PRINCIPLES of GOVERNMENT 
 
 DEDUCED FROM 
 
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 SUPPORTED BT 
 
 ENGLISH EXPERIENCE, 
 
 AND 
 
 OPPOSED TO 
 i 
 
 FRENCH ERRORS. 
 
 By the Rev. R. NARES, A. M. 
 
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 PREFACE. 
 
 A, Preface to a Pamphlet may appear, per* 
 haps, like a veftibule to a cottage ; a grea{ 
 formality to introduce a trifle. There feems, 
 however, to be reafon for it in the prefent 
 cafe. The enfuing meets are confined to 
 general topics ; this place may be allotted to 
 more particular confiderations. 
 
 Mofl of thofe in this country, who either 
 read or converfe, begin at length to be fa- 
 tigued with the difputes between the Englifh 
 and French politicians. The object of this 
 Effay is, to give a newer and more ufeful 
 form to the moil momentous questions that 
 arife from thofe diiputes : to convey what is 
 
 b con-
 
 VI PREFACE. 
 
 conceived to be the truth, in a kind of e!e~ 
 mentary method. The French Revolution 
 and its admirers are, therefore, for the reader's 
 comfort, baniihed to the preface. 
 
 On the fubjecl: of Government, the French 
 are new and unexperienced theorizers. It is 
 not very long that many have been bold 
 enough among them to difcufs the point 
 with any freedom. On a fudden they are 
 become, as fome among them have affected 
 to exprefs it, illuminated: they ftand, as they 
 imagine, on an eminence above mankind, 
 and think they have a wider profpecl than 
 the human eye has ever feen before. This, 
 however, is no proof of real knowledge ; it 
 refembles rather the prefumptuous boaft of 
 ignorance. The boor, who for the firft time 
 climbs a mountain, is furprifed to fee the 
 world fo large, and conceives his knowledge 
 of it to be a wonderful and fingular acquire- 
 ment, yet comprehends as little of its real 
 
 compafs
 
 PREFACE. VU 
 
 compafs and extent, as when he dwelt with- 
 in the bofom of his valley* 
 
 Such fudden illumination is not within the 
 courfe of nature. The French have gone, in- 
 deed, from one extreme to another, they 
 have burft, after long fervility, the chains of 
 defpotifm, and now all is liberty, equality, 
 and rights of man : but this is alfo the com- 
 mon progrefs of ignorance, long ago noted 
 by Satyrift.s.* Men efcaped from chains have 
 always raved as they do of liberty and equa- 
 lity, in proportion to the galling of their 
 former bonds : but this is not wifdom, it is 
 only extravagance. Becaufe one extreme is 
 evidently wrong, the other, they imagine, 
 mufl be right ; but truth, as well as virtue, 
 lefides generally in an intermediate point be- 
 tween fuch utter oppofites. We, too, have had 
 our phrenfies of this kind, but we have long 
 
 * Duin vitant ftuiti vitia in contraria currant* 
 Hor. ftat. I. ii. 24. 
 
 From one extreme fools rufh into another. 
 
 b 2 beer.
 
 Via PREFACE. 
 
 been cured. Thefe new difcoveries of the 
 French were then made here, and had been 
 made before, whenever men were in the 
 humour to throw off all order and reftraint. 
 Jack Cade had as correct a notion of the 
 rights of man as thefimwomen of Paris, and 
 exprefied it very fimilarly.* 
 
 The progrefs of human wifdom in difco- 
 yeries is naturally very flow; and a little 
 ibund experience, properly improved, is bet- 
 ter than whole w T aggon-k>ads of theory. 
 The conftkution of this country is the work 
 of found, deliberate fenfe, proceeding cooly 
 on experience ; it has been conftructed gra- 
 dually from a long fucceflion of experiments, 
 and having thus acquired a form which has 
 obtained the approbation of the wifeft men, 
 
 * tl Cade. Thou doft ride on a foot-cloth, doft thou 
 '•not: — Say. What of that? — Cade. Marry, thou 
 " ought'it not to let thy horfe wear a cloak, when. 
 " honefter men than thou go in their hofe and doub- 
 ■' lets/' Shakefp. Hen. vi. aft.fc. J. and for fuch wife 
 reaions the Arifiscrat, Lord Say, was put to death. 
 
 and,
 
 P R E F A C E.- i& 
 
 and, what is infinitely more deciiive, having 
 been found productive of profperity and public 
 happiuefs, has become renowned and glori- 
 ous, fo far as it is underflood, throughout 
 the civilized world. We prefume not to af- 
 fert it is perfect, for it would not then be hu- 
 man ; but it is excellent ; and in this refpecl 
 peculiarly io, that it has within it the means 
 of going on forever towards perfection, with- 
 out convulsion, violence, or danger. To be 
 always open to improvement, by regular and 
 legal procefs, is one of its moil: ilriking qua- 
 lities. 
 
 The Britilh Constitution is, however, in 
 its prefent irate fo good, that to fludy its 
 eonilruclion, and to comment on the modes 
 by which it is enabled to produce its excellent 
 effects, is perhaps the very beft of ail political 
 exercifes : and if any man may reafonably hope 
 to make difcoveries, and to place this branch 
 of human knowledge within wider limits, it 
 muft be an Englishman, who has well con- 
 sidered
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 fidered and comprehended the rights to which 
 he has been born, and the means by which 
 they are fecured. 
 
 On this ground, rather than with any 
 vain affumption of fuperior wifdom, has the 
 author of thefe meets prefumed to lay down 
 principles, which, being fo concife, upon a 
 fubjecl: fo extenfive and fo intricate, mull be 
 conlidered as a iketch defigned for ready ufe, 
 and not as a complete or finifhed fyflem. 
 If the principles are true, which it is hoped 
 they will be found, every man may build 
 fecurely on them for himfelf. This, at leaft, 
 they feem to have peculiar, that they accord at 
 once with the doclrines of Religion, and 
 the claims of freedom ; and that they lead 
 to peace, good order, and fecurity. Of this 
 i am convinced, that nothing folid can be 
 formed in morality or politics, that has not 
 true Religion for its balis. By the will of 
 God we are placed here, and by that, if we 
 
 are
 
 PREFACE. XI 
 
 are either wife or good, we muft be guided. 
 Nor can thofe fyftems be accounted right, or 
 friendly to the happinefs of men, which 
 lead to violence, injuftice, and confufion, 
 and cannot be eftablifhed, but on the ruins of 
 Religion and morality. The decifions of 
 reafon will here be found to accord with thofe 
 of revelation, fo that they who are infatuated 
 enough to object to either, may reft upon the 
 Gther, and unite in one conclufion. 
 
 The main point to which thefe general 
 reflections tend is to mow, that all the real 
 rights of men and citizens are fecured to us by 
 that form of Government under which we 
 live ; and that all other pretended rights are not 
 only chimerical, but pernicious to Society. 
 
 Revolutions have been lately talked of as 
 if they were in themfelves defirable, inftead 
 of being, as they mould be, the rare and ulti- 
 mate refult of dire necefTity. Common fenfe 
 can eafily difcern, that this is like the error of 
 
 2 a man
 
 Xil PREFACE. 
 
 a man who having feen a good efFect pro- 
 duced by violent medicine, mould deiire to 
 live upon it. It is find, that once a man was 
 cured of an inveterate abfcefs, by the thru ft 
 of a fmall fword through his body ; but fur* 
 gery will furely never ufe this method in the 
 common courfe of practice. 
 
 Efforts have been lately made, with no 
 fmall diligence, to perfuade the people of this 
 country, that even here another Revolution 
 is required ; and to alienate their minds from 
 the eftabliihed conflitution. That thefe en- 
 deavours have met with fmall, or no fuccefs, 
 is owing to that found good fcnfc which makes 
 our people know when they are well. They 
 who hold up to them the example of the 
 French, wim only to miflead them. At the 
 delivery of France from flavery, the Englifh 
 honeftly and generoufly rejoice ; but having 
 no chains of their own to throw afidc, what 
 Ihould they imitate ? If they do not on the 
 whole rejoice, it is becaufe they fee their 
 
 2iei°ii°
 
 PREFACE. Xlll 
 
 neighbours blindly rufhing from one great 
 evil to a worfe ; from an oppreftiye Govern- 
 ment with many faults, to one which, want- 
 ing the firft, principles of order, mull be little 
 befides faults. The horrors that have taken 
 place in every part of France, fmce the de- 
 ftruction of the old imperfect confhtution, 
 are in this country very little known ; and a 
 work might eafily be formed from moil au- 
 thentic materials, containing a detail too 
 mocking to humanity to be perufed with pa- 
 tience. The murders of a few men at Paris 
 and Verfailles are nothing, to the fcenes tha$ 
 have been acted in the country. 
 
 There is reafon to fuppofe that the men 
 who recommend an imitation of the French, 
 defire to introduce that anarchy, and viola- 
 tion of all rights of property which have been 
 there exhibited. We feem to have even a di- 
 rect proof, that hoftility and hatred to our 
 whole conftitution actuates them more than 
 ? ( ny other principle. The proof is this : a 
 
 c man
 
 XIV PREFACE. 
 
 man unconnected with this country, except 
 by the injuries he has done to it, and the pro- 
 tection he at prefent, though unworthily, 
 derives from the equality and mildnefs cf its 
 Laws, put out a paltry pamphlet ; in 
 which, in a rude and ungrammatical ftyle, 
 though not devoid, in parts, offtrength, and 
 a certain coarfe and popular ftyle of declama- 
 tion, he ventured to deliver a libel upon every 
 part of the Englifh Government. He at- 
 tacked, however unfkilfully, the principles 
 of our mod important Laws, the fucceffion 
 to the throne, the act of fettlement, the 
 throne itielf, the Ariftocratic order, and 
 even denied, moil impudently and abfurdly, 
 that we have a confeitution. This pamphlet, 
 however, bafe as it was, both in origin 
 and execution, fpoke out the meaning of the 
 Revolution party, and faid what for them- 
 felves they had not dared to fay. It was 
 extolled, patronized, bought up, reprinted, 
 circulated under forged recommendations, 
 given away ; and all this with the hope that 
 2 its
 
 PREFACE. XV. 
 
 its bold affertions might pafs upon the igno- 
 rant for truth, and that its virulent abufe 
 might leffen at leaft in the minds of the peo- 
 ple, their habitual affection for their country's 
 Laws and Government. Happily the at- 
 tempt has proved abortive, But it has had 
 accidentally this s;ood effect, that it has fet a 
 mark upon the men who hate and would de- 
 ftroy our constitution. The circulators and 
 extollers of this pamphlet muff be of courfe 
 the enemies of all our rights, as much as he 
 who wrote it. This, therefore, isofufe: it 
 lias taught us whom to view as difaffected ; 
 it has made it certain, at leaft, what men 
 we cannot trufr. Between the maxims of 
 that pamphlet they admire, and the principles 
 of the Britifh conftitution, there cannot pof- 
 fibly be formed a medium of reconcilement ; 
 \v\ 'ere the one is loved, the other mnft be hated, 
 fuch men, therefore, take whatever name 
 they pieafe, they are and have declared 
 themfelves the enemies of the Brkiih Confti- 
 tution. 
 
 c 2 "VVLla
 
 XVl f R E F A C E. 
 
 With refpect to the general attack of all 
 the principles of order at prefent fo inclined to 
 fpread in Europe, it is lingular enough that 
 an old poet in this country, lefs known than 
 he deferves, confidered it as a natural confe- 
 rence to arife from the difcovery of printing. 
 Daniel, for he was the writer, afTigned in- 
 deed a period too immediate for the produc- 
 tion of thefe effects ; but were he now alive, 
 he might perhaps be tempted to imagine that 
 his infpiration had been more than merely 
 poetical. He introduces Nemefis inftTuctins 
 Pandora to fow the feeds of mifchief among 
 men, in thefe terms : 
 
 Go therefore thou with all thy ftirring train, 
 Ol fweJling fciences, the gifts of grief ; 
 
 Go loofe the links of that foul-binding chain, 
 Enlarge this unquihtive belief : 
 
 Call up men's fpirits that fimplenefs maintain, 
 
 imter tiieir hearts, and knowledge make the thief, 
 
 To open ail the doors to let in light, 
 
 That all may ail things fee, but what is right. 
 
 Opinion
 
 PREFACE. XVII 
 
 Opinion arm againft. opinion grown ;* 
 
 Make new-born contradictions ftill to rife, 
 
 As if Thebes founder, Cadmus, tongues had fown, 
 Inftead of teeth, for greater mutinies. 
 
 Bring new defended faith, againft faith known ; 
 Weary the foul with contrarieties ; 
 
 Till all Religion become retrogade, 
 
 And that fair tire the mafk of fin be made. 
 
 And better to affect a fpeedy end, 
 
 Let there be found two fatal inftruments,-^ 
 
 The one to publifh, th' other to defend, 
 Impious contention and foul difcontents. 
 
 Make, that inflamped characters may fend 
 
 Abroad to thoufands, thoufand mens intents; 
 
 And in a moment may difpatch much more 
 
 Than could a world of pens perform before. 
 
 Whereby all quarrels, titles, fecrecies, 
 May unto all be prefently made known ; 
 
 Factions prepar'd, parties allur'd to rile, 
 Sedition under falfe pretences fown : 
 
 Whereby the vulgar may become fo wife, 
 That with a felf-prefumption overgrown, 
 
 They may of deepeft myfteries debate, 
 
 Controul their betters, cenfare acts of ft ate. 
 
 * Grown opinion, for mature opinion ; as a man crown for 
 . nan of tall age. 
 
 ■f Piloting and gunpowder. 
 
 And
 
 XVlll PREFACE. 
 
 And then, when this difperfedmifchief iliall 
 Have brought confufion in each myfterie, 
 
 CalPd up contempt ofjlates in general, 
 Rlperfd the humour of impiety ; 
 
 Then have they th' other engine, wherewithal 
 They may torment their felf-wrought mifery. 
 
 And fcourge each other in fo ftrange a wife, 
 
 As time or tyrants never could devife. 
 
 Civil Wars of England, b. vi. ft. 35, &c. 
 
 With this curious antique picture, which 
 feems only an anticipated reprefentation of 
 France, I fhall conclude this introductory 
 addrefs, and leave my readers to confide r 
 whether the principles that I have offered 
 in this treatife are not of a better tendency. 
 
 C O N«
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 Page 
 
 v>»HAP. I. On Government in general i 
 
 II. Of the Rights of Man 12 
 
 III. Of Liberty - - 25 
 
 • IV. Of Laws - - oi 
 
 ■ V. Of Legijlation - - oq 
 
 VI. Of Reprefentation - - 47 
 
 ■ VII. Of the Legislative Body 54 
 
 — VIII. Of the Executive Power 62 
 
 IX. Of the King - - 81 
 
 X. Of the Balance of Powers joo 
 
 XL On the Creation of an Ariflo- 
 
 craiic Order - - _ j j 2 
 
 — XII. Farther Conf derations on an 
 
 Order of Nobility - - _ I22 
 
 XII. On a Religious Eftablifhment 1 2 8 
 
 ■ XIV. On the Right ofReJtJlance 137
 
 ERRATUM. 
 
 Page 17, I.3. " For in truth" &c. feparate from ihs 
 quotation, to which it docs not belong.
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 O F 
 
 GOVERNMENT, &c. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 On Government in general. 
 
 A HE fource of all good government is 
 wifdom : the univerfe is therefore governed 
 perfectly, becaufe the Wifdom that directs it 
 is infinite. Goodnefs, properly, is included in 
 wifdom, becaufe all evil is only deviation 
 from that line of rectitude which perfect Wif- 
 dom difcerns. In human nature, however, 
 where wifdom is imperfect, goodncfs becomes 
 B fenarablc
 
 ( 2 ) 
 
 fcparable from it ; and the two qualities arc 
 found united in many different proportions. 
 In politics, therefore, the fubjec~t of which is 
 man, it is necefTary that wifdom and good- 
 nefs fhould be considered feparately. 
 
 Wifdom and Goodnefs arc univerfally the 
 principles and caufes of Order and Preferva- 
 tion ; Folly and Wicked nefs, of Confufion 
 and Deftru&ion. It is therefore ridit uni- 
 verfally, that the former mould govern, and 
 that the latter fhould be placed under con- 
 troul and government. 
 
 From this plain truth it follows alfo uni- 
 verfally, that, of all forms and iyftems of 
 Government, that mull be the bed:, which 
 mofr. fuccefsfully calls forth the aid of Wifdom 
 and of Goodnefs, and moil effectually reftrains 
 the public operation of Folly and of Wickednefs, 
 By this criterion may every government 
 be tried ; and with a conflant view to this 
 may fy ileitis bell be formed. 
 
 The
 
 ( 3 ) 
 
 The end of human government is the 
 general good of man in fociety.* From 
 wifdom and goodnefs alone can good be rea- 
 fonably expected. Folly and wickednefs being 
 naturally, in full proportion to the validity of 
 their operation, productive of evil. 
 
 Government is not merely defirable to man 
 as a good, but it is abfolutely neceflary to him 
 as a preventative of evil. It is of the firil and 
 flrongeft neeefiity. Without fome advantages 
 it is very poilible to iubiift, but under the 
 preiTure of fome evils, exiftence itfelf be- 
 comes intolerable. Of this nature are the 
 evils that arife from anarchy, or the total 
 want of government. 
 
 * Warburton, in his Alliance of Church and State, B. i. 
 ch. 4. endeavours to prove that civil fociety fecks not 
 allgoodas its end, but only one particulargood, namelv, 
 fecurity to the temporal liberty and property of man. How- 
 ever, as he afterwards explains himfelf, he feems to 
 include under that exprefTion, temporal good In p-encral, 
 which is the real end of civil ibciety>, audits ultimate 
 objecl;. Religion has a farther end, including alfo 
 the termer, the eternal good of man ; to which the for- 
 mer mull give way whenever there is a competition ; 
 and thus their objects arc fufficientlv diftinguifhed. 
 
 B 2 Thefe
 
 ( 4 ) 
 
 Thefe evils, and the confequent neceffity 
 for government, arife from the imperfections 
 of man, and in exact proportion to them. 
 Were all men wife and good, they might all 
 with perfect fafety be left to govern and con- 
 duct themfelves. Other animals being govern- 
 ed by inftinct, which is in fact the wifdom 
 of God imprefled upon them, require no far- 
 ther government. But man, being guided 
 by imperfect reafon, and by will, both of 
 them liable to great perverfion and depravity, 
 requires external government to counteract 
 the natural operation of his follies and his 
 vices. 
 
 Anarchy, or the total want of government, 
 is therefore the greatelt evil that can attend 
 collective bodies of men, as it includes what- 
 ever evils may arife from the want of wifdom, 
 and the perverfion of will ; from the opera- 
 tion of folly and wickednefs altogether unre- 
 il rained. 
 
 A bad
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 A bad government is, in general, only a 
 partial evil. No government can be imagined 
 fo completely bad as not to do fome good ; and 
 whatever good it does is fo much fubftra&ed 
 from the univerfal mifery of anarchy. * A 
 government fo bad as to reverfe the princi- 
 ples here laid down, appointing folly and 
 wickednefs in every inftance to govern, and 
 wifdom and goodnefs to be under their do- 
 minion, could not for an hour fubiift ; it 
 muft deftrov itfelf : like a gjobe of atoms 
 
 ml O 
 
 mutually repelling one another, it would 
 immediately explode and perifh. 
 
 Short of this, the worft government that 
 can be imagined, fo as to deferve the name 
 of government at all, is greatly preferable 
 to anarchy. It may be mended where defi- 
 cient, and affords at lead materials on which 
 
 * I call it univerfal mifery, for in anarchy all the 
 /hong will opprefs all the weak : and ltri&ly fpeak- 
 ing, to opprefs is as miferable as to be opprefTed : if 
 not now, yet in the flate of retribution to which both 
 reafon and religion direct the views of man. 
 
 to
 
 ( 6 ) 
 
 to work. In total confufion, who fhall dil- 
 ccvcr where to make a beginning: ? What 
 will fucceed, no man can pronounce with 
 certainty, as the contingencies on which it 
 mult depend are beyond all calculation. 
 
 Government, being thus neceffary to man, 
 is juftly efteemed facred. For the infinite 
 goodnefs of God cannot butdefire the general 
 good of man, and the ufe of thofe means by 
 which alone it is produced. Thus has go- 
 vernment the fanction of heaven : and thus 
 we fully uiiderftand why it is, that in the 
 genuine revelation of his will, the Almighty 
 has declared himfelf the general guarantee 
 and guardian of every human government. 
 His words are, " Submit yourfelves to every 
 ordinance of man, for the Lord's fake,"* 
 which, though they have been perverted to 
 fupport the abfurd doctrine of paffive yield- 
 ing to oppreffion, have no fuch meaning ; 
 but enforce only the general doctrine of obe- 
 dience : thev declare, that to obev, and to 
 
 Pet. ii. 13. 
 
 fupp 
 
 ort
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 fupport the eflablifhed order of fociety, is 
 not a civil duty only, but a religious obliga- 
 tion. This is the general rule ; in ordinary 
 cafes, the univerfal command : with excep- 
 tions it has no concern. Thefe, if there be 
 any, (as we fhall fee hereafter there are) 
 mud: be deduced from the fame principle as 
 the neceffity of government itfelf, the gene- 
 ral good of men collected in fociety. All 
 other pretended exceptions are falfe, delu- 
 five, and dangerous. * In general, whoever 
 reiifts lawful authority offends not only man, 
 but God. If it be neceifary to change the 
 mode of government, from motives wife and 
 good, that is a consideration wholly different. 
 
