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The Progress of 
 
 JAPAN 
 
 1853-I87I. 
 
 By 
 
 // 
 
 T. H. GUBBINS, C.M.G. 
 
 Late Secretary of Legation and Japanese Secretary of 
 
 H.B.M.'s Embassy in Japan 
 
 Lecturer in Japanese in the University of Oxford 
 
 Oxford 
 
 At the Clarendon Press 
 
 191 1 
 
3- 
 
 HENRY FROWDE, M.A. 
 
 PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 
 
 LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW YORK 
 
 TORONTO AND MELBOURNE 
 
 ••« 
 
 • « 
 
 
 ■ •! 
 
 * « t » « . 
 
PREFACE 
 
 Six lectures given in the University of Oxford 
 during 1909-10 are the basis of this book. They 
 are published as delivered, with only that amount 
 of revision which publication seemed to require. 
 The aim in view has been to give a slight sketch 
 of the progress of Japan in the period of transition 
 which lay, so to speak, between the old life and 
 the new. 
 
 The appendixes include documents which I have 
 added in order to save the reader the trouble of 
 looking for them elsewhere, and others which were 
 accessible only in the Japanese text. 
 
 To Sir Ernest Sato w my best thanks are due for 
 the loan of books, for information on various 
 points possessed by no one else, and for much 
 valuable criticism. For advice in the treatment 
 of the subject, and for many useful suggestions, 
 I am also indebted to Mr. S. Tuke. And the help 
 of every kind rendered by my wife from first to 
 last I gratefully acknowledge. 
 
 235605 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 "1 
 
 * PAGE 
 
 Selected Bibliography 
 
 Introduction 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 The Conditions existing in Japan when the First , 
 Treaty was negotiated ..... 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 The Establishment of Treaty Relations with Foreign 
 
 Powers 40 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 Japanese Internal Affairs, 1853-60 .... 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 Japanese Internal Affairs (continued), 1860-63 . 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 The Fall of the Shogunate 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 The Abolition of Feudalism . . . . .187' 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 Conclusion 218 
 
CONTENTS 5 
 
 PAGE 
 
 APPENDIXES 
 
 1. American Treaty, March, 1854 .... 227 
 
 2. American Treaty, March, 1854 ; Additional 
 
 Regulations, September, 1854. . . . 230 
 
 3. BrItish Convention, October, 1854 . . . 232 
 
 4. British Convention, October, 1854 ; Exposition 
 
 op Articles, October, 1855 .... 233 
 
 5. Russian Treaty, February, 1855 .... 235 
 
 6. Russian Treaty, February, 1855 ; Explanatory 
 
 Articles (same date) ..... 238 
 
 7. Russian Supplementary Treaty, October, 1857 . 239 
 
 8. Dutch Preliminary Convention, November, 1855 245 
 
 9. Dutch Treaty, January, 1856 .... 250 
 
 10. Dutch Treaty, January, 1856; Additional Articles, 
 
 October, 1857 255 
 
 11. American Convention (Shimoda), June, 1857 . 266 
 
 12. Extract from Constitution (or Arrangement) of 
 
 1615 defining Shogun's Authority . . 269 
 
 13. American Treaty, July, 1858 .... 269 
 
 14. Notes on Treaties of 1858 .... 283 
 
 15. Memorial on Foreign Intercourse presented 
 
 by h Kamon no Kami to Shogunate in 1853 . 285 
 
 16. Extract from Bakumatsu Gwaikodan, with Re- 
 
 ference to the Consultation of the Daimios 
 
 by the Government in 1858 .... 289 
 
 17. London Protocol, June, 1862 .... 291 
 
 18. Convention of Paris, June, 1864 . . . 294 
 
 19. Shimonoseki Convention, October, 1864 . . 296 
 
 20. Tariff Convention, June, 1866 . . . .298 
 
 21. Manifesto announcing Shogun's Resignation 
 
 (1867) 305 
 
 22. Memorandum, giving Reasons for Shogun's Resig- 
 
 nation, HANDED TO FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES 
 
 in November, 1867. 306 
 
 23. Shogun's Protest to Court, January, 1868 . . 312 
 Memorial of Daimios surrendering Fiefs, March, 
 
 1869 ........ 313 
 
 GLOSSARY 317 
 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Count Katsu Awa. Kaikoku Kigen ( k The Commencement of 
 
 the Opening of the Country') ; 3 vols. 
 Satow, Sir E. Chapter on Japan in Cambridge Modern History, 
 
 vol. xi. 
 Satow, Sir E. The Voyage of Capt. John Saris to Japan. 
 
 Hakluyt Society. . 
 Satow, Sir E. ' The Story of a Dream in the period of Cenji ' 
 
 (Genji Yume Monogatari) ; translation. 
 Satow, Sir E. 'History of Modern Times' (Kinse Shiriaku) ; 
 
 translation. 
 Shimada, S. Kaikoku Shimatsu (' The Affair of the Opening of 
 
 the Country '). 
 Sanab£, M. Bakumatsu Gwaikodan (' The Story of Foreign 
 
 Kelations in the last days of the Shogunate '). 
 Honda, T. Ishin Shi (' History of the Restoration'). 
 Kimura, K. Sanjiftnen Shi (' History of Thirty Years, 1838-68 '). 
 Kitabara, M. Shichinen Shi (' History of Seven Years, 1861-8 '). 
 Nakamura, Y. Ii Tairb to Kaiko (' The Regent li and the Opei 
 
 of the Ports'). 
 Kobayashi, S. Bakumatsu Shi ('History of the Last Days of the 
 
 Shogunate '). 
 
 Okamoto, T. Osei Fukuko ('The Restoration of the Monarch} '). 
 
 Adams, F. 0. History of Japan. 
 
 Mitford, A. B. Tales of Old Japan ; 2 vols. 
 
 Rundall, T. Japonia. 
 
 Hildreth, R. Japan as it was and is. 
 
 Chamberlain, B. H. Things Japanese. 
 
 Brinkley, Captain F. Japan and China ; 12 vols. 
 
 Murdoch, J. ) . __ . 
 
 A History oj Japan. 
 
 Yamagata, I. 
 Murdoch, J. A History of Japan ; vol. i. 
 Okakura, K. The Awakening of Japan. 
 I ye nag a, T. The Constitutional Development of Japan. 
 Tokugawa Kinreiko (' Collection of Tokugawa Enactments'), pub- 
 lished by Department of Justice, Tokio ; 10 vols. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The latter half of the nineteenth and the open- 
 ing years of the twentieth centuries have witnessed 
 a startling event in the world's history, the 
 transformation of a nation living in self-imposed 
 seclusion in a distant and little-known corner of 
 Asia into a great power, conspicuous for love 
 of progress, and equipped with all the adjuncts of 
 modern civilization. This change may be taken 
 to have begun with Commodore Perry's arrival in 
 Japan in 1853, and to have ended with the signa- 
 ture of the Portsmouth Convention in 1905 — an 
 interval of a little over fifty years. 
 
 The history of these fifty years falls naturally 
 into two periods, the first of which seems to close 
 appropriately with the abolition of feudalism in 
 1871. It is with this, the preliminary stage of 
 Japan's development, that the present pages are 
 concerned. It stands out in marked contrast to 
 that which followed, for she had to disencumber 
 herself of much before she could make a fresh start, 
 to pull down in order to rebuild. And at the outset 
 of this process her policy was decided for her by an 
 impatient world, in whose economy there was no 
 place for hermit nations. 
 
- 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE CONDITIONS EXISTING IN JAPAN WHEN THE 
 FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 
 
 A glance at the map will show that the position 
 occupied by Japan in Asia is similar to that of 
 England in Europe, with this difference that while 
 the British Isles lie on the west of the European 
 continent, the Japanese islands are to the east of 
 the mainland of Asia. Taking them in the order 
 from north to south, the group of islands com- 
 prised in the present Japanese Empire consist 
 of the Kuriles, the southern half of Saghalien, Yezo, 
 the main island known to Japanese as Hondo, 
 Shikoku, Kiushiii, the Loochoos, Formosa, and 
 the Pescadores. These stretch diagonally from the 
 51st down to the 21st degree of north latitude, 
 and are situated between the 120th and the 156th 
 degrees of longitude east of Greenwich. A warm 
 current, similar to the Gulf Stream of Northern 
 Europe, reaches the southern extremity of Kiushiu, 
 and, there dividing, flows partly up the west and 
 partly up the east coast, the latter portion of the 
 current branching out into the Pacific Ocean 
 before reaching Yezo. The climate is damp, like 
 that of our own islands, but the ranges of heat and 
 cold are much greater ; the south of Formosa is 
 semi-tropical and has practically no winter, while 
 the Kuriles, the portion of Saghalien, which now 
 
10 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 again belongs to Japan, and certain parts of Yezo, 
 have the climate of Nova Scotia, or Iceland. It 
 only remains to mention that the islands com- 
 prising Japan are all mountainous, so that with 
 a population much the same as that of the British 
 Isles, and an area considerably greater, there is 
 less space for cultivation, and less room for the 
 inhabitants ; that the rainfall is greater and the 
 summer much hotter than ours ; and that the 
 rivers are short, and their gradients very steep, 
 causing floods and droughts to be more frequent 
 than with us. The area of the Japanese Empire, 
 as above described, was increased in August of 
 last year by the annexation of Corea, over which 
 Japan had previously exercised a protectorate. 
 Her authority, moreover, extends beyond these 
 geographical limits, for she is in occupation of 
 a large portion of Manchuria, formerly under 
 Russian control, which includes the Liaotung 
 peninsula. 
 
 At the time, however, at which our story opens, 
 the dominions over which a Mikado reigned, and 
 the Shogun ruled, consisted only of an island 
 empire, with no territory on the continent of Asia, 
 and comprising neither Formosa nor Loochoo. 
 
 The history of Japan before the advent of 
 foreign treaty-makers may be given in a few words. 
 The ruler with which that history begins for the 
 Japanese is Jimmu Tenno, a semi-mythical per- 
 sonage, whose reign is said to correspond with a 
 date some 600 years before the Christian era. 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED II 
 
 Down to the year a.d. 1192, when Yoritomo was 
 appointed Shogun, the land was more or less under 
 the personal rule of the Mikados : 1 from that date 
 until the Restoration of 1868 the personal rule of 
 the Mikados ceased, and the government was 
 administered in whole or in part by Shdguns, of 
 different dynasties, with two intervals : the 
 period between 1199 and 1333, when the Ho jo 
 Regents were in power ; and subsequently the 
 short period preceding the establishment of the 
 Tokugawa Shogunate, when first Nobunaga, and 
 then Hideyoshi, took the administrative authority 
 from the feeble hands of the last Ashikaga Shdguns. 
 It may be well to explain what the Shogun really 
 was. Although the feudalism of Japan, in the 
 form in which it finally crystallized itself under the 
 Tokugawa rule, had distinctive features peculiar 
 to itself, what little we know of its origin leads 
 to the inference that it grew up under circum- 
 stances not very dissimilar to those which charac- 
 terized the growth of feudalism elsewhere. The 
 early social organization, founded more or less 
 on a tribal basis, gave place by degrees to a more 
 unified system, controlled and dominated by a 
 central government, which was directed, in name 
 at least, by an autocratic sovereign. Afterwards, 
 as time went by, the growing weakness of the 
 Court led to more and more authority being dele- 
 gated to local governors throughout the country, 
 w r hose power increased with the opportunities 
 
 1 See p. 82. 
 
12 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 created by the growing weakness of the govern- 
 ment at Kioto. The military forces of the country, 
 which had formerly been directly controlled by the 
 central authorities, came by degrees under the 
 orders of the local chieftains, and were organized 
 on a provincial basis under a system of feudal 
 tenure. Japan thus became an armed camp, and 
 from time to time the struggle for supremacy 
 between these various feudal chiefs, or dafcnios, 
 as they came to be called, led to one or other 
 asserting his superiority, and becoming the 
 military ruler of the country. In this capacity 
 his authority was absolute, but the shadow of 
 sovereignty was retained by the Crown, and he 
 governed in the name of the Mikado, with the 
 title of Sei-i-tai Shogun, which means barbarian- 
 quelling generalissimo. The Tokugawa Shoguns, 
 or mayors of the palace, as they may not inappro- 
 priately be termed, were the last representatives 
 of this series of administrators ; they were by far 
 the most powerful ; their government lasted 
 longer than those of any of their predecessors ; 
 and their admirers base their claim to the nation's 
 gratitude on the fact that they gave to the country 
 what is known as the ' Great Peace ', which lasted 
 250 years. It was the third Shogun of this line, 
 Iyemitsu, who consolidated its power, and who 
 is responsible for the closing of the country. 
 
 When Perry arrived in 1853 the Mikado was 
 living in the strictest seclusion in Kioto, a seclusion 
 in which the sovereigns had remained for nearly 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 13 
 
 700 years. The Tokugawa Shoguns, however, 
 when their turn came to administer the country, 
 had been careful to keep up the pretence of the 
 imperial dignity, and the Emperor in accordance 
 with this policy was treated with semi-divine 
 honours, and surrounded by a mock Court of 
 Kuge (or Court nobles). These held meaningless 
 administrative titles, and were the descendants 
 of the men who had ruled the country in far-off 
 times, when the Mikado's sovereignty was some- 
 thing more than a mere name. The ruling Shogun 
 was Iyeyoshi, and Yedo, the Tokugawa seat of 
 administration, and not Kioto, was the real 
 capital. Japan was parcelled out into some 
 260 1 odd fiefs, the holders of which were divided 
 into two broad classes, those called fudai, who were 
 hereditary vassals of the Tokugawa Shoguns, and 
 others known as tozama. The distinction was one 
 created by the founder of the line. In one of the 
 posthumous papers attributed to him, the ' Hun- 
 dred Articles ', better known to foreign readers 
 as ' The Legacy of Iyeyasu ', the former are 
 described as those samurai who had already 
 declared themselves on his side before the fall of 
 Osaka i% 1600 — the date on which his supremacy 
 was established — and the latter as those who 
 
 1 Japanese writers are accustomed to speak of ' the 60 odd 
 provinces of Japan and the 260 odd daimios. The exact number 
 is given variously by different authorities, and we know that it 
 changed from time to time. The parliament of 1869 contained 
 276 members, and it was understood that each clan was repre- 
 sented by one member. 
 
14 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 acknowledged his authority after that event. 
 The distinction had no effect on precedence, and 
 no relation to revenue. But it had a very practical 
 significance in the fact recorded in the same paper, 
 that the fudai daimios only, and not the tozama, 
 were eligible for official posts — an arrangement 
 which tended to the concentration of authority in 
 Tokugawa hands. There was another classifica- 
 tion which in the earlier days of feudalism had 
 great importance. This was the division of 
 daimios into three classes, the Kokushiu, or 
 ' lords of provinces ' (eighteen in number), the 
 Rioshiu, or ' lords of territories ', and the Joshiu, 
 or ' lords of castles '. To this last-mentioned class 
 more than two-thirds of the feudal nobility 
 belonged, and a few of them, known as fuyo were 
 dependent on the Kokushiu, or over-lords, of their 
 provinces. Towards the close of the Tokugawa 
 rule, however, the distinction between Rioshiu 
 and Joshiu had lost much of its significance, and 
 the one class which retained its original impor- 
 tance, and exclusive position, was that of the 
 Kokushiu. 
 
 First in the precedence of those days ranked the 
 heads of the Gosanke. This was the name applied 
 to the three princely houses of Owari, Kishiu 
 and Mito, from the two first of which, together with 
 the Gosankio — a family group of later institution — 
 the Tokugawa rulers were chosen. Next came the 
 other daimios of the Kokushiu class, the first three 
 places being filled by the princes of Satsuma, 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 15 
 
 Kaga, and Sendai. To these succeeded the Kuge, 
 or Court nobles, who in turn were followed by 
 tozama and fudai daimios, not of Kokushiu rank. 
 Then came the hatamoto, a special class of banner- 
 men created by Iyeyasu, some of whom had estates 
 equal in extent to those of the smaller daimios ; then 
 the Gokenin, a sort of superior feudal gentry ; and 
 lastly the ordinary samurai, who were divided into 
 two grades. All these belonged to the military 
 class. Outside the latter, and lower down in the 
 social scale, came the three classes of farmer, 
 artisan and merchant, in the order named. 
 
 The central authority was exercised in various 
 ways. The general direction of affairs was in the 
 hands of an upper and a lower council, the members 
 of which were chosen from the ranks of the fudai 
 daimios and the hatamoto. Decisions on grave 
 matters of State were referred, when necessary, 
 to the Gosanke, and the leading daimios, whose 
 association in the work of government was, how- 
 ever, more nominal than real. In the Shogun's 
 territories, and in those fudai daimiates which 
 were ruled from Yedo there were official governors 
 (daikwan), as distinct from clan rulers : while 
 the details of administration were entrusted to 
 an army of executive and judicial officers, in town 
 and country, with high-sounding titles, and func- 
 tions having little likeness to anything known at 
 that time outside Japan. 
 
 At Kioto there was an official representative 
 of the Shogun (or Resident), called the Shoshidai, 
 
16 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 through whom all official communications between 
 Yedo and Kioto passed, the Kwambaku, or chief 
 minister of the Court, and officials known as 
 Tenso and Oiso, representing the Throne in the 
 conduct of State business. The castle of Osaka 
 was occupied by a Shogunate official called Jodai, 
 and at Fushimi, Nagasaki, Uraga, and other places 
 there were Shogunate governors called Bugio. 
 
 Two religions, Buddhism and Shinto, existed 
 side by side, their boundaries at times so inter- 
 laced that they seemed to be one : while two 
 others, Confucianism and geomancy, though hardly 
 having the status of religions, exercised a great 
 influence on the morality and thought of the 
 nation. 
 
 Relations with the Spaniards had been broken 
 off in 1©24, and with the Portuguese twelve years 
 later, and from that time, till the new foreign 
 intercourse on a treaty basis was established, the 
 only two nations whose ships traded with Japan 
 were the Chinese and Dutch. The place where this 
 commerce was conducted was Nagasaki in the 
 province of Hizen in Kiushiu. There the Chinese 
 had always traded, and it was to the same port 
 that the Dutch traders were transferred from 
 Hirado after the issue, in 1636, of the edict closing 
 the country. There is little doubt that in making 
 this exception in favour of the Dutch the Japanese 
 were influenced by the belief that they were not 
 Christians, a belief which was confirmed by their 
 general attitude towards Christianity, and the 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 17 
 
 missionary propaganda. There is also reason to 
 credit the statement that the Japanese were later 
 on very indignant when they found out that 
 Christianity was also the religion of Holland. 
 
 The curious political conditions existing at that 
 time in Japan gave rise to much misunderstanding 
 on the part of foreigners. (So little was known or </ 
 heard of the Mikado that the Shogun was com- 
 monly taken to be the sovereign.) Another idea was 
 that Japan had two Emperors, one temporal and 
 the other spiritual, and this was the view taken by 
 the Portuguese and Dutch. Later writers again 
 have laid stress on the fraudulent conduct of the 
 Shogunate, which is accused of having deliberately 
 concealed from the outside world the existence of 
 the Mikado, and having falsely represented the 
 Shogun to be the actual sovereign of Japan. In 
 reality there was no wilful deception. It would 
 have been as difficult, if not impossible, for the 
 Japanese officials who negotiated the earlier 
 treaties with foreigners to explain to them the 
 true state of things, as it would have been for the 
 latter to understand the explanation when given. 
 And if the Japanese who acted as Dutch inter- 
 preters in speaking and writing of the Shogun 
 (or Taikun) used misleading phrases conveying 
 the idea of his sovereignty, the Japanese texts of 
 the earlier agreements are almost equally mis- 
 leading ; and it is not easy to see what other form 
 of words would have better answered the purpose 
 in view, which was to signify the deep veneration 
 
 1247 b 
 
18 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 and respect entertained for the de facto ruler of 
 Japan. 
 
 A Harleian manuscript of the sixteenth century, 1 
 in describing the autocratic position of Hideyoshi, 
 the predecessor of the Tokugawa Shoguns, towards 
 the feudal aristocracy of those days, says : — 
 
 ' To the end that he may become lord, or rather 
 absolute tyrant, he is wont to remove the princes 
 out of one province into another ; . not ignorant 
 that lords being taken out of their dominions and 
 placed over strange subjects become weak . . . ; 
 and that they may the less practise and devise any 
 revolt he decideth their realms and dominions. 
 Besides ... he will have them come to yield him 
 reverence . . . and offer him every year precious 
 gifts. . . . For though all rivers in a kind of thankful 
 remuneration return their waters to the sea 
 because they draw them from thence, yet the 
 princes of Japonia do clean contrary. They 
 receive nothing from the Emperor ' [namely 
 Hideyoshi] ' and yet give all to the Emperor. . . . 
 And that they may not grow rich and of sufficient 
 ability to make head against him, he suffereth not 
 their fleeces to grow, but shears them clean off by 
 raising taxes . . . for the building of castles and the 
 repairing of fortifications.' 
 
 What is said in the foregoing passage applies 
 with even greater force to the power of the 
 Tokugawa Shogunate. Its rule, as established by 
 its founder Iyeyasu, extended over the whole, and 
 not, as in Hideyoshi' s case, over only a part of 
 Japan. The opportunities for intrigue and revolt, 
 
 1 Undated, but evidently written towards the end of the 
 sixteenth century. Quoted in Japonia by Thomas Rundall. 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 19 
 
 already made small enough by Hideyoshi's policy, 
 were further reduced under the Tokugawa regime 
 by a regulation providing for the residence of 
 daimios alternately in Yedo, and in the provinces, 
 and for the permanent detention of their families 
 as hostages. This rule, by which the daimios 
 were kept continually travelling to and fro, chiefly 
 by land, put them to great expense, and incon- 
 venience, besides entailing troublesome arrange- 
 ments to prevent quarrels, and more serious 
 collisions, between different processions moving 
 along the high roads at the same time. 
 
 All-powerful as was the sway of the Tokugawa 
 Shoguns, to outward seeming, when the early 
 treaty negotiations commenced, the period of its 
 zenith had nevertheless passed, and the decay 
 which was shortly to show itself more clearly had 
 already set in for some time. For this there were 
 various causes. A spirit of unrest had been pro- 
 duced by the eager study of Western learning 
 through the medium of Dutch books, by associa- 
 tion with foreigners attached to the Dutch factory 
 in Deshima, and by the news, received through 
 the Dutch, of the proceedings of the French and 
 English in China. And in the course of the two 
 previous centuries the effect of three separate 
 movements, the study of ancient learning, as it 
 was called, the study of the Chinese philosophy 
 of Wang- Yang-Ming — known in Japan as 0-yo- 
 mei — and the revival of pure Shinto, had been 
 increasingly inimical to the Tokugawa Govern- 
 
 B2 
 
£ 
 
 20 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 merit. Each of these was in itself merely a phase 
 of the great literary renaissance which charac- 
 terized the Tokugawa period. Put very shortly, 
 the study of ancient learning was an attempt 
 to clothe Chinese Confucian ideas in Japanese 
 dress, and place, as it were, Confucian teaching 
 on a Japanese basis ; the aim of the O-yo-mei 
 philosophy was to translate theory into practice ; 
 while the revival of pure Shinto signified a revolt 
 from subserviency to Chinese principles of ethics 
 and administration, as well as an endeavour, by 
 the encouragement of historical and linguistic 
 research, to restore the ancient monarchical ideas, 
 including devotion to the Throne, which had died 
 out during the six or seven hundred years of 
 Shoguiiate rule. The combined effect of all three, 
 which showed, in spite of independent origin, 
 a curious singleness of tendency, was to create 
 a popular feeling in favour of the personal rule of 
 the Mikado, and thus weaken the Tokugawa 
 domination. And the operation of these various 
 causes was strengthened by the hereditary jealousy 
 of the more powerful daimios, who could not 
 forget that Iyeyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa 
 rule, had been a daimio like themselves, by the ill- 
 health of the reigning Shogun at the time of Perry's 
 visit, and by the fact that the Tokugawa family 
 was then, owing to dissensions which arose in the 
 Mito branch, a house divided against itself. 
 
 It should carefully be borne in mind in con- 
 sidering the question of Tokugawa government that 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 21 
 
 the Shogun did not personally rule any more than 
 the Mikado. What for want of a better name 
 may be termed the figurehead system of govern- 
 ment is noticeable throughout the whole course 
 of Japanese history, and is the natural outcome 
 of Japanese social and political ideas.) Real and 
 nominal power are rarely seen combined either 
 socially or politically. The family, which is the 
 unit of society, and not, as with us, the individual, 
 is nominally controlled by the individual who is its 
 head. But practically the latter is in most cases 
 a figurehead, the real power being vested in the 
 group of relatives who form the family council. 
 And so, in the feudal times of which we are now 
 speaking, it was with the territorial nobility. 
 With one or two notable exceptions, the daimids 
 did not administer their fiefs. The administration 
 of these was entrusted to a group of retainers, 
 known as karo, who held office hereditarily in \J 
 their respective clans. And it was the same with 
 the hatamoto. But here again the authority was 
 more nominal than real, the direction of affairs 
 being left as a rule to the more active intelligence 
 of retainers of inferior rank. Similarly the Shogun 
 was as often as not a mere puppet in the hands 
 of his Upper and Lower Councils, and these in 
 turn were controlled by subordinate office-holders. 
 So that the position of the Mikado in his enforced 
 retirement was simply a reproduction of what 
 existed in each sphere of the social and political 
 organization. Though very repugnant to the 
 
22 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 court nobles, who regretted their ancient power and 
 wealth, this position of the Crown did not appear 
 startling to the average Japanese, who was accus- 
 tomed by tradition and habit to the dissociation 
 of power from position, and regarded it, if he 
 thought about it at all, as perfectly natural, and, 
 in the circumstances, correct. With the establish- 
 ment of a new line of Shoguns, or the advent to 
 power, in any other of the above-named capacities, 
 of an individual of exceptional force of character, 
 there might be a reversion for a time to personal 
 rule. But this was seldom bequeathed to a 
 successor. It rarely outlasted the lifetime of the 
 individual in question, and the frequency of the 
 custom of abdication, which did not necessarily 
 mean the relinquishment of power, shows how 
 innate and all-powerful in the Japanese nation 
 was the instinct of ruling by proxy. In what 
 other country would a third of the feudal nobility 
 have been found, as was the case in Japan not 
 long after the opening of the country, living in 
 the retirement of abdication ? Where else could 
 such a state of things have existed as we find on 
 more than one occasion when there was not only 
 a roi faineant but a Shogun faineant, and the 
 government was conducted by a personage who 
 was neither sovereign nor Shogun ? 
 
 The natural tendency of this system was to 
 hinder the development of administrative capacity, 
 and to keep the government shrouded in an 
 atmosphere of impersonality. But in another 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 23 
 
 direction it had very practical results. The 
 weakness or incompetence of the ruler produced 
 no violent convulsions in the body politic. The 
 machinery of government worked on as smoothly 
 as before, unaffected by the personality of those 
 theoretically responsible for its control. And 
 for the Crown there were other gains. The 
 absence of personal rule precluded all possibility 
 of conflict with the people, while the seclusion 
 and mystery in which the monarch moved raised 
 the Crown in the popular veneration and esteem. 
 Thus was evolved a stability which has triumphed 
 over all vicissitudes. The dual system of govern- 
 ment in Japan has been ascribed by some writers 
 to deep policy on the part of the usurping Shoguns. 
 In reality it was an arrangement in thorough 
 consonance with Japanese ideas which had its root 
 in the social system. And, as time went by, the 
 tendency of office to divorce itself from the dis- 
 charge of the duties nominally associated with it 
 increased everywhere, with the result that by the 
 time Perry came all real authority both in the 
 clans and in the Yedo Government had been 
 transferred to members of the military class, who 
 were the virtual rulers of Japan. 
 
 It has been the custom to represent the military 
 class as having, when Japan emerged from her 
 seclusion, the warlike qualities commonly asso- 
 ciated with feudalism. This in a marked degree 
 was true, however, only of certain clans in the 
 south, west, and north. In other parts of Japan, 
 
24 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 and especially in Yedo and Osaka, and other 
 centres of commerce and wealth, the ' Long Peace ' 
 had instilled habits of luxury. The simplicity, 
 frugality, and hardiness, which had formerly 
 characterized the military class, were disappearing, 
 and literary pursuits were being cultivated at 
 the expense of warlike accomplishments. This 
 movement was stimulated indirectly by the Sho- 
 gunate through its two-fold policy of patroniz- 
 ing Buddhism, and at the same time encouraging 
 the spread of Confucian philosophy, each of which 
 in its own way tended to curb the military spirit 
 of the samurai. 
 
 It used to be thought at one time that all 
 Oriental countries were barbarous in comparison 
 with the West, and Japan was not unnaturally 
 included in this category. Western nations in 
 holding this view were but adopting the attitude 
 of China and Japan, for whom the world consisted 
 of two sets of people, themselves and ' outer 
 barbarians \ no exception being made by either 
 of the two in favour of her neighbour. But better 
 knowledge revealed the fact that the term bar- 
 barous was wholly inapplicable to the Far East ; 
 that she possessed a civilization older than that 
 of Europe, and superior to it in several branches 
 of agriculture, art, and industry ; and that it 
 was only in development along certain scientific 
 and ethical lines that Europe could claim any 
 manifest advantage. There is a striking unanimity 
 of opinion among all the earlier writers on Japan 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 25 
 
 in regard to the civilization which was found to 
 exist. And the value of this evidence is increased 
 by the fact that it comes from writers of many 
 nationalities and different professions, was gathered 
 under various circumstances, and extends through 
 a long period of years. What the missionaries of 
 the sixteenth century were the first to observe 
 is confirmed over and over again by later comers ; 
 by Spex and Sergersohn, Saris and Kaempfer in 
 the seventeenth century, by Thunberg in the 
 eighteenth, and by Golownin, Siebold, and others, 
 in the early part of the nineteenth century. One 
 piece of corroborative testimony comes from an 
 interesting and rather unexpected source. The 
 date is 1815. In that year Sir Stamford Raffles, 
 the brilliant governor of the Straits Settlements, 
 was administering the island of Java, then in 
 British possession. In the course of a lecture 
 delivered by him in Batavia, the capital of the 
 island, he referred to a visit made to Japan two 
 years before by Dr. Ainslie, one of the officials 
 serving under him, and quoted the opinion which 
 that gentleman had formed of the Japanese 
 people during a stay of four months at the Dutch 
 factory at Nagasaki. Dr. Ainslie spoke of them 
 as a nervous vigorous people, whose bodily and 
 mental powers resembled more nearly those of 
 Europeans than Asiatics ; who had a strong 
 inclination for foreign intercourse, in spite of the 
 anti-foreign policy of their rulers ; and whose 
 energy of character — and, he might have added, 
 
26 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 submission to discipline — showed itself in the 
 extraordinary decision which excluded the world 
 from their shores, and confined within their own 
 limits a people who were adventurous navigators, 
 and had formerly traded with all nations. In 
 their apparent coldness Dr. Ainslie traced a 
 resemblance to the stillness of the Spanish 
 character, due, in his opinion, to the same causes, 
 a system of espionage, and a spirit of disunion. 
 They were, he observed, attracted by novelty, 
 warm-hearted, and eager for knowledge and 
 information of all kinds. Finally they struck 
 him as being a people who were ready to throw 
 themselves into the hands of any nation of 
 superior intelligence. Reading this to mean a 
 willingness to be guided by the practical wisdom 
 of a wider civilization, wherever it might be found, 
 this is precisely what Japan has done in carrying 
 through the work of national development. 
 
 A similar impression, not unmixed with surprise, 
 was produced on the foreign negotiators of the 
 early treaties. We find constant references to the 
 singular attractiveness of the people, their eager- 
 ness for knowledge, and the difference between 
 them and other Asiatic peoples with whom they 
 are compared. The advanced state of education, 
 and its wide diffusion through the empire, were 
 also noted. 
 
 This education was for all classes obtained 
 chiefly in private schools. These had gradually 
 taken the place of the Terakoya, or schools attached 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 27 
 
 to Buddhist temples which, before the Tokugawa 
 administration, were the only places where learning 
 was taught. But for the special use of the military 
 class there existed also in Yedo an academy, 
 dating from the end of the eighteenth century, 
 and other schools, maintained by the Shogunate, 
 and in the provinces there were colleges supported 
 by local daimios. 1 
 
 It should also be borne in mind that the opening 
 of Japan to foreign trade in the middle of the 
 nineteenth century was not the first establishment 
 of foreign intercourse. It was the re-opening of 
 a country which had been open before, and had 
 then been deliberately closed. In the early years 
 of the seventeenth century very extensive trading 
 facilities were for a short time enjoyed by the 
 Portuguese, the Dutch, and the English. The 
 Portuguese carried on their trade chiefly in ports 
 of the province of Bungo, at the island of Hirado, 
 and at Nagasaki ; and the Dutch and English 
 commerce was likewise confined principally to the 
 southern island of Kiushiu. But the trading 
 facilities granted by the Japanese Government at 
 that time permitted a much wider scope, of which 
 advantage was never fully taken. Proof of this 
 is furnished by the charter obtained by Captain 
 
 1 Among the provincial towns which benefited by such establish- 
 ments were Yonezawa (in the province of Dewa), Sendai (in 
 Mutsu), Sakura (in Shimosa), Nagoya (in Owari), Okayama (in 
 Bizen), Hagi (in Choshiu), Saga (in Hizen), Kumamoto (in Higo), 
 and Kagoshima (in Satsuma). 
 
% 
 
 28 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 Saris in 1613, the first article of which runs as 
 follows : — 
 
 We give free license to the King of England's 
 subjects Sir Thomas Smith Governor and Company 
 of the East India merchants for ever safely to 
 come into any our ports or empire of Japan with 
 their ships and merchandise without hindrance 
 to them or their goods : and to abide buy and 
 sell and barter according to their own manner 
 with all nations and to tarry as long as they will 
 and depart at their pleasure.' 
 
 The second article of this charter allowed English 
 goods to be imported into Japan without payment 
 of customs duty ; under the third English subjects 
 were permitted to build houses in any part of 
 Japan ; and in the fourth it was expressly 
 stipulated that English subjects in Japan should 
 not be amenable to the somewhat summary pro- 
 cesses of Japanese law. 
 
 Could more liberal treatment have been desired ? 
 There is nothing here of the harsh restrictions 
 subsequently imposed on foreign intercourse, and 
 singularly enough in the conditions respecting 
 trade, residence, and jurisdiction, we see an 
 anticipation of the provisions of the treaties nego- 
 tiated two and a half centuries later. 
 
 This fact, therefore, that it was not the first open- 
 ing of Japan to foreign intercourse, but the re-estab- 
 lishment of that intercourse on a formal treaty 
 basis, must be kept in view by those who otherwise 
 might be tempted to exaggerate the shock produced 
 by renewed contact with Western nations. 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 29 
 
 Nor had Japan's seclusion in the interval 
 between 1636 and 1853 been complete. The 
 Spaniards and Portuguese were indeed expelled; 
 Japanese subjects were prohibited on pain of 
 death from going abroad ; and submission to this 
 decree was enforced by the provision which 
 reduced the tonnage of ships, limited to one the 
 number of masts to be carried, and so altered the 
 construction of vessels that they were helpless in 
 stormy weather, and were only fit to coast from 
 point to point along the shore. But a small 
 number of Chinese and Dutch trading vessels still 
 came to Nagasaki, bringing tidings of the outside 
 world ; and foreign news trickled through from 
 oilier sources — through Corea, from shipwrecked 
 mariners of different nationalities, and in letters 
 addressed to the Government of Japan by various 
 foreign potentates. And, as time went on, the 
 Japanese people acquired from Dutch books, brought 
 in both openly and secretly, a good sprinkling of 
 Western science, especially medicine and naviga- 
 tion. So that when foreigners came, demanding 
 treaties with a show of force, the Japanese, 
 though living for so long in a back eddy of the 
 world's active life, were not in the position of 
 a nation to whom the Western new-comers were 
 total strangers. They had traditions of Spanish 
 and Portuguese intercourse, and of an active 
 Christian propaganda prosecuted by zealous 
 foreign missionaries ; they knew of the buccaneer- 
 ing expeditions and trading enterprises of their 
 
30 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 ancestors on the coast of Asia before the edict of 
 seclusion ; and they were quite accustomed to the 
 idea of foreign trade. 
 
 And here it should be explained, by way of 
 excuse for much friction and misunderstanding 
 which subsequently arose, that the trade to which 
 the nation was accustomed was not a trade carried 
 on freely and directly by the people of Japan, 
 but one which, if not a Government monopoly, was 
 conducted under strict official supervision. State 
 control of foreign commerce became in the years 
 during which the Dutch and Chinese alone traded 
 with Japan an axiom of government. The prin- 
 ciple, as we shall see later on, stands recorded 
 in the first treaty, and it could always be supported 
 on the ground that the people must be protected 
 from the foreigner. So it was not, perhaps, sur- 
 prising that in spite of the express stipulations of 
 later treaties, inserted for the purpose of remedying 
 this state of things, the foreign representatives for 
 many years had much trouble in resisting official 
 encroachments, and in combating all sorts of 
 restrictions placed on the free conduct of trade. 
 
 The narratives of the negotiations bring out very 
 clearly the atmosphere of intrigue, suspicion and 
 fear in which the Japanese officials of that day 
 moved. Harris, the first United States repre- 
 sentative, in his diary speaks of the agitation 
 shown by them in the course of business interviews. 
 Interpreters would lose their self-possession en- 
 tirely, and shake with fear — one being mentioned as 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 31 
 
 ' trembling all over his body, as though he had an 
 ague fit, while large drops of perspiration stood like 
 beads on his forehead ' — and officers of higher 
 rank invariably supported a request for something 
 not to be done by the plea that, if it were, they 
 would lose their heads. Of the severity of the 
 Tokugawa rule abundant testimony is furnished 
 by its laws. For this we need not look further 
 than the Edict of 1636 which closed the country. 
 By this law it was death for a Japanese to go 
 abroad, for the children or descendants of Spaniards 
 and Portuguese to remain in Japan, or to return 
 there after banishment, and for a Japanese to 
 adopt or harbour such persons, or receive letters 
 from them. In every case, too, the whole circle 
 of the offender's relatives were punished. Nor, 
 from the lavish way in which rewards for the 
 detection of criminals were given, is there any 
 reason to suppose that these laws lost any of their 
 harshness in the process of application. Of two 
 things there seems to be little doubt : that officials 
 lived in terror of the Government they served, and 
 that the latter were in their turn very much 
 afraid of the foreigners who came to make treaties, 
 and of what would happen when those treaties 
 were made. 
 
 We notice, too, in the administration of that 
 time a partiality for the employment of two or 
 more officials to do what might seem to be the work 
 of only one. Thus, for instance, in Nagasaki and 
 Shimoda, and probably in other imperial districts, 
 
32 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 there were two governors and two vice-governors. 
 These functionaries were not all at their posts 
 at the same time. It was arranged that two should 
 be on duty during six months of the year, while 
 the other two were in Yedo or elsewhere. When, 
 as frequently happened, these posts were filled by 
 daimios, some arrangement of this kind was neces- 
 sitated by the obligation of residence in Yedo at 
 stated times. The same superabundance of office- 
 holders is noticeable in other branches of the State 
 service. It is not clear whether this tendency ever 
 extended so far as to become a principle of adminis- 
 tration, but it was a recognized practice in the 
 Loochoos at the time of their annexation to Japan, 
 and to its prevalence may be ascribed the general, 
 though perhaps mistaken, belief amongst foreigners 
 that Japanese officials usually worked in pairs. 
 Among the stories of those times there is one 
 which illustrates this tendency. 1 It is said that 
 when Lord Elgin and Kincardine came to negotiate 
 his treaty in 1858 the double name at once attracted 
 attention, giving rise to the assumption that the 
 British Government had sent two envoys, and not 
 one, to open relations with Japan ; and that when, 
 after the lapse of several days, the second envoy 
 never appeared, inquiries were made after the 
 missing Kincardine. 
 
 Any review of the conditions prevailing in Japan 
 
 1 The Elgin treaty itself is an instance in point. On one side 
 it is signed by Lord Elgin alone ; on the Japanese side there arc 
 no less than six signatures. 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 33 
 
 at the time of Perry's arrival would be incomplete 
 without some reference to the well-known fact 
 of the predominating influence of Chinese civiliza- 
 tion, which received a great impetus during the 
 whole of the Tokugawa period. It was apparent 
 in almost everything. Nor is this surprising in 
 view of the fact that at the time of what is known 
 as The Great Reform in the seventh century, the 
 whole administrative system was remodelled on 
 a Chinese basis. From China the Japan of that 
 day borrowed her written language, her court 
 ceremonial, part of her official organization, her 
 philosophy, her ethics, her religion, if we exclude 
 Shinto, her arts and industries, and her laws, 
 repeating the process later on. And, curiously 
 enough, it is from China also that she adopted the 
 name by which she became known to the world. The 
 old name for herself, the use of which triumphed 
 over that of all others, was Yamato. Originally the 
 name of the province where the seat of Govern- 
 ment was at an early date established, it has 
 always appealed to Japanese patriotic sentiment, 
 and it survives to-day in such expressions as 
 Yamato-kotoba, the Japanese language, and 
 Yamato-damashii, the spirit of Japan, and there- 
 fore of a Japanese. But the name Japan (or, as 
 the Japanese pronounce it, Nihon or Nippon), 
 which has practically superseded it, and all other 
 names, is of Chinese origin. Long before Europe 
 heard of the name through Marco Polo the Chinese 
 called the country Ji-pan, or the ' origin of the 
 
 1247 Q 
 
34 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 sun ', in allusion to its geographical position to the 
 east of China; and when Japan borrowed her 
 written language from China she, either uncon- 
 sciously, or in deference to the great country whose 
 influence she was accepting, or, it may be, because 
 Chinese was then the fashion, adopted this Chinese 
 name. That, in face of an influence so over- 
 whelming, Japan should have developed, as she 
 did, politically, and socially, on lines so original, 
 and so little like those of China, says a great deal 
 for the adaptive genius, and the racial vigour of her 
 people. 
 
 There still remain one or two points to which it 
 may be well to draw attention. We have seen how 
 insignificant Japan's foreign trade had become in 
 the closing years of the long period of her seclusion. 
 Her internal trade was also conducted under dis- 
 couraging circumstances. Under the feudal system 
 there was no such thing as free and unrestricted 
 movement of the population. The people of one 
 district could not mix freely with those of another. 
 The territory of each daimiate, or clan, was looked 
 upon as a sort of local preserve, into which the 
 intrusion of strangers was discouraged, even when 
 not expressly forbidden. And it was obviously not 
 easy for trade to do what was denied to individuals, 
 and penetrate the rigid barriers which separated 
 each clan from its neighbours. Nevertheless* in 
 spite of feudal restrictions, a considerable internal 
 trade was carried on by means of clan guilds, 
 whose operations extended beyond provincial 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 35 
 
 limits, and were conducted through the medium 
 of large towns like Osaka, which, then even more 
 than now, was the business centre of the country. 
 
 Trade was also hampered by the scarcity of 
 good roads, and the almost complete absence of 
 wheeled traffic.' The few chief high roads, such 
 as the Tokaido and Nakasendo, which connected 
 Kioto and Yedo by the sea-coast, and through the 
 central ranges of hills, respectively, were kept in 
 good order for the purpose of the daimios' journeys 
 to and from Yedo, if for no other reason. But the 
 other roads were little better than tracks. The 
 transport of commodities, and indeed also of 
 persons, overland was effected by means of pack- 
 horses and coolies, palanquins being used by the 
 wealthier classes. 
 
 There was also another feature of feudalism 
 which interfered with the development of com- 
 munications and of trade. This was the position 
 of the farmer. In the province of Satsuma, besides 
 the ordinary farming class, there were samurai 
 farmers, and similarly in certain districts of the 
 province of Mito there was a special class of 
 yeoman farmers, who enjoyed some of the privi- 
 leges of the samurai. But throughout the country 
 generally, the bulk of the agricultural class con- 
 sisted of peasant farmers who, while cultivating 
 their land on conditions similar to what is known 
 in Europe as the metayage system, were in many 
 respects little better than serfs. The peasant farmer 
 could not leave his holding and go elsewhere, 
 
 C2 
 
36 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 as he pleased ; nor could he dispose of his interest 
 in it, though there is reason to think that the law 
 in this respect was sometimes evaded. He was 
 subjected to certain restrictions both in regard 
 to the nature of the crops to be cultivated and 
 their rotation, and in the sale of his produce he 
 was hampered by the action of the clan guilds. But 
 if he belonged in a sense to the land, the land also 
 in a sense belonged to him, and if he was transfer- 
 able with it when it passed into the possession of 
 another feudal proprietor, he was, on the other 
 hand, under the feudal form of ownership which 
 existed, practically free from disturbance in his 
 holding so long as he paid his rent when it was 
 due, and other imposts when they were exacted. 
 
 It should be mentioned also that the country 
 suffered greatly both from the confused condition 
 of the paper currency and from debased coinage. 
 More than two-thirds of the daimiates had paper 
 currencies of their own, and in many cases different 
 issues were in circulation together. This paper 
 money, too, was of various kinds. There were 
 gold notes, silver notes, sen notes, notes represent- 
 ing fixed amounts in copper, brass, and iron cash, 
 and rice notes, representing definite quantities of 
 rice, and used in the payment of taxes, which were 
 chieflv levied in kind ; and there were also what 
 were called ' credit notes ', representing gold, 
 silver, cash, or rice, as the case might be. A similar 
 condition of things prevailed in fourteen of the 
 hatamoto territories. Besides these different pro- 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 37 
 
 vincial paper currencies, there were the Govern- 
 ment coin and paper issued by the Shogunate, 
 and much of the former was debased. The extent 
 of this monetary confusion may be realized from 
 the fact thatf according to an official estimate the 
 number of different paper currencies in circulation 
 a year or two after the Restoration was no less than 
 1,60c 1 It was intensified by the erroneous ideas 
 then held as to the proper ratio between gold and 
 silver, and between these two metals and copper, 
 which enabled the foreign trader to make unex- 
 pected profits, and caused great loss to the country. 
 The two classes on which the evils resulting from 
 this state of things bore most heavily were the 
 military class and the farmer. And other economic I 
 causes were working in the same direction, so that I 
 at the time of the opening of the country there \ 
 was much distress and discontent. 
 
 The Japanese of those days seem to have had 
 the same passion for sight-seeing and holiday- 
 making as those of to-day. The visit of the first 
 United States representative to Yedo for his 
 audience of the Shogun gave an opportunity to 
 the population of that city for indulging their 
 sight-seeing propensities. In his diary Harris 
 describes the crowds which assembled on that 
 occasion. He estimated the number of spectators 
 at about 185,000. All the way from the outlying 
 
 1 See History of Currency, published in Kwampo (Japanese 
 official Gazette) in 1886 : translated by E, A. Griffiths and 
 J. H. Gubbins. 
 
38 CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
 
 suburb of Shinagawa to his lodgings near the 
 castle, a distance of some four miles, the proces- 
 sion moved, he tells us, in a stillness which was 
 impressive. The only sound was that made by 
 the police in keeping the mass of people in their 
 places ; the silence of such a vast multitude 
 struck him as having something appalling in it. 
 The streets were packed with people standing in 
 lines five deep on each side. There were also people 
 in balconies, and on the tops of houses. The same 
 dense crowds on ceremonial occasions, and their 
 orderly behaviour, are noticed by the foreign 
 traveller now. 
 
 Before leaving this portion of our subject, it 
 may be well to restate briefly the position of 
 things when Perry arrived. He found a highly 
 organized community excelling in arts, industries 
 and agriculture, wedded to ceremonial, and per- 
 meated by Chinese ideas, with a gift for imitation 
 happily controlled by assimilative genius, and 
 independence of character, and enjoying a system 
 of government very cumbrous, and obscure, and 
 quite unique of its kind. The central authority 
 was nominally vested in a shadowy personage 
 in Yedo, whose exact relationship to a still more 
 shadowy personage in Kioto it was not easy to 
 determine. There was a feudal system under 
 which the daimios ruled their own territories, or 
 under Shogunate supervision, those of their neigh- 
 bours, certain localities, including what were 
 known as the Shogun's dominions, being reserved 
 
FIRST TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED 39 
 
 for the direct administration of the Yedo Govern- 
 ment, and the central authority was exercised by 
 means of Councils of State, and of a vast assem- 
 blage of executive and judicial officers. This 
 central authority was weak, and growing weaker, 
 an uneasy feeling was abroad, and the first signs 
 of the troubles which culminated in the downfall 
 of the Shogunate were beginning to show them- 
 selves. Clan jealousies and feudal restrictions 
 hindered national progress in many directions, 
 there was much distress and discontent, and the 
 currency of the country was in a state of great 
 confusion. Foreign intercourse was confined to 
 the Chinese and Dutch traders visiting Nagasaki, 
 and, when it was not Chinese, Dutch was the 
 medium of communication with the outside world. 
 
 s 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TREATY RELATIONS 
 WITH FOREIGN POWERS 
 
 For many years after the edict of 1636 had 
 closed Japan to all but a few Dutch and Chinese 
 traders, it was only at very rare intervals that any 
 other foreign vessel broke in upon her seclusion. 
 But at the end of the eighteenth century the 
 situation began to change, and before the first half 
 of the nineteenth century was over new forces had 
 come into play, making it difficult for Japan to 
 adhere to her fixed policy of isolation. Russia was 
 moving southwards to join her frontiers with 
 those of Japan ; America's activity was shown by 
 the movements of her shipping in the Pacific, 
 and the appearance of her whalers in Japanese 
 waters on their way to and from the Sea of 
 Okhotsk ; while France and England were pushing 
 their interests in the south of China in a manner 
 which indicated that the extension of their opera- 
 tions to Japan was only a question of time. The 
 trend of affairs was perceived by the Dutch. 
 They were witnesses to the increasing frequency 
 of the visits of foreign vessels, in cQnneiion with 
 which their good offices were usually required ; 
 they knew of the growing impatience of Europe 
 and America ; and they warned Japan that the 
 moment was approaching when the barriers she had 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 41 
 
 raised against the outside world could no longer 
 be maintained with safety to herself. 
 
 These visits of foreigners were of various kinds ; 
 some more or less accidental, as those of distressed 
 or shipwrecked navigators ; some half-serious, as 
 those made with the avowed object of restoring 
 to their homes Japanese castaways, and the 
 secret hope of perhaps obtaining some advantage 
 in the shape of trading facilities in return ; in 
 others again there was the declared design of 
 putting an end to Japan's seclusion. The two last 
 categories are those which claim our attention, 
 both from the special interest attaching to them, 
 and also because they form not unimportant links 
 in the chain of events which led ultimately to the 
 establishment of foreign intercourse on a treaty 
 basis. 
 
 After a time the method of dealing with the 
 visits of foreign vessels seems to have become more 
 or less stereotyped. If they came to Nagasaki, 
 they were told that Japanese law only permitted 
 trade with the Dutch and Chinese, and if they 
 came elsewhere, they were told to go to Nagasaki. 
 A very clear discrimination was exercised between 
 merchant vessels and warships. To the former 
 scant courtesy was shown, and they might think 
 themselves lucky if they were not fired upon, or 
 if their crews escaped harsh treatment. But 
 warships were treated with more respect. They 
 were rarely fired upon. They were towed into and 
 out of harbour free of charge by Japanese boats, 
 
42 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 and they were supplied with provisions for which 
 no money was accepted. In other respects the 
 procedure observed was much the same. As 
 soon as a foreign vessel had anchored, or even 
 before she had done so, boats surrounded her. 
 A letter in Dutch (or in Dutch and French) couched 
 in the usual formulas, was handed on board in 
 a cleft bamboo, and a ring, or sometimes a double 
 ring, of guard-boats prevented all communication 
 with the shore. Everything on board came under 
 keen observation ; many questions were asked, 
 and the answers carefully noted down ; but all 
 counter-questions were evaded, and with the first 
 favouring breeze the unwelcome guest was speeded 
 on her way. 
 
 It was probably the Russian visits which first 
 opened the eyes of the Yedo Government to the 
 inconveniences of the policy of seclusion. Saghalien 
 was held by the two countries in a sort of joint 
 possession without any boundary line, and uncer- 
 tainty existed in regard to the ownership of the 
 Kuriles, most of which were claimed by Russia. 
 The proximity of these islands, moreover, to the 
 Russian mainland increased the possibilities of 
 a collision. So it may be convenient to begin with 
 the first Russian attempt to establish relations with 
 Japan. 
 
 In the year 1792 a Russian lieutenant named 
 Laxman arrived in a harbour on the north coast 
 of Yezo. Here he passed the winter, and in the 
 summer of the following year sailed round to 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 43 
 
 Hakodate. He was charged with a mission from 
 the Empress Catherine to hand over to the 
 Japanese Government the crew of a Japanese 
 vessel, which had been wrecked in 1780 on one of 
 the Aleutian islands then belonging to Russia, 
 and he was instructed to utilize this opportunity 
 to establish friendly relations. But the Japanese 
 authorities at Hakodate had no idea of entering 
 into any negotiations of the kind. To have done 
 so would in all probability have meant signing 
 their own death-warrants. They explained to the 
 Russian commissioner that by the law of Japan 
 his life, and those of all the Russians on board 
 his vessel, were forfeit for coming there, as the 
 only port in Japan not closed to foreigners was 
 Nagasaki. But as they had come on an errand of 
 mercy, and had saved the lives of Japanese, their 
 fault would be pardoned. They must, however, 
 return to Russia at once, and come to Nagasaki, 
 if they came again. As for the shipwrecked crew, 
 they might leave them, or keep them, as they 
 liked, for they were regarded as belonging to the 
 place to which their destiny had carried them. 
 
 When a second mission under the leadership of 
 a chamberlain named Resanoff was dispatched 
 some years later, the advice of the Japanese was 
 followed, and it came to Nagasaki. The reception 
 given, however, was not encouraging. The un- 
 lucky chamberlain was put into a caged enclosure, 
 and he returned without having effected anything. 
 On his way back to Russia he conducted a raid on 
 
44 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 some Japanese islands in the North, in revenge 
 for the rough treatment he had experienced. 
 
 In May 1811 Lieutenant Golownin was sent to 
 survey the Kuriles in the Russian frigate Diana. 
 This at least is the Russian statement. Probably 
 he had a roving commission, in the execution of 
 which much depended on circumstances. Whether 
 the local Japanese knew the reason for his presence, 
 or would have understood or respected it had 
 they known it, is very doubtful, as doubtful indeed 
 as the nationality at that time of many islands in 
 those northern latitudes. But at any rate they 
 remembered Resanoff's raid ; and here was an 
 opportunity for reprisals. % So Golownin was 
 enticed on shore and captured. Like Resanoff, 
 he was put into a sort of cage, but he was other- 
 wise not unkindly treated, and in the summer of the 
 following year he was released and taken on board 
 the Diana, which had come to look for him. 
 
 In dealing with the visits of British vessels it 
 may be useful to refer in passing to the few cases 
 which occurred before the nineteenth century. 
 
 In 1673, during the reign of Charles II, and fifty 
 years after the English trade with Japan, which 
 only lasted ten years, had been discontinued, an 
 English ship, the Return, came to Japan and asked 
 for permission to trade. Owing, it is said, to 
 Dutch intrigues this permission was refused on 
 the ground that the English king had married 
 a Portuguese princess, and that the Portuguese 
 were the enemies of Japan. 
 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 45 
 
 From that date till the beginning of the nine- 
 teenth century only two British ships visited 
 Japan. One was the Argonaut, a merchant vessel 
 engaged in the Alaska fur trade. She put into 
 a harbour on the west coast of Japan in 1791, and 
 tried to trade, but was warned off. The other 
 was H.M.S. Providence, which visited Yezo a year 
 or two later, and was civilly treated by the 
 authorities. 
 
 In 1803 an English merchantman, the Frederick, 
 was sent to Nagasaki from Calcutta . with a cargo 
 of goods, but she was refused admittance to the 
 harbour, and was compelled to leave at once. 
 
 Five years later, England being then at war with 
 Holland, which had become a part of the French 
 Empire, H.M.S. Phaeton found herself in the 
 neighbourhood of Japan in need of supplies, and 
 resorted to an artifice to obtain them. She hoisted 
 the Dutch flag, and stood into the harbour of 
 Nagasaki. She was boarded by two men from the 
 Dutch factory, who were promptly made prisoners, 
 Through them and the superintendent of the 
 factory the commander eventually received the 
 supplies he needed, payment for which was de- 
 clined, and he was allowed to leave unmolested. 
 On this occasion the local authorities were blamed/ 
 for not having everything in readiness to meet 
 force by force, and several Japanese officials com- 
 mitted harakiri. 
 
 In the summer of 1813 the same superintendent, 
 whose name was Hendrick Doeff, went on board 
 
46 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 one of two ships, the Charlotte and Mary, which 
 came into Nagasaki flying, as the Phaeton had 
 done, the Dutch flag, and showing a private Dutch 
 signal. On arriving on board he found that he had 
 fallen into a trap, and that the ships were British, 
 and not Dutch. He was also astounded to learn 
 that Holland had been taken by the French, and 
 Java, whence his instructions reached him, by 
 the English ; and that the Governor at Batavia 
 was Sir Stamford Raffles, who had sent these 
 vessels in charge of two commissioners. These 
 were Dr. Ainslie, whose opinion of the Japanese 
 has already been quoted, and a Mr. Waardenaar, 
 a former superintendent of the Deshima factory. 
 In these difficult circumstances Doeff showed great 
 courage. When asked to obey the instructions of 
 the new Governor of Java, he refused to do so, 
 on the ground that they came with orders from the 
 Government of a colony in possession of the 
 enemy, and that neither Japan, nor the Dutch 
 factory there, was in any way affected by what 
 might have taken place in Java. It would 
 probably have gone hard with the English ships 
 if the Japanese had got wind of the situation, but 
 they were saved by the friendship between Doeff 
 and Waardenaar. The fact that the ships were not 
 Dutch was kept secret, the trading transactions 
 followed the usual course, and the vessels sailed 
 on the return voyage to Java, leaving Dr. Ainslie 
 behind as physician to the factory. 
 
 The fluctuating character of the relations of the 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 47 
 
 Dutch and English about that time puzzled the 
 Japanese a good deal. This was only natural, for 
 owing to the course of events in Europe these 
 relations were for some years rather involved. 
 During the continuance of hostilities between the 
 two countries the Dutch communications between 
 Java and Japan were maintained with difficulty 
 by the charter of vessels of other nationalities, 
 and were frequently interrupted for long periods. 
 Between 1810 and 1813 no ships reached Nagasaki 
 from Batavia, and on the occasion when the above- 
 quoted incident occurred the Dutch factory had 
 been without news for several years. 
 
 In the course of the following year (1814) Sir 
 Stamford Raffles made another attempt to reopen 
 intercourse with Japan, sending the Charlotte again 
 to Nagasaki with a Dutch agent on board. But 
 the attempt was unsuccessful. 
 
