^::^ -•^O n PxEESE LIBRARY Un. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORN'IA Received yyQ^^^.€^/i 88 Accessions No. S^ 0>>^/ Slielf No. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE; WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE THEORIES SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON AND M. COUSIN. HENRY CAI/DERWUOl). /' EDINBURGH: THOMAS CONSTABLE AND CO. HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO., LONDON. MDCCCLIV. .C3 j^/~ i^^/ EDIKBUEOH : T. CONSTABLE, PRINTER TO HER MAJE3TV, PREFACE. The woi'k now presented to the public is intended as an illustration and defence of the proposition, that man has a positive conception of the Infinite. It is an attempt, by a careful analysis of consciousness, to prove that man does possess a notion of an Infinite Being, and, since such is the case, to ascertain the peculiar nature of the concep- tion, and the particular relations in which it is found to arise. The discussion, therefore, belongs essentially to the sphere of the higher Metaphysics, and involves a course of speculation on many points not generally agitated by our Scotch philosophers, and even on some which have not hitherto, so far as I am av/are, been contemplated in the philosophy of this country. However great is the fondness for truth, and however strong the desire for its attainment, it is felt as an unfor- tunate characteristic of all our researches, that we have to advance to the determination of positive trutb, in the midst of the conflict of contending opinions. This I have found to be painfully the case in the present instance. As I have prosecuted the argument in defence of what I firmly believe to be truth, I have found it necessary to (lifter from Sir William Hamilton to a deojrce which is VI PREFACE. painful to one who has been indebted to the instructions of that distinguished philosopher. I feel for Sir W. Hamilton a degree of esteem and respect which can be thoroughly appreciated only by those who have listened to his prelections. Notwithstanding this, however, I have endeavoured to pursue my investigations concerning the Philosophy of the Infinite, with that love of mental science, and that independence of thought, which have been imbibed under his influence, and which it is his peculiar honour to cultivate. And, although I have come to results differing widely from those of Sir W. Hamilton, I know too much of the spirit of his philosophy to imagine that he will regard it as unbecoming or disre- spectful. I have not the presumi)tion to suppose that I have completely examined, and unerringly determined, all the points involved in a question so difficult and mysterious. My end has been gained, if I have made some contribution to the Philosophy of the Infinite, and have started specula- tions which may lead to the closer investigation of a theme so important and so grand. H. C. Edin'cuegh, Sei'teinlier 1854. CONTENTS. PAfiK CHAPTER L Statement of the question, , . . 1 CHAPTER II. Examination of Sir William Hamilton's distinction of the Infinite and Absolute, 16 CHAPTER III. Examination of Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of a Negative Notion of the Infinite, ;{9 Note A.— Negative Thinking. Sir William Hamilton's Second Edition of the " Discussions," 63 CHAPTER IV. Traces of the Infinite, 68 CHAPTER V. The Knowledge of the Infinite in the Relation of Time, ... 81 CHAPTER VI. The Knowledge of the Infinite in the Relation of Space, . . 115 CHAPTER VII. The Knowledge of the Infinite Being as First Cause, . . . 1.32 Vlii CONTENTS. CHAPTER VIII. )>AUE The Knowledge of the Infinite Being as Moral Governor, . . 188 CHAPTER IX. The Knowledge of the Infinite Being as the Object of Worship, . 207 CHAPTER X. Final Statement of the Philosophy of the Infinite, .... 222 TY HK PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. CHAPTER I. STATEMENT <)P THE QUESTION. In the midst of the various effbi-ts of the human intellect, the question is an interesting one, — what are the limits of our powers of thought % We make our observations in reference to the various phenomena presented in the external world, and in the world of thought. We speculate upon the many relations which present themselves around and within us, and we seek to discover what are the laws by which all things are regulated. Field after field of observation opens befoi-e us ; and the objects of our thought enlarge and increase, till the mind is startled by their magnitude. Still, these objects have their boundaries. Every thing before us is subject to conditions ; every visible object exists in certain relations. The same is true of the mind. Starting from a point, the circle of observation may go on en- larging; with vigorous effort the mind may endeavour A 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. to embrace the expanding objects of thought ; but still it is conscious of limits. Yet, its knowledge and belief rise above the things of matter. As it looks upon a finite world, and recognises that its own powers are limited, it is also conscious of the belief in an Infinite Being, who is subject to no restrictive conditions, but is all perfect in Himself. Man exists in relation with the Infinite. The fact of his existence, and the end of his being, can be ex- plained only on this admission. The union is indis- soluble, and man cannot sever it, even though he would. Limited though he be, he exists in relation with the unlimited ; nor can he, by any effort of the mind, conceive himself restricted to a relation with the merely finite. The Infinite is a prominent object in thought and feeling ; and its recognition has exercised a powerful influence throughout the entire history of the race. What, then, is our knowledge of the Infinite, and what can we know of the Infinite God '? This is the question upon the consideration of which we propose now to enter. It is the highest inquiry to which the mind can asjoire. The question is intensely interest- ing, but, at the same time, it is confessedly the most difficult within the range of philosophical investiga- tion, whether its purpose be to determine the precise limits by which the mind is regulated, or to discover what knowledge of the Infinite is competent to man, if, indeed, such a knowledge be at all possible. In STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 3 udvanciug to such a consideration, we rise above tlie limits of this earthly scene ; we seek to obtain a notion of the mysterious Infinite ; our thouglits venture to approach the presence of that Being, who regulates all things, yet is Himself unrestricted ; and, w^e endeavour to obtain some knowledge of that God, wdio, as Infinite, can never be completely known. The difficulties of the attempt are striking. The mind must be on the stretch ; the question is shrouded in mystery ; and yet, possessing, as we consider, a necessary belief in the existence of an Infinite God, the question is a fair one, — what is our notion of that Being in whose existence we must believe ■? On the very threshold of our inquiry, we