OGIC AND ARGUMENT THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES PROFESSOR JOHN ELOF BOODIN MEMORIAL PHILOSOPHY COLLECTION LOGIC AND ARGUMENT LOGIC AND ARGUMENT BY JAMES H. HYSLOP CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS NEW YORK 1899 COPYRIGHT, 1899, BY CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS TROW DIRECTORY NEW YORK PREFACE THIS work has been written to supply a double want, namely, the combination of a purely ele- mentary logic with the art of argumentative dis- course. Nor has this last feature of the subject been added out of deference to a revival of an in- tellectual interest in collegiate debate, but it has been suggested both by the practical value of logic as mental discipline and its close connection with the proper and orderly discussion of all sub- jects in which educated men are expected to en- gage. Logic as a practical art may be made quite free from discussion of the theory of knowledge ; and thus free from philosophic problems, may be made most serviceable in the field of clear and systematic thinking wherever a man is called upon to form and express his opinions. The author has long felt that formal and applied logic of the ele- mentary kind can be taught as well in the earlier as in the later part of a collegiate course, so that the student can receive the benefit of it throughout his whole academic career. It is especially a sub- ject which ought to follow closely upon mathe- matics. The value of this latter science lies in the habit of reasoning which it fosters, but it labors under one grave fault, if it is not supple- 1C9&595 vi PREFACE mented by a knowledge of practical logic on other data, and this is the encouragement which it may unconsciously offer to over-confidence in the legitimacy of our reasoning in subjects where our propositions do not resemble those in mathema- tics. Mathematics is the most important science in which to begin our discipline in reasoning, because we are not complicated with all those modifications of meaning which the subjects of distribution and equivocation introduce into the process in other sciences. But it ought to be fol- lowed closely by logic in a long and careful appli- cation to practical examples that may contribute to general knowledge while they also effect men- tal discipline. Fora somewhat similar reason I have connected it with one department of rhetoric, but only that which is concerned with the treatment of argu- ments. But I have not more than merely outlined this aspect of the subject, leaving to the instructor the development both of detailed rules and of practical work in themes. The outline and dis- cussion of any thesis often depends upon a variety of circumstances for which only the most general rules can be given, and hence I have endeavored only to assist the teacher in saving time by giv- ing the student the general principles in order to limit the amount of lecturing and dictation. The practical exercises will afford all the opportunity necessary for the special elucidation of principles. The work has also been written so that the part devoted to rhetoric can easily be omitted and the PREFACE vii remainder used for purely elementary logic. The treatment of induction has been made very brief, as not being adapted to as easy mastery as de- ductive logic. But I have carefully outlined the subject of fallacies and methods of argumenta- tion. It is hoped that the work may encourage an earlier study of logic than prevails in many in- stitutions. JAMES H. HYSLOP. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, May 22, 1899. CONTENTS CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. I. NATURE OF THE SUBJECT : Definition of Logic Defini- tion of Rhetoric. II. SCOPE OF LOGIC : Meaning of Law Meaning of Thought Prelogical Processes The Logical Processes. III. SCOPE OF DISCOURSE : Divisions of Idea Expression The Functions of Discourse Explanation Con- firmation. IV. SUMMARY, .... Pages 1-17 CHAPTER II. CLASSIFICATION OF TERMS OR CONCEPTS. I. DEFINITION OF TERMS. II. DIVISION OF TERMS: Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms Singular and General Terms Collective and Distributive Terms Concrete and Abstract Terms Positive and Negative Terms Absolute and Relative Terms, ..... Pages 18-30 CHAPTER III. THE CONTENT OF TERMS. I. INTRODUCTION. II. EXPLANATION OF THE PREDI CABLES : Extension Intension. III. ANALYSIS OF CON- CEPTS: Definition Division Partition, . Pages 31-52 X CONTENTS CHAPTER IV. EXPLANATORY DISCOURSE. I. INTRODUCTION. II. ANALYSIS OF THEMES: Applica- tion and Use of Definition The Application and Use of Di- vision The Application and Use of Partition Methods of Applying Analysis. III. SYNTHESIS OR COMPOSITION : Laws of Composition or Synthesis Forms of Composition. IV. CONCLUSION Pages 53-71 CHAPTER V. PROPOSITIONS. I. DEFINITION. II. DIVISIONS: Univocal Propositions Equivocal Propositions. III. DISTRIBUTION OF TERMS, Pages 72-92 CHAPTER VI. OPPOSITION. I. MEANING OF OPPOSITION. II. LAWS OF OPPOSITION. III. SPECIAL CASES. IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF OP- POSITION, . . . . . . Pages 93-102 CHAPTER VII. IMMEDIATE INFERENCE. I. DEFINITION. II. DIVISIONS: Conversion Obversion, Contraversion or Contraposition Inversion Contribution Antithesis, ...... Pages 103-117 CONTENTS XI CHAPTER VIII. MEDIATE REASONING. I. DEFINITION. II. DIVISIONS. III. ELEMENTS OF THE SYLLOGISM. IV. RULES FOR THE SYLLOGISM : Rules Affect- ing the Subject-Matter of the Syllogism Rules Affecting the Quantity and Quality of Propositions. V. MOODS OF THE SYLLOGISM. VI. FIGURES OF THE SYLLOGISM. VII. REDUC- TION OF MOODS AND FIGURES. VIII. PRACTICAL IMPOR- TANCE OF THE FIGURES, . . . Pages 118-130 CHAPTER IX. SIMPLE AND COMPLEX FORMS OF CATEGORI- CAL REASONING. I. CLASSIFICATION OF FORMS. II. EXPOSITION : Prosyl- logism and Episyllogism Enthymeme Epicheirema Sorites, Pages 131-137 CHAPTER X. HYPOTHETICAL REASONING. I. NATURE AND DIVISIONS. II. SIMPLE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. III. DILEMMATIC REASONING. IV. REDUC- TION OF HYPOTHETICAL TO CATEGORICAL REASONING, Pages 138-148 CHAPTER XI. DISJUNCTIVE REASONING. I. NATURE OF DISJUNCTIVE REASONING. II. FORMS OF DISJUNCTIVE REASONING. III. REDUCTION OF DISJUNC- TIVE SYLLOGISMS, Pages 149-154 XJi CONTENTS CHAPTER XII. FALLACIES. I. DEFINITION AND DIVISIONS. II. FORMAL FALLACIES : Illicit Process of the Middle Term Illicit Process of the Ma- jor Term Illicit Process of the Minor Term Illicit Process with Negative Premises Illicit Process with Mixed Premises and Conclusions. III. MATERIAL FALLACIES : Fallacies of Equivocation Fallacies of Presumption. IV. GENERAL OB- SERVATIONS, Pages 155-184 CHAPTER XIII. INDUCTIVE REASONING. I. GENERAL NATURE OF INDUCTIVE REASONING : Perfect Induction Imperfect Induction Definition of Inductive Rea- soning. II. FORMAL PROCESS IN INDUCTION. III. IN- DUCTIVE FALLACIES, .... Pages 185-191 CHAPTER XIV. PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION. I. INTRODUCTION: Nature of Proof Kinds of Proof. II. PROCESS OF PROOF OR ARGUMENT: Definition Analysis- Probation. III. CLASSIFICATION AND ARRANGEMENT OF ARGUMENTS: Forms of Argument Arrangement of Argu- ments, ....... Pages 192-214 QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES, . . Page 215 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT LOGIC AND ARGUMENT CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION I. NATURE OF THE SUBJECT. Two sci- ences or arts, as the case may be, are represented in the title to this book. They are Logic and Rhetoric. But the whole province of both of them will not be comprised in this one treatise. Only those portions of their territory which are closely allied will be comprehended in the plan before us, which will be to combine the principles of correct reasoning with those of systematic and orderly discourse. The more scientific portion of Logic and the more literary aspect of Rhetoric will be omitted, while we unite the practical func- tions of the former with the systematic principles of the latter. Discourse will thus get its treat- ment from a point of view which involves both a method of logical reasoning and a systematic form of constructing the material of thought, while the scientific object of the one and the aesthetic object of the other give way to the one purpose of teaching the student to logically sys- 2 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT tematize the knowledge which he acquires. In or- der to show the relation of the two subjects to each other and the mode of their present com- binations, a careful definition and explanation of their contents is necessary. ist. Definition of Logic. Logic may be treated either as a science or an art, or both. As a science it seeks to determine what are called the laws of thought, which is represented in the three processes of conception, judgment, and reasoning. As an art it applies these laws or rules to every-day thought. Thus a science teaches us to know, and art to do. But the distinction does not require to be urged for present purposes. The object here is to se- lect just those parts of both aspects that are suit- able to systematic and logical discourse, as dis- tinct from mere description, on the one hand, and pure science on the other. Consequently we may speak and think of logic from its practical side, or so much of it as pertains to orderly methods of statement and argument. Logic for this purpose will consist of the rules that regulate correct thinking and systematic presentation of ideas, more especially in the form of argument. As a whole it has two objects to fulfil : (i) To deter- mine the general laws of thought which are called the formal principles of thinking, and (2) To ex- plain the conditions under which these laws are to be applied and to be modified by the irregularities of language and common speech. The first object considers logic as a pure science, the second as an applied science or art. Only the latter aspect will enter into the purpose of the present treatise. INTRODUCTION 3 2d. Definition of Rhetoric Rhetoric may also be considered as either or both a science and an art. Like logic, it has to do with the form of dis- course or the presentation of ideas. But it in- cludes some things not considered by logic and omits some things included in logic. In both cases, however, it has a different object. It is not directly concerned with the rules of reasoning, nor with the truth of propositions and discourse, but with their form of expression. It is, there- fore, the science and art of the aesthetic and correct expression of ideas. Consequently it will include descriptive and narrative methods not found in logic while it insists upon beauty of form, and omits investigation of the laws of reasoning, while it insists upon orderly construction of ideas in ac- cordance with the principles of logical discourse. There are also then two aspects to rhetoric : (i) Beauty of form and expression, and (2) Systematic and orderly expression with a view to efficiency in imparting ideas. The former is the literary and aesthetic aspect, and the latter the discursive and persuasive function of the subject. But it is only the latter aspect that will enter into the present book, and only so much of it as directly relates to logical method. II. SCOPE OF LOGIC. In common usage logic is understood to treat of reasoning alone and its laws. But it has a wider field. The laws of thought apply to much more than reasoning, but only because " thought " is more than inference. It treats of all the complex processes of knowledge as distinct from the simple and elementary func- 4 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT tions of the mind, and in addition lays special em- phasis upon the rules which determine the dis- tinction between true and false thinking rather than upon the causes of mental phenomena. It omits the consideration of all elementary data of knowledge, such as sensation, perception, associa- tion, memory, and the mental states connected with art and ethics, the emotions, desires, and voli- tions, and confines attention to the three functions which constitute "thought;" namely, (i) The laws of Conception ; (2) The laws of Judgment, and (3) The laws of Inference. Each of these will come up for study in the proper place. At present we must ascertain more definitely what is meant by " laws of thought." ist. Meaning of Law. The term "law" has three meanings, one in politics and ethics, and two in science. They are (i) A command or pro- hibition, an injunction either by government or by conscience to do or not to do ; (2) The uniformity of events, or the fixed regularity with which events occur under conditions determining them ; and (3) A rule which serves as a criterion of what is true or false. This is sometimes called a princi- ple, and is distinguished from a cause in the or- dinary sense of that term. With the first of these senses logic has nothing to do. It concerns only the other two with special reference to the third inasmuch as it is mainly occupied with the means of distinguishing between truth and error, so far as conception, judgment, and reasoning are connected with them. In science "law" is either a name for mere uniformity of events beyond our INTRODUCTION 5 ability to modify them, or it is a name for a prin- ciple or rule of our own action in which we en- deavor to shape our thinking, feeling, and willing to the conditions of things outside of us as well as in the mind. Logic thus tries to find the uni- formities of mental operations and to put us in the way of conforming to them correctly, or ap- plying them so that illusion and error in knowl- edge and belief may not occur. In the present treatise, however, we shall not occupy ourselves with the determination of these laws as mere uni- formities of events, but as rules to be kept in mind when engaged in discourse or argument, and hence as helps to systematic and clear think- ing. For this purpose we do not require to study the most general " laws " of thought, but only those minor and subordinate rules connected with the use of conceptions, judgments, and reasoning, and which may be understood without a profound acquaintance with our subject. 2d. Meaning of Thought. This term has more than one meaning, only one of which is of in- terest in logical discourse. We may enumerate four of its meanings : (i) Consciousness, (2) Med- itation, (3) Comparison, (4) Reasoning. The first means merely " to have in mind," and involves no special laws of importance in logic. The second denotes reflection, or holding the attention upon some object of consciousness. The third and fourth usually imply this reflection, but denote more at the same time. They do not, however, represent the most comprehensive idea of the term which combines them and which may be 6 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT called synthesis. Thought or synthesis, as a log- ical process, may be defined as the mental act which compares, combines, and unifies experience so as to produce clear knowledge. This idea in- cludes more than mere inference, and so compre- hends all the processes that are connected with the formation of complex as distinct from simple ideas. Consequently in logic it is a term that comprehends all the mental actions connected with conception, judgment, and reasoning. These are occupied with complex ideas. The earlier and prelogical processes are connected with simple ideas, as they are often called : the mental states which do not compare, discriminate, or unite ex- periences to form thought wholes. Both classes of mental action may come in for brief consideration. 1. Prelogical Processes. These are : (i) Sen- sation, the definite states of consciousness effected by the mind's reaction upon stimulus from the ex- ternal world ; (2) Apprehension or Perception, the act of being aware of a fact that it is, not neces- sarily what it is ; (3) Memory, involving the reten- tion, reproduction, or association and the recogni- tion of past experiences. These are all elementary acts of the mind, not involving comparison or unification of any kind. They represent simple states of consciousness and simple subject-matter. They are the material or the occasion for calling into action the higher exercise of the understand- ing, but they are not themselves logical processes in the technical sense of the term. 2. The Logical Processes These are one and all acts of the mind which conceive a connection INTRODUCTION 7 between facts, or involve synthesis. They repre- sent the mind as holding two or more objects of consciousness before it and affirming or denying some sort of connection or relation between them. When I see or think of an object I conceive it per- haps as a group of attributes or as belonging to a class. In one case I perceive it, in the other I ap- perceive it ; the former denoting the process of bringing the properties to inhere in the same sub- ject and the other the process of seeing what a thing is. In both I compare and unify experiences or things. Also when I reason. In all I am dis- covering relations in a series or multiple of facts that make them some kind of definite whole. This may be made clearer by considering the three pro- cesses with which logic is concerned Conception, Judgment, and Reasoning. (a) Conception. Conception is the act of mind which in some way unites facts or experiences to form definite ideas. The product may be called a concept. This is of two kinds: (i) Individual wholes and (2) class wholes. The former may also be called attribute or substance wholes, and the latter general concepts. But the individual whole is found by conceiving a group of attributes as belonging to the same thing or subject. It is illustrated most clearly by a proper noun, such as " Plato," " Bucephalus," etc. A general term will also represent such a group of attributes, usually if not always, but it also stands for more than this at the same time. A class whole represents a group of individuals, thought together and de- noted by the same term on the ground of common 8 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT attributes. Thus "man," "quadruped," "tree," "animal, "are concepts that denote an indefinite number of individuals of like kind and applicable equally to each individual in the class. They are names for objects grouped together distributively, as it is called, and not collectively, by an act of comparison and abstraction. The common prop- erties are noted and the differences are ignored. But in both kinds of concepts an act of synthesis takes place. In individual or attribute wholes the synthesis is of different attributes or qualities in the same thing or subject, and in class wholes or gen- eral concepts the synthesis is of the same or like qualities in different things or individual subjects. The same distinction can be expressed in another way. The former may be considered a group of different attributes in the same subject or indi- vidual, and the latter a group of different indi- viduals or subjects with similar attributes, only the common qualities being considered, while the differences are neglected. The acts of mind in each case are both unifying acts, involving a judg- ment of connection, though they differ in respect of the object-matter about which they are em- ployed. Both seize upon the constant facts or groups of facts and qualities for the purpose of giving them a name which may always denote them and be their logical equivalent in discourse. All conceptions whatsoever may fall under one or the other of these forms. No exception is pos- sible until a subject is found with only one prop- erty, and this could still be called an individual whole, though we should not speak of a synthesis INTRODUCTION 9 of different qualities, but merely the idea of a single quality in a subject. (b) Judgment. Judgment is the act of mind which perceives and asserts a relation between things. It may be a relation of identity or differ- ence, of agreement or disagreement, an affirmative or a negative relation. The term is also used to denote a proposition which is in reality the prod- uct of the act. But here the emphasis is upon the mental act which connects affirmatively or negatively objects of consciousness. These ob- jects will be attributes and subjects. The relations will be between attributes and attributes, subjects and attributes, and subjects and subjects. Thus I may affirm or deny a connection between various attributes, or between various subjects and attrib- utes, or between various subjects. For instance, " White is not blue," " Plato is wise," " Men are bipeds," or "Lincoln was not Socrates." The act of judgment involves a connection or exclusion which cannot always be expressed by a single term or concept, and hence is often defined as the asser- tion of agreement or disagreement between con- cepts. For practical purposes this definition can be accepted, though the more technical account of it may be considered in order to evade objections based upon the desire for theoretical completeness and accuracy. The fact that most judgments in discourse are judgments of relation between in- dividual and general concepts, as defined techni- cally, may justify the reference to them in that form as typical of practical usage, and we may either stretch the term "concept " to include in- I0 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT dividual attributes as such, or permit the action of judgment to relate or connect properties that are sometimes called percepts or individual ob- jects of apprehension in distinction from individ- ual and class wholes. But aside from the question of its subject-matter the judgment is still a unify- ing act or assertion of relation of some kind. It represents consciousness as looking at two facts or things at the same time, and pronouncing upon this agreement or disagreement, likeness or un- likeness, connection or disconnection with each other. (c) Reasoning. This process is simply a little more complex in its object-matter than conception and judgment. It is still an act of discovering or asserting relations, but most usually between judgments, though it may be involved in the for- mation of concepts themselves. In usual discourse, however, it is the movement of the mind from one proposition to another in which the act discovers and asserts, and agreement or disagreement be- tween relations noticed in judgments. Thus if I know that metals have a metallic lustre and am told that sodium is a metal, I am likely to infer that sodium has a metallic lustre, though I have not seen the fact. I expect to find this fact to be true on the fact that the asserted connection be- tween sodium and metals, on the one hand, and metals and lustre on the other, is true. The in- ference or reasoning is the transition to connec- tions that are not suggested by a single proposition in this case, though in one kind of reasoning a new order of connection may come out of even a INTRODUCTION 1 1 single statement. But in all cases the same act of noting identity and difference, agreement and dis- agreement as in judgment, characterizes reason- ing, only the matter is more complex than in the other two logical processes. It is a process which usually or always affects the degree of certitude or probability in regard to propositions which may not carry with them satisfactory conviction until this relation is seen. Consequently it becomes a means of proof and discovery, if not of new mat- ter of knowledge, then of new relations between known facts. Logic will then have to do with the laws that regulate the formation and correct use of concep- tions, propositions, and reasonings, the processes involved in the comparison and unification of ideas. Its main object is to establish conviction when it is employed as an art, and to formulate laws for correct thinking when it is a science. Its scope, however, covers all the acts of mind comparing and connecting phenomena for the sake of know- ing their relations as subject to constancy and proof. III. SCOPE OF DISCOURSE The general meaning of thought expression, as comprehending every kind of presentation of ideas, has already been mentioned, and also the aspect of it which will come under notice here. We found it to rep- resent both aesthetic and systematic form, and stated that only the latter feature would be in- cluded in the present treatise, as the field for the application of logical as distinct from literary or rhetorical method proper. That is to say, we 12 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT intend here to examine the principles which regu- late the systematic construction of discourse as distinct from elegance of expression or of forms designed merely to please the feelings of taste. But it will conduce to a better understanding of our purpose if we briefly sketch the whole field of idea expression comprising the literary, historical, scientific, and philosophic modes of thought. We can then clearly observe the limited conception to be taken of discourse for our purposes. ist. Divisions of Idea Expression. The expres- sion of ideas divides itself into two general forms, namely : Poetry and Prose. This distinction is based merely upon the mode of literary and grammatical construction. Both are governed by the two functions of rhetoric, aesthetic principles designed to please the feelings, and systematic principles to influence the intellect. Each divi- sion, however, can be further sub-divided : Poetry into Didactic, Lyric, Epic, and Dramatic, and Prose into the Literary or Polite, and the Explana- tory. The Literary or Polite Prose may be divided into Oratory, Essay, and Fiction, and the Explana- tory into History, Science, and Philosophy. The tabular outline below gives a bird's-eye view of this field. f Didactic. f Poetry J >T ic - Epic. [ Dramatic. Thought Products . . . { ( Oratory. f Literary . . . . -^ Essay. Prose.. \ \ ?