NVENT10NS
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 SCHOOL OF LAW 
 LIBRARY
 
 SEVEN 
 
 C O E" V E 1ST T I O N S 
 
 BY 
 
 A. W. CLASO^ 
 
 NEW YORK 
 D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 
 
 1888
 
 T 
 
 COPTEIGHT, 1888, 
 
 BY D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.
 
 PEEFACE. 
 
 WHAT can a history of the Constitution do toward in- 
 terpreting its provisions ? This must be done by compar- 
 ing the plain import of the words with the general tenor 
 and object of the instrument. The instrument was 
 written by the fingers which write this letter. Having 
 rejected redundant and equivocal terms, I believed it to be 
 as clear as our language would permit ; excepting, never- 
 theless, a part of what relates to the judiciary. On that 
 subject conflicting opinions had been maintained with so 
 much professional acuteness, that it became necessary to 
 select phrases which, expressing my own notions, would 
 not alarm others nor shock their self-love ; and, to the best 
 of my recollection, this was the only part which passed 
 without cavil. But, after all, what does it signify that 
 men should have a written Constitution containing un- 
 equivocal provisions and limitations ? The legislative lion 
 will not be entangled in the meshes of a logical net. 
 
 The Legistature will always make the power which it 
 wishes to exercise, unless it be so organized as to contain 
 within itself the sufficient check. Attempts to restrain it 
 from outrage will only render it more outrageous. The
 
 4 PREFACE. 
 
 idea of binding legislators by oaths is puerile. Having 
 sworn to exercise the powers granted according to their 
 true intent and meaning, they will, when they desire to 
 go further, avoid the shame if not the guilt of perjury, by 
 swearing the true intent and meaning to be, according 
 to their comprehension, that which suits their purpose. 
 Gouvcrneur Morris to Timothy Pickering. 
 
 NOTE. On the 6th of August, IW, the committee of five submitted the 
 draft of a Constitution. The preamble read, " We the people of the States 
 of New Hampshire, Massachusetts," etc., seriatim. That was accepted unani- 
 mously, and the Convention passed to and upon each other article. The 
 number of States needed to ratify and make the Constitution a government 
 between them was then fixed at nine. The draft when amended was sent to 
 a committee of revision and style. As only nine States were needed to es- 
 tablish the Constitution, and as which nine could not be guessed, the enumer- 
 ation of States was no longer possible ; therefore, the " We," signifying sev- 
 eral, and " people," being either plural or singular, the signification of the 
 preamble first accepted and that subsequently accepted was to the minds of 
 men at that period identical. Therefore the objection of Henry was treated 
 as too trivial for argument. His political sagacity was awake to the pos- 
 sibility of the preamble being misrepresented, and dreaded the result.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 THE ISSUE BETWEEN GEEAT BRITAIN AND THE COLONIES. Tna 
 
 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 7 
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION .27 
 
 THE EATIFTINQ CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS . . .49 
 
 THE RATIFYING CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA 68 
 
 THE RATIFYING CONVENTION OF NEW YORK .... 103 
 THE NON-RATIFYING CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA . .120 
 THE RATIFYING CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA . . . 139 
 THE CONVENTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AT CHAP.LESTON . 160 
 THAT CONVENTION ADJOURNED TO BALTIMORE , .166
 
 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 1776. 
 
 IN the latter half of the eighteenth century two classse 
 of colonies were connected with Great Britain colonies 
 by conquest, as Canada and Jamaica ; colonies by settle- 
 ment, those which became the United States. The politi- 
 cal relation of the former was settled by the common con- 
 sent of mankind and the usage of ages. That of the latter 
 had not been so defined ; colonies under similar conditions 
 originated, not having before existed. The ties between 
 Great Britain and those colonies were many and strong 
 a common ancestry, a common religion, a common pride 
 of race, a common language, common political tradi- 
 tions, and a common share in the memories of the past, 
 the objects of the present, and the hopes of the fu- 
 ture. As in all political connections between a stronger 
 and a weaker, the weaker had on some subjects suffered 
 injustice, but none so keenly felt as to weaken a sense of 
 union with the mother- country, or to lessen loyalty to the 
 crown or affection for the people of England. Such a 
 condition of things might have remained unchanged for 
 years ; it could not, after either side had determined on 
 drawing a line which would force an issue. Neighbors 
 with adjacent open land may be careless of metes and 
 bounds, and indulgent to occasional trespass ; but, if one 
 begins to run a fence, the other turns to his title-deed.
 
 8 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 Great Britain, as the stronger always will, drew a line 
 which must force an issue. The colonies accepted the 
 challenge. The question was simple and single. "Wrong 
 must have been wholly on one side or the other. Walpole, 
 upon a suggestion to tax the colonies, answered, "Who 
 does must be a bolder man than I, and less a friend to the 
 British Constitution." The bolder man appeared, and 
 taxation was attempted. It was not heavy ; its returns for 
 a year would not have paid the cost of an army for a week. 
 The colonies had before contributed large free-will offer- 
 ings, when the equity of such contributions was manifest 
 to them, and were ready to do so again. But, glad to give, 
 they denied a right to take. Upon an aggression, which 
 involved a right of aggression, they justly thought it more 
 wise and equally safe at once to risk all in contesting it. 
 Submission would make a precedent for, and give color of 
 right to future aggressions. The debate which preceded 
 an armed solution, so far from convincing either dispu- 
 tant of wrong, confirmed both in their sense of right. 
 This was inevitable, for their premises differed, and conse- 
 quent reasoning from those premises developed conclusions 
 so repugnant, that one disputant must yield unreservedly, or 
 be made to. Those premises need to be clearly stated, not 
 only that their irreconcilable discord may be appreciated, 
 and the merits of the controversy correctly judged, but 
 that the subsequent history of those colonies be understood ; 
 for the opposite theories of the relation of communities 
 politically connected survived the contest, and men in the 
 United States have divided into parties, one of which un- 
 der various names has revived and embodied the British 
 conception, the other retaining and embodying the colonial 
 conception. The colonists claimed rights under the con- 
 tracts of their ancestors.* After the battle of Hastings, 
 
 * So that the right of colonies (to be held commonwealths or provinces) 
 saving honor and league with their metropoles dependeth wholly on their
 
 1776. 9 
 
 William of Normandy was master of England. Part of 
 its territory lie took for the crown, part lie left to the 
 vanquished race, part he divided among his followers upon 
 feudal tenures. The feudal system was a system of con- 
 tracts : if the feudal tenant kept to the bargain, his duty 
 was performed ; if the overlord did not, and sought more 
 than the bargain gave him, he might be justly and legally 
 resisted. If a contest ensued, it was held legitimate war. 
 Contract recognized as the basis of relations between free- 
 men, resistance to an invasion of rights under contract not 
 merely legal, but demanded by manhood, and the social 
 elevation of women, are the legacies of the feudal system 
 to our civilization. After the Great Charter and its nu- 
 merous confirmations, all free men in England were fully 
 recognized as entitled (subject to the law) to complete 
 mastership of person and property. If the king, for public 
 purposes, needed more than his own domain and the feudal 
 tenures could supply, he asked aid of his subjects. Their 
 right of refusal, though often evaded, was never denied. 
 "If the king stepped over the constitutional line, they 
 claimed the right to step over it themselves, and, that 
 failing, promptly armed and appealed to the God of 
 battles." Subject, then, within his kingdom to some 
 limitations, in external matters the king was supreme. 
 Title to land in America was in him ; he dealt with it as 
 he pleased. To have value it must be peopled ; therefore 
 he gave tracts of it to emigrants upon a tenure and rental, 
 and charters erecting them into bodies politic and corpo- 
 rate, which assured them the rights and privileges of Eng- 
 lishmen. The transaction was wholly between the king 
 and the emigrants ; England as a nation neither supplied a 
 penny nor furnished a man, and was then as disconnected 
 from any right of control as Spain. The emigrants were 
 
 license or letters by which their sovereign authorized them to plant. 
 " Leviathan," p. 2 10.
 
 10 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 to form communities, of which the King of England by 
 virtue of his office was to be the king, and the relation be- 
 tween him and them was as easily as it was clearly defined. 
 Whatever rights and privileges his English subjects then 
 had, or ever afterward should have, his American sub- 
 jects should also have. The .bargain was one of recipro- 
 cal advantage ; a consideration passed on both sides. All 
 political systems in the United States originated from con- 
 tract ; political systems in Europe,' with scarcely an excep- 
 tion, have conquest as their basis. Inattention to this dif- 
 ference makes all foreigners and many Americans mis- 
 understand our political system, and not realize that much 
 is permissible to a man as the citizen of a State, which is 
 forbidden to him as a subject of the Constitution of the 
 United States. Under their charters the emigrants had 
 organized separate societies and instituted governments. 
 Each had its elective Legislature, a judiciary, and an ex- 
 ecutive, the king. The colonies had made war upon the 
 natives, and conquering, enslaved them ; in one colony a 
 tribe had been exterminated, and the work of extermina- 
 tion was progressing in all. They had coined money, 
 issued a paper currency, pledged public credit, raised and 
 employed armed forces on land and at sea, and like 
 other communities had misused power to persecute dis- 
 senters from dogma, and to hang Quakers and witches.* 
 The conclusion they drew, when forced to a logical conclu- 
 sion was, that the colonies were nations, bearing the same 
 relation to Great Britain, as Scotland had to England be- 
 fore the union, when their king was the same, or Hanover 
 at that very time ; and that their citizens were subjects of 
 the king, but not subjects of his subjects. They did not 
 
 * Salem exhibited the almost solitary instance of men, protected by public 
 functions, making a public acknowledgment that, under a delusion, they had 
 perpetrated grave wrongs, for which they asked the forgiveness of men and 
 the mercy of God.
 
 1776. 11 
 
 press this claim, until immunity from taxation under their 
 charters was denied ; and then they could not withhold it, 
 for, though the right of an Englishman not to be taxed 
 without representation was their right, yet if not nations, 
 but parts of a nation, or dependencies of a nation, and one 
 of the three they must be, the government of Great Britain 
 was their government, and its action, no matter how in- 
 equitable, legal. 
 
 Highly as they prized their connection with Great 
 Britain, and strongly as their hearts yearned for the old 
 friendly relations, they felt that, if they were to be con- 
 verted into inferiors, even disastrous war, if it aggravated 
 servitude, must leave them self-respect. The British argu- 
 ment is nowhere so clearly stated or so closely reasoned as 
 in the " Taxation no Tyranny." The premises of that very 
 able paper are : Land in the colonies, in the view of polit- 
 ical law, is the territory of England, and the colonists are 
 units of the English nation ; the Parliament is their Parlia- 
 ment, in which they are virtually represented as the greater 
 number of Englishmen who have no votes are virtually 
 represented ; consequently that Parliament, as the dele- 
 gated sovereignty of the nation, supreme in all things, may 
 legally if not equitably alter or repeal any charter, and im- 
 pose any law or duty. England, from the nature of things 
 the stronger element in the nation, both in numbers and 
 wealth, is necessarily the preponderant portion, and as such 
 ought to command, while the colonies, as the minority of 
 the nation, ought to obey. If the colonists have the rights 
 and privileges of Englishmen, they must be subject to the 
 obligations of Englishmen. The issue, nation or nations, 
 could not be more distinctly presented. If the premises 
 were true, the conclusion was legitimate and true, and the 
 Americans must have been, as they seemed to Johnson and 
 to three fourths of his countrymen, insubordinate from 
 avarice, or malignant from obstinacy. But the premises
 
 12 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 were not true, because not based upon the genesis of the 
 colonies, nor of the word nation. Nation has but one 
 meaning, and can have no other. It is the mark by which 
 mankind have agreed to express the fact that a certain 
 number of human beings, inhabiting a defined territory, 
 have coalesced by consent, or been compacted by conquest, 
 into a general copartnership, having feelings for each other 
 very different from those they entertain toward the rest of 
 mankind, extending among themselves sympathy, and dis- 
 tributing and regulating selfishness.* In a nation there 
 can be but one sovereignty, Force ; and one standard of 
 right and wrong, its Will ; therefore Johnson properly de- 
 duced his conclusion that, if the colonists were units of a 
 nation, resistance to the act of the sovereign was a violation 
 of the social order. He saw clearly that " in sovereignty 
 there are no gradations; there must be in every society 
 some power from which there is no appeal, which admits 
 no restrictions, which pervades the whole mass of the com- 
 munity, regulates and adjusts all subordination, enacts 
 laws and repeals them, erects or annuls judicatures, extends 
 or controls privileges, exempt itself from question or con- 
 trol, and bounded only by physical necessity. By this 
 power, wherever it subsists, all legislation is animated and 
 controlled ; from this all legal rights are emanations which, 
 whether equitably or not, may be legally recalled. It is 
 not infallible, for it may do wrong ; but it is irresistible, 
 for it can only be resisted by rebellion, by an act which 
 makes it questionable what shall thenceforward be the 
 supreme power." This truth, familiar to antiquity, appar- 
 ent to all who think, was so far from being controverted by 
 the colonists that they made it the basis of all their reason- 
 
 * " Nation " is often used as a convenient abbreviation in a non-technical 
 sense, they who use and they who hear conscious of the impropriety. So we 
 say habitually the sun rises and sets, not thereby denying the Copernican 
 theory.
 
 1776. 13 
 
 ing and action. His own exposition of sovereignty should 
 have shown to Johnson that men not under one single and 
 exclusive government can not be the units of a nation. 
 That objection pressed him so sharply that he could only 
 find escape from it by the assumption that a colony in 
 America and a county in England were politically identi- 
 cal. As Great Britain really, though incidentally, through 
 the king, exercised some important functions of govern- 
 ment affecting the colonies, he may have confounded gov- 
 ernment with sovereignty, as more acute minds have before 
 and since, honestly or dishonestly. The colonists, however, 
 were familiar with the distinction between original and 
 derivative power, and knew that sovereignty makes and 
 unmakes governments. To an American confusion on the 
 subject ought to be impossible, for he knows that in thir- 
 teen communities governments were in full and complete 
 operation while the sovereignty in each was debating and 
 deciding upon a new distribution of the functions of gov- 
 ernment between two agencies, delegating power after it 
 had decided. In the lifetime of Johnson's father the army 
 which had defeated Charles I was sovereign in England. 
 It offered terms to the king, and, agreement failing, struck 
 off his head. It turned Parliament out-of-doors, it set up 
 Oliver Cromwell, it pulled down Richard Cromwell, not 
 representing the feelings or opinions of one fourth of 
 Englishmen, it ruled them as absolutely as the Conqueror 
 William, nor did it cease to be the sovereign until weakened 
 by dissension it ceased to be the force. Government with- 
 in a nation is the functionary of the society to maintain 
 peace and order among its different elements and to adjust 
 the relations between the stronger and the weaker. It 
 continues unchanged so long as the proportion of strength 
 and weakness remains unchanged. It properly, because 
 equitably, changes, as the proportion of strength and weak- 
 ness changes. The right of future management is the
 
 14 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 same as the right of original management ; the reason for 
 both, the welfare of the society.* A government of all of 
 them in communities politically connected, is their func- 
 tionary to maintain the original terms of union between 
 equals ; the shifting of strength is not a shifting of right ; 
 disputes between them are to be decided, if justly, by the 
 law of contract, not by that of force, either expressed in 
 numbers or by armies, f Great Britain, ignorant or careless 
 of the only rule under which connected communities can 
 abide together in peace, assumed mastership. If the prac- 
 tical wisdom of her great war minister, or the genius of 
 her great philosophical statesman, could have saved her 
 from (what now all admit) a silly scheme of discord, they 
 were not wanting. Chatham not merely justified the colo- 
 nies in resistance to taxation, but in armed resistance. He 
 reminded the Lords that what is known as the British Con- 
 stitution is certain accepted principles of political rights 
 evolved in the growth of the nation ; that representation 
 inseparable from taxation was one of those rights, and 
 that the colonists had been guaranteed its protection. He 
 warned them that contempt of constitutional restraint, un- 
 just to America in the present, must work harm to Great 
 Britain in the future, and, prescient of that future, pointed 
 to France and Spain, eagerly watching the maturity of 
 
 * The distinction between the nobility and the commons was originally a 
 real one that is, it was grounded upon a real superiority, physical or moral. 
 But every successive generation tended to make it more and more imaginary, 
 till, at the moment of the final struggle between the two orders, it had no real 
 existence at all. The commons then had become as well qualified as the 
 nobles, both physically and morally, to conduct the affairs of peace and war. 
 Arnold, Preface to " Thucydides." 
 
 j- The claim in the " Leviathan " that a commonwealth can alienate its 
 sovereignty, and that any government it institutes is an entity distinct from 
 and master of it, not its agent, was supposed buried with the jure divino. 
 It has been revived in the United States by such respectable authority as to 
 merit a rehearins;.
 
 1776. 15 
 
 error for the opportunity of war. Burke declined to dis- 
 cuss a right of taxation. Evidently, to his mind, if it did 
 not exist, there was an end of controversy ; if its existence 
 was so doubtful that men might honestly differ, English- 
 men had no right to force their new conclusions upon 
 Americans ; and if it did exist, its exercise would be inex- 
 pedient, unwise, and unjust, considering the relations up to 
 that period subsisting. " Such is my opinion of the absolute 
 necessity of keeping up the concord of this empire by a 
 unity of spirit, though in a diversity of operations, that, if 
 I were sure that the colonists had, on leaving this country, 
 sealed a regular contract of servitude, that they had sol- 
 emnly abjured all rights of citizens, that they had made a 
 vow to renounce all ideas of liberty for them and their 
 posterity to all generations ; yet I should hold myself 
 obliged to conform to the temper I found universally prev- 
 alent in my own day, and to govern two millions of men, 
 impatient of servitude, upon the principles of freedom. I 
 am not determining a point of law, I am restoring tran- 
 quillity ; and the general character and situation of a people 
 must determine what sort of a government is fitted for 
 them. That point nothing else can or ought to determine. 
 In the character of the Americans a love of freedom is the 
 predominating feature, which marks and distinguishes the 
 whole ; and, as an ardent is always a jealous affection, your 
 colonies become suspicious, restive, and untractable, when- 
 ever they see the least attempt to wrest from them by 
 force, or shuffle from them by chicane, what they think 
 the only advantage worth living for. This fierce spirit of 
 liberty is stronger in the English colonies, probably, than 
 in any other people of the earth, for the colonists emigrated 
 from you when this part of your character was most pre- 
 dominant, and they took the bias and direction the mo- 
 ment they parted from your hands. They are therefore 
 not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to
 
 16 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 English ideas and upon English principles. Abstract lib- 
 erty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found. Lib- 
 berty inheres in some sensible object, and every nation has 
 formed to itself some favorite point, which, by way of emi- 
 nence, becomes the criterion of their happiness. It hap- 
 pened that the great contests for freedom in this country 
 were from the earliest times chiefly upon the question of 
 taxing. Most of the contests in the ancient commonwealths 
 turned primarily on the right of election of magistrates, 
 or on the balance among the several orders in the state. 
 The question of money was not with them so immediate. 
 But in England it was otherwise ; on this point the ablest 
 pens and most eloquent tongues have been exercised, the 
 greatest spirits have acted and suffered. In order to give 
 the fullest satisfaction concerning the importance of this 
 point, it was not only necessary for those who in argument 
 defended the excellence of the English Constitution to in- 
 sist on this privilege of granting money as a dry point of 
 fact, and to prove that the right had been acknowledged 
 in ancient parchments, and blind usages, to reside in a 
 certain body called a House of Commons ; they went much 
 further : they attempted to prove, and they succeeded, that 
 in theory it ought to be so, from the particular nature of a 
 House of Commons as the immediate representative of the 
 people, whether the old records had delivered this oracle 
 or not. They took infinite pains to inculcate, as a funda- 
 mental principle, that in all monarchies the people must 
 in effect, themselves, mediately or immediately, possess the 
 power of granting their own money, or no shadow of lib- 
 erty could subsist. The colonies draw from you, as with 
 their life-blood, these ideas and principles. Their love of 
 liberty, as with you, is fixed and attached on this specific 
 point of taxing. Liberty might be safe, or be endangered, 
 in twenty other particulars, without their being much 
 pleased or alarmed. Here they felt its pulse, and as they
 
 1776. 17 
 
 found that beat, they thought themselves sick or sound. 
 I do not say whether they were right or wrong in applying 
 your general arguments to their own case. It is not easy, 
 indeed, to make a monopoly of theorems and corollaries. 
 The fact is, that they did thus apply your general arguments, 
 and your mode of governing them, whether through lenity 
 or indolence, through wisdom or mistake, confirms them in 
 the imagination that they, as well as you, have an interest 
 in those common principles." To the assertion that a 
 power of granting vested in the assemblies of the colonies 
 would dissolve the unity of the empire, he answered: 
 " Perhaps I am mistaken in my idea of an empire as dis- 
 tinguished from a single state or kingdom. An empire is 
 an aggregate of many states under one common head, 
 whether that head be a monarch or a presiding republic. 
 I do not know what this unity means, nor has it ever been 
 heard of, that I know, in the constitutional policy of this 
 country. The very idea of subordination of parts excludes 
 the notion of simple and undivided unity. England is the 
 head, but she is not the head and the members too. My 
 hold on the colonies is in the close affection which grows 
 from common names, from kindred blood, from similar 
 privileges, and equal protection. These are the ties which, 
 though light as air, are as strong as links of iron. Let the 
 colonies always keep the idea of their civil rights associated 
 with your government, and they will cling and grapple to 
 you, and no force under heaven will be of power to tear 
 them from their allegiance. But let it be understood that 
 your government may be one thing, and their privileges 
 another, that these two things may exist without any 
 mutual relation, the cement is gone, the cohesion is loos- 
 ened, and everything hastens to decay and dissolution. . . . 
 Reconciliation," urged Burke, "can hardly be expected 
 if it must depend upon the juridical determination of per. 
 plexing questions, or on the precise marking of the shadowy
 
 18 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 boundaries of a complex government; but it is certain, 
 upon a return to that path of peace which Great Britain 
 and the colonies have for so many years trod together, 
 with security, advantage, and honor." The resolutions of 
 Burke, framed upon the spirit of his speech, were negatived 
 by 270 to 78, and the preponderance of opinion was even 
 greater in the nation than in the House. In the colonies 
 the position was almost exactly reversed: three fourths 
 held Great Britain in the wrong, one fourth in the right, 
 technically, if ungenerously. That the ministry, the king, 
 or the English people, were consciously unjust, is far from 
 the truth. The causes of their misconception are obvious. 
 After continuous civil contests, accompanied by two civil 
 wars, much of the power of the crown had passed to the 
 nation, but the old form was preserved, and all service, 
 civil or military, is still her Majesty's. Whatever right 
 of government over the colonies had been vested in the 
 king, passed as had his other powers, undoubtedly with 
 their full assent ; but the obligation of the contract between 
 him and them was the same, shared or retained. No more 
 could pass than he possessed ; king, lords, and commons 
 had no larger right of rule than the king formerly. The 
 power Great Britain saw, for power is easily seen ; the 
 limitation was overlooked, for limitation, except by those 
 it protects, is easily overlooked. The taxation of Ameri- 
 cans by Parliament seemed an ordinary and natural exer- 
 cise of power to men whom it continuously taxed. The 
 recognition of its right of complete authority, by all sub- 
 jects except one portion, made the denial of such authority 
 by that portion apparently factious. Even to entertain 
 the idea of the contention of the colonies, an Englishman 
 had to get out of his usual habit of thought. Had the 
 question not become a party question, men might possibly 
 have appreciated distinctions and reasoned without bias ; 
 but, with party spirit enlisted, taxation had to be compelled,
 
 1776. 19 
 
 that opponents might be confuted. Bitterness against the 
 colonists, absent from the Taxation no Tyranny, is intense 
 against their English advocates. 
 
 " Far be it from an Englishman to thirst for the blood 
 of his fellow-subjects. Those who most deserve our resent- 
 ment are unhappily at a less distance. The Americans, 
 when the Stamp Act was first proposed, disliked it undoubt- 
 edly, as every nation dislikes an impost, but they had no 
 thought of resisting it till they were encouraged and in- 
 cited by European intelligence from men whom they thought 
 their friends, but who were friends only to themselves. 
 On the original contrivers of mischief let an insulted na- 
 tion pour out its vengeance. With whatever design they 
 have inflamed this pernicious contest, they are themselves 
 equally detestable. If they wish the success of the colo- 
 nies, they are traitors to this country ; if they wish their 
 defeat, they are traitors at once to America and to Eng- 
 land. To them, and to them only, must be imputed the 
 interruption of commerce and the miseries of war, the 
 sorrow of those that shall be ruined, and the blood of those 
 that shall fall." No words ever painted more vividly the 
 fate of him who, appreciating its danger, opposes some 
 darling scheme of his people. For him the future is 
 black ; with failure he is a mourner, with success a victim. 
 Another and perhaps the leading cause for the misjudg- 
 ment of Great Britain was the misapplication of the prin- 
 ciple of majorities and minorities. That upon a contro- 
 verted point of constitutional rights, less than three 
 millions should not defer to eight millions seemed the 
 unfairness of arrogance. The principle so consonant to 
 reason and so salutary when interests are identical, or con- 
 sequences will be equally shared, becomes a pure despotism 
 when they are not. To crown all, the very liberality and 
 loyalty of the colonies told against them. They had " given 
 to satiety," and were ready to give again. If they were
 
 20 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 willing to part with their money, was not collision upon 
 a mode of transfer not merely the unreason but the wick- 
 edness of pride ? 
 
 That Great Britain was in the wrong is undeniable, but 
 no people ever had greater excuse for being in the wrong, 
 and none with an object of desire to compass has ever been 
 honest enough to cast the first stone at her. War came, 
 of course ; between communities of equal civilization and 
 spirit the result is a question of resources. " The last 
 louis d'or wins." The colonies would have been subju- 
 gated, had not France very early secretly encouraged 
 and aided them, soon to become an open ally. Then 
 the disparity of force shifted,* and Great Britain was 
 forced to recognize each State as the independent com- 
 munity which the Declaration of Independence had an- 
 nounced it as such to the world. The fate of that famous 
 paper is singular. For more than fifty years it has been 
 assumed by many to mean what it does not say, and not to 
 mean what it does say ; though there never has been a 
 collection of words of which the intention is more palpable 
 or its expression more exact. Its propositions are four : 
 that men are created free and equal, entitled to life, lib- 
 erty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure those 
 rights they form societies and institute governments ; that 
 just governments are founded on the consent of the gov- 
 erned ; that a society has the right to alter, or to unmake, 
 and to make a new government. These it terms self- 
 evident truths. If self-evident, they can not be novelties ; 
 if truths, they must be true for all time and under all 
 circumstances. Their truth may be tested at once by 
 taking their converse, and drawing conclusions from it. 
 
 * On August 31, 1781, Count de Grasse entered Chesapeake Bay with 
 twenty-eight ships-of-the-line, six frigates, and three thousand soldiers, the 
 equivalent of thirty-five thousand men, which, in the exhausted state of the 
 principals, brought the contest to an end.
 
 1776. 21 
 
 Then their self-evidence will result from the nature of the 
 human mind. That men in a state of nature are free and 
 equal, and may do as they like, and take what they please, 
 if they can, few would venture to deny. A great writer,* 
 two centuries since, not only asserted that fact, but proved 
 it with the rigor of mathematical demonstration. But the 
 freedom and equality of all, is equivalent to the freedom 
 and equality of none ; the plus one to each, is minus the 
 infinity of plus ones to the rest. Such is the condition of 
 beasts. Men, having reason and speech, learned and com- 
 municated to each other the necessity of society. They 
 gave nothing in forming it, they exchanged mutual irre- 
 sponsibility for mutual responsibilities; each put into a 
 common fund the freedom and equality he could not 
 maintain for himself, and got in return as much as society 
 could maintain for him. Whether the family was the 
 original of society or not, agreement in one of its forms, 
 consent or assent, must have been the basis of it. The 
 idea of rights could not enter the mind until a society had 
 been formed, nor kept out of it afterward. Only society 
 could say, as it did at once, Propriamque dicabo. Experi- 
 ence, which had led to the formation of society, taught men 
 that its collective force must be placed somewhere to com- 
 pel the observance of the conditions of its being. Then, 
 by consent or assent, government was instituted. One 
 characteristic has marked every society ; none have recog- 
 nized the right of a man, by reason of a common humanity, 
 to become a member of it ; all have recognized that right 
 in the progeny of members, and in all, when the consent of 
 the governed is spoken of; the "governed" have been 
 i 
 
 * Hobbes, contending that a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy, 
 must equally and necessarily be despotic, and that a mixed government, no 
 matter in what proportions compounded of the three, must after constant 
 dissensions and civil war be resolved into one of the simple forms, reiterates 
 the original freedom and equality of man to superfluity.
 
 22 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 understood to be those entitled to political power; its 
 members by descent or admission. What the Declaration 
 did not say is as apparent as what it did say. It did not 
 say that men born in a social state are entitled to the irre- 
 
 </ 
 
 sponsibility of the savage state. It is not an evangel of 
 anarchy.* It did not say that government must be 
 founded on the consent of the governed, for the facts of 
 history were opposed ; and many governments existed, 
 founded on conquest. It did not moot questions of forms 
 of government or functions of government ; it said to what 
 kind " just " was applicable. It did not, as supposed by 
 those who do not weigh words, assert a right of revolution. 
 Revolution makes a right, it does not start with one ; it is 
 not the alteration of a government by a society, it is the 
 alteration by part of a society irregularly and forcibly, and 
 by such a part as is the stronger, whether the few or the 
 many. When the interests of parts of a society have become 
 totally divergent, and passions thereby have passed beyond 
 its control, its basis no longer exists, its members have re- 
 verted to the savage state, in which force must settle some 
 new conditions under which peace and order may again be 
 possible. The colonies could not have asserted a right of 
 revolution against Great Britain without stultifying them- 
 selves, and admitting what they had so long and so persist- 
 ently denied ; for revolution proclaims that existing rights 
 ought no longer to exist ; while they were contending that 
 existing rights, between contracting men and connected 
 communities, ought to exist, as they had existed. In cases 
 of contract between men, or connection between commu- 
 nities for only by contract, express or implied, can com- 
 munities have been peaceably connected " the force of 
 
 * Baldly stated, reason revolts at the proposition, but as the higher 
 law it was welcomed by many who may have to meet it under some other 
 name.
 
 1776. 23 
 
 words being too weak to hold men to their covenants, there 
 are in human nature but two imaginable helps to it: a 
 fear of the consequences of breaking their word, or a 
 glory and pride in appearing not to need to break it; 
 the latter a generosity too rarely found, to be presumed 
 on, especially in the pursuers of wealth, command, or 
 sensual pleasure, which are the greater part of mankind. 
 Therefore, unless the parties to a question covenant mu- 
 tually to stand to the sentence of an arbitrator, they 
 are as far from peace as ever; and, seeing that every 
 man is presumed to do all things to his own benefit, no 
 man is n't to be an arbitrator in his own cause ; and if 
 he were never so fit, yet equity allowing each party equal 
 benefit, if one is admitted to judge, the other is also, 
 and so the controversy which is the cause of war re- 
 mains " Unless this reasoning can be controverted, the 
 mind can only conceive one solution of peace where no 
 arbitrator has been chosen : that the contract be consid- 
 ered canceled. "War may indeed find another, but if it 
 ascertains which of the disputants is the stronger, it can 
 not establish which of them was in the right. The col- 
 onists did not say that their fourth proposition was self- 
 evident to force, but to reason, and they applied it to 
 the situation, announcing to the world that whatever the 
 nature of the political connection between them and Great 
 Britain, that power had severed it by attempting to exer- 
 cise an unwarrantable jurisdiction over them. They could 
 not do otherwise, for on the connection was based that 
 claim of jurisdiction. 
 
 Following the precept and example of England in 
 1888, they declared that the king had forfeited his right to 
 reign over them, for aiding and abetting his other subjects 
 in an invasion of their liberties. The assent of a colony to 
 an announcement that the connection with Great Britain 
 was dissolved, and that the king had ceased to reign, was
 
 24: SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 its declaration of independence.* In 1787, when twelve of 
 the States met in a convention to make a system differ- 
 ent from that existing, the mass of men in each State 
 believed in its nationality, on which they had argued so 
 long, and for which they had fought so hard and suffered 
 so much. To them the truths of the Declaration were 
 still self-evident. Their conviction that an unlimited 
 government must end in imbecility or bloodshed, had 
 been strengthened by the disasters which had followed 
 the attempt by Great Britain to overpass limitation, and 
 they held that system of government the best which per- 
 mitted the widest liberty, personal, social, and political, 
 compatible with order. There was, however, in each State 
 a minority, far from insignificant in number, and com- 
 prising men of rare ability, which did not have faith in the 
 governmental practicability of the majority opinions, but 
 they could not formulate their ideas into any plan which 
 might be submitted to the Convention, f The Constitution 
 which that Convention elaborated through many com- 
 promises, and submitted to the decision of the people of 
 each State in their sovereign character, is very simple and 
 equitable, if made by nations for nations ; uselessly complex 
 and inequitable, if made by a nation for a nation. The 
 improvements upon the federal systems of antiquity, and 
 upon the Articles of Confederation, were marked. The 
 principal are : The right of rule limited in the Union by 
 
 * New York did not vote for the Declaration. Her convention assented 
 some days later. 
 
 f Mason wrote from the Convention : " When I first came here (where on 
 pecuniary considerations I would not serve for a thousand pounds a day), judg- 
 ing from casual conversations with gentlemen from the different States, I 
 was very apprehensive that, soured and disgusted with the unexpected evils 
 we had experienced from the democratical principles of our government, we 
 should be apt to run into the opposite extreme, of which I think there is 
 still some danger, though I have the pleasure to find in the convention some S 
 men of fine republican principles."
 
 1776. 25 
 
 an enumeration of specific objects ; in a State, by an ex- 
 clusion of specific objects ; the action of Federal powers 
 similar to the action of such powers in a nation ; Federal 
 suffrage in each State such as the State chooses for itself ; 
 the regulation of commerce, interstate and international ; 
 revenue from its own resources of taxation ; the decision 
 of war and peace ; a mode of amendment ; the addition 
 of new States ; the right to prescribe the conditions under 
 which a State may confer citizenship ; a judiciary for ques- 
 tions in law and equity arising under the Constitution ; citi- 
 zenship in one State entitled to the rights and privileges 
 of citizenship in other States ; and the political influence 
 of a State in the conduct of common interests, growing 
 with its growth, and diminishing with its decline, through 
 representation in one branch of a Legislature proportioned 
 to population, equity to numbers giving them due weight ; 
 and equity to States, confining a State to an equal voice in 
 the other branch of the Legislature. The plan, on paper, 
 was as near perfection as any federal government (the best 
 of all) can be ; none ever united so much strength with so 
 much liberty. But Quis custodietf was instantly asked 
 by those whose belief in a limited government was not a 
 speculation, but a religion. A minority of States with a 
 majority of population found a check in the instrument, a 
 majority of States with a minority of population equally 
 found a check ; but where was the check to a majority of 
 States, with a majority of population ? If each State re- 
 mained jealous of its nationality and respecting the nation- 
 ality of the others, or if the voter held federal suffrage a 
 trust, not a property to subserve desire, there would be no 
 danger, but neither could be expected of human nature. 
 Still less could it be expected of human nature that a man, 
 no matter how tenacious of a limited government, would 
 fight his own State to secure it to another State. The 
 objection would have prevented the establishment of the 
 2
 
 26 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 Constitution, had not its advocates offered to put in it ex- 
 plicitly by amendment (as it was once thought was done) 
 the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence which 
 they insisted was already there by implication. Both ad- 
 vocates and opponents understood the offer to mean that 
 limitation had the same right to be, as government to be, 
 deriving title from the same source, expressed in the same 
 instrument, and vested with equal right of self-defense. As 
 none could deny that authority, from the nature of man, 
 is constantly impinging on liberty, the issue between the 
 advocates and opponents of ratification was, whether the 
 equal rights of limitation and authority were to be found 
 in the paper as it read ; the advocates insisting that they 
 were, and the opponents contending that liberty ought not 
 to depend upon inference, but should be guarded by lan- 
 guage not susceptible of doubt, nor permitting misinterpre- 
 tations. If a limited government can exist (still a prob- 
 lem), it can only exist by men being willing to put all at 
 hazard to maintain limitation.* If it is not worth that 
 price, they will neither keep it, nor deserve it. Again 
 and again the kings of England endeavored to escape 
 from the restrictions of Magna Charta ; as often, they were 
 confronted by men eager to die for it, and they prudently 
 desisted and reconfirmed it. Had not there been many in 
 England, in all periods of its history, who held limitation 
 as sacred as government, Englishmen would not be what 
 they now are, nor England what it is. 
 