are met by such questions as these : — Can we have any notion of Infinite extension in space ? Can we have any notion of Infinite duration in time 1 Can we have any knowledge of a God, Infinite in all his attributes 1 In endeavouring to answer such questions, it may seem that the decision of the judgment is at variance from the deliverance of consciousness ; that there is a want of harmony between the logical and psycho- logical. If the question were presented, — have we any notion of the Infinite, or, still more, leaving the abstract and adopting the personal, have we any notion of an Infinite Deity 1 — the immediate deliver- ance of our consciousness would bo, that wo have a positive notion of the Infinite, and that it is not a 4 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFlNPrE. mere negative notion ; that our notion of the Deity is not a mere negation of a finite creation, but some- thing positive. If, however, on the other hand, the question be presented for determination by the judg- ment, — can the finite embrace the Infinite ? the answer would as readily come forth that the thing is impossible. On the one hand, we would be ready to answer, that we have a positive conception of the Infinite Being ; and, on the other, we would as readily repl}^ that the Infinite cannot be embraced by the finite. In a psychological point of view, we might answer the question in the afiirmative ; in a logical point of view, we might answer in the negative. Is there, then, any discrepancy in these decisions ? Or, are these diff"erent results obtained by viewing the question in diff"erent aspects ? Is there a connnon stand-point from which both may be seen to har- monise 1 When we examine consciousness, do we find that we have a notion of the Infinite, though not a distinct conception, such as is obtained by em- bracing an object ? And when we view^ it in a logical aspect, do we find that our decision only in- volves the conclusion, that we cannot embrace the Infinite in all its extent ? If so, then the tw^o positions are perfectly compatible. We have not, however, raised these points for the purpose of giving them immediate attention, but simply with the view of bringing the subject more clearly before the mind of the reader, and revealing STATEMENT OF THE QtTESTION. 15 some of the points which will require careful con- sideration. The question is viewed in an aspect purely philosophical, and its determination must be based upon the deliverance of consciousness, and be in accordance with the conditions which regulate human thought. The speculations of philosophers on this question have been various, and strongly conflicting. Some have asserted that a knowledge of the Infinite is possible, while others have resolutely maintained that it is entirely beyond the reach of human thought. Those who have admitted to man a knowledoe of the o Infinite, have adopted very diflferent theories to account for its origin. Sir William Hamilton has given "a statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought," which we shall here quote, as presenting the matter with all the precision for which that philosopher is so distinguished. ='^ He says : — " These opinions may be reduced to four, — 1st, The Unconditioned is incog- nisable and inconceivable; its notion being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived. 2d, It is not an object of knowledge ; but its notion, as a regulative * For the sake of any reader who may be imacquaintecl with the rioimii- clature of the question under discusfcion, we may remark that the te}-iiis Iiifiiti'c, A hsolute, and Unconditioned, are synonymous, and are used to designate what is subject to no conditions, limits, or restrictions. The terms will be fully discussed in the next Cliaiiter, and Sir Uilliani liaiiiilton's dcliiiition of them considered. h THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. principle of the mind itself, is more than a raei'e negation of the conditioned. 3c?, It is cognisable, but not conceivable ; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the Absolute, but it is incom- prehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are only of the relative and the different. Uh, It is cognisable and conceivable by consciousness and re- flection, under relation, difl^"oreuce, and plurality."''' H\iQ first is the opinion maintained by Sir William Hamilton himself; the aecond is that adopted by Kant ; the third is the doctrine of Schelling ; and the foiiKfh is that of M. Cousin. The opinions of Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin are those which are received at the present day, and divide philosophers generally. We intend, therefore, in the prosecution of our argument, to compare our ground especially with that maintained by these two philosophers. In the meantime, we shall make a few remarks on the other two theories, which have been more generally set aside. Kant attributes to man the power of reason in two different relations ; the one is speculative reason, the other p7'aGtical reason, and the results of both are combined by judgment. Speculative reason is con- versant with what man can know; practical reason, with what man ought to do. According to Kant, specula- tive reason does not give to man a knowledge of the Infinite Cod. but, on the contrary, expressly involves • Sir William )Iai]ul(ou"s Di.sciisfjions on Pliilosophy. p. 12, STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. / the impossibility of such knowledge. On the other hand, he asserts that practical reason gives to man the recognition of God, and that as a necessary postulate for proper moral action. Reason, there- fore, according to Kant, both denies to man the possibility of any knowledge of God, and, at the same time, affords to him a knowledge of God, as necessary to constitute him a moral being. The theory thus manifestly destroys itself, and in its nature tends to the destruction both of philosophy and religion. To make the statements of reason contradictory, is to prove it deceitful in a certain aspect, and, consequently, is to overturn the basis upon which a sound philosophy rests. To admit that reason is contradictory, and, therefore, deceitful, is to assert that God has given us a power which deceives us, and, consequently, is to shake the confi- dence of that faith in God, which is the foundation of true religion. We, therefore, set aside the doctrine of Kant as inconsistent with itself, and consequently untenable. The doctrine of SchelHng is that we obtain our knowledge of the Infinitive by sinking back into a state beyond consciousness, in which we are identified in being with the Absolute, and thus know it. We know not whether the presumption or the absurdity of this theory affords greater cause for astonishment. To retire from consciousness, and constitute oneself a part of the one Absolute Being, is ventui'iiig to a 8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. degree of presumption happily not very common. Viewed as a philosophical theory it is baseless. If Schelling thought