IC-NRLF 
 
GIFT OF 
 

 A STUDY 
 
 OF 
 
 Consciousness, Intelligence and Matter 
 
 BY 
 
 IDIR,. GKEO. 
 
 SACRAMENTO: 
 
 PRINTED FOR GEO. PYBURN BY 
 J N. LARKIN & SON 
 

 
 
A STUDY 
 
 OF 
 
 Consciousness, Intelligence and Matter 
 
 BY 
 
 IDIR. GKEJO. 
 
 SACRAMENTO: 
 
 PRINTED FOR GEO. PYBURN BY 
 
 J N. LARKIN & SON 
 
 1901 
 
PROLOG 
 
 The original of this paper was written in 1881, for pub- 
 lication in one of the scientific magazines. By reason of 
 a change of policy abont this time in the conduct of the 
 magazine in question, the paper was laid aside and partly 
 forgotten. On February 13, 1887, it was read in its pres- 
 ent form before the CRITIC CLUB of Sacramento the 
 first essay. 
 
 Quite recently, in reading a critical notice of Prof. 
 Ernst Haeckel's latest work, "THE RIDDLE OF THE 
 UNIVERSE," I was pleased to note the general accordance 
 of the ideas herein set forth concerning the (so to speak) 
 intelligence of* matter with the Jena Professor's idea of a 
 "sole substance;" although it had not occurred to me to 
 label them MONISM. I concluded, however, to publish 
 the essay for the benefit of my philosophic friends, as a 
 fairly comprehensible introduction to one portion of the 
 Monistic philosophy. 
 
 To the members past and present of the CRITIC 
 CLUB, I present this essay, asking them to accept it as a 
 SOUVENIR of the many "feasts of reason" of which we have 
 partaken at our meetings during the past fourteen years. 
 
 G. P. 
 
 Sacramento, February 13, 1901. 
 
A STUDY . 
 
 -OF- 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTELLIGENCE 
 
 HYLAS. * * I see you turn when spoken to, and shrink when burned. 
 Prom such facts, joined with my personal experiences, I infer that you are 
 sensitive (conscious) as I am; and * * I infer that matter is not sensitive 
 (conscious) because it shows no such sign. HERBERT SPENCER. 
 
 It is somewhat difficult to express, in the few words 
 of a title, the scope of an essay of the nature of this, 
 which I have the honor to submit to your consideration 
 and criticism this evening. My object herein is to an- 
 alyze consciousness and intelligence, with a view of 
 discovering their elements, and the extent of their dis- 
 tribution in the universe. Even the word distribution, 
 which is here perforce used, is somewhat apt to mislead; 
 for, whereas it seems to convey an idea of diffusion 
 from a center or point of accumulation, the intent of 
 the word in its present connection is nearly the con- 
 trary, namely: existence outside of or beyond those 
 concentrated and organized beings whose intelligence 
 is evident and acknowledged by all. 
 
 And while I am aware that the conclusions delivered 
 herein are opposed to the commonly accepted teachings, 
 and may possibly, on further consideration, be found 
 fallacious and untenable, I am not thereby deterred 
 from presenting them in their present form; nor do I 
 deem an apology to the philosophic hearer necessary, 
 because I conceive that the consideration and orderly 
 statement of the several facts and inferences involved 
 in the discussion of any subject especially if new 
 including as it does the examination in detail of the 
 related ideas going to make up the several propositions, 
 
4 
 
 and a testing of their congruity or cohesive power, has 
 a value independent of the truth or precision of the 
 conclusions reached meanwhile. For besides the men- 
 tal discipline secured by the discussion, the conclusions 
 reached even though false or inexact furnish new 
 points of departure, or data, on which by comparison 
 with accepted truths to found dissent and corrections. 
 
 Premising that by "consciousness" is meant the sub- 
 jective side of existence, the passive cognition of the 
 objective non-ego, together with the cognition of the 
 reaction thereby excited, our inquiry will be directed 
 mainly to the discovery of the ultimate factor in con- 
 sciousness and its relation to matter. This inquiry 
 will involve an incidental examination of the position 
 assumed by Hylas, viz.: that matter shows no signs of 
 sensitiveness (consciousness). 
 