 * A small piece of string is a very insignificant matter, but, if the pud- 
 ding-bag is not tied with one, the mixture within becomes a mass. Limita- 
 tion is to government what the string is to the bag it helps by hindering.
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 ON the 25th of May, 1787, a convention met at Phila- 
 delphia, and proceeded to consider the subject for which it 
 had assembled. At that period and long after, States, in- 
 dependent communities, masters of themselves, entitled to 
 withdraw the delegation of their sovereignty from the 
 Union then existing, were supposed to be there represented. 
 The constant assertion of such a right in the Convention, 
 and its action in providing that nine States might make a 
 Union separate from the other four, would seem to have 
 embodied the belief then, and to have justified it later. 
 Respect for a contrary opinion, now dominant, requires 
 that the reasoning which has corrected the earlier miscon- 
 ception of the political rights of communities, should be set 
 forth in its own language ; the subtilty of the argument 
 might escape in any attempt to condense it : 
 
 "Our States have neither more nor less power than 
 that reserved to them in the Union by the Constitution, 
 no one of them having ever been a State out of the Union. 
 The original ones passed into the Union even before they 
 cast off their British colonial dependence. The new ones 
 came into the Union from a condition of dependence, ex- 
 cept Texas, and even Texas in its temporary independence 
 was never designated a State. The new ones only took 
 the designation of State on coming into the Union, while 
 the name was first adopted by the old ones by and in the 
 Declaration of Independence. The ' United Colonies ' 
 were declared to be free and independent States, but even
 
 28 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 then the object plainly was not to declare their independ- 
 ence of one another or of the Union, but directly the con- 
 trary, as their mutual pledge and their mutual action before, 
 at the time, and afterward abundantly show. The express 
 plighting of faith by each and all of the original thirteen 
 in the Articles of Confederation, two years later, that the 
 Union shall be perpetual, is most conclusive. The States 
 have their status in the Union, and they have no other 
 legal status. Originally some dependent colonies made the 
 Union, and in turn the Union threw off their dependence 
 for them and made them States, such as they are. Not 
 one of them had a State Constitution independent of the 
 Union." 
 
 The assertion, in defiance of their denial, maintained 
 by war, that the colonies were, as Great Britain claimed 
 them to be, dependencies, is a fitting preface to as much 
 missta'tement of history as was ever compressed into so few 
 lines. In 1775 the colonies proclaimed to the world that 
 they had not raised armies with the ambitious design of 
 separating from Great Britain and establishing independent 
 States, but to repel aggressions on their rights. In Jan- 
 uary, 1776, New Hampshire had its self-constituted system ; 
 in March, South Carolina ; in June, Virginia the govern- 
 ments of each in full and harmonious action. In July the 
 colonies announced to the world that they were free and 
 independent States. The cause is too patent for miscon- 
 ception or misstatement, and the men of 1776 understood 
 too well what they meant, and how to express their mean- 
 ing, for their words or actions to need or to admit of in- 
 terpretation. After and not till after the Declaration did 
 they attempt to organize a Union, and their delegates were 
 instructed to do the one and to attempt the other. On the 
 1st of March, 1781, a Union for the first time existed ; its 
 Congress met the next day. A union is a corporation, of 
 which communities are the corporators ; a community is a
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 29 
 
 corporation, of which human beings are the corporators. 
 The second of the Articles of Confederation, through the 
 acceptance of which only a Union existed, is explicit : 
 " Every State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and inde- 
 pendence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which 
 is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the 
 United States in Congress assembled." Then there must 
 have been States mutually recognized as sovereign, and in- 
 dependent of each other ; whence, else, that portion of juris- 
 diction, right, and power contributed to a common fund ? 
 Two years after a Union had been in full action, Great 
 Britain was required to and did acknowledge, not a Union, 
 but the independence of each State separately, name by 
 name, in the treaty of peace. The " perpetual Union " 
 was dissolved in a few years by the exercise of such sover- 
 eignty as made it. A new Union (" perpetual " dropped) 
 was established by an exercise of the sovereignty of the 
 States separately, its Constitution carefully disclaiming 
 any right in any State or number of States over another, 
 or any duty not self-imposed, of one State to another. 
 Rhode Island and North Carolina were out of the existing 
 Union when its Constitution was the government of eleven 
 States. What was their status ? New York and another 
 State did not ratify until a new Union existed ; what was 
 their status before ratification ? Finally, what was the 
 status of those communities which had proclaimed them- 
 selves States, before the Articles of Confederation made a 
 Union ? To Great Britain they were rebel colonies ; what 
 were they to each other ? If more facts than these are 
 necessary to demonstrate the absurdity of a Union making 
 States, instead of States making a Union, the debates in 
 the Federal Convention will supply them. To appreciate 
 those debates, the relative strength of the States must be 
 kept in mind. Virginia was the most populous by one 
 third, but half the population was negro slaves ; Massachu-
 
 30 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 setts was the most powerful, having nearly four hundred 
 thousand inhabitants, almost exclusively white. Pennsyl- 
 vania followed her closely in numbers, wealth, and the 
 characteristics of race. The three contained forty-two 
 ninetieths of the population of the United States. So far 
 in every Congress they each had but a single vote, and 
 were naturally and reasonably desirous of greater weight 
 in a new system, if one could be obtained, or in some 
 modification of that existing, which would effect their 
 object. There was no settled indisposition on the part of 
 the smaller States to concede to them an increase of influ- 
 ence. How, and how much, were cardinal points which 
 had to be settled before the machinery of a government 
 could gain close attention ? 
 
 Business was opened by the submission of " the Vir- 
 ginia plan," which was made the basis of debate ; those of 
 Pinckney, more coincident with that adopted than any 
 other, of Hamilton, and of Patterson, need not be detailed. 
 They were not without influence upon individuals and 
 committees, for it is apparent that in this, as in all other 
 conventions and legislative bodies, much of the heaviest 
 work was done by members who made few speeches, and 
 in committees which have left no record of their labors 
 but their reports. 
 
 YIEGINIA PLAN. 
 
 1. Resolved, That the Articles of Confederation ought to be so 
 corrected and enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their 
 institution, namely, common defense, security of liberty, and general 
 welfare. 
 
 2. Resolved, Therefore, that the rights of suffrage in the national 
 Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, 
 or to the number of free inhabitants, according as the one or the other 
 rule may seem best in different cases. 
 
 3. Resolved, That the national Legislature ought to consist of two 
 branches. 
 
 4. Resolved, That the members of the first branch of the national
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 31 
 
 Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States 
 
 every for the term of , to be of the age of years at 
 
 least ; to receive liberal stipends by which they may be compensated 
 for the devotion of their time to the public service, to be ineligible to 
 any office established by a particular State or under the authority of 
 the United States except those peculiarly belonging to the functions 
 of the first branch during the term of service and for the space of 
 
 after its expiration ; to be incapable of re-election for the space 
 
 of after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject 
 
 to recall. 
 
 5. Resolved, That the members of the second branch of the national 
 Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first out of a proper 
 number of persons nominated by the individual-Legislatures ; to be of 
 
 the age of years, at least to hold their offices for a term sufficient 
 
 to insure their independency, to receive liberal stipends, by which 
 they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public 
 service ; and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular 
 State, or under the authority of the United States except those 
 peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch during 
 
 the term of service and for the space of after the expiration 
 
 thereof. 
 
 6. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess the right of origi- 
 nating acts ; that the national Legislature ought to be empowered to 
 enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, 
 and, moreover, to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are 
 incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be 
 interrupted by the exercises of individual legislation; to negative all 
 laws passed by the several States contravening in the opinion of the 
 national Legislature the Articles of Union, or any treaty subsisting 
 under the authority of the Union; and to call forth the force of the 
 Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under 
 the articles thereof. 
 
 7. Resolved, That a national Executive be instituted, to be chosen 
 
 by the national Legislature for the term of ; to receive punctually 
 
 at stated times a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in 
 which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the 
 magistracy existing at the time of increase or diminution, and to be 
 ineligible a second time ; and, that, besides a general authority to ex- 
 ecute the national, it ought to enjoy the executive rights vested in 
 Congress by the Confederation. 
 
 8. Resolved, That the Executive and a convenient number of the
 
 32 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 national judiciary ought to compose a council of revision, with 
 authority to examine every act of the national Legislature before it 
 shall operate and every act of a particular Legislature before a nega- 
 tive thereon shall be final ; and that the dissent of the said council 
 shall amount to a rejection unless the act of the national Legislature 
 shall be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again 
 negatived by of the members of each branch. 
 
 9. Resolved, That a national judiciary be established ; to consist 
 of one or more supreme tribunals; to be chosen by the national 
 Legislature ; to hold their offices during good behavior ; to receive 
 punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their services, in 
 which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the 
 persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution. 
 That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal shall be to hear and de- 
 termine in the first instance and of the superior tribunal to hear and 
 determine in the dernier ressort all piracies and felonies on the high- 
 seas, captures from an enemy, cases in which foreigners or citizens of 
 other States applying to such jurisdiction may be interested, or which 
 respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any 
 national officers, and questions which may involve the national peace 
 and harmony. 
 
 10. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission 
 of States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, 
 whether from a voluntary junction of territory, or otherwise, with 
 the consent of a number of voices in the national Legislature less than 
 the whole. 
 
 11. Resolved, That a republican government and the territory of 
 each State except in the instance of a voluntary junction of govern- 
 ment and territory ought to be guaranteed by the United States to 
 each State. 
 
 12. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the continuance 
 of Congress and their authorities and privileges until a given day after 
 the reform of the Articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the com- 
 pletion of all their engagements. 
 
 13. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the amend- 
 ment of the Articles of Union whenever it shall seem necessary; 
 and that the assent of the national Legislature ought not to be re- 
 quired thereto. 
 
 14. Resolved, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 
 within the several States, ought to be bound by oath to support the 
 Articles of Union.
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 33 
 
 15. Resolved, That the amendments which shall be offered to the 
 Confederation by the Convention ought, at a proper time or times 
 after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or 
 assemblies of representatives recommended by the several Legis- 
 latures to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide 
 thereon. 
 
 No sooner were the Virginia resolutions before the 
 House, than Kandolph, who had introduced them, moved 
 that the consideration of the first be postponed, and that 
 in its place three new propositions be debated : 
 
 1. That a Union of States, merely federal, will not accomplish the 
 objects proposed by the Articles of Confederation, namely, common 
 defense, security of liberty, and general welfare. 
 
 2. That no treaty, or treaties, among the whole or part of the 
 States as individual sovereignties, would be sufficient. 
 
 3. That a national Government ought to be established, consisting 
 of a supreme Legislature, executive, and judiciary. 
 
 Gouverneur Morris (Pennsylvania), who had suggested 
 the supersedure of the first resolution of the Virginia plan 
 by the new propositions, recalled to the Convention the dis- 
 tinction between a federal and a national supreme govern- 
 ment : the former being a mere compact, resting on the 
 good faith of the parties; the latter having a complete 
 and compulsive operation. The Convention refused to 
 consider the first two, and adopted the latter. Then, turn- 
 ing to the Virginia plan, it postponed the second resolu- 
 tion, and carried the third, and so much of the fourth as 
 made a popular vote applicable to the elections for the first 
 branch of a contemplated Legislature. Upon the fifth reso- 
 lution the smaller Northern States stopped. If not un- 
 willing to give the larger States additional power, because 
 additional power was equitable, when the larger States 
 sought at once to be States and the Union, enabled to ex- 
 act and to refuse good faith, they saw clearly the intended 
 dominion, a domination of the most offensive kind, of
 
 34 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 State over State. Therefore, they said, States in a Union 
 is an idea not only familiar, but intelligible. States in a 
 nation, States in a State, is a contradiction in terms. You 
 want a nation ; we do not, but we will gratify you. Open 
 the map, divide the territory into thirteen districts as equal 
 as possible, then your scheme is feasible and acceptable, 
 for a nation has counties, a Union has States. Choose. To 
 Wilson, who was perpetually urging, " We come here to 
 make a government for men, not for imaginary beings 
 States," they said, " Why, then, should there be a Penn- 
 sylvania ? " To Madison and Randolph, " A Virginia 
 would be an anomaly." To King and Gorham, " The 
 Commonwealth of Massachusetts will be an imperium in 
 imperial Either their proposition was too fair to be 
 gainsaid, or their reasoning too just to be refuted, for 
 the word " national," as characterizing the proposed sys- 
 tem, was dropped without debate and with universal as- 
 sent, and is nowhere to be found in the finished work 
 of the Convention. Hamilton had indirectly, though 
 undesignedly, contributed to a result so opposite to his 
 views. His intellect was too clear not to see that a Union 
 and a nation were things as opposite as black and white. 
 He was too fearless to conceal his convictions, and there- 
 fore proposed the abolition of States. 
 
 "By an abolition of the States, he meant that no 
 boundary could be drawn between the national and the 
 State Legislatures ; that the former must, therefore, have 
 indefinite authority. If it were limited at all, the rivalship 
 of the States must gradually subvert it. Even as corpora- 
 tions, the extent of some of them, as Virginia, Massachu- 
 setts, etc., would be formidable. As States, he thought 
 they ought to be abolished." Wilson did not wish that 
 fate for Pennsylvania, nor King for Massachusetts, nor 
 Madison for Virginia, nor Butler for South Carolina ; and, 
 brought squarely up to decide whether they would retain
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 35 
 
 States and maintain the federal principle, or extinguish 
 the States, and essay the national principle, their choice 
 was made at once. Why they who were willing to form 
 units of a nation as men, if the States were fused into a 
 mass, and the mass divided into counties, were unwilling 
 to form a Union, statehood retained, except upon a fed- 
 eral basis, resulted from their minds being as incapable of 
 conceiving divided sovereignty as of a thing in two places 
 at once. Each State, at that time, had all the characteris- 
 tics of a nation interests, habits, an association of ideas, 
 belief of, and pride in, its nationality, and a self-constituted 
 political system, adjusting rights among its people, and 
 relations with the other States. Fusion into a nation had 
 its advantages and disadvantages ; confederation had its 
 advantages and disadvantages, but the plan submitted ap- 
 peared to distribute the advantages both of a nation and of 
 a Union to some States, and the disadvantages of both to 
 the others, to give to some all the rights of conquest and 
 to deny to the others the right of legal resistance. In a 
 Union the minority of a State not only does not count for, 
 but counts against, the opinion it holds. If a State has a 
 million of voters, an excess of five hundred on one side 
 carries the political power of a million, and will balance an 
 excess of five hundred thousand in another million. That 
 is the disadvantage of the federal plan, which the smaller 
 States were willing to risk, if the benefit of the federal 
 plan accompanied it, the right of judgment upon a breach 
 of faith, and of action upon the judgment, or they would 
 be satisfied with the absorption of statehood, because then 
 man would count for man, and, if an issue passed from 
 words to blows, could fight as he thought. 
 
 Their resolve was expressed in language not to be mis- 
 understood. Ellsworth was sure " that, to the eastward, 
 Massachusetts was the only State that would listen to a 
 proposition for excluding the States as equal political soci-
 
 36 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 eties, from an equal vote in both branches ; the others 
 would risk every consequence rather than part with so 
 dear a right." Bedford said : " The large States dare not 
 dissolve the Confederation. If they do, the small ones 
 will find some foreign ally of more honor and good 
 faith to take them by the hand." Patterson : " New Jer- 
 sey would never confederate upon the plan before the com- 
 mittee ; she would be swallowed up first." Luther Martin : 
 " No modifications will reconcile the smaller States to any 
 diminution of their equal sovereignty." .New York was 
 suspected (unjustly, no doubt) of arming in view of possi- 
 ble contingencies. At this junction, Sherman interposed : 
 " We are now at a full stop ; nobody, I suppose, means that 
 we shall break up, without doing something ; a committee 
 is likely to hit upon some expedient." As the Convention, 
 without dissent, agreed with Gorham, "that the States, 
 as now confederated, have, no doubt, a right to refuse to be 
 consolidated, or to be formed into any new system," a 
 committee was appointed. It reported, July 5th, a com- 
 promise, " That in the second branch each State shah 1 have 
 an equal vote." On the 16th that part of the report was 
 carried by the vote of five States to four. Massachusetts, 
 being divided, did not count ; New York, not present, was 
 sure to be added to the majority ; and New Hampshire, not 
 yet represented, was equally to be relied on. The next 
 day, Gouverneur Morris moved a reconsideration, which 
 was not seconded, and the nice question of an equitable di- 
 vision of political power among the States, which had so 
 long hampered the Convention, was at rest. The wisdom 
 of the decision became every day more apparent, until the 
 equal vote of the States in the Senate was spontaneously 
 excepted from the power of amendment. Wilson and 
 Madison were not only disappointed, but bitterly dissatis- 
 fied, and did not attempt to conceal their feelings. Wilson 
 urged the injustice of a minority of men ruling a ma-
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 37 
 
 jority ; and did not yield to the distinction between a ma- 
 jority not ruling and being ruled, the distinction between 
 a limited and an unlimited democracy, to which Ellsworth 
 drew his attention. Earlier in the debate he had been 
 equally inattentive to distinctions, until Johnson was forced 
 to point out to him that "controversy must be endless 
 while gentlemen differ in their grounds of argument, those 
 on one side considering the States as districts of people 
 composing one political society ; those on the other con- 
 sidering them as so many political societies. The fact is, 
 that the States do exist as political societies." Johnson's 
 claim of " the fact " was not disputed ; there were men 
 in the Convention, as out of it, who thought that one po- 
 litical society only would have been better adopted origi- 
 nally, but none dared to affirm that it had been adopted. 
 
 "Wilson, the earliest of those who have contended that 
 United States does not mean States united, and that Union 
 does mean nation, was a man of great capacity. He had a 
 fixed idea, proof against facts, and even his own inconsist- 
 ency. During the belief in witchcraft, " possessed " was the 
 word used to express a demon influence beyond escape when 
 once accepted. He was " possessed " by the idea that the 
 States were or should be considered politically as imaginary 
 beings, numbers, jure divino rulers, the realities. He never 
 attempted proof, nor disputed disproof of his theory, but 
 could never long escape its mastery of his mind. In the 
 later days of the Convention, he seemed, judging from his 
 language, to be fully conscious of the fact that States were 
 striving to agree upon the conditions precedent to a new 
 Union. He had heard knotty questions referred to com- 
 mittees that bargains eo nomine might be made, he could 
 not fail to have heard the universal admission that only 
 through the consent of States was a Union attainable, and 
 he had not heard a claim that any State owed to another 
 State, or to all the other States, any duty not arising from
 
 38 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 compact, and not owed by one and all to it ; yet in the Con- 
 vention of Pennsylvania (the first to meet) he could say : 
 " I know no bargains made in the Federal Convention. 
 The proposed government does not rest on contract ; the 
 idea of a government founded on contract destroys the 
 means of improvement." As he was the only member 
 in the Convention of his State who had sat in the Conven- 
 tion of the States, and as the debates and action in that 
 body were still a secret, his assertion could not be chal- 
 lenged.* 
 
 If any suppose that a sense of a right to unity existed 
 at that time, the record will undeceive them. Nothing 
 in the debates arrests attention more than the absence of 
 that which is now strong, the sentiment of a Union. Gor- 
 ham said that " the Eastern States had no motive for union 
 but a commercial one. They were able to protect them- 
 selves, were not afraid of external danger, and did not 
 need the aid of the Southern States." Butler : " The inter- 
 ests of the Eastern and Southern States were as different 
 as those of Russia and Turkey." Gouverneur Morris: 
 " Such distinction is fictitious or real ; if fictitious, let us 
 dismiss it, and proceed with due confidence ; if it be real, 
 instead of attempting to blend incompatible things, let us 
 at once take a friendly leave of each other." Ellsworth : 
 
 * Wilson may not have been conscious of falsehood ; a mind to which a 
 Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
 could at any time have appeared properly held fictions of the imagination as 
 a mermaid, or a centaur, may have held all that passed in the Federal 
 Convention equally properly an illusion of the senses. Or, he may have 
 believed that " people have a right to private truth from their neighbors, 
 and to economic truth from their families, so as not to be abused by their 
 wives, children, and servants, but have no right to political truth ; that the 
 people may as well all pretend to be lords of manors, or possessed of great 
 estates, as to have the truth told them in matters of government." In either 
 or any view, his ought now, of all names, to be the most revered, for Story, 
 Webster, Lincoln, and the lesser lights, have done no more than reiterate his 
 assertions, accept his premises, and repeat his language.
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 39 
 
 " Under a national government he should participate in the 
 national security, but that was all. He turned his eyes, 
 therefore, for the preservation of his rights, to the State 
 governments." Wilson : " If the Confederacy should be 
 dissolved, he hoped a majority, nay, a minority of States, 
 would unite for safety. He was anxious for uniting the 
 States under one government. He knew that there were 
 respectable men who preferred three confederacies, united 
 by offensive and defensive alliances. Many things may be 
 plausibly said, some things may be justly said, in favor of 
 such a project. He could not concur in it, but nothing 
 could be so pernicious as bad first principles." 
 
 The delegates always spoke as business men, occupied 
 upon a business matter, conscious that in this world noth- 
 ing is given, and that everything, in some way or other, 
 must be paid for. They knew that a partnership of the 
 States for external defense, the protection of person and 
 property from internal aggressions, and the care and con- 
 duct of interests which they had in common, was as desir- 
 able as it would be beneficial. To equalize the contribu- 
 tion of each State to a common fund was a subject upon 
 which they differed widely, compromised, agreed, and 
 wrote their agreement in (as they supposed) plain English. 
 From the opening of the session to the close, no State made 
 a claim of right to have, or to be, in a Union. Such a 
 claim would have been preposterous in the face of the fact 
 that the Convention was arranging to cut loose from the 
 Articles of Confederation; because under those articles, 
 Rhode Island, which had refused to join the Convention, 
 as well as every other State, had the power to defeat any 
 amendment. Kor does it appear from any utterance that 
 the purpose of the Convention was considered revolution- 
 ary. The right of each State to alter a form of govern- 
 ment, or make a new one, was held settled international 
 law between the States. The foundation of the new sys-
 
 40 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 tern laid and to lay it had occupied nearly one third 
 of the time the Convention sat the superstructure was 
 erected more rapidly, perhaps too rapidly ; a little of the 
 antecedent tenacity of Madison would have been fortunate. 
 With the political knowledge then diffused, a government 
 was certain to be composed, as it was, of a Legislature, a 
 judiciary, and an Executive, the system of each State. 
 
 The character of an Executive gave the Convention 
 much trouble, and exhausted much time. Upon its nature, 
 its functions, its power, the manner and the agency of 
 election, opinions were widely divergent. As no advan- 
 tage to any State was involved in any of the several 
 modes suggested, received, reconsidered, rejected, restored, 
 or modified, there was no heat in the discussion, and that 
 plan which was finally adopted was only claimed to be less 
 open to objections than any other. The manner of elec- 
 tion has been modified by amendment, and the agency 
 apparently, but not fundamentally, superseded in practice. 
 Although, now, the elector only registers the decision of a 
 party convention, his office may, in contingencies not diffi- 
 cult to imagine, become of vital importance. Foreign in- 
 fluence upon the Executive and the Legislature was an 
 object of dread at that period. With our experience, it 
 now seems to have been an apprehension almost silly. That 
 foreign influence has affected the United States disastrously 
 is true, but its action has not been upon officials, but upon 
 masses. An English habit of political thought has per- 
 meated many of the States, eating out, as a corrosive, 
 American ideas ; and the habit of thought which may be 
 excellent for England, is, or perhaps more properly was, 
 unsuited to the United States, because the basis of govern- 
 ment in the two differs.* 
 
 * The punishment for stealing the labor of British writers. That part 
 of the population of the Union which reads most, thinks least as Ameri-
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 41 
 
 " From causes which might he traced in the history and develop- 
 ment of English society and government, the general habit and prac- 
 tice of the English mind is compromise. No idea is carried out to 
 more than a small part of its legitimate consequences. Neither in 
 the generality of our speculative thinkers, nor in the practice of the 
 nation, are the principles which are professed ever thoroughly acted 
 upon. 
 
 " Something always stops the application half-way. This national 
 habit has consequences of very various character, of which the fol- 
 lowing is one : It is natural to minds governed by habit (which is the 
 character of the English more than any other civilized people) that 
 their tastes and inclinations become accommodated to their habitual 
 practice ; and as in England no principle is ever fully carried out, dis- 
 cordance between principle and practice has come to be regarded not 
 only as the natural but as the desirable state. This is not an epigram 
 or a paradox, but a sober description of the tone of sentiment com- 
 monly found in Englishmen. They never feel themselves safe unless 
 they are living under the shadow of some conventional thing some 
 agreement to say one thing and mean another. The English are fond 
 of boasting that they do not regard the theory but only the practice 
 of institutions ; but their boast stops short of the truth. They actu- 
 ally prefer that their theory should be at variance with their practice. 
 If any one proposed to them to convert their practice into a theory, 
 he would be scouted. It appears to them to be unnatural and un- 
 safe to do the thing they profess or profess the thing they do. A 
 theory which purports to be the very thing intended to be acted on 
 fills them with alarm. It seems to carry with it a boundless extent 
 of unforeseen consequences." J. S. Mill. 
 
 The English are a great people great because, no mat- 
 ter into how many sects and classes, or by what opinions 
 divided, all worship courage, and " are jealous of any at- 
 tempt to exercise power over them not sanctioned by long 
 usage and their own opinion of right, and fond of resisting 
 authority when it steps over prescribed limits." This char- 
 acteristic of Englishmen was the characteristic of the colo- 
 nists. Their quarrel with Great Britain was upon rights, 
 and rights depended upon words. A claim to extend or 
 vary in the slightest degree the originally received meaning
 
 42 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 of words is a claim to sport with rights. The first-named 
 characteristic of Englishmen has made gradual but steady 
 growth among the descendants of the colonists, and must 
 soon predominate in all, for if one player may be allowed to 
 slip a card with praise and profit, all must, in self-defense, 
 learn to be sharpers. The names now most revered are 
 those of men who have sought and found escape from the 
 ideas of 1776, and from the intention of the ideas of 1787, 
 and from the literal meaning of the words in which those 
 ideas were conveyed ; while the names of those who held 
 that they were " the very things to be acted on " are pass- 
 ing into oblivion, if not into obloquy. 
 
 The next question of some difficulty was the ratio of 
 representation in the first branch. Population had been 
 settled as the basis of it, but what constituted population ? 
 Two of the Southern States insisted that their slaves were 
 population. Some of the other States contended that they 
 were merely property. Mason, though Virginia would 
 gain by treating them as population, held that it would 
 be unfair to rate them as equal to white men. Gorham 
 settled the contention. The Congress had rated them for 
 the purposes of taxation as three for five, and that seemed 
 to him an equally fair proportion for the purpose of repre- 
 sentation. When Massachusetts threw her weight into one 
 of balanced scales, the result was not doubtful, and the com- 
 promise she advocated was adopted. 
 
 The next sharp discussion was upon the taxation of ex- 
 ports, which was claimed and opposed with equal perti- 
 nacity, and was finally excluded by a bargain between 
 some of the Eastern and some of the Southern States, 
 which embraced the importation of slaves, on the one hand, 
 and advantages to the interests connected with navigation, 
 on the other. Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania were 
 eager to have the importation of slaves immediately pro- 
 hibited, through the power of the Federal Government to
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 43 
 
 regulate commerce. Agreeable as that might be to such 
 States as had a surplus of slaves, of whom the price would 
 be enhanced, South Carolina and Georgia insisted upon an 
 exception to the general power. 
 
 The bargain as consummated provided that slaves might 
 be imported until 1808, that a duty might be imposed on 
 the importation, that exports should not be taxed, and that 
 navigation acts might be passed by a majority. Upon the 
 importation of slaves, Virginia and Pennsylvania waxed 
 warm, not merely discussing the point in issue, but the 
 moral and economical effects of slavery. South Carolina 
 and Georgia were firm, and not irritable. They saw, or 
 thought they saw, that their interest required such a supply 
 of labor, and with the practice of the world, up to that 
 period, favoring their views, would not accept the judg- 
 ment of some other States as superior to their own. They 
 offered, however, to absolve the other States from any ob- 
 ligation to suppress insurrections, if scruple might thereby 
 be appeased. 
 
 Connecticut settled the dispute. Ellsworth said : " Let 
 the States import what they please. The morality and 
 wisdom of slavery are considerations for the States them- 
 selves. The old Confederation had not meddled with this 
 point, and I can not see any greater necessity for bringing 
 it within the policy of the new one." Sherman reminded 
 the Convention that " the States were now in the posses- 
 sion of that right, and, as the public good does not require 
 it to be taken from them, it is best to leave the matter as 
 we find it." The next question, How many States must 
 ratify before the proposed system could become a govern- 
 ment ? was settled without much discussion. Seven, eight, 
 nine, ten, and thirteen were suggested ; nine found favor, 
 none claiming that any State owed to the others ratifica- 
 tion as a matter of comity even, much less of right. Wil- 
 son would have been satisfied with the assent of seven;
 
 44 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 and King, to prevent the possibility of misinterpretation, 
 moved, and the motion was carried by nine States to one, 
 that the words, " between the said States," be added, after 
 " the ratifications of nine States shall be sufficient for the 
 organizing this Constitution," so as to confine the operation 
 of the Government to the States ratifying it. Such was 
 the bargain which the people of each State the then rec- 
 ognized source of power was invited to accept. Under it, 
 besides the common profit of a more efficient General Gov- 
 ernment, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia would 
 gain power ; New Hampshire, New York, Maryland, and 
 Delaware would lose power; Connecticut, New Jersey, 
 and North Carolina would lose power, and gain commer- 
 cially ; Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Georgia would 
 lose a little more than any of the others. 
 
 Hamilton and Madison have been termed the architects 
 of the Constitution. Upon that point Hamilton shall speak 
 for himself : " He had been restrained from entering into 
 the discussions by his dislike of the scheme of government 
 in general, but he meant to support the plan to be recom- 
 mended, as better than nothing." Madison had been over- - 
 ruled upon the principal points he favored. To those two, 
 however, the Convention is due ; and, in addition, the very 
 able advocacy of a compact which disappointed them, and 
 the ratification of it by their respective States, absolutely, 
 through their personal exertions. Though all the States 
 aided in building, Connecticut was the architect. Her 
 delegates were pre-eminently reasoners and debaters. They 
 kept the Convention to the basis of facts, to its purpose, 
 trade, to the certainty that no State would take glass beads 
 for money, and that all must give to get. 
 
 The Convention would seem to have made a mistake 
 in not providing for the erection of tribunals pro re nata 
 to pass upon any issue of good faith between States good 
 faith having always been understood to be essential to the
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 45 
 
 peace, if not to the continued existence, of any Federal 
 system. In the plan of Confederation prepared by Dray- 
 ton, in 1778, the necessity was appreciated, and a method 
 exhibited. The omission appears more remarkable, as the 
 two latest, and comparatively recent, civil convulsions in 
 England had turned on that very point of good faith, and 
 had demonstrated the necessity of an arbitrator between 
 the States upon such a subject. Ship-money was an un- 
 doubted prerogative of the crown, but for a special pur- 
 pose; the use of it for general taxation was one of the 
 offenses of Charles I. The dispensing power was an un- 
 doubted prerogative of the king ; the use of it to circum- 
 vent law was the offense of James II. The use of power 
 allowed for certain purposes by a Constitution, for purposes 
 not allowed by that Constitution, is a similar offense of a 
 State against a State ; for the right of any control at all, 
 being authorized upon certain subjects only, the desire of 
 control upon other subjects, is latent hostility, and the at- 
 tempt to exercise control upon them through the Federal 
 organism, avowed hostility. It is a claim to have all the 
 rights peace has given, with all the rights war can give. 
 
 Had the Convention been asked why it had not added 
 such tribunals to those provided, it would have answered : 
 For all questions arising under the written paper, tribunals 
 exist ; for questions arising outside the written paper, like 
 that between Great Britain and the colonies, the States 
 have announced a rule of decision which this body has no 
 jurisdiction to revise. As men thought at the time, the 
 answer would have been held conclusive ; but were it per- 
 mitted to men to be as wise for the future as for the pres- 
 ent, the Convention would have considered that fifty years 
 later the belief of their day might be the heresy of poster- 
 ity, and have supplied an umpire for that contingency. The 
 Convention was made up of men Hamilton, Wilson, Mor- 
 ris, Reed, and some others not so outspoken who thought a
 
 46 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 government " an impossible government " unless unlimited 
 power was placed by any system in the central organism ; 
 of Patterson, Bedford, Luther Martin, Lansing, and some 
 others, who believed a government an impossible govern- 
 ment unless unlimited negative power was in any system left 
 in a State ; and of men outnumbering both, who believed 
 a system practical and excellent which limited the General 
 Government, the State governments, and the source of all 
 power, the population of a State, and they succeeded in 
 persuading the others to allow the experiment to be tried. 
 Their reasoning, as it may be perceived in the debates, 
 was this : In projecting a system of government, especially 
 one in which liberty is an object of desire by the gov- 
 erned, the point of departure from which the calcula- 
 tion of probabilities starts, is the fact of human nature, 
 that "every human being is born with a Pope in the 
 belly," * and will not deny himself the luxury of self- 
 will, unless reason points out danger, or some power threat- 
 ens with punishment. In a monarchy, or in an aristocracy, 
 those who exercise power may feel a sense of and a fear 
 of personal responsibility, they may suffer mediately or 
 directly. In a democracy a voter exercises power, and, 
 as he has no accountability for its use, is freed from fear ; 
 while if evil results from his action, and that of those who 
 thought as he thought, and did as he did, his agency is so 
 infinitesimal that he can not have a sense of responsibility. 
 Therefore, in a democracy only such subjects ought to be 
 submitted to suffrage in which all, so far as the condition 
 of humanity permits, have a common interest. If this 
 were true of a single democracy, a fortiori, it must be 
 true of conjoined democracies ; for if there be association 
 restraints upon a man in his own democracy, they are not 
 operative upon him for another democracy. 
 
 * The phrase dates from the controversy between Charles I and Parlia- 
 ment. Harleian Miscellanies.
 
 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 47 
 
 So reasoning, the Convention did what it intended to 
 do, supposed it had done, and said that it had done, in its 
 report to Congress "fully and effectually vested in the 
 General Government of the Union the power of making 
 war, peace, and treaties ; levying money, regulating com- 
 merce, and the corresponding executive legislative and judi- 
 cial functions." Had it imagined that in the future politics 
 in the Union could turn upon amending or not amending the 
 Constitution by majorities, or even by pluralities for such 
 has been the claim and effect of construction some method 
 of arbitrating that claim would have been inserted,* or, 
 more probably, the States would have retained the veto 
 power of the Articles of Confederation ; for amendment is 
 very strictly guarded. It is all that the mutual jealousy 
 and fear of the small and of the large States would allow : 
 these would not consent that amendments should be pro- 
 posed by fewer than two thirds of both Houses, practically 
 two thirds of the population of the Union ; nor those, that 
 they should be accepted by fewer than three fourths of the 
 States. If every other clause of the Constitution failed to 
 show that a Rhinocracy was not intended, the amendment 
 clause would suffice. At that period it was hoped by 
 many, if not believed by all, that the United States had 
 solved the problem of ages ; that they had in their system 
 distinguished so broadly between a right of management 
 and a right of rule, and had marked so clearly the duty of 
 a citizen of one State to the citizens of other States, that 
 the average intelligence and honesty of men could not err 
 therein. But a system, the exponent of the political edu- 
 cation of those who make it, can not retain its character- 
 
 * The value of arbitration in such cases is not so much that any opinion 
 shall prevail, as that the point of honor shall be saved. The most dangerous 
 disputes are on the point of honor, for then compromise is inapplicable. The 
 Electoral Commission saved the point of honor between two political parties, 
 and was only meant for that purpose.
 
 4:8 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 istics, if the political education of those who subsequently 
 administer it is dissimilar. Then the execution will be at 
 variance with the design. In many of the States of the 
 Union the political education of the masses has for two 
 generations been carefully confined to one line in the Dec- 
 laration of Independence, and one line in the preamble of 
 the Constitution, both misrepresented by the leaders, and 
 misunderstood by their followers. The result is, that 
 within less than a century the Constitution has become 
 exactly what they who framed it, and they who accepted 
 it, neither understood it to be, nor meant it to be a Gov- 
 ernment of numbers, by numbers, for numbers, instead of 
 a Government of States, by States, for States. In politics, 
 mankind seems destined to tread in a circle, from absolut- 
 ism to limitation, from limitation to absolutism.
 
