I LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OH CALIFORNIA I SANDlfcGO LOCKE ON WORDS - LOCKE ON WORDS AN ES S AY CONCERNING 4 HUMAN UNDERSTANDING BY JOHN LOCKE, GENT. BOOK III OF WORDS -. WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES F. RYLAND, M.A. LATE SCHOLAR OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE LONDON W. SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO. PATERNOSTER ROW 1882. LONDON : WOODFAI.L AND KINDER, PRINTERS, 111LFORD LANE, STRAND, W.C. PREFACE. No apology seems to be needed for presenting the " immortal Third book " of Locke's Essay in a separate form. All who know it admit that it may be read with great profit by those who have neither time nor inclination to study the rest of the work in which it forms a kind of episode. While it affords the student an admirable example of all that is most characteristic in Locke's style, method and opinions, it has also a real and substantive value of its own. As Hallam remarks, " Among many excellent things in the Essay on Human Understanding, none are more admirable than much of the third book on the nature of words, especially the three chapters on their imperfection and abuse." The present is a reprint of the seventh edition, published in 1715-16, with, however, a few unim- portant corrections of typographical errors, and the omission of the long and uninteresting note vi Preface. added by Locke to Chapter III. in reply to the criticisms of Stillingfleet. The Introduction and Notes have been put together chiefly with a view to assisting " the man of very ordinary capacity," the average reader, who as a rule knows little Logic and less Metaphysics. CONTENTS. P.U;E PREFACE . . v. INTRODUCTION : I. Chief Events of Locke's Life i II. Locke's Place as a Philosopher ... 3 III. Locke's Doctrine of Ideas . . . .10 IV. Locke's Doctrine of Species .... 22 AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. BOOK III. OF WORDS .... 33 CHAPTER I. Of Words or Language in General. SECTION 1. Man fitted to form articulate Sounds ... 33 2. To make them Signs of Ideas .... 34 3, 4. To make general Signs . . . . . -34 5. Words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible Ideas . . . . . . 35 6. Distribution 36 CHAPTER II. Of the Signification of Words. I. Words are sensible Signs necessary for Communi- cation 38 2, 3. Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas "who uses them 39, 40 viii Contents. SECTION PAGE 4. Words often secretly referred, First, to the Ideas in other Mens Minds . . . . . .41 5. Secondly, To the Reality of Things ... 42 6. Words by use readily excite Ideas .... 42 7. Words often used withoitt Signification ... 43 8. Their Signification perfectly arbitrary ... 44 CHAPTER III. Of General Terms. 1. The greatest part of Words general ... 46 2. For every particular thing to have a Name is im- possible " . .46 3, 4. And useless 47, 48 5. What things have proper Names .... 48 6-8. How general Words are made . . .49, 50, 5 1 9. General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas . 5 1 10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made use of in Defi- nitions 53 11. General and Universal are Creatures of the Under- standing 55 12. Abstract Ideas are the Essences of the Genera and Species 56 1 3. They are the Workmanship of the Understanding, but have their Foundation in the Similitude of Things 57 14. Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence . 59 15. Real and nominal Essence 60 1 6. Constant Connection between the Name and Nom- inal Essence ... .... 62 17. Supposition that Species are distinguished by their real Essences, useless 62 1 8. Real and nominal Essence the same in simple Ideas and Modes, different in Substances ... 63 19. Essences ingenerable and incorruptible ... 64 20. Recapitulation . 66 Contents. ix CHAPTER IV. Of the Names of Simple Ideas. SECTION PACK 1. Names of Simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something peculiar .... 67 2. First, Names of Simple Ideas and Substances, in- timate real Existence ...... 67 3. Secondly, Names of Simple Ideas and Modes sig- nify always both real and nominal Essence. . 68 4. Thirdly, Names of Simple Ideas undefinable . 68 5. If all were definable, 'twould be a Process in infini- tum 69 6. What a Definition is 69 7. Simple Ideas why undefinable .... 70 8,9. Instances; Motion 70,71 10. Light 72 11. Simple Ideas why undefinable, farther explained . 73 12, 13. The contrary shewed in complex Ideas by Instances of a Statue and Rainbow . . . . 75,77 14. The Names of complex Ideas when to be made in- telligible by Words 77 15. Fourthly, Names of simple Ideas least doubtful . 78 16. Fifthly, Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea praedicamentali 79 17. Sixthly, Names of simple Ideas stand for Ideis not at all arbitrary 80 CHAPTER V. Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relaticns. 1. They stand for abstract Ideas, as other gers,ral Names 82 2. First, the Ideas they stand for, are made by the Understanding . . . . . . .82 3. Secondly, made arbitrarily, and without Patterns 83 4. How this is done 84 x Contents. SECTION PAGE 5. Evidently arbitrary, in that the Idea is often before the Existence 84 6. Instances ; Murder, Incest, Stabbing . . .85 7 '. But still subservient to the end of Language . 87 8. Whereof the intranslatable Words of divers Lan- guages are a Proof ...... 89 9. This shews Species to be made for Communication 91 10, n. In mixed Modes, 'tis the Name that ties the Combi- nation together, and makes it a Species . 92, 93 12. For the Originals of mixed Modes, we look no farther than the Mind, which also shews them to be the Workmanship of the Understanding. . 94 13. Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, shews the reason why they are so com- pounded ... . . . . . -95 14. Names of mixed Modes stand always for their real Essences 96 1 5 . Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas 97 16. Reason of my being so large on this Subject . . 98 CHAPTER VI. Of the Names of Substances. \. The common Names of Substances stand for Sorts 100 2. The Essence of each sort is the abstract Idea . . 101 3. The nominal and real Essence different . . .102 4-6. Nothing essential to Individuals . . 103,104,106 7,8. The nominal Essence bounds the Species . 107, 108 9. Not the real Essence which we know not . .109 10. Not substantial Forms which we know less . . n i 1 1 . That the nominal Essence is that whereby we dis- tinguish Species farther evident from Spirits . in 12. Whereof there are probably numberless Species . 114 1 3. The nominal Essence that of the Species, proved from Water and Ice 116 14-17. Difficulties against a certain Number of real Essences 117, 118 Contents. xi SECTION PACK 1 8-20. Our nominal Essences of Substances, not perfect Collections of Properties . . . .118,119 21. But stick a Collection as our Name stands for . 119 22. Our abstract Ideas are to us the Measures of Species j instance, in that of Man . . .121 23. Species not distinguished by Generation . .122 24. Not by siibstantial Forms . . . . .123 25. The specifick Essences are made by the Mind . 124 26,27. Therefore very various and uncertain . . 125, 127 28. But not so arbitrarily as mixed Modes . . .129 29. ThJ very imperfect 131 30. Which yet serve for common Converse . . .132 31. But makes several Essences signified by the same Name 135 32. The more general our Ideas are, the more incom- plete and partial they are . . . . . 1 36 33. This all accommodated to the end of Speech . .138 34. Instances in Cassuaries 1 39 35. Men make the Species, instance Gold . . .140 36. Though Nature make the Similitude . . . 141 37. And continues it in the Races of things . . .142 38. Each abstract Idea is an Essence . . . .142 39. Genera and Species in order to naming, instance Watch ... 143 40. Species of artificial things less conftised than natural 145 41. Artificial Things of distinct Species . . .146 42. Substances alone have proper Names . . .147 43. Difficulty to treat of Words with Words . .147 44, 45. Instances of mixed Modes in Kinneah and Niouph . 149, 150 46,47. Instances of Substances in Zahab . . . 151, 153 48. Their Ideas imperfect, and therefore various . 154 49. Therefore to fix their Species, a real Essence is supposed . . . . . . . .155 50. Which Supposition is of no use . . . .155 51. Conclusion 156 xii Contents. CHAPTER VII. Of Particles. SECTION PAGE 1. Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences to- gether 158 2. In them consists the Art of well speaking . . 158 3, 4. They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts 159, 1 60 5. Instance in But 161 6. This Matter but lightly touched here . . .162 CHAPTER VIII. Of Abstract and Concrete Terms. 1. Abstract Terms not predicable one of another, and why 163 2. They shew the Difference of our Ideas . . .164 CHAPTER IX. Of the Imperfection of Words. 1. Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts 167 2. Any Words will serve for recording . . .167 3. Communication by Words, Civil or Philosophical. 168 4. The Imperfection of Words is the doubtfulness of their Signification 169 5. Causes of their Imperfection . . . . .169 6. The Names of mixed Modes doubtful. First, Be- cause the Ideas they stand for are so complex . 1 70 7. Secondly, Because they have no Standards . .171 8. Propriety not a sufficient Remedy . . . .173 9. The way of learning these Names contributes also to their Doubtfulness . . . . . .174 10. Hence unavoidable Obscurity in. antient Authors . 176 Contents. xiii SECTION PAGE 12. Names of Substances referred. First, to real Es- sences that cannot be known. . . . .178 13, 14. Secondly, To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly 179, 181 15. With this Imperfection they may serve for Civil, but not well for Philosophical Use . . .182 1 6. Instance, Liquor of Nerves . . . . .183 17. Instance, Gold 184 1 8. The Names of simple Ideas the least doubtful . 186 19. And next to them simple Modes . . . .188 20. The most doubtful are the Names of very com- pound mixed Modes and Substances . . .188 2 1 . Why this Imperfection charged upon Words . 1 89 22, 23. This should teach us Moderation, in imposing our own Sense of old Authors . . . .190, 191 CHAPTER X. Of the Abuse of Words. I. Abuse of Words 193 2, 3. First,Words without any, or without clear Ideas 193,194 4. Occasioned by learning Names before the Ideas they belong to 195 5. Secondly, Unsteady Application of them . .196 6. Thirdly, Affected Obscurity by wrong Application 198 7. Logick and Dispute has much contributed to this . 199 8. Calling it Subtilty . . . . . .199 9. This Learning very little benefits Society . .201 10. But destroys the Instruments of Knowledg and Communication ....... 202 1 1. As useful as to confound the Sound of the Letters. 202 12. This Art has perplexed Religion and Justice . 203 13. And ought not to pass for Learning . . . 204 14. Fourthly, Taking them for Things . . . 205 1 5. Instance in Matter 206 1 6. This makes Errors lasting 208 xiv Contents. SECTION PAGE 17. Fifthly, Setting them for what they cannot signify 209 1 8. V.g. putting them for the real Essences of Sub- stances 210 19. Hence ive think every Change of our Idea in Sub- stances, not to change the Species . . . .211 20. The Cause of this Abuse, a Supposition of Natures "working alii/ays regularly 213 21. This Abuse contains two false Suppositions . . 214 22. Sixthly, A Supposition that Words have a certain and evident Signification 215 23. The Ends of Language, First, To convey our Ideas 2 1 8 24. Secondly, To do it with Quickness . . . .219 25. Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knoivledg of Things . .219 26-31. How Metis Words fail in all these . 219, 220, 221 32. How in Substances 222 33. How in Modes and Relations 223 34. Seventhly, Figurative Speech also an Abuse of Language . . . ...... . 224 CHAPTER XL Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses, 1. They are worth seeking . . . . . . 226 2. Are not easy 226 3. But yet necessary to Philosophy . . . .227 4. Misuse of Words the Cause of great Errors . 227 5. Obstinacy 228 6. And Wrangling 229 7. Instance, Bat and Bird . . . . . .230 8. First, Remedy to use no Word without an Idea . 231 9. Secondly, To have distinct Ideas annexed to them in Modes . . .* . . . 232 10. And distinct and conformable in Substances . . 234 11. Thirdly, Propriety 235 12. Fourthly, To make known their Meaning . . 236 Contents. xv SECTION PAGE 13. And that three ways -. 237 14. First, In simple Ideas by synonymous Terms, or shewing . . - . . . . . . 237 15. Secondly, In mixed Modes, by Definition . .238 1 6. Morality capable of Demonstration . . .239 17. Definitions can make moral Discourses clear . . 240 1 8. And is the only way . . . " . . . 241 19. Thirdly, In Substances, by shewing and defining . 242 20, 21. Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances, are best got by shewing ..... 243, 244 22. The Ideas of their Powers best by Definition . 245 23. A Reflection on the Knowledg of Spirits . .245 24. Ideas of Substances must be conformable to Things 246 25. Not easy to be made so ...... "248 26. Fifthly, By Constancy in their Signification . .251 27. IV hen the Variation is to be explained . . .252 NOTES . . .255 INTRODUCTION. I. Chief Events of Locke s Life. Born Aug. 29th 1632 Goes to Westminster School under Dr. Busby ; with Dryden and South among his schoolfellows ... ... ... ... 1646 Commences residence at Christ Church, Ox- ford 1652 Takes the degree of Bachelor of Arts ... 1656 Senior Censor of Christ Church ... ... 1664 Goes as Secretary to Sir W. Vane, Ambassa- dor to the Elector of Brandenburg ... 1665 Enters the family of Lord Ashley, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury, where he lives in the capacity of doctor, friend, secretary, and tutor to the son, and afterwards to the grandson, of his patron ... Secretary of Presentations to the livings in the gift of the Crown (This he lost next year in consequence of Shaftesbury's fall.) B Introduction. Takes the degree of Bachelor of Medicine 1675 Goes to France, where he lives four years 1675 Engaged in political intrigue with Shaftes- bury 1681 Goes to Holland, where he lives till the Revo- lution 1683 Epistola de Tolerantia published ... ... 1685 (English translation published in 1689.) Returns to England 1689 Friendship and correspondence with Sir Isaac Newton ... ... ... ... 1689-1693 Made Commissioner of Appeals ... ... 1690 An Essay concerning Human Understanding 1690 Second Letter concerning Toleration ... ... 1690 Two Treatises of Government ... ... ... 1690 Takes up his residence with Sir Francis and Lady Masham, at Gates, in Essex, where he lives until his death ... ... ... 1691 Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money ... ... ... ... 1691 Third Letter for Toleration 1 692 Some Thoughts concerning Education ... 1693 The Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures ... ... ... ... 1695 One of the Seven " Commissioners for Pro- moting the Trade of the Kingdom" 1696-1700 Introduction. Of the Conduct of the Understanding, written about 1697 (Not published till 1706.) Dies Oct. 28th 1704 II. Locke s Place as a Philosopher. . John Locke's is probably the most important name in the list of English philosophers. Locke is to us what Descartes is to France, or Kant to Germany, the founder of a school destined to in- fluence all subsequent national thought. Two rival claims have been advanced to this unique position on behalf of Bacon and of Hobbes. But Bacon was an isolated thinker, whose writings seem to have had singularly little effect on his contemporaries, or on his successors for two centuries. There was never a Baconian philosophy, nor was there any pretence of one until the nineteenth century. Not- withstanding his magnificent project of a complete Reformation of Science, parallel to that which he had witnessed in Religion, Bacon's direct and tangible contribution to the great revival amounts to little more than a series of disconnected hints on the B 2 Introduction. methods of discovery. Locke himself owed nothing to Bacon, nor did any other English thinker, until within the last sixty or seventy years. We may, perhaps, say that Bacon is to Hobbes and Locke what Wicliffe is to Cranmer and Latimer: with broader and more revolutionary conceptions, he yet left much less important traces of his own immediate influence. The claim of Hobbes to pre-eminence in English philosophy is thus stronger than that of Bacon. He was the source and origin of all future discussion in Ethics. But his influence, although remarkably powerful, was almost wholly effected by way of antithesis. The Leviathan led to the de- velopment of the two great rival schools of the Intuitionists and Utilitarians, but in both cases the development came through contradiction of the system, not by expansion of it. And it cannot be said that in other fields, such as Metaphysics and Psychology, Hobbes made any marked impression or left many fervent disciples. Certainly Locke owed little or nothing to him ; perhaps he had never even read the Leviathan.* * Mr. Fox Bourne appears strangely to exaggerate when he says that Locke " had learnt quite as much from his [Hobbes'] 'Treatise of Human Nature' and his 'Leviathan,' as from the ' Discours de la Me"thode ' and the ' Meditationes' of Descartes." Life, ii. p. 89. Introduction. Although Locke cannot claim the same supreme importance in the history of philosophy as Des- cartes, from whom he derived a great deal more than English writers have, as a rule, cared to acknowledge, he is in every sense an epoch-making thinker. ' His intellectual descendants are so numerous and so widely spread that it" is difficult to classify them. His Essay gave rise directly to the line of meta- physical speculation which was developed and ex- tended by Berkeley and Hume ; and indirectly, by way of negation, to Kant and German Idealism ; while it finds its most recent exponent, as one born out of due season, in John Stuart Mill. It gave birth to the great Psychological school, whose favourite doctrine is the " Association of Ideas," represented in the last century by Hartley and Hume, and in our own time by the Mills, Spencer and Bain, while it contains more than traces of the modern comparative and pathological methods of research. / Locke's theological works were the origin of the rationalistic theology of the eighteenth century ; Collins was his friend and executor. His little book on Education, " our one classic " on that subject, occupies a position in the science of Pedagogy almost as notable as his Essay does in the sciences of Psychology and Metaphysics : he first made the road, as it has been said, which the great Introduction. educational reformers followed. His influence on the development of modern theories of Politics and Economics, if less important, has yet been decidedly marked. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that in France nearly every important thinker, from Voltaire to Victor Cousin, may be called a disciple of Locke. The Encyclopaedists and their followers, and even the leaders of the reaction against them, were influenced almost to a man, though of course in different degrees, by the teachings of the great Englishman. The psychological theories of Con- dillac, Cabanis and De Tracy, the political theories of Turgot and Rousseau, and the educational theories of the last, can be traced more or less directly to this one source ; while probably all the apostles of the eighteenth century Illumination could trace to him the first suggestion of their metaphysical and theological scepticism. Nevertheless, perhaps, Locke's fame depends less on the way in which he impressed a bent on the course of subsequent philosophical thought, than on his popularity amongst men "not accustomed to abstract speculation," but yet desirous to " raise themselves above the alms-basket, and not content to live lazily on scraps of begged opinions." Like Socrates, he essayed to bring down philosophy from the skies. He writes " for the man of very ordinary Introduction. capacity." He has firm trust in the common sense of the normal British citizen, even while his analysis seems to threaten its authority. Honest, impartial, and never run away with by enthusiasm here lies the secret of his wide influence in England, where the national mind has always been ostentatiously practical. Locke's manful disregard of mere con- sistency, his readiness to qualify statements which seemed extreme, and his loyalty to common sense, explain how it is that he enjoyed, especially during the realistic eighteenth century, so general a popularity. Berkeley and Hume were too rigidly logical, and too ready to indulge in paradoxes offensive to the man of ordinary capacity, to gain the same wide audience. Locke's reliance on common sense is seen even in places where he appears most at variance with it ; while Berkeley and Hume arc never more divergent from the thoughts and feelings of the vulgar than when they claim to be their advocates and exponents. To take* an example : Locke's doctrine of perception, although it may strike us now as artificial and paradoxical, was doubtless put forward by him as an honest state- ment of the plain, natural, and non-metaphysical belief held by unsophisticated people. He abandoned as far-fetched the thories of such writers as Cudworth and More, who make a broad distinction between 8 Introduction. thought and feeling, and who recognize even in "ex- ternal perception an act essentially intellectual, due to the synthetic activity of thought, and not to mere passive reception of ideas on a tabula rasa. Such a view seemed to him to savour too much of mystery and metaphysics to satisfy the " large, sound, round-about sense " for whose approval he always sought. Another characteristic feature of Locke's writings is his earnest and evident desire to arrive at truth ; and to arrive at it fairly and honestly. He will allow no hypothesis of his own, and no tradition of the ciders, to stand in the way. He feels a hearty enjoyment in the pleasures of intellectual exercise ; and this enjoyment prevents that over-anxiety to come up with the game which leads sometimes to hasty theorizing, and sometimes to the supine acceptance of antiquated beliefs. He is ready to allow " law " to the knowledge of which he is in pursuit. Both by precept and example he teaches his reader to think for himself. He represents in glowing colours the value of truth, the pleasure of seeking it, and the necessity of striving lawfully for it. As he tells us in his own manly way, he who " sets his own thoughts on work, to find and follow truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the hunter's satisfaction ; every mom ent of his pursuit Introduction. will reward his pains with some delight, and he will have reason to think his time not ill-spent even when he cannot much boast of ' any great acquisition." His books are thus eminently energizing and stimu- lating to the mind. However unlike in other respects, he resembles Plato in this. Few authors serve better the purpose of a mental tonic. It is of course not necessary or possible to deny that Locke has his faults. Leaving out of consider- ation the acknowledged inadequacy of his philosophy as a positive system, there are other defects in his writings which one would willingly have missed. One of these, for instance, is the tone of ironical contempt wherein he speaks of his predecessors in metaphysical speculation, not only of Plato, Aristotle and the Schoolmen, but also of Descartes, to whom he owed so much. Though not altogether un- pleasant at first, it jars on the ear through repetition. When Bacon criticizes gravely and with moderation, Locke too often sneers. His sympathies with alien modes of thought were indeed very limited. What did not seem reasonable on the face of it repelled him so completely that he too often regarded it as unworthy of further consideration. New or uncouth technical terms, a hint of what he suspected to be mysticism or verbal jugglery, was generally suffi- cient to repel him from a fair examination of io Introduction. doctrines which in themselves were reasonable enough. Yet, after all, this intolerance of verbiage is not by any means an unmixed evil, if only applied im- partially all round. The theology, philosophy and science of to-day would perhaps be none the worse for the criticism of a nineteenth-century Locke, with the seventeenth-century Locke's jealousy of un- defined, and perhaps undefinable, terms. Possibly Evolution, Culture, Welfare, and sundry strange words ending in -plasm and -geny might attract his at- tention, instead of Substantial Forms and Intentional Species, and be none the worse for the scrutiny. We may still be permitted to think with Locke, that " it is not without all reason supposed, that there are many such empty terms to be found in some learned writers, to which they had recourse to etch out their systems where their understandings could not furnish them with conceptions from things." III. Locke s Doctrine of Ideas. u Philosophy is much indebted to Mr. Locke for his obser- vations on the abuse of words. It is pity he did not apply these observations to the word idea, the ambiguity and abuse of which has very much hurt his excellent Essay." (Reid, Intellectual Powers, Essay VI. Chap, iii.) Introduction* 1 1 Knowledge, says Locke, consists in the " percep- tion of the connection and agreement, or disagree- ment and repugnancy, of any of our ideas." (Essay, Bk. IV. Chap. I. sec. 2.) Thus the first step towards understanding Locke must be to get a notion of what he means by the word Idea.* He defines it as "what- soever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks," or "whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." And as Locke, fol- lowing Descartes, uses the words think and thought for all the operations of consciousness, idea is equiva- lent to direct object of consciousness. It includes what are now distinguished as Sensation, Feeling, Percep- tion, Conception, Image, Representation, and even Emotion. It includes what Hume calls " impressions " that is, directly and immediately known feelings, as well as what Hume calls " ideas " that is, remem bered impressions. It is tolerably evident that a word used to denote so many different things cannot have a very clear and definite meaning. But Locke adds to the con- fusion by also using the word to denote the attri- butes in external things which are supposed to pro- duce impressions or sensations in us, as well as to denote the impressions themselves. The term may * On the history of the use of this word, see Hamilton's Reid, note G, p. 925. 1 2 Introduction. thus express a merely personal or subjective pheno- menon in my mind, or something which would still exist if I were unconscious or dead. "A snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snowball, I call 'qualities'; and, as they are sensations or perceptions in our under- standings, I call them 'ideas'; which ideas, if I speak of them sometimes as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us." (Bk. II. Chap, viii. sec. 8.) Instances of this use will be found in Bk. III. It leads to ambiguities such as those men- tioned in the note to Chap. x. sec. 17. All ideas come to us from experience ; there are no ready-made notions in our minds, no "innate ideas." But experience is not confined to external things ; we have experience also of states of con- sciousness. " Our observation, employed about ex- ternal sensible objects, or about the internal opera- tions of our minds," Locke tells us, "supplies our understandings with all the materials for thinking." These two " fountains of knowledge " are called Sensation and Reflection, the faculties of external and internal perception. By an idea of sensation, or sensible idea, Locke means what we call a sensation, or what we call a perception, or the remembrance of Introduction. 1 3 them. By an idea of reflection he means the result of an act of introspection or self-consciousness, " that notice which the mind takes of its own operations," or the remembrance of it. Thus red, solid, hot, whe- ther directly perceived or not, are ideas of sensation. If I am looking at a poppy, I have what we call a sensation of red ; and if I shut my eyes and picture the poppy to myself, I have a remembered sensation of red ; Locke calls them both ideas of sensation. If I am actually conscious of remembering, or of willing, or am imagining one of these mental states, I have an idea of reflection. All that the mind can do with regard to the ideas it thus becomes possessed of is to recall, compare, and unite them. It cannot originate any ideas. "All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds and reach as high as heaven itself take their rise and footing here : in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection have o'ffered for its contemplation." (Bk. II. Chap. ii. sec. 24.) The mind gives birth to no entirely new idea; but it com- bines, separates, and compares the ideas which come to it from inward or outward observation. Our ideas come to us from distinct and definite objects. This particular poppy gives me an indi- 14 Introduction. vidual idea, or perception; that particular stick of sealing-wax gives me another individual idea, or per- ception. They are, as Locke says, " particular ideas received from particular objects." But I can leave out of sight the points wherein the poppy and sealing- wax differ, and retaining in my mind the point wherein they agree, I can form the general abstract idea of red. It is general, because it applies to a large number of distinct objects. And it is abstract, be- cause it is formed by a process of drawing off (ab- strahere) the attention from the points of difference, in order to concentrate it on the point of resem- blance. General ideas are thus abstract ideas, and Locke is quite right in calling them so. But it must be noticed that the names of general ideas are not abstract terms. An abstract term is properly opposed to a concrete term, and signifies the name of an attribute, in contradistinction to the name of a thing. Poppy is a concrete term ; redness an abstract term.* Another division of ideas is that into simple and complex. By simple ideas Locke means "uncom- pounded appearances," that is, unanalysable ele- ments of knowledge, whether furnished by Sensation or Reflection. Not all ideas given by experience are * Cf. note to Chap. viii. sec. I. Introduction. 1 5 simple; but only those which are found to be in- capable of further analysis. Flower is to Locke a complex idea ; but fragrance, redness, softness, smoothness, are simple ideas ; because, while we can split up the idea of a flower into these and similar component ideas, we cannot break up our idea of redness or fragrance into still simpler elements. Locke's list of simple ideas embraces many which we have learnt to consider extremely complex; such, for instance, as Solidity and Extension. Locke divides complex ideas into three classes, which he calls Modes, Substances, and Relations. His treatment of the last of these, ideas of Relation, is not very clear or consistent, and fortunately they may be left out of consideration by the reader of Bk. III., in which practically only the two former kinds of com- plex ideas are discussed. By Modes Locke means "such complex ideas which, however compounded, contain not in them the sup- position of subsisting by themselves, but are con- sidered as dependences on or affections of substances; such are the ideas signified by the words ' triangle, gratitude, murder.' " (Bk. II. Chap. xii. sec. 4.) They are composed of groups of simple ideas more or less large and more or less varied. The less com- plicated groups, "which are only variations or dif- ferent combinations of the same simple idea," are 1 6 Introduction* called simple modes. The more complicated groups, which involve several simple ideas, are called mixed modes. The ideas of triangle and circle are modifi- cations of the one simple idea of space, and belong to the former class ; the ideas of gratitude and mur- der, involving notions of states of consciousness, ex- ternal actions, the obligations of law and morality, etc., belong to the latter. (Bk. II. Chap. xxii. sec. I.) Ideas of substances resemble mixed modes in being compounded of simpler ideas of different kinds ; but they differ from them in being " taken to represent distinct particular things, subsisting by themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief." (Bk. II. Chap. xii. sec. 6.) On the other hand, mixed modes are not thought as answering to " real beings that have a steady existence," but merely as groups of "scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind." By ideas of substances Locke means ideas of groups of attributes, together with the sup- posed metaphysical basis, or substratum, in which they are said to inhere. When we fully analyze our idea of a concrete external thing, we discover a more or less numerous set of simple ideas, such as those of space, solidity, colour, temperature, etc.; and further, we are obliged to assume what we can never discover, an "unknown support of these qualities we find Introduction. existing," the substratum or metaphysical substance of the thing, of which we can have only an obscure and confused idea. Thus our idea of an orange con- sists of ideas of roundness, yellowness, juiciness, a given size and weight, a peculiar taste, etc., plus an indeterminate idea of a "something to which they belong and in which they inhere." The word ' sub- stance ' is used by Locke to denote both the concrete thing itself and the metaphysical basis or substratum. It is not necessary here to examine the validity of the doctrine of ideas propounded by Locke. An able discussion will be found in Reid's Essays on the In- tellectual Powers (Essay VI. Chap, iii.), where it is pointed out that Locke's theory would make impos- sible all knowledge save that of our own states of consciousness. If all we know be our own ideas, we can never have any actual knowledge of external objects, but only of our own ideas about them. We remain shut up in the vicious circle of our own ideas. This line of argument is developed in Prof. Green's admirable Introduction to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, probably the most subtle piece of metaphysical criticism in English. Although even a brief summary of this discussion would be out of place, the reader must be reminded, that great as was Locke's advance on previous thinkers in clearness of style and directness of C 1 8 Introduction. thought, in practical breadth of view and in exhilar- ating freedom from pedantry, he here took a step, and a long step, backwards. In his theory cf knowledge he left little room for the part played by the intellect in combining the raw material of knowledge given us by the senses. It is not that he fails to recognize the deliverances of what has been called the Internal Sense, for, as we see, he places "Reflection," at any rate theoretically, on a level with external sensation as a source of ideas'. It is not that he rejects a doctrine of "innate ideas," which probably no philosopher ever seriously advanced, and thus became the coryphaeus in a long, tiresome and unnecessary series of logomachies. But it is, that he always tends to neglect, and never fully appreciates, the supreme importance of the intellectual factor in experience the synthetic activity of thought which brings into relation and gives meaning to the unrelated, and in themselves unmeaning, feelings yielded by internal and external sensation. This fundamental defect set English metaphysics travelling on the road to absolute scepticism, a road which ends in an impracticable subjective idealism, as unsatisfactory to the philo- sopher as it is revolting to the plain man. We know nothing, according to Hume and Mill, but our own states of consciousness, and these we do not know Introduction. 1 9 as our own ; we know neither ourselves nor the uni- verse ; everything is reduced to an incoherent flux of phenomena. Thought itself becomes a series of isolated and unmeaning states of feeling. But, it may be objected, to say this is only to say that Locke did not anticipate Kant. If so, the indictment is manifestly unfair. In point of fact, however, Locke, made a distinct step backwards. Historians of philosophy have not sufficiently noticed that in his contemporaries, More and Cud- worth, as well as in the despised Schoolmen, the factor which he so fatally left out of account is clearly and unambiguously affirmed. Kant's work, like that of many other great reformers, was after all only a restatement, though with fuller conscious- ness of its meaning and implications, of an old truth ; the truth, that knowledge is not merely a passive reception of ideas, but a synthesis of im- pressions by the active energy of thought. The Scholastics distinctly laid down that the intellect is not a tabula rasa, written on from with- out, although they at the same time allowed that, prior to experience, the mind has no content of ideas. It is thought and not sensation that really produces the record of experience. A parallelism was recognized between Biology and Psychology; for, just as the living organism builds itself up by C 2 2O Introduction. assimilating dead matter from without, so does the fabric of knowledge build itself up by the integra- tion of the "forms " of external things.* Cud worth (1617-1688), whose daughter, Lady Masham, was Locke's greatest friend, thus sums up and appropriates the scholastic theory : " Knowledge is not a passion from anything without the mind, but an active exertion of the inward strength,- vigour and power of the mind, displaying itself from within." He makes a clear distinction between this synthetic activity of consciousness and the internal sense ; and shows that even in perception of external objects the intellect actively exerts itself. " Things are never perceived merely by their own force and activity upon the percipient, but by the innate force, power and ability of that which per- ceives. And sense itself is not a mere corporeal passion, but a perception of the bodily passions proceeding from some power and ability supposed to reside in a sensitive soul, vitally united to that respective body." It is the intellect that gives us the relations of whole and part, equality and inequality, priority and posteriority, cause and effect; and consequently that gives us objects at * See, for instance, Kleutgen, La Philosophic scolastique (Paris), vol. i. pp. 34 sey. Cf. also his correction of Frosch- hammer's misrepresentations, p. 144. Introduction. 2 1 all. At the same time, Cudworth makes it clear that this objective idealism does not do away with the reality and actuality of our knowledge, as the theory of subjective idealism derived by Hume and Mill from the teaching of Locke certainly does.* Henry More (1614-1687) remarks that "relative ideas ".prove that the soul has "active conception proceeding from herself, while she takes notice of external objects." And he gives the following instances : " Suppose one side of a room whitened, the other not touched or meddled with, this other has thus become unlike, and hath the notion of dissimile necessarily belonging to it, although there has nothing at all been done thereunto. So suppose two pounds of lead which therefore are two equal pieces of that metal ; cut away half from one of them, the other pound, nothing at all being done unto it, has lost its notion of equal, and hath acquired a new one of double unto the other. Wherefore the ideas of equal and unequal, double and sub-double, like and unlike, with the rest are no external impresses upon the senses, but the soul's # Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, Bk. IV. chaps, i. ii. It may be as well to say that though this work was not published till 1731, the same views are taught in The Intellectual System, published in 1678. 22 Introduction. own active manner of conceiving those things which are discovered by the outward senses."* The ultimate effect of the negative thought of Locke and Hume was a more distinct enunciation of the forgotten factor ; we may say that it helped to solve the problem by a rednctio ad absurdum. In itself it was a retrogression. It obliterated one-half, and that the more important half, of the truth in order to bring into higher relief the other, and less impor- tant, half. But the metaphysical speculations of the great English philosophers were not wasted ; because the new solution offered by Kant and Hegel is incomparably fuller and more complete than that of St. Thomas Aquinas, or More, or Cudworth. And that new solution was only rendered possible by Locke's doctrine of Ideas. IV. Locke's Doctrine of Species. In the sixth chapter of this Book of the Essay, Locke expounds, at considerable length and with great ingenuity, his theory of the nature of Species. He lays down that Species or natural classes of things * Antidote against Atheism, Bk. I. chap. vi. Introduction. 23 are arbitrary in their origin, that they are relative not absolute,. and are not madefy Nature herself but by the understanding of man. They " depend on such collection of ideas as men have made, and not on the real nature of things." This somewhat para- doxical statement has been a stumbling-block and rock of offence to many of Locke's warmest admirers. It seems important, therefore, to point out in advance the true sense in which classification may be said to be " arbitrary," and also to explain Locke's general position with regard to the subject. It is obvious that any property may be taken as a foundation for the division of things into classes. An artist classifies things by forms and colours, while the man of science classifies by less easily recognized attributes. The statesman, the theolo- gian and the poet classify men and things in very different ways. The special interest determines the principle on which the classification depends. (Cf. Chap. ix. sec. 14, and note.) In this sense classifica- tion is arbitrary. Objects are, indeed, made by Nature to resemble each other, but the classes are made by the mind, which selects such points of resemblance between things as interests it most, and " sorts " them in conformity therewith. This, however, is not the whole of the truth. A little reflection serves to show that some particular 24 Introduction. classifications are more likely to be generally useful than others, viz., those which are founded on points of resemblance that involve other points of resem- blance. A grouping founded on such attributes as these will be more serviceable than others founded on attributes which do not imply further similarities. It is, however, by no means an easy matter to discover these attributes. To use the words of Mill, though in a sense slightly different from his own, "this, of course, supposes a comparison of the things, feature by feature and property by property, to ascertain what attributes they agree in, and not unfrequently an operation, strictly inductive, for the purpose of ascertaining some unobvious agree- ment, which is the cause of their obvious agree- ments." (Logic, ii. p. 221.) We see, then, that classes are, broadly speaking, divisible into two sorts, (i) those which are dis- tinguished by the possession of only one or two principal common attributes and the derivative attributes dependent on these, and (2) those which are distinguished by an immense number of common attributes more or less independent and uncon- nected. These latter are called by Mill Real Kinds, or Natural Kinds. While we can sum up in a moment the points of resemblance between the members of the class of "white things" or "heavy Introduction. 25 things," there is no likelihood of our ever discovering all the properties common to specimens of the Natural Kinds " sulphur " or " man." "There is no impropriety in saying that, of these two classifica- tions, the one answers to a much more radical distinction in the things themselves than the other does. . . . The differences, however, are made by nature, in both cases ; while the recognition of those differences as grounds of classification and of naming is equally, in both cases, the act of man." (Logic, i. pp. 138-9.) The recognition of a Real Kind is not a matter of mere " convenience ; " it cannot be " arbitrarily " fashioned by the mind. To frame a good definition, or a good classification, is "not a matter of choice but of discussion, and discussion not merely respecting the usage of language, but respecting the properties of things." In the notes it will be pointed out that Locke, although his language is somewhat inconsistent, has yet said sufficient to show that he did not consider classification of things into their species as entirely arbitrary. (Cf. especially Chap. vi. sec. 30 and sec. 36.) But at the same time (cf. sec. 38 of the same chapter) he shows that he does not discriminate between classes based on few and slight resem- blances, and those more fundamental ones which Mill calls Natural Kinds. 26 Introduction. The value and originality of Locke's treatment of the subject of species consists in his statements that (i) species are not absolute but relative, and are due immediately and directly to our own minds ; that although Nature makes resemblances, it is man that selects them as a basis cf classification. (2) The boundaries of species are not immovable. Not only are our definitions always more or less unfixed and vague, but Nature from time to time produces objects which fall into no recognized class (cf. sees. 23, 27). The recognition of this tendency to variation is a step towards the modern theories advocated by Mr. Darwin and Mr. Spencer. Locke's statements are, however, too strong ; and a grave defect in his view is the consequence. He overlooks the impor- tant connection between inheritance and classifica- tion. He adduces the existence of mules, and other crosses, to show that the pedigree is of little or no value in determining species. This is going too far. He is quite right in drawing attention to the easily forgotten fact, that Nature does not keep the " supposed real species distinct and entire " ; that is, does not make the progeny always exactly resemble the parents ; but he errs in under-estimating the part played by the forces of heredity, or inheritance from ancestors, which tend to preserve the species unaltered. The doctrine of evolution takes into Introduction. 2 7 consideration both the forces which resist, and those which bring about, variations of kind. (3) Species depend on names. Locke recognizes the influence of language on classification (sec. 39). To name a thing is ta class it ; much that is beautiful in poetry, as well as much that is misleading in philo- sophy, is due to the effect of these implicit classifica- tions. It may perhaps be advisable to quote here the following passages from the correspondence of Locke and his friend Molyneux, bearing on the question of the nature of species. Molyneux, writing on December 22, 1692, remarks that : "What you say concerning genera and species is unquestion- ably true ; and yet it seems hard to assert that there is no such sort of creatures in nature as birds: for tho' we may be ignorant of the particular essence that makes a bird to be a bird, or that determines and distinguishes a bird from a beast ; or the just limits and boundaries between each ; yet we can no more doubt of a sparrow's being a bird, and an horse's being a beast, than we can of this colour being black, and t'other white ; tho' by shades they may be made so gradually to vanish into each other, that we cannot tell where either determines." To this Locke replies as follows : " In the objection you raise about species, I fear you are fallen into the same 28 Introduction* difficulty I often found my self under, when I was writing on that subject, where I was very apt to suppose distinct species I could talk of, without names. For pray, Sir, consider what it is you mean, when you say, That we can no more doubt of a sparrow's being a bird, and an horses being a beast, than we can of tins colour being black and fotJier white, etc., but this, that the combination of simple ideas, which the word bird stands for, is to be found in that particular thing we call a sparrow. And therefore I hope I have nowhere said, There is no such sort of creatures in nature as birds ; if I have, it is both contrary to truth and to my opinion. This I do say, that there are real distinctions, and differences in those real constitutions one from another ; whereby they are distinguished one from another, whereby we think of them, or name them or no ; but that that whereby we distinguish and rank particular substances into sorts or genera and species, is not those real essences or internal con- stitutions, but such combinations of simple ideas, as we observe in them. This I design'd to show in lib. iii. c. 6. If, upon your perusal of that chapter again, you find anything contrary to this, I beg the favour of you to mark it to me, that I may correct it, for it is not what I think true. Some parts of that third Book concerning words, though the thoughts were Introduction. 29 easie and clear enough, yet cost me more pains to express than all the rest of my Essay. And there- fore I shall not much wonder if there be in some places of it obscurity and doubtfulness." OF HUMANE UNDERSTANDING. BOOK III. OF WORDS. The Commonwealth of Learning, is not at this time without Master-Builders, whose mighty Designs, in advancing the Sciences, will leave lasting Monuments to the Admiration of Posterity: Jluf every one must not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham ; and in ait Age that produces stich Masters, as the Great Huygenius, and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some other of that Strain ; 'tis- Ambition enough to be employed as an Under- Labourer in clearing Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish that lies in the way to Knowledge ; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the World, if the Endeavours of ingenious and industrious Men had not been much cumbered with the learned, but frivolous Use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible Terms introduced into the Sciences, and there made an Art of, to that Degree, that Philosophy, which is nothing but the true Knowledge of Things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought into well-bred Company, and polite Conversation. Vague and insignificant Forms of Speech, and Abuse of Language, have so long passed for Mysteries of Science', and hard or misapply 1 d Words, with little or no Meaning, have, by Prescrip- tion, such a Right to be mistaken for deep Learning, and hcighth of Speculation, that it will not be easie to pcrswade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the Covers of Ignorance, and Hinderance of trite Kn and sucn > from which others, sensible Signs as well as himself, might receive Profit necessary for Communica- and Delight ; yet they are all within his own Breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made appear. The Comfort and Advantage of Society, not being to be had without Communication of Thoughts, it was necessary, that Man should find out some External sensible Signs, whereby those invisible Ideas, which his Thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose, nothing was so fit, either for Plenty, or Quickness, as those articulate Sounds, which with so much Ease and Variety, he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how Words, which were by Nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made Use of by Men, as the Signs of their Ideas ; not by any natural Connexion, that there is between particular articulate Sounds and certain Ideas, for then there The Signification of Words. 39 would be but one Language amongst all Men ; but by a voluntary Imposition, whereby such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an Idea. The use then of Words, is to be sensible Marks of Ideas ; and the Ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate Signification. . 