 Consciousness, evidently, is to the individual the 
 central fact, or more precisely, the sum-total of exist- 
 ence. There can only be present-consciousness; and 
 this consists of the impressions made by outside things 
 at the moment, together with the memories or continu- 
 ance of impressions made heretofore. It is the sum or 
 resultant of all the impressions experienced by its sub- 
 ject up to the present moment. But the question at 
 once suggested is this: Since when? From what epoch 
 are these impressions or experiences to be reckoned? 
 From birth; from conception; from the infancy of the 
 race; from the beginning of organic life on the globe; 
 or from the dim past in the ages behind? And pre- 
 cisely here is the germ of the argument, the inferential 
 statement of the problem. 
 
 Let us leave for a while the subjective side of exist- 
 ence and turn to its objective side. If we examine and 
 analyze any organized being, e. g., a man or plant, we 
 find that the various tissues or organs are composed of 
 the common material of the planet, arranged in such 
 
and such modes, so that the difference between this and 
 that organ, or between this and that body, consists 
 solely in the ratio and mode of arrangement of the va- 
 rious constituent elements. The bulk of the whole is 
 but the sum of the bulk of the atoms and molecules 
 which make up its structure; and the weight of the 
 whole is no more than the sum of the attractions of its 
 constituent atoms for those of the earth. Without the 
 original matter of which they are severally composed, 
 no organized bodies would exist; unless the matter were 
 possessed of extension, resistance, weight, etc., the body 
 which it composes would not have these properties, for 
 the whole is but the sum of all its parts, and anything 
 not found in the parts can never appear in the whole. 
 
 If, further, we examine by the light of scientific con- 
 clusions a living organized being, we shall find that its 
 life objectively considered consists of a more or less 
 coherent and co-ordinated series of movements; and 
 this, whether we consider especially the so-called or- 
 ganic life in animal or plant, or the life of relation in 
 animals, the voluntary life from the pursuit of prey 
 by a hungry carnivore to the singing of an aria or the 
 painting of a picture by cultivated human beings. 
 Moreover, we are driven to the conclusion that these 
 highly complex movements of the whole body are but 
 the resultants of the movements of the various parts, 
 organs, molecules and atoms of which it is made up. 
 Indeed, the physical fact is, to a limited extent, demon- 
 strable: we can see the cyclical movement of the blood, 
 and the motions of the muscular and osseous appara- 
 tus, and feel the motion of the air in the larynx, observe 
 by suitable reflectors the vibrations of the vocal chords, 
 and with the unaided eye, the motions of the tongue 
 and the changing shape of the buccal cavity, which to- 
 gether make up the complex motions performed in sing- 
 ing the Marsellaise, or an Ave Maria. Shall we then stop 
 
abruptly where our eyes cease to be of use? or, in the 
 language of an eminent physicist and philosopher, 
 permit "the vision of the mind to supplement the vision 
 of the eye, and impelled by an intellectual necessity, 
 cross the boundaries of the experimental evidence," 
 and discover in the motion of these parts and organs, 
 which demonstrably go to make up the motion of the 
 whole, the resultant, and only the resultant of the 
 movements of their constituent parts, down even to the 
 ultimate atom? Of a surety, if there were no motion 
 of parts, there could be none of the whole; and the mo- 
 tion of the latter is precisely the sum and resultant of 
 the motion of the former. 
 
 Returning now to the subjective side of existence: if 
 we assert that the same principle which holds good 
 when applied to matter and motion, namely: that the 
 whole of either or both is but the sum of their several 
 parts, and that nothing can exist in the whole which 
 does not exist in the parts, is equally applicable to con- 
 sciousness, shall we strain the analogy? I think not. 
 
 A certain difficulty presents itself in discussing this 
 subject, consequent on the necessity of using words 
 having specific or relatively specific meanings, to indi- 
 cate general or less specific ideas. We find the same 
 difficulty, however, in speaking of vision, audition, in- 
 telligence, aesthetics, etc., in the lower orders of ani- 
 mals. To express even approximately correct ideas in 
 reference to the latter, we are compelled to deanthro- 
 pize words so as to bring them into correspondence 
 with non-anthropoid existences. 
 
