SYNONYMS DISCRIMINATED. SYNONYMS DISCRIMINATED A DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMOUS WORDS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE ILLUSTRATED WITH QUOTATIONS FROM STANDARD WRITERS b; thk latb CHARLES JOHN SMITH, M.A. 'SMRIST CHURCH, OXFORD; LATK ARCHDEACON OF JAMAICA, AND VICAR OF KKITH WITH THE author's LATEST CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS EDITKD BY THE REV. H. PERCY SMITH, M.A. OF BALLIOL COLUIGE, OXFORD; VICaR OF «RKAT BARTON, 8UFFOLB NEW YORK HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 1911 CHISWlCK'PRE^:\^HiV^Li^W«ITTINGHAM AND CO. > , TOQKS, COURT, CHANCeW LANE, LONDON. A. SYNONYMS DISCEIMINATED. ABANDON. Forsake. Deseut. RiLINQUISH. The etymological force of Abandon (Fr. abandoniier, a baiidon, at liberty; feudal Lat. bandian, an order y decree; see Brachet) has well-nigh disap- peared from this word. To embandon or abandon was, primarily, to bring under the power of another ; and as this would imply the surrender of all control on the part of the original pos- sessor, it is easy to see how the con- sequential idea has in modern English become the primary, and then the ex- clusive, meaning. To abandon is now, in the most comprehensive sense, to give upjinally and abso lute ly, whether with or without transference of the thing abandoned to some person or power external to ourselves. A ti-ace of the old meaning, that of placing beyond jurisdiction and so disclaiming possession, appears in Shakespeare : " Madam wife, they say that I have dreamed And slept alone some fifteen years or more. Lady. Aye, and the time seems thirty unto me. Being all this time abandoned from your bed." Spenser used the form aband. No praise or blame is absolutely ex- pressed by the term abandon, which is one of the widest in the language, though it has a tendency to imply blanie when used of persons without qualification. So to abandon friends sounds blame-worthy, because under this simple expression the mind con- templates nothing but a deserted friendship. Yet it is right to abandon friends, if they betake themselves to what is dishonest or disgraceful. We may abandon persons or things ; in particular, places, positions, ideas. opinions, hopes, expectations, offices, possessions, good or evil habits, as the case may be. But that which is abandoned is always a thing of con- sideration, not a thing of little value or a matter of petty detail. We may abandon wealtn, but not a purse. Where loss or injury is entailed on the person abandoned, or the abandon- ment is a dereliction of duty, this moral colouring belongs not to the force of the term, which is essentially no more than that of Jinal leaving or surrender^ but to the circumstances of the case. It is only when all efforts to save his ship are hopeless that the captain abandons her to the rocks and waves. In times of early Christianity men were called upon to abandon houses, lands, and relatives in such a way as would be now n:,t only un- called for, but an unjustifiable deser- tion of them. We may observe that a twofold idea seems inherent in abnn- donment. We may abandon directly or indirectly, either by actively trans- ferring, or by avoiding and taking ourselves off. I'he former force was the predominant in the old English, the latter in the new. " See how he lies at random carelessly dif- fused As one past hope abandoned, And by himself given o'er." Milton. Forsake is the A. S. for-sacan, meaning orig. to oppose, object (Bos- worth). In usage it implies some degree of antecedent habituation or association which is given up. We forsake relatives to whom we were naturally bound, friends with whom we once associated, habits which we had contracted, opinions which we had entertained, places which we used 252725 *t45 frequent* *TBe cau'se of forsaking is altered taste or habit, variation ot custom, alienated, or abated attach- ment. So, rhetorically, " the blood forsook liis cheek," that is, left its wonted jilace. The term does not go beyond this breaking off of previous habit or association, the makmg that a matter of neglect or avoidance which before was matter of inclination and seeking; and, like abandon, implies in itself neither praise nor blame, which depend on the circumstances of the forsaking. Inasmuch as there is implied in forsake a former personal connexion witli ourselves, we are not paid to forsake abstract forms of good. We forsake houses, lands, friends, possessions, not wealtli, station, or rank. These we are said to abandon or renounce. Persons on being for- saken by those who once loved them have sometimes abandoned themselves to despair. " For wele or wo she nill him noiforsake," Chauceb. To Desert (Lat. dish-ae ; to for- sake or abandon ; de and severe, to join or bind together, as opposed to asserere, to fasten — fasten hand to hand and so assert a claim) is applicable to per- sons, places, causes, principles, or un- dertakings in conjunction with others. ^Ve abandon but do not desert efforts or undertakings which are purely our own, and in which we owe no obliga- tion or allegiance to others. The term desert always implies blame except when used of localities. To desert a person, a principle, or a cause, e.g., is by the force of the term blame- worthy ; for it involves the abandon- ment of sympathy, help, countenance, protection, effort, where these were our bounden duty, and where the contrary involves a breach of trust, fidelity, honor, or natural obligation. Not so to desert a locality, which may be indifferent, justifiable, or com- pulsory. It was from overlooking the fact that pbces might be deserted that some have laid it down that all desertion is disgraceful. " A deserted fortress," a " dosertcd village." On the other hand it is opprobrious in the following, where the word laud meaiif more than locality: — SYNONYMS [abandon] " No more ex, ises or delays, I stand In arms, prepared to combat hand to nand. The base deserter of his native land." Dryden. Like forsake, desert implies some de- gree of previous habituation and association, but the bond broken in forsaking is that of attachment, in deserting duty; hence we are not said to desert what there was no moral obligation to adhere to, as, e.g.^ a statement, an expression, or a mere opinion; but principles which we weie bound to support as being pledged to maintain them. Desertion involves tlie withdrawal of active co- operation, forsaking of sympathetic association. Desert is more purely voluntary than forsake. We may for- sake under a feeling of imperative duty, our inclinations giving way to motives which our reason dares not discard ; but we desert when we dis- like our duty, or are prevailed upon by some external preference or allure- ment to escape from it. To Relinquish (Lat. rcl'mquere) is to give up under some influence, power, or physical compulsion. We relinquish as an act of prudence, judg- ment, or necessity that which, had we been left to ourselves, we should have continued to hold. The act of relin- quishment may of coui-se prove sub- sequently to have been necessary or unnecessary, wise or unwise. A wounded hand may be compelled to relinquish its grasp. In matters moral 1 relinquish my scheme on finding it impracticable, or my opinion on find- ing it untenable, or my hope on find- ing it vain. Some degree of previous struggle with ourselves is gone through before we finally resolve to rehnquish, or some external influence is brought to bear upon us which in- duces us to do so. "The Disdaine met him, and brought to him from her Majesty letters of revoca- tion with commandment to relinquish for his own part the intended attempt." — IlAKLUVT. It may be observed tliat abandon and desert express more positive acts of the mind than forsake and relinquish. He who abandons has finally resolved, he who forsakes has undergone change of mind, he who deserta has sacrificed [abandoned] discriminated. principle or duty, he who relinquishes has ceased to hope or to endeavour. As the others are applicable both to things and persons, so relinquish be- longs to things alone. In troublous times men have sought to preserve their treasure by concealing it under the earth ; if, after a while, it should be discovered by another, the law will not allow him to assume on the part of the original owner an intention to abandon it. Prosperity quickly raises about us a crowd of flatterers, who would be the first to forsake us in time of adversity. It is an aggravation of misfortune, if one who had long pro- fessed attachment should not only capriciously forsake us but also de- sert us in a moment of difficulty and danger. How often do we engage ourselves in pursuits which bring us far more anxiety and labour than profit or pleasure, which yet from habit or some other cause we cannot persuade ourselves to relinquish. ABANDONED. Profligate. Reprobate. Unprincipled. De- praved. Abandoned (see Abandon) is strictly a part, passive of the verb abandon, though used as an inde- pendent adj. In the former capacity It follows, of course, all the meanings of its verb. As an adj. it has the meaning of self-abandoned, and that to vice; for the ways of wickedness are easy, and not to struggle is to sink. It is used of persons and character, and so, by association, of life and con- duct. It is a voluntary surrender of self to the temptation of self-indul- gence; self-control and the estima- tion of others being disregarded and defied. The abandoned man is em- phatically not the misguided, seduced, or overborne man. The abandoned man is impatient of discipline and even of reflexion ; he is wanting in virtuous ambition ; he is without as- piration, and has nothing worthy to 6e called belief. Pleasure and ease are his only happiness, and all else is either a labour or a dream. His Social nature seeks relief in the com- panionship of others like himself. T his systematic character renders the tei-m inapplicable to single acts, how- ever atrociously bad. " Nor let her tempt that deep nor make tht shore Where our abandoned youth 8he sees Shipwrecked in Inxnry and lost in ease." Prior. Reprobate (Lat. repr'dbalus, tried and rejected) expresses that character in which a course of self-abandonment to vice results ; one cast away with- out hope of recovery, the very desire and recognition of good being lost, all repentance cast off, the bitter be- coming sweet and the light darkness, by a confirmed blunting of the moral perception. The reprobate is regarded as one whom it would be fruitless to attempt to reclaim. This state the abandoned may not yet have reached. " And strength and art are easily outdone By spirits reprobate." Milton. The Profligate man (Lat. projil- gave, to dash down) is he who has thrown away, and becomes more and more ready to throw away, all that the good and wise desire to retain, as principle, honour, virtue, possessions. Hence it follows that the very poor or obscure man, though he might be abandoned and even reprobate, could not be profligate. For profligacy is a vice of the great, the powerful, and the rich. We speak of a profligate monarch, nobleman, court, ministry, aristocracy ; of a corrupt or demora- lized, but not profligate, peasantry. Profligacy is characterized by shanio- lessness and a defiant disregard of morals. The old physical use of the term has disappeared, as in Bishop Hall's letter to the Pope: — " Is it for thee to excite Christian Princes, already too much gorged with blood, to the profligation and fearful slaughter of their own subjects ? " The modern use of it appears in the following : — " Hitherto it has been thought the highest pitch of profligacy is to own in- stead of concealing crimes, and to take pride in them instead of beicg ashamed of them."— BoLUsaBROKE. The Unprincipled man is not necessarilv abandoned to ways of liceutioMS8elf-indulgence,orproflignte of expenditure. He may, in the atiairt SYNONYMS I abase] of sensual enjoyment, be even abste- miouB, and in those of expenditure penurious. But as the abandoned man sins against self-control and the profligate against sobriety, so the un- principled against justice and integ- rity. The abandoned man injures himself primarily and others only indirectly ; the unprincipled is ready to erect his own interests on the i"uins of the interests of others. The term unprincipled, not an ancient one in our language, has a twofold mean- ing ; first, wanting in good principle, or conspicuously marked by an absence of it ; in which sense it is, negatively, applicable to acts, plans, or proceed- ings ; and secondly, not acting on good principle or acting upon the contrary toward others ; in which sense it is applicable to persons only. The first employment appears in the following : — "Whilst the monarchies subsisted this unprincipled cession was what the influence of the elder branch of the House of Bour- bon never dared to attempt on the younger." — Burke. The second in the following : — "Others betake themselves to State fcffairs '.Tith souls so unprincipled in virtue and true generous breeding, that flattery, and courtships, and tyrannous aphorisms appear to them the highest points of wis- dom."— Milton. DEPnAVED is a term which jioints to external circumstances or continued practices which have gradually per- verted the nature. (Lat. depravcn-e, to pervert, d'niort.) Depravity is perversion of the standard of right, and the term is employed not only of morals, but also of manners, taste, and the arts; and in a peculiar physical sense (which however is technical) of the humours of the body ; a phrase which illustrates the radical meaning of the term, corruptly depai-ting from a state of wholesome function. De- pravity involves the substitution of false for true principles, or the less worthy for the more worthy, the pretentious for the meritorious, the showy for the intrinsically solid and valuable, the meretricious for the chastt! ; tliat which attracts the admi- ration of the ignorant and vulgar for that which will bear the test of exact criticism ; a conventional stan- dard of morality for the true, the vir- tuous, and the right. It is that de- fective estimation which follows the assumption of a corrupt test. " When Reason and understanding are depraved, and as far corrupted as the very passions of the heart— when then the blind lead the blind, what else can we ex- pect than that both fall into the ditch 1 " — Sherlock. By tlie constant keeping of evil company a man's taste and character will of necessity become depraved. There is danger that he may grow un- principled in his dealings, that he may abandon himself to allurements and temptations, that he may go on to ex- hibit an open proJ{ig::cy of conduct, and finally sink into" the condition of a reprobate, whom conscience ceases to encourage or to warn. In old English the verb deprave was often used in the sense of to malign. ABASE. Humble. Degrade. Dis- GiiACE. Debase. Humiliate. Dis- honour. Depose. Depress. Lower. There was a time when the word abase (Fr. abaisser, baSj low) was used in a purely physical sense, as hy Shakespeare : — " And will she yet abase her eyes on me?" To abase is now only applied to f)ersons. It is to bring low or to ower in such a way as that the per- son lowered shall be deeply conscious of the lowering. But this is not of ne- cessity on account of great guilt or disgraceful conduct. That of which the person abased is primarily con- scious is unworthiness in reference to others' estimation of him or to his own. In abasement we suffer a con- tradiction of, or voluntai'ily forego, as the case may be, our own peculiar pretensions. It may even be merito- rious to abase or humble one's self (of these two abase is the stronger term). This could never be said of degrade or disgrace. The penitent man humbles himself, the remorseful penitent abases himself. In either case a conquest is gained over pride, an-ogance, or self-will. He is abased who suffers a diminution of his dig- nity, msrit, or repute. [abase] DISCRIMINATED. " Absorbed id that immensity I see. I shrink abased, and yet aspire to Thee." COWPER. To Humble (Lat. hiimilis, low), though not in one way so strong a term as abase, has a fuller moral meaning. He who is abased is brought low, he who is humbled recognizes the right of being so brought. It bears refe- rence to some former condition of ex- altation or estimate of self, as the proud man may be humbled by the reverses of fortune. lie who suffers no more than overwhelming shame in his reverses or change of condition is abased without being humbled. He is humbled, who is forced to become acquainted with those vicissitudes of nature or fortune, to which hitherto he had been blinded by unreflectiveness or pride. He is abased, whom con- science or circumstances have unde- ceived in his claims to n'oral or social superiority. " The plain meaning of the Apostle is to declare in one continued sentence that Christ when He was in the form of God humbled Himself by condescending to take npon Him the form of man, and not only so but humbled Himself yet further by con- descending to die even the death of a male- factor. " — Clarke. Degrade (Lat. de,doivn,nn(igr(idtis, a step) bears reference to some stan^ dard or level, moral or social, below which the person degraded or who Has degraded himself is supposed to have fallen. Unlike abase and hum- ble, which belong to sentient beings, degrade is not confined to persons, but is applicable to anything capable of an accession or diminution ot dig- nity. Art is degraded when it is treated only as a trade. The higher the social position, or the moral re- sponsibility of the person, the more degrading is the dereliction. The higher the standard to which persons may reasonably be expected to con- form, the more degrading is the for- feiture of self-respect. Sensuality, for instance, is peculiarly degi-ading in those who have great powers of mind, meanness of dealing in the affluent, low companionship in the nobly born. " Moments there must be when the sin- aer is sensible of the degradation of his state, when he feels with pain the slavish dependence under which he is brought to fortune and the world, to violent passion* and settled habits, and to fears and appre- hensions arising from conscious guilt "- • Blaiu. DiscHACE is to depriveof respect (O. Fr. disgrace, dis- and grace, Lat. gratia, favour). He who disgraces another deprives him of such social regard as would otherwise belong to him. He who disgraces himself deprives him- self of the respect of others. Disgrace is to the feeling of respect what Dis- honour is to its outward token. Hence disgrace is rather in a man's self, dis- honour depends rather upon others. While conscience may excite in us a feeling of disgrace, we can have none ofdishonourexceptitbe inflicted upon us by others. Yet in the term dis- grace there seems to be a blending o* the two ideas of the Latin gratia and the English grace, namely, internal comeliness and external favour. The minister who is capriciously dismissed by his sovereign is said to be dis- graced. Yet it is plain that he is m no other sense so than as being mere- ly thrown out of favour, while as re- gards his own character he is rather dishonoured than disgraced. The general who is taken captive after a gallant resistance never could be dis- graced, though he might, by an un- generous victor, be dishonoured or insulted. Dishonour may be only for a moment, disgrace is more perma- nent. We have an exemplification in the following of the twofold idea of grace, from which the double as- pect of disgrace arises : — " And with sharp quips joy'd others tc deface, Thinking that their disgracing did him grace." Spenser. " He that walketh uprightly is secure as to his honour and credit ; he is sure not to come off disgracefully either at homa in his own apprehensions, or abroad in the estimation of men." — Barrow. When a man is so humbled that his state becomes externally manifest or conspicuous, and is reflected in the condition and circumstances of the person humbled, he may further be said to be Humiliated, that is, brought to a condition and a sense of humility. So strong a part doea this 6 external element play in the word, that one who is only self-conceited may be humiliated by bemg thrown suddenly into an undignified and lu- dicrous position. The proud man is humbled, the vain humiliated. He who humbles himself endeavours to cherish a feeling of humility, he who humiliates himself places himself in the attitude of humility. Hence we are seldom said to humiliate ourselves. Persons or circumstances may humble us ; but it is circumstances, commonly speaking, that humiliate us. The case is a little different with the noun humiliation, which is the only sub- stantive form of the verb to humble> whose meaning therefore it follows. Yet in such a phrase as a *' Day of Fasting and Humiliation," the term conveys the idea of both internal and external self-humbling. " The former was a humiliation of Deity, the latter a humiliation of manhood."— Hooker, To Dkbase (De and Eng. base), though of the same etymology as abase, is to deteriorate or make base not the position but the internal nature as regards worth, or essential purity. Debased coin is so mixed with alloy as to have lost much of its intrinsic value. A debased style of architecture has become corrupt by deviation from the type and principles of the pure. In all things debased a noi-mal condition, form, character, nrinciples, or model is implied which Las been forgotten, deserted, or vio- lated. The systematic deviation from the standard of virtue leads to moral debasement, from the standard of cor- rect rule and pure taste to artistic debasement. " The great masters of composition know Yery well that many an elegant woi-d be- comes improper for a poet or an orator, when it has been debased by vulgar use,"— Anuisox, Depose (Fr. deposer) expresses the formal act of authority or of a supe- rior, and is a complete taking away of the office, or dignity ; Avhile degrade may express a partial lowering in rank, or removal to an inferior grade. " A tyrant over his subjects, and thcre- hre worthy to be deposed."— Vryuvz. SYNONYMS [aBASEMENTJ Depress (Lat. deprtmh-e. part, di' pressus, to press doicn) is physical and analogous. It denotes the exercise of some uniform influence to lower permanently. The muzzle of a ^un IS depressed which is kept pointing towards the gi-ound, the mind is de- pressed which is weighted by some burden of thought or reflexion. He is depressed whose merits, though they entitle him to promotion, are stifled by the jealousy of superiors. " The Gods with ease frail Man depress or raise," Pope. Lower, formed fi-om the adj. low, follows the various meanings of that adj. Its forces are in the main three : 1, to reduce in physical elevation, as to lower a flag ; 2, to abate the feel- ing of exaltation, as to lower pride ; 3, to bring down in value, amount, rank, dignity or estimation, as the price of goods, the rate of interest, professional position, or the respect of individuals, or of the public. Like the simpler and Saxon words gene- rally, its application in proportion to its extensiveness is weak specifically. It stands opposed to " raise," and is as comprehensive and no more pointed in its force. ABASEMENT. Lowness. An idea of degradation common to these two terms makes them svno- nyms ; but they have strong diffe- rences. Abasement (Fr. abaisser, to loicer) expresses the act of bringing low or the state consequent upon this, and always implies a former state more elevated. Lowness (allied to lie and lay) expresses simply the condition of tliat which is low in any of the numerous seuses of the word low, such as physical depression, meanness of condition or character, absence ol sublimity, meekness, mental depres- sion, an inferiority of degree, a deep pitch or inaudible character of sound. The physical meanings of lowness are not m modern English shared by abasement, which has only a moral application. Abasement is a condi- tion of inferiority bearing reference to our own possible position, lowness or inferiority to others. Abasement is moral or social degradation, and by an extension of meaning the painful [ABATEj consciousness of this. Jesus Christ was willing to be born in a condition of weakness and abasement. Abase- ment is voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary abasement is a virtuous act of the soul, by which it seeks to counteract and repress the natural tendency to pride. A low disposition on the other hand is incompatible with honour, and begets contempt. The low is opposed to the lofty in principle and sentiment, and the re- fined in taste and manners. A low character is one which might be ex- pected to associate and sympathize with the basest of mankind, a low style is such as would commend itself to the vulgar. That abasement which is the result of misfortune does not forfeit the right to consideration. Lowness is not desei*ving of consider- ation. Virtuous sentiment may re- concile the ambitious to a low estate in life, and assure them that by itself it involves no abasement, while yet it is a legitimate object of effort to ex- change a lower condition for a higher, if it be done by just and honest means. *' 'Tis immortality, 'tis that alone. Amidst life's pains, abasements, emptiness. The Soul can comfort." Young. Lowness consists in want of birth, merit, fortune, or condition. It may be observed that the noun lowness has not the sti-ong character of dis- paragement which belongs to the adjective low. The latter is always derogatory except when employed either physically or of social infe- riority of rank. ABASH. Confound. Confuse. To be Abashed is the O. Fr. Eshahii'j 10 astonish, part, esbahissant ; connected with the English bay, to gape, whence to stand at bay. To be abashed is to be under the influence of shame, and therefore will vaiy according to the degree and character of the sliame felt. The over-modest are abashed in the pre- sence of superiors, the guilty at the detection of vice or misconduct. Abase stands to the reason and the judgment as abash to the feelings. The fonner implies a sentence of un- DISCRIMINATED. worthiness felt to be passid against one's self, the latter shows itself in the downward look, the blushing cheek, or the confused manner, and may even be the pure effect of natural modesty. " Bat when he Venns view'd without disguise. Her shining neck beheld, and radiant eyes. Awed and abash'd he turu'd his head aside. Attempting with his robe his face to hide." CONGREVE. To be Confused (Lat. confundere , part, confums, to pour together, to perplex) denotes a state in which the faculties are more or less beyond con- trol, when the speech falters and thoughts lose their consistency. This may be from a variety of causes, as failure of memoi-y, conflicting feelings, a bewildered j udgment, over-modesty , shame, surprise, a sense of detection to one's dishonour. It is an embarras- sing self-consciousness accompanied by a humiliating sense of shortcoming. We have formed our plan and ai*- ranged our materials ; the former is perhaps forestalled, the latter by some accident disordered. We are thrown into disturbance, the time is lost, whither shall we look for help ? '*Till I saw those eyes I was but a l>nmp ; a chaos of confusedness dwelt in me." — Beaumont and Fletcher. To be Confounded, though another form of the same word, is far stronger, denoting an utter inability to exercise to any practical purpose the power of thought and speech, the reason being overpowered by the shock of argu- ment, testimony, or detection. To confuse is in its primary and simpler sense a milder tenn than confound. Things are confused, when they are in a state of promiscuous disorder. They are confounded, when they are so mixed up together that they become undistinguished and indistinguish- able, their individuality being lost. *' So spake the Son of God, and Satan stood A while as mute, confounded what to say." Milton. ABATE. Lessen. Diminish. De- crease. With the exception ot the last, these synonyms are employed gram- matically as both transitive and in- transitive verbs. The simplest and 8 SYNONYMS LABERRANX therefore the least ppecifically charac- teristic is LrssEN (A. S. liessa, adj. less), meaning to make or to give less, as m force, hulk, numher, quantity, or value. " St. Pa«l chose to magnify his office, when all men conspired to lessen it."— At- TERBDBY. DiMixisii (Lat. dimtnutre, minus, less ) is the exact Latin equivalent of the Saxon lessen, but is commonly substituted for lessen in the intransi- tive sense. The receding object di- minishes rather than lessens. There is hardly a shadow of difference be- tween the terms, except that the Saxon one is the more conversational, the Latin more likely to be employed in rhetorical, or scientific phraseology. " Hide their diminished heads." Milton. Abate (Fr. abattre, to beat down) refers to firce, and never to size, or anything in which the idea of force is not more or less implied. A storm, pain, mental emotion or excitement, the vigour of youth, and the like, abate. Of old the verb had a strong transitive force in a physical applica- tion, as to abate, that is, beat down the walls of castles. This active force is still preserved, but not in its physical application. The term has grown milder. We speak of abating pride, zeal, expectation, hope, ardour, a de- mand or claim ; and in legal language (though this is of course technical) of abating a writ, a nuisance, or a tax, the idea being that of annulling va- lidity or legal force. The word is employed with singular appropriate- ness in the following passage from Paley's Moral Philosophy. " The greatest tyrants have been those whose titles were the most unquestioned. Whenever the opinion of right becomes too Credominant and superstitious, it is abated y breaking the custom." Decrease (Lat. dlcresctre — de, down, and cresch-e, to grow) differs from diminish in denoting a more gradual and sustained process. We might even speak of an instantaneous di- minution, but not of an instantaneous decrease. To decrease is gradually to lessen or diminish. Yet we use the *orm decrease in some cases to express more strongly the idea of diminution by inherent force, or from an internal cause, as distinguished from external and more palpable influences; at least when speaking of physical matter or subjects, as the cold decreases through the season of the year. Property is diminished by extravagance. To de- crease is relatively to diminish abso- lute and positive. Things diminish whicli are simply made less through any cause. Things decreajse which exist in varying degree? of less or more. Of the nouns, diminution ex- presses a state, decrease a process. A diminution in the rate of mortality is the result of the decrease of an epi- demic. The cause which produces diminution, as it is more external, so is commonly more traceable than that which produces decrease. The royal authority may be diminished by a specific revolution, having such di- minution for its object. It may de- crease as the result of a variety of causes, e.g., the tendency of subse- quent legislation, the development among the people of the sense and the claim of self-government. " The olive-leaf which certainly them told The flood decreased." Dra^tox, ABERRANT. Abnormal. Ec- centric. Exceptional. Erratic. Aberrant (Lat. tiberrare, to wander away) dorotes that which deviates un- accountably from the uniform law of operation or procedure. " They not only swarm with errors, but vices depending thereon. Thus they com- monly affect no man any further than he deserts his reason or complies with their aie?Tanc/e5."— Brown's Vulgar Errors. The term is applied to natural devia- tion from the type of a class or order, as an aberrant animal or vegetable form; while as regards the actions of responsible agents, or the thoughts of reflecting beings, it denotes a depar- ture from the line of sober conduct, or consistent thought: so moral and intellectual aberrations. That is ab- normal in outward nature which ex- hibits a structure opposed to the usual sti-ucture ; and generally speaking, that whioh exemplifies procedure contrary to the receivet^ rule, law, or svstem. [abettor] DISCRIMINATED. EccENTKic (Lat. ex, out, and cen- ti^um, a centre; Gr. eh and xevt/jov) de- fiotes that wliich is a departure, or Rnalogous to it, from movement in a natural orbit. ExcEi'TioNAL (Lat. exciptre, part. txceptiis, to except) is applied generally to anything which strikes common observation as unlike what is familiar in similar cases. Of these, the two first are terms enlisted into modern science, while eccentric and excep- tional are applicable to other and un- scientific matters. The former of these was astronomical before it became moral or descriptive. In its technical use, an eccentric body is one which moves in a circle, which, though coinciding in whole or in part with another in area or volume, has not the same centre ; hence deviating from ordinary methods or usual appearance or practice. It is technically opposed to concentric. The primary and se- condary ideas appear combined in the following : — " For had I power like that which bends the sphei'es To music never heard by mortal ears ; Where in her system sits the central sun. And drags reluctant planets into tune : So would I bridle thy eccentric soul. In reason's sober orbit bid it roll." Whitehead, oti Churchill. Neither Abnormal nor Exceptional are found in the older English litera- ture. Erratic (Lat. erraticiis, errure, to wander) has a scientific application — as e.g. to geological material borne away from its original site. Erratic differs from eccentric in being confined to human conduct, while eccentric belongs to character and appearance also. The eccentric character is in- oflfensive and simply odd ; but there is danger that the erratic person may involve himself or others in mischief. Yet this force has been acquired in recent times. Its older use was that of idly wandering, as in the follow- ing :— " The season of the year is now come in which the theatres are shut, and the card- tables forsaken ; the regions of luxury are for a while unpeopled, and pleasui'e leads out her votaries to groves and gardens, to still scenes and en-atic gratifications." — Caubler. ABETTOR. Accessory. Accom- plice. An Abettor (O. Fr. abetter, to deceive, incite) is one who in any way promotes the execution of a scheme without taking a direct part in it. If he do so, he becomes, ac- cording to cii'cumstances, something more than an abettor. He is an Accessory (Lat. Accessorius, Du- cange) if he assists directly, but in an exti-aneous capacity ; an Accomplice ( Lat. ad, to, and compUcare, to fold together) if he is intimately bouna up in the project and responsibility of the scheme as a prime mover. It is in this way that in treason there are no abet- tors, the law not allowing the supposi- tion of indirect agency in the case, but regarding it as necessarily direct. Ad- vice, promises, rewards, or even the ob- sei'vance of silence and a forbearing to oppose may constitute an abettor, but no one can be negatively an accessory or accomplice. Generally speaking, it may be said that abettora urge and promote, accessories aid or assist, ac- complices design and execute. In Law, an accessory before the fact is one who procm-es, counsels, or com- mands another to commit a felony; an accessory after the fact is one who, knowing of the felony, assists, com- foits, or conceals the felon. It de- seiTCs to be remarked, that these terma are by usage restricted almost univer- sally to bad or unlawful deeds oi causes, although Woolaston in his "■ Religion of Nature " speaks oi " abetting the cause of truth." The older use of Shakespeare is still the common one : — " And you that do abet him in this kind Cherish rebellion, and are rebels all." " An accessory is he who is not the chief actor in the offence, nor present at its per- formance, but in some way concerned there- in, either before or after the fact com- mitted." — Blackstone, Dry den uses the tenn accomplice in the sense of a partner in guilt : — " Link'd hand in hand th' accomplice and the dame Their way exploring to the chamber came." The ordinary use is that of Johnson in the following — 10 "And thou, the curst accomplice of his treason, Dechire thy message, and expect thy doom." ABHOR. Detest. Abominate. Loathe. Of these the plainest is Loathe (A. S. lathmn, to loathe). It is also the most purely physical, being in the first place employed to express nausea or physical disgust. The sick man loathes Lis food. It is employed of moral objects, by a strong metaphor or analogy. In loathing there is a kind of passive disgust, which in the other synonyms is more active and demon- etrative. " A wicked man is loathsome and cometh to shame. The word translated loathsome properly denotes such kind of persons to be as nauseous and offensive to the judgments of others as the most loathsome, unsavory things are to their tastes and smells." — Bishop Wilkixs. To Abominate (Lat. (ibominor,-pnxt. abomuiatiis ; ab, from, and omen) is literally to shrink from, deprecate as ominous, and so to turn away from as not to be endured. Abominate occu- pies a place midway between loathe, which IS strongly physical, and detest, which is, as we shall see, emphati- cally moral ; and in either case denotes that kind of strong dislike which would excite protest and avoidance. Abhou (Lat. abhorrire, to shrink from with a shudder) differs from abominate in being more expressive of strong in- voluntary recoil, while abominate is more reflective and voluntary. He who abominates would destroy or re- move, he who abhors would v-cape from and avoid. Abominate is more applicable to the concrete forms of things, abhor to the abstract. " That very action for which the swine is abominated, and looked upon as an unclean and impure creature, namely, wallowing in the mire, is designed by nature for a very good end and use, not only to cool his body, bnt also to suffocate and destroy noisome and importunate insects." — Ray. " I may perceive 'I'hwe Cardinals trifle with me ; I abhor Thij dilatory sloth, and tricks of Rome." Shakespeare. Detest (Lat. ditestari, to call upon the Deity as a vntness as^ainst some per- son or iking) denotes a spontaneous And eiiergetic hatred of what is bad in SYNONYMS ' [abhor] principle or which is strongly disap. provea, and in our mind condemnea ; not the feelings only, but the judg- ment being concerned in it. It is a misapplication of the word to employ it of what is physically impure or per- sonally disagreeable. We abominate what is offensive, we abhor what is es- sentially uncongenial, we detest what is contemptible or evil, we loathe what is nauseous and disgusting. Thus there is more of feeling in abhor, more of reason in detest. Detestation is a kind of hatred which does not rest in feeling, but tends to find ener- getic expression in words and protes- tation. The sick man abhors reme- dies and food, the miserable wretch detests the day on which he first saw the light. '* For as the gates of Hades I detest The sordid wretch whom want can tempt to lie." CowPER, Homer. ABIDE. Stay. Sojouun. Dwell. Reside. Lodge. To Abide (A. S. d6idan, to stay con- stantly) expresses no more than a per- sonal halting or dwelling. It is in- definite as to time, and may be tempo- rary or permanent, according to cir- cumstances. We may abide in a place for a time, or for life. The radical idea is, however, that of a persistent stay. To abide by a decision is to adhere to it with moral fixity of pur- pose. But it involves some counter idea of unsettlement in the habits or acts of the person or persons abiding, and the likelihood of after-removal. An abode is hardly a place of per- petual habitation. Stay marks dis- tinction of place, and has^ as it were, a topogi-aphical force. I stay (con- nected with the Lat. stare, to stand) here, or there, in the town, in the countiy, at home, or in the house of a friend. As to stop is not to proceed, so to stay is not to change one's place. Stay is more conversational than abide, which is more formal and his- torical. Sojourn (Fr. sojourner, Lat. suhdinrnare) expresses a personal stay necessarily temporary, yet implying a living in that place as regards food and shelter ,which are not necessarily implied in either stay or abide. He stayed or abode, but not soiourned, w [ability] DISCRIMINATED. 11 the woods all night. It belongs to localities made homes for the time, and not belonging to one's self. A sojourner is by the force of the term a stranger. To D\ve\.i.(A.S. diceltan, which however is an active verb, to re- lard,to ^liasf raj/,"thepeculiar modem use being Scandinavian " : Skeat, Etym. Diet.) indicates a permanent stay in ». place whicli to some extent at least has become one's own home. Tlie idea of permanent resting may be illustrated, as in the case of abide, by other applications of the term, as when a speaker is said to dwell upon a word, or a singer on a note. To Reside (Lat. rcsidere, re- and scdtre, to sit) is a more dignified term, not applicable like abode and dwelling to the inferior animals, and carrying with it a notion of civilization and society, of elegance of living, of responsibilities of office, and of rights of property. The poor man dwells in a liumble cottage near the hall where the lord of the domain resides. Hence the force of reside is not 80 strictly continuous as the others. A Eerson may be said to reside where he as a residence, which he in the main occupitTo, tnough he should be even frequently absent. Lodge (Fr./o^er) conveys the idea of an occupation of a portion of some larger place of resi- dence, or a spot in a wider ai-ea, and so commonly a temporary stay under a common roof. 1 stay in Pai-is, I lodge in the Champs Elysees. As stay refers to the place, so lodge to the house in tliat place. We stay and abide for a long or short time. We sojourn pleasantly or otherwise. We lodge conveniently or not. We dwell continually. We reside continually or occasionally. " There is no virtue whipt out of the court. They cherish it to make it stay there, yet it will uo more than abide" — Shake- speare. " Say, uncle Gloucester, if our brother comti. Where shall we sojourn till our coro- nation ? " Shakespeare. " He made the Arabians change their manner of living, who are otherwise called Scenites, as much as to say Tent-dwellers, because they are vagrant people thnt dwell in no other houses but tents, which they ever use to carry with them."