 THE CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
 
 SIXTY-FIVE delegates had been appointed to the Fed- 
 eral Convention, of whom ten had not appeared, having 
 declined the duty, or resigned the office. Thirty-nine 
 attested that the Constitution had been adopted by the 
 unanimous vote of the States present. Had Yates and 
 Lansing been at their posts, the unanimous consent would 
 not have heralded its consideration ; sixteen declined to 
 give even such a limited sanction. Their motives were 
 various. Some held that the Convention had exceeded its 
 powers, and that they had no right to assent to more than 
 their delegation of power warranted ; others, that there 
 were defects in the plan, and that acceptance or rejection, 
 in the least degree, belonged exclusively to their constit- 
 uents ; others, that signing would bind them, in honor, to 
 an advocacy which duty forbade. The form of attestation 
 had been devised by Gouverneur Morris, to disarm the 
 scruples known to exist, and Dr. Franklin was selected to 
 move its adoption ; which he did, in some happy phrases, 
 marked by that sense of the relation of values which had 
 distinguished his life, public and private : 
 
 " There are some parts of the Constitution which I do 
 not, at present, approve, but I am not sure that I shall 
 never approve them. The older I grow, the more apt I 
 am to doubt my own judgment and to respect the judg- 
 ment of others. I sign this Constitution with all its faults, 
 if there are such, because I think a general government 
 3
 
 50 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 * 
 
 necessary for us, and because there is no form of govern- 
 ment but what may be a blessing to the people, if well 
 administered. I believe further, that this government is 
 likely to be well administered for a course of years, and 
 can only end in despotism, as other forms have done before 
 it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need 
 despotic government, being incapable of any other. I 
 doubt if any other convention may be able to make a 
 better Constitution ; for when you assemble a number of 
 men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you 
 inevitably assemble with those men, all their prejudices, 
 their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, 
 and their selfish views. It therefore astonishes me to find 
 this system approaching so near perfection as it does ; and 
 I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting to 
 hear that our councils are confounded, and that our 
 States are on the point of separation, only to meet here- 
 after for the purpose of cutting one another's throats. 
 I consent to this Constitution, because I expect no better, 
 and because I am not sure that it is not the best. The 
 opinion I have of its errors I sacrifice to the public 
 good. I have never whispered a syllable of them 
 abroad. Within these walls they were born, here they 
 shall die. If every one of us, in returning to his constit- 
 uents, were to report the objections he has to it, and en- 
 deavor to gain partisans in support of them, we might 
 prevent its being generally received, and thereby lose all 
 the salutary effects and great advantages resulting natu- 
 rally in our favor among foreign nations, as well as among 
 ourselves, from a real or apparent unanimity. Much of 
 the strength and efficiency of any government depends on 
 opinion ; on the general opinion of the goodness of the 
 government, as well as of the wisdom and integrity of the 
 governors." 
 
 If the Constitution was to take effect upon its adoption
 
 THE CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS. 51 
 
 by the Convention, the reasoning of Franklin would have 
 been incontrovertible, and a sense of any defect would 
 have been properly confined to subsequent efforts for 
 amendments in the mode it permitted ; but if it was to be 
 judged by others, whether they were not entitled to all the 
 information they could get, was a very different question, 
 and a very nice and difficult question of political ethics. 
 If a man commissions another to buy him a horse, the 
 balancing in the mind of the agent of the merits and de- 
 merits of the animal need not be communicated ; but if he 
 asks that the purchase be recommended, he expects that 
 defects will be disclosed, as well as qualities extolled. But 
 is the rule which would govern, in such a case of private 
 trust, applicable in its full extent to a public trust? Is 
 there not an element in one which can. not exist in the 
 other the solus populi of the considering State ? Upon 
 this point of political morality a long and acrimonious 
 debate occurred in the Convention of New York between 
 Hamilton and Lansing. Unfortunately, it is not reported, 
 for any conclusions of a mind so fertile as that of Hamilton 
 would be of inestimable value. The charge of Lansing 
 was : " You think this Constitution very defective ; so do 
 I. I state my objections ; you conceal yours, and only 
 utter praise. You are insincere to those who favor, and 
 unjust to those who oppose this instrument." The answer 
 of Hamilton probably embraced the entire range of politi- 
 cal duty and morality, and, if so, left certainly no point 
 untouched. He must have discriminated with the nicest 
 skill, between differing duties under differing circum- 
 stances, and asserted the right of judgment upon proba- 
 bilities. If, from what he could gather, he had become 
 satisfied that nine States would ratify, that conviction 
 would dictate one course ; if he had not, another line of 
 action might be proper, and the geographical position and 
 relative importance of probable ratifying and non-ratifying
 
 52 SEVEN CONVENTION'S. 
 
 States must be an element of consideration and judgment ; 
 or, if the choice lay, not between what he thought good, 
 but what he thought possible, the possible should be com- 
 mended exclusively ; finally, if there was only an option be- 
 tween bad and worse, good sense would forbid him to in- 
 veigh against the bad. Whatever his reasoning, it convinced 
 the body he addressed. A similar attack was made in the 
 Virginia Convention upon Randolph, who, refusing to sign, 
 urged and voted for ratification. His answer was frank and 
 full : " I refused to sign, because I saw grave defects in the 
 Constitution. I felt that it was my duty then ; I still think 
 it was. My opinion as to the existence of those defects has 
 not changed. But eight States have ratified. A Union 
 must be formed. It is better for Virginia to be in that 
 Union, in spite of defects in the Constitution, than to be 
 out of it in consequence of them. For every other act of 
 my life I appeal to the mercy of God ; for this, I am con- 
 tent to rely on his justice." Debates in the conventions 
 of five States are reported, how fully or fairly it is im- 
 possible now to say. If Johnson, reporting Parliament, 
 took care " that the Whig dogs should not have the best of 
 it," lesser men, if they had prejudices (and who is without 
 them ?), can not be hoped to have been perfectly impartial. 
 In his notes of the debates in the Federal Convention, in 
 spite of his claim to complete accuracy, it is certain that 
 the hearing of Madison was more acute for what he wished 
 said, than for what he wished unsaid, and, if contemporane- 
 ous documents may be trusted, he did not quite hear all 
 that was said. Enough (perhaps all that is necessary) is 
 preserved, to display the general sense of men upon some 
 points, and their differences upon others, and to testify to 
 the intelligence of the delegates to those conventions, and 
 of the constituencies which appointed them. Nothing 
 can convey a better idea of the political interest and ac- 
 tivity, than a remark of a delegate in the Convention of
 
 THE CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS. 53 
 
 Massachusetts. That body was very large, there being on 
 the average a representative for each thousand souls: 
 " When this Constitution was published, my town met to 
 examine it ; we studied it for seven hours ; then we all 
 agreed that it would not do." Massachusetts was the 
 pivotal State. If she had not ratified, it is certain that 
 Virginia and New York would have followed her example ; 
 New Hampshire most probably would not have ratified ; 
 North Carolina did not, and Rhode Island could not be 
 counted on. Either a second Convention must have met, 
 perhaps, under less happy auspices, or the States might 
 have separated, some gravitating to Massachusetts, some to 
 Virginia, and some to Pennsylvania. Therefore the de- 
 bate in her Convention is of primary importance. It is 
 marked by moderation in tone, calmness even in perti- 
 nacity, and respect for opposition. The first question 
 mooted was the biennial representation to the House. 
 Habit has great power. The delegates to the Congress of 
 the Confederation were elected for one year, were subject 
 to recall, and compelled to rotation. A change in that 
 respect not unnaturally "excited suspicion, and demanded 
 justification. Fisher Ames sought to disarm the one, and 
 supply the other: "I consider frequent elections one of 
 the first securities of popular liberty, in which its essence 
 may be supposed to reside. How shall we make the best 
 use of this instrument ? A delegation of power for a 
 single day would defeat the design of representation ; an 
 election for a term of years would be repugnant to it. 
 The period must be so long that the representative may 
 understand the interest of the people, yet so limited that 
 his fidelity may be secured by a dependence on their ap- 
 probation. Because annual elections are safe, it does not 
 follow that biennial are dangerous. Both may be good. 
 Besides, the term, being fixed by the Constitution, is not 
 subject to repeal. We are sure it is the worst of the case.
 
 54 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 Upon its own merits, however, it meets my entire appro- 
 bation. First, from the extent of territory to be governed, 
 as large as that of Borne in the zenith of its power ; next, 
 from the objects of legislation, if few, national ; two years 
 will be necessary to enable a man to judge of the trade and 
 interest of the State he never saw ; lastly, for the more 
 perfect security of our liberty, for faction and enthusiasm 
 are the instruments by which popular governments have 
 been destroyed. The people always mean right, and, if 
 time is allowed for reflection and information, always do 
 right. Biennial elections are a security for the sober, sec- 
 ond thought. A member chosen for two years may feel 
 some independence. The factions of the day will expire 
 before his term." The astuteness of the " plain men," who 
 questioned the propriety of the change, is not less notice- 
 able than that of the more educated class. If the territory 
 is so extensive, and the interests so complicated, a member 
 can only be competent from thorough previous study. "We 
 shall elect men who know, not men who have to learn. If 
 the objects of legislation are few, little time will be neces- 
 sary ; if they are national, a common feeling will make 
 them easy. As for faction, that is as probable of a second 
 as of a first year. The arguments of Ames and others 
 prevailed, and experience has justified their conclusions, 
 but not for the reasons they gave. A member who has 
 served one term, is worth, as a public man, twice as much 
 as a successor of equal ability. By that time, he has be- 
 gun to know the House, and the House to know him. The 
 clause which gives to the Congress the power to regulate 
 the time, place, and manner of elections was vigorously 
 attacked and not very vigorously defended. The defense 
 was twofold: That a State might neglect or refuse to 
 make the necessary regulations, and thus, no representatives 
 being elected, the General Government would be dissolved ; 
 that it would operate as a check upon the Federal Senate,
 
 THE CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS. 55 
 
 and its constituents, the State Legislatures, and in case of 
 the invasion of a State, act, when its Legislature might be 
 powerless. Secondly, the improbability that the power 
 would be abused. To the former, the rejoinder was, why 
 not add, " if a State shall neglect or refuse" ? that will pre- 
 vent prevarication. To the latter, which had been warmly 
 urged by a clergyman, you preach human depravity in the 
 pulpit, and human infallibility on this floor. The clause 
 had passed in the Federal Convention with little discussion 
 and no dissent, but in the State Conventions was viewed 
 by many as a source of probable injustice, and possible col- 
 lision. An exclusive Federal regulation would have been 
 consistent with the scope of a scheme, which aimed to 
 separate as distinctly as possible the functions of the gen- 
 eral and State governments. Against that, no argument 
 could be urged, which could not be urged against any other 
 delegation of power, but, if it was desirable that a State 
 originally should exercise it, a subsequent intervention 
 would necessarily be partisan. There may be good rea- 
 sons for the clause, but the fanciful ones asserted in the 
 Convention, and the equally fanciful idea of Madison, that 
 there would be a continuous inherent hostility between the 
 Federal and the State Legislatures, have little weight in 
 themselves and have found no warrant in experience. In 
 all constitutional governments, and pre-eminently in a fed- 
 eral republic, discretion as to rights ought to be excluded 
 to the very limits of possibility, for liberty consists less in 
 what a man has, than in what none can take from him. 
 To the objection that slaves were made an element of rep- 
 resentation, King answered : " The principle of this Consti- 
 tution is that taxation and representation go hand in hand. 
 The apportionment was the language of all America." 
 He, with others, contended that, in the bargain, the advan- 
 tage in that respect was with the Northern States. Upon 
 slavery itself, the opposition insisted that the Constitution
 
 56 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 pledged them to it, and to the slave-trade besides ; for 
 under the Confederation, as all admitted, the connection 
 was between States, not between the people of the States ; 
 whereas, under the plan submitted, there would be not only 
 a constitutional government, but a constitutional people, 
 and if the people of Massachusetts became a part of that 
 people, they would be as fully guarantors of property in 
 slaves as of any other species of property. General Heath 
 answered : " I apprehend it is not in our power to do any- 
 thing for or against those who are in slavery in the South- 
 ern States. I detest the idea of slavery. It is generally 
 detested by the people of this Commonwealth, and I ar- 
 dently hope that the time will soon come when our South- 
 ern brethren will view it as we do, and put a stop to it, 
 but we have no right to compel them. Two questions 
 naturally arise, if we ratify the Constitution. Shall we do 
 anything by our acts to hold the blacks in slavery ? Shall 
 we be partakers in other men's sins ? Surely not, for in 
 nothing do we voluntarily encourage the slavery of our 
 fellow-men." Others dilated upon the fact that a power 
 over the slave-trade, not before possessed, was acquired. 
 It is impossible to suppose that the Convention did not 
 know of the bargain by which the carrying States, with- 
 out giving up anything they had, got a great deal they had 
 not, a limitable slave-trade being one of its conditions. The 
 next ground of attack was the tenure of the Senate, which 
 Ames thus vindicated : "It is necessary to premise that 
 no argument against the new plan has made a deeper im- 
 pression than that it will produce a consolidation of the 
 States. This is an effect all good men will deprecate. The 
 State governments are essential parts of this system, and 
 the defense of this article is drawn from its tendency to 
 their preservation. The senators represent the sovereignty 
 of the States ; in the other House individuals are repre- 
 sented. The Senate may not originate bills. It need not
 
 THE CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS. 57 
 
 be said that they are principally to direct the affairs of war 
 and treaties. They are in the quality of embassadors of 
 the States, and it will not be denied that some permanency 
 in office is necessary to the discharge of their duties. If 
 they were chosen yearly, how could they perform their 
 trust ? If they were brought by that means more immedi- 
 ately under the influence of the people, they will represent 
 the State Legislature less, and become the representatives 
 of the people. The absurdity of this, and its repugnancy 
 to the federal principle of the Constitution, will appear 
 more fully, by supposing that senators are to be chosen by 
 the people at large, which, if there is any force in the 
 objection to this article, would be proper. But whom in 
 that case would they represent ? Not the Legislatures of the 
 States, but the people. This would totally obliterate the 
 federal feature of the Constitution. What would become 
 of the State governments, and on whom would devolve 
 the duty of defending them from the encroachments of 
 the Federal Government ? A consolidation of the States 
 would ensue, which, it is conceded, would subvert the new 
 Constitution, and against which this article, so much con- 
 demned, is our best security. Too much provision can not 
 be made against a consolidation. The State governments 
 represent the wishes, the feelings, and local interests of the 
 people. They are the safeguards and ornament of the Con- 
 stitution, they will protract the period of our liberties, they 
 will afford a shelter against the abuse of power, and will 
 be the natural avengers of our violated rights. This article 
 secures the excellence of the Constitution, and affords just 
 ground to believe that it will be in practice, what it is in 
 theory, a federal republic." The argument of Ames 
 must have compelled general conviction, for that objection 
 was never again seriously pressed. So far, the opposing 
 forces had skirmished ; battle was joined upon the taxa- 
 tion and judiciary clauses. The former, it was objected,
 
 58 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 is "a very good and valid conveyance of all the property 
 in the United States, to certain uses indeed, but those 
 capable of any construction the trustees may think proper 
 to make, and they are not amenable to any tribunal." The 
 general answer was : Government must have all necessary 
 power, the quantum can not be fixed, it must depend upon 
 the exigency which calls for its exercise. It may be 
 abused, that possibility is inseparable from all governments. 
 Somebody must be trusted. Parsons added that there 
 was a perfect remedy against misgovernment within the 
 Constitution. " The people have it in their power effectu- 
 ally to resist usurpation without being driven to an appeal 
 to arms. An act of usurpation is not obligatory, it is not 
 law, and any man may be justified in his resistance. Let 
 him be considered a criminal by the General Government, 
 yet only his fellow-citizens can convict him ; they are his 
 jury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not all the 
 power of Congress can hurt him, and innocent they cer- 
 tainly will pronounce him, if the supposed law he resisted 
 was an act of usurpation." It is curious to see the claim 
 of Calhoun forty years later, anticipated by one of the 
 greatest judicial minds Massachusetts ever produced. The 
 rejoinders were : " Faction is the vehicle of all transactions 
 in public life. This truth all know, and also that the prev- 
 alent faction is the body. Is it contended that the prev- 
 alent body must always be right, and that the true patriots 
 will always outnumber the base and the selfish ? Then it 
 must follow that no public measure ever was wrong, for it 
 must have been passed by a majority, and no power there- 
 fore ever was or ever can be abused. But if we know that 
 power can be and ' has been abused, why should we expect 
 more from Congress than from the myriads of public 
 bodies which have preceded it and have abused power ? A 
 sovereign power within a sovereign power is not conceiv- 
 able by the mind. Congress ought to have supreme power
 
 THE CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS. 59 
 
 over all matters within its jurisdiction, but that jurisdiction 
 ought to be so distinctly bounded that every one may 
 know the utmost limits of it. Where is the Bill of Rights 
 which shall say toCongress, ' Thus far shalt thou go and no 
 farther ' ? " * The objections to the judiciary may properly 
 be omitted, as amendments justified and obviated them. 
 
 The contest nearing a close, Ames called on those who 
 stood forth in 1775, to stand forth now, to throw aside all 
 interested, and party views, and have one purse, one heart 
 for the whole, and to consider that as it was necessary then, 
 so it is necessary now, to unite or die we must. The 
 appeal brought to the floor one " who would not have 
 troubled the Convention, if they who were on the stage in 
 1775 had not been called on. I was one of them, a mem- 
 ber of the court all the time ; if any body had proposed 
 such a Constitution as this, it would have been thrown 
 away ; it would not have been looked at. We did not con- 
 tend with Great Britain for a threepenny duty on tea, but 
 upon a right to tax us, and bind us in all cases whatsoever. 
 Does not this Constitution do the same ? " 
 
 Debate exhausted, and a decisive vote imminent, it 
 was apparent that the Constitution would be rejected.f 
 But there had been a great deal of neighborly outside dis- 
 cussion among the delegates, and they were possessed of 
 each other's reasonings and feelings as we could not be, if 
 the report was as full, as it is meager. Both sides ear- 
 nestly desired a Union. One side was so eager for it, as 
 not to stickle at any price ; the other side would only pay 
 
 * A Bill of Rights can not exclude the success of aggression, but it does 
 exclude the consecration of its success. Posterity will reverse the judgment 
 of former generations. 
 
 f King wrote to Madison that in the face of a majorjjy supposed of from 
 eight to twelve, a division upon any point had not been ventured. Another 
 correspondent informed him that, through the proposal of amendments (to 
 be recommended only) a majority of from fifteen to twenty could be secured 
 for ratification.
 
 60 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 so much. Those who favored ratification could not lose 
 by paying less for what they wanted, and, if they pledged 
 themselves to amendments embodying the views and 
 obviating the objections of the others, must not all be 
 satisfied ? Hancock was selected to offer the compromise, 
 which he did with equal skill and courtesy: "My situa- 
 tion has not permitted me to enter into the debates of the 
 Convention. It appears to me, from what has been ad- 
 vanced in them, that it is necessary to adopt the form of 
 government proposed, but observing a diversity of senti- 
 ment among the gentlemen of the Convention, I have 
 frequently conversed with them on the subject, and from 
 those conversations I am induced to inquire whether the 
 introduction of some amendments would not be attended 
 with the happiest consequences. I am unable, if my 
 abilities would permit, to go more largely into the subject, 
 and I rely on the candor of the Convention to bear me 
 witness that my wishes for a good Constitution are sincere. 
 I submit a proposition to your consideration, with the 
 desire and hope that it may tend to promote a spirit of 
 union." The proposed amendments read, Samuel Adams 
 moved that they be taken into consideration: "I have 
 had my doubts of this Constitution. I could not digest 
 every part of it as easily as some gentlemen. This is my 
 misfortune, not my fault ; other gentlemen have had their 
 doubts. I have observed the sentiments of men as far as 
 Virginia, and from newspapers, and in the conventions, I 
 find the same doubts, but in my opinion the proposition 
 submitted will have a tendency to remove such doubts and 
 to conciliate the minds of the Convention, and of the 
 people out-of-doors." Bowdoin, one of the strongest advo- 
 cates of ratification, expressed his " hearty approbation of 
 the propositions of his Excellency, as they would have a 
 tendency to relieve the fears and quiet the apprehensions 
 of some very worthy and respectable people." A motion
 
 THE CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS. 61 
 
 for a committee of two from each county, to consider the 
 amendments proposed, and any others that might be sug- 
 gested, and report thereon, was carried unanimously. The 
 amendments reported met universal favor. Adams ad- 
 mitted that the first article was " a summary of a Bill of 
 Eights, and consonant with the second of the Articles of 
 Confederation." Dr. Jarvis, a zealous and most powerful 
 supporter of ratification, termed it a "positive security of 
 what is not expressly delegated, leaving nothing to the un- 
 certainty of conjecture, or the refinements of implication, 
 an express reservation of what is nearest and most agree- 
 able to the people." The end, however, was not yet 
 reached. Upon the point whether ratification should be 
 conditional upon the acceptance of the amendments, or 
 absolute with a recommendation of them, the unanimity 
 was dissolved, the contest was renewed, and the issue was 
 again doubtful. The opposition claimed that the power of 
 the Convention only extended to ratification or rejection, 
 Conditional ratification was legitimate, but the mere pro- 
 posal of amendments was not contemplated in their ap- 
 pointment, nor embraced in their duties. Dr. Jarvis an- 
 swered: "Under what authority are we acting, from 
 Congress, from the Federal Convention, from the State 
 Legislature ? From neither, from the people of Massa- 
 chusetts as their immediate representatives to execute the 
 most important trust it is possible to receive. Are not the 
 people of Massachusetts, assembled by their delegates, at 
 liberty to resolve in what form that trust shall be executed ? 
 To what tribunal are we amenable ? Only to God and 
 our own consciences. It appears to me that a conditional 
 ratification is equivalent to a total rejection. As so many 
 other States have received the Constitution as it is, how 
 can it be made to appear that they will not adhere to their 
 resolution, and should they be as warmly and pertinaciously 
 attached to their opinions, as we might be to ours, a long
 
 62 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 and painful interval might elapse before we should have 
 the benefit of a Federal Constitution. Will the States 
 which have recently adopted, consent to call a new con- 
 vention at the request of this State ? If nine should ratify, 
 are we going to expose this Commonwealth to the disa- 
 greeable alternative of being forced into compliance, or of 
 remaining in opposition ? Why these amendments should 
 not be adopted I can not conceive. They are general, not 
 local, not calculated for the particular interest of this State, 
 but with indiscriminate justice, comprehend the circum- 
 stances of the man on the banks of the Savannah and on 
 the margin of the Kennebec. The remaining seven States 
 will have our example before them. There is a high prob- 
 ability that they, at least some of them, will take our con- 
 duct as a precedent, perhaps they will assume the same 
 mode of procedure." Ames summed up with his usual 
 ability : " Almost every one who has appeared against the 
 Constitution, has declared that he approves it with the 
 amendments. One distinguished for his zealous oppo- 
 sition would hold up both hands for it, if they could be 
 adopted. I admire this candid way of discussing the sub- 
 ject, and shall endeavor to treat it with equal care and 
 fairness. The nature of the debate is totally shifted. The 
 inquiry now is, as to the degree of probability, that the 
 amendments will be incorporated in the Constitution. 
 What, in any future thing, do we devise more than the 
 probable ? What more is another Constitution ? All agree 
 that we must have one. If we ratify, and a union is 
 formed, nine States only have to agree ; if we do not, and 
 a union is not formed, thirteen States have to be satisfied. 
 Either in a union the amendments will be accepted, or they 
 will not. If we believe that they will, we ought to be 
 unanimous for ratification ; if we believe that they will 
 not command the assent of enough States, this State ought 
 to submit, for one eighth or one tenth of the people ought
 
 THE CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS. 63 
 
 not to dictate to the whole." The mass of opponents were 
 not convinced, and were angry. They felt that a little of 
 the pia fraus had been used, that the offer of amend- 
 ments, not of the possibility, or probability of amend- 
 ments, averted a vote of rejection. Their mood is discern- 
 ible in the report, though discreetly veiled, but their 
 bitterness at those who, over the narrow bridge of proba- 
 bility, were about to pass from one camp to another, 
 is less dimly seen. When all who wished to be heard, 
 had been gratified, Hancock rose to put the question. 
 He prefaced it with a short address, of which the close is 
 perfect in temper and pertinency : " Let the question 
 be decided as it may, there can be no cause for triumph 
 on one side, or chagrin on the other. Should there be a 
 great division, every good man, every man who loves his 
 country, so far from exhibiting extraordinary marks of joy, 
 will sincerely lament the want of unanimity, and strenu- 
 ously endeavor to cultivate a spirit of conciliation both in 
 the Convention and at home. The people of this Common- 
 wealth are a people of great intelligence in public business. 
 They know that we have none of us an interest separate 
 from theirs, that it must be our happiness to conduce to 
 theirs, and that we must all rise or fall together. They 
 will, therefore, never forsake the first principle of society, 
 that of being governed by the voice of the majority. 
 Should the proposed form of government be rejected, 
 they will zealously attempt another. Should it, by the 
 vote now to be taken, be ratified, they will quietly acqui- 
 esce, and, where they see want of perfection in it, endeavor 
 in a constitutional way to have it amended." The re- 
 port upon which the vote was to be taken can not be 
 omitted : 
 
 " Commonwealth of Massachusetts in convention of 
 the delegates of the people of the Commonwealth of 
 Massachusetts, 1788.
 
 64: SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 "The Convention having impartially discussed, and 
 fully considered, the Constitution for the United States of 
 America, reported to Congress by the convention of dele- 
 gates from the United States of America, and submitted to 
 us by a resolution of the General Court of the said Com- 
 monwealth, passed the twenty-fifth day of October last 
 past, and acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodness 
 of the Supreme Ruler of the Universe in affording the 
 people of the United States an opportunity deliberately 
 and peacefully, without fraud or surprise, of entering into 
 an explicit and solemn compact with each other, by assent- 
 ing to and ratifying a new Constitution, in order to form a 
 more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tran- 
 quillity, provide for the common defense, promote the gen- 
 eral welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to them- 
 selves and their posterity, do, in the name and behalf of 
 the people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, assent 
 to and ratify the said Constitution for the United States. 
 And, as it is the opinion of this Convention that certain 
 amendments and alterations in the said Constitution would 
 remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions of many of 
 the good people of the Commonwealth, and more effectu- 
 ally guard against an undue administration of the Federal 
 Government, the Convention do recommend that the fol- 
 lowing alterations and provisions be introduced into the 
 said Constitution : 
 
 " 1. That it be explicitly declared that all powers not 
 expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are re- 
 served to the several States to be by them exercised. 
 
 "2. That there shall be one representative to every 
 thirty thousand, according to the census mentioned in the 
 Constitution, until the whole number of representatives 
 amounts to two hundred. 
 
 " 3. That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in 
 them by the fourth section of the first article, but in cases
 
 THE CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS. 65 
 
 where a State shall neglect or refuse to make the regula- 
 tions therein mentioned, or shall make regulations subver- 
 sive of the rights of the people to a free and equal repre- 
 sentation in Congress agreeably to the Constitution. 
 
 " 4. That Congress do not lay direct taxes, but when the 
 moneys arising from the impost and excise are insufficient 
 for the public exigencies, nor then, until Congress shall 
 have first made a requisition upon the States to assess, 
 levy, and pay their respective proportions of such requisi- 
 tions agreeably to the census fixed by the Constitution, in 
 such way and manner as the Legislatures of the States may 
 think best ; and in such case, if any State shall neglect or 
 refuse to pay its proportion pursuant to such requisition, 
 then Congress may assess and levy such State's proportion, 
 together with interest thereon, at the rate of six per cent 
 per annum, from the time of payment prescribed in such 
 requisitions. 
 
 " 5. That Congress create no company with exclusive 
 advantages of commerce. 
 
 "6. That no person shall be tried for any crime by 
 which he may incur an infamous punishment or loss of 
 life, until he be first indicted by a grand jury, except in 
 such cases as may arise in the government, and the regula- 
 tion of the land and naval forces. 
 
 " 7. The Supreme Judicial Federal Court shall have no 
 jurisdiction of causes between the citizens of different 
 States, unless the matter in dispute, whether it concern the 
 realty or the personalty, be of the value of three thousand 
 dollars at the least ; nor shall the Federal judicial powers 
 extend to any action between citizens of different States, 
 when the matter in dispute, whether it concern the realty 
 or the personalty, is not of the value of fifteen hundred 
 dollars at the least. 
 
 " 8. In civil actions between citizens of different States, 
 every issue of fact arising in actions at common law shall
 
 66 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 be tried by a jury if the parties or either of them re- 
 quest it. 
 
 " 9. Congress shall at no time consent that any person 
 holding an office of trust or profit under the United States 
 shall accept of a title of nobility or any other title and 
 office from any king, prince, or foreign state. 
 
 " And the Convention do in the name and in the behalf 
 of the people of this Commonwealth enjoin it upon their 
 representatives in Congress, at all times, until the altera- 
 tions and provisions aforesaid have been considered agree- 
 ably to the fifth article of the said Constitution, to exert all 
 their influence and use all reasonable and legal methods to 
 obtain, a ratification of the said alterations and provisions 
 in such manner as is provided in this said article." 
 
 The pledges of the Convention were not kept. When 
 the amendments were submitted to the States, the vote of 
 Massachusetts was not given for them. They became part 
 of the charter of government by the vote of States which 
 had accepted the ideas of Massachusetts, and followed her 
 example. The piety of the Commonwealth must have 
 obtained, for its respectability, a divine dispensation from 
 good faith. 
 
 The count showed 187 yeas, 168 nays. The shifting of 
 ten votes had been sufficient. The statistics of the votes 
 are curious, interesting, and perhaps instructive. The 
 delegates from some counties voted almost unanimously 
 yea; from others, with the same degree of unanimity, 
 nay. The officers of the late war, by about three to two, 
 voted nay; the clergy, by about five to one, voted 
 yea. The bench, the bar, and the trading and commercial 
 classes, almost to a man, voted yea. The yeomanry as a 
 class voted nay. Why the yeomanry were so determined 
 in opposition is a question easily answered. They had 
 suffered and fought for seven years to establish a fact, and 
 a political principle. The fact, that Massachusetts was a
 
 THE CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS. 67 
 
 community, and, as such, entitled to say what were her 
 rights and maintain them ; the principle, that the obligation 
 of governor and governed is reciprocal and the right of 
 judgment equal those things they had looked for in the 
 Constitution, and had not found them, or, if there, not so 
 distinctly stated as to defy denial. The first amendment 
 they thought supplied the deficiency, but they would not 
 trust amendment to any contingency. The reiterated 
 assurances of a set of checks and balances, within the sys- 
 tem did not impose upon them for a moment. They knew 
 that the electors, not the elected (whether State Legislature, 
 Congress, or a President), were the real depositories of 
 power. That power was what they wanted defined and 
 bounded. They knew that unless there was a check upon 
 that, " constitutional government is but solemn trifling, 
 all trusts in a Constitution being grounded on the assur- 
 ance not that the depositories of power will not, but that 
 they can not, misemploy their power." They understood 
 liberty to be, as Fisher Ames defined it, " due restraint 
 upon the liberties of others." Such due restraint they 
 knew was necessary to keep them from injustice to others, 
 and others from injustice to them. They did not propose 
 to change masters, and to give to a Union the right they 
 had denied to Great Britain. In every other convention 
 men of trained abilities were pitted against each other. In 
 that of Massachusetts all her disciplined intellect, famil- 
 iarity with debate, wealth, and high social position were 
 on one side ; on the other, the laborers in peace, and the 
 rank and file in war. Whoever appreciates political in- 
 sight, must see, from the scanty record, that her yeomanry 
 were indeed " a people of great light."
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 
 
 THE report of debate in the Convention of Virginia, 
 which exceeds six hundred pages, discloses three great cur- 
 rents of opinion : One, that the Constitution was accepta- 
 ble upon its merits ; one, that it was not, but indispensable ; 
 and one, that it would be, if amended, though not until 
 amended. The former was in a minority ; even with the 
 addition of the second a majority was doubtful, and, if tra- 
 dition may be trusted, only in the closing days of the Con- 
 vention were the few votes necessary to ratification secured j 
 and then only by an abandonment of the pretensions which 
 at the outset had characterized its advocates. The amenity so 
 conspicuous in the Convention of Massachusetts is less ap- 
 parent in the Convention of Virginia ; but the circumstances 
 were not the same. Massachusetts had a question almost 
 abstract to resolve; if she rejected, a preponderance of 
 strength and wealth would have responded to her decision. 
 If Virginia rejected, the only ally to be counted on was 
 North Carolina. The issue, therefore, was no longer sim- 
 ple ; the dangers of disunion, as well as the merits of an 
 instrument, had to be weighed, and the friends of adoption, 
 standing on vantage-ground, were little disposed to concili- 
 ation. The question forces itself upon the mind, why men 
 almost universally satisfied with the structure of the pro- 
 posed government, content with the apportionment of in. 
 fluence among the States, craving a Union, and possessing 
 the same objects of political desire, divided into parties, 
 almost hostile. The discord can not be accounted for merely
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 69 
 
 as a recurrence of the historical fact that in religion and in 
 politics men who agree upon ninety-nine out of one hundred 
 points, are sometimes dogmatical, indeed fanatical, upon the 
 single point, and, paradoxical as it sounds, are the farther 
 apart the nearer they are together, because, the less that is 
 to be yielded, the more each thinks that the other ought to 
 give way. There were two causes, one of which lies on 
 the surface, and one which will appear in this debate. Un- 
 fortunately, the Federalists, early, as can be seen in the let- 
 ters of the very moderate Madison, arrogated to themselves 
 a monopoly of Unionism and patriotism ; and if they did 
 not distinctly designate themselves, as Cicero did his party, 
 the Good, came dangerously near the thought, and its ex- 
 pression. As human nature is constituted, they could 
 scarcely do otherwise, under their intense conviction that 
 then was the golden moment, that the opportunity lost 
 could never be regained, that the rejection of the Constitu- 
 tion must be followed by anarchy, and anarchy by inter- 
 state wars, to a common destruction. The anti-Federal- 
 ists, principally consisting of the less timid classes in each 
 State, held such fears to be preposterous. They knew that 
 there was then a Union, and they believed that it would con- 
 tinue to exist, that it must exist, because its advantages 
 were palpable to every man and every State. They did 
 not believe that it could depend upon any one special set 
 of words, but upon a sense of its benefit, or, if it could, 
 that the Constitution was that special set of words, and they 
 felt that the assumption of a lack of patriotism, or Union- 
 ism, in an opposition to any proposed Constitution, was an 
 affront ; that the reason Mason gave in the Federal Conven- 
 tion for refusing his signature " I will not say take this, 
 or nothing" was their reason, and while they were satisfied 
 to vest in a Federal Government every power necessary to 
 a Union, they were determined to have nothing but a 
 Union, and resolved that every expression in the Constitu-
 
 70 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 tion should be so precise and clear, that a possibility of 
 doubt, or pretext for quarrel, should be excluded. When 
 Mr. Lincoln said that " the human mind can not reach to 
 the audacity of denying any right plainly written in the 
 Constitution," he spoke the praise, although the epitaph, of 
 the policy which sought to have every right and power 
 plainly written.* Possibly it is a matter of regret that the 
 criticism of the anti-Federalists had not been more minute 
 and searching, and their emendation more thorough. War, 
 and the change of the principle of government from con- 
 sent to force, might have been averted. With such parties 
 existing, the debate in the Virginia Convention opened. 
 Among the debaters were men whose names are inseparable 
 from the history of the United States Madison, Henry, 
 Marshall, Monroe. With these were associated others, per- 
 haps not inferior in mental power, if less fortunate in op- 
 portunities for displaying it. The preamble and first article 
 having been read in the Committee on the Whole, Nicholas 
 rose to commend it. He reviewed the plan of representa- 
 tion in its different characteristics ; the qualification of elect- 
 ors, of those they might elect, the number, tenure of office, 
 and powers of the latter ; and, lastly, the security of the 
 people. The qualification of electors for the general and 
 State Legislatures was the same ; a reasonable provision, 
 as the qualifications of electors varied in the States. The 
 qualifications of the elected were age and residence ; one, 
 requisite for maturity of judgment, the other for an identity 
 of interest with a State. The term of office, neither too 
 long nor too short, conciliated duty to the Union, with re- 
 sponsibilty to constituents for intelligent and faithful serv- 
 ice. The number had to be fixed arbitrarily at first, but 
 
 * The right not only plainly written in, but the Constitution itself is, 
 freedom from control the rule, control the exception, the characteristic of 
 governments based on consent : in those not so based, control is the rule, 
 freedom from control the exception.
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 71 
 
 upon the disclosures of a census would be altered to exact- 
 ness. So far as the security of the people might be in- 
 volved, the House had a greater weight in the system than 
 the Commons in that of England. The Commons had 
 overmatched greater powers than the House would have to 
 encounter, and their responsibility to constituents was less. 
 This power so vested can not be abused, for experience 
 has proved that men can trust those whose rights are identi- 
 cal with their own. Still more, the people being possessed 
 of the supreme power, can change the Government when 
 they please. The power to regulate the time, manner, and 
 place of elections for Federal officers in the House, he 
 deemed to be indispensable ; without it there could be no 
 security for the General Government against the hostility of 
 State Legislatures. If a State Legislature, by accident or 
 design, failed to regulate, the inaction would eventuaUy 
 put an end to the Union. Again, there might otherwise 
 be as many different periods of election as States ; there- 
 fore, without a power in the Federal Government to pre- 
 scribe uniformity, a full House might be unattainable. 
 Henry inquired of the delegates to the late Federal Con- 
 vention what was the purpose of that body ; what did it 
 mean by " We the people " instead of " We, the States ? " 
 Did it design a great consolidated government ? Randolph 
 seized the opportunity to deny vacillation. He had re- 
 fused to sign because he thought amendments necessary. 
 Had this Convention met at an earlier date, he should have 
 thought them a condition of acceptance. Now it was too 
 late ; the hope of subsequent amendments was all that was 
 left to him. The objection to " We, the people," was the 
 least and most trivial of all possible objections ; it carried 
 its answer with it. Should not the people be consulted 
 upon the construction of a government by which they were 
 to be bound ? 
 
 Mason claimed that direct taxation, before requisition
 
 72 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 made and refused, in which case it would be proper, sub- 
 verted every principle hitherto maintained, and would make 
 the system a consolidated Government. The plan he had 
 hoped for, was one which would draw a line between the 
 General Government and the State governments so distinct 
 as to prevent that clashing of interests and powers, which 
 must otherwise end in the destruction of one or the other. 
 
