Ai a 1 o o 1 i 3! 8! 7! 1 ! The ^nglishinan f s Letters Rel- ative to the Trade Between Great II Britain and the '\ast-Indies UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE ENGLISHMAN'S LETTERS RELATIVE TO THE TRADE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE EAST-INDIES. IN WHICH THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY, AND THE RIGHTS OF THE PRIVATE MERCHANTS, UNDER THE ACT QF 1793, ARE DISCUSSED. LON'DON: D BY J. WRIGHT, DFNM A RK-CO U RT, STRAND, AND SOI, D BY J. STOCKDALE, I'lCC ADILLY. 1802. V } Ap-7*. 13(33- EAST INDIA PRIVATE TRADE. \ - 1%. LETTER I. To the Proprietors of East India Stock. IT is not likely that you should be inattentive, either , to the critical situation of your affairs at this important time, or to the conduct of your Court of Directors in their management of them. There is, however* an inactivity in a body constituted as ours is (for I am alfo a Proprietor of India Stock) which requires to be ilimulated occasionally ; or else there is an overweening confidence in our Directors that it is equally necessary to guard against. I shall therefore dedicate a few obser- vations to you, from time to time, in hopes that they may be found not altogether unworthy of your notice. It is a difficult, as well as a delicate point, to adjust precisely the balance of interference between the con- stituent and the constituted body 3 if it preponderate with the former, it may lead to tumult and confusion ; if with the latter, it is apt to degenerate into contempt of authority, and impatience of control. I think it may be safely asserted, and will be generally assented to, that of late the Proprietors have been the ascending scale ; that a sort of complaisant confidence has been placed in the Directors, which, in addition to their political and patronal consequence, has given them greater weight than is either requisite or proper. The time ha* has been, and that not long ago, when the influence of the Proprietors was much greater than it is at present j and it is much to their credit to aver/ that it has never been exerted but on important occasions, and always with great benefit to their affairs. If the doctrine of confi- O dence, which has been of late strenuously supported, had been adopted in the case of shipping, we should have had a hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year more at least to pay for freight than we have at pre- sent j if it had been adopted in the case of recruits, we should have had to pay for the establishment of a depot in the Isle of Wight, of many thousand pounds a year j if it had been implicitly adopted in the case of increasing our capital, we should have had two millions added to our stock, for no other purpose than to please the Directors, who wanted to please the Minister ; and the same influence, if it had not been wisely checked, would have induced this Company, in the year 1796, to have volunteered an advance of two millions to Go- vernment, without interest, for the whole term of our Charter j and which we now find we have so much oc- casion for in the course of our own affairs. With these instances fresh in our memory, and many others which might be adduced, I hope we shall not, from a false delicacy, trust implicitly to our Directors in the business of Private Trade, which is now in discussion, and agitates- and heats the minds of all who attack or defend it. I am aware that it is a popular ground for the Directors to take, and they, too, are aware of their advantage. They have already boasted of their independent principles, and of their pure integrity in their support of the Company's Chartered Rights ; and they ( 3 ) they have even accused their opponents of base in- gratitude to that Company, by whose bounty they have been fed. Accusation is neither the best mode of sup- porting an argument, nor the bestproof of the truth of it; on the contrary, it is a symptom of weakness, rather than of strength, and implies a design in the person who has recourse to it, to engage the passions, because he despairs of convincing the understanding. But whoever intends to wield this weapon would do well to consider that it is a two-edged sword, and cuts both ways. In answer to the accusation, which has been made in the spirit of party, and not of truth, it is a sufficient re- futation of it to observe, that the Company's Chartered Rights are neither infringed nor endangered ; that if a general and national benefit can be proved to be ob- structed by partial privileges, those privileges must give way, and that those who are, or have been, servants of the Company, consult the interest of that Company better by endeavouring to remove the shackles of Private Trade, than those who wish to impose them ; that, therefore, if there be any ingratitude in taking a part in this important question, the crime of it is as charge- able on those who wish to suppress, as on those who wish to support the Private Trade ; for the imputation, if it means any thing but an outcry, means that it is injurious to the Company to encourage this trade ; on the other hand, those who engage in its support contend, that it is a benefit both to the Company and the nation. Since, however, some of the Directors in Parlia- ment have thought it would aid their cause to boast of their motives, and the disinterestedness of their actions, and to impeach the