 
 Dexterity of acting, and brings it to pais, that fo many jarring 
 Wills depending on themielves alone, and no more inclined to either 
 Side by the Divine Power, than if there were no fuch thing, mall 
 yet confpire together to promote the Good of the Univerfe. 'Tis im- 
 poflible that this Exercife of Wifdom mould not be very agreeable 
 to the Deity, if any thing in his Works may be efteem'd agreeable 
 to him. But if he were oblig'd to interfere with his Power, that 
 would feem to argue a Defect of Wifdom j for what occafion is 
 there for him to interpofe and flop the Liberty of Election before gran- 
 ted, if his Wifdom could provide fufficiently for the Good of the 
 whole, without altering his Defign * ? 
 
 VI. From 
 
 n o r E s. 
 
 n It may not be improper to obferve, that 
 ** fome of the Pleafures Man receives from 
 **. Obje&s are fo far from being the Effeft of 
 " Choice, that they are not the Effeft of the 
 " leaft Premeditation, or any Aft of his own, 
 " as in finding a Treafure on the Road, or in 
 *' receiving a Legacy from a Perfon unknown 
 " to him.*' But has a Man the fame Pleafure 
 ib thefe Cifes as if he had done fomething to 
 dtferve a Treafure of the Public ? or had the 
 
 Legacy conferr'd on him as a Reward for his 
 good Deeds to the deceafed Perfon, his late 
 lov'd Beneficiary, or his intimate Friend ? If 
 this Author can find a difference in thefe two 
 Cafes, this Obfervation of his muft be impro- 
 per : if he cannot, I am fure he has a different 
 enfe of things from the reft of Mankind, and 
 of confequence is not to be argued with. And 
 fo I take my leave of him. 
 
 * $** Dr. Jenkin, 2d Vol. Ch. 12. p. 140. &c.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 151 
 
 VI. From hence it feems fufficiently evident why God would not it wcuid 
 interpofe his Power, or intermeddle with our Elections, fince that ther f ore be 
 could neither be advantageous to ourfelves nor to the whole Syftem, "reeabie to 
 nor agreeable to God. 'Tis no wonder then that abfolute Goodnefs God ' nor 
 permits Evil Elections, fince for the moft part they could not be^[ U G d US ' 
 prevented without greater Evils. But if that can ever be done, foouid ai- 
 there's no doubt but God will take care that the very beft fhall be 3 Eic"-" 
 done. (94.) tions. 
 
 K k 2 5UBSECT. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (94.) What has been urg'd in the foregoing 
 Subfcction about the Divine Jnterpofition in 
 human Elections muft be underftood in a li- 
 mited Senfe, viz. as relating only to an imme- 
 diate Influence, or an abfolute Determination 
 of the Will, /*. e. to fuchan in termed ling with 
 Elections as would make them to be no Elec- 
 tions at all. For it appears from the follow- 
 ing Subfection, that our Author did not in- 
 tend to exclude all kind of Interpofition in the 
 Government of Free Agents, but only that par- 
 ticular fort which would fubvert their natu- 
 ral Powery, or be definitive of their Free- 
 dom. Tho' God has eftablifh'd general Laws 
 both in the animate and inanimate World, yet 
 he has not left thefe entirely to themfelves, but 
 influences, directs, and governs them in fuch 
 a manner as is moft conducive to the great 
 End for which he defign'd them ; which End 
 could not be attain'd without fuch a particu 
 lar Influence, as will be fhewn below. In 
 determining the manner of this Government 
 we muft beware of the two Extremes of fup- 
 pofing either firft, that the Deity always in- 
 fluences fecond Caufes or Acts (as Malclranch 
 terms it) by particular Wills, in the Natural 
 or Moral World ; which would diflblve all 
 Laws of Nature, deftroy the Liberty of the 
 Creature, and reduce every thing to Fate : or, 
 fecondly, that he never interpofes in the. Go- 
 vernment of either World, hut lets the gene- 
 ral Laws of Mechanifm or p.f Liberty take 
 
 their natural Courfe, and operate as it were in- 
 dependently of himfelf; which would entirely 
 deftroy a particular Providence, and render the 
 general one in a great meafure ufelefs. The 
 bad Confequences which would attend the for- 
 mer of thefe Schemes have been touch'd upon 
 above : The latter (which is particularly e- 
 fpous'd by Leibnitz in his Syftem of Pre-efia- 
 blijb'd Harmony, and by Mr. Whifion in his 
 Netv Theory of the Earth) will be obviated in 
 the following Subjection. I fhall here only 
 add the Opinion of S. C. on the prefent Sub- 
 ject: " * 'Twas highly fuitable to the Divine 
 " Wifdom in the Government of the World, 
 " both to pre-ordain fome of the principal E- 
 " vents with relation to the entire human 
 " Community, or to the more confiderable 
 " parts of it, and to referve to himfelf a Right 
 14 of interpofing and influenc'ng particular A- 
 " gents, as in other Cafes, fo mere efpecially 
 " in order to the accomplishment of tjiefe E- 
 " vents. That he has actually done fo is a- 
 ** bundantly clear from Scripture-Prophecys, 
 " and Hiftories. And that in fo doing he has 
 " acted in a manner moft worthy his Wifdom, 
 ft is no lefs manifeft. For hereby it appears 
 " that the Divine Government is equally op* 
 " pofed to Chance and Deftiny. Had the. 
 " Deity taken no Care of Futurity, but left 
 " every Man to the Conduct of his own In- 
 " clinations, and natural Effects in general ta 
 " the Influence of their Caufes, without ever 
 
 interpofing 
 
 Impartial Enquiry, &c p. 115.
 
 352 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 Devout Men 
 
 hope for a 
 change in the 
 courfe of 
 Nature, 
 thro' their 
 Prayers. 
 
 S U B S E C T. IV. 
 
 Concerning the Efficacy of Trayer. 
 
 I. OOME may apprehend that God is not fo averfe from interpo- 
 O . fi n g immediately in the Affairs of this World as is here affert- 
 ed j and that the Laws and Order of Nature are not of fo great con- 
 fequence with him, but that he may be ealily and frequently induced 
 to difpenfe with them contrary to what we have here advane'd. For 
 this feems to be the common Opinion of Mankind. Every Suppli- 
 cant that addrefTes himfelf to God, believes that this is effected by 
 the Deity, on account of his Prayers : for if he perceiv'd it to be 
 otherwife, he could hope for nothing from the Prayers he offers to 
 the Deity. For if all came to pafs according to the natural Order 
 of things, and the Series of Caufes, Vho could hope to be delivered 
 from a Diftemper or Calamity; from Evil Affections or Temptations, 
 
 by 
 
 NOTE S.. 
 
 interpofing to direct them to the attainment 
 of his great Defign ; this would have been 
 almoft in effect: to divert himfelf of the Go- 
 vernment of Rational Agents,, and to fubjedl 
 their Affairs to Chance, and to the hazard 
 of the utmoft Diforder and Confufion. Or 
 had he, on the contrary, abfolutely or fa- 
 tally determined every Event,, tho' this 
 would have been far enough from diverting 
 himfelf of the Government of the World, 
 yet it would have been a Government un- 
 worthy of the Deity, a Government entire- 
 ly exclufive of all proper Sin and Punish- 
 ment, Virtue and Rewards : wherein him- 
 felf would in effect have been the only A- 
 gent, and all the Creatures ftupid and paffive. 
 Whereas, by pre-ordaining the moft material 
 Events, and fuffering the Creatures freely 
 to exert their Faculties in all convenient 
 
 " Cafes, he appears moft wi fely to have chofen 
 " the middle way, and thereby to have equal- 
 " ly avoided the Mischiefs of both Extremes." 
 See alfo p. 1 16. 
 
 All the Difference between this ingenious 
 Writer and our Author is, that in the Govern' 
 ment of the World he fuppofes the general 
 Law of Liberty to be fometimes fufpended, as 
 well as the Laws of Motion, cjV. Whereas 
 our Author, tho' he aliens the fame of the 
 latter, yet he denys it of the former; at leart 
 does not grant that fuch an Abridgment of Li- 
 berty is ncceffary to the aforefaid Government : 
 How on this Principle he accounts for that, 
 which we generally mean by a Particular Pro- 
 vidence, anfwering the Prayers, and thereupon 
 often influencing and over-ruling the Affairs 
 of Mankind, will be fhewn in its proper place.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 253 
 
 by virtue of a Prayer ? Thefe things are either effected by the imme- 
 diate Interpohtion of the Divine Power, or are requeued of God in 
 vain. For if they depend upon their own proper Caufes, which may 
 not be alter'd, thofe Caufes would produce their Effects, as well up- 
 on the omiffion as the offering of thefe Supplications. But if God 
 fometimes voucnfafes to fufpend or change the Order and Laws of 
 Nature to gratify his Votaries; why may not the fame be done to 
 prevent the abufe of Free-Will and Natural Evils ? Either this In- 
 terpofition muff be admitted in order to oppofe thefe Evils, or it 
 mufl be rejected with regard to Prayers. This Difficulty deferves 
 an Anfwer. We attempt to folve it in the following man- 
 ner. 
 
 II. 'Tis to be obferv'd then, in the firft place, that all Prayers are Goddoesnot 
 not heard by God, nor do we hope that all things fhall be done heir all 
 which are requested of him, but only fuch as he has declared to be a- Pra )' crs - 
 greeable to his Will, and has in fome refpeet promis'd to perform. 
 
 Thofe things then which are unneceffary, trifling, inconfiffent, hurt- 
 ful or petitioned for in an unlawful Manner, are not to be expected by 
 the Petitioners, tho' they be requefled never fo frequently. 
 
 III. Secondly, God may be under a two-fold Obligation to his Crea- God is oh- 
 ture, firtt from his Goodnefs, whereby he is oblig'd fo to order all Jjjg'd t0 the 
 external things, that Exiftence fhall be better than Non-exiftence to hifooodneft 
 all who duely perform their Duty. Secondly, By fome Covenant or aid by c#- 
 Agreement, whereby he engaged, under certain Conditions, to be-*'* 
 flow fome Favours upon Men, notwithstanding they were Sin- 
 ners : Which Covenant, tho' it may not be efteem'd a natural one, 
 
 yet it cannot be judg'd to be againft Nature, or to offer Violence 
 to it. 
 
 IV. Thirdly, The things which are requeued of God either belong what may be 
 to the Mind, viz. that the Mind be found and vigorous, and able toJJJ ^ 
 govern the Affections, &c, or to the Body, that Life and Strength be lat cither 
 prolong'd, Gfr. or to external things, that the Weather be ferene and^ 11 ^ 11 ^ 
 ieafonable for the Fruits of the Earth, &c. Now thefe differ from external' 
 each other, and ought not to be prayed for under the fame Con- things, 
 ditions. 
 
 V. Fourthly*
 
 254. Of Moral Evil. 
 
 V. Fourthly, As to the Mind, fince the Elective Power is the chief 
 
 God docs p art Q Man, and is felf-motive, 'tis fcarce conceivable how it fhould 
 
 AiSHance to be determin'd from without itfelf. For that which determines itfelf 
 
 our Minis at \ s entirely different from that which ftands in need of another to move 
 
 undcr^s cer- it> an d thefe appear to be no more applicable to the fame thing, than 
 
 tain Laws as a Square and a Circular Figure are to the fame Surface, at leaft, their 
 
 Natural the Natures muft be chang'd to make them compatible. But yet this 
 
 World. Faculty, as well as others, may be vitiated by abufe and a perverfe 
 
 manner of acting, and when it is thus vitiated, 'tis probable that 
 
 God only can reflore it, for it is fuppos'd to be fubject to him a- 
 
 lone. 
 
 This Afliftance mull: be afforded to Mankind in fuch a manner that 
 no blemifh be thereby call: upon the Divine Conftancy, nor any Pre- 
 judice don to his Wifdom in eftablifhing the Laws and Order of Na- 
 ture. Now that all kind of Interpofition does not prejudice thefe, 
 appears from hence, viz. that it is mod worthy of the Divine Ma- 
 jefty to have referved to himfelf a Power over Nature, efpecially 
 while the Beings over whom this Power is referv'd enjoy their Li- 
 berty ; it feems not only proper that God mould be at Liberty to act. 
 in this manner with them, but alfo neceflary, provided this be not 
 done at random, but under fome known and certain Conditions. And 
 here the Divine Wifdom has exerted itfelf in a wonderful manner, 
 and devifed a Way to reconcile the Conftancy of God, and the San- 
 ctity of the Laws of Nature, with that Afliftance which is occasion- 
 ally afforded to Mankind upon their Requeft. Man might prefume 
 upon fome Method of effecting this, before Revelation : but 'tis to 
 this alone that we owe the clear and undoubted Manifeftation of it. 
 From hence we learn that God will give his Holy Spirit, under fome 
 certain Laws and Conditions, to thole that are fitly difpofed: which 
 would be as certain and conftant a Principle of Spiritual Actions, to 
 them that are endow'd with it, as Nature itfelf is of the Natural. 
 Since therefore this Spirit by its Grace affifts our depraved Will, and 
 in fome refpect reftores it to its Vigour, it cannot be judg'd to vio- 
 late the Order of Nature, any more than when its Influence fuftains 
 natural Caufes. If it be afk'd what thofe Laws are, under which the 
 Influence of this Spirit is promifed. I anfwer, all fuch things as are 
 
 neceffary
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 neceffary to Salvation are promifed to them who make a right ufe 
 of their prefent Abilities, that pray to God thro' Chrifi for an In- 
 creafe of them, and that celebrate the Sacraments as the Law of God 
 requires. Upon thefe Conditions this Spirit defcends into the Minds 
 of Men, and by its holy Infpiration forms them to Piety. 
 
 VI. The giving of this Spirit, and obtaining it by Chrift, was a 
 moft miraculous Work of Divine Power, but the Operations of it, 
 fince they are now produced according to fix'd Laws and a fettled 
 Order, as regularly and conftantly as the Works of Nature, cannot 
 be reckon'd a Miracle any more than thefe are : For I call a Mira- 
 cle a fenfible Operation of God, which is perform'd in a Way con- 
 trary to Nature ; and as it happens beyond all certain and fix'd Order, 
 it proves God to be the immediate Caufe and Author : But the Inter- 
 position of the Divine Power exerted about the Will is not an Inter- 
 pofition of this kind, for it is done, as we faid, according to a cer- 
 tain Rule and Order, and therefore cannot be miraculous. I con- 
 fefs that this is indeed an Exception from the general Law of Free 
 Agents, (95.) but it is no lefs regular than the Law itfelf, nor any 
 
 more 
 
 N O ? E S. 
 
 2 55 
 
 The Aid of 
 ihe Holy Spi- 
 rit is not mi- 
 raculous. 
 
 (95.) He does not mean that this is an Ex- 
 ception from the Law of their Liberty, as ap 
 pears from what immediately follows; but from 
 their being left entirely to themfelves, or to 
 the cafual Impreffions of thofe external Ob- 
 jects and Agents which furround them ; from 
 their afting folely upon Principles of their 
 own Formation or Difcovery, and following 
 the Guidance of their natural Underftanding, 
 without any internal Afliftance : which feems 
 to be the general Law of this their prefent 
 State of Probation. The Holy Ghoft then, ac- 
 cording to our Author, does /jot fubvcrt and 
 fuperfede, but rather flrengthen, prefcrve and 
 perfect our natural Freedom ; it repairs the 
 breaches made therein by the Violence of 
 Temptations, by the Force of Evil Habits, 
 &c. counterbalances as it were the Influence 
 of Evil Spirits, and reftores the Mind to its 
 native Equilibrium, or Indifference. How 
 thefe EfFedls may be fuppos'd to be produced 
 in us, and of what kind the Influence of the 
 
 Holy Ghoft, of Good and Evil Angels is, will 
 be confider'd by and by. We (hall firft give 
 the Opinion of an Author or two concerning 
 what the Holy Spirit's Operations are not, or 
 that they cannot be in any refpett deftruttive of 
 our natural Powers, 
 
 In the firft place, " The manner of the 
 M Spirit's Operation is not inconfiftent with 
 " the Nature of Mankind, which (fays Dr. 
 - Stebbing) is a Truth fo fully and fo liberal- 
 " ly granted by all Parties, that nothing needs 
 " to be faid to prove it. Now Man we know 
 " is an intelligent and rational Being, able to 
 " difcern between Good and Evil ; he has al- 
 " fo fuch a Freedim or Liberty of Will as 
 " makes him accountable to God for his Be- 
 " haviour in this Life. By confequence th 
 " Spirit muft not be fuppofed to operate in 
 " fuch a manner as not to make the leaft ufe 
 " of the Underftanding, nor muft it be fo far 
 " inconfiftent with Freedom and Liberty, as 
 
 " that
 
 056 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 more repugnant to their Nature. From hence it appears how God 
 may interpofe in Matters relating to the Will, and yet not violate the 
 Order of Nature, nor injure his Conftancy. Not that God actually 
 determines the Will by an immediate Influx, for by this means the 
 Act of Election would change its Nature, and be imputed to God 
 rather than to the Will of the Creature, but that in fome manner he 
 reflores the Faculty to its Perfection, and makes it, when thus fitly 
 difpos'd, exert its proper Actions according to the Rectitude of its 
 Nature, without any Diminution of its Liberty. 
 
 VII. Fifthly, 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 " that a Man's Ailions may not properly 
 ** be call'd his own *. '' Again, *' fuch 
 " is the manner of the Spirit's Operati- 
 " ons, that they do not make our own Care 
 '* and Diligence after Virtue aud Godlinefs 
 " unneceflary, but that on the other hand th? 
 " Operations of the Spirit will do us no 
 " Good, if our own Endeavours be wanting. 
 * Thirdly, He does' not produce his EfTecls 
 " in us all at once, but in fuch Order, and by 
 " thofe Degrees that fuit with our Capacities 
 *' and Qualification f. Laftly,vHis Motions 
 ** are not difcernable by us from the natural 
 "Operations of our Minds. We feel them no 
 * otherwife than we do our Thoughts and 
 " Meditations, we cannot diftinguifh them by 
 " the manner of their affedling us from our 
 ** natural Reafonings, and the Operations of 
 * Truth upon our Souls, fo that if God had 
 ' only defign'd to give the Holy Spirit to us, 
 without making any mention of it in his 
 '* Word, we couid never have known, unlefs 
 " it had been communicated to us by fome 
 ", private Revelation, that our Souls are mo- 
 " ved by a Divine Power when we love God 
 " and keep his Commandments }(.'' ' 
 
 This is a Confirmation of what our Author 
 has declared above, particularly that the Holy 
 Spirit's Operations cannot be call'd miraculous. 
 A larger Proof and Illwllration of the forego- 
 
 ing Propofitions may be feen in the fame Chap- 
 ter. The Confequence refulting from them, 
 viz. that the Spirit does not operate irrefiflibly, 
 is clearly proved and defended againft Turejin 
 in Chap. 8, 9, Ciff. 
 
 To proceed : "It hath been the antient 
 M Opinion of the Church of God (fays R. 
 " Batiell**) that the Will is not deltroy'd by 
 " Grace, but only repair'd. A diflocated 
 ! * Joint, when it is fet again, doth not lofe 
 " the Nature of a Joint, but rather is reftored 
 " to its former life and comelinefs, fo the 
 " Grace of God healing the Will, doth not 
 {t take away the Nature of the Will, butoniy 
 " makes it able to obey God's Will. So that 
 *' when God co-operates with the Will, Man 
 " is left in the hand of his own Council, to 
 ** turn or not to turn to the Lord : God fets 
 M Life and Death before him, and bids him 
 M reach out his hand to whether he will." 
 
 And again, p. 77. " Neither Sin nor 
 Grace take away the natural Power of the 
 " Will ; but only thus it is, Sin hurts and 
 " weakens it, efpecially ill Habits ; Grace 
 " heals and ftrengthens it, and brings it near- 
 " er to its primitive Goodnef.% 65V." This is 
 very agreeable to what our Author afierts in 
 the Conclufion of this Paragraph. See alfo 
 Serifs Chrijlian Life, Part 2. Ch. 4. par. 5. 
 p. 237. " God (fays he) in the ordinary 
 
 " courfe 
 
 * Treatife Concerning the Operations of the Spirit, C. 7. p. 123. %vo. 
 f- Ibid. p. 124. || Ibid. p. 125, 126. 
 
 -** Vulgar Emrs in Divinity removed, p. 74.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 a 57 
 
 VII. Fifthly, It may be demonftrated that the Prayers themfelves Pra y cr3 nata 
 have fome natural Power and Efficacy with regard to the Will : For,.^ " hc to 
 Prayers are certain Endeavours towards the Exercife of Liberty, andMind. 
 contain in them Acts of Election, tho' perhaps imperfect ones j and 
 fuch is the Nature of all Powers, that tney acquire Strength by trial 
 and exercife, and every Act, tho' imperfect, is a Step to a more per- 
 fect 
 
 NO r E s. 
 
 " coerfe of his Government doth as well leave 
 *' free Agents to the natural Freedom with 
 " which he firft created them as neecjfary one? 
 " to thefe Neceflities which he firlt itnprejs''c: 
 ' upon their Natures. For his Providence is 
 " fuccedaneous to his Creation, and did at firft 
 " begin where that ended, and doth ftill pro- 
 ** ceed as it began, ordering and governing all 
 " things according to the feveral Frames and 
 " Models in which he firft caft and created them. 
 " Nor can he order and govern them otherwife 
 **. without unravelling his own Creation, and 
 '* making things to be otherwife than he firft 
 " made them. For how can he ordinarily ne- 
 " cejfttate thofe Agents whom he firft made free 
 ** without changing their Natures from free to 
 ** necejfary, and making them a different kind of 
 " Being than he made them ? So that tho' in 
 " the courfe of his Government God doth 
 " powerfully importune and perfuade us, yet 
 " he lays no Neeejffity on our Wills; but leaves 
 " us free to cboofe or refufe; and as the Tempt a- 
 " tions of Sin incline us one way, fo the Grace 
 ** of God inclines us another, but both leave us 
 '* to our own Liberty to go which way we 
 " pleafe." 
 
 Laftly, what may be expected from the Spi- 
 rit is (according to Dr. Rymer *) contain'd in 
 thefe heads, \Ji. Faith in its feveral Degrees. 
 2dly. Support againft Temptations. $d/y. The 
 promotion of Virtue. And, $tbly, The Ad- 
 vancement of Piety. All which are produced 
 as he there fhews, in a manner perfectly con- 
 fident with the free ufe of our Faculties. I 
 mall cite a Paragraph or two in relation to the 
 2d and 3d of thefe Heads. " As the Spirit 
 
 " never offers Violence to the Soul, it may 
 " fomctimes happen that the Light it give.--, 
 " the Importunity it ufes, may be fo far over- 
 " come by fome glaring Vanity, or fome noify 
 " Paffion, as not to be obferv'a 1 : But general- 
 " ly in Minds well prepar'd by its former In- 
 " fluence, it oppofes the Delufions of Temp- 
 " tations with good Succefs, by bringing all 
 " the Arguments of Religion into view. 
 " And as the Spirit may thus difcountenance 
 " particular Temptations, it may likewife pre- 
 " ferve us from all vicious Habits, by familiar 
 " Reprefentations of the Reafon and Nature 
 " of things, and by many fecret Influences 
 " both on our Minds and Bodies ; diverting 
 " dangerous Thoughts, and moderating fuch 
 " Appetites and Affections as ufually tend to 
 " Vice, and often difpofe us for it. On the 
 " contrary, 'tis eafy to conceive how it may 
 ' forward us in Virtue, by prefenting to our 
 " Minds fuch Thoughts as leffen our Efteem 
 " for this World, and excite our Zeal for the 
 " other. The Apoftle, when he bids us not 
 " quench the Spirit, reprefents it as a Flame 
 " that both lights and warms us ; fhews us 
 " ufeful Truths, and gives us a fuitable Con- 
 " cern for them; and all this confident with 
 " the Liberty of our Minds, p. 215, 216." 
 See alfo Bp. Burnet on the 10th Article of the 
 Church of England, and A-Bp. Tillotfon's 1 69th 
 Serm. p. 45;. vol. 3. or 147th Serm. p. 310. 
 3d Edit.Fol. 
 
 If the foregoing Obfervations be true, it 
 follows that the ordinary Operation of the 
 Spirit cannot be any Phy fie al Influence, ot im-' 
 mediate Determination of the Will ; it muft ' 
 
 therefore 
 
 * General Reprefentation of Rcvcafd Religion, C. 9. p. 210, 211. 
 
 L 1
 
 258 
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 Tel one, till they have attain'd to a Habit and Facility of acting. 
 The conftant Exercife of Prayer may therefore tend, by a natural 
 Efficacy, to reftore the proper ufe of Free Will, and regain its na- 
 tive Vigour. 
 
 VIII. Sixthly, The fame may be faid concerning the Government 
 duTtheAffec- of the Paffions and Affections, which conftitutes fo great a Part of 
 
 human 
 
 And to fub- 
 
 tions. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 therefore be only a Moral Influence, or mediate, 
 rational Determination. The manner of ef- 
 fecting this may be by injecting Ideas, repre- 
 fenting Arguments, exhibiting Motives, and 
 aflifting the Understanding in its apprehenfion 
 of them. This I think is all that Mr. Wolla- 
 flon could mean by the Words Suggeftion, Im- 
 pulfe, or filent Communication of fome Spiritual 
 Being || ; and feems to be the only intelligible 
 Notion of the Influence of either Good or Evil 
 Spirits : in which fenfe I believe that we are 
 very frequently acted upon and over-ruled in 
 order to promote the Good of the whole, and 
 compleat the Defigns of a particular Provi- 
 dence. The Author laft cited has given us a 
 fine Defcription of the manner in which this 
 Government of Free Beings may be exercifed 
 and apply'd to the Ends above mention'd. 
 " It is not impoffible (fays he *) that many 
 " things fuitable to feveral Cafes may be 
 " brought to pafs by means of fecret, and 
 *' fometimes fudden Influences on our Minds, 
 " or the Minds of other Men whofe Acts may 
 " affect us. Forinftance; If the Cafe fhould 
 *' require that N fhould be deliver'd from 
 " threatning Ruin, or from fome Misfortune 
 " which would certainly befall him, if he 
 " fhould go fuch a way at fuch a time as 
 " he intended ; upon this occafion fome 
 " new Reafons may be prefented to his 
 " Mind why he fhould not go at all, or not 
 " then, or not by that Road ; or he may for- 
 ** get to go ; or if he is to be deliver'd from 
 " fome dangerous Enemy, either fome new 
 '* turn given to his Thoughts, may divert him 
 " from going where the Enemy will be ; or, 
 " the Enemy may after the fame manner be 
 
 | Relinon of Nature delineated, p. 106; 
 
 u diverted from coming where he fhall be, 
 ts or his (the Enemy's) Refentment may be 
 ** qualify 'd, or fome proper Method of Defence 
 ' may be fuggelled, or Degree of Refolution 
 " and Vigour excited. After the fame man- 
 " ner, not only Deliverances from Dangers- 
 " and Troubles, but Advantages and Succefles 
 tl may be conferred. Or on the other Side, 
 " Men may, by way of Punifliment for Crimes 
 " committed, incur Mifchiefs and Calamities. 
 " I fay, thefe things and fuch like may be. 
 " Far fince the Motions and Actions of Men, 
 " which depend upon their Wills, do alfo 
 " depend upon their Judgments, as thefe 
 f again do upon the prefent Appearan- 
 ** ces or Non-appearances of things in their 
 M Minds; if a new profpect of things can be 
 " any way produced, the Light by which they 
 M are feen alter'd, new forces and directions 
 <c imprefs'd upon the Spirits, Palfions exalted 
 '* or abated, the Power of judging enliven'd 
 m or debiliated, or the Attention taken off, 
 " without any Sufpenfion or Alteration of the 
 " ftanding Laws of Nature ; then without 
 " that, new Volitions, Defigns, Meafures, or 
 " a ceflation of thinking may alfo be produ- 
 M ced, and thus many things prevented that 
 * would otherwife be, and many brought a- 
 " boat that would not." See alfo Sberltck on 
 Providence, p. 51. 2d Edit. Again f, " That 
 " there may be poffibly fuch Infpirations of 
 ' new Thoughts and Counfels may perhaps 
 * appear farther from this, that we fo frequent- 
 ** ly find Thoughts arifing in our Heads, into 
 u which we are led by no Difcourfe, nothing 
 * we read, no clue of Reafoning, but they 
 " furprife and come upon us from we know 
 
 " not 
 * p. 105. f p. 107.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 human Felicity : we have fhewn that the Elective Power is fuperior 
 to all others, and has the Government of them, and that when the 
 Mind is corrupted with Vice, the Will in a great meafure falls from 
 that Power which Nature gave it. Yet the inferior Affections of the 
 Mind have not quite fhaken off the Yoke, they ftill obey, tho' with 
 fome difficulty, but ufe and exercife are neceffary to implant an Ha- 
 bit of Obedience in them. Since therefore Prayers contain in them- 
 felves an exercife of Election, they have a natural Efficacy to ftrength- 
 en the Elective Acts, and by the fame means accuftom the Affections 
 to Obey : for a repeated Act augments the Power and overcomes 
 ReMance. (96.) 
 
