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 STUDY ON 
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE CALIBER, MOBILE 
 
 ARTILLERY, AND MACHINE GUNS IN THE 
 
 PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR 
 
 
 PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS 
 
 AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY 
 
 POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES 
 
 WCD 9239-1 
 
 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON 
 NOVEMBER, 1915 
 
 509 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 
 1916 
 
♦•••••• • 
 
 • . • ./ . . . 
 
 • • • •• •   
 
 • .   . • 
 
 /::.:•;•:: : •.^ 
 
 • » .   
 
 
 War Department, 
 
 Document No. 509. 
 
 Office of the Chief of Staff. 
 
 r 
 
STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE CALIBER 
 MOBILE ARTILLERY AND MACHINE GUNS IN THE 
 PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR. 
 
 1. ARTILLERY. 
 
 At the outbreak of the present Phu-opean war two schools of 
 artillery thought had gradually developed among the European 
 nations. One school, fostered by the French, believed in the low- 
 power, rapid-fire field gun of about 3-inch caliber, and contended 
 that with a reasonable supply of ammunition it was possible to 
 render heavy field or siege artillery jDowerless with such a gun; the 
 second school, headed by the Germans, although believing in the 
 low-power, small-caliber, rapid-fire fieldpiece, believed that they 
 must be reenforced by a considerable number of heavier howitzers 
 or field guns, which were to be used to combat the ordinary field- 
 pieces as well as such entrenchments as could be constructed by 
 armies in the field and for long-range firing when necessary. 
 
 In general, Germany and Austria were the only European coun- 
 tries that had developed efficient large-caliber mobile artillery at 
 the outbreak of the present European war, but this war has devel- 
 oped the use of the large-cali'ber artillery by all of the belligerent 
 countries. This development of heavy mobile artillery in Germany, 
 Austria, and France is shown in attached "Notes on development 
 of large-caliber mobile artillery." 
 
 How the thoughts of the majority of the field-artillery officers 
 influenced the artillery organizatioii of France and Germany is 
 best shown by their army oi-ganization as it existed at the outbreak 
 of war. as shown by the following table : 
 
 Country. 
 
 Number of 
 of 3-inch 
 
 field Runs 
 
 per 1 ,060 
 
 rifles. 
 
 Numher of 
 
 li^ht field 
 
 howitzers 
 
 per 1,000 
 
 rifles. 
 
 Number of 
 
 heavy field 
 
 howitzers 
 
 per 1,000 
 
 rifles. 
 
 Total. 
 
 France 
 
 4.66 
 
 
 0.206 
 .01 
 
 4 87 
 
 Germany 
 
 4.12 
 
 1.37 
 
 6.1 
 
 This table shows that at the outbreak of war Germany had about 
 (me-half of a light field gun (about 3-inch) less than France per 
 1.000 combatants. Germany, on the other hand, had 1.37 light field 
 howitzers per 1,000 combatants more than France had, and had 3 
 
 30069°— No. 509 16 (3) 
 
 6C7366 
 
heavy field howitzers of about 6-inch caliber for every 1 possessed 
 by France. 
 
 The proportion of heavy field howitzers was in reality much more 
 than the table indicates, for, as is well known, France only had a 
 total of twenty-four 4-gun batteries of 6-inch howitzers when the 
 war opened, whereas Germany had more than one hundred and ninety 
 4-gun batteries of 6-inch howitzers. 
 
 We may say that the results of the war have justified not the 
 French but the German organization, and that as a result the French 
 have taken up the German idea and are now doing, and have been 
 doing for many months past, everything they can to meet the Ger- 
 man preparedness in heavy field artillery material by equipping their 
 army with heavy field guns and howitzers. It is of interest to note 
 that the French 6-inch howitzer had a maximum range of about 
 6,600 yards, whereas the corresponding German gun, although older 
 in years, had a maximum range of 7,700 yards. In other words, the 
 French were not only outclassed in number but also in the power of 
 the individual gun. 
 