fit to trust that he had obtained a knowledge of the Absolute, while he was not in a state of consciousness, — if he thought fit to trust that he had received a knowledge of the Infinite, which could not be retained on returning to a state of consciousness, — we do not imagine that he will obtain many supporters. Men are not accustomed to assert that they possess a knowledge of which they are not conscious. Nor need it much concern us how Schelling passed from the finite to the Infinite ; or, being once Infinite, how he again returned to the finite, since this important matter cannot be made known. This, at least, seems in- conceivable. Setting aside the theories of Kant and Schelling, there remain only those of M. Cousin and Sir William Hamilton : M. Cousin asserting that we have a know- ledge of the Infinite by relation, difi'erence, and plurality ; Sir William asserting that we can have no positive knowledge of the Unconditioned, its only notion being a negation of the Conditioned. In reference to this question, Morell says, — " Here we have three minds standing severally at the head of the respective philosophies of Britain, France, and Germany, assuming each a different hypothesis on this subject, while Kant, the Aristotle of the modern world, assumes a fourth. Under such circumstances. STATEMENT OP THE QUESTION. 9 lie must be a bold thinker who ventures to pronounce confidently upon the truth or error of any one of these opinions."'" Now, we trust that we can lay no claim to the character of a bold thinker, — it is certainly our desire that our thinking should be characterised by all caution and humility ; at the same time, w^e trust that we have sufficient fidelity to recognised truth, to be earnest in maintaining it. We have no wdsh " to pronounce confidently" upon a subject so difficult. We present our observations as a contri- bution to the Philosophy of the Infinite, and if they tend in the slightest degree to instigate to its further study, they will have gained their end, though the result of the study thus increased, should leave them far behind. In entering upon a subject so difficult as the Philosophy of the Infinite, we are conscious not only of feelings of diffidence, but of regret that we are constrained to take up a position opposed to that of Sir William Hamilton. Let us at once confess, that this fact, on the one hand, causes us the deepest regret ; and on the other, strongly convinces us of the necessity for taking the step. Respected and admired, as Sir William is, and possessing, as we rejoice to acknowledge, the very highest claims to such esteem, we cannot but regard it as unfortunate that he has propounded a doctrine concerning the Infinite so startling and hazardous. We regret that ■'■• History of Modern I'liiloHopby, vol. ii. p. 504, sicoml edition. 1 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the influence of the first philosopher of the present day, should be given so strongly to maintain the doctrine that we can have no notion of the Infinite. And when we hear around us the oft repeated admission that the arguments of Sir William on this question are unanswerable ; when we hear from others, only the feeble expression of a doubt that there may be error somewhere ; and when we find some taking up an opposite doctrine without being able to give a suflicient reason ; it is obvious that there is room for further investigation, and the im- portance of the question demands that such investi- gation be careful and minute. As a specimen of the manner in which the doctrine of Sir William has been received by many, we may take the following quotation from Morell. Considering the article on the Infinite as it first appeared in the Edinburgh Revieiu, he makes the following observa- tions, — " We freely confess that we are not yet prepared to combat, step by step, the weighty arguments by which the Scottish metaphysician seeks to establish the negative character of this great fundamental conception ; neither, on the other hand, are we prepared to admit his inference. We cannot divest our mind of the belief, that there is something positive in the glance which the human soul casts upon the world of eternity and infinity."'"' Wq find this statement made by Morell in the first * History of Modern Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 50 t. second edition. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 11 edition of his Hisiory of Philosophi/, and again repeated in the second edition, and it is only a specimen of ^Yhat has been commonly felt and expressed on the point. We confess to similar uneasiness in reference to the conclusion at which Sir William Hamilton has arrived — that man can have no knowledge of the Infinite God — and we readily admit that it is mainly to test the validity of this conclusion that we have entered upon a strict examination of the arguments adduced. M. Cousin has himself presented some defence of his position, but it is only partial, and cannot be regarded as a sufficient answer to the very formidable argimients of the philosopher of Edinbui-gh. Sir William Hamilton bases his doctrine of the inconceivability of the Infinite upon the constitution of the mind. He says that the conditions of thought are such as to render a conception of the Infinite impossible. The condition of Relativity is that which, according to this doctrine, is regarded as excluding the possibiKty of a knowledge of the Infinite. Let us take a passage from Sir William. He says, — " Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and an object of thought, known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each other ; while, independently of all this, all that we know either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of 12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the diflerent, of the modified, of the phenomenal.""'' Now, we grant all that is here said concerning the reL"ttive character of our knowledge. We grant that " consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a svd)ject and an object of thought known only in correlation ;" but, is it true that the subject and object limit each other 1 We do not admit it. We grant that the mind is limited, but does it thence follow that the object of thought must be limited '{ We think not. We grant that the mind cannot embrace the Infinite, but we neverthe- less consider that the mind may have a notion of the Infinite. No more do we believe that the mind, as finite, can only recognise finite objects, than we believe that the eye, because limited in its power, can only recognise those objects whose entire ex- tension comes within the range of vision, j^s well tell us that because a mountain is too large for the eye of a mole, therefore the mole can recognise no mountain : as well tell us that because the world is too large for the eye of a man, therefore man can re- cognise no world — as tell us that because the Infinite cannot be embraced by the finite mind, therefore the mind can recognise no Infinite. We altogether deny the assertion of Sir William Hamilton, that " the Absolute can only be known, if adequately known ;" though we admit that " it can only be adequately known by the Absolute itself.'