 Four years later, in 1818, Captain Gordon 
 sailed up the Bay of Yedo in a small brig of 
 sixty-five tons. He explained that he had come 
 to ask for leave to bring to Japan a cargo of goods 
 for sale. The officials who came on board insisted 
 on the rudder being unshipped and taken on shore, 1 
 and the removal of the ship's arms and ammuni- 
 tion. This having been done, various questions 
 were put through interpreters speaking Dutch, 
 some words of Russian, and a little English. The 
 visitors were especially anxious to know if the 
 
 1 The practice of removing a ship's rudder was not confined 
 to Japan. 
 
48 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 vessel belonged to the East India Company, and 
 if the English were again friends with the Dutch. 
 On the subject of trade they had but one answer 
 now familiar to our merchants : it was impossible. 
 Some trifling presents were offered to them but 
 declined, and eventually the rudder and other 
 things were restored, and thirty boats towed the 
 vessel out of the bay. 
 
 In 1845 H.M.S. Samarang, a surveying vessel, 
 called at Nagasaki to ask for supplies. These were 
 given readily, but no payment was accepted for 
 them. 
 
 The last British ship to visit Japan before inter- 
 course was reopened was another surveying vessel, 
 H.M.S. Mariner. She came in 1849 to Uraga, the 
 port visited by Perry four years later. The usual 
 letter was handed on board, and the captain was 
 asked not to cruise in the bay, but as he kept 
 on his course, the Japanese officials gave way, and 
 boats towed the ship to an anchorage ; and they 
 towed her out again, when, a few days after, she 
 went away. 
 
 The French seem to have made only one attempt 
 to establish friendly relations before their treaty 
 negotiations of 1858. This was in 1845. In that 
 year Admiral Cecille visited Nagasaki with two 
 ships, but he left without having succeeded in his 
 object. 
 
 We now come to the visits of American vessels. 
 Though mostly later in date than those we have been 
 considering, they showed a more serious purpose. 
 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 49 
 
 The question of establishing commercial relations 
 with Japan had occupied public attention in the 
 United States for more than twenty years before 
 Perry's arrival in 1853. Both in official and 
 business circles the matter had been much dis- 
 cussed. A resolution in favour of a mission being 
 sent to Japan had been proposed in the House 
 of Representatives. And as early as the year 
 1832 the United States Government had sent to 
 Commodore Roberts, then in command of the 
 American squadron in Chinese waters, instructions 
 regarding a mission to Japan ' for the purpose of 
 opening a trade ', which were to be acted upon 
 if he thought advisable. If he decided to under- 
 take this mission, he was to charter a private 
 vessel, and letters of credence, in which the proper 
 title of the Emperor was to be inserted, when 
 ascertained, were furnished to him. In view of 
 the defiant attitude adopted by Japan, and the 
 reception usually accorded to unarmed vessels, 
 it is hardly surprising that it was not considered 
 advisable to act on these instructions. 
 
 Apart from the desire to forestall the French and 
 English in gaining a footing in Japan — a point to 
 which the United States Government attached 
 some importance — the execution of the new and 
 vigorous policy decided upon at Washington was 
 doubtless hastened by the harsh treatment received 
 on various occasions by the crews of American 
 whalers wrecked on the coasts of Yezo and neigh- 
 bouring islands, and by the experience of the 
 
 1247 D 
 
50 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 Morrison in 1837. This was a British merchant 
 vessel, called after a well-known missionary in 
 China, and chartered by an American mercantile 
 house at Macao, for the purpose of restoring to 
 their country seven shipwrecked Japanese. The 
 Morrison was received with undisguised hostility. 
 She was not allowed to communicate with the shore, 
 and she was twice fired upon, first in Yedo Bay, 
 where she arrived, and afterwards at Kagoshima. 
 
 In 1845 the Mercator, an American whaler, 
 rescued some Japanese sailors at sea and took them 
 to the Bay of Yedo. On anchoring she was sur- 
 rounded by several hundred armed boats, and 
 deprived of her arms and ammunition. After a 
 detention of three days, orders for her release came 
 from Yedo. But the captain was told that Japanese 
 castaways could only be returned through the 
 Chinese and Dutch, and that in future no more 
 Japanese would be received under similar cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 In the same year Commodore Biddle endea- 
 voured under instructions from Washington to 
 open relations with Japan. He came with two 
 men-of-war, for by this time the United States 
 Government had evidently realized the futility 
 of trying to negotiate with unarmed vessels. 
 Avoiding Nagasaki, as Commodore Perry did later 
 on, and probably for the same reasons, he anchored 
 in Yedo Bay, and at the request of the Japanese 
 explained in writing the reason for his visit. But 
 his mission was a failure. The Yedo Government, 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 51 
 
 in a written reply, refused definitely to enter into 
 trading relations, and with this answer Commodore 
 Biddle withdrew. 
 
 Four years later the American man-of-war 
 Preble was sent to Nagasaki to fetch away the 
 shipwrecked crew of a whaler. She had some 
 difficulty in accomplishing her object, which was 
 only effected after a show of force. It was this 
 incident, perhaps, which led to the procedure 
 subsequently followed by the Japanese in all cases 
 of shipwrecked foreigners. They were handed over 
 at Nagasaki to the Dutch, who forwarded them to 
 Batavia, whence they were eventually repatriated. 
 
 In no way discouraged by the result of Commo- 
 dore Biddle's visit, the United States Government 
 persevered in their policy of opening Japan to 
 foreign trade. In 1851 instructions with that 
 object were sent to Commodore Aulick on the 
 China station, together with a letter from President 
 Fillmore addressed to the Emperor of Japan. 
 For some reason which does not appear these 
 instructions were not acted upon, but in the follow- 
 ing year the matter was again taken up ; fresh 
 credentials were prepared ; and Commodore Perry 
 received orders to proceed to Japan on a mission 
 which assumed almost the dimensions of a naval 
 expedition. 
 
 The objects of his mission were explained by 
 the State department to be threefold: to make 
 an arrangement for the more humane treatment 
 of American sailors who might be shipwrecked on 
 
 D2 
 
52 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 the coasts of Japan ; to obtain the opening of 
 one or more harbours as ports of call for American 
 vessels, and the establishment of a coal depot ; 
 and to secure permission for trade at such ports 
 as might be opened. 
 
 No secrecy surrounded the intentions of the 
 United States. They were known in Europe as 
 well as in America. Macfarlane, writing in London 
 in 1852, says, with some exaggeration perhaps: 
 1 The attention of the whole civilized world is now 
 fixed on the American expedition.' What Europe 
 knew the Dutch of course knew, and through them 
 the Japanese. 
 
 The late Count Katsu Awa in his book Kai- 
 Koku Kigen, ' The commencement of the opening 
 of the country,' reproduces a communication 
 addressed in the summer of 1852 by the out- 
 going and incoming superintendents of the Dutch 
 factory at Deshima to the Governor of Nagasaki, 
 In this the strength of the American naval forces 
 under Commodore Aulick in Chinese waters is 
 mentioned ; also the rumour that Commodore 
 Perry was to replace Commodore Aulick, that the 
 American squadron was to be largely reinforced, 
 and that the new Commodore would proceed to 
 Japan with an expedition in the coming spring, 
 or possibly a little later, all preparations for landing 
 a force, if necessary, having been made. The 
 Governor's report to Yedo asking for leave to 
 receive this communication, which is given in the 
 same work, states that this step was taken only at 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 53 
 
 the repeated request of the factory superintendents, 
 who represented the matter as being of urgent 
 importance for Japan, and drew attention to the 
 fact that the information had come a long way, 
 direct from the Governor of the Dutch East Indies, 
 The Governor of Nagasaki adds that he had at first, 
 in accordance with the law of Japan, declined to 
 receive the communication, but had finally con- 
 sented to refer the matter to Yedo. In another 
 report, presented by officials entrusted with the 
 defence of the coast, it is pointed out that the 
 communication from the superintendents, though 
 addressed to the Governor of Nagasaki, is drawn 
 up in the form of a memorandum, and not a letter. 
 This is held to diminish its importance, and the 
 contents, it is suggested, may be treated as what 
 they profess to be, namely, mere rumour. Never- 
 theless, the possibility of an attempt to establish 
 commercial relations being shortly made by some 
 foreign country or other ought not to be over- 
 looked. Reference is also made to the Dutch 
 having previously advised the relaxation of the 
 restrictions placed on foreign trade. Their attitude 
 is regarded as puzzling, since they would be the 
 first to suffer by the change ; and it is hinted that 
 the English, ' who have conquered more than half 
 the world and whose orders the Dutch have at 
 one time obeyed,' may possibly be at the bottom 
 of the whole business. 
 
 Permission to receive and transmit the docu- 
 ment was granted by the Yedo Government on the 
 
54 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 
 understanding that it was to be treated simply as 
 a statement of what was rumoured, and that the 
 superintendents of the factory should be informed 
 accordingly. 
 
 The action of the local authorities on this occa- 
 sion shows how strict were the orders relating to 
 foreign intercourse. It reveals at the same time no 
 little anxiety in the Japanese official world, which 
 doubtless felt that the country was confronted 
 with a situation more serious than any it had yet 
 been called upon to face. 
 
 On July 8, 1853, Commodore Perry with four 
 men-of-war anchored in Uraga harbour. The 
 letter from the President with which he was 
 entrusted dwelt on the advantages to be derived 
 by both countries by the establishment of com- 
 mercial intercourse. His instructions were to 
 obtain the facilities desired by persuasion, if 
 possible, but if necessary by force, and there is 
 evidence to show that he was ready, if authorized 
 to do so, to take such strong measures as the 
 occupation of territory to effect his object. With 
 his arrival the Shogun steps upon the scene 
 under a new title, that of Tycoon (or Great Lord). 
 This, a term first used in correspondence with 
 Corea, is the word chosen to designate the Shogun 
 in the earlier treaties and in official correspondence, 
 and is the name by which he was commonly known 
 to foreigners until the Restoration fifteen years 
 later. Once or twice, however, in treaties and 
 correspondence, he is also called Kunshiu, sovereign 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 55 
 
 or ruler, a term never applied to the Mikado, for 
 whom a loftier designation was reserved. 
 
 Perry was asked by the Japanese at Uraga to 
 go to Nagasaki, this being, he was told, the only 
 place where foreign ships were allowed to come. 
 He refused, and asked for an interview on shore, 
 at which he could deliver the letter he had brought. 
 After a few days' negotiation the Japanese gave 
 way. The interview on shore was granted, and 
 Perry delivered the President's letter, and his own 
 credentials as envoy. In the formal receipt given 
 to him it was admitted that the letter had only 
 been accepted under compulsion. 
 
 The envoy also handed in a letter from himself. 
 The vigorous terms in which tfhis was couched must 
 have been as embarrassing to the Japanese trans- 
 lators as they were surprising, even in their softened 
 Japanese form, to the ministers who read it. For 
 he said, amongst other things which must have 
 seemed somewhat unusual as coming from an 
 envoy in those days, that he was there to receive 
 a written assurance that Japan would treat 
 humanely the crews of American vessels wrecked 
 on her coasts, or driven by stress of weather into 
 her harbours. He pointed out the folly of persis- 
 tence in the present policy of seclusion, and the 
 importance of avoiding a quarrel. Great warships 
 were on their way from his country to Japan. 
 For these he had not waited, preferring to show 
 his friendly intentions by coming with only four 
 small vessels. He would return, he added, next 
 
56 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 spring with a larger squadron, and hoped that 
 before then the Japanese Government would have 
 decided to adopt the just and friendly policy 
 indicated in the President's letter. We are pre- 
 pared, therefore, for the complaint of the Japanese, 
 in the course of the later negotiations of the 
 following year, that the Americans were not long- 
 suffering, like the Dutch and Russians, but quick- 
 tempered, and did not understand the principles 
 of benevolence and good faith — two, it may be 
 noted, of the five cardinal virtues adopted by 
 Japan from the moral code of China. 
 
 On July 17, three days after the interview, 
 Perry sailed for the Loochoos, where he had called 
 on his way to Japan. These islands professed 
 a sort of double allegiance to China and Japan, 
 and as the Japanese had made no attempt to 
 enforce in them their policy of seclusion, they 
 served as a convenient base of operations. 
 
 In December of the same year Perry received 
 a letter from the Governor-General of the Dutch 
 East Indies, written at the request of the Japanese 
 Government, telling him of the Tycoon's death 
 having occurred soon after the receipt of the 
 President's letter, and asking him to postpone his 
 return to Japan as everything there was in con- 
 fusion. Perry in his reply thanked the Governor - 
 General for the news, but announced no change 
 in his plans. 
 
 On February 12, 1854, he arrived in Japan again, 
 this time with six ships, and on the following day 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 57 
 
 sailed up the Bay of Yedo and anchored at a spot 
 twelve miles above Uraga. He was urged by the 
 Japanese to go to Uraga, or Kamakura, and hold 
 a conference there. This, however, he declined 
 to do, and on the 25th he moved further up the 
 bay, anchoring off Kanagawa, then a small posting 
 town on the Tokaido, the high road leading from 
 Yedo to Kioto through the maritime provinces. 
 The Japanese then proposed that the conference 
 should take place at Yokohama, a village quite 
 close to Kanagawa, and opposite to the squadron's 
 place of anchorage. To this Perry agreed, and 
 about a month later his negotiations were brought 
 to a successful issue by the signature of thd[ Treaty 
 of the 31st of March, 1 which opened the ports of 
 Shimoda and Hakodate to American vessels, the 
 former at once, the latter at the end of a year. 
 From the time of this treaty the Shogun figures 
 under two titles. To foreigners he appears as 
 Tycoon ; to the Japanese he remains the Shogun. ) 
 
 In the following September additional regula- 
 tions 2 dealing with the limits within which 
 excursions might be made at the two open ports, 
 and other minor points, were agreed upon at 
 Shimoda ; and in February, 1855, the ratifications 
 of the treaty were exchanged at the same place. 
 
 This treaty, it should be noted, was not a regular i 
 commercial treaty, like those of later date. It 
 was an agreement for the concession of certain 
 limited facilities for navigation, and facilities of 
 
 1 Appendix 1. 2 Appendix 2. 
 
58 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 a still more limited character for trade, which 
 simply amounted to this, that an American vessel 
 might, through the medium of the local authori- 
 ties, dispose of cargo at two Japanese ports, and 
 obtain cargo there in exchange. In other words, 
 what trade there might be would be done, under 
 the supervision of Japanese local officials, by 
 a supercargo on board of a vessel, and not by 
 American merchants on shore. It provided very 
 fully for cases of shipwrecked or distressed 
 vessels, and it contained an unconditional most 
 favoured nation clause, but it did not concede 
 even the right of residence. If, however, it was 
 far from granting all that was wanted, it was 
 a step, and, under the circumstances, a long step, 
 in the desired direction ; the express stipulation 
 for treatment different from that accorded to 
 Dutch and Chinese traders placing foreign relations 
 at once on an altered, and a more dignified, footing. 
 According to the account of the discussions 
 given in Count Katsu Awa's book already men- 
 tioned the Japanese negotiators took credit to 
 themselves for having conceded so little, besides 
 making it appear that they had conceded even less. 
 In their report on the treaty to the Yedo Govern- 
 ment they are careful to mention that a memoranr 
 dum on the subject of the trade regulations agreed 
 to between America and China was handed in with 
 the suggestion that a beginning might be made 
 on this basis. 'But we pointed out,' they go on 
 to say, ' that nothing was known about foreign 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 59 
 
 trade in Japan, and that, therefore, it would be 
 difficult to allow it. The chief point the Americans 
 had raised was the humane treatment of their 
 countrymen. This we had taken into special 
 consideration, and had agreed to furnish ships 
 with supplies, but on the question of trade, which 
 is conducted for profit, and at the traders' own risk> 
 we were not prepared with an immediate answer. 
 Since then the matter has not been mentioned.' 
 The negotiators also prided themselves on the 
 fact that a settlement had been reached be- 
 tween themselves alone and Perry, without any 
 answer being given to the President's letter, and 
 without the members of the council being called 
 upon to affix their seals to any document. This 
 they thought was a worthy upholding of Japan's 
 dignity. _^ 
 
 The choice of open ports was unfortunate. 
 Hakodate was selected because of its convenience 
 for American whaling vessels frequenting the 
 Sea of Okhotsk. It had nothing else to recommend 
 it, for the extensive coal deposits since worked 
 were not known of at that time, nor, with a fringe 
 of population only on the south coast, could Yezo 
 be regarded as offering great prospects for trade. 
 As for Shimoda, there was nothing in its favour, 
 except from the Japanese point of view. The 
 harbour was bad, and the town stood at the end 
 of a wooded peninsula, shut in on every side 
 but that facing the sea by ranges of hills, and 
 remote from high roads and markets. 
 
60 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 The praise bestowed on Perry for the firmness, 
 patience, and tact displayed in his negotiations 
 was certainly deserved. As his correspondence 
 with the United States Admiralty shows, he had 
 made up his mind to demand as a right the 
 courtesy due by international usage, to suffer no 
 petty annoyances to be inflicted on him, and to 
 jealously maintain the dignity of the American 
 flag. He would allow no guard-boats to be 
 stationed near his ships, nor was any one, except 
 those who came on business, allowed on board. 
 His initial advantage was scored when on his first 
 visit he persuaded the Japanese to receive the 
 letter he had brought. ( But there is no doubt that 
 his diplomacy was assisted very largely by the 
 weakness and confusion existing in Japan.) In 
 spite of the brave appearances kept up, both the 
 Yedo Government and the Court at Kioto were 
 overawed by the force with which Perry's demands 
 were backed. This they felt powerless to resist. 
 All that they could do was to try to gain time ; to 
 postpone the evil day, Micawber-like, as long as 
 possible, in the hope that something might turn 
 up. And so we see them in the course of the 
 negotiations falling back on the argument, already 
 urged through the Dutch, that the pressure of State 
 business caused by the death of the late ruler and 
 the appointment of his successor, made it im- 
 possible for the Government to attend to anything 
 else ; when this excuse did not answer, expressing 
 their readiness to give supplies to vessels, but not 
 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 61 
 
 to permit any closer intercourse ; then suggesting 
 Nagasaki as the only port of call for some years ; 
 putting forward the excuse that so important 
 a matter could not be settled without reference 
 to Kioto ; and finally, when the treaty had 
 become a fait accompli, asking that the appoint- 
 ment of a consul should be held over for five years. 
 
 The signature of Perry's treaty was shortly 
 followed by the conclusion of arrangements with 
 other powers — with the British, the Russians, and 
 the Dutch. 
 
 First in order comes the British convention. 
 This was negotiated at Nagasaki in October of 
 the same year, 1854, 1 by Admiral Stirling, who 
 came with a squadron of four vessels, and it was 
 ratified a year later. The Crimean War had 
 broken out, and the British Government, who were 
 aware of the efforts of Russia to effect an under- 
 standing with Japan, were anxious that British 
 ships should be at no disadvantage as regards 
 access to Japanese harbours. The convention 
 simply opened the two ports of Nagasaki and 
 Hakodate to British vessels for the purpose of 
 supplies and refitting ; and, as in the case of Perry's 
 treaty, no right of residence was conferred. The 
 omission of Shimoda may mean that its useless- 
 ness even as a port of call had already been 
 recognized. The last article contains the singular 
 provision that after the ratification of the con- 
 vention * no high officer coming to Japan should 
 
 1 Appendix 3. 
 
62 ESTABLISHMENT OF I 
 
 alter it '. This was evidently intended to place 
 on record the fact that the terms of the convention 
 represented the high- water mark of Japanese con- 
 cessions. Another curious feature is the exception 
 made in the most favoured nation clause that this 
 was not to apply to ' the advantages accruing 
 to the Dutch and Chinese from their existing 
 relations with Japan '. The American negotiator 
 had, as we have seen, expressly stipulated for 
 treatment in the matter of trade different from 
 that accorded to the subjects and vessels of the 
 two countries in question. The British Admiral 
 was not concerned with trade at all. 
 
 When ratifications were exchanged, the meaning 
 of certain articles of the treaty was more clearly 
 set forth in a supplementary document. 1 In this 
 was recorded the general right of ships of war, 
 as distinct from merchant vessels, to enter ports 
 of friendly powers, but it was added that the right 
 would not be exercised in Japanese waters without 
 necessity, or without offering proper explanations 
 to the imperial authorities. 
 
 Four months later the Russian admiral, Poutia- 
 tine, concluded a treaty at Shimoda, 2 the ratifica- 
 tions being exchanged in the following year. 
 
 This was his second visit to Japan for that 
 purpose. He had previously (in August, 1852) 
 gone to Nagasaki, and the Russians made much of 
 this point, as showing their respect for the law 
 of Japan. From Japanese sources we learn that 
 
 1 Appendix 4. 2 Appendix 5. 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 63 
 
 his visit on that occasion caused some consterna- 
 tion, for he came with four vessels. He said he 
 wished to go to Yedo, and had brought letters and 
 presents. The local authorities were afraid to 
 obey their standing orders, and sericChim away, 
 for fear he might go to Uraga. So they wrote 
 to Yedo asking for instructions. Should they 
 receive the letters, and tell him to go away, naming 
 a date when he might return for an answer ? If 
 they received the letters, what was to be done 
 with the presents ? If an interview was granted 
 to him, should ceremonial dress be worn ; and how 
 big a suite might the admiral bring ? The reply 
 which came said : The letters might be received. 
 This, though contrary to the law of Japan, 
 seemed to be unavoidable. As for an answer, if 
 there was nothing about it in the letters, nothing 
 need be said, but if the Russians insisted on having 
 one, they might be told that the Government were 
 too busy to give it at once, but that it would be 
 sent later through the Dutch superintendent of the 
 factory. Poutiatine should be requested to leave. 
 They should be civil to the Russians, but careful 
 to maintain the dignity of the country. With 
 regard to the question of dress, they need not wear 
 ceremonial garments if an interview took place ; 
 ordinary attire would meet the case. 
 
 On his second visit — this time to Shimoda in the 
 late autumn of 1854 — Poutiatine came with only 
 one ship, and this he lost owing to a tidal wave. 
 But in the interval between the two visits Perry's 
 
64 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 treaty, and also Stirling's, had been concluded, 
 and this seems to have made all the difference in 
 his reception. The treaty he signed in February, 
 1855, which opened the three ports of Shimoda, 
 Hakodate, and Nagasaki to Russian vessels, and 
 the first two to Russian trade, was more on the 
 lines of later treaties than the two preceding 
 conventions. Russia's chief concern, according to 
 the letters brought by Poutiatine, was for her 
 frontier with Japan. This is the first subject 
 mentioned. In the Kurile islands it was deter- 
 mined, but the boundary in Saghalien was left 
 purposely undefined. The treaty is, moreover, in 
 some respects bilateral, and the principle of 
 exterritoriality, of which there is no mention in 
 either the American or British convention, is 
 recognized. 
 
 Additional articles l explaining the meaning of 
 the treaty were signed at the same time, and a 
 further supplementary treaty was negotiated by 
 Poutiatine at Nagasaki in the autumn of 1857. 2 
 
 The Dutch benefited very soon by the new 
 direction given to foreign relations. The treaties 
 made by America, Great Britain, and Russia had, 
 as we have seen, left them in the undisturbed 
 enjoyment of their trading privileges at Nagasaki. 
 Perry had designedly overlooked that port, and 
 the rights of the Dutch there had been carefully 
 respected by the other negotiators. But the 
 position into which they had drifted, so to speak, 
 1 Appendix 6. 2 Appendix 7. 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 65 
 
 in their eagerness for trade, was rendered almost 
 intolerable by the humiliating restrictions which 
 accompanied it. To name only a few of these, 
 a gate and guard-house barred all passage over 
 the bridge connecting Deshima with the mainland ; 
 no one was allowed out or in without a permit, 
 nor, when allowed out, were the Dutchmen per- 
 mitted to go anywhere without an escort. Any 
 Christian books found on board ship, or in the 
 possession of persons who had landed, were taken 
 away and kept during the vessel's stay in port, 
 or confiscated. Every one landing from a Dutch 
 vessel was strictly searched, and could only come 
 on shore at what was called ' the water-gate of 
 Deshima ' to distinguish it from the land-gate 
 guarded by the Japanese ; no Dutchman, even 
 with an escort, was allowed to go beyond the limits 
 of the town of Nagasaki, or to hold any com- 
 munication with Japanese except through the 
 recognized channels ; and Dutch vessels were 
 deprived of arms and ammunition, and were 
 obliged to give hostages, before being supplied 
 with boats to tow them into harbour. Some 
 relaxation of these restrictions it was desired to 
 obtain, and the concessions newly made to the 
 three other powers gave the Dutch the needed 
 opportunity. 
 
 In November, 1855, Mr. Donker Curtius, whose 
 original title of factory superintendent had been 
 raised to the more important one of Netherlands 
 Commissioner in Japan, concluded with the local 
 
 1247 B 
 
66 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 authorities at Nagasaki what was termed a Pre- 
 liminary Convention of Commerce. 1 The term is 
 a little misleading, for it was simply an arrange- 
 ment for altering the conditions of Dutch residence 
 and trade at Nagasaki. Though never ratified, 
 it went into operation in the manner agreed upon, 
 and it was replaced by what was called a Treaty 
 of Commerce, but was in reality nothing more than 
 an expansion of the previous arrangement, nego- 
 tiated by the same commissioner in January of 
 the following year. 2 By these two agreements the 
 Dutch position was materially improved. They 
 obtained full personal freedom ; exterritoriality 
 was formally recognized ; the commanders of 
 Dutch vessels were exempted from search by the 
 Customs ; communication with the Japanese, 
 except through certain channels, was no longer 
 forbidden ; Dutch women and children were 
 allowed to live in Deshima ; Dutch ships were 
 allowed to retain their arms and ammunition ; 
 both crews and vessels received better treatment ; 
 and the Dutch were allowed to send letters abroad 
 by Chinese and other vessels, and to correspond 
 with the commanders of foreign ships in the port 
 of Nagasaki. 
 
 When the ratifications of this treaty were ex- 
 changed, in October, 1857, certain additional articles 
 were agreed upon. 3 These gave to Dutch relations 
 with Japan for the first time more of the character 
 which distinguished those of other powers. Trade 
 
 1 Appendix 8. 2 Appendix 9. 3 Appendix 10. 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 67 
 
 at Hakodate as well as Nagasaki was permitted 
 under regulations of the usual kind ; most favoured 
 nation rights were conceded ; limits within which 
 excursions beyond the town of Nagasaki might 
 be made were fixed ; the custom of making presents, 
 at stated times, to ' the Emperor and other great 
 personages ', and, annually, to the local authorities, 
 was abolished ; and the Dutch were allowed to 
 practise in their houses, and at burying-places, 
 * their own or the Christian religion.' The curious 
 wording of this last provision, occurring as it does 
 in a document signed by the Dutch representative, 
 and ratified by his Government, seems to prove 
 that the Japanese had originally thought that the 
 Dutch were not Christians, and that the Dutch 
 had not discouraged the idea. 
 
 About the same time, the autumn of 1857, the 
 orders in force with regard to trampling on 
 Christian emblems were rescinded, the abolition 
 of this practice being notified to the Netherlands 
 commissioner by the local authorities of Nagasaki. 
 
 The advantages secured by the Dutch in this 
 series of arrangements give some idea of the 
 extent of the disabilities under which they pre- 
 viously laboured. There was still some difference 
 between their position and that of other foreigners, 
 but this only lasted a year or two. With the 
 operation of the treaties of 1858 the nation which 
 had prided itself on its exclusive trading privileges 
 with Japan for more than two centuries came in on 
 the same footing as other Western powers. 
 
 ¥J2 
 
 
68 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 The American treaty had stipulated for the 
 appointment, at any time after the expiration of 
 eighteen months from the date of its signature, 
 of a consul-general to reside at Shimoda, provided 
 either of the two governments (or both, according 
 to the Japanese text) deemed such arrangement 
 necessary. Mr. Townsend Harris was selected 
 for the post, and arrived in Japan in August, 1856, 
 in an American man-of-war. This appointment 
 of a consular official was the point of all others 
 which had provoked opposition during Perry's 
 negotiations. With the course of events in China 
 during the previous fifteen years the Japanese 
 were tolerably familiar, for news of what was going 
 on reached them through the Chinese and Dutch. 
 They knew of the constant turmoil surrounding 
 foreign intercourse in the sister country, of the 
 disputes which had resulted in the opium war, 
 and the British occupation of Hong Kong, and 
 of the general effect of the activity of foreign 
 official agents. When driven at length to acquiesce 
 in the residence of a consular official in Japan, 
 they had hoped that this provision of the treaty 
 might remain a dead letter, and this expectation 
 was encouraged perhaps by the delay of eighteen 
 months arranged for in the treaty. It can readily 
 be imagined, therefore, how unwelcome the arrival 
 of Mr. Harris was. The Japanese begged him to 
 return, urging — and the Japanese version of 
 the treaty certainly supported this argument— 
 that it was intended that a consul should be 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 69 
 
 appointed only if difficulties arose. None had 
 arisen ; so a consul was not required. Besides, 
 the Dutch and Russians would ask for one too. 
 When these entreaties had no effect, they turned 
 to the commodore who had brought him, and asked 
 him to take him away. Their contention, however, 
 was not borne out by the American text, and 
 Mr. Harris remained to negotiate subsequently at 
 Yedo his treaty of 1858. 
 
 The United States Government were as fortu- 
 nate in the selection of their first representative in 
 Japan, as they had been in their choice of Commo- 
 dore Perry. The task which confronted him was 
 one of peculiar difficulty, for he was the first foreign 
 agent to deal on equal terms with the Government 
 of Japan. In that capacity he had to bear the 
 brunt of obstruction so ingeniously and constantly 
 exercised that had he not been plentifully endowed 
 with patience, he must have relinquished his task 
 in despair. He had been forced upon the Japanese. 
 They retaliated by practically boycotting him. 
 He could get no trustworthy information ; if he 
 asked for anything, his request was either referred 
 to Yedo, which meant a delay of many weeks, or 
 he was told that it was contrary to the law of 
 Japan ; and his dispatches were unanswered 
 because ' it was not customary to reply to the 
 letters of foreigners '. To add to his difficulties, he 
 was for long periods without news from his Govern- 
 ment, and neither he nor his secretary had received 
 any training for the special work they had to do. 
 
 ^- 
 
70 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 The details of his long negotiations, which 
 began as soon as he arrived, are recorded at length 
 in his diary. Like Perry, he had brought a letter 
 from the President of the United States. This 
 he was determined to present to the Tycoon 
 himself, and he requested an audience at Yedo 
 for this purpose. The Japanese, on the other hand, 
 wished him to deliver the letter at Shimoda, as 
 Perry had done. *He was also anxious to make 
 some further arrangements in respect to residence 
 and trade, in amplification of Perry's treaty. 
 Several months having elapsed without any real 
 progress being made in any of the matters under 
 r discussion, he was instructed to warn Japan that 
 any attempt to evade treaty obligations would 
 render it necessary for the United States Govern- 
 ment to adopt strong measures. This threat, 
 assisted doubtless by the success of the English 
 and French forces in China, had the desired effect. 
 In June, 1857, 1 he was able to report the signature 
 of a convention opening Nagasaki (the port which 
 Perry had thought it prudent to overlook) to 
 American vessels, conceding the right of residence 
 at Shimoda and Hakodate, providing for the 
 appointment of a vice-consul at the latter port, 
 regulating the question of the exchange of American 
 and Japanese currency, and affirming the principle 
 of exterritoriality. Four months later he was 
 received in audience by the Tycoon. 
 
 Long before his visit to Yedo the United States 
 
 1 Appendix 11. 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 71 
 
 representative had recognized the desirability of 
 concluding a convention with Japan on a much 
 wider basis than that covered by the Perry 
 treaty, even when amplified by his own convention 
 of June, 1857. Accordingly on his arrival there he 
 at once opened negotiations with the Japanese 
 ministers on this subject. (He found them more 
 open to persuasion than before, a change of 
 attitude due, partly at least, to the growing 
 influence of Ii Kamon no Kami, who not long 
 afterwards became the Shogun's chief minister. 
 To his arguments that Japan had danger to fear 
 from the aggressive policy of European powers, 
 as instanced by the war then in progress in China ; 
 that it was wiser for her to come to an under- 
 standing with him than to wait for demands from 
 others which would immediately be backed up 
 by force ; and that an arrangement satisfactory 
 to the United States would probably be accepted 
 by other powers, they yielded. The terms of the 
 new treaty were finally settled in February, 1858, 
 but it was decided to refer it before signature 
 to Kioto for the approval of the Throne. ) 
 
 There was no necessity for this reference. The 
 supremacy of the Shogun in all administrative 
 matters is clearly laid down in the constitution, 
 or arrangement, established in 1615. 1 Long cus- 
 tom had confirmed the rule then made. And 
 before that date the Crown's concern in such 
 matters had never extended beyond a formal 
 
 1 Appendix 12. 
 
72 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 recognition of accomplished facts. Moreover, the 
 treaty had not yet been signed, so reference to 
 Kioto was in any case premature. But on the 
 occasion of Perry's first visit the Shogunate, in 
 order to conceal its embarrassment, had revived 
 the obsolete formality of imperial concurrence, 
 extending at the same time its application. The 
 same course was pursued now, and the minister 
 who had taken the most prominent part in the 
 negotiations, Hotta Bitchiu no Kami, was sent to 
 Kioto to obtain the imperial consent. Hayashi 
 Daigaku no Kami had been sent a month pre- 
 viously to explain matters, but the court had 
 signified its disapproval of the negotiations. 
 ^ In June Hotta returned, having failed in his 
 mission. Anti-foreign feeling was too strong. 
 The discussions over the treaty in Yedo had been 
 viewed with disfavour by the court party in 
 Kioto, and by the large majority of influential 
 daimios, who welcomed any pretext for opposing 
 the action of the Shogunate. The leader in this 
 opposition was Tokugawa Nariaki, ex-chief of the 
 Mito branch of the Tokugawa family, and ex-prince 
 of the clan of that name, a man of strong character 
 and great ability, who had already made himself 
 conspicuous by taking the side of the Kioto Court 
 party against his relative the Shogun. 
 
 The signature of the treaty was accordingly 
 postponed till September, on the understanding 
 that, whatever happened, it should have precedence 
 over that of any other, and the American nego- 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 73 
 
 tiator returned to Shimoda to await the result of 
 further overtures to Kioto. Very soon after his 
 return, however, an American man-of-war arrived 
 with the news that the war in China had terminated, 
 and that the English and French ambassadors to 
 China were on their way to Japan to negotiate 
 treaties. He at once proceeded in this vessel to 
 Kanagawa, and urged from there by letter the 
 necessity for the immediate signature of the treaty. 
 CHis representations, assisted by the presence of 
 Ii Kamon no Kami at the head of affairs, had the 
 desired effect, and without waiting any longer for 
 consent from Kioto, the treaty was signed at 
 Kanagawa on board the American man-of-war 
 on July 29. 1 ) 
 
 The ice having been broken, other treaties 
 followed in rapid succession, all on the same 
 general lines, thus proving the correctness of the 
 opinion given by Harris that what was satisfac- 
 tory to the United States would be acceptable to 
 other powers. The Dutch signed theirs on the 
 18th of August, the Russians on the 19th, the 
 British on the 26th, and the French on the 7th 
 of October. The British treaty was negotiated at 1 
 Yedo by Lord Elgin. All four followed more or 
 less closely the lines of the American convention. 
 
 1 Appendix 11. Although the wording of the other four treaties 
 is not absolutely the same it has been thought unnecessary to 
 include them amongst the appendixes. Choice has been made of 
 the American treaty because it was the first, and became the 
 model for all the rest. 
 
74 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 The new features of these treaties, which served 
 as a model for later conventions, were the opening 
 of additional ports, the establishment of a tariff, 
 and the introduction of tonnage dues ; the con- 
 cession of the right of travel anywhere in Japan 
 to diplomatic agents and consul-generals ; the 
 obligation, on the side of foreigners, to refrain 
 from erecting fortifications or places of strength, 
 and, on the Japanese side, to refrain from enclosing 
 the foreign residential area ; a slight modification 
 of the unilateral character which distinguished the 
 previous treaties ; and an understanding in regard 
 to revision. In other respects they merely con- 
 firmed, or amplified, the provisions of earlier 
 arrangements. Thus, to quote a few instances, 
 the right of appointing a consular agent at a 
 particular port was expanded into general diplo- 
 matic and consular privileges, including the right 
 to appoint a minister at Yedo ; for the port 
 regulations of previous arrangements general trade 
 regulations were substituted ; the right given the 
 year before to the Dutch in regard to religious 
 matters became a right to the free exercise of 
 religion and the erection of places of worship ; 
 the concession of exterritoriality was more ex- 
 plicitly defined, and was made to apply to civil as 
 well as criminal jurisdiction ; and the prohibition 
 of the importation of opium, mentioned in 
 previous Dutch and Russian treaties, was con- 
 firmed. 
 
 It has been already explained how, in spite 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 75 
 
 of the statements to the contrary made in the 
 report of the Japanese commissioners who signed 
 the Perry treaty, certain trading facilities were 
 granted by that instrument. But the treaty 
 stipulation conceding the privilege in question 
 remained a dead letter. One or two American 
 vessels did call at Japanese ports, but no trade 
 of any importance was carried on. Far-reaching 
 in other respects as were the effects of the first 
 treaties, the result, so far as trade was concerned, 
 was insignificant. It was only after these earlier 
 agreements had been amplified and expanded by 
 the treaties of 1858, to which a fifth power, 
 France, became also a party ; after provision 
 had been made for the residence of foreigners 
 in treaty ports, within reach of domestic markets, 
 for trade regulations, and for a tariff, that the 
 way was finally cleared for the development of 
 foreign intercourse and trade. The year 1858 
 is, therefore, an important date in the history of 
 Japan's foreign relations. 
 
 In addition to enlarging the scope of foreign 
 relations, and thus aiding the process of Japan's 
 development, the new treaties conferred a great 
 benefit by simplifying Japan's position, and replac- 
 ing a number of scattered and complicated engage- 
 ments, made at different times to meet different 
 cases, by a series of practically uniform agreements. 
 Modified later on by tariff .changes, and supple- 
 mented from time to time by regulations regarding 
 quarantine, travelling, and other matters, the 
 
76 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 treaties of 1858 governed Japan's foreign relations 
 for over forty years. It is important to notice that 
 the rights of residence and trade acquired under 
 them by foreigners applied only to the so-called 
 treaty ports, and that the right of travel, except 
 by special permission not readily granted, did not 
 extend beyond a certain area, known as ' treaty 
 limits ', in the neighbourhood of each port. The 
 rest of the country remained closed as before — 
 an arrangement which, however unpalatable to 
 foreign residents, was, in the then temper of the 
 Japanese people, a wise precaution. The limita- 
 tion of facilities for commercial intercourse was 
 moreover accentuated by the fact that the choice 
 of treaty ports was not always the best that 
 could have been made. Strongly opposed as 
 the Japanese were to the establishment of any 
 intercourse of a general kind, it was only natural 
 that they should prefer to open places as far from 
 markets as possible, and useless for other reasons, 
 and that when, as in the case of Kanagawa and 
 Hiogo, they were driven to consent to better 
 localities, they should seek to nullify the effects by 
 selecting the worst sites available. 
 
 With the conclusion of the new treaties Japan's 
 progress assumes a more definite shape. It had 
 begun long before. The first seeds had been sown 
 in the time when Dutch and Chinese traded 
 under such difficulties at Nagasaki. The new ideas 
 which then crept in, especially towards the end of 
 that long period, when many earnest students of 
 
 
TREATY RELATIONS 7 
 
 f7 
 
 foreign things in Japan read Dutch and French, 
 German and English books, had made an effect, 
 not perhaps noticeable at the time. The study of 
 ! Dutch Learning ', as it was called, which was 
 a general term for all Western knowledge, was 
 encouraged for official purposes by the Yedo 
 Government, and had prepared the way for later 
 changes by stripping them of the terror of the 
 unknown. And so, when Perry signed the first 
 treaty, many things came with a rush. The year 
 which saw his treaty signed saw the issue of a decree 
 removing the restrictions on the construction of 
 Japanese vessels, which could once more trust 
 themselves on the high seas. Twelve months later 
 the position of the Dutch in Deshima ceased to be 
 one of undignified confinement. * Other changes 
 affecting foreigners followed quickly. It is a 
 striking fact, that with all their dislike to foreign 
 intercourse, the Japanese in the course of five years 
 from the date of Perry's treaty had entered into no 
 less than thirteen elaborate agreements of one kind 
 or another, not to speak of other arrangements of 
 a less formal character. 
 
 t « 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 JAPANESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 3 
 
 In the preceding chapter some account was 
 given of the visits of foreign vessels during the 
 fifty or sixty years preceding the advent of 
 Commodore Perry, and of the circumstances 
 attending the negotiation of the treaty of 1854. 
 It was also shown how quickly, once the barrier 
 of seclusion had been broken down, agreements 
 with other foreign powers had followed, one on 
 the heels of another ; and the main features of 
 these various agreements were explained. 
 
 Before leaving this part of our subject it may 
 be useful to glance in passing at what the Japanese 
 had been doing to keep the country closed to all 
 foreigners, except the two nations which were 
 allowed to trade at Nagasaki. 
 
 In consequence of the apprehensions aroused by , 
 the visits of foreign vessels, the Japanese Govern- 
 ment, towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
 decided to establish a system of coast defence. 
 The duty of organizing and maintaining this system 
 was entrusted to the daimios and hatamoto of 
 maritime provinces, who were called upon to 
 pay all the attendant expenses; but in districts 
 ruled directly by the Shogunate, such as those 
 which included the ports of Uraga and Nagasaki, 
 this duty was assigned to officials appointed from 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 79 
 
 Yedo for that purpose, and the expenditure for 
 coast defence was defrayed by the Government, 
 who recouped themselves for this outlay by levy- 
 ing contributions on the merchants of Yedo and 
 Osaka. 
 
 Those who were thus made responsible for the 
 protection of the coast were called Kai-bo-gakari, 
 or coast defence commissioners, and stations in 
 communication with each other were established 
 at suitable points along the sea-board. The bay 
 of Yedo, and its vicinity, the inland sea, and 
 the harbours in Kiushiu, including the immediate 
 neighbourhood of Nagasaki, were places to which 
 special attention was given. Although the duty 
 of participating in the work of coast defence was 
 at first limited to the feudal lords whose territories 
 bordered on the sea, later on even those whose 
 fiefs had no sea-board were ordered to lend assis- 
 tance, in proportion to their resources, in the 
 event of a foreign vessel arriving anywhere in the 
 vicinity of their domains. The system was in 
 force only in the spring and summer months, 
 during the prevalence of the south-west monsoon. 
 For the rest of the year the coast defence establish- 
 ments went into winter quarters, since there was 
 little likelihood of their services being required 
 so long as the north-east monsoon lasted. 
 
 It is clear from the experience of foreign ships 
 which accident or enterprise carried into Japanese 
 waters, from the detailed instructions issued periodi- 
 cally from Yedo, and from the reports concerning 
 
80 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 the movements of foreign vessels appearing off 
 the coast which were constantly being received 
 from the local authorities, that there was no 
 lack of vigilance in the working of the system 
 of coast defence. But the manner in which the 
 instructions were carried out seems to have varied 
 to some extent from time to time according to the 
 degree of apprehension existing in official circles 
 at Yedo in regard to the intentions of foreigners. 
 And in the instructions themselves we can discern 
 the anxiety to evade responsibility, the tendency 
 to face both ways, so typical of the Government of 
 that day. 
 
 Two sets of these instructions, issued at different 
 dates to the coast defence commissioners, are 
 quoted in Mr. Kimura's San-jiu-nen Shi, or ' His- 
 tory of Thirty Years '. In the first, which was 
 issued in 1806, two years after Resanoff's visit to 
 Nagasaki, this visit is referred to, and the opinion 
 is expressed that the Russian ship in question will 
 not return, since she was told that her request for 
 trade could not be granted, and that she was not 
 to come again. The coast defence commissioners 
 are nevertheless enjoined to be always on their 
 guard. Whenever a foreign vessel is seen prepara- 
 tions for defence are to be made, and the militia 
 assembled. If, it is added, the ship is Russian, 
 steps are to be taken as quietly as possible for 
 her departure. Vessels taking shelter from bad 
 weather are to be given whatever supplies are 
 needed, but should a ship refuse to leave when 
 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 81 
 
 ordered to do so, she is to be driven away by 
 force, in accordance with the orders issued in 1791. 
 The second of these instructions is dated 1842, 
 five years after the Morrison incident. It begins 
 as follows : — 
 
 ' In the year 1819 orders were given that 
 foreign vessels coming to Japan should be driven 
 away without hesitation. But everything has now 
 been revised, and the (Shogun's) gracious wish 
 has been expressed for a return to the system of 
 government in the periods Kioho (1716-36) and 
 Kwansei (1789-1801), and for the adoption of 
 a benevolent administration in regard to all 
 matters. Should foreign vessels which come for 
 the simple purpose of asking for provisions, fire- 
 wood, and water, be driven away, without the 
 circumstances of the case being understood, such 
 action may, it is considered, be interpreted as 
 a hostile or retaliatory act towards all countries 
 generally. Accordingly it is the (Shogun's) gracious 
 wish to revert to the humane policy in regard to 
 the treatment of foreign vessels announced in the 
 instructions issued in 1806.' 
 
 The order then goes on to say that a foreign 
 vessel must in all cases be asked the reason for her 
 visit ; it repeats what was said before, in the 
 instruction already quoted, with regard to giving 
 supplies to vessels in distress ; it enjoins upon 
 those in charge of coast defence the exercise of 
 constant vigilance and the avoidance of undue 
 intimacy with foreigners ; and it ends with a 
 warning against panic, and with the injunction, 
 which we have heard before, that there must be 
 no hesitation to use force if necessary. 
 
 1247 F 
 
82 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 It would appear from these instructions that at 
 one time there was a disposition to refrain from 
 pushing matters to extremity, and perhaps a wish 
 to perform a disagreeable duty as pleasantly as 
 possible, that afterwards a policy of stronger 
 measures came into favour, and that finally more 
 prudent views again prevailed. But these plausible 
 exhortations to benevolence, emanating from a 
 Government of distracted counsels, do not seem 
 to have been intended very seriously, nor in- 
 deed, judging from subsequent incidents, to have 
 had much effect. The system of coast defence, 
 elaborate, but singularly ineffective, continued 
 in operation even after the negotiation of Perry's 
 treaty, and, if it failed to accomplish the object 
 for which it was instituted, it probably did much 
 to strengthen anti-foreign feeling throughout 
 Japan. 
 
 In the brief remarks on Japanese history made 
 in the opening chapter, it was stated that down to 
 the year 1192, when Yoritomo was appointed 
 Shogun, the country was more or less under the 
 personal rule of the Mikado. This statement 
 expresses the general idea on the subject, and is 
 convenient for marking the great change intro- 
 duced by the establishment of feudalism ; the 
 transfer, that is to say, of the seat of power from 
 Kioto to the provinces, and of authority from the 
 Court and Court nobles to the feudal nobility, as 
 representatives of the military class. But il 
 must not be taken too literally. As a matter oJ 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 83 
 
 fact the personal rule of the Mikados ceased at 
 a much earlier date. 
 
 Though instances of the usurpation of the 
 imperial authority by the representatives of great 
 houses occur before the introduction of the Great 
 Reform in 645 a. d., the elimination of the sovereign 
 from all active share in the work of government 
 may be said to have begun with the rise to power of 
 the Fujiwara family in the seventh century. From 
 that time on, though the country was still ruled 
 from the capital, the sovereign's influence in the 
 administration grew less and less, until by the 
 middle or end of the eighth century the Mikados 
 were little more than puppets in the hands of the 
 Fujiwara statesmen. For nearly five centuries, 
 allowing, it should be explained, for the short 
 interval in the twelfth century, during which the 
 Taira family controlled the Court, the offices of 
 regent (Sessho), during the minority of the reigning 
 Emperor, and of prime minister (Kwambaku), at 
 other times, were hereditary in the Fujiwara family. 
 If we look at the list of sovereigns who reigned 
 during this period, and compare the average 
 length of their reigns, and the number of abdica- 
 tions, 1 with those of the later period, between 
 the establishment of feudalism in 1192, and the 
 Restoration of 1868, the comparison — if shortness 
 
 1 So common was the custom of abdication amongst Japanese 
 sovereigns that many instances of three Mikados being alive at 
 the same time occur in Japanese history, and occasionally the 
 number rose to more. The language, moreover, has special words 
 to designate the exact order of monarchs who have abdicated. 
 
 ff2 
 
84 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 of reign and frequency of abdication may be re- 
 garded as proofs of the weakness of the sovereign's 
 influence — is in favour of feudalism. In other 
 words the monarchical influence, judged by this 
 criterion, was, if anything, stronger in the feudal 
 period than before. The average length of the 
 reigns of forty emperors who occupied the throne 
 during the four and a half centuries of Fuji war a 
 supremacy, and the short Taira period, is only 
 twelve years ; of these forty, no less than twenty- 
 three abdicated after reigning for an average 
 period of not more than nine years. In the longer 
 feudal period of nearly seven centuries which 
 followed, there were thirty-seven sovereigns. The 
 average length of their reigns is over eighteen years ; 
 but, while the frequency of abdication shows little 
 variation, the average length of the reigns of the 
 sovereigns who abdicated in the latter period rises 
 from nine to fifteen years. Further study of these 
 reigns brings out other points. We find that of the 
 first twenty emperors who reigned during the 
 period of Fujiwara ascendancy, that is to say, 
 during the 250 years from the beginning of the 
 eighth to the middle of the tenth century, only 
 four were minors on their accession to the throne 
 whereas in the latter half of the same period, 
 including the short interval of Taira supremacy, 
 there were no less than twelve. We notice als< 
 that with the establishment of feudalism this 
 tendency in favour of the accession of minors to 
 the throne increased. Of the first fifteen sovereigns 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 85 
 
 who occupied the throne after Yoritomo's appoint- 
 ment as Shogun, only four (including one of only 
 seventeen), were not minors, and these youthful 
 sovereigns were mostly children under twelve, the 
 youngest being a baby of two years old. The same 
 feature, the large proportion of minors who came 
 to the throne, characterizes the Tokugawa rule. 
 Only one of the first nine emperors who succeeded 
 to the throne during this period was not a minor, 
 and he was a boy of only eighteen. It does not 
 seem unreasonable to associate such frequent in- 
 stances of the occupation of the throne by minors 
 with a weak grasp of power by the sovereign, and 
 in this respect the comparison is in favour of 
 the earlier Fujiwara period, when, if reigns were 
 shorter, whether the sovereign abdicated or not, 
 and abdication was not less common than later on, 
 there were, at any rate, fewer cases of sovereigns 
 reigning as minors. The conclusion to which we 
 are brought is that so far as the weakness of the 
 position of the sovereign is concerned there is 
 not much to choose between the two periods, 
 the monarchy gaining in one respect what it lost 
 in another,/ and also that the withdrawal of the 
 sovereign from participation in the work of govern- 
 ment was of very ancient date, beginning, not with 
 feudalism, but far back in Fujiwara times, and 
 gradually developing during the course of twelve 
 centuries into a fixed principle, which resulted in 
 feudalism and the dual form of government.N 
 The frequency of abdication, and of the appoint- 
 
86 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 ment of minors to the position of ruler of the 
 State, is even more noticeable in the case of the 
 Shoguns, down to the beginning of the seventeenth 
 century, than in that of the sovereigns of Japan ; 
 although it must be borne in mind that the abdica- 
 tion of a Shogun did not mean quite the same 
 thing as the abdication of an Emperor. Some of 
 the former really did rule, and their abdication 
 did not necessarily signify the relinquishment 
 of their interest in the work of government. On 
 the contrary, it often meant a tighter grasp of 
 power, their influence in the administration being 
 greater after abdication than before. Of twenty- 
 five Shoguns succeeding Yoritomo who ruled, or 
 nominally ruled, from 1202 to 1603, no fewer than 
 sixteen were minors at the time of their appoint- 
 ment, and the number of abdications was the same. 
 When we come to the Tokugawa Shoguns, we find 
 a change in both respects. Of the sixteen Shoguns 
 of this line only four were minors when they were 
 appointed, and only five abdicated. This change 
 must not be taken as meaning that the personal 
 rule of these Shoguns was in reality more marked 
 than that of their predecessors — the Shoguns wh< 
 were controlled by the Hojo regents, and those of 
 the Ashikaga line. It is, on the contrary, safer to 
 assume that the principle of figure-head govern- 
 ment, to which we have previously referred, had 
 taken such firm root that neither abdication nor 
 the rule of minors made any difference to the 
 working of the administration. 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 87 
 
 It should be noted that the two features in the 
 reign of sovereigns, and the rule of Shoguns, to 
 which attention has been called as weakening the 
 principle of personal government, were both part of 
 the family system in its peculiar Japanese develop- 
 ment. And a third factor, which also plays a 
 conspicuous part in the social structure of Japan, 
 lent its influence in the same direction. This was 
 the custom of adoption. In Japan, as has already 
 been explained, the family, and not the individual, 
 is the unit of society. Everything centres round 
 the family. 1 The individual has little importance 
 except in his association with it, the continuity 
 of the family being the thing which matters most. 
 It is only natural that a state of things which is 
 the normal condition of society at large should be 
 reflected in governing circles. It will therefore be 
 readily conceived that the failure of a direct heir 
 in the imperial house, or in a line of Shoguns, 
 presented no insoluble difficulty. It was a matter 
 to be arranged by the Council of State, just as in 
 less exalted spheres such questions were referred 
 to the family council. So long as adoption could 
 be relied on to provide a successor, the question 
 of succession was greatly simplified, and the risk 
 of friction very much reduced. In these considera- 
 
 1 The importance of this fact comes out even in the case of legal 
 punishments. The extinction of his family was the severest 
 sentence which could be pronounced on a member of the military 
 class. This was the sentence passed on the leaders of the raid on 
 Kioto in 1863. 
 
88 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 tions we find the key to what to us seems the 
 strikingly incongruous and artificial system of 
 government evolved by the Japanese for them- 
 selves. That so often in the course of Japanese 
 history abdication should have occurred, that 
 the failure of direct heirs should have led to no 
 difficulty, that, in the same way, the machinery 
 of government should have worked smoothly 
 on, whether the occupant of the throne, or the 
 ruling Shogun, was a minor, or not ; and that 
 neither sovereign, nor Shogun, should have taken 
 an active part in State affairs, may seem to 
 the Western observer unusual and even startling. 
 To the Japanese mind there was nothing surprising 
 about it. It was simply the normal condition of 
 things to which every Japanese of that day, and 
 his father before him, were accustomed. At the 
 same time we must not overlook the peculiar 
 prestige attaching at all times to the Throne. 
 In spite of, and partly, too, because of, its early 
 relinquishment of administrative power, it retained 
 intact, together with its sanctity in the eyes of the 
 people, the jealously-guarded prerogative of con- 
 ferring Court dignities and empty titles, which 
 never ceased to be objects of ambition to all the 
 leading members of the feudal hierarchy. Thus, 
 as has already been explained in the opening 
 chapter, in its very aloofness from political life, in 
 its having the shadow without the substance of 
 power, lay the monarchy's greatest strength. This 
 accounts for its hold on the people, and its un- 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 89 
 
 broken survival, of which the Japanese nation is 
 so proud. 
 
 An appreciation of the foregoing facts is necessary 
 in order to understand the events which marked 
 the closing years of the Tokugawa Shogunate, 
 and to rightly apprehend the course of internal 
 affairs, which will occupy our attention in this and 
 the succeeding chapter. 
 
 At the time of Perry's visit more than half of 
 the country was practically under the direct 
 rule of the Shogunate, for in many of the lesser 
 fudai daimiates little latitude was left to the clan 
 authorities, even when the governors were not 
 Tokugawa officials. The remainder of the country 
 was governed by the feudal nobles, the degree of 
 dependence on Yedo varying according to the 
 situation and importance of the fief. Though the 
 nominal allegiance of these daimios to the Shogun 
 remained unchanged, the influence of the central 
 authority was gradually decreasing, especially in 
 the south and west of the country, owing to the 
 growing weakness of the Shogunate. 
 
 During the twenty-nine years of the rule of 
 the eighth Shogun (1716-46), a slight relaxation of 
 the anti-foreign policy which prevented the study 
 of all Western learning had resulted in some know- 
 ledge of the Dutch language being acquired by 
 those who wished to qualify as Dutch interpreters, 
 and by doctors who were curious to know some- 
 thing of the methods of the West. But in this 
 direction, as in that of trade, the Yedo Govern- 
 
90 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1863-60 
 
 ment pursued the same selfish course, being 
 anxious to retain for their own benefit any 
 advantage which could be derived from either. 
 The principle on which they acted was to keep 
 the people ignorant of everything relating to 
 foreign countries and things. A different spirit was 
 shown by some of the leading feudal nobles, 
 notably those of Mito and Satsuma, who quietly 
 encouraged for their own purposes the introduc- 
 tion of Western knowledge in regard to military 
 matters, shipbuilding, and other things. But 
 the country generally — thanks to the jealous and 
 short-sighted policy of the Shogunate — knew 
 nothing of anything going on ' outside of Japan. 
 This ignorance, so Mr. Shimada tells us, is strik- 
 ingly apparent in the literature of those days, 
 which he describes as being full of denunciation 
 of foreigners, and extravagant laudation of every- 
 thing Japanese. 
 
 Under conditions such as these, when everything 
 appertaining to administration was being con- 
 ducted strictly in accordance with Chinese ideas, 
 it would have been surprising if the visits of foreign 
 vessels, and the signature of the first treaties, had 
 not produced much popular commotion. This was 
 increased by the action of the Yedo Government. 
 Had they, when Perry came in 1853, acted with 
 the promptitude and decision they showed on the 
 occasion of the Russian visit to Nagasaki in 1804, 
 the nation, it is generally held, would have accepted 
 their decision without demur, the Shogun's au- 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 91 
 
 thority being ample to meet the case. And this 
 decision must have been in favour of the opening 
 of the country, for the simple reason that Japan 
 was not prepared for war. But the Shogunate, 
 instead of taking the course expected of them 
 under the circumstances, referred the matter to the 
 Throne, and asked the advice of the feudal nobles. 
 
 The latter were as much embarrassed in coming 
 to a decision as the Shogunate, and the memorials 
 giving the advice called for by the Shogunate 
 showed little knowledge of the situation, nor can 
 they have given much assistance to the perplexed 
 Government. 'I would venture to point out,' 
 said one daimio, ' that the title of the Shogun 
 is " Barbarian-expelling generalissimo ", and that 
 these words " barbarian -expelling ' have been in 
 use from time immemorial.' Similar language was 
 used by another feudal noble, who — forgetting, or 
 perhaps ignorant of, the fact that this title had 
 been adopted by the second Shogun in his corres- 
 pondence with the Spaniards and Portuguese in the 
 seventeenth century — said that the title of ' bar- 
 barian-expelling generalissimo ' was altogether in- 
 compatible with the policy of maintaining friendly 
 relations, and concluding treaties with foreigners. 
 
 In a letter in the collection of Lettres Edifiantes, 
 written from China by a Jesuit missionary, Pere 
 de Fontaney, in 1703, he alludes to the unfavour- 
 able answers given by Chinese officials of the 
 Board of Rites when reference was made to them 
 by the Emperor, suggesting the stoppage of a 
 
92 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 Christian persecution in a certain province. He 
 explains that when the Emperor asks a question 
 of the tribunals, and they return an answer 
 agreeably to the laws, they cannot be blamed ; 
 whereas, if the contrary is the case, the censors 
 of the empire have a right to impeach them, 
 and the Emperor is authorized to punish them 
 for pronouncing an opinion in opposition to 
 the laws. 
 