 L 1 2 IX. Seventhly, 
 
 3-59 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 ** not what Quarter. If they proceed from the 
 " Mobility of Spirits flragling out of Order, 
 " and fortuitous Affections of the Brain, or 
 " were of the Nature of Dreams, why are they 
 " not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as 
 " they are ? " Is it not much more reafonable 
 to imagine that they come by the Order and 
 Direction of an all-feeing and all-gracious God 
 who continually watches over us, and difpofes e- 
 very thing in and about us, for theGoodofour- 
 felves or others ? Not to fpeak of the agrceable- 
 nefi of this Notion to the Opinions and Belief 
 of the belt and wifeft Men in all Ages. The 
 Confequence Mr. Wollafton draws from the 
 whole is perfectly agreeable to the Scope of 
 our Author. " If this be the Cafe, as it feems 
 ** to be, that Men's Minds are fufceptive of 
 " fuch Infinuations and Impreffions as fre- 
 " quently by ways unknown do affect them 
 " and give them an Inclination towards this 
 " or that, how many things may be brought 
 ** to pafs by thefe means, without fixing and 
 " refixing the Law* of Nature, any more than 
 " they are unfix'd when one Man alters the 
 " Opinion of another, by throwing a Book 
 " proper for that purpofe in his way ? 
 
 To the fame purpofe fee Scott's Chrijiian 
 Life, Part 2. Vol. 2, S- ! P-8i, 82. Concer- 
 
 ning the Operations of the Spirit, as diflin 
 guifh'd into fuch as are previous, concomitant, 
 and fubfequent to our Converfion and Sandtifi- 
 cation, fee $. Faneourfs Effay concerning Li- 
 berty, Grace, and Prefcience, Letter 2. $. 2. p. 
 43, &c. 
 
 I hope the Reader will excufe us for in- 
 filling fo long on this Point, fince falie No- 
 tions concerning it have produced the mod 
 pernicious Confequences to Religion in gena- 
 ral, as well as the principal Objections againft 
 our Author's Syflem. 
 
 (96.) Prayer puts us upon making good Re- 
 folutions, and endeavouring to fubdue our vi- 
 cious Inclinations: it animates our Zeal, and 
 enflames our Affections ; it exercifes and im- 
 proves our Faith, our Hope, and Charity j 
 and therefore is in itfelf a Means of ftrength- 
 ning our Faculties, and removing all Impedi- 
 ments to a due Exertion of them. It alfb 
 makes us fenfible of our ftrict Dependence on 
 the Deity, of our manifold Wants, and the 
 great Benefit of his Supplies, and of confe- 
 quene'e it naturally fits us for them, and in- 
 clines us to make a right ufe of them when wo 
 do receive them. " It is not only a Mcans^ 
 " (fiys Dr. Barrtnv *) by Impetration acqui- 
 " ring for us, but it is an effectual Inflrument 
 
 " working 
 
 * Firft Vol. Fol. 1 ft Edit. p. 493:
 
 2 6o 
 
 The Actions 
 of Free Br- 
 ings will " 
 produce a 
 contingency 
 in material 
 things, yet 
 this does not 
 offer any Vio- 
 lence to Na- 
 ture. 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 IX. Seventhly, As to Material Objects, viz. our own Bodies and 
 the Elements, 'tis plain that the intellectual World is more noble 
 than the Material, and confequently that this latter was made for the 
 fake of the former, and is fubfervient to its ufe: But iince the Ac- 
 tions of Beings endow'd with Underftanding and Will are free, and 
 on that account contingent, they necelfarily produce a Contingency 
 alio in material Subflances which depend upon them. For we can 
 excite certain Motions in our own Bodies, and communicate them 
 to the adjacent ones, which Motions are not in this Cafe produ- 
 ced mereiv according to Mechanic Laws, but the direction of 
 die Will 
 
 Nor 
 
 N O T E S. 
 
 " working in us all true Good. It is the 
 " Channel by which God conveyeth Spiri- 
 .' tual Light into our Minds, and Spiritual 
 u Vigour into our Hearts, It is both the 
 " Seed and the Food of Spiritual Life, by 
 41 which all holy Difpenfations of Soul, and 
 " all honeil Refolutions of Practice are bred 
 " and nourished, are augmented and ftrength- 
 " ned in us. It exciteth, it quickneth, it 
 " rmintaineth all pious Affections. The love 
 " of God can no otherwife than by it be kin- 
 " died, fomented or kept in Life (without it 
 " we certainly fhall have an Ellrangement and 
 " Averfation from him) it alone can maintain 
 ** a conflant reverence and awe of God, keep- 
 ** ing him in our Thoughts, and making us 
 " to live as in his Prefence. It chiefly enli- 
 " veneth and exercifeth our Faith in God ; 
 *' N k is that which begetteth in us a favoury 
 * 4 Relilh of Divine things, which fweeteneth 
 % * and endeareth to ourfelves the Practice of 
 '* Piety; which only can enable us with de- 
 " light and alacrity, to obey God's Com- 
 '.* mandments : It alone can raife our Minds 
 " from the Cares and Concernments of this 
 " World to a fenfe and defire of Heavenly 
 " things. By it God imparteth Strength to 
 '* fubdue bad Inclinations, to reftrain fenfual 
 *' Appetite.% to compref* irregular Paffions ; 
 ". to evade the allurements to Evil, and the 
 * difcouragements from Good which this 
 
 World always prefenteth ; to fupport alfo 
 with Patience and Equanimity, the many 
 CroiTes we muft furely meet with therein. 
 It is, in fhort, the only flrong bulwark a- 
 gaint Temptation and Sin; the only fure 
 guard of Piety and a good Confcience." 
 " God's End (fays Mr. CbubF) in requiring; 
 this Duty of Prayer, is wholly and folely 
 the Good and Benefit of his Creatures, viz. 
 that it may be a Means to work in the Pe- 
 titioner a fui table frame and temper of mind, 
 and to ditpofe him to a fuitable Practice 
 and Converfation, and fo render him a fui- 
 table and proper Object of God's fpecial 
 Care and Love. For as Prayer is an Ad- 
 drefs or Application of a dependent Being 
 to his fupreme Governor and original Be- 
 nefactor, fo when this Duty is performed 
 with ferioufnefs and application of Mind, 
 it naturally tends to work in Men an awful 
 fenfe of the Being and Attributes of God, 
 of our dependence upon him, and of the 
 many Obligations we are under to ferve 
 him. It tends to awake in us a lively 
 fenfe of the Sovereignty and Power, of the 
 Knowledge and Wifdom, of the Holinefs, 
 Truth and Righteoufnefs, of the Mercy and 
 Goodnefs, and Loving-Kindnefs of the 
 Lord. It naturally draws forth our Souls 
 in filial Fear, in Hope and Truft, in Love, 
 Delight, and Joy in God, and creates in us 
 
 " ajuft.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 Nor would they have happen'd at the time or in the manner they 
 do, if the Will had not by its own Liberty excited them. Neither 
 do we fuppofe that any Violence or Diforder happens hereby to the 
 Laws of Natures for Nature itfelf has provided that the lefs fhould 
 give way to the more noble, that is, local Motion to the Action of 
 the Will, as being the more excellent of the two. We mutt believe 
 the fame concerning Agents of a fuperior Nature, and the more no- 
 ble Order they are of, the greater Sphere of Action is to be attributed 
 to them. Such little Creatures as we Men are, can convey Water 
 in Canals, drain fuch Parts of the Earth as are naturally cover'd 
 with Water, drown the Dry-Land, and produce a great many other 
 Changes, both in the Earth, the Water and the Air, who then can 
 affirm but that there may be other Agents who could change almoft 
 the whole Elements, if they were not prohibited by certain Laws ? 
 All who acknowledge the Exiftence of fuch Beings, are agreed that 
 thefe things are pofliblej now it muft be allow'd, that whatever is 
 perform'd by thefe Beings is done according to the Laws of Nature, 
 and that no manner of Violence is hereby offer'd to the Order of it, 
 any more than by the Actions of our own Will. 
 
 X. Eighthly, And as all material Beings are connected together, 
 and by mutual Influence act upon each other -, viz. the Superior upon 
 the Inferior, the Sun upon the iEther and the Moon, and that upon 
 the Air, Water, and Earth} and perhaps, vice verfa, fo 'tis in like 
 
 manner 
 
 as much upon each 
 
 261 
 
 There is a 
 Syltem of 
 intellectual 
 as well as 
 material 
 Beings, 
 which al 
 other. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 a jiift Concert! to pleafe him, and to ap- 
 prove ourfelves in his Sight ; and confe- 
 ancntly to put on that Purity and Piety, 
 Humility and Charity, which is the Spirit 
 and Praclice of true Chriftianity. And as 
 this is God's End in appointing this Duty, 
 fe for this End he requires the frequent Re- 
 turns of it, that the Mind of the Petitioner 
 may be habitually feafoned with a fenfc of 
 
 " himfelf*. See al fo Bp. Patrick's Difcourfe 
 " concerning Prayer, Ch. 8 and 9. 
 
 Thefe Effefts and Ufes of Prayer, molt of 
 which are difcoverable by natural Reaibn,prove 
 fufficiently, I think, that Prayer is a natural 
 Duty. Concerning the Efficacy of it, and the 
 manner whereby Providence may be fuppofec 
 to anfwer our particular Requefts, fee the fol- 
 lowing Notes to this Subfeclion. 
 
 Chubb"* trails, p. 1 80, &c.
 
 i6i Of Moral Evil 
 
 manner probable that there is a certain Order and Syftem of intel- 
 lectual Beings conftituted, who are no lefs fubordinate to one another, 
 and operate upon each other by a mutual Influence, according to the 
 Laws eftablim'd by Nature. 
 God makes XI. Ninthly, There feems to be no reafon why God mould not 
 u!~e of the make ufe of the Miniftry of thofe Beings in the Government of this 
 Aneci r ' V in World* whenever it may be expedient. This we fee is done in fome 
 the Govern- meafure upon our Earthly Globe. For he makes ufe of Men to go- 
 w nt . f i vcrn other Animals, and fome Men are fet as Guardians over others. 
 nor is this a- And as the Attendants of Princes and Judges perform their Office, 
 ny violence not as they themfelves pleafe, but according to the Appointment of 
 their Matters, or the Laws; fo in like manner we are to believe that 
 Agents more excellent than us (which we ttile miniftring Angels) dif- 
 charge their Office according to the Laws prefcribed by God. Sup- 
 pofe therefore this about affifting fuch as regularly apply to God, to 
 be one of thefe Laws j let them be commanded to relieve thofe who 
 make their humble Addrefies to him, and let the manner of invok- 
 ing him be prefcribed by Nature, or fome pofitive Law : Can it be 
 doubted whether they would not as readily exert their Powers for the 
 Affiftance of thefe Supplicants, and as diligently difcharge the Duty 
 of relieving them, as a Judge's Officer, or a Prince's Servant performs 
 the Commands of his Matter ? And fo long as thefe things are done 
 according to the general Order, and under fuch Conditions as are a- 
 greeable to Nature and Reafon, they can be no more deem'd repug- 
 - nant to the Order of Nature, or the Laws appointed for the Go- 
 vernment of the World, than civil Government and the Laws among 
 Men are. Here is nothing contrary to or inconfiftent with the Laws 
 of univerfal Nature: for it does not teem any more repugnant to 
 thefe, that Angels mould ufe their Powers for the Relief of fuch as 
 qpray to God, than that Men lhould help each other according to 
 their Abilities. If it be granted that thefe things are fo, it will be 
 very apparent how our Prayers may have their Effect, and the defired 
 Changes may be produced in our Bodies, and the Elements, without 
 doing Violence to Nature, or difturbing the Order eftablifhed by 
 God. Nay it may be provided by a Law, that our Wiffies be thus 
 
 fulfilled: 
 
 * See the Religion of Nature delineate* \ p. 108, \o~).
 
 Of Moral Evil 2 gj 
 
 fulfill'd : and we need not declare how much this Power over exter- 
 nal things granted by free Agents, may tend to raife our Affections, 
 and incline the Wills themfelves. 'Tis very well known how great 
 an Influence the Temperature of the Blood and Motion of the Spi- 
 rits have over thefe. Since then our Bodies are by a Law of Nature 
 capable of being moved by free Agents, at leaft when we defire it, 
 'tis not impoffible but that by the Means of thefe Bodies, they may 
 have Accefs to the Soul ; and though they cannot act upon the 
 Will immediately, yet they may indirectly excite it to exert it own 
 Ads. (97.) 
 
 XII. Tenthly, There's neither any occalion nor room to explain 9?. ,? n c 
 how agreeable this is to Reafon and the Holy Scriptures. Let it fuf- uke S aW ay 
 fice to obferve how large a Field is hereby open'd for Prayer, and how ths abuf ? of 
 effectual it may be for obtaining the Affiftance not only of God him- ^"'he 1 has 
 felf immediately, but alfo of his Minifters. enabled 
 
 Method 
 
 of affifting his Worfhippers. 
 
 It muff be confefs'd that God fometimes relieves the Diftrefs'd,' 
 and when apply 'd to, interpofes in Matters relating to the Will: 
 but thefe things are effected according to the Univerfal Law of Na- 
 ture. And tho' this be fuperior to that which is implanted in the 
 particular Nature of fome Beings ; yet it is no lefs natural with re- 
 gard to the Syftem of Univerfal Nature j neither are we to believe 
 that this is often done, but only in Cafes where a particular Nature 
 cannot be left to itfelf without Detriment to the whole. Nor is 
 God, becaufe he fometimes vouchfafes to interpofe and help the 
 Supplicant, alfo oblig'd entirely to remove the abufe of Free- Will j 
 that is, in reality, to deftroy the Nature itfelf. By a Law of Nature, 
 the Exercife of that Faculty belongs to fuch Agents as arc endow'd 
 
 with 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (97.) That is, as a Man is excited or inclin'd 
 to any thing by a Profpecl of the Pleafure or 
 Pain which may attend the Prolecution or O- 
 miffion of it ; or, as we commonly fay, by 
 another's working upon his Paffions, his Hope 5 , 
 or his Fears : For that fuperior Beings aft up- 
 on us in no other fenfe that their Influence 
 
 confifts only in occafioning pleafant or difa- 
 grceable Ideas in us in reprefenting Argu- 
 ments, Motives, fcrV. to u% may perhaps be 
 gather'd from Note 95. And, I think, it mull 
 oe allow'd that this is very confluent with that 
 Phyfical Indifference, or abfolute Freedom of 
 the Will above defcribed.
 
 264- N 
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 with it, and tho' that Law admit of an Exception, yet it cannot be 
 .quite abrogated, without greater Damage done to the whole than 
 what may happen from the abufe of it. Nor is God obliged, be- 
 caufe Prayers have their Effect with him, to relieve fuch as don't 
 pray to him at all. 
 ThtEMun XIII. Eleventhly, This feems to eftablifh the Efficacy of Prayers 
 ef Prayers much better than their Opinion who hold that all is fix'd by God in 
 counted*/ " a ^ ata ^ Concatenation, and that fuch things as are requeued of God, 
 if all things and feem to be obtain'd, are not in any refpedt owing to the Prayers, 
 be left to ne- but that God has by his Foreknowledge join'd the Actions of the 
 arycaues ' Will with corporeal Motions, in fuch a manner that they mould hap- 
 pen together, but without any other relation to each other than what 
 arifes from his Pre-ordination, as appears in the Agreement between 
 the Index of a Watch and the Sun. 
 
 For inftance : God has pre-ordain'd a Storm from neceffary Caufes, 
 and that fome notorious Offenders mail be failing in it j when they 
 are in danger they fhall repent and pray to God, and at length the 
 Wind fhall ceafe. 
 
 Thus a Calm enfues upon the Prayers of the Petitioners, but with- 
 out any Connection or Dependence on each other, merely by the force 
 of pre-difpofed Caufes, which do not require any Interpofition of the 
 Divine Power. (98.) 
 
 The 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (98.) The foremention'd Hypothefis of a 
 pre-determin'd and neceffary Connexion be- 
 tween Corporeal Motions and the Operation* 
 of the Will, is advanc'd by Leibnitz in what 
 is commonly call'd hj Syftem of the Pre-efta' 
 blips 'd Harmony, which occurs in feveral of his 
 Works, an account of which may be feen in 
 Fabricius*. An Explanation of \tby G.Han fcius 
 may be found in the Prefcnt State of the Republic 
 of Letters, Vol. 4. for Octob. 1729. There are 
 fome Objections againfl: it in BayJe's Diet. 
 Article Rozarius. Rem. L. " -But as the 
 
 whole of it is built upon a Suppofition that 
 the Mind has not a Liberty of Indifference, and 
 of confequence no proper Liberty at all, we 
 need not fpend any time in confuting it, ha- 
 ving, I hope, fufficiently eftablifh'd the con- 
 trary Principle above, and thereby remov'd 
 the Foundation of it. 
 
 Mr. Whifton in particular has efpous'd the 
 Opinion which our Author alludes to, and en- 
 larged upon it in the following Manner f. 
 " Our Imperfection is fuch, that we can only 
 " al pro re nata y can never know beforehand 
 
 " the 
 
 * Dehtlus Argumer.tcrum, &c. p. 387, &:. 
 f New Theory, B. 4. C. 4. Solution 87.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 The Affertors of this Opinion are oblig'd from the common fenfe 
 of Mankind to allow that God is to be invok'd; and that fuch as 
 duly offer up their Prayers have their Requefts granted : but as they 
 are of Opinion that things go by Fate, and that there is no room for 
 Contingency, or a particular Providence,, they have invented this 
 Scheme that there might be, or at leaft might feem to be fome room 
 for Prayers. But all this is to no purpofe : For fince God has made 
 Agents free, and allow'd them the ufe of Liberty, he mull alfo have 
 refcrv'd to himfelf a Liberty of treating them according to what 
 their Nature requires, which cannot be done without a peculiar Pro- 
 vidence, and immediate Interpofition j without thefe no Efficacy will 
 be left to Prayer, no Worfhip to God, no Honour to Religion; For 
 if the Production of thofe things which we requeft depend upon an- 
 tecedent 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *65 
 
 ' the behaviour or actions of Men, neither 
 1 can we forefee what Circumftances and Con- 
 : junctures will happen at any certain time 
 : hereafter. And fo we cannot provide for 
 : fatureEvents, nor prcdifpofe things in fuch 
 a manner chat every one (hall he dealt with, 
 or every thing done, no otherwife than if 
 we were then alive and prefent, we fhould 
 think proper and reasonable, and mould ac- 
 tually do. But in the Divine Operation it 
 is quite otherwife. God's Prefcience ena- 
 bles him to aft after a more fublime man- 
 ner, and by a conftant Courfe of Nature 
 and Chain of mechanical Caufes to do every 
 thing fo as it lhall not be diftinguifhable 
 from a particular Interpofition of his Power, 
 nor be otherwife than on fuch a particular 
 Interpofition would have been brought to 
 pafs. He who has created all things, and 
 given them their feveral Powers and Facul- 
 ties, forefees the Effects of them all j at once 
 looks thro' the entire Chain of Caufes, Ac- 
 tions and Events, and fees at what Periods, 
 and in what manner 'twill be neceffary and 
 expedient to bring about any Changes, be. 
 ltow any Mercies, or inflict any Punifh- 
 
 " ments on the World. Which being unque- 
 " flionably true, 'tis evident he can as well 
 " provide and predifpofe natural Caufes for 
 " thofe Mutations, Mercies or Judgments: he 
 " can as eafily put the Machine into fuch Mo- 
 M tions as fhall, without a Neccffity of his 
 " mending or correcting it, correfpond to all 
 " thefe forefeen Events or Actions, as make 
 " way for fuch Alterations afterwards by gi- 
 *' .ving a random Force to the whole : and 
 ** when thefe two ways are equally poffible, I 
 " need not fay which is moft agreeable to the 
 " Divine Perfections, and moll worthy of 
 * God.'' And again: " * We pray to God 
 M for Fruitful Seafons, for Health, for Peace, 
 " for the Succefs of our Endeavours, for a 
 '* Bleffing on our Food and Phyfick, and de- 
 11 precate the contrary Miferies from us. Yet 
 4C at the fame time we fee the Seafons depend 
 " on the fettled Courfe of the Sun, or other 
 " natural and neceffary Caufes ; we find our 
 " Health or Sicknefs to be the proper Effects 
 '< of our Dyet and Regimen : we obferve Peace 
 '* and War fubject to the Intrigues of Princes, 
 ** and the plain Refults of vifible Conjunctures 
 " inhuman Affairs: we know that worldly 
 
 " Prudence 
 
 * Ibid. Corollary, p. 562. ill Edit. 
 
 M m
 
 1 66 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 tecedent, natural, and neceffiry Caufes, our Defires will be anfwer'd 
 no lefs upon the Omiffion than the offering up of Prayers. Vows 
 and Prayers therefore are made in vain. If it be faid that the Suppli- 
 cants could not omit them, fince they were pre-ordainYj. I anfwer : 
 He that could omit them could not poffibly offer them : his Omiffion 
 therefore is not culpable : And he that is employ 'd in Prayer to God 
 undertakes a fuperfluous Office: for thefe Petitions in reality contri- 
 bute nothing to the Effect, and no reafon can be given why that mould 
 be required which is of no Benefit. (99.) 
 
 XIV. Tis 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 " Prudence and Cunning has a main ftrolce in 
 " the Succefs of Mens Labours: we feel the 
 " advantageous Effects of fome Food and Phy- 
 " fie, and have reafon to believe that the fame 
 " does very much refult from the Goodnefs of 
 " the Drug?, the fitoefs of the Proportion, and 
 '* the Skill of the Phyfician, aj6d can frequent- 
 " ly give a plain and mechanical Reafon of 
 " the different Operation of all thefe things; 
 * neither do we hope for the Exercile of a 
 " miraculous Power in thefe or the like Cafes. 
 " In fhort, " Second Caufes, fays he, will 
 " work according to their Natures, let Mens 
 " Supplications be never fo importunate : and 
 " %o expect a Miracle in anfwer to every Pe- 
 *' tion, is more than the mod religious dare 
 " pretend to." See alfo Mr. Wollafton'% excel- 
 lent Illuilration of this Hypothecs, p. 104. or 
 Dr. Fiddes's Body ef Divinity, 1 ft vol. p. 154. 
 
 We fhall propoie an Anfwer to it in the fol- 
 lowing Note. Let it fuffice at prefent to ob- 
 ferve, that this particular Interpofition of Di- 
 vine Power which our Author contends for, is 
 very improperly filled miraculous, as may be feen 
 from Note 95. and the 6th Paragraph of this 
 Subfection. 
 
 (99.) Tho this Anfwer is very folid, and may 
 by fome perhaps be thought fufficient ; yet, as 
 the Point before us is of the greateft Impor- 
 tance; fince wrong Notions concerning it 
 caufe Perplexities which difturb the Minds of 
 
 the Scheme of Providence fo elaborately dif- 
 play'd by this Author_wi)l not, I fear, help to 
 clear them as he here promifes, but rather oc- 
 caflon worfe ; on thefe accounts it will not be 
 improper to give a fuller Confutation of it from 
 fuch Authors as endeavour to prove that the 
 foremen tion'd Scheme of Providence is both 
 impofhble in itfelf, and attended with Confe- 
 quences deftructive of the very Notion of 
 Prayer, and moft other Duties of Religion. 
 '* The Abettors of the mechanical Hypothefis,f 
 " fays Dr. Jctikin, argue, that he is the belt 
 '* Artift who can contrive an Engine that fhall 
 *' need the leaft meddling with after itis made. 
 " But it ought to be confider'd what the Na- 
 " ture of the Engine is, and what the ends and 
 " ufes of it are ; and if the Nature of it be 
 M fuch that it cannot anfwer the Ends for 
 " which it was framed, without fometimes an 
 " affifting hand, it would be no point of Wif- 
 " dom in the Artificer, for the Credit of his 
 " Contrivance, to lofe the moft ufeful Ends 
 11 defign'd by it. As if, among other ufes, this 
 " curious Engine were defign'd to reward the 
 " good, and punifh bad Men ; to remove the 
 " Punifhment upon Amendment, and to renew 
 ' it upon a relapfe : fince brute Matter is inca- 
 " pable of varying its Motion, and fuiting it- 
 " felf to the feveral States and Changes of 
 4< free Agents, he muft aflift it, unlefs he will 
 *' lofe the chief End for which it is to ferve, 
 
 moft Men, as Mr. Whijlon obferves *; and fince.** It is no defect in the Skill and Wifdom of 
 
 ' "the 
 
 * New Theory, p. j6z. 
 + Reafonailenefs of CbriJUanity, 2d vol. p. 218. 5th Edit.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 267 
 
 XIV. Tis fcare poffible for one who reads this not to think of that 
 famous Difficulty, viz. how the Contingency of things can be confi- ^tLTthh 
 ftent with the Divine Prefcience : Neither is it proper to meddle with isnotrepug- 
 it in this Place : For it would require a whole Book. Let it fuffice JJvinefy/ 
 to give a hint, that the Solution of it depends upon confidering xhe/dend 
 
 M m 2 Manner 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 ** the Almighty, that Matter and Motion have 
 " not Free Will as Men have; but it would 
 " be a great defeft in his Wifdom not 
 u to make them the Inftruments of Rewards 
 '* and Punifhments, becaufe it is impoflible for 
 " them of themfelves to apply and fuit them- 
 " felves to the feveral States and Conditions 
 " of Free Agents. The Nature of Matter and 
 " Motion is fuch, that they cannot ferve all 
 " the Defigns of their Crettor, without his 
 " Interpofition, and therefore he conftantly 
 " doth interpofe according to a certain Tenor 
 " which he hath prefcrib'd to himfelf," And 
 again, " * We may well fuppofe that God 
 " has as much Regard to his Wifdom in his 
 " Government of the Moral as of the Material 
 " part of the Creation ; and yet he has added 
 " fupplemental Laws to enforce the Moral 
 " Laws, and thefe additional Laws have been 
 " chang'd as the Condition and Circumftanccs 
 " of Men requir'd. Why then fhould the 
 " Laws of the Material World be fo much 
 " more facred, as that he fhould never inter- 
 *' meddle with them ? He aflifts Mo/al A- 
 " gents with the continual Supplies of his 
 " Grace, and Natural Agents with that Help 
 " which is needful for them to perform his 
 " Will : God may halten and aflift natural 
 " Caufes upon our Prayers, he may quicken 
 " the Motions, and enforce the Powers of Na- 
 " ture, and remove fecret Impediments, to 
 ** help and make way for natural Operations ; 
 " or he may fufpend or retard natural Cau- 
 " fes, &c. 
 
 He proceeds to a particular Examination of 
 the Pri-ejlablijh'd Order in p. 221. which he 
 oppofcs with much the fame Arguments as thefe 
 thit follow frcm Dr. Tiddes\. " As to the 
 
 " Opinion of thofe who fay, God upon the 
 " Forefight of the Prayers of Men to him, dif- 
 44 pofed the Order of things in fuch a manner, 
 ** that what they pray for lhall happen, or 
 " what they deprecate be averted, this is alto- 
 44 gether inconceivable; or rather, in the Na- 
 " ture of things, fuppoling Men free Agents, 
 44 impoflible. For tho' God does forefee which 
 " way Men will aft, yet nothing upon the 
 11 Mechanical Hypothefis can follow from his 
 ** Aftion, but according to the Laws of Me- 
 " chanifm. In cafe any one, for inflance, 
 " fhould pray to be deliver'd from the danger 
 
 * of fome infeftious or peftilentious Diftem- 
 " per, the Vapour whereby 'tis propagated, 
 " will, notwithftanding, purfue its natural 
 1,4 Courfe, and produce its EfFeft wherever ic 
 * falls upon a proper Subjeft ; it can make no 
 ** manner of Diflinftion between him that fa- 
 " crijiath and him that facrificeth not. God 
 *J may indeed, by fome fecret Impulfe on the 
 " Mind of Man, which yet he is at Liberty 
 ** to follow, be the ocofion of diverting him 
 " from the Scope of its Motion ; or perhaps, 
 w on fome extraordinary Exigence, by an in- 
 M vifible Power, retard, accelerate, or obftruft 
 " its Courfe; but ftill, if all things operate 
 u mechanically, whether Men pray or no, it 
 " will unavoidably have its proper Effeft. 
 ** There is another Cafe wherein the Motives 
 w to Prayer, if all things come to pals by the 
 41 flx'd Laws of Mechanifm, appear ftill more 
 44 evidently groundlefs. A Man in the Heat 
 44 of Battle, prays that God would preferve 
 44 him from the Inftruments of Death, which 
 
 44 fly every where about him ; yet a Ball from 
 44 a Cannon or a Mufquet will neceffarily pur* 
 44 fuc the line of iu direction; it depends* 
 
 " however 
 
 p. 220. 
 
 f 7beol. Spec. B. 3. Part 2. C. 4. p. 292.
 