 Pendleton admitted that a consolidated government 
 " one with sole, exclusive, and unlimited power, executive, 
 legislative, and judicial would be inadmissible; bnt the 
 Constitution was neither such, nor could by any possibility 
 be made such. It only extended to the general purposes 
 of a Union, and did not intermeddle with the local par- 
 ticular affairs of the States. The Federal Government de- 
 pends upon the existence of the State governments ; with- 
 out those, to continue the existence of Congress, and 
 preserve order and peace within their boundaries, it must 
 be destroyed. Fault has been found with the expression, 
 ' "We, the people.' If the objection means that a union 
 ought not to be of the people, but of the governments of 
 the States, the choice of words is very happy. What have 
 the State governments to do with the Constitution ? If 
 they were to determine upon acceptance, the people would 
 not be the judges of the terms on which it was adopted. 
 Direct taxation encounters objection. A government must 
 be supported ; for support it must have its own revenue. 
 If it had to depend upon requisitions, precious time might 
 be lost between its necessities, and possibilities of supply 
 through the action of the State governments. Requisitions 
 might be neglected, even refused ; collision might ensue, 
 and the Union be dissolved." 
 
 Henry rejoined : " The fate of America is involved in 
 my question. Whether this plan is a confederation of 
 States, or a consolidation of States, turns upon that little 
 ' We, the people.' The inquiry is not how trade may be
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 73 
 
 increased, or a great and powerful people may be formed, 
 but how liberty which ought to be the direct end of gov- 
 ernment may be secured. Unfortunately, nothing will 
 preserve it but force. To give up the means to preserve 
 it will be ruin. My great objection to this government is, 
 that it does not leave us the means of defending our rights. 
 It is said that it is not safe to reject it. "Why not ? It is 
 said that there is a plain way of getting amendments. Am 
 I mad, or are my countrymen mad? Six tenths of the 
 people of four States, not one twentieth of the American 
 people, can deny the most necessary alteration. The gen- 
 tleman who presides (Pendleton) tells us that to prevent 
 abuses in our governments we will assemble in convention, 
 recall our delegated powers, and punish our servants for 
 abusing their trust. There would be fine times if, to pun- 
 ish tyrants, it were sufficient to assemble the people ! The 
 arms will be gone, and neither an aristocratic nor a demo- 
 cratic spirit be left. In what nation was a revolution ever 
 heard of, compassed by those without any power at all 
 against those with power ? There will be a standing army. 
 How can that be punished ? Will your mace-bearer be a 
 match for a disciplined regiment ? What will be the situa- 
 tion ? Power of direct taxation unbounded and unlimited, 
 power of exclusive legislation over ten miles square, and 
 over all places purchased for the erection of forts, maga- 
 zines, arsenals, and dock-yards is conceded. What resist- 
 ance could be made? The attempt would be madness; 
 the country would be in the hands of enemies, their garri- 
 sons in its strongholds. Even the disciph'ne of the militia 
 is to be alienated. Will the oppressor let go the oppressed ? 
 Was there ever such an instance ? Can the annals of man- 
 kind exhibit one single example when rulers, overcharged 
 with power, let the oppressed go upon their most urgent 
 entreaty ? Sometimes the oppressed have got loose by one 
 of those bloody struggles which desolate a country ; but a 
 4
 
 74: SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 willing relinquishment of power is one of those things of 
 which human nature never was, nor ever will be, capable. 
 The first consideration should be liberty; the second, 
 union. Are not the means confounded with the end in 
 this government ? There is no responsibility, no punish- 
 ment for the grossest maladministration, for the most out- 
 rageous violation of immunities. By what law can aggres- 
 sions be punished ? None is visible. The preservation of 
 liberty depends upon the chance of men being virtuous 
 enough to punish themselves." 
 
 Randolph pressed the consideration of safety : " Were 
 I convinced that our accession was not necessary to preserve 
 this Union, I would not accede without previous amend- 
 ments, but I am satisfied that it will be lost if we reject. 
 The Union is necessary to the safety of Virginia, and in- 
 dispensable to her happiness. I confess that it is impru- 
 dent for one nation to form an alliance with another whose 
 situation and construction of government are dissimilar; 
 but can Virginia exist without the Union ? She can not, 
 as I will prove." He detailed the reasons for his belief that 
 she would not be capable of defense against the bordering 
 States, if they should be hostile, and that they would be 
 hostile, he justly inferred from human nature. 
 
 Madison was " pained to hear continual distortion of the 
 natural construction of language. It was enough for any 
 human production to bear a fair discussion. If powers be 
 necessary, apparent danger is not a sufficient reason against 
 conceding them. Since the general civilization of mankind 
 there had been more instances of the abridgment of the 
 freedom of the people by the gradual and silent encroach- 
 ments of those in power than by violent and sudden usur- 
 pation. The history of ancient and modern republics 
 showed their destruction to have resulted from turbulence, 
 violence, and the trampling of the rights of a minority by 
 a majority. On consideration of the peculiar situation of
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 75 
 
 the United States, and the causes of the diversity of senti- 
 ment which pervaded their inhabitants, there is great dan- 
 ger that the same causes may terminate in the same fatal 
 effects they had produced in other republics. That danger 
 ought to be wisely guarded against, and perhaps in the 
 progress of this discussion it might appear that the only 
 possible remedy for those evils, and the means of protect- 
 ing and preserving the principles of republicanism, would 
 be found in that system which is declaimed against as the 
 parent of despotism. The principal question is, whether 
 the proposed government be federal or consolidated. It 
 is of a mixed nature, in a manner unprecedented. There 
 is not an express example in the experience of the world. 
 It stands by itself. In some respects it is of a federal 
 nature, in others of a consolidated nature. In the manner 
 in which the Constitution is investigated, ratified, and made 
 the act of the people of America, it is not completely con- 
 solidated nor entirely federal. Who are the parties to it ? 
 The people, but not the people as composing one great 
 body, but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties. 
 No State is bound by it without its own consent. Should 
 all the States adopt it, it will be a government established 
 by the thirteen States of America, not through the inter- 
 vention of Legislatures, but by the people at large. In this 
 respect, the distinction between the existing and proposed 
 system is very material ; that was created by the dependent, 
 derivative power of the Legislatures of the States, this will 
 be by the superior power of the people. This same idea is 
 in some degree attended to in the provision for alterations. 
 A majority of the States can not introduce amendments, 
 nor are all required for that purpose. Three fourths must 
 concur. In this there is a departure from the federal idea. 
 The members of the House of Representatives are to be 
 chosen by the people at large, in proportion to the numbers 
 in the respective districts. The Senate is elected by the
 
 76 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 States in their equal and political capacity. Had the gov- 
 ernment been completely consolidated, the Senate would 
 have been elected by the people in their individual capacity. 
 Thus it is of a complicated nature, and the complication 
 may be hoped to exclude the evils of an absolute consoli- 
 dated government, as well as those of a mere confederacy. 
 If Virginia were separated, her power and authority would 
 extend to all cases ; if all powers were vested in the General 
 Government, it would be a consolidated government ; but 
 the powers of the General Government are enumerated. It 
 has legislative powers on defined and limited objects, be- 
 yond which it can not extend its jurisdiction. If any of 
 those powers be necessary, inconvenient though they be, 
 Virginia must submit to receive them, or to lose the Union. 
 Direct taxation will probably be unnecessary for the general 
 purposes of government, but in case of war every resource 
 must be at its command." 
 
 Corbin considered Madison's definition of the proposed 
 government exact, and its appropriate designation, " a repre- 
 sentative federal republic, as contradistinguished from a 
 confederacy. It placed the remedy for disorder in the 
 hands that felt it, not as the other, in the hands that caused 
 it. The evils justly complained of in popular governments 
 faction, dissension, and the consequent subjection of the 
 minority to the caprice and arbitrary decision of the ma- 
 jority will be excluded by the Constitution, for faction 
 must be less when the interest of a nation is entirely con- 
 centrated, than when it is entirely diversified. This gov- 
 ernment, which will make us one people, which will have 
 a tendency to assimilate our situations, and which is so ad- 
 mirably calculated to produce harmony and unanimity, can 
 not possibly admit of an oppressive combination by one 
 part of the Union against the other. Therefore, what end 
 will be answered by an attempt to obtain previous amend- 
 ments ? Will the States that have adopted rescind their
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 77 
 
 resolutions ? Had we adopted, would we recede to please 
 the caprice of another State ? Must there not be another 
 Federal Convention ? Must there not be another conven- 
 tion in every State? If our conditions are rejected, we 
 must be excluded from the Union, or other conventions 
 must be called, eternally revolving and devising expedients 
 without coming to a final decision. Let us go hand in 
 hand with Massachusetts, adopt and propose amendments." 
 Henry resumed : " We are told that this government, taken 
 collectively, is without example ; that it is national in this 
 part, federal in that; in the brain it is national, in the 
 stamina federal; some limbs are federal, some national; 
 it is federal in conferring powers, it is national in retain- 
 ing them; it is not to be supported by the States, the 
 pockets of individuals are to be searched for its mainte- 
 nance. What signifies the most curious anatomical de- 
 scription of it in its creation ? To all the common purposes 
 of legislation it is a great consolidation of government, but, 
 when it works sorely on our necks, we may have the con- 
 solation of knowing that it is a mixed government, and of 
 saying that it was federal in its origin. Is it not absurd to 
 adopt this system, and to rely upon its being afterward 
 amended ? Is the rage for novelty so great, that you are 
 first to sign and seal, and then retract ? You are to bind 
 yourself hand and foot, for what ? To be unbound. You 
 are to go into a dungeon, for what ? To come out. Is there 
 no danger, when you go in, that the bolt of federal author- 
 ity will shut you in ? " Lee answered : " This new system 
 shows, in stronger terms than words could declare, that the 
 liberties of the people are secured. Its principle is, that 
 all powers are in the people, and that rulers have no pow- 
 ers but what are enumerated in that paper. When a ques- 
 tion arises with respect to the legality of any power as- 
 sumed or exercised by the Congress, it is plainly on the side 
 of the governed. Is it enumerated in the Constitution?
 
 T8 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 If it be, it is legal and just ; if otherwise, arbitrary and un- 
 constitutional." Monroe stated distinctly the ground upon 
 which many who recognized the superiority of the Consti- 
 tution in most respects to the confederation, and were de- 
 sirous to adopt it, felt compelled to insist upon a previous 
 amendment: "Power is divided between the State and 
 Federal Governments. It is distributed in the Federal 
 Government, for better administration, between three 
 branches ; there is little danger of either being subverted 
 by the others, but, if the Federal Government and a State 
 differ as to the boundaries of power, there is very great 
 danger that their coalition, for they will naturally coalesce, 
 may subvert the rights of the people. Where is the secu- 
 rity for rights ? where is a check within the system ? I can 
 not see any. There ought to be a third distinct branch, to 
 maintain an equilibrium." Though no immediate answers 
 were made to Monroe, two were incidentally attempted in 
 the course of debate. Madison found a solution of the 
 difficulty in the virtue of the people : " If they were not 
 virtuous enough, and intelligent enough, to elect men of 
 virtue and intelligence, no theoretic checks or forms of 
 government could insure." The experience of the world 
 is directly opposite. The nature of a government may 
 make bad men better, or good men less good. If the ap- 
 plication be narrowed to republican governments, or, still 
 more, restricted to the United States, the statement is just 
 as untenable. If a theory of government is, that rights and 
 duties are reciprocal and coextensive, the character of men 
 will be higher than if it fails in that respect. If the theory 
 of a government admits of a penalty for disregard of duty, 
 each succeeding generation will become more and more 
 self-controlled. If there be no penalty, each succeeding 
 generation will become less and less self-restrained. Mar- 
 shall supposed the solution to be found in the independ- 
 ence of the judges. But he, like Madison, evaded the
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 79 
 
 question. Independence is not impartiality. The appoint- 
 ing power necessarily has a bias, it selects for a judge a 
 man known to have the same bias. It can not be other- 
 wise, whenever the construction of a constitution is the 
 basis of parties. A Protestant would not be willing to 
 submit the points on which he differs from the Church of 
 Rome to the decision of the College of Cardinals, eminent 
 as that body may be ; nor would a Koman Catholic, to the 
 Bench of Bishops in England, or to a synod of Presby- 
 terian divines, strong as might be the intellect, pure the 
 nature, and just the intention of the bishops and divines. 
 What makes the impossibility of freedom from bias in a 
 Federal judiciary more striking is, that nominally Federal 
 officials are the parties appointing, but the real party is the 
 political will of some of the States. The question of 
 Monroe " What prevents a coalition, and with a coalition, 
 what becomes of rights ? " remains unanswered. 
 
 Marshall followed : " The supporters of the Constitution 
 idolize democracy. They admire the system, because they 
 think it establishes a well-regulated democracy. What are 
 the favorite maxims of a democracy ? Strict observance 
 of justice and public faith, from which no mischief or mis- 
 fortune ought to deter, and a steady adherence to virtue. 
 The friends of the Constitution are as tenacious of liberty 
 as its enemies. They desire no power in the Government 
 to endanger it, only such as will protect and preserve it. 
 What are the objects of the national Government ? To 
 protect the United States in war, and to promote the gen- 
 eral welfare. It must have powers commensurate with its 
 objects, and the right of direct taxation is so essential, that 
 without it the plan may as well be rejected. It is said 
 that there are no checks ; what has become of the Amer- 
 ican spirit ? In that source, upon oppression, will be found 
 the check and control. In this country there is no exclu- 
 sive personal stock of interest. The interest of the com-
 
 80 SEVEN CONVENTION'S. 
 
 munity is blended and inseparably connected with that of 
 the individual. When he promotes his own, he promotes 
 that of the community ; when he consults the common 
 good, he consults his own. Such checks abound. Is it an 
 absurdity to adopt before amendment; is the object of 
 adoption, solely amendment ; is it not, besides, safety, pro- 
 tection from faction ? If, on trying the system, amendment 
 shall be found necessary, what restrains amendment ? The 
 Government is not supported by force, it depends on our 
 free-will. When experience shows us any inconvenience, 
 we can correct it ; but until we have experience on the 
 subject, amendments, as well as the Constitution, are to 
 try. There is such a diversity in 'human minds, that it 
 is impossible we should concur in one system until we 
 try it." 
 
 In the remarks of Marshall there is a statement which 
 may have been justified by personal knowledge, but of 
 which neither proof nor probability can be found in any 
 recorded utterance. To him, in the Virginia, as to Wilson, 
 in the Federal Convention, peculiar information on the 
 matter seems to have been conveyed : " There are in this 
 State and in every State many who are decided enemies of 
 the Union. Reflect on the probable conduct of such men. 
 What will they do ? They will bring in amendments 
 which are local in their nature, which they know will not 
 be accepted. Disunion will be their object. This will be 
 attained by the proposal of unreasonable amendments." 
 
 Mason and Henry were strenuous opponents of uncon- 
 ditional ratification ; both were among the foremost men of 
 their time, long in public life, and from official positions 
 brought in contact with numbers. Mason's testimony on 
 the point is explicit and full : " Foreigners would suppose, 
 from the declamation about the Union, that there was a 
 great dislike in America to any General Government. I 
 have never in my whole life heard one single man deny
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 81 
 
 the propriety and necessity of a Union. This necessity is 
 deeply impressed upon the American mind. There can be 
 no danger of any object being lost, when the mind of every 
 man in the country is strongly attached to it to the bless- 
 ings of a Union, I hope, not merely to the name. They 
 who are loudest in praise of the name, are not more at- 
 tached to the reality than I. The security of our liberty 
 and happiness is the object we ought to have in view in 
 seeking to estabh'sh a Union. If we endanger, instead of 
 securing those, the name of Union is a trivial consolation. 
 We ask such amendments as will point out what powers 
 are reserved to the State government, and clearly discrimi- 
 nate between them, and those given to the General Govern- 
 ment, so as to prevent future disputes and the clashing of 
 interests. Grant us amendments to that end, and we will 
 cheerfully with our hands and hearts unite with those who 
 advocate the Constitution, and will do everything we can 
 to support and carry it into execution." 
 
 Henry was not less emphatic : " The reality of Union, 
 not the name, is the object which most merits the attention 
 of every friend of his country. The American Union is 
 dear to every man. Every man with three grains of infor- 
 mation must think and know that Union is the best of all 
 things. Let it be shown that the rights of the Union are 
 secure, and we consent." 
 
 "Words may be false, but facts can not mislead. No 
 amendment was ever sought that was not general, and no 
 amendment proposed had any object but peace and liberty. 
 
 Graysou held the radical defect of the Constitution to 
 lie in the opposition of its component parts. " There are 
 two opinions in the world upon the construction of govern- 
 ments one that men can govern themselves, the other that 
 they can not, but must be ruled by some force independent 
 of them. I believe in the possibility and advantage of 
 self-government. If I am right, a system should be
 
 82 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 purely federal ; if I am wrong, a system should be a com- 
 plete consolidation, in which case the object to be sought 
 was a yoke as light as possible. The proposed plan was 
 too strong for a federal, and too weak for a consolidated 
 government. Republican in form, it was founded on the 
 principles of a monarchy, with the three estates, but with- 
 out the inherent checks of the British monarchy. Its ex- 
 ecutive was blended with legislative functions, contrary to 
 the opinion of the best writers, and, fettered in some parts, 
 was as unlimited in others, as a Roman dictator. Its demo- 
 cratic branch was marked with strong features of aristoc- 
 racy, and its aristocratic branch with the impurities and 
 imperfections arising from inequality of representation and 
 want of responsibility. The Constitution did not remove 
 the fatal inconvenience of clashing State interests. The 
 members of Congress from Virginia would be actuated by 
 the interests of the State ; so would those from every other 
 State. I hope my fears may be groundless, but I believe, 
 as I do my creed, that the operation of the system will be 
 a faction 'of seven States to oppress the rest of the Union. 
 It may be said that we are represented. Will that lessen 
 our misfortunes ? A small representation gives a pretense 
 to injure and destroy. The British would have been glad 
 to take us into the Union, like Scotland, giving a small 
 representation. The Federal Convention, called to remedy 
 the defects of the Confederation, was asked for bread, and 
 has given a stone. "What was the defect of the Confedera- 
 tion? No means of a revenue. Supply that defect by 
 giving it the control of commerce, and as other defects be- 
 come apparent apply, by a mode of amendment, the remedy. 
 Apportion the public debts so as to throw the unpopular 
 ones on the back lands, call only for requisitions for the 
 interest on the foreign debt, and aid them by loans. Keep 
 on so, till the American character is marked with some 
 certain features ; we are too young to know what we are
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1188. S3 
 
 fit for. The continual migration of people from Europe, 
 and the settlement of new countries on our Western front- 
 ier, are strong arguments against making new experiments 
 in government now. In framing a government, the genius 
 and disposition of a people, and a variety of other circum- 
 stances, ought to be considered. 
 
 But we are told that unless we adopt tliis Constitution 
 we shall be disunited and ruined forever, that we shall have 
 wars and rumors of wars, and that every calamity shall 
 attend us. Pennsylvania and Maryland are to fall on us 
 from the North, like the Goths and Yandals of old ; the 
 Algerines, whose flat-sided vessels never come farther than 
 Madeira, are to fill the Chesapeake with mighty fleets to 
 attack us on the front ; on the rear the Indians are to in- 
 vade us with numerous armies, to turn our cleared lands 
 into hunting-grounds ; and the Carolinians from the South, 
 mounted on alligators, I presume, are to come and destroy 
 our corn-fields and eat up our little children. These dan- 
 gers are merely imaginary, and ludicrous in the extreme. 
 Are we to be destroyed by Maryland and Pennsylvania ? 
 For what will democratic States make war? How long 
 since have they imbibed a hostile spirit ? But the gener- 
 ality is to attack us. Will they attack us after violating 
 their faith in the first Union ? Will they not violate their 
 faith if they do not take us into their confederacy ? Have 
 they not agreed by the old Confederation that the Union 
 shall be perpetual, and that no alteration shall take place 
 without the consent of Congress, and the confirmation by 
 the Legislatures of every State ? I can not think there is 
 such depravity in mankind as that, after violating public 
 faith so flagrantly, they should also make war on us for not 
 following their example. We are told that we ought to 
 take measures, which otherwise we should not, for fear of 
 disunion. Disunion is impossible. The Eastern States 
 hold the fisheries, which are their corn-fields, by a hair.
 
 84 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 They have a dispute with the British Government about 
 their limits at this moment. Is not a general and strong 
 government necessary to their interests ? If ever nations 
 had inducements to peace, the Eastern States now have. 
 New York and Pennsylvania anxiously look forward to the 
 fur-trade. How can they obtain it but by union ? Can 
 the Western posts be got or retained without union ? How 
 are the little States inclined 2 They are not likely to dis- 
 unite. Their weakness will prevent them from quarreling. 
 Are not the inducements to union strong, with the British 
 on one side and the Spaniards on the other? Thank 
 Heaven, we have a Carthage of our own ! " 
 
 Grayson protested against direct taxation. His min4 
 could not conceive of two powers equally supreme over 
 one object. Madison observed " that requisitions were not 
 only an awkward and roundabout way to attain a desired 
 result, but were more calculated to insure inequality and 
 dissatisfaction than direct taxation. Men will pay less 
 grudgingly if certain that every one must pay, but with 
 the possibility that some may escape payment, all must be 
 reluctant. The experience of the Ctfnf ederation was con- 
 clusive against them. Besides, in case of war, some States 
 would be more exposed to its evils than others ; imports 
 would be less productive and expenses increased, and the 
 more secure any State was, the less it would feel the exi- 
 gency which compelled requisitions. There was another 
 consideration which might be operative in the future. As 
 manufactures increased, the revenue from imports would 
 diminish, and the vacuum must be filled by direct taxa- 
 tion. So far as a cession of power was involved, there was 
 no augmentation, simply a change necessary to the efficacy 
 of a power already vested in the Confederation. The dif- 
 ference was not in a theory of government, but in the 
 practice of government. Taxation to the same extent, 
 and for the same purposes, was authorized by both sys-
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 85 
 
 terns, but one made a State the tax-payer, the other indi- 
 viduals. The first had proved ineffectual, the latter would 
 be adequate." 
 
 Pendleton had " studied the Constitution ; not, however, 
 hoping to find a scheme free from the possibility of objec- 
 tions. That could not be expected of a human effort. He 
 did see the seeds of disunion in it, though in the future, 
 not the immediate operation of the Government, but he 
 trusted to the power of amendment to extrude those agen- 
 cies. He could not see any difficulty in the duality of gov- 
 ernments, their spheres of action being totally different, 
 one embracing interests common to all the States, the other 
 interests peculiar to each State. They ran on parallel lines ; 
 if each kept to its own sphere, they could not conflict. 
 Direct taxation might never be necessary, but it might be- 
 come indispensable to the safety of the Union, and there- 
 fore the power of direct taxation ought to be possessed by 
 the General Government. He desired amendments as ear- 
 nestly as others, but Virginia had no right to ask the adopt- 
 ing States to accept conditions ; she should put herself in 
 the same position as those States ; then her attitude would 
 be conciliatory, and the amendments she craved would be 
 unmistakably in the interest of all." 
 
 Grayson having remarked that manufactures were the 
 resource of a redundant population, crowded into a limited 
 space ; that the extent and fertility of the territory would 
 for many years attract labor almost exclusively to agricult- 
 ure ; that therefore imports must be more productive, and 
 consequently that direct taxation could not be necessary, 
 and its exercise might become a source of friction ; Madi- 
 son admitted that " imports would increase until population 
 became so great as to compel a recurrence to manufactures, 
 but the unsettled parts of America would be inhabited at 
 no distant period. In twenty-five years the population in 
 every part of the United States would be as great as it
 
 86 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 then was in the settled parts ; already, wherever there was 
 a medium, manufactories were beginning to be established. 
 In preparing a government for futurity it should be 
 founded on principles of permanency, not on conditions of 
 a temporary nature. Direct taxation could not be a cause 
 of friction. When the authority of the General Government 
 was exclusive, no question could arise ; when it was con- 
 current, future legislation must regulate action. It was 
 necessary, however. Men have to pay for the advantages 
 of government, and it obviously could make no difference 
 to them whether they pay to the Federal Government 
 directly, or through the conduit of a State ; but, to the 
 public credit of the Union, the difference was very great 
 whether its debts were to be paid from its own resources, 
 or whether payment depended upon the compliance of thir- 
 teen bodies. No one would lend it a shilling on that con- 
 tingency." 
 
 Henry rejoined : " We are told that all powers not 
 given, are retained. Advert to the history of England. 
 Its people lived without a declaration of rights till the war 
 in the time of Charles I. Power and privilege then de- 
 pended upon implication and logical discussion. Upon the 
 expulsion of the Stuarts, a Bill of Eights prescribed to 
 William of Orange on what terms he should reign, and 
 the end of construction and implication was the end of 
 revolutions. Did Scotland enter into a union with Eng- 
 land and trust to subsequent amendments ? "No ; all the 
 terms of the bargain were settled beforehand. We are 
 told that our safety is secured by representation. Is Vir- 
 ginia represented ? Rhode Island and Delaware together, 
 infinitely inferior in extent and population, have double 
 her weight, and can counteract her influence. Representa- 
 tion, therefore, is not the vital principle of this Govern- 
 ment." He inquired why the States were not to pay their 
 own agents, why the salaries were not fixed, and why mem-
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 87 
 
 bers of Congress should be permitted to abandon an office 
 to which they had been elected by their constituents, for 
 one to which they had not been designated. " If incite- 
 ment to office was desirable, the provision was proper ; if 
 not, it should be corrected by an amendment." 
 
 Madison developed the reasoning of the Federal Con- 
 vention : " If compensation had been appointed by the 
 State governments, the Government of the Union would 
 not have been safe ; at least its existence must have been 
 precarious, with members of the Congress dependent upon 
 salaries from other public bodies competent to withhold 
 them. The salaries had not been fixed, because the pur- 
 chasing power of money varies ; and if they had become 
 inadequate, the door would have been open to evils from 
 inadequacy, which reflection must suggest as probable. 
 This was the most delicate point in the organization of a 
 republican government, the most difficult to establish on 
 unexceptionable grounds. It appeared to him that the 
 Convention had fixed on the most eligible ; the Constitu- 
 tion takes the medium between two extremes, and perhaps 
 with respect to the eligibility of representatives to office, 
 with more wisdom than either the British or the State 
 governments. They can fill no new offices created by 
 themselves, nor old ones of which they have increased the 
 salary. If they were excluded altogether, it is possible that 
 disadvantages might accrue from the exclusion, not to 
 mention the impolicy and injustice of denying them a com- 
 mon privilege. They will not relinquish their legislative, 
 to accept other offices. They will more probably confer 
 them on friends or connections. If this be an incon- 
 venience, it is incident to all governments." 
 
 Grayson objected to the right of the Senate to propose 
 or concur in amendments to money bills. " Practically it 
 was equivalent to originating them." 
 
 Madison answered that, in his view, a right of the Sen-
 
 88 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 ate to originate money bills was unimportant, and, if it had 
 been given, would not have been objectionable. Its power 
 of amendment was commendable. "Without that, the 
 slighest exceptionable feature might cause the rejection of 
 a bill, and all the time spent and labor bestowed would 
 be wasted. As an alteration can not conclude the House, 
 no harm was possible, many advantages might be gained, 
 and the rights and interests of the States be better 
 guarded. 
 
 Mason stated an amendment which ought to be made 
 in that clause of the Constitution which confers the power 
 to arm and discipline the militia : " I wish an express 
 declaration that in case the General Government shall neg- 
 lect to arm and discipline the militia, the State govern- 
 ments may. With this single exception I would agree to 
 this part." Madison " could not conceive that, by giving 
 that power to the General Government, the Constitution 
 had taken it from the State governments. The power is 
 concurrent, not exclusive. Does the organization of the 
 government warrant a belief that the power will be abused ? 
 Can that be supposed of a government of a federal nature, 
 consisting of many coequal sovereignties, particularly as it 
 has one branch chosen from the people ? " 
 
 Henry observed : " If you give too little power to-day, 
 you may give more to-morrow ; but if you give too much 
 power to-day, you can not retake it to-morrow ; for that 
 purpose to-morrow will never come. If you have the fate 
 of other nations, you will never see it. It is assumed that 
 American rulers will not depart from their duty. It is a 
 universal principle, in all ages and all nations, that rulers 
 have been actuated by private interest ; equally so will they 
 be in America. In a sense of duty you will not find a 
 check. If the power of arming and discipline is concur- 
 rent, the power of naming officers must be concurrent. 
 To admit this mutual concurrence will carry you into end-
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 89 
 
 less absurdity, the Congress with nothing exclusive on one 
 hand, nor the States on the other." 
 
 Nicholas confuted the argument : " The power of arm- 
 ing and disciplining is already vested in the State govern- 
 ments, and, though given to the General Government, is 
 not given exclusively, because in every instance where the 
 Constitution intends that the General Government shall 
 exercise any power exclusively, words of exclusion are par- 
 ticularly inserted. Consequently, in every case where such 
 words of exclusion are not inserted, power is concurrent, 
 unless it is impossible that the power should be exercised by 
 both the General Government and the State governments. 
 It is not absurd to say that Virginia may arm the militia if 
 Congress neglects to arm them, but it would be absurd to 
 say that Virginia should arm them after Congress had done 
 so, or to say that Congress should appoint the officers and 
 train the militia when it is expressly excepted from their 
 powers." 
 
 Marshall closed : " Each government derives its powers 
 from the people ; each is to act according to the powers 
 given it. The State governments do not derive powers 
 from the General Government ; then, must not every power 
 be retained which is not parted with ? If a power, before 
 in the State Legislatures, is given to the general Legisla- 
 ture, both shall exercise it, unless there be an. incompati- 
 bility or negative words precluding the State governments. 
 All the powers which the States possessed, antecedent to 
 the adoption of the Constitution, of which they are not 
 divested by any grant of, or by any restriction from, in the 
 Constitution, they must necessarily be as fully possessed 
 of as ever they had been." 
 
 Henry was not yet satisfied. " The nations which had 
 retained their liberty were comparatively few. America 
 would add to the number of the oppressed, if she depended 
 on constructive rights and argumentative implication. If
 
 90 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 rights not given were retained, why were there negative 
 clauses upon some of the powers of Congress ? Concurrent 
 power is not reducible to practice. If there was an insur- 
 rection in Virginia against the State, and an insurrection 
 in another State against the General Government, the call 
 of one or the other must be obeyed. Of which ? " Madison 
 replied : " The power must be vested in Congress, or in the 
 State governments, or there must be a division, or there 
 must be a concurrence. If in the State governments, 
 where is a provision for the general defense ? If it must 
 be divided, let a better method be shown. When the 
 militia are in the service of the United States, the United 
 States govern them. What can be more positive than that 
 the States govern them when not ? A State is not barred 
 from calling forth its militia to suppress insurrections and 
 domestic violence; and, in its right to call for Federal 
 aid, it has a supplementary security." 
 
 What is the intent, it was asked, of the power to call 
 forth the militia to execute the laws of the United States ? 
 Is a military government aimed at ? The answer was, the 
 meaning is plain if the civil power be insufficient. Why 
 not say so ? was the rejoinder ; we are all agreed upon that 
 point, and, when the expression of a purpose is so easy, 
 why leave a loop-hole for construction ? On the face of 
 the instrument there is nothing to exclude the danger of a 
 future claim that the words mean exactly what they say, 
 and no more. Madison answered by recalling " a remark 
 which had fallen from a gentleman on the same side as 
 himself, and which deserved to be attended to. If we be 
 dissatisfied with this national Government, and choose to 
 renounce it, this is an additional safeguard to our defense." 
 
 Great objection was made to the exclusive jurisdiction 
 over the ten miles square. Madison thought he had obvi- 
 ated it, by the suggestion that the Federal Government 
 could not otherwise be guarded from the undue influence
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 91 
 
 of some State, or be safe in its deliberations, and secure 
 from insult. He pointed out that there must be a cession 
 of the land by a State or States, which could settle the 
 terms of cession, and make such stipulations as they 
 pleased. 
 
 Grayson said : " There are no objections to giving all 
 necessary powers, but there are objections to giving any 
 unnecessary powers. Exclusive jurisdiction might be held 
 to nullify, within that district, provisions of the Constitu- 
 tion which had been considered sagacious. Governmental 
 and police powers would answer all the ends proposed to 
 be attained. No check could be found in terms of cession 
 or stipulations, for the ten miles square might be located 
 in a Territory." 
 
 "That objection fails," answered Nicholas, "for the 
 power of Congress over the Territory is limited to making 
 rules and regulations for its disposal ; the grant of it was 
 for the benefit of all the States, it can not be perverted to 
 the prejudice of any." Pendleton argued that " the clause 
 did not by any fair construction give Congress any power 
 to impede the operation of any part of the Constitution, or 
 to affect the rights of the citizens of the Union. The 
 jurisdiction is not opposed to the general powers of the 
 Federal Legistature, or to those of the State Legislatures. 
 It is opposed to the legislative power of the State within 
 which the ten miles square are situated. It does not go 
 one step beyond the delegated powers." 
 
 Upon almost every clause of the Constitution, as it was 
 read, one point was raised, or one question reiterated. 
 Where is the distinct acknowledgment that all power not 
 conceded is retained ? Where is there a word to foreclose 
 the assertion that it is not ? At this time you believe and 
 say, with perfect sincerity, not only that it is, but that the 
 mind can not conceive that it is not, but can you answer 
 for the future ? In every other system, government has
 
 92 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 every power not expressly excluded. If, hereafter, men 
 shall contend that this system is to be gauged by the rules 
 applicable to other systems, what, so far as reasoning goes, 
 is to confute them ? You construe to-day, why shall not 
 others construe to-morrow ? "What is to prevent " general 
 welfare " or the " sweeping clause " being held in the 
 future, absolute surrenders of every right, and an investi- 
 ture of complete sovereignty. There is a clause in the 
 Articles of Confederation reserving to each State every 
 power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly delegated to 
 the United States. That clause met general approval. 
 "Why was it not inserted in the Constitution ? Would it 
 have consumed too much paper? "What was the motive 
 for omitting it, or what could be the objection to add- 
 ing it ? 
 
 Mason stated that he was the more pertinacious upon 
 this point, because he had perceived in the Federal Conven- 
 tion the disposition, and, moreover, the intention, on the 
 part of some, to extend power by construction, so that by 
 slow, gradual, incessant encroachments, the Constitution 
 could be made, not what it purported to be, or was then 
 represented to be, but what they thought it should have 
 been. 
 
 Madison, unlike some great men of his party, sincere 
 in advocacy and sanguine in hope, demanded an explana- 
 tion. Mason answered, " The fact is well known that the 
 disposition was not merely prevalent in the Federal Con- 
 vention, but that it exists in many men in every State of 
 the Union, among whom are men of great abilities and 
 high character. From frequent intercommunication with 
 Madison, he knew that such were not his sentiments, and 
 he believed that they were not entertained by any delegate 
 from Virginia." Madison was satisfied with the disclaimer 
 as to himself, but it does not appear that he denied the 
 accuracy of the statement as to others. From the political
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 93 
 
 action in the earlier years of the republic, the disposition 
 might have been then so inferred ; but from this debate we 
 learn that the anti-Federalists were possessed of the views 
 and objects of their opponents. It is now easy to account 
 for the intensely bitter party spirit, and the fierce hatreds 
 and fatal encounters of individuals. Few things irritate 
 men more than the sense of trickery, intended or at- 
 tempted. 
 
 Nicholas reasserted what his side had frequently as- 
 serted : " The sweeping clause " has the same effect and 
 no more as if it had followed each delegation of power, 
 and was bounded as a summary of them. The " general 
 welfare" was united to the particular power of levying 
 and collecting taxes, etc., and was not connected with any 
 general power of legislature. The question had been put, 
 why negative words were found in the Constitution? 
 They created exceptions to a general power ; for instance, 
 under the power to regulate commerce, the slave-trade 
 might at once have been prohibited, but for the exception. 
 To the question, How is the extent of power to be deter- 
 mined ? he answered : " By the same power, which in all 
 well-regulated communities determines the extent of legis- 
 lative powers. If a Legislature exceeds its powers, the 
 judiciary will declare the excess void, or the people will 
 have the right to declare it void. It is universally agreed 
 that the people have all power ; if they part with any, is 
 it necessary to declare that they retain the rest ? " 
 
 Mason denounced the clause which admitted a slave- 
 trade. He " would have preferred to it a Union excluding 
 the States which exacted it. Slavery was a great misfor- 
 tune ; only one could be greater manumission." Henry 
 equally deplored slavery, and dreaded manumission. These 
 sentiments appear to be contradictory, but they are not. 
 An abolitionist in a slaveholding community is such from 
 his reason, not his emotions. His aim is to reconcile, not
 
 94: SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 to antagonize, the present and the future with the past. 
 He recognizes his duty to the master as a fellow-citizen, 
 to the slave as a fellow- man. Duty to the master was held 
 to be the higher, as the obligation to him was twofold, 
 whence his consent must be coaxed or bought. Duty to 
 the slave was held to consist not merely in freedom from 
 thrall, but in betterment of existence. Therefore all the 
 early abolitionists, and they were many, considered that 
 abolition and colonization must go hand in hand. They 
 believed that of two free races, inhabiting the same coun- 
 try, intermarriage being repugnant, one must finally be 
 extirpated. They did not believe that intermarriage was 
 among the possibilities of the future, basing their opinion 
 on the example of the colonists, who shunned that relation 
 with the Indians, though then white women were scarce, 
 and red women comely. This generation is either better or 
 wiser, but as the learned, the pious, the liberal Dr. Arnold, 
 not many years since, thought the difficulty insuperable, it 
 may be indulgent to the mistakes of its ancestors. 
 