*tion. f History. (. Explanatory. \ Science. t Philosophy. INTRODUCTION 13 Now the conception of Discourse as it is here to be cultivated will cover the whole field of Prose where the rules for systematic construction of thought are the same for the literary as for the explanatory forms of expression ; but special reference will be made to the explanatory branches of idea expression. Perhaps even the same prin- ciples are applicable to Poetry, as I think they are , but as we are not considering either the special principles that distinguish poetry as such, nor the aesthetic object of all expression we may limit the idea of Discourse or systematic construction to Prose, and thus keep in view the logical side of the subject. Hence we shall speak of Discourse as the systematic expression of thought, and illus- trate it exclusively for the field of prose, ignoring that aspect of rhetoric which has aesthetic expres- sion for its object. 2d. The Functions of Discourse. Discourse, like logic, has an object. This object is to discuss and present a theme. The theme is some subject of thought, and may be either an idea or a truth, a single object of thought requiring analysis and exposition, or a proposition requiring demonstra- tion. The object to be served by discourse will thus have a range limited by the nature of the theme. The range will be less in the case of an idea than in that of a truth, while the latter will include one additional function and all that is required by the former. An idea or single con- ception requiring explanation and analysis will be any individual or class whole, such as "metals," "cathedral," "architecture," " art," " science," 14 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT " Greece," " Plato," " British Museum," " The Papacy." All of these are objects to be described and explained, and not to be proved. But the second class of conceptions either imply judg- ments or state them, and in addition to explana- tion require proof. They are concerned with the establishment of the truth, or reality of an idea or proposition. The former concerns only what it is, or its nature as an admitted or conceivable fact ; the latter concerns the truth of some law, fact, or principle embodied in judgments. The proposi- tion may not always be expressed formally. It may only be implied, even in a single term, as in titles, headlines, etc. But a theme is subject only to explanation when it is merely a conception, in- dividual or general, and becomes subject to proof in addition to explanation only when it expresses or implies a proposition to be affirmed or denied. Such are " protection," " free trade," " Malthus law of population," " patent laws," "single tax," "punishment," "private property," "the impor- tance of the family," " the necessity of quarantine," "the existence of God," "immortality," "the freedom of the will," etc. In propositions these conceptions take the form, " protection is inde- fensible," or " protection is necessary," " God exists," " the will is free," etc. In them we have judgments whose terms are to be explained, and whose assertions are to be proved or dis- proved, while in individual conceptions the proc- ess stops with exposition. The whole process of discourse, however, of logical discourse, as here defined, consists of two fundamental forms INTRODUCTION 1 5 of method with their subordinate divisions. They are Explanation and Confirmation. Each of these can only be briefly outlined at this stage of the work. ist. Explanation. The explanation of a theme is the exposition of the characteristics or facts which constitute the object of thought. It states what a thing is and shows all the qualities or events which it represents, and involves two gen- eral processes. They are Analysis and Synthesis. Each is the complement of the other, and both processes are necessary to complete the process of explanation. (a) Analysis. The analysis of a theme is the separation of a conception or whole of thought into its constituent parts, qualities or relations, in order to find all that it means or implies. It is a process that discriminates between the essential and non-essential attributes expressed by a thing. Its object is to render clear the parts that make up a whole. Three processes are involved in it. They are Definition, Division, and Partition. The discussion of them will come up in the proper place. (If) Synthesis. Synthesis is a constructive proc- ess, and consists in the systematic arrangement of the parts of a whole in order to give a clear and complete conception of it as a whole. As analysis shows only the parts that constitute a thing, synthesis shows the manner in which those parts constitute an orderly whole. Synthesis ex- hibits a coherent totality, a finished product, and analysis the raw material out of which it is com- !6 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT posed. There are two forms of synthesis, ac- cording as the theme or object of thought repre- sents a space whole, or a time whole. They are Description and Narration. Both are processes of systematization, and aim to give an orderly ac- count of the qualities or facts expressed or im- plied by a theme. They will be further discussed at another time. Possibly Exposition might be added as a third form of synthesis, for what may be called thought wholes. ad. Confirmation. Confirmation is proof, a process of establishing conviction. The previous processes only show what a conception means, or what a thing is : they do not determine conviction. They impart instruction as to facts and form ideas of real or possible things, but they do not aim to dissolve doubts, to decide beliefs, to fix the truth or falsity of propositions. Proof is the process by which the truth of a judgment is established. There are two forms of this proof or confirmation, according as it determines certitude or probability. They are Deductive, or Analytic, and Inductive, or Synthetic Proofs. They represent the reasoning processes of discourse, and are superadded to those of explanation. They also will come up for more careful exposition. IV. SUMMARY We have now found that logical discourse comprises a knowledge of the laws of thought and of the laws of constructive arrangement. We thus combine in this treatise the practical part of logic and the logical part of rhetoric. The laws of thought will be considered only in so far as they are necessary for regulating INTRODUCTION 1 1 the correct interpretation and use of conceptions, judgments, and reasoning, and the principles of rhetoric will be considered only in so far as they deal with clear and systematic treatment of themes, the art of aesthetic expression being left to others for discussion. Discourse then, as it is here conceived, denotes the logical analysis and synthesis of the ideas expressed by a theme, and all subsequent investigations will concern the laws and conditions under which those processes can best be applied. CHAPTER II CLASSIFICATION OF TERMS OR CONCEPTS I. DEFINITION OF TERMS. -- The words " Term " and "Concept " are identical in logic, but in general usage their synonymous meaning is not so apparent. " Term " has a grammatical associa- tion and generally denotes a word, while' concept denotes always an idea of some kind. In logic, however, a term is any word or words that con- stitute a subject of thought. Concept denotes the subject of thought without suggesting so distinctly the word by which it is named. But it is the idea or subject of thought that is the important fact, and this may be expressed either by a single word, or by any combination of them that denotes a single idea. For instance, " the Queen of Eng- land," "the elderly gentleman in the box," are as much terms in logic as the single words " man," " tree," " house," etc. Consequently a " Term " in logic may even be a whole clause or phrase, provided that this is a mere adjunct of a cen- tral concept which it designs to make more definite. II. DIVISION OF TERMS. The classifica- tion of terms is various, inasmuch as there are many points of view from which to consider them. 18 CLASSIFICATION OF TERMS OR CONCEPTS 19 But each division may cover all the terms used in discourse or having importance. i st. Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms. This division is based upon the distinc- tion between what is essential and what is not essential to the formation of a proposition. 1. Categorematic terms are those which can stand as the subject or predicate of a proposition. They are of three kinds : (a) substantive, as " horse," " animal," " government ; " (b) adjectival, as " true," "generous," " pertinent," and (c) verbal, as " shine," " rule," " assert." 2. Syncategorematic terms are such as cannot stand alone as subject or predicate of a proposi- tion. They are of two kinds : (a) modal, as " veri- ly," "amiably," "considerately," or all adverbs, and (b) relational, as "in," "by," "to," "and," " through," or prepositions and conjunctions. zd. Singular and General Terms. This divi- sion is based upon the distinction between Individ- ual and Class Wholes, or the number of objects to be denoted by a term. Accordingly, terms in this classification are distinguished by their form of extension, a property to be considered farther on. i. Singular Terms are those which apply in the same sense only to a single object, real or imag- inary. Proper names are good illustrations, as " Europe," " Plato," " Paris," though any term not a proper name but denoting only a single whole, will also be singular, as " the first man," " the highest good," and possibly " time," " space," etc. A combination of terms, such as " The present Secretary of State," " The King of Spain," " The 2O LOGIC AND ARGUMENT Superintendent of Public Buildings," etc., will also be singular, when it refers only to one specific person or thing. Even expressions, like " this table," referring to an individual case in view, or " the street running diagonally across the city of A," etc., are singular terms. Some seem to have thought that terms like "water," "stone," " ice," " mercury," " iron," may sometimes be singular, as being similar to "space," "time," "universe," but I should treat them as abstract whenever used to denote the quality or qualities which make the kind of thing denoted by them. Oneness of kind is not the only or distinctive feature of singular terms, but individuality, or singularity, as repre- senting a concrete individual whole. 2. General Terms are those which can apply, in the same sense, to each individual in an indefinite number of objects, real or imaginary, and of the same kind. They are, therefore, terms represent- ing class wholes, as singular terms represent indi- vidual wholes. Illustrations of general terms are such as "man," "vertebrate," "animal," " trees," " figures," " bipeds," etc. In these instances the terms denote more than one object and apply to all of the same kind. Their meaning is important in the interpretation of what are called universal propositions. 3d. Collective and Distributive Terms This division is based upon the distinction between ag- gregate wholes of the same kind and class terms. It partly coincides with the division into singular and general terms, the latter always being distrib- utive. CLASSIFICATION OF TERMS OR CONCEPTS 21 1. Collective Terms are those which apply to an aggregate whole of individuals, usually similar in kind and constituting together a totality that is spoken of as if it were an individual. Thus, "army," "forest," "crowd," " nation," " family," " regiment," are collective terms because they de- note composite or aggregate wholes. 2. Distributive Terms are those which apply to each individual in a class, or to a single individual. For example, " man," " vertebrate," " quadruped," " book," " Germans," are distributive terms. It will be remarked also that they are general terms. But even singular terms are distributive, as " Bis- marck," " Pitt," etc. Consequently, " distributive" expresses individual denotive power as distinct from composite, while singular and general dis- tinguish between one and more than one object of thought, whether collective or distributive. Hence we find the division between singular and general terms crossing between that of collective and distributive. Thus some singular names or terms are collective, as " The Vatican Library," "The 72d Regiment," "The French nation," while also all collective terms not singular and applicable to an indefinite number of similar ag- gregates are general and therefore are distributive at the same time that they are collective. But they are not distributive in the same sense that they are collective. It is important also to keep clear the distinction between class wholes and collective wholes, or the distinction between distributive and the collective functions of the same or different terms. They 22 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT are often confused so as to call a term denoting a class a collective term. But the radical difference is that, besides denoting more than one, collective terms name a whole spoken of as one object, while class or general terms denote both more than one and apply to each individual in the class. Collective terms do not apply to the units com- posing the aggregate. The relation between the two divisions may be summarized in the follow- ing tabular form : Terms or Terms i Distributive only <- it ) Singula General j Collective and fS ist ributive [ CollecUve ^ Ge S era 4th. Concrete and Abstract Terms. It is much more difficult to define concrete and abstract terms satisfactorily, because the current and tra- ditional accounts of them show less agreement than in the previous cases. But the general dis- tinction is based upon the difference between any- thing considered alone, and out of relation to its individual subject. There are also terms that have both a concrete and an abstract signification. i. Concrete Terms are those which stand for a thing thought and used as a subject of properties, or for an attribute thought and used as an attri- bute, but in each case conceived independently and alone. This definition provides for two kinds, certain nouns and all adjectives. Thus " Parthenon," " Lincoln," " Charter Oak," and " wise," " noble," " clear," etc., are concrete terms or conceptions. CLASSIFICATION OF TERMS OR CONCEPTS 23 2. Abstract Terms are those which represent an attribute conceived apart from the subject to which it belongs, and treated as if it were a sub- ject itself. Thus, " righteousness," " ability," " vir- tue," "purity," " redness," are abstract concepts or terms. These are used as nouns and can be- come subjects of propositions, while the attributes they express can only be predicates. 3. Subdivisions. Some terms are only concrete, some are only abstract, and some may be either concrete or abstract. This fact gives rise to the distinction between ///r^ and mixed terms. Then, as concrete terms may be either substantives or adjectives, we may recognize two kinds of this class and two kinds of the abstract. The follow- ing table or outline with illustrations will indicate what is meant while it explains the definitions : ( ( r j Substantive=Singular Nouns, e.g., Homer. p ete "1 Attributive= Adjectives, e.?., Pure. Terms ( lre ' 1 A u_ f _., rt 1 Static= Adjectival Nouns, e.g.. Sweetness. act " 1 Dynamic = Verbal Nouns, e.g., Distillation. (_ Mixed = Concrete and Abstract, e.g., Government, Religion, etc. Certain kinds of terms are omitted from the illustrations in this outline. They are such gen- eral terms as "man," "tree," "animal," " build- ing," etc. The reason for this omission is that some writers treat them as concrete. But this is due to a conception of the concrete which is not the logical one and which will come up for con- sideration in a moment. I regard them, however, as both concrete and abstract, and hence as belong- ing to the mixed class along with "government," " religion," etc., and for the same reason. All 24 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT general terms, in fact, may be treated as abstracts, though it may not be true that all abstract terms are general. But general terms are abstract when they stand only for the common properties of the individuals composing the class, and concrete when they denote the individuals as such. Thus, in the use of a distinction still to be explained, general terms are abstract when they are taken in their intension or to denote the qualities expressed by them, and concrete when they are taken in their extension or to denote the number of individ- uals in the class. 4. The Popular Distinction. The popular con- ception of concrete terms is that of sensible ob- jects, and of abstract terms as that of non-sensible things. This notion coincides with the difference between material and immaterial things. From this point of view "man," "tree," "Plato," "Bis- marck," " nation," " white," " round," " heavy," would all be concrete, and "thought," "emotion," "spirit," "government," "religion," "generous," "sincere," etc., would be abstract. But while this distinction may do very well for the purpose of indicating the difficulties involved in imparting our ideas of non-sensible things, it does not serve the purposes of clear logical thinking. The com- mon mind may find it easier to deal with tangible or sensible things, but the propositions and beliefs we form have as much to do with the non-sensible as the sensible, and hence the distinction for logic between the concrete and the abstract must be between facts conceived as self-sufficient and facts conceived out of relation to their subject, and not CLASSIFICATION OF TERMS OR CONCEPTS 25 between the representable or picturable and the non-representable or unpicturable. Errors in ar- gument do not occur from the confusion of the intangible with the tangible, but from the illegiti- mate transition from a fact out of relation to its subject, or vice versa, and hence it is this distinc- tion which logic must keep in view. 5th. Positive and Negative Terms. This divi- sion is based upon the distinction between terms that imply the presence and those that imply the absence of an attribute. From the position of grammatical form in connection with meaning we may recognize also Privative and Nego-positive terms or concepts, as will be further explained, but considering " terms " and " concepts " as identical we may reduce the four forms to two, and divide each of the two into pure and mixed. This may be represented after the definition of each. 1. Positive Terms are those which signify the presence or possession of certain qualities de- noted by the word ; for example, " good," " pure," "excellence," "metal," " organic," " human," etc., are positive terms. They are positive grammat- ically and logically, or both in form and matter. 2. Negative Terms are those which denote the absence of certain given qualities ; as " inorganic," "insincere," "imperfect," "headless," "unnatu- ral," etc. These are negative in both form and matter. The usual symbols of negative terms are in, tin, less, dis, a or an, anti, mis, sometimes de, and non, and not. 3. Privative Terms are those which signify the 2 6 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT absence of a quality or qualities once possessed or belonging normally to the object named. Thus "deaf," "dead," "dumb," "blind," "dark," etc., are privative terms. They are positive in form and negative in matter or meaning. 