 In addition to this 16-Gentimeter (6-inch) howitzer, which was 
 assigned at the rate of 4 batteries of 4 gims each to each army corps, 
 Germany had a certain number of heavy gun batteries of 10-centi- 
 meter (3.94-inch) and 13-centimeter (5.12-inch) caliber and a field 
 28-centimeter (11.3-inch) mortar battery. The exact number of these 
 batteries is unknown. 
 
 The successes of the German army for the first' four months of 
 the war can be attributed, in a great measure, to the heav}' field 
 ai-tillery with which they were equipped, and to its proper handling. 
 Our observers all state that the moral actual effect produced on the 
 French in the opening battles of the war by the heavy German field 
 artillery w^as tremendous, and came to most of the Frenchmen, who 
 had been taught and had believed that the 75-millimeter gun was the 
 ruler of the artillery world, as a terrific shock. At the commence- 
 ment of the war the French did not take the trouble to entrench nor 
 conceal their artillery the way they do now ; the result Avas that the 
 heavy German batteries, when used as counterbatteries and assisted 
 by aeroplanes, had a clear field and managed to destroy whole bat- 
 talions of the light 75-millimeter French guns without the latter 
 being able to do them any harm. After the opening battles of the 
 war the French realized that they must have heavy field artillery, 
 and made every effort to obtain it as soon as possible. The result 
 was that between August, 1914, and March, 1915, they had sent a 
 number of 4-gun batteries of 10.5-centimeter guns to the front and 
 had adopted and issued to the service a considerable number of new 
 15-centimeter rapid-fire howitzers, and had started to construct 14- 
 inch mortars. In other words, a few months after the war started 
 
 509 
 
the French school of artillery thoufjht had completely veered around 
 and adoj)to(l the (JerniaU artilUMv idea. 
 
 From tlie artillery jxjint of view, the, lesson to be learned from 
 the war is the same' less(m that has been taii<i;ht by every war since 
 the discovery of cannon, namely, that evei-ything being equal, the 
 side having the heaviest gun and the best ammunition-supply sys- 
 tem is the one thjat i^ best able to give the proper support to its 
 infantry, and therefore has the greatest chance of success. 
 
 Before the present war started most of our artillery officers be- 
 lieved that the heaviest field gun or howitzer which would be needed 
 b.y an army Avas ther 6-inc.li howitzer fii-ing a 120-pound projectile, 
 and in justice to. them it must be stated that, with the exception of 
 the German and Austrian ATmies, this belief was genei-al. They 
 also believed that the function of the heavy field guns of more than 
 G-inch caliber, which it was known Germany and xVustria, possessed, 
 was to destroy field forts of steel and concrete, and that it would 
 not be possible to transport either of these guns or the ammunition 
 they re(iuired with the field armies. How wrong this assumption 
 was is shown by the present war in wdiich the Germans and Aus- 
 trians have actually transported with their field armies 11-inch 
 howitzers. 12-inch howitzers, IG-inch howitzei-s, and 17.7-inch how- 
 itzers and used them, not for the purpose of destroying works of 
 steel and concrete, but for the purpose of destroying field fortifi- 
 cations, supply depots in rear of the line, villages in which troops 
 are quartered, wire entanglements and other obstacles. All reports 
 now indicate that the great successes obtained by the German and 
 Austrian Armies on the eastern front were due in no small measure 
 to the use of these enonnous fieldpieces, which must hereafter be 
 considered as essential to success in war. 
 
 The lesson to be learned as to. the amoiwit of artillery to be 
 assigned to the different units has been taken advantage o-f by the 
 General Staff, who, in the organization recommended in their mili- 
 tary policy, have increased the number of Field Artillery regiments 
 with each Infantry division from two to three, and in the report of 
 a board of officers which recently recommended that the heavy field 
 artillery with each field army be increased from one to three regi- 
 ments. These recommendations, if carried into effect, will result 
 in the following ])i'oportion of guns per 1.000 combatants: 
 
 
 Field gun. 
 
 Light field 
 howitzer. 
 