 * " The powers that be are ordained of God." Rom. 
 xiii. i. This text does not fuppofe any infallibility in 
 the exifting powers, or a neceffity of fubmitting in all 
 poffible cafes : it is a general afTertion only, and has 
 reference principally to three general truths: i. That 
 from the infinite power of God all other power mud: 
 be derived. 2. That his fuperintending Providence 
 ordains the general courfe of things. 3. That God 
 is, in general, as above faid, the defender of all 
 legal government. 
 
 i Such
 
 ( 8 ) 
 
 Such is the rational principle, and fuch its 
 true connection with religion. That it is juft, 
 and that obedience to fome eflablifhed autho- 
 rity is generally neceflary, may be farther 
 proved experimentally by fubdividing fociety. 
 The fmalleff. human fociety, a private family, 
 cannot be conducted well without good 
 government. Even on fo fmall a fcale, the 
 folly or wickednefs of the greater number 
 muft be over-ruled by fome authority, or all 
 will be confufion and contention. Whoever 
 fhall expect to manage even fo fmall a fociety, 
 by appealing in every {ingle inftance to the 
 reafon of each individual in it, without the 
 intervention of authority, will find that he 
 has badly calculated the effects of folly and 
 perverfenefs, in refilling even the clearefr. 
 arguments. If this take place in fmall 
 focieties, much more will ic certainly happen 
 in the lareefl:. If the necefTitv be inherent 
 in the hrft elements of human fociety, it is 
 impoffible that it mould not be augmented, 
 as the fame component parts are multiplied. 
 
 All
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 All men partake one common nature, and 
 the imperfections eiTentially belonging to that 
 nature mnft of courfe increale as the indivi- 
 duals increafe in number. 
 
 Government being to mankind fo indifpen- 
 fably neceffary, and being, for the fame rea- 
 fons, very difficult to eftablifh, (fince the 
 very fame human infirmities which create 
 that neceffity, excite alfo a fpirit of reiiftance) 
 to endeavour to dilfolve it is the hi^hefl 
 crime, in the fight of God and man, that can 
 be committed againft fociety. To endeavour 
 {o to alter an dftablifhed Government, as to 
 incur the danger of producing anarchy, is 
 criminal in exact proportion to the degree of 
 that danger incurred ; and they who do Co 
 are refponfible, in point of natural juftice, 
 for every evil confequence that may enfue, 
 though not perhaps forefeen or wifhed for 
 by them. Hence does every government, 
 with great juftice and wifdom, inflict its 
 highefl puniihments on thofe who are con- 
 C vi&ed
 
 ( '° ) 
 
 victed of defigning to fubvert it. The faults 
 that may be difcovered in any Government, it 
 is always right, in theoretical (peculation, 
 to remove. But if the proper remedies evi- 
 dently cannot be applied without great danger 
 to the whole, it generally is found, in prac- 
 tice, wifer to endure them. This, however, 
 depends of courfe, on the proportion fubfiir.- 
 ing between the degree of that danger and 
 the prefiure of the evil. There are undoubt- 
 ed! v fome faults too great for men to tolerate 
 from motives of common prudence. 
 
 As Government is intendefrfor the general 
 good of iociety, the beft and furefh tefl of 
 goodnefs in it is the happinefs and profperity 
 of thofe for whom it is conftructed : if thefe 
 be great and linking, it can be with no good 
 intent that evils very partial are noticed and 
 exaggerated. To expect entire perfection is 
 abiurd ; and to hazard the greateit. evils, for 
 the lake of removing fome that icarcely are 
 perceptible, if it be not mere infatuation, mint 
 
 have
 
 ( II ) 
 
 have fome taint of wickednefs. In what 
 eftimation fhould we hold a phyfician, who 
 to remove a blemifh in a finger, would put 
 his patient's life to hazard ? Amendments, 
 that can be peaceably and fafely gained, are 
 at all times to be fought ; but thole improve- 
 ments which beget contention, and awaken 
 malignity, m lift be very confiderable in valus, 
 to repay the price of the attainment. 
 
 C2 CHAP,
 
 ( " ) 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the Rights of Man. 
 
 IT is perfectly falfe, that every man has 
 naturally and ejfentially a right to govern him- 
 felf or to be governed by his own confent ; and 
 the afiertion that he has, is either the boaft of 
 ignorant pride, or the artifice of wickednefs 
 to efcape controul, and to render folly mil- 
 chievous. No man can have a right to do 
 an act. for which he is altogether unfit. Wii- 
 dom and goodnefs alone have, in reafon, any 
 light to govern, fince they alone are fit for it. 
 The foolim and the wicked, therefore, in 
 proportion to the extent of thofe imperfections, 
 are difqualified from Government by nature, 
 or by themfelves, and ou^ht to be controul- 
 ed. But the foolim and the wicked corn- 
 pole no fmall part of mankind, who there- 
 fore mould be ruled ; and if refractory, 
 without their confent, and even againft their 
 2 will.
 
 ( '3 ) 
 
 will. To fuch imperfections, indeed, all men 
 are fo far liable, that there is no complete 
 fecurity againft their prevalence in any 
 individual. Hence, as we have feen, arifes 
 the neceffity for Government ; which being 
 ib conflituted as to be wife and good, may 
 exercife a due controul over the imperfections 
 of all. 
 
 Large bodies of men have no effential right 
 of governing themfelves ; for what no indivi- 
 duals have, the aggregate of individuals cannot 
 have. In facl, experience proves their great 
 nnfitnefs for it ; the acts of very numerous 
 bodies, operating collectively, being for the 
 moft part foolilh, or wicked, or both : and 
 that, for a moil clear and fimple reafbn, fug- 
 gefted by the very nature of man, that paf- 
 Jton is more fir ong than reafon,* 
 
 Still 
 
 * Whoever has confidered unfele&ed bodies of men as 
 
 a£ting together, and the more numerous they are the 
 more ftrongly the obfervation holds, mull know that 
 
 they
 
 ( '4 ) 
 
 Still lei's has a majority any natural or 
 ellcntial right to controul a fmaller number. 
 OccafionalJy indeed, and for the fake of 
 peace, it may be very prudent to agree that 
 queftions (hall be fo decided. Parties nearly 
 balanced will produce a ftrong and perhaps a 
 very pernicious contention, which mould be, 
 if poflible, avoided : and if either party be by 
 agreement to prevail, it feems moil: prudent to 
 allow that preference to the greater number, 
 which, if recourfe was had to violence, it would 
 rnofr. probably be able to obtain : in any other 
 light, the claim of a majority is nothing. If 
 20, 100, 1000, or any number of men, be 
 dcfirpus to act foolifhly or wickedly, the will 
 of anv nnglc man,who wiihes to act virtuouily 
 and wifely ought, in reafon and eflential 
 hi it ice, to prevail again (1 them all. 
 
 they arc directed ufualiy,notbythewifeftcounfeIs, but 
 the moil fpecious, or thole which are moll artfully 
 difplayed ; that they adopt, in general, not the moll 
 virtuous plans, hut thofe which are mo ft flattering to 
 their paffions. It is even worfe, for they who would 
 act wifely, as private men, are often led to act in 
 public foolifhly. 
 
 Power
 
 ( '5 ) 
 
 Power is ufually miftaken for Right ; and 
 from that error is deduced the falfe principle 
 contradicted in the opening of this chapter ; 
 which, though it has of late heen circulated 
 as true, and even laid down as an axiom, is 
 not the lefs erroneous. Great majorities have 
 certainly the natural power of governing. In 
 the collective hody of a people the whole po- 
 litical flrenGfth efientiallv refides ; nor would 
 it he pofiible for any meafure to be effected, 
 however ncceflarv, were the general fenti- 
 ments of a people ftrongly turned againff. it. 
 Even external military force, if they were 
 nearly unanimous, and firmly fixed in enthu- 
 iiaffcic refolution, might extirpate them, but 
 could not govern. Were a whole people refol- 
 ved to live without all Government, a^> far as 
 it is poffible to live in fuch confufion, they 
 certainly might do fo ; but it doea not follow 
 that, becaufe they have this natural power, 
 they alio have a right to exerciie it. 
 Thofe men have been in all times and all 
 countries the mod pernicious members of fo- 
 
 cietv,
 
 ( i6 ) 
 
 clety, who have been diligent to make the 
 people know and feel their natural powers, 
 concealing from them, at the fame time, 
 or not fufnciently explaining and enforcing 
 their natural duties. Whatever is prohibited 
 to man as wrong, mull: be within the reach 
 of natural power, otherwife the prohibition 
 would be foolifh. Power and right are there- 
 fore clearly feparable, and it is abfurd to 
 think that one includes the other, or to con- 
 found things that are naturally fo difiincl:. 
 
 Men taken without choice in very nume- 
 rous majorities of fociety, neither have the 
 wifdom nor the virtue to conduct and govern 
 themfelves ; they cannot, therefore, have 
 a natural right to do fo. By the neceflary 
 operation of man's inherent imperfections, 
 a country governed by the multitude muft be- 
 come the feat of total confufion, and of utter 
 wretchednefs ; the hot-bed of every evil and 
 dcitructive paffion ; or, to ufe the energetic 
 language of the Poet, 
 
 It
 
 ( '7 ) 
 
 It muft become a wildernefs again, 
 Peopled with wolves, its old inhabitants.* 
 For in truth, where all govern, nobody is go- 
 verned. 
 
 la this pernicious ftate, if it were the 
 general and unalterable will of the multi- 
 tude to live, that will could not be over-ruled, 
 but then in all that number every indivi- 
 dual would be highly and atrocioufly guiltv, 
 in the light of God and man, for indulg- 
 ing a propenfity fo deflructive and fo contrary 
 to right. Now the operation of fuch a will 
 is always more or lefs to be apprehended, 
 and from that very circumftance arifes the 
 chief difficulty of political contrivance ; it 
 being one of the mod: inherent evil propenfi- 
 ties of man to refill: controul and govern- 
 ment, and generally with a repugnance the 
 mofl violent and pertinacious when controul 
 
 iicTTEp yap TiAiui7it b£Ai»rov ™ ^mwv xyjfUTTo; = r*v* isTuJ y.c.l 
 ^A-'f.crGcy youa x.y.1 diy.r,; y %ii~ r i-oi CTavlwy* %aXs7rtoVi>1 yxj) ccd.v.i:c 
 
 tx^«- ox\x. Ariflot. Pol. i. cap. 2; Ut enim homo omnibus 
 partibus abfolutus ceteris animalibus longe prxftat, fie £ 
 lege juflitiaque alienus, lit pefllmus. Atrociffima enim eft 
 armata injuftitia. 
 
 D Is
 
 ( »8 ) 
 
 is the moil necefTary ; namely, when his will 
 is bad and dangerous. 
 
 As men have not in reafon any right to 
 govern themfelves, or to be governed by 
 their own confent, fo neither do there ap- 
 pear, in the eftablimed order of nature, any 
 traces of a plan by which they may enjoy 
 that privilege. 
 
 As foon as man is born he is fubject, by 
 the ordinance of nature and of Providence, to 
 the government of others wifer than himfelf: 
 he owes obedience to his parents, or to 
 thofe by whom his infant weaknefs may 
 chance to be protected. If independent rights 
 of felf-government were natural and inhe- 
 rent, they would belong to infants no lels 
 than to adults ; the Rights of Children would 
 deferve as much refpect as the boafled Rights 
 of Man; and confequently no child could 
 juftly be governed but by his own confent ; 
 no parent could have any right to command 
 the children he produced and nourifhed. To 
 
 a fie it
 
 ( '9 ) 
 
 affert which would be no lefs an outrage 
 to reafon than to religion. So far is this from 
 being true, that to controul their children is 
 not only a right of parents, but a duty indif- 
 penfably incumbent on them ; fince other- 
 wife, we know the growing mind would 
 foon become depraved. 
 
 Man is thus born fubjeft to a natural Go- 
 vernment. As he grows to riper age, he muft 
 of courfe be fubject to that Government to 
 which his parents or fupporters owe allegi- 
 ance, and under which they found that fafety 
 and protection they were thus enabled to ex- 
 tend to him. To that which thofe obey who 
 govern him, he muft by implication owe obe- 
 dience : and if at years of full difcretion he 
 refolve to fix his lot in the fame country, 
 he tacitly confents to live there on the terms 
 on which he was at firft fupported, and to 
 continue that implied allegiance. Thus, if 
 there be any Government in the country 
 where he is produced, he is born under an 
 D 2 implied.
 
 ( 2° ) 
 
 implied, and he lives under an actual obli- 
 gation to obey it, and if he difobey, is juftly 
 liable to punifhment. If there be no Govern- 
 ment already eftablifhed, he, and every other 
 individual, is bound in moral obligation to 
 form, as foon as poffible, and with their ut- 
 moft wifdom and goodnefs, that which is {o 
 abfolutely necelTary to the welfare of human 
 fociety. In doing this he will confer the 
 greatefl benefit he can upon the whole com- 
 munity. 
 
 Are there then no Rights of Man ? there 
 are undoubtedly, and thofe of the moir. clear 
 and certain nature. In general terms, what- 
 ever man may reafonably expect from wifdom 
 and from goodnefs, the univerfal foilrces of 
 Government, is his undoubted right. The 
 w ildom and goodnefs of God have given him 
 life, and evidently mean to give a life well 
 w T orth acceptance ; confequently he has a 
 right to expect of human wifdom and good- 
 nefs that they will imitate the Divine, and 
 
 2 endeavour
 
 ( 21 ) 
 
 endeavour to fecure to him his life and all 
 that innocently conduces to its comfort. More 
 particularly may he expect, this, as it is the 
 profeffed defign of Government to promote 
 the general welfare of fociety, which can only 
 be effected by preferving, as far as may be pof- 
 fible, whatever is eflential to the being and 
 well-being of every individual. Now thefe 
 eflentiajs are life, and whatever belongs to the 
 natural perfection of man ; as health, and the 
 integrity of his limbs ; liberty of action, fo far 
 as may be not injurious to others; perfonal li- 
 berty, property, reputation, and that rank and 
 fituation among men which he has fairly and 
 juftly obtained. The fecurity of thefe is 
 neceffary to the happinefs of every man : to 
 have them, therefore, protected is the natural 
 right of every man : and, by every good 
 and well-formed Government, they are ac- 
 cordingly defended. 
 
 Thefe are the Rights of Man, which wif- 
 dom and goodnefs will of courfe endeavour 
 
 to
 
 ( " ) 
 
 to preferve, and which the law of Great Bri- 
 tain recognifes in their very fulleft extent.* 
 Befides thefe there are no natural rights. In 
 general, if a man be defirous to act wifely 
 and virtuoufly, he has a right to expect fup- 
 port and protection ; if he be deiirous to acl: 
 foolifhly or wickedly, he fhould in reason 
 expect that wifdom and goodnefs will exert 
 themfelves to counteract and punifh him : 
 nor has he even the fmalleft ihadow of a 
 right to look for other treatment. 
 
 In every inftance wherein the Rights of 
 Man above enumerated are not fufficiently 
 
 * See them fully detailed by Tudge Blackftone, in 
 his Commentaries, B. i. ch. i. He reduces them to 
 three principal or primary articles, the right of per- 
 fonal fccurity, the right of perfonal liberty, and the 
 right of private property. " Becaufe, he very truly 
 adds, as there is no other known method of ccmpul- 
 fion, or of abridging man's natural free will, but by 
 an infringement or diminution of one or other of 
 thefe important rights, the prefervation of thefe in- 
 violate, may juftly be faid to include the prefervation 
 of our civil immunities, in their largeft and mo ft ex- 
 tenfive fenfe." 
 
 protected,
 
 ( >3 ) 
 
 protected, a Government is doubtlefs faulty, 
 and ought to be amended. The beft 
 Government will contain within itfelf the 
 means of making fuch amendments, when- 
 ever they fhall appear neceflary, without 
 convulfion and without danger : and when- 
 ever there are, in the regular conftitution of 
 a flate, fuch provisions for amendment, the 
 guilt of feeking to produce it by means more 
 violent, and of great hazard, will be very 
 much enhanced. 
 
 To the above fpecified natural Rights of 
 Man the claim of all men is equal ; for it 
 ariles to all from the fame confideration, that 
 of the wifdom and goodnefs of the Creator 
 and common Father of mankind. The moral 
 quality that leads us to refpecl them is deno- 
 minated Juflice : it is the foundation of all 
 Law, and confiders men as fuch, without 
 refpecl to accidental difti notions. The dif- 
 regard of thefe rights is called InjufKce ; and 
 the aft of infringing them bv the violence of 
 
 u 
 
 uperiof
 
 ( 24 ) 
 
 fuperior ftrength, is named Oppreffion. 
 Wherever there is not a fufficient defence 
 provided for them in the conftitution of a 
 flate, there rs an opening for oppreffion ; 
 which it is certainly important to fill up by 
 wife and juft provifions. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 ( * 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of Liberty. 
 
 LIBERTY, in the mofl extended fenfe 
 of the word, is the power of acting without 
 any fpecies of reftraint : of effectuating what- 
 soever the will fuggefts. Such liberty be- 
 longs to God alone ; nor is it fit to be com- 
 municated to any other being. When united 
 with perfect wifdom and goodnefs its effects 
 can only be good : but combined with any 
 degree of imperfection in thofe qualities, it 
 mull become dangerous in exact proportion 
 tQ the quantity of that imperfection. 
 
 Such Liberty, therefore, is denied univer- 
 fally to all inferior beings : In the firft place, 
 phyiically, or naturally ; becaufe their natu- 
 ral powers are limited. In the fecond place, 
 morally, in fuch beings at leaft, as are capa- 
 E hie
 
 ( *« ) 
 
 ble of moral action : all actions in themfelves 
 pernicious, that is, productive of unneceffary 
 evil, being forbidden ; either by reafon, as 
 eflentially offenfive to the nature of that fu- 
 preme Being, whofe goodnefs we difcern 
 throughout his works: or by Revelation, 
 which is an exprefs declaration of that orTen- 
 fivenefs, proceeding from the Deity him- 
 felf. 
 
 The limits of the former reftraint, that 
 which is natural, are abfolute ; fmce 
 no finite being can pofnbly gain liberty 
 to act beyond the limits of his natural 
 powers. The moral reftraint, even when 
 adopted by religion, is conditional ; a moral 
 agent being at liberty, or in other words, 
 having the power, to tranfgrefs the laws of 
 rectitude, and to do thofe things which he 
 knows to be offenfive to God, if he can re- 
 folve to rifk the confequences. 
 
 But
 
 ( 2? ) 
 
 But it is no advantage to fuch moral agent, 
 to a man for initance, to be permitted fo to 
 exercife his natural free agency as to incur 
 a fure and dreadful penalty. On the con- 
 trary, if the natural checks of reafon and of 
 confcience mould not be fufficient to reftrain 
 him, every new reftraint, every fuperadded 
 temporal penalty, that can excite his fears, 
 or over-rule his vicious will, is in truth a wife 
 pro virion for his fafety. 
 
 Liberty, therefore, is not an abfolute good. 
 Nor can it be by any means conducible to 
 the proper happinefs of any man, even in 
 this prefent life, to have the power of acting 
 foolifhly or wickedly. The reftraint of will 
 without juft reafon is indeed an evil ; with 
 it, the advantage far outweighs the pain of 
 the conftraint. 
 
 Liberty, fo far as it is to man a real good, 
 may be denned, the power of following the 
 dictates of the will in all indifferent matters, 
 and of acting in all other-; according to the 
 
 la 
 
 VVp
 
 ( ^ ) 
 
 laws of wifdom and of goodnefs. This Li- 
 berty, which is made up of two of the na- 
 tural rights of man, above enumerated, 
 (page 21) of Liberty of Action, as there de- 
 lined, and perfonal Liberty, which is, in 
 itrictnefs, only a part of the former ;* this 
 Liberty it is, which every wife and virtuous 
 man would flrenuoufly afiert for himfelf, and 
 no leis earneillv endeavour to obtain and to fe- 
 cure for others. For this the men who have 
 fought and died, have fought and died like 
 heroes, and like patriots ; their tombs arc 
 vifited with refpect, and their memory is 
 -t onfecrated by admiration. To this Liberty, 
 they who have endeavoured to fet the divine 
 law in oppofuion, have groflly injured both. 
 "Relig-ion violates it not ; but, with whatever 
 elfe conduces to the true advantage of man- 
 Jilnd, defends and confecrates it. 
 
 * Enumerated Separately, for the fake of ckar- 
 nefs; left any one, not perceiving the implication, 
 ihould imagine it omitted 
 
 Th
 
 ( *9 ) 
 
 The violent abridgement of this rational 
 Liberty, and the other natural rights of men, 
 is oppreffion ; the pain of which will al- 
 ways make men feel the value of that free- 
 dom which they want, and ufually, in time, 
 produce a ftruggle to obtain it, with a flrong 
 enthufiafm to preferve it when acquired. 
 Unhappily the fame fenfations do not make 
 them fully underftand its nature or perceive 
 its proper limits ; whence, in the ferment of 
 their eager paffions, they are apt to feek in- 
 ftead of it licentioufnefs ; and to demand an 
 abfolute Liberty, inflead of that reduced 
 and qualified fpecies, which wifdom knows 
 to be alone conducive to their happinefs.* 
 
 On this pofition, however, we may reft 
 in practice, that in whatever country every 
 
 * In England the true notion of Liberty has, on 
 the whole, been better underftood than in any other 
 country; for though there have been times, even 
 here, when the undefined notions of licentious free- 
 dom iubverted all found Government, yet the people 
 were foon brought to feel and to repent their error. 
 
 man
 
 ( r> ) 
 
 man may do without reftraint, whatever may" 
 be plcafmg or advantageous to himfelf, and 
 not injurious to other individuals, or to the 
 community, Liberty is fufficiently efla- 
 blifhed* 
 
 '* it is of courfc implied, that thefc expediencie? 
 fliould be equitably aicertained, and actions fairly 
 judged ; with permanent fecurity for the continuance 
 of theie advantaae>. 
 