^ We * Discussions;, p. 1-1. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 1 .S deny that we must have eitlier an adequate notion of the Absolute, or no notion of it at all. There is nothing in our mental constitution to prevent us having an indefinite conception of an object of which we can form no adequate conception. On the con- trary, our experience presents proof, both abundant and convincing, of the possibility of indefinite and inadequate conceptions of objects not fully recognised. With these convictions, we find ourselves shut up to an opposite theory from that wdiich affii-ms that we can have no knowledge of the Infinite. Yet, though this be the case, we are w^illing to admit that our knowledge is only of the relative. That is to say, w^e admit that an object must come into relation with the mind in order to be known, and that even when an object is thus presented, we can recognise only its relative manifestations or properties. We do not profess a system of Ontology, nor do we think this at all necessary in order to establish the possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite. When, therefore. Sir William, in laying down the conditions of thought, restricts us to a knowledge of the relative, we perfectly concur in the restriction, but we think this restriction is carried too far, when it is maintained that nothing can exist in relation to our mind as an object of thought, except the finite. It is possible to confine us by a theor}'- to an extent much greater than we are in realit}' restricted ; it is possible to raise barriers which may seem to establish the im- 14 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. possibility of our obtaining, or possessing any know- ledge of what we can know ; nay, of what we do know. This we consider Sir William Hamilton has done in asserting the impossibility of our obtaining any knowledge of the Infinite. In treating of the Infinite, he has dealt with a mere abstraction, for the knowledge of which no one contends, which does not even exist, and by arguments, which are sufficiently valid as applied to the abstraction which he has himself enunciated, he has seemed to establish the impossibility of our obtaining any knowledge of the Infinite. To vindicate for man a knowledge of the Infinite, and remove the objections thus urged against it, is the purpose of the present Treatise. We consider that the balance of truth in this case is to be found with M. Cousin, though we think it necessary to premise, that in upholding the French philosopher, we do so only to a limited extent, and that merely in reference to this individual doctrine, and not in reference to the relation which that doctrine holds in his system. Nor are we to be understood as tending towards a system of Eclecti- cism, with which we have little sympathy. We cer- tainly believe that M. Cousin is right in maintaining that we have a positive notion of the Infinite, but we are not by any means persuaded that he has strictly confined himself to a delineation of consciousness. On the contrary, we consider that he has encumbered the doctrine with matter altogether untenable, and STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 15 has thus laid it open to assault, so that, at a cursory glance, it might seem that even the citadel itself had been considerably shaken. We admire the great central truth in the philosophy of M. Cousin, but we regard the various points of Eclecticism, which he has made to cluster around it, as so many outposts, worse than useless, which ought to fall to atoms, and which have so fallen under the effective assaults of the Scottish metaphysician. CHAPTER 11. EXAMINATION OF SIR AVILLIAM HAMILTON'S DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. Before entering upon a consideration of the re- spective theories in reference to the Infinite, it is necessary that we precisely determine what we understand by the terms employed ; for even here there is a diversity between Sir William Hamilton and other philosophers. On this ])oint there are three terms in common use — the Infinite, the Ab- solute, and the Unconditioned. In the ordinary language of philosophers, these three terms are re- garded as synonymous ; the Infinite is that which is absolute, that which is unconditioned, that which is limited or restricted by no conditions. But in the language of Sir William, the Infinite is the " un- conditionallj^ unlimited," the Absolute is the "uncon- ditionally limited," and the Unconditioned is the genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species. According to this distinction, the Infinite is that which is without beginning or termination, — which is circumscribed by no boundaries, which is DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITP: AND ABSOLUTE, 17 determined by no limits. The Absolute is that which, while limited, is finished, perfect, or complete in itself; and, consequently, is subject to no condi- tions. The two constitute, according to this theory, the ojDposite poles, between which alone all thought, as conditioned, is possible. To both of these ex- tremes or poles belongs the characteristic of being unconditioned, and they are, therefore, taken together to constitute one genus under this title. In making this distinction, its author finds in the two extremes which he has indicated as the Infinite and the Absolute, the character of being uncondi- tioned, or destitute of any conditions or relations which affect their existence. This is what they possess in common, and what renders them capable of being classified under one genus, which is thus called the Unconditioned. That which distinguishes them from each other, is that, while both are uncon- ditioned, the Infinite is unlimited, the Absolute is limited, hut perfect. In contradistinction to this, other philosophers have regarded the Infinite and Absolute as one and the same, and have not recognised the pos- sibility of any other Absolute than the Infinite. With all deference to Sir William, we consider that the pro- blem of the Unconditioned is one, and not twofold as he has maintained ; and, in confirmation of our opinion, we shall endeavour to show that the Infinite is also Absolute, and that the Absolute postulated by him is not really absolute. B 18 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFlNPrE. I. In entering upon this point, onv first question is, — Are philosophers in general wrong in regarding the Infinite as in its nature also Absolute 1 Does that quality which we distinguish by the name of Absolute, belong, or not belong, to the Infinite ? Sir William distinguishes the Infinite and Absolute, not only as essentially distinct, but also as contradictory opposites, consequently, it seems from this doctrine, that philosophers in regarding the Infinite as at the same time Absolute, must have been attributing to it that which does not belong to it. Our question, therefore, is, — Do philosophers in general include in the Infinite that which does not pertain to it ; or, does the author of this distinction exclude from it that which ought to belong to it 1 Let us first define the term Absolute. The plain and etymological meaning of the term is freed or loosed, and hence it means freed from restriction or condition. In this sense it is evident that the In- finite must be absolute ; that that which has no limitation does not afford the possibility of restriction. This is the sense in which philosophers have uni- formly used the word ; and, in this sense, Sir Wil- liam admits that " the Absolute is not opposed to the Infinite."''