2. The use Men have of these Marks, being either to record their own Thoughts for Words are the Assistance of their own Memory; the sensible . Signs of his or, as it were, to bring out their Ideas, ideas who and lay them before the view of others : nses them ' Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever, or carelessly those Ideas are collected from the Things, which they are supposed to represent. When a Man speaks to another, it is, that he may be understood ; and the end of Speech is, that those Sounds, as Marks, may make known his Ideas to the Hearer. That then which Words are the Marks of, are the Ideas of the Speaker : Nor can any one apply them, as Marks, immediately to any thing else, but the Ideas, that he himself hath, For this would be to make them Signs of his own Conceptions, and yet apply them to other Ideas ; which would be to make them Signs, and not Signs of his Ideas at the same time ; and so in effect, to have 119 Signification at all. Words 40 The Signification of Words. being voluntary Signs, they cannot be voluntary- Signs imposed by him cm Things he knows not. That would be to make them Signs of nothing, Sounds without Signification. A Man cannot make his Words the Signs either of Qualities in Things, or of Conceptions in the Mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. 'Till he has some Ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the Conceptions of another Man ; nor can he use any Signs for them : For thus they would be the Signs of he knows not what, which is in Truth to be the Signs of nothing. But when he represents to himself other Mens Ideas, by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same Names, that other Men do, 'tis still to his own Ideas ; to Ideas that he has, and not to Ideas that he has not. 3. This is so necessary in the Use of Language, ,, r , that in this respect, the knowing, and Words are to ' the sensible the Ignorant ; the Learned, and Un- Signs of his Ideas who learned, use the Words they speak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every Jl fan's Mouth, stand for the Ideas he has, and which Jie would express by them. A Child having taken Notice of nothing in the Metal he hears called Go'd, but the bright shining yellow Colour, he applies the Word Gold only to his own Idea of that Colour, and nothing else ; and therefore calls the same Colour in The Signification of Words. 41 a Peacock's Tail, Gold. Another that has better observed, adds to shining yellow, great Weight : and then the Sound Gold, when he Uses it, stands for a complex Idea of a shining Yellow and very weighty Substance. Another adds to those Qualities, Fusi- bility: And then the Word Gold to him signifies a Body, bright yellow, fusible, and very heavy. Another adds Malleability. Each of these uses equally the Word Gold, when they have Occasion to express the Idea, which they have apply'd it to : But it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own Idea ; nor can he make it stand, as a Sign of such a complex Idea, as he has not. 4. But though Words, as they are used by Men, can properly and immediately signify Words often nothing but the Ideas, that are in the s * cretl y re ~ jerrea, rirst, Mind of the Speaker; yet they in other Mens their Thoughts give them a secret Minds. Reference to two other'Things. First, They suppose tJieir Words to be marks of tJie Ideas in the Minds also of other Men, with whom they communicate : For else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the Sounds they applied to one Idea, were such, as by the Hearer were applied to another, which is to speak two Languages. But in this, Men stand not usually to examine, whether the Idea they and those they Dis- 42 The Signification of Words. course with have in their Minds, be the same : But think it enough, that they use the Word, as they imagine, in the common Acceptation of that Lan- guage ; in which they suppose, that the Idea, they make it a Sign of, is precisely the same, to which the Understanding Men of that Country apply that Name. 5. Secondly, Because Men would not be thought to ta ^ b arc of their own Imaina- Se-ondlv To the Reality of tions, but of Things as really they Things. are ; therefore they often suppose their Words to stand also for the Reality of Things. But this relating more particularly to Substances, and their Names, as perhaps the former does to simple Ideas and Modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying Words more at large, when we come to treat of the Names of mixed Modes, and Substances, in particular : Though give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting the use of Words, and brings unavoidable Obscurity and Confusion into their Signification, whenever we make them stand for any thing, but those Ideas we have in our own Minds. 6. Concerning Words also it is farther to be b cons idered : First, That they being use readily immediately the Signs of Mens Ideas ; excite Ideas. and, by that means, the Instruments whereby Men communicate their Conceptions, and The Signification of Words. 43 express to one another those Thoughts and Imag- inations they have within their own Breasts, there conies by constant use, to be such a Connexion be- tween certain Sounds, and tJie Ideas they stand for, that the Names heard, almost as readily excite certain Ideas, as if the Objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the Senses. \Vhich is manifestly so in all obvious sensible Qualities ; and in all Substances, that fre- quently, and familiarly occur to us. 7. Secondly, That though the proper and imme- diate Signification of Words, are Ideas in Word$ ofien the Mind of the Speaker ; yet because by wed without Signification. familiar use from our Cradles, we come to learn certain articulate Sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our Tongues, and always at Hand in our Memories ; but yet are not always care- ful to examine, or settle their Significations perfectly, it often happens that Men, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive Consideration, do set their Thoughts more on Words, than Things. Nay, because Words are many of them learned before the Ideas are known for which they stand : Therefore some, not only Children, but Men, speak several Words, no otherwise than Parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those Sounds. But so far as Words 44 The Signification of Words. are of Use and Signification, so far is there a con- stant Connexion between the Sound and the Idea ; and a Designation, that the one stand for the other ; without which Application of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant Noise. 8. Words by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in Men certain nificationper- Ideas, so constantly . and readily, that fectly arbi- ^gy are a p t to suppose a natural Connexion between them. But that they signify only Mens peculiar Ideas, and that by a perfectly arbitrary Imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same Language) the same Ideas, we take them to be the Signs of : And every Man has so inviolable a Liberty, to make Words stand for what Ideas he pleases, that no one hath the Power to make others have the same Ideas in their Minds, that he has, when they use the same Words, that he does. And therefore the great Augustus himself, in the Posses- sion of that Power which ruled the World, acknow- ledged, he could not make a new Latin Word : which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint, what Idea any Sound should be a Sign of, in the Mouths and common Language of his Sub- jects. 'Tis true, common use, by a tacit Consent, appropriates certain Sounds to certain Ideas in all The Signification of Words. 45 Languages, which so far limits the Signification of that Sound, that unless a Man applies it to the same Idea, he does not speak properly. And let me add, that unless a Man's Words excite the same Ideas in the Hearer, which he makes them stand for in speak- ing, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequence of any Man's using of Words dif- ferently, either from their general Meaning, or the particular Sense of the Person to whom he Addresses them, this is certain, their Signification, in his use of them, is limited to his Ideas, and they can be Signs of nothing else. 46 General Terms. CHAPTER III. OF GENERAL TERMS. I. AH Things that exist being Particulars, it The greatest ma ^ P erha P s be thought reasonable fart of Words that Words, which ought to be con- general. formed to Things, should be so too, I mean in their Signification : but yet we find the quite contrary. The tec greatest part of Words, that make all Languages, are general Terms : which has not been the Effect of Neglect, or Chance, but of Reason, and Necessity. 2. First, It is impossible that every particular Tiling should have a distinct peculiar For every Name. For the Signification and Use particit I ar thing to have of Words, depending on that Con- imbotsible. nexion, which the Mind makes be- tween its Ideas, and the Sounds it Uses as Signs of them, it is necessary, in the Application of Names to Things, that the Mind should have distinct Ideas of the Things, and retain also the par- ticular Name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar Appropriation to that Idea. But it is General Terms. 47 beyond the Power of Humane Capacity to frame and retain distinct Ideas of all the particular Things we meet with : Every Bird, and Beast, Men saw ; every Tree, and Plant, that affected the Senses, could not find a Place in the most capacious Under- standing. If it be looked on, as an Instance of a prodigious Memory, That some Generals have been able to call every Soldier in their Army, by his proper Name : We may easily find a Reason, why Men have never attempted to give Names to each Sheep in their Flock, or Crow that Flies over their Heads ; much less to call every Leaf of Plants, or Grain of Sand that came in their way, by a peculiar Name. 3. Secondly, If it were possible, it would yet be iiscless ; because it would not serve And useless. to the chief end of Language. Men would in vain heap up Names of particular Things, that would not serve them to communicate their Thoughts. Men learn Names, and use them in Talk with others, only that they may be under- stood : which is then only done, when by Use or Consent, the Sound I make by the Organs of Speech, excites in another Man's Mind, who hears it, the Idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot be done by Names, apply'd to particular Things, whereof I alone having the Ideas in my 48 General Terms. Mind, the Names of them could not be significant, or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very particular Things, which had fallen under my Notice. 4. TJiirdly, But yet granting this also feasible ; (which I think is not,) yet a distinct Name for every particular Thing would not be of any great Use for tlie Improvement of Knowledge : which, though founded in particular Things, enlarges itself by general Views ; to which, Things reduced into Sorts under general Names, are properly subservient. These, with the Names belonging to them, come within some com- pass, and do not multiply every Moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or Use requires. And therefore in these Men, have for the most part stopped ; but yet not so, as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular Things, by appropriated Names, where Convenience Demands it. And there- fore in their own Species, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular Persons, they make use of proper Names ; and their distinct Individuals have distinct Denominations. 5. Besides Persons, Countries also, Cities, Rivers, Mountains, and other the like Distinc- What things have proper tionsof Place, have usually found peculiar Names, and that for the same Reason ; General Terms. 49 they being such as Men have often an Occa- sion to mark particularly, and, as it were, set be- fore others in their Discourses with them. And I doubt not, but if we had Reason to mention parti- cular Horses, as often as we have to mention par- ticular Men, we should have proper Names for the one, as familiar as for the other ; and Bucephalus would be a Word as much in Use, as Alexander. And therefore we see that amongst Jockeys, Horses have their proper Names to be known and distin- guished by, as commonly as their Servants : Because amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or that particular Horse, when he is out of Sight. 6. The next thing to be considered is, how general Words come to be made. For ,, How general since all things that exist are only Words are particulars, how come we by general Terms, or where find we those general Natures they are supposed to stand for ? Words become general, by being made the Signs of general Ideas : And Ideas become general, by separating from them the Circumstances of Time, and Place, and any other Ideas, that may determine them to this or that particular Existence. By this way of Abstraction they are made capable of representing more Indi- viduals than one ; each of which, having in it a Con- E 50 General Terms. formity to that Abstract Idea, is (as we call it) of that sort. 7. But to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be amiss to trace our Notions, and Names, from their beginning, and observe by what Degrees we proceed, and by what Steps \ve enlarge our Ideas from our first Infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the Ideas of the Persons Chil- dren converse with, (to Instance in them alone) are like the Persons themselves, only particular. The Ideas of the Nurse, and the Mother, are well framed in their Minds ; and, like Pictures of them there, represent only those Individuals. The Names they first gave to them, are confined to these Individuals ; and the Names of Nurse and Mamma, the Child Uses, determine themselves to those Persons. After- wards, when time and a large Acquaintance has made them observe, that there are a great many other Things in the World, that in some common Agreements of Shape, and several other Qualities, resemble their Father and Mother, and those Persons they have been used to, they frame an Idea, which they find those many Particulars do partake in ; and to that they give, with others, the name Man for Example. And thus they come to have a general Name, and a general Idea. Wherein they make no- thing new, but only leave out of the complex Idea General Terms. 51 they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane f that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all. 8. By the same way, that they come by the general Name and Idea of Man, they easily Advance to more general Names and Notions. For observing, that several Things that differ from their Idea of Man, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that Name, have yet certain Qualities, wherein they agree with Man, by retaining only those Qualities, and uniting them into one Idea, they have again another and a more general Idea ; to which having given a Name, they make a Term of a more com- prehensive Extension : Which new Idea is made, not by any new Addition, but only, as before, by leaving .out the Shape, and some other Properties signified by the Name Man, and retaining only a Body, with Life, Sense, and Spontaneous Motion, comprehended under the Name Animal. 9. That this is the Way, whereby Men first formed general Ideas, and general Names to tJiem, I think, is so evident, that there tur * s a are ,f~_ needs no other Proof of it, but the con- thin S b " f ab ~ s tract Ideas. sidering of a Man's self, or others, and the ordinary Proceedings of their Minds in Know- ledge : And he that thinks general Natures or Notions, are any thing else but such abstract and E 2 52 General Terms. partial Ideas of more complex ones, taken at first from particular Existences, will, I fear, be at a Loss where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his Idea of Man differ from that of Peter and Paul ; or his Idea of Horse from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out some- thing that is peculiar to each Individual ; and retain- ing so much of those particular complex Ideas, of several particular Existences, as they are found to agree in ? Of the complex Ideas, signified by the Names Man, and Horse, leaving out but those parti- culars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct complex Idea, and giving the name Animal to it, one has a more general Term, that Compre- hends, with Man, several other Creatures. Leave out of the Idea of Animal, Sense and spontaneous Motion, and the remaining complex Idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of Body, Life, and Nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive Term, Vivens. And not to dwell longer upon this particular, so evident in it self, by the same way the Mind proceeds to Body, Substance, and at last to Being, Thing, and such universal Terms, which stand for any of our Ideas whatsoever. To conclude, this whole Mystery of Genera and Species, which make such a noise in the General Terms. 53 Schools, and are, with Justice, so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract Ideas, more or less comprehensive, with Names annexed to them. In all which, this is constant and unvariable, That every more general Term stands for such an Idea, as is but a part of any of those contained under it. 10. This may shew us the Reason, why, in the defining of Words, which is nothing but wh ^ declaring their Signification, we make Genus is or- dinarily mad? use of the Genus, or next general Word use of in De- that comprehends it. Which is not out fi mtions - of Necessity, but only to save the Labour of enu- merating the several simple Ideas, which the next general Word, or Genus, stands for ; or, perhaps, sometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But though defining by Genus and Differentia, (I crave leave to use these Terms of Art, though originally Latin, since they most properly suit those Notions they are apply'd to ;) I say, though defining by the Genus be the shortest way ; yet, I think, it may be doubted, whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is not the only, and so not absolutely necessary. For Definition being nothing but making another under- stand by Words, what Idea the Term defined stands for, a Definition is best made by enumerating those simple Ideas that are combined in the Signification of the Term defined : and if instead of such an 54 General Terms. enumeration, Men have accustomed themselves to use the next general Term, it has not been out of Necessity, or for greater clearness ; but for quickness and dispatch sake. For, I think, that to one who desired to know what Idea the Word Man stood for; if it should be said, that Man was a solid extended Substance, having Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of Reasoning, I doubt not but the meaning of the Term Man, would be as well under- stood, and the Idea it stands for, be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a rational Animal '; which by the several Definitions of Animal, Vivens, and Corpus, resolves it self into those enume- rated Ideas. I have in explaining the Term Man, followed here the Ordinary Definition of the Schools : which tho', perhaps, not the most exact, yet serves well enough to my present purpose. And one may, in this Instance, see what gave Occasion to the Rule, that a Definition must consist of Genus and Differentia : and it suffices to shew us> the little Necessity there is of such a Rule, or Advantage in the strict observing of it. For Definitions, as has been said, being only the explaining of one Word, by several others, so that the meaning or Idea it stands for, may be certainly known ; Languages are not always so made, according to the Rules of Logick, that every Term can have its Signification exactly General Terms. 55 and clearly expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary ; or else those who have made this Rule, have done ill that they have given us so few Definitions conformable to it. But of Definitions, more in the next Chapter. 11. To return to general Words, it is plain, by what has been said. That General and , , General and Universal, belong not to the real exist- Universal are . Creatures of ence of Things ; but are the Inventions the Under- and Creatures of the Understanding, standm S- made by it for its own use, and concern only Signs, whether Words, or Ideas. Words are gen- eral, as has been said, when used for Signs of general Ideas ; and so ~are applicable indifferently to many particular Things ; and Ideas, are general, when they are set up as the Representatives of many particular Things : But Universality belongs not to Things themselves, which are all of them particular in their Existence, even those Words, and Ideas, which in their Signification, are general. When therefore we quit Particulars, the Generals that rest, are only Creatures of our own making, their general Nature being nothing but the Capacity they are put into by the Understanding of signifying or representing many Particulars. For the Signification they have, is nothing but a Relation, that by the Mind of Man is added to them. 56 General Terms. 12. The next thing therefore to be con- sidered, is, What kind of Signification Abstract Ideas are the it is, that General Words have. For as Essences of , the Genera it is evident, that they do not signify and Species. bare i y one particular thing ; for then they would not be general Terms, but proper Names ; so on the other side, 'tis as evident, they do not signify a Plurality ; for Man and Men would then signify the same ; and the Distinction of Numbers (as the Grammarians call 'em) would be superfluous and useless. That then which general Words signify, is a sort of Things ; and each of them does that, by being a Sign of an abstract Idea in the Mind, to which Idea, as things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that Name ; or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident, that the Essences of the Sorts, or (if the Latin Word pleases better) Species of Things, are nothing else but these abstract Ideas. For the having the Essence of any Species, being that which makes any thing to be of that Species, and the Conformity to the Idea, to which the Name is annexed, being that which gives a right to that Name, the having the Essence, and the having that Conformity, must needs be the same thing : Since to be of any Species, and to have a right to the Name of that Species, is all one. As for Example, to be a Man, or of the Species General Terms. 57 Man, and to have right to the Name Man, is the same thing. Again, to be a Man, or of the Species Man, and have the Essence of a Man, is the same thing. Now since nothing can be a Man, or have a right to the Name Man, but what has a Conformity to the Abstract Idea the Name Man stands for ; nor any thing be a Man, or have a right to the Species Man, but what has the Essence of that Species ; it follows, that the Abstract Idea for which the Name stands, and the Essence of the Species, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that the Essences of the sorts of things, and consequently the sorting of this, is the Workmanship of the Under- standing that Abstracts, and makes those general Ideas. 13. I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature in the They are the Production of Things, makes several l ^?. rk ? a ?T snip oj the of them alike: there is nothing more Understand- .... - ingi but have obvious, especially in the Races of theirFounda- Animals, and all things propagated by ^nililnd^f Seed. But yet, I think, we may say, things. the sorting of them under Names is the Workmanship of the Understanding; taking occasion from the Simili- tude it observes amongst 'em, to make Abstract general Ideas, and set 'em up in the mind, with Names annex'd to 'em, as Patterns or Forms, (for in 58 General Terms. that sence the word Form has a very proper Signifi- cation,) to which, as particular Things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that Species, have that Denomination, or are put into that Classis. For when we say, this is a Man, that a Horse ; this Justice, that Cruelty ; this a Watch, that a Jack ; what do we else but rank Things under different Specifick Names, as agreeing to those Abstract Ideas, of which we have made those Names the Signs ? And what are the Essences of those Species, set out and marked by Names, but those abstract Ideas in the mind ; which are, as it were, the Bonds between particular Things that exist, and the Names they are to be ranked under ? And when general Names have any Connexion with particular Beings, these Abstract Ideas are the Medium that unites them : so that the Essences of Species, as distinguished and denomi- nated by us, neither are, nor can be any thing but those precise Abstract Ideas we have in our Minds. And therefore the supposed real Essences of Sub- stances, if different from our Abstract Ideas, cannot be the Essences of the Species we rank Things into. For two Species may be one, as rationally, as two different Essences be the Essence of one Species : And I demand, what are the Alterations may, or may not be in a Horse or Lead, without making either of 'em to be of another Species ? In determining the General Terms, 59 Species of Things by our Abstract Ideas, this is easy to resolve : but if any one will regulate himself herein, by supposed real Essences, he will, I suppose, be at a loss : and he will never be able to know when any thing precisely ceases to be of the Species of a Horse, or Lead. 14. Nor will any one wonder, that I say these Essences, or abstract Ideas, (which are the Measures of Name, and the Boun- abstract" daries of Species) are the Workmanship " a distinct c Essence. of the Understanding, who considers, that at least the complex ones are often, in several Men, different Collections of simple Ideas : and therefore that is Covetousness to one Man, which is not so to another. Nay, even in Substances, where there abstract Ideas seem to be taken from the Things themselves, they are not constantly the same ; no not in that Species, which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate Acquaintance : It having been more than once doubted, whether the Foetus born of a Woman were a Man, even so far, as that it hath been debated, whether it were, or were not to be nourished and baptized : which could not be, if the abstract Idea or Essence, to which the Name Man belonged, were of Nature's making ; and were not the uncertain and various Collection of 60 General Terms. simple Ideas, which the Understanding puts together, and then abstracting it, affixed a Name to it. So that in truth every distinct abstract Idea, is a distinct Essence : and the Names that stand for such distinct Ideas, are the Names of things essentially different. Thus a Circle is as essentially different from an Oval, as a Sheep from a Goat : and Rain is as essentially different from Snow, as Water from Earth, that abstract Idea which is the Essence of one, being impossible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abstract Ideas, that in any part vary one from another, with two distinct Names annexed to them, constitute two distinct sorts, or if you please, Species, as essentially different, as any two the most remote, or opposite in the World. 15. But since the Essences of Things are thought by some, (and not without Reason,) to Real and / nominal Es- be wholly unknown ; it may not be amiss to consider the several Significa- tions of the Word Essence. First, Essence may be taken for the being of .^ny thing, whereby it is, what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Con- stitution of Things, whereon their discoverable Quali- ties depend, may be called their Essence. This is the proper original Signification of the Word, as is General Terms. 61 evident from the Formation of it ; Essentia, in its primary Notation, signifying properly Being. And in this Sense it is still used, when we speak of the Essence of particular things, without giving them any Name. Secondly, The Learning and Disputes of the Schools, having been much busied about Genus and Species, the Word Essence has almost lost its primary Signification ; and instead of the real Constitution of things, has been almost wholly applied to the arti- ficial Constitution of Genus and Species. 'Tis true, there is ordinarily supposed a real Constitution of the sorts of Things ; and 'tis past doubt, there must be some real Constitution, on which any Collection of simple Ideas co-existing, must depend. But it being evident, that Things are ranked under Names into sorts of Species, only as they agree to certain abstract Ideas, to which we have annexed those Names, the Essence of each Genus, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract Idea, which the General, or Sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from Sort, as I do General from Genus,) Name stands for. And this we shall find to be that which the Word Essence imports, in its most familiar use. These two sorts of Essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the Real, the other the Nominal Essence. 62 General Terms. 1 6. Between the nominal Essence, and the Name, there is so near a Connection, that the Constant Connection Name of any sort of Things cannot be b NamT and attributed to any particular Being, but nominal Es- w hat has this Essence, whereby it answers sence. that abstract Idea, whereof that Name is the Sign. 17. Concerning the real Essences of corporeal Substances, (to mention those only,) that Sfaries tnere are ^ ^ mistake not, two Opinions. are distin- The one is of those, who using the gmshed by their real Word Essence, for they know not what, Essences. use- , . ,., , r , , * esSm suppose a certain Number of those -Essences, according to which, all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that Species. The other, and more rational Opinion, is of those, who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts, from which flow those sensible Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have Occasion to rank them into sorts, under common Denominations. The former of these Opinions, which supposes these Essences, as a certain Number of Forms or Molds, wherein all natural Things, that exist, are cast, and do equally Partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the Knowledge of natural Things. The frequent Productions of General Terms. 63 Monsters, in all the Species of Animals, and of Changelings, and other strange Issues of humane Birth, carry with them Difficulties, not possible to consist with this Hypothesis : since it is as impossible, that two things, partaking exactly of the same real Essence, should have different Properties, as that two Figures partaking in the same real Essence of a Circle, should have different Properties. But were there no other Reason against it, yet the Supposition of Essences, that cannot be known ; and the making them nevertheless to be that which Distinguishes the Species of Things, is so wJiolly tiselcss, and unser- viceable to any part of our Knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and con- tent our selves with such Essences of the Sorts or Species of Things, as come within the reach of our Knowledge ; which, when seriously considered, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else but those abstract complex Ideas, to which we have annexed distinct General Names. 1 8. Essences being thus distinguished into Nominal and Real, we may farther Real and nominal Es- observe, that in the Species of simple scnce the same Ideas and Modes they are always the same: But in Substances, always quite different. Thus a Figure including a Space between three Lines, is the real as well 64 General Terms. as nominal Essence of a Triangle ; it being not only the abstract Idea to which the general Name is annexed, but the very Essentia, or Being, of the thing it self, that Foundation from which all its Pro- perties flow, and to "which they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise concerning that parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring on my Finger, wherein these two Essences are apparently different. For it is the real Constitution of its insen- sible Parts, on which depend all those Properties of Colour, Weight, Fusibility, Fixedness, &c. which makes it to be Gold, or gives it a right to that Name, which is therefore its nominal Essence. Since nothing can be called Gold, but what has a Conformity of Qualities to that abstract complex Idea, to which that Name is annexed. But this Distinction of Essences, belonging particularly to Substances, we shall, when we come to consider their Names, have an occasion to treat of more fully. 19. That such abstract Ideas, with Names to them, as we have been speaking of, are Essences in- generableand Essences, may farther appear by what incorruptible. ^11 -*? we are told concerning Essences, viz. that they are all ingenerable, and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real Constitutions of Things, which begin and perish with 'em. All things, that exist, besides their Author, are all liable General Terms. 65 to Change ; especially those Things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into Bands, under distinct Names or Ensigns. Thus that which was Grass to Day, is to Morrow the Flesh of a Sheep ; and within few Days after, becomes part of a Man : In all which, and the like Changes, 'tis evident, their real Essence, i. e, that Constitution, whereon the Proper- ties of these several things depended, is destroy 'd, and Perishes with them. But Essences being taken for Ideas, established in the Mind, with Names annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steddily the same, whatever Mutations the particular Substances are liable to. For whatever becomes of Alexander and Bucephalus, the Ideas to which Man and Horse are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain in the same ; and so the Essences of those Species are preserved whole and undestroy'd, what- ever Changes happen to any, or all of the Individuals of those Species. By this means the Essence of a Species rests safe and entire, without the Existence of so much as one Individual of that kind. For were there now no Circle existing any where in the World, (as, perhaps, that Figure exists not any where exactly marked out,) yet the Idea annexed to that Name, would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to be as a Pattern, to determine which of the particular Figures \ve meet with, have, or have not a Right to the Name F 66 General Terms. Circle, and so to shew, which of them, by having that Essence, was of that Species. And tho' there neither were, nor had been in Nature such a Beast as an Unicorn, nor such a Fish as a Mermaid; yet sup- posing those Names to stand for complex abstract Ideas, that contained no inconsistency in them ; the Essence of a Mermaid is as intelligible, as that of a Man ; and the Idea of an Unicorn as certain, steddy, and permanent, as that of a Horse. From what has been said, it is evident, that the Doctrine of the Immutability of Essences, proves them to be only abstract Ideas ; and is founded on the Relation estab- lished between them, and certain Sounds as Signs of them ; and will always be true, as long as the same Name can have the same Signification. 20. To conclude, this is that which in short I Recapitula- would say, (viz.) that all the great Busi- tlon ' ness of Genera and Species, and their Essences, amounts to no more but this, That Men making abstract Ideas, and settling them in their Minds, with Names annex'd to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider Things, and Discourse of them, as it were in Bundles, for the easier and readier Improvement and Communication of their Knowledge, which would advance but slowly, were their Words and Thoughts confined only to Parti- culars. 6 7 CHAPTER IV, OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS. I. Though all Words, as I have shewn, signify nothing immediately but the Ideas in Names of the Mind of the Speaker, yet upon a Simplelte&s, Modes, and nearer Survey, we shall find that the Substances, Names of Simple Ideas, mixed Modes, something pe- (under which I comprise Relations too,) culiar - and natural Substances, have each of them some- thing peculiar, and different from the other. For Example. 2. First, The Names of Simple Ideas, and Sub- stances, with the abstract Ideas in the First, Names Mtnd, which they immediately signify, O f Simple intimate also some real Existence, from Substances** which was deriv'd their original Pattern, intimate real Existence. But the Names of mixed Modes, ter- minate in the Idea that is in the Mind, and lead not the Thoughts any farther, as we shall see more at large in the following Chapter. F 2 68 Names of Simple Ideas. 3. Secondly, The Names of Simple Ideas, and Modes, signifying always the real, as well Secondly, Names of as nominal Essence of their Species. But and MoJ^s ^ ie Names of natural Substances, signify signify al- rarely, if ever, any thing but barely the waysbothreal and nominal nominal Essences of those Species, as 2l,SS}lC6 we shall shew in the Chapter that treats of the Names of Substances in particular. 4. Thirdly, The Names of Simple Ideas are not Thirdly, capable of any Definitions ; the Names Simple Ideas f a ^ complex Ideas arj. It has not, undejinabU. t h at I know, hitherto been taken Notice of by any Body, what Words are, and what are not capable of being defined : the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling, and Obscurity in Mens Discourses, whilst some demand Definitions of Terms that cannot be defined ; and others think, they ought to rest satisfied in an Explication made by a more general Word, and its Restriction, (or to speak in Terms of Art, by a Genus and Difference,) when even after such Definition made according to Rule, those who hear it have often no more a clear Conception of the meaning of the Word, than they had before. This at least, I think, that the shewing what Words are, and what are not capable of Definitions, and wherein consists a good Definition, is not wholly besides Names of Simple Ideas. 69 our present purpose ; and perhaps, will afford so much Light to the Nature of these Signs, and our Ideas, as to deserve a more particular Considera- tion. 5. I will not here trouble my self, to prove that all Terms are not definable from that If all were Progress, in infinitnm, which it will definable, 'twottld be visibly lead us into, if we should allow, a Process in that all Names could be defined. For if the Terms of one Definition, were still to be defined by another, Where at last should we stop ? But I shall from the Nature of our Ideas, and the Signifi- cation of our Words shew, why some Names can^ and ciJiers cannot be defined, and which they are. 6. I think, it is agreed, that a Definition is nothing else, but the sliewing the meaning of one iyjj at a Word by several other not synonymous nition is. Terms. The meaning of Words being only the Ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses 'em ; the meaning of any Term is then shewed, or the Word is defined, when by other Words the Idea it is made the Sign of, and annexed to in the Mind of tbc Speaker, is as it were represented, or set before the view of another; and thus its Signification ascer- tained ? This is the only use and end of Definitions ; and therefore the only Measure of what is, or is not a good Definition. 70 Names of Simple Ideas. 7. This being premised, I say, that the Names of Simple Ideas, and those only, are in- Simple Ideas J ' why wide- capable of being defined. The Reason whereof is this, That the several Terms of a Definition, signifying several Ideas, they can altogether by no means represent an Idea, which has no Composition at all : And therefore a Definition which is properly nothing but the shewing the meaning of one Word by several others not signifying each the same thing, can in the Names of Simple Ideas have no Place. 8. The not observing this difference in our Ideas, Instances; anc * thd r Names, has produced that Motion. eminent trifling in the Schools, which is so easy to be observed in the Definitions they give us of some few of these Simple" Ideas. For as to the greatest part of 'em, even those Masters of De- finitions were fain to leave them untouched, meerly by the Impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite Jargon could the Wit of Man invent, than this Definition, The Act of a Being in Power, as far forth as in Power ? which would puzzle any rational Man, to whom it was not already known by its famous Absurdity, to guess what Word it could ever be sup- posed to be the Explication of. If Ttdly asking a Dutchman what Beweeginge was, should have received this Explication in his own Language, that it was Names of Simple Ideas. 71 Actns entis in potentia quatenus in potentia ; I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the Word Beweeginge signified, or have guessed what Idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his Mind, and would signify to another when he used that Sound. 9. Nor have the Modern Philosophers, who have endeavoured to throwoff the Jargon of the Schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded in defining Simple Ideas, whether by explaining their Causes, or any otherwise. The Atomists, who define Motion to be a Passage from one place to another, What do they more than put one synonimous Word for another ? For what is Passage other than Motion ? And if they were asked what Passage was, How would they better define it than by Motion ? For is it not at least as proper and significant, to say, Pas- sage is a Motion from one Place to another, as to say, Motion is a Passage, &c. This is to translate, and not to define, when we change two Words of the same Signification one for another ; which when one is better understood than the other, may serve to dis- cover what Idea the unknown stands for ; but is very far from a Definition, unless we will say, every English Word in the Dictionary, is the Definition of the Latin Word it Answers, and that Motion is a Definition of Motus. Nor will the successive Application of the 72 Names of Simple Ideas. Parts of the Superficies of one Body, to those of another, which the Cartesians give us, prove a much better Definition of Motion, when well examined. 10. The Act of Perspicuous, as far forth as per- Light. spicnous, is another Peripatetick Defini- tion of a Simple Idea ; which though not more absurd than the former of Motion, yet Betrays its Useless- ness and Insignificancy more plainly, because Expe- rience will easily convince any one, that it cannot make the meaning of the Word Light (which it pre- tends to define) at all understood by a blind Man : but the Definition of Motion appears not at first sight so useless, because it scapes this way of Trial. For this Simple Idea, entring by the Touch as well as Sight, 'tis impossible to shew an Example of any one, who has no other way to get the Idea of Motion, but barely by the Definition of that Name. Those who tell us, that Light is a great Number of little Globules, striking briskly on the Bottom of the Eye, speak more intelligibly than the Schools : but yet these Words ever so well understood would make the Idea, the Word Light stands for, no more known to a Man that understands it not before, than if one should tell him, that Light was nothing but a Company of little Tennis-balls, which Fairies all Day long struck with Rackets against some Mens Foreheads, whilst they passed by others. For granting this Expli- Names of Simple Ideas. 73 cation of the thing to be true ; yet the Idea of the cause of LigJit, if we had it ever so exact, would no more give us the Idea of Light it self, as it is such a particular Perception in us, than the Idea of the Figure and Motion of a sharp piece of Steel, would give us the Idea of that Pain which it is able to cause in us. For the cause of any Sensation, and the Sensation it self, in all the Simple Ideas of one Sense, are two Ideas ; and two Ideas so different, and distant one from another, that, no two can be more so. And therefore should Des Cartes 's Globules strike ever so long on the Retina of a Man, who was blind by a Gntta Serena, he would thereby never have any Idea of Light, or any thing approaching it. tho' he under- stood what little Globules were, and what striking on another Body was, ever so well. And therefore the Cartesians very well distinguish between that Light which is the Cause of that Sensation in us, and the Idea which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly Light. ii. Simple Ideas, as has been shewn, are only to be got by those Impressions, Objects themselves make on our Minds, by the why undefin- proper Inlets appointed to each sort. If **7 f ar ^ ler explained. they are not received this way, all the Words in the World, made use of to explain, or define any of their Names, will never be able to produce in us 74 Names of Simple Ideas. the Idea it stands for. For Words being Sounds, can produce in us no other Simple Ideas, than of those very Sounds ; nor excite any in us, but by that volun- tary Connexion, which is known to be between 'em, and those Simple Ideas, which common Use has made 'em Signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any Words can give him the taste of a Pine-Apple, and make him have the true Idea of the Relish of that celebrated delicious Fruit. So far as lie is told it has a resemblance with any Tastes, whereof he has the Ideas already in his Memory, imprinted there by sensible Objects, not Strangers to his Palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in his Mind. But this is not giving us that Idea by a Definition, but exciting in us other Simple Ideas, by their known Names ; which will be still very different from the true taste of that Fruit it self. In Light and Colours, and all other Simple Ideas, it is the same thing : For the Signification of Sounds, is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no Definition of Light, or Redness, is more fitted, or able to produce either of those Ideas in us, than to Sound LigJit, or Red, by it self. For to hope to produce an Idea of Light, or Colour, by a Sound, however formed, is to expect that Sounds should be visible, or Colours audible ; and to make the Ears do the Office of all the other Senses. Which is all one as to say, that Names of Simple Ideas. 75 we might Taste, Smell, and See by the Ears: a sort of Philosophy worthy only of SancJw Panca, who had the Faculty to see Dulciuea by Hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received into his Mind, by the proper Inlet, the simple Idea which any word stands for, can never come to know the Signifi- cation of that Word, by any other Words, or Sounds, whatsoever put together, according to any Rules of Definition. The only way is, by applying to his Senses the proper Object ; and so producing that/k/m in him, for which he has learned the name already. A studious blind Man, who had mightily beat his Head about visible Objects, and made use of the Explication of his Books and Friends, to understand those Names of Light and Colours, which often came in his way ; bragg'd one Day, That he now under- stood what Scarlet signify'd. Upon which his Friend demanding, what Scarlet was ? The blind Man answer'd, It was like the Sound of a Trumpet. Just such an Understanding of the Name of any other simple Idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a Definition, or other Words made use of to explain it. 12. The case is quite otherwise in complex Ideas ; which consisting of several simple ones, it is in the Power of Words, standing for the several Ideas, that makes that Composition, to imprint complex Names of Simple Ideas. Ideas in the Mind, which were never there before, and so make their Names be under- The contrary stood> In such Collections of Ideas, shewed tn passing under one Name, Definition, or by Instances of a Statue the teaching the Signification of one Word ' b y several others, has Place, and may make ns understand the Names of Things, which never came within the reach of our Senses ; and frame Ideas suitable to those in other Mens Minds, when they use those Names : provided that none of the Terms of the Definition stand for any such simple Ideas, which he to whom the Explication is made, has never yet had in his Thought. Thus the Word Statue may be explain'd to a blind Man by other Words, when Picture cannot, his Senses having given him the Idea of Figure, but not of Colours, which therefore Words cannot excite in him. This gained the Prize to the Painter, against the Statuary ; each of which contending for the Ex- cellency of his Art, and the Statuary bragging, that his was to be preferred, because it reached farther, and even those who had lost their Eyes, could yet perceive the excellency of it. The Painter agreed to refer himself to the Judgment of a blind Man ; who being brought where there was a Statue made by the one, and a Picture drawn by the other ; he was first led to the Statue, in which he traced with his Names of Simple Ideas. 77 Hands, all the Lineaments of the Face and Body ; and with great Admiration, applauded the skill of fhe Workman. But being led to the Picture, and having his Hands laid upon it, was told, That now he touched the Head, and then the Forehead, Eyes, Nose, &c. as his Hand moved over the Parts of the Picture on the Cloth, without rinding any the least Distinction : Whereupon, he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine Piece of Workmanship, which could represent to them all those Parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing. 13. He that should use the Word Rainbow, to one who knew all those Colours, but yet had never seen that Phenomenon, would, by enumerating the Figure, Largeness, Position, and Order of the Colours, so well define that word, that it might be perfectly understood. But yet that Definition, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind Man un- derstand it ; because several of the simple Ideas that make that complex one, being such as he never received by Sensation and Experience, no Words are able to excite them in his Mind. 14. Simple Ideas, as has been shewed, can only be got by Experience, from those Objects, which are proper to produce in us those Perceptions. When by this means we have our Minds stored with 'em, 78 Names of Simple Ideas. and know the Names for them, then we are in a Condition to define, and by Definition to The Names of complex understand the Names of complex Ideas, that are made U of them - But when intelligible by anv term stands for a simple Idea, that a Words. Man has never yet had in his Mind, it is impossible, by any Words, to make known its meaning to him. When any term stands for an Idea a Man is acquainted with, but is ignorant, that that term is the Sign of it, there another Name, of the same Idea which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand its meaning. But in no case what- soever, is any Name, of any simple Idea, capable of a Definition. 15. Fourthly, But though the Names of simple Fourthly Ideas, have not the help of Definition to Names of determine their Signification : yet that simple Ideas least doubt- hinders not but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those of mixed Modes and Substances. Because they standing only for one simple Perception, Men, for the most part, easily and perfectly agree in their Signification : And there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once, that -Whiteness is the Name of that Colour he has observed in Snow, or Milk, will not be apt to misapply that Word, as long as he retains that Idea \ Names of Simple Ideas. 79 which when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he Understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple Ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the Names of mixed Modes : nor a supposed, but an unknown real Essence, with Properties depending thereon, the precise Number whereof are also un- known, which makes the Difficulty in the Names of Substances. But on the contrary, in simple Ideas the whole Signification of the Name is known at once, and consists not of Parts, whereof more or less being put in, the Idea may be varied, and so the Signification of its Name, be obscure, or uncertain. 