 Ileavy field 
 pin and 
 howitzer. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Fnited States 
 
 2.70 
 4.12 
 
 1.35 
 1.37 
 
 1.12 
 .61 
 
 5.17 
 
 ti ermany 
 
 6.10 
 
 
 
 509 
 
The percentage of gims provided by Germany for her army is 
 shown above for the purpose of comparison. It shows that before 
 the war Germany had 1.42 more field guns per thousand combatants, 
 about the same number of light field howitzers, and 0.51 of a heavy 
 field gun less than we now contemplate. The number of heavy field 
 guns given in the above table for Germany does not include any 
 guns heavier than the 16 centimeter (6-inch howitzer), whereas for us 
 it included the heavier contemplated fieldpieces. The proposed con- 
 templated scheme for procuring enough guns, ammunition, and other 
 necessary field artillery material to equip 1,000,000 men will involve 
 the expenditure of about $470,000,000 over a period of 8 years, and, 
 when completed, will onily provide for about twice the number of 
 guns used by Marshal Mackensen's army in the Galician campaign. 
 In other words, if the scheme is approved by Congress, in eight years 
 from now we will have about enough gims and ammunition and 
 other necessar}?^ stores to supply two German field armies. 
 
 2. ARTILLERY AMMUNITION. 
 
 Before the present war no one ever dreamed of the amount of am- 
 munition that would be required to keep the armies supplied, and if 
 he did dream of it he kept his dream to himself for fear of being 
 called crazy. It was known that at the beginning of the war both 
 France and Germany had a reserve supply of small-caliber field-gun 
 ammunition of about 2,500 rounds per gun, and a corresponding 
 amount for the larger fieldpieces on hand, and were splendidly 
 equipped with facilities for manufacturing ammunition of all kinds 
 in large quantities. Notwithstanding their reserve supply, which 
 was considered immense at that time, and their facilities of manu- 
 facture, both these nations found themselves confronted with a most 
 serious shortage of ammunition before the war had been going on 
 very long, and in the case of France at least forced her to practically 
 suspend operations for a protracted period. 
 
 At the present time the reserve supply of ammunition to be kept 
 on hand per gun is considered as that necessary to wear out the gun ; 
 in other words, during peace a sufficient amount of ammunition 
 should be accumulated for each gun to permit it to fire as long as it 
 is capable of doing so. For a 3-inch field gun this amounts to about 
 5,000 rounds per gun. 
 
 The question of ammunition supply has become such an important 
 one that France and England have both ]5laced cabinet ministers in 
 charge of it ; and England, so far as Ave know, has not solved the 
 problem to date. 
 
 509 
 
3. AERO SERVICE FOR FIELD ARTILLERY. 
 
 Aeroplanes are now jceofrnized as indispensable adjuncts of the 
 Field Artillery. The followin*? will illustrate some of the service 
 performed by the Aviation Corps: 
 
 (1) (Jeneral reconnoissance work. 
 
 (2) To discover exposed batteries of the enemy. 
 
 (3) To test concealment of their own batteries. 
 
 (4) To direct artiller}' fire on enemy's batteries and trenches. 
 Observation captive balloons aie employed, as shown by the fol- 
 lowing report: 
 
 The ofTicers wlio conduct tlio fire of these guns are well up in tlie trenches, 
 connected witii liieir guns or batteries by telephone wires, which are usually run 
 along the walls of the comnnmication trenches and held in place by staples. In 
 one second-line trench I counted 11 different telephone wires running out to 
 different observation trenches. In addition to the observation posts in the 
 advance trenches there is anotlier method employed by l)oth sides during the 
 day ; it is the Drachen, or sausage-shaped captive balloon which is sent up at 
 daylight and remains all day until dark, at altitudes varying, I should estimate, 
 from four to eight hundred yards, and far enough in rear of the lines to escape 
 artillery fire, if directed against it. The observer in this balloon is equipped 
 witli telephonic communication and powerful glasses. This silent sentinel 
 remains up rain or shine, and both sides have the greatest respect for its power 
 of observation. We were not allowed to assemble in groups in view of them 
 at the front. 
 