^ Thus far, then, there is no dif- ference. If philosophers, therefore, are chargeable in the matter, it is not in respect of positive error, but in respect of neglect. One question, however, is Discussions, page 13. DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 19 open at this point, — Is it warrantable in Sir William to take a term which naturally, and bj common consent, expresses a certain notion, and appl}' it to that which is entirely distinct ? Is it warrantable to make such an unusual application of a term in common use, and thereby cause it to appear as if philosophers had entirely mistaken the character of the Absolute, and had ascribed to the Infinite that which does not belong to it 1 If it be true, as our author admits, that, in the primary sense of the word absolute, the Infinite, from its very nature, is ab- solute, is it warrantable to take the word absolute and apply it to that which is asserted to be contra- dictory of the Infinite 1 We might push our question farther and say, if the Infinite be necessarily absolute, can that be really absolute wdiich is contradictory of the Infinite ? But this is to anticipate what shall be afterwards considered. The meaning of the term ab- solute, as employed by Sir William, will shortly appear ; but what we w^ish observed in the meantime, is that he admits that philosophers are correct in regarding the Infinite and Absolute as convertible, if the latter term be used as expressiveof entire freedom from all restric- tion. His objection is, not that philosophers have put their Absolute in the wrong place, but that they have failed to recognise an Absolute in another sense which he marks out. We have deemed these remarks neces- sary, since at a cursory glance it might seem that our author considers that philosophei-s have blundered in assertino- that the Infinite is also Absolute. 20 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. The sense in which Sir WilHam employs the term absolute, when he distinguishes it as a contradictory of the Infinite, is what \^ finished, perfected, completed ; so that the absolute in this sense is " what is out of relation, &c., as finished, perfect, complete, total."* In reference to the application of the ivord abso- lute in this sense, we remark, first, that it is to be observed, that even this definition of the Absolute, so far from excluding the Infinite, or being contra- dictory of it, in reality includes it. This is suffi- ciently plain, for it is obvious that the Infinite is perfect and whole. If anything be "perfect" or " complete," the Infinite must, for if it wei'e imperfect or incomplete, it would be no longer infinite. If anything be " total," the Infinite must, for if there were any want in its totality it would cease to exist. We say again, therefore, that even with this second definition given by Sir William, philosophers were right in including the Absolute with the Infinite, and considering them applicable to the same existence. This is true whatever that may be which Sir Wil- liam places at the opposite extreme from the In- finite, and pronounces contradictory of it ; for we have shown that this quality of perfection, or com- pleteness, which characterises the Absolute, belongs also to the Infinite, since the Infinite is perfect or complete. Whatever, therefore, be the other ex- treme embraced in the theory which we are con- Discnssioiis, page 13. DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE xVND ABSOLUTE. 21 sidering, it is plain that the Infinite is perfect as well, and yet Sir William says that, " in this accepta- tion, the Absolute is diametrically opposed to. is contradictory of, the Infinite." On this ground, we remark, secondly, that, since Sir William's Absolute is pronounced contradictory of the Infinite, and yet it is apparent that the defini- tion of the Absolute in reality embraces the Infinite, there has not been drawn a sufficiently clear verbal distinction. If the definition of the Absolute pre- sented by our author, indicates that which is contra- dictory of the Infinite, it, at the same time, indicates what as really belongs to the Infinite, and, therefore, includes too much, that is, includes so mueh that it invalidates the asserted contradiction. If there be at all such a thing, therefore, as that Avhich Sir Wil- liam describes as the contradictory of the Infinite, and which he names the Absolute, we submit that the distinction has not been drawn with sufficient clearness ; for, that which is presented as the specific difference of the Absolute, namely, perfection or com- pleteness, belongs as much to the Infinite as to the Absolute, and, therefore, constitutes no specific dif- ference. That perfection and not limitation is the specific difference between the Infinite and the Ab- solute as distinguished in this theory is sufficiently plain. Limitation is the specific difference between the finite and the Infinite, and this quality belongs to the Absolute only as a finite object, and distin- 22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. guislies it from the Infinite, not specially, but only .IS it distinguishes the whole crowd of finite objects. Perfection or completeness is thus the quality which belongs to the Absolute as unconditioned; it is presented as the specific difference between the Absolute and the Infinite ; and inasmuch as this quality belongs to the Infinite equally with the Ab- solute, there is no specific difierence established, and the distinction breaks down. Of course, these re- marks are based upon the admission that there is such a thing as this Absolute — this absolutely per- fect or complete existence — apart from the Infinite and contradictory of it. This we admit only for the sake of the verbal ci-iticism, and for the purpose of showing that the nomenclature employed in other systems of philosophy is, at least, more exact than that of the theory which distinguishes the Infinite and Absolute as contradictory opposites. We shall immediately consider whether there is such an Ab- solute as that indicated by Sir William as opposed to the Infinite, but all that we say at present is, that, admitting that there is, the distinction between them has not been defined with sufficient clearness, since both Infinite and Absolute are alike perfect and com- plete ; and we suspect that, had the distinction been clearly drawn, and