4. Nego-positive Terms are those which denote the presence of a positive quality though ex- pressed in a negative manner ; as " inhuman," " disagreeable," " infamous," " inconvenience," " displeasure," " invaluable," etc. They are nega- tive in form and positive in matter. They can, in most cases at least, be distinguished from nega- tive conceptions or terms, pure and simple, by substituting their positive equivalents. Thus " unhappiness" and "invaluable" have their equivalents in the positive terms " misery " and "costly." Some terms may be interpreted in either a negative or a nego-positive sense, ac- cording as we choose to use them. Thus " un- certain," " unhealthy," " unpleasant," " indistinct," may be conceived as the negatives of " certain," " healthy," " pleasant," " distinct," or, as the nego-positive equivalents of "doubtful," "sickly," "painful," "obscure." 5. Summarized Divisions. The last remark shows that there may be a grammatical difference in the form of terms, but no logical difference in meaning or matter. It will be possible, therefore, to reduce the fourfold division of terms as here defined and based partly upon grammatical and partly upon logical principles, to two classes, based only upon logical principles. They will be viewed wholly from the standpoint of concepts, CLASSIFICATION OF TERMS OR CONCEPTS 2^ which are logical in their implication, and not from that of terms, which have a grammatical association. Hence we may ultimately reduce all concepts, or terms in meaning, to two classes, the positive and negative, making the privative nega- tive and the nego-positive, positive, though for the sake of clearness calling attention to their mixed character from the standpoint of gramma- tical structure as compared with their meaning. This is only to say that the grammatical and the logical criteria of the nature of terms are not always coterminous. Each taken alone will give us two divisions, positive and negative, but when terms come to be arranged under these divisions some that would be positive grammatically would be negative logically, and some that would be negative grammatically would be positive logi- cally. We may, therefore, outline in tabular form the various ways of classifying and defining terms or concepts as just discussed. (Positive = Positive in both form and matter. Negative = Negative in both form and matter. Privative = Positive in form but negative in matter. Nego-positive = Negative in form but positive in matter. f Positive = Grammatical and Logical forms cotermi- Pure - 1 nous. | Negative = Grammatical and Logical forms cotermi- nous. Terms or f Privative = Grammatically positive and Logically Mixed -I negative. ] Nego-positive = Grammatically negative and Logi- cally positive. f Positive -| Dimple = ure Positive Concepts ( Negative } Simple = Pure negative. I "( Complex = Privative. 2 g . LOGIC AND ARGUMENT 6. Infinitated Terms. There is a form of con- ception which is called " infinitated." This term is applied to such conceptions because it refers to that use of them which denotes the thought of all other things than those expressed by the cor- responding positive term. It avails to divide all possible objects of thought into two classes. These classes may be called the positive and the negative, as above. The negative may be called the infinitated concepts. The usual symbol of such terms is non and not, as " non-moral," "non-ma- terial," " not-animal," " not-tree," etc. They are not always, if ever, recognized as rhetorically ele- gant, but are valuable often to make clear the really negative, or infinitatively negative nature of the idea in mind. Thus " tree " and " not-tree " will together comprise all objects of thought and in some logical processes, as dichotomous division, obversion and contraversion, to be considered later, it is important to have this fact known. Every term then, conceived or expressed by the qualification non or not, and denoting the whole universe of objects excluded from the positive concept is an infinitated conception. Even such terms as "not-just," "not-good," "non-moral," or perhaps all negative terms, can be conceived in an infinitated sense, and sometimes are so. But in common usage negative adjectival or attribu- tive concepts are applied to the same general kind of subject as the positive, and no reference is made or understood to objects outside this par- ticular limit. Thus, " not-just " would be con- fined to the universe of actions, this being divided CLASSIFICATION OF TERMS OR CONCEPTS 29 into "just "and "not-just actions," other things than actions not being implied or included in " not- just," and the infinitation not extending beyond the negative facts within the concept " action." The source of equivocation from this may be dis- cussed again. But the wider meaning of infinita- tion is clearer when applied to substantive terms. 6th. Absolute and Relative Terms This di- vision is based upon the distinction between in- dependence and dependence on other terms for meaning. In its narrower import the distinction is not very important for practical logic, though the wider use of it, largely, if not wholly coincid- ing with that between Concrete and Abstract con- cepts, has very great value. Assuming the latter as sufficiently considered, we may be content with a very brief account of the former. 1. Absolute Terms are those in which the proper- ties or qualities expressed are intrinsic to the in- dividual subject and do not represent a mere rela- tion to any other subject or being. Thus " man," " tree," "earth," "star," " book," may be consid- ered as absolute terms. They do not imply any necessary correlatives to complete their meaning. The things which they denote may exist in all sorts of relations, but it may not be necessary to think of these relations in order to obtain an ad- equate idea of what the term means. Quite the contrary terms is true of relative. 2. Relative Terms are those whose distinctive meaning is derived from the relation expressed to some other individual object. Thus " father," "son," "parent," "master," "servant," " mon- 30 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT arch," " subject," etc., are relative terms. Each term suggests a relation to others as the distinc- tive meaning of the word. Thus " father " is a " man," but a man in a certain relation, and the term is intended to express that relation, which may not be a quality necessary for recognition of the individual as such. We see in this way that relative terms suggest the thought of other indi- viduals with the relation involved as a part of the term's meaning, while absolute terms suggest only the qualities in the subject without a relation to others being necessarily involved. CHAPTER III THE CONTENT OF TERMS i. INTRODUCTION. Every term or concept has a content. This content is its meaning. As a term it is simply a word, a sound, a vocable, but it stands for something. It is a name for a thing, a fact, a quality or any circumstance about which consciousness or knowledge can be occupied. As a concept it is an idea which contains a reference to the same that is denoted by a word. The mean- ing or content is simply the character or charac- ters which a term names or implies, or which an idea represents. But the meaning, material content and ways of viewing a term are rich and various. All of them have a quantity and a quality import ; that is, a reference to number and a reference to properties. These characteristics bear an important relation to the laws of thought and the art of discourse. Different principles have to be considered in treat- ing of these two aspects in which terms may be taken, especially when we come to treat of propo- sitions. But at present we are limited to their im- portance in terms. The aspects under which concepts have always 31 3 2 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT been considered by students of logic have been expressed by the \.&m predicables, borrowed from Aristotle, and expressing the nature of the " predi- cates "or attributes possessed by terms. They are the most general conceptions under which the meaning of terms can be described and have been given as five in number. I hope to show that they are reducible to four, with a subdivision of two of them which has an interest outside of the mere quantity and quality import of terms. But I shall first give the old table of predicables, fol- lowing it with a new one. OLD TABLE. NEW TABLE. Genus (yivot) = Genus. Genus = Genus. Species (et&x) = Species. Species . = Species. Differentia (Suwfropa) = Difference. Conferentia = Identity. Proprium (iti&v) = Property. Differentia Difference. Accidens (i/3<:/3i E Distributed, Distributed. Propositions { o _. i ) Affirmative, I Undistributed, Undistributed. [ ^articular j Ne gative. O Undistributed, Distributed. All Universal propositions, A and E, distribute the subject. All Particular propositions, I and O do not dis- tribute the subject. All Affirmative propositions, A and I, do not distribute the predicate. All Negative propositions, E and O, distribute the predicate. There are two propositions of a peculiar charac- ter which require special mention in this connec- tion. They are Definitions and Exclusive proposi- tions. In the former the predicate quantitatively coincides with the subject ; that is, is treated as identical with it. In this way it appears to be dis- tributed, although it seems to be a universal af- PROPOSITIONS 91 firmative. But formally it is not so distributed. We only know this equivalence between subject and predicate by first knowing that the proposi- tion is a definition. The form of expression does not indicate it invariably or infallibly, and hence formally definitions have to be treated as A prop- ositions. When the predicate is considered as distributed in them, it is only from a knowledge of its material meaning, and not from the mode of expression, which is all that formal logic can recognize. In exclusive propositions of the form " Only elements are metals," or " Only the honest de- serve respect," though apparently A propositions, the subject is undistributed and the predicate is dis- tributed. This is the meaning of the term " only." In the case " Only elements are metals," we do not say or imply that " All elements are metals," though this might be true. But we mean that " nothing else " can be " metals," or that " all non- elements are not metals," which is the same in meaning as " All metals are elements," in which "metals" is distributed, and hence distributed in the exclusive proposition. In this elementary treatise I shall say nothing about the doctrine of the explicit quantification of the predicate as advocated by some writers, far- ther than to say that it adds four new proposi- tions to our classification. These are U and Y, affirmative corresponding to A and I, and 17 and o> (Greek letters), negative, corresponding to E and O. In U and Y the predicate is said to be dis- tributed, as in the propositions "All the Cau- 92 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT casians are all the whites," and " Some elements are all the metals." In rj and w the predicate is said not to be distributed, as " No men are some animals," and " Some metals are not some ele- ments." Such forms of expression are not fre- quent enough in practical discourse to treat them as important. CHAPTER VI OPPOSITION I. MEANING OF OPPOSITION. Opposition treats of the relation between the propositions A, E, I, and O, growing out of their quantity and quality. It has not to do with the relation between the sub- ject and predicate, nor with the elements of propo- sitions as such, but with the propositions as a whole. The question regarding their consistency and inconsistency with each other is the proper one to be considered in thus fixing their relations> and hence the conditions under which the. truth or falsity of any one or more propositions can be maintained when other propositions are asserted. But Opposition does not undertake to decide what propositions are necessarily true to start with, but only what will follow in three of them if the fourth is supposed to be either true, false, or indetermi- nate. Some propositions, if true, interfere with the truth of others, or may also include the truth of still others, and the falsity of some propositions likewise interfere with the falsity of others, or may include the falsity of still others. All four propositions, assuming, of course, that they con- tain the same matter, cannot be either true or false at the same time. Hence the problem of 93 94 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT opposition is to determine the conditions and limitations under which any one or more of these propositions can be affirmed or denied when cer- tain others are affirmed or denied. We have said that, in order to determine the relations of agreement or disagreement between these propositions, they must have the same mat- ter. This means that the subject and predicate of any given proposition must either be the same as those of any others compared with it, or must be capable of comparison with such subject and predicate through the relation of genus or species. Thus we cannot determine any relation of consist- ency or inconsistency between such propositions as "Iron is hard " and "Water freezes," or even such as " Iron is hard " and " Iron is useful." We must have, for the purposes of the purest formal logic, such propositions as " All metals are ele- ments," " No metals are elements," " Some metals are elements," and " Some metals are not ele- ments." In these alone can we ascertain, in the simplest way, the formal rules for the relation of consistency and inconsistency, between proposi- tions. The place which Opposition occupies in argu- mentative discourse is this : It determines the manner in which we may most effectively prove or disprove certain propositions, and hence the conditions under which clear thinking and debat- ing are to be conducted. To this we shall return after exhibiting the laws of Opposition. II. LAWS OF OPPOSITION. The relations of consistency and inconsistency between propo- OPPOSITION 95 sitions can first be illustrated and the laws for those relations formulated afterward. Thus if we assert that "All horses are animals," it cannot be true at the same time that " No horses are animals," or that " Some horses are not animals." This we express by saying that if A be true, E and O cannot be true at the same time. They are both inconsistent with it. Also again, if it be true that " No men are quadru- peds," it cannot be true that "All men are quadru- peds," or that " Some men are quadrupeds." This we again express by saying that if E be true, A and I cannot be true at the same time, but are inconsistent with it. But still farther, if it be false that " All men are Caucasians," it will be true that " Some men are not Caucasians," but nothing is determined, one way or the other, about the proposition " No men are Caucasians." This last may^ be true as a mat- ter of fact, but this truth does not follow from the falsity of the first. Hence, to express the same matter more formally, if A be false, it follows that O must be true, but it does not follow that E is either true or false. It is indeterminate so far as A is concerned, no matter whether it be true or false as a fact. On the other hand again, if it be false that " Some men are not mortal," it must fol- low that " All men are mortal," and, as we have shown previously, the negative of this, " No men are mortal," will be false. This we express by saying that if O be false, A will be true and E is false. Similarly, if I be false, E must be true and A false. In this way we find that if A be true, O will be false, and if A be false, O will be true ; and if E be true, I will be false, and if E be false, I will 96 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT be true ; again, if O be true, A will be false, and if O be false, A will be true ; and if I be true, E will be false, and if I be false, E will be true. This kind of inconsistency between A and O, on the one hand, and between E and I on the other, we call contradiction. In the loose sense of the terms, the words "contradiction" and "contradictory" are used to express any kind of inconsistency which prevents two things from being true at the same time. But as the relation between A and E is not the same as between A and O or E and I, a technical meaning has to be given to the term "contradiction" and another term employed to express the relation between A and E. In the Con- tradictories A and O, and E and I there is a mutual or reciprocal and universal inconsistency which enables us to say that one or the other must be either true or false, or that only one of them can be true or false at the same time. But A and E are called Contraries, because, although the truth of A implies the falsity of E, and vice versa, the truth of E implies the falsity of A, yet the falsity of either of them does not imply the truth of the other, but the falsity of either leaves the other wholly indeterminate. It remains to determine the relations between A and I, E and O, and I and O. First, if it be true that " All men are mortal," it will be also true that " Some men are mortal ; " if it be true that " No men are quadrupeds," it will also be true that " Some men are not quadrupeds." This we express by saying that if A be true, I must be true, and if Ebe true, O must be true, because the OPPOSITION 97 part must be included in the whole. But on the other hand, if it be true that " Some men are wise," it does not follow that " All men are wise ; " or if it be true that " Some men are not wise," it does not follow that " No men are wise." This we express by saying that if I be true, A will be indeterminate, and if O be true, E will be indetermi- nate. This is because the whole is not included in the part. But again, if we suppose a proposi- tion A to be false, it will be found that I will be indeterminate, and the same with O if E be false. On the other hand, if I be false, it does not leave A indeterminate, nor will the falsity of O leave E indeterminate. On the contrary, the falsity of I implies the falsity of A, and the falsity of O that of E. This variable relation is expressed by call- ing A and I, and E and O, Subalterns. But A in relation to I, and E in relation to O are each called Subalternans, while I and O are called Sub- alternates. When we compare I and O we find that they are of the opposite quality and the same quantity. One is affirmative and the other negative, and in that respect they are " opposed " to each other. But the relation of consistency and inconsistency between them is the reverse of that between A and E. We found that A and E could not both be true, but they might both be false at the same time. In the case of I and O compared, if it be true that " Some metals are elements," the law of Contradiction between E and I will make E, " No metals are elements," false, and by subalternation, as just explained, O will be indeterminate. That 7 98 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT is, nothing follows about O from the truth of I, and also nothing about I from the truth of O. But if it be false that " Some men are trees," it follows by contradiction that the proposition " No men are trees" is true, and by subalternation, "Some men are not trees" would be true also. This we express by saying, that if I be false, E will be true, and by inclusion O will be true, and by parity of reasoning if O be false, I will be true. But both cannot be false at the same time, because this would involve the simultaneous truth of A and E, but they, I and O, may both be true. This relation is expressed by calling them Sub- contraries. These various relations of the four propositions can be diagrammatically represented by what is called the Square of Opposition. A Contraries E o % c ^ y fy \p c s \& g * A, 5 ^ -fc VJ >O I Subcontraries O The rules for regulating or expressing these relations can be formulated as follows : 1. Of Contradictories, one must be true and the other false. 2. Of Contraries, only one can be true and both may be false. 