 These observers are on the alert at all times, and we were informed that 
 where groups of 5 or 10 appeared in the open, a shell was usually sent in their 
 direction as a warning that nothing escaped their observation. These balloons 
 are so generally used by both sides that during a clear day they can be seen 
 up and down the lines as far as the eye can reach. I counted eight along the 
 front — Notre Dame de Lorette — St. Eloi. They are used also, I was informed, 
 very often in directing the fire of heavy artillery. The steadiness of this shape 
 of balloon, even in a strong wind, is quite remarkable. 
 
 The "War College Division has not made recommendation as to 
 aviation equipment needed, as tests are now being made under direc- 
 tion of the Field Artillery Board at Fort Sill, Okla. 
 
 4. CONCLUSION. 
 
 In general, the opinion of foreign officers and all of our observers 
 abroad is that the largest calibers are the most effective and have 
 done the work in this war with high-explosive shell. 
 
 The large-caliber howitzers and mortars with high-explosive shells 
 are employed not only to reduce concrete forts, but are generally used 
 now against fieldworks and entrenchments of all kinds. 
 
 Every effort should be made to provide our Army with large- 
 caliber mobile artillery and ample aero equipment. 
 
 509 
 
8 
 
 5. MACHINE GUNS. 
 
 Machine guns have phiyed a most important part in the present 
 war, and have been extensively used by all sides, under all condi- 
 tions, and have proven their worth. 
 
 The following table shows the number of machine guns per 1,000 
 men of Infantry or Cavalry provided for by the organizations of 
 the European armies at the opening of the war, and also the proposed 
 proportion contemplated for our Army in the tables of organization : 
 
 
 Army Corps. 
 
 Infantry Division. 
 
 Reserve Infantry 
 Division. 
 
 Cavalry 
 Division. 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Germany 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 2 
 1.32 
 
 
 1.67 
 
 France 
 
 2.2 
 
 2 
 2 
 2.12 
 
 
 2.2 
 
 1.67 
 
 Russia 
 
 
 2.20 
 
 United States 
 
 
 3.24 
 
 
 
 3.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Since the war started it is positively known that all the warring- 
 nations have greatly increased the number of machine guns with 
 their armies. Exactly what this increase has been is. however, 
 unlaiown. Reports received from our observers indicate that there 
 is about one machine gun for every 30 yards on the western front. 
 At the commencement of the war the Germans had 64 and the 
 French 06 guns per army corps. 
 
 6. CONCLUSION. 
 
 It is believed that machine guns at the rate of 6 per battalion 
 of Infantry or squadron of Cavalry should be provided for our 
 Army, or 18 machine guns per regiment of Infantry. 
 
 NOTES ON DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE-CALIBER MOBILE ARTIL- 
 LERY IN EUROPEAN WAR. 
 
 GERMANY. 
 
 The Germans had 42-centimeter (16.5-inch) mortars, 28-centimeter 
 (11.023-inch) Krupp siege howitzers, and 21-centimeter (8.4-inch) 
 howitzers at the outbreak of war. These mortars and howitzers 
 were employed in the reduction of the Belgian fortifications. 
 
 The Ji.2-centimeter {IG.o-hieh) mortars are transported b}'^ rail, and 
 spur tracks are run directly to the edge of the pits in which they 
 are emplaced. It is probable that a derrick car is used to mount 
 the parts of the carriage and the mortar and also to handle the 
 shell, which weighs about 2,000 pounds. 
 
 509 
 
In the recent German-Austrian oli'ensive in Galicia, May 2 to 
 June 25, 1915, large-caliber howitzers and mortars were used with 
 nuirked success against field intrenchments and field works. 
 