 Bearing in mind, then, these considerations, shall we 
 find any good grounds for disputing, that without con- 
 sciousness in the atom, there can be none in the mass; or 
 conversely, that since consciousness organized con- 
 sciousness, if the phrase be permitted is a (subjective) 
 whole, corresponding and belonging to an organized 
 
7 
 
 body, therefore it (the consciousness of a man e. g^) is 
 made up of, and is but, the sum and resultant of the 
 consciousness corresponding and belonging to the con- 
 stituent atoms and molecules of its proper body? If 
 the parts be not conscious, while the whole is, then a 
 new element has been added to, or created by, the com- 
 bination, and the whole is found to be greater than the 
 sum of all its parts. 
 
 If we arrive at the same result by different processes 
 of thought, we feel so much the more convinced of the 
 correctness of our conclusions; let us proceed, there- 
 fore, to inquire into the reasons which lead us to infer 
 the existence of consciousness in our fellows. How do 
 we become convinced of the experience or possession of 
 consciousness by others? It needs no argument to 
 show that the only thing known to any of us is his own 
 consciousness; and yet all of us are fully convinced of 
 the existence of consciousness in others, and of a kind, 
 we conclude, more or less like to our own. Indeed, we 
 govern our intercourse with our fellows on just this 
 presumption. By what process of reasoning do we ar- 
 rive at this conclusion? 
 
 In general terms, we predicate consciousness in man 
 and animals when we see them manifest change of 
 state form, motion, etc. following and presumably 
 consequent on changes in their environment, or on 
 changes in their relations to environment. We tickle 
 them and they laugh, poke them with a stick and they 
 move, threaten them and they flee or fight. In man, 
 possessed as he is with the faculty of speech, moreover j 
 we hear and see him describe his conscious states by 
 symbols such as we have learned to use in describing 
 our own. We see in him, moreover, movements indic- 
 ative of this or that emotion, which being experienced 
 by ourselves would prompt the same or similar move- 
 ments. Thus, by inference, from observing purely ob- 
 
8 
 
 jective phenomena, various in detail but similar in es- 
 sence, we become satisfied that others, like ourselves, 
 are sentient and conscious. 
 
 In accepting this statement, however, we are com- 
 pelled to admit that consciousness is not the exclusive 
 property of any sharply-defined group of existences; 
 but, on the contrary, is as widely diffused as the extent 
 of our observations enables us to judge. Suppose we 
 examine the matter in detail: 
 
 Taking for granted the consciousness of the higher 
 order of animals, let us descend the scale. An earth- 
 worm, if we shake the ground in which it lies, comes 
 out to the light of day; we touch it with a stick, or 
 push it aside with our foot, and it wriggles and attempts 
 to escape. We find no difficulty in conceding to it a 
 certain low kind of consciousness. But if we touch 
 the leaves of a sensitive plant (Mimosa pudica) it 
 folds its pinnae and its branching leaf-stalks and 
 bends down its petiole. If an insect alight on the or- 
 bicular leaves of the sundew (Drosera rotundifolia), or a 
 small fragment of flesh be laid thereon, the leaves close 
 around the intruder, more slowly, it is true, but just 
 as surely as a lurking spider closes on an unlucky fly 
 entangled in his web. The terminal pinnae of the leaf 
 of Venus ' fly trap (Dwntza muscipula) respond to the 
 touch of the fly, just as surely as the maxillipede of a 
 crab or lobster responds to the touch of a stick, or of 
 some more juicy morsel on its serrated edges. 
 
 Are these plants, then, conscious ? No ? Then our 
 method of inferring consciousness, as above set forth, 
 is inaccurate and needs revision. Yes? Then we can- 
 not stop here! All plants turn to the light; in general 
 terms they change their state (position) in response to 
 change in their environments. Climbing plants revolve 
 their apices in search of support, or bend their leaf- 
 stalks and tendrils around it when found. The Des- 
 
*r 
 rxjfc 
 
 I U 
 
 9 
 
 modium gyrans unceasingly fans the air in the sultry 
 heat of an Indian day; the Mimosa (acacias), Clovers, 
 Oxalises, and many other plants, spread out their leaves 
 to the sunshine, and fold them up as darkness super- 
 venes. Calendula, Oxalis, Mesembryanthemum, and a 
 host of well-known flowering plants open their flowers 
 in the light and warmth of the orb of day, and close 
 them up at night or in gloomy weather; and this they 
 do day after day, and night after night, in frequent al- 
 ternation. The so-called infusoria move through the 
 surrounding waters in pursuit of food, avoiding collis- 
 ion with each other, but at the proper time finding their 
 respective foods and sexual mates. Are these various 
 organisms, too, to be considered void of consciousness, 
 or the contrary? 
 