 CHAP-
 
 3 1 
 
 ) 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of Laws. 
 
 jrYs the perfection of all Government de- 
 pends upon the eftabiifhed agency of wifdom 
 and goodnefs, particularly of political good- 
 nefs, which is juitice, it is neceflary that 
 there fhould be fome fixed and public rules 
 by which this benefit may be fecured. Such 
 rules are denominated Laws* 
 
 Laws, known and acknowledged, are, 
 from the imperfection of human nature, 
 equally neceflary for the direction of thofe 
 who govern, and thofe who are governed. 
 For, in the firft place, there would be ma- 
 nifeft danger in furrering every cafe of right 
 and wron£ to be decided as it mould arife. 
 They who were called in as umpires might 
 .be either unwife, unacquainted with the ge- 
 2 neral
 
 ( 32 ) 
 
 neral principles of juftice, or, hi the par- 
 ticular inftance then before them, biaffed by 
 partiality. But Law gives its decifion in 
 general terms, before the cafe occurs, and 
 therefore is impartial ; it is made at times 
 of leifure and reflection ; and, if fitly made, 
 by men who are well verfed in fuch inquiries, 
 diftinguifhed and approved for knowledge, 
 wifdom, and integrity : or it is deduced from 
 long experience, and practices of known and 
 tried utility. Laws thus conftrucled give at 
 lead a promife and ftrong probability of wif- 
 dom and impartial juftice. In the fecond 
 place, Law is neceflary for the general di- 
 rection of men living in fociety ; who, with- 
 out its falutary warnings, might offend un- 
 knowingly againft the general principles of 
 juftice, and the rights which all mould 
 equally refpect. 
 
 Law, to be perfect, fhould ccnfift of the 
 decifions of perfect wifdom and goodnefs, on 
 all fuch matters as concern the regulation of 
 
 fo-
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 fociety. But iuch perfection cannot b,e at- 
 tained or hoped for in any works of man. 
 Were there a divine law promulgated, in 
 that it would be reafonable to expect a per- 
 fect fyftem. There is, in fact, a law exift- 
 ing, which proceeds from a divine authority ; 
 but that law is not formed or meant to, be a 
 guide in politics, or to lay down the plan of 
 of human * Governments ; it is defigned for 
 higher purpofes. This, however, mould be 
 obferved in the formation of all human laws, 
 that they in no refpect may contradict the 
 principles and fpirit of thcfe facred ordinan- 
 ces ; the rcfl is left intirely to the care, the 
 virtue, and the wifdom of mankind. 
 
 The end of Government being the good of 
 men in fociety, the tendency of its chief in- 
 strument, Law, (hould be to fecure to every 
 
 * The law delivered by Mofes was, indeed, a divine 
 law, intended to direct a human polity ; but, accord- 
 ing to a fyftem peculiar and lingular, nor ever meant 
 to be applied to other Governments, 
 
 F man,
 
 ( 34 ) 
 
 man, as much as poffible, the pofleffion of 
 his natural rights, above enumerated, with- 
 out which he can have no full enjoyment of 
 his life, Or any other worldly good. 
 
 One primary eflential of goqd laws is, 
 then, that they mould be equal ; that is, 
 that they mould equally enfure to all, of 
 every rank and fituation, the fame kind of 
 protection ; defending againfl all invasion the 
 natural and inherent rights of every- indivi- 
 dual. Wherefoever there is, in this refpecl, 
 any deficiency, fo far there is, or may be 
 oppreffion. 
 
 The firfl outlines of Law are fimple, clear, 
 and obvious, deduced from thofe neceflities 
 which all men feel alike ; and, confequently, 
 are in every country much the fame. But 
 the complicated intereils of men, united 
 into large fccieties, make it very difficult, 
 in many cafes, to determine what is beft and 
 wifeft. : and there are points, on the compa- 
 rative-
 
 ( 35 ) 
 
 rative expediency of which difputes may be 
 maintained for ever. 
 
 A fyftem of laws, confidered chiefly with 
 refpect to its general tendency and fpirit, is 
 called a Conftitution. It is abfurd to fay, 
 that any country, having laws, is without a 
 conftitution. Thefe may differ in degrees 
 of goodnefs, or they may be intrinfecally 
 bad ; but every country, not in a ftate of fa- 
 vage wildnefsj has fome eftabliflied conftitu- 
 tion of its Government. 
 
 A wife man, if his integrity be equal to 
 his wifdomj may do much towards drawing 
 up a ufeful fyftem or code of laws ; but it is 
 not to be expected that any man, or any 
 body of men, lriall fo far fucceed in an un- 
 dertaking fo extremely difficult and complex, 
 as that the execution of the plan fhall not 
 occafion any evilsj or inconveniencies, nor be 
 liable to any objections. The beft of fpecula- 
 tive judgement is ftill fallible : for which rea- 
 F 2 Ion,
 
 ( 3* ) 
 
 foil, in all matters that refer to practice, the 
 bell: and only certain teft of goodnefs is ex- 
 perience. In politics, perhaps more fre- 
 quently than in any other fcience, the re- 
 mits of actual experiment are found directly 
 contradictory to the firit conclufions of mere 
 theory. But the effects of that which has 
 been long and fairly tried, are known ot 
 courfe. 
 
 To Laws, therefore, formed for general 
 and daily ufe, and affecting by their opera- 
 tion all the various interefts of mankind, 
 their rights and comforts, this teft alone can 
 be with certainty applied ; efpecially when 
 they are viewed together in a fyflem, called 
 a confKtution. Particular Laws mav admit 
 of partial confideration ; but the general re- 
 iult, the tendency and fpirit of the whole, 
 can be afcertained only by experience. 
 Where all the molt important ends of equal 
 law are fully anfwered, where the general 
 and undeniable effects are liberty, fecurky, and 
 
 happinefs,
 
 ( 37 ) 
 
 happinefsj to change the fyflem on the _ fug- 
 geftion of partial views, or even of general 
 theories, however fpecious, mull be the 
 work either of infatuated folly, or of daring 
 wickednefs ; perhaps of both united. 
 
 Whoever undertakes to form a code of 
 laws, or to amend one that exiils" already, 
 will, if he be wife, infert, or will retain with 
 care each particle of ancient inftitutions, that 
 he knows to have received the fanction of 
 experience. 
 
 Fie will not wantonly reject even fuch in- 
 ftitutions as have been merely proved to havs 
 no bad effect ; becaufe what he w T ould fub- 
 flitute might, perhaps, turn out pernicious. 
 He will new model, and not entirely reject 
 all fuch as mall appear to have in part a good, 
 in part an evil tendency. Finally, he will 
 be upon his guard particularly againfr, a pe- 
 tulant fpirit of innovation ; well knowing, 
 that in many cafes, the bed expedients are 
 % moil
 
 ( 3* ) 
 
 thofl obvious, and more curious refine- 
 ments tend rather to perplex than to amend ; 
 and that, on matters the moll intricate, in 
 the great fcience of politics, he is far from 
 being the firft who has thus exercifed his mind. 
 Whoever^ in thefe matters, fancies himfelf 
 wifer than all who ever lived before him, has 
 either not informed himfelf of what they 
 knew, or is befotted in his own prefump- 
 tioru 
 
 CHAP,
 
 ( 39 ) 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of Legijlation, 
 
 BECAUSE, as was remarked above, no 
 human wifdom can compofe a perfect code of 
 laws, and experience, the befl teacher of 
 fuch knowledge will, from time to time, 
 fuggeft improvements upon fuch as have been 
 made, it is neceflary that a permanent, and 
 always active power of legiflation mould exifl 
 in every flate. 
 
 Nor is it merely for the fake of introdu- 
 cing fuch amendments as additional know- 
 ledge may prove requifite, that this provifion 
 muft be made. Circumftances themfelves 
 are liable to change ; and different fituations 
 of political bodies will call, undoubtedly, for 
 different regulations. The great outlines of 
 right and juflice are indeed unchangeable ; 
 
 but
 
 ( 4o ) 
 
 but many of thofe particulars which make 
 up the vaft detail of national policy, muft 
 frequently require a frefh modification. New 
 interests, new relations, and new expedien- 
 cies may arife, which could not be provided 
 for, till time had brought them forth. 
 Local and temporary laws will fometimes be 
 required, or a temporary fufpenfion of fome 
 laws that are in general necefTary. 
 
 To obviate thefe and fimilar neceffities, to 
 which all human Governments mull: be for 
 ever liable, a proper power muft be eitabllm- 
 ed. Whence the queftion unavoidably arifes, 
 in what manner fuch a power may beft be 
 xc&cd. 
 
 The power exifts, without a doubt, origi- 
 naliy, in the general body of the people ; 
 that is to fay, the collective ftrength of 
 vaft majorities is fuch, that, as no Government 
 could be formed at firft againft their will, 
 nor any laws enforced, fo neither without 
 
 their
 
 ( 4! ) 
 
 their confcnt, or at lead their acquiefcence, 
 can any changes be reduced to practice. But 
 as in the former cafes they were flhown above 
 to be bound by reafons of expedience and of 
 re&itude, or natural duty, to allow a Govern- 
 ment and Laws to be eftablifhed ; fo are 
 they held, in this point alfo, by the fame 
 ftrong ties, to give confent to fuch a plan of 
 permanent legiflation as wifdom and as jus- 
 tice fhall require ; and to let the power be 
 veiled wherever it may belt effect: the wel- 
 fare of the whole community. 
 
 For the purpofes of fuch legiflation ; for 
 deliberating with folidity of judgement, and 
 an ample range of intelligence on matters of 
 iome intricacy ; for comparing old eflablifh- 
 ments with new propofals ; deciding upon 
 the exigence of untried fituations, or difcern- 
 ing cjifUnt tendencies, the mofl numerous 
 clafTes of a people, the tradefmen, artifans, 
 mechanics, and all below them included in 
 name of populace, cannot poflibly be fit. It 
 G cannot
 
 ( 42 ) 
 
 cannot happen that their minds, unpractifed 
 in the careful life of the arts of reafon, and 
 by their neceffary habits of life incapable 
 of being fo exercifed, fhould ever gain the 
 power of duly weighing queftions of great 
 difficulty, or unravelling the intricacies of 
 political expediency. 
 
 Recurring to our principles, we find, that 
 the qualities required for this, as well as every 
 other purpofe of legiflation, are wifdom and 
 goodnefs. But a populace enacting laws will 
 always be an agent doing that for which he 
 cannot pofiibly be qualified ; and consequent- 
 ly doing very wrongly. Such laws will have 
 but little chance of being wife ; nor will 
 there be much greater hope of goodnefs in 
 the motives of decifion. A popular affembly 
 is the region both of prejudice and paffion ; 
 and the evil paffion s are by far more eafily 
 excited than the virtuous feelings. An afXem- 
 bly of that nature cannot think, and the men 
 who fuggeft. thoughts to it, will, probably, 
 
 contrive
 
 ( 43 ) 
 
 Contrive that they fhall be directed to their 
 own individual advantage. Such has been 
 the general hiftory of democratic legi nation.* 
 
 The numbers, then, who have the ftrength 
 have not the right to legiflate. There can- 
 not be a moral right for acting wrongly. For 
 their own fakes, for the fake of the commu- 
 nity at large, they mull; relinquish what they 
 cannot juftly afiert. It would be a fooliih 
 and a wicked jealoufy which mould make 
 them obftinately hold a power they cannot 
 rightly exerciie. If an obfervation of the ftars 
 could be of public necefiiry, the unlearned 
 in fuch fciences would hardly claim the right 
 of making it. In many refpects, the art of 
 legiflation is frill more difficult, and more 
 beyond the reach of common minds ; in all 
 refpects, it is a much more dangerous art for 
 thofe to try who cannot know its principles. 
 
 ■* See particularly in the hiftories of Athens and 
 of Rome. 
 
 G 2 'Whee
 
 ( 44 ) 
 
 Where then muft we feek our legiflators ? 
 Within thofe clafles, furely, wherein by edu- 
 cation, leifure, and other collateral advantages, 
 the ampleft means of knowledge and of wif- 
 dom are enjoyed. We cannot, indeed, with 
 any certainty collect in human fociety the 
 wifdom and the goodnefs which would h# 
 molt clelirable ; but we may and ought to 
 take the faired: chance we can of, finding 
 both ; and after that, have only to reftraiiji, as 
 much as poffible, the means of doing evil. 
 Thus approaching, as in other human contri- 
 vances, as near as may be to that perfection v 
 which we cannot fully reach* 
 
 The chance of wifdom will then be belt 
 fecured, by taking men of liberal education, 
 enjoying leifure, and all other means of infor- 
 mation, and mental improvement. For vir- 
 tuous conduct fome tolerable fecurity may be 
 obtained from general character, and itill more 
 from vigilant infpection, and the jealous fu- 
 perintendence of the public eye. 
 
 . % The
 
 ( 45 ) 
 
 The legislative power is of necefiity, and 
 by its very nature, great ; and the evil princi- 
 pally to be apprehended from its abufe is op- 
 preffion. But of this, we muft remember, the 
 body of the people is the befb and only ade- 
 quate judge : they certainly can tell whe- 
 ther they are themfelves oppreffed or not ; 
 can feel where they are hurt, and teftify their 
 w r ifh to be relieved : and it is the very per- 
 fection of political contrivance, that every 
 man mould be employed in doing that for 
 which he is moll fit. 
 
 Eftablim then this intercourfe between the 
 people and their legiflators, that the former 
 may, at certain intervals, nominate the latter ; 
 and you will obtain in the firft place, the 
 fanction of current opinion for the characters 
 of thofe appointed, and in the fecond, a con- 
 stant check upon the abufe of the legifiative 
 power, and the introduction of oppreflive 
 laws. 
 
 For
 
 ( 46 •> 
 
 For thefe purpofes, the befl expedient jet 
 deviled is that of reprefentation ; by means 
 of which the legiflators are felecled from the 
 moil enlightened claries of fociety, and indi- 
 vidually called forward to that pod by public 
 choice and approbation. To the considera- 
 tion of this fubjecl the enfuing chapter mall 
 be fet. apart. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of Reprefentatiofi. 
 
 Representation is not founded * 
 
 any right inherent naturally in man to 
 Jegiflate for himfelf, or to be governed by his 
 own confent ; for it has been proved that no 
 fuch right exifls : but on the right he has 
 undoubtedly of being preferved from all oppref- 
 iion : for fecuring the enjoyment of which 
 right, it feems, as was before obferved, the 
 befl devifed expedient that has yet been tried. 
 
 It may be defined a mode, by which the 
 body of a people formally concedes its natu- 
 ral power of legiflation, to thofe who have 
 more right to exercife it ; namely, to thofe 
 w r ho are more likely to employ it properly ; 
 retaining fo much influence as may fufficc 
 to guard them from oppreflioii. 
 
 Rep re-
 
 ( 43 ) 
 
 Reprefentation is therefore perfect, not 
 when every individual has a vote, * which 
 is neither requifi tenor practicable, but when, 
 throughout a country, they who are moft 
 liable to furTer from oppreflive laws, are en- 
 abled to felecl: as legiflators, thofe who are 
 moll: likely to fulfil the duties of that office 
 with wifdom and integrity. 
 
 To preferve the necefTary influence of the 
 people over thofe they thus elect, it is re- 
 quired that they mould have the power of 
 changing them occafionally, or of re-electing, 
 The proper periods for exerting this power 
 cannot perhaps be flrictly afcertained by the- 
 ory. The following general limits muft, 
 however, be attended to : that the time muft 
 neither be folon «; as to make the lesiilators care- 
 lefs of the feelings of the people ; nor fo fhort 
 as to render them the flaves of their caprices. 
 Thefe cautions are fuggefted the very fpirit of 
 the definition. There are befides collateral evils, 
 
 * I fay every individual, for if every man had an. 
 inherent right to vote, every woman would have it 
 alfo, if not every child of age to exercife it. 
 
 ariiinsc
 
 ( 49 ) 
 
 arising from too frequent elections, which, 
 with many other points, experience will 
 heft afcertain, In England, feven years have 
 been found a period very convenient for the 
 duration of the legiflative body ; and though 
 there ftill are many advocates for quicker 
 returns of nomination, it does not yet appear 
 to have been proved that the inconveniences 
 of fuch a method would not overbalance its 
 advantages. 
 
 To the quefHon, " who mall be the elec- 
 " tors ?" The general anfwer that fuggefts 
 itfelf is this : in every diftrict of the nation, 
 fome, that the interefts of no part may be 
 neglected ; but all, upon important ques- 
 tions, may be compared and duly balanced. 
 As to number, the electors mould be, upon 
 the whole, fo many, that the general body of 
 the nation may have juft realon to be fatif- 
 fied with the influence it reta'ns ; and that, 
 in facl, whenever, upon any public meafure, 
 it fhall be deemed expedient to know the 
 XI feelings
 
 ( 5° ) 
 
 feelings of the nation, its general fentiments 
 may be collected fairly from the tendency of 
 the elections.* 
 
 Principal divifions of a kingdom, and prin- 
 cipal towns, mould properly be reprefented ; 
 and the number of electors in each mould, 
 according to theory, be regulated by local 
 circumitances. Bat thefe may vary much at 
 different times ; places once important, may 
 be at length reduced, and others of no note 
 may rife to eminence ; if, however, on the 
 whole, the general effects above frated be 
 produced, it will molt commonly be better 
 that fuch partial imperfections mould be tole- 
 rated, than that alterations mould be hazarded 
 which mull produce great jealoufy and fer- 
 mentation. The great object in politics, is 
 
 * According to the modern notions of right, nothing 
 can in juftice do away the claim of any individual to a 
 vote; but this difficulty is one of the phantoms con- 
 jured up by faife theory, and at the touch of reafon 
 vaniflies. 
 
 not
 
 ( 51 ) 
 
 not theoretical perfection, but practical ex- 
 pedience and fecurity. 
 
 The right of voting in fuch elections, ex- 
 tended itt every cafe as far as local conveni- 
 ence will permit, mould not however delcend 
 below the iphere of property. From total 
 indigence or dependence of fituation, little 
 fagacity and little freedom of choice can be 
 expected-; corruption and influence will there 
 of courfe prevail, and defeat the genuine pur- 
 pofe of the inftitution. Property, (befides 
 that it is the moil vulnerable part of civil 
 rights, being neceffarily fubject to taxation, 
 and to depreciation from various caufes, and 
 requiring therefore the moil efficacious de- 
 fence) has this peculiar advantage in its na- 
 tural effects on thofe who have it, that it 
 creates a fpirit of independence, and an ac- 
 tive jealoufy for the defence of every other 
 real right of man. He who has a houfe, and 
 family, and goods ; and in his trade, at leaft, 
 or other ofteniible means of fubfiflence, a 
 H 2 kind
 
 { t* 5 
 
 kind of independence, will be alarmed at 
 every movement that may hurt or touch 
 him, in any of thefe vulnerable parts. He 
 will watch with anxious eye even the re- 
 moteft inroads of oppreffion. Whereas a 
 man detached from all fuch ties, has only 
 perfonal fecurity to guard, of which, perhaps, 
 he may be thoughtlefs ; or perfonal advan- 
 tage to provide for, which oftener will fe- 
 duce him from his duty to the public, than 
 confirm him in it. 
 
 Property is, therefore, the beft criterion 
 whereby we can confer the right of voting * 
 which, where the numbers will not thus be 
 made too great, may be extended to every 
 man who has a houfe or a lodging, with fome 
 oftenfible fubflftence for himfelf and family, 
 Limitations, where neceflary, muft be di- 
 rected by the general fpirit of thefe obferva- 
 tions ; excluding thofe who have the leafr, 
 for thofe who have the ftronger intereft. in the 
 public welfare, 
 
 Reprefen-
 
 ( S3 ) 
 
 Reprefentation, with great advantages, 
 has alio fome attendant inconveniencies* 
 Elections, in very popular towns, can hardly 
 be preferved from the difgrace of grofs cor- 
 ruption, idlenefs, and tumult. In fuch fitua- 
 tions, the right mould, therefore, be as much 
 confined as is confident with the general 
 principles of reprefentation ; and the time of 
 election as much abridged as poflible. With 
 thefe, and all reftriftions, an election in a 
 populous and bufy place, will generally be 
 found a temporary evil, and therefore mould 
 not, without good caufe, be frequently re- 
 newed, 
 
 CHAP.
 
 ( S4r ) 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the Legijlative Body. 
 