— North's flutarch, Transl. " His Grace ^Henry VIII.) therefoie willing and minding to revoke j»u all by little and little, except you. Sir Gregoi^, being his ambassador there coniiiiually residing ."—Bv^^^r. " Stay, and lodge by me this night." Shakespeare. ABILITY. Skill. Capacity. Capability. Cleverness. Talent. Genius. Of these. Ability (Fr. habile, Lat. MbUis, skilful) is of wide application. It may be shown in things physical, moral, intellectual, social, legal, pro- fessional, casual. It deserves, how- ever, to be observed, that while the adjective able is employed in this wide manner in specific connexion — as he is an able lawyer, able to com- mit passages rapidly to memory, or able to lift a great weight — this ad- jective,when not so connected,is never used (any more than the noun ability) to mean physical power. For in- stance, we might say, " I dotlbt your ability to move that y^one ; " but not "He moved the stonfe with compara- tive ease, being a person of great ability." Ability is partly a gift ol nature, paitly a product of training, study, and experience. The able man is he who makes great use of what he knows. An able general must have commanded with success. "Natural abilities," said Bacon, using the tenn in the plural(after the a;»alogy of pai-ts, talents, wits, and formerly intellects), " are like natural plants that need pruning by study." In its widest sense \bility ia the power of doing, the possession of needful faculties and needful means and opportunities for the performance of a thing, and is op- posed to inability ; the power of ap- plying knowledge to practical ends. The erudite man, for instance, or the philosopher, however profound, is not able until he brings his knowledge to bear upon a purpose. " They say that all lovers swear more performance than they are able, and yet reserve an ability that they never perform, vowing more than the perfection often, and discharging less than the tenth part of one." —Shakespeare. Quickness of mind, showing itself especially in readiness to contrive means to an end, whether material or 12 mental, is called Cleveuneso. Clever- ness in things of pure pliysicsl ti-eat- ment is called dexterity. It is re- markable that cleverness is not a term of old English literatui-e, the old ad- jective clever having been only of late put into the form of a noun. It is not a term of the highest order of praise,and belongs to ordinary transac- tions and concerns of life. A modern writer has illustrated this by making one of his characters, a silly young nobleman, apply to Shakespeare the epithet of clever. Cleverness is natu- ral aptitude which dispenses with much insti'uction. That cleverness in things physical which requires not only adroitness of manipulation but judgment and discernment as the result of experience, is Skill. The root-meaning of skill is discernment — such accurate knowledge as sees and allows for differences. So the old Shrase "it skilleth not" — it makes no ifference. Hence it came to mean an art distinctly professed, which was called a skill, and finally applied as above. It is special and technical, not general like cleverness. We might speak of such an one as a clever man and skilful physician. Skill is neither of purely abstract knowledge nor of mere physical habituation, but lies midway between the two, and practically comprises both. A skilful man combines theory with practice. " The Bliip would quickly strike against the rocks for want of skilfulness in the pilots."— Seaech, Light of Nature. Capacity (Lat. cdpdcitdtem) is po- tential rather than actual, and may be no more than undeveloped ability. It is employed commonly of the intel- lectual, though not excluded from the moral nature (as we speak of a capa- city for virtue), and is not employed at all of the physical powers, where capability would take its place. Gene- rally speaking, capacity stands to understanding as ability to action, though the same person may possess both. So the capacity of a great general would be rather in his power of remembering, interpreting, and calculating the movements of the enemy, in grasping and recognizing the chaiacter and resources of a coun- 8YN0NYMS [ABILITY] try, with reference to the movements 01 tlie campaign, his ability in his actual direction of those movements, and in the disposition and employment of troops in action. " An neroic poem resembles the accom- plishment of some great undertaking whici requires the duty of a soldier, and the capacity of a general." — DbydeN. Capability (Lat. citpdMlis, suscep- tible of), Tv'hen employed passively of things and not persons, means spe- cific practicability, as a plot of ground intended for landscape gardening may be said to have great capability for the purpose. When applied to per- sons it may be said that generally, as capacity is the inherent faculty of understanding, so capability is the inherent faculty of use or action, especially of mental action. So we should say of a hopeful student of phi- losophy that he had capacity, the main end being knowledge ; of a hopeful student of oratory that he had capability, the main end being action. It is not impossible, nor even uncommon to find capability com- bined with want of ability in the same person and in kindred matters. For instance, one has great capability for learning, and so becomes learned, yet has no ability to teach, lacking the power of imparting knowledge to others. Hence the common observa- tion that the most erudite men are not necessarily the best instructors. Capable denotes sufficiency of (qualifi- cation, able, the possession of it in an eminent degree. He is capable who is not incapable. He is able who is more capable than others. " Sure he that made us with such large discourse Looking before and after, gave us not That capability and godlike reason To rust in us unused." Shakespeare. Talent, a term borrowed from the Scripture Parable of the Talents, and" Genius (Lat.genius, the tutelar deity oj a person or place) differ, in that talent is the capacity of learning rules, and the capability of readily acting upon them ; genius is that innate intuition which is hardly conscious of rules, and can in a measure, by natural force, supersede the use, that is, the specifto recognition of them. l_ ABJURE J DISCRIMINATED. 13 " Like many other men oftalent, Fielding was nnfortunate."— Sir W. ScoiT. " Homer was the greater genius, Virgil the better artiat." — Pope, In the oldest English, as in Chaucer, the word talente is used in the sense of desire or propensity, the Latin animi affectus. This comes, no doubt, fi'om the idea of weight, bias. For the Greek rdXavTov meant a certain weight as well as a certain value of metal. So Gower : — " But not to steal a vestmente. For that is nothing my talente" I.e., propensity. Talent may be hid and require to be searched for, genius develops itself. Genius creates, talent leai*ns, appre- hends, and executes. Talent needs opportunities, genius makes them for itself. ABJURE. Recant. Retract. Revoke. Recall. Renounce. Re- pudiate. All these terms refer to the verbal undoing of what has been, or in some cases of what might be, main- tained, declared, or professed. Ab- jure (Lat. abjurare, to deny on oath) retains so much of its original a^ to mean a deliberate and solemn giving up. Hence it applies to things seriously maintained and there- fore feeriously abandoned. It is to give up deliberately, as principles of belief or conduct, allegiance to a sove- reign, claims, connexions or obliga- tions, or even pleasures and advan- tages. We abjure what we declare ought not to be held, or not by us. Yet in order to abjure a thing it is not necessary to have actually held it. So in this country and elsewhere men abjure allegiance to the Pope, not the less for having never rendered it. It implies a protest against the thing abjured, whereas we may renounce what we regard as trifling, or what we still value though we renounce it. Policy may induce us to renounce, but principle compels us to abjure. Abju- ration is always taken in a favorable sense as being dictated by a love of truth or right and an aversion to their contraries. The eri'or, if any, is intel- lectual not moral. On the other hand 've may recant in form but not in heart. " A Jacobite who is persuaded of the Pre- tender's right to the crown cannot take the oath of allegiance, or if he could, the oath of abjuration follows, which contains an ex- press renunciation of all opinions in favour of the exiled family.'' — Paley. To Recant (Lat. rccantdre, lit. to chant back, to recall) refers not so much (like abjure) to any inherent solemnity in giving up, as to the formality and publicity of doing it. A man may change his opinions in secret, but he recants them openly. So entirely does the idea of publicity occupy the word, that the recantation is complete though it should be feigned and hol- low, so long as it be openly and pre- cisely made. Moreover a change of opinion real or professed is implied in recant, which as we have seen is not necessarily implied in abjure. *' How soon would ease recant Vows made in pain as violent as void," Milton. To Retuact (Lat. retractdre, to re- handle, reconsider) is a taking back for the purpose of undoing the prac- tical effects of what has been declared. It has a more varied application than recant, being employed of other mat- ters than doctrine or opinion, to which recant is properly restricted. We re- tract promises on which others have calculated, expressions by which others may haye been wounded or mis- led, accusations which we feel cannot be supported. As we abjure on princi- ple and recant either on principle or policy, so we retract under the in- fluence of interest or the force of cir- cumstances. As in strength of pur- pose we abjure, so in the same we often refuse to retract. Though Plenry IV. of France abjured Calvinism, he would not retract the promise of pro- tection he made to the Calvinists. A recantation is primarily by word of mouth, a retractation is also by writing. "I would as freely have retracted the charge of idolatry as I ever made it." — SxiLLINGrLEET. Revoke and Recall are the same word under a Lat. (rivocdre, to call back) and an Engli sh form ; but though thus identical etymologically they are employed with some little diflference. Recall is more conver- sational and ordinary, less formal and 14 SYNONYMS [abolish] authoritative than revoke. We recall generally or in particular, inaccurate or otherwise objectionable expressions ; but formal acts, authoritative deci-ees, orders, and solemn promises are re- voked. " The lord in the Gospel really forgave his servant all his debt, but revoked the grant on that servant's new misbehaviour," — Waterlaxd. *' In his retractations he recalleth and correcteth this."— Cudworth. Renounce (Lat. rcnuntiare, to send a tnessage opposed to a previous one ; cf. prov. Eng-. to " backword ") is a wide term applicable to anything bearing a close relationship to one's self whether mental or external, as hopes, designs, claims, possessions, one's friends, the world. It is to pro- claim against all connexion, actual or possible, between one's self and the tiling or person renounced, even ex- tending to such things as maxims or customs which one intends no longer to follow, and to claims and preten- sions which one is determined to put forward no more. It was to these last that the word primarily applied. It is possible to renounce willingly or reluctantly. As the thing renounced commonly has the nature of a good or supposed goodj or some value or in- terest real or imagined, renunciation ordinarily involves a decided change of sentiment and an act of indirect preference of something else over the thing renounced. " A solemn renunciation of idolatry and false worship under the general title of the devil and all his pomps." — Waterlakd. Unlike the foregoing, Repudiate (Lat. ■^epYidiare, to divorce) is only ap- plicable where a relation has been established, or sought to be esta- blished, towards us from without, either in the course of nature or by the force of circumstances. We renounce opinions irrespectively of others ; we repudiate them when others have fas- tened upon us the charge of holding them. We repudiate what has come to be closely associated with us. The idea of repudiating obligations or debts is recent, and a deviation from the earlier, which was that of un- worthines.s (not simple rejection) in the thing cr person repudiated. " Servitude is to be repudiated with greater care by us than domination is effected by them."— Frysne. ABOLISH. Abrogate. Repeat^ Revoke. Annul. Cancel. Of these Abolish (Fr. abolir, Lat. Hholcre) is the most general, and is ap- plicable to many things to which the rest are inapplicable. It denotes the voluntary exercise, or the operation of extinctive power. Anything which is entirely done away with so tliat it is as if it had never been, may be said to be abolished. The term ordinarily involves some length of standing in the thing abolished. Asa synonym with the above terms it denotes the total doing away with laws, customs, institutions, and the like, by any power, gTadual or sudden, personal or impersonal ; as, e.g. a specific act of legislation may abolish a right, or as the silent influence of fashion or a change of taste may abolish a cus- tom. The application to persons is obsolete, though Tennyson says : — " His quick instinctive hand Caught at the hilt as to abolish him." " The rtio/iYion of spiritual courts, as they are called, would shake the very foundationa on which the Establishment is erected." — Warburton. Abrogate, though primarily ap- plicable to laws (Lat. abrogare, to re- peal, in the general assemblies of citizens of Rome, literally to ask back or off a law), has been extended to customs as having a force like that of law. The essential force of abroga- tion is the exercise of authority to undo what authority had previously es tablished or recognized. Non-usage may abolish, but a positive act is re- quired to abrogate. To say that a thing was abrogated by disuse would be to imply that disuse furnished a power or ground for causing it to cease. Old practices are often abo- lished by new ones superseding them. What equity had established has been abrogated by despotic power. " It appears to have been an usual prac- tice in Athens, on the establishment of any law esteemed very useful or popular, to pro- hibit for ever its abrogation and repeal." — Hume. Repeal (Fr. rappeUr, Lat. re-ap peltdrej to call back) is applied charac- [above] teristically to the acts of a number, as an assembly or council may repeal a law. An irresponsible ruler would hardly be said to repeal, because the word wears an air of legality. In the resolutions of deliberative assem- blies, which have not the force of law but are only regulatively binding upon its members, the term employed is re- scind. To Revoke (Lat. rcvucfire) stands to personal, as repeal to collec- tive, authority. As adespot does notre- peal, so a parliament does not revoke. As laws and customs are abrogated or repealed, so edicts are revoked, and, indeed, any formal expression on the part of individuals, especiall}'^ such as affects others, e.g. an epithet or promise, whether in word or writing. The proclaimed law is revoked, the written law is repealed. The revoca- tion, not the repeal, of the edict of Nantes. The repeal, not the revocation, of the Irish Union. The object of re- vocation is that an act or a word should be regarded as if it had never been made ; the object of repeal is that a thing should cease to have force or operation. " A devise by writing may be also revoked by burning, cancelling, tearing, or oblite- rating thei'eof by the devisor, or in his presence and \v;th his consent." — BlaCK- STOXE. Annul (Lat. annnllare, to bring to nothing) expresses no more than the rendei-ing inoperative of what before had force, whether by law, custom, or consent. The term belongs to legal enactments and compacts. Annulling is done by some provision to the con- trary, proceeding either from authority or those from whom the original pro- vision emanated. A reciprocal obli- gation may be annulled by the parties who imposed it upon themselves, but if the binding force were one of au- thority the annulling force must be Buch also. " Your promises are sins of inconsidera- tion at best, and you are bound to repent and annul them." — Swift. To Cancel is a kind of annulling. (Lat. cajicelliire, to strike through writing by diagonal lines of erasure resembling D-mfi/i^, Lat. cancelli, pi.) It is to undo something the force of DISCRIMINATED. 15 which ali'ected the condition of an- other, as a promise, a contract, or an obligation. It is like the erasure or tearing-up of a bond. A thing may be annulled virtually, as by the force of circumstances which neutralize, in- validate, or supersede it ; but it is cancelled by some deliberate or spe- cific exercise of power striking out what had operative force, whether in law or moral obligation. The term wears a legal, social, or conventional air, belonging to ti-ansactions between man and man. "Shake hands for ever, cancel all our vows." Drayton. ABOVE. Over. Beyond. Upon. These terms all have both a physi- cal and a figurative meaning. Phy- sically, Above indicates a superiority of physical altitude, as the sun is above the earth, an interval being supposed, without exact verticality. OvEK indicates what is expressed by above, with the addition of the idea of verticality, as the cloud hangs over the sea. UroN denotes what is ex- pressed by over, with the addition of contact, or the absence of the interval supposed by above, as the crown is placed upon the king's head. Beyond relates to the horizontal or to the measurementof length and not height, though it may chance that this length is measured vertically, and may or may not imply adjacency, as the river and the country beyond ; the ivy has grown beyond the first storey of the house. 'J'hese analogies are preserved in the metaphorical uses of the words. So if we said that the general was above the captain we should mean that he was of higher rank in the arm.y ; over llie captain would mean that he exer- cised authority in regard to him spe- cifically. ^Vhen one misfortune comes upon another it is as if there were no respite or interval between. When a thing is beyond conception it is as if the stretch and grasp of the mind were insufficient to reach so far. " The Gospel places morafity above rites and ceremonies." — JoRTlN. " For He, be sure, In height or depth still flrst and last will reign Sole King, nnd of His Itin^dom lose nop«rt 16 By our revolt, but over Hell extend His empire." Milton. " A place beyond all place, where never ill Nor impure thought was ever harboured." Fletcher. " He sawe vpon the grene gi-as The faire flower freshe springe.' GoWER. ABRIDGE. Abbreviate. Cur- tail. Contract. Of these ABKiDGEand Abbreviate are etymologically tbe same word, the Latin form abbrcviare becoming the French abrtger (brcviSy short). Yet abbreviate is hardly ever used but in the simple sense of to shorten, while abridge is applied with more play of metaphor, as to abridge powers and privileges. We speak peculiarly of abbreviating words in writing, as Dr., Lieut., Esq. To abridge is to shorten by condensing or compressing, whilst to abbreviate^s to shorten by cutting or contracting. In literary abridg- ments we have the same substance in smaller compass, and if the abridg- ment is well made the original runs a risk of being neglected for it. " This book was composed after two old examples of the same kind in the times of Ethelbert and Alfred, and was laid up as sacred in the Church of Winchester, and for that reason, as graver authors say, was railed Liber Domus Dei and by abbrevia- tion Domesday Book."— Sir W. Temple. Differences deserve notice between Abridge, Curtail (formerly curtail, Lat. curlus, docked), and Contract (Lat. contrahtre, part, contrac.lus, to dra w together). VV hen used of things not purely physical, abridge seems usually to refer to number and duration, curtail to extent, and contract to compass or sphere of exercise. Hence, for in- stance, pleasures or privileges are abridged and contracted when they are made fewer and shorter, curtailed when the sphere of their exercise is in any way diminished, contracted also when the inherent power of en- joyment is lessened in individuals. Commonly also the exercise of per- sonal power curtails, and the force of circumstances conti'acts privileges or enjoyments. It should be observed tliat unlike Abridge and Abbre- viate, which may accidentally in- volve diminution of value, incom- pleteness, or deficiency, these are SYNONYMS [abridge] necessarily involved in curtail and contract. We may say, generalh speaking, that pleasures are abridged, privileges or expenditure curtailed, and powers contracted ; but they are employed to a large extent inter- changeably. It may also be said that time is abridged, and space contracted, which fundamental rule may best govern the application of the words. Abbreviate, Abridge, and Cur- tail, belong to artificial processes. Contracted is a term sometimes ex- pressive of natural limitation within narrow bounds, as the stream is by drought contracted within naiTOW limits. A person of contracted mind is so either from want of largeness of sympathy or understanding constitu- tionally, or as the result of narrowing influences which have cramped and fettered it. " That man should thus encroach on fellow- Abridge him of his just and native rights." COWPER. " Have the burdens of the war compelled them to curtail any part of their former expenditure ? " — Burke, " In all things desuetude doth contract and narrow our faculties." — Government ofihe I'ongue. ABRIDGMENT. Compendium. Epitome. Summary. Abstract. Draught. Digest. Synopsis. Pro- gramme. An Abridgment is anything which f)urports to give the substance of a iterary production in a shorter form. Some such abridgments are formed by the simple omission of portions which are regarded as unessential or subordinate, some by a condensation of the diction or style, but tlie sub- stance of the original is in an abridg- ment supposed to be unaltered. It is the same thing shortened, and is itself a work. Itmay be added that Abridg- ment may be used as a generic term under which most of the others might be included. *' An abridgment or abstract of anything is the whole in little, and if it be of a science or doctrine the abridgment cogsists in the essential or necessary parts of it contracted into a narrower compass than where it was diffused in the ordinary way of delivery." — Locke. Compendium (Lat. a shorteuingf [abrupt] DISCKIMINATED. 17 ahndgmg) is not of a work but of a subject, purporting- to give as much as need be known of some branch of science or knowledge in a concise form, and is also a work, as a com- pendium of universal history. Sum- mary (^hsLt.Summnriiun,summa,tliesui7i or total) professes to give heads or general results of the body of a narra- tive or lengthened statement, as in headings prefixed to chapters. Ab- stract (Lat. absirdhcre, to draw off or Away) gives the general drift and tenor, and belongs rather to writings than to printed books. The summary is commonly deficient in consecutive- ness of style ; while the abstract, unlike the abridgment, maybe a pro- duction in which the form has been altered by the reproducer^ who may have assimilated the subject-matter, and re-expressed it in a style of his own. " The Sermon on the Mount, which is a summary of a Christian's life." — Bishop Taylor. "All those excellent persons of whose acts and sufferings we have a compendium or abridgment in this chapter." — Bishop Hall. A Draught (literally, a thing drawn out) commonly precedes the work, and is of the nature of a sketch or outline intended for the guidance of another who is to fill it up and finish it. The term is more technical than literary, as of deeds or judicial proceedings. "And thus Poetry and the Writer's art, as in many respects it resembles the Statuary's and the Painter's, so in this more particularly, that it has its original draughts and models for study and praetite." — Shaftesbury, Epitomk {iTiirofxh, iTTnifA.yaoj 1 abiidge). It is such an abridgment as prunes or lops off all but the most salient and characteristic points or features, and is a summary of all tliat is most distinctive. We may observe, as regards present use, that as com- pendium is of science, so epitome is of facts or history. " This sentence (St. Matthew vii. 12), I read unto is very fitly placed towards the close of our Saviour's admirable Sermon 111 the Mount, as being in great measure the epitome and sura of what the Divine Preacher had there expressed more at large."— Bishop Aiterbury. A Digest (Lat. d'lgtrtre, to distri- bute, anange ; part, dlgestus) has for its object arrangement or re-arrange- ment of given materials in an orderly, convenient, and available shape, under Eroper letters, as the Digest of Roman ,aws by order of Justinian; and results iu abridgment, though brevity is not its primary or direct purpose. " If we had a complete digest of Hindu and Mahommedan laws after the model of Justinian's celebrated Pandects, we should rarely be at a loss for principles and rules of law applicable to the cases before us."— Sib W. Joxes. Synopsis (o-Jvo^jj, a collective view, a table of contents) difl['ers from the preceding, with the exception of sum- mary, in not aiming at any style in consecutiveness, and in giving nakedly and disjointedly a view of all needful points, as in a chart or table. It aims at totality and juxtaposition, so that a number of matters may be viewed as a whole, and in their reciprocal bear- ings or concurrence. A synopsis of general history brings into con- spicuous collocation facts which would otherwise lie as it were dis- persed or disconnected in the several particular histories. " Not to reckon up the infinite helps of interlinearies, breviaries, synopses, and other loitering gear," — Milto:^. As synopsis gives what is to be ob- served, so Programme (TTfoyoaju/ua, a public notice, programme) gives what is to be done. It ia a summary of practical proceedings, and belongs not to the past but the future. ABRUPT. Rugged. Rough. These terms may be taken in their order to express the same thing in o:radually lessening degrees. Those features of nature, which on a large scale are precipitous ( Lat. prcEcYpifem, headlong) on a lesser are abrupt (Lat. abruinpcre, abruptus, to break off). Abruptness on a smaller scale is Rug- gedness (A. S. hreog, rough, stormy), and this, on a reduced scale again, is ilovcu'S¥.ss(A.&.hreof, rough, scabby). The terms have their figurative uses, An abrupt style or manner is one tlja^ )ii passes from one point to anotlier by jerks, witliout easy transitions. Such abruptness may be sbown in the com- bination of manner and words, as an abrupt salutation, an abrupt depar- ture. Shakespeare must have contem- plated the word in its etymology when he wrote «' Oi- if thou hast not broke from company Abruptly, as my passion no\Y makes me. Thou hast not loved." Of ruggedness and roughness, the former commonly belongs to appear- ance, the latter to character and bear- ing, yet not exclusively so. Scott, in his " Christian Life," speaks of that unmanly sharpness and ruggedness of humour which renders us perverse and untractable in our conversation. In this sense it is less coarse and violent than roughness, which carries with it the idea of a rude overbearing. Ruggedness is characteristic of the individual only ; roughness passes on to the treatment of others. " Sleek o'er your rugged looks." Shakespeark. ■* " To take a cause out of your hands into mine I do but mine office. You meddle farther than your office will bear you, thus roughly to handle me for using of mine."— Subnet. Abrupt is opposed to continuous or unbroken, rugged to even, rough to smooth. The abrupt and the rough may be the result ot nature or the eft'ect of character or art. The rugged is never artificial. An abrupt man- ner, a rough behaviour, a rugged dis- position or humour. The first comes of want of refinement and social training, or in some cases is the sud- den action of feeling ; the second from want of moral discipline ; the third from selfish inconsiderateness. Men of equable temper, good breed- ing, and self-command are not abrupt. He who has sympathy with others is not rugged in his humours. ABSENT. Abstracted. DivF.n- TED. Distracted, Absorbed. En- grossed. Of these the simplest is absent (J^at. abesse, to be absent), which de- notes either the specific or habitual state of one whose mind is inattentive V} what is goin^ on 1 efore or around SYNONYMS [absent] liim. Absence may be the result of a habit of abstract thought, or the oppo- site, namely, an impatience of pure reflexion or casual inattention. It implies naturally thought, but not deep thought. "What is commonly called an absent man is commonly either a very weak or a very affected man." — Chesterfield. Abstractp:d, on the other hand (Lat. abstrtihtre, part, abstractus, to draw away), implies the influence of something sufficiently strong to draw oflf the mind from present things and fix it in a state of rapt contemplation of others. One may be abstracted in solitude, one is absent only in the company of others. The mind of the abstracted man is closely at work, that of the absent man may be en- gaged with light fancies. The absent man is in one place while his mind is in another. He sees not present objects, nor hears what is said. He is at Paris in the midst of London, and when others are talking of love he is engaged with mathematics or the contrary. Absence differs from Distraction in being the result of a single influence, while distraction (Lat. distrHhtire, to draw asunder) may be of many, nor has it the uneasiness and disturbance of distraction. ]M ore- over, distraction implies an influence in contradiction to some proposed matter of thought for which the mind is accordingly incapacitated, while in abstraction it is wholly given to it. The distracted man, taking the term in that sense in which it is opposed to the absent, has his eyes and ears open to everything at once, and so cannot be attentive to anything in particular. In trying to hear every- thing he apprehends nothing clearly. A common cause of distraction is a tiresome talk to which politeness compels us to listen, while words of interest fall upon our ears fi-om an- other quarter. As regards social conversation, the absent do not care for it, and the distracted get no benefit from it. Our own ideas make us abstracted. External objects dis- tract us. Hard study, responsible and arduous duties, strong passions, make persons abstracted. Trifles are [absolute] enough to distract, more especially the young and thoughtless. A dreamy habitude leads to abstraction ; a lively curiosity to distraction. The absent man makes irrelevant answers, the abstracted does not answer, the distracted is continually answering himself. " Whether dark presages of the night proceed from any latent power of the soul daring her abstraction, or from the opera- tion of subordinate spirits, has ^leen a dis- pute." — Addison. *' As for me, during my confinement to this melancholy solitude, I often divert myself at leisure moments in tiying such experiments as the unfurnishedness of the place and the present disti-actedness of my mind will permit me." — Boyle. Diverted is a term of lighter meaning, and is applicable to cases of mental recreation or amusement, in which the mind is turned aside ( Lat. divert tre, to tiii-n aside) from studious or grave thought to matters less serious. Further remarks will be found under Amusement. Absorbed (Lat. absorbire, to suck np, to e7igi-oss) and Engrossed (Fr. gros^ big ; Lat. grossus) differ from the preceding in denoting, not so much a drawing off from present matters, as an intense or excessive contemplation of them. Ab- sorption excludes distraction and diversion of the mind, which is swal- lowed up with present employment. Engrossment of mind is relative absorption ; that is, absorption to the disregard of other matters wliich may possibly have equal or greater claims upon the attention. So it may be well to be absorbed, but it is not altogether well to be engrossed. • " Circe in vain invites the feast to share. Absent I wander and absorpt in care." Pope. •' Too long hath lore engrossed Britannia's stage. And sunk to softness all oar tragic rage." TiCKELL. ABSOLUTE. Despotic. Arbi- trary. Tyrannical. Of these Absolute (Lat. absolvere, part. absUutus, to hose or free from re- straint) denotes simply the possession of unlimited and irresponsible power, fvithout implying anything as to the way in which it may be exercised, or, DISORTMINATEi.. 19 necessarily, that it is exercised at all ; only that it exists. Absolute power is independent of all other })Ower, and superior to it. It is rarely employed of the character and acts. When so employed it may be said that tlie ab- solute man expects exact and un- questioning obedience, which may be exacted in a spirit of calm determina- tion. It is a cliaracter of firmness, and makes itself felt continually within the sphere of its influence. "An honest private man often grows cruel and abandoned when converted into an absolute prince." — Addison. Despotic may be used either in the abstract, of the power, like absolute, or relatively,of the way in which it is exercised. Despotic power may have been acquired with the consent or through the instrumentality of others. The Greek Sfs-Trcr*!? was strictly a mas- ter of slaves, hence an absolute ruler whose subjects were slaves; while Tupttwoc meant a sovereign ruler whose power was unlimited by law or con- stitution. His conduct might be the very opposite of cruel, and he might owe his elevation to the State, or to some party in it. As employed by ourselves in a moral sense, the des- potic character is he who enforces implicit obedience to his will. Abso- lute is a term general and descriptive. Despotic is political or social. A man is absolute in himself, despotic in his rule over others. When absolute power resides in the ruler of a State, the form of government is a despot- ism. The moralist may draw the reflexion how unfit man is to wield absolute power, from the fact that it has been found impossible that the terms tyrant and despot, tyrannical and despotic, should preserve a mo- rally neutral meaning. Tyrannical, in modern parlance, relates not only to the disposition and proceedings of the governing party, but to the result upon the governed. It associates the suffering or oppression of the latter with the domination and caprice of the former. The despotic man may be not less exacting, but he is a more equable character than the tyrannical man. For the despotic feels more sure of his power, while the tyranni- 20 c&l makes the most of his opportunity. The despotic character will, however, naturally tend to become tyrannical ; that is, when the will is thwarted, or against those who thwart it. The sjjoilt cliild allowed to be a despot will grow into a tyrant. Despotism is measured by the will of the person, tyranny by the excess of legitimate autliority. A democrat would call any monarch a tyrant by reason of his excessive possession of power, though a humane sovereign of a Con- stitutional State could never be called a despot. Despotism is a more esta- blished force than tyranny. Despo- tism is crushing, tyranny vexatious. The former reduces to submission, the latter rouses to resentment. A people lies powerless under a military despo- tism, and rises in rebellion against the tyranny of an aristocracy. *' ^TiateA'er the will commands the whole mftn must do. the empire of the will over all the faculties being absolutely overruling and despotic."- South. " These poor prisoners eat nothing but rice and drink water, and are tyrannically insulted over by their rigid creditore till the debt is paid,"— Dampieb's Voyages. The Arbitrary character (Lat. arhitrdrius, having to do with arhitra- tion; 2, depending on the will) ex- f)ects submission where nothing but lis own will or decision constitutes the principle of rule ; hence, as im- pressiveness belongs to the despotic, fickleness is associated with the arbi- trary. The arbitrary character is far less violent than the tyrannical or despotic. The despot enforces his will, the tyrant his power, the arbi- trary man his preference. Tyranny is always hateful. Despotism may, under certain circumstances, be exer- cised with salutary effect and in the interest of its subjects. Arbitrariness reflects upon the character and dis- position of the man, but not on the truth of his opinions or on the justice of his decisions. " By an rtr5iYn;ry proceeding, I mean one conducted by the private opinions or feel- ings of the man who attempts to regulate." — BUREE. A Bsoi.uTE, Positive. '"'lese terms are applicable to the SYNONYMS [absolution J subject-matter of statements. An ab- solute or positive statement. They express an incontestable truth, but under different aspects. Absolute is the Lat. absolidus, part., from abso- lua-e, to loose or detach ; hence that is absolute which is complete in itself, freed and unfettered, and dependent upon nothing for its existence, con- tinuance, or support. Positive (Lat. posifivus, settled by agreervent) is that which has a real substantial position, existence, or force of its own as opposed to what is negative or to what is relative. A positive good is distinguished from a negative good. It is a positive good to be happy, a negative good to live unmolested, a relative good to be- come possessed of a field advantage- ously adjoining one's estate, which, therefore, has a value for one's self which it has not for others. The word absolute is passive, indicating a state; the word positive lias the Latin termination " -wus," which probably marks an inherent quality or force. A positive law is one which has the force of a law laid down as dis- tinguished from a moral obligation. Hence it follows that a positive truth or statement is one which cannot be shaken or impugned; an absolute truth cannot even be touched. An absolute truth is true independently, a positive truth is true incontestably. I know absolutely, and therefore can speak positively. The system of philosophy called Positivism excludes everything but natural phenomena, and properties with their ascertain- able and known, because invariable, relations in time and space. Such relations are called laws, and are dis- covered by observation, comparison, and experiment. The system excludes all inquiry into causes eflScient or final, that is, what produces things, or why they are produced. It declares that such things imply an assumption of absolute knowledge, which is not possessed by mankind. ABSOLUTION. Pardon. Re- mission. The Pardon (Fr. pardon) is in consequence of an offence, and re- [absolve] g-ards principally the person who has committed it. It depends upon the person offended, and produces recon- ciliation wlien it is sincerely asked and sincerely accorded. The Remission (Lat. rcmissionem) follows upon a crime, and relates specially to the penalty with which it deserves to be visited. It is ac- corded by the dispensing power in the State or community, and inter- poses to arrest the execution of justice. The Absolut ION (Lat. absMiitionem) is in consequence of a fault or sin, and relates mainly to the guilty state of one who has offended against the laws divine, and who by ecclesiasti- cal authority, after penitence, is re- instated in the condition and rights of the innocent. ABSOLVE. Acquit. Exonerate. Clear. Exculpate. To Absolve ( Lat. absolvcre, to loose) is against the idea of sin and guilt hav- ing a religious or gravely moral ap- plication. It refers to the loosing of solemn obligations, or tlie setting free from the consequences of moral or religious offence. Even in its lighter significance, absolution is still a loosing from such ties as it would be sin or guilt to violate, as oaths, promises, and the like. " Compelled by th-eats to take that bloody oath. And the act ill, I am absolved by both." Waller. As Absolve applies to offences against the laws of God and man, or from moral obligations towards the latter. Acquit (Fr. acquitter, Lat. adquiitdre, to settle a claim) bears reference to specific charges of offences against the laws of man only. Absolution sets free the conscience, acquittal the f)erson, goods, or reputation. Abso- ution sets free the guilty ; acquittal recognizes the innocent. Acquittal is a kind of legal reparation which es- tablishes the accused in his former state. Yet, though the legal effect of acquittal is always complete, the moral effect may be variable. A man may be acquitted on the ground of clear and ample evidence in his favour, or the want of such evidence against liim. DISCRIMINATED. 