 258 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 Manner by which we apprehend the things of God. (ioo.) He that 
 understands that manner rightly will never flick at this Difficulty. 
 
 The 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 { 
 
 " however on the choice of Man, whether he 
 " will give it fucha particular Diredtion as by 
 M the natural tendency of it will take away the 
 " Life of the Perfon who deprecates the Dan- 
 " ger wherewith he finds himfelf furrounded. 
 " In this Cafe it is impoflible, upon any fore 
 " fight of his Prayers, that the order of Cau- 
 " fes, which are in themfelves of arbitrary and 
 M uncertain Determination, fhouidbe difpos'd 
 M after fuch a manner as certainly to produce 
 " the defired Effect of them." Concerning 
 the Impoffibility of adapting a fix'd and immu- 
 table Law to the State and Condition of Free 
 or mutable Agents, fee B. 2. Part 1. p. 154. 
 
 Laftly : ** It is of great ufe to us (fays Dr. 
 " Sherlock -}-) to underftand this which teaches 
 " us what we may expect from God, and what 
 " we muft attribute to him in the Government 
 " of Nature. We muft not expect in ordina- 
 " ry Cafes that God Ihould reverfe the Laws 
 ** of Nature for us ; that if we leap into the 
 " Fire it fhall not burn us ; or into the Wa- 
 " ter it fhall not drown us : and by the fame 
 " reafon, the Providence of God is not con- 
 ' cern'd to preferve us when we deftroy our- 
 " felves by Intemperance and Luft : for God 
 '* does not work Miracles to deliver Men from 
 u the evil Effects of their own Wickednefs : 
 " But all the kind Influences of Heaven which 
 " fupply our Wants, and fill our Hearts with 
 ** Food and Gladnefs, are owing to that good 
 " Providence which commands Nature to 
 " yield her Increafe; and thofe Diforders of 
 " Nature which afflifl the World with Fa- 
 " mines, Peftilence and Earthquakes, are the 
 " Effects of God's Anger and Difpleafure, and 
 " are order'd by him for the Puniftiment of a 
 *' wicked World. We muft all believe this, 
 *' or confefs that we mock God, when we blefs 
 ** him for a healthful Air and fruitful Seafons, 
 " or deprecate his Anger when we fee vifible 
 " Tokens of his Vengeance in the Diforders 
 u of Nature. For did not God immediate- 
 " ly intcrpofe in the Government of Na- 
 
 *' ture, there would be no reafon to beg his 
 " Favour or deprecate his Anger upon thefe 
 " accounts." And to the fame purpofe he 
 urges, p. 71. That without this Belief, that 
 God takes a particular Care of all his Crea- 
 tures in the Government of all Events that 
 can happen to them (which Belief appears to 
 be impofiible upon the Mechanical Hypotbef.s) 
 there is no reafon or pretence for m oft of the 
 particular Duties of Religious Worfhip, as is 
 fully proved in the fame place. See alfo C. 9. 
 Concerning the true Notion, as well as the Rca- 
 fmablenefi and NectJJity of Prayer, fee p. 381. ib. 
 (100.) He means the Scheme of Analogy, 
 concerning which fee his Note E> We have 
 given our Notion of the Word Prefcience in 
 Note 18. X e. fee alfo Mr. Jackfon on Human 
 Liberty, p. 62. But tho' we cannot perhaps- 
 determine the precife manner of God's know- 
 ing the free Acts of Men, yet we are certain 
 that he does and muft always know them : 
 fince otherwife he would know many things 
 now which he did not know once, and confe- 
 quently his Omnifcience or Infinite Knowledge 
 would receive addition from Events which (as 
 we have made appear in Xe.) is contrary to 
 the true Notion of Infinity. This general Argu- 
 ment drawn from God's infinite or perfeel 
 Knowledge, feems to me the only one which 
 can come near to a Proof that he muft always 
 have a compleat and equal Knowledge of fuch 
 actions as are in themfelves abfolutely con- 
 tingent, as all thofe evidently are which de- 
 pend upon the Free-Will of the Creature. 
 Thefe actions (as we formerly obferv'd) may 
 properly be call'd Future with refpect to us or 
 other Men, and the Knowledge of them in 
 the fame refpect be (tiled Fore -Knowledge. But 
 with regard to the Deity, whofe Exiftence and 
 Attributes can have no relation to time, i. e. to 
 which nothing can be at a diftance, I think, 
 the Expreflion is abfurd ; and we muft necef- 
 farily either admit the fore-men tion'd abfurdity 
 
 of 
 
 f Qn Providence, p. 38. 1 ft Edit.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 The Reader may obferve, that in 'this and other Places, I interfperfe 
 fbme things which belong to Revealed Religion, contrary to what I 
 intended at firft ; which happen'd becaufe fome Objections feem'd to 
 arife from reveal'd Religion, in oppofition to the Principles and Ar- 
 guments here laid down. Since therefore 1 had determin'd to pro- 
 duce nothing but what was perfectly agreeable to the Articles of 
 Faith, and the Principles of the Chriftian Religion, I found it necef- 
 fary to call in the Scripture to my Afiiftance, that the Anfwer might 
 come from the fame Quarter with the Objections. 
 
 One that knows nothing of Reveal'd Religion cannot bring thefe 
 Objections ; one that does not believe it has no right to urge them. 
 For if he be fenfible that the Objections are of any force, he muft 
 of neceffity alfo admit the Solutions, fince both of them depend 
 upon the fame Authority. (101.) 
 
 69 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 of fuppofmg his Knowledge limited, or elfe 
 allow that all things are at all times equally in 
 his view; and confequently that Knowledge, 
 as in him, hath nothing to do with fore and 
 sfter. 
 
 If we admit this Notion of things being al- 
 ways prefent to God, tho' fucceffive to us, 
 which feems to be the only way of conceiving 
 how Contingencies can poflibly be Objefts of 
 any Knowledge ; If this, 1 fay, be allow'd, 
 then all things, a&ions, cirV. which can pro- 
 perly be faid to exift, will be equally proper 
 Qbj(Rs of God's Knowledge, fince he is here- 
 by fuppofed not to know them in fieri, or in 
 their Caufe ; but in e/j[e, or in their aftual Exi- 
 fience. Which at the fame time gives us the 
 Medium of their being knowable, viz. Their 
 real Exiflence; and makes it as eafy for us to 
 imagine how God fhould always know them, 
 as how we mould ever know a thing when it is 
 immediately prcfented to us. 
 
 *Tis fubmitted to the Reader, whether this 
 
 old Notion of the Schoolmen be not ftill the 
 bell we are able to frame upon the prefent 
 Subjeft. 
 
 (101.) This general Argument lies againtt 
 all thofe who bring Objections from the Scrip- 
 ture Account of the Creation, Fall, ci/V. viz. 
 either thy believe the Truth and Divine Au- 
 thority of thofe Books, or they do not ; if 
 they do, then they muft believe them alfo when 
 they declare that all the Works of God are ho- 
 ly and juft and good j and confequently that 
 the foremention'd Difficulties are no real Ar 
 guments againft the Divine Attributes : if they 
 do not; then the whole falls to the Ground. 
 For to admit one part of an account and re- 
 ject the other, when both depend upon the 
 fame Authority, is evidently unreasonable. 
 
 Objections therefore drawn from the Scrip- 
 ture account of thefe Matters can but be mere 
 Arguments ad bominetn at beft: and are of 
 no force either to make or juftify an Unbe- 
 liever. 
 
 SUBSECT
 
 ljo Of Moral Evil 
 
 SUBSECT, V. 
 
 Why God does not tranjlate Man to fome other Place, 
 "where nothing "would occur that could tempt him to 
 choofe amifs. 
 
 I. / M *IS plain, that in the prefent State of things it is impoflible 
 2me Is If It A ^ or ^an to ** ve w i tn ut natural Evils, or the danger of 
 
 were ask'd, erring. 'Tis a common Queftion, why does not God change this 
 
 Wh t y ?ve d th e d ^ tate > anc * tran ^ ate Man t0 ^ ome other, where all Occafions of Er- 
 Earth to be ror, and Incitements to Evil being cut off, he might choofe only 
 inhabited byG ooc j. i % e% j n reality, Why has he placed Man upon the Earth? 
 onV^ rUteS ^ky did he not leave it to be inhabited by the Brutes alone? There 
 are fome perhaps who expect fuch things as thefe from the Divine 
 Goodnefs, but without any Senfe or Reafon j fince it manifestly ap- 
 pears to be better that we mould contend with the prefent Evils, 
 than that the Earth mould be void of all rational Inhabitants. (102.) 
 
 fome 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 ... -, -_ ._ j t _ - ~~ - 
 
 is, i. e. confifting of a Soul and a Body, this ders as could be conceiv'd to exift between 
 World was a proper place for him. To the himfelf and nothing: or fo long as Exiftence 
 Queftion, Why fhould he be made of fuch a in the very loweft Order might be a Benefit 
 Nature as denominates him Man, or placed in either to the Beings of that Order, or to thofe 
 this lower Clafs of Beings ? a fufficient An- ' of fome other. The Confequence of which is, 
 fwer is given in Note 35. where, I think, it' that we muft either have been placed in the 
 is render'd probable, that the fame Goodnefs Clafs we are in at prefent, or no where, fince 
 which excited the Deity to create Beings of by the Suppofition every other Clafs is full, 
 the higheft Order, would induce him both to ; And there will appear fufficient reafon for our 
 create as many of that Order as could commo- J being created in this Order, and placed where 
 dioufly exift together, or be confiftent with the I we are, rather than not created at all, provided 
 
 that
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 Some make it a Qtfeftion, why fo great a Part of the Earth is given 
 a'' ay to the Brutes j but tbefe Men would have it all left to 'em j 
 and Mankind itfelf extinct 
 
 II. We hive often declared that Evils are chiefly to be avoided, 
 nay that they are prohibited by God, becaufe they are prejudicial to 
 human Nature, but how much worfe would it be to take that Na- 
 ture enrirely away? They therefore who require this of the Divine 
 Goodnefs, defire the greateft Evil of all as a Remedy for E- 
 vils. The fame Perfons alfo, that with fuch Earneftnefs defire a 
 Change of their Condition, are afraid of Death, forgetting that 
 this Change of their Condition is what they dread the moft of all 
 in Death. 
 
 III. Mankind believes indeed from the Light of Nature, that God 
 will tranflate good Men into a better State, but it is necerTary that they 
 mould be prepared here, as Plants in a Nurfery, before they be re- 
 moved into the Garden where they are to bear Fruit. God has 
 therefore decreed this Life to be as it were the PafTage to a better. 
 Thus this Earth is replenifti'd with Inhabitants, who being educa- 
 ted under Difcipline for a while, till they have finim'd their Courfe, 
 mall depart into another State fuited to their Deferts. They who 
 find fault with this in God, feem to me to do the fame as if one 
 who is ignorant of Agriculture and Harveft mould laugh at the 
 
 Sower 
 
 271 
 
 God in due 
 time will 
 tranflate 
 good Men to 
 a better flate, 
 but the pre- 
 fent is as ne- 
 ceflary as 
 Seed-time is 
 to Harveft. 
 
 This istotal- 
 lyextirpating> 
 Mankind. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 th.it Exiftence be a Bleflings to us, or that we 
 receive in general more Happinefs than Mifery 
 in this prefent State: which point will be 
 confider'd in the next Subie&ton. 
 
 Tint thefe feveral Clafles may be fuppofed 
 to advance gradually towards Perfection, and 
 of confequence that we in time may be remo- 
 ved into fome better State, fee Note 30. 
 
 Thefe Confidentions will fupply us with an 
 Anfvrer to Bay/e's Objeftion againft what our 
 Author advances in this Paragraph. " This 
 " (fays he) is juft like as if a King ihould con- 
 " fine feveral of his Subjefls in his Dungeons, 
 *' till they were 60 Years old, becaufe thefe 
 
 I" Dungeons would otherwife be empty. But 
 to make any likenefs at all in thefe two Cafes, 
 it muft be made appear in .the firlt place, that 
 we really meet with more Evil of all kinds 
 than Good in this World ; and confequently, 
 that it were better for us to be out of it than 
 in it: contrary to what our Author has proved 
 in Ch. 2. par. 7. Ch 4. .8. par. 7. and in the 
 following Subfeftion: and fecondly, it muft 
 be fhewn alfo, that we might have been placed 
 in fome better World, without any Inconve- 
 nience to the re/} of the U/ir. r'e, contrary to 
 what -may be concluded from the former Part 
 of this Note, and that other to which it refers.
 
 73 Of Moral Evil 
 
 J x 
 Sower for throwing away his Corn. For there is no doubt but the 
 prefent State of things is as neceflary, not only to the Earth left it 
 (hould be void of Inhabitants, and to the Animals, which for the 
 moft part depend upon the Labours of Men, but alfo to Men them- 
 felves: and as requifite in the Divine Adminiftration, in order to 
 fome better Life, as Seed-time is to Harveft. (103.) 
 
 SUBSECt 
 
 N ? E S. 
 
 (103.) Sayle objcfts, that our Author's com- 
 parifon here is not a juft one, fince God can- 
 not be ty'd to the ufe of common means, and 
 a flow Progrefs of fecond Caufes. He is not 
 obliged to nurfe us up as a Gardener does his 
 Plants, but might as well have produced us 
 adult and ripe in Perfection, and have made 
 us happy at once. But perhaps it may appear 
 a little doubtful to a Perfon who attentively 
 confiders Note 30, whether this could be done 
 even in natural Pleafure. However, I think, 
 'tis abfolutely inconceivable how it Ihould be 
 effected in Moral Happinefs. If we confider 
 the Nature of Virtue and of Man, it will not 
 be poflible for us to imagine how this could 
 be implanted in him at firft, or infufed into him 
 afterwards, or he be in any wife made moral- 
 ly perfect or good on a fudden. The Idea of 
 Virtue confifts in a repetition of free Acls, and 
 therefore it cannot be receiv'd faffively. and 
 tho' the Difpofition might be thus communi- 
 .cated, yet to compleat its Nature, and make 
 it actually productive of true moral Happi- 
 nefs, there muft necefiarily be rcquir'd due 
 time for Exercife, Experience and confirmed 
 Habits, as may be gather' d from the Prelimi- 
 nary Dijfertation ; and will farther appear from 
 Notes 1 06 and 108. 
 
 From the Nature of Man alfo, or a Being 
 in his imperfect State, we may fairly infer, 
 that he could not have fo great an Idea of the 
 moral Perfections of the Deity, nor fo clear 
 an apprehenfion of the contrary Qualities, nor 
 
 confequently, a fuitable afFettion for the one, 
 and an abhorrence of the other, if he had not 
 fome experience of both *. 
 
 We know not the real Value of a good 
 thing, we cannot be duly fenfible of its Ex- 
 cellence, except we have been in fome meafure 
 acquainted with its Oppofite, or at leaft have 
 perceiv'd the want of it on fome occafion. 
 " Does any one (fays Leibnitz f) fufficiently 
 " relifh the Happinefs of good Health who 
 " has never been fick ? Is It not moft times 
 " neceflary that a little Evil fhould render a 
 " Good more fenfible, and confequently grea- 
 " ter?'' See alfo Note 30. The fame holds 
 I ftronger ftill in Moral Good : which is a con- 
 . firmation of the Alternative that LaBantius 
 ' fpeaks of |l; and which is well defcrib'd by 
 \JL Gelliusff. It does not therefore feem pof- 
 j fible for us to have a due Knowledge of Virtue 
 if we never had feen Vice. Without this 
 Knowledge of Virtue, we could not ardently 
 defire it, without fuch a defire, and a fedulous 
 profecution of that defire, we could not attain 
 to the proper exercife of it, and without this 
 attainment we could not have any confciouf- 
 nefs of defert, any comfortable felf-approba- 
 tion, or true Moral Happinefs. 
 
 It appears then that Virtue is an Act of our 
 .own, that a Series of thefe Als is requifite to 
 conftitute an habit of Virtse, and of confe- 
 quence that this cannot be infpired into any 
 Being, or however not produced tn one of our 
 weak frame on a fudden : and in the laft place, 
 
 that 
 
 * Zee Note 90. f Memoirs of Literature, v. 3. Art. 2c. 
 
 \ De Ira Dei, .13; ftft. fub fin. and 15.. ft B. 6. Ch. 
 
 118.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 273 
 
 S U B S E C T. VI. 
 
 Concerning the Scarcity of Hafpy Terfons, and the Gene* 
 ral Corruption of Mankind. 
 
 I. DUT it may feem ftrange, that of fo great a Multitude of Men, s ob . 
 
 3 fo few mould attain to Happinefs. For whether that be fup- tions propo^ 
 pofed to arife from the fruition of fuch things as are agreeable to fe . d conccr- 
 the natural Appetites, or from free Elections, 'tis manifeft, that not "ityVfHap* 
 even one of a hundred thoufand is truly happy. In vain then do we py Perfons. 
 enquire about the Means which lead to Happinefs ; the Power of E- 
 lection is beftow'd on Man to no purpofe, fince it fo rarely attains 
 the end for which it was imparted. 
 
 II. Secondly, The far greater part of Mankind neglecting this That the 
 Power of pleafing themfelves in Elections, or rather, to confefs thep w . ero / E - 
 truth, not in the leaft obferving that they have it, or that Happinefs ^g^"^ not 
 is to be expected from the ufe of it; give themfelves up entirely to 
 the Government of their natural Appetites and Senfes, and are plain- 
 ly hurried on according to the Impetus and Direction of the Animal 
 
 Nature^ 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 that this prefent State is neceflary (as our fta- 
 thor toys) to train us up, and fit us for a bet- 
 ter. That this Life Is properly a State of 
 '7oWand Probation, and the Virtues of it ab- 
 solutely neceffary to the Happinefs of the next, 
 ice Ryu?)-'* General Reprtjtntati.n of TteVtaTd 
 Religion, Part 2. Ch. 3. p. 385, c^V. and Sectfs 
 Clnjiinn Life, Vol. 2. Ch 4. ^.3. p. 3 2 1.3 5$, 
 L'c 8vo. and Sbnlock on Death, C.I. V3- 
 P 77, t<- 4th Edit. 
 
 N 
 
 To the fame purpofe is that excellent Paper 
 in the Sprtttifor, N. 447. " The raft ufe I 
 /hall make of this remarkable Pioperty in 
 41 human Nature, of being delighted withthofe 
 " Aclions to which it is accnltonVd, is to fhew 
 * how abfolutely nccelfary it is for us to gain 
 " habits of Virtue in thi.-Life.if we would enjoy 
 the pleafurcsof the next.ThcSraie of Blifs we 
 4 * call Heaven will not be capable of affecting 
 11 thoicMinds which .ire no' thu-nualify'd for it ; 
 
 we 
 
 n
 
 bgio 
 
 274 Of Moral Evil 
 
 Nature as much as Brute?. If therefore we have this Power in us, 
 it feems to be given us in vain, i. e. to fuch as neither ufe it, nor are 
 conicious that they have it. 
 
 III. Thirdly, Hence all Mankind lie polluted and immers'd in 
 
 That there is T7 . , xxr - , , r , , * . , , 
 
 nuniverC] vice and Wickednels ; and tis not one or two, but everyone, that 
 Corruption, deviates from the right ufe of Election. How can thefe things be re- 
 concii'd with the Care and Providence of an infinitely good and 
 powerful God ? . 
 , IV. I confefs, that this Corruption of Manners, and almoft univer 
 anfwer'd hy &1 Deviation from the way to Happinefs, is better folv'd from Re- 
 reveai-d R<t- veal'd than Natural Religion, and that the neceffity of a Revelation 
 is from hence rightly proved. For fince the true Caufe which gave 
 rife to this is a matter of Fact, viz. the Fall of the firffc Man, it 
 cannot be difcover'd merely by the Strength of Reafon ; but we itand 
 in need of Hijiorical Tradition to tranimit this, as well as other mat- 
 ters of Fact, down to us. But tho' there had been none fuch, and 
 we were ignorant of the Fall of the Firft Man, yet we fhould have 
 been furniih'd with a proper, tho' not fo clear an Anfwer, fince the 
 Mifery or Corruption of Mankind tho' really lamentable, yet is not fo 
 great but that it may be reconciled with the good Providence of 
 God. 
 
 V. For as to the firft Objection taken from the fewnefs of them 
 ormodenue that attain to Happinefs, we may reply that Happinefs is two-fold, 
 Happinefs. perfeEi and abfolute^ or moderate and partial. I call that perfect which 
 anfwers in every refpect to our Wifhes, and that moderate which, 
 
 tho' 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Many attain 
 
 ** we muft in this World- gain a Relifli of 
 *' Truth and Virtue, if we would be able to 
 " tafle that Knowledge and Perfection which 
 *' are to make us happy in the next. The feeds 
 " of thofe Spiritual Joys and Raptures which 
 " ztc to rife up and flourifh in the Soul to all 
 " Eternity muft be planted in her during this 
 ' her prefent State of Probation. In ftiort, 
 " Heaven is not to be Jook'd upon only as the 
 *' Reward, but as the natural EfFeft of a Reli- 
 " gious Life." See alfo Tillotfoti's Serm. ift 
 vol. Pol. r>. 51, 82, 85, &c. and the 78thSerm. 
 
 2d vol. p. 591. Concerning the true End of 
 Man, and the Means of obtaining it, and the 
 Nature both of thofe Virtues which will con- 
 ftitute the greateft part of Heaven, and of 
 thofe Infiratnental Duties by which we are to 
 acquire, improve, and perfeft thefe Heavenly 
 Virtues, or make our own Heaven, fee Scott's 
 incomparable Treatife of the Cbriftian Life, 
 vol. 1. particularly Ch. 3. which Notion is al- 
 fo well defended by Dr. Rymer in the Chap, a- 
 bove mention'd. See alfo Dr. Laugbttri's, Serm. 
 on Ram. 6. 23.
 
 Of Moral Evd. 
 
 tho' it does not equal our Defires, yet is not quite deftitute of agree- 
 able Enjoyments, with which Life being accompanied, and fweeten'd 
 as it were by the Mitigation of its Evils, and the Alleviation of its 
 Cares, becomes a Bleffing, and worth a prudent Man's Choice. As 
 to the former, 'tis certain that it cannot fall to the Lot of any Man 
 in this prefent State, nor is it a Debt due from God to a Creature> 
 tho' never fo innocent. Since the Condition of Men is, and muft ne- 
 cefTarily be fuch (while we inhabit this Earth in its prefent State) as 
 will by no means admit of this abfolutely perfect Happinefs. For 
 Pains, Griefs, and the reft of thofe which we call natural Evils, can- 
 not, as things now ftand, be totally avoided, but by the preternatural 
 Favour of the Deity. The Earth then muft either be left deftitute 
 f Inhabitants, or we muft take up with a moderate fliare of Happi- 
 nefs; this alfo is a Gift worthy of God, and fit to be accepted and 
 embrae'd by Man, Neither is this a rare Felicity, and which hap- 
 pens to few Men ; for all may enjoy it, and moft actually do ; efpe- 
 cially if they will make a prudent ufe of their Elections. For if 
 there be any bitter thing in Life, it generally flows from depravad 
 Elections, and by a right ufe of thefe, any thing which creates un- 
 eaiinefs, or can make us weary of Life, might be mitigated or re- 
 mov'd. To conclude, tho' we complain of the Miferies of Life, yet 
 we are unwilling to part with it, which is a certain Indication that 
 it is not a burden to us, and that not fo few attain this moderate 
 Happinefs, as the Objection would inlimsate. (104.) 
 
 N n 2 VI. As 
 
 75 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (ic.f) To calculate whether the Sum of 
 Happinefs in this World exceed the Sum of 
 Mifcry, Upon the whole, would be an endlefs 
 piece of Work, and what no Man perhaps is 
 nble precifely to determine : I Diall therefore 
 only produce the Opinion of one or two Au- 
 thors on the Queftion, which may fcrve at 
 lead to confront the Teflimony fo often and 
 . fo hugely repeated by B.i)'e in all his Works. 
 
 w I am fure (fays Dr. Sherlock f\ we are rc- 
 " ry ungrateful to Almighty God jf wedo not 
 " acknowledge that bountiful Provifion which 
 he has made for the Happinefs of ManJiml 
 " in this World. For what is wanting on 
 " God's part to make Man as happy as he can be 
 " here ? We want no fenfc which is ufeful to 
 " Life ? wc want no Objects to gr.uifie thofe 
 " Senfes, and which is very confiderablc, the 
 
 " moft 
 
 + Oft Prcv'uUiia, Ch. 7. p. Z43^ *d Edit.
 
 a^6 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 VI. As to the fecond thing objected, viz. that moft: of us are either 
 ufe of"thU ig norant or regardlefs of this Power of pleafing ourfelves by Elec- 
 Elcftive tion; upon a thorough Enquiry it will be manifeft, that the ufe of 
 Power tho' t hj s Power is neither difrcgarded, nor fo rare as might appear at firft 
 observe it. Sight. I own there are few who take notice of this in themfelves, 
 or obferve, that the Pleafure which they feel in acting arifes from the 
 Exercife of it. But neverthelefs they do excrcife it, and tafte the Plea- 
 fure arifing therefrom. And the fame thing feems to befal us in the 
 Exercife of this Power which happens in fome Organs of Senfe, tho' 
 we are entirely ignorant which they are, or of what kind, yet we 
 ufe them, and by the ufe of them perceive external things. Thus 
 we pleafe ourfelves in choofing, tho' we are not aware that things 
 pleafe us becaufe they are chofen. Now that this is fo will be evi- 
 dent, if we examine thofe things which afford Pleafure to both young 
 and old, wife as well as foolifh. For if the far greater part of them 
 have no manner of Connection with the natural Appetites, nor with 
 the Neceffities of Nature, it will appear that they have pleafed us 
 no otherwife than by virtue of Election. Let us weigh the trifles of 
 Children, and the ferious Affairs of Men ; the Temerity of Fools, and 
 the Counfels of the Wife j and it will be evident almoft in all of 
 them, that they pleafe by Election only * This, among other things, 
 
 may 
 
 NOTE $, 
 
 " moft ufeful, and ncceffary, and delightful tc rich. Thefe indeed at beft are but mean 
 Obje&s, are moft common, and fuch as ] '* Pleasures, the Pleafures of Senfe, which are 
 
 " the loweft a ieafonable Soul is capable of; 
 
 ** Mankind pretty equally fhare in. There is 
 " not fuch a mighty Difference as fome Men 
 * imagine, between the Poor and the Rich : 
 " in Pomp, and Shew, and Opinion, there is 
 *' a great deal, but little as to the true Plea- 
 '* fures and Satisfactions of Life : they enjoy 
 *'. the fame Earth, and Air, and Heavens; 
 " Hunger and Thirft makes the poor Man's 
 ** Meat and Drink as pleafant and relifhing as 
 " all the Varieties which cover a rich Man's 
 " Table : and the Labour of a poor Man is 
 * more healthful, and many times more plea- 
 *' {ant too, than the Eafe and foftnefs of the 
 
 " but yet they are fo entertaining, that the ge- 
 nerality of Mankind think it worth living 
 w to enjoy them. And yet there are mote no- 
 *' ble aad divine Pleafures which Men may en- 
 44 joy in this World ; fuch as gratify the no- 
 " bier Faculties of the Soul, the Pleafures of 
 " Wifdom and Knowledge, of Virtue and Re- 
 " ligion ; to know and worfhip God, to con- 
 " template the Art and Beauty and Perfection 
 41 of his Works, and to do Good to Men. 
 " Thefe indeed are Pleafures that do not make 
 41 us very fond of. the Body, nor of this World; 
 
 " for 
 
 Ste mere of this in Sett. I. Subfeft. 5. par. 11, 12, &c.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 may appear from the Diverfions of Cards and Dice. Nothing is 
 more agreeable to all, or pleafes more ; but upon no other accounr, 
 if we examine ic thoroughly, than becaufe we will be thus em- 
 ploy *d. ' ( 
 
 Nay that dire Luft of Rule which bewitches mortal Minds, and 
 tranfports them beyond themfelves, which cannot be fatisfy'd un- 
 lefs the whole World be fubdued, and even not then; this nei- 
 ther receives its Origin nor Approbation from Nature or any innate 
 Appetite. 
 