 There was a similar reverence for the law 
 (' the honourable country's law ' as it was called) 
 in Japan, at the time in question, and some allow- 
 ance for this feeling must be made in arriving at 
 the true value of the opinions given by the daimios 
 when consulted by the Government. 
 
 The majority of the daimios who were consulted, 
 little as they understood the question, were in 
 favour of resisting the foreigners' demands. Their 
 opinion was adopted by the Court, which had no 
 views of its own, and the Shogun received instruc- 
 tions from the Throne to drive away the foreigner. 
 Accordingly in the autumn of 1853 the Government 
 issued a proclamation which purported to express 
 the decision of the Throne. But in reality this 
 proclamation meant nothing. It said, what every 
 one knew, that there was much divergence of 
 opinion in the advice offered by the feudal nobles 
 in their memorials, and added, what was equally 
 patent to all, that the outcome of the deliberations 
 was that there must be peace or war. It dwelt 
 on the necessity of strengthening the defences of 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 93 
 
 the country, and of fighting, if necessary, to 
 preserve the country's honour ; but it also urged 
 the importance of giving no definite answer, and 
 at the same time of doing everything that was 
 possible to avoid a collision. As a declaration of 
 policy such a document was worthless. Its effect 
 was only to increase popular excitement, and to 
 strengthen the hands of those who were working 
 with the Court party against the Shogunate. 
 
 The chief of these was Tokugawa Nariaki, the 
 ex-prince of Mito, one of the three Tokugawa 
 houses known as the Gosanke. It was a Tokugawa 
 tradition that the Mito prince should act as adviser 
 to the Shogun, and on this ground the representa- 
 tives of this branch of the family were usually 
 excluded from the succession to the Shogunate. 
 Nariaki was a man of very strong character. He 
 seems to have resembled in many ways his more 
 famous ancestor Tokugawa Mitsukuni, who from 
 the encouragement he gave to literature in the 
 latter half of the seventeenth century, has been 
 called the Maecenas of Japan. In 1844 Nariaki 
 was obliged to abdicate because he had destroyed 
 the Buddhist temples in his province, and made 
 their bells into cannon. The reason he gave for thus 
 acting was his desire to be in a position to render 
 effective assistance in repelling a foreign invasion, 
 but the Shogunate suspected him of entertaining 
 other designs. Like his ancestor, he was a great 
 patron of learning. He promoted the study of 
 foreign languages, and he took an interest in many 
 
94 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 new things of foreign origin, especially the science 
 of shipbuilding. From his ancestor, too, he seems 
 to have inherited a bias in favour of the Kioto 
 Court, and his imperialist tendencies were increased 
 by his marriage with the daughter of an imperial 
 prince. Early in his career he was given the high 
 rank of Ghiunagon, and after his death this was 
 altered to the still higher rank of Dainagon. He 
 is one of the many instances in Japanese history 
 of the power wielded by political personages after 
 abdication. The policy pursued by him was some- 
 what inconsistent even for an age of inconsistency. 
 He encouraged ' Dutch Learning ', and neverthe- 
 less supported the party who clamoured for the 
 expulsion of the barbarian. He was an avowed 
 imperialist, and an opponent and detractor of 
 the Yedo Government. Yet at the same time one 
 of his chief objects was to secure the succession 
 to the Shogunate for his son Hitotsubashi Keiki, 
 who, having been adopted into the Hitotsubashi 
 family, was eligible, in spite of his parentage, for 
 appointment as heir. Had his ambition been 
 gratified by his son's succession to the Shogunate 
 in 1858, instead of nine years later, the course of 
 events would probably have been very different. 
 
 In the history of those times two figures stand 
 out with special prominence. Nariaki is one of 
 these. The other is Ii Kamon no Kami Naosuke, 
 the daimio of the province of Omi. His castle 
 town was Hikone, and he is also known as Ii Tairo, 
 the Regent Ii. The events of the period between 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 95 
 
 1853 and 1860 resolved themselves into a struggle 
 between these two statesmen. The Ii family was 
 ancient, tracing its descent back to the Fujiwara 
 administrators. Its founder Ii Tomoyasu forsook 
 the pleasures of the Court for a country life, and on 
 the shore of Lake Biwa, at a spot called the valley of 
 Ii, whence the family took its name, he built him- 
 self a castle. His successors took an active part 
 in the civil wars, and other more local distur- 
 bances, which took place in the twelfth, fourteenth, 
 and fifteenth centuries. At one time the fortunes 
 of the family were brought to a very low ebb 
 through the treachery of a retainer, but they 
 were subsequently retrieved by Ii Naomasa, who 
 was one of Iyeyasu's most famous generals. As 
 a reward for his services he was confirmed in the 
 lordship of Hikone, and to the family were given 
 certain hereditary privileges. Amongst these were 
 the duty of guarding the Court, and sheltering the 
 Emperor in the castle of Hikone, should it become 
 necessary for His Majesty at any time to leave 
 the capital, a permanent position in the Council 
 of State, and the first seat in the Tamari-no-ma, 
 the second highest of the antechambers of the 
 Shogun's castle in Yedo. The house of Ii also 
 prided itself on other distinctions. The head of 
 the family was qualified to go to Kioto as the 
 Shogun's representative to thank the Court for 
 Imperial Orders, and to worship at the Nikko 
 shrines on behalf of the Shogun ; and he alone 
 of all the nobles had the honour, when the Emperor 
 
96 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 went out of his palace, of carrying a spear and 
 a box in the imperial procession. This privilege, 
 and the fact that red was the battle colour of their 
 chiefs, gave them the soubriquets of the ' Single 
 Spear Holders' and the 'Scarlet Demons'. The 
 future regent was born in 1815. He was one of 
 nineteen children, and had thirteen brothers older 
 than himself. It was a rule in the Ii family, as in 
 others, that younger sons should be adopted, if 
 possible, into other families, where an heir was 
 lacking, to the headship of which they might 
 succeed. This was, and is, the universal practice 
 in Japan, as much pains being taken to estab- 
 lish younger sons in this way as is taken in 
 Western countries to arrange suitable marriages for 
 daughters. Failing such arrangements, younger 
 sons were either brought up as retainers of the 
 family, or were given a small allowance, barely 
 sufficient for their maintenance. The latter course 
 was adopted in the case of Naosuke, who for several 
 years lived a very retired life in Hikone. His 
 eldest brother had succeeded his father in 1832, 
 and, having no children, had adopted another 
 brother as his heir. The latter dying in 1845, 
 Naosuke was adopted as heir in his place, and he 
 was taken to Yedo and presented at the Sho ami's 
 court. Five years later the head of the family 
 died, and was succeeded by Naosuke. During his 
 five years' residence in Yedo, Naosuke had heard 
 a good deal about the visits of foreign vessels, 
 which had become one of the pressing questions 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 97 
 
 of the day, and he had had many opportunities 
 for making himself thoroughly acquainted with 
 the subject. From the first he seems to have made 
 up his mind that Japan could no longer persist in 
 her policy of seclusion. The reasons he gave in 
 writing in support of this view, when the opinions 
 of the daimios were sought by the Government 
 in 1853, do not suggest any special enthusiasm 
 for foreign ideas, but they show more practical 
 wisdom than the advice tendered on the same 
 occasion by others. 
 
 His memorial * called attention to the fact that 
 in 1636, when the country was closed by the 
 third Shogun, Iyemitsu, there were nine govern- 
 ment vessels suitable for navigating the high seas. 
 All vessels above a certain tonnage being then 
 destroyed, there were at present none which could 
 use heavy guns in a fight with foreigners. It was 
 a maxim of war that the advantage lay with those 
 who attacked. Owing to the want of proper ships 
 Japan could not take the offensive, but could only 
 defend herself against attack. ' Our ancestors,' 
 the memorial went on to say, ' in closing the 
 country left a Chinese and Dutch bridge. Japan 
 should make use of this bridge for the conduct of 
 foreign relations, and follow prudent counsels for 
 the present, postponing hostilities till we are in a 
 position to obtain certain victory.' The memorial 
 proceeded to urge the advisability of giving way 
 to the American demands in regard to the supply 
 
 1 Appendix JC 
 
 1247 Q 
 
98 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 of coal, and the treatment of shipwrecked mariners, 
 and of adopting the bold policy of carrying on 
 commerce with both America and Russia, and, in 
 pursuance of this policy, sending Japanese ships 
 once more into distant seas. A modern navy, it 
 was suggested, might be gradually created with 
 assistance from the Dutch as instructors, and then 
 Japan would be in a position to go out to meet 
 difficulties, and not wait for them to come to her. 
 And, in accordance with the procedure customary 
 in times of national emergency, the memorial 
 ended by recommending the consultation of 
 certain Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples by 
 the Court and Shogunate, in order that the Govern- 
 ment might be fortified by the knowledge that 
 their decision had been submitted for the approval 
 of the gods. 
 
 The sincerity of Naosuke's convictions has been 
 questioned. His memorial at any rate gave no 
 uncertain sound. It contained a distinct declara- 
 tion in favour of treaties with foreign countries. 
 The early associations of his family, moreover, 
 made the rising statesman a strong supporter 
 of Tokugawa rule. On both of these points he 
 found himself, when he joined the Council of 
 State in 1853, in conflict with the ex-Prince of 
 Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki. The death of the 
 Shogun Iyeyoshi in that year created a new ground 
 of discord. 
 
 It arose in this way. The new Shogun Iyesada 
 was childless, and, in accordance with custom in 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 99 
 
 these cases, it was necessary for him to choose, 
 and adopt, a successor. The wish of the ex-Prince 
 of Mito was, as we have seen, that his son Keiki 
 should be chosen. But the Shogun Iyesada was 
 only twenty-nine on his accession, and he was in 
 no hurry to choose a successor from another house, 
 hoping still for a family of his own. Moreover, 
 his relations with the ex-Prince of Mito were not 
 cordial, and he seems to have objected to Keiki 
 as a successor, because he was too distant a rela- 
 tion, ana also on the grounds that he was not 
 young enough, though he was only fifteen at the 
 time, and that if he were chosen, it would lead to 
 his own (the Shogun' s) abdication. If he were 
 obliged, against his own wishes, to nominate a 
 successor, his choice would, it was known, fall 
 on his nearer kinsman, the young Prince of Kishiu, 
 a boy only nine years of age. The Shogun' s views 
 with regard to the succession was shared by li 
 Naosuke, by four or five other members of the 
 Council of State, and by Prince Kujo and his party 
 in Kioto. The ex-Prince of Mito was supported 
 by the Prince of Owari, the daimios of Satsuma, 
 fichizen, Tosa, and Sendai, and many other feudal 
 nobles, as well as an influential group of Court 
 nobles headed by Prince Konoye. The weight 
 of family prestige and territorial influence was 
 with the ex-Prince of Mito, while the strength of 
 the other side, the party of li Naosuke, lay chiefly 
 in the two facts that they held the reins of govern- 
 ment and were in the Shogun' s confidence. The 
 
 G2 
 
100 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 struggle lasted for some five years, and at one 
 time (in 1855) the ex-Prince of Mito gained the 
 upper hand. But it was only for a moment. Ii 
 Naosuke and his party regained their ascendancy 
 in the administration, and held it until, in 1858, 
 the question of the succession was finally settled 
 in their favour by the appointment as heir of the 
 Kishiu candidate Iyemochi. 
 
 We have seen how vague and contradictory was 
 the proclamation issued in 1853, after the question 
 of permitting foreign intercourse had been first 
 referred to Kioto by the Yedo Government. If 
 any inference could be drawn from so colourless 
 a pronouncement, it would be that the policy to 
 be pursued should be non-committal. It certainly 
 gave no authority for negotiating treaties. But 
 since foreigners were clamouring for admission to 
 Japan, and pressing for a definite answer, a policy 
 of the nature indicated was obviously impossible. 
 So, in spite of the proclamation, and in direct 
 opposition to the instructions received, the Yedo 
 Government took the only possible course, and 
 went on with the negotiation of foreign treaties. 
 And this course was justified by the result ; for 
 with delightful inconsequence, the Throne, in 
 spite of its previous attitude, and in contradiction 
 to its non-committal policy, formally approved, 
 in February, 1855, the conclusion of the first 
 treaties with America, Great Britain, and Russia. 
 The Shogun's Resident in Kioto, in reporting this 
 approval to Yedo, stated that copies of the treaties 
 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1858^99 itfl 
 
 had been submitted for the Emperor's perusal, that 
 His Majesty had expressed his warm appreciation 
 of them, and that his mind was at ease. His 
 Majesty, it was added, was fully sensible of the 
 great trouble which the work of negotiation had 
 given to the Shogun, of the strenuous labours of 
 the Council of State, and of the services rendered 
 by all the officials concerned. 
 
 It might well have been supposed that the issue 
 of this imperial approval would be conclusive, and 
 would put an end to the contentions existing with 
 regard to foreign relations. But this was not so. 
 The struggle over the succession was becoming 
 more acute, and presumably, in view of the strong 
 anti-foreign feeling of the time, the treaty question 
 was too convenient a weapon for use in the con- 
 test to be discarded. So the strange and almost 
 incomprehensible farce was continued. In theory 
 foreign intercourse was condemned ; in practice 
 negotiations were pursued uninterruptedly, and 
 the silent procession of treaties went on amidst a 
 chorus of official and popular disapproval. 
 
 The period of four or five months preceding the 
 signature of the American treaty was a period of 
 busy intrigue at Kioto, each of the two parties 
 in the State trying to gain the advantage in the 
 contest over the succession, and the ex-Prince of 
 Mito losing no opportunity of opposing the treaty 
 policy of the Shogunate. 
 
 In June, as was mentioned in the previous 
 chapter, Hotta returned to Yedo, having failed 
 
102 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 in his attempt to gain the imperial consent to the 
 American treaty. The answer of the Throne, which 
 brought his mission to an end, was drawn up after 
 no less than seventy Court nobles had been 
 consulted. It said that the Court had from the 
 first viewed with disfavour the idea of concluding 
 treaties, and changing the sound policy followed 
 ever since the beginning of the Tokugawa adminis- 
 tration. It had been decided, therefore, to call 
 upon the feudal nobility, from the Gosanke down- 
 wards, for their advice on the following points : — 
 
 1. How best to give tranquillity to the imperial 
 mind. 
 
 2. What measures were necessary to avert 
 calamity from the State. 
 
 3. The devising of a scheme of national defence, 
 to be adopted in the event of the refusal of the 
 Court to consent to any other treaty with the 
 Americans. 
 
 If the advice received pointed to no definite 
 conclusion, an imperial messenger would be dis- 
 patched to the Ise shrine, and as soon as a decision 
 had been arrived at, it would be communicated 
 to Yedo. 
 
 As was only to be expected, there was some 
 divergence of opinion in the advice tendered in 
 answer to this summons, but as compared with 
 the result of the first consultation of notabilities, 
 when Perry arrived five years before, there was 
 a great difference. From many of those consulted 
 came answers showing that they, or the retainers 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 103 
 
 directing clan affairs, took an intelligent interest 
 in the question, and had ideas of their own. 
 
 The Prince of Owari said that if the request 
 of the foreign barbarians were granted there would 
 be no limit to the concessions demanded, and the 
 country would be disgraced. 
 
 The young Prince of Kishiu, the future Shogun, 
 and one of the candidates for the succession, 
 excused himself from offering an opinion on the 
 ground of his youth. 
 
 The ex-Prince of Mito, and his son, who had 
 succeeded him in the chieftainship of the clan, 
 were of opinion that the demand of the foreign 
 barbarians for the opening of Kioto and Osaka 
 could not be granted, nor could they be given 
 access to the province of Kii, or the island of 
 Awaji. As for trade, it should be limited to 
 articles useful for Japan. 
 
 The Lord Tayasu (one of the Gosankid, and later 
 on guardian of the young Prince of Kishiu after 
 he became Shogun) said he had no opinion to 
 offer, but suggested that a conference should be 
 held, and a joint decision adopted. 
 
 Prince Keiki, the other candidate for the succes- 
 sion, and afterwards the last of the Shoguns, then 
 known by the official title of GiobuJcio, or Minister 
 of Justice, suggested that the Shogun should be 
 careful not to bring shame on the country by 
 neglecting his duty as ' barbarian- queller ', and 
 that officials should be chosen for their merit. 
 
 The Prince of Kaga explained verbally that he 
 
104 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 had no special opinion to offer, but that if it was 
 a question of deciding between peace and war, 
 he would be in favour of the first. 
 
 The Prince of Echizen, a noble of great character 
 and influence, spoke strongly of the Shogunate's 
 treaty policy. He advocated the encouragement 
 of navigation and commerce ; the introduction 
 of a new system of foreign trade ; and military 
 and educational reforms. He objected to the 
 opening of Kioto to foreigners, but thought three 
 ports, including Osaka, should be opened, that 
 foreign ministers should reside in Yedo, and that 
 Shinagawa (a suburb of the latter) should be 
 made a commercial port. He was also in favour 
 of three other things, the connexion between 
 which is not obvious, the purchase of arms from 
 America, the granting of permission to foreigners 
 to travel, and the creation of Osaka as a place of 
 residence for all the feudal nobility. 
 
 The Prince of Awa was in favour of foreign 
 trade, and the immediate opening of Shinagawa 
 and Yedo, but not of Kioto. He also advocated 
 military reform and the encouragement of navi- 
 gation. 
 
 The Prince of Satsuma attached the greatest 
 importance to reverence for the Throne, a sound 
 condition of military defence, currency reform, 
 naval construction, the raising of the rank of the 
 governors of places opened to foreign trade, and 
 the encouragement of navigation. 
 
 The Prince of Mutsu would wait and see what 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 105 
 
 advice was tendered by others before expressing 
 any opinion. 
 
 The Prince of Mikawa objected to the residence 
 of foreign representatives in Yedo, and to open 
 ports being established in districts where men's 
 minds were disturbed, but he was in favour of 
 foreign trade with limitations, of preparations for 
 defence being completed in order that the country 
 might not suffer disgrace, of military reform, and 
 of the existing system of the residence of daimios 
 in Yedo in alternate years being made less rigorous. 
 
 The Prince of Etchiu was opposed on general 
 grounds to the demands of the foreign barbarians 
 being granted, but he was not prepared to offer 
 any special suggestions on the subject, so long as 
 measures were taken for the defence of the country, 
 and for preventing men's minds from being dis- 
 turbed, and the clans from falling into decay. 
 
 The Prince of Sendai was in favour of military 
 reform, and the encouragement of commerce and 
 navigation. 
 
 A group of dignitaries which included Ii Naosuke 
 and other members of the Council were of opinion 
 that the proposals of the American representative 
 should be reduced as much as possible, that Yedo, 
 Shinagawa, Kioto, and Osaka should not be in- 
 cluded in the list of places to be opened, the 
 number of which should be made as small as 
 possible. But they could not undertake to say 
 how far it might be possible to carry out these 
 suggestions. * 
 
106 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 The Baron Inaba of Mino said that the foreigners 
 ought to be driven away at once, but as Japan's 
 military preparations were not yet completed, the 
 American demands should be granted for the 
 present. 
 
 The Baron Satake of Hitachi suggested that 
 the limit of concession had been reached. If more 
 were conceded, more would be asked. Let the 
 foreigners be content with the three ports of 
 Nagasaki, Hakodate, and Shimoda. 
 
 Another daimio, one of the many Matsudairas, 
 thought, like several others, that the opening of 
 more ports could not be prevented. He suggested, 
 however, that steps should be taken to prevent 
 a rise in prices ; that gold and silver should not 
 be exchanged weight for weight with foreign coin ; 
 and that paper money should be used instead. 
 
 One or two of those consulted suggested the 
 conclusion of the proposed treaty for a term of 
 years, at the end of which period it was hinted 
 that the foreigner might be expelled ; others 
 dwelt on the necessity for reform, and the im- 
 possibility of persisting in the policy of seclusion ; 
 while a fourth of the whole number (sixty-five) 
 from whom answers were received had no opinion 
 to offer. 1 
 
 The results of this second consultation of the 
 territorial nobles ought to have strengthened the 
 Shogunate's hands, and shaken the Court's objec- 
 tions to the conclusion of the treaty, for there was 
 
 1 See also on this point Appendix 15. 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 107 
 
 a clear preponderance of opinion in favour of the 
 extension of foreign intercourse — and this too 
 came mostly from the same men who a few years 
 before had spoken in a very different sense. But 
 it is doubtful if all this reference and consultation 
 of which we read had much influence on the 
 situation. The part of the game of politics that 
 counted was being played by other hands in ways 
 of which the public did not hear so much. 
 
 Since the crisis of 1855, already mentioned, 
 the influence of Ii Naosuke in the Government 
 had gradually increased, and on June 5, 1858, he 
 was appointed Tairo, a title which may be rendered 
 by the word Regent. The office of Tairo was to the 
 Yedo Government not unlike what the office of 
 Sessho, a term which more closely corresponds to 
 our word Regent, had been to the Kioto Govern- 
 ment under the Fujiwara administrators. Whereas, 
 however, the latter office was tenable only during 
 the minority of an Emperor, that of Tairo was not 
 limited in this way to a Shogun's minority, but 
 could also be created at any time at the pleasure of 
 the ruling Shogun to meet occasions of emergency. 
 
 On the 16th of July the ex-Prince of Mito, whose 
 association with his son in a written opinion on 
 the treaty question — which though unfavourable 
 to the Shogunate's policy was moderate in tone — 
 has already been noticed, addressed to the Regent 
 and Council of State a letter, or memorial, enclosing 
 the well-known memorandum called ' the fourteen 
 points '. 
 
108 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 In this letter he explained that when asked for 
 his advice on a recent occasion, in regard to the 
 nature of the imperial answer to be made on the 
 subject of the proposed new treaty, he had given 
 a hasty opinion without learning the views of the 
 Shogunate, which was a very wrong thing to do. 
 He had thought of attending at the Shogun's 
 palace, and learning the sentiments of the Council 
 of State, and the ideas of the coast defence 
 commissioners, but he thought it would not look 
 well for one who had withdrawn from public 
 affairs to put himself forward so prominently. 
 He was, therefore, obliged to express his opinions 
 in writing, and this he did not feel the same 
 reluctance in doing, since on the Shogunate was 
 laid the duty of administration, and the Court 
 acted on the advice it gave. 
 
 The first four clauses of this memorandum, 
 which may serve to show the nature of the argu- 
 ments used by the Jo-i, or anti-foreign party, in 
 support of their views, may be summarized as 
 follows : — 
 
 ' The American barbarians made representations 
 last winter, and after interviews had been held 
 treaties were concluded. I understand it is the 
 Shogun's intention to complete military prepara- 
 tions with the profit made out of commerce. In 
 my opinion military preparations should be com- 
 pleted first. If this be done, commerce will be 
 developed later. I beg the Government will con- 
 sider this. 
 
 ' It is said that the northern barbarians have 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 109 
 
 made a request, and that, if this be not granted, all 
 countries will unite and attack us. This is quite 
 probable, but assisted only by hearsay, and maps, 
 they will not be able easily to penetrate far into 
 the interior of our country. Everything now is 
 quiet, but by means of trade and their bad religion 
 the barbarians will become intimate with our 
 people, and they will learn thoroughly the geo- 
 graphy of the country, and the feelings of the nation. 
 Then, if war should break out, the situation will 
 be much more dangerous. I beg the Government 
 will consider this. 
 
 ' It is said that a Minister is to be placed in Japan, 
 and that he will have charge of all matters, and 
 communicate with the Minister in charge of foreign 
 business. If this should happen, he will ask for 
 changes in all sorts of things relating to foreign 
 countries, besides commerce, which he may regard 
 as inconvenient. And it is impossible to say what 
 harm may not be done. They (the foreigners) say, 
 that in the case of the opium war in China, the matter 
 would have been amicably arranged had there 
 been a Minister in Peking. But if there was not 
 a Minister in Peking, there was one in China. I 
 beg that the Government will deal with the matter 
 after they have carefully examined the action 
 taken by the Chinese Government. The foreigners 
 ask for a speedy decision, but I beg the Government 
 will carefully consider this point. 
 
 * With regard to the request for the opening of 
 several ports, is this only for the American bar- 
 barians ? The others may come and say it is 
 difficult for them to live in the same ports as the 
 American barbarians, and may ask for more ports 
 to be opened.' 
 
 Other points in the treaty criticized in the 
 memorandum were the treaty limits, and the right 
 
110 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 to build Christian churches ; the policy of making 
 treaties at all was assailed on the grounds that 
 the indiscriminate introduction of foreign learning 
 would have a demoralizing effect, that if once this 
 new departure were made, and the ancient laws 
 (closing the country) disregarded, everybody would 
 do as they liked, and there would be no longer any 
 discipline ; stress was also laid on the desirability 
 of keeping the foreigners away from the National 
 Shrines at Ise, and the Five Home Provinces 
 surrounding the capital. 
 
 That a communication of this kind could have 
 been addressed to the Government four years after 
 the signature of Perry's treaty, and after several 
 other agreements had been concluded, and were 
 in operation, shows what a singular condition of 
 things then prevailed. We shall probably be 
 right in regarding it as a demonstration directed 
 as much against the Shogunate, as against the 
 Shogunate's foreign policy. 
 
 It was doubtless due to the authority attaching to 
 the appointment of Tairo, added to the ascendancy 
 he had acquired over his colleagues in the Council 
 of State, which made it possible for the Regent 
 to conclude, on the 29th of July, the American 
 treaty of 1858, without waiting any longer for the 
 imperial sanction asked for in the spring. To the 
 same causes was probably due the final triumph 
 of his party a week later in the matter of the suc- 
 cession. On the 4th of August the young Prince of 
 Kishiu was proclaimed heir. Ten days later the 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 111 
 
 Shogun Iyesada died. The new Shogun, Iyemochi, 
 being still a minor, a Tokugawa prince became his 
 guardian, and the Government was conducted by 
 the Regent. 
 
 The day after the signature of the treaty an 
 explanation in writing of the reasons for its 
 signature was sent to the Shogun' s Resident in 
 Kioto, for the information of the* Throne. 
 
 The reasons given were the arrival of more 
 Russian and American ships, the defeat of China 
 by the English and French, and the news that the 
 two latter were on their way to Japan determined 
 to carry matters with a high hand. The American 
 Minister had advised the immediate signature of the 
 treaty as the best way to meet the new demands, 
 and the Government had, after much anxious 
 consideration, decided to adopt this course, in 
 spite of the fact that the question was still under 
 consideration by the Throne. The report added 
 that a member of the Council would shortly be 
 sent to Kioto to offer further explanations. 
 
 At the same time the fact was notified to the 
 daimios in a circular letter, which quoted the terms 
 of the report to the Throne. 
 
 The signature of the American treaty was the 
 signal for a fresh outburst of real or simulated 
 indignation from some of the feudal nobles. The 
 ex-Prince of Mito was, as before, the most con- 
 spicuous. In the remonstrance which he addressed 
 two days afterwards to the Council of State, he 
 ignored the fact of the treaty having been already 
 
112 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 signed, and insisted on the Court's being consulted 
 beforehand. For the Shogunate, he said, to act 
 without reference to Kioto would be to fail in its 
 high duty of respect for the Throne, which had been 
 the guiding principle of all Shoguns, and to be 
 guilty of disobedience to the imperial commands. 
 
 The Regent's reply was to strike at once at his 
 enemies. This his newly acquired authority, and 
 his triumph in the matter of the succession, enabled 
 him to do in vigorous fashion. The ex-Prince of 
 Mito and the Prince of Owari were confined in 
 clan yashikis in Yedo, while the latter and the 
 daimios of fichizen, Tosa, andUwajima were forced 
 to abdicate. And when the Court, growing uneasy 
 at this sudden reassertion of authority on the part 
 of the Shogunate, summoned the Regent, or one 
 of the Gosanke (the Kishiu Prince being only a boy 
 at this time), to come to Kioto to report on the 
 situation, a reply was sent to the effect that the 
 Regent was detained by State affairs, and that 
 the princes of Owari and Mito were confined to 
 their clan yashikis. 
 
 The confinement of the latter Prince in Yedo did 
 not stop the intrigues of the party in Kioto. On 
 the 15th of September their allies there arranged 
 for the issue of a secret imperial decree, addressed 
 to the Shogunate, and signed by six of their number. 
 Accompanying the decree was a separate paper 
 addressed to the ex-Prince as doyen of the daimios, 
 and ordering the immediate publication of the 
 imperial wishes. 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 113 
 
 The decree censured the Shogun for his presump- 
 tion and disrespect in concluding the treaty in 
 defiance of the imperial wishes duly notified to 
 Yedo. Leaving aside the question of foreigners, 
 it said, the Throne was troubled to think of the 
 disorder in the country which might result from 
 this action. It expressed the astonishment of the 
 Court at the reasons given for the inability of the 
 Regent, or one of the Gosanke princes, to go to 
 Kioto in obedience to the imperial summons, and 
 it concluded by calling for a further consultation 
 of the dignitaries of the Empire. These papers 
 duly reached the ex-Prince of Mito in Yedo towards 
 the end of September by the hands of the retainers 
 in charge of the Mito yashiki in Kioto. Whatever 
 expectations may have been formed by the 
 Mito party as to the favourable results of this 
 manoeuvre were not realized. In Mito itself 
 much mischief was caused. The ex-Prince's suc- 
 cessor had not inherited his father's political 
 prejudices, and when, later on, the return of the 
 decree was demanded by the Court, serious dis- 
 turbances broke out in the clan, and it was with 
 the utmost difficulty that the Prince of Mito 
 was able eventually to comply with the Court's 
 request. 
 
 And the only result so far as the Shogunate was 
 concerned, was to hasten the departure for Kioto 
 of a mission charged with the formal report of the 
 conclusion of the American treaty, which had been 
 delayed by the death of the Shogun Iyesada. The 
 
 1247 H 
 
114 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 mission was composed of two members of the 
 Council of State, Manabe and Sakai. 
 
 This, it will be noted, was the third mission 
 within a year, sent by the Yedo Government to 
 Kioto in connexion with the negotiation and sig- 
 nature of the same treaty. The previous missions 
 of Hayashi and Hotta had both failed to obtain 
 the approval of the Court. By the time, however, 
 that the third mission under Manabe was dis- 
 patched, the aspect of affairs had been changed by 
 the Regent's appointment. 
 
 At the end of three months Manabe succeeded 
 in accomplishing the main object of his mission, 
 an interesting account of which is given by Sir 
 Ernest Satow in vol. xi of the Cambridge Modern 
 History. 
 
 It has been already suggested that the treaty 
 question was a very minor issue in the struggle 
 between the parties led respectively by the Regent 
 and the ex-Prince of Mito. The author of the 
 Bakumat.su Gwaikodan, The story of Foreign 
 Relations in the last days of the Shogunate,' thinks 
 also that this treaty question was merely a secon- 
 dary matter in Manabe's negotiations ; that the 
 Shogunate's agents were directed to make no 
 difficulties in regard to wording, but to accept 
 any decree which clearly established the fact that 
 an understanding between the Court and the 
 Shogunate had been effected. 
 
 However this may be, the imperial decree, which 
 was eventually handed to Manabe, is as singular 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 115 
 
 a document in its way as the memorandum of 
 
 the ex-Prince of Mito, to which reference has 
 already been made. 
 
 Beginning with the statement that previous 
 sovereigns had been much troubled in mind by 
 matters concerning friendship and trade with 
 barbarians, and that the Throne had repeatedly 
 expressed to the divine ancestors its feelings of 
 apprehension and distress lest this reign should 
 be the first to witness the establishment of foreign 
 relations, the decree went on to say that the two 
 councillors from Yedo had represented to the 
 Throne that the Shogun, the Regent, and the whole 
 Council of State were in favour of keeping foreign 
 barbarians at a distance, as the Throne had decreed, 
 and that the imperial mind was accordingly at 
 ease. And it concluded by urging on the attention 
 of the Shogun the Throne's deep concern in regard 
 to the sea in the neighbourhood of the imperial 
 Shrines and Kioto, and the safety of the sacred 
 insignia — which, put into plainer language, meant 
 that no port should be opened near lse, or the 
 capital. 
 
 The generally accepted explanation of the issue 
 of this decree, which deliberately ignored the pro- 
 gress already made in foreign relations, and talked 
 of closing the country again, is that Manabe, in 
 the course of his negotiations at Kioto, succeeded 
 in persuading the Court that though the signing 
 of this particular treaty was unavoidable, the 
 Yedo Government were really not in favour of 
 
 H2 
 
116 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 foreign intercourse, but would welcome the first 
 opportunity that presented itself for the expulsion 
 of foreigners. In any case the fact of the Mikado's 
 approval having been given to the earlier treaties 
 does not appear to have caused any embarrass- 
 ment to the Court in coming to its new decision. 
 This, it should be noted, in spite of its anti-foreign 
 tone, contemplated, as was so often the case 
 throughout the period we are considering, doing 
 nothing for the moment. 
 
 In . order to enable the reader to follow the 
 complicated course of political events during this 
 period it has been thought necessary to give many 
 wearisome details from the State-papers of those 
 days. The reader who has the patience to peruse 
 them will form some idea of the tortuous methods 
 adopted, in the course of the long struggle between 
 the rival factions, by each side : by the anti- 
 foreign party in order to discredit the Shogunate, 
 and by the latter in order to come to some arrange- 
 ment with the Court, which, however openly it 
 might sacrifice the name for the reality, and seem 
 to give way to the wishes of the Throne, might 
 justify in practice the policy upon which the 
 Government had embarked. 
 
 Both in the affair of the succession, and in regard 
 to the treaty question, the Mito party had been 
 defeated, for, strange as it may seem, the anti- 
 foreign decree issued by the Court was regarded 
 everywhere as a triumph for the Regent. He took 
 full advantage of his victory. Hotta, the State 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 117 
 
 Councillor who had originally supported the Regent 
 against the Mito party on the treaty question, 
 in connexion with which he had gone to Kioto, 
 but had opposed him in the matter of the succes- 
 sion, had already been dismissed from the post of 
 minister in charge of foreign business, and other 
 changes were made in the Council of State. Many 
 arrests were made in Kioto and elsewhere, and 
 sentences of banishment and execution were 
 carried out on a scale which surprised even the 
 officials of those days. 1 By the end of the year 
 the Regent had disposed of all his opponents, and 
 was master of the situation. His triumph was, 
 however, short-lived. The long struggle he had 
 waged with the anti-foreign party, which had 
 ended in the defeat and disgrace of the ex-Prince 
 of Mito, had roused feelings of bitter hostility in 
 the clan ; and in the spring of 1860 he was killed 
 in Yedo by Mito swordsmen on his way to the 
 Shogun's palace. 
 
 There can be little doubt that the Regent's direc- 
 tion of affairs greatly assisted the work of re-opening 
 Japan to foreign intercourse. What is not so clear 
 is whether he was guided in his action by the 
 conviction that this was the only safe policy for 
 Japan under the circumstances, or whether he 
 adopted it as the best means of strengthening 
 and maintaining the Tokugawa regime. For the 
 
 1 Count Katsu Awa says in his book to which reference has 
 already been made, ' The prisons were filled to an extent unknown 
 before, even in remote times.' 
 
118 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 
 
 vacillating and contradictory behaviour of the 
 Yedo Government and the Kioto Court during 
 his tenure of office it would be unjust to blame 
 him. For this he was not responsible. It was 
 part of the system of government in his time. 
 Nor in the apparent inconsistency of his actions 
 was he doing more than following the tendency 
 of the age. He seems to have been willing to allow 
 the Court and nation to believe in the nominal 
 triumph of the anti-foreign policy, so long as he 
 remained free to secure practical results by the 
 negotiation of foreign treaties, and to have been 
 content to leave the future to work out the com- 
 plicated problem presented by a State which was 
 saying one thing and doing another. He saw, and 
 for the moment checked, the beginning of the 
 political movement which shifted the centre of 
 gravity in the administration from Yedo, where 
 it had remained for three centuries unchallenged, 
 back to Kioto. After his death the fall of the 
 Shogunate was only a question of time. 
 
 When looking at Japan during the period we 
 have been considering from outside — from the 
 point of view of the foreign countries seeking to 
 establish commercial relations — we are struck by 
 the evidence of sudden and rapid progress afforded 
 by the number, and increasing scope, of the treaties 
 and agreements negotiated in so short a space of 
 time. A survey from within gives a less favour- 
 able impression. We notice, it is true, the exis- 
 tence of a current of progressive thought, but we 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1853-60 119 
 
 see, dominating everything, in Government circles 
 as elsewhere, unreasoning anti-foreign prejudice, 
 which threatened to undo all the good that had 
 been done. 
 
 How this wave of hostile sentiment subsided 
 without doing the mischief expected must always 
 remain something of a puzzle. The same mystery 
 of inconsequence attaches to the imperial decrees, 
 which said so much but effected nothing. It may 
 be that here again we simply see the working of 
 the Japanese tendency towards make-believe, that 
 much of what was said and done at that time was 
 intended simply for effect, and was never meant 
 seriously. But perhaps the truer explanation is 
 that Japan was being drawn, with or against her 
 will, into the stream of the world's progress, and 
 that against the forces thus drawing her no 
 reactionary influences, however exalted or power- 
 ful, could contend with any prospect of success. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 JAPANESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS (continued) 
 
 1860-63 
 
 In the preface to his book Kaikoku Shimatsu, 
 ' The Affair of the Opening of the Country,' 
 Mr. Shimada gives an account of what happened 
 after the Regent's assassination, which is also the 
 story of how the materials for the book came to be 
 preserved. It gives so clear a picture of the times 
 in which the Regent lived, and of the political 
 methods of those days, that we are tempted to 
 reproduce it nearly in full. 
 
 ' Almost immediately after the Regent disap- 
 peared with the spring snow,' writes Mr. Shimada, 
 ' the aspect of affairs underwent a great change. 
 The voices which denounced the policy of the 
 Shogunate were heard everywhere, both at Kioto 
 and throughout the various clans, and in the end 
 this clamour resulted in an outburst of " post- 
 humous censure ' against the Ii family. The 
 Shogunate thereupon confiscated the territories 
 of the Hikone fief, in order to give the Court at 
 Kioto a proof of the reformed character of the 
 Government. The people of the Hikone clan were 
 much incensed, and there were many who wished 
 to call the Shogunate to account for this injustice, 
 and dispute the matter with their lives. But they 
 were calmed by appeals to the instructions left 
 behind at his death by one of the Regent's ances- 
 tors, Ii Naotaka. According to the Shogunate 
 regulations, if a samurai, or hard, or daimid died 
 a violent death, his hereditary income ' (if a 
 samurai or hard) c or his territories ' (if a daimid) 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 121 
 
 1 were confiscated. When the Regent was murdered 
 a cry was raised in the Hikone clan for vengeance 
 on the Mito clan, which had done this thing, and 
 two of the clan hard presented a letter to the 
 Government declaring that they could not rest 
 happy until the assassins had been apprehended. 
 But the Shdgunate, fearing trouble between the 
 two clans which might grow into more widespread 
 disorders, rejected the petition, and sent secret 
 instructions to the Hikone clan to conceal the 
 murder, and to report that the Regent had died 
 (in his palace) from the effects of a wound. This 
 having been done, the Regent's son Naonori was 
 acknowledged as his successor (in the lordship of 
 Hikone), and the matter was settled in this way. 
 Soon after, however, political feeling changed ; the 
 Regent was accused of having conducted the 
 administration badly during his lifetime, and his 
 retainers were blamed for not having reported the 
 murder of their master ; and on these grounds 
 the fief was sequestered. Thereupon the whole 
 clan was thrown into commotion. Kato, a han- 
 sotsu, went to the Yashiki in Yedo of a member 
 of the Council of State, the daimio Inouye Kawachi 
 no Kami, and there disembowelled himself, leaving 
 a paper complaining of the injustice of the Govern- 
 ment. Many others sympathized with this act, 
 and matters were in a disturbed condition. It 
 was then that the authorities bethought themselves 
 of the instructions bequeathed to the clan by its 
 former chief Ii Naotaka, who laid down the rule 
 that however heartless and cruel the orders of 
 the Council of State might be, they must always 
 be obeyed. The first duty was to serve the State. 
 Then the public mind gradually quieted down. 
 
 ' Previous to this, however, the hard of the clan, 
 fearing lest it might be punished by the Shogunate, 
 executed two faithful retainers of the Regent named 
 Nagano Shiuzen, and Utsunoki Rokunojo, hoping 
 
122 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 thereby to lighten the punishment which they felt 
 was coming.' 
 
 Nagano, it should be explained, had been the 
 secret agent of the Regent in Kioto, and the lat- 
 ter' s final triumph in the long contest with the 
 ex-Prince of Mito was largely due to the ability 
 and courage with which Nagano penetrated and 
 defeated the intrigues of the Jo-i party in the 
 capital. 
 
 ' Things had now come to such a pass that it 
 was not only impossible to bring the Government 
 to book for the injustice they had perpetrated, but 
 the hard feared lest further calamity should fall 
 upon the clan through information obtained from 
 the Regent's private papers, and the records kept 
 by his personal retainers. So it was decided to 
 burn all these documents, and thus destroy all 
 traces of the past. The task was assigned to two 
 men, a priest of the Buddhist temple of Rio-ho-ji, 
 and a retainer of the Ii family called Okubo Shonan ; 
 and it was generally understood that the papers 
 had all been destroyed by these two. But when 
 after the Restoration public opinion again changed, 
 and the Ii family was praised for loyalty to the 
 Throne ; and when later on, with the lapse of time 
 and the progress of events, the feeling even with 
 regard to the Regent changed, and finally the nation 
 ceased to condemn him, then it became known 
 that the two persons entrusted with the burning 
 of the Regent's papers had held different views. 
 The priest of Rio-ho-ji had been of opinion that 
 to burn the papers was the best way to secure the 
 welfare of the Ii family. Okubo, on the other hand, 
 had argued that although the policy of his deceased 
 lord had perished with him, it rested with these 
 documents alone to prove in the future the true 
 

 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 123 
 
 state of things at the time, and the difficulties he 
 had had to contend with. If from inability to bear 
 patiently present trouble the papers were burnt, 
 how could the injustice of the charges brought 
 against the Regent ever be proved ? He would 
 therefore secretly preserve them and report their 
 destruction to the clan office. Should the matter 
 come prematurely to light, he would accept all 
 responsibility, and, destroying himself with the 
 documents, prevent the implication of his old 
 lord in the affair. If happily, however, an 
 aupicious age arrived, when it was possible to 
 make the papers public, the happiness would not 
 be theirs alone. If, again, the auspicious moment 
 did not come in his lifetime, he would charge his 
 descendants to preserve the papers in the family. 
 The priest was unable to dissuade him from this 
 course, and so the papers were kept by Okubo, 
 who guarded against all eventualities by keeping 
 them stored with some gunpowder. Nobody save 
 the priest and he knew what had been done, and, 
 the former dying not long afterwards, the secret 
 remained with him. His cherished hopes were not 
 in vain. In 1887 the happy time he looked for 
 came. In the spring of that year the anniversary 
 of the Regent's death was celebrated with every 
 mark of respect for the deceased statesman, 
 whose reputation in the eyes of the nation was 
 completely restored. Okubo's thoughts returned 
 to his old friend, the priest, whose solicitude for 
 the welfare of the Ii family had been as great as his 
 own. He visited his friend's grave, and explained 
 what he was going to do. Then he published the 
 papers. They are now in the custody of the Ii 
 family.' 
 
 Six months after the Regent's assassination 
 his old enemy the ex-Prince of Mito died. The 
 
124 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 deaths of the two rival statesmen may have had 
 the effect of diminishing to some extent the 
 bitterness of party feeling, but it is doubtful if 
 the country was the gainer in the end. Their 
 removal from the scene left Japan without any 
 master mind to control a difficult situation. So 
 long as the reins of government had been in the 
 strong hands of the Regent, the Court, eager though 
 it was to regain the authority which the weakness 
 of the Shogunate seemed to place within its reach, 
 hesitated to run counter to the custom of centuries. 
 And the same feeling restrained the territorial 
 nobility, which had welcomed the anti-Shogunate 
 policy of the ex-Prince of Mito. But the set of 
 the tide of popular feeling was in the direction 
 of change of some kind, and favoured the aspira- 
 tions of the Court, and the ambitions of the feudal 
 aristocracy ; and while, on the one side, the Sho- 
 gunate was deprived of its strongest supporter, 
 on the other, the movement initiated for his own 
 purposes by the ex-Prince of Mito had gathered 
 such strength that the Court felt more and more 
 encouraged to try conclusions with the Kwantd 
 administration. 
 
 Hitherto there had been three centres, as it 
 were, of political action, the Regency, which meant 
 the Yedo Government, the Court, and the Mito 
 party. With the disappearance of the Regent 
 and the ex-Prince of Mito the situation was 
 simplified. What had been the Mito party joined 
 the Court, and Kioto became the open rival of 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 125 
 
 Yedo. Hitherto it had been more or less a conflict 
 of parties, the overthrow of the Shogunate not 
 being yet contemplated as part of a realizable 
 programme. Henceforth it was a struggle between 
 Kioto and Yedo, between the Court and the 
 Shogunate, between the west, as it was called, 
 and the east. 
 
 In describing geographical situation in Japan 
 we naturally talk of north and south, east and 
 west, as the case may be. And so do the Japanese 
 themselves. But in Tokugawa days, politically 
 speaking, and in a sense geographically too, there 
 was for the Japanese one broad division of the 
 country which overshadowed all the others, that, 
 namely, between east and west, the line of separa- 
 tion passing not through the centre of the country, 
 nor through the capital, but through the mountains 
 in which lies the Hakone pass. For the Japanese 
 all was east — Kwanto or Togoku it was called — 
 which lay to the east of the guard-house at the 
 top of the Hakone pass, and everything to the 
 west of that was west, being termed Kwan-sai or 
 Sai-Jcoku. 
 
 The growing excitement and unrest in the 
 country gave an opportunity to a class of persons, 
 of which in ordinary times little was heard, though 
 it existed as a feature of feudalism. This was the 
 class of ronin. 
 
 Readers of Tales of Old Japan will recall the ex- 
 planation of this class which is given by the author 
 in a note to the story of ' The Forty-seven Ronin \ 
 
126 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 ' The word renin,' he says, c means literally a 
 " wave-man ", one who is tossed about hither and 
 thither as a wave of the sea. It is used to designate 
 persons of gentle blood, entitled to bear arms, who, 
 having become separated from their feudal lords 
 by their own act, or by dismissal, or by fate, 
 wander about the country in the capacity of some- 
 what disreputable knights-errant, without osten- 
 sible means of living, in some cases offering 
 themselves for hire to new masters, in others 
 supporting themselves by pillage ; or who, falling 
 a grade in the social scale, go into trade and 
 become simple wardsmen. 1 Sometimes it happens 
 that for political reasons a man will become ronin, 
 in order that his lord may not be implicated in 
 some deed of blood in which he is about to engage. 
 Sometimes, also, men become ronin, and leave 
 their native place for a while, until some scrape 
 in which they have become entangled shall have 
 blown over ; after which they return to their 
 former allegiance. Nowadays it is not unusual 
 for men to become ronin for a time, and engage 
 themselves in the service of foreigners at the open 
 ports, even in menial capacities, in the hope that 
 they may pick up something of the language and 
 lore of western folks.' 
 
 To this description, written, it should be re- 
 membered, when feudalism was in its death-throes, 
 we may add that the adventures of these ronin 
 knights-errant, both real and imaginary, have 
 a special place in Japanese literature, and that 
 their number varied with the circumstances of 
 the day. They were the stormy petrels of Japanese 
 feudalism, increasing, like the soshi of recent years, 
 
 1 Chonin, a Japanese term applied to all townspeople who were 
 not samurai. 
 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 127 
 
 in turbulent and unsettled times, and diminishing 
 again whenever stricter conditions of law and 
 order prevailed. The troubled period which 
 ensued after the deaths of the Regent and the 
 ex-Prince of Mito favoured the increase of these 
 clanless samurai, and they played a by no means 
 inconsiderable part in the history of that time. 
 The cry of ' Honour the King and expel the 
 barbarian ' appealed to their adventurous, if 
 lawless instincts, and singly, in groups of two or 
 three, and in larger bodies they found their way 
 to Kioto, drawn thither, like many of the feudal 
 nobles, by an instinctive feeling that there, and 
 not in Yedo, was the centre round which forth- 
 coming events would group themselves ; that 
 the hereditary seat of imperial power, and not 
 the capital of the ' usurping Shoguns ', would 
 furnish the stage on which the last scenes of the 
 approaching political drama were to be enacted. 
 These ronin posed as the protectors of the 
 Court against foreign intrusion. They bid for 
 public esteem in their character of ronin, and also 
 in a role to which they had no claim, that of 
 otokodate, a kind of citizen knight-errant, who, 
 somewhat after the fashion of the city apprentice 
 in the Middle Ages in Europe, figured as the 
 champion of the weak against the strong, of the 
 burgher against the military class. Their acts 
 soon showed that their sympathies were enlisted 
 on the side of the Court, and in opposition to what 
 by this time, in spite of the bewildering tenour 
 
128 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 of the Yedo proclamations, had come to be re- 
 garded as the Shogunate policy with respect to 
 foreign intercourse. Their hands were against 
 every man who was identified in any way with the 
 Government, but they specially singled out for 
 attack the retainers of men in high positions, who 
 had distinguished themselves as the instruments 
 of the late Regent in the severe measures taken 
 against the members of the Mito party. Among 
 their earliest victims were two well-known retainers 
 of Prince Kujo, the ex-Prime Minister of the Kioto 
 Court, one of the Regent's staunchest allies ; and 
 not a week passed without the murder of some 
 of their political enemies, Government officials, 
 police officers, or spies ; the usual course followed 
 being to expose the head of the murdered person 
 on a pole in the bed of the river which flows through 
 Kioto, a placard stating the reason for the murder 
 being attached thereto. 
 
 In the year 1861 they extended their operations 
 to Yedo, where they attacked the British Legation, 
 and two years afterwards they destroyed the 
 official residence which was being built for the 
 British Minister. The general effect produced in 
 official circles by their reckless audacity is men- 
 tioned by the author of ' The Story of a Dream 
 in the period of Genji ', who says :< — 
 
 6 In consequence the Bakufu officials were in 
 a great state of alarm. . . . Some abandoned their 
 hereditary appointments, their household goods 
 and families, and fled far away to hide their 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 129 
 
 shadows from sight. They dreaded the ronin as 
 if they had been tigers, or wolves, and remained 
 shrivelled up with fear.' 
 
 The people of Kioto, on the other hand, in whose 
 eyes the cry of i expel the barbarian ' was justified 
 by its connexion with that of ' honour the King', 
 if by nothing else, welcomed them as the champions 
 of the Court and the popular cause, and spoke of 
 them in grateful terms as 'the righteous samurai ', 
 ' the loyal samurai ', and ' the avengers of heaven '. 
 
 This ronin movement eventually assumed such 
 serious proportions as to embarrass the Court, 
 whose protection was the chief object in view, 
 as much as it alarmed the Shogunate, which was 
 so openly defied ; and an appeal was made to the 
 daimios of Satsuma, Choshiu and Tosa, who by 
 the Court's desire had established a sort of head- 
 quarters for themselves at the capital, to take 
 steps for their control. In this matter the Prince 
 of Choshiu took the leading part by enrolling large 
 numbers of the ronin as an auxiliary force with 
 the Choshiu troops. The Shogunate, after a time, 
 recognizing the advantages to be derived from 
 securing their co-operation, followed his example, 
 and from that time, until the Restoration was 
 finally accomplished, considerable bodies of ronin 
 were employed on both sides, those enlisted in 
 the Choshiu ranks being called the Seigishi, or 
 c Righteous Samurai', while the name of Shincho- 
 gumi, or ' New Levies ', was applied to those in 
 the service of the Yedo Government. 
 
 1247 i 
 
130 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 Before leaving the subject of the ronin, to whose 
 influence on the events of this particular period 
 it is necessary to draw special attention, it may be 
 interesting to give one or two instances of their 
 lawless behaviour, which will serve also as an 
 illustration of the disturbed condition of affairs. 
 From ' The Story of a Dream in the period of 
 Genji ' we learn that in the spring of 1862 the 
 father of the young Prince of Satsuma, Shimadzu 
 Idzumi, on whom, though he was a less adroit 
 politician, the mantle of Tokugawa Nariaki, as 
 leader of the anti-foreign and anti-Shogunate 
 party had fallen, was on his way to Yedo. He 
 was met at Himeji a castle-town on the northern 
 shore of the inland sea, and the capital of the 
 province of Harima, by several hundred ronin, 
 ' assembled,' as our author tells us, ' like a flight 
 of crows, to complain of the crimes of the Toku- 
 gawa officials, and to declare their noble purpose 
 of laying the facts before the Mikado, and urging 
 His Majesty to set forth to subjugate and expel 
 the barbarians in person.' Their leader presented 
 to Shimadzu Idzumi a document, for transmission 
 to the Throne, stating amongst other things that, 
 since the violation of the fundamental laws of the 
 Empire by the Yedo Government, Japan was in 
 great peril from the foreign barbarians with whom 
 treaties had wrongfully been made ; that the 
 patriots of the western provinces had secretly 
 consulted and desired to perform some noble 
 deed. Unfortunately their numbers were small, 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 131 
 
 and without the assistance of some great daimio, 
 they felt they could not succeed. They had 
 ascertained that the province of Satsuma was 
 animated by the most ardent zeal, and, hearing 
 of Shimadzu's visit to Yedo, they had waited for 
 him, hoping for his assistance in restoring the old 
 state of things. They wanted him to at once 
 attack and destroy the Shogun's castles in Osaka 
 and Kioto, and the castle of the Ii family at 
 Hikone, to drive out all the Shogunate officials 
 from Kioto, and then, escorting the Emperor to 
 Yedo, to put an end to the Tokugawa Government. 
 Shimadzu Idzumi, we are told, praised these ' low- 
 class samurai ' for their loyalty and honest feelings, 
 and, not perhaps seeing his way to refuse, acceded 
 to their request, and proceeded with the band to 
 Osaka, and thence to Fushimi. But the band of 
 renin arrived without their leader. The daimio 
 of the clan to which he owed allegiance happened 
 to be also travelling in the same direction, and 
 when the ronin leader, in accordance with feudal 
 etiquette, sought an audience to announce his 
 intentions, he was promptly arrested, and sent 
 back to his native place. 
 
 Some weeks later the daimio of Oka in the 
 province of Bungo was passing through Fushimi, 
 a suburb of the capital, on his way to Yedo to 
 fulfil the duty of periodical residence. It was not 
 customary in those days for daimios to stop at 
 Kioto on their way to and from Yedo, but the Court, 
 
 with an increasing sense of its importance, affected 
 
 12 
 
132 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 to be indignant at what it professed to regard as 
 a want of respect to the Throne. 
 
 ' At a time like the present,' it was said, ' when 
 all the daimios of the West who were devoted to 
 the Throne were hastening to Kioto, and exerting 
 themselves on behalf of the State, to pass so close 
 to the capital without the slightest intention of 
 asking after the Mikado's health was a slight 
 offered to the Court, and therefore a crime. The 
 Prince Awata (one of the imperial princes), and 
 the Kwambahu gave orders that his conduct 
 should be rigidly inquired into, and in consequence 
 a number of ronin patriots proceeded at once to 
 Fushimi, intercepted the daimid of Oka, and 
 demanded an explanation. The daimio obeyed 
 the orders of the Court, and, entering Kioto, took 
 up his residence in a temple on the west of the 
 city.' 
 
 This last instance seems to point to an under- 
 standing between the Court and the ronin, and 
 there is little doubt that this was often the case, 
 and that the assemblage of ronin in the neighbour- 
 hood of the capital was hastened by private advices 
 received from persons in palace circles. The 
 Court had no troops of its own, the military 
 element in the capital being represented only by 
 the Shogun's forces. It is only natural, therefore, 
 that it should welcome armed support from any 
 quarter. We read, for example, of a retainer of 
 the daimid of Settsu collecting a number of con- 
 federates, and marching openly to Kioto ' in order 
 to work there for the good cause '. For his loyalty 
 he was rewarded by the Emperor — in what way 
 
 T 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 133 
 
 is not stated — but on returning to his native 
 province he was put in prison, like the other ronin 
 leader we have mentioned, lest his chief should 
 be suspected in Yedo of being in sympathy with 
 the Court. This, too, was the pretext for Shimadzu's 
 first visit to Kioto, at the end of which, in addition 
 to the Emperor's thanks, he received a sword and 
 the name of Saburo, in place of his original name 
 of Iduzmi ; the young Prince of Choshiii, on his 
 way back to his province from Yedo, was persuaded 
 to arrest his journey at the capital for the same 
 object ; and it was also for the same reason, and 
 in answer to secret requests for aid, that so many 
 of what were called the western daimios flocked 
 with large retinues of armed followers to Kioto. 
 
 It must not be supposed that the ronin had 
 matters all their own way. This was by no means 
 the case. Always objects of suspicion to the Yedo 
 Government, their movements were closely watched, 
 and, when arrested, they usually received a short 
 shrift, for the Shogunate laws were severe, and 
 at that time, as a measure of self-defence, they 
 were administered in the harshest spirit. Some- 
 times, too, the tables were turned upon the ronin 
 in an unexpected manner, their own methods being 
 used for their discomfiture. A dramatic incident 
 of this kind occurred during the visit to Kioto of 
 Shimadzu Saburo — henceforth to be known by 
 his new name — to which reference has already 
 been made. A formidable band of Satsuma ronin 
 was already in the capital. Dissatisfied with 
 
134 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 what they regarded as the too cautious policy of 
 the clan authorities, they were determined, in spite 
 of all efforts to dissuade them, to strike a blow 
 against the Shogunate at once. A few Satsuma 
 men in the suite of Shimadzu resolved to risk their 
 lives in an attempt to defeat this design. So they 
 went one evening after dark to the inn where the 
 ronin were staying. The latter were lodged in 
 rooms upstairs. The party of Satsuma men, at 
 the head of whom was Narabara, who has since 
 held high official positions, established themselves 
 downstairs in a part of the building some distance 
 away from the quarters occupied by the ronin, and 
 invited their leaders to a consultation. At a given 
 signal the lights were put out, and each man of 
 the party struck at the ronin he had singled out 
 beforehand, crouching down after each stroke to 
 avoid the sweep of the swords in the air. After 
 a few minutes of desperate fighting all of the eight 
 ronin leaders were killed, and only one of their 
 assailants. The survivors of the melee then went 
 upstairs, and told the rest of the ronin what 
 they had done, expressing their willingness to 
 die now that their object was accomplished. 
 Their case seemed desperate, but the fury of the 
 ronin was appeased by the sudden championing 
 of the opposite cause by one of their number, 
 the younger Saigo, brother of the famous Saigd 
 Takamori, and afterwards for many years a promi- 
 nent member of the Tokio Ministry. He succeeded 
 in persuading his comrades that the others had 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 135 
 
 understood better than themselves their duty to 
 the clan, and the State, and the affair ended with- 
 out further bloodshed. 
 
