Ex Libris 
 [ C. K. OGDEN * 
 
 V '/ 
 
 


 
 FOREKNOWLEDGE, 
 
 AND 
 
 FATE. 
 
 A 
 
 FRAGMENT. 
 
 By EDWARD SEARCH, Efq ; 
 
 Unde besc eft Path avolfa Voluntas* LUCRE T. 
 
 Hunc Naturam vocas, Fatum, Fortunam : omnla ejuj- 
 dsm Del nomina funt^ varie utentis fua poicjlatg. 
 
 SENECA de Bcnef, 
 
 Others reafon'd high of Knowledge, Fate, and Will j 
 Fixt Fate, Freewill, Foreknowledge abfolute. 
 And found no end, in wSndring mazt-i loft. 
 
 Mi I. TON, 
 
 L O N D O N: 
 
 Printed for R. and J. DOSDLEY, ia 
 . MDCCI.X11I,
 
 T O 
 
 The READER. 
 
 f^ N revifitins; Alma Muter Oxoni- 
 
 < 
 
 O en fa a ^ ter a ^ on S a bf ence > among 
 3e( M many noble edifices entirely 
 k.)6(&)6Uft new to mCj i obferved an ele- 
 
 gant range of chambers at Magdalen, on 
 either end of which there projected two 
 rows of rough ftones from top to bottom 
 ready to fatten in with future walls that 
 might be run up againft them; and 
 chimnies were worked between for the ac- 
 commodation of future chambers that 
 might hereafter rife out of the adjacent 
 ground. But as the faid adjacent ground 
 was fmoothed into a neat parterre, and I 
 faw no preparation for further erections, 
 I could look upon the projector as having 
 defighed only to exhibit the fragment of a 
 building. 
 
 Being at St.,Mzr/s one Smday, I heard 
 
 a learned and excellent difcourfe on three 
 
 A 2 out 

 
 iv To the R E A D E R. 
 
 out of five fub-divifions of the fecond head 
 of a treatife in defence of the Proteftant 
 Caufe. I was told the firft head had been 
 delivered three years before, and it might 
 probably come to the Preacher's turn to 
 give the two remaining fub-divifions about 
 three years hence: fo confidering how 
 fluctuating a body the congregation con- 
 fided of, and fuppofing the Preacher knew 
 their tafle, I concluded it cuftomary 
 to prefent them with the fragment of a 
 DhTertation. 
 
 Every body knows the prodigious de- 
 mand for Magazines, which are little elfe 
 than bundles of various and difcordant 
 fragments > and compofitions of all kinds, 
 not excepting Dictionaries, find greater 
 vent when broken into numbers, than 
 when delivered entire. 
 
 Having fuch precedents, as well of 
 learned as fimple, to keep me in coun- 
 tenance, J need no farther apology for 
 exhibiting a Fragment to public view; 
 efpecially fince it can fcarce be called fo, 
 when confidered in itfelf : for I have pur- 
 fued my fubjecl: as thoroughly as I was 
 able, and brought it to a conclufion ; fo 
 
 M* 
 
 that
 
 To the R E A D E R. 
 
 that I flatter myfelf it will appear rent 
 and torn only with refpect to certain firings 
 of connection and allulions bearing a re- 
 ference to other matters of my production, 
 which I keep ftill in referve. Neverthelefs 
 it will be expected that I fhould give 
 fome more particular account of my dealing 
 out this piece of a performance, than barely 
 the allowablenefs of fo doing, after the 
 example of other people. 
 
 The Searches, from whom I claim to be 
 defcended, were a very ancient family, as 
 old almoft as the time when curiofity firft 
 began to prevail in the world. But as this 
 quality, while left to follow its natural 
 bent, would catch indifferently at every 
 thing novel or engaging, of what kind 
 foever, our line have always endeavoured 
 to confine it to objects from whence fome- 
 thing ufeful might be gathered, either for 
 improving the knowledge or promoting the 
 fervice of mankind. But as many of us 
 have but moderate capacities, we often 
 labour to little purpofe, and fail of pro- 
 ducing the good expected from our en- 
 deavours j yet we ftill continue thofe en- 
 deavours, like other Projectors, in hopes 
 A 3 of
 
 vi To the R E A D E R. 
 
 of better fuccefs by and by, or for the 
 chance that what little we produce may 
 occafion others to improve upon it, and fo 
 be made to yield better fruits when cul- 
 tivated by abler hands. But there is one 
 benefit we cannot well fail of, the having 
 employment for our time, together with 
 the foothing fatisfaction of knowing that 
 our aim is juftifiable, and of being engaged 
 perpetually in purfuit of fomething that 
 carries the appearance of ufe and importance. 
 For perfeverance and good intention are 
 characteriftics of the Searches, and direct 
 them feverally to thofe courfes of enquiry 
 wherein their particular turn of mind or 
 opportunities render them moil likely to 
 proceed with effect. 
 
 It has been my fortune, or my humour, 
 to lay out much of my thoughts upon 
 moral Philofophy, and the rules of Pru- 
 duce for the government of our conduct, 
 which I find generally made to confift of 
 detached tenets or maxims varioufly un- 
 derftood, having little dependance upon 
 each other, but oftentimes appearing to 
 clam j from whence great difputes and per- 
 plexities unavoidably enfue. For men pro- 
 ceed
 
 To the R E A D E R. vii 
 
 cecd upon different principles, which they 
 feverally efteem felf-evident, and therefore 
 will not fuffer them to be queftioned. But 
 it feems to me, that many things are re- 
 ceived as principles, which are not truly fuch, 
 but deductions from fomething elfe ; tho* 
 men efteem them felf-evident, as having for- 
 gotten the inducements recommending them 
 to their reception, or having imbibed them 
 from their teachers or companions, without 
 knowing of any other original they ever 
 had. Therefore I conceived it might be 
 expedient to take our principles themfelves 
 under examination, not with defign to 
 overthrow them, for they may be true as 
 conclufions, though not felf-evident as 
 principles, but in order to trace them down 
 to the foundations whereon they ftand. 
 And it foon appeared that human under- 
 ftanding can build fecurely on no other 
 foundation than experience and obfervation 
 of ourfelves, and that part of nature lying 
 within our cognizance ; nor can any ab- 
 ftract reafonings be depended upon which 
 do not ground ultimately upon that bot- 
 tom. 
 
 A 4 Under
 
 viii To the R E A D E R. 
 
 Under this perfuafion I fet myfelf care- 
 fully to confider the nature of the mind, 
 her manner of acting in the common oc- 
 currencies of life, the fources of good and 
 evil ordinarily befalling her, what Ideas 
 naturally occur from contemplation of 
 things external, and what conclufions 
 might be drawn from thence for regulating 
 as well our theory as our practice. For I 
 conceived, that if fomething of a fyftem 
 could be formed upon this bails, it mufl: 
 carry a mutual dependance in all its parts, 
 which would contribute, fo far as it ex- 
 tended, to render our opinions confident 
 and uniform : becaufe our premifes being 
 taken from common experience of things 
 obvious to every body's obfervation, what- 
 ever could be plainly deduced from thence 
 mufl meet with every body's approbation ; 
 and if we could be brought to try our 
 feveral notions by that touchftone, and 
 model them according to that ftandard, it 
 mufl: tend towards a general reconcilement j 
 an object more fuitable to my tafte than 
 oppofition or victory. 
 
 Therefore without interefting myfelf in 
 the difputes which have divided the world,
 
 To the RE A D E R. ix 
 
 I endeavoured to ftrike out what lights I 
 could from experience, without prejudice 
 or partiality, yet "with fuch deference to the 
 opinions of others before me, as to prefume 
 them well grounded, until I feemed clearly 
 to difcern wherein the error lay ; and 
 rather defirous of putting fuch construction 
 upon them as appeared reafonable, than 
 forward to reject them. 
 
 This attempt has furnimed me more 
 employment than I imagined at firft fetting 
 out j for I found, in the progrefs of my 
 enquiries, that one difcovery gave birth to 
 another, that to a third, and fo on to a 
 length I could fcarce have thought capable 
 of being traced out, much lefs that I mould 
 be fo lucky as to trace it. And I began to 
 fear, that t what with unavoidable avoca- 
 tions, what with my natural flownefs, and 
 fome bodily infirmities rendering me unfit 
 for long and hard labour, the work I have 
 drawn upon my hands, though not likely 
 to prove very voluminous, was more than 
 could be compleated while I have ftrength 
 and fpirits to go through it. This made 
 me think of giving out what I had gotten 
 ready, without flaying until the whole 
 
 were
 
 To the READER. 
 
 were finifhed, had I judged it fafe or pru 
 dent fo to do* But as I have endeavoured 
 all along to proceed with a perfect freedom, 
 and at the fame time to avoid a licen^ 
 tioufnefs or wantonnefs of thought, my 
 freedom has led me to maintain fome pe- 
 titions which might give offence, or be 
 thought of dangerous confequence: and 
 tho' when it hall be feen what ufe I mall 
 make of them, I truft they will not only 
 be found innocent, but to corroborate thofe 
 received opinions they feem at firft fight to 
 fubvert ; yet my caution with-holds me from 
 uttering any thing that might appear 
 poifonous, until I had prepared the antidote. 
 
 For truths are not to be fpoken at all 
 times indifcriminately ; becaufe the moft 
 ufeful of them ftanding fometimes con- 
 nected in men's minds with error, it would 
 do hurt to undeceive them in the latter, 
 without having provided means of dif- 
 folving the connection. 
 
 The little Differtation here prefented to 
 view feemed the only part of my pro- 
 ductions proper to be ventured abroad 
 alone, as being lefs complicated than others 
 with the reft, and not fo much a new 
 
 fuper-
 
 To the READER. 
 fuperflrudture raifed upon grounds before 
 laid down, which when detached from its 
 foundation might appear like a cattle in 
 the air, as a clearing the way for other 
 buildings. For it contains no more than 
 an attempt to refcue the doctrine of uni- 
 verfal Providence, as maintained in the 
 preceding chapter, from an objection or- 
 dinarily occurring againft it, as if it fub- 
 verted human liberty, by leaving us nothing 
 in our power to do : an attempt which 
 furely cannot give offence to the mod 
 fcrupulous, whether Divine or Philofopher. 
 And yet I forefee that fome exceptionable 
 confequences may be drawn from this 
 dodlrine in the latitude whereto it is here 
 extended j but they will probably be over- 
 looked, by thofe efpecially whom they 
 might be moft likely to ftagger; therefore 
 I mall not be fo indifcreet as to point them 
 out, until in my further progrefs I mall 
 have gotten matters ready for obviating 
 them. 
 
 It would be departing from the honefty 
 and ingenuoufnefs of the Searches to deny, 
 that perhaps the true reafon of my exhibiting 
 a part of my face in open view may be no 
 
 other
 
 To tHe READER. 
 
 other than an impatience of appearing in 
 print, and reviewing my labours in a fairer 
 character than I can give them with my 
 own fcribbling hand. But if this be my 
 motive, it is more than I know myfelf ; 
 for it is not uncommon with every body for 
 imagination to fuggeft folid and fubftantial 
 reafons in fupport of any thing they have 
 a mind to; and fuch are not wanting, 
 which to my thinking determine me upon 
 the prefent occafion. 
 
 For by fubmitting this fpecimen to the 
 judgement of any who mail think it worth 
 his perufal, I may receive fome admoni- 
 tions for my conduct in proceeding further. 
 A man is no competent judge of his own 
 performances ; for being the product of 
 his own thoughts, they muft tally exactly 
 with his ways of thinking;. which upon 
 revifal may give them a face of neatncfs and 
 proportion they will not carry in the eyes 
 of other people : fo that after all his care to 
 make his arguments connected and com- 
 pact, others may find them abounding in 
 gaps and fuperfluities ; the explanations he 
 gives as clear and full may be thought ob- 
 fcure and imperfect by them ; obfervations 
 
 that
 
 To the R E A D E R; xiii 
 
 that look ftriking and appofite to him, they 
 may pronounce flat and unavailing ; and 
 matters he judges momentous, may to them 
 appear trifling. Nor can one fafely depend 
 upon the judgement of intimates ; for how- 
 ever impartial and difcerning they may be, 
 ftill the knowledge of the perfon raifes a 
 curiofity upon what he produces, which 
 will keep up their attention in places where 
 a ftrariger might have fallen afleep : befides 
 that there is always fome fimilitude in the 
 way of thinking between perfons who con- 
 verfe often together. Therefore whatever 
 precautions one may take at home, there 
 is no knowing how one may be received in 
 public without making the trial. 
 
 My manner of handling the fubjecls I 
 treat of is what I am-moft fuipicious of re- 
 prehenfion upon j for they being generally 
 unentertaining and dry, I have endeavoured 
 to embellish them with a diverfity of ftile, 
 in order to relieve the Reader, and keep his 
 attention awake ; intermingling fometimes 
 poetical and rhetorical figures, fometimes 
 familiar and vulgar images among abitrufe 
 fpeculations j fometimes giving the reins to 
 a playful fancy in the tranfitions, feverally 
 
 intro-*
 
 xiv To the R E A D E R. 
 
 introducing them $ and fometimes talking 
 to my Reader as if we were fitting together 
 over a bottle. In thefe particulars I am 
 willing to ftand under correction, as not 
 knowing myfelf whether all this be an 
 agreeable variety or a motley mixture; 
 whether an ornament fetting off the fub- 
 ftance, or a disfigurement rendering it 
 hideous. 
 
 Whatever information I can pick up, 
 either with refpect to matter or form, will 
 not be utterly loft upon me ; for though I 
 cannot promife to work a thorough refor- 
 mation, it being difficult to depart from a 
 track one has long habituated one's felf to, 
 and that enthufiafm fometimes pofTeffing 
 a writer not lying always under controul ; 
 yet neither am I of a temper to perfift ob- 
 flinately in a fault which I find in my power 
 to mend. 
 
 As for gaining applaufe for my per- 
 formances, it is what I neither expect nor 
 defire; for the Searches were never remark- 
 able for a fondnefs of fame -, the point they 
 conflantly drove at was to fecure a felf- 
 approbation in the juftnefs of their under- 
 takings, and of the meafures they took to 
 2 purfue
 
 To the R E A D E R. xv 
 
 purfue them ; but being diffident of them- 
 felves, they could never poffefs this folace 
 compleatly, until they had it confirmed to 
 them by the fandtion of others. I mall think 
 it fufficient encomium, if any body mail 
 fay the fame of me as Horace did of Lu- 
 ciliuS) that when he run incorrect, yet there 
 was fomething you would think well worth 
 your while to pick up: and whether this 
 fomething can be' found or no, I mall reap 
 an advantage from the difcovery either way. 
 For if I have been labouring all this while 
 to no purpofe, it will be expedient for me 
 to know it. I mail then be delivered from 
 the fatigue of toiling any longer after an 
 ignis fatuus, a mere notion of being impor- 
 tant without the reality : I {hall have more 
 time to fpare for innocent amufements, and 
 may enter into them with a quiet confcience, 
 upon being convinced of an unfitnefs for 
 things ufeful. For I am luckily placed in 
 a lituation that binds me down to no par- 
 ticular tafk ; I may either work or play, as 
 I fee proper ; and my life would pafs more 
 pleafurably in the latter, could I once lay 
 alide the thought of obligation to the for- 
 mer. On the other hand, mould that 
 
 Some-
 
 xvi To the R E A D E R. 
 
 Something be found in the little fample I 
 deal out, which might prove of fervice to 
 any body towards clearing up his doubts, 
 or cafting a light upon matters he judges 
 of fome moment, it will raife a hope and 
 alacrity that will fupport me under my 
 future labours, and enable me to purfue 
 them more effectually 5 and may acquit 
 me of fome omiffions in private life, which 
 feem to call for an excufe. 
 
 For my friends and neighbours find it 
 difficult to draw me out of my retirement, 
 or get me to confort among them when 
 near, or correfpond with them when 
 diftant : which I am apprehenfive they 
 may afcribe to an unfociable fullenefs of 
 temper, or a felfim fondnefs for idle fpe- 
 culations, in difregard of what is owing to 
 perfons around me, though they are more 
 polite and good-natured than to charge me 
 openly with thefe blemimes. Now I have 
 too great a value and defire of their good 
 opinion to reft eafy under the thoughts of 
 having forfeited it : therefore am willing 
 to (how them that I do not fit idle while 
 retired within myfelf, affuring them at the 
 fame time that I am detained in my her- 
 mitage
 
 To the HEADER. xvii 
 
 rnitage by fomething bearing the air of 
 bufinefsand obligation, and that it did not 
 appear to me the indulgence of an unfociable 
 humour to be employed in refearches after 
 what might prove beneficial to fociety. 
 But if I mould obtain a teftimonial from 
 any body who has in anywife received be- 
 nefit from my fpeculations, or (hall pro- 
 nounce them worth the pains I have taken 
 in purfuing them, this will avail me more 
 than any proteftations of mine ; becaufe 
 the beft intentions perfifted in without pro- 
 ducing fome good effect, while they juftify 
 the heart can: a flur upon the underfland- 
 ing. And leaft it mould be thought that 
 the little I have to (hew might be dif- 
 patched at leifure hours, without interrup- 
 tion to other engagements $ I beg leave to 
 obferve, that a great deal more is requisite 
 to be done than appears to fuch as have 
 not experienced it; for though I have en- 
 deavoured as far as in me lies to attain an 
 eafy manner of conveying my thoughts, 
 yet we have it upon Mr. Addlfbn\ authority, 
 that there is a great difference between 
 eafy writing, and what any one may eaiily 
 write, efpecially in handling fuch knotty 
 b fubjecls
 
 To the R E A D E R. 
 
 fubjec*ts as I have fallen upon. I am Cure 
 it has coft me infinite pains to fave pains to 
 my Reader j and I have been forced to run 
 over in my thoughts as much as would fill 
 ten meets, before I could furnim out a 
 fingle one in a manner that might afford a 
 tolerable expectation of being fatisfaftory 
 to him. Add to this, that the weaknefs 
 of my fpirits difables me from performing 
 great matters at a fitting j but I muft do 
 my work by fnatches, morning or after- 
 noon, as I find myfelf in a cue for it : 
 this makes me unwilling to multiply thofe 
 engagements which take up a great part of 
 the day ; for if I am not allowed liberty to 
 catch at every favourable gale as it rifes, 
 I fhall make no progref& in my work, nor 
 can hope to finifh it before the time comes 
 wherein I can work no more. It was an 
 old obfervation, that art is long but life 
 fhort ; and this may be applied to nobody 
 with more truth than to myfelf, for inftead 
 of wanting employment for my time, as is 
 the cafe with many people, I want time for 
 my employment: therefore I hope my 
 good friends will indulge me in being par- 
 fimonious, in confideration of my poverty, 
 
 and
 
 To the R E A D E R. xix 
 
 and permit me to leave the larger con- 
 fumptions of it to thofe who have lefs to 
 do, or better fund of ftrength and fpirits 
 to fupport the expence. 
 
 The gentle Reader may expect, that in 
 compliance with general cuftom, I mould 
 befpeak his favourable attention, by expa- 
 tiating upon the importance and excellence 
 of my fubject; but our family having never 
 yet given into the cuftom, I mail not begin 
 it now, but leave him to find them out as 
 well as he can ; and only prefent him with 
 the defign J have aimed at in all my la- 
 bours : which is none other than to recom- 
 mend mutual Good-will to mankind, and a 
 hearty Zeal for one another's benefit. I 
 fuppofe there is nobody who is not willing 
 to promote his own intereft, or would be 
 lefs willing to promote thofe of other peo- 
 ple, if it could be mewn that he ferves 
 himfelf moft effectually by doing his ut- 
 moft to ferve them. Now it feems to mo 
 not impofiible to make it appear, from the 
 contemplation of nature external and inter- 
 nal, together with certain inferences juftly 
 drawn in order therefrom, that every man's 
 private intereft ftands neceflarily connected 
 b 2 with
 
 To the R E A D E R, 
 with the general good, fo that whatever 
 advances or hurts the one, muft in like 
 manner affect the other : and the dominion 
 of Providence defended in this chapter, is 
 a principal link in the chain employed for 
 that connection. 
 
 With refpect to the particular part pre- 
 fented in the following fheets, I mall fay 
 no more than this, that although Prefcience, 
 Fate, and other matters herein contained, 
 are generally efteemed difmal and dangerous 
 fubjects, apt to diffract the brains of fuch 
 as have entered deeply into them ; and 
 though the natural coldnefs of my confti- 
 tution renders me very fufceptible of alarms j 
 yet in the manner wherein I have brought 
 them to lie, in my thoughts, I fee nothing 
 terrifying or gloomy in them, but rather a 
 comfortable profpedt in finding that chance 
 and human frailty, which we muft ac- 
 knowledge to have a great influence upon 
 all our proceedings, ftand under controul 
 of Wifdom and Goodnefs. If upon the 
 fcene here exhibited, they mall appear to 
 lie in the fame manner to the Reader, my 
 purpofe is anfwered : only I beg leave to 
 advertife him, that as I found it no eafy 
 
 matter
 
 To the READER. 
 
 matter to bring them into this train, fo he 
 muft expect to find fome pains and atten- 
 tion requifite in following it ; for we fhall 
 be unavoidably compelled to fpin very fine 
 in fome places, and without gentle and 
 cautious ufage the thread will break in his 
 hands. Therefore he muft not go to work 
 in a hurry j for difquifitions of this fort are 
 not to be run off like a novel, where one 
 has little elfe to do than to drive on poft 
 hafte to fee how it ends ; but he muft take 
 care to digeft one thing well before he 
 proceeds to another ; for here, as in the 
 human body, an error in the firft con- 
 coction is not to be rectified afterwards. 
 Particularly I would recommend to him 
 to fettle well his ideas of Liberty and Free- 
 will in the feveral lights here reprefented, 
 and to fix thoroughly in his mind the di- 
 flinctioh between the two kinds of Poffibi- 
 lity before he goes on to things beyond, 
 which without this caution will fcarce ap- 
 pear clear or intelligible. If what he reads 
 fhould give him fcope for further reflec- 
 tion, and put him upon running over the 
 arguments again in his own way, I would 
 wifli him to dwell as little as poffible upon 
 b 3 mere
 
 xxii To the READER. 
 
 mere abftra&ions, but to judge of the 
 abftract in the concrete : and when he has 
 fixed upon particular inftances, wherein 
 he conceives either Fate or Freewill to 
 have operated, firft to examine each of 
 them fingly, and then compare them to- 
 gether, in order to form his general in- 
 ferences therefrom. 
 
 There are fome exprefTions, particu- 
 larly that in the introductory feclion, of 
 riding upon the rays, that will appear 
 myfterious : but this muft always be the 
 cafe with the middle of a Competition, 
 wherein things are alluded to with which 
 
 o , 
 
 the Reader has not yet been made ac- 
 quainted. Therefore he muft acknowledge 
 I have ac"ted fairly, by giving him notice in 
 the Title Page, that he was not to expect a 
 Work, but the Fragment of one ; for he 
 may choofe whether he will meddle with 
 fuch broken wares or no ; but if he dpes 
 condefcend to deal in them, he muft not 
 blame me for fome little inconveniencies 
 unavoidable in a traffic of this fort. 
 
 But thofe expreffions he may look on 
 for the prefent as excrefcencies, not inter- 
 rupting the chain of reafoning, of which I 
 
 have
 
 To the READER. 
 
 have cut him off a length he may examine 
 by itfelf independantly on the matters al- 
 luded to : which whoever will take the 
 trouble to do, fo as to make himfelf m after 
 of the argument as here purfued, will be 
 qualified to give me his advice thereupon : 
 and if he mould find himfelf inclined to 
 fay fome civil things of me, I will tell 
 him the grounds upon which I conceive 
 they might be expected. One of the ex- 
 ceptionable pofitions advanced in former 
 chapters, which perhaps may draw both 
 Divine and Philofopher upon my back, is 
 this, that things are not laudable in them- 
 felves, but merit commendation or cenfure, 
 according as either would be moft ufeful ; 
 the one being applicable as a fpur, ftimu- 
 lating men to perfevere in what they have 
 done well j the other as a bridle, restraining 
 from the repetition of what they had better 
 have let alone. Therefore if my Reader 
 chances to be in the fame way of thinking, 
 he will give me more or lefs encourage- 
 ment in proportion as he wiflies to fee more 
 of my handy work, or to have any body 
 elfe turn their hand to the like employment. 
 
 b 4 PRE-
 
 
 A 
 
 ii^is: 
 
 
 . 
 
 ~T*0 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 . 
 
 '.:, I 
 \T3ih t nwo 
 
 ''^ r s
 
 PREFACE 
 
 O F 
 
 The A N N O T A T O R. 
 
 ,HEY fay fimilitude conciliates 
 affection ; but then it muft have 
 fome diverfity mingled amongft 
 it; as Ovid faid of the three 
 Ladies, that they all had one and the fame 
 fet of features, and yet not the fame, fuch 
 as may be expected among fifters. For 
 equal talents turned upon purfuit of the 
 fame object, are apt to beget a rivalfhip 
 and jealoufy, but ill compatible with per- 
 fect friendship. Now there is this diffimilar 
 fimilitude which wonderfully well adapts 
 me for an attachment to my worthy friend 
 and relation Mr. Edward Search. For the 
 Comments are an under branch of the 
 Searches, having the like family-turn for 
 the ufefully curious ; but being unable to 
 ftrtke out any thing of their own, they 
 
 delight
 
 xxvi PREFACE of the ANNOTATOR. 
 
 delight to rummage among other folks 
 works, examining, comparing, digefting, 
 explaining, illuftrating, expatiating, and 
 doing any other little office they think may 
 render them more ferviceable. Some of 
 us indeed, to our (hame be it fpoken, have 
 undertaken things above our pitch, nor 
 fpared even the Bible itfelf 5 which they 
 have overwhelmed with fuch a variety of 
 expofitions, and found fo many contrary 
 fenfes in the fame text, that it is become 
 difficult to fee any fenfeat all, through their 
 envelopements. For my part, I never 
 would attempt any thing of this fort with- 
 out confulting my Coufin Search, who has 
 dropped a hint, that in his next volume he 
 may poffibly allow me the liberty, after 
 having prepared forne inftructions for my 
 conduct. In fliort, we feem cut out for 
 one another ; he pleafes me, by furniming 
 me with matter to fpend my thoughts upon, 
 and I pleafe him with the fondnefs I mow 
 for his fpeculadons. So we are grown 
 hugely intimate ; we communicate every 
 thing, and know one another as well as we 
 doourfelves; nay, we ftrive to enter into 
 fcach others fentiments more carefully than 
 
 perhaps
 
 PREFACE cf //.* A N N o T A T o R. xxvit 
 perhaps moft people do into their own : 
 for Search has obferved fomewhere, that 
 there are many latent defires and imagina- 
 tions in the human breaft unknown even 
 to the owner. 'Twas I, that firft put him 
 upon this publication : for, good Coufin, 
 fays I, may not it be expedient to cut off a 
 fample from the loom before you finifh 
 your piece, in order to mow it about 
 amongft the Mercers for their opinion of 
 the defign ? This feems advifeable for one 
 who works out of the common track, in- 
 termingling figures of the mofl oppolite 
 caft among one another. Some people 
 have blended jeft with topics of Religion, 
 in order to turn them into jeft ; others have 
 conveyed precepts of Morality and common 
 Prudence, in fables, figures, and allegories: 
 but few fmce Plato have attempted to in- 
 terfperfe humour and gaiety among clofe 
 argumentations, metaphyfical refinements, 
 and diflertations upon the moft ferious fub- 
 jects. Humour and Religion are both very 
 delicate things, and though agreeable in 
 themfelves may fuffer by their commixture, 
 as tea and fnuff laid in the fame drawer 
 fpoil one another's flavour, nor without 
 
 dexterous
 
 xxviii PREFACE of the A N N o T A T o R. 
 
 dexterous management can they be fo 
 joined as that one (hall not lofe its dignity, 
 nor the other its livelinefs. Now you 
 know we have worked all along by our- 
 felves, and how much foever we may have 
 pleafed our own fancy, can never know 
 how we mall pleafe others without making 
 the experiment. Troth, Coufin, fays he, 
 I believe your advice is good. But what 
 would you have me do ? I cannot publifli 
 my work imperfect, the defign being con- 
 nected in its feveral parts ; fome of which 
 feparated from the reft might be liable to 
 mifconftruction, and make me thought 
 aiming at conclufions furtheft in the world 
 from my intention. I was fenfible of this, 
 fays I, therefore never prefTed you before. 
 But methinks the chapter you havejuft 
 now finimed, contains an entire pattern 
 that may be mown without difgufting the 
 eye for want of other figures to join with 
 it. Perhaps fo, fays he. But there are 
 many allufions to former chapters, which 
 without being let into the matters alluded 
 to, muft appear unintelligible and myfte- 
 rious. Oh ! fays I, you don't consider 
 how fond the world is of myfteries. They 
 4 are
 
 PREFACED /^ANNOTATOR.. xxjx 
 
 are never fo well pleafed as with blanks, 
 initial letters, and innuendos, which it 
 may be have no meaning, and therefore 
 cannot porTibly be underftood. True, 
 fays he ; yet ftill they love to have a chink 
 to peep at the myftery, though not enough 
 to unveil it. Why, is it impoffible, fays I, to 
 have a few chinks opened fome how or 
 other by proper Annotations where necef- 
 fary ? He faw my drift, and replied, I 
 am too earneft in running off my principal 
 work to do any fuch thing. You know 
 I begun late in the day, having employed 
 the former part of my life in laying in a 
 ftock of -materials, and bringing my 
 thoughts into fome regular train. You 
 have fometimes compared me to the filk- 
 worm, that devours voracioufly for a while, 
 and then applies wholly to the bufinefs 
 of fpinning herfdf out. My day is far 
 fpent, and I have a long web to fpin, which 
 I fear I mall fcarce be able to compleat 
 before night j efpecially as there are fome 
 of my brother worms, who being no fpin- 
 fters themfelves, delight perpetually to 
 crawl over me and interrupt my work : 
 fo I muft not flop to revife, remark, or 
 
 explain.
 
 xxx PREFACE of t&e A UN or AT OR. 
 explain. But if you have a mind to un- 
 dertake the job, I fhall take it kindly. 
 You know the particulars alluded to, as 
 well as I myfelf j and have leave to open 
 the chinks as wide as you judge proper. 
 With all my heart, fays I. But that I 
 may not exceed my commiffion, let me 
 know the extent of it. As you fay you 
 run off your work without revifing, I may 
 chance to find fomething obfcure or liable 
 to be mifunderflood, or omitted in an ar- 
 gument that might have been purfued 
 further ; may I fupply what you feem to 
 have forgot ? By all means, fays he. And 
 you will probably find room enough for 
 this fubftituting office : for the ftate of my 
 brain correfponds but too much with that 
 of the weather : fo where you perceive the 
 effect of eaflern chills, you may do me 
 good fervice, by fuggefting what I mould 
 have done had the air been milder. We 
 have lived long enough together in intimacy 
 for you to know all my thoughts, and may 
 ufe your difcretion upon them. Have a 
 care, fays I, what you do. It may be 
 dangerous to give me an unreferved liberty 
 with all your thoughts. What if I fliould 
 
 happen
 
 PREFACE of the AUNOTATOR. xxxi 
 happen to touch upon fome of the peculia- 
 rities in them ? You have fo long accuftom- 
 ed me to a habit of Sincerity and Plain- 
 dealing, I mail not know how to palliate 
 or cover them over with plaufible colourings. 
 No matter for that, fays he, I defire no 
 colourings. I know you are an honefl 
 fellow, and will not do me an injury by 
 mifreprefenting me. Only take care not 
 to throw out what might do hurt to 
 fqueamifh palates. If you do not offend 
 other people, you cannot offend me. 
 
 So having obtained full permiffion, I 
 went to work upon a lining for his brocade 5 
 which he being pleafed to fay was not un- ,. 
 fuitable to the pattern he had cut off, we 
 refolved to pufh them both out upon the 
 fhop-window : wholly uncertain how they 
 might take with the paffengers, any further 
 than as it will probably be faid, They are 
 an Original. 
 
 CUTHBERT COMMENT, 
 
 From my Apartment in 
 Search- Hall, /fth Ofle- 
 &r, 1762.
 
 ERRATA 
 
 Pag. 40. I. 19. for forborne rvw^forborn 
 
 102. 1. 13. for gout to, which read gout, to which 
 124. 1. 20. for it is my option, and I know rend 
 
 it is in my option, and know 
 174. 1. 15. for proceedings read proceeding 
 1 88. 1. 9. for refiftable read refiftible 
 265. 1. 22. for velocity read velocity 
 ult. 1. ult. for ferve read fervice
 
 CHAP. XXIV. a 
 
 FREEWILL, FOREKNOWLEDGE, and 
 FATE. 
 
 SECT. 1. 
 
 us now arrived at Tranfi- 
 
 . /!. r 
 
 the moil intricate part or our 
 
 tlon 
 
 an 
 
 ourney, 
 
 wilder nefs, puzzled 
 
 . 
 
 impracticable 
 
 with 
 
 mazes, and perplex t with errors, where 
 many mighty have fallen, and many faga- 
 cious loft their way j for fhadows, clouds 
 and darknefs cover it; or what flafhes of 
 light break out from time to time, prefent 
 the image of truth on oppofite fides, the 
 winding paths lead round the disappointed 
 B travel- 
 
 a The Reader is not to conclude from the 
 
 B 
 
 number of this chapter, that the Author has huge 
 piles of his labours in (lore : for there is but one more 
 chapter fo long as this, and many of them will run off 
 in feven or eight pages.
 
 Tranfatort. 
 
 traveller to the fpot from whence he let 
 out, or involve him in difficulties wherein 
 neither Proteftant nor Papift, neither Di- 
 vine nor Philofopher has yej: found an 
 openkig, and which the facred mufe of 
 Milton pronounced infuperable, even by 
 the Devil himfelf. 
 
 In this dangerous road we may be al- 
 lowed with better^ reafon than the Poets, 
 to call in feme fuperior power to our aids 
 but what Mufe, what Spirit, what God 
 {hall we invoke ? For here are no private 
 tran factions unfeen by mortal eye, no dreams 
 of Rhefas broken off by the fleep of death, 
 no fecrets of nature lying beyond our reach 
 to be difcovered : we need not dive into 
 the bowels of the earth, nor afcend to mix 
 among the dances of the planets, nor dif- 
 fect the human frame to find all the curious 
 threads of its organization. But our bufinefs 
 lies with the common actions of life, familiar 
 to every one's and every day's experience : 
 we want only to know, whether a man 
 may act freely who makes his choice upon 
 motives fuggefted by external objects, whe- 
 ther
 
 'Tranjitivn* 
 
 ther he tnay know beforehand what his 
 neighbour will do, or offer inducements 
 which will infallibly prevail on him to one 
 particular manner of behaviour, without 
 infringing upon his liberty. Queftions 
 -that one would think could fcarce admit of 
 a difpute ; nor do they with common un- 
 derftandings, until men of uncommon re- 
 finements have, by their abftractions, fpun 
 them into a fenfe not naturally belong- 
 ing to them, and introduced a confufion, 
 into their ideas, by an inaccuracy of lan- 
 guage. Therefore upon this fubjecl: I con- 
 ceive we (hall have more to do with words 
 than with things, nor find fo much diffi- 
 culty in afcertaining the facts to be taken 
 under confideration, as the proper import 
 of the expreffions employed in fpeaking 
 of them. 
 
 Come then thou folemn power Philology, 
 pioneer of the abftrufe Sciences, to pre- 
 pare the way for their paflage, enwrap me 
 in thy clofe-bodied leathern jacket, that I 
 may creep through the brakes and brambles 
 of equivocation without their catching hold 
 B 2 9
 
 'franjition. 
 
 of me ; lend me thy needle-pointed penci!> 
 that I may trace out the hair-breadth dif- 
 ferences of language -, affift me with thy 
 microfcope to ' difcern the minute changes 
 of ideas paffing to and fro among the fame 
 words, as they change their places in dif- 
 ferent phrafes. 
 
 If any one will follow me while I travel 
 under thy guidance, let him look for other- 
 guifed entertainment than when beftriding 
 Pegafus a we bounded along the rapid 
 rays of folar or ftellar light, to vifit the 
 Athenian b and S ami an c Sages, to behold 
 
 the 
 
 3 The Author fome time ago was favoured with a 
 ,Vifion, wherein he was rapt inextacy out of his body, 
 and tranfported to the intermediate ftate lying between 
 death, and the final confummation of ail things j where 
 he faw furprizing things not yet lawful to be uttered. 
 Pegafus is only a figurative term to exprefs the flights 
 of imagination : for the Author did not ride upon a 
 flying horfe, but was dragged along by one of the old 
 inhabitants, who was expert in walking upon fuch 
 moveable ground as the rays of light. 
 
 b Plato and Socrates, with whom the Author con- 
 verfed in his excurfion. 
 
 c Pythagoras^ from whom he received a very fcien- 
 tific le&ure, containing many curious matters, partly 
 orthodox, and partly heretical.
 
 Tratojltitif* 
 
 the wonders of the vehicular ftate % and 
 boundlefs glories of the mundane foul e . 
 
 For thou, Goddefs, conforteft not with 
 the Mufes nor the Genii, the flights of ima- 
 gination affright thee : figure and orna- 
 ment are thy abhorrence, for they blend to- 
 gether in wanton aflemblages thofe ideas 
 which thou art moft follicitous to keep 
 afunder : familiar example f alone, of all 
 the flowery train, thou admitteft to fhed 
 his luftre upon the print of thy mincing 
 
 d Inhabited by Woola/lon's vehicles, that is, de- 
 parted fouls, carrying with them an inner tunicle, or 
 fine organization of corporeal fubftance, inconceivably 
 i'mall, but infinitely more a&ive and lithfome than our 
 grofs bodies. 
 
 e A created Being, of unlimited power, under- 
 ftanding and excellence, commenfurate with the un> 
 verfe, whereinto the fpirits of men are abforbed on 
 their departure from the vehicular ftate. 
 
 r This fprightly Gentleman has proved very fervice- 
 able to our Author, who is fond of his company as 
 often as he can get it; as will appear by the fequel : 
 for he has a marvellous knack at opening the pafiages 
 through briars, rendering abftraclions vifible, and fix- 
 ing them upon the memory. It is recommended to all 
 dealers in profound fpeculations to take his afiiftance ; 
 for he is a younger fon of Experience, employed in 
 difpenfing his father's ftores upon particular occafions 
 as wanted. 
 
 B 3 feet,
 
 franjition, 
 
 feet, and render the. marks of them more 
 eafily difcernible to the draining eye. But 
 induftry, and fcrupulous exactnefs, are thy 
 conftant companions 3 labour and vigilance 
 thy delight, thorns and briars the favourite 
 plants of thy garden. Whoever undertakes 
 to accompany thee there muft prepare hin> 
 felf for toil and attention.} he muft obferve 
 the path exactly in which thou leadeft him, 
 mark all the outlets on either hand, pafs 
 and repafs the whole length again and again, 
 before he ventures into another turning, 
 that he may fix fo perfect an idea of it upon 
 fiis memory, as never to miftake another 
 Similar alley for the fame. 
 
 But fay, Goddefs, by what avenue fhall 
 we enter the wildernefs ? Does not thy 
 methodical prudence direct, that upon every 
 queftion we fhould firft know precifely 
 the terms concerning which the queftion is 
 propofed ? Where then can we better begin 
 an enquiry into the Freedom of Action, 
 than by afcertaining the proper import of 
 'Freedom ? 
 
 2. Liberty,
 
 Liberty. 7 
 
 . 2. Liberty, fays Mr. Z,0r&, is a power, Liberty, 
 and fo is will j therefore they cannot be 
 predicated of one another, for it would be 
 abfurd to affirm of a power that it has a 
 power. But with fubmiffion to the autho- 
 rity of fo great a Matter, I conceive Liberty 
 a more complex term than he has made it a 
 and though it includes an idea of power, 
 it contains other ideas betide. And as I 
 apprehend it^to be a negative term, imply- 
 ing no more than a denial of reftraint and 
 force 5 for when we fay a man is free, we 
 mean nothing elfe than that there is no 
 hindrance againft his doing or forbearing 
 what he has a mind ; therefore it will be 
 expedient to confider how we come by the 
 notion of Reftraint or Force. 
 
 We find ourfelves poffefled of feveral 
 powers of action, we can walk, or fpeak, 
 or think, or can let them alone : fome- 
 times difeafes or other accidents deprive us 
 of our powers, and then we can no longer 
 perform the functions of them ; but at 
 other times, though we remain poffefTed 
 of our powers entire, yet we cannot exert 
 B 4 them,
 
 8 Liberty. 
 
 them, by reafon of fomething ftronger 
 counteracting them. Thus a man in the 
 ftocks has not loft his power of walking, 
 the vigour of his mufcles is not abated, 
 nor is he lefs able to bear the fatigue of a 
 journey on foot than he was before ; never-/ 
 thelefs, he cannot walk at all, becaufe the 
 clofenefs of the wood refills the motion 
 of his legs, therefore he is under a reftraint 
 which hinders him from ufing the power 
 nature has given him. So if he be 
 puflied along by another ftronger than him- 
 felf, he muft move forward whether he 
 will or no, not that he has loft the natural 
 command of his limbs to put them in mo- 
 tion or keep them at reft j but becaufe he 
 is under a force greater than he can refift. 
 
 Thus Reftraint is a comparifon between 
 fome power and an impediment prevenu 
 ing it from performing its proper function, 
 as Force is the like comparifon between the 
 power of forbearance, and fome external 
 impulfe which renders action neceflary, 
 but forbearance impracticable ; and Liberty 
 denotes the abfence of the other two ; for 
 
 when
 
 Liberty. 
 
 when we pronounce a man free, we un- 
 derftand thereby that there is nothing either 
 impelling him to do what he would not, 
 or restraining him from doing what he 
 would. So that all three include the idea 
 of Power, Reftraint and Force, as wel\ as 
 Liberty, nor can either of them fubfift 
 where there is none ; for the bars of a pri- 
 fon are no reftraint to a paralytic, nor will 
 you give him liberty by unlocking them, 
 neither can you force a man to fly, or a 
 horfe to fpeak. 
 
 We may obferve further, that Liberty is 
 fo far from being the fame thing with 
 Power, that it may be reftored by the lofs, 
 and leflened by the acceffion of it. Were 
 an aft of parliament made to prohibit me 
 from going out si. London for a twelvemonth, 
 I mould think it a grievous reflraint upon 
 my liberty ; but mould I be rendered un- 
 able to ftir abroad by gout or pally, or fome 
 other complaint which I could not hope to 
 get rid of in the time, the reftridtion would 
 no longer be fuch to me, and I mould re- 
 main as much at liberty, as if the ftatute 
 
 had
 
 Liberty. 
 
 had never been made'. On the other hand 
 our cloaths are made to fit our bodies, fo 
 that we can move all our limbs freely, not- 
 withflanding the many ligatures and cover- 
 ings wherewith we are enveloped; but 
 fhould.it pleafe God to caufe a pair of wings 
 to fprout out from our fides, we mould 
 find our cloaths a troublefome reftraint upon 
 
 us, 
 
 a If it be faid the law extends to every body with- 
 out exception, fo that women and children are bound 
 by the game afts, as well as the unqualified fportfman. 
 I fhall obferve, that it is proper the law fhould fpeak 
 in general terms, becaufe it would be troublefome to 
 diftinguim conftantly between the able, and the un- 
 able j and entirely needlefs, the reftraint being barely 
 nominal with refpeft to the latter. And fo it would 
 appear, if a law were to be made againft what no man 
 can do. As ready as we are to cavil at the minifters, 
 if one of them were to procure an aft to pafs, laying 
 a grievous penalty upon any who fhould fly about in 
 the air j however we might fufpeft his intellects, we 
 fhould never fufpeft his having defigns upon our 
 liberty, nor grumble at the reftriftion, which we fhould 
 fee was not a real one. Indeed I have heard the Teft 
 Aft complained of as a hardfhip, by fuch as had no 
 chance of ever rifingto preferment i but this is, becaufe 
 they think it difagreeable to have a mark of diftinftion 
 fet upon them : and fo is every thing difagreeable that 
 (hows a diflike, although we fuftain no immediate da,- 
 mage by it. 3
 
 Liberty, I $ 
 
 ys, and we muft fend for our taylors to 
 put flits in them for letting out the wings, 
 in order to reftore us that liberty we had 
 loft by the fuperaddition of a new power. 
 
 Hence we fee that liberty is fo far from 
 being inapplicable to power, that it is pro- 
 perly applicable to nothing elfe } nor is it 
 an abfurd queftion to afk, whether a power 
 be free, for it implies no more than to en- 
 quire how fuch power ftands circumftanced 
 with regard to any force or impediment 
 which might compell or obftrucl: the ex- 
 ertion of it. And when we apply fuch 
 queftions to the agent, they bear a refe- 
 rence always to fome power he poffefles, 
 therefore a man may be free and reftrained 
 at the fame time with refpect to different 
 powers of action ; for he that is locked faft 
 in a room may be free to think or fpeak, 
 though he is not to go abroad -, but a power 
 to do fome particular act cannot be free 
 while conftrained, nor the contrary. 
 
 Indeed there are degrees of freedom, not 
 incompatible with a partial reftraint, but 
 father implying it, as when we find fome 
 
 impediment
 
 j 2 Liberty. 
 
 impediment obftrudting us,- though not fo 
 great as that we cannot furmount it j for a 
 man with heavy jack-boots on can ftill 
 walk, though not fo freely and alertly as 
 in a neat pair of fhoes : fuch obftacles do 
 not debar us the ufe of our powers, but 
 . render it difficult and laborious, or limit 
 them in compafs. 
 
 . 3. Let us nowcaft back our eye upon 
 the path we have trod, in order to difcover 
 what equivocal outlets there may be to 
 miflead the unwary traveller. We get our 
 idea of power, fays Mr. Locke> from the 
 changes we fee made in fubftances by one 
 another: therefore the word Power ori- 
 ginally and properly denotes a quality or 
 property in fomething to caufe thofe 
 changes, and is fynonimous with ability, 
 and we have hitherto ufed it in that fenfe. 
 But it often carries a larger fignification, 
 comprehending other circumftances befides 
 ability; fo that according to the various 
 lights wherein we place it, a man may have 
 power when he has it notj that is, he 
 
 may
 
 Liberty. 
 
 may have it in one fenfe while he wants it 
 in another. 
 
 Suppofe a perfon of full health and 
 vigour bound down in his bed by a multi- 
 tude of threads wound all over him ; ano- 
 ther feeing him lie motionlefs, but not 
 knowing the occafion, fancies him ftruck 
 with fome fudden diftemper that has taken 
 away the ufe of his limbs j he laments his 
 unhappy condition, in being at once de- 
 prived of all his powers of a&ion : muft 
 not we pronouncethis complainant miftaken, 
 for that the man has loft none of his powers, 
 but they all remain entire as ever, though 
 he cannot ufe them until the firings that 
 tie him down be loofened ? If a fecond 
 perfon comes into the room who takes the 
 cafe differently, afcribing the man's in- 
 activity to a fit of lazinefs with which he 
 upbraids him, (hall we not plead in his ex- 
 cufe, that it is no fault of his that he does 
 not rife, for that the bandages hold him 
 down fo tight, he has no power to ftir either 
 hand or foot ? 
 
 Thus
 
 Liberty. 
 
 Thus we fee that power may be truly 
 affirmed or denied in the fame inftance^ 
 according to the manner wherein the 
 queftion is propofed, or thoughts of the 
 perfon fropofing it 5 and a man may have 
 ability fufficient for performing a work, 
 which yet he is not able to do, by reafon 
 of fome obftacle, want of fome instrument 
 or material, or other eircumftance (landing 
 in the way. 
 
 We may prefume Mr. Locke underftood 
 Power in this extenfive latitude, when he 
 made it the fame with Liberty 5 for where 
 he obferves that a man on the fouth fide of 
 a prifon has power to walk northwards but 
 not fouthwards, this were not true, If 
 fpoken of natural ability 5 for the fame 
 vigour of limbs which might carry hirri 
 one wayj would fuffice to carry him any 
 other 5 therefore if he want power to walk 
 fouthwards becaufe the walls of the prifon 
 obftruct his paflage, the term muft be fd 
 conftrued as to include Liberty ; and in this 
 fenfe it would indeed be as abfurd to afkj 
 
 whether
 
 Liberty. 
 
 whether a Power be free, as whether Blue- 
 nefs be blue, or Hardnefs hard. 
 
 .4. We may remark further, that Know- 
 ledge is often confounded with Power ; for 
 ideal caufes a being requiflte to direct us in 
 the choice of proper adions, we can no 
 more proceed without them than we can 
 without ability. If I have a paper in my 
 Cuftody which I have miflaid, upon being 
 
 urged 
 
 a The Author has a chapter upon thefe, and makes 
 them a fpecies of ideas, as he does motives, or final 
 caufes, an under fpecies of them. The diftincYion 
 between thefe three may be explained by the following 
 inftance. A man walking in the fields may fee birds 
 flying, or cattle grazing, which ftrike ideas upon him> 
 but fuch as are no caufes of any thing he does ; for he 
 would walk in the fame manner if they did not appear. 
 The fight of his path, together with the windings and 
 turnings of it, and his remembrance or information of 
 the right way, where it parts into two, are ideal caufes 
 without which he could not proceed ; for if he had 
 them not, he might ftumble againft a ftone, or wander 
 out of the way. But health, bufmefs, or diverfion, 
 are final caufes ; becauft without thefe, or fome other 
 purpofe in view, he would not walk at all. Thus 
 ideal caufes are that part of our knowledge, which 
 does not inftigate us to a&ion, but dire&s us how to 
 Jhape it.
 
 16 Liberty, 
 
 urged to produce it inftar^ly, I {hall be apf 
 to alledge that it is out of my power fo to 
 do, not becaufe I have not the key of the 
 drawer where it lies, nor ftrength in my 
 fingers to take it out as well as any other 
 paper, but becaufe I know not where to 
 look for it. So if a countryman wants to 
 fpeak with a perfon living at the further 
 end of the town, he may fay it is out of 
 his power to find the houfe ; not that he 
 wants pliancy in his joints to carry him 
 through all the turnings leading thither as 
 well as any citizen, but becaufe he fhould 
 lofe his way for want of knowing the 
 right. But this idea does not enter into 
 difputes concerning freedom, for ignorance 
 is efteemed a defect of power rather than 
 an abridgement of liberty. 
 
 It has been (hewn in Chap. II. that 
 what we generally call an Action b , is not 
 one, but a ftries of many actions j and when 
 we go about to do a thing, we proceed 
 
 to 
 
 b And it is expedient for common ufe that we 
 fhould call it fo; for were we to enumerate all the 
 minute motions we make upon every occafion, we 
 
 fhould
 
 Liberty. I J 
 
 to the accomplishment of it by feveral inter- 
 mediate fieps, each whereof requires a par- 
 ticular exertion of power to performit. Now 
 if there fland an impediment any where in 
 the way, we cannot do the thing propofed ; 
 neverthelefs we remain ftill at liberty to 
 take the fteps lying on this fide the impedi- 
 ment, and at all events can ufe our endea- 
 vours, how ineffectual foever they may 
 prove. Thus if a man be hindered from 
 going to London by floods out in the road, 
 he may yet go up to the edge of the flood 
 without obftacle : if he be locked into a 
 room, he may pum againft the door j and 
 if his fingers be bound round with a pack- 
 thread, he may try to expand them, being 
 at full liberty to give his mufcles the in- 
 flation proper for fpreading them open. 
 
 It is obfen-able likewife, that reftraint 
 is often confounded with impotence, nor 
 can we eafily avoid doing fo ; for reftraint 
 
 fhould make no difpatch in our converfations with one 
 another. But when we go to examine the nature of 
 the mind, and fcrutinize her manner of proceeding 
 we ftiall often find it neceflary to analyze a&ion into 
 its conftitucnt parts. 
 
 C being
 
 1 8 Liberty. 
 
 being a comparifon between our powers 
 and any thing that might obftruct their ex- 
 ercife, may ceafe upon their increafe, or 
 may be generated by a diminution of our 
 powers, rendering that an obftacle to our 
 motions which was none before. Thus 
 Sampfon, after being fhprn of his ftrength, 
 was brought under confinement by the 
 fame cords which were no infringement of 
 his liberty aforetime, and if they had re- 
 mained on him until his hair had grown 
 again, he would have been reftored to 
 liberty by the return of his ftrength, with- 
 out any alteration in the ftrength of the 
 bandage. 
 
 Therefore we pronounce up'on the fame 
 cafe, as being a defeat of power or of 
 liberty, according. to the light wherein we 
 place it : the laws prohibiting the aliena- 
 tion of church lands, are called fometimes 
 difabling, and fometimes retraining ftatutes; 
 and we fpeak indifferently of a man being 
 difabled to go abroad or confined at home 
 by a diftemper. But in ftriclnefs, the 
 beginning of a fever works no difability, 
 
 for
 
 Liberty. 
 
 for there is generally then an unufual 
 ftrength and' flow of fpirits, fo that the 
 patient might do as he did at other times, 
 if it were not for the neceflary regard to 
 his health, which is a bar againft his flir- 
 ring out of the houfe ; whereas a pally 
 does jj|*-properly confine, for air and exer- 
 cife might be wholefome, and nothing 
 hinders you from going abroad, but you 
 are not able, the ufe of your limbs being 
 fufpended by the diftemper. 
 