3. Of Subcontraries, only one can be false and both may be true. OPPOSITION 99 4. Of Subalterns, if the subalternans be true, the subalternate will be true, but if the subalternans be false, the subalternate will be indeterminate. On the other hand, if the subalternate be true, the subalternans will be indeterminate, but if the sub- alternate be false, the subalternans will be false. III. SPECIAL CASES. The rules of Opposi- tion are laid down for Universal and Particular propositions, as introduced respectively by All and Some, or their equivalents. But they have to be modified for Singular propositions and for a class which may be called abstract general propositions, and which may be treated as Singulars. Singular propositions will have no Contraries and no Sub- contraries. They can have only Contradictories. Thus, " Socrates was a man " has only the Con- tradictory " Socrates was not a man." The form " Some Socrates," or " Some of Socrates was a man," is palpably impossible and nonsense, and anything more universal than itself with the same subject is equally impossible. That it can only have a Contradictory and neither Contrary nor Subcontrary is evident from the attempt to apply the rules of Opposition to it. If the affirmative be true, the negative will be false ; if the affirma- tive be false, the negative will be true ; and vice versa. This expresses the relation of Contra- diction. What I have called abstract general propositions is illustrated by such as " Charity is a virtue," "Science is useful," " Religion is true." Consid- ered as abstract terms, the subjects in these cases may be treated practically as Singulars. Hence I0 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT the rules for the Opposition of Singular proposi- tions may also be applied to them. The importance of these considerations will be observed at once if we remark that in almost all ordinary discourse and argument we are dealing either with concrete Singular propositions or Abstract general ones. The recognition of this fact will simplify the methods of treating dis- course. We should have only to consider the simple relation of contradiction in the process of argument. IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF OPPO- SITION. The practical use of Opposition con- sists in its showing how proof and refutation can be best accomplished. If an opponent asserts an A proposition, the proper and easier way to refute him is to prove O. If O be true, A cannot be true. A could be equally disproved by the truth of E, but it is always harder to prove a Universal than a Particular or a Singular. Any person who as- serts a universal proposition, either A or E, lays himself under the obligation to explain away or disprove every single exception brought against it. An opponent may thus always restrict himself to the much easier task of finding instances which contradict the universality of the statement against him, but if he takes upon himself to affirm the Con- trary instead of the Contradictory, he lays himself open to attack. " Were it to be asserted, for in- stance, that ' All Christians are more moral than Pagans,' it would be easy to adduce some ex- amples showing that 'Some Christians are not more moral than Pagans,' but it would be absurd OPPOSITION 101 to suppose that it would be necessary to go to the contrary extreme, and show that ' No Christians are more moral than Pagans.' " The error in dis- proof, however, may lie in certain assumptions about the relations between the two propositions after the proper one has been proved. Thus I may be required to disprove the proposition " All Indians are moral," and in order to do so I may maintain, or prove, that " Indians are not civilized." But here I simply evade the issue. My proposition neither contradicts the one to be disproved nor is the contrary of it. Again, it is no disproof of the assertion that " Cromwell was a usurper," to say that l< Foreign nations acknowledged his author- ty," any more than it would be proof of his legiti- macy to make the same statement. Likewise it is no disproof of the assertion " A is bad " to say that " He is religious," any more than it would prove that a man is white by showing that he is not black. If I assert that " Governments are necessary," it is no disproof of it to show that " Some governments are bad." Many arguments in refutation, however, are conducted upon just such logic, assuming an inconsistency where there is none. But to be pertinent and effective, an argument in refutation must really contradict, and the most secure resource for this contradiction is the assertion of a Particular against a Universal proposition. But the proof of a Particular against a Particular proposition will not refute, because, as we have seen in the Square of Opposition, both I and O may be true at the same time. The dis- proof in this case necessitates an appeal to a Uni- 102 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT versal proposition whatever the disadvantages in this procedure. In the process of proof as distinct from refu- tation, there is no escape from the obligation to use Universals, no matter whether the proposition asserted be a Particular or a Universal. The proof of the Particular must involve some Univer- sal or Subalternans which includes it, and the proof of a Universal involves some proposition more general and inclusive of the one to be estab- lished. This necessity of resorting to Universals for proof is the fact that makes proof more diffi- cult than refutation, which, as we have seen, does not require to go further than the use of Particular propositions, save in the case of refuting a Partic- ular. But there is an alternative here which con- siderably lightens the task of the debater when called upon to argue against Particular proposi- tions. This is the demand for proof of them, especially when we know, what will be learned in discussing the syllogism, that Particular proposi- tions can serve no purpose for further reasoning of any important kind, and hence are serviceable only for disproof. CHAPTER VII IMMEDIATE INFERENCE I. DEFINITION. The term inference in gen- eral expresses a very comprehensive process that is difficult to define, because it equally includes the reasoning to what is possible with what is certain and necessary. But it is at least the act of mind which undertakes to connect or to see new or old ideas upon the basis of those already known, and takes several forms, the two main ones going by the name of Deductive and Inductive in- ference. When it comes to considering immediate inference, however, the definition is less compre- hensive and, therefore, much easier. Immediate inference is simply the deduction of one propo- sition from another implying it. The process is usually defined as reasoning without a middle term. This means that only one proposition is required for the premise, and that the conclusion is drawn directly from this one and without comparison with any other term or proposition. Thus from the proposition, " The sciences are useful," I can infer, if " infer " is the right term here, that " Some useful things are science," or, " What is not useful is not science." The process may be nothing but a restatement of the original meaning 103 IO4 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT in a new form or relation, but it nevertheless has its use in understanding the various forms of thought which the mind adopts in its transition from one form of expression to another, and hence correct immediate inference serves as a criterion of the legitimate mode of passing from one propo- sition to another without introducing new matter. II. DIVISIONS. The divisions of Immediate Inference are based upon the various forms in which it is possible to state directly the meaning and implications of a proposition without intro- ducing new thought or ideas. These forms may be called, in terms of general usage in logic, Con- version, Obversion, Contraversion (Contraposition), Inversion, Contribution, and Antithesis. Each of these requires separate treatment. ist. Conversion. Conversion is the transposi- tion of subject and predicate, or the process of immediate inference by which we can infer from a given proposition another having the predicate of the original for its subject and the subject of the original for its predicate. But there are certain limitations under which this transposition can take place. For instance, from the propo- sition, "All horses are animals," we cannot infer that " All animals are horses ; " nor that " Some animals are not horses," though this may actually be a fact. The rules, therefore, which limit the process of conversion are two : (a) The quality of the converse must be the same as that of the convertend. (b) No term must be distributed in the con- verse which is not distributed in the convertend. IMMEDIATE INFERENCE 105 These rules may be abbreviated so as to read : Do not change the quality of a proposition, and Do not distribute an undistributed term. We may undis- tribute a distributed term, but not vice versa. The Convertend is the proposition to be converted ; the Converse is the proposition or result after the process of conversion has been performed. The forms of conversion are two, according as the quantity of the Converse is the same or differ- ent from that of the Convertend. If the quantity of the converse remains the same as that of the convertend, the conversion is called Conversio sim- plex, or Simple Conversion ; if the quantity is changed (diminished), it is called Conversio per accidens, or Limited Conversion, usually Conver- sion by Limitation. We have now to illustrate the process and to ascertain the extent of its applica- tion to the several propositions, A, E, I, and O. i. Proposition A. Take the proposition, "All apples are fruit." In this proposition, as already shown, the predicate is not distributed. This means that other things also may be contained in the predicate, or class " fruit," so far as can be determined by the assertion given. It is, of course, not known from the assertion itself that any additional matter is included in the predicate, but only that the form of expression does not ex- clude this possibility. Hence, if in transposing the subject and predicate, we say "All fruits are apples," we should be asserting more than the original proposition will admit. In the original we have said nothing about the whole of the term "fruit," whether it includes or excludes I0 6 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT other subjects, but only that it includes " apples ; " and so we cannot be permitted to infer anything not distinctly said or implied by our premise. Consequently, we can assert something only of a part of this predicate in the process of conver- sion, if we assert anything at all, inasmuch as the original asserts something only of a part of the predicate and asserts or implies nothing about the rest of it. That we may assert something is evi- dent from the fact that some degree of identity or connection exists between the subject and predi- cate in the convertend, and this same relation can be asserted or inferred in the converse. By lim- iting our statement, therefore, to the part of the predicate of which we actually affirm something, we are able to infer from the original proposition that " Some fruits are apples." This is evidently legitimate, and as evidently true if the original be true. Here the quantity of the proposition is changed, while its quality remains the same ; that is, the quantity of the convertend is universal and its quality affirmative, while the quantity of the converse is particular and the quality affirmative. We have, therefore, converted A into I. To con- vert " All apples are fruit " into " All fruits are apples," would be to violate the second rule for conversion. Hence A cannot be converted into A. To change the quality of the proposition A in conversion that is, into either E or O would be to violate the first rule for conversion. It is apparent that we cannot infer an exclusion be- tween a subject and predicate from an affirmed connection or identity between them. Hence A IMMEDIATE INFERENCE 107 cannot be converted into either E or O, and we have found also that it cannot be converted into A, but only into /. This fact is expressed by say- ing that A is not capable of simple, but only of limited, conversion. There is at least one apparent exception to this rule, and perhaps two. This is the case of defini- tions and exclusive propositions. Definitions are often considered, at least tacitly, as universal af- firmatives, and yet they are capable of simple con- version. The truth is, however, that definitions are not A propositions in their meaning, but only in their form of statement. They are materially U propositions and capable of simple conversion on that account, but formally we can only apply limited conversion to them. We must know from some other fact than their form of statement that they are definitions in which the predicate is made convertible or identical with the subject. But without assuming this material identity we could know nothing of the virtual distribution of the predicate, and hence formally definitions have to be treated as all propositions in A, until we are told or made to know the intention of the person using them. Formally considered, therefore, they can no more be converted than ordinary proposi- tions into A. Nevertheless, it is important to ob- serve that in some cases of our actual reasoning the mind may be correct in its processes on the ground that the datum is a definition that is, subject and predicate are identical or convertible, although formally ; that is, in its external appear- ances, the reasoning is fallacious. It would simply I0 8 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT be a case where the real meaning is different from the formal and apparent meaning of the propo- sition. The exclusive proposition, although it may ap- pear to some people as a universal, is not such. The subject is not distributed, though the predi- cate is. The "only" means some, and it may or may not be all, but certainly nothing else. Hence the exclusive proposition is, from its distribution of the predicate and not that of the subject, in fact but an inverted universal, so that its simple con- version is but its reduction to an univocal propo- sition. 2. Proposition /. The proposition " Some men are vertebrates " can only be converted into " Some vertebrates are men," or by simple conversion. We cannot infer from it that "All vertebrates are men," for the same reason that we cannot con- vert A into A. It is because the predicate in the convertend is undistributed, and must not be dis- tributed as subject in the converse. It would seem to be an exception to this that from " Some men are Caucasians" we maybe supposed to infer correctly that "All Caucasians are men." But while this converse may be true, we must not sup- pose that because any proposition is true we can infer it from anything else. We simply happen to know that "All Caucasians are men, "and this fact \snotf0rmally expressed or implied in the propo- sition " Some men are Caucasians ; " and as we are only dealing with formally definite or indefinite as- sertions, we are not allowed to transgress our rules simply because we may happen to know that any IMMEDIATE INFERENCE IOQ given proposition is true. We must distinguish between what we can believe and what we may in- fer. Further again, it would violate the first rule to convert I into Eor O, for the same reason that A cannot be converted into E or O. Hence I can only be converted into I. This is a case of Conversio simplex, or Simple Conversion, because the quan- tity and quality, or form, of the converse is the same as that of the convertend. 3. Proposition E. The proposition " No books are pens " can be converted either simply or by limitation. In this E proposition the predicate is distributed, and this fact will permit of the distri- bution of the same term in the converse. Hence we can infer or assert " No pens are books." By subalternation from this we can infer " Some pens are not books." The first of the two cases is the simple converse, and the second the limited converse of the original, and can be directly ob- tained by remembering that a distributed term can be undistributed, but not vice versa. Hence E is convertible into either E or O. But O may be called a weakened converse of E, because E might as well be inferred. 4. Proposition O. A peculiar difficulty exists in particular negative propositions, as will be ap- parent in the attempt to convert the proposition " Some men are not Caucasians," which is true, into " Some Caucasians are not men," which is not true. Of course it is not the truth or falsity of the converse that determines whether the conver- sion is correct or not, but we may safely use a contradiction between convertend and converse IIO LOGIC AND ARGUMENT as evidence of mistake somewhere. But the rea- son for the error is to be found in the nature of the original assertion. First, we have found that the converse must be of the same quality as the convertend. In this case, therefore, the converse must be negative. But according to the rule, negative propositions distribute the predicate. Hence the subject of the convertend which is not distributed becomes the predicate of the converse which is distributed, and so violates the second rule. Therefore O cannot be converted by the ordinary method, if at all. It has been usual, however, to apply what is called an indirect method called Conversion by Ne- gation. Take, for example, " Some realities are not material objects." If we infer that " Some or all material objects are not realities," we violate the second rule, because the predicate of the converse is distributed, while the subject of the convertend, which becomes the predicate of the converse, is not distributed. But now if we attach the nega- tive term "not" to the predicate in the original we have " Some realities are not-material, or non-material objects ; " or again, the equivalent, " Some realities are immaterial objects." The proposition thus resulting is supposed to be iden- tical with the first and original instance. But we observe that it becomes I in this form which we can convert simply into " Some immaterial objects are realities," or in the less euphonious form, " Some not-material objects are realities." This proposition, then, can be inferred from the origi- nal, and the process of reaching it has been called IMMEDIATE INFERENCE III the indirect one of Negation. The same process is applicable to any similar propositions. Thus the instance of " Some elements are not metals " would become, first, " Some elements are not-met- als, or non-metals," and then "Some non-metals are elements," etc. But it must be observed that the quality of this so-called converse is affirmative, while that of the convertend is negative, and hence viewed in this light the process of conversion by negation is a violation of the first rule. Besides, we have been led by it to affirm something positive about non- material or immaterial objects assumed in the con- verse, when the convertend merely denies some- thing about material objects. While this may be allowable by some other process, it is not permissi- ble by conversion. The violation of the first rule decides that matter. Hence we conclude that proposition O is really not convertible at all, be- cause the retention of the quality violates the second rule, and the alteration of the quality vio- lates the first rule. This is now the general opin- ion of logicians. Nevertheless, the process de- scribed as conversion by negation is a legitimate one, at least formally speaking. But it is in real- ity a double process : first one of obversion and then one of conversion, which makes the result the converse of the obverse of the original. This makes it what we shall call Contraversion, or the process commonly called Contraposition. 2d. Obversion. Obversion is sometimes called " Immediate Inference by Privative Conception." This will serve as a good name when the propost- II2 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT tions are affirmative, and when a privative term can be found for the purpose. But when the proposition is negative, and when a privative term is not accessible, it is much better to use the term Obversion. The process consists in negating the copula and the predicate without converting. Thus the proposition " All men are mortal " is obverted by saying, " All men are not not-mortal," or " No men are not-mortal," or again, as it is sometimes expressed, " No men are immortal." Here it is noticeable that Obversion changes the quality of the proposition in the process from affirmative to neg- ative, or from negative to affirmative, as the case may be. The meaning of the original is retained by virtue of the fact that the two negatives make an affirmative, but the form of expression appears as negative, since one of the negatives qualifies the copula and the other the predicate. In the negative proposition the obversion is accomplished simply by connecting the negative particle with the predicate, which both changes the quality of the proposition and the character of the predicate, as in the affirmative. Thus, " No men are quadrupeds," or " All men are not quadrupeds," by obversion becomes "All men are not-quadrupeds," meaning that they are in the class " non-quadrupeds " from not being in the class "quadrupeds." This process terminates in the same result as literally following the rule. To follow the rule of double negation in this case the proposition would become " All men are not not-quadrupeds," and the first two negatives be- coming superfluous, cancel each other ; so that we IMMEDIATE INFERENCE 113 have, as in the first case, " All men are not-quad- rupeds." A negative proposition is, therefore, most conveniently obverted by transferring the negative particle to the predicate. In regard to the process in general it will be found, by following the rule, to apply to all four propositions A, E, I, and O. 3d. Contraversion or Contraposition. Contra- version or Contraposition consists in the negation of copula and predicate with conversion. That is, we first obvert the original and then convert this ob- verse. It amounts to the same thing to take the negative of the predicate in the contravertend for the subject of the contraverse, and deny the con- nection between it and the subject of the contra- vertend, if the latter be affirmative, and affirm the connection if the contravertend be negative. This can be best explained by an example. Take the proposition "All men are mortal." By the very terms of this judgment the class " men " is wholly included in the class " mortal," as indi- cated in Fig. IV., and excluded, therefore, from everything "not-mortal." We can, therefore, af- firm that " All men are not in the class of those who are not mortal ; " or, more briefly the obverse, " All men are not not-mortal." By simple convex sion from this we get "All not-mortal are not men." But, again, noticing that the inclusion of " men " in the class "mortal " excludes those who are "not-mortal" from "men, "we may as well affirm that fact directly, and hence from the origi- nal infer at once from " All men are mortal " that " All not mortals are not men." We reach the re- sult in this case without a roundabout process. 