 This is the popular account of what took place. 
 The official version, which is given in the Shichinen 
 Shi, * The History of Seven Years,' is less romantic. 
 This connects the incident with Shimadzu's meet- 
 ing with the ronin on his way to Kioto, and 
 says that, in accordance with the promise made 
 to them, he memorialized the Throne, asking, 
 amongst other things, for the dismissal of one 
 of the two Councillors of State, who, since the 
 Regent's death, had had the chief control of affairs, 
 for orders summoning the other to Kioto, and for 
 the appointment of Prince Keiki to be guardian 
 to the young Shogun, and of the ex-daimio of 
 Echizen to be regent ; that certain Satsuma 
 ronin, wishing to precipitate matters by attacking 
 the palaces of Prince Kujo and of the Shogun' s 
 residence were met and defeated by Narabara's 
 party, seven of whom were wounded and one 
 killed. The Court's answer to the memorial of 
 Shimadzu was an order to him to remain at the 
 capital to control the ronin, but this incident, and 
 the stern repressive measures subsequently taken 
 by him, caused the Court, it is said, to regret its 
 decision, and to rely afterwards more on the 
 protection of the Prince of Choshiu, whose lenient 
 attitude towards the lawless bands of ronin 
 suggested his being, for the moment, a more 
 amenable and useful ally. 
 
136 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 After the death of the Regent the growing power 
 of the Court showed itself in many ways. The 
 Mito party held up its head again, and the Regent's 
 friends were in their turn dismissed from office, 
 fined, imprisoned, or banished, For a time indeed 
 there seemed to be some prospect of a complete 
 reconciliation between the Court and the Yedo 
 Government. The latter had not hesitated to 
 sacrifice the Regent's family and allies for this 
 purpose, and, as a further means to this end, 
 a marriage between the Mikado's sister and the 
 young Shogun was arranged. Moreover, advantage 
 was taken of the general amnesty which was 
 proclaimed on this occasion to restore to favour 
 the chief members of the Mito party, who had 
 been involved in the disgrace of their leader. But 
 the concord was of short duration. 
 
 The Shogun' s marriage took place in the spring 
 of 1862. In the summer of the same year an 
 imperial messenger, escorted by Shimadzu Saburo, 
 presented what was practically an ultimatum, 
 demanding the presence of the Shogun at Kioto 
 to consult with the Court in regard to the expulsion 
 of foreigners. To this the Yedo Government 
 after some demur consented, and the triumph of 
 the reactionary party was emphasized by conces- 
 sions on two other points, the appointment of 
 Prince Keiki to be guardian to his young cousin 
 the Shogun, in the place of Prince Tayasu, and the 
 selection for the post of President of the Council 
 of State of the ex-Prince of fichizen, the head of 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 137 
 
 one of the numerous clans related to the Tokugawa 
 family, a statesman noted as much for his per- 
 sistent hostility to the late Regent as for his political 
 association with the ex-Prince of Mito. As a 
 further sign of the Court's displeasure, the Shogun's 
 Consort, who on her marriage had, in accordance 
 with custom, assumed the title of Midaidokoro, 
 always borne by ladies in her high position, was 
 obliged to revert to her original title of Imperial 
 Princess. At the same time the new turn given to 
 the conduct of affairs was apparent in the more un- 
 compromising tone assumed in regard to the ques- 
 tion of foreign intercourse, despite the fact that 
 Portugal in 1860, and Prussia in the following year, 
 had been added to the list of 'treaty powers'. 
 In its anxiety in 1858 to arrive at an understanding 
 with the Court at almost any price, the Shogunate 
 had, as we have seen, made many concessions in 
 point of form, concessions indeed which, strictly 
 interpreted, might have been regarded as stultifying 
 its own actions. And in the course of the negotia- 
 tions conducted at Kioto with this object the 
 impression had undoubtedly been conveyed that 
 the treaty with America of 1858, and consequently, 
 by implication, those which followed it, the 
 tenour of all being the same, were simply pro- 
 visional arrangements, which might be cancelled at 
 the pleasure of Japan in the time to come. This 
 idea lay at the bottom of the Court's attitude 
 in regard to this question, and to some extent 
 explains the futile proceedings for the expulsion 
 
138 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 of foreigners which continued to be taken from 
 time to time in subsequent years. 
 
 But in the midst of much that was futile the 
 determined hostility of the Court and conservative 
 party to everything foreign led to one practical 
 result in the direction of their wishes. In their 
 perplexity, placed as they were between the devil 
 and the deep sea, the Yedo Government appealed 
 through special envoys to the Treaty Powers, and 
 also to the representatives of those powers in 
 Japan, not to abrogate the treaties, which was what 
 the Court wanted, but to postpone for five years 
 the opening of the ports of Hiogo and Niigata (or 
 some other harbour on the west coast) and the 
 towns of Yedo and Osaka. The governments 
 addressed consented on the conditions recorded, 
 so far as Great Britain was concerned, in the 
 London Protocol of June 6, 1862. 1 The grounds 
 on which this appeal was based were frankly 
 stated in the protocol to be ' the difficulties 
 experienced by the Tycoon and his ministers in 
 giving effect to their engagements with foreign 
 powers having treaties with Japan in consequence 
 of the opposition offered by a party in Japan 
 which is hostile to all intercourse with foreigners '. 
 The conditions, stated shortly, were the cessation 
 in future of official interference of all kinds with 
 trade and intercourse. The wording of this 
 instrument shows that the position of the Tycoon 
 was becoming better understood in Europe. The 
 
 1 Appendix 17. 
 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 139 
 
 title of royalty does not appear, as in the earlier 
 treaties. The protocol also records the intention 
 of the Japanese negotiators to recommend to 
 their Government the opening, as a treaty port, 
 of Tsushima, an island in the channel between 
 Corea and Japan, which Russia had temporarily 
 occupied the year before. The recommendation, 
 if ever made, was never acted upon, and very 
 wisely, for the position of the island is not favour- 
 able to trade. The idea in the minds of the 
 envoys, due, it seems, to a suggestion made in 
 London, was probably that the opening of the 
 island to foreign trade might protect it against 
 aggression on the part of any single foreign 
 power. 
 
 In the autumn (October 1862) a momentous 
 decision, indicating in itself the feebleness of the 
 administration, was taken by the Shdgunate in 
 regard to the periodical visits of the daimios to 
 Yedo, to which reference was made in the opening 
 chapter. The system known as San-Kin Ko-tai, 
 • taking turns in official attendance at Yedo,' 
 was introduced by the third Shogun, Iyemitsu, 
 in the middle of the seventeenth century, as a 
 political measure to strengthen the Shogunate. 
 It drew the feudal nobles in alternate years from 
 the provinces to Yedo, where they stayed for fixed 
 periods, leaving their wives and families behind 
 as permanent hostages when they returned to 
 their fiefs. The arrangement was troublesome, 
 besides being inconvenient, and led to the loss of 
 
140 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 much time in journeying to and fro. It was also 
 very costly, for in addition to the expense of the 
 journeys, performed with every accompaniment 
 of ostentatious luxury, it was the rule for each 
 daimio, on arriving in Yedo, to offer valuable 
 presents to the Shogun, who bestowed gifts in 
 return. The details of this exchange of gifts, 
 which never varied, was regulated with minute 
 precision, the things to be given and received on 
 these occasions being in each instance duly noted 
 in the bukan, or manuals of the peerage. The 
 changes now introduced made the conditions, both 
 in regard to these periodical visits and the giving 
 of the customary presents, much lighter. Though 
 professedly made in the interests of the feudal 
 nobles, who, it was said, would be enabled to attend 
 more closely to the administration of their terri- 
 tories, and to the work of coast defence, we can 
 see in them the hand of the Court and of the 
 daimios who had previously belonged to the Mito 
 party. From various authorities, which are not 
 always in agreement, we gather that attendance 
 at Yedo was regulated for the future somewhat 
 as follows : — 
 
 The heads of the three Princely Tokugawa 
 Houses of Owari, Kishiu, and Mito were required 
 to visit Yedo only once every twelve years, in 
 the years of the wild boar, the rat, and the dog, 
 respectively, according to the calendar then in 
 force, the period of residence at the seat of govern- 
 ment not being stated. The great nobles, lords 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 141 
 
 of provinces (Kokushiu), such as the daimios of 
 Satsuma, Choshiu, and Tosa, who were privileged 
 to sit in the Obiro-ma, the highest of the ante- 
 chambers of the Yedo Castle, were required to 
 attend at Yedo for only a hundred days every 
 third year. In the case of the daimios of Mino, 
 Tsushima, and Hizen, who, for some reason which 
 does not appear, seem to have occupied a special 
 position, attendance at Yedo was limited to only 
 one month in three years. The daimios who sat 
 in the Tamari-no-ma, the second ante-chamber, of 
 whom the late Regent was one, those of equal 
 rank but without that right, certain fudai daimios, 
 and the tozama daimios, were called upon to pass 
 one year out of three at Yedo ; while the rest 
 of the feudal nobility, including the hatamoto, 
 were required to spend two hundred days there 
 every year. Things were made easier for them 
 in other respects, the general tendency being in 
 favour of relaxing the stringency of all ceremonial 
 observances and etiquette as between the Shogun 
 and the feudal aristocracy. Those, for instance, 
 whose official duties kept them in Yedo might 
 apply for permission at any time to go to their 
 territories. Daimios were encouraged while in 
 Yedo to go to the Shogun's castle at any time to 
 discuss State business, to talk over things with 
 other daimios, or in order that they might be 
 consulted by the Shogun. They were asked to 
 bring small retinues with them when they came 
 to Yedo, to leave their mansions there in charge 
 
142 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 of as few retainers as possible when they left, and 
 to avoid unnecessary trouble and expense in their 
 journeys to and fro. 
 
 But the greatest change of all was the abolition 
 of the rule under which the wives and families of 
 feudal nobles were detained permanently in Yedo 
 as hostages. Henceforth they were free to reside 
 in the provinces. The effect is thus described in 
 the ' Story of a Dream in the period of Genji ' : — 
 
 ' In consequence all the daimios and hatamotos 
 who owned lands sent their wives and children 
 to their country residences, and in the twinkling 
 of an eye the flourishing city of Yedo became 
 like a desert ; so that the daimios allied to the 
 Tokugawa family, and the Tokugawa family 
 itself, and the vassals of the Shogunate of all 
 ranks, and the townspeople too grieved and 
 lamented. They would have liked to see the 
 military glory of Kwanto shine again, but as the 
 great and small daimios who were not vassals of 
 Tokugawa had cut at the root of this forced 
 residence in Yedo, and few of them obeyed any 
 longer the commands of the Bakufu, they also 
 began to distrust it, and gradually the hearts 
 of the people fell away. And so the prestige of 
 the Tokugawa family, which had endured for 
 three hundred years, which had been really more 
 brilliant than Kamakura in the age of Yoritomo 
 on a moonlight night when the stars were shining, 
 which for more than two hundred and seventy 
 years had forced the daimios to come breathlessly 
 to take their turn of duty in Yedo, and had day 
 and night eighty thousand vassals at its beck and 
 call, fell to ruin in the space of one morning.' 
 
 What Yedo lost, the provinces and the capital 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 143 
 
 gained. Recovering something of its long- vanished 
 greatness, the population of Kioto increased, and 
 trade and industries revived. 
 
 ' From this time until the spring of 1863,' says 
 the book from which our last quotation came, 
 1 the daimios from all parts of the country came 
 up to Kioto to about the number of seventy, and 
 besides them the number of vassals of the Shogun 
 was also very considerable. As none of them had 
 residences in the capital, they hired temples as 
 temporary he ad- quarters, so that all the temples 
 and monasteries within and without the city were 
 occupied in this way. The clans, anxious not to 
 be behindhand in appearing at Kioto, at last 
 bought houses . . . and built barracks. The 
 streets were crowded with samurai on foot and on 
 horseback ; pleasure and sightseeing became the 
 order of the day, and the capital flourished as it 
 had never done in any former reign.' 
 
 In the spring of 1862 the Court had issued one 
 of its many anti-foreign decrees, insisting on the 
 expulsion of the foreign barbarians, and reminding 
 the Yedo Government of the provisional nature 
 of the treaties concluded by the Shogunate. Early 
 in the following year another stage in the futile 
 protests of the Court against foreign intercourse 
 was reached, when at a council held in Kioto 
 and attended by the Shogun' s guardian, Prince 
 Keiki, and many feudal nobles, it was decided 
 that a date should be fixed for the expulsion of 
 foreigners, and the cessation of all foreign inter- 
 course. 
 
 In the meantime complications had occurred. 
 
144 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 One of a party of four British subjects was killed 
 on the high road a few miles from Yokohama by 
 Satsuma men belonging to the retinue of Shimadzu 
 Saburo. The Satsuma leader was on his way back 
 from Yedo, whither he had escorted the imperial 
 messenger carrying the ultimatum to which refer- 
 ence has already been made. The confessed in- 
 ability of the Government to punish the murderers 
 led to the bombardment of the Satsuma capital 
 by the British fleet in August of the same year. 
 
 This Richardson affair, in which Great Britain 
 was the only foreign country concerned, was 
 followed by a more serious incident, in which the 
 other clan, whose close connexion with the ronin 
 movement has been mentioned, that of Choshiu, 
 were the aggressors, and several foreign powers 
 were involved. But this falls more naturally into 
 its place if dealt with as one of the results of the 
 anti-foreign movement, at the head of which the 
 Court had placed itself. 
 
 In the spring of 1863 the Shogun, in compliance 
 with the imperial summons, went to Kioto, which 
 had not seen a Shogun for two hundred and fifty 
 years. There is something unusual, even for those 
 days, and almost pathetic, in the circumstances 
 under which the present visit was made. Iyemochi 
 had become Shogun at the age of twelve, had 
 married three years later, and was now seventeen. 
 He was still, however, a ward under guardianship, 
 according to the etiquette of the time, and the per- 
 son selected for the post of guardian was no other 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 145 
 
 than his cousin, who had been the rival candidate 
 for the post he now occupied. Moreover, he was 
 going to the capital against his wish, or at any 
 rate against the wish of the Government he 
 represented, and while, on the one hand, it was 
 desired in Yedo that his visit should be very brief, 
 the intention of the Court was to keep him as long 
 as it could. 
 
 The Shogun reached Kioto on the 21st of April, 
 and on the 24th he was received in audience by 
 the Mikado. Four days later there appeared an 
 imperial edict saying it was very natural for the 
 Shogun to wish to return to Yedo at once, for the 
 purpose of organizing the defence of the country 
 in the crisis occasioned by the visit of English 
 ships, but that it was necessary for him to give 
 personal orders for the defence of the capital 
 and the adjacent seas. At the present moment, 
 too, when it was a question of deciding upon 
 warlike operations for the expulsion of the 
 barbarians, it was important that there should 
 be a complete understanding between sovereign 
 and subject. 
 
 If the Shogun returned to Yedo, he would be at 
 a distance from the Court, and relations might be 
 disturbed by misunderstandings due to defective 
 communication of views, with grievous and irre- 
 parable consequences to the State. The imperial 
 mind could not entertain without anxiety the 
 idea of the Shogun' s return to Yedo. He must 
 therefore allay this anxiety by staying in Kioto, 
 
 1247 k 
 
146 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 and giving his earnest attention to plans for the 
 defence of the capital, and the adjacent seas. 
 
 On the same day the Emperor, accompanied 
 by the Shogun and his guardian, visited the Kamo 
 Shrines in connexion with the measures to be 
 taken for the expulsion of foreigers. A month 
 later the Emperor paid a visit to other shrines in 
 the neighbourhood, where it was arranged that 
 the Shogun should receive from the Emperor a 
 sword in token of the part he was to play in the 
 approaching campaign against the barbarians. 
 But at the last moment the Shogun pleaded 
 sickness, and Prince Keiki, his guardian, who 
 took his place in the imperial procession, became 
 also suddenly indisposed before the shrine was 
 reached. So the ceremony of presenting the sword 
 was never performed, much to the indignation of 
 the anti-foreign party, who said that the Yedo 
 Government did not after all intend to drive out 
 the barbarians. 
 
 On the 5th of June the question of expelling the 
 foreign barbarians was discussed in council, the 
 Shogun and his guardian being present, and a date 
 for their expulsion was solemnly fixed. The date 
 chosen was the 24th (or 25th, according to some 
 accounts) of June. Preparations for hostilities 
 were at once made by the Court, and the Yedo 
 Government found themselves in the impossible 
 position of appearing to acquiesce in measures 
 for the expulsion of foreigners, knowing all the 
 time the futility of the proceedings. In this new 
 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 147 
 
 crisis we find them, as before, trying to face both 
 ways at once ; yielding to the imperative messages 
 from the capital, and at the same time welcoming 
 any opportunity for shelving the orders received. 
 Some suspicion of their attitude being entertained 
 in Kioto, the Prince of Mito was sent to Yedo to 
 see that the Mikado's orders were carried out. 
 He was followed later by Prince Keiki, and on 
 the appointed day, the 24th of June, Ogasawara 
 Dzusho no Kami, a member of the Council of 
 State, having conferred with two of his colleagues, 
 Matsudaira Buzen no Kami and Inouye Kawachi 
 no Kami, who, during the Shogun's absence from 
 Yedo, had been left in joint charge of affairs, 
 delivered to the British, French, and American 
 ministers a letter informing them of the Govern- 
 ment's decision to close the country again to 
 foreigners, and of his readiness to open negotiations 
 at once for that purpose. The reception given to 
 his communication was disquieting. It looked, 
 indeed, as if Japan might be forestalled in the 
 commencement of hostilities ; for the British 
 authorities were still pressing the question of 
 Richardson's murder, and an intimation was given 
 by the powers concerned that suitable steps 
 would be taken to protect foreign interests. So 
 the Shogunate in its alarm paid the indemnityasked 
 for by the British, and insisted on Ogasawara's 
 explaining to the Court that ' it (the Court) knew 
 nothing about foreign affairs, and that if hostilities 
 once broke out it would not be easy to make 
 
 K2 
 
148 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 matters quiet again'. Accordingly the Prince of 
 Mito and Ogasawara reported that the two 
 questions of Richardson's murder, and the closing 
 of the country, must be kept separate ; as to the 
 first, an indemnity had been paid ; as regarded 
 the latter, negotiations would be continued. 
 Prince Keiki, too, at this juncture memorialized 
 the Throne, saying that on the question of the 
 expulsion of foreigners no two Councillors of State 
 were agreed, and that the imperial mandate 
 could not be carried out. He also tendered his 
 resignation, but it was not accepted. 
 
 While the Mikado's decision was being com- 
 municated to the foreign ministers at Yokohama, 
 the Shogun had left Kioto on a visit to Osaka, 
 and Kishiu, his native province. He was back 
 in the capital at the end of June, and a month 
 later returned by sea to Yedo. His return, which 
 seems to have taken the Court by surprise, was 
 hastened by the action of the Yedo Government, 
 who, becoming anxious at his long absence, sent 
 two steamers with troops to bring him away. 
 
 Meanwhile, on the 24th of June, the day on which 
 Ogasawara had delivered his letter in Yokohama, 
 the Choshiu forts at Shimonoseki fired on an Ameri- 
 can vessel — the reason assigned being that this 
 was the date fixed for the expulsion of foreigners. 
 A fortnight later other foreign vessels were fired 
 at. Reprisals followed, and the Choshiu clansmen 
 were worsted in engagements with the Americans 
 and French. But the straits remained closed 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 149 
 
 till the autumn of the following year, when the 
 batteries were attacked and destroyed by an 
 expedition in which Great Britain, France, the 
 United States, and Holland took part. 
 
 A great deal of false sentiment has been manu- 
 factured in connexion with this incident and the 
 indemnity exacted by the four powers concerned 
 under the Shimonoseki Convention signed at Yoko- 
 hama on the 22nd of October, 1864. 1 One writer 
 on Japan, the author of The Mikado's Empire, 
 even goes so far as to call it c a needless and wicked 
 act of war'. The truth is that nothing helped 
 Japan more, or did so much to save the situation 
 for her at a critical time, than the destruction of 
 the Shimonoseki forts and the bombardment of 
 Kagoshima. A sharp lesson was needed in each 
 case. Nothing else would have answered the 
 purpose. 
 
 The action of the Choshiu Prince in precipita- 
 ting hostilities with foreigners before preparations 
 everywhere were completed gave great umbrage 
 in Kioto, and the fact that his troops had been 
 unsuccessful did not improve his position with the 
 Court. Eventually the Choshiu clansmen, who 
 had figured so prominently in the protection of 
 the Court, and the encouragement of the rdnin, 
 were forbidden to stay in the capital, and accord- 
 ingly they left in a body, being accompanied by 
 seven of the leading Court nobles. One of these 
 was Prince San jo, who was afterwards Prime 
 
 1 Appendix 19. 
 
 
150 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 Minister in the first Cabinet formed after the 
 Restoration. 
 
 No sooner had the Shogun returned to Yedo 
 than he addressed a memorial to the Mikado on 
 the subject of foreign relations, which confirmed the 
 reports previously received by the Court from 
 the Prince of Mito, Prince Keiki, and Ogasawara. 
 In this he said that he had come to the conclusion 
 that the present was not a suitable moment for 
 expelling foreigners, and that the measures to be 
 taken for that purpose should be postponed. He 
 advised, therefore, that it should be left to him 
 to fix a suitable date later on. To this the Court 
 reluctantly consented. . 
 
 The attempt to persuade the Foreign Repre- 
 sentatives to consent to the closing of the port 
 of Yokohama had thus failed completely, its only 
 result having been to bring fresh discredit on the 
 Shogunate, and to suggest to the British and 
 French Governments the advisability of making 
 special arrangements for the protection of their 
 subjects. Thinking, however, that they might 
 find foreign governments more amenable, if ap- 
 proached in Europe, than the diplomatists on 
 the spot, the Shogunate decided to send a mission 
 to London and Paris ; and the murder of a French 
 officer near Yokohama in the autumn of that year 
 (1863) furnished a pretext for its dispatch. The 
 mission effected nothing in the desired direction, 
 and it did not go further than Paris. But when 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 151 
 
 its members returned, in August, 1864, they brought 
 with them a convention they had signed in Paris x 
 for the reopening of the Shimonoseki straits. 
 This contained a stipulation providing for its 
 immediate operation, without ratification by either 
 party. The Shogunate, however, conscious of 
 their inability to carry out this provision, repu- 
 diated the agreement, and it never came into force ; 
 but the mere fact of its signature delayed for 
 a short time the destruction of the Shimonoseki 
 forts. 
 
 The threatening attitude of the Court, and the 
 inability of the Yedo Government to restrain 
 the growing hostility of the anti-foreign party, 
 made it necessary to take precautionary measures 
 for the protection of the foreign community. 
 Towards the end of the year 1863, with the full 
 approval of the Japanese authorities, French and 
 British troops were quartered in Yokohama, where 
 they remained until 1875. 
 
 The history of this short period, which calls for 
 rather detailed treatment, is written in proclama- 
 tions, memorials, and political correspondence. 
 All three have a strong family resemblance. Under 
 the influence of Chinese culture men think in 
 grooves and formulas. And this is also how they 
 speak and write. So the same stock phrases did duty 
 on each occasion. The Court and the Shogunate, 
 which issued proclamations, the memorialists, who 
 addressed themselves to each in turn, or, when 
 
 1 Appendix 14. 
 
152 INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1860-63 
 
 they were simple samurai, to their feudal lords, 
 and the inditers of political epistles, which were 
 often manifestos, were all equally distressed at 
 the perilous condition of affairs ; all equally con- 
 cerned for the safety and honour of the State, 
 and the sanctity of the country's laws ; all burning 
 to get rid of the foreign barbarian ; all equally 
 convinced of the vital importance of giving rest 
 to the country, and tranquillity to the imperial 
 mind. We hear of little else. 
 
 Conditions such as those described did not admit 
 of much progress. On the whole, nevertheless, 
 things were moving forwards in spite of anti-foreign 
 sentiment and administrative chaos. The saving 
 factor in the situation was the presence of the 
 foreigner, who had come to stay. This fact was 
 gradually becoming recognized. The fighting at 
 Kagoshima and in the Shimonoseki straits brought 
 it home to the mind of the Court at Kioto, and 
 led also, as more than one writer has pointed out, 
 to the creation in each of the two clans concerned 
 of a small but influential group of men, who were 
 thenceforth in favour of foreign intercourse, seeing 
 clearly that therein lay the only salvation for 
 Japan. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE FALL OF THE SHOGUNATE 
 
 In the midst of the political confusion of the 
 short period dealt with in the last chapter we 
 notice two things : the beginning of the formidable 
 coalition of western daimios which subsequently 
 overthrew the Shogunate, and the lead taken 
 thus early by the two clans of Satsuma and 
 Choshiu. In the first of these clans the chief 
 figure is not that of its ruler, but Shimadzu SaburO, 
 the father of the ruling prince, and the brother 
 of his predecessor. He it was who succeeded the 
 ex-Prince of Mito as the moving spirit of the party 
 opposing the Shogunate ; who became the adviser 
 and protector of the Throne ; who alternately 
 encouraged and held back the ronin ; and who, 
 like the statesman he replaced, while secretly 
 favouring the study of foreign learning for clan 
 purposes, figured to the last as a determined op- 
 ponent of everything that was foreign. 
 
 Japanese writers take different views as to the 
 actual date from which the authority of the 
 Shogunate became so seriously impaired as to 
 justify the conclusion that its downfall had begun. 
 Some think that this date should be placed at 
 the time of the issue of the proclamation which 
 so greatly changed the system of the attendance 
 of the daimios at Yedo, and did so much to restore 
 
154 THE FALL OF 
 
 the ancient glory of the capital at the expense of 
 its eastern rival ; others hold that the overthrow 
 of the Tokugawa rule did not suggest itself as 
 a realizable project until the failure of the Sho- 
 gunate expedition against Choshiu. To us it seems 
 that the first weakening of Tokugawa authority 
 is to be seen in the reference to Kioto when Perry 
 arrived, and that the turning-point of its fortunes 
 came with the death of the Regent Ii in 1860. 
 After that occurrence the Shogunate' s authority 
 was never the same. Little by little the Court 
 encroached on the administrative sphere in which 
 for centuries the Shogun had ruled unchallenged, 
 and one by one the privileges it had enjoyed 
 for so long were withdrawn. Its authority was 
 impaired by the relaxation in 1862 of the rules 
 for the attendance of the daimios at Yedo, and 
 by the concessions made in regard to investiture 
 and other matters in 1864 ; and the Choshiu 
 campaign exposed its military weakness. The 
 point to be noted is the gradual waning of its 
 influence. Its end did not come all at once, but 
 by slow degrees. When the Restoration took 
 place it was not so much that the Shogunate was 
 overthrown, as that the institution bearing that 
 name had fallen to pieces, having outlasted its 
 time. 
 
 Our attention must now be given to the struggle 
 between the Shogunate and the Choshiu clan, 
 which was the final stage in the undoing of the 
 existing order of things. 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 155 
 
 It was in the summer of 1863 that this clan, by 
 reading too literally the Court's pronouncement 
 against foreigners, had involved the Government 
 in complications with foreign powers, and brought 
 about the expulsion of its clansmen from Kioto. 
 Smarting under this rebuff, and anxious, perhaps, 
 to anticipate the operations of the Shogunate, 
 which had received orders to punish it for firing 
 on foreign vessels at Shimonoseki, the clan planned 
 a sudden raid on the city of Kioto. The instru- 
 ments for the purpose lay ready to its hands. 
 
 It has already been pointed out how the Court 
 at one time was disposed to rely more on the 
 support of the Choshiu clan than on that of 
 Satsuma, owing to the former's more lenient 
 attitude towards the bands of lawless samurai, 
 who, as ronin, were a doubtful asset to their 
 employers. The attitude of the Court had, however, 
 changed. A reconciliation, good for the moment 
 at least, had been effected with the Shogunate, 
 and the Satsuma leader, Shimadzu SaburO, was 
 in favour both with the Court and with the 
 Yedo Government. The capital, therefore, being 
 no longer a safe place for those ronin whose 
 patron was the Choshiu Prince, the territory of 
 the latter, and not Kioto, became the centre of 
 their activity, and large numbers were enrolled 
 into a force called the Kiheitai, or ' Irregulars '. 
 
 The object of the clan's raid was to gain posses- 
 sion of the person of the Emperor, and then pro- 
 claim their opponents rebels (Ghoteki), a favourite 
 
156 THE FALL OF 
 
 device resorted to during the civil wars of earlier 
 times in order to enlist popular sympathy, and at 
 the same time act with the weight of imperial 
 authority. 
 
 The details of the affair are recorded at length 
 in two books, ' The Story of a Dream in the period 
 of Genji,' already quoted, and the Kinsei Shirialcu, 
 ' A History of Modern Times,' both of which have 
 been translated by Sir Ernest Satow. 
 
 Towards the end of July two detachments 
 arrived at Osaka by sea from Suwo, the nearest 
 to the capital of the two Choshiu provinces, one 
 slightly in advance of the other. The first was 
 a mixed force, some 400 strong, composed of 
 Choshiu samurai under the command of Fukuhara 
 
 r 
 
 Echigo, a karo of the clan, and ronin irregulars ; 
 the second, and more numerous, body was under 
 the leadership of two retainers of the Prince of 
 Choshiu, named Kunishi and Masuda. These 
 forces moved on Kioto from Osaka, and established 
 themselves at three different places in the suburbs, 
 Fukuhara, the most prominent of the leaders, 
 addressing a petition to the Court. In this it was 
 stated that ever since the Prince of Choshiu and 
 his son 1 had obeyed His Majesty's desire for the 
 
 1 A characteristic feature of the documents of this time relating 
 to Choshiu affairs is the frequent association of the names of the 
 prince and his son. The prince not having abdicated, there was 
 no reason for the son's name to be coupled with the father's. Nor 
 did the association of names impart any strength to the clan 
 administration, for both princes were completely in the hands of 
 hard, or other clan samurai. 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 157 
 
 expulsion of the barbarians (by firing on foreign 
 vessels in the Straits of Shimonoseki) they had 
 passed their days and nights in ceaseless anxiety 
 lest they should fail in carrying out the imperial 
 will ; and that the clan was unable to understand 
 why the Court should attribute guilt to Prince 
 Sanjo, and the other Court nobles, who had taken 
 refuge in Choshiu. The clan, therefore, humbly 
 prayed that the seven Court nobles might be 
 restored to their functions, and the Prince of 
 Choshiu and his son might be permitted to re-enter 
 the capital. A similar petition was presented 
 a day or two later by the leader of the ronin 
 irregulars. 
 
 To the first of these petitions the reply of the 
 Court was to the effect that Fukuhara might remain 
 at Fushimi with a small number of men, send the 
 petition quietly through the proper hands, and 
 wait for the Emperor's orders. As for the rest 
 of the Choshiu forces, they must return at once 
 to their own territory. Fukuhara, who was at 
 Fushimi, expressed his readiness to obey these 
 instructions, but it soon appeared that he had no 
 authority over the other leaders. Accordingly, 
 after a delay of several days, a notification was 
 issued by the Court to the Choshiu clansmen at 
 the two other places in the suburbs, referring 
 to the orders already given to Fukuhara, and 
 adding that the Court had decided to take vigorous 
 measures at once for the chastisement of the 
 rebellious clan. The Court's firm attitude put 
 
158 THE FALL OF 
 
 an end to negotiations, and the raiders, one 
 of whom, Kido, played a prominent part after- 
 wards in the Restoration, forthwith delivered 
 their attack. This was directed from three 
 different points, and was designed to converge on 
 the imperial Flower Garden. Here the Prince of 
 Aidzu, the guardian, or military governor, of the 
 city, had established himself for the double 
 purpose of directing the defence, in which task 
 he was assisted by Prince Keiki, and seeing to 
 the personal safety of the Emperor. 
 
 And here it should be mentioned that, when 
 the order of the Court expelling the Prince of 
 Choshiu and his son from the capital was issued, 
 a certain number of Choshiu clansmen had been 
 allowed to remain in the city in charge of the clan 
 yashiki. The leading samurai of this garrison 
 of caretakers took part in the discussions at which 
 the policy to be adopted towards Choshiu was 
 decided, and as soon as the notification above 
 mentioned was issued, they evacuated the yashiki, 
 and joined their comrades outside the town. 
 
 The forces in Kioto at the disposal of the 
 Shogunate consisted chiefly of samurai of the 
 Aidzu, Kuwana, Satsuma, fichizen, and Hikone 
 clans, with a sprinkling of ronin, and considerably 
 outnumbered the assailants. The fighting which 
 ensued was fierce, and for some time the advantage 
 lay, if anything, with the assailants ; but eventually 
 superior numbers, and the courage of the Aidzu 
 and Satsuma men gained the day, and the raiders, 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 159 
 
 being completely routed, fled in all directions. 
 The Court having commanded the instant chas- 
 tisement of the rebellious clan, the Shogunate 
 embarked upon the campaign against Choshiu 
 which, by exposing its military weakness, was to 
 prove ultimately its own undoing. 
 
 The raid had taken place on the 19th of August, 
 1864. Six days afterwards the Government issued 
 a proclamation which amounted to a declaration 
 of war against the Prince of Choshiu. It is given 
 in the Kinreiko, a collection of Tokugawa enact- 
 ments, published by the Department of Justice, 
 the two first volumes of which appeared in 1894. 
 It was addressed to all the feudal nobility, twenty- 
 one of whom received it in Kioto from the 
 Shogun's resident there. 
 
 The proclamation described the raid made by 
 the Prince of Choshiu, and said that circumstances 
 showed that it was evidently part of a military 
 plot. It ordered, therefore, the immediate punish- 
 ment of the rebellious clan. 
 
 The official editors of the collection of enact- 
 ments above mentioned give in a note what are 
 called the military instructions which the Prince 
 of Choshiu and his son were accused in the pro- 
 clamation of giving to one of the leaders of the 
 raid. They show the proneness to minute detail 
 so characteristic of the Tokugawa period. The 
 leader to whom the instructions are addressed 
 is told that the men of the various companies 
 bound for Kioto are placed under his charge, and 
 
160 THE FALL OF 
 
 that he has authority in all matters. Stress is laid 
 on the necessity of harmony between the various 
 companies. Private feuds are strictly forbidden, 
 and dissipation of all kinds and all extravagance in 
 dress are condemned. Propriety of behaviour and 
 discretion in speech are enjoined ; and it is added 
 that any one offending against these orders is to 
 be tried by military law, and sentenced, if guilty, 
 to perform harakiri. 
 
 When every allowance has been made for the 
 situation, these sound rather singular orders for 
 troops on the point of starting for the capital 
 to make a raid on the palace of their sovereign. 
 
 Another interesting state-paper of this time, 
 coming from the opposite side, appears in the 
 collection of enactments already mentioned. It is 
 called ' A respectful inquiry from the Prince of 
 Choshiu inviting the decision of the Government 
 after he and his retainers had been reprimanded ', 
 but whether this was the original title of the 
 document, or is simply that given by the official 
 editors, is not clear. However this may be, this 
 document, which is dated the 4th of September, 
 1864, was evidently the public reply of the Prince 
 of Choshiu and his son to the Government's 
 impeachment. In spite of the deferential language 
 used, a note of defiance can be detected in the 
 communication. It stated that the prince and 
 his son had learnt with profound regret of the 
 conduct of certain runaway retainers, who, in 
 company with some ronin, had, it appeared, 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 161 
 
 proceeded to the palace precincts, and, showing 
 no reverence for the Court, had been guilty of 
 riotous behaviour. The prince and his son had 
 relied on the Choshiu clansmen being restrained 
 by their leaders, but the latter had apparently 
 lost control of their men, and thus a disturbance 
 had taken place. For this the two princes felt 
 their responsibility, and they asked that judgement 
 might be passed on them. 
 
 No notice was taken of this communication by 
 the Government, but preparations for the campaign 
 were rapidly made. The chief command of the 
 expedition was given to the ex-Prince of Owari, 
 the second in command being the ex-Prince of 
 Echizen. 
 
 The expedition was successful, and early in the 
 following year (1865) the Tokugawa forces returned 
 to Osaka, their port of departure, having accom- 
 plished all that was desired. The rebellious clan 
 had been * chastised ' according to instructions, 
 the five Court nobles who still remained in Choshiu 
 territory had been handed to the safe custody of 
 other clans, and the three Choshiu leaders of the 
 raid had been executed. 
 
 The success of the Government was due, how- 
 ever, not to the overwhelming superiority of the 
 Tokugawa troops, but to the co-operation of 
 several of the leading clans, including that of 
 Satsuma ; and to the fact that the Choshiu clan 
 was at the time divided into two parties. Of these 
 one was eager and ambitious for the clan to play 
 
 1247 l 
 
162 THE FALL OF 
 
 a prominent part in the stirring times which were 
 beginning, and was as devoted to the Court as it 
 was hostile to the Shogunate ; while the other, 
 nicknamed the Vulgar View Party, was in favour 
 of a cautious and moderate policy, and strongly 
 disapproved of the raid on Kioto. Before the 
 advanced guard of the Tokugawa forces had 
 reached Choshiu territory the latter party had 
 gained the ascendant, and, having imprisoned the 
 leaders of the raid, and many others concerned 
 in it, had gone so far as to lay hands on the prince 
 and his son, and confine them in a Buddhist 
 temple. 
 
 The return of the Tokugawa forces to Osaka 
 was generally interpreted as signifying that the 
 resistance of the clan was at an end, and the 
 Government were congratulating themselves on 
 the prompt suppression of a movement which at 
 one time had caused much anxiety, when the 
 aspect of things was suddenly changed by the 
 receipt of news that the anti-Shogunate party 
 in Choshiu, which had appeared to be crushed, had 
 again gained the upper hand, and that the whole 
 clan was once more in commotion. 
 
 The change was due to the efforts of a certain 
 Choshiu clansman named Takasugi Shinsaku, to 
 whose initiative the raising of the irregular troops, 
 previously mentioned, had been due. He had 
 returned to Choshiu as soon as the Government 
 forces had withdrawn, and, collecting a large 
 number of the men he had previously enrolled, 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 163 
 
 had attacked and defeated the adherents of the 
 Vulgar View Party, and gained control of the clan 
 territory. His proceedings had apparently the 
 sanction of the Prince of Choshiu. To tell the 
 truth, however, neither this feudal chief nor his 
 son seem to have counted for much in the councils 
 of the clan. We have already heard of them as 
 having been confined in a temple before the arrival 
 of the Government troops. The same historian 
 now tells us : — 
 
 * Takasugi and his friends ' (the quotation is 
 from Sir Ernest Satow's translation) ' carried off 
 the prince and his son to the town of Yamaguchi, 
 where extensive fortifications had been constructed 
 in the year when the expulsion of the barbarians 
 was first resolved upon. The two princes had been 
 originally removed to this stronghold, but after 
 the attack on Kioto the " Vulgar View Party " 
 had placed them in a temple at Hagi, and they 
 were now carried back again.' 
 
 At this critical juncture, when the Choshiu clan 
 were preparing for the fresh struggle with the 
 Tokugawa Government which could no longer be 
 avoided, their hands were unexpectedly strength- 
 ened by the action of the clan of Satsuma. In 
 the previous year the Choshiu forts at Shimonseki 
 had fired upon and sunk a Satsuma steamer, 
 mistaking her for a foreign vessel. Several lives 
 had been lost on this occasion, and it was said at 
 the time of the Kioto attack that the Satsuma 
 men who defended the palace against the Choshiu 
 raiders still bore a grudge against them in connexion 
 
 L2 
 
164 THE FALL OF 
 
 with this incident. The wounded Choshiu men, 
 however, who fell into their hands on this occasion 
 were kindly treated, and eventually sent back to 
 Choshiu ; and soon afterwards private overtures 
 were made by the Satsuma clan for the establish- 
 ment of a good understanding between the two 
 clans. These were gladly accepted by the Choshiu 
 clansmen, and the arrangement had a great effect 
 on the result of the campaign. 
 
 It seems also to have occurred to the clan, or 
 to the party there in the ascendant at the time, 
 after the affair of the Kioto raid, that it might 
 be advisable to make their position clearer to 
 foreigners. Some such intention apparently under- 
 lay the letter addressed by the Prince of Choshiu 
 to the British admiral just after the bombardment 
 of Shimonoseki in the autumn of 1864. In this 
 the prince explained that when in the previous 
 year, and subsequently, he had, in obedience to the 
 commands of the court and the Shogunate, fired 
 on foreign vessels, he was surprised to learn that 
 his conduct was regarded as violent and irregular, 
 and contrary to the imperial commands. About 
 this time he heard from two of his retainers who 
 had returned to Choshiu that they had been 
 treated with kindness bv the admiral. His son, 
 the Prince of Nagato, had gone to Kioto in order 
 to ascertain definitely the wishes of the Emperor 
 (in regard to foreigners), but on his way there the 
 disturbances in Kioto had taken place, and he 
 was therefore unable to carry out his intention. 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 165 
 
 The prince had endeavoured on two occasions 
 to communicate with the admiral in order to explain 
 that there would be no interference with vessels 
 passing through the straits, but without success, 
 and then the Shimonoseki fighting had taken place. 
 He wished the admiral to understand that there 
 was no settled ill-will on his part, that he had no 
 wish to cause suffering to large numbers of people, 
 and that all he desired was peace. 
 
 A glance at the map will show that the two 
 provinces of Suwo and Nagato, forming the 
 territory of the Choshiu clan, lie at the extreme 
 southern end of the main island, the former 
 bordering on the inland sea, and the latter 
 touching the same sea on the south, and the Sea 
 of Japan on the west. The Choshiu territory 
 was accessible, therefore, both by land and sea. 
 The Tokugawa forces included contingents from 
 several clans, but their previous Satsuma allies 
 were conspicuous by their absence, the clan having 
 sent in a memorial protesting against the injustice 
 of the war, and declining to furnish its quota. 
 
 The Satsuma people were not alone in their 
 objection to the renewal by the Government of 
 hostilities with Choshiu. The ex-Prince of Owari, 
 who had, as we have seen, held the chief command 
 on the previous occasion, remonstrated strongly 
 against this course being taken, pointing out that 
 ' it was not right to take up arms without manifest 
 cause, that the Prince of Choshiu had made 
 atonement by inflicting capital punishment on 
 
166 THE FALL OF 
 
 his chief retainers, and that the Shogunate, by 
 taking this unjustifiable action, was imperilling 
 the very existence of the Tokugawa family \ 
 Another kinsman of the Shogun, the ex-Prince 
 of fichizen, spoke in the same sense. Similar 
 advice was given by other councillors, but it was 
 not taken, and at the end of May, 1865, an imperial 
 decree announcing the impending chastisement 
 of Choshiu was issued, and it was arranged that 
 this time the Shogun would take the field in person 
 at the head of all his vassals. 
 
 It seems reasonable to assume that for this 
 decision to resume hostilities the young Shogun, 
 who was only nineteen years of age, was not 
 responsible. His personal influence in the Govern- 
 ment seems never to have been great, and so little 
 relish had he for State affairs that he petitioned 
 about this time to be allowed to retire from the 
 position of Shogun in favour of his cousin and 
 ex-guardian, Prince Keiki. Nor, although the 
 Court had openly approved the original expedition 
 against the clan, is it likely that its opinion would 
 have been opposed on this point to that held in 
 common by the Satsuma clan, the ex-Princes of 
 Owari and Echizen, and other prominent person- 
 ages, not to speak of the strong claim on its good- 
 will which the clan of Choshiu had established 
 before the raid took place. The Tokugawa 
 statesmen who were responsible for the disastrous 
 course which was followed may have been influenced 
 by the fact that the previous proceedings against 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 167 
 
 the clan had lacked the final conclusion in such 
 cases, namely, the formal punishment of the Mori 
 family. When the Tokugawa forces were with- 
 drawn on the previous occasion, this point was 
 reserved for future decision. A difference of 
 opinion had arisen subsequently, the Court being 
 disposed not to proceed further in the matter, 
 while the Shogunate was inclined to impose 
 humiliating conditions, which included the con- 
 veyance of the Prince of Choshiu. and his son to 
 Yedo under arrest. The Government may have 
 felt that in the circumstances their dignity had 
 suffered, and that it was necessary to do something 
 to reassert their waning authority. 
 
 Let us look for a moment at the military position 
 of the Shogunate. By a law passed in 1648, 
 known as the Keian law from the name of the 
 year-period in which it was issued, the feudal 
 nobility were called on to furnish two men for 
 military service in time of war for every hundred 
 pounds sterling worth of annual produce which 
 their lands were estimated to yield. This placed 
 at the Shogunate' s disposal a force variously 
 estimated at between 400,000 and 500,000 men. 
 In 1861, a few years before the date at which we 
 have now arrived, the contribution of men for 
 £100 of revenue was reduced by one-half. Further 
 changes were made at the same period by the intro- 
 duction of the rule that money or rice might be sub- 
 stituted for men. Advantage was taken very 
 generally of this permission. The military power 
 
168 THE FALL OF 
 
 of the Shogunate had, therefore, by this time been 
 reduced in two ways, the smaller contingents 
 furnished, and the commutations permitted. And 
 the testimony of many Japanese writers goes to 
 show that there was a great falling off also in 
 military efficiency. The Shogunate troops included, 
 we are told, large numbers of needy adventurers, 
 and a large proportion was without cohesion or 
 proper military training. The fighting capacity, too, 
 of the samurai in many parts of the country had, 
 according to the same testimony, greatly deterio- 
 rated. The view generally expressed that the 
 value of the samurai lay in his fighting capacity, 
 and that when he no longer excelled as a fighting 
 man he was useless for all purposes, is one which 
 will be endorsed by all who had an opportunity 
 of making the acquaintance of Japanese troops 
 before the introduction of conscription on the 
 Western model. 
 
 In the summer of 1865 the Shogun proceeded 
 to Osaka from Yedo, and for many weeks after- 
 wards contingents from various clans were to be 
 seen pursuing their way from different parts of 
 the country to the same place, where preparations 
 for the forthcoming campaign were being made 
 on a large scale. But there was much delay. 
 Operations did not commence till more than 
 twelve months later. In the interval the Govern- 
 ment continued to publish fierce denunciations 
 against Choshiu, coupled with calls to arms 
 against the ' rebels ' as they were termed ; orders, 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 169 
 
 to which no attention was paid, were issued for 
 the attendance of the two princes at Yedo ; 
 instructions, which were without practical result, 
 were promulgated for the holding of a species of 
 tribunal at Hiroshima ; and notifications prohibit- 
 ing the entry of persons, or goods, into Choshiu 
 by sea were sent to various parts of the country. 
 Finally, with the nominal approval of the Throne, 
 a decree was published removing from the Mori 
 family the stigma of ' rebels ', but confiscating a 
 large portion of their lands, ordering the abdication 
 of the Prince and his son, and the appointment of 
 a fitting successor, to be nominated by the Govern- 
 ment, and notifying the extinction of the families 
 of the three chief retainers concerned in the Kioto 
 raid. On the Choshiu side communications of all 
 kinds protesting against the action taken against 
 the clan were addressed to the Court, to the 
 Government, and to other clans. 
 
 In one of these documents — signed by the karo, 
 or chief retainers, of the clan — complaint is made 
 of the refusal of the Government to forward a 
 petition of the clan to the Court, and of its neglect 
 to answer repeated memorials from the clan. 
 The Shogunate is reminded of its weak and 
 vacillating action ; of its having asked the advice 
 of the Court and of the nation on the policy of 
 establishing foreign intercourse ; of the fact that 
 the ' Shimoda ' Treaty 1 never received the sanction 
 of the Throne beforehand ; of its written promise, 
 
 1 American Treaty of 1857. 
 
170 THE FALL OF 
 
 to which all the members of the Council of State 
 set their seals, to expel all foreigners within five, 
 or, at the most, eight, years, and of its complete 
 failure to fulfil it ; of the Shogun's visit to Kioto, 
 and of the imperial vow taken before the gods 
 to drive away the barbarians ; and of the notifica- 
 tions which were accordingly circulated throughout 
 the country. 
 
 * The prince and his son have,' it is added, ' ever 
 since been troubled in their minds about the two 
 policies of opening or closing the country, but 
 it is clear that they have had no selfish motives, 
 but have been actuated solely by the desire to obey 
 the imperial wishes ; and now they are accused of 
 having, in their attempts to expel the barbarians, 
 committed an act of private and unauthorized 
 war. The offence of firing on foreign vessels at 
 Shimonoseki having been expiated, the troops 
 of the Government under the ex-Prince of Owari 
 were withdrawn. But now it is announced that 
 hostilities are to be reopened. The Shogun is 
 to take the field in person, and commissioners 
 charged with the collection of information are 
 already at work in the neighbouring province. 
 Nothing remains,' it is said, ' but to die, but we 
 make a last appeal to the Government to stay 
 its hand, and, by exercising generosity and justice, 
 to give tranquillity to the spirits of the deceased 
 ancestors of the prince and his son, and happiness 
 to the people of the two provinces.' 
 
 Another of these state-papers is a memorial 
 issued in the name of the whole clan : — 
 
 6 The reputation for loyalty to the Throne,' 
 says the memorial, c which has distinguished our 
 
I THE SHOGUNATE 171 
 
 two princes for many years has been lost in 
 a single morning. Not only has this happened, 
 but a national calamity has been brought about, 
 and no opportunity is given to them for removing 
 the stain of an unjust accusation, or for discharging 
 even a small portion of their obligations to the 
 Throne. We, who have stolen our lives, and 
 wasted our days, are overwhelmed with fear, 
 trembling with the perfect sincerity induced by 
 a sense of many crimes.' 
 
 And after protesting that no thought of irrever- 
 ence towards the Throne was ever in the minds 
 of the two princes, the memorial concludes with 
 the statement that the clansmen have come to 
 a common decision to defend their territory, and 
 refuse to obey the Government's commands. 
 
 A letter addressed about the same time, the 
 summer of 1865, by the two princes to the Geishiu 
 clan, whose territory, the province of Aki, or 
 Geishiu, formed the eastern frontier of Choshiu, 
 is couched in the same defiant tone. 
 
 ' We put ourselves to some trouble,' it says, 
 ' to go to Kioto by arrangement, and render 
 assistance to the Court, and we were under the 
 impression that some ease had thereby been 
 vouchsafed to the imperial mind. We told our 
 opinion freely, and without reserve, to the respon- 
 sible officers of the Throne, but evil officials having 
 maligned us, we incurred the imperial censure, 
 and now the Shogun is coming to chastise the 
 two provinces. We do not think the continuance 
 of our useless lives can benefit either the Empire 
 or the Government. We have, therefore, agreed 
 to give battle at once, and die fighting. It being 
 
172 THE FALL OF 
 
 the practice of our House when we go to war to 
 announce the fact to the Emperor, we have the 
 honour to give you this notice.' 
 
 Another curious document, written evidently 
 on the eve of hostilities, is given in the History of 
 Thirty Years. The date is June, 1865. It bears 
 no signature nor address, but the author calls it 
 ' a notice in writing sent to the House of Choshiu ', 
 — in other words the Mori family. The internal 
 evidence points to its having been written by 
 some member of the Tokugawa Government who 
 was friendly to the Choshiu Prince. It runs as 
 follows : — 
 
 ' It is said that the Shogun takes the field in 
 person. This being so, it will be a great happiness 
 if you atone for your fault by submission, and if 
 your submission is accepted. If you do not agree 
 to do this, war is inevitable, but I beg earnestly 
 that you will tender your submission. Then, if 
 it is not accepted, it cannot be helped, and you will 
 be prepared for the worst. I entreat you to 
 discharge your duty of loyalty even at the sacrifice 
 of life. Bear in mind that it is not to us only that 
 you owe loyalty, but also to your ancestors.' 
 
 The campaign commenced in July, 1866, the 
 town of Hiroshima, in Geishiu, close to the eastern 
 frontier of Choshiu, which served a similar purpose 
 in Japan's two recent foreign wars, being chosen 
 as the base of operations. From the first the 
 Government troops were unable to make any 
 headway, although they had the advantage of 
 numbers, and could attack both by sea and land ; 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 173 
 
 and after some months of fruitless effort they 
 were driven back to their base at Hiroshima. 
 
 In September of that year (1866) the young 
 Shogun Iyemochi died, being succeeded by his 
 cousin Prince Keiki, 1 and, in accordance with the 
 etiquette of court mourning, orders for a temporary 
 cessation of hostilities were issued. To these 
 ChOshiu, distrusting the Government's intentions, 
 seems to have demurred, and the war smouldered 
 on in a fitful way. 
 
 The death of the Shogun was followed shortly 
 by that of the Emperor Komei, which took place 
 in February, 1867. He was succeeded by his son 
 the present Emperor. By this time it was apparent 
 that no success could be looked for in the operations 
 against Choshifi. The country, which had never 
 been in favour of the renewal of hostilities, was 
 tired of war. The Government, financially em- 
 barrassed and crippled by the Shimonoseki and 
 Kagoshima indemnities, and by the heavy and 
 unaccustomed expenditure, which in one way 
 and another foreign intercourse had entailed, 
 were coming to the end of their resources, being 
 already reduced to call for donations to the war 
 fund from Buddhist and Shinto shrines. The issue 
 therefore, in March, of a notification announcing 
 a general disbandment of the troops on account 
 
 1 The name of Keiki was in reality only assumed by him on his 
 accession as Shogun. He was previously known by his surname 
 of Hitotsubashi, but we have throughout spoken of him as Keiki 
 in order to prevent confusion. 
 
174 THE FALL OP 
 
 of national mourning for the late Emperor was 
 welcomed on all sides. 
 
 Thus the war came to an end. But one matter 
 still remained for settlement, as had occurred on 
 the previous occasion. This was the question of 
 the punishment of the clan. It was not till July 
 of the same year that this point was dealt with. 
 But the proclamation then issued settled nothing. 
 It merely suggested that lenient steps should be 
 taken, and added that the four clans which had 
 come to Kioto and the Shogun concurred in this 
 view. But the two princes had already by decree 
 been deprived of their rank and titles, and the 
 withholding for the present of the formal restoration 
 of these was probably regarded as meeting the 
 case. 1 
 
 During the stormy period beginning with the 
 Kioto raid, and ending with this Proclamation of 
 July, 1867, the course of foreign relations is marked 
 by the conclusion of further treaties and arrange- 
 ments. The first which calls for notice is the 
 Shimonoseki Convention, concluded on the 22nd 
 of October, 1864. 2 So much has been said and 
 written in condemnation of the conduct of the 
 four powers concerned, Great Britain, America, 
 France, and Holland, in exacting a pecuniary 
 indemnity for the act of what the convention 
 itself terms ' a rebellious prince ', that it may be 
 well to recall the fact that the agreement gave 
 
 1 The two princes were formally pardoned in January, 1868, 
 after the Shogun's resignation. 2 Appendix 19. 
 

 THE SHOGUNATE 175 
 
 to the Japanese Government the option of opening 
 the port of Shimonoseki in lieu of an indemnity, 
 and that the foreign powers would have much 
 preferred the former solution. The other important 
 agreement is the Tariff Convention of June 25, 
 1866, 1 to which Japan and the same four powers 
 who signed the Shimonoseki Convention were 
 parties. The effect of this Tariff Convention was 
 to substitute for the existing tariff of varying 
 rates averaging about 15 % ad valorem a simplified 
 tariff of one uniform duty of 5 % ad valorem on 
 all imports and exports ; to place on record the 
 right of a Japanese subject to go abroad on 
 obtaining a passport from his authorities ; to 
 make a beginning in the lighting of the Japanese 
 coasts and harbours ; and to take measures for 
 the establishment of a Government Mint, as a 
 first step in the reorganization of the Japanese 
 currency. Treaties were also entered into with 
 Belgium in 1866, and with Italy and Denmark 
 in 1867. Various arrangements were also made 
 regarding the foreign settlement at Yokohama and 
 other matters. The two questions, however, which, 
 perhaps, more than anything else occupied the 
 attention of the foreign representatives were 
 the ratification by the Emperor of the existing 
 treaties, and the opening of the port of Hiogo. 
 
 In the diary of the first American representative 
 in Japan we notice not long after his arrival the 
 first dawning of a suspicion that the Shogun, or 
 
 1 Appendix 20. 
 
176 THE FALL OF 
 
 Tycoon, was not the real sovereign of Japan. 
 Mr. Harris, like others after him, felt that there 
 was something in the background, a puzzle to be 
 cleared up, though its solution was not possible 
 then. At the time of which we are now speaking 
 several years had elapsed since the negotiation 
 of the Harris Treaty, and foreign Governments 
 were well aware of the existence of a sovereign 
 in seclusion, though the exact relations between 
 Kioto and Yedo were not fully understood. They 
 were aware, moreover, that the Imperial Court was 
 not well disposed towards foreigners, and foreign 
 intercourse, for, in addition to the dangers attend- 
 ing residence in the Shogun's capital, their repre- 
 sentatives had been confronted with the unpleasant 
 duty of rejecting official overtures, emanating 
 from Kioto, for the closing of the country, which 
 meant the abandonment of all that had been 
 gained in the course of several years by a combina- 
 tion of force and diplomacy. The representatives 
 themselves, in the freshness of their knowledge, 
 could not fail to be impressed by the growing 
 influence of a Throne whose existence had only 
 recently been realized. It was generally felt, there- 
 fore, that as an important step in the consolidation 
 of good relations, the Emperor, who had given 
 his formal approval to the earlier treaties, should 
 be invited to ratify those which had taken their 
 place. Accordingly a powerful combined squadron 
 of foreign vessels assembled in the harbour of 
 Hiogo in the autumn of 1865 with the object of 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 177 
 
 putting pressure on the Shogunate, and indirectly 
 on the Court at Kioto, in regard to this matter. 
 The demonstration had the desired effect. The 
 Shogun addressed a strong representation to the 
 Court, pointing out the necessity of the imperial 
 ratification, and the Court gave way, and granted 
 the formal approval desired ; attaching to it the 
 condition, which was not communicated to the 
 foreign representatives, that the port of Hiogo 
 was not to be opened. 
 
 This was the other question which proved so 
 troublesome. It will be remembered that in 1862 
 the Treaty Powers had agreed to postpone for five 
 years the date of opening the port of Hiogo, our 
 share in the matter being recorded in the London 
 Protocol of that year. The objections in Court 
 and feudal circles to the opening of Hiogo rested 
 on a double basis of sentiment and expediency. 
 The peculiar position of the monarchy, standing 
 as it had done for centuries above and apart from 
 administrative activities, and equally removed 
 until recent years from jealousies of faction or 
 party, depended to some extent on the geographical 
 situation of the capital. This was in the centre 
 of the country, and remote from the outlying 
 districts which would naturally serve as points 
 of contact with the outside world. The security 
 of the Court would, it was considered, be diminished 
 by the establishment of foreigners so near the 
 capital, and the proximity of an open port might, 
 it was felt, interfere with the maintenance of 
 
 1247 M 
 
178 THE FALL OF 
 
 the exclusive traditions attaching to the place 
 of imperial residence, which, on the principle 
 of quieta non mover e, there was a general reluc- 
 tance to disturb. The policy followed by the 
 Shogunate in concealing from the Foreign Repre- 
 sentatives the attitude assumed by the Court on 
 this point probably served in this instance, as in 
 so many others during the early days of foreign 
 intercourse, a useful purpose, by preventing for 
 the moment a serious collision of views. Later 
 on, the political situation having in the meantime 
 changed, the opposition of the Court was with- 
 drawn, and Hiogo, and at the same time the city 
 of Osaka, were opened to trade on the 1st of 
 January, 1868, the date fixed by the London 
 Protocol. 
 