 Madison "would conceive the clause impolitic if it 
 were an evil which could be excluded without encounter- 
 ing greater evils. The Southern States would not have 
 entered into a union without that temporary permission ; 
 and if excluded, the consequences might have been dread- 
 ful to them and to us. "We are not in a worse situation 
 than before. The traffic is prohibited by our laws, and 
 the prohibition may be continued. The Union in general 
 is not worse off, for, in the Confederation, the importation 
 might be continued forever, while now, it may be for- 
 bidden after twenty years. Great as the evil is, a dismem- 
 berment of the Union would be greater; those States, 
 if disunited, might solicit and receive aid from foreign 
 powers." 
 
 Mason claimed " that a separate clause in the Constitu- 
 tion ought to settle distinctly the status of property in
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 95 
 
 slaves. Any species of property exclusively held by some 
 of the States, which the other States neither wanted nor 
 would want, must have a safeguard ; for, if it may be as- 
 sumed that men may be trusted to govern others, when 
 they themselves will suffer from misgovernment, it does 
 not follow that they are capable of just power when others 
 only bear the evils of injustice. Federal taxation might 
 be so used as to destroy the value of slave-property. The 
 right of reclamation of the fugitive slave was of little im- 
 portance ; the meaning was that the fugitive should not be 
 protected." It may be doubted if then there was a man in 
 the United States who conceived that " delivering " was a 
 State duty, much less a Federal duty. The anti-Federal- 
 ists at least understood the phrase to mean that in every 
 State, process of law for the recovery of property should 
 be as applicable to property in men, as to property in things. 
 When the political idea was dominant that the Federal 
 Government would be the stronger the more it meddled, 
 the fugitive-slave law was passed, and its constitutionality 
 was affirmed judicially, upon that political theory, not upon 
 history or language. 
 
 Madison answered that the Southern States most affect- 
 ed were satisfied, and dreaded no danger to their property. 
 The extent to which the General Government could inter- 
 meddle with slavery was levying a tax of ten dollars a 
 head upon importations, and prohibiting the slave-trade 
 after a fixed period. 
 
 It was suggested that the vice-presidency was a useless 
 office, attended with possible dangers, besides giving some 
 one State a greater representation in the Senate. 
 
 Madison disclosed the reasoning of the Federal Con- 
 vention on the subject. Some officer was necessary to 
 continue the Government in case of an accident to the 
 President ; and a casting vote, in case of a tie, was a desir- 
 able legislative expedient. He added that, as the Yice-
 
 96 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 President would probably be always selected from one of 
 the larger States, the inequality, which was excessively 
 slight, would be least inequitable. 
 
 Inquiry made, why in a certain contingency, the Presi- 
 dent was to be elected in the House, by a vote of States, 
 Madison answered that it was the result of a compromise 
 between the larger and the smaller States. 
 
 Pendleton opened the debate upon the judiciary clause. 
 His opinions carried great weight, from his judicial experi- 
 ence. He was satisfied, except with the expression " law 
 and fact," which he admitted to be unfortunate. The 
 authority of Congress over " exceptions and regulations " 
 relieved him, however, from an anxiety he should other- 
 wise feel. 
 
 Mason agreed that in cases affecting diplomatic agents, 
 in controversies between States, between citizens of the 
 same State claiming land under grants from different 
 States, and in admiralty and maritime questions exclusive 
 Federal jurisdiction was proper ; and equally so, with some 
 restrictions, in controversies to which the United States 
 were parties. In disputes between a State and citizens of 
 another State, a foreign state, its citizens or subjects, Fed- 
 eral jurisdiction was manifestly improper. He objected to 
 the word " arising," as vague, ambiguous, and inconsistent 
 with any conception of limitation. Anything might be 
 said to arise under a constitution. 
 
 Henry added : " There never seems to be any difficulty 
 in finding apt words for grants of power, but, for the 
 security of liberty, language is apparently only capable of 
 ambiguity. Are the judiciaries and citizens of all the 
 States so lost to shame as to be incapable of justice ? Is 
 an individual to summon a State before a court, especially 
 a foreigner ? Was it ever heard of that such a privilege 
 should be given a foreigner? "Was war to enforce the 
 judgment of a court ? Congress, it is said, may be trusted
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 97 
 
 to make such exceptions and regulations as experience will 
 suggest. It is not the business of representatives, but of con- 
 ventions, to settle the basis of government. "Why can not 
 a State be trusted to do justice between a citizen and an 
 Englishman or Frenchman ? The provision is disgraceful ; 
 it will degrade the judiciary, and prostrate the Legislature 
 of Virginia." 
 
 Madison asked the committee to consider the difficulties 
 in organizing a government for the United States. " They 
 who prepared the paper on the table found difficulties not 
 to be described. Mutual deference and conciliation were 
 absolutely necessary. It was settled, when no party was 
 formed, no particular propositions made, when the minds 
 of men were calm and dispassionate ; yet even under such 
 circumstances agreement upon a general system was very 
 hard to be attained. The judiciary clause claimed the in- 
 dulgence of a fair and liberal interpretation. He would 
 not deny that more accurate attention might place in it 
 terms which would remove some of the objections which 
 had been made ; but with a liberal construction there was 
 nothing dangerous nor inadmissible. Surely it was not 
 supposable that an individual could drag a State into 
 court ; the only operation of the clause will be, that a 
 State must sue an individual in a Federal court. Perhaps 
 disputes between citizens of different States had better have 
 been left to the courts of the States." 
 
 Marshall considered this part of the plan a great im- 
 provement on the system about to be abandoned. " There 
 are tribunals for the decision of controversies, before not 
 at all, or improperly provided. The opposition is based 
 upon the idea that the Federal courts will not determine 
 causes with the same fairness and impartiality as other 
 courts. "Why not ? Why do we trust judges ? From 
 their appointment and independence in office. Will not 
 the judges in the Federal courts be chosen with as much 
 5
 
 98 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 wisdom as the judges in the State courts ? Will they not 
 be equally, if not more, independent ? If there is as much 
 wisdom and knowledge in the United States as in any one 
 State, will not that wisdom and knowledge be exercised in 
 the selection of judges ? Why conclude that they will not 
 decide with the same impartiality and candor ? It is said 
 that it is disgraceful that the State courts shall not be 
 trusted. Does the Constitution take away their jurisdic- 
 tion ? It is necessary that the Federal courts should have 
 cognizance of cases arising under the Constitution and 
 laws of the United States. What is the service and pur- 
 pose of a judiciary, but to execute the laws in a peaceable, 
 orderly manner, without a recurrence to force, conflict, 
 and bloodshed. To what quarter can you look for protec- 
 tion from an infringement of the Constitution if power is 
 not given to the judiciary, no other body can afford such 
 protection. It is objected that Federal officials may be 
 secured from merited punishment by Federal courts. 
 What bars the injured from applying for redress to the 
 State courts ? It is objected that a State may be called to 
 the bar of a Federal court. The intent is to enable a 
 State to recover claims against individuals residing in 
 other States. It is said that it would be partial to allow a 
 suit by a State, and not against a State. It is necessary, 
 and can not be avoided. There is a difficulty in making a 
 State defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff. 
 Objection is made to suits in the Federal courts by the 
 citizens of one State against the citizens of another. Were 
 I to contend that it was necessary in all cases, and that the 
 Government would be defective without it, I should not 
 use my own judgment ; but is not the objection carried 
 too far ? What can they get more than justice ? It has 
 been urged that we ought not to depend upon others to 
 rectify defects which it is our duty to remove. Our duty 
 is to weigh the good and the evil before we decide. If we
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 99 
 
 be convinced that the good greatly preponderates, though 
 there be small defects, shall we give up the good, when we 
 can remove the little mischief ? " 
 
 Grayson answered : " The excellence of human nature 
 has been invariably urged in all countries when the cession 
 of power was in agitation. It seemed to be the basis of 
 all the arguments on one side. The judiciary clause is so 
 vague and indefinite in expression that human nature can 
 not trace the extent of its jurisdiction, nor ascertain its 
 limitation. Between the Federal and the State courts the 
 line should be so distinctly drawn that interference will be 
 impossible, otherwise there can be no arbiter but the sword. 
 The judiciary itself is upon as corrupt a basis as the act of 
 man can place it. The salaries may be increased. That a 
 State may be sued by or sue a foreign state is a new law 
 of nations. Consent must be had, it is said. The foreign 
 state must consent, the American State must submit. Is 
 it not so written in the Constitution ? Congress, we are 
 told, will eliminate defects. If it can not make a law 
 against the Constitution, neither can it make a law to 
 abridge the Constitution, and the judges can neither extend 
 nor abridge it." 
 
 Randolph, "though he could not concur with those 
 who thought the judiciary clause so formidable, must admit 
 that the words used to define jurisdiction were ambiguous 
 in some parts, and unnecessarily extensive in others. ' What 
 are cases in law and equity, arising under the Constitution ? 
 "What do they relate to ? The phraseology is very ambigu- 
 ous, and can carry jurisdiction to an indefinite extent.' He 
 thought that the intent of one clause was, that a State 
 might be sued by an individual, and approved of it ; any 
 objection which might be obviated by honesty had with 
 him little weight. If he was asked why, knowing the 
 Constitution to be ambiguous, he would vote for its ratifi- 
 cation, he answered, because it contains within itself the
 
 100 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 means of removing defects, because he believed that any 
 defects would be removed, and because he believed men 
 capable of honesty, even under temptation. If he did be- 
 lieve that all power not expressly retained, was parted with, 
 he would detest the system ; therefore he proposed that 
 Virginia should ratify, putting in the form of ratification 
 the words that all authority not given is retained by the 
 people, and may be resumed when perverted to their op- 
 pression ; and that no right can be canceled, abridged, or 
 restrained by the Congress or any officer of the United 
 States. Those words he supposed woiild manifest the 
 principles on which Virginia adopted the Constitution, and 
 entitled her to consider the exercise of a power not dele- 
 gated a violation of it." 
 
 Henry replied : " He saw the dangers which may and 
 must arise if the Constitution was accepted. There could 
 be no reliance on it for rights and liberties. There will be 
 an empire of men, not of law. Rights and liberties would 
 depend upon men. Their wisdom and integrity may pre- 
 serve, their ambitious and designing views may destroy. 
 Already it must be seen that the friends of the Constitu- 
 tion do not agree as to its meaning. A Constitution ought 
 to be so clear as to be comprehended by every man." Wy the 
 admitted the imperfections of the plan and the propriety 
 of amendments, but the excellency of many parts could 
 not be denied by its warmest opponents. Experience, the 
 source of improvement in the science of government, could 
 alone develop consequences. He proposed ratification, and 
 the recommendation of such amendments as were thought 
 necessary. " They certainly must be obtained, as amend- 
 ments were desired by all the States, and had been pro- 
 posed by some." Henry urged that the amendment, to the 
 necessity of which every one agreed, " that all power not 
 expressly delegated is reserved," should precede ratification. 
 " To talk of it as a thing subsequent, and not an inalienable
 
 THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788. 101 
 
 right, is to leave it to the casual opinion of the Congress. 
 They will not reason with Virginia about the effect of this 
 Constitution, they will not take the opinion of this Con- 
 vention as to its operation, they will construe it as they 
 please. Subsequent amendments stand against every idea 
 of fortitude and manliness in a State, or in any one. Evils 
 admitted in order to be removed, and tyranny submitted 
 to, in order to be excluded by subsequent alteration, were 
 things new to him." 
 
 Madison claimed great allowance for the plan : " Its 
 friends have never denied that it has defects, but have 
 claimed that the defects were not dangerous. As all are 
 agreed that it has defects, it will be easy to remedy them 
 by the healing power in the instrument itself. Other 
 States have been content to ratify, and rely on the proba- 
 bility of amendments. Why should not Virginia do the 
 same ? She has hitherto always spoken with respect to her 
 sister States, and has been listened to with respect. It is 
 neither the language of confidence nor respect to say that 
 she does not believe that amendments for the promotion of 
 the common liberty and general interest of the States will 
 be consented to by them." 
 
 Innes took the subtle ground that, " if previous amend- 
 ments were proposed, the people would not have had an 
 opportunity of expressing their views upon them ; whereas, 
 upon subsequent amendments, they would have a facility 
 of examination, and an expression of judgment. He did 
 not apprehend any danger from the dissimilarity of inter- 
 est, North and South. He could not conceive that with 
 the brotherly affection, reciprocal friendship, and mutual 
 amity, so constantly inculcated, and with the strongest 
 reasons of self-interest besides, the Northern States could 
 be so blind as to alienate the affections of the Southern 
 States, and adopt measures which would produce discon- 
 tent, and terminate in the dissolution of a Union so neces-
 
 102 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 sary to the happiness of all. To suppose that they would 
 act contrary to such principles would be to suppose them 
 not only destitute of honor and of probity, but void of 
 reason ; not only bad men, but mad men." 
 
 It is apparent that, if the Federalists had profited by 
 the example of Massachusetts, had at once admitted de- 
 fects, and concurred in amendments, their object would 
 have been gained with little loss of time and great saving 
 of temper. As soon as they yielded what they should have 
 proffered, the Constitution was ratified by 89 yeas to 79 
 nays. What would have happened, if they had continued 
 obstinate, may be learned by the vote upon a motion to 
 strike out one of the proposed amendments. Although 
 all the great leaders who had championed ratification spoke 
 and voted for the motion, it was defeated by a majority of 
 twenty. 
 
 The form of a ratification drawn up by a committee 
 exclusively Federalist Randolph, Nicholas, Madison, Mar- 
 shall, and Corbin contains these words : " The powers 
 granted under the Constitution, being derived from the 
 people of the United States, may be resumed by them, 
 whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury or 
 oppression, and every power not granted thereby remains 
 with them and at their will." As soon as possible after the 
 Constitution became the Government of the United States, 
 the amendments so eagerly desired were imbedded in it. 
 The ninth and tenth meant something to the mind of that 
 generation ; to subsequent generations the meaning de- 
 pended upon degrees of latitude.
 
 THE CONVENTION OF NEW YOEK, 1788. 
 
 IN the Convention of New York, after the prelimina- 
 ries of order were settled, debate was opened by Living- 
 ston (the Chancellor). He directed attention to the fact 
 that throughout the United States one language was spoken, 
 one religion professed, and one political principle recog- 
 nized that all power is derived from the people. " It 
 must be of little moment to the people how much of that 
 power they vest in a State government, and how much in 
 the councils of the Union. . . . Our situation admits of a 
 Union and our distresses point out its necessity. Our ex- 
 istence as a State depends on a strong and efficient Federal 
 Government. The State has great natural advantages from 
 its valuable and abundant staples, the situation of its prin- 
 cipal seaport, from the command of the commerce of New 
 Jersey by the river discharging in its bay, from the facility 
 of intercourse with the Eastern States by the Sound, from 
 the Hudson bearing on its bosom the wealth of the remote 
 parts of the State. A lasting peace affords a prospect . of 
 its commanding the treasures of the "West by the improve- 
 ment of its internal navigation. The domestic debt of the 
 Union is light ; the back lands will pay the foreign debt, 
 if a government vigorous enough to avail of that resource 
 is adopted. For that Government, imports, at no distant 
 day, will be sufficient, and taxation will only be needed for 
 internal government. But the State has disadvantages, 
 in the detached situation of its parts, particularly Staten 
 Island and Long Island, in the vicinity of States which,
 
 104 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 in case of disunion, would be independent, and might be 
 hostile. To the northeast, Yermont, a State with a brave 
 and hardy people whom we have not the spirit to subdue 
 nor the magnanimity to yield to, will avail of the weakness 
 of New York. On the northwest there are the British 
 posts and hostile savages. In case of domestic war, the 
 Hudson, intersecting the State, weakens it by the difficulty 
 of bringing one part to support the other. Consequently, 
 our wealth and our weakness equally require the support 
 of a Federal Union. A Union can only be found in the 
 existing Confederation, or in that under consideration; 
 and as a Union can only be founded upon the consent of 
 the States, it should be sought when that consent may be 
 expected. The powers of the Confederation were very simi- 
 lar to those in the proposed Constitution. Why had they 
 not been efficient? Why was Yermont an independent 
 State ? Why have new States been rent from those in the 
 West, in defiance of our plighted faith ? Why are the 
 British posts within the limits of the States ? Because the 
 Confederation is defective in principle and impeachable 
 in execution, operating on States in their political capacity, 
 not upon individuals. The powers intended to be vested 
 in the Federal head have been impossible of execution, on 
 the principle of a league of States totally separate and in- 
 dependent, therefore the form of government must be 
 changed." Lansing said: "We ought to be extremely 
 cautious how we establish a government which may give 
 distinct interests to the rulers and the ruled. The objec- 
 tions urged against the Confederation are, that it affords 
 no defense against foreign attack, and no security for do- 
 mestic tranquillity. Both might be compassed if Congress 
 could be vested with power to raise men and money, its 
 legislation to act on individuals, after requisitions had been 
 made and not complied with. This proposed Constitution 
 I suppose to be a new experiment in politics. A Govern-
 
 THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, 1788. 105 
 
 ment so organized and possessing such powers will un- 
 avoidably terminate in depriving us of civil liberty. Con- 
 quest can do no more ; that, in the present state of civiliza- 
 tion, subjects us to be ruled by persons in whose appointment 
 we have no agency. I am content to risk a possible, even 
 a probable evil, to avoid a certain one. I contemplate the 
 idea of disunion with pain, but, if it should ensue, what is 
 to be apprehended ? We are connected both by interest 
 and affection with the Eastern States, we harbor no ani- 
 mosities against each other, we have no interfering terri- 
 torial claims. Our manners are nearly similar, they are 
 daily assimilating, and mutual advantages will probably 
 prompt to mutual concessions and enable us to form a 
 Union with them. I have declared that a consolidated 
 government, even partaking in a great degree of republi- 
 can principles, which had in its object the control of the 
 inhabitants of the extensive territory of the United States, 
 could not preserve the essential rights and liberties of the 
 people. Reflection has given that belief greater force, 
 and, as the representative of others, my duty is to offer 
 amendments to this Constitution. Any amendment which 
 will have a tendency to lessen the danger of the invasion 
 of civil liberty by the General Government will meet my 
 approbation, while none which in the remotest degree 
 originate in local views will receive my concurrence." The 
 Chancellor rejoined that, " if a Federal requisition upon a 
 State was disregarded, subsequent Federal action upon 
 individuals must be a source of eternal disorder, for then 
 there would be a body of Federal officials acting in a State 
 in direct opposition to the declared sense of its Legislature." 
 Melancthon Smith was "willing to sacrifice anything 
 for a Union except the liberties of his country. That was 
 the point to be debated. As for alarm from the inimical 
 disposition of the Eastern States, he did not believe in the 
 existence of such feelings. It could not be supposed that
 
 106 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 those States would war on us for exercising the rights of 
 free men, deliberating and judging for ourselves on a sub- 
 ject the most interesting that ever came before any assem- 
 bly. If war with our neighbors was to be the result of not 
 acceding, debate was useless. "We had better receive their 
 dictates, if we were unable to resist them. The defects of 
 the old Confederation needed as little proof as the necessity 
 of a Union, but the question is not whether the old plan 
 was bad, but whether the new one is good. To the clause 
 before the committee his objections were threefold. To 
 the apportionment the principle of representation is that 
 a free agent ought to be concerned in governing himself. 
 Slaves have no will of their own, therefore the rule of ap- 
 portionment was founded on an unjust principle, but if the 
 result of accommodation, it must be admitted, utterly re- 
 pugnant as it was. To the absence of a prohibition against 
 a reduction of the number of the House the first Con- 
 gress would have the power to reduce the number, a power 
 inconsistent with every principle of a free government. If 
 the only security is the integrity of those trusted with 
 power, it is idle to contend about constitutions. To the 
 inadequacy of representation, twenty thousand should be 
 entitled to a representative." 
 
 Hamilton rose : " The radical defect of the Confeder- 
 ation is that the laws of the Union apply only to the States 
 in their corporate capacity. They can not be made effect- 
 ive but by an army. Can any reasonable man be well dis- 
 posed toward a government which makes war and carnage 
 the only means of supporting itself, a government that can 
 only exist by the sword ? What is the cure for this great 
 evil ? To enable the national laws to act upon individuals 
 in the same manner as those of the State do. Why not, 
 then, give that capacity to the Confederation ? Because, 
 though such a system may be safely intrusted with certain 
 powers, to give it unlimited power over taxation and the
 
 THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, 1788. 107 
 
 national forces would be to establish a despotism ; for, the 
 definition of a despotism is, all power concentered in a 
 single body." He then proceeded to disclose the reasonings 
 and conclusions of the Federal Convention ; to demonstrate 
 that the project submitted was the outcome of a series of 
 bargains ; and to assert that if a convention of a similar 
 character met again, met twenty times, or twenty thousand 
 times, it must have the same difficulties to encounter, and 
 the same clashing interests to reconcile. He also examined 
 the equity of that bargain which apportioned representa- 
 tion. " Much has been said as to the impropriety of repre- 
 senting men who have no wills of their own. Whether 
 this be reasoning or declamation, I will not presume to say. 
 It is the unfortunate situation of the Southern States to 
 have a great part of their population, as well as property, 
 in blacks. The regulation complained of was one result of 
 the spirit of accommodation which governed the Conven- 
 tion, and without this indulgence no union could have been 
 formed. But, considering the peculiar advantages we de- 
 rive from them, it is entirely just that they should be grati- 
 fied. The Southern States have certain staples tobacco, 
 rice, indigo which must be capital objects in treaties of 
 commerce with foreign nations, and the advantages which 
 they necessarily procure will be felt throughout all the 
 States. But the justice of this plan will appear in another 
 view. The best writers on government have held that 
 representation should be compounded of persons and prop- 
 erty. This rule has been adopted, as far as it could be, in 
 the Constitution of New York. It will, however, be by 
 no means admitted that the slaves are altogether property. 
 They are men, though degraded to the condition of slavery. 
 They are persons, known to the municipal laws of the 
 States they inhabit, as well as to the laws of Nature. But 
 representation and taxation ought to go together, and one 
 uniform rule to apply to both. Would it be just to com-
 
 108 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 pute the slaves in the assessment of taxes, and discard them 
 from the estimate in the apportionment of representation ? 
 Another circumstance ought to be considered. The rule 
 is a general rule, and applies to all the States. You have 
 a great number of people in your State who are not rep- 
 resented at all, and have no voice in your government. 
 These will be included in the enumeration ; not three 
 fifths, but the whole. This proves that the advantages of 
 the plan are not confined to the Southern States, but ex- 
 tend to other parts of the Union." As to the future num- 
 ber of representatives, he " admitted that there were no 
 direct words of prohibition against a reduction, but the 
 true and genuine construction of the clause does not give 
 Congress power to reduce representation below the num- 
 ber as it stood." Upon the proper number to send a repre- 
 sentative, he argued that " the proper number was a mat- 
 ter of opinion, between what all regarded as too small, and 
 what all considered too great. The diversity in the State 
 Legislatures proved it ; but while one proportion might be 
 more or less wise, no proportion, upon the basis assumed, 
 could be unjust." More of an argument which surveyed 
 the subject from every side need not be cited, except so 
 much as replied to an objection of Melancthon Smith, who 
 had contended for the smaller number, because " the larger 
 would throw the office into the hands of the rich, and ex- 
 clude the middling class, always the superior in virtue and 
 patriotism." " The people have it in their power to elect 
 the most meritorious men. While property continues to 
 be pretty equally divided, and a considerable share of in- 
 formation pervades the community, the tendency of the 
 people's suffrages will be to elevate merit, even from ob- 
 scurity. As riches increase and accumulate in a few hands, 
 as luxury prevails in society, virtue will, in a greater de- 
 gree, be considered only a graceful appendage of wealth, 
 and the tendency of things will be to depart from the re-
 
 THE CONVENTION OF NEW TORE, 1788. 109 
 
 publican standard. This is the real disposition of human 
 nature ; it is what neither the honorable member nor I can 
 correct ; it is a common misfortune that awaits our State 
 Constitution as well as all others. But experience does not 
 justify the supposition that there is more virtue in one class 
 of men than in another. Look through the rich and the 
 poor of a community, the learned and the unlearned. 
 Where does virtue predominate ? The difference, indeed, 
 consists not in the quantity, but in the kind of vices which 
 are incident to various classes. Here the advantage of 
 character belongs to the wealthy ; their vices are probably 
 more favorable to the prosperity of the State than those 
 of the indigent, and partake less of moral depravity." To 
 a suggestion that the failure of the Confederation was 
 largely due to the efforts of powerful and designing men, 
 aiming at revolution and instigating disaffection, he an- 
 swered : " The insinuation is false, the thing is impossible. 
 I will venture to assert that no combination of designing 
 men under heaven will be capable of making a government 
 unpopular which in its principle is a wise and good one 
 and vigorous in its operations." 
 
 At least one speech, and a very important one, of Ham- 
 ilton's is not reported. Its purport can be guessed only 
 from the answer of Smith : " The last speaker has assured 
 the committee that the States would be checks upon the 
 General Government, and had pledged himself to point out 
 and demonstrate the operation of those checks. For him- 
 self, he could not see the possibility of checking a govern- 
 ment of independent powers, which extended to all objects 
 and measures without limitation. His own aim was to 
 provide such checks as would not leave the exercise of 
 government to the operation of causes which in their na- 
 ture are variable and uncertain." 
 
 Mr. G. Livingston moved an amendment to the Senate 
 clause that no person shall be a senator for more than six
 
 110 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 years in any twelve years, and that the Legislatures of the 
 States may recall either or both, and elect others in their 
 stead. Lansing supported it : " We are told that in one 
 House, individuals, the people of the State, are represented, 
 in the other its sovereignty. Should not the principal 
 have the right to recall his agent ? If the agent seeks his 
 personal interest in disregard of that of the State, is the 
 latter to be powerless for six years ? " Smith suggested 
 the additional possibility of corruption, both in the official 
 and the people. He must have been asked, although the 
 question does not appear, how corruption was practicable, 
 and whence the fund for corruption. " More than one of 
 the gentlemen have ridiculed my apprehensions of corrup- 
 tion. How, they say, are the people to be corrupted ? By 
 their own money. In many countries people pay their 
 money to corrupt themselves, why should it not happen in 
 this ? I presume there is not a government in the world 
 in which there is a greater scope for influence and corrup- 
 tion through the disposal of offices." Hamilton spoke 
 twice against this amendment : " The zeal for liberty be- 
 came predominant and excessive in us, as was natural, 
 when the usurpation of Great Britain had to be met. That 
 object is certainly very valuable, but there is another 
 equally important a principle of strength and stability in 
 the organization of the Government and vigor in its oper- 
 ations ; a purpose not to be accomplished but by the estab- 
 lishment of a select body founded particularly on this 
 principle. It must be small, hold its authority during a 
 considerable period, and have such an independence in the 
 exercise of its powers as will divest it as much as possible 
 of local prejudices. It should be so formed as to be the 
 center of political knowledge, to pursue always a steady 
 line of conduct, and to reduce every irregular propensity 
 to system. Without this establishment, we may make ex- 
 periments without end, but shall never have an efficient
 
 THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, 1788. HI 
 
 government. It is an unquestionable truth that the body 
 of the people in every country sincerely desires its pros- 
 perity, but it is equally unquestionable that they do not 
 possess the discernment and stability necessary for system- 
 atic government. To deny that they are frequently led 
 into the grossest errors by misinformation and passion, 
 would be a flattery their own good sense must despise. 
 That branch of administration which involves our political 
 relations with foreign states, a community will ever be 
 incompetent to. These truths are not often held up in 
 public assemblies, but they can not be unknown to any 
 who hear me. Consider the purposes for which the 
 Senate was instituted, and the nature of the business to** 
 be transacted. They, together with the President, are to 
 manage all our concerns with foreign nations and un- 
 derstand all their interests and political systems. This 
 knowledge is not soon acquired ; but a small part is gained 
 in the closet." The conclusion he deduced was, that the 
 amendment assimilated the Senate to the House, and, just 
 in proportion as the resemblance was closer, the mischief 
 was greater. Up to this stage of the debate, the advocates 
 of ratification had represented the Constitution as a system 
 of checks and balances by which power and liberty were 
 reconciled, checks and balances in the machinery of gov- 
 ernment, a check and balance between the Union and each 
 of its constituent factors. Assertion of the latter was as 
 constant as of the former. "The balance between the 
 national and the State governments ought to be dwelt on 
 with peculiar attention. It forms a double security for 
 the people. If one encroaches on their rights, they will 
 find a powerful protector in the other. Indeed, they will 
 both be prevented from overpassing their constitutional 
 limits by a certain rivalship which will ever subsist between 
 them. The State governments possess inherent advan- 
 tages, which will ever give them an influence and ascend-
 
 112 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 ency over the national Government, and will forever pre- 
 clude the possibility of Federal encroachments." The 
 ground upon which Hamilton predicted these assertions 
 was : " There are certain social principles in human nature, 
 from which we may draw the most solid conclusion with 
 respect to the conduct of individuals and communities. 
 We love our families more than our neighbors ; we love 
 our neighbors more than our countrymen in general. The 
 human affections, like the solar heat, lose their intensity as 
 they depart from the center, and become languid in propor- 
 tion to the expansion of the circle in which they act. On 
 these principles the attachment of the individual will be 
 first and forever secured by the State governments, and 
 they will be a mutual protection and support." The 
 answers of Smith and Lansing were : " How, upon your 
 theory, can a State government oppose the Federal Gov- 
 ernment, except by inciting its citizens to hostility ? What 
 remedy against misgovernment do you propose but re- 
 bellion ? If the governments are rivals, must not one 
 finally conquer and destroy the other ? They ought not to 
 be and need not be rivals ; there should not be opposition, 
 there should be harmony between them. The means are 
 in our hands, the task is easy. What would be the func- 
 tions of a government in an independent state are, in a 
 union, divided between an organization created by a con- 
 stitution, and an organization originally existing. The 
 line between the powers of each ought to be so strongly 
 marked and so obvious, that misconception will be im- 
 possible to a sane mind. How, otherwise, can right and 
 wrong exist ? Such a line is possible or impossible : 
 if impossible, constitutional government is impossible, 
 and the pretense of it hypocrisy ; if possible, why not 
 draw the line, or if you think it drawn, point it out ? " 
 The experience of daily life seems in some measure to sup- 
 port that view. A multitude of men can pass through a
 
 THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, 1788. 113 
 
 narrow street with ease and comfort if the ascending and 
 descending streams of travel observe the law of the road. 
 The subsequent speeches of Hamilton show the influence 
 of this reasoning upon his mind: " In debates of this kind, 
 it is extremely easy, on either side, to say a great number 
 of plausible things. It is to be acknowledged that there is 
 even a certain degree of truth in the reasonings on both 
 sides. In this situation, it is the province of judgment 
 and good sense to determine their force and application, 
 and how far the arguments on one side are balanced by 
 those on the other. The ingenious dress in which both 
 may appear renders it a difficult task to make this decision, 
 and the mind is frequently unable to come to a safe and 
 solid conclusion. There are two objects in forming sys- 
 tems of government : safety for the people, and energy in 
 the administration. When these objects are united, the 
 certain tendency of the system will be the public welfare. 
 If the latter object be neglected, the people's security will 
 be as certainly sacrificed as by disregarding the former. 
 Good constitutions are formed upon a comparison of the 
 liberty of the individual, with the strength of the govern- 
 ment. If the tone of either be too high, the other will be 
 weakened too much. It is the happiest mode of concili- 
 ating these objects to institute one branch endowed with 
 sensibility, and another with knowledge and firmness. 
 Through the opposition and mutual control of these bodies 
 "the Government will reach in its operations the perfect 
 balance between liberty and power." The validity of this 
 argument rests upon the assumption that the two bodies 
 represent distinct and hostile interests, and that each would 
 be restrained from excess by the fear of a civil war, in 
 which each could, with equal justice, claim to be defend- 
 ing the right. The subsequent admission that they were 
 agencies of the same principals justified Smith and Lansing 
 in denying such effect in the system, and therefore any
 
 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 force in the reasoning. He must be dull indeed who does 
 not see that, in the absence of some check, a majority of 
 the States, having a majority of population, can take pos- 
 session of every branch of the Government and call and 
 make their wills law, the other States occupying to them 
 the relation which Great Britain claimed that the colonies 
 occupied to her. The fact has been proved by experience, 
 and the impotence of the judiciary as a check has also 
 been proved by experience. 
 
 Driven from his claim of an internal check, Hamilton 
 instantly changed front : " A Senator was an agent for 
 the Union, not simply an agent for a State; the Senate 
 should be formed so as to check in some measure the State 
 governments ; the interests of a State ought to be sacri- 
 ficed for those of the Union." To the reply of Smith, 
 " The interest of each State is the interest of every State, 
 and must be so in a well-regulated government, why else 
 was an equal vote given to each in the Senate?" his re- 
 joinder was : " It has been remarked that there is an incon- 
 sistency in our admitting that the equal vote in the Senate 
 was given to secure the rights of the States, and at the 
 same time holding that their interests should be sacrificed 
 to those of the Union. The committee can certainly per- 
 ceive the difference between the rights of a State and its 
 interests. The rights of a State are defined by the Con- 
 stitution, and can not be invaded without a violation of 
 it ; but the interests of a State have no connection with 
 the Constitution, and may in a thousand instances be 
 constitutionally sacrificed." At this period Chancellor 
 Livingston informed the committee " that the ninth State 
 had ratified the Constitution, and that the Confedera- 
 tion was consequently dissolved. The question now be- 
 fore the committee was one of policy and expediency. 
 He presumed the Convention would consider the situa- 
 tion of their country. Some might contemplate dis-
 
 THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, 1788. 115 
 
 union without pain, and flatter themselves that some of 
 the Southern States would form a league with us. He 
 could not look without horror at the dangers to which any 
 such confederacy would expose the State of New York. 
 It might be political cowardice, but he had felt since yes- 
 terday an alteration of circumstances which had made a 
 most solemn impression on his mind." Smith said " that 
 the change of circumstances had not altered his feelings 
 or his wishes on the subject ; he had long been convinced 
 that nine States would receive the Constitution." 
 
 Lansing said : " I do not agree that our particular cir- 
 cumstances are, in fact, altered since yesterday. That the 
 ninth State has ratified the Constitution is an event which 
 ought not to influence our deliberations. I presume that 
 I shall not be charged with rashness if I continue to insist 
 that it is still our duty to maintain our rights. Our dissent 
 can not prevent the operation of the Government ; since 
 nine States have acceded to it, let them make the experi- 
 ment. It has been said that some might contemplate dis- 
 union without terror. I have heard no sentiment from any 
 gentleman that can warrant such an insinuation. We ought 
 not, however, to suffer our fears to force us to adopt a 
 system which is dangerous to liberty." Upon the several 
 clauses of the Constitution, as the reading continued, amend- 
 ments were offered and debates ensued. If not carrying 
 conviction, they disclosed exactly how far men were apart, 
 and who, on one or both sides, were anxious to find some 
 basis of agreement. The opposite positions upon the scope 
 of Federal power can be summed up on one side in the 
 words of Hamilton, " When you have divided and nicely 
 balanced the departments of government, when you have 
 strongly connected the virtue of your rulers with their in- 
 terest ; when you have rendered your system as perfect as 
 human forms can be, you must have confidence, you must 
 give power " ; and, on the other side, in the words of
 
 116 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 Treadwell : " We are told that if government is properly- 
 organized, and the powers suitably distributed among the 
 several members, it is unnecessary to provide any other 
 security against the abuse of power ; that power thus dis- 
 tributed needs not restriction. Is this a "Whig principle ? 
 does not every Constitution on the continent contradict 
 this position ? Whatever be the design of the preachers, 
 the tendency of their doctrines is clear to corrupt our 
 political faith, to take us off our guard, to lull to sleep that 
 jealousy which, we are told by all writers, and is proved 
 by all experience, to be essentially necessary for the pres- 
 ervation of freedom. In this Constitution we have de- 
 parted widely from the principles and political faith of 
 '76, when the spirit of liberty ran high and danger put a 
 curb on ambition. Here we have no security for the rights 
 of individuals, for the existence of our State governments, 
 no Bill of Eights, no proper restriction of power. Our 
 lives, our property, our consciences, are left wholly at the 
 mercy of the Legislature ; the powers of the judiciary may 
 be extended to any degree short of Almighty. A union 
 with our sister States I as ardently desire as any man, and 
 that upon the most generous principles. The design of a 
 union is safety. In one sense this may bring us to a state 
 of safety ; for it may reduce us to such a condition that 
 we may be sure nothing worse can happen, and conse- 
 quently have nothing to fear. This is a dreadful kind of 
 safety, but it is the only kind of safety I can see in this 
 union." Amendments and debates thereon (not recorded) 
 occupied yet more than a fortnight ; then Lansing moved 
 a conditional ratification, with a Bill of Rights prefixed and 
 amendments subjoined. The motion was carried. The 
 vote is not given, but it was undoubtedly thirty to twenty- 
 seven. Four days after, Mr. Jones moved that the words 
 " in full confidence " be substituted in the form of ratifi- 
 cation for the words " on condition." That motion was
 
 THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, 1788. 
 
 carried by thirty-one to twenty-nine. M. Smith, G. Liv- 
 ingston, and Williams, had passed over to their former 
 adversaries. How they were won is not told, but may be 
 easily guessed from the declaration by the Convention of a 
 right of external check : 
 
 " The delegates of the people of the State of New York 
 declare and make known that all power is originally vested 
 in, and consequently derived from the people, and that 
 government is instituted by them for their common inter- 
 est, protection, and security ; that the powers of government 
 may be resumed by the people whenever it shall become 
 necessary to their happiness ; that every power, jurisdic- 
 tion and right, which is not by the Constitution clearly 
 delegated to the Congress of the United States or to the 
 departments of government thereof, remains in the people 
 of the several States or to their respective State govern- 
 ments to whom they may have granted the same ; and that 
 the clauses in said Constitution which declare that Con- 
 gress shall not exercise certain powers do not imply that 
 Congress is entitled to any powers not given by said Con- 
 stitution, but such clauses are to be construed either as ex- 
 ceptions to certain specific powers, or inserted merely for 
 greater caution." * The circular letter from the Conven- 
 tion to the Governors of the several States discloses more 
 of the compromise which, in their view, justified the trans- 
 fer of votes. A few sentences will exhibit it : 
 
 " Several articles in the Constitution appear so excep- 
 tionable to a majority of us, that nothing but the fullest 
 confidence of obtaining a revision of them by a general 
 convention, and an invincible reluctance to separate from 
 our sister States, could have prevailed upon a sufficient num- 
 ber to ratify it, without stipulating for previous amend- 
 ments. We all unite in the opinion that such a revision 
 
 * Rhode Island made the same claim of a right of external check in nearly 
 the same words.
 