 In addition to the regulation quota of artillery pertaining to the divisional 
 
 orgiinizatioii, there was asslgni'd to the army for the sju'cial mission a large 
 
 quantity ol' heavy artillery, ineluding certain 21-eentimeter howitzers, 28-cen- 
 
 timeter seacoast mortars, 30.o-centimeter mortar batteries, and probably some 
 
 42-centimeter mortars, as these were used later in the campaign at Przemysl. 
 * * * 
 
 The present war has shown that we must revise our views as to what 
 constitutes " field " artillery. With ordnance having calibers as large as 30.5 
 centimeters, moving steadily along with the troops, the artillery features of 
 present-day conil)ats have received a marked dcveloinnent. Thanks to this 
 heavy ordnance, the Germau-Austrians were enabled to break down the mate- 
 rial and moral resistance of the Russians at all their strongly prepai*ed posi- 
 tions, and to prepare the way for assault of the infantry, which found its task 
 relatively easy. At the had a ring trench about 200 feet in di- 
 ameter on the sunnuit of a low knoll forming a closed work about 250 yards 
 in rear of a long rifle trench lower down a gentle slope. Within this ring 
 trench were seven craters made by 30.5-centimeter (12-inch) mortar shells, 
 some of the craters intersecting and sections of the trench having been obliter- 
 ated. At Hill on. the position in front of the Russians had 
 
 a strong fleldwork consisting of a double tier of trenches with overhead cover, 
 traverses and splinter proofs. This was assaulted and carried by a division 
 after about 2 hours' artillery preparation by 21-centimeter (8.25-inch) howit- 
 zers and 30.5-centimeter (12-inch) mortars, with almost negligible losses. 
 This work was inspected before the field had been cleared, and it was easy 
 to understand how demoralized and shaken its defenders must have been in 
 consequence of the effective artillery fire. About 100 corpses lay in or close 
 to the trenches, most of them terrildy mangled, even with clothes torn from the 
 body by the blast which occasionally blew them out of the trenches on the 
 gi-ound in the rear. Whole sections of the parapet were obliterated and 
 splinter proofs were wrecked. This work was built along the edge of a pine 
 groove which was almost leveled to the gi'ound by the artillery fire. Again 
 
 at , the work on knoll , to the west of , a very strongly built 
 
 fieldwork with strong, wide wire entanglements, was bombarded for an hour 
 with heavy artillery with similar effects to those described above. The at- 
 tack of field fortifications by 12-inch ordnance is a novel feature in war, but 
 in no other way can the strongly built positions, which an enemy can build 
 in a few days, be prepared for assault by infantry. The transport of such 
 heavy field ordnance, and, more particidarly of the neetlful anununition supply, 
 of course, presents tremendous difliculties, and, without fairly good roads, is 
 impracticable * * *. 
 
 During long trips, on four different da.vs, over practically all the roads be- 
 tween the and , military transportation of evei-y kind, from the 
 
 light, native country wagon, hauled by two diminutive hor.ses, to the heavy 
 motors, hauling 28 and 30.5 centimeter mortars, where encountered moving 
 steadily to the front without any serious difficulties * * *. 
 
 In their previously prepared positions, the showed some fine examples 
 
 of technical work, their fire trenches being invariably provided with overhead 
 cover, and with plenty of splinter proofs close at hand. It was only because 
 of their free use of the heaviest artillery that the German-Austrians were able 
 to break the lines. 
 
 509 
 
10 
 
 The Germans have, on several occasions, fired 38-centimeter (15-inch) shells 
 
 into from a distance, it is estimated, of 30 kilometers (18.7 miles) ; 
 
 where these shells have fallen they have caused great destruction. 
 
 The success of the 42-centimeter mortar and the excellent results 
 secured from this weapon have steadily spurred the Krupp Co. on 
 to developing even larger and better calibers of guns. It is claimed 
 that the Krupp Co. has now perfected the 54-centimeter (21.26-inch) 
 gun with a range of about 38 miles. 
 
 AUSTRIA. 
 
 The Austrian army infantry division had, at the outbreak of the war, about 
 42 field guns and howitzers per division of 12,000 rifles. This percentage is 
 exclusive of the corps artillery which is composed of 8 heavy howitzers. 
 