 And when, still descending, we come to the inorganic 
 world, and observe the behavior mark the word of 
 mineral and elementary substances, we shall find no 
 break in the chain of evidence by which alone we have 
 hitherto recognized, or from which alone we have hith- 
 erto inferred consciousness. 
 
 If we take a piece of the metal potassium, and plunge 
 it into a vessel filled with benzine, gasoline, or other 
 like fluid, it will remain quiescent for an indefinite 
 period of time; but change its environment plunge it 
 into a vessel filled with water and its behavior changes 
 instantly. At once the hitherto passive potassium at- 
 tacks the water, appropriates its oxygen and part of its 
 hydrogen, and this with such vehemence of motion as 
 to ignite the escaping portion of hydrogen. Poke po- 
 tassium with a stick of one kind (benzine), and it stirs 
 not; tickle it with a straw (of water), and lo! it turns 
 and laughs. 
 
 A piece of silver, however, may be plunged into water, 
 and it will remain passive, quiet; it will give no sign 
 of consciousness of its surroundings. But plunge it 
 
10 
 
 into nitric acid and see how it responds to the changed 
 environment. Bubbles of nitrogen-oxide gathering at 
 the surface of the liquid and forming an orange-col- 
 ored atmosphere above it, soon show that it is actively 
 engaged in pulling to pieces the nitric acid in order to 
 satisfy its affinity (liking) for oxygen. 
 
 Shall I strain your logic if I ask you to admit that 
 these two examples which might be added to indefi- 
 nitely show a power in the metals named to distin- 
 guish between benzine and water, and between water 
 and nitric acid, respectively? Is it needful to insist 
 that a necessary correlative to the power of distinguish- 
 ing is consciousness? There must surely be cognition 
 of at least one of the things distinguished. 
 
 It may be well here to point out the manifest differ- 
 ences in kind and degree of sensitiveness shown by 
 different things and beings, as going to explain why 
 the same impinging object stimulus does not evoke 
 consciousness and responsive motions in all alike. 
 These differences depend, doubtless, on complexity of 
 aggregation, combination, or organization in the sub- 
 ject considered. Plants and animals take cognizance 
 of light, warmth, food ; the savage, in common with 
 animals, includes in his cognitions relations of sex and 
 paternity, friends and enemies, sounds, the fitness of 
 weapons, etc. The more cultivated groups of men, in 
 addition to these, are sensitive to harmonies of sound 
 and color, beauty of form and motion, the involved re- 
 lations of numbers, magnitudes, sentiments and laws, 
 the reactions of the various parts of the cosmos on each 
 other, and the like. Minerals take cognizance only of 
 things closely related to them by affinity (whatever 
 that may be) and close proximity. Even among men 
 of the same race, and living in society together, we see 
 individuals who are utterly unconscious of qualities 
 and entities which are vividly perceived by others; and 
 
II 
 
 this state of affairs, in the light of the considerations 
 just set forth, is easily explicable; but on any other 
 theory its explanation is beset with insuperable diffi- 
 culties. 
 