 118 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 will be necessary to recommend it to the approbation and 
 support of a numerous body of our constituents." The 
 final vote was thirty to twenty-seven. Most of the coun- 
 ties were unanimously for, or against ratification. The 
 trading-classes and the sea-washed counties were unani- 
 mous in their desire for the adoption of the Constitution ; 
 the agricultural class and the interior counties were the 
 opponents. Before the final vote was taken, Lansing made 
 a last effort to compel amendments. He moved a resolu- 
 tion that the State of New York reserve the right to with- 
 draw from the Union after a certain number of years, unless 
 the amendments proposed should previously be submitted 
 to a general convention. That motion was negatived. The 
 vote upon it is not in the printed report. The sense of 
 the Convention on the subject of its long list of proposed 
 amendments, is expressed in one paragraph of the circular 
 letter : " Our amendments will manifest that none of them 
 originated in local views ; they are such as, if acceded to, 
 must equally affect every State in the Union. Our attach- 
 ment to our sister States, and the confidence we repose in 
 them, can not be more forcibly demonstrated than by ac- 
 ceding to a government which many of us think very im- 
 perfect, and devolving the power of determining whether 
 that government shall be rendered perpetual in its present 
 form, or altered agreeably to our wishes, and a minority of 
 the States with whom we unite." * 
 
 * The debates in the Convention of New York are like a Homeric battle, 
 Hamilton against a host. His mind, " like an ample shield, took all their 
 darts, with verge enough for more." The display of intellectual power is 
 the more remarkable, from his total lack of faith in the plan. Of all men 
 who have ever lived in the United States, his was the most complete mind. 
 He seemed to absorb information. Upon any subject he could leap fully 
 armed into the saddle, ready to meet all comers. If right, he was irresisti- 
 ble ; if wrong, master of sophistry, he was almost irrefutable. His ideal of 
 government was based upon human nature, as exhibited for thousands of 
 years, not upon the then characteristics of American nature. He believed
 
 THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, 1788. H9 
 
 that the existing passion for liberty must be evanescent, and that his coun- 
 trymen would soon become as other men more eager to rule, than jealous 
 of rule. Instead of a Federal Union, he wished a legislative Union, with 
 exceptions of power, and a Senate embodying the good features of the Senate 
 of Rome ; both it and the President to be elevated above party, by a tenure 
 beyond party. He purposed that the democratic element should be fully 
 represented in the House. His political career in the new Union was shaped 
 by a belief, often expressed, that the Federal would be invaded by the State 
 power, a consequence only to be averted by the gradual absorption of all 
 the limitations upon Federal power. His theory of construction was inspired 
 by a conviction that the federal principle must rest on force or on influence, 
 not on good faith. No man, even believing that theory fatal, ever distrusted 
 his motives or doubted his patriotism. To those, Burr, his sole rival in New 
 York, did full justice, although a mutual personal enmity of long date was 
 conjoined with political divergence. To those who with Gorham thought an 
 hereditary monarchy the best of governments, there lacked an aristocracy, 
 an insuperable objection, as he admitted ; to those who thought with Hamil- 
 ton, there lacked a plutocracy ; to its creation, therefore, he addressed all his 
 faculties.
 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 
 
 1788. 
 
 WHEN the Convention of North Carolina was organized, 
 Galloway moved that the Constitution be discussed clause 
 by clause. 
 
 Willie Jones moved that the question upon its adoption 
 be immediately put. It had so long been the subject of 
 the deliberation of every man that the members of the 
 Convention were (he believed) prepared to vote. 
 
 Iredell was surprised at the motion : " A Constitution 
 has been formed after much deliberation. It has had the 
 sanction of men of the first characters, for their probity 
 and understanding. It has also had the solemn ratification 
 of ten States in the Union. It ought not to be adopted or 
 rejected in a moment. Shall the representatives of North 
 Carolina, assembled for the express purpose of deliberating 
 upon the most important question that ever came before a 
 people, refuse to discuss it, and discard reasoning as use- 
 less ? I should not choose to determine on any question 
 without mature reflection , and on this occasion my repug- 
 nance to. a hasty decision is equal to the magnitude of the 
 subject. I readily confess my present opinion strongly in 
 its favor ; but, notwithstanding, I have not come here re- 
 solved, at all events, to vote for its adoption. I have come 
 to learn, and to judge. The Constitution ought to be dis- 
 cussed in such a manner that all possible light may be 
 thrown on it. If they who think that it would be a bad 
 government will unfold the reasons of their opinion, we
 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 121 
 
 may all concur in it. Can it be supposed that any here are 
 so obstinate and tenacious of their opinion, that they will 
 not recede upon reasons to change it ? Has not every one 
 here received useful knowledge from communication with 
 others ? Have not many of the members of this house, 
 when members of the Assembly, frequently changed opin- 
 ions upon subjects of legislation ? If so, surely a subject 
 of so complicated a nature, and which involves such seri- 
 ous consequences, requires the most ample discussion. I 
 hope, therefore, that we shall imitate the laudable example 
 of the other States, and go into a committee of the whole 
 house, that the Constitution may be discussed clause by 
 clause." 
 
 Jones, if members differed from him as to the propriety 
 of his motion, submitted to their views. 
 
 Rev. Mr. Caldwell, in order to obviate the difficulty at- 
 tending discussion, conceived it necessary to lay down cer- 
 tain fundamental principles of free government, compare 
 the Constitution with them, and judge it by its consonance 
 to them. 
 
 Davie observed that, to lay down a number of original 
 principles would require a double investigation, the princi- 
 ples would have to be established, and then the comparison 
 would have to be made. 
 
 Caldwell presented his principles : " A government is a 
 compact between the rulers and the people. Such compact 
 ought to be lawful in itself. It ought to be lawfully ex- 
 ecuted. Unalienable rights ought not to be given up, if 
 not necessary. The compact ought to be mutual. It ought 
 to be plain, obvious, and easily understood." 
 
 Iredell : " The first principle is erroneous. In other 
 countries, where the origin of government is obscure, and 
 its formation different from ours, government may be 
 deemed a compact between the rulers and the people, with 
 the consequence that, unless the rulers are guilty of op- 
 6
 
 122 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 pression, the people, upon the principle of contract, which, 
 can not be annulled without the consent of both parties, 
 have no right to new-model their government. Our gov- 
 ernment is founded upon much nobler principles. Our 
 people are known with certainty to have originated it them- 
 selves. Those in power are their servants and agents, and 
 the people, without their consent, may new-model their 
 government whenever they think proper ; not merely be- 
 cause it is oppressively exercised, but because they think 
 another form will be more conducive to their welfare. It 
 is upon the footing of this very principle that we are now 
 met, to consider this Constitution before us." 
 
 Caldwell admitted that the government proposed did 
 not resemble the European governments, but thought it yet 
 partook of the nature of a compact. 
 
 Maclaine said the "principles" were taken from sources 
 which can not hold here. In England the government is a 
 compact between the people and the king. 
 
 Goudry thought that there was a quibble upon words. 
 Compact, agreement, covenant, bargain, or what not, the 
 intent of the instrument was a concession of power by the 
 people to rulers. We know private interest generally gov- 
 erns mankind. Power belongs originally to the people, 
 but, if rulers are not well guarded, that power may be 
 usurped from them ; hence, the necessity of general rules. 
 
 Iredell said : "The line between power which is given, 
 and which is retained, ought to be as accurately drawn as 
 possible. In this system, the line is most accurately drawn, 
 by the positive grant of powers to the General Government. 
 But a compact between the rulers and the ruled is certainly 
 not the principle of this government. Will any man say 
 that, if there be a compact, it can be altered without the 
 consent of both parties ? Those who govern, unless they 
 grossly abuse their trust, which is held an implied violation 
 of the compact, and therefore a dissolution of it, have a
 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 123 
 
 right to say that they do not choose that the government 
 should be changed. But have any of the officers of our 
 government a right to say so, if the people choose to change 
 it ? Surely not." 
 
 Spencer : " I conceive that it will retard business to 
 consider the proposal. It does not apply to the present 
 circumstances. When there is a king, or other governors, 
 there is a compact between the people and him. In this 
 case, in regard to the government it is proposed to adopt, 
 there is no ruler or governor." 
 
 The previous question, being put, was carried by an 
 immense majority ; then the motion to consider the Con- 
 stitution, clause by clause, was debated and carried by a 
 great majority. 
 
 Caldwell inquired the meaning of " We, the people." 
 
 Davie supposed the question to be prompted by the as- 
 sumption that the Federal Convention had exceeded its 
 powers ; as a member of that Convention, he could answer 
 for its action. Its mission was " to decide upon the most 
 effectual means of removing the defects of our Federal 
 Union. That was a general discretionary authority, to pro- 
 pose any alteration thought necessary and proper. The 
 State Legislatures were afterward to review the proceedings. 
 Through their recommendation the plan is submitted to 
 the people, and it must remain a dead letter, or receive its 
 operation from the fiat of this Convention. The general 
 objects of the Union are to protect us against foreign in- 
 vasion, internal commotions and insurrections, and to pro- 
 mote the commerce, agriculture, and manufactures of Amer- 
 ica. To neither was the Confederation competent ; and, as 
 it would have been dangerous to lodge additional power in 
 a single body, a different organization was necessary. To 
 form some balance, the departments of government were 
 separated, and the Legislature divided into two branches. 
 The House is immediately elected by the people, the Sen-
 
 124: SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 ate represents the sovereignty of the States. The differ- 
 ence of the States, in point of importance and magnitude, 
 was an additional reason for the two branches. The pro- 
 tection of the small States, against the ambition and influ- 
 ence of the larger, could only be effected by arming them 
 with equal power in one branch of the Legislature. With- 
 out that check, the consent of the smaller States could not 
 have been obtained. The executive is separated in its 
 functions from the legisktive as well as the nature of 
 things would admit. A radical defect of the old system 
 was, that it legiskted for States, not individuals, and that 
 its powers could only be executed by military force, in- 
 stead of by the intervention of the civil magistrate. Every 
 one acquainted with the relative situation of the States, 
 and the genius of our citizens, must acknowledge that, if 
 the government was to be carried on by military force, the 
 citizens of America would be rendered the most implaca- 
 ble enemies to one another ; and, if it could be thus carried 
 into effect against the small States, it could not be put in 
 force against the larger and more powerful. The Conven- 
 tion knew that all governments, merely federal, had been 
 short-lived, or had existed from principles extraneous to 
 their constitution, or from external causes, which had no 
 dependence on the nature of their governments ; therefore 
 it departed from that solecism in politics, the principle of 
 legislation for States, in their political capacity. The great 
 extent of country appeared a formidable difficulty, but a 
 confederate government appears, at least in theory, capa- 
 ble of embracing the various interests of the most extensive 
 territory. There was a real difficulty in conciliating a num- 
 ber of jarring interests, arising from the incidental, but 
 unalterable, difference between the States, in point of ter- 
 ritory, situation, climate, and rivalship in commerce. Each, 
 therefore, amicably and wisely relinquished its particular 
 views. I hope that the same spirit of amity, of mutual
 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 125 
 
 deference, and concession, to which the Federal Convention 
 attributed the Constitution, will govern the deliberation 
 and decision of this Convention." 
 
 Taylor returned to " "We, the people." He saw in 
 these words an intention of consolidation. Maclaine was 
 astonished to hear objections to the preamble : " Is not 
 this a dispute about words, without any meaning what- 
 ever? This Constitution is a blank until it is adopted by 
 the people. When that is done here, is it not the people 
 of North Carolina that do it, joined with the people of 
 the other States that have adopted it ? The expression, 
 then, is right." 
 
 Caldwell remarked that, while all legislative power was 
 placed in the Congress, the Yice-President was associated 
 with the legislative power by his casting vote. 
 
 Davie stated why the Federal Convention imposed that 
 duty on the Yice-President. " The commercial jealousy 
 between the Eastern and Southern States had a principal 
 share in this business. It might happen, in important 
 cases, that the voices would be equally divided. Indecision 
 might be inconvenient, and dangerous to the public. 
 The Yice-President, in consequence of his election, is the 
 creature of no particular State or district. He must pos- 
 sess the confidence of the States in a very great degree, 
 and is consequently the most proper person to decide on 
 cases of that kind. It is impossible that any officer could 
 be chosen more impartially." Maclaine added that a pro- 
 vision of the sort was to be found in all legislative bodies, 
 was useful, expedient, and calculated to prevent the opera- 
 tion of the government from being impeded. 
 
 Lenoir observed that the President was also connected, 
 to some extent, with the legislative powers ; whereupon 
 Iredell attempted a distinction between the power to legis- 
 late and the power to prevent legislation. There are no 
 two provisions in the Constitution more wise than the
 
 126 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 casting vote of the Yice-President and the veto of the 
 President, and none more defensible ; but to contend that 
 the power which enables something to become, or forbids 
 it to become law, is not a legislative power, is to juggle 
 with words. The impolicy of not meeting an issue 
 squarely, was demonstrated on the next objection; that 
 the executive was blended with the legislative power, as 
 the Senate acted upon treaties. The answer might have 
 been : This is a government sui generis. There is in it 
 an association, to some extent, of the legislative and exec- 
 utive functions, very prudent and proper. There is an 
 agency for making statutes, and an agency for making 
 treaties ; the functions are different, if the persons are the 
 same. Instead of which, a verbal distinction was drawn, 
 which did not satisfy inquiry, and increased suspicion. 
 Upon the word " sole," in the clause which gives to the 
 House of Representatives the power of impeachments, 
 debate was sharp. No one contended that the word was 
 not superfluous, although it was claimed that the surplus- 
 age could not injure, as by the context it was plain that 
 impeachment was limited to officers of the United States. 
 The answer in substance was : Every unnecessary word in 
 a Constitution is dangerous; casuistry can find exercise 
 enough in the imperfection of language, without extrane- 
 ous aid. "Sole" may contain danger. Upon the Fed- 
 eral regulation of the time, place, and manner of elections, 
 Governor Johnston was forced to say : " Although a 
 great admirer of the Constitution, I can not comprehend 
 the reason of this part. This power in Congress appears 
 useless, so long as the State Legislatures have the power 
 not to choose senators ; but I do not consider this blemish 
 in the Constitution sufficient for rejection. I observe that 
 every State, which has adopted and recommended altera- 
 tions, has given directions to remove this objection." 
 
 Spencer, conscious as he was of the excellences of the
 
 TEE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 127 
 
 Constitution, and reluctant to find fault, could not consent 
 to a provision which sapped the foundations of those gov- 
 ernments on which the happiness of the States and of the 
 General Government must depend. Iredell appealed to 
 the candor and moderation of the last speaker to consider 
 the language in connection with the rest of the instrument. 
 " Representatives were to be chosen every two years ; they 
 must be chosen. Whether in January, March, or any other 
 month, was all that was left for future congressional regu- 
 lation. He could see in the possibilities of a State Legis- 
 lature being unable to act in case of war, or in the combi- 
 nation of some great States not to send representatives, 
 the reasons which prompted the clause." 
 
 He was careful not to touch upon " place and manner." 
 Spencer responded : " I only meant to say that the words 
 are exceedingly vague. They may admit of the construc- 
 tion just given ; they may admit of a contrary construction. 
 In a matter of so great moment, words ought not to be so 
 vague and indeterminate. No man wishes for a Federal 
 Government more than I do. I consider it necessary to 
 our happiness ; but at the same time when we form a gov- 
 ernment which must entail happiness or misery on poster- 
 ity, nothing is of more consequence than settling it so as 
 to exclude animosity, and a contest between the Federal 
 and the individual governments. The words under con- 
 sideration are words of very great extent, and so vague and 
 uncertain that they must ultimately destroy the whole lib- 
 erty of the United States." 
 
 Davie asserted two reasons for the existence of the 
 clause. If he was justified by facts, they must be part of 
 an unwritten history of the Federal Convention. The 
 principal reason was to prevent the dissolution of the Gov- 
 ernment by designing States. Without this control in 
 Congress, the large States might successfully combine to 
 destroy the Federal Government. Another principal rea-
 
 128 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 son was, that it would operate in favor of the people, 
 against the ambitious designs of the Federal Senate. He 
 next inquired as to the effect of the clause. A fundament- 
 al principle beyond the reach of the General or State gov- 
 ernment is, that representatives shall be chosen every two 
 years ; that the qualifications of these electors shall be the 
 qualifications of electors to the most numerous branch of 
 the State Legislature, and that senators shall be chosen for 
 six years. All the power of the State Legislature is to 
 regulate the when, the where, and the how; that was 
 equally the power of Congress no less, no more. 
 
 Bloodworth said : " It was easy to mention that the 
 control of Congress should be exerted when a State neg- 
 lected, refused, or was unable, in case of invasion, to regu- 
 late elections. If that was the meaning, why was it not 
 expressed ? If more was meant, that was a sufficient rea- 
 son to reject the Constitution. There seemed to be a strange 
 inconsistency in the arguments adduced." 
 
 Spencer, willing to give the General Government im- 
 post, excise, and direct taxation, in case of war, was unwill- 
 ing to concede the latter power during peace, until requi- 
 sitions had been made, neglected, or refused. The power 
 of direct taxation should be kept as near to the people as 
 possible. 
 
 Whitmill Hill remarked that while the general wish 
 was to empower Congress to raise all necessary sums, there 
 was a great difference of opinion as to the better mode. 
 Two circumstances might weigh with the committee : First, 
 that the people of North Carolina had the honesty and the 
 ability to pay any reasonable tax ; secondly, that when it 
 was once known to foreign nations that the Government 
 and its finances were upon a respectable basis, money for 
 any emergency could be borrowed on advantageous terms. 
 
 Governor Johnston denied the assumption that, under 
 the proposed system, the power of taxation was taken out
 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 129 
 
 of the hands of the people : " Taxes must be voted by their 
 representatives. If there were danger from that source, 
 where can political security be found ? It is said that our 
 proportion of representation is small ; then our proportion 
 of taxation is small ; and, unless we suppose that all the 
 members of Congress will combine to ruin their constitu- 
 ents, there can be no reason for fear." 
 
 Goudry and McDowell disclosed the reasons for the 
 overwhelming opposition to the grant of power of direct 
 taxation : " Some represent us as honest, but not rich ; 
 others as rich, but not honest. The fact is, we are very 
 poor, and not able to bear taxation for more than one gov- 
 ernment. If there are two, with equal right to tax, one 
 must give way. The tendency of the Constitution to de- 
 stroy the State governments must be clear to every man of 
 common understanding." 
 
 Other clauses were read without debate, until that which 
 admitted the slave-trade was reached. 
 
 McDowell asked the reasons of the Federal Convention 
 for that exception. 
 
 Spraight answered that it was the result of a compro- 
 mise between the Eastern and the Southern States. South 
 Carolina and Georgia had lost a great many slaves during 
 the war, and wished to supply the loss. As North Carolina 
 had not passed any law to prohibit the importation of ne- 
 groes, her delegates had not felt authorized to contend for 
 an immediate prohibition of it. 
 
 By both sides the utmost repugnance was manifested 
 to the clause. The Convention only yielded its detesta- 
 tion, to the reasoning of Iredell, that the Constitution really 
 presented the only means, so far as Americans were con- 
 cerned, of terminating an odious traffic. On the subject 
 of slavery itself, the sentiment of North Carolina and Vir- 
 ginia appears to have been identical. Two difficulties stood 
 in the way of manumission : a right of property, which
 
 130 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 had been universally recognized up to that period, and a 
 repugnance of race. Perhaps both were never more clearly 
 and calmly stated than in this discussion, by Galloway. 
 After expressing his horror of an " abominable traffic," he 
 continued : " With respect to the abolition of slavery, it 
 requires the utmost consideration. The property of the 
 Southern States is principally in slaves ; if slavery is done 
 away with, this property will be destroyed. If we must 
 manumit our slaves, to what country shall we send them ? 
 It is impossible for us to be happy, if, after manumission, 
 they are to stay among us." The aversion of race is to 
 some extent cruel, and to some extent silly, but it is not a 
 mere prejudice ; it has some reason in the nature of things. 
 
 The clause which vested executive power having been 
 read, and no observation made, Davie expressed " surprise 
 at the silence and gloomy jealousy of the opposition. 
 Out-of-doors, no feature of the Constitution had met 
 with such violent, indeed, virulent censure." 
 
 Taylor thought that, even if the Convention possessed 
 the power to amend the Constitution, every part need not 
 be discussed, as some were not objectionable ; his objec- 
 tion was to the power of Congress to determine the time 
 of choosing the electors and the day on which they should 
 give their votes. His meaning, in the objection "that 
 everything which could be, should be, definitely fixed, 
 beyond the future passions of men," was mistaken for con- 
 cern as to a detail, not as to a principle. 
 
 The answers, with justice, sustained the detail, but did 
 not touch the scruple. Upon the association of the Sen- 
 ate with the President, in treaty-making and appointment 
 to office, Spencer detailed the grounds of opposition, which, 
 if neither accepted nor acceptable, were based upon a 
 careful study of political science : " It is an essential 
 article in our Constitution that the executive, the legisla- 
 tive, and the supreme judicial powers of government
 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 131 
 
 ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other. 
 The Senate, in the proposed plan, are possessed of legis- 
 lative power in conjunction with the House. They are 
 possessed of the sole power of trying impeachments, and 
 by this clause, in effect, they possess the chief executive 
 power. They form treaties which are to be the law of the 
 land. They control the appointment, practically, of all 
 the officers of the United States. The President may 
 nominate, but they have a negative upon his nomination. 
 He will be obliged, finally, to acquiesce in the appoint- 
 ment of those whom in reality the Senate will nominate, 
 or else no appointment will be made. Hence, it is easy to 
 perceive that the President, in order to do any business, or 
 to answer any purpose in this department of his office, and 
 to keep himself out of perpetual hot water, will be under 
 a necessity to form a connection with that powerful body, 
 and be contented to put himself at the head of the leading 
 members who compose it. I do not expect, at this day, 
 that the outline and organization of the proposed govern- 
 ment will be materially changed, but it would have been 
 infinitely better, and more secure, if the President had 
 been provided with a Standing Council, composed of a 
 member from each State, whose term of office might have 
 been the same as his own. Two very important conse- 
 quences would result, which can not result from the pres- 
 ent plan. The first, that the executive department, being 
 separate and distinct, the President and his Council, any 
 or either, would be amenable to the justice of the land. 
 As it is, I do not conceive that the President can even be 
 tried by the Senate, with any effect, or to any purpose, for 
 any misdemeanor in office, unless it should extend to high 
 treason, or unless they should wish to fix the odium of any 
 measure upon him, in order to exculpate themselves. 
 The other important consequence is, that the President 
 would have an independence which he does not have in
 
 132 SEVEN CON VENTIONS. 
 
 this plan. If no other argument for a council could be 
 urged, the diminution of the power of the Senate would be 
 sufficient." Davie admitted " that a total separation of the 
 branches of government was desirable, but it has never 
 been found entirely practicable. So far as it was departed 
 from in this system, the causes would be found in the ex- 
 treme jealousy of executive power in the American mind, 
 and the difference in size, wealth, and population of the 
 States. The smaller States had a disproportionate influ- 
 ence in the government, which they insisted was necessary 
 to their safety. That influence is exerted in the Senate. 
 The difficulty could not be got over. It arose from the 
 unalterable nature of things. Upon some subjects the 
 smaller States would not agree that the House should have 
 a voice, and upon the same subject none of the States 
 would agree that the President should have an exclusive 
 voice. Not only the present distribution of power is good 
 in itself, but no one can suggest a better. A council 
 would be open to every objection that can be urged against 
 the Senate, and to other objections which can not be urged 
 against the Senate. The Senate represents the Federal 
 principle of the government and is the safeguard against 
 consolidation. Its great power is commensurate with its 
 functions." Iredell added : " God forbid that in any coun- 
 try a man should be punished for want of judgment! 
 For errors of the heart, should any be committed here, 
 there is a ready way to punishment. That is a responsi- 
 bility which answers every purpose a people jealous of 
 their liberties can ask. Parties must exist, and may be 
 bitter ; the malignity of party will interpret difference of 
 opinion, as deliberate wickedness." 
 
 Upon the judiciary clause, debate was not conducive to 
 harmony. Davie urged the undeniable political truth that 
 the judicial must be coextensive with the legislative power. 
 The proposition was not denied; the contention turned
 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 133 
 
 upon the point whether the judicial was not, or might not, 
 become more extensive, and the Constitution become judge- 
 made, not convention-made. The object of a Constitution 
 being to fix the meum and tuum between the States, and 
 between the General Government and the States, the judi- 
 ciary, it was conceded, might be qualified and trusted to 
 decide whether either was invaded, but not to determine 
 whether the meum and tuum had been properly parti- 
 tioned. This course of reasoning led, naturally, to the 
 consideration of the necessity for a Bill of Rights. Davie 
 and others insisted that, though necessary in a monarchy, 
 it was unnecessary in such a government, the Constitution 
 itself being a Bill of Rights, as it excluded whatever was 
 not included. 
 
 Spencer answered : " It is said that what is not given 
 up to the United States will be retained by the individual 
 States. I know it ought to be so, and should be under- 
 stood so, but it is not declared, as it was in the Confedera- 
 tion. What is not declared is apt to be overlooked. The lan- 
 guage in the Articles of Confederation was the equivalent 
 of a Bill of Rights." 
 
 Iredell asked " what more could be necessary when the 
 people declare how much they give. The Constitution 
 may be considered as a great power of attorney. If we 
 had formed a general Legislature, with undefined powers, 
 a Bill of Rights would have been not only proper, but ne- 
 cessary, to operate exceptions to the legislative authority." 
 Spencer's belief that what is generally understood ought 
 to be distinctly stated, seems to be approved by events. 
 Had the friends of the Constitution embodied in it, or in 
 an amendment, the declarations they made in conventions, 
 the epithets of their posterity might have been differently 
 distributed. The omission of mention of a jury in civil 
 cases, while specified in criminal cases, excited great alarm. 
 
 Iredell stated the cause of the omission : " Let any
 
 134: SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 gentleman consider the difficulties in which the Federal 
 Convention was placed. A Union was absolutely necessary. 
 Everything could be agreed upon except the regulation of 
 the trial by jury in civil cases. All were anxious to estab- 
 lish it on the best footing, but found that they could fix 
 upon no permanent rule that was not liable to great objec- 
 tions and difficulties. If the delegates could not agree 
 among themselves, they had still less reason to believe that 
 all the States would have unanimously agreed to any one 
 plan that could be proposed. They therefore thought it 
 better to leave the regulations to the Legislature. It has 
 been said that the objection might have been obviated by 
 the addition of five or six lines. If, by the addition of five 
 or six hundred lines, this invaluable object could have been 
 secured, I should have thought the Convention criminal in 
 omitting it." 
 
 Among the amendments to the Constitution, a few 
 lines dissipated doubts and dispelled fears upon that point. 
 
 Iredell expkined the reasons for the " fugitive-slave " 
 clause : " Some of the Northern States have emancipated 
 their slaves. If any of our slaves go there, and remain a 
 certain time, they would, under present laws, be entitled 
 to their freedom, so that their masters could not get them 
 again, to prevent which this clause is inserted." The rea- 
 sons for the prohibition to the States, of issuing paper 
 money, and making anything, save gold and silver, a legal 
 tender, were asked of those members who had been dele- 
 gates to the Federal Convention. The answer was : " Mis- 
 chief had been done, it could not be repaired, but some 
 limitations to that great political evil had to be formed. 
 The people of Massachusetts and Connecticut had been 
 great sufferers by the dishonesty of Rhode Island, and 
 similar complaints existed against this State. The clause 
 became, in some measure, a preliminary, with the delegates 
 who represented the other States. ' You have,' said they,
 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 135 
 
 ' by your iniquitous laws, and paper emissions, shamefully 
 defrauded our citizens. The Confederation prevented our 
 compelling you to do them justice ; but, before we con- 
 federate with you again, you must not only agree to be 
 honest, but put it out of your power to be dishonest.' " 
 
 Galloway asked if the inhibition on a State to pass a 
 law impairing the obligation of contracts applied to the 
 public securities of a State. Davie answered : " In no part 
 of the Constitution is power vested to interfere with the 
 public securities of a State. The clause refers to contracts 
 between individuals." 
 
 Abbot wished to know, as treaties were to become the 
 supreme law of the land, whether a treaty could engage 
 to some particular religion, and also, as no religious test 
 was required, whether, in the oath to support the Constitu- 
 tion, Juno, Minerva, or Pluto, might not be the deities in- 
 voked. 
 
 Iredell answered, "The question has also been asked 
 whether the Pope may not be elected President." With 
 polite circumlocution, he suggested that the assumption of 
 sanity, as the normal condition of mankind, was the only 
 possible answer to some questions. " The absence of any 
 religious test was the glory of the Constitution. Men are 
 left to believe as they can ; admit the least difference, and 
 the door is opened to persecution. Whatever form binds 
 the conscience, is the essence of an oath." Abbot further 
 asked the import of the guarantee of a republican form of 
 government. 
 
 Iredell replied, "With thirteen States, confederated 
 upon a republican principle, it was essential to the har- 
 mony and existence of the Confederacy, that each should 
 have a republican government, and that no one should 
 have a right to establish a monarchy or an aristocracy." 
 
 The reading of the Constitution finished, the question 
 next in order was, What will be the relation of North
 
 136 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 Carolina to the other States, if she refuses to adopt? 
 " She will be a foreign State," said Davie, " and can com- 
 municate with the United States only through embassa- 
 dors." " What then," it was asked, " becomes of the faith 
 plighted by the Articles of Confederation ? If some 
 States can absolve themselves at will from the obligations 
 of those, why not from the obligations of the Constitu- 
 tion." . In the Federal Convention the same inquiry had 
 been made : " If nine States can withdraw from thirteen, 
 why not six from nine, four from six?" Answer was 
 avoided there, but not in the Convention of North Caro- 
 lina. 
 
 " The great principle," said Iredell, " the fundamental 
 principle upon which our government is founded, is the 
 safety of the people. For their welfare government is 
 instituted, and this ought to be its object, whatever its 
 form. Our governments have clearly been created by the 
 people themselves ; the same authority that created can 
 destroy, and the people may undoubtedly change the gov- 
 ernment, not because it is ill-exercised, but because they 
 conceive that another form will be more conducive to 
 their welfare. It is suggested that, though ten States 
 have adopted the Constitution, they had no right to dis- 
 solve the old Confederation, that the Articles still subsist, 
 and the old Union remains, of which we are a part. That 
 this is true may well be doubted. All writers agree that, 
 if the principles of a Constitution are violated, the Consti- 
 tution itself is dissolved, or may be, at the pleasure of the 
 parties to it. The principles of the Confederation have 
 not seldom been violated, and North Carolina, as well as 
 others, has been an offender. This Constitution is pro- 
 posed to the thirteen States. The desire was, that all 
 should agree ; but, if not, care was taken that at least nine 
 might save themselves from destruction." 
 
 Davie took other ground : " It is said that it is a rule
 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 137 
 
 of law that the same solemnities are necessary to annul as 
 were necessary to create or establish a compact ; and that, 
 as thirteen States created, so thirteen States must concur 
 in the dissolution of the Confederacy. This may be the 
 talk of a lawyer or a judge, but is not the talk of a poli- 
 tician. Every man of common sense knows that political 
 power is political right. In every republican community, 
 whether confederated or separate, a majority binds the 
 minority.* The voice of the majority of the people of 
 America gave the Confederation validity; the same au- 
 thority can and will annul it. Adoption places us in the 
 Union ; rejection extinguishes the right." 
 
 If Iredell was right, the claimants under the Articles 
 of Confederation had no cause of complaint ; if Davie 
 was right, it made no difference if they had, and therefore 
 both, with Johnston, urged adoption by arguments which 
 reason could not answer. " You will, you admit, be satis- 
 fied with this Constitution if amended ; adopt, and your 
 strength, added to that of those States, eager for the same 
 amendments, can carry them ; reject, and your weakness 
 will count against you, in place of your strength counting 
 for you. Adopt, and you can help shape the new govern- 
 ment and share in the feast ; reject now, and when you 
 adopt, as you eventually must, you will have to accept the 
 shaping of others, and find only the crumbs." 
 
 Upon the motion to ratify, the yeas were 84, and the 
 
 * Pennsylvania is an illustration. The charter of that colony reserved to 
 Great Britain the right of taxation. Her claims to independence could not, 
 therefore, have been based upon an invasion of charter liberties, that usurpa- 
 tion of an unwarranted jurisdiction denounced by the other colonies, but must 
 have rested upon an inherent right in one community, upon its judgment of 
 the necessity to renounce a political connection with another. Two speeches 
 of great ability, made in her Convention, in advocacy of ratification of the 
 Constitution, exist, though other record of debate is lost. Neither recog- 
 nizes any obligation of faith under the Articles of Confederation, and they 
 differ as to the character and effect of the instrument they recommend.
 
 138 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 nays 184. Upon the motion neither to adopt nor reject, 
 the yeas were 184, and the nays 84. By the same vote 
 any impost passed by the United States was recommended 
 to be passed by the Legislature of North Carolina, the 
 proceeds to be held at the disposition of Congress. 
 
 The motive of the majority, if surmise be permissible, 
 was to serve the desire for amendments, the difference of 
 opinion between the majority and minority being as to 
 whether such service would be more efficient by presence 
 in, or absence from, the councils of the new Union. 
 
 At the first session of Congress, held in the city of New 
 York, 4th of March, 1789, twelve amendments were pro- 
 posed to the Legislatures of the States, of which ten were 
 adopted. On the llth of January, 1T90, the President 
 communicated to both Houses of Congress the ratification 
 of the Constitution by North Carolina.
 
 THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 
 
 1788. 
 
 THE debates in the Convention of South Carolina are 
 said to have been distinguished by the ability with which 
 ratification was advocated and opposed, but no report of 
 them is extant. A fragment remains ; from that, from the 
 vote upon the question, and from the debate in the Legis- 
 lature, upon the motion for the call of a convention, some 
 knowledge may be acquired of those who favored and those 
 who opposed the adoption of the Constitution, and some 
 conception of the reasoning upon which their action was 
 based. What, in later years, was termed " the slave power," 
 the professions, and the commercial class, as a general rule, 
 were passionate adorers of the Constitution ; the yeomanry 
 of the upper parishes were obdurate skeptics. As in other 
 States, favor and disfavor seem to have been largely local. 
 