1 6. Fifthly, This farther may be observed, con- cerning simple Ideas and their Names, C5 * f T^ * /*i7 7 C* / / Fifthly, Stm- that they have but few Ascents in linea pi e Ideas Prcedicamentali (as they call it,) from Jjg^iS the Icnvest Species, to the summum Genus. Praedicamen- tali. The reason whereof is, that the lowest Species being but one simple Idea, nothing can be left out of it, that so the difference being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one Idea common to them both ; which having one Name, is the Genus of the other two: v.g. There is nothing can be left out of the Idea of White and Red, to make them agree in one common Appearance, and so have one general Name ; as Rationality being left So Names of Simple Ideas. out of the complex Idea of Man, makes it agree with Brute, in the more general Idea and Name of Animal. And therefore when to avoid unpleasant Enumera- tions, Men would comprehend both WJdte and Red, and several other such simple Ideas, under one general Name ; they have been fain to do it by a Word, which denotes only the way they get into the Mind. For when White, Red, and Yellow, are all compre- hended under the Genus or Name Colour, it signifies no more, but such Ideas, as are produced in the Mind only by the Sight, and have entrance only through the Eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general Term, to comprehend both Colours and Sounds, and the like simple Ideas, they do it by a Word, that signifies all such as come into the Mind only by one Sense : And so the general term Quality, in its ordinary Acceptation, comprehends Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, and tangible Qualities, with Distinction from Extension, Number, Motion, Plea- sure, and Pain, which make Impressions on the Mind, and introduce their Ideas by more Senses than one. 17. Sixthly, The Names of simple Ideas, Sub- stances, and mixed Modes,, have also Sixthly, this difference : That those of mixed s ^"l/g ideas Modes stand for Ideas perfectly Arbi- s ^ nd f or Ideas not at trary : Those of Substances, are not all arbitrary. perfectly so ; but refer to a Pattern, though zvit/i Names of Simple Ideas. 81 some Latitude : and those of simple Ideas are perfectly taken from the Existence of Things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which what difference it makes in the Significations of their Names, we shall see in the following Chapters. The Names of simple Modes differ little from those of simple Ideas. G 82 Names of mixed Modes. CHAPTER V. OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS. I. The Names of mixed Modes being general, They stand tnc 7 stand, as has been shewn, for sorts for abstract or Species of Things, each of which has Ideas, as other general its peculiar Essence. The Essences of these Species also, as has been shewed, are nothing but the abstract Ideas in the Mind, to which the Name is annexed. Thus far the Names and Essences of mixed Modes, have nothing but what is common to them, with other Ideas : But if we take a little nearer survey of them, we shall find, that they have something peculiar, which, perhaps may deserve our Attention. 2. The first Particularity I shall observe in them is, that the abstract Ideas, or, if you First, The Ideas they please, the Essences of the several matfo^fo' "the Species of mixed Modes are made by the Understand- Understanding, wherein they differ from ing. those simple Ideas : in which sort, the Mind has no Power to make any one, but only Names of mixed Modes. 83 receives such as are presented to it, by the real Existence of Things operating upon it. 3. In the next Place, these Essences of the Species of mixed Modes, are not only made by Secondly, the Mind, but made very arbitrarily, made arbi- trarily, and made without Patterns, or reference to without Pat- any real Existence. Wherein they differ tern3 * from those of Substances, which carry with them the Supposition of some real Being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conform- able. But in its complex Ideas of mixed Modes, the Mind takes a Liberty not to follow the Existence of Things exactly. It unites and retains certain Collections, as so many distinct Specifick Ideas, whilst others, that as often occur in Nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward Things, pass neglected without particular Names or Specifications. Nor does the Mind, in these of mixed Modes, as in the complex Ideas of Substances, examine them by the real Existence of Things ; or verify them by Patterns, containing such peculiar Compositions in Nature. To know whether his Idea of Adultery, or Incest, be right, will a Man seek it any where amongst Things existing ? Or is it true, because any one has been Witness to such an Action ? No ; but it suffices here, that Men have put together such a Collection into one complex Idea, that makes the Archetype, G 2 84 Names of mixed Modes. and Specifick Idea, whether ever any such Action were committed in rerum natura, or no. 4. To understand this aright, we must consider wherein tJiis making of these complex How this is j deas consists'. an( j t i iat j s not j n t h e done. making any new Idea, but putting together those which the Mind had before. Wherein the Mind does these three Things : First, It chuses a certain Number. Secondly, It gives them Connec- tion, and makes them into one Idea. Thirdly, It ties them together by a Name. If we examine how the Mind proceeds in these, and what Liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe, how these Essences of the Species of mixed Modes, are the Workmanship of the Mind ; and consequently, that the Species themselves are of Mens making. 5. No Body caji doubt, but that these Ideas of mixed Modes, are made by a voluntary Evidently ar- Collection of Ideas put together in the bitrary, that the Idea is Mind, independent from any original often before . the Existence. Patterns in Nature, who will but reilect, that this sort of complex Ideas may be made, abstracted, and have Names given 'em, and so a Species be constituted, before any one individual of that Species ever existed. Who can doubt, but the Ideas of Sacrilege, or Adultery, might be framed in the Mind of Men, and have Names given them ; Names of mixed Modes. 85 and so these Species of mixed Modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed ; and might be as well discoursed of, and reasoned about, and as certain Truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no being but in the Understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real Existence ? Whereby it is plain, how much the sorts of mixed Modes are the Creatures of the Understand- ing, where they have a being as subservient to all the ends of real Truth and Knowledge, as when they really exist : And we cannot doubt, but Lawmakers have often' made Laws about Species of Actions, which were only the Creatures of their own Under- standing : Beings that had no other existence, but in their own Minds. And, I think, no Body can deny, but that the Resurrection was a Species of mixed Modes in the Mind, before it really existed. 6. To see how arbitrarily t/iese Essences of mixed Modes are made by the Mind, we need , . ,. , c , Instances ; but take a view 01 almost any ot them. Murder A little looking into them, will satisfy "cfY/'- us, that 'tis the Mind, that combines several scattered independent Ideas, into one com- plex one ; and by the common Name it gives them, makes them the Essence of a certain Species, without regulating it self by any Connection they have in Kature. For what greater Connection in Nature, 86 Names of mixed Modes. has the Idea of a Man, than the Idea of a Sheep, with Killing ; that this is made a particular Species of Action, signify'd by the word Murder ; and the other not ? Or what Union is there in Nature, between the Idea of the Relation of a Father, with Killing, than that of a Son, or Neighbour ; that those are combined into one complex Idea, and thereby made the Essence of the distinct Species Parricide, whilst the other make no distinct Species at all ? But though they have made killing a Man's Father, or Mother, a distinct Species from killing his Son, or Daughter ; yet in some other Cases, Son and Daughter are taken in too, as well as Father and Mother ; and they are all equally comprehended in the same Species, as in that of Incest. Thus the Mind in mixed Modes arbitrarily Unites into complex Ideas, such as it finds convenient ; whilst others that have altogether as much Union in Nature, are left loose and never combined into one Idea, because they have no need of one Name. 'Tis evident then, that the Mind, by its free Choice, gives a Connection to a certain Number of Ideas ; which in Nature have no more Union with one another, than others that it leaves out : Why else is the part of the Weapon, the beginning of the Wound is made with, taken Notice of, to make the distinct Species called Stabbing, and the Figure and Matter of the Weapon left out ? I Names of mixed Modes. 87 do not say, this is done without Reason, as we shall see more by and by ; but this I say, that it is done, by the free Choice of the Mind, pursuing its own ends ; and that therefore these Species of mixed Modes, are the Workmanship of the Understanding: And there is nothing more evident, than that for the most part, in the framing these Ideas, the Mind searches not its Patterns in Nature, nor refers the Ideas it makes to the real Existence of Things ; but puts such together, as may best serve its own Pur- poses, without tying it self to a precise Imitation of any thing that really exists. 7. But though these complex Ideas, or Essences of mixed Modes, depend on the Mind, j i t_ -A. -j.1. A. T -I. But still sub- and are made by it with great Liberty ; servient to yet they are not made at Random, and Me end of Language. jumbled together without any reason at all. Though these complex Ideas be not always copied from Nature, yet they are always suited to the end for which abstract Ideas are made: And though they be Combinations made of Ideas, that are loose enough, and have as little Union in themselves, as several other, to which the Mind never gives a Connection that combines them into one Idea ; yet they are always made for the convenience of Communication, which is the chief end of Lan- guage. The use of Language is, by short Sounds to 88 Names of mixed Modes. signify with ease and dispatch general Conceptions ; wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but also a great Variety of independent Ideas collected into one complex one. In the making therefore of the Species of mixed Modes, Men have had regard only to such Combinations, as they had occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined into distinct complex Ideas, and given Names to ; whilst others that in Nature have as near r.n Union, are left loose and unregarded. For to go no farther than humane Actions themselves, if they would make distinct abstract Ideas of all -the Varieties might be observed in them, the Number must be infinite, and the Memory confounded with the Plenty, as well as overcharged to little Purpose. It suffices, that Men make and Name so many complex Ideas of these mixed Modes, as they find they have occa- sion to have Names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their Affairs. If they join to the Idea of Killing, \\\cldea of Father, or Mother, and so make a distinct Species from Killing a Man's Son, or Neighbour, it is because of the different Heinousness of the Crime, and the distinct Punishment is due to the murdering a Man's Father and Mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the Murder of a Son or Neighbour ; and therefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct Name, which is the end of Names of mixed Modes. 89 making that distinct Combination. But though the Ideas of Mother and Daughter, are so differently treated, in reference to the Idea of Killing, that the one is joined with it to make a distinct abstract Idea with a Name, and so a distinct Species, and the other not ; yet in respect of carnal Knowledge, they are both taken in under Incest ; and that still for the same convenience of expressing under one Name, and reckoning of one Species, such unclean Mixtures, as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others ; and this to avoid Circumlocutions, and tedious Descriptions. 8. A moderate skill in different Languages, will easily satisfy one of the Truth of this, Whereof the it being so obvious to observe great intranslat- store of Words in one Language, which ^^tai have not any that answer them in g' ia es are a Proof, another. Which plainly shews, that those of one Country, by their Customs and Manner of Life, have found occasion to make several complex Ideas, and give Names to them, which others never collected into specifick Ideas. This could not have happened, if these Species were the steddy Workman- ship of Nature ; and not Collections made and ab- stracted by the Mind, in order to Naming, and for the convenience of Communication. The Terms of our Law, which are not empty Sounds, will hardly find Words that answer them in the Spanish or Italian, no 90 Names of mixed Modes. scanty Languages ; much less, I think, could any one translate them into the Caribbee, or Westoe Tongues : And the Versura of the Romans or Corban of the Jews, have no Words in other Languages to answer them : The Reason whereof is plain, from what has been said. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different Lan- guages, we shall find, that though they have Words, which in Translations and Dictionaries, are supposed to answer one another ; yet there is scarce one of ten, amongst the Names of complex Ideas, espe- cially of mixed Modes, that stands for the same precise Idea, which the Word does that in Diction- aries it is rendred by. There are no Ideas more common, and less compounded, than the Measures of Time, Extension, and Weight, and the Latin Names Hora, PCS, Libra, are without Difficulty rendred by the English Names, Hour, Foot, and Pound: But yet there is nothing more evident, than that the Ideas a Roman annexed to these Latin Names, were very far different from those which an Englishman ex- presses by those English ones. And if either of these should make use of the Measures that those of the other Language designed by their Names, he would be quite out in his account. These are too sensible Proofs to be doubted ; and we shall find this much more so, in the Names of more abstract and Names of mixed Modes. 91 compounded Ideas ; such as are the greatest part of those which make up Moral Discourses : Whose Names, when Men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into, in other Languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their Significations. 9. The Reason why I take so particular Notice of this, is, that we may not be mistaken about Genera, and Spe- species to be ties, and their Essences, as if they ^adeforCom- J mumcation. were Things regularly and constantly made by Nature, and had a real Existence in Things ; when they appear, upon a more wary survey, to be nothing else but an Artifice of the Understanding, for the easier signifying such Col- lections of Ideas, as it should often have occasion to communicate by one general Term ; under which divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abstract Idea, might be comprehended. And if the doubtful Signification of the word Species, may make it sound harsh to some, that I say, that the Species of mixed Modes are made by the Understanding ; yet, I think, it can by no Body be denied, that 'tis the Mind makes those abstract complex Ideas, to which specifick Names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the Mind makes the Patterns, for sorting and naming of Things, I leave it to be considered, 92 Names of 'mixed Modes. who makes the Boundaries of the Sort, or Species ; since with me, Species and Sort have no other differ- ence, than that of a Latin and English Idiom. 10. The near Relation that there is between Species, Essences, and their general In Mixed Modes, 'tis Name, at least in mixed Modes, will the Name that r .1 i -1.1 ties the Com- fartner appear, when we consider, that bination to- j t j s t h e Name that seems to pre- geiner, and makes it a serve those Essences, and give them their lasting Duration. For the Con- nection between the loose parts of those complex Ideas, being made by the Mind, this Union, which has no particular Foundation in Nature, would cease again, were there not something that did, as it were, hold it together, and keep the Parts from scattering. Though therefore it be the Mind that makes the Collection, 'tis the Name which is, as it were, the Knot, that ties them fast together. What a vast Variety of different Ideas, does the word Triumphns hold together, and deliver to us as one Species ! Had this Name been never made, or quite lost, we might no doubt, have had Descriptions of what passed in that Solemnity : But yet, I think, that which holds those different Parts together, in the Unity of one complex Idea, is that very Word annexed to it ; without which, the several Parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing, Names of mixed Modes. 93 than any other shew, which having never been made but once, had never been united into one complex Idea, under one Denomination. How much there- fore, in mixed Modes, the Unity necessary to any Essence depends on the Mind ; and how much the Continuation and fixing of that Unity depends on the Name in common Use annexed to it, I leave to be considered by those, who look upon Essences and Species, as real established Things in Nature. ii. Suitable to this, we find, that Men speaking- of mixed Modes, seldom imagine or take any other for Species of them, but such as are set out by Name : Because they being of Man's making only, in order to naming, no such Species are taken Notice of, or supposed to be, unless a Name be joined to it, as the Sign of Man's having combined into one Idea several loose ones ; and by that Name, giving a last- ing Union to the Parts, which would otherwise cease to have any, as soon as the Mind laid by that abstract Idea, and ceased actually to think on it. But when a Name is once annexed to it, wherein the Parts of that complex Idea have a settled and per- manent Union ; then is the Essence, as it were established, and the Species looked on as compleaj;. For to what purpose should the Memory charge it self with such Compositions, unless it were by Abstraction to make them general ? And to what 94 Names of mixed Modes. purpose make them general, unless it were, that they might have general Names, for the convenience of Discourse, and Communication ? Thus we see, that Killing a Man with a Sword, or a Hatchet, are looked on as no distinct Species of Action : But if the point of the Sword first enter the Body, it passes for a distinct Species, where it has a dis- tinct Name, as in England, in whose Language it is called Stabbing : But in another Country, where it has not happened to be specified under a pecu- liar Name, it passes not for a distinct Species. But in the Species of corporeal Substances, though it be the Mind that makes the nominal Essence : yet since those Ideas, which are combined in it, are supposed to have an Union in Nature, whether the Mind joins them or no, therefore those are looked on as distinct Species, without any Operation of the Mind, either abstracting, or, giving a Name to that complex Idea. P .j 12. Conformable also to what has Originals of been said concerning the Essences of mixed Modes, , we look no the Species of mixed Modes, that they f ?he her Mi?id, are the Creatures of the Understanding, which also ra ther than the Works of Nature : Con- shews them to be the Work- formable, I say, to this, we find, that manshift of jr . , T , , ^ 7 , . ,/ Understand- their Names lead our Thoughts to the tn - Mind, and no farther. When we speak Names of mixed Modes. 95 of Justice, or Gratitude, we frame to our selves no Imagination of any thing existing, which we would conceive ; but our Thoughts terminate in the abstract Ideas of those Vertues, and look not far- ther ; as they do, when we speak of a Horse, or Iron, whose Specifick Ideas we consider not, as barely in the Mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the original Patterns of those Ideas. But in mixed Modes, at least the most considerable Parts of them, which are moral Beings, we consider the original Patterns, as being in the Mind ; and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular Beings under Names. And hence I think it is, That these Essences of the Species of mixed Modes, are by a more particular Name called Notions : as by a peculiar Right apper- taining to the Understanding. 13. Hence likewise we may learn, Why the com- plex Ideas of mixed Modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded, than ma( j e fojfc those of natural Substances. Because Understand- ing ivithout they being the Workmanship of the Patterns, . . shews the rea- Understanding, pursuing only its own son w h y they ends, and the conveniency of expressing a S j j Com ~ in short those Ideas it would make known to another, does with great Liberty unite often into one abstract Idea Things that in their Nature have no coherence ; and so under one Term, bundle 96 Names of mixed Modes. together a great Variety of compounded, and decom- pounded Ideas. Thus the Name of Procession, what a great mixture of independent Ideas of Persons, Habits, Tapers, Orders, Motions, Sounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together, to express by that one Name ? Whereas the complex Ideas of the sorts of Substances are usually made up of only a small Number of simple ones ; and in the Species of Animals, these two, viz. Shape and Voice, commonly make the whole nominal Essence. 14. Another thing we may observe from what Names of ^ as been sa ^> ' 1S > That the Names of mixed Modes mixed Modes always signify (when they stand always for their real have any determined Signification) the real Essences of their Species. For these abstract Ideas, being the Workmanship of the Mind, and not referred to the real Existence of Things, there is no Supposition of any thing more signified by that Name, but barely that complex Idea, the Mind it self has formed, which is all it would have expressed by it ; and is that on which all the Pro- perties of the Species depend, and from which alone they all flow : and so in these the real and nominal Essence is the same ; which of what Concernment it is to the certain Knowledg of general Truth, we shall see hereafter. Names of mixed Modes. 97 15. This also may shew us the Reason, Why for the most part the Names of mixed Modes . arc got, before the Ideas they stand for Names are usually got are perfectly known. Because there be- b e f ore their ing no Species, of these ordinarily taken Ideas - Notice of, but what have Names ; and those Species, or rather their Essences, being abstract complex Ideas made arbitrarily by the Mind, it is convenient, if not necessary, to know the Names, before one endeavour to frame these complex Ideas : unless a Man will fill his Head with a Company of abstract complex Ideas, which others having no Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by, and forget again. I confess, that in the Beginning of Languages, it was necessary to have the Idea, before one gave it the Name : And so it is still, where making a new complex Idea, one also, by giving it a new Name, makes a new Word. But this concerns not Languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for Ideas, which Men have frequent Occasion to have, and communicate : And in such, I ask, whether it be not the ordinary Method, that Children learn the Names of mixed Modes, before they have their Idcasl What one of a Thousand ever frames the abstract Idea of Glory and Ambition before he has heard the Names of them. In simple Ideas and Substances, I grant it is otherwise ; which being such Ideas, as H 98 Names of mixed Modes. have a real Existence and Union in Nature, the Ideas, or Names, are got one before the other, as it happens. 1 6. What has been said here of .mix'd Modes, is with very little difference applicable Reason of , T> \ . i i my being so also to -Relations ; which since every tkiS Man himse tf mav observe, I may spare my self the Pains to enlarge on : espe- cially, since what I have here said concerning Words in this Third Book, will possibly be thought by some to be much more than what so slight a Subject required. I allow, it might be brought into a nar- rower Compass : But I was willing to stay my Reader on an Argument, that appears to me new, and a little out of the Way, (I am sure 'tis one, I thought not of, when I began to write,) That by searching it to the Bottom, and turning it on every side, some part or other might meet with every one's Thoughts, and give occasion to the most averse, -or negligent, to reflect on a general Miscarriage ; which, though of great con- sequence, is little taken Notice of. When it is con- sidered, what a pudder is made about Essences, and how much all sorts of Knowledge, Discourse, and Conversation, are pestered and disordered by the careless, and confused Use and Application of Words, it will, perhaps, be thought worth while throughly to lay it open. And I shall be pardoned if I have Names of mixed Modes. 99 dwelt long on an Argument which I think therefore needs to be inculcated ; because the Faults, Men are usually guilty of in this kind, are not only the greatest Hindrances of true Knowledge ; but are so well thought of, as to pass for it. Men would often see what a small pittance of Reason and Truth, or possibly none at all, is mixed with those huffing Opinions they are swelled with ; if they would but look beyond fashionable Sounds, and observe what Ideas are, or are not comprehended under those Words, with which they are so armed at all Points, and with which they so confidently lay about them. I shall imagine I have done some Service to Truth, Peace, and Learning, if, by an enlargement on this Subject, I can make Men reflect on their own Use of Language ; and give them Reason to suspect, that since it is frequent for others, it may also be possible for them, to have sometimes very good and approved Words in their Mouths, and Writings, with very un- certain, little, or no Signification. And therefore it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves, and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others. With this Design therefore, I shall go on with what I have farther to say, con- cerning this matter. H 2 ioo Names of Substances. CHAPTER VI. OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCES. I. The common Names of Substances as well as other General Terms, stand for Sorts ; The common Names of which is nothing else but the being Substances 10- r i TJ stand for rnade Signs of such complex Ideas, wherein several particular Substances do, or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common Conception, and signify'd by one Name. I say, do or might agree: for though there be but one Sun existing in the World, yet the Idea of it being abstracted, so that more Substances (if there were several) might each agree in it ; it is as much a Sort, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars. They want not their Reasons, who think there are, and that each fixed Star, would answer the Idea the Name Sun stands for, to one who were placed in a due Distance ; which, by the way, may shew us how much the Sorts, or, if you please, Genera and Species Names of Substances. 101 of Things (for those Latin Terms signify to me no more than the English word Sort} depend on such Collections of Ideas, as Men have made ; and not on the real Nature of Things : since 'tis not impos- sible, but that in Propriety of Speech, that might be a Sun to one which is a Star to another. 2. The measure and boundary of each Sort, or Species, whereby it is constituted that particular Sort, and distinguished from O j each sort others, is that we call its Essence, which *s the abstract Ideas. is nothing but that abstract Idea to which the Name is annexed'. So that every thing contained in that Idea, is essential to that Sort. This, though it be all the Essence of natural Substances that we know, or by which we distinguish them into Sorts ; yet I call it by a peculiar Name, the nominal Essence, to distinguish it from that real Constitution of Substances, upon which depends this nominal Essence, and all the Properties of that sort, which therefore, as has been "said, may be called the real Essence, v. g. the nominal Essence of Gold, is that complex Idea the word Gold stands for, let it be, for instance, a Body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the real Essence is the Constitution of the insensible Parts of that Body, on which those Qualities, and all the other Properties of Gold depend. How far these two are different, IO2 Names of Substances. though they are both called Essence, is obvious, at first sight, to discover. 3. For though, perhaps, voluntary Motion, with Sense and Reason, join'd to a Body of The nominal , . , , ,, i T j and real Es- a certain Shape, be the complex Idea, to sence differ- w hi c h I, and others, annex the Name ent. Man ; and so be the nominal Essence of the Species so called ; yet no Body will say, that that complex Idea is the real Essence and Source of all those Operations, which are to be found in any Individual of that sort. The Foundation of all those Qualities, which are the Ingredients of our complex Idea, is something quite different : And had we such a Knowledg of that Constitution of Man, from which his Faculties of Moving, Sensation, and Reasoning, and other Powers flow, and on which his so regular shape depends, as 'tis possible Angels have, and 'tis certain his Maker has, we should have a quite other Idea of his Essence, than what now is contained in our Definition of that Species, be it what it will : And our Idea of any individual Man would be as far different from what it now is, as is his who knows all the Springs and Wheels, and other Contrivances within, of the famous Clock at Strasbnrg, from that which a gazing Countryman has of it, who barely sees the Motion of the Hand, and hears the Clock strike, and observes only some of the outward Appearances. Names of Substances. 103 4. That Essence, in the ordinary Use of the Word, relates to Sorts, and that it is considered ,, . Nothing Es- in particular Beings, no farther than as sential to In- dividuals. they are ranked into Sorts, appears from hence : That but take away the abstract Ideas, by which we sort Individuals, and rank them under common Names, and then the thought of any thing essential to any of them, instantly vanishes : we have no Notion of the one, without the other : which plainly shews their Relation. 'Tis necessary for me to be as I am ; GOD and Nature has made me so : But there is nothing I have is essential to me. An Accident, or Disease, may very much alter my Colour, or Shape; a Fever, or Fall, may take away my Reason or Memory, or both ; and an Apoplexy leave neither Sense, nor Understanding, no, nor Life. Other Crea- tures of my shape may be made with more, and better, or fewer, and worse Faculties than I have : and others may have Reason and Sense in a shape and body very different from mine. None of these are essential to the one, or the other, or to any Individual whatsoever, till the Mind refers it to some Sort or Species of Things ; and then presently, ac- cording to the abstract Idea of that sort, something is found essential. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and he will find, that as soon as he sup- poses or speaks of Essential, the Consideration of IO4 Names of Substances. some Species, or the complex Idea, signified by some general Name, comes into his Mind : And 'tis in reference to that, that this or that Quality is said to be essential. So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me, or any other particular corporeal Being to have Reason ? I say no ; no more than it is essential to this white thing I write on, to have Words in it. But if that particular Being be to be counted of the Sort Man, and to have the Name Man given it, then Reason is essential to it, supposing Reason to be a part of the complex Idea, the Name Man stands for : as it is essential to this thing I write on to contain Words, if I will give it the Name Treatise, and rank it under that Species. So that essential, and not essential, relate only to our abstract Ideas, and the Names annexed to them, which Amounts to no more but this, That whatever particular Thing has not in it those Qualities, which are contained in the abstract Idea, which any general Term stands for, cannot be ranked under that Species, nor be called by that Name, since that abstract Idea is the very Essence of that Species. 5. Thus if the Idea of Body, with some People, be bare Extension or Space, then Solidity is not essential to Body : If others make the Idea, to which they give the Name Body, to be Solidity and Exten- sion, then Solidity is essential to Body. That there- Names of Substances. 105 fore, and that alone is considered as essential, which makes a part of the complex Idea the Name of a Sort stands for, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that Sort, nor be intituled to that Name. Should there be found a parcel of Matter, that had all the other Qualities that are in Iron, but wanted Obedience to the Load-stone; and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive Direction from it, would any one Question, whether it wanted any thing essential? It would be absurd to ask, Whether a thing really existing wanted any thjng essential to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this made an essential or specifick difference, or no ; since we have no other mea- sure of essential or specif ck, but our abstract Ideas ? And to talk of specifick Differences in Nature, with- out reference to general Ideas and Names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What is sufficient to make an essential difference in Nature, between any two particular Beings, without any regard had to some abstract Idea, which is looked upon as the Essence and Standard of a Species? All such Patterns and Standards, being quite laid aside, par- ticular Beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their Qualities equally essential ; and every thing, in each Individual, will be essential to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For though it may be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the io6 Names of Substances. Magnet, be essential to Iron ? yet, I think, it is very improper and insignificant to ask, Whether it be essential to the particular parcel of Matter I cut my Pen with, without considering it under the Name Iron, or as being of a certain Species f And if, as has been said, our abstract Ideas, which have Names annexed to them, are the Boundaries of Species, nothing can be essential but what is contained in those Ideas. 6. Tis true, I have often mention'd a real Essence, distinct in Substances, from those abstract Ideas of them, which I call their nominal Essence. By this real Essence, I mean, that real constitution of any thing, which is the Foundation of all those Pro- perties, that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal Essence ; that particular Constitution which every Thing has within it self, without any Relation to any thing without it. But Essence, even in this Sense, relates to a sort, and sup- poses a Species : For being that real Constitution, on which the Properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of Things, Properties belonging only to Species, and not to Individuals ; v. g. Supposing the nominal Essence of Gold, to be Body of such a peculiar Colour and Weight, with Malleability and Fusibility, the real Essence is that Constitution of the Parts of Matter, on which these Qualities, and their Union, Names of S^^,b stances. 107 depend ; and is also the Foundation of its Solubility in Aq. Regia, and other Properties accompanying that complex Idea. Here are Essences and Pro- perties, but all upon Supposition of a sort, or general abstract Idea, which is considered as immutable: but there is no Individual parcel of Matter, to which any of these Qualities are so annexed, as to be essential to it, or inseparable from it. That which is essential, belongs to it as a Condition, whereby it is of this or that sort: But take away the Consideration of its being ranked under the Name of some abstract Idea, and then there is nothing necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the real Essences of Substances, we only suppose their Being, without precisely knowing what they are : But that which annexes 'em still to the Species, is the nominal Essence, of which they are the supposed Foundation and Cause. 7. The next thing to be consider'd is, by which of those Essences it is, that Substances ihe nominal are determined into Sorts, or Species] and essemebounds ,, ,,. ., , . . the Species. that, tis evident, is by the nominal Essence. For 'tis that alone, that the Name, which is the mark of the sort, signifies. 'Tis impossible therefore, that any thing should determine the sorts of Things, which we rank under general Names, but that Idea, which that Name is designed as a mark io8 Names of Substances. for ; which is that, as has been shewn, which we call the Nominal Essence. Why do we say, This is a Horse, and that a Mule ; this is an Animal, that an Herb ? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that Sort, but because it has that nominal Essence, or, which is all one, agrees to that abstract Idea, that Name is annexed to ? And I desire any one but to reflect on his own Thoughts, when he hears or speaks any of those, or other Names of Substances, to know what sort of Essences they stand for. 8. And that the Species of Things to us, are nothing but the ranking them under distinct Names, according to the complex. Ideas in us; and not according to precise, distinct, real Essences in them, is plain from hence, That we find many of the Individuals that are rank'd into one sort, call'd by one common Name, and so receiv'd as being of one Species, have yet Qualities depending on their real Constitutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ specifically. This, as it is easy to be observed by all, who have to do with natural Bodies ; so Chymists especially are often, by sad Experience, convinced of it, when they, some- times in vain, seek for the same Qualities in one parcel of Sulphur, Antimony, or Vitriol, which they have found in others. For though they are Bodies of the same Species^ having the same nominal Essence^ Names of Substances. 109 under the same Name ; yet do they often, upon severe ways of Examination, betray Qualities so different one from another, as to frustrate the Ex- pectation and Labour of very wary Chymists. But if Things were distinguished into Species, according to their real Essences, it would be as impossible to find different Properties in any two individual Sub- stances of the same Species, as it is to find different Properties in two Circles, or two equilateral Triangles. That is properly the Essence to us, which determines every particular to this or that Classis ; or, which is the same Thing, to this or that general Name : And what can that be else, but that abstract Idea, to which that Name is annexed ? And so has, in truth, a Reference, not so much to the Being of particular Things, as to their general Denominations. 9. Nor indeed can we rank, and sort Things, and consequently (which is the end of sort- \ ^ Not the real ing) denominate them by their real Essencewhick we know not. Essences, because we know them not. Our Faculties carry us no farther towards the Know- ledg and Distinction of Substances, than a Collection of those sensible Ideas, which we observe in them ; which however made with the greatest diligence and exactness, we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal Constitution, from which those Qualities flow, than, as I said, a Countryman's Idea no Names of Substances. is from the inward contrivance of that famous Clock at Straslurg, whereof he only sees the outward Figure and Motions. There is not so contemptible a Plant or Animal, that does not confound the most inlarged Understanding. Though the familiar use of things about us, take off our Wonder ; yet it cures not our Ignorance. When we come to examine the Stones, we tread on ; or the Iron, we daily handle, we presently find, we know not their Make ; and can give no Reason of the different Qualities we find in them. 'Tis evident the internal Constitution, whereon their Properties depend, is unknown to us. For to go no farther than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, What is that Texture of Parts, that real Essence, that makes Lead and Anti- mony fusible ; Wood and Stones not ? What makes Lead and Iron malleable ; Antimony and Stones not ? And yet how infinitely these come short of the fine Contrivances, and unconceivable real Essences of Plants or Animals, every one knows. The Work- manship of the All-wise, and Powerful God, in the great Fabrick, of the Universe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the Capacity and Comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent Man, than the best contrivance of the most ingenious Man, doth the Conceptions of the most ignorant of rational Creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range Names of Substances. 1 1 1 Things into Sorts, and dispose them into certain Classes, under Names, by their real Essences, that are so far from our Discovery or Comprehension. A blind Man may as soon sort Things by their Colours, and he that has lost his Smell, as well distinguish a Lilly and a Rose by their Odors, as by those internal Constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish Sheep and Goats by their real Essences, that are unknown to him, may be pleased to try his Skill in those Species, called Cassioivary, and Querechinchio ; and by their internal real Essences determine the Boundaries of those Species, without knowing the complex Idea of sensible Qualities, that each of 'those Names stand for, in the Countries where those Animals are to be found. 10, Those therefore who have been taught, that the several Species of Substances had their distinct internal substantial Forms ; ^- a / Forms and that it was those Forms, which made less. the Distinction of Substances into their true Species and Genera, were led yet farther out of the Way, by having their Minds set upon fruitless Enquiries after substantial Forms, wholly unintelli- gible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure, or confused Conception in general. ii. That our ranking, and distinguishing natural Substances into Species, consists in the nominal Es- 1 1 2 Names of Substances. set ices the mind makes, and not in the real Essences to be found in the Things themselves, That the no- minalEssence is farther evident from our Ideas of is that where- -,.',.. ^ ,, ,,. , . . by we distin- Spirits. For the Mind getting, only b y ^fleeting on its own Operations, dent from those simple Ideas which it attributes Spirits. to Spirits, it hath, or can have no other Notion of Spirit, but by attributing all those Opera- tions, it finds in itself, to a sort of Beings, without Con- sideration of Matter. And even the most advanced Notion we have of God, is but attributing the same simple Ideas which we have got from Reflection on what we find in our selves, and which we conceive to have more Perfection in them, than would be "in their absence, attributing, I say, those simple Ideas to him in an unlimited Degree. Thus having got from reflecting on our selves, the Idea of Existence, Know- ledg, Power, and Pleasure, each of which we find it better to have than to want ; and the more we have of each, the better ; joyning all these together, with Infinity to each of them, we have the complex Idea of an Eternal, Omniscient, Omnipotent, infinitely Wise, and happy Being. And though we are told, "that there are different Species of Angels ; yet we know not how to frame distinct specifick Ideas of them ; not out of any Conceit, that the Existence of more Species than one of Spirits, is impossible : But Names of Substances. 113 because having no more simple Ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to such Beings, I ut only those few taken from our selves, and from the Actions of our own Minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several Parts of our Bodies, we can no otherwise distinguish in our Conceptions the several Species of Spirits, one from another, but by attri- buting those Operations and Powers, we find in our selves, to them in a higher or lower Degree ; and so have no very distinct specifick Ideas of Spirits, except only of GOD, to whom we attribute both Duration, and all those other Ideas with Infinity ; to the other Spirits, with Limitation : Nor as I humbly conceive do we, between GOD and them in our Ideas, put any difference by any Number of simple Ideas, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of Infinity. All the particular Ideas of Existence, Knowledg, Will, Power, and Motion, &c. being Ideas derived from the Operations of our Minds, we attri- bute all of them to all sorts of Spirits, with the difference only of Degrees, to the utmost we can imagine, even Infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an Idea of the first Being ; who yet, 'tis certain, is infinitely more remote in the real Excel- lency of his Nature, from the highest and perfectest of all created Beings, than the greatest Man, nay, purest Seraphim, is from the most contemptible part I 114 Names of Substances. of Matter ; and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow Understanding can conceive of him. 12. It is not impossible to conceive, nor repug- nant to Reason, that there may be there are* pro- man 7 Species of Spirits, as much sepa- bablynumber- ratec j anc j diversified one from another, less Species. by distinct Properties, whereof we have no Ideas, as the Species of sensible Things are distin- guished one from another, by Qualities, which we know, and observe in them. That there should be more Species of intelligent Creatures above us, than there are of sensible and material below us, is pro- bable to me from hence ; That in all the visible corporeal World, we see no Chasms or Gaps. All quite down from us, the Descent is by easy Steps, and a continued series of Things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are Fishes that have Wings, and are not Strangers to the airy Region : and there are some Birds, that are Inhabitants of the Water ; whose Blood is cold as Fishes, and their Flesh so like in taste, that the scrupulous are allowed them on Fish days. There are Animals so near of kin both to Birds and Beasts, that they are in the middle between both : Amphi- bious Animals link the Terrestrial and Aquatick together ; Seals live at Land and at Sea, and Por- poises have the warm Blood and Entrails of a Hog, Names of Substances. 115 not to mention what is confidently reported of Mer- maids, or Seamen. There are some Brutes, that seem to hrve as much Knowledg and Reason, as some that are called Men : and the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms are so nearly joined, that if you will take the lowest of one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them ; and so on till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical Parts of Matter, we shall find everywhere, that the several Species are linked together, and differ but in almost insensible Degrees. And when we consider the infinite Power and Wisdom of the Maker, we have Reason to think, that it is suitable to the magnificent Harmony of the Universe, and the great Design and infinite Goodness of the Architect, that the Species of Creatures should also, by gentle Degrees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite Perfection, as we see they gradu- ally descend from us downwards : Which if it be probable, we have Reason then to be perswaded, that there are far more Species of Creatures above us, than there are beneath ; we being in Degrees of Perfection, much more remote from the infinite Being of GOD, than we are from the lowest State of Being, and that which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet of all those distinct Species, for the Reasons above-said, we have no clear distinct Ideas. I 2 1 1 6 Names of Substances. 13. But to return to the Species of corporeal . Substances. If I should ask any one 1 he nominal Essence that whether Ice and Water were two distinct of the Species, r TU- TJUI. *. u .. T proved from Species of Things, I doubt not but I Water& Ice. should be answered in the affirmative: And it cannot be denied, but he that says, they are two distinct Species, is in the right. But if an Englishman, bred in Jamaica, who, perhaps, had never seen nor heard of Ice, coming into England in the Winter, find the Water he put in his Bason at Night, in a great part frozen in the Morning, and not knowing any peculiar Name it had, should call it hardened Water ; I ask, Whether this would be a new Species to him, different from Water ? And, I think, it would be answered here, It would not be to him a new Species, no more than congealed Gelly, when it is cold, is a distinct Species, from the same Gelly fluid and warm ; or than liquid Gold, in the Furnace, is a distinct Species from hard Gold in the Hands of a Workman. And if this be so, 'tis plain, that our distinct Species are notJdng but distinct com- plex Ideas, with distinct Names annexed to them. 'Tis true, every Substance that exists, has its peculiar Constitution, whereon depend those sensible Quali- ties, and Powers, we observe in it : But the ranking of Things into Species, which is nothing but sorting them under several Titles, is done by us, according to Names of Substances. 117 the Ideas that we have of them : Which though suf- ficient to distinguish them by Names ; so that we may be able to Discourse of them, when we have them not present before us ; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal Constitutions, and that Things existing are distinguished by Nature into Species, by real Essences, according as we distinguish them into Species by Names, we shall be liable to great Mistakes. 14. To distinguish substantial Beings into Species, according to the usual Suppo- j^-^ ,,- sition, that there are certain precise against a cer- tain Number Essences or Forms of things, whereby all of real Es- the Individuals existing, are, by Nature distinguish'd into Species, these Things are neces- sary. 15. First, To be assured, that Nature, in the Production of Things, always Designs them to par- take of certain regulated established Essences, which are to be the Models of all Things to be produced. This, in that crude Sense, it is usually proposed, would need some better' Explication, before it can fully be assented to. 1 6. Secondly, It would be necessary to know, whether Nature always attains that Essence it Designs in the Production of Things. The irregular and monstrous Births, that in divers sorts of Animals n8 Names of Substances. have been observed, will always give us Reason to doubt of one, or both of these. 17. Thirdly, It ought to be determined, whether those we call Monsters, be really a distinct Species, according to the scholastick Notion of the Word Species ; since it is certain, that every thing that exists, has its particular Constitution : And yet we find, that some of these monstrous Productions, have few or none of those Qualities, which are supposed to result from, and Accompany the Essence of that Species, from whence they derive their Originals, and to which, by their Descent, they seem to belong. 1 8. Fourthly, The real Essences of those Things, which we distinguish into Species, and .. -. i , AT Our nominal as so distinguished we Name, ought to Essences of be known ; i. e. we ought to have Ideas Su * sta es > f not perfect of them. But since we are ignorant in Collections of Properties. these four Points, the supposed real Es- sences of Things stand us not in stead for the distin- guishing Substances into Species. 19. Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that having framed perfect complex Ideas of the Properties of things, flowing from their different real Essences, we should thereby distinguish them into Species. But neither can this be done : for being ignorant of the real Essence it self, it is impossible to know all those Properties that flow Names of Substances 119 from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that Essence is not there, and so the thing is not of that Species. We can never know what are the precise Number of Properties depending on the real Essence of Gold, any one of which failing, the real Essence of Gold, and consequently Gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real Essence of Gold it self, and by that determined that Species. By the Word Gold here, I must be understood to design a particular piece of Matter ; v. g. the last Guinea that was coined. For if it should stand here in its ordinary Signification -for that complex Idea which I or any one else calls Gold ; i. e. for the nominal Essence of Gold, it would be Jargon : so hard is it to shew the various Meaning and Imperfection of Words, when we have nothing else but Words to do it by. 20. By all which it is clear, That our distin- guishing Siibstances into Species by Names, is not at all founded on their real Essences ; nor can we pretend to range, and determine 'em exactly into Species, according to internal essential Differences. 21. But since, as has been remarked, we have need of general Words, though we know But such a .1 IT- r T-I 11 Collection as not the real Essences of Things ; all our we can do, is to collect such a Number stands for. of simple Ideas, as by Examination, we find to be I2O Names of Substances. united together in Things existing, and thereof to make one complex Idea. Which though it be not the real Essence of any Substance that exists, is yet the specifick Essence, to which our Name .belongs, and is convertible with it ; by which we may at least try the Truth of these nominal Essences. For Example, there be that say, that the Essence of Body is Exten- sion : If it be so, we can never mistake in putting the Essence of any thing for the Thing it self. Let us then in Discourse, put Extension for Body ; and when we would say, that Body moves, let us say that Extension moves, and see how it will look. He that should say, that one Extension by impulse moves another Extension, would, by the bare Expression, sufficiently shew the Absurdity of such a Notion. The Essence of any thing, in respect of us, is the whole complex Idea, comprehended and marked by that Name ; and in Substances, besides the several distinct simple Ideas that make them up, the con- fused one of Substance, or of an unknown support and cause of their Union, is always a part : and therefore the Essence of Body is not bare Extension, but an extended solid thing ; and so to say, an extended solid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to say, Body moves, or impels. Likewise, to say, that a rational Animal is capable of Conversation, is all one, as to say, a Man. Names of Substances. 121 But no one will say, That Rationality is capable of Conversation, because it makes not the whole Essence to which we give the Name Man. 22. There are Creatures in the World that have Shapes like ours, but are hairy, and Our abstract want Language, and Reason. There ideas are to us are Naturals amongst us, that have per- **? M ^"- s . OJ ^DtClCS j fectly our Shape, but want Reason, and instance, in that of Man. some of them Language too. There are Creatures, as 'tis said, (sit fides penes A utliorem, but there appears no Contradiction that there should be such) that with Language, and Reason, and a shape in other Things agreeing with ours, have hairy Tails ; others where the Males have no Beards, and others where the Females have. If it be asked, whether these be all Men, or no, all of humane Species ; 'tis plain, the Question refers only to the nominal Essence : For those of them to whom the Definition of the Word Man, or the complex Idea signify'd by that Name, agrees, are Men, and the other not. But if the enquiry be made concerning the supposed real Essence ; and whether the internal Constitution and Frame of these several Creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into our specifick Ideas ; only we have Reason to think, that where the Faculties, or outward Frame so much differs, the 122 Names of Substances. internal Constitution is not exactly the same : But what Difference in the internal real Constitution makes a specifick Difference, it is in vain to enquire ; whilst our Measures of Species be, as they are, only our abstract Ideas, which we know ; and not that internal Constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the Difference of Hair only on the Skin, be a mark of a different internal specifick Constitution between a Changeling and a Drill, when they agree in Shape, and want of Reason and Speech ? And shall not the want of Reason and Speech be a sign to us of different real Constitutions and Species between a Changeling and a reasonable Man ? And so of the rest, if we pretend that the Distinction of Species or Sorts is fixedly establish'd by the real Frame, and secret Constitutions of Things. 23. Nor let any one say, that the Power of Pro- pagation in Animals by the mixture of distinguished Male and Female, and in Plants by by Genera- Seeds, keeps the supposed real Species distinct and entire. For granting this to be true, it would help us in the Distinction of the Species of Things no farther than the Tribes of Animals and Vegetables. What must we do for the rest ? But in those too it is not sufficient : for if History lye not, Women have conceived by Drills, and what real Species, by that measure, such a Pro- Names of Siibstances. 123 duction will be in Nature, will be a new Question : and we have Reason to think this is not impossible, since Mules and Jumarts, the one from the Mixture of an Ass and a Mare, the other from the Mixture of a Bull and a Mare, are so frequent in the World. I once saw a Creature that was the Issue of a Cat and a Rat, and had the plain Marks of both about it ; wherein Nature appeared to have followed the Pattern of neither sort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which, he that shall add the monstrous Productions, that are so frequently to be met with in Nature, will find it hard, even in the race of Animals, to determine by the Pedigree of what Species every Animal's Issue is ; and be at a loss about the real Essence, which he thinks certainly convey'd by Gene- ration, and has alone a right to the specifick Name. But farther, if the Species of Animals and Plants are to be distinguished only by Propagation, must I go to the Indies to see the Sire and Dam of the one, and the Plant from which the Seed was gather'd, that produced the other, to know whether this be a Tyger or that Tea ? 24. Upon the whole matter, 'tis evident, that 'tis their own Collections of sensible Qua- ^Vot by sub- lities, that Men make the Essences of stantialForms. their several sorts of Substances ; and that their real internal Structures are not considered by the greatest 124 Names of Substances, part of Men, in the sorting them. Much less were any substantial Forms ever thought on by any, but those who have in this one part of the World learned the Language of the Schools ; and yet those ignorant Men, who pretend not any insight into the real Essences, nor trouble themselves about substantial Forms, but are content with knowing Things one from another, by their sensible Qualities, are often better acquainted with their Differences, can more nicely distinguish them from their Uses, and better know what they may expect from each, than those learned quick-sighted Men, who look so deep into them, and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential. 25. But supposing that the real Essences of Sub- stances were discoverable by those that Essences are would severely apply themselves to that "tot-it Enquiry ; yet we could not reasonably think, that the ranking of things wider general Names, was regulated by those internal real Constitutions, or any thing else but their obvious Appearances : since Languages, in all Countries, have been established long before Sciences. So that they have not been Philosophers, or Logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about Forms and Essences, that have made the general Names, that are in use amongst the several Nations of Men: But Names of Substances. 125 those, more or less comprehensive Terms, have for the most part, in all Languages, received their Birth and Signification, from ignorant and illiterate People, who sorted and denominated Things, by those sen- sible Qualities they found in them, thereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had an Occasion to mention a Sort, or a particular Thing. 26. Since then it is evident, that we sort and name Substances by their nominal, and not by their real Essences ; the next very ' thingf to be considered is, how, and by a " uncer- 3 tain. whom these Essences come to be made. As to the latter, 'tis evident they are made by the Mind, and not by Nature : For were they Nature's Workmanship, they could not be so various and different in several Men, as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal Essence of any one Species of Substances, in all Men the same ; no not of that, which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be, that the abstract Idea, to which the Name Man is given, should be different in several Men, if it were of Nature's making ; and that to one it should be Animal rationale, and to another, Animal implume bipes latis unguibus. He that annexes the Name Man, to a complex Idea, made up of Sense and spontaneous Motion, joined 126 Names of S^tbstances. to a Body of such a Shape, has thereby one Essence of the Species Man : And he that, upon farther Examination, adds Rationality, has another Essence of the Species he calls Man : By which means, the same individual will be a true Man to the one, which is not so to the other. I think, there is scarce any one will allow this upright Figure, so well known, to be the essential difference of the Species Man ; and yet how far Men determine of the sorts of Animals, rather by their Shape, than Descent, is very visible ; since it has been more than once debated, whether several humane Foetus's should be preserved, or re- ceived to Baptism, or no, only because of the dif- ference of their outward Configuration, from the ordinary Make of Children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of Reason, as Infants cast in another Mould : Some whereof, though of an approved shape, are never capable of as much ap- pearance of Reason, all their Lives, as is to be found in an Ape, or an Elephant ; and never give any Signs of being acted by a rational Soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward Figure, which only was found wanting, and not the Faculty of Reason, which no Body could know would be wanting in its due Season, was made essential to the Humane Species. The learned Divine and Lawyer, must, on such Occasions, renounce his sacred Definition of Names of Substances. 127 Animal Rationale, and substitute some other Essence of the humane Species. Monsieur Menage furnishes us with an Example worth the taking Notice of on this occasion. When the Abbot of St. Martin, says he, was born, he had so little of the Figure of a Man, that he bespake him rather a Monster. ' Twas for some time under Deliberation, whether he should be baptized or no. However, he was baptized and de- clared a Man provisionally [till time should shew what he would prove] Nature had moulded him so tm- towardly, that he was called all his Life the Abbot Malotru, i. e. Ill-shaped. He was of Caen, Menagiana Hi)-. This Child we see was very near being ex- cluded out of the Species of Man, barely by his Shape. He escaped very narrowly as he was, and 'tis certain a Figure a little more odly turned had cast him, and he had been executed as a thing not to be allowed to pass for a Man. And yet there can be no Reason given, why if the Lineaments of his Face had been a little altered, a rational Soul could not have been lodged in him, why a Visage somewhat longer, or a Nose flatter, or a wider Mouth could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his ill Figure, with such a Soul, such Parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a Dignitary in the Church. ^ 27. Wherein then, would I gladly know, consists 128 Names of Substances. - the precise and nnmoveable Boundaries of that Species ? 'Tis plain, if we examine, there is no such Thing made by Nature, and established by her amongst Men. The real Essence of that, or any other sort of Substances, 'tis evident we know not ; and there- fore are so undetermined in our nominal Essences, which we make our selves, that if several Men were to be asked, concerning some odly shaped Fcetus, as soon as born, whether it were a Man, or no, 'tis past doubt, one should meet with different Answers. Which could not happen, if the nominal Essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the Species of Substances, were not made by Man, with some Liberty ; but were exactly copied from precise Boundaries set by Nature, whereby it distinguished all Substances into certain Species. Who would undertake to resolve, what Species that Monster was of, which is mentioned by Licetus, lib. I. c. 3. with a Man's Head and Hog's Body ? Or those other, which to the Bodies of Men had the Heads of Beasts, as Dogs, Horses, &c. If any of these Creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would have increased the Difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of Humane Shape, and all below Swine ; Had it been Murder to destroy it ? Or must the Bishop have been consulted, whether it were Man enough to be admitted to the Font, or no ? As I have Names of Substances. 129 been told, it happened in France some Years since, in somewhat a like Case. So uncertain are the Boundaries of Species of Animals to us, who have no other Measures, than the complex Ideas of our own collecting : And so far are we from certainly knowing what a Man is ; though, perhaps, it will be judged great Ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may say, that the certain Boundaries of that Species, are so far from being determined, and the precise number of simple Ideas, which make the nominal Essence, so far from being settled, and perfectly known, that very material Doubts may still arise about it : And I imagine, none of the Definitions of the Word Man, which we yet have, nor Descriptions of that sort of Animal, are so perfect and exact, as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive Person ; much less to obtain a general Consent, and to be that which Men would every where stick by, in the Decision of Cases, and deter- mining of Life and Death, Baptism or no Baptism, in Productions that might happen. 28. But though these nominal Essences of Sub- stances are made by the Mind, they are But not so r.ot yet made so arbitrarily, as those of arbitrary as j */r j T At. 1 r mixed Modes, mixed Modes. To the making of any nominal Essence, it is necessary, First, That the IJcas whereof it consists, have such an Union as K 130 Names of Substances. to make but one Idea, how compounded soever. Secondly, That the particular Ideas so united, be exactly the same, neither more nor less. For if two abstract complex Ideas, differ either in Number or Sorts, of their component Parts, they make two different, and not one and the same Essence. In the first of these, the Mind, in making its complex Ideas of Substances, only follows Nature ; and puts none together, which are not supposed to have an Union in Nature. No Body joins the Voice of a Sheep, with the Shape of a Horse ; nor the Colour of Lead, with the Weight and Fixedness of Gold, to be the complex Ideas of any real Substances ; unless he has a Mind to fill his Head with Chimera's, and his Discourse with unintelligible Words. Men ob- serving certain Qualities always joined and existing together, therein copied Nature ; and of Ideas so united, made their complex ones of Substances. For though Men may make what complex Ideas they please, and give what Names to them they will ; yet if they will be understood, when they speak of Things really existing, they must in some degree conform their Ideas to the Things they would speak of: Or else Mens Language will be like that of Babel; and every Man's Words being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve to Conver- sation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life, if the Ideas Names of Substances. 131 they stand for be not some way answering the common appearances and agreement of Substances, as they really exist. 29. Secondly, Though the Mind of Men, in making 'tis complex Ideas of Substances, Thtf-veryim- never puts any together that do not i> er f ect - really, or are not suppos'd to co-exist ; and so it truly borrows that Union from Nature : Yet the Number it combines, depends upon the various Care, Industry, or Fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with some few sensible obvious Qualities ; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as those that they take. Of sensible Substances there are two sorts ; one of organized Bodies, which are propagated by Seed ; and in these, the Shape is that, which to us is the leading Quality, and most characteristical Part, that determines the Species : And therefore in Vegetables and Animals, an extended solid Sub- stance of such a certain Figure usually serves the turn. For however some Men seem to prize their Definition of Animal Rationale, yet should there a Creature be found, that had Language and Reason, but partook not of the usual shape of a Man, I believe it would hardly pass for a Man, how much soever it were Animal Rationale. And if Balaam's. Ass had, all his Life, discoursed as rationally as he K 2 132 Names of Substances. did once with his Master, I doubt yet, whether any one would have thought him worthy the Name Man, or allowed him to be of the same Species with himself. As in Vegetables and Animals, 'tis the Shape, so in most other Bodies, not propagated by Seed, 'tis the Colour we most fix on, and are most led by. Thus where we find the Colour of Gold, we are apt to imagine all the other Qualities, compre- hended in our complex Idea, to be there also : and we commonly take these two obvious Qualities, vis. Shape and Colour, for so presumptive Ideas of several Species, that in a good Picture, we readily say, this is a Lion, and that a Rose ; this is a Gold, and that a Silver Goblet, only by the different Figures and Colours, represented to the Eye by the Pencil. 30. But though this serves well enough for gross , and confused Conceptions, and unac- Whtchyet serve for com- curate ways of Talking and Thinking; mcmConverse. MT _ ... , . yet Men are far enough from having agreed on tJie precise number of simple Ideas, cr Qualities belonging to any sort of Things, signified by its Name. Nor is it a wonder, since it requires much Time, Pains and Skill, strict Enquiry, and long Examination, to find out what, and how many those simple Ideas are, which are constantly and inseparably united in Nature, and are always to be found together in the same Subject. Most Men Names of Siibstances. 133 wanting either Time, Inclination, or Industry enough for this, even to some tolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious, and outward Appearances of Things, thereby readily to distin- guish and sort them for the common Affairs of Life. And so, without farther Examination, give them Names, or take up the Names already in use. Which, though in common Conversation they pass well enough for the Signs of some few obvious Qualities co-existing, are yet far enough from com- prehending, in a settled Signification, a precise Number of simple Ideas ; much less all those, which are united in Nature. He that shall consider, after so much stir, about Genus and Species, and such a deal of Talk of specifick Differences, how few Words we have yet settled Definitions of, may, with Reason, imagine, that those Forms, which there hath been so much noise made about, are only Chim&ras, which give us no light into the specifick Natures of Things. And he that shall consider, how far the Names of Substances are from having Significations, wherein all who use them do agree, will have Reason to conclude, that though the nominal Essences of Sub- stances are all supposed to be copied from Nature, yet they are all, or most of them, very imperfect. Since the Composition of those complex Ideas, are, in several Men, very different : and therefore, that 134 Names of Substances. these Boundaries of Species, are as Men, and not as Nature makes them, if at least there are in Nature any such prefixed Bounds. 'Tis true, that many particular Substances are so made by Nature, that they have agreement and likeness one with another, and so afford a Foundation of being ranked into sorts. But the sorting of Things by us, or the making of determinate Species, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general Terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that Nature sets the Boundaries of the Species of Things : Or if it be so, our Boundaries of Species are not exactly conformable to those in Nature. For we having need of general Names for present use, stay not for a perfect Discovery of all those Qualities, which would best shew us their most material Dif- ferences and Agreements ; but we our selves divide them, by certain obvious Appearances, into Species, that we may the easier, under general Names, com- municate our Thoughts about them. . For having no other Knowledg of any Substance, but of the simple Ideas, that are united in it ; and observing several particular Things to agree with others, in several of those simple Ideas, we make that Collection our specifick Idea, and give it a general Name ; that in recording our own Thoughts, and in our Discourse with others, we may in one short Word design all Names of Substances. 135 the Individuals that agree in that complex Idea, without enumerating the simple Ideas, that make it up ; and so not waste our Time and Breath in tedious Descriptions : which we see they are fain to do, who would Discourse of any new sort of Things, they have not yet a Name for. 31. But however, these Species of Substances pass well enough in ordinary Conversa- Essences of tion, it is plain, that this complex Idea. Species under the same wherein they observe several Individuals Name -very to agree, is, by different Men, made " . very differently ; by some more, and others less accurately. In some, this complex Idea contains a greater, and in others a smaller Number of Qualities ; and so is apparently such as the Mind makes it. The yellow shining Colour makes Gold to Children ; others add Weight, Malleableness, and Fusibility ; and others yet other Qualities, which they find joined with that yellow Colour, as constantly as its Weight and Fusibility :. For in all these, and the like Qua- lities, one has as good a Right to be put into the complex Idea of that Substance, wherein they are all joined, as another. And therefore different Men leaving out, or putting in several simple Ideas, which others do not, according to their various Examination, Skill, or Observation of that Sub- ject, have different Essences of Gold which must 136 Names of Substances. therefore be of their own, and not of Nature's making. 32. If the Number of simple Ideas, that make the nominal Essence of the lowest Species, or general T^r first sortin g of Individuals, depends on \ fez.?, are, the tJ te Mind of Man, variously collecting more incom- plete and them, it is much more evident that ^ tc they do so, in the more comprehensive Classis, which, by the Masters of Logick are called Genera. These are complex Ideas design- ed^ imperfect : And 'tis visible at first sight, that several of those Qualities, that are to be found in the Things themselves, are purposely left out of generical Ideas. For as the Mind, to make general Ideas ; comprehending several particulars, leaves out those of Time, and Place, and such other that make them incommunicable to more than one Individual ; so to make other yet more general Ideas, that may com- prehend different sorts, it leaves out those Qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new Col- lection, only such Ideas, as are common to several sorts. The same Convenience that made Men express several Parcels of yellow Matter coming from Guinea and Peru, under one Name, sets them also upon making of one Name, that may comprehend both Gold, and Silver, and some other Bodies of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those Qualities, Names of Substances. 137 which are peculiar to each sort ; and retaining a complex Idea made up of those that are common to them all. To which the Name Metal being annexed, there is a Genus constituted ; the Essence whereof being that abstract Idea, containing only Malleable- ness and Fusibility, with certain Degrees of Weight and Fixedness, wherein some Bodies of several Kinds agree, leaves out the Colour, and other Qualities peculiar to Gold and Silver, and the other sorts comprehended under the Name Metal. Whereby it is plain, that Men follow not exactly the Patterns set them by Nature, when they make their general Ideas of Substances ; since there is no Body to be found, which has barely Malleableness and Fusibility in it, without other Qualities as inseparable as those. But Men, in making their general Ideas, seeing more the convenience of Language and quick dispatch, by snort and comprehensive Signs, than the true and precise Nature of Things, as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract Ideas, chiefly pursued that end, which was to be furnished with store of general and variously comprehensive Names. So that in this whole business of Genera and Species, the Genus, or more comprehensive, is but a partial Conception of what is in the Species, and the Species, but a partial Idea of what is to be found in each Individual. If therefore any one will think, that a Man, and a 138 Names of Siibstances. Horse, and an Animal, and a Plant, &c. are distin- guished by real Essences made by Nature, he must think Nature to be very liberal of these real Essences, making one for Body, another for an Animal, and another for a Horse, and all these Essences liberally bestowed upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly consider what is done, in all these Genera and Species, or Sorts t .we should find, that there is no new Thing made, but only more or less comprehensive Signs whereby we may be enabled to express, in a few Syllables, great Numbers of particular Things, as they agree in more or less general Conceptions, which we have framed to that purpose. In all which, we may observe, that the more general Term, is always the Name of a less complex Idea ; and that each Genus is but a partial Conception of the Species comprehended under it. So that if these abstract general Ideas be thought to be complete, it can only be in respect of a certain established Relation between them and certain Names, which are made use of to signify them ; and not in respect of any thing existing, as made by Nature. 33. This is adjusted to the true Jnmodated end f S P" c/i > which is to be the easiest to the end of an( j shortest way of communicating Speech. our Notions. For thus he, that would discourse of Things, as they agreed in the complex Names of Substances. 139 Idea of Extension and Solidity, needed but use the Word Body to denote all such. He that to these would join others, signified by the Words Life, Sense, and spontaneous Motion, needed but use the word Animal, to signify all which partook of those Ideas : and he that had made a complex Idea of a Body, with Life, Sense, and Motion, with the Faculty of Reasoning, and a certain Shape joined to it, needed but use the short Monosyllable Man to express all particulars that correspond to that complex Idea. This is the proper business of Genus and Species : And this Men do, without any Consideration of real Essences or substantial Forms, which come not within the reach of our Knowledg, when we think of those things ; nor within the Signification of our Words, when we Discourse with others. 34. Were I to talk with any one of a sort of Birds, I lately saw in St. James's Park, instant* in about Three or Four Foot High, with a Cassuaries. Covering of something between Feathers and Hair, of a dark brown Colour, without Wings, but in the Place thereof, two or three little Branches, coming down like Sprigs of Spanish Broom : long great Legs, with Feet only of Three Claws, and without a Tail ; I must make this Description of it, and so may make others understand me : But when I am told, that the Name of it is Cassuaris, I may then use that Word 140 Navies of Substances. to stand in Discourse for all my complex Idea men- tioned in that Description ; though by that Word, which is now become a specifick Name, I know no more of the real Essence, or Constitution of that sort of Animals, than I did before ; and knew prob- ably as much of the Nature of that Species of Birds, before I learned the Name, as many Englishmen do of Swans, or Herons, which are specifick Names, very well known of sorts of Birds common in England. 35. From what has been said, 'tis evident, that Men deter- Men make sorts of Things. For it being mine the sorts, different Essences alone that make dif- ferent Species, 'tis plain, that they who make those abstract Ideas, which are the nominal Essences, do thereby make the Species, or Sort. Should there be a Body found, having all the other Qualities of Gold, except Malleableness, 'twould, no doubt, be made a Question whether it were Gold or no ; i. e. whether it were of that Species. This could be determined only by that abstract Idea, to which every one annexed the Name Gold : so that it would be true Gold to him, and belong to that Species who included not Malleableness in his nominal Essence, signified by the Sound Gold ; and on the other side, it would not be true Gold, or of that Species to him, who included Malleableness in his specifick Idea. And who, I pray, is it, that makes these diverse Species, Names of Substances. 141 even under one and the same Name, but Men that make two different abstract Ideas, consisting not exactly of the same Collection of Qualities ? -Nor is it a mere Supposition to imagine, that a Body may exist, wherein the other obvious Qualities of Gold may be without Malleableness ; since it is certain, that Gold it self will be sometimes so eager, (as Artists call it) that it will as little endure the Hammer, as Glass it self. .What we have said, of the putting in, or leaving Malleableness out of the complex Idea, the Name Gold is by any one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar Weight, Fixedness, and several other the like Qualities : For whatsoever is left out, or put in, 'tis still the complex Idea, to which that Name is annexed, that makes the Species : and as any particular parcel of matter answers that Idea, so the Name of the sort belongs truly to it ; and it is of that Species. And thus any thing is true Gold, perfect Metal. All which Determination of the Species, 'tis plain, depends on the Understanding of Man, making this or that complex Idea. 36. This then, in short, is the Case: Nature makes many particular Tilings which do Nature makes the Simili- agree one with another, in many sensible tude. Qualities, and probably too, in their internal Frame and Constitution : but 'tis not this real Essence that distinguishes them into Species ; 'tis Men, who, taking 142 Names of Substances. occasion from the Qualities they find united in them, and wherein they observe often several Individuals to agree, range them into Sorts, in order to their Naming, for the convenience of comprehensive Signs ; under which Individuals according to their Conformity to this or that abstract Idea, come to be ranked as under Ensigns ; so that this is of the Blue, that the Red Regiment ; this is a Man, that a Drill : And in this, I think, consists the whole business of Genus and Species. 37. I do not deny, but Nature, in the constant Production of particular Beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike, and of kin one to another : But I think it nevertheless true, that the Boundaries of the Species, whereby Men sort them, are made by Men since the Essences of the Species, distinguished by different Names, are, as has been proved, of Man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal Nature of the Things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of Things, is the Workmanship of Men. 38. One thing I doubt not, but will seem very strange in this Doctrine ; which is, that , , . Each abstract from what has been said, it will follow, Idea is an Essence that each abstract Idea, with a Name to it, makes a distinct Species. But who can help it, if Truth will have it so ? For so it must remain till Names of Substances. 143 some body can shew us the Species of Things, limited and distinguished by something else : and let us see, that general Terms signify not our abstract Ideas, but something different from them. I would fain know, why a Shock and a Hound, are not as distinct Species, as a Spaniel and an Elephant. We have no other Idea of the different Essence of an Elephant and a Spaniel, than we have of the different Essence of a Shock and a Hound ; all the essential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from another, consisting only in the different Collection of simple Ideas, to which we have given those different Names. 39. How much the making of Species and Genera is in order to general Names, and how * i -VT . r Genera and much general Names are necessary, if species are not to the Being, yet at least to the in r der to naming. completing of a Species, and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above concerning Ice and Water, in a very familiar Example. A silent and a striking Watch, are but one Species, to those who have but one Name for 'em : but he that has the Name Watch for one, and Clock for the other, and distinct complex Ideas, to which those Names belong, to him they are different Species. It will be said, perhaps, that the inward Contrivance and Constitution is different between these two, which 144 Names of Substances. the Watch-maker has a clear Idea of. And yet, 'tis plain, they are but one Species to him, when he has but one Name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward Contrivance, to make a new Species ? There are some Watches, that are made with four Wheels, others with five : Is this a specifick differ- ence to the Workman ? Some have Strings and Physics, and others none ; some have the Balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral Spring, and others by Hogs Bristles : Are any, or all of these enough to make a specifick Difference to the Work- man, that knows each of these, and several other different Contrivances, in the internal Constitutions of Watches ? 'Tis certain, each of these hath a real Difference from the rest : But whether it be an es- sential, a specifick difference or no, relates only to the complex Idea, to which the Name Watch is given : as long as they all agree in the Idea which that Name stands for, and that Name does not as a generical Name comprehend different Species under it, they are not essentially nor specifically different. But if any one will make minuter Divisions from Differences that he knows in the internal Frame of Watches, and to such precise complex Ideas, give Names that shall prevail, they will then be new Species to them, who have those Ideas with Names to them ; and can, by those Differences, distinguish Names of Substances. 145 Watches into these several sorts, and then Watch will be a generical Name. But yet they would be no distinct Species to Men, ignorant of Clock-work, and the inward Contrivances of Watches, who had no other Idea, but the outward Shape and Bulk, with the marking of the Hours by the Hand. For to them all those other Names would be but synony- mous Terms for the same Idea, and signify no more, nor no other thing but a Watch. Just thus, I think, it is in natural Things. No Body will doubt, that the Wheels, or Springs (if I may so say) within, are different in a rational Man, and a Changeling, no more than that there is a Difference in the Frame between a Drill, and a Changeling. But whether one or both these Differences be essential, or specifical, is only to be known to us, by their Agreement, or Disagreement with the complex Idea that the Name Man stands for : For by that alone can it be deter- mined, whether one, or both, or neither of those be a Man, or no. 40. From what has been before said, we may sec the Reason why, in the Species of . ,- , ,~ 7 . . Sfiectes of ar- artijictal Ihings, there is generally less tzfitial things Confusion and Uncertainty, than in l ff s con f use ^ than natural. Natural. Because an artificial thing being a Production of Man, which the Artificer design'd, and therefore well knows the Idea of, the L 146 Names of Substances. Name of it is supposed to stand for no other Idea, nor to import any other Essence, than what is cer- tainly to be known, and easy enough to be appre- hended. For the Idea, or Essence, of the several sorts of artificial Things, consisting, for the most part, in nothing but the determinate Figure of sensible Parts ; and sometimes Motion depending thereon, which the Artificer fashions in Matter, such as he finds for his Turn, it is not beyond the reach of our Faculties to attain a certain Idea thereof; and so settle the Signification of the Names whereby the Species of artificial Things are distinguished, with less Doubt, Obscurity, and Equivocation, than we can in Things natural, whose Differences and Operations depend upon Contrivances, beyond the reach of our Discoveries. 41. I must be excused here, if I think, artificial Things are of distinct Species, as well as Artificial things of dis- natural : Since I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into sorts, by dif- ferent abstract Ideas, with general Names annexed to them, as distinct one from another as those of natural Substances. For why should we not think a Watch, and Pistol, as distinct Species one from another, as a Horse, and a Dog, they being expressed in our Minds by distinct Ideas, and to others, by distinct Appellations ? Names of Substances. 147 42. This is farther to be observed concerning Substances, that they alone of all our -. , Substances a- several sorts of Ideas, have particular, lone have pro- or proper Names, whereby one only par- ticular thing is signify 'd. Because in simple Ideas, Modes, and Relations, it seldom happens that Men have occasion to mention often this, or that particular, when it is absent. Besides, the greatest part of mixed Modes, being Actions which perish in their Birth, are not capable of a lasting Duration, as Sub- stances, which are the Actors ; and wherein the simple Ideas that make up the complex Ideas designed by the Name, have a lasting Union. 43. I must beg pardon of my Reader, for having dwelt so long upon this Sub- Diffictilty ject, and perhaps, with some Ob- to treat of ., TJ . T , . ., , Words. scunty. But I desire it may be con- sidered, how difficult it is, to lead another by Words into the Thoughts of Things, strip' d of those speci- fical Differences we give 'em : Which things, if I name not, I say nothing ; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some sort, or other, and suggest to the mind the usual abstract Idea of that Species ; and so cross my purpose. For to talk of a Man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary Signification of the Name Man, which is our complex Idea, usually annexed to it ; and bid 148 Names of Substances. the Reader consider Man, as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguished from others, in his internal Constitution, or real Essence, that is, by something, he knows not what, looks like trifling : and yet thus one must do, who would speak of the supposed real Essences and Species of Things, as thought to be made by Nature, if it be but only to make it under- stood, that there is no such thing signified by the general Names, which Substances are called by. But because it is difficult by known familiar Names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an Example, to make the different Consideration, the Mind has of specifick Names and Ideas, a little more clear ; and to shew how the complex Ideas of Modes are referred sometimes to Archetypes in the Minds of other intel- ligent Beings ; or, which is the same, to the Signifi- cation annexed by others to their received Names ; and sometimes to no Archetypes at all. Give me leave also to shew how the Mind always refers its Ideas of Substances, either to the Substances them- selves, or to the Signification of their Names, as to the Archetypes ; and also to make plain the Nature of Species, or sorting of Things, as apprehended, and made use of by us ; and of the Essences belong- ing to those Species, which is, perhaps, of more Moment, to discover the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledg, than we at first imagine. Names of Substances. 149 44. Let us suppose Adam in the State of a grown Man, with a good Understanding, r* .,, .. ,-,. Instances of but in a strange Country, with all Things m j xe( f Modes new, and unknown about him ; and no in , Kmneah and Niouph. other Faculties, to attain the Knowledg of them, but what one of this Age has now. He observes Lamech more Melancholy than usual, and imagines it to be from a Suspicion he has of his Wife Adah (whom he most ardently loved) that she had too much kindness for another Man. Adam Dis- courses these his Thoughts to Eve, and desires her to take care that Adah commit not Folly : And in these Discourses with Eve, he makes use of these two new Words, Kinneah and Niouph. In time, Adams Mistake appears, for he finds Lamectis Trouble proceeded from having killed a Man : But yet the two Names, Kinneah and Niouph ; the one standing for Suspicion, in a Husband, of his Wife's Disloyalty to him, and the other, for the Act of com- mitting Disloyalty, lost not their distinct Significa- tions. It is plain then, that here were two distinct complex Ideas of mixed Modes, with Names to them, two distinct Species of Actions essentially different ; I ask wherein consisted the Essences of these two distinct Species of Actions ? And 'tis plain, it consisted in a precise Combination of simple Ideas, different in one from the other. I ask, whether 150 Names of Substances. the complex Idea in Adam's Mind, which he called Kinncah, were adequate or no ? And it is plain it was; for it being a Combination of simple Ideas, which he without any regard to any Archetype, without respect to any thing as a Pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted and gave the Name Kinneah to, to express in short to others, by that one sound, all the simple Ideas contained and united in that complex one ; it must necessarily follow, that it was an adequate Idea. His own Choice having made that Combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being referred to no other Arche- type, which it was supposed to represent. 45. These Words, Kinneah and Nionph, by Degrees grew into common Use ; and then the Case was somewhat altered. Adam's Children had the same Faculties, and thereby the same Power that he had, to make what complex Ideas of mixed Modes they pleased in their own Minds ; to abstract them, and make what Sounds, they pleased, the Signs of them : But the use of Names being to make our Ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the same Sign stands for the same Idea in two who would communicate their Thoughts, and Discourse together. Those therefore of Adam's Children, that found these two Words, Kinneah and Names of Substances. 151 Niouph, in familiar use, could not take them for insignificant Sounds ; but must needs conclude, they stood for something, for certain Ideas, abstract Ideas, they being general Names, which abstract Ideas were the Essences of the Species distinguished by those Names. If therefore they would use these Words, as Names of Species already established and agreed on, they were obliged to Conform the Ideas, in their Minds, signify'd by these Names, to the Ideas, that they stood for in other Mens Minds, as to their Patterns and Archetypes', and then indeed their Ideas of these complex Modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of Combinations of many simple Ideas] not to be exactly conformable to the Ideas in other Mens Minds, using the same Names ; though for this, there be usually a Remedy at Hand, which is, to ask the meaning of any Word, we understand not, of him that Uses it : it being as impossible to know certainly, what the Words Jealousy and Adultery (which I think answer HMp and rpN3) stand for in another Man's Mind, with whom I would discourse about them ; as it was impossible, in the beginning of Language, to know what Kinneah and Niouph stood for in another Man's Mind, without Explication, they being voluntary Signs in every one. 46. Let us now also consider after the same 152 Names of Siibstances. Manner, the Names of Substances, in their first . Application. One of Adam's Children, Instance of Substances in roving in the Mountains, lights on a Zahab. glittering Substance, which pleases his Eye, home he carries it to Adam, who, upon Considera- tion of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow Colour, and an exceeding great Weight. These, perhaps at first, are all the Qualities he takes Notice of in it, and abstracting this complex Idea, consisting of a Substance having that peculiar bright Yellow- ness, and a Weight very great in Proportion to its Bulk, he gives it the Name ZaJiab, to denominate and mark all Substances that have these sensible Qualities in them. "Pis evident now that, in this Case, Adam acts quite differently, from what he did before in forming those Ideas of mixed Modes, to which he gave the Name Kinneah and Niouph. For there he puts Ideas together, only by his own Imagi- nation, not taken from the Existence of any thing ; and to them he gave Names to denominate all Things, that should happen to agree to those his abstract Ideas, without considering whether any such thing did exist, or no ; the Standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his Idea of this new Substance he takes the quite contrary Course ; here he has a Standard made by Nature ; and therefore being to represent that to himself, Names of Siibstances. 153 by the Idea he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no simple Idea into his complex one, but what he has the Perception of from the thing it self. He takes care that his Idea be conformable to this Archetype, and intends the Name should stand for an Idea so conformable. 47. This piece of Matter, thus denominated Zahab by Adam, being quite different from any he had seen before, no Body, I think, will deny to be a distinct Species, and to have its peculiar Essence ; and that the Name Zahab is the mark of the Species, and a Name belonging to all Things partaking in that Essence. But here it is plain, the Essence Adam made the Name Zahab stand for, was nothing but a Body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquisitive Mind of Man, not content with the Know- ledg of these, as I may say, superficial Qualities, puts Adam on farther Examination of this Matter. He therefore knocks, and beats it with Flints, to see what was discoverable in the Inside : He finds it yield to Blows, but not easily separate into Pieces : he finds it will bend without breaking. Is not now Ductility to be added to his former Idea, and made part of the Essence of the Species that Name Zahab stands for ? Farther Trials discover Fusibility, and Fixedness. Are not they also, by the same Reason, that any of the others were, to be put into the com- 154 Names of Siib stances. plex Idea, signified by the Name Zahab ? If not, What Reason will there be shewn more for the one than the other ? If these must, then all the other Properties, which any farther Trials shall dis- cover in this Matter, ought by the same Reason to make a part of the Ingredients of the com- plex Idea, which the Name Zahab stands for, and so be the Essence of the Species, marked by that Name. Which Properties, because they are endless, it is plain, that the Idea made after this Fashion by this Archetype, will be always inade- quate. 48. But this is not all, it would also follow, that the Names of Substances would not imperfect, on ^y have, (as in Truth they have) but and therefore wou ld also be supposed to have different various. Significations, as us'd by different Men, which would very much cumber the Use of Lan- guage. For if every distinct Quality, that were dis- covered in any Matter by any one, were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex Idea, signified by the common Name given it, it must follow, that Men must suppose the same Word to signify different Things in different Men : since they cannot doubt, but different Men may have discovered several Quali- ties in Substances of the same Denomination, which others know nothing of. Names of Substances. 155 49. To avoid this therefore, they have supposed a real Essence belonging to every Species, Therefore from which these Properties all flow, and * fi? their Species, a would have their Name of the Species real Essence stand for that. But they not having su PP 0i any Idea of that real Essence in Substances, and their Words signifying nothing but the Ideas they have, that which is done by this Attempt, is only to put the Name or Sound, in the Place and Stead of the thing having that real Essence, without knowing what the real Essence is ; and this is that which Men do, when they speak of Species of Things, as sup- posing them made by Nature, and distinguished by real Essences. 50. For let us consider, when we affirm, that all Gold is fixed, either it means that Fixed- Wntch Sup- ness is a part of the Definition, part of position is of ItO ItSt? the nominal Essence the Word Gold stands for ; and so this Affirmation, all Gold is fixed, contains nothing but the Signification of the Term Gold. Or else it means, that Fixedness not being a part of the Definition in the Word Gold, is a Pro- perty of that Substance it self: in which Case, it is plain, that the Word Gold stands in the Place of a Substance, having the real Essence of a Species of Things, made by Nature. In which way of Substi- tution, it has so confused and uncertain a Significa- 156 Names of Substances. tion, that though this Proposition, Gold is fixed, be in that Sense an Affirmation of something real ; yet 'tis a Truth will always fail us in its particular Appli- cation, and so is of no real Use nor Certainty. For let it be ever so true, that all Gold, i. e. all that has the real Essence of Gold, is fixed, What serves this for, whilst we know not in this Sense, what is, or is not Gold} For if we know not the real Essence of Gold, 'tis impossible we should know what parcel of Matter has that Essence, and so whether it be true Gold or no. 51. To conclude; What liberty Adam had at first to make any complex Ideas of Conclusion. mix d Modes, by no other Pattern, but by his own Thoughts, the same have all Men ever since had. And the same Necessity of conforming his Ideas of Substances to Things without him, as to Archetypes made by Nature, that Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the same are all Men ever since under too. The same Liberty also, that Adam had of affixing any new Name to any Idea, the same has any one still, (espe- cially the beginners of Languages, if we can imagine any such,) but only with this Difference, that in Places, where Men in Society have already estab- lished a Language amongst them, the Signification of Words are very warily and sparingly to be Names of Substances. 