PERSONALITY AND P A T 1-F V 1 T\. 1 lH 1 f: URPARY L fY Of SAN DIEGO PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY COPY. PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY BY F. C. CONSTABLE, M.A. TRIN. COLL. CAM. ^^r MEMBER OP THE SOCIETY FOR PSYCHICAL RESEARCH LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD. DRYDEN HOUSE, GERRARD STREET, W. 1911 TO MY FRIEND EDMUND GUENEY INTRODUCTION THE first part of this book is separable from the second and third parts. Those who are not interested in what savours of the meta- physical may, I think, pass over the first and still find the second and third intelligible. The attempt herein made is to prove that we have human experi- ence of our existence as (relatively) spiritual selves. That we have such human experience has been already suggested by many, and evidence, to that end, adduced. But I do not know of any syste- matic treatise the sole object of which has been to prove, by the evidence of human experience exclusively, that we exist as spiritual selves. It is possible that only in the comparatively present time we have, through the evolution of human knowledge, been given command of the evidence necessary to prove the fact. The new factor in reasoning introduced is telepathy : I assume that, as human personalities, we are so related to the external that we have human experience of it otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. The assumption, it must be admitted, is dogmatic ; at the same time it is to be borne in mind that a large and increasing number of men of science accept telepathy as a fact of human experience. 1 In psychology, treated as a science, an assumption is made of the existence of an ego in relation to the series of conditions in which we exist ; that is in relation to our universe of relations. ' Psychology is not called on to transcend the relation of subject to object or, as we may call it, the fact of presentation ' (James Ward). I take but one step beyond the psychologist : I make the human personality (the subject or psychological ' I ') a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of a spiritual self. 2 I term this spiritual self an intuitive self. 1 Certain marked men of science hold that to explain Darwin's scheme the funda- mental factor conation (having part in evolution from the very first) must be intro- duced. They refer the origin of evolution to the psychical ; for crmation imports will and volition. Cf. Ency. Brit., ninth edition, vol. xx. p. 42, where a luminous explanation of conation is given by James Ward. 2 The term ' mediate ' is used because we have no human evidence that human personality is the only possible manifestation of the spiritual self. vii viii PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY I have been led to use the term, intuitive self, for the following reasons : All human thought is based on (emanates from) intuition. And as human thought is active, intuition must be active and must be actively presented to the subject (the human personality). Now sensibility is passive and so intuition (which is active) cannot be referred to (cannot emanate from) sensibility. What, then, is the origin of this active presentation of intuition to the subject ? I argue that a personality of intuition (an intuitive self) must present intuition to its subject, that is, to the human personality which exists as its (the intuitive self's) partial and mediate manifestation in our universe. I hold that this active presentation of intuition is not a general presentation to humanity from God, Nature or the Unknown, but from intuitive selves to their manifestations in our Universe, because (as I try to prove) each one of us has, as a human personality, human experience of existence as a spiritual or intuitive self. There I stop. The argument makes no pretence to extend to proof of an immortal soul in man : it extends only to proof of the spiritual self and approximate proof of the survival of personality after the dissolu- tion by death of human personality. 1 And though we have (by the argument) proof in human experience of the existence of the intuitive self, we cannot determine (arrive at the nature of) this intuitive self. For this intuitive self is (relatively) a spiritual self and so free from (not subject to) those conditions of our earthly universe to which the human personality, even in thought, is subject. For the same reason we cannot determine the intuition of the intuitive self : we must distinguish between real (relatively noumenal) intuition and, so termed, human intuition. Intuition is presented to the subject (the human personality), but it is only partially and mediately manifest in human thought. So while we must hold that intuition is presented actively to the human personality to account for the fact that we think, still we can know nothing of intuition itself. For we know nothing but the partial and mediate mani- festation of intuition in our particular universe of relations. As the argument is confined to an attempt to prove solely by 1 I do not deny that this spiritual self may be the Jmmortal soul in man. But, as human beings, we can have no human experience of immortality, and the argu- ment is concerned only with what can be proved by human experience : belief and revelation are outside the purview of this book. INTRODUCTION ix human experience the existence of the intuitive self, it is not, I think, metaphysical. The first part is mainly concerned with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and this part though most of my time has been expended on it may, as I have already suggested, be omitted if the reader seek for interest only in definite facts. It is possible that Kant's commentators have ignored the fact that even his Aesthetic and Logic are based on an assumption of a soul in man. 1 From this arises confusion between the manifold on the one hand and the manifold in our apprehension on the other. And, so, Kant's theory (?) of the schema and his use of the term ' imagination ' have, possibly, been unfairly criticised. If, however, we expand the purview of human experience by an assumption that the subject has human experience otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, I think it will herein be shown that we can understand more clearly the reception by the subject of the schema and Kant's use of the term ' imagination.' The manifold (the unconditioned) though presented to the subject, remains undeter- mined : the manifold received by us (the schema) is conditioned by our apprehension, it is in our apprehension : it is the manifold in (conditioned by) our apprehension. How is it received ? Otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. Kant, by his use of the term ' imagination,' inferred this reception otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. 2 Assuming telepathy as a fact of human experience, I try to show that in Kant's Aesthetic and Logic we find scientific proof of the existence of the intuitive self. I rely on Kant's Dialectic in no way : the supreme problems of God, Free-will and Immortality have no part in the present scheme. The second and third parts deal with (assumed) facts of human 1 It has been alleged that Kant had a false or at least inadequate idea of the individual. If, in truth, his subject was treated by him (as I allege) as no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of the soul of man, all such objections to his theory fail. He was not under the necessity of defining the nature of the soul in man. 2 I have the audacity to hold that telepathy relieves Hume himself from the crux of his theory. He says : ' In short there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real con- nection among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did the mind perceive some real connection among them, there would be no difficulty in the case. ' If telepathy be a fact of human experi- ence, then (without introducing 'imagination' as a power of the soul, as Kant does) we get the reception of the schema by the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. By so 'expanding' human experience we get a foundation, in human experience, for ' a real connection among distinct existences. ' x PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY experience, and the proof essayed is that they are explicable only if the intuitive self have real (relatively noumenal) existence. A few words must be written as to spiritualism. The theory that human personality comes to an end with death does, on its face, conflict with most spiritualistic theories. But a little reflection will show that there is no real conflict. For the embodied human personality is very generally admitted to be phenomenal ; so when I argue it is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of an intuitive self, I do not degrade human personality in any way. If, however, embodied human personalities are phenomenal, then appearances of the disembodied in human form must also be phenomenal. So, in the present thesis, no argument lies against the assumption that disembodied appearances may have the same relative reality in our universe as embodied appearances. If we survive death and survive in some higher form of personality, I cannot see why we might not still have power to ' project ' ourselves in earthly appearance on to the human universe. Assume, for instance, that Myers, disembodied and existing in some form (?) higher than human form, is communicating with us. No one, I think, would suggest that the real (relatively noumenal) Myers is revealing himself fully in his communication with us : his communication must be subject to our limitations just as Sir Isaac Newton could only communicate in mathematics with a child subject to the child's limited knowledge. It must be a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of the (relatively) noumenal Myers a ' fragment ' of Myers as Barrett holds that is communi- cating. As spiritual selves we are timelessly in communion with the disembodied : but this communion transcends human thought, human reason. 1 As human personalities we cannot be in full communion with the disembodied, just as (in lower degree) there can be no full communion between the mind of a child and the mind of a philosopher. If, however, human thought be not lost but merely subsumed under the intuitive thought of the disembodied, then the disem- bodied might have power to communicate with us on the level of our conditioned universe. I, confined from birth in a prison-house, cannot communicate with those at liberty. But if those who are 1 Mark the distinction I hereafter draw between telepathic communion and the manifestation to us, as human personalities, of this communion. INTRODUCTION xi at liberty have power to place themselves in the limited confines of my prison-house, then we can communicate subject to my condition* : we can communicate, but the freedom of our exchange of thought must be subject to my limitations of thought to my human experi- ence gained in the prison-house. Again, my argument on its face may be criticised as in opposition to the theory of F. W. H. Myers that great man to whom we all owe so deep a debt of gratitude. For he expounded the theory of the survival of human personality. But what did he mean by human personality ? If the attempt now made to prove by human experience that we exist as intuitive selves be held successful, I do not think spiritualism is affected in any way unless it be held that a good foundation is thereby laid for some theory of spiritualism. And, as to F. W. H. Myers' line of thought, I shall try to show that the present argument is very possibly not so opposed to his theory as, at first, it may appear to be even though I deny anthropomorphic intellectual distinc- tions in the spiritual. We have advanced so rapidly in knowledge of and command over the forces and material of nature, that humanity is in danger of being stifled in a soulless atmosphere of the intellectual. Where the false gods of rank, wealth and power are set up for worship, the ideals of the soul in man lie sullied in the dust. If human experience could be shown to prove to us that we exist as spiritual selves spiritual selves which survive earthly death would not such proof introduce a new factor for the spiritual advance of humanity ? If it were brought home to all of us that our earthly life of mean distinctions in wealth, rank, power and intellect is but a passing phase, and that each one of us enters, on the dissolution of body and brain by death, 1 a new life of the spirit free from such evil conditions, should we not all be drawn together more closely in full love and respect ? Should we not more clearly understand that for us, even on earth, the spirit rather than the body must be cherished ? Would not religion, itself, be given thereby a new and stronger human foundation for belief ? I believe most firmly that human experience does prove that we exist as spiritual selves : I try to make the proof clear in words. 1 The common idea that death affects life may be positively stated as false, unless we regard life as a function of forms of matter. All that death does is to put an end to the manifestation of life in or through (or as a function of?) material organisms. xii PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY No one can appreciate more fully than myself the audacity of the attempt now made, and no one can be more conscious than I of the paucity and fallibility of the language in which the attempt is clothed. But, if this book spell failure, I have strong hope it may influence some stronger man to prove, clearly and intelligibly, what I feel sure can be proved. And the proof, once established, must inure, immutable, for the spiritual good of mankind. The full debt of gratitude I owe to the Society for Psychical Research needs no acknowledgment : it is apparent through all now written. The altruistic labour of the marked men and women who come to our minds in very thought of the Society, stands on record for the benefit of humanity at large, now and in the future. An equal debt of gratitude is due to many others, the records of whose work have been herein used. The reader will understand why particular names are not given, but it is right to state that Herbert Batty of Combe Grange has gone through the whole of the first part with me, laboriously, and that, under his guidance, important changes in language have been made. F. C. C. CONTENTS PART I MM INTRODUCTION ....... vii BIBLIOGRAPHY . . .XT THE MANIFOLD AND THE INTUITIVE SELF .... 1 THE MANIFOLD UNITY AND DIVERSITY . . . .10 UNITY AND THE INTUITIVE SELF ..... 13 THE INTUITIVE SELF ...... 24 TIKE AND SPACE ....... 34 IMAGINATION, TELEPATHY, AND THE INTUITIVE SELF . . 36 THE SCHEMA ........ 47 FURTHER ARGUMENTS AS TO THE INTUITIVE SELF . . 56 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC ..... 59 DREAMS OF A SPIRIT SEER ...... 63 MEMORY : IDEAS AS SUBJECTS OF MEMORY . . .66 MEMORY ........ 75 A PERFECT MEMORY . . . . .77 THE RELATION OF IDEAS ..... 84 IDEAS ORIGINATE IN TIME . . . .88 UNCONSCIOUS MEMORY ..... 99 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ...... 104 PART H TELEPATHY DEFINED ...... 106 TELEPATHY ..... .118 SPONTANEOUS CASES .... . 127 FEELING ........ 128 RUDIMENTARY IDEAS : SIGHT, SOUND, AND TOUCH . . 136 DEFINITE IDEAS IN THE PERCIPIENT, BUT NOT RELATED TO THOSE OF THE AGENT ....... 141 xiii xiv PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY PACK THEORIES OF DIRECT THOUGHT TRANSFERENCE . . .145 DEFINITE IDEAS IN THE PERCIPIENT APPARENTLY TRANSFERRED FROM THE AGENT . . . ; . " . . 151 RECIPROCAL CASES . . . . . . .156 CLAIRVOYANCE AND CLAIRAUDIENCE . . . . . 161 EXTERNALISATION . . . " . . . . 162 TRAVEL OF PERSONALITY . .... . . . 170 TRAVEL OF PERSONALITY : AN OBJECTION TO THE THEORY . 178 CASES OF PURE CLAIRVOYANCE AND PURE CLAIRAUDIENCE . 184 THE DIVINING-ROD H % 188 CRYSTAL-GAZING . . . . / . . 190 AUTOMATIC WRITING . . > . ? 5 . . . 199 PART HI WILL, DESIRE, AND VOLITION . .' ' . . .211 AGREEMENTS TO APPEAR AFTER DEATH .' . . .216 EXPERIMENTAL CASES . . . . . .221 DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN NORMAL AND TELEPATHIC HUMAN EXPERIENCE . . . . ; . . . 245 SLEEP AND HYPNOSIS . . .' ** . . . 248 RAPPORT .... . "; ' . . 255 SELF-SUGGESTION ....'... 261 EXALTATION OF FACULTY . . . , '* '. . 265 MEMORY IN HYPNOSIS . . . . . 271 MEMORY AND MULTIPLEX PERSONALITY . * '.' ' . . 273 TIME MEMORY IN HYPNOSIS . . . ' . 279 PERSONALITY AND THE MATERIAL . . . . . 283 HAUNTED HOUSES ....... 294 PSYCHOMETRY ....... 298 THE DISEMBODIED . . . . . . - . 301 COMMUNION WITH THE DISEMBODIED . 314 LAST WORDS ......'. "'- . 322 INDEX : DIGEST OF THE ARGUMENT 325 EDITIONS OF KANT'S WOEKS EEFEEEED TO The Critique of Pure Reason. By MEIKLBJOHN. (George Bell and Sons, 1905.) Inaugural Dissertation of 1770. By GEORGE KOFF. (Columbia College, New York, 1894.) Kant's Prolegomena. By BELFORT BAX. (George Bell and Sons, 1903.) Philosophic de Kant. By M. VICTOR COUSIN. (Librairie Nouvelle, Paris, 1857.) Dreams of a Spirit Seer, (Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1900.) PART I THE MANIFOLD AND THE INTUITIVE SELF KANT states that our faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the limits of possible experience, while the most essential object of the science of metaphysics is to transcend these limits. He solves the difficulty thus : ' The estimate of our rational cognition a priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere. Here we are enabled to put the justice of this estimate to the test. For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phenomena, is the unconditioned, which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to complete the series of conditions. Now, if it appear that when, on the one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction ; and that when, on the other hand, we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as phenomena, conform to our mode of representation, the contradiction disappears : we shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we began by assuming for the sake of experiment ; we may look upon it as established that the unconditioned does not lie in things as we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in themselves, beyond the range of our cognition ' (Kant, Preface to second edition, p. rax. Cf. Pro- legomena, p. 31, where Kant refers, not to intuition but human intuition, for he relies on the assumption that ' all which can be given to our senses (the outer in space, the inner in time) is only intuited by us as it appears to us, and not as it is in itself '). What I lay the greatest stress on in the above is the statement, ' For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phenomena is the unconditioned, which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to complete the series of conditions.' The above statement is in- contestably true, and it shows our ' vital knowledge of our own ignorance ' ; i.e. our reason tells us most surely of the existence of A 2 something which, though the basis of all our cognition, is, and must be, incomprehensible to us in cognition so long as, and so far as, we are conditioned in our time and space. Now the unconditioned must be referred to in Kant's Critique, for he relies on it as required in things as they are in themselves in order to complete the series of conditions, and it is this series of conditions which forms the groundwork of the Critique. The un- conditioned is the ' stuff ' of our series of conditions. These references we can only find in the term ' The Manifold.' The manifold is (to us) the real, the (relatively) noumenal : our universe (the series of conditions in which we exist and which determine us as subjects) is to us phenomenal of the manifold. But still our series of conditions must in some way be what is, to us, an abstraction from the unconditioned. The manifold is then, to us as (Kant's) subjects, the unconditioned, and we cannot cognise or even think it : we cannot touch it, con- sider it, in any way by our reason. More than this, by no possibility can we, as subjects, think the manifold. But, herein, we find an apparent contradiction. For we not only do think x the existence of the manifold, but we arrive at a necessary conclusion that it exists, though outside our cognition as subjects. Bear in mind I now refer to the existence of the manifold, not the manifold itself. ' To say that we " know " the Infinite is a manifest contradic- tion, for " knowing " is, as we have said, determining or finitising. But to say that we know the fact of the Infinite in the conditioned is not a contradiction : it is simply a fact ' (Laurie's Synthetica, vol. i. p. 256). The manifold is presented to us in intuition 2 (from what source will be hereafter considered) : for we know that our cognition results from a determined form of intuition, and there could be no such determination of form unless intuition itself were presented to us. From this presentation arises the possibility of our arriving at the existence of the manifold as a fact. But the manifold is not received by us fully in intuition : such reception can only be by a subject of intuition. We cannot, therefore, treat it as in itself conditioned in any way : we cannot treat it as conditioned in itself in unity or diversity as known to us. But as our unity and diversity are no more than phenomenal in our series of conditions we cannot hold that the manifold may not exist in some unity or diversity. For the manifold is no more than that which is to us the uncondi- tioned, as outside our particular series of conditions. But we must hold that if such unity or diversity exist in the manifold, it must * If it be held we do not think but intuite the existence of the manifold, the present argument, if affected in any way, is strengthened. If we think no more than the existence of the manifold (the unconditioned) the thought is without content. 2 I distinguish between ' intuition ' and human intuition or intuitions. THE MANIFOLD AND THE INTUITIVE SELF 3 exist in a form (?) unknown to us. For the unconditioned (the manifold) is, to us, the permanent out of which our (transient) series of conditions is abstracted, and in the permanent there can be no contradiction. So the unity of the manifold cannot exist in contradiction to diversity or vice versa, whereas unity as known to us necessarily exists in contradiction (in contradiction to diversity) because we exist in a series of conditions. In the manifold no such contradiction can exist. It is true Kant ' arrives at ' the existence of God in unity, at Free-will and Immortality (ultimately) for the subject. But he does not allege that he proves the existence of any one of the three. For all involve the fact of real unity, and Kant holds this unity to be, for us, purely hypothetical : ' It is not maintained that this unity does really exist, but that we must in the interests of reason, that is, for the establishment of principles for the various rules presented by experience, try to dis- cover and introduce it, so far as practicable, into the sphere of our cognitions ' (Kant, p. 398). Our present inquiry has nothing to do with God, Free-will, or Immortality : the reference is made to them simply to press home the fact that, though Kant holds we do ' arrive at ' the fact of the existence of the manifold (which is, to us, the noumenal), we can- not, as subjects, determine anything in human proof as to its nature or constitution. At the same time Kant does hold as to personality that / (not as a subject) do intuite myself, as myself : there exists (relatively to the subject) intuition of a noumenal /. Kant intro- duces into his scheme a personality of intuition. To what extent he relies on the fact of this personality is hereafter considered. As subjects (in our series of conditions) we cannot compass the fact of the existence of the manifold (the unconditioned) outside our series of conditions : but we do compass or ' arrive at ' the fact. Therefore the ' I ' to whom this existence is a fact must be a subject higher in form of thought than the ' I ' existing in and conditioned by the series of conditions of our limited universe. Kant relies on the existence of the ' soul of man ' : herein he finds the real self in relation to the phenomenal, cognitional self. I shall argue that we can get this ' I ' from the fact that selves exist which intuite themselves, and that (reading between the lines) we thereby do not affect Kant's reasoning. What is above written consists in some part of bare allegation : it is dealt with in fuller detail later on. But, though we arrive at the fact of the existence of the manifold, we arrive at a fact quite beyond all cognition. The manifold cannot be said to be determined in any way by us as subjects ; we can only regard it as a bare inexplicable fact. This is why Kant laid such stress on the fact that the noumenal is beyond our empirical range. He considered it only hypothetically for the interests of reason. 4 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY What is in our apprehension is not the manifold but the manifold of (relations between) phenomena with which we deal in our series of conditions. Bear in mind that in stating this I refer to the mani- fold itself, not the existence of the manifold. When, then, one commentator states that Kant ' tells us in the analytic that sense only presents to us a mere manifold which re- quires to be bound together in the unity of a concept ere it can be apprehended as an object ' : another refers to the ' looseness of the manifold ' : while yet a third informs us that ' the faculty (in- tuition) which gives us multiplicity (the manifold ?) and the faculty (self -consciousness) which gives us unity, are different in kind,' they cannot be held to refer to the manifold itself. For if we say the manifold is conditioned in any way even in unity or diversity as known to us in cognition we are conditioning the unconditioned. And this cannot be done. But if we hold they are referring to the manifold in our appre- hension, 1 then their meaning is clear. For this apprehension is the apprehension of a subject with unity of apperception : they treat this unity of apperception as real, and so, in relation, the manifold is a ' loose ' or ' mere ' manifold which requires ' binding together ' for the unity of apperception. It will appear hereafter that our unity of apperception is no more than a particular phenomenal unity in our particular phenomenal series of conditions ; and that, in relation, the transcendental unity of apperception may (for the interests of reason) be referred to the / which intuites itself. The fact of the existence of the unconditioned is a fact to me. But as the unconditioned does not lie in cognition, it is not a fact to me in my apprehension as a subject of cognition : from my apprehension of the manifold I conceive it as a loose or ' mere ' manifold. So we are driven, even at this early stage of our in- vestigation, to the fact of the existence of an I of which the person- ality of cognition is no more than a part or a partial manifestation : the purview of thought of the latter is but part of the fuller purview of thought of the former. The former may be said to intuite (or, possibly, think without content ?) the manifold itself ; the latter thinks it only in its (the subject's) series of conditions : thinks it conditionally, in that the subject's (human) intuition of the mani- fold is subject to the formal conditions of time and space. Thought (dependent on a form of intuition) of the subject is active, and must be referred to active presentation of intuition itself. We must distinguish between the manifold itself and the manifold in our apprehension as subjects. I should here also point out that Kant never alleged things-in- themselves to exist in the noumenal. If he had said they did or 1 See p. 66 for the meaning I give to apprehension. THE MANIFOLD AND THE INTUITIVE SELF 5 did not so exist lie would have been conditioning the unconditioned in diversity or unity he left the question severely alone. ' How things may be in themselves, without regard to the re- presentations through which they affect us, is utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition ' (Kant, p. 143). ' This permanence is, however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the phenomenal world.' ' Kant has pointedly declared that it would be a gross absurdity to suppose that in his view separate, distinct things-in-themselves existed corresponding to the several objects of perception' (by Professor Adamson, Ency. Brit., vol. xiii. p. 851, 9th ed.). He uses the term things-in-themselves, but as a term in relation to our experience. Indeed, in the universe of the intuitive self, that for which Kant uses the term things-in-themselves, may quite possibly appear as phenomenal : we can determine in no way the relation of the intuitive self to its external. In the Dialectic Kant states : ' In relation to this criterion (the law of reason), therefore, we must suppose the idea of the syste- matic unity of nature to possess objective validity and necessity ' (Kant, p. 399). This apparent conditioning of the unconditioned in unity does not refer to any unity known to us in our series of conditions. The passage will be again referred to. The manifold, as used by Kant, has been defined as : ' The total of the particulars furnished by sense before they are connected by the synthesis of the understanding : that which is in the sense and has not been yet in thought.' But this is not a definition of the manifold itself, but of the mani- fold in our apprehension. We reason under a synthesis of the under- standing, and in relation to this synthesis we regard the manifold as a ' total of particulars.' We treat our synthesis as giving us noumenal unity : we shall find hereafter this is not so ; synthesis is no more than a necessary process for subjects (conditioned in time and space as known to us) to have self-apperception. ' There are many laws of nature that we can only know by means of experience, but regularity in the connection of phenomena i.e. nature in general we can never learn through experience, because experience itself requires such laws, and these lie at the foundation of its possibility a priori. The possibility of experience in general is at once the universal law of nature, and the axioms of the one are at the same time the laws of the other. For we know nothing of nature otherwise than as the sum-total of phenomena, namely, of presentations in us, and hence can derive the law of their connection in no other way than from the principles of the same connection in ourselves : in other words, from the conditions of 6 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY necessary union in a consciousness, which constitutes the possibility of experience ' (Prolegomena, p. 66). In the above statement Kant, in defining nature in general as ' regularity in the connection of phenomena,' necessarily gives only a definition of nature in our apprehension. But he marks the dis- tinction I have pointed out between the manifold on the one hand and the manifold in our apprehension on the other hand. ' Our apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon ' (cf . Kant, p. 142, where the words ' in a phenomenon ' are replaced by the words ' of phenomena ') ' is always successive, is consequently always changing. By it ' our apprehension ' alone we could, therefore, never determine whether this manifold, as an object of experience ' (my italics) ' is co-existent or successive, unless it had for a founda- tion something that exists always, that is, something fixed and permanent, of the existence of which all succession and co-existence are nothing but so many modes (modi of time). ... It is only by means of the permanent that existence in different parts of the successive series of time receives a quantity, which we entitle dura- tion ' (Kant, p. 137). Herein, again, Kant distinguishes between the manifold itself and the manifold in our apprehension. By saying the manifold exists always and is permanent he means it is not conditioned in our time and space. Succession and co-existence arise only in re- lation to our apprehension of the manifold. Our apprehension of the manifold is subject to succession and co-existence, not because succession and co-existence exist in the manifold, but because our apprehension itself exists in and subject to time : succession and co-existence are mere modi of time, and time has but phenomenal existence. Even in mathematics we find thought driven to admitting the existence of the manifold or manifoldness, as the unconditioned. For while, in practice, some arbitrary unit must always be used, the admission of continuity obliges us to hold that any such unit may be multiplied or subdivided to an unlimited extent. In the infinitesimal calculus, when dealing with continuity, we bring in and oo as limits (?) beyond, even to, which we cannot proceed in cognitional thought. Herein, as we deal with symbols unknown in themselves, and having meaning to us only in relation to other symbols, and as our universe is a limited universe of relations, we find we cannot relate those symbols which have meaning to us (that is, relations for us) in our universe of relations, to those symbols which have, for us, no relative meaning that is, to and oo. Our cognition is limited to knowledge of relations : and oo are outside our universe of relations (they are, to us, the unconditioned) so we cannot use them in cognition. This is why, in practice, we can say oo : I/ : : oo : 10,000, or that the ultimate term of the series 1, |, 1/x l/oo is 0. In theory there are no grounds to support the former THE MANIFOLD AND THE INTUITIVE SELF 7 statement. It amounts simply to saying : Infinity (the unlimited) is outside our universe of limits ; any number, however great or small, is within our universe of limits, and any such number being, to us, nothing in itself but a relation, has no existence at all (or exists as 0) when compared with that which is outside our universe of relations. The related has, in cognition, no existence in the unrelated. But when considering such a series as 1 ... 0, I think we are justified in accepting the series as a fact to us. If, however, it be a fact, what follows ? We find a relation between the related terms down to the unrelated term : a contradiction. For is outside our universe of relations. We have then (outside cognition) proof of some relation between the conditioned and unconditioned. This is seen again when we consider the statement 1 + + 1 l/ =2. We have a relation between numbers and l/oo or 0. It follows that : ' Pure mathematics no less than pure natural science can never refer to anything more than mere phenomena ' (Prolegomena, p. 61 ; cf. Kant, p. 33). The manifold (the unconditioned) lies at the back even of mathematics. If we consider our universe as one of relations only, and admit that the activity of the mind must bring with it certain principles of relation under which the manifold of sense must be brought, we still find we must treat the manifold as the unconditioned. For the ' principles of relation ' referred to are not noumenal in any way. These relations are no more than abstractions from the manifold, necessary for human cognition because the subject (the human personality) does not exist in the unconditioned, but in a series of conditions : its universe is a universe of relations. A subject existing in the manifold (in the unconditioned) would not require these relations for cognition, just as its understanding would re- quire no synthesis of the manifold in intuition it would ' intuite ' directly in the manifold. But it must be borne in mind that the manifold (the unconditioned) is no more than that which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to complete the series of conditions in which we exist. It does not infer the reality of things-in-them- selves : they may be mere phenomena of noumena or of some noumenon, or no more than an expression for noumena or some noumenon. Nor, so far as our reason can touch the manifold, can we say it is the ultimate. It may well be that what is the manifold to us is in itself conditioned in some way outside our cognition or even our reason outside our series of conditions. But all such questions being outside our cognition, we must still treat the manifold itself as being, to us, the unconditioned. What is above written may be criticised as a mere statement of indisputable fact. But the statement had to be made, for it is 8 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY important at the outset of our argument to mark the wide dis- tinction which exists between the manifold on the one hand and the manifold in our apprehension on the other. The manifold is the unconditioned, and so cannot, itself, be conditioned in any way as a ' loose ' or ' mere ' manifold. It is only in our apprehension (as subjects of time and space) that it can be so conditioned. To prevent misapprehension I would here anticipate the argu- ment. For the student may, at first thought, hold that what has been written tends to a theory destructive of any reality in person- ality points, indeed, to all personalities being merely phenomenal. And this is true if we consider only human personalities of time and space ; but it is true only so far. For though what has been written points to human personality being merely phenomenal, it opens the possibility also of human personality being phenomenal (a mani- festation in time and space) of some (relatively) real personality. Indeed, that we determine the fact of the existence of the manifold demands the existence of personalities higher in form of thought than human personalities ; for we, as mere human personalities, exist and have our being only within the limits of human experience. Kant says : ' The understanding or mind which contains the manifold in intuition, in and through the act of its own self-conscious- ness (in other words, an understanding by and in the representation of which the objects of the representation should at the same time exist), would not require a special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity of its self-consciousness, an act of which the human understanding, which thinks and cannot intuite, has absolute need' (Kant, p. 85). Human thought always includes (exists in ?) limitation (Kant, p. 43). Herein Kant refers to such higher personalities as possible, and I shall argue hereafter that he infers and relies on the existence of such personalities. But, as they exist in the manifold, when Kant speaks of their unity of self-consciousness he uses the word to mark only, for us, the personal self of any one in distinction from all other selves. He does not use the word ' unity ' as the unity we know in our series of conditions. It is a hypothetical unity in the uncon- ditioned, or, rather, in that which is, to us, unconditioned : it is a unity outside our cognition. If, indeed, we dissect the meaning of the unity of human person- ality, we find it to be only phenomenal it is a variable thing of time and space as known to us. So we have no grounds for holding that the unity of personality as known to us is the only possible unity of personality. The unity of a self-consciousness in what is, to us, the manifold may also, very possibly, be phenomenal. But as it exists in what is, to us, the unconditioned, we must treat it as noumenal, as real. And, herein, lies the whole gist of my' present argument the unity of Kant's subject is phenomenal, not real. At the same time THE MANIFOLD AND THE INTUITIVE SELF 9 Kant's whole scheme fails unless we make this subject phenomenal of a real subject a subject, to us, marked by noumenal, not phe- nomenal, unity in self-apperception. Kant, it is true, never states definitely his reliance on the existence of this (to us) real subject : he refers to it but vaguely as the ' soul of man.' Why he was so indefinite I attempt hereinafter to explain. THE MANIFOLD UNITY AND DIVERSITY KANT'S Critique leads, I think, to a definite conclusion that unity and diversity, as known to us, are no more than what may be termed abstractions from the manifold ; that is, from what is, to us, the unconditioned. Or we may consider unity and diversity as merely relative and interchangeable terms ; for example, any ' thing ' in our universe can be thought as a thing of unity, while in relation to other things it can be thought as a thing of diversity. We cannot think unity without thinking diversity in contradic- tion, nor can we think diversity without thinking unity in contra- diction. Neither the one nor the other can, then, be the ultimate, the permanent. For in the permanent contradiction cannot exist. We can have a conception of an object, so any object exists, to us, as a thing of unity. But an object is that in the conception of which the manifold in a given intuition is united (Kant, p. 84 ; cf. p. 143). That is, the conjunction of this manifold must be related to the fact of the conception : there is required a synthesis of this manifold for the conception to exist. But this object of unity may become an object of diversity in relation to other objects. For instance, we may think of the unity of any given part of a machine. But we may also think of the machine itself as an object, and, when so thinking, we think of the parts of the machine as objects of diversity. In relation to the unity of the machine, its parts become objects of diversity. So the terms, unity and diversity, are no more than terms of relation in our universe of relations. Any unity that we think is no more than a unity in our series of conditions in our universe of relations. The highest, most inclusive unity we can think is the unity of Nature. But what is this unity as thought ? It is no more than a synthesis of diversity : we can only think this unity of Nature by thinking at the same time the contradiction diversity. Just as there is contradiction between the terms andoo, so there is contradiction between the terms unity and diversity. But, also, just as we find a continuum between and oo, so we find a con- tinuum between unity and diversity. The contradictions are phe- nomenal in our universe of relations. Reason informs us that Kant's antinomies have no real existence : they arise only phe- nomenally in our universe of relations conditioned in time and space. It may be objected that is a real fixed limit of the infinitely 10 UNITY AND DIVERSITY 11 small, and oo a real fixed limit of the infinitely great, whereas the above argument gives no such fixity to unity in contradiction to diversity, for it makes the same one object a thing of unity or a thing of diversity not in itself, but as it is thought in relation to or not in relation to other objects. But, always remembering that pure mathematics never refer to anything more than mere phenomena (Prolegomena, p. 61), this proves no more than that unity differs from diversity only in synthesis. Any unity is no more than a synthesis of some diversity, and all synthetic thought is phenomenal. Again, the manifold is manifest, to us, in diversity. But we have no human experience of any real diversity. For every conception must be considered as a representation which is contained in an infinite multitude of different possible representations (Kant, p. 24). That is, the simplest conception requires in Kant's language a synthesis of the manifold in a given intuition. All thought, even the simplest, involves synthesis, that is, is phenomenal. Once grant that our universe is a universe of relations only, and we arrive at the fact not only that it is phenomenal, but that any subject conditioned in such a universe can only think within the limits of synthetic thought. If an object exist only in a given synthesis of particulars of the manifold, it is phenomenal ; that is, it exists only in relation to the human understanding as conditioned. So any synthesis of objects must be also phenomenal, for the synthesis amounts to no more than a summation of the phenomenal. We can think an object in its unity ; we can think of classes or groups of objects in unity, in which case each object loses its appearance of unity in its appearance of diversity in relation to the class or group. And so (in a continuum of thought ?) we can think ultimately the unity of Nature. But the unity of any object differs from that of Nature itself (as thought by us) in degree, not in kind. Both involve synthesis : the only distinction is that the latter involves a fuller and more comprehensive synthesis than the former. And, as synthesis has existence only in relation to a manifold, considered as a sum or total of particulars, that is, to the manifold in our apprehension, and not to the manifold itself, it follows that we only appear to ourselves to think any real unity, in the same way that we think ourselves not as we are, but as we appear to ourselves to be. We exist in a series of conditions. When we consider any diver- sity, we find it is no more than a synthesis of particulars of the manifold as manifest to us. So we can only deal in thought with a synthesis of (a summation of) these syntheses of particulars of the manifold in our series of conditions : the highest, most inclusive synthesis of these particulars that we can arrive at must, then, be phenomenal in our phenomenal universe of relations in time and space. This synthesis we term the unity of Nature, and it is pheno- 12 menal not noumenal ; it is no more than a unity in our series of conditions. There is, herein, no denial (or affirmation) of any noumenal unity, but any such unity is not within the purview of cognition. If we hold that by any synthesis we arrive at unity, and that this unity is a unity of the manifold, then this unity is ' outside ' the series of conditions in which we exist. It is a unity of reason as opposed to any unity of possible experience, and so is purely hypo- thetical (Kant, pp. 217, 398). So this unity is not a unity known to us as subjects of time and space. We arrive, necessarily, at the fact that our understanding when thinking in unity or diversity is thinking in (particulars of) the manifold. Unity and diversity are, then, abstractions from (limits or conditions of) the manifold, and we are driven to conclude that the subject is restricted, in cognition and judgment, to these ab- stractions, because its personality is conditioned in some way. We are so conditioned that we think within limits (abstractions) of the manifold, our limits of contradiction (so far as the present argument is concerned) being unity and diversity. If the subject were objective, and so its conditions objective to it, it could not reason outside the limits of unity and diversity ; it could not travel outside cognition. But / do determine that I exist in limits : I arrive at the necessity of the existence of the unconditioned to complete my series of conditions as a subject ; I do travel outside cognition. The subject therefore manifests a limited power of reasoning outside its series of conditions : though it cannot determine in any way the manifold, reason leads it to the definite conclusion of the existence of the non-conditioned, that is, of the manifold. This power of reasoning, outside cognition, im- ports the fact that the subject is a manifestation within limits of some (relatively) real self. This real self I hereinafter term the intuitive self. The intuitive self is the self of an understanding or mind which contains the manifold in intuition (Kant, p. 85). But the subject arrives only at the fact of the existence of the intuitive self : it can determine this self only so far as it is manfest to it in its universe. THE conception of an object is really, for cognition, the conception of a particular relation. So we see that the conception of an object per se is impossible. 1 The object is really a dependence on other objects which are also dependences, and to know anything of the object itself we must know its relation to other objects, so we must know other like and unlike objects. And this in the limit leads to the necessity of knowledge of relations in general. For if there were not this knowledge of relations in general, the particular relation (which we term an object) could not be a subject of cog- nition. But all conceptions depend on intuition. So when intuition re- sults in the conception of an object, it must also result in (what I may somewhat loosely term) a general conception of objects. More exactly, as intuition is the means through which an object given to us can be a thing of cognition, there must also be for human knowledge a synthesis of the manifold which is presented to us in intuition. The manifold itself is given through sensibility : for our unity of apperception there must be a synthesis of the manifold. (The synthesis is of the manifold in our apprehension, not of the manifold itself.) Consider this from a different point of view. The subject is given. The subject being given, we must infer unity of apperception in the subject. Concepts, judgments, even (Kantian) ideas, cannot be mine, unless this unity of apperception exists in me. But if / do exist as an objective reality, whether as a disembodied human personality, a personality of intuition or a soul, I must exist as a limit, as a condition. Grant that (to us) any such objective reality is not conditioned in time and space, that it is a thing not of concepts or ideas but of intuition ; still, the fact that it has real objective personality (as distinct from other personalities) makes it a condition. I do not allege it is a limit or condition like to any limits or conditions we know by our human understanding. All I allege is that it cannot be the unconditioned as the Supreme is unconditioned. Perhaps, instead of positively alleging it is a limit 1 As through the external sense, nothing but mere representations of relations are given us, the said external sense in its representation can contain only the relation of the object to the subject, but not the essential nature of the object as a thing in itself (Kant, p. 40). 13 14 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY or a condition, I should write negatively that it is not really un- conditioned, though it appears to be unconditioned in relation to us as human personalities. And that would be sufficient for the present purpose. Now the unconditioned is no more and no less than that which completes our ' series of conditions,' and this series of conditions is determined by the subject ; that is, it is the subject itself which recognises this series of conditions as no more than a series of con- ditions which require the unconditioned for completion. So it must be carefully borne in mind that we do not deal with the manifold as unconditioned in itself, but simply as unconditioned in relation to the subject. Though, then, we must, for the requirements of reason, assume the fact of unity of apperception in a personality of intuition, we cannot form any conception of this unity of apper- ception. At the same time, as all we want to find out is what ultimate conclusions we can arrive at by the exercise of our own reasoning power, we must make an assumption ; we must assume as objectively true our unity of apperception as intuitive selves. Kant himself holds that I do intuite myself as I am, whereas to deter- mine myself (?) as a subject, a determinate mode of intuition is necessary. I deal later on with the impossibility of the subject's determining itself as an object or subject. But how does our unity of apperception as subjects arise ? Is unity of perception given to the subject so that it is (necessarily) received in unity ? If so, then through sensibility unity must be given directly, sensibility must not merely open the possibility to the subject of arriving at its unity by abstraction from the manifold given. This is not so : unity is not given through sensibility directly : what is given through sensibility is the manifold to be intuited. Sensibility is passive ; it may, perhaps, be termed the potentiality of active thought : or we may liken it to the circumambient air, which is a condition precedent to the active breathing of a live thing. So when sensibility is spoken of as ' giving ' the manifold to be intuited, it must be borne in mind there is never any active giving by sensibility. (The intuitive self presents (actively) the manifold in intuition, as we shall afterwards see.) The following extracts from Kant show that this unity of per- ception for the subject is not given : it exists because of the limita- tions of the subject itself. ' Now, as the categories have their origin in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility, I must, in my deduction, make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an empirical intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclusively on the unity which is brought by the understanding ' (my italics) ' into the intuition by means of (under ?) the category. In what follows it UNITY AND THE INTUITIVE SELF 15 will be shown from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity which belongs to it is no other than that which the category imposes on the manifold in a given intuition. . . . But there is one thing in the above demonstration of which I could not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the understanding, and independently of it' (Kant, p. 89). Bear in mind that the categories have their origin in the under- standing alone ; they are merely rules for our understanding as human personalities ; they possess no significance in relation to a faculty of cognition where the understanding is itself intuitive (Kant, p. 89). ' The understanding draws its laws (a priori) not from nature, but prescribes them to it ' (Prolegomena, p. 68). Note, too, the importance of the word imposes, in the statement that ' the unity which belongs to it is no other than that which the category imposes on the manifold.' Again, Kant distinctly says unity is brought by the understanding into the intuition by means of (under ?) the category. Both state- ments show that unity is treated as the result of an abstraction from the manifold : that it is not given. ' The manifold content given in a sensuous intuition comes neces- sarily under the original synthetical unity of apperception, because thereby alone is the unity of intuition possible ' (Kant, p. 88). Here Kant, though indirectly, refers again to the manifold as what is given, and says it comes necessarily under the original synthetical unity of apperception. Kant, in his reasoning, is hampered by his assumption (in the aesthetic) that sensibility gives only objects though he still refers to the manifold in intuition. But he treats unity as an abstraction from the manifold from the unconditioned. In considering the manifold that is given by sensibility, Kant introduces ' imagination,' x and, while he says it belongs to sensi- bility, says also it belongs in part to the understanding. He states : ' Thus under the name of a transcendental synthesis of imagina- tion, the understanding exercises an activity upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is : and so we are right in saying that the internal sense is affected thereby ' (Kant, p. 94). ' Now that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination, a mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual synthesis, and sensibility manifoldness of appre- hension ' (Kant, p. 100). Here Kant expands the purview of sensi- bility in relation to the subject. For now he says the subject can 1 I use here the (unsatisfactory) word imagination, because it is the word used >>j Meiklejohn. I consider hereafter what Kant means by the word so translated. 