 Mr. Locke fays, thataclive power belongs 
 only to fpirit : however this be, we certainly 
 conceive it, and in our common difcourfes 
 fpeak of it as refiding in things inanimate j 
 therefore we apply the terms Force and 
 Reflraint when we perceive them acting 
 or moving in a manner-different to that we 
 mould expect from their natural properties, 
 as we do -Liberty, when nothing hinders 
 their operations : we talk of a free air, a 
 pendulum fwinging, or a river running 
 freely, where there is no obftruction againft 
 their motions ; of water being forced up- 
 C 2 wards
 
 Liberty. 
 
 wards by an engine, or a ftream confined 
 within its channel, by raifing the banks. 
 
 Hence it appears, that the force of in*- 
 ertnefs afcribed by Naturalifts to matter, 
 and the force of impulfe caufing its changes 
 of ftare from motion or reft to the con- 
 trary, does not carry precifely the fame 
 fignification with force in vulgar language ; 
 for 'tis the impulfe of gravitation, together 
 with its own inertnefs, or perfeverance in a 
 motion once received, that makes a torrent 
 rum violently into the fea ; yet every com- 
 mon man apprehends water to run down- 
 wards of itfelf, nor ever efteems it under a 
 force, unlefs when he fees it driven up- 
 wards by fome other power, nor under 
 reftraint, unlefs when fomething obftructs 
 the courfe it would naturally take. And 
 though we talk frequently of the force of a 
 torrent, we do not underftand thereby any 
 force the water itfelf lies under, but that 
 we fuppofe it able to put upon whatever 
 may happen to ftand in its way. 
 
 Whoever will examine the language of 
 mankind, may find that we apply expref- 
 
 fions
 
 2 1; 
 
 fions to bodies which belong properly to 
 our own manner of proceeding ; and how 
 well foever we know the contrary, fpeak 
 of them as voluntary agents, exercifing 
 powers of their own : thus it is faid the 
 wind bloweth where it lifteth, and we con- 
 ceive water as having a fluidity or perpe- 
 tual motion among its particles, unlefs 
 bound up by a piercing froft. 
 
 Nor do the learned abflain from the like 
 catachrefis, when they talk of the tenden- 
 cies and nitencies, the conatus recedendi of 
 bodies, the fpontaneous or automatic mo- 
 tions of clock-work, or the laws c of mat- 
 ter; and even when they abftradt from 
 the fecondary properties refulting from 
 competition, they feem to conceive reft as 
 the natural ftate and choice of body which 
 it exerts its power to preferve itfelf in, as 
 one may gather from their calling the mo- 
 mentum or quantity of motion in any body 
 a force, which conveys an idea fimilar to 
 
 c For in ftriftnefs, law is applicable only to intelli- 
 gent agents, with-held from ufing their powers by the 
 fear of puniihment, or obligation to authority. 
 
 C 3 that
 
 22 Liberty. 
 
 that of a man carried along againfl bis 
 inclination by fome impulle he flrives in 
 vain to refift. 
 
 . 5. I take notice of thefe niceties, not 
 fo much for any benefit they may be of 
 towards determining the prefent queftion, 
 as for a caution to beware of letting fuch 
 variations of language lead us aftray : for 
 the proper and genuine fignifkation of free- 
 dom being the abfence of all obftruclion 
 which might thwart us in the exercife of 
 any power we pofTefs, we are free when 
 upon employing our power it will take 
 effect ; but under reftraint, when fome- 
 thing impedes us in the exercife of our 
 power, fo as that although we fhould exert 
 it, the proper confequence of fuch exertion 
 would not follow. 
 
 Thus a man is at liberty to walk, if 
 upon ufmg his legs they will carry him to 
 the place he purpofes ; but if there fland 
 any wall or bar in the way, fo that with 
 his utmoil endeavours he cannot move 
 forwards, then he is not at liberty. And 
 
 fo
 
 Liberty. 2 3 
 
 fo in all actions we have ability to perform, 
 if they would not enfue upon our efforts, 
 it mufl be owing to fome hindrance which 
 cramps and prevents them from taking 
 effect. 
 
 Frorri hence it appears, that Freedom 
 relates to the event of our endeavours, not 
 to the caufes of them ; for whether any 
 or no inducement prevails on me to ,walk, 
 I am equally free, provided nothing hinders 
 me from walking, if I ftand fo inclined ; 
 for Liberty does not depend on any thing 
 prior to the exercife of my power, but 
 upon what would or would not ftand in the 
 way after having exerted it, and therefore 
 is not inconfiftent with any antecedent 
 caufes or difpofition of Providence in- 
 fluencing me to walkj for how much 
 foever they may impell me to go out of the 
 room, I am not at liberty to do it while the 
 door is locked, and when the door is 
 opened I am fet at liberty, how much fo- 
 ever they may with-hold me from uling it. 
 
 But it will be faid, all this may be very 
 
 true, and yet affects not the cafe under 
 
 C 4 confidera-
 
 24 Parlous Wills. 
 
 confideration, as it relates only to freedom 
 of action, concerning which there is no 
 controverfy, not to freedom of will: for 
 no Armiman will doubt a man's being der- 
 barred of his Liberty by {hutting him up 
 in a goal ; nor will the mofl rigid Cahinift 
 deny, that upon being let loofe he is at 
 liberty to go which way he pleafes. So 
 the difpute turns, not upon our freedom to 
 do as we will, but upon our freedom to 
 choofe out of feveral actions in our power : 
 and both feem to agree, that whatever act 
 is contained in the plan of Providence muft 
 be performed, nor can we will the con- 
 trary if we would. 
 
 6. Before we enter upon the dif- 
 of this queftion, it will be neceflary 
 to underfland ourfelves in the propofing it j 
 for men feem to me not always very clear in 
 their idea of the term Will, as it flands in 
 either branch of the fentence, 
 
 We learn, upon Mr. Locke's authority, 
 that we are capable of no more than one 
 determination of the Will at once, ano! 
 3 who-
 
 Parlous Wills. 25 
 
 whoever obferves the motions of the human 
 mind will find her volitions tranlient and 
 momentary ; (he varies her action perpe- 
 tually, willing this inftant what (lie rejects 
 the next j and if the perfeveres for a time in 
 one purpofe, it is by a train of numerically 
 diftincl, tho' fimilar and correspondent vo- 
 litions : therefore to afk, whether we can will 
 this prefent inftant, if we will this prefent 
 inftant, would be an idle and trifling que- 
 ftion ; it muft indeed be anfwered in the 
 affirmative, and fo muft eve^ry other of the 
 like fort j for I can walk if I walk, ride if 
 I ride, or do any thing elfe you can name, 
 if I do it ; and fuch hypothetical affirma- 
 tions may be true of things which cate- 
 gorically propofed were abfolutely impof- 
 fible ; for it is as true, that I can lift the 
 houfe if I lift it, or jump over the moon if 
 I jump over it, as that I can take up a pin 
 if I take it up : fuch propofitions are merely 
 identical, making a fhew of fomething 
 profound, but adding nothing to our in<- 
 formation. 
 
 Therefore
 
 26 Various Wills. 
 
 Therefore the queftion, to mean any 
 thing ? muft relate to different Times or dif- 
 ferent Wills, and the drift of it be to en- 
 quire either, whether by willing a thing 
 now I can caufe myfelf to will it by and by j 
 or whether if I happen to will oppofite 
 things at the fame time, as to buy a coftly 
 trinket and to fave my money, I can by 
 one Will controul the other, or by a third 
 - Will choofe which of the two {hall have 
 the guidance of my conduct. 
 
 To the fjrft of thefe enquiries, one can- 
 not give a direct anfwer, it being notorious 
 by every day's experience, that we do de- 
 termine upon what we will do beforehand^ 
 and many times do it accordingly, but at 
 other times do it not, and that upon two 
 accounts ; either becaufe we have changed 
 pur mind, or becaufe though we continue 
 jn the fame, we find fome defire, or terror> 
 or difficulty rife upon us too ftrong for our 
 refplution ; but changes of mind create no 
 doubts concerning liberty j for nobody 
 imagines that our refolving upon a thing 
 lays us under a neceflity of performing it, 
 
 although
 
 Various Wills.., 27 
 
 although good reafons mould occur to the 
 contrary, or our judgement mould alter ; 
 nor will deny, that how ftrongly foever I 
 have determined to leave London feven 
 years hence, I may remain perfectly free 
 all the while to determine otherwife when- 
 ever I think proper. 
 
 Which by the way (hews Liberty not 
 incongruous with prior caufes ; for if I do 
 fomething becaufe I had refolved upon it 
 beforehand, and this we praclife every day 
 of our lives, the volition whereby I perform 
 it muft be acknowledged an effect of my 
 former determination, neverthelefs will be 
 counted a free act in every body's eftima- 
 tion, provided nothing hinders but that I 
 might omit it ; therefore if my firft deter- 
 mination were contained within the plan 
 of Providence, the performance may make 
 a part of that plan without infringement of 
 my liberty ; for even fuppofing me influ- 
 enced to refolve by fome irrefiftible grace, 
 or fupernatural impulfe, though I was not 
 free in making, I am yet free in keeping 
 the refolution, nor does there need any 
 > I more
 
 28 Various Wills. 
 
 more than to keep off all fuggeftions which 
 might alter my judgement, or temptations 
 which might overpower it, and I (hall 
 execute what was refolved on by virtue of 
 the freedom remaining within me. 
 
 But when we change our conduct with-^ 
 out changing our mind, and do not pro~ 
 fecute what we have in our intention, by 
 reafon of fome appetite drawing the con- 
 trary way, then difputes and difficulties 
 arife; becaufe we conceive our Will ftill 
 exerting itfelf, but prevented from taking 
 effect by a fuperior force or impediment 
 counter-acting it, which prefents the ge^ 
 niiine idea of a want of Liberty. 
 
 Thus this queftion, whether by our'pre^ 
 fent Will we may determine what we mall 
 will at fome future time, becomes reduced 
 into that other, whether one Will may 
 controul or confine another coexiftentWill. 
 
 . 7. And no wonder we find perplexities 
 in, examining metaphyfically a queftion, 
 the terms whereof have no place in the 
 metaphyfical vocabulary ; for there is a 
 
 philo-
 
 Wills. 29 
 
 philofophical, and there is a vulgar language, 
 and if ftudious men will mingle their ab- 
 flractions among vulgar ideas, they muft 
 unavoidably bewilder themfelves in mazes 
 and darknefs. 
 
 The notion of a diverfity of Wills is un- 
 known to him that carefully ftudies the 
 motions of the human mind, for her ads 
 are inftantaneous and tranfitory; nor can 
 he perform any more than one at the fame 
 time : we have various powers of action, 
 and they all lie under the command of the 
 mind to turn them upon one particular ob- 
 ject ; her giving them that turn is properly 
 volition, and it is as abfurd to imagine fhe 
 mould exert oppofite volitions together, as 
 that the wind mould blow eaft and weft. 
 
 We may be reftrained in the ufe of our 
 powers, becanfe their operation pafles 
 through feveral ftages ; we work upon 
 certain unknown nerves, they inflate the 
 mufcles, the mufcles pull the tendons, the 
 tendons move the limbs, and if there be 
 an obftruction any where, we have not 
 liberty to perform the action intended, how 
 
 much
 
 Various Wills. 
 
 much foever we may endeavour it ; but 
 the acts of the mind upon the firft cor- 
 poreal fibre receiving her impulfe are im- 
 mediate, fo there is no rpom for any im- 
 pediment to interfere in flopping their 
 progrefs : we may indeed imagine her to 
 lofe her power by the fibre becoming in- 
 capable, or being removed out of her reach ; 
 but we have feen that when power is gpne, 
 there is no place either for Liberty or Re- 
 ftraint. 
 
 Nor let it be afked, whether the mincl 
 be free to determine her own acts ; for this 
 implies, that one volition is the confe- 
 quence of another, and fo it may be re- 
 motely ; but we have mown in a former 
 place, that the mind never acts upon her- 
 felf, unlefs by the mediation of motives ; 
 for there is no one action of our lives which 
 we do not enter upon through fome mo- 
 tive of judgement or inclination, or prefent 
 fancy ; and even if we had an elective 
 power befides our active, how much foever 
 that might determine the latter, it muft 
 
 itfelf
 
 Various Wills. 31 
 
 itfelf be determined by fome fatisfaction 
 apprehended in the choice 3 . 
 
 But the fuggeftion of motives to our 
 thoughts is as much an action, as the 
 moving of our limbs, and if any thing 
 obftrudts their rifing, notwithftanding our 
 endeavours to call them up, we may be 
 free or restrained with refpecT: to that action ; 
 but in refpedl: to our firffc endeavours, we 
 are no more capable of either, in one cafe 
 than the other b . 
 
 There- 
 
 a There is a long chapter upon this head, wherein 
 it is endeavoured to overthrow the do&rine, of a Free- 
 will of indifference, and to mew, in confirmation of 
 what Mr. Locke had advanced before, that the ex- 
 pectation of prefent fatisfaction, or efcape of prefent 
 uneafmefs, is the thing that determines the Will in her 
 every motion ; that remote good never moves her, un- 
 lefs by the fatisfa&ion taken in making advances to- 
 wards it ; and that when we do wrong, we are milled 
 by prefent gratification appearing znore fatisfaclory 
 than a greater diftantgood. 
 
 b It having been fhown in a former place, that the 
 mind never aits upon herfelf, unlefs by mediation of 
 fome material organ employed to raife ideas of re- 
 flection before her ; which is an aftion as much as 
 holding up a paper to exhibit the writing thereon to 
 our fight. Now the mind gannot be retrained from 
 
 touching
 
 Various Wills. 
 
 Therefore we may agree with Mr. Locke 
 in pronouncing Liberty as little applicable 
 to Volition, taken in the philofophical fenfe, 
 as Squarenefs is to Virtue, or Swiftnefs to 
 Sleep, .. r 
 
 . 8. But if we Men to the common 
 difcourfes of mankind, we mall find them 
 fpeaking of feveral Wills, feveral agents in 
 the fame perfon refuting, counteracting, 
 overpowering and controuling one another : 
 hence the fo ufual expreffions of the fpiritual 
 and carnal Wills, of the man and of the 
 beaft, of felf-will and reafon, of denying 
 our Wills, fubduing our paffions, or being 
 enflaved by them, of adting unwillingly or 
 againft our will, and the like: all which 
 take rife from a metonyme of the caufe for 
 
 touching the organ, though the latter may be hindered 
 by fome obftacle from anfwering the touch. Thus if 
 I am prevented from thinking, either by the fumes of 
 indigeftion, or the noife of people gabbling about my 
 ears, yet nothing prevents me from trying, which is 
 all the mind has to do ; but in one cafe the organs are 
 rendered unfit to perform their office ; and in the 
 other, the ideas they caft up are obfcured by thofe 
 thrown in forcibly by the fenfes. 
 
 the
 
 Various Wills. 33 
 
 the effect, for our aliens being conftantly 
 determined either by the decifions of our 
 judgement, or follicitations of our defires, 
 we miftake them for the Will itfelf : nor 
 is it a little confirmation of the Will being 
 actuated by motives, to find them fo in- 
 timately connected therewith that a com* 
 mon eye cannot diftinguifh them apart. 
 
 When in our fober moods we deliberate 
 and afterwards fix upon our meafures of 
 conduit $ we look upon fuch determination 
 as our Will, which we conceive not a 
 tranfient act, but an abiding power, ex- 
 erting itfelf from time to time as opportu- 
 nities offer, until either the defign be com- 
 pleated, or frem reafons prevail on us to 
 alter it. 
 
 But it often happens, that fome inordi- 
 nate paffion or inveterate habit comes 
 athwart our way, and puts us by from the 
 profecution of our defign, without making 
 us change it : this we likewife regard as 
 our Will, being fenfible that what we do 
 by its inftigation is ftill our own act, and 
 becaufe we find the fame defire prompting 
 
 D us
 
 34 Parlous Wills. 
 
 us at different times, we apprehend this too 
 a permanent power lying in us, ready to- 
 be exerted upon the proper objects prefent- 
 ing. Thus we get the idea of two Wills 
 oppofing, impeding, reflraining,. and matter- 
 ing one another. 
 
 : Sometimes there enfues a conteft be- 
 tween them, the mind hovering uncertain 
 for a while,, until at laft fhe fettles on 
 either fide : hence comes the idea of a 
 third Will, determining between the other 
 two; and I believe this gave rife to the 
 notion of an elective, be fides our active 
 power. 
 
 But thefe druggies are owing to the fluc- 
 tuations of firength in our motives, and 
 the victory to fome one of them catching 
 the idea of Satisfaction away from the reft : 
 for 'tis well known, that motives as well of 
 reafon as paffion, do not always appear in 
 equal colours, nor prefs with equal force, 
 but urge vehemently or feebly by turns, 
 with frequent and fudden variations: and 
 we may perceive the like wavering in our 
 cooleft deliberations between two mcafures 
 4 of
 
 Various Wills. 35 
 
 t>f conduct or two diverfions, wherein the 
 mind cannot be fufpeded of giving a pre- 
 ference, being difpofed all along to follow 
 whichever fhall be found the beft or mod 
 (entertaining} but both appear fuch alter- 
 nately, until at laft the ballance of judge- 
 ment or fancy fettles without intervention 
 of the Will to caft it either way. 
 
 . 9. Neverthelefs, men cannot be put 
 out of their accuftomed manner of talking: 
 
 o 
 
 and thinking, therefore in compliance with 
 their conceptions, let us fuppofe a diverfity 
 of Wills, that thofe Wills exert permanent 
 acts, lafting for hours and days without in- 
 termiffion, and that we may will at one 
 time, what we mall will at another. In 
 this light there is certainly room for apply- 
 ing reftraint and freedom to the Will; for 
 its operations being now conceived paffing 
 through a length of time before they take 
 effect, may be obftrudted, or turned afide 
 in their pafTage by fomething elfe : fo if I 
 do in the afternoon what I had determined 
 in the morning to forbear, my former Will 
 D 2 Hill
 
 3 6 Various Wills. 
 
 fHH continuing the fame, I am under a 
 force, and the Will I have at prefent is a 
 different Will from that remaining with 
 me from the morning's determination, and 
 counteracts it. 
 
 But it being obvious that we can exert 
 our power only one way at a time, we are 
 apt to entertain a contradictory notion that, 
 while we have a diverfity of Wills within 
 us, one of them only is our own, and 
 efteem each of them fuch in turn according 
 as we chance to be in the humour. Some- 
 times it is the will of inclination, and mufl 
 be fo taken in all expreffions relating to 
 felf-denial, to curbing our Wills, or to 
 things we do unwillingly, or againft our 
 will, that is, againft our liking : but more 
 commonly we underftand the determina- 
 tion of our judgement to be our Will, 
 becaufe there are none of us without this 
 Will, for I fuppofe nobody ever refufes to 
 do what hisprefent judgement reprefents as 
 beft, provided it give him no trouble in the 
 performance, nor thwart any inclination, 
 or fancy whatever, therefore this is a Will 
 
 always
 
 Various Wills. 37 
 
 always fubfifting in us, though not always 
 taking effect. 
 
 As to the third Will, that of Election, 
 this takes place only occafionally, when 
 there is a conteft between the other two : 
 for as nobody ever choofes to act againft 
 his judgement without fome inclination 
 drawing him, or uneaiinefs driving him 
 the other way ; fo likewife I imagine no- 
 body ever choofes to abftain from doing 
 what he likes, when he fees no reafon in 
 the world why he (hould forbear ; when 
 Reafon and Inclination urge the fame way, 
 or one alone follicits, the other remaining 
 totally filent, which frequently happens, 
 there is but one obje<3: prefented to the 
 mind, who in that cafe has no room to 
 make any choice or election at all. 
 
 Therefore the will of Judgment or Re- 
 folution, in common propriety of language, 
 is to be efteemed our Will, our freedom 
 depending upon the prefepce, or abfence 
 of any impediment which might prevent 
 that from directing our motions : and fo 
 St. Paul underftood it, where he reprefents 
 D 3 the
 
 38 Various Wills. 
 
 the carnal man as omitting to do the things 
 he would, and doing the things he would 
 not, which he juftly ftiles, a wretched 
 bondage : nor can that glorious liberty of 
 the Sons of God, which we are exhorted 
 to aflert, be better expounded than by an 
 exemption from all inordinate defires and 
 temptations, fo that we may perform what- 
 ever our reafon and duty recommends with 
 eafe and readinefs. 
 
 . 10. But there is a reflrajnt which our 
 judgement lays upon itfelf, when an action 
 occurs we judge eligible regarded alone, 
 but cannot be done without omitting fome- 
 thing elfe we judge more expedient, we 
 think ourfelves not at liberty to do it. 
 Thus if I am afked to do fome little good 
 office for a friend, when fome bufmefs of 
 importance calls me another way, I fhall 
 excuie myfelf by faying, I would gladly 
 oblige him if I were not under a neceffity 
 of attending to my bufmefs. 
 
 It is this oppofition of things eligible to 
 the judgement, if confidered apart, that 
 
 gives
 
 Various Wills. 39 
 
 gives birth to thofe we have called Motives 
 of Neceffity \ to Obligation, to Duty, the 
 command of a Superior, the regard for our 
 Health, our Prefervation, the avoidance of 
 Mifchief, or Damage ; all which compel 
 us many times to act otherwife than we 
 wih, or than our judgement would choofe, 
 if thefe bars did not ftand in the way : but 
 this kind of neceffity is a very unftable 
 term, the fame cafe being efteemed fuch in 
 one light which is not in another. 
 
 A man having a feal put forcibly into his 
 hand, and the hand with the fame violence 
 preffed down upon wax affixed to a deed, 
 containing a conveyance of his eftate, will 
 be counted by every body under neceffity ; 
 but then the fealing is no more his act than 
 it is the act of the feal employed therein, 
 D 4 for 
 
 a In a former chapter upon that article, wherein 
 Neceffity is made one of the four clafles under which 
 all our motives of a&ion may be reduced; the other 
 three being Pleafure, Ufe, and .Honour. For we 
 never ftir a finger, unlefs to pleafe ourfelvcs more or 
 lefs, or for fome ufe we apprehend therein, or becaufe 
 we efteem it in forne degree laudable, or becoming, or 
 becaufe we mint for avoiding fome mifchief or incon- 
 venience.
 
 Various Wills. 
 
 for both aft by impulfe without any thing 
 that can be called freedom. 
 
 But what if his hands being left at liberty, 
 he be only locked up in a room, and 
 threatened to be kept there without victuals 
 or drink until he {hall feal ? Perhaps he has 
 a wife and children who muft be ruined by 
 the lofs of his eftate, and being a man of 
 refolution, he determines bravely to perifti 
 rather than bring them to deftrudtion : in 
 this forlorn condition he lolls out at a win- 
 dow, where he fees an intimate friend of 
 of his, a lawyer, who advifes him to exe- 
 cute, for that no damage can enfue there.- 
 from : he then calls for the deed, fets to his 
 feal, and obtains Jiis enlargement. This the 
 Philofopher will not allow to be arj ad of 
 neceffity, for it was in his power to have . 
 forborne, and he did actually forbear until 
 his friend's admonition having altered his 
 judgement, he chofe voluntarily to feal, 
 upon a prudential motive of faving his life 
 without detriment to his family. The 
 Grantees bring ejectment for the land in 
 WeftminJler-Ml, where the whole cafe ap- 
 pearing
 
 Various Wills. 41 
 
 pearing upon evidence as above, the judge 
 and jury pronounce the deed void, for that 
 the man was under durejje y and his aft not 
 voluntary but impofed upon him by force, 
 Thus we find the fame act adjudged necef- 
 fary in legal conftruction, which was free 
 and voluntary in the philofophical. 
 
 Now to change the cafe a little, imagine 
 the confinement were in a public gaol for a 
 lawful debt, which the party has no means 
 of paying, nor credit to procure bail ; feme-? 
 body offers to purchafe a farm contiguous 
 to his houfe, and which it would be greatly 
 inconvenient for him to part with, neverr 
 thelefs he confiders his health is infirm, 
 and if he remains in prifon it will inevitably 
 . prove his death ; fo he accepts the offer as 
 the only poffible means of extricating him- 
 felf. If he be afterwards blamed for fo 
 imprudent a bargain, he will alledge the 
 neceffity of his affairs compelling him to 
 it ; and this allegation will be readily ad- 
 mitted as a full excufe. If upon eject- 
 ment brought, he offers to refund the 
 money, and refufes to deliver poffeffion, 
 
 urging
 
 4 2 Various Wills. 
 
 urging the neceffity he lay under, I am 
 afraid this plea will not avail him ; for the 
 court will fay, his ad: was free and volun- 
 tary, nor was he under any compulfion 
 when he did it, therefore it muft ftand 
 good. 
 
 Let us now vary our circumftances once 
 more, and fuppofe the man under no con- 
 finement or debt at all ; but he has taken 
 a fancy to fome girl of the town; (he 
 wants a fum of money to throw away upon 
 an extravagance, and will leave him for 
 fome other gallant, unlefs he will fupply 
 her, which he has no means of doing 
 any other way, than by falc of the farm 
 above-mentioned : he is fo befotted with 
 her allurements that he cannot live with- 
 out her; fo he executes the conveyance, 
 though forcly againft the grain, and againft 
 his judgement i he will be apt to plead 
 neceffity in excufe for this foolifh proceed- 
 ing ; but no indifferent perfon will admit 
 it for fuch : here then is a neceffity men 
 deem fo themfelves, though nobody elfe 
 will call it by that name. 
 
 But
 
 Various ffiills. 43 
 
 But Neceffity being conftantly oppofed 
 to Freewill, the changeablenefs of thefe 
 terms, according to the lights wherein you 
 regard them, gives rife to as notable dif- 
 putes among us, as thofe canvafied of old 
 among the Philofophers concerning the 
 proper colour of the feathers of a cock- 
 pidgeon's neck, which prefents a different 
 afpect upon every little motion of the 
 bird. 
 
 . n. Every body efteems freedom the 
 bafis of morality j for no man deferves 
 praife or blame for doing what he could 
 not help, or omitting what he was not at 
 liberty to perform : we are juftified inr 
 doing things upon the command of a fu- 
 periour, which were blameable had we 
 done them upon our own accord ; and it is 
 a received maxim, that neceffity has no 
 law. Neverthelefs the reftraints laid upon 
 us by our vices juftify us not, and the 
 flave of fin is always thought anfwerable 
 for the drudgery he goes through in obe- 
 flience to his tyrant. On the other hand, 
 
 we
 
 Various Wills. 
 
 we may merit commendation, by com- 
 plying with the neceflary obligations of our- 
 reJigion and our duty. 
 
 Oftentimes, as has been already remark- 
 ed, we blend the idea of impotence with 
 want of liberty, or attribute to the one, 
 what proceeds from the other ; and indeed 
 the latter in fome meafure depends upon 
 the former ; for whatever obftacle ftands 
 in our way, were our ftrength increafed fo 
 as greatly to furmount it, would become 
 none, but we mould be fet at liberty from 
 its oppofition. A man bound hand and* 
 foot with cords, upon having the flrength 
 of Sampfon given him, would regain his 
 liberty without being untied : and a cobweb 
 wound about our hands makes no abate- 
 ment in our freedom, though it deftroys 
 that of a fly ; not that it does not oppofe 
 the fame refinance againfl our fingers as it 
 does againfl the legs of the fly, but becaufe 
 that refiftance is nothing in comparifon with 
 our greater ftrength. 
 
 When fome fond paffion captivates the 
 heart, and forces us upon actions our pre^ 
 
 fent
 
 Various Wills. 45 
 
 fent judgement difapproves, we are faid to 
 labour under an impotence of mind j and 
 the compliance with fuch temptations as 
 few or none can refut, is attributed to the 
 weaknefs of human nature. When ho- 
 nour, or duty calls a man to fome very 
 painful enterprize, like thofe of Sca?vola, 
 Regulus, or the Chriftian Martyrs, he does 
 not want freedom of action to accomplish 
 it ; for his hands will as readily obey the 
 command of the mind to thruft them into 
 burning coals, as into a bafon of water, if 
 he can but bring his mind to give the com- 
 mand : perhaps fome of us might refolve 
 upon fuch an exploit, but mould probably 
 flinch in the attempt j and we many times 
 do enter confidently upon undertakings 
 where we find our courage fail in the exe- 
 cution : here then is an effect of the Will 
 directing her own volitions, which yet are 
 forcibly turned a contrary way by the ter- 
 rors of the pain j fo then here, if ever, 
 the Will is not free to follow her own 
 choice and election : neverthelefs, when 
 
 trials
 
 Free Agency. 
 
 trials of this fort have been undergone, we 
 do not reckon them inftances of greater 
 freewill, but greater ftrength of virtue, and 
 extraordinary vigour of mind. 
 
 So if a covetous man intends to give 
 money in charity, but when he comes to 
 take his guineas out of the bag, has not 
 the heart to part with them j he has a will 
 to do a generous deed, and would execute 
 it if not retrained by his fondnefs for the 
 pelf; yet we do not ordinarily reckon him 
 deftitute of Freewill, but that he has not 
 power to give any thing away. Thus 
 we efleem the fame cafe a defect of Liber- 
 ty, or of Power, according as we fix our 
 eye upon the ftrength of the obftacle, or 
 feeblenefs of the agent. 
 
 Free $ l2 * ^^ e Speculative talk much of a 
 
 Agency, free and neceffary Agency, terms not in 
 ufe among the vulgar, nor do they lofe 
 any thing by the want of them : for if we 
 go to examine what Free Agency is, we 
 mall find it to be no more than the depen- 
 
 dency
 
 Free Agency. 47 
 
 dency of actions upon volition % therefore 
 man is a free Agent, becaufe his limbs 
 move according to the directions of his 
 
 Will, 
 
 * It is not clear that my friend Search has hit the 
 xa notion of free Agency, as underftood by thofe 
 who commonly employ the term. For according to 
 his definition, we muft afcribe it to the Brutes, not 
 excepting the moft ftupid of them, the Slugg and the 
 Beetle j becaufe unlefs we fuppofe them mere Carte/Jan 
 machines, we muft allow their motions to depend upon 
 their volition; for when they crawl to the right hand 
 or the left, it is not by impulfe, like a billiard ball 
 ftruck on either fide, but they are drawn that particu- 
 lar way by fome allurement ftriking their fenfe, and 
 might as well have crawled the contrary, if the like 
 allurement had invited them thither. Yet we do not 
 hold them for free Agents, nor efteem them account- 
 able Creatures, or capable of moral good and evil ; 
 as we do man, folely upon account of his having the 
 privilege of free Agency. So- that their Agency feems 
 to be of a middle nature, between free and neceflary: 
 fomething that partakes of both, and yet is neither. 
 
 Now in order to fettle the idea of free Agency, let 
 us obferve that man, befides his power of acting ac- 
 cording to the motives in his imagination, has a power 
 over the imagination itfelf, to call up ideas there, 
 which would not arife of their own accord. But this 
 power the Brutes feem to want ; for though they re- 
 member, they do not recollect; they have ideas of 
 reflexion, but fuch only as are thrown upon them 
 mechanically ; they have combinations and aflbciations, 
 formed by the frequent appearance of objects together, 
 
 without
 
 Free Agency. 
 
 Will, but Matter a neceflary Agent, ss 
 having no will, and acting folely by virtue 
 of the motion or impulfe imparted to it. 
 
 Not 
 
 without any endeavours of their own to unite them ; 
 and if they fometimes make inferences, thofe are fuch 
 as occur to them fpontaneoufly, and are not drawn out 
 by ftudy and meditation. Now this privilege of vo- 
 luntary reflection, commonly called Underftanding or 
 Reafon, is what denominates us free Agents, and 
 renders us accountable for our manner of ufmg it. Not 
 but that in fome of our actions, one can find no diffe- 
 rence from thofe of our fellow animals : for a dog 
 upon turning the corner of a ftreet, if he faw another 
 dog running againft him, would {tart afide, I fuppofe, 
 as well as a man upon the like occafion. Therefore 
 in this inftance the actions of both are fimilar : and 
 numberlefs inftances might be produced, wherein we 
 act under the guidance of fenfe and imagination, with- 
 out direction of our uriderftanding, or reflection upon 
 what we are doing. Yet how much foever we may 
 act in this manner, without ufing our underftanding, 
 We might always ufe it if we would : therefore this 
 privilege remaining always with us, we efteem our- 
 felves always free Agents : and the omiflion of ufing 
 it, is equally imputable to us, with any wrong ufe we 
 may make of it. 
 
 But to bring ofF our Author as well as we can, it 
 may be aliedged, that thofe actions only which we 
 perform with a reflex act, or confcioufnefs accompany- 
 ing them, and with confent of the mind upon fome 
 confideration, how tranfient foever, of what we are 
 
 about,
 
 Free Agency. 4-9 
 
 Not but upon a man's being pufhed 
 violently down to the ground his fall is necef- 
 fary, but then it is properly no aft of his 5 for 
 though we are apt to fay he hurt himfelf 
 
 ' 
 
 about, are efteemed the work of our will : but what 
 we do inadvertently, by fudden impulfe of fancy, or 
 furprize of habit, we are faid to do accidentally, or 
 mechanically. Therefore thefe adions, being ordina- 
 rily not reckoned our own, nor effects of our will, it 
 {till remains true, that free Agency is the dependance 
 of our actions upon our volition : taking thofe terms in 
 the fenfe wherein thofe who talk of free Agency under- 
 ftand them. 
 
 We may obferve further, that this double power the 
 human mind poffeffes, of ailing as well upon the 
 imagination as upon the limbs, probably gave rife to 
 the notion of an elective power, coexiftent with our 
 adive. For her reflex ad, introducing new ideas, 
 ftriking various lights from them, changing the colour 
 of our motives, removing fatisfadion to a different 
 point, thereby caufing other adions to enfue, than 
 would have followed upon the motives firft occurring, 
 and employed as often in adding ftrength to the follici- 
 tationsof paffion, as weight to the judgements of rea- 
 fon; it is looked upon as the operation of another 
 power, direding that whereby we perform our bodily 
 motions, and fetting it at work without the inter- 
 vention of motives, and even contrary to their in- 
 fluence. Whereas in reality thefe are not different 
 powers, but one and the fame, exercifed upon different 
 fubjeds, to wit, the mental and corporeal organs; 
 E nor
 
 Free Agency. 
 
 by the fall, which implies fomething done 
 by him, yet upon mature confideration, 
 we never attribute the hurt to him, but to 
 the perfon who threw him down : for in this 
 cafe his -motion is fimilar to that of body, 
 which does not properly act, but only 
 tranfmits the adlion of fomething elfe that 
 moved it. When a ftone ftrikes againft a 
 wall it ferves only as a channel of con- 
 veyance for the force of the engine from 
 whence it wascaft, that again ofthefprings 
 and wheels whereby it was worked, and fo 
 backwards in a feries of effects and caufes, 
 until you come to fome voluntary agent 
 
 nor do they <lire& one another any otherwife, than as 
 when a man reads an advertifement pofted up againft 
 a market-houfe, the fight of what he reads, raifes a 
 defire he might not otherwife have felt, of purchafing 
 the wares fpecified therein, and directs him where to 
 feek for them ; and fo gives birth to other actions than 
 he would have performed upon the motives in his 
 thought, before he turned his eyes upon the paper. 
 
 But however this be, it affe&s not the main argu- 
 ment carried on in the text : for whatever idea we 
 entertain of Agency, ftill our freedom confifts in the 
 removal of all impediment againft its taking effect 
 upon being exerted, but has no concern at all with 
 the caufes, or inducements prevailing on us to exert it. 
 
 giving
 
 Free Agency. 
 
 giving the firft impulfe, whofe act it is, 
 whether he intend the confequence or no. 
 Jf a man (hoots another, the wound made 
 by the bullet is his act, and he chargeable 
 with the murder j or if he (hot at a crow 
 and happened to kill a man, though he be 
 guilty of no crime, ftill the (laughter is 
 his act, but an undefigned and accidental 
 one. And if we commonly afcnbe powers 
 to body, it is becaufe we cannot trace them 
 back to the caufes from whence they ori- 
 ginally fprung. 
 
 Upon this view of the matter, we fee 
 that free Agency has nothing to do with 
 queftions concerning Liberty, for the one 
 may remain after the other being taken away. 
 A man fhut up in a prifon ftill continues a 
 free agent of fuch actions as he can per- 
 form i if he would gladly go abroad but 
 fits ftill in his wicker chair, as knowing 
 the doors are locked, his quiefcence is an 
 act of free Agency, not like that of the 
 chair he fits on, for he might have rofe 
 from it if he would. Or if he be ihoved 
 along by the (boulders, though he muft 
 E 2 move,
 
 c 2 Free Agency. 
 
 move, being under a force., yet he is a free 
 agent in the motion of his legs, for a ftatue 
 pufhed along in like manner, being a ne- 
 ceflary agent, would have fallen upon its 
 face. 
 
 Thus how much foever we may be 
 abridged or confined in our powers, while 
 there is any thing left that we can do, our 
 free agency fubfifts entire, for this relates 
 only to our manner of doing thofe actions 
 we perform, that is, by willing them ; and 
 confequently in every thing a man does 
 which is properly his act, whether by com- 
 pulfion, or reftraint, or free choice, he is 
 in that inftance a free agent, or in other 
 words, he is fuch whenever he is an agent 
 at all. 
 
 . 13. But all this will not fatisfy the 
 curious, for they afk further, whether a 
 man have free agency to will fuch a par- 
 ticular exertion of his power as well as to 
 execute it : now this is another kind of 
 Agency from that we have been fpeaking 
 of hitherto; and for diftinction fake we 
 ftiali beg leave to call it free Vblency (for 
 
 the
 
 Free Agency. 
 
 the Speculative will allow one another to coin 
 a word upon occasion) : fo the queftion is 
 not whether man be a free Agent, but a 
 free Volentj for his agency remains the 
 fame, provided his actions follow accord- 
 ing to his volition, whatever laws this latter 
 be fubject to. 
 
 Now in order to raife a queftion upon 
 this head, we muft fuppofe our Volition 
 the effect of fome prior or other act of the 
 Will befides the Volition itfelf under exa- 
 mination : but we have feen in the progrefs 
 of this work, that the Will is no fubject 
 of her own operation, but takes her turns 
 from time to time, according to the prefent 
 ftate of the judgement and imagination, 
 therefore the epithet Free, can neither be 
 affirmed, nor denied, nor any ways applied 
 to Volency j this not being immediately 
 produced by any exertion of our power. 
 'Tis true, we do often determine before- 
 hand what we will do, and purfue meafures 
 accordingly, which we (hould have omit- 
 ted", had it not been for fuch determination ; 
 and in this fenfe the Will acts upon herfelf, 
 E 3 but
 
 but then Die does it mediately by fixing 
 fuch ideas, refolutions, or propenfities t.pon 
 the memory and imagination as will fcrve her 
 for motives by and by ; and h is plain her 
 ag'. ncy terminates with the impreffing fuch 
 ideas, becaufe if they flip out of our head, or 
 fomething happens to render the determi- 
 nation inexpedient, though we aft con- 
 trary to it, yet -no doubts arife concerning 
 our free Agency, either in the firft deter- 
 mination or fubfequent volition. 
 
 Befides, fome of our actions leave room 
 for no more than one operation of the Will ; 
 a man turning the corner of a ftreet fees 
 fomebody come haftily againft him, and 
 fuddenly ftarts back ; here the firft aft of 
 his Will is that whereby he moves his limbs, 
 fo there is no prior Agency whereto the 
 term Free may be applied. 
 
 There are fome who hold two confub- 
 fitting Wills, an active and an elective, the 
 latter continually directing the former, how 
 truly I {hall not examine ; but upon this 
 fuppofition man is a free Agent, and a free 
 Volent j for free Agency is the dependance 
 
 of
 
 free Agency. 55 
 
 of his actions upon volition, and free vo- 
 lency the dependance of volition upon his 
 choice j but you Cannot go on further to 
 entitle him a free eleclant too; for I 
 never heard of any body fpinning the 
 thread fo fine as to fuppofe another election 
 determining that which determines the 
 Will: all who hold an elective power 
 making it either dependant upon motives, 
 or felf-moving independent on all caufes 
 whatever, even on any prior, or other act 
 of the Will, fo the term Free cannot be 
 applicable to it, becaufe we are free only 
 in fuch things as will enfue upon fome 
 previous act of the Will exerted to produce 
 them. 
 
 We do indeed often talk in common 
 converfation of a free, and a forced choice j 
 but this relates to the confequence of our 
 choice, not to the manner of making it, 
 and depends not fo much upon our being 
 able to choofe, as to obtain the thing chofen. 
 We fay indeed, a man has not liberty 
 to choofe when he knows the thing is not 
 to be had, becaufe he cannot will an im- 
 E 4 poffibilityj
 
 5 6 jFVw Agency. 
 
 pofTibility, for how much foever we may 
 wifh or defire, we never actually Will with- 
 out a prefent apprehenfion of fomething 
 feafible : but this proves volition dependant 
 upon final caufes occuring to the imagina- 
 tion, for an unattainable end is no end at 
 all, becaufe it is not a thing wherein our 
 efforts may terminate, nor can the mind 
 raife a volition of it by any power me pof- 
 fefles. Befides that choice, in vulgar ac- 
 ceptation, lies undoubtedly liable to con- 
 flraint, we meet with numberlefs in- 
 ftances every day of our being confined 
 in our choice j which mows that choice in 
 this fenfe is a different thing from the 
 elective power fpoken of juft now; for 
 that, the maintainers of it infifl upon as a 
 privilege inherent in human nature, which 
 nothing can divert us of, nor any external 
 force, [or circumftances of fituation conr 
 troul ; but that we have always power to 
 will, how much foever we may be re? 
 drained from doing. 
 
 J. 14, Thus
 
 Free Will 57 
 
 . 14. Thus have I endeavoured to point FreeWill. 
 out fome of thofe variations of fenfe our 
 words are liable to, according to the occa- 
 fion introducing them, or light wherein 
 they are placed : and it is this fluctuation 
 of language that makes the labyrinth, and 
 throws up the briars and thorns that en- 
 tangle us in our reafonings upon human 
 Liberty. For men fet out with one 
 queftion, but fcarce have gone a few fteps 
 before they flide infenlibly into another, 
 from thence into a third, and fo on with- 
 out limitation : no wonder then they can- 
 not come to a fatisfactory conclufion upon 
 a fubjecl perpetually changing. 
 
 I know of no other ufe * in the dif- 
 cufiion above attempted of thofe feveral 
 
 changes, 
 
 * Every common man apprehends himfelf as having 
 the command of his actions, and fome underftanding 
 to judge of their expedience. He knows his powers 
 are limited in compafs, or many times obftrufted by 
 outward impediments from taking effect when exerted, 
 and that his judgement is defective. Yet he can al- 
 ways ufe what judgement he has, and apply his endea- 
 vours towards helping himfelf to the thing it recom- 
 mends. He fees likewife that there are methods to 
 
 be
 
 Free Will. 
 
 changes, unlefs to warn men againfl being 
 beguiled by them, for let them keep their 
 ideas fteady, and I believe they will find no 
 difficulties. Therefore I hold it wrong to 
 enter upon a debate concerning free Will 
 in general, that being a variable term, as 
 well in our common difcourfes, as in our 
 abftrad fpeculations, for the Will is always 
 
 free, 
 
 be employed for improving his judgement, and in- 
 culcating motives upon his mind that will invigorate 
 his endeavours in time of a&ion. When he has failed 
 in any of thefe points, he taices fliame to himfelf for 
 the omiffion } and when he has done his beft, feels an 
 Approbation refting upon the deed. All this he can 
 eafily comprehend, and is comprehenfion enough for 
 his ufe : for in the bufinefs of life, we never talk of 
 free Agency, nor nd occafion to diftinguifh between 
 freedom of A&ion, and freedom of Will, nor to exa- 
 mine how many confubfifting powers we poffefs, opera- 
 ting upon one another. 
 
 Therefore honeft Ned acknowledges the fine-fpun 
 difcuflions he has attempted, of no ufe to fuch as can 
 be contented to keep within the compafs of common 
 fenfe : but if they will needs launch out into fubtile 
 refinements, until they find themfelves entangled, he 
 offers his beft afliftance to extricate them. Only he 
 defires they will not think of untying all the knots 
 ^t once ; but obferve where the thread flicks, and 
 apply his directions from time to time, for difingaging 
 it, in that particular part where they find the prefent 
 difficulty.
 
 Free WilL 59 
 
 free, that is, always doing fomething or 
 other while we wake, yet at the fame 
 time may be confined to one, or a few 
 ways of exerting herfelf : but let them 
 take into confideration particular acts of the 
 Will, and they will find her fometimes free, 
 fometimes under force or reftraint, and 
 fometimes neither of the three applicable 
 to her, according to the different lights 
 wherein they regard the matter, according 
 to what they underftand by the term 
 Will, and what they apprehend to be an 
 a6t of her's. 
 
 But with refpedl: to our main point the 
 confiftency of human Freedom with Pro- 
 vidence, it is not much matter what no- 
 tions men entertain of Liberty, of Agency, 
 of Will, or Choice, provided they con- 
 template each inftance fingly by itfelf, and 
 do not blend them together, nor change 
 them, by juggling like a conjuror with cups 
 and balls. For they muft difcern fo much 
 fimilitude in all cafes of Liberty that can be 
 produced, if they will, but keep their ideas 
 clear, and under fuch -difcipline as not to 
 
 joftle,
 
 60 Free Will. 
 
 joftle, or run into one another, that the 
 fame confequences will always follow, how 
 varioufly foever they may underftand Li- 
 berty in the feveral cafes propofed. 
 
 . 15. Let us confider a man juft en- 
 larged out of prifon, who we (hall fay has 
 regained his liberty, becaufe he can ftay at 
 home, or go abroad this way, or that, 
 north or fouth as he pleafes. So his free- 
 dom confifts in the dependance of his mo- 
 tions upon his Will, in his flanding fo cir- 
 cumftanced as that nothing hinders but 
 that reft, or motion, or any particular mo- 
 tion he mail direct, iliall enfue upon his 
 willing 5 it does not at all relate to the in- 
 ducements he may have for willing, whe- 
 ther fome prudential motive, or fudden 
 flart of fancy, or impulfe of paffion, or 
 whether he put it to the caft of a die, in 
 each cafe he remains at full liberty to do as 
 he will. 
 
 Well, but fuppofe him under the autho- 
 rity of fome matter, who gives him a holi- 
 day to divert himfelf at home, or go abroad 
 
 wherever
 
 Free Will. 61 
 
 wherever he choofes. I fhall not difpute, 
 whether the injunctions of a Superiour be 
 ftridtly an abridgement of human Liberty, 
 for that they may be difobeyed by any one 
 who fhall difregard the confequences : let 
 us grant for the prefent, that he could not 
 do the thing whereon his choice fhall 
 fall, if any prohibition were given againft 
 it, yet there being no fuch prohibition, 
 leaves him befides his liberty of action, a 
 liberty of choice in what manner he fhall 
 ufe his other liberty : now this liberty, like 
 the former, confifts in the dependance of 
 his actions upon his choice j for where he 
 has free choice, nobody can doubt he will 
 do as he choofes ; and where he has not, 
 he may be forced to do what he does not 
 choofe : but it has no concern with the 
 caufes of his choice, whether he fpend 
 his holiday prudently, or foolifhly, ac- 
 cording to his own whims, or the perfua*- 
 ilons of an acquaintance. 
 
 But fuppofe he has ftrong reafons either 
 
 of religion, or duty, or refpect to fome 
 
 Relation who may leave him a good legacy 
 
 2 which
 
 Free WilL 
 
 which urge him to go one way, but his 
 companions, or his own jovial difpofition, 
 follicit him another to the alehoufe, and 
 nobody has any authority to interpofe, 
 fo he remains ftill at liberty to choofe 
 between them> becaufe he may take 
 either way as his will and his choice 
 mall direct. No, you fay, 'tis not clear 
 that he has a freedom of choice; for 
 though I admit he may do as he choofes, 
 yet I doubt his being free to choofe ; be- 
 caufe his evil habit of tippling may force a 
 choice upon him whether he will or no. 
 Beware, my friend, of the mazes in the 
 labyrinth, for we are now ftriking into 
 another alley, and ftarting a different 
 qucftion from that we had under con- 
 templation before. 
 
 In common ufage, we apply Liberty in- 
 differently to the power or aft performed 
 thereby ; for we fay the choice is free when 
 nothing hinders, but that we may do 
 whatever it fhall pitch upon, and the adt 
 free when it follows in confequence of our 
 choice, and not of any compulfion oblig- 
 
 I ing
 
 Free Will. 63 
 
 ing us to perform it. And one of the riiofl 
 dangerous fources of perplexity arifes from 
 the want of diftinguiming in our enquiries 
 concerning the freedom of a power, whe- 
 ther we regard it as a caufe or an effect 5 
 for while we behold it in a double light, 
 as too frequently is done, we mall never 
 fee diftinctly where to find an iffue. Ac- 
 cording to your prefent ftating the doubt, 
 we muft confider it as an effect, the proper 
 object of fome power the man has to in- 
 fluence his choice, unlefs the prevalence of 
 habit mould give it a contrary bias. 
 
 As to cafes of reftraint they will con- 
 duce nothing to our main purpofe, 
 therefore we will confider only fuch cafes 
 wherein you may fuppofe a freedom of 
 choice in our prefent fenfe of the Term, 
 that is, as an effect of fome power we 
 poffefs. 
 
 \ 
 
 . 1 6. Suppofe a man deliberating in 
 the morning how be (hall lay out his after- 
 noon: there are no bolts nor bars in his 
 way, no authority of a fuperiour, nor re- 
 ftraint
 
 64 Free Will 
 
 flraint of law, duty, honour, or obliga- 
 tion intervening in the matters under deli- 
 beration, fo we know his afternoon's adions 
 will be fuch as his Will and Choice fhall 
 then dired, but neither is there any ftrong 
 inclination, or paffion at work, which 
 might drive him upon one way of employ- 
 ing himfelf preferably to the reft, fo he 
 ftands indifferent to choofe now in what 
 manner he fhall difpofe of himfelf in the 
 afternoon, nor has he any choice until he 
 fhall determine it by fome prefent ad: of 
 his Will 
 
 I do not give this as a philofophical re- 
 prefentation of the cafe, but certain it is, 
 we often do conceive ourfelves in a fituation 
 (how juftly 'tis no matter) to will or choofe 
 what we fhall will and do by and by a : for 
 
 if 
 
 a But when we a& in confequence of a previous 
 choice, we do fo, either becaufe retaining in mind the 
 reafons inducing us to make it, or becaufe confiding 
 in our judgement that there were fufficient reafons, or 
 becaufe the expedience conftantly found in adhering to 
 a refolution once taken, without which we could com- 
 pleat none of our purpofes, has given .us a habit of 
 
 perfe-
 
 Free Will 65 
 
 if upon afking a friend to walk with you 
 in the Park this afternoon, he fhould gravely 
 reply, Good,' Sir, I cannot poffibly tell 
 you, for the prefent moment only is in 
 our power j my future actions depend upon 
 my future volitions, and the Will cannot 
 act upon itfelf, nor is what I mall do five 
 hours hence the fubjedl of my prefent 
 option : you would think he bantered you, 
 and be apt to cry, Pr'ythee cannot you 
 choofe either to walk, or let it alone, can- 
 not you tell me whether you will or no ? 
 
 Therefore unlefs we will talk in a ftrain 
 contrary to the language and conceptions of 
 all mankind, we muft acknowledge that a 
 perfon in the cafe before us has a perfect 
 freedom of choice. But wherein does this 
 freedom confift ? where, unlefs in the ab- 
 
 perfeverance : all which are motives weighing with the 
 Will, unlefs other motives (hould arife to take off 
 their force. , Therefore in cafes of prior determina- 
 tion, we operate upon our own Will no otherwife, 
 than we might operate upon the Will of another per- 
 fon, by fuggefting motives fufficient to prevail with 
 him 3, as when we engage a labourer to work for us by 
 the promife of good wages for his fervice. 
 
 F fence
 
 66 Free Will 
 
 fence of all impediment, reflraint, autho- 
 1 rity, obligation or force whatfoever againfl 
 his power of choofing, fo that his choice 
 will continue fuch as he fixes it, and his 
 afternoon's actions follow precifely accord- 
 ing to his prefent determination, nor has 
 it any thing to do with the motives or 
 caufes inducing him to choofe riding rather 
 than walking, or flaying at home before 
 both. 
 