 In the autumn of the year 1867 occurred the event 
 which was the prelude to the rupture between the 
 Court and the Shogunate. This was the resignation 
 of the Shogun. To the student of those times it 
 seems as if the end of the system of dual government 
 must have been in sight for many years — as if 
 it must have suggested itself to all foreseeing 
 minds as a thing inevitable, which nothing short 
 of a miracle could prevent. It has been pointed 
 out already in the course of these pages how ever 
 since Commodore Perry's first visit to Japan the 
 Shogunate' s influence began to decline. When 
 on that occasion the Yedo Government renounced, 
 or forebore to exercise, its traditional right to 
 govern the country, and referred to the Throne 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 179 
 
 and the feudal nobility the question of foreign 
 intercourse, which by the law of the country it 
 ought to have settled itself, the thin end of the 
 wedge which broke the Tokugawa rule was inserted. 
 It was a confession of weakness of which advantage 
 was at once taken. Little by little the Court 
 recovered powers it had not wielded for centuries, 
 and what it regained the Shogunate, and no one 
 else, lost, until in 1863, as we have seen, Kioto 
 and not Yedo was fast becoming the political 
 centre of the country. Then came the Choshiu 
 affair, and the Kioto raid, which, had the reins 
 been in more skilful hands, should have furnished 
 an opportunity for retrieving the situation. The 
 opportunity was lost through the blindness of the 
 Council of State, which, by its obstinate insistence 
 on disproportionate and vindictive conditions for 
 Choshiu' s submission, lost the confidence of the 
 country, and the support of its friends, driving 
 into the opposite camp even those, like Satsuma, 
 whose co-operation was indispensable. It had also 
 played the game of its enemies by suddenly, at 
 the very moment when its conduct was alienating 
 public opinion, and when those daimios who had 
 obeyed the call to arms against Choshiu were 
 busy with warlike preparations, decreeing a return 
 to the system of the attendance of daimios in 
 Yedo in alternate years, which had been entirely 
 changed three years before (in 1862), and inti- 
 mating the necessity of immediate compliance 
 with the order. The effect on the feudal nobility 
 
 M2 
 
180 THE FALL OF 
 
 of this rash attempt to reassert a position which 
 it had abandoned was disastrous for the Toku- 
 gawa interests. Finally the Yedo Government had 
 been worsted in a campaign against a single clan. 
 The Tokugawa power and prestige had alike dis- 
 appeared. 
 
 Hitherto throughout this short sketch of events 
 before the Restoration we have preferred to speak 
 as far as possible of the Shogunate, rather than 
 of the Shogun, as the moving power in the adminis- 
 tration ; and this method has been alike convenient, 
 and more in keeping with Japanese ideas. This 
 method will serve us no longer. The Shogun comes 
 naturally now to the front of the stage as he did 
 for a moment, as Tycoon, when the first treaties 
 were signed — and the Shogunate retires into the 
 background. 
 
 The new Shogun (Keiki) had been formally 
 installed in January, 1867. Highly accomplished, 
 but of an unassuming temperament and retiring 
 disposition, it was with reluctance that he had 
 accepted the dignity of Shogun ; and after a few 
 months' experience of the cares of the post, and 
 of the difficulty of holding his own against the | 
 combination of western clans which was formed 
 as soon as the Choshiu campaign had ended, he 
 announced his resignation in a manifesto addressed 
 to the feudal nobilitv. 
 
 In this remarkable document, unique as was 
 the occasion which produced it, the Shogun alludes 
 to the administrative power having passed in 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 181 
 
 early times from the hands of the Emperors to 
 those of the Ministers of State, to its subsequent 
 transfer in the Middle Ages to the military class, 
 and to the eventual assumption of ruling authority 
 by his Tokugawa ancestors. He confesses to hav- 
 ing failed to carry on the work of administration 
 in a satisfactory manner, and dwells on the desira- 
 bility, in view of the gradual extension of relations 
 with foreign powers, of the Government being 
 directed from one central point. ' If, therefore,' 
 he adds, ' the old order of things be changed, and 
 the administrative authority be restored to the 
 Imperial Court, if national deliberations be con- 
 ducted on an extensive scale, and the imperial 
 decision then invited, and if the Empire be 
 protected with united hearts and combined effort, 
 our country will hold its own with all nations of 
 the world. This is our one duty to our country, 
 but if any of you have other views on the subject, 
 you should state them without reserve.' 1 
 
 In the adoption of this course the Shogun was 
 probably influenced by a memorial received by 
 him from the ex-Prince of Tosa — countersigned, 
 it should be noted, by three leading retainers — 
 who pointed out the danger to which the country 
 was exposed by the discord existing between the 
 Court, the Shogun, and the feudal nobility, and 
 advocated the discontinuance of the dual system 
 of administration, and a return to the ancient form 
 of government — the direct rule of the Mikado. 
 
 1 Appendix 21. 
 
182 THE FALL OF 
 
 Further light is thrown on the manifesto by 
 the personal letter addressed at the same time by 
 the Shogun to the Hatomoto, a class of vassal 
 gentry specially created by the founder of the 
 Tokugawa line of Shoguns. In this he says : — 
 
 ' The great change I have made by my own 
 unaided decision is due to what has been in my 
 mind from the first. It has caused you all great 
 grief for the sake of my family, and you are now 
 pressing me to return to Yedo. Your sincere 
 affection for my house has been shown for more 
 than 200 years, and it gives me profound satisfac- 
 tion. But I appeal to you. My feelings for my 
 family, the house of Tokugawa, are the same as 
 yours. This is only natural. But is there not good 
 reason for changing the great laws, and the mag- 
 nificent system handed down to us by our ances- 
 tors ? Of late years as a result of the progress of 
 the times, there have been two channels for the 
 exercise of administrative power. And in view 
 of the development of foreign relations it was 
 impossible for me, if things went on in this way, 
 to feel at ease with regard to the permanent repose 
 of the Empire, and the welfare of my family. 
 Grieving over this, I reflected deeply, and made 
 up my mind that if the supreme power were 
 concentrated in single hands, and the power of 
 the whole country combined by co-operation, 
 and joint deliberation, the great work by which 
 the Empire would take its place with all other 
 foreign nations would be achieved. Do you also 
 carefully consider your obligations to the Empire, 
 and to my family, and, fostering the feelings of 
 affectionate and devoted loyalty }^ou have enter- 
 tained for me, give now, I beseech you, your 
 whole energies unceasingly and without sloth to 
 the performance of your official duties. I have 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 183 
 
 for a long time been a guest in Kioto, and I am 
 eager to go home, but I have been occupied 
 without any intermission ever since the autumn 
 of last year with business concerning the relations 
 between the Court nobility and the military class. 
 The desire to return to Yedo is with me night and 
 day, for there are things connected with the feelings 
 and conduct of the people of Kwanto which need 
 looking into, but there is much state work to be 
 done, and having received much kindness and 
 many favours from the Court, both during the 
 reign of the late Emperor and since, I am bound 
 by the feelings of a subject towards his sovereign, 
 and I cannot leave the vicinity of the imperial 
 palace. Truly I may say that I am tied here and 
 cannot get away. I wish you to understand that 
 I am exercising great patience, and am intent on 
 preserving my reputation, reverencing the Court, 
 and doing my duty to my ancestors, and that my 
 position is one of trouble and anxiety. Prosperity 
 and decay, success and failure, follow natural 
 laws. The great man when going a long journey 
 adapts himself to circumstances, and watches his 
 opportunity before giving full play to his energies 
 Foolish as I am, I desire not to discredit the line- 
 age of my ancestor Toshgou (Iyeyasu), to carry on 
 the family succession, and to do my duty to the 
 country. Bear in mind that you are now in the 
 autumn of obligations for having been enabled 
 to live and eat in peace for more than two hundred 
 years ; strengthen your sense of patriotic duty ; 
 be diligent in your work, and, in rendering me your 
 assistance, be careful in all matters. I say this 
 to you all from the highest to the lowest official.' 
 
 The Shogun's resignation was accepted ; and 
 it was notified to the foreign representatives in 
 a memorandum explaining the reasons for the 
 
184 THE FALL OF 
 
 step. 1 But the Throne intimated its desire that 
 he should continue to remain responsible for the 
 direction of affairs until a council of the leading 
 daimios should have time to meet and deliberate 
 in the capital. 
 
 The ex-Shogun, therefore, remained in Kioto 
 after his resignation awaiting the meeting of the 
 Council, being in charge of the administration, as 
 before, and relying for support on a force which 
 consisted chiefly of Aidzu and Kuwana samurai. 
 His position there was, however, rendered un- 
 tenable by a sudden change in the situation. 
 Several of the western clans had been increasing 
 the number of their troops in the capital in 
 preparation for a concerted movement, and on 
 the 3rd of January, 1868, a Court order deprived 
 the Aidzu clan of the duty of guarding the palace 
 gates. Other orders of an uncompromising char- 
 acter followed, abolishing the offices of Shogun 
 and Kwambahu, and creating new offices and titles, 
 the recipients of which included no supporter of 
 the Shogun. A provisional Government, the real 
 power in which lay with the fifteen members 
 who represented the five clans of Satsuma, Tosa, 
 Geishiu, Owari, and Echizen, was formed ; a formal 
 pardon was granted to the Prince of Choshiu and 
 his son ; and, the ban of expulsion having been 
 removed, a large Choshiu force re-entered the 
 capital. Four days later the ex-Shogun addressed 
 a memorial to the Court protesting against these 
 
 1 Appendix 22. 
 
THE SHOGUNATE 185 
 
 new measures, and retired to Osaka. 1 0He was at 
 first inclined to content himself with this protest, 
 as appears from the statement made by him to 
 the British and French Ministers on the same day 
 after his arrival at Osaka, and also from his reply 
 to the address presented by the foreign represen- 
 tatives on the 10th of January, but he was eventu- 
 ally persuaded by his more impetuous adherents to 
 endeavour to reassert his authority. He therefore 
 marched on Kioto with the troops at his disposal 
 at the end of January. Half-way to the capital 
 he encountered the imperial forces, was defeated, 
 and was forced to retire to Osaka, whence he 
 reached Yedo by sea. 
 
 The prospect of a peaceful settlement ol the 
 crisis which had appeared so hopeful a short time 
 before was thus interrupted by civil war. Hostili- 
 ties were, however, of short duration. Except in 
 the north-eastern provinces, where the Aidzu and 
 Yonezawa troops made a final gallant stand, and 
 in the northern island of Yezo, where a small 
 remnant of Tokugawa sympathizers held out until 
 the following year (1869), little resistance was 
 encountered by the imperial forces ; and by the 
 spring of 1869 peace was re-established every- 
 where. 
 
 With the restoration of the direct rule of the 
 Mikado the curtain falls on this period of Japanese 
 history — a period separated by a wide gulf from 
 the Japan of to-day. Whatever faults the dual 
 
 1 Appendix 23. 
 
186 THE FALL OF THE SHOGUNATE 
 
 system of g^ernment represented by the Tokugawa 
 rule may have had, it secured to Japan the blessings 
 of peace for more than 250 years, and in the course 
 of that long period the seeds of much of what 
 we admire in modern Japan were sown. 
 
 From this brief survey of the historjr of the 
 few troubled years which ended with the fall of 
 the Shogunate we derive a sense of very definite 
 progress having at last been achieved. Out of 
 the political confusion and turmoil of those times 
 certain outstanding features appear, showing 
 clearly the direction which national tendencies 
 are taking. We see, as regards the authorities, 
 the end of the authorized anti-foreign crusade, 
 and, on the part of the people, the first symptoms 
 of an improved feeling towards foreigners. From 
 the strife of civil war, and the misfortunes of 
 foreign complications, Japan emerged with a 
 clearer view both of the possibilities lying before 
 her in the future, and of the duties and responsi- 
 bilities she had deliberately, and also unconsciously, 
 assumed. 
 

 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 When, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, 
 the foreign representatives were informed by 
 the ministers in Yedo of the Shogun's resignation, 
 an official explanation of the matter in writing 
 was supplied at the same time. The version of 
 this document given in the Bakumatsu Gwaiko 
 Dan, ' Story of Foreign Relations in the last days 
 of the Shogunate,' bears no date. Allowing, how- 
 ever, for some variations in the text, and it is no 
 secret that more than one version was prepared — 
 the statement * is evidently the same as that com- 
 municated at Yedo to the British Minister about 
 the 27th of November, 1867, by Ogasawara Iki no 
 Kami, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 ' The Tycoon ', says this statement, ' has of his 
 own free will decided to return to the Mikado the 
 administrative authority handed down to him by 
 his ancestors through a period of more than two 
 hundred and fifty years. Fearing that at this 
 moment of political change people's minds may be 
 led astray by false rumours, we think it necessary 
 to explain the circumstances of the case to all 
 countries.' 
 
 Then follows a long summary of historical 
 events showing how the dual system of government 
 originated, and how the administrative authority 
 
 1 Appendix 16, p. 289. 
 
188 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 became eHwitually concentrated in the hands of 
 the founder of the Tokugawa line of Shoguns, and 
 with a brief allusion to the Christian troubles, 
 and the closing of the country, the narrative is 
 brought down to Perry's arrival, and the reopen- 
 ing of foreign intercourse. The statement then 
 refers to the dissatisfaction caused throughout 
 the country by the change of policy in regard to 
 foreigners, and to the internal troubles and foreign 
 complications which occurred, and ascribes to 
 the ex-Shogun the credit for the success achieved 
 by the Government in having, in spite of all these 
 difficulties, secured the observance of the stipula- 
 tions of the treaties with foreign powers. 
 
 Allusion having been made to the friendliness 
 manifested by the ex-Shogun in his relations with 
 the foreign representatives, the memorandum 
 proceeds to explain that under the dual system 
 of government peculiar to Japan, which was the 
 natural result of circumstances, the tranquillity 
 of the country was maintained, but that now that 
 intercourse with the whole world has been estab- 
 lished much inconvenience is caused by the name 
 under which this intercourse is carried on ; and 
 that the ex-Shogun' s resignation is due to his 
 appreciation of this fact, and of the necessity for 
 a reform of the constitution. And it concludes by 
 assuring the foreign representatives that there will 
 be no change in the foreign policy of Japan, and 
 asking them for their assistance and co-operation. 
 
 In addition to the official statement of the 
 

 
 
 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 189 
 
 Shogun's resignation given by the Yedo authorities 
 to the foreign representatives, an official announce- 
 ment of the fact was also made to the latter by 
 the Emperor. In this communication it was 
 stated that in place of the title of Tycoon, which 
 had hitherto been employed in the treaties, that 
 of Emperor would be substituted, that officers 
 would be appointed to conduct foreign affairs, and 
 that in future the Emperor would exercise supreme 
 authority both in the internal and external affairs 
 of the country. 
 
 A point to which attention may now conveniently 
 be drawn is the intimate connexion between the 
 IShogunate and the feudal system, of which, in one 
 of its aspects, it formed a part. Japanese feudalism, 
 in the form in which we find it towards the close of 
 the Tokugawa regime, was largely a creation of the 
 first and third Shoguns of the line. Its most dis- 
 tinctive features had been given to it by those 
 two rulers, and by the effects of intermarriage 1 
 and adoption, and the use of a common surname, 
 many of the chief feudal houses had become 
 identified with the fortunes of the ruling family. 
 Moreover, to how great an extent what has been 
 described as the figure-head system of government 
 prevailed in Japan has already been explained at 
 some length. It has been pointed out how this sys- 
 tem of make-believe had its origin in the structure 
 of society, whence it permeated the whole political 
 organization ; so that the position of the head of 
 
 1 Matsudaira. 
 
 / ' 
 
190 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 a family was reproduced in that of the Kara who 
 governed a clan in the name of the daimio, in 
 that of the daimio whose affairs were thus managed, 
 in that of the Shogun who presided over the 
 Government, and in that of the sovereign who 
 reigned but did not rule. This contradiction 
 between appearance and reality, between theory 
 and practice, was, as we have said, the com- 
 mon characteristic of all Japanese institutions ; it 
 constituted the tie which held them together ; 
 and in it lay the secret of their stability. 1 The 
 Shogunate and the feudal system must therefore 
 be regarded as forming very closely knit together 
 parts of a wider political organization, resting on 
 a social basis peculiar to Japan, any portion of 
 which it was difficult to disturb without danger to 
 the rest of the structure. To the politician of those 
 days it may have seemed a simple enough matter 
 to do away with the Shogunate, but the foregoing 
 view of the situation, if correct, points to the con- 
 clusion that the downfall of the Shogunate could 
 only be the prelude to the abolition of feudalism. 
 
 With the disappearance of the Shogunate its 
 territorial revenues passed into the hands of the 
 Crown. It may be interesting to note what these 
 revenues were, 2 and to trace at the same time 
 their distribution throughout the country, since 
 
 1 See Stubbs's Constitutional History, vol. i, pp. 3 and 4. 
 
 2 The revenues in question would, of course, only represent the 
 portion derived from the land in the form of land-tax, and would 
 not include other taxation. 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 191 
 
 it gives some idea of the territorial basis on which 
 the influence of the Tokugawa Government rested. 
 Out of the 68 provinces into which Japan at the 
 time of the Restoration was divided, no less a 
 number than 47, by reason of lands owned therein 
 by the Government, contributed directly towards 
 the Tokugawa Exchequer. The most notable 
 exceptions were the provinces of Satsuma and 
 Osumi in the southern island of Kiiishiu, which 
 constituted the territories of the Satsuma clan ; 
 in the island of Shikoku the province of Tosa 
 belonging to the clan of that name ; and in the 
 main island the provinces of Nagato and Suwo, 
 which were held by the clan of Choshiu, and 
 the provinces of Owari and Kii, which were the 
 possessions of two of the three princely Toku- 
 gawa families known as the Gqsanke. The 
 lands thus owned by the Government were re- 
 markable, however, rather for the wide extent 
 of their distribution than for the actual area 
 comprised. The total annual assessed yield in 
 rice of all these lands amounted to a little 
 over 10,000,000 koku of rice, equivalent to 
 I about £10,000,000. More than half of this sum 
 represented the yield of land in eleven provinces, 
 the average annual yield of the produce of lands 
 in the other 34 provinces amounting on an average 
 to less than £50,000. But on the recognized 
 principle of four parts to the feudal lord, or owner, 
 and six parts to the cultivator, which governed 
 the apportionment of the produce of the Shogun's 
 
192 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 territories in those days, 1 not more than £4,000,000 
 found its way into the Tokugawa Exchequer. 
 
 In the early years of the revival of foreign 
 intercourse, when the Shogunate was vainly 
 endeavouring to recover some of the authority 
 it had at a weak moment abandoned, when the 
 Court at Kioto was bestirring itself to turn the 
 new spirit imported into the situation to its own 
 profit, and the feudal nobles were occupied with 
 intrigues against the Court, against the Shogunate, 
 and against each other, political opinion was 
 represented mainly by three parties. Th^re_were, 
 according to the author of The Awakening of 
 , Japan, the Federalists l ed by the Satsuma clan, 
 a whose aim was the overthrow of tl ie Shogunate , 
 and the reorganization of the feudal system much 
 on the lines which existed during the half -century 
 preceding the Tokugawa domination. There were 
 the Imperialists, represented by the Choshiu clan, 
 ' who sought their ideal further back, and desired 
 the restitution of the imperial bureaucracy as it 
 had existed before the establishment of the feudal 
 system.' The third party consisted of what 
 Mr. Okakura terms the Unionists, who, following 
 the rather indefinite teaching of the famous 
 scholar, Sakuma Shozan, advocated administrative 
 reform on Western lines. The vague aspirations 
 
 1 Outside the Shogun's dominions the proportion varied from 
 three parts to the cultivator and seven to the landlord, to seven 
 parts to the former and three to the latter. In some places the 
 division was equal. 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 193 
 
 of this last-named group of politicians did not 
 survive the death of their leader, whose enthusiasm 
 for reform drew upon him the suspicion of a 
 Government too weak to tolerate any liberal pre- 
 tensions ; and whatever ambitions the Satsuma clan 
 may originally have entertained, by the time 
 the Restoration took place the course of events 
 had led to their becoming merged, together with 
 the independent ambitions of other clans, in 
 a common programme of Imperialism. But it 
 was Imperialism resting on a feudal basis, and 
 with a strong leaven in it of the spirit of reform, 
 in imitation of the foreign institutions which had 
 so much impressed the minds of the young samurai 
 of progressive tendencies. 
 
 Among other reasons for adopting as the new 
 form of government the old bureaucratic system 
 of administration, which had existed before the 
 establishment of feudalism, there were two which 
 in themselves alone justified the selection. In 
 the first place, it was inadvisable, even had it 
 been possible, to attempt to retain the constitution 
 of the Shogunate which had been just overthrown. 
 In the second place, it was necessary to take full 
 advantage of the current of popular feeling in favour 
 of the Restoration, and at the same time to work 
 as far as possible, while as yet the influence of 
 the rising men was still small, through men of 
 high rank in the class of huge, or Court nobles, 
 who had administered this system in early days, 
 and through the feudal nobility. 
 
 1247 N 
 
194 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 The constitution of the new Government was 
 briefly as follows : — 
 
 There were eight departments of state called 
 Kioku. The first was the Sosaikioku, or Depart- 
 ment of Supreme Administration; the second had 
 control of all matters connected with the Shinto 
 religion. Of the other six, one dealt with legis- 
 lation, while the remaining five corresponded in a 
 general way to similar departments in Western 
 countries. 
 
 The high position assigned to the Shinto religion 
 will be noticed, Buddhism being as conspicuously 
 ignored. In the reorganization which took place 
 later in the same year (1868) still greater im- 
 portance was given to Shinto, the department 
 dealing with Shinto affairs ranking with, but after 
 the Council of State (Dajokwan), which replaced 
 the Sosaikioku, and not with the ordinary state 
 departments. In 1871, however, Shinto, while re- 
 taining its privileged character as the Court religion, 
 ceased to be recognized as the only state church, 
 and the department regulating its affairs became 
 simply the department of religion. 
 
 Feudal interests were represented in the new 
 Government by a special class of councillors with de- 
 liberative functions, chosen from the various clans, 
 the number furnished by each clan being regulated 
 according to the annual assessed yield of its terri- 
 tory. The character of a deliberative assembly thus 
 given to the new administration was in accordance 
 with principles of reform subsequently enunciated 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 195 
 
 in the imperial oath. From this representation, 
 however, seven clans were excluded on the ground 
 of their holding views opposed to the new order of 
 things. 
 
 A member of the imperial house, Prince Arisu- 
 gawa, was appointed president of the new adminis- 
 tration, and two leading court nobles, San jo and 
 Iwakura, became the two Vice-Presidents. Sanjo 
 was one of the seven Kuge who had incurred the 
 displeasure of the late Government by taking 
 refuge in Choshiu territory shortly before that 
 clan's raid on Kioto, while Iwakura became after- 
 wards one of the foremost statesmen of the new 
 era. Two other imperial princes and five Court 
 nobles were placed at the head of the remaining 
 seven departments, the second position in three 
 of these being given to the daimios of fichizen, 
 Geishiu, and Higo. Among those who held office 
 under the new Government in minor capacities 
 were Okubo and Terashima of Satsuma, Kido of 
 Choshiu, Goto of Tosa, Ito and Inouye, the two 
 young Choshiu clansmen who on their return 
 from England in 1864 had tried unsuccessfully 
 to prevent the Shimonseki hostilities, and. others 
 whose names will always be associated with the 
 great work of Japan's progress. 
 
 There was by this time a complete change of 
 attitude in regard to foreign intercourse on the 
 part of the leaders of the Restoration movement, 
 and we hear of the anti-foreign party as a party 
 no more. Evidence of the altered state of feeling 
 
 N2 
 
196 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 is furnished by a memorial to the Throne pre- 
 sented about this time by five of the leading 
 daimios. 1 The memorial refers to the recent 
 resumption of administrative authority by the 
 Emperor, and to the urgent necessity of placing 
 the question of foreign intercourse on a clear 
 basis. It gives a short sketch of foreign relations 
 both before and after the conclusion of treaties 
 with foreign powers, and concludes with an earnest 
 exhortation to all officials in high positions to 
 appreciate rightly the circumstances of the present 
 foreign situation, to eschew the Chinese principles 
 on which all ceremonies and functions had hitherto 
 been modelled, and, abandoning the prejudiced 
 and ignorant views prevailing for so long in regard 
 to foreigners, to unite in establishing relations 
 with foreign countries on a footing of cordiality 
 and friendship. 
 
 On the 6th of April, 1868, in the Throne Room 
 oi the palace in Kioto, took place the function 
 which serves as a landmark in Japanese con- 
 stitutional history, and occupies for the Japanese 
 people a position similar to that of the granting 
 of the Magna Charta with us. This was the 
 ceremony in which the Emperor, in the presence 
 of the Imperial Princes and high officials of state, 
 took what is known as the Imperial Oath of Five 
 Articles. It is not too much too say that this 
 Imperial Oath was the foundation on which the 
 whole structure of new Japan was raised. No 
 1 Those of lj]chizen, Tosa, Choshiu, Satsuma, Geishiu, and Higo. 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 197 
 
 apology, therefore, is needed for quoting it in full. 1 
 It runs as follows : — 
 
 ' 1. Deliberative Assemblies shall be established 
 on an extensive scale, and all measures of Govern- 
 ment shall be decided by public opinion. 
 
 ' 2. All classes, high and low, shall unite in 
 vigorously carrying out the plan of government. 
 
 ' 3. All classes of the people shall be allowed to 
 fulfil their just aspirations, so that there may be no 
 discontent. 
 
 ' 4. Uncivilized customs of former times shall 
 be abolished, and everything shall be based upon 
 just and equitable principles of nature. 
 
 * 5. Knowledge shall be sought for throughout 
 the world, so that the foundations of the Empire 
 may be strengthened. 
 
 ' Desiring to carry out a reform without parallel 
 in the annals of our country, We Ourselves here 
 take the initiative and swear to the Deities of 
 Heaven and Earth to adopt these fundamental 
 principles of national government, so as to establish 
 thereby the security and prosperity of the people. 
 We call upon you to make combined and strenuous 
 efforts to carry them out.' 
 
 The general correspondence of the language of 
 the Imperial Oath, with reference to the necessity 
 of widening, and, in a sense, popularizing the basis 
 of government, with that of the ex-Shogun's 
 manifesto, when he tendered his resignation in 
 the autumn of the previous year, will be noticed. 
 We are reminded, too, of what was said in memorials 
 presented to the Government on this subject. 
 
 1 The translation given in Baron D. Kikuchi's ' Japanese 
 Education ' has in the main been followed. 
 
198 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 This shows that the feeling in favour of reform 
 was very widely entertained. The Oath is not 
 a declaration of rights, but a declaration of inten- 
 tions, a statement of the principles on which it 
 was resolved in future to conduct the Government, 
 and as such it has always been regarded as of the 
 highest value. In introducing the principle of 
 deliberation, or discussion, into the conduct of 
 state business there was, of course, no intention 
 of giving the masses a voice in the Government, or 
 of establishing popular representative institutions 
 at once. Any such idea was at the time quite 
 unthinkable, for the feudal system was still in 
 existence, and the bulk of the population had no 
 interest in public affairs. But that it was intended 
 to make a beginning in this direction — that repre- 
 sentative institutions were the goal towards which 
 men's thoughts were turning — there can be little 
 doubt. The crudeness of the attempt to give 
 practical effect to the new theories of government 
 by importing into the constitution a delibera- 
 tive element, out of keeping with the otherwise 
 bureaucratic character of the new administration, 
 was due simply to inexperience, and a confusion 
 of ideas not unnatural in the circumstances. 
 
 In June of the same vear the constitution of 
 the Government was reorganized, much of its 
 original framework, including the deliberative 
 features already described, being, however, re- 
 tained. In the decree announcing these changes 
 the text of the Oath was quoted, and it was 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 199 
 
 also expressly stated that the object in view- 
 was to proceed with the work of administrative 
 reform in the direction therein indicated. The 
 administrative system was fated to undergo so 
 many changes in succeeding years that a detailed 
 examination of the constitution as elaborated by 
 this decree is hardly necessary. It may be interest- 
 ing, however, to mention a few of its main points. 
 The administrative authority was centred in one 
 body called the Dajokwan, or Council of State, 
 which w r as divided into seven departments : — 
 
 1. The deliberative chamber (Sei-in), which 
 took over the duties of the former Legislative 
 Department, consisting of an upper and a lower 
 house, and including an office for the publication 
 of the ' Official Gazette ' (the issue of which has 
 continued uninterruptedly from that date). 
 
 2. The office of the Lords President of the 
 Council, which had functions combining those of 
 the former Department of Supreme Administration 
 and Home Department, which it replaced. 
 
 The five other departments were, as before, 
 those of the Shinto religion, Finance, War, Foreign 
 Affairs, and Justice. 
 
 One important change made w r as the extension 
 of the privilege of representation in the Govern- 
 ment by means of deliberative councillors to the 
 great cities of Yedo, Kioto, and Osaka, and im- 
 perial territories, besides the clans to whom this 
 right was originally limited. 
 
 How slowty the new Government was feeling 
 
200 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 its way in the conduct of state affairs, and how 
 curiously, and even incoherently, in its first creative 
 efforts, the old and the new were blended, may be 
 seen from the explanations given in the decree. 
 
 1 The power and authority of the Council of 
 State,' it says, ' is threefold, legislative, executive, 
 and judicial.' This division was of course borrowed 
 from the West. The Government also, as we have 
 seen, contained a deliberative element. 
 
 1 The reason,' we read in another place, ' why 
 appointment to the highest rank in the various 
 offices is limited to princes of the blood, the nobles 
 of the Court, [Jcuge], and territorial nobles, is 
 because due affection should be shown to the 
 relations of the sovereign, and due respect to 
 people of rank. The selection of other officials 
 from the military class and the common people 
 is in order that wisdom may be honoured.' 
 
 In another passage we are told that ' the object 
 of establishing the system of a deliberative body 
 is that open discussion and the opinion of the 
 majority may be secured.' 
 
 The reason, we learn, that princes of the blood, 
 huge, and territorial nobles were, when out of 
 doors, to be accompanied by only six two-sworded 
 men and three lackeys, and persons of lower rank 
 by only two two-sworded men and one lackey, is 
 ■ in order to do away with the appearance of pomp 
 and grandeur, and to prevent the existence of a 
 barrier between classes.' 
 
 The decree also established the rule, in imita- 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 201 
 
 tion probably of the precedent furnished by the 
 Government of the United States, that all officials 
 should be changed after four years' service. But 
 this rule is qualified by the practical proviso that 
 ' such as cannot conveniently be dismissed, because 
 they have won general approval, must be retained 
 for a further period of years.' 
 
 In view of the slender financial resources at 
 the disposal of the new Government it is not 
 surprising to read of a forced contribution, to 
 which the term of 'tribute' is given, being levied 
 on all classes of the people, officials being called 
 
 I upon to pay a tax amounting to one-thirtieth of 
 their salaries. 
 By the transfer of the Shogunate territories to 
 the Crown the classification for purposes of local 
 administration had become rearranged into three 
 divisions. The large cities of the Empire, Yedo, 
 Kioto, and Osaka, formed a group by themselves, 
 the territories of the clans, and the imperial 
 domains, constituting the two other administrative 
 areas. The decree provided that in each of these 
 separate areas local administration was to be con- 
 ducted in accordance with the principles laid down 
 in the Imperial Oath, the separate and distinct 
 character of each being maintained. At the same 
 time, with a view to strengthening the imperial 
 authority, and counteracting any decentralizing 
 tendencies which had made the task of government 
 so difficult in the past, it was enacted that no rank 
 was to be bestowed, no money coined, and no 
 
202 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 foreigners employed without special permission, 
 and no alliances formed either between neighbour- 
 ing clans, or between any clan and a foreign 
 State. 
 
 It was not till April of the following year (1869) 
 that full effect was given to the intentions announced 
 in the Imperial Oath by the opening in Yedo of 
 a deliberative assembly, or parliament, to which 
 the name of Kogisho was given. It consisted of 
 276 members, one for every clan. 
 
 The plan of convoking a parliament did not 
 originate with the men who took the leading part 
 in the Restoration. The idea of consulting public 
 opinion was in the air long before then. It is 
 true, as the British Minister, Sir Harry Parkes, 
 reported to his Government at the time, that the 
 establishment of such an institution formed one 
 of the objects of the promoters of the revolution. 
 But the idea did not originate with them. It was 
 equally in the minds of the Shogun's advisers. In 
 a manifesto issued by the ex-Shogun in February, 
 1868, he stated his intention ' to listen to the voice 
 of the majority, and to establish a deliberative 
 assembly ' — (the very word Kogisho being used) 
 — ' where any one who has an opinion to express 
 may do so without fear of the consequences '. 
 
 Speaking at the time of this first attempt at 
 parliamentary institutions, a foreign paper published 
 in Yokohama observed : — 
 
 i It must be remembered that not only was the 
 Assembly composed of nothing but two-sworded 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 203 
 
 men, who, in order to render them eligible, were 
 declared to rank as karo, but that the members 
 were there as representatives of the clans alone. 
 In this attempt at a Parliament there were no 
 members from cities or towns, but only from 
 clans ; the merchants and the people at large 
 had no voice in the deliberations ; they could 
 neither elect nor be elected. The House could 
 not therefore lay claim to the appellation of a 
 National Assembly ; it was a first attempt to 
 introduce a liberal element into the new constitu- 
 tion, and to form a channel for the expression 
 of public opinion. It should in fact be looked 
 upon as a species of debating society, where 
 opinions could be broached, and subjects discussed ; 
 but it could pass no laws.' 
 
 Sir Harry Parkes puts the matter very clearly 
 in a dispatch to Lord Clarendon when he says : — 
 
 ' The object of the Kogisho was to enable the 
 Government to sound public opinion on the various 
 topics of the day, and to obtain the assistance of 
 the country in the work of legislation by ascer- 
 taining whether the projects of the Government 
 were likely to be favourably received.' 
 
 Perhaps a little more was intended, for the 
 ambitions of the reformers were much in advance 
 of the times — but this is all that was done. 
 
 It would have been very surprising if this first 
 attempt at representative institutions, made, it 
 must not be forgetton, in the atmosphere of 
 feudalism, had been attended with any marked 
 success. The inexperience associated everywhere 
 with all such early experiments showed itself as 
 usual in many ways, chiefly perhaps in the 
 
204 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 bewildering variety of subjects introduced for 
 debate. But the British Minister, in forwarding 
 to the Foreign Office an account of one of the 
 debates, the subject discussed being foreign trade, 
 was able to say that, viewed as an illustration of 
 the capacity of the members, and of the tone of 
 the House on the question of foreign commerce, 
 the debate appeared to him to possess considerable 
 interest, and its result to be creditable to the 
 discernment of the assembly. 
 
 The impression produced on foreign observers 
 by the proceedings of the parliament was on the 
 whole favourable, though it was noticed that 
 conservative and reactionary tendencies showed 
 themselves in the rejection of proposals for the 
 abolition of harakiri and the wearing of swords, 
 and in the contemptuous tone adopted by many 
 members when speaking of foreigners. Public 
 interest in the assembly did not survive the year 
 of its institution, but the assembly lingered on, 
 nevertheless, till the autumn of 1870, when it was 
 amalgamated with the bureau created for the 
 receipt of memorials, and it was not formally 
 dissolved till 1873. But before its dissolution a 
 discussion had taken place on the most important 
 point of all the business which had occupied its 
 attention. This was the momentous question of 
 the surrender of their fiefs to the Crown by the 
 feudal nobility — in other words, the abolition of 
 feudalism. 
 
 The sentiments disclosed in memorials presented 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 205 
 
 by various daimios to the Throne at the time of 
 the Shogun's resignation in the autumn of 1867 
 showed that there was a great conflict of opinion 
 in regard to the situation. Some of the daimios, 
 notably those of the leading western clans, had 
 been loud in their denunciation of the Tokugawa 
 rule, and had dwelt on the necessity of putting 
 an end to the dual system of government. Others, 
 like the Daimio of Kii, and Makino of Mikawa, 
 had expressed themselves in favour of the continu- 
 ance of the Tokugawa Shogunate under somewhat 
 altered conditions ; while a third party, consisting 
 of the Shogun's staunchest supporters, had bluntly 
 recommended that his resignation should not be 
 accepted, and that things should go on as before. 
 A thing often said, too, at the time, though not in 
 memorials, was that the west x had never ruled 
 Japan, and it was doubtful if it ever could. This 
 divergence of views points to the existence of 
 a very general feeling that the Shogunate was an 
 integral part of the machinery of government, 
 and that its abolition would result in a serious 
 disturbance of the whole administrative system. 
 To the close connexion between the Shogunate 
 and feudalism the first of the memorials on the 
 subject of the surrender of the fiefs bears eloquent 
 testimony ; and from the recognition of this fact 
 to a conviction of the necessity of a sweeping 
 change in the government of the country, even 
 if such change were to involve the disappearance 
 
 1 The Western Provinces, see p. 125. 
 
206 THE ABOLTTTON OF FEUDALISM 
 
 of the clans, was not after all a very great transition. 
 This conviction had taken root in the minds of 
 the leading reformers, of men like Kido, Iwakura, 
 and Okubo. From them it spread to others, with 
 the result that in March, 1869 — a month before 
 the opening of the Deliberative Assembly — 
 memorials were presented by several daimios, 
 the lead in this matter being taken by the chiefs 
 of four of the western clans, those of Satsuma, 
 Choshiii, Hizen, and Tosa. These four stated 
 their views in the well-known joint memorial. 1 
 
 The points emphasized in the memorial were 
 the necessity of one central body of Government, 
 and one universal authority ; the fact that the 
 combination of the name and reality of power in 
 ancient days had resulted in the tranquillity and con- 
 tentment of the people ; the circumstances which 
 had led to the establishment of the dual form of 
 government ; and the gradual usurpation of all 
 authority by the Tokugawa Shoguns. And in 
 proof of the sincerity of their statements, and of 
 their conviction as to a complete change of govern- 
 ment being the only remedy for the existing 
 situation, the memorialists concluded by surrender- 
 ing their territories and revenues to the Crown. 
 
 There seems to be no reason to question the 
 correctness of the popular view which has assigned 
 the authorship of this remarkable document to 
 Kido. A curious feature about it is the vehement 
 denunciation of the dual system of government 
 
 1 Appendir"2t: H. r 
 
THE ABOLTTTOX OF FEUDALISM 207 
 
 in the face of the fact that the last of the Shogiins 
 had resigned eighteen months before, and that 
 nearly a year had elapsed since the short civil 
 war had come to an end. This supports the 
 suggestion, already made, that in the thoughts 
 of the nation feudalism and the Shogunate were 
 inseparably associated. 
 
 The example of the four clans was at once 
 followed by others, including the president of the 
 Deliberative Assembly. Before many weeks had 
 elapsed similar memorials had come in from most 
 of the clans, and by the end of the vear out of 276 
 feudatories there were only seventeen abstainers 
 from the movement, these being daimios of 
 eastern territories who had taken the Shogun's 
 side in the civil war. One of the earliest and most 
 enthusiastic memorialists was the Daimio of Kii, 1 
 the Tokugawa prince who has already come under 
 our notice as an advocate in 1867 of the continuance 
 of the Shogunate. and who had only succeeded to 
 the lief by the promotion of his relative, Prince 
 Keiki, to be Shogun. This change of attitude on 
 
 I the part of a feudal prince of such commanding 
 position indicates the unsettled state of political 
 opinion, but it may also be interpreted as showing 
 how natural was the association of feudalism 
 with the Shogunate in men's minds, and how 
 difficult for him, as for others, was the conception 
 of feudalism existing without a Shogunate ; if 
 
 1 Or Kishiu. (not to be confused with Kiiishiu, the southernmost 
 of the islands constituting the Japanese Empire of that time). 
 
208 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 the one was to go, so must the other, was the 
 natural conclusion to be reached. 
 
 In dealing with the question raised by these 
 memorials the Government proceeded cautiously. 
 The answers given to the memorialists stated that 
 the question would be submitted to the council 
 of daimios about to assemble in Yedo. The matter 
 was also referred, as we have seen, to the par- 
 liament. Whatever hesitation, however, existed 
 related more to the method in which effect should 
 be given to the proposal than to the spirit in which 
 it should be met ; and early in August a decree 
 was issued stating that the Emperor, ' having 
 submitted the matter freely to public discussion,' 
 had been pleased to acquiesce in the proposal 
 for the surrender of the clan fiefs, feeling that 
 this course would consolidate the authority of the 
 Government. Many details were left for arrange- 
 ment afterwards, but, as a preliminary step, the 
 administration of the clans was remodelled so as 
 to bring them into harmony with the rest of the 
 Empire, and the daimios convened to pronounce 
 upon their own fate returned in the new capacity 
 of governors (Chihanji) to the territories they 
 had hitherto ruled. 
 
 A further step in the same direction was taken 
 by the abolition of the distinction between court 
 nobles and the feudal aristocracy, the two classes 
 being thenceforth merged into one, to which the 
 name of kwazoku (nobles) was given. 
 
 Two years later, the necessary arrangements 
 

 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 209 
 
 having by that time been completed, the matter 
 was finally settled by the issue on August 29, 
 1871, of a decree singular in its brevity. ' The 
 clans,' so it ran, ' are abolished and Prefectures 
 are established in their place.' At the same 
 
 (time the officials administering the clans were 
 ordered to continue to perform their duties till 
 other arrangements had been made ; and an im- 
 perial message was addressed to the ex-daimios, 
 who were, as we have seen, acting as governors 
 of the clan territories, pointing out the unsatis- 
 factory state of things resulting from the separation 
 of theory from practice in matters generally, and 
 the distribution of governing authority in several 
 hands instead of one; and mentioning, amongst 
 other reasons for the change, the better oppor- 
 tunities that would be afforded for putting an 
 end to the special evils indicated. 
 
 The ex-daimios received pensions amounting to 
 one-tenth of their former revenues, and provision 
 was made out of the latter for the support of the 
 clan samurai. From this arrangement, however, 
 the samurai of one or two clans, who had offered a 
 protracted resistance to the imperial forces, were ex- 
 cluded, and much suffering and hardship resulted. 
 
 The surrender of the clan fiefs involved of 
 course the rendition of the lands, varying greatly 
 in extent, which were held by two large sections 
 of the military class, the hatamoto and gokenin, 
 who numbered several thousand, and formed the 
 hereditary personal following of the Tokugawa 
 
 1247 o 
 
210 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 Shoguns. Their pensions were regulated on a scale 
 similar to that adopted for other members of the 
 military class. 
 
 The question of the revenues acquired by the 
 Crown from the abolition of the feudal system 
 is a difficult problem. In the Tokugawa law called 
 1 The Hundred Articles ', but better known to 
 foreigners as ' The Legacy of Iyeyasu ', the total 
 assessed yield of the country is stated to be 
 28,190,000 koku of rice. 1 Of this 20,000,000 koku 
 represented the produce of the territories of the 
 feudal nobility and gentry, and the balance the 
 yield of the Shogun's estates. This statement was 
 made in the early part of the seventeenth century, 
 that is to say, nearly 300 years before the Restora- 
 tion, and it is natural to suppose that in the course 
 of this period the revenues of feudal territories 
 may, in spite of the unfavourable economic 
 conditions known to have existed in the century 
 preceding the opening of the country, have 
 increased with the general progress of the nation. 
 In the absence of exact data, we shall probably 
 be not far wrong if we estimate the gross revenue 
 which came into the possession of the Crown by 
 the abolition of the Shogunate and the feudal 
 system as not much under 35,000,000 koku (or 
 £35,000,000). From this had to be deducted the 
 portions due to the cultivators, which varied, 
 as we have explained, with the locality in question, 
 
 1 Only a portion of this production was actually rice, but the 
 Value of other produce was stated in terms of rice. 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 211 
 
 and out of the residue the pensions due to 
 members of the military class had to be paid 
 (until the commutations had been effected), so 
 that the balance accruing to the imperial exchequer, 
 in the first few years of the new administration, 
 could not have been large. 
 
 It may be asked what effect the abolition of 
 the feudal system had upon the peasantry 
 throughout Japan. Unlike the samurai the farmer 
 was a gainer by the change. His position under 
 feudalism had been full of anomalies, and had 
 varied according to the locality of his holding. 
 But even in those parts of the country where the 
 peasant was little better than a serf, and he was 
 subject to grave disabilities and restrictions in 
 the cultivation and disposal of his land, fixity 
 of tenure was, as was explained in the open- 
 ing chapter, virtually assured to him. It might 
 perhaps have been expected that the Govern- 
 ment would have taken advantage of the sur- 
 render of the fiefs to place the matter of land 
 tenure on a clear footing. This, however, was 
 not done. No decree affecting the broad issue 
 raised for the farming class by the disappearance of 
 the feudal landlords was promulgated, and it was 
 only by degrees that the policy of the new Govern- 
 ment was disclosed. One by one the various 
 restrictions which had curtailed the rights of the 
 cultivator were removed, until by the year 1872 
 it became clear that while retaining the theory 
 that the ownership of all land was vested as of 
 
 02 
 
212 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 right in the Crown, it was intended that, subject 
 to the obligation of paying land tax, the farmer 
 should become virtually the proprietor of his land. 
 ' A more picturesque incident,' says Captain 
 Brinkley in his History of Japan, speaking of the 
 surrender of their fiefs by the daimios, ' could 
 scarcely be conceived, nor one less consistent 
 with the course that human experience would 
 have anticipated.' As a general statement this 
 may be accepted, but with the important qualifica- 
 tion that the situation was unique. The absence 
 of personal control was the hall-mark of clan 
 and Shogunate administration, and long before 
 the Restoration took place the government of 
 the fiefs had passed out of the hands of the 
 nominal rulers. The state of things in the provinces 
 resembled that in Yedo. Both daimio and hard 
 were, like the Shogun, relegated to a position of 
 nonentity. Of this there is abundant evidence. 
 Confusion existed everywhere. We have seen 
 how completely at the time of Choshiu's struggle 
 with the Shogunate the prince and his son were 
 in the hands, not of the clan karo, but of lesser 
 men, whom the crisis had elevated to positions 
 of control ; how the policy of the other great 
 Western clan, Satsuma, was directed, not by its 
 hereditary chief, nor by his karo, but by his father, 
 Shimadzu Saburo, with whom were associated 
 clansmen of quite independent views ; and how 
 the authority of the daimios of Hizen and Tosa 
 was exercised by retainers in the names of their 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 213 
 
 masters. In the clan of Mito things were in a 
 condition approaching anarchy. The rival parties 
 in that territory were animated by feelings of 
 hostility to each other fiercer perhaps than the 
 rivalry which existed between the Court and the 
 Shogunate, or between the latter and the western 
 clans ; and the increasing number of ronin in all 
 parts of the Empire afforded conclusive proof of 
 the universal decadence of clan authority. If 
 in the course of the period under review we come 
 across instances of feudal chiefs who had some 
 share of power and influence, these were excep- 
 tions to the general rule ; and the authority they 
 wielded was brought to bear rather on the affairs 
 of the state, than in the administration of their 
 own territories. 
 
 Under circumstances such as these little opposi- 
 tion was to be looked for on the part of the daimios. 
 Brought up in traditions of seclusion analogous 
 to those which characterized the tenure of the 
 throne and the Shogunate, denied by custom all 
 share in the management of clan affairs, the 
 daimios had no reason to object to the abolition 
 of feudalism. It involved no sacrifice on their 
 part. Their material interests remained unaffected, 
 and there was no authority to be relinquished, save 
 in name. As a matter of state policy it was beyond 
 their control. Personally the change meant for 
 those who could appreciate it a release from irk- 
 some conditions of existence, and a wider scope 
 for the exercise of individual energies, of which, 
 
214 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 in a few cases, brilliant use was made. Picturesque 
 and dramatic as the incident of the surrender by 
 the daimios of their fiefs may appear to the casual 
 observer, a study of the facts reveals the simple 
 truth that throughout all the negotiations for the 
 surrender of their fiefs the feudal nobility counted 
 for nothing, and were as a class only dimly 
 conscious, if aware at all, of the importance of 
 what was going on. 
 
 When the endeavour is made to explain the 
 feelings with which the samurai class generally 
 regarded the great change introduced, a more diffi- 
 cult task is encountered. It is only natural that 
 they should view with great reluctance the abolition 
 of a system centuries old under which they occupied 
 a position of superiority in the social order, and 
 its replacement by a new state of things which 
 to them promised nothing. Moreover, shortly 
 before the Restoration, the Tokugawa Government 
 had been compelled, for reasons of economy, to 
 reduce the establishments of several of the hata- 
 moto, and the disbandment of many hundreds of 
 samurai, which was the effect of this measure, must 
 have served as an object-lesson to the samurai 
 of each fief, intimating possibilities which might 
 occur nearer home. There is probably no little 
 truth in Captain Brinkley's suggestion that the lead 
 given by the four Western clans was in harmony 
 with the spirit of the Restoration, and with the 
 self-sacrificing ideals in which the samurai had 
 been trained. But there is more to be said. A 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 215 
 
 wave of Imperialism had swept over the nation, 
 of which the reforming statesmen took full 
 advantage, and it must also be remembered that 
 in spite of the effete character of clan administra- 
 tion there was everywhere a strong under-current 
 of feudal loyalty, which showed itself in a spirit 
 of implicit obedience to the decision of the feudal 
 lord, no matter through what channel it might be 
 conveyed, and survived years after the disappear- 
 ance of the clans. Discontent, too, was rampant, 
 induced by the impoverished condition of the 
 samurai, and of the daimios on whom they depended 
 for support. Then again, the spirit of change 
 was abroad, and with it came an attraction for 
 novelty, not unnatural in a nation shut off for 
 so long from free contact with the outside world, 
 which was stimulated by the study of Western 
 literature, and an acquaintance with Western 
 things gained through intercourse with foreigners. 
 And there was the influence of the reformers, the 
 leaders of public opinion, whose efforts to convince 
 their countrymen of the necessity of great changes 
 in the body politic never slackened till the work 
 of reform was placed on a solid basis. From these 
 men, the first to be affected by the impulse of 
 the new imperialist tendencies, the first to be 
 moved by the feeling of national exaltation 
 common to times of great popular commotion, 
 came the inspiration which guided the nation in 
 this critical hour of its fortunes. Swept along 
 by the movement of reform they had done so much 
 
216 THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 
 
 to initiate, it was not given to them to see very 
 far ahead, but they must have seen through the 
 hollow artificiality of administration, whether of 
 Shogunate or clan, and recognized the sacrifice 
 of substance to shadow so frequently condemned 
 in the memorials and other writings of the time. 
 Moreover, defective as their knowledge of Western 
 countries might be, some at least knew enough to 
 understand that feudalism was a stage of evolution 
 through which most European countries had passed, 
 and it is not assuming too much to suppose that in 
 their eagerness to imitate the progress of other lands 
 they very soon came to realize that the abolition 
 of the dual system must entail the abolition of 
 clan government, and that the continuance of 
 feudalism, no less than that of the Shogunate, 
 was incompatible with the new extension given to 
 foreign relations. 
 
 Finally there was the question of finance. As 
 has been pointed out by more than one writer, 
 the financial embarrassments of the Shogunate 
 had been one of the contributing causes of its 
 downfall. Although the Crown had succeeded to 
 the Shogunate' s revenues, these were manifestly 
 insufficient to meet the increasing needs of the 
 national exchequer, — more especially in view of 
 the heavy expenditure entailed by the reorganiza- 
 tion of the Government, and the various new calls 
 on state revenue arising out of the development 
 of foreign intercourse. Of this the leaders of the 
 reform movement must have been fully aware. 
 
THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 217 
 
 In these considerations, to which may perhaps be 
 added the influence of personal ambitions, may 
 be found the key to the solution of the problem. 
 
 The Restoration had brought Japan to the 
 parting of the ways. Thanks to the genius of her 
 statesmen the decision to advance was carried 
 out with no uncertain footsteps. With the abolition 
 of feudalism the last strands which bound her to 
 an antiquated, past were severed, and the history 
 of modern Japan begins. In great national 
 changes the operation of two different agencies — 
 revolution within, and pressure from outside — may 
 often be traced. It was so in the case of Japan. 
 Otherwise the success attending the efforts of the 
 reformers would have been less conspicuous. On 
 the one hand the presence of foreign troops, 
 stationed in the country since 1864, and the fear 
 of sharing China's fate ; on the other the con- 
 viction of the urgent need of something to take 
 the place of the worn-out fabric of administration 
 — these two together constituted the driving 
 power which urged Japan forward. Henceforth 
 it was in a fresh spirit of unity that the nation 
 prepared itself to meet the difficulties of the future 
 which lay before it. This future was not without 
 its checks and relapses, but the new instinct of 
 co-operation, always latent in the people, prevailed, 
 until in the end a higher form of patriotism, better 
 suited to the needs of the country, was evolved 
 than that represented by clan loyalty. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 In the preceding pages the progress of Japan 
 has been traced during eighteen eventful years. 
 The period opened with the reversal at foreign 
 instance of the policy of seclusion. It was dis- 
 tinguished throughout by sustained resentment 
 of foreign intrusion, by the conflict of opposing 
 factions, and by the gradual shifting of power from 
 Yedo to Kioto. And when it ended, both Shogunate 
 and feudalism had vanished. Two things were in 
 doubt during the greater part of that period, the 
 survival of the Shogunate, and the permanence of 
 the newly-established foreign intercourse. There 
 was a close connexion between the two. Not only 
 did the Shogunate from the first favour the con- 
 clusion of treaties, thus identifying itself with the 
 cause of the intruding foreigner, but the anti-foreign 
 party had deliberately joined in one programme 
 the two cries of ' honour the sovereign ' and c drive 
 away the barbarian '. It seemed, therefore, certain 
 that if the anti-Shogunate party gained the day, 
 the triumph of their cause would mean the ex- 
 pulsion of the foreigner. But this is just what 
 did not happen. The Court party triumphed, 
 and the Shogunate came to an end, but foreign 
 intercourse, instead of sharing its fate, was recog- 
 

 CONCLUSION 219 
 
 nized as essential to the country, and received the 
 formal sanction of the Throne. 
 
 Notwithstanding a general vagueness of agree- 
 ment amongst Japanese writers as to the general 
 trend of affairs at the time of the Restoration, 
 there is some divergence of opinion in regard to 
 the causes which brought it about. On the one 
 hand it is suggested that the existence of the dual 
 form of government was incompatible with the 
 changed conditions which followed upon the 
 establishment of foreign intercourse on the new 
 basis ; that the Shogun, while a subject of the 
 Emperor, was claiming a position of equality 
 with the sovereigns of other countries, which was 
 clearly improper ; and that when once foreign 
 Governments had understood the real state of 
 the case, the continuance of the Shogunate was 
 impossible. It is also contended that the raising 
 of the question of the Shogun' s real position in 
 Japan caused confusion in the country, produced 
 a conflict of authority between the Court and the 
 Shogunate, and created doubts as to the quarter 
 where homage was due. 
 
 The other view is that there was no essential 
 incompatibility between the dual form of govern- 
 ment and the new foreign intercourse, and that 
 the Restoration was the result of many causes, 
 amongst which the complications arising out of 
 the conclusion of foreign treaties had but a 
 secondary place. 
 
 There is truth in both views. It is possible to 
 
220 CONCLUSION 
 
 argue that the dual form of government was one 
 to which the nation had become thoroughly 
 accustomed, imperial princes having at one period 
 been Shoguns for nearly a century ; that it was 
 not the first time, either as regards foreigners, or 
 Japanese, that the question of the Shogun's position 
 had been raised ; that the change back to direct 
 imperial rule was a leap in the dark ; and that had 
 the Shogunate retained its influence undiminished, 
 there would have been no discord between Kioto 
 and Yedo, no conflict of authority, and no need 
 for the Shogun's resignation. But there is no 
 getting away from the fact that the new foreign 
 relations were hardly in keeping with the existence 
 of a phantom court at the old capital ; that the 
 changed conditions which were the result of the 
 opening of the country introduced new and per- 
 plexing problems ; and that it was not possible 
 for the nation to adjust itself to these new 
 conditions without a degree of friction which 
 would probably have been fatal to the continuance 
 of dual government. This is admitted in the 
 Shogun's manifesto itself, and in the official explana- 
 tion of his resignation given by his Ministers. 
 
 Nor, on the other hand, is it likely that the 
 Shogunate would have survived very long, even 
 if the country had not been opened. The view 
 that it carried within itself the seeds of its dissolu- 
 tion seems well-founded. Economic causes were 
 operating everywhere, in the territories ruled 
 directly from Yedo, as well as in those of the self- 
 
CONCLUSION 221 
 
 governing clans, to the detriment of the two 
 classes, the samurai and the farmer, which formed 
 the backbone of the feudal system. The increase 
 of population, in spite of famine and other adverse 
 causes, without a corresponding growth of the 
 national resources ; the presence of a large un- 
 productive class which became an ever-increasing 
 burden to the country ; over-production of rice to 
 the exclusion of other uses of the land, uncertain and 
 unjust taxation ; defective communications, and 
 careless management of state and clan revenues, 
 had created widespread poverty amongst the 
 military class and the farmers. And this general 
 distress resulted in a gradual fusion of classes, 
 leading to the loosening of feudal ties, and clan 
 disorganization. With progress and expansion 
 of all kinds hindered by the narrow spirit and 
 routine of feudalism, with commercial and maritime 
 enterprise rendered alike impossible by the closure 
 of the country, it w r ould have been strange indeed 
 if the Shogunate, itself the central government, 
 and, at the same time, a part of the system it 
 controlled, had not shown symptoms of weakness 
 before ever foreigners came ; and stranger still, 
 perhaps, if this weakness had not been increased by 
 the complications which arose out of their coming. 
 A failing cause is naturally at a disadvantage, 
 inasmuch as attention is concentrated on its 
 shortcomings. This was notably the case in the 
 closing days of the Tokugawa administration. 
 Its services to the country in the past in rescuing 
 
222 CONCLUSION 
 
 it from a condition of anarchy, and establishing 
 the period of order and tranquillity known as The 
 Great Peace, were forgotten, and its many excel- 
 lences were lost sight of in the high tension of 
 public feeling and the popular clamour which 
 ushered in the Restoration. But its claims to the 
 nation's gratitude for the encouragement given 
 to education, to literature, and to art are now 
 generally recognized, and have recently received 
 special acknowledgement from one of Japan's 
 most prominent statesmen in an educational work 
 written for the youth of the nation. 1 
 
 In thinking of Japan's long seclusion from the 
 world one is apt to dwell only on one side of it, 
 the shutting out of foreigners, and to overlook, 
 what for Japan was the more important side, the 
 confinement of the Japanese people to their own 
 shores. In the one direction the seclusion was 
 never, as we know, complete, for through the 
 Dutch, if not the Chinese, the Japanese Govern- 
 ment were kept informed of important events in 
 Europe and elsewhere. They knew in this way 
 of Perry's mission long before he arrived, and news 
 of what was passing in China reached them 
 through the same channels. But in the other 
 direction the isolation was absolute. Their know- 
 ledge of the outside world was acquired only 
 at second hand, it was influenced by the personal 
 equation of the medium through which it came, 
 
 1 The Kokumin Tokuhon (' National Reader '), by Count Okunia, 
 1910. 
 
CONCLUSION 223 
 
 and it was limited to official circles. This explains 
 why the nation as a whole, up to the time at least 
 of the Kagoshima and Shimonoseki hostilities, 
 displayed such ignorance of the power of Western 
 countries. It also accounts for the vivid im- 
 pression produced on the minds of Japanese, when 
 they did go abroad, by what they saw, for the 
 enthusiasm of the reformers, and for the haste 
 with which reforms were adopted. 
 