 JLN what clafs of fociety the legiflators fhould 
 be chofen, has been already ftated. The de~ 
 fcription points at perfons in a fituatiorL to 
 have been well and liberally educated ; in af- 
 fluent, or at leaft in eafy circumftances. In 
 general, the greater the fortune of the repre- 
 fentative, the ftronger his fecurity from fome 
 temotations ; though this rule is not infalli- 
 ble. Great landed property, and in fome 
 meafure, all great property, has this addi- 
 tional advantage, that it produces a ftrong 
 intereft to promote the general welfare of the 
 country, by the diftrefs of which, thofe will be 
 affected in the greatefl meafure and proportion, 
 who have the moll: extended poffefiions to 
 fuffer depreciation, plunder, or deflruction. 
 The interefls of a country, however di- 
 verfified in form, are all connected, more or 
 i lefs,
 
 ( 55 ) 
 
 lefs, with landed property. The price of 
 labour, of provifions, of manufactures, all 
 immediately affect the holder of land ; who 
 cannot therefore injure thofe who labour, 
 who raife provifions, or produce manufac- 
 tures, without partaking in their lofs or dif- 
 
 advantage.* 
 
 Among the numbers fuch a clafs may fur- 
 nilh, thofe will be the fitted to be legislators, 
 who mall be diftinguiihed for abilities, in- 
 tegrity, political experience, or knowledge 
 extenfive and accurate, in any of thofe vari- 
 ous matters which may become, in fuch af- 
 femblies, the fubject of inquiry or delibera- 
 tion. To fuch men, the public choice will 
 of itfelf moll: naturally tend ; by means of the 
 reipect which common fame will always pay 
 to characters of this defcription : it would, 
 perhaps, fo tend in every inftance, were it 
 
 * It is found in fact, that in this nation, thofe who 
 are called the country gentlemen, men of extenfivc 
 landed property, form the iteadieft and moft uncor- 
 rupted fource of legiilation. 
 
 poffiblc
 
 ( 5* ) 
 
 pofiiblc entirely to deftroy the influence of 
 fome fecret motives, which the mofl pru- 
 dential regulations can diminifh only. To 
 felect fuch legiflators is undoubtedly the in- 
 tereft and the duty of thofe who are allowed 
 to vote ; which if they neglect, they mufl at 
 their own rrfk abide the confequences. 
 
 The legislative body, powerful by the 
 very nature of its office, fhould have no ex- 
 clusive privileges, but fuch as tend to give it 
 dignity. The laws its members form for 
 others muft be binding alfo on themfelves : 
 nor mould they claim exemption from any 
 public burthen, fuch only excepted as may 
 be incompatible with their chief truft and 
 duty. 
 
 From this afTembly taxes, with the plan 
 and mode of their affeflment and collection, 
 mould originate. Becaufe, connected as it is 
 with every diftricl: of the nation, the intereft 
 of the whole mull: there be known : and be- 
 caufe
 
 ( 57 ) 
 
 caufe by the great weight of property its 
 members cany with them, they mult be 
 deeplv interefled to prevent oppreffive and 
 uneaual burthens. Befides, which is indeed 
 the moft material point, they are at ftated 
 times refponfible for their proceedings to the 
 general body of the nation, which will not 
 fail on iiich occasions to make its feelings 
 known. 
 
 To fecure this ialutary effect, the votes 
 of the affembly and its proceedings mould 
 fo far be public, that it may be always 
 known from whom each meafure fir ft origi- 
 nated, and bv whom it was {"imported ; but 
 its deliberations mould be ftricUy facred at 
 all times from all cabal, interruption, and in- 
 fluence ; from infult, and every kind of dif- 
 refpect. 
 
 The proper time for the duration of one 
 affembly, before a re-election, has been above 
 confidered. (p. 33.) Proviiion mull be alfo 
 
 1 made
 
 ( 5« ) 
 
 made by law, that too long time may never 
 intervene, by any means, between the diffolu- 
 tioa of one houfe of reprefentatives, and the 
 aflembling of another ; left the nation mould 
 be left without its legiflators, and the public 
 bufinefs ftand fufpended, or be carried on 
 without due reference to thole whofe office is 
 to check the inroads of oppreffion. 
 
 The fltteft number of which affemblies of 
 this nature can confift, is among the points 
 which cannot ftriclly be defined : it will of 
 courfe be regulated in part by the extent and 
 magnitude of the community there reprefent- 
 ed. But this at leaft mould be obierved, that 
 there be in every fuch aifembly fuch a num- 
 ber, that all queftions of importance or of 
 difficulty may receive a due difcuilion, and 
 be illuftrated by various and extenfive views, 
 the refult of different minds, and different 
 habits of confideration. It muft alfo, on the 
 other hand, be recollected, that very nume- 
 rous affemblies are tumultuous rather than 
 
 wife,
 
 ( 59 ) 
 
 wife, and like bodies of unwieldy magnitude, 
 impede their own operations. Experience 
 feems to mow that the utmoft bounds of 
 number, fo as to be at all confident with 
 convenience, order, and wife deliberation, 
 fbind far below a thoufand. * 
 
 From the principles laid down in this and 
 the preceding chapter, we fee beyond a 
 doubt, how perfectly abfurd mufl be the no- 
 tion of directions given by the electors to the 
 legiflators ; and how completely the permif- 
 fion of it would counteract the very purpofes 
 for which a reprefentative is chofen. ~j- The 
 
 * The national affembly of France feems to afford, 
 not: a refutation, but a proof of this affertion. 
 
 -j- It may be granted, that the word reprefentative 
 implies apparently mere perfonai fubftitution ; but it 
 mult be granted alfo, that, in many cafes, ifthele- 
 giilator reprefented, by any ftrong refemblance of 
 character and acquifitions, thefe by whom he rnufl 
 be nominated, a houfe of this kind would be ftrangely 
 filled. Grammatical diftindtions are not always of 
 the fir ft importance. 
 
 I ?- body
 
 C 60 ) 
 
 body of a people unable, from defect of wif- 
 dom, or knowledge, to legiflate for itfelf, 
 choofes thofe who feem deierving of that 
 trnft, among the men who are mod likelv 
 to be duly qualified. In thefe then it is ne- 
 ceflary, for the time, to place full confi- 
 dence : fmce to appoint a v. Her man to act, 
 and then prefume to tell him what to do, is 
 in confident. It is to confers, in the fir ft in- 
 ftance, comparative inability, and then afTume 
 fliperiority : to call in a phyfician, and then 
 attempt to teach him what he fhould admin li- 
 ter : to chooie an abler pilot, and then feize 
 the helm. W hen queftions are expected to 
 be moved, in which the people lake a lively 
 mtereft, it is very natural that electors, not 
 reflecting duly on the nature of their office, 
 mould be defirous to impofe directions ; but 
 .it mould not be permitted. Notions the mcfc 
 popular may yet be perfectly erroneous ; and 
 it is fit that every quefHon mould be fub- 
 piiitted fairly to the full difcuiiion of wifdom, 
 
 and
 
 ( 6i ) 
 
 and tried bv the flronsr teft of argument, not 
 curie J bv the force of popular opinion. * 
 
 * Mr. Burke, in a fpeech to his conftituents at 
 Briftol in 1774, very ably argued the fame point, 
 iC Government and legiflation are matters of reaion 
 and judgement, and not of inclination; and what fort 
 of reafon is that, in which the determination precedes 
 the difcuihon ; in which one let of men deliberate and 
 another decide ; and where thole who form the con- 
 clufion are perhaps three hundred miles diltant from 
 thofe who hear the arguments?" W ith more to the 
 
 C II A P.
 
 C 6* ) 
 
 C H A P. VIII. 
 
 Of the Executive Power. 
 
 -LAWS, to be completely perfect, lhould 
 have, among their other properties, that of 
 enforcing their own execution ; for, if they 
 are effentially good, every failure of their 
 operation, or delay in it, mud be, in fome 
 degree, an evil. Such are the laws of God 
 eitablifhed in the vifible creation : they ope- 
 rate of neceffitv without external ai.l ; and 
 in every time and fituation, according to the 
 irate of circumftances. 
 
 Human laws, however, cannot have this 
 excellence: the powers of man are not fuf 
 ficient to confer it : they are dead, and their 
 operation mufl be provided for by means ex- 
 traneous to then:. They cannot enforce, 
 
 thev
 
 ( 6 3 ) 
 
 iliey cannot even, with certainty, explain 
 themielves ; for both which purpofes there 
 muft be proper officers appointed. 
 
 To defcend to the detail of fuch arrange- 
 ments, is foreign to the purpofe of this trea- 
 tile. Suffice it to fay, generally, that, in 
 every department of them, knowledge and 
 integrity muft be the qualities required ; and 
 that the removal of temptation, and the re- 
 ftriction of bad difpoiitions, muft be provided 
 for by every poirible attention. 
 
 While all is peaceable and regular, the ordi- 
 nary officers of law will, perhaps, be fully able 
 to enforce its execution. But, as there may 
 arife, from various caufes, a difpofition to 
 refill, the means muft alfo be provided of 
 aiming law with power to bear down oppo- 
 sition. 
 
 The whole force of the ftate mould be, if 
 poffible, concentered in the law ; for that 
 
 which
 
 ( ^4 ) 
 
 which is for the fake of all eflablifhed, fhoulJ 
 alio for the fake of all be executed. It is in 
 vain that Wifdom has decreed, if icily or 
 perverfenefs mall be left at liberty to dilobey, 
 But the real force of every ilate, notwith- 
 ftanding all endeavours to transfer it, mud 
 remain in the collective body of the people : 
 and in very large detachments of that body 
 there will alwavs be a itrencrth which it is 
 not eaiy to oppoie. To this ftrength, left at 
 any time it be difpofed to fpurn, or difobey 
 the laws, it is neceffary to provide iomc 
 counterbalance : and to eftablilh iomewhere 
 an authority that may in general overawe, it 
 it cannot always overcome reiiilance. 
 
 Difobedience and avowed oppolition even 
 to law eflablifhed and acknowledged, mud 
 
 be expected from the vices and fermenting 
 
 i. <~ 
 
 paffions of mankind. Nor could exprefs 
 alien t obtained beforehand effectually exclude 
 this evil : for it is one thing to approve a pro- 
 portion in cool judgement, or perhaps with- 
 2 out
 
 ( 65 ) 
 
 out reflection, and another to continue that 
 aflent, when the paflions are inflamed againfr. 
 the Law, or prefent intereft feems to lead 
 another way. Proportionable to the ftrength 
 of paffion, and the feeblenefs of reafon, is the 
 effect of thofe propenfities which thus pro- 
 duce refiitance ; which, confequently, will 
 prevail the molt, in thofe whofe numbers are 
 moft formidable. The multitude is neither 
 exercifed to ufe its reafon, or fubdue its paf- 
 fions. Thus will even the expedient of a 
 previous aflent be found uncertain and inade- 
 quate, as a pledge of fubfequent obedience. 
 Nor can this feeble guarantee be had for the 
 fupport of ordinary legislation, which mull: 
 be carried on when the people cannot be col- 
 lected to aflent or to reject ; and mull: be often 
 founded on confiderations which, if col- 
 lected, the greater number could not com- 
 prehend. 
 
 L 
 
 But if it be thus probable that the Law 
 ihould be refilled, and if the natural ftrength 
 K cf
 
 ( 66 ) 
 
 of multitudes be fuch as cannot eafily be 
 counterbalanced, there certainly is nothing 
 more impolitic, than to arm the body of the 
 people. This is adding force to that which 
 has too much already ; it is giving to a power- 
 ful herd the fangs and the ferocity of lions ; 
 after which, who fhali attempt to be their 
 keepers ? It Is even worfe ; for lions would 
 attack their keepers only, whereas the people 
 would deftroy each other alio. It is hoftile 
 to their primary and mofl important intereft, 
 which is that of being well and wifely go- 
 verned. 
 
 Befides this, as the natural flrength fo 
 likely to refill:, fo difficult to be refilled, re- 
 quires fome counterpoife, the force of arm? 
 muft be referved to ftrengthen that authority 
 in which we place the energy of law. 
 
 Where the people are not armed, the com- 
 mand of military force may, indeed, confer on 
 Government a ftrength which cannot often 
 
 be
 
 ( 67 ) 
 
 be refitted. But in what hands mall fuch a 
 power be placed ? The experience of the 
 world has mown, that armies fo augmented 
 as to be rendered almoft irrefiftible, form an 
 engine too deftructive for any Government 
 to be allowed to wield. Power may be abu- 
 fed, and therefore muff, be kept in ftricter 
 limits ; when unreftrained, it actually begets 
 abufe, by the temptations which it offers, 
 and the corruption which it gradually pro- 
 duces in the human heart. A military force, 
 too far augmented, produces generally a 
 double tyranny : firft, that of the governors 
 over the body of the people ; and fecondly, 
 thai of the army, as foon as it has learned its 
 own importance, over the governors them- 
 felves. So was it under the corruptions of 
 the Roman Empire, fo is it alfo in the 
 Turkifh. The army, therefore, as the only 
 effectual counterbalance to the natural ftrength 
 of multitudes, muft be employed for the fup- 
 port of Law, and confided to the manage- 
 K 2 ment
 
 ( 68 ) 
 
 meat of the executive power; but then it 
 muft be held within fuch limits, as to aug- 
 mentation, and under fuch reftrictions, that 
 it may not be in danger of becoming the 
 means of violence, or the inftrument of op- 
 prefiion. In civil matters, it muft continue 
 fubject to the general Laws, and ordinary 
 tribunals of the ftate ; its regulation and em- 
 ployment muft be confided to the hands of 
 Government. 
 
 What cannot fafely be conferred in the 
 form of actual force, muft be iupplied by 
 means of opinion ; and the executive power, 
 on which, as has been faid, the energy of 
 Law depends, if it be not made fo ftrong as 
 to deftroy all oppofition, muft at leaft, for 
 the fake of public tranquillity, be rendered 
 fo refpeclable, that it may not often meet it. 
 
 To produce this excellent effect, the moft 
 obvious and natural method is that of efta- 
 
 bliihing
 
 ( h ) 
 
 blilhing a monarchy. To a King, mankind 
 ffi general are difpofed to look with reve?- 
 rence ; and commands, confident with JLaw, 
 proceeding from that authority, will not 
 often be difputed. The authority of a King 
 is fimpleand intelligible; it refembles that of 
 a father, which every man has been trained 
 up to venerate ; or that of a mailer, which 
 every man has either held, or hopes to exer- 
 cife. It is the mofl natural form of power, 
 not onlv from its general analogy to thefe, 
 but alfo as being that, to the eitablimment of 
 which almofl every date of incipient fociety 
 directly tends.* If we go back to the origin 
 of mankind, we cannot but fuppofe that, 
 while the ftate of things continued peaceful, 
 
 ■rK px.G-iXivoy.iMY yx-p m/ynAQoy. TIkctc, yap mmx (3xcri\iV:Tix.i £r» 
 Tii 'STfiavi/TOiTH' tc; tte x.»i al a7roix»«;, §*» 7w crvyyimccv. Itaque 
 
 initio civkates regibus parebant, et nunc etiam gentes ; al> 
 iis enim qui regio imperio tenebantur profe&ae lunt. Omnis 
 enim familia ieniore, tit rcgc gubernatur ; quare etiam colo- 
 i>iae, propinquitatis caufa. Ariftot, Polit. i. i. See alio i. 3, 
 
 families.
 
 ( 7= ) 
 
 families originating from one father, frill 
 alive, would continue to acknowledge the 
 authority he had ufed in his domeftic circle, 
 and thereby center upon him a kind of mo- 
 narchy. Thus would the firfl man, during 
 life, be allowed to govern his defcendents ; 
 and after his deceafe, priority of birth, which 
 mud have given before a kind of occafional 
 and deputed authority, would be admitted as 
 the fitted: claim to fill the vacant place. In 
 diiperfion, families would naturally take up 
 that form of Government to which, in their 
 original abode, they had become habituated. 
 Thus mud have arifen the Patriarchal Go- 
 vernment, and thus become extended ; every 
 patriarch being, within his little dill riot, a 
 fort of Monarch. In any other cafual union 
 of families into villages, or villages into dif- 
 trieb, the neceffity of an umpire and referee, 
 •n all diiputed points of right, would foon be 
 ftrongly felt ; and this umpire, with a very 
 little management, would icon become a mo- 
 
 narch
 
 ( 7' ) 
 
 uarch.* Thus would it be in peace. In a 
 ftate of warfare, the chief who had fucccfl- 
 iully led forth his country's troops to battle, 
 would, when that exigence had ceafed, with 
 eafe fecure obedience. Regard for his cou- 
 rage, and experience of his wifdorn, added 
 to the influence unavoidably arifing from his 
 military foliation, if not an actual force re- 
 tained, would lead, or overawe the multi- 
 rude to rank, themfelves as fubjects under 
 him. Agasnft external violence, he would, as 
 a King, for his own fake, defend them; and 
 in him, whofe qualities they had already 
 tried, they would not readily fufpect abufe 
 ©f power. 
 
 '•' Thiscircumrtance actually took place in the cafe of 
 Deioccs, who thus became king of Media. Deprived 
 for a time of his equitable decifions, the Medes faid, 
 "*Our prefent fitaation is really intolerable; let us 
 f * therefore elect a king, that we may have the ad- 
 " vantage of a regular Government, and continue 
 " our ufual occupations, without any fear or danger 
 il of moleftation." Their umpire of ccurfe was made 
 their king. Herectetus, b, i, c. 96, Sec, Be he's tranf- 
 ■atkn. 
 
 In
 
 ( •;* ) 
 
 111 thefe, aiid other cafes, which might bd 
 imagined, the monarchical authority Would, 
 probably, have lefs or greater Strength, ac-* 
 cording to the circumstances from which it 
 happened to arife. But it would be ftill an 
 authority of the fame kind, and would afford, 
 in every instance, a proof how naturally the 
 ibcieties of men coalefce into the forms of 
 Monarchy. 
 
 If the power of a monarchy be afcertainec! 
 and carefully defined by Law, and not too 
 Strongly armed with military force, there will be 
 little caufe to apprehend opprefiion from that 
 form of Government. A nation that has once 
 enjoyed the benefits of free and equal Laws, 
 w r ill not be readily perfuaded to relinquish or 
 neglect them. A King is a confpicuous ob- 
 ject, whofe actions many eyes will always 
 be employed to watch, and whofe intentions 
 many minds, in fuch a State, will always be 
 
 inclined
 
 < 73 ) 
 
 Inclined to fcriitinize.* He can take no da- 
 ring ftep without creating an alarm, which 
 would infallibly defeat his purpofes. Limited 
 as we fuppofe him, and fupported rather by 
 opinion than by real and efficient flrengtb, 
 to route the public apprehenfion would be to 
 hazard every thing. Much greater caufe is 
 there to fear that by gradual, unfufpecled, or 
 yet more formidable, becaufe applauded, en- 
 croachments, the body of the ftate that has 
 the natural power, the people, or their repre- 
 fentatives, may deflroy that vigour which a 
 monarchy mould have, and with it the bell" 
 fafeguard of the law. Againfr. this danger 
 wife proviiions mud be made. 
 
 Other modes have been devifed of vefting 
 the executive authority, but they are in ge- 
 neral more remote from nature, more com- 
 plicated, and lefs advantageous. Of num- 
 
 "'•'■' Sec De Lolme on the Conftitution of England. 
 b. ii. ch. 2. where this truth is very fenfibly fug- 
 -refted, and more fully explained, and illullrated. 
 
 L ber~
 
 ( 74 ) 
 
 bers placed in joint command it may be laid 
 tmiverfally, that if united, they are more for- 
 midable than a lingle man ; if difcordant. they 
 impede each other. * Among expedients to 
 
 prevent 
 
 * Of a Sovereign Ariftocracy there are at prefent 
 few defenders. Of Republics take a picture from one 
 who wrote from knowledge and experience, and 
 i'peaks of fmall ones, which are iuppoied to be the 
 bell:. " The mind is never fubjecled to a more odi- 
 " ous tyranny, than that which prevails in thefe 
 " little republics ; where not only the rich citizen ex~ 
 " acts himfelf into a proud mailer over his lefs wealthy 
 " equals, but where the contracted notions of this 
 " little tyrant become, il unoppofed, the ftandard o: 
 " reafon to all the town. The members of fmall re- 
 " publics care only lor thcmfelves, and feel littlv 
 " anxiety about any thing that paiTes bevond theii 
 " own limits. The all-powerful and imperious go- 
 il vernor confidershis little territory as the univerfe. 
 " His breath alone decides every queltion that is pro- 
 '•'* poled at the Guild-Hall ; and the reft of his time is 
 li wholly occupied in maintaining his authority over 
 '"• the minds of his fellow citizens, in relating anec- 
 •'- dotes of families, etc." Zimmerman on Solitude, chap. 
 iii. p. 96. We may fay, perhaps in general, of repub- 
 lican government, that it is an effort to make thofe 
 govern, or appear to govern, who cannot do fo in 
 reality. They have the llrength, bat not the wif- 
 iom. Thry mull be guid.d, they muft, even for 
 
 their
 
 ( 75 ) 
 prevent abufe of power, that of a frequent 
 change of governors has been deviled and 
 tried. It is, however, a contrivance which, 
 pn the very face of it, prefents this difadvan- 
 tage, that it excludes from the executive 
 power whatever wifdom may be gained by 
 habit and experience. * Befides, it is a plan 
 which rnyft infallibly produce contentions 
 and intrigues. Ambition is a fierce and rel- 
 iefs paffion, and whatever flation gives the 
 
 their own eafe, be controuled ; though perhaps with- 
 out being confeious of it. The general arguments 
 for democracy, oligarchy (or ariflocracy) and monar- 
 chy are certainly not ill detailed by Herodotus in the 
 fpeeches of Otanes, Megabyzus, and Darius, b. iii. 
 ch. So. See Beloe's tranilation, vol. ii. p. 96, 
 
 V: The Romans, during the republic, often fuffered 
 from this caufe; and ftill more frequently from that 
 which follows. Contentions for the confulfhip make 
 \ip a great part of their hiftory. The conftituent 
 afTembly of France, in its felf-denvinp- ordinance 
 againffc a re-election, feems to have determined that 
 the country fhould enjoy as much as poflible, the 
 benefits of ignorance and inexperience in its legifla- 
 tors ; and the experiment appears to anfwer accor- 
 dingly. 
 