 But we have not done yet; for fome 
 there be who infift upon an elective 
 Power b confublifting with our power of 
 Volitionj and determining it as well in 
 giving the preference to what we are to do 
 
 b King upon the origin of Evil, and his Commen- 
 tator <7tt;, place the operation of this elective Power 
 in annexing the idea of Beit, to whatever adion we 
 think proper, which then the Will proceeds imme- 
 diately to perform. Yet they allow the action fo 
 performed to be a free act : which fhews Freedom, 
 even according to their notion of it, not inconfiftent 
 with the influence of motives ; for the idea fo annexed, 
 may furely be acknowledged to operate as a motive, 
 influencing the Will to purfue the Adion whereto we 
 have united it, as much as if we had found them 
 united by decifion of the judgement, or reprefentation 
 of the fancy. 
 
 2 hereafter,
 
 Free Will. 67 
 
 hereafter, as in the prefent exercife of our 
 bodily powers. Be it fo, fince they will 
 have it fo. Then the freedom of this 
 elective Power depends upon the removal 
 of all force or impediment againft the 
 Will taking fuch determination as is elected, 
 but not at all upon the caufe of fuch elec- 
 tion. Add further, that when we do 
 what we had elected or determined before- 
 hand, nobody will deny our being free in 
 the volitions exerted at the time of execu- 
 tion : which proves Freedom confident 
 with Precaufation, for otherwife- either our 
 Election and Predetermination mufl have no 
 avail nor influence upon our future con- 
 duct, or elfe muft put a force upon the 
 Will, containing it to act conformably 
 to them until -they were compleated. 
 
 . 17. Thus how many powers foever 
 we may conceive in the mind directing 
 one another, the proper and genuine idea 
 of Freedom, with refpect to each of them, 
 will be the fame: for in order to difcufs 
 the point of freedom, we muft confider 
 F 2 fome
 
 68 Free Will 
 
 fome operating power as the caufe, and 
 fome exertion of the power operated upon 
 as an effect to be produced thereby : if fuch 
 effect will follow as may be expected from 
 the caufe, then are we free in the operating 
 power, and our exertion of the operated 
 is our own free aft j but if a different effect 
 will follow, then are we under force or 
 restraint. 
 
 If we enquire further whether we be 
 free to ufe this operating power, this is a 
 new queftion which muft be difcuffed in 
 like manner with the former, by con- 
 fidering the operating power as an effect, 
 and fome other power not thought of be- 
 fore as a caufe. 
 
 For let the mind have ever fo much 
 power to act upon herfelf, either by pre^ 
 determination, or coexiftent election, fuch 
 her acting is an action as much as acting 
 upon the limbs, and the freedom of it 
 muft be tried by the fame rules : for as I 
 have freedom of action fo long as there 
 lies no bar or obftacle againft ufing my 
 bodily powers in fuch manner as my Will 
 
 mall
 
 Free 
 
 (hall direct, whatever caufes may incline 
 me to employ them one particular 
 way; fo have I freedom of Will while 
 nothing hinders, but that fuch voli- 
 tion mail take place as I predetermine or 
 elect, whatever may give occafion to my 
 fo determining or electing. For Liberty 
 bears no connection with any thing ante- 
 cedent a to the operation of that power 
 
 ? Chryjippus and the Stoics, as we find in Tully de 
 fato, placed the freedom of Will in its independance 
 on all external or antecedent caufes. Yet they claim- 
 ed this freedom as the natural privilege of man ; and 
 held at the fame time, that all his actions, even the 
 minuteft of them, were fated. How they reconciled 
 thefe two opinions, it is difficult to guefs. 
 
 Their miftake feems to have proceeded from want 
 of diftinguifhing between efficient, and final caufes, 
 the former whereof, being antecedent, deftroy free 
 agency, which yet may well confift with the latter. 
 A cannon-ball has no efficacy to beat down a rampart, 
 unlefs what it receives from the powder, which there- 
 fore is an efficient antecedent caufe ; and confequently, 
 the action of the ball muft be neceflary. But if you 
 defire your friend to pull down the window-fafli, you 
 give no efficacy to his arm, for he does it entirely 6y 
 his own ftrength, therefore his action is free : yet your 
 rsqueft was the motive, without which he would not 
 have done it ; fo you are the antecedent, and external 
 caufe of what he does. 
 
 F 3 whofe
 
 7 o Free Will 
 
 whofe liberty we enquire into, but folely 
 with what {hall follow after it, and with 
 the removal of all obftruftion which might 
 prevent it from taking effect : therefore 
 may well confift with caufes prior to fuch 
 operation, and with the dominion of that 
 Providence whofe difpofal thofe caufes lie 
 under. 
 
 Thus while we can keep a Difputant to 
 any one fettled point, one dated cafe of 
 acting, or willing, we (hall manage well 
 enough with him ; but men are apt to 
 dodge about the port, alledging, that we 
 may will as we choofe, and choofe if we 
 will, without underftanding themfelves in 
 the ufe of thofe terms, or fettling the 
 diftin&ion between them ; but one mo- 
 ment taking them for fynonimous, and the 
 next for different ads producing one ano- 
 ther. Whereas if we fix the meaning of 
 choice to a predetermination, then in fuch 
 cafes where our determination {lands con- 
 fined to certain limits, or we are com^ 
 pelled to take a courfe contrary to that we 
 determine, our volitions, and confequently 
 
 our
 
 Free Will. 71 
 
 our actions depend upon the caufes apply- 
 ing fuch force or restraint : but in cafes 
 where we remain perfectly free to profecute 
 whatever we may determine upon, they 
 depend upon the motives occurring to our 
 judgement, or imagination in making the 
 determination, or upon our former cares 
 in forming the condition of our mind ; 
 which cares depended upon the like caufes, 
 and fo on as far as the Will was concerned, 
 until you come to fome firft determination, 
 or ad of the mind to which there was no 
 other act preceding b . 
 
 . 1 8. As to the coexiftent elective power , 
 felf-moving and independent on all caufes, 
 
 whether 
 
 b Which aft muft depend upon external caufes ; 
 and confequently fo muft all fubfequent volitions de- 
 pendant thereon. 
 
 a Our Author's zeal againft the freewill of indiffe- 
 rence urges him to take every occafion of aiming a 
 ftroke at it : but his principal attack is carried on in 
 the Chapter of Satisfaction, where in conjunction with 
 Mr. Loch, he has purfued it to every corner, and 
 fubterfuge under which it might take refuge. But he 
 conceives that the notion of the Will adding without 
 F 4 motives,
 
 Free 
 
 whether of external objecls, motives of 
 judgement and imagination, or prior de- 
 terminations of our own, if this could 
 once be well eftablifhed, then farewell to 
 all prudence, deliberation, and dependance 
 upon our own conducl, and that of other 
 people ; for what avails it to contrive a 
 
 plan 
 
 motives, took rife from there being many of them; 
 latent, unknown even to ourfelves ; for it is a com- 
 mon remark, that nothing is more deceitful or un- 
 fathomable than the heart of man ; and from there 
 being many of them fo tranfient that we cannot ob- 
 ferve them ; befides that the taftes and defires of men 
 being infinitely various, we often find them aling 
 upon inducements, which would not have been fuch 
 to ourfelves, therefore fuppofe they had none for their 
 proceeding. 
 
 Nor need we wonder at his zeal againft indifference, 
 
 becaufe that doctrine once eftablifhed would overthrow 
 
 his whole fyftem ; which contains an examination of 
 
 the feveral fpecies of motives weighing with the mind, 
 
 the manner of their being generated and introduced to 
 
 the thought, and the methods of providing ourfelves 
 
 with fuch as (hall be moft falutary, and conducive to 
 
 happinefs : in all which he apprehends that Science, 
 
 reported anciently to have defcended from heaven, the 
 
 knowledge of ourfelves, to confift. And his theology 
 
 depends in great part upon the influence of motives : 
 
 for he conceives 'tis by their intervention alone, that 
 
 the government of Providence over the moral world
 
 Free Will 73 
 
 plan of my meafures ever fo wifely, to 
 inculcate falutary maxims upon my mind, 
 to nourifh fentiments of honour, or duty, 
 or moral fenfes for my guidance, if I may 
 afterwards chance to elect the wildeft, and 
 moft extravagant actions in defiance of all 
 reafon, or inclination, or former refolutions 
 to the contrary ? or how can I depend that 
 my befl and deareft friend will not murder 
 me, while there is a hazard that he may 
 elect in oppolition to all the judgement 
 and difcretion in his head, the fentiments 
 and defires in his heart , ? 
 
 may be explained ; and pur expectations in a future 
 life, upon any tolerable grounds, afcertained. For 
 we can difcover nothing in all vifible nature likely to 
 affeft us hereafter, nor can we know any thing of the 
 manner wherein we (hall be difpofed of otherwife than 
 by fo much as we may difcover of the character of that 
 Being, who prefides over all nature, as well vifible as 
 invifible. But the character of an Agent is deno- 
 minated by the views and motives wherewith he con- 
 duds himfelf. Therefore unlefs we conceive God 
 Jikewife to acT: upon motives, and take final caufes under 
 our contemplation, we can gather nothing fatisfaclory, 
 by the light of reafon, concerning our future condition : 
 but the profpect will lie dark, uncertain, and difmal 
 Before us, 
 
 But
 
 Free Will. 
 
 But fuch terrors as thefe the moft 
 lous devotees of an elective power do not 
 lie under ; they depend upon men's acting 
 conformably to their characters 3 if they 
 know a hardened villain, they make no 
 queftion of his electing acts of violence, 
 injury and dimonefly whenever opportunity 
 mall ferve, and confide in themfelves for 
 making juft and wife elections in their fu- 
 ture conduct. 
 
 What then occafions the difference be- 
 tween man and man ? for there muft be 
 fome caufe of the moral character, fome 
 account to be given why we know what 
 ufe each perfon will make of his elective 
 power. The difference, fay they, lies in 
 the Will itfelf, which has a peculiar bent, 
 or ply, or I know not what, different from 
 that of another perfon : the villain has a 
 perverfenefs of Will, therefore will always 
 choofe perverfely ; and they themfelves a 
 rectitude of Will, fo of courfe they will 
 choofe rightly and wifely. But whence 
 got they this I know not what in their 
 Will ? was it innate ? was it the natural 
 
 conflitution
 
 Free Will. 75 
 
 conftitution of their mind? Then they 
 ought to blefs the Author of their nature, 
 who gave them this happy conftitution on 
 creating them. But no, this muft not be 
 the cafe j for they will lofe all merit of 
 their rectitude, unlefs it was of their own 
 acquiring ; therefore they gave this right 
 Ply to their Wills themfelves by their for- 
 mer cares, and induftry, and right manage- 
 ment of their elective power. Be it fo ; 
 for we are in the humour to admit every 
 thing they pleafe to aflume ; flill we muft 
 afk, what moved them to fuch right ma- 
 nagement ? it could not be the Ply of their 
 Will ; for if this were acquired, they could . 
 not have it before they acquired it, nor 
 could they derive from thence their choice 
 of the right methods taken in the acqui- 
 fition. What then, did they light upon 
 thofe methods by mere chance ? I do not 
 fufpect they will fay this j for this would 
 make Virtue nothing more than a lucky 
 hit, which one Simpleton might ftumble 
 upon as well as another. If then their 
 choice had a fource, there remains no other 
 
 . 
 
 we
 
 7 6 Free Will 
 
 we can guefs befides education, example, 
 company, the temperament of their body, 
 /late of their mental organization b , objects 
 furrounding them, events touching their no- 
 tice, and the like ; caufes antecedent and 
 external to the mind electing, under the 
 dire&ion of that power whom they muft 
 acknowledge to govern all things external. 
 
 . 19. Upon the whole, we may con- 
 clude Freedom, in whatever light we place 
 
 * A kind of technical term, employed by our Au- 
 thor, to denote a fet of organs compofed of very fine 
 corporeal fubftance, ufed by the mind as her inftru- 
 ment in meditation, when retired from all external 
 objects. For he conceives the faculty of thinking, or 
 reafoning, not a primary property of the mind, but a 
 refult from her cprnpofition with a certain fyftem of 
 matter ; and fuppofes pure created fpirit no more a 
 thinking, than it is a walking, or a fpeaking fubftance. 
 He allows indeed it can always think, whenever united 
 to a proper organization j and fo it can always walk 
 or fpeak, whenever united to a body having legs, or 
 organs of fpeech : but when removed from all matter, 
 it can perform neither function, for want of inftru- 
 ments to a& with, materials and objects to a<5t upon. 
 
 Thefe organizations, detached from their grofs 
 bodies, were the vehicles he found inhabiting the' 
 vehicular ftate, when tranfported thereinto in the 
 vifion.
 
 Free WilL 77 
 
 it, or to whatever power, whether real or 
 imaginary, apply it, by no means repugnant 
 to the operation of prior caufes moving us 
 to the exercife of that power, nor to the 
 dominion of Providence, having all thofe 
 caufes and their caufes at difpofal. So that 
 the Plan of Providence may well take 
 effect without infringing a tittle upon our 
 Liberty : events which neither our judge- 
 ment, nor our appetite would incline us to 
 produce, arc placed out of our power, 
 and entrufted in the hands of other agents, 
 fo come to pafs by neceffity with refpect 
 to us j the returns of fummer and winter 
 do not depend upon our option, becaufe 
 we might be apt to choofe a perpetual 
 fpring : but wherever God thinks proper 
 to employ us in executing any part of his 
 plan, there needs only to give us the powers, 
 the talents,, the opportunities, the judge- 
 ments, the motives requifite, and we mall 
 compleat the lines allotted us by the exer- 
 cife of our freedom. 
 
 So far as you can penetrate into a man's 
 fentiments, and defires, and have the pro- 
 
 3 P er
 
 7 8 Free 
 
 per objects at command, you may put him 
 upon any work you {hall require : if money 
 be his idol, and you have enough to bribe 
 him, you may make him do whatever you 
 pleafe j if he make his belly his god, you 
 may draw him from Millbank to Radclife- 
 highway by an exquifite entertainment ; of 
 if good nature be his ruling principle, you 
 may employ him in any kind office you 
 fhall want. Your politicians know how 
 to turn the paffions of men independent 
 on their authority to ferve their defigns: 
 and the Divine Politician may do this more 
 compleatly, not only as he knows perfectly 
 the fecrets of all hearts, but as he gave 
 them that underftanding, and thofe ap- 
 petites which determine the colour of their 
 actions j and we need not doubt of his 
 having given them fuch as will effectually 
 anfwer the purpofes intended by them. 
 
 In fome few inftances where we know 
 the hearts of men, we can effect our pur- 
 pofes with them as furely as we can with 
 any corporeal instruments in our hands: 
 if you want to give a ball, or an enter- 
 tainment,
 
 > 
 
 Free Will. 79 
 
 tainment, 'tis but fending an invitation to 
 perfons fond of thefe diverfions, and you 
 will have your company refort to you of 
 their own free choice, nor could you bring 
 them more effectually, if you had the au- 
 thority of an abfolute monarch over them ; 
 fo that in this inftance you govern their 
 motions either to Hick/OKI's, or the Apollo 
 near 'Temple- Bar, or your own dining-room, 
 without the leafl impeachment of their 
 liberty. And we have a prefent example 
 before our eyes of a monarch, who having 
 the love of his fubjeds, can by their free 
 fervices refift the combined efforts of the 
 mightieft defpodc powers upon earth. Nor 
 can Defpotifm itfelf do any great matters 
 without aid of Free Will: for rewards, 
 honours, and encouragements, thofe en- 
 gines of free agency, contribute more to 
 the valour of armies, than any fcourges of 
 punifhment, or peremptory edidls con- 
 cluding, For fuch is our Will. 
 
 Since then experience teflifies, that man 
 can make fo much ufe of liberty towards 
 accomplishing his defigns, why fhould we 
 
 fcruple
 
 3o Free WilL 
 
 fcruple to .think the fame of God in a larger 
 extent ? for he not only has all the objects 
 in his power which touch the fprings of 
 action, but fabricated the fprings them- 
 felves, and fet them to receive what touches 
 they (hall take. 
 
 .20. But we judge of the workings 
 of Providence by our own narrow way of 
 proceeding ; we take our meafures from 
 time to time as the expedience of them oc- 
 curs to our thoughts, and then muft make 
 what ufe we can of the materials or inftru- 
 ments before us, be they fuch as exactly 
 fuit our purpofe, or not; and even if we 
 had the making of our inflruments, yet 
 not always knowing what we (hall want to 
 do with them, we mould often find them 
 inconvenient for our fervice : nor is it un- 
 frequent that the works we performed 
 yefterday (land in the way of thofe we are 
 to perform to-day, becaufe new fchemes 
 and new occafions of employing ourfelves 
 occur to us perpetually *. J n 
 
 It is not eafy for us to form any conception of the 
 manner of God's working, unlefs by anally with our 
 
 own* 
 
 T
 
 Free Will. , 81 
 
 own. Now when we act providently for the future, 
 it is by fome operation upon the things about us, to 
 produce effects that woulu not otherwife have enfucd : 
 for when things fall of themfelves into the train we 
 defire, there is no room for our activity or prudence 
 to interfere, nor have we any thing more to do, than 
 wait the event. And in this cafe we may fcarce be 
 able to fatisfy a by-ftander, of their lying under our 
 difpofal, unlefs by making fome alteration in their \ 
 motions, to convince him of our power. In like 
 manner, we look for the manifeftation of a Providence, 
 in extraordinary events, and fuch are commonly pro- 
 duced by thofe who would enforce the belief of one': 
 as if there were not fufficient evidence in the ordinary 
 courfes of nature, while (he proceeds in her. ufual 
 channel of fecond caufes. But we ftiould confider that 
 the cafe is different between God, and ourfelves : there 
 are innumerable caufes in act around us, which we did 
 not fet at work ; nor have our activity and contrivance 
 any other object than what little alterations we cart 
 make among them. The woods would grow, and the 
 rivers run, had the earth been never inhabited ; but 
 when we fee the one cut into regular glades, or the 
 otHer divided into canals, hollowed along through 
 higher ground, we know the hand of man has been 
 bufy among them , and in general, the marks of hu- 
 man induftry are found only in fuch works, as would 
 not have been performed by rude nature. But nature 
 could not have begun any courfe, unlefs put into it by 
 the divine appointment ; nor could fecond caufes have 
 ptoceeded to act in any manner, without an energy 
 and direction received from the firft. Therefore their 
 operations are an evidence of his power ; and their 
 productions, ferving the- ufes of man, an evidence of 
 his Providence, equally convincing with that of ex- 
 G traordinary
 
 82 Free Will 
 
 traordinary events, to an attentive obferver, taking Irt 
 the confederation of final caufes ; without which, 
 neither evidence would have any avail. For what do 
 we fee in the remarkable changes of wind contributing 
 to bring on the Revolution. The winds vary every 
 day, nor can we gather any thing from the particular 
 variations happening at that time, tmlefs we fuppofc 
 God to have had in view the deliverance of thefe 
 kingdoms from Popery and arbitrary power. What 
 lhall we fay to the many caufes concurring at the Re- 
 formation ? The wilful and imperious temper of the 
 Monarch, fubmiflive difpofition of the people, tired 
 out by long wars between the two rofes, obftinacy of 
 the Roman Pontiff, quarrels between foreign Princes, 
 allowing them no leifure to interfere? How is the 
 hand of Providence difcernible in all this, without 
 the idea of a gracious defign to refcue our forefathers 
 and ourfelves from papal tyranny and fuperftition ? 
 And with fome fuch idea we may difcern the fame hand 
 in the powers of nature, whereof we have continual 
 experience. For the fertility of foils, the rife and 
 deicent of vapours, the viciffitudes of feafons, the 
 curious ftrudture of veflels and fibres in the tree 
 yielding fruit after his kind, and the herb after his 
 kind, whofe feed is in itfelf, indicate a provident con^ 
 cern and contrivance for the fuftenance of animals, 
 exerted at the creation. The progrefs of arts, manu- 
 faftures, and fciencesj the advancement of knowledge 
 and thofe accomplifhments rendering nations more 
 civilized, befpeak a kind regard for mankind, and an 
 admirably wile provifion', made at the beginning, 
 enabling them, by the ufe of their natural talents, and 
 the materials prepared to exercife them upon, to rife 
 from the rude and favage fimplicity of ancient times, 
 
 to
 
 Free Will 
 
 In like manner we vulgarly imagine b 
 God acting occasionally, and taking up 
 
 purpofes 
 
 to their prefent better policied, and better accommo- 
 dated fituation. And as thefe advantages flill tend to 
 further improvement, they denote the like regard for 
 the future race of men who (hall fucceed us while 
 the world endures. Therefore we need not hunt about 
 for ftrange incidents, and uncommon phenomena, to 
 fatisfy us of a providence, which rather wants fuch 
 teftimonies to awaken our attention, than convince 
 our undei {landing. Even miracles themfelves were in 
 ancient language called Signs and Wonders ; and the 
 Very word by its derivation imports, fomething exciting 
 our admiration ; nor were we to fee them worked our- 
 felves, could we efteem them inflances of greater 
 power than appear in the ftated laws of nature. 
 Neither could we fuppofe God employing them as ne- 
 ceiTary means, without which he was not able to have 
 effected his purpofe : but rather in condefcenfion to the 
 dulnefsof our apprehenfions, which might have over- 
 looked the purpofe, had he compleated it by lefs ftrik- ' 
 ing means. But it would be better for us, if we could 
 fo clear our mental eye, as that it might fee by the 
 common light ; for it argues a defeat in the optics, 
 not to difcern objects without an extraordinary glare 
 caft upon them. Befides that thofe who are over fond 
 of thefe glares, run a great hazard of meeting phan- 
 tafms and illufions among them. 
 
 b And this imagination, though reprefented here in 
 
 an unfavourable light, does not deferve to be difcoun- 
 
 tenanced, as being the beft fuited to common capacity. 
 
 For the plain man can never totally banith the idea of 
 
 G 2 chance
 
 84 Free 
 
 purpofes he had not thought of before 
 until a concurrence of circumftances ren- 
 dered them expedient : we apprehend him 
 as having turned the numerous race of men 
 loofe into the wide world, endowed them 
 with various powers, talents, appetites, 
 and characters, without knowing precifely, 
 or without caring what they will produce : 
 we allow him indeed to have formed the 
 main lines of a. plan j but left large vacan- 
 cies between to be filled up by chance, 
 whofe wild workings lie under his con- 
 troul to divert their courfe when they would 
 interfere with the flrokes of his pencil ; 
 for the eye of Providence watches over the 
 motions of human creatures, and when he 
 fees them running counter to his defigns, 
 he turns them afide, or guides them by his 
 fecret influence to co-operate therewith. 
 
 chance out of his fyftem, nor underftand the govern- 
 ment of Providence, otherwife than by a conftant 
 vigilance over the workings of fecond caufes, and oc- 
 cafional interpolations to rectify whatever happens to 
 runamifs: neither does he fee wherein this idea dero- 
 gates in any-wife from the divine Power, or Wifdom, 
 or Omnifcience. 
 
 Now
 
 Free Will 
 
 Now confidering the vaft variety of hu- 
 mours, the clifcordant aims and interefts 
 among mankind, it muft be acknowledged 
 that the government of the world, in this 
 view of it, could not be adminiftered with- 
 out either continual miraculous interpo- 
 litions in the motions of matter, or com- 
 pulfions and reftraints upon free Agency, 
 giving our volition another turn than it 
 would take from the motives prefent before 
 us, or caufing other motions to arife in our 
 limbs, and thoughts in our minds, than our 
 prefent volition would naturally produce. 
 
 But when we reflect that even the 
 wanton gambols of chance muft refult 
 from agents and caufes originally fet at 
 work by the Almighty, when we call to 
 mind his infinite Wifdom and Omnifcience 
 which nothing can efcape, nothing perplex 
 or overload, it feems more congruous with 
 that boundlefs attribute to imagine that no 
 iingle, nor moft diftant effecT: of the powers 
 and motions he gave was overlooked, no 
 chafms or empty fpaces left in his defign : 
 G 3 but
 
 86 Free Will 
 
 but that upon the formation of a world c he 
 laid a full and perfect plan of all the opera- 
 tions that fhould enfue during the period of 
 jts continuance. 
 
 And what interpofitions there are (for I 
 would leave every one to his own opinion 
 concerning the frequency, or rarity of 
 
 them 
 
 c Not creation of the world, as any other perfon 
 would have exprefled it. For our author, though far 
 from a Free-thinker, in the modern fenfe of the word, 
 that is, a lover of oppofition againft received tenets, 
 has endeavoured all along to maintain a freedom and 
 opennefs of thought. But it is dangerous trufting to 
 human reafon, which has unluckily led him into a 
 whimfical and unorthodox notion, that this world we 
 inhabit is not the only one God ever created, nor the 
 feveral fpecies of animals falling within our notice, the 
 only living works of his hands : and that after certain 
 periods, the worlds now fubfifting may be diflblved, 
 and new ones fabricated out of the materials. Nay, 
 his fondnefs for the maxim, Nothing made in vain, 
 will not fuffer him to admit any waftes, or vacancies 
 in nature: but he fuppofes, in his chapter of the Mun- 
 dane Soul, that all fpace, not occupied by body, may 
 be replete with fpiritual fubftance, to whom the par- 
 ticles of matter, floating therein, may ferve for objects 
 of perception, and fubjects of a&ion, and whofe mini- 
 ury may be employed in carrying on the courfes of 
 nature according to the laws prefcribed for them, or 
 perhaps in forming new worlds upon the plans con- 
 trived by infinite Wifdom. Strange ! to what wild 
 
 lengths
 
 Free Will. 
 
 them *) how much foever they may ope- 
 rate fecretly to us, were not fudden expe- 
 dients 
 
 lengths of fpeculation a lively fancy will fometimes 
 carry people ! But my Friend's enthufiafm is excufable, 
 as proceeding from a commendable principle : for he 
 conceives it would give a higher idea of the maenifi- 
 cence of our Creator, to imagine his great kingdom 
 the univerfe fully peopled, to fuppofe innumerable 
 hefts of fpirits receiving continual fupplies of happinefs 
 from his inexhauftible bounty, and praiiinghim incef- 
 fantly by that beft of facrifices, more acceptable than 
 the fat of lambs, an active and willing obedience to 
 his commands, and an unwearied diligence in execut- 
 ing his laws, as well ordinary as extraordinary. 
 
 On communicating this note to Mr. Search^ who is 
 ever follicitous that none of his vagaries Ihould do 
 hurt to any body, he defired me to caution fuch of my 
 Readers as may chance to catch the enthufiafm from 
 him, that they give way to it no further than while it 
 may warm their hearts, or raife their ideas, in thofe 
 feafons only, wherein fpeculation is proper ; but to 
 throw it wholly afide when they enter into the com- 
 mon tranfa&ions, and common converfations of life j 
 left they meet the mifhap of that Aftronomer who 
 gazing at the ftars as he went along, faw nothing of 
 the ground before him, and fo plunged headlong into 
 a miry ditch : and above all, to beware of fancying 
 themfelves having an intercourfe, or being in any dif- 
 coverable manner affected, with the fpiritual fubflance 
 wherewith he fuppofes them on all fides clofely fur- 
 rounded. 
 
 d Mr. Search, from the beginning of his enquiries, 
 kas proceeded folely upon the fund of natural reafon j 
 G 4 not'
 
 88 Free Will. 
 
 clients to anfwer unforefeen emergencies, 
 but contained in the original plan, which 
 was purpofely fo framed as to need his in- 
 terpofing hand when, and where, and as 
 
 often 
 
 not that he means to depreciate the treafures afforded 
 by Revelation, but having not had the reading fuffi- 
 cient for qualifying him to examine the evidences of it, 
 and being defirous of going to the bottom in every 
 part of his work, as being to deal with perfons who 
 will not fuffer him to take any thing upon truft, he 
 thought himfelf intitled to build only uponfuch ground 
 as he found in his pofleiTion, to which no man would 
 controvert his right of entry. So he fet out with the 
 examination of human Nature -he then proceeded to 
 contemplate the courfes of things around us, fo far as 
 they fell under our cognizance or obfervation ; and 
 from thence to gather what could be difcovered with 
 reafonable affurance, concerning the Author of Na- 
 ture. He is now returning downwards from the idea 
 of God to the idea of thofe of his works remaining to 
 us invifible : which are not to be counted matters of 
 mere fpeculation, being fuch wherein we ourfelves are 
 likely within a few years to have concern. la this 
 part of his progrefs he is arrived at Providence, the 
 title of his laft preceeding chapter, wherein he enter- 
 tains fo large an idea of the divine Skill and Omni- 
 fcience, as to conceive it pofiible, in theory, that God 
 might have compleated his univerfe from everlafting, 
 and refted ever fince from all his works ; having form- 
 ed nature once for all in fuch admirable contrivance, 
 that (he might run her appointed courfes for ever, with, 
 out needing any further touch of his hand ; the mun. 
 1 dane
 
 Free Will 89 
 
 often as he predetermined to apply it. But 
 in thofe parts wherein he has thought pro- 
 per to employ us as his instruments for 
 executing them, to controul us in the 
 
 exercile 
 
 dane foul, or fpiritual fubftance, being provided with 
 a&ivity fufficient to repair the continual decays of mo- 
 tion among matter, occafioned by the collilion of 
 bodies. On the other hand, he did not find it incon- 
 gruous with his notions of the Deity, to imagine him, 
 in his firft work, purpofely leaving fomething for him- 
 felf afterwards to do ; and laying his fchemes broken 
 in fome parts, that there might be room for further 
 application of his power, at fuch times, and in fuch 
 manner, as he in his wifdom judged proper. So the 
 queftion, Whether interpofition or none, being equally 
 tenable in theory on both fides, remains to be decided 
 by obfervation of fafts. But he can find no pofitive 
 evidence ( bating thofe recorded in facred Writ, which 
 he cannot take into confideration, as being befide his 
 plan) to fatisfy him of an interpofition, later than the 
 formation of this earth, and the planetary fyftem : 
 fince which, as far as the eye of reafon can difcern, 
 God feems to have refted from his works. Yet he does 
 not defire to hinder others from believing frequent in- 
 terpofitions, made every day, or every hour of the 
 day, if they fee convincing proofs of them : hoping 
 they will indulge him in retaining his ow;i opinion, 
 until he (hall have fufficient lights afforded him to dif- 
 cern the truth. And he wifhes every one might be 
 allowed the like liberty, without bringing a discredit 
 
 J GO 
 
 upon himfelf from thofe whom the ufe of it carries a 
 different way. For he thinks men by much too hafty 
 
 and
 
 go , Free Will. 
 
 exercife of our powers would be to defeat 
 his own defigns, by difturbing the opera- 
 'tion of thofe caufes himfelf had chofen for 
 the accomplishment of them. 
 
 Thus 
 
 and feVere upon one another in their cenfures of Pro- 
 phanenefs andSuperftitionj the fame notions being fuch 
 to one, which are not fo to his neighbour, according 
 to their different apprehenfions. The feries of caufes 
 and events has been compared of old to a golden 
 chain, hanging down from heaven, whereon the earth 
 and elements, with all their contents, whether gods, 
 or men, or animals, or vegetables, are fufpended. Now 
 we all agree that this chain is upholden by Almighty 
 Power grafping it at the uppermoft link ; but which is 
 that uppermoft fink, we greatly differ, and muft necef- 
 farily do fo while one man can fee further, to count 
 more links than another. To make the figure more 
 appofite to our purpofe, we will fuppofe the chain 
 branched out into innumerable fmaller ones, fuftaining 
 their refpe&ive weights among the productions of na- 
 ture, and ifTues of fortune. Then in proportion as 
 men have accuftomed themfelves to look at diftant ob- 
 jedts, they will acquire a more or lefs piercing fight ; 
 and confequently trace all, or fome, or a few only of 
 thefe little chains to the principal. But wherever they 
 lofe the connection, they muft place a feparate finger 
 at the top of what remains, or the weight will have 
 nothing to fupport it. Therefore the plain man is not 
 fuperftitious in conceiving a multitude of interpofitions, 
 becaufe without them he cannot conceive how the 
 weight fhould be upholden by Almighty Power: nei- 
 ther is the ftudious man prophane in rejecting them, 
 
 becaufe
 
 Free Will. 91 
 
 Thus he governs all things in heaven 
 
 and earth by power and wifdom conjointly, 
 
 matter by neceffity and impulfe, brutes by 
 
 fenfe and inftindl, the blefled fpirits above 
 
 ' 
 
 becaufe he difcerns the whole fuftained by one effort of 
 that power. For prophanenefs is the refting in fecond 
 caufes without regard to the firft ; and fuperftition the 
 calling in omnipotence needlefly j which muft necef- 
 farily vary its form among mankind, as one perfon's 
 needs differ from thofe of another. But it is recom- 
 mended to every man to remove the finger of God 
 from him as far as poflible, provided he never Jet it go 
 out of light : for in fo doing he will difcern more of 
 the divine Wifdom, becaufe there is none in doing 
 every thing by dint of force and authority. Were 
 God to maintain us by raining manna from heaven as 
 we wanted it ; this would not difplay his wifdom, like 
 the various provifions he has made for fupplying us with 
 food by natural means. Were he to fend his angel 
 every morning to declare what each of us was to do 
 for the day, and fhower down his irrefiftible Grace, 
 to carry us through temptations that might urge us to 
 difobey him wilfully; we fhould acknowledge his 
 power, and his goodnefs, but fee nothing of his wif- 
 dom. But when he turns his numerous race of men 
 abroad with various and difcordant paffions, inclina- 
 tions, interefts, talents, views, and opinions, fo ad- 
 mirably adjufted together, and diftributed among them, 
 as that they fullfil his will, in the accomplifhment of 
 his purpofes, while they think of nothing lefs : who- 
 ever has fenfe and obfervation enough to underftand 
 this, muft adore the wife contriver of fo complicated 
 
 a
 
 -Free Will. 
 
 by fignifications of his will, which they 
 gladly and freely fet themfelves to fulfil, 
 man partly by neceflary agents affecting ' 
 him, partly by laws, reftridions, appre- 
 henfions of mifchief and danger controuling 
 him, and partly by leaving him to his free 
 choice in following fuch portion of under- 
 
 flanding 
 
 a fcheme. Now there is a juftlce to be obferved be- 
 tween the attributes, nor muft we fuffer our zeal for 
 one to magnify it at the expence of another. There- 
 fore let us all, according to the ftate of our refpeclive 
 imaginations, caft them into fuch fcenes, as may give 
 us the fulleft reprefentation of the divine government 
 in all its parts, without difturbing one another in our 
 manner of laying out the profpecT:. Let not the 
 devout religious man judge hardly of the rationalift, 
 for afcribing all to nature and fecond caufes, bccaufe 
 he fees God at the birth of nature, planning down 
 her courfes, and giving fpring to the caufes that pro- 
 duce events of all kinds, as well certain as cafual. 
 Neither let the latter deny his lefs penetrating neigh- 
 bour the benefit of a perpetual interpofition, neceflary 
 to him for comprehending the adminiftration of affairs 
 throughout the world j becaufe the powers of nature 
 appear to him as felf-moving, and the mazes of for- 
 tune flruck out every day afrefh by the blind ramblings 
 of chance. And I believe if any perfon of a ferious 
 turn will recolledl the fyftem of Providence he enter- 
 tained in his youth, he will find it abounding in inter- 
 pofuions, which as he grew in knowledge and ex- 
 perience have gradually decrcafed.
 
 Free Will. 93 
 
 (landing and appetites as himfelf has al- 
 lotted him. 
 
 . 21. Nor need we fancy ourfelves 
 always in fhackles, becaufe every moment 
 under the dominion and condu<5t of Pro- 
 vidence, for it has been mewn that Liberty 
 has no concern with caufes antecedent to 
 the exercife of our power, but folely with 
 what might ftand in our way upon fuch 
 exercife : if I can do what I will, I have 
 freedom of action, no matter how I came 
 to will this or that particular employment : 
 if I can choofe as I will, I have freedom of 
 choice, no matter what induced me to 
 make one choice preferably to all others. 
 
 What then, are we mere puppets, actu- 
 ated by fprings and wires, becaufe it was 
 given us both to will and to do ? By no 
 means ; for when they are given us, we 
 have as full and free liberty to ufe them 
 both, as if they had fallen upon us by 
 chance, or we had made them for ourfelves. 
 If my father left me a good portion, I can. 
 do' the fame with it, and have as free dif- 
 
 pofal
 
 94 
 
 pofal of itj as if I had made the gold my- 
 felf by tranfmutation with the Philofopher's 
 ftone a : and if he brought me by the cares 
 of his education, from a lavifh temper to 
 
 prudence 
 
 a Ned was led into this thought by one of his own 
 foibles : for you muft know, he has long fince gotten 
 a mighty notion of the Philofopher's ftone ; only in* 
 ftead of tranfmuting metals, he wants to tranfmute 
 error into truth with it. For being of a peaceable 
 di/pofition, he does not love to overthrow, fo much as 
 to tranfmute. The procefs whereby he thinks toeffe<ft 
 this is, by diftin&ions, illuftrations, conftru&ions, 
 explanations, and other methods known only to 
 Adepts, to pick out the grofs particles from fome 
 doctrine that has hitherto been found poifonous, and 
 infufe others in their room, thereby giving it a con- 
 trary quality. The curious Reader may find him ex- 
 hibiting a fpecimen of his art by and by upon prefcience, 
 fate, and predeftination ; which from a'lumpifli fatur- 
 nine fubftance, that ufed to lie heavy upon the digeftion, 
 generating black bile, damping the fpirits, benumbing 
 the active powers, and fending up frightful phantoms 
 to the brain, he will attempt to turn into an aurum 
 potabile, that (hall fit eafy upon the ftomach, and en- 
 liven and invigorate like a falutary cordial. It was his 
 reliance upon this art, that made him keep the former 
 part of his works in referve : for having picked up 
 fome bafe metals in his refearches, he chofe not to 
 iflue them forth, until he could find means of tranf* 
 muting them properly into current flerling. 
 
 When I have expoftulated with him upon the folly 
 
 of hunting after the Philofopher's ftone, he juftified 
 
 4 himfelf
 
 Free Will 95 
 
 prudence and ceconomy, this does not im^ 
 peach my liberty to fquander it all away. 
 
 Nor have we reafon to difturb ourfelves 
 with imaginations of a thraldom from fe- 
 
 cret 
 
 himfelf by the general pra&ice. For, fays he, there 
 are multitudes of Trafmutors up and down every 
 where ; but the vexation is, they go to work the wrong 
 way, converting gold into bafe metals. The Papifts, 
 Fanatics, and Methodifts, have tranfmuted the golden 
 ftreams of religion into a kind of Mercury fublimate, 
 that infmuates throughout the conftitution, and in- 
 toxicates the brain ; making men furious or foolifh, 
 curfing, damning, and worrying one another to pieces, , 
 or giving up their perfons, their eftates, and their 
 fenfes to the difpofal of their leaders ; leaving com- 
 mon fenfe to run after illuminations, and turning the 
 fancies of men into the counfels of God. The Free- 
 thinkers have tranfmuted fterling reafon into tinfel 
 witticifm, productive of felf-conceit, and an afiurance 
 of victory j for when you begin to joke with a Dif- 
 putant, you do not deferve to be talked with any 
 longer ; fo your argument remains unanfwerable, and 
 yourfelf mafter of the field. Our political writers 
 have trafmuted liberty into licentioufnefs, and the bare 
 furmife of an infamous peace being intended, into a 
 certain facl, for which a minifter ought to be hanged, 
 drawn, and quartered, in the judgement of all the 
 zealous patriots of our tea-tables, coffee-houfes, and 
 ale-houfes. Since then, fays he, thefe operators have 
 met with fuch fuccefs in the world, it (hows there js 
 fomething in the art: and if they have ufed it per- 
 
 verfely,
 
 Free Will. 
 
 cret influences, and unfeen fprings, when 
 thofe that are manifeft and feen do not 
 work upon us by conftraiat ; for fome- 
 times we may difcern the influence that 
 guides us, and yet find no thraldom in 
 following whither it leads. 
 
 How much of our employment depends 
 upon the natural appetites of hunger and 
 third ? You may pretend indeed that thefe 
 
 are 
 
 verfely, why (hould not I turn it to better fervice ? 
 Nor, if I can produce a fingle grain of good metal, 
 out of any drofs, ought I to incur blame for con- 
 tributing my mite towards enriching the common- 
 wealth of learning. 
 
 Befides, fays he, I find the Rofy crucian art very 
 convenient for my private ufe: for I want no index 
 expurgatorius. I may read Spinoza^ Machiavel, Tindal, 
 or We/ley's Journals, with fome emolument. For if 
 I cannot do like Virgil, who was faid to pick up gold 
 out of the dunghill of Ennius 9 yet I may imitate the 
 arch-chymift, Sun, who every day tranfmutes that 
 filthy fubftance into rofes and lilies, wheat, barley, 
 and wholefome vegetables. Indeed there are fome 
 ftubborn fubjeds eluding all the powers of chymiftry : 
 fuch as our weekly Diflertations, popular Declamations, 
 and mailings of Scandal and Obloquy againft the 
 Great: for they contain no folid fubftance at all, and 
 it is impoffible to make any thing out of whipped fulJa- 
 bub, or mere colouring.
 
 Free Will. 97 
 
 are ads of neceffity, becaufe we muft eat, 
 or ftarve b , but follow men to their meals, 
 and you will not fee one in a thoufand 
 that eats becaufe he muft, but becaufe he 
 likes it ; which of us ever fits down to 
 table by compuliion, or feels himfelf con- 
 ftrained to cut the joint before him, or 
 perceives his tongue moved by firings like 
 a puppet when he calls for a glafs of 
 wine ? 
 
 What fhall we fay to the mutual pro- 
 penfity between the fexes, another main 
 fpring in the hand of God, by which he 
 preferves the race of men upon earth ? 
 How many under twigs, what fafhions, 
 contrivances, amufements, accomplim 
 ments, grow from that ftem ? but wherein 
 does it check or overfhadow human liberty ? 
 
 b In a former chapter, having occafion to obferve how 
 commonly we miftake our motives of adtion, he fays, 
 If any body fhould afk, why you take your ftated 
 meals of breakfaft, dinner, and fupper, I warrant you 
 would anfwer, Becaufe I cannot live without eating. 
 But if this were our real motive, we fhould hardly 
 play fo good a knife, or put about the glafs fo brifkly 
 as we do ;' for we might keep ourfelves alive with a 
 great deal lefs trouble. 
 
 H Do
 
 98 Free Will. 
 
 Do boys and girls meet together by com- 
 pulfion, or choice ? Is the Mifs under a 
 force when jfhe culls among her trinkets 
 with curious toil to tiff herfelf out in the 
 moft engaging manner, or teazes pappa 
 for money to buy a new-fafhioned filk ? Is 
 the Beau compelled againft his Will to 
 pradtife winning airs before the glafs, OF 
 employ for whole hours all 'the thought 
 withinfide his noddle to bepowder and be- 
 curl the outfide ? 
 
 How ftrongly does parental inftinct ope- 
 rate upon us! 'Tis by this channel that 
 Cod tranfmits arts and fciences, education, 
 eftates, conveniencies of life, knowledge, 
 and old experience from generation to ge- 
 neration. In this we Tee the finger of Pro- 
 vidence and feel its potent touches' 1 , yet 
 feel no limitation in our liberty therefrom : 
 for what parent does not willingly go about 
 the provifions he makes for his children, 
 
 c My friend, like other Philofophers, is a little 
 flovenly in his drefsj which makes him the readier to 
 give a fly wipe at the contrary chara&er. 
 > d Honeft A/i^fpeaks experimentally in this place ^ 
 for nobody is more fenfible to thefe touches than he. 
 
 or
 
 Free Will. 99 
 
 or finds himfelf under any other direction 
 than his own choice and judgement in the 
 application of his cares for their advantage, 
 or perceives himfelf moved by clock-work 
 to procure any little toy, or diverfion for 
 them ? 
 
 . 22. Our powers of action fland limit- 
 ed to a certain extent of ground, but 
 within the enclofure we may ramble about 
 as we pleafe to take our pafture, or our 
 paftime : fometimes there are restraints 
 hanging over us, which confine us to par- 
 ticular walks, obligations and duties to be 
 fulfilled, authority to be obeyed, wants to 
 be fupplied, neceflaries of life to be pro- 
 vided, and it behoves us to regard thefe 
 reftriclions, or mifchief will enfue : but in 
 many of our hours we have no limitations 
 upon our conduct, and then we may move 
 eafily and lightly without the weight of any 
 fecret force or impediment encumbering 
 us. 
 
 Nor need we fear left we may defeat 
 
 the purpofes of God, or make any breaches 
 
 H 2 in
 
 too Free Will. 
 
 in the plan of his Providence; for he 
 knew what ufes we would make of our 
 Liberty, and has provided his plan ac- 
 cordingly. Let the Princes run madly 
 into broils, and the Grecians fuffer, the 
 Will of Jove is fulfilled by their madnefs, 
 and will be, whatever conduct man (hall 
 purfue. Therefore we have but our own 
 Will a to take care of; only let us not confult 
 
 folely 
 
 " Here understood, the Will of Inclination. Our 
 Author has fpent a whole chapter in defence of a 
 doctrine that may feem heretical, both in natural and 
 revealed. Religion : for his fubject being the fummum 
 tonum, or ultimate end of action, he places it folely 
 in every man's own happinefs. But happinefs is the 
 aggregate of pleafures ; and pleafures, except fome 
 few of them, which fall upon us unexpectedly from 
 fenfation, confift in the gratification of our refpedtive 
 defires ; for what pleafes one perfon, may give pain to 
 another, who has a contrary tafte. So a man has 
 nothing elfe to do, than ftudy how he may beft 
 gratify his defires. Now this looks like an exhortation 
 to purfue every fudden whim as it ftarts up in our fancy, 
 and will be fo taken, until we mail fee how he has 
 tranfmuted it. For he fays, this is not the way to 
 gratification : he owns, indeed, that defire is the beft 
 friend we have; becaufe but for it, our Jives would 
 pals infipid and irkfome ; neverthelefs he exhorts men 
 not to forget their abfent friends, nor gratify one 
 
 defire
 
 Free Will 101 
 
 folely our prefent Will and Fancy, but pay 
 a due regard to what we may will to- 
 morrow j and in our deliberations and exe- 
 cution of the prudential meafures for pro- 
 curing 
 
 defire prefent to their thoughts, at the expence of ano- 
 ther that may follicit by and by. But when they have 
 divers meafures of conduct lying before them for their 
 option, and ftand in a fituation to difcern all the con- 
 fequences refulting therefrom, let them chufe fuch as 
 will procure them moft gratification upon the whole. 
 If they fit down to a table plentifully ftored with high- 
 drefled viands, and find in themfelves a ftrong inclina- 
 tion to eat unmeafurably ; while doing this they add to 
 their happinefs j therefore fo far they do well. But 
 what if fuch indulgence will bring on ficknefs of fto- 
 mach, incapacity for bufinefs, converfation, or other 
 diverfion, hurt their fortune, or their reputation, or fit 
 heavy upon their confcience : confequences they will 
 vehemently diflike when falling upon them ? Or, tho* 
 they do not forefee thefe effe&s, yet are warned againft 
 them by the moral fenfe, or rules of fobriety founded 
 upon the general obfervation of their expedience ? If 
 they ftill indulge, they are very ill providers for gratifi- 
 cation. A true lover of money will make any fliift 
 rather than call in what he has {landing out at intereft 
 on good fecurity : and a true lover of pleafure will 
 undergo any felf-denial, that tends to greater enjoy- 
 ment. For 'tis the want of knowing the value of 
 money, that makes the young Spend-thrift encumber 
 his reverfions for the fake of raifing a fum in hand : 
 and 'tis the like want of knowing the value of happi- 
 H 3 nefs,
 
 IO2 Free Will. 
 
 curing what we (hall will to have another 
 time, we may proceed with the fame free- 
 dom as if there were no fuperiour power k 
 over us. 
 
 nefs, that puts the voluptuous upon mortgaging their 
 future expectations for a little prefent indulgence. 
 
 He obferves likewife, that gratification being re- 
 lative to defire, there are two ways of attaining it : 
 either by procuring the objects of our deilre, or by 
 turning defire upon the objects in our power, or 
 which may be convenient for us. If I have port in 
 my cellar, but wifh for claret ; or if I have claret, but 
 have likewife the gour, to which it would be hurtful ; 
 I fhall be gratified alike, either by ordering in claret 
 in the one cafe, and getting rid of my gout in the 
 other ; or by bringing myfelf to a liking of the liquor 
 I have and may drink without inconvenience. Now 
 men are ready enough of their own accord to- purfue 
 the former of thefe two methods: fo the Moralift 
 need only exhort them to the latter. And it becomes 
 the Mifer in happinefs to take that of the two upon 
 every occafion which he finds the moft feafible, or 
 likely to yield him the greateft income. If he has 
 money enough to fpare for the claret, or a fure fpecific 
 againft the gout, he will pleafe his palate : but if he 
 knows not where to get either of thefe, he will enure 
 his mind to enjoy herfelf over a glafs of common 
 port. 
 
 b He does not mean, no authority it is incumbent 
 upon us to regard, but no ftronger power able to con- 
 troul us in the exercife of our faculties. 
 
 i And
 
 Free Will 103 
 
 And the moft ufeful deliberation we can 
 enter upon, is how to enlarge our freedom, 
 for all are ready enough to allow that Hap- 
 pinefs confifts in liberty to do what we will, 
 nor (hall I contradict them, fo they do not 
 reftrain Will to that of the prefent moment. 
 We commonly underftand by our Will 
 what our Judgement reprefents as moft 
 eligible, or our Inclination prompts to as 
 moft alluring ; and whenever thefe two co- 
 incide, our Will is quite free ; therefore fo 
 far as we can bring defire to tally with 
 feafon, we (hall enlarge the bounds of our 
 liberty j and if we could do this compleatly 
 fo as to make a virtue of every neceffity, 
 and a pleafure of every obligation, we 
 fhould never have any reftraint hanging 
 over us, but attain a perfect liberty j be- 
 caufe willing 'always what was right and 
 feafible, we mould always do what we 
 would. 
 
 And this perfect liberty would more ap- 
 parently, though not more really coincide 
 with the plan of Providence than that pit- 
 tance of it we now poflefs - y for then we 
 H 4 fhould
 
 IO4 Foreknowledge. 
 
 fhould fulfill the Will of God knowingly, 
 whereas now we fulfill it, but unknowingly, 
 and many times by fetting ourfelves moft 
 ftrenuoufly to oppofe it, 
 
 Foreknow- & 27. And now we might think the 
 
 ledge. 
 
 controverfy ended, and all difficulties got 
 over, the freedom of Will being fully re- 
 conciled with the authority and dominion 
 of God : but the bufy mind of man, in- 
 genious in finding new perplexities to in- 
 volve itfelf in, will not let us reft quiet fo; 
 but feeing light open upon one fpot, fhifts. 
 the fcene to fome other corner, where it 
 may cover itfelf with clouds and obfcurity ; 
 and as if fond of ilavery, endeavours to 
 derive a title thereto from another quarter, 
 namely, that of Foreknowledge, 
 
 For, fay the fine Reafoners, if your 
 actions are foreknown, you can do no 
 otherwife than it'is known you will do ; fo 
 your hands are tied down to one particular 
 manner of proceeding, nor are you at 
 liberty to take any other than that you (hall 
 purfue, 
 
 But
 
 Foreknowledge. 105 
 
 But why fo ? what connection is there 
 between another's knowledge, and my be- 
 haviour ? it may poliibly direct his own 
 meafures, but has no influence at all upon 
 rnine. You allow that while my actions 
 remain unknown to every body I may be 
 free ; what then if after my being in pof- 
 feffion of this freedom fome fhrewd Poli- 
 tician mould difcover what I will do, how 
 does that divert me of it, in what refpect 
 alter my condition, or by what channel of 
 communication does his difcovery operate 
 upon me ? 
 
 No, fay they, you miftake the grounds 
 of our objection ; we do not affign his 
 knowledge as a caufe of any thing you do, 
 nor pretend it lays any reftraint upon your 
 liberty - 3 we only produce it as an evidence 
 of another reftraint hanging over you j for 
 he could not know how you will behave, 
 unlefs it were certain -, therefore his know- 
 ing is a proof that you will certainly do as 
 he knows ; but what will certainly come to 
 pafs cannot fall out otherwife 5 fo you have 
 
 no
 
 to6 Foreknowledge, 
 
 no liberty left, becaufe you cannot do what 
 will never be done. 
 
 But how does this alter the cafe ? where^ 
 in is the difference between Certainty and 
 Knowledge ? Why yes, the difference lies 
 here, that Certainty is the objedt of Know- 
 ledge, though fhe may riot have caft her 
 eye upon it ; therefore is a different thing, 
 as having exifted before it ; for your dif-* 
 eovery did not make the Certainty, but pre- 
 fuppofes it j for the thing was certain before, 
 though you did not know it. 
 