157 altered. Because Men being furnished already with Names for their Ideas, and common Use having appropriated known Names to certain Ideas, an affected Misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath new Notions, will, perhaps, venture sometimes on the coining new Terms to express them : But Men think it a Boldness, and 'tis uncertain, whether common Use will ever make them pass for currant. But in Communication with others, it is necessary, that we conform the Ideas we make the Vulgar Words of any Language stand for, to their known proper Significations, (which I have explained at large already,) or else to make known that new Signification we apply them to. 158 Particles. CHAPTER VII. OF PARTICLES. i. Besides Words, which are Names of Ideas in the Mind, there are a great many others Particles con- , , , f , . . r , t nect Parts or tnat are ma de use of, to signify the whole Scnten- Connection that the Mind gives to Ideas, ces together. or Propositions, one with another. The Mind in communicating its Thought to others, does not only need Signs of the Ideas it has then before it, but others also, to shew or intimate some par- ticular Action of its own, at that time, relating to those Ideas. This it does several ways ; as, Is, and Is not, are the general Marks of the Mind affirming or denying. But besides Affirmation, or Negation, without which there is in Words no Truth or Fals- hood, the Mind does, in declaring its Sentiments to others, connect not only the Parts of Propositions, but whole Sentences one to another, with their several Relations and Dependencies, to make a coherent Discourse. 2. The Words, whereby it signifies what Con- Particles. 159 nection it gives to the several Affirmations and Negations, that it Unites in one con- , , -r, . , T .. In them con- tmud Reasoning or Narration, are gene- sists t j ie rally called Particles' and 'tis in the of well speak- ing. right Use of these, that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good Stile. To think well, it is not enough, that a Man has his Ideas clear and distinct in his Thoughts, nor that he observes the Agreement, or Disagreement, of some of them ; but he must think in train, and observe the dependence of his Thoughts and Reasonings, one upon another : And to express well such me- thodical and rational Thoughts, he must have Words to shew what Connection, Restriction, Distinction, Opposition, Emphasis, &c. he gives to each respective part of his Discourse. To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing his Hearer : and therefore it is, that those Words, which are not truly, by themselves, the Names of any Ideas, are of such constant and indispensible use in Language, and do much to contribute to Mens well expressing them- selves. 3. This part of Grammar has been, They shew perhaps, as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated. 'Tis Mind gives to its own easy for Men to write, one after another, Thoughts. of Cases and Genders, Moods and Tenses, Gerunds 1 60 Particles. and Supines: In these and the like, there has been great Diligence used ; and Particles them- selves, in some Languages, have been with great shew of exactness, ranked into their several Orders. But though Prepositions and Conjunctions, &c. are Names well known in Grammar, and the Particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct Subdivisions ; yet he who would shew' the right use of Particles, and what Significancy and Force they have, must take a little more Pains, enter into his own Thoughts, and observe nicely the several Postures of his Mind in discoursing. 4. Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these Words, to render them, as is They shew what Rela- usually in Dictionaries, by Words of *Mind gives anotner Tongue which came nearest to to its own their Signification : For what is meant Thoughts. - by them, is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as another Language. They are all marks of some Action or Intimation of the Mind\ and therefore to understand them rightly, the several Views, Postures, Stands, Turns, Limitations, and Exceptions, and several other Thoughts of the Mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient Names, are diligently to be studied. Of these, there are a great Variety, much exceeding the number of Particles, that most Languages have to express them Particles. 1 6 1 by ; and therefore it is not to be wondred, that most of these Particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite Significations. In the Hebrew Tongue, there is a particle consisting but of one single Letter, of which there are reckoned up, as I remember, Seventy, I am sure above Fifty several Signifi- cations. 5. BUT is a Particle, none more familiar in our Language : and he that says it is a dis- instance in cretive Conjunction, and that it answers ^ ut- Sed in Latin, or Mais in French, thinks he has suffi- ciently explained it. But it seems to me to intimate several Relations, the Mind gives to the several Propositions or Parts of them, which it joins by this Monosyllable. First, B U T to say no more'. Here it intimates a Stop of the Mind, in the Course it was going, before it came to the end of it. Secondly, I saw BUT two Plants : Here it shews, that the Mind limits the Sense to what is expressed, with a Negation of all other. Thirdly, Yon Pray ; BUT it is not that GOD would bring yon to the true Religion. Fourthly, BUT that he zvould confirm yon in your own : The first of these BUTS intimates a Sup- position in the Mind of something otherwise than it should be ; the latter shews, that the Mind makes a M 1 62 . Particles. direct Opposition between that, and what goes be- fore it. Fifthly, All Animals have Sense ; BUT a Dog is an Animal'. Here it signifies little more, but that the latter Proposition is joined to the former, as the Minor of a Syllogism. 6. To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other Significations of this Particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full Latitude, and consider it in all the Places it is to be found : which if one should do, I doubt, whether in all those Manners it is made Use of, it would deserve the Title of Discretive, which Grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full Explication of this sort of Signs. The Instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect upon their Use and Force in Language, and lead us into the Contemplation of several Actions of our Minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these Particles, some whereof constantly, and others in certain Constructions, have the Sense of a whole Sentence contained in them. 163 CHAPTER VIII. OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS. I. The ordinary Words of Language, and our common use of 'em, would have given Abstract us light into the Nature of our Ideas, Terms not predicable one if they had been but considered with of another, Attention. The Mind, as has been shewn, has a Power to abstract its Ideas, and so they become Essences, general Essences, whereby the sorts of Things are distinguished. Now each abstract Idea being distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, the Mind will, by its intuitive Knowledg, perceive their difference ; and therefore in Propositions, no two whole Ideas can ever be affirmed one of another. This we see in the common use of Language, which permits not any two Abstract Words, or Names of abstract Ideas, to be affirmed one of another. For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how certain soever it is, that Man is an Animal, or Rational, or White, yet every one, at first hearing, perceives the Falshood of these HI 2 164 Abstract and Concrete Terms. Propositions ; Humanity is Animality, or Rationality, or Whiteness : And this is as evident, as any of the most allowed Maxims. All our Affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract Idea to be another, but one abstract Idea to be joined to another ; which abstract Ideas, in Substances, may be of any sort ; in all the rest, are little else but of Relations ; and in Substances, the most frequent are of Powers ; v. g. a Man is White, signifies, that the Thing that has the Essence of a Man, has also in it the Essence of Whiteness, which is nothing but a Power to produce the Idea of Whiteness in one, whose Eyes can discover ordinary Objects ; or a Man is rational, signifies, that the same Thing, that hath the Essence of a Man, hath also in it the Essence of Rationality, i. e. a Power of Reasoning. 2. This Distinction of Names, shews us also the Thev shew difference f our Ideas : For if we ob- the difference ser ve them, we shall find, that our of our Ideas. Simple Ideas have all Abstract, as well as Concrete Names : The one whereof is (to speak the Language of Grammarians) a Substantive, the other an Adjective ; as Whiteness, White, Sweetness, Sweet. The like also holds in our Ideas of Modes and Relations ; as Justice, Just ; Equality, Equal ; only with this difference, That some of the Concrete Abstract and Concrete Terms. 165 Names of Relations, amongst Men chiefly, are Sub- stantives ; as Paternitas, Pater ; whereof it were easy to render a Reason. But as to our Ideas of Substances, we have very few or no Abstract Names at all. For though the Schools have introduced Animaliias, Humanitas, Corporietas, and some others ; yet they hold no Proportion with that infinite Number of Names of Substances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract ones : and those few that the Schools forged, and put into the Mouths of their Scholars, could never yet get Admittance into common Use, or obtain the License of publick Approbation. Which seems to me at least to intimate the Con- fession of all Mankind, that they have no Ideas of the real Essences of Substances, since they have not Names for such Ideas : Which no doubt they would have had, had not their consciousness to themselves of their Ignorance of them, kept them from so idle an attempt. And therefore though they had Ideas ( enough to distinguish Gold from a Stone, and Metal from Wood ; yet they but timorously ventured on such Terms, as Aurietas and Saxietas, Metallietas and Lignietas, or the like Names, which should pretend to signify the real Essences of those Sub- stances, whereof they knew they had no Ideas. And indeed, it was only the Doctrine of substantial Forms, 1 66 Abstract and Concrete Terms. and the Confidence of mistaking Pretenders "to a Knowledg that they had not, which first coined, and then introduced Anima&tas t &ad Humanitas, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own Schools, and could never get to be current amongst Understanding Men. Indeed, Humanitas was a Word familiar amongst the Romans ; but in a far different Sence, and stood not for the abstract Essence of any Substance ; but was the abstract Name of a Mode, and its concrete Humanus, not Homo. 167 CHAPTER IX. OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. I. From what has been said in the foregoing Chapters, it is easy to perceive, what Words are T ' , ,. ,. T j * fs> d f or re ~ Imperfection there is m Language, and cor ding and how the very Nature of Words makes communicat- J tng our it almost unavoidable, for many of them Thoughts. to be doubtful and uncertain in their Significations. To examine the Perfection, or Imperfection of Words it is necessary first to consider their use and end : For as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so are they more or less perfect. We have, in the former part of this Discourse, often, upon occasion, mentioned a double use of Words. First, One for the recording of our own Thoughts. Secondly, The other for the communicating of our Thoughts to others. 2. As to the first of these, for the recording our own Thoughts for the help of our own Any Words Memories, whereby, as it were, we talk will serve for to our selves, any Words will serve the turn. For since Sounds are voluntary and indifferent 1 68 Imperfection of Words. Signs of any Ideas, a Man may use what Words he pleases, to signify his own Ideas to himself: and there will be no Imperfection in them, if he con- stantly use the same Sign for the same Idea, for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the Right Use and Perfection of Language. 3. Secondly, As to Communication of Words, that too has a double Use. Comiminica- T ~. .. tionby Words * ^ iml - CivilorPhilo- H philosophical. sophical. First, By their Civil Use, I mean such a Communication of Thoughts and Ideas by Words, as may serve for the upholding common Conversation and Commerce about the ordinary Affairs and Con- veniences of Civil Life, in the Societies of Men one amongst another. Secondly, By the Philosophical Use of Words, I mean such an use of them, as may serve to convey the precise Notions of Things, and to express, in general Propositions, certain and undoubted Truths, which the Mind may rest upon and be satisfied with, in its search after true Knowledg. These two Uses are very distinct ; and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one, than in the other, as we shall see in what fol- lows. Imperfection of Words. 169 4. The chief End of Language in Communica- tion being to be understood, Words The Tmper- serve not well for that end, neither in fection of Civil, nor Philosophical Discourse, when doubt/utne$s any Word does not excite in the Hearer f. their ^ i S~ nificatton. the same Idea which it stands for in the Mind of the Speaker. Now since Sounds have no natural Connection with our Ideas but have all their Signification from the arbitrary Imposition of Men, the doubtfulness and uncertainty of their Signification, which is tlie Imperfection we here are speaking of, has its cause more in the Ideas they stand for, than in any Incapacity there is in one Sound more than in another, to signify any Idea : For in that regard they are all equally perfect. That then which makes doubtfulness and uncer- tainty in the Signification of some more than other Words, is the difference of Ideas they stand for. 5. Words having naturally no Signification, the Idea which each stands for must be Causes of learned and retained by those who their Imper- would exchange Thoughts, and hold intelligible Discourse with others, in any Language. But this is hardest to be done, where, First, The Ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great Number of Ideas put together. 170 Imperfection of Words. Secondly, Where the Ideas they stand for have no certain Connection in Nature ; and so no settled Standard any where in Nature existing, to rectify and adjust them by. TJdrdly, Where the Signification of the Word is refered to a Standard, which Standard is not easy to be known. Fourthly, Where the Signification of the Word and the real Essence of the Thing, are not exactly the same. These are Difficulties that attend the Signification of several Words that are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all, such as Names standing for any simple Ideas, which another has not Organs or Faculties to attain : as the Names of Colours to a blind Man, or Sounds to a deaf Man, need not here be mentioned. In all these Cases we shall find an Imperfection in Words, which I shall more at large explain, in their particular Application to our several sorts of Ideas : For if we examine them, we shall find, that the Names of mixed Modes are most liable to Doubtfulness and Imperfection, for the two first of Reasons ; and the Names of Substances diiefly for the two latter. 6. First, The Names of mixed Modes, are many of them liable to great Uncertainty, and Obscurity in their Signification. Imperfection of Words. 171 I. Because of that great Composition these com- plex Ideas are often made up of. To make Words serviceable to the End of Communication, it is necessary, doubtful. ftrst, Because (as has been said) that they excite, the Ideas they ,t_ TT , . - TJ stand for, are in the Hearer, exactly the same Idea so co , n pi ex , they stand for in the Mind of the . Speaker. Without this, Men fill one another's Heads with Noise and Sounds ; but convey not thereby their Thoughts, and lay not before one another their Ideas, which is the end of Discourse and Language. But when a Word stands for a very complex /dfc#,that is compounded and decompounded, it is not easy for Men to form and retain that Idea so exactly, as to make the Name in common use stand for the same precise Idea, without any the least Variation. Hence it comes to pass, that Mens Names of very compound Ideas, such as for the most part are moral Words, have seldom, in two different Men, the same precise Signification, since one Man's complex Idea seldom agrees with anothers, and often differs from his own, from that which he had Yes- terday, or will have to Morrow. 7. II. Because the Names of mixed Secondly, Because they Modes, for the most part, want Stand- have no Stan- ards in Nature, whereby Men may ' rectify and adjust their Significations ; therefore 172 Imperfection of Words. they are very various and doubtful. They are Assemblages of Ideas put together at the Pleasure of the Mind, pursuing its own Ends of Discourse and suited to its own Notions, whereby it designs not to Copy any thing really existing, but to denominate and rank Things as they come to agree, with those ArcJietypes or Forms it has made. He that first brought the Word Sham, Wheedle, or Banter in use, put together, as he thought fit, those Ideas he made it stand for : And as it is with any new Names of Modes, that are now brought into any Language ; so was it with the old ones, when they were first made use of. Names therefore that stand for Collections of Ideas, which the Mind makes at pleasure, must needs be of doubtful Signification, when such Collec- tions are no where to be found constantly united in Nature, nor any Patterns to be shewn whereby Men may adjust them. What the word Murther, or Sacri- Icdge, &c. signifies, can never be known from Things themselves : There be many of the Parts of those complex Ideas, which are not visible in the Action it self, the Intention of the Mind, or the Relation of holy Things, which make a part of Murder, or Sacri- ledge, have no necessary Connection with the outward and visible Action of him that commits either : and the pulling the Trigger of the Gun, with which the Murther is committed, and is all the Action, that, Imperfection of Words. 173 perhaps, is visible, has no natural Connection with those other Ideas, that make up the complex one, named Murder. They have their Union and Com- bination only from the Understanding which unites them under one Name : But uniting them without any Rule, or Pattern, it cannot be but that the Signi- fication of the Name, that stands for such voluntary Collections, should be often various in the Minds of different Men, who have scarce any standing Rule to regulate themselves, and their Notions by, in such arbitrary Ideas. ' 8. 'Tis true, common Use, that is the Rule of Propriety, may be supposed here to r ' Propriety not afford some aid, to settle the Significa- sufficient Remedy. tion of Language ; and it cannot be denied, but that in some Measure it does. Common use regulates the meaning of Words pretty well for common Conversation ; but no Body having an Authority to establish the precise Signification of Words, nor determine to what Ideas any one shall annex them, common Use is not sufficient to adjust them to Philosophical Discourses ; there being scarce any Name, of any very complex Idea (to say nothing of others,) which, in common Use, has not a great Latitude, and which keeping within the Bounds of Propriety, may not be made the Sign of far different Ideas. Besides, the Rule and Measure of Propriety 174 Imperfection of Words. it self being no where established, it is often matter of Dispute, whether this or that way of using a Word, be Propriety of Speech, or no. From all which, it is evident, that the Names of such kind of very complex Ideas, are naturally liable to this Imper- fection, to be of doubtful and uncertain Signification ; and even in Men, that have a Mind to understand one another, do not always stand for the same Idea in Speaker and Hearer. Tho' the Names Glory and Gratitude be the same in every Man's Mouth thro' a whole Country, yet the complex collective Idea, which every one thinks on, or intends by that Name, is apparently very different in Men using the same Language. 9. The way also wherein the Names of mixed Modes are ordinarily learned, does not a The -way of learning these little contribute to the Doubtfulness of 'also their Signification. For if we will ob- tothdrDoubt- serve how Children learn Languages, fulness. we shall find, that to make them under- stand what the Names of simple Ideas, or Substances, stand for, People ordinarily shew them the thing whereof they would have them have the Idea, and then repeat to them the Name that stands for it, as White, S^vect, Milk, Sugar, Cat, Dog. But as for mixed Modes, especially the most material of them, moral Words, the Sounds are usually learned first, Imperfection of Words. 175 and then to know what complex Ideas they stand for, they are either beholden to the Explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) are left to their own Observation and Industry ; which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of Names, these moral Words are, in most Mens Mouths, little more than bare Sounds ; or when they have any, 'tis for the most part but a very loose and undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused Signification. And even those themselves, who have with more Attention settled their Notions, do yet hardly avoid the Inconvenience, to have them stand for complex Ideas, different from those which other, even intelligent and studious Men, make them the Signs of. Where shall one find any, either con- troversial Debate, or familiar Discourse, concerning Honour, Faith, Grace, Religion, Church, &c. wherein it is not easy to observe the different Notions Men have of them ; which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the Signification of those Words ; nor have in their Minds the same complex Ideas which they make them stand for : and so all the Contests that follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a Sound. And hence we see, that in the Interpretation of Laws, whether Divine, or Humane, there is no end ; Comments beget Comments, and Explications make new Matter for Explications : 176 Imperfection of Words. And of limiting, distinguishing, varying the Signifi- cation of these moral Words, there is no end. These Ideas of Mens making, are, by Men still having the same Power, multiplied in infinitum. Many a Man, who was pretty well satisfy'd of the meaning of a Text of Scripture, or Clause in the Code, at first reading, has by consulting Commentators, quite lost the sense of it, and by those Elucidations, given rise or increase to his Doubts, and drawn Obscurity upon the Place. I say not this, that I think Commen- taries needless ; but to shew how uncertain the Names of mixed Modes naturally are, even in the Mouths of those who had both the Intension and the Faculty of speaking as clearly as Language was capable to express their Thoughts. i o. What Obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the Writings of Men, who have Hence i ma- ..',... A j j-rr voidable Ob- Uved m remote Ages, and different sciirityinan- Countries, it will be needless to take tient Authors. Notice ; since the numerous Volumes of learned Men, employing their Thoughts that way, are Proofs more than enough to shew what Attention, Study, Sagacity, and Reasoning are required, to find out the true meaning of Antient Authors. But there being no Writings we have any great concernment to be very sollicitous about the meaning of, but those that contain either Truths we are required to believe, Imperfection of Words. 177 cr Laws we are to obey, and draw Inconveniences on us when we mistake or transgress, we may be less anxious about the Sense of other Authors, who Writing but their own Opinions, we are under no greater necessity to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on their Decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their Notions : And therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use their Words with a due clearness and perspicuity, we may lay them aside, and without any injury done them, resolve thus with our selves, Si non vis intclligi, debes negligi. ii. If the Signification of the Names of mixed Modes are uncertain, because there be no real Standards existing in Nature, to which those Ideas are refcred, and by which they may be adjusted, the Names of Substances are of a doitbtful Signification, for a contrary Reason, vis. because the Ideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the Reality of Things, and are refered to Standards made by Nature. In our Ideas of Substances we have not the Liberty as in mixed Modes, to frame what Com- binations we think fit, to be the characteristical Notes, to rank and denominate Things by. In these we must follow Nature, suit our complex Ideas to real Existences, and regulate the Signification of their Names by the Tlrngs themselves, if we will N 178 Imperfection of Words. have our Names to be the Signs of them, and stand for them. Here, 'tis true, we have Patterns to fol- low ; but Patterns that will make the Signification of their Names very uncertain : For Names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the Ideas they stand for be refered to Standards without us, that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and tincertainly. 12. The Names of Substances have, as has been Names of shewed, a double Reference in their Substances re- ordinary Use. fer'd, First, To real Es- First, Sometimes they are made to settees that . . .- cannot be stand for, and so their Signification is supposed to agree to, The real Con- stitution of Things, from which all their Properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this real Constitution, or (as it is apt to be call'd) Essence, being utterly unknown to us, any Sound that is put to stand for it, must be very uncertain in its Appli- cation ; and it will be impossible to know, what Things are, or ought to be called an Horse, or Anti- mony, when those Words are put for real Essences, that we have no Ideas of at all. And therefore in this Supposition, the Names of Substances being refered to Standards that cannot be known, their Significations can never be adjusted and established by those Standards. Imperfection of Words. 179 13. Secondly, The simple Ideas that are found to co-exist in Substances, being that which . Secondly, To their Names immediately signify, these, co . existing as united in the several Sorts of Things, are are the proper Standards to which their known but imperfectly. Names are refered, and by which their Significations may be best rectify'd. But neither will these Archetypes so well serve to this purpose, as to leave these Names, without very various and un- certain Significations. Because these simple Ideas that co-exist, and are united in the same Subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal Right to go into the complex specifick Idea, which the specifick Name is to stand for, Men, though they propose to themselves the very same Subject to consider, yet frame very different Ideas about it ; and so the Name they use for it, unavoidably comes to have, in several Men, very different Significations. The simple Qualities which make up the complex Ideas, being most of them Powers, in Relation to Changes, which they are apt to make in, or receive from other Bodies, are almost infinite. He that shall but observe, what a great Variety of Alterations any- one of the baser Metals is apt to receive, from the different Application only of Fire ; and how much a greater Number of Changes any of them will receive in the Hands of a Chymist, by the Application of N 2 180 Imperfection of Words. other Bodies, will not think it strange, that I count the Properties of any sort of Bodies not easy to be collected, and completely known by the ways of enquiry, which our Faculties are capable of. They being therefore at least so many, that no Man can know the precise and definite Number, they are differently discovered by different Men, according to their various Skill, Attention, and Ways of handling ; who therefore cannot chuse but have different Ideas of the same Substance, and therefore make the Signification of its common Name very various and uncertain. For the complex Ideas of Substances, being made of such simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in Nature, every one has a Right to put into his complex Idea, those Qualities he has found to be united together. For though in the Substance Gold, one satisfies himself with Colour and Weight, yet another thinks Solubility in Aq. Regia, as necessary to be joined with that Colour in his Idea of Gold, as any one does its Fusibility : Solubility in Aq. Regia, being a Quality as constantly joined with its Colour and Weight, as Fusibility, or any other ; others put in its Ductility or Fixedness, &c. as they have been taught by Tradition, or Experience. Who of all these has established the right Signification of the Word Goldt Or who shall be the Judge to deter- mine ? Each has his Standard in Nature, which he Imperfection of Words. 181 appeals to, and with Reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex Idea, signify'd by the Word Gold, those Qualities, which upon Trial he has found united ; as another, who has not so well examined, has to leave 'em out ; or a third, who has, made other Trials, has to put in others. For the Union in Nature of these Qualities, being the true Ground of their Union in one complex Idea, who can say, one of them has more Reason to be put in, or left out, than another ? From whence it will always unavoidably follow, that the complex Ideas of Sub- stances in Men using the same Name for them, will be very various ; and so the Significations of those Names, very uncertain. 14. Besides, there is scarce any particular tiling existing, which, in some of its simple Thirdly, To Ideas, does not communicate with a C o - existing greater, and in others a less Number of - are particular Beings : Who shall determine known but imperfectly. in this Case, which are those that are to make up the precise Collection, that is to be signified by the specifick Name ; or can with any just Autho- rity prescribe, which obvious or common Qualities are to be left out ; or which more secret, or more particular, are to be put into the Signification of the Name of any Substance ? All which together, seldom or never fail to produce that various and doubtful 1 82 Imperfection of Words. Signification in the Names of Substances, which causes such Uncertainty, Disputes, or Mistakes, when we come to a Philosophical Use of them. 15. Tis true, as to civil and common Conversation, the general Names of Substances, regu- Inlp ejection lated in their ordinar y Signification by they may SO me obvious Qualities, (as by the Shape serveforCiml but not well and Figure in Things of known seminal phical Use Propagation, and in other Substances, for the most part by Colour, joined with some other sensible Qualities,) do ivell enough to design the Things Men would be understood to speak of: And so they usually conceive well enough the Substances meant by the word Gold, or Apple, to distinguish the one from the other. But in Philo- sophical Enquiries and Debates, where general Truths are to be established, and Consequences drawn from Positions laid down, there the precise Signification of the Names of Substances will be found, not only not to be well established, but also very hard to be so. For Example, he that shall make Malleableness, or a certain Degree of Fixedness, a part of his complex Idea of Gold, may make Propositions concerning Gold, and draw Consequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from Gold, taken in such a Signification : But yet such as another Man can never be forced to admit, nor be convinced of their Truth, Imperfection of Words. 183 who makes not Malleableness, or the same Degree of Fixedness, part of that complex Idea, that the Name Gold, in his use of it, stands for. 1 6. This is a natural, and almost unavoidable Imperfection in almost all the Names of Instance Substances, in all Languages whatsoever, Liquor. which Men will easily find, when once passing from confused or loose Notions, they come to more strict and close Enquiries. For then they will be con- vinced how doubtful and obscure those Words are in their Signification, which in ordinary use appeared very .clear and determined. I was once in a Meeting of very learned and ingenious Physicians, where by chance there arose a Question, whether any Liquor passed through the Filaments of the Nerves. The debate having been managed a good while, by Variety of Arguments on both sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that the greatest part of Dis- putes were more about the Signification of Words, than a real Difference in the Conception of Things) desired, That before they went any farther on in this Dispute, they would first examine, and establish a'mongst them, what the Word Liquor signify'd. They at first were a little surprized at the Proposal ; and had they been Persons less ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one : Since there was no one there that 184 Imperfection of Words. thought not himself to understand very perfectly, what the word Liquor stood for ; which I think too none of the most perplexed Names of Substances. However, they were pleased to comply with my Motion, and upon Examination found, that the Sig- nification of that Word was not so settled and certain, as they had all imagined ; but that each of them made it a Sign of a different complex Idea. This made them perceive, that the main of their Dispute was about the Signification of that Term ; and that they differed very little in their Opinions, concerning some fluid and subtile Matter, passing through the Conduits of the Nerves ; tho' it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called Liquor or no, a thing which when considered, they thought it not worth the contending about. 17. How much this is the Case in the greatest Instance P art ^ Disputes, that Men are engag'd Cold. so i lo tly in, I shall, perhaps, have an Occasion in another place to take Notice. Let us only here consider a little more exactly the fore- mentioned instance of the Word Gold, and we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its Sig- nification. I think all agree, to make it stand for a Body of a certain yellow shining Colour ; which being the Idea to which Children have annexed that Name, the shining yellow part of a Peacock's Tail is Imperfection of Words. 185 properly to them Gold. Others finding Fusibility joined with that yellow Colour in certain parcels of Matter, make of that Combination a complex Idea to which they give the Name Gold to denote a sort of Substances ; and so exclude from being Gold all such yellow shining Bodies, as by Fire will be re- duced to Ashes, and admit to be of that Species, or to be comprehended under that Name Gold, only such Substances as having that shining yellow Colour will by Fire be reduced to Fusion, and not to Ashes. Another by the same Reason adds the Weight, which being a Quality, as straitly joined with that Colour, as its Fusibility, he thinks has the same Reason to be joined in its Idea, and to be signify'd by its Name : And therefore the other made up of Body, of such a Colour and Fusibility, to be im- perfect ; and so on of all the rest : Wherein no one can shew a Reason, why some of the inseparable Qualities, that are always united in Nature, should be put into the nominal Essence, and others left out : Or why the Word Gold, signifying that sort of Body the Ring on his Finger is made of, should determine that sort, rather by its Colour, Weight, and Fusi- bility ; than by its Colour, Weight, and Solubility in Aq, Regia : Since the dissolving it by that Liquor, is as inseparable from it, as the Fusion by Fire ; and they are both of them nothing, but the Relation i86 Imperfection of Words. which that Substance has to two other Bodies, which have a Power to operate differently upon it. For by what right is it, that Fusibility comes to be a part of the Essence, signify 'd by the Word Gold, and Solubility but a Property of it ? Or what is its Colour part of the Essence, and its Malleableness but a Property ? That which I mean, is this, That these being all but Properties, depending on its real Constitution ; and nothing but Powers, either active or passive, in Reference to other Bodies, no one has Authority to determine the Signification of the Word Gold, (as refered to such a Body existing in Nature) more to one Collection of Ideas to be found in that Body, than to another : Whereby the Signi- fication of that Name must unavoidably be very uncertain. Since, as has been said, several People observe several Properties in the same Substance ; and, I think, I may say no Body all. And there- fore we have but very imperfect Descriptions of Things, and Words have very uncertain Significa- tions. 1 8. From what has been said, it is easy to The Names observe, what has been before remarked, of simple 17 >. That the Names of simple Ideas Ideas the least doubt- are, of all others, the least liable to Mis- takes, and that for these Reasons. First, because the Ideas they stand for, being each but one Imperfection of Words. 187 single Perception, are much easier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones, and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty, which usually attends those compounded ones of Sub- stances and mixed Modes, in which the precise Number of simple Ideas, that make them up, are not easily agreed, and so readily kept in the Mind. And Secondly, Because they are never refered to any other Essence, but barely that Perception they im- mediately signify : Which Reference is that which renders the Signification of the Names of Sub- stances naturally so perplexed, and gives occasion to so many Disputes. Men that do not perversly use their Words, or on purpose set themselves to cavil, seldom mistake in any Language, which they are acquainted with, the Use and Signification of the Names of simple Ideas'. White, and Sweet, Yellow, and Bitter, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is Ignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what precise Collection of simple Ideas, Modesty, or Frugality stand for in another's Use, is not so certainly known. And however we are apt to think, we well enough know, what is meant by Gold or Iron ; yet the precise complex Idea, others make them the Signs of, is not so certain : And I believe it is very seldom that in Speaker and Hearer, they 1 88 Imperfection of Words. stand for exactly the same Collection. Which must needs produce Mistakes and Disputes, when they arc made use of in Discourses, wherein Men have to do with universal Propositions, and would settle in their Minds universal Truths, and consider the Conse- quences that follow from them. 19. By the same Rule, the Names of simple Modes are next to those of simple Ideas, And next to them simple least liable to Doubt and Uncertainty, especially those of Figure and Number, of which Men have so clear and distinct Ideas. Whoever, that had a Mind to understand them, mistook the ordinary meaning of Seven, or a Triangle? And in general the least com- pounded Ideas in every kind have the least dubious Names. 20. Mixed Modes therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious simple Ideas, The most doubtful are have usually Names of no very uncer- . tain Signification. But the Names of p o un d e d mixed Modes, which comprehend a great mixed Modes and Sub- Number of simple Ideas, are commonly of a very doubtful, and undetermined meaning, as has been shewn. The Names of Sub- stances, being annexed to Ideas, that are neither the real Essences, nor exact Representations of the Patterns they are refer'd to, are liable yet to greater Imperfection of Words. 189 Imperfection and Uncertainty, especially when we come to a Philosophical use of them. 21. The great disorder that happens in our Names of Substances, proceeding for ih is the most part from our want of Know- i m p er fection ledg, and Inability to penetrate into their real Constitutions, it may probably be wondered, Why I charge this as an Imperfection, rather upon our Words than Understandings. This Exception has so much appearance of Justice, that I think my self obliged to give a Reason, why I have followed this Method. I must confess then," that when I first began this Discourse of the Under- standing, and a good while after, I had not the least Thought that any Consideration of Words was at all necessary to it. But when having passed over the Original and Composition of our Ideas, I began to examine the Extent and Certainty of our Know- ledg, I found it had so near a Connection with Words, that unless their Force and Manner of Signi- fication were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning Know- ledg : which being conversant about Truth, had constantly to do with Propositions. And though it terminated in Things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of Words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general Knowledg. At 190 Imperfection of Words. least they interpose themselves so much between our Understandings, and the Truth, which it would contemplate and apprehend, that like the Medium through which visible Objects pass, their Obscurity and Disorder does not seldom cast a Mist before our Eyes, and impose upon our Understandings. If we consider, in the Fallacies Men put upon themselves, as well as others, and the Mistakes in Mens Disputes and Notions, how great a part is owing to Words, and their uncertain or mistaken Significations, we shall have Reason to think this no small obstacle in the way to Knowledg, which, I conclude, we are the more carefully to be warned of, because it has been so far from being taken Notice of as an Incon- venience, that the Arts of improving it have been made the business of Mens Study ; and obtained the Reputation of Learning and Subtilty, as we shall see in the following Chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the Imperfections of Language, as the Instrument of Knowledg, more throughly weighed, a great many of the Controversies that make such a Noise in the World, would of themselves cease ; and the way to Knowledg, and, perhaps, Peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does. 22. Sure I am, that the Signification of Words, in all Languages, depending very much on the Thoughts, Notions, and Ideas of him that uses Imperfection of Words. 191 them, must unavoidably be of great uncertainty to Men of the same Language and Country. This is so evident in the Greek t shoul ^ s Authors, that he that shall peruse their Moderation, in imposing Writings, will find in almost every one our own c . .. . , . . Sense of old oi them a distinct JLanguage, though the Authors. same Words. But when to this natural Difficulty in every Country, there shall be added different Countries, and remote Ages, wherein the Speakers and Writers had very different Notions, Tem- pers, Customs, Ornaments, and Figures of Speech, &c. every one of which influenced the Signification of their Words then, though to us now they are lost and un- known, it would become us to be charitable one to another in our Interpretations or Misunderstanding of those antient Writings, which though of great Concernment to be understood, are liable to the unavoidable Diffi- culties of Speech, which, (if we except the Names of simple Ideas, and some very obvious Things) is not capable without a constant defining the Terms of conveying the Sense and Intention of the Speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to the Hearer. And in Discourses of Religion, Law, and Morality, as they are Matters of the highest Con- cernment, so there will be the greatest Difficulty. 23. The Volumes of Interpreters, and Commen- tators on the Old and New Testament, are but too 192 Imperfection of Words. manifest Proofs of this. Tho' every thing said in the Text be infallibly true, yet the Reader may be, nay cannot chuse but be very fallible in the under- standing of it. Nor is it to be wondred, that the Will of GOD, when clothed in Words, should bo liable to that doubt and uncertainty, which unavoid- ably attends that sort of Conveyance ; when even his Son, whilst clothed in Flesh, was subject to all the Frailties and Inconveniences of humane Nature, Sin excepted. And we ought to magnify his Good- ness, that he hath spread before all the World, such legible Characters of his Works and Providence, and given all Mankind so sufficient a light of Reason, that they, to whom this written Word never came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search) either doubt of the Being of a GOD, or of the Obedi- ence due to Him. Since then the Precepts of natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible to all Man- kind, and seldom come to be controverted ; and other revealed Truths, which are conveyed to us by Books and Languages, are liable to the common and natural Obscurities and Difficulties incident to Words, methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own Sense and Interpretations of the latter. 193 CHAPTER X. OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. I. Besides the Imperfection that is naturally in Language, and the Obscurity and Con- Abuse of fusion that is so hard to be avoided in Words. the Use of Words, there are several wilful Faults and Neglects, which Men are guilty of, in this way of Communication, whereby they render these Signs less clear and distinct in their Signification, than naturally they need to be. 2. First, In this kind, the first and most palpable abuse is, the using of Words, without , , ,. .. TJ i i First. Words clear and distinct Ideas; or, which is wit hout any, worse, Signs without any thing signify'd. or . without clear Ideas. Of these there are two Sorts : i. One may observe, in all Languages, certain Words, that if they be examined, will be found, in the first Original, and their appropriated Use, not to stand for any clear and distinct Ideas. These, for the most part, the several Sects of Philosophy and Religion have introduced. For their Authors, or Promoters, either affecting something singular, and o 194 Ab^^,se of Words. out of the way of common Apprehensions, or to support some strange Opinions, or cover some Weak- ness of their Hypothesis, seldom fail to Coin new Words, and such as, when they come to be examined, may justly be called Insignificant Terms. For having either had no determinate Collection of Ideas annexed to them, when they were first invented ; or at least such as, if well examined, will be found inconsistent, 'tis no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same Party, they remain empty Sounds, with little or no Signification, amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their Mouths, as the distinguishing Characters of their Church, or School, without much troubling their Heads to examine what are the precise Ideas they stand for. I shall not need here to heap up Instances, every one's Reading and Conversation will sufficiently furnish him : Or if he wants to be better stored, the great Mint-Masters of these kind of Terms, I mean the School-men and Metaphysicians, (under which, I think, the disputing Natural and Moral Philosophers of these latter Ages may be comprehended,) have where-withal abun- dantly to content him. 3. II. Others there be, who extend this abuse yet farther, who take so little care to lay by Words, which in their primary Notation have scarce any clear and distinct Ideas which they are annexed to, Abuse of Words. 195 that by an unpardonable Negligence, they familiarly use Words, which the Propriety of Language has affixed to very important Ideas, without any distinct meaning at all. Wisdom, Glory, Grace, &c. are Words frequent enough in every Man's Mouth ; but if a great many of those who use them, should be asked, what they mean by them ? they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer : A plain Proof, that though they have learned those Sounds, and have them ready at their Tongue's-end, yet there are no determined Ideas laid up in their Minds, which are to be expressed to others by them. 4. Men having been accustomed from their Cradles to learn Words, which are easily got and n s' d retained, before they knew, or had framed fy learning Names before the complex Ideas, to which they were the Ideas they annexed, or which were to be found in the Things they were thought to stand for, they usually continue to do so all their Lives, and without taking the Pains necessary to settle in their Minds determined Ideas, they use their Words for such un- steady and confused Notions as they have, contenting themselves with the same Words other People use ; as if their very Sound necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning. This, though Men make a shift with in the ordinary Occurrences of Life, where they find it necessary to be understood, O 2 196 Abuse of Words. and therefore they make Signs till they are so : Yet this Insignificancy in their Words, when they come to Reason concerning either their Tenets or Interest, manifestly fills their Discourse v/ith abundance of empty unintelligible Noise and Jargon, especially in Moral Matters, where the Words, for the most part, standing for arbitrary and numerous Collections of Ideas, not regularly and permanently united in Nature, their bare Sounds are often only thought on, or at least very obscure and uncertain Notions annexed to them. Men take the Words they find in use amongst their Neighbours ; and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them con- fidently, without much troubling their Heads about a certain fixed meaning ; whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain this Advantage, That as in such Discourses they seldom are in the Right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong ; it being all one to go about to draw those Men out of their Mistakes, who have no settled Notions, as to dispossess a Vagrant of his Habitation, , who has no settled abode. This I guess to be so ; and every one may observe in himself and others, whether it be or no. 5. Secondly, Another great abuse of Words is, Inconstancy in the use of them. It is hard to find a Discourse written of any Subject, especially of Abuse of Words. 197 Controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with Attention, the same Words (and those commonly the most material in UnsteadyAp- the Discourse, and upon which the Ar- P lication of them. gument turns) used sometimes for one ' Collection of simple Ideas, and sometimes for another, which is a perfect Abuse of Language. Words being intended for Signs of my Ideas, to make them known to others, not by any natural Signification, but by a voluntary Imposition, 'tis plain cheat and Abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing, and sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great Folly, or greater Dishonesty. And a Man, in his Accompts with another, may, with as much fairness, make the Char- acters of Numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another Collection of Units (v. g. this Character 3 stand sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight) as in his Dis- course, or Reasoning, make the same Words stand for different Collections of simple Ideas. If Men should do so in their Reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them ? One who would speak thus, in the Affairs and Business of the World, and call 8 sometimes 7, and sometimes nine, as best served his Advantage, would presently have clap'd upon him one of the two Names Men are constantly 198 Abuse of Words. disgusted with. And yet in Arguings, and learned Contests, the same sort of proceeding passes com- monly for Wit and Learning ; but to me it appears a greater dishonesty, than the misplacing of Counters, in the casting up a Debt ; and the Cheat the greater, by how much Truth is of greater Concernment and Value than Money. 6. Thirdly, Another abuse of Language is, an affected Obscurity, by either applying old fecteddbscur- Words to new and unusual Significa- tty by wrong tions, O r introducing new and ambiguous Application. Terms, without defining either ; or else putting them so together, as may confound theii ordinary meaning. Though the Peripatetick Phi- losophy has been most eminent in this way, yet other Sects have not been wholly clear of it. There is scarce any of them that are not cumber'd with some Difficulties, (such is the Imperfection of Hu- mane Knowledg,) which they have been fain to cover with Obscurity of Terms, and to confound the Signification of Words, which, like a Mist before Peoples Eyes, might hinder their weak Parts from being discovered. That Body and Extension, in common use, stand for two distinct Ideas, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For were their Signification precisely the same, it would be proper, and as intelligible to say, the Body of an Extension, . Abuse of Words. 