 A question which must occur to most readers of 
 Japanese history is, how it was possible for a people 
 which had already given proofs of unusual vitality 
 and enterprise to submit to being penned up within 
 its own shores by the edict of 1636. No explanation 
 seems quite satisfactory. It is possible that the 
 invasion of Corea, still fresh in the memories of 
 the people, may, by its exhaustion of national 
 energies, have taken the edge off the spirit of 
 enterprise which existed before. There is also 
 reason to think that the severity of the laws, to 
 which attention has been called in the opening 
 
 » chapter, the fact that trade was largely a Govern- 
 ment monopoly, the antagonism provoked by 
 religious strife, and the example of China's rigid 
 conservatism, may to some extent explain the 
 phenomenal acquiescence of a high-spirited people 
 in a situation so abnormal, and altogether without 
 precedent. Be this as it may, the effects of the 
 long-continued policy of isolation were visible 
 long after the country was opened. Neither the 
 Government which had imposed the restrictions, 
 
224 CONCLUSION 
 
 nor the people which had submitted to them, 
 were able readily to free themselves from the 
 prejudice which attached to the free intercourse 
 of Japanese with other nations, and a faint echo 
 of the trammels of the past exists to this day. 
 
 And when we speak of the opening of Japan we 
 must remember how small a fraction of the 
 country it was after all to which foreigners were 
 admitted by the earlier treaties. During the first 
 twenty years of foreign intercourse foreign ships 
 were permitted to visit only four places scattered 
 at wide intervals along Japan's extensive seaboard. 
 Foreign trade and residence were limited to these, 
 and to two towns, Tokio and Osaka, from which 
 foreign ships were excluded. One other port was 
 opened subsequently without appreciable result, 
 and of the four ports first opened commerce only 
 really throve at two. At the places opened 
 foreigners were restricted as regards trade and 
 residence to the boundaries of the settlements, 
 with the privilege of making excursions within 
 an area of a few miles known as treaty limits. 
 Some twenty years after the first treaty was 
 signed the introduction of a passport system gave 
 foreigners some liberty of travel in the interior, 
 and although this system was extended somewhat 
 in later years, it was not until after the operation 
 of the revised treaties in 1899 that the real opening 
 of the country can be said to have taken place. 
 
 We take leave of Japan at an interesting stage 
 in her development. The old order of things had 
 
CONCLUSION 225 
 
 crumbled away, and out of the wreck of the Sho- 
 gunate and feudal system she was piecing together 
 with not a little trouble a new kind of administra- 
 tion. The form of this new government was 
 borrowed, as we have seen, from an ancient model. 
 And it was the same with the principle it repre- 
 sented, that of direct imperial rule. But here the 
 resemblance ended. Japan had entered on a new 
 departure. She was moving in the direction of 
 reform on Western lines. For China as pattern 
 was now substituted the West, and in this breaking 
 with tradition and precedent lay not the least 
 of her difficulties. In the long and laborious work 
 of reform, upon which she now embarked, she was 
 helped by two things ; the large stock of national 
 energy stored up during her long seclusion from 
 the world, and the knowledge and advice of the 
 foreigner, against whose admission to intercourse 
 on a footing of equality she had rebelled as a 
 violation of the country's ancient laws. 
 
 1247 
 

 
APPENDIXES 1 
 
 APPENDIX 1 
 
 American Treaty, March, 1854 
 
 Signed at Kanagawa, March 3lst, 1854. Ratified by the 
 President of the United States, July, 1854. Ratifications 
 exchanged at Simoda, February 21st, 1855. 
 
 The United States of America and the Empire of Japan, 
 desiring to establish firm, lasting, and sincere friendship 
 between the two nations, have resolved to fix, in a manner 
 clear and positive, by means of a treaty or general con- 
 vention of peace and amity, the rules which shall in future 
 be mutually observed in the intercourse of their respective 
 countries ; for which most desirable object the President 
 of the United States has conferred full powers on his 
 commissioner, Matthew Calbraith Perry, special embas- 
 sador of the United States to Japan, and the August 
 Sovereign of Japan has given similar full powers to his 
 commissioners, Hayashi, Dai-gaku-no-kami, Ido, prince of 
 Tsussima, Izawa, prince of Mimasaka, and Udono, member 
 of the Board of Revenue. And the said commissioners, 
 after having exchanged their said full powers and duly con- 
 sidered the premises, have agreed to the following Articles: — 
 
 I. There shall be a perfect, permanent and universal 
 peace, and a sincere and cordial amity between the United 
 States of America on the one part, and the empire of 
 Japan on the other part, and between their people 
 respectively, without exception of persons or places. 
 
 II. The port of Simoda in the principality of Idzu, and 
 the port of Hakodade 2 in the principality of Matsmai, are 
 granted by the Japanese as ports for the reception of 
 American ships, where they can be supplied with wood, 
 
 1 The translations of all documents, not treaties, which appear as 
 appendixes, are, except where otherwise stated, the author's. 
 a Hakodate. 
 
 P2 
 
228 AMERICAN TREATY, MARCH, 1854 
 
 water, provisions, and coal, and other articles their 
 necessities may require, as far as the Japanese have them. 
 The time for opening the first named port is immediately 
 on signing this treaty ; the last named port is to be 
 opened immediately after the same day in the ensuing 
 Japanese year. 
 
 [Note. — A tariff of prices shall be given by the Japanese 
 officers of the things which they can furnish, payment for 
 which shall be made in gold and silver coin.] 
 
 III. Whenever ships of the United States are thrown on 
 the coast of Japan, the Japanese vessels will assist them, 
 and carry their crews to Simoda or Hakodade, and hand 
 them over to their countrymen appointed to receive them ; 
 whatever articles the shipwrecked men may have pre- 
 served shall likewise be restored, and the expenses incurred 
 in the rescue and support of Americans and Japanese who 
 may thus be thrown upon the shores of either nation are 
 not to be refunded. 
 
 IV. Those shipwrecked persons and other citizens of the 
 United States shall be free as in other countries, and not sub- 
 jected to confinement, but shall be amenable to just laws. 
 
 V. Shipwrecked men and other citizens of the United 
 States, temporarily living at Simoda and Hakodade, 1 shall 
 not be subject to such restrictions and confinement as the 
 Dutch and Chinese are at Nagasaki, but shall be free at 
 Simoda to go where they please within the limits of seven 
 Japanese miles (or ri) from a small island in the harbour 
 of Simoda, marked on the accompanying chart hereto 
 appended ; and shall in like manner be free to go where 
 they please at Hakodade, within limits to be defined after 
 the visit of the United States squadron to that place. 
 
 VI. If there be any other sort of goods wanted, or any 
 business which shall require to be arranged, there shall be 
 careful deliberation between the parties in order to settle 
 such matters. 
 
 VII. It is agreed that ships of the United States resort- 
 
 1 Hakodate. 
 
AMERICAN TREATY, MARCH, 1854 229 
 
 ing to the ports open to them shall be permitted to ex- 
 change gold and silver coin and articles of goods for other 
 articles of goods, under such regulations as shall be 
 temporarily established by the Japanese government for 
 that purpose. It is stipulated, however, that the ships 
 of the United States shall be permitted to carry away 
 whatever articles they are unwilling to exchange. 
 
 VIII. Wood, water, provisions, coal, and goods required, 
 shall only be procured through the agency of Japanese 
 officers appointed for that purpose, and in no other 
 manner. 
 
 IX. It is agreed, that if at any future day the govern- 
 ment of Japan shall grant to any other nation or nations 
 privileges and advantages which are not herein granted to 
 the United States and the citizens thereof, that these 
 same privileges and advantages shall be granted likewise 
 to the United States and to the citizens thereof, without 
 any consultation or delay. 
 
 X. Ships of the United States shall be permitted to 
 resort to no other ports in Japan but Shimoda and 
 Hakodade, unless in distress or forced by stress of 
 weather. 
 
 XI. There shall be appointed by the government of the 
 United States consuls or agents to reside in Simoda, at 
 any time after the expiration of eighteen months from the 
 date of the signing of this treaty : provided that either of 
 the two governments deem such arrangement necessary. 
 
 XII. The present convention having been concluded 
 and duly signed, shall be obligatory and faithfully ob- 
 served by the United States of America and Japan, and 
 by the citizens and subjects of each respective power ; and 
 it is to be ratified and approved by the President of the 
 United States, by and with the advice and consent of the 
 Senate thereof, and by the August Sovereign of Japan, 
 and the ratifications shall be exchanged within eighteen 
 months from the date of the signature thereof, or sooner 
 if practicable. 
 
230 AMERICAN TREATY, MARCH, 1854 
 
 In faith whereof, we, respective plenipotentiaries of the 
 United States of America and the Empire of Japan afore- 
 said, have signed and sealed these presents. 
 
 Done at Kanagawa this thirty-first day of March, in 
 the year of our Lord Jesus Christ one thousand eight 
 hundred and fifty-four, and of Kayei, the seventh year, 
 third month, and third day. 
 
 (L.S.) M. C. PERRY. 1 
 
 APPENDIX 2 
 American Treaty, Additional Regulations 
 
 Agreed upon at Shimoda in September, 1854. 
 
 Article I. The imperial governors of Simoda will place 
 watch-stations wherever they deem best, to designate the 
 limits of their jurisdiction ; but Americans are at liberty to 
 go through them, unrestricted, within the limits of seven 
 Japanese n, or miles (equal to sixteen English miles), and 
 those who are found transgressing Japanese laws may be 
 apprehended by the police and taken on board their ships. 
 
 Article II. Three landing-places shall be constructed 
 for the boats of merchant ships and whale ships resorting to 
 this port ; one at Simoda, one at Kakizaki, and the third at 
 the brook lying south-east of Centre Island. The citizens 
 of the United States will, of course, treat the Japanese 
 officers with proper respect. 
 
 Article III. Americans, when on shore, are not allowed 
 access to military establishments, or private houses, with- 
 out leave ; but they can enter shops and visit temples as 
 they please. 
 
 Article IV. Two temples, the Rioshen at Simoda, and 
 the Yokushen at Kakizaki, are assigned as resting-places 
 for persons in their walks, until public houses and inns are 
 erected for their convenience. 
 
 Article V. Near the Temple Yokushen, at Kakizaki, 
 
 1 The signatures of the Japanese Plenipotentiaries were appended to 
 the Japanese text. 
 
ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS 231 
 
 a burial-ground has been set apart for Americans, where 
 their graves and tombs shall not be molested. 
 
 Article VI. It is stipulated in the treaty of Kanagawa, 
 that coal will be furnished at Hakodade * ; but as it is very 
 difficult for the Japanese to supply it at that port, 
 Commodore Perry promises to mention this to his govern- 
 ment, in order that the Japanese government may be 
 relieved from the obligation of making that port a coal 
 depot. 
 
 Article VII. It is agreed that henceforth the Chinese 
 language shall not be employed in official communications 
 between the two governments, except when there is no 
 Dutch interpreter. 
 
 Article VIII. A harbour-master and three skilful pilots 
 have been appointed for the port of Simoda. 
 
 Article IX. Whenever goods are selected in the shops, 
 they shall be marked with the name of the purchaser and 
 the price agreed upon, and then be sent to the Goyoshi, 2 
 or government office, where the money is to be paid to 
 Japanese officers, and the articles delivered by them. 
 
 Article X. The shooting of birds and animals is 
 generally forbidden in Japan, and this law is therefore to 
 be observed by all Americans. 
 
 Article XI. It is hereby agreed that five Japanese ri, 
 or miles, be the limit allowed to Americans at Hakodade, 
 and the requirements contained in Article I of these regula- 
 tions are hereby made also applicable to that port within 
 that distance. 
 
 Article XII. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan is 
 at liberty to appoint whoever he pleases to receive the 
 ratification of the treaty of Kanagawa, and give an 
 acknowledgment on his part. 
 
 It is agreed that nothing herein contained shall in any 
 way affect or modify the stipulations of the treaty of 
 Kanagawa, should that be found to be contrary to these 
 regulations. 
 
 1 Hakodate. a Goyosho. 
 
232 BRITISH CONVENTION, 
 
 APPENDIX 3 
 
 British Convention, October, 1854. 
 
 Signed at Nagasaki, October 14th, 1854. Ratified by Her 
 Britannic Majesty, January 23rd, 1855. Ratifications 
 exchanged at Nagasaki, October 9th, 1855. 
 
 It is agreed between Sir James Stirling, Knight, Rear- 
 Admiral and Commander-in-chief of the ships and vessels 
 of Her Britannic Majesty in the East Indies and seas 
 adjacent, and Mizu-no 1 Chikugo-no Kami, Obugio 2 of 
 Nagasaki, and Nagai Iwa-no jio, 3 Ometske 4 of Nagasaki, 
 ordered by His Imperial Highness the Emperor of Japan 
 to act herein ; that — 
 
 I. The ports of Nagasaki (Hizen) and Hakodate 
 (Matsmai) shall be open to British ships for the purposes 
 of effecting repairs, and obtaining fresh water, provisions, 
 and other supplies of any sort they may absolutely want 
 for the use of the ships. 
 
 II. Nagasaki shall be open for the purposes aforesaid 
 from and after the present date ; and Hakodate from and 
 after the end of fifty days from the Admiral's departure 
 from this port. The rules and regulations of each of 
 these ports are to be complied with. 
 
 III. Only ships in distress from weather or unmanage- 
 able will be permitted to enter other ports than those 
 specified in the foregoing Articles, without permission 
 from the Imperial Government. 
 
 IV. British ships in Japanese ports shall conform to the 
 laws of Japan,, If high officers or commanders of ships shall 
 break any such laws, it will lead to the ports being closed. 
 Should inferior persons break them, they are to be delivered 
 over to the Commanders of their ships for punishment. 
 
 V. In the ports of Japan either now open, or which 
 
 1 Mizuno. 2 Bugio. 3 Iwa-no-jo. 
 
 4 Metsuke. (This official was not an OmetsuM, the o in the word 
 being simply an honorific prefix. ) 
 
OCTOBER, 1854 233 
 
 may hereafter be opened, to the ships or subjects of 
 any foreign nation, British ships and subjects shall 
 be entitled to admission and to the enjoyment of an 
 equality of advantages with those of the most favoured 
 nation, always excepting the advantages accruing to the 
 Dutch and Chinese from their existing relations with Japan. 
 
 VI. This Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifica- 
 tions shall be exchanged at Nagasaki on behalf of Her 
 Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, and on behalf of His 
 Highness the Emperor of Japan, within twelve months 
 from the present date. 
 
 VII. When this Convention shall be ratified, no high 
 officer coming to Japan shall alter it. 
 
 In witness whereof we have signed the same, and have 
 affixed our seals thereunto, at Nagasaki, this fourteenth 
 day of October, 1854. 
 
 (L.S.) JS. STIRLING. 1 
 
 APPENDIX 4 
 
 Exposition of the Articles of the Convention of 
 Nagasaki of the 14th October, 1854 
 
 Agreed to on the 18th October, 1855, by Their Excellencies 
 the Rear Admiral Commanding in Chief and the Japanese 
 Commissioners . 
 
 The first Article of the Convention opens the ports of 
 Nagasaki and Hakodade 2 to British ships for repairs and 
 supplies. It opens the whole and every part of those 
 ports ; but ships must be guided in anchoring by the 
 directions of the local government. Safe and convenient 
 places will be assigned where ships may be repaired. 
 Workmen, materials, and supplies will be provided by 
 the local government according to a tariff to be agreed 
 upon, by which also the modes of payment will be regu- 
 
 1 The signatures of the Japanese Plenipotentiaries were appended to 
 the Japanese text. a Hakodate. 
 
234 BRITISH CONVENTION, 
 
 lated. All official communications will hereafter, when 
 Japanese shall have time to learn English, be made in 
 that language. A British burial-ground shall be set apart 
 on Medsume Sima, fenced in by a stone wall, and properly 
 protected. 
 
 The second Article provides that, at each of the ports 
 of Nagasaki and Hakodade l the Port Regulations shall be 
 obeyed ; but the Japanese Government will take care 
 that they shall not be of a nature to create embarrassment, 
 nor to contradict in any other way the general tenour and 
 intent of the Treaty, the main object of which is to promote 
 a friendly intercourse between Great Britain and Japan. 
 
 The third Article declares that only ships in distress 
 from weather, or unmanageable, shall enter other parts 
 than Nagasaki and Hakodade 1 without permission from 
 the Imperial Government ; but ships of war have a general 
 right to enter the ports of friendly Powers in the unavoid- 
 able performance of public duties, which right can neither 
 be waived nor restricted ; but Her Majesty's ships will not 
 enter any other than open ports without necessity, or 
 without offering proper explanations to the Imperial 
 authorities. 
 
 The fourth Article provides that British ships and 
 subjects in Japanese ports shall conform to the laws of 
 Japan ; and that if any subordinate British subjects 
 commit offences against the laws, they shall be handed over 
 to their own officers for punishment ; and that if high 
 officers or commanders of ships shall break the laws, it will 
 lead to the closing of the ports specified. All this is as it 
 should be ; but it is not intended by this Article that any 
 acts of individuals, whether high or low, previously 
 unauthorized or subsequently disapproved of by Her 
 Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, can set aside the 
 Convention entered into with Her Majesty alone by His 
 Imperial Highness the Emperor of Japan. 
 
 The fifth Article secures in the fullest sense to British 
 
 1 Hakodate. 
 

 OCTOBER, 1854 235 
 
 ships and subjects in every part of Japan, either now open 
 or hereafter to be opened, an equality in point of advan- 
 tage and accommodation with the ships and subjects or 
 citizens of any other foreign nation, excepting any peculiar 
 privilege hitherto conceded to the Dutch and Chinese in 
 the port of Nagasaki. If, therefore, any other nation or 
 people be now or hereafter permitted to enter other ports 
 than Nagasaki and Hakodadi, 1 or to appoint Consuls, or 
 to open trade, or to enjoy any advantage or privilege 
 whatever, British ships and subjects shall, as of right, 
 enter upon the enjoyment of the same. 
 
 APPENDIX 5 
 
 Traite de Commerce, de Navigation, et de Delimita- 
 tion, ENTRE LA KUSSIE ET LE JAPON 
 
 Signe a Simoda,, le . „, . — - 1855. [Ratifications echangees 
 a Simoda, le om/ ^ re> 1856.] 
 
 Les Plenipotentiaires de Sa Majeste PEmpereur de 
 Toutes les Russies, l'Aide-de-Camp-General Vice-Amiral 
 Eupheme Pout ia tine ; et de Sa Majeste le Grand Souverain 
 du Japon, Tsoutsoui-Khizenno-Kami 2 et Kavadzi-Saie- 
 monno-Dzio, 3 ontarreteet conclu, dans la ville de Simoda, 
 le 26 Janvier, 1855 (ou le 21 e jour du 12 6me mois de la 
 premiere annee Ansey), un Traite et des Articles explicatifs 
 qui contiennent ce qui suit : 
 
 Voulant assurer la paix et l'amitie entre la Russie et le 
 Japon, et les consolider par un Traite, Sa Majeste FEmpe- 
 reur de Toutes les Russies a nomme pour son Plenipoten- 
 tiaire son Aide-de-camp et Vice-Amiral Eupheme Poutia- 
 tine, et Sa Majeste le Grand Souverain du Japon a nomme 
 de son cote pour ses Plenipotentiaires ses illustres sujets 
 Tsoutsoui-Khizenno-Kami et Kavadzi-Saiemonno-Dzio. 
 
 1 Hakodate. a Tsutsui Hizen no Kami. 3 Kawaji Sayemon-no-jo. 
 
236 RUSSIA AND JAPAN, 1855-7 j 
 
 LesquelsPlenipotentiaires ontarrete les Articles suivants : 
 Art. I. II y aura a l'avenir paix et amitie sincere entre 
 la Russie et le Japon. Les Russes et les Japonais jouiront 
 dans les possessions des deux Etats de toute protection 
 et assistance, tant pour leur surete personnelle que par 
 rapport a l'inviolabilite de leurs proprietes. 
 
 II. La frontiere entre la Russie et le Japon passera 
 desormais entre les iles Itouroup et Ouroup . L'ile Itouroup 
 appartient tout entiere au Japon, et l'ile Ouroup, ainsi que 
 les autres iles Kouriles situees au nord de cette ile, appar- 
 tiennent a la Russie. Quant a l'ile Krafto (Sakhaline ou 
 Saghalien), elle reste, comme par le passe, indivise entre 
 la Russie et le Japon. 
 
 III. Le Gouvernement du Japon ouvre 3 ports aux 
 na vires russes, savoir : Simoda, dans la Principaute de 
 Idzou ; Hakodadi, dans la Province de Hakodadi ; et 
 Nagasaki, dans la Principaute de Khisen. Dans ces 
 3 ports, les navires russes pourront reparer leurs avaries, 
 s 'appro visionner d'eau, de bois de chaufTage, d'aliments et 
 autres objets necessaires, de charbon de terre meme, la ou 
 il s'en trouverait ; ils paieront tous ces objets en monnaie 
 d'or ou d'argent, ou a defaut d'especes, en marchandises 
 de leur chargement. 
 
 A l'exception desdits ports, les navires russes ne visite- 
 ront aucun autre port, sauf les cas de necessite absolue, 
 lorsqu'ils seront dans l'impossibilite de continuer leur 
 route. Les depenses faites dans ce cas seront remboursees 
 dans un des ports ou verts aux navires. 
 
 IV. Toute assistance sera pretee dans les deux Etats 
 aux navires naufrages et a leurs equipages ; ces derniers 
 seront expedies dans un des ports ouverts ; pendant toute 
 la duree de leur sejour sur le territoire etranger, ils jouiront 
 de la liberte en se soumettant aux lois equitables du 
 pays. 
 
 V. Les Russes ont la f aculte de faire dans les deux pre- 
 miers des ports ouverts (Simoda et Hakodadi) l'echange 
 des marchandises, objets et monnaies qu'ils auront 
 
RUSSIA AND JAPAN, 1855-7 237 
 
 apportes, contre les marchandises et les objets qu'ils 
 desireraient acquerir. 
 
 VI. Le Gouvernement russe nommera, lorsqu'il le 
 jugera necessaire, un Consul dans l'un des deux premiers 
 ports susnommes. 
 
 VII. Chaque fois qu'une question ou une affaire quel- 
 conque aura ete jugee ou decidee, elle le sera scrupuleuse- 
 ment par le Gouvernement du Japon. 
 
 VIII. Tout Russe au Japon, et tout Japonais en Russie, 
 jouira toujours d'une liberte complete et ne sera soumis 
 a aucune vexation. Tout individu qui aurait commis un 
 crime peut etre arrete, mais il ne peut etre juge que selon 
 les lois de son pays. 
 
 IX. En consideration du voisinage des deux Etats, les 
 sujets russes participeront de plein droit a tous les droits 
 et privileges que le Gouvernement du Japon a deja 
 accordes ou accordera par la suite aux sujets des autres 
 nations. 
 
 Le present Traite sera ratifie par Sa Majeste l'Empereur 
 de Toutes les Russies et par Sa Majeste le Grand Souverain 
 du Japon, ou par leurs Plenipotentiaires, ainsi que cela est 
 mentionne dans les Articles Separes annexes au present 
 Traite, et les ratifications en seront ecliangees a Simoda 
 dans un delai de 10 mois au moins ou a toute autre epoque 
 favorable. 
 
 Presentement, on echangera des copies du Traite, reve- 
 nues des signatures et des sceaux des Plenipotentiaires 
 des deux Puissances ; les dispositions du Traite entre- 
 ront en vigueur des le jour de sa signature et seront 
 fidelement et inviolablement observees par les Parties 
 Contractantes. 
 
 Fait et signe a Simoda le 26 Janvier, 1855, ou le 2' 
 jour du I2" m0 mois de la premiere annee Ansey. 
 
 (L.S.) C. E. POUTIATINE. 
 
 (L.S.) TSOUTSOUI-KHIZENNO-KAMI. 
 
 (L.S.) KAVADZI-SAIEMONNO-DZIO. 
 
 me 
 
 
238 RUSSIA AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 APPENDIX 6 
 
 Articles explicatifs du Traite, cokfirmes par les 
 Plenipotentiaires russes et japonais 
 
 Ad. Art. Ill (a). Dans les deux premiers ports designes 
 dans le Traite, les Russes pourront librement circuler dans 
 la ville de Simoda et ses environs dans un rayon de 7 milles 
 japonais, en partant de File Inoubassiri ; a Hakodadi 1 
 dans un rayon de 5 lieues japonaises. II leur est permis 
 de visiter les boutiques, les temples, et de se reposer dans 
 les maisons provisoirement designees a cet effet en atten- 
 dant la construction d'auberges speciales ; ils n'entreront 
 dans les maisons des particuliers que lorsqu'ils y auront 
 ete invites. A Nagasaki ils se conformeront a ce qui sera 
 statue par la suite pour les autres nations. 
 
 (b) Pour la sepulture des morts, il sera reserve dans 
 chacun des ports un terrain special, qui sera inviolable- 
 ment protege. 
 
 Ad. Art. V. L'expedition des marchandises se fera dans 
 un batiment designe a cet effet pour le Gouvernement ; 
 les marchandises et la monnaie d'or et d 'argent apportees 
 par les Russes y seront deposees. Les Russes, apres, avoir 
 choisi dans les boutiques les marchandises et objets qui 
 leur conviennent et etre convenus de leur prix avec les 
 vendeurs, effectueront le paiement ou l'echange des 
 marchandises dans ledit entrepot par l'entremise des 
 employes japonais. 
 
 Ad. Art. VI (a). Les Consuls russes seront nommes 
 des l'annee 1856. 
 
 (b) Les edifices et le terrain necessaires pour l'installation 
 du Consulat seront designes par le Gouvernement du Japon. 
 Les Russes y demeureront d 'apres leurs lois et coutumes. 
 
 Ad. Art. IX. Les droits et privileges qui seront re- 
 connus aux autres nations, quelle que soit d'ailleurs leur 
 nature, s'etendront par ce fait meme sur les sujets russes, 
 
 1 Hakodate. 
 
RUSSIA AND JAPAN, 1855-7 239 
 
 ainsi qu'il est dit dans l'Article IX, sans qu'on ait besoin 
 de recourir a de nouvelles negociations. 
 
 Les presents Articles explicates ont la meme force que 
 le Traite et sont egalement obligatoires pour les deux 
 Parties Contractantes. En foi de quoi ils ont ete signes 
 par les Plenipotentiaries des deux Puissances, et revetus 
 de leurs sceaux. 
 
 (L.S.) C. E. POUTIATINE. 
 
 (L.S.) TSOUTSOUI-KHIZENNO-KAMI. 1 
 
 (L.S.) KAVADZI-SAIEMONNO-DZIO. 2 
 
 APPENDIX 7 
 
 Supplementary Treaty of Commerce and Naviga- 
 tion between Russia and Japan 
 
 12 
 
 Signed at Nagasaki, October ^ 1857. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 In addition to the Treaty concluded between Russia and 
 Japan at Simoda, on the 26th January, 1855, or of Ansey 
 the first year, 21st day of the 12th month, the undersigned 
 Count Euphinicus Poutiatine, Vice-Admiral and Aide-de- 
 Camp, General of His Majesty the Emperor of all the 
 Russias, and their Excellencies Midzno-Tsikogono-Kami, 3 
 Controller and First Governor of Nagasaki, Alao-Iwamino- 
 Kami, 4 Second Governor of Nagasaki, and Twase-Igano- 
 Kami, 5 Imperial Commissioner, came to an agreement, 
 and have stipulated the following Articles : 
 
 Art. I. In order to establish commerce and friendly 
 intercourse between Russia and Japan on a more solid 
 foundation, new regulations are hereby enacted for the 
 guidance of the Russians and Japanese in the ports of 
 Hakodate and Nagasaki. 
 
 As to the Port of Simoda, it being an unsafe harbour, 
 
 1 Tsutsui Hizen no Kami. 2 Kawaji Sayemon-no-jo. 
 
 3 Mizuno Chikugo no Kami. 4 Arao Iwami no Kami. 
 
 5 Iwase Iga no Kami. 
 
240 RUSSIA AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 the former stipulations alone will there remain in force. 
 The new regulations will then be applicable, when it is 
 finally decided that Simoda, or some safer port, is to be 
 opened for foreign trade. 
 
 II. In future the number of ships, or the amount of 
 money employed in trade will not be limited, and all 
 commercial transactions will be done by the mutual 
 consent of both parties. 
 
 III. When a Russian merchant vessel arrives in one of 
 the above-mentioned ports, the captain and supercargo 
 is bound to present through the Russian Consul, or where 
 there is not one, to deliver himself to the local authorities, 
 a declaration comprising the name of the ship, its tonnage, 
 the name of the captain or supercargo, as well as the sort 
 and quantity of goods brought by him, such declaration 
 is to be made during the first day or not later than 48 hours ; 
 in that space the captain is bound to pay anchorage 
 money, consisting of 5 mace or 42 copecks for each ton, 
 if the vessel is above 150 tons, and 1 mace or 9 copecks 
 for every ton, if the vessel is 150 tons, or of a smaller 
 size. 
 
 The anchorage money is to be paid even when a vessel 
 has entered the port not for the purposes of trade, but has 
 been staying in it longer than 48 hours. 
 
 No anchorage money is levied from a vessel coming for 
 repairs except its cargo, or a part of it, has been discharged 
 on land, or into another ship. 
 
 The Custom-House having received the anchorage 
 money is bound to give a receipt, and to allow at the same 
 time the unloading of the ship. 
 
 IV. If the captain of a merchantman does not present 
 a declaration during the first 48 hours after his arrival in 
 port, he will have to pay a penalty of 65 roubles 50 copecks 
 for each day, which is not to exceed 266 roubles. 
 
 In case of a false declaration, the captain will be fined 
 655 roubles, and for unloading the cargo without licence, 
 besides the aforesaid penalty, his goods will be confiscated. 
 

 RUSSIA AND JAPAN, 1855-7 241 
 
 V. Russian vessels having paid the anchorage money 
 on their arrival in the first Japanese port, can go into other 
 ports, without further payment, if they only produce the 
 receipt given them at the first port. 
 
 It is understood that this rule does not apply to vessels, 
 which during their voyage enter and take new cargoes in 
 ports of other nations. 
 
 VI. Boats employed in towing vessels, loading, or dis- 
 charging goods, and all sorts of workmen are to be hired 
 from the number appointed for that purpose by the local 
 Japanese authorities. These boats, as well as all others, 
 are to land at fixed places and wharfs. 
 
 VII. The goods purchased by Japanese from Russian 
 merchant vessels, as well as those that are sent in return, 
 are to be transmitted through the Custom-House. Besides 
 this transmission the Custom-House is not to interfere 
 in any commercial transaction between Japanese and 
 Russian merchants. 
 
 VIII. In default of Japanese goods to be exchanged in 
 return for a Russian cargo sold in Japan, the Custom- 
 House will pay for it in silver, or gold foreign coin, accord- 
 ing to the fixed rate of exchange. 
 
 IX. The existing duty of 35 per cent, will be levied on 
 the sums realized for goods sold by public sale or private 
 transactions, till a tariff shall be enacted. For this purpose 
 the Consul, or the captain of the merchant vessel is bound 
 to signify at the Custom-House the payments agreed for 
 the purchase of the Russian goods. 
 
 The above-mentioned duty does not apply to the goods 
 purchased by the Custom-House % 
 
 The exposition of the goods and the public sale may be 
 repeated as often as the Russian merchant desires, and 
 the Custom-House cannot limit the number of Japanese 
 merchants coming to that sale. 
 
 X. If the goods are sold at the public sale the Custom- 
 House is answerable for their payment. In private trans- 
 actions it does not take the responsibility on itself, but 
 
 1247 Q 
 
242 RUSSIA AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 will examine and decide any complaints which may arise, 
 together with the Consul. 
 
 After the goods have been once delivered, neither party 
 can complain about the quality or value of the purchased 
 goods. 
 
 XI. Goods bought by Russians in Japanese ships will 
 be paid in paper money, delivered by the Custom-House, 
 for which it is bound to give real coin to the Japanese 
 merchants immediately on the presentation of the paper 
 money. The Russians will make payment in the same 
 way for the hiring boats, purchasing provisions and other 
 objects, but the pay in Russian or foreign coin is only 
 to be made through the Custom-House. 
 
 XII. In settling accounts for purchased goods and all 
 sorts of objects, the value of the money will be defined 
 by the comparative weight and quality of the Russian or 
 foreign gold and silver, with the Japanese gold and silver 
 itsebous, viz., gold with gold, and silver with silver, and 
 after an exact appreciation of their value, a further sum 
 of 6 per cent, will be allowed for the expenses of recoinage. 
 The settlement of accounts may also be done by reckoning 
 1 Spanish dollar equal to 2 J Dutch florins, or 1 rouble 33 
 copecks, or 1 Mexican dollar to 2 Dutch florins 55 cents, 
 or 1 rouble 35 copecks. 
 
 The weights, the measures of capacity and length will 
 be compared and fixed in each of the opened ports by 
 persons appointed for this purpose by both Governments. 
 
 XIII. All articles of war are not to be sold to private 
 persons, but to the Government alone. 
 
 If in future the Japanese Government finds it necessary 
 to stop the sale into private hands of some imported goods 
 unknown to it, they will be purchased then on account of 
 the Custom-House. 
 
 XIV. In case Russian vessels shall import opium in 
 Japan, their cargoes will be confiscated and the guilty 
 will be dealt with according to the Russian laws, strictly 
 forbidding that pernicious trade. 
 
RUSSIA AND JAPAN, 1855-7 243 
 
 XV. The exportation from Japan of gold and silver in 
 coin or bars is prohibited, except gilt objects or gold and 
 silver manufactured wares. 
 
 Copper, all sorts of arms, harness, silk stuff, under the 
 name of ' Pamatonisiki '/can only be exchanged for objects 
 purchased or ordered by the Japanese Government. 
 
 XVI. Rice, barley, wheat, red and white beans, coals, 
 writing paper called ' Mino ' and * Hanci ', 2 books, charts, 
 and copper wares, can only be obtained by purchase from 
 the Custom-House ; but this prohibition does not apply 
 to persons buying these objects for their own use, with 
 the exception of prohibited books and charts. 
 
 In case of scarcity, the exportation of articles of food, 
 vegetable wax, and paper may be stopped for a time. 
 
 XVII. To prevent smuggling, guard-boats may be 
 stationed about merchant vessels by the local authorities, 
 but the expenses on that account are not to be levied on 
 Russian trade. 
 
 XVIII. For the above-mentioned reason the crew of 
 a merchantman and boats loaded with merchandise may 
 be searched at the Custom-House, or at the place ap- 
 pointed as a depot for goods. 
 
 XIX. If any loss of goods or other objects belonging to 
 the Russians shall ensue during the transportation in 
 hired boats, a strict examination will be made and all 
 
 » means taken to recover what was lost, but in this case, as 
 in all similar difficulties, the Custom-House, besides 
 making inquiries, will not be responsible for any losses. 
 XX. The transhipment of goods from one Russian 
 vessel to another or a foreign one, cannot be done without 
 previous declaration to the Custom-House by the Consul 
 or the captain of the vessel. The declaration must contain 
 the sort and quantity of merchandise intended for the 
 transhipment, and in such cases the Custom-House can 
 send an officer on board to insure that no contraband 
 should take place during the dischargement. 
 
 1 Yamato-nishiki. 2 Hanshi. 
 
 Q2 
 
 
244 RUSSIA AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 If the transhipment is done without licence, the Custom- 
 House will make it known to the Consul, and where there 
 is not one, will itself stop and seize the transhipped goods. 
 
 XXI. When any Russian merchantman is found smug- 
 gling in open ports, the goods alone will be confiscated, 
 but if in other places of Japan, the vessel also will be seized. 
 
 This, however, must not be done before a previous 
 examination and decision of the case shall be made by the 
 Japanese authorities, together with the Russian Consul. 
 
 XXII. If a merchantman or any one belonging to the 
 vessel, desire to make a present to a Japanese, they are 
 to deliver with the donations a note certifying its being 
 made by them. 
 
 XXIII. During the stay of a vessel in port, all the ship's 
 papers are to be kept at the Russian Consulate, and where 
 there is none they are to be delivered to the local authorities. 
 
 The Consul or the authorities at the departure of the 
 vessel will not give up the ship's papers till all accounts are 
 settled with the Custom-House and the Japanese merchants. 
 
 XXIV. Russians desiring to study the Japanese lan- 
 guage or any of the Japanese arts, are bound to make their 
 wishes known through the Consul or Captain to the local 
 authorities, and proper persons will be appointed for the 
 desired instruction. 
 
 XXV. All communications of the Russian Government 
 with the Japanese, will be done through the highest person 
 representing Russian authority in Japan, and by him 
 transmitted to the local Governor. If from some circum- 
 stances, the communication or the letter is brought to 
 a port where there is no Consul resident, it will be pre- 
 sented by the person to whom it was intrusted to the 
 Governor of the place, and immediately sent by him to its 
 destination. The answer may be forwarded to the port 
 where the letter was delivered, if the vessel is awaiting it 
 there, or may be sent through the Consul to forward it by 
 the first opportunity to Russia. 
 
 XXVI. The rights of neutrals, acknowledged by all 
 

 RUSSIA AND JAPAN, 1855-7 245 
 
 civilized nations, oblige two belligerent States not to 
 attack the ships of their adversaries in neutral ports, it is 
 understood that in case of war between Russia and 
 another nation, the Russian ships will not attack their 
 enemies lying in Japanese ports. 
 
 XXVII. Russians residing constantly or temporarily 
 in Japan, have a right to bring their wives and families 
 to live in that country. 
 
 XXVIII. If in future it may be found necessary to 
 alter or add any Articles to this Treaty, each of the 
 Governments has a right to demand a revision of it. 
 
 The ratification of this Supplementary Treaty will be 
 exchanged in 8 months, or as circumstances will allow. 
 The copies in Russian, Japanese, Dutch, and Chinese 
 languages, signed and sealed by those who have concluded 
 this Treaty, will be now exchanged, and all the Articles are 
 binding from the date of the signature and will be observed 
 by the Contracting Parties faithfully and inviolably. 
 
 12 
 
 Done and signed at Nagasaki the 04th October, in the 
 
 year of our Lord, 1857, and the 3rd of the reign of His 
 Majesty Alexander II, Emperor of All the Russias, or of 
 Ansey, the 4th year, 7th day of the 9th moon. 
 
 (L.S.) C. E. POUTIATINE. 
 
 (L.S.) MIDYNO-TSIKOGONO-KAMI. 1 
 
 (L.S.) ALAO-TWAMINO-KAMI. 2 
 
 (L.S.) TWASE-IGANO-KAML 3 
 
 APPENDIX 8 
 Preliminary Convention of Commerce between 
 the Netherlands and Japan. 
 Signed at Nagasaki, November 9, 1855. 
 (Tra?islation.) 
 
 Convention between Mr. Jan Hendrik Donker Curtius, 
 Netherlands Commissioner in Japan, Knight of the Order 
 of the Netherlands Lion, and Plenipotentiary Extra- 
 
 1 2 3 See p. 239. 
 
246 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 ordinary of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, and 
 Arawo Iwamino Kami, 1 and Kawa Moera Tsoesimano 
 Kami, 2 Governors of Nagasaki, and Asano Ihkakf , 3 Imperial 
 Superintendent at Nagasaki, entered into at the Govern- 
 ment House in that town on the 9th of November, 1855. 
 Art. I. From the 1st December, 1855, the Nether- 
 landers shall enjoy full personal freedom, and may there- 
 fore leave Desima at all times without an escort, just as 
 they are allowed to do now, upon leave, with an escort. 
 
 II. If a Netherlander should at any time transgress any 
 Japanese law, information thereof shall be given to the 
 highest Netherlands officer stationed at Desima, and through 
 his interposition the transgressor shall be punished by the 
 Netherlands Government according to the Netherlands laws. 
 
 III. In case any Netherlander should be improperly 
 treated by a Japanese, the matter shall, on complaint by 
 the Netherlands Commissioner in Japan, be inquired into 
 by the Japanese magistrates, and the Japanese shall be 
 punished according to the Japanese law. 
 
 IV. In case one or more other ports of the Japanese 
 empire may be opened now or hereafter to one or more 
 other nations, exactly the same privileges shall be imme- 
 diately granted to the Netherlands. 
 
 V. Whenever an officer or other seaman belonging to 
 one of the ships-of-war of His Majesty the King of the 
 Netherlands, or any person belonging to the Netherlands 
 land forces, may die in Japan, his funeral shall take place 
 with the military ceremonies used by the Netherlands land 
 and sea forces, and hitherto observed. Salutes may also be 
 fired from small arms at the burial-place, as well as on 
 board the Netherlands ships-of-war, even with great guns. 
 
 VI. The Netherlands merchant-ships coming to the port 
 of Nagasaki shall, upon nearing the coast, show a private 
 signal-flag in addition to the national flag, as has been the 
 custom hitherto. The ships-of-war have no private signal 
 flag. 
 
 1 2 3 iSee p. 239. 
 
NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 247 
 
 VII. When the two flags are seen by the watch on the 
 Island of Iwo Sima, the Netherlands flag shall be exhibited 
 from the flag-staff there, in token of recognition, just as 
 is usual now also for the ships-of-war. 
 
 VIII. The Netherlands ships-of-war and merchant 
 vessels shall come to anchor behind the Papenberg, as has 
 been the custom hitherto. 
 
 IX. So soon as the Governor of Nagasaki shall have 
 satisfied himself of the nationality of the vessels, by 
 sending off for that purpose an officer of the guard accom- 
 panied by one of the officers from the Netherlands factory 
 at Desima, the ships shall be at liberty to sail or steam 
 into the harbour, or to have themselves towed therein by 
 Japanese vessels, as has been the custom hitherto, but 
 without giving hostages. 
 
 X. The crews of the ships shall be at liberty to use the 
 ships' boats for communication with the other Netherlands 
 ships and with the Island of Desima, or in rowing round 
 the bay for their health, with this understanding, that the 
 sailors of the Netherlands merchant ships may only enjoy 
 this privilege when a captain or mate is with them in the 
 boat or boats. They shall, of course, land nowhere else than 
 at the water-gate of Desima, and they must have no inter- 
 course with the crews of Japanese vessels. The boats shall 
 bear the Netherlands flag for the purpose of recognition. 
 
 XI. There shall be no landing from the boats at any 
 other place than the water-gate of Desima. 
 
 XII. Except the outer wall, the guard-houses, and 
 public buildings of Desima, all the dwellings and ware- 
 houses shall be sold, through the intervention of the 
 Governors of Nagasaki, to the Netherlands factory, and 
 the ground of Desima let. They shall be under the 
 direction of the highest Netherlands officer dwelling there, 
 and be maintained at the cost of the Netherlands factory. 
 
 XIII. For the performance of the necessary repairs, 
 the building or pulling down of warehouses or dwellings, 
 or for making alterations and improvements therein, 
 
248 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 the Netherlands factory shall be at liberty to employ 
 Japanese tradesmen and to buy Japanese materials, 
 for which payment shall be made in ' kambang ' money. 
 Previous notice of these operations shall be given to the 
 Governor of Nagasaki. 
 
 XIV. The Netherlanders residing at Desima are at liberty 
 to go round the bay in Netherlands or Japanese vessels, 
 but without landing anywhere. They may fish from these 
 vessels in the bay for recreation. These vessels shall bear 
 the Netherlands flag for the purpose of recognition. 
 
 XV. The keys of the water-gate are in the exclusive 
 keeping of the highest Netherlands officer at Desima. 
 
 XVI. The keys of the land-gate are in the keeping of 
 the Japanese officer on guard there. 
 
 XVII. But the sailors belonging to the Netherlands 
 merchant ships are, except the commanders, subject to 
 personal search, as has been the custom hitherto, when 
 they go by the land-gate of Desima to Nagasaki and when 
 they return from thence. At the water-gate and on board 
 the Netherlands ships no search takes place. 
 
 XVIII. The examination of goods only takes place when 
 they are introduced into Japan from Desima, or when they 
 are brought from Japan to Desima, as has been the custom 
 hitherto, and not at the delivery from the ships into Desima, 
 or at the delivery from Desima on board the ships. The 
 strongest precautions shall be taken against smuggling. 
 
 XIX. During the presence of Netherlands merchant- 
 ships in the port of Nagasaki, while works are going on 
 there, a Japanese officer shall be stationed at Desima to 
 keep order amongst the Japanese coolies in general who 
 are then to be found there, as has been the custom hitherto. 
 
 XX. The management of mercantile affairs remains 
 for the rest on the present footing. The keys of the ware- 
 houses are always in the keeping of the highest Nether- 
 lands officer residing at Desima, whenever Netherlands 
 goods are deposited therein. No Japanese seals are placed 
 upon the warehouses,, 
 

 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 249 
 
 XXI. All Japanese who have the necessary permission 
 according to the Japanese laws, are to be admitted into 
 Desima. 
 
 XXII. At all meetings that take place at Nagasaki, the 
 compliments and the reception by the Japanese are to be 
 according to the Japanese forms, and by the Nether- 
 landers according to the Netherlands forms. 
 
 XXIII. Whenever opportunities may occur, the Nether- 
 landers residing at Desima shall be at liberty to send 
 letters by the Chinese junks as well as by the ships of 
 other nations. 
 
 XXIV. The Netherlanders shall be at liberty to have 
 free correspondence by letters with the commanders of 
 ships or squadrons of foreign nations at peace with Japan, 
 who are stopping in the bay of Nagasaki. 
 
 XXV. Musterings are to take place only on board the 
 Netherlands merchant ships, on their arrival and depar- 
 ture, and not at Desima. 
 
 XXVI. The Netherlands merchant-ships shall retain 
 their gunpowder and arms, including their great guns. 
 
 XXVII. The customary presents for His Majesty the 
 Emperor and other great personages, and the annual 
 ' fassak ',* are regulated on the present footing. No altera- 
 tion is to be introduced in the manner in which the trade 
 with the factory is carried on. If any alteration therein 
 should be hereafter desired, either on the part of the 
 Japanese or the Netherlanders, it shall be agreed upon and 
 regulated by the Governor of Nagasaki and the Nether- 
 lands Commissioner in Japan. 
 
 XXVIII. In case it should appear that any matter 
 requires further regulation, it shall be taken into careful 
 consideration by the Governor of Nagasaki and the Nether- 
 lands Commissioner in Japan, and all restrictions which 
 are now found to be burthensome by the Netherlanders 
 shall be removed as far as possible. 
 
 XXIX. So soon as a Treaty shall have been entered 
 
 . * Hassaku. 
 
250 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 into between the Netherlands and Japan, this Convention 
 shall become void. In case such a Treaty should not be 
 entered into soon, this Convention shall, nevertheless, 
 remain in force, but subject to the ratification both of His 
 Majesty the King of the Netherlands and of His Majesty 
 the Emperor of Japan, and the ratifications signed by high 
 officers empowered thereto on both sides, shall be ex- 
 changed at Nagasaki within the space of two years from 
 the date hereof. 
 
 All the stipulations of this Convention come into imme- 
 diate operation with the exception of the following Articles : 
 
 Art. I. The freedom therein granted comes into 
 operation on the 1st December, 1855, and Articles IX, 
 XII, XIII, XIV, XVIII, XX, and XXVI, come into 
 operation on the 1st January, 1856. 
 
 In witness whereof we, Mr. J. H. Donker Curtius, 
 Netherlands Commissioner in Japan, Knight of the Order 
 of the Netherlands Lion, and Plenipotentiary Extra- 
 ordinary of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands ; 
 and Arawo Iwamino Kami, 1 Kawa Moera Tsoesimano 
 Kami, 2 Governors of Nagasaki, and Asano Ikkakf, 3 Imperial 
 Superintendent at Nagasaki, have signed this Convention, 
 and set our seals hereto. 
 
 Done in duplicate, in the town of Nagasaki, on the 
 9th November, in the year of our Lord, 1855. 
 
 (L.S.) J. H. DONKER CURTIUS. 
 
 APPENDIX 9 
 
 Treaty of Commerce between the Netherlands 
 
 and Japan. 
 
 Signed at Nagasaki, January 30, 1856. [Ratifications 
 
 exchanged at Nagasaki, October 16, 1857.] 
 
 Their Majesties the King of the Netherlands, Prince of 
 
 Orange-Nassau, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, &c, and the 
 
 Emperor of Great Japan (Dai Nipon) desiring to confirm 
 
 1 2 3 Seo p. 239. 
 
NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 251 
 
 the ancient relations between the inhabitants of the two 
 empires, and considering the period favourable for making 
 the privileges granted to the Netherlanders more in 
 accordance with the tenor of those bestowed upon them 
 by the Emperor's illustrious predecessors, have appointed 
 for their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, His 
 Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Master Jan Hendrik 
 Donker Curtius, Knight of the Order of the Netherlands 
 Lion ; and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Arawo 
 Iwamino Kami, 1 and Kawa Moera Tsoesimano Kami, 2 
 Governors of Nagasaki, and Nagai Iwamodsio 3 and Asano 
 Ikkakf , 4 Imperial Superintendents ; who have agreed as 
 follows : 
 
 Art. I. The Netherlanders have full personal freedom, 
 and may therefore leave Desima at all times without an 
 escort, just as they are allowed to do now, upon leave, 
 with an escort. 
 
 II. If a Netherlander should at any time transgress any 
 Japanese law, information thereof shall be given to the 
 highest Netherlands officer stationed at Desima, and 
 through his interposition the transgressor shall be punished 
 by the Netherlands Government according to the Nether- 
 lands laws. 
 
 III. In case any Netherlander should be improperly 
 treated by a Japanese, the matter shall, on complaint by 
 the Netherlands Commissioner in Japan, be inquired into 
 by the Japanese magistrates, and the Japanese shall be 
 punished according to the Japanese law. 
 
 IV. In case one or more other ports of the Japanese 
 empire are, or shall be, opened to one or more other 
 nations, exactly the same privileges shall be immediately 
 granted to the Netherlands. 
 
 V. Whenever an officer, or other seaman belonging to 
 one of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands ships of 
 war, or any person belonging to the Netherlands land 
 forces, may die in Japan, his funeral shall take place with 
 
 ISee p. 239. 3 Nagai Iwa-no-jo. 
 
 l a 4 ft, 
 
252 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 the military ceremonies used by the Netherlands land and 
 sea forces, and hitherto observed. Volleys may also be 
 fired from small arms at the burial place, as well as on 
 board the Netherlands ships of war, even with great guns. 
 
 VI. The Netherlands merchant-ships coming to the 
 port of Nagasaki shall, upon nearing the coast, show 
 a private signal flag in addition to the national flag, as 
 has been the custom hitherto. The ships of war have no 
 private signal flag. 
 
 VII. When the two flags are seen by the watch on the 
 Island of Iwo Sima, the Netherlands flag shall be exhibited 
 from the flag-staff there, in token of recognition, just as 
 is usual now also for the ships of war. 
 
 VIII. The Netherlands ships of war and merchant 
 vessels shall come to anchor behind the Papenberg, as 
 has been the custom hitherto. 
 
 IX. So soon as the Governor of Nagasaki shall have 
 satisfied himself of the nationality of the vessels, by 
 sending off for that purpose, an officer of the guard 
 accompanied by one of the officers from the Netherlands 
 factory at Desima, the ships shall be at liberty to sail or 
 steam into the harbour, or to have themselves towed 
 therein by Japanese vessels, as has been the custom 
 hitherto, but without giving hostages. 
 
 X. The crews of the ships shall be at liberty to use the 
 ships' boats for communication with the other Netherlands 
 ships and with the Island of Desima, or in rowing round 
 the bay for recreation ; with this understanding, that the 
 sailors of the Netherlands merchant ships may only make 
 use of this privilege when a captain or mate is with them 
 in the boats. They shall of course land nowhere else than 
 at the water-gate of Desima, and they must have no inter- 
 course with the crews of Japanese vessels. The boats shall 
 bear the Netherlands flag for the purpose of recognition. 
 
 XI. There shall be no landing from the boats at any 
 other place than the water-gate of Desima. 
 
 XII. The existing dwellings and warehouses remain 
 
NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 253 
 
 upon the old footing. They may, however, be repaired 
 and altered by the Netherlands factory at its own cost, for 
 which previous notice shall be given to the Governor of 
 Nagasaki, and when he has given permission thereto, the 
 materials purchased, and the workmen's wages shall be 
 paid for in ' kambang ' money ; in like manner for new 
 dwellings and warehouses to be built. 
 
 XIII. The Netherlander residing at Desima are at 
 liberty to go round the bay in Netherlands or Japanese 
 vessels, but without landing anywhere. They may fish 
 from these vessels in the bay for recreation. These vessels 
 shall bear the Netherlands flag for the purpose of recog- 
 nition. 
 
 XIV. The keys of the water-gate are in the exclusive 
 keeping of the highest Netherlands officer at Desima. 
 Notice of the opening and shutting of this gate shall be 
 given to one of the Japanese officers at Desima, who shall 
 take care that no Japanese go into Desima by the water- 
 gate unless they have permission to do so. 
 
 XV. The keys of the land-gate are in the keeping of the 
 Japanese officer on guard there. 
 
 XVI. But the sailors belonging to the Netherlands 
 merchant-ships are, except the commanders, subject to 
 personal search, as has been the custom hitherto, when 
 they go by the land-gate of Desima to Nagasaki, and when 
 they return from thence. At the water-gate and on board 
 the Netherlands ships no search takes place. 
 
 XVII. The examination of goods only takes place when 
 they are introduced into Japan from Desima, or when they 
 are brought from Japan to Desima, as has been the custom 
 hitherto, and not at the delivery from the ships to Desima 
 or at the delivery from Desima on board the ships. The 
 strongest precautions shall be taken against smuggling. 
 
 XVIII. During the presence of Netherlands merchant- 
 ships in the port of Nagasaki, while works are going on 
 there, a Japanese officer shall be stationed at Desima, as 
 has been the custom hitherto, 
 
 
254 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 XIX. The management of mercantile affairs remains 
 for the rest on the present footing. The keys of the ware- 
 houses are always in the keeping of the highest Nether- 
 lands officer residing at Desima, whenever Netherlands 
 goods are deposited therein. No Japanese seals are placed 
 upon the warehouses. 
 
 XX. All Japanese who have the necessary permission 
 according to the Japanese laws may come to Desima. 
 
 XXI. At all meetings that take place at Nagasaki the 
 compliments and the reception by the Japanese are to be 
 according to the Japanese forms, and by the Netherlanders 
 according to the Netherlands forms. 
 
 XXII. Whenever opportunities may occur, the Nether- 
 landers residing at Desima shall be at liberty to send letters 
 by the Chinese junks, as well as by the ships of other 
 nations. 
 
 XXIII. The Netherlanders shall be at liberty to have 
 free correspondence by letters with the commanders of 
 ships or squadrons of foreign nations at peace with Japan, 
 who are stopping in the bay of Nagasaki. 
 
 XXIV. Musterings are to take place only on board the 
 Netherlands merchant-ships on their arrival and departure, 
 and not at Desima. 
 
 XXV. The Netherlands merchant-ships shall retain 
 their gunpowder and arms, including their great guns. 
 
 XXVI. The customary presents for His Majesty the 
 Emperor and other great personages, and the annual 
 ' fassak ', are regulated on the present footing. No altera- 
 tion is to be introduced in the manner in which the trade 
 with the factory is carried on. In case any alteration 
 therein should be hereafter desired, either on the part of 
 the Japanese or the Netherlanders, it shall be agreed upon 
 and regulated by the Governor of Nagasaki and the 
 Netherlands Commissioner in Japan. 
 
 XXVII. In case it should appear that any matter 
 requires another regulation, it shall be taken into careful 
 consideration by the Governor of Nagasaki and the 
 
NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 255 
 
 Netherlands Commissioner in Japan, and all restrictions 
 which are now found to be burdensome or needless by the 
 Netherlanders or the Japanese shall be removed as far as 
 possible. 
 
 XXVIII. This Treaty shall be subject to the ratifica- 
 tion, both of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands and 
 of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the ratifications 
 signed by high officers empowered thereto on both sides 
 shall be exchanged at Nagasaki within the space of two 
 years from the date hereof. 
 
 All the stipulations of this Convention come meanwhile 
 into immediate operation. 
 
 In witness whereof we, Master Jan Hendrik Donker 
 Curtius, Netherlands Commissioner in Japan, Knight of 
 the Order of the Netherlands Lion, and Plenipotentiary 
 Extraordinary of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, 
 and Arawo Iwamino Kami, 1 and Kawa Moera Tsoesimano 
 Kami, 2 Governors of Nagasaki, and Nagai Iwamodsio 3 and 
 Asano Ikkakf, 4 Imperial Superintendents at Nagasaki, 
 have signed these presents and set our seals hereto, with 
 the exception of the first-named of the Japanese Plenipo- 
 tentiaries, who has been prevented from doing so by his 
 departure for Jeddo. 
 
 Done in duplicate in the town of Nagasaki on the 
 30th of January, in the year of our Lord 1856. 
 
 (L.S.) J. H. DONKER CURTIUS. 
 
 APPENDIX 10 
 
 Additional Articles to the Treaty of Commerce 
 concluded january 30, 1856, between the 
 Netherlands and Japan. 
 
 Signed at Nagasaki, October 16, 1857. 
 Additional Articles agreed upon between the Nether- 
 lands and the Japanese Plenipotentiaries : 
 
 Master Jan Hendrik Donker Curtius, Netherlands Com- 
 
 1 2 3 4 See pp. 239 and 251. 
 
256 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 missioner in Japan ; and Midsoeno Tsikoegono Kami, 1 
 Financial Governor and Governor of Nagasaki, Alao 
 Iwamino Kami, 2 Governor of Nagasaki, Iwase Igano 
 Kami, 3 Imperial Superintendent ; 
 
 In order to form part of the Treaty concluded between 
 the Netherlands and Japan, at Nagasaki, on the 30th 
 January, 1856. 
 
 Art. I. Trading shall be allowed from henceforth in the 
 ports of Nagasaki and Hakodate. 
 
 Trading at Hakodate shall begin 10 months from the 
 date hereof. 
 
 II. Tonnage dues calculated at Sp. m. 0.5 (5 maas), 
 or/. 0.80 (80 cents.) Netherlands currency per ton, shall 
 be paid within two days after arriving. 
 
 For ships of less than 150 tons burden Sp. m. 0.1 (1 maas) 
 or/. 0.16 (16 cents.) Netherlands currency is to be paid 
 per ton. 
 
 Ships of war pay no tonnage dues, but they pay pilot 
 dues, and the hire of towing vessels. 
 
 In case the tonnage dues have been once paid at 
 Nagasaki, and the ships depart from thence direct for 
 Hakodate, the tonnage dues are not to be paid a second 
 time. For this effect a receipt shall be given at Nagasaki, 
 on the manifest for the tonnage dues paid, and vice versa, 
 in like manner on departing from Nagasaki for Hakodate. 
 After having visited a foreign port a manifest must again 
 be produced, and tonnage dues paid whenever new articles 
 are brought. 
 