8 H 4 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT The same process will apply to propositions in E. Simply include the negative particle in the sub- ject of the contraverse and make the latter affirm- ative. Thus, "All negroes are not Caucasians" will be contravened by saying "Some not-Cau- casians are negroes." The transfer of the nega- tive particle to the term to be used for the subject of the contravertend has the effect of obversion, and makes the proposition an A, which must be converted by limitation into I. By similar processes we can treat I and O. But we shall find that I cannot be contravened, for the same reason that O cannot be converted. Summarizing results, however, we find that all propositions except O can be converted ; all can be obverted, and all except I contravened. In the practical application of Contraversion we must be careful about the use of privative, and especially nego-positive, terms. The result to the latter in particular, in substitution for the nega- tion of the predicate, may lead to equivocation, and therefore to material error in the process. Thus to contravert " All just acts are expedient " into " All inexpedient acts are unjust," is to assume that "unjust" is convertible with " not-just," which is not necessarily the case. A better illustration of the contention here made is perhaps the propo- sition " All human actions are free," in which the contraverse is " All not-free actions are not hu- man," instead of " All not-free actions are inhu- man" Other cases of a like error may not be so evident, but they are precisely the kind of error against which we have to guard. IMMEDIATE INFERENCE 115 4th. Inversion. Inversion is the process of in- ferring from one proposition another which shall contain for its subject the negative of the subject in the original, and for its predicate the predicate of the original. The result is accomplished by alternating the processes of obversion and con- version, and beginning with either of them and proceeding until the result is gained. A and E can be inverted ; I and O cannot. In the case of the two propositions the result depends upon the way we begin. Take an A proposition : "All horses are animals." If we start with conversion, then obvert, and again try to convert, we shall find that we have an O proposition for the last process and we can proceed no farther. But if we first obvert, then convert, obvert again, then convert, and last- ly obvert, we shall find the required proposition. Thus, " All horses are animals " obverted is " All horses are not not-animals ; " then this converted gives "All not-animals are not horses ; " obverted again we have " All not-animals are not-horses," and again converted, being an A proposition, be- comes " Some not-horses are not-animals," and lastly obverting, we have " Some not-horses are not animals." The process, however, is not im- portant in practical logic and does not require to be more than mentioned. 5th. Contribution. Contribution is the process by which what is affixed to the subject as a modifier may also be affixed to the predicate in the same sense. It takes two forms, called respectively Immediate Inference by Added Determinants, and Immediate Inference by Complex Conceptions. The simplest H6 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT illustration of the general process is in mathemat- ics. Thus if x = a, then x + i = a + i. 1. Inference by Added Determinants. This con- sists in merely adding some adjective or similar term to both subject and predicate. Thus, to " A house is a dwelling" we can add "A good house is a good dwelling." But we cannot add different quantities to both terms, as is implied by using the superlative degree of an adjective. Thus, while we can say " Dogs are quadrupeds," we cannot say "The largest dogs are the largest quadru- peds." The quantity and quality added must be the same. This will not always apply to particu- lar proportions. 2. Inference by Complex Conception. This con- sists in the addition of complex phrases and clauses to both sides f the proposition, always observing the identity of quantity and quality in both cases. Thus, to " Pigeons are birds" we can add " Pigeons that live in warm climates are birds that live in warm climates," etc. But here we have to be on our guard against the same error as in Added Determinants. From " Voters are men " we cannot infer that '' The majority of voters is the majority of men." False inferences by contribution often occur, even though it be unintentional, in long and com- plicated cases of discourse, and it requires close observation to detect them. In simple reasoning they are not so liable to take place. 6th. Antithesis. Antithesis isM in order to become an assured object of knowl- edge. Again, it was observed that the specific gravity of nitrogen taken from the air is greater than nitrogen taken from all other sources. It was inferred from this that there must be some other substance to account for this difference. Finally, argon was discovered. Still, again, I ob- serve the rise in price of certain stocks. I may infer several causes of it, but if I know the circum- stances well enough, I may infer the probability, for instance, that some agreement is maturing be- tween rival companies. I may notice again that frequently the appearance of a rainbow is followed by clear weather, and hence may infer from ob- servation in any particular case the re-occurrence of the same clear weather. In all of these in- stances my reasoning is from some specific facts to a general rule comprehending more than the special cases. III. INDUCTIVE FALLACIES It is not easy to indicate the inductive fallacies, if it be even possible, in the formal process of induction. In deduction they consist of violating the laws of the quantification of terms ; that is, in going beyond the premises and endeavoring at the same time to retain the same certitude in the conclusion as was supposed in the premises. But induction per- mits us to transcend the premises, quantitatively at least, and there can hardly be any formal fallacies INDUCTIVE REASONING 19 1 in this, unless we except the case of negative premises. But all this is a matter for more ad- vanced logic to determine. It is certain, how- ever, that in respect to the subject-matter of the conclusion in inductive reasoning there are some very definite limitations upon the right to tran- scend the premises. We cannot infer anything we please from any premises we please. We must conform to certain definite rules or principles. Any violation of them will be a fallacy. These rules are the same as those for material fallacies in deduction, so that the fallacies of induction, whether they are ever formal or not, are at least material ; that is, they occur whenever equivoca- tion and presumption are committed. There are, then, two simple rules which should not be vio- lated, (i) The subject-matter in the conclusion should be of the same general kind as in the prem- ises. (2) The facts constituting the premises must be accepted and must not be fictitious. CHAPTER XIV PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION I. INTRODUCTION Description, Explana- tion, and Exposition were examined as processes by which we endeavor to narrate facts and thoughts in a systematic and orderly manner. They are designed to give an intelligible and methodical conception of the data that are connected with a particular theme. But they are not designed to convince the mind. They may incidentally do this, but it is not their primary object to create conviction. They are occupied with the forma- tion and presentation of clear conceptions, syste- matic and methodical discourse, which does as much to make ideas intelligible as it does to please the sense of order. But Proof and Argumenta- tion go beyond this. They endeavor to convince, to remove doubt, to give belief and knowledge to the intellect. It will be necessary to examine its nature and its kinds. i st. Nature of Proof. Proof is defined as a method of producing conviction ; that is, of creat- ing assent to propositions. This assent takes two forms : Belief \ or probable truth ; and Knowledge, or certain truth. Whenever any proposition is as- serted or made the subject of argument, the ob- 192 PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION 193 ject is to show whether it be true or false. The general method of argumentation is the same for both sides. But the proposition at the outset is supposed not to represent any conviction in favor of or against itself, but to be balanced between belief and disbelief, or certitude and denial. The problem is to influence the judgment so that it will decide in favor of or against the proposition. Proof or Confirmation is the process of determin- ing the conviction one way or the other, and of removing the balance or doubt so that some de- gree of assent or denial, whether of belief or knowledge, will follow as a consequence. The process is effected in various ways as the kinds of proof will show. One important point in the nature of proof must not be neglected. It is somewhat different from inference, though it is reasoning. Inference properly proceeds from premises to conclusion ; proof proceeds from conclusion to premises. Proof assumes that a proposition is first asserted or stated and then established. In inference the premises are given and the conclusion is found, but in proof the conclusion is given and the premises found for establishing it. This is clearly illustrated by the process of debating where the issue is first defined and then proved. We state our proposition as a fact, and then, assuming that it is doubted by others, proceed to find the prem- ises, or propositions, which include it and which enforce conviction upon the doubter. Proof is, therefore, technically speaking, a process the re- verse of inference, though it succeeds in establish- 13 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT ing the same fact, inference being the process for finding it. 2<3. Kinds of Proof. The kinds of proof or argumentation assume two general forms, Direct and Indirect, and each of these may be subdivided into two forms. Direct proof or argumentation consists in the attempt to establish a given propo- sition ; indirect proof consists in refuting objec- tions to it. Each of these may be divided into deductive and inductive argumentation, and as the method of arranging the data for proof or dis- proof is the same in both the direct and the in- direct forms of it, there will be little necessity for dwelling at any length on these general divisions. It will suffice to illustrate direct and indirect proof. A case of direct proof is found deductively in the proposition demonstrating that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or infer- ring that the ancestors of land crabs were once marine crabs from the existence of intermediate and amphibious species. Here consistent and pertinent matter is mentioned in which the con- clusion is contained, or which suggests it as prob- able. A case of indirect proof of the same propo- sitions would be the reductio ad absurdum of the contradictory proposition of the first instance, and a removal of apparent contradictions in the second instance. Thus, if to disprove the marine ancestry of land crabs it be asserted that the one is physiologically constructed to live in water and the other is not, we should effectively remove the force of this objection to the original assertion PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION '95 by showing that to-day there are species of ani- mals which are born and live for a period in the water, and afterward live on land. This is a case of indirect proof by removing objections. The general method of deductive proof is ex- plained in the discussion of deductive reasoning. All that remains to be remarked here is that it is to be resorted to whenever we wish to give certi- tude to the proposition asserted. In choosing our premises and facts, therefore, we must be careful to select those which really include the conclu- sions. Any other procedure will involve one of the formal or material fallacies. Thus, if the thesis to be proven is that " The punishment of Socrates was unjust," my premises must be stated so as to include this as an instance. I can assume that the punishment of innocent men is unjust, and then prove that Socrates was an innocent and right- eous man. But if my major premise be "Most wise men should be exempt from punishment," the proof would be impossible. The proof, there- fore, when demonstration is to be attained, must represent the conclusion as clearly comprehended in the premises. In inductive proof this requirement is not im- perative. The conclusion is only probable and represents a preference in this respect over the alternative course. Hence, it is sufficient to show that the conclusion is enough like or connected with other facts to be probably included in them in regard to the matter at issue. Thus, if I find a man dishonest in a certain number of transactions, I may expect to find him so in the future or in 196 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT other transactions. This is not a necessary con- sequence, but only a probable one. In an argu- ment, therefore, we must be careful to distinguish between this kind of proof and the deductive process. We must see that we are not confusing the inductive with the deductive proof. Other- wise we are liable to a charge of fallacy. If we recognize that our proof is inductive, the argu- ment against us must be inductive, unless the con- tradictory of our proposition can be deductively proved, in which case inductive evidence of our thesis is impossible. II. PROCESS OF PROOF OR ARGUMENT. There is always a definite order of events in the proper presentation of proof. We have to remember that the object is to convince, and not merely to please. But to effect this end we should not plunge into a debate without knowing what both the nature and the compass of the issue is. The presentation of arguments is the final stage of the process in producing conviction. The first thing is to make the issue clear. Then we have to show how much ground it covers. Finally, we have to present the proofs. These three proc- esses may be called Definition, Division c- Analysis, and Probation. Each will come up in order for treatment. i st. Definition. In an argument definition is the process of determining the nature of the issue or thesis to be proved or disproved. The thesis will be some proposition for or against which argu- ments are to be produced. But before the argu- ments can be seen to have pertinency we must PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION I 9 7 know exactly what is to be proved or disputed. Propositions are often equivocal, and only careful definition can make clear what is to be defended or opposed. Thus, in the simple proposition " Man is mortal," there may be a doubt about the issue. Whether the predicate " mortal " is to be affirmed or denied of the subject will depend as much upon what we mean by the subject " man " as upon the nature of the predicate. The issue here is the connection between the subject and predicate. If we define " man " as the particular animal organ- ism which we know as having certain qualities, our proposition will mean one thing. If we define the term as the abstract subject of consciousness without reference to the animal organism, our proposition will mean another. Again, if " man " means the race of individual organisms, the prop- osition will mean still another thing. Our argu- ments must be different for each aspect of the question. It is so with every thesis. Take again the proposition " Protection is beneficial to the country." Here the first duty in determining what the issue under debate may be, is to define carefully what is meant by "protection." There is the etymological import of the term, which would be rejected here as not indicating specifi- cally enough what was meant. Then there is the broad conception of prevention of any kind of in- jury to citizens, which would define the object of all civil laws. This might not be the issue in- tended. Then there is lastly the economic policy of taxing certain imports for the benefit of the producer. This conception would indicate the 198 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT issue usually understood by such a proposition This illustrates a definition of the subject. But the predicate equally demands definition in many, if not all, cases. We must make clear what we mean by " beneficial to the country." We must indicate whether the issue regards economic or moral benefits, or both. The arguments will be very much affected by this distinction. But in all cases we must make the issue clear by definition in order to prepare the mind for estimating the pertinence of the argument, as well as for enabling the debater himself to select pertinent and valid proofs. The rules for determining the definition have been given already in their proper place. 2d. Analysis. Analysis or division is the proc- ess of showing how many specific and different aspects of an issue are involved in it and which can be separated for distinct treatment. The process recognizes a classification and logical or- der for the several arguments to be produced. It may also be defined as the process of supplying the topics for the discourse or argument. Suppose we have the thesis " Literature civilizes man." The analysis into topics may extend to both the subject and the predicate. We simply apply the principles of division to each term in order to determine the several topics or aspects of the issue. The importance of this process after definition is that it enables the debater to discuss a part of his theme at a time, and not expose the whole of it to attacks that may be based upon its general and abstract meaning. Thus, if we divide " liter- PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION 199 ature " into its various form to speil " scientific philosophic, historical, etc., or other forms, we can select one division at a time for probation, in which it may be easier to establish the claim as- serted than in some other case, and in this way we can produce at least a presumption in favor of others. Hence, in trying to show that " Literature civilizes man," we can divide the subject first into a series of topics. Thus, we could have the prop- osition " Polite literature civilizes man," and again subdivide " polite literature " into prose and poetry, and each of these into its further subdi- visions, so as to bring out the merits and influence of each in the process of civilization. Then we could proceed to show that " Scientific literature civilizes man," and also resort to various subdi- visions here. But the nature of the influence of scientific thought is different from that of polite literature. It affects the interests and character of men in a different way. Hence, it is convenient to separate the treatment of the one aspect of the issue from the other. It will be the same with the other two divisions, " philosophic" and " historical literature." Similarly a series of top- ics may be deduced from an analysis of the predi- cate. We may divide the civilizing process into " the elevation of artistic literary taste," " the re- finement of manners," " the extension of knowl- edge," " the improvement of morals," etc. All of these maybe regarded as processes in civilization, and we have to show that literature either in its parts or as a whole does or does not accomplish these results. In this way we give a variety of as- 200 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT pects to the issue, and prepare the mind to esti- mate it more clearly while the discourse may be more logical and effective. The process just illustrated is that of division. But a thesis or subject may be analyzed into topics by partition. This process has already been ex- plained. It names the properties connected by a conception or theme. Hence, we may supply the aspects of an issue in argument by partition either of subject and predicate, or the proposition as a whole, as well as by division. Thus, if we have the thesis " Monarchy is the best form of government," we may analyze the issue by partition so as to show what has to be sustained or disproven in the following manner. For the thesis we might fix on the several characteristics that define monarchy as a government : (i) The simplicity of mon- archy ; (2) The efficiency of monarchy ; (3) The venerable nature of its power ; (4) The influence of monarchy upon science and art, etc., to almost any extent we might please. Against the thesis we might produce counter characteristics : (i) The irresponsibility of its power ; (2) The ten. dency to nepotism ; (3) Its historical habit of in- terfering with human liberty ; (4) Its inadjusta- bility to social and economic progress, etc. All themes or issues can be analyzed in this way, and the value of the process is simply that which has already been indicated ; namely, the dis- tinction and logical classification of arguments so as to aid the mind in the formation of its convic- tions and the systematization of its ideas. The next process is Probation. PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION 2OI 3d. Probation. Probation is the process of proof, the statement and arrangement of facts and truths which will establish belief or knowledge in regard to the proposition at issue, or the contrary. The thesis or issue is the proposition to be proved or disproved. The truths which prove or dis- prove it are the known facts and principles which may constitute the premises, and the thesis will be the conclusion. These determining truths may be axioms, postulates, proved propositions, or any truth or fact which the person to whom the pro- bation is presented may accept. Their accept- ance is the condition of their proving or disprov- ing anything. We must observe, therefore, that probation, as here discussed, is a material as well as a formal process. The object in proof is, not merely to have correct reasoning, but also to have correct and true propositions. We must, there- fore, enunciate some facts or principles accepted by the person to whom the probation is presented, and then bring the thesis or issue under it in such a way as to enforce conviction, or at least make it the most probable alternative. As thus defined, however, there are two general types of this pro- bation which we may consider. They are the Deductive and the Inductive arguments. i. Deductive Arguments. These are arguments that endeavor to give perfect certitude to the proposition affirmed or denied. I give an illus- tration of its method from mathematics. Suppose I am asked to prove that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. If now I can show either by observation or proof that the 202 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to some quantity which is known or admitted immediately to be equal to two right angles, I can then draw the conclusion desired. The demand and the attempt to give proof assumes that the proposi- tion cannot be immediately seen to be true, at least in the special concrete case. Hence, I try to find some known truth in which the concrete case is evidently included. I first construct my triangle as follows : cL The thing to be proved is the assertion that a + b 4- c = two right angles. Now we know by construction that c + d + e = two right angles. The triangle is also by construction a right-angled triangle, so that c is a right angle and also d + e make a right angle. By drawing the line, separat- ing d and e, parallel with the hypothenuse of the triangle, we make b = d and a = e, according to a proposition in geometry here assumed. The ar- gument then takes the following form : c + d + e two right angles. a+b + c = c + d + e. ..a + b + c = two right angles. He who admits the two premises must thus admit the proposition which was to be proved. It is the same with any other proposition, such as PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION 203 " Democracy is the proper form of government." If it is to be proved, its identity or inclusion in some other admitted proposition must be seen ; that is, we must see that it follows from some other known fact. There are no special subdivisions of this form of argument except the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive syllogism. These have already been explained, and it remains only to mention certain advantages which one or two of them may have over others. The disjunctive syllogism has the value of confining the issue when the debater is careful to observe the demand for complete dis- junction. The hypothetical argument has the ad- vantage of getting the conclusion admitted on the condition that the minor premise is proved. It designs, therefore, to limit the duty of proof to the minor premise by getting consideration for the major premise without committing the affirm- ative to a categorical assertion of it. It is the connection between it and the conclusion that is to be gained with a reservation for the minor premise which has probably to be proved, and which, as representing a simple matter of fact, may be easy of proof. Hence, there are situations in which these forms of argument are preferable to the categorical ; but the debater must use his own insight as to the proper emergencies for the application of them. Disproof, of course, employs the same method, and only tries to establish a con- trary or contradictory proposition. 