conduct of their opponents, they B 2 could ( 4 ) eould not complain, if it provoked an inquiry into the validity of their vaunted claim. But it is not my in- tention to imitate an example I disapprove, or to change the argument and divert the mind from prin- ciples to persons. My plan, in the letters which I shall take the liberty of addressing to you in future, is to inquire dispassion- ately into the nature of the Private Trade ; to trace it from its origin to the present time j to consider its con- sequences both in India and England ; to examine whe- ther the regulations and restraints which the Court of Directors formed and imposed upon it, from time to time, were wise and necessary, or injudicious and im- politic ; to take a view of the situation of the trade of foreign nations, and to investigate the rights, and privi- leges, and interest of our own Company. In a word, I mean to enter into so full a discussion of this subject of Private Trade, as shall bring the whole of it fairly be- fore you, and enable you, if my ability (with the as- sistance of my friends) prove equal to my intention, to judge of its good or ill effects on your affairs, and whe- ther you should join with your Directors in suppressing it, or comply with the petition of the merchants in en- couraging it on a wise and liberal scale. AN ENGLISHMAN Jw/< y. 1802. LETTER LETTER II. To the Proprietors of East India Stock. ijEFORE I enter upon the subject of this day's ad- dress, I beg to be indulged with a few words more on the doctrine of confidence. It is only to lay before you what pafied at the General Court on the 28th of May laft, relative to the unanimity of the Directors on that occasion, and to leave it to your own reflection whether that will increase your confidence in the executive body. At that meeting the Directors in general seemed im- pressed with the idea, that the declaration of their una- nimity was to act as magic on the Court, and to silence all opposition : one honourable Director said, " it was . the Dutch, the French, and the English ; and the agents of these factories purchased from the native merchants the various sorts of articles which were required for the European markets. When this trade was first established, after the dis- covery of the passage of the Cape of Good Hope, it was carried on by companies of different European na- tions, not because monopoly ever was considered the most favourable mode of commerce, but on account of the danger, risk, and expcnce, which attended the trade at those early periods, and which were more than pri- vate individuals could incur, or durst venture. At one time two companies were formed in England, which afterwards became united, and were granted the exclu- sive privilege of trading to India. The trade of that country lay open, as has been ob- served, to the merchants of every nation, whether they came by sea or land, and the native merchant or manu- facturer was at free liberty to sell his goods to whom he pleased. Thus the competition of purchasers in India encouraged its manufactures and agriculture, and in- creased the stock of wealth in the country to so prodi- gious a degree, that when the English Company became 'the sovereigns of it, they thought it an inexhaustible mine, and ordered, in the year 1768 (vide General Letter, iitb January, 1768,) 500,000!. to be sent home in specie ; and, after remitting supplies to China and their other settlements, to reserve a million in the treasury at Bengal. But, alas! those wise Directors ^~ were soon wakened from this golden dream, as we shall see hereafter. 64 In ( 8 ) In the year 1765, the grant of the Dew finny was made to the Company, and they became, in fact, from that rime, the sovereign of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa ; and here I beg to mark the era when their change of situation should have made a change of councils. So- vereign and merchant are two distinct characters, which in my humble opinion have never been thoroughly un- derstood by the Court of Directors, or at least they have never acted as if they had sufficiently discriminated them. Before they were possessed of the Dewanny, and whilst they acted like all other merchants in India, they provided their investments for Europe by means of specie, and the produce of some few articles which were sent from England, and by money advanced to them by their servants in India, and free merchants, the pro-r duce of their industry, for which they gave them bills of exchange at 2s. 6d. the current rupee, payable in England. The Company granted these bills for two substantial reasons, both useful to themselves : first, to supply their own deficiency of means to provide their investment ; and secondly, to prevent this money going x into the hands of foreign companies. This is a very remarkable circumstance, and should be particularly noticed; for to this source may be traced the origin of what was denounced Clandestine Trade ; and has been since changed into Private Trade. The ser- vants of the company, civil and military, and the free merchants, had no means of remitting the fortunes they had acquired, and reaping the fruits of their in- dustry, but through the Company's treasury, or that of some foreign company ; and if they had been denied both those means, they must have remained in India all their ( 9 ) their lives in possession of fortunes