16 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY be affected through sensibility, not only as to objects, but in mani- foldness of apprehension. Through sensibility the manifold is given, but the subject can only receive the manifold within the limits of its particular apprehension. The above extracts must be read with the following before they can be considered : ' Now in order to cognise ourselves, in addition to the act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, there is necessary a determinate mode of intuition whereby this manifold is given ; although my own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon (much less mere illusion) the determination of ' (my italics) ' my existence can only take place conformably to the form of the internal sense, according to the particular mode in which the manifold which I conjoin is given in internal intuition, and I have therefore no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. . . . My intelligence (that is, I) can render that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only according to the relations of time, which are quite beyond the proper sphere of the conception of the understanding, and conse- quently cognise itself in respect to an intuition (which cannot possibly be intellectual, nor given by the understanding) only as it appears to itself, and not as it would cognise itself, if its intuition were intellectual ' (Kant, pp. 96, 97). In considering the above three passages bear in mind that sensi- bility is passive. The first and second passages refer clearly to the subject the human personality. But the last refers also to a higher, fuller personality. For the subject by the act of thinking could not subject the manifold of every possible intuition to its (the subject's) unity of apperception unless this manifold of every possible intuition were presented to the subject. And this presentation must be active ; that is, the presentation must be from a personality of intuition. Kant distinguishes between the ' I ' which intuites itself and the ' I ' which thinks itself, even though he holds that the act of such thinking subjects the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception. (He holds definitely there is an ' I ' which intuites itself, Kant, p. 95.) The distinction is shown in the follow- ing passage : ' The understanding or mind which contained the manifold in intuition, in and through the act of its own self-consciousness, in other words, an understanding by and in the representation of which the objects of the representation should at the same time exist, would not require a special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity of its consciousness, an act of which the human understanding, which thinks only and cannot intuite, has absolute need ' (Kant, p. 85). This amounts to a definition UNITY AND THE INTUITIVE SELF 17 of the intuitive self, and marks the distinction I rely on. For this I which intuites itself has no need of any synthesis of the manifold content of presentations for its unity of consciousness, whereas the ' I ' which thinks itself has such need (Kant, p. 96). But how does Kant use this ' I ' which thinks itself ? Possibly as no more than a step between the intuitional ' I ' and the ' I ' which is said to cognise itself. ' Now, as in order to cognise ourselves, in addition to the act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, there is necessary a determinate mode of intuition whereby this manifold is given. ... I have therefore no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself ' (Kant, p. 96). (By means of the pure apperception of our under- standing in the thought I am no manifold content is given (Kant, p. 85). The ' thought ' / am has no content.) Kant would appear (?) to state that the subject determines itself as an object. I cannot see how this is possible, for (to the subject) any subject only exists in opposition to object, and vice versa. Only the self of intuition can determine itself (can think itself as it is) in, to us, unity of apperception. For (this determination requiring no synthesis) to the intuitive self subject is object and object is subject in other words the contradiction between the two has no existence. The ' I,' when thinking itself as I am, finds no content in its thought ; the moment it gives content to the thought it thinks itself only as a phenomenon. I find difficulty in distinguishing between intuition and this thought without content. The ' I ' which intuites itself exists. Consider a manifestation of this ' I ' in space and time the subject. Its intuitive self presents intuition to it : the subject receives intuition in a particular mode (conditioned in time and space). The subject has power of cog- nition (an abstraction from intuition). So it appears to itself to cognise itself, to determine itself : but it cannot really determine itself, for it is a thing of transience in time and space, there is nothing for determination. The intuitive self, however, can determine the subject as a manifestation of itself (the intuitive self), or a projec- tion of itself in time and space. When we thus introduce into our course of reasoning the intuitional /, then possibly we do not require the nexus of the / which thinks itself. I do not deny that I think myself as / am ; but, as this thought is without content, how does it differ from intuition of myself as an intuitive self ? For I do determine myself as a subject, and this determination can only be referred to myself as an / which is a personality of intuition. This would appear to require consciousness of self as an intuitive self. It has been necessary to cite the above passages at once in order to show that they have not escaped my observation. But the phrase ' the transcendental synthesis of imagination ' must be considered hereafter : it cannot be dealt with now. 18 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY So far, in considering the ' stuff ' for unity of apperception of the subject, Kant still treats the manifold as the unconditioned, and he treats the unity of the subject as a condition arising from the syn- thesis of imagination, where, through sensibility, the manifold is given. He opposes to this unity of the subject the higher, fuller (relatively noumenal) unity of the ' I ' which intuites itself. This latter does not require any synthesis. We have then the manifold presented in intuition to the subject : for unity of apperception of the subject there must be unity of perception. This unity of perception results (for the subject) from the transcendental synthesis of the imagination it is a conditioning of the manifold. We need not now trouble with the difficulty in- volved by the fact that the subject (by its understanding) sets up, itself, unity for itself ; that will be dealt with hereafter. (Kant, as we shall see, does not refer the power of synthesis to the under- standing.) But it is clear that unity is throughout treated as the result of abstraction from the manifold. For Kant's subject a determinate mode (a conditioning) of intuition is necessary : he refers incident- ally only to the subject which subjects, in abstract thinking, the manifold of all possible intuition to its unity of apperception. But he relies on the fact of the existence of this self of intuition : his whole scheme is based on this fact. Using the word ' idea ' in its ordinary, not its Kantian meaning, we find that the idea of diversity is impossible without the ac- companying idea of unity, and so we find that the idea of unity is impossible without the idea of diversity in contradiction. But unity is not diversity, and diversity is not unity. Therefore neither can have objective reality ; neither can be the permanent, for the one cannot be thought without thought of the other in contradic- tion. But they have both objective reality for us. The only solu- tion of the difficulty is that they are both the results of abstraction from the unconditioned, that is, from the manifold as the uncon- ditioned. The reception of the manifold through the normal organs of sense gives diversity : the necessary unity of apperception in the subject makes unity of perception obligatory. Unity and diversity con- joint, as the result of abstractions from the manifold given, are necessary for the human personality, conditioned in time and space, to exist as a subject with self-apperception. The human person- ality thinks, not in the manifold, but within limits of the manifold. Unity and diversity mark the limits of the synthetical thought of the subject. Or we may consider diversity and unity in relation to time and space, and shall find we arrive at the same conclusion. If we consider objects as external, we must consider them in UNITY AND THE INTUITIVE SELF 19 space. If we relate one object to another we must relate them in space : two like objects can only be distinguished, one from the other, if related in space. And, I think, when, through mental operation, we relate external objects one to another, succession in time is involved. Diversity in objects, therefore, imports for us the conditions of space and time. On the other hand, if we consider the subject in relation to the external, we find from Kant : ' It is true that I exist as an intelligence which is conscious only of its faculty of conjunction or synthesis, but subjected in relation to the manifold which this intelligence has to conjoin to a limitative (my italics) conjunction called the internal sense. My intelligence (that is, I) can render that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only according to the relations of time ' (Kant, p. 97). (To prevent misapprehension, I should perhaps here again state that the ' intelli- gence ' above referred to, is one of concepts, judgments and (Kantian) ideas. An intelligence of intuition would not require the said conjunction or synthesis.) We find, then, that for the very existence, not only of diversity, but of unity as known to us, we must have the conditions of time and space. But time and space are mere forms of sensibility. Therefore diversity and unity, as known to us, have only real existence for the subject in time and space. They have no existence, so far as we know, outside the conditioning of time and space. So they must be merely the result of abstractions from the manifold : for the manifold is not conditioned in time and space as known to us. There may be some difficulty in understanding how unity can be a mere abstraction from the manifold, for unity is ordinarily re- garded as resulting from a real synthesis of diversity, the fact being ignored that there is presentation of the manifold in intuition. This results from the subject, whose very existence involves (phe- nomenal) unity of apperception, making (in human thought) the manifold subject to its unity of apperception, and so treating unity of perception as a thing in itself. (The distinction between the manifold on the one hand and the manifold in our apprehension on the other hand is lost sight of.) But when we bear in mind that all human cognition and judgments are conditioned in time and space, and that it is from this conditioning the fact arises that we can only think in unity and diversity, then we see that unity and diversity are necessarily subjective to the manifold they are but abstractions from the manifold. ' But the unity of objects is determined simply by the under- standing, according to conditions that lie in its own nature ' (Kant's Prolegomena, p. 69). It may be granted that, to our reason, unity of apperception is necessary for the existence of any subject, but unity of perception, as we know it, is not necessary for any possible unity of apperception. 20 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY Our unity of perception is from the conditioning of the subject in time and space as we know them : it is a particular unity of per- ception. Granting that the intuitive self has unity of apperception, we cannot even imagine that it is the same as ours. The following passages, collated, support my allegation that what I have stated as to the relation of the manifold on the one hand to diversity, and on the other hand to unity, is in accordance with Kant's treatment of the manifold. ' But this principle ' that the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest principle of all exercise of the understanding ' is not to be regarded as a principle for every possible understanding, but only for that understanding by means of whose pure apperception in the thought / am no manifold content is given. The understand- ing or mind which contained the manifold in intuition, in and through the act of its own self-consciousness (in other words, an understanding by and in the representation of which the objects of the representation should at the same time exist), would not require a special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity of its self-consciousness, an act of which the human under- standing, which thinks only and cannot intuite, has absolute need ' (Kant, p. 85). ' The manifold in an. intuition, which I call mine, is represented by means of the synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the necessary unity of self -consciousness, and this takes place by means of (under ?) the category. . . . Now, as the categories have their origin in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility ' (that is, they exist as laws of cognition and thought for the under- standing, because the understanding is conditioned in time and space). ' I must, in my deduction, make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an empirical intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclusively on the unity which is brought by the understanding into the intuition by means of the category. In what follows it will be shown from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity which belongs to it is no other than that which the category imposes on the manifold in a given intuition, and thus its a priori validity in regard to all objects of sense being established, the purpose of our deductions will be fully attained' (Kant, p. 89). Bear in mind that if we speak of the faculty of sensibility, we must as sensibility is passive speak of it as a passive faculty, if such faculty be possible. Intuition must be presented actively to the subject, and if sensi- bility is passive (as Kant says it is), I cannot understand how it can, even passively, give empirical intuition ; it certainly cannot present intuition. ' But the unity of objects is determined simply by the under- standing, according to conditions that lie in its own nature ' (Kant's Prolegomena, p. 69). UNITY AND THE INTUITIVE SELF 21 If, in considering the above passages, we bear in mind that (1) unity and diversity as known to us are, for us, the result merely of abstractions from the unconditioned, the manifold ; (2) that through sensibility (which is passive, and is not in itself conditioned in time and space) the manifold is given to be intuited ; (3) that intuition is not in itself conditioned in time and space ; (4) that Kant, in using the word understanding, means the human under- standing then the whole meaning is clear. Bear in mind also that Kant has throughout inferred the faculty of imagination which belongs to sensibility. We have : Through sensibility the manifold is given to be intuited, where the manifold is the unconditioned. The subject being conditioned in time and space, receives and deals with the manifold in time and space. So far as the subject is conditioned with the normal organs of sense it receives the manifold through those organs necessarily in diversity. The subject, limited as it is, can only cognise and think under the categories which are its laws of limit it does not itself ' lay down laws for nature,' it only lays down laws for nature as phenomenal to it. As the subject is given, so its unity of apper- ception is given, and it must receive the manifold in unity as well as in diversity. Unity and diversity are the limits of abstraction from the manifold, so we may speak of a continuum from diversity to unity. But, so far, only the manifold to be intuited is given (passively) to the subject, and we must have the manifold in intuition presented to the subject. And this must be presented actively. As to this the following passage is important : ' But there is one thing in the above demonstration, of which I could not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold, to be intuited, must be given previously to the synthesis of the under- standing, and independently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined. For if I cogitate an understanding which was itself intuitive (as for example, a Divine understanding which should not represent given objects, but by whose representations the objects themselves should be given or produced), the categories would possess no signification in relation to such a faculty of cog- nition. They are merely rules for an understanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that is, in the act of submitting the syn- thesis of the manifold which is presented to it in intuition (my italics) from a very different quarter, to the unity of apperception a faculty, therefore, which cognises nothing per se, but only connects and arranges the material of cognition, the intuition, namely, which must be presented to it by means of the object ' (Kant, p. 89). The above statement is of great importance to our present purpose. When Kant, as above, refers to the manifold to be intuited, he refers to that which is given through sensibility : sensibility could 22 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY not give the manifold in intuition for sensibility is passive, and the presentation of the manifold in intuition infers the active presen- tation of intuition itself. There can be no passive presentation of intuition ; such presentation can only be active by a self of in- tuition. So we find, in the same statement, that when Kant refers to the categories he says : ' They are merely rules for an understanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that is, in the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented to it in intuition from a very different quarter, to the unity of apperception.' That is, the manifold is presented in intuition, while the understanding submits the synthesis of this manifold to the unity of apperception. Here Kant necessarily refers to a presentation of the manifold in intuition : the giving or presentation of the manifold to be in- tuited is not sufficient for him : intuition itself must be presented and presented actively to the subject. He could not say the presen- tation in intuition is from sensibility, for sensibility is passive ; so he uses the indefinite term ' from a very different quarter.' This ' very different quarter,' he would appear to refer to as the soul of man (?). I refer it to the intuitive self. (Intuition cannot possibly be intellectual, nor given by the understanding. Kant, p. 97.) In any case it must be a subject of intuition as defined by Kant, and if we introduce this subject of intuition, we have all that Kant wants for his presentation of intuition to the subject. My act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of every possible intuition to my unity of apperception must refer, ultimately, to myself as an intuitive self. As an intuitive self I have intuition for presentation, and it is my intuitive self which presents the manifold in intuition to my- self as a subject in time and space. The part of sensibility is passive ; it is merely the medium through or by which the manifold to be intuited is given to the intuitive self ; it is the passive nexus between the intuitive self and some universe of which our world of time and space is but phenomenal or partial and mediate. The intuitive self receives the manifold in intuition, and presents the manifold in intuition to the subject of the intuitive self the human personality. But the subject being conditioned in time and space can only receive a form of intuition, i.e., it receives a form of in- tuition determined (conditioned in limits) in time and space. Kant's whole scheme stands on the fact that the manifold in intuition is presented to the subject. From sensibility, which is passive, he can only get the giving of the manifold to be intuited. He must be held to assume the existence of an intuitive self to get his active presentation to the subject of^the manifold in intuition. This (active) presentation to the subject of the manifold in intuition is a condition precedent to the subject's being able to appear to determine itself in cognition (a limit of intuition) in its universe of UNITY AND THE INTUITIVE SELF 23 relations in time and space. The intuitive self determines itself (is to itself as it in fact is) in intuition : the subject only appears to determine itself in cognition. It follows that the unity of self -apperception of the subject is not a real, a permanent unity : it is but a unity phenomenal of the unity (outside our cognition) of the intuitive self. THE INTUITIVE SELF THE manifold is the unconditioned : it is that which reason absol- utely requires in things as they are in themselves (things-in-them- selves). The manifold is presented to the subject in the manifold of intuition. Bear in mind that this ' subject ' is the human per- sonality : a subject of intuition receives the manifold in intuition. 1 We must distinguish between the manifold in intuition as presented, and the manifold in intuition as fully received by the intuitive self, or as partially or mediately received by the subject in time and space. Sensibility is passive and, therefore, though it may be termed a source of human knowledge (Kant, p. 18), by no possibility can it give more than the manifold to be intuited. For intuition itself is meaningless unless we refer it to a personality of intuition (Kant's ' soul of man ' must be what is, to us, a personality of intuition). And to say the subject (the human personality) thinks in a form of intuition is equally meaningless unless we have intuition presented to the subject ; for (unless our form of intuition is directly presented, which is impossible) any form of intuition must have intuition itself for foundation. It cannot then be that sensibility presents the manifold in intuition to the subject, for such presentation must be active. But (Kant himself holds this) the manifold in intuition is presented to the subject and presented actively. This presen- tation must be from a self of intuition the intuitive self. The subject (the human personality which is considered by Kant) is conditioned in time and space. So the subject can only, in refer- ence to itself, be affected by intuition conditioned by time and space ; that is, it can receive and deal with the manifold only when con- ditioned : this is why Kant speaks of our intuition as sensuous. For the subject, then, space and time must be forms of sensibility (Kant, pp. 72, 110). But this does not show that sensibility itself is conditioned in any way. These forms of sensibility have objective reality for the subject in relation to its concepts and judgments : they have no objective reality in themselves they condition the manifold only in relation to the subject. 1 The intuition of God is pure intuition. The subject of intuition (an intuitive self) being a condition, intuition must be presented to" it and received by it. But, for our present purpose, we are not concerned with the profound problems of the nature of this presentation or of this reception. 24 THE INTUITIVE SELF 25 ' In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiv- ing presentations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to its ' (my italics), ' and it alone fur- nishes us with intuitions : by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But all thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions : consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us ' (Kant, p. 21). Now this requires explanation, for on its face it would appear to state that sensibility does give objects. But this is not so. What Kant states is that objects are given to us or in relation to us and, as we are conditioned in certain ways, what is given must be limited by our power of reception before it can be received by us : what is given through sensibility is the manifold to be intuited. It is necessary also to point out that if it be held Kant says sensi- bility itself gives us intuitions, he is in error : he makes a statement opposed to his scheme of reasoning. For sensibility is passive, and so can only give the manifold to be intuited : by no possi- bility can it present the manifold in intuition, for that infers the presentation of intuition itself, and nothing passive can have in- tuition. The subject must be furnished with intuition actively, and this can only be by a subject of intuition. I think that Kant in saying sensibility furnishes us with intuitions means no more than that sensibility is a passive carrier for intuitions. Thought of the subject is active, and thought is a limit of intuition which must, therefore, also be active. The distinction between thought and intuition is in degree, not in kind. Again, we find that Kant here uses the plural word ' intuitions.' But what is given through sensibility is the manifold to be intuited. What, then, gives rise to intuitions ? Kant relates back an object which is given to us to aw intuition and, in this connection, we may well, as subjects, speak of intuitions. Kant distinguishes between intuition and human intuition. But bear in mind only intuition is presented. Intuitions have only subjective existence in relation to objects. In the Aesthetic Kant uses the word sensibility in a very limited sense. 1 In the Analytic, when considering Imagination (as defined by him), he extends its purview, and in so doing introduces, what 1 I have already stated that sensibility gives the manifold to be intuited. We find this justified from Kant's own words. 26 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY may be to some of us, confusion as to what the word really means. This is considered later on when we shall find, as will be submitted, that the fact of telepathy places Kant's reasoning on firmer ground. But, confining ourselves at present to the restricted meaning of sensibility as used in the Aesthetic, we find that Kant means by sensibility that which, in ordinary parlance, enables us to have sensuous information (intuitions) information through (what we term) our normal senses. Now the subject, wholly conditioned in time and space, is con- ditioned in some measure also by the normal organs of sense in time and space : it is not fully conditioned by these organs as we shall hereafter see. Through sensibility the manifold is given, not only objects : the subject through its normal senses receives the manifold in diversity (as objects). Bear in mind what has been recorded as to diversity. Kant's objects are not simple things : they are made up of parts, of varying presentations : they are particular syntheses of particulars of the manifold. If we consider our human experience, derived through the normal organs of sense, we shall find that this is so : we, necessarily, derive this experience in diversity. Why we receive the manifold in diver- sity, we do not know : all we know is the fact that we are so con- stituted that we do so receive it. Through sensibility is given the manifold, and this makes possible intuition of the manifold. But through sensibility (in its restricted meaning of the Aesthetic) objects only are given to us, and so con- ceptions of objects result from what Kant terms sensuous intuition. Kant, in stating his opinion with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general, says, ' We have intended, then, to say, that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena ; that the things which we intuite are not in them- selves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us ' (Kant, p. 35). Here Kant is using the word ' intuition ' in a limited sense, in the limited sense of our intuitions as subjects in time and space : he is speaking of human intuition. But when he states : ' Where we think of an object God which never can be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can never be an object of sensuous intuition we carefully avoid attributing to his intuition the conditions of space and time and intuition all his cognition must be, and not thought, which always includes limitation ' (Kant, p. 43) then he is using the word ' intuition ' in its full and real sense. He also refers to a subject whose understanding gives to it intuition direct, and not merely cognition from intuition. It is in this fetter sense, and this sense only, that I use the word intuition. But even in this sense the intuition of the intuitive self cannot be held to be the same as the THE INTUITIVE SELF 27 pure intuition of God. For though to us, as subjects, the intuition of the intuiting self is noumenal (that is, has reality as opposed to phenomenal thought), still the intuitive self must be a condition in relation to the Supreme, and so its intuition must be a limit of the pure intuition of the Supreme. For cognition there must be a determinate mode of intuition, that is, a conditioning or form of the manifold in intuition (cf . Kant, pp. 88, 89, 94). Kant, I submit, brings the whole question of the existence of the intuitive self to a head in the following passage : ' At the same time how (the) " I " who thinks is distinct from the " I " which intuites itself (other modes of intuition being cogitable as at least possible), and yet one and the same with this latter as the same subject ; how, therefore, I am able to say : " I," as an intelli- gence and thinking subject cognise myself as an object thought, so far as I am, moreover, given to myself in intuition only, like other phenomena, not as I am in myself, and as considered by the understanding, but merely as I appear," is a question that has in it neither more nor less difficulty than the question, " How can I be an object to myself ? " or this, " How can I be an object of my own intuition and internal perceptions ? " ' (p. 95). Note, at the outset, that Kant makes the ' I ' who thinks sub- jective to the ' I ' who intuites. For he says the ' I ' who thinks, thinks in a particular mode of intuition this follows from his ad- mission that other modes of intuition are at least cogitable. The ' I ' who thinks is therefore necessarily phenomenal of the ' I ' who intuites. Again, he asks how can the ' I ' who thinks be distinct from the ' I ' which intuites itself, and yet one and the same with this latter as the same subject ? I hold the question to be answerable only when we make the ' I ' which intuites objective in relation to the ' I ' which thinks as subjective. We can only reply reasonably by making the ' I ' which thinks, a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the ' I ' which intuites. And again, he asks, ' How can I be an object to myself ? ' I deny that I can be an object to myself : only a self of intuition can be an object to itself. But when he asks, ' How can I be an object of my own intuition and internal perception,' then I reply, ' If by " I " is meant the human personality in time and space and by " my own intuition and internal perceptions " is meant my real self as an intuitive self (that is, the / which intuites itself), then I can be an object of my intuitive self. Kant, I think, endorses this when he says : ' In the same way do I require, in order to the cognition of myself, not only the consciousness of myself or the thought that I think myself, but in addition an intuition of the manifold in myself, by which to determine this thought' (Kant, p. 97). Herein, he says, I, as a subject, cannot determine the thought of myself ; it 28 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY is only by intuition of the manifold in myself that I can determine myself. But by no possibility can we refer this ' intuition of the manifold in myself ' to myself as a subject of cognition. Intuition of the manifold in myself must be referred to a ' myself ' of intuition in the manifold, and it is this real self which determines the phe- nomenal self as an object. He says, also, that it is by the nature of our soul we attain to the clear consciousness of ourselves as sub- jects (Prolegomena, p. 100). Herein, we find, as in the previous passage, that, as subjects, we cannot attain to the clear consciousness (the determination) of ourselves as subjects : this determination can only be by the nature of our souls. I submit the fact of an intuitive self is sufficient, for all Kant requires is a personality which intuites and which presents intuition to its subject. The extracts given are reconcilable and understandable only when we make Kant's subject a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of an intuitive self. ' Cognition is necessarily limited. The categories are restricted, in their application to elements of possible experience, to that which is presented in intuition, and all intuition is for the ego contingent. But to assert that cognition is limited and its matter contingent, is to form the idea of an intelligence for whom cognition would not be limited, and for whom the data of intuition would not be given contingent facts, but necessarily produced along with the pure categories. 1 This idea of an intuitive understanding is the definite expression for the completed explanation which reason demands, and it involves the conception of a realm of objects for such an understanding, a realm of objects which, in opposition to the pheno- mena of our relative and limited experience, may be called noumena or things in themselves. The noumenon, therefore, is in one way the object of non-sensuous intuition, but more correctly is the expression of the limited and partial character of our knowledge. The idea of a noumenon is thus a limiting notion' (Ency. Brit., vol. xiii. p. 853, 9th ed.). The above extract from an article by Professor Adamson amounts, I submit, to a statement that the fact of the intuitive self is a fact underlying all Kant's reasoning in the Critique. For when we hold that cognition is limited and its matter contingent, we do not simply ' form the idea of an intelligence for whom cognition would not be limited ' we are driven to assume that such an intelligence exists. The term itself ' limited ' imports the existence of the unlimited : the statement that cognition (which is active) is necessarily limited, imports either cognition which is unlimited, or that cognition is an abstraction from thought unlimited in time and space from intuition. But cognition can only exist in the subject when intuition is presented to it, and received by it (so* far as it can be received) 1 I do not understand the meaning of the words ' the pure categories ' in the above connection. THE INTUITIVE SELF 29 in time and space. And this presentation must be active we are driven to assume the existence of an intelligence of intuition. In what is above written I have followed Kant closely. But here I must qualify what has been written, though this qualification, I think, will not vitiate Kant's line of reasoning. Possibly there is no qualification but only a statement of certain deductions direct from Kant's own reasoning. Sensibility is passive, so through it only the manifold to be intuited can be given : it cannot present the manifold in intuition. But the manifold in intuition must be presented to us before we can have any knowledge, any human experience. And the manifold in intuition is presented to us. From what source ? It must be presented actively from some source, and we cannot hold that sensibility, which is passive, is this active giver. There must be intuition in the source from which intuition is presented to us, and this necessarily infers that the source is personal has personality. Now Kant says : ' An understanding, in which all the manifold should be given by means of consciousness itself, would be intuitive ' (Kant, p. 83). This self of understanding I term the intuitive self, and I submit that Kant's scheme fails unless we introduce the intuitive self as a fact. For the manifold in intuition is presented to the subject, and this (active) presentation can only be by a self of intuition. When Kant states positively that I do (I must) intuite myself, he relies on the fact of the existence of an intuitive self, though he only vaguely terms it the soul of man. Sensibility then is the passive means for all knowledge ; but real knowledge (intuition) is presented to the subject. This presentation of real knowledge must be active, and can only be from an intuitive self as the giver. We have then : Through sensibility (passive) is given the manifold to be intuited : the intuitive self (active) receives the manifold in intuition. The intuitive self presents the manifold in intuition to its subject (the human personality in time and space). The subject receives the manifold in intuition so far as it can receive it (phenomenally) in time and space in its universe of relations. I do not think this qualification affects Kant's reasoning : it possibly amounts to no more than a justifiable interpretation. Indeed, if for the vague expression ' soul of man ' which he uses, we replace the more definite expression ' intuitive self,' it is possible his reasoning is rendered clearer and more direct. I have even attempted to prove that, reading between the lines, we find Kant himself relies on the existence of an intuitive self as a necessary part of his scheme. The intuition of the Supreme is in God ; His intuition is, what we may term, pure intuition. With this even as intuitive selves we can deal in no way. For the intuitive self must be a condition : 30 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY so its intuition cannot be pure intuition it must, in some way, be conditioned. While, therefore, we must hold that the ' soul of man ' is immortal, we cannot predicate this of the intuitive self. I think Kant introduces the ' soul of man ' because (as intuition is presented to the subject) he must have something intuitive in itself which can actively present intuition to the subject. We get this presentation of intuition from the intuitive self without travelling into the unknowable country of the soul of man. The confusion between the manifold on the one hand and the manifold in our apprehension on the other has taken so strong a hold on human thought that it is advisable to extend our considera- tion of the relation between the intuitive self and the subject (the human personality). When we consider human personality we find it is a thing not of any fixity or permanence but of successive change in time ; it is a thing of transience. The constitution of the material body of the subject is in a state of flux ; we cannot say that at any moment, even, this body is the same as it was in the preceding moment. And with the material body the material brain changes in like manner from moment to moment there is no fixity, no permanence ; all is subject to successive change in time. And all human thought, human ideas are functions of the particular constitution of each particular material brain. Sir Oliver Lodge, for instance, manifests higher output of brain action than a gutter-snipe, because the two differ in the material formation of their brains. (I neglect, now, the influence of environments, for I am considering the facts of personality itself, not the mere manifestations in action of human personality in our universe of relations.) We appear to ourselves to determine, to recognise, ourselves, even our human thought, as existing in change, in succession of time. I think Buddhism (certainly one school) stops short at considera- tion of the human personality it is the human personality that by learning (through human knowledge) ' life is sorrow ' arrives at the not I, where this not I is no more than a negation of human personality. ' What follows on the extinction of delusion ? ' asks a monk of the learned nun Dhammadinna. ' Abandon the question, brother ! I cannot grasp the meaning of the question. If it seem good to thee, go to the Enlightened One, ask him for an explanation of the question.' And the Buddha, asked, makes answer : 'Wise is Dhammadinna, and mighty in understanding. Wouldst thou ask me for an explanation, I would give thee exactly the same answer ' (Buddhist Essays, Macmillan & Co., 1908). Even that supreme exponent of the ^theory of the survival of human personality, F. W. H. Myers, has said : ' If an immortal soul there be within us, she must be able to THE INTUITIVE SELF 31 dispense with part of the brain's help while the brain is living, as with the whole of its help when it is dead ' (Proceedings S.P.R., vol. iv. p. 260). Myers (reading between the lines) acknowledged the fact that those distinctions manifested between human personalities which exist from differing constitution of the material brain only exist in time, that is, only so long as the particular material brains have earthly existence they disappear on death, or, at the lowest, are subsumed under what he would term the subliminal. So far, then, human personality exists only in time and ends with bodily death. For all human thought (which requires the help of the brain) exists in succession in time, and on the dissolution of the body and material brain neither exists any longer in succession in time. We find that I appear to determine myself as a mere subject of succession in time ; a subject of no fixity, no permanence. But by no possibility can a subject of succession in time deter- mine itself as a subject of succession in time. One and the same / cannot be an object to itself, unless it be the / which intuites itself. If I exist only in limits, by no possibility can I travel in thought outside those limits, whatever they may be. So the / which deter- mines itself as a subject of succession in time must exist free from the limits of succession in time, and we arrive at the conclusion that this / must be a personality which, in the present connection, determines not itself, but itself as partially and mediately mani- fested in (succession of) time. Myself, as the intuitional 7, 1 as a subject cannot determine : the thought is without content. I can only arrive at a conclusion (outside cognition) that I do exist as an intuitive self. Nor can I determine the intuition of myself as an intuitive self. All I can arrive at in thought is that intuition is the stuff (?) of my cognition as a human personality, so that it consists of more than knowledge of mere relations between phenomena, more than mere cognition in time and space. But, still, I can say that the intuitive self thinks in the manifold of intuition while the subject thinks synthetically in particulars of the manifold : the thought of the subject may be termed phenomenal, that of the intuitive self (relatively) noumenal. It follows that there is a relation between the intuition of the real self and the cognition of the subject, thought in the manifold of intuition is related to synthetic thought in particulars of the mani- fold of intuition. There are not two selves : there is no real relation of subject to object. The human personality is the intuitive self conditioned in (transient) time and space in a universe of relations. When we consider the manifold in our apprehension it takes the form of a ' loose ' or ' mere ' manifold, or a sum of particulars. So, in our apprehension, we arrive at a real synthesis (for self- 32 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY apperception) of this manifold. But this synthesis is no more than that which is necessary in our series of conditions for the self- apperception of the subject. If, however, we start with the manifold itself, that is, with the manifold (not as conditioned in any way but) as the unconditioned which completes our series of conditions, we find at once the pheno- menal nature of our synthesis. But we do more than this. It is we ourselves who determine the subject as thinking in limits of the manifold, who determine its self-apperception as phenomenal in its series of conditions. So we are driven to define ourselves as subjects thinking in the manifold itself with self -apperception which is (relatively) noumenal : for this self-apperception no synthesis is necessary. And these intuitive selves differ, so far, not in kind but in degree only from their subjects in time and space. The very fact that, to me, my cognitional thought exists in limits, proves the existence of thought in me higher than mere cognitional thought. And this higher form of thought must have been actively presented to and, at the least, partially and mediately received by me as a subject, or I could not determine cognitional thought as existing in limits. The / which determines itself as limited in cognitional thought must be a self of this form of thought higher than cognitional thought. If we once free ourselves from our ingrained assumption that thought is necessarily thought in succession in time, the difficulty vanishes in arriving (in reason, not cognition) at the intuitive self which thinks in the manifold in, as it were, ' a lump.' The question is one of thought, for there can be no fixity, no permanence of dis- tinctions of personality in space : relations in space are phenomenal only. We all, as human personalities, think within the same limits, the same particulars of the manifold : our universe of relations is one and the same. Why should our distinctions between one another as intuitive selves be lost when we all think free from such limits ? If, thereby, the distinctions disappear it must be because they are creations of thought in limits (particulars) of the manifold. I deny the possibility of such creation, so far as our present argument is concerned. When I think myself (assuming the thought has some content) what is the myself that I think ? I think myself as a subject distinct from other subjects in time and space. Even qua the intellectual I can only distinguish myself from other subjects in thought related ultimately to the particular material formation of my brain as dis- tinct from other material formations. 1 And these distinctions exist only in time and space. 1 All religions ignore intellectual distinctions : knowledge, as used by Gautama, is but a detail of will or feeling. THE INTUITIVE SELF 33 I think myself then only phenomenally : for space and time are phenomenal. But I assume that I do determine my own existence : my thinking self is an object of my real self (here we reverse the ordinary mean- ing of object and subject). And, as any subject (of space and time known to us) cannot think itself (determine itself) as an object, this real self must be one which can determine itself as a thinking self. The only solution is that an intuitive self exists which is the real self, and which determines its thinking self as a manifestation of itself in time and space. Bear in mind how very limited is our present inquiry into person- ality. We do not touch on any such abstract questions as those of God ; Nature ; Free-will ; the Soul of man. All I do is this : In psychology the science starts with an assumption of what may be termed the psychological ego, that is, the ego in relation to the series of conditions in which we exist as human personalities. I, on the other hand, start with the intuitive self and treat the psychological ego as a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of this intuitive self. I hold the intuitive self to be ' the ultimate postulate of all thought and action whatever' (cf. The Roots of Reality, by Belfort Bax, published by Grant Kichards, p. 53), and have tried to prove that all Kant's reasoning in the Critique is founded on the fact of the existence of this intuitive self. Mark, too, that though (following Kant) I treat the external as distinct from external personalities, I trench in no way on the question of the ultimate relation of the external to personality. Let us make a preposterous assumption : let us assume that Fichte, Hegel, for instance, and, to some extent, Schopenhauer, all confused the manifold with the manifold in our apprehension, so that their reasoning fails because they were all attempting the impossible : attempting, that is, to explain, to compass, the unconditioned by reasoning within the limits of their series of con- ditions. Or in other words that their reasoning fails because they start with (unconscious ?) denial that the manifold is the unconditioned which completes our series of conditions and treat it as subject to (conditioned by) our apprehension ; that is, treat it as a subject of human reasoning. Even with this preposterous assumption the present argument is not affected. For I attempt in no way to explain or dissect the manifold. I treat even the intuitive self as a condition, and though I hold that, to us, it exists in the manifold, I suggest the possibility, even the strong probability, that what is, to us, the manifold of the intuitive self, may itself be conditioned in some way, though not in our series of conditions. TIME AND SPACE THE relation between time and space has little to do with the argu- ment and so need not be discussed at length. But there must be some short reference to the subject, in order to get rid so far as possible of what may appear to be confusion in my use of the terms. This confusion exists because I am unable to distinguish between time and space : they are, to me, but, as it were, different appear- ances of one and the same thing. Following a theory two thousand years old, I have argued elsewhere that we are not conditioned in space and time but in motion, and that ideas of space and time are derivative only. The external (motion) we regard as conditioned in space : the external (motion) as affecting us internally (in intel- lectual thought) has for us the aspect of time. Kant, I think, points to something of which time and space are but aspects. Space imports the existence of time : time ordinarily imports the existence of space. Space is the external appearance of our con- ditioning : time the internal affect on us of the same conditioning. ' All that can be given to our senses is the outer in space, the inner in time ' (Prolegomena, p. 31). When we regard the external we regard it as conditioned in space. But when this same external affects us (when, we may say, the external regards us) it affects us as conditioned in time. Kant says : ' What we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere repre- sentations of our sensibility, whose form is space ' (Kant, p. 28). This, I think, is the same as saying that outward objects (the external) when regarded by us (through sensibility as external representations) take on the appearance of being conditioned in space. Kant also says : ' Time is nothing but the form of our internal intuition ' (Kant, p. 33), and elsewhere he speaks of the mere non- entity of time (Kant, p. 43). This, I think, is the same as saying that the same outward objects (the same and one external) affect us (through our internal sense as internal presentations through sensibility) under the appearance of being conditioned in time. These differing conditions of appearances would apparently result merely from the external being on the one hand considered as seen or felt as the external, and, on the other h^and, being considered qua its effect on the internal sense. In the Dissertation Kant defines space as ' the absolutely first 34 TIME AND SPACE 35 formal principle of the sensible world.' He defines time also in the same way as ' the absolutely first formal principle of the sensible world ' (Kant's Dissertation, p. 63 and 67). He, so far, makes no distinction between them in definition. I cannot find that he resiles from this position in the Critique. The only distinction he there raises is that he says we regard the external as, in appearance, conditioned in space : that our internal sense is affected by the external as, in appearance, conditioned in time. The subject is conditioned in relation to the external. It regards the external in one way, it is affected by the external in another way. Kant himself, in the Critique, explains at length how it is that our internal sense is affected by the external in time (in suc- cession and, as it were, in a line a plane ?), and how it is we regard the external in space (in three dimensions). James Ward says : ' We should never have a self-consciousness at all if we had not previously learnt to distinguish occupied and unoccupied space, past and present in time, and the like. But, again, it is equally true that, if we could not feel and move as well as receive impressions, and if experience did not repeat itself, we should never attain even to this level of spatial and temporal intuition ' (Ency. Brit., vol. xx. p. 81, 9th ed.). James Ward was considering the science of psychology when he made the above statement. But I think, so far, it supports the contention that both our spatial and temporal intuition result from our being conditioned in motion. IMAGINATION, TELEPATHY, AND THE INTUITIVE SELF 1 ONE difficulty encountered as yet in the argument preferred, has been as to the extent that the subject may be affected by the external through sensibility : for sometimes Kant would appear to restrict sensibility to the ' giving ' of objects. I begin now by attempting to remove this difficulty by a consideration of what the purview of sensibility must be if we assume the subject is affected through sensibility otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. I do not enter on any full discussion of difference between the meanings attached to sensibility by Kant, Leibnitz, or others, or as to whether or not Kant used the word as having different meanings. I assume that through sensibility the subject is affected, not only through, but otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, and submit that by so extending the purview of sensibility we remove great part of the difficulty some of us find in following the reasoning of Kant. I think the Critique requires from sensibility something more than the mere giving of objects. Sensibility is passive : through it is given to the subject the manifold to be intuited. It gives (passively) the manifold itself, that is the (relatively) noumenal necessarily unconditioned in time and space as known to us. Through its normal organs of sense the subject (conditioned in time and space) receives the manifold in diversity (data of sense). Otherwise than through its normal organs of sense it receives the manifold not in diversity : for diversity (a limit or abstraction) results solely from the limited and particular powers of reception of the normal organs of sense. I shall hereafter argue that human experience establishes, prac- tically, the fact that the subject is affected by sensibility otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. And, if this be so, it follows that sensibility gives 2 to the subject the manifold as fully as the subject, conditioned in time and space, and not conditioned by its normal organs of sense, can receive it : it gives the universal 1 ' Imagination ' I now use in the meaning attached to it by Kant. 