 But the force of Election is never more apparent than in fome 
 Men's infatiable Avarice, and continual Study to heap up unprofita- 
 ble Riches, for no ufe, no end, but to fatisfy their Choice. Behold 
 the covetous Man brooding over his Gold; a Curfe to his Relations, 
 a Jefl to his Neighbours, a Reproach to Nature ; depriving himfelf 
 of Food, Sleep, Reft, and other Neceflaries, and yet applauding him- 
 felf ftill. Why do thefe tilings pleafe which are fo unnatural, fo 
 abfurd, fo prepofterous ? This is felt, this is purfu'd, tho\ he that 
 does this be not confcious that he is doing it, neither obferves what 
 it is which pleafes him. It is not therefore the Direction of the 
 Senfes, or the Impulfe of Animal Nature only, which tranfports us 
 into Vices and unlawful Acts; thefe are commonly done againft the 
 
 Remonftrance 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 " for they do not arife from the Body, nor 
 " are they confin'd to this World. We have 
 " rafon to hope, that when we get loofe 
 ** from thefe Bodies, our intellectual Facul 
 " ties will be vaftly improv'd ; that we fhall 
 *\ know God after another manner than we 
 ** now do ; and difcover new and brighter 
 " Glories which are conceal'd from Mortal 
 " Eyes ; but yet the Pleafures of Knowledge, 
 u and Wifdom, and Religion in this World, 
 " are very great and ravifhing, and therefore 
 " we either do or may enjoy at prefent fuch 
 " Pleafures as make Life very defirable : Were 
 " there no other nor happier State after this, I 
 
 " World, and live as long as we can here, to 
 * enjoy the Pleafures and Satisfactions which 
 ** may be enjoy'd in this Life." 
 
 An Explication of Eccl. Ch. 4. v. 2, 3. may 
 be found in the fame excellent Chapter, fee al- 
 fo p. 225. 
 
 LeiknitZ) EJfais de Theodicee *. " It will 
 ** be faid, that Evils are very great and nume- 
 M rous if compar'd with good things ; but it 
 " is a Miftake; Want of Attention is the on- 
 '* ly thing that lefTens our Happinefs ; and 
 " 'tis necefTary that this Attention mould be 
 " rais'd by a mixture of Evih Let us fupply 
 " by Reflection what is wanting to our Percep- 
 yet it were very defirable to come into this J" tion, to be more fenfiblc of our Happinefs. 
 
 " Were 
 
 Mtmoirs of Literature^ V. 3. p. 118.
 
 $*}% Of Mwcd Evil 
 
 Remonflrance of thofe Appetites Which are implanted by Nature,agamil 
 the Remonftrance of Senfe and Initincl:, no lefs than Reafon, and th.2 
 lealt Crime we commit is in obeying them. We may learn then, to our 
 great Misfortune, that we are not entirely driven by the Impetus of A- 
 nimal Nature^ and that this Power of pleafing ourfelves by Election 
 does not lie idle ; but rather that it is the too great and inordinate 
 nfe of it which tranfports us into Wickednefs. 
 El-aioiis ^ ^ s * ^* "*^ Objedion, viz. that the Corruption of Man- 
 
 produce the kind is almoft univerfal\ it is to be obferv'd in the nrft. place, that 
 fame eftea in Ei ec ^i ons produce the fame eifeft in the Moral, as Motion does in 
 WoridasMo- r ^ e Natural World ; neither is it any more to be expected, that in 
 tion does in our prefertt State all Elections iliould.be confident and uniform, than 
 rthe Natural. j^ a jj ivi Gt ion6 mould be lb. Now as contrariety of Motion is a 
 necefTary Gaufe of natural Corruption, fo the interfering of EleBions 
 h of Vice br Moral Corruption. God could indeed take away both, 
 viz. by destroying Motion and free Choice ; but while thefe are per- 
 mitted-, neither of the Evils tould be prevented in the prefent State 
 of things. 
 
 WW 8ect>Adly-, We may obfervt that things are connected toge- 
 ^ . ther, and have a mutual dependence on each other, oil this account, 
 
 Things are ' ^ ' ' 
 
 conneftedto- *S 
 
 gerher, and a Defecl ifi tffife srte&s many others. 
 
 AT f S. 
 
 " thers, Perjuries, Frauds, Moffiurt;, AJfzjfir.r.' 
 titms, they have ever either heard of or read 
 
 " Were it not for the Knowledge of a future 
 " Life, I believe moft People would be wil- 
 ling at the point of Death to begin a new 
 
 " Lite, upon condition that they flic u!d en 
 -* joy as much Good, and undergo as many 
 " Evils, efpecially if they were of another 
 ** kind. They would be contented with a 
 " Change, without requiring a more happy 
 " Condition.' ' 
 
 The fame Conclnfion is drawn by Mr. Hucbe- 
 fvi after an accurate Enquiry into the Frame of 
 .human Nature, aiid a Comparifon of the Plea- 
 
 " in Hiftory ; thence concluding all Mankind 
 " to be very wicked as if a Court of Juftice 
 tt were the proper Place of making an Eiti- 
 " mate of the Morals of Mankind, or an Ho* 
 * fpital of the Healthful nefs of a Climate. 
 " Ought they not to confkler, that the Num- 
 " ber of honeft Citizens and Farmers far furpais 
 " thit of all forts of Criminals in any State ; 
 " and that the innocent or kind Aclions of e- 
 " ven Criminals themfelves furpafs their 
 
 fare's and Pains attending its fcveral Senfes f . " Crimes in number? That 'tis the Rarity of 
 " Here Men are apt to let their Imaginations " Crime?, in comparifon of innocent or good 
 
 rtm o"ut upon all the Robberies, Piracies, Mur~ 
 f Jay en the Peflions, p. 1 77, &c. and in particular p. 1 84. 
 
 " A&iom, which engages 'our attention to 
 
 them
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 as Machines which require the moft Workmanfhip may be flopped 
 o<- difor iered by the defect of a fingle Nail or Wheel : (o the Error 
 or Offence of one Man puts the rational Syitem or Society of Man- 
 kind o-;t of Order. Any Perfon, byaimoftone fingle free Act, may 
 deftroy a Hqufe or Ship, nay a City or a Fleet by Fire or Wreck. 
 Any King or Governor can, by an eafy and free Acl, overwhelm 
 whole Nations with War, Rapine, Slaughter and Villany. A Fa- 
 ther may beget Sons, who being yet unborn, are fure of inheriting 
 his Difeafes and Infirmities as well as his Goods. Nor could it be 
 otherwife while the Nature and Condition of Men and of the Earth 
 are fuch as we experience them to be. Either therefore Liber- 
 ty and the Connection of things muft be deftroy'd, or thefe Evils 
 tolerated. 
 
 IX. Thirdly, 'Tis certain that God does not permit any bad E- 
 lections, but fuch as may be reconciled with the Good of the 
 whole Syftem, and has digefted and order'd every thing in fuch a 
 
 l 19 
 
 
 
 Vice and 
 Wicked- 
 
 nefs, tho' 
 deform 'd 
 
 manner, in them . 
 
 Telvcs , do 
 not impair the Beauty of the whole. 
 
 N O $ E S. 
 
 them, and makes them to be recorded in 
 Hiftory; while incomparably more honeft 
 generous domeftick Aclions are overlook'd 
 only becaufe they aie fo common ; as one 
 great Danger, or one Month's Sicknefs fhall' 
 become a frequently repeated Story, during 
 a long Life of Health and Safety. The 
 Pains of the external Senfes are pretty fre- 
 quent, but how fhort in comparifon of the 
 long Tiats of Health, Eafe, and Pleafure ? 
 How rare is the Inftancc of a Life with one 
 Tenth fpent in violent Pain ? How few 
 want abfolute Neceffarics, nay have not 
 fomething to fpend on Gaiety and Orna-, 
 tnents ? The Pleijures of Beauty are expos'd 
 to all in feme Meafure. Thefe kinds of 
 Beauty which require Property to the full 
 Enjoyment of them are not ardently defir'd 
 by many. The Good of every kind in the 
 Univerfc is plainly fuperior to the Evil. 
 
 *' How few would accept of Annihilation ra- 
 " ther than Continuance in Life in the middle 
 M State of Age, Health, and Fortune? Or 
 " what feparated Spirit who had confidex'd 
 14 human Life, would not, rather than perifli, 
 u take the hazard of it again, by returning in- 
 u to a Body in the State of Infancy ? " 
 
 " i Who would lofe 
 
 ' For fear of Pain this intellectual Being, 
 
 '* Thofe thoughts which wander thro' Eternity 
 
 * l To perijh rather, /wallow 1 d up and M 
 
 M In the wide Womb of uncreated Night ; 
 
 " Devoid of Senfe and Motion ?< . << 
 
 Milton'/ Par. lojl, B. 2: 
 
 See alfo Mr. Chubb** Supplement to the 
 Vindication of God's Moral Character ff, or 
 Lucas's Enquiry after Happintfs, V. 1. $. 2> 
 C. 2. p. 41. 
 
 ft Tr*as, p, 281, &V;
 
 -8o Of Moral Evil 
 
 manner, that thefe very Faults and Vices (hall tend to the Good of 
 the whole. For as in Mufick Difcords, if heard feparately, grate 
 and offend the Ear with harfhnefs, but when mix'd in confort with 
 other Notes, make a more fweet and agreeable Harmony j in like 
 manner bad Elections, if confider'd alone, are look'd upon as odious 
 and deteftable, but compared with the whole Syftem, they promote 
 and increafe the Good and Beauty of the whole. For when they are 
 temper'd they become medicinal to each other by that very Con- 
 trariety, and thofe which would poifon feparate, when mix'd be- 
 come a Remedy *. | 
 
 For inftance, One by a depraved Choice raifes an immenfe Sum of 
 Money, and a vaft Eftate, and either the fame Perfon os his Heir, by 
 his Vanity and Profufenefs, compenfates for what he had acquir'd 
 by his Extortion, and perhaps does as much Good by fquandering a- 
 way his ill-gotten Wealth to the moft idle Purpofes, as if he had be- 
 ftow'd all upon the Poor. For he applies a Spur to Induftry, where- 
 as he would otherwife afford an handle to Sloth. The rich Man 
 offends in Luxury and Idlenefs : the Poor tranfgrerles no lefs by too 
 much Labour and Solicitude, which he indulges perhaps for no other 
 End than to provide Inftruments of Luxury for the Rich : but each 
 of them pleafes himfelf in his Choice, and 'tis almoft the fame thing 
 with refpect to the benefit of the Univerfe, as if one had converted 
 to pious Ufes what he fpent in Luxury, and the other had labour'd 
 moderately to provide only what was ufeful. The fame almoft may 
 be faid of all Vices, they are prejudicial, but only to the Criminals 
 themfelves, or thofe that defer ve to fuffer -, nay they are often bene- 
 ficial to others; and fo long as the whole comes to no harm, 'tis 
 fit to allow every one the ufe of their own Will, and let them fuf- 
 fer for their Sin. God could indeed cut ofT all Occafion of Sin, by 
 taking away free Elections : But it is plain that this would be 
 far from an Advantage to intelligent Agents. 'Tis our Bufinefs to 
 prevent bad Elections, and if we 5 will not, we fufTer for our Folly: 
 
 But 
 
 * See Leibnitz in tbs Mtmirs of Literature refar'd t: alr.-e.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 But God will procure the Good of the whole by our Folly no fefs 
 than by our Wifdom. (105.) 
 
 X. I 
 
 181 
 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (105.) We may add, and by our Sin no lefs 
 than by our Rightewtfttefs. Thus it may be faid 
 in a good Senfe that private Vices (as well as 
 private Misfortunes) often becomes public Be- 
 nefit.', tho' the Authors be no lefs liable to Pu- 
 nishment: But it will be objected, that this 
 makes Vice to be necelTary for the Public 
 Good, and therefore to be no Vice at all ; nor 
 coafequently punifhable. For a tendency or 
 oppofition to the general Happinefs of our 
 Syflem, is the very Criterion of Virtue and 
 Vice: If then what is call'd my Wickednefs 
 tends to the Good of the World, how can I 
 be punifh'd for it ? And if my Action pro 
 motes the Glory of God, why doth he yet find 
 fault ? We anfwer, Vice naturally and in ge 
 ncral tends to the Mifery of any Syflem ; fo 
 that if all were vicious, all would be wretch- 
 ed ; and on the contrary, if every one were 
 virtuous, all mull be happy; to be vicious and 
 to be productive of Pain or Mifery, would 
 then be convertible terms. But in a mix'd ir- 
 regular State, where fome purfue the Rules of 
 Virtue and others do not, the Cafe is very much 
 aiter'd, there Pain or Evil, and fuch Actions 
 as produce it, may often be the moll proper 
 means to remedy fome greater Evil, or procure 
 feme fuperior Good ; to reform a Vice, or im- 
 prove a Virtue ; in which Cafe, tho' that way 
 of acting which in general tends to Mifery, 
 happens to be productive of fome real Hap- 
 pinefs which could not have been produced 
 without it, yet this is not fufficient to excufe 
 or juilify it, nor is it fomuch the confequencc 
 of its own Nature, and attributable to its im- 
 mediate Author, as an effect of the fupcrin- 
 tendency of fome other Agent, who applies it, 
 and raatas it inflrumental to fome End of his' 
 . who brings Good out of Evil, or from 
 Evil takes occafion to do dill more Good than 
 he could be conceiv'd to have done without 
 lliat Evil. 
 
 All this I think may be fuppofed of God, 
 
 and yet the different Natures of Good and E- 
 vil continue fix'd. Man, who cannot fee all 
 the Confequences and Connection of things, 
 mull be obliged to fome general Rules of act- 
 ing, and whenever he deviates from thefe 
 Rules he does amifs ; at leall when he intends 
 to act againll the very End of thefe Rules, /. e. 
 the general Good, he evidently fins, let the 
 Confequence of his Acts be what it will. 
 Thus the Actions of a Man may be often mo- 
 rally Evil to himfelf, tho' they prove natural- 
 ly Good to fome 'others : they may proceed 
 from a bad Intention in him, or he may be a 
 Tranfgreflbr by acting againll his Rule ; and 
 tho* God may have, an occafion of Glorifying 
 himfelf thereby, of difplaying his Wifdom and 
 Goodnefs, &c. to a higher degree than they 
 could otherwife have been exhibited; and 
 therefore may reafonably permit the Actions of 
 this Man, and convert them, either to the 
 Punifhment and Correction of himfelf or o- 
 ther Sinners, or to the Blelfing of fome righ- 
 teous Perfons ; yet the immediate Author is 
 neverthelefs accountable both to God and 
 Man for fuch his Actions. Inttances of this 
 kind are innumerable, and may be feen in 
 Sherlock on Providence. See particularly what 
 is required from God's Goodnefs in a State of 
 Difcipline. p. 221,224, 230, C5V. 2d Edit, or 
 in Simplicity on Epiftctt/s, p. 83. 4th Edition, 
 Lond. 1 670. 
 
 What has been faid here only relates to- 
 God's permitting Moral Evil, fo far as it is a 
 means of fome prepollent Good. 
 
 S. C. in his Impartial Enquiry, cjrV. carries 
 the Matter farther, and fuppofes that God may 
 for the general Good decree fome fuch Acts as 
 fecm to be morally Evil ; which I can fee no 
 reafon or ncceflity for fuppofing. How lie en- 
 deavours to make this out and reconcile it with 
 the Holinefs and Juflice of the Deity, may be 
 fecn in Part f. Cl. n. prop. 9. p. 94, &c. 
 
 O o
 
 Z%7 
 
 'oil 
 
 qoti 
 X. If 
 
 Of Moral 
 
 this be true, it is a 
 
 l Evil. 
 
 cj yi btagapM 
 
 fufncicnt Vindication of the Div 
 
 me 
 
 I ( t !\ sbear "Goodnefs, notwithstanding fuch a plentiful Crop of Vices be per- 
 Scuiar Cafes, mitted ; nor need we infift upon a longer enquiry how this may be 
 it accounts applied to particular Cafes; for whether this Corruption was oc- 
 vTrfai Cor-" cafion'd by the Fall of our firft Parents as Truth itfelf declares, or 
 *uption. by any other Caufe whatever, 'tis certain that God would never have 
 permitted it, if it could have been prevented without greater Da- 
 mage to the whole. { 1 06.) We may wonder indeed that almoft all 
 
 Mankind 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (106.) Perhaps fuch a Scheme as this of the 
 Fall appears to be from the Reprefentation gi- 
 ven of it, and its effects in Scripture, was ne- 
 ceffary to malce ns duly fenfible of the Nature 
 of Good and Evil, to acquaint us more fully 
 with the Moral Perfections of the Deity 
 (which could not have been lb clearly exhibi- 
 ted to us if there had never been any room for 
 the Exercife of them) and confequently to 
 bring us to an Imitation of thefe Perfections, 
 and thereby to the greateft and molt refined 
 Happinefs that our better part is capable of. 
 Man (as we obferv'd in Note ro3.) is a very 
 imperfect compound Being, who, by the con- 
 ltitution of his Nature, feems incapable of be- 
 ing made truly wife and virtuous, or which is 
 the fame thing, morally happy on fudden, he 
 muft therefore receive Improvement gradually, 
 and as he is to compteat his good Habits by a 
 Series of virtuous Acts, fo it fcems proper for 
 him to be trailed up by various Difpenfations, 
 and a Series of Events adapted to the feveral 
 Faculties of his Body and Mind ; the various 
 conftituent Parts of his Nature, and different 
 Sources of his Happinefs: accordingly we find 
 rrvit the Happineia of Man in his firlt Eftate 
 was chiefly Animal, to which an Earthly Para- 
 dife was exquilitely fitted ; a Change in this 
 was probably requifite to introduce the ratio- 
 nal or moral kind into the World, and to 
 make him direct his Thoughts to fomething 
 higher than mere fenfitive Delights. This we 
 are told wis the Method of Divine Providence 
 with the Jeivijb Nation in particular, who had I 
 
 
 a Law of Carnal Ordinances to exercife them 
 for a while, and Jead them on to the Expec- 
 tation of better things; to fpiritnalize their 
 Notions by Degrees, and prepare them for the 
 Heavenly Doctrines of Mfjftah. And why 
 might not the like Method be made ufe of in 
 the Government of Mankind in general, or e- 
 ven all rational Beings ? What if God, wil- 
 ling to make known the greater Riches of his 
 Glory, fuiFer'd our firft Parents tD fall foon 
 from that Condition wherein he created them 
 at firft, in order to raife them and their Pofte* 
 rity to a much higher State of Glory and trire 
 Happinefs after ? And who can prove that 
 the former was not conducive to the latter ? 
 We believe that the Blifs of Heaven will in- 
 finitely exceed the Pleafures of a TerreftrJal 
 Eden j why then fhould we not fuppofe that 
 the lefs might be in tome manner ufeful and 
 introductory to the greater ? Why might not 
 a fhort Life in Paradife be as proper a State of 
 Probation for the Virtues of this prefent 
 World, as this World is for the Glories of a- 
 nother ? There is a Paffage concerning Para- 
 dife in Scoffs Cbriflian Life * which confirms 
 this Notion : But it is the moft fully explain'd 
 by Mr. D'Oyly in his firft T>iJ[ertation y C. 3. 
 p. yi, &c. I fhall tranferibe fo much as may 
 be neceflary to fhew his general Defign. " If 
 " we confider our Nature as it came in Inns- 
 * cence out of the hand of its Creator, God 
 " forefaw how very foon it would fall from 
 " its primitive Purity, and therefore defign'd 
 " it farther for a much happier State, raifed 
 
 and. 
 
 * VoL 1.. p. 26.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 Mankind are polluted in Wickednefs, and that God puts no flop to 
 the Progrcfs of thofe Vices which deform his Work j but in reality 
 this is no more to be wonder'd at, than that this inferior World is 
 by Motion univerfally fubjected to natural Corruption. For as Con- 
 trariety of Motions neceflarily works a Change in folid and hetero- 
 geneous Bodies, and tranfpofes them into another Form and Condi- 
 tion, whence neceflarily proceed Diflblution and Concretion, Cor- 
 
 U o 2 ruption 
 
 -. ~,., 
 
 
 . 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 283 
 
 and refined by a clearer and more extenfive 
 Manifeftation of himfelf : But had it flood 
 the Reward (at leaft as far as we know) 
 would have been the indefeafable Pofl'eflion 
 of a Paradife in this World, the enjoying of 
 an immortal Life here on Earth, chequer' d 
 as it were with Spiritual and Senfitive, or 
 Animal Pleafures. And for their Conduct 
 in that State God feems to have left them 
 (one or two Inftances excepted) under the 
 Direction of the Law of Nature, the Spiritual 
 or Religious Part of which taught them to 
 look up to him as the Creator of the World; 
 the Lord and Author of their Being, and to 
 fear and obey him as their Almighty So- 
 vereign. The Civil part of it furniflVd them 
 with right Reafon, dictating what was ne- 
 cefiary to be done in order to their well- 
 being in this World. So that had they 
 flood, their Happinefs would probably have 
 been what that of Mankind was afterwards 
 a mixture of rational and fenjitive, or bodily 
 Enjoyments. And as to any Knowledge of 
 God, farther than that now mention'd ; it 
 may, I conceive, be thought reafonable to 
 preiume that they had the fame awful fenfe 
 of his Veracity as of any other Attribute : 
 and yet how very eafily were they wrought 
 into a Belief by the firft Story they heard, 
 and from they know not whom, that he had 
 afted collufively in barring them the Fruit of 
 the Tree of Knowledge^ defigning by it only 
 to keep them down under the Veil of Igno- 
 rance, and that there was no fuch imminent 
 
 ** Danger of Death confequent to their tafting 
 " it, as they were at firft made to believe f 
 " Whatever fuch Knowledge therefore we fup- 
 " pofe them to have had, it may be doubted, 
 " its Impreffions were not vivid and forcible 
 " enough to influence their Wills to fuitable 
 " Efforts in loz'ing and cleaving fteadily to 
 " him : fince no one can love whom he docs 
 " not believe, and without Faith 'tis as im- 
 " poflible to love as to pleaft God ': So that 
 " thofe Impreflions could not confequently be 
 " very inftrumental in making an Addition to 
 " their Happinefs, as has been fliewn above. 
 '/ Nay as to Adam himfelf in particular, it 
 " may perhaps feem reafonable to think he 
 " had not that profound Reverence and awful 
 " regard for the Divine Majefty which he 
 " might juflly have been expected to exprefs, 
 " (tho' not under the Circumflances of a Cri- 
 H minal) fince after the Facl committed, he 
 " feems attempting to fcreen his Guilt, even 
 " by throwing the blame obliquely upon God 
 " himfelf, where he anfwers, The Woman whom 
 " Thou gaveft to be with me, Jbe gave mc oftkt 
 " Tree and I did eat *. M 
 
 The Author proceeds to enquire into the 
 State of Religion in the Antcdeluvian 
 World, the Patriarchal Ages, and down to 
 the Jetvijb Difpcnfation, and fhews that 
 Mankind could not from the Works of 
 Creation and Providence only (which yet 
 were their only means of Knowledge) have 
 fo extenfive and perfect a Knowledge of God 
 as was requifitc to advance their Happinefs 
 
 properly 
 
 Diflcrt. 1. p. 33.
 
 "084. Of Moral Evil 
 
 ruption and Generation : In like manner free Choice neceffarily ad- 
 mmifters occafion of Sin to Agents endow'd with an imperfect Un- 
 derstanding, and obnoxious to Pafiions and Affections. And as in the 
 natural World; the Corruptionand Contagion of one thing extends it- 
 felf to others, and acquires Strength by Spreading ; fo alfoin the mo- 
 ral, if Election once deviate to Evil, the Poifon is difrufed along 
 with it, and feizes and infects all about it.- 
 
 But 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 properly {o call'd, as rational Agents, to any 
 confiderable Degree; nor confequently to be 
 the foundation of a Worfhip worthy of him. 
 From whence he concludes, " The Faculties 
 ' of our rational Nature muft have lain dor- 
 " ment and ufelefs as to the greatell Happinefs 
 ** it was capable of attaining by the Exercife of 
 " them; and as to the higheft Honour and 
 " moft exalted Worfhip it was in itfelf qua- 
 " lify'd to pay to the Divine Majefty, unlefs 
 " he had pleas'd to make provifion for the 
 "farther Manifeftation of himfelf: which, in 
 " what manner he has in his infinite Wifdom 
 " and Goodnefs determin'd to effect, will ap- 
 ** pear by laying open the moft advantageous 
 " Changes which has been made as to thefe 
 " and other refpects, by the appearance of 
 " Chrift in the Flejb. For if it be fhewn, that 
 " by that amazing Tranfaction he has {o dif- 
 " play'd the infinite Excellencies and Perfec- 
 " tions of his Nature, as to give the utmoft 
 4 poffible Scope to the whole rational Crea- 
 " tion, to exert their nobleft Faculties, and 
 " ilrain them up to the moft exalted aftonifh- 
 ** ing Thoughts of, and feraphical Devotion to 
 " him : if farther he has thereby apply' d the 
 " moft proper and forcible means to rectify 
 ' the Moral Errors, reform the Vices, and o- 
 ' vercome the daring Wicktdnefs of Mankind ; 
 ' and laftly, if it be fhewn that he has done 
 " all this in fuch a manner that it could not 
 " have been effected to fo great Advantage^ any 
 " other way, then will it be demonftratively 
 2 evident, that whereas he forefaw from all 
 
 " Eternity, that Man whom he had decreed to 
 " create would abufe his natural Liberty, and 
 " fo, being tempted, fall into Sin : There 
 " was infinite reafon on this account as well 
 tc as that mention'd before, why he might 
 " have pleas'd alfo, in his infinite Wifdom 
 " and Goodnefs, to have decreed to permit it, 
 r thereby to open a way for the ftupendous 
 " Manifefiation of himfelf, as above exprefs'd. 
 " And particularly that by what follow'd 
 " from it, Mankind might become capable of 
 " attaining far greater Happinefs than they 
 f* would have been had our firft Parents con- 
 " tinued innocent." p. 43. 
 
 How this Author makes out the fore-men- 
 tioned Particulars may be feen in the remainder 
 of his Differ -tat ion. 
 
 See alfo Dr. Jenkin on the fame Subject *. 
 
 Now this is not, as Bayle objects f, " To 
 " compare the Deity to a Father who mould 
 " fuffer his Children to break their Legs, on 
 " purpofe to fhew to all the City his great 
 '* Art in fetting their broken Bones. Or to a 
 H King who fhould fuffer Seditions and Fac- 
 " tions to encreafe thro 1 all his Kingdom, that 
 *' he might purchafe the Glory of quelling 
 " them." But rather like a King who permits 
 fome of his Subjects to put their feditious De- 
 figns in practice, and to promote a Revolt, 
 in order to illuftrate his Wifdom, Power and 
 Goodnefs more fully in reducing them to their 
 Duty, and to convince them more clearly of 
 the Expedience and abfolute Neceffity of obey- 
 ing him, and thereby to confirm them, or at 
 
 leaft 
 
 * Reafonablenefs ofCbriftianity, 2d vol. C. 1 2. 
 f Crit. Difi. p. 2488.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 But yet both natural and moral Corruption have their Bounds, nei- 
 ther does God permit them to fpread farther than is conducive to 
 to die Good of the whole*. It may feem ftrange to us that he fuf- 
 fers both of them to wander over this World of ours without Re- 
 ftraint; but what is our World to the whole Syftem of the Univerfe ? 
 How fmall a Part! how next to nothing! (107.) Let this whole Earth 
 
 of 
 
 n^ , 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 
 
 leafl: all the reft of his Subjects, in a well 
 grounded Obedience to his Government, in 
 which their Happinefs entirely confifts : Or 
 like a Father that finding, his Children oblli- 
 nately difobedient, fuffers them fometimes to 
 wander aftray, and to fall into fome Dangers 
 and Inconvenicncies, and lets them fmart un- 
 der the Mifery which they bring upon them-' 
 fclves, in order to make them more fenftble of 
 their need of his Affiftance and Direction, and 
 thereby more dependent on him for the future, 
 and more fubject to him, and therefore more, 
 fare of Happinefs. This Comparifon is well 
 explain'd by Sherlock on Providence, Chap. 7. 
 p. 262. 
 