they could neither enjoy themselves, nor bequeath to their friends in Eng- land. Such a state of banishment no masters had a right to impose after their servants had entered their service without its forming a condition of it ; and if they were to commit such an aft of injustice, they must be aware it would be evaded. The fact proved to be so with the English East India Company ; their Directors did commit this aft of injustice ; it was evaded by every servant they ever had ; they knew it, they were implored to redress the injury, and they promised to do it, but they never did ; many of those very servants became Directors, joined in the same measures, and I believe I should not go too far if I were to add that some at this very day are reprobating what they themselves from necessity had practised. No sooner had the Company become possessed of the Dewanny, than they directed that no bills of exchange V should be granted, or money received for certificates, unless in cases of absolute exigency, and that the rate of exchange should be lowered to 2s. jd. and 2s. id. the V current rupee (vide General Later, ijtb May, 1766,) and in January 1768, they ordered the surplus reve- nue to be employed in providing their investment, but they said, received from the English for re- mittance enabled the foreign nations to purchase goods for their investments, and prevented their sending spe- cie from Europe to that amount. This, as I have be- fore stated, constituted what the Directors call Clan- deftine Trade ; and what people in England, from not knowing the nature of it, conceived to be a trade pur- loined, as it were, from the Company's investment, and smuggled into Europe, to the detriment of their exclu- sive privileges ; but it will be seen, from this description of it, and the fact is, it only enabled foreigners to purchase those articles in India, to which they had, and still have, the same right as the English Company, namely, the right of a Firmaun, with a British capital furnished on the spot, instead of foreigners sending so much specie from Europe. As far as it tended to en- courage the manufactures in India it was of service to the Company in the character of Sovereigns, by af- fording their subjc&s the means of paying the revenue ; and in fact it did them no harm as merchants, for the demand of the markets in Europe was great enough to take off all the goods which were imported from India by all the European Companies, The principal injury it it did them was, the preventing of so much specie coming into India j this they either did not know, or did not regard, for all their ideas were engrossed about increase of investment. But be the effect what it might, they owed it all to their own impolicy and in- justice j and if they had understood their true interest at that time a whit better than they do at this, they might, in their collective wisdom, then have devised means for remitting those private fortunes through their own cash ; by so doing they would have increased the productive labour of their subjects in India, pre- vented foreigners from benefitting by thofe remittances, and forced them to fend specie to India, of which the Directors were at this time draining it through every floodgate they could open. Let us now consider the effects of this trade in India and Europe. It is plain that the employment of the inhabitants of any country is its true source of wealth j and in India, it has been shewn, that from its commerce alone it derived its superabundant riches ; the Direc- tors, therefore, ought to have turned all their thoughts- to the encouragement of it, and they were continually urged to do so by the representations of their servants on the spot. Every feasible plan that could have been devised for removing all restraints on trade should have been listened to ; and, as they were told by Governor Verelst, such regulations should have been made, " as ;t would leave the fair, industrious merchant at full li- *' berty, and in the undisturbed enjoyment of that free- " dom which is the support and life of commerce in " every country, but more particularly essential in this, c< as its commerce from the most accurate calculations is a " clear ( 15 ) " clear and intrinsic gain to it, to the whole amount of its " annual exports." (Verelst's Minutes Sel. Com. i ith August, 1796.) If such would be the effects of the encouragement of trade in India, let us look at them in Europe. The avidity with which the commodities of India have been sought after from time immemorial by all other nations induced different States of Europe to establish companies to purchase and bring them from that coun- try to their own ; and it is not saying too much to af- firm, that the English Company would have found a market for all the goods they could have purchased by the joint produce of their surplus revenue and the mo- ney of individuals ; for their own sales were never hurt by the imports of foreign Companies, who had re- ceived the aid of those remittances which the Company had rejected. If, then, there be a demand in the mar- kets of Europe, for all the goods which can be sent from India, whether by the Company or individuals, it is evidently the interest of the Company to permit indi- viduals to provide such goods, and send them to Eng- land. As sovereigns of India, it is a self-evident propo- sition. As merchants here, it