 But what fort of thing is this Certainty 
 to which you afcribe fuch irrefiftible force ? 
 let us know what rank of Beings to 
 place it under ? is it a fubftance ? 
 Or if a quality or accident, in what 
 fubftance does it refide ? for we generally 
 apply it to propofitions which are only 
 judgements of the mind. It is no agent, 
 it is no power, nor has any efficacy in its 
 ftate of pre-exiftence to knowledge ; for 
 were it ever fo certain the ifcufe was on 
 fire, this would influence none of my 
 actions until I know it. 
 
 24.
 
 Foreknowledge. 107 
 
 . 24. If Certainties have any adtive 
 virtue, it is to generate one another ; all our 
 rules of logic mow us that fome truths are 
 fuch in confequence of other truths : if 
 it certainly will rain to-morrow, it is 
 certain there will be clouds in the air; 
 if it be certain the gun I make tryal of 
 will go off, then the flinE will certainly 
 ftrike fire ; and in general the certainty of 
 Events infers the certainty of all caufes 
 operating to produce them : therefore what- 
 ever adts of my Freewill are certain, I muft 
 certainly have the freedom to do them. 
 
 We may indeed frame proportions con- 
 cerning future events, without thinking of 
 the 1 manner how they will come to pafs j 
 but remember your own obfervation, that 
 knowledge does not make certainty, but 
 finds it j much lefs can any form of words 
 make, or the omiffion of them deftroy it: 
 therefore whether you fpeak and think of 
 them or no, the fame proportions may be 
 applied, and the fame certainty belong to 
 the operating caufes, be they Force or 
 
 Free-
 
 I o 8 Foreknowledge. 
 
 Freewill, as to the events, and the certainty 
 of each reciprocally, implies the other. 
 
 Suppofe you under an engagement to 
 meet a perfon at any particular place, and 
 have a flrong inclination to go fomewhere 
 elfe, neverthelefs you have too much ho- 
 nour to break your word ; but perhaps the 
 man will fend five minutes hence to releafe 
 you from the engagement, and then you 
 will go where you like : now if it be cer- 
 tain you mall go there, mufl it not be 
 equally certain the reftraint will be taken 
 off, and you fet at perfect liberty to follow 
 your choice ? And if any body had affirm- 
 ed both a thoufand years ago, he would 
 have fpoken truth ; for while the one re- 
 mained fortuitous, the other could not be 
 certain : fo likewife in all inftances of free 
 Agency, the certainty of the action cafts a 
 certainty upon the freedom of the Agent ; 
 and the certain Foreknowledge of our 
 voluntary proceedings is fo far from over- 
 throwing, that it eftablifhes human liberty 
 upon a firmer bottom than it has really 
 belonging to it. 
 
 For
 
 Foreknowledge. 109 
 
 For we may obferve further, that this 
 argument unluckily proves too much ; be- 
 caufe if whatever mall happen, it be ab- 
 folutely impofiible that it mould not hap- 
 pen j then in fuch inftances wherein we 
 have our freedom, the debarring us the ufe 
 of it was from all eternity an abfolute im- 
 poffibility, infurmountable even by Omni- 
 potence itfelf j fo that inftead of being 
 dependant in all our motions upon neceffary 
 caufes, we fhall become independent on 
 the firft, the fupreme Fountain of all power 
 and action. 
 
 And for ought I know, the Devil might 
 have employed this fophifm when he re- 
 belled, to prove himfelf his own mafter ; 
 for feeling himfelf in poffeffion of freedom, 
 it was always true, that he mould be free ; 
 nor could Omnipotence itfelf prevent his 
 being fo : or he might have beguiled him- 
 felf into his fall, and juftified his difobe- 
 dience, by arguing in the following man- 
 ner. If any one had faid before I was 
 made, that I fliould be, he would have 
 fpoken truth ; therefore it was certain that 
 
 I
 
 no Foreknowledge, 
 
 I mould be, therefore an abfolute impofii* 
 bility that I fhould not be ; fo God could 
 not help creating me, nor do I owe any 
 thanks to the Almighty for my exiflence. 
 
 .25. What dependance or countenance 
 does this argument deferve ? which is fuch 
 a Drawcanfir as to cut down both friend 
 and foe j or like a fwivel gun, may be 
 pointed upon any quarter, fore and aft, 
 (larboard and larboard; and what is worfe, 
 we find it generally, in the hands of floth 
 and depravity, turned againft the lawful 
 authority of reafon and prudence. 
 - For when men are too lazy to beflir 
 themfelves, or too fond of a foolim thing 
 to be put afide from it by their cleareft 
 judgement, they then catch hold of this 
 idle pretence, what will be, muft be; 
 therefore why need I take pains, or deli- 
 berate at all? for my actions will have 
 fome certain iffue, and if certain, it is ne- 
 ceffary, and if neceflary, the event will 
 work itfelf out fome how or other, without 
 my giving myfelf any trouble to compafs it. 
 
 But
 
 Foreknowledge. 1 1 1 
 
 But who ever argues in this manner, 
 when they have fome favourite paffion to 
 gratify ? They then can fludy and con- 
 trive, fet all their wits to work, and ufe 
 all their might to accomplish their defigns : 
 whereas if they think confidently, there is 
 the fame certainty in matters of inclination, 
 as of prudence and duty ; whatever they 
 wifh, muft have fome certain hTue one 
 way or other, and is either unattainable in 
 fpite of their utmofl endeavours, or will 
 drop into their mouths without their feek- 
 ing. And thus they may go on to argue 
 themfelves out of all activity whatever, fo 
 as neither to take up the victuals from their 
 plate, or move away from the fire when it 
 burns their fhins. 
 
 . 26. But thefe fantaftical remoras do 
 not obftru<5t us in the familiar tranfaclions 
 of life, nor do they ever enter into the 
 head of a common man. If a pqor fellow 
 has done me fome fignal fervice, and I call 
 to him Hark ye, Tim ; do you fee that 
 fack of peafe in the barn-floor yonder ? 
 
 there
 
 Ii2 Foreknowledge^ 
 
 there are a couple of guineas in it forne-* 
 where ; if you can find them they are your 
 own. Now I know well enough he will 
 get the money j for he will take out every 
 pea one by one but he will come at it , but 
 I know as well that he cannot find it with- 
 out a good deal of pains and rummaging. 
 
 Suppofe one of your profound Specu- 
 latifts were by, and mould tell him, Why, 
 7/X you need not put yourfelf in a hurry 
 to go a rummaging ; you may as well fit 
 with your nofe over the kitchen fire ; for 
 Search knows you will get the money; 
 therefore it is a thing certain, and you 
 muft have it whether you do any thing, 
 or no. This logic would hardly prevail 
 upon 'Tim to ftop his fpeed for a moment. 
 
 Or fuppofe another fubtile refiner fets 
 the matter in a different light : < Tim ) fays 
 he, is a mere machine in this cafe utterly 
 deftitute of liberty j for not only his getting 
 the money, but his rummaging the fack is 
 foreknown ; fo his adion is certain and 
 neceflary, nor can he help rummaging any 
 more than the great clock can help ftriking. 
 
 Tim
 
 Foreknowledge. 113 
 
 2/w being an arch fell6w replies, Ay, but 
 Mafter, for all that I could ftay here and 
 never meddle with the fack, if I were 
 fool enough to run the hazard of fome* 
 body elfe getting away the money before 
 me - 3 and if you'll give me three and forty 
 Shillings to try, I'll fhow you what I 
 can do. 
 
 How many times a day do we foreknow 
 our own actions, and thofe of other people, 
 yet feel on rfelves and perceive them free in 
 the performance ? Our liberty is fo apparent 
 that the Philofopher with his microfcope a , 
 and the Ploughman with his half an eye, 
 .can difcern it diftinclly through the veil of 
 Certainty and Foreknowledge : 'tis only 
 the half - reafoner, who hangs between 
 
 both, 
 
 a Our Author difcovered his having a Microfcope 
 while at work on his chapter of Satisfaction, on hap* 
 pening for once to fpin a thread fomewhat finer than 
 Mr. Locke. He feemed mightily pleafed with it, as 
 finding it aflift him greatly in his tranfmutations ; and 
 talked much of it at firft, but has not mentioned it a 
 good while until now. Yet he ftill continues to ufe 
 it, as the difcerning Reader may perceive, by fome 
 microfcopic obfervations upon Liberty, upon Agency, 
 
 Volency,
 
 Foreknowledge. 
 
 both, and ufes a glafs full of flaws, that 
 hunts for it in vain, or fees it confufedly. 
 
 . 27. It is the crinkles in this glafs 
 making objects appear double, and repre- 
 fenting each individual as two diftindt things, 
 which produces that diftinction urged by 
 fome people between human Prefcience 
 and divine, as if one might be compatible 
 with human Liberty, though the other 
 were repugnant. 
 
 But why fo ? for it is not the party know- 
 ing, but the intrinfic certainty of the fact 
 that lays the reftraint : now as man can- 
 not know what is uncertain, fo neither if 
 there were any thing abfolutely fortuitous, 
 
 Volency, and Ele&ancy ; upon Powers operating, or 
 operated upon, in . 2, 13, 17, fcf pafflm. He fays, 
 this little inftrument is abfolutely neceflary for a Ma- 
 thematician or a Philofopher j but a common magni- 
 fying glafs, fuch as we buy for children to play with, 
 will do well enough for a Freethinker; becaufe it 
 ferves to difcovejr doubts and objections, that a man 
 with his common fenfes would never think of, and 
 magnifies them fuificiently, but fcarce ever reaches to 
 a folution. 
 
 could
 
 Forekn owledge. 115 
 
 could it be foreknown even to God a j there- 
 fore Knowledge, wherever refiding, is 
 alike evidence of Certainty. 
 
 Very true, fay they, where the know- 
 ledge is of the fame kind ; but our's is only 
 conjectural ; whereas that of God is ab- 
 folute : we all eonfefs the human Under- 
 landing fallible at beft, nor ever fo fure of 
 her hits, but there remains a poffibility of 
 her being miftaken, and it is this poffibility 
 that opens the door to Liberty. 
 
 Here, by the way, I cannot help remark- 
 ing how ready fome folks are to blow hot 
 and cold with the fame breath, as either 
 ferves the turn : if I happen in company 
 to drop a hint like thofe fuggefled in my 
 chapter on Judgement", that Certainty, 
 
 mathematical 
 
 a There are fome who hold Eternity a (landing 
 point with him, and the future to be equally prefent 
 with the current moment : but in this cafe the Know- 
 ledge would not be Prefcience, but direl Intuition, 
 which does not affecT: the Argument before us. 
 
 b Where the Author falls into downright Scepticifm : 
 
 for after having overthrown all Knowledge, except of 
 
 one thing, which is that we know nothng, he proceeds 
 
 10 take away this too, and proves demonftratively, 
 
 I 2 that
 
 6 Foreknowledge. 
 
 mathematical Certainty, was not made for 
 man, and that we know no more, if fo 
 much, than the appearances exhibited this 
 prefent moment to our fenfes* and the 
 ideas actually in our thought y I am ex- 
 claimed againft for an arrant Sceptic, a 
 Vifionary, a Trifler, advancing things I do 
 not believe myfelf. What ! cry they, do 
 not we know certainly that the Judges will 
 fit in Weftminfter-hall this term ; that the 
 Servant will lay the cloth for dinner 3 that 
 we ourfelves mall go to bed to-night ? Yet 
 thefe very people, like crafty Politicians, 
 now the interefts of their argument require 
 it, can take the opposite fide, and ilrike up 
 a coalition with the fallibility of human 
 
 that we dont know whether we know any thing or not. 
 For which Socrates in the vifion compliments him, as 
 being a wifer man than himfelf, who was declared 
 wifeft by the Oracle : for he it feems had fanned he 
 did know that he knew nothing; whereas our Author's 
 greater fagacity had difcovered that he did not know 
 even this. 
 
 I need not tell the Reader, he made his efcape out 
 of this dungeon, becaufe he finds him abroad in open 
 - daylight, pretending to know ieveral things in the very 
 lafl Section. 
 
 Under-
 
 Foreknowledge. 117 
 
 Underftanding in her ftrongeft aflurances. 
 Perhaps the Judges will not fit, for the 
 hall may be fwallowed up by an earth- 
 quake; perhaps the Servant will not lay 
 the cloth, for he may be ftruck with an 
 apoplexy ; perhaps we mall not go to bed, 
 for the houfe may take fire. Were thefe 
 
 J 
 
 cafualties, which depend upon external 
 caufes, alledged in diminution of Liberty, 
 they might carry fome weight; but what 
 efficacy they can have to encreafe it, I can- 
 not difcern with beft ufe of the micro- 
 fcope. 
 
 But waving this, if bare Poffibility may 
 give opening enough to fet us free, this , 
 fame Mr. Liberty mufl be a very flender 
 gentleman, to creep in at fuch an auger- 
 hole : yet let us confider whether he does 
 get his whole body through, or only thruft 
 in a little finger at moft ; for we have feen 
 there are degrees of Liberty confident with 
 a partial Reftraint. When I put on my 
 great coat and boots, I can flill move my 
 limbs, though not fo freely as before : when 
 in town I have not the fame liberty as in 
 I 3 the
 
 g Foreknowledge. 
 
 the country j I mull not go out in my 
 cap and flippers j I muft not carry a bundle 
 under my arm > if Ettzabetba Petrowna, 
 whom 1 never faw nor cared for, happens 
 to die two thoufand miles off, I muft not 
 wear a coloured coat, for fo the great 
 goddefs, Fajhion, that Diana of Ephefus, 
 whom all the world worfhippeth, ordains ; 
 yet fhe gracioufly allows me fome latitude 
 in my drefs and motions ; for I may go 
 armed with a fword I know not how to 
 ufe, and faunter away the day in coffee- 
 "houfes, or fpend the night in toffing about 
 a pack of cards, without offence to her 
 delicacy. 
 
 Now I believe my Antagonifls and I, 
 how flightingly foever we have fpoken of 
 human Underftanding, (hall agree that in 
 fome inftances our Knowledge grounds 
 upon evidence, which makes it a million 
 to one we are in the right : and fince an 
 Event may be probable, as well as certain, 
 though we do not know fo much, it muft 
 then contain an intrinfic probability inde- 
 pendent on our knowledge or conjecture.
 
 Foreknowledge. 119 
 
 But this probability, being fo near of kin 
 to certainty, that the acuteft Philofophers 
 could never find a criterion to diftinguifh 
 them, may be prefumed to have the family 
 ftrength, though not in equal meafure $ 
 and if one totally overthrows liberty, the 
 other muft faften a clog upon it proportion- 
 able to the degree of the probability j fo 
 that in cafes of the higheft aflbrance we 
 fhould find ourfelves reduced to the con- 
 dition of a perfon who mould have fo many 
 weights hung about him, that one millionth 
 part added more, would render him un- 
 capable of ftirring at all. 
 
 / 
 
 . 28. But if this will not do, and they 
 infift upon Probability being totally diffe- 
 rent from Certainty in kind and efficacy, 
 and that one has no force at all, though 
 the other be irrefiftible, let them con- 
 template an object, wherein they muft 
 needs acknowledge both perpetual Free- 
 dom and abfolute Foreknowledge ; for I 
 hope they will not deny God to be per- 
 fectly free in all his proceedings. If there 
 14 be
 
 120 Foreknowledge. 
 
 be fucb a thing in nature as freedom, where 
 can it refide, if not in the fupreme Author 
 of all powers, to whom there is nothing 
 fuperior that might controul him? Yet 
 I fuppofe they will fcarce imagine all his 
 meafures fudden, and his actions fortuitous, 
 or that he does not know to-day what he 
 will do to-morrow. 
 
 But if certainty infers neceffity, then 
 either he forefees no better than we do, 
 that is conjecturally, when he will flop the 
 torrents of blood that overwhelm Europe^ 
 the diftrefTes, the ruins, the havock and 
 defolation that fpread over land and fea, 
 and reftore peace to Chriftendom, or his 
 hands in the interim remain tied to do it at 
 one precife time, nor is he at liberty to 
 advance the happy event one moment 
 fooner a . Nay, we mail not flop here ; 
 for if a proportion had been affirmed from 
 everlafting concerning any work of Pro- 
 vidence that has been performed, it would 
 have been true: therefore God from 'all 
 
 This was wrote before any overtures for a treaty 
 of Pacification were publickly known. 
 
 eternity
 
 Foreknowledge. 1 2 1 
 
 eternity was neceffitated to create and go- 
 vern his worlds precifely in the manner he 
 has done ; and fo, according to the devilifh 
 fine reafoning ufed at the end of . 24. we 
 are not obliged to him, but to the iron- 
 handed goddefs Neceflity, for our life, our 
 health, our daily bread, and all the blefiings 
 we receive. 
 
 Perhaps they will alledge the cafe is dif- 
 ferent here ; for the ads of God are fuch 
 only as he had determined upon himfelf, 
 therefore in performing them he executed 
 his own will : but let them remember, that 
 they placed the necefTity in the intrinfic cer- 
 tainty of the fadr, not in the caufes operat- 
 ing to produce it; for if they admit thefe, 
 then the caufe of our free actions being the 
 freedom we have to perform them, will 
 evidence itfelf, inftead of proving our bon- 
 dage: but, according to them, when a facT: 
 is certain, it is necelTary, no matter why, 
 or how, it came to be fo ; and equally cer- 
 tain, whether proceeding from the agent's 
 own determination or fome external caufe: 
 for if what will be, muft be, then whatever 
 1 God
 
 122 Foreknowledge. 
 
 God foreknows will be done by himfelf as 
 well as by us, becomes alike certain, nor 
 can even omnipotence prevent it from tak- 
 ing effecl: \ 
 
 Thus we fee the fame ill luck attends the 
 argument wherever we turn it ; for if it 
 proves any thing, it proves more than it 
 fhould -, nor can it infringe upon human 
 liberty, without encroaching upon God 
 himfelf. 
 
 Neither let them throw in my teeth what 
 I have reported from Pythagoras concerning 
 the oath of Jove j for this was only a figu- 
 rative expreffion, to denote the unchange- 
 ablenefs of the divine nature : if God has 
 fworn, his oath is facred, becaufe we know 
 
 b To this argument might be added another. Foe 
 I fuppofe every pious man efteemsiit certain, that God 
 will reward the good and punifh the evil-doer ; that he 
 will maintain the laws of nature, not throw all things 
 into confufion, nor annihilate the beings he has creat- 
 ed. Thus human prefcience extends in fome cafes to 
 the divine agency. But if certainty inferred neceffity, 
 then either God muft not be free to difpofe of us in 
 what manner he judges proper,or it muft remain totally 
 uncertain how he will ufe his power. 
 
 he
 
 Foreknowledge. 123 
 
 he will keep it c , being not liable, like man, 
 to change his fentiments, or defign one thing 
 to-day and the contrary to-morrow ; but 
 nobody imagines him under any compul- 
 lion or neceffity, in cafe he could be fup- 
 pofed at any time defirous of violating it ; 
 fo that when he performs, he acts with the 
 
 c Being part of the le&ure delivered in the vifion. 
 From which oath the laws of nature received their {la- 
 bility, and the courfes of events befalling men their cer- 
 tain appointment. Dacier would have faid, the phi- 
 lofopher took, this hint from the covenant made with 
 Noah) that day and night, feed-time and harveft, fhould - 
 never fail. And our Rofycrucian took the hint from 
 Dacier , to practife with his art chymical upon the fub- 
 lime myfteries imparted to him. For the Samian fage 
 having broached fo many heathenim inventions of a pre- 
 exiftence, a mundane foul, difcerptions and abforptions, 
 tranfmigrations, eternity # parte ante of created beings, 
 limited duration of punifliments, homogenity of fpirits, 
 their differences refulting from their refpective compo- 
 fitions with matter, that he was afraid of being thought 
 a bad man himfelf for conforting with fuch wicked 
 company. So he went to work upon his tranfmuting 
 procefs, wherein he fucceeded fo luckily, that having 
 ventured to read over the whole lecture to a learned 
 divine, a man of a very good difcernment, he cried out 
 at the conclufion, with a kind of rapturous furprize : 
 Why Search ! you have made Pythagoras an orthodox 
 Chriftian. 
 
 fame
 
 J2/J. Foreknowledge. 
 
 fame pure bounty and unlimited freedom as 
 when he promifes. 
 
 .29. When we examine what gave rife 
 to this notable difcovery of every thing cer- 
 tain being neceffary, we fhall find it fpring 
 from a mere quibble of words. What you 
 will do, fay they, you muft do ; for you 
 cannot do otherwife fo long as you are to 
 do that, becaufe you cannot do both. Who 
 doubts it ? Therefore I allow this to be mat- 
 ter of neceflity, not of prudence ; nor would 
 I recommend it to any man to deliberate, or 
 make trial, how he (hall run 'and fit (till at 
 the fame time, or ride on horfeback while he 
 goes in a coach : but for all that, what ails 
 him that he might not omit the thing he has 
 refolved upon, or will do, and take a con- 
 trary courfe ? How fure foever I am of 
 going to bed, ftill I may fit up all night, 
 if I pleafe, for neither God nor man 
 hinders me ; but I know I fhall not, be- 
 caufe I know it is in my option, and 
 know what I chufe to do : fo my know- 
 ledge ftands upon my freedom -, for if I 
 had it not, I might be compelled to do 
 
 what
 
 .Foreknowledge. 125 
 
 what I do not chufe, and my action would 
 be uncertain. 
 
 But my Knowledge they fay is only con- 
 jedtural. What then? does not God know 
 it too ? and does not he know likewife, that 
 he has left the iffue to my option ? and whe- 
 ther he has given me fo much difcretion 
 as will withhold me from doing a filly thing 
 merely to (hew what I can do ? So thefe 
 three points of Knowledge, the Difcretion, 
 the Liberty to ufe it, and the Event, are fo 
 far from overthrowing that they fuflain and 
 ftrengthen one another. 
 
 The difficulties we make fpring from our 
 conceiving too narrowly of the divine pre- 
 fcience ; we confider God as foreknowing 
 an event feparately, without knowing, or 
 without contemplating the caufes giving it 
 birth : in this cafe indeed the Foreknow- 
 ledge muft have a fomething, an inexpli- 
 cable fatality attending it, for elfe it could 
 not be abfolute, becaufe there might fome 
 unforefeen caufe intervene to render it abor- 
 tive. But the prefcience of God is univerfal 
 as well as abfolute ; when he knows what 
 
 will
 
 126 Foreknowledge* 
 
 will come to pafs, he knows the eaufcg 
 himfelf has provided for accomplifhing it, 
 nor can any body who confiders the matter 
 at all imagine him ever ignorant or forget- 
 ful of either 5 nay, he knows the one, be* 
 caufe he knows the other : for if we could 
 fuppofe him ignorant of the caufes, he 
 would not know their iflue : therefore in 
 fuch inftances where freedom is one of 
 thofe caufes, he foreknows that freedom, 
 the motives inclining us to ufe it, and how 
 thofe motives will operate ; and confequent- 
 ly by the rule infifted on, it is as neceflary 
 we mould enjoy that freedom, as in what 
 manner we (hall employ it* 
 
 .30. Neverthelefs they go on ft ill to 
 urge, that we cannot do otherwife than we- 
 hall do, not only becaufe we cannot do 
 both, but becaufe we cannot omit what we 
 certainly mail do, and take another courfe : 
 for an event that will certainly happen, 
 cannot fail of coming to pafs, nor can the 
 contrary take effedt; but the divine pre- 
 frience is an irrefragable evidence of this 
 
 cer
 
 Foreknowledge. 127 
 
 certainty, becaufe if the thing were uncer- 
 tain, the Foreknowledge could not be ab- 
 folute. Now there is no poffibility that God 
 {hould be miftaken ; therefore none that any 
 thing foreknown by him fhould not take 
 effect, or the contrary fhould fall out; then it 
 is not poffible for us to omit whatever it is 
 impoffible {hould fail of being done j fo our 
 power is gone ; or if we have a natural 
 ability either to do or to omit, we have no 
 liberty to ufe it, being confined to that par- 
 ticular way which is foreknown. 
 
 Now if they will pleafe to throw this cu- 
 rious reafoning into the logical form of a 
 fyllogifm, we may chance to fhew them it 
 has four terms, and therefore concludes no- 
 thing. Whatever God foreknows, it is im- 
 poffible the contrary fhould be done ; what 
 is impoffible to be done, it is out of my power 
 to do; therefore whatever God foreknows, 
 it is out bf my power to do the contrary. 
 
 I (hall not deny major nor minor -, but if 
 the word impoffible fhould carry different 
 fenfes as it ftands in either, the whole chain 
 will become a rope of fand, and the confe- 
 
 quence
 
 Foreknowledge* 
 < o 
 
 fequence limp lame behind. In order to 
 canvafs this point, let us have recourfe to 
 our prefent patronefs Philology, to mark 
 out the feveral ufes wherein we employ that 
 term, together -with others relative thereto, 
 fuch as, mjufl, 'W&fa . cw* . nejcejjary, and 
 the like,, both in our familiar and ferious 
 
 c^i. ' ' - 
 
 difcourfes. - ^j^f.- .^ 
 
 . Pofjible^ relates originally and mod ob- 
 vioufly to Powerj for things are.poflible as 
 far as we have power to perform them, but 
 no farther : and if it be aiked, Whether it 
 is poflible to tranfniute lead into gold ? you 
 will underftand by the queftion, whether 
 it is in the power of man, by chymical pro- 
 cefs, or any other art or contrivance, to 
 effea it. 
 
 A * 
 
 But we often apply the term where we 
 have nothing of power in our thoughts. 
 Suppofe, in pkying at whift, I have only 
 two cards left in my hand, but muft win 
 both tricks to fave the game ; my partner 
 leads a trump, and the king was turned up on 
 my left hand, in this cafe I mail put down 
 the ace with hopes of fucceeding, becaufe 
 
 it
 
 Foreknvwftdge. 
 
 it is pomble the king may be alone. Now 
 by poffible, I do not mean in the power of 
 any body, or any thing, to make the king 
 alone, or guarded : if chance ever had any 
 power, me has executed it as foon as the 
 eards were muffled and cut, nor has me now 
 any further concern in the affair. There- 
 fore here the term denotes only the con- 
 tingency of what other card lies in the fame 
 hand with the king, and is relative ; for to 
 him who holds the eards it is not poffible 
 they mould be any other than what he 
 fees them, though to me who do not fee 
 them, guarded or not guarded are equally 
 poffible* 
 
 On the other hand, whoever confiders 
 the pains I hive taken on this crabbed fub- 
 jedtj will think it impoffible I mould throw 
 my labours into the fire as foon as I have 
 compleated them : not that he thinks any 
 thing of my powers, or fuppofes me to plod 
 on until my arm is fo benumbed that I 
 cannot extend it to the grate, or that I 
 write upon cloth of Afoeftos, which will 
 not confume in the Flames, but becaufe he 
 K thinks
 
 'oJ a foreknowledge. 
 
 thinks there is no chance I fhould inftantly 
 deftroy what I have been fo earned to pro- 
 duce. 
 
 Thus Poffible fometimes denotes the 
 Power or Liberty we have to do a thing, 
 as Impoffible does the want of it, and fome- 
 .times only the contingency* or our know- 
 ledge or ignorance of an event, without 
 the leaft reference to the powers producing 
 it. There may be different degrees of pof- 
 iibility in what manner I mall fpend my 
 afternoon, according as people know more 
 -or lefs of my character, difpofition, or ways 
 -of employing my time : but my power and 
 my liberty muft be the fame, whatever 
 other folks think of me, or though there 
 mould be a hundred different opinions or 
 degrees of knowledge about me. If I am 
 under engagement to go with another whi- 
 ther he wants me, and fomebody afks which 
 way I am bound, I may fay, 'tis poflible 
 to the Exchange, or'tispoffible to St. James's, 
 but this leaves me no more at liberty than 
 if it were abfolutely impofTible that one of 
 them fliould not be the place. Or if I want 
 4 to
 
 foreknowledge. 
 
 fpeak with a perfon whom I know not 
 readily where he is, but am fo lure of find- 
 ing him, that I fay it is impomble but I 
 rnuft fee him ; this does not abridge or any 
 ways alter the liberty I mould have to pur- 
 fue or forbear my enquiries, were it pol- 
 fible my endeavours might prove inef- 
 fectual. 
 
 It avails nothing to tell us, that our 
 knowledge at beft -can amount only to the 
 higher! probability of conjecture; for our 
 bufinefs now lies with the propriety of 
 language, and natural import of thofe ex- 
 preffions, wherein we ufe the words Poffible 
 or Impoffible : whatever refined notions we 
 may have in our clofets, we leave them be- 
 hind, and take up common conceptions 
 when we go abroad upon our common 
 tranfadions j be our cleared knowledge ever 
 fo conjectural, we efteem it certain upon, 
 thefe occafions : which of us in fetting out 
 upon a vifit, a diverfion, or an affair of 
 bufinefs, apprehends a pombiiity of not ar- 
 riving at the place of his deftination, yet 
 
 at the fame time does not .apprehend himfelf 
 K2 at
 
 132 Foreknowledge. 
 
 at liberty to alter his courfe in any part of 
 hisprogrefs ? but if the impoffibility of an 
 event failing, implied neceffity in the agent, 
 the idea of fuch impoffibility, however er- 
 roneous, yet while entertained, muft banifh 
 the idea of freedom j but whether it does 
 fo, I appeal to the judgement and hourly 
 
 exoerience of all mankind. And if our 
 
 * 
 
 Antagonifts have found a new fenfe in the 
 word Impoffible, unknown to the reft of 
 the world, they will do well to explain 
 their idea in a manner enabling us to under- 
 hand their peculiar meaning. 
 
 To confider the other words of the like 
 import, we fay it may rain, or be fair to- 
 morrow j and when we fay this, we think 
 nothing of any choice in the clouds, or 
 the air to produce either weather, as the 
 word naturally implies j for what we may 
 do lies in our option to do, or to forbear. 
 And it is one thing, when fpeaking of a 
 prifoner for debt, for whom we have juft 
 procured a releafe, we fay, Now he may 
 go home to his family j and quite another, 
 when fpeaking of a perfon gone out upon 
 
 a tone
 
 Foreknowledge. 133 
 
 a tour of diverfion, we fay, He may come 
 home to-day : in one cafe, May exprefles 
 the liberty he has to do as he likes j in the 
 other, it denotes only the chance there is 
 in what manner he will ufe jhis liberty; 
 for though I fhould know the releaied 
 debtor will not go home, {till I mail think 
 he may if he will ; but if I know the 
 traveller's intention to ftay out longer, I 
 fhall not think it poffible he may come 
 home to-day. 
 
 Nor ihould we fcruple to ufe the word 
 Can upon this occafton ; for if we judge it 
 not poffible that he may come, it is the 
 fame thing as believing it certain he cannot 
 come, yet without idea of any imbecillity 
 or reftraint to prevent him. 
 
 So likewife Muil and Neceflary, con- 
 fidered by themfelves, imply a force com- 
 pelling to one particular action, or an un- 
 furmountable bar as;ainft all others : if I 
 
 o 
 
 muft attend upon a tryal, I am not at liberty 
 to flay away; if my health renders exer- 
 cife necdiary, I muft go abroad fome how 
 or other, and in that cafe am neceilitated 
 K ^ to
 
 Foreknowledge* 
 
 to walk when debarred the ufe of all con 
 veyances. But fuppofe a friend has fome 
 bufinefs with me, which requires no fort 
 of hafte, but I know he loves to take the 
 firft convenient opportunity for difpatching 
 whatever he has to do : upon being afked 
 when I expe& to fee him, I may fay, 
 perhaps not to-day, nor to-morrow, nor all 
 this week j but I think he muft neceflarily 
 come before the month is out. 
 
 Nor do we fcruple applying the fame 
 terms to things inanimate, which though 
 really necefiary agents, we generally con- 
 ceive and fpeak of as having powers and 
 liberty. Water comprefTed in a fire engine 
 mu ft neceflarily rufh through thefpout,being 
 forced to mount upwards againfl its nature, 
 and becaufe it can find no other vent. But if 
 a carelefs fervant does not mind to thrufl 
 the fpigot faft into the barrel, the beer mufl 
 neceflarily run all away : in ufing this ex- 
 prefiion, we think nothing of the force of 
 gravitation impelling bodies downwards, 
 but only the certainty of the mifchief en- 
 fuing which we apprehend, for that the 
 
 liquor
 
 Foreknowledge* 1 3.5 
 
 liquor being left to its liberty will follow 
 the natural propenfity it has to defcend, 
 and will exert a power to drive away the 
 loofe fpigot obstructing its paffage. 
 
 .31. Any body with a little attention, 
 may recollect a thoufand inftances wherein 
 the impoffibility of an event not coming to 
 pafs, implies no more than a denial of all 
 hazard that it may not come to pafs, which 
 is neither an affirmation nor denial of power 
 or freedom in the caufes bringing it forth 
 to produce the contrary. Therefore in 
 cafes where we need not, or lie under no 
 neceffity of doing a thing, where we can, 
 and may, and it is eafily poffible for us to 
 act differently, yet we may be fo fure of our 
 meafures as that they muft neceffarily take 
 effect, that they cannot, there is an im- 
 poffibility they mould fail of fucceeding, 
 or we mould omit to employ them ; which 
 latter impoffibility is a foundation ftrong 
 enough to fupport the higheft degree of 
 Foreknowledge, and confequently Fore- 
 knowledge may well be abfolute without 
 K 4 putting
 
 j 3 6> Foreknowledge. 
 
 putting a force upon us, or cramping us 
 the Jeaft in our. liberty. 
 
 Thus have I endeavoured to refcue man* 
 kind from flavery, from the dread of force, 
 reftraint and controul hanging continually 
 over them, not like Epicurus by pulling 
 Providence from her throne, and fetting 
 lip the Anarchy of Chance in her ftead ; 
 but by Showing the confiftency of her go- 
 vernment with the free ufe of thofe powers 
 allotted us, and proving human liberty one 
 of the minifters to execute her purpofes. 
 
 If the foregoing Obfervations upon this 
 dark and intricate Subject (hall render it 
 intelligible to others, and {hall have the 
 fame weight upom them as they feem to 
 Hie to deferve : then in thofe feafons where- 
 in, as I may fay, God gives them a holiday 
 to follow their own inclinations, they will 
 move .brifkly and cheerfully, without 
 thought of any other reftraint than, what 
 I hope they will never wifh to throw afide, 
 Innocence and Propriety j and when h$ 
 palls them to his fervices, if they do but 
 pianage to bring their minds into a proper 
 
 difpq?
 
 Demerit. 137 
 
 difpofition, they will find the performance 
 of them a ftate of perfect Freedom. 
 
 . 32. Neverthelefs we have not done Demerit, 
 with our Difputants yet, for if we can de- 
 fend our Liberty againfl infringement by 
 univerfal Providence and abfolute Fore- 
 jsnowledge, they change their attack upon 
 another quarter, namely, the juflice of 
 Reward and Punimment in the fituation of 
 mankind we have reprefented : for, fay 
 they, if the Will of God be fulfilled on 
 earth as well as in heaven, who hath ever 
 refitted his Will ? why then doth he punifti ? 
 As to Reward, they find no fault with 
 that being conferred upon them unmerited, 
 fo the only difficulty remains with refpect 
 to punimment; and in order to anfwer, 
 their queflion, let us examine what is the 
 proper and natural foundation of Punim- 
 ment. 
 
 Men are apt enough to inflict it for in- 
 juries received, with no other view than to 
 wreak their refentment, and the Righteous, 
 \vhen having moll: compleatly mattered
 
 1 3,8 Demerit. 
 
 their paffions, ftill feel an abhorrence rife 
 in their breafts againft enormous crimes, 
 although no ways affecting themfelves, nor 
 capable of hurting them. What then, is 
 this Refentment and this Abhorrence in- 
 nate ? Suppofe they were, yet we cannot 
 afcribe our paffions and averfions to the 
 Almighty, or imagine him punifhing in 
 order to remove a loathfome object from 
 his light which it gives him pain to behold. 
 But Mr. Locke has long fince exploded the 
 doctrine of innate Ideas, and if the idea 
 of Injury was acquired, thofe of Refent- 
 ment and Abhorrence, being its offspring, 
 muft be younger. 
 
 In our chapter on the Paffions we have 
 traced Anger * to its origin, and found it 
 derived from Expedience ; for children 
 having often relieved themfelves from what- 
 ever 
 
 a He fays, we pafs through four ftages at leaft in 
 our progreis to the paffion of anger : the experience of 
 damage brought upon us by others ; of our power to 
 give them dtfpleafure; of the effeft of fuch difpleafure 
 to make them alter their meafures, and of the oppo- 
 fjtion vre muft expeft to meet with againft the exertion 
 
 of
 
 Dement. 139 
 
 ever opprefled them by a violent exertion 
 of their power againft the caufe of it, con- 
 tradt a habit of violence, and pradife it 
 afterwards without view to the confequences, 
 fatisfalion being tranflated b from the end 
 to the means. 
 
 The 
 
 of this power. Which laft gives anger its violence, 
 becaufe a ftrenuous exertion is neceflary to furmount 
 that oppofition. But after having compleated our 
 progrefs, we lofe fight of the ftages leading to it, and 
 then the defire of revenge rifes habitually upon fight of 
 injury, without any further thought. 
 
 b There is a chapter upon Tranflation; which is the 
 principal channel whereby our motives are derived from 
 one another. For the fatisfa&ion apprehended in at- 
 taining a purpofe, is what makes it a motive of action 
 with us. Now when there are means neceflary to be 
 purfued in order to accomplifh this point, our defire 
 of the end cafts a fatisfa&ion like wife upon the means : 
 fo long as we retain the end in view, that is properly 
 our motive, and we defire the means only for the fake 
 of what they will conduit us to : but it very frequently 
 happens, that the fame means bring us fo often to 
 our defired end, that the fatisfaction thrown from ir, 
 refts at laft upon them, and we continue our fondnefs 
 for them after the end is dropped out of our thought. 
 Then it is the translation is perfectly made; and the 
 means become an end, or motive, capable of influ- 
 encing us to action. 
 
 This matter is illuftrated by the inftance of monev, 
 which every body allows would have no regard, unlefs 
 
 for
 
 I4-Q Demerit. 
 
 The abhorrence of villainy, as well wheri 
 propofed topurfelves, as pradli Ted by others, 
 is one of the moral fenfes % which we 
 have mown in the proper place, iflue from 
 the fame fountain : they may indeed be 
 conveyed to particular perfons by educa- 
 tion, by precept, by example, and fym- 
 
 pathy, 
 
 for fake of the conveniences and pleafures of life it 
 procures us. Yet we find it fo conftantly tending to 
 this end, that there are few of us who would not take 
 fome pains, and feel fatisfa&ion in getting a fum, 
 without thinking of the pretty things we could do with 
 it : -and in fome the fatisfa&ion is fo ftrongly tranflated, 
 that they will deny themfelves thofe very conveniences 
 which rendered it defjrable, for the fake of faving their 
 money. 
 
 And as fatisfa&ion is tranflated from end to means, 
 fo is aflent, or judgement, from the premifes to the 
 conclufion refulting therefrom, which being once well 
 fettled in the mind, we continue to look upon as a 
 certain truth, after having utterly forgotten the evi- 
 dence by which we were brought to acknowledge it for 
 fuch. 
 
 Thus it is by tranflation we receive all our ftores of 
 knowledge, except what is thrown in immediately from 
 the fenfes : and by the fame channel we derive all our 
 motives and defires, except thofe excited by fenfation. 
 
 c Mr. Search will not allow them to be given imme- 
 diately by nature, but either catched by fympathy from 
 others, or formed by tranflation , which latter is of two 
 
 forts,
 
 Demerit. 
 
 forts, as we have feen in the proceeding note. For 
 education, precept, and example, operate by infor- 
 mation of the judgement concerning the reditude of 
 the things taught, or feen pradtifed ; but fometimes 
 he fuppofes them acquired by fatisfaclion tranflated 
 from thofe defirab'e ends to which they have been ob- 
 ferved to conduce. And he thinks his opinion con- 
 firmed by the great difference of moral fenfes among 
 mankind : one man places his point of honour in re- 
 venging an affront j another in making his payments 
 punctually, another in fufFenng no wafle of his time, 
 another in having nothing to do : one efteems perfe- 
 cution meritorious ; another looks upon it with horror 
 and deteftation; nor perhaps are there any two men, 
 who fee the fame things with equal degree of appro- 
 bation or abhorrence. But if thefe fenfes were na- 
 tural, not acquired, why (hould they not reprefent 
 their objects in the fame colours to every body ? For 
 all men fee whitenefs in lilies, rednefs in rofes, and 
 verdure in the grafs. Nor let it be faid that bad com- 
 pany, or vicious courfes, may debilitate or corrupt 
 the fenfes nature gave us ; for the company a man 
 keeps, or vices he practifes, will not make him blind 
 or deaf, n'or fee different colours, or hear different 
 founds from other people. Or if interr.perance does 
 fometimes weaken and vitiate the bodily fenfes, it does 
 fo with refpet to all objects alike: a jaundiced eye 
 fees every thing yellow, nor does it add a particular 
 brightness to fome colours above the reft : but the 
 moral fenfe often difcerns the lufcreof fome virtues re- 
 markably well, and fees none at all, or perhaps a 
 darknefs in others equally refplendent. Neither is it 
 an objection that fome objects appear generally amiable 
 or deteftable ; that we have moral fenfes of things 
 without any pains or care taken to acquire them j that 
 
 they
 
 Demerit. 
 
 they judge inftantaneoufly without our knowing why 9 
 and ftrike their notices upon us forcibly againft our 
 utmoft endeavours to ftifle them. For by this rule our 
 knowledge of language may be counted natural ; be- 
 caufe men in general have fome language j we learn 
 our mother tongue without care or pains ; the mean- 
 ing of what we hear ftrikes us inftantaneoufly with 
 the found, though we know not why the words table 
 or chair, were affixed to the things they fignify ; nor 
 can we, with our utmoft endeavours, diflbciate fcan- 
 dal, or unwelcome truths from the expreffions con- 
 veying them. 
 
 Nor yet does he think their being derived from ex- 
 pedience any ways depreciates their value : for when 
 our moral fenfes give their notices ftrong, it is aft 
 evidence, which ought not to be disregarded, that we 
 ourfelves formerly, or other perfons before us, have 
 found an expedience in the practices they recommend* 
 though we may not at prefent difcern it. Therefore 
 they deferve the fame refpecl as a man, in whofe judge- 
 ment we can fully confide, who mould give his advifes, 
 without laying before us the grounds whereon he 
 founded them. 
 
 Thus if any body mall take offence at the fuppofition 
 of there being no immediate natural connexion be- 
 tween tranfgrefiion and punifhment, let it be made 
 known to him that this does not invalidate the rules, 
 nor influence of juftice : for the chain is often too 
 long for us to bear in mind, which juftifies us in 
 bringing the two ends to a contiguity they had not in 
 nature. Many evil imaginations of the heart are 
 harmlefs, unlefs as they give the mind an evil turn* 
 productive of bad actions : many fmgle deviations 
 from rule maybe innocent, otherwife than as they lead 
 into pernicious4iablts: and in fome infbuices an aci of 
 
 injuftice
 
 Demerit. 143 
 
 pathy d , but whoever acquired them firft, 
 learned them by obfervation of their ne- 
 
 cefTary 
 
 injuftice might be expedient, were it not for fetting 
 a bad example, or opening a door to licentioufnefs in 
 ourfelves, by throwing us off our guard upon other 
 occafions. Nor is it uncommon for men, after fome 
 years experience over their heads, to difcern a fatal 
 tendency in irregularities, it would have been impoffi- 
 ble to have convinced them of in their youth. So 
 that if we were never to proceed againft offences 
 without alking, why, what harm do they do ? we 
 might not always be ready with an anfwer : and vice 
 fnuft go unpunrfhed, our own failings ftand uneor- 
 redled, and the mifchiefs remotely confequent there- 
 upon muft be incurred. Wherefore it is right, be- 
 eaufe neceffary, to make the. translation of odium to 
 vvickednefs compleat, without which the connection 
 could not be preferved : and a prudent man will teach 
 others, and enure himfelf, to feel an abhorrence of it 
 upon no further view, than its b'acknefs. Thus the 
 allocution between Demerit and Depravity derives 
 from prudence, not from nature : men being led into 
 into it by the expedience there is in affociating them, 
 elofely together without the intervention of expedience* 
 
 And in like manner he has laid down upon a former 
 occafion, that things deferve honour, not merely be- 
 caufe they are ufeful, but becaufe it will be ufeful to 
 place honour upon them. 
 
 d The fubje6t of a feparate chapter. By this term, 
 he underftands that aptnefs we all have, more or lefs, 
 of taking the fentiments, the ideas, the affections, or" 
 the company we confott with, and in general cafring 
 our imagination, hr.o the feme train with theirs : wfth- 
 
 put
 
 44. Demerit. 
 
 ceflary tendency to good order and hap- 1 
 pinefs, and by experience of the mifchiefs 
 refulting from thofe praclifes they would 
 reftrain. The frequent view of thefe 
 good effects cafts a value upon the fenti- 
 ments producing them, and the tranflation 
 being once compleatly made> defire fixes 
 upon them as upon its ultimate object. 
 
 We find judgement does the fame with 
 refpecl to truth tranilated from the Poflulata 
 to the Problem demonflrated : the equality 
 between the fquares of the two fides and 
 hypothenufe in a rectangular triangle ferves> 
 for a bafis in mathematical and mechanical 
 operations without our running back pep- 
 out which converfation would grow languid, the plea- 
 fures of fociety lofe their relifh, and our inclination to 
 good offices its vigour. This is another main fpring 
 of our motives, and even of our judgements ; and 
 performs its work much quicker than tranflation : for 
 we do not prefently drop our ends out of view, but we 
 often imbibe defires and opinions from others in ah 
 inftant. 
 
 The dexterous management of this engine makes a 
 great part of the Poet's and Orator's arts, for upon it 
 depends the efficacy of exclamation, pofitivenefs, arid 
 ridicule, and of Horace's rule, if you would have me 
 weep, you muil firft be grieved yourfelf. 
 
 petually
 
 Demerit* 145 
 
 petually through the whole procefs where- 
 by Euclid convinced us of its being a truth. 
 In like manner when our moral fenfes are 
 grown vigorous, we follow their impulfe 
 without thinking of any higher principle 
 firft recommending them, and many of us 
 without acknowledging any fuch principle. 
 Now I would not by any means leflen 
 their influence, I rather wim it were ftronger 
 than it is; for we very feldom fland in a 
 fhuation to difcern the expedience of our 
 actions, nor where it lies any thing remote 
 have we ftrength of mind enough to pur- 
 fue it ; but thefe moral fenfes ferve as ex- 
 cellent guides to direct:, and fpurs to ftimu- 
 late us towards the attainment of a hap- 
 pinefs that would otherwife efcape us. 
 Neverthelefs it muft be owned they partake 
 of the nature of paflion, having the like 
 qualities, the like vehemence and manner 
 of operation, and may be ftiled virtuous 
 appetites, as being the produce of reafon 
 and induftry rather than of nature. They 
 are to be ranked among the Scyons which 
 Plato told us Urania grafted upon the 
 L wild
 
 14.6 Demerit. 
 
 wild (locks in PJycbe's garden % and which 
 his mafter afterwards put us in mind were 
 apt to run luxuriant, unlefs kept within 
 bounds by a proper tendance. 
 
 Therefore it is one thing to confult our 
 rules of action for fhaping our condudl: 
 thereby, and another to examine the rules 
 themfelves for determining in what manner 
 we (hall eftablifh, or rectify them. For as 
 military discipline confifts in the ftridl Sub- 
 ordination of the foldiers to the officers, 
 
 e In his allegorical defcription of earthly and heaven- 
 ly love, under the names of Tha/aJ/ian and Uranian 
 Venus, related in the Vifion. He reprefents Pfycke 
 receiving her firft notices from external objects and 
 appetites, as fhe lay helplefs in the garden of Nature. 
 The gardener, Selfi/h, planted certain wild ftocks pro- 
 ducing crabbed fruits, until Thalajfio grafted the ao 
 complifhments, and Urania the virtues upon them. 
 The latter accompanied Pfyche through the journey of 
 life, and then fetting her aftride upon the golden anchor 
 of Elpis, wafted her up into the blefled abodes. 
 
 Plato afterwards recounted fome converfations he 
 had formerly with a certain native of Tarfus in Cillcia^ 
 the fubftance of which he imparted to our Author; 
 dreffmg them up after the philofophical manner. But 
 unluckily our Author cannot recollect auy thing at 
 prefent ; though he hopes to do it in convenient time, 
 having fome confufed traces of them frill in his me- 
 mory. 
 
 and
 
 Demerit. 147 
 
 and the officers to the general, fo the little 
 ftate of man is never fo well difciplined as . 
 when the moral fenfes have the entire com- 
 mand of our motions, but lie themfelves 
 under controul of fober confederation and 
 found judgement. While in the hurry of 
 action we have not leifure to confult the 
 general, but muft pufh bravely on whither 
 our immediate officers lead us ; nor indeed 
 is confultation the bufinefs then, but in- 
 trepidity, vigour and alertnefs, Therefore 
 the virtuous man acts becaufe it is right 
 and juft, becoming and laudable, and for- 
 bears what appears wrong and bafe, un- 
 worthy and mocking to his thought : he 
 follows the motions of zeal, honour, fhame, 
 decency, natural affection, civility, as he 
 feels them rife in his breaft ; or if doubts 
 arife he tries the moral fenfes by one ano- 
 ther, and adheres to that which carries the 
 ftrongeft luftre, and higheft excellency in ' 
 his imagination, without confidering fur- 
 ther why he fuffers himfelf to be guided 
 by their influence, or whence it was derived. 
 For the greatefr. part of mankind know not a
 
 148 Demerit. 
 
 'why nor ^whence, but take up their principles 
 partly from their parents and tutors, partly 
 from cuftom and general eftimation -, and 
 thofe who do invefligate them to the foun- 
 tain, cannot carry their inveftigations in their 
 head upon common occafions. 
 
 But in feafons of deliberation, when ad- 
 mitted into the general's tent, having the 
 inftrudtions and intelligences laid before us, 
 and fitting in council upon the operations of 
 the campaign, it would be abfurd to take 
 an officer's own teftimonial of his merit, or 
 give him his orders becaufe they are fuch as 
 he is moft fond of executing ; we are only 
 to regard the public fervice, what are each 
 man's abilities, and how he may befl con- 
 duct himfelf to promote it. So if we have 
 fufficient lights and opportunity to take 
 our moral fenfes under examination, in or- 
 der to moderate what extravagancies they 
 may have run into, or determine the rank 
 among them in the command of our powers, 
 it would be no lefs prepofterous to try their 
 rectitude by what themfelves fuggeft to be 
 right, or to fettle their degrees of authority 
 
 upon
 
 Demerit. 1 49 
 
 upon any other foundation than their feve- 
 ral tendencies towards the general happinefs, 
 wherein we mall always find our own con- 
 tained. 
 
 . 33. Now in matters of punimment, 
 when we have it in our power, let us re- 
 gard the heinoufnefs of the offence, together 
 with all circumftances that may aggravate 
 or abate our abhorrence of it as beheld by 
 our moral fenfe : but when we are to exa- 
 mine the foundation we have for entertain- 
 ing this abhorrence, we mall find no other 
 than the expedience a and neceffity of pu- 
 
 a Were the connection between offence and puniih- 
 ment natural and neceflary, there would he no room 
 for mercy ; for what nature has joined infeparably, 
 the will of man ought not to put afunder, and what ts 
 odious in itfelf no circumftances can make innocent. 
 But our rules of juftice being imperfect, calculated for 
 general ufe, and impoffible to be adapted to every par- 
 ticular cafe, the exceptions whereto they are liable 
 open the door to mercy : Which is not to be exercifed 
 arbitrarily, but guided by rules ; fuch as the firft of- 
 fence, or the party being drawn in by furprize, or in 
 hurry of paffion, or upon repentance, which takes 
 away the neceffity of punifhment, by anfwering the 
 fame purpofe in preventing of future crimes. But 
 mercy is as blamable as injuftice, when extended with- 
 out rule or reafon, or perhaps unlefs when the rigour 
 of the law, according to the vulgar faying, would be 
 at\ injury. 
 
 L 3 ,. nifll-
 
 Demerit. 
 
 nimment to preferve order, and good faith, 
 and honefty among mankind. Even thofe 
 who take private revenge, when called upon 
 to juftify their conduct, always plead that 
 otherwife they mould lie open to perpetual 
 infults ; which mews that the only reafon- 
 able excufe for refentment is not ftrictly the 
 injury received, but the prevention of in- 
 juries for the future. Therefore reafon, as 
 well as authority, enjoins us to forgive our 
 brother not only feven times, but until fe- 
 venty times feven, unlefs where animadver- 
 iion is necefiary either for our own quiet and 
 benefit, or that of others. 
 