21 Absolve is the more moral, acquit the more judicial term. Human au- ♦^hority acquits, the force of circum- stances may absolve. "Those who are truly learned will acquit me in this point, in which I have been so far from offending that 1 hare been scrupu- lous, perhaps to a fault, in quoting the authors of several passages which I might have made my own." — Addison. To Clear (0. Fr. cler, Lat. cldrui, clear) is the simplest and most general of these terms. A man is cleared by anything, whether fact or argument, which shows him to be innocent. It implies, therefore, the antecedent in- nocence of the l>arty, while absolve implies an antecedent offence, except where it is used in the sense of to free from an obligation. The innocent are cleared, the guilty are absolved. "Although innocency needs no defence as to itself, yet it is necessary, for all the advantages it hath of doing good to man- kind, that it appear to be what it really is ; which cannot be done unless its reputa- tion be cleared from the malicious asper- sions which are cast upon it." — Stillikg- fleet. Exonerate and Exculpate are both less formal than absolve and ac- quit. They imply a moral, the former a magisterial decision. They may be used of cases in which blame is im- puted without any public indictment. They indicate, however, some superi- ority, real or assumed, in the person who exonerates or exculpates. Tlie terms, however, are also employed of the process of proving, as well as the act of declaring free from blame. Id this sense a man may be exculpated, or he may exculpate himself; he may also be exonerated by himself or an- other. Exculpation ( Lat. c» /pa, 6/a7ne) is a rescue from the guilt, exoneration (Lat. exMirare, to unload) from the charge and liabilities of an offence, or even, in a different sense, from the burden of an obligation. Exculpation, as the term implies, is restricted to fault? and crimes ; exoneration extends to other responsibilities than those of fault or blame. Exculpation is from an actual fault or offence, ex- oneration may be even from the su9^ picion of it. Exculpation is a simple term, exoneration a metaphorical term. 22 SYNONYMS [ab STAIN I Hence the wider and more varied ap- plication of the latter to things which press upon us as moral burdens, as by obligation external or self-imposed. I am exculpated by the decision of a judge; I may be exonerated by the indulgence of a friend. *' I entreat your Lordships to consider whether there ever was a witness brought before a court of justice who had stronger motives to give testimony hostile to a de- fendant for the purpose of exonerating him- self."— 5te?e Trials. " In Scotland the law allows of an ex- culpation, hy which the prisoner is suffered before his trial to prove the thing to be impossible." — Burnet. ABSTAIN. FoRBEAn. Refrain. Desist. Of these Abstain (Lat. abstinere, to hold off, act) is the most general in its sense. It is simply not to do wlien to do would be possible. We may abstain with a slight effort of self-con- trol from what we are inclined to do, or with a stronger effort from what we are powerfully attracted to do, oi with no effort at all from doing that which we might have done in the ordi- nary course, but which we avoid doing from the thought of inconvenient or disastrous consequences. We may abstain under the strongest impulses or the slightest tendencies. Prudence or a sense of duty may cause us to ab- stain from things in themselves in- different. " He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming plea- sures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better- he is the true way-faring Christian." — Milton. As abstain regards mainly an external object with which we refuse to con- nect ourselves, or an external act which we refuse to perform, so both to Forbear (literally, to bear or keep, and^or with tlie sense of negation ; to withhold) and Refrain (Lat. re- frlnare, to bridle, curb) regard mainly the internal impulse which we resist. Refrain and forbear differ in the de- gree of the impulse and in tlie nature of it. In refraining we put a stronger check upon ourselves than in forbear- ing. To refrain from doing a thing is to prevent ourselves from d )ing it. To forbear doing a thing is not to do it when we might. We for the most part refrain from what primarily afiects ourselves, we forbear doing that which primarily affects others. Refraining belongs rather to a decision of will, forbearing is the result of ante- cedent judgment or reflexion. The force of refrain appears more plainly in tlie reflexive use of it — to refrain one's self, to which forbear has no parallel. " In pretence o^ forbearance they resolve to torment him with a lingering death." — Bishop Hall. Desis'i (X-Vit. d'esisltre, to stop from) expresses voluntary cessation of hitherto continuous action. It differs from abstain in not being applicable to objects, but only to actions, and also in implying a notion which abstaining excludes. He Avho abstains from doing a tiling does it not, he who desists does it for a while, or to a certain extent. We desist from a course of action or systematic pur- suits, and, commonly speaking, be- cause we see that they are unseemly, unjust, or profitless ; and sometimes from weariness or dissatisfaction. " A Politician desists from his designs when he finds they are impracticable." — Blair. ABSTINENCE. Fast. These terms are technically distin- guished. Abstinence (see Abstain) is a refraining from certain sorts of food. " The temperance which adorned the severe manners of the soldier and the philo- sopher was connected with some strict and frivolous rules of religious abstinence ; and it was in honour of Pan or Mercury, of Hecate or Iris, that Julian on particular days denied himself the use of some parti- cular food." — Gibbon. Fasting (A. S.fiestan, to fast ; Teu- ton, fast, i.e. firm ; and so tokeep,i.e, from food ; or (?) as an ordinance), whence fast is to refrain from food altogether. " Froni hence may an account be given why the inhabitants of hot countries may entlure longer fasting and hunger than those of colder, and these seemingly prodi- gious and to us scarce credible stories of the fastings and abstinence of the Egj-ptian monks be rendered probable."— Rat, On Creation. [abstraction] discriminated. 23 ABSTINENT. Sober. Abste- MFOus. Temperate. ]\Ioderate. Abstinence expresses the power and the habit of refraining from in- dulgence of the appetites. " 13e abstinent, show not the corruption of thy generation. He that feeds shall die, therefore he that feeds not shall die, there- fore he that feeds not shall live." — Beau- mont AND Fletcher. When abstinence refers to matters of food and drink, it is called Abste- miousness. *' Promised by heavenly message twice de- scending Under her special eye Abstemicms I grew up, and thrived amain." Milton. Sober (Lat. sbhrius, i.e., se-, pre- fix, meaning separation, and ibrius, drunken), denotes the character which by its natural gravity is constitution- ally untempted to excesses of any kind, being content with what is mo- derate and sufficient. It has, how- ever, two characters, according as it is employed of abstinence from intoxi- cating liquors and of the character generally. In the fonner use it de- notes no more than the opposite to intoxicated, so that a man may be called sober who is not drunk, though he be not at all abstemious, and, through strength of constitution, or even habitual drinking, may be able to drink much without being affected by any degree of intoxication. In its more widely moral significance, sober applies to all situations, and even to thoughts and opinions as well as out- ward behaviour. In this way sobriety includes reserve, discretion, modera- tion, restraint. It consists in not say- ing, doing, thinking, feeling exces- sively, but in all these things being according to the rule of right reason. " Sobriety is sometimes opposed in Scrip- ture to pride, and sometimes to sensuality." —Gilpin. Temperate (Lat. temptrdre, to tem- per) expresses the character which is well-balanced in its appetites, and to rrong way, to Abuse is to misuse in such a way that hurt accrues to the thing misused, or to some other. To misuse may be the consequence of inexpe- rience or unfamiliarity with the thing used ; to abuse is intentionally to use it in wrongdoing. In misuse one offends against reason, order, propriety, me- thod, interest; in abuse against jus- tice or honesty. In misuse there is derangement, in abuse excess. Ex- cess is the characteristic in the idea of abusing one's powers, or the patience and forbearance of others. It de- serves, however, to be remarked, that tJie abusing of one's own powers may arise from imprudence or even gene- rosity, as wliere the anxiety to serve or benefit others has made us forget the care and consideration due to our- selves. But, generally speaking, to misuse i« to use with waste of power; abuse is to use with wrongfulness of pur- pose. Language is abused when it is employed to deceive, to advocate in- justice, to excite bad passions, in blasphemy, and the like. It is mis- used when it is spoken unidioraati- cally or ungrammatically. " The gravest and wisest person may be abused by being put into a fool's coat." — TiLLOTSOX. "How much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding, the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover, and that per- haps in words little suspected for any such misuse." — Locke. ACADEMY. School. College. University. Seminauy. Institute. Academy is a term borrowed from the Greek ixa^n/xua, a gymnasium in the suburbs of Athens where Plato taught. Hence the Platonic schools were called academies, and societies of learned men have since been called academies. The term is also applied to societies for promoting the fine arts and sciences, as the Academy of France, the Royal Academy of Pain- ters in England, and many others. It is an affectation to call a school for young boys an academy. It is evi- dent that no common living together is involved in the simple idea of an academy, which is constituted simply on tlie jirinciple of a community in learning or art, and denotes more than their first rudiments. " In a conference of the French Academy, one of the Academicians desired to hare their opinions on the conduct of Paul Vero- nese, who, though a painter of great oon- sidei-ation, had, contrary to the strict rules of art, in his picture of Perseus and Andro- meda, represented the principal figure in shade." — Sir J. Reitjolds. A School (Greek, a-x^y^n, leisure), commonly expresses among ourselves the idea of youthful students and the discipline and instruction of elders, except where the word is used in the sense of a school of art, as of painting, meaning a succession of artists of the same style. Even here, however, the earlier painters or founders of the style are spoken of as masters, and their imitators as pupils. Like aca- demy, but more strictly, common study is implied in school, but not of neces- sity common living together. Aca- demy and school are also applicable to places where bodily accomplish- ments are practised, as a School of Fencing, or a Riding Academy. [accede] DISCRIMINATED. 27 " This place shoald be at once both School and University, not needing a remove to any other honse of scholarship, except it be some peculiar College of Law or Physic, where they mean to be practi- tioners." — Milton. In College (Lat. ColUgium^ col- leagueship ; and so antj kind of corpo- ration) is involved, on the other hand, a societv of persons living together or acting officially in concert. And this is tlie essence of the idea, that of learn- ing being accidental. Some colleges are not institutions of learning or science, as the College of Cardinals. A college in the educational sense is supposed to be more under public government than a school, which may be Bti-ictly private. " When we consider the greatness of our wants in this kind, we should be tempted to wish for a College destined for the supplial of a sufficient number of able missionaries in constant succession, brought up from their early youth in such a disci- pline as may be judged best fitted for such a service." — Warburtox. An aggregate of colleges may form an University, which, however, is not thereby constituted, but rather by being a place oi'universal learning ( Lat. nm versitatem, orig. a guild corporatioii) has commonly a corporate existence and rights which are recognized by the State to which it belongs. A uni- versity may consist of one or more than one college. The building called the University of London is not a college, but represents a central seat of learning to which colleges are affiliated. " As it resembled a royal court in regard of those many nobli-mea and persons of quality that lived in it, so one might esteem it an University, for those many accom- plished men in all kinds of knowledge and good learning that were his domestics." — Strype. ACCEDE. Assent. Consent. AcnEE. Comply. Acquiesce. Con- FOUM. Accede (Lat. acctdere, to go to or join) expresses a voluntary going forth of the mind,- to attach itself to some proposed matter. That to whiih we accede is of the nature of some- thing .proposed to our consideration, OS a request, or a plan of action. We accede when we go over to the side, as it were, of another, in consequence of his representations made to us. We accede when we agree to the terms of a person or party or a convention. " And vain were reason, coui-age, learning, all. Till power accede ; till Tudor's wild caprice Smile on their cause."— Shekstoke. As we accede to practical proposals, so we Assent( Lat. assenfn'c) to matters of judgment as enunciated in spe- culative propositions. We assent to a thing when we admit it to be true, or recognized as such, whether formally proposed to our acceptance or not. It is opposed to dissent, which is to express an opposite or different opinion, as assent a similar or the same. It is purely mental, but is also taken for the voluntaiy expres- sion of concurrence, as an act of the judgment. " Subscription to articles of Religion, though no more than a declaration of the subscriber's assetit, may properly enough be considered in connexion with the subject of oaths, because it is governed by the same rule of interpretation." — Paiey. Consent (Lat. consenhre) is to con- cur to some practical pui'pose, to agree to act according to the will of another. But the noun consent bears the meaning of collective assent, as in the phrase, " the universal consent of mankind." Consent is given to others in some matter in which they are in- terested, and which is promoted by such agreement on our part. Some superiority, either personal or of posi- tion, springing out of the circum- stances is implied in consent. Assent may be the result of some proposal or request to express it. Consent is al- ways consequent upon request. The effect of assent is to involve in the responsibility of expressed opinion ; the effect of consent is to implicate in a course of action. " My poverty and net my will consents." Shakespkarb. Agree (Fr. agrier=^prendre a g"6^ t.e.ad gralum,toreceiiefavourabtu, (rom Lat. grntus,) is the most comprehen- sive. Assent is agreement of opinion ; consent, agreement of action; acced- ing, agreement to proposals : confor- mity, agreement to outward rules or practices ; compliance, agreement to 28 ittbmit one's self to the wishes of another. As the rest are voluntary and deliberate acts, so a^eement may be voluntary or involuntary. Agi'eement may be between persons and things, or a person and a thing. It may be a harmony of will, moral likeness, me- chanical aptitude, external similarity ; and, in short, anything which is not disagi-eement or difference. Agree- ment may be complete or partial, of all points or of some only. Things agi-ee which harmonize m opinion, feeling, statement, proposal, appear- ance, operation — that is, where they meet in some third tenn, which is a test or standard of judgment, senti- mei.t, expression, or evidence, pur- pose, likeness, or result. " Knowledge seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion ana agreement or disagreement, and repugnance of any of our ideas." — Locke. Comply and Consent (the former from Lat. complire, tofuljil, through It. complire, not Fr. compiler) very nearly coincide, but compliance denotes far more strongly and personally the surrender of one's own will to that of another. We may comply reluctantly or gladly. We comply with the wishes of another as such ; but we might con- sent to do a thing on its being shown to be for our own interest, or if a sufficient inducement were held out to us, though it should not be of any particular advantage to the person who should endeavoui- to induce us to act. To consent is a more indepen- dent act than to comply. In con- senting we recognize proper ground of action, though at the request of another. I n complying we recognize nothingbuthis desires. Consentmay, and generally does, come from a supe- rior, or one independent of us ; comply- ing, from one who is in some degree the inferior or weaker. If we con- sent wrongly, it is from an error of judgment ; if we comply wrongly, it IS from weakness of character. Not to consent is to refuse ; not to comply is to resist. " He that complies against his will. Is of the same ojiinion Btill." HUDIBRAS. fo Acquiesce {LqX. acqtue&ctre) is 8YN0NYMS [ACCELERATE] to concur with what is said or done in some degree short of a full and hearty concurrence, and even with the mere absence of contradiction or opposition. Acquiescence is a passive act dictated by prudence, dutj^, or ne- cessity. It is a negative or permissive act which refi-ainsfrom challenging the truth of statements, or the justice of decisions and dispositions. It is the act of an inferior by position or circum- stances. It is a kind of consent or compliance, which comes not so much from the will or the judgment as from a determination to have no will and exercis* no judgment of our own in the matter. " Submission to God's will, and acquies- cence in the event disposed by Him."— Barrow. CoNFOUM (Lat. conformare, to form symtneirically) denotes, as the structure of the word expresses, an external, or at least formal, agreement. We con- form only in externals, or the opinions which affect them, or the rules which regulate them. We conform to habits, customs, and practices ; not to thoughts, but to the modes in which they find expression; not to principles, but the action which is the result of them. An outward confonnity may even conceal an inward dissent. '* I think those who make laws and ost force to bring men to Church conformity in religion seek only the compliance ; but concern themselves not for the con^^ction of those they punish." — Locke, ACCELERATE. Hasten. Speed. Expedite. Despatch. Quicken. Urge. Instigate. Of these Hasten, Speed, Quicken, are used both as active and neuter verbs; Expedite, Despatch, Accele- rate, Urge, only actively. It is as active verbs that they are hei*e con- sidered. Accelerate (Lat. acc^lh-dre) has much the sense of the English form Quicken (A.S. civic, quick, alivCy lively, rapid), which is the most generic of all. Accelerate refers to some movement already begun, and except as a scientific ' tei-m, is not applied to the object itself— the rota- tion of a wheel, not the wheel itself, is accelerated ; the speed of a horse, not the horse. In this respect it [accelerate] differs from Hasten, which may be employed where no movement has as yetDe.2:un; and in tlie sense of shorten- ing the interval before something tftkes place, as to hasten a person's departure. It has a character more purely mechanical than hasten. To accelerate is to cause increased ve- locity of movement; to hasten (of. German, hasten) is to cause di- minished occupation of time. la hastening we have a final object, in acceleratmg we may have no more than an operative object. I hasten the despatch of business in order that it may be the sooner concluded ; I accelerate the rotation of the gi-ind- stone that it may grind the more effectually. The setting of additional sail, by accelerating the speed of the vessel, will hasten our an'ival at the port. If we accelerate a conclusion. It is that we accelerate the process by which it is airived at. " Motion may be in an endless variety of directions. It may be quick or slow, recti- lineal or curvilineal. It may be equable, or accelerated, or retarded." — Reid. " The two Houses, finding things in this posture, hastened the departure of their Commissioners to the Isle of Wight, with powers and instructions to treat with the king." — Ludlow. Spekd in this sense ( A.S. spkdan, to hasten) is a little old-fashioned, and is rather used when the idea of pro- gperous or successful furtherance is intended, without of necessity an in- crease in the rate of motion. It be- longs to the enterpiises, undertakings, and transactions of men, which occupy time, and run a prescribed course, and need management and regulation. " Speeder of Night's spies And guide of all her dreams' obscurities." Chapman, Homer. Urge is employed in matters in which the action of persons is con- cerned, and is only poetically used in the sense of propel mechanically (Lat. urg'ere), as by Gray — " To chase the rolling circles' speed. Or urge the flying ball." We say, however, to urge a conside- ration, argument, plea, and the like. It conveys the idea of hastening by pressure, and from a feeling of the danger or undesirableness of light suggestions or delay. DISCRIMINATED. 29 " My brother did urge me in this act." Shakespeare. He who urges acts under a grave impulse. Circumstances as well as persons may urge, that is, exercise, strong inducement to action when we reflect upon their nature and conse- quences. When we urge we supply a stimulus to action where it is want- ing, or we regard it as wanting. The use of the whip will urge the horse to his highest speed. Ambition will urge men to arduous, almost to des- perate attempts. We are urged equally by the violent promptings of passion, and by the incontrovertible force of reason. To urge stands midway be- tween incline, which is weaker, and compel, which is stronger. Expedite and Despatch (Lat. gi- pcdire, and Fr. dtpScher, It. dispacciare) are employed of transactions in busi- ness, but expedite refers rather to the hastening oi the process, despatch to the attainment of the end ; so that both may concui", in the same phrase, to expedite the despatch of business. The idea of expediting is to free from incumbrances, so as to enable to move faster ; the idea of despatching is to unfasten, and so to set loose or free. A matter is expedited when it is got over more quickly, it is despatched when it is disposed of as done. To despatch a messenger is to send him off, to despatch an enemy is to send him out oi life. Insiigate (Lat. instigare) is only used towards persons, and commonly in an unfavourable sense. We urge to honest exertion, and instigate to crime. The idea of instigation is that of goading on to do something ; to this has come to be added that of a secret motive or impulse. Instigation is a means, by stimulation and secret excitement, of urging one to do what he is not otherwise inclined to do, and which he may even resist. He who is instigated is forced on in some way. Sound and sober reasons, how- ever unanswerably forcible, do not instigate, though they may prompt, urge, and even compel. *' Your Imperial Majesty's just influence, which is still gi'eater than your extensive power, will animate and expedite the effort* of other sovereigns." — Buuke. 30 SYNONYMS [accent] " Ere we pnt ourselves in arms, despatch we The business we have talked of." Shakespeare. As the idea of quick is first that of life, and then that of such active movement as flows from life, the verb quicken follows this twofold idea, and besides being employed of the mere acceleration of motion, may be used also of increasing tlie motive faculty, as in the following : — " Liice a fruitful garden without a hedge, which quickens the appetite to enjoy so tempting a prize." — South. " He hath only instigated his blackest agents to the very extent of their malig- nity."— Warbubtox. ACCENT. Emphasis. Stuess. Of these. Stress is the most gene- ral, expressing an idea of effort (O. Fr. estroissir, to straighten), while Em- phasis (Gr. EiJt.usig, from ifX'^oiivofjiai) expresses the idea of light and shade, and Accent (Lat. acceiUns) that of in- tonation, flletaphorically, stress is used as the others are not — upon ideas, arguments, or moral considerations. We lay stress upon that to which we attribute importance, to which we desire to assign a prominent place in our representations. As accent and em])ha5is belong not to thoughts but to their utterance in language, so ac- cent is on syllables, emphasis on words. The object of accent is gram- matical, for the purpose of character- izing words; the object of emphasis is rliPtorical, for the purpose of draw- ing the idea which they express into prominence, and illustrating the sense by a marked pronunciation of the word. Accent is a matter of rule, and belongs to the requirements of the lano^uage, and in no sense to the taste of the speaker. It has in some cases its written signs which are in- variable. Emphasis is variable, and depends, where it is deliberate, on the taste and interpretation of the reader or speaker ; where it is spontaneous, on his emotion. " Agi-eeably to this (short pronunciation of our words) is a remarkable peculiarity of Engli.«h pronunciation, the throwing the accent farther back— that is, nearer the be- ginning of the word, than is done by any other nation." — Blair. " The voice all modes of passion can express That marky the proper, and with proper stress : Bat none emphatic can that actor call, Who lays an equal emphasis on all." Lloyd's Actor. ACCEPT. Receive. Take. Of these. Take (A.S. tacan, to take, lay hold of) which is the simplest and most purely physical, is employed in the twofold sense of spontaneous as- suming, and of ready receiving at the hand of another ; in other words, to assume with or without the interven- tion of another person. The force oscillates between the most active and the most purely passive senses. I take a thing by force, or I take an injury — that is, endure without resent- ing it. In this passive sense it is em- ployed of inanimate substances to denote no more than a natural im- pressibility, or capability of being acted upon. Wax will take the im- pression of a seal. In fresco painting the moist ground will take the colors better than when dry. Receive (Fr. i-ecevoir, Lat. rcciptre) is purely passive. Like take, it be- longs both to voluntary agents and inanimate substances. I receive a friend at my house ; I receive a blow ; the wax receives the impression. When employed of the former, take is more or less voluntary, even in its passive sense. Receive may be vo- luntary or involuntary. To take a blow is passive and voluntary. To receive a blow is passive and involun- tary. The voluntariness is distinctly prominent in Accept (Lat. acctpere, part, accept us), vi-hich always implies pleasure, or at least readiness. On the other hand, we receive gladly or unwillingly, as the case may be. We accept what we choose to take from another, we receive what he chooses to give us. The difference may be illustrated by the difference between receiving an apology or an invitation and accepting it. It is to be noted that accept is not used in this sense of persons whom we always receive, sometimes gladly, sometimes ungra- ciously, unless the person is in some way presented to our choice. Ac- ceptance is an active, voluntary, and conscious reception. We are com-, monly said to receive thanks and to accept services. Receive may denote [acceptance] discriminated. 31 no more than not refusing. We ought always to be grateful for benefits we hare received, and to be very slow in rejecting what we have once ac- cepted. " And toward the education of yonr daugh- ters I here bestow a simple instrument. And this small packet of Greek and Latin books, If you accept them, then their worth is great." Shakespeare. " Justification always supposes two par- ties, one to give, and another to receive, whether without any act at all on the re- ceptive side, as in the case of infants ; or whether accompanied by receptive acts, as in the case of adults, who may be properly said to accept and assent to, as well as to receive and enjoy." — Waterland. " Take, eat, this is my body." — English Bible. " Do I fully trust in God as the Giver and Taker away of all earthly things ? "— Gilpin. ACCEPTABLE. Grateful. Wklcome. That is Acceptable (See Accept) which is gladly to be received as a relative good as coinciding with our circumstances and requirements. But this only within certain limits, for it is not a strong term. Tlie appropriate belongs essentially to the accept- able : we should be speaking ironically if we said of any gift of great value that it was acceptable. That is ac- ceptable which is suitable in itself and pleasant to receive. The accept- able is determined as much by the judgment as by the feelings. " If the mind is at any time vacant from every passion and desire, there are still some objects that are more acceptable to us than others." — Reid. Grateful (Lat. ^rnf us) expresses not so much what is recognized as a good as rather what is sensibly de- lightful and consonant with the feel- ings. Hence, unlike acceptable, it may be predicted of things which are not gifts at all, nor of the nature of possessions. A donation of money is grateful to the poor man, as gladden- mg his heart with the means of ob- taining what otherwise he could not possess ; acceptable to him as reflect- ing upon the improvement of hig condition consequent upon it. The grateful commonly meets a natural, as the acceptable an artificial or casual want. The cool breeze is grateful to the fevered patient. As tlie accept- able excites satisfaction, so the grateful excites joy or pleasure. The accept- able meets a requirement, the grateful a want. " Hope's grateful stimulus produces i pleasing and salutary flow of the animal spirits, and diffuses a temperate vivacity over the system." — Cogax. Welcome, as the word plainly in- dicates, belongs to that which comes to us gladly, and includes, like grate- ful, many things besides gifts or things offered to our acceptance. What is welcome is always of the nature of an event. It is, strictly speaking, not the person, but his arri- val or coming which is welcome. Welcome expresses, more positively than acceptable or even grateful, the fact that the thing has accrued to the person. That which is acceptable or grateful one would be glad to have, that which is welcome has arrived. The former express the qualities of things, the latter their effect upon ourselves. " O welcome hour 1 " — Miltox. acceptance. Acceptation. Tliese words, which are only diffe- rent modifications of the word accept, have come to be employed with some distinction of meaning; depending, nevertheless, entirely upon usage. It is, however, consonant with tlieir ety- mology that acceptance sliould have the more subjective and active, acceptation the more objective and passive, sense. So acceptance denotes the actor process of receiving, acceptation the mode in which the word or thing is received. The acceptance of a word would mean the recognition and reception of it, either by an individual or into the vocabulary of a language. Its acceptation would be its force and meaning after it had been so received. The acceptation of a word is conven- tional. It depends upon what a parti- cular people or generation may re- gard as its direct and proper force. So, for instance, the Lat. dbuti, to use wrongly, has gone out in different meanings in the French abuser and the English abtise as regards persons, 62 SYNONYMS [access] the French notion of abuse in such cases being deception, the English, coarse denunciation. The acceptance of a word lies more commonly in the genius of a language, which seems to possess, 80 to speak, an instinctive faculty of admitting what is con- sonant, and rejecting what is uncon- genial to it. Like all instincts, how- ever, it is not unerring; and we are sometimes surprised to find what we regard as a rejection without a cause, where the a'cceptance of the word would have added to the resources of the language. " Such with him Finds no acceptance nor can find." Milton. " ' Friend,' quoth the Cur, ' I meant uo harm. Then why so captious, why so warm ? My words in common acceptation, Could never give thee provocation.' " — Gay. ACCESS. Approach. Both these words are employed both of the drawing near and of the line of movement by which it is effected — that is, of the act and the way ; but Access (Lat. accessus, from acctdere, to approach ) bears reference rather to the capabilities, Approach {Fr.approcher, Lat. nppro^priare, Bra- cket) to the way, of drawing near. In approach, the question is as to the ri^ht or wrong line or method, or the safety or expediency of making it at all. In access, it is as to the ease or difficulty of finding or obtaining it. Approach is used in more varied senses than access, which commonly means capa- bility of reaching or being reached. Approach is the act of drawing near, and is applicable to time as well as space, or, in a secondary sense, bears the meaning of resemblance, an ana- logy existing between the ideas of Bimilarity and approximation. Access is a complete, approach a partial, act. Approach may still leave an interval between us and the object approached ; access precludes the idea of such interval. In regard to persons, one would sometimes gladly approach tliem, but cannot gain access to them. In such cases we commonly approach them in order to insinuate ourselves into their good graces, and seek access to them on the ground of some matter of interest in which we believe that they may render us assistance. " They anon With hundreds and with thousands troop- ing came Attended, all access was thronged." MiLTOX, " By thy approach thou mak'st me most unhappy." Shakespeare. ACCIDENT. Contingency. Casualty. Incident. All these terms express the occur- rence of events in the producing of which, our own design had no part. Of these Accident (Lat. acctdere, to befall) and Casualty (Lat. cdsudlis, fortuitous) are more closely personal than Contingency (Lat. coiitingtre, to fall to the lot) and Incident (Lat. inctdtre, to befall). Although the term accident means in itself no more than a befalling, it is never used without qualification to express the chance occurrence of anything good, but requires a modifying term ; as, a lucky accident. An accident bears refe- rence to some person to whom an event occurs undesignedly. In the phrase " by accident," as, " I met him by accident in the street," the idea of untoward befalling is not implied as in the case of the simple noun, an accident. Accident is the concrete of which chance is the abstract. Chance instanced in somebody becomes acci- dent. We may see how the term accident was on the turn in Shake- speare's time, from an unexpected occurrence to an untoward one, in the line, •' Of moving accidents by flood and field." Casualty, like accident, tends to an unfavourable sense. The use of such words seems to indicate the feeling of mankind, that where things occur not as the consequence of human fore- thouglit and desion, they are in the majority of cases infelicitous or disas- trous. A casualty is first a chance occurrence, then an infelicitous one ; as an accident is first a chance occur- rence, then a disastrous one. Casualty is more independent of ourselves than accident. An accident may be, an a head or end) is to accomplish under special circumstances of dirticulty, but differs from the foregoing in that some deo^ree of excellence is attached to the idea, either in the striving or the tiling striven for, or both, ^ione of the other synonyms go beyond the fact, and imply nothing of the merit of doing. And although a matter cannot be in itself more thai: accom- plished, effected, or executed, yet there may be room for reiJexion that it might have been more fully accom- plished, more faithfully or exactly executed, or more permanently ef- fected. But the thing achieved has been pushed to the extreme limit of success, both in the result and the mode in which it has been gained. In the others chance may have com- bined with effort, but he who has been helped by luck in any degree has not achieved. " No exploits so illustrious as those which have been achieved by the faith and pa- tience, by the courage and prudence, of the ancient saints. They do far surpass the most famous achievements of Pagan heroes," —Barrow, To Perform is to caiTy on with sus- tained or continuous action, to per- form perfectly is to do this out to the end. We perform what is prescribed or marked out by rule as a part or duty, a function or office, a command- ment. In all the rest the end is well- nigh everything, in performance the end is irequently nothing, and the doing everything. A performance as such, has no object beyond itself. It is itseK an end, the thing being 36 SYNONYMS [ACCOSTJ done lor the sake of doing it, or for some purpose which goes along with it, as the exhibition of some quality in the performer, or some pleasure accessory to it. Continuous function according to prescribed rule is per- formance, whether it be physical, mental, moral, or partly one and pai-tly another, as dancing upon a rope, mental arithmetic, an act of benevolence, or playing a musical instrument, or talking part in a dra- matic representation. " Some men are brave in battle who are weak in counsel, which daily experience sets before our eyes. Others deliberate wisely, but are weak in the performing part."— Dryden. ACCOST. Salute. Auduess. Greet. Hail. Accost (Fr.accosfc)', Lat. accostare) is literally to come to the side, Lat. costay of or up to a person, with the purpose of addressing him. In old English writers occurs the form " ac- coast," which was employed as a geographical term. " So much of Lapland as accoasts the sea." Fuller. The idea of the movement has dropped out of the word, which has come to mean exclusively thf purpose of it, namely, the address. It denotes the ilirection of words to a person in an un- premeditated Avay whom chance cir- cumstances have thrown in one's way. One accosts another as one meets him in the street, the object being in the first instance to bring one's self before his notice. Hence in accost- ing there is some degree of abrupt- ness by the necessities of the case, or familiar acquaintance with the person. " If you would convince a person of his mistake, accost him not upon that subject when his spirit is ruffled or discomposed with any occurrences of life, and especially when he has heated his passions in the de- fence of a contrary opinion." — Waits. Salute (Lat. sUtutare, to ivish health) is to exhibit on meeting some sign of friendship or respect which may or may not consist in, or be ac- conipanitjd by, words. Among ac- quaintance it is hardly a voluntary act, fcJid is reqviired by the usages of society. While accost is of equals and in words, salute is not uncommonly of superiors and without words. To salute is deferential, to accost may be so, or it may be cpiite the contrary. Saluting is momentary and not sus- tained ; while accosting may be mo- mentary in regard to act, and sustained in regard to the words. " I shall not trouble my reader with the first salutes of our three friends." — Ad- DISOiV. Address (Fr. s'adresser, which traces back, through certain changes, to Lat. dirigerCy to direct) may be with or without personal meeting, as by letter. It is more sustained than accost. So we might accost a person for the purpose afterwards of address- ing him at length. Both accost and salute belong more restrictedly to the moment of first meeting. The verb address is applied sometimes directly to the person addressed, sometimes to the thing, as an observation or a letter addressed to him. For further re- marks see the noun Address. *' The shortest and best prayer which we can address to Him who knows our wants and our ignorance in asking ;s, 'Thy will be done.' "— Bolikgbroke. Greet (A. S. grttan) is to salute with some demonstration of personal feeling. This is commonly favourable, as to greet with smiles, but usage sometimes employs the term in re- ference to the contrary, as the ap- pearance of an unpopular orator, for instance, is greeted with yells and hisses. It is demonstrative recogni- tion by words or other signs and ex- pressions. We accost and salute only persons directly. We may greet their acts or words. By a poetical analogy the term is even extended to events, though, in its older use, it was con- fined to persons, as very elegantly in the following : — " Roget, droope not, see the spring Is the earth enammelling. And the birds on every tree Greete this moi'n with melodie." Brown. W hen used of events it has the force of welcome or the reverse, but with a stronger element of emotion. Hail (Icel. heill, i.e., hale, healthify and connected with heal and healthy [account] DISCKIMINATED 37 answering to the Lat. sahe! and so to " salute ") has lost its etymological force, and means now such a short demonstrative accosting as shall arrest the attention, as when we speak of hailing a ship at sea. We hail in order to cause and excite attention by some cry of recognition, or some short and stirring form of words, to which we add effect by the very force and sound which we impart to them. In greet- ing we demonstrate our feelings in regard to the person, in hailing we recognize something in him. A mul- titude, when it greets a man as their Prince, ismoved by feelings of loyalty. In hailing him as their Prince they do no more than give outward token of accepting him as such. This may be a formal act following upon his elec- tion, or an outward acclamation con- cealing inward disaffection. " I pray'd for children, and thought bar- renness In wedlock a reproach. I gain'd a son, And such a son as all then hailed me happy. Who would be now a father in my stead ? " Milton. ACCOUNT. Bill. As synonyms these words express in common a representation or state- ment of charo-es on money. Account (Lat. ad and compiitare, to compute, of which coiuit is an abbre- viation) enters more into details than a Bill (O. Fr. bille, a label or note of the value of an article, L. Lat. billa). Hence bill has commonly but one side to it, embodying a charge of one party against another. An ac- count may have two sides to it, a balance being finally struck in favour of one side or party in the account. " To love's account they placed their death of late. And now transfer the sad account to fate." Parnell. "Ordinary expense ought to be limited by a man's estate, and ordered to the best, that the bills may be less than the estima- tion abroad."