'Telepathy,' for the purposes of this chapter, may be defined generally as a term expressive of the fact that through sensibility the subject is affected otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. When we, afterwards, consider human experience, this definition must be particularised. 2 The verb 'gives' in relation to sensibility is always used in a passive sense. 36 IMAGINATION, TELEPATHY, AND INTUITIVE SELF 37 or what may be termed the manifold of sense from which is derived the manifold in our apprehension. Sensibility gives the manifold to be intuited : sensibility gives, to the subject, the manifold to be intuited in its (the subject's) apprehension, where this apprehension is conditioned in time and space the ' universal ' (that is, the manifold in our apprehension) is received not conditioned in diversity as received through the normal organs of sense. This ' universal ' is a continuum from unity to diversity (which are the limits of contradiction in our universe). Professor Adamson referring to the manifold of sense as defined by Kant says : ' The manifold of sense, which plays so important a part in the critical theory of knowledge, is left in an obscure and perplexed position. . . . The sense manifold is not to be con- ceived as having, per se, any of the qualities of objects as actually cognised ; its parts are not cognisable, per se, nor can it with propriety be said to be received successively or simultaneously ' (Ency. Brit., vol. xiii. p. 851, 9th ed.). Professor Adamson would appear to use the terms ' the manifold of sense,' and ' the sense-manifold ' as both having the same mean- ing : that is, he does not hold either term refers to a faculty (?) of the subject, but that both mean the manifold given through sensi- bility and received (so far as it can be received) by the subject. I think he means the manifold as conditioned by reception by the subject and, if so, I doubt that Kant can be said to leave it in an obscure and perplexed position. It is an expression for the ' uni- versal ' which the subject receives through sensibility otherwise than through its (the subject's) normal organs of sense. So it can have none of the qualities of objects as actually cognised all its reception does is to make possible for the subject the cognition of objects. And, therefore, its parts cannot, per se, be cognisable. The term ' parts ' has no meaning in relation to the universal until, in our apprehension, the universal appears to us as a synthesis. Whether it can with propriety be said to be received neither successively nor simultaneously is a more difficult question to deal with. We cannot, indeed, say that the manifold, itself, is given through sensibility either successively or simultaneously, for either word has meaning only in time and the manifold itself is given through sensibility unconditioned in time. So the intuitive self cannot be said to receive the manifold either successively nor simul- taneously. But the subject which receives the manifold of sense is a subject conditioned in time, and so receives the manifold of sense in time. Still I doubt whether this manifold of sense can, in itself, be said to be received as either simultaneous or successive : for having no parts it has nothing to which to refer simultaneity or succession. It is when we regard this manifold of sense in our apprehension it appears to us as a sum of particulars, as a synthesis of diversity 38 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY from which we extract, by analysis, our data of sense. And so, I think, the manifold of sense appears to us as received simultaneously. But we thus arrive only at a principle for the empirical use of the understanding. All we can say is that by regarding the manifold of sense as a sum of particulars we arrive at that (phenomenal) synthesis necessary for thought in analysis (cf. Kant, p. 136, first paragraph ; Prolegomena, p. 83). The facts of telepathy hereinafter referred to support, I think, the theory that the subject is affected through sensibility, otherwise than through its normal organs of sense free from the conditioning of time and space. And we must bear in mind that all synthesis and analysis are phenomenal : both have existence for the human understanding only. Why this is so we do not know ; Kant refers synthesis to a power of the soul. So, though the reception of the manifold of sense is a reception in time, it appears to me reasonable to hold that there is no reception either simultaneously or succes- sively. The manifold of sense (the universal) is a particular of the manifold itself, and it is only when the understanding uses this manifold of sense as the background, as it were, for data of sense, that it appears to the understanding as a synthesis or sum of parti- culars. The subject, though conditioned in time, does, I think, to some limited extent think in the manifold (cf. pp. 95, 96). But, so far, we have no thinking, no active cognitional subject, for we have, as yet, considered directly but the potentiality of the subject in reception. I deny that by any possibility can sensibility, which is passive, present intuition, thought, or cognition to the sub- ject to make it as it is, an active subject. Such presentation must be active. That active thought of the subject, which makes it an active subject, lies in cognition, and cognition is a limit of intuition. So intuition must be (actively) presented to the subject. And this active presentation is, as before shown, from the intuitive self. But now, by introducing the fact of telepathy, we find that the sub- ject can receive from its intuitive self intuition applicable to the ' universal ' as well as to diversity. We thus get, directly, the ' universal ' in our apprehension which is necessary for the particular (data of sense) to be the subjects of cognition. For sensibility, in its now extended meaning, enables the subject to be affected by the external otherwise than through its normal organs of sense. (Sensi- bility being the passive source of all knowledge, we may still possibly speak of the intuition the subject receives as sensuous. But, if so, we must expand our meaning of the word sensuous : it now includes affects received by the subject otherwise than through its normal organs of sense.) Let us consider a certain paragraph written by Professor Adamson which deals with the alleged inconsistences and imperfections of Kant's doctrine : IMAGINATION, TELEPATHY, AND INTUITIVE SELF 39 ' The mode in which Kant endeavours to show how the several portions of cognition are subjectively realised, brings into the clearest light the inconsistences and imperfections of his doctrine. Sense had been assumed as furnishing the particular of knowledge, under- standing as furnishing the universal : and it had been expressly declared that the particular was cognisable only in and through the universal. Still, each was conceived as somehow in itself complete and finished. Sense and understanding had distinct functions, and there was wanting some common term, some intermediary which should bring them into conjunction. Data of sense as purely particular could have nothing in common with the categories as purely universal. But data of sense had at least one universal aspect their aspect as the particular of the general forms, space and time. Categories were in themselves abstract and valueless, serviceable only when restricted to possible objects of experience. There was thus a common ground on which category and intuition were united in one, and an intermediate process whereby the uni- versal of the category might be so far individualised as to compre- hend the particular of sense. This intermediate process which is really the junction of understanding and sense Kant calls pro- ductive imagination, and it is only through productive imagination that knowledge or experience is actually realised in one subjective consciousness. The specific forms of productive imagination are called schemata, and upon the nature of the schema Kant gives much that has proved of extreme value for subsequent thought ' (Ency. Brit., vol. xiii. p. 852, 9th ed.). The statement that : ' Sense had been assumed as furnishing the particulars of knowledge, understanding as furnishing the uni- versal, and it had been expressly declared that the particular was cognisable only in and through the universal,' is, I think, erroneous, so far as the first part of the sentence is concerned. It is true Kant lays down, at first, the principle that sensibility gives only objects. He was concluded by the then state of human experience to the fact that sensibility affects the subject only through the normal organs of sense. But, later on, he is driven to assume that sensibility gives more than objects. ' Now that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination, a mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual synthesis and sensibility, manifoldness of appre- hension ' (Kant, p. 100). In considering the above statement, bear in mind that Kant also says : ' Apperception (and its synthetical unity) . . . applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects ' (Kant, p. 94). If sensibility be confined to giving objects only, then it cannot give manifoldness of apprehension. Sensibility (in this restricted meaning) gives the manifold to be intuited, but the subject receives 40 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY (and only receives) the manifold (through its normal organs of sense) conditioned in diversity the subject can have only sensuous intuition to operate with. There may be, for the subject, a synthesis of this sensuous intuition, but this synthesis exists only in relation to the subject and its (phenomenal) synthetical unity. We not only make the subject with its synthetical unity purely phenomenal, but we fail to get the presentation to the subject of the ' universal,' which is absolutely necessary for its cognition. And Kant sees and admits the difficulty when he says apper- ception (and its synthetical unity) applies to the manifold of in- tuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects. The manifold of intuition in general must be presented prior to all sensuous intuition of objects as a condition precedent to apper- ception and its synthetical unity. But sensibility is the medium for this presentation, and so must give more than objects : it must give the manifold to be intuited. And, for the subject, we must have a sense-manifold, that is, the subject must have the potenti- ality of being affected through sensibility by more than objects, which is the same thing as saying it can be affected otherwise than through its normal organs of sense. And Kant says there is a sense- manifold. It is thus seen that Kant ultimately interprets sensibility as furnishing more than mere particulars of knowledge : it furnishes the universal. That Kant never assumed that the understanding furnishes the universal, but that it is furnished through sensibility, is shown by the following passages : ' Imagination is the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in intuition. Now, as all our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by reason of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding, belongs to sensibility ' (Kant, p. 93). ' Now that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination, a mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual synthesis and sensibility, manifoldness of appre- hension ' (Kant, p. 100). I have dealt at length with the impossibility of sensibility, which is passive, giving intuition to the subject and so now ignore the question. But why in this connection does Kant introduce imagination ? Because he is bound to hold that sensibility (as a faculty ?) must be able to give more than objects ' present in intuition.' If we hold that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, we get directly this ' power of imagination ' from sensibility. But, however this may be, Kant does not hold that the understanding furnishes the universal. All he says is that it operates with the universal given through sensi- IMAGINATION, TELEPATHY, AND INTUITIVE SELF 41 bility and contributes that unity of intellectual synthesis which is necessary for the phenomenal self-apperception of the subject. Kant makes this self-apperception phenomenal of the (relatively) noumenal self-apperception of the soul : he even refers synthesis, ultimately, to a power or function of the soul (Kant, p. 62). Again, if sensibility affects the subject only through the normal organs of sense, we get from sensibility only data of sense (diversity) and these, as purely particular, can have nothing to do with the categories as universal. But the particular is cognisable only in and through the universal. (Our universe, as already shown, is one of phenomenal relations, and these cannot give cognition unless a ' general scheme ' of relations is present in the understanding. Or we may perhaps say there must be present in the understanding a full integration (the universal) before partial integrations (data of sense) can produce cognition). Here we find Kant's great difficulty, which led him to his theories of imagination and the schematism of the understanding. But if the subject has the potentiality of being affected through sensibility otherwise than through the normal organs of sense I submit the difficulty disappears. Without introducing ' imagination,' we get through sensibility the universal and the particular : without any schema, we get the universal received by the subject. We have, directly, what Kant wanted. It may be true Kant makes sense and understanding distinct functions (?) for sensibility is passive and so gives only the manifold to be intuited, whereas the understanding operates actively with intuition presented actively to it. But Kant did not require to bring sense and understanding into conjunction : he had already got sensibility as giving the manifold to be intuited. What he wanted was power of reception in the understanding from sensi- bility of more than objects : he wanted power of reception of the universal. And he reading between the lines gets this by making sensibility affect the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. Sensibility remains sensibility whether or not we term it imagination. The categories exist and have effect only for our universe : the reception of the ' universal ' from the manifold given to be intuited exists and has effect only for our human understanding. Both are conditioned in and determined by time and space as known to us. The categories are general rules or forms of thought deter- mined by the subject itself as defining the limits of its understanding in operation. This power of determination imports the potentiality of the reception by the understanding (through sensibility) of the universal. Kant's statement that the understanding has an original poicer of conjoining the manifold of intuition (Kant, p. 94), requires some 42 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY explanation, for, on its face, this would appear to give the under- standing power to create its own self-apperception. But this is not so. For the intuitive self (the relatively noumenal self) intuites itself, and for such intuition no conjunction of the manifold in intui- tion is necessary. The conjoining of the manifold in intuition is a conditioning of the manifold in intuition necessary only for the (phenomenal) subject's apperception because the subject is con- ditioned in time and space. So this power of conjunction in the subject can only be said to be original in that it is peculiar to the subject, and it marks in the subject no more than a limit of the full power of thought of the intuitive self. In the Dissertation Kant does not introduce imagination or the faculty of imagination : he does not give to the understanding this original power to conjoin the manifold of intuition. But he must get what, in the Dissertation, he terms co-ordina- tion of all sensations from somewhere. He gets it from a law or power of the soul : ' Things cannot appear to the senses under any form but by means of a power of the soul co-ordinating all sensations in accordance with a fixed law implanted in its nature ' (Dissertation, p. 66). ' For sensations excite this act of the mind the co-ordinating its sense concepts in accordance with perpetual laws but do not influence intuition, neither is there anything connate here except the law of the soul, in accordance with which it conjoins in a certain way its sensations derived from the presence of an object ' (Disserta- tion, pp. 68 and 69). And in the Critique itself he does not resile from this position. For he says : ' Synthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the mere operation of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious ' (Kant, p. 62, cf. p. 109, last four lines). It is, to me, most strange that so many of Kant's commentators miss the point that Kant's whole scheme falls to the ground unless we give reality to, what he terms, the soul of man. We find then that Kant, in the Critique, follows his reasoning in the Dissertation ; that is, he only gives subjectively to the under- standing any original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition : he relates synthesis to a blind but indispensable function of the soul. This means, I hold, that the soul of man is Kant's real subject, and that his subject (the human personality) is no more than a manifestation of its soul in time and space. Synthesis is merely a necessary condition (or limit) for Kant's subject in time and space. If, however, we assume sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, abandon reliance on any IMAGINATION, TELEPATHY, AND INTUITIVE SELF 43 blind but indispensable function of the soul, and rely on the exist- ence of the I which intuites itself, I think Kant's reasoning is strengthened. We may, in reason, give (transcendental ?) unity of apperception to the intuitive self for which it requires no synthesis. But for the subject (the human personality) conditioned in time and space, we find this synthesis is inherently necessary, not as creating any real unity but as a condition of its active existence in time and space. If the active subject in time and space is given or assumed, I submit its unity of apperception (requiring a synthesis) is also given or assumed : they appear to me but differing expressions for one and the same thing. But the subject and its unity of apperception are merely phenomenal, they are no more than manifestations in time and space of the intuitive self and its (transcendental ?) unity of apperception. And now, when we assume sensibility affects the subject other- wise than through the normal organs of sense, we find that sensi- bility gives to the subject the manifold to be intuited and that the subject can receive this manifold not conditioned by its (the subject's) normal organs of sense ; that is, can receive it in the universal. It is this acception which makes Kant's co-ordination of all sensations possible. The subject (through intuition presented to it by its intuitive self) can operate with the universal. We no longer require reliance on a blind but indispensable function of the soul. And we can now interpret ' imagination ' simply. Imagination as belonging to sensibility expresses sensibility itself in reference to the continuum from unity to diversity (the universal), which the subject can receive from the manifold to be intuited given through sensibility. Imagination as belonging to the understand- ing marks the operation of the understanding on the universal which has been received through sensibility. This operation infers (phenomenal) synthesis. It is not said that we now require the terms imagination or the faculty of imagination. I refer to them only to show that, assuming sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, we do not vitiate, but possibly strengthen, Kant's reasoning. In this connection it is to be noted that Professor Adamson criticises Kant's definition of the mind or self in that ' the mind or self appears as though it were endowed with a complex machinery by which alone it could act upon the material supplied to it ' (Ency. Brit., vol. xiii. p. 851). But surely this criticism is not well based ? For, throughout the Critique, Kant makes this ' mind ' or ' self ' phenomenal of the soul of man : he even refers the transcendental synthesis of imagination necessary for the self-apperception of the subject to a function of the soul of the subject. Kant's subject is a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the soul 44 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY of the subject. And as he holds our world is but one of other possible worlds, he necessarily treats his subject (the mind or self) as being endowed with a particular complex machinery by which alone it can operate upon that which is presented to it. It may be that, herein, the distinction between the / which intuites itself and the / which thinks itself is lost sight of by Professor Adamson, a blindness shared by Cousin and other commentators. Bear in mind that the present argument has little or nothing to do with Kant's Dialectic, and that in substituting the term ' intuitive self ' for the term ' soul of man ' used by Kant, I rely, hereafter, on the evidence of human experience. In support of the argument that Kant's reasoning is not vitiated, but strengthened and clarified if we give sensibility the extended meaning in question, and, abandoning all reference to the soul of man, 1 rely only on the fact of the existence of the intuitive self, I now paraphrase an important passage from the Critique : ' That which determines the internal sense is the understanding and its original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is, of bringing this under an apperception. (Upon which rests the possibility of the understanding itself) ' (Kant, p. 94). In the first place, for the understanding to operate on the manifold of intuition this manifold of intuition must be presented actively to it, the understanding. And this presentation cannot be by sensibility : for sensibility, which marks, for the subject, no more than the potentiality of being affected, is passive. The presentation of the manifold of intuition must be active. Again, the manifold of intuition is not conditioned in time and space, while the understanding is so conditioned. So the con- junction of the manifold of intuition by the understanding is not real but phenomenal, it is a conditioning in time and space of this mani- fold. This I have termed the abstraction of unity from the mani- fold. If we hold that this conjunction is real then we make the understanding (a phenomenon of time and space) create a noumenon, which is impossible. ' Now, as the human understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition, and is unable to exercise such a power, in order to conjoin, as it were, the manifold of its own intuition, the synthesis of under- standing is, considered per se, nothing but the unity of action, of which, as such, it is self-conscious, even apart from sensibility, by which, moreover, it is able to determine our internal sense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to it according to the form of sensuous intuition ' (Kant, p. 94). What does Kant, when speaking of the human understanding, mean by ' the manifold of its own intuition ' ? This understanding is not a faculty of intuition. He must nfean the manifold of intui- 1 The argument does not in any way touch on the question of whether a soul in man does or does not exist. Df AGINATION, TELEPATHY, AND INTUITIVE SELF 45 tion which is presented to it, the understanding. And this pre- sentation, I repeat, must be active. Has Kant's ' internal sense ' only a form of sensuous intuition ? If so, how is intuition itself presented to the understanding ? ' Thus, under the name of a transcendental synthesis of imagina- tion, the understanding exercises an activity upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is ; and so we are right in saying that the internal sense is affected thereby ' (Kant, p. 94). (The word trans- cendental is probably introduced because Kant gets the power of synthesis from the soul of man.) This would appear to make the understanding an active faculty of the internal sense, the internal sense being treated as passive. And Kant continues : ' Apperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal sense. The former, as the source of all our synthetical conjunction, applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensu- ous intuition of objects. The internal sense, on the contrary, con- tains merely the form of intuition, but without any synthetical conjunction of the manifold therein, and consequently does not contain any determined intuition, which is possible only through consciousness of the determination of the manifold by the trans- cendental act of the imagination (synthetical influence of the under- standing on the internal sense) which I have named figurative synthesis ' (Kant, p. 94). I think Kant here suggests that the internal sense contains the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects ; and that the understanding determines (in synthetical conjunction) this intuition. For, if not, then the internal sense contains merely a form of intuition, and the giving of the manifold of intuition in general prior to all sensuous intuition of objects must be through sensibility otherwise than through affection on the in- ternal sense. There appears to be a difficulty here as to how the internal sense is to be defined. But the point I make is that Kant holds apperception and its synthetical unity apply to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects. If the understanding is a faculty of the internal sense (a re- ceptivity) as passive, then the internal sense must (following Kant) contain the manifold to be intuited in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects. The internal sense (passively acceptive) must contain the manifold which is to be intuited by the subject. If sensibility gives only sensuous intuition (objects in diversity), how can there be active presentation to the subject of the manifold of intuition in general prior to all sensuous intuition of objects ? Such presentation is impossible : for it is through sensibility alone that the subject has the potentiality of being affected. It follows that sensibility must give more than sensuous intuition of objects, 46 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY and, through sensibility, the subject must have power to receive more than sensuous intuition of objects it must have power to be affected by sensibility otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. The apperception of the subject applies to the manifold of intuition in general, so this manifold of intuition must be presented to the subject and received by it so far as it can be received in time and space. This infers such power of reception in the subject, and all potentiality of reception in the subject from the external can only be found in sensibility. THE SCHEMA I HAVE argued that reading between the lines Kant's reasoning in the Critique is based on an assumption that the subject can be afiected through sensibility otherwise than through its (the sub- ject's) normal organs of sense : his Dreams of a Spirit Seer is based on the assumption. And, that this potentiality in the subject is possible, is shown in a remarkable passage in the Critique itself. Therein Kant refers to the possibility of ' a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may be.' It is true that, speaking of this and other conceptions, he says, ' They are conceptions, the possibility of which has no grounds to rest upon. For they are not based on experience and its known laws : and without experience they are a mere arbitrary conjunction of thoughts, which, though containing no internal contradiction, has no claim to objective reality, neither, consequently, to the possi- bility of such an object as is thought in these conceptions ' (Kant, p. 164). Bear in mind, however, that he holds this ' power of the mind ' to be possible, because, as he states, it contains no internal contradiction. He rejects its consideration for the sole reason that he could find no basis for its acceptance in human experience and known laws. I suggest that we now have grounds based on human experience for such acceptance. If we consider Kant's schema and the schematism of the under- standing under the light of (as I now assume) our lately acquired human experience that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, I think we shall be able to follow his reasoning. In spite of certain modern authoritative opinion I cannot but think the theory of the schema contains pro- found and valuable truth. Kant says that conceptions ' are quite impossible, and utterly without significance, unless either to them, or at least to the elements of which they consist, an object be given ' ; here he refers to conceptions of diversity ' and that, consequently, they cannot possibly apply to objects as things-in-themselves without regard to the question whether and how these may be given to us, by means of the modification of our sensibility, and, finally, that pure a priori conceptions in addition to the function of the understanding in (under ?) the category, must contain a priori formal conditions of sensibility (of the internal sense, namely) which again contain the 47 48 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object. This formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the conception of the understanding is restricted in its employment we shall name the schema of the understanding, and the pro- cedure of the understanding with these schemata we shall call the schematism of the pure understanding. The schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the imagination. But as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single intuition, but merely unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema is clearly distinguish- able from the image ' (Kant, p. 108). (Is not the internal sense here treated as more than a mere receptivity for sensuous intui- tions ?) If we hold that sensibility gives only data of sense (diversity) then we find that Kant in the above passage is seeking to get rid of the conflict between the category as the universal and the data of sense as the particular. (He says the schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the imagination he introduces ' imagination ' to get his ' universal.') But, if this be so, what does he mean when he says that pure a priori conceptions must contain a priori formal conditions of sensibility which again contain the general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object ? These conceptions are conceptions of the understanding, and only through sensibility (which is passive) can the understanding get its ' stuff ' to enable it to arrive at any conceptions. So sensibility must give ' the general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object' must give the universal which is necessary for cognition of the particular. (The manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the under- standing and independently of it ' (Kant, p. 89). It is sensibility through which the manifold to be intuited is given.) Thus we get our schema direct through sensibility, not from a mere product of the imagination, while we see that the schema is clearly dis- tinguished from the image. By making sensibility affect the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, we clarify Kant's reasoning without rejecting it. Kant, when treating of diversity and its synthesis, begins by stating : ' The first thing that must be given to us in order to the a priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition ; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second ' (Kant, p. 63). But later on he says : ' In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions ' (Kant, p. 109). When, then, Kant refers to a ' synthesis of diversity ' what is this diversity ? If schemata lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions, I think he must have a synthesis of schemata. And, if we assume sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through THE SCHEMA 49 the normal organs of sense, we have to hand the schema as founda- tion for this synthesis of schemata. But, however this may be, if schemata lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions, they must be given to us, and by no means can they be given unless through sensibility. Sensibility, then, can give us more than objects can affect us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense. When Kant says, ' The first thing that must be given to us in order to the a priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition ; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second,' he gets what Cousin terms ' remin- iscence.' And this is of great importance when we (as we shall hereafter) consider memory. But this synthesis of diversity is not sufficient for him : he must have something else. So, later on, he says : ' In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous con- ceptions.' These schemata must result from what is given through sensi- bility, and (there being no objects given) must be given by sensi- bility as affecting the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. What is received (passively) through sensibility is the schema : the schemata exist only (phenomenally) in relation to the understanding and its schematism. It is too often forgotten that Kant refers synthesis, not to the understanding, but to a function of the soul of the subject, so that while he holds there is an / which intuites itself he holds that the subject ' intuites itself, not as it would represent itself immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which the mind is internally affected, consequently, as it appears, and not as it is ' (Kant, p. 41). He states also that I, as a subject, require ' in order to the cognition of myself, not only the consciousness of my- self or the thought that I think myself, but in addition an intuition of the manifold in myself, by which to determine this thought ' (Kant, p. 97). That is, I can only as an intuitive self determine myself as a subject. Kant assumes the existence of the intuitive self : for I do determine myself. Now if we begin with this intuitive self in reasoning, and work down to the subject, instead of beginning with the subject and working up to the intuitive self, Kant's Schema and the schematism of the understanding are rendered clearer in our thought. Sensibility gives the manifold to be intuited ; the subject receives this manifold to be intuited in time and space : it receives it through and otherwise than through its normal organs of sense. The recep- tion through the normal organs of sense is a reception of particulars of the manifold (diversity). The reception otherwise than through the normal organs of sense is a reception of the manifold in time and space, that is, the manifold is received in a continuum from unity D 50 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY to diversity (the universal) which are the limits of contradiction of our universe of relations. The reception through the normal organs of sense gives objects : the reception otherwise gives the universal. The universal appears, to us, in our apprehension as a sum or total of particulars. From this latter reception we get, through sensibility, Kant's schema, and it requires no further argu- ment to show that without this schema given to the understanding, objects would have no meaning in cognition : the particular is cog- nisable only in and through the universal. The intuitive self presents intuition to the subject. But the sub- ject is conditioned in time and space and so can only receive in- tuition conditioned in time and space. But assuming sensibility affects it otherwise than through the normal organs of sense the understanding now gets, through sensibility, not only objects, but the schema to operate on. The understanding being conditioned in time, the schema is, to it, so conditioned : the categories (which apply to our universe in time) apply generally and are logically correct rules for the schema. Kant says that ' it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions ' (Kant, p. 109). And this requires explanation, for it is only the schema which is received by the subject. Just as Kant relates conceptions to intuitions, though only intuition is presented, so he relates back images of objects to schemata, though only the schema is given. When I think of a number in the particular I can relate this back to its particular schema of a number in general. But just as all classes of objects given to and received by the subject are phenomenal only, so their schemata are phenomenal only. The schema itself is the manifold given to be intuited and received (phenomenally) in time and space. Thus Kant says : ' Hence it is apparent that the schematism of the understanding by means of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, amounts to nothing else than the unity of the manifold of intuition in the internal sense ' (Kant, p. 112). The schematism of the understand- ing is the procedure of the understanding with the schemata, and Kant, herein, defines the schema as the manifold of intuition in the internal sense. The manifold of intuition in the internal sense can only be in the internal sense so far as it can be affected through sensibility. The only distinction I raise is that the internal sense (a recep- tivity) can only contain the manifold to be intuited : it is the recep- tacle of the ' stuff ' on which the subject can operate with the in- tuition presented to it (the subject) from the intuitive self. The internal sense being conditioned in time and space the manifold to be intuited which it contains is so conditioned. Bear in mind, too, that Kant has said, ' apperception (and its THE SCHEMA 51 synthetical unity) . . . applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects ' (Kant, p. 94). So when he refers above to the manifold of intuition in the internal sense, I think he does not mean to re- strict this manifold of intuition to affects on the internal sense through the normal organs of sense, and it is important to note that now it is the schematism of the understanding which is in question for the transcendental synthesis of the imagination there is no synthesis of mere objects. But the intuitive self intuites and determines itself without any synthesis, so the synthesis of the subject must mark a conditioning of personality, must result from the limited nature or constitution of the subject. It is phenomenal. I am afraid I must admit I can find nothing transcendental in the ' synthesis of the imagination.' Given a subject unconditioned in time and space. By no possi- bility can we make any synthesis necessary for its self-apperception. But given a subject conditioned in time and space then we must have a synthesis. For no matter how or by what external such a subject is affected it must, in its human experience, refer all affec- tion to itself as a thing of place and succession in time, and this imports synthesis. But there is no real synthesis, for the external remains the same whether or not the subject exist. Self-apper- ception of the subject means that it refers all its experience to itself as a thing of space and time. The self -thought of this ' particular of time and space ' imports synthesis of its experience. Before leaving this part of the subject one aspect has to be considered which is opened by our giving to sensibility power to affect the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense : The particular is cognisable only in and through the universal : the universal must be in the understanding for any conception of diversity to exist. (We shall find this is so in human experience when we hereafter consider memory.) Real knowledge is in the intuitive self only : the knowledge of the subject is but knowledge of relations between phenomena. Sensibility gives us, through our normal organs of sense objects : it gives to us the external in diversity. We cannot hold that there is any reality in this diversity. For the diversity arises from the conditioning by the normal organs of sense of the manifold given to be intuited. What then does sensibility give us when received by us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense ? When the understanding uses ideas (as distinct from feeling or impressions) it uses them ordinarily as conditioned in the visual, auditory or tactile. This arises, I think, from the fact that the human personality is so largely conditioned by its normal organs of 52 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY sense : its understanding operates ordinarily as altogether subject to (conditioned by) its normal organs of sense. f But when sensibility affects us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense we do not receive the manifold as conditioned in the visual, auditory or tactile. This is an important fact sometimes lost sight of when telepathy is considered. (Both Gurney and Myers, as we shall afterwards see, recognised the fact.) So if these affects from sensibility emerge in the understanding as visual, auditory or tactile ideas, this must result from the understanding itself relating them to, or conditioning them in, the visual, auditory or tactile after reception. It follows that from the nature of the understanding itself as con- ditioned by the normal organs of sense results the conditioning in diversity of the manifold to be intuited which is given to the under- standing. (If we consider diversity I think it is a function of the visual, auditory or tactile.) For as the manifold to be intuited, received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, is not received in diversity, certainly not as visual, auditory or tactile, we can only hold that this reception in diversity arises when the reception is through the normal organs of sense. Bear in mind, however, that when the understanding conditions in diversity the manifold to be intuited given to it, there is no creation of diversity : diversity, as before shown, is no more than an abstraction from the manifold. This abstraction exists because of the particular and limited nature of the understanding as conditioned by its normal organs of sense. We get, then, the manifold to be intuited given to the subject and received by it (otherwise than through the normal organs of sense) not conditioned in diversity. This reception by a self of intui- tion would be unconditioned in any way. But as the subject is con- ditioned in time and space, its reception must be conditioned in time and space. It can only receive the manifold to be intuited within such limits (a continuum from unity to diversity or the universal). Kant starts with sensibility as giving only diversity (objects). But when, afterwards, he is driven to hold that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the under- standing and independently of it (Kant, p. 89), he must be held to refer to sensibility this giving of the manifold to be intuited. There is difficulty here. When, however, we hold that sensibility affects the subject not only through its normal organs of sense but other- wise than through those organs, we get the manifold to be intuited as given to the subject through sensibility free from the limitations of reception through the normal organs of sense. The subject, though still limited in time and space,-must be held not limited by its normal organs of sense. So there is given to it the manifold to be intuited in the highest form the subject is capable of receiving THE SCHEMA 53 it within, that is, the limits of unity and diversity (particulars of the manifold) where there is a continuum from diversity to unity. We get directly what Kant wants, the giving by sensibility of the manifold to be intuited to a subject capable of receiving it within the limits of unity and diversity capable of receiving it (under the conditions of time and space) in the universal and the particular. The subject has, then (through sensibility which is passive), the potentiality of being affected (by the manifold to be intuited given by sensibility) both in the universal and the particular. And so, when it receives intuition from its intuitive self it can use this intui- tion not to intuite the manifold itself directly and fully, but within the limits of the universal and the particular, where the universal and the particular are limits of contradiction in our universe of relation in time and space. I have argued that Kant's real subject is what he terms the ' soul of man ' and that the subject he uses throughout the Critique is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of this soul of man. Kant gives (a form of ?) personality tot the soul of man, and I have further argued that if we rely only on the I which intuites itself as the real subject and ignore all reference to the immortal soul of man we do not, to a certain point, affect Kant's reasoning in the Critique. I have even suggested we strengthen his reasoning and render it more easily intelligible. But, by so doing, we limit the purview of our inquiry. If I can hereafter show there is human evidence in proof of the existence of what I term the intuitive self (the / which intuites itself), still this gives us no assistance in considering such questions as the existence of God, Immortality, Morality, Free- Will, or the relation of the External to Personality. I barely touch on Kant's Dialectic. Still, if it can be shown that / and you really exist as personalities higher in form than mere human personalities of transient time and space, so that the dissolution of material death affects us as (rela- tively) real subjects in no way, we shall have made an advance in human thought. We can, before considering human experience, arrive at certain conclusions from the assumption of the existence of the intuitive self and of the fact that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. The intuitive self presents intuition to its subject. The subject receives and operates with intuition so far as it can receive it. (The very assumption of the existence of this subject infers the assump- tion of its self-apperception : it is an active subject.) But the subject can only receive the manifold to be intuited through sensi- bility (which is passive). It follows that the highest form of thought of the subject must 54 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY exist in the use of its fullest potentiality of being affected through sensibility. Now the subject is most fully affected by sensibility when the affect is otherwise than through its normal organs of sense : hence is the affect of the universal, whereas affects through the normal organs of sense are affects only in the particular (in diversity). (For unity we speak of a synthesis of diversity or we analyse unity in diversity.) But the particular is cognisable only in and through the universal. I think this means the universal must be in the understanding, for it to cognise the particular. And, if so, the universal must lie in cognition : it is not images of objects but schemata which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. But, how- ever this may be, the understanding must have the universal to operate with in order to cognise the particular. The highest form of thought, then, of the subject lies in its thought of the universal not of the particular (diversity). By this argument we reduce our visual, auditory and tactile ideas to the subordinate positions of conditioned thought in the particular where there is in the understanding (relatively) a higher form of thought in the universal. As subjects, we have experience of the universal and we thus reduce our ordinary experience in the visual, auditory and tactile to mere conditioned particulars of this experience. We reduce our human personality conditioned by the visual, auditory and tactile to a supraliminal part of our (relatively) real subliminal human personality which is not so conditioned. (I here use Myers' general terms of the supraliminal and subliminal as marking the distinction between the subject as able to receive, through sensibility, only objects and as able so to receive the (relatively) universal. It is from this reception of the universal (otherwise than through the normal organs of sense) that I get the possibility of the subject and its self -apperception.) We have thus opened to us a vast field of thought as to what is the consciousness, the human experience of the subject ; what is the true nature of its ideas and how these are related to the impres- sions received from sensibility either through or not through the normal organs of sense. All such questions, however, I must, in the main, leave unanswered. I would only point out that when even psychologists admit we have human experience of feeling and impressions which are not condi- tioned in the visual, auditory or tactile, then the fact that sensibib'ty affects us otherwise than through the normal organs of sense offers a possibility of approaching the solution of what are now insoluble problems. But certain details must be considered. The assumption made covers, for instance, the possibility that an event in Australia may affect a subject in England otherwise than through his normal organs of sense. THE SCHEMA 55 Can this affect result in visual, auditory or tactile ideas of the event in the subject ? That is, can human evidence of the event be in the subject ? Bear in mind that if such visual, auditory or tactile ideas emerge in the subject, the evidence of the event is in him, whether or not he record it for the knowledge of others. I submit that such a result is possible. Through sensibility the subject is affected by the event. Through intuition presented to the subject, the subject may be able to cognise the event. And to cognise the event in relation to its normal organs of sense the understanding has to create nothing. All it has to do is to condition its experience in relation to the visual, auditory or tactile ; to abstract visual, auditory or tactile ideas of the event. The subject conditioned by its normal organs of sense is but a part of the subject not so conditioned. Through sensi- bility and intuition the subject has full experience of the event in its cognition. (Hereafter I try to prove that impressions, as dis- tinct from visual, auditory or tactile ideas, lie in cognition.) From this full experience its understanding abstracts visual, auditory or tactile ideas. Bear in mind I do not allege the subject does do this : its power in action can only be determined by the evidence of human experi- ence. All I submit is that the potentiality may well be in the subject. Kant dealt with a series of conditions. Reason proved to him incontestably that the fact of sensibility giving to us the universal, must be brought into his series of conditions. He could find no proof of this in human experience, and fell back on reliance on ' an art hidden deep in the soul of man.' If we now have proof in human experience that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, then we have the fact of sensibility giving to us the universal (an abstraction from the manifold, that is, a continuum from unity to diversity) brought into our series of conditions, and we can abandon reliance on an art hidden deep in the soul of man. We get our schema direct from sensibility without having to rely on any (transcendental ?) transformation of sensi- bility into imagination. More than this : in the light of the new proof we must expand or extend the meaning we attach to the term ' the subject.' We bring it into closer and less material relation to the (relatively) real, intuitive self a self which, I hold, must be inferred to exist if Kant's scheme is to stand in reason. It must not be forgotten that in all written above of the manifold as unconditioned, it can only be regarded as unconditioned in rela- tion to the series of conditions in and through which the subject exists. All meant by saying it is unconditioned is that it is not subject to any conditions known to us. FURTHER ARGUMENTS AS TO THE INTUITIVE SELF I ASSUME, by a consideration of Kant's reasoning, to have shown that unity and diversity are the results merely of abstractions from the manifold, the unconditioned ; that they constitute, as it were, no more than limits (of contradiction) of the manifold as manifest in time and space ; Kant's antinomies cannot exist in the manifold ; they have existence only, for us, in our universe of relations. And I have adduced argument to show that Kant's scheme neces- sarily infers the existence of an intuitive self, his subject being no more than a partial and mediate representation in time and space of this intuitive self. Incidentally I must here explain that thus we answer directly an objection raised by Cousin, for Cousin points out that Kant states : ' Elle (1'unite de la conscience) n'est done qu'un phenomene elle- meme, et elle est entierement accidentelle ' (Kant, by Cousin, p. 95), and that he (Kant) also states : ' Mon existence propre n'est pas un phenomene encore bien moins une simple apparence ' (Kant, by Cousin, p. 97). Cousin holds these statements to be contradictory, and by his reasoning they are contradictory. But if we hold that Kant's subject, the human personality, is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of an intuitive self that is, of a real self in relation to the phenomenal human personality then Cousin's reasoning fails. For by ' 1'unite de la conscience ' Kant refers to the human personality, his subject, and this per- sonality is clearly phenomenal and accidental ; while by ' mon existence propre ' he refers to the intuitive self, which is objectively real in relation to the human personality. Having now arrived at an interpretation of what the manifold is, and determined its relation as the unconditioned to unity and diversity, we are in a position to consider a further and direct argu- ment in support of the contention that the existence of an intuitive self is inferred in Kant's scheme. Kant says : ' For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phenomena is the unconditioned, which reason absolutely requires in things .as they are in themselves in order to complete the series of conditions ' (Kant, preface to second edition, p. 30). 