 In case vessels are hired for unloading, loading or 
 towing, coolies are to be employed who are registered as 
 such. No coolies shall be employed who are not provided 
 with a certificate of registration. 
 
 III. Merchant ships which do not trade, but remain 
 longer than twice 24 hours in a port pay tonnage dues. 
 
 Merchant ships which run in for repairs, from distress, 
 &c, without trading or transhipping, pay no tonnage 
 
 1 2 3 See p. 239. 
 
NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 257 
 
 dues. In case the cargo disembarked before the repairs 
 should be sold, tonnage dues must be paid. 
 
 IV. Within 48 hours after the arrival of a merchant-ship 
 at Nagasaki the name of the ship and of its commander 
 shall be sent in by the highest Netherlands officer at 
 Desima, accompanied by the manifest and the burden of 
 the ship in tons, on pain of punishment for the com- 
 mander, as provided in Article XXII. At Hakodate the 
 same shall be done by the commander within 24 hours. 
 At Nagasaki the unloading can take place at once during 
 the day ; but at Hakodate the unloading must be after 
 the manifest is presented, and in presence of Japanese 
 officers appointed for the purpose. If a place for the 
 examination of imported or exported goods should be 
 provided also at Nagasaki, negotiations shall take place 
 thereon, and the necessary regulations shall be established. 
 
 V. The number of merchant ships is unlimited. There 
 is no limitation of the trade to a certain sum of money. 
 In case goods brought in are not bought by the Japanese, 
 or that there is deficiency of goods for return, then they 
 remain unsold. In case the goods brought in are bought, 
 but there is a deficiency of goods for return, then payment 
 shall be made in foreign gold and silver coin, whenever 
 there is any in the Treasury, more or less in quantity. 
 
 VI. A duty of 35 per cent, shall be levied on the produce 
 of all merchandize sold at public sale, or by private con- 
 tract ; but this levy is not applicable in regard to goods 
 which are disposed of to the Treasury. Duties upon 
 importation, transit, and exportation shall be fixed by 
 negotiation from time to time. Until then, the present 
 levy continues. 
 
 VII. After inspection of the goods for sale, the sales 
 take place at the Treasury, which receives and takes care 
 of the purchase money unless goods are received in 
 payment by the sellers. If the buyers who have purchased 
 at the public sales fail to pay the purchase money, it shall 
 be made good by the Treasury. But if the purchase 
 
 1247 R 
 
258 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 money of goods sold privately, be not paid, it is not made 
 good by the Treasury. The Netherlands merchants shall 
 be at liberty to have such public sales held as often as they 
 think fit, without limitation of the number of merchants 
 who are admitted thereto. 
 
 VIII. Whenever any goods are brought for sale, but 
 remain unsold, and these are kept at Desima, to be again 
 offered for sale, the proceedings shall be always according 
 to the foregoing Article. The goods may also be sold 
 privately. 
 
 But all articles bought privately by the Japanese must 
 be paid for in hard cash at the Treasury. Direct returns 
 must not be given for them by the Japanese buyers. In 
 case a list of goods privately sold to the Japanese, be 
 presented through the highest Netherlands officer at 
 Desima, to the Treasury with a statement of the purchase 
 money, then the goods shall be delivered to the buyers, 
 upon production of a proof of payment at the Treasury. 
 
 IX. Not only the appointed purveyors, but all mer- 
 chants may come to Desima to treat concerning the buying 
 and selling of goods. At Hakodate a place (commercial 
 house or bazaar) shall be appointed for the purpose. 
 
 X. In case the Japanese merchants have bought goods 
 privately, and these have been delivered by the Nether- 
 lands merchant before the purchase money has been paid 
 at the Treasury, and thereupon difficulties arise ; if the 
 goods should have disappeared or the buyers have fled, 
 or also, if agreements for commission cause difficulties, 
 the matter shall be inquired into as far as possible ; but 
 the Treasury shall not be answerable for the damage. 
 After the delivery and reception of goods, complaint can 
 no longer be made respecting the quality, the weight, and 
 the measure of the goods bought or sold. 
 
 XI. If a Netherlander buy goods of a Japanese he shall 
 pay for them in notes which are to be issued by the 
 Treasury. These notes shall be immediately paid by the 
 Treasury to the Japanese holders in Japanese coin. All 
 
NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 259 
 
 the expenses of Desima, the hire of towing vessels, &c, 
 shall be paid for with money kept by the Treasury. 
 
 XII. The Netherlanders may also pay in foreign gold 
 and silver coin. In case the Japanese should wish to 
 receive foreign gold and silver coin, they shall arrange 
 thereupon with the Netherlanders. All foreign gold and 
 silver coin must, however, be taken only to the Treasury. 
 
 The silver Spanish dollar, or pillar dollar, is reckoned 
 at the value of /. 2.50 (2 guldens 50 cents). The silver 
 Mexican dollar at the value of/. 2.55 (2 guldens 55 cents). 
 
 XIII. Munitions of war in general may be delivered to 
 the Japanese Government, but not to the merchants. 
 
 If amongst goods brought to Japan for the first time, 
 articles should be found, which the merchants are forbidden 
 to deliver in Japan, the matter shall be officially arranged. 
 
 XIV. The introduction of opium into Japan is forbidden. 
 
 XV. Gold and silver must not be bought by the Nether- 
 landers, but this does not apply to gilt articles, nor to 
 manufactured gold and silver. Japanese coin must not be 
 exported. If there should be any other articles, the 
 exportation of which cannot be allowed, official communi- 
 cations and decisions shall take place thereon in each case. 
 
 XVI. Rice, barley, wheat, ' daitz V ' schoods ', 2 coals, 
 paper-' mino ' and paper-' hansi ', books, maps, brass- 
 work, shall only be delivered by the Treasury. But this 
 restriction has no application to articles bought for personal 
 use of the purveyors or in the town. Books and maps which 
 have been printed, or written, or sold without the permis- 
 sion of the Japanese Government, must not be exported. 
 
 XVII. Copper, sabres and appurtenances, ' Jama to 
 nisiki ' 3 (a certain silk stuff), armour, fire-arms, bows with 
 appurtenances, harness and other warlike apparatus, 
 must not be delivered by the Japanese merchants. But 
 upon a contract for the delivery of goods to the Japanese 
 Government, it may be agreed to make them serve in 
 part payment. If there should be other forbidden articles, 
 
 1 daidzu. 2 shodzu. 3 Yamato-nishiki. 
 
 R2 
 
260 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 they shall be treated in the same way, according to official 
 arrangement. 
 
 XVIII. All the goods sold by the Japanese are to be 
 delivered at prices agreed upon in each case, and not at 
 fixed prices. 
 
 On the failure of the harvest, the Japanese Government 
 shall have the power of forbidding, for a time, the exporta- 
 tion of any provisions. The exportation of wax and paper 
 may also be temporarily forbidden upon occasion of any 
 disaster. 
 
 XIX. During the stay of the merchant-ships at Hako- 
 date, all ships' papers shall be delivered into the keeping 
 of the Government there. At Nagasaki they are to be 
 given into the keeping of the highest Netherlands officer 
 at Desima. In both ports Japanese guard-ships shall be 
 placed near the merchant vessels, to prevent smuggling. 
 The number of these vessels maybe increased or diminished, 
 according to circumstances. The Netherlanders pay 
 nothing for these. 
 
 XX. As the boats for loading and unloading are hired 
 privately, the goods which may be lost thereby are not to 
 be made good by the Treasury. But the matter shall be 
 inquired into, as far as possible, on the Japanese side. 
 
 XXI. If on the arrival of a merchant-ship a false 
 manifest should be delivered, the highest Netherlands 
 officer shall inquire into the matter, and impose a penalty 
 on the commander to the amount of 500 silver dollars for 
 the Treasury. 
 
 XXII. If on the arrival at Hakodate no manifest is 
 delivered within 24 hours, the commander shall pay to 
 the Treasury a penalty of 50 silver dollars for every day's 
 neglect ; but in no case shall this penalty amount to 
 more than 200 silver dollars. If unloading take place 
 at Hakodate before the manifest has been delivered, 
 the goods unloaded shall be declared forfeited, and the 
 commander shall pay a penalty of 500 silver dollars to 
 the Treasury. 
 

 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 261 
 
 XXIII. Nothing belonging to the cargo shall be trans- 
 ferred from one ship to another lying in the port, whether 
 the ships be native or foreign, without the previous per- 
 mission of the Government and in the presence of the 
 appointed Japanese officers. Cargo transferred from ship 
 to ship without this permission shall be declared forfeited 
 to the Treasury. 
 
 XXIV. If smuggling should be carried on in the open 
 ports, the Japanese smugglers shall be punished according 
 to the Japanese law. The Netherlands smugglers shall 
 be subject to the forfeiture of the goods smuggled in or 
 out when legally seized. If smuggling should be carried 
 on along the Japanese coasts, the boat and the cargo shall 
 be declared forfeited. The highest Netherlands officer 
 residing in Japan shall, after examination, make no 
 difficulty in regard to these matters. 
 
 XXV. No Japanese may stay on board a Netherlands 
 ship without the knowledge of the Government. If 
 a Japanese goes on board a Netherlands ship of his own 
 accord, or without consent, he shall be taken up and 
 delivered to the Japanese officers. 
 
 XXVI. The highest Netherlands officer at Desima 
 shall not allow any Netherlands merchant-ship to depart 
 before all accounts are settled. At Hakodate, the goods 
 bought there by the Netherlanders must not be all loaded 
 before they have been entirely paid for, or goods have 
 been delivered for them. 
 
 XXVII. Goods smuggled in or out through the land- 
 gate of Desima (not agreeing with the permit) shall, when 
 legally seized, be declared forfeited. 
 
 XXVIII. Goods for private use, given by a Netherlander 
 to a Japanese, can only be taken out at the gate, on a permit 
 granted by the highest Netherlands officer at Desima. 
 
 XXIX. On the arrival of ships of any nation which has 
 already entered into a Treaty with Japan, there shall be 
 free personal intercourse between the Netherlanders and 
 the persons coming on board such ships, both in the ships 
 
262 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 and at Desima. Due care shall be taken herein, that it 
 may appear to the officer on guard, upon examination, 
 to what nation the ships belong. 
 
 XXX. The Netherlander s shall not, unless invited to 
 do so, enter batteries, Government buildings, houses or 
 other places having a door. Temples, tea and resting 
 houses, &c, are excepted. The prohibition of this Article 
 is not applicable when the highest Netherlands officer 
 residing in Japan wishes to visit the Government respect- 
 ing matters of business. 
 
 XXXI. For payments in resting or tea houses and in 
 temples, and for what is bought in the shops for private 
 use, and for carriage hire, payment shall be made in notes 
 to be issued by the Treasury. 
 
 XXXII. The boundaries for the excursions of the 
 Netherlanders at Nagasaki are shown upon the accom- 
 panying map. At Hakodate the boundary is fixed at five 
 Japanese miles. If a Netherlander has exceeded these 
 bounds without the consent of the Government, upon 
 receiving notice from those present, he shall go back. If 
 he does not attend to such a notice, he shall, without 
 respect of person, be taken up and delivered to the highest 
 Netherlands officer. 
 
 XXXIII. The Netherlanders are at liberty to practise 
 their own or the Christian religion within their buildings 
 and at the burying-places appointed for them. 
 
 XXXIV. Letters from the Netherlands Government 
 to that of Japan shall be delivered by the highest Nether- 
 lands officer to the Governor of Nagasaki, or in his absence 
 to the highest Japanese officer present there, in order that 
 they may be sent on. 
 
 Vice versa letters from the Japanese Government to 
 that of the Netherlands shall be delivered by the Governor 
 of Nagasaki to the highest Netherlands officer at Desima 
 in order to be sent on. Autograph letters from His 
 Majesty the King of the Netherlands to His Majesty the 
 Emperor of Japan, or from His Majesty the Emperor of 
 
NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 263 
 
 Japan to His Majesty the King of the Netherlands shall 
 be transmitted in the same way. 
 
 XXXV. In case Netherlander should wish to learn 
 the Japanese language or other Japanese sciences and 
 arts, then, at the request of the highest Netherlands officer 
 at Desima, teachers shall be chosen and sent by the 
 Japanese Government to give instructions therein at 
 Desima in the day time. 
 
 XXXVI. In case disputes or disagreements should arise 
 between the foreigners who arrive, they shall be settled 
 without the interference of the Japanese Government. 
 
 XXXVII. If such should be the case between Nether- 
 landers and Japanese, or if righting, wounding, robbery, 
 incendiarism, should take place between them, the matters 
 shall be examined into, and if possible settled by officers 
 on both sides. And such occurrences shall not of 
 themselves interfere with the mutual friendship of the 
 two States. 
 
 XXXVIII. All matters on the part of the Netherlands 
 shall, in the absence of the highest Netherlands officer at 
 Desima, be managed by the Netherlands officer imme- 
 diately next to him in rank. 
 
 XXXIX. All rights that are or shall be granted to other 
 foreign nations shall at the same time be immediately 
 extended to the Netherlands. As for the rest, the local 
 regulations shall be observed. 
 
 XL. The stipulations of the Treaty which are not 
 altered hereby, and all other stipulations not annulled 
 hereby, remain as at present. At Hakodate, things shall 
 be managed as nearly as possible in the manner provided 
 in these Articles. 
 
 If any alteration or explanation should appear to be 
 necessary in regard to some stipulations or subjects, they 
 shall be settled by negotiation. 
 
 The foregoing Articles shall be looked upon as forming 
 part of the above-mentioned Treaty between the Nether- 
 lands and Japan of the 30th January, 1856, and they 
 
264 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 shall have the same force as if they had been inserted word 
 for word therein. 
 
 These Additional Articles shall be submitted for the 
 ratification of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands 
 and of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the 
 ratifications drawn up according to the provisions of 
 Article XXVIII of the Treaty, shall be exchanged at 
 Nagasaki within one year from the date hereof. 
 
 In witness whereof we, the Plenipotentiaries on both 
 sides, Master Jan Hendrik Donker Curtius, Netherlands 
 Commissioner in Japan, Knight, &c. ; and Midsoeno 
 Tsikoegono Kami, 1 Finance Governor and Governor of 
 Nagasaki, Alao Iwamino Kami, 2 Governor of Nagasaki, 
 Iwase Igano Kami, 3 Imperial Superintendent, have signed 
 these presents and set our seals hereto. 
 
 Done in duplicate in the town of Nagasaki on the 
 16th October, 1857. 
 
 (L.S.) J. H. DONKER CURTIUS. 
 
 Supplement to the Additional Articles agreed 
 upon between the netherlands and japanese 
 Plenipotentiaries. 
 
 Art. I. Considering that the Company trade (komps- 
 handel) ceases from henceforth, and no copper may be 
 exported, except by the Imperial Government alone, in 
 payment of goods required, the presents and the f fassak ' 4 
 mentioned in Art. XXVI of the Treaty are hereby abolished. 
 
 II. The stipulations of Articles VI, VIII, IX, and 
 XXIV of the Treaty are annulled. The Netherlands ships 
 shall, therefore, for the future come to anchor immediately 
 before the town, in the usual place. 
 
 In witness whereof, we, the Plenipotentiaries on each 
 side, Master Jan Hendrik Donker Curtius, Netherlands 
 Commissioner in Japan, Knight, &c. ; and Midsoeno 
 Tsikoegono Kami, Finance Governor and Governor of 
 
 123 Seep. 239. * Hassaku. 
 
NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 265 
 
 Nagasaki, Alao Iwamino Kami, Governor of Nagasaki, 
 Iwase Igano Kami, Imperial Superintendent, have signed 
 these presents and set our seals hereto. 
 
 Done in duplicate in the town of Nagasaki, on the 16th 
 October, 1857. 
 
 (L.S.) J. H. DONKER CURTIUS. 
 
 [Translation.) 
 
 To the Netherlands Commissioner in Japan. 
 
 Negotiations shall take place respecting the manner 
 in which the highest Netherlands officer shall travel to 
 have audience with His Majesty the Emperor, after the 
 local regulations of each place on the route shall have 
 been examined. 
 
 The Netherlanders are not prevented from having their 
 wives and children with them within the open ports of 
 Japan. 
 
 Negotiations for the exportation of Japanese coins are 
 still going on. 
 
 The manner of trading at ^Hakodate and Nagasaki has 
 been agreed to for the Netherlanders. 
 
 Other nations who shall hereafter conclude treaties, 
 shall not, therefore, be prevented from trading in the 
 same manner in the said two ports. 
 
 So long as the duties levied by the treasury are not 
 sufficient for the various disbursements, it will still carry 
 on trade with some imported and exported goods. 
 
 The month Hatsigoeats, 1 of the 4th year of Ansei. 
 
 MlDSOENO TsiKOEGONO KAMI. 
 
 Alao Iwamino Kami. 
 Iwase Igano Kami. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 To the Netherlands Commissioner in Japan. 
 
 There is nothing to prevent our answering the request, 
 that, in accordance with the especial communication, 
 
 1 Hachigwatsu (8th month). 
 
266 NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN, 1855-7 
 
 there is, so far as concerns all nations on the Japanese 
 side, no idea of concluding a treaty of friendship and 
 commerce with the Kingdom of Portugal, like that with 
 the Netherlands, in case such a treaty should be desired 
 by that Kingdom. 
 
 The month Hatsigoeats, of the 4th year of Ansei. 
 
 mldsoeno tsikoegono kami. 
 Alao Iwamino Kami. 
 
 Iwase Igano Kami. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 To the Netherlands Commissioner in Japan. 
 
 The trampling on images is abolished from henceforth ; 
 but the introduction of the Christian worship and the 
 importation of the Christian and other foreign religious 
 books, prints and images, are not allowed in Japan. 
 
 The month Hatsigoeats, of the 4th year of Ansei. 
 
 mldsoeno tsikoegono kami. 
 Alao Iwamino Kami. 
 
 Iwase Igano Kami. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 To the Netherlands Envoy in Japan. 
 A question is asked respecting the port of Simoda. 
 They are busy inquiring about it and no communication 
 can now be made. 
 
 The month Hatsigoeats, of the 4th year of Ansei. 
 
 mldsoeno tsikoegono kami. 
 Alao Iwamino Kami. 
 Iwase Igano Kami. 
 
 APPENDIX 11. 
 American Convention, June, 1857. 
 
 Concluded at Simoda, June llth, 1857. 
 
 For the purpose of further regulating the intercourse 
 of American citizens within the Empire of Japan, and 
 after due deliberation, his excellency Townsend Harris, 
 
AMERICAN CONVENTION, JUNE, 1857 267 
 
 consul-general of the United States of America for the 
 Empire of Japan, and their excellencies Ino-oo-ye 1 , prince 
 of Sinano, and Nakamura, prince of Dewa, governors of 
 Simoda, all having full powers from their respective 
 governments, have agreed on the following articles, to 
 wit : — 
 
 I. The port of Nangasaki, in the principality of Hizen, 
 shall be open to American vessels, where they may 
 repair damages, procure water, fuel, provisions, and 
 other necessary articles, even coals, where they are 
 obtainable. 
 
 II. It being known that American ships coming to the 
 ports of Simoda and Hakodate cannot have their wants 
 supplied by the Japanese, it is agreed that American 
 citizens may permanently reside at Simoda and Hakodate, 
 and the government of the United States may appoint 
 a vice-consul to reside at Hakodate. 
 
 This article to go into effect on the fourth day of July, 
 eighteen hundred and fifty-eight. 
 
 III. In settlement of accounts the value of the money 
 brought by the Americans shall be ascertained by weigh- 
 ing it with Japanese coin (gold and silver itsebues), 
 that is, gold with gold, and silver with silver, or weights 
 representing Japanese coin may be used, after such 
 weights have been carefully examined and found to 
 be correct. The value of the money of the Americans 
 having been thus ascertained, the sum of six per cent, shall 
 be allowed to the Japanese for the expense of recoinage. 
 
 IV. Americans committing offences in Japan shall be 
 tried by the American consul-general or consul, and shall 
 be punished according to American laws. Japanese com- 
 mitting offences against Americans shall be tried by the 
 Japanese authorities, and punished according to Japanese 
 laws. 
 
 V. American ships which may resort to the ports of 
 Simoda, Hakodate, or Nangasaki, for the purpose of 
 
 1 Inouy6. 
 
268 AMERICAN CONVENTION, JUNE, 1857 
 
 obtaining necessary supplies, or to repair damages, shall 
 pay for them in gold or silver coin, and if they have no 
 money, goods shall be taken in exchange. 
 
 VI. The government of Japan admits the right of his 
 excellency the consul-general of the United States to go 
 beyond the limits of seven ri, but has asked him to delay 
 the use of that right, except in cases of emergency, ship- 
 wreck, &c, to which he has assented. 
 
 VII. Purchases for his excellency the consul-general, 
 or his family, may be made by him only, or by some 
 member of his family, and payment made to the seller 
 for the same without the intervention of any Japanese 
 official, and for this purpose Japanese silver and copper 
 coin shall be supplied to his excellency the consul- 
 general. 
 
 VIII. As his excellency the consul-general of the 
 United States of America has no knowledge of the Japanese 
 language, nor their excellencies the governors of Simoda 
 a knowledge of the English language, it is agreed that the 
 true meaning shall be found in the Dutch version of the 
 articles. 
 
 IX. All the foregoing articles shall go into effect from 
 the date hereof, except article two, which shall go into 
 effect on the date indicated in it. 
 
 Done in quintuplicate (each copy being in English, 
 Japanese, and Dutch), at the Goyoso of Simoda, on the 
 seventeenth day of June, in the year of the Christian era 
 eighteen hundred and fifty-seven, and of the Indepen- 
 dence of the United States of America the eighty-first, 
 corresponding to the fourth Japanese year of Ansei, Mi, 
 the fifth month, the twenty-sixth day ; the English 
 version being signed by his excellency the consul-general 
 of the United States of America, and the Japanese version 
 by their excellencies the governors of Simoda. 
 
 Townsend Harris. [L.S. 
 
 
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 269 
 
 APPENDIX 12 
 
 Article 2 or Constitution (or Arrangement) of Sep- 
 tember 7, 1615, DEFINING AUTHORITY OF SHOGUN. 
 
 Taken from Tokugawa Kinreiko (Collection of Tokugawa Enactments). 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 The Shogun of the Kwanto, Chancellor of the two 
 Colleges, having been entrusted with the government of 
 the country, has complete authority over the three 
 Imperial Princes, the five Sekke 1 families, the court 
 nobles, and the feudal nobility. He will notify all appoint- 
 ments made in the service of the state, and in the matter 
 of administration no reference to the Throne is necessary. 
 If the country within the four seas is not kept tranquil, 
 the fault will lie with the Shogun. 
 
 APPENDIX 13 
 
 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, between the 
 United States and Japan 
 
 Signed at Yedo, July 29, 1858. 2 [Ratifications exchanged at 
 
 Washington, May 22, I860.] 
 
 The President of the United States of America and His 
 Majesty the Ty-Coon of Japan, desiring to establish on 
 firm and lasting foundations the relations of peace and 
 friendship now happily existing between the two countries, 
 and to secure the best interest of their respective citizens 
 and subjects by encouraging, facilitating, and regulating 
 their industry and trade, have resolved to conclude 
 a Treaty of Amity and Commerce for this purpose, and 
 have, therefore, named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is 
 to say : the President of The United States ; his Excel- 
 lency Townsend Harris, Consul-General of the United 
 States of America for the Empire of Japan ; and His 
 
 1 See Glossary. 
 
 2 Signed also in the Japanese and Dutch languages. 
 
270 UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
 
 Majesty the Ty-Coon of Japan, their Excellencies Ino-oo- 
 ye, 1 Prince of Sinano, and Iwasay, 2 Prince of Hego 3 ; who, 
 after having communicated to each other their respective 
 full powers, and found them to be in good and due form, 
 have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles : 
 
 Art. I. There shall henceforward be perpetual peace 
 and friendship between the United States of America and 
 His Majesty the Ty-Coon of Japan and his successors. 
 
 The President of The United States may appoint 
 a Diplomatic Agent to reside at the city of Yedo, and 
 Consuls or Consular Agents to reside at any or all of the 
 ports in Japan which are opened for American commerce 
 by this Treaty. The Diplomatic Agent and Consul- 
 General of The United States shall have the right to travel 
 freely in any part of the empire of Japan from the time 
 they enter on the discharge of their official duties. 
 
 The Government of Japan may appoint a Diplomatic 
 Agent to reside at Washington, and Consuls or Consular 
 Agents for any or all of the ports of The United States. 
 The Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General of Japan may 
 travel freely in any part of The United States from the 
 time they arrive in the country. 
 
 II. The President of The United States, at the request 
 of the Japanese Government, will act as a friendly 
 mediator in such matters of difference as may arise be- 
 tween the Government of Japan and any European Power. 
 
 The ships of war of The United States shall render 
 friendly aid and assistance to such Japanese vessels as they 
 may meet on the high seas, so far as can be done without 
 a breach of neutrality ; and all American Consuls residing 
 at ports visited by Japanese vessels shall also give them 
 such friendly aid as may be permitted by the laws of the 
 respective countries in which they reside. 
 
 III. In addition to the ports of Simoda and Hakodade, 
 the following ports and towns shall be opened on the 
 dates respectively appended to them, that is to say : 
 
 1 Inouye. 2 Iwase. 3 Higo. 
 
[ UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 271 
 
 Kanagawa, on the 4th of July, 1859 ; Nagasaki, on the 
 4th of July, 1859 ; Nee-e-gata, on the 1st of January, 
 1860 ; Hiogo, on the 1st of January, 1863. 
 
 If Nee-e-gata is found to be unsuitable as a harbour, 
 another port on the west coast of Nipon shall be selected 
 by the two Governments in lieu thereof. Six months 
 after the opening of Kanagawa the port of Simoda shall 
 be closed as a place of residence and trade for American 
 citizens. In all the foregoing ports and towns American 
 citizens may permanently reside ; they shall have the 
 right to lease ground, and purchase the buildings thereon, 
 and may erect dwellings and warehouses. But no fortifica- 
 tion or place of military strength shall be erected under 
 pretence of building dwelling or warehouses ; and to see 
 that this Article is observed, the Japanese authorities 
 shall have the right to inspect, from time to time, any 
 buildings which are being erected, altered, or repaired. 
 The place which the Americans shall occupy for their 
 buildings, and the harbour regulations, shall be arranged 
 by the American Consul and the authorities of each place, 
 and if they cannot agree, the matter shall be referred to 
 and settled by the American Diplomatic Agent and the 
 Japanese Government. 
 
 No wall, fence, or gate shall be erected by the Japanese 
 around the place of residence of the Americans, or any- 
 thing done which may prevent a free egress and ingress 
 to the same. 
 
 From the 1st of January, 1862, Americans shall be 
 allowed to reside in the city of Yedo ; and from the 1st of 
 January, 1863, in the city of Osaca, for the purposes of 
 trade only. In each of these two cities a suitable place 
 within which they may hire houses, and the distance they 
 may go, shall be arranged by the American Diplomatic 
 Agent and the Government of Japan. Americans may 
 freely buy from Japanese and sell to them any articles 
 that either may have for sale, without the intervention of 
 any Japanese officers in such purchase or sale, or in 
 
272 UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
 
 making or receiving payment for the same ; and all classes 
 of Japanese may purchase, sell, keep, or use any articles 
 sold to them by the Americans. 
 
 The Japanese Government will cause this clause to be 
 made public in every part of the empire as soon as the 
 ratifications of this Treaty shall be exchanged. 
 
 Munitions of war shall only be sold to the Japanese 
 Government and foreigners. 
 
 No rice or wheat shall be exported from Japan as cargo, 
 but all Americans resident in Japan, and ships, for their 
 crews and passengers, shall be furnished with sufficient 
 supplies of the same. The Japanese Government will sell, 
 from time to time at public auction, any surplus quantity 
 of copper that may be produced. Americans residing in 
 Japan shall have the right to employ Japanese as servants 
 or in any other capacity. 
 
 IV. Duties shall be paid to the Government of Japan 
 on all goods landed in the country, and on all articles of 
 Japanese production that are exported as cargo, according 
 to the tariff hereunto appended. 
 
 If the Japanese Custom-House officers are dissatisfied 
 with the value placed on any goods by the owner, they 
 may place a value thereon, and offer to take the goods at 
 that valuation. If the owner refuses to accept the offer, 
 he shall pay duty on such valuation. If the offer be 
 accepted by the owner, the purchase-money shall be paid 
 to him without delay, and without any abatement or 
 discount. 
 
 Supplies for the use of The United States navy may 
 be landed at Kanagawa, Hakodade, and Nagasaki, and 
 stored in warehouses, in the custody of an officer of the 
 American Government, without the payment of any duty. 
 But, if any such supplies are sold in Japan, the purchaser 
 shall pay the proper duty to the Japanese authorities. 
 
 The importation of opium is prohibited, and any Ameri- 
 can vessel coming to Japan for the purposes of trade, 
 having more than three catties (four pounds avoirdupois) 
 
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 273 
 
 weight of opium on board, such surplus quantity shall be 
 seized and destroyed by the Japanese authorities. All 
 goods imported into Japan, and which have paid the duty 
 fixed by this Treaty, may be transported by the Japanese 
 into any part of the empire without the payment of any 
 tax, excise, or transit duty whatever. 
 
 No higher duties shall be paid by Americans on goods 
 imported into Japan than are fixed by this Treaty, nor 
 shall any higher duties be paid by Americans than are 
 levied on the same description of goods if imported in 
 Japanese vessels, or the vessels of any other nation. 
 
 V. All foreign coin shall be current in Japan and pass 
 for its corresponding weight of Japanese coin of the same 
 description. Americans and Japanese may freely use 
 foreign or Japanese coin in making payments to each 
 other. 
 
 As some time will elapse before the Japanese will be 
 acquainted with the value of foreign coin, the Japanese 
 Government will, for the period of one year after the 
 opening of each harbour, furnish the Americans with 
 Japanese coin, in exchange for theirs, equal weights being 
 given and no discount taken for re-coinage. Coins of all 
 description (with the exception of Japanese copper coin), 
 may be exported from Japan, and foreign gold and silver 
 uncoined. 
 
 VI. Americans committing offences against Japanese 
 shall be tried in American Consular courts, and when 
 guilty shall be punished according to American law. 
 Japanese committing offences against Americans shall be 
 tried by the Japanese authorities and punished according 
 to Japanese law. The Consular courts shall be open to 
 Japanese creditors, to enable them to recover their just 
 claims against American citizens, and the Japanese courts 
 shall in like manner be open to American citizens for the 
 recovery of their just claims against Japanese. 
 
 All claims for forfeitures or penalties for violations of 
 this Treaty, or of the Articles regulating trade which are 
 
 1247 s 
 
274 UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
 
 appended hereunto, shall be sued for in the Consular courts, 
 and all recoveries shall be delivered to the Japanese 
 authorities. 
 
 Neither the American or Japanese Governments are to 
 be held responsible for the payment of any debts con- 
 tracted by their respective citizens or subjects. 
 
 VII. In the opened harbours of Japan, Americans shall 
 be free to go where they please, within the following limits : 
 
 At Kanagawa, the River Logo x (which empties into the 
 Bay of Yedo between Kawasaki and Sinagawa), and 10 ri 
 in any other direction. 
 
 At Hakodade, 10 ri in any direction. 
 
 At Hiogo, 10 ri in any direction, that of Kioto excepted, 
 which city shall not be approached nearer than 10 ri. The 
 crews of vessels resorting to Hiogo shall not cross the 
 River Enagawa, which empties into the Bay between 
 Hiogo and Osaca. The distance shall be measured inland 
 from Goyoso, 2 or town hall, of each of the foregoing har- 
 bours, the ri being equal to 4,275 yards American measure. 
 
 At Nagasaki, Americans may go into any part of the 
 Imperial domain in its vicinity. The boundaries of Nee-e- 
 gata, or the place that may be substituted for it, shall be 
 settled by the American Diplomatic Agent and the 
 Government of Japan. Americans who have been con- 
 victed of felony, or twice convicted of misdemeanours, 
 shall not go more than one Japanese ri inland from the 
 places of their respective residences, and all persons so 
 convicted shall lose their right of permanent residence in 
 Japan, and the Japanese authorities may require them 
 to leave the country. 
 
 A reasonable time shall be allowed to all such persons 
 to settle their affairs, and the American Consular authority 
 shall, after an examination into the circumstances of each 
 case, determine the time to be allowed, but such time shall 
 not in any case exceed one year, to be calculated from 
 the time the person shall be free to attend to his affairs. 
 1 Rokugo. a Goyosho. 
 
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 275 
 
 VIII. Americans in Japan shall be allowed the free 
 exercise of their religion, and for this purpose shall have 
 the right to erect suitable places of worship. No injury 
 shall be done to such buildings, nor any insult be offered 
 to the religious worship of the Americans. American 
 citizens shall not injure any Japanese temple or mia, or 
 offer any insult or injury to Japanese religious ceremonies, 
 or to the objects of their worship. 
 
 The Americans and Japanese shall not do anything 
 that may be calculated to excite religious animosity. The 
 Government of Japan has already abolished the practice 
 of trampling on religious emblems. 
 
 IX. When requested by the American Consul, the 
 Japanese authorities will cause the arrest of all deserters 
 and fugitives from justice, receive in jail all persons held 
 as prisoners by the Consul, and give to the Consul such 
 assistance as may be required to enable him to enforce the 
 observance of the laws by the Americans who are on land, 
 and to maintain order among the shipping. For all such 
 service, and for the support of prisoners kept in confine- 
 ment, the Consul shall in all cases pay a just compensation. 
 
 X. The Japanese Government may purchase or con- 
 struct, in the United States, ships of war, steamers, mer- 
 chant ships, whale ships, cannon, munitions of war, and 
 arms of all kinds, and any other things it may require. It 
 shall have the right to engage in the United States, 
 scientific, naval and military men, artisans of all kinds, 
 and mariners to enter into its service. All purchases made 
 for the Government of Japan may be exported from the 
 United States, and all persons engaged for its service may 
 freely depart from the United States : provided that no 
 articles that are contraband of war shall be exported, nor 
 any persons engaged to act in a naval or military capacity, 
 while Japan shall be at war with any Power in amity with 
 the United States. 
 
 XI. The Articles for the regulation of trade, which are 
 appended to this Treaty, shall be considered as forming 
 
 82 
 
276 UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
 
 a part of the same, and shall be equally binding on both 
 the Contracting Parties to this Treaty, and on their 
 citizens and subjects. 
 
 XII. Such of the provisions of the Treaty made by 
 Commodore Perry, and signed at Kanagawa, on the 31st of 
 March, 1854, as conflict with the provisions of this Treaty 
 are hereby revoked ; and as all the provisions of a Con- 
 vention executed by the Consul-General of the United 
 States and the Governors of Simoda, on the 17th of June, 
 1857, are incorporated in this Treaty, that Convention 
 is also revoked. 
 
 The person charged with the diplomatic relations of 
 the United States in Japan, in conjunction with such 
 person or persons as may be appointed for that purpose 
 by the Japanese Government, shall have power to make 
 such rules and regulations as may be required to carry 
 into full and complete effect the provisions of this Treaty, 
 and the provisions, of the Articles regulating trade 
 appended thereunto. 
 
 XIII. After the 4th of July, 1872, upon the desire of 
 either the American y or Japanese Governments, and on 
 one year's notice giveii by either party, this Treaty, and 
 such portions of the Treaty of Kanagawa as remain unre- 
 voked by this Treaty, together with the regulations of 
 trade hereunto annexed, or those that may be hereafter 
 introduced, shall be ^bject to revision by commissioners 
 appointed on both sides for this purpose, who will be 
 empowered to decidek>n, and insert therein, such amend- 
 ments as experience shall prove to be desirable. 
 
 XIV. This Treaty shall go into effect on the 4th of July, 
 1859, on or before which day the ratifications of the same 
 shall be exchanged at the city of Washington ; but if, 
 from any unforeseen cause, the ratifications cannot be 
 exchanged by that time, the Treaty shall still go into effect 
 at the date above mentioned. 
 
 The act of ratification on the part of the United States 
 shall be verified by the signature of the President of the 
 
 
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 277 
 
 United States, countersigned by the Secretary of State, 
 and sealed with the seal of the United States. 
 
 The act of ratification on the part of Japan shall be 
 verified by the name and seal of His Majesty the Ty-Coon, 
 and by the seals and signatures of such of his high officers 
 as he may direct. 
 
 This Treaty is executed in quadruplicate, each copy 
 being written in the English, Japanese, and Dutch 
 languages, all the versions having the same meaning and 
 intention, but the Dutch version shall be considered as 
 being the original. 
 
 In witness whereof, the above-named Plenipotentiaries 
 have hereunto set their hands and seals, at the city of 
 Yedo, this 29th day of July, in the year of our Lord 1858, 
 and of the Independence of the United States of America 
 the 83rd, corresponding to the Japanese era, the 19th 
 day of the 6th month of the 5th year of Ansei Mma. 1 
 
 (L.S.) TOWNSEND HARRIS. 
 
 Regulations under which American Trade is to be 
 
 conducted in Japan. 
 
 Regulation 1. Within 48 hours (Sundays excepted) 
 after the arrival of an American ship in a Japanese port, 
 the captain or commander shall exhibit to the Japanese 
 Custom-House authorities the receipt of the American 
 Consul, showing that he has deposited the ship's register 
 and other papers, as required by the laws of the United 
 States, at the American Consulate, and he shall then make 
 an entry of his ship, by giving a written paper, stating the 
 name of the ship, and the name of the port from which 
 she comes, her tonnage, the name of her captain or com- 
 mander, the names of her passengers (if any), and the 
 number of her crew, which paper shall be certified by the 
 captain or commander to be a true statement, and shall be 
 signed by him ; he shall at the same time deposit a written 
 
 1 For 5th year of Ansei Mma read 5th year (or year of the horse), of Ansei.. 
 
278 UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
 
 manifest of his cargo, setting forth the marks and numbers 
 of the packages and their contents, as they are described 
 in his bills of lading with the names of the person or persons 
 to whom they are consigned. A list of the stores of the 
 ship shall be added to the manifest. The captain or com- 
 mander shall certify the manifest to be a true account 
 of all the cargo and stores on board the ship, and shall 
 sign his name to the same. If any error is discovered in 
 the manifest, it may be corrected within 24 hours (Sundays 
 excepted) without the payment of any fee ; but for any 
 alteration or post entry to the manifest made after that 
 time, a fee of 1 5 dollars shall be paid. All goods not entered 
 on the manifest shall pay double duties on being landed. 
 Any captain or commander that shall neglect to enter his 
 vessel at the Japanese Custom-House within the time 
 prescribed by this regulation shall pay a penalty of 60 
 dollars for each day that he shall so neglect to enter his 
 ship. 
 
 Regulation 2. The Japanese Government shall have 
 the right to place Custom-House officers on board of any 
 ship in their ports (men-of-war excepted). All Custom- 
 House officers shall be treated with civility, and such 
 reasonable accommodation shall be allotted to them as the 
 ship affords. No goods shall be unladen from any ship 
 between the hours of sunset and sunrise, except by special 
 permission of the Custom-House authorities, and the 
 hatches, and all other places of entrance into that part 
 of the ship where the cargo is stowed, may be secured by 
 Japanese officers, between the hours of sunset and sunrise, 
 by affixing seals, locks, or other fastenings ; and if any 
 person shall, without due permission, open any entrance 
 that has been so secured, or shall break or remove any 
 seal, lock, or other fastening that has been affixed by the 
 Japanese Custom-House officers, every person so offending 
 shall pay a fine of 60 dollars for each offence. Any goods 
 that shall be discharged or attempted to be discharged 
 from any ship, without having been duly entered at the 
 
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 279 
 
 Japanese Custom-House, as hereinafter provided, shall 
 be liable to seizure and confiscation. 
 
 Packages of goods made up with an attempt to defraud 
 the revenue of Japan, by concealing therein articles of 
 value which are not set forth in the invoice, shall be 
 forfeited. 
 
 American ships that shall smuggle, or attempt to 
 smuggle, goods in any of the non-opened harbours of 
 Japan, all such goods shall be forfeited to the Japanese 
 Government, and the ship shall pay a fine of 1,000 dollars 
 for each offence. Vessels needing repairs may land their 
 cargo for that purpose without the payment of duty. All 
 goods so landed shall remain in charge of the Japanese 
 authorities, and all just charges for storage, labour, and 
 supervision shall be paid thereon. But if any portion of 
 such cargo be sold, the regular duties shall be paid on the 
 portion so disposed of. Cargo may be transhipped to 
 another vessel in the same harbour without the payment 
 of duty ; but all transhipments shall be made under the 
 supervision of Japanese officers, and after satisfactory 
 proof has been given to the Custom-House authorities of 
 the bona fide nature of the transaction, and also under 
 a permit to be granted for that purpose by such authori- 
 ties. The importation of opium being prohibited, if any 
 person or persons shall smuggle or attempt to smuggle, 
 any opium, he or they shall pay a fine of 15 dollars for each 
 catty of opium so smuggled or attempted to be smuggled ; 
 and if more than one person shall be engaged in the offence, 
 they shall collectively be held responsible for the payment 
 of the foregoing penalty. 
 
 Kegulation 3. The owner or consignee of any goods, 
 who desires to land them, shall make an entry of the same 
 at the Japanese Custom-House. The entry shall be in 
 writing, and shall set forth the name of the person making 
 the entry, and the name of the ship in which the goods were 
 imported, and the marks, numbers, packages, and contents 
 thereof , with the value of each package extended separately 
 
280 UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
 
 in one amount, and at the bottom of the entry shall be 
 placed the aggregate value of all the goods contained in 
 the entry. On each entry the owner or consignee shall 
 certify, in writing, that the entry then presented exhibits 
 the actual cost of the goods, and that nothing has been 
 concealed whereby the Customs of Japan would be 
 defrauded ; and the owner or consignee shall sign his 
 name to such certificate. 
 
 The original invoice or invoices of the goods so entered 
 shall be presented to the Custom-House authorities, and 
 shall remain in their possession until they have examined 
 the goods contained in the entry. 
 
 The Japanese officers may examine any or all of the 
 packages so entered, and for this purpose may take them 
 to the Custom-House, but such examination shall be 
 without expense to the importer or injury to the goods, 
 and after examination, the Japanese shall restore the 
 goods to their original condition in the packages (so far 
 as may be practicable), and which examination shall be 
 made without any unreasonable delay. 
 
 If any owner or importer discovers that his goods have 
 been damaged on the voyage of importation before such 
 goods have been delivered to him, he may notify the 
 Custom-House authorities of such damage, and he may 
 have the damaged goods appraised by two or more com- 
 petent and disinterested persons, who, after due examina- 
 tion shall make a certificate setting forth the amount per 
 cent, of damage on each separate package, describing it 
 by its mark and number, which certificates shall be signed 
 by the appraisers in presence of the Custom-House 
 authorities, and the importer may attach the certificate 
 to his entry, and make a corresponding deduction from it. 
 But this shall not prevent the Custom-House authorities 
 from appraising the goods in the manner provided in 
 Article IV of the Treaty, to which these regulations are 
 appended. 
 
 After the duties have been paid, the owner shall receive 
 
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 281 
 
 a permit authorizing the delivery to him of the goods, 
 whether the same are at the Custom-House or on ship- 
 board. All goods intended to be exported shall be entered 
 at the Japanese Custom-House before they are placed on 
 ship-board. The entry shall be in writing, and shall state 
 the name of the ship by which the goods are to be exported, 
 with the marks and numbers of the packages, and the 
 quantity, description, and value of their contents. The 
 exporter shall certify in writing that the entry is a true 
 account of all the goods contained therein, and shall sign 
 his name thereto. Any goods that are put on board of 
 a ship for exportation before they have been entered at 
 the Custom-House, and all packages which contain 
 prohibited articles, shall be forfeited to the Japanese 
 Government. 
 
 No entry at the Custom-House shall be required for 
 supplies for the use of ships, their crews, and passengers, 
 nor for the clothing, &c, of passengers. 
 
 Regulation 4. Ships wishing to clear shall give 24 
 hours' notice at the Custom-House, and at the end of that 
 time they shall be entitled to their clearance ; but if it be 
 refused, the Custom-House authorities shall immediately 
 inform the captain or consignee of the ship of the reasons 
 why the clearance is refused, and they shall also give the 
 same notice to the American Consul. 
 
 Ships of war of the United States shall not be required 
 to enter or clear at the Custom-House, nor shall they be 
 visited by Japanese Custom-House or police officers. 
 Steamers carrying the mails of the United States may 
 enter and clear on the same day, and they shall not be 
 required to make a manifest, except for such passengers 
 and goods as are to be landed in Japan. But such steamers 
 shall, in all cases, enter and clear at the Custom-House. 
 
 Whale ships touching for supplies, or ships in distress, 
 shall not be required to make a manifest of their cargo ; 
 but if they subsequently wish to trade, they shall then 
 deposit a manifest, as required in Regulation 1. 
 
282 UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
 
 The word ship, wherever it occurs in these Regulations, 
 or in the Treaty to which they are attached, is to be held 
 as meaning ship, barque, brig, schooner, sloop, or steamer. 
 
 Regulation 5. Any person signing a false declaration 
 or certificate with the intent to defraud the revenue of 
 Japan, shall pay a fine of 125 dollars for each offence. 
 
 Regulation 6. No tonnage duties shall be levied on 
 American ships in the ports of Japan, but the following 
 fees shall be paid to the Japanese Custom-House authori- 
 ties : for the entry of a ship, 15 dollars ; for the clearance of 
 a ship, 7 dollars ; for each permit, 1 J dollars ; for each bill 
 of health, 1 J dollars ; for any other document, If dollars. 
 
 Regulation 7. Duties shall be paid to the Japanese 
 Government on all goods landed in the country according 
 to the following tariff : 
 
 Glass 1. All articles in this class shall be free of duty. 
 
 Gold and silver, coined or uncoined. 
 
 Wearing apparel in actual use. 
 
 Household furniture and printed books not intended 
 for sale, but the property of persons who come to reside 
 in Japan. 
 
 Glass 2. A duty of 5 per cent, shall be paid on the 
 following articles : 
 
 All articles used for the 
 purpose of building, rigging, 
 repairing, or fitting out of 
 ships. 
 
 Whaling gear of all kinds. 
 
 Timber for building 
 houses. 
 
 Rice. 
 
 Paddy. 
 
 Steam machinery. 
 
 Glass 3. A duty of 35 per cent, shall be paid on all 
 intoxicating liquors, whether prepared by distillation, 
 fermentation, or in any other manner. 
 
 Salted provisions of all 
 kinds. 
 
 Bread and breadstuff s. 
 
 Living animals of all 
 kinds. 
 
 Coals. 
 
 Zinc. 
 
 Lead. 
 
 Tin. 
 
 Raw silk. 
 
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 283 
 
 Class 4. All goods not included in any of the preceding 
 classes shall pay a duty of 20 per cent. 
 
 All articles of Japanese production, which are exported 
 
 as cargo, shall pay a duty of 5 per cent., with the exception 
 
 of gold and silver coin and copper in bars. Five years after 
 
 the opening of Kanagawa the import and export duties 
 
 shall be subject to revision if the Japanese Government 
 
 desires it 
 
 (L.S.) TOWNSEND HARRIS. 
 
 APPENDIX 14 
 
 Notes on Treaties of 1858 
 
 Although the five treaties all followed the same 
 general lines, there were differences of arrangement and 
 other minor divergencies, reflecting, in some cases, the 
 special circumstances under which the negotiation took 
 place. Thus, for instance, four out of the five treaties 
 provided for free trade between the subjects and citizens 
 of the contracting parties, without the intervention of any 
 Japanese officers. But this stipulation does not occur in 
 the Russian treaty, and the American and Dutch treaties 
 contain an additional clause which provides that this 
 stipulation is to be made public in every part of the Japanese 
 Empire. The American, Dutch, and Russian treaties, 
 moreover, revoked, in whole or in part, previous agree- 
 ments : it was arranged that the American treaty should 
 go into effect at the appointed time, even in the absence 
 of an exchange of ratifications. In the American, Russian, 
 and French treaties the point of trampling on, or otherwise 
 insulting, Christian emblems is mentioned ; the two other 
 treaties are silent on the subject. The British and French 
 treaties are remarkable for the clearness with which the 
 question of jurisdiction is treated, and they are also the 
 only treaties which deal with the language of official 
 communications, and with the hire of pilots, a very 
 
284 NOTES ON TREATIES OF 1858 
 
 important matter in the days when Japanese waters were 
 not fully surveyed. The American treaty, moreover, 
 contained the singular provision that the President of the 
 United States would at the request of the Japanese 
 Government act as a friendly mediator in such matters of 
 difference as might arise between the Governments of 
 Japan and any European power. 
 
 The prohibition of the importation of opium, which 
 occurs in all the treaties, is evidently taken from the 
 Dutch supplementary treaty of 1857. 
 
 All the treaties agreed in making the Dutch version the 
 authentic text, the French treaty containing an additional 
 provision to the effect that the Dutch version was to be 
 regarded as not differing in any respect au fond from the 
 Dutch versions of the American, Russian, and British 
 treaties. 
 
 In all these treaties, as in the earlier ones, the Mikado 
 is not mentioned either in the foreign or Japanese texts. 
 And in the way in which the Tycoon is spoken of there are 
 differences between the earlier agreements and those of 
 1858, and between the foreign and the Japanese texts. In 
 the foreign texts of all the earlier treaties the Tycoon is 
 spoken of as the Emperor or Sovereign of Japan. In the 
 corresponding Japanese texts he is called the ' Tycoon ', 
 or the ' Tycoon of Japan ', except in the American Treaty 
 of 1854, where he is described also as Nihon Kunshiu, 
 * the sovereign or ruler of Japan,' and the Dutch Treaty of 
 1856, which in the final article speaks of RioJcoku-Kun, 
 the Kun of both countries, a term apparently invented 
 for the occasion. In the foreign versions of the American, 
 British, and Dutch Treaties of 1858 the Tycoon is called 
 ' His Majesty the Tycoon of Japan ', whilst in the other 
 two, the Russian and the French, he is still termed 
 ' Emperor '. In the corresponding Japanese texts of all 
 five treaties he is called ' Teikoku Dai Nihon no Taikun ', 
 or ' Nihon Taikun ', and never ' Kunshiu ' (' sovereign or 
 ruler '). 
 
FOREIGN INTERCOURSE, 1853 285 
 
 APPENDIX 15 
 
 Memorial on Foreign Intercourse presented to the 
 Shogunate by Ii kamon no Kami (afterwards known 
 as the Regent Ii), in 1853. 
 
 (Extract from Kaihohu Shimatsu, ' The Affair of the Opening of 
 
 the Country '.) 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Before the year 1636 there were nine government 
 vessels (of war), but at that date, owing to the prohibition 
 of Christianity during the rule of Iyemitsu, these vessels 
 were stopped from making voyages, and a law was passed 
 closing the seas to navigation, and shutting up the 
 country, trade being permitted only with the Chinese 
 and Dutch. Looking carefully at the circumstances of 
 to-day, distinguished and far-seeing scholars, who are 
 solicitous for the country's welfare, are discussing the 
 question eagerly. Should a crisis occur now, I do not 
 think that the peace of the country and the safety of the 
 State can be assured by simply maintaining the old laws 
 closing the seas to the navigation of our vessels, and in 
 any case some time must elapse before measures for 
 defence are complete. Since the destruction of all war 
 vessels of 500 koku and over, we have no war-ships which 
 could use heavy guns in a fight with foreigners. If they 
 were to obtain a foothold by seizing the Hachijo Islands 
 or Oshima (Vries Island), we could not let the matter 
 rest there, but without war-ships I feel uneasy with regard 
 to any scheme for pursuing and attacking them. There 
 is a saying handed down from the past that if the bridge 
 of a besieged castle be taken away it cannot hold out for 
 ever ; that if two armies are fighting with a river between 
 them the one that crosses and attacks the other will win. 
 It is an old axiom that the advantage is with the side 
 which attacks, and not with that which defends. Our 
 ancestors passed a law closing the ocean to navigation 
 
286 MEMORIAL ON 
 
 by our ships, but they left a Chinese and Dutch bridge. 
 This bridge will now be convenient to the government in 
 carrying out its foreign policy. If we postpone hostilities 
 for the present, a scheme to obtain certain victory and 
 ^complete security may be devised. Coal, which America 
 desires, is said to be abundant in Kiushiu, and although it 
 has been stated, for reasons of policy, that it is required 
 for use in Japan, if the Americans need it at sea in a 
 sudden emergency, they will come to Nagasaki and ask 
 for it. And if there is a surplus (not wanted by us), it 
 should be given them ; firewood and water, too, are 
 things which we should not grudge. With regard to 
 provisions, there are plentiful and scarce years in all 
 countries (and in the former stores ought to be accumu- 
 lated to provide for the latter), but these ought to be 
 given to shipwrecked people. Moreover, with regard to 
 castaways, these should be cared for, and restored to 
 their homes, as has been done of late years ; there is no 
 necessity to examine especially into these cases ; com- 
 munications with regard to all such matters can be made 
 through the Dutch. Again, with regard to trade, there 
 is a national prohibition, but there is a difference between 
 the past and the present ; to exchange what one has for 
 what one has not is the law of the universe. 
 
 After informing the spirits of our ancestors (of our 
 intentions) we should send merchant vessels from Japan 
 to the trading emporium of the Dutch Company in Java, 
 and selling things to the Americans and Russians carry 
 on trade with them through the medium of the Dutch. 
 It is said that the building of big vessels for navigating 
 the ocean will of course take one or two years. If the 
 Government deals with them (the Americans and Russians) 
 on the same general lines on which it has dealt with the 
 Dutch, they will in this way be taken by surprise. Then 
 we must restore the Government vessels which existed in 
 and before the period of Kwanyei (1624-44). Orders 
 should be given to the rich merchants of Osaka, Hiogo, or 
 
FOREIGN INTERCOURSE, 1853 287 
 
 Sakai, and, shares being given them in the enterprise, 
 strong and big men-of-war and steamers should be built. 
 (In these latter) goods not wanted by Japan should be 
 loaded; Dutchmen should, for a time, be engaged as 
 captains and sailors, honest and capable men should be 
 placed on board, and, they should be made to learn how 
 to work the guns, how to navigate the vessel, and how 
 to manage the compass. The vessels should be professedly 
 merchant ships, but in reality no effort should be spared 
 to obtain efficiency in naval drill ; the number of these 
 ships should be gradually increased, and at the same time 
 naval training should gradually be perfected, so that 
 Japanese might eventually navigate the high seas inde- 
 pendently and, no longer needing the secret information 
 supplied by the Dutch, see directly for themselves the 
 condition of foreign countries ; later on, complete naval 
 preparations might be made, and the panic and appre- 
 hensions which have hitherto prevailed would be dis- 
 pelled, the evil of luxury and extravagance be put an 
 end to, and the internal condition of the country as 
 regards military preparation being entirely satisfactory, 
 we should be in a condition to display our martial vigour 
 abroad. Thus no longer should we remain excluded 
 from the world, but, being completely equipped at 
 home and abroad, the Imperial land (Empire) would be 
 secure. This is my view. Let us go forward (to meet 
 difficulties — not wait for them to come to us) and 
 set to work at once. Having done this, the Government 
 can, in accordance with circumstances, at any time 
 prohibit intercourse as in the Kwanyei period and prevent 
 foreigners from coming to Japan. This is, I think, a good 
 plan. Again with regard to the prohibition of the strange 
 teaching, this should be maintained with the utmost 
 strictness. I understand that it is only of recent years 
 that the Americans and Russians have become fully 
 skilled in the art of navigation. Japanese are naturally 
 skilful and quick, and if they are from this time forward 
 
288 FOREIGN INTERCOURSE, 1853 
 
 trained, they will surpass foreigners. If, consideration 
 being given to the condition of the country, and the cir- 
 cumstances of the times, the state be guarded securely 
 for ever without danger to the Empire from foreign 
 barbarians, even if some alterations be made in the 
 country's ancient laws, the gods will, I think, not dis- 
 approve. The point of first importance in the action 
 now to be taken by the Government is, in my opinion, 
 that truth and righteousness should be secured inter- 
 nally. Therefore I am of opinion that in the first 
 place, a communication should be made to the Court, 
 and Imperial messengers being sent to (the shrines at) 
 Ise, Kiomidzu (Kioto) and Kagoshima, and a Shogun's 
 representative to Nikko, an announcement should be made 
 of the decision to be arrived at by the Government for the 
 tranquillity of the country and the security of the state, 
 and the matter left to the will of the gods, and that in 
 this way measures should be taken to bring into agree- 
 ment the ancient laws of the country of the gods and 
 the wishes of the people. 
 
 It is now by no means an easy matter by means of 
 military dispositions in the seas adjacent to the seat of 
 Government to arrange for everything to be in readiness 
 to meet a sudden and unexpected crisis. There should, 
 therefore, not be an instant's delay. However many 
 rings of iron walls may be erected, if foreign complications 
 occur, national harmony cannot be maintained. In any 
 case what is now of pressing importance is that the 
 Government should arrive at a decision for tranquillizing 
 the whole country, and that the necessary orders should 
 be issued to those concerned. 
 
 The above views being contrary to the august pro- 
 hibition, I feel alarmed at putting them forward, but 
 I offer this opinion because we are asked to speak fully, 
 and place our plans, if we have any, before the Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 (Sd.) II KAMON NO KAMI. 
 
LAST DAYS OF THE SHOGUNATE 289 
 
 APPENDIX 16 
 
 Extract from the Bakumatsu Gwaikodan, * The Story 
 of Foreign Relations in the Last Days of the 
 Shogunate ' (p. 53), with Reference to the Con- 
 sultation, EARLY IN 1858, OF THE DAIMIOS BY THE 
 
 Government in regard to the Conclusion of the 
 American Treaty of that Year, and the Action 
 taken by the court in consequence. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 When it had been decided in the Bakufu councils to 
 open the country, consent was given to the American 
 official's coming to Yedo (which he did on January 15, 
 1858) and having an audience of the Shdgun (which took 
 place on the 23rd of the same month). Five days later 
 Harris gave a lecture at the Yashiki of Hotta Bitchid no 
 Kami on the conditions of the world. His eloquence was 
 like a rushing torrent, and must have made a great 
 impression on the officials present, and converted them 
 (to his way of thinking). 
 
 It was therefore decided to conclude a treaty, and on 
 the one hand plenipotentiaries were appointed to negotiate, 
 while on the other hand the daimios were informed of 
 what was to be reported to the throne, and asked for their 
 opinions. . . . We only possess the replies of sixty-four or 
 sixty-five of the clans. It is not possible, therefore, to give 
 a complete summary of the views of the feudal nobility. 
 There were, however, only two daimios who were dis- 
 tinctly and positively in favour of refusing to have inter- 
 course with foreigners. These were Matsudaira Yamato 
 no Kami and Arima Nakatsukasa-taiyu. Some suggested 
 that an experimental permission for foreign intercourse 
 should be given ; others, that intercourse ought to be 
 restricted ; others again temporized and said they had 
 no opinion to offer. Two, however, were very decidedly 
 
 1247 T 
 
290 FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE 
 
 in favour of foreign intercourse. These were Matsudaira 
 Mikawa no Kami and Tachibana Hida no Kami. The 
 views of Matsudaira fichizen no Kami were the most 
 valuable, and showed that he understood the conditions 
 of the times. On the occasion of Perry's first visit the 
 memorial presented by that noble had been entirely 
 in favour of foreigners being driven away. His change 
 of views was due, it is said, to the advice of a retainer 
 named Hashimoto Sanai, who must have been a man of 
 . far-seeing views. Some of those consulted spoke of the 
 Shogun being charged with the duty of driving away 
 barbarians by virtue of his office, while others laid stress 
 on the importance of taking such action as might produce 
 harmony in the nation. Both of these opinions might be 
 taken to mean that foreign intercourse was undesirable, 
 but this was not actually said. . . . 
 