presented in a verbal form, that verbal form would at once have revealed the unten- able character of that which is thus named the Abso- lute, and distinguished as contradictory of the Infinite. DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 23 II. Our second question on this point is this, — Is there such an Absolute as that which Sir WilHani postulates, and which he asserts to be contradictory of the Infinite ? Is that which he postulates, really absolute, or lias it any existence at all 1 In endea- vouring to answer this question, let us recall Sir William's definition of the Infinite and of the Absolute ; it is this, — the Infinite is the unconditionally un- limited, the Absolute is the unconditionally limited. Now, we cannot understand in what sense the Ab- solute can be called the unconditionally limited, in what sense anything can be called unconditioned which is at the same time limited. Is not limitation a condition of existence ; to be limited, to be con- ditioned ? May we not as well speak of the un- limitedly limited, or of the unconditionally condi- tioned, as of the unconditionally limited ? If the Infinite is unconditioned inasmuch as it is unlimited, must not the Absolute be conditioned inasmuch as it is limited "? But, to be more particular, let us take the illustration of the A bsolute which Sir William gives. He says : — "For example, on the one hand, wecan positively con- ceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a whole so great, that we cannot conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole ; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts." Sir William says, hat we cannot realize in thought the Absolute which 24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. he distinguishes, any more than we can realize the Infinite, but, if we could realize it, here are two in- stances of what it would be, — 1st, " A whole so great, that we cannot conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole," that is, a vi'hole pe?ifect in itself, quite complete, and not standing related as a part to some greater whole. '2d, " A part so small, that we can- not also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts," that is, a part perfect in itself, quite complete, and while a part, at the same time a whole, one and indivisible, and not standing related to any parts of which it should be the sum. These, if they could be realized, would both present examples of what this philosopher distinguishes as the Absolute. Let us direct attention to both of these in their order. 1st, The Absolute, in the sense in which Sir William employs that term, is exemplified in a whole so great, that it forms no part of some greater whole. Let us then, imagine a whole which is so small as to be confessedly conditioned, being related both to certain parts which it contains, and to a certain whole in which it is contained. Let us then extend from this whole, to the greater in which it is contained ; and again to that which is still greater ; and, pro- ceeding in this manner, we ask the question, — can the absolute whole, of which we are in search, ever be reached 1 Our answer to this question must be twofold. In i\\e first place, w^e say it never can, un- less we reach the Infinite. However large the whole DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 25 to which we may reach ; how^ever large the whole to which w^e could reach, it never could be absolute unless it were also infinite. Whatever may have been the extent of the whole, with w^hich, on account of the limited character of our mental powers, we have terminated, it must be related to another be- yond, and this must be the case wath every whole short of the Infinite. The only absolute wdiole which can exist is that which is at once infinite and indi- visible. We say, therefore, that this whole which Sir WiUiam postulates as opposed to the Infinite, and nevertheless unconditioned, cannot exist. We ad- mit that we cannot think it, and why are we unable? Not, assuredly, on account of any new difiiculty pre- sented to the mind by the presentation of this new Absolute, but the difficulty is precisely the difficulty of reaching or thinking tlie Infinite. W^e never could reach such a whole without reaching the Infinite, and, though we hold that w^e can know the Infinite, we admit that we never could attain a knowledge of it in this manner, since it would require eternity to ac- complish it ; and, therefore, though we were always approximating to it, it never could be reached. We never could reach an absolute whole by a process of imagination constantly enlarging the object of thought, simply became we never could reach the Infinite. And even though we could reach the In- finite in this manner, it would not be really uncon- ditioned, since it would bo made up f>f parts, and 26 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. therefore conditioned. By directing us to think an absolute whole, that is, " a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole ;" the difficulty has not been shifted in the least. For, if this absolute whole be finite, we can think it, if it be not finite, then it is infinite, it is identical with the Infinite, and we cannot think it, just because we cannot think the Infinite. On this ground again, we think that philosophers in general are right in making the Absolute identical with the Infinite, and denying the possibility of any other unconditioned. On grounds already stated, we have shown that, if philosophers be chargeable at all, it cannot be for error in what the^^ have stated, since, whatever be Sir William's Absolute, the In- finite is also absolute in the very same sense, so that, if chargeable at all, it can be only for deficiency in theory by the neglect of an Absolute, which either does exist, or can exist. On grounds now stated, we consider that philosophers are not chargeable even with deficiency, since the Absolute presented in this theory as distinct from the Infinite, neither does exist nor can exist. In the second place, we remark, that even could we reach such a whole as that indicated by Sir Wil- liam, it would not be absolute. Let us begin again with a limited whole, and advance from it to a still larger whole in which it is contained, and, advancing in this manner from less to greater, let us suppose i DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 27^ '^1°^^ that we reach such a whole as would realize the -^ '^■s>,. /^^; Absolute as defined, viz., a whole which is perfect and complete in itself, inasmuch as it does not stand related as a part to some greater whole. Now. sup- posing that there were such a whole, and that we had reached it, we ask if we have after all obtained a whole which is really absolute. We answer that we have not. Though such a whole were free from all relation as a part contained in a greater whole, it is related to the parts which it contains ; the combination of pai'ts is a necessary condition of its existence. If such a whole could exist, it would be unconditioned or absolute only on