 Hence then it will perhaps appear that we 
 have reafon to fuppofe, that the Fall of Man 
 from Earthly and Animal Delights, was de- 
 fign'd to raife him to a Rational and Heaven- 
 ly State of Happinefs, and to make way for 
 fuch a wonderful Difplay of all the Divine 
 Attributes in that Expedient, as could not 
 have been exhibited at all, or not to fo high a 
 Degree without it ; and confequently that this 
 Method was the very beft even for eur own 
 Syftem. But if this Suppofition feem impro- 
 bable, or infufficient, yet Hill why may not 
 all the Mifery in this Syftem of ours promote 
 and encreafe the Happinefs of fome others f ? 
 We have good reafon to believe that there is 
 fome Connection between the different Sy- 
 ftcms of the Univerfe ; but have fmall ground 
 to imagine ours the beft, why then may it not 
 be fubfervient to a better ? This indeed is 
 
 only Conjecture ; however, I think it would 
 be no eafy Matter to, confute it; till which be 
 done, we may very fafely conclude with our 
 Author, that the Fall it/elf, as well as all the 
 Sin and Mifery confequ'em upon it, cou'd not 
 hive been prevented without greate? detriment 
 to the whole : and one may iay the me of 
 Eve as the Poet did of the hand Jttumms 
 Sccevola : Si nan- errafjet., fecerat ilia minus L 
 
 (107.) " It will be objected, that even after 
 
 " this Life Mifery will prevail above HappU 
 
 c * nefs (fince there are but few EleB) which 
 
 " appears inconfiftent with the Goodnefs of 
 
 ' the fupreme Being. * In anfwer to this 
 
 " Difficulty, granting that the Number of 
 
 " thofe who are to be tormented in Hell will 
 
 " be incomparably greater than that of the 
 
 " Blefled, the Evil will Hill appear like no- 
 
 " thing if compared with the Good, confidcr- 
 
 " ing the true Extent of the City of God. The 
 
 " Ancients had a narrow Notion of the Works 
 
 *' of the Author of Nature ; and St. Auguftin, 
 
 " for want of knowing the modern Difcove- 
 
 s * ries, was not a little pcrplex'd when he un- 
 
 " dertook to juftify the prevalency of Evil. 
 
 *' It was in former times a common Opinion, 
 
 ' that the Earth was the only part of the World 
 
 " furniftted with Inhabitants; nay the Antients 
 
 lt were afraid of admitting any Antipodes : they 
 
 believ'd that the reft of the World did only 
 
 " confift of fome mining Globes and Cryftal- 
 
 " line Spheres : But in our Days it will be 
 
 " acknowledged that there is an innumerable 
 
 * Number of Globes, as large and larger than 
 
 ' ours. 
 
 * See Sherlock on Providence, Ch. 7. p. 261. 2d Edit, and Scott'/ Chriftian Life, V. 2. Ch. 4 
 par. 3. p. 318, Sec. %vo. 
 
 f See the next Note, See Leibnitz EJfais de Tbecdicee, Part 2. $* 239.
 
 a 86 Of. Moral Evil 
 
 of ours be ftain'd with Corruption of both kinds ; fuppofe it clouded 
 and benighted with Darknefs and Vice, yet it will -but be like a 
 very fmall Spot in a very beautiful Body, which is fo far from lef- 
 fening, that it encreafes the Comelinefs and Beauty of the whole. 
 The Earth, notwithstanding its Obfcurity, has its Ufe and Place in 
 Nature, which it could not commodioufly fill if thofe things which 
 render it liable to Darknefs and Corruption were removed. The 
 fame muft be faid of Men, they have their proper Ufe and Station, 
 and in order to fill it commodioufly, they were to be created of 
 fuch a Nature and Difpofition- as might eafily be corrupted with 
 Vice. Neither have we any more reafon to conclude that all free 
 Agents are involv'd in Evil Elections, becaufe this happens almoft 
 univerfally to Men, than that all the Regions of the Heavens are 
 fubjecl to the fame Changes that our Air is liable to. The whole 
 Work of God may be bright and beautiful, tho' that Point which 
 conftitutes our World feem by itfelf rude and unadorn'd : and tho' 
 fome Parts appear to us who have not a View of the whole Contex- 
 ture, larger or lefs than the juft Proportion requires, yet they may 
 agree with others in the moft perfect Symetry. Nor need we pre- 
 fume upon the Divine Wifdom and Goodnefs in the Moral, any more 
 
 than 
 
 no r E s. 
 
 '* ours, which may be inhabited by rational 
 " Creatures, tho' it does not follow that they 
 * are Men. Our Earth is only a Planet, that 
 *' is, one of the fix principal Satellites of our 
 " Sun. And becaufe all hVd Stars are fo 
 ** many Suns, 'tis plain the Earth is a very 
 ** inconsiderable part of the Univerfe, fince 
 " it is only an appendix of one Sun. Perhaps 
 " all the Suns are inhabited by happy Crea- 
 " tures, at le.;fl we -have no reafon to believe 
 '* that many of their Inhabitants will be dam- 
 " ned. Befides, confidering that there is no 
 " reafon to affirm that there are Stars every 
 -" where, it may very well be, that there is a 
 -*' vaft Space beyond the? Region of the Stars. 
 " Whether it be the Empyreal Heaven or not, 
 ** that immenfe Space which furrcunds all that 
 
 Region may be filled with Glory and Hap- 
 pinefs. It may be conceiv'd like an Ocean, 
 which receives the Rivers of all happy Crea- 
 tures, when they have attain'd to their Per- 
 fection in the Syftem of the Stars. What 
 will then become of the Confideration of 
 our Globe and its Inhabitants ? Will it 
 not be a thing incomparably lefs than a 
 Phyfical Point, fince our E.mh is like a 
 Point with refpecl to the diltance of fome 
 fix'd Stars ? And therefore the Proportion 
 of that part of the Univerfe which we know 
 being loll in a kind of Nothingnefs, it may 
 very well be faid that all Evils are almoit 
 nothing in comparifon with all the good 
 things that are in the Univerfe -f. 
 
 f Leibnitz in Memtirs of Literature, Vol, 3.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 than in xh&hWural World. The Crimes and Vices themielves are 
 very few in comparifon of the free Agents, and may contribute to 
 the Good of the whole, no lefs than natural Corruption does to the 
 PrefervatiOn of the Syflem. Nay one Man's Fault is very often cor- 
 rected by the Vices of another, and the Deformity ftamp'd upon the 
 Works of God by the Wickednefs of fome, is obliterated by the fu- 
 pervening Iniquity of others. By the vitiated Elections of fome, a 
 Stop is put to the Wickednefs of many ; and the Virtue and Hap- 
 pinefs of a great many is confirmed and increafed by the Mifery of 
 a few j nay an Opportunity of doing Good is offer'd to fuch as are 
 fo difpofed, which never could have been if none had abufed their 
 Choice. (108.) 
 
 S U B S E C T. 
 
 587 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (108.) Upon the whole, from that little 
 which we know of the Scheme of Divine Pro- 
 vidence in the Formation and Government of 
 the M'<ml World, it feems very reafonable for 
 us to conclude concerning this, in the fame 
 manner as we did concerning the Natural 
 World, viz. That no considerable part of it 
 can be alter'd for the better ; or that no E- 
 vil in it could either have been originally a- 
 voided, or may now be removed, without in- 
 troducing greater Since the whole Contro- 
 vcrfy depends upon the truth of this general 
 Conclufion, 'tis proper that we mould be as 
 fully fatisfy'd as poffible about the ground of 
 it. 
 
 But to attempt to demonftrate it by an In- 
 duction of Particulars would be infinite, Ifhall 
 therefore choofe rather to illustrate it by a re- 
 view of fome of the Principles before laid 
 down. In the firlt place then the Deity is fup- 
 pofed out of pure Benevolence to have created 
 as many immaterial Beings of the nobleft kinds 
 as were agreeable to the Order and Conve- 
 nience of his Syftem ; for his Benevolence be 
 ing unbounded, feems to require this as much 
 as it does the Creation of any Beings at all : 
 The fame Benevolence alfo prompted him to 
 produce more imperfect, mixt ones, becaufe 
 even thofe were better than none. He en- 
 
 dowed thefe with an abfolutely free Principle 
 of Volition and A3ion, becaufe fuch Freedom 
 was abfolutely requifite to that Happinefs for 
 which he dcfign'd them ; riz. Goodnefs, Vir- 
 tue, or a refemblancc of hi* own Moral Qua- 
 lities, which is the only true Happinefs or a 
 rational Being. He continues this Free- 
 
 dom to them, tho' many abufc it to the Cor- 
 ruption of their Natures, and Introduction of 
 the greateft Mifery ; becaufe this abule pro- 
 portionably improves the Nature, and increa- 
 fes the Felicity of others, and fo Liberty (till 
 tends to the Good and Perfection of the 
 whole : and this it may be conceived to do in 
 the following manner. The miferable Effect 
 of the abufe of Freedom by fome in this 
 World, makes all others much more fcnfible 
 of the Nature and Confequences of Sin, and 
 thereby renders them confeious of a double 
 Pleafure in ufing their Powers aright : it ex- 
 ercifeth fome Virtues in them which could 
 have no place without it; it improveth and 
 cxalteth others, and confequently raifes their 
 whole Nature to an higher degree of Perfection 
 than it could otherwife acquire. By parity of 
 Reafon we may believe that in the next World 
 alfo, the Happinefs of them, as well as of 
 fome other Syltems, will be infinitely advan- 
 ced by reflections naturally arifing from their 
 
 View
 
 288 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 SUB-SECT. VII. 
 
 Wherein the 'Principles before laid down are apply d to 
 the Solution of fome Objetlions. 
 
 Moral Evils * 1 37ROM the foregoing Principles it feems not impoffible to an- 
 are not ne- Jl ^* wer mc h Objections as are commonly brought againfl the 
 ceflary in Goodnefs and Providence of God. For in the firft place, when it is 
 
 reipect of !_ n. j 
 
 Free-will, objected 
 
 but they 
 
 are neceffary with regard to God, fo that he mull either tolerate thefe or greater. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 View of the Mifery which fome fhall undergo : 
 (which feems to be the beff, the only folid rea- 
 fon that can be affignM for the Creation of 
 thofe Beings who fhall be finally miferable, and 
 for the continuation of them in their mife- 
 rable Exiflence *.) 
 
 " To have efcaped Hell, and to find our-r 
 " felves in the unchangeable PcfTeffion of Sal-; 
 " vation by the free Mercy and Goodnefs of 
 " God, and by the Death of his own Sor, are 
 " Thougbts which muft create a new Heaven 
 " as it were in Heaven itfelf; I mean, they 
 " will enlarge our Souls to the utmoft Capa- 
 " city of our Natures, and fill and afluate 
 " them with fuch Divine Ardors of Love, as 
 " if we had been kept neceffarily from all 
 " Sin, feem impoffible to have been raifed in 
 " us-f. 
 
 This then we may with Reverence prefume 
 to have been the principal Defign f God in 
 
 permitting all Mankind to bring themfelves in- 
 to fuch a dangerous Eftate, and fome of them 
 to fuffer under it ; and perhaps the fame rea- 
 fon will hold for his permitting the Fall of 
 Angeh: For I think it plainly appear'd from 
 Note 23. that the Good, or rather Goodnefs of 
 the Creature, is properly the ultimate End of 
 all the Difpenfations of God, and not his own 
 Glory, as fome love to fpeak : This Glory 
 feems to bedifplay'd no otherwife than as It is 
 fubfervient and neceffary to that End ; and 
 neceffary it is (as has been partly fhewn a- 
 bove.) For Goodnefs is of our own making, 
 and muft require Knowledge, Love, &c. as 
 Motives and Means to further us in the gra- 
 dual Formation of a fuitable Temper and pro- 
 per Habits here, the Enlargement and Im- 
 provement of which will conftitute our Hea- 
 ven hereafter, as Scott and Dr. Rymer have 
 fhewn at large. 
 
 Virtue 
 
 * See the Appendix, V 2. par. 9. 
 
 f Jenki*, 2d vol. Ch. 12. p. 244, &c. 5th Edit.
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 obje&ed, that Moral Evil is not a necefTary concomitant of human 
 Nature, and therefore is voluntarily permitted by God, and that no 
 Benefit arifes from the permiffion of it, as there does from Hunger, 
 Thirft, and the Paffions : We mutt reply, that Liberty of Choice is 
 a necefTary Concomitant of our Nature, and that the Exercife of it 
 cannot be hinder'd, as we have feen, without greater Evils : In re- 
 fpect then of our own Will, Moral Evil is not necefTary, but in re- 
 flect of God it is, /. e. he muft either tolerate this Evil or a greater; 
 from hence alfo proceeds no fmall Advantage to univerfal Nature, as 
 well as to Mankind. 
 
 II. Secondly, Hence we perceive the Anfwer to Cicero's Objection 
 in his third Book, De Natura Deorum, where Cotta is introduced ar- 
 guing 
 
 Phycian who gives his Patient Wine when he knows that he will dye of it. Or a Father 
 his Eftate to a Prodigal Son. 
 
 189 
 
 Ciceif s 
 Objection 
 propofed 
 which is ta- 
 ken from a 
 who leaves 
 
 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Virtue therefore or Moral Good cannot (as 
 Bayle imagines) be infufed into us miraculoufly; 
 neither could God, according to the Order of our 
 Ideas, have acquainted us with fo much of his 
 adorable Nature, his Mercy, Long-fujfering, 
 Goodnefs and 'Truth (as he himfelf defcribes it *) 
 nor confequently have brought us to (o great a 
 refemblance of it by any other Method. The 
 fole Idea of a Being infinitely perfeil, Sec. (as 
 Bayle objects f) would not do the Bufinefs, nor 
 i'f it were perceiv'd and would have been at- 
 tended to, could it be of fufficient force to in- 
 fluence the Minds of Men, and regulate their 
 Practice, as is evident from daily Experience. 
 The prefent Scheme of Providence was there- 
 fore necefTary, in order to produce in the ge- 
 nerality of Men the greateft degree of 'Goodnefs 
 in this Life, which is the ground and founda- 
 tion of their Happinefs in the next.. Even 
 fhcre alfo may the Memory of their former 
 Trials (as was hinted above) the Confciouf- 
 
 ne.fs of their own happy Choice, when others 
 did, and they had the fame Power and the 
 fame Temptations to have done otherwife : the 
 joyful Reflection on their paft Dangers and 
 prefent Safety, and the natural Confequence of 
 all this Love and Gratitude, and Glory to 
 God in the Higheft, and mutual Congratula- 
 tions of each other. Thcfe and the like Con- 
 templations will (as Dr. Jcnkin fays) create a 
 new Heaven in Heaven itfelf. * 
 
 And tho' in one refpect a view of the Mife- 
 ry which the damned undergo, might feem to 
 detract from the Happinefs of the Blcfled, thro' 
 Commiferation, &c. Vet under another, a 
 nearer, and much more affecting Confidcra- 
 tion, viz. that all this is the Mifery which 
 they themfelves often expofed themfclves to, 
 ana were in imminent Danger of incurring ; 
 in this View, why may not the fenfe of their 
 own Efcape fo far overcome the Scnfe of a- 
 nother's Ruin, as quite to extinguifh the Pain 
 
 that 
 
 * Exod 34. 6, 7. 
 -| Crit. Diet. p. 248^,
 
 $90 Of Moral Evil 
 
 guing in this manner : " If a Phyfichn knows that his Patient, who 
 
 ' * is order'd to drink Wine, will drink too much and dye of it im- 
 
 ,c mediately, he is greatly blameable for allowing him it. Thus is 
 
 " this Providence of yours to be blamed, which has given Reafon 
 
 " to fuch as it knew would make a perverfe and wicked Ufe of it." 
 
 He proceeds alfo to confute thofe Perfons who endeavour to excufe 
 
 Providence, by faying, " that it does not follow that we are not ve- 
 
 " ry well provided for by the Gods, becaufe a great many ufe their 
 
 . v " Gifts perverfely ; fince many make a bad ufe pf their Paternal 
 
 " Eftates, and yet thefe cannot be faid to have no Benefit from their 
 
 u Fathers." To which he replies in thefe Words : " I wifh the 
 
 u Gods had not beftow'd that Cunning upon Men which very few 
 
 " make a right ufe of : In fo much that this Divine Gift of Reafon 
 
 " and Deliberation may feem to be imparted for a Snare and . not a 
 
 ,c Benefit to Mankind." He adds, " We leave Eflates to our Chil- 
 
 " dren in hopes of leaving them well, wherein we may be deceiv'd j 
 
 " but how can God be deceiv'd ? " 
 
 Tis fhewn III. To all which we reply, Firft, That it is very unfair to com- 
 
 that theCom- <c p are fa Reafon which is granted to Man with Wine given to 
 
 panfon is ill r o 
 
 put between the 
 
 Reafon and 
 
 Free -Will, and the giving of Wine; and that Gcd, if he took away Liberty for fear we fliould 
 
 Sin, would be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he Ihould be fick. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 thattfually attends the Idea of it, and even ren- j I fhall conclude with another Paflage from 
 der it productive of fome real Happinefs? To ! Dr. Jenkin*, which fets them in the flrongeft 
 
 this purpofe apply that of Lucretius, B. z. 
 
 Suave tnari tnagno turbantibus tequora v$ntis 
 E terra alter ius magnum f peel are labor em, 
 Nori quia vexari quenquam ejl jucunda volup- 
 
 tas. 
 $ed, quibus ipfe malis careas, quia eernere [na- 
 ve eft. 
 
 Eat however this be, mod of the foregoing 
 Reflections feem juft and unexceptionable. 
 
 Light. 
 
 " It muft advance the Happinefs both of 
 *' Artgels and Men in Heaven, that upon 
 " Choice and Trial they have preferr'd God 
 " before all things, and upon that find them- 
 " felves confirmed and eftablifh'd in the per- 
 " petual and unalterable Love and Enjoy-. 
 " ment of him. This very Coitfideration, 
 " that they might once have fallen from his 
 " Love, infpires them with the higheft Ar- 
 ** dors of Love, when they rejoice in the 
 
 " infinite 
 
 p. 242.
 
 Of Moral EviL 
 
 9 l 
 
 the Siek. For a fick Perfon may enjoy Life, and even recover, with- 
 out Wine; but Man cannot be what he is without Reafon. The 
 Comparifon therefore is very improperly made between things that 
 are difperate. Neither is there a lefs difference between finning and 
 dying. 'Tis very true, that no body would let a fick Perfon take 
 Wine which he knew would kill him : but yet any prudent Phyfi- 
 cian would allow his Patient to take fome Meat, without which he 
 knew that he certainly mull die, tho' he underftood, that upon ta- 
 king it the Fever would encreafe a little. In Like manner God has 
 given Reafon to Men, without which they would not be Men, 
 tho' he forefaw that fome Evils would arife from it. Reafon there- 
 fore ought to be compared to Life, and natural Evils to the Diftem- 
 per. If then God were to take away Reafon left Men mould ufe it 
 amifs, he would be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he mould 
 be fick. 
 
 IV. Secondly, Human Reafon is improperly compared to a Pa- Reafon is no 
 trimony, fince it is the very Being and Life of Man : and who would ^^y" 1 ^* 
 rather put his Son to Death than furler him to lead a fort of an ir-par'd to an 
 regular Life ? Eftatc - 
 
 V. Thirdly, We ought to remember that we are not born forr tten dsto 
 ourfelves alone, but are fubfervient to Nature as Parts of the Uni- the good of 
 vjerfe, 'tis reafonable therefore that we mould bear fuch things as^^^ 
 
 P p 2 tendfelves too, 
 
 that we 
 fhould have 
 
 the ufe of Free- Will: for we had rather be what we are than in the Condition of Brutes^ or without 
 
 Reafon. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *' infinite Rewards of fo eafy and fhort a 
 ' Tryal : and the Refle&ion upon the Dan- 
 " gers efcaped, heightens even the Joys of 
 " Heaven to them, and makes an addition to 
 " every Degree of Blifs. The remembrance 
 " of their pail Sins and Temptations, and 
 " tftc Senfe of their own Unworthinefs ari- 
 " fing from that Remembrance, will conti- 
 " nually excite in the Blefled frefh Ais of 
 " Love and Adoration of God, who has rai- 
 
 " fed them above all Sin and Temptatiop, 
 " and fix'd them in an everlafting State of 
 " Blifs and Glory. The Trial thu the Righ- 
 " teous underwent here, makes up fome put 
 " of their Happinefs in Heaven; and in 
 " what Degree foever their Happine s can 
 " be fuppofed to be, yet it is in fome 
 " mcafure incrcafed, and as it were en- 
 M deared to them, by reflecting on their 
 " former State of Trial, in which they 
 
 " were
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 tend to the Good of the whole, tho' they be a little inconvenient to 
 us. Now we have fhewn before that the Abufe of Reafon cannot 
 be prevented without Violence done to the Laws of the Univerfe, 
 without Detriment to Mankind and to ourfelves. If therefore a 
 Father could not refufe a Son his Inheritance, without breaking 
 the Laws of his Country, without injuring his Family, and laftly, 
 without the Lofs of his Son's Life, he would not deferve to be 
 blamed for giving him it. tho' he underftood that he would make 
 a bad ufe of it : Efpecially if he forefaw that the Brothers of this 
 Prodigal would take warning by his Error and become frugal, and 
 that the Eftate which he fpenr, would turn to their Benefit. The 
 fame mull be faid of the Phyfician who gives his Patient a Glafs 
 at his Requeft; which if he did not give, the Patient would im^- 
 mediately itab himfelf. Is he culpable if he compound for a lefs 
 Evil, in order to avoid a greater? More efpecially, if many labour 
 under the fame Diftemper, and would not be convinc'd of the dan- 
 ger of ufing Wine but by Experiment : would it not be better to 
 let one or two make the Experiment than that all fhould perifh ? 
 God therefore knowingly permits us fick Perfons to ufe Wine ; 
 for tho' we abufe it, yet our Condition will be better than if he 
 had not beftow'd it upon us. If any urge, that it is better not to 
 be at all, than to be miferable, and confequently that 'tis more 
 proper to deprive us of Life, than to fufFer us to abufe it. I an- 
 fweras before, That we mutt make a Diftinction in Mifery; for 
 where there is more Evil than Good, it is indeed preferable not to 
 be, than to be involv'd in this kind of Mifery, but that which 
 attends human Reafon is not fuch, by our own Judgment. For 
 we had rather be what we are than not be at all, or be with- 
 out Reafon. Elfe why are we unwilling to change our Condition 
 
 with 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 " were fubjeft to Temptation and Sin." I Eternity of Hell-Torments, Argument the 4th. 
 See the fame handled more diftin&ly in J p. 73, &c. or Scotfs Chrijlian Life, Vol. 5. 
 the firft of Mr. D'Oylfs four DifTertations, J p. 100. 
 CL10. or A-Bp. Dawei'i 5th Sermon on the]
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 with the Brutes, or Mad-men, if we do not think it better than 
 theirs ? 
 
 VI. But to conclude, Cotta in Cicero has neither brought perti- 
 nent Similitudes, nor given good Advice to Providence. For God, 
 as a Phyfician, does not give Wine to the fick Perfon to kill him ; 
 but to one that will die, in order to prevent his dying fooner. 
 Neither has the Divine Father given an Inheritance to his Sons 
 that they may wafte it, but has beftow'd it upon mch as will wafte 
 it, left they fhould want Neceflaries. Whereas, if Cotta had been 
 Counfellor to Providence, he would have advifed Phyficians to let 
 their Patients die with Thirft, left fome of them fhould drink too 
 much ; he would have perfuaded Parents either to kill their Chil- 
 dren, or never beget them, left they fhould make a bad ufe of their 
 Eftates when they came to Age. (109.) 
 
 VII. From 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 293 
 
 Cicero has 
 neither 
 brought ap- 
 pofite Simi- 
 les, nor gi- 
 ven good 
 Advice to 
 Providence 
 
 (109.) The fame holds good ag.iinft all 
 B.iy/e's Comparifons, Crit.Dicl. Art. Paulicians, 
 Rem. E. F. K A A, &c. p. 2488. where he 
 fays, that to permit Men to fin rather than 
 over-rule their Wills, is like a Mother that 
 lets her Daughters go to a Ball, where fhe is 
 fure they will lofe their Honour, and then 
 pleads in her own Juftification, " that fhe 
 " had no mind to reftrain the Liberty of her 
 " Daughters, nor to fhew a ay Diflruft of 
 ' them." Again f, If a Son fhould fee his 
 '* Father ready to throw himfelf out of the 
 " Window, either in a fit of Frenzy, or be- 
 " caufe he is troubled in Mind, he would 
 " do well to chain him, if he could not re* 
 " ftrain him otherwife. If a Queen fhould 
 " fall into the Water, any Footman that 
 " fhould get her out of it, either by embra- 
 " cing her, or taking her by the Hair (|, tho' 
 " he fnould pluck off above one half of it, 
 " would do a very good Aftion ; fhe would 
 " not certainly complain of his want of Re- 
 ** fpett to her. If any one fhould fuffer a 
 
 " Lady finely drefs'd to fall into a Precipice, 
 " would it not be a very foolifh Excufe to 
 " fay, that it had not been poflible to flop 
 " her without fpoiling her Ribbons and 
 " Head-drefs ? " And to name no mere*, 
 
 " To have regard to the Free-Will of a 
 " Man, and carefully to abftain from laying 
 " any reflraint upon his Inclination, when he 
 *' is going to lofe his Innocence for ever, to 
 " be eternally damn'd, can you call that a 
 " lawful Obfervation of the Laws of Liberty? 
 " You would be lefs unreafonable if you 
 " would fay to a Man who gets a Fall near 
 " you, and breaks his Leg, that which bin- 
 " der'd us /rem preventing your Fall is, that 
 " tve to ere afraid t$ undo fome Folds of your 
 " Gown, we bad fo great a refptcl for its Sy- 
 " me try, that we would not undertake to fpoil 
 " it, and we thought it was much better to 
 " let you run the hazard of breaking your 
 * Bones," 1 ' &c- 
 
 In all which this Author evidently miftakes 
 the Cafe, by comparing the De/lruilion of Free- 
 
 Will 
 
 f Crit. Did. p. 2497. 
 
 || Thus S^ Chriflina was taken out of a Lake at Stockholm?. 
 
 * P- 2497-
 
 294 
 
 The Objec- 
 tion of Epi- 
 curus pro- 
 pofed which 
 accufes God 
 of Impotence 
 if he was not 
 able ; or of 
 Envy, if he 
 was able to 
 removeEvilf. 
 
 'Tis a Con- 
 tradiction, 
 that all E- 
 vils be re- 
 moved 
 from crea- 
 ted Be- 
 ings : God 
 is not im- 
 potent, tier 
 
 Of Moral Evil 
 
 VII. From the fame Principles we may folve that ftrong Objec- 
 tion of Epicurus againft. Providence, which Laclantius enforces in his 
 Book De Ira Dei -j-, and, as fome think, does not fufficiently an- 
 fwer. It flands thus: *' Either God is willing to remove Evils, 
 " and not able, or able and not willing, or neither able nor wil- 
 " ling. If he be willing and not able, he is impotent, which can- 
 " not be apply'd to the Deity: If he be able and not willing, he 
 " is envious; which is equally inconiiftent with the Nature of 
 " God. If he be neither willing nor able, he is both envious and 
 " impotent, and confequently no God. If he be both willing 
 " and able, which is the only thing that anfwers to the Notion 
 M of a God, from whence come Evils ? Or why does he not re- 
 " move them ? 
 
 VIII. We muft take the third of thofe four Branches of his 
 puzling Argument ; viz. That God neither will nor can remove E- 
 vils. (no.) Yet we deny the Confequence. He is neither to be e- 
 fleemed Envious nor Impotent, becaufe he does not work Contra- 
 dictions : 
 
 efore becaufe he does not remove them. 
 