does not hurt them; and the benefit to the nation is as demonstrable as that the increase of commerce is an increase of wealth. AN ENGLISHMAN. Lundon, Jan, 20, 1802- LETTER ( 16 ) LETTER IV. To the Proprietors of East India Stock. IN a former letter I have endeavoured to explain the origin of what was called Clandestine Trade, and is now known by the name of Private Trade j but lest 1 should not have been sufficiently explicit, and as it is essential to the right understanding of any argument to define the terms of it, I will recur to the subject, and treat of it a little more at large. In this discussion truth is my only object, and I have no other view than to bring it before you, as far as lies in my power, un- disguised, and to prevent your being misled by names to which ideas are associated different from their real import. I have already set forth the causes which induced the Court of Directors to prohibit the receipt of money into their treasury from individuals, either for certifi- cates or bills of exchange ; and I have shewed, that by this prohibition they deprived their servants, both civil and military, and free merchants, cf the cus- tomary means of remitting their fortunes to England. The treasuries of other companies, and individuals, as I have before observed, lay open to them ; and in the alternative to which the Company's orders had un- justly reduced their servants, they had recourse to fo- reigners for the remittance of their fortunes which had been, otherwise, useless to them, unless they remained in India all their lives. This recourse was generally had through houses of agency at Calcutta, and those houses made their agreements with foreign merchants in ( 17 ) in various forms which mercantile experience dictated aj the safest or most beneficial. For these reasons it was called by the Court of Directors, and not unjustly, a Clandestine Trade j not because the goods were either clandestinely procured in India to their detriment, for the foreign companies had an equal right with them to any articles of India produce or manufacture, nor be- cause the goods were clandestinely brought into Eng- land (for what we have to lament is, that they never came here), but because part of those goods was pro- vided by an English capital, v/hich their own impolitic measures had forced into a foreign channel. This capital, of course, increased as the numbers of individuals, and their means to make money, increased ; and the Court of Directors have always been eager to complain, but slow to redress the grievance. Their own exigencies have been the sole cause of their open- ing their treasury for the remittance of private fortunes ; for when, in process of time (and that a very short \/ one) they found their revenues inadequate to their multiplied expences, and that it was impossible to de- fray them and provide an investment too for Europe, they borrowed money for this purpose, and thus were obliged again to open that channel of remittance which they had unjustly shut. In the further progress of changes v/hich, from the varying circumstances of time took place in India and the Company's affairs, it was found there were many articles of trade in which the Company did not deal that afforded means of com- * merce to the free merchants who were settled there, and might be transported to England with great ad- vantage to both countries. These articles, which may C properly ( 18 ) properly be called the surplus produce of India, were what the merchants there dealt in, and constitutes what is now called the Private Trade. The jealousy of the Company about the monopoly, and those mercantile habits which, Adam Smith ob- serves, draw men almost necessarily, though perhaps insensibly, to prefer the narrower principles of exclusive trade to the more liberal policy of an extended com- merce, prevented the Court of Directors from adopting such measures as this policy would have dictated j and instead of considering in what manner this trade might be encouraged, and brought into the Port of London, they regarded it with apprehension as a rival to their exclusive privileges, and from this fear forced it into fo- reign conveyances. The Legislature, however, viewed this trade in a different light, and saw that it was not only beneficial to India, where it augmented the pro- ductive labour, and of course the revenue of that coun- try, but that it would be highly advantageous to this, by the duties it must pay, by the additional industry it must create, and by making London the mart of its sale instead of foreign parrs. On this principle Government wisely acted in 1793, when they renewed the charter of the Company ; and by the Act of Parliament which was then passed, the Legislature changed the state of the exclusive privileges which had been originally granted to the Company. This act conferred on private merchants the right, not only of exporting goods from England to India to a certain amount, but also the right of importing Indian commodities to England. Fiom the spirit in which this right was conceded, and from the words in which it is expressed ( 19 ) expressed, it appears evidently to have been the inten- tion of the Legislature to give every reasonable facility to a trade which they justly conceived must be so bene- ficial to India and England, and which they as justly imagined might be so conducted as to put