one side, by being- free from relation to a superior whole ; while it would be conditioned on the other side by being- related to certain component parts of which it would be the sura. As a necpssary condition of its exist- ence, it would be made up of parts. But the Ab- solute is that which is entirely unconditioned ; the whole indicated by Sir William is conditioned ; therefore, it is not absolute. On this ground, again, we think philosophers are right in admitting no Ab- solute, but the Infinite. The only absolute unity is the Infinite, which is one and indivisible. Let us now turn to the other example aftbrded by the philosopher who has presented the distinction, and see if any better foundation can be made out here for an Absohite distinct from the Infinite, and opposed to it as contradictory. The example is. 28 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. " an absolute part, that is, a part so small that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts." If, then, we imagine the part of a limited whole, and then take a part of this part, and thus proceed diminishing, could we ever in thought reach a part which would be absolute and final, by not being itself divisible into parts ? In the Jirst place, we answer in the same manner as in the previous instance, that w^e cannot ; but we do so in the present case upon ground somewhat different from that adopted in the former. In refer- ence to the absolute whole indicated, we said that we never could reach it in thought, unless we could reach the Infinite ; in reference to the Absolute part now indicated, we say that we never can reach it, unless we can think nothing, and, since to think nothing is not to think at all, we never can reach it. Since we cannot think the division of a part resulting in nothing, every part we think is thought under the condition of being again divisible into parts. Division is a processof diminution, and if, in descending through this process, we were to reach the absolute part indi- cated by Sir William, it would be the smallest possible part — the point just next to nothing — any diminu- tion of which would result in nothing. By each act of division, we diminish the amount of existence. Suppose, then, that we reach the least possible part — the part just next to nothing. Though we cannot in thought divide this least possible part into two, is DISTINCTION OP THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 29 it not possible that there may still be a diminution of existence 1 Clearl}'' there may. So long as there is existence, there may be diminution of it ; that is to say, there may be diminution until the entire existence is annihilated. What hinders, then, to think a part so small that it could not l)e again divided 1 In other words, what hinders to think a part so smaJl that any diminution of its existence would result in annihilation 1 Simply the impossi- bility to think annihilation — the impossibility to think nothing — the necessity to have something as the result of each act of thought — the necessity to have an object of thought — the necessity to think existence. In the present instance, therefore, we do not say, as in the previous case, that we cannot reach this Absolute unless we can think the Infijiite ; be- cause, wei-e it possible to talk of an Infinite in the case, it would be an Infinite entirely different from that of which we speak in endeavouring to reach an absolute whole. In endeavouring to reach an absolute whole, the object of thought is always extending, that is, approximating to an Infinite object. But, in en- deavouring to reach an absolute part, the object of thought is always diminishing, that is, receding from an Infinite object, so that, if in this relation we can at all use the term Infinite, it must be in reference to the process of division. In the one case, it is an Infinite object towards which we proceed ; in the other, if such were possible, it would be an Infinite 30 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINrrE. process in which we proceed. In attempting, there- fore, to reach an absolute part, we do not make the difficulty identical with the difficulty of reaching the Infinite, since, in this instance, there is no Infinite to be reached. Still farther, we deny that the difficulty of reaching an absolute part arises from the difficulty of carrying out an Infinite process, since it is glaringly absurd to imagine that a finite part could afford ground for an infinite process of division. We therefore place the difficulty of reaching an absolute part, that is, a part which is one and indivisible, in the impossibility of thinking nothing. As the mind carries out a process of division, the result in each case must be, either a part which is again divisible, or a part so small that it cannot be again divided. As already shown, the former cannot always continue, and it is impossible to realize the other in thought, since any attempt at the division of such a part would result in annihilation, that is, in nothing, and since the mind cannot realize annihilation, that is, nothing, the only change of a part which it can think is division. The reader will observe that the fact to be ac- counted for is that, wdiile it is logically manifest that a finite object cannot be infinitely divisible, it is psychologically tiue that, in carrying out a process of division, we cannot, in thought, reach a part which may not be again divided. The question, then, is, wdiy can we not think such a part ? Sir William i DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 3i sajs because it is absolute, that is, because it is not made up of parts. This we deny. We can think an object without at all considering whether it is raade up of parts. We can think a stone, without consider- ing whether it is made up of parts ; and in the same manner we could think this absolute part were it presented to us. It is therefore plain that the im- possibihtj of thinking such a part does not arise from its being absolute in the sense indicated by Sir William. Though the mind cannot embrace the Infinite in all its extent, surely it may embrace this small part. The difficulty is, not to think an object of a certain degree of minuteness, but, while the mind is carrying on a process of division, to reach a part so small that it cannot be divided. While it is logically manifest that, iu the course of division, we must reach the smallest possible part, why is it that we cannot realize in thought the existence of such a part 1 We answer, because the process is one of diminution, and we never can think an act of diminu- tion which results in nothing — and that, because we cannot think nothing. We therefore say that the impossibility of thinking such a part does not arise from the fact of its being absolute, but it arises from the mental impossibility of thinking nothing, and is itself only an example of that impossibility. In the second place, we remark that, even though we could realize this indivisible part, it would not be absolute. An absolute part is a