 NOTE S, 
 
 Will (for that is the only thing, as we have 
 prov'd, that can prevent the abufe of it) 
 which Will has been fhewn to be the very 
 Life and Soul of Man ; to fuch mere trifles as 
 tearing his Hair, or difcompofing his Habit : 
 Whereas, from the foregoing account of the 
 ineftimable Worth of Liberty to each Indivi- 
 dual, and the many Advantages that arife in 
 common, even from the abufe of it, it plain- 
 ly appears, that to abridge, or which is the 
 very fame, to deprive a Man of Liberty for 
 fear he fhould abufe it, would, in regard to 
 him, be juft as good as to knock him on the 
 Head for fear he mould maim or disfigure 
 
 himfelf. And wirh.refpeft to the Publick, he 
 would be far more unreafonible who fhould 
 defire the abfence of this Liberty, beciu-fi 
 of its frequent abufe, than he who fhould 
 wifli that there were no fuch things as Fire, 
 Wind, or Water, in the World, becaufe fo 
 many Men, Houfes, and Ships are deilroy'd by 
 them. As the reft of Bay/e's elaborate Similes 
 are founded on the fame Mifreprefentation, 
 one hint of this kind is, I think, enough to 
 invalidate them. 
 
 (no.) Leibnkz would rather fay, " that 
 " God could take them away, but he was 
 " not willing to do it abiblutely ; and for a 
 
 very 
 
 f ; 12. p.435. Camlr. Edit.
 
 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 395 
 
 dictions : But it is a Contradiction that all Evils mould be remo- 
 ved, without removing the whole Univerfe; which would be the 
 greateft of all Evils. For fome kind of Evils adhere (as we have 
 often declared) to the very Natures of things, and cannot be remo- 
 ved while any created Nature continues. For when a Circle is once 
 made, all the Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference, 
 mud neceffarily be equal; neither is God impotent becaufe he can- 
 not make them unequal while it continues to be a Circle: In like 
 manner, when he has made a Creature, he mull neceffarily tolerate 
 the Evil of Imperfection in it, which is as efTential to it as an 
 Equality of the Radij is to the Circle. When therefore Matter, 
 Motion and Free-Will are conftituted, he muft neceffarily permit 
 Corruption of things, and the abufe of Liberty, or fomething 
 worfe. For thefe cannot be feparated (as was fhewn) without a 
 Contradiction. God therefore is no more impotent becaufe he can- 
 not remove thefe Evils from things while the things themfelves re- 
 main, than becaufe he cannot feparate an Equality of the Radij 
 from a Circle. The Confequence then is falfe which charges God 
 with Impotence becaufe he cannot remove Evils. 
 
 IX. Neither is that AfTertion lefs falfe which attributes it to Envy God always 
 that he will not. For he that always wills the beft, and the leaft fJXof it' 
 of many Evils, is abfolutely Good, and the fartheft from Envy: and vils, and 
 we have fhewn that this is the Cafe with refpect to God. If a l, * ercfor ? is 
 
 - not envious. 
 
 Perfon 
 
 N 7 E S. 
 
 41 very good reafon, becaufe he fliould have 
 " taken away the Good at the fame time, and 
 " becaufe he fliould have taken away more 
 " Good than Evil f." 
 
 The Anfwer */"La6tantius is as follows. " De- 
 " us poteft quicquid volet, & imbccillitas vcl 
 " invidia in Deo nulla eft : poteft igitur nu- 
 " la tollere, fednonvult, nee ideo tamen in- 
 " vidus eft, id circo enim non tollit quia fa- 
 " pientiam (ficut edocui) fimul tribuit, & plus 
 " eft boni ac jucunditatis in fapientia, quam 
 " in malis moleftiae ; faplcntia enim fa- 
 
 " cit ut etiam Deum cognofcamus & per earn 
 " cognitionem, immortal itatcm aflequainur, 
 " quod eft fummnmj&onum. Itaque nifi pri- 
 " us malum agnoverimuj, ncc poterimus ag 
 " nofcere Bonum, fed hoc non videt Epicn- 
 " nu, nee alius qnifquam, ft tollantur mala 
 " tolli pariter S..pientiam, nee ulla in ha- 
 " mine remanere virtutis veftigia, cujus ratio 
 " in fuftinenda & fuperanda malorum a ccrbi- 
 " tateconfift.it- Itaque propter exiguum com- 
 " penJium fublatorum malorum, maximo Se 
 " vero & proprio nobis bono carcftmus. 
 
 f Rcmarjues, p. 488.
 
 2 9 6 Of Moral Evil. 
 
 Perfon had his Choice either to abolifli or not to abolifh Evil, he 
 would be malicious if he did not abolifli it. But when the choice 
 is between this and a greater Evil, he that choofes the lefs is far 
 from being malicious. The Divine Goodnefs therefore reduces God 
 to this Difficulty, that he mufl choofe to make either no Creature at 
 all, or an imperfect one; either no fuch thing as Matter and Mo- 
 tion, or tolerate Contrariety and Corruption in things ; either no 
 free Agent, or admit a Power of finning. He muft necerTarily have 
 chofen one of thefe, and 'tis eafy to fay whether of them was more 
 directly oppofite to Envy. 
 God could X. To fpeak my Thoughts, I dare confidently, but with Reve- 
 concdv'd^o rcnce > pronounce, that God would nei her have been infinitely pow- 
 be infinitely erful nor good, if he could not have made any thing which we call 
 powerful, if E v il. For there are fome things pofiible which are not confident 
 able to ere: te with each other, nay are repugnant and mutually deftructive, i.e. 
 imperfea Be- are Evils to each other: If God were unable to produce any of 
 cStures? thefe, how would he be infinitely powerful, fince he could not do 
 or things that all that is poffible ? Nor would it be lefs injurious to his Goodnefs to 
 are contrary j^ unw }H} n g f or bv this means his Power muft lie idle and ne- 
 
 to each o- . / 
 
 ther; i.e. ver effect any thing at all; fince nothing can be fimply Good and 
 Evils: nor CX empt from all manner of Evil, but God himfelf. If therefore 
 Good, if he the Divine Goodnefs had deny'd Exiftence to created Beings, on ac- 
 hadbeen count of the concomitant Evils, he might really have been efteem- 
 Wmfeif^and 1 e d Envious, fince he had allow'd none to exift befide himfelf, and 
 deny'd Exi- while he refufed to admit of any kind of Evil, he would have re- 
 ften " t0 ^ jeded all the Good. Thus vaniihes this Herculean Argument, which 
 
 induced the 'Epicureans to difcard the good Deity, and the Manichc- 
 
 ans to fubftitute an Evil one. 
 Epicurus xi. Epicurus then is both a Deceiver and deceived himfelf, 
 
 is deceiv'd when from the prefent Evils he concludes againfl: the Omnipotence 
 who en- and Goodnefs of the Deity, Whereas on the contrary God would 
 to attri- neither have been powerful nor Good if he had not tolerated E- 
 bute im- vils. From a competition or (if we may be allow'd the expreffion) 
 P dEnv a C n flift of two Infinites, i. e. Omnipotence and Goodnefs, Evils ne- 
 to the Dei- . cefTarily 
 
 ty, when 
 
 he ought to have inferr'd the higheft Power and Goodnefs.
 
 Of Moral Evil ^ * ~ 
 
 cefTarily arife. Thefe Attributes amicably confpire together, and yet 
 reflrain and limit each other. There is a kind of Struggle and Op- 
 pofkion between them, whereof the Evils in Nature bear the Sha- 
 dow and Refemblance. Here then, and no where elfe, may we find 
 the Primary and moll certain Rife and Origin of Evils j and here 
 only muft we look for that celebrated Principle of the Antients 
 
 The Peftilential Strife and Bloody Fight. 
 
 Empedocles. 
 
 A P P E N- 
 
 Q~q
 
 3*8 
 
 ! 
 
 APPENDIX: 
 
 Concerning the Divine Laws. 
 
 Why God made Laws when he knew that they 
 would not be obferv'd. 
 
 r pofitivc 
 
 The Divine * /"' * H E Divine Laws are either thofe which God has implan- 
 Lawsareei- tea 1 in the Nature of every Being, or thofe which he has 
 
 ther natunl JL publim'd to Mankind in a particular manner, by certain 
 
 Mejj'engers chofen and fent for this Purpofe. For fince a 
 haw is the Will of a fuperior fujficiently promulg'd to an Inferior , 
 and attended with the Hope or Fear of Reward or Punijhment : 'tis, 
 plain that God may be conceiv'd to nave made this Declaration of 
 his Will to his Creatures two Ways : Firft, by giving them fuch a 
 Nature as requires that fome things be done, and others avoided, in 
 order to its Prefer vation : thofe things which are made known to us 
 in this manner, are commanded or forbidden, we fay, by the Law 
 of Nature : and that Lav/ which thus difcovers itfelf to our Under- 
 Handing
 
 ATTENDIX. 
 
 derftanding we look upon as the Will of God promulg'd to his Crea- 
 tures: For we are very certain that God, according to his Goodnefs, 
 wills the Good and Prefervaticn of all things which he himfelf has 
 made, as far as is pofllble : and confequently hates any thing that is 
 hurtful to the Creature. 
 
 II. Now it muft be obferv'd that thefe natural Laws are either Particular 
 Univerfal or P articular - y and 'tis fit the particular ones fhould give Lav '. s 0U S ht 
 way to the more Univerfal, and thofe of lefs Moment to the more [ mor/ge- 6 
 important. For inftance, 'tis of the Nature of Body that it be capa- nenl on<,s 
 ble of Motion, that it be ftopp'd and broken in Pieces by meeting of C Rcp4- nd 
 with others in Motion, and this is the Univerfal Law of Bodies. But nancy could 
 it is of the Nature of an Animal to preferve itfelf, and ufe its utmoft ^-^ a * 
 Endeavour that the Parts of its Body be not feparated or dilTolv'd,, 
 and this is the particular Law of Animals. 
 
 Now fince thefe Laws are fometimes inconfiftent, it is reafonable 
 that the latter, as being a particular one, and of lefs Confequcnce, 
 mould yield to the former: and this is evidently the Will of God. 
 If it be afk'd, Why did God make Laws which in fome refpect inter- 
 fere with one another ? I anfwer, as before, That this could not be 
 avoided without a greater Evil : Since therefore of two Evils the 
 lefs is to be chofen, God wilFd that particular Laws, and thofe of 
 lefs confequence, fhould give place to the more Univerfal and thofe 
 of greater Importance, rather than remove that Inconfiftency, for 
 there arifes lefs Inconvenience to Nature from thence. 
 
 III. The fame muft. be faid of thofe Laws which relate to Mora- The fae 
 lity. 'Tis the Univerfal Law of Free Agents, that they fhall pleafc JjSjyJ^ 
 themfelves by Election, but there are fome things eligible which may which relate 
 be prejudicial to fome particular Beings. Now it is better, as was !^ thc . moril 
 faid before, that Particulars be injur'd, than that the Univerfal Law 
 of Free Agents be violated. We mult fuppofe then that God willed 
 this as the lefs Evil of the two. Men are permitted therefore 10 a- 
 bufe their Free- Will, and it is necelTary that God fhould tolerate ci- 
 ther this Inconvenience or a greater. But it is not at all necelTary 
 that Man fhould make an Evil Choice j therefore he alone is faulty j 
 for it proceeds from his Act that God is reduced to a neceflity of choo- 
 
 fmg the leaft among many Evils. 
 
 IV. From 
 
 Q_q 2
 
 3 oo AT T E NT) I X. 
 
 IV. From hence it appears that all the Laws of Nature are always 
 ^^^obferv'd according to the Will and Intent of God. For he will'd that 
 gry with Sin- the Particular fhould give place to the General ones, and that Man 
 hiTwiTfs ^ lou ^ ^ n rat ^ er t ^ lan t> e driven from Sin by force. You'll fay, Why 
 always done, then is he angry at Sinners, fince nothing is done againil his Will ? I 
 anfwer: When Anger is attributed to God, 'tis after the manner of 
 Men -J- whereas it is ordcr'd and effected by the very Nature and 
 Conftitution of things, that whoever does any thing in oppofition to 
 any Law of Nature, tho' it be a particular one, fhall bring fome In- 
 convenience upon himfelf. By which contrivance God has taken care 
 that the very lead Law fhould not be violated rafhly and without 
 Neceffity. When an Offender therefore, who willingly breaks a par- 
 ticular Law, brings certain Mifery upon himfelf, God who wifely 
 coupled thefe together is faid to be angry : Becaufe a Man in Anger 
 would not take any other or more effectual Revenge on the Perfon that 
 provoked him ; and the Evil which naturally attends a bad Election, 
 is to be efleem'd a Punifhment inflicted as it were by an Angry 
 God. 
 worTS to V. As to the fecond fort of Divine Laws, viz. the Pcftthe ; 'tis 
 the Laws of certain, that God, who is the Author of Nature and eftablifh'd the 
 Nature, and L aws of it, can either alter them or add to them when he fees it pro- 
 rance u t hat he per. Neither does he want Means whenever he pleafes, to affure 
 intends to do Mankind that he will do it. When therefore we find any Altera- 
 orig^n n fp^rJ n in the Laws of Nature, we may from hence conclude that God 
 fuive Laws, demands our Attention. And hereupon we efteem the Promulga- 
 andaReve- t - on Q f a new L aw recommended to us by this Token, to be 
 an authentic Declaration of the Will of God. In this man- 
 ner were the Mofaic and Evangelic Laws eftablifhed j viz. by Mi- 
 racles. 
 Laws VI. But it is ufually afk'd, Why did God eftablilh and promulge 
 
 " e ^ e of , thofe Laws which he knew Men would not obferve? It mult be 
 informing anfwer'd, That thefe Laws are Means of acquainting Free Agents 
 Free-Ao w j r j 1 w h at j s expedient for them, and of moving them to the choice 
 
 Sents or * _ 
 
 what is Ot 
 
 u;et'ul or prejudicial to them 
 
 f Se? Chap. i. 3. pir. 10. an 2 Note. E.
 
 
 ATTENDIX. 
 
 of it. Neither does their Nature admit of any that are more effica- 
 cious: for it is fuch as .muft be perfuaded and not compell'd. Not- 
 withstanding therefore God knew that his Laws would not be cb- 
 ferv'd by all, yet he propofes them to all, for by this Means a great 
 many learn their true Intereft, thankfully embrace the Lau s and o- 
 bey them; and the reft, are no worfe for them, fince they would be 
 involv'd in the fame Evils which they feel from the Sanclion of the 
 Laws, and perhaps greater, tho' thefe Laws had never been, (in.) 
 
 But 
 
 361 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (in) 1 Tis a very ufeful Observation which 
 our Author makes in this place, and illuftrates 
 in the following Section, par. 3. ciz. that the 
 Divine Laws (etpecially thofe of the Cbrijlian 
 Difpenfation) are chiefly Declarations of the na- 
 tural and neceiiary Effe&s of Sin, or Direclions 
 and Means to avoid them; which neceflury 
 Effects are conceived to be the real Sanclion 
 cf thefe Laws. Confequently thefe Laws can- 
 not properly bring us into a worfe State than 
 we fhould have been in without them. 
 They do not introduce a new Train of arbi- 
 trary and additional Evils, but on the con- 
 trary are defign'd in pure Goodnefs to lefl'en 
 the Number of the old ones, to forewarn us 
 of the natural Confequences of our own Ads 
 and Habits, and prevent thofe Moral Evils 
 to which we are expofed by the very confti- 
 tution of our Being,. which the univerfal 
 Law of Liberty makes it poffible for us to in- 
 cur, and impoflible for God to hinder, by any 
 other means, as has been fhewn above. Far- 
 ther ; this Notion, that moll of the Mifery 
 both in this World and the next, is the necef" 
 J'ary Confequence of finful Actions, according to 
 the fix'd Laws of Nature, rather than any po- 
 fitive Punifhment immediately inflicted by the 
 Deity, will, lam apt to think, have the grea- 
 teft Influence on molt Men to deter them from 
 fuch Actions. I am fure I find myfelf more 
 deeply affedted with this Reflection, that Mi- 
 fery will follow of Courfe upon fome certain 
 
 Pra&ice?, and that by indulging them, I na- 
 turally and neceflarily deflroy myfelf, than I 
 fliould be by a Profpett of the very fame De- 
 gree of Pain threatned as a Punifhment for 
 fuch Practices. And the Reafon of this is c- 
 vident : I am apt Hill to hope that the latter 
 may poflibly be remitted : but the former 
 leaves no room for Hope. Again, A due 
 attention to this Doclrine, that all our moral 
 Happinefs in this World mull be of our own 
 making, and that difordered, evil Affe&ions, 
 irregular and perverfe Habits, sV. will con- 
 ftitute the greateft part of our Hell in the next, 
 (which might be fhewn in the fame manner as 
 was hinted concerning virtuous Habits, in 
 Note 103. but is render'd unneceiTary by the 
 Authors there mention'd.) This Doctrine, I 
 fay, if rightly underflood and apply'd, would 
 difcover the weaknefs of all fuch pretences to 
 Salvation as are built upon the bare Belief of a 
 Confidence in what any other has done or 
 can do for us ; or even of what we do our- 
 felves purely by way of Opus operatum. i.e. as 
 ultimately reiving on the Dare Difcharge of or 
 ny Duty, and not ufing and applying it as a 
 mcins to fome farther End, v. g. on Prayer , 
 as the mere Labour of the Lips, on the Sacra- 
 ment as a Charm, on Repentance as a fimple 
 Aft entitling us to Happinefs, &r7. In fhorr, 
 of any thing which does not enter the Heart 
 and improve the Temper. If Heaven be not 
 fo much the Reward of Religion, as the na- 
 tural 

 
 A T T E N T> I X. 
 
 granting that fome who tranfgrefs the Laws meet with greater and 
 more Inconveniencies than they would have done without them, 'tis 
 better that fome fhould fuffer Inconveniencies thro/ their own fault, 
 than that all fhould be deprived of the Benefit of the Divine Laws ; 
 God therefore, out of infinite Goodnefs, which is always inclined to 
 the belt, promulg'd thofe Laws which he knew all Men would 
 not obferve. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 tural Confequence of a Religious Frame of Mind, 
 and vice verfa ; then how abfurd is it for us 
 who are afpiring after that State, to flop by 
 the way, to reft in any particular Acts of Re- 
 ligion as arbitrary Inftitutions procuring, and 
 as it were pur chafing it for us, inftead of u- 
 fing them as, what they really are, fit Inftru- 
 ments to work out our Salvation, by producing 
 
 this frame of Mind in us, as proper Helps 
 and Afliftances enabling us to acquire this Hea- 
 venly Temper ? And on the other Side, how 
 vain mull be our Hopes of efcaping Hell hy 
 any fuch Methods as thefe, if we ftill carry our 
 Hell within us. See pan i. of the follow 
 ing Seftion. 
 
 
 SECT. 
 

 
 
 HI II 
 
 ATTENVIX. 303 
 
 SECT. IL 
 
 Concerning Divine Rewards and Punijhments. 
 
 LIT was proper to fay fomething concerning thefe, flnce Punifh- 
 
 J ment is a natural Evil, viz. Pain, Difappointment of Appetite, ^natural' 
 or Damage annex'd to a wrong Choice, by a Forefight whereof we Evil connec- 
 might be deterr'd from making a wrong Choice. In thefe confifts Sprayed * 
 the Power and Efficacy of Laws, nor would they be of any force Choice 
 without them. Now Good or Evil, /. e. Rewards and Punifh- 
 ments, may be annex'd, either by Nature, or by Laws of pofi- 
 tive Inftitution. 
 
 II. As to Nature, all Evil is prejudicial to it, /. e. interrupts its Evil j s vio . 
 Courfe : Evil therefore proceeds from fome Violence done to Nature, icncc done 
 and that which offers Violence muft necelfarily fuffer it; for every [^ t Naturc ; . 
 natural Action has Re-action join'd with it. According to the Laws tuni Aeiion 
 of Mechanifm then Evil done to another is for the mod part re- has re -aciion 
 pair'd with Evil to the Doer, i. e. with Punimment. By which dcn7toit" 
 piece of Machinery or Contrivance, God has manifefted both his therefore he 
 Wifdom and Goodnefs. For by this means he has taken effectual S? t I does 
 
 j Violence 
 
 Care that none mould trnnfgrefs the Laws of Nature without Pu- muft nccefla- 
 nimment, or offer unnecefTary Violence to the Appetites of others ; r ty fu ^cr 
 or if it were neceffary to offer it, yet that it mould not be without th \ t c n n "* 
 fome Inconvenience to him that does offer it. For it is better that a may fin 
 Creature fhould be able to provide for its own Safety with fome In- vv,thout Pu " 
 
 niftim cnt - 
 
 conveniences.
 
 jet 
 
 AT T E N D 1 X. 
 
 conveniencics, than that it mould be at Liberty to offer neediefs Vio- 
 lence to others, and the Laws belonging to their particular Nature 
 be broken to no manner of end: For by that means there would 
 be more Evils in Nature than there are at prefent, and they would 
 be multiply'd unnecefiarily. Hence it appears how worthy it is of 
 God to have framed the Nature of things in fuch a manner, that 
 from the very Conftitution of them, the Intemperate, Injurious, the 
 Thief, Robber, Adulterer, Proud, Envious, &c. fhould have fome- 
 thing to dread. If any one aik, why there are not fuch Punifhments 
 as might effectually imprint a lively fenfe upon our Minds, and 
 thereby totally reftrain us from a wrong Choice ? I anfwer : A 
 greater Evil muft not be done on account of a lefs ; but if the Pu- 
 nifhments and Dread of them were increas'd to fuch a Degree, as to 
 be fufficient to prevent all kind of Evil, they themfelves would be 
 the greateft of all Evils, and the dread of them would more deeply 
 affect, and be a greater Affliction to the Minds of Men, even of 
 thofe who would not do amifs, than the Evils themfelves are, for 
 the Prevention of which thefe Punifhments are propofed by God. 
 It was therefore ft that there mould be feme meafure in Punifh- 
 ments ; viz. left by being always prefent to the Minds of Mortals, 
 they fhould prove a greater Prejudice to our Eafe and Happinefs, 
 than thofe very Evils which are prohibited under the Penalty of them 
 would be, were we forced to undergo them. 
 
 III. As to the Punifhments which God has affix'dby way of &z;z?/0;z 
 
 acquaint' as ^ t0 Pf lt }' ve Laws, we mull affirm, that they are to be efteem'd as Ad- 
 
 with the Pu- monitions and Notices of the Mifchiefs confequent upon evil Elec- 
 
 nl J} n ? ems ,tions, rather than that God himfelf will immediately inflict them. 
 
 deprav'd E- Natural Confcience is for the melt part fufficiently able to inform us 
 
 legions from what is Good and what is Evil : but it was impoffible for Nature 
 
 the thin&n- t;o acquaint us with all the Confequences which attend our Actions in 
 
 ther than in- an infinite Train and Continuance of things- Now, left we fhould 
 
 flift new k e i n volv'd in Evils unawares, and contrary to our Expectations, God 
 
 has inform'd us by pofltive Laws what our Condition muft be if we 
 
 will indulge ourfeives in Evil Elections. And has promulg'd them 
 
 by way of Punijhments denoune'd, rather than by fimple Prediction 
 
 that
 
 A P P E N 2> I X. . 3 o^ 
 
 that they might enter more deeply into our Minds, and oblige us to 
 take care of ourfelves. 
 
 IV. But if there be any thing which is not reducible to this head, That the de- 
 and feems to prove an immediate Infliftion by the Deity, neither is treeing and 
 that done without Reafon. For it is fit that God mould remove that p^iftSentt 
 Being out of the World which cannot be made confident with the prevents 
 Good of the Univerfe : and reform that by Chaftifement which sreater EviI: 
 would otherwife, thro' its irregular Motion, prove offenfive to the 
 Author, and all about it. Punifhments then are annex 'd to Evil E- 
 kctions, in order to prevent them, and inflicted to correcl and amend 
 
 the Offenders, or to deter others from the like Offences. If therefore 
 the Appointment and Infliction of Punimments prevent greater Evils 
 than they are themfelves ; it follows that God has chofen the better 
 Part in eftablifhing and exacting them. 
 
 V. It may be afk'd, how this can agree with the Punimments of , T ; S ask , d . 
 the Wicked, which the Chrifiian Religion declares to be Eternal. For the tirft place, 
 in the nrft place, 'tis plain that they are not inflicted either to reform I 10 wthis "|\ 
 
 be rcconci] d 
 
 the Guilty (for there is no room for Reformation in Hell) or to deter with eternal 
 others from the like Guilt: for Sin will be at an end, and the very Punishments, 
 pombility of finning taken away bef re they (hall be inflicted. They^ CI J, c c;ip bje 
 can neither be of ufe to the Dead therefore, nor to the Living; for either of re- 
 they are kept fecret while they might be of any ufe. Confequently py^f/^ 
 there feems to be fome other end of thefe Punimments, viz. to make of being 'a 
 Satisfaction to the Divine Vengeance for the Injury and Affront offer'd ' v; j rnln s t0 
 to his Majefly. 
 
 VI. Secondly, Thefe Eternal Torments appear to be not very a- , T5$ ask , d 
 greeable to the Divine OEconomy in another refpect. For it is to be in the fe- 
 oblerv'd that God has framed all things, rnd difpofed them in fuch a ho^f Puni fh 
 manner, that nothing can repent of its having been made by him : m ents can 
 for when it is come to this, that its Mifery exceeds its Pleafure, the J> e eternal, 
 Being perilhes, and is withdrawn from both. Not to exijl tJiW-aweeable 
 fore, or not to perceive any means of Relief, is the very worn: Con- to Good 
 dition, as was ihewn before f. A violent Object not only deftroys ^ c l r ca _ 
 
 the ted all things 
 in fuch a 
 manner that nothing mi^ht repent of its being created. 
 
 t Ch. 4 . V 8. pir. 5. 
 
 R r
 
 306 ATTEND! X. 
 
 the Scnfory, but takes away the Scnfe itfelf} the Divine Goodnefs 
 providing that no Creature mould be worfe by its Exiftence than if 
 it had not exifted. And as far as appears, thinking Beings ought to 
 be dealt with after the fame manner, viz. When Pain, Sorrow, Fear, 
 Anxiety, and the reft of the Paffions and Affections incrcafe to fo 
 great a Degree that the Mind receives more Evil than Good from 
 the Senfe of its Exiftence, 'tis reafonable that the Excefs of thefc 
 fhould extinguish Thought itfelf, as the Excefs of bodily Pains de- 
 ftroys the Senfe : Otherwife thefe miferable Beings feem to receive no 
 Benefit from God, fince Providence has reduced them to a State worfe 
 thin that Non-exiftence in which it found them *. Neither does it 
 feem a fuflkient Vindication of the Divine Goodnefs, to fay, that 
 this befalls them thro' their own Fault, for it is hardly agreeable to 
 Goodnefs to have placed any Being in that State which was obno- 
 xious to fuchexcefliveMifery : For who would choofe Exiftence atten- 
 ded with a danger that fo very much overbalances it ? He is not 
 a wife Man that expofes all his Eftate to hazard, nor a good Man 
 that obliges any one to do it. 
 "Tis ask'd, VII. 3^/)'. Whatever is perpetual muft have a natural and perpetual 
 thirdly, how Cauje-, for a perpetual Miracle is not to be expected. If therefore 
 fa^iubfift 18 tne Punifhments of the Wicked be eternal, it feems necefTary for 
 without a thefe Punifhments to arife from the Laws and Conftitution of Na- 
 natural caufe. ture p or j t j s f carce conceivable how a State of Violence fhould 
 be perpetual. I have propofed thefe Objections at length, left I 
 mould feem to have declined them on account of their Difficulty, 
 
 (112.) 
 
 VIII. As 
 NOTES. 
 
 (112.) The chief of thofc Authors who feem 
 to oppofc the ftrift, abfolute Eternity of Hell- 
 Torment;, are A-Bp. Tillotfon, T. Burnet, de 
 Statu Mi,rt. Ch. 10. p. 290, &t. T. Szuinden 
 in the Appendix to his Book on Hell. The 
 Author of the Annotitions cm Lux Orientals, 
 p. 73, 74 5. Lolltler in his Impartial Enquiry, 
 p. 105, 6jV. and his EJ]'.,y en RtveaCd Religion, 
 p. 1 42, 5V. Wbitby Appendix to the 2d TbeJ/'. 
 
 * See Match. 26. 24. <wiMark 14. 21. 
 
 Bayle, Epifcopius, and the Fratres Poloni. See 
 alfo Fafoicii Deleftus Argumentorum, isfc. C. 47. 
 p: 720. concerning fome Pieces in the P be- 
 nix, Sec. 
 