199 as the Extension of a Body ; and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their Signification. To this Abuse, and the Mischiefs of confounding the Signification of Words, Logick and the liberal Sciences, as they have been handled in the Schools, have given Reputation ; and the admired Art of Disputing hath added much to the natural Imper- fection of Languages, whilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the Signification of Words, more than to discover the Knowledg and Truth of Things : And he that will look into that sort of learned Writings, will find the Words there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermined in their Meaning, than they are in ordinary Conversation. 7. This is unavoidably to be so, where Mens Parts and Learning, are estimated by their Skill in Disputing. And if Repu- Dispute "has tation and Reward shall attend these ^uch contri- buted to this. Conquests, which depend mostly on the Fineness and Niceties of Words, 'tis no Wonder if the Wit of Man so employ'd, should perplex, in- volve, and subtilize the Signification of Sounds, so as never to want something to say, in opposing or defending any Question ; the Victory being adjudged not to him who had Truth on his side, but the last Word in the Dispute. 8. This, though a very useless, skill, and that 2OO Abuse of Words. which I think the direct opposite to the ways of Calling it Knowledg, hath yet passed hitherto Subtdty. under the laudable and esteemed Names of Subtilty and Acuteness ; and has had the applause of the Schools, and Encouragement of one part of the learned Men of the World. And no wonder, since the Philosophers of old, (the disputing and wrangling Philosophers I mean, such as Lucian wittily and with Reason taxes,) and the Schoolmen since, aiming at Glory and Esteem, for their great and universal Knowledg, easier a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquired, found this a good Expedient to cover their Ignorance, with a curious and unexplicable Web of perplexed Words, and procure to themselves the Admiration of others, by unintelligible Terms, the apter to produce Wonder, because they could not be understood : whilst it appears in all History, that these profound Doctors were no wiser, nor more useful than their Neigh- bours ; and brought but small Advantage to humane Life, or the Societies wherein they lived : Unless the coining of new Words, where they produced no new Things to apply them to, or the perplexing or obscuring the Signification of old ones, and so bringing all things into Question and dispute, were a thing profitable to the Life of Man, or worthy Com- mendation and Reward. Abuse of Words. 201 9. For notwithstanding these learned Disputants, these all-knowing Doctors, it was to the unscholastick Statesman, that the ing -very little Governments of the World owed their ^fi* 5 So ~ ciety. Peace, Defence, and Liberties ; and from the illiterate and contemned Mechanick, (a Name of Disgrace) that they received the Improvements of useful Arts. Nevertheless, this artificial Ignorance, and learned Gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last Ages, by the Interest and Artifice of those, who found no easier way to that pitch of Authority and Dominion they have attained, than by amusing the Men of Business and Ignorant with hard Words, or imploying the Ingenious and Idle in intricate Dis- putes, about unintelligible Terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless Labyrinth. Besides, there is no such way to gain Admittance, or give Defence to strange and absurd Doctrines, as to guard them round about with Legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined Words : which yet make these Retreats, more like the Dens of Robbers, or Holes of Foxes, than the Fortresses of fair War- riours ; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the Strength that is in them, but the Briars and Thorns, and the Obscurity of the Thickets they are beset with. For Untruth being unacceptable to the Mind of Man, there is no other defence left for Absurdity, but Obscurity. 2O2 Abiise of Words. 10. Thus learned Ignorance, and this Art of keeping, even inquisitive Men, from But destroys the Instru- true Knowledg, hath been propagated Tnolledg f in the World > and hath much perplexed, and Commu- w hilst it pretended to inform the Under- mcatton. standing. For we see, that other well- meaning and wise Men, whose Education and Parts had not acquir'd that acnteness, could intelligibly express themselves to one another ; and in its plain use, make a benefit of Language. But though un- learned Men well enough understood the Words White and Black, &c. and had constant Notions of the Ideas signified by those Words ; yet there were Philosophers found, who had learning and subtilty enough to prove, that Snoiv was black, i. e. to prove, that White was Black. Whereby they had the Ad- vantage to destroy the Instruments and Means of Discourse, Conversation, Instruction, and Society ; whilst with great Art and Subtilty they did no more but perplex and confound the Signification of Words, and thereby render Language less useful, than the real Defects of it had made it a Gift, which the illiterate had not attained to. i [. These learned Men did equally As useful as . , _ , T . , . to confound instruct Mens Understandings, and pro- ihe Sound of fit their Lives as he who snO uld alter the Letters. the Signification of known Characters, and, by a subtle Device of Learning, far surpass- Abuse of Words. 203 ing the Capacity of the Illiterate, Dull, and Vulgar, should, in his Writing, shew, that he could put A for B, and D for E, &c. to the no small Admiration and Benefit of his Reader. It being as sensless to put Black, which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible Idea, to put it, I say, for another, or the contrary Idea, i. e. to call Snow Black, as to put this mark A, which is a Character agreed on to stand for one Modification of Sound, made by a certain Motion of the Organs of Speech, for B which is agreed on to stand for another Modification of Sound, made by another certain Motion of the Organs of Speech. 12. Nor hath this Mischief stopp'd in logical Niceties, or curious empty Speculations ; it hath invaded the great Concernments has perplexed of humane Life and Society : obscured ^tg* * and Justice. and perplexed the material Truths of Law and Divinity ; brought Confusion, Disorder and Uncertainty into the Affairs of Mankind ; and if not destroy'd, yet in great Measure render'd useless, those two great Rules, Religion and Justice. What have the greatest part of the Comments and Dis- putes, upon the Laws of GOD and Man served for, but to make the meaning more doubtful, and perplex the Sense? What have been the Effect of those multiplied curious Distinctions, and acute Niceties, 204 Abuse of Words. but Obscurity and Uncertainty, leaving the Words more unintelligible, and the Reader more at a loss ? How else comes it to pass, that Princes, speaking or writing to their Servants, in their ordinary Com- mands, are easily understood ; speaking to their People, in their Laws, are not so ? And, as I re- marked before, doth it not often happen, that a Man of an ordinary Capacity, very well understands a Text, or a Law, that he reads, till he consults an Expositor, or goes to Council ; who by that time he hath done explaining them, makes the Words signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases. 13. Whether any By-Interests of these Profes- ., sions have occasion'd this, I will not And ought not to pass for here examine ; but I leave it to be con- Learning. sidered, whether it would not be well for Mankind, whose concernment it is to know Things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to spend their Lives in talking about them, or tossing Words to and fro ; whether it would not be well, I say, that the Use of Words were made plain and direct ; and that Language, which was given us for the Improvement of Knowledg, and bond of Society, should not be employ'd to darken Truth, and unsettle Peoples Rights ; to raise Mists, and render unintelligible both Morality and Religion ? Or that at least, if this will happen, it should Abuse of Words. 205 not be thought Learning or Knowledg to do so? 14. Fourthly, Another great Abuse of Words is, the taking them for Things. This ,, though it in some degree concerns all taking them for Things. .Names in general, yet more particularly affects those of Substances. To this Abuse those Men are most subject, who confine their Thoughts to any one System, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the Perfection of any received Hypothesis ; whereby they come to be perswaded, that the Terms of that Sect, are so suited to the Nature of Things, that they perfectly correspond with their real Exist- ence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the Peripatetick Philosophy, who does not think the ten Names, under which are ranked the ten Predica- ments, to be exactly conformable to the Nature of Things? who is there of that School, that is not perswaded, that substantial Forms, vegetative Sotils, abhorrence of a Vacuum, intentional Species, &c. are something real ? These Words Men have learned from their very entrance upon Knowledg, and have found their Masters and Systems lay great Stress upon them ; and therefore they cannot quit the Opinion, that they are conformable to Nature, and are the Representations of something that really exists. The Platonists have their Soul of the World, 206 Abitse of Words. and the Epicureans their endeavour towards Motion in their Atoms, when at rest. There is scarce any Sect in Philosophy has not a distinct set of Terms, that others understand not. But yet this Gibberish, which in the Weakness of Humane Understanding, serves so well to palliate Mens Ignorance, and cover their Errors, comes by familiar use amongst those of the same Tribe, to seem the most important part of Language, and of all other the Terms the most significant : And should Aerial and ALtherial Vehi- cles come once, by the prevalency of that Doctrine, to be generally received any where, no doubt those Terms would make Impressions on Mens Minds, so as to establish them in the Persuasion of the Reality of such Things, as much as Peripatetick Forms and intentional Species have heretofore done. 15. How much Names taken for Things are apt Instance in * Mislead the Understanding, the atten- Matter. tive reading of Philosophical Writers would abundantly discover ; and that, perhaps, in Words little suspected of any such Misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How many intricate Disputes have there been about Matter, as if there were some such thing really in Nature, distinct from Body ; as 'tis evident, the Word Matter stands for an Idea distinct from the Idea of Body ? For if the Ideas these two Terms stood for Abuse of Words. 207 were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all Places Be put one for another. But we see, that though it be proper to say, There is one Matter of all Bodies, one cannot say, There is one Body of all Matters : We familiarly say, one Body is bigger than another; but it Sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say, one Matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this then ? Viz. from hence, that though Matter and Body be not really distinct, but wherever there is the one, there is the other ; Yet Matter and Body stand for two different Conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the other. For Body stands for a solid extended figured Substance, whereof Matter is but a partial and more confused Conception, it seeming to me to be used for the Substance and Solidity of Body, without taking in its Extension and Figure : And therefore it is that speaking of Matter, we speak of it always as one, because in truth, it expressly contains nothing but the Idea of a solid Substance, which is every where the same, every where uniform. This being our Idea of Matter, we no more conceive, or speak of different Matters in the World, than we do of different Solidi- ties ; though we both conceive, and speak of different Bodies, because Extension and Figure are capable of Variation. But since Solidity cannot exist without Extension and Figure, the taking Matter to be the 208 Abuse of Words. Name of something really existing under that Preci- sion, has no doubt produced those obscure and unin- telligible Discourses and Disputes, which have filled the Heads and Books of Philosophers concerning Matcria prima ; which Imperfection or Abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general Terms, I leave to be consider'd. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer Disputes in the World, if Words were taken for what they are, the Signs of our Ideas only, and not for Things themselves. For when we argue about Mat- ter, or any the like Term, we truly argue only about the Idea we express by that Sound, whether that precise Idea agree to any thing really existing in Nature, or no. And if Men would tell, what Ideas they make their Words stand for, there could not be half that Obscurity or Wrangling, in the search or support of Truth, that there is. 16. But whatever Inconvenience follows from this mistake of Words, this I am sure, This maKes Errors last- that by constant and familiar use, they itis** charm Men into Notions far remote from the Truth of Things. 'Twould be a hard Matter to persuade any one that the Words which his Father or School-master, the Parson of the Parish, or such a Reverend Doctor us'd, signify'd nothing that really existed in Nature : Which, perhaps, is none of the least Abiiss of Words. 209 Causes, that Men are so hardly drawn to quit their Mistakes, even in Opinions purely Philosophical, and where they have no other Interest but Truth. For the Words, they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their Minds, 'tis no wonder, that the wrong Notions annexed to them should not be removed. 17. Fifthly, Another Abuse of Words, is the setting them in the place of Things, wJiich se t they do or can by no means signify. We ting them for what they may observe, that in the general Names cannot sig- of Substances, whereof the nominal Essences are only known to us, when we put them into Propositions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose, or intend they should stand for the real Essence of a certain sort of Substances. For when a Man says Gold is Malleable, he means and would insinuate something more than this, for what I call Gold is Malleable, (though truly it amounts to no more) but would have this understood, vis. that Gold, i.e. what has the real Essence of Gold is Malleable, which amounts to thus much, that Malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from the real Essence of Gold. But a Man not knowing wherein that real Essence consists, the Connection in his Mind of Malleable- ness is not truly with an Essence he knows not, but only with the Sound Gold he puts for it. Thus 2io Abuse of Words. when we say, that Animal rationale is, and Animal implume bipes latis unguibus, is not a good Definition of a Man ; 'tis plain, we suppose the Name Man in this case to stand for the real Essence of a Species, and would signify, that a rational Animal better described that real Essence than a two leg^d Animal with broad Nails, and witJiout Feathers. For else, why might not Plato as properly make the Word ai/S-pwTroe or Man, stand for his complex Idea, made up of the Ideas of a Body, distinguished from others by a certain Shape, and other outward Appearances, as Aristotle, make the complex Idea, to which he gave the Name av^pwTroe or Man, of Body, and the Faculty of Reasoning joined together ; unless the Name avSpwiroG or Man, were supposed to stand for something else, than what it signifies ; and to be put in the place of some other thing than the Idea a Man professes he would express by it ? 1 8. 'Tis true, the Names of Substances would be much more useful, and Propositions V. g. Putting i . i i i. f gm for the m ade in. them much more certain, were real Essences the rea i Essences of Substances the if Substances. Ideas in our Minds, which those Words signified. And 'tis for want of those real Essences, that our Words convey so little Knowledg or Cer- tainty in our Discourses about them : And therefore the Mind, to remove that Imperfection as much as it Abuse of Words. 211 can, makes them, by a secret Supposition, to stand for a Thing having that real Essence, as if thereby it made some nearer approaches to it. For though the Word Man or Gold, signifying nothing truly but a complex Idea of Properties, united together in one sort of Substances : Yet there is scarce any Body in the use of these Words, but often supposes each of those Names to stand for a thing having the real Essence, on which those Properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the Imperfection of our Words, that by a plain Abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something, which not being in our complex Idea, the Name we use can no ways be the sign of. 19. This shews us the Reason why in mixed Modes any of the Ideas that make the Composition of the complex one, being ^-l lce we think every left out or changed, it is allowed to be change of our Idea in Sub- another thing, z. e. to be of another stances not to Species, as is plain in Chance-medly, C " Man-slaughter, Murder, Parricide, &c. The Reason whereof is, because the complex Idea signified by that Name is the real as well as nominal Essence ; and there is no secret Reference of that Name to any other Essence but that. But in Sub- stances it is not so. For though in that called Gold one puts into his complex Idea what another leaves r 2 212 Abuse of Words. out, and Vice Versa ; yet Men do not usually think that therefore the Species is changed : Because they secretly in their Minds refer that Name, and suppose it annexed to a real immutable Essence of a thing existing, on which those Properties depend. He that adds to his complex Idea of Gold, that of Fixedness and Solubility in Aq. Rcgia, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the Species ; but only to have a more perfect Idea, by adding another simple Idea, which is always in fact joined with those other, of which his former complex Idea consisted. But this reference of the Name to a thing, whereof we have not the Idea, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in Difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real Essence of that Species of Bodies, the Word Gold (which by standing for a more or less perfect Collection of simple Ideas, serves to design that sort of Body well enough in civil Discourse) comes to have no Signification at all, being put for somewhat, whereof we have no Idea at all, and so, can signify nothing at all, when the Body it self is away. For however it may be thought all one ; yet, if well considered, it will be found a quite different thing, to argue about Gold in Name, and about a parcel of the Body it self, v. g. a piece of Leaf Gold laid before us ; though in Discourse Abuse of Words. 213 we are fain to substitute the Name for the thing. 20. That which I think very much disposes Men to substitute their Names for the real Essences of Species, is the Supposition O f"^he Abuse before mentioned, that Nature works i i ,.1 ij J * r TM-- f Natur( ? s regularly m the Production of Things, working a/- and sets the Boundaries to each of those J^y Species, by giving exactly the same real internal Constitution to each Individual, which we rank under one general Name. Whereas any one who observes their different Qualities can hardly doubt, that many of the Individuals, called by the same Name, are, in their internal Constitution, as different one from another, as several of those which are ranked under different specifick Names. This Supposition, however that the same precise internal Constitution goes always with the same specifick Name, makes Men forward to take those Names for the Representatives of those real Essences, though indeed they signify nothing but the complex Ideas they have in their Minds when they use them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposed for or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind of use, cause a great deal of Uncertainty in Mens Discourses ; especially in those who have thoroughly imbibed the Doctrine of 214 Abuse of Words. substantial Forms, whereby they firmly imagine the several Species of Things to be determined and distinguished. 21. But however preposterous and absurd it be, to make our Names stand for Ideas we This Abuse , , , . , . ., . contains two have not, or (which is all one) .Essences false Suppo- that we k not j t be j ng j n effect to sitions. make our Words the signs of nothing ; yet 'tis evident to any one, who reflects ever so little on the use Men make of their Words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a Man asks whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a Drill, or a monstrous Foetus, be a Man, or no ; 'tis evident, the Question is not, Whether that particular thing agree to his complex Idea, expressed by the Name Man : But whether it has in it the real Essence of a Species of Things, which he supposes his Name Man to stand for. In which way of using the Names of Substances, there are these false Suppo- sitions contained. First, That there are certain precise Essences, according to which Nature makes all particular Things, and by which they are distinguished into Species. That every thing has a real Constitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible Qualities depend, is past Doubt : But I think it has been proved, that this makes not the Distinction of Abuse of Words. 215 Species, as we rank them ; nor the Boundaries of their Names. Secondly, This tacitly also insinuates, as if we had Ideas of these proposed Essences. For to what purpose else is it, to enquire whether this or that thing have the real Essence of the Species Man, if we did not suppose that there were such a specifick Essence known ? Which yet is utterly false : And therefore such Application of Names, as would make them stand for Ideas which we have not, must needs cause great Disorder in Discourses and Reasonings about them, and be a great Inconvenience in our Communication by Words. 22. Sixthly, There remains yet another more general, though perhaps less observed Abuse of Words ; and that is, that Men having by a long and familiar use an- have a cer- nexed to them certain Ideas, they are tain and evi- , dent Sirnifi- apt to imagine so near and necessary a ca ti on . Connection between the Names and the Signification they use 'em in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is ; and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the Words delivered, as if it were past doubt, that in the use of those common received Sounds, the Speaker and Hearer had necessarily the same precise Ideas. Whence presuming, that when they have in 216 Abuse of Words. Discourse used any Term, they have thereby, as it were, set before others the very thing they talk of. And so likewise taking the Words of others, as naturally standing for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, or under- stand clearly others meaning. From whence com- monly proceeds Noise, and Wrangling, without Im- provement or Information ; whilst Men take Words to be the constant regular marks of agreed Notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteddy Signs of their own Ideas. And yet Men think it strange, if in Discourse, or (where it is often absolutely necessary) in Dispute, one sometimes asks the meaning of their Terms : Though the Arguings one may every Day observe in Conversation, make it evident, that there are few Names of complex Ideas, which any two Men use for the same just precise Collection. 'Tis hard to name a Word which will not be a clear Instance of this. Life is a Term none more familiar. Any one almost would take it for an Affront, to be asked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in Question, whether a Plant, that lies ready formed in the Seed, have Life ; whether the Embrio of an Egg before Incubation, or a Man in a Swound without Sense or Motion, be alive, or no ? It is easy to perceive, that a clear distinct Ab^lse of Words. 217 settled Idea does not always accompany the Use of so known a Word, as that of Life is. Some gross and confused Conceptions Men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common Words of their Language, and such a loose use of their Words serves them well enough in their ordinary Discourses or Affairs. But this is not sufficient for Philosophical Enquiries. Knowledg and Reasoning require precise determinate Ideas. And though Men will not be so importunately dull, as not to understand what others say, without demanding an Explication of their Terms ; nor so troublesomely critical, as to correct others in the use of the Words they receive from them : yet where Truth and Knowledg are concerned in the Case, I know not what Fault it can be to desire the Explication of Words, whose Sense seems dubious ; or why a Man should be ashamed to own his Ignorance, in what Sense another Man uses his Words, since he has no other way of certainly know- ing it, but by being informed. This Abuse of taking Words upon Trust, has no where spread so far, nor with so ill Effects, as amongst Men of Letters. The Multiplication and Obstinacy of Disputes, which has so laid waste the intellectual World, is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of Words. For though it be generally believed, that there is great Diversity of Opinions in the Volumes and Variety of 21 8 Ab^lse of Words. Controversies, the World is distracted with ; yet the most I can find, that the contending learned Men of different Parties do, in their Arguings one with another, is, that they speak different Languages. For I apt to imagine, that when any of them quitting Terms, think upon Things, and know what they think, they think all the same : Though perhaps what they would have, be different. 23. To conclude this Consideration of the Im- perfection and Abuse of Language ; the The ends of , , r . ,-. . .,, Language-. ends of Language in our Discourse with First to con- O fj iers being chiefly these three : First, veyour Ideas. To make known one Man's Thoughts or Ideas to another. Secondly, To do it with as much ease and quickness as is possible ; and Thirdly, Thereby to convey the Knozvledg of Things : Language is either abused, or deficient, when it fails of any of these Three. First, Words fail in the first of these Ends, and lay not open one Man's Ideas to another's view. First, When Men have Names in their Mouths with- out any determined Ideas in their Minds, whereof they are the Signs : or Secondly, When they apply the common received Names of any Language to Ideas, to which the common use of that Language does not apply them : or Thirdly, When they apply them very unsteddily, making them stand now for cne, and by and by for another Idea. Abuse of Words 219 24. Secondly, Men fail of conveying their Thoughts, with 'all the quickness and - ,. ease that may be, when they have com- do it with quickness. plex Ideas, without having distinct Names for them. This is sometimes the Fault of the Language it self, which has not in it a Sound yet apply'd to such a Signification ; and sometimes the Fault of the Man, who has not yet learned the Name for that Idea he would shew another. 25. Thirdly, There is no Knowledg of Things, conveyed by Mens Words, when their Thirdly Ideas agree not to the Reality of Things. Therewith to convey the Tho' it be a Defect, that has its Original Knowledg of in our Ideas, which are not so conform- able to the Nature of Things, as Attention, Study, and Application might make them ; yet it fails not to extend it self to our Words too, when we use them as Signs of real Beings, which yet never had any Reality or Existence. . 26. First, He that hath Words of any Language, without distinct Ideas in his Mind, to ., which he applies them, does, so far as Words fail in all these. he uses them in Discourse, only make a Noise without any Sense or Signification ; and how learned server he may seem by the use of hard Words, or learned Terms, is not much more advanced thereby in Knowledg, than he would be in Learning, 220 Abiise of Words. who had nothing in his Study but the bare Titles of Books, without possessing the Contents of them. For all such Words, however put into Discourse, according to the right Construction of Grammatical Rules, or the Harmony of well turned Periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare Sounds, and nothing else. 27. Secondly, He that has complex Ideas, without particular Names for them, would be in no better a Case than a Bookseller, who had in his Ware house Volumes that lay there unbound, and without Titles ; which he could therefore make known to others, only by shewing the loose Sheets, and communicate them only by Tale. This Man is hundred in his Discourse, for want of Words to communicate his complex Ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known by an Enumeration of the simple ones that compose them ; and so is fain often to use twenty Words to express what another Man signifies in one. 28. Thirdly, He that puts not constantly the same Sign for the same Idea, but uses the same Words sometimes in one, and sometimes in another Signification, ought to pass in the Schools and Con- versation for as fair a Man, as he does in the Market and Exchange, who sells several Things under the same Name. 29. Fourthly, He that applies the Words of any Abuse of Words. 221 Language to Ideas, different from those to which the common use of that Country applies them, however his own Understanding may be filled with Truth and Light, will not by such Words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his Terms. For however the Sounds are such as are familiarly known, and easily enter the Ears of those who are accustomed to 'em ; yet standing for other Ideas than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the mind of the Hearers, they cannot make known the Thoughts of him who thus uses 'em. 30. Fifthly, He that hath imagined to himself Substances such as never have been, and filled his Head with Ideas which have not any correspondence with the real Nature of Things, to which yet he gives settled and defined Names, may fill his Discourse, and perhaps another Man's Head, with the fantas- tical Imaginations of his own Brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true Knowledg. 31. He that hath Names without Ideas, wants meaning in his Words, and speaks only empty Sounds. He that hath complex Ideas without Names for them, wants Liberty and Dispatch in his Expressions, and is necessitated to use Peri- phrases. He that uses his Words loosly and un- steddily, will either be not minded, or not under- 222 Abuse of Words. stood. He that applies his Names to Ideas, different from their common use, wants Propriety in his Language, and speaks Gibberish. And he that hath Ideas of Substances, disagreeing with the real Exist- ence of Things, so far wants the Materials of true Knowledg in his Understanding, and hath instead thereof C J tinier a' s. 32. In our Notions concerning Substances we How in Sub- are l^ble to all the former Inconveni- stances. ences : v. g. He that uses the word Tarantula, without having any Imagination or Idea of what it stand for, pronounces a good Word ; but so long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a new-discovered Country shall see several sorts of Animals and Vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true Ideas of them, as of a Horse, or a Stag ; but can speak of them only by a Description, till he shall either take the Names the Natives call them by, or give them Names himself. 3. He that uses the word Body sometimes for pure Extension and sometimes for Extension and Solidity together, will talk very fallaciously. 4. He that gives the Name Horse, to that Idea which common Usage calls Mule, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5. He that thinks the Name Centaur stands for some real Being, imposes on himself, and mistakes Words for Things. Abuse of Words. 223 33. In Modes and Relations generally we are liable only to the Four first of these How in Inconveniences, (viz.) I. I may have in Modes mid * "/ i Relations. my Memory the Names of Modes, as Gratitude, or Charity, and yet not have any precise Ideas annexed in my Thoughts to those Names. 2. I may have Ideas, and not know the Names that belong to them ; v. g. I may have the Idea of a Man's drinking, till his Colour and Humour be altered, till his Tongue trips, and his Eyes look red, and his Feet fail him, and yet not know, that it is to be called Drunkenness. 3. I may have the Ideas of Vertues or Vices, and Names also, but apply them amiss : v. g. When I apply the name Frugality to that Idea which others call and signify by this Sound, Covetousncss. 4. I may use any of those Names with inconstancy. 5. But in Modes and Relations, I cannot have Ideas disagreeing to the Existence of Things: for Modes being complex Ideas, made by the Mind at pleasure ; and Relation being but my way of considering or comparing two Things together, and so also an Idea of my own making, these Ideas can scarce be found to disagree with any thing existing ; since they are not in the Mind, as the Copies of Things regularly made by Nature, nor as Properties inseparably flowing from the internal Constitution or Essence of any Substance ; but, as it 224 Abuse of Words. were, Patterns lodged in my Memory, with Names annexed to them, to denominate Actions and Rela- tions by, as they come to exist. But the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong Name to my Con- ceptions ; and so using Words in a different Sense from other People, I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong Ideas of them, when I give wrong Names to them. Only if I put in my Ideas of mixed Modes or Relations, any inconsistent Ideas together, I fill my Head also with Chimczra's ; since such Ideas, if well examined, cannot so much as exist in the Mind, much less any real Being be ever denominated from them. 34, Since Wit and Fancy finds easier entertain- ,, , ment in the World, than dry Truth, and Seventhly, J Figurative re al Knowledg, figurative Speeches, and Speech also . . an Abuse of allusion in Language, will hardly be admitted, as an Imperfection or Abuse of it. I confess in Discourses, where we seek rather Pleasure and Delight than Information and Improve- ment, such Ornaments as are borrowed from them, can scarce pa^l for Faults. But yet, if we would speak of Things as they are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative Application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby Abuse of Words. 225 mislead the Judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheat : And therefore however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided ; and where Truth and Knowledg are concerned, cannot but be thought a great Fault, either of the Language or Person that makes use of them. What, and how various they are, will be superfluous here to take Notice ; the Books of Rhetorick which abound in the World, will instruct those who want to be- informed. Only I cannot but observe, how little the Preservation and Improvement of Truth and Know- ledg, is the Care and Concern of Mankind ; since the Arts of Fallacy are endowed and prefered. 'Tis evident how much Men love to deceive, and be deceived, since Rhetorick, that powerful Instrument 'of Error and Deceit, has its established Professors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great Reputation : And I doubt not but it will be thought great boldness, if not Brutality in me to have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the fair Sex, has too prevailing Beauties in it, to suffer it self ever to be spoken against. And 'tis in vain to find Fault with those Arts of Deceiving, wherein Men find pleasure to be Deceived. 226 Remedies of the Imperfection, CHAPTER XI. OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPER- FECTIONS AND ABUSES. I. The natural and improved Imperfections of -,, Languages, we have seen above at large ; -worth seek- and Speech being the great Bond that ing. holds Society together, and the common Conduit, whereby the Improvements of Knowledg are conveyed from one Man, and one Generation to another, it would well deserve our most serious Thoughts, to consider what Remedies are to be found for these Inconveniences above-mentioned. 2. I am not so vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect Reform- Are not easy. ing the Languages of the World, no not so much as of his own Country, without rendring himself ridiculous. To require that Men should use their Words constantly in the same Sense, and for none but determined and uniform Ideas, would be to think, that all Men should have the same Notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct Ideas of. Which is not to be expected and Abuse of Words. 227 by any one, who hath not Vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with Men to be very knowing or very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the World, who thinks that a voluble Tongue shall accompany only a good Understanding ; or that Mens talking much or little, shall hold Proportion only to their Knowledg. 3. But though the Market and Exchange must be left to their own ways of Talking, t . and Gossippings not be robbed of their cessary to Philosophy. antient rnviledg; though the Schools, and Men of Argument would perhaps take it amiss to have anything offered, to abate the length, or lessen the number of their Disputes ; yet, methinks, those who pretend seriously to search after or main- tain Truth, should think themselves obliged to study how they might deliver themselves without Obscurity, Doubtfulness, or Equivocation to which Mens Words are naturally liable, if care be not taken. 4. For he that shall well consider the Errors and Obscurity, the Mistakes and Confusion, that are spread in the World by an ill \v or( is the use of Words, will find some Reason to cause of great Errors. doubt, whether Language, as it has been employ'd, has contributed more to the Improvement or Hindrance of Knowledg amongst Mankind. How Q 2 228 Remedies of the Imperfection, many are there, that when they would think on things, fix their Thoughts only on Words, especially when they would apply their Minds to Moral Matters? And who then can wonder, if the result of such Contemplations and Reasonings, about little more than Sounds, whilst the Ideas they annexed to them, are very confused, or very unsteddy, or perhaps none at all ; who can wonder, I say, that such Thoughts and Reasonings end in nothing but Obscurity and Mistake, without ~any clear Judgment or Know- ledge ? 5. This Inconvenience, in an ill use of Words, Men suffer in their own private Medi- Obstinacy. tations ; but much more manifest are the Diorders which follow from it, in Conversation, Discourse, and Arguings with others. For Language being the great Conduit, whereby Men convey their Discoveries, Reasonings, and Knowledg, from one to another, he that makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledg, which are in Things themselves ; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop the Pipes, whereby it is distributed to the publick use and advantage of Mankind. He that uses Words without any clear and steddy meaning, What does he but lead himself and others into Errors ? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an Enemy to Truth and Abuse of Words. 229 and Knowledg. And yet who can wonder, that all the Sciences and Parts of Knowledg, have been so over-charged with obscure and equivocal Terms, and insignificant and doubtful Expressions, capable to make the most attentive or quicksighted, very little or not at all the more Knowing or Orthodox ; since Subtilty in those who make Profession to teach or defend Truth, hath passed so much for a Vertue. A Vertue. indeed, which consisting for the most part, in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful Terms, is only fit to make Men more conceited in their Ignorance, and obstinate in their Errors. 6. Let us look into the Books of Controversy of any kind, there we shall see, that the ^nd Wrang- cffect of obscure, unsteddy or equivocal " n - Terms, is nothing but noise and wrangling about Sounds, without convincing or bettering a Man's Understanding. For if the Idea be not agreed on, betwixt the Speaker and Hearer, for which the Words stand, the Argument is not about Things, but Names. As often as such a Word, whose Signification is not ascertained betwixt them, comes in use, their Under- standings have no other Object wherein they agree, but barely the Sound, the Things that they think on at that time as expressed by that Word, being quite different 230 Remedies of the Imperfection, 7. Whether a Bat be a Bird, or no, is not a /*rfa, */ Question ; whether a / be another and Bird. thing than indeed it is, or have other Qualities than indeed it has, for that would be ex- tremely absurd to doubt of: But the Question is, i. Either between those that acknowledged them- selves to have but imperfect Ideas of one or both of those sorts of Things, for which these Names are supposed to stand ; and then it is a real Enquiry concerning the Nature of a Bird, or a Bat, to make their yet imperfect Ideas of it more compleat, by examining, whether all the simple Ideas, to which, combined together, they both give the Name Bird, be all to be found in a Bat : But this is a Question only of Enquirers, (not Disputers) who neither affirm, nor deny, but examine : Or, 2. It is a Question between Disputants, whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a Bat is a Bird. And then the Question is barely about the Signification of one, or both these Words ; in that they not having both the same complex Ideas, to which they give these two Names ; one holds, and t'other denies, that these two Names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the Signification of these two Names, it were impossible they should dispute about them. For they would presently and clearly see, (were that adjusted between them,) whether all the simple Ideas, and Abuse of Words. 231 of the more general Name Bird, were found in the complex Idea of a Bat, or no ; and so there could be no doubt, whether a Bat were a Bird or no. And here I desire it may be considered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the Disputes in the World are not merely Verbal, and about the Signification of Words; and whether if the Terms they are made in, were defined, and reduced in their Signification (as they must be where they signify- any thing) to determined Collections of the simple Ideas they do or should stand for, those Disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish. I leave it then to be considered, what the learning of Disputation is, and how well they are employ'd for the Advantage of themselves, or others, whose Business is only the vain Ostentation of Sounds, i. e. those who spend their Lives in Disputes and Controversies. When I shall see any of those Combatants strip all his Terms of Ambiguity and Obscurity (which every one may do in the Words he uses himself) I shall think him a Champion for Knowledg, Truth, and Peace, and not the Slave of Vain-Glory, Ambition, or a Party. 8. To Remedy the Defects of Speech First, Remedy to use no before-mentioned, to some degree, and Word with- to prevent the Inconveniences that out an Idea ' follow from them, I imagine the Observation of these 232 Remedies of the Imperfection, following Rules may be of use, till some Body better able shall judge it worth his while, to think more maturely on this Matter, and oblige the World with his Thoughts on it. First, A Man should take care to use no word without a Signification, no Name without an Idea for which he makes it stand. This Rule will not seem altogether needless, to any one who shall take the Pains to recollect how often he has met with such Words ; as Instinct, Sympathy, and A ntipathy, &c. in the Discourse of others, so made use of, as he might easily conclude, that those that used them had no Ideas in their Minds to which they apply'd them ; but spoke them only as Sounds, which usually served instead of Reasons, on the like Occasions. Not but that these Words, and the like, have very proper Significations in which they may be used ; but there being no natural Connection between any Words, and any Ideas, these, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by Men who have no Ideas in their Minds, to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them stand ; which is necessary they should, if Men would speak intel- ligibly even to themselves alone. 9. Secondly, 'Tis not enough a Man uses his Words as Signs of some Ideas, those Ideas he an- nexes them to, if they be simple, must be clear and and Abuse of Words. 233 distinct ; if complex, must be determinate, i. e. the precise Collection of simp'e Ideas set- Secondl to tied in the Mind, with that Sound an- ?iave distinct Ideas annex' d nexed to it, as the Sign of that precise to them in determined Collection, and no other. This is very necessary in Names of Modes, and especially moral Words ; which having no settled Objects in Nature, from whence their Ideas are taken, as from their Original, are apt to be very confused. Justice is a Word in every Man's Mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined loose Signification : Which will always be so, unless a Man has in his Mind a distinct Comprehension of the component Parts, that complex Idea consists of; and if it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still on, till he at last comes to the simple Ideas that make it up : And unless this be done, a Man makes an ill use of the Word, let it be Justice, for example, or any other. I do not say, a Man need stand to recollect, and make this Analysis at large every time the word Justice comes in his way : But this, at least, is necessary, that he have so examined the Signification of that Name, and settled the Idea of all its Parts in his Mind, that he can do it when he pleases. If one who makes his complex Idea of Justice, to be such a treatment of the Person or Goods of another, as is according to Law, hath not a 234 Remedies of the Imperfection, clear and distinct Idea what Law is, which makes a part of his complex Idea of Justice, 'tis plain, his Idea of Justice it self will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will, perhaps, be judged very trouble- some ; and therefore most Men will think they may be excused from settling the complex Ideas of mixed Modes so precisely in their Minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it "must not be wondred, that they have a great deal of Obscurity and Confusion in their own Minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their Discourses with others. 10. In the Names of Substances, for a right use . , of them, something more is required formable in than barely determined Ideas : In these Substances* the Names must also be conformable to TJdngs, as they exist : But of this, I shall have occa- sion to speak more at large by and by. This Exact- ness is absolutely necessary in Enquiries after Philo- sophical Knowledg, and in Controversies about Truth. And though it would be well too, if it extended it self to common Conversation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life ; yet I think that is scarce to be expected. Vulgar Notions suit Vulgar Dis- courses ; and both, though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the Market, and the Wake. Mer- chants and Lovers, Cooks and Taylors, have Words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary Affairs ; and and Abuse of Words. 235 so, I think, might Philosophers and Disputants too, if they had a Mind to understand, and to be clearly understood. n. Thirdly, 'Tis not enough that Men have Ideas, determined Ideas, for which they Thirdly make these Signs stand ; but they must P r P riet y- also take care to apply their Words, as near as may be," to such Ideas as common use has annexed them to. For Words, especially of Languages already framed, being no Man's private Possession, but the common Measure of Commerce and Communication, 'tis not for any one, at Pleasure, to change the Stamp they are current in ; nor alter the Ideas they are affixed to ; or at least when there is a Necessity to do so, he is bound to give Notice of it. Men's Intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be understood ; which cannot be without frequent Explanations, Demands, and other the like incommodious Interrup- tions, where Men do not follow common Use. Pro- priety of Speech, is that which gives our Thoughts entrance into other Men's Minds with the greatest Ease and Advantage : and therefore deserves some part of our Care and Study, especially in the Names of moral Words. The proper Signification and Use of Terms is best to be learned from those, who in their Writings and Discourses, appear to have had the clearest Notions, and apply'd to them their Terms 236 Remedies of the Imperfection^ with the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a Man's Words, according to the Pro- priety of the Language, tho' it have not always the good Fortune to be understood ; yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is so unskilful in the Language he speaks as not to understand it, when made use of as it ought to be. 12. FourtJily, But because common use has not Fourthly, to so visibly annexed any Signification to 'their 'mean- Words, as to make Men know always tn S- certainly what they precisely stand for : And because Men in the Improvement of their Knowledg, come to have Ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they must either make new Words, (which Men seldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of Affectation or Novelty,) or else must use old ones, in a new Signification. Therefore after the Obser- vation of the foregoing Rules, it is sometimes necessary for the ascertaining the Signification of Words, to declare their Meaning ; where either common Use has left it uncertain and loose (as it has in most Names of very complex Ideas] or where the Term, being very material in the Discourse, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any Doubtfulness or Mistake. and Abuse of Words. 237 13. As the Ideas, Mens Words stand for, are of different sorts ; so the way of making known the Ideas, they stand for, when three there is Occasion, is also different. For though defining be thought the proper way to make known tJie proper Signification of Words ; yet there are some Words that will not be defined, as there are others, whose precise Meaning cannot be made known, but by Definition ; and, perhaps, a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, as we shall see in the Names of simple Ideas, Modes and Substances. 14. First, When a Man makes use of the Name of any simple Idea, which he perceives is First In not understood, or is in danger to be s "^P le Ideas by synony- mistaken, he is obliged by the Laws of mous terms, . or shewing. Ingenuity, and the end of Speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what Idea he makes it stand for. This, as has been shewn, cannot be done by Definition ; and, therefore, when a synonymous Word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. First, Sometimes the naming the Subject, wherein tliat simple Idea is to be found, will make its Name be understood by those, who are acquainted with that Subject, and know it by that Name. So to make a Country-man understand what Fueillcmorte Colour signifies, it may suffice to Remedies of the Imperfection, tell him, 'tis the Colour of withered Leaves falling in Autumn. Secondly, But, the only sure way of making known the Signification of the Name of any simple Idea, is by presenting to his Senses that Subject, which may produce it in his Mind, and make him actually have the Idea that Word stands for. 15. Secondly, Mixed Modes, especially those belonging to Morality, being most of Secondly, in mixedModes, them such Combinations of Ideas, as by Definition. , t ,_. . ,. - ., the Mind puts together of its own choice ; and whereof there are not always standing Patterns to be found existing ; the Signification of their Names cannot be made known, as those of simple Ideas, by any shewing ; but in recompence thereof, may be perfectly and exactly defined. For they being Combinations of several Ideas, that the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any Archetypes, Men may, if they please, exactly know the Ideas that go to each Com- position, and so both use these Words in a certain and undoubted Signification, and perfectly declare, when there is Occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay great blame on those, who make not their Discourses about moral Things very clear and distinct. For since the precise Significa- tion of the Names of mixed Modes, or which is all one, the real Essence of each Species, is to be known, and Abuse of Words. 