— Bacon. ACCOUNT. Naiirative. Nar- ration. Description. Relation. Record. History. Tale. Memoir. Story. Anecdote. An Account, being literally a ren- dering of counts, is a detailed state- ment of what makes up a thing, what brings it about, and what it is com- posed of wlien it is brought abou,. An account is an explication of facts^ and a true account is an exact explica tion of them. It may be of any com pi ex phenomenon, as of an ordinary personal occurrence, an historical transaction, a physical law or fact, an artificial system or theory. It is not a term of high hi'-torio dignity, but refers to matters of the more familiar kind. We should speak of Thucy- dides' history, rather than account, of the Peloponnesian war. The virtue of an account is not to be lengthy but concise, clear, sufficiently full, and correct. It should contain neither more nor less than the sum of the facts. Its end is to convey instruc- tion with fidelity. Accounts may be vague, coming in from various and unverified sources. On the other hand, narrative, description, and re- lation, imply more distinctly a nar- rator, describer, and relator. •' For this cause chiefly we thought it good to yield up an account of our faith iu writing." — Bp. Jewel. A Narrative (Lat. narrdve, to re- late) differs from a narration, as the objective fi-om the subjective, that is, the narration is the narrative viewed in connexion with the mind and act of the narrator. A narrative is not like an account of any complex fact or transaction, but only of such as are characterized by an historic sequence. A narrative belongs to occurrencea. It is not only bound to truth of fact and a representation of details in the order of occurrence, but it possesses a rhetoi'ical style. In narration general truth takes the place of minute ex- actitude ; the manner takes pre- cedence of the evidence. It may be the combined result of study and art. It has to do, not with naked facts, but with facts clothed. It does not dispense with interest in aiming at instruction. Its virtue is to be clear, consecutive, striking, touching, ele- gant, descriptive, illustrative. Livy's narratives of the battles of early Roman history cannot be regarded as historical . Relation (Lat. referre, part, re- latusy to relate, record) is literally a 38 SYNONYMS bringiMg bact. To relate in old Eng- lish meant simply to bring back. So Spenser — " " Till morrow next agaia Both light of heaven and strength of men rdnteJ" But before this it had been commonly ased in the sense of bringing back by recital, representing in story. " And relacion Maketh to the Quene how he had do," GOWER. The terra connects the matter closely with the speaker, making the action a strictly personal one. It is such an account as is given by an individual of facts which he has either actually experienced, or has assimilated and made his own. Therefore the virtues of relation are the virtues of therelater, such as come from a close observation, a lucid intellect, a sound judgment of the relative importance of events, sym- pathy, candour. Unlike narration, it may be verv inartistic yet very efFec- tfve, from the vivid and natural man- ner of the relater. A narrative gains by rhetorical completeness, a relation by unstudied simplicity. The narrator presents you with a finished account, the relater with the aggregate of his own experience in fact and feeling. It belongs, however, to a more familiar, shorter, less grave, and more personal subject than narrative, so that a very commonplace occurrence may become peculiarly interesting fiom the mind and manner of the relater. "Those relations are commonly of most value in which the writer tells his own •tory."— JoHxsoN. '* In the nnrration of the poet, it is not innteriul whether he relate the whole story in his own chax'acter, or introduce some of his personages to relate any part of the action that had passed hefore the poem opens."— Blair. History (Gr. laro^ta, a learning by i7iquiry) is a formal and connected account of many events in series, for which some degree of importance is claimed as illustrative of men and nations, an account standing to a history as an item to a general sum. So we might speak of the account of the Plague of Athens as given in the history of Thucydides. For further remarks see J 1 isV jhy . [account] " Secondly, we have likewise a most ancient and credible history of the begin- ning of the world. I mean the history of Moses, with which no book in the world in point of antiquity can contend." — TiLtOT- sox. The presumption at least is that a history is true. This is not neces- sarily the case with Story (the word is an abbreviated form of History), which may be fictitious. Where it is not fictitious there is still implied an inferior de^-ree of dignity and im- portance, the subject turning gene- rally upon incidents of private and domestic life, as the story of Robin- son Crusoe, the story of Fabricius and the Elepliant, the story of the Babes in the VVood. The interest of history lies in occurrences and trans- actions on a great scale ; the changes of political constitutions ; the delibe- rations of senates, the increase of popular power, the shock of battles, the celebration of triumphs, the pro- gress of armies, the lives of flictious and ambitious leaders, heroes, orators, statesmen. The interest of story lies in the adventures of persons more like ourselves generally, in personal en- terprises, in scenes of home life. In history we look on as upon a grand spectacle. In story we identify our- selves with what is passing, and feel that fortune mio-ht have made us prin- cii)al actors in it. Our minds are oc- cupied engagingly, and the introduc- tion of history plays only a secondary part. A story may instruct, but its first purpose is to entertain. It should combine, in an unpretending manner, the virtues of nairation and relation. "A story in which native humour reigns, 'Tis often useful, always entertains." COWPER. In Tale (A. S. tal, a reckoning speech) the si-bject is often fictitious*, not of necessity, but because the primary characteristic is not truth but relation. As a good story is entertaining, so a good tale excites sentiment or sympathy. A tale may be true or false, or a compound of truth and falsehood. A tale is ety- mologically a telling off or coui.ting off (compare ^ccoj/n/) of matters in narration. A tale is commonly a story 3f personal experience involving hap- [accountable] discriminated. 39 piness or unhappiness, success or disappointment, prosperity or the reverse. It is a story coloured by human feelings and fortunes, turning on individual cases. A true tale, a false tale, a tale of happiness, a pitiful tale, an ingenious tale, a tale of glorious achievements, a tale of lying wonders. We may tell a tale as it has been told to us, or we may invent it, or mix narrative with inven- •ion. As story borders more closely cpon narrative, so tale upon relation. The character of a story depends xiore upon the matter, the character «f a tale on the reciter. In the phrases tale-bearing, tale-telling, we seem to recognize the ideas of personal in- cident which receive a colour from Jie relater. ** In thy faint slumbers I by thee have vratch'd. And heard thee murmur tales of wars." ShAK£SP£ARS. a Description (Lat. descfibcrey to wnte off, to writs down) professes to be a porti-aiture in langiiage, giving the fact or the object as it strikes the eye or the mind with fidelity of re- presentation. It is delineation in detail. It is not in itself a story or narrative, though it becomes a kind of story or narrative to him to whom it is given ; as, e.g. a description of the whole appearance of a person where the sequence is the order of representation and not of occurrence, j Its excellence consists in fidelity to j the original, and a fine and natural j accuracy. External objects, occur- | rences, transactions, are the common i Bubject of description, while philo- j sophically, description is a kind of popular definition which consists in an enumeration of the essential cha- : racteristics of a thing. As descrip- tion is word-painting, or word-sketch- ing, the measure of description is the power of the describer over the re- presentati ve employment of language, superadded to a natural capacity to receive vivid and exact impressions in himself. The case is somewhat different between descriptions of out- ward objects and mental impressions or sensations. In the former case we ''*>ficribe by commensurate terms, in the latter by likenesses and analogies to impressions derived through oUier senses. A description of a man would consist in specifying, numbering, measuring, and delineating, in giviiTj^ his hue, complexion, stature, dimen sions, character oi features, cha- racteristic expression of countenance, apparent age, and so on. The blind man described his impression of scarlet, which was purely a mental one, by saying that he believed it must be like the sound of a trumpet, that is, that it stood to the impres- sions of sight as such sounds to the impressions of hearing. Spenser used the form discrive : — " How shall frail pen discrive her heavenly face For fear through want of skill her beauty to disgrace." An Anecdote (Gr. avIxJoTof, not published) is literally an incident not given out or published, and so in private keeping or circulation. It is the relation of a characteristic matter of fact relating to individuals, and therefore stands to story as species to genus. It is commonly a passage of private life. "Antiquity has preserved a beautiful instance in an anecdote of Alexander the tyrant of Phera?, who, though he had so industriously hardened his heart as to seem to take delight in cruelty, even murdering many of his subjects every day without cause and without pity, yet, at the bare re- presentation of a tragedy which related the misfortunes of Hecuba and Andromache, he was so touched with the fictitious dis- tress which the poet had wrought upon it thiit he burst out into a flood of tears." — Sterxe. ACCOUNTABLE. Answerable. Responsible. Amenable. Obnoxi- ous. Liable. Subject. Accountable (see Account) means literally liable to be compelled to give an account or standing in such a rela- tion as involves it. It is sometimes, like responsible, used in the abstract sense of being possessed of reason and so being master of one's own actions, and by conseouence bound to render an account of them. As a synonym with the above-mentioned it denotes in a marked manner a personal service or relationship which is subordinate to some superior person, as a steward 40 is accountable to his employer. It is a specific condition springing out of a specific relationship. " The first point to be endeavoured after is to impress upon children the idea of ac- countableness, that is, to accustom them to look forward to the consequences of their actions in another world." — Palet, This specific subordination does not attach, or not in so marked a manner, to Responsible (Lat. respondcre, to give answer), which is far more gene- ral. A responsible office may be one of g^-eat personal influence and dignity, and of moral responsibility rather than specific accountableness. Hence re- sponsibility extends beyond acts to their issues. I am accountable to my superior for what I do. I may be held in the judgment of others re- sponsible for the consequences of what 1 do. I may, by a voluntary agree- ment, make mj'self responsible for what may occur to a person towards whom I stand otherwise in no relation of accountableness. ** He has been pleased to ask, ' Is the doctor willing to be responsible at last for the nature, quality, and tendency of all his notions I ' " — Waterland. Answerable is in English what Re- sponsible is in Latin, and so expresses the simplest and most generic sense of these tenns. It expresses a relation to simpler and commoner things for one's conduct in matters of minor trusts and mere ordinary duties. 1 am answerable when 1 take upon myself a common risk for the habits or good behaviour of another ; for the safety of some article left in my keeping. I am answerable in cases where some Dledge has been given for the per- formance of an act or the fulfilment of an engagement, the breach of which would involve loss, disgrace, punish- ment, or disappointment. Account- able and answerable rather express the fact, and responsible the nature of condition. Hence there is in an- swerable a latent force which does not belong to responsible, or less ob- servably that of being liable to punish- ment or penalty in case of failure in such trust or duty. " If I pay money to a banker's servant, the banker is answerable for it." — Black- SYNONYMS [accountable] This force of liability to punishment comes out more strongly still in Ob- noxious. This is due to the classic meaning of the term, which is properly applied to " one who, on the ground of a mischief or wrong committed by him, is justly liable to punishment {otf noxam poena: obtigatus). It has what has been termed a lax and slovenly " use, as a "vague, unserviceable sy- nonym for offensive. "We punish, or wish to punish, those whom we dis- like, and thus obnoxious has obtained its present sense of offensive." It may be added, that in this vague sense it has extended beyond subjects ca- pable of punishment, and we speak of obnoxious smells. In its correct ap- plication it expresses not only a liabi- lity but, in some cases, that the stage has been reached when the possible position of the answerable has be- come actual, and punishment or re- sentment may be expected in conse- quence of the liability incurred. " Our obnoxiousness to the cui-se of the law for sin had exposed us to all the extre- mity of misery, and made death as due to us as wages to the workman." — South, Amenable (Fr. amener, to lead or guide to) means liable to some thing or person which has an inherent power to bind or compel, as laws, rules, au- thority, a parent, a governor^ It sometimes further bears the sense of a natural willingness to recognize such power, and then becomes an epithet of moral conduct or character, as when one is amenable to discipline, advice, or reason, or simply amenable. To be amenable is to be accountable so far as one is bound by laws and regulations. " The sovereign of this country is not ametiable to any form of trial known to the laws." — Junius. Liable (Fr. Her, Lat. Itgdre, to bind) expresses in a simple and compre- hensive manner a relative capability of beino- acted upon ; and not only has nothing of the strictly personal action involved in accountaWe, or the moral dignity of responsible, but is applicable even to merely physical influences, as silver is liable to be tarnished by damp. It is, like an- SAverable, used for certain common accredit] DISCRIMINATED. 41 and familiar obligations, as to he liable for the debts of another. This would mean that a power -would be forth- coming; tf compel their payment. To be answerable for them would rather mean that this power resulted from some relation to the debtor, natural, incurred, or assumed on the part of .he other party. I am liable by law ; I am answerable also by my own acts or obligations. Hence, as the dis- tinctive capacity of a thing is very likely to find exercise, or the distinc- tive quality of a thing to find some- thing to act upon it, the word liable has become a synonym for likely, that is, likely to act or be affected in a certain way under certain circum- stances, as in the following : — " In geometry we are not liable to adopt the same paradoxical conclusions as in al- gebra, because the diagrams to which our attention is directed serve as a continual check on our reasoning powers.'' — Stewart. It may be worth while in this place to notice the difference specifically between Liable and Subject. Subject (Lat. siibjich'e, part, subjectus, to cast or ■place under) stands to nature as liable to circumstances. JNIen are subject to error from their mental, to aeath from their physical, to temp- tation from their moral constitution, to anger from the in-itability of their temperament. They are liable to catch cold in draught, and to arrest for debt. From one point of view it may be said that we are subject, and become liable ; or, again, we are sub- ject to that which dominates over us as partaking a common nature, we are liable to what affects us as individuals. That to which we are subject, as, for instance, death, will overtake us sooner or later. That to which we are liable, as, for instance, accident, may be happily escaped, or by cir- cumspection avoided. Subject im- plies the pressure of a more uniform, liable of a more casual influence. " For what is strength without a double share Of wisdom ? Vast, unwieldy, burdensome. Proudly secure, yet liable to fall By weakest subtleties." MiLTON. "AH numan hemgs are subject to decay." Dbyden. ACCREDIT. Entrust, Dele- gate. Commission. Depute. These words express the idea ia common of reposing trust or confer- ring authority on another for a pur- pose of one's own. The simplest and most general is to Entrust, to place in a position of trust or by a converse use to commit to a person's trust or faithful keeping. We entrust persons with offices, property, or even secrets. In all cases we entrust on the ground of a belief of a sufficiency of intelli- gence, and such personal regard to one's self, as well as such probity or character as would induce the other to act for our own interests, or at least not to neglect or oppose them. Him whom we entrust with anything we constitute a guardian on our own behalf. It is great folly to entrust matters of importance to the weak, the careless, tne thoughtless, or the dishonest. " He (the Lord of all the families of the earth) will enter into a severe scrutiny how we may have employed all those talents that He hath entrusted us with." — Sharp. Accredit (Fr. accriditer) is to place in the position of acting as one's representative, and of showing him to be so iu a formal and public manner, ii necessary, as by giving him creden- tials. It is a term of diplomacy . To accredit is to place in a position of public trust. " I am better pleased indeed that he (the reviewer) censures some things than I should have been with unmixed commen- dation ; for his censure will, to use the new diplomatic term, accredit his praises." — COWPER. To Delegate (Lat. delegare, to entrust), is to cause to be done by another that which one has to do one's self. It is closely allied to De- pute (Lat. depiitare, in the sense of to allot to), but both persons and duties may be delegated, while persons only are deputed. The appointment makes the deputy ; the being sent elsewhere to act makes the delegate. A mem- ber of parliament is the deputy of the people as soon as he is returned ; he 18 then delegate when he has gone to the metropolis to represent tlieir in- terests. The term delegate is em- ployed of important matters of public 42 SYNONYMS [accrue] interest. A deputy may 1)6 no more than the representative of an official of low rank. The deputy merely does what the other is not present to do in person. The delegate has a greater freedom of responsible action, and may have but little less than in- dependent powers. " This change from an immediate state of procuration and delegation to a coarse of acting as from original power, is the way in which all the popular magistracies in the world have been perverted from their purposes." — Burke. " Christes deputie or vicar." — Udal. To Commission (Lat. commiifn-^, to entrust) differs from depute in that the latter refers to a continuous charge or vicarious office. He who is deputed is a representative ; he who is commis- sioned has no representative capacity. To commission does not go beyond the act or work, and does not imply neces- sarily a permanent office. We com- mission at will, and in cases where it suits our convenience to act through others. It is in general the superior that commissions the inferior in order to avail himself of his services. A monarch, for instance, appoints a commission of inquiry in the interests of the public. It is evident that the commission depending upon the will and convenience of another may be of any character which it is consonant with^such will and convenience to con- fer, from the execution of a trivial trust to the investiture of official dignity. " We are to deny the supposition that he (Moses) was a private person at that time of killing the Egyptian, but that he was even then commissioned by God Governor of Israel, and, consequently, in the right of a governor might revenge the wrong done to his subjects." — South. ACCRUE. Supervene. Devolve. Redound. The ideas common to these ternis are those of certain things coming upon or out of others, so that persons are affected by them. In Accrue (Fr. accrUf part, of accroitre ; Lat. accrescire, to grow to), that which accrues comes from a natural ten- dency in its cause to produce it, as wealth accrues from industry ; that is, there is in industry an inherent apti- tude to produce wealth, 't is also a personally relative term, involving the idea of some person to whose benefit or harm the thing accrues. 'J'hat which accrues is of the nature of increase, profit, or damage. It is, as it were, the fruit which a thing bears naturally. " Good men consult their piety as little as their judgment and experience when they admit the great and essential advan- tages accruing to society from the freedom of the press, yet indulge themselves in peevish or passionate exclamations against the abuses of it."— Junius. Supervene (Lat. sYtpervtturej to come upon) expresses the simple event of one fact occurring upon another, which other may be itself a result. That which supervenes intensifies the preceding cause or pre-existent state of affairs. It comes in unexpectedly with little sequence apparently of cause and effect, yet with very deci- sive results. A man broke his leg by a fall, fever supervened, and he died. The effect of that which supervenes i.«! in proportionto the aptitude of actual circumstances to be affected by it for detriment or improvement. *' His good will, when placed on any, was so fixed and rooted, that even super' vening vice, to which he had the greatest detestation imaginable, could not easilj remove it." — Fell's Life of Hammond. Devolve (Lat. devolvere) is literally to roll don-n upon, but is employed only in the figurative sense, with an idea of transmission or succession. In the absence of one who has a duty to perform, that duty will often devolve upon one who is the nearest bound by obligation or interest to perform it. On the removal of the proprietor of an estate by death, the estate devolves upon the next heir; that is, alights as it were on him who is the next halting point in the course of the suc- cession. Things which devolve are of the nature of duties, privileges, re- sponsibilities, tasks, offices, obliga- tions, powers, or possessions. "Which was augmented by the state ol the sayd Richard, and the devohdion of the same to Henry IV." — Grafton. To Redound (Lat. rtdunddre, to flow back, to redound) is to come back as a consequence of good or ill upon an actor, originator, or promoter [acjiieve] That whicli redounds is a remoter effect of human action or something following ujx)n that effect, whether the action be one's own or of another. It is a result of a general and abstract nature, and commonly of the nature of profit, advantage, reputation, in- terest, gain, credit, or the contrary of these. It supervenes as a practical consequence, and accrues as the Becondary product of a fact accom- plished. That which redounds may nave been contemplated in action, but it was not primarily or directly aimed at, being an eftisct of an effect. I perform a gallant or generous action. My motive was the pleasure or satis- faction of benefiting another. The act may redound to my interest through the gratitude of those bene- fited, or to my honour and reputation through public admiration of the deed. "There will no small use redound to them from that raanufactare." — Addisox. ACCUSTOM. Habituate. Tvure. Use. Train. Familiarize. Of these terms to Use (Lat. iili, part. iisuSf to ttse) is the simplest and the generic. It is also the most col- loquial, yet seems to be seldom em- ployed, though its passive participle used is very common. To Accustom (O. Fr.acostuiit ; Lat. constietudinem, whence Eng. custom ) is employed both ofstatesand actions. Habituate (Lat. hdbitiuire) only of states. Hence an alteration of mind is implied in accus- tom, an alteration of conditions only in habituate. 1 may even be accus- tomed to events which happen to me independently of any will or action of my own. One is habituated to what one has often felt, accustomed to what one has often experienced in anyway. I may be accustomed to ill treatment without being at all habituated to it. Inure (Lat. znurire, to brand, impress) advances a step beyond habituate, and indicates the process of habitua- tion against uncongenial influences till use leaves little or no pain or inconvenience. Train (Fr. trainer) is to accustom by a given course of practice to a given capacity. F..ami- i.iARizK (Fr. Jamiiiariser) is to make well known by practice or converse. DISCRIMINATED. 43 We are familiarized with that which, after we have often witnessed or meditated upon it, has produced a lively and lasting impression upon us. Thus we may be familiar with sights, scenes, processes, facts, truths. Chance or intention may have accus- tomed, habituated, inured, or fami- liarized, but only purpose and system can train us. ACHIEVE. Finish. Tkraiixate. One Achieves (Fr. achever, chef, a head) by working skilfully, per- severingly, or undauntedly at what has been undertaken or commenced One Finishes {Fr. Jinir ; Lat. J^in'ire, to end) by putting the last stroke to what is far advanced. One Termi- nates (Fr. terminer; Lat. terniinus, an end or limit) what ought not to be continued further, by some act of discontinuance. So that the charac- teristic force of achieve is bringing the undertaking to its last stage, that of finish is the actual arrival of this period, and that of terminate the ces- sation of the thing itself. After achieving one enjoys the sight or the thought of the work or the action brought to a successful end. It is the realization of one's efforts. One may desire to finish what has cost much loss of time and labour, and for other reasons, as, for instance, that one may pass on to something else, or from weariness of the particular em- ployment. Terminate is hardly applied to any other matters than discussions, differences, or disputes, and those which have the nature of a course or career. The achievement of a thing is its complete development, its per- fect and entire execution, the bring- ing it to a state which could not be improved upon, and a point which could not be surpassed. The end is opposed to the beginning, after which there can be nothing to do, as nothing done before the beginning. We have to make an end as we make a begin- ning ; we achieve when we have worked the whole ; we finish when we have worked tlie concluding part. The termination is that point of time or space where & thing stops. It presuj>j)08es duration or continuity. 44 SYNONYMS [acid] One may finish well or ill, ana more or less expeditiously, more or less effectively, but there is only one way of achieving. ACID. Sour. Acrid. Bitter. The two first words express not diiferent things, but ratlier different degrees of the same quality. "Acid," says Taylor, "is an artificial, concen- trated, corrosive, sourness." Sour- ness (connected with the German saner and other Northern forms) is a kind of mellowed Acidity (Lat. Hciditatem) as acidity is a sharpened sourness. Acrid (Lat. deer, with suflUx -id) denotes the combination of acidity or sourness with harshness. Lemon juice is acid; milk may turn sour ; unripe fruit is often acrid. Bitter (A.S. biter, frnmbitayi, to bite) expresses a different taste altogether, too familiar to need any attempt at description. It may be observed that in their secondary uses, sour is ex- pressive only of human disposition, while bitter is expressive of feeling and expression, as bitter hatred, bitter sarcasm, and also of the character of external events as affecting ourselves, as bitter misfortune. ACKNOWLEDGE. Own. Con- fess. Avow. Recognize. To Acknowledge is to admit that one has knowledge. Its element of publicity it has in common with the other synonyms. It is the opposite to denying, keeping back, or concealing a fact. " So ech that denyeth the Sone hath not the fader, but he that knowlechith the Sone hath the fader also." — Wiclif's Translation of the 1st Ep. S. John. We necessarily acknowledge only such facts or matters as are personally related to ourselves, because by the supposition the original facts were in our own keeping. The avowal of Buch facts furnishes others with pecu- liar and complete evidence. The extent to which acknowledgment furnishes knowledge to others in the sense of information which they did not previously possess is a matter of degree. To acknowledge one's obli- gations for the kindness of others is little more than to express them. To acKnowieuge one s tault may or may not imply that it was not known to otliers. To acknowledge a secret marriage is to give others a complete- ness of information which otherwise they had not possessed. Yet the term where it means more than openly to avow a relationship, as to acknow- ledge a 9on, implies some amount of knowledge, or, at least, tendency to belief in others already existent. " Eke shamefastness was there as I tooke hede. That blushed red and darst nat ben a know. She lover was, for thereof had she drede. She stood and hing her visage downe alow." Chaucer. Own has two forces: 1, that of simple possession ; and, 2, that of avowing such possession or fact o' relationship to one's self. Both ac- knowledge and own in this latter sense commonly imply some degree of ignorance, doubt, or previous con- cealment, as in the case of offences acknowledged or owned which be- fore were only imputed . We acknow- ledge and own in cases where our evidence supplements the suspicion of others, and imply some degree of sup- posed culpability. The more inti- mately the matter is connected with one's self the better may we employ own ; the more simply we regard it as a matter to which we give publicity, the better may we employ acknow- ledge. I own a state of feeling, for instance ; I acknowledge an action.. I acknowledge that violence was per- petrated in the course of the proceed- ings, but I will not own to having instigated or sanctioned it. " And now, my dear, cried she to me, I will fairly own that it was I that instructed my girls to encourage our landlord's ad- dresses."— Goldsmith. It should be noted that to Own, ?'.«., to possess, the A. S. dgnian, and t« Own, i.e., to admit, the"A. S. nnnauj are, strictly, different words. Length of use, however, lias go blended them, as to make the disentanglement scarcely possible. On the other hand, to Confes* (Lat. conjtteri, part, confessus) may be of some action of which the per- sons to whom we speak may be ab»o Iacquaintance] discriminated. lately ignorant, aa in the voluntary confession of a penitent to a priest. If the action be kno-wii, but not the author, the declaration that we did it would be an owning of it, that is, an acknowledgment of one's authorship of it. The essence of acknowledging an oflfence consists, as we have seen, in declaring our self-consciousness, so that we may acknowledge a fault even after we have been known and proved to have committed it. In that case, to acknowledge a fault is to re- cognize it as it is viewed by others. If both the doer and the deed were known, we should hai-dly use either own or confess. Yet a prisoner is said to make a full confession even afterhehasbeenJudged,convicted,and sentenced. This is probably because his confession is regarded as perfect- ing the evidence against him, or making his crime a matter of abso- 1 ute knowledp. We confess actions, opinions, and feelings as we acknow- ledge facts, and own our participation in them. It may be added that Ac- knowledge and Own are applied to matters of less grave moment than confess, which denotes a more formal publicity. We confess sins and crimes ; we acknowledge and own errors, mistakes, faults, and minor offences. So characteristic ol con- fession is the giving of formal publi- city to something connected with one's self, that the term is used where this is the case of matters in which no blame attaches, as in the acknowledg- ment of a belief or opinion in one's self, as in the following : — 45 " Spite of herself e'en En^'y mnst confess That I the friendship of the great possess." Author (?) To Avow (Fr. ai?o»er, which orig. meant to swear fealty to, Littre), to declare with boldness and frankness. This implies at the same time our own consciousness of right, and of the fact that others do not think us 80, or at least are not fully persuaded of it, for in that case no boldness of utterance would be needed. We do not avow what we are ashamed of, but we avow our motives, reasons, Ofit(ions, actions, spontaneously, as M%scrtinff at the same time what is true or right. We confess sponta- neousljr as admitting ourselves in the wrong. We acknowledge and own with less freedom as acting under some necessity or obligation, or as- senting to what we are charged with. " I followed Nature's laws, and must avow I broke my bonds, and fled the fatal blow." Dryden. ACQUAINTANCE. Familiarity. Intimacy. Acquaint (0. Fr. acointerj L. Lat. adcognttdre). Acquaintance is that slight knowledge of another person which springs from occasional inter- course. The word acquaintance, how- ever, has a force which may be modi- fied, so tliat we may speak of a slight or an intimate, a superficial or an ac- curate acquaintance with persons or subjects, as, for instance, authors, books, branches of science. That with which we are acquainted we in some degree know, but beyond this know- ledge nothing is implied in the way of feeling towards the object or per- son. We may be sufficiently ac- Quainted with a man to know that we should never desire to be on intimate or even familiar terms with him. In social parlance the word acquaintance is not satisfied by that amount of ob- seiwation and experience which en- ables us to recognize or identify a person. An acquaintance is one with whom we have already held such social intercourse a."? would justify us in renewing it. " Contract no friendship or even acqvain- tajice with a guileful man. He resembleth a coal, which, when hot, burneth the hand, and when cold, blacketh it." — Sir W.Jones, Translations. Familiarity (Lat. ftimiliMtuiem, fjUmilia being o household, consisting oj the members of the family and the slaves or servants). As acquaintance means first knowledge, then social know- ledge, so familiai'ity has the twofold sense of common conversance and common conversation. A state of familiarity is, as it were, a result of living together, or of frequent inter- course. Those who live in the same house, frequent the same place, are engaged in the same routine of busi- ness or pleasure, who, in short, find themselves often thrown together, be- 46 SYNONYMS [acquire] come femiliar. Such habitual re- unions have two results : the one, that persons become more than super- ficially acquainted with each other; the other, that they come to waive formal rules and usages of society, and throw off ceremonious resti-aints. 'I'hese facts coiTespond with the two- fold meaning of fiimiliarity, which is applicable both to things and persons. In the one sense we speak of a familiarity with a particular branch of science, in the other of an imperti- nent familiarity, which is can-ied too far. "All this was before his (Plorace's) ac- qnaiutance with Maecenas, and his intro- duction into the court of Augustus, and the familiarity of that great Emperor."— Dryden. Intimacy (Lat, inttmus, mmosl) ex- presses in regard to persons such ac- quaintance as has grown into a sus- tained and unreserved intercourse of the closest kind, with friendship and sympathy in thought and feeling. Intimacy, like acquaintance and fa- miliarity, may be employed to cha- racterize our knowledge of facts, pro- cesses, or cu'cumstances. Intimate knowledge arises from very fi-equent repetition and exhibition, so that we have exercised opportunities of varied and close observation. The noun intimacy, however, is confined to persons, though we say an intimate knowledge or acquaintance. The terms acquaintance, familiarity, and intimacy may be regarded as in some cases expressive of degrees of com- parison in practical knowledge. An acquaintance with a foreign language enables us to translate or comprehend it ; a familiarity with it comes from the frequent employment of it; an intimate knowledge would embrace its idioms, authors, and finest shades and distinctions of meaning. '♦ If it were so needful before the Fall, when man was much more perfect in him- self, how much more is it needful now against all the soi-rows and casualties of this life to have an intimate aud speaking help, a ready and reviving associate in marriage." — iSliLTON. ACQUIRE. Get. Outain. Gain. Win. liARN. Attain. Procure. To Acquire (Lat. acquVere) is a j continuous process in which we get something by our efforts an d abilities. Get (A.S. gitan) being the simplest, most vernacular, and therefore most generic of the tei-ms, all the rest of which may be regarded as modes of getting. Industry and talent are commonly requisite for acquiring, and we use the term of solid and beneficial results, though sometimes of things solid, but not beneficial, as to acquire a bad name. As the process of ac- quiring is continuous, that which is acquired comes to us by the force of the term gradually, by sustained en- deavour and in the course of time. Knowledge by sustained efforts in detail, honour as our conduct be- comes more widely known, reputation as our character is more talked about, fortunes as our stock is added to more and more. If successful in our efforts we acquii-e from the time that we begin to seek, and the only measure of our acquirement is our endeavour. A quality of permanence attaches to that which we nave acquired. " No virtue is acquired in an instant, hut step by step."— Ba^-us. Obtain (Lat. obdn'tre) implies less of continuousness in the efforts to get the thing obtained, which may even be done through the means of others, as when a young man obtains a valu- able appointment through interest, without having acquired through patience and industry the qualifica- tions of the position. One may obtain in a variety of ways, as by patience, energy, honourable or dishonourable means, enti'eaty, fraud, force, luck. We have obtained when we have done something to put into our pos- session a good or supposed good, the idea of chance being excluded. If a man obtains a prize in a lottery, what is expressed is not his luck simply, but the happy circumstance that he bought a ticket. •' Some pi-ay for riches, riches they obtain " Dryden. Gain {Yv.gagner) says little about the mode, but implies a character in the result, namely, that it is valuable or desirable. To gain is to obtain a good. There is in gain an element of risk and chance, ft is expressive of ;_acquirement] discriminated. speculative profit. As we acquire possession, and obtain our object, whatever it may be, so we gain re- wards, distinction, public favour, live- lihood, advancement. Successful gamblers and successful traders are both said to gain. " What 8}m11 it profit a man if be gain the trhole world and lose his own soul I" — English Bible. To Win (A,S. winnan, to contend^ gain) is to gain with the added notion of certain chances or competitors against us, or as surmounting difficul- ties or opposition. To have gained is satisfactory, to have won is happy oi lucky also. It may be even purely lucky, which gain never is, as to win a toss. A general gains a battle, or ob- tains the victory,buthe winstheday as against his adversary and the chances of war. We gain in so far as we act with intention, we win in so far as we act prosperously. What is gained or won may be only a partial or transitory possession; we gain or win to-day what we may lose to-moiTOW. We gain the good opinions of others by consistently vorthy action ; we some- times win their affection without an effort. ••And whereas religion is tlie greatest winner of men's affections, he (Essex) en- deavoured to allure unto him the Puritans and their ministers, whom the Queen did not at all like of, and withal the Papists by seeming to pity their afflicted condition." — Camdek, To Earn (A.S. eandan, to gain, orig. to reap) is to do that which entitles to recompense or reward, whether it be actually bestowed or not, but commonly implying that it has accrued. A labourer earns his wages by riglitly doing his right amount of work. A soldier earns distinction or promotion by doing hia duty, or by his bravery. Like acquiie, it is sometimes used in an unfavour- able sense, in which cases it is the product of misdirected effort. In this sense gain also may be employed. •• To have gained this harm and loss." — English Bible. in earning, the thing obtained is an eouivalent, a balance as it were bein? struck between the thin^ expended and the thing awardea. To earn is to 47 purchase with labour, as to buy is t« purchase with money. " Yon, then, who are initiated into the mysteries of the blindfold goddess, inform me whether I have a right to eat the bread I have earned by the hazard of my life or the sweat of my brow." — BoRKE. To Attain (Lat. attinere), which is used as an intransitive as well as an active verb, indicates a mark proposed beforehand, or abstractedly one which has been reached. All degrees of effort are implied in it, and sometimes no effort at all, as " he has attained the age of forty years." It is in tliat case definitive, not of endeavour, but of progression. When used as an in- transitive verb, it is commonly found associated with some expression indi- cative of decree, as to attain to perfec- tion or to a high pitch of excellence. VVe attain that which we have brought within our reach, or to the level of which we have raised ourselves. " While we are curious in tracing the progress of barbarism, we wonder more • that any arts existed than that they attained no degree of perfection." — Walpole. Procure denotes acquirement through a careful use of means to the end. It applies to such things as are regarded as needful or desirable to possess. We obtain honour ; we procure the necessaries of life. It is a term of a very practical character. We procure things by knowing where to look for them and how to get at tliem, not by prodigious effort, extra- ordinary knowledge, sudden luck, or profound research. We often procure by simply acting upon rule. By cer- tain substances combined in certain proportions the chemist procures a substance which is not the mere sum of the substances combined, or in other words a compound, but a distinct sub- stance. " Such dress as may enable the body to endure the diffierent seasons the most un- enlightened nations have been able to pro- cure." — JoHJfSON. ACQUIREMENT. Acquisition. Both are from the same verb (see Acquire), but in usage acquisition belongs to material or jphysical, ac quirement to moral and intellectual mings. The acquirements of learn- ing, the acquisition of fortune. The 48 SYNONYMS [ACQUIREMENTSj force of acquire, namely, to get gra- dually, is stronger in acquirement than acquisition. The latter some- times means no more than a happy accession to the stock of what one possesses already. " It (the Gospel) is not confined to per- sons whose iutellectij^l excellences are su- perior to their neighbours, or who exceed others in understanding and the acquire' ments of the miud."