 As the war went on the number of batteries has been increased in various 
 ways until there are now probably 50 field guns per division. The corps artil- 
 lery remains as at the beginning, but the field army artillery, composed of 
 24, 30.5 and 45 centimeter (17.7-inch) mortars, is being constantly increased 
 and is used as field artillery. 
 
 The Austrians are using their large guns up to 45 centimeter (17.7-inch) 
 against fieldworks, field guns, storage depots, railway stations and villages, 
 where troops are quartered, and to tear up barbed wire and other entangle- 
 ments. Tliese uses are made because the guns are available. 
 
 The writer visited three forts of shortly after the fortress was cap- 
 tured. The Germans had used 42-centimeter mortars to prepare the forts, but 
 what part of the destruction of the concrete work was done by the German 
 
 shells or what part by the when they surrendei-ed the fortress to the 
 
 is not known, but it may be stated that the moral effect of the bombard- 
 ment was very great, for the defense was weak when the infantry assault 
 
 took place. 
 
 The had very few guns of position in and the mobile artillery 
 
 was reduced as much as possible to provide field artillery for the field army. 
 In one artillery position were found two 8-centimeter field guns and a 5-inch 
 gun stood on the road nearby, showing that it had been in use in the vicinity. 
 In one of the forts there was a rapid-fire gun pedestal mount of 3-inch caliber. 
 These were the only guns seen. 
 
 The writer has seen the effect of fire of the 30.5 centimeter (12-inch) and 45 
 centimeter (17.7-inch) mortars on semipermanent earthworks. The craters on 
 tlie hill in rear of the line of works were 20 feet deep and 30 feet in diameter, 
 and the blast from the explosion of the shells must have been tremendous. The 
 
 usual killing radius mentioned by officers was 200 meters, but it is 
 
 scarcely that great, but it is great enougli to cause the to have a profound 
 
 respect for the " ammunition wagons," as the soldiers called them. 
 
 Artillery fire is very effective when the target is suitable; for instance, en- 
 fihiding artillery fire is feared. It is to be doubted whether the 3-inch gun 
 produces the effect on moving lines in the open which might be expected; but 
 the heavy shell fire from field howitzers is very effective as a morale destroying 
 agent. 
 
 609 
 
11 
 
 FRANCE. 
 
 At the outbreak of war. the mobile artillery consisted of substan- 
 tially the following calibers: 
 
 C5-mlllimeter (2.56-inch) mountain. 
 7r)-niillinieter (2.92-iiich) fiold guns. 
 ISa-niilliincter (6.1-incli) rapid-firo Riniaillio ;:un. 
 
 The following artillery, considered as obsolete at outbreak of war, 
 was i)ut in action as soon as possible after the superiority of the Ger- 
 man heavy artillery was demonstrated: 
 
 Old material : 
 
 120-millinieter (4.73-inclO long and short gun. 
 155-millimeter (6.107-inc-h) long and short gun. 
 220-millimeter (8.G6-inch) mortar. 
 270-millimeter (lO.GG-inch) mortar. 
 
 About one month before the outbreak of war, G regiments of 105- 
 niillimeter (•J:.14-inch) guns were authorized, but the guns were not 
 read}' for issue at the outbreak of the war. Since the outbreak of 
 war these regiments have been furnished with the lOo-millimeter 
 (4.14-inch) guns, and the following other calibers have been in- 
 troduced : 
 
 150-millimeter (G-inch) Schneider rapid-fire howitzers. 
 
 2G0-millimeter (10.5-inch) howitzers. 
 
 305-millimeter (12-inch) navy gun, mounted (in i-.iilway carriage. 
 
 340-millimeter (13.8-inch) navy giui, moimted on railway carriage. 
 The French have been making a new 370-millimeter (14.G-inch) mortal*. Six 
 or eight have been completed and are to be sent into the field immediately 
 This piece was under study when the war broke out, and is comparatively 
 simple in construction ; the trials have given most satisfactory results. 
 
 The 75-millimeter field gun is now seldom used by the French in 
 bombarding field entrenchments. 
 
 509 
 
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