 And there is a fpecies of punifhment 
 called chaftifement, which has no other 
 object befide the benefit of the party upon 
 whom it is exercifed. Parents and fchool- 
 mafters may not be difpleafed at unlucky 
 tricks played by their lads, as mewing a 
 fagacity and fprightlinefs they delight to 
 behold, yet they will not fuffer them to pafs 
 with impunity, leaft it mould generate idle- 
 nefs and other mifchiefs : here is no abhor- 
 rence ftriking the moral fenfe, nor are the 
 
 boys
 
 Dement. 151 
 
 boys difliked the worfe for their Tallies of 
 youth and ingenuity ill applied ; fo the cha- 
 flifement is not for mifcarriages committed, 
 but for future enormities which might be 
 committed. 
 
 'Tis true the judge pafles fentence upon 
 criminals by dated rules, becaufe he is no 
 more than a minifter to fpeak the fenfe of 
 the law : but the legiflature, in eftabliming 
 the law, regards no other rules than thofe 
 refpe&ing the public utility ; therefore equal 
 punimments are appointed for offences of 
 unequal enormity ; for the law hangs for 
 Healing the value of five millings, but does 
 no more for murder j and fome go wholly 
 unpunifhed, fuch as ingratitude, intempe- 
 rance, entailing difeafes or poverty upon 
 families by gallantries or extravagance, be- 
 caufe they cannot be enquired into without 
 caufing confufion and worfe inconveniencies. 
 On the other hand, when the title to a 
 throne is fo difputable that many honeft, 
 well-difpofed perfons are drawn by mere 
 error of judgment to take part on the un- 
 fortunate fide j they are adjudged and exe- 
 cuted as rebels, becaufe it is neceflary to 
 L 4 main-
 
 Demerit. 
 
 maintain the authority of government, and 
 tranquillity of the ftate. 
 
 . 34. Should it be objected, that this 
 proves the contrary to what we have laid 
 down, becaufe the law, whofe balls is uti- 
 lity, does not govern us in our eftimation 
 of Demerit, for we compaffionate inftead 
 of detefting the deluded malecontent, while 
 we acknowledge the expedience and ne- 
 ceffity of the law which condemns him, 
 and think the abandoned debauchee de- 
 ferving of punimment which the law can- 
 not provide for him; therefore we build 
 our judgement upon other grounds than 
 thofe of utility. I mail anfwer, that as 
 the law is not the fole meafure of juflice, 
 fo neither is it the fole fountain of utility : 
 . for be the polity of a nation ever fo well 
 regulated, or ever fo wifely adminiftered, 
 the people muft ftili do fomething for 
 themfelves in order to compleat their hap- 
 pinefs, and Providence has referved to his 
 own management the putting a check upon 
 fome enormities which the law cannot 
 reach, nor human fagacity difcover or 
 prevent; There,
 
 Demerit. 153 
 
 Therefore that utility which the pro- 
 vinons of the law cannot totally compafs, 
 may flill remain for the foundation of pri- 
 vate animadverfion and cenfure : nor is it a 
 fmall argument of its being fo, that we 
 naturally look upon the greatnefs of mif- 
 chief done as an aggravation of guilt in the 
 perpetrator. If an unwholefome potion 
 be given to make a man fick for a week, 
 it is an injury -, if it bring on an incurable 
 difeafe, it is a more heinous offence ; if 
 death enfue, it is the crying fin of mur- 
 der. 
 
 Well, but you fay the mifchief muft 
 bedeligned, or there will be no crime at 
 all : the greater degree of mifchief is only 
 an evidence of deeper blacknefs in the de- 
 fign ; fo that properly fpeaking, it is not 
 the damage done, but depravity of heart 
 in the doer, which raifes your abhorrence 
 and wimes for vengeance ; for when aflured 
 of the defign, you pronounce the guilt the 
 fame, feel the fame abhorrence and wifti, 
 although its purpofe be utterly fruftrated, 
 and no damage at all enfue. 
 
 Why
 
 Demerit. 
 
 Why this is the very thing I have been 
 contending for all along, that the true 
 ground of punifhment is not the mifchief 
 done, or the crime committed, but the 
 prevention of future enormities, productive 
 of future mifchiefs, and this object I think 
 may fairly rank under the clafs of utility. 
 
 We have found in the former part of 
 this work, that the volitions giving birth to 
 our actions depend upon the prefent mo- 
 tives occuring to our thought, which are 
 either what our judgement reprefents as 
 jnoft expedient, or our imagination as moft 
 alluring and defireable ; and thefe motives 
 are fuggefted. by the opinions, the fenti- 
 ments, the inclinations and habits we have 
 contracted : when defire fixes upon prac- 
 tices of pernicious tendency, this is called 
 a Depravity of Mind, or vulgarly, though 
 improperly, a Depravity of Will, by a 
 metonyme a of caufe for effect, becaufe the 
 
 ftate 
 
 a Figures, though very convenient for common 
 ufe, to give a lively tint to our ideas, and gain them 
 an eafy reception with thofe to whom we addrefs our- 
 felves, yet are dangerous things to the fpeculative, 
 
 who
 
 Dement. 155 
 
 ftate of the mind, and defires in the heart, 
 influence the will, and of courfe produce 
 actions conformable thereto; for a good 
 tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither 
 can an evil tree bring forth good fruit. 
 
 Therefore this depravity of heart being 
 productive of bad effects, whenever the 
 feafon and opportunity ferves to bring them 
 to maturity, becomes juftly odious upon 
 account of the poifonous fruits it bears. 
 But as punimment, animadverfion and cen- 
 fure, being grievous to the party fuffer- 
 ing them, tends to diflbciate defire from 
 the fentiments whereto they are annexed, 
 and work amendment, or in other words, 
 to give men a difguft for the vices rendering 
 them obnoxious thereto; or at leaft to re- 
 
 who perplex themfelves grievoufly by underftanding 
 figurative expreflions literally. We have fufficiently 
 feen the mifchiefsofthem in the difficulties upon Free- 
 will, Election, and coexiftent Powers, occafioned by 
 taking the caufes of volition, for volition itfelf. Thofe 
 who ufe the common magnifying glafs ordinarily 
 puzzle themfelves about the figure, without ever touch- 
 ing the thing fignified, and make work enough for the 
 genuine Microfcope to rectify the blunders they 
 commit* 
 
 {train
 
 r 6 Demerit. 
 
 flrain them from breaking forth into act, 
 and difcourage others from entertaining the 
 like 5 it is this ufe which renders the pu- 
 nifhment merited and juft : for I appeal to 
 any confederate perfon, whether he would 
 punim, or afcribe to a depravity of heart 
 any action, or fentiment whatever, which 
 could never do the leaft hurt either to the 
 owner, or any perfon in the world befide. 
 
 . 35. For this reafon freedom of action, 
 and fo much underftanding as may make 
 the party fenfible for what the punimment 
 was inflicted, are always efteemed necefTary 
 requisites to render him obnoxious thereto 3 
 becaufe punimment operating upon the 
 Imagination, and through that upon the 
 Will, where either of thefe two channels 
 are wanting, becomes ufelefs, and confe- 
 quently unjuft. Therefore fly Revenges 
 which may be miftaken for accidents, and 
 , nobody can know they were the effect of 
 refentment, though fometimes pradtifed by 
 fpiteful perfons, have never been held war- 
 rantable by the judicious : nor will a righte- 
 ous
 
 Demerit. 157 
 
 ous man punifh where the tranfgreflbr had 
 not liberty of choice, nor where the reafon, 
 of his punifhing cannot be underftood. 
 
 If a brick tumbles down upon you, it 
 would be ridiculous to fall a whipping, or 
 breaking it, becaufe fuch difcipline could 
 contribute nothing towards preventing other 
 bricks afterwards from tumbling upon your 
 own, or fomebody elfe's head ; but had 
 our treatment with brickbats any influence 
 upon their future motions, we mould form 
 rules of juftice for our dealings with them 
 as well as with one another. When the 
 puppy dog fouls your parlour you beat him 
 for it j but then you rub his nofe in the 
 filth to make him fenlible why he is beaten; 
 and you think this feverity juftifiable, with- 
 out difcerning any depravity of heart in the 
 beaft, only becaufe it fecures your rooms 
 againft the like difafter for the future : but 
 if he has ftolen a woodcock from the 
 larder, and you do not difcover the theft 
 till next morning, when your correction 
 can do no good, it would be cruelty to 
 chaftife him, 
 
 Mifchiefs
 
 158 Demerit. 
 
 Mifchiefs done by mere accident are 
 judged pardonable : but why ? becaufe 
 punimment has no influence upon accidents : 
 for in fome cafes, where better care may 
 prevent them, we do not fcruple to ani- 
 madvert in order to fpur men to greater 
 vigilance : the flatute of Ann lays a heavy 
 penalty upon fervants fetting a houfe on 
 fire undefignedly ; nor did I ever hear that 
 flatute complained of as contrary to natural 
 juflice. 
 
 Why are military punimments feverer 
 than all others ? Is there greater depravity 
 in difobedience to an officer, than to a civil 
 magiftrate, a parent, or a matter ? Not fb, 
 but becaufe the fervice requires a drifter 
 difcipline, and more implicit obedience. 
 Nor can you pretend the foldiers confent 
 upon enlifting, for many of them are in- 
 veigled to enlifl by drink, or by the bounty- 
 money, without knowing what they under- 
 take, or confidering the rules they fubmit 
 to : betides that you fubject the impreffed . 
 man to the fame feverities with the vo- 
 lunteer. 
 
 2 Why
 
 Demerit. 159 
 
 Why is the law of fafliion fo ftrict upon 
 little matters, that a man would make him- 
 felf more ignominious by wearing his wig 
 the wrong fide outwards, than by corre- 
 fponding with the Pope, or the Pretender? 
 unlefs becaule cenfure, exclamation and 
 ridicule, being the only penalties you have 
 to enforce it, you muft lay them on the 
 more luftily to keep the thoughtlefs world 
 to decency in matters wherein they have no 
 other reftraint upon them. 
 
 Thus whatever fpecies of punifhment 
 we fix our eye upon, we fhall always find 
 it deducible from utility ; but the deduction 
 is too long to carry conftantly in our heads, 
 nor can every head trace it out j neither do 
 we upon all occafions (land in a fituation to 
 difcern the confequences of our punifhing, 
 or fparing : therefore the judicious, from 
 their obfervation of thofe caufes, fo far as 
 they can inveftigate them, ftrike out rules 
 of juftice, and diftinguim degrees of wicked- 
 nefs, which they hang up in public as 
 marks, or erect as pofts of direction to 
 guide our Heps in the journey of life, and 
 
 inculcate
 
 160 Demerit* 
 
 inculcate a moral fenfe, or abhorrence of 
 evil, to ferve as a guard to protect us againft 
 inordinate defires that might tempt us to 
 injuftice, and as a meafure to apportion 
 our refentment againft the heinoufnefs of 
 an offence, or depravity of an offender. 
 
 Such of us as are well difciplined look 
 up to thefe marks continually, and fhape 
 their fteps accordingly, both with refpect 
 to what they fhall avoid themfelves, and 
 what notice they mall take of the pro- 
 ceedings and fentiments of their fellow- 
 travellers, without thinking of any thing 
 further ; and much the greater part of us 
 without knowing of any thing further to 
 be thought of: when thefe latter get a 
 fmattering of philofophy, you hear them 
 declaim inceffantly upon the effential and 
 unalterable rules 3 of right and wrong, in- 
 
 4 
 
 dependent 
 
 * It is difficult to conceive a rule not relating to the 
 ation of fome Beings exiftent : for a rule refpecling 
 nonentities can fcarce deferve the name of one. 
 Therefore Rules can be no older than the Beings they 
 relate to, nor have exiftence before thefe were created. 
 Neither can they be independant on God, becaufe de- 
 pending upon the condition, wherein he placed his 
 
 creatures.
 
 Demerit. 161 
 
 dependent on God himlelf, having a nature 
 he did not give them, and being an obliga- 
 tion upon him that he muft not break 
 through. 
 
 . 36. But the all-feeing eye of God 
 ftretches wide and far, beholds all nature 
 and all futurity in one unbounded profpedt, 
 therefore needs no marks nor rules a to 
 diredt his meafures, nor moral fenfes to 
 
 proteft 
 
 creatures. For if men had no property, there could 
 be no fuch rule as, Thoujbalt not ftcal; neither could 
 there be a rule, Thou /halt not learfalfe witnefs, if men 
 had not the ufe of fpeech. Our Author has confidered 
 this matter more at large in his chapter on Rectitude, 
 where he has endeavoured to fettle the proper import 
 of eflential and intrinfic, when applied thereto, and 
 ihow how thofe words have been abufed, by extending 
 them to a latitude never thought of by fuch as firft 
 employed them. 
 
 a Nor virtues, nor paflions, nor affe&ions. There- 
 fore when we fay he is juft or merciful, jealous or 
 compaflionate, angry or grieved, or repentant ; thefe 
 are only fo many forms whereinto we are forced to cafl 
 his wifdom, in order to bring it fuitable to our con* 
 ception. For when he purfues the like me^fures as we 
 are prompted to by thofe affe&ions, he does it upon a 
 difcernment of their propriety to effect his purpofes. 
 Which motive fomctimes carries him in contrariety to 
 
 M thefc
 
 1 62 Demerit. 
 
 againft temptations which cannot approach 
 him : for in every application of fecond 
 caufes, he bears his ultimate end conftantly 
 in view, and purfues it unerringly and in- 
 variably. What this end may be, perhaps 
 it were in vain for us to enquire, but the 
 utmoft point beyond which we can con- 
 ceive nothing further, is the good and 
 happinefs of his creatures : this then we 
 mull regard as the centre wherein all his 
 difpenfations terminate, and by the ten- 
 dency whereto he regulates his meafures of 
 juftice. 
 
 Now Punifhment muft be acknowledged 
 an evil to the fufferer while under the lam. 
 of it, therefore unlefs we will fuppofe the 
 fountain of Goodnefs fometimes to termi- 
 nate his views upon evil, we muft allow 
 that he never punifhes,. unlefs for fome 
 greater benefit to redound therefrom, either 
 to the offender, or fome other part of the 
 
 thefe affe&ions : for he fuffers the wicked to pafs with 
 impunity, when he has any good to bring out of their 
 evil, and the righteous to lie under diftrefles, when 
 tending to work out a greater weight of glory feir 
 them. 
 
 creation*
 
 Demerit. 163 
 
 creation. What other benefits may arife 
 therefrom we know not, but we know its 
 tendency to check or cure a depravity of 
 heart where it is, to difcourage the con- 
 trading of it where it is not, and confe- 
 quently to prevent the mifchievous fruits 
 growing from that evil root. 
 
 Therefore as men are conftituted, this 
 remedy is neceffary to reftrain enormities 
 from abounding among them, unlefs you, 
 will fuppofe a miraculous interpofition, 
 which is not the ufual method of pro- 
 vidence ; and it is this neceffity which 
 juftifies the punifhment, and afcertains the 
 meafure of it. If we go on to enquire fur- 
 ther, why men are fo conftituted, this will 
 involve us in another queftion, which never 
 was, and perhaps never will be determined 
 by the fons of Adam, namely, why pain, 
 diftrefs, affliction, and uneafmefs of all 
 kinds, were permitted at all in the world ; 
 for moral evil were no evil if there were no 
 natural; becaufe, how could I do wrong, 
 if no hurt or damage could enfue therefrom 
 to any body, and is no greater than the 
 M 2 niif-
 
 1 64 Demerit. 
 
 mifchiefs whereof it may be productive? 
 Therefore it is natural evil which creates 
 the difficulty, and the quantity of this evil 
 is the fame from whatever caufes arifing. 
 " Think ye thofe eighteen upon whom the 
 " tower in Siloam fell were finners above all 
 * * other Galileans ? " We are told, nay : yet 
 the pain, the lofs of life, and other damages 
 they fuftained, were the fame in quantity as 
 if they had brought down the ruin upon 
 their own heads by their mifconducl:. 
 
 Let any man explain to me clearly how 
 the permiffion of mifchievous accidents is 
 confiftent with our ideas of infinite good- 
 nefs, and I will undertake to mow him by 
 the lights he mall afford me, how the per- 
 miffion of moral evil is likewife confiftent. 
 The only folution of this difficulty I ap- 
 prehend muft be taken from the imper- 
 fection b of our underftanding, for we have 
 
 ob- 
 
 * Our Author in his chapter on Goodnefs, fuppofes 
 fome other Attribute, unknown to the fons of Adam* 
 to fet the bounds to infinite Goodnefs, that it may not 
 be coextenfive with Omnipotence. And in a dif- 
 courfe he had with an angel in the vifon, on his re- 
 turn
 
 Demerit. 165 
 
 obfervcd in a former place, that infinite 
 Goodnefs and infinite Power confidered in 
 the abftracT:, feem incompatible c : which 
 fhows there is fomething wrong in our 
 conceptions, and that we are not com- 
 petent judges of what belongs, and what 
 is repugnant to goodnefs. But God know* 
 though we do not, and is good and righteous 
 
 turn back from the mundane foul into the vehicular 
 ftate, he is fhown that there muft be other attributes 
 befides thofe whereof we have any conception, be- 
 caufe thefe would not fuifice for the bufinefs of the 
 Creation. 
 
 Dader would have faid, he took this hint from Mofes 
 being admitted to fee the back parts of God, but not 
 his whole perfon. But Search aflures me, he thought 
 nothing of Mofis while he was with the angel. He 
 had indeed before taken notice of the expreflion, that 
 no man can fee God and live ; which he expounded, 
 not that the fight would be fo terrible as to deftroy us, 
 but that man, while imprifoned in this mortal body, has 
 not faculties to difcern the divine Nature, and fo can- 
 not fee God while he lives under this veil of flefh. 
 
 c Becaufe our idea of infinite Goodnefs feems to re- 
 quire, that it fhould exhauft Omnipotence, and our 
 idea of the latter, that it fhould be inexhauftible. 
 Since then we find fomething wrong in our conceptions, 
 how can it be expected we fhould explain an object 
 we have not faculties to comprehend ? Therefore our 
 want of underftanding is no proof againft its reality. 
 
 M 3 in
 
 1 66 Demerit. 
 
 in all his ways ; therefore whatever method 
 he purfues is an evidence of its rectitude 
 beyond all other evidences that can offer to 
 us for the contrary. 
 
 . 37. Juflice regards folely the degree 
 oif depravity exiftent, nor has any concern 
 with the manner how it came to exift : a 
 man bribed with a large fum of money is 
 not excufed by the guilt of the employer, 
 although perhaps he would never have 
 thought of committing the crime without 
 that temptation ; and if evil communica- 
 tion corrupts good manners, the corruption 
 coming through this channel does not ex- 
 empt it from cenfure. The perpetration 
 indeed of villainies, without any inftiga- 
 tion or inducement, aggravates their hei- 
 noufnefs, becaufe it indicates a greater de- 
 pravity of heart ; but the degree of de- 
 pravity once afcertained, always fets the 
 meafure to the detefhtion xand demerit of 
 the offender, without enquiring into the 
 fource from whence it was derived ; ' and 
 
 we
 
 Demerit. 167 
 
 we (hall find it fo in whatever cafe we con*, 
 lidcr maturely and candidly. 
 
 Suppofe you and I delegated by heaven 
 to govern fome little diftridt, with abfolute 
 power of life and death over the inhabitants, 
 with perfect knowledge of the fecrets of * 
 their hearts, and were fitting in council 
 together upon the meafures of executing 
 our commiffion, which we were refolved 
 to do with exact juftice and integrity. Sup- 
 pofe further, what has been mown not to 
 be the real fact, but in order to make our 
 cafe the ftronger for our prefent purpofe, 
 let us fuppofe that men had been hitherto 
 utterly deftitute of Freewill, but guided in 
 all their motions by an external influence \ 
 and their fentiments and difpoiitions thrown 
 upon them, without their own act, by the 
 impulfe of neceffary caufes ; but at the 
 moment when we entered upon our office, 
 this influence and impulfe were taken off, 
 and they were put into the condition of 
 common men, whom we have converfed 
 with in the world : how mould we pro- 
 ceed to manage with them. 
 
 M 4 In
 
 1 68 Demerit. 
 
 In the firft place it may be prefumed we 
 mould agree upon a general amnefty for 
 the paft, in confideration of the force they 
 had lain under ; and in the next, we 
 fhould contrive meafures for their future 
 well-being, and finding them in poflefTion 
 of powers of a&ion, together with liberty 
 to ufe them, we fhould ftudy to turn their 
 Freewill into courfes moft advantageous to 
 the community. Jf we faw vices and ma- 
 lignancy among them, we might probably 
 feel an abhorrence and deteftation thereof, 
 for I do not fuppofe ourfelves diverted of 
 the moral fenfes we had acquired before, 
 but this fentiment would be like that aver- 
 fion we have to fpiders, toads and adders, 
 who did not make themfelves what they 
 are, but received their venom and uglinefs 
 from the hand of nature j yet I hope we 
 {hould be too equitable to punifh any man 
 merely becaufe we did not like his looks, 
 unlefs where thofe looks manifefted a bad- 
 nefs of heart, productive of mifchief to 
 himfelf or his neighbours, and then we 
 mould apply fuch punimments, notes of 
 
 infamy,
 
 Demerit. 169 
 
 infamy, or cenfures, as we judged moft 
 proper for preventing his, ill qualities from 
 breaking forth into aft, or fpreading the 
 contagion elfewhere, thinking our proceed- 
 ings juftifiable by their expedience, and 
 regulating the meafure of our punimments 
 by their feveral aptnefs to anfwer the pur- 
 pofe intended. 
 
 . 38. If then we find that human rea- 
 fon, when acting moft conformably to our 
 ideas of prudence and equity, would reftrain 
 depravity, from whatever fources arifing, 
 by adequate punimments, why mould we 
 arraign the juftice of God for proceeding in 
 the like manner ? For he beholds the 
 works of his hands, and difcerns whereof 
 they are made, nor is he unacquainted with 
 the operations and ufes of fecond caufes : 
 He has made moral evil the general, and, 
 as fome believe, the fole * fountain of natu- 
 ral 
 
 * It is a very orthodox tenet, that pain and mifery 
 were brought into the world, as well among the brute 
 as the rational creation, by the fall of Adam. And 
 the ancient Mythologies give us a defcription of their 
 
 golden
 
 Demerit. 
 
 ral : He has given man freedom tp choofc 
 between good and evil : He knows that 
 
 Vices- 
 golden age, fimilar to that of paradife, exempt from 
 both evils. Yet though they have made the moral 
 coeval with the natural, they feem not to have fup- 
 pofed them effe&s of one another ; but both co-effe<5h 
 of the fame caufe, to wit, the gradual decay of nature 
 in her three changes, from the golden 1 age to the filver,. 
 from filver to brafs, and from thence to iron. The 
 Philofophers appear to have held natural evil the con- 
 fequence of moral j which opinion we may fuppofe 
 they founded upon the divine Goodnefs, from whence 
 nothing evil could proceed, but the creatures brought 
 it upon themfelves by the perverfe ufe of their powers. 
 But then they conceived this attribute muft require, 
 that the natural evil fliould refult from the moral of 
 that particular creature upon whom it fell : for they 
 could not underftand it confiftent with goodnefs that 
 any one fhould fuffer for the failings of another. This 
 led them into the notion of a pre-exiftent ftate, wherein 
 every man, by his misbehaviour, may have rendered 
 himielf obnoxious to the misfortunes he undergoes in 
 the prefent. . 
 
 I need not remark the abfurd confequences that 
 would follow from this doctrine fupported upon thefe 
 grounds : which muft with equal reafon infer a pre- 
 exiftence for the brute creation too, down to the 
 pifmire, the maggot, the new-found polypus, and 
 fcarce-perceptible puceron he devours, together with 
 a-rationality therein, rendering theni capable of mora] 
 gt>od and evil. BecauTe though we can account for, 
 the diftrefll-s of men, the maimed and diftempered births 
 
 of
 
 Demerit. 171 
 
 vices will abound among them, which will 
 influence them to ufe their freedom to per- 
 nicious 
 
 of children, from the derivation of original fin : yet 
 that fin being never extended to the animals, will not 
 account for the fufferings brought upon them by their 
 tyrannical lord, imperial man, by their fellow fubjedls, 
 by weather, or accidents. I fay, I need not urge this 
 objection, the do&rine of Pre-exiftence being now 
 univerfally exploded. For every old woman knows 
 the foul of the child was created at the very inftant 
 when the mother firft felt herfelf quick. And any 
 body may fee with half an eye, that if we had all 
 exifted a hundred years ago, fome or other of us mufl 
 have remembered it. Befides, if we would not beat a 
 dog, unlefs for fome fault he may be fenfible of, who 
 can imagine we fhould be punifhed ourfelves, without 
 letting us know for what ? But the moft folid argu- 
 ment againft Pre-exiftence arifes from its ufelefsnefs: for 
 what is pad and gone we have nothing to do with, our 
 concern lies only with the future, and it behoves us to 
 fhape our behaviour in fuch manner as may make our 
 condition happy hereafter. If we could demonftrate 
 our Pre-exiftence ever fo clearly, we could not expeft 
 to know what pafled with us in that ftate, nor gather 
 from thence a fund of experience whereon to build 
 obfervations for regulating our future conduct. There- 
 fore this fubjeft is not worth our taking into confidera- 
 tion at all ; and without confidering, we can fee no 
 proofs of its reality, and without proofs it would not 
 become us to believe rt; and what does not become us 
 to believe, there can- be no harm in running down with 
 exclamation or ridicule, The like may be faid of the 
 
 Pre
 
 Demerit. 
 
 nicious purpofes, and has appointed punifti- 
 ment as one of the fprings to operate upon 
 
 Pre or Poft-exiftence of animals, which if we could 
 difcover, would neither do us any fervice, nor enable 
 us to do them any. And the fame method might be 
 proper in other cafes, by refufingto puzzle our thoughts 
 with curious fpeculations, which if inveftigated to the 
 utmoft can do no good. 
 
 Nor would our author be difpleafed to have it prac- 
 tifed uponhimfelf : for there are things ufeful to fome, 
 vrhich are not fo, but rather mifchievous to others ; 
 and he has been forced fometimes to enter upon fub- 
 jedts that might fcandalize the fcrupulous, or hurt the 
 unwary, to whom he hopes to give better content, 
 when he can recover the matters before mentioned to 
 have been communicated by Plato from the Cilician : 
 but this muft be a work of time. In the mean while, 
 he would be glad that every one would follow him in 
 the difcuflion of fuch points as they find fuited to their 
 tafte or liking, paffing lightly over the reft, as the 
 wanton rovings of a fpeculative fancy. For my friend 
 Starchy to do him juftice, has an honeft heart, and 
 would willingly give offence to nobody, but difpenfe 
 his wares about in quarters where they might at leaft 
 be harmlefs. But, as he has obferved in a difcourfe 
 upon this topic with his vehicular conductor, the an- 
 tients, delivering their lectures by word of mouth, 
 could adapt their fubje&s to their audience, refer v ing 
 their efoteries for adepts, and dealing out exoteries on- 
 ly to the vulgar: whereas we moderns having no other 
 channel of communication than the prefs, muft throw 
 out both forts to the mercy of every man that can 
 raife the pence to buy a copy, or has a friend of whom 
 he can borrow one. 
 
 the
 
 Demerit, 173 
 
 the human mind for retraining the growth 
 of wickednefs, and preventing its bad ef- 
 fects. Can we then doubt that he will em- 
 ploy all the fprings of action in thofe ufes, 
 and upon thofe occafions wherein he in his 
 wifdom judges them refpectively proper? 
 or what rule of juftice does he violate by fo 
 doing ? 
 
 Why he permitted moral evil, is a con- 
 fideration quite foreign to the prefent fub- 
 ject, and can only produce that entangle- 
 ment naturally confequent upon blending 
 difcuffions of different natures together : 
 for whether we can reconcile that permif- 
 fion with our ideas, or no, {till evil being 
 once permitted, becomes a foundation for 
 juftice to ward off the bad effects that might 
 enfue from it : for juftice cannot ftand at 
 variance with goodnefs, nor can one ever 
 forbid what the other recommends. 
 
 As the judge pafles fentence upon the 
 houfe-breaker and the affaffin, not in ani- 
 mofity to them,, but in regard to the honeft 
 man, that he may fleep quietly in his bed, 
 and go about his lawful occafions without 
 
 hazard
 
 Demerit. 
 
 hazard of his life : fo God punimes the 
 wicked not in wrath and deteftation, but in 
 mercy and loving-kindnefs, many times to 
 the delinquent himfelf, but always either to 
 him or his fellow- creatures. 
 
 Therefore to the queftion, Who hath 
 ever refitted his will ? Why then doth he 
 punifh ? It may be anfwered, To fecure the 
 further accomplishment of his will, and to 
 effect his gracious purpofes towards thofe 
 whom he intended to prefer ve from the like 
 wickednefs, or the pernicious confequences 
 fpringing therefrom : views wherein we 
 cannot find the leaft tincture of injuftice or 
 arbitrary proceedings. 
 
 $. 39. But it is not enough to juftify ihe 
 ways of God, unlefs we endeavour likewife 
 to obviate the perverfe confequences men 
 fometimes draw from the will of God being 
 conftantly fulfilled. For, fay they, if that 
 will always rake place, then we have no 
 will of our own, being pinned down to one 
 particular manner of proceeding, which it 
 is his will fhould be taken. 
 
 But
 
 Demerit. 175 
 
 But if human action were neceffary, as 
 indeed it is not, we have feen that would 
 not excufe iniquity from punifhment, as 
 being an application of the proper caufe for 
 preventing the growth and mifchiefs of it j 
 and this perfuafion fufficiently inculcated, 
 would neceffarily, if the operation of mo- 
 tives be neceffary, drive them into a courfe 
 of thinking and acting productive of hap- 
 pinefs ; and if they attain the poffeffion of 
 this treafure, 'tis not much matter whether 
 they apprehend themfelves procuring it by 
 neceffary or voluntary agency c : therefore they 
 
 will 
 
 c 'Squire Search in this place probably had a view to 
 the difpute that happened upon the road fome time ago 
 between him and Doctor Hartley. The fquire, it 
 feems, in his chapter on the caufes of action, had 
 afligned the mind herfelf for the efficient caufe of all 
 we do : this the doctor would not allow 3 for he gave 
 the following account of the matter. The human 
 body, fays he, is a collection of little threads or fibres 
 curioufly bound up together; among which the Ether 
 infmuates throughout every part of our .frame, difpo- 
 fmg itfelf into firings running crofs-wife between the 
 fides of the interfaces wherein it lies. When objects 
 ftrike upon our fenfes, they agitate the fibres of the or- 
 gan whereon they fall : which agitation puts the ethe- 
 lial firings contiguous to them into little tremours, 
 
 , called
 
 Demerit. 
 
 will do well to contemplate the penalties an- 
 nexed to evil- doing 5 for it will do them good 
 one way or other, if not as exhortation to 
 work upon a free agent, at leaft as a falu- 
 tary medicine to rectify the diforders in their 
 
 machine. 
 
 But 
 
 called by him Vibratiuncles. As the firings commu- 
 nicate with one another all over our body, the fore- 
 faid vibratiuncles excite others correfpondent to them 
 in the firings lying about the nerves of our mufcles, 
 thereby agitating thofe nerves, which produce a con- 
 traction in the mufcles, and caufe them to move the 
 limbs. Thetremours in the firfl mentioned firings he 
 ililes fenfory vibratiuncles, and in the latter motory vi- 
 bratiuncles. Thus the dotor acknowledges all hu- 
 man action neceflary, being performed by the me- 
 chanical running of vibratiuncles from the fenfory to 
 the motory, without any intervention of the mind to 
 aflift in the operation. He allows indeed that the vi- 
 bratiuncles, in their paflage, touch at the feat of the 
 mind, where they leave information of the way they 
 are going, and of the external objects exciting them, 
 fo the mind, having continual notice of what is doing, 
 fancies herfelf the author of all that is done ; whereas 
 in reality fhe fits an idle fpe<5tator only, not an agent 
 of our actions ; like the fly upon the chariot-wheel, 
 afcribing to her own prowefs, the mighty clouds of 
 duft fhe fees raifed around her. 
 
 Now, my coufin Search not having fludied anatomy, 
 thought himfelf no match at argument for the learned 
 phyfician, fo declined entering the lifts with him, but 
 
 pro*
 
 Demerit. 177 
 
 But an event being agreeable to the will 
 of another, does not always hinder it from 
 being the choice of our own will too : what 
 I do by the command of a fuperior, while 
 I pay him a chearful and ready obedience, 
 is done by the will of both. 'Tis lucky, 
 
 you 
 
 propofed a feigned iflue to be tried by the country, in 
 imitation of thofe directed out of chancery, upon the 
 following cafe. Mr. "Jeffery Dolittle, a gentleman of 
 tolerable capacity and good repute among his neigh- 
 bours, departed this life in an unufual manner ; for one 
 morning after breakfaft his perceptive or fpiritual part 
 was taken from him miraculoufly, without anydifeafe, 
 diforder, accident, or diflocation of any fingle particle 
 either in the grofler or finer part of his material frame. 
 The queftion is, how this defunct or mere machine 
 would behave ? Both parties agree, that the pulfe 
 would continue to beat, the lungs to play, the animal 
 fecretions to be carried on, the vibratiuncles to traverfe 
 to and fro, as before, and that by dinner-time the 
 tongue and palate might come into that ftate which 
 affeds us with hunger ; yet the perceptive mind being 
 gone, there would be no uneafinefs for want of vic- 
 tuals, nor perception of the objects round about. But 
 Search, in his declaration, avers, that it would not 
 walk down flairs, fit down to table, carve the meats, 
 converfe with the company, nor give its opinion upon 
 the conduct of the miniftry, ufefulnefs of the militia, 
 or whether Nivernois comes in good earneft to con- 
 clude, or only to amufe us. The doctor in his plea 
 infifts, that it would do all this, and every thing elfe 
 
 N that
 
 Demerit. 
 
 you fay, I ftand fo difpofed, for I muft 
 have done the thing had I been ever fo de- 
 firous of the contrary : fo I am in the con- 
 dition of a man fitting in a room where the 
 doors are locked upon him without his per- 
 ceiving it ; he is actually a prifoner, though 
 
 that might be expected from a reafonable creature, and 
 well-bred gentleman. And upon this point iflue wa* 
 joined. 
 
 But it being difficult prefently to impanel a jury 
 who would confent to be {hut up without victuals, 
 drink, or candle, until they fhould agree upon a ver- 
 dict, the litigants ftruck up a compromife in the mean 
 time, that each (hould jog on his own way without 
 interruption from the other. For, fays Search, I fup- 
 pofe, doctor, we both aim at doing fome good to man- 
 kind by our labours : now if we can effect our pur- 
 pofe, 'tis not a farthing matter by what procefs the 
 operation goes on. Whether we can draw fuch fcratches 
 upon paper, as that the rays reflected therefrom fhall 
 raife vibratiuncles in the reader, which fhall inform 
 him of falutary theorems, that will better the condi- 
 tion of his mind, and beget motory vibratiuncles that 
 will put his limbs into a courfe of action moft con- 
 ducive to his benefit} or whether, by the ordinary me- 
 thods of conviction, inftruction, and exhortation, we 
 can fpur him on to ufe his own activity in a manner 
 nioft beneficial to himfelf. 
 
 Purfuant to this compromife, we fee in the text be-r 
 fore us, that our author, fo he can work a perfuafion 
 productive of happinefs, does not care whether it ope- 
 rates by free or necefiary agency. 
 
 he
 
 Demerit. 179 
 
 he does not feel his confinement, becaufe 
 he happens to choofe the only thing in his 
 power, that is, to flay where he is. 
 
 But what if I do a good office for an ac- 
 quaintance to whom I owe no obligation, 
 nor have other inducement than good 
 nature ? do not I gratify his will and my 
 own at the fame time ? Or what if an art- 
 ful politician, who can fee through and 
 through me, leads me dextroufly to co-ope- 
 rate with his defigns : although the iflue 
 mould fall out befide or contrary to my in- 
 tention, ftill the fteps I am made to take by 
 his management were the work of my own 
 will. So when God puts in ufe the proper 
 caufes for producing an event, we need not 
 fear but he will adapt them fo wifely as that 
 they mail not fail to accomplim his will ; 
 neverthelefs, if among thefe caufes there be 
 the motives fit to work upon a free agent, 
 the act performed is as compleatly the will 
 of that agent, as if his ideas had derived 
 from any other fource, or been thrown up 
 by the fortuitous declination of Epicurus's 
 atoms. 
 
 N 2 The
 
 Dement. 
 
 The fallacy here lies in the fame equi- 
 vocation of language taken notice of in the 
 foregoing pages, to which I refer any body 
 who thinks it needful to revife what has 
 been already offered : for the Will of God 
 muft be fulfilled in no other fenfe than 
 what was abfolutely foreknown, or con- 
 tained in the plan of Providence; muft 
 come to pafs, not by compulfion or necef- 
 fity, but by removal of all hazard to the 
 contrary. 
 
 . 40. Another fond imagination may 
 ftart up in men's heads from the never- 
 failing completion of the divine Will, as 
 if it juftified them in all the follies they 
 have been guilty of j for, fay they, what- 
 ever we have done muft have been agree- 
 able to the Will of God, becaufe having 
 taken effed j for nothing has fallen out 
 that was not fo ; therefore wherein have we 
 done amifs ? for who hath ever refifted his 
 Will ? And they put this queftion by way 
 of defiance, to give any other than one cer- 
 tain anfwer. 
 
 But
 
 Demerit. 1 8 1 
 
 But they deceive themfelves by their 
 manner of wording the queftion ; for had 
 it been afked, who hath defeated his Will ? 
 we could not have produced -an inftance, 
 nor yet would it have ferved their purpofe, 
 nor furnimed an excufe for their mifcon- 
 duct that we could not : but who hath re- 
 fifted his Will ? is no fuch unanfwerable 
 queftion j for the Will may be refifted with- 
 out fuccefs, and then come to pafs not- 
 withftanding - 3 or it may be mifunderftood, 
 and in that cafe accomplished by the very 
 endeavour to do fomething contrary to it. 
 
 Suppofe you lend money to a friend 
 upon his note ; he being at a diftance, and 
 fully confiding in your honour, fends you a 
 letter with the value inclofed, only defiring 
 you will burn the note, that your executors 
 may not find it to charge him with the 
 debt 5 but before you can fulfill his requeft, 
 fomebody elfe finds the note, who having 
 a fpite againft you, throws it into the fire 
 with intention to difable you from recover- 
 ing the fum contained in it ; here he ads 
 in direcl: oppofition to your Will, his defign 
 N 3 is
 
 , 
 
 Demerit. 
 
 is nothing elfe than to crofs and thwart 
 you ; yet in fo doing he does the very thing 
 you will fliould be done, and would have 
 done yourfelf, if he had not been before- 
 hand with you. In like manner we may, 
 and too frequently do, refift the Will of 
 God, but by that very refiftance accomplish 
 it; for we act in the dark, fcarce ever 
 knowing what is his real Will, or that, its 
 con flan t aim, the good of his creation, 
 with the greateft part whereof we have no 
 vifible connection, nor the leaft fufpicion 
 of what concern their interefls have with 
 our proceedings. 
 
 We have often heard of a diftinction 
 between the fecret a , and declared Will, 
 
 the 
 
 a Great mifchiefs and much enthufiafm have arifen in 
 the world, from pretending to pry into the fecret Will. 
 The very attempt is highly abftird ; for can we fancy 
 ourfelves wifer than God, or cunning enough to find 
 out what he purpofely conceals ? Therefore we are 
 conftantly to efteem that his Will, to which we are 
 directed by the rules afiigned us, or lights afforded us ; 
 nor can any thing elfe be counted fuch until verified 
 by the event, and that will not juftify our having pro- 
 ceeded to accomplish it. For though whatever has 
 been permitted, was .beft to be done, becaufe Provi- 
 dence
 
 Demerit. 183 
 
 the latter is fo much as we can difcover by 
 the beft ufe of our understanding, which 
 being fallible, will fometimes difcover to 
 
 O ' 
 
 us what is not the truth ; yet this is the 
 guide God has given us for our direction, 
 .and while we act conformably thereto, 
 
 dence orders all things for the heft ; yet is this no plea 
 for the tranfgreflbr : becaufe the merit of an action 
 depends upon the ultimate point in view: whatever lies 
 beyond, which could not be difcerned, has no (hare 
 in the eftimation. 
 
 Tully relates a ftory of one Jafon of Phereu, who 
 had an impoftume upon his ftomach, that could not be 
 cured by any means or afliftance he could procure. It 
 became fo troublelbme to him, that he grew tired of 
 life; but having not learned the ftoical doctrine of 
 Suicide, he determined to difpofe of his life for the 
 benefit of his country ; fo he entered into the wars, and 
 put himfelf foremoft in all dangerous enterprizes. In 
 one of thefe he received a wound with a fpear, which 
 luckily opened the impoftumation, and worked a per- 
 fect cure. Now had this wound been given in private 
 enmity inftead of open war, every body would have 
 condemned it as a crying enormity. For the intention 
 whereon the view terminates, muft denominate the 
 deed : and though it was the WilJ of God to reftore 
 health and eafe by this means to the fufFerer, yet this 
 object lying out of fight could have no effect to 
 brighten the colour of the action. Nor could the Per- 
 petrator be faid to do the Will of God, becaufe he 
 acted in difobedience to his declared Will, contained 
 in the command, Thou fialt do no murder. 
 
 N 4 although
 
 184 Demerit. 
 
 although the event by difappointing our en- 
 deavours fhould prove the fecret Will to 
 have been other wife, neverthelefs our honeft, 
 though miftaken zeal for his fervice, will 
 ftand approved in his fight, and engage his 
 bountiful favour towards us. 
 
 Whereas on the other hand, if we per- 
 verfely run counter to the admonitions of 
 this guide, it will avail us nothing that our 
 being permitted to take our courfe proves it 
 agreeable to the fecret Will ; for God does 
 not punifh in anger, nor for having been 
 difappointed of his purpofe j a caufe of re- 
 fentment which can never befall him 5 but 
 with the view of a phyfician who pre- 
 fcribes afmart operation neceflary to cure a 
 diftemper that would deftroy the patient, 
 or infect the neighbourhood : and if we re- 
 gard our vicious difpofitions in this light, 
 which is the true one, we muft behold 
 them with the fame averfion we mould a 
 loathfome difeafe, whether we apprehend 
 it brought upon us by our own mifmanage- 
 ment, or inflicted by the hand of heaven ; 
 which averfion once become hearty and 
 
 ftrong,
 
 Demerit. 185 
 
 ftrong, may be trufted to take its chance for 
 the effect it will have upon our conduct. 
 
 .41. For it is not fo material to give a 
 right judgement upon what is paft and can- 
 not be undone, as to take right meafures 
 for the future. Therefore left any mould 
 encourage themfelves in indolence, or 
 wrong doing, under pretence that fince the 
 Will of God is always punctually fulfilled, 
 whatever fhall be done, good or bad, muft 
 be conformable to that Will, fo they need 
 not fcruple to take the courfes they like, 
 being fure to accomplish it at all events : 
 let them confider, that fince that Will fhall 
 take effect at all events, they may as well 
 accomplifh it by doing right, as wrong, 
 being equally fure either way, that what 
 they (hall do will be the thing that was to 
 come to pafs ; if then the Will of God be 
 done in both cafes, and they have their 
 choice" in what manner they fhall accom^ 
 
 plifh 
 
 3 For we may place the matter in this light, as hav- 
 ing it in our option, with refpe& to events within our 
 power, to determine what fhall be the Will of God. 
 
 If
 
 Demerit. 
 
 plifh it, had they not better choofe the 
 manner mofl advantageous to themfelves, 
 than one pernicious and deftrudtive to 
 
 them? 
 
 For 
 
 If at any time we can know the tendency of all caufes 
 in aft, we may know what is the Will of God in that 
 fnftance: therefore where the powers of men arethofe 
 caufes, we may know that Will, by knowing the 
 turns that human volition fliall take; and wherever we 
 can* by our refolves; give the turn to our own volition, 
 God leaves us at liberty to determine his Will. Nor 
 is there greater abfurdity in this thought, than in con- 
 ceiving a mother permitting her child to determine 
 which way file fliall lead him, or a king his deferving 
 fubject what tide of honour he fhall confer upon 
 him. 
 
 Suppofe a man fays to me, I got drunk laft night ; 
 therefore it was the Will of God, becaufe done. In- 
 deed I was bloody fick this morning : but then it was 
 beft I fhould be fo, becaufe finding a place in the plan 
 of Providence. Very well ; but is this a reafon why 
 you fhould get drunk again to night ? For if you keep 
 fober, that will likewife be God's Will : and if you 
 have no qualms to-morrow, that will be the beft, be- 
 caufe obtaining a place in the fame plan. Since then 
 either way will conduct you furely to that ultimate 
 beft known only to God, why fhould you not take the 
 cleaned, fafeft road, rather than involve yourfelf in 
 the filth and dangers of debauchery ? Nor we*e the 
 cafe different could you fwallow ever fo much with- 
 out being fick or forry : for the notices of your moral 
 
 fenfe,
 
 Demerit. 187 
 
 For our bufinefs is to purfue our own 
 trueft interefts ; we have nothing to do with 
 the fecret Will j that will work itfelf out 
 without our follicitude to compleat it : the 
 end affigned us to work out, is none other 
 than our own happinefs, to be purfued care- 
 fully and induftrioufly, according to the 
 lights afforded us. 
 
 Good and evil lie before us ; we have 
 powers of adion, with liberty to ufe them : 
 if our powers at any time be limited, we 
 have ftill fome fcope to range in ; if our 
 paffions, or evil habits abridge our liberty, 
 ftill we may ftrive and ftruggle againft 
 them : in all cafes there is fomething or 
 other wherein we may exert our endea- 
 vours j let us then apply them where they 
 may turn moft to our benefit ; but above 
 
 fenfe, and the judgement of confiderate perfons dif- 
 fuading excefs, are an evidence you have reafon to 
 confide in, for the reality of mifchiefs you may not 
 immediately difcern. So you have no concern with 
 that Will which is verified only by the event, but may 
 confultyour own liking; provided you do not confine ' 
 your regards to your prefent liking, but extend them 
 to the confequences, which you may vehemently 
 diflike. 
 
 all
 
 1 88 Fate. 
 
 all beware of reducing ourfelves to fuch a 
 deplorable condition, as that even mercy 
 and loving kindnefs mufl lay a heavy weight 
 of punifhment upon us in order to effect its 
 gracious purpofes. 
 
 Fate. . 42. There is ftill another quarter of 
 the wildernefs we have not yet explored, 
 where the giant Fate ftalks along with ir- 
 refiftable ftrides, bearing down the forreft 
 like tender blades of corn before him, 
 forcing his paffage through ramparts and 
 rocks y the textures of human contrivance 
 are but as the dewy cobwebs of autumn 
 acrofs his way -, nor can Freewill find a 
 place for the fole of her foot among the 
 heapy ruins wherewith he beftrews the 
 
 ground a . 
 
 But 
 
 * Upon my friend's fhowing me this tranfition, I 
 /ecolleded that a little before we had read together the 
 poems of OJjlan the fon of Flngal I told him I 
 thought here was an inftance of that fympathy he has 
 talked of fo much, as being one principal channel by 
 which we daily furnifh our imagination with motives, 
 affe&ions, fentiments, and trains of thought. I know, 
 fays I, the ftar from whence you catched this fpark of 
 
 the
 
 Fate. 189 
 
 But before we enter into an examination 
 of the courfes of Fate, let us, according 
 to our ufual cuftom, endeavour to under- 
 ftand what is properly meant by the word. 
 We find it often confounded with Neceffity, 
 
 or 
 
 the fublime. Of the Pompeus rather, fays he. But 
 when we take a frefh fympathy, it is apt to hang loofe 
 upon us like Horace's purple rag, until incorporated in 
 time among the old trains. 
 
 Thefe fympathies, coufm Comment, are helpful to 
 form and improve the ftile : and it is neceflary to 
 ftore in variety of them from different quarters, or elfe 
 we fball be fervile copiers inftead of bold imitators. 
 You are right, coufm Search^ fays I. But may not 
 this variety be multiplied too far ? For where will you 
 find readers with the like variety of taftes ? And you 
 have laid down, that when the trains fuggefted to an 
 auditor are fo difftmilar to thofe he has been accuftom- 
 ed to that they cannot poflibly run into one another, it 
 generates antipathy inftead of fympathy. But as you 
 have managed the matter, there is nobody who will _ 
 not find fomething to excite this antipathy. The 
 grave will be difgufted to fee you handle the moft 
 ierious fubje&s in the air of a novel or a comedy : and 
 the gay will find themfelves grievoufly difappointed, 
 when you draw them by the lure of amufement into a 
 metaphyfical fubtilty. And you know that what 
 naufeates, hangs longer upon the palate than what is 
 fuitable to the tafte. So that by aiming to pleafe 
 every body, you will pleafe nobody : becaufe there is 
 nobody who will not think yov either too profound or 
 
 too
 
 i go fate. 
 
 or the impulfive operation of neceflary 
 caufes : fo the Sir atonic and Democratic 
 Atheifts b underftood it, when they afcribed 
 
 all 
 
 too playfull. Your remark, fays he, Coufm, is juft, 
 provided I were to confult Reputation only. But who 
 knows but that by blending the airy and the abftrufe, 
 I may (how the contemplative that it is poflible to be 
 ferious without being folemn, to purfue inventions 
 without injury to truth, and give a loofe to imagina- 
 tion without lofing one's underftanding : and if I have 
 carried matters beyond bounds, they may proceed with 
 better difcretion. On the other hand, by flourishing 
 about and pretending to amufe, I may bring the 
 thoughtlefs unawares into a clofenefs of thinking, 
 which they ufed to dread, as being incompatible with 
 chearfulnefs. 
 
 Thus the converfation ended, as converfations gene- 
 rally do, each party retaining his own opinion. 
 
 b They held atoms eternal and uncreated ; and but 
 of thefe, by their various collifions, aflbrtments, and 
 adhefions, the fouls of men, and all other productions 
 were formed. Strata made his atoms fentient, but in 
 the loweft degree, fo as not to be capable of a com- 
 pleat perception > yet that a multitude of them club- 
 bing forces might produce the brighteft Genius or ableft 
 Politician. 
 
 Our Author has battled both thefe people, ftiowing 
 that Perception cannot be made up of what are no 
 Perceptions ; nor received by a number of atoms 
 jointly, unlefs received entire by each of them fingly. 
 For a found cannot be heard by a whole aflembly, 
 without being heard by every one of the perfons com- 
 
 pofing
 
 Fate. 191 
 
 ail events to Fate, that is, the actions of 
 matter depending upon one another in a 
 continued feries from all eternity : and 
 Homers Moira crataia, ftrong-handed fate, 
 has been generally tranflated by the Latin 
 poets, dura Necejfitas, inflexible Neceffity. 
 
 pofing it : neither can whifpers heard by a thoufand 
 men, make together an audible voice. He obferves 
 further, that exiftence belongs only to individuals j a 
 compound being a number, or collection of fubftances, 
 and having no other exiftence than that of its parts. 
 For if the king were to incorporate fix hundred men 
 into a regiment, there would not be fix hundred and 
 one Beings therefore, one for the regiment, and one 
 for each of the men, inftead of only fix hundred there 
 were before ; nor were he to break it again would 
 their be a Being the lefs in his kingdom. So neither 
 when a multitude of atoms run together to compofe a 
 human body, is there a Being more than there was 
 before : nor would there be a Being loft out of nature 
 upon its diflblution. But no man can doubt of his 
 own exiftence, or that he has a perfonality belonging 
 to him didinct from all other Beings: for I can never 
 
 O 
 
 ceafe to be myfclf, nor become another perfon. There- 
 fore there is one Being the more in nature for my 
 exiftence j and were I annihilated there would be a 
 Being the lefs. From hence he infers the individuality 
 of the mind, or fpirit of man, and confequently its 
 perpetual duration : for nature can only deftroy com- 
 pounds by diffolving their parts, but individuals can- 
 not be deftroyed without a miracle, that is, an imme- 
 diate exertion of Omnipotence. 
 
 2 But
 
 1 92 Fate. 
 
 But I conceive thefe two very different 
 things in common understanding, if we 
 may reckon Neceflity as here ufed a com- 
 mon idea, for I rather take neceffary agency 
 to be terms belonging to the fpeculative 
 vocabulary ; but apprehend that operations 
 whereto they may be applicable, cannot 
 upon that account be fliled the work of 
 Fate, in propriety of language. The cir- 
 culation of fap in vegetables, the con- 
 traction and dilatation of their fibres, the 
 action of the fun, air and mould, con- 
 tributing to make them yield their feveral 
 fruits, are all neceffary agencies : yet when 
 a man plants a peach-tree, can you pro- 
 perly fay it is therefore fated that he (hall 
 gather peaches and not plumbs or filberds 
 therefrom ; or if he fows oats in his field, 
 does he think any thing of a fatality againft 
 his reaping wheat or barley ? So neither if 
 we knew a collection of atoms having mo- 
 tions among them which muft form a re- 
 gular world, fliould we efteem every 
 
 thing
 
 Fate* 193 
 
 thing fatal c that might be produced by 
 them. 
 