239 they being not of Nature's, but Man's making, it is a great Negligence and Perverseness, to Discourse of moral Things with Uncertainty and Obscurity, which is more pardonable in treating of natural Substances, where doubtful Terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary Reason, as we shall see by and by. 1 6. Upon this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that Morality is capable of De- Morality ca- monstration, as well as Mathematicks : pable of De- . ,, . , ^ c , , monstration. Since the precise real Essence of the Things moral Words stand for, may be perfectly known ; and so the Congruity, or Incongruity of the Things themselves be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect Knowledg. Nor let any one object, that the Names of Substances are often to be made use of in Morality, as well as those of Modes, from which will arise Obscurity. For as to Substances, when concerned in moral Discourses, their divers Natures are not so much enquired into, as supposed ; v. g. when we say that Man is subject to Law : We mean nothing by Man, but a corporeal rational Crea - ture : What the real Essence or other Qualities of that Creature are in this Case, is no way considered. And therefore, whether a Child or Changeling be a Man in a physical Sense, may amongst the Natu- ralists be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral Man, as I may call him, which is this 240 Remedies of the Imperfection, immoveable unchangable Idea, a corporeal rational Being. For were there a Monkey, or any other Creature to be found, that had the use of Reason, to such a degree, as to be able to understand general Signs, and to deduce Consequences about general Ideas, he would no doubt be subject to Law, and in that Sense be a Man, how much soever he differed in Shape from others of that Name. The Names of Substances, if they be used in them, as they should, can no more disturb Moral, than they do Mathe- matical Discourses : Where, if the Mathematician speaks of a Cube or Globe of Gold, or any other Body, he has his clear settled Idea which varies not, though it may by mistake be applied to a particular Body to which it belongs not. 17. This I have here mention'd by the bye, to shew of what Consequence it is for Definitions can make Men, in their Names of mixed Modes, 'courses cUar. and consequently, in all their moral Discourses, to define their Words when there is Occasion : Since thereby moral Knowledg may be brought to so great Clearness and Certainty. And it must be great want of Ingenuity, (to say no worse of it) to refuse to do it : Since a Definition is the only way, whereby the precise Meaning of moral Words can be knoivn ; and yet a way, whereby their Meaning may be known certainly, and without having and Abuse of Words. 241 any room for any contest about it. And therefore the Negligence or Perverseness of Mankind cannot be excused, if their Discourses in Morality be not much more clear, than those in Natural Philosophy : since they are about Ideas in the Mind, which are none of them false or disproportionate ; they having no external Beings for the Archetypes which they are referr'd to and must correspond with. It is far easier for Men to frame in their Minds an Idea, which shall be the Standard to which they will give the Name Justice, with which Pattern so made all Actions that agree shall pass under that Denomination, than, having seen Aristides, to frame an Idea that shall in all Things be exactly like him, who is as he is, let Men make what Idea they please of him. For the one, they need but know the Combination of Ideas that are put together in their own Minds ; for the other, they must enquire into the whole Nature, and abstruse hidden Constitution, and various Qualities of a thing existing without them. 1 8. Another Reason that makes the defining of mix'd Modes so necessary, especially of And is t j ie moral Words, is what I mentioned a on ^ wa y- little before, viz. That it is the only way whereby the Signification of the most of them can be known with Certainty. For the Ideas they stand for, being for the most part such, whose component Parts no where R 242 Remedies of the Imperfection, exist together, but scattered and mingled with others, it is the Mind alone that collects them, and gives them the Union of one Idea : and it is only by Words, enumerating the several simple Ideas which the Mind has united, that we can make known to others what their Names stand for ; the Assistance of the Senses in this Case not helping us, by the Proposal of sensible Objects, to shew the Ideas, which our Names of this kind stand for, as it does often in the Names of sensible simple Ideas, and also to some Degree in those of Substances. 19. Thirdly, For the explaining the Signification of the Names of Substances as they Substances stand for the Ideas we have of their by s S j l . in 2 distinct Species, both the fore-mentioned and defining. ways, viz. of shewing and defining, are requisite, in many Cases, to be made use of. For there being ordinarily in each sort some leading Qualities, to which we suppose the other Ideas, which make up our complex Idea of that Species, annexed, we forwardly give the specifick Name to that thing, wherein that characteristical Mark is found, which we take to be the most distinguishing Idea of that Species. These leading or character- istical (as I may so call them) Ideas, in the sorts of Animals and Vegetables, is (as has been before remarked, C/i. VI. 29. and C/i. IX. 15.) mostly and Abuse of Words. 243 Figure, and in inanimate Bodies Colour, and in some both together. Now, 20. These leading sensible Qualities, are those which make the chief Ingredients of our Ideas of the spectfick Ideas, and consequently the leading Qua- most observable and unvariable part Dances ^re in the Definitions of our specifick be , sf ot b V shewing. Names, as attributed to Sorts of Sub- stances coming under our Knowledg. For though the Sound Man, in its own Nature, be as apt to signify a complex Idea made up of Animality and Rationality, united in the same Subject, as to signify any other Combination ; yet used as a Mark to stand for a sort of Creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward Shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex Idea, signified by the Word Man, as any other we find in it ; and therefore why Plato's Animal implume Bipes latis unguibus, should not be as good a Definition of the Name Man, stand- ing for that sort of Creatures, will not be easy to shew : for 'tis the Shape, as the leading Quality, that seems more to determine that Species, than a Faculty of Reasoning, which appears not at first, and in some never. And if this be not allowed to be so, I do not know how they can be excused from Murder, who kill monstrous Births, (as we call them,) because of an unordinary Shape, without knowing whether they R 2 244 Remedies of the Imperfection, have a rational Soul, or no ; which can be no more discerned in a well formed, than ill shaped Infant, as soon as born. And who is it has informed us, that a rational Soul can inhabit no Tenement, unless it has just such a sort of Frontispiece, or can join it self to, and inform no sort of Body but one that is just of such an outward Structure ? 21. Now these leading Qualities are best made known by shelving, and can hardly be Ideas of the leading Qua- made known otherwise. For the Shape h stanceC SU are of an Horse > or Cassuary, will be but best got by rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the shewing. Mind by Words, the sight of the Ani- mals doth it a thousand times better: And the Idea of the particular Colour of Gold is not to be got by any Description of it, but only by the frequent Exer- cise of the Eyes about it, as is evident in those who are used to this Metal, who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the Sight, where others (who have as good Eyes, but yet, by use, have not got the precise nice Idea of that peculiar Yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said of those other simple Ideas peculiar in their kind to any Substance ; for which precise Ideas there are no peculiar Names. The particular Ringing Sound there is in Gold, distinct from the Sound of other Bodies, has no particular and Abuse of Words. 245 Name annex'd to it, no more than the particular Yellow that belongs to that Metal. 22. But because many of the simple Ideas that make up our specifick Ideas of Sub- , . , . The Ideas of stances, are Powers which lye not t fr eir p owers obvious to our Senses in the Things as ** De fi~ they ordinarily appear ; therefore, in the Signification of our Names of Substances some part cf the Signification will be better made known by enumerating those simple Ideas, than in shewing the Substance it self. For he that, to the yellow shining Colour of GV/Wgot by sight, shall, from my enumer- ating them, have the Ideas of great Ductility, Fusi- bility, Fixedness, and Solubility in Aq. Regia, will have a perfecter Idea of Gold, than he can have by seeing a piece of Gold, and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious Qualities. But if the formal Constitution of this shining heavy, ductil thing (from whence all these its Properties flow) lay open to our Senses, as the formal Constitution, or Essence of a Triangle does, the Signification of the Word Gold might as easily be ascertained as that of Triangle. 23. Hence we may take Notice, how much the Foundation of all our Knowledg of cor- c. ,-, A Reflection poreal Things lies in our Senses, ror on theKnow- how Spirits, separate from Bodies, (whose Knowledg and Ideas of these 246 Remedies of the Imperfection, Things, are certainly much more perfect than ours) know them, we have no Notion, no Idea at all. The whole extent of our Knowledg, or Imagination, reaches not beyond our own Ideas, limited to our ways of Perception. Though yet it be not to be doubted, that Spirits of a higher rank than those immersed in Flesh may have as clear Ideas of the radical Constitution of Substances, as we have of a Triangle, and so perceive how all their Properties and Operations flow from thence : but. the manner how they come by that Knowledg exceeds our Conceptions. 24. But though Definitions will serve to explain , ,. the Names of Substances, as they stand Ideas also of J Substances for our Ideas ; yet they leave them not must be con- formable to without great Imperfection, as they stand for Things. For our Names of Substances being not put barely for our Ideas, but being made use of ultimately to represent Things, and are so put in their Place, their Signification must agree with the Truth of Things, as well as with Mens Ideas. And therefore in Substances, we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex Idea, com- monly received as the Signification of that Word, but must go a little farther, and enquire into the Nature and Properties of the Things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our Ideas of their and Abuse of Words. 247 distinct Species ; or else learn them from such as are used to that sort of Things, and are experienced in them. For since 'tis intended their Names should stand for such Collections of simple Ideas t as do really exist in Things themselves, as well as for the complex Idea in other Mens Minds, which in their ordinary Acceptation they stand for : therefore to define their Names right, natural History is to be enquired into; and their Properties are, with Care and Examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding Inconveniences in Dis- courses and Arguings about natural Bodies and sub- stantial Things, to have learned from the Propriety of the Language, the common but confused, or very imperfect Idea, to which each Word is applied, and to keep them to that Idea in our use of them : but we must, by acquainting our selves with the History of that sort of things rectify and settle our complex Idea, belonging to each specifick Name ; and in Dis- course with others, (if we find them mistake us) we ought to tell what the complex Idea is that we make such a Name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done by all those who search after Knowledg, and Philosophical Verity, in that Children being taught Words whilst they have but imperfect Notions of Things, apply them at Random, and without much thinking, and seldom frame determined Ideas to be 248 Remedies of the Imperfection, signified by them. Which Custom, (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary Affairs of Life and Conversation) they are apt to continue, when they are Men : And so begin at the wrong end, learning Words first, and perfectly, but make the Notions to which they apply those Words after- wards, very overtly. By this means it come to pass, that Men speaking the proper Language of their Country, i. e. according to Grammar-Rules of that Language, do yet speak very improperly of Things themselves ; and by their arguing one with another, make but small Progress in the Discoveries of useful Truths, and the Knowledg of Things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our Imaginations ; and it matters not much, for the Improvement of our Knowledg, how they are called. 25. It were therefore to be wish'd, That Men, Not easy to versed in Physical Enquiries, and ac- be made so. quainted with the several sorts of natural Bodies, would set down those simple Ideas, wherein they observe the Individuals of each sort constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that Confusion which comes from several Persons, applying the same Name to a Collection of a smaller or greater number of sensible Qualities, proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining the Quali- and Abuse of Words. 2.49 ties of any sort of Things, which come under one Denomination. But a Dictionary of this sort, con- taining, as it were, a Natural History, requires too many Hands, as well as too much Time, Cost, Pains and Sagacity, ever to be hoped for ; and till that be done, we must content our selves with such Defi- nitions of the Names of Substances, as explain the sense Men use them in. And 'twould be well, where there is Occasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done ; but Men talk to one another, and dispute in Words, whose meaning is not agreed between them, out of a mistake, that the Signification of common Words are certainly estab- lished, and the precise Ideas, they stand for, per- fectly known ; and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Both which Suppositions are false : no Names of complex Ideas having so settled deter- mined Significations, that they are constantly used for the same precise Ideas. Nor is it a shame for a Man not to have a certain Knowledg of any thing, but by the necessary ways of attaining it ; and so it is no discredit not to know what precise Idea any Sound stands for in another Man's Mind, without he declare it to me by some other way than barely using that Sound, there being no other way, without such a Declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed, the necessity of Communication by Language, biings 250 Remedies of the Imperfection, Men to an Agreement in the Signification of common Words, within some tolerable Latitude, that may serve for ordinary Conversation : and so a Man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the Ideas, which are annexed to Words by common Use, in a Language familiar to him. But common Use being but a very uncertain Rule, which reduces it self at last to the Ideas of particular Men, proves often but a very variable Standard. But tho' such a Dic- tionary, as I have above-mention'd, will require too much Time, Cost and Pains, to be hop'd for in this Age; yet, methinks, it is not unreasonable to pro- pose, that Words standing for Things, which are known and distinguish'd by their outward shapes, should be expressed by little Draughts and Prints made of 'em. A Vocabulary made after this Fashion, would, perhaps with more ease, and in less time, teach the true Signification of many Terms, espe- cially in Languages of remote Countries or Ages, and settle truer Ideas in Mens Minds of several Things, whereof we read the Names in ancient Authors, than all the large and laborious Comments of learned Criticks. Naturalists, that treat of Plants and Animals, have found the Benefit of this way: And he that has had occasion to consult them, will have reason to confess, that he has a clear Idea of Apinm, or Ibex, from a little Print of that Herb, or and Abuse of Words. 251 Beast, than he could have from a long Definition of the Names of either of them. And so no doubt, he would have of Strigil and Sistrum, if instead of a Curry comb and Cymbal, which are the English Names Dictionaries render them by, he could see stamp'd in the Margin, small Pictures of these Instru- ments, as they were in use amongst the Antients. Toga, Tunica, Pallium, are Words easily translated by Gown, Coat, and Cloak ; but we have thereby no more true Ideas of the Fashion of those Habits amongst the Romans, then we have of the Faces of the Taylors who made 'em. Such things as these which the Eye distinguishes by their Shapes, would be best let into the Mind by Draughts made of 'em, and more determine the Signification of such Words, than any other Words set for 'em, or made use of to define 'em. But this only by the bye. 26. Fifthly, If Men will not be at the Pains to declare the meaning of their Words, and Definitions of their Terms are not Constancy in to be had ; yet this is the least that can the fr s *S n ifi- ' J cation. be expected that in all Discourses, wherein one Man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should use the same Word constantly in the same Sense : If this were done, (which no Body can refuse without great Disingenuity) many of the Books extant might be spared ; many of the Con- 252 Remedies of the Imperfection, &c. troversies in Dispute would be at an end, several of those great Volumes, swollen with ambiguous Words, now used in one Sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow compass ; and many of the Philosophers (to mention no other,) as well as Poets Works, might be contained in a Nut-shell. 27. But after all, the Provision of Words is so scanty in respect of that infinite variety Variation is f Thoughts that Men, wanting Terms to be ex- to su j t their precise Notions will, not- ptatnea. withstanding their utmost caution, be forced often to use the same Word, in somewhat different Senses. And though in the Continuation of a Discourse, or the pursuit of an Argument, there be hardly room to digress into a particular Defini- tion, as often as a Man varies the Signification of any Term ; yet the import of the Discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed Fallacy, suffi- ciently lead candid and intelligent Readers into the true meaning of it : but where that is not sufficient to guide the Reader, there it concerns the Writer to explain his meaning, and shew in what Sense he there uses that Term. LOCKE'S ESSAY. BOOK III. NOTES. "And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, "which are framed and applied according to the con- ceit and capacities of the vulgar sort: and although -we think we govern our -words, and prescribe it -well loquendum ut vulgus sentiendum ut sapientes ; yet certain it is that -words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back iipon the understanding of the -wisest and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment. So as it is almost necessary, in all controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the matJiematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of o^^r words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur -with us or no. For it comet ft to pass for want of this, that we are sure to end there -where -we ought to have begun, which is, in ques- tions and differences about words. " BACON, Advancement of Learning, Book II. Chap. xiv. Sec. ii. LOCKE'S ESSAY. BOOK III. NOTES. pp. 33, 34. CHAPTER I. 2. Signs of internal conceptions. On Locke's view that words are only signs of the speaker's own ideas, compare note to Chap. ii. sec. 2. 3. General terms are names which apply to all the members of a class. Thus dog is the name of all those things which resemble each other in a certain way. They are thus equivalent to common nouns in grammar. On the origin of general terms see note to Chap. iii. sec. 4. 4. Ideas simple or complex. See Introduction, p. 14- Privative words. Logicians often apply the term privative to a name which implies (i) the absence of certain attri- butes, and (2) that their presence might have been expected. E.g. blind, which not only implies the absence of sight, but that the thing denoted can usually or normally see. But Locke uses the term as equivalent to negative ; and in point of fact no clear line can be drawn between the two classes of words. Relate to positive ideas. If negative terms simply signified negation, and did not imply any positive qualities whose pre- 256 Notes. pp, 35, 36. sence is denied, they would be absolutely without distinct meaning. 5- Original, origin. Cf. Shakspere, " It hath its original from much grief." (2 Henry IV. i. 2, 131.) Sensible ideas. See Introduction, p. 12. Imagine, from imago, an image ; apprehend, comprehend, from prehendo, to lay hold of ; adhere, from haereo, to stick ; conceive, from capio, to take ; instil, from stillo, to drop ; dis- turbance, from turba, a crowd ; tranqitillity, probably connected with quiesco, to be still ; spirit, from spiro, to breathe ; angel, from ayyeXos, a messenger. " It does not follow that a word as we use it now bears a gross, narrow, or natural sense, because the root to which we can refer it had a limited meaning, and was connected with matter." (Thomson, Laws of Thought, p. 8.) " In point of fact the obligation is not entirely on one side. While as regards attributes and phenomena, the language of mental science has mostly been borrowed from that of sensation ; in all that relates to the notions of cause or force, as has been well remarked by Maine de Biran, the language properly belonging to the mental fact has been transferred by analogy to the physical. As the basis of a theory, the fact is of no great value ; but its weight, such as it is, should at least be acknowledged to bear on both sides of the question." (Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, p. 1 68.) The first beginners of languages. Locke and his contempo- raries were inclined to look on language, law, and religion as arbitrary and artificial products, due to agreements and con- tracts entered into by men. Modern theories tend to regard them as natural products growing up almost unconsciously, and not as the result of convention consciously agreed upon. We may allow that " language is based upon general agreement, if we give our assent to its use every day by hearing and answer- ing it, just as truly as if the view of Maupertuis were correct, Notes. 257 pp. 36, 37. that language was originally formed by a session of learned societies." (Thomson, Laws of Thought, p. 38. Cf. also Sayce, Introduction to the Science of Language, vol ii. Chap, x. ; Donaldson, New Cratylus, Chap, iii.) Locke, however, guards against the error in his Thoughts concerning Educa- tion, sec. 1 68, " Languages were made not by rules of art but by accident and the common use of the people." Ideas of sensation. See Introduction, p. 12. Operations they experimented in themselves, operations they experienced in themselves ; *>., mental activities of which they were themselves conscious. Agreed, agreed upon. 6. Species and genera. A genus means in logic any supe- rior class, including under it a lower class or species. Thus the genus Animal includes the species Dog. (Cf. note to Chap. iii. sec. 10.) Propositions, and those most commonly universal ones. Knowledge, according to Locke, consists in the " perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas " ; this agreement or disagreement, expressed in words, is what we call a proposi- tion. A universal proposition is one in which the subject is " distributed " ; that is, one in which all the things signified by the term which forms the subject are referred to. "Allm&\\ are mortal," is a universal proposition ; " Some men are mortal," is a particular proposition. It is the chief object of science and practical experience to establish universal propositions ; since, while we only have particular propositions, we can never be sure whether any given instance comes under them. If I only know " Some men are mortal," I cannot be sure whether A, B, or C be mortal. 258 Notes. pp. 38 40. CHAPTER II. I. Sensible, perceptible by the senses. By a voluntary imposition. Locke's view of the artificial origin of language is prominent here. Cf. note to Chap. i. sec. 5. As it has been said, to invent language already presup- poses language. At the same time, Locke is no doubt right in ascribing the predominance of articulate language to the variety and quickness with which this special .sort of symbols can be produced. Cf. Spencer, Principles of Psychology* vol. ii. pp. 122-5, on the connection between names and things. 2. The use men have of these marks. Locke omits another important use of language, viz., its symbolic use as a mechanical aid to thought. " A highly complex notion [e.g., happiness, the state, etc.] is seldom fully realized ; seldom other than symbo- lical. Here, then, is a further use of names ; they serve to abbreviate the process of thought." (Thomson, Laws of Thought, p. 37 ; Mill, Logic, ii. pp. 264, et seq.) Nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them. " But seeing names . . . are signs of our conceptions, it is manifest they are not signs of the things themselves ; for that the sound of this word stone should be the sign of a stone cannot be understood in any sense but this, that he that hears it collects that he that pronounces it thinks of a stone." (Hobbes, Computation or Logic, Chap. ii. sec. 5.) Locke does not seem to go so far as this. He puts in the qualifications " primary," " proper and immediate." Still, he lays down that words are, strictly speaking, the signs of ideas ; and that to make them stand for " the reality of things " is to misuse them. (Cf. sec. 5.) Compare Mill : " If it be merely meant that the concep- tion alone, and not the thing itself, is recalled by the name or im- parted to the hearer, this of course cannot be denied. Never- theless, there seems good reason for adhering to the common Notes. 259 pp. 4045. usage, and calling the word sun the name of the sun, and not the name of our idea of the sun. For names are not intended only to make the hearer conceive what we conceive, but also to inform him what we believe. Now when I use a name for the purpose of expressing a belief, it is a belief concerning the thing itself, not concerning my idea of it. When I say, ' the sun is the cause of day,' I do not mean that my idea of the sun causes, or excites in me the idea of day j or, in other words, that thinking of the sun makes me think of day. I mean that a certain physical fact, which is called the sun's presence (and which in the ultimate analysis resolves itself into sensations, not ideas), causes another physical fact, which is called day." (Logic, i. pp. 23-4.) But this view was not logically open to Locke, who held that we only know our own ideas, and nothing beside or beyond them. This denial, in spite of frequent incon- sistencies, real or apparant, underlies the whole of the Essay. The question is fully discussed in Prof. Green's admirable Intro- duction to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. 5. Barely of their own imaginations, merely about their own fancies and thoughts. Simple ideas. See Introduction, p. 14. 7. Words often used without signification. Cf. note to sec. 2 of this chapter. Several. Divers, many. 8. Peculiar ideas. Their own ideas. The great Augustus himself. The reference is possibly to Suetonius, Vita Tiber., Cap. 71. S 2 260 Notes. pp. 46 49. CHAPTER III. 2. Some generals. Cf. Pliny, Hist. Nat., Bk. VII. Chap, xxiv., who relates this of Cyrus the elder. Xenophon's account in Cyropaedia, Bk. V. Chap. iii. 46-50, is less astonishing, but much more credible. 4. Enlarges itself by general views. Knowledge is essen- tially general, and its growth is always, when we take a wide survey, from particular cases to universal laws. (Compare the note to Chap. i. sec. 6.) In this lies the chief importance of general names. " If they only served, by mutually limiting each other, to afford a designation for such individual objects as have no names of their own, they could only be ranked among contrivances for economizing the use of language. But it is evident that this is not their sole function. It is by their means that we are enabled to assert general propositions ; to affirm or deny any predicate of an indefinite number of things at once." (Mill, Logic, i. p. 27.) And therefore in these, i.e., in general names. 5. Bucephalus. The famous horse of Alexander the Great, which carried him in his Asiatic Expedition. Jockeys, horsedealers, those who have to do with horses, not merely, as now-a-days, riders of racehorses. The word is a diminutive of Jack 6. By this way of abstraction. General ideas arise by separating the points of agreement of a group of things from the points of difference. The mind abstracts (abstraherc draw off) its attention from the latter, in order to dwell on the former. Hence Locke rightly calls all general ideas abstract. There is another side of the question, since abstraction seems to involve the power of forming general ideas. (See Mansel, Notes. 261 pp. 5155. Prolegomena Logica, pp. 34-6.) Compare below note to Chap. viii., sec. i, and also Introduction, p. 14. 8. Extension. By the " extension " of a name logicians mean the various individual things to which the name applies. This is often called the "denotation." By the "comprehension," " intention," or " connotation " of a name is meant the attributes which the name implies. Locke here tells us that if we diminish the connotation by leaving out of sight some of the attributes implied, we increase the denotation. There are more animals than men, because the term animal implies fewer qualities than the term man. (Compare Thomson, Laws of Thought, p. 79.) 10. Genus and differentia. A genus is a superior class ; a species is a class comprehended under the genus. The additional attributes implied by the genus man over and above those implied by the species animal is called the differentia. It is obviously a shorter way to define by genus and differentia than by enumerating all the attributes implied by the general name. If we define man as a rational animal, rational being the differentia, we save ourselves the trouble of separately naming all the attributes implied by the term animal. n. Signs, whether words or ideas. Locke calls ideas " signs," because he considers them as being in many cases (e.g., simple ideas and ideas of substances) representative or symbolic of external realities. (Cf. Essay, Bk. II. Chap. xxxi. especially sec. 12-13.) That rest, that remain. Compare Shakspere : " What resteth more, But that I seek occasion how to rise." 3 Henry VI., \. 2, 44. Creatures of otir own making. External things, says Locke, are all individual existences ; there is no general essence 262 Notes. pp. 56, 57. shared in common by all the things ranked in a given class. But nature makes things resemble each other in different ways, and we group them into classes according to the number and importance of the resemblances. (See Introduction, p. 22.) 12. A sort of things, class of things. Compare Shak- spere : " There are a sort of men, whose visages Do cream and mantle like a standing pond." Merchant of Venice, i. i, 88-9. Are nothing but these abstract ideas. Locke attacks the Realistic theory of the meaning of general names. In the middle ages one of the most vexed questions of philosophy was that of the "nature of universals." What is it which is really shared in common by all the members of a class ? Apart from subtleties which could hardly be explained here, we may say that two answers were suggested as early as the ninth or tenth century, (i.) That there is a real common nature which each member of the class possesses, an essence of the species actually present in each of the individual things belonging to the species. This substantial form (cf. note to Chap. vi. sec. 10) is really existent, apart from the minds of men, in the individuals included in the class. Humanity is a real some- thing, objectively present in all men; and it is this which con- stitutes them men. The " universal," according to this theory, called Realism, is in re. (ii.) The other answer, the theory of Nominalism, asserted that the universal character, the bond between individuals of the same kind, was not to be found in the individual things, but in the mind itself, derived from a perception of the things, and therefore post rcm. Classes of things are made by the mind, which forms a conception of the points wherein a number of things agree, and fixes it by giving a general name. Of this theory two distinct forms were developed. According to one, Conceptualism, the conception of a class is a general idea, not an individual representative Notes. 263 pp. 56, 57. of one of the things contained in the class, but a general .though imperfect representative of all. The Conceptualists say that I can conceive the idea of Man in general, as opposed to individual ideas of Tom, Dick, and Harry. This is what Locke held. The other modification of the anti-realistic theory denies that we can form a general conception, what Locke calls " the abstract idea for which a name stands," and holds that we can only form conceptions of individuals, Tom, Dick, Harry. What is universal is the name of the class, not the idea of the class. " There is nothing universal but names," says Hobbes. The name Nominalism is now generally reserved in order to denote this extreme form of the theory. Both forms agree in denying that the "universal" general nature is to be found in things themselves apart from our minds ; but Conceptualism says that it is a concept or general idea, while (ultra-) Nominalism says that it is a word or general name. (Compare 'Thomson, Laws of Thought, pp. 95-1 06 .) Essence of the species, the universal, or general fact, the presence of which constitutes a class, whether it be name, idea, or self-existing entity. According to Locke, it is "conformity to the abstract idea" which makes us place things in this or that class; and this abstract or general idea is termed by him the Nominal Essence, as opposed to the Real Essence, the fundamental constitution or essential attribute of a thing. (See note to next section.) 1 3. Classis, class. " Class " does not seem to have been used in the singular during the seventeenth century, though the plural form frequently occurs. Ja;k, here probably a " bottle-jack," used for roasting meat. Real essence of substances, the real but unknowable constitu- tion of things, upon which their knowable qualities depend. This, as he points out, is quite distinct from the " abstract idea " of the species, which he calls the nominal essence. His 264 Notes. pp. 5762. objection to the Realist doctrine is, that it confuses the two things. For tivo species may be one, etc. In other words, it is just as absurd to suppose the nominal essence and the real essence both to be the essence of the species, as it would be to suppose that two different classes of things are the same class. There can no more be two essences to one class, than one class for two essences. The internal constitution of the individual and the "abstract idea" of the class cannot both be the fact which constitutes the class. But we know that " conformity to the abstract idea" does distinguish things into classes. Therefore, the internal constitution does not. Alterations may or may not be. The relative is omitted : " which may or may not." Compare Shakspere : " In war was never lion raged more fierce. Richard II., ii. i, 173. In determining the species of things. We can easily decide whether a given thing belongs to a class if only the " essence of the species," the fact which constitutes the class, is our " abstract idea " ; because we can come to an agreement that the " abstract idea " (connotation of the class name) shall contain just such and such attributes, and no others. If the given thing possesses just those attributes, it belongs to the class ; if not, not. But if we make participation in the same real essence the test of belonging to a class, we shall never be certain whether a given thing belongs to the class or not ; be- cause we can never be certain what amount of external likeness implies the possession of the same internal constitution, or real essence. 1 6. By nominal essence Locke means the connotation of the class-name, the group of attributes implied by the name : for instance, animality, rationality, a given shape, etc., in the case of Man. Hence, of course, the name Man will be applied where this group of attributes is found. Notes. 265 pp. 6266. 17. The one. This is the doctrine of Realism, described above, note to sec. 12. 1 8. Parcel, a small part or portion. French, parcelle, from Latin particula, the diminutive of pars. (Compare the word parcel gilt; and A. V., Genesis xxxiii. 19.) Insensible parts. The parts not perceptible by the senses. (Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum, Lib. ii. sec. 7.) Fixedness. Locke explains this elsewhere as " a power to remain in the fire unconsumed." Fixed means not volatile, not capable of being evaporated. 19. Ingenerable, cannot be generated or produced. Aris- totle lays down that Form or Essence is ingenerable in Bk. VI. of the Metaphysics ; what is produced in any given case is the embodiment of the Form in Matter. Locke's argument in this section brings into relief the half-concealed distinction between v.'hat is Aristotle's meaning of Form or Essence, and that current in Locke's time, which he denotes by the term Real Essence. " Real Essence," according to Locke, is, after all, material ; it is "a structure" or " inward constitution," of things ; whereas Aristotle intended to express by the words Form or Essence the exact opposite of Matter the formative principle not yet em- bodied in Matter. Besides the Author, except the Author ; not, of course, as well as the Author. As perhaps that figure exists not anywhere exactly marked out. " There exist no real things exactly conformable to the definitions [of Geometry]. There exist no points without magnitude ; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight ; no circles with all their radii exactly equal, nor squares with all their angles perfectly right." (Mill, Logic, i. p. 259.) Com- pare Henry More, Antidote against Atheism. (Appendix ; p. 147, Edit. 1662.) " The exact idea of a circle or triangle is rather hinted to us from those described in matter, than taught us by them." 266 Notes. pp. 6770. CHAPTER IV. 2. Intimate real existence. The simple idea red, and the idea of the substances/if/, have each a real or archetype pattern, of which they are ectypes or copies. This external reality is supposed to exist independently of the ideas, although we can have no knowledge of it, save by means of them. 4. Capable of being defined. Descartes had already pointed out that we must distinguish between what has to be defined before it is understood and what can be clearly known in it- self. He preceded Locke in asserting that names of " simple ideas," as Locke termed them, are indefinable. So, too, the writers of the Port Royal Logic, published in 1662, see Part I. Chap. xiii. Sir W. Hamilton says that the observation had been made " by Aristotle, and after him by many others ; while subsequent to Descartes, and previous to Locke, Pascal and the Port Royal Logicians, to say nothing of a paper by Leibnitz, in 1684, had reduced it to a matter of commonplace." (Reid's Works, p. 220, note.) 6. What a definition is. Locke's account of the term definition, although agreeing with ordinary use, is much vaguer than that given by most logicians. He includes, for instance, what they call descriptions, as well as definitions proper. ^Compare Mill, Logic, vol. i. pp. 155-160.) 7. Incapable of being defined. Compare the Port Royal Logic. " It would be impossible to define all words ; for in order to define a word we must of necessity have others which may designate the idea to which we may wish to attach that word ; and if we still wish to define the words which we have employed for the explication of it, we should still have need of others, and so on to infinity. It, therefore, is necessary Notes. 267 pp. 70, 71. that we stop at some primitive terms which cannot be defined ; and it would be as great a fault to wish to define too much as not to define enough, because by one or the other we should fall into that confusion which we pretend to avoid." (Professor T. S. Baynes' transl. p. 85.) Several terms, several ideas, different, distinct, individual. (Cf. A. V., 2 Kings, xv. 5; Rev. xxi. 21.) Below, in this section, the word is used in its more recent and ordinary sense. (Cf. note to Chap. ii. sec. 7.) 8. Act of a being in power, etc. " Who is there that ever comprehended the nature of motion better through this de- finition Actus entisin potentia quatenus in potentia? Is not the idea which nature gives us of it a hundred times more clear than this? And who is there that has. ever learned from it any of the properties of motion ? " (Port Royal Logic, p. 1 68.) The seventeenth-century opponents of Scholasticism constantly strove to throw ridicule on the definitions given by Aristotle, especially those of Motion, Light (compare sec. 10 of this chapter), and the Soul. These definitions were, indeed, expressed in strictly technical terms, and of technical terms the new schools had a great horror. It is clear that "the man of very ordinary capacity " would derive no practical in- formation from such definitions. But the mistake made was to suppose that the definitions were ever intended to afford useful information to such a person. All strictly scientific de- finitions, such as those of Geometry, are open to the same objections, and can be defended on the same grounds, as those of Aristotle. They aim at showing us the relation borne by the thing defined to the whole system of the science. Their purpose, as Mill says (Logic, i. p. 59), is "to serve as the land- marks of scientific classification " ; to point out the position some one thing occupies in reference to an arrangement of things in general. Given a comprehension of what Aristotle means by Act, Power, etc., given his view of what are the 268 Notes. pp. 70, 71. ultimate realities of the universe, and then the definitions are anything but " exquisite jargon." Mr. Spencer's dennition of Evolution as " an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion ; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation," might fairly "puzzle any rational man," until he took the trouble to find out what was meant by such terms as integration, homogeneity, heterogeneity, etc. ; but this would be no argument against its value or validity. But, in addition to this, we must remember that Locke and Aristotle often (as here) mean quite different things by De- finition. The former means by it an " analysis of the sub- jective impression," which the thing defined produces in the mind ; while the latter means by it an account of the objective cause of the phenomenon. And, although we cannot analyze the simple idea which Light or Motion produces in us, we can assign the cause of Light or Motion, the essential con- ditions which invariably accompany it or produce it. (Compare Mansel, Appendix to Aldrich, C.) It is difficult to explain in a few words the real meaning of Aristotle's definition of motion (9 rov fivi/arov jj 8vvar6v eVreXe'^eta Kivr)(rts turtv, Phys. I. iii ), as that would involve a further explanation of one of the fundamental points of his Meta- physics. Actus (tvfpytia) and potentia (dwdfjus) are with him primary conceptions, in reality simpler than that of Motion, Light, etc., though acquired by us long after these latter. What he undertakes to do is to express Motion in terms of these. But, in the first place, Aristotle regards Motion (niv^o-is) as almost equivalent to Change (/xera/SoXTj). He defines it as the energy or activity of a thing only potentially real ; in other words, as the becoming real of a thing which is not at present real. Change is realization. A house is being built ; a heap of bricks is being changed into a house. The house is at first potentially present in the bricks ; it is present in potentia, iv After a time it is really and actually present ; present Notes. 269 pp. 70, 71. in actu, tv evfpyda. In the interim there is Change or Motion, Kivrj etc. I have not been able to trace this definition in any of the early Cartesians. Descartes' own definition of motion is " the action by which a body passes from one place to another," or, more fully, " the transporting of one part of matter or of one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it, or which we regard as at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies." (Princ. Philos. part ii. sec. 25.) 10. The act of perspicuous, etc. Aristotle gives this de- finition of Light in the De Anima, II. vii. ($ws 8e ta-nv ff TOVTOV fvtpyeia TOV 8iaance, found them to be what we now call the Scoter (CEdemia nigra), a kind of duck. He subsequently gave an account of them in the Philos. Trans, (vol. xv. p. 1041). It was this bird that Locke in all probability had in his mind. Blood and entrails of a hog. The Porpoises belong to the mammalian order Cetacea, and possess the same general characteristics as the mammals which live on land. Ray speaks of " the Porpoise, which as his English name Porpesse, i.e. Porcpiscese, imports, resembles the hog both in the strength of his snout and also in the manner of getting his food by rooting." (Discourses on the Creation, p. 122, Edit. 1827.) Lowest of one and highest of the other. In point of fact the animal and vegetable kingdoms most nearly approach each other in their lowest forms. There is little resemblance between a rose and the very undeveloped animals classed as Protozoa, but there is a considerable resemblance between the simplest plants (Algae) and the Protozoa. It is often uncertain whether a particular species should be ranked in the vegetable or animal kingdoms. Haeckel has suggested the formation of an intermediate " kingdom," in which to place these doubtful intermediate forms. With higher development comes diver- gence. 14. Substantial beings, " Substances," concrete things. For if it should stand here, etc. Locke seems to mean, that it would be nonsense to say, "we can never know what are the precise number of properties depending on " the nominal essence of gold, because the nominal essence is simply the group of attributes implied by the name, when used Notes. 285 pp. 117119. (as it generally is) as a common noun. In his example Locke seems to be using the term gold as a proper noun, a mere arbitrary mark to designate this individual given piece of matter, and as not implying the existence of known attributes. The real essence of this individual fragment of matter, he says, we do not know ; therefore, we do not know all the properties depending on it ; and hence we cannot place it in the class to which it belongs by nature, supposing such a class to exist. But the last two or three sentences in the section are not quite clear. 21. As by examination we find to be united together. This shows that Locke felt that the classification and definition of " substances " was not entirely " arbitrary." (Cf. Introduction, p. 25.) Specific essence, essence of the species. Cf. note to Chap iii. sec. 12. There be that say. For the omission of the demonstrative pronoun, compare Shakspere, Othello, iii. 3, 157. The Cartesians are meant. Descartes and his followers held that the essence of body lies in extension ; that what we mean by body is, in the ultimate analysis, occupation of space. Locke, on the other hand, maintained that, in addition to ex- tension, the idea of body involves " solidity," that is, impene- trability and resistance to compression. " Solidity is so inseparable an idea from body that upon that depends its filling of space, its contact, impulse, and communication of motion from impulse . . . Body and extension, it is evident, are two distinct ideas." (Essay, Bk. II. Chap. xiii. sec. 11.) The Cartesians so completely identified extension with body, that they held that no such thing as a perfect vacuum, positively empty space, can exist ; there cannot be extension without body. (Cf. Descartes, Princ. Philos., Pt. II. sees. 11-12, 16-18.) Putting tJie essence of anything for the thing itself. We can 286 Notes. pp. 120121. substitute the attributes implied by the class name (nominal essence) for the name itself, and a proposition in which it occurs will still remain true. If the proposition does not remain true it will show that our own assumed connotation is not the correct one, it is not the true " specific essence," though it is our own " nominal essence," the " essence in respect of us." Locke here means by " specific essence " the true " no- minal essence," such a connotation of the class name as a being gifted with perfect knowledge would give it. Locke has no right to assume such an objective specific essence, since on his principles all species are equally arbitrary. Yet he here and elsewhere recognizes, to some extent, an appeal to an external standard, " by which we may at least try the truth of these nominal essences." (Cf. Introduction, p. 25.) 22. Creatures in the ivorld. Ourangs, &c. Naturals, idiots. Cf. Shakspere : " For this drivelling love is like a great natural." (JK.omeo and Juliet, ii. 4, 95 Mff.) Have hairy tails. See Marco Polo, Bk. III. Chap, xv., with Marsden's note, p. 613 of his edition. Pliny, Hist. Nat., Bk. VII. Chap. ii. Even quite recently it has been several times asserted that tails are common among the Niam-Niams in Central Africa. (Cf. the curious note on page 216, vol. ix. Series II. of the Dictionnaire encyclopedique des Sciences medicales, edited by Dr. Dechambre.) Males have no beards. This is not unusual. (Cf. the work just cited, vol. viii. Series I., article Barbe.) Females have. For a learned and interesting note on the very unusual growth of beards on women, cf. the Lancet, 1852, vol. i. p. 421. Aristotle tells us that certain priestesses in Caria had beards (Hist. Anim, Bk. III. Chap. x. sec. 7) ; and Lam- bert Daneau, in his commentary on St. Augustine's book, De Notes. 