2. Inductive Arguments. There are arguments that endeavor to show why the conclusion is 204 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT preferable to any other supposition. They should always be recognized as such by the person pre- senting them, if he wishes to escape the charge of certain formal and material fallacies. The in- ductive argument consists in the statement of the facts which suggest the rationality of the conclu- sion. Suppose the thesis is to maintain that the earth moves around the sun. When Copernicus advanced this doctrine he had only an inductive argument to favor it. This consisted in a few simple facts which his theory would explain, but which did not appear to necessitate it. They were first the facts that night and day and the seasons were as consistent with his conception as with the Ptolemaic, while the apparent retrograde motions of the heavenly bodies were more simply explained by his than by the opposing doctrine. In the course of time the case was taken as proved, but at first all that could be asserted was that some facts suggested it and made it possible or probable. Or again, A is bitten by a cobra, and the inference is that he will die. Now, if I can assume as certain that all who are bitten by the cobra must die, the reasoning would be deductive. But it may be that all my knowledge in the case is limited to the fact that some who have been bitten by the cobra die. Instead, therefore, of having deductive proof, I have only the inductive. It will stand as follows : Some (X. Y. Z.) bitten by the cobra die. A is bitten by the cobra. .'. A will die. PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION 2O$ Here the conclusion can only be probable in so far as the premises are concerned, and the man who relies upon this method of proof escapes the necessity of proving the universality of the major premise, and requires only to show a sufficient number of actual facts either easily provable or readily admitted in order to give at least some possibility to the thesis to be established, pro- vided, of course, that he observes the material conditions for inference of any kind. Many prop- ositions, perhaps, are capable only of inductive proof, and the proper sagacity must be shown in deciding this matter. III. CLASSIFICATION AND ARRANGE- MENT OF ARGUMENTS The deductive and inductive arguments which have been discussed assume various forms according to the purpose which they are made to serve. But they are not classified according to the form of the reasoning. They are considered from the kind of force or cogency which they represent in producing con- viction. As to the arrangement of them, there must be some conception of the special situation before any rules can be laid down absolutely about it. The general principle is that the order of arguments must depend upon the state of the mind or minds addressed and the order of de- pendence in the proofs. Hence, we may lay down two general rules which determine the order of stating arguments, and which will be considered after classifying the kinds of arguments. ist. Forms of Argument. Here we have to do, not with merely formal processes, but with 206 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT certain material aspects and relations of facts and truths which give rise to interest and conviction. They may be classified as follows : 1. Analytic Arguments. These are merely the analysis and presentation of what the very con- ception of the thesis* and its terms involves. It partakes usually of the nature, or at least the cer- titude, of deduction, and also of definition. Rather it represents an analysis of all that is implied in the contents of definition. For instance, suppose the issue is " Protection is inexpedient." After defining protection as a tax" on goods not pro- duced by a country in order to encourage such production, it may be seen that such a tax in- volves in its very conception a discrimination against unprotected consumers, and therefore in- expedient or even unjust. This conclusion is the result of mere analysis, or inference from the con- ceptions in the thesis as premises. 2. Synthetic Arguments. Analytic arguments are of the nature of deductions or inferences from the ideas contained in or implied by the thesis itself. But synthetic arguments are of the nature of re- gressive proof, going back to premises containing the thesis as a conclusion. It is thus a process of finding a truth containing the proposition to be proved, and enough more usually to make it true, whatever we may think of the proposition at stake. Thus, in the thesis " Protection is inex- pedient," we should seek the assertion of some general and unquestionable truth, such as " Any policy which favors one class at the expense of another is inexpedient." This is a major premise PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION 207 which will gain easy admission, or impose a heavy task upon an opponent to refute it, and hence it leaves the affirmative the easier task of proving that the minor premise is contained in it as the necessary link in the chain leading to the conclu- sion. The synthetic feature in it is the fact that the thesis seems to be or is a necessary conse- quence of two or more independent, or apparently independent, truths. It is deductive in its nature, as it has been illustrated ; but it is not deductive in the sense that it starts from definition and mere- ly shows that the proposition is a consequence of that definition, but it is deductive only in the sense that it necessarily follows from two prem- ises mediated by the third term and is included in them. But the synthetic argument involves the difficulty of making good the assertion of truths that contain something more comprehensive than the particular conclusion at issue. It is possible also to give the synthetic argument an inductive character. It becomes so according to the nature of the premises. 3. Argument from Antecedent Possibility. This argument is sometimes called antecedent proba- bility, but antecedent possibility is better. It means the argument which shows that there is nothing opposed to the supposition under discus- sion. It may be considered a form of indirect argument. It proves that it is not against reason to suppose the apriori possibility of the proposi- tion, and leaves to other positive evidence the proof of the proposition as a fact. Suppose the issue is whether there is any immaterial substance 208 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT or not. It is an antecedent possibility to show that the conception of such a rea'ity does not contradict any known reality. It is not the slight- est evidence of the fact. No such immaterial reality may exist as a fact. But it is no reason to deny it that there is no positive evidence for it. Hence, wherever there is a tendency to deny the existence of something on the ground of the want of evidence, it is a defence of its possibility to show that no facts stand in the way of supposing it, so that positive belief or conviction only awaits evi- dence. In regard to the particular instance be- fore us, this argument for antecedent possibility consists in showing that the known facts, or the limits of positive knowledge only extend to the denial of evidence for immaterial substance, and not to the denial of its existence. The error, of course, in assuming the latter on the ground of the former, has its counter error in the assumption of its existence because it cannot be positively de- nied. But we must be as careful to avoid this use of the argument as we are desirous of impeaching the opposite side for committing the counter error. We must be careful to show that the ar- gument is only indirect, and not direct. One form of this argument for antecedent pos- sibility is the so-called argument from Analogy, which is based upon the resemblance of relations rather than upon the resemblance of properties be- tween things. For instance, the argument from the habitation of the earth to the habitation of other planets is one of analogy ; or again, from the metamorphosis of the butterfly to immortality. PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION 209 These arguments are often taken for real ones, but in so far as they are arguments at all they are only indirect and of a weak kind even at that. In fact, it might be possible to maintain that the chief, if not the only, function of analogy is to de- fine a conception or issue. But there are probably uses of it where it avails to establish an antece- dent possibility, though it can do no more than this. 4. Argument from Circumstantial Evidence. This is a form of inductive and synthetic proof, and is that form of argument which endeavors to prove a thesis by the presence of certain signs or incidents which suggest it. For instance, I have to show that light has velocity. If I can point to the phenomenon or fact that there is a difference of time in the observation of the eclipses of certain satellites, determined by the position of the earth in its orbit, I may safel'y maintain that my thesis has some probability. If I can collect a number of concurrent facts, I strengthen that probability. A still better in- stance is the following : A man is charged with murder. We wish to prove the accusation. We find certain characteristics in the boot-tracks go- ing away from the murdered person. If we find that the boots of the accused correspond exactly to these characteristics, we have at least presump- tive evidence of his guilt. If, further, we find that the accused possesses bullets or slugs like those found in the body of the murdered person, we have corroborative circumstantial evidence. Un- less this can be of a large and cumulative amount 14 210 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT or of a particular quality, it does not suffice for demonstrative proof, but only establishes a certain degree of probability. It is simply an argument from certain signs, marks, characteristics, coinci- dences, etc., to the probability that a given thesis is true. Whenever we argue from any given at- tribute or phenomenon to an unknown cause, we in fact employ the argument from circumstantial evidence, though the phrase is usually limited to legal situations and problems, where the data from which the inference is drawn are not usually, if ever, attributes of anything, but events and facts apparently independent of the thing to be proved. 5. Personal Argument. This argument may be regarded as a form of circumstantial evidence, though it is not what we should call the ad rem argument, but what I should technically call the argumentum ad personam. So far as the real issue is concerned, this class of arguments is comprised in that which I have called the evasio dictionis, and includes the argumentum ad judicium, argumentum ad populum, argumentum ad hominem, etc. These, we have shown, may be legitimate if they are di- rected to produce conviction, but not tor proving the truth. In debate or argumentative discourse the first object is to produce conviction ; that is, agree- ment or disagreement in regard to the issue, and the material truth must then depend upon other processes than mere reasoning. In order that one side or the other may thus establish this result, it is necessary that each shall be allowed to present a form of argument that involves the other in the PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION 211 conclusion which the latter denies. This is a way of indicating that the truth lies on the side of consistency, only it does not finally decide upon which side the consistency lies. If, for instance, the issue is " The appointing power of the execu- tive should be increased," and the affirmative quotes A as an authority in his favor, it is perfect- ly pertinent for the negative to quote in reply the same authority for facts which contradict this con- clusion. This is an ad hominem argument against the affirmative, and requires either the abandon- ment of his authority or the acceptance of the negative's conclusion. In the appeal to universal consent, or to the convictions of the audience, there is the effort to present facts with some pre- sumptive weight in the conclusion to be sustained. It is the same with the argumentum ad verecundiam. But the authority to which appeal is made in this case must be recognized by the opponent. 6. Argument from Testimony. This is a form of argument based upon the credibility of a witness to real or alleged facts. The facts are circum- stantial evidence of the thesis, and the character of the witness is the measure of the weight at- taching to his testimony on the facts. " The de- gree of weight to be attributed to testimony is always to be estimated by this view of the nature of testimony that it is a sign, implying the facts to which it testifies as more or less necessary conditions of its having been given. Whenever, therefore, occasions or motives exist in the case for giving the testimony other than the truth, the credibility of the witness will be so far impaired. 212 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT We are thus to judge of the credibility of histor- ians. The historian of a sect or of a party must be received as a credible witness only so far as it may appear that truth was the condition of his speaking as he does. All admissions against his own sect or party, unless made as baits or lures, wil-1 be received as honest testimony. If these qualifications are wanting, there is nothing on which testimony can rest." But where honesty and candor, as well as good judgment, exist, the facts attested will have all the weight of these qualities, though this may not be so great as in the case that the facts are personally known by the disputants. This argument from testimony takes two forms : (i) Testimony in regard to facts, and (2) Testi- mony representing matters of opinion. The latter involves the results of judgment and inference, and the former does not go beyond matters of per- ception, in which more people are competent to pronounce than in matters involving interpreta- tion and inference. The second form is some- times called "expert evidence." It me:;: accept the judgment of qualified men where com- mon experience is not a guide. 2d. Arrangement of Arguments. The general principles which regulate the order of stating the arguments are two. They are : (i) The state of the mind addressed ; (2) The dependence of the arguments upon each other. " If the mind addressed be already in a state of belief, and the object of the discourse is to con- firm and strengthen it, then the weaker arguments PROOF AND ARGUMENTATION 213 may generally need to be placed first, and the stronger ones last. But if there be an opposing belief to be set aside, it will be better to advance the stronger first, in order to overthrow opposi- tion at once. The weaker may follow, which will confirm when they would be of no avail in the first assault. In order to leave a strong impres- sion, however, some of the stronger arguments may be reserved for the close ; or what is equiva- lent, the arguments may be recapitulated in the reverse order." When it comes to the consideration of the sec- ond principle, which disregards the state of mind addressed, we have an order that may not repre- sent the order of strength in producing convic- tion, but an order in which the strength itself may be affected by what goes before. The succeeding arguments are supposed to receive additional weight from the cogency of the preceding. Other things being equal, therefore we have the follow- ing rules : (1) Deductive should precede inductive proofs. This assumes that they are both applicable to the issue. In case that only one of them is possible, this rule does not apply, and in case that the state of mind is already one of belief, the order should be reversed. Those also who maintain that induc- tion conditions deduction might adopt the reverse of this order. (2) Analytic proofs should precede the syn- thetic and all others. The reason for this rule is that the analytic argument naturally follows the process of definition, and prepares the way for 214 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT the reference to general principles or particular facts antecedent to the proposition stating the issue, while the analytic argument does not go be- hind the conceptions which define this issue. (3) Antecedent possibility arguments should precede the inductive arguments generally and those from circumstantial evidence in particular. If any presumption against the possibility of the thesis exists, the first thing is to get that out of the way, and the mind is then receptive for the others. But there are no hard-and-fast rules to be fol- lowed for every thesis. The judgment of the debater must be used first to gauge the situation and to adopt the best arrangement to suit it with a general reference to the rules just mentioned. The debater must decide in each particular case both the state of mind addressed and the pro- priety of using the cumulative method of argu- ment. In all cases, however, no matter what the technical name given to the kind of argument, the cumulative argument has great value and weight. This is the successive presentation of arguments that grow in cogency and power, and the order will depend somewhat upon circumstances. The order here will be first antecedent possibility, testimony, circumstantial evidence, personal argu- ment, and deduction. This procedure must or ought to be concluded by a recapitulation which sums up in outline all the arguments that have been presented. Just as definition introduces dis- course, recapitulation should close it. QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1. Define Logic, and show when it is a science and when an art. 2. Define Rhetoric, and show its relation to Logic. 3. Explain the various meanings of the term " law," and more especially its usage in Logic. 4. What is the meaning of the term " thought ? " 5. Name the prelogical processes. 6. Define the logical processes, and state the common characteristic of all of them. What is the distinction between perceiving and apperceiving ? 7. What is the name of the two kinds of Conceptions, and what do they mean ? 8. Define Judgment and Reasoning, and distinguish between them. 9. What are the divisions of Idea-expression ? 10. Define a " theme," and the processes of Explana- tion and Confirmation. 11. What is meant by " analysis " and "synthesis" in Discourse ? CHAPTER II 1. What is a Term or Concept ? 2. What are Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms ? 215 2l6 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT 3. Define and distinguish between Singular and Gen- eral Terms. 4. Define and distinguish between Collective and Dis- tributive Terms ; also between Concrete and Abstract Terms. 5. What is the popular meaning of Abstract and Con- crete Terms, and how is it distinguished from the logical and technical meaning ? 6. In the following list of Terms select the various kinds of them, and explain why they are such, stating whether they are pure or mixed : Act, Beauty, Man, Ability, Presidency, Action, Timeliness, Virtue, Excellence, Wisdom, Agency, Plato, Solitude, Dexterity, Government, Agent, Library, Introduction, Art, Production, Warmth, Science, Truth, Stone, Paper, Society, Personality, Wood, Army, House, Sun, Washington, Chair, Nation, Sweetness, Some, Bible, History, Koran, Prime Minister. 7. Explain the uses of Terms in the following propo- sitions and passages : (a) The inhabitants of Germany constitute a nation. (b) " All men find their own in all men's good, And all men join in noble brotherhood " (f) All standing armies are dangerous to the state. (d) Non omnis moriar (i.e., I shall not all die). (e) All the men cannot lift this weight. (/) Virtue brings its own reward. (g) Society is an organism. (h) All of the regiment was put to flight. (z) Duty cannot be evaded when the nation is- sues a call to arms for the defence of its dignity and humanity. Justice and right must be secured, even if the people cannot form a united resistance to an enemy. All QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 217 the moral forces and interests of the com- munity ought to be arrayed with the gov- ernment in such an emergency, and when the country's chief ruler issues his com- mand for action and obedience. 8. Select and explain the various uses of the following Terms, Positive, Negative, Privitive, and Nego-posi- tive : Tree, Animal, Deaf, Inhuman, Inconclusive, Insensible, Ignorant, Peerlesi, Perfect, ('nartistic, Useful. Impure, Defect, Decarnate, Inconvenient, Blind. Clean, Cold, Dislike, Imperishable, Pure, Bitter, Naked, Inordinate, Uncontrollable. 9. Define and explain Infinitated, Absolute, and Rel- ative Terms. CHAPTER III 1. What is meant by the Predicables? 2. What is meant by the Quantity and Quality, or Ex- tension and Intension of Terms ? 3. Define Genus and Species. What is the relation between them ? 4. Explain the meaning of Conferentia and Differ- entia, and show their relation to each other. 5. Explain the meaning of Essentia and Accidentia. 