66 Now I hold that the above statement is incontestably correct ; I doubt if many deny it. But let us assume that Kant's subject constitutes our sole per- sonality, that each one of us is no more than a thing conditioned in time and space ; a subject, that is, of human experience and of human experience only. 1 Then I deny the possibility, for this subject, of reason as denned by Kant in relation to understanding, and I deny the possibility of Kantian ideas. For, in reasoning, we must treat this thing as an objective reality ; the ' thing ' itself can only reason about itself and its experience as objective realities. These were the assumptions that Hume made, and that most conscientious of all men admitted that the assump- tions led him to conclusions which could not be exhaustive. Haeckel, on the other hand, in his Riddle of the Universe, never admits that his conclusions are unsound. But what do we find ? He treats the subject as objective, the universe as objective. He assumes to solve the riddle of the universe by treating the series of conditions in and through which the subject and the universe exist as an infinite, exhaustive or unlimited series, so that the uncondi- tioned is non-existent. But then, after an expression of his vague reliance on ' scientific ' faith, he says that his closed circle of moments of evolution and devolution takes place under ' the eternal iron laws of nature.' He founds his solution of the riddle of the universe in the ultimate on the fact of the immaterial governance of some- thing immaterial of which he knows nothing but its effect on his personality and his Lilliputian universe. He completes his series of conditions by admitting the existence of the unconditioned. If the subject is objective it cannot, by reasoning, determine that it exists in a series of conditions. For its reason must be deter- mined by its constitution, and its constitution is determined by the series of conditions, so that, to the subject, the series of conditions is objective and exhaustive ; there is no place for the uncondi- tioned. Such a subject cannot think or reason outside itself and its conditions ; for itself and its universe, being objective, there is nothing ' outside ' for it to think or reason about. How could such a subject determine that its universe is pheno- menal ? How determine that things-in-themselves are the founda- tion of its phenomenal universe, when things-in-themselves are beyond its limits of experience and of all phenomena ? The very statement that it is objective is a statement that it is limited in concept, in (Kantian) idea, and in reasoning power within the limits of its own objectivity. But what does Kant's subject do ? By its own reasoning power it transcends the limits of its own experience and of its phenomenal universe (reason frees the con- ception of the understanding from the unavoidable Limitation of a 1 This assumption is to be taken as importing the falsity of telepathy. 58 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY possible experience, Kant, p. 256) ; by its own reasoning power it proves that it exists in a series of conditions. This proof imports proof, and proof for the subject itself, that the unconditioned exists. More than this, the subject can prove the relation of its series of conditions to the unconditioned ; it can prove that the unconditioned is the very foundation on which the series of conditions rests, though this foundation is buried so deep beyond the purview of cognition that the subject cannot determine what it is. The subject could not thus reason outside itself and outside time and space if it were not more than a simple thing of space and time. For its reasoning power cannot be separated from itself ; this reasoning power is an attribute of, a characteristic inseparable from, the character itself. So there is something in the subject itself capable of transcending the limits of its own experience, and of its phenomenal universe. If, then, the subject has this power of transcending its own experience and its phenomenal universe, it must be more than an objective thing of space and time. It arrives at definite con- clusions that something exists which, in itself, is beyond its (the subject's) cognition. If the subject were simply a thing of cognition, this would be impossible. We are driven to a conclusion that for the subject which can, in Kant's words, subject the manifold of every possible intuition to its unity of apperception, there is also necessary for it to cognise itself a determinate mode of intuition whereby the manifold is given (Kant, p. 96), and this imports the active presentation of intuition which can only be from a (relatively) real self. For when, in reasoning, we transcend our own experience and our phenomenal universe, we think (or intuite ?) in the manifold, though we cannot reduce such thought to cognition. By such thought or intuition we arrive at ' vital knowledge,' though this vital knowledge is, in cognition, sheer ignorance : the thought, if thought there be, is without content. ' That man knows that he is relative and anthropomorphic means that he is more, that he can stand above and outside himself, and measure himself against the infinite and eternal ' (By Father Tyrrell, Quarterly Review, July 1909, p. 122). Kant's subject, then, must be subjective to a (relatively) real subject. No determinate mode of intuition is necessary for the apperception of the real subject; for Kant's subject a determinate mode of intuition in time and space is necessary. Kant's subject is a ' form ' in time and space of the real, the intuitive subject ; or, as it were, a projection of the intuitive self on or in time and space. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC HEREIN, Kant arrives by pure reasoning at the conclusion that : In our moral consciousness we find ourselves under a law which calls upon us to act as beings who are absolutely self-determined or free, and which, therefore, assures us that our intelligible self is our real self, and conclusively determines our empirical self in contrast with it as phenomenal (Ency. Brit., vol. xvi. p. 84, 9th ed.). If for the expression ' intelligible self ' we replace ' intuitive self,' it may possibly be held that Kant himself proves that the human personality (the empirical self) is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the intuitive self (the intelligible self). And, if this be so, it would appear there is no reply to the accusation that I have been uselessly showing the way to a goal which is already full in sight. But there is an important distinction in the method of proof. In his Dialectic Kant introduces the factors of God, Free-will, and Immortality : it is the moral law he uses to give reality to the intelligible world. But I leave all these factors unconsidered : I refer them to the manifold. I neither affirm nor deny the moral law, for I do not engage in that higher form of thought necessary for its consideration or for consideration of the Being of God, or of the existence, in us, of Free-will or Immortality. What I have as yet attempted to prove is that, under the assump- tion that sensibility affects us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense, we can prove by reasoning, based on human experi- ence, that we exist as intuitive selves. What I shall hereafter attempt to prove is that we do not need the assumption that sensibility affects us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense : I hope to show we do not need the assumption because it is a fact of human experience. If this be proved it follows directly that our existence as intuitive selves is a fact of human experience. We arrive at this proof with- out relying, as Kant relies, on the assumption of the existence of moral law, and without entering on the profound problems of the Being of God or Nature, or of Immortality or Free-will. Kant never assumes to prove the fact of the intelligible self otherwise than by transcending human experience. I, on the other hand, with the new fact of telepathy, assume ultimately to prove 59 60 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY the existence of the intuitive self without transcending human experience. At the same time, when Kant's reasoning in the Critique up to (but not including) the Dialectic, is considered as I have considered it by the light of the new fact of telepathy (which imports the fact that sensibility affects us otherwise than through the normal organs of sense) I have tried to show that not only does all his reasoning stand good, but that it necessarily imports the fact of the intuitive self. Bear in mind, however, I repeat, how very limited is the present inquiry, when compared with Kant's profound investigation dis- closed in his Dialectic. The intuitive self is herein defined as no more than a self existing free from the limits of the series of condi- tions of the human personality in time and space. It is only in relation to the human personality that the intuitive self can be said to be immortal, to have freedom of will. The intuitive self, it is true, must be conditioned in relation to God, Immortality, and Freedom of Will. But all such questions I do not touch on I restrict the argument to an attempt to prove, in human experi- ence, the fact of our existence as intuitive selves. In all yet written I have kept clear of any Dialectic. I have barely touched on Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, but as Kant does, in a certain connection, assume he does not state as a fact that the idea of the systematic unity of Nature possesses objective validity and necessity (Kant, p. 399), I must refer in some detail to his Transcendental Dialectic, though what I write must be eminently unsatisfactory. For I have only studied this part of the Critique with reference to the particular point I deal with. In the first place, Kant defines Dialectic in general as no more than a logic of appearance. And he says : ' This does not signify a doctrine of probability, for probability is truth, only cognised upon insufficient grounds, and though the information it gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful ' (Kant, p. 209). But if in any Dialectic we are dealing with no more than a logic of appearance, we can by no possibility arrive at more than deter- minations in appearance. The intuitive self is a condition, and so, even for the self apperception of such a subject, there must appear, to us, to be objective validity and necessity in some systematic unity of Nature. But this is only in appearance, for if we hold there is absolute truth in such conclusions, we are reasoning under an assumption that we can condition the unconditioned, an assump- tion which is false. In appearance we arrive at conclusions of the objective validity and necessity of some systematic unity of -Nature, and at the unity of God. But these conclusions are purely anthropomorphic con- clusions. They result from the particular nature of the subject's TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC 61 unity of apperception in time and space, so that the subject treats unity as objective, as a real synthesis of the manifold. I hold that Kantian ideas lead us to a conclusion of the objective validity and necessity of the manifold of Nature, and of the manifold of God. We can prove the existence of the manifold ; we can prove that unity and diversity are mere abstractions from the manifold. But this is simply arriving at vital knowledge of our own ignorance, for we know nothing of the manifold but within the limits of its abstractions of unity and diversity. If, then, we hold that God and Nature exist in unity as known to us, we are conditioning both. God and Nature exist, to us, in unity ; but there is an astound- ing power in man to reach out beyond all human experience, all phenomena. We can reach out to proof of the manifold where the manifold itself is incomprehensible to us in Kantian ideas, in ordin- ary idea, or in conception. Reason tells us that God and Nature exist, in fact, in the manifold. But herein is no denial of the fact that God and, perhaps, Nature exist in some unity transcending any known to us. For though the manifold is, to us, the unconditioned, it is, in fact, no more than that which completes the series of conditions in and through which we exist. Kant himself states : ' The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from this unity, which is that of the understanding. That everything which happens has a cause is not a principle cognised and prescribed by reason. This principle makes the unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, which, without a possible experience, could never have produced by means of mere conceptions any such synthetical unity ' (Kant, p. 217). That is, the unity of reason is not the unity of the understanding, and for this unity of reason the principle does not hold that every- thing which happens has a cause : for, I think, Kant holds that this unity of reason is not conditioned in time and space as known to us. If so, we can in no way determine the unity of reason by any analogy to the unity of the understanding. ' Now, as the unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of conditions is itself always unconditioned, a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained by means of the conception of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned ' (Kant, p. 226). All we can do is, by reason, to arrive at a conclusion that the unconditioned exists. I doubt if this imports a conception of the unconditioned, and as we can only negatively determine the relation of the unconditioned to a totality or synthesis of conditions, I do not see how any conception if possible of the unconditioned can 62 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY be a real basis for any synthesis of the conditioned. A synthesis of the conditioned exists only because of, and in relation to, the conditioned nature of the understanding, and all our knowledge is merely relative. I think that Kant, in the passage above cited, is referring, not to the manifold itself, but to the manifold in our apprehension. ' These relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with each other to discover, if possible, the one radical and absol- utely fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations. But this unity is purely hypothetical. It is not maintained that this unity does really exist, but that we must, in the interests of reason that is, for the establishment of principles for the various rules presented by experience try to discover and introduce it so far as is practicable into the sphere of our cognitions ' (Kant, p. 398). This passage, read with that cited before it, would appear to show that Kant does not allege objective existence for the unity of reason, but only objective existence for it in relation to the subject, conditioned as the subject is; and this interpretation would appear to be supported by the following passage : ' Natural theology is a conception of this nature at the boundary of the Human Reason, inasmuch as it sees itself necessitated to look beyond to the idea of the Supreme Being (and in a practical connection, also to that of an intelligible world), not in order to determine anything in respect of this mere essence of the understand- ing in other words, anything outside the world of sense but to guide itself for its own use within the latter, according to principles of the greatest possible unity (theoretically as well as practically).' (Kant's Prolegomena, pp. 110 and 111.) Throughout the whole of Kant's chapter on the ' Determination of the Boundary of the Pure Reason ' (Kant's Prolegomena, p. 99, et seq.), I find nothing to show that he conditions the Supreme Being or the intelligible world in unity of reason against my statement that reason leads us to conclude they are, or exist in the manifold. I only find he states that reason, for its own guidance in the world of sense, deals with them according to principles of the greatest possible unity. I HAVE assumed, by somewhat lengthy reasoning, to show that Kant's Critique infers the existence of an intuitive self in each one of us, of which his subject is a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space. The main argument to this end is based chiefly ou the fact that all human experience must be referred ultimately to the presentation of the manifold in intuition. Sensibility (which is passive) can only present the manifold to be intuited. But the presentation of the manifold in intuition must be active and so it can only be from a personality of intuition an intuitive self. I have already tried to show why it is that, in the Critique, Kant does not definitely rely on the existence of the intuitive self but on that of the immortal soul in man. But now we are in a position to show that he had in mind the possibility of the existence of this intuitive self, and that he contem- plated this possibility without relying on the fact of the ' moral law ' in support. For his Dreams of a, Spirit Seer, is, I think, based on the assumption that this intuitive self unconditioned in our time and space has real existence, and the whole work would appear to consist of a consideration of the conclusions that naturally flow from such an assumption. In Dreams of a Spirit Seer, Kant departs from strict reasoning : he theorises. It is true he laughs at himself for theorising (see p. 61) says that never again will he indulge in so remote a part of metaphysics as that of spirits and that as he cannot attain the great will restrict himself to the mediocre (p. 90). But, for all that, he presents the conclusions he draws, under his assumption of the existence of the intuitive self, as conclusions of reason. Now if we hold that telepathy is a fact of human experience, I assume to have proved that Kant's Critique is rendered clearer in reasoning : I thereby make the intuitive'self a fact in Kant's reason- ing. And, if this be so, we may treat the conclusions Kant arrives at in his Dreams of a Spirit Seer as conclusions not based on the assumption of the existence of the intuitive self but on the fact of the existence of the intuitive self. We can, then, consider these conclusions not in theory but in reasoning. That these conclusions are almost entirely negative follows directly from the fact that we who reason are largely con- ditioned in our time and space, whereas the intuitive self, about 64 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY which we reason, is not so conditioned exists free from our series of conditions. But though we arrive at a conclusion that the intuitive self exists, we can know nothing of what its existence is, per se : we can know it only so far as it is manifest to us in our phenomenal world. In this connection we may speak of the spiritual ideas of the intuitive self to distinguish them from the human ideas of the subject. Kant says : ' This difference, however, in the nature of spiritual ideas and those belonging to the body life of man must not be considered so great an obstacle, as to remove all possibility of becoming, some- times, conscious of the influences of the spirit-world even in this life. For spiritual ideas can pass over into the personal conscious- ness of man, indeed, not immediately, but still in such a way that, according to the law of the association of ideas, they stir up those pictures which are related to them and awaken analogous ideas of our senses. These, it is true, would not be spiritual conceptions themselves but yet their symbols ' (Dreams of a Spirit Seer, p. 69). Herein Kant shows how the intuitive self may be manifest to the subject. But herein we find also, incidentally, a reason why he only assumed the existence of the intuitive self. For by our ' senses ' he meant our normal senses, so that he is still hampered by the assumption that sensibility affects us only through our normal organs of sense. Clearly, spiritual ideas can have no direct affect on our normal senses. But if, assuming telepathy as a fact, we widen the means sensibility has of affecting us and hold it affects us not only through but otherwise than through our normal organs of sense, we see how spiritual ideas (intuitive thought) may affect us and be manifest to us symbolically in ideas, visual, auditory or tactile. It is telepathy which, in human experience, makes possible this degree of manifestation of the intuitive self (even if disembodied) to the human personality. Whereas affects from the external received through the normal organs of sense are, on reception, conditioned as visual, auditory or tactile, this is not so with such affects (telepathic) received other- wise than through the normal organs of sense. The conditioning of the latter as visual, auditory or tactile takes place, after reception, on their emergence as ideas in the human mind. This again shows that while ' spiritual ideas ' to use Kant's expression cannot in themselves be conditioned as visual, auditory or tactile, they may, symbolically, so affect us as to ' awake analogous ideas of our senses.' Again Kant says : ' Departed souls and pure spirits can indeed never be present to our external senses, nor communicate _with matter in any other way than by acting on the spirit of man, who belongs with them to one great republic ' (p. 72). DREAMS OF A SPIRIT SEER 65 ' We should, therefore, have to regard the human soul as being conjoined in its present life with two worlds at the same time, of which it clearly perceives only the material world, in so far as it is conjoined with a body, and thus forms a personal unit. But as a member of the spiritual world it receives and gives out the pure influences of immaterial natures, so that, as soon as the accidental conjunction has ceased, only that communion remains which at all times it has with spiritual natures ' (p. 60). Herein, when Kant speaks of the human soul, he speaks of it as conditioned, for it is a personal soul. And I doubt if, for his imme- diate purpose, he places great reliance on the immortality of the human soul he refers to : he uses it only as a personality surviving its accidental conjunction with a body in the material world. If then we replace for the expression ' human soul ' the more limited expression ' intuitive self,' it would appear we do not interfere with Kant's meaning. Possibly we make his meaning clearer ; for the human experience of Kant's subject (a thing of bodily life) is derived from intuition, and, in relation to the subject, we may well speak of the intuition of the intuitive self as consisting of ' spiritual ideas.' I have referred thus to Dreams of a Spirit Seer, because, if we accept telepathy as a fact, we find the theory of Kant therein referred to is raised to more than mere theory. We find his assumption of the existence of the intuitive self is more than a bare assumption : it is a fact. And so Kant's theorising becomes reasoning. MEMORY IDEAS AS SUBJECTS OP MEMORY MEMORY, I think, is of far greater importance than is generally supposed when considered in relation to any attempt to determine whether or not there exists in each of us a (relatively) noumenal self. This is why I now try to worry out what memory really is. For all extant theories appear to me defective. But before trying to determine what memory is, we must con- sider what it is that is the subject of memory. So far as possible this subject must be defined. The term ' idea ' appears to offer the nearest approach to what is wanted. But if we hold that ' ideas ' are the subject of memory, explanation is necessary, in this connection, of what meaning I give to ' ideas.' For the term ' idea ' has, in ordinary parlance, many and diverse meanings. At this point all we can say is that the definition to be arrived at will not include Kantian ideas : for when we consider the subject of memory, we are considering that which has relation to the human personality where the human personality is treated as objective. Again, before stating the meaning that I now give to ' ideas,' it is necessary to define the terms, apprehension, perception, percept, conception, concept. For these terms are involved in any defini- tion given for ideas : ideas are impossible without apprehension, perception and conception. I must, too, establish some relation between perception and conception before I can define the term ' ideas.' When we consider sensibility we must treat the human person- ality as no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of the intuitive self, for in sensibility lies not only the possibility of the human personality being affected by the external, but of the intuitive self being so affected. And thus, when con- sidering sensibility, we must consider the relation of the human personality to the intuitive self. But when we try to define such terms as apprehension, percep- tion and conception, we must treat the human personality as objec- tive : for such terms have reference only to the subject, the human personality : the intuitive self is a personality of intuition, not of apprehension, perception or conception as known to us. 66 MEMORY 67 Apprehension has been defined as a term for the human faculty of perception. For instance the intuitive self, being a person- ality, may be said to apprehend the manifold itself, the subject apprehends the manifold only so far as its (the subject's) apprehen- sion permits. Sensibility gives the manifold to be intuited. The human person- ality has only the potentiality of receiving the manifold to be intuited within the limits of space and time. This limited form of reception determines the limits of the perception of the subject. Perception is a term for the potentiality of the subject to receive the manifold to be intuited, and, as already shown, this potenti- ality extends, not to the manifold to be intuited, but exists only in limits, where the limits of contradiction are the universal and particular or unity and diversity. If we term the perception of the subject a passive human faculty (?) then the apprehension of the subject is this faculty of perception. The intuitive self may be said to have a noumenal faculty of perception so that the manifold itself is in its apprehension. The human personality has but a phenomenal faculty of perception so that the manifold itself is not in its apprehension. The manifold in the apprehension of the human personality is not the manifold itself, but the manifold in limits or abstraction. These limits (of contradiction) are from the universal to the particular or from unity to diversity. But, so far, we have been considering the subject merely as passive : we have no active thought : we have no self-conscious- ness of perception. The result of perception is, for the subject, conception of the understanding. Herein I find self-consciousness of perception. Just as sensibility (passive) is related to intuition (active) so when we consider the human personality as objective I make perception (passive) related to conception (active). We must hold sensibility to exist in itself, to be noumenal, but perception exists only in relation to the human personality. Perception is a passive attribute or faculty (?) of the human personality : conception marks the activity in thought of the human personality. Now conception, which is the act of conceiving, imports that something is conceived. And human experience informs us that the most diverse ' somethings ' may be the subject of conception. We may have conception of the most simple object presented to us through our normal organs of sense or, at the other extreme, we may, for instance, have conception of the unity of nature. But whether we have a simple conception of any such object or a more complex conception (even of the unity of nature) all these conceptions differ from one another in degree only, not in kind. For the ' object ' of conception, whatever it may be, exists in synthesis, and one ' object ' differs from another only 68 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY in the relative complexity of the synthesis involved in the ' object.' As I give this general meaning to conception, so I must give as general a meaning to ' concept.' I define the ' object ' of any conception as a concept. Bear in mind, however, that the diversity of human conceptions (and so the diversity of concepts) arises phenomenally from the fact that the human personality is conditioned in time and space. A ' percept ' can have no reality in itself, for perception only marks the limited potentiality of the human personality to receive the manifold to be intuited given through sensibility. But just as we can use the term ' intuitions,' though only intuition exists, so we can use the term ' percepts,' though only perception exists for us : we can relate a ' concept ' to a ' percept.' But bear in mind that conception gives us no knowledge of objects : the mere pre- sentation of objects cannot make conception possible. For con- ception gives us knowledge only of relations between phenomena, so the universal must be presented to the understanding for conception to be possible. Still, so far, we have nothing that can be the subject of memory. For perception has nothing to do with memory or the use of memory, and conception marks only the activity of the understanding it is the act of conceiving : conception, itself, has nothing to do with any continuing effect in time on the understanding, it relates only to particular acts in time. Any percept, itself, can have no con- tinuity in time, and so has nothing to do with memory. And a concept ? It is no more than (in a general sense) the ' object ' of conception : it has nothing to do with continued effect in time. As memory is a fact of human experience, we must find some- thing which affects the mind in self-consciousness where the effect is lasting in time. I find this ' something ' in ideas. It is necessary, therefore, as before said, to explain what I mean by ideas. The first and simplest definition we arrive at for an idea is : A mental image, conception or notion. 1 So far we find little or no difference between an idea and a con- cept for a concept is an object of conception. But as an idea has a wider meaning than a concept, we must, so far, hold that an idea includes a concept, or that its inception infers the previous existence of a concept. There is a definition of an idea by the Scottish school given as : ' The immediate and direct mental product of knowing, as dis- tinguished from the object of knowing or process of knowing.' The process (potentiality ?) of knowing is in perception : the active mental product of knowing is in conception. So in this definition I find no satisfactory distinction between idea and concept. For 1 My references will be mainly found in Murray's and the Century Dictionaries. MEMORY 69 though conception includes its concept (the object of conception), I cannot admit that any object itself constitutes or is a concept. The concept itself appears to me to be no more than the (pheno- menal) immediate and direct product of knowing, of conception. Now a concept arises or originates in time, but does not, I think, in itself, infer continuance in time. An idea, however, does infer continuance in time. Hence we get the further definition of an idea as : ' An image existing or formed in the mind. The mental image or picture of something previously seen or known and recalled in memory.' Stanley (1659) says : ' Ideas are notions of the mind, and subsist in our minds as similitudes and Images of Beings.' These two latter definitions are not in substitution of the two former : they are but extensive of meaning. They show that sub- sistence in the mind after being formed in the mind is a character- istic of ideas : for otherwise they could not be recalled in memory. Herein I find a vital distinction between concepts and ideas. So at this stage we arrive, for our present purpose, at the defini- tion of an idea as : ' The immediate and direct mental product of knowing, as dis- tinguished from the object of knowing or process (potentiality) of knowing ; the product being such that, once formed, it subsists in the mind so that it can be the subject of memory.' The ' subject of memory ' means, so far, a mental product of knowing formed in the mind of the human subject at any time, which has continuance or subsistence in the mind, so that at any future time the human subject can bring it into the present time of its, the human subject's, consciousness. Bear in mind that here a power only of the human subject is referred to the exercise of the power is not referred to. Memory itself is the potential : the exercise of Memory is the use of this potentiality in bringing up into the present, ideas already in the mind. But still we have not exhausted the subjects of memory. For the term ' idea ' means also : ' More generally, a picture or notion of anything conceived by the mind : a conception.' This definition is weak as it stands, for, ' anything conceived by the mind ' is not, I think, intended to refer to ordinary conceptions only, but to include imaginative or derivative conceptions. Other- wise it carries us little further than the previous definitions. Now, when we have formed any ideas coming under the definition already arrived at, we can ' play ' with these ideas in imagination. (The ' bringing up ' into the present of ideas already in the mind infers only the exercise of memory : the use of these ideas to form deduced ideas infers the exercise of imagination (in its ordinary sense) as a characteristic of the understanding.) We can form in our minds deductions, and even inductions, from these ideas which 70 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY result in ideas in our minds : we can even use these ideas for the concoction of fantastic imaginative creations continuous in them- selves romantic tales, etc. And these ideas once formed in the mind have continuous existence in the mind. The man of science, for example, can, by the exercise of memory, recall not only the facts he dealt with in experiment or the books he read at any past time, but he can also recall, not only the deductions he made in his mind from this experience, but the theories he formed, the laws of nature he arrived at. These ideas are formed in his mind, and so subsist in his mind. All such ideas are subjects of memory. But, again, we must widen our definition to determine the subject of memory. For we can recall in memory impressions of feeling. We can recall in memory not only past events, but the feeling we experienced in relation to the events. We can do more. We can recall in memory impressions of states of feeling, of general malaise or abstract pain or pleasure, where the state of feeling is with diffi- culty associated with memory of any cognition, per se, or bodily state. Herein I find myself faced by a question of great difficulty and am likely to stumble. Imprimis, a digression is advisable but, as mystic, it may well be omitted by the reader. For what I now say is in apparent con- tradiction to the line of argument ensuing. How, or in what way I do not know, but I allege that the human personality has direct experience of feeling quite apart from cog- nition or bodily state. (There may be a possible explanation for this when we use the fact that sensibility affects us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense.) If my own experience stood alone, what I now write would not be written. But I know others have had like experience many, experience far more impressive than my own. No few of us have known moments of mystic experience which we can recatt in memory : experience which cannot be referred to cognition, cannot be referred to bodily state. The very feeling exists in self -consciousness of non-self in time and space : of the non- existence of the human personality, and yet in the finding of one's real self in this negation of human personality. Any one who has had such experience remains through earthly life impressed with living belief that he exists in some reality of which his human exist- ence is but a passing shadow. Herein I find a particular proof that we really exist as intuitive selves and only phenomenally as human personalities of time and space. But the proof is particular for a_few of exceptional experi- ence and so cannot be relied on generally. I therefore reject it as evidence of any value. I refer in digression to this exceptional MEMORY 71 human experience merely to show that for some there is proof, outside cognition, that we are not objective things of time and space. I enter now on the question of ' feeling,' and, for the reason above stated, my reply must be weak. But ' feeling ' either, per se, or conditioned in some way, is a subject of memory and so must be considered. Kant says that feeling is not cognition. But when he says ' the feelings of pain and pleasure . . . are not cognition ' (Kant, p. 40), I think we may add the explanation that they cannot exist without consciousness in cognition. For cognition may be taken as a synonym for knowledge (Hamilton), and memory is perpetuated knowledge. Therefore, so far as feeling is a subject of memory, it must exist in cognition. And we know that moments of pain and pleasure are subjects of memory. I distinguish feeling from the manifestation of feeling to us as subjects, in the same way that I distinguish intuition from cogni- tion, which is the manifestation to us of intuition. James Ward arrives at the ultimate conclusion that : ' The simplest form of psychical life, therefore, involves not only a subject feeling, but a subject having qualitatively distinguishable presenta- tions which are the occasion of its feeling ' (Ency. Brit,, vol. xx. p. 41, 9th ed.). Herein I find a distinction between feeling itself, and the manifestation of feeling to the subject. For the subject to be a ' feeling ' subject, there must be presentations to it which are the occasion of its feeling. But when we bear in mind that James Ward, in arriving at the above conclusion, was treating of psychology as a science, and keeping at arm's length from the metaphysical, we get a second conclusion from what he states. The subject must have ' occasion ' through presentations for it to be a feeling subject. But feeling itself (whatever it may be) must be presented to the subject : feeling for the subject exists and exists only in consciousness. If feeling were not so presented, by no possibility could the subject get consciousness of feeling through any presentation. And sensibility (passive) cannot present feeling : it merely opens the possibility for the subject to be affected by feeling. The pre- sentation of feeling must be active, must be by an active subject of feeling which can feel without those presentations, necessary for the subject we consider to be a ' feeling ' subject. But so far there is some confusion in the argument which arises from the want of definiteness in our term ' feeling.' James Ward in his essay on Psychology in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (vol. xx. p. 40), where he distinguishes, carefully, meta- physical reasoning from psychology treated as a science gives a general definition of feeling as : (a) A touch, a feeling of roughness; (6) an organic sensation, us 72 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY feeling of hunger ; (c) an emotion, as feeling of anger ; (d) feeling proper, as pleasure or pain. He prefaces this definition of feeling by the statement that : ' As to the meaning of the term, it is plain that further definition is requisite for a word which may mean any one or all of the state- ments (a), (6), etc., given above.' As I assume the subject can be affected (through sensibility) otherwise than through its normal organs of sense, I would add to these definitions (e) impressions on the subject from the external and external personalities which do not result in sufficiently definite operation of the understanding to cause the emergence of visual, auditory or tactile ideas. These I term impressions of feeling, though they import some measure of cognition, and may be the basis of full cognition. I do not think that, for the human personality, any fuller defini- tions for the term ' feeling ' can be found than those above given. And what do the definitions amount to ? They do not define feel- ing ; they define only impressions of feeling. They explain in no way what feeling itself is ; they explain only what feeling as mani- fest to the subject is. Still, without them, the subject could not be a feeling subject : they are the presentations which give occasion to the subject so that it can be a feeling subject. More than this. They are all subjects of memory and so must be cognition or be in cognition. But we are carried no further in our attempt to get a definition of ' feeling ' itself : feeling itself does not exist in cognition any more than intuition does. I think no definition of feeling is possible. All we can do is to arrive at the fact that feeling exists. James Ward does not treat the subject as a pure feeling subject : its ' feeling ' is conditioned in that, to be a feeling subject, it requires presentations for the occasion of its feeling. It cannot feel directly : it can only feel through presentations in its universe of contradic- tions. But, as feeling itself must be presented actively to the subject, we are driven to assume the existence of a pure feeling subject which presents feeling to the subject. What then is feeling ? We do not know any more than we know what intuition is. But we must hold it exists as it is manifest to us in our universe. And we must distinguish. The pure feeling subject is the intuitive self : the subject is not a pure feeling subject, it is merely a subject to whom feeling is presented ; and, being no more than a partial and mediate representation of its intuitive self, its feeling is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation (in its universe) of pure feeling. The confusion in our argument has arisen from our confounding pure feeling with -those limited manifesta- tions of feeling which only affect us consciously as subjects. It was said by G. H. Lewes that all cognitions, even the most MEMORY 73 abstract, are primarily feelings, and perhaps I should not err in saying I define feeling as an expression for the affect of intuition on the subject. But all I want, for our present purpose, is the fact that impressions of feeling are subjects of memory : and this fact, it would appear, is established. Consider our universe : it is one of relations. The intuitive self intuiting directly has knowledge. We, as subjects, conditioned in a universe of relations have but a form of knowledge : our know- ledge is relative. Even a concept gives us no knowledge : it gives but relative knowledge of the concept as a relative thing : knowledge only of the particular relation of the concept to other relations. Now the idea of pleasure has no meaning to us unless we have in mind the idea of pain also in contradiction ; feeling of pleasure has meaning only in relation to feeling of pain. So, even a feeling of sympathy or of pride imports ideas in the mind of the contradic- tion of sympathy, the contradiction of pride. And any impression on the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, must if the subject is to be conscious of the impression give occasion to the subject for feeling by affecting its understanding, an under- standing which exists, and exists only, in its universe of contra- dictions. If then as we must we give reality to feeling, we find it cannot, in itself, consist of pleasure, pain, sympathy, pride, etc., for no one of these can be thought (or felt ?) without its contradic- tion also. These must be but forms of feeling manifest to us in our universe of relations. But as we are justified in relating back our cognition (partia manifestation to us of intuition) to the unknown ' intuition,' so we are justified in relating back feeling, as manifest to us, to the unknown ' feeling.' As unity and diversity can have reality only for us, so pleasure and pain, for example, as known to us, can have reality only for us. The first affect from the external on the subject may be said to be in feeling. From this feeling it derives or abstracts cognition the cognition of its self-apperception in time and space. I cannot understand how the memory of the human personality, as a human personality, can affect it, the human personality, in self-apper- ception (as it does affect it), unless the understanding has been affected in some way. And this must be in cognition. How then can the subject in self -apperception be affected by impressions of feeling as distinct from impressions of ideas ? Feel- ing itself cannot so affect it. It follows that feeling must be manifest in time and space before it can affect the subject. And as feeling so impresses us that we can recall the impressions in memory, we know that feeling is manifest to us in time and space : we can recall in memory these past impressions of feeling where the recalled impressions are not conditioned as visual, auditory or tactile ideas. 