 Some of thofe who have particularly in- 
 filled on the Defence of it are A-Bp. Dazves, 
 Jenhin, Fiddes, Lupton, Lake, Sherlock on Pro- 
 vidence, Ch. 2. and Difcourfe concerning the 
 Happinefs of good Men and Punifhment of 
 
 the
 
 AT T E N I A 307 
 
 VIII. As to the firft Objection, I anfwer: It appears from the Light To the 
 of Nature, that there {hall be future Punifiments but not that thefe firft. \\% an- 
 ihall be Eternal ; we mult not therefore enquire of Natural Reafon { t f^[ *' 
 why they are inflicted; for they belong to reveal'd Religion, by which nifliments 
 they are denounced: that is, there may be a Reafon for them, but fuch? re made 
 as is beyond the mere natural Sagacity of Man to difcover. Now we U s byVeU- 
 jind many things of this kind in Nature ; it does not therefore follow, lation, and 
 becaufe the Goodnefs of God has reveal'd to us that the Punimment of [!| ut n f t od 
 the Wicked mall endure for ever, that he is alio obliged to reveal why therefore 
 and how that comes to pafs. For perhaps it may be above the Power obl, s ,c jt 
 of our Mind to conceive it in the prefent ftate of Things. or why 
 
 they are 
 fo : for perhaps the Reafcn is above our Ccrrprehenfion. 
 
 IX. Secondly, Who will undertake to mew that the Eternal Pu- rt does noc 
 nimment of the Wicked has no Tendency towards confirming good '^ the Pu- 
 Men in the Choice of their Duty? (113.) If God make ufe of Means nifliments of 
 for that End, and do not immediately exert his Omnipotence alone, m-yjjJeof^Jfe 
 fcarce could any other more effectual means be found out to make to the Good, 
 the BlefTed approve themfelves in their Choice conformed to the Di- 
 vine Will, and perfevere therein, than the continual Contemplation of 
 
 thofe miferable Beings who have done otherwife. Election is matter 
 of Freedom, and not to be excited or prevented by other means than 
 
 R r 2 a Rcpre- 
 
 N O T E S. 
 
 the Wicked, &s. Rjmcr, Part ift. Chap. 7. 
 Nubc Is Conference tuith a TheiJI, Part 3. p. 309, 
 <tc. Scotrs Cbrijlian Life, vol. c, p. 91, &c. 
 Svo. and Dilcourfe 22d. p.435, &c. 2d vol. of 
 his Works, Fol. Patrick, WitneJfesofChriftia- 
 nity, Part 2d. Bates on the Exijlence of God, 
 'Jc. Ch. 12. 
 
 (nv) See A-Bp. Datoes's Serm. 5. p. 73, 
 C>. or Note toS. Or it may be for the per- 
 petual Benefit .ind Improvement of fome other 
 Sv'.lems; fee the Litter end of Note 106. Or 
 perhaps for a ilanding Monument and Warning 
 to the Heathen Woild during their State of 
 
 Probation, which, for ought we know, njay 
 be extended beyond this Life, tho' we Chri- 
 flians have no reafon to expeel any farther 
 Trval. 
 Sec Scott's Cbrifian Life, %vo. 2d Vol. p. 
 
 35 1 - 
 
 Something of this kind, I humbly appre- 
 hend, mull be concciv'd as the Reafon for 
 Hell-Torments, in order to make them confi- : 
 llent with perfect Goodnefs f, whatever we 
 fuppofe the Nature of thefe Torments to be ; 
 of which below. 
 
 f Sec Note 23.
 
 3 o8 AT T E N7> I X 
 
 a Reprefentation of Good or Evil to the Underftanding. Since there- 
 fore God has undertaken to conduct and preferve an almoft infinite 
 Multitude of thinking Beings to all Eternity, thro' all the Change.? 
 and Succefiions of things, in as great a degree of Happinefs as pof- 
 fible, without Violence done to Elections j where is the Wonder if he 
 leave a few to the Mifery which they brought upon themfelves there- 
 by to give the reft a Warning how much they ought to ftand upon 
 their guard againft the like? There's no neceflity therefore to attri- 
 bute eternal Punilhment to the Divine Vengeance (nor is there proper- 
 ly any fuch thing in God, but it is afcribed to him, as other human 
 Paflions are in condefcention to our Capacity.) For fince thefePuniili- 
 ments may be conceiv'd to promote the good of the whole, they 
 may arife from the Goodnefs, and not the Vengeance of the Deity. 
 To the fe- X. As to the fecond Objection, The Matter is yet in debate, whe- 
 cond 'tis re- ther it were better to be miferable than not to be at all, and there are 
 jffiiJi?:. Arguments on both Sides. (114.) 'Tis manifeft, that what the Ob- 
 
 the matter is . e> . \ ' ' . . . I 
 
 yet in debatejecrion mentions, viz. thofe Evils which overbalance the Defire and 
 whether it isj a ppi ne f s f Ljf e> p Ut an en j t0 jjg. itfelf, and that fuch Objects as 
 
 bemhferable are hurtful to the Senfe at length deftroy it. The fame feems to hold 
 or not to be good in thinking Subftances, viz. thofe things which affect the Mind to 
 Misery of the a higher Degree than it is able to bear, may in like manner put an 
 Damned ma> end to it. For they may be fuppofed either to drive us to Madnefs, 
 H iV kc j that or fe far to diforder the thinking; Faculty, as to make us think of 
 
 of Mad-men . hi * i i i~ i / 
 
 nothing at all. Who can tell then whether the Puminment of the 
 Wicked may not lead them into a kind of Phrenfie and Madnefs ; 
 Thus they may indeed be very miferable, and become a fad Spectacle 
 to others ; they may be fenfible of their Mifery alf, and flrive againft 
 
 It 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (114.) A mod elaborate Difputation on this 
 Subjeft may be feen in Bp. Barlow**, Remains, 
 p. 470, &V. But our Author, in the laft Sub- 
 feel of his Book, par. 5, &c. very reafonably 
 giants, That Nsn exijlence becomes preferable to 
 Exijlence wbsnever the Sum of Mifery exceeds that 
 of Happinefs, and Evil becomes predominant in 
 the whole ; and therefore, if he takes this Que- 
 
 ftion in the fame Senfe, he had no great occafion 
 to ftart it. Nay the Queftio'n will be about an 
 abfolute I'mpofftbility, if any Mifery which o- 
 verballances the Happinefs of Life do ipfo faclo 
 put an end to Life, as our Author maintains 
 in this very Paragraph : Concerning which. 
 Notion fee Note 55.
 
 IJLT T E N Z> I X. 30? 
 
 it with all their Power but while they don't obferve or believe that 
 it is founded in perverfe, Election, they may hug themfelves in the 
 Caufe the Effects whereof they abhor ; being ft ill wife in their own 
 Opinion, and as it were pleaiing themfelves in their Mifery. 
 
 Thus, the more they labour under it, the more they embrace the 
 Caufe of it, and thereby become their own hindrance from ever get- 
 ting free; and vv ill not fuffer themfelves to be anything but what 
 they are. This we fee done daily by mad and frantic Perfons, and 
 reckon it a part of their Unhappinefs. The Divine Goodnefs there- 
 fore is not to be charg'd with Cruelty for letting them continue in 
 that Exiftence, tho' it be very miferable, when they themfelves will 
 not have it remov'd: or for net altering their Condition, which they 
 utterly refufe to have alter'd. 'Tis better for them indeed not to be 
 than to be; but only in the Opinion of wife Men, to which they do 
 not afTent. For they indulge themfelves in their obftinate Election, 
 and tho' every way furrounded and oppreffed with Woes, yet will they 
 not alter what they have once embraced. We have frequent exam- 
 ples in this Life refembling this kind of Obftinacy. 
 
 XI. We fee perverfe People voluntarily undergoing Pains, Affile- The Damned 
 tions, Torments, and even Death itfelf, rather than repent of their mif^raVie 6 ^ 
 Refolution and change what they have once determin'd in their Mind. State, asLo- 
 Nor is it uncommon for fomc to indulge, and in a manner p/ea/e x ' CT ?: Z T y> 
 themfelves in their very Miferies. Thus the forrowful love all fuch envious Per- 
 things as aggravate and foment their Grief: and in like manner the r ns indulge 
 Envious, the Angry, the Ambitious, the Defpairing : not that they lh ^ things" 
 are infenfible of Uneafinefs under thefe Paffions, or don't believe them- which in- 
 felves to be miferable; but becaufe they had rather have that Mifery ^-j^ y their 
 fo long as they enjoy their Choice, than want it and them too ; or at 
 leaft they can perfift in it, becaufe they do not obferve that this Mi- 
 fery arifes from thence. When therefore the Wicked obftinately op- 
 pofe themfelves to God, and refufe to make their Elections conforma- 
 ble to his Will, they take delight perhaps in that very Oppofition : to 
 hate Gcd, to difobey his Commands, and ftrive againir him with all 
 their Power, is pleafing to them; and tho' they fee themfelves over- 
 whelm'd with innumerable Evils, yet they had rather endure them all 
 than repent. As Men that are defperately in Love, ambitious, en- 
 vious, choofe to bear Torments, lofs of Eflate, and hazard of Life, 
 
 rather
 
 ATTEND! X. 
 
 rather than lay afide thefe fooliih and bewitching Affections. We 
 may eafily conceive then how the Wicked in Hell may be in very 
 great Mifery upon the increafe of their Obftinacy and Folly, and yet 
 unwilling to be freect from them. All fee and exclaim againft the 
 Folly, Mifery, and Madnefs of thofe Men who fpend their Eftate in 
 Vice, impair their Health, and bring on an untimely Death; who 
 involve themfelves in Labours, Dangers, Deaths; and for no other 
 end but becaufe they will do fo: yet they perfift in this, and their 
 Obftinacy increafes with their Evils. Thefe are fome Preludes of the 
 Mifery of the Damned, and from hence we may underftand that thefe 
 Perfons are extremely miferable, and yet will not be fet at Liber- 
 
 ty. ("50 
 
 It may be objected, that thefe miferable Beings may receive fome 
 kind of Pleafure from their Elections. But we place Felicity not bare- 
 ly in the Aft of ckoofing, but much more in the Enjoyment of the Ob- 
 jects chofen. The more obftinately therefore any one chcofes abfurd 
 and impofiible things, the more miferable will he be when fruftrated 
 
 of 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (115.) From hence like wife we may under* 
 ftand what a natural, abfolute, and indifpenfi 
 ble Neceffity there is for watching over all our 
 Habits, Affections, Appetites, 8cc. for curbing 
 our Paffions, and correcting our Denies by 
 Reaj'on; for taking a Ariel and conftant care 
 that thefe be neither violent, irregular, nor 
 rix'don improper Objects in this Life, if we 
 hope to avoid Mifery in the Life to come. 
 For if thefe accompany us into the other 
 World, (and if we confide r what Scott and 
 Rytner have faid on the Subject, it will appear 
 inhnitely probable that they do) the fame or 
 greater Unhappinefs mult unavoidably attend 
 them there. If we fhall have any Memory in 
 th other World of whatpafs'd in this (which 
 we muA have, in order to give us eithci a 
 <r evil Ccnfrier.ce, and to make us capable 
 of Reward or Pnni foment in that refpect) how 
 probable is it that we fhall thon alfo feel the 
 force of all thofe Habits and AJfociations which 
 in this Life were fo ftrong as to raife Paffions, 
 
 Affections, C5V. in us, and make us conflantly 
 proceed upon them for felf-evident Principles, 
 and purfue them for ultimate Ends of Action, 
 as appear 1 d from the Preliminary Diffirtation ? 
 " And this being Co, of what unfpeakable con- 
 " fequence are the Actions of Men, that thu3 
 " draw after them a Chain of Joys or Woes, 
 " as long as Eternity? And how careful 
 " ought we to be to what courfe of Life we 
 " determine ourfelves, confidering that our 
 " Eternal Fate depends upon what we are 
 " now doing, that every moral Action we 
 " perform is a Step Heaven or Hell wards, that 
 " in every hid Choice we make, we are plan- 
 " ring our Topbet, or our Paradife, and that 
 " in the Confequents of our preient Actions 
 " we fhall rue or rejoyce to eternal Ages ? 
 " Scott, 2d vol, p. 26. See alio 4th vol. Ch. 
 " 6, p.692, ciJV. Fol. Edit, or Hutckejlnon the 
 Conduct of the Paffions and Affections, (f. 4, 
 and 6. or Note 103, 1 1 1, 1 16. and par. 14, 1 5 
 of this Sect.
 
 ATTENVIX. ,,, 
 
 of his Choice; and we may imagine the damned to be always fru- 
 ftrated : neverthelefs, after fo much Warning and Experience, they 
 don't intend to alter their Elections, hut ft ill perfifl in them, 
 oppreffed with the Senfe and Weight of their Mifery, and 
 plung'd in deep defpair. For it is poflible that they may be regardlefs 
 or ignorant that there is no other Way for them to be freed from 
 thefe Miferies, but by altering their Elections, and not know how to 
 do this, fo as to perfift in them for ever, and become more defperate 
 by Difappointments, and to augment and multiply their Mifery by 
 new Attempts, which prove no lefs unhappy. The Power of wil- 
 ling the State they are in is not therefore of any Service to them to- 
 wards the Attainment of Happinefs, but renders them capable of E- 
 ternal Mifery. For fuch Election may have the fame Relation to this 
 kind of Mifery, as the natural Appetites have to Pain. 
 
 XII. Now it is fufficiently confonant to the Divine Goodnefs to s uc h Punifli- 
 permit or inflict this kind of Punifhment, nor would it be lefs fub- ment is very 
 fervient to the Ends for which Punimments are wont to be impo- ye" t ' W g(j d 
 fed, viz. that by a previous Apprehenfion of them we may learn to anfweri the 
 be wife, and others be deterr'd from offending by our Example. For E . nd .j D }' 
 who does not dread Fury and Madnefs as the moft miferable ftate men ts 
 
 of Mind ? Who does not condemn the Folly and Madnefs of Men 
 in Love, of envious and ambitious Perfons ? Efpecially when he be- 
 holds them labouring thereby under innumerable Evils, from which 
 they will not be delivered ? 
 
 XIII. But allowing that Exiftence is worfe than Non-exiftence to God ought 
 the Damned, let them imagine their Mifery to be greater than it to prefer the 
 really is. Let it be a part of their Mifery, to beconfeious that th^^rionto that 
 were the only Caufe of all their Grief: yet fince that could not be of particulars 
 prevented without greater detriment to the whole, there's no room 
 
 for objecting againft Providence which always does the beft. If God 
 had made nothing at all, and been contented to have remain'd alone, 
 there would have been nothing that could fin, that could choofe a- 
 mifs, that could be miferable. But fince it is impoflible that there 
 mould be more Gods, the Deity made Creatures fuch as the Nature 
 of a Created Being allow'd. Now it was expedient, for the Good of 
 the whole, that fome of thefe mould have a Power of bringing 
 Mifery upon themfelvcs by evil Election. Nor can any thing be 
 
 charg'd
 
 31, ATT END IX. 
 
 charg'd upon the Goodnefs of God in this, unlefs" that he created 
 Men, and not Gods equal to himfelf; and that he preferr'd the Salva- 
 tion of the Generality to that of fome Particulars. He chofe there- 
 fore that fome mould regret their having been made by God, viz. 
 thro' the abufe of their Free-Will, rather than that none mould be 
 happy by ufing it aright. 
 Anfwer to XIV. As to the third Objection, I believe it to be a great Truth 
 the third ob that the Mifery of the Wicked arifes from the very Confutation of 
 i ea '": ' Tis the Sinner, and that the Laws of Nature hold in evil Elections. We 
 that theW fee that our Bodies may be maim'd for ever, and our Limbs diflo- 
 fery of the cated and diftorted to fuch a degree as to become totally incapable 
 ffsTromthe f ^ofc Functions for which Nature defign'd them. Why mould 
 very Nature we not have the fame Opinion of the Mind, viz. that by depraved 
 of Sin. Elections, Paffions, and Affections, it may be fo far diverted from 
 the right way of thinking, as to become equally difabled and un- 
 fit for governing its Actions according to the Dictates of Right Rea- 
 fon, as a lame Man is for a Race ? We may fee fcvery Day that right 
 Notions of things are capable of being perverted by a perverfe Ha- 
 bit of thinking ; and it is evident from Experience that we miftake 
 and are ignorant of ufeful things. We are wont to labour under 
 Prejudices, and be averfe to fober Counfels; in fhort, we are willing 
 to endure any thing rather than alter our Choice. 'Tis a common 
 thing for us to pleafe ourfelves in Dangers, in the Ruin of our For- 
 tunes, in the Lofs of Eafe, and Life itfelf; and oar Volition, per- 
 verfe as it is, fometimes appears more defirable than Friends, King- 
 doms, Pleafures, or even Life. If therefore God does not interpofe 
 his Omnipotence, the fame Errors, the fame Ignorance, the fame ha- 
 bits of a perverted Mind and obftinate Propenfity to Evil, which 
 here draw us afide from the right Path, may continue with us for e- 
 ver : nor will the Soul that is immers'd in this kind of Evil be capa- 
 ble of curing itfelf : For one that is infected with thefe Maladies, is 
 as unfit to help himfelf, as one that has cut off his Hands and Feet is 
 unable to run or feed himfelf. ( 1 1 6.) 
 
 XV. Secondly, 
 NOTES. 
 
 (i 16.) This is the true Meaning of that Ma- j Enmity with God, and under a natural Inca- 
 cula Peccati which always remains and fets us at j pacity of Happineft, and feems to make it im- 
 
 j poflible
 
 AT T E NT) I X. 
 
 3'3 
 
 XV. Secondly, A Perfon of this Difpofition of Mind hares God, for T ^c Wicked, 
 he fees thar he has chofen fuch things, in the Enjoyment whereof thro ' Ign f; 
 
 i i 1 t> 1 - L l r n J t t ^ . . rancc andEr- 
 
 he places his Delight, as cannot be confiitent with tjie Divine ror, will de- 
 Will. He therefore looks upon God as his Enemy, and confequent- ]i ? ht 5n fuch 
 ly avoids all Commerce with him, and endeavours to abfcond from the'y 8 cannot 
 him, but never thinks of changing his own Will : For thro' Error en Jy' ^d 
 and Ignorance he knows not how to take delight in any thing elfe. Tnowhow 
 Therefore he applies all his Endeavours to the Attainment of fuch to take de- 
 things as cannot really be attain'd, and flrives forever in vain with 'j? ht '?. nnjr 
 a more powerful Eeing, i. e. God ; nor ceafes he from ftruggling, 
 tho' full of Mifery and Defpair. For tho' he feels himfclf tor- 
 mented with a moll: exquifite Pain, yet he dreads a greater from 
 the change of his Refolution : he fees Mifery invading him on each 
 hand, and is forced either to oppofe the Deity without any profpet 
 of Succefs, or to give over the Conteft, and lay afide all Hopes of 
 enjoying the Object of his Choice : He embraces the former, as the 
 lefs Evil of the two,* and yet a greater can fcarce be deviled. The 
 perverfe Fool may be pleas'd with the very Conteft, tho' it proves 
 to no manner of purpofe. In the interim God leaves fuch an one 
 to himfelf, who, by purfuing abfurd and impolTible things, will be- 
 come troublefome to himfelf and others, aiTaulting fome, and being 
 attack'd by others like himielf. We fee in this World how much 
 bad Men delight in heaping Mifery on others, and who are there- 
 fore bad Men becaufe they take delight in Mifchief. The Servant 
 
 of 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 poffibie for future Punifhments to have any 
 other Period than the total Extinction or An- 
 nihilation of the Subjects of them : and what 
 Ground there can be to hope for that may 
 be fecn from the Authors referr'd to in 
 Note . i 2. 
 
 Our Author, in the following Paragraph, 
 explains how this Macula may be conceiv'd 
 to render God and gocd Men our Averfi- 
 on, and 'tis cafy to apprehend how utterly 
 
 incapable of Happinefs that Man mud be, 
 whofe whole Soul is bent another way ; 
 whofe every Motion, Thought, and Inclin - 
 tion j whofe Defigns, Defires, and Hope, 
 are all fix'd and riveted to thofe Objects 
 which can never fatisfy them, which are ci- 
 ther quite different from, or contrary to the 
 very Nature and Idea of true rational Hap- 
 pinefs. A view of the Confequences atten- 
 ding each inveterate evil Habit, each ungo- 
 vernable 
 
 S f
 
 3i+ 
 
 ATTEND! X. 
 
 of an abfurd Matter is unhappy, and fo is he who lives near a ma- 
 levolent and morofe Neighbour. Suppofe then the Wicked who are 
 banimed from God, and odious to all good Men, aflbciating toge- 
 ther, and 'tis eafy to conceive what kind of Society that of Repro- 
 bates and Devils muft be, how grievous and oftenfive to each other. 
 We may obferve how very pernicious a wicked Governor is in his 
 Province, how miferable they that are fubject to fuch: how much 
 more wretched muft the ftate of the Wicked be, who are fubjecled 
 to, and joined with none but mad, malicious, envious and froward 
 Beings ? 
 
 XVI. 'Tis to be believ'd that God has provided a place that is 
 fuitable and proper for them, and to which they are as much con- 
 fined by the Laws of their Nature, as Fifties to the Sea, or terreftri- 
 Companions a i Animals to the Earth. What fort of a Place that is we know 
 o? Nature! 8 not > Dut *f * s reafonable to believe that there is fuch an one. Men 
 as we are to in this Life choofe for themfelves Habitations and Companions accor- 
 ding to their ownGenius,Temper, and Difpofitionof Mind: and likenefs 
 begets Love : and who can doubt but the fame thing may attend the 
 bad and good after Death? The Good refort therefore to the So- 
 ciety of God, Angels, and Spirits of Good Men, but the Wicked choofe 
 thofe Ghofis, which were Partakers in their Iniquity, and Devils for 
 their Companions: And this may poffibly be brought about by 
 natural InftincT, and mere human Difpofition. Nor is God want- 
 ing in Goodnefs if he fufters them to live in their own way, and 
 
 enjoy 
 
 TheWicted 
 are eonfin'd 
 to certain 
 places and 
 
 the Earth. 
 
 N O 7 E S. 
 
 vernable Paffion, or Affection mifapplyM, will 
 fhew the abfurdity of fuppofing any Perfon in 
 fuch a Cafe to be happy even in Heaven it- 
 felf *. But this important Doctrine of the 
 force of Habits, &c. in this World, as well 
 as the Continuance of them in the next, has 
 been fo well ftated and inforced by the Au- 
 thors referr'd to above, that an attempt to 
 give any further Uluftration of it feems im- 
 
 practicable. I {hall therefore difmifs it with 
 a Paffage from the Caufes of the Decay of Chri- 
 ftian Piety, Ch. i. " Thofe immaterial Fclici- 
 " ties we expect, do naturally fuggeil to us 
 " the neceffity of preparing our Appetites, 
 " and hungers for them, without which Hea- 
 " ven can be no Heaven to us : For fince 
 " the Pleafure of any thing refults from the 
 " Agreement between it and the Defire, 
 
 " what 
 
 * See the Spedator, N. 90.
 
 ATT E NT) IX. 
 
 3'5 
 
 enjoy the Life themfelves have chofen. For this could not be pre- 
 vented without doing Violence to the Laws of Nature. And tnefe 
 Punifhraents which the Wicked voluntarily bring upon them- 
 felves, tend to the Benefit of the Univerfal Syftem of Rational Be- 
 ings. 
 
 XVII. So much for Moral Evils, Laws, Rewards and Punifl-^* 1 ^ 
 merits. In which fome things may appear too fubtle for common Evu relates 
 Apprehenfion ; but we ought to remember that the Difpute is con- to ?? M }? d 
 cerning one of the niceft things in Nature, viz. the Operations of rations, aid" 
 our own Mind : and whatever is faid in order to explain thcfe, on that ac " 
 muft necefifarily be fubtle. On this Account the Art of Logic is ^ceffariiy be 
 call'd fubtle, becaufe it has thefe for its Object, and any thing that fomewhat 
 is more fubtle than ordinary, is reckon'd Logical. He that does not fubtlc " 
 like any thing that is fubtle therefore, ought not to difpute about 
 what relates to our own Minds. Moral Evil is as it were the Di- 
 {temper of our Minds arifing from the irregular Motion of the co- 
 gitative Faculties -, now, as 'tis difficult to difcover the Caufes of 
 thofe Diftempers which infect the Body, fo it is much more diffi- 
 cult to find out the Caufes and the Motions of thofe Maladies 
 which afflict the Mind. For it is neceffary that we perfectly un- 
 derftand our own Minds, the Notions, Operations, and Means where- 
 by the Will is moved, and the Understanding operates, before we 
 can hope to make a full Difcovery of thefe Paffions of the Mind, 
 and the Caufes of them. And 'tis evident to any one how difficult 
 
 S f 2 that 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 " what Satisfaction can Spiritual Enjoyments 
 " give unto a Carnal Mind t Alafs, what 
 " Delight would it be to the Swine to be 
 " wrapt in fine Linen and laid in Odours ? 
 " His Senfes are not gratify'd by any fuch 
 " Delicacies ; nor would he feel any thing 
 " befides the Torment of being withheld 
 *' from the Mire. And as little Complacen- 
 " cy would a brutifh Soul find in thofe 
 " purer and refined Pleafuies, which can on- 
 
 " ly upbraid, not fatisfy him. So that could 
 " we, by an impoflible Suppofition, fancy 
 " fuch an one aflum'd to thofe Fruitions, his 
 " Plcafure fure would be as little as his pre- 
 " paration for it was. Thofe Eyes which 
 " have continually beheld Vanity, would be 
 " dazled, not delighted with the beatific Vi- 
 " fitn ; neither could that Tongue which has 
 " accuftom'd itfelf only to Oatbs and Blafpbe- 
 " mies, find Harmony or Mufic in Hallelujahs. 
 
 'Tis
 
 3 i6 . AT? E N<D 1 X. 
 
 that is; what fubtlc Abftradions, and long Deduction of Confe- 
 qucnces it muft require. 'Tis no wonder then if the Investigation 
 of the Caufes, and Orgin of the Evil of the Mind require fome 
 things which are too fubtle for all to comprehend. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 " 'Tis the peculiar Privilege of the pure in 
 *' Heart, that they (hall fee God ; and if any 
 " others could fo invade this their Inclo- 
 " fure, as to take Heaven by Violence, it 
 " furely would be a very Joylefs Pofleffion 
 " to thefe Men, and only pjace them in a 
 
 " Condition to which they have the gre.v 
 '* teft Averfion and Antipathy. So that Ho- 
 " linefs here is not only neceflary to the 
 " acquiring, but the Enjoyment of Blifj 
 " hereafter. 
 
 . 
 
 
 H J 
 
 SECT. 
 
 ^
 
 A T T E N V I X 
 
 i 
 
 noiifcjgifbvn? 
 
 V7 
 
 
 
 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Concerning the Queftion, Why bad Men are 
 happy \ and good Men miferable. 
 
 I. '"T"*HIS Queftion feems to have fome relation to the former. Thi/Qjw- 
 
 X t For if Punijhment, that is, Natural Evils, be infliaed in^nfowcil 
 Proportion to the defert of Evil Elections, whence come good things treated by 
 to evil Men, and Evil to the Good? Tis not fo difficult to anfwer c "' is that 
 this Queftion upon the Suppofition of a future State, as to make it fcarce any 
 neceffary for us to infift much upon it. And it muft be confefled, om for 
 that it has been treated of in a very proper Manner by feveral Wri- crup c 
 ters: (i 17.) fo that there's fcarce any Room left for Scruple. Ne- 
 verthelefs a few things fhall be touch'd upon, and very briefly, that 
 we may not repeat what has been faid already. 
 
 II. In the firft place then the matter of Fact is very often doubt- Thc malter 
 ful, notwithilanding the Complaints which many Perfons make to of Fa is 
 the contrary. We fee indeed good Men frequently miferable, but it is ^"foHtis 
 a Query whether their Goodnefs may not be owing to their Mifery, not good 
 and they would have prov'd wicked if they had been tempted by M that are 
 
 Profpenty? bllt nther 
 
 teform'd by 
 by Adverfity : Nor are bad Men profperous, but made bad by Profperity. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (117.) V. G. Sherlock on Judgment, Ch. i. 
 V 3 P- 76, &c. 1 ft Edit. on Providence, 
 
 Ch. 7. p. 258. 2d Edit. Cudwortb t p. 877. 
 Cockburn, Effay 5. prop. 7, 8. p. 137, &r 
 Wollafton, p. 7 1 , and no, tsfc Cradock on 
 Eccl. 9. 2. Seneca, Ep. 24. Fiddei Sermons, 
 
 Fol. 14 and 19. Scott, 2 vol. Ch. 4. V 3. p. 
 331, &V. Svc. and Difcourfe 16. p. 320, isSc. 
 2d vol. Fo). Stillingfieet, Origines Sacra, B. 3. 
 Ch. 3. V 11. p. 326, fcjV- Fol. Grew, Ccf- 
 mhgia Sacra, B. 3. Ch. 2. V 57, 58.
 