6. What is the relation between Extension and In- tension ? 7. What is the analysis of Concepts ? Name its forms. 8. Explain and illustrate the processes of Definition, Division, and Partition. What are the rules for each ? 9 Give a logical definition for each of the following concepts : Biped, Nation, Diet, Spirit, Water, Honor, House, Mind, Republic, Action, Religion, Imagination, Club, Money, Matter, Spectacle, Science, Government, Flood. Politics, Poetry, Picture, Heat, Gravitation. 2l8 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT 10. Examine the following definitions : (a) A chair is a thing on which men sit. (b) Ink is a black liquid. (c) Philosophy is knowledge. (d) An animal is a thing which increases in size. (e) A nation is a collective body of men. (f) A triangle is a figure which is formed by the intersection of three straight lines. (g) Death is the opposite of life. (h) A king is one who exercises regal functions. (/) A gentleman is a man who has no visible means of subsistence. (_/) Man is a rational animal of the highest form of development. (k) Science is the study of phenomena with a view to scientific knowledge. (/) Religion is a theory of divine government. (/) Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. () Legislatures are bodies of law-makers. (o) Members of the solar system are anything over which the sun exercises an influence. (/)) Socialism is a theory of government. 11. Apply Logical Division to the following Concepts : Tree, Religion, Matter, Quadrupeds, Vertebrates, Stones, House, Machines, Organisms, Literature, Science, Books, Vegetables, Churches, Employment, Poetry, Laws, Substance, Mammals, Societies. 12. Divide "man" according to color, language, and religion ; " government" according to constitution, territory, and race ; " houses " according to form, ar- chitecture, use, and history ; "vegetables " according to structural form, use, habitat, and history ; " language " according to form, geographical distribution ; " matter' 1 according to density, structure, and use; "books" ac- cording to form, subject, binding, price, age, and utility. QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 219 13. Divide each of the following concepts according to two distinct principles of division : Law, Occupations, Metals, Religion, History, Society, Triangle, Liquids, Instruments, Animals. 14. Analyze the following concepts by partition : Metal, Picture, Cathedral, Knowledge, Religion, Ink, Iron, Stone, Honor, Money, Literature, Book, Plant, House, Water, Virtue, Production, Ice, German, Diamond, Vertebrate, Sensation, Gravitation, Wheat. 15. Apply Partition to the following abstract concep- tions so as to exhibit their qualities either of action or passion : Politeness, Beauty, Comity, Manliness, Courtesy, Wisdom, Justice, Credulity, Purity, Confidence, Generosity, Penitence, Patriotism, Genius, Spirituality. CHAPTER IV 1. Define Analysis of a theme in Discourse. What processes constitute it ? 2. What is the place of Definition in Explanatory Discourse ? 3. What are the uses of Division and Partition in the same ? 4. How is Analysis to be applied ? 5. Define Synthesis in Discourse. 6. What are the laws that regulate Synthesis or Com- position? 7. Define each of the three forms of Composition. 8. Describe the following subjects or themes accord- ing to the various classes of attributes suggested by Par- tition : The Zodiac ; America ; Boston ; Mont Blanc ; Web- ster's Dictionary ; a tree ; a locomotive ; an electric 220 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT telegraph ; a book ; a diamond ; the yErieid ; Paradise Lost; Dante's Inferno ; England; The character of Na- poleon ; Bismarck ; Ohio ; United States ; Atlantic Ocean ; a statesman ; a philosopher ; a poet ; a laborer ; Raphael's Madonna ; a legislature. The elephant ; quadrupeds ; a manufactory ; store ; true manhood ; genius ; politeness ; a horse-race ; plants ; electricity ; commerce ; inflation of the cur- rency ; candor ; temporal power of the Pope ; civiliza- tion of the present century ; a winter landscape ; the medieval Church ; the government of England ; the Roman religion ; Christianity ; commerce ; Greek art ; political institutions. 9. Apply Narration to the following themes with analysis : The Crusades ; the American Revolution ; the Amer- ican Constitution ; the progress of Art ; the battle of Gettysburg ; the French Revolution ; the Life of Glad- stone, of Bismarck, of Pitt ; the glacial epoch ; the formation of habit ; the growth of a plant ; a boat-race ; a game of ball ; a railway collision ; the rise of chival- ry ; the slave trade ; the history of Protection, of Free- trade ; the growth of intelligence ; currency problems in the United States ; growth of the Speaker's power in Congress ; American architecture, etc. 10. Apply Exposition to the following themes with analysis : Government ; religion ; science ; property ; politics ; virtue ; dress ; rhetoric ; manners ; society ; art ; music ; painting ; sculpture ; personality ; the Church ; archi- tecture ; the Papacy ; protestantism ; the social con- tract ; the Constitution ; the Declaration of Indepen- dence ; justice; commerce; business; law; literature; currency ; magnanimity ; self-reliance ; poverty ; civil- ization ; democracy ; empire. QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 221 CHAPTER V 1 . Define a Proposition and distinguish between Univ- ocal and Equivocal Propositions. Illustrate. 2. Define and illustrate each of the Logico-Grammati- cal Propositions. 3. What are the symbols of each of these propositions, and how distinguish them in respect to form and matter ? 4. Define and illustrate both the Logico-Qualitative and the Logico-Quantitative Propositions. 5. How do we reduce the five-fold division of proposi- tions into the two-fold ? 6. State, define, and illustrate the divisions of Equivo- cal Propositions. 7. What are the symbols for each of the Equivocal Propositions, and how reduce them to the Univocal form ? 8. What is meant by the Distribution of terms ? What is the distribution of terms in Definitions and Exclusive Propositions ? 9. Examine the following propositions and resolve them into their proper forms for definite logical use : (a) Man is rational. (b) All men are not wise. (c) Only bipeds have hands. (d) Man alone is not obedient to his instincts. (e) Few elements are metals. (/) Most men are Caucasians. (g) Only those substances which are not subject to gravity are immaterial. (h) All persons except criminals and foreigners are not allowed to vote. 222 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT CHAPTER VI 1. What is meant by the Opposition of Propositions ? 2. How do we treat singular and abstract proposi- tions ? 3. If we assume the falsity of any one of the four propositions, A, E, I, and O, what follows in regard to the others ? 4. How may we disprove propositions, and which is the better form of disproof ? 5. What are the laws of Opposition ? 6. Select pairs of the following propositions and ar- range them so as to show all the various relations illus- trated by them : (a) All metals are elements. (b) Some metals are not elements. (c) No metals are elements. (d) Some metals are elements. (e) Most metals are elements. (f) All metals are not elements. (g) Not all metals are elements. (h) Only metals are elements. (0 Few metals are elements. 7. Examine the relation expressed by the following propositions : (a) One man says that all men are wise and an- other that they are all ignorant. (b) Free trade lowers prices and protection does not. (c) One party asserts that A will be elected presi- dent, and the other that B will be elected president. (d) Mr. X asserts that not a nail was made in this country before 1861. E says that so far from this statement of X being true that in 1856 there were 2,645 nail-machines in QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 223 operation in this country with an output of 86,462 tons, and in 1859 as many as 4,686,- 207 pounds of nails were exported. (e) Will the educated woman marry ? So queried one of our alumnae in a recent magazine article in which the object was to show that she would not. The review roll of our alumnae shows that of 76 ladies who grad- uated in our classes, 32 have already mar- ried. (/) The policy which he now says would have been infamous he was then proposing to adopt. (g) If the appreciation of gold has been the cause of the extraordinary fall in prices, why have ivory and whalebone not fallen in price, but on the contrary have steadily risen in price during the last decade ? CHAPTER VII 1. What is the meaning of inference? Of immediate inference ? Of mediate inference ? 2. Name the divisions of immediate inference. 3. What are the rules for conversion ? What is meant by Convertend and Converse ? 4. What propositions can be converted and what not, and why ? 5. Why cannot proposition I be contraverted ? 6. Why are Definitions and Exclusive propositions real or apparent exceptions to these rules ? 7. What is the technical meaning of the exclusive particle ? 8. What is meant by Conversion by Negation ? 9. What are the rules for Obversion and Contraver- sion ? 224 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT 10. How do we obvert negative propositions ? 11. Define and illustrate inference by Contribution. 12. What is the difference between the two kinds of Contribution ? 13. Define and explain Antithesis. 14. State the logical process by which we pass from each of the following propositions to the succeeding one : (a) All oaks are trees. (b) No oaks are not trees. (c) No not-trees are oaks. (d) All not-trees are not-oaks. (e) All not-trees are not oaks. (/) All oaks are not not-trees. (g) All oaks are trees. (h) All not-trees are not oaks. (/) All not-trees are not-oaks. (j) Some not-oaks are not-trees. (k) Some not-oaks are not trees. (/) Some oaks are trees, (a) (m) Some trees are oaks. () No trees are oaks. (o) All trees are oaks. 15. Apply the various processes of immediate infer- ence to the following propositions : (a) Every man is a biped. (b) Some books are dictionaries. (c) The virtuous alone are happy. (d) No triangle has one side equal to the sum of the other two. (e) " Every consciousness of relation is not cog- nition." (/) Perfect happiness is impossible. (g) A stitch in time saves nine. (//) None think the great unhappy but the great. (*') Few are wise enough to.be virtuous. (j) No one is free who does not control himself. QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 225 (k) Good orators are not always good statesmen. (/) Some inorganic substances do not contain carbon. (m) Only the brave deserve the fair. () All men are not born equal. () All Europeans are Caucasians. All Caucasians are white. (c) All lions are carnivora. All carnivora are devoid of claws. (d) Some animals are quadrupeds. All quadrupeds are vertebrates. (e) Oak trees are evergreen. Pine trees are evergreen. {/) Some Americans are not white. All white persons are Caucasian. QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES CHAPTER IX 229 1. Define each form of simple and complex syllogism or reasoning. 2. How can the enthymeme be completed to form a syllogism ? 3. What are the conditions of a valid sorites ? (a) Europeans are Caucasians because they are white. (b) We cannot know what is false because knowl- edge cannot be deceptive. (c) I am at liberty to do as I please, since he did not deliver the message. (d) A is B because it is C. (e) A is B because C is B. E is A because C is A. Eis A. (/) A manor cannot begin at this day, because a court baron cannot now be founded. CHAPTER X 1. What is the difference between categorical and hypothetical reasoning ? 2. Define each kind of hypothetical reasoning. 3. Give the rules for valid hypothetical reasoning. 4. To what in the categorical syllogism are the moods of hypothetical reasoning equivalent ? 5. What characterizes simple and complex dilemmatic reasoning ? 6. How can hypothetical reasoning be reduced to categorical ? 7. Examine the following instances of hypothetical reasoning, state the moods and convert into categorical syllogisms : 230 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT (a) If education is necessary it will be popular. It is popular, and therefore will be neces- sary. (&) Rain has fallen if the ground is wet ; but the ground is not wet ; and therefore rain has not fallen. (c) If the citizens would reform themselves their government might be improved ; but the citizens will not change their character, and hence no improvement in their gov- ernment can be expected. (d) If rain has fallen the ground is wet ; but rain has not fallen, and therefore the ground is not wet. (e) If the weather is cloudy it will not be warm : but it is warm, and therefore is not cloudy. (f) If food is not scarce the wants of the com- munity are satisfied ; but food is not scarce and hence the wants of the community are satisfied. (g) The ground is wet if rain has fallen ; the ground is wet ; therefore rain has fallen. (k] If citizens do not obey the law, they will not retain their freedom ; but they obey the law and hence retain their freedom. (*) If the ground is wet rain has fallen. But rain has fallen ; therefore the ground is wet. (/) If a man cannot make progress toward per- fection, he must be a brute ; but no man is a brute, and therefore is capable of such progress. (k) If two and two make five in some other planet, Mill's opinion about the matter is correct ; but they do not make five in any place, and hence Mill is wrong. QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES CHAPTER XI 231 1. Define and illustrate disjunctive reasoning. 2. Explain the uses of the symbols of disjunctive prop- ositions. 3. Name and define the two moods of disjunctive reasoning. 4. Upon what does incomplete disjunction depend ? 5. What fallacy characterizes disjunctive reasoning ? 6. Examine the following instances of disjunctive rea- soning, and resolve into both hypothetical and categori- cal syllogisms: (a) Criminals are either good or bad. They are bad. They are not good. (b) The weather will be either clear or warm. It will not be warm. It will be clear. (c) A is either B or C. A is not B. A is C. (d) Aristotle was either very talented or very in- dustrious. He was very industrious. He was not very talented. CHAPTER XII 1. Give the definition and divisions of the several kinds of fallacy. 2. What determines the existence of formal fallacies ? 3. How do we classify the material fallacies ? 4. Define and distinguish between the two kinds of fallacy based upon equivocation. 5. Define and illustrate the fallacies tf petitio principii and non sequitur. 232 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT 6. What are the legitimate uses of the argumcnta ad jndicium, ad populum, etc ? 7. Explain several points of view from which fallacious reasoning can be considered. CHAPTER XIII 1. Define inductive reasoning. Distinguish between Perfect and Imperfect Induction. 2. How do you distinguish between Deduction and Induction ? 3. What is the difference between the formal process in the two kinds of reasoning ? 4. What are the rules for inductive reasoning ? CHAPTER XIV 1. Define what is meant by proof and its two kinds. 2. What is the difference between proof and infer- ence ? 3. What is the difference between direct and indirect proof ? 4. Name and define the various processes involved in proof. 5. How should arguments be classified in logical dis- course ? 6. What is meant by analytic and synthetic argu- ments? 7. Explain the nature of Personal Arguments. 8. What should be the arrangement of arguments ? 9. Apply argumentation with analysis to the following themes, choosing according to conviction or conven- ience whether it shall be proof or disproof : The benefits of the Crusades. The execution of Charles the First. The punishment of Socrates. The policy of protection. The policy of free trade. The QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 233 merits of the classics. Co-education. The freedom of the press. College athletics. The benefits or evils of feudalism. The character of Aaron Burr. The ban- ishment of Napoleon. The execution of the Due d'Enghien. The Hispano-American war. Civil-service reform. Universal suffrage. States rights. The Pel- oponnesian war. Lynch law. Strikes. Boycotting. The necessity of labor unions. Free education. Trusts. Political bosses. The instructor may find it best to supply subjects of current interest. PRACTICAL EXERCISES DEDUCTIVE 1. Personal deformity is an affliction of nature. Disgrace is not an affliction of nature. Therefore personal deformity is not a disgrace. 2. None but animals are quadrupeds. Horses are quadrupeds. Therefore horses are animals. 3. All roses are beautiful. Lilies are not roses. Therefore lilies are not beautiful. 4. Every book is liable to error. Every book is a human production. Therefore all human productions are liable to error. 5. All paper is useful ; and as all that is useful to men is a source of comfort to them, therefore, all paper is a source of comfort to them. 6. Some statesmen are also authors ; for such are Burke, Macaulay, Gladstone, Lord Russell, etc. 7. Some philosophers are logicians. No logicians are ignorant of the works of Aristotle. Therefore some philosophers are not ignorant of the works of Aristotle. 234 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT 8. No persons destitute of imagination are true poets. Some persons destitute of imagination are good logicians. Therefore some true poets are not good logicians. 9. If Caesar was a tyrant he deserved to die. Caesar was not a tyrant. Therefore he did not deserve to die. 10. Good is the object of moral approbation. The highest good is, therefore, the ultimate object of such approbation. 11. If it stops raining the weather will be colder. The weather will be colder. Therefore it will stop raining. 12. It is doubtful whether Caesar will come forth to- day or not. For he is superstitious grown of late. 13. Every man should be moderate ; for excess will Cause disease. 14. All Parisians are Frenchmen. No Chinese are Parisians. Therefore some Chinese are not Frenchmen. 15. Some men are not virtuous. All Americans are men. Therefore some Americans are not virtuous. 16. Blessed are the merciful ; for they shall obtain mercy. 17. As almost all the organs of the body have a known use, the spleen must have some use. 1 8. Some of the inhabitants of the globe are more civ- ilized than others. No savages are more civilized than others. Therefore, some savages are not inhabitants of the globe. 19. Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore, I am). 20. He must be a Mohammedan, for all Mohamme- dans hold these opinions. QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 235 21. He must be a Christian, for only Christians hold these opinions. 22. Logic is either a science or an art. It is a science. Therefore, it is not an art. 23. No idle person can be a successful writer of his- tory ; therefore, Hume, Macaulay, Hallam, and Grote must have been industrious. 24. Every moral man obeys the law ; every citizen does not do so, and therefore is not moral. 25. This explosion must have been occasioned by gunpowder ; for only gunpowder had a sufficient force. 26. Rational beings are accountable for their conduct ; brutes not being rational are exempt from responsibility. 27. All valid syllogisms have three terms. This syllogism has three terms. Therefore, this syllogism is valid. 28. All syllogisms are valid that have three terms. This syllogism has three terms. Therefore, this syllogism is valid. 29. Comets are heavy matter : for otherwise they would not obey gravitation. 30. A charitable man has no merit in relieving dis- tress, because he merely does what is pleasing to him- self. 31. If the government enacts such a law it must either adopt socialism or go into bankruptcy. But it will not enact such a law, and hence there is no danger of either socialism or bankruptcy. 32. None but savages were in America when it was discovered. The Hottentots were savages. Therefore, they were in America when it was dis- covered. 33. None but despots possess absolute power. The Czar of Russia is a despot. Therefore, he possesses absolute power. 236 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT 34. Bacon was a great philosopher and statesman, and he was also a lawyer ; we may infer that any lawyer may be a great philosopher and statesman. 35. Mathematical studies undoubtedly improve the reasoning powers ; but as logic is not a mathematical study we may conclude that it does not improve our rea- soning powers. 36. If a man cannot obey the law he must be either a machine or a demon ; but no man is either of these, and hence he must be able to obey the law. 37. Whatever tends to draw the mind from pursuits of a low nature deserves to be promoted. Classical learning does this, since it gives us a taste for intellectual enjoyments : therefore, it deserves to be promoted. 38. If virtue is involuntary, vice is involuntary. Vice is voluntary. Therefore, virtue is voluntary. 39. All civilized people are inhabitants of the temper- ate zones. Few Indians are civilized, and therefore few Indians are inhabitants of the temperate zones. 40. If pain is severe it will be brief, and if it last long it will be slight ; it is either severe or it lasts long, and therefore will be either brief or slight. 41. Some who are truly wise are not learned ; but the virtuous alone are truly wise ; the learned, therefore, are not always virtuous. FORMAL AND MATERIAL 42. The Americans are a nation, and as the citizens of New York City are Americans, they must be a nation. 43. The right should be enforced by law. Hence, since the exercise of the suffrage is a right, it should be enforced by law. 44. Napoleon was not a great emperor ; for though he would have been great had he succeeded in retaining power, he did not do so. QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 237 45. Seven and nine are odd numbers. Sixteen is seven and nine. Therefore sixteen is an odd number. 46. If capital punishment involves cruelty to its vic- tims it ought to be abolished in favor of some other pen- alty ; if it does no good to society it should also be abolished. But it either involves cruelty to its victims or does no good to society, and hence it ought to be abolished. 47. The Reformers were strongly opposed to the papal supremacy, and as Mr. B. was a reformer, because he favored better politics, he was opposed to the papal supremacy. 