 L ^ hi°;hefr.
 
 ( 7<5 ) 
 
 hie heft marks of honour and the o-reateft 
 range of power, will become the object of 
 ambition ; fo long as even a hope of gaining 
 it exifls, the ftruggles and the ftrife of all 
 who have pretentions will be renewed for 
 ever. 
 
 Monarchy, among its numerous arl van- 
 tages, has tli is, that it prevents fuch com- 
 petition for the higheft rank and power; and, 
 if eitablifhed in a line of fixed fucceffion by 
 hereditary right, excludes it almoft totally* 
 This form of monarchy has, therefore, by the 
 wifeft men been thought the beft, and has 
 moft frequently been tried. The experience 
 of the world is in its favour. One only dif- 
 advantage appears to threaten in it, which is, 
 that in aline fo limited, the power may hap- 
 pen to devolve on one who is not worthy of 
 it ; whofe talents may be mean, or difpoil- 
 tion bad. Nothing can at firft appear more 
 formidable than this objection, and nothing 
 more complete than the expedient offered to 
 remove it, in making monarchy elective, 
 
 In
 
 ( 77 ) 
 
 la this manner the worthieft man may be fe* • 
 }ected by the common voice, and called to 
 fill the throne, to which approved abilities 
 and known integrity, the Lushed claims to 
 power, have given him juif pretenfions. But 
 alas ! againil- this fpecious theory experience 
 lias invariably decided. In every age and 
 every country, when the trial has been made, 
 it has appeared, that fpecious arts have al- 
 ways more effect than real merit ; that in- 
 fluence, corrupt or violent, performs what 
 independent choice mould do ; and that, with 
 fuch a prize as royalty to flimulate ambition, 
 contention and corruption '.ever ceafe. The 
 confequence is this, that having, from the 
 fear of a contingent evil, given up tranquil- 
 lity, fecurity, public happinefs, and virtue, 
 the nation that elects its king, in general finds 
 its throne the prey of force, or the reward of 
 fraud, intrigue, and treachery. 
 
 Experience alfo proves that the great evil 
 apprehended from fucceffion may be much 
 
 more
 
 C 7* ) 
 
 more fully obviated, than thofe which thus 
 arife from an elective throne. It is certain 
 that evil difpofition may be nearly, if not 
 totally difarmed, by general limitations of 
 authority, compatible, at the fame time, with 
 the proper energy of government : and that 
 deficient powers of intellect will not be felt, 
 if by any means it can be made an intereft, 
 or, as near as may be a neceffity, to the mo- 
 narch, to employ, as the immediate agents o{ 
 his power, the belt abilities within his coun- 
 try. That this may be contrived fhall, in 
 its proper place, be mown more fully. 
 
 In Giving an hereditary claim to the moft 
 ample powers of government, we do not then 
 depart from our original pofition ; but we 
 feek, by indirect contrivance, the afiiftance 
 of that wifdom and virtue, which we cannot 
 by direct provifions gain with any certainty, 
 
 Nor is it merely for the fingle purpofe of 
 invefl:ing Lav/ with ftrength and dignity, 
 
 2 that
 
 ( 79 ) 
 
 that the authority confidered in this chapter 
 is required ; difcretionary power is alfb 
 wanted ; for neither any written code, nor 
 an 7 legiflative body, however chofen, can 
 provide for all political contingencies. In 
 the conrfe of human affairs, circumflances 
 mult not unfrequently arife which call for 
 prompt and fee ret counfels ; for quick deci- 
 lion upon new and unforefeen events, and 
 vigour to enforce at once the refolutions 
 formed. For thefe and fimilar purpofes the 
 power that mult be veiled fomewhere, mould 
 not be divided from that which has been made 
 executive : it h not indeed divifible, with- 
 out creating two inch rival powers, as never 
 could combine or be at peace. It cannot be 
 confided more judicioufly than to the hands 
 of monarchy, the leading qualities of which 
 are vigour, promptitude, and fecrecy* 
 
 We conclude, then, that the mo£t conve- 
 nient and molt ufeful form in which the 
 executive power can be conferred, with its 
 
 attendant
 
 ( So ) 
 
 attendant branches of diicretionary power, is 
 that of an hereditary monarchy. 
 
 The nature and the limits of the whole 
 authority confided, thus fhall be the fbbjeft 
 of our next difcuffion. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 ( 8i ) 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Of the King. 
 
 xjl KING, in a well-ordered Conflitution, 
 is the Law perfonified. The eflablifhed 
 Laws of the country over which he reigns, 
 are the organs of his political exiftence : with- 
 out them he can do nothing ; with them, 
 every thing. In the Scriptures the chief ma- 
 giftrate is reprefented as the Vicegerent of 
 God himfelf, which in truth he is, his 
 office beins: to enforce obedience to thofe 
 Laws, which the Providence of God, by ren- 
 dering them neceffary to Society, has virtually 
 eflablifhed, and does expreflly guarantee. 
 The perfon of a King is, therefore, juftly 
 reckoned foe red, and the ftyle of Sacred Ma- 
 jefty, and, by the Grace of God, with the 
 religious ceremonies attendant upon coro- 
 M nations,
 
 ( 82 ) 
 
 nations, are all fo well and properly deviled, 
 that they alone can cenftlre them, who alfo 
 aim their bold objections againft the Throne 
 of Heaven itfelf. 
 
 The Sovereign is diftinguifhed, therefore, 
 
 from every other member of the State ; the 
 
 Majefty of public juftice dwells upon him, 
 
 the fplendour of public honour blazes round 
 
 his throne, he holds the higheft ftation that 
 
 the Law admits, and ultimately is the fburce 
 7 j 
 
 of honour to all others. All this is abfo- 
 lutely neceffary to maintain his confequence 
 in the efKmation of his people, and to for- 
 tify by opinion and by expectation that au- 
 thority, which, though it be not fafe to make 
 too flrong in actual force, it is by no meaiv:. 
 lefs unfafe to leave devoid of energy, or in 
 a flate of weaknefs. To this end ferve the 
 Crown, the State, the Palace, the grandeur 
 and the forms of courts ; attendance, and 
 refpeel:, and all that fhovvs a King to be what 
 no man elfe within the State can poffibly 
 
 afTume.
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 afiume. The expences of a court, which 
 to fome nicely-calculating oeconomifts has 
 appeared a ferious argument againfl its very 
 exigence, are thus repaid moit amply to the 
 State by the dignity that thence accrues to 
 Government and Law. In the fplendid 
 perfon of a King, much more than in their 
 abftract exiftence, are thefe moft neceflary 
 engines of fociety reflected. From the cen- 
 tre of a metropolis to the remoteft corner of 
 a State, the efficacy of that great name is 
 felt, * and trade at the fame time grows rich 
 by the fupplies this very fplendour draws, 
 from thofe who otherwife might hide it in 
 their coffers. 
 
 It is falfe, fallacious, and of very evil 
 tendency, to call a King a Servant of the 
 
 * A Writer of more fame than merit has faid, <l If 
 li I afk a man in America if he wants a King, he re- 
 " torts, and afks me, if I take him for an ideotr"— 
 An Atheift would, I fancy, retort in the fame man- 
 ner, were he afked concerning the neceffity of a God. 
 As an argument it is of equal value in both cafes. 
 
 M 2 " State,
 
 ( 8 4 ) 
 
 State* * The language of the Britifh Con- 
 rtitution is, on the contrary, Our Sovereign 
 Lord the King, and it is the language of rea- 
 ion alfo ; the mirtake appears to have arifea 
 in this matter from a confufion of ideas be- 
 tween Jervwg, and rendering fervice. It is 
 undoubtedly for the fervice of the State, that, 
 is, for its advantage and benefit, that the 
 Royal Power is conftituted ; but the benefit 
 the King confers, is by commanding, not by 
 ferving. It is a head the people want, and 
 not a fervant. Not a deputy appointed to 
 perform a tafk they might have undertaken 
 for themfelves, but a chief inverted with due 
 power to execute what they could never do 
 themfelves, to govern them ; a multitude go- 
 
 * Or, as the prefent fafhion is in France, the hlghcfi 
 public Funftionary. Such is their grotefque expreflion. 
 It is founded nearly on the fame idea; that of the King 
 being appointed bv the people to perform thofe func- 
 tions, which, though they have a right to do it, they 
 do not choofe to exercife themfelves ; he is, therefore, 
 in that feni'e, their fervant; or, at beft, the deputy to 
 the Y'ajefty of the people. 
 
 verning
 
 ( 3 5 ) 
 verning itfelf would be a multitude ungon 
 verned. The power of every Sovereign 
 mull:, indeed, originate from his people ; for 
 power to govern many cannot naturally 
 exift. in one, and human force, (excluding 
 difcipline and arms) depends on numbers 
 only. But power is thus conferred, not 
 that the general will, if fuch a thing can be, 
 mould be at all events performed ; but that 
 it may be, whenever it is foolifh or pernicious, 
 over-ruled. A King, unlefs the meaning of 
 the name be arbitrarily changed, is one whofe 
 hi°;h authoritv is ultimate on earth, and 
 fubject only to the Law : and to the Law 
 he is considered as fubject, not becaufe it is, 
 or ever was, the will of all the people, but 
 becaufe it is fuppofed to be the voice of tvif- 
 dom and of goodnefs. Becaufe it is defigned 
 to do for all, what the indulgence of their 
 own caprices never could efFed"t, to make 
 them peaceable, fecure, and happy. 
 
 All
 
 ( *6 ) 
 
 All bodies that are to aft in concert, re- 
 quire a head ; which head is not the fervant 
 of the members, but the mailer. Of this 
 claim even an actual election does not at 
 all invalidate the force. A s-eneral is the 
 mafter of his army ; fuppofe him, then, 
 elected to that office ; he is, when in it, not 
 the fervant of the reft, but the commander ; 
 otherwife he is in vain appointed, and the 
 iervice he mould render cannot be performed. 
 If the army will command its general, in- 
 flead of paving him obedience, his appoint- 
 ment from the firft was nugatory, and the 
 whole will go to ruin. When the Praeto- 
 rian foldiers chofe a Roman Emperor, they 
 chofe for themfelves not a matter only, but 
 a defnotic mailer : fo far is anv fuperiorkv 
 from being connected with the right, or even 
 the practice of electing. To appoint a fer- 
 vant to govern, does, indeed, approach fo 
 nearly to a blunder, that when expofed, it 
 
 ill be, we rnav hope, exploded. 
 
 Th<
 
 ( 3 7 ) 
 
 The power of the collective body of a 
 people is, therefore, here, as it has been fre- 
 quently before, acknowledged ; but their 
 right to have their arbitrary will prevail 
 againft the wifdom of their rulers, by what- 
 ever title they may be denominated, is de- 
 nied. They have the power to change at 
 pleaiure even the whole nature of their Go- 
 vemment ; but the right to do fo mufl de- 
 pend upon the merits of the cafe. To 
 change it from a better to a worie they can- 
 not have a right.* 
 
 The perfon of the King muft be of courfe 
 inviolable ; mice to arraign, confine, judge, 
 condemn, or punifh him, would imply fu- 
 
 '•" This is ftrongly and fingularly illuftrated in the 
 Hiftory of the Jews. That people, in the time of Sa- 
 muel, had the power, humanly conhdered, of decla- 
 ring they would have a mortal King ; even when the 
 Lord their God was their King. To this perverfc 
 determination of their will it pleafed God to give 
 way, that he might make their crime their punifh- 
 rnent ; hut it will hardly be contended that they had 
 « r i?ht thus to reject the Government of God. 
 
 perior
 
 ( 83 ) 
 
 perior authority : which if there exift, he 
 is not what our theory demands, a Sove- 
 reign. The metaphorical perfonage of the 
 Law is, indeed, fuperior, in fome {en{s, even 
 to the monarch ; becaufe to her commands, 
 for the reafons above affigned, he owes obe- 
 dience. But Law, from the very nature of 
 her exiflence, cannot explain herfelf beyond 
 her written words, which are liable, like 
 other writings, to falfe application, and to 
 malicious or injudicious interpretation. In 
 doubts, rifing from fuch circumftances, who 
 mall be the judge between the Law and him 
 who, next to her, is fupremc ; who is him- 
 felf the ultimate interpreter on earth of her 
 determinations ? Or if there were no doubt, 
 the removal of a Sovereign is a meafure fo 
 replete with the very worit. political dangers, 
 that it is wifer far to place refponfibility 
 upon fome lower ft.ep of the great fcale of 
 Government, than to attach it to the higheft. 
 If once the key-ftone of the arch were 
 ihaken or thrown down, the multitudes who 
 q lived
 
 ( «9 ) 
 
 lived beneath its fhelter would have caufa 
 to tremble.* To fpeak without a meta- 
 phor, the King, the reprefentative of Law, 
 mull" be fecure, or Law itfelf is not fecure ; 
 the executive and difcretionary powers ot 
 monarchy are always neceffary to a State, 
 and therefore mud: not be fufpended ; trans- 
 ferred they cannot be without a total alte- 
 ration of the fvltem, attended with fuch dan- 
 srers as from changes of that kind muft ever 
 be infeparable. 
 
 Such is the origin of that moil: wife, as 
 well as ancient, maxim of the Englhh Law, 
 that the King can do no wrong ; by which, 
 as is well known, it is not intended to be 
 
 arTerted 
 
 * The authority of Mr. Locke upon this fubjecl 
 will, doubtlefs, be confidered with refpect " The 
 " harm which the Sovereign can do in his own perfon 
 <c not being likely to happen often, nor to extend it- 
 '« felf far; nor being able, by his fingle ftrength, to 
 '-' iubvert the laws, nor opprefs the body of the 
 ** people — the inconveniency of fome particular mif- 
 " chiefs, that may happen fometiirjes, when a heady 
 
 N <{ prince
 
 ( 9° ) 
 
 alTerted that he is morally, as a man, infal- 
 lible ; but that, as Sovereign, he cannot le- 
 gally be accufed, or eonfidered as involved 
 in any guilt.* 
 
 Where then, it may he aiked, is the fe- 
 curity of the people againfr. the mifemploy- 
 ment of a power, thus placed above refpon- 
 fibility ? It is obtained by the eafieil of all 
 contrivances ; by eilabliftiing the refponfi- 
 
 *•' prince comes to the throne, are well recompenfed 
 tc bv the peace of the public, and feciirity of the Go- 
 t; vernraent, in the perfon of the chief magiftrate 
 " being thus fet oat of danger." Locke on Govern- 
 ment, apud BlackficKc. Comm. i. 7. 
 
 * It means altogether, according to Blackftone, 
 two things : Firft, " that whatever is exceptionable 
 " in the conduct of public affairs, is not to be im- 
 <c puted to the King, nor is he aniwerable for it per- 
 ii fonally to his people : for this doctrine would to- 
 iC tally deitroy that Confiitutional independence of 
 " the Crown, which is ncceffary for the balance of 
 li power, in our free, active, and, therefore, com- 
 " pounded Confiitution." And fecondlv, " it means 
 '•' that the prerogative of tlic Crown extends not to 
 <: do any injury; it is created for the benefit of the 
 u people, and, therefore, cannot be exerted to their 
 {£ prejudice." 
 
 j. b'luy
 
 ( 9< ) 
 
 biiity of all the agents of that power. By 
 his own perfonal ilrength, a King, like any 
 other fingle man, can do but little that is 
 formidable ;* nor is it likely that, for his cha- 
 racter's fake, he will attempt, in a free coun- 
 try, any thing whatever of that kind : be- 
 yond this, all muft be performed by orders. 
 Now as foon as it is fully imderftood that no 
 command from the crown, however pofitive 
 or urgent, can fecure the perfon who obeys it 
 from the legal confequences of the act, there 
 will be, to the execution of all improper or- 
 ders, a difficulty oppofed which cannot very 
 eaiiiy be vanquished. Again, with refpect to 
 meafures of a public and political kind ; if 
 the immediate fervants of the crown be con- 
 fidered as advifers of the Sovereign, and held 
 refponfible for all fuch acts, as originating 
 from their counfels ; the meafures may be 
 tried as juftice may demand, the advifers may 
 be punifhed as the law fhall have directed, 
 
 * See the citation from Locke in the preceding 
 note, page 89. 
 
 N 2 and
 
 ( 9* ) 
 
 and yet the dignity and independence of the 
 legal head of all remain imviolated. 
 
 In this expedient will be found a remedy 
 for the only very important inconvenience to 
 be apprehended from hereditary monarchy ; 
 the inability or depravity of an individual on 
 whom the fovereignty may happen in the 
 courfe of the fuccefiion to devolve. Of this 
 eventual evil, which was hinted at before, 
 we here perceive the means of fully obvi- 
 ating the effects. Whatever may be the fup- 
 pofed character of a poflible inheritor of the 
 crown, his advifers and immediate agents 
 mufl be men who can defend and juftify their 
 meafures legally, and in a public diicuflion ; 
 and will be driven fucceffively from their 
 places, by the influence of the legiflative af- 
 fembly, io long as they (hall give pernicious 
 counfels ; cr, what will be in the eye oi the 
 conftitution the fame thing, whenever they 
 confent to execute the orders of a fuvereign, 
 either unable tc direct well, or defirous to di- 
 re cl improper] v. 
 
 By
 
 ( 93 ) 
 
 By the fame contrivance, we fhail hav© 
 attained the moft important object in, the 
 whole theory of Government. Government, 
 according to our fundamental principles, in 
 the hands of perfect wifdom and goodnefs, 
 would be perfect. The power of inch a 
 Government would require no limitation : 
 on the contrary, to introduce limitations 
 would be, in that cafe, to introduce defects. 
 Thus, the infinite and illimitable power 
 of God effects the prefervation of the Uni- 
 verfe ; were it poffible that any external re- 
 itrictions could affect that power, the ener- 
 gies of perfect goodnefs and wifdom would 
 be in the fame degree re {trained, and the 
 government of the univerfe would be ren- 
 dered, in proportion to that restriction, de- 
 fective. But from power committed to hu- 
 man agents, it is importable to feparate much 
 imperfection, both in wifdom and goodnefs ; 
 fuch power muit, therefore, be reitrained, and 
 the molt effectual fecurity againft the mif- 
 employment of that which mult be left to 
 
 form
 
 ( 94 ) 
 
 form a Government, is to make the perfons 
 it is veiled in reiponfible. This refponfibi- 
 lity however cannot, for fuch reafons as have 
 been affigned, be made to bind the hands of 
 fovereignty itfelf. It would be an abfurdity, 
 it would be creating a fovereign to judge the 
 Sovereign. But the fame advantage, with- 
 out the fame abfurdity, will be obtained by 
 making the immediate agents of the crown * 
 refponfible. Thus fhali we acquire the ad- 
 vantage, if not of wifdom and goodnefs, yet 
 of that which muft in human regulations be 
 accepted as a fubfiitute ; wifdom, and the 
 reftraint of evil difpcfitions. Without a com- 
 petent degree of wifdom, the poft of minifter 
 in a free Hate cannot be long maintained ; 
 
 * I make no apology for ufing this metaphorical ex- 
 preiTion ; the attempt to ridicule it that was made by 
 a hoilile pen, is too filly to affect one reafonable 
 perfon. A child who does not know that by the 
 crown is meant the king, or the royal power, ihould. 
 be fent to fchool to learn the general ufe of metaphors: 
 a man who has not learnt it, muft be paft inftruo 
 t:an» 
 
 and,
 
 ( 95 ) 
 
 and, if virtue mould by chance be too remifs ifl 
 the talk of fcrutinizing, malice itfelf will al- 
 ways jealoufly examine the defigns of thofe 
 who hold a ftation fo exalted. With this fecu-* 
 rity, the Monarch may be {ctfcly veiled with 
 that power his dignity £o indifpenfably re- 
 quires, of naming his own minifters. The 
 external prefiii re of circumftances will fpeedily 
 remove from fuch an office thofe that are un- 
 fit to hold it ; and among, the reft, it is de- 
 firable, as well as juft, that the Sovereign 
 mould be left at liberty to choofe. 
 
 Having thus difcufled fome leading points 
 relating to the regal power, the queftioii 
 naturally occurs, what other matters muft be 
 left in the difpofal of that power. To this a 
 eeneral anfwer has been virtually given in 
 the enumeration of thofe reafons- which make 
 a King defirable ; and render him, in reafon, 
 neceffary to a conftitution wifely regulated. 
 By thefc, it evidently appears, that the power 
 intrufted to the Monarch muft be fuch as 
 
 {hall
 
 ( 96 ) 
 
 mall, when requisite, enforce obedience to 
 the Laws ; and provide for all thofe ftate 
 occafions which may call for fecret eounfels, 
 and for promptitude of execution. 
 
 For the former purpofe, the King muft 
 have the management of all fuch military 
 forces as are deemed confident with the 
 maintenance of liberty ; and what he want? 
 in acluai power, mull: be conferred in fplen- 
 dor, dignity, patronage, and influence ; by 
 fome of which opinion, and by others in- 
 tereft * is engaged in the defence of legal Go« 
 vernment. 
 