 3 i8 AT T E N 2) 1 r X. 
 
 Profperity? it is not the Good then that are afflicted, but the refe- 
 rable that are reclaimed. On the other hand, we behold happy, 
 rich, and powerful Men that are wicked ; but their Wickednefs may 
 be attributed to their Profperity, and they would perhaps be very 
 good if the Incitements to Evil were removed. Tis not the Wicked 
 therefore that are happy, but the happy that are corrupted with 
 Profperity, and thereby fall into Wickednefs. 
 Wc are par- III. Secondly, We are blinded with Prejudice, ami thereby ren- 
 Meruffronf der>d vei T partial Judges of the Goodnefs or Badnefs of other Men. 
 the inftance He that is our Acquaintance and befriends us ) is a good Man, he 
 ofH'M'M that favours our Enemies is a very bad one. Thus Scipio is celebra- 
 ted by the Roman Hiftorians, and if any hard or unprofperous Acci- 
 dent befal him, they begin to afk whether there be any Gods ? Whe- 
 ther Divine Providence takes care of human Affairs ? But Hannibal is 
 condemn'd, his Victories are charg'd as Crimes on Providence, and 
 they repine at his having been fo long fuccefsful. Whereas 'tis real- 
 ly dubious whether of the two was the worfl Man ; both certainly 
 were very bad : For their Aim was to put the World into Confufion, to 
 fubdue Nations by force of Arms, the one intending to make Car- 
 thage, the other Rome, Head of the World, by Slaughter, Rapine, 
 War, and Injuftice. Now the Man that fludies to opprefs the whole 
 World in Servitude, and bring it under the Power of that Nation to 
 which he belongs, this Man is truly wicked and unworthy of Succefs, 
 however he may veil his Ambition, Pride, and Fury in fome parti- 
 cular Instances, under the fpecious pretence of Clemency and Love of 
 his Country. 
 We are bad IV. Thirdly, As we are partial Judges of the Deferts of other Men, 
 
 Ha gt \ei of ^ are we no s unc l ua ^fy' d to P r nounce on their Felicity. For we 
 
 Men : for are taken with the pomp, and noife, and glittering outfide of things, and 
 
 thoie arc consequently judge the Rich, the Potent, the Noble, and the Learned to 
 
 moft mifera- be happy. And yet herein we are very frequently miftaken, fince neither 
 
 biewhomve f them are what they appear to be. For Life is often attended with 
 
 Ld e thecon- more Happinefs among Cottages, Hufbandry, and Trade, nay in the 
 
 trary. midft of Bodily Pains and Difeafes ; than among Sceptres, Diadems, 
 
 high Pedigrees, and fuperfluous Heaps of Books ; fince, as we have 
 
 fhewn before, and Experience teftifics, Happinefs lies chiefly, if not 
 
 folely, in Election. 
 
 V. Fourthly,
 
 ATTENDIX. 3I? 
 
 V. Fourthly, It is to be obferv'd, that the greateft Part of the Hap- The chief 
 pinefs in this Life confifts in Hope, and that the Fruition of the defi- Happincfs 
 red Objecl: is not anfwerable to the Hope pre-conceiv'd, which mufti 1 "?/ 00 *! 115 
 be efteem'd an Indication that complete Happinefs is referv'd by Na- Ivhichw a 
 turc for another Life j the more then we afpire after, and adhere to fl 8 n thlt P. cr * 
 the prefent Objects, the lefs Care we (hall take of thole things which ^ ""- 
 tend to our future Happinefs. It was therefore wifely provided by ed for ano- 
 God, that the Good mould not be corrupted with too plentiful an a ]ff r th rfe e,and 
 Enjoyment of the things of this World, but that the Bad mould have things which 
 them in abundance : For by this means all may underftand that their K a i , good or 
 time ought not to be fpent in thefe things, but that the Space of this means"' it!* 
 fliort Life mould be employed in looking after other Matters, i. e. fuch 
 
 as regard Eternity. 
 
 To conclude, we mull affirm that nothing happens to good Men 
 which may not prove a Means of greater Good j nor to the Bad, which 
 may not be for their Punimment or Reformation. 
 
 VI. And I hope it appears from what has been faid, that the Ob- Conclufion 
 jections of the Manicheans and Pauliciam are not fo formidable as ofthewholc ' 
 they have feem'd to fome ; and that human Reafon is not fo blind 
 
 but that it can folve thefe Difficulties from the Principles laid down, 
 and fuch Suppolitions as are generally admitted ; and tho' not abfo- 
 lutely certain, yet probable however, and fuch as we ufe to acquiefce 
 in, in the Solution of other Phenomena. 
 
 But I offer all thefe things to the Cenfure of the Learned: I fub- 
 mit them entirely to the Judgment of the Catholic Church, efpecial- 
 ly to the Governours of thofc Parts of it which conftitute the Chur- 
 ches of England and Ireland. If there be any thing herein which 
 feems not perfectly agreeable to their Faith, as I hope there is not, 
 and would not have it, I defire that may be look'd upon as abfo- 
 lutely unfaid and retracted. 
 
 FINIS.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 \
 
 gu 
 
 Index to the Notes. 
 
 A. 
 
 ABfolute Infinity, what it is. Page 1 2, 70 
 
 Abfolute Necefiity, an abfurd Term, 37,38. Cannot be the ground 
 of the Divine Exiftence, ib. The fame as Caufe, ib. Cannot be 
 apply'd to the Relations of things, 194, 1.95,196. Inconfiftent 
 with the Divine Freedom and-Diverftty of Attributes^ 49, 50 
 
 Abjfrail Ideas, how made, 7. Not form'd by Analogy, ib. Have no Ob- 
 jects correfpondent to them, . . ib. 
 
 Aclion twofold, 155, 156. Cannot be hecefiary in either fenfe, ib. 
 
 Adam, whether naturally, mortal, in, 138. .Whether his Powers were dif- 
 ferent from thofe of his Pofterity, ib. The Scheme of Providence in 
 his Fall, 138, 139, 146, 282, 283,^. His Happihefs not fo great as 
 that which is attainable by -us, 283,284 
 
 Alteration, there can be no partiar one in this Syftcm for the better, 107,108. 
 A total one inconceivable, ib. The fame may be fhewn in the moral 
 World, . 287,288,289 
 
 Alternative of Good and Evil neceflary to improve our Happinefs, 88, 272. 
 If we were incapable of the one we could not attain to fo high a Degree 
 of, the other, ib. and 247, 273, 288, 289. A general Anfwer to Bayleh 
 Objections, 247 
 
 Analogy not to be apply'd to the whole Nature of the Divine Attributes, but 
 only to the Modus of them, 68,' 69, 70, 82. Nature of any thing di- 
 ftinct from the Modus of Exiftence, L 7 
 
 Angels , whether they ftill have not Freedom of Will, 241. Some Reafons 
 why their Fall might be permitted ; vide Fall. 288 
 
 Antecedent Necefiity not the ground or reafon of the Divine Exiftence, 37 , 
 38. The very lame as a Caufe, ib. 
 
 Anxiety does not determine the Will, J54* 1 55*^5 
 
 Appetites may be oppofed and overcome by the Will alone, 203 
 
 Arbitrary, in what Scnfe the Divine Will is fo, 195 
 
 Argument a priori, cannot be apply'd to the Divine Being, 36, 49 
 
 T t Afith
 
 3rfg INDEX. 
 
 4ttributes of God primary and fccondary, 46, 47. How we get our Ideas of 
 them, 67, 68. Not from Analogy, 68,69,70 
 
 B. 
 
 BEing of God, Proof of it, 45 
 
 Beings, whether all ought to have been created at firft in the higheft De- 
 gree they are capable of, 84, 85. Arguments fo# the Arfirmative,86. 
 Anfwer, 87, 88, 89 
 
 C. 
 
 ' ( 
 fy Ertainty, wherein it confifb, I 1 7, 1 8 
 
 'V-V Chafm, none in the Chain of Beings, 94, 95, 103 
 
 Clajfes of Beings down from God to nothing, 91, 94, The Neceflity for 
 fuch, 102, 103, 270, 271. Anfwer to Bayle's Objection, ib. 
 
 Cotnparifons, the Impropriety of thofe of Bayls concerning Free-will, 292, 
 .' '' t 293 
 
 Confcicnce of Guilt and Mifery very diftinct Perceptions, zoi, 202. 'Tis im- 
 pofllble to have a guilty Confcience without Liberty, ib. The Con- 
 science of having ufed our Liberty aright is the fource of all our moral 
 Happinefs, 247, 248 
 
 Confcioufnefs of Liberty proves that we are abfolutely free, 413 
 
 Contingency as certain to the Divine Knowledge as Neceffity, 232 
 
 Contingent Actions may be Objects of the Divine Knowledge, 269 
 
 Creation did. not add to the Divine Happinefs or Perfection, 52. Why no 
 fooner, ib. The Effect: of Goodnefs, 54. In what fenfe it was indiffe- 
 rent to God, 189, 193 
 Creatures, not all made for the nfe of Man, 91. But for each others Happi- 
 nefs, ib. Whether all ought to have been made equally perfect, 84 
 
 D. 
 
 DEatb, a neceflary Confequence of the general Laws of Nature, in.. 
 Could not have been prevented naturally in Paradife, ib. and 138. 
 Neceflary for the Government of this World in the prefent State, 139. 
 The Fear of it neceflary, 1 14. Of great Benefit to the World, 128 
 Declination of the Earth's Axis, the Neceflity for it, 121 
 
 Defett, whence this Evil arifes, 89, 90 
 
 Degree, infinite, what is to be underftood by it, 70 
 
 Dtjire, the fame with Volition, 165. Cannot be oppofed to.it, 166 
 
 Dijlance,
 
 :o ajsM iuo } 9g 5V7 woH INT) EX. ^3 
 
 (/fc**, what it is, >] I ro 
 
 Duration, what, 58. Not applicable to the Deity, 59. Incapable of abfo- 
 
 lute Infinity, 13, 69 
 
 E. 
 
 
 
 EArth, the Advantages of its prefent Figure, 120. Situation, 121. Me* 
 tion, Inclination of its Axis, Parallelifm, ib. 
 
 Earthquakes, the Caufes of them, 122,1,2.3* 
 
 Effence, what, '4, 
 
 Eternal, fomething mull be fo, 45. Every thing cou'd not be fo, 61, 62. 
 This Syftem cou'd not, ib. Whether the Matter of it was Eternal* 
 
 29 
 
 Bternity, not made up of fucceflive Duration, 5 fr. Not inftantaneous, 59. 
 
 The Meaning or that Attribute, 58*59,60 
 
 Exiftence, our own felf-evident, 56 
 
 Extenfton, not applicable to the Deity, 27. Nor to any immaterial Being, 
 
 32,33 
 Evils of Life, whether they ever exceed the Benefits of it, 127. Whether 
 
 they generally do fo, 275,276,(5*^. 
 
 Evil Principle, the Manichean Notion of it, 74, 75, The abfurdity of fuch 
 
 a Suppofition, 75, j6. The Creation cannot be owing- to it, 76, 77. 
 
 The Argument for it propofed at length, ib. 
 
 F. 
 
 \ 
 
 FAll of Man, the Neceflity for it in the Scheme of Providence, 282,285, 
 284. The Advantages arifing to Mankind from it, ib. Objections an- 
 
 fwer'd, 284,285 
 
 Fear of Death neceflary, 114. Of great Benefit to the World, 128 
 
 Fermentation the Caufe of Earthquakes, Storms, Thunder, Lightnings, &V. 
 
 122,123. The Neceflity for it,. ib. 
 
 Figure of the Earth, the Advantages of the prefent, r 20,1 21 
 
 fit in itfelf, an abfurd Expreflion, 22, 23, 66 
 
 Fitnefs of things, what it ihould mean, 47, 105. A relative Term, 22, 65. 
 
 In what Senfe eternal and immutable, ib. and 195, 196. In no Senfe 
 
 antecedent to the Will of God, ib, 
 
 Foreknowledge, an improper Term when apply 'd to the Deity, 61,268,269 
 Freedom of God, Proofs of it, 46. Of Man, 212,413 
 
 Free-Will, the Meaning of thofe Words, 161 
 
 ; 
 
 T t 2 Genera
 
 I N Z> E X 
 
 G 
 
 cj fc . . bO to noboV* a'lo 
 
 G. >lortV? ad) 
 
 ad Jor.i 
 Eneral Ideas, what they are, 4. How form'd. ib. 
 
 Generations, infinite, impofiible, 13*56,57 
 
 Glory of God, what thefe Words mean, 54, How God may be faid to do 
 all things for bis own Glory, 55 
 
 God, a Proof of his Exiftence and Attributes,. 45>56jC?<r. 
 
 God, z relative Term, 63 
 
 Good is that which produces Happinefs, 66. Nothing Good or Evil in itfelf, - 
 
 ib. 
 Goodnefs, Divine, Proofs of it, 47, 48. The Rule of all the Moral Attri- 
 butes, 48, 49. The Reafon of the Creation, 54, 55, 287. This no 
 Bar to the -Divine Liberty,, : 1.89. 
 
 HAbits. the Strength of them, 310. The Foundation of our Happi- 
 nefs or Mfery in the next Life, 273, 274, 301, ,302, 3 jo, 313,314." 
 The Ufe and Application of this Doctrine, 301, 302 
 
 Happinefs, whether the Sum of it exceeds the Sum of Mifery in this World,- 
 ! "275, 276', &ci Whether it wilWo fo in the next, 285, 286. Founded 
 chiefly in Virtue, 241,288,-289 
 
 H<f//-Torments, the Authors who have treated on the Eternity of them, 306, 
 307. They don't feem capable of #ny other End befide the Annihila- Jj 
 tion of the Subjects of them, 313, 314, 315. Have a natural Founda- 
 tion" in the Evil Habits contracted in this Life, 273, 301, 310,313, 
 The Ufcixo which theymay ferve, 288, 307 
 
 Holinefs of God, 49 
 
 Holy Gbofi, in what manner it influences the Mind, 255. This is not de- 
 structive of our Natural Powers, 256, 257. But rather aflifting and re- i 
 ftoring them, 257, 258. In what way we may conceive this Influence 
 to be exercifed, - ' " 25^259 ^ 
 
 .... . J 
 
 I.' 
 
 
 
 IDea, what the Author means by that Word, - . 6, 7 
 
 *- Idea of God, whether it proves his Exiftence, 20,21 
 
 Imperfection, whence it arifes, 89, 90 
 
 Jnc^niprehenfibility > '47 
 
 4 - . -., - In difference ,
 
 I N Z> E 5C* 
 
 fnjMfferenee, the Author's Notion of it, 174, 175. Cannot be apply'd to 
 the Whole-man, but only to the Powers of willing and acting, ib. 
 Cannot be apply'd to. Perception or Judgment, 184 Miift be apply'd' 
 to the Will, 2i2. The Benefit of it, 213,214,215 
 
 Indifferent, in what fenfe the Creation was fo to God, 189, 193. This con- 
 fident with his being determin'd by his Goodnefs, ib. 
 
 Indifferent Actions prove that the Mind determines itfel 163, 164. Inftan- 
 ces of them, I0 ^ 
 
 Infinite, what is meant by that Word, 12, 13, 1 6, 60. The fame as Per- 
 fection, 70, 7 1 . The Idea of it pofitive, ib. And previous to that 
 of finite, :'. How it differs from a Mathematical Infinite, 14 
 
 Infinite Degree, what is to be underftood by it, 70 
 
 Infinite Series, the abfurdity of it, 45. In Generations, 56, $y. In Number, 
 Motion, Magnitude, &V, ^ 
 
 InflincJ, none innate, . 67 
 
 Judgment -does not determine the Will, 154,1 55,163 
 
 Jujiice. Divine, Proof of it, 48, Infinite Juftice not inconfiftent with in- 
 finite Mercy, 53>7 l >7* 
 
 Juftice, punitive, what it means, 71, Cannot be faid to oblige or demand 
 any thing, 72 
 
 T 
 
 - 
 
 LAbour, the Neceflity for it, and Advantages of it, 124,125 
 
 Laclantius, his Anfwer to the Objection of Epicurus againft Providence, 
 
 2 95 
 Laws, Divine, the Defign of them, 301. They are Declarations of the 
 
 natural Effects of Sin, and Directions to avoid them, ib. They do not 
 
 bring us into a worfe State than we mould have been in without them, 
 
 ib. 
 
 Laws of Nature, the Neceflity for fome eftablifh'd ones in the Natural 
 World, 99. The Wifdom of it, 132, 244. The fame in the Moral < 
 World, ibid. The ill Confequences that would attend the contrary, 
 ib. Yet thefe are not left entirely to , themfelves, 252. The Divine t 
 Interpofition fometimes neceflary, 267,268 
 
 Liberty, whether we experience it in ourfelves, 19Q, 213. We are confeious 
 of it before we try it, 164, 165. The different Notions of it, 153. 
 Applicable to Volition as well as to Attion, 1 54, 1 60. The Poffibility 
 of it, 214. The Value of it, 213, 214, 225. Inconveniencies that 
 wou'd attend the want of it, 234, 235. Or the over-ruling it on par- 
 ticular 
 
 3*5
 
 INDEX. 
 
 ticular Occafions, 244, 293, 294. Even the abufe of it tends to the 
 
 Good of the whole, 287,288 
 
 Liberty fhewn to belong to God, 46. And alfo to Man, 212,213 
 
 Life, as much in the World as it is capable of, 94, 95, 103, 1 19. The pre- 
 
 fent Life better than Non-exiltence, 141, 
 
 Limitation of any Attribute in the Deity, is an Effect without a Caufe, 62, 
 
 63 
 
 Loeking-GIafs, the abfurd Confequence of applying that Simile, as is done 
 
 by the Author of the Procedure, Extent and Limits of Hum. Underjl. 
 
 69,70 
 
 M. 
 
 M Acuta Peccati, the true Meaning of thefe Words, 3 1 2^3 1 3 
 
 Man, why not made more perfect, 91, 270. Why placed in this 
 World, ib. The head of the lower part of the Creation, 91. 
 All things not made immediately for his ufe^ but to enjoy them- 
 felves, and be fubfervient to each other, ib. 
 
 Matter, the Idea of it, 2. Not Eternal, 29. Incapable of Thought and 
 Self-motion, 92. The Ufes of it in its prefent State, ib. Why not 
 made more perfect, 93. The Source of Natural Evils, 97 
 
 Mechanical Hypothefis, an account of it, 264, 265. A Confutation of it, 
 
 266,267,268. 
 
 Mifery, not fo great in general as the Happinefs in this Life, 275, &V. Nor 
 
 in the next, 285,286. Whether that of the Damned will increafe the 
 
 Happinefs of the Blefied, 289,290 
 
 Motion cannot be Eternal, 24 
 
 Motives, whether the Mind be always determin'd by them, 212, 213. 
 
 In what fenfe fome are called ftronger than others, ib. 
 
 Moral Attributes, certain, tho' not capable of ftrid Demon ftration, 
 
 47 
 Moral Good and Evil confifts in producing Natural Good and Evil, 
 
 ib. and 64,65 
 
 Moral Senfe alone directs us to do Good to others, 64. The fame with 
 
 Confidence, 66. Not innate or implanted in us, 6y 
 
 * 
 
 Necejfary
 
 I N $) & X. 
 
 N. A l 
 
 ^TTEceffiiry, always irrelative Term, 22, 23. Neeeflary in kfelf, or ab- 
 X\l folutely fuch in its own Nature, abfiird Expreflions, ib. 
 
 Nccejhry-Exiitcnce, what it means, 22. The fame as Self-Exiftence, 62. 
 
 How proved, ib. Cannot be underftood pofitively, 36. Built upon a 
 
 falfe Maxim, g 
 
 NeceJJjty, whether the -perceiving none in our Actions be a Proof that there 
 
 is none, IQ ^ 
 
 Nothing, in what fenfe -things arofe from it, 89. This caufes the Evil of 
 
 Defect, g 
 
 Novelty, an Improvement of our Happinefs, 88 
 
 
 O. 
 
 OBligatiot:, what that Word means, 66. Whence Moral Obligation a- 
 rifes, ib. 
 
 Ob/linacy, what it is founded in, 208,209 
 
 Omnipotence proved, 46. Does not imply a Contradiction, $$. How it may 
 be faid to be not able to do feveral things, 53 
 
 Omniprefence, what it means, 63,64 
 
 Omnifcience, 46. Proof of it, 2 6$. Contingencies maybe proper Objects 
 of it, 269 
 
 P. 
 
 ")Jin, we do not always defire to remove it, 138 
 
 Paradife, the difference between that State and the prefent, 282, 283. 
 No Arguments can be drawn from that, or the ftate of Angels, againft 
 the Goodnefs of the prefent Syftem, 114,241 
 
 Parallelifm of the Earth, the Advantages of it, 121 
 
 Particular Wills, the Deity does not act by them in the Government of ei- 
 ther the Natural or Moral World, 244, 252. Yet his Interpofition is 
 fometimes neeeflary. 260,267,268 
 
 Pajftons, the Ufcs of them with refpect to the Body, 113. To the Mind, 
 
 "5 
 
 Per/eft, no Creature can be fuch, 81. Whether all ought to have the fame 
 Degree of Perfection, 84, 102. Whether all ought to be fixed in one 
 certain Degree, 84, $5. Arguments for the Affirmative, 86. An- 
 fwer, 87,88,89 
 
 Pleafures,
 
 I N 2> E X. 
 
 PUafures, fenfible and intellectual, fuitcd to our prefent State, 107, 138 
 moft of them arifc from paft Defects, 88 
 
 Pojfibility, no Argument from infinite Poflibilities, that a Power actually 
 exifts which can bring them into Being, 50 
 
 Powers of the Mind active and paflive, 153,154 
 
 Prayer, the natural good Effects of it upon our Minds, 2*59, 260. God's 
 End in requiring it, 260. It is properly a natural Duty, 261 
 
 Prayers, the Efficacy of them, 266, 267, 268. Of no ul'e without a parti- 
 cular Providence, ib. 
 
 Pre-ejtabli/h'd Harmony, an account of that Syftem, 264, 265. Inconfiftent 
 with the Ends of Religion, 266,267 
 
 Prefcicnce of God an improper Term, 61. What fhou'd be meant by it, 
 
 268,269 
 
 Probation, the Neceflity for fuch a State in order to improve our Happinefs, 
 
 272,273 
 
 Providence, the manner of its Government of both the Natural and Moral 
 World, 252, 253, 266, 267, 268. Tiie Belief of a -particular one necef- 
 fary to moft of the Duties of Religion, ib. 
 
 R 
 
 R. 
 
 Elations of things, what fhou'd be meant by them, 65. In what 
 fenfe they are immutable and eternal, ib. Not antecedent to, or 
 independent of the Will of God, ib. and 195, 196. Not necefifary to 
 the Determination of it, 193. Their Neceflity is only Hypotheti- 
 cal and fubfequent to the Creation, 194, 195. It does not from 
 hence follow that God may alter them while the Creation continues, 
 195, 196, 157. They are not 1 -to be chofen for their own fakes., 
 
 65,66 
 
 S. 
 
 SCale of Beings neceffary for the Good of the Univerfe, 91,94,25,102, 
 103,270,271 
 Scripture, Objections from it concerning the Fall, &c. are of -no force, 269 
 Self-Exiftence, what it means, 38, 62. How proved, ib. The fame with 
 Independence, 45 
 
 Situation of the Earth, Advantages of the prefent, 1 20, 1 2 1 
 
 Space, what it is, 95,40. Not capable of ablblute Infinity, i-o. Not necef- 
 iarily exiftent, 31, 32. May be fuppofed all away, but cannot be an- 
 nihilated
 
 IN E -X 
 
 nihilated by Parts, 39. The 5ubAratvm of Fxtenfmn, 40, 41 , Dif- 
 ferent from the Idea of a Vacuum; 25, AY hat is meant by our net be- 
 ing able to fct bounds to it, I j 
 Spirit, not extended, S 2 t3i 
 Storms, the Caufes of thera, j,^ 
 Subftanee;' what it commonly fignifles, 2. "Whether it beany thing real, 'lb. 
 SubflratUm, particularly belongsto Matter, \ z 
 Succeffion, none in the Deity, 59,6o 
 Sufficient reafon for every thing, a 'folfe Maxim, '39 
 Sum, whether t'hat of Happinefs exceeds the Sum of Mifery fa this World, 
 *75> vffi* &c* ' Whether it will do fo in the next, 285,286 
 Summum Bortum, the reafon ' why Phildibphers were fo uncertain about it, 
 
 168,169 
 
 Sufpenfion, the Power of it is a Proof that the Mind is abfolutely free, 
 
 170. Not founded in the general Defire of Happinefs, 171. Not 
 
 different from any other Exercifc of the "Will, ft, 
 
 Htmder, the Caufe of it, l '23 
 
 Time, what, 58. Not applicable to the Deity, 59. Incapable of ab- 
 
 folute Infinity, % 13,60 
 
 3*9 
 
 V 
 
 % . 
 
 'Acuum, different from Space, 25 , Often confounded with it, ib. Ar- 
 guments ufed againft it when fo confounded, 26 
 Variety, neccflary to improve bur Happinefs, 88,272,277,278 
 Variety of ufes of moft things in Nature, 105,106 
 Veracity, or rather Faithfulnefs, an Attribute of God, 48,49 
 Vice, how it may tend to the Benefit of the Public, 281, And therefore 
 is permitted by the Deity, tho* it be never the lefs puniihable, ib. 
 Virtue, the foundation of our greateft 1 Happinefs, 288, 289. Cannot be in- 
 fufed into us miraculoufly, or on a fudden, ib, and 272, 273. Produced 
 only byExercife and Experience, 241, 289, 290, 291. Cannot fub- 
 fift without Liberty, 241. Anfwer to the Arguments drawn from An- 
 gels and Saints, ib. 
 Vnchangeablenefs of God, 46. 46 
 Volition, diftinft from Action, 153. The Advantages of fuch a Power, 
 225. The Inconveniencies that wou'd attend the want of it, 234,23 J 
 Ufes, many, of almoft every thing in Nature, 105,106 
 
 U ti Will,
 
 3?o INDEX. 
 
 w. 
 
 /II, its Freedom from both Compulsion and Neceflity, 154. 
 Not properly determined by any thing without itfelf, ib. Creates 
 Pleafure in things by choofing them, 1 79. But cannot increafe 
 the Pleafure in infinitum, 1 80. Its Freedom ftated and defended, 
 212,- 213, 214. Whether it can be determin'd to particular Ob- 
 jects, 235. The Confequences that wou'd- attend fuch a Limita- 
 tation of. it, 239. Or a Sufpenfion of it, 244. The Abufes o: 
 it tend to the Good of the whole, 287, 288. Will conftitute 
 the greateft Part of our Happinefs in the next Life, 241. An- 
 fwer to Bayle's Objections, ib. The Method of treating it, 244. 
 Never determin'd Phyfically, 255. Anfwer to the Objection 
 drawn from the Operations of the Holy Ghoft, 256,257,258 
 JVifdom, Divine, Proof of it, *4$ 
 
 World, not Eternal, 56. Nor Infinite, 83, 84.1 Why no fooner made, 52 
 
 FINIS.
 
 H X *3 <\ 
 
 \f4 
 
 E R R A t A, 
 
 
 
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 mentions. Ib. 1. 30. dele other, p. iz. 1. 39. r. X 1. p. 89. c. 2. 1. 30. r. all at once. p. 41. 
 1. 18. r. Contaft. ib. 1. 22. r. of it. p. 49. 1. laft, r. Subfeft. p. 53. 1. laft, r. Subfeft. p. $8. 
 col. I. 1. laft, dele (.) p. 6.. col. 2. 1. 36. r. exifts. p. 67. col. 2. 1. 8. r. Feltbuyfen. p. 68. 
 col. 1. 1. 9. for are r. were. p. 76. col. 2. 1. 8. r. external, p. 78. col. 1. 1. 4. x.Hamartigenia. 
 p, 81. 1. icv r. would. /'. 1. 12. r. mould, p. 92. 1. 14. r. Exiftence. ib. col. 1. 1. 9. r. for. 
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 N.B. the Contents of the 2d and 3d Paragraphs are tranfpofed. p. 295. col. 1. 1. 6. r. velit. ib, 
 col- 2. 1. 5. r. vidit. p. 301. col. 2. 1. 20. r. or confidence, ib. 1. 24. r. of any Duty. p. xxii. 1. z, 
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