 If we pause here to inquire how intelligence is re- 
 lated to simple consciousness, we shall find that the 
 former is founded on the latter. Those who are born 
 blind, or deaf, can never other things being equal be 
 as intelligent as those who are furnished with their full 
 complement of sense-organs. They have fewer points 
 of contact with their environments, and are less sensi- 
 tive to certain impacts and certain qualities or motions 
 of the non-ego. This proposition is by implicatidn ad- 
 mitted when we express surprise at even the mediocre 
 attainments in the arts, or in the acquisition of knowl- 
 edge under systematic instruction by those born blind 
 or deaf. When we speak of an intelligent man or 
 woman, we mean one who has knowledge of things; 
 that is, one who has cognized and is conscious of their 
 qualities and relations among themselves and to him- 
 self; and who, in addition, has the power of so modify- 
 ing his own movements under changing circumstances 
 and relations as to enjoy a continuance of pleasurable 
 consciousness therefrom; one who is able to adapt him- 
 self to the requirements of the moment, and to do what 
 is fit under changing and enlarged conditions. But 
 this reduced to the lowest terms is cognition of the 
 diverse and complicated motions outside, and ability to 
 find the resultant of these and his own proper motion. 
 And the greater the knowledge that is, the broader 
 the area, and the deeper the stream of consciousness, 
 and the greater the power of adaptation the greater 
 the intelligence. 
 
 Now if we attempt to account for the existence of intel- 
 ligence in the higher order of beings and man, we can 
 not do so, satisfactorily, on any other theory than this, 
 
12 
 
 namely: that matter throughout the cosmos possesses, 
 even in its ultimate atoms, the essential element of con- 
 sciousnes and intelligence, which is this: cognition of 
 impact of the non-ego, and the tendency on impact to change 
 of motion in the path or line of least resistance; in other 
 words : cognition of impact of the non-ego, and the tendency 
 to adopt the motion of the impinging body (atom, molecule, 
 etc.) to the extent of its relative quantity and quality. And 
 the more carefully we consider this proposition, the more 
 clearly shall we find it to formulate a definition of intelli- 
 gence; knowledge of the environment and conscious or- 
 dering of the life motions to fit; inherent power of 
 adaptation. 
 
 That such a universality of this sensitiveness to change 
 of environment is found in nature, we 1 have learned 
 in our previous studies herein; and although the differ- 
 ences in degree are great in the various orders of things, 
 e. g., in minerals to chemical qualities, in plants to sun- 
 shine, the touch of insects, supporting bodies and the 
 like, in man, extending to those relations we call intel- 
 lectual, emotional, social and ethical; nevertheless, the 
 difference between the range of the savage and that of 
 highly cultivated man is scarcely greater than that be- 
 tween the savage and some of the lower animals, or than 
 that between these latter and the conspicuously sensitive 
 plants. Indeed, this power of adaptive modification 
 throughout organic nature, having for its basis conscious- 
 ness of impact of surrounding existences, appears to be 
 the fundamental source of EVOLUTION; and here we per- 
 ceive no breach of continuity, no beginning, no end. 
 
 There are but two theories by which to explain the ex- 
 istence and manifestation of intelligence seen throughout 
 nature: either the intelligence is outside of a purely pas- 
 sive and plastic material, which receives the impress and 
 motions of the external force; or, in the classic words of 
 Tyndal, "in matter * * (is) the promise and potency 
 
of all terrestrial life" including, of course, its intelli- 
 gence. 
 
 Shall we, then, say that matter is intelligent? I see no 
 way of escape from this conclusion, startling as the as- 
 sertion may appear. If we duly estimate the value of the 
 facts here passed in review, and bear in mind the consid- 
 erations previously set forth, relative to the difficulties 
 encountered in the use of words in new connections, we 
 must at least find the raw material of intelligence in the 
 raw material of living beings matter. 
 
 With this view of things, we need not trouble ourselves 
 to search for the "beginnings of life" the time and place 
 when and where "dead matter" became organic and "liv- 
 ing." The beginnings of life are in the "stuff" of which 
 things consist. 
 
 However, not to leave the question without considering 
 possible objections, let us proceed to review some of these. 
 During sleep, consciousness is said to be abolished; our 
 first impressions on awaking connect themselves with 
 those last experienced before falling asleep; and were it 
 not for the different condition of surrounding things, e.g. 
 the clock-hands, the sun's altitude, the activity of our fel- 
 lows, joined to certain internal feelings of rest, hunger, 
 etc., which have supervened, we should not know that 
 any interval had elapsed. The same condition, in a 
 greater or less degree, obtains in the unconsciousness 
 and delirium of coma and fever, of alcoholic and other in- 
 toxications, of syncope and epileptic paroxysms, somnam- 
 bulistic and cataleptic states, and as caused by blows and 
 other injuries to the encephalon. At first blush it would 
 appear that the proper inference to be drawn from these 
 facts is this, namely: that consciousness is an accompa- 
 niment only of cerebral activity, and that, therefore, it 
 must be denied of those organisms which are not pro- 
 vided with cephalic ganglia, and a fortiori of those 
 
14 
 
 which are entirely devoid of a nervous apparatus, and of 
 plants and minerals. 
 