 The 
 
 * In England, where whatever may in any way af- 
 fect the caufe of public liberty, has been more fully 
 fiftcd than in any other country, much has been faid 
 and written upon the Subject of influence* The ques- 
 tion lies, in fa£t, within a very narrow compafs. In- 
 fluence is a Supplement to limited authority which 
 the corruption of national morals, and that alone, 
 will render necefTary. "Would men attend impartially 
 to reafon, a Government whoSe movements were dii- 
 cufTed, muft either proceed well, or elSe be liable to 
 
 chanee :
 
 ( 97 ) 
 
 The latter purpofe above recounted, points 
 moft evidently and unequivocally, at nego- 
 ciations, treaties, the management of war, 
 and all relating to it, including the right of 
 declaring it, and of making peace ; all, 
 however, to be executed by the agents of the 
 crown, under the tic of their refponfibility. 
 But by them exclusively, as being matters 
 which require the higheit political wifdom, 
 knowledge, and experience, attended with 
 
 change : but when men will not do rightly without 
 an intereft in it ; when devotement to parties, with- 
 out regard to meafures, is openly avowed ; when fbme 
 are fo atrociouily befotted to their private intereft^ 
 that they can even wilh. for the heavier!: misfortunes 
 to theircountry, in ordertodriveoutafet of men whom 
 they may then fupplant ; the wheels of Government, 
 thus clogged by cold friends, and refilled by virulent 
 oppofers, could not poffibly move on without the oil 
 of influence ; and they who would deny it to others, 
 would be the firft to pour it in themfelves. In few 
 word's, virtuous and patriotic fpirits would refift in- 
 fluence, and reject it with difdain; corrupt and in- 
 tercfted minds will not do even w r hat they wilh them- 
 felves, in ftate affairs, without its impulfe. In oppo- 
 sing Government, much influence will in fuch times 
 be always employed; in defending it, there muft be 
 therefore a ftrong neceffity toufe it. 
 
 O much
 
 "( 98 ) 
 
 much fecrecy, unfhaken fleadinefs, and 
 prompt activity ; all of which can neither be 
 expected in the current, but crude notions of 
 the multitude, and moil of which are incom- 
 patible with the proceedings of any large 
 afTembly. 
 
 Inveft, then, the hereditary Sovereign of a 
 free and reafonable monarchy with dignity 
 and fplendor to command refpect, with the 
 power of doing good to gain affection, with 
 patronage to govern intereit ; make him 
 the great fource of right and juftice, of ho- 
 nour, and preferment ; arm him with due 
 fbength to crufh a partial rebellion, though 
 not to exercife oppreffion : beftow on him 
 the means to be abroad refpected, relied upon, 
 and if there be occafion, feared ; and for the 
 ufe of thefe prerogatives, let not him feif, but 
 thofe whom he employs, be anfwerable ; and 
 the ftate will then be made a body fit fox 
 action, and yet fecured from moit of the dif- 
 orders which the fermentation of bad pailions 
 
 rnisnt proau 
 
 It
 
 ( 99 ) 
 
 It feems not in this place neceflary to de- 
 fcend to the detail of all the branches of pre- 
 rogative. The reafonings above Itated, will 
 apply to the defence of thofe with which the 
 monarch of Great Britain is inverted, and 
 will mow the great neceffity of fome of which 
 a neighbouring king has been defpoiled. To 
 do much more, is beyond the purpofe of the 
 pre fen t treatife.* 
 
 * For fuller information on this fubjeft Judge 
 Blackftone's excellent chapter on the prerogative 
 ihould be perufed with care, (Comm. b. i. c. 7.) in 
 which republican principles are occafionally. oppofed 
 Tv'ith manly vigour, and great political fagacity. 
 
 Oz CHAP.
 
 ( »oo ) 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Of the Balance of Powers, 
 
 W E have now two powers eftablifhed in 
 our ftate, and only two, the natural power 
 of the people, operating through the legifla- 
 tive aftembly, and the conceded or artificial 
 power of the Sovereign. 
 
 Now as one indifpenfable guide in political 
 regulations and contrivances is the knowledge 
 of human nature, the fubjecl to which they 
 mu ft be all applied, we muft not fail to re- 
 collect that, of all the paffions of mankind, 
 the moft reftlefs and infatiable is the love of 
 power ; and confequently, wherefoever power 
 is given with limitations, attempts muft be 
 expected to make off reflraint, or to acquire, 
 at leaft an ampler (hare. Suppofe, then, the 
 
 two
 
 ( ioi ) 
 
 two powers eftablimed in our fancied (late 3 
 inclined, as they would be, to make in- 
 croachments on each other ; it is evident, 
 that, as our regulations fland at prefent, the 
 cqnteft would be perfectly unequal. 
 
 The Sovereign, limited by Law, and 
 armed with fuch a force, as is calculated ra- 
 ther to prevent the difpofition to refill:, than 
 actually to overcome great efforts, ftill lefs to 
 make addition to his power by any acts of 
 violence ; having beyond this, no other -fup- 
 port than public opinion, and an influence 
 which can operate only within a certain dis- 
 tance from the throne, and not at all upon the 
 bulk and body of the people ; being beiides a 
 confpicuous, and generally, among a free 
 people, (though frequently without the 
 flighted reafon) a fufpected object, could do 
 but little towards acquiring any new accef- 
 fions of authority : and whatever, he might 
 do by unfufpected means, would be with 
 eafe, as foon as its effects difcovered it, 
 
 repreffed,
 
 ( 1°2 ) 
 
 fepreffed, and for the future totally pre- 
 vented, by a fingle effort of the legiflative 
 power. 
 
 On the other hand, the legiflative body^ 
 holding an authority derived directly from 
 the people, and by election reverting to them 
 periodically, will not fo readily incur fuf- 
 picion of ambitious aims : or if it were fuf- 
 pecled, the people would in general be eafily 
 perfuaded that the power their reprefentatives 
 acquired was gained, in fact, to them ; and 
 confequently would be ready to fupport and 
 countenance fuch efforts.* Befides this, 
 two of the greateft. powers that can be given, 
 are already, by cur fuppofition, vefled in 
 
 * In England where, fince the dreadful troubles of 
 Charles the firfl's reign, and the miferies enfuing, the 
 people have been more enlightened than in other 
 countries, concerning the comparative merits of Mo- 
 narchy and Democracy, they have been known to 
 make ftrong efforts in fupport of royal power. But 
 this is a degree of political fagacity not to be expedited 
 in general, nor to be calculated upon in theory. 
 
 that
 
 ( 10 3 ) 
 
 that body : thefe are the power of granting 
 money, and the power of making laws. 
 
 In the form of money, the public force is 
 reprefented mod compendioufly ; without it 
 neither military flrcngth can be fupported, 
 nor any effort of importance made ; not even 
 outward dignity and fplendor can be long 
 maintained. Whatever may be nominally 
 the powers conceded to the Sovereign, they 
 are all at once fufpended if the public purfe 
 be clofed againfl him, 
 
 The legiflativc authority is alio of fo great 
 extern, that it can at any moment chance 
 the conftitution. Whatever be the powers 
 eftablimed, to whatever hands entrufted, or 
 in whatever form conceded, a fin pie act of 
 legiflation may abolim them at once ; or if 
 that were too bold an effort, on the fuppofi- 
 tion that the body of the people might prefer 
 the former ftate of things, and would relent 
 fuch daring innovation ; yet fti'il, by imper- 
 2 ceotible
 
 ( rc 4 ) 
 
 ceptibie approaches, which the people could 
 not trace, nor would be likely to fufpecl:, an 
 attack upon the regal power might be main- 
 tained, which in the end would render it 
 fubfervient wholly to the legiflative. 
 
 Againft fuch evils, whofoever wifhes to 
 preferve the form, and to enjoy the great ad- 
 vantages of monarchy, will be inclined to 
 make effectual proviiion. 
 
 With refpedl: to money, it muft be con- 
 fefled that the reftraints which the with- 
 holding of a full command of it impofes upon 
 monarchy, are abfolutely neceflary, to pre- 
 vent oppreffion. The powers that muft be 
 veiled in a King are fuch, that could he 
 gain iupplies at pleaiure, neither property nor 
 freedom could have that fecurity which the 
 lights of man, above enumerated, demand. 
 Making; then, at proper times,* fome ge* 
 
 * For inftance, at the accefiion of a new king, as 
 
 neral 
 
 in England.
 
 ( «o 5 ) 
 
 neral and adequate provifion to fupport the 
 royal dignity, we mult in other matters 
 leave the monarchy with this ftrong check 
 upon it. Nor is the power of thus with- 
 drawing aid fo much a force often live as 
 defenfive : it may difarm a power that feems 
 too formidable, but raifes up no arms againfl 
 it. 
 
 The power of legiflation is very differently 
 circumftanced, it may be ufed to make at- 
 tacks direct or indirect ; and as, in our con- 
 fiderations on the fubjc£r. of reprefentation, 
 it was advanced as a maxim, that it is the 
 perfection of political contrivance, for every 
 man to be employed in doing that for which 
 he is mod: fit, fo here alfo we may apply the 
 fame remark. To watch over his own pre- 
 rogative, the fovereign is undoubtedly moft 
 fit. He, with his immediate advifers, can 
 beit. perceive when an attack upon it is either 
 made or meditated : his in te reft is the moft 
 immediate and moft urgent, to detect in- 
 P croachments.
 
 ( io6 ) 
 
 croachments, in whatever manner covered 
 and difguifed ; and he is firfl concerned to Hand 
 upon his guard againfl that rival power which 
 mull by its own natural flrength prevail, if 
 not refilled with fome care, and balanced by 
 fome force of counterpoife. 
 
 To give the Sovereign, then, the means of 
 meeting fuch attempts with proper vigour, it 
 is necefTary that he mould be allowed to form 
 an integrant and independent portion of the le- 
 giftature : to every ael of the great and popular 
 body already conflituted, his full aflent mull 
 be required ; his fingle negative mull be made 
 of force fufficient to prevent all innovation in 
 the law, which he may apprehend as hoflile 
 to his power and dignity, or may eileem for 
 any other reafon inexpedient ; and this with- 
 out delay or interruption, left the adverfe 
 power mould gather ftrensrth to make re- 
 iiilance. 
 
 With
 
 ( io 7 ) 
 
 With refpecl to this great power of coun- 
 teracting the proceedings of the other branch 
 of legiflature, we have feen that it is necef- 
 fary to defend the royal functions. It muft 
 be confidered alfo, left it fhould appear more 
 formidable than in truth it is, that it is inno- 
 vation only which the Kins, is thus enabled 
 to refift. If the constitution of the ftate was 
 tolerably formed before, it cannot greatly 
 fuffer from the want of a new Law, which, 
 in the judgement of the Sovereign, or of his 
 advifers, Cby the fuppofition, men of, at leaft, 
 fome competent degree of wifdom) fhall ap- 
 pear to be of evil tendency. For the exer- 
 tion of this, as well as every other branch of 
 fovereign authority, thofe counfellors will be 
 of courfe refponfible.* If, however, the Law 
 propofed, and thus refilled, mould have 
 found wifdom on its fide, or very evident ex- 
 
 * Unlefs, as is fuppo fable, helhould difmifs them at 
 the inftant, and turn the privilege againft their mea- 
 fures. In this cafe, it would remain to.be inquired 
 by what fecret advifers this ftep had been fuggefled. 
 
 pediency,
 
 ( io8 ) 
 
 pediency, it is not to be feared that men fo 
 iituated as the royal minifters, or even the So- 
 vereign himfelf, in a itate fo conilituted as 
 here has been laid down, will venture long 
 to (land againft the general conviction of the 
 public* 
 
 Nor will it be fufficient thus to arm the 
 Sovereign againft attacks, direct or indirect, 
 proceeding from the lesfulative aflembly ; he 
 mud alfo be enabled to put a flop to the de- 
 liberations of that body by diffolution, when- 
 ever it may be their general tendency to 
 
 '* This power of rejecting Mils by royal negative 
 
 has been acknowledged in its full extent by all the 
 writers on our conilitution. That it is not dange- 
 rous, is proved fufficiently by hiftory : yet it was, 
 within the memory of all, the favourite opinion that 
 the crown could not with fafetv ufe it ; and the doc- 
 trine of many, that it ought not to enjoy it. That 
 the doctrine is erroneous, 1 have not the ihadow of a 
 doubt; and if the opinion be jult, our conftitution 
 lias received, in that refpecl, a confiderable alteration, 
 which may in time prove fatal to the very exiftence 
 of the monarchy* 
 
 j tli wart
 
 ( i°9 ) 
 
 thwart and to impede the neceiTary powers of 
 Government, or to declare a hoftile dilpofi^ 
 tlon towards himfelf, or thofe whom he em- 
 ploys ; or for any other caufe to be deter- 
 mined by his counfeilors, under the reilraint 
 of their refponfibility. 
 
 This is alfo a power which by its nature 
 cannot greatly be abufed. We have fuppofed 
 it fixed by Law, that no long time mall 
 pais without convening an alTembly of the 
 reprefentatives ; diflblution, therefore, fol- 
 lowed by a re-election, is in truth an ap- 
 peal only, and a recurrence to the people ; 
 and in every fuch recurrence, flrength is 
 given to popular fentiments, and an activity 
 to popular influence, which for their own 
 fakes, the men who hold the reins of Go- 
 vernment will not too frequently beftow. It 
 is indeed, in the nrft inftance, an exertion 
 of great apparent power againft. the popular 
 divifion of the legiilature : but, in the fecond, 
 it fubmits itfelf to the decifion of the people. 
 
 It
 
 ( no ) 
 
 It fends back the legiflators to their conditio 
 ents ; but the people, in their turn, can 
 fully fhow their fentiments, either by a re- 
 election of the fame difcarded reprefentatives, 
 or by the choice of others frill more friendly 
 to their wifhes or pretentions. After which, 
 it is mofl evident, that nothing could be 
 gained to Government by further diflblu- 
 tions. 
 
 But w.hen we have thus balanced with fome 
 care the two great powers of irate, the King, 
 and the afiembly chofen by the people ; and 
 have provided fome defences for that power 
 which is artificial, and originally weak, againfi 
 that which is natural, and efientiahy ftrong ; 
 that which is conftituted for the purpofe of 
 producing a good Government, againft. that 
 which, by its inherent and indeftructible 
 ftrength, occafions the chief difficulty in 
 forming any Government at all : when all 
 this has been done, by the means above re- 
 cited, 'here will flill fnbfift, without fome 
 
 further
 
 ( tit ) 
 
 farther care, one evil of no trifling magnitude?. 
 It is this : that in every ftruggle and difpute, 
 the power and will of the monarch will be fet 
 in competition , immediately and folely, with 
 the power and wifhes of the people ; which 
 will tend to make the former odious, and the 
 latter violent : fubverting thus at once the 
 chief ilipport of a free monarchy, opinion, and 
 deftroying the chief pledge of popular obedi- 
 ence, the want of difpofition to refill:. 
 
 Agaiufl: this danger alfo we muft make pro- 
 vifion, and the bed: expedient that reafon can 
 fus^efl is that of railing up fome intermediate 
 power between the fovereign and the people. 
 The mode of doing this (hall be confidered iri" 
 the chapter following. 
 
 CHAP,
 
 ( HZ ) 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 
 On the Creation of an Arijlocratic Order. 
 
 «O.S we have atprefent but two legal powers 
 within our ftate, and each of them an inde- 
 pendent portion of the legislature, it is evi- 
 dent, that if we would prevent their too im- 
 mediate mock and conflict, we muft raife up 
 a third, of fimilar authority, to fland be- 
 tween them. 
 
 To render this great fervice, nothing can 
 be better fitted than an Ariftocratic Body, 
 which, {landing in political fituation, be- 
 tween the fovereign and the people, or their 
 reprefentatives, may be inclined by intereft, 
 and habitual notions, to renTt incroachments 
 
 made on cither fide.' v - : 
 
 This 
 
 * la this opinion our moll able flatcfmen of all 
 parties arc at prefent happily united. Mr. Fox, in 
 
 the
 
 ( »3 ) 
 
 This ariftocratic body mud be formed, 
 like the democratic, into a feparate and inde- 
 pendent 
 
 the debates on the Quebec Bill, May nth, 1792, " laid 
 " it clown as a principle never to be departed from, 
 that every part of the Britifh dominions ought to pof- 
 fefs a government in the conftitution of which monar- 
 chy, ariftocracy, and democracy, were mutually 
 blended and united; nor could any government be a 
 jit one for Btitifli fubjects to live under, which did 
 not contain its due weight of ariftocracy, becaufe that 
 he confidered to be the proper poife of the conftitu- 
 tion, the balance that equalized and meliorated the 
 powers of the two other extreme branches, and gave 
 (lability and firmnefs to the whole." And afterwards 
 £he fame gentleman declared, " that, fo necefTary was 
 ariftocracy to all governments, that in his opinion, 
 the deftruclion of all that had been deftroyed, could 
 be proved to have arifen from the neglect of the true 
 ariftocracy, upon which depended whether a conftitu- 
 tion fhouid be great, energetic, and powerful/' 
 Stcckdale's Debates, p. 516. and $20. An. 1 79 1 . 
 
 Mr. Pitt alfo, alluding to Mr. Fox's words, faid, 
 that " Ariftocracy was the true poife (as the hon. gen- 
 tleman had emphatically ftated it) of the conftitution, 
 it was the effential link that held the branches toge- 
 ther, and gave liability and flrcng t h to the whole. 
 Ariftocracy reflected luftre on the crown, and lent 
 fupport and effect to the democracy, while the demo- 
 cracy gave vigour and energy to both, and the fove- 
 0. reignty
 
 ( «i4 ) 
 
 pendent afiembly,* for the purpofes of deli- 
 beration, and entrusted with an equal fhare 
 of legiflative power. Queflions of much in- 
 tricacy and importance will obtain, by this 
 contrivance, full difcuflion : taken up in this 
 affembly on different grounds, and viewed 
 in new and various lights, it may be hoped 
 that they will gain elucidation, in one part 
 of the procefs or another, from the beams or 
 truth. And if there be, at any time, occafion 
 to refill opinions, which, though falfe, may 
 happen to be popular, the effort may be made 
 more fafely by a body of this nature, than by 
 the finde act and intervention of the Sove- 
 reis;n. 
 
 ieignty crowned the conftitution with authority and 
 dignity." Ibid. p. $21. 
 
 See alfo the very itriking quotation from the wri- 
 tings of John Adams, cited by Colonel Simcoe in hii 
 fpeech upon the fame occafion. P. 513. 
 
 * It is true that there were flrong reafons, at the 
 firft affeinbling of the deputies in France, for an 
 union of the orders in one houfej but reafons that 
 muft vanifh with the temporary exigence and the 
 ancient p;overnmenl. 
 
 1 A rich
 
 ( "5 ) 
 
 A rich and hereditary nobility, created 
 originally by the Sovereign himfelf, will pof- 
 feis thofe properties exactly, which we feek 
 in an order fo to be employed. Connected 
 with the monarch by the mode, and brought 
 near to him by the degree of their political 
 elevation, thefe nobles will furround his 
 throne, augment its daily fplendor and its 
 general influence, and form a bulwark be- 
 tween him and democratic power, without 
 conferring any real ftrength that can be ren- 
 dered dangerous to liberty. Independent at 
 the fame time, both by wealth, and by here- 
 ditary right to hold or to tranfmit the ho- 
 nours once conferred, this order will not be 
 enflaved by royal influence ; even the perfonal 
 obligation of a gift that cannot be retracted, 
 will not bind too ftrongly or too long, when 
 other motives intervene to counteract: it.* 
 Such a body will be, if any can, above cor* 
 
 * In England it has been proved, that the obli- 
 gation of a title conferred, may be fqrgotterr. in a 
 time incredibly (hort. 
 
 Q^2 ruption-.
 
 ( "6 ) 
 
 ruption, Interefted above all other fubjea!£ 
 in the prefervation of that focial order on 
 which their rank depends, and as much, at 
 feaft, as any others in the prevention of fucb 
 arbitrary msafures, or fuch popular licentiouf- 
 nefs, as may lefTen the fecurity of property,. 
 or other pergonal- rights, the clafs of nobility 
 will oppofe itfelf alike againfl: the machina- 
 tions ot a King defirous to : extend his power 
 beyond the proper limits,- or the excefles of 
 a people defirous, in the name of liberty, to- 
 a& the tyrant.* It will be found,, therefore,, 
 
 the 
 
 * u On peut doutcr que le Roi accepte librement la. 
 profcription de la NoblefTe, et fanctionne le malheur 
 des plus illuftres families du royaume. Une profonde 
 reflexion a du lui fa ire conncitre que dans un grand 
 etat, la NoblefTe, non point comme ordre, fi Ton veut, 
 rnais comme clajfe, comme clCtr.tiit <Pun fenat national, pre- 
 fente un appui durable a la conftitution, a la liberte 
 une raefure foge, au trone la fplendeur et la puiffance 
 qui lui conviennent." Thus writes a fenfible and in- 
 telligent author, by birth a Genevan, M. Mallet du 
 Pan, in the Mercurc de France, He then afTerts the 
 fame, in erTecr, as I have laid above, and proceeds, 
 «* Ces verites contre lefqudles il eft de mode d'argu- 
 menter aujcurd'huij nc font point detruites par l'af- 
 
 fe elation
 
 ( "7 ) 
 
 the fureft anchor of the ftate in every kind of 
 political agitation. 
 