 In the House of Representatives of the State of South 
 Carolina, upon the motion for the call of a State Conven- 
 tion, after the Constitution had been read, Charles Pinck- 
 ney, a delegate to the Federal Convention, opened the 
 debate, by enumerating the causes which led to that Con- 
 vention, and by stating that, when it met, the first question 
 in the view of almost every member was, " Shall the old 
 plan be amended, or a new one devised ? " " Conscious that 
 the Confederation, though possessing the outlines of a good 
 government, was, strictly speaking, a league destitute of 
 the elements of permanency and coercive operation, the 
 Convention felt the necessity of establishing a government
 
 140 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 which, instead of requiring the intervention of thirteen 
 Legislatures between demand and compliance, operated 
 upon the people in the first instance. Upon that point 
 the members did not differ, however much they differed 
 upon the question of power. Upon the distribution of 
 influence, in a system possessing extensive national authori- 
 ties, the compromise between the larger and the smaller 
 States, though originally opposed by him, seemed far 
 from injudicious. The judiciary, under wise manage- 
 ment, would be the key-stone of the arch, for in peace 
 more depended upon the integrity and energy of the ju- 
 diciary than upon any other branch of the government. 
 The Executive was not constructed upon a principle as 
 firm and permanent as he could wish, but as much so as 
 the genius and temper of the people would permit. As 
 commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces, he could 
 neither raise nor support them by his authority, and his 
 negative upon laws could be overridden. He could not 
 make a treaty, nor appoint to office, without the concur- 
 rence of a Senate, in which the States had each an equal 
 voice. In a Union so extensive as this would be, composed 
 of so many State governments, inhabited by a people char- 
 acterized, as our citizens are, by an impatience of any act 
 which looks like an infringement of their rights, an inva- 
 sion of them by the Federal head appeared the most remote 
 of all public dangers. To what limits a republic of States 
 may extend, how far it may be capable of uniting the lib- 
 erty of a small commonwealth with the safety of a peace- 
 ful empire, whether among the co-ordinate powers dis- 
 sensions and jealousies may not arise, which, for the want 
 of a common superior, will proceed to fatal extremities, 
 were questions upon which the example of any nation did 
 not authorize decision. It was an experiment admittedly, 
 but an experiment which could be made upon a scale so 
 extensive, and under circumstances so promising, as to be
 
 THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 141 
 
 the fairest in favor of human nature, and its firm estab- 
 lishment better calculated to answer the great ends of 
 public happiness than any ever yet devised." In his ad- 
 dress to the Convention, Pinckney gave wider scope to his 
 reasoning : " The first knowledge necessary to be acquired 
 is that of a people for whom a system is to be formed, for, 
 unless acquainted with their situation, their habits, opin- 
 ions, and resources, it would be impossible to frame a gov- 
 ernment upon adequate or practicable principles. None 
 of the distinctions of rank which exist in Europe do, or, in 
 all probability, ever will, exist in the Union. The only 
 distinction which may take place is that of wealth. Riches, 
 no doubt, will have their influence ; and, when suffered to 
 increase to large amounts in a few hands, may become dan- 
 gerous, particularly when, from the cheapness of labor and 
 the scarcity of money, a great proportion of the people are 
 poor. That danger is very little to be apprehended for 
 two reasons the destruction of the right of primogeni- 
 ture, and the nearly equal division of landed property in 
 the Eastern and Northern States. Few have large, and 
 few have not small tracts. The greater part of the 
 people are employed in cultivating their own lands, the 
 rest in handicraft and commerce. Plain tables, clothing, 
 and furniture prevail in their houses, and expensive ap- 
 pearances are avoided. Among the landed interest few 
 are rich, and few are very poor, nor, while the States are 
 capable of supporting so many more inhabitants than they 
 contain at present, while so vast a territory on our frontier 
 remains uncultivated and unexplored, while the means of 
 subsistence are so much within every man's power, are those 
 dangerous distinctions of fortune, prevalent in other coun- 
 tries, to be expected. The people of the Union may be 
 classed as follows : Commercial men, who will be of con- 
 sequence, or not, in the political scale, as commerce may 
 be an object of the attention of the Government. Presum-
 
 14:2 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 ing that proper sentiments upon that subject will ultimately 
 prevail, it does not appear that the commercial line will 
 ever have much influence in the politics of the Union. 
 Foreign trade is one of those enemies to be extremely 
 guarded against, more so than any other, as none will have 
 a more unfavorable operation ; it is the root of the present 
 distress, the source from which future national calamities 
 will grow, unless great care is taken to prevent it. Divided 
 as we are from the Old World, we should have nothing to 
 do with its politics, and as little as possible with its com- 
 merce ; it can never improve, but must inevitably corrupt 
 us. Another class is that of professional men, who, from 
 their education and pursuits, must and will have consider- 
 able influence, while government retains the republican 
 principle, and its affairs are regulated in assemblies of the 
 people. The third class, with which may be connected the 
 mechanical interest, is the landed interest ; the owners and 
 cultivators of the soil, the men attached to the truest inter- 
 est of their country, from those motives that always bind 
 and secure the affections of a nation. Here rests, and it 
 is to be hoped will always continue to rest, all the authority 
 of the Government. Fortunately for their harmony, these 
 classes are connected with and dependent on each other ; 
 from which mutual dependence, mediocrity of fortune is 
 the leading feature in our national character. Another 
 distinguishing feature of the Union is its division into in- 
 dividual States, differing in extent of territory, manners, 
 products, and population. Those acquainted with the 
 Eastern States, the reasons of their migration, and their 
 pursuits, habits, and principles, know that they are essen- 
 tially different from those of the Middle and Southern 
 States; that they retain all those opinions respecting 
 government and religion which first induced their ances- 
 tors to cross the Atlantic; and that they are perhaps 
 more purely republican in habits and sentiments than any
 
 THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 143 
 
 other part of the Union. The inhabitants of New York, 
 and the eastern part of New Jersey, originally Dutch set- 
 tlements, seem to have altered less than might have been 
 expected in the course of a century ; indeed, the greater 
 part of New York may still be considered a Dutch settle- 
 ment, the people in the interior generally using the Dutch 
 language in their families, and having little varied from 
 their ancient customs. Pennsylvania and Delaware are 
 nearly one half inhabited by Quakers, whose passive prin- 
 ciples upon the governmental questions, and rigid opinions 
 upon the personal, render them extremely different from 
 the citizens of the Eastern and Southern States. Maryland 
 was originally a Roman Catholic colony ; a great number 
 of its inhabitants, among whom some of the most wealthy 
 and cultivated, still profess that faith. A striking differ- 
 ence must always exist between the Independents of the 
 East, the Calvinists and Quakers of the Middle States, and 
 the Roman Catholics of Maryland ; but that is not to be 
 compared with the difference between the inhabitants of 
 the Northern and Southern States ; by Southern and North- 
 ern, meaning Maryland and the States south of her, and, 
 by Northern, the others. Nature has drawn as strong 
 marks of distinction in the habits and manners of the peo- 
 ple as in their climates and productions. The Southern 
 citizen beholds, with a kind of surprise, the simple man- 
 ners of the East, and is often induced to entertain unde- 
 served opinions of the apparent purity of the Quakers; 
 while they, in turn, seem concerned at what they term the 
 extravagance and dissipation of their Southern brethren, 
 and reprobate, as an unpardonable moral and political evil, 
 the dominion held over a part of the human race." Prem- 
 ising that systems and laws have a powerful effect upon 
 manners, and that all the States had adhered to the repub- 
 lican principle, though differing as to the best mode of 
 preserving it, he passed in review the Constitutions of the
 
 144 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 several States, giving the palm to New York. Turning to 
 antiquity, he claimed that from its history instruction could 
 not be drawn, because little of it was accurately known, 
 and that little showed that representation, the fundamental 
 of a republic, had not been practiced. In the modern 
 world there had been, in no sense of the word, a confeder- 
 ated republic; and he analyzed the systems which bore 
 some resemblance to the one proposed, and distinguished 
 their non-conformity. He then examined the three simple 
 systems of government monarchy, oligarchy, and democ- 
 racy exhibited their advantages and disadvantages, and 
 claimed that the Constitution embodied all the good, and 
 eliminated all the bad, of each. Moreover, if a republic 
 did not exclude dissensions and tumults, they must be less 
 dangerous in large confederated states than in small societies. 
 To return to the debate in the Legislature. Judge 
 Pendleton said that " ministers in England might be im- 
 peached for advising illegal measures. How could the 
 Senate be punished, before what tribunal arraigned, and if 
 the President were impeached for making a bad treaty, 
 must he not be sheltered by the consent of the Senate ? " 
 General C. C. Pinckney answered : " That question unveils 
 one of the geatest difficulties in framing the Constitution. 
 The treaty-making power must be placed somewhere, and 
 might be placed in three depositories ; to each there were 
 objections, therefore the least liable to objection was se- 
 lected. As the Senate was not a permanent body, senators 
 might be tried by succeeding senators." Mr. Lowndes 
 suggested that "as treaties became the law of the land, the 
 President and two thirds of the Senate were absolute." 
 Mr. Pringle interposed a distinction between the power to 
 make law through treaties and a general legislative power. 
 Mr. Lowndes continued : " If this Constitution is adopted, 
 the sun of the Southern States will set, never to rise. Ex- 
 clusive of Rhode Island, six of the Eastern States formed a
 
 THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 145 
 
 majority in the House. Is it consonant with reason, with 
 wisdom, or with policy, to suppose that, in a Legislature 
 where a majority has different interests from a minority, 
 the minority has the smallest chance of gaining ade- 
 quate advantages ? Our delegates, undoubtedly, did all in 
 their power to procure a proportionate share in this new 
 government, but the little they had gained proved what 
 may be expected in the future. The interest of the North- 
 ern States will so predominate as to divest this State of 
 any pretensions to the title of a republic. What cause was 
 there of jealousy for the importation of negroes? That 
 trade can be justified on the principles of religion, humani- 
 ty, and justice ; for to translate a set of human beings from 
 a bad country to a better was fulfilling every part of those 
 principles." Mr. Rutledge answered : " We have our full 
 share of the House ; fears of the Northern interest, at all 
 times prevailing, are unfounded, for several of the North- 
 ern States are already full of people, and the migrations to 
 the South are great. We shall, in a few years, rise high 
 in our representation, while their States will keep their 
 present position." 
 
 General Pinckney, in answer to Mr. Lowndes, who had 
 reiterated that all the advantages which captivated gentle- 
 men were small in proportion to the evils to be appre- 
 hended from a majority, governed by ideas and prejudices 
 differing extremely from theirs, spoke more fully : " Every 
 member who attended the Convention was, from the begin- 
 ning, sensible of the necessity of giving greater powers to 
 the Federal Government. As we found it necessary to 
 give it very extensive powers over the persons and estates 
 of citizens, we thought it right to draw one branch of the 
 Legislature immediately from the people, and that both 
 wealth and numbers should be considered in representa- 
 tion. We were at a loss for some time for a rule to ascer- 
 tain the proportionate wealth of the States. At last we 
 7
 
 14:6 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 thought that the productive labor of the inhabitants was 
 the best rule. In conformity to this rule, joined to a spirit 
 of concession, we determined that representatives should 
 be apportioned among the several States, by adding to the 
 whole number of free persons three fifths of the slaves. 
 We thus obtained a representation for our property, and I 
 did not expect we conceded too much to the Eastern States, 
 when they allowed us a representation for a species of prop- 
 erty which they have not among them. The numbers in 
 the different States, according to the most accurate accounts 
 we could obtain, were : 
 
 New Hampshire 102,000 
 
 Massachusetts 360,000 
 
 Rhode Island 58,000 
 
 Connecticut 202,000 
 
 New York 233,000 
 
 New Jersey 130,000 
 
 Pennsylvania 360,000 
 
 Delaware 37,000 
 
 Maryland, including f 80,000 negroes 218,000 
 
 Virginia, including f 280,000 negroes 420,000 
 
 North Carolina, including f 60,000 negroes 200,000 
 
 South Carolina, including f 80,000 negroes 150,000 
 
 Georgia, including f 20,000 negroes 90,000 
 
 South Carolina has one thirteenth of the representatives, 
 all she is entitled to, and all she has in the Confederation. 
 As the Eastern States are full of people, and the migration 
 is south and south westwardly, it is not probable that the 
 representation of the South will be inadequate. The South- 
 ern States have been termed the weak States ; they are so 
 weak that they could not form a Union by themselves, 
 that would effectually protect them. Without a Union 
 with the other States, South Carolina would soon fall. Is 
 any one such a Quixote as to suppose that this State could 
 maintain her independence alone, or in connection with 
 the other Southern States ? Let an invading power send a
 
 THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 147 
 
 naval force into the Chesapeake, to keep Yirginia in alarm, 
 and attack South Carolina, with such a naval and military 
 force as Sir Henry Clinton brought here in 1780, and, 
 though they might not soon conquer us, they would cer- 
 tainly do us infinite mischief, and, if they considerably in- 
 creased their numbers, we should probably fall. From the 
 nature of our climate, and the fewness of our inhabitants, 
 undoubtedly the weaker, should we not endeavor to form 
 a close union with the Eastern States, which are strong ? 
 Ought we not to endeavor to increase that species of 
 strength which will render them of most service to us 
 in peace and in war, their navy ? By doing this, we ren- 
 der it their particular interest to afford us every assistance 
 in their power, as every wound we receive will eventually 
 affect them. Their country is full of inhabitants, and so 
 impracticable to an invader by their numerous stone walls, 
 and a variety of other circumstances, that they need not 
 apprehend danger from attack. They can enjoy their in- 
 dependence without our assistance. If our government is 
 to be founded on equal compact, what inducement can 
 they possibly have to be united with us, if we do not grant 
 them some privileges with regard to their shipping? Sup- 
 pose they were to unite with us without having those priv- 
 ileges, can we flatter ourselves that such union would be 
 lasting ? Interest and policy concurred in prevailing upon 
 us to submit the regulation of commerce to the General 
 Government. But justice and humanity require it like- 
 wise. Who have been the greatest sufferers in the Union 
 by our obtaining our independence ? The Eastern States. 
 They have lost everything but their country and freedom. 
 As to the restriction upon the African trade after 1808, 
 your delegates had to contend with the religious and po- 
 litical prejudices of the Eastern and Middle States, and the 
 interested and inconsistent opinion of Yirginia. So long 
 as there is an acre of swamp-land uncultivated in South
 
 148 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 Carolina, I favor the importation of negroes. Our climate, 
 and the flat, swampy situation of our country, oblige us 
 to cultivate our lands with them. Without them the State 
 would be a desert. Those members of the Convention 
 who opposed an unlimited importation, alleged that slaves 
 increased the weakness of any State which admitted them ; 
 that they were a dangerous species of property, which an 
 invading enemy could easily turn against ourselves and 
 the neighboring States, and that as we were allowed a rep- 
 resentation for them, our influence in the government 
 would be increased in proportion, as we were less able to 
 defend ourselves. Show us some period, said the members 
 from the Eastern States, when it may be in our power, if 
 we please, to put a stop to the importation of this weak- 
 ness, and we will endeavor, for your convenience, to restrain 
 the religious and political prejudices of our people upon 
 this subject. The Middle States and Virginia made no 
 such proposition ; they were for immediate and total prohi- 
 bition. A committee of the States was appointed to accom- 
 modate this matter, and, after a great deal of difficulty, it 
 was settled on the footing recited in the Constitution. By 
 this settlement we have secured an unlimited transporta- 
 tion of negroes for twenty years. Nor is it declared that 
 it shall then stop ; it may be continued. "We have a se- 
 curity that the General Government can never emancipate 
 them, for no such authority is granted, and it is admitted 
 on all hands that the General Government has no powers 
 but what are expressly granted by the Constitution, and 
 that all rights not expressed were reserved by the several 
 States. We have obtained a right to recover our slaves in 
 whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is 
 a right we had not before. We have made the best terms 
 for the security of that species of property it was in our 
 power to make, and upon the whole they are not bad." 
 Mr. Lowndes persisted : " The Confederation recognized
 
 THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 149 
 
 the status of the States as fixed by themselves, in the treaty 
 of peace with Great Britain. That recognition did not 
 appear in the proposed plan, and the possibilities of danger 
 from that omission overbalanced any advantages." 
 
 Mr. Barnwell characterized the supposed inevitable 
 antagonism of the Eastern States as a prejudice : " There 
 were no facts to support it. When the arm of oppression 
 lay heavy upon us, were they not the first to arouse ; when 
 the sword of civil discord was drawn, were they not the 
 first in the field ; when war deluged their plains with blood, 
 did they demand Southern troops for the defense of the 
 North ; when war floated to the South, did they withhold 
 their assistance ? When we stood with the spirit, but the 
 weakness of youth, they supported us with the vigor and 
 prudence of age. When our country was subdued, when 
 our citizens submitted to superior power, those States 
 showed their attachment. I see here no man who does 
 uot know that the shackles of the South were broken asun- 
 der by the arms of the North. We are indeed in a mi- 
 nority, but there must be a majority somewhere. Either 
 North or South must be in that relation to each other. 
 That this Constitution is not the best possible to be framed 
 is undeniable, but it is the best our situation admits of." 
 Mr. Edward Rutledge compared the governmental powers 
 in the old and new Constitutions : " They differed very 
 little, except in the essential point of giving a power to 
 Government of enforcing its obligations. Surely no man 
 could object to that. So far from not preferring the 
 Northern States with a Navigation Act, policy dictated to 
 us to increase their strength by every means in our power. 
 In the day of danger, we should have no resource but 
 in the naval strength of our Northern friends. We must 
 hold oui country by courtesy, unless we have a navy, and 
 can never become a great nation till powerful upon the 
 waters."
 
 150 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 General Pincknej dated independence from " that dec- 
 laration which babes should be taught to lisp in their 
 cradles, youth to recite as an indispensable lesson, young 
 men to regard as their compact of freedom, and the old to 
 repeat with ejaculations of gratitude for the blessings it 
 would bestow on their posterity. The separate independ- 
 ence and individual sovereignty of the several States, were 
 never thought of by the patriots who framed it. The seve- 
 ral States are not even mentioned by name in any part of it, 
 as if it were intended to impress this maxim on Americans, 
 that our freedom and independence arose from our Union, 
 and that without it, we could be neither free nor independ- 
 ent. Let us consider all attempts to weaken the Union, 
 by maintaining that each State is separately and individual- 
 ly independent, as a species of political heresy, which can 
 never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious dis- 
 tresses." 
 
 Mr. Lowndes was " pained to appear pertinacious, but 
 as his constituents were in favor of the Constitution, and 
 therefore he should not sit in the Convention, he relied 
 upon the indulgence of the House for the performance of 
 his duty to his State, by whose decision he, as a good citi- 
 zen, must cheerfully abide. The arguments adduced he 
 must consider specious. Supposing we considered our- 
 selves so aggrieved as to insist on redress, what was the 
 probability of relief ? In revolving a misfortune, some 
 little gleams of comfort resulted from a hope of being 
 able to resort to an impartial tribunal. Would that be 
 found in Congress? As to migration from the Eastern 
 to the Southern States, our country from its excessive 
 heats is so uncomfortable, that our acquaintance is rather 
 shunned than solicited." 
 
 Mr. Lincoln " had listened with eager attention to all 
 the arguments in favor of the Constitution, and the more 
 he heard the more he was convinced of its evil tendency.
 
 THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 1788. 151 
 
 You contended ten years for liberty. What is liberty? 
 The power of governing yourself. If you adopt this Con- 
 stitution, do you have that power ? no ; you give to it men 
 who live a thousand miles from you. What security have 
 you for a republican form of government, when it de- 
 pends upon the will and pleasure of a few men, with an 
 army, a navy, and a rich treasury at their back, to alter 
 and change it at their will ? " 
 
 The motion for a Convention passed by a majority of 
 one. Of the opposition as of the advocacy in that Con- 
 vention, a solitary memorial is extant. 
 
 Patrick Dollard claimed that " his people, the people 
 of Prince Frederick Parish, were brave, honest, and in- 
 dustrious, and that they had been conspicuous in the late 
 bloody struggle. Nearly to a man they are opposed to 
 this Constitution. Willing to vest ample and sufficient 
 powers in Congress, they will not agree to make over to 
 them, or to any set of men, their birthright. They are 
 highly alarmed at the long and rapid strides taken in this 
 Constitution toward despotism. They say it is big with 
 political evils, and pregnant with a great variety of woes 
 to the people of the Southern States, and especially to 
 South Carolina ; that it is particularly calculated for a des- 
 potic aristocracy, and carries with it the appearance of a 
 phrase much in use in despotic reigns, the favorite of Arch- 
 bishop Laud ' non-resistance.' " 
 
 The Constitution was adopted, by a vote of one hun- 
 dred and forty-nine to seventy-three.
 
 THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION, 1860. 
 
 THE Charleston Convention was as important in its 
 effects as any that ever met in the United States, and, 
 although a party Convention, deserves the same considera- 
 tion as the Federal and ratifying Conventions ; for there 
 the majority of the Democratic party of the free States 
 renounced the principles on which the Jeffersonian party 
 had succeeded in 1800. The southern claim in that Con- 
 vention was no new claim, an assertion of passion, or a 
 manoeuvre of politicians, but the deliberate conviction of 
 every year since the ratification of the Constitution a 
 ratification mainly due in the Southern States to the slave- 
 holding interest. In 1826, Hayne expressed the sense of 
 rights, in defense of which the non-slaveholder and the 
 slaveholder were ready to risk any extremity : 
 
 " The question of slavery is one in all its bearings of 
 extreme delicacy, concerning which I know of but a sin- 
 gle wise and safe rule, either for the States in which it 
 exists or for the Union. It must be considered and treat- 
 ed entirely as a domestic question. In respect to foreign 
 nations, the language of the United States ought to be, 
 that it concerns the peace of our political family, and there- 
 fore we can not permit it to be touched ; and in respect 
 to the slaveholding States, the only safe and constitutional 
 ground on which they can stand is, that they will not per- 
 mit it to be called in question either by their sister States 
 or by the Federal Government. It is a subject upon which 
 I always advert with exteme reluctance never, until it is 
 forced upon me. I consider our rights in that species of
 
 THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION, 1860. 153 
 
 property as not open even to discussion, either here or else- 
 where, and duties imposed by our situation, we are not to 
 be taught by fanatics political or religious. To call into 
 question our rights, is gravely to violate them ; to attempt 
 to instruct us on the subject, is to insult us ; to assail our 
 institutions, is wantonly to invade our peace. The Southern 
 States will never permit, never can permit, any interfer- 
 ence whatever in their domestic concerns, and the very day 
 on which the attempt shall be made by the authorities of 
 the Federal Government we will consider ourselves driven 
 out of the Union ! " 
 
 On the 23d of April, 1860, the delegates to a National 
 Democratic Convention met at Charleston. Called to order, 
 and a president pro tern, appointed, it proceeded to com- 
 plete its organization. A committee on organization and 
 a committee on credentials were constituted. In each, 
 the delegations selected one of their number to represent 
 them. Contesting delegations from New York and Illinois 
 being present, the Convention ordered neither of the sit- 
 ting delegations to vote in their own case. An attempt to 
 exclude a contested delegation (until the right was adjudi- 
 cated) from any action in the Convention, had previously 
 been made, but failed. 
 
 The committee on organization reported a list of officers, 
 Caleb Gushing (of Massachusetts) the president. It recom- 
 mended that the rules and regulations of the Conventions 
 of 1852 and 1856 be adopted, with the addition " That 
 in any State which has not provided, or directed by its 
 State Convention, how the vote may be given, the Con- 
 vention will recognize the right of each delegate to cast 
 his individual vote." 
 
 To the officers reported there was no objection, to the 
 additional rule there was ; and, a division of the question be- 
 ing demanded, the first clause only was carried. The retiring
 
 154: SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 president and his successor addressed the Convention. The 
 former urged the fact that the Democratic party knew no 
 sections of the Union, its tie of brotherhood, East, West, 
 North, and South, being a common belief in certain politi- 
 cal principles. The latter asserted that the mission of the 
 party had been, and was, to maintain the public liberties, 
 to reconcile popular freedom with order, to maintain the 
 sacred reserved rights of the States, and to stand sentinel 
 at the outposts of the Constitution. He characterized the 
 other party as aiming at a sectional conspiracy of one half 
 of the States against the other half, with the mingled stu- 
 pidity and insanity of fanaticism, hurrying the knd to 
 revolution and civil war. Business resumed, a committee 
 to report a platform and resolutions was constituted, each 
 delegation selecting one of its members to sit. Until a 
 platform should have been adopted, the Convention deter- 
 mined not to ballot for nominees. 
 
 The majority report of the committee on credentials 
 (adopted) awarded seats to the sitting delegations and dele- 
 gates. 
 
 The minority report (rejected) divided the vote of New 
 York equally between the contesting delegations. 
 
 The committee on the platform, by its chairman, pre- 
 sented a report, the judgment of seventeen States : 
 
 " That the platform adopted at Cincinnati be affirmed, 
 with the following resolutions : 
 
 "1. The national Democracy of the United States 
 hold these cardinal principles upon the subject of slavery 
 in the Territories : That Congress has no power to abolish 
 slavery in the Territories ; that a Territorial Legislature 
 has no power to abolish slavery in the Territories, nor to 
 prohibit the introduction of slaves, nor any power to ex- 
 clude slavery therefrom, nor any power to destroy or im- 
 pair the right of property in slaves, by any legislation 
 whatsoever.
 
 THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION, 1860, 155 
 
 " 2. That the enactments of State Legislatures to defeat 
 the faithful execution of the fugitive-slave law are hostile 
 in character, subversive of the Constitution, and revolu- 
 tionary in their effect. 
 
 " 3. That it is the duty of the Federal Government to 
 protect, when necessary, the rights of persons and property 
 on the high-seas, in the Territories, or wherever else its 
 constitutional authority extends. 
 
 " 4. That the Democracy of the nation recognizes the 
 imperative duty of the Government to protect the natural- 
 ized citizen in all his rights, whether at home or in foreign 
 lands, to the same extent as its native citizens. 
 
 "5. The national Democracy earnestly recommends 
 the acquisition of the Island of Cuba at the earliest prac- 
 ticable period. 
 
 " 6. Whereas, one of the greatest necessities of the age, 
 in a political, commercial, postal, and military point of 
 view, is a speedy communication between the Atlantic and 
 Pacific coasts, therefore, that the national Democratic party 
 hereby pledge themselves to use every means in their power 
 to secure the passage of some bill for the construction of 
 a Pacific Railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific 
 Ocean at the earliest practicable moment." 
 
 Payne (of Ohio) presented a minority report, which 
 embodied the views of fifteen States : 
 
 " We, the Democracy of the Union, in convention as- 
 sembled, hereby declare our affirmance of the resolutions 
 unanimously adopted and declared as a platform of princi- 
 ples by the Democratic Convention at Cincinnati in the 
 year 1856, believing that Democratic principles are un- 
 changeable in their nature when applied to the same sub- 
 ject-matter, and we recommend as the only further resolu- 
 tions the f ollowing : 
 
 " That all questions in regard to rights of property in 
 States or Territories are judicial in their character, and the
 
 156 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 Democratic party is pledged to abide by, and faithfully 
 carry out, such determination of those questions as has 
 been, or may be, made by the Supreme Court of the 
 United States. 
 
 "That it is the duty of the United States to afford 
 ample and complete protection to all its citizens, whether 
 at home or abroad, whether native or foreign born. 
 
 " That one of the necessities of the age, in a military, 
 commercial, and postal point of view, is speedy communi- 
 cation between the Atlantic and the Pacific States, and 
 the Democratic party pledge such constitutional govern- 
 ment aid as will insure the construction of a railroad to the 
 Pacific coast at the earliest practicable period. 
 
 " That the Democratic party are in favor of the acquisi- 
 tion of the Island of Cuba on such terms as shall be honor- 
 able to ourselves and just to Spain. 
 
 " That the enactments of State Legislatures to defeat 
 the faithful execution of the fugitive-slave law are hostile 
 in character, subversive of the Constitution, and revolu- 
 tionary in effect." 
 
 Butler (of Massachusetts) presented a second minority 
 platform : 
 
 " "We, the Democracy of the Union, in convention as- 
 sembled, hereby declare our affirmance of the Democratic 
 resolutions unanimously adopted and declared as a platform, 
 of principles at Cincinnati, in the year 1856, without addi- 
 tion or alteration, believing that Democratic principles are 
 unchangeable in their nature when applied to the same 
 subject-matter, and we recommend as the only further 
 resolution the following : 
 
 " It is the duty of the United States to extend its pro- 
 tection alike over all its citizens, whether native or natural- 
 ized." 
 
 Cochrane (of New York) offered an amendment to the 
 Butler report :
 
 THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION, 1860. 157 
 
 " That the several States of the Union are, under the 
 Constitution, equal, and that the people thereof are entitled 
 to the free and undisturbed possession of their rights of 
 person and property in the common Territories ; and that 
 any attempt by Congress or a Territorial Legislature to 
 annul, abridge, or discriminate against such equality or 
 rights would be unwise in policy and repugnant to the 
 Constitution ; and that it is the duty of the Federal Gov- 
 ernment, whenever such rights are violated, to aiford the 
 necessary, proper, and constitutional remedies for such vio- 
 lations; that the platform of principles adopted by the 
 Convention at Cincinnati, and the foregoing resolutions, 
 are hereby declared the platform of the Democratic party." 
 
 The proposition of Mr. Cochrane, being a third amend- 
 ment, could not, under the rules, be considered, and Bigler 
 (of Pennsylvania) moved that the majority and minority 
 reports be recommitted to the committee, with instructions 
 to report in an hour the following resolutions : 
 
 " That the platform adopted by the Democratic party 
 at Charleston be affirmed, with the following explanatory 
 resolutions : 
 
 " That the government of a Territory organized by an 
 act of Congress is provisional and temporary, and during 
 its existence all citizens of the United States have an equal 
 right to settle in the Territory, without their rights either 
 of person or property being destroyed or impaired by Con- 
 gressional or Territorial legislation. 
 
 " That it is the duty of the United States to maintain 
 all the constitutional rights of property in the Territories, 
 and to enforce all decisions of the Supreme Court in refer- 
 ence thereto," etc.* 
 
 A division of the question being demanded, recommit- 
 ment was ordered, but the instructions were tabled. 
 
 * Those resolutions on which there was substantial agreement will be de- 
 signated by " etc."
 
 158 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 At this stage the rule of the Convention as to the unit 
 and individual vote had to be construed. Georgia "re- 
 quested " its delegates to vote as a unit. The chair decided 
 that so its vote must be cast. Later, New Jersey having 
 instructed its delegation to vote on one subject as a unit, 
 and " recommended " it to vote as a unit upon all other 
 subjects, the chair decided that its vote must be cast as a 
 unit. The decision, on^appeal, was overruled. 
 
 The committee on the platform and resolutions re- 
 ported (its chairman stating that its report was understood 
 to embody in substance the views of Bayard, Cochrane, and 
 Bigler) : 
 
 " That the platform adopted by the Democratic party 
 at Cincinnati be affirmed, with the following explanatory 
 resolutions : 
 
 " That the government of a Territory organized by an 
 act of Congress is provisional and temporary, and during 
 its existence all citizens of the United States have an equal 
 right to settle with their property in the Territory, without 
 their rights either of person or property being destroyed 
 or impaired by Congressional or Territorial legislation. 
 That it is the duty of the Federal Government, in all its 
 departments, to protect, when necessary, the rights of per- 
 sons and property in the Territories or wherever its con- 
 stitutional authority extends. 
 
 " That when the settlers in a Territory have an adequate 
 population, and form a State Constitution, the right of sov- 
 ereignty commences, and, being consummated by admission 
 into the Union, they stand on an equal footing with the 
 people of the other States ; and the State thus organized 
 ought to be admitted into the Federal Union, whether its 
 Constitution prohibits or recognizes the institution of slav- 
 ery," etc. 
 
 The minority submitted its report : 
 
 " That we, the Democracy of the Union, in convention
 
 THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION, 1860. 159 
 
 assembled, hereby declare our affirmance of the resolutions 
 unanimously adopted and declared as a platform of prin- 
 ciples by the Democratic Convention at Cincinnati in the 
 year 1856, believing that Democratic principles are un- 
 changeable in their nature when applied to the same subject- 
 matter, and we recommend as the only further resolutions 
 the following : 
 
 " Inasmuch as difference of opinion exists in the Demo- 
 cratic party, as to the nature and extent of the powers of 
 a Territorial Legislature, and as to the powers and duties 
 of Congress, under the Constitution of the United States, 
 over the institution of slavery within the Territories : 
 
 " Resolved, that the Democratic party will abide by 
 the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
 upon those questions of constitutional law," etc. 
 
 The second minority report (Butler) repeated the origi- 
 nal words. 
 
 The question was first taken upon the Butler report. 
 It was rejected. The minority report was then adopted as 
 a substitute for the majority report. A division of the ques- 
 tion being demanded, separate votes were taken upon each 
 of its propositions : that which pledged the Democratic 
 party to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court upon 
 questions of the nature and extent of the powers of a Ter- 
 ritorial Legislature, and of the powers and duties of Con- 
 gress in regard to slavery in the Territories, was defeated ; 
 the others were adopted. 
 
 Stuart (of Michigan) moved to reconsider, and also to 
 lay the motion to reconsider upon the table, but gave way 
 to Walker (of Alabama), who, under instructions from his 
 delegation, presented a communication to the chair, and 
 announced that Alabama withdrew from the Convention. 
 The delegations from Mississippi, South Carolina, Florida, 
 Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas followed the same course, 
 and duly announced the same. As the reasoning in each
 
 160 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 communication was identical, if its expression varied, the 
 citation of one will exhibit all. 
 
 " To the President of the Democratic Convention. 
 
 " SIR : As chairman of the delegation which has the 
 honor to represent Mississippi on this floor, I desire to be 
 heard by you, and by the Convention. 
 
 " In common consultation we have met here, the repre- 
 sentatives of sister States, to resolve the principles of a 
 great party. While maintaining principles, we profess no 
 spirit save that of harmony, conciliation, the success of our 
 party, and the safety of our organization. But to the for- 
 mer the latter must yield, for no organization is valuable 
 without it, and no success is honorable which does not 
 crown it. 
 
 " We came here simply asking a recognition of the 
 equal rights of our State under the laws and Constitution 
 of our common Government, that our rights of property 
 should be asserted, and the protection of that property, 
 when necessary, should be yielded by the Government 
 which claims our allegiance. We had regarded govern- 
 ment and protection as correlative ideas, and, so long as the 
 one was maintained, the other still endured. After a delib- 
 eration of many days it has been announced to us by a con- 
 trolling majority of nearly one half of the States of the 
 Union, and that, too, in the most solemn and impressive 
 manner, that our demand can not be met, and our rights 
 can not be recognized. While it is granted that the ca- 
 pacity of the Federal Government is ample to protect all 
 other property within its jurisdiction, it is claimed to be 
 impotent when called upon to act in favor of a species of 
 property recognized in fifteen sovereign States. Within 
 those States, even Black Republicans admit it to be guar- 
 anteed by the Constitution, and to be only assailed by a 
 higher law ; without, they claim the right to prohibit and
 
 THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION, 1860. 161 
 
 destroy it. The controlling majority of Northern repre- 
 sentatives on this floor, while they deny all power to de- 
 stroy, equally deny all power to protect ; and this, they 
 assure us, is, and must, and shall be the condition of our 
 co-operation in the next presidential election. 
 
 " In this state of affairs our duty is plain and obvious. 
 The State which sent us here announced to us her prin- 
 ciples. In common with seventeen of her sister States, 
 she has asked a recognition of her constitutional rights. 
 They have been plainly and explicitly denied to her. We 
 have offered to yield everything, except an abandonment 
 of her rights ; everything, except her honor, and it has 
 availed us nothing. 
 
 " As representatives of Mississippi, knowing her wishes, 
 as honorable men, regarding her commands, we withdraw 
 from the Convention, and, so far as our action is concerned, 
 absolve her from all connection with this body, and all re- 
 sponsibility for its action. 
 
 " To you, sir, as presiding officer of the Convention, 
 while it has existed in its integrity, we desire, collectively, 
 as a delegation, and individually, as men, to tender the high- 
 est assurances of our profound respect and consideration." 
 
 The communication of the Arkansas delegation dis- 
 closes its additional reason for withdrawal : 
 
 " That, by the usages and customs of the Democracy, 
 as developed in its practice in former conventions ; by the 
 compact believed to have been made by Democrats of the 
 United States, when conventions were first agreed to be 
 founded ; the report of the committee on the platform 
 became the platform of the party, and therefore this Con- 
 vention had no duty to perform in relation thereto, but to 
 receive, confirm, and publish the same, and cause it to be 
 carried into effect, wherever in the respective States the 
 Democracy were able to enforce their decrees at the ballot- 
 box.
 
 162 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 " Tins opinion is confirmed by the history of the past, 
 which shows that in all instances the sovereignty of the 
 States, not the electoral vote of the States, has uniformly 
 been represented in the committee on a platform, and that 
 the report of the committee has invariably been registered 
 as the supreme law of the Democratic party, by unanimous 
 consent of the entire Convention, without changing or in 
 any manner altering any part or portion thereof. It is a 
 part of our traditional learning, confidently believed, that 
 the Democracy of the United States, by a peculiar system 
 of checks and balances, formed after the fashion of the 
 Federal Government, had contracted and bound them- 
 selves to fully recognize the sovereignty of the States in 
 making the platform, and of the population or masses of 
 the States in naming the candidate to be placed on the 
 platform. That many States have been uniformly allowed 
 to vote the full strength of their electoral college in these 
 conventions, when it was well known that the said States 
 had never heretofore, and probably would never hereafter, 
 give a single electoral vote at the polls to the candidate 
 whom they had so large a share in nominating, can not be 
 accounted for on any other principle than that it was in- 
 tended as a recognition of the sovereignty and equality of 
 said States. 
 