 But a critical examination of the case in the light of 
 the philosophy of consciousness will, I think, show that 
 this inference is false, and that, so far from consciousness 
 per se being absent in any of the cases adduced, it is only 
 the co-ordinated consciousness of the complete organism 
 which is thus temporarily abolished. 
 
 Examine first the case of sleep: This we know is fre- 
 quently accompanied by dreaming which may be seen 
 by observing the subject during its continuance and yet 
 the dreams may not be remembered on awaking, and the 
 answer to an inquiry, "Did you dream?" will be u No, I 
 remember nothing since falling asleep." Conversation 
 may, in many instances, be carried on with sleepers, who, 
 on awaking, will tell you that they have not dreamed, 
 and they retain no memory of anything done or said. In 
 addition to this, we have evidence that during sleep the 
 subject is conscious of pressure, change of temperature, 
 etc., for he will turn for change of position and cover up 
 with the bed-clothes. Similarly, in the other abnormal 
 - conditions mentioned, as sleep-walking, catalepsy, etc., 
 evidences are not wanting of sensitiveness to external in- 
 fluences and objects, and of quasi-intelligent conduct in 
 relation thereto. 
 
 In like manner, during the delirium of coma and fever, 
 while the patient on recovery will tell you that the last 
 thing remembered is this or that occurrence previous to 
 the delirium, and that he is ignorant of the length of 
 time which has passed since, the attendants know that 
 meanwhile he has given evidences of consciousness (and 
 intelligence) in numerous instances, replied to questions, 
 obeyed orders, eaten food and swallowed drink. For 
 reasons, however, to be afterward discussed, the two sets 
 of experience, namely: that during the normal state, and 
 this during the delirium, etc., are in no way connected, 
 
j 5*... .-....:: t.*rt :::.>. 
 
 and hence are not recalled by association ; they are not 
 related nor continuous, and hence do not suggest each 
 other. 
 
 On this subject, the remarks of Herbert Spencer, in his 
 chapter on ^Estho-physiology (Prin. of Psych., Vol. I, p. 
 105, Am. Ed.), are to the point: "For the recognition of 
 a sensation as such, or such, necesitates the bringing of 
 it into relation with the continuous series of sentient 
 states, from some of which, simultaneously experienced, 
 it is dissociated by perceived unlikeness, and with others 
 of which, previously experienced, it is associated by per- 
 ceived likeness; and the implied comparisons of sentient 
 states are impossible unless the correlative nervous 
 changes are put in connection at one place. It does not 
 follow, as at first seems, that feelings are never located in 
 the inferior nerve-centers. On the contrary, it may well 
 be that in lower types the homologues of these inferior 
 centers are the seats of consciousness." Thus far Spencer. 
 
 It may be, and I think it likely, that in the same man- 
 ner as we of the present day, with our extensive and rel- 
 atively complex knowledge, are quite unable to realize 
 the thoughts and feelings of savages or children in view 
 of this or that phenomenon to us easily explicable be- 
 cause already classified and correlated so the extensive, 
 heterogeneous and complete consciousness of the enceph- 
 alon is unable to realize the less complete and frag- 
 mentary consciousness experienced by the lower nerve- 
 centers and is unable to unify them with the series with 
 which memory backs up those of the present moment. 
 
 In this manner only can be explained the fact of the 
 oblivion in which the feelings and experiences of very 
 early childhood are buried; they are so utterly incongru- 
 ous with those of the present time as to be so to speak 
 incommensurable. 
 
 This subject is so replete with interest, and so many 
 instances might be cited from the annals of mental path- 
 
i6 
 
 ology and psychology corroborative of the views here set 
 forth, that one is loth to close its presentation in such 
 short order, but the limits of time prescribed by the oc- 
 casion have already been overpassed; I shall, therefore, 
 close here, and submit the question to your consideration 
 and discussion. 
 

 
 
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