74 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY So, though we are ignorant of what feeling is, per se, it is not cognition yet we can cognise its manifestation in time and space. For impressions of feeling are subjects of memory, that is, by the exercise of memory we can recall, in present time, past impressions of feeling as distinct from past visual, audile or tactile ideas, and this could not be unless through the cognition of the understanding. We find, then, that not only ideas, as before widely defined, but impressions of feeling are the subject of memory. An impression, then, comes under the term ' idea ' as defined by me as the subject of memory. But still, for the following reason, I distinguish impressions from ideas. Assume as I shall hereafter assume that telepathy is a fact. Imagine that A is affected by the external otherwise than through his normal organs of sense. How will he be affected if conscious of the affection ? He will be affected first by an impression of feeling. This impression I admit lies in cognition. But it may end in what may, perhaps, be here termed inchoate cognition ; it may be followed by no such definite affect on the understanding as to give rise to definite ideas as distinct from impressions of feel- ing. His cognition may only give him information that he has been affected by the external without giving him definite information as to who or what affected him, without giving him any definite sublunary facts in ideas, visual, auditory or tactile. For such definite ideas to arise in him there must be not only the affection from the external which affects him in impressions of feeling, but this affect must be of such a (continuing) nature as to cause opera- tion of the understanding in the emergence of definite ideas. In all such cases the impression in feeling must precede the emergence of ideas in the subject. This is, indeed, no more than a corollary from the fact that intuition (which we can only now term feeling) is the basis of all cognition of all ideas. I therefore treat the subject of memory as consisting in impres- sions and ideas as defined. When we come to a consideration of the facts of telepathy, we shall find it is of the greatest import- ance to bear in mind that impressions in feeling always precede the emergence of definite ideas in the understanding of the subject, when affected by the external otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. MEMORY IN now trying to worry out what memory really is, I begin by assum- ing that the subject and its ideas have objective reality. With this assumption the conclusion is arrived at that the ideas we use when exercising the power of memory are unconditioned in time and space. I then abandon the above assumption and, treating the subject as a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the intuitive self, try by strict reasoning to reconcile what theory tells us must be fact with the practical (but impossible) conclusion originally arrived at. I am standing at some place at some time no matter where, no matter when. I hear a bell ring. This is something external to me : let us call it an event in my life I being an ordinary human being. Now, so far as I am concerned, that bell rang once and for all : the same ring of the same bell can never be repeated. The ringing of the bell was, for me, an event that took place in time and space once, never to occur again. But how was it I knew that the bell rang ? Because the ringing affected me in some way. I heard the ringing. In fact I know nothing at all of what the event was except the affect of the event (the ringing) on me. So all I can allege is that an event occurred as to which I know nothing but that its effect on me was, what I term, the ringing of a bell. But though I know nothing of what the event really was in itself, I can say I know, so far as I am myself concerned as a human person- ality, that it happened in time and space once and for all, never to be repeated. How I know this and what the knowledge is worth will be considered hereafter. Now I shall make an assumption : I shall assume for the present that my memory is a perfect memory. A week, a month, a year, or a day has passed since I heard that bell ring and, therefore, since the event happened once and for all never to be repeated. But I can still think about the event when I choose to do so. When I do not choose to do so, I do not think about the event. It does not matter at all how much or how little time has passed since the event happened : I can, if alive, still 75 76 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY think about it when I choose. And as I always, when I choose, think about the event itself as always exactly the same, it seems even at this early stage of our argument as if time and space had nothing to do with my thinking about the event : it would appear to be only my choice of thinking that has to do with time and space. But how is it that I can think at any time about this event, which happened once and for all in time and space ? Which, as an event, is to me a dead thing of the past ? It is because when I assume to think of the event I am not think- ing of the event, but of the affection of the event on me, and because, though the event, to me, happened once and for all, the affection of the event on me is lasting. When the event happened, the happening caused a mental im- pression on me. I term this impression an idea of the event. Bear in mind I have already denned what I mean by an idea. If at any time, so long as I live, I can use this idea of the event whenever I choose : if, when I take it out for use, I find it always exactly the same ; if, when I take out any such idea for use, I find it is not necessarily governed by any law of succession in relation to other ideas (bear in mind the distinction between events and ideas of events), then it follows that the idea, so long as I live, is not subject to change, decay or death in time and space. The idea is not, during my lifetime, conditioned in or by time or space. And here an important distinction must be borne in mind : the distinction between the idea and the use, by me, of the idea. The idea must be in me or I could not use it : and it is in me, uncon- ditioned in time and space. But when I take it out for use, I take it out in time and space. For I and my understanding are con- ditioned in time and space, and I can only exercise my power of memory in time and space. Ideas, then, in relation to the human personality, are not condi- tioned in time and space : the use of ideas by the human person- ality is conditioned in time and space. But any idea comes into being in time and space : it is the happen- ing of the event in time and space that gives birth to the idea of the event in (approximately) the same time and space. And the idea as an idea ends in time and space with me, the human person- ality, when I end in time and space. So we find that the idea is (apparently) only unconditioned in time and space for a definite period between two particular times and two particular spaces ? which on its face is impossible : the unconditioned cannot, itself, be limited by the conditioned. Besides the above there are many other objections to the allega- tion that ideas, for a particular period and a particular period only, are unconditioned in time and space. I proceed to deal with the objections. MEMORY 77 The object in view is to prove that, in spite of these objections, the allegation made points to the truth. What the truth is will appear later on, when we consider the fact that the real basis of ideas is in intuition. A PERFECT MEMORY Is there such a thing as a perfect memory ? I argue that each one of us has, potentially, a perfect memory, and that it is only our power to use memory in the present which is, normally, imperfect ; under abnormal circumstances we have full power to use this, potentially, perfect memory in the present. Myers says : ' I hold that every impression made on the organ- ism ... be it visual, auditory or tactile, is in a certain sense remembered by some stratum of that organism, and is potentially capable of being reproduced in the primary memory ' (Proceedings, vol. vi. p. 191). The exercise of memory consists in the use in the present of ideas already stored up in the subject. These ideas have had their origin in events which have happened in relation to the subject, so that the subject has been affected by the events. I have dealt at present only with a simple event the ringing of a bell where the event was a positive act. But now we must have a more general definition. ' An event ' as hereinafter used, means any of the originating causes giving rise to ideas and impressions as hereinbefore defined. I shall here use the term ' idea ' as cover- ing both an ' idea ' and an ' impression.' Now, however involved or intricate our ideas may be, when we call them up in the present by the exercise of our faculty ' memory,' we call them up from ourselves : the ideas must necessarily be al- ready in us, or there is no exercise of memory. This sounds a mere commonplace, but it is of the greatest importance. The ideas must be in our potential memory or by no operation of the understanding could we, by the exercise of memory, call them up into the present. Further, if we can always call up these ideas into the present, the ideas themselves must always, potentially, be in the present in relation to ourselves. Mark, then, these facts : When we consider ' memory ' we must have (1) a storage in us, potentially in the present, of ideas which arose in us in relation to events of the past ; (2) a capacity to call up into the present, for use in the present, these or some of these stored ideas. If our capacity extends to calling up into the present for use in the present, all and every of these stored ideas, then we have, what is ordinarily termed, a perfect memory. If there is in all of us a full storage of ideas of all past events which have affected us, then, whether we can or cannot call them all up into the present for present use, we have 78 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY in all of us, the ' stuff ' for a perfect memory. If we have not what is termed a perfect memory it is because we cannot use all this ' stuff.' This question of the fallibility or perfection of memory has not, necessarily, anything at all to do with the storage of ideas. For it may well be that each one of us has the same full and complete storage of ideas and yet that each one of us has varying capacity to take out of and use from the storage, ideas of these events for use in the present. Human evidence points very strongly to, if it does not prove, the fact that there is the same full and complete storage of ideas in each one of us, and that we differ from one another, in memory, only in our varying capacity to take ideas out of this storage and use them in the present. Events do affect us, and it is the ideas resulting from these affects that we use when we exercise memory. The fact that any one of us can only, by the exercise of memory, call up for use in the present certain ideas of certain past events, constitutes no evidence that only these certain events have given rise to ideas. When we say that the memory of some particular person is defective, we mean simply that he fails in normal capacity to call up for use in the present, ideas of past events : we predicate nothing as to his having or not having, in him, the ideas themselves. Indeed, the very limitation referred to, when we speak of a defective memory, would appear to be based on the assumption that there is this full storage of ideas in the subject, and that the defect in memory consists in want of capacity to use it as it is normally used. If we make any attempt to limit the storage in any one of ideas of past events, by the measure of his capacity to use the ideas in the present, we must fall into hopeless confusion. For the capacity of each of us to exercise memory varies from time to time normally, and if the power to exercise memory is taken as a measure of the ideas stored in us, then this storage must vary from time to time ; and this cannot be. Again, we have much ' abnormal ' evidence which supports the allegation that there is this full storage of ideas in all of us. Cases are not rare where human beings at a crisis of life danger of death by drowning or otherwise ; a serious mental or nervous shock ; exceptional emotional state find all the events of their past life brought before them in consciousness in the immediate present : trivial details of the past that they had forgotten, flash into present conscious clarity. Now no crisis in a human life can create, for such human life, events of the past or present ideas of the past. So what happens must be this : the crisis so affects the personality that it, the per- sonality, is enabled abnormally to call up into present consciousness what is already in it, the personality. What is called up into present MEMORY 79 consciousness must have been (crisis or no crisis) already in potential consciousness. Again, it is the external, the crisis, that causes this result. The understanding through the internal sense of the subject is affected by the external. (The crisis cannot affect the subject in unity of apperception directly.) So the power to call up, in a flash, all the past into the present must have been pre-existent to the crisis. What the crisis has done is simply to give circumstance (the external) to the understanding which has enabled the personality to exercise patently its latent power. (I admit an apparent contradiction in the above paragraph ; for the understanding is conditioned in time : the use of the term ' understanding ' may be incorrect. But as the understanding can, for example, think a house in the manifold, so it might, in any such crisis referred to, be able to think its storage of ideas in the manifold.) The importance of such cases lies in this. The only relations in time are simultaneity and succession (Kant, 137). I am arguing that our storage of ideas is in us unconditioned in time and space, not stored in succession. Events happen suc- cessively, their affects on us have effect successively ; that is, ideas are stored in our minds successively. But when stored up they fall back, or retreat as it were, into what is to us the mani- fold where there is neither succession nor simultaneity. It is true that when we use these ideas in the present we use them succes- sively or simultaneously, for human thought in the present is so conditioned. But by the exercise of memory we can abstract these ideas in arbitrary succession or simultaneity : that is, we find our storage of ideas is not conditioned in any determined form of succession or simultaneity. For if it were so determined in form we could not change the form : we could not pick and choose, arbitrarily, now some ideas, now others for use in present time. So if, in any crisis like to those stated above, we find all our past present to us in a flash of the present, then we are affected abnormally by all our stored ideas at once, that is, not in succession. (The affect I think is in the universal, not in simultaneity). So the storage of ideas cannot, in itself, be conditioned in time. It may be argued in objection that though, in such a crisis, all our past flashes before us in an instant of time, still, as we know nothing of absolute time, this past may still flash before us in suc- cession. And the argument cannot be definitely proved as false ; though, in relation to the subject, it is not easy to understand how a period of years can flash before one in an instant and without any appearance of succession. In support of my argument, I can refer to cases of dreams of pure (not Kantian) imagination where the dramatisation is back- wards : ' A long dream of the Reign of Terror concluded with his ' the 80 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY dreamer's " arrest, trial, conviction ; he clearly remembered all the details of his transportation in a tumbril to the place of execution, how he was bound to the fatal plank, how the knife fell and with the blow he awoke to find that the curtain pole of his bed had fallen and struck him a severe blow on the back of the neck. His mother, who was in the room, said that he awoke the instant it fell.' Again : ' A similar case was narrated by a friend of mine. She had been very ill with typhoid fever but was convalescent ; she had fallen into a light doze in her chair and dreamed that she was being pursued from room to room by a savage dog. She would enter a room, close the door, hold it against him ; he would make his appearance by another door, and she would escape by the one she was holding and take flight to another room. This lasted, she thought, for half an hour or so. She had been driven to the third storey and taken refuge in a small room with but one door. That door she held against the dog's pressure until her feeble strength gave way, the brute sprang upon her with a howl and she woke with a start to find that her sister had at that moment placed her hand upon her arm and said " Boo " ' (By Professor W. Romaine Newbold. Proceedings S.P.R., vol. xii. p. 20). The above two cases are given as examples of a class : they show the mere play of fancy or imagination. Now I deny that fancy or imagination even hypnotism can create anything which had not previous existence : apparent exalta- tion of faculty or power results only from a freeing of the subject from normal restrictions or from a change in what is external to the subject, so that it can manifest patently what was before latent. When imagination plays with a storage of ideas it creates nothing new, it simply gives new (phenomenal) form to what is pre-existent. If we hold that the two dreams were dreams unconditioned by time and space dreams where there was no succession the diffi- culty as to ' dramatisation backwards ' disappears. But, if we hold this, we must also hold that it was the freedom from certain bonds of the external that sleep gave, which enabled the subjects to ' dream ' unconditioned by time and space. Further, we must hold that the power to use ideas, unconditioned in time and space, was latent in the subjects when not asleep, and became patent only from change by sleep in the relation of the subjects to the external. If the blow from the curtain-pole and word ' Boo,' spoken, did originate the dreams recorded, then I do not think we can intro- duce ' succession ' as governing the dreams. But when the dreamers awoke they could only think in time and space in succession. Looking back on their dreams in the ' mani- fold ' they could only regard them under* the limiting condition of succession. MEMORY 81 All these imaginative dreams, where the dramatisation is back- wards, are really kaleidoscopes where the ideas already stored in the dreamer are used as material. But they certainly point to power in us to dream in the manifold, though, doubtless, most normal dreams take place in succession in time. Of many remarkable cases bearing on the question of a perfect memory now under consideration, the most remarkable I know is that reported in the Journal of the S.P.R., vol. xii. p. 287. I give a digest, as short as possible, of this case. The subject, Miss C., was not a professional medium. She was hypnotised, and when in trance described herself ' as leaving her body and going " up " into other " planes " of existence of which the one most constantly visited is described as the " Blue." ! In one of these planes Miss C. purported to meet a certain lady, Blanche Poynings, who lived in the time of Richard the Second and from alleged conversations with this lady Miss C. purported to give many details as to Richard the Second, the Earl and Countess of Salisbury, and others. These details were found to be historically correct, especially the genealogical data. Miss C., in her normal state, could remember nothing that she had read bearing on the facts given. It was, however, ultimately discovered that in 1892 (the experi- ment was in 1906), when Miss C. was a girl of eleven, her aunt had read to her a novel entitled The Countess Maud. In this book the character Blanche Poynings appeared, and ' the book proved to contain the whole of the personages and facts she, " Miss C.," had given.' Now leave out of consideration the imaginatively objective reality Miss C. gave to the people she spoke of ; leave out of consideration also any distinction between the ' subliminal ' and ' supraliminal ' self. Personally I think that if the ' subliminal ' and ' supraliminal ' self are considered they must, in many connections, be considered as no more than subjective conditions of a relatively objective self. What does the case prove ? That the chance reading of a chance novel to Miss C., when she was a girl of eleven in 1892, left stored up in her after long years, ideas of what she had heard. If we treat this ' reading ' as an event in the life of Miss C., we cannot imagine any event in her life less likely to leave, stored up in her, ideas of the event. The ' event ' was not even in itself of such ' imaginative ' interest as to be likely to make any lasting impression. Much of what was remembered was from the appendix to the book, and, as Mr. Fielding says, ' dull as was the book from all accounts, the appendix was still more dull, and it was improbable either that a child should read it willingly herself, or even that her aunt should have inflicted it on her.' In volume xii. of the Proceedings S.P.P., p. 263, is an interest- F 82 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY ing case given by Professor J. H. Hyslop, and received by him from a Mrs. D. who wrote in 1883 : ' A few years ago I was visiting my mother. I said " Mother, I dreamed of being in some place last night. It seemed so real, I want to tell it to you." After telling her of the house, the queer garden, etc., mother told me I had been there, but that I was a very small child when I made my visit.' A hypnotised girl recognised and named a doctor with whom her only connection was that at the age of two she had been an inmate of an institution he had visited (Proceedings, vol. iv. p. 545). I refer hereafter to certain experiments carried out by the Rev. H. E. (see Part n. pp. 191 et seq.), which point to there being in each one of us this perfect memory. Now (February 10, 1910) the Rev. H. E. sends me a statement of the following experi- ment : ' I once gave a subject, while awake, a cedar pencil which I took from my pocket. He was to make some calculations for me, previ- ously to being hypnotised, and he used the pencil for about five minutes or so. After he had been hypnotised, and had completed the experiment in which I was engaged, I asked him suddenly the name, etc., of the maker of the pencil. He gave it me at once, and knew the number of the particular make, which was stamped in the usual gold letters and figures, together with the name of the manu- facturer. Afterwards, when he was awake, I offered him five shillings if he would give me these details, but he was quite unable to, adding that he had never troubled to look at the pencil. Now he had looked at the pencil, and he had taken in all these details probably at a glance but he was quite unconscious of the fact. It may be argued that he read my mind. But this will not help much, as / must, equally unconsciously, have learnt these details and stored them, for I did not know in the least the words or numbers on the pencil, and should be quite ready to declare I had never seen them.' Referring to a particular case of this class, Myers states : ' In this and similar cases the original piece of knowledge had at the time made a definite impress on the mind had come well with- in the span of apprehension of the supraliminal consciousness. Its reappearance after however long an interval is a fact to which there are already plenty of parallels ' (Proceedings S.P.R., vol. viii. p. 381, cf. the cases reported on pp. 488 and 489). These many cases can only be reasonably accounted for by the theory that there is in all of us the same full storage of ideas of past events, and that we vary in memory one from another only in our varying power to use these ideas in immediate consciousness. If, for example, it had not been for the offchance that Miss C. was mesmerised, she herself would never have'had the remotest present human consciousness that these ideas were stored up in her. MEMORY 83 Consider, again, cases of multiplex or alternation of personality, leaving out of question the possibility of possession a possibility which I neither accept nor reject. Can we suppose that each person- ality has its own exclusive store of ideas for the use of memory ? that each personality has an entirely different and separate store of ideas ? Take a simple case where the subject has two personalities, personality A and personality B. When B comes on the scene, can he by any possibility originate in himself a new storage of ideas foreign altogether to that already existing in A ? When B dis- appears and A returns, where does he find his original storage of ideas if B has replaced it by a foreign storage ? On the other hand, if A and B both use different parts of the same storage, we can account for the change of personality as humanly manifested. But here again we find we cannot measure the storage itself in A or B by the use of it by A and B. For A and B both use a different storage, and if we measure each storage by its use, there is real exclusive difference between the storage oi A and the storage of B ; and this would appear to be impossible. The difference then must consist in A using one part, B another of the same one storage. And this points to, though it does not prove, full storage of ideas of all past events in A and so, necessarily, in B. There is difference only in the use of the storage. Where the difference between the personalities A and B is in feeling, the problem becomes more difficult and cannot now be dealt with. So far we can only say that multiplex, or alternations of, person- ality result from varying outcome in human manifestation of one and the same understanding where the ideas for the use of memory are the same for all the personalities in any one particular case, though the use itself of the ideas varies. ' For any difference in memory involves a certain difference in character, and in proportion as the two memories are co-exclusive (which they may be in varying degrees) the moral and intellectual habits founded on the differing memories will be likely themselves to diverge ' (By Myers, Proceedings S.P.R., vol. iv. p. 225). We find, then, there is strong evidence to support the contention that there is in all of us this full storage of ideas, unconditioned in time and space, of past events, and that we differ from one another in memory, simply in that our understandings vary in power to use this storage. Or, it may be, that the understanding of each one of us has power to use this full storage of ideas in the present, but that, normally, each one of us cannot so use it, simply because circumstance is normally adverse to such full use. And this view appeara to me the more probable. (Cf. the chapter on Crystal Gazing, and, especially, the experiments therein referred to of the Rev. H. E. These experiments support the above argument.) 84 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY I think the evidence is strong enough to justify the assumption that there is in each of us, potentially, a perfect memory. Another objection may be put forward on the ground of : THE RELATION OF IDEAS It has been shown that unity and diversity are the results merely of abstraction from the manifold, and that a concept of an object in itself gives no knowledge of the object to the subject : the uni- versal is necessary for cognition of the particular. But it has been shown, too, that Kant holds sensibility to give the manifold to be intuited, and I assume to follow Kant in holding that the concept of an object results from an abstraction from the manifold given to be intuited, and that synthesis (unity) results also from an abstraction from the manifold given to be intuited. Further, either abstraction infers the other. Now if when we call up an idea in the present we find it is indissolubly linked with other ideas, do we not find that time becomes a condition of ideas in themselves ? For we cannot relate one idea to another without introducing succession, i.e., time, and an idea, for us, exists only in relation to another idea or other ideas. Here again I think we find confusion between the idea itself and the use of the idea by the subject. For we only relate an idea to another idea when we use the idea for relation to other ideas, and this use is necessarily in time and space. The idea itself, being the result of an abstraction from the mani- fold, must have in it, the idea, at least something of, or in relation to, the manifold. The idea truly is a phenomenon ; it could not, however, be a phenomenon if not based on the permanent. But the subject can only use the idea in diversity, in relation to other ideas. The subject receives the idea in diversity. This does not show that the idea is conditioned in itself ; it shows but a condition of its reception. Again, it has been stated that an idea of an object is really the idea of no more than a particular relation, and therefore it may be argued that it is in itself a (subjective) thing of diversity, therefore of time. And this is true for its. But when, by reasoning, we are driven to conclude that ideas are not fundamentally conditioned in time and space, we find we can explain away the above argument. All we, as human personalities, know of ideas is their use. We may have a full storage of ideas in potential consciousness of which we ordinarily know little, because we cajmot fully use it. As we are conditioned in time and space, we know we can only use ideas in time and space. Clearly, then, we cannot disprove the state- MEMORY 85 ment that ideas only appear conditioned in time and space because we are so conditioned. If ideas are of ' stuff ' conditioned in time and space, there can be nothing in them of, or in relation to, the permanent. But they are the result of abstraction from the manifold, and so must have some- thing in them of, or relating to the permanent though this is beyond our knowledge as human personalities. Succession in time infers the existence of the permanent, which is not conditioned in time (Kant, p. 40). The constitution of our brain is material, and so in a state of constant flux ; we can understand, then, the passing effect on us of a passing event. But we cannot understand the lasting effect on us of the idea of the passing event. If it be replied that the idea is lasting simply because of a lasting material change (effected by the idea when arising) in the material brain, the reply fails. For no part of the material brain can remain changeless in time : if this permanence in the brain be alleged, we then have material permanence between two times, which is impossible. Every event is probably correlated to some material change in the brain of the subject affected. But this does not support any argument for the fixity of such change. Such ideas, however, are in us unconditioned in time and space if: Ideas do not change in time. When by the exercise of memory we call up for use in the present any of our stored ideas, we find that these ideas have apparently changed in time. The great river of childhood has, in our middle age, dwindled to a little brook. Venus has evolved into Hecate, and the loved apple a thing of fear. But it is we who have changed, not the ideas. We have, in time, stored up new and fresh ideas : when we call up into the present a past idea, we call it up for use in relation to our other stored ideas, and so the relation of the idea to our storage constantly changes, as the storage itself changes ; hence the apparent change in the remembered idea. (Bear in mind that imagination, whatever it may mean in ordinary parlance, is not memory. It may be based on memory, may be a kaleidoscope which uses ideas to make quasi- original pictures from ideas. But it is not memory.) In considering this question of whether ideas do or do not change in time, leave out of consideration all question of will. Will in itself has nothing to do with cognition and nothing to do with the subject now considered the human personality, the ordinary human being (Kant, p. 40). It has to do with the real self of intuition. By the exercise of will independence of memory, of all past ideas, of the external itself can be attained. The many well 86 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY recorded cases of the remarkable efiects of ' self suggestion ' show that there is in all of us though generally undeveloped, even alto- gether unused power by exercise of will to subject the external to ourselves. But this has nothing to do with cognition. The great river of our childhood is in itself the same thing as the little brook of our later age. The affection of this thing on us, as children, remains in us in idea in continuity of personality. By what possibility can after-change affect this idea ? The idea itself ? The idea, changeless in itself, remains in us : the very fact that we can compare the idea of our childhood with the idea of our later age proves the continuance of the former idea. When, in age, we see the same stream of water that we saw in youth, the impression on us from the external may be the same. But the resulting idea (in itself a new idea) relates to a different storage of ideas, which makes the affection of the idea on us to differ from what it would have been were we still children. We store up changeless ideas : we deal with this storage in bulk : that is, when we use any idea or ideas, we necessarily relate tho particular idea or ideas to the whole storage, and as the storage changes, the relation of the idea or ideas to the storage changes. It is this which effects differences between human personalities. Each of us practically records the same events of passing time differently, because each of us relates them to a different storage of ideas. Consider an extreme case : I have a perfect memory and abnormal power of sight. I watch, during thirty years, a seed grow to a tree. Every period of evolu- tion in growth is a fact, for me, in time : each happens once and for all, never to be repeated. At the end of thirty years these periods are things of the past, and instead of a seed there exists a tree. But my storage of ideas in regard to the tree ? At every future moment of my life after the thirty years, these ideas are, still y potentially in the present. By the exercise of memory I can call up into the present for use in the present any or all of the ideas in me which were originated, in me, by the growth of the tree from a seed during thirty years. It may be quite true that I can only use these ideas in succession, in time. But by no argument can we condition the ideas themselves in time. The whole growth of the tree in time becomes to me, potentially, a growth unconditioned in or by time : in idea the whole growth of thirty years is, potentially, in the present : I can even think the whole growth in the manifold. For I know nothing of what really happened, though, with Kant, I hold something did happen. All I know are the effects on me, the ideas in me, resulting from the happenings. And these ideas are, potentially, not conditioned in or by time ; that is, they do not, with reference to myself, change in time. MEMORY 87 Or consider the following illustration, which I have stolen from Sir Oliver Lodge for my own purposes. I travel by rail from London to Brighton for the first time in my life. What I see of the country as we pass I see successively : we may call this ' seeing ' successive events in my life, and so ideas of these events arise in me in succession, in time. But when the journey is completed, when I have arrived at Brighton ? Is there any succession in my stored ideas of the country I have seen ? There is not : the whole country passed through was, and still is, an existing fact, and is so in idea to me : Chislehurst exists at the same time as Reigate, and so for all I saw in succession. I can think all I saw (a synthesis) at one moment : my new storage of ideas is in itself unconditioned in time, though when used by me in the present it is used in time (cf. Kant, p. 99, 1. 4). When I start on my journey, all I am going to see future events in my life already exists. As I journey I see in succession that which already has existence my succession in sight results only from the fact that / am a subject conditioned in time and space. But after I have seen this one existing thing, successively ? After my arrival at Brighton ? Then, to me, this one existing thing has one existence in time ; there remains in me nothing but an idea of the journey in relation to all I saw. If, however, I think about the journey in detail then, though I use the idea of the journey stored in me, I must analyse the idea, must break it up into ideas of the successive events of the journey. And so I must use these ideas in succession. But this use of them in succession proves in no way that they are stored up in me in suc- cession : for the succession I use is arbitrary I determine it myself. This illustration may be used to show that our being conditioned in time and space constitutes a limit of our real personality. For suppose that I am not conditioned in time and space, and, so, that I exist at every point of the journey from London to Brighton. Then for me all the landscape exists at one moment. I exist in reference to all the landscape at the same one moment, and so I have an idea of all the landscape at the same one moment. Herein we find what appears to be perfectly natural. (Bear in mind that Kant's object is in itself a series of representations.) But, unfortunately, I am conditioned in time and space, and it is because I am so conditioned I can only take in the whole existing landscape in succession. This shows that succession in time and space arises from my limitation. If we were not so limited I should receive directly the empirical intuition of the whole journey by apprehension of the manifold contained therein (cf. Kant, p. 99, 1. 4). But, even limited as I am, once the idea of the journey is in me it remains in me changeless in time. The fact that when we use ideas we use them related in time 88 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY does not, I think, prove that the ideas, themselves, are conditioned in time. If so, ideas do not change, per se, in time. I deal now with the strongest objection. IDEAS ORIGINATE IN TIME If ideas arise in time and end in time, there can be no middle period between their arising and ending which is unconditioned in time. This is certain, and no proof is necessary. If we hold that ideas are determined immediately by the constitu- tion itself of the material brain, they cannot be unconditioned in time and space : for the constitution of the material brain is so conditioned. Now, to us, an idea has its origin in or with an event. Bear in mind we know nothing of what this event is in itself, we know only the effect on us (the idea originated in us) of the event. But though we know nothing of what the event is in itself, we know something about the event ; we know that we can only cognise and think in time and space, and so we know that any happening to us must be a happening in time and space. The event, therefore, to us, happens in time and space simply because we are conditioned in time and space. Again, we know that our relation to the external is through sensibility which give the manifold to be intuited. Sensibility does not directly give diversity (objects, events) ; it does not directly give unity. We, as subjects, receive within the limits of unity and diversity the manifold in intuition presented to us by the intuitive self. An event, then, is, to us, an affection on us of the manifold. So, whatever the event may or may not be, it cannot of itself be con- ditioned in time and space ; it is the affection only of the event on a subject in time and space which is conditioned in time and space. ' In fact when we regard the objects of sense, as is correct, as mere appearances, we thereby at the same time confess that a thing in itself lies at their foundation, although we do not know it, as it is constituted in itself ' (Kant's Prolegomena, par. 32, p. 62). This affection of the event on the subject is (through conception) in idea. The event is external to the subject, the affect of the event is through the internal sense of the subject, and this affect results in an idea of the event. (Concepts in relation to events may be termed the effects of percepts as affects.) Now ' we cannot cognise any thought except by means of intui- tions corresponding to these conceptions ' (Kant, p. 101). We have seen that the subject does (practically) store up ideas of past events unconditioned in time. But the basis of all these ideas is in intuition. Kant even says that for conceptions there are always corresponding intuitions. MEMORY 89 Bear in mind, however, that this correspondence of intuitions to cognition in thought is only subjective : the correspondence exists only in relation to the subject. When intuition is used as I use it, it means only the intuition of the intuitive self. When, then, ideas are or appear to be stored up, what becomes of their corresponding intuitions ? For if the corresponding in- tuitions no longer exist, these ideas can no longer exist. I hold that the intuitions must be as lasting as the ideas. The existence of the idea (the conditioned) infers necessarily the exist- ence of the intuition (the relatively unconditioned). As we know in human experience that the subject does (practi- cally) store up these ideas unconditioned in time, we must, in reason, assume that the intuitions corresponding to these ideas are in relation to the subject stored up. But this storage of intuitions can only be related to the intuitive self. Bear in mind that it has already been shown that the intuitive self cannot be unconditioned, though how conditioned we know not ; for its conditioning does not come within the series of conditions known to and limiting the subject. Now ideas arise in time and die in time, so they cannot really be unconditioned in time, though to the subject they appear uncon- ditioned in time. The explanation is this : The (relatively) real, permanent self is the intuitive self: the ideas of the subject exist only in relation to (have no existence apart from) the intuition of the intuitive self. The intuitive self is always affected by the manifold, and stores up these affections in intuition. (Neglect at present the impossi- bility of the intuitive self ' storing up ' intuition or intuitions.) These affections are unconditioned in time and space. To the subject (a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the intuitive self) the manifold appears externally as events ; this subject is affected internally by these events as ideas, these ideas being abstractions from the manifold in intuition. Follow- ing Kant we may say these ideas correspond to intuitions. ' Memory ' in the subject, which human experience tells us has real existence, is this : The subject has power to use the storage of intuition in its intui- tive self. It can at any time and all times abstract ideas from what are, to it, corresponding intuitions. The ' stuff ' used (intuition) is not conditioned in time : the ideas abstracted are conditioned in time. But, as the subject can at any and all times abstract the same ideas from the same (subjec- tively) corresponding intuitions, and as the subject is unconscious of its act of abstraction, the subject to itself appears to use a full storage of ideas unconditioned in time and space of all past events. 90 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY The schematism of the understanding is made possible by the presentation to the understanding, otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, of the schema. Events (data of sense) are presented through the normal organs of sense, and it is through the schematism of the understanding that these events can give rise to (active) concepts which are conditions precedent for ideas to have (apparently) lasting effect on the understanding. The universal presented makes possible the particular in cognition : the particular is always an abstraction from the universal. Now human experience informs us definitely that when any idea has been formed in the mind of the subject, the subject can, by the exercise of memory, recall into the present this idea of the past. The subject, then, appears to itself to have in it a full storage of all past ideas unconditioned in time. But this we know is impossible. for no storage of ideas can be unconditioned in time. How did the subject get the original conception which led to the idea ? By abstraction from its, the subject's, universal. So we are driven to assume that when the subject exercises memory it recalls past ideas into the present by abstraction from the universal it repeats the operation which led to the original idea. By the exercise of memory it abstracts a present idea of the past from the intuitive (timeless) memory of itself as an intuitive self. It is true that memory is personal to the subject, and so the per- sonal memory of the subject depends on its past human experience, and this may apparently lead to the conclusion that ' my ' universal is not ' your ' universal. But personal memory does not condition the universal itself; all it conditions is the use the subject can make of the universal for the abstraction of ideas : you and I differ only in the use each of us can make of the universal. The schema (the universal) I admit is not the manifold : it is but the manifold as presented and received by us the manifold in our apprehension. But the manifold of our apprehension is pheno- menal of the manifold of the intuitive self, and, to us, the memory of the intuitive self subsumes the past, present and future. So we may hold that by the exercise of memory we abstract the past from the timeless thought of our intuitive selves. Only so, I submit, can we explain the strange fact in human experience that the subject has power by the exercise of memory to recall in the present ideas of the past. Or we may consider this question from another point of view. And now bear in mind that we have nothing to do with the pro- found question of whether the intuitive self is or is not immortal : we are concerned only with the question of its survival of the dis- solution of the body and brain, dissolution which imports the death or destruction of the human personality. The human personality exists, passively, as a thing of percep- tion ; it exists, actively, in its power or faculty (?) of conception. MEMORY 91 The concepts of conception result in ideas as the subject of memory. That is, concepts appear to the subject to have lasting effects on the understanding of the subject, which lasting effects I term ideas. Human experience informs us positively that memory exists in each subject, and this memory infers, for the subject, the lasting effect in time of its ideas. But, as already shown, there can be no reality in this apparent lasting effect of ideas. We are driven, in reason, to the following conclusions : If the human personality has no ideas there is nothing in it which can be the subject of memory it has no memory. Human experi- ence, therefore, is a condition precedent for the subject to have memory. So the memory of each subject is personal to itself it depends on its personal human experience. But this personal human experience is phenomenal ; it is no more than the experi- ence of a partial and mediate manifestation of the personality of the intuitive self. It has existence only as phenomenal of the (rela- tively) noumenal experience of the intuitive self. The concepts (in cognition) of the subject have existence only in relation to the intuition of the intuitive self : they are abstractions from intui- tion. So the resulting ideas (the subject of memory) can have no lasting effect in time, and we must conclude (in reason, not assump- tion) that as the original concepts were abstractions from intuition, so ideas, as the subject of memory, mark a power in the human personality to bring ideas of the past into the present by repeating this same abstraction from intuition which originally led to the concept. This power in the human personality to bring up into the present ideas of the past certainly exists, and by no possibility can past ideas remain so unchanged in time that at any future time they can be recalled, unchanged, in the present. So the only explana- tion of memory is that its exercise exists in some present process of the understanding in relation to ' stuff ' unconditioned in time. I find this ' stuff ' in intuition, and submit that the abstraction of a concept by the subject once made, the fact of memory proves that the same abstraction can be repeated again and again. This is why the subject appears to itself to have in it a full storage un- conditioned in time of all past ideas. The intuitive self is always being affected in intuition by the manifold. So, to the subject conditioned in time and space, the intuitive self stores up intuition in time. The affection of the external, the manifold, on the intuitive self takes, for the subject, the phenomenal form of affection from external events. These affections, for the subject, as internally affected, constitute ideas. These ideas are the subject of memory, and appear to be lasting in time because they are abstractions from (timeless) intuition. When once an idea is impressed on the subject it remains ear- marked as his idea ; and at any future time he can, by the exercise 92 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY of memory, abstract what is to him practically the same idea from the intuition (timeless) of his intuitive self. To meet a possible objection at this point I here interpolate an explanation. When an external event affects the subject it affects the material brain materially causes some change in its material constitution. But the brain, being conditioned in time and space, is in a constant state of flux. So the change itself is not lasting it is subject to constant flux. We cannot, therefore, refer directly a perfect memory to stereotyped changes in the brain. But I think the relations between the material changes in the brain may be lasting, and these relations cannot, in themselves, be said to be material. We know that ideas are but relative, and I think it may be that the relations between the material changes of the brain are lasting because of some direct (though to us pheno- menal) connection with the permanent that the permanent, which exists as the foundation of events, reveals itself to us phenomenally in these relations which are not material. In mathematics, for instance, we may, when dealing with numbers, change our unit arbitrarily, and yet the relations between the numbers remain i has the same relation to 2 as 32 to 16, though the numbers differ. In dealing with numbers we find they have no meaning for us, per se ; any number has meaning only in relation to other numbers, and this is why we can change our unit arbitrarily and yet preserve relations. In the same way ideas have no mean- ing for us, per se ; any idea has meaning only in relation to other ideas. An idea is no more than a relation, and herein we find why ideas have only phenomenal form. Now, when, in exercising memory we use intuition, then, for intuition to emerge in idea, the ' machinery ' of the material brain must be used. The material changes effected in the brain by past events are used. But as, in the passing of time, these changes of the brain have no fixity, they are useless in themselves as records of past events. At the same time the relations between these changes may have fixity. And all intuition requires for the emerg- ence of ideas when memory is exercised is this fixity of relations. That the material constitution of the brain constantly changes in time is a fact. So if we refer memory to these changes, per se, memory must change in time. Any change effected in our youth by an event will have changed in our old age : the event recalled in old age must be referred to the brain as it exists. I deny the possibility of any material change in the brain existing timeless : and yet we can in age recall in idea the events of our youth. An explanation of this would appear to lie. in the fact that relations between the changes which are non-ma'terial do, for us, appear to exist timeless. MEMORY 93 These relations, however, cannot, for the subject, exist timeless : for the subject nothing can, in cognition, exist timeless. They can only exist timeless in relation to intuition. So the subject, when exercising memory, must be able to use the intuition of its intuitive self to call up these relations into the present to abstract ideas from intuition for conscious use in present time. 1 Perhaps my meaning may be rendered clearer by the following line of argument. C. C. Massey finds ' the accomplished in the accomplishing ' (Thoughts of a Modern Mystic, pp. 146 et seq.). Paraphrasing this we may say that a full integration of those relations which con- stitute, for us, ideas gives us the universal. I would thus make our particulars of knowledge not to disappear in the universal, but to be subsumed under it ; in the same way that I have suggested limits do not disappear in the limitless, but are subsumed under it. In this way, though relations still remain phenomenal in our pheno- menal universe, we still give them a form of noumenal reality. A shadow is phenomenal of the body that casts it. But with an heroic stretch of imagination ! we may assume that a full inte- gration of all possible shadows cast by the body would give us the body itself. Returning to our argument as to memory, let us consider a con- crete instance. At some particular time an event affected me. A month after I recall the event in memory bring up into the present an idea of the event. I use the idea and abandon it. The idea is gone for me is a thing of the past. Again, in twelve months I recall in idea the same event in memory. I use the idea (which to me is the same as the former idea) and abandon it. The idea is gone for me is a thing of the past. Now these two ideas cannot be, per se, the same one idea ; each is conditioned in different time, and is related to a different storage of ideas in me. But to me they appear to be one and the same. For, granting a perfect memory, I may recall the event myriads of times, and always the idea, to me, is the same. The apparent explanation is that the intuition corresponding to the idea of the event and stored up in the intuitive self is always the same (that is, is not conditioned in time) ; and that I, in abstracting, at any time, the idea from the intuition, always make the same abstraction which must always, to me, result in the like idea. But an intuition, as before shown, has no real existence : only intuition exists. So the true explanation is that, the idea being originally 1 Scientific knowledge advances not through evolving knowledge of things-in- themselves, but through evolving knowledge of the relations between the phenomena studied by men of science. And this, perhaps, points to the fact that the uncon- ditioned (or manifoldness) lies at the background even of science. 94 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY an abstraction from intuition, the abstraction once made, memory gives power to the subject to repeat, again and again, the same abstraction which always results in, apparently, the same idea. Memory enables us to recall the past into the present. Therefore memory must use something timeless (something which subsumes the present and the past) for the exercise of its strange power. This ' something timeless ' we find in intuition. But in the above argument have we not got rid of the lesser diffi- culty by the creation of a greater ? If ideas cannot really, but only apparently, be stored up in the subject, must it not be impossible for the intuitive self to store up intuition ? How can intuition be stored up unless in time ? And, when intuition is unconditioned in time, how can it be stored up in time ? This objection, I am sure, can be proved unsound, and I now try to prove it unsound. If I fail it is from want of personal clearness in thought and language. The intuitive sell is always affecting and being affected by the external and other intuitive selves ; as the intuitive self is a con- dition this requires no proof, though we can only state, without explaining, the fact. Indeed, my use of the word ' always ' is but an attempt to get rid of the conditioning of time and space as known to us. This affection is not, in itself, conditioned in time and space ; but, in relation to the subject (not the intuitive self), it is conditioned in time and space ; and, as it is the subject who is using the ideas resulting from the conceptions of the understanding for reasoning, this conditioning must be, for it, treated as objective. 