 But Fate, derived from the Latin, Fan, 
 fignifying to fpeak, muft denote the word 
 fpoken by fome intelligent Being, who has 
 power to make his words good ; fo that 
 whatever he fays (hall be done, will infal- 
 libly come to pafs ; and does not at all re- 
 late to the caufes or manner whereby it is 
 accomplimed, unlefs thofe caufes be made 
 to act in confequence of the word fpoken. 
 
 As to the Parcce, fuppofed in heathen 
 mythology to fpin the thread of life, and 
 by their fciflars to determine the period of 
 it, I mould underftand this thread only to 
 exprefs the feries of events befalling every 
 man, not the feries of caufes operating 
 to bring them forth. And the Pagans 
 feem unfettled in their notions concerning 
 the author of *Fate ; fometimes it is their 
 Jove who fixes it by his arbitrary decree, 
 as in the ill fucceiTes of the Grecian army j 
 
 c Yet CbryftppttS) Seneca^ and the Stoics, fpeak in this 
 ftile, thereby extending the word to a fenfe not belong- 
 ing to it in common language. 
 
 O fome-
 
 194 Fate. 
 
 fometimes he is only an executive power* 
 fubordinate to the Parcas, compelled by 
 their fpinning, to do . or permit what he 
 does not like, as in the death ofSarpedon d . 
 However, leaving them to their own 
 imaginations, with us who acknowledge 
 one fupreme Governour fubordinate to no- 
 thing nor controulable by any other Power, 
 Fate or Deftiny, muft be the fame with 
 the decree of the Almighty j nor can we 
 doubt that whatever he has decreed will 
 
 not fail of coming to pafs. 
 
 \ 
 
 . 43. But this decree works no effect 
 of itfelf, being no efficient caufe ; for if 
 you order your fervant to do a thing, the 
 bufinefs is done by the efficacy 'of his 
 aftion, not of your's ; a command given to 
 a fubordinate, we mall acknowledge com- 
 
 d And fometimes himfelffubje&ed to their laws : for 
 we learn from Ovid, that he remembered a time in the 
 bofom of fate, wherein the fea, the earth, and im- 
 perial palace of heaven fhould be wrapt in flames : Yet 
 it feems he knew fo little the certainty of that time, 
 that he was afraid the madnefs of Phaeton might an- 
 ticipate it. 
 
 i pulfive;
 
 Fate* 195 
 
 pulfive ; therefore if any man knows of a 
 decree ifTued from the Almighty concern- 
 ing fomething he is to do, I fhall never 
 advife him to flrive againft it, nor think 
 himfelf at liberty to do the contrary. 
 
 But it is not this kind of decrees that 
 are iuppofed to generate Fatality, which 
 arifes from thofe unknown to us, confining 
 our actions to the courfe fuited for bringing 
 forth the deftined event : yet even in this 
 cafe it is not the word fpoken and never 
 heard by us, but fomething confequent 
 upon it that impofes the Fatality. We are 
 told indeed, that God faid, Let there be 
 Light, and there was Light ; yet we can- 
 not imagine the Light fprung forth with- 
 out fome exertion of Omnipotence to pro- 
 duce it j for when afterwards he faid, Let 
 us make man after our own Image t neverthe- 
 
 lefs man x was not made until he moulded 
 
 \ 
 
 the duft of the earth into a human body, 
 and breathed thereinto the breath of life : 
 therefore when we fay God created all 
 things by his word, we do not underftand 
 that they produced themfclves out of non- 
 O 2 entity^
 
 Fats. 
 
 entity, in obedience to the order given a 
 but intend only to exprefs the facility 
 wherewith the divine operations are per- 
 formed fimilar to that of a man in authority, 
 caufing what he pleafes to be done upon 
 the word of command. 
 
 Very true, you fay: nobody imagines 
 the found of words fpoken can work any 
 thing. But when God pronounces his de- 
 cree, he accompanies it with fome act of 
 power efficacious and irrefiftible to enforce 
 the execution : or he watches over the 
 tendency of fecond caufes, and turns them 
 by his fecret influence to co-operate to- 
 wards bringing forth the deftined event : in 
 both cafes he abridges human liberty > for 
 what is ordained mufl inevitably come to 
 pafsj nor can all the art or power of man 
 turn it afide -, for the Fatality hanging over 
 us confines our choice to one certain train 
 of objects, or by privately counteracting us, 
 baffles our utmofl endeavours, when turned 
 the contrary way. 
 
 * Nor that this order was aa efficient caufe of their 
 exiftence. 
 
 This
 
 Fate. 197 
 
 . 44. This feems to be the ordinary 
 way of confidering this matter, and the 
 concomitant exertion of power makes the 
 difference between a Decree and a Com- 
 mand, for both are fuppofed to proceed 
 from the word of God. We are told, he 
 faid, Let there be Light, and there was light : 
 we are likewife told, that he faid, Thou 
 Jhalt not murther j thou Jhalt not fteal ; thou 
 Jhalt not commit adultery \ neverthelefs men 
 do ftill murder and fteal, and commit 
 adultery, notwithstanding the word fpoken. 
 So the word of God operates nothing of 
 itfelf when delivered as a command, nor 
 unlefs when delivered as a decree : becaufe 
 in the latter cafe only, it is accompanied 
 with an exertion of Omnipotence, or a 
 determination to exert it when occafion 
 fhall require. 
 
 But the idea of a determination, to ufe 
 power whenever requifite for accomplim- 
 ing a decree, arifes from our narrow con- 
 ception of the proceedings of God tajten 
 from our own manner of proceeding, as ob- 
 ferved already in . 20. and the latter part 
 O 3 of
 
 ig8 Fate. 
 
 of . 29. For when we refolve upon the 
 compafiing of any diftant purpofe, we can 
 fcarce ever lay our meafures fo furely but 
 that they may fail of the iflue intended ; fo 
 we are forced to watch over and correct 
 them from time to time as we mall find 
 occafion ; or accidents may intervene which 
 will require our further endeavours to pre- 
 vent their defeating our defign 5 or many 
 times we know not what meafures are pro- 
 per until we have feen the tendency of other 
 caufes, and conduct of other per'fons any 
 ways affecting the end we have in view ; 
 and then we mutt employ fuch^ power and 
 ikill as we are matters of, in order to bring 
 things into the train we would have them 
 take. From this experience of ourfelves, 
 we are led to think the fame of the Al- 
 mighty, whom we conceive as having 
 deftined certain particular events, but in 
 general left the powers of nature and free 
 agents to take their own courfe, until they 
 chance to take a tendency contrary to his 
 defigns, and then he controuls and turns 
 
 them
 
 Fate. 199 
 
 them by his fecret influence, fo as to make 
 them co-operate therewith. 
 
 Now a little reflection may mow how 
 injurious this notion is to the wifdom and 
 power of God, reprefenting him as fixing 
 indeed upon certain purpofes, but uncertain 
 in what manner they {hall be brought to 
 pafs, until the tendency his fecond caufes 
 fhall happen to take points out the mea- 
 fures necelTary for turning them into their 
 deftined courfe ; and thus giving chance a 
 {hare in the government of the world, 
 liable indeed to his controul, but working 
 of herfelf whenever he does not interfere, 
 and even furnilhing employment for his 
 wifdom and power, by the errors me com- 
 mits. 
 
 i 
 
 . 45. But when we confider, that all 
 events, as well thofe efteemed fortuitous 
 as others, mufl proceed from certain caufes, 
 which derived their exiftence and efficacy 
 mediately or immediately from the firft ; 
 and when we contemplate his Omnifcience, 
 extending to every thing that can be fop- 
 CD 4 pofed 4
 
 2 co Fate. 
 
 pofed the objea of knowledge, we (hall 
 find reafdn to convince us that nothing 
 comes to pafs unlefs in confeqiience of fome 
 act of his j and that whenever he acts, he 
 knows precifely what he does, together 
 with theremoteft andminuteft confequences 
 to refult from his doings. ' 
 
 For what bounds fhall we fet to his in 
 telligence ? If our own lies confined within 
 a fmall compafs, it is owing to the fcan- 
 tinefs of our organs, thofe necefTary inftru- 
 ments of our perception. We have but 
 two hands, fo can touch no more than they 
 will reach to ; w.e have eyes only before 
 us, fo can behold no further than half the 
 circle furrounding us : the tablet of our 
 memory, the chart of our imagination, the 
 line of our reflection, have their appointed 
 meafures, fo we can recollect, or calculate, 
 or contemplate no more than the ideas they 
 contain. 
 
 But God perceives not by organs, neither 
 meditates by animal fpirits, or the little 
 fibres of the brain, nor receives his notices 
 by channels, whofe number or contents 
 
 might
 
 Fate. 201 
 
 might be computed, fo as to determine the 
 precife quantity they are capable of con- 
 veying. What then is there to fet the 
 limitation to his knowledge ; or by what 
 rule or meafure can we afcertainthe bounds ? 
 Can he comprehend a million of ideas, and 
 no more ? Does he clearly difcover all 
 events to happen within the enfuing cen- 
 tury, and no longer ? Do the concerns of 
 empires fo occupy his thoughts, that he 
 fcas none to fpare for the peafant, the 
 labourer, or the beggar ? Are the affairs of 
 men fo burthenfome to his mind, that he 
 has no room to think of the moufe and the 
 wren, the emmet and the mite, the green 
 myriads of the peopled grafs, the many- 
 tribed weeds of the field, or the dancing 
 motes that glitter in the noontide beams ? 
 
 Since then we know of no boundaries 
 to circumfcribe the divine Omnifcience, 
 t>ut that it may extend to every thing with- 
 out overlooking any thing, and difcern re- 
 moteft confequences in their prefent caufes, 
 why mould we fcruple to admit that he 
 gave being to thofe caufes with a view to 
 
 their
 
 2O2 Fate. 
 
 their confequcnces ? and on the formation 
 of a world difpofed his fubftances, ma- 
 terial and fpiritual, with fuch properties, 
 powers, fituations, motions and ideas, as 
 Should produce the exact feries of events 
 he intended to bring forth ? 
 
 In this cafe there is no occafion nor room 
 for controlling or altering the operation of 
 fecond caufes, they being already adjufted 
 to anfwer all the purpofes they were deftined 
 to compleat, And if there be fupernatural 
 interpontions (which I neither affirm nor 
 deny) we cannot fuppofe them made upon 
 unforefeen emergencies to fupply defects in 
 the original contrivance, but comprized 
 therein, as being judged proper for mani- 
 feftation of the divine power and govern- 
 ment to intelligent creatures, and worked 
 up into one uniform plan, together with 
 the operations of fecondary .agents, 
 
 . 46. In this view of the ceconomy of 
 Providence, we fee that any abfolute de- 
 cree or fecret fatality to enforce the execu- 
 tion of a defign againft the tendency of 
 
 fecond
 
 Fate. 203 
 
 fecond caufes to turn it afide, muft be fu- 
 perfluous, provifion being already made in 
 perfect wifdom for every event which is to 
 take effect by difpofltion of the caufes pro- 
 per to give it birth, nor will any of thofe 
 caufes deviate into another tendency than 
 that they were calculated to take. 
 
 Thus it appears, that all things fail out 
 according to the will and difpofition of God, 
 and conformably to the fcheme of his Pror 
 yidence, working for the moft part, if not 
 always by the miniftry of material or vo- 
 luntary agents : but the methods whereby 
 this miniftry is conducted are various. 
 Some parts of the plan are accomplifhed 
 by the choice and induftry of man, infti- 
 gated thereto by appetites, judgements, 
 imaginations, defires, obligations, dangers, 
 and other motives ; other parts are exe r 
 cuted by the ftated laws of nature, fuch a? 
 the inftinct a of brutes, action of the ele-r 
 
 a Which, we have feen in a former note, is feme- 
 thing between neceffary and free Agency ; but in ge- 
 neral etlimation, feems ranked under the former. And 
 what we do ourfelves without reflection, or confciouf- 
 jiefs, is commonly ftiled mechanical. 
 
 ments a
 
 204 Fate. 
 
 merits, powers of vegetation, qualities of 
 foils, changes of feafons, and viciflitudes 
 of night and day ; and others brought 
 about by the courfes of fortune dependant 
 upon the fituations b of fubftances, and 
 their mutual applications upon one another, 
 to us accidental and uninveftigable. 
 
 But what proceeds from the two firft of 
 thefe caufes, we do not ufually afcribe to 
 the hand of Fate: for nobody looks upon 
 it as a Fatality that laft winter is now fue- 
 ceeded by fummer ; that the days are long, 
 the air warm, the corn and fruits begin to 
 ripen, for all thefe are natural, nor could 
 any body expect things mould have fallen 
 out otherwife. So neither do we think a 
 parent fated to put his fon out to fchool,. 
 
 b The powers of fecond caufes belong to Nature ; 
 but their concurrence, or coming to where they may 
 operate, lies within the province of Fortune. That 
 flame fhould burn wood is nothing ftrange : but that 
 the candle fhould be left clofe to the wainfcot was 
 unlucky. So we know well enough there are caufes 
 in nature capable of raifing a ftorm : but that they 
 fliould be ready at hand to raife it with violence, and 
 drive it upon our forefts, or our houfes, makes trje 
 misfortune. 
 
 for
 
 Fate. 205 
 
 for it was his defire to give him a good 
 education, and his choice and judgement 
 directed him to the proper methods for 
 effecting it. 
 
 Therefore the laft clafs of caufes only 
 remains for the province of Fate, to wit, 
 fuch whofe operations are fortuitous and 
 unaccountable, that is, beyond the reach 
 of human forefight and fagacity to dif- 
 cover ; neverthelefs they muft have fome 
 certain fprings and iiTues, as well as the 
 motions of nature or actions of men. 
 
 . 47. Thus the fame events lie under 
 the difpofal of Fate and of Fortune, and 
 both terms take their rife from our manner 
 of conceiving things. Chance is no agent 
 nor power, but the creature only of ima- 
 gination, deriving its birth from our igno- 
 rance j for when we fee caufes at work, 
 but know not their tendency, we fay it is a 
 chance what they will produce : therefore 
 that which is chance to one man may be 
 none to another, who has better informa- 
 tion
 
 2o6 fate. 
 
 tion or niore judgement to difcern the traJri 
 things are taking^ 
 
 If a die were to be thrown, the caft 
 would be produced by the motions of the 
 thrower's arm, the mape of the boxj in- 
 equalities of the table, and other imper- 
 ceptible circumftances, of which we can 
 make no eflimate, therefore we deem it to 
 lie under the power of Chance ; but were 
 the caft to determine between two male- 
 factors which of them mould fuffer, we 
 fhould then think it a matter worthy refer- 
 ring to the fupreme difpofer of all events, 
 for the lot cometh from the Lord ; yet ftill 
 being uncertain what means he will em- 
 ploy, or what effect they (hall take, we 
 attribute the decifion to his Will or Decree, 
 {kipping over that undifcernible chain of 
 caufes lying between his firft appointment 
 and thofe now in act. 
 
 Therefore Fate and Fortune feem for the 
 moft part to claim a concurrent jurifdiction, 
 many tracts lying within the province of 
 both : and under this apprehenfion we ex- 
 prefs ourfelves upon common occasions j 
 
 for
 
 Fate. 
 
 for when we hear of a man falling in battle, 
 we fay indifferently, it was his Fate, or his 
 Fortune to be ilain ; and of a young per- 
 fon intended to be fent abroad, but un- 
 certain in what bufinefs, or what place he 
 may find opportunities for fettling, we fay* 
 it is doubtful where his Jot may fall, where 
 fortune may carry him, or his fate or 
 deftiny fix him. 
 
 But to which of thefe powers we (hall 
 afcribe the influence, depends upon the 
 objects we take into contemplation : while 
 we regard only the fecret fprings and un- 
 forefeen incidents which may affect an 
 event, we deem it in the hand of For- 
 tune : but when we look on further to that 
 intelligent Being, who is the difpofer of all 
 events, we conceive that thofe fprings will 
 work, and incidents fall out, according to 
 his direction and decree. 
 
 Neverthelefs it is obvious, as we ob- 
 ferved before, that a decree will work no- 
 thing without an application of power to 
 enforce the execution of it, and when 
 fuch application has been made by provifion 
 
 of
 
 2o8 Fate. , 
 
 of the proper means for bringing an event 
 to pafs, a decree or declaration of the pur* 
 pofe intended becomes needlefs : for the 
 requifite meafures being once taken, will 
 have their effect, whether any word be 
 fpoken concerning them or no. There- 
 fore the iflues of things proceed, and for- 
 tune derives her efficacy, from the provifion 
 not the decree of the Almighty, from the 
 work of his hand, not the word of his 
 mouth ; and this latter, if any fuch there 
 were, added nothing to the acts of Omni- 
 potence, but muft be delivered for fome 
 other purpofe than to enfure the comple- 
 tion of his defign. 
 
 . 48. Hence it appears, that in nfing 
 the terms Fate, Decree or Deftiny, we 
 fpeak after the manner of men ; for it being 
 cuftomary with us, whenever we refolve 
 upon fome diflant work, to declare our 
 intentions to perfons under our influence, 
 who may affift in compleating it, and to 
 fix a determination in our minds which may 
 render us vigorous, and keep us watchful 
 
 in
 
 Fate.. 209 
 
 in the profecution, we conceive of God as 
 making the like declared or mental deter- 
 mination with regard to every fpot he com- 
 prifes within the plan of his Providence. 
 
 Then again, being fenfible this deter- 
 mination cannot operate upon the courfes 
 of fortune as a command, yet that fome- 
 thing mini operate to put them in motion, 
 and being unable to trace, or even to con- 
 ceive a chain of caufes extending from the 
 firft formation of the plan to all thefe mul- 
 tifarious events, we cannot help acknow- 
 ledging mufl come to pafs by the divine 
 appointment, we get an obfcure idea of an 
 irreftftible force, a fomething we cannot 
 explain nor account for its exiftence, 
 which we call a Fatality, which perpetually 
 hangs over fecond caufes, conftraining their 
 motions, or like an adamantine wall, con- 
 fining them within their appointed courfe, 
 from whence they would have a natural 
 propenfity to deviate. Thus Fatality be- 
 comes disjoined from the decree, and lofes 
 the proper import belonging to it by its 
 derivation, being now no longer a fatum 
 
 r> 
 
 or
 
 2io Fate. 
 
 or word fpoken, but one knows not well 
 whatj an emanation from it, like light from 
 the fun-beams, a power without an agent 
 to exert* it; for when God has fpoken, his 
 action ceafes, and the Fatality is a confe- 
 quence of what he has faid. 
 
 That this is the fenfe, if a fenfe it may 
 be called, that men ordinarily affix to the 
 term, appears by the Atheifts employing it, 
 who acknowledge no intelligent Being who 
 mighty^r/, that is, fpeak or uTue a decree : 
 for being called upon to affign a caufe for 
 the laws and eftablimments of nature, they 
 afcribed them to a blind Fatality* working 
 upon the mafs of matter throughout the 
 univerfe, and driving it into a regular form. 
 But if we regard etymology, a blind -fata- 
 lity is as abfurd an expreffion as that of a 
 dumb decree, or an unintended defign. 
 The Epicureans alone difcarded Fate upon 
 a moft unphilofophical principle, that 
 events may enfue, fuch as the declination 
 of atoms, without any prior caufe what- 
 ever to produce them : but all who ad- 
 mitted an eternal Firft Caufe, whether in- 
 telligent
 
 Fate. 21 i 
 
 telligent or unfentient, feem to have enter- 
 tained a notion of Fatality. 
 
 This confufed and indeterminate notion 
 opened the door to judicial Aftrology % for 
 though the ftars were fuppofed by their po- 
 iitions to affect the lives of men, I never 
 yet heard it attempted to be mown in what 
 manner, or by what mediums they ope- 
 rated : but a conformity being once fancied 
 between the fucceffes of human tranfactions 
 and afpects of the heavenly bodies, it was a 
 fhort way to talk of a Fatality, though 
 nobody could tell why, or how, or by 
 what channels the connection mould be 
 effected. 
 
 The like may be faid of the P arete, 
 whofe finging anfwers to the decree utter- 
 
 a And to the Art Magic, and Prognofticattons by 
 dreams, omens, prodigies, prickings into the bible 
 ftrangers in the candle, fcreechings of owls, influences 
 of a rainy Friday upon the following week, and other 
 the like trumpery, maintained by the Stoics in Tally's 
 Divination, and by our modern old women in the 
 nurfery. For all thefe are not efteemed as Revelations, 
 but as a confent or fympathy in things, between which 
 the Philofopher ajid Naturalift cannot find the leaft 
 connection. 
 
 P 2 ed,
 
 -212 Fate. 
 
 ed, and could have no other effect than to 
 amufe themfelves and lighten their tafk; 
 but it was the thread they fpun which de- 
 termined the duration and colour of men's 
 lives beyond the power of Jove himfelf to 
 .alter : ye* we never hear of their having 
 any communication with fublunary affairs, 
 or acting as efficient caufes upon any thing 
 moving here $ neverthelefs upon their fpin- 
 ning, there inftantly arofe a fympathetic 
 energy in the caufes at work upon earth, 
 drawing them to produce an iffue con- 
 formable to what was fpun. 
 
 . 49. We fee from the foregoing obfer- 
 vations, how the term Fate has flid off its 
 original bafts, being departed from its 'firft 
 fignification, that of a decree or refolve of 
 the Almighty to a fomething generated 
 thereby, an undefinable influence, refiding 
 neither in body, nor foul, nor fubftance, 
 but an abftracl force or activity % hovering 
 
 a Which there is no agent to exert. Not God, for 
 his a&ion was compleated long ago, upon ifluing the 
 decree : nor fecond caufes, for they are fuppofed to be 
 turned afide from their natural'- operation by the Fa- 
 tality. 
 
 2 as
 
 Fate. 213 
 
 as it were in the air, and operating upon 
 the caufes of things as they feverally begin 
 to aft. 
 
 Nor yet do men keep always fteady to 
 this idea of Fate in their common conver- 
 fation ; for we often hear them talk of the 
 Fate of a convicl criminal lying in the hand 
 of the Prince who has power to pardon or 
 to order execution ; the lover waits for the 
 decifion of his miftrefs to fix his Fate 
 the poet talks of phyficians ilTuing man- 
 dates in arreft of Fate b , and an unexpected 
 accident or arrival of a timely fuccour is 
 thought fometimes to change the Fate of a 
 battle : whereas if we regard the genuine 
 notion of Fate, it was fixed long ago by 
 the decree of heaven; nor is it in the 
 power of man, or any natural agent, to 
 determine or flop, or change, or afFedt it 
 in any refpect. 
 
 b Jf^lth looks demure they grafp the golden laity 
 And ijjue manddtti in arrtjl of fate. 
 
 THURSTON. 
 
 Who being a lawyer, took his metaphor from the law 
 courts, arrefting or flopping judgement after a verdict 
 for. irregularities fhown in the proceedings, 
 
 P ? Thcfe
 
 Fate. 
 
 Thefe variations of language do not 
 diflurb us in our ordinary difcourfes, for 
 the context or occafion introducing them 
 moulds our words into the fhape that is 
 proper j but men of thought and abilrac- 
 tion, defirous of affixing conftantly the 
 fame ideas to their words, find themfelves 
 difappointed when they light upon a term 
 of vague and unftable fignification ; for as 
 we generally think in words, and their 
 fenfe in the various phrafes whereto we join 
 them, is determined by cuftom; we are 
 led infenfibly in the progrefs of our reafon- 
 ings to underfland them differently, from 
 whence great confufion and perplexity mud 
 unavoidably enfue. 
 
 Therefore the fcience of language, and 
 exact obfervation of ideas adhering thereto, 
 would help us greatly in" our difcoveries of 
 nature; for if men could fix upon terms 
 not liable to variation of lenfe or mifap*- 
 prehenfion, their difputes would be morten- 
 ed, and they might quickly arrive at fo 
 much knowledge as is attainable by hu- 
 man understanding. We have found no 
 
 reafon
 
 Fate. 215 
 
 reafon hitherto to difregard the admonitions 
 of our prefent patronefs Philology, they 
 having been helpful to us upon feveral oc- 
 cafions ; and fhe informs us, the word Fate 
 carries a very loofe and indeterminate figni- 
 fication. 
 
 For this reafon I wim it were quite ex- 
 punged from the philofophical vocabulary, 
 and Providence fubftituted in its room, 
 which I conceive would render our thoughts 
 clearer and lefs intricate, and give them a 
 freer progrefs when turned upon the govern- 
 ment of the world ; for the provifions of 
 heaven in the original difpolition of adequate 
 caufes may anfwer all purpofes, as well 
 thofe aceomplimed by natural as accidental 
 means, or the motions of free agency. 
 
 . 50. But men find a difficulty in con- 
 ceiving of abfolute dominion, without a 
 coercive authority or compulfion exercifed 
 upon the fubjecls under it : which makes 
 us all fo fond of power as a neceffary means 
 for bringing our purpofes to bear againft 
 the oppofition of other agents which might 
 P 4 attempt
 
 2i6 Fate. 
 
 attempt to defeat them. Yet in many in- 
 flances, as has been remarked in . 19. we 
 ourfelves can make provifion for defigns 
 wherein other perfons are to concur, and 
 guide their conduct fo far as we know 
 what will move them, and have the pro- 
 per motives in our hands, without pre- 
 tending to any authority or compulfive 
 power over them. And if there be always 
 fome hazard of a difappointment, it is be- 
 caufe we can never fee thoroughly the 
 exact ftate of their defires, nor what ex- 
 ternal accidents, fuch as weather, difeafe, 
 or the like, may difturb the fuccefs of our 
 fchemes : but were there nothing extra- 
 neous to interfere, and had we a perfect 
 knowledge of men's minds, much more, 
 were their inclinations and judgements of 
 our framing, we fhould need no defpotic 
 jurifdiction nor controlling power to guide 
 them into what courfes of behaviour we 
 pleafed. 
 
 r* * 
 
 Now there is nothing external to the 
 work of God. The laws of nature bring- 
 ing forth her various productions were of 
 
 his
 
 Fate. 21 7 
 
 his eftablimment : the workings of .chance 
 followed from fome determinate caufes, 
 though to us unknown ; thefe again from 
 other prior, and fo on in a continual chan- 
 nel from the fources firft opened by the 
 exertion of his power ; for no event, how^ 
 ever cafual, can happen without fomething 
 occafioning it to fall out in that manner: 
 the actions of men proceed according:to 
 their apprehenfions and judgements thrown 
 upon them by their conftitution or tem- 
 perament, by education, by company and 
 
 DlJOJf IT! '1 j:rn;?<'.^ ^j 'OfFF 
 
 occurrences befalling them in life j all 
 which were conveyed by nature or fortune* 
 and therefore muft be referred to the origin 
 from whence they derived. ' For every 
 effect muft be produced by the action of" 
 fome agent material or fpiritual, or the 
 concurrence of-feveral, and muft follow 
 according to the manner of that action 
 being exerted; which manner was deter- 
 mined by fome impulfe or motive impreffed 
 from elfewhere; nor can we ftop until we 
 arrive at fome act of Omnipotence. 
 
 Thus
 
 2i 8 Fate. 
 
 Thus the face of things^ as well 'in the 
 moral as natural kingdoms, refults from 
 the qualities, politions a , and motion's God 
 
 The fecondary qualities of bodies refult from their 
 form, which is nothing elfe than a certain pofition of 
 their component parts : for the fame (hillings laid upon 
 a, table, will make a fquare, a lozenge, a ring, or a 
 crofs, according as you place them; and the fame 
 particles of matter wHl make grafs, or mutton, of 
 human flefh, according as they are difpofed among 
 one another by digeftion. The modifications of our 
 organs occafioning them to imprefs their feveral per- 
 ceptions, can be .conceived no otherwife than as de- 
 pending upon their figures or motions : fo that though 
 Thought be neither figure nor motionj it follows pre- 
 cifely upon the changes made in either; and thi s 
 whether we work thofe changes ourfelves, or have 
 ' them produced before us by other caufes. 
 
 The fecondary qualities of fpirit depend upon its 
 pofition, in fome organization ; for if the fpirit of a 
 man were placed in his great toe, he would neither 
 fee nor hear, nor underftand ; and if it were placed 
 in the organization of an oyfter, perhaps he might 
 have no more fenfe than that ftupid animal. Motion 
 ferves only to change pofitions into one another, and 
 what effect it (hall have depends upon prior pofitions : 
 for the fame motion of a bullet will deftroy this man 
 or that, according to the pofition of the mufltet, or 
 places they occupy : and the fame particles of beef are 
 capable, or not, of being moved about by the circu- 
 lation for our nourimment, according to their internal 
 pofition in the joint when it is raw or roafted, or 
 putrefied. 
 
 gave
 
 Fate. 219 
 
 gave to his fubftances at the formation of a 
 world. It remains only, that we afk our- 
 felves the queftion, whether he extended 
 his plan to a compafs larger than he could 
 comprehend himfelf, or gave birth to 
 caufes which might produce events un- 
 thought of by him, or more numerous 
 than he could grafp in his Omnifcience ? 
 If we anfwer in the negative, we muft 
 needs acknowledge that provifion was made 
 at the beginning for all that train of events, 
 and accomplimment of thofe purpofes we 
 have feen, or mall hereafter fee erFcc"led. 
 
 But experience teftifies, that this pro- 
 vifion leaves many things in our power, 
 and circumfcribes us in many other refpects;- 
 we lay fchemes, and take meafures appear- 
 ing certain to fucceed, but find them fail 
 in the ifTue, and that by accidents we could 
 not have expeded, nor can account for their 
 happening ; our- reafon deferts us in time, 
 of need ; we commit blunders, and give 
 into follies we could not have thought our- 
 felves capable of: tempefts, earthquakes, 
 famines, peftilences, and deftrudive dif- 
 
 >* . eafes
 
 22O Fate. 
 
 eafes arifefrom no natural caufes that we can 
 difcern; and our experience of thofe things 
 gives us the notion of Fatality. There- 
 fore Fate, if we will needs employ the 
 term in our fpeculations, is that part of the 
 divine provifion producing events which 
 would not have enfued by the known laws 
 of nature, nor operation of obfervable 
 caufes, nor contrivances of man, but are 
 rather contrary to his endeavours. 
 
 t "r?J;i : ''"' ',' 
 
 .51. Seneca, in Nat. $u<zjl. Lib. II,. 
 cap. 36. defines Fate the neeeiHty of ail 
 things and actions, which no -force can 
 break through : and he feems herein to have 
 given Fate the import belonging to it in; 
 common propriety of language ; for the 
 courfes of Fate are always deemed irre-. 
 fiftible and unalterable j nor do we apply 
 the term unlefs to cafes wherein the will 
 and power of man has no concern. 
 
 Therefore when a perfon fails in a di- 
 flemper, we fay it was his Fate to die, be- 
 caufe we fuppofe his wim and endeavours 
 were bent upon preventing it : but if he 
 
 efcapes,
 
 Fate. 221 
 
 efcapes, we do not fay he was fated to re- 
 cover, but at moft that his Fate was not yet 
 come, that is, has not yet operated upon 
 him j for this was the effect of the cares 
 taken to fave him. 
 
 If we happen to ruin a fcheme we were 
 extremely fond of accomplishing through 
 fome palpable mifconduct of our own, we 
 think ourfelves under a fatal infatuation, 
 becaufe every body is conceived willing to 
 employ his beft judgement for his own 
 benefit; from whence comes the obferva- 
 tion, that whom Jove would deftroy, he 
 firft deprives of their underftanding: but 
 if we chance to fucceed beyond expecta- 
 tion by a more than ordinary dexterity of 
 management, we think nothing of a Fata- 
 lity, becaufe the unufual clearncfs of judge- 
 ment and fuccefs confequent thereupon, 
 were things agreeable to our wifli, and 
 effects of beitirring ourfelves in the exer- 
 cife of our faculties. 
 
 So likewife -a. fatal accident is that which 
 brings on an event, we are extremely avefle 
 to : whereas a lucky incident is never termed 
 
 fatal,
 
 222 Fate. 
 
 fatal, becaufe tending to further our ad- 
 vancement towards fomething we defire. 
 
 But if Seneca was right in calling Fate a 
 Neceffity, which no force can break thro', 
 we cannot think him fo in the extent he 
 has given to its dominion, comprehending 
 all things and all actions : for this fwallows 
 up the whole province of Freewill, to 
 which Fate and Neceflity, in every body's 
 understanding, are counted diametrically 
 oppofite : for what is fated to happen does 
 not lie in my power to prevent, and what 
 depends upon my pleafure and option, is 
 yet undetermined by any Fatality. 
 
 Nor let it be thought we injure him, 
 by taking his expreffion too ftrictly ; for he 
 goes on, in cap. 38. to particularize in 
 matters belonging directly to human ma- 
 nagement. If, fays he, it be fated that 
 fuch a young perfon mall become eloquent, 
 it is likewife fated that he mall ftudy rhe- 
 toric j if that he mall grow rich, it is fated 
 that he mail trade to foreign parts. In 
 like manner his brother Stoic, Cbryjippus, 
 infifts, in fully de Fato y cap. 13. that when 
 
 a
 
 Fate. 223 
 
 a fick man is fated to recover, it is con- 
 fated that he fhall fend for a phyfician ; 
 to which it might be added, and that the 
 doctor {hall ufe his beft {kill, and the apo- 
 thecary difpenfe his recipes properly. 
 
 But any common eye may fee, that 
 thefe Fates do not carry fuch a neceflity as 
 the force of man cannot break through : 
 for the fcholur, if he pleafes, may neglect 
 his fhidies, the young trader fquander 
 away his ftock in extravagancies and de- 
 baucheries, the fick perfon perfift obfli- 
 nately in refufing help, the doftor deftroy 
 his patient, or the apothecary impofe upon 
 both by neglecting to provide good drugs, 
 or mixing up ingredients that will do 
 mifchief. 
 
 What then ! are not eloquence, riches, 
 and health, the bleffings of heaven ? are 
 they not given to thofe whom God thinks 
 proper, and withheld from whom he plea- 
 fes ? Or can any, to whom he defigns a fa- 
 vour, ever fail of receiving the effects of 
 his bounty ? By no means j nor does this 
 confequence follow from our rejection of 
 
 Fatality ;
 
 224 Fate. 
 
 Fatality : for tho' all things are not fated, 
 yet all things are wifely provided, fo as to 
 take the train requifite for compleating 
 whatever events were contained within his 
 , plan. Thus the orator and merchant were 
 provided by education, example, and other 
 natural means, with a difpofition for im- 
 proving the talents and opportunities put into 
 their hands ; the tick man is provided with 
 fenfe to know the value of life, and fond- 
 nefs for its prefervation j the medical affift- 
 ants with companion to a fellow-creature 
 in diftrefs, with fkill and diligence and 
 a defire to maintain their credit in their 
 profeflions : and thefe difpofitions will in- 
 fallibly put them upon taking thofe mea- 
 fures voluntarily, which they had full pow- 
 er and free liberty to have omitted. 
 
 Thus the will of God is done without em- 
 ploying the compulfive force of Fate, or rigid 
 arm of Neceffity. But the difficulties that 
 have always perplexed the fpeculative upon 
 this fubje<ft, fpring from their not obferving 
 double fenfe of the word pojfibk, as it re- 
 s to power or to contingency, remarked 
 
 in
 
 Fate. 225 
 
 in the foregoing pages, . 30, 31 ; for 
 want of which they could not conceive 
 how any thing could be left to the power 
 and option of man, without inferring a 
 poffibility that he might defeat the purpofes 
 of God : but having well fettled that dif- 
 tinction in our minds, and taking along 
 with us that the behaviour of men follows 
 upon their apprehenfions and fentiments 
 which refult from the feen and unfeen 
 fprings employed by God in his admini- 
 flration of the moral world, we may eafily 
 comprehend how it may be poffible, that 
 is, in the power of man, in many inftances 
 to fruftrate his defigns ; neverthelefs he may 
 fo perfectly ICMW what will be the defires 
 and thoughts OT their hearts, that there is no 
 poffibility, that is, no danger, they mould 
 purfue any other than the particular tenour 
 of conduct moft conducive thereto. 
 
 .52. The elTence of Fate lying in its 
 unchangeablenefs and independence on the 
 turns of Freewill, the powers of different 
 p'erfons being various, and coming or go- 
 
 ing
 
 226 Fate. 
 
 ing according as opportunity changes, there 
 is no paradox in aflerting, that the fame 
 event may be under the arbitrary difpofal 
 of one man, which is fated and necefTary to 
 another, and may be matter of choice to- 
 day, which was efteemed the work of Fate 
 yefterday, and may be fo again to-morrow. 
 
 Suppofe you and I could give evidence a- 
 gainft fomebody of a capital offence unknown 
 to any body elfe> but there being fome fa- 
 vourable circumftances in his cafe, we went 
 into a room together to confult whether we 
 fhould make the difcovery or no : this we 
 mould be apt to call fitting to fix his Fate ; 
 and any body upon feeing us come out, 
 and knowing what we haj^ been about, 
 might properly afk, well, what is his Fate ? 
 is he doomed to die ? But though our de- 
 cifion be reckoned Fate, with refpeft to 
 the culprit, as being unalterable and inevita- 
 ble by him, yet we mould not cfteem our- 
 felves under a Fatality or Necefllty to pro- 
 fecute, becaufe it would flill remain in our 
 power to do it or forbear. 
 
 Marriages
 
 Fate. 227 
 
 Marriages are commonly faid to be made 
 in heaven ; yet it is of the very efTence of 
 marriage to have the free confent of the 
 parties j for the folemnization follows upon 
 their will and defirej but the caufes in- 
 fluencing their choice were not of their 
 own procurement, but extraneous and for- 
 tuitous to them. A man determined to 
 fettle in the world, but unprovided of his 
 object, may think it in the hand of Fate 
 or Fortune what qualified party he mall 
 meet with j but when the acquaintance is 
 made, the liking fixed, and matters agreed 
 on both fides, things proceed thence for- 
 ward under the direction of Choice and 
 Freewill: then again, if afterwards fhe 
 prove a ihrew, he may chance to curfe his 
 flars for fubjecting him to fo cruel a Fate. 
 
 The fall of Troy was faid to be written 
 in the book of Fate before its foundation ; 
 yet the parties inftrumental thereto, Paris 
 and Helen, the Grecian Princes, the council 
 of Priam refufing reftitution, acted by 
 palTion, contrivance, defign, and delibera- 
 tion, thofe fprings of free agency : and 
 
 during
 
 228 , Fate. 
 
 during the iiege, the poor Trojans ufed 
 their utmoft efforts to ward off the ftroke 
 of Fate, which neverthelefs fell inevitably 
 upon them. 
 
 Thus when Fate has begun his courfe, 
 it opens at intervals to let in Freewill, who 
 having played her part, the ftream clofes 
 again, and involves all before it in irre- 
 fiflible neceffity. 
 
 From hence it appears, that in difquifi- 
 tions upon this fubject our bufinefs is to 
 enquire not fo much into the nature of 
 things, as the import of expreflions and 
 ftate of ideas under contemplation ; and 
 we mall often find that the fame event, 
 according to the perfons concerned in it, 
 to the Hght wherein we place it, or to our 
 confidering the whole or fome part only 
 of the chain whereon it hangs, fhall be 
 either the work of Fate, the effect of 
 Chance, or the product of human Induftry, 
 Forethought and Option. For Fate and 
 Neceffity being always oppofed to free 
 Choice, may be applicable to an Event or 
 
 not,
 
 Fate. 229 
 
 not, according to whofe choice, or what 
 act of the will you refer it. 
 
 If I lie under the power of a fuperiour 
 in what manner to difpofe of me, the de- 
 termination is Fate to me, though matter < 
 of choice and deliberation to him. So I 
 may efteem it in the hand of Fate to de- 
 termine how I mail difpofe of myfelf feven 
 years hence, if I cannot by any prefent 
 act of mine certainly direct my future re- 
 folves ; but when the time of action comes, 
 I mall then have it my power and option 
 which way to turn myfelf: then again, 
 after I have executed my choice and fixed 
 my ntuation, if I run back through the 
 whole chain of caufes bringing me thereinto, 
 the opportunities enabling, and inducements 
 prevailing on me to take the part I did, 
 which were not of my own procurement, 
 I may be apt to call it the work of Fate. 
 
 No wonder then that fo variable and 
 flippery a term mould often prefent us with 
 double lights, bewildering the moft cau- 
 tious traveller, like an ignis fatuus : where- 
 fore, as I faid before, it were better we 
 
 could
 
 2 3 o Fate. 
 
 could do entirely without it ; for Provi- 
 dence feems a much clearer and fteadier 
 idea -, nor are there the like difficulties in 
 \ Hinder ftanding how that, by the apt dif- 
 L ^pofition of caufes fuited to each refpective 
 purpofe, may generate the laws of nature, 
 {hape the windings of fortune, and pro- 
 duce the motives giving the turn to human 
 volition. 
 
 . 53. Let us now confider how far our 
 conduct and condition in life may be 
 cramped and controuled by this univerfal 
 proviiion. We find ourfelves circum- 
 fcribed in our powers, our knowledge, and 
 the fcope allotted us to exercife them. 
 This nobody doubts. The feverities of 
 winter fucceed the conveniencies of Aim- 
 merj our weight binds us down to the 
 
 earth, nor can we foar aloft like the fwallow. 
 % j 
 
 Tempefts, difeafes, and finifter accidents 
 come upon us inevitably, and ma#y things 
 fall out beyond our ikill or power to pre- 
 vent them : but want of fkill and power is 
 not wapt of liberty* Bars, obstructions, 
 
 ana
 
 Fate. 231 
 
 and reflralnts confine us in the exercife of ; 
 thofe powers we have -, but there is a dif- 
 ference between freedom of action and 
 freedom of will : the latter refpects only 
 fuch things as we have a natural ability to 
 perform, and againft which there lies no 
 impediment to prevent the fuccefs of our 
 endeavours. But Freewill cannot proceed 
 without inducements to move, and ideas to 
 direct it ; therefore that provifion which 
 fupplies us with thefe, is fo far from over- 
 throwing, that it is the bafis and fupport 
 of our freedom. 
 
 Nor would doubts arife concerning our 
 pofleffion of this privilege, if we did not 
 generally extend it beyond its proper object, 
 which, ftrictly fpeaking, is no other than 
 the prefent action in our power ; but our 
 prefent endeavours often have a tendency 
 to diftant purpofes ; and experience teaches 
 us what they have been ufed to produce ; 
 therefore we e,fteem the confequences to be 
 effected by them as under our power, and 
 fubjects of our option: then, if fuch re- 
 mote events fall out otherwife than expected, 
 
 we
 
 232 Fate. 
 
 we afcribe it to a Fatality ; whereas the 
 failure was really owing to particular cir- 
 cumftances we did not attend to, or the 
 interfering of natural caufes we did not 
 take into account. 
 
 More efpecially we conceive ourfelves 
 matters of our own ideas, and to have the 
 conftant ufe of that judgement and dif- 
 cretion we poflefs j therefore if they fail us 
 at any time in fome egregious mifconduct, 
 we apprehend ourfelves as having been 
 under a fecret infatuation $ becaufe the pro- 
 ceeding being contrary to our prefent and 
 former will and judgement, which we can 
 fcarce believe could have varied fo greatly 
 in the interval, we conclude a force muft 
 have been put upon our Will to make it 
 adl fo oppofite to its own deligns. 
 
 But it is well known, that our appre- 
 henfions are not always the fame, nor does 
 reafon always operate with equal vigour ; 
 imagination varies her fcenes, difcretion 
 falls off her guard, fancies ftart up, deiires 
 intrude, paffions beguile, and things pre- 
 fent themfelves in unufual afpe&s, owing 
 
 to
 
 Fate. 23 J 
 
 to the ftate of our bodily humours, the 
 mechanical play of our organization, pre- 
 valency of our habits, and appearance of 
 external objects; all which are natural 
 caufes acting with a regularity undifcern- 
 ible to ourfelves. So there is no occafion 
 for recurring to that unfubftantial Fatality 
 fpoken of in . 48. for Fate is fo much of 
 the order of fecond caufes, as our Will has 
 no fhare in carrying on, and our Under- 
 ftanding no light to difcover. 
 
 Thus Fate and Freewill have their di- 
 ftinct provinces, nor ever appear to clafh 
 unlefs when we happen to miftake the 
 boundaries ; but if we efteem events within 
 our power which depend upon other 
 caufes, we may find ourfelves fruftrated, 
 not by a force upon our will, but by 
 having undertaken more, and carried our 
 expectations further than we were war- 
 ranted. For the giant Fate, though enor- 
 mous in ftrength and flature, never tramples 
 upon Liberty, nor fo covers the ground as 
 not to leave fome fpace for human Agency 
 while employed in its proper offices. 
 
 54-
 
 . 54- F r we h ave nothing to do with 
 Events lying within the bofom of Fate, 
 nor are we- to take our meafures upon any 
 thing we may fancy contained there : it 
 may affect the fuccefs, but cannot alter the 
 prudence of our conduct, which confifts 
 in the conformity of our actions with the 
 beft lights of our judgement. 
 
 If God has any fecret purpofe to ac- 
 complifh, no doubt he has provided caufes 
 to work it out ; our bufinefs lies only with 
 thofe caufes whofe exiitence and tendency 
 we can difcern ; while we make the due 
 ufe of them, fo far as we have power and 
 opportunity, we {hall perform our little 
 {hare- fa the execution of his plan. 
 
 When we have determined upon our 
 point ever fo wifely, and projected our 
 fcheme ever fo prudently, perhaps there 
 may be a decree to a contrary effect which 
 will baffle all our endeavours j but this can 
 be no guide to us, nor object of our con- 
 templation, until manifefting itfelf by th 
 completion : in the mean time, if we find . 
 
 things
 
 Fate. 235 
 
 things take a wrong turn unexpectedly, we 
 are not from thence to infer there k a Fa- 
 tality a upon them, for we cannot expect 
 to penetrate into the fecret workings of 
 Fate, which are purpofely concealed from 
 us, but muft employ our fkill and induftry 
 to rectify our meafures, while there re- 
 mains any probability of fuccefs, that is, 
 until we perceive invincible obftacles {land- 
 ing apparently in the way. 
 
 Nor have we the lefs range of action for 
 the fecret fprings of events taking their 
 certain courfe by the divine appointment, 
 
 a Yet if we have often tried the fame fcheme un- 
 fuccefsfully, this is a reafon why we fhould defift from 
 attempting it any more : not as convinced of a Fatality, 
 but of a defectivenefs in the fcheme, or of there/being 
 fome natural obftacles which we do not perceive. 
 For the frequency of an event is an evidence in mul- 
 titudes of cafes, of there being adequate caufes to pro- 
 duce it again, though we may not inveftigate them. 
 Thus if a farmer has feveral times planted a field with 
 barley, but never could find a crop at harveft, he will 
 do wifely to fow no more there ; being perfuaded 
 there is fomething either in the foil, or fituation, unfit 
 for that grain, though he difcerns no apparent dif- 
 ference of either from other grounds. This obferva- 
 tion would be very ufeful for projeitors, who perftft 
 obftinately in fupporting theory againft experience. 
 
 neither
 
 236 Predeftinatton. 
 
 neither would our liberty be at all enlarged, 
 if they were fet in motion by the fortuitous 
 declination of Epicurus's atoms. Expe- 
 rience teaches that our ftrongeft expecta- 
 tions are liable to be fruftrated, and our 
 beft projected fchemes rendered abortive 
 unaccountably $ and we mould ftand equally 
 at a lofs how to ward off the difappoint- 
 ment whether it were to come by chance 
 or by Fate, for we can as little conjecture 
 what the wild workings of chance would 
 produce, as the ftated provifions of wifdom : 
 in both cafes we can only proceed accord- 
 ing to what we fee, and put in ufe thofe 
 methods which we judge moft expedient. 
 Nor would it prove lefs deftruclive of care 
 and induftry, if we mould entertain a no- 
 tion of luck b running againft us, than of a 
 Fatality. 
 
 .-.edefti- 55 There is one fpecies of Fate re- 
 fpecting the condition of each man in ano- 
 
 b Prevailing much among gamefters, fometimes 
 doing them great detriment ; and which by an eafy 
 transition they often turn into Fatality. 
 
 ther
 
 Predestination. 237 
 
 ther life dependant on his conduct in this, 
 commonly called Predestination. This, in 
 many people's apprehenfion, carries with 
 it the idea of a Fatality ; for they fay the 
 Saint cannot fin, nor the Sinner do right : 
 yet it being obvious there can be neither 
 right nor wrong, unlefs in things within 
 our power and option, they fuppofe that 
 though we have power to perform, we 
 have none to choofe, fo there lies a force 
 upon the will conftraining it to one par- 
 ticular choice. 
 
 But experience does not fupport this 
 doctrine, for the wicked now and then 
 ufe their power well, and it is too notorious 
 that the righteous often fail of doing the 
 good they might. Did Peter act right 
 when he thrice denied his mafter ? Or did 
 Pil&t act wrong in ufing endeavours to 
 get jefas releafed inftead of Barabbas? 
 and does not this manifeft, that neither 
 were under a conftant fatality, but ,left 
 fometimes at leaft at liberty to depart from 
 their general tenbur of conduct ? 
 
 Then
 
 238 Predeftination. 
 
 Then if any pretend that this general 
 tenour, fo far as requifite to denominate 
 the party good or bad, is influenced by the 
 fatality of a decree ; let them fearch into 
 the recefles of the human heart, examine 
 the judgements, defires, imaginations har- 
 bouring there, underftand perfectly all the 
 natural caufes anywife affecting them, and 
 clearly difcern that none of thefe are ade- 
 quate to the effedT:, before they are war- 
 ranted to aflert this. Nor let them build 
 too haftily upon the dictates of authority, 
 which are beft explained by experience of 
 facts, and are delivered in a language ac- 
 commodated to the common conceptions of 
 men, wherein we often afcribe events to 
 the aft of God, which were the refult of 
 fecond caufes eftablifhed by him. 
 
 Therefore it may be true that God giveth 
 us both to will and to do, without con- 
 ftraining our Wills by his immediate and 
 irrefiftible influence ; as it is true, that he 
 giveth us our daily bread, though he fends 
 it not by fpecial mefTengers, as he did to 
 but by the provifions he made for 
 
 the
 
 Predeftmatwn. 239 
 
 the fruits of nature in the ftru&ure of 
 plants, fertility of foils, kindly warmth of 
 the fun, feafonable refrefhments of dews 
 and mowers, and by the provifions he 
 made for exerting human induftry, and 
 fixing an attachment to their feveral pro- 
 feflions in the farmer, the miller, the 
 mealman, and the baker a . 
 
 . 56. It muft be acknowledged that 
 the final ftate of every man, as well as all 
 other events without exception, depends 
 upon caufes flowing from fprings originally 
 provided by the Almighty $ and in this 
 light it may be faid that none (hall be faved 
 whofe names were not written in the book 
 of life b : but the writing in this book, if 
 
 we 
 
 * So are our fchools, our univerfities, our treatifes 
 of divinity and morality, our hiftories, our encourage- 
 ments for learning and induftry, our eftablimments of 
 divine fervices and fermons, fo many provifions made 
 for giving us to will : and though now and then they 
 may give us to will what we had better have let alone, 
 yet we fhould find great mifs if We were totally deprived 
 of them. 
 
 b And the like may be faid with regard to other 
 events as well as our future ftate. For none fhall be a 
 
 fcholar*
 
 240 Predeftinatlon. 
 
 we will employ the figure, has no efficacy, 
 nor can limit our freedom, being no more 
 than a declaration or record of the caufes 
 in act, and operations of under-caufes flow- 
 ing from them; which are equally matter 
 of record, whether running in the channel 
 of freewill, or of impulfe, force, and 
 neceffity. 
 
 And the provifions now fpoken of en- 
 croach leaft of any upon the province of 
 free Agency ; a man may have his bones 
 broken, his fortune ruined, his life de- 
 ilroyed, by earthquakes, tempefts, plagues, 
 or other accidents he cannot poflibly guard 
 againft nor prevent; but his interefts in 
 futurity cannot be hurt, unlefs by fomc 
 action he has power and liberty .to forbear. 
 Therefore is he free in whatever he does 
 affecting thofe interefts, notwithstanding 
 
 fcholar, a foldier, a merchant, a poftillion, or a chim- 
 ney- fweeper ; none (hall get to the Eaft or U^ejl Indies^ 
 nor (hall build a houfe, or lay out a garden, whofe 
 names are not written in the book, as deftined to 
 thofe purpofes : that is, for whom caufes were not 
 provided, enabling and leading them to the accomplifh- 
 ment. 
 
 4 the
 
 Predeftination. 241 
 
 the entry recorded, or proviiion preordained \ 
 for liberty, as we have feen before, de- 
 pends upon the act enfuing the exertion of 
 our power, not upon any thing antecedent, 
 nor upon the motives or caufes inciting us 
 to exert it : if we have talents, opportu- 
 nities, underftanding and difcretion, we 
 have the fame freedom to ufe them by 
 what means foever they came to us, whe- 
 ther by a fudden and accidental good for- 
 tune, or by a long feries of caufes pre- 
 appointed for that purpofe. 
 