— Watts. " Her cook, an acquisition made in France, Might put a Chloe out of countenance." Churchill. ACQUIREMENTS. Attain jiENTS. Accomplishments. The idea of developed capacity is common to these terms. Acquire- ments (Lat. acquirtre) are opposed to natural gifts. In the broadest sense, anything which has been learnt, or is the result of study, pain, or practice, is an acquirement. But as commonly used, and in the plural number, the term denotes purely intellectual re- sults, as of history or languages, or the subjects of study as distinct from practice. Attainments (0. Fr. ulein- dre, Lat. attingirej to touch, come in contact with) differs not in the idea of the subject, but in relating to the progress and efforts of the student. Accomplishments (Fr. accomplir, to accomplish) are of those things in which study and art are combined to produce skill or adroitness. They turn upon the elegant, the graceful, the pleasing, the effective, or the use- ful. An accomplished painter, poet, musician, orator. We might even say an accomplished student where the idea was that of the grace rather than the depth of his educational acquire- ments. Varied acquirements, solid attainments, charming accomplish- ments. ACRIMONY. Acerbity. Aspe- rity. Animosity. Tartness. Harsh- ness. Acrimony (Lat. acrtnibnia) denotes a deep-seated bitterness and, as it were, corrosiveness of feeling, which may show itself in language or man- ner. It may or may not be personal, and may be generally excited by the recollection of circumstances. A dis- appointed man, for instance, is aj)t to allude with acrimony to the circum- stances of his disappointment. Acri- mony is the result of disappointment or wrong, real or supposed, or per- sonal dislike, or may be caused by ill-tempered disputations and criti- cisms. It is an habitual sourness, showing itself in small things. It is the mark of a small mind. As a scien- tific term, it has been applied to a certain character of the humours of the body and the juices of plants, as the acri- mony of the bile ; hence its moral meaning of a biting sharpness pro- duced by an embittered spirit. " These milks (in certain plants) have all an acrimony, though one would think they should be lenitive." — Bacox. "Like- a lawyer 1 am ready to support the cause on which give me leave to sup- pose I shall be soon retained, with ardonr and, if occasion be, with 8ubtle»-y and acrimony" — Bolikgbroke. Acerbity (Lat. ttcerUitatem, bitter taste, severity) is less deep-seated and energetic than acrimony, and more chronic. It is not so much ex.iited as acrimony is by external causes as constitutional and innate. Indeed, in the old use of the term, it was seldon connected with human disposition^ but with acts, measures, and opera- tions, as of penalty or bodily pain So Bacon says : — " There are some penal laws fit to be retained, but their penalty is too great, and it is ever a rule that any over great penalty, besides the acerbity of it, deadens t he exe- cution of the law." Acerbity is the expression of a cha- racter wanting in natural mildness and sweetness. Asperity (Lat. aspcritatem, rou^h- ness of surface, severity) relates rather to the manner than to the disposition. It is a rough way of dealing with others which is not incompatible with a love of fairness, and indeed often accompanies it, and, being quite con- sonant with substantial kindness of heart, is widely different from acri- mony and animosity, which are essen- tially uncharitable. A reproof, just in itself, is conveyed with aspeiity. This is the fault of one who is more intent on enforcing than sensitive of the effect of what he is enforcing upoa the feelings of others. 1 1 ofttn S])ri2i<;s [act] DISCRIMINATED 49 from a sligLt feeling of resentm*:^'. against a real or supposed insensibi- lity of others to the truth or force of what we say, and so is a spontaneous eifort to make up for what we feel we lack in persuasiveness. " I hope it is no very cynical asperity lot to confess obligations where no benefit nas been received." — JoHXSox. Animosity (Lat. diiimositatem) is essentially personal. It is an active and energetic dislike. It commonly 8j)rings from some personal or party feud, as the animosities of race or religion. It is a violent, irritable, and inconsiderate ill-will, and may he felt exclusively in one (juarter. " How apt nature is, even in those who profess an eraineace in holiness, to raise and maintain animosities against those whose calling or person they pretend to find cause to dislike." — Bishop Hall. Harshness (Dan. liarsky rancid) is much the same thing in English as Asperity, derived from the Latin. We commonly use the term not of the habi- tual demeanourornature generally,but of treatment on some particular occa- sion, as some incidental act or word ; and it conveys the idea of needless or unwarranted severity of speech or con- duct,proceedingfrom want of consider- ation or feeling, where a more sympa- thetic and thoughtful mind would have seen it to be unmerited and misplaced. It is the characteristic of unfeeling na- tures where it is habitual. Acrimony may subside or vanish on a better knowledge. Animosity may be paci- fied or reconciled, asperity corrected, but harshness is ingrained. Its most ef- fective cure is providential trouble or iBiction. It is both unkind and rude. " No complaint is more feelingly made than that of the harsh and rugged manners of persons with whom we have an inter- course." — Blaib. Tartness (A. S. teart, tart, severe) is that slight asperity which is more unbecoming than bitter, and indi- cates a union of cleverness with in- considerateness and self-conceit. It is the fault especially of some women and children. When used as it is almost exclusively, it denotes a pun- gent readiness of mind, which is use- ful and justifiable in repartee. •♦ One jeeringly saluted him, ' Good mor row, Bishop juondam,' to whom Bcnner as tartli/ replieu, • Good morrow, knave sem per.' " — Fuller. ACT. Action. Deed. Act and Deed are etymologically almost the same thing. Acluniy from the Latin agere, to do, being equiva- lent to deed (A. S. deed), or the thing done. They are, however, viewed from different points. Ihe deed is the result viewed, as it were, his- torically, the act is the result viewed in connexion with the power and will of the doer. Deeds are good or bad. Acts are voluntary or involun- tary. In many cases action and aci inight be used indifferently, yet some distinction between uiem is observ- able. Act is never used of things mechanical. When so used action is equivalent to mode of mechanical movement, as the action of a steam engine, or when nothing else is con- templated, of a horse. An act is the simple exertion of power preceded by volition ; an action is a complex ex- ertion of the same, and is more con- tinuous', and occupies more time. To poke the fire is a physical act, to re- collect a circumstance a mental act, to reconcile friends who have quar- relled a praiseworthy action. Hence the action often comprises several acts under itself which go to make it up. The act denotes power. The action involves the mode in which the power is exercised. To speak generally, acta are primarily physical, and seconda- rily moral; actions are primarily moral, and secondarily physical : a benevolent action and an act of bene- volence. In the former case we think of the quality of benevolence as car- ried out into practice. In the latter of a physical movement prompted by a moral quality or impulse. INIomen- tary intentions and impulses show themselves in like acts, as hasty deci- sions on rash acts ; but as the life and character of a man, such are hia actions. When we speak of the moral character or of any quality as the motive and account of something done speciScaliy, we use the term act, not action. So, on the one hand, gene- rally good or bad actions, faithful, charitable, prudent, foolish, despe- 60 SYNOiN YMS [action] rate actions are c'/|uivalent to acts of | faith, of charity, of prudence, of folly, of desperation. An action is used DOth of what is important and unim- >ortant, but an act, if it have any thing moral in it, and be more than a mere physical movement, implies some degree of importance. Our actions are tests and indications of our character ; our acts are sometimes out of harmony with them. The actions of a wise man are so far wise actions, but the wisest occasionally commit acts of folly. Acts of the same character frequently repeated by the same person will create a habit. What is done under the force of that habit, and considered in connexion with it, is an action. A deed is a graver and more emphatic term than an act. An act may be confined to the agent. A deed has its prominence, importance, and influence upon others. It is re- markable that tlie acts of bodies or communities are not called deeds, which belong to individuals only. In many cases act and deed may be used interchano;eably, yet it is no tautology to say, " This is my act and deed." It is my act so far as I and no other do it. It is my deed inasmuch as the tiling itself is done and completed in form and validity. " Cato said the best way to keep good acts in memory was to refresh them with new." — Bacon. " The Lord is a God of knowledge, and by Him actions are weighed." — Eiwlish Bible. ACTION. Gesture. Gesticula- tion. These terms may be regarded as belonging in common to the art and practice of oratory. Action when so employed is not general in its relation to the person, but refers to some part of it set in motion, more especially the hands and arms, as being the parts most commonly and naturally moved. On the other hand, the action of a horse is his way of movement in pacing or locomotion. In this sense the term is also mechanical, and we speak of the action of a steam-engine. A Gesture ( Lat. gfer&re, part, gestus, to bear) is a particular, significant, and illustrative action, as when in sarcastic speech, for instance, one shrugs the slioulders. When gesture is sustained, frequent, veliement, or demonstrative, it becomes Gesticula- tion (L?it. gesttciilationem). " Suit the action to the word." Shakespeare. " Moi-pheus of all his numerous ti'ain express'd The shape of man, and imitated best ; The walk, the words, the gesture could supply. The habit mimic, and the mien bely." Dryden. " Indeed that standing is not so simple a business as we imagine it to be is evident from the gesticulations of a di'unken man who, has lost the goverament of the centre of gravity." — Paley. ACTOR. Player. Performer. Of these Performer is the least specific, inasmuch as performance need not be of a dramatic character at all, such as a performance on a musical instrument or a tight-rope. We may play in private but we per- form in public. The idea of perform has been explained under that head. The difference between Actor (Lat. actorem) and Player (A.S. flesan, to spoilt) is that the latter is incompatible with high art. We speak of an actor of celebrity and a strolling player. A player is essentially professional ana acts for hire, an actor may exhibit his talent in private theatricals or for mere love of the art. When persons perform, as it were, insincere parts on the stage of life, professing what the^ do not feel, or dissembling for their own ends, we call them actors, not players. In the following the poet probably uses the lower word as being the more depreciatory, as ex- pressing the routine and mercenary character of social professions as well as the idea of assigned parts to be fulfilled. " All the world's a stage, And all the men and women merely players." Shakespeare. Not so the following: " Like a dull actor now I have forgot my part, A id I am out even to a full disgrace." Shakespeare. ACTUAL. True. Positive. Veri TABLE. Real. Certain. Extant. Present. Of these True ( A.S. treowe^ a trutt ) [actual] DISCRIMINATED. 5. is the simplest, denotes tliat a thing is as represented, that the statement or expression answefs to an objective reality and does so completely, that is, is neither false nor inaccurate. A true relation gives an account of oc- cun*ences which contains neither more uor less than has taken place, arranged in the order of their taking place, and in such proportion of statement as leaves no room for partial or total exaggeration, without counterfeit or adulteration. Truth is expressed whenever subject and predicate are rightly united in an affirmative or negative proposition. But in the broad sense of the word we may distinguish truth of perception, truth of fact, of narration, of statement, of representa- tion, of expression, of conception. In this broad sense truth is conformity to reality in the world of matter or of mind. As regards ourselves truth is right belief or correct impression. The statement •' This is Thomas," is true if I am right in applying the name to the individual before me. My im- pression of the shape of the earth is a true one if I have that of an oblate 8{)heroid. I believe wliat is true if I believe that all men are mortal, because the persons denoted by tlie subject are never found but in connexion with the attribute of mortality con- noted by the predicate. "Our ideas being nothing but bare ap- pearances or perceptions in onr minds, can- not properly and simply in themselves be said to be tnie or false, no more than a single name of anything can be said to be true or false."— Locke. A s the word true marks the precise ex- istence of objective verity, veritable (Fr. vtritubte) expresses truth of re- presentation, or truth in its expository aspect. True, when asserted of any- thing, means that it is what we say it is, veritable that we say what it is. As the fact is said to be true, the medium by which the fact is conveyed is said to be veritable. It is not a veritable history which reports to us the doings of Romulus, if his existence be not true in fact. The use of veri- table is a little strained on purpose in the following, yet it seems to bear out the distinction just drawn "This Emperor was so wvee in all things that among them that were merry he was of gi-eat mirth, and in verities he was Tery veritable."— Golden Book. "Real works of nature or vintable acta of story," — Brown's Vulgar Errors. Positive (Lat. pos^Uivus) denotes that the truth is so ascertained as to exclude all possibility of doubt or question, being a matter of demonstra- tion as distinct from supposition or inference. It has also a subjective sense, in which it means the manner or state of mind of a person possessed, or believing himself possessed, of such truth, and is thus opposed to doubtful in mind. A positive fact is one which is direct and determinate, in opposition to that which is indirect, indetermi- nate, or negative. *' 'Tis positive 'gainst all exception." Shakes PEABK. Actual (Lat. actttalis) belongs to that which is beyond the state of mere probability, possibility, tendency, pro- gression, or evolution. As a term of the scholastic philosophy actudlis was opposed to p)itentiaUs, and had its ex- istence in esse not in posse. The actual is the conceivable realized, and where this conceivable thing is not only possible but natural to con- ceive or to be expected in a certain order of things, actual, like the French actuel, comes to have the force of present in time. While the monarch IS dying the heir-apparent to the throne is only not the actual king. " How insensibly old age steals on, and how often it is actually arrived before we suspect it."— CowPEB. As the actual is opposed to possible, probable, conceivable, or approxi- mate, true to false, positive to indeter- minate, dubious, indirect, or negative, and veritable to supposititious or un- authentic, so Real (Lat. redlis) is opposed to imaginary or feigned. It expresses tliat which has an existence of Its own, and not such as our fancy might attribute to it, or our ingenuity impose upon it. When we speak oi the actual condition of a country we refer to that to which it has been brought, «.g. by previous acts, events, processes, and regard it as the sum of antecedentcauses,which have resulted 52 in that state. When we speak of its real condition we mean that in which alone it exists as a subject of con- sideration. A real object of com- passion is not artificially made up. A real sentiment is neither disguised nor pretended. " Our simple ideas are all real. All agi-ee to the reality of things."— Locke. Certain (Fr. certain, Lat. certus) differs from the foregoing in some important respects. Certain is a sub- jective tei-m. That is certain wliich follows necessarily or demonstratively from the inferences of reason, the evidence of the senses, or testimony of men. Certainty is the subjective form of truth. It belongs to persons, and represents states of mind, and is only transferred secondarily to ex- ternal facts. When we speak of a fact as certain we mean that we ap- prehend it as true. Hence, unlike the others, certain may express not only what has happened but what has not, if we conceive its future happening to be a thing of necessity, and so are sure of it. The cause being recognized or ascertained, its effect is certain. The sun will certainly rise to-morrow, that is, this follows (if we believe that it does) from the knowledge and ex- perience which we possess. Things \»hich are actual, true, positive, veri- table, or real, are unalterably fixed. They cannot be set aside ; wt must re- cognize and acquiesce in them. On thf: other hand, 1 am continually liable to find myself mistaken in what I be- lieved to be the certainty of things which may turn out on corrected or more extended evidence to be either ft Ise, or contingent and variable. ' I hope before I have done to make it er/dent that this way of certainty by the knowledge of our own ideas goes a little fa( ther than bare imagination, and I believe it vill appear that all the certainty of gene- ra truths a man has lies in nothing else." - Locke. 3uRE (Fr. sur, Lat. sicurus) is, ac- cording to its etymology, first un- an lious or careless, that is, having a seise of sureness, and thence objec- ti 'ely, having the nature that induces ti is, fixed, permanent, regular, inevi- t hie. As a synonym with certain. SYNONYMS [actual] and as applied to persons, we may ob- serve that sure is more closely asso- ciated with operation and action, certain with fact and knowledge. The fact is certain, the operation sure. Necessary sequence inaction or cause and effect is expressed by Sure ; as a sure remedy, a sure success. 1 am certain of what 1 have persuaded my- self is true. I am sure of what I be- lieve to be firmly established, and which I do notsomucn feel convinced of as regard as in itself fixed. In pro- portion as we speak of tiuth of nature we use the tei-m sure, in proportion as we rely on the conviction of our own minds we use the term certain. Men are sure of what they have seen, and certain of what they have heard. I am sure of a fact, certain of a theory, sure that the sun is in the sky to-day, certain that it will rise to-morrow. On this supposition that things are generally speaking sure in themselves and certain to us, we may understand how no tautology would be involved in such a phrase as the " sure and certain hope of the resun-ection to eternal life." The term certain seems more generally applicable to matters of speculation and where evidence is in question. First principles are cer- tain. We speak of mathematical cer- tainty not sureness. Practical matters and general rules are sure. One is certain of a point of science, sure of a moral truth. The philosopher claims his right of question on every point which is not certain. The prudent man distmsts that of which he is not sure. " It shows indeed, supposing they took up tms practice as a matter of duty, that they were in doubt which was the right way they were obliged to keep, and there- fore for sureness they would keep both." — Sharp. We believe what is certain, we count upon what is sure. The friend on whom we can rely we call not certain but sure. When a thing is testified by a sure witness it is certain. That is Extant (Lat. ex-stant-etny standing out or forth) which still stands out in prominence, and has not been denuded or overwhelmed by any de- structive, removing, or superseding [actuate] DISCRIMINATE I). 63 force, such as violence or the lapse of time. Bentley used the term in its literal and physical sense, when he spoke of a body partly immersed in a fluid and partly extant. " There are some ancient writings still extant which pass under the name of Sibylline orat-les."— Melmoth's Cicero. It is a term full of picturesque mean- ing. We look, for instance, upon some ancient graveyard. We cannot doubt that it contained formerly other monu- ments or tombstones besides those which are before us. Some have de- cayed, some have been taken away, some by frequent alterations of the level of the ground may yet lie un- known beneath its surface ; but others have escaped these changes, chances, and influences, and are in the strict sense of the word extant. That is Present (Lat. pra'sentem) which is before us, that is, an object to us in time, space, or thought, as op- posed to the past, the future, or the absent. It denotes simultaneity in time and place with intelligent beings who take cognizance of things pi esent. Co'ilccation or contemporaneousness is not presence. It may be obsei-ved that presence in space involves pre- sence of time, but that the converse is not true. The twofold aspect of the present is made up of the here and the now. The meaning of the word pre- sent and presence is satisfied if the state of things is such tliat cognizance might take place, though in fact it has not. In this way one person might say to another, " 1 was present at such a meeting, and was surprised after- wards to hear that you had been there. as I did notsee you." In the presence chamber of the monarch may be some who escape his observation. In this sense presence signifies such nearness as is easily and perfectly compatible with personal communication. This involves sameness of place. The fact that it might be just possible to estab- lish a communication, as by speaking to a person in another room or by an electric wire across the A tlantic, would Qot constitute presence. " These things have I spoken unto yon eing yet present with you." — Eng. BMe. ACTUATE. Impel. Induce. Actuate (L. Lat. artuare, to put m action) is to subject to an impulse and so quicken into action. This is ap- parent from the older form which It has supplanted, activate. That is actuated which has its natural powers roused and made more intense or active. So Bacon: " Snow and ice es- pecially being holpen and then cold activated by nitre or salt will turn water to ice, and that in a few hours." In the following it is applied to moral or spiritual things : — " The soul being an active nature is al- ways propending to the exercising of one faculty or other, and that to the utmost it is able ; and yet being of a limited capacity it can imploybut one in height of exerciseat once: which when it loseth and abates <«f its strength and supreme vigour, some other whose improvement all thiswhile was hindred by this its ingrossing rival, must by consequence begin now to display itself, and awaken into a more vigoi'ous actua- tion."— Ql.ak\'ilu. We are actuated when we are in- ternally stiiTed to action by an ex- citing cause. We may be impelled by menaces or induced by sober con- sideration ; we are actuated by pas- sion, desire, instincts of nature, love, hope, fear, which produce an accelera- tion of the movements of our moral life. What most actuates us depends on the peculiarities of our nature or our circumstances at a given moment. One man is actuated by a sense of duty to do what another would only do under great excitement. One is actuated by reason as effectively as another by passion. " He that studies to represent one of known and eminent merit to be a mere fcol and an idiot, ^i;»C5 himself the lie and be trajrt that he is either actuated with envy or cor- rupted by a faction."— Bentley Impel (Lat. impellerej to drive on) implies nothing of the nature of the force which induces action, be- yond the fact of its strength, which is in-esistible, or at least unresisted. When we are actuated, volition is quickened; when impelled,it is in some measure superseded by a foreign force, lie who is impelled is borne along a course, as he who is Induced (Lat. induchefto lead into)is led ap to a pomt. 54 SYNONYMS [acute That which impels us drives us before it — we go along with that which in- duces us. The one has the mastery over us. To the other we give in our adhesion, and are not simply subject to its force but recognize it as adequate to the ends of action. Hence it com- monly expresses such milder con- straints as come of reason, judgment, gnd persuasion, and is applicable not only to matters of external action but of jireference and mental action ; as e.g. to be induced to like or select one thing rather than another, or to expect, ho})?, or believe some thing. " Offer a man a gratuity for doing any- thing, for seizing, for example, an offender. He is not obliged by your offer to do it, nor would he say he is, tliough he may be induced, persuaded, j)revailed upon, tempted."— Palky. ACUTE. Keen. Shrewd. Sa- gacious. Sharp. Sharp and Acute are much the same; Acute being the Lat. (lciitHS,sharpened, fromflcittre, tosharpev. Sharp (A.S. scearp) expresses the lowest order of human quickness of perception, like that of the lower animals, while acute expresses sharpness of observation and understanding. This kind of difference, if there be no other, is usually apparent in cases in which two words represent respectively Saxon and Latin equivalents, the former expressing generally the more jiliysical and primary ideas. The sharp animal or person has his faculties of observation continually on the alert, nothing escapes him. It is a sharp dog whose eyes, nose, and ears are always doing their work. The sharp person perceives and observes every thing before him, the acute one sees deeper into any matter to which his attention is drawn. He discovers well; as, for instance, falsehood underlying truth, or the converse. He goes beyond the sharp person in being not only observant but discrimi- nating. He can deal with specula- tive and abstruse matters, and sees rapidly where the important points lie. " Many other things belong to the materia) world wherein the sharpest philo- sophers have not yet obtained cleai ideas."— Watts. " Chrysoppns,the acutest of all the Stoics, was at first a racer." — Bkntley. Sharp, Acute, and Keen (A.S. ct ne, keen, warlike) &rea\\ employed of matters of pure sensation, in which the idea of mental perception is en- tirely subordinate ; as sharp pain, acute disease, a keen sense of shame, where it will be seen that the two former belong more naturally to phy- sical, the last to moral pain. Keen denotes an exceeding degree of sharp- ness. Physically, points are acute, edges are keen, and either might be called sharp. A knife should be sharp, a skewer sharp-pointed or acute, a razor keen. The keen person is one of powerful penetration; he sees clearly and afar off: the acute one of understanding in speculative, and the sharp in practical matters of common life, business, and conversation. "In his Etnean forge the god of fire That falchion laboured for the hero's sire Immortal keenness on the blade bestow'd And plunged it hissing in the Stygian flood." Dryden's Virgil. " His acuteness was most eminently sig- nalized at the masquerade, where he dis- covered his acquaintance through their disguises with such wonderful facility." — Johnson. Acute, as used of bodily pain or disease, is opposed to chronic, and employed of a specific disease, while Sharp is an epithet of pain generally. Sharp suffering ; acute rheumatism ; a keen sense of injury, disappoint- ment, and annoyance, but also, unlike the rest, a keen relish or enjoyment, a keen sense of the ridiculous. Keen- ness is a more active element of cha- racter than either sharpness or acute- nes^s. The keen person not only feels and perceives, but seeks. He has an appetite to satisfy — he is an eager searcher. He not only sees readily, but hunts up, as it were, what it is to his interest to procure. The keen man is likely to make a fortune, and has a somewhat dangerous skill in this respect. Our appreciation of the quality is tempered by distrust lest it should be inconveniently practised upon ourselves. A sharp remark is a [add] DlSCllIMINATED. 55 quick and clever one. An acute re- mark is an intelligent one. A keen remark shows insight into human nature. " Their weekly frauds his fcee7i rep.ies detect. He undeceives more fast than they iufect." D BYDEX. Keenness ought to be in the sati- rist ; acuteness in the lawyer, tlie diplomatist, or the scientific investi- gator ; and shrewdness in the conver- sationalist or the wit. Shrewd (which originally meant ill-disposed) denotes one who is prac- ticallj'' clever at analyzing motives and accounting for conduct by a kind of instinctive power. Shrewdness is in matters of common occurrence what acuteness is in matters calling for higher intelligence. " Some of the observers on board the •Centurion' shrewdly suspected, from the appearance of her armour, that instead of steel it was only composed of a particulai* kind of glittering pajjer." — Assay's Voyages. Sagacity (Lat. s<^^ficitatem) is a higher quality than sarewdness. It manifests faculties of practical intelli- gence and penetration inherent in the nature. It is practical wisdom which is independent of the deductions of reason or the guidance of rules. It is the genius of common-place. It is penetrative and discriminative, but unlike shrewdness, goes on from dis- cernment to action. It detects the hidden, unravels the complicated, tracks the intricate, solves the diffi- cult, elucidates the obscure. Slight indications, wliich would generally be overlooked, are by the sagacious observed and turned to account in ar- riving at conclusions. He sees con- nectedness under apparent discon- nexion. It is not mere conjecture on the one hand nor scientific induc- tion on the other ; yet it partakes of both. The necessities of his animal existence quicken to an almost super- human power the sagacity of the American Indian. On the other hand, Kepler's discovery of the elliptical orbits of a planet from certain observed points in it is, perhaps, the highest recorded exemplification of scientific sagacity. Sag:icity Ls proleptic, good at theory and hypothesis. It divines, anticipates, foresees, discloses. " A quickness in the mind to find ont these intermediate ideas (that shall dis- cover the agreement or disagreement of any other) is, I suppose, that which is called sagacity."— LocKK ADD. Annex. Append. To Add (Lat. addcre) is sinijdy to put one thing on to another. It ap- plies to things as they exist in num- ber or quantity, or conceived so to exist, as in the case of a material mass, a numerical sum, or a logical or metaphysical aggregate ; as to add to a heap of gold, or to two hundred, or to the comfort, happiness, misery, benefits, or disadvantages of society or of men. It increases by aggrega- tion the thing added to. Addition is the opposite of subtraction, as aug- mentation is of diminution. Whether addingresults in collocation, junction, or coalition, depends on the nature of the subject and the case. " All the praises and commendations of the whole world can add no more to the real and intrinsic value of a man than they can add to his station." — S«tft. To Annex (Lat. annectere, pan. annexus, to bind together) is not used of number nor in the unmodified sense of fastening one thing on to another, but implies some whole or main body which is affected by the annexation. It implies also the sub- ordination or relative smallnessr of the thing annexed. The gieater is not annexed to the less, but the less to the greater, as a province to an em- pire or a condition to a gi-ant. A dog is not annexed to his kennel, but seals are to a watch, as they become appendages to the same. Things an- nexed pass into general and perma- nent connexion, which we still, how- ever, conceive as separable. They ac- company, or follow, the fortunes of the things to which they are annexed. As the purpose of addition is to in- crease the quantity of the thing added to, so the purpose of annexation is to increase its value, dignity, impor- tance. Sometimes the thing annexed has a modifying or regulative force over that to which it is annexed. A5 56 SYKOJNYMS [address] in the case of a codicil to a will, or a penalty to a proliibitory law, or a re- ward to the fulfilment of certain pro- posed conditions. It is physical, political, and legal, or conventional ui its different aspects. •* With regard to the other adjacent islands which are subject to the cro^\^l of \Jreat Britain, some of them are comprised within some neighbouring country, and are, therefore, to be looked upon as annexed to the Slother Island, and part of the kingdom of England." — Blackstoxe. To AfPKND (JMt. appendcre, weigh somelhmg to any one) is to join in such a way that the thing to which some- thing is appended shall be more fully competent to answer its purpose. It denotes a posteriority of relationship, and may be the result of afterthought. It is employed like annex in the sense of a physical hanging on, as in the instance given above, to append a seal to a watcli-chain, where the only difference is that between fastening and suspending: and in a figurative sense, as to append notes illustrative of a text. That which is appended stands as an accessory to the principal thing. " There is a further purpose appended to the primary one." — J. Tavlur. ADDRESS. Speech. Oratiok. Hauangue. Discourse. Appeal. Of these, Address (Fr. adiesser) derives its specific character from the character of the occasion, and the person to whom it is made. It is a formal, and more or less continuous speaking to a person, a collection of persons, or a personified object. It may be of great length or very short, in the latter case it is equivalent to Accost. The address may be purely spoken or read, or partly read and partly spoken, or purely written, and recognizes a peculiar capacity in the pei'sons addressed. It bears upon some subject or occasion. The ad- dress should be appropriate, clear, and tempered to the quality, charac- ter, and circumstances of the person addressed, whose attention it is de- sired to jjrocure. It must not be wanting in tact, tedious, unsuitable iu phraseology, bnld, or liigh-flown ; not over-elaborate and absti-use on the one hand, nor shallow and flip- pant on the other. The term is used sometimes of the mode as well as the matter of address. " See, they approach ! This grove shall shrond me till they cease their strain. Then I'll address them with some feigndd tale." Mason. A Speixh (A.S. sprecdu, spcecan, to speak) very closely resembles an ad- dress, but belongs to another point of view. It looks at the matter from the side of the speaker, as address does from the side of the hearer. It is less formal than address. So we are ac- customed to hear of an address to tlie throne, and a speech fi-om it. It is presumed to be unwritten, being a kind of spoken dissertation on some subject to which it owes its unity, without being specifically addressed to one or more persons, but rather uttered in their hearing, as bear- ing on topics of common interest to speaker and hearer. It should be ready, fluent, neat. In the case of speeches in Parliament, the speech fi'equently rises to tlie dignity of an oration : on the other hand, speeches from the hustings are commonly Ha- ( RANGUEs. In a play, a set form of j woi'ds of some length is called gener- ally a speech, though it should hap- f)en to be a soliloquy. On the other land, a soliloquy and an address are contradictions in terms. " Every circumstance in their speeches and actions is with justice and delicacy adapted to the persons who speak and act."— Addison. An OitATioN (L. oratibnem) is a formal and public speech, laying claim to a lofty and refined character, being necessarily what speeches are occa- sionally, the product of premeditation and study, which is due to its gravity and dignity ; for the tenn is applied not, like speech, to ordinary, but to extraordinary occasions of rhetorical effort. The oration commonly turns on matters of criticism or of panegyric. It aims at captivating the imagination, and rousing the passions and emo- tions. Its beauties lie in its being elevated, forcible, delicate, brilliant. It presents different aspects, and in- volves different styles in an effective versatility. It appeals successively [adduce] to fact and fancy, to reason and feel- ing. It deals in history and parable, in hard figures and brilliant simili- tudes. It uses the lightest and the most massive implements of rhetoric. In order to effect this it has its rules, which extend to matters of arrange- ment, style, diction, enunciation, and even taste in expression, attitude, and gesture. " And after the procession, the King him- self remaining seated in the qnire, the Lord Archbishop upon the grace of the quire made a long oration."— B/LCoy . HARANGUE(Fr./iaran^we, originally from Ger. hring,a circle, an assembly). By it we denote such speeches as have for their special object to raise the feelings, or to give vent to them, and so are not subject to the rules of an oration, but admit of any style, however discursive, and are untram- melled by the laws of taste. They are modes of address often resorted to by persons of more energy than training, or on occasions when ora- tions would be thrown away, or not listened to. They have to be spoken on occasion without time for preme- ditation. The excellence of harangue lies in its life. It is essentially stimu- lative of thought or action. '* The author of the Ecclesiastical Polity had in so many books of his own endea- voured to harangue up the nation into fury against tender consciences." — Marvel. When Discourse (Lat. discursus) is used synonymously with the.se it conveys tlie idea of a methodical and instructive speech, addressed prima- rily to the understanding. Its object is exposition and explanation, and its excellence consists in being orderly, lucid, exhaustive, logical. Discourse may be familiar, historical, academi- cal, philosophical, theological. Its character is enunciative. '* My intention in this and some future discourses, is to set before you the divine authority of the Christian Religion ; and that I may do this the more effectually, and with the greater degree of evidence, I propose to lead your thoughts as it were step by step towards the important con- clusion." — Pearce, Sermons, An Api'EAi, (Fr. appeler, Lat. ap- pelldre) is a call made uj)on a person for a .special purpose, as to defend himself, or to give a decision. In the DISCRIMINATED. 