287 pp. 121, 122. Haeresibus (Cap. 97, p. 240, original edit., 1578), tells us that among the Georgians the women were similarly decorated. No part of that going into our specific idea. Our ideas of things are simply compounded of groups of attributes, and we know nothing of the real essence which gives rise to the attributes. Changeling, an idiot. The literal meaning is that of a child changed at birth, especially by the fairies, who were supposed to take away mortal children to be their servants. (Cf. Shak- spere, Mitts. Night's Dream " She, as her attendant, hath A lovely boy stol'n from an Indian king ; She never had so sweet a changeling." ii. i, 21 seg.) Locke often refers to facts connected with idiocy, etc., and is one of the earliest writers on mental science who have ap- pealed to abnormal or pathological cases. (Cf. Essay, Bk. IV. Chap. iv. sees. 13-15.) Drill. Some African species of monkey. The origin of the word is uncertain. Richardson connects it with " drivel," an idiot. But in all probability it is of African origin. Buffon, in two foot-notes, kindly pointed out to me by Prof. Newton, speaks of " mandrill " as a term used by the English living on the coast of Guinea, but one of which they could give no explana- tion ; and adds a very wild suggestion of his own as to its origin. (Cf. his Hist. Nat, Quadrupedes, torn. vii. [Paris, 1788], pp. 97 and 99.) Buffon identifies the mandrill, or drill (he seems to consider the latter word an abbreviation of the former) with the orang-outang. 23. Women have conceived by drills. Cf. Licetus, De Monstrorum Causis. Bk. II. Chap. Ixviii. Jumart. This is a French word; origin uncertain, accord- ing to Littre. 288 Notes. pp. 123127. Issue of a cat and a rat, " This cannot be true ; but if it were ? Are there, therefore, no mere cats and no mere rats ? " (Hallam, Hist, of Literature, iv. p. 147, note referring to this passage.) 25. Have been established long before sciences. This, how- ever, does not prevent us from correcting the use of general names by inquiry. Such a correction is, indeed, always going on. (Cf. Mill, Logic, i. pp. 171-6; ii. p. 217 seq.) "Lan- guage, as Sir J. Mackintosh used to say of government, is not made, but grows A name is not imposed at once and by previous purpose upon a class of objects, but is first applied to one thing, and then extended by a series of transitions to another and another." (Ib. i. 173.) 26. Animal rationale. This, the " sacred definition " of the Aristotelians, is found in Porphyrii Isagoge, Cap. iii. Duval's edition of Aristotle (1629), vol. i. p. 6. Compare Aristotle's Politics, Lib. I. Cap. 2, p. 1253, sec. 10, \oyov Se uv6p v f- Animal implume, etc. " Plato having defined a man to be an animal with two legs, without feathers, and having gained great applause thereby, he [Diogenes, the Cynic] stript a cock, and brought him into his school, and said, ' Here is Plato's man for you ' : which occasioned him to add to his definition, with broad nails." (Diogenes Laertius, 13 k. VI., transl., 1688, i. p. 414.) Acted, driven, moved, animated. " If I shall be told that I am acted by prejudice, I am sure it is an honest prejudice." Spectator, No. 287. Menage. Giles Menage (1613-1692), advocate, and after- wards priest, a well-known writer on language. His chief work was Les Origines de la Langue Frangoise, published in 1650. But he is perhaps still better known by the collection of anecdotes, Notes. 289 pp. 127, 128. table talk, etc., called "Menagiana, ou les Bons-mots et Remarques critiques, historiques, morales, et d'erudition de Monsieur Menage, recueillees par ses Amis." The reference to VAbbt Malotru occurs on p. 95, vol. ii. of the Edition of 1729 (Paris). And yet there can be no reason. Cf. Essay, Bk. IV. Chap, iv. sees. 15-16. 27. Amongst vien. Locke possibly says " amongst men * in order not to deny too positively the existence of species " made by nature," but not known to men as such. (Cf. In- troduction, p. 25.) Licetus Fortunio Liceti, an Italian physician (died 1657), author of De Ortu Animae Humanae, De Novis Astris, and other scientific works. Locke's reference is to his Book De Monstrorum Causis : the editions of 1634 and 1668, both published at Padua, contain engravings of this wonderful and certainly fabulous monster. (Cf. Lib. II. Cap. Ixviii. of the same work.) On the subject of " Monsters," cf. the article by C. Davaine in the Dictionnaire encyclopedique des Sciences medicales, vol. ix. Series II. As to make but one idea. The ideas which compose the signification of the word, its connotation, must be capable of being " united in a possible object of intuition." There must be no impediment to our putting together the various elements ; such as would happen if the component ideas were in ex- pressed or implied contradiction, or had no conceivable con- nection. (Cf. Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, pp. 23 seq.} In forming an idea of a class of natural things we are spared this difficulty because the several elements of our idea (e.g. shape, colour, etc.), have been already actually united in the thing itself, and thus can be united again. But Locke in the next section admits that we may suppose elements to co-exist which do not actually co-exist. U 290 Notes. pp. 130136. Be exactly the same, should not differ from time to time. Locke does not discuss this requirement at length, as he does the first. Serve to, serve for. To and for are often interchanged. In Elizabethan English, and still in the northern counties, the question would run, " What will you have to dinner ? " (Cf. St. Matthew, iii. 9. Abbot, Shakspearian Grammar, sec. 186.) Be not some -way answering, do not in some way answer to, etc. Babel. Cf. Genesis, xi. 1-9. 29. Various, varying. Fancy, probably means imagination. The word has now a stronger suggestion of arbitrariness or unreasonableness than it used to have when it was employed simply to denote the faculty of imagination or representation . Fancy is Phantasy, misspelled, (tyavravln, from (fravrdfa, to show, make visible). Balaam's ass. Cf. Numbers, xxii. 28 seq. In a good picture, etc, A bad instance for Locke, since we do not really suppose the other qualities are present. When we say, This is a lion, we mean, This represents a lion. But the general statement is nevertheless true. All recognition of objects is really rapid and unconscious inference from the presence of one or two attributes to the presence of the object itself with the rest of the attributes. (Cf. Mill, Logic, ii. 186-8.) 30. // requires much time, pains, and skill. Here we have another admission from Locke that species are not entirely " arbitrary." (Cf. Chap. ix. sec. 1 1 ; Chap. xi. sec. 24.) 32. Lowest species. A Lowest Species (infima species) is the narrowest Real kind to which an individual thing can be referred. Thus Napoleon is a man, he is an animal, and he is Notes. 291 pp. 137144. an organized creature. Man is the lowest species, because no other real kind can be found to place between this and the in- dividual Napoleon. If we divide up the class Man, we divide it not into other classes but into separate individuals. The Lowest Species is thus a species which cannot become a genus. (Cf. Thomson, Laws of Thought, pp. 77-8.) To that purpose. For that purpose. (Cf. note to sec. 28.) 34. In St. James's Park. Allusions to the collection of strange animals in St. James's Park occur several times in the diaries of Pepys and Evelyn. (Cf. Evelyn, i. pp. 389-90 ; iii. p. 136 [Ed. 1852] ; Pepys, ii. p. 9 [Ed. 1849].) Spanish broom. Sparlium juncetim ; belonging to ' the order Leguminosae, grows in Southern Europe ; its coarse fibres are used for making rope, rough cloth, etc. Knew probably as much. Locke means that on his learning the name of the birds, newly imported into the language, he learned nothing freSh about the birds themselves. When he first saw the birds he knew as much about them as most Englishmen do of birds whose names they are well acquainted with. In both cases the knowledge came from observation. 38. Shock and a hound. A shock, or shough, was a rough- coated kind of dog. The name is perhaps connected with shag, which means rough : and we find the compound shag- dog. A hound is a hunting-dog ; and Dr. Caius, in his treatise Of English Dogs, absurdly derives " hound " from "hunt." " It signifieth such a dog only as serveth to hunt, and therefore it is called a hound." (Cf. also Macbeth, iii. i, 93 seq.) 39. Strings and physies. The latter word stands probably for fusee, the name of the cone round which the chain, or "string," is wound. It is the French _/.$&, a spindle. U 2 2 92 Notes. pp. 147156. 42. The greatest part of mixed modes being actions. Thus virtue, glory, murder, are the names of actions, evanescent events, or can be ultimately resolved into them, while the moving causes of the events are men, who are " substances " or " concrete things." 44. Kinneah and nionph. See next section. Lamech, Adah. Cf. Genesis, iv. 18 seq. 45. Which I think answer. Mr. Jacobs tells me that Locke's prehistoric philology is somewhat at fault here. In their original meaning both kinneah and nionph express physiolo- gical processes ; the former, e.g., meaning " getting red in the face from excitement," which may be of almost any kind : jealousy, as in Cant. viii. 6 ; rivalry, as Eccles. iv. 4 ; zeal, as Isaiah, ix. 6 ; or anger, Ps. Ixxix. 5. " Jealousy," therefore, scarcely " answers " kinneah, though " adultery " does nionph, so far as it is used in the Old Testament. 46. Bdng to represent, having to represent. For this use of to be, where we should employ to have, cf. Shakspere : " What stuff 'tis made of, whereof it is born I am to learn." Merchant of Venice, i. r, 5. 49. They have supposed a real essence. Locke, perhaps, does not mean that they consciously and knowingly assumed a real essence ; though the general tendency of philosophy at his time was to mistake natural and unconscious inferences for deliberate and conscious ones. 50. All gold is fixed may mean, says Locke, (i) that the idea fixed is a part of the complex idea gold; or (2) that the property of fixedness belongs to the concrete something we call gold, the something which has a given internal constitution, or real essence quite unknowable by us. This latter statement, Notes. 293 pp. 156160. thinks Locke, though intelligible after a fashion, is of no use. We cannot know gold as a concrete thing apart from the mind, but only as a group of ideas in the mind. We cannot tell whether this particular piece of matter has a certain real essence, viz., that of gold ; we can only tell whether this particular group of ideas, to which we give the name gold, does or does not include the idea of fixedness as a part of it. This passage shows as clearly as any in Locke how com- pletely his theory of knowledge, as the perception of agree- ment or disagreement between our ideas, shut him off from making affirmations about real things, and confined his propo- sitions to statements about the relations between ideas. (Cf. Introduction, p. 17 ; and note to Chap. x. sec. 17.) CHAPTER VII. 2. In train, coherently, connectedly. 3. Discoursing, reasoning. Discourse is seldom used as a verb in this sense, though often (in sixteenth and seventeenth century writers) as a noun. Cf. Shakspere : " Sure, he that made us with such large discourse, Looking before and after, gave us not That capability and god-like reason To fust in us unused." (Hamlet, iv. 4, 36 seq.) 4. Intimation, suggestion. 294 Notes. pp. 160162. Stands, halting-places. Cf. Shakspere : " Like Romans, neither foolish in our -stands Nor cowardly in retire." (Coriolamis, i. 6, 2.) In the Hebrew tongue there is a particle. This may be either the particle V " in," or /' " to," each of which is prefixed to Hebrew words, and is analyzed by Gesenius into some forty variations of meaning, and has been made the subject of a separate treatise by German scholars. s 5. Discretive, disjunctive. Minor of a syllogism. The syllogism is a formal way of stating our reasoning so as to exhibit clearly the premises, or ground of the conclusion. There are always two premises ; the first, called the major, makes some general statement, while the second, the minor, brings a particular case under it. (See Thomson, Laws of Thought, pp. 143-5.) 6. Other significations. On the use of but cf. Earle, Philology of the English Tongue, sec. 549. Explication, explanation. In this one, in the case of this one sign. Cf. Shakspere ; " Almost all Repent in their election." (Coriolanus, ii. 3, 263.) Cf. Abbot, Shakespearian Grammar, sec. 162. Notes. 295 pp. 163165. CHAPTER VIII. I. Abstract and concrete terms. A concrete term is the name of a thing ; an abstract term is the name of an attribute of a thing. Thus child is a concrete, childhood an abstract, term. Adjectives are properly concrete terms ; they are names applicable to all the things of a certain sort ; "snow is white," means that snow is a white thing. But they are sometimes used to signify a quality instead of a thing, as, for instance, " white (= whiteness) is the prevailing colour in the arctic regions ;" they are then abstract. An abstract term is not the name of an " abstract idea." An abstract idea (in Locke) is a general idea, the name of which is called a general term, and includes both concrete and abstract terms. (See Introduction, p. 14.) Intuitive knowledge. Direct knowledge got by merely looking at (intueor) a thing, as opposed to knowledge got by inference or reasoning. " For if we will reflect on our ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by them- selves, without the intervention of any other : and this, I think, we may call ' intuitive knowledge.' " (Essay, Bk. IV. Chap. ii. sec. i.) Allowed, approved, recognized. Bacon, "And surely I do best allow of a division of that kind, though in more familiar and scholastical terms." (Advancement of Learning, O7 Bk. II. Chap. vii. sec. I ; see also Prayer Book Psalms, xi. 6.) All our affirmations Men are only in concrete. Cf. Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, p. 67. 2. The Schools. The " Schools," here used metaphorically for the teachers of the scholastic philosophy. The name Schoolmen (scholastici) was originally applied to those who taught in the schools instituted by Charlemagne ; it was after- 29^ Notes. pp. 165168. wards extended to all those who taught and developed the system of philosophy professed in these monastic schools. (See notes to Chap. x. sees. 2, 6.) The term Schools is still used at Oxford and Cambridge to denote the University lecture rooms, and also certain exercises held there. There was nothing necessarily ridiculous in this attempt to coin abstract terms for purely logical and metaphysical purposes. Of course such words sounded uncouth, but this is a common fault of all purely technical terms. We speak of quality and quantity \ why should we laugh at quiddity ? Amongst curious examples is the famous term haecceity, abstract of the demonstrative pronoun, equivalent to thisness. And even proper names fur- nished corresponding abstracts ; e.g., Petreity, from Peter. Consciousness to themselves. Consciousne^ or self-con- sciousness. (Cf. the Latin expression, conscius s*'\) Humanitas, says Locke, meant the state or condition of being humane, as humanity does with us ; not the state or condition of being a man. This, however, is a mistake, since it is often used in the latter sense, e.g., by Cicero, in De Oratore, Bk. I. Chap, xii., and in many other places. CHAPTER IX. 2. Indifferent. That is, not in their nature attached to particular ideas. The word " Horse" would serve just as well as the word " Man " to signify what we mean by the latter. 3. Commerce, intercourse, not necessarily by way of trade. Notes. 297 pp. 169173. 4. Arbitrary imposition. Words, however, were not connected with ideas by mere exercise of self-will on the part of men ; some sort of reason led to the use of a particular sound to signify a particular idea. (Cf. note to Chap. i. sec. 5. See also Mill, Logic, ii. pp. 239 scq. ; Thomson, Laws of Thought, pp. 33-45-) 5. Naturally, of their own nature. 7. The word " sham," " -wheedle," or "banter." Apparently none of these occur before the second half of the seventeenth century. In the Tatler, Number 230, "sham" and "banter" are ironically described as " modern terms of art." North, in his Examen, gives the following improbable account of the former : " The word sham is true cant of the Newmarket breed. It is contracted of ashamed. The native signification is a town lady of diversion in countryman's clothes, who, to make good her disguise, pretends to be so 'shantd: thence, it became proverbial " . . . . The word wheedle is to be found in Butler's Hudibras, Part III. Canto i. 760, where he speaks of reasons, " Which ralliers, in their wit and drink, Do rather wheedle with than think." This was published in 1678. It is also to be found in Blunt's Glossographia, Edit. 1661 : " Whead or Wheadle is a late word of fancy, and signifies to draw one in, by fair words or subtile insinuation, to act anything of disadvantage or reproof." In the later editions he gives a wildly improbable etymology. Swift says of banter : " This polite word of theirs was first borrowed from the bullies in White Friars, then fell among the footmen, and at last retired to the pedants, by whom it is as properly applied to the production of wit, as if I should apply it to Sir Isaac Newton's mathematics." (Tale of a Tub, Author's Apology.) 298 Notes. pp. 174181. 9. Moral words. Words signifying ideas belonging to Ethics and the other " moral " sciences. ii. Characteristical notes. We cannot, says Locke, put together arbitrary collections of ideas to be types of classes of external things. We must in this case "accommodate our complex ideas to real existences." (Cf. note to Chap. vi. sec. 30.) 13. Ideas that are found to coexist. Practically, tdea'm this and similar passages is equivalent to attribute. (Introduction, p. ii.) Locke means that the name of a concrete thing, e.g., Dog, simply signifies the various attributes implied by the name ; in other words, the nominal essence. It cannot possibly signify, or bring before the mind, the unknown internal con- stitution which is the cause and origin of the various qualities, and which he calls the real essence. Powers. By powers is meant " the aptness ... in any substance to give or receive such alterations of primary qualities as that the substance so altered should produce in us different ideas from what it did before." " Powers, therefore, make a great part of our complex ideas of substances. . . For, to speak truly, yellowness is not actually in gold ; but is a power in gold to produce that idea in us by our eyes when placed in a due light." (Essay, Bk. II. Chap, xxiii. sees. 9-10.) 14. Who shall determine in this case. Locke means to point out that there is no authority to decide on the exact connotation of the names of concrete things. Each individual thing has a vast number of different attributes ; the class name cannot signify all of these, because no two things are alike in every particular. A selection has to be made ; but who is to select the attributes which the name is to be understood to imply ? In practice, as we have said (note to Chap. vi. sec. 30), the name connotes different selections of attributes, according Notes. 299 pp. 181188. to the occasion of its use. A human being possesses an almost infinite number of attributes. But when the word Man is used by a sculptor or biologist, it connotes chiefly, or merely, phy- sical attributes ; when, on the other hand, it is used by a theologian or moralist, it connotes chiefly, or merely, moral attributes. 1 5. Known seminal propagation, known to be propagated by seed. 1 6. Determined, determinate, fixed, settled. Ingenious had in the seventeenth century a stronger meaning than it has now, viz., possessed of genius. Main. The main point. We still use main as a noun-sub- stantive to denote an ocean. 17. Straitfy, strictly. Strait, straight, strict, stretch, and strain, are all connected, though, of course, not by way of direct derivation. The primary idea is to strain, or stretch tight. Property. An attribute not connoted by the name of a thing, but always found in conjunction with the attributes so implied, is called a property (proprium}. It thus forms no part of the nominal essence. The attribute of having equal angles is a property of equilateral triangles ; it is not contained in the definition, but is, nevertheless, always found along with the possession of equal sides. 1 8. But barely that perception they immediately signify. The names of simple ideas are never supposed to signify any- thing beyond that simple attribute denoted by them ; the word " red" means the colour red, and nothing else. Whereas the names of substances are constantly supposed to refer, not to the collection of attributes (nominal essence) which they really do signify, but to their unknowable inner constitution (real essence). (Cf. Chap. vi. sec. 49.) 300 Notes. pp. 189, 190. 21. Exception, objection. This discourse of the understanding, (sc. the Essay.) The preposition 0/was often used (till late in the eighteenth century) where we use on : compare, e.g., the title of Hume's work, the Treatise of Human Nature, and the titles of chapters in the Essay. Even now we say "dependent on," but " independent of" The first two books of the Essay deal with the origin of our ideas, " the ways whereby the understanding comes to be fur- nished with them," and analyze compound ideas into their simple elements. The fourth, and last, book deals with the nature and reality of knowledge. Locke tells us here, and elsewhere (cf. Bk. II. Chap, xxiii. sec. 19), that when he had finished the first part of his inquiry, contained in Bks. I. and II., he found that an inquiry into " the nature, use, and signifi- cation of language" was necessary before he proceeded to the matters treated of in Bk. IV. ; for though his inquiry was not to be a merely grammatical one, but " terminated in things," yet, as words are the means of registering and expressing our thoughts, it became necessary to consider them separately. He accordingly devotes Bk. III. to this subject. (Cf. Mr. Fox Bourne, Life of Locke, ii. pp. 101-2, who thinks that Locke had actually begun Bk. IV. before he found it necessary to write what is now Bk. III.) 22. The Greek authors. Locke, like Bacon, has the pro- foundest contempt for ancient and mediaeval philosophers, and seldom loses an opportunity of throwing a stone at them. The present charge cannot be confined to " Greek authors," but must in fairness be brought against all philosophers. As Locke says afterwards, " Tnere is scarce any sect in philosophy has not a distinct set of terms that others understand not." (Chap. x. sec. 14.) Every original writer is obliged to attach his special meaning to the technical terms he uses. Definitions of terms, though placed first, are the results, rather than the causes, of Notes. 301 pp. 191193, divergence of views. Thus Locke's special use of the words substance, essence, etc., differs from the use of preceding writers, the schoolmen, Cartesians, etc. (Cf. note to Chap. x. sec. 2.) CHAPTER X. On the subject of this chapter it may be worth while to quote the following section from Locke's Conduct of the Under- standing : " I have copiously enough spoken of the abuse of words in another place, and therefore shall upon this reflection, that the sciences are full of them, warn those that would conduct their understandings right not to take any term, however authorized by the language of the schools, to stand for anything till they have an idea of it. A word may be of frequent use and great credit with several authors, and be by them made use of, as if it stood for some real being ; but yet if he that reads cannot frame any distinct idea of that being, it is certainly to him a mere empty sound without a meaning, and he learns no more by all that is said of it or attributed to it than if it were affirmed only of that bare empty sound. They who would advance in knowledge, and not deceive and swell themselves with a little articulated air, should lay down this as a funda- mental rule, not to take words for things, nor suppose that names in books signify real entities in nature, till they can frame clear and distinct ideas of those entities. It will not, perhaps, be allowed if I should set down substantial forms and intentional species, as such that may justly be suspected to be of this kind of insignificant terms. But this, I am sure, to 302 Notes. p. 193. one that can form no determined ideas of what they stand for, they signify nothing at all ; and all that he thinks he knows about them is to him so much knowledge about nothing, and amounts at most but to a learned ignorance. It is not without all reason supposed that there are many such empty terms to be found in some learned writers, to which they had recourse to etch out their systems where their understandings could not furnish them with conceptions from things. But yet I believe the supposing of some realities in nature, answering those and the like words, have perplexed some and quite misled others in the study of nature. That which in any discourse signifies / know not what, should be considered I know not when. Where men have any conceptions, they can, if they are ever so abstruse or abstracted, explain them, and the terms they use for them. For our conceptions being nothing but ideas, which are all made oip of simple ones, if they cannot give us the ideas their words stand for, it is plain they have none. To what purpose can it be to hunt after his conceptions who has none, or none distinct ? He that knew not what he himself meant by a learned term, cannot make us know anything by his use of it, let us beat our heads about it ever so long. Whether we are able to comprehend all the operations of nature and the manners of them, it matters not to enquire ; but this is certain, that we can comprehend no more of them than we can dis- tinctly conceive ; and, therefore, to obtrude terms where we have no distinct conceptions, as if they did contain, or rather conceal, something, is but an artifice of learned vanity, to cover a defect in a hypothesis or our understandings. Words are not made to conceal, but to declare and show something ; where they are by those, who pretend to instruct, otherwise used, they conceal indeed something, but that which they conceal is nothing but the ignorance, error, or sophistry of the talker, for there is, in truth, nothing else under them." (Section 28, Words.} 2. In this kind, that is, in the class of " wilful faults and neglects." Notes. 303 pp. 193, 194. Clear and distinct ideas. " As a clear idea is that whereot the mind has such a full and evident perception as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-disposed organ, so a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a \ difference from all other." (Essay, Bk. II. Chap. xxix. sec. 4.) In the Epistle to the Reader, prefixed to the Essay, Locke explains that he means by the expression " clear and distinct," determinate, that is fixed and settled. But his explanation is rather confused, and may for our purposes be neglected. Two sorts. "The idols imposed by words on the under- standing are of two kinds. They are either names of things which do not exist (for as there are things left unnamed through lack of observation, so likewise are there names which result from fantastic suppositions, and to which nothing in reality corresponds), or they are names of things which exist, but yet confused and ill-defined, and hastily and irregularly derived from realities. Of the former kind are Fortune, the Prime Mover \Primum Mobile], Planetary Orbits, Element of Fire, and like fictions which owe their origin to false and idle theories. And this class of idols is more easily expelled, because to get rid of them it is only necessary that all theories should be steadily rejected and dismissed as obsolete." (Bacon, Novum Organum, Bk. I. Aphorism 60 ; Spedding's transl.) Either affecting something singular. But, as Locke after- wards allows, when " men in the improvement of their know- ledge come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones," it is necessary either to invent new words, or else use old ones in a new signification. (Cf. Chap. xi. sec. 12.) And the latter course is open to special dangers, as the history of the sciences of Ethics and Political Economy shows. " So long as the pedantic objection to the introduction of new technical terms continues, accurate thinkers on moral and political subjects are limited to a very scanty vocabulary for the expression of their ideas." (Mill, Unsettled Ques- tions, p. 75.) This "pedantic objection" dates back to the 304 Notes. pp. 194, 195. Renascence, when writers became absolutely fanatical about the purity of their Latin style. Locke, however, in no way exaggerates the importance of affixing definite meanings to such new terms ; and his contempt for those who use political, scientific, or theological catchwords without attaching distinct ideas to them is not a bit too strong. Insignificant, that is, without signification. Mint Masters. The Master of the Mint is the title of the official who has the nominal superintendence of the Royal Mint. This is now usually the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Locke's friend, Sir Isaac Newton, was Master of the Mint from 1695 till his death. The Schoolmen. The mediaeval philosophers who taught in the monastic "schools" (Cf. note to Chap. viii. sec. 2), or followed the doctrines current there, are known as the School- men or Scholastics. Their systems were all, in the main, based on Aristotle, though they introduced modifications from Platonic, Arabian, and Jewish sources. Aristotelian doctrines were at first regarded with disfavour by the ecclesiastical authorities ; some of them were forbidden by a synod at Paris in 1209, and so late as 1231 the Physics and other treatises of Aristotle were censured by Pope Gregory IX.* Nevertheless Aris- totelianism, in a slightly modified form, became the dominant, and at length the exclusive, doctrine of the Schools ; and was gradually recognized as the orthodox philosophy in the Roman Catholic Church. In 1629 the Parliament of Paris decreed that to contradict Aristotle was to contradict the Church. The present Pope, Leo XIII., has recently issued an encyclical in which he strongly advocates the revived study of the works of St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), the greatest of the * It is perhaps open to question how far these ecclesiastical censures were due to the pantheistic interpretations and interpolations of the Arabic philosophers through whose translations Aristotle was made known to western Europe. Notes. 305 pp. 195, 196. Scholastics. Besides St. Thomas (the "Angelic Doctor"), may be mentioned St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury (d. 1109) ; Abelard (d. 1142) ; Alexander of Hales, the "Irre- fragable Doctor" (d. 1245) ; Albert the Great, the " Universal Doctor" (d. 1280); Duns Scotus, the "Subtle Doctor" (d. 1308); and William of Occam, the "Invincible Doctor" (d. 1347). At the Renascence, Platonic, Epicurean, and other ancient systems of philosophy were revived ; and as Aristotel- ianism became more and more sterile, and seemed incapable of any further development, it gradually succumbed to the at- tacks made on it from all sides, such as those of Giordano Bruno (burned, 1600), Bacon (d. 1626), Descartes (d. 1650), Gassendi (d. 1655), and Hobbes (d. 1679.) Though with little else in common, all these thinkers agreed in their contempt for the philosophy of the Schools, which had become firmly bound up with a rigid orthodoxy in religion, and opposition to the new scientific ideas. However, it lingered on at the Universities, both Catholic and Protestant, after a partial reversion to Aris- totle himself, in place of his commentators. Melancthon had been the means of its adoption by the Protestants. Oxford was formally pledged by the University Statutes to follow Aristotle ; a fine of five shillings was imposed on Bachelors or Masters of Arts who contradicted him. Locke's Essay was long regarded with suspicion and dislike by the academic authorities ; and, even when its use had become general, passages such as the present, in which the old system was ridiculed, seem to have been omitted by tutors. In the seventeenth century the modified Scholasticism held its position only by sheer force of prejudice and the conserva- tism natural to Universities. But we ought not to overlook the fact that Scholasticism had not always been equally barren. It had once been an earnest, and not altogether unsuccessful, attempt to give a thorough, complete, and systematic account of God, the universe, and man. Modern writers have done something towards modifying the harsh judgments of the pioneers of newer methods, whose position of antagonism X 306 Notes ; pp. 196198. made them unfair critics of the system they were attacking. To speak only of Englishmen, writers so divergent as Coleridge, Hamilton and Mill, for instance, invariably speak with respect of the acuteness, clearness, and subtlety of the Schoolmen. A readable, but superficial and not very reliable, account of the struggle with Aristotelianism will be found in Lewes, History of Philosophy, vol. ii. (See also Hallam, History of Literature, i. pp. 389 seq. ; ii. pp. 100 scq.) 5. // z's plain cheat and abuse. Locke of course exagge- rates. He himself is by no means consistent in his use even of technical terms. As he tells us later on, " But after all the provision of words is so scanty in respect of that infinite variety of thoughts that men wanting terms to suit their precise notion will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be forced often to use the same word in somewhat different senses." (Chap. xi. sec. 27.) Presently, at once, immediately. So, generally, in Shak- spere, e.g., Hamlet ii., 2, 170, 620. The two names, knave and fool. Constantly, always, ever. Wit had in Locke's time a wider and more serious significa- tion than it has now. It meant intelligence, acuteness. " Would steer too nigh the sands to boast his wit." (Dryden, Absalom and Achitophel, i. 162. Misplacings of counters. Counters were used on a board (abacus) for the purposes of easy calculation. In Shakspere's Winter's Tale the clown says, " Fifteen hundred shorn, what comes the wool to ? I cannot do it without counters." (iv. 3, 38.) 6. The peripatetic philosophy. " Hermippus relates that Ximocrates was head of the Academic school, when Aristotle was deputed by the Athenians ambassador to Philip ; but re- Notes. 307 pp. 198, 199. turning home and finding that the school was still in other hands than his own, he made choice of a place to walk in, in the Lyceum, where he accustomed himself so much to walk to and fro, while he instructed his disciples, that he was from thence called the Peripatetic, or the Walker." (Diogenes Laertius, transl. of 1688, i. pp. 322-3.) More probably the name comes directly from TrepiVaTot, the shady walks of the Lyceum where Aristotle lectured, and thus indirectly from TrfpiTrar/co. "Body" and "extension." The Cartesians held that the essence of body is extension. (Cf.note to Chap. vi. sec. 21.) The idea of body, according to Locke, however, includes the idea of extension and of " solidity " besides ; hence, while we can speak of the extension of body, we cannot speak of the body of exten- sion, because the former word implies impenetrability, which the latter excludes. Art of disputing. Academic exercises throughout the middle ages, and indeed until the present century, usually took the form of public disputations, in which a thesis was maintained by the candidate for a degree against appointed Examiners (as we should now call them), or against any who chose to enter the lists. "The schools, having made disputation the touchstone of men's abilities, and the criterion of know- ledge, adjudged victory to him that kept the field ; and he that had the last word was concluded to have the better of the argument, if not of the cause." (Essay, Bk. IV. Chap. vii. sec. 1 1.) "Something may be said in favour of that art of disputation against which so much eloquence has been expended. It was doubtless carried to a dangerous and ridiculous excess, and seems utterly worthless and wearisome now. Yet it was to the athletes of the Middle Ages what parliamentary debate has been to the English a good, though by no means an unmixed good, and far from the best. We may admit that the art was ineffectual as an instrument of research, and was so far inju- rious that it withdrew men's energies from patient contempla- tion of phenomena, and employed them in the easy but illusory X 2 308 Notes. pp. 199, 200. manipulation of formulas, thus rearing curious exotics sterile of all flowers and fruit. Nevertheless in those days any intel- lectual activity which could escape on the one hand from the oppression of barbarian indifference, and on the other from theological dictation, was of value." (Lewes, History of Philo- sophy, ii. p. 8. Cf. also Sir W. Hamilton's favourable opinion in his Discussions, pp. 679 seq. and note.) Details with respect to the scholastic disputations may be found in Mr. J. Bass Mullinger's University of Cambridge from the Earliest Times to 1535, Chap. iv. 7. Parts, talents. 8. Such as Luctan wittily and with reason taxes. The satirist, Lucian of Samosata (died about 190 A.D.), is constantly attacking the philosophers of his day, and Locke probably has no particular passage in his mind. (Cf. for instance, Vitarum auctio, or the Sale of the Philosophers, etc.) Admiration, wonder. "It seemeth the reprehension of Saint Paul was not only proper for those times, but prophetical for the times following ; and not only respective to divinity, but extensive to all know- ledge : Devita prof anas vocum novitates, et oppositiones falsi nominis scientiae. [i Timothy vi. 20.] For he assigneth two marks and badges of suspected and falsified science : the one, the novelty and strangeness of terms ; the other, the strictness of positions which of necessity doth induce oppositions, and so questions and altercations. Surely, like as many substances in nature which are solid do putrify and corrupt into worms ; so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrify and dissolve into a number of subtle, idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term them) vermiculate questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and life of spirit, but no soundness .of matter or goodness of quality. This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen who, having sharp and Notes. 309 pp. 201, 202. strong wits and abundance of leisure, and small variety of reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle, their dictator), as their persons were shut up in the cells of monasteries and colleges, and knowing little history either of nature or time, did out of no great quan- tity of matter and infinite agitation of wit spin out unto us those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books." Bacon, Advancement of Learning, Bk. I. Chap iv. sec. 5. Small advantage to human life. It is worth while to re- member, that " as an engine of science, an instrument of dis- covery, logic never, even by the schoolmen, was proposed." (Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works, note p. 701. Compare Bacon, Novum Organum, Bk. I. Aphorisms, 11 seq.} 9. Gibberish. Gibber is another form si jabber and gabble (Cf. Hamlet, i. i, 116.) This, like "jargon," is another of Locke's " question-begging epithets." It is perhaps worth while to remember, "that there are scarcely any advocates who do not accuse each other of delaying the process, and concealing the truth by artifices of speech." (Cf. Port Royal Logic, Pt. III. Chap. xx. sec. 5, Bayne's transl., p. 271.) 10. Inform, to put form into anything, to give a shape to anything, hence, to instruct. To inform the mind thus implies something else besides filling it with disconnected scraps of knowledge. (Cf. note to sec. 15.) "The god of soldiers, With the consent of supreme Jove, inform Thy thoughts with nobleness.''' (Shakspere, Coriolanus, v. 3., 71.) To prove that snow was black. This was Anaxagoras, who contended that snow was black that is, dark, as well as white since water, of which it consists, is so. This paradoxical state- 3io Notes. pp. 202205. ment was advanced to show that the senses are fallible and easily deceived. The mind assures us that the snow is not white, while the senses assure us it is ; and it is obvious that the former must be right. (See Cicero, Academica, Lib. II. Cap. xxiii. sec. 72, and Cap. xxxi. sec. 100.) 12. A man of very ordinary capacity. Another example of Locke's dislike for theologians and lawyers. All the earlier opponents of Scholasticism, overwhelmed with the immense extent of its literature chiefly commentaries and glosses, and summaries of commentaries and glosses laid stress on the natural power of the mind, which, if only freed from the bonds of the old system and furnished with the new Method (of Bacon r Descartes, or of whomever it might be), would easily Attain to- philosophical truth. In the same way, the Reformers believed that any "plain man," if left to study the Bible without note or comment, would necessarily arrive at what they severally con- sidered theological truth, so long as he refrained from obscuring- and confusing his ideas by consulting Catholic divines. "Every man carries about him a touchstone, if he will make use of it, to distinguish substantial gold from superficial glit- terings, truth from appearances. And indeed the use and bene- fit of this touchstone, which is natural reason, is spoiled and lost only by assumed prejudices, overweening presumption, and narrowing our minds." (Locke, Conduct of the Understanding,, sec. 3. Cf. Descartes, Discourse on Method, Pt. I. Cf. also- Locke's prefatory, "Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles by consulting St. Paul himself.") 13. By-interests, side interests, selfish interests. "[Truth} is rigid and inflexible to any by-interests." (Locke, Conduct of the Understanding, sec. 14.) 14. The ten predicaments, or Categories, of Aristotle were, it is usually said, an enumeration of the highest classes to- which we can refer things ; a classification of the assertions Notes. 3 1 1 pp. 205, 206. we can make about anything ; or, to put it in another way, they are an analysis of the different questions which can be asked concerning anything. But the older logicians seem to have understood by Predicament not merely the summum genus, to which anything belongs, but an orderly arrangement of the lower classes contained under it, together with the highest class itself. (Cf. note to Chap. iv. sec. 16.) The ten predica- ments were Substance or Being in itself (ovcri'a), Quantity (TTOOW), Quality (TTOKJJO, Relation (Trpofrt), Action (Troteii/), Passion (7rdo-xy), Place (TTOU), Time (TTOT*), Position (mo-$aO, Habit (ex"")- "These are the ten categories of Aristotle, about which there has been so much mystery, although they are in themselves of very little use .... but are often very injurious, for two rea- sons, which it is important to remark. The first is ; That we regard the categories as something founded on reason and truth, whereas they are altogether arbitrary, and are founded only in the imagination of a man who had no authority to pre- scribe a law to others, who have as much right as he to arrange after another manner the objects of their thoughts, each according to his own method of philosophising. . . . The second reason which renders the study of the categories dangerous is, that it accustoms men to satisfy themselves with words, and to imagine they know all things when they know only arbitrary names, which form in the mind no clear and distinct idea of the things." (Port Royal Logic, Pt. I. Chap. iii. Bayne's transl., 40.) This objection to what may be called pigeon-holing Nature, by trying to regard things only according to a some- what artificial and superficial classification, is constantly found in seventeenth-century antagonists of Aristotle. (Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum, Bk. I. Aph. 63.) Substantial forms. (Cf. note to Chap. vi. sec. 10.) Vegetative souls. By the nutrient or vegetative soul was meant the " vital principle," or source of life in animals and plants. Aristotle recognized different kinds, or rather stages of 312 Notes. pp. 205, 206. development, of souls. The lowest of these is the Nutrient Soul, shared by all organized bodies. It is the " form" (Note to Chap. vi. sec. 10) of the organism, building it up, preserving it against the forces of external nature, and reproducing it. When the faculty of sensation is added, this soul becomes the Sentient Soul ; and this stage of development is characteristic of all animal life. In man the Sentient Soul has become Noetic, or Intelligent, by the addition of fresh powers. (Aristotle, De Anima, Bk. II. Chap. ii. seg.) Abhorrence of a vacuum. This phrase was the explanation commonly put forw?rd to account for the phenomena of suc- tion, the rise of water in a pump, the mercurial barometer, etc. In point of fact it is no explanation at all, but only a figurative, though convenient, description of the observed facts. An imaginary principle, adopted on insufficient evidence, it was con- clusively disproved by showing that a vacuum can be produced by water in a tube over thirty-four feet high, and by heavier fluids in shorter tubes, as was done by Torricelli about 1643. This doctrine of Nature's horror of a vacuum "was unphilosophical , because it introduced the notion of an emotion, horror, as an account of physical facts ; it was imperfect, because it was at best only a law of phenomena, not pointing out any physical 'cause ; and it was wrong, because it gave an unlimited extent to the effect." (Whewell, Hist, of Inductive Sciences, ii. p. 65.) Or, as the writers of the Port Royal Logic put it, " There are some who assign chimerical causes for chimerical effects, as those who maintain that Nature abhors a vacuum, and that she exerts herself to avoid it (which is an imaginary effect, for Nature abhors nothing, but all the effects which are attributed to that horror depend on the weight of the air alone), and are continually advancing for that imaginary horror reasons which are still more imaginary It is a kind of science, which proves the non-existent by means of the existent." (Part III. Chap, xix.) Intentional species. The knowledge of external objects was Notes. 313 pp. 205, 206. supposed to be due to the appropriation by the mind of certain images or species thrown off by the things. In one form or other this doctrine of perception was common to nearly all the ancient and mediaeval philosophers ; it is to be found in its grossest and most materialistic form among the Epicureans, and in its most refined and metaphysical shape among the scholastics. "But the philosophy schools through all the uni- versities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, say, for the cause of vision, that the thing seen sendeth forth on every side a visible species in English, a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen, the receiving whereof in the eye is seeing ; and for the cause of hearing, that the thing heard sendeth forth an audible species that is, an audible aspect, which, entering at the ear, maketh hearing; nay, for the cause of understanding also, they say the thing understood sendeth forth an intelligible species, which, coming into the understanding, makes us understand." (Hobbes, Leviathan, Pt. I. Chap, i.) Descartes also opposes the doctrine, and speaks ironically of "those little images flying through the air, called intentional species, which so wonder- fully exercise the imagination of philosophers." (Dioptrics, Chap. i. sec. 5.) Why these species, or images, were called in- tentional is not very clear ; although several explanations are quoted by Sir W. Hamilton in his edition of Reid, Note M. p. 952 ; e.g., because they have only a relative and incomplete reality, the full reality being in the object from which they are derived, or because they require intentio'tinaS. is, attention on the part of our minds in order to apprehend them. Soul of the world. In the Timteus Plato speaks of the soul of the world, which he seems to conceive of as bearing the same relation to the universe as the soul of man does to his body. It is the expression of the form and order of the universe, created by God before the material universe itself. It is the source of the movement of the heavens, and is the highest and best of created things. All this is described in a 314 Notes. pp. 205, 203. mystical fashion ; Plato's tone seeming here to be half-way between that of mythical tradition and philosophical specula- tion. (Cf. Cudworth, Works, i. p. 702 seq.j Edit. 1837.) Endeavour towards motion in their atoms -when at rest. The Epicureans and their seventeenth-century followers held that the ultimate realities of the universe were atoms and empty space. All things, on analysis, could be resolved into combi- nations of atoms. These possessed only shape, size, and weight ; they were, as the name implies, indivisible, and also indestructible. They had a constant motion downwards, and also an innnitesimally small swerving from this particular movement, which sufficed to bring them into collision with each other, and thus to set up aggregation. This swerving is brought about, according to Lucretius, by a spontaneous impulse in the atoms themselves. (Cf. De Rerum Natura, Lib. II. 216 seq. y 251-93.) Gassendi lays down that there is in atoms a " native, inherent, etc., endeavour towards motion (ad motum propensio), a spontaneous effort and impulse (ab intrinseco propulsio)" (Physics, Sec. I. Lib. III. Cap. vii.) Descartes uses the expression propensio ad motum, e.g., Dioptrics, Chap. i. sec. 8. Diogenes Laertius, one of the principal authorities for the opinions of Epicurus, says that he taught that "Atcms are in continual motion. . . . Some are also far distant from one another ; others retain the same agitation, when they are in- clined of themselves to embrace each other, or detained by those that are violently hurried close together in order to some composition." (Bk. X. transl. 1688-96.) Aerial and etherial vehicles. The later Platonists, Plotinus, Porphyry, etc., taught that the disembodied soul was attached to a body of air or ether, called its vehicle. " Now from these passages, cited from Philoponus, it further appeareth, that the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality did not suppose human souls, after death, to be stripped stark naked from all body ; but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them, though Notes. 3 1 5 pp. 205, 206. in different degrees of purity and impurity respectively to them- selves Nevertheless the same Philoponus there addeth, that according to these ancients, besides the terrestrial body, and this spirituous and airy body too, there is yet a third kind of body, of a higher rank than either of the former (peculiarly belonging to such souls after death as are purged and cleansed of corporeal affections, lusts, and passions), called by them erw/za avyo8er, and ovpdviov, and aldtpiov, etc., a luciform and celestial and etherial body." (Cudworth, Works, ii. pp. 222-3 ; Edit. 1837.) This doctrine had also been advocated by Henry More, another contemporary of Locke's, in his book on the Immortality of the Soul, from which may be quoted the fol- lowing : "The Platonists do chiefly take notice of three kinds of vehicles, aetherial, aerial, and terrestrial ; in every one of which there may be several degrees of purity and impurity, which yet need not amount to a new species Wherefore not letting go that more orderly conceit of the Platonists ; I shall make bold to assert that the soul may live and act in an aerial vehicle as well as in the aetherial ; and that there are very few that arrive at that high happiness, as to acquire a celestial vehicle immediately upon their quitting the terrestrial one : that heavenly chariot necessarily carrying us in triumph to the greatest happiness the soul of man is capable of: which would arrive to all men indifferently, good and bad, if the parting with this earthly body would suddenly mount us into the heavenly. Wherefore, by a just Nemesis, the souls of men that are not very heroically virtuous will find themselves re- strained within the compass of that caliginous air, as both rea- son itself will suggest, and the Platonists have unanimously determined." (Bk. II. Chap. xiv. sees, i and 6.) Scarce any sect in philosophy has not. Compare Chap. ix. sec. 22, and note. For the omission of the relative pronoun "[which] has not," see Abbot, Shakespearian Grammar, sees. 244 seq. Peripatetic forms. SQQ note to Chap. vi. sec. 10, on Sub- stan tial forms. 3 1 6 Notes. pp. 206208. 1 5. Instance in one; /.