 In consequence of the views expressed by the daimios 
 the following decree was issued by the Court in the twelfth 
 month (January or February, 1858) : 
 
 The Council of State in Yedo have reported as follows : 
 The letter sent from America and the statements of the 
 envoy are difficult matters. Careful consideration is 
 therefore being given to them by the Government. 
 Commerce has been permitted. With regard to the matter 
 of a minister being appointed to reside in Japan, the 
 harmony of the public mind must be considered, and it 
 will be necessary to make communications regarding rules 
 for the date of residence (of the minister) and the place of 
 residence, &c. With regard also to (trading) ports, per- 
 mission has been given for Shimoda to be closed, and for 
 another port to be opened instead. With regard to the 
 place where the port shall be, this will be determined 
 subsequently after negotiation. This has been decided. 
 With regard to details a communication will be made later 
 on. We will inform the two persons (Harris and his 
 interpreter Heusken) that the above is to be laid before 
 the throne at once. 
 
LAST DAYS OF THE SHOGUNATE 291 
 
 Accordingly the matter has been communicated to the 
 Kwambaku and Taiko, and brought to the notice of the 
 throne. 
 
 The Imperial mind is much distressed by these difficult 
 things. With regard to the place of residence of the 
 Minister, and the place to be chosen as a port in substi- 
 tution (for Shimoda), no decision has been come to yet. 
 The present Imperial residence is different from what it 
 was in old days. If the matter be treated without due 
 consideration by the Government, the Imperial mind will 
 not be at ease. The five home provinces, and the other 
 provinces near the capital, must be made an exception 
 (namely, excluded from the operation of treaties), the 
 national honour must not be endangered, and the security 
 of the four classes of ^he people must be assured. This is 
 the desire of the throne. 
 
 Let this be communicated to the Kwanto. 1 
 
 APPENDIX 17 
 
 London Protocol, June, 1862 
 
 /Signed by Earl Russell and the Japanese Envoys, 
 
 June 6, 1862. 
 It has been represented to Her Britannic Majesty's 
 Minister in Japan by the Ministers of the Tycoon, and to 
 Her Majesty's Government by the Envoys who have been 
 sent to England by the Tycoon, that difficulties are 
 experienced by the Tycoon and his Ministers in giving 
 effect to their engagements with foreign Powers having 
 Treaties with Japan, in consequence of the opposition 
 offered by a party in Japan which is hostile to all inter- 
 course with foreigners. 
 
 Her Majesty's Government having taken those repre- 
 sentations into consideration, are prepared, on the con- 
 ditions hereinafter specified, to consent to defer for 
 a period of five years, to commence from the 1st of 
 
 1 See Glossary. 
 T2 
 
292 LONDON PROTOCOL, 1862 
 
 January, 1863, the fulfilment of those portions of the 
 Illrd Article of the Treaty between Great Britain and 
 Japan of the 26th of August, 1858, which provide for the 
 opening to British subjects of the port of Ni-igata or some 
 other convenient port on the West Coast of Nipon on the 
 1st day of January, 1860, and of the port of Hiogo on the 
 1st day of January, 1863, and for the residence of British 
 subjects in the city of Yedo from the 1st day of January, 
 1862, and in the city of Osaka from the 1st day of January, 
 1863. 
 
 Her Majesty's Government, in order to give to the 
 Japanese Ministers the time those Ministers consider 
 necessary to enable them to overcome the opposition now 
 existing, are willing to make these large concessions of 
 their rights under Treaty ; but they expect that the 
 Tycoon and his Ministers will in all other respects strictly 
 execute at the ports of Nagasaki, Hakodate, and Kana- 
 gawa, all the other stipulations of the Treaty ; that they 
 will publicly revoke the old law outlawing foreigners ; 
 and that they will specifically abolish and do away 
 with — 
 
 1. — All restrictions, whether as regards quantity or 
 price, on the sale by Japanese to foreigners of all kinds of 
 merchandise according to Article XIV of the Treaty of the 
 26th of August, 1858. 
 
 2. — All restrictions on labour, and more particularly 
 on the hire of carpenters, boatmen, boats, and coolies, 
 teachers, and servants of whatever denomination. 
 
 3. — All restrictions whereby Daimios are prevented from 
 sending their produce to market, and from selling the 
 same directly by their own agents. 
 
 4. — All restrictions resulting from attempts on the part 
 of the Custom-house authorities and other officials to 
 obtain fees. 
 
 5. — All restriction limiting the classes of persons who 
 shall be allowed to trade with foreigners at the ports of 
 Nagasaki, Hakodate, and Kanagawa. 
 
LONDON PROTOCOL, 1862 293 
 
 6. All restrictions imposed on free intercourse of a social 
 kind between foreigners and the people of Japan. 
 
 In default of the strict fulfilment by the Tycoon and 
 his Ministers of these conditions, which, indeed, are no 
 other than those which they are already bound by Treaty 
 to fulfil, Her Majesty's Government will, at any time 
 within the aforesaid period of five years, commencing 
 from the 1st of January, 1863, be entitled to withdraw the 
 concessions in regard to the ports and cities made by this 
 Memorandum, and to call upon the Tycoon and his Minis- 
 ters to carry out, without delay, the whole of the pro- 
 visions of the Treaty of August 26th, 1858, and specifically 
 to open the aforesaid ports and cities for the trade and 
 residence of British subjects. 
 
 The Envoys of the Tycoon accredited to Her Britannic 
 Majesty announce their intention, on their return to Japan, 
 to submit to the Tycoon and his Ministers the policy and 
 expediency of opening to foreign commerce the port of 
 Tsushima in Japan, as a measure by which the interests 
 of Japan will be materially promoted ; and they engage 
 to suggest to the Tycoon and his Ministers to evince their 
 goodwill to the nations of Europe, and their desire to 
 extend commerce between Japan and Europe, by reducing 
 the duties on wines and spirits imported into Japan, and 
 by permitting glass-ware to be inserted in the list of 
 articles on which an import duty of 5 per cent, is levied, 
 and thereby remedying an omission inadvertently made 
 on the conclusion of the Treaty ; and they further engage 
 to recommend to the Tycoon and his Ministers to make 
 arrangements for the establishment at Yokohama and 
 Nagasaki of warehouses in which goods coming from 
 abroad may be deposited, under the control of Japanese 
 officers, without payment of duties, until such time as the 
 importers shall obtain purchasers for such goods, and be 
 prepared to remove them on payment of the import duties. 
 
 Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State 
 for Foreign Affairs and the Envoys of the Tycoon have 
 
294 LONDON PROTOCOL, 1862 
 
 accordingly signed this Memorandum, which will be 
 transmitted by the former to Her Majesty's Representa- 
 tive in Japan, and by the latter to the Tycoon and his 
 Ministers, as an evidence of the arrangement made 
 between them on this 6th day of June, 1862. 
 
 (Signed) Earl Russell. 
 
 Takenouchi Shimotsuke no Kami. 
 Matsudaira Yewami no Kami, 
 klogoku noto no kami. 
 
 APPENDIX 18 
 Convention op Paris, June 20, 1864 
 
 L'arrangement suivant a ete conclu entre le Ministre des 
 Affaires fitrangeres et les Ambassadeurs du Japon : 
 
 Sa Majeste l'Empereur des Francais et Sa Majeste 
 FEmpereur du Japon, desirant consolider par des temoi- 
 gnages d'une mutuelle confiance les relations d'amitie et 
 de commerce qui existent entre les deux pays, ont resolu 
 de regler, d'un commun accord et par arrangement special, 
 les difficultes qui se sont elevees entre leurs Gouverne- 
 ments depuis l'annee 1862. 
 
 En consequence, son Excellence M. Drouyn de Lhuys, 
 Ministre Secretaire d'Etat au Departement des Affaires 
 Etrangeres de Sa Majeste l'Empereur des Francais ; et 
 leurs Excellences Ikeda Tsikougo no Kami, Kawatsou 
 Idzou no Kami, Kawada Sagami no Kami, Ambassadeurs 
 de Sa Majeste le Taicoun, dument autorises a cet effet, 
 sont convenus des Articles suivants : — 
 
 I. En reparation de l'acte d'hostilite commis, au mois de 
 Juillet 1863, contre le batiment de la marine imperiale le 
 1 Kien Cheng,' sur lequel des coups de canon ont ete tires, 
 dans la Province de Nagato, le Gouvernement japonais 
 s'engage a verser entre les mains du Ministre de Sa 
 Majeste l'Empereur des Francais a Yedo, trois mois apres 
 le retour de leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs du Taicoun 
 
CONVENTION OF PARTS, 1864 295 
 
 au Japon, une indemnity de 140,000 piastres mexicaines, 
 dont 100,000 piastres seront payees par le Gouvernement 
 lui-meme, et 40,000 piastres par l'Autorite de la Province 
 de Nagato. 
 
 II. Le Gouvernement japonais s'engage egalement a 
 faire cesser, dans les trois mois qui suivront le retour de 
 leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs du Taicoun au Japon, 
 les empechements que rencontrent en ce moment les na vires 
 frangais qui veulent passer le Detroit de Simonoseki, et a 
 maintenir ce passage libre en tout temps, en recourant, si 
 cela est necessaire, a l'emploi de la force, et, au besoin, en 
 agissant de concert avec le Commandant de la division 
 navale francaise. 
 
 III. II est convenu entre les deux Gouvernements que, 
 pour favoriser le developpement regulier des echanges com- 
 merciaux entre la France et le Japon, les reductions de 
 tarifs accordees en dernier lieu par le Gouvernement de 
 Sa Majeste le Taicoun au commerce etranger seront main- 
 tenues en faveur des articles importes par des commergants 
 f rancais, ou sous pavilion frangais, pendant toute la duree 
 du Traite conclu a Yedo entre les deux pays le 9 Octobre, 
 1858. 
 
 En consequence, tant que ce Traite demeurera en 
 vigueur, la douane japonaise admettra en franchise les 
 articles suivants destines a la preparation et a l'emballage 
 des thes — plomb en feuilles, soudures de plomb, nattes, 
 rotins, huiles pour peinture, indigo, gypse, bassines et 
 paniers. Elle percevra seulement un droit de 5 pour cent, 
 de la valeur a F entree des vins et spiritueux, sucre blanc, 
 fer et fer-blanc, machines et pieces detachees de machines, 
 tissus de lin, horlogerie, montres et chaines de montres, 
 verreries, medicaments, et un droit de 6 pour cent, sur 
 les glaces et miroirs, porcelaines, bijouterie, parfumerie, 
 savons, armes, coutellerie, livres, papiers, gravures et 
 dessins. 
 
 IV. Cet arrangement sera considere comme faisant partie 
 integrante du Traite du 9 Octobre, 1858, entre la France 
 
296 CONVENTION OF PARIS, 1864 
 
 et le Japon, et il sera immediatement mis a execution, 
 sans qu'il soit necessaire de le soumettre a la ratification 
 des Souverains respectifs. 
 
 En foi de quoi, les Plenipotentiaires ci-dessus nommes 
 ont signe le present arrangement et y ont appose le sceau 
 de leurs armes. 
 
 Fait a Paris, en double original, le vingtieme jour du 
 mois de Juin de Fan mil huit cent soixante-quatre. 
 
 (Signe) Droityn de Lhuys. 
 
 Ikeda Tsikougo no Kami. 
 Kawatsou Idzotj no Kami. 
 Kawada Sagami no Kami. 
 
 APPENDIX 19 
 
 Shimonoseki Convention, October, 1864. 
 
 Signed at Yokohama, 22nd October, 1864. 
 
 The Representatives of Great Britain, France, the 
 United States, and the Netherlands, in view of the hostile 
 acts of Mori Daizen, Prince of Nagato and Suwo, which 
 were assuming such formidable proportions as to make it 
 difficult for the Tycoon faithfully to observe the Treaties, 
 having been obliged to send their combined forces to the 
 Straits of Shimonoseki, in order to destroy the batteries 
 erected by that Daimio for the destruction of foreign 
 vessels and the stoppage of trade ; and the Government 
 of the Tycoon, on whom devolved the duty of chastising 
 this rebellious Prince, being held responsible for any 
 damage resulting to the interests of Treaty Powers, as 
 well as the expenses occasioned by the expedition ; 
 
 The Undersigned Representatives of Treaty Powers, 
 and Sakai Hida no Kami, a member of the Second Council, 
 invested with plenipotentiary powers by the Tycoon of 
 Japan, animated with the desire to put an end to all 
 reclamations concerning the acts of aggression and 
 hostility committed by the said Mori Daizen, since the 
 
SHIMON OSfiKI CONVENTION, 1864 297 
 
 first of these acts, in June, 1863, against the flags of divers 
 Treaty Powers, and at the same time to regulate definitely 
 the question of indemnities of war, of whatever kind, in 
 respect to the allied expedition to Shimonoseki, have 
 agreed and determined upon the four Articles following : — 
 
 I. The amount payable to the four Powers is fixed at 
 3,000,000 dollars. This sum to include all claims, of 
 whatever nature, for past aggressions on the part of the 
 Prince of Nagato, whether indemnities, ransom for 
 Shimonoseki, or expenses entailed by the operations of 
 the allied squadrons. 
 
 II. The whole sum to be payable quarterly in instal- 
 ments of one-sixth, or 500,000 dollars, to begin from the 
 date when the Representatives of said Powers shall make 
 known to the Tycoon's Government the ratification of 
 this Convention and the instructions of their respective 
 Governments. 
 
 III. Inasmuch as the receipt of money has never been 
 the object of the said Powers, but the establishment of 
 better relations with Japan, and the desire to place these 
 on a more satisfactory and mutually advantageous footing 
 is still the leading object in view, therefore, if His Majesty 
 the Tycoon wishes to offer in lieu of payment of the sum 
 claimed, and as a material compensation for loss and 
 injury sustained, the opening of Shimonoseki, or some 
 other eligible port in the Inland Sea, it shall be at the 
 option of the said foreign Governments to accept the 
 same, or insist on the payment of the indemnity in money 
 under the conditions above stipulated. 
 
 IV. This Convention to be formally ratified by the 
 Tycoon's Government within fifteen days from the date 
 thereof. 
 
 In token of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have 
 signed and sealed this Convention in quintuplicate, with 
 English and Japanese versions, whereof the English shall 
 be considered the original. 
 
 Done at Yokohama this 22nd day of October, 1864, 
 
298 SHIMONOS^KI CONVENTION, 1864 
 
 corresponding to the twenty-second day of the ninth 
 month of the first Year of Genji. 
 The Japanese character for : 
 
 ~. , Sakai Hid a no Kami. 
 * ° Rutherford Alcock, Her Britannic 
 
 Majesty^s Envoy Extraordinary and 
 
 Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan. 
 LiiON Roches, MinistrePlenipotentiaire 
 
 de Sa Majeste VEmpereur des Francais 
 
 au Japon. 
 Robt. H. Pruyn, Ministre Resident 
 
 of the United States in Japan. 
 D. de Graeff van Polsbroek, His 
 
 Netherlands Majesty's Consul-General 
 
 and Political Agent in Japan. 
 
 APPENDIX 20 
 
 Tariff Convention, June, 1866. 
 
 Signed at Yedo in the English, French, Dutch, and Japanese 
 languages, on the 25th day of June, 1866. 
 
 The Representatives of Great Britain, France, of the 
 United States of America and Holland, having received 
 from their respective Governments identical instructions 
 for the modification of the Tariff of Import and Export 
 Duties contained in the Trade Regulations annexed to 
 the Treaties concluded by the aforesaid Powers with the 
 Japanese Government in 1858, which modification is 
 provided for by the VHth of those Regulations ; — 
 
 And the Japanese Government having given the said 
 Representatives, during their visit to Osaka in November, 
 1865, a written engagement to proceed immediately to the 
 Revision of the Tariff in question, on the general basis of 
 a duty of five per cent, on the value of all articles Imported 
 or Exported ; — 
 
 And the Government of Japan being desirous of affording 
 
TARIFF CONVENTION, 1866 299 
 
 a fresh proof of their wish to promote trade and to 
 cement the friendly relations which exist between their 
 country and foreign nations ; — 
 
 His Excellency Midzuno Idzumi no Kami, a Member 
 of the Gorojiu and a Minister of Foreign Affairs has been 
 furnished by the Government of Japan, with the necessary 
 powers to conclude with the Representatives of the above- 
 named four Powers, that is to say ; 
 Of Great Britain, 
 Sir Harry S. Parkes, Knight Commander of the 
 Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Her Britannic 
 Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni- 
 potentiary in Japan ; 
 Of France, 
 Monsieur Leon Roches, Commander of the Imperial 
 Order of the Legion of Honour, Minister Plenipotentiary 
 of His Majesty the Emperor of the French in Japan ; 
 Of the United States of America, 
 A. L. C. Portman, Esquire, Charge d' Affaires ad 
 interim ; 
 And of Holland, 
 Monsieur Dirk de Graeff van Polsbroek, Knight 
 of the Order of the Netherlands Lion, Political Agent 
 and Consul General of His Majesty the King of the 
 Netherlands ; 
 
 The following Convention, comprising Twelve Articles. 
 I. The contracting Parties declare in the names of their 
 respective Governments that they accept, and they hereby 
 do formally accept as binding upon the subjects of their 
 respective Sovereigns, and the citizens of their respective 
 countries, the Tariff hereby established and annexed to 
 the present Convention. 
 
 This tariff is substituted not only for the original Tariff 
 attached to the Treaties concluded with the above-named 
 four Powers, but also for the special Conventions and 
 arrangements relative to the same Tariff, which have been 
 entered into at different dates up to this time between the 
 
300 TARIFF CONVENTION, 1866 
 
 Governments of Great Britain, France, and the United 
 States on one side, and the Japanese Government on the 
 other. 
 
 The New Tariff shall come into effect in the Port of 
 Kanagawa (Yokohama) on the first day of July next, and 
 in the ports of Nagasaki and Hakodate on the first day of 
 the following month. 
 
 II. The Tariff attached to this Convention being incor- 
 porated from the date of its signature in the Treaties 
 concluded between Japan and the above-named four 
 Powers, is subject to revision on the first day of July, 1872. 
 
 Two years, however, after the signing of the present 
 Convention, any of the contracting parties on giving six 
 months' notice to the others, may claim a re-adjustment 
 of the duties on Tea and Silk on the basis of five per cent, 
 on the average value of these articles, during the three years 
 last preceding. On the demand also of any of the con- 
 tracting parties, the duty on timber may be changed from 
 an ad valorem to a specific rate six months after the 
 signature of this Convention. 
 
 III. The Permit fee hitherto levied under the Vlth 
 Regulation attached to the above-named Treaties, is hereby 
 abolished. Permits for the landing or shipment of cargo 
 will be required as formerly, but will hereafter be issued 
 free of charge. 
 
 IV. On and from the first day of July next at the port of 
 Kanagawa (Yokohama), and on and from the first day of 
 October next at the Ports of Nagasaki and Hakodate, the 
 Japanese Government will be prepared to warehouse 
 imported goods on the application of the importer or 
 owner, without payment of duty. The Japanese Govern- 
 ment will be responsible for the safe custody of the goods, 
 so long as they remain in their charge, and will adopt all 
 the precautions necessary to render them insurable against 
 fire. When the importer or the owner wishes to remove 
 the goods from the warehouse, he must pay the duties 
 fixed by the Tariff, but if he should wish to re-export them 
 
TARIFF CONVENTION, 1866 301 
 
 he may do so without payment of duty. Storage charges 
 will in either case be paid on delivery of the goods. The 
 amount of these charges, together with the regulations 
 necessary for the management of the said Warehouses 
 will be established by the common consent of the con- 
 tracting parties. 
 
 V. All articles of Japanese production may be conveyed 
 from any place in Japan to any of the Ports open to 
 foreign trade, free of any tax or transit duty other than 
 the usual tolls levied equally on all traffic for the main- 
 tenance of roads or navigation. 
 
 VI. In conformity with those articles of the Treaties 
 concluded between Japan and Foreign Powers which stipu- 
 late for the circulation of foreign coin at its corresponding 
 weight in native coin of the same description, dollars have 
 hitherto been received at the Japanese Custom-house in 
 payment of duties at their weight in Boos (commonly 
 called Ichiboos), that is to say, at a rate of Three Hundred 
 and Eleven Boos per Hundred dollars. The Japanese 
 Government being, however, desirous to alter this practice 
 and to abstain from all interference in the exchange of 
 native for foreign coin, and being also anxious to meet the 
 wants both of native and foreign commerce by securing an 
 adequate issue of native coin, have already determined to 
 enlarge the Japanese Mint so as to admit of the Japanese 
 Government exchanging into native coin of the same 
 intrinsic value, less only the cost of coinage, at the places 
 named for this purpose, all foreign coin or bullion 
 in gold or silver that may at any time be tendered 
 to them by foreigners or Japanese. It being essential, 
 however, to the execution of this measure, that the various 
 Powers with whom Japan has concluded Treaties should 
 first consent to modify the stipulations in those Treaties 
 which relate to the currency, the Japanese Government 
 will at once propose to those Powers the adoption of the 
 necessary modification in the said stipulations, and on 
 receiving their concurrence will be prepared from the 
 
302 TARIFF CONVENTION, 1866 
 
 first of January, 1868, to carry the above measure into 
 effect. 
 
 The rates to be charged as the cost of coinage shall 
 be determined hereafter by the common consent of the 
 contracting parties. 
 
 VII. In order to put a stop to certain abuses and incon- 
 veniences complained of at the open Ports, relative to the 
 transaction of business at the Custom-house, the landing 
 and shipping of cargoes and the hiring of boats, coolies, 
 servants, &c, the contracting parties have agreed that 
 the Governor at each open port shall at once enter into 
 negotiations with the foreign Consuls with a view to the 
 establishment, by mutual consent, of such regulations as 
 shall effectually put an end to these abuses and incon- 
 veniences and afford all possible facility and security both 
 to the operations of trade and to the transactions of 
 individuals. 
 
 It is hereby stipulated that in order to protect mer- 
 chandise from exposure to weather, these regulations shall 
 include the covering in at each port of one or more of the 
 landing places used by foreigners for landing or shipping 
 cargo. 
 
 VIII. Any Japanese subject shall be free to purchase 
 cither in the open Ports of Japan or abroad, every descrip- 
 tion of sailing or steam-vessel intended to carry either 
 passengers or cargo ; but ships of war may only be obtained 
 under the authorization of the Japanese Government. 
 
 All foreign vessels purchased by Japanese subjects 
 shall be registered as Japanese vessels on payment of 
 a fixed duty of three Boos per ton for steamers and one 
 Boo per ton for sailing vessels. The tonnage of each 
 vessel shall be proved by the Foreign Register of the ship, 
 which shall be exhibited through the Consul of the party 
 interested on the demand of the Japanese Authorities, 
 and shall be certified by the Consul as authentic. 
 
 IX. In conformity with the Treaties concluded between 
 Japan and the aforesaid Powers, and with the special 
 
TARIFF CONVENTION, 1866 303 
 
 arrangements made by the Envoys of the Japanese Govern- 
 ment in their note to the British Government of the sixth 
 of June, 1862, and in their note to the French Government 
 of the sixth of October of the same year, all the restrictions 
 on trade and intercourse between foreigners and Japanese 
 alluded to in the said notes, have been entirely removed, 
 and proclamations to this effect have already been pub- 
 lished by the Government of Japan. 
 
 The latter, however, do not hesitate to declare that 
 Japanese merchants, and traders of all classes are at 
 liberty to trade directly, and without the interference of 
 Government officers, with foreign merchants, not only at 
 the open Ports of Japan, but also in all foreign countries, 
 on being authorized to leave their country in the manner 
 provided for in Article X of the present Convention, 
 without being subject to higher taxation by the Japanese 
 Government than levied on the native trading classes of 
 Japan in their ordinary transactions with each other. 
 
 And they further declare that all Daimios or persons in 
 the employ of Daimios are free to visit on the same con- 
 ditions, any foreign country, as well as all the open Ports of 
 Japan, and to trade there with foreigners as they please, 
 without the interference of any Japanese officer, provided 
 always they submit to the existing Police regulations and 
 to the payment of the established duties. 
 
 X. All Japanese subjects may ship goods to or from 
 any open Port in Japan, or to and from the Ports of any 
 Foreign Power, either in vessels owned by Japanese or in 
 the vessels of any nation having a Treaty with Japan. 
 Furthermore, on being provided with Passports through 
 the proper Department of the Government, in the manner 
 specified in the Proclamation of the Japanese Government 
 dated the twenty-third day of May, 1866, all Japanese 
 subjects may travel to any foreign country for purposes 
 of study or trade. They may also accept employment in 
 any capacity on board the vessels of any nation having 
 a Treaty with Japan. 
 
304 TARIFF CONVENTION, 1866 
 
 Japanese in the employ of foreigners may obtain 
 Government passports to go abroad on application to the 
 Governor of any open Port. 
 
 XI. The Government of Japan will provide all the Ports 
 open to foreign trade with such lights, buoys or beacons 
 as may be necessary to render secure the navigation of the 
 approaches to the said Ports. 
 
 XII. The Undersigned being of opinion that it is un- 
 necessary that this Convention should be submitted to their 
 respective Governments, for ratification, before it comes 
 into operation, it will take effect on and from the first day 
 of July, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-six. 
 
 Each of the Contracting Parties having obtained the 
 approval of his Government to this Convention, shall 
 make known the same to the others, and the communi- 
 cation in writing of this approval shall take the place of 
 a formal exchange of Ratifications. 
 
 In Witness whereof the above-named Plenipoten- 
 tiaries have signed the present Convention, and have 
 affixed thereto their seals. 
 
 Done at Yedo in the English, French, Dutch, and 
 Japanese languages this twenty-fifth day of June, one 
 thousand eight hundred and sixty-six. 
 
 [L.S.] Harry S. Parkes, 
 
 Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extra- 
 ordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary 
 in Japan. 
 
 [L.S.] Leon Roches, 
 
 Ministre Plenipotentiaire de 8. M. 
 UEmpereur des Francais au Japon. 
 
 [L.S.] A. L. C. Portman, 
 
 Charge d? Affaires a. i. of the United 
 States, in Japan. 
 
 [L.S.] D. de Graeff van Polsbroek, Politiek 
 Agent en Consul Generaal der Neder- 
 landen, in Japan. 
 
 [L.S.] Midzuno Idzumi no Kami. 
 
SHOGUN'S RESIGNATION 305 
 
 APPENDIX 21 
 
 Manifesto announcing Shogun's Resignation, 
 
 November 8, 1867. 
 
 (Extract from Kaikolcu Kigen, i The Beginning of the Opening of the 
 
 Country,' p. 2930.) 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Looking at the various changes through which the 
 Empire has passed, we see that when the monarchical 
 authority became weakened, the power was seized by 
 the Ministers of State, and that afterwards, owing to the 
 civil wars of the periods Hogen (1156-9) and Heiji (1159- 
 60), it passed into the hands of the military class. Later 
 on again my ancestor received special favour from the 
 throne (by being appointed Shogun), and his descendants 
 have succeeded him for over 200 years. Though I fill the 
 same office, the laws are often improperly administered, 
 and I confess with shame that the condition of affairs 
 to-day shows my incapacity. Now that foreign inter- 
 course becomes daily more extensive, unless the Govern- 
 ment is directed from one central point, the basis of 
 administration will fall to pieces. If, therefore, the old 
 order of things be changed, and the administrative 
 authority be restored to the Imperial Court, if national 
 deliberations be conducted on an extensive scale, and the 
 Imperial decision then invited, and if the Empire be 
 protected with united hearts and combined effort, our 
 country will hold its own with all nations of the world. 
 This is our one duty to our country, but if any persons 
 have other views on the subject they should be stated 
 without reserve. 
 
 1247 
 
306 STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR 
 
 APPENDIX 22 
 
 Statement of Reasons for Shogun's Resignation 
 presented by japanese ministers in yedo to 
 Foreign Representatives in November, 1867. 
 
 (Extract from Bahumatsu Gwaikodan, ' The Story of Foreign Relations 
 in the last days of the Shogunate,' pp. 524 et seq.) 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 The Tycoon of Japan has of his own free will decided 
 to return to the Mikado the administrative authority 
 which has been handed down to him by his ancestors 
 through a period of more than 250 years. Fearing that 
 at this moment of political change people's minds may 
 be led astray by false rumours and idle reports, we think 
 it necessary to make the following explanation of the 
 circumstances of the case to all countries. 
 
 More than two thousand years ago, when the ancestors 
 of the Royal House came down from heaven they governed 
 the country by personal rule, and so did their descendants 
 after them. They were then actually (as well as in name) 
 the sovereigns of Japan, and were known to foreign 
 countries by the name of Mikados. 
 
 After a time the condition of the country deteriorated, 
 and the governing power fell into the hands of a distant 
 branch of the Imperial House, — the family of Fujiwara, 
 the Mikados reigning, but taking no part in the adminis- 
 tration. After this family had assumed power, its members 
 gave themselves up to luxury and effeminacy, and though 
 the Court was supposed to be composed of officers com- 
 bining civil and military duties, this state of things existed 
 only in name, and military power was in the hands of 
 hereditary military officials. Whenever there was trouble 
 in the country, the Government were unable to cope with 
 it. So when there were rebels, the Government relied on 
 these hereditary military officials to carry out their 
 
SHOGUN'S RESIGNATION, 1867 307 
 
 chastisement. These hereditary military officials were 
 grouped under two chief houses, the Minamoto and Taira. 
 They divided the country between them, the Minamoto 
 having authority in the east, and the Taira in the west. 
 Then there was a quarrel regarding the Imperial succession, 
 and the whole country ranged itself under the rival 
 banners, even the house of Fujiwara taking sides. At 
 first the Taira were victorious, and they succeeded to the 
 position of the Fujiwara, and ruled the country for twenty 
 years. But they acted arrogantly, and wrongly made use 
 of the Imperial name to cloak their arbitrary designs. 
 The Mikado thereupon called the Minamoto to his 
 assistance, and caused them to destroy the house of Taira. 
 The Minamoto destroyed their ancient enemies, and 
 preserved the Imperial House. The latter, in reward for 
 the services rendered, entrusted the whole country to the 
 military authority of the Minamoto. The military class 
 thus, as a result of the events of several years, came to 
 the front everywhere, and, the power of the Court being 
 unable to restrain it, in all parts of the country military 
 chieftains rose to the head of affairs. None had any 
 influence in the administration save members of the 
 military class, and they gained it by service to the Throne, 
 by lineage, and by gaining the confidence of the nation. 
 In the end all power became concentrated in the military 
 class. This was about a.d. 1200, according to Western 
 reckoning. The political change thus introduced was 
 very great. The official title (of the new administrator) 
 was Sei-i-tai Shogun. His position was conferred upon 
 him by the Court, but his rule extended over the whole 
 country. This is how the Tycoon came to preside over 
 the Government under the Emperor of Japan. 
 
 Afterwards, any one disputing administrative authority 
 in the country at once assailed the position of the Shogun, 
 civil war continued for nearly 400 years ; great chieftains 
 established themselves in all parts of the land, and fought 
 with one another; both Mikado and Shogun were non- 
 1247 xj 2 
 
308 STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR 
 
 entities, and the condition of the Empire became more 
 disturbed than ever. 
 
 This was the state of affairs when ToshSgu, 1 the ancestor 
 of our Tycoon, stepped on the scene, and by immense 
 exertions put an end to this disorder. 
 
 The Mikado of that day highly appreciating his great 
 services, appointed him to be Shogun, and entrusted to 
 him all the administrative affairs of the country, both 
 civil and military. The ancestor of the ruler who became 
 known to foreign countries as our Tycoon, far surpassed 
 all previous Shoguns in regard to services rendered. His 
 authority also exceeded that of any other Shogun who 
 had preceded him. Consequently he caused the various 
 feudal chieftains throughout the country who had pre- 
 viously established themselves by force of arms in various 
 places, and had enjoyed independent power, to assemble 
 in Yedo, his own place of residence, and take an oath of 
 fealty to him. He also acquired the right of investing 
 these feudal lords with their territories, or depriving 
 them of them, and this investiture was conferred by 
 special written grant. Yashikis were also established in 
 Yedo, and the system of attendance there every year, or 
 every alternate year, was introduced. All daimios, both 
 great and small, throughout the Empire, accepted these 
 laws, and submitted to them, and there was not one 
 dissentient voice. 
 
 The descendants of this ancestor have succeeded one 
 another for several generations, and have continued to 
 govern the country in this way for over 200 years with 
 the approval of the Court, the feudal nobility submitting 
 thereto and the people pursuing their avocations in tran- 
 quillity and enjoying the blessings of a long peace. 
 
 At the beginning of the long period (we have described) 
 foreign ships came to Japan, and Japanese vessels traded 
 abroad, and there was no hindrance to foreign commerce. 
 But from a certain foreign country there came missionaries, 
 
 1 The posthumous name of Iyeyasu. 
 
SHOGUN'S RESIGNATION, 1867 309 
 
 who conspired with certain rebellious Japanese and plotted 
 to create disturbance. In order to preserve the peace of 
 the country severe edicts were issued, this religious move- 
 ment was proscribed, the missionaries were driven away, 
 and in the end the visits of foreign ships were prohibited, 
 and Japanese vessels were forbidden to go to foreign 
 countries, trade being permitted with only one or two 
 foreign countries at the single port of Nagasaki. The 
 closing of Japan was a step rendered unavoidable by the 
 circumstances of that time. 
 
 Of recent years, however, the conditions of the world 
 have greatly changed, and, an Envoy having come from the 
 United States, the country was opened. The Tycoon of 
 that time, and one or two leading statesmen in the 
 Government realized that in modern times, from the 
 moment when the invention of steam navigation had 
 brought all countries near to one another, it was impossible 
 for one island country in the East to refuse to have inter- 
 course with all other nations in the world. They, there- 
 fore agreed (to the Envoy's proposals), and it was decided 
 to establish foreign intercourse and trade, conclude 
 treaties, and generally to revert to the condition of things 
 which existed under the rule of the founder of the line. 
 
 This was indeed a great change in the affairs of the 
 country, and people who were contented with the old 
 condition of things became very dissatisfied. Consequently 
 the cry of ' Close the country and expel foreigners ' was 
 heard everywhere. The Tycoon's Government, suiting 
 its action to circumstances, took the excellent and suitable 
 decision above-mentioned; but those who were dis- 
 satisfied mistook what was done for submission to foreign 
 demands from fear of hostilities. And they slandered 
 (the Tycoon) to the Court, saying that he was neglecting 
 the military duty entrusted to him. The Court did not 
 understand the state of things, and at once agreed to 
 what was suggested, ordering the Tycoon's Government 
 to break off intercourse with foreigners. Consequently 
 
 t U 3 
 
310 STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR 
 
 many foreign complications occurred, and indescribable 
 inconvenience was caused. With these the Foreign 
 Representatives are well acquainted, so they need not be 
 mentioned here. 
 
 We confess with shame that it cannot be said that 
 since foreign intercourse was established by the Tycoon's 
 Government all its measures have been attended with 
 complete success. But we can say this, that ever since 
 the conclusion of foreign treaties those who have advocated 
 the closing of the country, and have been hostile to 
 foreigners, have gradually been suppressed, and that the 
 Government has never swerved from its fixed intention 
 to carry out every clause of the treaties. 
 
 That it has been possible to settle the rules for the 
 opening of the country, and carry out all treaty stipula- 
 tions, is due most certainly to the fact that our present 
 energetic and sagacious Tycoon, who is endowed with 
 heaven-sent intelligence, has filled the post of ruler of 
 Japan in succession to his ancestors. The Foreign Repre- 
 sentatives know well what cordial feelings he manifested 
 to them when in the course of this year he received them 
 in audience in the castle of Osaka, what sincere friendship 
 he showed, how careful he was to respect treaty engage- 
 ments, and how many obstacles, incidental to his duties 
 as Tycoon, were met and overcome before the present 
 position was attained. 
 
 The form of administration under which (the Tycoon) 
 has governed the country, holding a rank one degree 
 below that of the Emperor, is one peculiar to Japan, which 
 is the natural result of circumstances, and has lasted for 
 the last six hundred years. By virtue of the authority 
 thus wielded tranquillity was maintained, but now that 
 relations have been established with the whole world 
 much inconvenience is caused owing to the name under 
 which this intercourse is carried on. Moreover, the fact 
 that, at present, men's minds throughout the country are 
 in a state of confusion, and are not in harmony, is due 
 
SHOGUN'S RESIGNATION, 1867 311 
 
 chiefly to the same cause. Therefore our enlightened 
 Tycoon, making up his mind of his own accord, has 
 arrived at the momentous decision to restore the adminis- 
 trative authority to the Mikado, and convoking a council 
 of the heads of the great houses, and inquiring fully into 
 the present condition of affairs, to set up a suitable Govern- 
 ment, and establish a political constitution which nothing 
 in the future can disturb, and in this way enable the country 
 to hold its own with other nations, and become rich and 
 strong. Of a surety never has such great solicitude for the 
 welfare of a country been shown before. 
 
 Matters have thus arrived at the present situation. 
 But it is unnecessary for us to give an assurance that the 
 change will in no way affect unfavourably our relations 
 with foreign countries, and that everything will be 
 arranged quietly and harmoniously as before. There is 
 no reason for anxiety. 
 
 All the provisions of the treaties concluded with 
 Foreign Powers have been carried out by the Tycoon, 
 and he has thoroughly recognized the importance of 
 foreign relations. The Council of feudal nobles, great and 
 small, which is shortly to assemble, will, as soon as the 
 circumstances of foreign affairs have been explained to 
 them, all respect what has been done. And in view of the 
 fact that eight or nine in every ten persons have enjoyed 
 the benefits conferred on them by the Tokugawa rule, 
 although there may be some people who are in favour of 
 old institutions, there is no chance of their being able to 
 gain the day. We earnestly trust, therefore, that the 
 Foreign Representatives will support our views with their 
 usual friendliness, and will in the spirit of the exertions 
 already made by their countries for the prosperity of all 
 concerned look at things as they really are. 
 
 We have ventured to undertake this explanation of the 
 past. With regard to other matters, as was stated in our 
 recent letter, we shall communicate with you again as 
 soon as we have heard from Kioto. 
 
312 PROTEST TO THE COURT 
 
 APPENDIX 23 
 
 Protest presented by ex-Shogun to the Court on 
 
 January 7, 1868. 1 
 
 (Extract from the Sanjiunen Shi, ' History of Thirty Years,' p. 753.) 
 
 I beg to acknowledge with respect the receipt of the 
 Imperial Orders stating that the matter of the Choshiu 
 princes has been arranged in accordance with the Imperial 
 wishes ; that no objection to this arrangement has been 
 made, but that it is desirable, in view of the Emperor's 
 youth, and the importance of not alarming His Majesty 
 or prejudicing the Imperial authority, to take every 
 precaution against the outbreak of disturbances, and that 
 therefore I am to exert myself to preserve order. 
 
 I had taken careful steps for guarding the Imperial 
 palace, but now extraordinary changes have been made, 
 so that I am greatly distressed about preserving order. 
 Careful instructions have been given to all officials, but 
 I find it difficult to control so large a number of people — 
 [an allusion evidently to the numerous bodies of clansmen 
 who had entered Kioto]. I have tried to do my duty by 
 the Throne, but I fear that my efforts will be brought to 
 naught by the rude action of common fellows. I have 
 therefore decided to retire to Osaka for a short while. 
 I trust that the Emperor will understand that I am doing 
 this solely in the interests of the Throne, being anxious 
 that order should be preserved, and tranquillity main- 
 tained, in the precincts of the palace. I ought to have 
 asked leave of the Throne before quitting the capital, 
 but this would have taken time, and I was afraid that in 
 the interval, through some fault of those low rascals, 
 a grave national crisis might be precipitated. I am 
 therefore leaving for Osaka at once. 
 
 1 Both in the book from which this document is taken, and in the 
 Kaikoku Kiyen, the date given is Jan. 27, 1868, which is manifestly an 
 error. 
 
MEMORIAL TO THE CROWN 313 
 
 APPENDIX 24 
 Memorial surrendering their fiefs to the Crown 
 
 PRESENTED IN MARCH, 1869, BY THE DaIMIOS OF 
 
 Satsuma, Choshiu, Hizen, and Tosa. 
 
 (Taken from Parliamentary Paper (Report on Taxation and Land 
 Tenure by Mr. Gubbins) published in 1884.) 
 
 ' Your servants again venture to address Your Majesty 
 with profound reverence. Two things are essential to 
 the Mikado's administration. There must be one central 
 body of government, and one universal authority which 
 must be preserved intact. Since the time when Your 
 Majesty's ancestors founded this country and established 
 a basis of government, all things in the wide expanse of 
 heaven and all things on the earth to its furthest limits, 
 have belonged to the Emperor from generation to genera- 
 tion. This is what is known as " one central government ". 
 And the sole power of giving and of taking away, which 
 renders it impossible for the nobles to hold the people in 
 subjection by virtue of their land, or to deal with the 
 smallest piece of ground at their pleasure, or to seize and 
 treat despotically any single individual of the humbler 
 classes ; this is what is understood by the term " one 
 universal authority ". 
 
 ' The administration of the Emperors was conducted 
 entirely on this principle. They conducted the govern- 
 ment in their own persons, the name and the reality of 
 power were combined, and consequently the nation was 
 tranquil and contented. But from the time of the middle 
 ages the administrative system became lax, and the 
 authority of the Emperors came to be a plaything. All 
 men fighting for power, changes of government followed 
 each other in rapid succession, until half of the country 
 fell into the hands of men who dealt with the people and 
 the land at their pleasure ; and in the end a state of 
 things was reached where there was nothing but open 
 
314 MEMORIAL SURRENDERING 
 
 contention and acts of violence. The Government having 
 no body of administration to protect, and no effective 
 power, were unable to control matters. Everywhere men 
 of influence, but of unprincipled character, took advantage 
 of the existing disorder to promote their own interests, 
 and the weak became food for the strong. 
 
 ' The most powerful barons took possession of fourteen 
 or fifteen provinces, while those of less influence collected 
 bodies of armed retainers to the number of five and six 
 thousand. Successive Shoguns seized land and people 
 arbitrarily wherever they thought fit, and by this means 
 extended their influence. Finally the Mikado's Govern- 
 ment lost all real authority, and was entirely dependent 
 on the will of the Shogunate. The boundless despotism 
 of the Shogunate lasted for over 600 years, and during 
 this interval violent dealings with land and with the 
 people were carried out by stealth under pretence of the 
 Imperial Authority. And these acts were rendered 
 possible owing to the existence of people who could not 
 dissociate themselves from the time-honoured observances 
 of the past, and were still guided by the reverence due 
 from a subject to his sovereign, and by a proper sense 
 of the relations which should exist between high and low. 
 
 'The ancient family of the Tokugawa dynasty of 
 Shoguns and their relatives held half of the country ; as 
 a natural consequence fresh families were constantly 
 springing up ; and it became a precedent founded on long 
 custom which has lasted up to the present day for these 
 numerous branches of the Tokugawa family to take no 
 heed of the question as to whether their lands and subjects 
 had been received in grant from the proper Government 
 or not. It was commonly said by members of these 
 families : " These possessions of ours were gained by the 
 military power of our ancestors." But there is little 
 doubt that these ancestors had originally raised forces, 
 plundered the Imperial storehouses, and laid forcible 
 hands on the treasures contained, and that they had 
 
FIEFS TO THE CROWN, 1869 315 
 
 braved the penalty of death in the execution of their 
 designs. Those who break into storehouses are commonly 
 termed robbers, but no suspicion was attached by the 
 nation to those who seized upon the land and the people. 
 It is terrible, indeed, this confusion of ideas between right 
 and wrong. 
 
 ' It is now sought to establish an entirely new form of 
 government. Care must, therefore, be taken to preserve 
 intact both one central body of government, and one 
 universal authority. The land in which your servants 
 live is the land of the Emperor, and the people whom they 
 govern are his subjects. Neither the one, therefore, nor 
 the other can belong to your servants. 
 
 Your servants accordingly beg respectfully to surrender 
 to Your Majesty the registers of the population, and beg 
 Your Majesty to deal with everything as you may think 
 fit, giving what should be given and taking away what 
 should be taken away. They entreat Your Majesty to 
 issue such Imperial decrees as may be deemed necessary 
 with respect to the lands and the people of the four clans 
 represented in this Memorial, and to make such changes 
 as Your Majesty may think proper. They also beg that 
 all laws, decrees, and military regulations, extending 
 even to military dress and accoutrements, may be issued 
 by the Central Government, so that all matters of state, 
 both great and small, may be decided by one and the same 
 authority. In this way both name and reality will be 
 secured, and this country will be placed on a footing of 
 equality with foreign powers. 
 
 Your servants share the responsibility which the 
 present critical condition of affairs entails upon the 
 Mikado's Government. It is this which has led them 
 to present their foolish views for the consideration of Your 
 Majesty.' 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
 Aidzu. Name of clan whose territories were in the old province 
 of Mutsu (now Iwashiro). The castle-town was Wakamatsu. It 
 was one of the clans which supported the Shogun in 1868 up to 
 the last. 
 
 Bakufu. The Shogun's Government. The term, which means 
 literally ' camp-office ', dates from the establishment of the feudal 
 system by Yoritomo in the twelfth century. 
 
 Bugio. A word of frequent occurrence in the titles of Toku- 
 gawa officials who were governors of towns, or in charge of 
 certain branches of the administration. Its exact rendering in 
 English depends on the context. Thus when joined to the name 
 of a town, as in the titles Fushimi-bugio, Nara-bugio, Nagasaki- 
 bugio, it meant the governor of the town named ; but jisha-bugio 
 was a superintendent in charge of temples and shrines, and 
 fushin-bugio was a commissioner of works. 
 
 Chiunagon. An official title conferred by the Court. 
 
 Choshiu. Name of clan whose territories comprised the two 
 provinces of Nagato and Suwo at the south-western extremity 
 of the main island. 
 
 Choteki. Rebel. The literal meaning is ' enemy of the Court '. 
 
 Daidzu. A kind of large bean. The word occurs in the 
 Dutch treaty of 1857, where it is spelt daitz. 
 
 Daikwan. Literally ' representative official '. A term applied 
 to the governors of the Shogun's domains and other territories 
 ruled by the Yedo Government. 
 
 Daimio. Literally ' great name '. A term applied to all terri- 
 torial nobles the annual assessed yield of whose lands was not 
 less than ten thousand koku of rice. 
 
 Dainagon. An official title conferred by the Court, ranking 
 above Chiunagon. 
 
 Daizen no Daibu. An official Court title, hereditary in the 
 family, borne by the Prince of Choshiu. It may be rendered 
 Superintendent of the Imperial Kitchen. 
 
318 GLOSSARY 
 
 Dajokwan (also pronounced Daijokwan). Name of Council of 
 State established in 1868. 
 
 Dzusho no Kami. An official Court title, which may be 
 rendered Chief Librarian. 
 
 Fassak. See Hassaku. 
 
 Fudai. Literally ' successive generations '. The term was 
 applied by Iyeyasu to the daimios who joined him before the 
 battle of Sekigahara in 1600, as distinguished from the tozama 
 daimios, who submitted to him after that battle. Two-thirds of 
 the feudal nobility (some 176 daimios in all) were of the fudai 
 class. The term was also applied to hatamoto, gokenin, and kerai, 
 who were hereditary vassals. 
 
 Fuyo. A term applied to daimios dependent on an overlord. 
 
 Giobukio. An official title conferred by the Court. It may be 
 rendered ' Minister of Justice '. The title was held for a time by 
 the last Shogun. 
 
 Giso. Court officials at Kioto, five in number, who were 
 associated with the Tenso in the transmission of the communica- 
 tions which passed between the Throne and the Shogunate. 
 
 Gokenin. A section of the military class created by Iyeyasu, 
 and ranking after the hatamoto. 
 
 Gokinai. The five provinces round Kioto, namely, Yamashiro, 
 Yamato, Kawachi, Settsu, and Idzumi. 
 
 Gosanke. The three princely Tokugawa families of Kishiii, 
 Owari, and Mito. They ranked first in the territorial nobility, 
 and members of the first two were eligible for the dignity of 
 Shogun. 
 
 Gosankio. The three princely Tokugawa families of Hitotsu- 
 bashi, Tayasu, and Shimidzu, the members of which were eligible 
 for the dignity of Shogun. They were a later creation than the 
 Gosanke, and were not members of the territorial nobility ; they 
 had neither clans, nor castle-towns ; and their lands were, like the 
 Shogun's domains, administered by special officials. 
 
 Goyoshi. See Goyosho. 
 
 Goyosho. An official place of business. The term occurs 
 in the earlier American treaties, where it is misspelt goyoshi. 
 
 Hanshi. A kind of thin rough paper in common use. 
 
 Hansotsu. A clan samurai belonging to the lower or sotsu 
 class. 
 
GLOSSARY 319 
 
 | 
 
 Harakiri. Suicide by disembowelment. There were two 
 kinds, one voluntary, the other compulsory, the latter being 
 imposed as a penalty for certain offences. The Japanese rarely 
 use this word, preferring the Chinese form of the word, 
 seppuku. 
 
 Hassaku. A term which occurs in the earlier Dutch treaties, 
 where it is spelt fassak. As there used, it refers to the annual 
 presents given by the Dutch factory to the local authorities of 
 Nagasaki. 
 
 Hatamoto. A section of the military class created by Iyeyasu. 
 They and the Gokenin were known by the collective name of 
 Shomid (' small name ') in contradistinction to the daimio. 
 
 Hideyoshi. The regent who ruled Japan before Iyeyasu. 
 
 Hirado. An island off the north-west coast of Kiushiu, where 
 the Dutch and English factories were established in the seven- 
 teenth century. 
 
 Hizen. Name of province and clan in Kiushiu. 
 
 Inkio. Abdication, or a person who has abdicated. 
 
 Ise. Province in south of main island near Owari Bay, noted 
 for its national shrines. 
 
 Iyemitsu. The third Tokugawa Shogun, who closed the 
 country. 
 
 Iyeyasu. The founder of the line of Tokugawa rulers, who 
 became Shogun in 1603. 
 
 Iyeyoshi. The Shogun who died in 1853. 
 
 Jimmu Tenno. The mythical first sovereign of Japan. 
 
 Jodai. (1) the custodian of a castle ; (2) the term applied 
 to the Shogun's representative at Osaka, who was custodian of 
 the castle. 
 
 Jo -i. Literally, ' expel the barbarians,' the cry of the anti- 
 foreign party. 
 
 Joshiu. Literally, ' lords of castles.' The term applied to the. 
 third class into which daimios were divided. 
 
 Kami. This word was used in two ways in person's titles. 
 (1) When it followed the name of a province, it signified the 
 prince of the province named. But the title might be, and very 
 often was, borne by a noble who had no connexion with the pro- 
 vince in question. (2) When it occurred in what were known as 
 official titles bestowed by the Court, the word had the general 
 
320 GLOSSARY 
 
 sense of c chief ' or ' head ', the English rendering in these cases 
 depending on the context. 
 
 Karo. Literally ' house elder '. The chief retainers (several in 
 number, and of two classes) of a clan who managed the clan's 
 affairs. The office was usually hereditary. There were also hard 
 in hatamoto families. 
 
 Kerai. A feudal retainer. 
 
 Kn. See Kishiu. 
 
 Kishiu. Name (1) of a province in south of main island 
 bordering on Kii Channel, and (2) of the clan (the head of which 
 was one of the Gosanke) to which the territory of the province 
 belonged. 
 
 Kiushiu. Name of the southernmost of the islands comprising 
 the Japanese Empire before the annexation of Loochoo in 
 1879. 
 
 Kogisho. The first deliberative assembly, or parliament, 
 established in 1869. 
 
 Koku. (1) (of rice) a measure equal to about five bushels ; 
 (2) (of ships) one-tenth of a ton. 
 
 Kokushiu. Literally, ' lords of provinces.' A term applied 
 to some eighteen of the feudal nobility, who formed the highest 
 of the three classes into which daimios were divided. 
 
 Kuge. Court nobles residing at Kioto, as distinguished from 
 the feudal nobility. 
 
 Kunshiu. Sovereign, or ruler. A term used occasionally to 
 designate the Shogun in the earlier treaties and official corre- 
 spondence. 
 
 Kuwana. Name of castle-town in province of Ise, and of clan 
 of same name. 
 
 Kwambaku. The post of Prime Minister in the old Kioto 
 Government. The minister holding this office was regent (Sessho) 
 during the Emperor's minority. Occasionally, as in Hideyoshi's 
 case, a kwambaku was virtually regent. After the establishment 
 of the Tokugawa Shogunate, this office, like all the other Kioto 
 posts, became a sinecure. It was abolished in January 1868. 
 
 Kwansei (also called Kwansai). Literally, ' west of the 
 barrier.' General term applied before Restoration to country 
 west of the guard-house, or barrier, on the Hakone Pass. 
 
 Kwanto. Literally, 'east of the barrier.' (1) General term 
 
GLOSSARY 321 
 
 applied before Restoration to country east of guard-house, or 
 barrier, on the Hakone Pass ; (2) the Shogunate. 
 
 Matsudaira. One of the surnames of the Tokugawa family 
 and their descendants. Before the Restoration more than fifty 
 peers bore this surname. The privilege of using it was also 
 conceded to nine of the eighteen kokushiu daimios, including the 
 Prince of Choshiu. 
 
 Metsuke. A class of officials subordinate to the Ometsuhe, 
 q. v., and charged with similar duties. 
 
 Mikado. Literally, ' Honourable Gateway.' A term applied 
 to the Emperor of Japan. 
 
 Mino-gami. A kind of thick paper originally made in the 
 province of Mino, and used for wrapping purposes. (Mentioned 
 as an article of commerce in the Dutch treaty of 1857, where it is 
 referred to as paper-' mino '.) 
 
 Mito. Name of one of the Gosanke, of a clan, and of the town 
 of Mito in province of Hitachi. 
 
 Nakatsukasa-taiyu. Vice-Minister of the Imperial House- 
 hold (an official Court title). 
 
 metsuke. Chief metsuke, a class of officials, created under 
 the Tokugawa regime in 1632, whose functions, as defined in 
 the Tokugawa Kinreiko, included the duty of seeing to the strict 
 observance of the laws, watching the administration of justice, 
 and reporting any irregularities which might occur. They were 
 charged also with a general supervision of the country, and were 
 regarded as ' the ears and eyes of the Shogun ', who was enabled, 
 through the information thus received, to ascertain the actual 
 working of the administration. 
 
 Otokodate. A term applied to the members of bands, or 
 guilds, of apprentices which were formed in later Tokugawa 
 times in the chief cities of Japan. See p. 127. 
 
 Ri. One Japanese ri is equivalent roughly to 2^ English 
 miles. 
 
 Rioshiu. Literally, ' lords of territories ; ' the term applied 
 to the second class into which daimios were divided. 
 
 Ronin. Literally, ' wave-man.' A general term applied to 
 samurai not attached to any clan : see pp. 126 and 127. 
 
 Saikoku. A term applied before the Restoration to the 
 provinces, or clans, in the country west of the Hakone Pass. 
 
322 GLOSSARY 
 
 Sankin Kotai. Literally, ' Attending in turn to perform 
 duties.' The term applied to the compulsory attendance of 
 daimios at Yedo. 
 
 Satsuma. Name of a province, and of a clan whose territories 
 comprised the provinces of Satsuma, Osumi, and a portion of the 
 province of Hiuga in the island of Kiushiu. 
 
 Sayemon-no-jo. Left Warden of the Palace Gates (an official 
 Court title). 
 
 Sekke. The term applied to the five leading huge families 
 (Ichijo, Nijo, Kujo, Konoye, and Takatsukasa), from one of which 
 the Empress, and the Kwambaku and Sessho were always chosen. 
 
 Sessho. The regent during the minority of the Emperor in the 
 old Kioto Government. Under the Tokugawa Shogunate the post 
 was a sinecure. 
 
 Shimoda. The port in the province of Idzu where the Additional 
 Regulations attached to the American Treaty of 1854 were 
 agreed upon. 
 
 Shodzu. A kind of small bean. The word occurs in the Dutch 
 Treaty of 1857, where it is spelt schoods. 
 
 Shogun. Literally, ' the general commanding an army.' The 
 term applied to the administrative rulers, as distinguished from 
 the sovereigns, of Japan. Also known as Taikun. 
 
 Shomio. Literally, ' small name.' A term applied to those 
 members of the nobility and gentry the annual assessed yield of 
 whose lands was less than ten thousand Jcoku of rice. The class 
 comprised the hatamoto and gokenin. 
 
 Shoshidai. The Shogun's official representative, or Resident, 
 at Kioto. 
 
 Soshi. A term first applied some years after the Restoration 
 to a class of political rowdies who to some extent took the place 
 of the former ronin. 
 
 Taiko. The title given to a Kwambaku, who, on retirement 
 from office, was succeeded by his son. 
 
 Taikun. Literally, ' great lord.' The term employed by the 
 Japanese in the earlier treaties, and in their official correspondence 
 with foreigners, to designate the Shogun ; sometimes also, though 
 rarely, used in the closing days of the Shogunate in official corre- 
 spondence between Kioto and Yedo. It was first used in con- 
 nexion with intercourse with Corea. 
 
GLOSSARY 323 
 
 Taira. The family which administered Japan in the twelfth 
 century, and was eventually crushed by the rival family of 
 Minamoto. 
 
 Tairo. Literally, ' great elder.' The term applied to the 
 minister appointed under the Tokugawa Government to the 
 presidency of the Council of State in Yedo in times of emergency. 
 The position was equivalent to that of regent. 
 
 Tenso. Literally, ' transmitting and presenting to the Throne.' 
 The term applied to the two officials at Kioto through whom 
 communications from the Yedo Government were transmitted to 
 the Throne. 
 
 Togoku. The provinces, or clans, to the east of theHakone Pass. 
 
 Tokugawa. The family and line of Shoguns founded by 
 Tokugawa Iyeyasu. 
 
 Toshogu. Posthumous name of Iyeyasu. 
 
 Tosa. The name of a province and clan in the island of Shikoku. 
 
 Tozama. Literally, ' outer gentry '. The term given by 
 Iyeyasu to those daimios, one-third of the whole number, who 
 submitted to him after the battle of Sekigahara (1600). Their 
 position was more independent than that of the fudai daimios, 
 but on the other hand they were not, like the others, eligible for 
 official employ. 
 
 Tycoon. See Taikun. 
 
 Uraga. The port in the province of Sagami where Commodore 
 Perry arrived in 1853. 
 
 Yamato. One of the names for Japan. Yamato-nishiki, 
 Japanese brocade. 
 
 Yashiki. A general term applied to the residence, in town or 
 country, of a daimio or hatamoto. It was also applied in a special 
 sense to the residential establishments maintained by the clans in 
 Yedo, Kioto, and Osaka. The leading clans had two or more of 
 these residences in Yedo itself. 
 
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