57 language of the old law. the accused might be said to be appealed as well as the judge. Hence, to appeal is to have recourse to authority and power, especially with a personal interest, and so in an earnest way for the pur- pose of having one's position coii- iirmed, or assured. The orator is said to appeal to anything in human nature, which might be stimulated to induce men to act or speak in the re- quired way. One man in discourse appeals to the reason of another, to his passion, prejudice, common sense, love of justice, selfishness, hopes, fears, or anything else which may gain him over, or induce him to do or feel as desii-ed. The excellence of an appeal lies in its being touching, earnest, powerful, stirring, persua- sive, convincing, sympathetic. Other things besides words have a power of appeal, and may help the words — such are looks, gestures, tears, atti- tude. The word is now of general application, but was in the original use of it, legal and technical. " Long have we sought t'instruct and please mankind. With studies pale, with midnight vigils blind ; But thank'd by few, rewarded yet by none, We here appeal to thy superior throne ; (Jn wit and learning the just prize bestow. For fame is all we must expect below." Pope. ADDUCE. Allege. Assign. Advan'ce. These terms are all employed to express what is employed in logical confii-mation. To adduce ( Lat. addii- ccre, to lead to) is simply to impart or apply to the case in hand, something that bears upon it. It may be an argument, an instance, a quotation, an illustration, a general considera- tion, a proof, an indirect confirmation, or its contrary; something which shall invalidate or tend to disprove. It may be regarded as the generic term, of which the rest are exemplifications. " The price had it seems before the tax been a monopoly price, and the argument addziced to sho^ that sugar was an improper subject of taxation demonstrated perhaps that it was a proper one." — Adam Smith, To Allege (Fr. alltguer, to eite as an authority) is, according to its legal origin, to bring forward some- 58 SYKONYMS [adequate] thing whicli is of the nature of a plea, excuse, or justification, and therefore implies some antecedent charge, or hurden of proof. An allegation is a statement of fact bearing upon a moral or legal issue. One alleges facts or reasons to maintain or defend a position or an example, as a justifi- cation of conduct, or a general con- sideration in palliation of an offence. As a legal term, and especially of ec- clesiastical law. Allege applied not only to the plea, but also to the origi- nal charge. This force still survives in the word, though less prominently, as when it is said that certain charges against a person were alleged. " Courageous chief. The first iu flight from pain, hadst thou alleged To thy deserted host this cause of flight. Thou surely hadst not come sole fugitive." Milton. To Assign (Lat. as&ignare) is to mark out something which shall stand in a certain relation to another thing, and is therefore employed in as many connexions as tliere are relations which it expresses. I assign one thing as the cause of another, its limit, its sig- nification, its purpose, its origin, its account, its work, its method, personal use, enjoyment, or possession. I as- sign a point of time for an event, and the like. Assignment has the charac- ter of specification and limitation, combined in connexion with a parti- cular object. It declares that one thing belongs to another and in what respect. "The only adequate and assignable rea- son of the difference is that the latter have a source to draw from which was unknown to the former." — Bishop Porteus. To Advance (Fr. avancer, avant, before, i.e. ub ante) is voluntarily to put forward; and, especially, something against which we challenge argument or are prepared to make defence. Commonly speaking, in argumenta- tive charge we advance ; in reply we allege. Doctrines or opinions ai*e ad- vanced, and especially such as are new in character and strange to those who hear of them. They betoken some degree of boldness and originality in him who advances them. " I have heard of one that having ad- vanced some erroneous doctrines of philo- sophy, refused to see the experiments by which they were confuted." — Johnson. ADEQUATE. Sufficient. Com- petent. Proportionate. Commen- suuate. Enough. Adequate (Lat. McequuhiSy part. 7nade equal) means literally made equal to, or brought to the level of another thing. It expresses the equa- lization, not of simple quantity, but of forces, powers, means, resources. It expresses the coming up to some re- quirement in regard to a material, in- tellectual, or moral standard. That which is adequate either meets a de- mand or fulfils a purpose. " To fear God, that is wisdom ; that is, is the proper and adequate wisdom, suitable to human nature and to the condition of man- kind." — Hale. Sufficient (Lat. sujftcere, to suf' Jice) has to be distinguished more es- pecially from adequate and Enough, (A.S. genoh, genog).. Adequate is general, Suffici ent is specific. Ade- quate is enough according to the na- ture of the case. Sufficient is enough to meet a specific demand. Ade- quate looks toward the end that is answeredjSuFFiciENT towards the per- son that requires. An adequate re- muneration is one which on the whole is fair — which balances or equalizes what has been done and what is re- ceived. A sufficient remuneration is one which is enough to discharge the obligations of the payer. An inade- quate return for benefits received may be unsatisfactory both in character and amount; an insufficient return is only one that is too small. Adequate regards the force and value of tlimgs, sufficient their employment. This character of sufficient will be seen to hold good when compared with enough. Enough relates to internal satisfaction, sufficient to the demands of a purpose. Enough is the quantity which one wishes to have, sufficient the quantity which one wishes to em- ploy. A miser has sufficient for all his wants, yet has never enough. The prodigal man never has what is enough or sufficient. He cannot be content with what he has, for he is [adequate] DISCRIMINATED. 5» always desiring tc spend more than be possesses. When we have had as much as we want we say it is enough. When we feel that we have heen ade- quately supplied, we say it is suffi- cient. There is a use of enough whicli is expressive simply of the ex- istence of a quality in a satisfactory measure, being equivalent to the ad- verbs rather and very. It augments either slightly or considerably the posi- tive force of adjectives. In the phrase, " The place is pleasant enough," the augmentation is slight. In the phrase, " He will be ready enough to do what you ask him if you pay him well," it is greater. ♦* Whose wealth wft« want, whose plenty made him poor. Who had enough, yet wished evermore." Spknser. " Thus with yoar reverence me thinketh that this e^-ideuoe as to this point is suffi- cient." — GEsasn. Competent (Lat. compcicre, to coincide, to be suitable) denotes the possession of sufficient personal quali- fications. It is not precisely the same thing as qualified; for quali- fications may be arbitrary or conven- tional. Competency comes of na- tive sufficiency. It mostly respects mental endowments and attainments. A person is competent or not to un- dertake an office, to decide a question, to give advice, to manage a business, and the like ; where the competent man has his advantage, is in matters practical, social, and official. Compe- tency is practical power, which comes of natural ability strengthened by ex- perience, observation, and conver- sance with some particular depart- ment of knowledge or business. " A competent knowledge of the world." —Bishop Atierbury. Commensurate and Propor- tionate are exclusively terms of the relation of things, and not the quali- ties of persons, except so far as such qualities are treated after the analogy of quantity and number. Propor- tionate (Lat. proportional us) denotes the just relationship of one thing to another in extent, amount, or force. Where the proportion, as in the case of coinmensurateness, is between the means and the end, it becomes a synonym with adequate and suffi- cient. Commensurate (Lat. com- viensuratus, adj.) expresses a coin- cidence or equality in measure or extent of a fixed geometrical character, while Proporiionate might denote also a concunent relationship accord- ing to circumstances which may make it variable. Nor is the idea of propor- tion that of commensurateness. In the commensurate there are only two tenns ; in the proportionate there are four necessarily. Proportion presup- poses a ratio. Commensurate means only that two or more things have the same or an equal number or quantity. Two things of the same dimensions are commensurate; two things which bear the same relation to a third thing in point of quantity are in the same pro- portion to that third. " The rental of a man's house is commensurate with liis income," would mean that the whole of his income went to pay his rent. " His rent is in proportion to his income " presupposes a rule that what a man pays in rent of his house ought not to exceed a certain portion of his in- come. Hence in commensurateness there is no idea but that of totality or equal wholes; in proportion there is that of division and distribution also. But Commensurate has become con- founded with Proportion from the cir- cumstance that some attribute or qua- lity of a thing may be conceived as continuously accompanying it for a period of time. This introduces an idea of proportion. For instance Tillotson says : — "Those who are persuaded that they shall continue for ever cannot choose bat aspire after a happiness commensurate to their duration." Now this is capable of being con- ceived in two ways ; either that their happiness and eternity both lasting together are commensurate, or that their happiness may bear the same relation to eternity that they them- selves will, which becomes proportion. " O let us be sure then our confidence, our claims to heaven, improve not above their proportio7i, that we preserve this sym- metry of the parts of grace, that our hope be but commenswdfe to our sincerity, onr daringness to our duty." — Hammond. 60 SYNONYMS [adherent] AUJIERENT. Follower. Par- TizAN. Disciple. Scholar. Of these the simplest is Follower, which is employed generically of all the rest, with meanings of its own, such as a pursuer, a lover, a dependent, associate. When the Follower (A.S. fylcgan, to follow) is such from a belief of the truth or right of such doctrines or principles he becomes a Disciple ( Lat. disctptilus), as learning or having learnt to believe in them. Scholar (see School), like disciple, is used of one who learns from another ; but Jie scholar learns from a teacher, the lisciple from a master. The scholar IS trained in the rudiments of things, thedisciplein the more advanced bran- ches. Nor are the lessons used of the same subject-matter. The disciple is engaged with doctrines and principles as they regard philosophical systems, and such sciences as admit of a variety of sentiments and views ; the scholar in such as have been fixed, and have simply to be learnt. The scholar is in common learning what the disciple is in philosophy, politics, or religion. The scholar learns directly from his teacher by simple and personal com- munication, the disciple may be re- moved by an interval of some genera- tions from the time of the master whose principles or system he learns by tradition or by books. The Ad- herent (Lat. Mhirnre, to stick to) manifests his attachment in a public way, the term being employed of tliose who openly support persons or causes, whiles one may be a disciple in secret. The disciple upholds the opinions of another, the adherent his interests. The same person may be both an adherent and a disciple, be- cause a system of principles may also be a cause as regards the vrorld in which it has to be maintained and spread. The Partizan (Fr. partisan) is one strongly and perhaps violently attached to a party, and the interests they represent or have embraced, na- turally accompanied with a strong attachment to those who lead or hold them. It is the relation of disciples or adherents in an energetic and ex- clusive w'ay, and is commonly taken to involve an excessive or illiberal and one-sided attachment to a person, a party, or a cause. A faithful follower, a firm adherent, a true disciple, a vio- lent and prejudiced partizan. " Luther and his adherents holil this heresy, that all holy order is nothing." — Sir T. More. " No Indian Prince has to his palace More followers than a thief to the gallows." HUDIBRAS. "The monarchic and aristocratical and popular partizans have been jointly lajring their axes to the root of all government, and have in their turn proved each other absurd and inconvenient." — BuRKE. " We are not the disciples of Voltaire." —Burke. " The Romans confessed themselves the scholars of the Greeks."~JoHKSOJf, ADHERENCE. Adhesion. These words (Lat. tldha:rire, to stick to), which were once freely inter- changed, have parted almost entirely, so that the former expresses the moral, the latter the physical idea of close conformity or attachment. Adherence to a statement, a duty, or the like ; adhesion to a substance. There is, perhaps, an exceptioii in the solitary case of the phrase " to give in one s adhesion to a principle or a party." ADHERENT. Attached. An- nexed. Inherent. A thing isA dh er ent( Lat. Udhee^rtrey to stick to), either by a union which is formed by nature, or by the contex- ture and continuity of the material. It is Attached (Fr. attacker) by arbitrary or artificial bonds, by which it is kept in a purposed place, situa- tion, or connexion. It is Annexed (Lat. ann'eciire, })art. annexus, to bind on to) by such a junction as results from the will and appointments of man. Inherent has the force of tliat intimate connexion, which is essen- tially instituted in the nature of things, and may be either physically or morally employed. The wax of the seal adheres to the letter. The sails of a ship are attached to the mast. Sometimes a minor appointment is annexed to a gi-eater, to enhance its importance or emoluments. There are certain evil tendencies naturally inherent in human nature. Adherent, except as a noun in the sense of follower or support, does not lend itself so readily as attached to a monU [adjust] DISCRIMINATED. 61 use. The metaphorical employment of attached in the sense of united by affection or interest is familiar enough. ADHESIVE. Tenacious. The difference between these terras is best illustrated by their etymology. Adhesive is the Lat. Udhaercre, tostick to. Tenacious, ttnacem, holding on, taih-e. to hold. The Adhesive, therefore, may be regarded as one kind of the Tenacious, expressive of that quality by which one thing holds on to another, surface to surface, by the inherent properties or qualities of such surface, while the tenacious ex- presses the property of holding on in any way. oo ivy is tenacious so far as it clings to a ruin ; it is adhesive, inasmuch as it spreads itself over the expanse of the wall, and by its minute fibres forms a surface of vegetation. Adhesive does not share with Tena- cious the secondary sense in which tenacious is employed of a persistent ad- herence to claims, rights, or oj)inions. ADJUST. Arrange. Range. Accommodate. Adapt. Compromise. Adjust is to set right (O. Fr. ajoster ; L. Lat. adjuxtare, to put side by side). The word implies either an external standard or measure to which matters have to be applied, or some condition of inherent fitness, pro- priety, shape, or order to which they are to be reduced. Dress is adjusted when its several articles are suitably arranged and worn according to their right place and use. Quarrels are said to be adjusted when the alleged wrongs on both sides are referred to some satisfactory decision, arbitration, or agreement. " When things were thus far adjusted towards a peace, all other differences were »oon accommodated." — Addison. Arrange (Fr. a nan o^er, rang, Eng. rank) deals with particulars, as Adjust with wholes. \Ve adjust by rightly ordering the parts so as to form an orderly whole. We arrangf^ separate and particular articles, whether as parts of a whole or not. We arrange according to the fitness of things to stand by each other, while in ranging nothing more is denoted than the plarini; in a lino of separate articles. Items whioh have nothing in common, but that they are movable units, may be ranged, that is, placed in a row. They bear some character in which they stand related to one another when they are arranged, which may or may not be in a line. Practical convenience, seemliness, or order for its own sake is the object in arranging, Articles of furniture in a room are arranged wlien they are relatively placed according to their form, colour, use, and the like. In a procession tlie persons are ranged when the line is formed ; arranged when the order of precedence and accompaniment is fixed. We range books in order to arrange a library. To range is to put in place ; to arrange is to put in right pliice. To range is a physical and, as it were, mechanical art. To ar- range needs thought, taste, know- ledge. When we range we are bound to a certain course. When we ar- range we are at liberty to choose our principle or mode of arrangement, as efficiency, availableness, scientific pre- cision, or pleasurable efl'ect, or any other such cause. " In vain you attempt to regulate your expense if into your amusements or youj society disorder has crept. You have ad- mitted a principle of confusion which wilJ defeat all your plans, and perplex anu entangle what you sought to arrange." — Blaik. ^ We Accommodate (Lat. accommo- dare) when we make one thing supply what the other requires. Both persons and things are subjects of accommo- dation. When we accommodate our- selves to circumstances, we aim at producing a conformity between our wishes and actions, and the limits imposed upon us by them. In this case some sacrifice of ourselves is im- plied. We contract our desires to the measure of their possible fulfilment. If we accommodate a friend with lodgings or a loan, we put him into such a position that his wants in each respect are commensurate with his means of meeting them. When we accommodate differences we bring persons into such harmony that the demands of neither are in excess of what the other is ready to meet. When we accommodate an event to h SYNONYMS [admirable] prophecy, it is by so representing the event, or so stretching or narrowing the terms of the prophecy, that the same space of meaning shall be covered by both as accoraant and co- incident expressions. " It is not the endeavour of Moses or the prophets to discover any mathematical or philosophical subtleties, but rather to accommodate themselves to vulgar capa- cities." — Bp. Wilkins. CoMPUOMisE (Lat. compromittcre) is in its rudimental meaning a joint or mutual promise, and, in particular, a promise to refer a matter to the deci- sion of an arbiter. Then, singularly enough, the subject of this arrange- ment dropping out, the arrangement alone survived ; and, the idea of arbi- tration being abandoned, the term came to mean almost the opposite to its original idea, namely, that of mutual concession without any extra- neous decision ; an adjustment of the matter between the parties themselves in a spirit of conciliation or policy ; for it would often happen that cases destined for an arbiter were never carried so far, but privately arranged. In the phrase, " The person is compro- mised, the idea of obligation or en- gagement is uppermost ; that is to say, he has done something which places him in a certain position or has impli- cated him in a responsibility, though he may not have seen and intended the full consequences of his act. In the other phrase,"The matter was com- promised," the idea of the private arrangement is uppermost ; that is to say, it was determined by mutual concession, and not carried to law. At present the spirit of compromise is that of forestalling judicial or authori- tative decision by timely concessions, a giving and taking on both sides. Compromise is the resort of persons with whom policy is a stronger motive than principle, or with those who, being desirous of truth and justice, will secure to themselves or their cause as much of them as circum- stanses will permit, rather than run the risk of losing them by too rigorously insisting upon their own views and claims. In proportion as men are inclined to believe that exact forms are either irrelevant to truth or obstructive to it, they will advocate compromise ; in proportion as they regard them as essential to its conser- vation they will regard compromise in the light of moral cowardice and unfaithfulness. **An abhorrence of concession and com- promise is a never- failing characteristic of religious factions." — Hallam. ADMIRABLE. Excellent. Ex- quisite. Of these terms the first relates to an impression produced upon our mind, the two others to the character in- herent in objects. That is Admirable (Lat. admirdbilis) which is literally worthy of admiration. And admira- tion is a state of mind produced by the involuntary appreciation of what is excellent in nature, in art, or in the sentiments and actions of mankind. Hence the measure of the Admihable is the faculty of the mind for discern- ing and appreciating such excellence. Admiration is wonder or surprise mingled with approbation, and ac- companied by pleasing emotions. That is Excellent which surpasses (hat.excelltre, to surpass) other things of the same kind in good, desirable, or estimable qualities. Superiority in an object which is purely material, as the fine growth of a tree, or the special costliness of a gem, is not ex- cellence. The excellent always bears reference either to what is morally good, or materially serviceable or desirable in connexion with the re- quirements of men. An excellent person is morally virtuous and esti- mable. An excellent house could no* mean one of architectural beauty, bul one well built for purposes of habita- tion. The excellent is in moral things an object of praise, and in material things an object of advantage. That which is Exquisite (Lat. exqmrhr€f part, exquisllus, to seek ont) exhibits ex- cellence of a peculiar, rare, choice, or delicate kind. It requires refinement of taste and a delicate sensibility to appreciate it. The excellent may be on any scale. The exquisite has never the attribute of size, though it may characterize objects of size. It is a term more artistic than moral, and [admittance] discriminated. Joes not belong to character or acts, yet is not inapplicable to the moral nature, sensibility, and sentiments. It may imply a bigh degree of excel- lence in art, out belongs also to Avhat is not matter of art, as " exquisite torture," that is, rarely, peculiarly, and, as it were, retinedly intense. It has a more superlative force than either admirable or excellent. It is the product of a combination of mental power and delicacy. 63 ADMISSIBLE. Pkr.missibi.e. These stand related as argument to act. That which is Admissible fLat. admitttre, part, admissiis, to admit) may be conceded as true, just, fair, convenient, probable. That which is Permissible (Lat. permitttre^ part. permissnx, to permit) may be conceded as a thing which may be done. A supposition, for instance, is admis- sible, a proceeding permissible. ADMIT. Receive. When employed in regard to per- sons the difference in usage between these words seems to be that the former does not imply what the latter does — a peculiar relation to self as the result of the process. To Admit (Lat. admitttre) is to open an entrance to another. To Receive (Lat. rMpcre) is so to open it as to brin^ him into some close relation to one s self. I admit a person into a public building. 1 receive him into my own house. Hence receive implies a stronger exercise of the will than admit. I admit him into my house to whom 1 do not refuse entrance. I receive him whom I cause to feel welcome. Both Admit and Receive are applicable to merely physical objects and processes. Vet the same analogy is preserved in that case. Admit only involves the absence of exclusion, Receive an adaptation between the two objects. This difference is exemplified in the following sentence of Locke : — " There are some ideas which have ad- mittance only through one sense, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them." ADMIT, Allow. Grant. These terras are here compared only in regard to matters of speculation and argument. In that sense Gravt (O. Fr. gruanter, creanter, to assure) is re- lative to the person of another. It expresses such a concession as benefits or strengthens the position of him to whom it is made. To A dm it is abstract, and belono^s to the propriety, truth, or justice of what is conceded. The concession is the result of the force of argument which renders it impossible to deny, or of a previous knowledge or conviction which one feels must, in justice, be carried to the account of the opposite party. To Allow (Fr. I alloiier, Lat. ad, to,laudare, to praise) is negative, while admit is positive. 1 admit what I cannot deny. I allow what ought in fairness to be granted. Logical necessity compels me to ad- mit. Argumentative honesty requires that I should allow. Admit denotes what is due to the case. Allow what is due to him who argues, as a claim. " Even a real miracle cannot be admitted as such, or carry any conviction to those who are not assured that the event is con- tradictory to the course of nature." — Farmer. " The min'd spendthrift now no longer proud, Claim'd kindred there, and had his claims alloic'd." Goldsmith. There is more freedom and voluntari- ness in Grant than in either Allow or Admit ; so that the term sometimes refers to such concession as an ante- cedent to all argument whatever, as in the following : — " I take it at the same time for granted that the immortality ofthe soul is sufficiently established by other arguments."— Steele. ADMITTANCE. Admission. Admittance belongs more simply to the mere act of allowing to enter. Admission in a moral sense to the re- ception with some sort of sanction. Hence admittance is purely local, as admittance into a building. Admis- sion rather bears the meaning of a right of admittance, or the power of demanding an entrance. It is the right of admission which procures the admittance. The admission of the truth of a charge ; the admittance of light into an apartment. Admission is more ic the admitter, admittance in 64 the admitted, lliere is admission when persons are willing to admit. There is admittance when the way is left open. " Of the foolish virgins who watched not, neither had trimmed theu" lamps, but were too late to buy oil when the bride- groom came, 'tis observed that they found no more place of admittance than if they had been slothful stiil."— Clarke, " Our Bishops are made in form and order as they have been evei', by free election of the Chapter, by consecration of the Archbishop and other three Bishops, and by the admission of the Prince." — Bishop Jewel. ADMONISH. Advise. Caution. Warn. Admonish (Lat.admbHtre) respects the moral conduct, and is the act of a superior. The personal expression of authoritative advice constitutes admonition. It has two aspects, looking to the past and the future. It bears reference to something done or probably done, thus in force re- sembling censure, and to something also likely to be done in the future, from which the person admonished is sought to be kept, thus approaching to warning. Admonition notes the past with disapproval, and at the same time represents the ill conse- quences of any repetition of the offence. It serves to put persons on their guard against wrong conduct, and is therefore most called for in those who are most prone to trans- gress. It cautions against error only m cases where en-or is a moral fault, vs where it occurs through negligence, indifference, inattentiveness, and the like. It involves reason and remon- strance on the act, and authoritative declaration of its ordinary conse- quences. " Admonitio,"says Cicero, "est quasi lenior objurgatio." Ad- monition is a kind of mild reproof. Coming from superiors in age or posi- tion, and having prevention for its object, it often implies that the ad- monisher himself will visit more severely in the way of punishment a repetition of the offence. Resting in the power of such superior it will be Bubj ect to his discretion in its exercise, and he will admonish a favourite, or one in whose character he feels conli- SYNONYMS [admonish] dence, where perhaps he would have visited another with punishment. It is of course possible that the superiority implied in the right to admonish should be rather assumed than real. A belief or possibly knowledge of their own moral or intellectual supe- riority will lead some persons to take up the altitude of admonition toward others. "It has long been charged by one part of mankind upon the other, that they will not take advice, that counsel and instruc- tion are generally thrown away, and that in defiance both of admonition and example all claim the right to choose their own measures, and to regulate their own lives.'' —Adveriturer. Ad V isE ( Fr. aviser, avis, opinion) has reference solely to the future except in the sense, not here considered, of formal notifications. It is positive in its effect, as Admonish is negative. A dvice prompts as admonition deters. We advise per^sors as to their future conduct by giving rules and directions, and imparting informations© far as it may be needed, as we possess it, or it bears upon the matter in hand. As admonition is for the unruly, so ad- vice is for the inexperienced. For further observations see A dvice. " The person who pretends to advise does in that particular exercise a superio- rity over us, and can have no other reason for it, but that in company.or with himself, he thinks us defective either in our conduct or our understanding. For these reasons there is nothing so difficult us the art of making advice agreeable." — Spectator. Warn (A.S. warnian, to beware, tc warn), bears simply upon the hurtful as a possible event of tlie future, and like Advice, and unlike Admonish, has no reference to the past. It deals with the moral only so far as it is pnident, and with the immoral so far as it is dangerous, that is, not as having a certain character, but as followed by certain consequences. Caution (Lat. cautionem, wariness) and Warning are closely allied, but there are differences, lioth respect the personal interest or safety of others,butWARN is a more determinate word than Caution. We might cau- tion another against probable incon- venience aiising frcm a certain 8te|k [adoke] DISCRIMINATED. 65 We should warn him against certain evil accruing from it. In caution we draw the attention of another mainly to his own conduct, which we desire him to be careful in regulating ; in warning, to certain evils external to himself which we desire that he should avoid. Warning implies a far greater amount of positive know- ledge in the speaker than caution. I warn another as absolutely knowing the consecjuences of action, whereas 1 may caution him for the very reason that I do not know them ; and indeed, generally speaking, the ground of warning is certainty, the ground of caution is uncertainty. Caution re- lates to conduct, warn to the circum- stances or issues of conduct. We warn a man against approaching danger. We caution him against running into it. We are cautioned against speak- ing rashly, we are warned of the con- sequences. Admonitions come only fi-om persons, for personal considera- tions give them their weight; but events may serve as cautions and warnings. In the former case they make us circumspect, in the latter observant. " Cautioning us to take heed lest we be overcharged with surfeiting and druukou- ness." — TiLLOTSox. " As two broad beacons set in open fields Send forth their flames far off to every shi«e. And warning give that enemies conspire. With fire and sword the region to invade So flamed his eyne with rage and rancorous ire." . Spe.nser. ADOPT. EjJ BRACE. These terms are employed to express the identification of ourselves with opinions, or forms of truth not hitherto professed by us. They difl'er in the feelings, and so, to some extent, in the motives leading to Kuch action. We A ooPT ( Lat. Udoptare, to take for one's belf) views, opinions, a form of f)ersuasion, a mode of action, and the ike, from necessity or fitness, or as believing them to be true, or right, or convenient. We Embrace them (0. Fr. embracer) with eagerness, a stronger exercise of the will, and a more complete sympathy. That which we adopt we are prepared to defend and make use of. That which we embrace satisfies our needs and meets our mental requu-ements. The term adopt belongs more to the outside of things, embrace more to their inner qualities. I may adopt the statement of another, and make it my own, as effectively or conveniently expressing my own meaning. I em- brace his opinions when I have be- come persuaded of their tmth and am glad to have found them. European travellers in the East often adopt the dress of the Mussulman without em- bracing his faith. ADORE, Reverence. Revere. Venerate. Worsuip. Auore (Lat. (idordre) is primarily the act of worship which consistB in adili'essing prayer. It im})lies there- fore a belief in the continued existence and superhuman attributes of the ob- ject adored. It is by virtue of them that it is worshipped, or constituted an object of prayer. It is by an ex- aggerated metaphor that the term ia employed to designate the warmest devotion to other persons. It involves a higher and more purely intellectual estimate of its object than worship, which is also more purely external. So the lowest forms of religion consist in the worship of material objects, while the highest consist in the sincere and intelligent adoration of the one su- preme God. It IS the conception of power which leads to \vorship,of purity also which leads to adoration. We adore God forllis perfections. We sometimes adore the creature in spite of its im- perfections. We adore when we pay the tribute of admiration as to a Being of a divine or superhuman character. The term sometimes denotes no more than the fervent attachment of an in- ferior, as good princes are said to be adored by their subjects. Adoration I of God, then, is first, simply ])rayer ; I then the recognition of those attri- I butes which are the ground of prayer, I and the feelings consequent on that recognition. It is the rendering to ' Him the homage of reason which, however, so natui-ally expresses itself in outward homage that the teim is sometimes employed to expi-esa this dii'ectly. 66 " Rejoicing hut with awe lu adoration at his feet 1 fell Submiss." Milton. As Adoration is primarily mental and secondarily external, so Worship (Eng. north, uorthship) is primarily external and secondarily mental . Adoration may be genuine without worship, but worship without adora- tion would be hypocrisy. The radical idea of worship is that of placing on a higher level than one's self for the pur- pose of showing honour, the associa- tion being close betweenexaltation and virtue, as in the word excellent, which means first, raised in position, then exceeding in goodness. To worship is to regard as eminently good or great. It has gone through many de- grees of meaning, from that of paying respect, as in the title of mayors of boroughs, or the phrase " with my body I thee worship," to that of ren- dering divine honours, or venerating with religious rites. It is natural to apply to the gods or God terms ex- pressive of social or political exalta- tion. To adore is a mental or spiritual act ; to worship is partly made up of physical acts. Details of a ceremonial, as for instance the burning of incense, may be so many parts in a complex act of worship. Hence it would fol- low that worship is the wider or gene- ric term, and that adoration is a kind of worship. The prevailing feeling in adoration is our own inferiority and unworthiness, which would lead us to prostrate ourselves in the pre- sence of a being morally superior to ourselves. The prevaihng feeling in worship is the power and superiority of the object worshipped. In wor- shipping we pay ihoinage to the power, wisdom, and goodness of God. ^n adoring we express our own weak- ness and dependence upon Him. " If the worship of God be a duty of re- li^on, public worship is a necessary in- stitution, forasmuch as without it the greater part of mankind would exercise no religious worship at all." — Palky. Between Revere (Lat. rtvcviri) and Reverence (Lat. rcvtrentia) there is the difference betAveen a sen- timent entei-tained and a sentiment manifested. To rrviMCTice is to show SI ANONYMS • [adorn] in deportment that which is due to inherent sanctity of character, whether divine or human. Revere is more in- timate to the feelings, and may refer to what is preserved as sacred in the mind, independently of any external signs of respect, as to revere the memory of a deceased friend. It is possible to reverence, though we could never be said to revere, places and objects for the sake of those persons to whom they have belonged, or those persons, things, or uses with which they are closely associated in our minds. " The Jews made him an object of terror more than of awe and reverence, and their religion was a system of the rankest super- stition ; for nothing can be more true than what St. Austin quotes somewhex'e from Varro, that they who are religious revere, and the superstitious fear, God." — BoLlNO- BROKE. BetweenREVERExcE and Venerate ( Lat. vtncran) there seems this main difference, that the object of venera- tion is not so far removed from our- selves as the object of reverence ; that there is more of worship in reverence,as of the name of God, and more of esteem in veneration, as of the good and aged. Associations of antiquity lead to veneration, associations of religion and piety to reverence. Veneration is a profound respect; reverence is a respectful fear which inspires a feeling of restraint. " Veneration is a higher degree of respect in which the mind seems to be more for- cibly struck with wisdom connected with the sterner virtues. Hence we speak of characters which are more venerable than amiable."— CoQAjy^. ADORN. Decorate. Embellish. Garnish. Ornament. Of these Adorn (Lat. Udomare) expresses the accession of beauty in its highest and truest character. The process is one of the best taste and value. It is an advance upon deco- ration. A house just built must be Decorated (Lat. dec^rare,tonOellish- rtient, like the authors above mentioned, but makes an artful use of it for the carry- ing on of his imhle." —Spectator. ADROIT. Expert. Dexterous. Adroit (Fr. adroit, a and droity straight) is literally the faculty of going straight to an object. It is used 68 SYNONYMS [aDVANTAGEJ of other matters than those of physical manipulation, as an adroit answer. It implies an unfixedness of subject- matter. So, for example, we may not say adroit upon a musical instrument. It implies a clever versatility, and so may be negative in its character. We -nay elude or parry sis well as thrust adroitly. Adroitness is the product of natural quickness and experience or practice. An adroit act compasses its end with rapidity and effectiveness, whether in speech or action. Its movement is quick, sudden, tellinrr. Dexterous (Lat. dextcra, or dextva, the right hand) nearly resembles Adroit, so that in some cases the same act might be designated by either term; but Adroit refers to the thing done, Dext erous to the mode, means, or im- plement of doing it. An adroit stroke ; dexterous management. The adroit use of the bow would consist in cle- verly hitting the mark on one occasion. Its dexterous use would mean the same thing done habitually. We may say, ''Throughout the whole course he managed his horses dexterously, and turned one dangerous corner most adroitly." I n moral matters dexterity is a terai of unreserved approbation. Not so adroitness. The dexterous man manages skilfully, the adroit man ingeniously and elusively. A dex- terous man holds his course through difficulties, an adroit man finds a way of escape from them. Even the dex- terous examiner finds difficulty in dealing with an adroit witness. Expert ( Lat. expertus, part, ofexpc- r'lri, to try) is a word implying trained dexterity. Expertness is determined by some art or system of rules. It is the result of practice, that is, of often doing the same thing, until at last it comes to be done with a calculable regularity, so that the effect becomes less intense, and the end more certain and eflfec- tive. "There were no marks of expertness in the trick played by the woman of Endor upcjii the perturbed mind of Saul."— CoGAN. '• They smooth the plank very expe- ditiously and dexterously with their adzes, and can take off a thin coat from a whole plank without missing a stroke." — Cook's Voyages. " M«y taere not be a great deal in the ingenious versatile, in the skill and adroit- ness of the artist, acquired as yours has been by repeated acts and continual prac- tice." — Bishop Horne. ADVANTAGE. Benefit. Boon. Profit. Tmerest. These terms are synonyms in so far as they denote something by which a person is bettered — that is, they are all relative forms of good. But the good is regarded from different points of view. An Advantage (Fr. avantage,avant,fo)-ward; Lat.a6, ante) is that which puts a man forward — that is, places him in a better state as regards society or his position in it, or some office or work which he has to do, as the advantages of a good education. It respects external cir- cumstances of profit, honour, or con- venience, and turns upon the wishes and wants of life. An advantage is not a final form of good, but rather something which puts us in the way of acquiring further good. The ad- vantageous is not only desirable but promotive and helpful. " Whatever advantages I obtain by my own free endeavours and right use of those faculties and powers I have, I look upon them to be as much the effects of God's providence and government as if they were given me immediately by Him without my acting." — WooiASTON. Benefit (Lat. ht"iitfdcere,sn'^.bmc- factum, to do good) is anything which makes the condition of the person who receives it happier or more pro- sperous. It may be conferred upon us by another, or it may come to us as the result of a process directed to the purpose. Some benefits are con- ferred, others are reaped. A rich man may heap benefits upon a poor man. Ihe man of sedentary habits takes a walk for the benefit of his healtli. Benefits are commonly mat- ters of the body or the estate. The advance of mechanical science re- dounds to the benefit of the human race. " He now found that such friends as benefits had gathered round him were little estimable. He now found that a man> own heart must be ever given to gain that of another."