 But men are led by their averfenefs to 
 trouble to extend the idea of their power 
 beyond its proper bounds, they want to do 
 fomething to-day whereby to enfure an in- 
 defeafible title to future happinefs, with- 
 out leaving any thing for to-morrow, but 
 to take their paftime in the manner moft 
 agreeable to themfelves. This is miftaking 
 their province, for they can never do their 
 work fo compleatly but there will always 
 remain fomething further to do : yet this 
 does not affedl their liberty to take fuch 
 meafures as -at prefent are feafible, / for 
 R what-
 
 242 Predeftination. 
 
 whatever be predefined concerning them, 
 to-morrow they may ftill do fo much for 
 themfelves as the actions .now in their power 
 amount to. 
 
 Therefore it behoves us to (land always 
 upon the watch, to obferve every fucceed- 
 ing moment what comes into our power, 
 and to employ it fo as may turn mod for 
 our benefit : for Predeftination rightly un- 
 derftood, operates by our hands, and the 
 courfe we fleer is always that it takes upon 
 every particular occaiion, unlefs when it 
 employs external caufes not under our con- 
 troul, and thefe we have no bufinefs with ; 
 where indeed we could know the fuccefs 
 depends folely upon fuch caufes b , our cares 
 
 and 
 
 b For our future conduct may be determined by 
 them : we can only make our refolves properly, but 
 whether they mail remain in full colour and vigour de- 
 pends in great meafure upon the temperament of our 
 bodies, the company we fall into, or temptations aflail- 
 ing us : fo much of thefe, as we cannot forefee nor 
 provide againft, it would be fruitlefs to folicit ourfelves 
 about, nor have we any thing elfe to do with reipedl 
 to them, than confide in that Providence which orders 
 all things for the beft. But fo far as we can help 
 
 ourfelves
 
 Predeftination. 243 
 
 and endeavours were fuperfluous, but in 
 matters depending upon ourfelves, our 
 opinion or difbelief of their being pre- 
 deftined in the manner above defcribed by 
 a provifion of the proper caufes for enabling, 
 moving, and directing us, how to beftir 
 ourfelves, makes no alteration in the rule 
 of our conduct. For if a merchant breeds 
 up his fon to induftry, inftructs him in the 
 mifteries of trade, and furnimes him a 
 competent flock, with a certain .fore- 
 knowledge and determination that he mall 
 make a fortune thereby : neverthelefs the 
 fame diligence, the fame circumfpedlion, 
 and the fame methods of proceeding will 
 be requisite as if thofe advantages had fallen 
 upon him accidentally, and the fuccefs 
 been abfolutely unknown to every body. 
 
 . 57. But it is not enough to take off 
 the difcouragements againft deliberation 
 
 ourfelves by any prefent ac~r, either to prevent them, or 
 prepare our minds againft them, we may ufe the powers 
 and opportunities put into our hands with the fame 
 freedom, whether we conceive them derived to us by 
 a preappointment, or otherwife. 
 
 R 2 and
 
 244 Predeftinatiort. 
 
 and activity, unlefs we quiet the appre- 
 henflons arifing in men's minds concerning 
 their future proceedings : for fome difturb 
 themfelves with the dread of a predeter- 
 mination upon all their motions, which 
 may turn them hereafter into the road of 
 deflruction, notwithstanding the beft dif- 
 pofitions they find at prefent in their hearts. 
 But let them confider, that their prefent 
 actions were as much predefined as any 
 they mail perform hereafter, yet they find 
 themfelves at full liberty to fhape them in 
 fuch manner as they judge expedient ; 
 therefore they may depend upon having 
 the like freedom at other times. 
 
 Well, but they know not what ideas 
 may then ftart up in their minds urging 
 them to mifapply their powers. Is there 
 not the like hazard attending the common 
 affairs of life ? for other events, as well 
 as thofe affecting the moral character, are 
 equally predefined by the provifion of 
 caufes fuited to bring them forth. Yet 
 who that lives in peace and plenty ever 
 affrights himfelf with the thought that 
 
 there
 
 Predeftination. 245 
 
 there may be fecret fprings at work which 
 may deprive him of his health, his limbs, 
 or his fubftance* ? While things go on in 
 a good train, and no danger difcernible to 
 human circumfpedlion threatens, we reft 
 contented with our fituation, unmolefted 
 by imaginary terrors, and fo we may with 
 refpect to our fpiritual concerns, for virtue 
 improves itfelf, and good habits grow 
 ftronger by exercife : therefore though our 
 
 a Yet there are thofe who in the midft of affluence 
 affright themfelves with the apprehenfion that they 
 (hall want : but this is always looked upon as the effect 
 of diftemper : and fo are the like terrors of any other 
 kind. Few labour under more than one fort of thefe 
 difturbances : he that fancies infections in the air does 
 not think of wanting ; and he that dreads the ap- 
 proach of want, is not follicitous about his future 
 ftate. Therefore let each make himfelf confiftent 
 throughout, and learn from his eafmefs under the bare 
 poflibility of one mifchief, to take courage againft the 
 like poffibrlity of another. Nor may there want room 
 for honeft artifice in curing diftempers of this fort : 
 an alarm raifed of rogues or fire would probably fufpend 
 any doubts of the religious kind. For it is not un- 
 natural that one terror fliould banifh another. I be- 
 lieve the old women upon the banks of the Jfofer or 
 the Fulda (if there be any ftill left unftarved) have 
 fomething elfe to think on than Election and Repro- 
 bation. 
 
 R 7 final
 
 24.6 Predestination. 
 
 final ftate remains in the hand of Provi- 
 dence, and we cannot penetrate the fecret 
 councils of heaven, yet the right difpo- 
 fitions we feel at prefent, are an evidence 
 that provision is made for a happy ifTue at 
 laft, an evidence fufficient to exclude every 
 thing more than a poffibility of our failing: 
 nor were it expedient that this mould be 
 excluded, as being ferviceable to keep us 
 vigilant, and guard us againft a fupinenefs 
 of temper that might creep upon us in- 
 fenfibly. 
 
 Befides, let us examine wherein it would 
 better our condition, if God were to re- 
 voke his Predeftination, and undo hisr pro- 
 vifion of caufes, fo far as relates to our- 
 felves : would this enable us by our prefent 
 cares fo to bind our future conduct as that 
 it could never run amifs ? and if not, how 
 would matters be mended with us ? There 
 would ftill remain a poffibility that after 
 having begun well we might faint in the 
 midway, and this event would become ab- 
 folutely fortuitous : but we mould hardly 
 find more comfort in thinking that our 
 
 Fate
 
 Predeftination. 247 
 
 Fate depended upon the caft of a die than 
 upon a Predetermination. 
 
 So then it might fairly be put to men's 
 choice whether they had rather believe 
 themfelves in the hand of Chance, or of a 
 wife and gracious Governour : for the pro- 
 ceedings of wifdom are regular, and tho' 
 we know not perfectly what belongs to 
 goodnefs, we may form a judgement there- 
 on fatisfaclory to any reafonable perfon; 
 but the flighty gambols of chance are ob- 
 jects of no fcience, nor grounds of any 
 dependance whatever. 
 
 Nor mould we find greater fecurity in 
 the privilege of indifference fo much 
 vaunted by fome, for this being controul- 
 able by no motives, it would avail us little 
 to have a fober underftanding and virtuous 
 inclinations moving us to take a falutary 
 courfe ; for our Freewill of indifference 
 might run counter to them all, nor could 
 we have any aflurance what turns it might 
 take : which mud throw us again into all 
 the anxieties attendant upon the dominion 
 of chance. 
 
 R 4 Thus
 
 248 Predeftination. 
 
 Thus whatever hypothefis we can frame, 
 leaves as much room for apprehenfions as 
 that of Predeftination above defcribed, for 
 while we conceive it operating not by a 
 Fatality, but by an apt difpofition of fecond 
 caufes, it gives as large a fcope to human 
 freedom and forecaft, and induftry, as we 
 have reafon from experience to think our- 
 felves pofTefled of, and as good ground of 
 expectation from the fuccefs of our mea- 
 fures as we are warranted in any light to 
 entertain. 
 
 . 58. Neverthelefs, if the mind appears 
 to have taken a wrong turn, are there not 
 juft grounds of apprehenfion ? Moil af- 
 furedly. But this turn manifefts itfelf 
 moft evidently in the prevalence of evil 
 habits, and attachment to prefent pleafures, 
 without regard to the confequences ; there- 
 fore thofe who ftand in greateft danger, 
 are leaft apt to take the alarm, and who- 
 ever could raife it in them, would do them 
 an ineftimable kindnefs. On the contrary, 
 fuch in whom difquietudes abound, have 
 
 upon
 
 Predeftination. 249 
 
 upon that very account the lefs reafon to 
 entertain them j for an earneft concern for 
 the future being the firft and principal 
 fpring provided for bringing men into the 
 right way, where this appears ftrongly, it 
 is of itfelf alone an evidence that provifion 
 has been made in their favour. 
 
 But defpondencies of this kind are often 
 owing to the indilcretion of teachers, who 
 infift too flrenuoufly upon higher perfec- 
 tions of virtue than human nature can 
 attain, and are found to prevail moft upon 
 women, or perfons of fmall ability, and 
 in their contemplative hours rather than 
 feafons of action. For the confolation of 
 fuch perfons therefore let it be obferved, 
 that righteoufnefs does not confift in the 
 quantity of good we do, but in our doing 
 fo much, be it little, or be it much, as 
 lies in our power. There are pegs and 
 pins in a building as well as beams and 
 columns, nor can we doubt that God 
 diftributes to every man the talents fuited 
 to the tafk he is to perform ; therefore if 
 we attend only to family affairs, or making 
 
 broths
 
 250 Predeftination. 
 
 broths for the fick, provided this be all we 
 had ability to do, we have compleated our 
 part. 
 
 Let it next be remarked, that our ima- 
 gination does not lie under our abfolute 
 command to raife ideas there, in what ' 
 flrength and vividnefs of colour we pleafe : 
 the Poet cannot always fill himfelf with 
 infpiration, nor the Philofopher with his 
 clear difcernment of abftracted truth, nor 
 the religious man with his ardors and 
 tranfports : therefore the want of a fervent 
 faith a and glowing zeal is not fo much the 
 mark of reprobation, as of a prefent in- 
 difpofition of the organs. 
 
 Let 
 
 a If any man fhall difquiet himfelf for that he can 
 never rife at all to this fervent faith, let him confider 
 that the capacity of entertaining a flrong perfuafion, 
 is one of the talents given for carrying us through good 
 works, and God diftributes it to men in proportion to 
 the tafks they have to perform. To thofe whom he 
 calls to perfecution, or arduous trials, he will afford a 
 larger meafure ; but let fuch as have little to do, con- 
 tent themfelves with what fuffices for their purpofe. 
 Strength of mind is no otherwife in our power than 
 ability of body : we may improve either by exercife, 
 or management, but can never extend them beyond 
 
 the
 
 Predeftination. 251 
 
 Let it further be remembered, that not- 
 withftanding what may have been incul- 
 cated of a conftant attention to the duties 
 of religion, our bufinefs lies chiefly in 
 action, and the common duties of life : fo 
 that when perplexities overcloud us, in- 
 ftead of foreboding melancholy omens from 
 the gloom they caft, we mould rather take 
 them as admonitions, that it is not now 
 the feafon to puzzle our brains with think- 
 ing, but to beftir ourfelves in fome active 
 employment, or purfue fome innocent re- 
 creation, which may fupply us with a flow 
 
 the bounds our natural conftitution has prefcribed to us. 
 Our common labourers acquire a much greater robuft- 
 nefs than others of the fame make, brought up to an 
 indolent or fedentary life ; but no affiduity in labour 
 can bring a (lender loofe-built man to tofs the weaver's 
 beam of Goliah, or carry the gates of Gaza. It may 
 be obferved further, that our vigour, both of mind 
 and body, grows with our growth, and abates upon 
 our beginning to decay ; therefore old women and 
 children, plied injudicioufly with good books, are 
 moft liable to the difquietudes we have been fpeaking 
 of. The one may be taught to expe& greater lengths 
 than they can yet attain : and the other not to charge 
 it upon themfelves as a fault, that they grow feeble 
 a.nd poor in fpirit. 
 
 of
 
 252 Predejtmation. 
 
 of fpirits for reafon to work with to better 
 purpofe afterwards. 
 
 For if fear and trembling be a duty, a 
 becoming confidence and juft repofe in the 
 divine Goodnefs is a duty likewife, nor is 
 fortitude lefs a virtue than prudence, and 
 the proper province of both is afcertained 
 by their ufefulnefs b . Therefore when 
 anxieties arife, it behoves us to confider 
 what purpofe they may anfwer, while they 
 ferve to keep us vigilant, and fpur on our 
 activity in helping ourfelves, we do well to 
 encourage them ; but when they tend to 
 no good, nor urge us to any thing we 
 
 b This (hows the benefit of trying our principles of 
 ac-Hon by their reference to ufe : for the concern for 
 futurity is one of the moral fenfes, apt like the others 
 to grow luxuriant, and run into extremes ; but what 
 is an extreme can be determined only by examining 
 whether the giving way to it would do more hurt than 
 good. A man is never the nearer heaven for being 
 confident that he (hall get there, nor ever the farther 
 from it merely for his apprehenfions that he mall not 
 find an entrance. Therefore the former would be the 
 more eligible perfuafion, were it not likely to make us 
 remifs and carelefs in our journey ; and the latter is 
 recommendable no further than as it fpurs us to activity 
 and vigilance. 
 
 fhould
 
 Predeftmatlon. 253 
 
 fhoulcl not have done as well without them, 
 we cannot do better than to turn our face 
 from them, and ufe any expedient at hand 
 to banifh them out of our thoughts. 
 
 But Predeflination, though formerly 
 making much noife in the world, is now 
 grown an unfashionable topic c , nor am I 
 forry that it is fo, for though I think it 
 might be fo explained as to render it neither 
 formidable nor fubverfive of diligence, yet 
 I fear fuch explanation would not ftkk 
 with common apprehenfions, but they 
 would ftill annex to it an idea of Fatality, 
 which mufl unavoidably nourim defpon- 
 
 Nor would ever have come into fafhion had it not 
 been for the arts of defigning perfons, who claim a 
 power of conferring it : for by perfuading mankind 
 that their final happinefs depends upon holding the 
 precife form of do&rine taught by themfelves, they 
 infenfibly infufe a notion of their having a privilege to 
 admit whom they pleafe into the number of the Eleft, 
 or at leaft to declare who is one of that number j and 
 impofe fuch terms upon the admiflion as they think 
 moft for their own advantage. But were Predeflina- 
 tion really abfolute, no fubfequent conduit could turn 
 it afide ; nor would it be of more confequence what a 
 man believes, or whom he follows, than how he lives, 
 or what he pra&ifes. 
 
 Liii dencies
 
 2 54 Conclujion. 
 
 dencies in phlegmatic tempers, prefumption, 
 and fatal fecurity in the fanguine. 
 
 Condu- . 59. I have now rummaged every 
 corner of the wildernefs, and left no thicket 
 untried that I could think of: it has been 
 my endeavour to open the paflages as I 
 went along, and difentangle the boughs 
 where they had matted themfelves together, 
 or been interlaced by perfons of an unlucky 
 fhrewdnefs in perplexing ; fo that the tra- 
 veller may never be drove againft the thorns 
 without finding an opening to efcape them, 
 nor bewildered in mazes, without feeling a 
 clue to direct him. 
 
 Yet I do not pretend fo to have cleared 
 the way, as that he may run carelefsly 
 along, for the boughs will ftill overhang, 
 the paths remain dark, rugged, and in- 
 tricate, and the clue put into his hands be 
 apt to flip away from him ; therefore he 
 muft not proceed in a hurry, but take 
 every ftep warily and circumfpectly, putting 
 the twigs afide that they may not ftrike 
 againft his eyes, nor intercept his view of 
 2 the
 
 Conclufion. 255 
 
 the ground as he goes along, and keeping 
 good hold of his feveral clues while ne- 
 ceflary for his guidance. 
 
 If I have not done my work compleatly 
 to the fatisfaction of every body, allowance 
 may be made for the difficulty of the fub- 
 ject, which has foiled fo many men of deep 
 thought and learning, that mould any thing 
 be found here to render it clearer, I mould 
 rather look upon it as a lucky hit, than 
 any claim to extraordinary merit. For I 
 have not pretended to manage the fame 
 train of argument better than other people, 
 but have proceeded in a method of my 
 own, which if purfued imperfectly, may 
 dill ferve as a hint, that others may im- 
 prove upon to greater advantage. I have 
 at leaft to my own content effected a per- 
 fect reconcilement between Freewill and 
 Univerfal Providence, and if this could be 
 done to the general content, it would be 
 no fmall fervice to the ferious part of man- 
 kind j for neither of thefe points can eafily 
 be given up, nor has it hitherto been found 
 
 eafy
 
 256 Conclufiott. 
 
 eafy to {how them confident with one 
 another. 
 
 For our reafon affords us fo many 
 grounds of afliirance, that affairs as well 
 in the moral as natural world, are admini- 
 ftered by the power and wifdom of God, 
 and yet fo many important events, fuch as 
 the rife and fall of empires, the lives and 
 deaths, the fortunes and diftreffes of men, 
 depend upon their behaviour among one 
 another, that we cannot but be perfuaded 
 he governs the thoughts and actions of 
 mankind with as full and abfolute a domi- 
 nion as he does the courfes of nature. On 
 the other hand, daily experience bears wit- 
 nefs that our motions lie under our own 
 controul, and we can do this thing or that 
 as we pleafe, without any force conftraining, 
 or dominion compelling us to the contrary. 
 Then upon comparing thefe two confidera- 
 tions together, while they appear to clam, 
 we are tempted to diftruft either our rea- 
 fon or our experience ; and according to 
 which part we take, either are thrown off 
 our difcretion arid tenour of condudt by 
 
 the
 
 Conclufion. 257 
 
 the imagination of a fecret influence and 
 compulfion hanging over us, or lofe our 
 dependance upon Providence, that trueft 
 folace of our minds in time of danger and 
 diftrefs, and fureft direction of our con- 
 duel in feafons of eafe and profperity. 
 
 Whereas were the inconfiftency taken 
 off, we might then allow both human 
 agency and divine government their full 
 extent, becaufe they might co-operate in 
 the fame work without interfering with 
 each other : we mould fee no difcourage- 
 ment againft making obfervations upon the 
 things about us relative to our conduct, 
 and taking our meafures accordingly with 
 freedom, and a decent confidence in their 
 fuccefs, and we mould depend contentedly 
 upon the guidance of Providence' for turn- 
 ing the courfes of fortune and actions of 
 perfons with whom we have any concern, 
 fo as to procure all the good intended to 
 be beftowed upon us. 
 
 Nay further, when we confider that 
 
 things vifible and invifible, lie under the 
 
 dominion of one governour, connecting 
 
 S all
 
 258 Conclufion. 
 
 all in one wifely regulated polity, wherein 
 nothing is eftablifhed in vain, and reflect 
 how much of our time is loft in deep and 
 infancy, how many pains, difeafes and 
 troubles fall upon us, how many unavail- 
 ing hours pafs over our heads, and how 
 often we are forced to beftir ourfelves to 
 very little purpofe of our own, there is a 
 probable prefumption that all thefe things 
 turn fome how or other to the account of 
 other beings. So that our little concerns 
 and tranfacYions may be of greater impor- 
 tance than we imagine, and ourfelves made 
 unknowingly to work out the advantage of 
 fellow-creatures, whereof we have not the 
 leaft knowledge, nor even fufpicion. Nor 
 need we want hopes from the goodnefs of 
 God, that we mail one day reap the benefit 
 of thofe fervices wherein we have been 
 made, tho' undefignedly, inftru mental*. 
 
 But 
 
 a I have already let the Reader into fome of my good 
 Coufm'fi fancies, which may be reckoned the luxurian- 
 cies of a warm imagination and contemplative turn : 
 nor are fuch peculiar to him, but may be found among 
 the ancient Philofophers, primitive Fathers, and rno- 
 d'jrn Divines. Jn my third note on . 20. I have 
 
 hinted
 
 Conchijion. 259 
 
 But how fimpk and confined, or how 
 extenfive and complicated fchemes foever 
 
 we 
 
 hinted his notion, That all fpace not occupied by 
 body, may be replete with fpiritual fubftanccj and 
 that there may be other worlds created befides this we 
 inhabit. When he talks of other worlds, he has not 
 fo much in his thoughts the fuppofition of earths and 
 heavens beyond the Itarry fphere (though this too he 
 does not deny) as other fyftems of creatures inter- 
 mingled among our own ; governed by diftincl: laws, 
 yet ordered in fuch wifdom and contrivance, as not to 
 difturb or interfere with thole wherein we have con- 
 cern. 
 
 My friend has fome phlegm to temper his fire, which 
 witholds him from catching at every plaufible fpecu- 
 lation carrying no appearance of benefit, but does not 
 hinder him from embracing, perhaps too eagerly, 
 whatever he conceives tending to difplay the divine 
 Excellence, or raife our idea of the power, the wifdom, 
 or the goodnefs of our Creator. Now it feems to 
 him more glorious to thofe attributes, that there mould 
 be no defolate fpot in the empire of God incapable of 
 receiving his bounty, no ftroke in his plan fuperfluous, 
 nor work of his hand unproductive of ufes propor- 
 tionable to the largenefs of the defign ; than that this 
 immenfe fabric of the vifible unjverfe mould be con- 
 ftru&ed only for the benefit of a few reptiles crawling 
 about' this infignificant globe ; the greater part of 
 whom have not even the benefit of contemplating the 
 wonders it contains. Some perhaps m;\y aMedge, tl\at 
 profufenefs gives the greater difplay of magnificence, 
 as ftiowing the inexhaustible riches of the- divine 
 power, fo that God can afford an immenfe coft for the 
 better accommodation of creatures "whom he de%s 
 
 8 2 to
 
 260 Conclufan. 
 
 we may conceive contained within the 
 divine plan, the ftumbling block of com- 
 
 pulfion 
 
 to favour. But let us confider why we efleem profu- 
 flon a mark of magnificence in man; namely, be- 
 caufe of his ignorance of the exact wants, and feveral 
 likings of the perfons he is to entertain ; for could he 
 know the precife meafure of one, and particular ob- 
 jects of the other, he might give proof of his riches, 
 by fhowing himfelf able to fupply every man with 
 what he defires, without heaping fuperfluities upon 
 the table. Were we invited to the houfe of a great 
 perfonage, where we faw preparations larger than 
 could poffibly contribute to our entertainment, fhould 
 we not conclude that he had other guefts to entertain 
 befides ourfelves ? and did we perceive meats cooked 
 up in a manner unfuitable to an Englijh palate, mould 
 we not fuppofe he expected a company of foreigners, 
 or perfons whofe palates were differently conftitute4 
 from our own ? By the fame reafon, when we behold 
 mighty works in nature, which ferve us only for ob- 
 jects of contemplation, may we not conclude there 
 are other inhabitants whom they ferve for more need- 
 ful purpofes ? 
 
 As to thofe called by Lucretius the faults of Nature, 
 however fome righteous people may deny their being 
 fuch, and infifr. that all things contribute in fome fhape 
 or other, nearly or remotely, to our ufes : my neigh- 
 bour does not fcruple to acknowledge there are faults, 
 fuppofing man the fole object deferving regard. For 
 though it might be difficult to point out a Reformation 
 in any particular which would not be attended with 
 worfe inconveniencies, yet he thinks it too daring pre- 
 fumprion to aflert, that infinite Wifdom could not 
 2 have
 
 Conclufion. 261 
 
 pulfion upon free Agency being removed, 
 we may conclude that every purpofe com- 
 prized 
 
 have contrived methods for avoiding thofe inconve- 
 niencies, and formed a world better fuited to the ac-. 
 commodation of human life, had that been the fole 
 point in view. Therefore that this was not done, he 
 looks upon as an evidence that there were other views 
 to be provided for, and other creatures differently 
 conftituted, for whofe advantage thefe feeming faults 
 were calculated. Nor yet will he controvert, that all 
 things we have knowledge of were made for the fervicc 
 of man, provided it be not added for man alone ; for he 
 obferves, that nature ferves many purpofes by one and 
 the fame provifion. The air we breathe wafts the birds 
 aloft, fuftains the vapours, and affifts in the growth of 
 vegetables : the woods, from whence we draw mate- 
 rials for (hips, for houfes, forutenfils, for firing, afford 
 (belter and pannage to the cattle, habitation and food 
 to the fowls, harbour and nourimment to the infects. 
 Why then fhould we imagine that multitude of im- 
 menfe bodies we fee twinkle by night, were hurrg out 
 only as a fpe&acle for us to gaze at ? That the vaft 
 effufion of light was darted forth on all fides throughout 
 the heavens, for the fake of a few rays to fall upon 
 our eyes ? That the boundlefs fields of Ether were 
 fpread out with no other defign than for our little 
 planets to roll in ? To fay this, he apprehends lefs 
 worthy the divine attributes, and lefs agreeable to his 
 favourite principle, of nothing made in vain, than to 
 fuppofe innumerable hofts of perceptive beings, for 
 whofe conveniences, and enjoyments, thefe ftupen- 
 dous works were contrived. 
 
 He remarks further, that univerfal Nature being the 
 work of one Creator, and dominion of one Governor, 
 
 it
 
 262 Conclufion. 
 
 prized therein has adequate caufes pro- 
 vided for its execution, and every caufe in 
 
 aft, 
 
 it is no unreafonable prefumption to fuppofe it formed 
 upon one all comprehenfive plan, nor that the laws 
 refpecting the different fyftems of beings, are to be 
 regarded as municipal, contained under one general 
 polity: fo that nothing ftands alone, nor unconnected 
 with the reft ; but as other things were fo far made 
 for man as that regard was had to him in their 
 eftablifhment, fo man was made for the fervice 
 of his fellow-creatures, vifible and invifible, re- 
 gard being had to them in the conftitutions of 
 nature or fortune eftabliflied for him, and his tranf- 
 a&ions, together with the incidents befalling him, 
 being made productive of fome advantages to them. 
 He feems to fee this notion confirmed by the conftitu- 
 tion of things upon this fublunary ftage, wherein men 
 and animals, plants and elements mutually affeft one 
 another ; from whence it may be prefumed the like 
 mutual affection prevails throughout the regions un- 
 feen. And as the profufion of ftars, of light, and of 
 ether, almoft ufclefs to us, give proof of other natures 
 to whom they might be ufeful ; fo the wafte of time, 
 of thought, and labour, occafioned by fleep, by in- 
 firmities, error, and ignorance, which make large de- 
 ductions from our enjoyment, muft add as largely to it 
 elfewhere. , 
 
 He takes notice likewife, that nature forms her 
 productions by long preparation, and through feveral 
 Heps : the little feed grows and ripens gradually in the 
 pod of the flower ; when falling into the ground, it 
 fhoots firft a bud, then a ftem, and laftly a full grown 
 plant ; and upon the ftru&ure of the embrio feed de- 
 pend the kind, the qualities, the fruits of the future 
 tree. Why then may not there be a like progreflion 
 
 of
 
 Conclufiqn* 263 
 
 whether voluntary or necefiary agent, 
 contributes its {hare towards the completion 
 of fome purpofe. There- 
 
 of the foul through her feveral forms of being ; each 
 being preparatory to the next, not only as our good 
 or evil conduct here determines our condition either 
 way hereafter, but as our feveral ways of living upon 
 this ftage may fit us to perform different parts upon 
 another ? We have paffed through but one pre- 
 exiftent ftate that we know of, I mean that of the 
 womb, and upon what happened to us there, depends 
 in great meafure our ftrength, our vigour, our genius> 
 and our talents : nor does there want probability that 
 the fame in our future birth will depend upon what 
 has happened to us during our prefent ftate. For our 
 fenfations pafs through the mental organization in their 
 way to the mind : if I look upon a houfe, I have an 
 image of it in my fancy, as well as when I think of it 
 with my eyes fliut ; and this image is neceflary to my 
 perceiving it, for were I to ftare ever fo much while 
 thinking intenfely on fomething elfe, I might have no 
 more perception of the houfe than if there flood none 
 before me. But matter, however finely organized, 
 can imprefs variety of Perceptions no otheiwife than 
 by being diverfly modified : whence it follows, that 
 the action of our fenfes throws the mental organiza- " 
 tion into different modifications, and by doing this 
 frequently, may bring the fibres of them into a diffe- 
 rent texture. Accordingly we find our habits, our 
 turns of thought, our taftes, our feveral expertnefs in 
 one way rather than another, formed in us by the ob- 
 jeds wherewith we have been moftly conVerfant. So 
 that every man's underftanding and imagination be- 
 come diverfly modelled according as he has been a 
 foldier, a fcholar, a mechanic, or a labourer. Now 
 my contemplative^and ierious friend, eileeming it for 
 
 the
 
 264 Conclufion. 
 
 Therefore the dcxflrine of univerfal Pro- 
 vidence being, as it teems to me, well 
 
 eftabliflied, 
 
 the glory of God to difcover new ufes in the feveral 
 provifions of nature, thinks this a prefumptive evidence 
 that the mind, or fpiritual part, carries off this mental 
 organization upon her departure ; and that the pro- 
 feffions whereinto we are diverfly led, befides their 
 ufes in human life, adapt us feverally for fome pecu- 
 liar functions we are deftined to perform in our next 
 form of being. 
 
 Nor does he fcruple to imagine, that future punifh- 
 ments, may be derived through the fame channel ; 
 human nature being fo ordered, that the practice of 
 vicious courfes, by working improper mixtures into 
 the organization, may render it difturbed and diftem- 
 pered, breeding the worm that dieth not, and the in- 
 ward fire that is not quenched. For fmce nature is 
 the work of God, and all her provifions of his con- 
 trivance, whatever mifery mall follow by natural con- 
 fequence is as much the effect of divine vengeance, 
 as what is inflicted by the miniftry of devils, or ele- 
 mentary flames. 
 
 When he reflects on the exiftence of evil, that 
 myflery which the wit of man has never yet been able 
 to unveil, he cannot allow any thing to exift necefla- 
 rily, nor unproduced by the creator ; therefore fub- 
 fcribes to what he apprehends a fcripture doctrine, 
 That the Lord created evil as well as good. Yet this 
 work of the creation feeming repugnant to our ideas 
 of infinite Goodnefs, he thinks we ought to extend it 
 no further than experience and neceffity oblige us ; 
 which juftifies him in confining it to the embodied and 
 inorganized dates : fo that when the fpirit can get 
 totally difengaged from matter, it fhall become totally 
 
 exempt
 
 Conclusion. 265 
 
 eftablifhed, I may go on without further 
 fcruple to raife what fuperflrudture I can 
 upon this foundation. 
 
 exempt from evil. This reduces the quantity of it 
 within a very narrow compafs, for bodies being ex- 
 tremely fpongy, the moft folid of them, upon Newton's 
 authority, containing more of pore than fubftance, 
 he fuppofes that if all the matter within the folar 
 fyftem were comprefTed together, it would form a 
 mafs no bigger than the body of the fun. Therefore 
 if all fpace be replete with fpiritual fubftance, even 
 admitting that fomuch of it as lies immerfed in matter 
 were conftantly miferable (which God be thanked is 
 far from the fact) the evil would bear no greater pro- 
 portion to the good than the magnitude of that body 
 to the whole fyftem around it. So that it would be no 
 extravagant figure to cry out with David, Behold bow 
 high the heaven is in comparifon of the earth ^ fo great is 
 the mercy of the Lord towards them that fear him ! Now 
 to compute that proportion, reckoning the fun's dia- 
 meter at 1200,000 miles, which the light, according 
 to its velocity fettled by Newton t would run over in 
 feven feconds ; and taking Huygens eftimation of the 
 diftance of the neareft fixed ftar, which would require 
 fix. lunar months for light to travel through : the fun's 
 magnitude will be to that of his whole f)ilem, or the 
 proportion of evil to good, as one to the cube of fo 
 many times feven feconds as are conta ned in the fix 
 months, that is, 8916100448256000000, almoft 
 nine millions of millions of millions. 
 
 Then being perfuaded that God never terminates 
 
 his purpofe upon evil, nor fends it unlefs fjr fome 
 
 greater good to be brought out of it ; he proceeds to 
 
 examine in what manner it may be productive of good. 
 
 T In
 
 266 Conclufion. 
 
 In order to this he confiders the nature of the mind, 
 which never moves to action unlefs for avoidance of 
 fome uneafinefs, or upon profpect of fome fatisfaction 
 that would be loft without her endeavours to procure 
 it : therefore a being polTefied of happinefs, and in full 
 fecurity that nothing could difturb or abate it, would 
 remain in perpetual indolence, having no inducement 
 to exert its activity. But the apprebenfion of evil 
 fuffices to move the mind without its actually falling 
 upon her, yet we cannot well conceive fuch Appre- 
 henfion without actual fuffering fomewhere or 
 other, and a very little will do for the purpofe ; for 
 one man's misfortune may give warning to a million, 
 yet we fhould never have an apprehenfion of bruifes 
 or broken bones, or other misfortunes, if they were 
 never to happen at all ; and perhaps a man who had 
 never felt or feen any hurt, would wonder what you 
 meant by admoniming him to guard againft it. There- 
 fore fome degree of actual fuffering may be neceflary 
 to keep activity alive in the fpiritual fubftances for 
 avoiding the fources of it. He trunks this the beft 
 
 account that can be given for the origin of evil : 
 and this affords a reafon why the heavenly bodies, 
 together with the planetary fyftems probably furround- 
 ing them, were difperfed up and down to fuch im- 
 meafurable diftances, and the fields of ether ftretched 
 throughout the vaft expanfe containing them j to wit, 
 that the former might ferve as a habitation for animals* 
 and the latter as a range for difembodied organizations ; 
 fo that famples of actual fuffering might not be wanted 
 in any part of the univerfe. 
 
 Thus all nature ftands reciprocally connected : the 
 
 purely fpiritual part having concern with the embodied, 
 
 as exhibiting fpecimens of evil neceflary to preferve 
 
 them in happinefs. And we having concern with 
 
 2 whatever
 
 Conclufion. 267 
 
 whatever fecures the happinefs of thofe beings, among 
 whom we hope one day to be incorporated. 
 
 Thefe fpeculations, which he thinks helpful to 
 open our minds, to give us a fuller idea of the divine 
 bounty, magnificence, and polity, and a better opi- 
 nion of that univerfal nature under whofe laws we 
 live, yet being of too thin and airy a nature to fink 
 deep in the imagination ; he has employed the hypo- 
 thefes of vehicles, and a mundane foul, to render 
 them more fenfible and more eafily retainable. For 
 when a probable manner can be devifed to {hew how 
 things may be effe&ed, it gains them a readier recep- 
 tion than bare arguments to prove their reality. Nor 
 are they new inventions of his own making : for 
 many learned men have fuppofed an inner tunicle ad- 
 hering to the mind upon her reparation from the body ; 
 the antients painted the Soul, or Pfyche, with butter- 
 flies wings, to denote her refemblance with a butterfly 
 coming forth from the chryfalis in a body before formed 
 therein ; and St. Paul likens the fpiritual body of 
 refurgents to the blade fpringing from wheat, or barley, 
 or it may be fome other grain, which Naturalifts tell 
 us is no more than an expanfion of the little germ con- 
 tained in the feed. Nor can it be denied, that many 
 of the old Philofophers held a mundane foul, or foul 
 of the world, which though now commonly under- 
 flood of the fupreme Being, whoever examines their 
 remains, will find they meant by it only a created 
 fubflance, whereinto the fouls of men and animals 
 were abforbed. 
 
 Thefe v hypothefes efFc&ually banifli the notion of 
 ghofts, apparition?, witchcraft, and the like. For 
 the vehicles, although there be fome unlucky malicious 
 creatures among them, yet are too fmall and feeble 
 to do us any mifchief, or give mo:ion to particles of 
 matter enough to ftrike any of our fcnfcs. And the 
 
 mundane
 
 268 Gbnciujiwt* 
 
 mundane foul, although abundantly able to praclife 
 the art magic, and raife ftorms or earthquakes fuffi- 
 cient to beat our houfes about our ears ; yet is of too 
 important a character to play tricks with us, and too 
 great a lover of regularity ever to difturb the order of 
 nature, or work any thing fupernatural without an 
 exprefs direction from above. 
 
 Now fliould any body afk what ufe all thefe fpecu- 
 lations are of, let him declare what he underftands 
 by ufe ; if he means, for directing our meafures in the 
 common concerns of life, my honeft Coufm readily 
 acknowledges they are of none ; therefore he would 
 have them referved for our clofets, nor ever fuffered to 
 intrude upon our thoughts when we go about our 
 ordinary tranfaclions. But fo neither are the articles 
 of religion of any ufe upon thefe occafions : for who 
 ever takes his meafures in letting a farm, or buying a 
 houfe, or ordering provifions for his family, from his 
 opinion concerning the formation of the world, or a 
 future ftate? Were I atheift or devotee, I (hould 
 probably buy my wares at the fame (hop, and employ 
 the fame carpenter to mend the paling of my yard. 
 Therefore let fuch as refolve to confine themfelves to 
 the daily bufmefs of their ftation, or to thofe courfes of 
 acting and thinking which cuftom has made current in 
 the world, or who do not find thefe fubjecls fuited to 
 their tafte, pafs them over unheeded : yet they need 
 not defpife them for all that, until certain they can 
 fuit.the tafte, or ufes, of nobody elfe. And if there 
 be any who fhall find my Author, or myfelf, have 
 contributed the leaft towards enlarging or clearing his 
 ideas, or improving his Theory of Providence, he is 
 heartily welcome; nor (hall either of us think the 
 time we have fpent for his ferve ill beftovved. 
 
 FINIS.
 
 MAN in queft of HIMSELF: 
 
 O R, A 
 
 DEFENCE 
 
 OF -THE 
 
 INDIVIDUALITY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 HUMAN MIND, or SELF. 
 
 Occafioned by 
 
 Some REMARKS in the MONTHLY REVIEW for 
 July 1763. on a Note in SEARCH'S FREEWILL. 
 
 By CUTHBERT COMMENT, Gent. 
 
 They imagine Compounds to be fomewhat really different 
 from that of which they are compounded ; which is a 
 very great miftake. 
 
 Clarke^ Attrib. 6th Edit. 1725. page 53. 
 
 Endlefly feparable parts are as really diftincT: Beings, not- 
 withftanding their contiguity, as if they had been at 
 never fo great a diftance from one another. 
 
 Ibid. p. 89. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for R. and J. DOD s L E Y in Pall-Mail. 1 763. 
 [ Price One Shilling. ]

 
 MAN in queft of Himfelf. 
 
 . - 
 M^ T 
 
 is an old obfervation, that no- 
 M thing is more difficult for a Man 
 to know than himfelf ; infomuch 
 that this fcience was thought un- 
 attainable without fupernatural affiftance ; for 
 
 From Heaven's high dome defcended, KNOW THYSELF* 
 
 But then this was underftood to refpeft the 
 knowledge of a Man's character, fentiments, 
 and real motives of action ; nor was it ever 
 efteemed difficult to know his own perfon from 
 that of another, or from his cloaths, his hair, 
 or any thing elfe belonging to him. Whereas 
 a difficulty has been lately fiarted in afcertain- 
 ing what is properly the Man, or to what the 
 pronoun / ought to be applied. 
 
 The laft Monthly Review for 'July 1763. has 
 made honourable mention of my Coulin and 
 
 A 2 myfelf,
 
 [ 4 1 
 
 myfelf, .and has interfperfed therein fome cri- 
 ticifms, by way of admonition for our conduct: 
 He may fee they are not loft upon us ; for we 
 have profited by them already in our title-page. 
 We had proceeded before upon Horaces anti- 
 quated rule, being fludious rather of produc- 
 ing fire out of fmoke, than fmoke out of a 
 flam j never reflecting, that fince the inven- 
 tion of gunpowder it is manifefr. the gun can 
 never do execution if the pan do not flafh. 
 So to pleafe him, I have put a little more pow- 
 der into the pan this time of charging : and 
 we hope he perceives by the look of the flafh, 
 that our fhot is not levelled againft him, but 
 againft an opinion he has advanced. For thefe 
 two are very different marks : people may dif- 
 fer in fentiment upon a fpeculative point, and 
 flill be very good friends. And indeed he has 
 faid fo many obliging things of us, far beyond 
 our moft fanguine expectation, that it would 
 be the height of imprudence to put him out 
 of humour with us, or attempt to lefTen his 
 character: we rather wifh his authority maybe 
 fo great with the public, as that they may give 
 their voices upon us according to his fumming 
 up the evidence ; we fhall be perfectly fatis- 
 fied with the verdict. 
 
 Yet
 
 [ 5 ] 
 
 Yet we fhall obferve in paffing, that befides 
 his admonitions, he has been careful to inftrudt 
 us by his example too j for, though he has al- 
 lowed my Author to have acquitted himfelf 
 with politenefs, yet it feems this was not a 
 politenefs of the right fafhionable colour, ad- 
 mired in our great Metropolis and the adja- 
 cent Borough ; therefore he has fet us a pattern 
 of the true genuine fort in the following ex- 
 preffions : Greatly deficient in phyfiological know- 
 ledge j Very confiderable blunders j Thefe very 
 accurate pbilologifts ; Indeed, friend, you have 
 here overlooked yourfelf; -It is with equal im- 
 propriety they talk.' Now, we muft needs 
 
 acknowledge thefe drains in the higheft pitch 
 of modern perfection, becaufe the like abound 
 in the North Briton and Cave of Famine, thofe 
 celebrated performances, which every true- 
 born Englishman doats upon. But we are 
 much afraid whether we (hall be able to copy 
 after his example; for it is commonly ob- 
 ferved, that nobody ever fucceeds in a 
 thing he does not give his mind to ; but it 
 happens unluckily that we find in ourfelves no 
 inclination to attain this modern genteelnefs : 
 our ambition prompts us rather to the Ridicu- 
 lum than the Acre, and we mould be proud 
 if wecould acquire a fpark of that old-famion- 
 
 ed
 
 [ 6 ] 
 
 ed politenefs defcribed by Perfius in one of his 
 predeceflbrs : 
 
 When Horace every foible touch' d with art^ 
 Hisfmiling friend received him to his heart. 
 Pleas d with the tickling probe, nor felt it 
 
 fmart. 
 
 The tefly people too could patient ft and. 
 While wip'd their follies by his Jkilful hand. 
 
 I don't know why he {hould take fuch dif- 
 tafte at my button, unlefs perhaps that he 
 faw his own face in one part of it ; and might 
 be a little chagrined to find, that I had not 
 better maintained the dignity of the noble 
 branch of the Comments: 
 
 However, I have the pleafure to fee this 
 little difappointment has not overcome his af- 
 fection to a relation ; for he has fpoken of me 
 in a very handfome manner, well becoming 
 one Comment of another : and with refpect to 
 my Author, whom he will eafily believe I 
 muft love as well as I do myfelf, he has pro- 
 ceeded with remarkable tendernefs. For it 
 being abfolutely necefiary to find fault fome-. 
 where, becaufe the Public, proceeding for 
 once upon a very right principle, That there 
 can be no perfon nor performance in this world 
 compleatly perfect, would not think him well 
 
 qualified
 
 . t 7 ] 
 
 qualified for his office of Critic-General, if he 
 did not find fomething to blame in every piece 
 he took in hand ; he has kindly fpared the 
 main work, and fallen upon one of my Notes, 
 containing a matter no ways affeding the ar- 
 gument carried on in the text. 
 
 But notwithftanding his good intention, fo 
 it happens, that he has done us more mifchief 
 than we flatter ourfelves he defigned. For the 
 Individuality of the Mind was a principle Mr. 
 Search had depended upon to prove its unpe- 
 rifhablenefs ; which gave an opening to his 
 enquiries concerning the other world. Becaufe 
 his plan having confined him to build folely 
 upon the fund of natural reafon, he was not 
 entitled to avail himfelf of the afTurances given 
 in the Gofpel : but while it remained uncertain 
 whether our continuance was to laft any longer 
 than this life, there was very little encourage- 
 ment to confider whether there were another 
 world or no : on the other hand, if it could be 
 fhown from contemplation of our Nature, that 
 the Mind is built to laft for ever, then it would 
 become expedient to examine what is likely to 
 befal her hereafter, and whether any thing to 
 be done at prefent may affecT: her future con- 
 dition. 
 
 Therefore
 
 [ 8 ] 
 
 Therefore my coufin exhorted me to endea- 
 vour fettling 'what is a Man's Self, and whe- 
 ther it may have continuance after diffolution 
 of the human frame : not in contradiction to 
 Mr. Monthly, with whom we have no quarrel, 
 but in defence of an article we conceive mate- 
 rial, againft whoever mall attack it, or as a 
 further explanation to fuch as may not have 
 fully comprehended our meaning. 
 
 But we muft crave leave to make our de- 
 fence in our own way : and as Horace obferves 
 that every animal places his dependence upon 
 the arms Nature has furnifhed him with, the 
 Wolf never defends himfelf with his heels, nor 
 the Bull with his teeth : fo we, who it feems 
 are excellent Philologifts, though greatly de- 
 ficient in phyfiological knowledge, and for this 
 reafon do not clearly comprehend what is to be 
 tmderftood by phyfical and metaphyfical exift- 
 ence, palpable and impalpable individuals, 
 material and immaterial fubflance, as handled 
 by our opponent, may be allowed to avail our- 
 felves of that part where our greatefl.ftrength 
 lies. 
 
 Therefore, under the guidance of our Pa- 
 
 tronefs, who has helped us fo well hitherto, 
 
 we {hall obferve that Same is an equivocal 
 
 term. If, upon giving me a glafs of wine, I 
 
 2 mould
 
 t 9 ] 
 
 fhould think it tailed different from that you 
 gave me half an hour before, and you affure 
 me it is the fame wine, becaufe you poured it 
 out of the very fame bottle, I mould reft fatisfied 
 with the anfwer. But if a conjurer mould 
 pretend to take out a glafs of wine unmingled 
 that I had thrown into water, and upon his 
 producing a glafs of pure wine I doubted whe- 
 ther it were the fame, if he mould tell me, Yes, 
 for he poured it out of the fame bottle, I mould 
 think he trifled with me. 
 
 In like manner it may be faid, that rich and 
 poor are all the fame flefh and blood, or that 
 every ftick of elder contains the fame pithy 
 fubftance. Yet whoever fays this does not 
 imagine, that my cookmaid and I have but 
 one body, or the fame mafs of blood between 
 us : nor that one ftick of elder contains the 
 fame fubftance as twenty. 
 
 From hence we may fee there are two forts 
 of identity ; one wherein things are the fame 
 in appearance and quality, and this we may 
 call fpecific : neverthelefs they ftill remain nu- 
 merically diftincl ; as this egg is not the fame 
 with that, how much foever it may be the 
 fame to the eye, or for any ufes we may have 
 
 of it. 
 
 B Thus
 
 Thus fubftances, as numerically diftinguifh- 
 cd, never fluctuate nor change into one ano- 
 ther ; their fluctuation is only of form or po- 
 fition upon their entering into compolitions of 
 fubftances fpecifically different. The fame 
 particles which were mould laft year, might 
 afterwards have become grafs, then mutton,' 
 then human flefh, laftly, a flea or a maggot, 
 and continue the fame throughout all their fe- 
 veral migrations : fo that what is maggot now, 
 may have been part of a man, or a fheep, 
 or a blade of grafs, or a clod of dirt. 
 
 Therefore if we confider man as the whole 
 compofition of flefti, blood, bones, and hu- 
 mours, it is plain he fluctuates and changes 
 continually : for if he be kept without victuals, 
 his fubftance waftes away, and is renewed 
 again by proper nourimment : fo that how 
 long foever he may continue the fame fpecies 
 of creature, he does not continue the fame fub- 
 ftance in all its parts a week nor a day. Nor 
 was the Mr. Monthly who dealt fo favourably 
 with us in July, the fame with him that treat- 
 ed a friend of ours with the like benignity in 
 
 J 755- 
 I have met with fome who fay they have 
 
 no idea of fubftance, becaufe they cannot 
 conceive one devoid of all quality whatever ; 
 
 but
 
 [ II ] 
 
 but this is not the right way of going to work 
 for conceiving it. For there are fome things 
 we cannot apprehend exifting by themfelves, 
 tho' we may eafily in conjunction with others : 
 a father cannot be without a child ; there can- 
 not be colour without figure, nor figure with- 
 out magnitude ; yet the ideas of father and 
 fon, of colour, figure and magnitude, are 
 clearly diftindt. Nor, if we confider the mat- 
 ter fairly, is it more eafy to apprehend qua- 
 lity by itfelf than fubftance. For can there 
 be fquarenefs without fomething fquare, or 
 rednefs without any thing red ? Or can there 
 be a fquare or a red nothing, any more than 
 a fubftance without quality ? But fquarenefs 
 and rednefs are only perceptions of the mind ? 
 What then ? Should we fuppofe with Berkeley y ( 
 they are not effects of the external caufes we 
 afcribe them to, then are there no qualities 
 without us any more than there are fubftan- 
 ces : but if there be real qualities producing 
 the perceptions, then is there a real fomething 
 pofleffing the qualities. Tis true we may 
 be fometimes deceived by appearances of 
 things that are not real, as when a man fees 
 apparitions: but tho' there be no fubftance 
 ftanding before him in the place where he ap- 
 prehends it to be, yet there is a real fubftance 
 
 B 2
 
 [ 12 ] 
 
 fomewhere, either in the eye, or the hu- 
 mours, or the brain, caufing the appearance. 
 Even in the moft retired thoughts of the 
 mind, whether we imagine her to raife thofe 
 thoughts by her own immediate operation, 
 then is me a fubftance pofleffing the quality of 
 impreffing them j or whether me ufes fome 
 organ of our internal material frame, as an in- 
 ftrument to imprefs them by, then is the mo- 
 dification of that organ the object we dif- 
 cern. 
 
 But the ftrongeft idea of fubftance we may 
 have from ourfelves, the knowledge whereof 
 is more certain than that of qualities. For 
 how know we the qualities are real, unlefs be- 
 caufe we really perceive them ? And if we 
 are nothing real ourfelves, they cannot be 
 really perceived by us : for it is the' hardeft 
 thing of all to conceive how any thing unreal 
 can really do or be really affected by any 
 thing. And this fubftance retains its exifl> 
 ence when exerting no quality, as in found 
 fleep. 
 
 Qualities continually change : a fquare piece 
 of clay may be moulded into a round, warm 
 water may grow cold : but in all thefe changes 
 fomething ftlll remains the fame, and that can 
 be none other than the fubftance. When a 
 2 . quality
 
 [ '3 ] . 
 
 quality goes off, it is fucceeded by another, as 
 fquarenefs in the clay by fome other figure, 
 and warmth in the water by coolnefs j nor 
 does the fubflance ever want a quality to in- 
 veft it : but the quality upon being altered does 
 not fly off to fome other fubflance, but is ab- 
 folutely loft; and may be regained without 
 being drawn from any other fund. 
 
 We come next to the term Individual ; and 
 what does that import but fomething that 
 cannot be divided ? therefore to talk of every 
 Individual being a compound, is a palpable 
 abfurdity, a flat contradiction, the fame as an 
 indivifible divifible, or an uncornpounded 
 compound. Perhaps here our Mafter will 
 think us hopeful lads, beginning to come for- 
 ward in the modern politenefs : but we can- 
 not arrogate fo much merit yet ; for we do 
 not charge it upon him as a blunder or im- 
 propriety j and for this very good reafon ; be- 
 caufe we could not do fo without' hitting our- 
 felves a (lap on the face. There were three 
 young fellows once went to fee a fine gar- 
 den : one of them fpying another pluck a 
 peach, whifpered the third, Pray is it right 
 to take a Gentleman's fruit without leave ? 
 Yes, fays he, it muft certainly be right ; be- 
 caufe I have a couple in my pocket. So con- 
 trad i-
 
 t 14 ] 
 
 traditions muft fometimes be proper, becaufe 
 Mr. Search ufes one in Page 12, where he 
 fays, " a man may have power when he has 
 " it not." But then we fee how he brings 
 himfelf off by adding, " That is, he may 
 c{ have it in one fenfe while he wants it in 
 <{ another." Now if we take the fame me- 
 thod for folving the other contradiction, per- 
 haps we fhall find it throw fome light upon 
 the argument in hand. 
 
 Naturalifts (I beg pardon, I mean Phyfio- 
 logifts) diftribute the productions of Nature 
 into kinds, as animals, vegetables, foffils ; 
 which they fubdivide into Species, as Men, 
 horfes, fheep, &c. Several further divifions are 
 occasionally made under thefe, as French, 
 Englifli, men grown, children, and the like. 
 But you cannot go lower than the fingle bodies 
 of each clafs, whofe parts are joined together, 
 not to be feparated without lofing their fpe- 
 cific denomination, nor do we ever fee them 
 reunited after feparation. Therefore we call 
 them Individuals, becaufe to us they appear 
 fuch, and may be efteemed fuch for any ufes 
 we have of them. 
 