1 Consider the subject at any time, and again at any future time. During the interval between these times there has, for the subject, been this affection between its intuitive self and the external. This affection is not really in time, but to the subject it appears to be in time and objectively in time. For during this interval the subject has been living and thinking in time, and (as it is a partial and mediate manifestation of the intuitive self) it is that which has been affecting the intuitive self unconditioned in time which must have been affecting the subject conditioned in time. So, to the subject, this affection of the intuitive self is objectively in time. (It must always be remembered that, in time, we deal only with (phenomenal) abstractions from the (relatively) noumenal.) This means that, from the point of view of the subject, the ia- 1 Succession of thought is a limit or conditioning of thought in the manifold. The thought in the manifold of the intuitive self is timeless ; that is, for the sub- ject, it subsumes thought in the past, presenfand future. The subject, when exercising memory, abstracts thought of the past from the thought in the manifold of its intuitive self. MEMORY 95 tuitive self has been storing up intuition in time. And this is all that is required for proof. Bear in mind in reading what is above written that the real, the permanent, is not conditioned in time and space. The permanent is the basis of our universe, but our universe is a phenomenal uni- verse. I might almost say that for anything to be objectively true for the subject it must be only phenomenally true. For the permanent does not come into the series of conditions in and through which the subject exists ; it only comes in to complete the series by the unconditioned. The above line of reasoning may be somewhat difficult to follow, both from want of clarity in my language and from the fact that the distinction between thinking in the manifold and thinking in time and space has never been fully dissected. As we have already seen, some commentators of Kant treat the manifold as something loose or indefinite in itself, while treating unity as a real product by syn- thesis from diversity. They do not distinguish clearly between the manifold itself and the manifold in our apprehension. I therefore prefer further argument. I have given instances which, I have suggested, show power in the subject to think in the manifold : indeed, I hold that all human thought is in particulars of the manifold. On its face this may be in opposition to Kant, but I do not think it affects the groundwork of his scheme. And it must also be borne in mind I assume to follow Kant in holding that while the intuitive self presents to the subject the manifold in intuition, the subject, through sensibility, is affected by the manifold to be intuited, which assumption itself opens the possibility for the subject of thought in the manifold to some limited degree. Kant says ' we may certainly give the name of object to every- thing, even to every representation, so far as we are conscious there- of.' And he says an object (phenomenon) is nothing more than a complex of representations of parts succeeding one another in time (Kant, pp. 142, 143). Again he says, ' We cannot think any object except by means of the categories ; we cannot cognise any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to these conceptions ' (Kant, p. 101). Consider the following passage : ' For example, I see a ship float down the stream of a river ; my perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this phenomenon the vessel should be per- ceived first below and afterwards higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is determined ; and by that order apprehension is regulated ' (Kant, p. 144). Here all is plain sailing : the ship is conditioned in two sue- 96 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY cessive times and two successive places we have a case of suc- cession, not simultaneity. But Kant continues, speaking now not of a ship but a house : ' My perceptions in the apprehension of a house might begin at the roof and end at the foundation, or vice versa ; or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical intuition by going from left to right, and from right to left. Accordingly, in the series of these percep- tions there was no determined order, which necessitated my be- ginning at a certain point, in order empirically to connect the manifold ' (Kant, p. 144). What does this mean ? It means that when the concept of a house is formed, and the resulting idea is afterwards used, in memory, the succession of the representations of parts of the house is not determined, but arbitrary. Therefore succession in time, as to the complex of representations going to make up the object, has nothing to do with the past concept of the house, when the past concept is used in the present by the exercise of memory. But simultaneity and succession are the only relations of time (Kant, p. 137), and the concept (which is the basis of the idea) of a house when used in memory is a concept in time. But the subject does not think the house in any determined suc- cession of parts when exercising memory. It must, therefore, think it in (phenomenal) simultaneity of parts. The thought of the object is in time, but there are no relations of different times for the parts of the object thought. The subject thinks the object as one in time thinks it in (a particular of) the manifold. The sub- ject does, to some limited extent, think in the manifold. Now go a step further. Consider a subject not different in kind but only in degree from Kant's subject. Expand the limited power of thought in the manifold in Kant's subject to full power of thought in the manifold in this new subject. (Bear in mind that now power to think in diversity and unity is not necessarily lost : it may simply become subjective to this full power of thought in the manifold. A subject, thinking in the manifold, might well have power to project its thought on to our phenomenal universe of time and space, and so communicate in ideas with subjects conditioned in time and space. This relationship, in fact, exists for each one of us. An intuitive self thinks in intuition ; its human personality, conditioned in time and space, uses intuition conditioned in time and space as ideas.) Then this subject is not conditioned in our time and space or in any way by the normal organs of sense. We arrive (so far as is possible for us) at the mind of an intuitive self. But still the relation between the subject and the intuitive self remains : the subject of time and space is a manifestation within the limits of time and space of its intuitive self, not a distinct subject in kind. And to the subject (conditioned in time and MEMORY 97 space) the affections on the intuitive self (which are not conditioned in time and space) must appear to be in time (intuition becomes subject to succession), because time conditions all the cognition of the subject. So, relatively to the subject, the intuitive self does store up intuition. This storage is only phenomenally real ; but, so far, it is for the subject objectively real. We arrive, then, at the following conclusions : As intuitive selves we receive the manifold in intuition ; we think in intuition. So far we have nothing to do with the conditions of time and space as known to human personalities. The ' stuff ' of the memory of the subject is this manifold in intuition of its intuitive self. 1 The subject is the intuitive self conditioned in time and space or, in other words, a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the intuitive self. So, to the subject, the intuition of the intuitive self originates in time and space with events. This simply means that the subject can only be affected in its understanding by intuition conditioned in time : what affects it must appear to be so conditioned. Events, to us, become things of the past. But ideas of the events do not become things of the past. In relation to memory these ideas are always potentially in the present : the subject has a full storage of ideas of all past events, potentially in the present and which by the exercise of memory can be used to a greater or less extent in the present. What is stated in the above paragraph is phenomenally true for the subject, but it has no (relatively) noumenal truth. The truth is this : The intuitive self is affected by the manifold in intuition ; to its subject this is an affection in time. At any and all times the subject can abstract ideas of past events from the intuition of its intuitive self ; but the subject is unconscious of its acts of abstrac- tion and so, to itself, appears to have a full storage of ideas poten- tially in the present of all past events. When the subject, by the exercise of memory, calls up for use in the present an idea of a past event it appears to itself to call up this idea directly from a full storage in it, the subject, of ideas of all past events. What it really does, when it calls up for use in the present an idea of a past event, is to abstract this idea from the intuition of its intuitive self. But as it can at all times make the same abstraction and is unconscious of the act of abstracting, it appears to itself to call up the idea directly from a full storage of 1 Past, present and future exist only for a subject in time, so only such a subject can exercise memory : memory expresses the potentiality of making the past, the present. The intuitive self does not require this potentiality, for to it the distinction between past and present does not exist : the 'stuff' of memory is in the intuitive self without the exercise of any such faculty (?) as memory. G 98 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY ideas in itself as above stated. The intuition of the intuitive self is, to the subject, a storage in time. The subject can abstract thought of the past from the thought in the manifold of its intui- tive self. Bear in mind that when in cognition we think the manifold in time, that is, in the past, present or future, we condition the mani- fold : we deal with nothing more than, as it were, a projection of the manifold on or in time and space. When we think in unity and diversity we are really thinking within limits of the manifold. I am strongly of opinion that in making the foundations of memory to lie in intuition and in thus explaining the (apparent) timeless fixity in the understanding of ideas of past events, I am propound- ing no new theory. For Professor W. F. Barrett in his Presidential address to the S.P.R. says : ' Our minds are like a photographic plate, sensitive to all sorts of impressions, but our ego develops only a few of these impressions, these are our conscious perceptions, the rest aro latent, awaiting development, which may come in sleep, hypnosis, or trance, or by the shock of death, or after death ' (Proceedings S.P.R., vol. xviii. p. 337). Here the opposition between ' minds ' and ' ego ' is doubtful ; for by ' minds ' is clearly meant something on which impressions can be impressed and remain impressed unaffected by time. For, if not, the impressions could not be exactly developed in after time. If for ' minds ' we read ' intuitive selves ' and for ' impres- sions ' ' affects in intuition,' the difficulty is removed. By the ' ego ' is meant the human personality, and Barrett states that this human personality can only deal, in conscious perception, with the ' impressions ' when they are developed, he makes these develop- ments (ideas) subjective to the impressions (intuition). Paraphrasing his statement we arrive at the theory that the in- tuitive self does (in relation to the human personality) store up intuition unconditioned in time and space, from which the human personality can abstract (develop) ideas in present time and space. And this is closely the same as the theory now propounded as to memory. That, by the exercise of memory, we can at any present time recall in idea the events of our past life, appears to me the most extraordinary of all the facts of human experience, and I do not think that there is any definite extant theory which explains how a subject existing in the present can have power so to make its past exist in the present. The theory I suggest may offer some explana- tion. But if my theory be sound then we find in it further proof that each of us exists as an intuitive self. For memory is possible only when intuition is (timelessly) presented to the subject by its intui- tive self. MEMORY 99 UNCONSCIOUS MEMORY To prevent misapprehension I should here point out that all subjects at all times exercise what may, relatively, be termed unconscious memory. This follows directly from the fact that our universe is a universe of relations. Anything present in the understanding cannot be a subject of cognition unless other like and unlike things are also present. For we know nothing of things-in-themselves, but only their relations one to another, as they affect us. A ball, a rattle, has no meaning in itself to any child first seeing it. It is only when the child learns by experience the distinction of the thing presented to it from other things that it knows anything about the particular thing, can form a concept of the particular thing. So when a child cognises anything at any time it must at the same time (by unconscious memory) have other things present in its mind. This is true for all of us, and for all our experience (cf. Cousin's Kant, pp. 92, 114). And this must also be true for impressions of feeling. Any feel- ing (including emotion or sensation) recalled in memory is meaning- less in itself for cognition. There must be present in the mind also, with relative unconsciousness, ideas in contradiction of the idea of the particular feeling ; there must be the exercise of unconscious memory. For, if not, the particular idea has no relative meaning for us ; that is, it has in our universe of relations no meaning at all. We find examples of the truth of what is above stated even with some adult human beings. For certain individuals exist whose physical condition and sense organs are normal, so that their under- standing must be affected by the external in the same normal way that ordinarily reasonable persons are affected. And yet these individuals manifest weakness in intellect forms of idiotcy. Now if we bear in mind that nothing present in the understanding can be a subject of cognition unless other like and unlike things are also therein present ; that is, unless there be the exercise of unconscious memory, then we find an explanation for the absence in manifestation of normal intellect in these individuals. They fail from want of power to exercise unconscious memory : they have experience of the external like to that of normal individuals, but this experience giving them no knowledge of relations for use, they have no power to use their knowledge for cognition. They cannot operate with it in making what are, to the normally con- stituted, real things ; i.e. things of relation. Or consider an individual normally constituted but in that he has lost all sense of personal identity. This means that he cannot relate his thought in the present to himself as distinct from other personalities. But the word ' himself ' as above used does not mean himself at the moment of thought : at the moment of thought 100 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY he does relate his thought in the present to himself. The word means, himself of the present and the past. For full sense of per- sonal identity all our ' past of personality ' must be present to us in the passing present moment, and this full presence of personality exists in unconscious memory. The individual in question has lost sense of personal identity from inability to exercise uncon- scious memory. We err when we assume that our consciousness of self is a mere consciousness of self in the present passing moment : it is a con- sciousness of self in the present passing moment in relation to the self of all past personal human experience. ' Lorsque je me trouvais seul,' said a patient of Krishaber's, ' dans un endroit nouveau, j'etais comme un enfant nouveau-ne, ne reconnaissant plus rien. J'avais un ardent desir de revoir mon ancien monde, de redevenir 1'ancien moi : c'etait ce desir qui m'a empeche de me tuer ' (Proceedings, vol. iv. p. 502). The fact of the ' ardent desir ' proves he was conscious he was still himself. But he could not determine himself as himself because he could not recall in present consciousness his ' ancien monde ' or his ' ancien moi/ He was incapable of relating himself in the present to himself in the past, and without this relation he could not determine himself in full self-consciousness. The following passage from Cousin bears on the meaning of what I now term unconscious memory. His reference to three faculties, imagination, memory and consciousness may have been held by some as not sound in any explanation of Kant's Critique. But the faculty of memory has a more important place in Kant's scheme than is, perhaps, generally given to it. It is because of Cousin's direct reference to ' reminiscence ' that I give the passage : for it supports the theory I have developed as to what memory really is. The passage runs as follows : ' Ce n'est pas tout ; si Ton veut avoir une idee exacte de 1'entende- ment dans le systeme de Kant, il faut savoir aussi quelles sont les facultes particulieres que supposent, selon lui, cette faculte fonda- mentale. La fonction de 1'entendement est de ramener a 1' unite la variete de nos representations ou de nos intuitions : mais cette unite nous ne pourrions 1'obtenir, si nous n'avions pas la faculte de rapprocher, de rassembler les diverses parties qui doivent former le tout : cette faculte, c'est 1'imagination. Comme vous le voyez, son role est d'operer la reunion, la synthese sans laquelle 1'entende- ment ne pourrait penser les objets. Mais cette reunion ne se fait pas d'un seul coup, pour ainsi dire ; elle se fait successivement. II faut que je parcoure 1'une apres 1'autre toutes les parties ; et pour cela il faut que mon imagination, chaque fois qu'elle passe a une partie nouvelle, reproduise toutes les'parties precedentes ; sinon, celles-ci seraient perdues pour moi et la reunion serait impossible. L'imagination est done, sous ce point de vue, une faculte repro- MEMORY 101 ductive, on la nomme la reminiscence. Enfin il ne suffit que 1'imagina- tion reproduise les diverses parties ; pour que cette reproduction soit efficace, il faut que nous soyons convaincus interieurement que ce que reproduit 1'imagination est le meme que ce qu'elle avait repro- duit d'abord, et cette conviction, c'est la conscience qui nous la donne. II y a done, en resume, trois facultes, l'imagination, la reminiscence et la conscience, au moyen desquelles 1'entendement pense les objets que lui livre la sensibilite ' (Cousin's Kant, pp. 92, 114). In the above passage Cousin, in a certain connection, treats imagination as a reproductive faculty which is to be termed memory. When we think of anything we think of it in the present. As, however, we know nothing of things-in-themselves but only of their relations, inter se, as phenomena, it follows that human ' thought ' of a thing infers the presence in the mind at the same present moment of thought of other things of which we have had experience in the past. We must exercise memory in order to ' think ' anything in the present. This power to exercise memory Cousin terms imagina- tion as a reproductive faculty. When we think anything in the present we are conscious of the thought of the thing. But we are not conscious in the same way that this thought involves also present thought of other things. This accompanying thought, then, of other things is (relatively) unconscious thought : we exercise unconscious memory. An instance showing how we exercise this (relatively) unconscious memory may well be given. It is commonly held that the philosopher's idea of the sun is quite different from that of the savage. But this requires consideration ; for the affect of the sun on both is the same. The distinction really lies in this : When the savage is affected by the sun he relates the affect in idea to his storage of past ideas to his past human experience. The sun is to him an unknown moving thing which gives fight and life on earth. Of what it is, how or why it moves, he knows not, but he knows it does do something and so may even personify it as a mystic being governing all life and nature. The idea in him of the sun is an idea in relation to (conditioned by) his existing storage of ideas. The philosopher, so affected, makes the same relation. But now his stored ideas give him more definite information, and the sun is to him a material centre of the movement of the earth : he can determine more or less materially why the sun, as such a centre, has its effect on the earth. But the mystery of the unknown remains a mystery for both, unless we hold the mystery is rendered greater for the philosopher because his judgment has a wider pur- view than that of the savage. Both are affected by the external in the same way : the affect on 102 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY both is the same. Why, then, does this same affect result in such differing ideas in the two ? Because ideas are relative only, so that, though the effect on both is the same, the emerging ideas differ because the idea of the savage exists in relation to one storage of ideas, and that of the philosopher to another. When the external affects us in idea we always by the exercise of (relatively) unconscious memory relate the effect on us to our stor- age of ideas. The emerging idea is relative to our storage, our past experience. Given the same normal organs of sense then any particular of the external affects each one of us in the same way. But, in idea, we relate this affect to our storage of ideas, our past experience. We effect this relation by the exercise of (relatively) unconscious memory. And as this storage in each one of us differs from those of all others, and the idea in us is but a thing of relation, we find that the same affect on each of us results in a differing idea. But bear this in mind : A child of three may see the sun and may constantly see the same sun till the age of fifty, when he has grown to be a philosopher. The affect on him is always the same, but his ideas mark a continuum of evolution from his idea of the sun as a child of three to that of his idea as a philosopher of fifty. So these ideas are phenomenal only, and exist only in relation to a human personality conditioned in succession of time and space. In the same way we may consider the same child of the age of three, but assume, at the age of fifty, he is not a philosopher, but remains as sheerly ignorant of the real nature of the sun as when three years old. We have now the same continuum of ideas, but we have not the same evolution in ideas. We find then, from the above considerations, that the evolution of human personality is determined by environment in time and space : there is nothing of the permanent in human personality. We arrive at the ' illusion ' or ' delusion ' or ' sorrow of life ' of the Buddhist. (Gautama in determining the illusion of the ' I ' neces- sarily arrived at the ' not I.' But as the ' not I ' is beyond human knowledge he treated it as a negation, for he confined his philosophy within the four corners of human knowledge, though he treats the root of the intellectual as existing in feeling.) Kant understood clearly that human personality is illusion, and that is why he said we think ourselves not as we are, but as we appear to ourselves to be. But the personality of the child remains the same whatever its human experience may be. Kant referred this (relative) permanence to the soul of the child. The three faculties (?) ' 1'imagination, la reminiscence, et la con- science,' refer to the subject, the human personality. Kant wanted more for his (relatively) noumenal self. And he got it by the MEMORY 103 presentation to his subject of the manifold of all possible intuition previous to sensuous intuition of objects. For this presentation is active and can only be effected by an intuitive self. (Kant's soul of man.) We must assume the fact of the existence of this (relatively) noumenal I (though we are ignorant in cognition of the ' I ' itself) to explain why our self-apperception is, to ourselves, a phenomenal self-apperception. The strange results of habit or custom are, too, explained by this exercise of unconscious memory : it explains automatic or instinctive action. When any subject does anything or engages in any line of thought it finds, normally, that by constant repetition of the act or engage- ment in the particular line of thought, it ordinarily gains constantly evolving power in effecting the act or in determining the line of thought. It is by constant repetition that the child learns to walk, the marksman to shoot nearer the bull's-eye ; the philosopher by constantly engaging in one line of thought arrives ultimately at or near to the truth he wishes to search out. It is the subject itself as to which this evolution in power (by repetition) takes place. The child has in its present thought (by unconscious memory) each and all its past efforts to walk. These constitute, for it, experience. It knows, by past failure, what not to do, and so, under accumulating experience, ultimately does only that which leads to success. And so with the philosopher. By constant shooting at his particular target of truth, he attains ultimately success in hitting the bull's-eye. Relatively unconscious memory of past failures leads to approximate success in the present. If unconscious memory be thus involved in the full self-con- sciousness of the subject, we must give to the personality of the subject a certain continuity in time : we must modify our conclusion that the subject is a mere transient ' thing' of the passing, present moment. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN we assume that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, I hold we clarify and strengthen Kant's reasoning in the Critique : his theory of the Schema and his use of ' Imagination ' as referable both to sensibility and to the understanding are rendered more intelligible. Possibly, under the assumption made, we do not require for our reasoning either the Schema or Imagination. Again, Kant's real subject is the soul of man : he relies always on the soul for ultimate explanation of the existence and, so, the self-apperception (with synthetic thought) of his assumed subject, the human personality. I have tried to show that his reasoning points conclusively to the existence of an intuitive self, and that the fact of this intuitive self is sufficient for him without any refer- ence to the soul of man, if we leave out of consideration his reason- ing in the Dialectic. And we not only can, but must leave out of consideration Kant's reasoning in the Dialectic, for the profound problems therein attacked of God, Immortality, Free- Will, and the Moral Law are outside the purview of our present investigation. All as yet attempted has been to prove the existence of the intuitive self, and that Kant's subject is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of this intuitive self. This proof has been based on an assumption that sensibility affects the subject, not only through, but otherwise than through, the normal organs of sense. But I have also tried to show that this assumption underlies Kant's own reasoning. We now turn from more or less abstract reasoning to the facts of human experience, and I try to show that in human experience we find proof of what is but yet an assumption ; that is, that sensi- bility affects the subject, not only through, but otherwise than through, the normal organs of sense. At the outset it may be stated positively that if telepathic com- munication takes place between human personalities then sensi- bility does affect human personalities otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. It is by the light of this fact and that of the existence of the intuitive self I try l& find the fundamental law underlying the various psychical phenomena we shall deal with. 104 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 105 What I now attempt is to apply the theory of personality and the incidental theory of memory, which I have already explained, to telepathy as part of our human experience. We shall thus find the psychical phenomena considered brought under the governance of one fundamental law. But it is right to state that there are some alleged psychical phe- nomena which I do not consider at all, and others for which I offer no explanation. My main object is to show that in human experi- ence we have the strongest evidence in support of the argument that each one of us exists as an intuitive self. PART II TELEPATHY DEFINED THE first part of this book has been confined mainly to an attempt, by the light of Kant's Critique, to prove that human personality is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of time and space of a (relatively) real personality, the intuitive self. As incidental to the argument the assumption has been made that sensibility affects the subject (the human personality) not only through, but otherwise than through, the normal organs of sense. This assumption I have argued to be obligatory for full effect to be given to Kant's reasoning in the Critique if we ignore his Trans- cendental Dialectic. But I have not introduced the intuitive self as a new factor in Kant's reasoning. What I hold is that he himself makes his subject (the human personality) a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space, as known to us, of the soul of man ; and all I have done is for the term ' soul of man ' to replace the term ' intuitive self,' and I have tried to show that this term (which is not so ex- tensive as that of the soul of man) is sufficient for his purpose, if we do not touch on his Dialectic. It is important to bear in mind that I make no attempt to define (to determine) the personality of the intuitive self : I arrive only at the fact of its existence. This personality we cannot determine in idea, for we know it only to that limited extent in which it is manifest to us in our limited universe. So far as the argument has proceeded we have no more than a bare, if necessary, assumption that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense : so the argument, as yet, rests on a bare assumption. If, now, we can find human experience in proof of the fact that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, then we may abandon the assumption and rely on the fact proved. With this fact as proved I submit we shall have human evidence in human experience that the intuitive self exists. This brings us to a consideration of human evidence of the facts of telepathy. To this point I have treated telepathy as marking 106 TELEPATHY DEFINED 107 no more than the fact that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense ; for, whatever telepathy may or may not mean, it must have this fact for foundation. When, however, we consider human evidence of human experience we require a more exact and particular definition for telepathy. Such a definition I shall now try to worry out. The ultimate attempt is to bring the differing phenomena of telepathy under the one great fundamental law foreshadowed by Myers. If this can be effected we shall, I think, find, in human experience, proof of the existence of the intuitive self. What I attempt is to prove the fact without transcending human experience. Myers, in the year 1896, denned telepathy as ' the communi- cation of impressions of any kind from one mind to another independently of the recognised channels of sense.' He defined Telaesthesia perception at a distance ' as implying any direct sensation or perception of objects or conditions independently of the recognised channels of sense, and also under such circum- stances that no known mind external to the percipient's can be suggested as the source of the knowledge thus gained ' (Proceedings, vol. xii. p. 174. See also Proceedings, vol. i. p. 147). He thus made telepathy refer to affects on the percipient from external personalities otherwise than through the recognised channels of sense ; telaesthesia to affects on the percipient from the external (as distinct from external personalities), otherwise than through the recognised channels of sense. In June 1884 Professor Sidgwick had stated that the S.P.R. had arrived at the important conclusion that ' feelings and ideas, under certain exceptional and as yet unknown conditions, are transmitted from one living human being to another, otherwise than through the recognised organs of sense ' (Journal, vol. i. p. 8). The importance of Professor Sidgwick's statement lies in this : Whereas Myers' definition of telepathy refers to communication between mind and mind, Sidgwick more cautiously refers to transfer from one living human being to another : the former definition, too, refers to the communication of impressions, the latter to the trans- mission of feeling and ideas. (Gurney, in considering thought- transference, says : ' Thought must here be taken as including more than it does in ordinary usage ; it must include sensations and volitions as well as mere representations or ideas.' Phantasms, vol. i. p. 11.) Now, by the theory I propound, there is (through sensibility which is passive) constant action and reaction between any intuitive self and other intuitive selves and the external. For the intuitive self this manifests itself actively and directly in the intuition of the intuitive self. The intuitive self thinks in intuition, and we may term this 108 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY thought intelligent, for it relates to affects in self-apperception. But the affects on the intuitive self from other intuitive selves and the external are direct they are not received in the form of time and space. So the intuitive self is affected and thinks in the mani- fold thinks, as it were, ' in a lump,' and not in succession as known to us. Bear in mind that this thinking (unconditioned in time and space) is a higher form of thought than thought in succession : thought in succession is a limited form of thought in the manifold, it is a conditioning of thought in the manifold. We can ordinarily only think in succession ; in a limited form of thought in the mani- fold. So we cannot think with our intuitive selves, we are but phenomenal forms (in space and time) of our real intuitive selves. It is our intuitive selves that really think ; we, as human personal- ity, but think phenomenally (in time and space). So our intuitive selves may be said to think with us, though we cannot think with them : they determine our thoughts. For instance, a shadow is but a phenomenon of something which casts the shadow : it is this ' something,' however, which determines the shadow. (So an intuitive self, disembodied, might possibly communicate directly with the embodied, though the embodied can only communi- cate indirectly with the disembodied. For intuitive selves, dis- embodied, may be able to limit their thought in succession for com- munication with us, whereas we cannot, as human personalities, communicate with them fully in thought in the manifold.) In this connection conceptions and their resultants, ideas, may be termed projections of intuitional thought on or in time and space. And, herein, we find an explanation of genius. For the man of genius differs in degree only, not in kind, from his fellows : he marks the high- water mark of the emergence of true phenomenal ideas in the understanding from the intuition of the mind of the intuitive self. It is ' the shadows of the real ' that affect us in cognition, and the man of genius is he who, with unique power, most truly relates these shadows to the real. In what is above written a distinction arises incidentally between ' mind ' and ' understanding ' which must be explained. Myers refers to the communication from mind to mind ; Sidgwick, more cautiously, refers to transmission from one human being to another. I think that Sidgwick, in referring to transmission from human being to human being, confined the transfer from human mind to human mind, or from understanding to understanding. Now psychology as a science must, so far as is possible, keep clear of the metaphysical, and so must ignore Kant's distinction between the ego as pure and the ego as empirical : it ignores the uncon- ditioned, and so, for the science, the ego or subject is denoted by the simple fact that everything mental is. or is referred to a Self of our universe. In other words an assumption is necessarily made that the human personality exists objectively in personal consciousness. TELEPATHY DEFINED 109 But, in psychology, the terms mind, human-mind and under- standing are used as I think having different meanings, and I think there is an underlying admission in psychology that the distinction between mind and human mind, though it must exist, cannot be clearly denned ; psychology evades, and quite rightly evades, the distinction. After dealing at some length with the question of what mind is, James Ward says : ' There still remains an alternative, which, like the first, may be expressed in the words of J. S. Mill, viz., " the alternative of believing that mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them." To admit this, of course, is to admit the necessity of distinguishing between mind or ego, meaning the unity or continuity of consciousness as a complex of presentations, and mind or ego as the subject to which this complex is presented. In dealing with the body from the ordinary biological standpoint no such necessity arises. But, whereas there the individual organ- ism is spoken of unequivocally, in psychology, on the other hand, the individual mind may mean either (1) the series of feelings or " mental phenomena " above referred to, or (2) the subject of these feelings for whom they are phenomena, or (3) the subject of these feelings or phenomena plus the series of feelings or phenomena themselves, the two being in that relation to each other in which alone the one is subject and the other a series of feelings, phenomena, or objects. It is in this last sense that mind is used in empirical psychology, its exclusive use in the first sense being favoured only by those who shrink from the speculative associations connected with its exclusive use in the second. But psychology is not called upon to transcend the relation of subject to object or, as we may call it, the fact of presentation. On the other hand, as has been said, the attempt to ignore one term of the relation is hopeless ; and equally hopeless, even futile, is the attempt by means of phrases such as consciousness or the unity of consciousness, to dispense with the recognition of a conscious subject ' (Ency. Brit., vol. xx. p. 39, 9th ed.). The above extract shows that in psychology there is an assump- tion of the existence of a conscious subject, where the consciousness of the subject is related and related only to a series of feelings or ' mental phenomena.' This is an assumption of an objective human personality, and so, for it, the term ' mind ' means the same as ' human mind.' But James Ward very carefully guards himself from coming into conflict with Kant's distinction between a Self as pure and a Self as empirical. He says psychology is not called upon to transcend the relation of subject to object. For just as Darwinism deals only with the facts of variation and the struggle for existence without touching the question of why such facts are facts to us, so psychology only deals with the fact of human person- 110 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY ality as a fact, without touching the question of why human person- ality exists as it exists, or of whether it may be the mere object of some subject or the subject of some object. (Kant says the under- standing is a faculty of cognition and of judging (Kant, pp. 84, 57). But he makes cognition and judgment subjective to intuition. This, I have held, makes the understanding (as marking the human personality) subjective to a (relatively) objective self of intuition. For intuition must be given actively to the subject.) If, now, we enter the realms of metaphysics we find that the ' conscious being ' of psychology is empirical ; it is, in the language I have used, no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of an intuitive self relatively, a pure self. So, if I am correct in holding that the ' mind ' of psychology is not dis- tinct from a human mind, I may, metaphysically, refer the term ' mind ' to the intuitive self as opposed to the term ' human mind ' of the human personality. This distinction in definition I shall use throughout what I now write. 1 But we must go further than this, for, in psychology, it is possible that we can find no satisfactory definition of the human mind as related to or distinguished from the understanding. The assumption of psychology of the existence of a Self (a mind) to which everything (determined as) mental is referred, does not mean a general consciousness in humanity of the existence of humanity and the external. It means, for each one of us, self- consciousness of self in distinction from other selves. In what does the distinction consist ? Bear in mind that we are now con- sidering these selves as objective, not as mere manifestations of intuitive selves. The distinction must exist in time and space, and so must be as it is referred to mentality. This self is objective and so its mentality must be personal the mentality in question is not a general human mentality but a particular and personal mentality. And distinctions in mentality must be referred to dis- tinctions in brain structure. Give all men absolutely the same brain structure, and distinctions psychologically between human minds disappear. It may be objected that even if two men have absolutely the same brain structure, still, their human experience cannot be the same and so their minds will differ. But in such a case differences will arise from differing affects from the external resulting in differ- ing material effects, and, again, the distinction exists in difference in brain structure. Or, it may be objected, I treat man as simply a thing of cognition, whereas he is a thing also of feeling. But with this question I have already dealt when treating of Memory and Ideas. 1 If it be herein proved that we have in human experience proof of the existence of the intuitive self, then, I think, it may be fairly claimed that, spite of the use made of Kant's Critique, the argument is not founded in any way on the meta- physical. TELEPATHY DEFINED 111 Lastly, it may be objected that any attempt to identify the human mind with the understanding is merely comparing two things dis- tinct in themselves ; the human mind means the Self to which everything mental is referred, while thought consists merely ' of a certain elaboration of sensory and motor presentations and has no content apart from these.' In other words the human mind is that which is conscious of thought ; the understanding is that which is or produces thought. If this objection be raised I accept it at once as unanswerable. For I go further I hold that the understanding is no more than a very limited machine which the mind of the (relatively) pure Self uses for limited purposes. But where, then, is the ' mind ' of the psychologist ? Psychology, it is true, recognises the distinction between the thinker and the phenomena which are thought, but guards against defining the mind as the subject ' of these feelings for whom they are phenomena.' It makes the mind ' the subject of these feelings or phenomena plus the series of feelings or phenomena themselves,' that is, confines the ' mind ' to a universe of these feelings or pheno- mena. This mind is a human mind, and the subject itself can only determine (?) these feelings or phenomena through the understanding. The moment we enter the realms of metaphysics we see at once that this ' mind ' is subjective : it is a human mind where the self- consciousness is determined by the series of feelings or phenomena. And there must be a mind behind this human mind, or we should have no mind to determine the universe of the human mind as merely phenomenal. So, as before said, I refer ' mind ' to the intuitive self and ' human mind ' to the human personality, which human mind is or is deter- mined by the understanding. Again, in the distinction thus drawn between the intuitive self and the human personality, we find the distinction which Myers often relies on between the subliminal and supraliminal consciousness. We, as human personalities, cannot distinguish between past, present and future as different ' things ' in themselves. Where time is, it is but past, present or future in relation to our conscious- ness in time as human personalities : past, present and future are to us but aspects of time. (Indeed, as already shown, for us to have cognition in the present the past also must be present to us by (relatively) unconscious memory.) And it is not difficult to under- stand that these aspects are merely phenomenal : that is, these differing aspects have no reality in themselves ; they exist, to us, only because we exist as limits in a universe limited in time and space. So even human experience leads us to the conclusion that, follow- ing Kant, time is no more than a form of our internal intuition. Bear in mind that our internal intuition is not intuition : it is no more than a form of intuition. 112 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY Now our consciousness is not a full consciousness, it is a suprali- minal consciousness ; that is, a form of consciousness in our universe of time and space. So there must be a relatively full consciousness free from the conditions of time and space, of which our conscious- ness is a form. Our consciousness may be said to be phenomenal of a full consciousness just as a shadow cast in two dimensions may be said to be phenomenal of some three (or even higher than three) dimensional body which casts the shadow. This (relatively) full consciousness is the subliminal conscious- ness : it is what we can only term the self-apperception of the intuitive self. Some have criticised Myers' distinction between the subliminal and supraliminal as false because pointing to different beings of different consciousness. But I think the criticism baseless, and that Myers (in the present connection) means by the supraliminal consciousness no more than, as it were, a projection a shadow cast on our universe of time and space of full (subliminal) consciousness. The intuitive self being unconditioned in our time and space is not so conditioned that it views time and space under differing aspects : for it, there is no distinction in time as past, present and future ; no distinction in space as ' here ' and ' there.' (The intui- tive self, exists, to us, in an everlasting and changeless now. But this is true only for human apprehension : where the past and the future are not, now (the present) is not ; it has but relative existence.) So its consciousness is (relatively) a full consciousness. But this consciousness being the consciousness of a (relatively) real per- sonality as distinct from other personalities must be conditioned in some way, though not in time and space as known to us. It follows that supraliminal consciousness being but a partial and mediate manifestation, in our universe of time and space, of the subliminal consciousness, can never be or become the sub- liminal consciousness : it can only be phenomenal of it. But the subliminal consciousness is the real (the noumenon) of this pheno- menon and so by limitation may be or become the supraliminal consciousness. For the intuitive self the distinctions of human personality which exist for us in form, size, distance and time do not really exist : nor do those mental distinctions, which are necessarily referred to the particular material formation of the brain. But all such dis- tinctions have phenomenal existence for the intuitive self : they are partial and mediate manifestations of (relative) reality. So the intuitive (subliminal) self is not a separate and distinct thing from the human (supraliminal) personality : the human per- sonality is a (phenomenal) manifestation of the intuitive self. Accepting the above further explanation of personality we can now return to a consideration of telepathy. I shall use the word TELEPATHY DEFINED 113 telepathy as including telaesthesia, i.e. I make telepathy cover affects from external personalities and affects from the external. The distinction between impressions (' feeling ') and ' ideas ' is that the former are affects on the understanding, followed, for con- sciousness, \)j some operation of the understanding : the latter are or are related solely to operation of the understanding. If the subject be conscious of feeling it must be conscious in time and space. And, as our consciousness infers some operation of the understanding, the affect of feeling on the understanding can only be manifest to the subject where there is some conscious operation of the understanding ; where there is cognition, however vague. I hold, as before stated, that the first manifestation to the subject of this consciousness of feeling is in impressions. We may say that feeling is marked by pure impressions : the term ' impressions ' as used by me means impressions accompanied by some operation of the understanding. These impressions being impressions of the subject are in time and space ; they are not in their origin conditioned in time and space : it is as manifestations to the subject that they are so con- ditioned. Feeling is manifest in impressions. Now, in a digression (see p. 70, Part I.), I have contended that we can be affected in feeling quite apart from any affect in bodily state or cognition. But so few have had experience of this that it cannot be relied on for argument as establishing a fact. So I ignore it as evidence. With this proviso I continue : These impressions of feeling being impressions of the subject must be related to the subject, which is a thing of space and time. So they must affect the bodily state, and this affection, for conscious- ness, must include an affection of the understanding, that is, of the human mind. Through intuition the subject is always being affected by impressions on the understanding. Where the subject is con- scious of these impressions the consciousness sometimes extends only to consciousness of feeling so far we get impressions. But it is the human mind that is conscious, so the subject has cognition of these impressions. Sometimes these impressions result in more definite operation of the understanding and then ideas result. It may be, indeed, that these impressions always lead to the same operation of the understanding in the evolution of ideas. If this be so we must hold that the human mind is not always immedi- ately conscious of its ideas we have conscious and (relatively) unconscious ideas. When referring to the production of hypnotic trance Gurney uses the expression ' unconscious idea.' And as to this he says : ' It is difficult to avoid using this expression, but I of course do not mean by it mere " unconscious cerebration." My whole view of telepathic transference is that it is a psychical event with a physical side possibly, but psychical certainly ; consequently the idea 114 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY transferred, in this as in every case, must have complete psychical reality. In calling it unconscious, therefore, I am, for convenience, confining the meaning of " conscious " to the mode or plane of ordinary human experience in which we may surmise the true consciousness of the individual to be only partially manifested' (Proceedings, vol. v. p. 233). Gurney, it would appear, refers ' unconscious ideas ' to what I term the intuitive self. I, on the other hand, refer all ideas conscious or unconscious to the understanding. At the same time I refer the foundation of ideas, conscious or unconscious, to the intuitive self. Impressions give but consciousness (in time and space) of per- sonal feeling : ideas give consciousness (in time and space) of the external and external personalities. But bear in mind we are here considering the consciousness of the subject ; the consciousness of the intuitive self is in intuition, where this distinction between feeling and ideas does not exist. Clearly, impressions are precedent to ideas, so we may be con- scious of the preceding impression without being conscious of any after emerging definite ideas in cognition. But we may be conscious of impressions and also of after emerging ideas. As, however, we have no means of determining this after emergence in time, we should expect that varying time may often elapse between con- sciousness of the impression and consciousness of the after emerging ideas. We may even be unconscious of the impression, and only conscious of the after emerging ideas. Again, our consciousness in impression is a consciousness of a real affect on the understanding from intuition, made manifest to us (in time and space) in impression. But the after emerging ideas result solely from operation of the understanding. So as the understand- ing cannot be assumed always to operate correctly or free from the influence of stored ideas, or of imagination a real impression may be followed by the emergence of ideas only symbolically or even falsely related to the particular affects from the external or external personalities. Bear in mind I do not say the impression is the real affect : I only say it results from a real affect : real affects can be referred only to the intuitive self. Impressions, though but partial and mediate manifestations to us in time and space of affects from the external and external person- alities, have always a real relation to these affects : ideas, resulting from operation of the understanding, though this operation is always started by some affect from the external or external personalities, may or may not (phenomenally) interpret correctly the said affect. (Bear in mind that if telepathy be a fact it follows necessarily that sensibility affects the human personality otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.) What is above written leads at once to a distinction between TELEPATHY DEFINED 115 telepathy itself and telepathy as manifested to us, as subjects, in action. I, therefore, suggest the following definitions. Telepathy is a term used to express the timeless and spaceless communion between intuitive selves and between intuitive selves and the external communication between mind and mind and between mind and the external in intuition. The intuitive self has ' mind,' the human personality has ' human mind/ Telepathy as manifested to us as subjects (human personalities) is a term used to express : The communication, otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, between subjects and between subjects and the external in impressions (feeling which emerges consciously in the understanding), and communication otherwise than through the normal organs of sense between subjects and between subjects and the external which emerges consciously in ideas in the understanding. (The impressions are manifestations in