— Goldsmith, Profit (Lat. prbftcere, to go far- ward, to be useful) is so far like [adventurous] DISCRIMI>.'ATED 69 tinl addition to tlie sum of our well- being, but it comes to us in a peculiar way. Jt is ^ain arising out of a thing — the balance of benefit after something expended, vrhether in action, m labour, or in money. It is in its fullest sense the excess of acqui- sition over expenditure in any way in which those words may be applied. Advantages may come to us adventi- tiously; benefits may be conferred upon us, but profit is always the product of our own doings. " The revenue derived from labour is called wages ; that derived from stock by the pei"sou who manages or employs it is called -profit:'— kn AM Smith. A Boon (Dan. and Sw. hon, a peti- tion ; see Skeat's Eti/m. Diet.) is a specific benefit, a private and per- sonal good^ a gift peculiarly accept- able, meeting m a peculiar way the circumstances or wants of the indi- vidual. It has a relative, rather than an absolute and universal value. What is a great boon to one man it might not be worth another's while to accept. " If you mean to please any people you must give them the boon which they ask; not what ou may think better for them, out of a kind totally different."— Burke. Interest (Lat. iuttrest, it concerns) expresses both the fact and the feel- ing of concern. It is in the former sense that we have to deal with it here. The interest of a person or a community is the sum total of what concerns them ; the aggregate of their well-being ; all that it hehoves them to possess in regard to happiness and prosperity. It is not a form of good, but any and all good, as it relates to them specifically. " Divisions hinder the common interest and public good."— Sir W. Temple. ADVENT. Arrival. Both these terms are employed to signify the coming of objects in space and of events in time. But Advent {Lat. advhure, part, adventus) signifies no more than a coming to. Arrival (Fr. arriver, for which see Bn.ACHET) implies progressive move- ment, a course and a speciiic destina- tion . Advent is abstract, arrival is spe- cific. Advent regards our anticipation of the thing that comes, which is ac- cordingly fulfilled by its coming. Arri- val regards the movement of the thing that comes, which is accordingly ter- minated when a given point is reached. ADVENTURE. Enterprise. Both are marked occurrences or transactions of which the issue is de- termined by chance, but the Adven- ture (^Fr.aventnrc, h.J^at. advent fira) befals us, and the Eni ERrnisE is sought. We undertake enterprises, and meet with adventures. An en- terprise {Yr. entreprendre, part, eritre- pris, to undertake) is a bold, hazard- ous undertaking. An adventure is something befalling us of an unusual, perhaps romantic character. The best adventure is that which ends in the safety of the ])arty after strange incidents and a complication of perils. The best enterprise is that which ends in the success of the part}^ after a com- flication of dangers and difficulties, t was an indomitable spirit of enter- prise which led the Spanish dis- coverers of the new world. The lives of Columbus,Cortes, and Pizarro were full of adventures. ADVENTUROUS. Enterpris- ing. V e ntu r esom e . The first of these, the Adven- turous (Fr. aventnre, an enterprise; L. Lat. adventura), is one who is pri- marily led by a spirit of boldness, and either courts, or at least disregards danger. The Enterprising (Fr.cn- treprise,undertakingyenterprise) is pri- marily led by the desire of achieving a bold scheme or undertaking in itself profitable or good. The enterprising combines calculation with boldness to a gi-eater extent than the adven- turous, vvhose character is liable to degenerate iuto the rosh or foolhardy. The enterprising is not deterred by peril, the adventurous loves it for its own sake. Yet adventurous is a lof- tier term than Venturesome. The former expresses the character, the latter the spirit or act of the moment. There is a chivalrous element in the adventurous. The venturesome thing 70 is orlinary, but attended with risk. An adventurous course, a venturesome act. Columbus was adventurous. lie who would trust his weight upon thin ice is venturesome. "I thence Invoke thy aid to mine adventurous song. That with no middle flight intends to soar Above th' Ionian Mount, while it pursues Things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme." Milton. " Through hardy enterprise Many great regions are discovered." Spenser. '• It must ever redound unto the honour of his memory, that bold and venturesome net of his in so bravely tasting oif the long- usurped power of the Pope in these realms." — Strtpe. ADVi:RSE. Contrary. Oppo- site. Inimical. Hostile. Repug- nant. Averse. Adverse (Lat. adversiis, turned towards, hostile), belongs both to ex- ternal circumstances or influences, and to the sentiments or acts of men. That whicli is adverse acts to the hindrance or disadvantage of another. It is commonly employed of that which tends to thwart our plans or movements by an opposing force or influence, either actively resisting, or, more commonly, negatively impeding and obstructing. Adverse circum- stances retard and make more difficult the progress of our purposes and schemes. Adverse winds exercise a counteractive force on the movements of the ship. Opposition of sentiment makes others adverse to our designs. " Happy were it for us all if we bore prosperity as well and wisely as we endure our adverse fortune." — Southev. Contrary (Lat. cojitrdrius, contra, against) does not imply the specific relation involved in adverse, but is a more abstract term. A thing is ad- verse in the way in which it operates, contrary in its own nature. The ad- verse is tlie contrary in operation. Things ai'e contrary which have very great unlikeness to each other in cha- racter and attributes. They are Op- posite (Lat. opponcre, part, oppos^tus, to set over against) when they have this unlikeness in tlie ^eatest pos- sible degree. There is in opposite a SYNONYMS [adverse] geometrical exactitude which does not belong to contrary. Things may be more or less contrary, but not more or less opposite. The cont^-ary has wide differences, the opposite has nothing in common. The contrary negatives tlie majority of the attri- butes ; the 0])posite negatives them all. Contrary is to quality what op- posite is to position. Opposition is complete and measured contrariety. So virtue is contrary to vice and op- posite to vice — contrary in its total unlikeness in character, manifesta- tions, motives, and practical effects; o])j)Osite in that its definition might consist in affirming all that is denied and denying all that is affirmed of virtue. Contrary is a moral and me- taphysical, as opposite is a mathema- tical term. The opposite side of the street would be the north side, if the speaker were on the south ; the con- trary side would be the opposite to that about which some idea had been entertained or some statement made. Opi)Osite is static in its character, contrary is dynamic. Contrary things are sure to come into some collision with each other ; opposite things are simply utterly removed. " Many of them (the bones of the human body) conspire to one and the same action, and all this contrarily to the laws of specific gi-avity." — Ray. " Novels by which the reader is misled into another sort of pleasure opposite to that designed in an epic poem." — Dryden. The remaining synonyms all ex- press adverseness, contrariety, or op- fosition in human feeling or action. NiMiCAL(Lat. mtmlciis) and Hostile (Lat. hostilis) are very similar, but Inimical is not so strong a term as Hostile, rather implying the posses- sion of such feelings or qualities as would naturally lead to oj)position or a refusal to aid ; while Hostile denotes a more positive, open, and energetic display of such opposition. The ad- verse tends to thwart, the inimical to discourage, the hostile to defeat and destroy. " We are at war with a system which by its essence is inimicai to ail other govern- ments."— BuEKK. Repugna NT ( Lat. repugnare^ to fight [adviceJ DISCRIMINATED 71 against) is now almost exclusively applied to things, not persons. It de- notes that which either excites a feeling of dislike in a person, or is essentially discordant with something else, and so both contradicts its cha- racter and is inconsistent with its working. That is repugnant which possesses an incompatible character or attributes — a contrariety in matters of mind, feeling, emotion, passion, spirit, principle, purpose, character. An act may be consistent with the letter of a law but repugnant to its spirit. " liepugnant to the principles of human natiire," — Stillingfleet. Like Inimical and HosTiLE,but un- like repugnant. Averse (Lat. auecsas, alienated, part.of ai'frr, a sudden danger) is the generic term which coniprises the rest. It is the natural fooling produced by the instinct of self-pr* 86 servMtion, at the actual nearness or supposed nearness of the dangerous, or, iu a milder way, the odious. In one sense fear is a passion. In an- other it is an intellectual state, and the latter is again actual or hypo- thetical. Hence there may be said to be three kinds of fear, of which the following would be examples. 1. The fear of a savage beast. 2. The fear of the cold. 3. The fear of the consequences of exposure to cold. The first is produced immediately by an impression upon the senses. The second is the result of association. The third of reasoning by anticipa- tion. Thus the feeling of fear is commensurate with, and runs parallel to, man's intellectual faculty ot appre- hending the presence of danger. superadding to the animal instincts of aj ' his own. a power of apprehension peculiarly "Fear is a painful sensation produced by the immediate apprehension of some impendiHg evil."— CoGAN. When the nearness of danger is rather specuhitive than manifest, it gives rise to the feeling of Appukh en- sign (Lat. apprehevsionem, a gi-asping with the mind), the third land of fear illustrated above. It is the intellec- tual consciousness of possible danger, and is therefore the lowest or least energetic form of fear. Indeed, the idea of fear at all is only incidental to the term, though usage has made it the most promment. As we appre- liend coming pleasure as well as coming pain, the term apprehension might, consistently with its etymology, have expressed hope as well as fear ; hut custom, which is the arbiter of speech, the norma loquendiy has decreed it otherwise. We may fear persons ; we apprehend only occur- rences, whether actions or events, or the results of either. •'The pain of death is most an apprehen- sion." Shakespeare. Fright (A.S.fyrhtnJright) is the sudden confusion of the senses by an external appearance, which produces in an instant an unreflecting fear. It is an instantaneous and excessive perturbation. It paralyzes and takes complete possession of the mind. It SYNONYMS [alertness] makes people stand aghast. It showfi itself in the rigid posture of the body, and the dazed stare of the countenance. " When lo I the doors buret open in a tmse, And at their banquet terrified the miee. They start, they tremble in a deaMy friy hi. And round the room precipitate their flight." Francis, Horace. Consternation (Lat. constemati- onem) is that state of powerlessnoss which is the combined result of tenor and amazement, the latter, however, predominating. It seizes the mind, benumbs the reasoning powers, and is a kind of intellectual fright, and may be produced by what we learn as well as by what we see or hear. For further remarks, see the article Surprise. Panic (jlavtuov iatfxa, panic Jear, any sudden unaccountable terror being ascribed to Pan, from his having been supposed to have struck terror into the Persians at the battle of Marathon) is commonly taken to de- note that sort of fear which is at once sudden, indefinite, and contagious among a multitude, though sometimes used also in reference to an indivi- dual in the sense of a wild and unac- countable fear. A panic is a fantas- tic fear — a fright without any external cause accounting for it. " Consternation : This species of fear is a strong foreboding of tremendous evils, which are likely to follow misfortunes which have already taken place."— CoG AN. " But the serpent said unto Adam, Tush 1 this is but a panick fear in yon, Adam. Yon shiill not so surely die as yon conceit." — H. More. •• The first author of it (the general shout) was Pan, Bacchus' lieutenant-general, in his Indian Expedition, where being encom- passed in a valley with an array of enemies far superior to them in number, he advised the god to order his men in the night to give a geneiul shout, which so surprised the cpposite army that they immediately llci (i-om their camp ; whence it came to pass that all sudden feais impressed upon men's spirits without any just reason, were called by the Greeks and Romans panick terrors." — Potter's Greece, * ALERTNESS. Alacrity. Agi- lity. Activity. Briskness. Nimble- NESS. Ai.KHTNKss (It. aW erta, on the watch) and Alacrity (Lat. itlacrt- tatem) very nearly resemble each [all] DISCRIMINATED. 87 other. Alertness comes of natural or constitutional promptitude. He is alert who is eagerly vigilant, whose interest in his position and circum- stances is such as to render him alive to the possibility of occurrences that may affect them. Alacrity comes rather from the impulse of the will set upon a particular movement. This may be on one's own behalf or another's. So one not remarkable for alertness might show alacrity in com- plying with the request of another. " The mountain torrents on every side rnshed down the hills in notes of various cadence as their quantities of water, the declivities of their fall, their distances, or the intermission of the blast brought the sound fuller or fainter to the ear, which organ became now more alert." — Gilpin's Tour. The ideas of alacrity are humor- ously contradicted in the following : — "The rogues slighted me into the river with as little remorse as they would have drowned a blind bitch's puppies fifteen in the litter; and you may know by my size that I have a kind of alticrity of sinking." — Shakespeare. Agility (^Lat. HgiCitdtem) denotes physical activity, as in the monkey, the runner, the acrobat, or the gym- nast. It is the product of corporeal vigour and lightness of frame. It in- volves flexibility of the body and limbs. Nimble (A. S. nemaly nimany to catchy seize) has, contrary to the usual order, been transferred from the men- tal to the bodily capacities. It meant quick of apprehension, then handy, adroit. It is now confined to the agile use of the feet in particular. " He that before wholly attended upon his body to make it excel in strength or agility, that he might contend victoriously in the Olympic games, then made it his business to improve and advance his soul in knowledge and virtue." — Bates, Im- mortality of the Soul. " Ovid ranged over Parnassus with great nimbleness and agility." — Addison. Activity (Lat. actwitatem),ha.ring a derivation in common with agility, is applied to both body and mind, and denotes such a general combina- tion of life and movement as readily meets the practical business of life. The active man has in the physical sense a tendency to the use of his body from inherent life and strength and a dislike of sedentariness ; in the moral sense a love of employment and a dislike of remaining unem- ployed. Alertness and alacrity are shown on specific occasions, though they belong to certain characters ; but agility and activity are {)ermanenl qualities. "Man is an active creature. lie can not be long idle." — Hales. Briskness (Welsh, brysg, quick, nimble) is that liveliness of mind which shows itself in quickness of manner and movement; a constitu- tional alertness shown in the minor requirements of life, and in matters of recreation no less than in matters of duty. Briskness is the outcome of vivacity, as alertness of vigilance, activity of ardour, and alacrity of willingness. " Brisk toil alternating with ready ease." Wordsworth ALL. Whole. Every. Each. These are not so much synonyms as words employed in kindred ways on which it may be well to remark. All(A. S.«a/)iscollective. Every (i.e. ever-each; A. S. tifre, ever; (tie, each) is distributive and collective. Each (A. S, u:lc) is distributive and individual. All regards a body in its numerical totality, whole in its quantitative totality. " All men " is equivalent to the whole human race. Every implies first a class, and then the separate members of it dealt with exhaustively. Each implies first a class and then the separate members dealt with one by one. Each denotesthings taken severally, Every describes them taken singly. Besides these distinctions, Each re- lates to two or more individuals, Every always to more than two. " Whose serious muse inspires him to ex- plain That all we think and all we act is vam." Prior. '• Every thing is endowed with such a natural principle whereby it is necessarily inclined to promote its own preservation and well-being."— WiLKlNS, Natural Re- ligion. " Let's each one send unto his wife. And he whose wife is most obedient 88 SYNONYMS [allegiance] To come at once when he doth send for her Shall win the wager which we wifl propose." Shakespkare. " Upon this question, what supported or kept np this chain, would it be a sufficient answer to say that the iirst or lowest link hung upon a second or that next above it ; the second, or rather the first and second together, upon the third ; and so on ad infi- nitum! for what holds up the whole?" — WOOLASTOX. But All, like Whole and unlike EvKiiY and Each, is used of quantita- tive totality. It is, however, only of mental subjects that it is so used. In that case, as whole is the sura of the parts, so all is the sum of the species. *' All hope is lost," means hope of every kind. " The whole idea is false," would mean that no portion of it was true. ALLEGIANCE. Loyalty. Allegiance (older form, aiie- geaunce; Skeat, Etym. Diet. : a-, i.e. Lat. ad, to, and 0. Fr. ligance, homage ) is the recognition of a binding le- lationship toward a superior, and so a principle of action; while Loyalty (Fr. loyal) is a personal sentiment of attachment to an individual ruler (Fr. loi, law). Allegiance has been extended to apply to parties, prin- ciples, systems, and causes. It is evident, however, that personal re- lationship is involved in these. Al- legiance might be to any government, as, e.g. to a republican form of it. Loyalty is even applicable to relation- ships of minor superiority, as, e.g. to leadership of a party, or even of friend to friend. It can-ies with it in that case the ideas of pure, frank, and generous deference, consent, and sup- port rendered at once, without com- pulsion and without effort. Allegiance conveys the idea of formally professed or sworn obedience. A wife bears loyalty, though not allegiance, to her husband, on account of her equality with him. "Hear me, recreant, on thine allegiance hear me." Shakespeare. " Unhappy both, but loj/al in their loves." Dryden. ALLIANCE. League. Confede- racy. Association. Paiunershu'. Combination. These terms express in conunon the idea of union and communion ainont>- Sersons. They vary in implying a ilferent character and purpose for such unions. Alliance (Fr. alliance; allier, te ally ; Lat. alUgare, to bind to) is lite- rally the state of being bound. It is applicable to individuals, families, states, and communities or parties. Alliances are voluntarily sought. Al- liance between persons is for fi-iend- ship, mutual protection, or assistance. It is in this case presumed to be hon- ourable. When between families, it involves union by marriage, and the consideration or influenceof the houses so allied. When between States, it is for purposes offensive or defensive, or both ; when between parties or communities, it is dictated by policy, as an alliance between Church and State. " Adrastus soon with gods averse shal? join In due alliance with the Theban line." Poi'E. League (Fr. ligue) is from the snme root (Lat. Itgare, to bind). It attaches men to some common cause or principle ; and, as leagues are generally self-constituted by the in- ferior or weaker for protection against the superior or stronger, their mode oi constitution and action is iiregular. Hence there is often attached to league the idea of self-interest in pre- dominance. Identity of interest will even bind together persons who would never otherwise have associated, in an almost unnatural league. " And let there lie 'Twixt us and them no league, no amity.'' Denham. A Confederacy (Lat. confxde- ratus, bound together by a covenant) is a fomial and covenanted compact. As we naturally mistrust secrecy in others, we give to confederacy be- tween nations an honourable mean- ing, but confederacy among indi- viduals is a synonym with conspu-acy. A confederacy politically may be re- garded as the union of several inde- pendent leagues. For its relation to individuals, see Caiial. The league is less compreliensive and less ])er- manent than tlie confederacy. The States of the American union are in permanent coTiteJeracy. 'I he Cove- [alliance] DISCRIMINATED. 89 nautevs in Scotland were to Calvinism what the League in France was to Catholicism. " The Grecian Couimonwealth, while they maintuiaed their liberty, were the most heroic co'>federacy that ever existed, they were the politest, tiie bravest, and the wisest of men."— Harris, Hermes. Association (Lat. ass'6cidre, to asso- eiate^ verb act.) is in its full etymolo- gical application tlie most comprehen- sive ot" all, inasmuch as all involve the idea of association. But in common usage an association is something of a lighter and less lasting character than the others. It is often such an union as is kept alive merely by the spirit of union brought to bear upon a temporary object. It will be more or less permanent, according to the end which it proposes. Some asso- ciations quickly achieve their end, and are at once dissolved. Some are for the purpose of common work and continuous employment, as an asso- ciation for investigating the geology, botany, or archaeology of a district. In some cases the association, recog- nizing a permanent end, assumes an organization, and calls itself a society. " In my yesterday's paper I proposed that the honest men of all parties should enter into a kind of nssociatiun for the de- fence of one another," — Addison. Partnership is that association of two or more persons which is based on a community of personal interests, and which must be secured by more or less formal sanctions. In this sense man and wife enter into part- nership. When extended beyond this it relates to matters of gain and profit in commercial dealing. It in- volves the joint employment of money, goods, labour, skill, or any one or more of these, with a view to a com- munication of proceeds. " In this partnership a.\] men have equal rights, bat not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the partnership has as good a right to it as he that has five hun- dred pounds has to his larger proportion." — Burke. Combination, in its fullest sense, belongs to inanimate things, as forces, circumstances, substances, ideas. Combination is a species of oon- aexiou. (. Lat. comb\nare, con- ana 6i/ii, a pair). A.8 applied to persons, it tends, like leagiie, to an unfavourable or unlawful sense. It is the associa- tion of many persons in private for the purpose of some object desired ir. common. For the exact idea of com- bination generally, see Connect. Aa lawful purposes can in well-regulated communities be commonly compassed by ordinary means, combination con- veys the idea of conspii'acy or union against some existing power not al- together peaceful or honourable. The term, however, admits being so quali- fied as to neutralize this force. A union for a good purpose, as in the cause of humanity and science, is not spoken of in an unqualified manner as a combination, though persons may combine in it. " A solemn combination shall be made Of our dear souls." SHAKESPEARE. Alliances, leagues, and confedera- cies admit of every degree of formal- ity and solemnity in their sanctions. The bonds of relationship and ol friendship, the advantages of superior knowledge and experience, and the assurance of assistance in time of need are the ordinary motives to alliances. The object of a league is ordinarily the reduction of a common enemy, or a defence against his attacks. It is an union of force and design to carry out a particular scheme or enterprise in the hope of reaping the fruit of it as against another. A confederacy is an union based on mutual interest and support. League and confederacy are employed only of persons and powersi, alliance also of things, as the alliance of the principles of the world with those of the Gospel, or of the eftbrts of art with those of nature. Alliances are for the gr<^at, the power- ful, and the healthy ; confederations for those under trouble, or oppression, or weakness by their littleness: leagues for the designing and ma- licious. An alliance is sought for the sake of satisfaction ; confederation for action, league for victory, success, or gain ; association for entertain- ment and useful occupation. The life of alliance is harmony ; of confedera- tion, concert ; of league, self-interest ; of association, a common spirit ; of com- 90 unites. The association brings to- gether. The confederation consti- tutes. The combination co-ordinates. The partnership yokes. The league binds. Friendship will form an al- liance ; patriotism a confederation ; sympathy an association ; policy a partnership ; discontent a league. The wise ally themselves. The pru- dent confederate themselves. The congenial associate themselves. The oppressed league themselves. ALLOT. Appoint. Destine. Ap- portion. Assign. To Allot (Fr. allotir, an old law tei-m : Littr e) is to give as a lot. We may allot to one or to many. To Ap- i^oiiTiON is to allot according to pro- portion (Lot, portionem^ a portion). Al- lotment determines the thing itself, apportionment determines the quan- tity of it. Allotment is used only of things, not of persons, except where the personality is taken no account of, as to allot certain b-oops to a district. Allotment is more arbitrary than ap- portionment, for allotment may be of different things, while apportionment is of different assignments from the same stock. It has pleased Divine Providence not only to apportion wealth unequally to the rich, but to allot riches to some and poverty to others. Apportionment is regulated by a principle of distribution, allot- ment by the will of him who allots. To Appoint (L. hat.appunctare, to arrange, settle) is to assign a particu- lar thing in a particular way for a particular purpose. The orio;in and force of the word, however, is to be traced, not to the Latin, but to the French. The French " point " was used in the sense of condition, ar- rangement, turn, plight, case. Hence the L. Lat. appunctdre, to determine or arrange a controversy. Hence our own expression that a remark is to the point, and that an establishment is well-appointed. To appoint is spe- cifically to arrange, to select, and ap- ply to a purpose in hand. Both per- sons and things are appointed, but in either case it is in reference to some Durpose, work, or end. I allot from 6 sense of fitness; I appoint as part SYNONTMS [allot] of an arrangemeui. To allot is in some sense to give ; to appoint is to fix only. Hence there are many cases in which they would not be jointly employable. If I say I appoint a time for meeting, I mean I select and assign it towards the purposes of tlie transaction. If I say I allot it, I mean that I take it as a portion of the time nt my disposal, and give it to the business in hand. If I say that I ap- portion it, 1 mean that I give it feeling that I give as much as I ought. We should allot judiciously, apportion fairly, appoint precisely. " As no man can excel in everything, we must consider wliat part is allotted to us to act in the station in wliich Providence hath placed us, and to keep to that." — Mason. " Man hath his daily work of body or mind Appointed, which declares his dignity. And the regard of heaven on all his ways. While other animals inactive range. And of their doings God takes no account," MiLTOlf. " God having placed us in our station, he having apportioned to us our task." — Barrow. As all the other of these synonyms beai- upon the immediate present, so Destine (Lat. destindre) upon the future. The act of destining is as it were an act in abeyance, and takes full effect in the future, and is at pre- sent in reseiwation. A person has a task allotted to him on which he is supposed at once to enter, or he is appointed to an office the obligations of which he incurs immediately; but he may be destined to the office before the appointment is made. Moreover, destination is not alwaj'-s relative. It may be absolute — that is, things may be destined simply to be or occur. " Mark well the place where first she lays her down. There measure out thy walls and build thy town ; And from thy guide Boeotia call the land In which the destined walls and town shall stand." Addison, Ovid. ALLOW. Permit. Suffer. Tole- RATE. It ought to be observed that there are in Allow two distinct forces, the mean* injr. viz., of to permit and to afford. I'o Phrmif (Lat. peifniitcre) la used rather in a passive, while Allov [allude] DISCRIMINATED. yi has a more active sense. If I allow him I give him at least some degree of sanction, however small ; if I per- mit, I only do not prevent him. Suffer (Lat. sn^'erre) is more pas- sive still, and may be entirely against the inclination. On the other hand, it jiay be purely negative, as the indo- lent master suffers his pupils to be idle. There are in allow, permit, suffer, and tolerate, degrees as regards the will. I allow what I myself sanc- tion or will. I permit what another wills. I suffer that about which I am content to have no will. I Tolerate (Lat. idler are) that which is against my will. •• Without the King's will or the State's allowance." Shakespeare, " If by the author of sin is meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted, or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow — I say if this be all that is meant by being the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin, though I dislike and reject the phrase as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense ; it is no re- proach for the Most High to be then the author of sin." — Edwards, Freedom of the WiU. It should, however, be observed that in matters not of tlie will of in- dividuals only, but of formal or public sanction. Permit is a stronger term than Allow. In this connexion th'e case is reversed. If the law pennit me to do something, it sanctions my doing it ; on the other hand, it may allow of my doing it fi*om the case not having been contemplated and provided for by law. One tolerates a thing when, having the power to prevent it, one does not exercise the power. One suffers it when one does not oppose, either feigning ignorance, or not ha\«ig power to prevent. Allow supposes the thing allowed to be good. Permit, that it may be good or bad. Tolfrate and Suffer, that it is bad or beheved to be so. •• I snfiTer him to enter and possess. ' MiLTOX. •• Alleging that if God ruled the woi Id CO much wickedness and impiety would not h« ioierated therein."— Barrow. ALLOW. GnA>r. Besiow. Afford. The leading idea in A llow is pro- portionateness, or measured giving ; in Grant, favour, or willing giving; in Bestow — a compound form of stow — substantial benefit, or solid giving; and in Afford, personal sparing or relative giving. A father allows his son a certain sum yearly ; kings grant pensions ; gifts and honours are some- times bestowed upon the unworthy; relief is afforded to the poor or the sick. We allow what is claimed or expected, we grant what is asked, we bestow what is valued, and afford what is needed. " If it (my offence) be weighed By itself, with aggravations not sur- charged. Or else with just alloivance counterpoised, I may, if possible, thy pardon find." Milton. "This mutual convenience introduced commei'cial traffic, and the reciprocal trans fer of property by sale, grant, or convey ance." — Blackstone. "Almighty GoJ, though He really doth aud raiinot otherwise do, yet will not seenc to bestow his favonrs altogether gratis, bu* to expect some competent retui'n, some small use and income from them." — Barrow. " Great Dryden next, whose tuneful Muse affords The sweetest numbers and the fittest words." Addison. ALLUDE. Refer. Advert. These words are often used indis- criminately, but they are by no meaois identical in meaning. To Allude (Lat. alludere) is indi- rect. Refer (Lat. referre) is positive and direct. If I quote an author, for instance, not by name but by de- scription, subject, period, or style of writing, I allude to him ; but if I attribute something to anotlier, speci- fically and plainly, 1 do not allude but refer to him. Allusion is often so vague that confusion arises from ignorance of the person or period alluded to. The fault of reference is not obscurity, but inexactness. A wrong reference — an obscure allusion. Advert (Lat. adverlere, to turn to) has in it a character of casualty, almost of abruptness, as if in adverting, one suddenly turned aside to take notice 92 of something in connexion with the main matter in hand, but with no in- tention of dwelling upon it. The noun Advertence is equivalent to cou- 8cious observation. " The people of the country alluding to its foam (Buttermere Lake) call it Sour Milk Force."— Gilpin's Tour. "But to do good is not only our greatest duty, but our greatest interest and advan- tage, which is that that Solomon chiefiy refers to in the text."— Sharp, " Now to the universal whole advert. Our earth regard as of that whole a part." Blackmore. ALMOST. Nearly. Nearly is more strictly applied to matters of quantity, time, space, and fact ; Almost to matters of progres- sion, degree, or force. So if we said, " He is nearly tej years of age," we should mean that his age was sepa- rated from ten by a small interval. Almost ten would mean that in a little he would reach or have reached it. It may be observed that while Nearly is used grammatically with a negative. Almost is never so preceded. That which is begun and approaches its completion is almost done ; that which is on the point ofbeing begun, is nearly begun. A man almost killed has suf- fered a severe injury, a man nearly killed has escaped. ALSO. Too. Likewise. Besides. Too is a sligliter and more familiar word than A i.so, which is more formal. Also means, as well as. Likewise, in a similar manner. Too,in addition. Be- sides denotes parallel addition. Also cannot be usetl for Likewise if there be only a similarity of position gram- matically , and no community of nature. So "lie is a prince and also a musi- cian" may be said, because it is only a logical or grammatical unity that is expressed, the same person being a subject of two propositions. *' He is a prince and likewise a musician," we could not say, by reason of the ab- sence of any community of charac- ter between the things expressed by the terms. Grammatically, Too cannot begin a sentence, while Also can. AIWAYS. Continually. One does Always that which one does at all times and on all occasions ; one does Continually that which one 8TNONY3IS [aLMOST] does without intermission or interrup- tion. One is bound always to prefer duty to pleasure. It is inapossible to be continually at work. One is also bound always to speak, when in com- pany, with a certain consideration of others ; this of itself will prevent us from speaking continually. As Con- tinually belongs to prolongation of time, so Always belongs to recurrence of occasion. AMBASSADOR. Envoy. Pleni- potentiary. Deputy. Minister. Ambassador (Ft. ambassadef an em- bassy) is a minister of the highest rank resident in a foreign country even in times of peace, and keeps up by the style of his living the dignity of the country which he represent! ; while an Envoy ( Fr. eiivoi, a sending) is commonly not permanently resi- dent, but sent on a particular occasion. The term applies especially to the ministers ofmonarchs. Minister (Lat. minister, an attendant on a monarch) being the general term for foreign political representatives. " Since the Congress of Vienna, repre- sentatives have been usually divided into three classes : ambassadors, envoys, and charges des affaires, the last of these com- municating not between the heads, but between the foreign departments of Go- vernments. Ambassadors are sent by Great Britain to Russia, Austria, the German Empire, Italy, France, and Turkey ; our other ministers abroad are termed envoys, or ministers plenipotentiary." — Brandk AND Cox, Diet, of Lit., Science, aiid Art. The envoy, like the ambassador, ex- ercises his functions in a sumptuous manner. The Plenipotentiary, as his name implies (Lat. plcnus, full , potentia, authority) is one vested with full powers to treat with a foreign go- vernment, especially when its rela- tions are precarious. Personal influ- ence, diplomatic talent, and loyalty, are needed in the plenipotentiary. The Deputy {Ft. depute, Lat. dipii- tare, to decide) has much less power, beingsentuponaspecificmissionwhich he is bound to execute with dignity, strictness, and despatch. Ambassa- dors and envoys speak and treat in the name of their sovereigns, but the first are invested with a representative duality; the second are authorised [amend] ministers, but not representative mem- bers in tlie full sense of the term. No such higli rank and power is ever eajqyed by "deputies who appear and speak in behalf of some subordinate section of the community, or some private body. The title of minister comprises the functions of ambassador and envoy ; that of deputy assimilates itself to those of an agent. Mi\g- nificence of living and personal dignity belong characteristically to the ambassador. Cleverness in nego- tiation constitutes the merit of an envoy. Natural talent and aptitude for business are desired in a deputy. Deputies may be sent to sovereigns, though they are not sent by them. The title plenipotentiary commonly accompanies that of ambassador-ex- traordinary, "The commerce of the Turkish Company (Irst occasioned the establishment of an ordinary ambassador at Constantinople." — Adam Smith. " As when some faithful envoy, who at large Receives commission for a weighty charge. Chides his neglect, recalling to his thought Some valued purpose 'midst his zeal forgot. And ere he sees his lord with eager care Rends every power the omission to repair," HoOK, Ch-lando Furioso. "The British Henipotentiaries were di- rected to give the same assurances to the Dutch ministers at Utrecht, and withal to let them know that the Queen was deter- mined by their late conduct to make peace, cither with or without, but would much rather choose the former." — Swift, "When I was at Assamea some of the principal inhabitants of several different cities complained to me of the excessive appointments that were decreed to their deputies." — Melmoth, Cicero. AM151GU0US. Equivocal. Ambiguous (Lat, ambtguus) quali- fies such a form of expression as leaves the sense doubtful. Equivocal (Lat, (cquivocus) is the character which belongs to a term as having more than one meaning. So ambiguous is negative ; equivocal is Jositive. In an ambiguous sentence do not see the grammatical sense. In an equivocal sentence there is more than one sense, each plain enough, but 1 do not know which to take. Ambiguitjr obscures the expression; equivocation conceals the intention ot the speaker. The former is far less often the result of design than the DISCRIMINATED. 93 latter, which is a synonym with pre- varication. In deliberate equivoca- tion, it is intended that the hearer should take what is said in a sense favourable to the speaker ; and this is made possible by the use of variable or elastic terms. Equivocation is pre- sumed to be intentional ; but confused, or inadequate ideas, or a style want- ing in lucidity, will often lead to am- biguity. Primarily, Equivocal is an epithet of terms, Ambiguity, of ex- pressions or sentences. When asaying is equally intelligible in two distinct senses, it is equivocal. The relative " who " as referring to more than one possible antecedent is a fruitful source of the equivocal. "The son of John Jones who committed the theft," leaves it equivocal whether the father or the son was the thief. Puns are another — " Tout ce qm porte plume Est cree pour voler." may either express flight as an attri- bute of winged animals, or thie vishness as an attribute of attorneys. It is to be observed, however, that it will fre- quently happen that the same expres- sion may be characterized either as ambiguous or as equivocal . The equi- vocal is always ambiguous, though the ambiguous may owe its ambiguity to otlier causes than the multiform meaning of terms. He who wishes to be ambiguous will resort to equivo- cation as one way of concealing his meaning, and a more available way than the construction of involved sentences, " Taking advantage of a sentence or word that might be amfei^ows or doubtful." — SiK T. Elyot. ♦' The equivocal title of the ' Apostolical * given to the Roman creed."— Wateklaitd. AMEND. Correct. Reform. Emend. Rectify. Of these Amend and Emend are really the same word, emenddre in Latin becoming the Fr. amender. The root is Lat. menda, a fault. In usage, Amend means positively to better, Emend, negatively to remove faults. Emend is more commonly used of literary matters, amend of moral, and of I" reductions of the understandinf;, as a law or an arrangement. 