an end to all those complaints and bickerings which were for ever inflaming the counsels of the Directors, and, by depriv- in foreigners of the aid of a British capital, force them to employ their own. This was the plan devised with wisdom for the destruction of clandestine trade, in which it promises to be completely successful, and to afford most important advantages to the Company and British India, if the false alarms of the Directors are not per- mitted to over-rule the judgment of Parliament. On this single hinge turns the whole dispute between the Directors and the Private Merchants. The Mer- chants contend that instead of all that facility being granted to their trade, by which alone they could enjoy the rights that had been granted to them, the Directors had thrown insuperable obstacles in their way. The Directors, on the other hand, acknowledge in some degree the justness of these complaints, but rest their vin- dication of what is past on those circumstances of the war, which they could neither prevent nor control. Jn regard to the future, they assert that the facilities which the Merchants demand for carrying on this trade are full of danger to their Chartered Rights, and lead in their effects to Colonization, and ultimately to the annihilation of the Company. These are such exagge- rated fears, that they scarcely merit a serious answer; they have, however, been very ably answered and fully refuted ; and i: now remains to be proved, whether the C narrow ( 20 ) narrow policy of the Court of Directors, or the enlarged and enlightened principle of the Legislature, lhall pre- vail. If it mould, unhappily, be the former, it will have a most pernicious effect in India, and it is not within the compass of my understanding to con- ceive how the Company are to employ the ma- nufacturers and realise their revenues, for they cer- tainly have not the means, at present, of procuring any considerable investment for themselves, nor is it likely they should have for some years to come. If, therefore, a necessity on their parts prevent their pro- curing an investment of any considerable amount, and a mistaken policy prohibit other persons employing the manufacturers of India, what is to become of that country ? In my poor opinion, to overlook all the im- mediate evils that must ensue, and to see only the danger of colonization and revolution, is like looking at a prospect through the reversed end of a telescope ; you may imagine, that you have placed the object at a greater distance, but it is as near to you as ever all the effect of this incongruous conduct will be, to make it more difficult to apply a remedy to an instant and dangerous complaint. AN ENGLISHMAN London. Jan. 23. 1SOC. LETTER LETTER V. To the Proprietors of East India Stock. IT appears to be necessary to examine, without fur- ther delay, into the Origin of the ELEVEN PROPOSI- v TIONS relative to Private Trade (styled a BASIS only, by the Chancellor of His Majesty's Exchequer) and the disposition with which the Directors appear to have offered them in place of the Resolutions annexed to their Report. You will recollect, that at the General Court, on the 28th May, the Report and Resolutions V were approved almost by acclamation ; that argument was said to be exhausted, and conviction so manifest and decided, as to leave nothing further to be done, but to act without delay upon the principles those Re- solutions detailed. Yet when that Report came to be v considered by the Board of Commissioners with the in- structions which Mr. Charles Grant had prepared to accompany it to India, it was found that the opinions of the Court of Directors were not opposed only by discontented, interested, and" ungrateful servants, but that men in the highest offices of the State, and distin- guished characters in Parliament, entertained the same sentiments, and differed as widely from the conclusions so hastily adopted in Leadenhall-street. The best proof ^ of this is, that no orders on the subject have at this distant day (ayth January, 1802) received the sanction ^ of Government to be transmitted to India. Was the General Court right then in rejecting all further ad- vice ? I trust that, in candour, the most ardent at that meeting, will now acknowledge that the proposition of C 3 their their opponents was not so totally destitute of common sense and discretion. Another circumstance which oc- curred at that time is well -'deserving your attention, and tha: is the anxiety the Directors affected to feel for the dignity of the Proprietors in their circular letter of the rst of June. Had that feeling positively existed, would it have been possible that they should have de- signedly left you totally in ignorance from that day to this, in respect to the state of this important question ? If such a marked neglect does not satisfy you in what degree of respect you really stand with these gentlemen who profess to hold their offices by your favour, there is an influence operating which has not the Constitution of this Company for its guide, or there is an infatuation prevailing equally inimical to it. Had they acted as most accountable agents would have done, I should not have to depend upon other public channels to enable me to state that after long negotiation, after repeated ef- forts, and after finding the Board of Commissioners not to be moved from their opinion ; (