 There is nothing fo difficult for a prince, 
 defpotically inclined, to render patient and 
 fubmiffive as an high fpirited and indepen- 
 dent nobility. In France the gradual extinc- 
 
 fetation menfongere de confondre la corruption de 
 quelques nobles, et la feodalite, avec l'iuflitution poli- 
 tique de la NoblefTe dans 1'etat. Tant qu' a Rome le 
 fenat a joui de la confideration et du pouvoir, qu'il a 
 balance la force toujours croiffante du peuple, la re- 
 publique s'eft elevee au plus haut dignede gloire et de 
 puiflance ; elle n'a perdu fa liberte, elie n'eil devenue 
 le patrimoine des Neron, et des Caligula> que lorfque 
 la Nobleffe avilie, et le fenat fans force, n'ont pu em- 
 pecher le peuple de fe vendre aux tyrans. Lorfque 
 Cromwell, feconde du parti fanatique, voulut regner 
 par la crainte, ce fut contre la chambre des pairs qu'il 
 dirigea les fureurs des communes. Des qu'elie fut de- 
 truite, la liberte s'aneantit avec elle, et Ton vit bien- 
 tot un Roi foible et malheureux cimenter de fon fang 
 la fervitude publique." Merc, de France, No. 32. 
 Augujl 3d, 1 79 1. M. Mallet du Pan writes uniformly 
 with the fentiments of an Englishman, acquainted 
 with the true principles of politics ; and has bad the 
 honour to be perfecuted, on that account, as an Arlf- 
 Ucrnt} though a very zealous friend to liberty. 
 
 tion
 
 ( n3 } 
 
 tion of the independent nobles of the ancient 
 Hate rendered the Sovereign defpotic ; and in 
 all the ffates of Europe the principles of liber- 
 ty that ft.ill fubfift, originated chiefly from 
 the freedom and high fpirit of the feudal ba- 
 rons. In England particularly, where we are 
 indebted to the united efforts and ftrong 
 courage of that very order for the great and 
 fundamental Charter of our Liberties, 
 for its frequent renewal, and final confirma- 
 tion, it would be unpardonable in gratitude 
 to decry nobility, which, even for that one 
 acl, deferves to be accounted facred among 
 us for ever. 
 
 The fituation of a nobility, fuch as is here 
 defcribed, oppofes itfelf with no lei's felicity 
 againfl the undue influence of popular force. 
 For which reafon, and becaufe the very ex- 
 igence of fuch a clafs is offenfive to that un- 
 focial and bafe pride, w T hich, when it cannot 
 honeftly exalt itfelf, is defirous of obtaining 
 gratification by the only method remaining, 
 
 that
 
 ( "9 ) 
 
 that of degrading others ; a nobility is generally 
 the firft object of rage, whenever there is in 
 tiie people a difpolition to exert their dange- 
 rous ftrength ; that strength which for the 
 benefit of fociety, and particularly of them- 
 felves, ought to remain in general inactive. 
 In the earlieft periods of the Roman repub- 
 lic we find, indeed, the patricians oppreffing 
 the plebeians, but not fo much as nobles 
 exerting their power againfr. the commons, 
 as in the character of rich men who oppreffed 
 their indigent creditors, which may happen 
 where no order like nobility exifts. In all 
 the fubfecpent periods of that hiftory, the 
 tendency of popular pride to gain the eleva- 
 tion it denies to others, is perpetually illus- 
 trated ; and in time fo far obtained its object:, 
 that the ambitious among the patricians were 
 compelled to the expedient of being made 
 plebeians. Then was the country ripe for 
 the machinations of demagogues, and confe- 
 quently for fubfequent Servitude. All which 
 is no mere than the natural operation of hu- 
 man
 
 ( ««> ) 
 
 ittan pride, ambition, and other vices, ftofc 
 reftrained by the due balance of political au- 
 thority. In our own country, the deftruc* 
 tion of the nobility was fought with eager- 
 nefs by thofe chiefs of the republicans, who 
 wimed to exercife a heavy tyranny them- 
 felves : and when the neceffity for a free and 
 equal government was felt and underltood, 
 the nobility was fully re-efUblifhed ? with- 
 out a murmur. 
 
 Care muft of courfe be taken, for the fake 
 of public liberty, that the privileges conceded 
 to this order, be not of fuch a nature that 
 they can produce oppreflion. No exemp- 
 tions from the fanclions of the penal law, no 
 exemptions from taxes or other public bur- 
 thens ;* no right of exacting fervices. Their 
 distinctions mud be only fuch as give a dig- 
 nity and fplendor, without oppreffing any 
 
 * Such exemptions formed the real grievances felt 
 in France from their nobufjc, which differed in almofl 
 every point from oui nobility. 
 
 man ;
 
 ( 121 ) 
 
 man : titular, and armorial honours, prece* 
 dence, the appointment to certain royal or- 
 ders, and the like ; things which, though it 
 is moft natural for thofe to feek very ear- 
 nestly, who have a reasonable profpe£t of fuo 
 cefs, diilurb no man's repofe that has them 
 not, while moving in another fphere, nor 
 raife even transient envy in the bofoms of the 
 wife. 
 
 The independence and liberality of an af- 
 fembly formed from fuch a clafs, will, in 
 general, free its deliberations from the fetters 
 of all mean and partial interefts : and, by 
 the fame qualities it will beft be fitted for a 
 court of ultimate appeal, efpecially if there 
 be of neceffity admitted to it fome of thofe 
 men whofe lives have been employed in 
 iludying and deciding on their country's laws. 
 Such a court will be, in this refpect as well 
 as others, above improper influence, and 
 having the afiiftance of knowledge, may be 
 expected to decide impartially and juftly. 
 
 R CHAP-
 
 ( 122 ) 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 Farther Confederations on an Order of Nobility 
 
 IT is a vain attempt to fquare the paffions 
 of mankind to fuit the theories of abflra£t 
 reafoners : a wife man forms his fyflem ra- 
 ther on experiments, and works on human 
 nature as lie finds it. 
 
 The mojft important fecret is, to render 
 even the failings and faults of men, if poffi- 
 bie, fubfervient to the public welfare. The 
 love of honour, and political diftin&ions, is 
 among our ftrongeft paffions. To gratify it, 
 men will make fuch efforts as few other 
 worldly motives will produce ; to aggrandize 
 their families they will die; and thefe feel- 
 ?;-/. ;.< >: h not entirely pure, are often 
 : ; ■ , '.\ able from minds of the moft 
 
 "■/ : .-'v, and capable of the moft ex- 
 cellent
 
 ( i2 3 ) 
 
 ^client exertions. Befides this, to preferve 
 for any time a fyftem of political equality, 
 is of all attempts moft vain and fruitlefs. 
 Nobility denied in one form will rife up in 
 another : nor can it be forefeen upon how 
 many different pleas it will be claimed, and, 
 in a little time, acknowledged. In Rome, 
 when the original ftrictnefs of diftinclion be- 
 tween the orders was deftroyed, thofe men 
 aifumed nobility, and with all the pageantry 
 and pride of any times afferted it, whofe an- 
 cestors had gone through certain public offices. 
 So that latterly man might be a plebeian, and 
 yet not only noble, but proud and infolent 
 from his nobility. The images of their ances- 
 tors preferred to curule honours, were their 
 armorial bearings ; were fet up in their houfes 
 and carried at their funerals, with a pomp 
 exceeding that of modern heraldry. Yet this 
 was a republic, without a titled nobility, in 
 which the new man Cicero had a thoufand in- 
 fults to encounter, before even his uncom- 
 mon merit could procure him due re- 
 R 2, fpecT,
 
 ( "4 ) 
 
 fpe#.* So inveterate are thefe propenfities, 
 and To impoffible is it for any fyftem wholly 
 to prevent their operation. A foreft might 
 be kept upon a level, but it could only be 
 effected by a labour which nature would be 
 ever active to defeat ; by cutting to a certain 
 mark the befr and fin eft trees, the fhrubs 
 could never be trained up to any height or 
 magnitude. 
 
 There are many public fervices which 
 honours only can repay, and thofe not merely 
 perfonal, but of greater value and duration. 
 To hold in high refpect the families of men, 
 whofe actions have been great or wifdom 
 eminent, is natural and juft. It mows the 
 
 * To ihew that the exiftence of a titled nobility is 
 not fo hoftiie to merit as the common prejudices of 
 mankind; in England, where there is fuch a nobility, 
 the fen of a cobler or a fcavenger might become the 
 firft man in the nation, next to the fovereign, with 
 much lefs difficulty than Cicero encountered to ob- 
 tain his dignities in Rome. Through the channel of 
 the law he might become lord chancellor, and then 
 prime minifter. Other means of rife might alfo be 
 pointed out, 
 
 fanclity
 
 ( "5 ) 
 
 &nctity of virtue by which a whole defcent 
 can be illuftrated, and gives, as far as mortal 
 power can give, a kind of immortality of ho- 
 nour. When the career of life is nearly 
 clofed, of what avail are perfonal diftinctions 
 to a wife or thinking man: but to exalt his 
 family he will purfue his toils to the very- 
 verge of life. It is wife to have incitements 
 of this kind for thofe who may defpife all 
 meaner motives, and to keep them in grada- 
 tion, fo that very few indeed may ftand above 
 the hope of gaining fomething more. This 
 is to take fair advantage of the flrongeft hu- 
 man propenfities, and to ufe them as the 
 means of caufing good and great exer- 
 tions. 
 
 Honours gained by public fervice are paid 
 to thofe who nrfl achieve them as a general 
 debt ; they are continued to their families, 
 becaufe it is mod evident that otherwife, in 
 comparifon with the benefits conferred, they 
 ere futile and inadequate rewards ; to violate 
 
 them,
 
 ( 126 ) 
 
 them, at any 'period, is national difhonefty^ 
 amounting to lefs than a direct confeffion of 
 being too bafe. to merit any noble fervice, 
 and much too falfe to anfwer any confi- 
 dence.* 
 
 From a clafs of men accuflomed to look 
 chiefly to high objects, hereditary counfellors 
 offtate, and legiflators, commanding the befk 
 means of general information and improve- 
 ment, a nation cannot fail to gain accefiion. 
 of fome great and noble fentiments, which 
 will on due occasions mow themfelves in its 
 defence and fervice : and if, as in the execu- 
 cution of all human plans there will arife de- 
 fects, the origin of honours mould not 
 always be in practice that which fages 
 might point out, the ufes of the clafs which. 
 
 * Is there any Englishman fo void of feeling as not 
 to glory in the elevation which fome great Englifh 
 families enjoy from the achievements of their ances- 
 tors ? To heftow them was originally a duty, to efteem 
 them facrcd is the only proof that can be ftill preferved 
 of public gratitude. 
 
 bears
 
 ( I2 7 ) 
 
 bears them will yet remain the fame ; its in- 
 dependence will refill: ambitious projects from 
 the throne, and its collected firmnefs check 
 the turbulence of demagogues. 
 
 The picture of a well-conitructed fociety 
 cannot be perceived in a monftrous and forced 
 equality of ranks, but in fuch a regular grada- 
 tion of them, as may give to thofe whole 
 talk it is to aid or to participate the government, 
 dignity, and noble elevation ; to the greater 
 numbers, who to be happy mull: be governed, 
 protection and fecurity, without the flightelt 
 danger of oppreffion. Thus, in a garden 
 well arranged, the high and fpreading trees 
 .will neither be cut down nor violated, but 
 placed in fuch a manner that, while they 
 neither intercept the fun, nor draw the juices 
 of the foil from the humbler plants, they may 
 effectually ward off from all the fury of the 
 north, and blighting Iharpnefs of the eaft. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 [ 128 ] 
 
 C H A P. XIII, 
 
 On a Religious EJlabliJtJtnent . 
 
 1 HOUGH it be a moft falfe, and the re- 
 fuge of a dcfperate perverfenefs, to affert that 
 religion was at firft invented by the magiftrate 
 or lawgiver, the better to effect his purpoies; 
 vet certain it is, that to Law and public or- 
 der, there can be" no aid fo perfect or fo powerful 
 as religious principle. That which pervade* 
 the heart, and regulates the jfecret fprings of 
 actions, is able to prevent ftich crimes, and 
 difpofition towards offence, as human Lav/ 
 can never take within its cognizance; and by 
 referring to a judge of infinite intelligence, 
 excludes all hope of paffing undetected.* 
 
 An 
 
 * Sec Warburton on the alliance of church and ft ate. 
 h. i. c. 3. where the fubject is more fully treated, and 
 
 more
 
 ( I2 9 ) 
 
 An aid fo powerful mould, moll: afl'iiredly, 
 be fought by every wife and prudent lawgiver ; 
 and a good man, in thofe circumftances, mud: 
 naturally wifh to make that doctrine preva- 
 lent which he himfelf believes to be di- 
 vine, 
 
 Now it feems impoffible that without the 
 aid of an eflablifhment, the culture of Reli- 
 gion can be properly encouraged, or its per- 
 manence fecured : for, though to entertain 
 fome notions of Religion be fo natural to man 
 that he is hardly ever found diverted of them 
 totally, yet, to think correctly on a fubject 
 lb abftrufe, or to ac"l confidently with fuch 
 good principles as he admits, are things fo 
 little fuited to his feeble reafon and ftxong 
 paffions, that we find him always liable to 
 
 more ably : the whole chapter well deferves a careful and 
 confiderate perulal. I would, however, have it under- 
 Hood, that in commending certain parts of that very- 
 able work, I by nc means undertake to be a blind de- 
 fender of the whole. 
 
 S the
 
 ( >3° ) 
 
 the greateft corruptions in opinion, and the 
 moft. extreme licentioufnefs in conduct. 
 
 As an anchor to prevent, in fome degree, 
 uncertain fluctuations, an eftablimment is 
 highly ufeful. It is a public teftimony of 
 preference to the perfuafion fo maintained, by 
 which it is enabled to command attention 
 and refpecl. It enforces duties which might 
 otherwiie feem merely fpeculative ; and gives, 
 in due return for the fupport that Law derive? 
 from the internal principle, the flrength cr 
 Law to regulate the outward practice. 
 
 The Religion to be efbblifhed in any 
 country muff, be, for many reafons, that 
 which the people, or an evident majority among 
 them, may approve. In the firil place, from 
 a kind of neceffity ; for the people, having 
 indefeaiibly the main flrength of the Hate 
 redding in them, cannot, if it mould become 
 a conteit, be compelled to pay obedience, 
 where they do not give aflent : or if, in 
 2 matters
 
 ( I S 1 ) 
 
 matters of lefs confequence, they might, yet 
 in that which they fo ftrongly feel as their 
 Religion, they will not be fo tractable. In 
 the fecond place, from evident expedience ; 
 for as the end of an eftablimment, in com- 
 mon with all other plans of legiflative wifdom, 
 is public benefit, the greater number it em- 
 braces, the more widely are its benefits 
 dirTufed, 
 
 With refpecr, to the internal form of an ef- 
 tablimment, mould any be prefcribed by the 
 Religion thus admitted, that of courfe mult 
 be preferred. If it be left to men, as in the 
 Chriflian revelation we have caufe to think it 
 is, to form the government of church, as 
 w r ell as Hate, according to their views of ge- 
 neral utility, then it rauft become a work of 
 human wifdom like the former.* 
 
 Without 
 
 * The regulations introduced by the Apoftles in their 
 
 churches, are not in Scripture recommended to us as 
 
 our models. It appears, indeed, raoft wife to imitate, 
 
 5 2, a"
 
 ( *3 2 ) 
 
 Without attempting a detail, which here 
 would be mifplaccd, thus much at leaft is 
 evident, that of things deligned for firnilar 
 ends, the regulation mould alfo be, in wif- 
 dom, firnilar ; confequently, as political ef- 
 tablimment, conftrucled upon the knowledge 
 of human nature, calls for a gradation of or- 
 ders, with provifion for the ableft minds to 
 govern, and the inferior to obey, with profpecls 
 to excite a laudable ambition for the public 
 fervice ; ih alfo in the church eftabiimment 
 there muft be, for the fame reafons, the like 
 fubordination, and the fame incitements. 
 
 The ecclefiaftical eftabiimment, as well as 
 every other in the ftate, muft be made fub- 
 ;ect to the Sovereign ; and it will be right 
 
 as far as we can trace them, and the change of public 
 manners will admit, whatever inftitutions were devifed 
 by men fo wife, and lb peculiarly affifted ; and this the 
 Church of England has endeavoured : but the difcre- 
 tionary ufc of human wifdom feems to be allowed moil 
 fully, 
 
 that
 
 ( l 33 ) 
 
 that in this alfo, as in the others, he mould 
 be regarded as the primary fource of ho- 
 nour.' 
 
 
 As property is, by the natural principles 
 of liberty, inviolable, and Government itfelf 
 is inftituted principally for its defence ; it is 
 jufl and necefTary, that eccleilafHcal property, 
 in whatever form conferred, fhould be held 
 at lead: as facred as all other. By ecclefiaf- 
 tical property, of courfe, is meant that pro- 
 yifion and fubfiltence which men legally ac- 
 quire by exercifmg religious functions, or by 
 holding any certain rank within the church 
 eftablimment. Between which, and all other 
 property, it feems that no diftinclion can be 
 juftly made ; or if any, fuch only as muft be 
 entirely in its favour. 
 
 * The popular election of bifhops, &c. has fome- 
 thing fpecious in it, and might anfwer well when all 
 men had fome purity of zeal, but in times of much 
 corruption, we well know that the intriguing and 
 impudent would always gain the advantage againfl mo- 
 lt e it piety, learning, and true merit. 
 
 From
 
 ( *34 ) 
 
 From the office which the miniflers of 
 Religion hold, as employed in public wor- 
 fhip, and in the general inftruction of the 
 oeople, it is neceflary that the whole eftab- 
 lifhment fhould be maintained by Law, on 
 fuch a footing, that neither dependence may 
 render them timid, nor indigence contempti- 
 ble. The illiberal of all claiies, if they 
 could command their teacher, would infult 
 him ; and the vain, if his appearance w 7 ere 
 not decent, would defpife him. We muft 
 proceed in this cafe, as in others, not upon 
 the fuppofition of the virtues which men 
 ought to have, but fo as to obviate the dan- 
 ger of thole vices which we know are always 
 prevalent. 
 
 To all oerfuaUons in Religion, befides that 
 
 ily eftabliined, fhould be given an entire 
 
 toleration; with this exception only, that 
 
 lever there appears in any feci a hoitile 
 
 and an active fpirit, eager to fubvert and to 
 
 fupplant the church, to which the Law has 
 
 given
 
 given eftablifhment, fuch reft rict. ions rauft 
 be made as legiflative wifdom {hail efteem 
 i'ufiicient to defeat thofe machinations ; that 
 the country be not torn by contefts the moft 
 violent and dangerous, nor the majority of 
 people interrupted in the worfhip they pre- 
 fer, nor deprived of thofe advantages, for 
 the fake of which the eftablifhment was at 
 the firft deemed neceflary. To form an in- 
 Aitution, and then rc r uie protection to it, 
 would be the height of folly. So long as 
 any dangers can be jufrly apprehended, to 
 endeavour to remove inch Laws as form a 
 barrier to the church efcablithed, would be 
 to try to make the legislature counteract 
 itfelf: to perfiiade an honeft man to give 
 away his own fecuritv, and yield, through 
 mere well-meaning, his only weapons of 
 defence, to thofe who have declared them- 
 felves his enemies. While religious opini- 
 ons continue matter of {peculation, or of 
 private cbiervance only, they fall not within 
 the iuiifdietion of the legiflator ; but when 
 
 they
 
 ( '3« ) 
 
 they are productive of defigns and actions 
 deflructive of that order, which the wifdom 
 and goodnefs of the nation has appointed, 
 they then require reftraint and counterac- 
 tion. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 ( *37 > 
 
 CHAP. XIV, 
 
 On the Bight of Rtjijtance. 
 
 J\S in this fmall tract fome points have 
 been denied, which the extravagant afferters 
 of freedom mifunderftood have confidered as 
 axioms; and fome truths afferted, concern- 
 ing the neceffity of order and obedience, 
 which are hoftile to many notions injudicioufly 
 connected with the caufe of natural rights ; 
 and as in maintaining fome parts of my opi- 
 nion I have called in aid fome texts of Scrip- 
 ture, which have been prefTed fometimes, 
 however unfairly, into the fervice of the pa- 
 pal doctrines of non- refinance and the like ; 
 it will not, perhaps, be expected by fome 
 readers, that with the fame zeal that I have 
 mown in the defence of Kings and Nobles ? 
 T I mould
 
 ( '33 ) 
 
 I mould maintain alfo the right of general 
 Refinance to oppreffive Government. 
 