time and space of real affects from external personalities and the external ; they consist in affects on the understanding and some operation of the under- standing : the ideas are subjective in that they result solely from operation of the understanding preceded and given rise to by impressions on the understanding.) The above definitions of telepathy and of telepathy as manifested to us, though determined subject to the theory of personality pro- pounded, will still be found to be mere expansions of the definitions of Sidgwick and Myers referred to, while incorporating the distinc- tion raised by Sidgwick and Gurney between ' feeling ' and ' ideas.' (Of. the two passages from Dreams of a Spirit Seer given on p. 64, Part i. The comparison will show that I have, in some measure, drawn these definitions from Kant's theory. Cf. also the state- ment by Barrett : ' If this unconscious radiation and reaction is going on between mind and mind, then observed cases of telepathy would simply mean the awakening of consciousness to the fact in certain minds.' Proceedings, vol. xviii. p. 337.) But, by the theory of personality propounded, we must consider a possible expansion of the above definition of telepathy. For the intuitive self may have continued existence after the dissolution of its phenomenal form as a subject of time and space. Indeed, as we know that time and space exist only phenomenally for the phenomenal subject, we have no foundation to rest on if we argue that the dissolution of the phenomenal infers the dissolution of the (relatively) noumenal. But, herein, I do not think we arrive, in theory, at any absolute proof of the continued existence of the intuitive self after the dissolution of its (phenomenal) bodily form. All we arrive at is negative proof that dissolution of the (phenomenal) subject establishes no evidence against the continued existence of the intuitive self. Assuming, however, as I think we may, that the intuitive self 116 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY survives what we term bodily death, then disembodied intuitive selves may be able to communicate telepathically with subjects embodied. For if the disembodied intuitive self have power as it may possibly have to project its thought in the manifold in intuition on to our universe of relations in time and space, it could so communicate with the embodied. The intuitive self thinks in the manifold : we think in particulars of the manifold (within the contradictory limits of unity and diversity). There seems no reason, a priori, to suppose the intuitive self cannot think within our limits. And herein lies the importance of memory as already denned. For the disembodied carry away with them full memory of all that, to us, is their past. And if they have power to condition this memory in succession, that is, in time and space, they can communi- cate with the embodied, not only in feeling (impressions), but in ideas of what is, to us, the past, and possibly what is, to us, the future. This form of communication, however, if rendered probable, is not, I think, fully established in human experience, and so, at present, can be no more than the subject of theory. I shall consider it, then, only incidentally when dealing with alleged facts. We need not, therefore, at present expand our definition of telepathy as manifest to us. It should be explained, however, that I do not at any time con- sider the bare fact of the existence of intuitive selves never mani- fested as subjects in time and space. I shall consider only intuitive selves disembodied : that is, intuitive selves existing after they have appeared (phenomenally) in bodily form. And mark here an important fact which, so far as I know, has been ignored by writers on telepathy. The accepted definitions of telepathy, however much they may differ inter se, have nothing to do with ' a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may be' (Kant, p. 164). They are no more than attempts to determine what the telepathic communication from man to man is, and how it takes place : they do not, any of them, infer power in man to use at his own mil this means of communication. For instance, in Podmore's admirable work, Apparitions and Thought Transference, he relies mainly for proof of telepathy on experimental cases, as distinct from spontaneous cases. But if experimental cases are to be relied on, then telepathy must be a fact, for otherwise man could not use it at will. (That he can, at present, only use it within very narrow limits does not affect the fact that he can use it.) Spontaneous cases on the other hand, as a rule, prove only the fact of telepathy without offering any evidence of its possible active use by man at his will. But though, if experimental cases are proved to be trustworthy, TELEPATHY DEFINED 117 they prove, incidentally, the fact of telepathy, still a consideration of such cases cannot be expected to give as much information as a consideration of spontaneous cases. For in experimental cases telepathy is used only for limited and particular purposes, and so is manifested in action only in a limited and particular way. In spontaneous cases, on the other hand, we should expect to find all possible forms of manifestation of telepathy in action. I do not suggest that all these varying forms of the manifestation of telepathy in spontaneous cases are explicable. But I think that, in due course, the consideration of the manifestation of telepathy in spontaneous cases should precede consideration of the use of telepathy by man as shown in experimental cases. Mark, too, a second fact which I think is generally ignored. (Gurney and Myers consider this fact at length.) The affects on us from the external, or external personalities through our normal organs of sense, are received by us directly as visual, auditory or tactile. But such affects when telepathic are not received by us as visual, auditory or tactile : it is after reception that, as effects, they are conditioned as visual, auditory or tactile : it is in the resultant that the form of the ideas is determined as visual, auditory or tactile. When we are affected telepathically, we are affected through sensibility otherwise than through our normal organs of sense we are not affected directly in the visual, auditory or tactile. And yet, as we shall hereafter find to be the fact, these affects may emerge consciously in the understanding of the person affected as visual, auditory or tactile ideas. I hold that this proves power in the understanding to relate these impressions to its normal experience, that is, there is power in the understanding to abstract from these impressions ideas of the visual, auditory or tactile. Bear in mind that as impressions which have never been reduced to visual, auditory or tactile ideas are the subject of memory, these impressions must be affects on the understanding. So the under- standing has these affects to operate on for reduction into visual, auditory or tactile ideas : the understanding reduces the (relatively) universal into the particular, or, in other words, abstracts the particular from the (relatively) universal. TELEPATHY THE cumulative weight of the evidence going to proof of telepathy is now so great, and the evidence itself is, in detail, of such a nature, that many marked men of science accept it as, practically, proving the fact. It is true, also, that many scientific men are said to reject the evidence as unreliable : but I think they must be held to ignore rather than reject. For scientific rejection implies a decision arrived at after full investigation and criticism of the evidence, and I can find no report of any such full investigation and criticism by any marked man of science followed by rejection. Those denying would appear to proceed on the principle that ' the antecedent improbability of telepathy is so great that no amount of human evidence can overcome it,' and so to ignore rather than reject the evidence in proof. We have then, on the one hand, many scientific and thoughtful men who, after full investigation and criticism of the evidence for and against telepathy, have come to the conclusion that it is, practi- cally, proved to be a fact : we have, on the other hand, many scientific and thoughtful men who, without any full investigation and criticism of the evidence, rely on chance coincidence as an explanation, or declare that telepathy is but the creation of fraud, a fantasy of human imagination, or the result of self-deception. To the ordinary individual the former class of scientific men would appear to offer a conclusion based on reason : the latter a conclusion based on dogmatic assertion. The opinion of this latter class must be treated by us all as having great weight, but its weight would appear to be that of bare authority, whereas the weight of opinion of the former would appear to be not only of authority, but of authoritative reasoned decision on evidence. (Cf. Hypnotism, by Dr. A. Moll, translated by A. F. Hopkirk, pp. 510-5. Herein Dr. Moll, while admitting the possibility of telepathy as a fact, denies we have evidence in proof of the fact. But I cannot think his criticism of the evidence exhaustive or satisfactory. On p. 513, 1. 1-5, there appears to be an error in fact.) In the previous chapter I have given definitions of telepathy, and of telepathy as manifest to us as human personalities. And I have assumed to deduce the definitions from the theory as to person- ality set forth in the earlier part of this bt>pk, coupled with the fact that sensibility affects the human personality otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, us TELEPATHY 119 But now we are considering human experience. And I do not allege that, in human experience, the truth of telepathy is estab- lished. I doubt greatly whether, in human experience, we can ever arrive at any absolute truth. But I shall assume that we have, in human experience, sufficient evidence to justify the assump- tion that communication takes place between human personalities otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. This assump- tion I shall make. Still, bear in mind, this assumption does not cover an assumption that telepathy, and telepathy as manifested to us, denned as I have defined them, are facts. That remains open for proof on a con- sideration of the material at our command. The first definite attack on behalf of telepathy against the citadel of science was made, I think, by Professor W. F. Barrett. In the year 1876 he read a paper on the subject at the British Associa- tion, when he asked that a committee of scientific men might be appointed to investigate the question of the possibility of ideas or information being voluntarily or involuntarily transferred from one mind to another, independently of the recognised organs of sense. The suggestion was scouted : even that great man, Helmholtz, declaring that telepathy was impossible (Proceedings, vol. xviii. p. 329). But the suggestion had effect. For, thereafter, a large body of earnest and independent men of position of whom Barrett was one formed the Society for Psychical Research. As I had nothing to do with the labour of these men, I may, without prejudice, say they are worthy of all admiration for the work they did in the accumulation of reported facts going to prove, especially, the truth of telepathy. For public opinion was dead against them. I can myself well remember that in the sixties one was treated as an amiable lunatic if investigating mesmerism, a congenital idiot if considering spiritualism, and an atheist if accept- ing the Darwinian theory. We are too apt to forget that the first pioneers in new fields of science have to face moral and social suffer- ing from the cruel inquisition of authority and public opinion as great in degree as the physical suffering of martyrs of religion. The year 1886 was marked in the annals of the Society for Psychical Research by the publication of a book called Phantasms of the Living. The writers were Edmund Gurney, F. W. H. Myers, and Frank Podmore. By far the greater part of the labour of composition was borne by Edmund Gurney (see Apparitions and Thought Transference, p. 11). This work is now a classic of research and record. The fully expressive term, telepathy, was, I believe, coined by Myers. I have, above, defined telepathy as : ' The timeless and spaceless communion between intuitive selves, 120 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY and between intuitive selves and the external: communication between mind and mind, and between mind and the external in intuition.' Telepathy, as manifested to us as subjects (human personalities with human minds), I have denned as : ' Communication otherwise than through the normal organs of sense between subjects, and between subjects and the external in impressions (feeling which emerges consciously in the understanding), and communication otherwise than through the normal organs of sense between subjects, and between subjects and the external which emerges consciously in ideas in the understanding.' (Impressions are manifestations of real affects on the under- standing from external personalities, and the external where, for consciousness of the impressions, there follows some operation of the understanding. Ideas result solely from operation of the understanding, originated or preceded by impressions on the under- standing.) Bear in mind that to this point we do not take into consideration ' a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may be ' (Kant, p. 164). Kant refers to a power in the subject exercisable by the subject at its own will or desire ; the definition given refers but to an involuntary passive power or, rather, attribute of man. The power glanced at by Kant will be afterwards directly considered : now it can only be incidentally referred to. The question is, does human experience point to the definition of telepathy and its manifestation I have offered as the most correct definitions we can arrive at ? For proof, I shall rely mainly on the facts contained in Phantasms of the Living, and those collected and published by the Society for Psychical Research. There are some who attack the S.P.R. as too restrictive in their method of research : as requiring too much weight of evidence before they accept any ' case ' for publication. No one, I think, who has studied the evidence, charges them with laxity in the reception of evidence. Now, in this, the S.P.R. may be right or they may be wrong. But there is no doubt at all that their restrictive method of pro- ceeding makes the matter of their publications of far greater value for the cautious student than it could otherwise be. Speaking as a student, I say it is far better for me that the S.P.R. should reject nineteen veridical cases than that they should accept them and with them accept one false case. (Some few even of the cases they have accepted have been found to be untrustworthy.) The S.P.R. offers us a mass of evidence which has abready gone through the fire of adverse criticism from men and women", not only of exceptional intelligence and acumen, but influenced by differing even con- TELEPATHY 121 flicting preconceived ideas as to what theory or theories offer the best solutions of the problems psychical research presents to us. Besides the cases recorded by the S.P.R. there are many others also reported. I do not deny that these latter are worthy of full attention. But I do not rely on them generally for the following reasons : The S.P.R. regard telepathy, not as a fact proved, but a fact which has to be proved. So they consider each case on its own merits : they do not consider each case with reference to any cut and dried theory. Each case, then, that they offer for consideration is sup- ported by strong evidence of its truth they eliminate, so far as is possible, errors arising from preconceived ideas in the percipients and from the fallibility of human observation. But most of the other reported cases are offered as no more than evidence in support of telepathy as already proved as a fact, and frequently as evidence of communication with the dead where the fact of such communication is assumed to be already established. These cases may all be veridical : but, evidentially, they are weak. For telepathy and communication with the dead being assumed as facts, the reporters accept evidence of psychical phenomena as proof, without weighing it so strictly as does the S.P.R. There is also a mass of evidence, of the most astounding psychical phenomena, with the authority of marked scientific men at its back. This evidence, though it touches closely the question of personality, travels far outside the limits of telepathy. So, without expressing any dogmatic opinion, I have good excuse for ignoring such evidence. As I have said, however, I hold that the mass of evidence accumu- lated by the S.P.R. justifies acceptance of the fact that communi- cation does take place between human beings otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, and in so holding I am but a humble follower of a large number of men and women marked by excep- tional ability, even scientific ability and reputation. What I shall try to do is to justify (using references to the opinions of men of authority) the definitions of telepathy and its manifestation which I have given, and the distinction incidentally raised between impressions and ideas. If the attempt be successful, then we have proof, in human experience, of the existence of the intuitive (the spiritual) self. In considering the carefully selected cases of the S.P.R. as the basis for any such general theory of telepathy as that I offer, it must be borne in mind that the S.P.R. only publish those cases which comply with certain stringent conditions they have laid down. The three following passages will show what these conditions are. ' For our purposes, then, the dreams must have been noted down, or communicated to others, directly after their occurrence. If concerned with grave events, those events must not be of a chronic but of a critical kind, such as sudden danger or actual death. If 122 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY concerned with trivial events, those events must be in some way bizarre or unexpected, not such everyday occurrences as a visit from a friend or the arrival of a present' (Proceedings S.P.R., vol. i. p. 143). This principle of exclusion governs the decision of the S.P.R. with respect to the publication of nearly all cases not of dreams only coming before them. ' The abnormality of the agent's state, though needed to make the coincidence striking enough to be included in this book ' (Phan- tasms of the Living), ' may not for all that be an indispensable condition : genuine transfer of ideas of which we can take no account may occur in the more ordinary conditions of life : and the continuity of the experimental and spontaneous cases may thus conceivably be complete.' ' We must not be too positive that the telepathic action is con- fined to the well-marked or ostensive instances on which the proof of it has to depend ' (Phantasms of the Living, vol. i. p. 97). The cases recorded by the S.P.R. are, in fact, picked cases ; cases concerned with trivial events are not, ordinarily, recorded : the recorded cases are closely confined to those where the excep- tional nature of the event and the abnormality of the agent's state make the coincidence in question striking. If then telepathic communion takes place, as I allege, ordinarily and generally amongst humanity, even as to the most trivial matters, and where those concerned are in a normal state, we find the S.P.R. has deliberately refrained from recording such cases. This is stated as a bare fact, not as an attack on the methods of the S.P.R. It follows directly that the whole body of spontaneous cases reported by the S.P.R. constitutes no evidence at all in disproof of any theory that telepathy is of constant and general occurrence, even as to the most trivial matters, and when agents and percipients are in their ordinary normal state. At the same time we find that in experimental telepathy, as carried on by the S.P.R. itself, both agents and percipients are, ordinarily, in a normal state, and only the most trivial matters are dealt with : and Gurney himself says that if telepathy occurs in the more ordinary conditions of life, the continuity of the experimental and spontaneous cases may conceiv- ably be complete. That this continuity exists is highly probable if not certain. For it approaches absurdity to argue that in experimental cases tele- pathy has one field of action and in spontaneous cases another field of action. Therefore, though from the reported spontaneous cases evidence is not available in proof or disproof of telepathy being of constant and general occurrence, we can still, by comparing the experimental with the spontaneous cases" arrive at a high degree of probability that telepathy is of constant and general occurrence TELEPATHY 123 as to the most trivial as well as the more important occurrences of life, and that abnormality in the agents or percipients is not a neces- sary factor. Personally, I treat this high degree of probability, when coupled with the theory propounded, as practically establish- ing the fact. That telepathy is of this constant and general occurrence, that its whole range must be referred to some great fundamental law, known or unknown, is supported by the following three passages : ' Here, moreover, the prophetic element clearly takes us on to altogether fresh ground ' : the reference is to a case where a lady saw ' an event,' shortly before it in fact occurred. ' So, again, there is strong evidence that clairvoyants have witnessed and described trivial incidents in which they had no special interest, and even scenes in which the actors, though actual persons, were com- plete strangers to them ; and such cases seem properly assimilated to those where they describe mere places and objects, the idea of which can hardly be supposed to be impressed on them by any per- sonality at all. Once more, apparitions at death, though the fact of death sufficiently implies excitement or disturbance in one mind, have often been witnessed, not only by relatives or friends in a normal state but interested in the event -a case above considered but by other observers who had no personal interest in the matter. In some of these cases the disinterested observer has been in the company of the person for whom the appearance may be supposed to have been specially intended, as in the now classical case of the apparition of Lieutenant Wynyard's brother. In other cases there is not even this apparent link, as where a vision or apparition announces the death of a perfect stranger to some one who is wholly at a loss to account for the visitation. ' Clearly, then, the analogy of Thought-transference which seemed to offer such a convenient logical start, cannot be pressed too far. Our phenomena break through any attempt to group them under heads of transferred impression, and we venture to introduce the words Telaesthesia and Telepathy to cover all cases of impressions received at a distance without the normal operation of the sense organs ' (Proceedings S,P.R., vol. i. p. 146). ' No one supposes that the few emergent cases which happen to have become accessible to our view comprise the whole range of what must by its very nature be a great fundamental law ' (Pro- ceedings S.P.R., vol. xv. p. 408. By F. W. H. Myers). ' The answer I am disposed to give to this question would be that, taken in the widest sense, telepathy probably is universal, and that what is rare and exceptional is only our restriction of it.' By Gerald Balfour (Proceedings, vol. xix. p. 383). If in this whole range there be but the operation of one great fundamental law, then we must hold that the phenomena of so termed telepathy, telaesthesia, clairvoyance and clair-audience are 124 but differing manifestations (or forms of evidence) of one and the same power in or attribute of man. I use, as before said, the word telepathy as covering all such phenomena and try to get at the one great fundamental law. To this end we must consider the recorded cases and try to deter- mine what conclusions are to be drawn from them. But before entering on this task a further explanation must be given turning on the nature of these recorded cases. I have said that impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense are, in their origin, unconditioned in time and space ; it is only as manifestations to us in feeling and idea that they are so conditioned. But the recorded cases do not give any great assistance in proving this unconditioning in time and space, i.e. the proof is but weakly supported by human evidence. This absence of evidence, however, can be accounted for. If these impressions are in their origin so unconditioned in time and space we should expect to find recorded cases dealing with events not only of the present but of the past and future. But clearly any case dealing with an event of the past must, in its nature, be weak evidentially, and so is not likely to be reported by the S.P.R. for the reasons given above. Herein we find an explanation for the paucity of such cases reported. Again, cases dealing with the future, that is, cases of prophecy, are almost as weak evidentially. For prophecy is to the majority of us an impossibility, a thing of superstition or a subject for laughter. So if such a case occur to any one it is unlikely to be recorded or even kept in mind. Coupled with this attitude of mind of the great majority, the ordinary carelessness even of those who believe in prophecy is so great, that they are unlikely to make any record at the time of the event : they will ordinarily trust to personal memory. So, even when such cases are brought to the attention of the S.P.R. , the chances are that they are so weak evidentially that they are held not worth recording. Herein we find an explanation of the paucity of such cases recorded. For proof, then, that these impressions are in their origin so un- conditioned, I must admit there is little human evidence to rely on. Still there are recorded cases. Many, for example, are referred to by Ernest Bozzano in a paper ' Symbolism and Metapsychical Phenomena,' reported in the Annals of Psychical Science, vol. vi. pp. 235 and 335. Incidentally I would suggest that Bozzano's reasoning on these cases is worthy of the attention of the student : I submit that the point of view from which he considers them is the correct point of view. I give the following passage from p'age 364 in detail : ' As to this, however, I was constrained to remark that in the TELEPATHY 125 same category of phenomena incidents were found which were not capable of psycho-physical interpretation, leading us to the assumption of the existence of a subconscious Ego, endowed with psychic faculties unknown to the conscious Ego, and of superior quality.' The purview of the present inquiry may be stated as follows : Starting with the theory that the human personality is a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of an intuitive self : that the intuitive self, in relation to the human personality, stores up intuition in time, so that the human personality has, practically, a full storage of ideas unconditioned in time and space of events past in time and space to work with in potential memory, then can we, by consideration of the facts of telepathy, find support for the theory in human experience ? Can we, incidentally, arrive at any fundamental law governing the psychic phenomena which have been under consideration ? If these questions can be answered in the affirmative then, I think., we have scientific as distinct from metaphysical proof that the intuitive (spiritual) self exists. But we can know (can deter- mine) this intuitive self only so far as manifest to us in time and space. If we read Myer's ' subliminal self ' as meaning, in certain con- nections, the intuitive self, and in certain other connections the human personality with a perfect potential memory, we shall find the theory propounded is in expansion of rather than in opposi- tion to the theory propounded by him. The following extract supports this allegation. ' I have already urged that the impulse which ultimately generates the phantom is in no case directly received by the superficial self, but always by the subliminal faculties, in some unknown fashion. I have suggested that this impulse is not in itself of any definite sensory or motor quality, but is generally capable of being trans- lated to the superficial self in either sensory or motor terms, accord- ing to the subject's psychostatical condition perhaps according to the predominance of visile, audile or motile imagery in his habitual psychic operations ' (Proceedings, vol. vii. p. 321. By F. W. H. Myers). In the above paragraph write for ' impulse ' the word ' intuition,' and for ' subliminal faculties ' the words ' intuitive self,' and we find how like the theory propounded is to Myers' theory. Consider, too, the following passage by Gurney : ' We have encountered several cases, which there seems strong ground for considering telepathic, where the phantasmal form was not recognised : and we have seen that on the theory that the tele- pathic impulse may take place on various levels, or even below any level of consciousness, and may be projected into sensory form 126 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY by the percipient with various degrees of distinctness, this lack of recognition is not surprising ' (Phantasms, vol. ii. p. 73). If we hold that the ' telepathic impulse ' takes place always on one level (that of the intuitive self) we get one relation to human consciousness and the projection ' into sensory form by the per- cipient with various degrees of distinctness,' directly follows. We arrive, so far, at a theory not unlike that now propounded. SPONTANEOUS CASES I BEGIN with a consideration of spontaneous cases. For they involve, generally, as has already been stated, only the fact of telepathy itself, whereas experimental cases infer not only the fact of telepathy, but the fact also that telepathy is used by man at will. But it must not be forgotten that some, of whom Podmore himself is one, rely mainly on the evidence of experimental cases for proof of telepathy as a fact. The names of the agents and percipients, in the cases I refer to, are most of them published, and if not published can probably be made known to the student on reference to the Society for Psychical Research. In considering the recorded cases, I shall group them more or less arbitrarily. I do this for the better exemplification of the theory propounded. And this grouping is justifiable : I do not interfere with truth, I simply deal with it in arbitrary succession. 12T FEELING As I hold that telepathy is manifest to us in impressions (feeling), and that ideas arising from telepathy result from operation of the understanding originated or preceded by these impressions, I must begin by a consideration of the communication of impressions. But bear in mind that, for consciousness, these impressions must infer some operation of the understanding. Otherwise there would be no recorded cases for consideration : these impressions to be evidential must be the subject of memory. Telepathic communion itself takes place between intuitive selves (subliminal selves) : it is manifested to us in the communication of impressions and ideas. Impressions are manifestations to us in consciousness of affects on the understanding ; ideas result solely from operation of the understanding. Thus, where the S.P.R. speaks of deferred ' impressions,' I speak of deferred ' ideas.' For instance : Where A in England sees the death of B in Australia some time after the event, I hold we have a deferred ' idea,' not ' impression ' of the event. And in many such cases I should expect evidence of preceding impression (feeling) close to the time of the event. The recorded cases where feeling (impressions) exceptional in its nature precedes the emergence of ideas are too numerous to be all referred to. A glance through Phantasms of the Living will show how many they are. (See, for instance, Phantasms, vol. i. pp. 196, 204, 208, 240, 243, 271, et seq. ; vol. ii. p. 138). Note, too, the general statement as to percipients in experimental cases made by Professor Oliver Lodge : ' With regard to the feelings of the percipients when receiving an impression, they seem to have some sort of consciousness of the action of other minds on them : and once or twice, when not so conscious, have complained that there seemed to be ' no power ' or anything acting, and that they not only received no impressions, but did not feel as if they were going to. ... I asked one of them what she felt when impressions were coming freely, and she said she felt a sort of thrill or influence ' (Proceedings, vol. ii. p. 200). Here for ' impressions ' I replace the word ' ideas ' ; and for ' a sort of thrill or influence ' the feeling (impression) in the percipient manifesting the intuition of the percipient's intuitive self. Again, there is a feature marking, I think, the majority of reported 128 FEELING 129 cases of feeling, the importance of which, has escaped the attention it deserves. These cases show that the particular experience of the percipients was not an ordinary, but an extraordinary experience. We all, more or less, dream waking and sleeping. But these percipients say their experience was not that of ordinary vision : they were, in all these cases, peculiarly affected, so that the experience had unique effect on them. In very many instances indeed, I think, in the large majority we find that the percipients had but once or twice been the subjects of such experience, while we must hold they had often been the subjects of ordinary visions. Now can we refer this unique effect to the ideas themselves of the experience ? I think not. I think we must refer it to the ex- ceptional nature of the impression preceding the emergence of ideas, for the ideas are always of the nature of ordinary human ideas. I think we have, herein, very strong evidence of unique affection in intuition which has led to the impressions or the emergence of the ideas. I record now three cases of ' feeling ' for consideration : 1 ' Miss M. says : ' I was sitting alone in the drawing-room, reading an interesting book, and feeling perfectly well, when suddenly I experienced an undefined feeling of dread and horror ; I looked at the clock and saw it was just seven P.M. I was utterly unable to read, so I got up and walked about the room trying to throw off the feeling, but I could not : I became quite cold, and had a firm presentiment that I was dying. The feeling lasted about half an hour, and then passed off, leaving me a good deal shaken all the evening ; I went to bed feeling very weak, as if I had been seriously ill. The next morning I received a telegram telling me of the death of a near and very dear cousin, Mrs. K.' (Phantasms, vol. i. p. 197). 1 ' When a boy, about fourteen years of age, I was in school in Edinburgh, my home being in the west of Scotland. A thoughtless boy, free from all care and anxiety ; in the " Eleven " of my school, and popular with my companions ; I had nothing to worry or annoy me. I boarded with two old ladies now both dead. ' One afternoon on the day previous to a most important cricket match in which I was to take part I was overwhelmed with a most unusual sense of depression and melancholy ; I shunned my friends, and got " chaffed " for my most unusual dullness and sulki- ness. I felt utterly miserable ; and even to this day I have a most vivid recollection of my misery that afternoon. 1 The death had taken place at 7 P.M. the previous night. I 130 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY ' I knew that my father suffered from a most dangerous disease in the stomach a gastric ulcer and that he was always more or less in danger, but I knew that he was in his usual bad health, and that nothing exceptional ailed him. ' That night I had a dream. ... I at once left for home, and found my father had just died when I reached the house. The ulcer in the stomach had suddenly burst about four o'clock on the previous day, and it was about that hour that I had experienced the most unusual depression I have described ' (Journal S.P.R., vol. i. p. 364 ; Phantasms, vol. i. p. 278). ' On the evening of January 28, 1863, 1 had met several old friends at dinner at a friend's house near Manchester, in which neighbour- hood I had been paying visits. My return home to my father's house was fixed for the next afternoon. I ought to say that between that father and me, his first-born child, a more than common bond of affection and sympathy existed, arising from circumstances I need not mention, and I was looking forward to my return with earnest longing. The evening had been bright and happy, sur- rounded by friends I valued. When I was about to leave, my hostess pressed me to play for her a very favourite old march. I declined, on account of the lateness of the hour, and keeping horses standing. She said, " It is not yet twelve, and I have sent the carriage away for a quarter of an hour ! " I sat down laughing, and before I played many bars, such an indescribable feeling came over me, intense sadness heralded a complete breakdown, and I was led away from the piano in hysterics. By ten o'clock the next morning I got a telegram to say my father had gone to bed in his usual health, and at a quarter to twelve the night before had passed away in an epileptic fit, having previously said to my sister how glad he was to think of seeing me so soon, and when she bid him good-night, pray- ing to God to give them both a quiet night and sleep ' (Journal S.P.R., vol. i. p. 365). (See also three cases reported in the Journal S.P.R., vol. ii. pp. 76, 78, and 100.) (In the experimental case reported at p. 271 of vol. x. of the Pro- ceedings, there appears to have been success in transfer of feeling, the failure was because there was no sufficiently definite operation of the understanding of the percipient for definite ideas to emerge.) All these percipients state that their experience was unique. Now these percipients were conscious only of personal feeling, not of cognition in idea of the external, or of external personalities : they were affected in impression as distinct from idea. And this affection was in each case a telepathic affection. We cannot refer this communication of impressions to a cause different from that resulting in the apparent transference of ideas. FEELING 131 (In the second case, indeed, the impression was followed by the emergence of ideas in a remarkable dream not here set out as it is not now in point.) If we consider the numerous other reported cases where impressions were followed by the emergence of ideas, I think we must hold that in the cases now considered the impres- sions might have been followed by the emergence of ideas. And what does this mean ? It means that the evidence of these impressions is evidence of the manifestation to the percipients in consciousness of affects on them (as intuitive selves) from the external or external personalities, which might have emerged, but did not emerge in definite ideas because there was no sufficient conscious operation of the understanding. That is, the telepathic impulse is exactly the same in these cases as in those where ideas emerge : the only distinction between the cases is that in these cases the telepathic impulse is not followed by action of the under- standing in the conscious emergence of definite ideas in cognition. Myers says : ' There are a good many cases where the phantasm is observed some time after the apparent death of the agent we may even say some time after his actual bodily death. Now in these cases the phantasm seems almost always to await a quiet moment generally at night for its appearance ; and it seems possible to suppose that the impression (my italics) received perhaps at the moment of the friend's death, has gone through a period of incu- bation in some subconscious region of the percipient's mental activity, and is developed or externalised as soon as the stimuli of active existence have ceased to engross the brain ' (Journal, voL i. p. 183). Note that here Myers refers the telepathic impulse to an impres- sion which later on emerges in the understanding in definite idea of the phantasm : the externalisation of the phantasm is made sub- jective to the manifestation in impression of telepathic communion. He distinguishes between impressions and ideas. And this is in agreement with the theory propounded if, too, for Myers's ' subconscious region of the percipient's mental activity ' we read ' the intuitive self,' we find still closer agreement. There is a case reported in the Proceedings, vol. vii. p. 33 et seq. (many other like cases are therein recorded). I refer only to that part of it which has a bearing on the present argument. Mrs. P. states : ' I arose about the usual hour on the morning of the accident ' an accident to her brother Edmund, who was at some distance from her ' probably about six o'clock. I had slept well throughout the night, had no dreams or sudden awakenings. I awoke feeling gloomy and depressed, which feeling I could not shake off. After breakfast rny husband went to his work, and, at the proper time, the children were gotten ready and sent to school, leaving me alone in the house. Soon after this I decided to steep and drink 132 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY some tea, hoping it would relieve me of the gloomy feelings afore- mentioned. I went into the pantry, took down the tea canister, and as I turned around, my brother Edmund or his exact image stood before me, and only a few feet away.' Mrs. P. then gives details of the accident to her brother as she saw it. It was afterwards proved that the accident had happened as she said she had seen it happen. Now the accident happened about 3 A.M. Mrs. P. woke up about 6 A.M. that is, three hours after the accident, feeling gloomy and depressed. It was, perhaps, three hours later, that is, six hours after the accident, that Mrs. P., still feeling gloomy and depressed, saw in idea the accident to her brother. Mrs. H. Sidgwick, in referring to this case, says : It will have been noticed that her impression was not contemporaneous with the event to which it related, but occurred some six hours after- wards ' (p. 34). Herein Mrs. Sidgwick refers to the appearance of the phantom as the impression on the percipient. I prefer to say that the impression on the percipient was the feeling of gloom and depression which probably affected her in sleep at the time of the accident, and continued in affect till she awoke three hours later. The appear- ance of the phantom, again three hours later, was not, I hold, in impression but in idea the impression emerged so late in idea because then for the first time the external environments of the percipient were consonant with the emergence of the idea in her human understanding : the idea emerged in her soon after she was first alone. Again, Mrs. Sidgwick referring, I think, to Mrs. P. says : ' But it seems quite possible that the nervousness and depression may have had to do with some condition in the percipient which ren- dered the vision possible.' I hold that it is not simply possible but certain that the connec- tion Mrs. Sidgwick refers to, existed. At the time of the accident the personality of Mrs. P. was affected in intuition and her human personality was impressed by the affect. Afterwards when she was comparatively free from normal external disturbance the affect emerged in idea through operation of her understanding. In all cases like to this the first impression of the percipient is in conscious personal feeling, not in definite idea : it is but a detail (of the understanding) that after ideas emerge. And there can be no transfer of feeling by direct thought-transference, for feeling has nothing to do, per se, with cognition. I hold that such cases go to prove that the communion between personalities is not in idea : the after emergence of ideas must result from some operation of this communion on the understanding. There is a remarkable case reported in Phantasms of the Living, vol. i. p. 274 : FEELING 133 ' During the whole afternoon I remained in this state of dismal wretchedness. All at once a telegram arrived from home, inform- ing me that my grandmother was taken very ill, and that she was earnestly longing for me. There I had the solution of the riddle. Nevertheless from that hour my melancholy gradually decreased, and in spite of the telegram it completely disappeared in the course of the afternoon. In the evening I received a second telegram, to the effect that the danger was over. In this way the second pheno- menon, the rapid decrease of my wretchedness a circumstance which in itself was surprising, inasmuch as the melancholy should naturally have increased after the receipt of the first news received its explanation. For the afternoon was just the time when the change in the patient's condition for the better took place ; and the danger to her life once over, her yearning for my presence had decreased ; while simultaneously my anxiety was dispelled ' (Reported also in Proceedings, vol. ii. p. 122). This case is remarkable in that it shows the affect on the per- cipient, from an impression on her understanding arising from tele- pathic impulse, was stronger than the affect on her (through the operation of her understanding) of positive information conveyed through her normal organs of sense. The case I must admit does not form one of a class : I can find only one like to it (see Phantasms, vol. i. p. 244). But so far as we can rely on these two we have evidence of the subjectivity of mental operation to what Gurney terms emotional state, or what I term impression. The evidence of these two cases goes in direct support of the theory I propound. The following case is of interest with reference to the present argument : ' Two friends of ours, Mr. X. and Mr. G. lived together till the marriage of Mr. X., and were, therefore, intimately associated in our minds. It happened that though Mrs. X. and I had exchanged cards we had not met, and I merely knew her by sight at the time when Mr. G. also married. But as I had found Mrs. G. at home I was slightly acquainted with her. ' It was a few months after Mr. G.'s marriage, on the night of May 14th, 1879, when my dream occurred. I was staying at Bristol at the time. It seemed to me I was making my first call on Mrs. G., and that she proceeded to show me her trousseau a thing that would never have occurred to her in actual life, or to any but very intimate friends. A variety of dresses were displayed, and as I was looking at a black net evening dress, with crimson trimmings, thinking it was very like one of my own, a sudden transformation took place. Mrs. G. had changed into Mrs. X., and the dress was a widow's dress complete. I woke very strongly impressed with the dream, and mentioned it to my father the next morning. It 134 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY haunted me till, on May 15th or 16th, I saw the Times' announce- ment of Mr. X.'s death. ' Afterwards I learnt that, on the afternoon preceding my dream, Mr. X. had returned home, apparently in his usual good health, only rather tired, but within half an hour had died of quite unsus- pected heart disease ' (Journal, vol. i. p. 393). In this case the operation of the understanding of the percipient resulted in a purely imaginative dream : in no way can we refer this dream itself to direct communion in telepathy between the percipient and the external or any external personality. Even the idea of the widow's dress was purely imaginary ; there was no transfer of ideas between the percipient and any external personality. But the widow's dress in association with Mrs. X. was cer- tainly symbolic of Mr. X.'s death. We must therefore hold that there was some affection on the percipient from the external or some external personality which started the mental operation of the percipient : the affect must have been on the understanding of the percipient. There is no evidence, it is true, of the manifesta- tion of any impression, but the emerging ideas being purely imagina- tive and yet, in part, symbolic of the death which had really occurred, we must refer the dream to some real affect from the external or some external personality which might have been manifest in conscious impression. Now the recorded cases of unique impressions as distinct from ideas are, as I have said, very numerous. We must do one of two things : We must hold (1) that the telepathy which sets up impres- sions in the percipient is a different thing from the telepathy which sets up ideas in the percipient, or (2) we must refer both series of cases to one and the same principle of telepathy. I reject the former and hold to the latter theory. It follows that we must refer cases of (apparent) transfer of impressions and cases of (apparent) transfer of ideas to one and the same root. That is, there is an affect from the external or external personalities on the personality of the percipient, and this (the root of apparent transfer) manifests itself in conscious impressions (feel- ing) of the percipient, and sometimes in the after emergence of ideas in the understanding of the percipient by more definite operation of the understanding. But it may be objected the very cases of impressions that you rely on prove the real transference of impressions. An examination of the cases relied on and, indeed, of all the reported cases, will prove this is not so. Consider the first three cases set out at length. In all these what were the impressions of the percipient ? Gloom and depression ; an hysterical state resulting in sharp personal unhappiness or discomfort. The impressions were all of personal FEELING 135 feeling in the percipient, personal feeling which in no single case we are justified in holding was shared by the agent. In all these cases the death or nearness of death of the agent was the ' event ' in question. Now we have no grounds at all for hold- ing that death or the nearness of death necessarily impresses the person dying with any feeling of gloom or depression. Ordinarily the feeling is one of supreme indifference, or even longing for the end of human life. There may be gloom or depression, but, even where there is, it is a feeling personal to the agent dying and to his personal state ; whereas the feeling of gloom or depression in the percipient is personal to the percipient and his personal state. We can well understand the agent, dying, to experience full happiness, while the percipient is affected, in contradiction, by gloom or depression. What conclusion follows directly ? The event is the supreme crisis death. The agent is affected by the event in impression ; the impression is personal to himself. The event telepathically affects the percipient in impression per- sonal to himself, where his impression may be directly the opposite of that of the agent. So the communion between the agent and percipient cannot be in transfer of impressions : it must be in some- thing which is merely manifested in the (probably differing) impres- sions of the agent and percipient. The same argument holds for all cases of ' feeling.' We are driven to a conclusion that the telepathic impressions or ideas of any percipient are no more than manifestations of an affect on the percipient from the external or external personalities ; and I cannot, in this connection, treat the percipient as a human personality of feeling and cognition. If we so treat the percipient we must so treat the agent, and the communion must be held to be direct between two subjects of human feeling and ideas, so that the communication is direct in feeling and idea. The evidence available disproves any such direct communication. These cases of impression, then, show that telepathy is a term used to express the communion in intuition between the intuitive self and other intuitive selves and the external, manifested to us, as subjects, in impressions and sometimes in ideas. RUDIMENTARY IDEAS: SIGHT, SOUND, AND TOUCH WHERE telepathy results in impressions only, and is not followed by the definite operation of the understanding necessary for definite ideas, there is still some operation of the understanding. We might, then, term impressions rudimentary ideas. But the term ' rudimentary ideas ' is already appropriated by the authors of Phantasms of the Living, and so it will be better to follow them and refer rudimentary ideas to ideas involving sight, sound, and touch. Rudimentary ideas herein mean ideas of the hearing of tappings, tickings, knocks, crashes, footsteps, bells, clocks, etc., the seeing of vague forms or the feeling of vague touches. All these ideas are of sight, sound, or touch (cf. Phantasms, vol. i. p. 503 ; vol. ii. pp. 73-6, 125-32, 570-6, 635-9). Now telepathic impressions are probably of constant and general occurrence even as to the most trivial matters, and when agents and percipients are in their ordinary normal state (see p. 123). And tele- pathy as manifested to us results from an affect on the understand- ing, so that when there is operation of the understanding this operation is originated by the affect on the understanding. In the great majority of cases, then, we might expect the resulting ideas to be rudimentary ideas. For, in most cases, we may assume that the operation of the understanding is at a minimum. So the number of such cases extant not necessarily published should be large : it is, in fact, very large (cf. Proceedings, vol. vi. p. 330). But evidentially little reliance can be placed on such cases. For winds play with trees, even with walls, windows, chimneys ; furniture creaks especially at night on change of temperature, and thus we are often conscious of uncanny sounds : our senses of sight, hearing, and feeling, too, frequently give rise in us to false rudimentary ideas. It follows that the available evidence of rudi- mentary ideas is largely worthless as evidence of telepathy. For, though we may be unable to trace their cause, we know that any one of numberless natural causes may be the origin quite apart from telepathy (cf. Phantasms, vol. ii. p. 125). The following case is worthy of attention as showing how easily natural noises may be the genesis of a ^pod ' ghost ' story. As Whateley has told us, the most difficult false story to break down is one based on a substratum of truth. 