94 "Graunt me, Lord, grace oi amendement." Piers Ploughman. To Correct (Lat. con-lgtrCy part. correctus) is to bring to a conformity with rule, moral, artificial, or scien- tific, by removing- faults ; and, by an extension of meaning, punishing them. In the latter case the correction is, un- happily, no guarantee for the amend- ment. To Reform (Lsit. rtformare) is to correct or amend by a continuous process and with permanent effect. In reference to })ersous it has the sense of to reclaim from wrongness of life ; and to institutions, from inherent cor- ruption, deterioration, or disorganiza- tion. Correction redresses errors and omissions for the purpose of bringing back to an order or to a standard. Amendment is brought about in that which to some extent has been well done. Reform denotes the state of a tljing re-established in its right order or condition. Correction is more in detail. Amendment and Reform more general, extensive. A correction of faults will constitute an amendment of character, which, if completely sustained, will result in an entire re- form. Reform is predicated of such tilings as wear a character and pursue a course of conduct — that is, are asso- ciated with the individual natures or collective proceedings of men. " Under what manner, therefoi-e, should I now submit this book to be corrected and amended of them which can suffer nothing to be well ? "— Tynbal. •• The practical definition of what the popular branch of our legislature was at this day he took to be precisely this : an assembly freely elected, between whom and the mass of the people there was the closest union and the most perfect sympathy. Such a House of Commons it was the purpose of the Constitution originally to erect,and such a House of Commons it was the wish of every Iteformer now to establish." — Pitt, Speech on Parliamentary Keform. " I hardly left a single line in it without giving it what I thought an emendation." —Mason. To Rectify (Lat. recttjlcare) refers to something done, and denotes the adjusting of what is wrong without reference to any continuity of habit. We rectify things only, and wrong things. It belongs to intellectual as well as moral subject-matter; as e.g. to rectify the errors or exaggeration* SYNONYMS [amazement] of a statement; but it has also as cor- rect a bearing ou cases of purely physical adjustment. Between con-ect and rectify there is a great likeness. But we rectify when we make things right, we correct when we make them exact or true. We correct by adjust- ing to an external test, we rectify by putting into normal condition. 1 rec- tify a timepiece when 1 set it in good order for going ; I correct it when I make it indicate the true time. AMAZEMENT. Wonder. Be- wilderment. Amazement is connected by Wedge- wood with the Italian smagare, to dis- courage^ dispirit ; Fr. s'esmaier, to be sad, thoughtful., astonished. Skeat, Etym. Diet, considers Amaze, for- merly amase, to be the A. S. intensive prefix d-, compounded with maze; and thus — tocon/oHj'd utterly. Amaze- ment is a combination of Wonder (A. S. wundrian) and a feeling akin to dismay — a blank, open-mouthed astonishment, affecting the senses and the reasoning faculties. Won- der is more calm and rational. Won- der increases with the exercise of reason and contemplation, amazement oppresses the reason. In wonder the mind may be active and the tongue eloquent ; in amazement one is mute and overborne. Bewi lderment is literally the wild- ness of perplexity. When it is mixed with wonder it is the strongest form of amazement; but it may haveno wonder in it, in which case it is the result of ex- treme perplexity. A man is bewildered by the presentation before his mind of many aifierent objects, having equal claim to choice or preference in judg- ment or in action, by which he is re- duced to a state of perplexed inaction. AMBUSH. Ambuscade. These words are both derivatives from the Low Lat. boscus,a huih,wood, — literally, a personal concealment in a wood or trees. Of old the word was Ambush ; Ambuscade is more recent. The latter is, however, seldom used but as a strategic terra, and is also used of the persons in ambush. 1 1 eiice ambuscade is associated with the legi- timate operations of war; a-nbu.sb [ample] DISCRIMINATED. with a cowardly attack upon enemies or objects of ill design. The wild beast lies in ambush, tlie commander plans an ambuscade. AMIABLE. ESTIMABLK. These adjectives follow tlie distinc- tion of the verbs from which they are derived. Love is produced by the exhibition of such moral qualities as are attractive, esteem hy such as are deserving oi' regard. The Estisiable (Lat. (Bsttmdbtlis) person is higher than the Amiable (Lat. UmabtUs), though not so interesting to ourselves. The latter character is contemplated with affection and pleasure, thefonner with affection and respect. The ami- able disposition is often weak, capable of pleasing, and desirous to please, yet, by this very thing, liable to act unthoughtfully, inconsiderately, un- justly. The estimable disposition may be better relied on. It is tempered by right feeling, and not only kindly or comjdiant feeling. He wlio is merely amiable is wanting in independence of character, and so, being willing to please all, will often disappoint and dissatisfy many. He who is estimable exercises justice in small things, and would avoid all cause of offence, not by seeking merely to please all, but to give all their due. AMICABLE. FuiENDLv. These words are etymologicalr_y equivalent, the Latin 07nicws being the English yr/end (A. S. J'reoud). But Amicable is the more formal word of the two, and so indicates less warmth of feeling personally. Friendly is positive in its force, while Amicable often means no more than the absence of quarrel. And so it often refers to the externals of conduct or to a con- ventional friendship, as in the case of the amicable adjustment of disputes. We are bound in Christian duty to live amicably with all, but it would be, perhaps, impossible to feel friendly towards all in equal degree. Friendly means with the feelings of friends ; Amicable, after the manner of friends. Wher. persons are friendly, their inter- course will be amicable. " Even those that break the peace canuot but praise it, how much more should they bid for it that are true friends to it and to 95 -Bp. that amicableness that attends it ! ' Taylor. " There are several texts in the New Testament which interpret the love of our neighbours to mean universal benevolence or friendliness towards the whole kind, as opportunities may offer." —Watkrland. AMPLE. Spacious. Capacioi'S. These words convey in common the idea of extentor largeness. But Ample (cat. amplus) is always relative to some standard of want or need. Ample is fully enough, as scanty is barely enough. Anything which is moie than sufficient is ample, whether in quantity, number, space, or amount in anyway. It applies, unlike the other two, not only to fixed, but also to vari- able amounts, or to things that can be narrowed or extended ; an ample robe has been made of full measure. " How may I Adore Thee, Author of this Universe, And all this good to roan, for whose well-being So amply and with hands so Mberal Thou hast provided 1 " Milton Spacious expresses what is of super- ficial largeness in reference to human habitation, movement, or occupation. A spacious garden gives plenty of space for recreation. An ample garden is fully sufficient for this and all other purposes of a garden, as to the supply, for instance, of fruit and flowers. Capacious (Lat. cdpacem) is largo in external measurement. In the ample, one has satisfaction, in tlie spa- cious freedom, in the capacious roomi- ness and stowage. Ample is equally applicable to things moral and physi- cal — ample powers, ample ground. Spacious is applicable only to physical extent, except by metaphor; while Capacious belongs in its primary sense to the material, and in the secon- dary to the intellectual. That is ampW which exceeds requirement. That tft spacious which givesnoideaof circum- scription. That is capacious which is not easily overfilled, nor checks the process of depositing or storing. " In that spacious place ships of the greatest burden may ride afloat." — Dam- PIER's Voyages. "No figure is so eapacious as this (the sphere),and consequently whose parts are so well compacted and united, and lie so near o:ie to aiui^er for mutual strenfljth."— li* y 96 AMUSEMENT. Diversion. En- rtRiJiiNMENT. Sport. Recreation. Pastime. A.MUSEMENT ( Fr. amuscry to amuse) is employed to express both the thing that amuses and the state of being amused. An amusement is an employ- ment or occupation which gives ease to the mind whether purposely sought or not. It is continuous action suffi- ciently interesting to prevent a sense of labour and of time, and may or may not have a special object beyond itself. It is a lull of the mind, and a release from mental efforts and serious re- flexions without beinga merely passive state. Amusement implies something to which the attention is given con- tinuously, and on which itmuses. The mere absence of ennui without the positive sensation of pleasure is suffi- cient to constitute amusement, yet there must be a lightness of occupation tending to the side of mirth, though not necessarily exciting it, and cer- tainly not exciting the contrary. Hence it is in one sense a synonym with beguile. " High aboA-e onr heads at the summit of the chff sat a group of mountaineer children amusing themselves with pushing stones from the top and watching as they plunged into the lake."— Gilpin's Tour. Diversion (Lat. dzt;ersione/n., a turn- ing aside) is an amusement viewed relatively to the more serious business of life, from which it is a deviation. As we are amused by having our attention turned to a thing, so we are diverted behaving our attention turned from it. Hence diversion is more Btrongly counteractive than amuse- ment, and implies a higher degree of excitement — such, for in stance, as may- amount to positive merriment. Di- version is a livelier term than amuse- ment. When one is amused, the time passes unmarked ; when one is diverted It passes marked only by lively and agreeable sensations. We are amused by a tale, diverted by a comedy. One does not say that the tragedy diverts, because it is too serious ; nor amuses, because it is too earnest. He must be wellnigh weary of life whom nothing can amuse ; he must be deep in melan- Jialy wliom nothing can divert. One SYNONYMS [amusement] may amuse one's self, one is diverte<] by other things or persons. One may, therefore, be amused in solitude ; one is diverted only in company. It is not well to give way to a fondness for diversions, for it is likely to create an incapacity for quiet amusements, as draughts too strong destroy the relish for those which are weaker, and ex- citing pleasures make common plea- sures tame. Calm, sedentary, and sometimes, unhappily,frivolous,thing6 amuse. It requires something more animated to divert. " They must act as their equals act, they must, like others, dress, keep a table, an equipage, and resort to public diversiotis. It is necessary according to their ideas." — Knox, Essays. Entertainment is a term which has assumed with ourselves a lighter character than belongs to its French original. In Fr. entretien means more sustained conversation. The proceedings of a debating society are more closely allied than anything else to tlie original idea of entertainment. Yet the entertainment with us has so much in common with this that the idea is that of social amusement of a more or less refined character, as a play, a descriptive lecture, a musical performance, and the like. The in- tellect and the taste are sought to be enlisted in entertainment, and those are the most entertaining books which appeal to such capacities of amusement as belong to the refined and educated. Common people prefer diversions, and are incapable of appreciating enter- tainments. " But the kmd hosts their entertainment grace With hearty welcome and an open face ; In all they did you might discern with ease A willing mind and a desire to please." Dryden. Sport (0. Fr. se desporter, to amuse oneself) represents a species of bodily recreation peculiarly adapted to tlie young and agile, and taking place for the most part in the open air. A game may or may not be sedentary, sport never is. But sport belongs to conver- sation as well as action, and sport in that case means playful talk without serious meaning — irony, banter, jest, [ai^alysis] and the like, are in that sense sport. A sport may be defined to be a diversion of the field such as fowling, hunting, fishing'. It differs from game in the further particular that besides being capable of being carried on in soli- tude, it is not governed by rules of conformity. Game, again, is used of mental re- creation, as a game of chess. " In areas varied with mosaic art. Some whirl the disk, and some the javelin dart ; Aside, sequestered from the vast resort Antinous sate spectator of the sport." Pope. Recreation (Lat. recredre, to re- new) is, like diversion, counteractive, but not necessarily so energetic, and comprises all degrees of relaxation, from the most active to the least active of amusements. Still some amount of action is involved, otherwise, it would be repose. It belongs espe- cially to the studiojs, the industrious, and those who are engaged in the responsible duties of office. To such recreation is a relief from past labours and a preparation for resuming them, [t may be an amusement, a diversion, an entertainment, or a sport, and it is commonly sought and taken with a view to its restorative effects. The Pasi I.MK is, as its name denotes, a means of pleasantly passing the lime. It is tlie active amusement which beguiles the leisure hour wliich otherwise might hang tediously. It is a liappy relief to the industrious to find recreation: it is better that for the indolent there should be found a pastime than that he should be left to his own idleness. *' So that of necessity they must either apply their accustomed labours, or else re- create themselves with honest and laudable pastimes."— 'Mork'S Utopia. ANALOGY. Resemblance. Analogy (Gr. avaX'-yia.) is often used familiarly as if it meant no more than moral similarity or resemblance. It is true that the words analogy and likeness might often be used inter- changeably, bnt analogy is not simple likeness. Analogy is a resemblance of relationships. It expresses a fixed f^iiantity. Resemblance may exist in DISCRIMINATED. 97 any degpree ; the resemblance of the whole being striking to our sense and observation in proportion to the number of points in detail which are similar. If two trees are very much alike in lieight, growth, sliape of leaves, and general colour, tliere is no analogy, but a resemblance between them. On the other hand, there is an analogy between the branchps ard a man's arms, so that we sometimes speak of an arm of a tree ; for the re- lation of the branch to the trunk of the tree is like that of tlie arms of a man to the human body. If I argue that because the seed dies in the earth before it springs up anew, therefore it is probable that the human body will rise again after death ; this is as to the idea only a resemblance ; as to the argument, an analogy; the prin- ciple bein^ some community in the ground of the likeness ; as, for instance, that as the same God is tlie Author of a natural and of a spiritual world, He may be expected to act in regard to each upon similar or common laws. " The schoolmen tell us there is an arwi- logy between intellect and sight, for as much as mtellect is to the mind what sight is to the body, and that he who governs the state is analogous to him who steers a ship. Hence a prince is analogically styled a pilot, being to the state what a pilot is in the ves- sel."— Bishop Bekkelev. " To do good is to become most like God. It is that which of all other qualities gives us the resemblance of His Natura and perfection."— Sharp. . ANALYSIS. Resolution. Re- duction. Analysis (avaXwo-jf) is from Gr. avaXvuv, the equivalent of the Lat. rcsoLvere, to resolve. But though in meaning identical, they differ some- what in application. Analysis is a chemical and metaphysical term. We analyze a substance into its comj)onent parts, or a complex notion into its constituent ideas, or a sentence inUi its parts of speech. Resolution means the" same thing, but is also applicable to other processes than those which belong to human intelligence and skill. The action of the elements may resolve a substance into its com- ponent parts, but it does not analyze it. Resolution expresses the fact or 98 process, analysis tlie scientific inten- tion as well. Resolution may be ac- cidental, analysis is conducted with the purpose of cognition. Reductio-v (Lat. rtductionem, a brbiging back) i*. like resolution as being the result either of intelligence or of mechanical operation ; but it means a different thing. As to resolve is to loose or separate, so to reduce is to bring back. A thing resolved is taken to pieces, a thing reduced is taken to another form usually inferior, weaker or more elementary. After resolution there are many parts or particles, differing among themselves. After reduction there is one substance altered in form or condition or aspect. Men may be reduced to tribes, animals or vege- tables to classes, many rules to one comprehensive rule, a number from one denomination to another without altering its value, shillings to pence, stone to powder, a metal from other substances with which it is combined. On the other hand the atmosphere is resolved into oxygen and nitrogen gases, or the idea of amazement into wonder and bewilderment, or the commandments of the decalogue into the duty towards God and that towards our neighbour. If we were to use the term reduced, in this last case we should mean that the nximber ten was reduced to the number two, or ten commandments to two commandments, which is no analysis or resolution of the subject matter. Analysis searches, resolution decomposes, reduction- alters in form. ANIMAL. Brute. Beast. Animal (Lat. Hiiimal) comprehends every creature endowed with that life which is superior to the merely vege- tative life of plants, and therefore in- cludes man. It is sometimes, how- ever, made to express distinctively Dther animals than man. In that case we have to suppose a further distinc- tion drawn between the rational and the irrational animal life. "Animate bodies are either such ns are indued with a vegetative soul as plants, >r a sensitive soul as the bodies of animals, oirds, beasts, fishes, or insects, or a rational joul as the body of man and the vehicles of *ngels if any such there be." — Ray, on Creation SYNONYMS [animal] Brute (Lat. brhtns, irrational) and Bkast (Lat. ftes/m) stand related each in its own way to man. Brute is the animal regarded in reference to the absence of that intelligence which man possesses, Beast (except where the word is used in the sense of cattle) ic. reference to that savage nature of which man is or ought to be devoid. The indolent, senseless, and violent brute ; the cruel, savage, vile or filthy beast. Hence while the term animal is applicable to insects, neither brute nor beast is so, being insusceptible of moral comparison with man. In ap- plying the terms figuratively to the cha- racter and disposition of men, Animal denotes one who follows the instincts and propensities of his lower nature to the neglect of moral restraints and intellectual sympathies; Beast one who grovels in sensuality, Brute one whose nature seems deadened to fine feeling. ""We cannot teach brute animals to nse their eyes in any other way than that in which nature hath taught them." — Reid. " Inspiring dumb And helpless victims with a sense so keen Of injury, with such knowledge of their strength, And such sagacity to take revenge. That oft the beast has seemed to judge the man." COWPKR ANIMATE. Inspire. To Animate (Lat. dnimare) is lite- rally to put life or soul into a thing. To Inspire (Lat. inspirdre, to breathe iiito) is to impart an influence to the nature of another as if by a breath. The difference lies in what is supposed to be communicated. The lower in- fluence is expressed by the word ani- mate, so that the term is applied to the mere imparting of life, or the ap- pearance of life. The soul animates the body, the marble of the sculptor appears animated. The higher, more spiritual, or finer faculties and feelings are said to be imparted by inspiration, as to be inspired with a sublime cou- rage or devotion. Animation quickens the physical and inferior, inspiration the mental, moral, and spiritual im- pulses, as of human nature. So Ani- mate lends itself the more easily to express evil influences ; as to be ani- mated by a spirit of revenge. That [announce] which animates incites to action al- ready begun, accelerates it, and post- pones th'e conclusion of it, giving energy, fire, and warmth. lie has to be animated who is wanting on the score of spirit, who is cold and indif- ferent in action, who requires to be drawn out of apathy, who is to be quickened out ot sluggishness, having a weak will or little earnestness. He who is animated by hope of a reward uses all his faculties more briskly. [le who is inspired with a love of glory will be so enthusiastic as to have little regard for anything but the distinction which is the object of his endeavours. " Wherever we are formed by Nature to any active purpose, the passion which ani- rnates us to it is attended with delight, or a pleasure of some kind." — BuRKE. ANIMATION. Life. Vivacity. Spirit. Ankmatign (see Animate) and Life ( A. S. lif) are employed alike to ex- press the appearance of one actuated by the lively impulses of nature. Life is used both for the possession of the functions oforganic life and the exhibi- tion of them in a demonstrative degree. Vivacity (Lat. v'wdc^itdtem) differs from animation in expressing itself rather by the manner, speech, and movements, while animation may be confined to the countenance. Si-irit (Lat. splritum) stands to action as vivacity stands to movement, and ani- mation to aspect. It is that vivacity which sustains itself in ditliculty or danger, and is accompanied by self- assertion when needed. Animation is in the soul, vivacity in the tempera- ment, spirit in the heart. Animation is subjective, there is a sense in which life is objective. A picture has life when it presents the external character of natural truth. Life in this sense exhibits the facts of life, as animation the feelings of life. Animation is ap- jKirent in the person, life is tlirown into the thing. An exuberance of dninual life and spirits will produce vivacity, which for a time may be en- livening, but afterwards becomes op- pressive. Animation is gentle, spiri- tual, intellectual ; vivacity is animal. A man without vivacity will be a dull DISCRIMINATED. 99 companion. He who speaks or de- claims without animation, probably lacks interest in the subject or the oc- casion. He who is known to be want- ing in spirit, will let slij) tiie oppor- tunities of the enterprizing and be a prey to the selfish and the aggressor. " Heroes, in animated marble, frown. And legislators seem to think in stone." POPB. " They have no notion of life and fire in fancy and words." — Felton. " Their attitudes, their vivacity, their leaps out of the water, their frolics in it, which I have noted a thousand times with equal attention and amusement, all conduce to show their excess of syiirits, and are sim- ply the effects of that excess." — Paley. " With all the warmth of a zealot in the cause of virtue, he (Juvenal) pours his msi- jestic verse, and amid the most spirited in- vective and the finest morality, emits many a luminous irrarliation of poetry beautifully descriptive." — Knox, Essays. ANNOUNCE. Proclaim. Pub- lish. Declare. 'I'hings which are of the nature of intelligence are Announced (Lat. amiuncidre, to announce, proclaim). Facts which are tidings, as well as per- sons, are announced. Announcement often bears reference to something by no means new, but already expected. It implies some degi-ee of formality. An invited guest is announced. A marriage is announced in the news- papers. Announcement may be to many, to few, or to one. It com- monly refers to things just coming or ! just come. The approach of royalty is I sometimes announced by a salvo of I artilleiy. Announcement may be in words, or by signal without words. *'Her (Queen Elizabeth's) arrival was announced through the countiy by a peal of cannon from the ramparts, and a display of fire-works at night." — Gilpin's Tour. PuocLAiM (Lat. prbcldmare) applies only to what is or may become matter of public interest, and is made in the hearing or cognizance of many. We say in the cognizance, because procla- mation may be of writing ; as, tidings, opinions, the movements of gi-eat men or their edicts. As Announce is in its character official, or personal, so Pro- claim is authoritative. A monarch proclaims, a child might announce. As Announce may refer to what is te 100 SYNONYMS [annoy] take place after an interval of time, as j an intended departure may be an- nounced, so Pnoci.AiM and Publish ( Lat. pubiicdre) usually refer to tilings present. In such phrases as to pro- claim or publish an intention the sub- ject is in fact present. There is a close alliance between Publish and Pro- CLAiM, but Publish may belong to any means for putting a matter in the possession oi the public. We proclaim our own acts or intentions, we pub- lish what interests or concerns others to kflow. We announce in order to apprize, as we Declare (Lat. dicla- rare) to remove obscurity, secrecy, or doubt. We publish that all may know. We proclaim that thej may know whose business or duty it is to know. We announce that they may know who are interested in hearing. When we declare we do not desire so much a wide publicity for what we say, as a distinct understanding. It is spoken out clearly and unreservedly, because we wish it to be well known, understood, and believed. A lover declares his i)assion. A suitor his in- tentions. A criminal his accomplices. Proclamation is authoritative, but short-lived, publication. " Now had the Great P>-oclaimer with a voice More awfnl than the sountl of trumpet cried Repentance, and Heaven's kingdom nigh at hand To all baptized." Milton. " For the instruction, therefore, of all BortB of men to eternal life, it is necessary that the sacred and saving truth of God be openly published unto them, which open publication of heavenly mysteries is by an excellency termed preaching."— HoOKER. " But the attorney answered them that he is not the Declarer of his intentions ; he must be judged by the book, by his words, above all by the effect."— 6Yafe Trials. ANNOY. Molest. Tease. Ag- grieve. Persecute. Annoy is from the O. Fr. anoier, the modern Fr. ennyer (Lat. in odio esse, to be an object of dislike). Molest (Lat. m'6lestare). Tease (A. S. tccsan, to pluck, to tease). That which offends annoys by its presence. Annoyance is the action of the hateful or offensive, POt of the positively painful. To be subjected to what we dislike is the etymological force of annoyance. It may be mental or physical, a re- petition of discordant sounds, a glare of light, the misconduct of a friend. As annoyance depends upon our own feelings or circum- stances, more than in the inherent nature of things, it will often happen that what may be an annoyance to us is not so to others, or to our- selves at some other time. Inapti- tude of times and seasons, disregard of measure and propriety in things may lead to annoyance. We may even be annoyed with ourselves. Molest is physical, and comes only from without. It denotes an active though temporary trouble. That which annoys us is distasteful. That which molests us is oppressive, bur- densome ; it disturbs the order of our being and action. It is like the per- petual sense of a foreign body brought into contact with us. It is difficult to bear. We may sometimes reason our- selves out of annoyance, but molesta- tion is too obtrusive to be so disposed of. The sense of molestation is otten pro- duced by the repetition of causes of an- noyance. One is molested by insults, by begging applications, by the visits of a fly or a wasp. We are not mo- lested by facts or circumstances in themselves, or by what we hear or is reported to us; but by that which galls, fetigues, or haunts us by unwelcome repetition. We feel especially molested in some course which is interrupted, or some state disturbed, or some occu- pation obti'uded upon; as sleep may be molested by unpleasant dreams, oi study by distracting noises. "Savewhere from yonder ivy-mantled towe* The moping owl doth to the moon com plain Of such as wandering near her secre bower Molest her ancient solitary reign," Gray. W^e are teased by unpleasant ti-ifles which by their recun-ence cause iiri- tation of mind. Teasing is a lighter foi-m of molesting. We are molested by the importunities of men, teased by those of children. " Bat as a whelp starts up with fear When a bee's hamming in his ear ; [answer] DISCRIMINATED. m With upper lip elate he grins As round the little teazer spins." Fejctox. Aggrieve (nearly the same as ag- gnivate, Lat. aggvKvttre, to biirdeiiy ainiou) Jjoints to an uneasy sense of injurious treatment. He is aggrieved who is wounded in his pride, his liberty, his sense of fairness; as by insult, oppression, extortion. We are aggrieved when we are not dealt with as we think we ought to he. Annoy- ance aggrieves when we reflect upon it as personal, uncalled-for, or incon- siderate, 'i'he aggrieved person con- siders that he has cause to complain that he has not been taken into due account, or that he has been the ob- ject of wrong. " Aggrieved by oppression and extor- tion."— Macaulay. To Persecute (Lat. perscqui, part. persccntus) is persistently to ag- grieve, to follow up with injury or annoyance, to afilict on purpose, and through dislike or hatred, to punish by harassing inflictions. One may fancy one's self aggrieved by mis- understanding the motives and con- duct of another, but there can be no mistake about persecution, which is always intentional on the part of the persecutor. Persecution is such in- tormal punishment as individuals take upon themselves to administer. Hav- ing no legal or public sanction it can- not inflict as it desires the penalty of displeasure in full. It is therefore induced to fall back upon such instal- ments of it as opportunities allow, or as can be inflicted with impunity to the persecuted. Persecution attests the weakness of the person or the cause which has recourse to it. It proves an inability to conciliate or to con- vince, and often when the immediate cause has passed away, it is the resort of petty vindictiveness and retributive malice. " Persecution produces no sincere con- viction, nor any real change of opinion ; rm the contrary, it vitiates the public roorals by di-iving men to prevarication, iud lotnmouly ends in a general though secret infidelity by imposing, under the a&me of revealed religion, systems of doc- trine which men cannot believe, and dare uot exaniiue ; finally, it disgraces the cha- racter, and wounds the reputation of Chr'^ tianity itself by making it the author of op- pression, cruelty, and bloodshed."— Paley. AxXOMALOUS. Irregular. That is Irregular (Lat. in, 7iot, and rigula, a rule) which is a devia- tion fi-om the common rule. That 13 Anomalous (Gr. avrw^uaXo?, a.-,not, and ojotftXo?, even) which is out of the com- mon run of things. That which is in-egular is an exception to rule, that which is anomalous is not reducible to rule. That which is ii'regular is a depaiture from a course or process, that which is anomalous stands alone, being unlike the tenour of one's obser- vation or experience. Hence a soli- tary or rare exception to a rule becomes an anomaly, ANSWER. Reply. Rejoinder. Response. The general idea common to these terms is that of words given in required return for words. An Answer (A. S. ayidswarian, or'ig. to sivear in opposition to, to respond) is given as being speci- fically demanded. So an answer fol- lows a question as the supply upon the demand ; and in a debate an an- swer to a speech meets certain points, according to preconcerted understand- ing and arrangement. To the answer in the latter case the term Reply (Fr. repliqner, Lat. rep[icare, to fold back, to make a reply) would be applicable. A reply is a formal answer to an ar- gumentative assertion which is far ihore than a question or interrogation. It commonly implies a statement to the contrary of that to which it replies. An answer may be simply commensu- rate with the tenns of an interroga- tion. A reply goes beyond them, and does not necessarily suppose interro- gation at all. An answer is asked, a reply may be volunteered without being asked, and to the surprise of the speaker. So we may reply to a remonstrance, a reprimand, or objur- gation. A reply is an answer offered or demanded or expected, or the con- trary, and extending beyond mere affinnation or negation. " When a man asks me a question,! have it in my power to answer or be silent, to answer softly or roughly in terms of re- spect, or m terms of contempt." — BeatI'LB. nn: STNONYMS [antic " The plaintiff may plead again, and reply to the defendant's plea. The plaintiff in his replication may totally reverse the plea."— Blacksxone. Rejoinder expresses not, as Reply does, a formal and lengthened coun- ter-statement, but one -within a sliort compass and of a pointed character. It follows upon a i-emark directly or indirectly personal, and is dictated by a desire to give the speaker something as good as he brings, to place him upon the same level as that to which he would reduce the other. The term bears the technical meaning of a re- ply upon a reply. "Rejoinder to the churl the king disdained. But shook his head and rising wrath re- strained." Pope. Response CLat.rlspotisum) is some- times only a more learned word for Answeu. But it has also a character of its own in which it differs from Re- joiNDEK in being not an antagonistic but an accordant answer. It extends beyond words to acts and feelings, which are in accordance with those of another. The responses of a liturgy are framed in harmonious correspon- dence, tlie prayers of the people echoing back as it were the sentiments of the priest in prayer. An intelli- gent and feeling remark will often find a response in tlie heart or mind of another. " Tertnllian takes notice that the re- sponses in Baptism were then somewhat larger than the model laid down by Christ, meaning than the form of Baptism, and h*e refers the enlargement of the respojises to immemorial custom or ti-adition." — W atek- XAND. ANTIC. Gesticulation. An Antic (Fi". antique, Lat. aiit'i- quxis, ancient) is literally an antic juated grotesque movement of the w hole body or such a posture of it. Gesticula- tion (^hiit. gesticaUtiibnem) is a move- ment of the whole body or limbs, whetlier accompanied by speech or not, of which the purpose is to ex- press some meaning, to indicate some sentiment, or to signify some direction to another. Ihe gesticulation has its characteristic in illustrating or enforc- ing a meaning ; the antic is often the most striking when it is meaningless, gratuitous, or insubordinate. A for- mal and demonstrative act, of which the value or significance bears no pro- portion to the main action or purpose, is called in the language of critical satire, an antic. Gesticulations at the point when they are excessive, so that the manner outstrips the matter, be- come antics. Gesticulations may be connected with the most tragical or the most ludicrous subjects; antics are never serious, though they may be farcically solemn. APARTMENT. Room. Cham- beu. Apartment (Fr. a part, i.e. Lat. ad partem, apart) meant originally, not a chamber, but a portion of a house, a suite of rooms set aside for a pai-ticular purpose ; as it were a com- partment of a house; it came sub- sequently to be apj)lied to a single chamber. Chamber (Fr. chambre^ Lat. cdnii'u ) is a vaulted space, a place with an arched roof. Room is the A. S. rum, space, in the sense in which we say " there is room enough : " hence, space set apart in a house, and enclosed in walls. Hence the charac- teristic idea of apartments is variety of chamber compactness, that of room, accommodation. Apartments should be elegant and sufficiently numerous. A room spacious, com* modious, well proportioned. A cham- ber neat, snug, private. APOCRYPHAL. Supposititious. That which is Apocuypual (Gr. amv.fv3 It may be observed that the term apocryphal is restricted to matters of statement, and especially literary pro- ductions supported by dubious evi- dence, while supposition is extended generally to wlmt is put forward as true, being counterfeit ; as a sup- posititious child. APOLOGY. Defence. Justifi- cation. Excuse. Plea. An Apology (Gr. aTTokoyUc) had originally the simple meaning of de- fence, as Bishop Jewel's "Apology for the Church of England." As such it vs'ears a literary air. In such cases it supposes the charge of imperfection, but not necessarily the recognition of it. As at present employed, the word means something said by way of amends, and so becomes practically the contrary to a defence, and an ad- mission of some wrong or impropriety- said or done, or some omission of wh ich the speaker acknowledges himself guilty. It is dictated by a eense of social j ustice or of deference. He who apologises defends himself by acknow- ledging himself in the wrong. •• For in the Book that is called mine apology it is not required by the nature of that name that it be any answer or defence for mine own self at all ; but it suf- ficeth that it be of mine own making an answer or defence for some other." — Sir T. More. It will be seen that Defence (Lat. dcfendhey to dej'ind) and Justifica- tion (hsLt. jusCi/icationem), although the same as Apology in one of its senses, are its opposite in another; namely, in the fact that they do not al- together admit wrong committed. Yet justification is a stronger term than defence. The apology in the case of an accused personishis defence, which may or may not be complete, while his justification is a proof of more than innocence, namely, that he did right in what he did. Justification is the object of apology, and apology the effort at justification. Like defence, apology presu})poses charge or attack, whilejustification may be volunteered. We apolo";ise to another or to others. We justify or defend what we our- »elve8 have done, and sometimes what we advance as a claim. We defend ourselves by either admitting or deny- ing that we have so acted as alleged. Wejustif}- ourselves by first conceding the fact, and then defending the rights of it. Where the defence admits the allegation, it does not extend beyond a palliation of the charge, or a demon- stration of its allowableness. It is possible that a justification may go no farther. On the other haud,'it may prove jiositively a high degree of truth and right. Defence is a more formal word than justification. It may be against proceedings in courts of law, or in answer to some public challenge. Nor is it confined to acts, but is ap- plicable to the vindication of opinions. Justification is lees formal. It is of acts and conduct, and is made in the }>resence of any with whom we may wish to set ourselves right. The grounds of justification are indefinite, and would depend, for their force, on the character and views of those before whom the justification was made. A technical defence may be successful, yet fall short of a moral justifica- tion. Excuse (Lat. excusare, to free from blame) is a weaker term than defence and justification, and is applicable to matters of less gravity. Serious of- fences may be defended or even justi- fied; in which case the argument would go to show that they were only appa- rent, not real offences : but they are never excused. An excuse admits the fact charged or the thing done, but endeavours to show that it ought to be leniently dealt with, on the ground of extenuating circumstances, and is often the line adopted by plea- ders when justification seems impossi- ble. It is then tantamount to a weak defence. An excuse may be against an obligation as well as a charge, as when an invitation is met with an ex- cuse. In such cases excuse refers not to something done, but omitted to be done. It depends for its validity less on its intrinsic force, than on the dis- position of those to whom it is made. It commonly carries an unfavourable reflexion, and a good excuse is most probably only apt, clever, and inge- nious. The person who employs tho ^liW: •':.;'•■■; ; 'synonyms excuse, is said to excuse himself, while he who accepts the excuse, is also said to excuse him. " And there are few actions so ill, unless they are of a very deep and black tincture indeed, but will admit of some extenur-tion at least from these common topics of human frailty, guch as are ignorance or inadver- tency, passion or surprise, company or solici- tation, with many other such things which may go a great way towards an excusing of the agent, though they cannot absolutely lustify the action." — SoUTH. A Plea (¥r.plai(},'Lat.pllicttnm, ati ordinance) is a specific point of self- defence. It is as it were an item in the general sense of a defence, so that we may put in successively one plea, and then another. Technically speak- ing, the allegation of the plaintiff is answered by the plea of the defendant. An apology is satisfactory or unsatis- factory, a defence is successful or un- successful, justification is complete or partial, an excuse valid or invalid, a plea strong or weak. " Defence in its true legal sense signifies not a justification, protection, or guard, which is now its pojjular signification, but merely an opposing or denial (ft-om the French verb defeitdre) of the truth or vali- dity of the complaint." — Blacksxone. "They towards the throne supreme Accountable made haste to make appear With righteous plea their utmost vigilance And easily approved." Milton. APPARATUS. Parapheunalia. These stand related as the useful to tne ornamental. Appahatus (Lat. 'jppltrdre, to adjust) is the aggregate of implements of art, or ])hysical organs necessary to form some ]>roduction or promote some natural function. Para- pij ERNALiA is a L.L.adjective, the sub- stantive bo7ia, i.e. gooi'h, being under- stood. The paraphernalia were such goods as a wife possessed beyond her dowry, and were her own propei'ty independently of her husband : Trapd, beyoudy and