 To this, however, the political opinions 
 herein frated, do, if rightly underftood, di- 
 rectly lead. With the fpirit of an Englifh- 
 man have I read, argued, and written ; with 
 the fpirit of a man, who, feeling that by the 
 constitution of his country are fecured to 
 him and all his fellow fubjects every real 
 right of man j and thankful to heaven for all the 
 comfort that fccurity conveys, muft regard, 
 not as crimes, but as proofs of wifdom and 
 of virtue, thoie great efforts of refinance, by 
 which it was at firft obtained and afterwards 
 perpetuated. Had the refinance of the Com- 
 mons in the reign of Charles the Firfr. been 
 confined to the rejection of all arbitrary im- 
 positions, and the prevention of all arbitrary 
 judgements and oppreffive meafures ; every 
 itep, in i'uch a caufe, prefcribed by flridl necef- 
 iity, would have been within the boundaries 
 of" right : but when they thence proceeded 
 
 to
 
 ( l 39 ) 
 
 to degrade the nobles, perfecute the church, 
 and with a mockery of juftice try and mur- 
 der him to whom, in all jufl points, they 
 owed obedience, then their guilt effaced their 
 former merits, or rather brought to light 
 their dark hypocriiy. For this, when they 
 had filled their meafure of iniquity, they were 
 puniihed ; fir/1 by a ftrong tyranny they raifed 
 themfelves, and then, by being configned to 
 infamy, and the public execration of pofterity, 
 
 Of the Revolution in 1688 we now all 
 think alike, or nearly fo : we regard it as the 
 glory of our nation ; as a memorable and 
 mofl illuftrious proof of public virtue, firm- 
 nefs, moderation, and true wifdom. Thofe 
 only are duTentient who hold, as very few at 
 prefent do, the old doctrine of right indefea- 
 fible ; and thofe who, on the contrary, think 
 that effort was imperfect, becaufe it did not 
 reproduce the horrors of the former sera ; or 
 who think, as fome at prefent feem to do, 
 that as a Revolution, it was indeed a good 
 T 2 thing,
 
 ( Ho ) 
 
 thing, but mould be preparatory only to ano- 
 ther, which in its turn mull: lead to other 
 Revolutions in everlafting fucceflion ; ima- 
 gining of Government, as the old fanatics 
 did of religion, that it was 
 
 intended, 
 
 For nothing elfe but to be mended ; 
 
 And that the thing to be defired in politics 
 is the want of permanence in all inftitutions, 
 and the frequent introduction of confufion. 
 
 Having premifed thus much as explana- 
 tory of my particular notions as an Englifh- 
 man, I fhall proceed, as in the former inftan- 
 ces, to confider the political doctrine I advance 
 en the general principles of wildom and of 
 right. 
 
 THE
 
 ( Hi ) 
 
 THE Right of making Refinance to op- 
 preffive Government is founded upon that 
 which nature has moft ftroiisdv intimated, 
 and no refpectable authority has ever called 
 in qweftion, the right of felf- prefers at i on y 
 which, though conveniently afferted in this 
 fmgle phrafe, is in truth no other than the 
 risrht above laid down as natural, the univer- 
 ial right to life and all its innocent advan- 
 tages, derived exprelily from the gift of the 
 beneficent Creator. 
 
 When from the imperfection or the ine- 
 quality of law, or the iniquity of fome pre- 
 vailing cuflom, the value of that general gift 
 is grievoufly diminimed, by the infecurity of 
 life, of liberty, or property, it then is wife 
 and juft to introduce fuch reformation as the 
 cafe requires. Whatever has been inftituted 
 the collected ftrength of many may annul : 
 the right to exerciie this power depends upon 
 
 the
 
 ( H2 ) 
 
 the juftice of the caufe. Whoever finch 
 himfelf aggrieved, and liable by the eilablilh- 
 ed ftate of things to be fo, in thofe great 
 points wherein the fecial liberty of man con- 
 fifts, in thofe effential rights to which he is 
 attached by the moft natural of all feelings, 
 the defire of felf-prefervation, is authoriied to 
 join with others, and to make refinance. 
 Laws are not facred in themfelves which de- 
 feat, infiiead of being friendly to, the end of 
 all good Government, the general welfare ; 
 and refinance may be carried on by all expe- 
 dient means, till permanent redrefs and due 
 fecurity mail be obtained. The precepts re- 
 commending honour and obedience to all hu- 
 man inftitutions in behalf of Government, 
 are applicable only to the general ftate of 
 things, when all proceeds by rules admitted, 
 and in the even tenor of a fixed eftablifh- 
 ment ; not to thofe few periods of ebullition, 
 and general exertion, when bv a ftron^ 
 neceifity men are compelled to change their 
 form of Government, or new-model fome 
 
 impor-
 
 ( -43 ) 
 
 important parts, or elfe relinquifh their true 
 rights as men. By the commands of Scrip- 
 ture and morality enforcing order, individu- 
 als are in general moil: ftriclly bound ; nor 
 does the exception take its rife until the caufe 
 become a common one ; until the juftice of 
 the plea be evident, and the neceflity for the 
 effort prefling. 
 
 In wifdom, however, it muft be remem- 
 bered that a total Revolution, changing every 
 thing, and annulling all exifting authority, 
 is a very deiperatc meafure. It introduces 
 anarchy, the worft and moll: pernicious flate 
 of man collected in fociety. Nor can it of- 
 ten be required : bad Governments have 
 parts, in general, that are good : thefe expe- 
 rience has approved and made familiar, and to 
 change them is to choofe a hazardous expe- 
 riment in preference to certain knowledge. 
 Need we add that fuch a Dreference is foilv, 
 if not wickednefs ? 
 
 a This
 
 C H4 ) 
 
 This alio, for the fake of juitice, mufl be 
 laid down as a maxim to be kept in mind in 
 every Revolution or new-modelling of Go- 
 vernment, partial or entire, if in times fo cir- 
 cumstanced the rules of juflice or the voice 
 of reafon can be heard ; that property or fub- 
 fiflence legally acquired, under any previous 
 forms of policy, however faulty, mufl be 
 held facred in the petions of the individuals 
 fo pofleffing or enjoying them. For as the 
 heaviefl of punifhments, hardly excepting 
 death itfelf, is degradation, or the reduction 
 of man from affluence to a ilate of indigence, 
 either abfolute or even comparative, to inflict 
 this punifhment on thofe who have been 
 guilty of no crime, mufl be a cruel and a vio- 
 lent injuflice. Whatever there might be im- 
 proper in the prior laws, they were, while 
 they exifled, the bond of the community, 
 and to live according to them was not only 
 innocent, but neceifary. Under the faith of 
 the fubfifting Government, and confequent- 
 \y of the whole nation, while the nation ac- 
 
 quiefced,
 
 ( 145 ) 
 
 qniefced, men exercifed their powers and ta- 
 lents to obtain fnpport ; and confequently, by 
 the faith of the whole nation, if there be any, 
 they o\.i2.ht to be Droteeted to the end of life 
 in thofe their lawful acquifitions. If favings 
 are decreed in certain branches, the nation in 
 the end will be the gainer, but cannot juftly 
 make its profit by the ruin or diflrefs of thofe 
 who there have vetted all their hopes of 
 maintenance, who fought their {ituations 
 with the fanction of the laws, and paid the 
 legal price to gain them. The lapfe of a few 
 years will, in the courfe of nature, clear away 
 the prefent holders of f uch polls as may feem 
 burthenfome, and then fuppreflion or reduc- 
 tion may be made without injufKce, and the 
 immortal public will enjoy the benefit. 
 
 if for the neglect of this juft maxim be al- 
 ledged the preflure of a public neceffity, even 
 this plea, fpecious as it may appear, mufl be 
 injurious and falfe. If there be indeed a pub- 
 lic neceffity, the public mould combine, gene- 
 U rally
 
 ( J 46 ) 
 
 r£\y and individually, in fair proportions, to 
 remove it : but to plunder any fingle clafs of 
 the community, merely to relieve the reft, who 
 have no better claim than they to favour and 
 protection, may be the law of the ftrong, but 
 never can be of the juft ; it is indeed the lit- 
 moft ft retch of public profligacy . 
 
 With refpe£t to honours, the fame rule 
 mould be obferved ; for if the worth of pro- 
 perty be rated by the natural feelings of man- 
 kind concerning it, then rnuft honours be 
 among the moft inviolable kinds of property, 
 and that which would be laft relinquiflied : 
 mere honours opprefs no one ; but the lofs 
 of honours, lawfully obtained, without a 
 crime, is a very grievous opprcflion. 
 
 Very different is the cafe of privileges 
 which are, in their nature or effects, oppref- 
 "jive. It is not juft that any men mould, for 
 an hour, endure oppreffion, for the fake of 
 thofe who. ; by a claim once legal, had gained 
 
 a power
 
 ( '47 ) 
 
 a power to exercife it. The privilege was 
 from the firft offenfive to natural right and 
 juftice, and the delire to ufe it, fo vicious, 
 bafe, and cruel, that it can deferve no ten- 
 dernefs or management. It may be at any 
 time deflroved, and bv anv mode of abroga- 
 tion, fo that it be attended with no penal 
 judgement, but that lcfs, againft the men, 
 who, when they tiled it, had the function 
 of the law, 
 
 Such have been my private thoughts upon 
 the general principles of Government, and 
 the moft finking features of political fcience ; 
 which I have no farther laboured to accom- 
 modate to the Conftitution of Great Britain, 
 or to aim againft the prefent errors of France, 
 than as the one appeared to me confident 
 with the founded wifdom, and the other 
 pregnant with confufion and defrruction both 
 in their origin and example, 
 
 1 2 I AC
 
 C »4« ) 
 
 The general maxim on which the whole 
 difcuffion has been founded, and which, for 
 diilinclnefs fake, I here repeat, is this : 
 That the sources of all good Govern- 
 ment, AND ESSENTIALLY OF ALL RIGHT 
 TO GOVERN, ARE WISDOM AND GOODNESS. 
 
 My deductions from this principle, and re* 
 flections on the fubject-S naturally arifing 
 thence, I have now made public ; becaufe I 
 feel a hope that they may be of fervice to my 
 country ; and becaufe I know, undoubtedly, 
 that whomfoever they fhall perfuade to think 
 as I do on the whole, or concerning the main 
 parts of thele great topics, they will make a 
 zealous friend to public order, public virtue, 
 and public liberty. 
 
 APPEN
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 A Review of the French Declaration of the 
 
 Rights of Men and Citizens on the Prin- 
 ciples of this Treat/fe.* * 
 
 DECLARATION. REMARKS. 
 
 I. I. 
 
 EN are born and al- J- HERE is nothing iti 
 
 ways continue free and this article that is objec- 
 
 cqual as to their rights, tionable, or not recognized 
 
 Social diftinctions can be fully by the Conftitution 
 
 founded only upon gene- of Great Britain* 
 
 ral utility. 
 
 The This 
 
 * The preamble is omitted, as containing nothing that re- 
 quires to be controverted, except the general notion that the 
 good propofed can be effected by the declaration fubjoined, the 
 falsehood of which will be evident from the remarks annexed.
 
 ( *5° ) 
 
 DECLARATION. REMARKS. 
 
 II. II. 
 
 The end of every poll- This alfo is acknow- 
 
 ileal alToeiation is the pre- lodged ; and is afferted fully 
 fcrvation of the natural in this treatife, at p. 21. 
 and imprefcriptible rights 
 of man. Thefe rights are, 
 liberty, property, fecurity^ and 
 rcjijiance of epprefftcn. 
 
 III. HI, 
 
 The nation is cffentially The nation has, indeed; 
 
 the fource of all fovereign- effentially the power by 
 ty. No body of men, nor which all Government 
 any individual, can excr- muft be fupported. But 
 cife any authority which Government is its raoft ef- 
 is net derived from it. fential want; could a na- 
 
 tion govern itfelf, there 
 would be no occasion to 
 appoint a Government. The principle is alfo practically 
 dangerous : who will obey, when he is told, that it is his 
 right to govern ? They who can ccntroul their goverr 
 nors are not governed. That all authority is, in fact, 
 derived from the collective ftrength of the many, is a 
 truth; but is a truth from which no obligation to obey 
 the many can be properly deduced. The many mult 
 obev, for their own fakes, becauic thev know not how 
 
 1 to
 
 I l 5 1 J 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 to govern. If they command, it is becaufe they cafr, 
 not becaufe they ought : becaufe they are ftrong and 
 wilful, not becaufe they are either wife or virtuous. 
 If a majority, however great, affume, by force, the 
 right of governing, becaufe they have the power, they 
 injure the minority; for every man has a natural right 
 to be governed by reafon and juftice, not by brute force. 
 
 DECLARATION. REMARKS. 
 
 IV. IV. 
 
 Liberty confifts in the This is true, and feems 
 
 power of doing whatever to need no particular re- 
 does not injure another, mark. 
 Thus the exercife of the 
 natural rights of every man, 
 has no other limits than 
 thofe which enfure to eve- 
 ry other member of the 
 fame fociety the enjoyment 
 of the fame rights. Thefe 
 limits can be determined 
 only by the law. 
 
 V. V. 
 
 The law has no right to This too is very well, if 
 
 forbid any anions except it be remembered that the 
 
 thofe few
 
 t 152 ) 
 
 DECLARATION. REMARKS. 
 
 thofe which may be hurt- law alone is to determine 
 
 ful to fociety. What is what is hurtful. 
 
 not forbidden by the law 
 
 fhould not be hindered, 
 
 ftor can any man be forced 
 
 to do what the law does not 
 
 require. 
 
 vi. vr. 
 
 The law is the expreffion The law is the expreffion 
 
 of the general will.* All ci- ofthewifdemandtheiuftice 
 
 tizens have a right to con- of the men who formed it, 
 
 cur perfonally, or by their and is, if they were well fe- 
 
 reprefentativesjinitsforma- lecled, the beft wifdom of 
 
 tion. It fhould be the fame the nation : to this the va- 
 
 for all, whether it protects rious wills of the commu- 
 
 or punifhes. All citizens, nity fhould properly be 
 
 being equal in it? fight, are fubjccl. 1 here is no iuch 
 
 equally admirable to all tiling as a general will in 
 dierii- large 
 
 * 1 hefeare the words of RcufTeau. But Roufieau fays alfo, that 
 this will is intranfmiftible, that it cannot be represented cr fupplied, 
 and remits from the immediate will cf every citizen. M. Ma/ouet, 
 remarking on this fubjccl in the National Alfembly, laid very pro- 
 perly, " RoulFeau would have defined law better if he had called 
 " it the cxfrtjjlon of the public ju.'ticc and <vcifdom : fur the general 
 ic will may be unjuit, and tinctured with bad paflions, which the 
 
 << law fhould never be."- Mercurc dc France } Aug. 50, 1701, 
 
 p- 210,
 
 ( l $3 ) 
 
 DECLARATION. REMARKS. 
 
 dignities; places, and public large focieties, for there 
 employments, according to never can be unanimity; 
 their qualifications, and and the will of a majority 
 without any distinction, may be unjufl when that 
 except that created by their of a minority is jure. If 
 virtue or their talents. citizens had all a perfonal 
 
 right to concur in forming 
 laws., the fending reprefen- 
 tatives would not be an 
 equivalent. But the forming of laws is matter of 
 prudence, not of right ; and reprefentatives are chofen 
 to fecure the people from opprefiion, not to utter their 
 intentions, or to take up their opinions right or wrong. 
 That laws fhould be equal is true. As to the eligibility 
 of men to places, as places do not rank among the rights 
 of men, the caution feems unneceiTary. Much, how- 
 ever, will depend upon the latitude of the interpre- 
 tation, if it be meant that a prieft may be created a 
 judge, or a lawyer a bifhop, upon proof or fuppofition 
 of their being qualified, the meafure would produce 
 fome difcontent, and on the whole, perhaps, more 
 harm than good. If it be intended only to prevent ex- 
 clufive claims of claflcs more arbitary, fuch as nobles or 
 plebeians, to certain employments, the provilion isjuft 
 enough ; but fhould be made in another way, by the de- 
 nial of exclufive arbitrary privileges. 
 
 X Verv
 
 ( *54 ) 
 
 DECLARATION. REMARKS. 
 
 vii ; VII. 
 
 No inan can be accufed, Very right ; and per- 
 
 arrefted, or held in con- fectly eftablifhed here in 
 fmement, except in cafes England : except that there 
 determined by the law, and is a latitude in the terms of 
 according to the forms the declaration in this 
 thereby prefcribed. They place, which might admit 
 who folicit, promote, exc- of much ridiculous inter- 
 cute, or caufe to be exe- pretation. 
 cuted, any arbitrary orders, 
 ought to be punifhed : but 
 every citizen, cited or ap- 
 prehended by virtue of the 
 law, ought to obey inftant- 
 ly, and by reilftance be- 
 comes culpable. 
 
 VIII. VIII. 
 
 The law fhould not Right : except that it is' 
 
 eftablifh any punifhments hardly poffible for human. 
 
 but fuch as are ftriclly and wifdom to determine, what 
 
 evidently neceiTary : and puniihments are ftridlly 
 
 no man mould be punifhed and evidently neceflary in 
 
 but by virtue cf a law efta- fome cafes. The latter 
 
 bliflied and promulgated claufe is perfectly right. 
 
 bv> Rieht-
 
 ( ' $5 ) 
 
 DECLARATION. REMARKS, 
 
 before the offence, and le- 
 gally applied. 
 
 IX. IX. 
 As every man is pre- Right. 
 
 fumed innocent till his 
 guilt is [legally*] declared, 
 whenever the detention of 
 any one is judged indifpen- 
 fable, all rigour, beyond 
 what is necefTary to fecure 
 his perfbn, fhould be fe- 
 verely prohibited by law. 
 
 X. X. 
 
 No rnan fhculd be mo- Veryjuft; and perfecl- 
 
 lefled on account of his ly confident with the prin- 
 opinions, not even his re- ciples laid down above, in 
 ligious opinions, provided Chapter the Thirteenth. 
 his avowal of them does 
 not interrupt the public or- 
 der which bv law has been 
 eftablifhed. 
 
 * Legally fhould have been adde-j, it is clearly meant to be im- 
 plied. 
 
 The X 2 This
 
 ( '56 ) 
 
 DECLARATION. REMARKS. 
 
 XI. XI. 
 
 The free communica- Thisbeing only the fourth 
 tion of thoughts and opi- article applied to aparticu- 
 nions is one of the moft lar cafe, is nugatory and 
 precious rights of man : fuperfluous. It means 
 every man may, there- only that a man may do in 
 fore, fpeak, write, or print this refpecl, as well as 
 freely, except that he muft others, whatever the law 
 anfwer for the ahufe of this dees not forbid; as to the 
 liberty in cafes determined free communication of 
 by the law. thoughts being one of the 
 
 moft precious rights cl 
 man, it is true enough ; 
 it is a part of perfonal li- 
 berty, and conduces both 
 to the comfort and to the 
 improvement of life. 
 
 XII. XII. 
 
 A public force being of This no Englishman will 
 necefhty required to gua- deny. 
 rantee the rights of men 
 and citizens, that force is 
 inftituted for the benefit of 
 all, and not for the private 
 
 ad- Very
 
 { '57 ) 
 
 DECLARATION REMARK.?. 
 
 advantage of thofe to 
 whom it is entrufted. 
 
 XIII. XIII. 
 
 For the fupport of the Very true: adding only, 
 public force, and for the ifpoflible. 
 expences of Government, 
 a public contribution is 
 of indifpenfable necemty. 
 This, therefore, fhould be 
 equally divided among all 
 the citizens according to 
 their property, 
 
 XIV. XIV. 
 
 Every citizen has a right, Theywhogive their rao- 
 
 by himfelf or his reprefen- ney have certainly a right 
 
 tative, to determine the to be well fatisfied, that it 
 
 neceffity of public contri- is legally demanded, and 
 
 bution, to give a free con- juftly ufed ; but as moftof 
 
 fent to it, to examine the thefe points are totally be- 
 
 employment of it, and to yond the knowledge of the 
 
 regulate the amount, af- generality, and as the peo- 
 
 feffmentj enforcement, and pie always will incline 
 
 duration. againft
 
 ( 158 ) 
 
 PECLARATION. REMARKS. 
 
 again it .m impofir, the ge-n 
 ral management of all thefe 
 points muft be entrufled to 
 the Government, or rather 
 to the legiflature, under 
 due reflrictions- 
 
 XV. xv, 
 
 The fociety has a right to Every public agent who 
 
 demand of every public betrays his truft fliould be 
 agent an account of his puniflied by the law. The 
 adminiftration. fqvereign, however, is not 
 
 properly a public agent, 
 nor can confiflently be 
 made refpcnfihlc. Sec p. 
 85. 
 
 XVI. XVI. 
 
 Every fociety in which It fliould rather be laid, 
 
 there is no full fecurity of that every fuch fociety has 
 
 rights eftablifhed, nor fepa- a bad conftitution; though 
 
 ration of powers deter- what is faid about the fe- 
 
 mined, is without a conui-"" p ara tion of powers is not 
 
 tution, vcrv intelligible. 
 
 The The
 
 ( -59 ) 
 
 DECLARATION. REMARKS. 
 
 XVII. XVII. 
 
 The right to property The plea of public ne~ 
 being inviolable and facred, ceflity was evidently in- 
 no one ought to be de- tended to cover the bold ra- 
 prived of it, except in ca ^ es pinesof the National AfTem- 
 when public nece/fity, le- bly.* But public neceffity 
 gaily afcertained, may evi- can attack no particular 
 dently demand it, and on property in preference to 
 condition of a ]ufl and pre- others ; as the law is equal 
 tions indemnify. to all, fo alfo the neceffity 
 
 which fuperfedes the law 
 muft prefs on all alike, and 
 confifcate all property or 
 none. What indemnity 
 have the French clergy 
 received ?-{*■ 
 
 * So fpakc the fiend, and with necefiity 
 The tyrant's plea, excus'd his dcvilifh deeds, 
 
 Parad. Lojl. iv. 393;. 
 
 t This is acknowledged by Mr. Mackintofh, (p. 72.) who feeks 
 ao defence for his French allies, but in his ftrange argument, that 
 church property is not property. 
 
 1 Such
 
 t *6o ) 
 
 Such is the celebrated declaration of rights which af- 
 ferts no claim that is not granted freely to all English- 
 men, except fuch as are founded on falle principles; 
 
 t ii i l :•
 
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