136 RUDIMENTARY IDEAS 137 T. E. C. states : ' In the winter of 1857 I was living in a roomy old-fashioned house in Wiltshire. Many people will recollect the severity of that winter, and in particular the bitter cold of that Christmas Eve. On that intensely cold afternoon, my father-in-law, Mr. D., started from London and travelled by a very slow train, stopping at every station, and not reaching the town where I lived till quite late in the evening. The result of that journey to him was a severe attack of bronchitis. He was confined to his bed for some days, and we were getting rather anxious as to the prospect of his recovery. ' One night I had occasion to go downstairs rather late and saw a light in the pantry, a small room on the ground floor, without a fireplace, and paved with stone.' He found all the servants in this fireless place, and asked why they were there and not in the warm kitchen. The reply was/ Oh, sir, we daren't sit there. There 's a horrible noise there every night. We never hear it in the daytime. We are sure Mr. D. is going to die.' He then went into the kitchen, being told by the servants the noise was like that of a woman very far off screaming in pain, but that they could not locate the sound. ' There,' continues T. E. C., ' was the noise sure enough. An uncanny sound of a small voice of some one in pain at a distance, or rather as if it came through a wall.' He went to different places to the scullery, to the top of the cellar steps, outside the back door. He still heard the sound wherever he was, could not locate it, and was greatly puzzled. Ultimately he marked that the sound occurred regularly once in three seconds, and, now on the right track, traced its origin to a gas meter. The water valve had got rusty, and shrieked each three seconds as it measured the passage of gas. He explained the matter to the servants, and they were content. But the story does not end here. For, after the discovery, T. E. C. tells us that the sound was not heard again, and, too, ' my father-in- law began at once to get well ' (Journal S.P.R., vol. iii. p. 311). Herein we see how easily honest witnesses may interpret a near and natural sound as a distant and ' ghostly ' sound in this case as the distant screaming of a woman in pain. Not only this. We have a real coincidence in time between the uncanny sound and the illness of a person in the house, and a second real coincidence in time between the ceasing of the sound and the ceasing of the illness. So, as Gurney says, ' the vast majority of these non-human phantasms may be safely pronounced purely subjective affections.' But, as he also says, ' there are instances of strong and unique hallucinations of light or noise which have too markedly coincided with some external crisis for the hypothesis of telepathic origin to be ignored ' (Phantasms, vol. i. p. 503). 138 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY By the theory I propound these rudimentary ideas of telepathic origin must be very large. But all we can consider is the evidence towards proof that such rudimentary ideas are of telepathic origin. And, qua evidence, I fully agree with Gurney. I give three cases where the evidence points to telepathic origin. They are treated by Gurney as veridical. 1. SIGHT ' About the year 1841 1 was in a room with my father in our house in the Isle of Wight, when he exclaimed, " Good God, what is that ? " starting up as he spoke and looking at something. He then turned to me and said he had seen a ball of light pass through the room, and added, " Depend upon it, Nurse Symonds is dead." This was an old servant in London, to whom he had been sending money, in illness. In course of post came information that she passed away at the very time in question. S. H. S.' (Phantasms, vol. ii. p. 76). Here we may fairly assume the seeing the ball of light was unique in the experience of the percipient. But the coincidence is only a bare coincidence between the seeing by the percipient of a ball of light and the death at a distance. For telepathy, I would suggest, the case is strongest evidentially because of the strength and unique- ness of the hallucination, and the feeling of the percipient mani- fested in impression and partial idea which led him to associate the hallucination with the death. The next case is given by a gentleman whose name can only be communicated privately. 2. SOUND ' Two days after leaving St. Helena I was up aloft doing some trifling sailor's work with the fourth officer, on the mizzen topsail or top gallant yard, when I heard a bell begin to toll. I said to him, " Do you hear that bell tolling ? " " No," he said, " I hear nothing." However, my agitation was so great that I went down and examined both our bells, and placed my arm near them to see if they were vibrating, or if any chance rope was swinging loose and striking them. However, while doing this, I still heard the boom of the tolling bell, and it seemed far away. I then, when I had satisfied myself that the sound was not attributable to either of our ship's bells, went up aloft and scanned the horizon in search of a sail, but saw none. I then said to my messmates, " That 's my ' black letter.' I knew I should have bad news this voyage." ' He found when the ship reached Falmouth that a lady who had been to him an elder sister, and whom he, boylike, adored, had died at the time he had heard the booming of the bell. He adds, ' I am forty years old now, and have been through dangers of all sorts, in imminent danger of death many times, but I have never had a pre- RUDIMENTARY IDEAS 139 sentiment since. After nearly twenty-five years I can still remember the boom, boom of that old bell in the Manx churchyard, which I heard in latitude 14 S. or thereabouts. ... I have never suffered from any hallucinations ' (Phantasms, vol. ii. p. 127). 3. TOUCH W. B. C. states : ' I well remember a singular circumstance I have often heard my father (one of the early civil engineers of this country) relate, which occurred to himself. He was a man of very strong mind, and more free from fancies and superstitions than most people. At the time of the occurrence he was about thirty years of age. He was in the habit of lying with his right hand extended out of bed ; and one morning, about five o'clock, when wide awake, he felt a firm hand grasp his, so much like the grasp of his father's hand that he im- mediately told my mother " that his father had taken his hand as he usually did when saying ' good-bye.' " His father died at that time that morning, somewhat suddenly. My father did not know he was ill. His father died near Sunderland ; my father, at that time, was living in Sussex ' (Phantasms, vol. ii. p. 574). If we dissect these cases I think we find that they do not point to direct thought transference, but to some telepathic affect on the understanding originating or followed by operation of the under- standing resulting in ideas. For in the first it is impossible to hold that the agent had in her the idea of appearing to the percipient as a ball of light, and in the second it is equally impossible to hold that the agent transferred the idea of hearing a bell boom. The third is more difficult to deal with, for we can well imagine that the father dying had, in him, the idea of a last handshake with his son. But he must also, if thinking of his son, have had many other ideas related to him ; and there is no reason, a priori, why the idea of shaking hands should have been the particular one transmitted. On the other hand, if the event, death, affected the percipient's mind telepathically, we can imagine that it was followed by opera- tion of his understanding which caused the emergence of an idea relat- ing to a characteristic of the agent marked in the (his percipient's) human mind. Again, if we find in the former two that there could be no direct transference of idea, I think we may hold there was no direct transference in the third. For all three are of one class, and so one fundamental law should explain all. If we make these rudimentary ideas of sight, sound, and touch, subjective to affects on the minds of the percipients, we find one law in explanation of all. These affects have been, in Myers' language, ' translated to the superficial self in either sensory or 140 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY motor terms according to the subject's psychostatical condition perhaps according to the predominance of visile, audile, or tactile imagery in his habitual psychic operation ' (Proceedings, vol. vii. p. 321 ; cf. Phantasms, vol. ii. pp. 76, 129, 130). The simplest form of rudimentary ideas resulting from telepathic affects is, perhaps, manifest in sounds like raps or ticks. If so, these should be of common occurrence : but bear in mind they are, as before explained, weak evidentially. They would, in fact, appear to be of common occurrence. An interesting case is to be found in the Journal, vol. x. pp. 162 et seq. Mrs. Verrall, too who is so generally known as an able and trust- worthy investigator that her name may fairly be given reports her own experience as to ' tickings ' in the Journal, vol. ix. pp. 134, 159. DEFINITE IDEAS IN THE PERCIPIENT, BUT NOT RELATED TO THOSE OF THE AGENT WE consider now a largo class of cases where the evidence points to the percipients being affected by the external or external per- sonalities, but where the facts disprove that the affection can be in transference of ideas. That is, where the percipients are so affected, and yet where the emerging ideas are foreign to any possible ideas of the agents. I give three cases for consideration. A Miss V. dreamt that she saw the corpse of a friend of hers, Mrs. A., laid out on a bed. A Mrs. M. staying in the house with Miss V. states that in a dream the same night ' I saw my friend, Miss A., running towards me. She passed me by, and took off her hat and bent her head down into the sea. I tried to grasp her by her clothes, but she cried out, ' Don't stop me, for my mother is dying.' Mrs. A., who was in perfect health the day before, died about the time of these dreams. The facts of Mrs. M.'s dream were all imagina- tively false (Phantasms of the Living, vol. i. p. 362). The Rev. C. C. W. states : ' In my bachelor days I lived for two years at C. , in the outskirts of London. On a certain night I dreamed that Mr. W. with whom I was acquainted and myself were walking in the cloisters of Westminster Abbey. ' He abruptly bade me " Good-bye," saying that he must go to a particular gravestone. I in my dream entreated him not to go, but to come back with me out of the cloisters. " No, no," he replied, " I must go, I am fated to go," with that he broke from me, hurried to the stone, and sank through the floor. The next morning I mentioned the dream to my landlady, and told her it was my firm conviction that my friend was dead. ' The next morning's post brought me a letter from my brother, who stated that on the previous night Mr. W. had died suddenly from disease of the heart ' (Phantasms of the Living, vol. i. p. 364). 141 142 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY 3 Mrs. H. states : ' The dream that I am about to relate occurred about two years ago. I seemed to be walking in a country road, with high grassy banks on either side. Suddenly I heard the tramp of many feet. Feeling a strange sense of fear, I called out, " Who are these people coming ? " A voice above me replied, " A pro- cession of the dead." I then found myself on the bank, looking into the road where the people were walking five or six abreast. Hundreds of them passed by me neither looking aside nor looking at each other. They were people of all conditions and in all ranks of life. I saw no children amongst them. I watched the long line of people go away into the far distance, but I felt no special interest in any of them, until I saw a middle-aged friend, dressed as a gentleman farmer. I pointed to him and called out, " Who is that, please ? " He turned round and said in a loud voice, " I am John M. of Chelms- ford." Then my dream ended. Next day, when my husband returned from his office he told me that John M. of Chelmsford had died the previous day ' (Phantasms of the Living, vol. i. p. 366). The above three cases mark in characteristics a large class. In none of them can we find any evidence of direct transference of ideas : indeed they disprove such direct transference. For we cannot relate Miss A.'s running down into the sea ; Mr. W.'s impossible conduct in the cloisters of Westminster Abbey ; John M.'s peculiar declara- tion of his own decease, to any reality in thought or action on the part of the agent. These ' imaginings ' constitute no more than subjective ideas on the part of the percipients, which are false in relation to those of the agent. But this constitutes no explanation of what took place ; the coincidences on which the authors of Phan- tasms of the Living rely still remain inexplicable if referred to chance. If, however, we assume that the percipients received intuition of what was happening to the agents, and that intuition gave rise to ideas, related to the intuition but false in detail, because of the fallible or imaginative working of the understanding of the per- cipients, then we have a clear explanation of what took place. I have no doubt that Mrs. M. knew Hastings before she dreamt of it ; that the Rev. C. C. W. knew the cloisters of Westminster Abbey before he dreamt of them ; and Mrs. H. tells us, herself, she had afterwards another dream of the same kind in general detail as to the procession, which shows her tendency to the same form of dream- ing. All these percipients had true telepathic experience in intuition, but when their understandings came into operation ' imaginative ' ideas emerged : for, by imagination, used in its ordinary sense, we can ' play with ' our storage of ideas. Bear in mind that quite apart from the active and definite exercise t>f memory, our imagina- tion has always a vast storage of ideas to ' play with ' : it can DEFINITE IDEAS 143 relate them to one another in the most heterogeneous, exaggerated and fantastic fashion, and so construct the strangest pictures in idea. But in all these cases the foundation for even false imaginative ideas must be referred to real telepathic impression from the agents. The following passage from Phantasms of the Living is in point directly as to the theory I propound. ' Suppose the same kind of real event say the peaceful death of an aged parent were to occur in twenty cases, and in each of them to produce a real and unique sort of disturbance in some absent person's mind ; then, if that disturbance clothed itself in some sensory form or, as I should say, if it reached the point of causing hallucination the hallucination might take twenty different forms. One percipient may hear his parent's voice ; another may imagine the touch of his hand upon his head ; a third may see him in his wonted dress and aspect ; a fourth may see him as he might appear when dying ; a fifth may see him in some transfigured aspect ; a sixth may see a figure or hear a voice resembling his, but not recog- nise it, or recognise it only in recollection ; and others may invest the disturbing idea with every sort of visible symbolism, derived from their mind's habitual furniture and their wonted train of thought ' (Phantasms, vol. i. p. 539). If we consider this ' real and unique sort of disturbance in some absent person's mind,' we find that three different classes of result may follow. The disturbance may result, (1) in the emergence of no idea of any sensory form but merely in impression ; (2) in the emergence of ideas of sensory form resulting from the affect of the disturbance on the stored ideas in the absent person's mind ; (3) in the emergence of ideas of sensory form directly related to the dis- turbance cases, that is, of apparent thought transfer. This ' real and unique sort of disturbance ' precedes in all cases the emergence of ideas bear in mind that all our concrete ideas are clothed in some sensory form. The distinction between the disturbance and the emerging ideas is this : the disturbance is an affect on the understanding from the external : the emerging of ideas clothed in sensory form is the result of an operation of the understanding. Herein we find Gurney closely in agreement with Myers when the latter relates telepathic impressions to the sub- liminal self. The disturbance does not consist in idea, it is the affect of the disturbance which makes possible the emergence of idea or ideas. So I prefer for Gurney's statement a ' real and unique disturbance in some absent person's mind,' the statement ' a real and unique disturbance on some absent person's mind.' If for Gurney's ' real and unique disturbance ' we write ' an affect in intuition,' we find his theory in agreement with the theory propounded. 144 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY The importance of the cases now under consideration lies in this: We are justified in assuming that one and the same fundamental law must hold good for these cases and for all cases (if any exist) where there is apparent direct thought transference cases, that is, where the ideas that emerge in the percipients are like to those of the agents. But in the cases considered we find there is no direct thought transference. So in the latter cases there can be no direct thought transference. We cannot, therefore, refer the transfer to direct communication in brain-thought between the agent and per- cipient : we must refer it to some communion between them which starts the brain-thought of the percipient. This communion is between them as intuitive selves : between them as ' minds ' as distinct from ' human minds.' AFTER considering definite ideas in the percipient which are not related to those of the agent, we should, in due course, consider cases where there are definite ideas in the percipient like or related to those of the agent. But such cases (apparently) involve direct thought transference and, therefore, before considering them, we must consider the theories extant as to direct thought transference. In disagreeing with all such theories, I shall try to prove that I am not so heretical as would to many investigators at first thought appear to be the case. The Literary Committee of the S.P.R. state : ' Clearly then the analogy of Thought Transference, which seemed to offer such a convenient logical start, cannot be pressed too far. Our phenomena break through any attempt to group them under heads of transferred impressions ; and we venture to introduce the words Telaesthesia and Telepathy to cover all cases of impression received at a distance without the normal operation of the recog- nised sense organs ' (Proceedings, vol. i. p. 147). The distinction I raise between impressions and ideas is not marked in the above extract. Doubt, however, is thrown on the general application of any theory of direct Thought- Transference. ' But as our evidence has developed, our conception of telepathy has needed to be more and more generalised in other and new direc- tions still less compatible with the vibration theory ' (Proceed- ings, vol. xv. p. 409. By F. W. H. Myers). But the great exponent of so-termed brain-wave theories is Sir W. Crookes. I claim, however, that the theory I propound is in extension rather than in opposition to his theory. Sir W. Crookes in his Presidential Address, reported in vol. xii. p. 338 of the Proceedings S.P.R. , says : ' It seems to me that in these rays ' that is, certain series of rays as to the affect of which on us we are at present scientifically ignorant ' we may have a possible mode of transmitting intelligence, which with a few reasonable postulates may supply a key to much that is obscure in psychical research. Let it be assumed that these rays, or rays even of higher frequency, can pass into the brain and act on some nervous centre there. Let it be conceived that the brain contains a centre which uses these rays as the vocal cords use sound K 1 146 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY vibrations (both being under the command of intelligence) and sends them out, with the velocity of light, to impinge on the receiv- ing ganglion of another brain.' So far we are on clear ground, though the sending out and receiving (?) of these vibrations is made subject to intelligence. But he continues : ' To this hypothesis it may be objected that brain waves, like any other waves, must obey physical laws. Therefore transmission of thought must be easier or more certain the nearer the agent and recipient are to each other, and should die out altogether before great distances are reached. Also it can be urged that if brain waves diffuse in all directions, they should affect all sensitives with- in their radius of action instead of impressing only one brain. The electric telegraph is not a parallel case, for there a material wire intervenes to conduct and guide the energy to its destination. ' These are weighty objections, but not, I think, insurmountable. Far be it from me to say anything disrespectful of the law of inverse squares, but I have already endeavoured to show we are dealing with conditions removed from our material and limited conceptions of space, matter, form. Is it inconceivable that intense thought concentrated towards a sensitive with whom the thinker is in close sympathy may induce a telepathic chain of brain waves, along which the message of thought can go straight to its goal without loss of energy due to distance ? And is it also inconceivable that our mundane ideas of space and distance may be superseded in these subtile regions of unsubstantial thought where " near " and " far " may lose their usual meaning ? ' (Proceedings, vol. xii. p. 352). I claim that the theory I propound is not open to the objections raised by Sir William ; that, as before said, it is in extension rather than in opposition to his theory. If, in the subtle regions of unsubstantial thought, we formulate any theory whereby ' near ' and ' far ' have lost their usual meaning, then we are in regions free from the limits of space and time, and where the law of the inverse square does not hold sway. But by no possibility can we imagine waves from a material centre travel- ling through regions outside the tyrannic authority of the inverse square. Now bear in mind that Sir William leaves free to me the directive force of intelligence. Suppose we consider the limit of his waves ? Suppose that, as he himself suggests we hold that for them ' near ' and ' far ' are the same or, in other words, that they are not conditioned by ' near ' and ' f ar ' ? And also that, in travel, they are not conditioned by the law of the inverse square ? Then these waves cannot be brain- waves, for we cannot refer them to material centres of origin. If, however, sensibility exist and (passively) affects us otherwise 147 than through our normal organs of sense, we have what is closely the same as these waves, unconditioned by ' near ' and ' far ' ; that is, unconditioned in time and space and free from the govern- ance of the inverse square. Sensibility requires no active ' diffu- sion ' ; it exists, timeless, spaceless, passive in omnipresence. We have then in sensibility our means (not our voluntary use of the means) of communication between personalities, though not directly between human personalities. These personalities are our intuitive selves, always (through sensibility) in communion with other intuitive selves and the ex- ternal, where the communion is manifest actively to each intuitive self in intuition. Sir W. Crooke's theory, applied to intuitive selves, follows directly for the means of communication are not conditioned in time, or by ' near ' and ' far.' And, herein, we find the defini- tion I have given for telepathy. Telepathic communion is the basis of telepathy as manifest to the human personality. But this manifestation is not in intuition : it is in impressions and ideas. Some few of us have had experi- ence of, relatively, pure telepathic impressions, that is, impressions not conditioned in cognition (see p. 70, Part i.). But I reject this experience as evidential for the reasons already given. Our human experience then lies in these pure impressions followed by some operation of the understanding which results in what I term impressions, and in impressions sometimes followed by more definite operation of the understanding which results in the emergence of ideas in the human personality. So I make telepathy free from the conditioning of time and space and telepathy manifest to us in impressions and ideas subjective to telepathic communion. I submit this theory as in expansion of rather than in opposition to that of Crookes. For the human understanding is not only conditioned in time and space, but its impressions (not pure impres- sions) and ideas are so conditioned. When, then, impressions or ideas emerge in the human understanding, the human personality, being unconscious of the genesis of its ideas, necessarily regards them as objective. This fact explains the appearance to human beings of direct thought-transference. There is, in fact, as Crookes puts it, transfer of intelligence : but I refer this intelligence to our intuitive selves. Consider, for instance, wireless telegraphy. Herein is no direct transfer of ideas. At one point a centre of matter is put in vibra- tion. The vibrations affect a distant centre of matter. If these two centres of matter are in certain attunement, an ' idea ' is (appar- ently) transferred from one centre to the other. But these centres of matter transmit nothing : they are no more than centres for the manifestation of transfer the emitting centre of matter transmits its message in every direction through space. And the emitting 148 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY centre itself originates nothing : it is but used by the operator, it is the operator who determines it as a point of emission. In fact, there is no transference of ideas at all ; all that takes place is that the message despatched (which is one thing) is like to the message received (which is another thing). The message is despatched in all possible directions : it is received only at one distant centre because of material attunement between the centre of despatch and centre of reception. The theory I propound carries us thus far, but no farther. It explains how apparent direct thought transference takes place : but it does not explain why this thought transfer only takes place between particular human beings. For this we must introduce theory as to will or desire, or particular attunement between par- ticular understandings or exceptional receptive power on the part of the percipient. But I think the theory propounded is, I repeat, in extension rather than in opposition to that of Sir W. Crookes. Turning now to the theory of F. W. H. Myers, we shall find an underlying likeness to the theory propounded : I have already shown that Myers throws doubt on brain-wave theories. What I do is, practically, to give Myers's subliminal self two distinct meanings. That is, I assume he uses the expression some- times as meaning the intuitive self which I have deduced from Kant's Critique, and sometimes as meaning the human personality regarded as a full storehouse of, potentially, present ideas of all its past events. I think whether my theory be sound or not that if this distinction be assumed and kept in view, Myers's theory will be more easily grasped. Possibly, too, he sometimes uses the subliminal self in a third sense as meaning the soul of man (cf. Proceedings, vol. iv. p. 260), as distinct from the intuitive self. But this meaning we may neglect for our present purpose. The following extract from a paper by Myers on the Subliminal Consciousness is in point : ' I have already urged that the impulse which ultimately generates the phantom is in no case directly received by the superficial self, but always by the subliminal faculties, in some unknown fashion. I have suggested that this impulse is not of itself of any definite sensory or motor quality, but is generally capable of being trans- lated (Myers's italics) to the superficial self in either sensory or motor terms, according to the subject's psychostatical condition perhaps according to the predominance of visile, audile, or motile imagery in his habitual psychic operations. To explain these collective or elective cases ' cases, that is, where ideas from an agent emerge as somewhat the same ideas in more than one percipient ' with their similarities in the general image, but difference in detail, we should have, on this view, further to suppose that the said impulse is sometimes of a kind which affects the subliminal self of all suitably constituted persons within a certain area, and which, although DIRECT THOUGHT TRANSFERENCE 149 modified in each observer's case by individual conditions, has yet a prepotent tendency to translate itself into one special form of imagery, so that the phantom which each observer perceives is similar, but not identical ' (Proceedings, vol. vii. p. 321). If we assume that Myers in the above statement is treating the subliminal self as the intuitive self I rely on, we find he is closely in agreement with the theory propounded. What he states is clearly in opposition to all brain-wave theories : he makes the communi- cation between human beings to consist in ' impulses,' and treats ideas as subjective to these impulses. All that I object to is his suggestion that ' the said impulse is sometimes of a kind which affects the subliminal self of all suitably constituted persons within a certain area.' I hold that the impulse referred is an affect (through sensibility) in intuition. It therefore affects all persons, not merely suitably constituted persons : and its affect is not confined to a certain area. The ' suitable constitution ' of the person affected is in the constitu- tion of the human understanding of the person : so that, though all persons are affected, corresponding ideas only emerge in those few whose understandings are in peculiar attunement with that of the agent, or peculiarly receptive, or where the will or desire of the agent (and possibly of the percipient) is a factor. To return to the general argument against theories of direct thought transference. There would appear to be some strong probability that the percipient can be affected by the external as distinct from external personalities. Even admitting that in all cases of affection from the external there is some action or influence from external person- alities, there is still some direct affect from the external. In such cases there is no external brain as a centre of radiation for brain-waves. Again, in all experimental cases, where the percipient sees or hears or feels in attunement with the agent, it must be as held by Gurney and Myers that the percipient himself creates, as it were, the visual, auditory or tactile idea in himself, for there is no direct transfer in the visual, auditory or tactile. And, again, however freely we may sublimate the brain itself or its action, the brain must remain a material thing of space and time, and its action must be referred for origin to the material in space and time. So the dissolution of the brain on death must put an end to communication through telepathy, if we hold with any brain waves theory. Now I do not allege there is evidence to prove communication between the living and the disembodied : but there is evidence towards proof which demands the most serious consideration, 1 and this evidence is of such a nature that it goes to show this communi- 1 Since the above was written the evidence towards proof has increased. 150 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY cation does, to a certain extent, take place in the same way as tele- pathic communication between the living. The theory I propound makes possible if, to us, extremely difficult this like mode of communication between the living and the dead as between the living and the living. But any theory of brain waves makes this like mode of communication impossible if telepathic communica- tion takes place directly between the living from brain to brain, then communication between the living and the dead must take place by other and unlike means : for on death the brain becomes non-existent. ' If an immortal soul there be within me, she must be able to dispense with part of the brain's help while the brain is living, as with the whole of its help when it is dead.' (by Myers, Proceedings, vol. iv. p. 260). This statement must be equally correct if we write ' intuitive self ' for an ' immortal soul.' Lastly, the theory I propound, is altogether in opposition to any theory of brain waves. For, according to that theory, in all cases of affection from the external or external personalities, otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, the affects are in intuition : emerging impressions and ideas are subjective to intuition. DEFINITE IDEAS IN THE PERCIPIENT APPAR- ENTLY TRANSFERRED FROM THE AGENT BEAR in mind that we are now considering spontaneous, not experi- mental cases. When we come to experimental cases the apparent transference of definite ideas will be considered at greater length. By the theory propounded any direct transference of ideas from an agent to a percipient is impossible. In Phantasms of the Living we find a chapter headed : ' Trans- ference of Ideas and of Mental Pictures ' (vol. i. p. 232). And as to the cases therein considered Gurney says : ' The great point which connects many of the more inward impressions of spontaneous telepathy with the experimental cases is this, that what enters the percipient's mind is the exact reproduction of the agent's thought at the moment ' (p. 232). In this chapter thirty cases (numbered 37-66) are given as instances of this exact reproduction. But when the cases are examined, I think most of them are found to fail in showing any exact reproduction of the agent's thought. For instance in case 47 (p. 245), a child of five in Edinburgh says : ' Cousin Janie at the Cape, she 's dead.' And it is afterwards found that the lady died at the Cape at the time the child spoke of the death. In this case an event affected the agent in South Africa, and the same event affected the child in Scotland : I can find no exact reproduction of thought from agent to percipient : the exact reproduction would appear to have been of the event, death, in relation to its affect on the agent. For, certainly, the child's words were the result of mental opera- tion started by some affect from the external otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. If we admit that this affect was from ' Cousin Janie,' still the communication was not in mentality but in affect on the understanding on the percipient. Again in the well-known case of Bishop Wilberforce (p. 248), when he suddenly exclaimed, ' I am certain that something has happened to one of my sons,' and it was afterwards found that at the time, the foot of his eldest son had been badly crushed by an accident at sea, we also find that the Bishop was affected by the event in relation to his son. Suppose that the accident had taken place in the presence of the 151 152 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY Bishop, so that he had been affected through his normal organs of sense ? Then he would have been affected in the same way by the event (though more definitely because, in cognition, the affect would have been through his normal senses) and we should require no abnormal explanation of his experience : we should not set up any theory of exact reproduction of thought. Why should we set up such a theory when he was affected otherwise than through his normal organs of sense ? But a few of the cases given suggest at first thought this trans- ference of ideas. Consider the following case : Mrs. H. D. says : ' . . . One evening I suddenly laid down the book I was reading, with this thought so strong upon me I could scarcely refrain from putting it into words : ' I believe that Mr. C. is at this moment dying.' She asked her husband to note the time ifc was 7 P.M. The next morning they learnt through a letter that Mr. C. died at 7 P.M. (Phantasms, vol. i. p. 243). Herein, I think, consideration of the case will show that there was not even apparent direct transference of ideas from agent to percipient. Mrs. H. D. was impressed only by the event death. Her impression had nothing at all to do with Mr. C.'s ideas at the time of death. It is quite true that the idea in her that the death was the death of Mr. C. may fairly be held to have been the result of some ' play ' between her intuitive self and that of Mr. C. But there is no evidence at all of any transference of human thought. Even if we hold she associated the event, death, with Mr. C. because he was thinking of her, that establishes only a possible explana- tion of the emergence in her of the idea of Mr. C.'s death. Or even if we hold that she associated the event, death, with Mr. C. because he was not only thinking of her but also thinking of his own death, we are carried no further for any argument in support of trans- ference of ideas. For Mr. C.'s ideas as to his own death were in all probability, if not necessarily, different altogether from Mrs. H. D.'s ideas of the same event. Or consider the following case and this it is more difficult to explain. It is given by Sir L. G. at length. I offer but a short digest. Sir L. G. was with Colonel L. A. in a large unoccupied room, given up to lumber and packing-cases. He was turning over some old songs and lighted on a duet, ' Dal tuo Stellate soglio,' in which he had, years before, been accustomed to take part. As he was look- ing at it Colonel L. A. who stood at the other end of the room read- ing, his back to Sir L. G., began to hum the air of the song Sir L. G. was looking at (Phantasms, vol. i. p. 234). Here is an apparent case of transference of ideas. But dissect the case and the explanation will not stand*. - How was Colonel L. A. affected ? Not through his normal organs 153 of sense. There must have been some affect on his understanding which caused him to exercise (relatively) unconscious memory : for we must assume he knew beforehand the tune he hummed. So what he did was to take out of his storage of ideas his idea of the particular tune and use it as a present idea that he hummed the tune is but a detail. The afiect on him was from the external in impression on the understanding which caused operation of the understanding in the emergence of the particular idea in the present. Doubtless when Sir L. G. looked at the duet a flood of memory of the past came over him. But Colonel L. A. was affected only by the ' event,' that is, in the same way as Sir L. G. in relation to the tune of the particular piece of music. Why Colonel L. A. was so affected in the particular case that the affection emerged in idea it is unnecessary to enter on. All now wanted is to show there was no direct transference of ideas between the agent and percipient. Or consider the following case : The narrator was at St. M.'s vicarage, Leicester, her two sisters at H., fourteen or fifteen miles from Leicester. ' I had been asleep for some time, and was not consciously dreaming at all. I was awoke instantaneously, not by any sound, but intensely awake, starting up in a panic not of fear, but of horror, knowing that something horrible was close by ... whilst it was there I was very angry with myself for being so absurd ; and I remember wondering whether a young German, who was living there as a pupil, a protege of Chauncey Townsend's, could be mesmerising me.' About the same time her two sisters R. and E. were affected by the same consciousness that something dreadful or harmful was near (Phantasms, vol. i. p. 240). In this case I do not see why we should infer transference of ideas. Chance coincidence may (most improbably) be an explanation. If not, the explanation to our hand is that something external material or spiritual matters not affected all three sisters. And one of them being distant from the other two, the affection cannot have been in human thought : the affection was manifest in the idea of horror relating to something external. The following case, I think, is explicable without inferring tele- pathy. Miss C. E. S. states : ' My brother and I were travelling together from Cologne to Flushing. We were alone in the carriage, when suddenly my brother, who had been half asleep, said to me that he had an odd idea that some one else was in the carriage sitting opposite me. The very same idea had struck me just before he spoke ' (Phantasms, vol. i. p. 239). It seems probable that the time was night or near the fall of night ; that both were half asleep, and that some movement heard by both on the empty seat gave rise to the hallucination. Miss S. says her feet were on the opposite seat where the phantom was suspected, 154 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY and the movement heard by both might have been the result of involuntary action on her part. The next case to be considered appears as near to one of trans- ference of ideas as is possible. Mrs. F. states : ' The other night my husband and I dreamt at the same hour, the same dream a subject on which neither of us had been thinking for months. It was a dream of wandering about our first home, and in it looking at the same spot ' (Journal, vol. ii. p. 179). Mrs. F.'s husband corroborates the account published. But let us see what this case amounts to. Mrs. F. in dreaming was using, in memory, her storage of ideas of past events. She was simply calling up into the present ideas already in her. Her husband was doing exactly the same thing. But he, for his dream, was using his own storage of ideas, just as his wife was using hers. Each used a different storage. We reduce the case, then, to one, not of transference of ideas, but simply of approximately like mental operation. We can well understand that some of the ideas of the past thus called into the present by Mrs. F. were pleasurable to her, while Mr. F.'s ideas (as to the same events) recalled by him were not pleasurable. The ideas recalled by both were as to the same events, but the ideas of the one were not the ideas of the other. This approximately like mental operation was perhaps the result of partial attunement in understanding between husband and wife, who had probably lived together for a long time, during which they had been affected by the same external environments. When we consider experimental cases, that is, cases where those concerned deliberately use telepathy for their own purposes we shall find greater difficulties in our way in explanation. But spontaneous cases, it appears to me, can be more easily dealt with. Consider, for instance, cases like to that of Sir L. G., where one thinks of a tune and thereon another sings or hums it aloud. Now, so far as I know, there is not one established case of this class where the percipient, humming the tune, did not know it beforehand. I cannot find one case even of hypnotism where the hypnotiser, thinking of a tune which the hypnotised does not already know, has succeeded in making the hypnotised hum or sing it. Such a case, I think, is possible, but it would only prove extra- ordinary power on the part of the hypnotiser in directing his patient how to exercise his own understanding. Ordinarily, for success in telepathic communication, the per- cipient must know the tune beforehand it must be part of his storage of ideas of the past. In cases of success, then, there is no transference of ideas. All effected is this : By some affect of the agent on the understanding of the percipient the percipient brings up into his present (from his storage of the past) the particular tune. That this particular tune DEFINITE IDEAS IN THE PERCIPIENT 155 is like to the tune the agent is thinking of must be referred to like mental operation. It may be objected that in the above argument I am but beating the air as I, practically, admit the transference of ideas. But the distinction raised is most important. Kant, for instance, when he uses the term ' object ' is most careful to provide against our falling into the error of imagining it is an objective thing to us. He states, again and again, that we can analyse it as no more than a series of representations. Not only this : he shows that, to us, it is no more than a thing of relation. He gives reality only to the manifold. But certain of his commentators reason as if an object were, to us, a thing-in-itself and so fall into error in treating analysis and synthesis of objects as real, whereby they arrive at the looseness of the manifold or the definition of it as a ' sum of particulars.' They condition the manifold, confusing the manifold itself with the mani- fold in our apprehension. Just as Kant uses the term ' objects ' so we can use the term ' transference of ideas.' But we must always bear in mind that there is no reality in transference of ideas. The real communion between agent and percipient is in intuition between them as intui- tive selves (in telepathy) where this communion is or may be manifest to them as human personalities in (apparent) transference of impressions and ideas (manifestations of telepathy). So though we know there is no real transference of ideas, we can still use the expression ' transference of ideas ' if we keep in mind the fact that it refers only to what is manifest to us as human personalities. RECIPROCAL CASES As to these cases, Edmund Gurney says : ' It will be seen that the number of these reciprocal cases (even with the addition of those in the Supplement) is small so small that the genuineness of the type might fairly enough be called in question. There is some danger that our view of the rarer tele- pathic phenomena may be unduly affected by the sense of certainty that gradually and reasonably forms with regard to the broad fact of telepathy itself. The argument for the reality of telepathy, we must remember, depends on a mass of narratives so large as to make a universal error in the essential point of all, or nearly all, of them exceedingly improbable ; and is not available in respect of peculiar features, which are present in only a very small proportion of the alleged cases. For these, the various possibilities of error so fully discussed in the general sketch of the evidence (vol. i. cap. iv.) may seem quite sufficient to account ; and the greater the theoretic interest of the peculiarities, the more jealously must their evidential claims be scrutinised. As to reciprocality, the reader must form his own opinions. That the examples should be few, as compared with those of the simpler telepathic types, cannot at this stage of our inquiry seem unnatural. For if, amid all the apparent oppor- tunities that human lives present, the unknown and probably transient conditions of telepathic percipience and of telepathic agency only occasionally chance to coincide, so as to produce a telepathic phenomenon at all (pp. 77-8) : and if, of the two, the conditions of percipience are the rarer, as experimental thought- transference would lead us to suppose ; then the complete conditions of a reciprocal case must be rare among the rare ' (Phantasms, vol. ii. p. 167. See, too, p. 303). If we consider these reciprocal cases by the light of the theory propounded, we must expect them to be as they are, in fact, the rare among the rare : all Edmund Gurney's arguments apply directly. The following argument may be added to those adduced by him. For the evidence to be sufficient to establish a reciprocal case the agent must be, what I shall term, a clairvoyant percipient. So, in all reciprocal cases, we must have the unlikely coincidence that telepathy results in an affection of lx>th the agent and per- cipient in idea : we have the evidence of both in support of the 156 RECIPROCAL CASES 157 telepathic phenomenon. And probability is against our having the evidence of both in any particular case. The reported reciprocal cases in Phantasms of the Living are fourteen (see Phantasms, vol. ii. p. 154 et seq., and p. 590 et seq.). I find, also, in the Collective cases, eight numbers 309, 339, 340, 341, 343, 354, 667, 683 which, though not so definite, are, in their nature, reciprocal. That is, twenty-two in all (cf. case 82). Of these I reject two (numbers 642 and 644) as doubtful. I do not reject them as false, but, considering the complexity of the facts, as involving possible error in memory on the part of the percipients. Now there is a common likeness in all these twenty cases which not only in itself increases the weight to be attached to the evidence in support of them as facts, but which is in itself of exceptional interest. I give a very short digest of three of these cases. (303) vol. ii. p. 154 : The percipient, in his drawing-room, saw his grandmother, who embraced him and vanished. The agent (the grandmother) who was at a distance, and in delirium, suddenly put her arms round a lady's neck and then, on opening her eyes and regaining conscious- ness, she said, with a look of surprise, ' Oh, Polly, is it you ? I thought it was somebody else.' (304) vol. ii. p. 156 : The agent was kicked violently in the face by a horse. He was not rendered insensible and, after the kick, stood leaning against the stable wall, when he saw, in idea, the lady he was engaged to. Haunted by the appearance, he went next day to the place where the young lady lived, who said, ' Why, I expected you all yesterday afternoon. I thought I saw you looking so pale and your face all bleeding.' The time she fancied she saw him was the time of the accident. (308) vol. ii. p. 164 : Two young ladies, great friends, but unrelated, who were in a rectory garden, and running down a path which was separated by a hedge from an orchard adjoining, distinctly heard themselves called twice, apparently from the orchard, thus, ' Connie, Margaret Connie, Margaret ! ' They stopped, but could see no one, and so went to the house, a distance of about forty yards, concluding that one of Margaret's brothers had called them from there. But, to their surprise, they found this was not the case. It was found afterwards that a brother of Constance not of Margaret who lay sick five miles off, had, at the time of this hear- ing of the words ' Connie, Margaret,' called to them in delirium, and said, ' Now I see them running along the hedge, but directly I call them they run towards the house.' (See, too, Proceedings, vol. i. pp. 121 and 122 ; vol. x. p. 299.) The common likeness between these three cases that I am about 158 PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY to define is to be found in all the other reciprocal cases, not excepting the two I do not rely on. In all these reciprocal cases, if we take the evidence only of the percipients who were, physically, on the spot, we find ordinary cases of telepathy. But in all there is also corroboration of the evidence of the percipients by the direct evidence of the agents themselves as percipients. But what is the nature of the evidence of the agents ? It is, in all the cases, evidence of telepathy of the type termed clairvoyant or clairaudient. In each case the agent, though at a distance, states that in idea he was there on the spot to accomplish more or less closely that which the percipient, physically on the spot, saw or heard. This ' undesigned ' likeness in the form of corrobora- tion in all the cases is remarkable, and more than one inference can be drawn from it in support of the authenticity of the alleged facts of telepathy. But it affects the present argument mainly in the following way: If we consider ordinary cases of telepathy, there is found strong reasons to believe that we can divide them, qua evidence, into two great classes. In the one class the percipient feels or hears or sees something where he is physically : and in all these cases the per- cipient is affected by impressions or ideas arising from telepathic impressions from some agent at a distance. In the other class the percipient feels or hears or sees something not where he is bodily, but at a distance. These latter cases all involve what is ordinarily termed clair- voyance or clairaudience ; they are all marked by the (apparent) travel of the personality of the percipient to the spot of the psychical phenomenon. If, in these cases, the percipient were physically on the spot, and not merely psychically on the spot, there would be nothing in them of the abnormal. The distinction between these two great classes is merely one of evidence : in the first class we have the evidence of the percipient on the spot : in the second class we have the evidence of the per- cipient who travels psychically to the spot. For in all these cases, as I hereafter argue, there must be psychical travel of the agent. The following is an example of the first class : ' A young girl of ten dreamt that she saw an old friend who had gone away to the city of Mexico. In her dream she saw him sitting in her father's office, and immediately ran up to him, exclaiming, " I 'm so glad you 've come back ! " But he put his hand up, as if to repulse her gently, and said gravely, " You must not come near me. I am dying in Mexico of the sore throat, and I have come to tell your father." This old friend die