 " Would it be right for the numerical majority to de- 
 prive the Black Republican States, represented on this 
 floor, of the representation which by custom they have so 
 long enjoyed, because it is evident that they will be unable 
 to vote the Democratic ticket in the next presidential elec- 
 tion ? If wrong, how much more unjust to deprive all the 
 States of their vested right to make and declare the plat- 
 form in the usual and customary manner ! The South has 
 heretofore felt safe, because of the checks and balances 
 imposed upon the machinery of conventions. Where she 
 retained an equal power to write the creed of faith, she
 
 THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION, 1860. 163 
 
 could trust her Northern sisters, with their immense popu- 
 lations, to name the candidate, and all would alike support 
 the creed and the candidate." 
 
 Twenty-six of the thirty-six delegates from Georgia 
 announced that they withdrew from the Convention. Ten 
 refused to abide by their decision, but when they sought 
 to vote, the vote was challenged, and the chair decided that, 
 under the instructions of Georgia to its delegation, they 
 were excluded from separate action. Upon an appeal, the 
 Convention sustained the chair. 
 
 It is clear now, if it was not then, that upon the nature 
 of a federal republic, upon the scope of a Constitution, 
 and upon the principles of the Democratic party, there 
 was a divergence between the Democracy North and 
 South, too radical to admit of further concert of action. 
 Between the Republican party and the Northern Democ- 
 racy the distinction was of form, not substance.* Both 
 claimed that a numerical majority could rightfully dictate 
 to the Southern States what thenceforth should be their 
 constitutional rights ; one, through the agency of elections, 
 the other, through that of party conventions. The "bad 
 robber " in the nursery tale proposes to dispatch " the 
 babes in the wood " at a blow. The " good robber " pre- 
 vents by killing him, and then leaves the children to die 
 from starvation. The Southern claim of rights had only 
 the choice between the " bad robber " and the " good rob- 
 ber." 
 
 Mr. Cook (of Ohio) moved that the Convention, by a call 
 of States, proceed to nominate candidates for the presidency 
 and vice-presidency, and asked the previous question, which 
 he withdrew for the moment, whereupon Bidwell (of Cali- 
 fornia) read the resolutions of California : 
 
 * The Democratic party in the free States was far from unanimity ; at 
 least one third held to its once universal theory of constitutional rights, but 
 of course was powerless.
 
 164: SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 " 1. That the platform adopted at Cincinnati, in 1856, 
 is hereby affirmed. 
 
 " 2. That to entitle a Territory to form a Constitution 
 for admission into the Union as a sovereign State, it should 
 contain a reasonable number of inhabitants, not less than 
 the number required for a representative in Congress. 
 
 " 3. That the true interpretation of the Cincinnati plat- 
 form is hereby declared to be, that the right to hold slaves 
 in a Territory rests on the same ground and is entitled to 
 the same protection as other property. 
 
 " 4. That any infraction of the rights of property in a 
 Territory would be a judicial question, and that it is the 
 duty of Congress to pass such laws as may be necessary to 
 secure the faithful execution of the mandates of the courts. 
 
 " 5. That Congress has the power at any time to change 
 or repeal any Territoral organic act, and to revise or annul 
 any Territorial act conflicting therewith." 
 
 Howard (of Tennessee) offered a resolution, " That the 
 president of the Convention be directed not to declare any 
 person nominated for the office of President or Yice-Presi- 
 dent, who has not received a number of votes equal to two 
 thirds of the votes of all the electoral colleges." Mr. Cook 
 called up his resolution, upon which the previous question 
 had already been moved and seconded. It was carried. 
 
 Against the Howard resolution a point of order was 
 made, that in effect it changed an existing rule of the Con- 
 vention, viz., "That two thirds of the votes given shall 
 nominate," and must therefore He over a day. The chair 
 decided that the resolution was in order. Upon an appeal, 
 the decision was sustained, and then the resolution was 
 carried. 
 
 Douglas, Guthrie, Dickinson, Hunter, Johnson, Lane, 
 were then nominated by delegations or delegates. Fifty- 
 seven ballots were taken without a result. The vote for 
 Douglas was constant at 150 to 152, for the other candidates
 
 THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION, 1860. 165 
 
 100 to 102. Having become satisfied that a nomination was 
 impossible either with or without the Howard resolution, 
 the Convention adjourned, to reassemble at Baltimore on 
 the 18th of June. It recommended to the Democratic 
 party of the several States the filling of all vacancies in 
 their respective delegations. 
 
 The clause in the Constitution, upon the meaning of 
 which the free and the slave States crossed swords, is : 
 
 " The Congress shall have power to dispose of, and 
 make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Ter- 
 ritory, or other property belonging to the United States ; 
 and nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to 
 prejudice any claim of the United States, or of any par- 
 ticular State." 
 
 In the Federal Convention that clause was accepted 
 instantly and almost unanimously.* In the ratifying con- 
 ventions of the States, while almost every other delegation 
 of power was subjected to sharp scrutiny, acute criticism, 
 and demand for exposition, that was admitted without 
 question, though even the jurisdiction over ten miles 
 square excited jealousy. It is evident that all men then 
 understood it alike, or supposed that they did. 
 
 * Maryland only, No.
 
 THE CHAKLESTON CONVENTION AD- 
 JOUKNED TO BALTIMOKE. 
 
 To appreciate easily the proceedings of the Convention 
 at Baltimore, the situation must be understood. 
 
 The Federal Government, under its power to dispose 
 of the Territory, etc., causes the land to be surveyed and 
 divided into plots. It establishes knd- offices to sell and 
 to give evidences of title under its laws. It commissions 
 a Governor, and, under its authority, a Territorial Legis- 
 lature is elected. When satisfied that the population is 
 sufficient, it authorizes, or recognizes, a Convention called 
 to frame a Constitution. Upon that Constitution it admits 
 the Territory into the Union, as a State. No one, there- 
 fore, denied that the Convention which framed a Constitu- 
 tion could settle therein its internal policy as to property 
 in slaves. Before it became a State, the status of that prop- 
 erty in it was the bone of contention. The Republican party 
 held that the words " to make all necessary rules and regu- 
 lations for the disposal," invested the Federal Government 
 with the right to prohibit slavery in the Territories. This 
 position the Democratic party denied, but, as to the power 
 of a Territorial Legislature on the subject, Democrats in 
 different sections of the Union differed widely. A ma- 
 jority of them in the Free States held that the right of 
 property in slaves was a subject within the jurisdiction of 
 a Territorial Legislature, and that its action thereon was 
 beyond the jurisdiction of the Federal authority. This
 
 CONVENTION AT BALTIMORE, 1860. 167 
 
 doctrine was known as " non-intervention " and " popular 
 sovereignty." 
 
 A minority of them in the free States, and nearly all 
 in the slave States, held that non-intervention was practi- 
 cally hostile intervention, because property of every kind, 
 only existing by convention, and only continuing to exist 
 by the protection of law, the abdication by the Federal 
 Government of the duty of protecting any species of prop- 
 erty in the Territories was equivalent to destroying it; 
 that non-intervention vested in a Territorial Legislature of 
 a few thousand settlers a power not possessed by the Fed- 
 eral Government, and therefore not communicable by it ; 
 a power only capable of being exercised by three fourths 
 of the States ; and that it assumed, in addition, a question 
 to be open, which was closed by the Constitution. Com- 
 mon right in each State for a citizen of it to enter into a 
 Territory with such property as his State recognized, and 
 to keep it, protected by the Union, until the Territory was 
 admitted as a State, had been denied by a majority at 
 Charleston, which equally denied the right of an appeal 
 to and of a decision by the constitutional umpire, the Su- 
 preme Court, the practical effect being to make the will of 
 a majority, the Constitution. Hence the secession of dele- 
 gations. 
 
 Mr. Douglas, a man of remarkable energy and ability, 
 was so committed to " non-intervention at all hazards," that 
 he could not, with a decent regard to consistency, accept 
 a nomination upon any platform which did not recognize, 
 still less upon one which conflicted with it. His following 
 could have nominated him at Charleston after the seces- 
 sions, by rescinding the two-thirds rule, but, as neither the 
 platform nor the nomination in that case could have re- 
 ceived the vote of a single Southern State, he would have 
 been a sectional candidate upon a sectional platform ; there- 
 fore the Convention was adjourned to Baltimore, in the
 
 168 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 hope that some, if not all of the Southern States would 
 sacrifice constitutional belief for the unity of the party. 
 
 At the assemblage of the Convention, the president 
 directed those States present at the adjournment to be 
 called. They being reported by the secretary present, he 
 called the body to order, and stated the business left un- 
 finished the resolutions constituting a platform, and the 
 ulterior question of adopting the majority report as 
 amended. He recalled the fact that a motion to proceed 
 to a ballot for nominations had been carried, under which 
 many ballotings had been taken; then, that motion had 
 been laid on the table, and a motion to adjourn had been 
 carried, with a recommendation to the several States to 
 supply vacancies in their delegations, the construction of 
 which language, and the scope of its application, the Con- 
 vention, not the chair, must determine. The chair had 
 received communications purporting to be the credentials 
 of delegations from certain States; they would be sub- 
 mitted to the Convention, the chair having no authority 
 to canvass credentials. The president then briefly urged 
 the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the Demo- 
 cratic party, as the issue, in the political contest about to 
 be waged, was victory or defeat for the Constitution. 
 
 The first question to be settled was the meaning of 
 vacancies. The chair decided that it had neither the power 
 to decide whether there were or were not vacancies, nor 
 the right to make a suggestion to the Convention on the 
 subject. The question was settled by the adoption of a 
 resolution offered by Mr. Church (of New York), " That the 
 credentials of all persons claiming seats in this Convention, 
 made vacant by the secession of delegates at Charleston, 
 be referred to the committee on credentials, and said com- 
 mittee is instructed, as soon as practicable, to examine and 
 report the names of persons entitled to such seats." By 
 unanimous consent, the claims of contesting delegates to
 
 CONVENTION AT BALTIMORE, 1860. 169 
 
 seats in the sitting delegations were referred to the same 
 committee. 
 
 The majority of the committee reported that the seats 
 of the original delegations from Alabama, Mississippi, 
 Louisiana, Texas, and Florida had become vacant ; that 
 those from Georgia, Arkansas, and Delaware had become 
 partially so ; that from Florida none appeared with cre- 
 dentials ; that from Mississippi and Texas there were dele- 
 gations whose claim to seats was not contested ; that there 
 were two delegations from Arkansas, one of three, one of 
 six, claiming the three vacant seats, which should be ad- 
 mitted, the six to cast two of the votes, the three, one ; 
 but if either should neglect to take their seats or cast their 
 votes, the other should cast the three votes. 
 
 That the delegation from Louisiana (the Soule) be ad- 
 mitted. 
 
 That the delegation from Alabama (the Forsyth) be 
 admitted. 
 
 That the delegation from Texas be admitted. 
 
 That the delegation from Georgia, of which H. L. 
 Beming is chairman, be admitted, with power to cast half 
 the vote of the State ; that the delegation of which Colonel 
 Gardner is chairman be admitted, with power to cast half 
 the vote of the State ; and if either of the delegations neg- 
 lected or refused to cast the vote as above indicated, that 
 the ten delegates present may cast the whole vote of the 
 State; that James A. Bayard and William G. Whitely 
 are entitled to seats from the county of New Castle, Dela- 
 ware. 
 
 That E. L. Chaffee, who (as substitute for B. F. Hal- 
 lett) was admitted at Charleston, is entitled to a seat, and 
 said Hallett, who has assumed said seat, is not. 
 
 That John O. Fallon, Jr. (as substitute for Gardy), 
 duly admitted at Charleston as a delegate from the Eighth 
 Congressional District of Missouri, is entitled to a seat. 
 8
 
 170 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 A minority report gave seats to Hallett, of Massachu- 
 setts ; to Gardy, of Missouri ; and to Bayard and Whitely as 
 delegates from Delaware. It held that the original dele- 
 gations from Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and 
 Texas were entitled to seats; as to Mississippi, agreeing 
 with the majority. It advised that the delegation from 
 Florida to Charleston be invited to take seats and cast the 
 vote of Florida. Its reasoning was, that " vacancies in a 
 delegation" meant and was intended to mean vacancies, 
 not new delegations ; that the original delegations contin- 
 ued such until the power which had conferred withdrew 
 their function ; but if otherwise, a new delegation must 
 be commissioned by the same authority which had com- 
 missioned the old. " The right of persons to seats is to 
 be determined by the fact that they were appointed ac- 
 cording to its usages by the constituency they claim to 
 represent; wanting those essential prerequisites, they are 
 not entitled to seats, even if there are no contestants ; 
 with them, they are entitled to seats, if there are contest- 
 ants." The facts which the report stated as the basis of 
 its conclusions are : 
 
 In Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi, the Democratic 
 Executive Committees had called conventions of the party, 
 by which the course of their delegations at Charleston had 
 been approved, and they were accredited to Baltimore. In 
 Louisiana the old Convention was reassembled, a new Con- 
 vention not being possible ; in that, the course of its delega- 
 tion at Charleston was approved, and it was accredited to 
 Baltimore. In Texas, time not permitting the assemblage 
 of its Democracy in convention, its Executive Committee 
 accredited the delegation to Baltimore. In Delaware, under 
 the rules of the party, the old Convention reassembled and 
 acted. 
 
 The majority report, except as to the Georgia delega- 
 tion, was adopted. Upon the motion of Mr. Church (of
 
 CONVENTION AT BALTIMORE, 1860. 
 
 New York), the old delegation was declared entitled to seats. 
 The chair thereupon directed tickets to be issued to the 
 admitted delegates. Russell (of Yirginia) then announced, 
 by the instructions of a large majority of the delegation, 
 that they could no longer participate in the deliberations 
 of the Convention, having, in their judgment, exhausted 
 all honorable efforts to avert that necessity, and having 
 arrived at that conclusion after long, mature, and anxious 
 consideration. 
 
 Lauder (of North Carolina) had the painful duty imposed 
 on him to announce that a very large majority of the dele- 
 gation of North Carolina were compelled to retire from the 
 Convention. The recent vote had satisfied them that the 
 Northern Democracy was no longer willing to attribute 
 to the South equality in the Union. 
 
 Ewing (of Tennessee) stated that the Tennessee delega- 
 tion had exhibited, as far as they knew how, an anxious de- 
 sire to harmonize the Convention, but, upon the result that 
 day obtained, twenty of its members would have to retire. 
 Four would remain. 
 
 Stevens (of Oregon) : " By the action to-day delegations 
 as much entitled to seats as our own have been excluded. 
 For this injustice to and ignoring of the weaker States, the 
 delegation from Oregon will take no further part in the 
 deliberations of the Convention." 
 
 Ten of the delegation from Kentucky deemed it incon- 
 sistent with duty to themselves and to their constituents 
 to participate further in the deliberations of the Conven- 
 tion. Five, "without intending to vacate our seats, and 
 with the intention of co-operating with the Convention, if 
 its unity and harmony be restored by any future event, 
 will not in the mean time participate in its deliberations, 
 nor hold ourselves or our constituents bound by its action." 
 
 Two delegates from Missouri then retired from the 
 Convention. A vote upon the resolution to proceed to
 
 172 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 nominate candidates for the presidency and vice-presi- 
 dency being in order, the chair addressed the Convention : 
 
 " The delegations of a majority of the States of this 
 Union have, either in whole or in part, in one form or an- 
 other, ceased to participate in the deliberations of this 
 body. I deem it due to myself, and to the members of 
 the Convention, as to whom my action would no longer 
 represent the will of a majority of the Convention, to re- 
 sign my office, take my seat as one of the Massachusetts 
 delegation, and abide its determination upon the future 
 action of the Convention." The admission of sham dele- 
 gations was the cause of these withdrawals. 
 
 David Todd (of Ohio) assumed the chair, and stated that, 
 if there were no privileged questions intervening, the secre- 
 tary would proceed with the call of the States. 
 
 Mr. Butler attempted to address the chair to present a 
 protest, and asked the same respectful hearing for Massa- 
 chusetts which had been given to everybody else. Objec- 
 tion being made, he was compelled to be silent until Massa- 
 chusetts was called. He then, under instructions from the 
 majority of the delegation, presented a protest against the 
 action of the Convention in excluding Mr. Hallett. He 
 also announced that part of the Massachusetts delegation 
 would no longer participate in the deliberations of the 
 Convention. The members whom he spoke of thereupon 
 retired. 
 
 Two ballotings were had; in the latter one hundred 
 and ninety-four and a half votes were cast, of which one 
 hundred and eighty-one and a half were for Douglas, who 
 was thereupon, by unanimous resolution, declared the regu- 
 lar nominee of the Democratic party. Benjamin Fitz- 
 patrick received the nomination as Yice-President. He 
 declined, and the nomination was then tendered by the 
 National Democratic Committee to Herschel V. Johnson 
 (of Georgia), who accepted.
 
 CONVENTION AT BALTIMORE, 1860. 173 
 
 After the nomination, the Convention, with but one or 
 two dissenting voices, resolved, 
 
 " That it is in accordance with the interpretation of the 
 Cincinnati platform that, during the existence of the Terri- 
 torial governments, the measure of restriction, whatever it 
 may be, imposed by the Federal Constitution on the power 
 of the Territorial Legislature over the subject of the do- 
 mestic relations, as the same has been, or shall hereafter 
 be, finally determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, should be respected by all good citizens, and en- 
 forced with promptness and fidelity by every branch of 
 the General Government." 
 
 If this resolution was meant to embody the resolution 
 to the same apparent effect rejected at Charleston, it would 
 seem wiser to have adopted it there, where it might have 
 averted a secession. If its ambiguity in the words " do- 
 mestic relations " was meant " to keep the promise to the 
 ear and break it to the hope," the attempt at a trap for 
 voters was not successful. It nowhere appears in the rec- 
 ord of the Baltimore Convention that the unfinished busi- 
 ness, stated by the chair after its organization, was consid- 
 ered ; if so, and any action were needed to establish a plat- 
 form, none existed. 
 
 The temper of the free-State delegations can not be 
 misunderstood or misrepresented, for it found expression. 
 " Admit that we are wrong," said Church, " we have the 
 right to be wrong." The right to be wrong may be insep- 
 arable from any political relation between communities or 
 individuals, but the English race has always been impatient 
 of the claim.* 
 
 * After the election of Jefferson, some men, timid from his application 
 of the fourth premise of the Declaration of Independence to the Union, 
 asked him how he construed the Constitution. As its friends asserted it to 
 be, and the people believed, matters of full publicity and general notoriety, was 
 the answer. As contract must be a conception of the mind before honesty
 
 174 SEVEN CONVENTIONS. 
 
 One lesson taught by the history of the Charleston 
 Convention is, that a rule of voting in such a body should 
 be uniform the individual vote or the vote by delega- 
 tions. Either is fair, though the former seems more com- 
 mendable, but no other rule is fair. Another is the neces- 
 sity, in public as in private affairs, of avoiding the use of 
 terms necessarily ambiguous. The word " people," in the 
 Territorial dispute, was the source of untold woes. Men 
 could and would construe it by their desires. Therefore, 
 if an umpire was rejected, they must quarrel. To the con- 
 struction of language the majority principle is not applica- 
 ble. Six men have no more natural right to govern five 
 men than five to govern six. If the eleven agree that 
 upon any subjects the will of six shall control that of five, 
 to such extent the majority has the right of sway, and the 
 minority the duty of obedience. But, if there is a dispute 
 as to what they had agreed on, the right derived from 
 agreement no longer exists. They then stand as before 
 the compact, and must find an umpire, separate, or fight. 
 
 can be a conception, as a denial of contract must be a rejection of honesty, 
 the Jeffersonian party held the Constitution to be a mutual contract of the 
 States, honesty as indispensable between States in a Union as between men 
 in a society ; and the law of contract to be, that a disregard of it by one 
 party is the absolution from it of another party. In communities whose 
 religion is the belief of a covenant made by God with one race, amplified and 
 extended through his Son to all races, the relation which the Omnipotent 
 thought fit between Omnipotence and men, ought to be recognized as just 
 between men and men and States and States. If there be any obligation 
 with a divine sanction, it is that of covenant. Very many of the party hi the 
 free States, which asserted itself the heir of the Jeffersonian party, substi- 
 tuted sentimentality, which is self-indulgence, for honesty, which is self- 
 control. 
 
 THE END.
 
 D, APPLETON & CO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 New revised edition of Bancroft's History of the United States. 
 
 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, from the Discovery 
 of the Continent to the Establishment of the Constitution in 1789. 
 By GEORGE BANCROFT. Complete in 6 vols., 8vo, printed from new 
 type, and bound in cloth, uncut, with gilt top, $2.50; sheep, $3.50; 
 half calf, $4.50 per volume. VoL VI contains the History of the 
 Formation of the Constitution of the United States, and a Portrait of 
 Mr. Bancroft. 
 
 In this edition of his great work the author has made extensive 
 changes in the text, condensing in places, enlarging in others, and care- 
 fully revising. It is practically a new work embodying the results of 
 the latest researches, and enjoying the advantage of the author's long 
 and mature experience. 
 
 " On comparing this work with the corresponding volume of the ' Centena- 
 ry ' edition of 1876, one is surprised to see how extensive changes the author 
 has found desirable, even after so short an interval. The first thiug that strikes 
 one is the increased number of chapters, resulting from subdivision. The first 
 volume contains two volumes of the_ original, and is divided into thirty-eight 
 chapters instead of eighteen. This is in itself an improvement. But the new 
 arrangement is not the result merely of subdivision ; the matter is rearranged in 
 
 into periods, abandoned in the 'Centenary' edition. His division is, 
 a new one. As the permanent shape taken by a great historical work, 
 arrangement is certainly an improvement." The Nation (New York). 
 
 " The work as a whole is in better shape, and is of course more authoritative 
 than ever before. This last revision will be without donbt, both from its desir- 
 able form and accurate text, the standard one." Boston Traveller. 
 
 " It has not been granted to many historians to devote half a century to the 
 history of a single people, and to live long enough, and, let us add, to be willing 
 and wise enough, to revise and rewrite in an honored old age the work of a 
 whole lifetime. New York Mail and Express. 
 
 "The extent and thoroughness of this revision would hardly be guessed with- 
 out comparing the editions side by side. The condensation of the text amounts 
 to something over one third of the previous edition. There has also been very 
 considerable recasting of the text. On the whole, our examination of the first 
 volume leads us to believe that the thought of the historian loses nothing by the 
 abbreviation of the text. A closer and later approximation to the beet results of 
 scholarship and criticism is reached. The public gains by its more compact 
 brevity and in amount of matter, and in economy of time and money." The In- 
 dependent (New York). 
 
 " There is nothing to be paid at this day of the value of ' Bancroft. 1 Its au- 
 trqrity is no longer in dispute, and as a piece of vivid and realistic historical 
 writing it stands among the best works of its class. It may be taken for granted 
 that this new edition will greatly extend its usefulness." Philadelphia North 
 American. 
 
 New York : D. APPLETON & CO., 1, 3, & 5 Bond Street.
 
 D, APPLETON & GO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 HISTORY OF THE WORLD, from the Earliest Records to the 
 Fall of the Western Empire. By PHILIP SMITH, B. A. New edition. 
 3 vols. 8ro. Vellum cloth, gilt top, $6.00; half calf, $13.50. 
 
 "These volumes embody the results of many years of arduous and conscien- 
 tious study. The work is fully entitled to be called the ablest and most satisfac- 
 tory book on the subject written in our language. The author's methods are 
 dignified and judicious, and he has availed himself of all the recent light thrown 
 by philological research on the annals of the East." Dr. C. K. Adams's Manual 
 of Historical Literature. 
 
 HISTORY OF HERODOTUS. An English Version, edited, with 
 Copious Notes and Appendices, by GEORGE RAWLINSON, M. A. With 
 Maps and Illustrations. In four volumes, 8vo. Vellum cloth, 
 $8.00 ; half calf, $18.00. 
 
 " This must be considered as by far the most valuable version of the works of 
 'The Father of History.' The history of Herodotus was probably not written 
 until near the end of his life ; it is certain that he had been collecting materials 
 for it during many years. There was scarcely a city of importance in Greece, 
 
 lany things laughed at for centuries as impossible .. 
 
 found to have been described in strict accordance with truth." Dr. C. K, 
 Adams's Manual of Historical Literature. 
 
 A GENERAL HISTORY OF GREECE, from the Earliest 
 Period to the Death of Alexander the Great. With a Sketch of the 
 Subsequent History to the Present Time. By G. W. Cox. 12mo. 
 Cloth, $1.60. 
 
 "One of the best of the smaller histories of Greece." Dr. C. K. Adams's 
 Manual of Historical Literature. 
 
 A HISTORY OF GREECE. From the Earliest Times to the 
 Present. By T. T. TIMAYENIS. With Maps and Illustrations. 2 vols. 
 12mo. Cloth, $2.60. 
 
 " The peculiar feature of the present work is that it is founded on Hellenic 
 sources. I have not hesitated to follow the Father of History in portraying the 
 heroism and the sacrifices of the Hellenes in their first war for independence, 
 nor, in delineating the character of that epoch, to form my judgment largely 
 from the records Be has left us." Extract from Preface. 
 
 GREECE IN THE TIMES OF HOMER. An Account of 
 the Life, Customs, and Habits of the Greeks during the Homeric 
 Period. By T. T. TIMAYENIS. 16mo. Cloth, $1.50. 
 
 " In the preparation of the present volume I have conscientiously examined 
 nearly every book Greek, German, French, or English written on Homer. But 
 my great teacher and guide has been Homer himself." From the Preface. 
 
 New York: D. APPLETON & CO., 1, 3, & 5 Bond Street.
 
 D, APPLETON & OO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN ENGLAND. By HENRY 
 THOMAS BUCKLE. 2 vols. 8vo. Cloth, $4.00 ; half calf, extra, $8.00. 
 
 "Whoever misses reading this book will miss reading what is, in various 
 respects, to the Best of our judgment and experience, the most remarkable book 
 of the dav one, indeed, that no thoughtful, inquiring mind would miss reading 
 for a gooa deal. Let the reader be aa adverse as he may be to the writer's phi- 
 losophy, let him be as devoted to the obstructive as Mr. Buckle is to the progress 
 party, let him be as orthodox in church creed as the other is heterodox, as dog- 
 matic as the author is skeptical let him, in short, find his prejudices shocked 
 at every turn of the argument, and all his prepossessions whistled down the 
 wind still, there is so much in this extraordinary volume to stimulate reflection 
 and excite to inquiry, and provoke to earnest investigation, perhaps (to this or 
 that reader) on a track hitherto untrodden, and across the virgin soil of untilled 
 fields, fresh woods and pastures new, that we may fairly defy the most hostile 
 spirit, the most mistrustful and least sympathetic, to read it through without be- 
 ins; glad of having done so, or haying begun it, or even glanced at almost any one 
 of its pages, to pass it away unread." New Monthly Magazine (London). 
 
 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, AND OTHER POLITICAL 
 ESSAYS. By WALTER BAGEHOT. Latest revised edition. Contain- 
 ing Essays on the Characters of Lord Brougham and Sir Robert 
 Peel, Bart., never before published in this country. With an Amer- 
 ican Preface. 12mo. Cloth, $2.00. 
 
 " A work that deserves to be widely and familiarly known. Its title, however, 
 is so little suggestive of its real character, and is so certain to repel and mislead 
 American readers, that some prefatory words may be useful for the correction of 
 erroneous impressions. It is well known that the term ' Constitution,' in its 
 political sense, has very different significations in England and in this country. 
 With us it means a written instrument. The English have no such written docu- 
 ment. By the national Constitution they mean their actual social and political 
 order the whole body of laws, usages, and precedents, which have been in- 
 herited from former generations, and by which the practice of government is 
 regulated. A work upon the English Constitution, therefore, brings us naturally 
 to the direct consideration of the structure and practical working of English 
 political institutions and social life. Mr. Bagehot is not so much a partisan or an 
 advocate as a cool philosophical inquirer, with large knowledge, clear insight, 
 independent opinions, and great freedom from the bias of what he terms ' that 
 territorial sectarianism called patriotism.' Taking up in succession the Cabinet, 
 the Monarchy, the House of Lords, the House of Commons, he considers them 
 in what may be called their dynamical inter-actions, and in relation to the 
 habits, traditions, culture, and character of the English people. We doubt If 
 there is any other volume so useful for our countrymen to peruse before visiting 
 England." From the American Preface. 
 
 HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS FROM AUGUS- 
 TUS TO CHARLEMAGNE. By WILLIAM E. H. LECKT. 
 2 vols. 12mo. Cloth, $3.00; half calf, extra, $7.00. 
 
 " So vast is the fleld Mr. Lecky introduces us to, so varied and extensive the 
 information he has collected in it, fetching it from far beyond the limits of his 
 professed subject, that it is impossible in any moderate space to do more than 
 indicate the line he follows. . . . The work is a valuable contribution to oar 
 higher English literature, as well as an admirable guide for those who may care 
 to go in person to the distant fountains from which Mr. Lecky has drawn fot 
 them so freely." London Times. 
 
 New York: D. APPLETON & CO., 1, 3, & 5 Bond Street
 
 D. APPLETON & CO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 from the Revolution to the Civil War. By JOHN BACH MCMASTER. 
 To be completed in five volumes. Vols. I and II, 8vo, cloth, gilt 
 top, $2.50 each. 
 
 SCOPE OP THE WORK. In the course of this narrative much is written of wars, 
 conspiracies, and rebellions ; of Presidents, of Congresses, of embassies, of treaties, 
 of the ambition of political leaders, and of the rise of great parties in the nation. 
 Yet the history of the people is the chief theme. At every stage of the splendid 
 progress which separates the America of Washington and Adams from the Amer- 
 ica in which we live, it has been the author's purpose to describe the dress, the 
 occupations, the amusements, the literary canons of the times ; to note the changes 
 of manners and morals ; to trace the growth of that humane spirit which abol- 
 ished punishment for debt, and reformed the discipline of prisons and of jails; to 
 recount the manifold improvements which, in a thousand ways, have multiplied 
 the conveniences of life and ministered to the happiness of our race; to describe the 
 rise and progress of that long series of mechanical inventions and discoveries which 
 is now the admiration of the world, and our just pride and boast ; to tell how, 
 under the benign influence of liberty and peace, there sprang up, in the course of a 
 tingle century, a prosperity unparalleled in the annals of human affairs. 
 
 " The pledge given by Mr. McMaster, that ' the history of the people shall be 
 the chief theme,' is punctiliously and satisfactorily fulfilled. He carries out hie 
 promise in a complete, vivid, and delightful way. We should add that the liter- 
 ary execution of the work is worthy of the indefatigable industry and unceasing 
 vigilance with which the stores of historical material have been accumulated, 
 weighed, and sifted. The cardinal qualities of style, lucidity, animation, and 
 energy, are everywhere present. Seldom, indeed, has a book, in which matter 
 of substantial value has been so happily united to attractiveness of form, been 
 offered by an American author to his fellow-citizens." New York Sun. 
 
 " To recount the marvelous progress of the American people, to describe 
 their life, their literature, their occupations, their amusements, is Mr. McMaster's 
 object. His theme is an important one, and we congratulate him on his success. 
 It has rarely been our province to notice a book with BO many excellences and 
 BO few defects." New York Herald. 
 
 "Mr. McMaster at once shows his grasp of the various themes and his special 
 capacity as a historian of the people. His aim is high, but he hits the mark." 
 New 1'ork Journal of Commerce. 
 
 "I have had to read a good deal of history in my day, but I find eo much 
 freshness in the way Professor McMaster has treated his subject tLat it is quite 
 like a new story." Philadelphia Press. 
 
 "Mr. McMaster's enccess as a writer seems to us distinct and decisive. In 
 the first place he has written a remarkably readable history. His style is clear 
 and vigorous, if not always condensed. He has the facnlty of felicitous com- 
 parison and contrast in a marked degree. Mr. McMaster has produced one of 
 the most spirited of histories, a book which will be widely read, and the enter- 
 taining quality of which is conspicuous beyond that of any work of its kind." 
 Boston Gazette. 
 
 New York : D. APPLETON & CO., 1, 3, & 6 Bond Street
 
 D, APPLETON & CO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 AUNT CHARLOTTE'S STORIES OF AMERICAN HIS- 
 TORY. By CHARLOTTE M. YONGE and H. HASTINGS WELD, D. D. 
 With numerous Illustrations. 12mo, cloth, gilt side and back, $1.50. 
 
 "In this book we find well-told and intensely interesting and instructive 
 stories of American history, which should be familiar to every boy and girl in 
 the land. In forty-nine chapters the well-known and popular authors have 
 embodied the essential facts of American history from the earliest period to the 
 presidency of Chester A. Arthur. It is a book parents and teachers can safely 
 commend to the young; in fact, it would be a gift of usefulness and practical 
 lalue to any young person." Boston Journal of Education. 
 
 ANECDOTES OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITfcO 
 STATES. By Brevet Major-General E. D. TOWNSEND, late Adju- 
 tant-General U. S. Army. 12mo, cloth, $1.25. 
 
 "The work treats in a very pleasant conversational way of various events 
 and incidents, around which our interest lingers, and of which much is here said 
 that has hitherto been unsaid. Among the topics upon which the author dwells, 
 and which may be cited aa giving an idea of the scope and nature of his work, 
 are General Scott's loyalty, the defense of Washington, the neutrality of Ken- 
 tucky, Early's invasion, service in the Adjutant-General's office, President Lin- 
 coln's funeral, Fort Sumter, oricin of military commissions, Army of the Potomac 
 commanders, etc." Washington Daily Post. 
 
 " General Townsend's book is all interesting." New York Army and Navy 
 Journal. 
 
 " An agreeable intermingling of personal anecdotes and historical statements. 
 Full of useful information." New York Home Journal. 
 
 " The General bore an important and honorable part in the struggle, and has 
 the rare gift of telling briefly, humorously, and pathetically of what he saw and 
 heard during all the eventful years." New York Journal of Commerce. 
 
 "The author writes in a charitable spirit of Scott, Stone, Lee, Buckner, 
 Burke, McClellan, Blair, Sheridan, Stanton, Lincoln, and many others. General 
 Townsend fully disposes of the malicious rumor that Stanton committed suicide. 
 These anecdotes are well worth buying and reading from beginning to end." 
 New York Christian Advocate. 
 
 FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
 FROM 1774 TO 1789, embracing the Period of the American 
 Revolution. By ALBERT S. BOLLES. 8vo, cloth, $2.50. 
 
 " It fills a place and meets a wRnt which, so far as my observation extend?, is 
 not supplied by any one publication." DAVID A. WELLS. 
 
 FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
 FROM 1789 TO 1860. By ALBERT S. BOLLES. 8vo, cloth, 
 
 FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
 FROM 1861 TO 1885. By ALBERT S. BOLLES. 8vo, cloth, $3.50. 
 
 New York : D. APPLETON & CO., 1, 3, & 5 Bond Street.
 
 D, APPLETON & OO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 EIGHTEEN CHRISTIAN CENTURIES. By Rev. JAMES 
 
 WHITE. With Copious Index. 12mo. Cloth, $2.00. 
 
 The best epitome of Christian history extant. Mr. White possesses in a hip;h 
 degree the power of distilling the essence from a mass of facts, and condensing 
 events in description. A battle or a siege, which, without his skill, would occupy 
 a chapter, is compressed by him into a page or two, without sacrificing any 
 essential or significant feature. 
 
 "An attempt to picture the prevailing characteristics and tendencies of each 
 of the centuries. Its merit is an the fact that the spirit of each ae is generally 
 well apprehended and correctly rep resell ted. "Dr. C..K. Adams's Manual of 
 Historical Literature. 
 
 LECTURES ON MODERN HISTORY. By Dr. THOMAS AR- 
 NOLD. 12mo. Cloth, $1.50. 
 
 These lectures are universally admitted to be among the most valuable of Dr. 
 Arnold's works. They make the reader acquainted with the true method of 
 historical inquiry. Even a cursory reading of Macaulay shows that their methods 
 were identical namely, to exhaust all the topics of inquiry, and leave nothing 
 which can illustrate the actual life of past ages unexamined. 
 
 THREE CENTURIES OF MODERN HISTORY. By C. D. 
 
 YONGE. 12mo. Cloth, $2.00. 
 
 HISTORY PRIMERS. Edited by J. R. GREEN, M. A., Examiner in 
 the School of Modern History at Oxford. 18mo vols. Flexible 
 cloth, 45 cents each. 
 
 GREECE. By C. A. FYFFE, M. A. 
 
 ROME. By M. CREIGHTON, M. A. 
 
 EUROPE. By E. A. FREEMAN, D. C. L. 
 
 OLD GREEK LIFE. By J. P. MAHAFFT, M. A. 
 
 ROMAN ANTIQUITIES. By Professor A. S. WILKINS. 
 
 GEOGRAPHY. By GEORGE GROVE, F. R. G. S. 
 
 FRANCE. By CHARLOTTE M. YONGE. 
 
 MEDIEVAL CIVILIZATION. By Professor G. B. ADAMS. 
 
 L'HISTOIRE DE JULES CESAR, par S. M. I. Napoleon HI. 
 
 2 vols., 12mo. Paper, $2.50. 
 THE SAME. With Maps and Portrait. 2 vols. Cloth, $4.00. 
 
 " It can not be denied that this is a history of some importance, in spite of 
 the questionable obiect for which it was written. The work was prepared with 
 the utmost care a care which extended in some instances to special surveys, to 
 insure perfect accuracy in the descriptions." Dr. C. K. Adams's Manual of His- 
 torical Literature. 
 
 New York : D. APPLETON & CO., 1, 3, & 5 Bond Street.