 Yet this manner of diftribution admits of 
 feveral exceptions : in fome fpecies there are 
 no individuals, fuch as Fire, Water, Oil ; be- 
 caufe
 
 t '5 ] 
 
 caufe in all divifions of them difcernible by 
 our fenfes, they ftill retain their fpecific qua- 
 lities. Some individuals may be multiplied 
 into many j an ofier may be cut into twenty 
 twigs, each whereof is a diftindl plant of the 
 fame kind. Animals and vegetables receive 
 their fubftance from parents of their kind, 
 which fubftance neverthelefs lofes its ipecies 
 during the paffage, and refumes it again after- 
 wards : an egg is never numbered in fpecies 
 with the bird that laid it j but when hatched 
 into a chicken, it ranks as one among the 
 poultry. Both fpecies and individuals are of- 
 ten made by art : .Punch, Beer, and Mead are 
 different kinds of liquor j and when a man 
 takes an inventory of his houfhold goods, he 
 can diftinguifh thofe of the fame fort only by 
 individuals - 3 or if he draws off a pipe of wine, 
 he muft drive in a cork to prefer ve each indi- 
 vidual bottle from growing vapid. Thus we 
 fee that both in phyfiological and artificial ef- 
 timation, Individual is an arbitrary term, ap- 
 plied to things for our convenience. 
 
 With regard to thofe fpecies that have in- 
 dividuals, the term Exiftence or Being muft 
 belong to them. A Man, being I fuppofe a 
 palpable 'Individual, will be allowed to have 
 an Exiftence or Being of his own, diftincT: 
 
 from
 
 [ 16 ] 
 
 from all other men. So you will fay the 
 whole race of men has a Being and exiftence 
 of its own, diftindt from all other creatures. 
 Very true: but not diftinct from the men 
 compoling it ; nor has it another Being to be 
 added to the number of theirs. The fame 
 will hold good of any leffer colle&ion of men; 
 as a Regiment, which has not an additional 
 Being over and above that of the men, nor 
 exifts otherwife than by their exiftence, which 
 neverthelefs they have independent on one 
 another. For if Serjeant Blufwere annihila- 
 ted, Corporal Trim might ftill continue the 
 fame Man he was : but if all the Men were 
 annihilated, what would become of the regi- 
 ment? 
 
 Neverthelefs it is manifeft that all thefe in- 
 dividuals, as our Corrector juftly and properly 
 exprefles it, are compounds, confifting of parts 
 fubftantially and numerically diftinct from 
 each other : fo that the palpable fubftance, 
 Man, is a collection of many fubftances, as 
 the Regiment was j and has exiftence no other- 
 wife than that ; to wit, by the exiftence of 
 his parts. Were his hands annihilated, his 
 feet might remain the fame Beings they were 
 before, as "Trim might upon the deftruclion 
 
 of
 
 [ '7 ] 
 
 of Bluff i but were all his parts annihilated, 
 the Man muft utterly lofe his Being; 
 
 * t> 
 
 Well, but his hands and feet are compounds 
 too, made up of the elements : therefore they 
 have no other exigence than what belongs to 
 the elements compofmg them. But what 
 mall we fay to thefe elements ? for beino- a 
 
 . O 
 
 meer ignoramus in phyfiological knowledge, I 
 proteft I don't know what to make of them. 
 I think I can feel earth, water, air, and fire, 
 if they touch me in quantities enough to af- 
 fect my fenfes j therefore they fliould be pal- 
 pable. But we are told at firft they are im- 
 palpable exiftencies j and yet I am not fure 
 of that neither j for it is faid afterwards, that 
 if they fluctuate and change into one another, 
 they are no exiftencies at all, being devoid 
 not only of palpable, but of abfolute and me- 
 taphyfical exiftence, which belongs to nothing 
 befides God alone. 
 
 I mall not deny it poffible the elements may 
 change into one another, but then this is a 
 fluctuation of form, or of enence, which feems 
 all along to have been miftaken for exiftence, 
 not of fubftance : for it is impoffibJe to con- 
 ceive any particular fubftance (hould ever 
 change into another fubftance, whether fimi- 
 lar or of different kind. An egg, by putre- 
 C fadtion
 
 fadlion and vegetation, may in procefs of time 
 become an apple ; but this egg can never be- 
 come that egg, nor that apple ; nor can either 
 egg or apple ever lofe their numerical exi- 
 gence, whatever various forms they pafs thro', 
 or new effences they take. So if what now 
 is earth once was water, ftill it is the fame 
 fubftance diverfly modified : nor can this drop 
 of water ever be turned into that drop, or 
 that fpeck of dirt, by any fluctuation what- 
 ever. 
 
 But if the elements may change, it muft be 
 by a various difpofition of their parts ; there- 
 fore they have parts : and I fuppofe it is un- 
 derftood, tho' not expreffed, that thefe parts 
 have under parts, and fo on for ever. Which 
 fubintelligltur is neceflary to prove the non- 
 exiftence of elements : for fince they be com- 
 pounds, having no other exiftence than that of 
 their parts, nor thefe than of the under parts 
 competing them, we cannot make them a 
 title to exiftence, until we come to abfolute 
 Individuals without any parts at all, which it 
 is fuggefted, are no-where to be found. 
 
 Before this was urged againft us, it mould 
 have been remembered what antagonifts we 
 were contending with, namely, the Stratonic 
 and Democratic Atheifts, who would not have 
 
 prefled
 
 [ 19 ] 
 
 preiTed us fo clofely : for they admitted Atoms 
 
 abiblutely indivifible, whereout the fouls of 
 men, and all other productions were formed ; 
 and held, that thefe Atoms were floating 
 about in infinite fpace, diftincl and feparate 
 from each other, until by their collifions, af- 
 fortments, and adhefions, they ranged them- 
 felves into the compound bodies we fee. Up- 
 on this hypothecs, it is plain there was the 
 lame number of fubftances from all eternity 
 there is now ; and upon their clultering to- 
 gether, whether by chance or neceffity, no- 
 thing new, unlefs in kind and quality, or ef- 
 fence, not in fubftance, could be produced. 
 Therefore the fouls of Men could have no 
 diftinct exiftence of their own, nor other than 
 that of the Atoms compofing them : and up- 
 on their diflblution, not a fingle Being would 
 be loft ; any more than the King would lofe 
 a fubjecl, that is, a palpable fubftance, upon 
 difbanding a regiment. Neverthelefs thefe 
 Atoms were a fufficient foundation for ' the ex- 
 iftence of what they compofed, their fubftance 
 being that of the compounds wherein to they 
 entered. So that our argument, however de- 
 fective in proving our point to other people, 
 may ftill remain good ad bominem, upon the 
 occaiion whereto we applied it. 
 
 C 2
 
 [ 2 ] 
 
 Yet we need not .want the like foundation 
 without availing ourfelves of the Atheift's con- 
 ceiTion : for after all poffible divifion of Mat- 
 ter, it will continue Matter ftill ; nor can you 
 reduce it to nothing by any feparation of parts 
 whatever '; whence it follows, that there are 
 particles which never were, nor ever will be 
 fmaller than they are. Thefe then may fairly 
 be ftiled Atoms actually, if not potentially, in- 
 divifible. Nor is this repugnant to the opi- 
 nion now generally received among phyliolo- 
 gitls, that all Matter is homogeneous j all 
 compound bodies being made up of a Mate- 
 ria prima, which is every where one and the 
 fame in kind and quality, their various effences 
 refulting from the various aflbrtments where- 
 into it is caft. 
 
 If it be faid the particles of Materia prima 
 muft have a right fide and a left, feparable, 
 tho' perhaps never actually feparated from one 
 another j this is more than we are warranted 
 to affert. For the moft coniiderate perfons, 
 have forborn to pronounce peremptorily up- 
 on the divifibiiiry of matter, any further than 
 that it is indefinite, that is, no magnitude can be 
 afiigned than which we may be afiured there 
 cannot be a fmailer. But divifibility abfolute- 
 ly infinite, has its difficulties as well as finite : 
 
 for
 
 for upon that hypothecs, half an apple muft 
 contain as many parts as th^ whole j for the 
 half containing infinite parts, nothing can be 
 greater thn infinite ; yet the other half con- 
 taining the like infinity, to fay that the addi- 
 tion of them does not enc;eafe the number in, 
 the whole, feems as abfurd as ta deny that 
 two and two make four. Since then we have 
 not faculties to determine this point with cer- 
 tainty, the evidence before us of bodies exift- 
 ing, and of their having no further exiflence 
 beyond that of their parts, is a ftronger proof 
 that a ftop muft be - put to divifibility fome- 
 where, tho' we cannot tell where, than our 
 want of conception of a particle without fides 
 is of the contrary. For neither our fenfes nor 
 imagination can go beyond a certain degree of 
 minutenefs ; how then do we know what we 
 might fee or apprehend, were they acute 
 enough to difcern or comprehend objects be- 
 low that degree. 
 
 However this be, it can fcarce be doubted 
 that the matter, or firft principle of bodies, 
 has an exiftence of fome fort or other, whe- 
 ther original or derivative, 'tis no matter j and 
 that whatever higher compofitions are formed 
 thereout, exift only in the exiftence of that ; 
 becaufe if the matter of any body were anni- 
 hilated,
 
 t ] 
 
 hilated, the exigence of that being withdrawn, 
 the body would be no more. Juft as a Re- 
 giment exifts only by the exiftence of the 
 men, of whatever kind it be belonging to 
 them, and upon their annihilation could exift 
 no more. 
 
 But it is alledged, that a Regiment has no 
 Being. Why ? Becaufe all compounds, ac- 
 cording to us, have no exiftence at all. Pray 
 when did we ever fay fo ? Did you never hear 
 of the Welshman, who riding with a heavy port- 
 manteau before him, and perceiving his horfe 
 tire, took up the portmanteau upon his own 
 ihoulders to eafe the beaft ? never confldering 
 that while the horfe carried him that bore 
 the burthen, he carried that too : and if there 
 had been twenty men hoifted upon one ano- 
 ther, fo long as the uppermoft had the port- 
 manteau upon his fhoulders, the horfe would 
 have carried the fame weight as if it had lain 
 upon his own back. So while the compo-' 
 nent parts of bodies exift, their exiftence runs 
 thro' the competitions whereinto they enter ;. 
 and palpable Individuals, together with what- 
 ever Companies, Regiments, Corporations, or 
 other Compounds can be formed of them, 
 have as much exiftence as their primary prin-. 
 ciples, becaufe they have the very fame. 
 
 There-
 
 [ 23 1 
 
 Therefore we never denied a Regiment to 
 have exiftence or Being ; but only that it was 
 a Being in the fingular number, diftincl from 
 that of the men, and to be added to them. 
 
 We conceived it to be like a noun of num- 
 ber, as a Grofs, a Score, a Dozen, which, 
 tho' entia rationis in themfelves, yet have a 
 real exiftence when applied to particular fub- 
 ftances. For a dozen of counters exift as\ 
 really as a fingle one j if you put the dozen 
 into your pocket, you put in real fubitance, 
 iKt a fhadow or meer imagination j yet you 
 have not thirteen things there, to wit, twelve 
 counters and the dozen over and above. 
 
 You fay, if a regiment is no Being, nei- 
 ther is man a Being j and this you charge up- 
 on us as an egregious overfight. 1 ut upon 
 what principles does the confequence .follow? 
 Why, upon thofe of the Atheifts we were 
 combating ; and was fo far from being an 
 overfight, that the main ftrefs of our argu- 
 ment lay in driving our Antagonists to the 
 abfurd conclufion of making man to have no 
 Being, no diftinct exiftence peculiar to him- 
 lf ; nor any thing more than a regiment of 
 atoms, admirably well marmalled and dif- 
 ciplined indeecT, but fubftantially and numeri- 
 cally the fame they were before enlifting. 
 
 Upon
 
 [ 24 1 
 
 Upon our own principles the conclufion runs 
 the other way : for we argue, that Man muft 
 be an Individual, not like your palpable Indi- 
 viduals, conlifting of parts, becaufe he has a 
 Being of his own. And for the truth of our 
 pofiitlatum, we appeal to every man, Whether 
 he can doubt of his own exiftence, or that he 
 has a perfonality diftinct from that of all other 
 Beings. 
 
 Neverthelefs this appeal, itfeems, cannot avail 
 us ; becaufe, how could any man acquire this 
 fenfe or knowledge of his perfonality without 
 a human body ? or in other words, how can 
 a man exift without a body ? Had we faid the 
 mind or foul of man might fo exift, it would 
 have been lefs exceptionable ; and yet excep- 
 tionable it would have been j for how could 
 the mind acquire a fenfc of perfonality with- 
 out a body ? Now if it be remembered what 
 was the opinion we fet out to battle againft in 
 the beginning of my note, namely, that the 
 fouls of men, as well as all other productions, 
 were formed out of atoms, the correction of 
 Man into Mind might have been fpared. For 
 when afterwards we fpoke of the atoms run* 
 ning together to compofe a human body, we 
 thought that, upon the principles of our ad- 
 verfaries, Mind and Body muft be the fame 
 3 thing :
 
 f 1$ 1 
 
 thing : but if any one thinks otherwife, he is 
 welcome to dele Body, and read Mind, Soul 
 or Spirit j our argument will run never the 
 worfe. 
 
 As to the queftion, whether a Man or a 
 Mind can acquire a fenfe of perfonality with- 
 out a human body ; we apprehend it as diffi- 
 cult for any body to anfwer in the negative, 33 
 for us in the affirmative. It may be faid in- 
 deed, as is faid of Mr. Locke, that the nega- 
 tive may be very eafily proved on our owri 
 principles : certainly nothing is more eafy than 
 to aflert this, and it may pafs with fuch Rea- 
 ders as will take pofitivenefs for demonftra* 
 tion : but it may not be quite fo eafy to make 
 out the aflertion. 
 
 But fuppofing it certain there can be no 
 knowledge of perfonality without a body, 
 how does it follow that no perfonality or exift- 
 ence can be had without one ? or that not 
 having knowledge of exiflence, and not exift- 
 ing, are fynonimous expreffions ? This is new 
 dodrine to us, and the logic by which it is 
 proved, rifes far above our pitch. It puts us 
 in mind of that ufed in our infancy under the 
 dictates of pure nature, unperverted by edu- 
 cation, when the child hides its face in 
 Mamma's apron, and then cries, Nobody fees 
 
 D me.
 
 [ 26 ] 
 
 me. Which, in the learned language of our 
 Cenfor, would run thus, < In this fituation I 
 <f can acquire no fenfe or knowkdge of any 
 <f body's feeing me; therefore, or in other 
 " words, nobody does fee me." Now in our 
 humble apprehenfion, the reality of a fad is 
 not the fame thing with the evidence of it : 
 the one may be true, tho' the other be want- 
 ing. If we have evidence of a thing's exift- 
 ing, we may believe it had an exiftence be- 
 fore we knew it, and may ftill continue to 
 exift after our evidence is withdrawn and loft 
 out of our memory. 
 
 I doubt not Mr. Monthly has pafled many a 
 night in found ileep, fince he did us the ho- 
 nour to take notice of us; for, coniidering 
 how much more than juftice he has done our 
 characters in the principal parts of them, he 
 can have had nothing to difturb his reft upon 
 that fcore. Then during all thefe naps, I 
 fuppoie he had no fenfe or knowledge of his 
 own exiftence : but will he therefore fay, 
 that he really had no exiftence ? or that every 
 time he fell afleep, he ceafed to be, was no 
 Perfon, no Subftance, no Being ? but refumed 
 all thefe again the moment he awoke in the 
 morning? Therefore upon what grounds can 
 he infer, that when he, and we, and all hu- 
 man
 
 man palpable Individuals mall become ftupi- 
 fied in the deep of death, we fhall utterly lofe 
 our exiftence, tho' we lofe all evidence of it ; 
 and that a new fet of corporeal organs (if fuch 
 organs be necefTary) may not invert and awa- 
 ken us to a new fcene of evidence ? 
 
 What {hall we fay of the houfes, the trees, 
 the fields we fee around us ? have they a 
 knowledge of their exiftence ? or do they 
 therefore not exift at all ? To draw this con- 
 fequence, muft drive us plumb into Berkleys 
 fcheme ; that bodies fubfift only in our idea, 
 and are, or ceafe to be, according as our ideas 
 fluctuate. So that when every body goes out 
 of the room, the tables, the chairs, the pi- 
 ctures, they left behind, become inftantly an- 
 nihilated i and upon the company's return, 
 become as inftantly re-exiftent. 
 
 Notwithftanding all this, he will not deny 
 that the mind or fpirit of man may be an in- 
 dividual exiftence, to be deftroyed only by the 
 immediate exertion of Omnipotence. Yet in 
 effect he does deny it a few lines below ; for 
 he fays, that by exiftence, in this cafe, muft 
 be meant an abiblute and metaphyfical exift- 
 ence j in which fenie it is more than probable, 
 there is no other Being in the univerfe but 
 God : for while every thing in nature appears 
 
 D 2 to
 
 to be in a conflant fluctuation and change, it 
 is rational enough to fufpect, from analogy, 
 that even the elements of things may be fotoo. 
 Now this reafoning feems to imply, that the 
 fpirit of man is no more than a fifth element, 
 like that called by Ariftotle^ Entelechia; 
 far unlefs the mind be included in the ele- 
 ments, the argument from their fluctuation, 
 that there is no created fubftance metaphyfi- 
 cally exifting, would not hold good : or that 
 it is fomething analogous to the fpirit of 
 brandy or hartihorn, a drop of which being 
 put into Tunbridge water, takes off the chill it 
 would elfe caft upon weak fromachs ; fo a 
 drop of the fpirit of man infufed into his ma- 
 terial compofition, takes off the infenfibility 
 naturally belonging to it, and renders it ca- 
 pable of fenfe and underftanding. Yet it is 
 plain, this drop may be divided into parts, 
 which may one after another enter into the 
 compofition of the other elements : fo that 
 what is n6w fpirit of man, may by and by 
 become a drop of water, a puff of air, a fpark 
 of fire, or a fpeck of earth. 
 
 If this be fo, I fee no reafon for calling in 
 Omnipotence to defiroy the fpirit of man ; for 
 J fuppofe there are certain ftated laws, I mufl 
 not fay of nature, but, of the univerfe, ope- 
 rating
 
 ![ 2 9 ] 
 
 luting thefe fluctuations and changes of the ele- 
 ments. And that the changes mull be gra- 
 dual we may prefume from analogy ; for tho' 
 a dead dog may become a tree by being bu- 
 ried under it, it muft putrify firft, and be re- 
 duced to fomething which is neither animal 
 nor vegetable fubftance, before it can be drawn 
 up by the radical fibres of the tree. So the 
 elements, during their paffage into one ano- 
 ther, mult be no elements at all, neither earth, 
 nor water, nor air, nor fire, nor entelechia, 
 and confequently be non-exiflent ; for palpa- 
 ble exigence they have none, and other exifl- 
 ence, we are told, belongs not to created things. 
 The refult of all this is, that ourfelves, and 
 whatever we fee or handle, are made up of 
 non-entities, than which nothing; can be hard- 
 
 o 
 
 er of digeflion j and if we can pronounce any 
 thing, we may pronounce this abiblutely im- 
 poffible even to Omnipotence. I have heard 
 indeed, that God created all things out of no- 
 thing, but I never knew it underilood there- 
 by, that he employed Nothing as a material 
 whereout to fabricate his worlds j or that he 
 moulded and kneaded up a certain quantity of 
 Nothing, as a baker kneads his dough, until 
 it became Something. I know the Atheifts, 
 Lucretius in particular, charge this idea of 
 
 creation
 
 [ 30 ] 
 
 creation upon us, and take great pains to 
 overthrow it; but they fight all the while 
 with a fhadow ; for no Theift ever entertain- 
 ed fuch a notion. 
 
 Another reprehenfion given us is for faying, 
 that upon diflblution of the human body, there 
 is not a Being loft out of Nature ; which ex- 
 preffion, Out of Nature^ is, it feems, fuch an 
 egregious ' impropriety, as to deferve being 
 ftigmatized with Italics. But we were un- 
 \varingly drawn thereinto by the example of 
 other perfons before us : for we have heard 
 of there being a God in Nature of invifible 
 Natures, perhaps more elegantly exprefled by 
 impalpable Natures of the Nature of virtue, 
 juftice, government, and many other things 
 which are not objects of phyfiological know- 
 ledge. And if we were led to talk like chil- 
 dren, by converting among other children, it 
 had been kind in our Mafter to have inftruc~t- 
 ed us how to fpeak with better propriety : for 
 he might know well enough that our mean- 
 ing was only to affert, that upon certain fub- 
 ftances joining together in a compound, there 
 is not a new Being added to the number up- 
 on ci)mpofition, nor is one loft again out of 
 the whole number upon feparation. Now 
 how ought we to have expreffed ourfelves up- 
 on
 
 f 31 ] 
 
 on this occafion ? In fliort, it feems not very 
 material whether we add Out of Nature, or 
 omit it. If a billet be confumed in the fire, 
 we fuppofe the parts of it are diflipated, but 
 not annihilated : a few of them only remain 
 palpable in the afhes, but whether the reft be 
 in nature or out of nature 'tis no matter, fo 
 they be exiftent fomewhere ; there will ftill 
 be the fame number of parts as before dif- 
 union ; and the billet having no exiftence over 
 and above, or diftinct from the parts, there 
 will not be a Being loft upon its confumption. 
 But we muft correct our theory againft ano- 
 ther time, and adopt a new article of Faith, 
 to wit, that a compound may confift of parts 
 which had no exiftence in Nature before they 
 entered into it ; and the five elements them- 
 felves, for we muft reckon the Entelechia for 
 one, be made up of a Materia prima, every 
 where uniform, and capable of being formed 
 into any of them indifferently, tho' there be 
 no fuch thing in Nature as a Materia prima. 
 Yet we cannot help faying, it was a little 
 ungenerous in Mr. Monthly to attack us in flank, 
 while we were engaged with another enemy, 
 againft whom our difpofition was not impro- 
 perly made : for they being as deficient in 
 phyfiology as ourfelves, would not have de- 
 2
 
 nied the exiftence of atoms in nature : there- 
 
 < ' 
 
 fore we ftill humbly conceive it was with 
 propriety with refpect to them we urged, that 
 after difperfion of the atoms, there rnuft be 
 as many Beings in nature, as there had been 
 during their coalition in a man. And confe- 
 quently, if Man has a Being and Perfonality 
 of his own, diftincl: from all other Beings, 
 and which would be loft out of Nature upon 
 his annihilation, he cannot be fuch a com- 
 pound of atoms. 
 
 But having driven them out of the field, 
 and being now to deal with another kind of 
 affiftant, we may be allowed to change our dif- 
 pofition according to the nature of the attack. 
 But hold : we (hall be chid again : for Attack is 
 not a phyfiological Being, and there may be great 
 impropriety in applying the term Nature to it. 
 Well then, according to the manner of the 
 attack. For atoms, it feems, there are none, 
 and the principles of phyfical Beings have no 
 exiftence in nature, until formed into com- 
 pounds. Let us try then how we can manage 
 our argument by help of phyfical Beings alone : 
 and in fo doing, our example of the regiment 
 may ftill ferve our purpofe. For the men are 
 admitted on both fides to be fubftances, whe- 
 ther palpable or me'aphyfical, whether indi- 
 vidual
 
 t 33 1 
 
 vidual or compound, 'tis all one ; for though 
 we love hair-fplitting as well as moft folks, 
 where necefTary, we fee no ufe for it here : 
 Subftances they ftill are, diftind and indepen- 
 dent on one another. If then there were fix 
 hundred of them difperfed about the country, 
 they did not, upon being incorporated into 
 ten Companies and one Regiment, become fix 
 hundred and eleven fubftances : nor will the 
 King, upon difbanding them, lofe a fingle 
 Subject, or Subftance, or Being, out of his 
 dominion. For furely difbanding is not anni- 
 hilating, nor can you conceive any Exigence 
 or Subftance belonging to the Regiment anni- 
 hilated fo long as the men remain all alive. 
 
 Now, to apply this to man : if he be 3 
 compound, yet we are not obliged to go fo far 
 as to the primary principles whereof his ele- 
 ments are conftituted, for then we mall wan- 
 der out of Nature ; but we may diftribute his 
 whole compofition into parts ftill remaining 
 palpable, as his arms, his legs, his heart, his 
 brain ; fuppofe twenty of them. Thefe twen- 
 ty parts then are fo many feveral Beings, nu- 
 merically and fubftantially diftincl: from each 
 other in the compofition ; for the leg is not 
 the arm, nor the brain the heart, even in a 
 living man. So that he is nothing more than 
 
 E a
 
 [ 34 ] 
 
 a Regiment or collection of thefe twenty parts, 
 having no diftinft Being of his own which 
 might be added to theirs to make the whole 
 number twenty-one. And if they were fepa- 
 rated by difledion, though they would lofe 
 their vitality, they would not lofe their fub- 
 ftance, but there would ftill remain twenty 
 fubftances, as many as could be counted in the 
 whole compofition, nor would a fingle Being 
 be loft out of Nature. 
 
 Therefore if a man, while poflefling his fenfes 
 and underftanding, has undoubted evidence 
 of his own exiftence and perfonality diftinct 
 from all other Beings, and adds one to the 
 number of thofe exiftent, he cannot be a com- 
 pound or collection of fubftances, but an indi- 
 vidual, making fome one particular part of the 
 compofition whereinto he enters. 
 
 This brings us to the examination of what 
 is properly a Man's Self, or that whereto the 
 perfonal pronouns 7, Tou, He, and Sbe t may be 
 applied. And here perhaps at firft there may be 
 thought to be no difficulty j for upon a man 
 coming into the room, my eyes may inform 
 me fufficiently of his perfon, and I may fee 
 plainly enough that he is not the table, the 
 chairs, nor the wainfcot furrounding him. 
 Very well : let us try then what I can difcover 
 
 by
 
 [ 35 ] 
 
 by my eyes. Why, I fee a face, a pair of 
 hands, a coat, ftockings, and moes : are all 
 thefe Tou ? No to be fure : You know well 
 enough I pull off my coat and moes when I 
 go to bed, and put on banyan and flippers in 
 
 the morning. Well, but you don't pull 
 
 off your hair and nails when you go to bed : 
 then they are parts of Tou. 'No, no : they 
 are only excrefcencies ; for they have no 
 
 fenfe or feeling. How fo ? If any body 
 
 was to tear off a parcel of your hair, or one of 
 your nails, mould not you feel a grievous fmart ? 
 Ay, the pronoun / mould, becaufe they 
 are fattened to my flefh ; but thq hair and the 
 nails would feel nothing. They are like a 
 packthread wound round my wrift, which if 
 any one mould twitch violently, he would 
 hurt the wrift, but he would not hurt the 
 packthread, So then what has fenfe and 
 
 feeling only is Tourfelf. Undoubtedly : and 
 
 every thing that has fo is a part of My/elf. 
 
 What think you of 'your teeth, your bones, 
 your fat, the humours in your glands ? for al- 
 terations may happen in them without your 
 feeling it.- I don't know what to fay to 
 that : for in common acceptation every thing 
 is reputed Myfelf that remains with me after 
 I have pulled off all my cloaths, except the ex- 
 E 2 crefcencies.
 
 [ 36 ] 
 
 crefcencies. *Ay, and the excrefcencies too 
 fometimes ; for we often defcribe a man's per- 
 fon by the colour of his hair 5 and Ihould do 
 by his nails, if they have any thing remark- 
 able or diftinguiming j nay, by his cloaths, if 
 we think he has but one fuit to wear. So you 
 fee the term Self, like other terms of common 
 acceptation, is fluctuating, determined this 
 way or that by the prefent occafion : for he 
 that, upon his knife flipping while he carves 3. 
 loin of mutton, is afked whether he has cut 
 Jiimfelf, may fay, No, 'tis only a piece of my 
 nail 3 but if he dames the gravy upon his coat, 
 he will be apt to fret at having greafed himfelf. 
 But what do you take to be truly and properly 
 
 fourfelf? 1 doubt I mufl give up the bones, 
 
 the fat, and the humours: but furely my fy-^ 
 item of nerves, and organs of fenfe, muft be 
 Myfeff, for the great Mr. Monthly pronounces, 
 that without them I could not have knowledge 
 of my perfonality, or, in other words, could 
 not exift. But then it is the nerves and or- 
 gans jointly that make Tourfelf. Your eyes are 
 not You, nor your ears, nor your brachial or 
 crural nerves ; but the whole compofition of 
 them altogether is that whereto the pronoun 
 Ton belongs. So it mould fecm. Sup* 
 pofe an Englifh fojdier has loft a leg in Ger> 
 
 many,
 
 [ 37 1 
 
 many, may he afterwards fay, I was born in 
 England : * Why not ? Becaufe the palpa- 
 ble compound born, to which the pronoun jf 
 was then applicable, is now no more, being 
 deftroyed by fubtraftion of the nerves in the 
 leg.* ^Oh ! but it is (till a part of the fame 
 compound. Remember what you faid be- 
 fore, that it was not your eye, nor your ear, but 
 the whole compofition which was Tourfelf.* 
 But it is rational enough to imagine from ana- 
 logy, that compounds may fluctuate and 
 change into one another, fo that what was a Self 
 with two legs may become a Self with only one. 
 May be fo : but then it is not the fame Self j 
 for the term Self belonging to the whole com- 
 pofition, it is plain the prefent compofition wants 
 a part which was an ingredient helping to 
 
 complete the former. You puzzle me now. 
 
 I wifh Mr. Monthly were here : I warrant he 
 would manage yon with a wet finger. And 
 yet I cannot help thinking the man was the 
 fame Self after lofing his leg as before, and 
 might apply the pronoun / to whatever was 
 done or fuffered by the two-Jegged Self. 
 Take care, For if the Self remains entire af- 
 ter lofs of the leg, then it will follow that the 
 leg, while in vital union with the body, was 
 no constituent part of the palpable fubftance 7j 
 
 becaufe
 
 t 38 i 
 
 becaufe this fufTers no diminution by the am- 
 putation. But we will not prefs this, becaufe 
 you have not your champion by to help you 
 out. 
 
 Therefore let us take the compound before 
 fluctuation, while the man has all his limbs 
 and fenfes entire.- In this ftate I fuppofe the 
 whole compofition, not any part, nor any 
 number of parts lefs than all, is Tou : fo that 
 what the compofition does, you do j and, vice 
 verfa, whatever is done by you is done by the 
 whole compofition.-^ You are right.- 'Pray 
 do you hear me fpeak ? Why mould you 
 afk ? have not I anfwered you all along ? 
 I am not fure of that : Something has heard 
 and anfwered me all along very clearly : but I 
 am in fome doubt whether that was Tou - 3 be- 
 caufe it feems to me not to have been your 
 whole compofition. Did your eyes hear any 
 thing of what I faid ?-^ ^They helped to 
 underftand you, by obferving your geftures, 
 
 and motion of your lips. Probably they 
 
 might : But had your nofe or the nerves of 
 your legs or arms any {hare in the hearing ?- 
 There was no occafion : for I have ears good 
 enough to perform the office of hearing with- 
 out other aid. So your ears, or if you 
 pleafe tp add eyes, have performed the whole. 
 
 office
 
 [ 39 ] 
 
 office of hearing and underftanding ; and I 
 have been talking all this while, not with your 
 whole competition, nor with Tou, but with a 
 pairofeyes and ears. Pfhaw ! now you joke 
 with me. And let me tell you, this does not fit 
 fo eafy upon you, nor appear fo little forced as 
 your argument. Can any body deny that what 
 my ears hear is my hearing ? I deny or affirm 
 nothing; I only afk, whether what your eyes 
 fee, and your ears hear, is feen and heard by 
 
 your whole compofition ? 1 think it is. I 
 
 am fure it is feen and heard by Myfelf: for I 
 have no notion of one Self to fee, another to 
 hear, another to fmell, and fo on -, nor of half 
 Myfelf feeing when the other half does not. 
 But to my thinking a perception received at 
 any one part runs through the whole Self, the 
 whole compofition. ~-Does it fo ? When 
 you look at a picture, does the fight of it run 
 down to your great toe ? and when fomebody 
 treads upon your toe, do your eyes inftantly feel 
 a fympathetic fmart? I am fure it is the {a me 
 7, the fame Self, that fee the one and feel the 
 other. Then if you have but one Self to 
 ferve you upon all occafions, and this Self can- 
 not perceive by halves, mud it not be fome- 
 thing diftinct from the nerves and organs, 
 which alternately remain infenfible of one an- 
 other's
 
 f 40 ] 
 
 other's perceptions? And is it not rational 
 enough to. fufpect, that thefe organs are only 
 channels of conveyance tranfmitting their re~ 
 fpective notices, as windows tranfmit the light, 
 to the fame Self, the whole of which perceives 
 
 every thing that is perceived ? O ! for Mr. 
 
 Monthly again, to ftand by and fee my head 
 broke ! But fuppofing it were fo ; may not 
 this Self be ftill a compound ? I am afraid 
 we {hall hardly be able to make a palpable in- 
 dividual compound of it : fo we have loft our 
 exiftence already > for nothing it feems exifts 
 that is not fo, nor is there any thing indivi- 
 dual unlefs compounds. Nor do I much care : 
 for, fo we can find pleafure in one another's 
 company, it is no matter whether we find it 
 with exiftence or without. But what do you 
 take this compound to be ? Truly, I don't 
 very well know : but fuppofe it to lie fome- 
 where in the brain. We are told the nerves 
 have been traced to the pineal gland : perhaps 
 there may be a drop of the fifth element ; or 
 fpirit of man, gathered there -, and then that 
 is the Self whereto the perfonal pronouns be- 
 long. 
 
 Do you apprehend yourfelf to be a real Being, 
 
 or only a dream, a mere fancy or imagination ? 
 
 I cannot doubt of my exiftence, fo long 
 
 as
 
 [ 4' ] 
 
 as I have my fenfes. The having your 
 
 fenfes depends upon your having fenfitive or- 
 gans, which we have now agreed are no parts 
 of you, therefore are feparable from you. But 
 upon fuch feparation fhould you lofe your Be- 
 ing, becaufe you loft the knowledge or con- 
 
 fcioufnefs of it? No, provided the drop 
 
 remained entire. Suppofe the drop, with- 
 out being ever diffipated, fhould get into the 
 pineal gland of another human body, mould 
 you regain your knowledge and confcioufnefs ? 
 I mould know I had a Being, but not 
 that I was the fame Being and Perfon I am 
 now, becaufe probably I might not remem- 
 ber any thing paffing with me now. 
 Well, but tho' you might not know it, mould 
 you not really be the fame Perfon and Being ? 
 
 Certainly : for the drop being Me, while 
 
 that remains the fame, I muft be the fame. 
 
 So the Being and Subftance of the drop are 
 your Being, which you undoubtedly know you 
 
 pofTefs, while you have your fenfes. They 
 
 are And the materials of the drop are 
 
 your materials. Yes. Do you and the 
 
 drop make two Beings ? No : both are one 
 
 and the fame. -So while the whole drop 
 
 continues to fubfift, you fubfift.- 1 do. 
 
 But the drop may be divided into two half 
 
 drops.. Ay, and thofe again into infinite 
 
 F parts;
 
 [ 42 ] 
 
 parts j for Matter is divifible ad tnfmitum.-~ 
 With all your divifions, can you ever reduce it 
 
 to nothing ? I do not pretend that. Is 
 
 there not the lame fubftance or quantity of 
 matter in the two halves as there was in the 
 
 whole drop ? To be fure. And after their 
 
 being divided into infinite parts, is there not 
 
 flill the fame quantity among them all ? 1 
 
 agree it. Then none of your fubftance be- 
 ing loft, you ftill continue to fubfift, notwith- 
 ftanding an infinite diffipation of your parts. 
 My Subftance does j but riot Me." 
 Why fo ? Are you any thing elfe than the 
 
 fubftance whereof you confift ? Yes, the 
 
 union of it into a compound is neceflary to 
 my fubfiftence. Is Union a fubftance ? 
 I never faid it was. Can it make a fub- 
 ftance ? It may make that to be one which 
 
 was many before. Is that one any addition 
 
 to the number there was before union, or has 
 it any other exiftence befides or over and above 
 theirs ? 
 
 It does not to the number of fubftances, but 
 
 it has an exiftence befides theirs. How do 
 
 you make that out ? Becaufe, in common 
 
 propriety of fpeech, we apply exiftence to the 
 compofition diftincl from the fubftances com- 
 pounded. In what inftances, pray ? Some 
 people deny there is any fuch thing as a circle 
 
 exifting
 
 [ 43 ] 
 
 exifting In nature ; for what appears fuch, they 
 fay, is only a Polygon whofe angles are imper- 
 ceptible. Now when they fay this, they do 
 not mean to deny the exiftence of the bodies 
 feeming to be circular : and if they admit the 
 exiftence of fquares and triangles, thefe are 
 different ideas from that of the fubftances ex- 
 
 ifting in them. Different ideas they may be 
 
 without being different exiftencies : for com- 
 petition may ftill be no more than a particular 
 mode of exifting in fubftances, upon their com- 
 ing into union from being difperfed. And it is 
 not necefTary that upon their being caft out of 
 a triangle into a fquare there mould be an exift- 
 ence loft and gained, but only that they change 
 their manner of exiftence, which whether in 
 fquare or triangle is ftill their exiftence, not 
 
 that of any thing elfe. Still, in my appre- 
 
 henfion, when a thiftle grows out of the ground, 
 there is a plant in being which was not exiftent 
 before. -Well, if you make a difficulty, we 
 do not love contefting where it is needlefs. We 
 will fuppofe Compofition to have an exiftence 
 
 diftin<t from the fubftances compounded. 
 
 Thank ye, for your indulgence. Tho' I am 
 afraid you would not grant it, if you thought 
 
 it would do me any good. It could do you 
 
 no good to deny it. Upon this fuppofition 
 there will arife a new queftion, What is pro- 
 
 F 2
 
 t 44 ] 
 
 perly You, and your Exiftence ? for you know 
 you have one of ibme fort or other : whether 
 it be the exigence of your compofition with 
 that of your fubftance jointly, or the former 
 
 alone abftraded from the latter. Stay j I 
 
 muft think a little : this is not a matter to be 
 
 determined prefently. Nay, if you are not 
 
 clear, never ftand to puzzle your brains about 
 it. For whichever way we take it, our argu- 
 ment will run the fame : fo we will try with 
 the Compofition, confidered apart from the 
 materials united by it. Take your own way* 
 fince you fay both will conduct to the fame 
 
 point. Lay down a brafs quadrant upon the 
 
 table : I fuppofe you will allow it has a com- 
 pofition exifting diflindly from all other com- 
 
 pofitions.^ -Very readily. -Place another 
 
 equal quadrant of filver by it. Has not that a 
 
 compofition of its own exifting too ?- -Cer- 
 
 tainly. -Does it deftroy the compofition of 
 
 the other ? How can it affect that, only by 
 
 being laid fide by fide by it ? Put two other 
 
 quadrants of fteel and copper againft the for- 
 mer : Have not the four fo many diftind: com- 
 petitions exifting in them ? No doubt they 
 
 have.- But all together make a compleat 
 circle. True. Has not this circle a com- 
 pofition too? -^-Undoubtedly. Is the com- 
 pofition
 
 [ 45 ] 
 
 pofnion of the circle any thing elfe than 
 an aggregate of the four competitions in the 
 
 quadrants ? Nothing elfe, that I know of. 
 
 Now let us return to the human body. 
 
 Has not your right leg a competition of its 
 own diftinct from that of your left ? It has. 
 
 And your right arm another ? Yes. 
 
 And your nofe another ? To be fure. 
 
 And every part of your human frame a fepa- 
 
 rate competition of its own. 1 cannot deny 
 
 it. But we difcovered before, that the parts I 
 
 have named were no parts of Tburfeff. We 
 
 muft not retract that : So your exigence 
 
 lies in the competition of the drop or fpirit of 
 man lodged in your pineal gland. It does. 
 
 Which drop may be divided into two 
 
 halves. It may. And each of thefe 
 
 halves into three hundred fubdivifions. Ay, 
 
 fo many at leaft. And matter being divifible 
 
 (id infinitum, each of thefe fubdivifions are 
 compounds having a competition exifting in 
 
 them diftinct from all the reft. Admit that 
 
 they have. Then is the competition of the 
 
 drop, which is Tbu, any thing elie than the 
 aggregate of the fix hundred compofitions in 
 
 the fubdivifions ? It muft be fo : Plato, 
 
 thou reafoneft well. So now we are come 
 
 to the regiment again. This plaguy trouble- 
 
 fome
 
 [ 46 ] 
 
 fome foe purfues us to whatever quarter we 
 can turn, and drives us to a conceiTion, that 
 we have no better title to exigence than itfelf ; 
 and it appears in all lights that you have no 
 diilindt Being of your own, being nothing more 
 than a regiment or collection of infinite fub- 
 ftances or exiftencies j and upon the difband- 
 ing of them, tho' you ceafe to be, yet there is 
 not a Being, a Compound, a Compofition, loft 
 out of the univerfe. Yet for all that I can- 
 not help thinking, that upon my ceafing to be, 
 there muft be one Being the fewer in the uni- 
 verfe : fo I mall fuppofe, that fo long as the 
 fubftance compofmg me fubfifts, however dif- 
 perfed or diffipated, I mall fubfift. 
 
 But this will avail us little : for bare exift- 
 ence without perception is of no value ; and 
 when the particles fall out of their union and 
 interconrfe with one another, they cannot form 
 
 a perceptive compound.- That's a great 
 
 comfort, no doubt. But fuppofing any of 
 them eould fee, or hear, or feel, while you 
 fubfift, and they continue to be parts of you, 
 tho' difperfed to great diftances j mould you 
 be infenfible of their perceptions? Sup- 
 poling that, I muft be affected with what af- 
 fects any of them : but this an impomble fup- 
 pofition, becaufe they cannot perceive v unlefs 
 * 7 in
 
 [ 47 ] 
 
 in compofition. But after being decom- 
 pounded they may come into compofition 
 
 again. Poflibly they may. The elements 
 
 perpetually fluctuate and change : fo what 
 is now fpirit of man, may become fpirit of 
 brandy, and in further procefs of time may 
 become fpirit of man again, either in one com- 
 pofition, or interfperfed among feveral drops 
 gathered in feveral pineal glands. 1 can- 
 not deny the poffibility of this. Then 
 
 in this ftate of compofition they will all be 
 perceptive, but probably have very different 
 and contrary perceptions ; fome feeing while 
 others do not fee, fome being in pleafure while 
 others are in pain. And as you muft be affected 
 with whatever affects them, you muft then have 
 thefe contrary perceptions at the fame time, 
 and enjoy pleafure while you fuffer pain. 
 I can't tell how to come into this notion tho', 
 that I may fee and not fee, be in pleafure and 
 
 pain at the fame inftant. 
 
 You know the almighty power of Chance, 
 and how in the courfe of infinite ages me 
 muft produce all poffible combinations. Now 
 one poffible combination is this ; that fome 
 thousands of years hence half your drop and 
 half mine mould join in one pineal gland, and 
 the other halves in fome other p'uieal gland. 
 
 Will
 
 ['48 ] 
 
 Will thcfe two compounds be Perfons having 
 knowledge of their own exiftence ? I make 
 
 no doubt of it. Will they be difUnft and 
 
 different perfons from one another ? Cer- 
 tainly. Which of them will be one of us ? 
 
 Neither.- Do not we fubfift fo long as 
 
 our fubftances fubfift ; and fhall not we per- 
 ceive whatever they or any parts of them per- 
 ceive ? We agreed fo juft now; not in 
 
 liking to the hypothefis, but becaufe drove 
 out of every other. Shall we have any other 
 fubftance, or exiftence, or perception, than 
 
 what belongs to thofe two Perfons ? And 
 
 yet I can never bring myfelf to believe that I 
 can become another Perfon, or part of another 
 Perfon, or perceive by his perceptions, much 
 lefs by the perceptions of two. 
 
 So long as you continue alive, I fuppofe, 
 you are the fame Perfon you were fome years 
 ago. You can agree to this without being 
 
 drove out of all other hypothefes. Very 
 
 readily. Nobody can doubt that. The fame 
 
 Being, Exiftence, or individual Subftance. 
 
 Certainly. And the fame individual Compound 
 
 too. Do not the humours of our body 
 
 continually fluctuate and change, being firft 
 fecreted from the blood, then entering into the 
 fubftance of our flefh, and afterwards flying 
 
 off
 
 [ 49 ] 
 
 otf by perfpiration ? One cannot be igno-. 
 
 rant of this, without great deficiency in phy- 
 
 fiological knowledge. Is it not rational 
 
 enough to fufpedt from analogy, that the fpirit 
 of man (if it be a fifth element, or material 
 fluid) fluctuates in like manner; being firft 
 fecreted from the animal fpirits, then turning 
 to the medullary fubftance of the brain, and 
 afterwards flying off by perfpiration ? --Truly 
 there is a fhrewd fufpicion of fuch analogy.- 
 And as the particles of this fluid are detached, 
 others flow in to fupply their places -, fo that 
 there may not be one particle the fame that 
 was there fome time ago : but what is now 
 fpirit of man in you, once was blood, or chyle, 
 or vi&uals you have eaten, and perhaps a 
 twelvemonth hence may be vapour floating 
 about in the air ; yet You continuing all the 
 while the fame fubftance and perfon. I don't 
 know how to difprove all this. Then if 
 You are a real Being and Subftance, and arc 
 not barely a form or mode of exiftence in, 
 fomething elfe, and if your Exiftence and Per- 
 fonality remains the fame throughout all the 
 ftages of life, from infancy to extreme old age, 
 notwithftanding all the changes of particles in. 
 your drop ; may we not argue, as we did be- 
 fore, concerning the nerves and the organs, 
 G that
 
 that they are no parts of Tou t but channels to 
 convey perception to fomething elfe, which is 
 numerically and fubftantially Tourfelf? 
 Well, I'll fay no more, but turn you over to 
 my champion. 
 
 Thus which ever way we turn ourfelves, we 
 find nothing but abfurdity and contradiction, 
 fo long as we' place our exiftence and perfo- 
 nality in a compound : nor can we efcape them 
 otherwife than by admitting an Individual, not 
 one of your compound individuals, which is 
 none at all except in idea, but an Individual 
 truly fuch, confiding of no parts j that can- 
 not either totally or partially become another 
 fubftance, nor can lofe its identity unlefs by 
 annihilation : in which cafe there would be a 
 Being abfolntely loft out of Nature, that is, 
 out of the number of Beings exiftent. Into 
 whatever compofition this Individual enters, 
 we efteem it Ourfelves for the time, notwith- 
 ftanding any fluctuation of its parts ; provided 
 they fall into the fame connection, and ferve 
 the fame ufes their predeceflbrs had done be- 
 fore. 
 
 According to the form and texture of thefc 
 compofitions, we conceive phyfical Beings de- 
 nominated : fo we are orthodox in this article 
 of phyfiological faith. But we are reproved 
 
 for
 
 I Si ] 
 
 for mifapplying the term Man to a part of 
 him ; becaufe we obferve, that no man can 
 doubt of his own exiftence, and a little after 
 place that exiftence in the mind, which is an 
 individual that can be diverted of its Being by 
 no power lefs than that which gave it. What 
 then ? has not the Man fuch a Being if his 
 mind has it ? May not we fay a Man has a 
 freih colour, becaufe he has it only in his 
 cheeks; but none in his arms or his back? 
 So the difpute turns upon a point of language 
 rather than of phyfiology. For furely nobody 
 can underftand us to imagine that when Rice 
 was hanged, he was not diverted of his Man- 
 hood, or did not ceafe to be a Man. The 
 fole queftion is, Whether the term Man may, 
 upon any occafion, be applied to either of his 
 parts after their feparation. Suppofe his body 
 had been hung upon a gibbet in tire little green 
 near Stamford-hill, if on going along the road 
 in dufk of evening with a friend, as my eyes 
 are not very good, I mould aik, Pray what is 
 that flicks up in the middle of the common ? 
 Is it a tree ? And he mould anfwer, No : it is 
 a Man hanging in chains. Would he be guilty 
 of falfe language in his anfwer ? Or fuppofe I 
 afk Wbitefeld what he thinks is become of 
 him : and he tells me, " Such a wicked Man, 
 G 2
 
 [ 5* J 
 
 w not having received abfolution from me, to 
 " be fure is gone to the Devil." Muft we call 
 this an impropriety of expreffion, meerly be- 
 caufe we are pretty fure the Devil has not got 
 both parts of the palpable Individual yet ? 
 
 With regard to Agency, we hold as appears 
 by Note (b) on page 31, that in every hu- 
 man action the mind acts upon fome corpo* 
 real organ or inftrument, and having many of 
 them under command, {he can by employing 
 them refpectively affect things external, as 
 when we take up a book $ or the body, as 
 when we wipe our face $ or herfelf, as when 
 we recollect fome paft occurrence. All which 
 actions are ordinarily afcribed to the Man : for 
 we fay the Man thinks, the Man wipes his 
 face, or the Man takes up a book. But if the 
 term Man belongs only to the palpable com- 
 pound, it muft include the whole of it, and 
 cannot be applied to the mind even together 
 with fome of the limbs and organs excluiive 
 of the reft : fo that the Man neither walks, 
 nor writes, becaufe in the former his hands 
 perhaps hang dangling by his fide 5 i n the lat- 
 ter, his legs, like a couple of lazy curs, fit 
 doing nothing under the table. If we are to 
 be held to this rigorous phyfiological dialect, 
 perhaps no Man ever did a fingle thing in all 
 
 bis
 
 f S3 1 
 
 his life ; becaufe it would be difficult to af- 
 fign any action whereto fome parts of his 
 compofition were not wholly ufelefs and un- 
 concurrent. 
 
 As to the adverb alternately, I don't recoi- 
 led where we have employed it : but if we 
 have, I fee no great harm done. Poffibly Mr. 
 Monthly takes a pipe fometimes, while fitting, 
 like Fate, over the new-born babes of litera- 
 ture, to fpin their future fortunes in the temple 
 of* fame. He whiffs and thinks, and thinks 
 and whiffs again. In this cafe, might not wfc 
 fay the Man acts alternately. Sometimes up- 
 on his mouth to draw fmoke into it, and 
 fometimes upon his Pericranium to raife ideas 
 there, now and then a little fmoky too ? or 
 fhould we fay the mind acts upon the pecto- 
 ral and guttural mufcles, they act upon the 
 fuming weed in the tube, the exudations of 
 that ftimulate the fenfory nerves in his palate, 
 thefe communicate their motion to the brain, 
 which acts upon the mind again, by railing 
 up judicious obfervations for her to contem- 
 plate ? Would this learned ftile tend more tq 
 the entertainment and edification of our 
 readers ? 
 
 If our language, in all thefe particulars, has 
 been incorrect, it will be good-natured in hin> 
 
 to
 
 .> t 54 J 
 
 to fet us right. In the mean time, as a man 
 that makes auk ward bows muft go on with 
 his aukwardnefs Until his dancing-mafter can 
 teach him to perform more genteelyj fo we 
 may hope for indulgence in our vulgarity of 
 cx^reffion, until our Mafter mail inftrudt us 
 to deliver ourfelves with better grace and ele- 
 gance. 
 
 fcJ -We have fpent many more words in our 
 defence than were employed in the attack : 
 but it is always the cafe, that lefs trouble is 
 requHite to puzzle a caufe than to clear it up, 
 and -a man may make more tangles in a fine 
 fkain of thread in a minute, than he can undo 
 again in an hour. We did not undertake it 
 for the fake of our own credit, which has 
 been much mor6 raifed than deprefled by the 
 labours of our good coufin Mr. Monthly Com- 
 ment, who has faid fo many handfome things 
 of us, that it would be vanity to repeat them ; 
 and a few freedoms ought not to be taken 
 amifs, as they (how an impartiality, that adds 
 weight to what has been faid in our favour. 
 It : is common -to- fee two council fight like 
 dog and bear at the bar, without thinking the 
 worfe of one another all the while j their ftre- 
 nuoufnefs encourages clients. So our making a 
 Hide noife with' one another may turn to mu~ 
 
 tual
 
 [ 55 1 
 
 tual account ; it may ferve, like the market- 
 bell, to awaken the curiofity of cuftomers, 
 and quicken the fale of both our wares. This 
 benefit, if it accrues, we {hall be heartily 
 glad of, in gratitude for the high encomiums 
 beftowed on us ; yet we own it will be pure- 
 ly accidental : for what raifed our follicitude, 
 was the doctrine advanced, of the mind and 
 material elements fluctuating and changing 
 into one another; which feemed a revival, 
 tho' we are willing to believe it was not in- 
 tended as fuch, of the old atheiftical notion, 
 that a perceptive and active Being might be 
 formed of inert and fenfelefs principles. This 
 feemed a matter of importance to us, well 
 deferving our ferious care and endeavours to 
 prevent ; and engaged us to a replication, 
 which upon all other accounts we mould have 
 judged needlefs. 
 
 FINIS.
 
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