48. Knowledge is of no use to anyone in preventing him from committing crime ; for we hear every day of frauds and forgeries which would have never been com- mitted had not the person learned to read and write. 49. Wealth is valuable ; value is purchasing power ; purchasing power is the product of labor, and the prod- uct of labor is property ; therefore, wealth is property. 50. Every rule has exceptions ; this is a rule, and therefore has exceptions ; therefore, there are some rules that have no exceptions. 51. All who think this man innocent think he should not be punished ; you think he should not be punished ; therefore, you think him innocent. 52. All who think this man innocent think he should not be punished ; you think he should be punished ; therefore, you do not think him innocent. 53. The end of punishment is either the protection of society or the reformation of the criminal. Capital pun- ishment ought, therefore, to be abolished, because it neither prevents crimes of violence, nor protects society, nor does it reform the criminal. 54. Haste makes waste, and waste makes want. A man, therefore, never loses by delay. 55. Only the virtuous are truly noble ; some who are 238 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT called noble are not virtuous ; therefore, some who are called noble are not truly noble. 56. All equilateral triangles are equiangular, and therefore, all equiangular triangles are equilateral. 57. For those bent on cultivating their minds by dili- gent study the incitement of academic honors is unnec- essary ; and it is ineffectual for the idle and such as are indifferent to mental improvement ; therefore, the in- citement of academic honors is either unnecessary or ineffectual. 58. Logic, as it was cultivated by the schoolmen, proved a fruitless study ; therefore, logic as it is culti- vated to-day must be a fruitless study. 59. A, B, C, D, and E are the only German students that I know ; they are all men of considerable intellect- ual attainments, and consequently I may infer that all German students are men of considerable intellectual attainments. 60. Repentance is a good quality ; wicked men abound in repentance, and therefore abound in what is good. 61. Warm countries alone produce wine. Spain is a warm country, and therefore produces wine. 62. It is an intensely cold climate that is sufficient to freeze mercury ; the climate of Siberia is sufficient to freeze it, and hence must be intensely cold. 63. No designing person ought to be trusted ; engrav- ers are, by profession, designing persons or designers; therefore, they ought not to be trusted. 64. I will not do this act because it is unjust ; I know it is unjust because my conscience tells me so, and my conscience tells me so because the act is wrong. 65. Is a stone a body ? Yes. Then is not an animal a body ? Yes. Are you an animal ? I think so. Ergo, you are a stone, being a body. 66. If ye were Abraham's children ye would do the works of Abraham. John viii, 39. 67. He that is of God heareth God's words ; ye there- QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 239 fore hear them not, because ye are not of God.JoAn viii, 47. 68. His imbecility of character might have been in- ferred from his proneness to favorites ; for all weak princes have this failing. 69. He is brave who conquers his passions ; he who resists temptation conquers his passions ; so that he who resists temptation is brave. 70. Suicide is not always to be condemned ; for it is but voluntary death, and this has been gladly embraced by many of the greatest heroes of antiquity. 71. All that glitters is not gold; tinsel glitters and therefore is not gold. 72. Meat and drink are the necessaries of life. The revenues of the king were spent on meat and drink, and were therefore spent on the necessaries of life. 73. Nothing but the express-train carries the mail, and as the last train was the express, it must have car- ried the mail. 74. Theft is a crime ; theft was encouraged by the laws of Sparta ; therefore, the laws of Sparta encour- aged crime. 75. Since all gold is a metal, the most rare of all masses of gold must be the most rare of all the metals. 76. He who calls you a man speaks truly ; he who calls you a fool calls you a man ; therefore, he who calls you a fool speaks truly. 77. Protective laws should be abolished, for they are injurious if they produce scarcity, and they are useless if they do not. 78. Detention of property implies at least possession; for detention is natural possession. 79. Profit is interpreted or defined to be advantage ; to take profit then is to take advantage. It is wrong to take advantage of one's neighbor, and therefore it is wrong to take profit. 240 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT 80. Peel's remission of taxes was beneficial ; the taxes remitted by Peel were indirect, and therefore the re- mission of indirect taxes is beneficial. 8r. Some poisons are vegetable ; not poisons are use- ful drugs, and therefore some useful drugs are not vege- table. 82. Whosoever intentionally kills another should suf- fer death ; a soldier, therefore, who kills his enemy should suffer death. 83. Few towns in the country have 500,000 inhabi- tants, and since all such towns ought to have three repre- sentatives in Congress, it is evident that few towns should have three representatives. 84. If Bacon's opinion be right it is improper to stock a new colony with criminals from prison ; but this course we must allow to be proper if the method of colonizing New South Wales be a wise one. If this be wise, there- fore, Bacon's opinion is not right. 85. The people of the country are suffering from fam- ine, and as A, B, and C are people of the country, they must be suffering from the famine. 86. You are not what I am ; I am a man ; therefore, you are not a man. 87. Gold and silver are wealth ; and therefore the diminution of the gold and silver of a country by expor- tation is a diminution of the wealth of the country. 88. The holder of some shares in a lottery is sure to gain a prize, and as I am the holder of some shares in a lottery I am sure to gain a prize. 89. A monopoly of the sugar-refining business is bene- ficial to sugar refiners ; and of the corn trade to corn growers ; and of the silk manufacturers to the silk weav- ers ; of labor to the laborers. Now, all these classes of man make up the community. Therefore, a system of restriction upon competition is beneficial to the com- munity. 90. Over-credulous persons should never be believed, QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 241 and as the ancient historians were in many instances over-credulous they ought never to be believed. 91. That is unfortunate ; you insolently assert that you are a Darwinian, while the truth is that you are a poet. 92. Every incident in the narrative is probable, and hence the narrative may be believed, since it is probable. 93. If a substance is solid it possesses elasticity, and so also it does if it be liquid or gaseous ; but all sub- stances are either solid, liquid or gaseous ; therefore, all substances possess elasticity. 94. Who is most hungry eats most ; who eats least is most hungry ; therefore, who eats least eats most. 95. If the elixir of life is of any value those who take it will improve in health ; now, my friend who has been taking it has improved in health, and therefore the elixir is of value. 96. What produces intoxication should be prohib- ited ; the use of intoxicating liquors causes intoxica- tion ; therefore, the use of spirituous liquors should be prohibited. 97. When we hear that all the righteous people are happy, it is hard to avoid exclaiming, what ! are all the unhappy persons we see thought to be unrighteous ? 98. Italy is a Catholic country, and abounds in beg- gars ; France is also a Catholic country, and therefore abounds in beggars. 99. If it be fated that you recover from your present disease, you will recover, whether you call in a doctor or not ; again, if it be fated that you do not recover from your present disease, you will not recover, whether you call in a doctor or not. But one or the other of these contradictories is fated, and therefore it can be of no service to call in a doctor. 100. All the trees in the park make a thick shade ; this oak tree is one of them, and therefore makes a thick shade. 101. All visible bodies shine by their own or by re- 16 242 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT fleeted light. The moon does not shine by its own ; therefore, it shines by reflected light ; but the sun shines by its own ; therefore, it cannot shine by reflected light. 102. The two propositions, " Aristotle is Living," and " Aristotle is Dead," are both intelligible propositions ; they are both of them true or both of them false, because all intelligible propositions must be either true or false. 103. I am charged with absenteeism from my post, and on that ground I am accused of ignorance in regard to the proper duties of my office. But my accuser him- self, who was my predecessor in the same office, was not longer than five days in the country of which he was the chief officer. 104. Every law is either useless or it occasions hurt to some person ; now, a law that is useless ought to be abolished ; and so ought every law that occasions hurt ; therefore, every law ought to be abolished. 105. Does a grain of millet when dropped on the floor make a sound? No. Does a bushel of millet make any sound under the same circumstances ? Yes. Is there not a determinate proportion between the bushel and the grain ? There is. There must, therefore, be the same proportion between the sonorousness of the two. If one grain be not sonorous, neither can ten thousand grains be so. 106. Injustice is more profitable than justice, because those who do unjust acts gain more than the just. 107. Ruminant animals are those who have cloven feet, and they usually have horns ; the extinct animal which left this foot-print had a cloven foot ; therefore, it was a ruminant animal and had horns. Again, as no beasts of prey are ruminant animals, it cannot have been a beast of prey. 108. Happiness signifies a gratified state of all the faculties. The gratification of faculty is produced by exercise. To be agreeable that exercise must be pro- portionate to the power of the faculty ; if it is insuffi- QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 243 cient discontent arises, and its excess produces weari- ness. Hence, to have complete felicity is to have all the faculties exerted in the ratio of their several develop- ments. 109. I am offered a sum of money to assist this person in gaining the office he desires ; to assist a person is to do him good, and no rule of morality forbids the doing of good ; therefore, no rule of morality forbids my re- ceiving the sum of money for assisting this person to obtain office. no. We must either gratify our vicious propensities or resist them ; the former course will involve us in sin and misery ; the latter requires self-denial. Therefore, we must either fall into sin or practise self-denial. 111. He that can swim needs not despair to fly; for to swim is to fly in a grosser fluid, and to fly is to swim in a subtler fluid. 112. Every moral aim requires the rational means of attaining it ; these means are the establishment of laws ; and as happiness is the moral aim of man it follows that the attainment of it requires the establishment of laws. 113. The several species of brutes were created to prey upon each other, and consequently the human species was created to prey upon them. 114. If any objection can be urged to justify a change of established laws, no laws could be reasonably main- tained ; but some laws can be reasonably maintained ; therefore, no objection that can be urged will justify a change of established laws. 115. Riches are for spending, and spending for honor and good actions. Therefore, extraordinary expense must be limited by the worth of the occasion. 116. If our rulers could be trusted always to look to the best interests of their subjects, monarchy would be the best form of government. But they cannot be trusted ; therefore, monarchy is not the best form of government. 244 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT 117. The good is pleasure, for it results from the due performance of proper functions ; but the good" is a state of consciousness ; therefore, the good is a state of consciousness which results from the due performance of proper functions. 1 1 8. He who bears arms at the command of the mag- istrate does what is lawful for a Christian ; the Swiss in the French service and the British in the American ser- vice bore arms at the command of the magistrate ; therefore, they did what is lawful for a Christian. 119. No soldiers should be brought into the field who are not well qualified to perform their duty ; none but veterans are well qualified to perform their part ; there- fore, none but veterans should be brought into the field. 1 20. Improbable events happen almost every day, but what happens almost every day is a very probable event ; therefore, improbable events are very probable events. 121. The object of war is durable peace; therefore, soldiers are the best peace-makers. 122. Confidence in promises is essential to human in- tercourse and commerce ; for without it the greatest part of our conduct would proceed upon chance. But there can be no confidence in promises if man were not obliged to perform them ; the obligation, therefore, to perform promises is essential to the same ends and in the same degree. 123. The minimum visibile is the least magnitude which can be seen ; no part of it alone is visible, and yet all the parts of it must affect the mind in order that it may be visible ; therefore, every part of it must affect the mind without being visible. 124. He who believes himself to be always in the right in his opinion lays claim to infallibility ; you always be- lieve yourself to be in the right in your opinion ; there- fore, you lay claim to infallibility. 125. If the light is not refracted near the surface of QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 2 45 the moon there cannot be any twilight there ; but if the moon has no atmosphere, light is not refracted near its surface ; therefore, if the moon has no atmosphere it cannot have any twilight. 126. What you say is that virtue is the power of at- taining good? Yes. And you would say that goods are such as health and wealth, and the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honor in the state these are what you call goods ? Yes, all these. Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold. MISCELLANEOUS INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE 127. Geometry contemplates figures. Figure is the termination of magnitude ; but extension in the abstract has no definite determinate magnitude ; whence it fol- lows clearly that it can have no figure, and consequently is not the object of Geometry. 128. The newly discovered painting must be a Ru- bens ; for the conception, the drawing, the tone and tints are precisely those seen in the authentic works of that master. 129. In nine counties, in which the population is from 100 to 150 per square mile, the births to loo marriages are 396 ; in sixteen counties, with a population of 15010 200 per square mile, the births are 39010 100 marriages. Therefore, the number of births per marriage is in- versely related to the density of population, and contra- dicts Malthus's theory of population. 130. " Cramming" for examination is detrimental rather than otherwise ; for I have noticed that, no matter what the subject is, I invariably write a poor paper when I " cram," and a good one when I do not. 246 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT 131. If the earth were of equal density throughout it would be about 2> times as dense as water; but it is about 5X times as dense; therefore, the earth must be of unequal density. 132. The great famine in Ireland began in 1845, and increased until it reached a climax in 1848. During this time agrarian crime increased very rapidly until, in 1848, it was more than three times as great as in 1845. After this it decreased with the return of better crops, until, in 1851, it was only fifty per cent, more than it was in 1845. It is evident from this that a close relation of cause and effect exists between famine and agrarian crime. 133. "Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a man's life worse ? But neither through ignorance, nor having the knowledge but not the power to guard against or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked them ; nor is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that good and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly, and honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure all these things happen equally to good men and bad, being things which make us neither nor worse. Therefore, they are neither good nor evil." Marcus Aurelius. 134. If the majority of those who use public houses are prepared to close them legislation is unnecessary ; but if they are not prepared for such a measure, then to force it on them by outside pressure is both dangerous and unjust. 135. On May 27, 1875, a remarkable shower of small pieces of hay occurred at Monkstown, near Dublin. They appeared floating down from a great height. A similar shower occurred a few days earlier in Denbigh- shire. From this and many similar facts we conclude that the distribution of organisms over continents and QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 247 islands separated by the ocean has been effected by the agency of natural forces. 136. The influence of heat in changing the level of the ground upon which the Temple of Jupiter Serapis stands might be inferred from several circumstances. In the first place, there are numerous hot springs in the vicinity, and when we reflect on the dates of the principal oscilla- tions of level this conclusion is made much more prob- able. Thus, before the Christian era, when Vesuvius was regarded as a spent volcano, the ground upon which the temple stood was several feet above water. But after the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 B.C. the temple was sinking. Subsequently, Vesuvius became dormant, and the foundations of the temple began rising. Again Vesuvius became active and has remained so ever since. During this time the temple has been subsiding again, so far as we know its history. 137. This person may reasonably be supposed to have committed the theft, for he can give no satisfactory account of himself on the night of the alleged offence ; moreover, he is a person of bad character, and being poor is liable to a temptation to steal. 138. Don't you think the possession of gold is good ? Yes, said Ctesippus, and the more the better, and to have money everywhere and always is a good. Cer- tainly, a great good, he said. And you admit that gold is a good ? I have admitted that, he replied. And ought not a man have gold everywhere and always, and as much as possible in himself, and may not he be deemed the happiest of men who has three talents of gold in his stomach, and a talent in his head, and a stater of gold in his eye. Plato's Dialogues. 139. It has been found that linnets when shut up and educated with singing larks the skylark, woodlark, or titlark will adhere entirely to the songs of these larks instead of the natural song of the linnets. We may in- fer, therefore, that birds learn to sing by imitation, and 248 LOGIC AND ARGUMENT that their songs are no more innate than language is in man. 140. The policy of protection was immediately fol- lowed by a great increase in prosperity and wealth of the country, and hence we may infer that the result was due to its connection with the enactment of the protec- tive law. In reply, however, we are told that before the passage of the law the loss by fire in Chicago in one year was $200,000,000, but was only $3,000,000 for the year after its passage, so great was the effect of this act. 141. A man that hath no virtue in himself envieth virtue in others ; for men's minds will either feed upon their own good or upon others' evil, and who wanteth the one will prey upon the other. 142. Five years ago a first-class pair of nickel-plated steel skates, with the necessary clamps to fasten them to the boot or shoe, cost $15. To day, precisely the same article, and with an equal finish and completeness, can be obtained for $4. Three years ago a second grade of nickel-plated steel skates cost $4. The same article can be produced to-day for $1.50. The decline of seventy per cent, in five years, and of sixty per cent, in three years shows just how protection cheapens prices. 143. "'By open discrimination, or by secret rates, drawbacks, and rebates, a few railway managers may subject to their will every business in which transporta- tion is a large element of cost, as absolutely as any ori- ental despot ever controlled the property of his subjects. No civilized community has ever known any body of rulers with such power to distribute at pleasure, among its mercantile classes, prosperity or adversity, wealth or ruin. That this is no abstract or remote danger to society is plain to any man who will look at the condi- tion of trade and of mercantile morals in the United States to-day.' How vivid ! But how absurd ! how un- true ! Our commercial morals are equal to the highest in the world." QUESTIONS AND EXAMPLES 249 144. We observe very frequently that very poor hand- writing characterizes the manuscripts of able men, while the best handwriting is as frequent with those who do little mental work when compared with those whose pen- manship is poor. We may infer, therefore, that poor penmanship is caused by the influence of severe mental occupation. 145. Since there is no harm or evil to the elements themselves in their continual changes into one another, a man should have no'apprehension about the dissolution of all elements. For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil that is according to nature. Marcus Aurelius. 146. " Mr. Gladstone, however, commits himself to the principle that ' all protection is bad.' If this has been his belief ever since he became an advocate of free trade, his conscience must have received many and severe wounds, as session after session, while Chancellor of the Exchequer, he carried through Parliament a bounty may I not say a direct protection ? of ^180,000 to a line of steamers running between England and the United States a protection that began six years before free trade was proclaimed, and was continued nearly twenty years after." UC SOUTHERN A'- 'null HI in 1 1| 000 085 248