contradiction in 32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. terms, for a part is only the tei-m of a relation. Sucli a part is obviously related to the whole of which it is a part, and, consequently, it is not absolute, but conditioned. Taking the two examples of the Absolute thus afforded, viz., an absolute whole and an absolute part, we find that they are conditioned, and that upon the converse sides, the absolute whole being necessarily related to the pai'ts of which it is the sum, and the absolute part being related to the whole of which it is a part. . In confuting the argu- ments of the French philosopher, the Scottish meta- physician has argued " that the Absolute, as defined by Cousin, is only a relative, and a conditioned ;" and we think that by a similar course of reasoning, the argument may be turned with equal force against the Absolute postulated by Sir WilHam, as contra- dictory of the Infinite. Here again, therefore, we conclude that philosophers are right in consider- ing the Unconditioned as only a single existence, which is both Infinite and Absolute. In a sentence, the professed absolute whole and absolute part are not in reality absolute, since whole and part are mere relative terms, and express a relation. The existence of all the parts is a necessary condition of the existence of the whole : the existence of the whole is a necessary condition of the existence of a part. Once more, Ave remark that Sir William defines the Absolute, not only as what is perfect, complete, DISTINCTION OF TIIH INFINITE AND AMSOLUTK. Xi or whole; but, also, what i^Jinisliecl perfected, complet- ed, thereby indicating progression or causal energy, which, at its termination, results in the production of the Absolute. Now\ we ask if all this does not indicate something essentially relative? The Abso- lute, which is subject to no conditions, is thus made dependent for its existence upon a foregone relation. That which is finished, must have been previously unfinished; that which m perfected, must have been previously imperfect ; that which is completed must have been previously incomplete. That wdiich is progressing, but is not finished ; that which is in process towards perfection, but not perfected ; that which is in process of completion, but is not completed ; is in its very nature relative and subject to conditions. The very definition as stated by Sir AVilliam is fatal to his doctrine. If this be the Abso- lute, it is evolved out of the relative, and is thus contradictory. If the Absolute be that which is subject to no conditions, this certainly is not the Absolute, since it has been produced by subjection to those conditions wdiich constituted its relation to the perfecting or completing power. If to be finished or completed is to be Absolute, what may we not reckon Absolute \ And if this be the Absolute, what hinders us to think it 1 We say that the object com- pleted is related to the com[)leting cause, and this, being a relation, can be thought ; for relativity is a condition of thought. In answer to this, it is to no c 34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. purpose to tell us that, according to Sir William's theory, the notion of causality arises from a weakness of the mental powers. Whatever be the theory adopted on this question, cause and effect is admitted to be a relation which we cannot but think, and, consequently, if this notion exists in the mind, it supposes a relation. That which is finished or completed supposes such a relation ; the Absolute, according to Sir William's definition, is that which is free from all relation ; therefore, this is not an Absolute, We have thus fully brought out what is the Absolute as distinguished by Sir William. In refer- ence to this Absolute, he says it is " diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the Infinite." Now, in so far as this professed Absolute is Jiiiite, we of course admit that it is contradictory of the Infinite, but this it is in common with every other finite object. If it were absolute in the sense of being perfect, and complete, and out of all relation, which it is not, it would not be contradictory of the Infinite, since the Infinite is also perfect and complete. But, we have seen that this Absolute is not unconditioned, and the distinction between the Infinite and Absolute has not been presented with sufficient clearness. Had the distinction been presented fully in a verbal form, the fallacy would have been quite apparent. In such a form the Infinite would be the absolute-absolute, or the absolutely absolute, that is, the Absolute on both DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 35 sides, the really absolute ; the Absolute as distin- guished bj Sir William, would be the relatively absolute, which is a contradiction in terms, and no absolute. III. Once more, granting to Sir William the Absolute which he distinguishes, our third question is, — How can it be pronounced one extreme, between which and the Infinite lies all positive thought 1 Sir William contrasts an absolute whole with an infinite whole ; and, on the other hand, an absolute part with an infinite process. We place the latter case, therefore, entirely out of account, since in that instance the absolute is not contrasted with a real infinite ; in fact, if there is any thing to be called absolute in the case, it would be an absolute process, that is, a completed process in reaching an indivisible part, in contrast with an infinite process of division, which cannot be carried out. The only object con- trasted by Sir William with the really Infinite, is the absolute whole, and we ask, does all positive thought in reference to wholes lie between these two extremes 1 Or, descending, if you will, to the absolute part, does all positive thought in reference to parts lie between such an indivisible part, and an infinite process of division ? Assuredly not. Does all conditioned thought, that is, all limited thought, lie between the unconditionally unlimited, and the unconditionally limited f The very terms of the question, we should consider, clearly show that the answer must be in 3G THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the negative. So far from Sir William having pre- sented an Absolute, which is an extreme opposed to the Infinite, we would rather say that he has attempted, by abstracting a quality from the Un- conditioned, viz., that of completeness, and joining* it to a quality of the Conditioned, viz., that of limita- tion, thus to obtain a connecting link betw^een the Conditioned and the Unconditioned. But it is rather too much, after having formed a hybrid by the union of a quality of the Unconditioned, and a quality of the Conditioned, to take philosophers to task, and pronounce their theories incomplete, for not having taken into account such a mongrel notion. We have thus presented the grounds upon which we agree w^ith philosophers generally, in considering that there is only one existence to which we can apply the term Unconditioned. The only uncon- ditioned existence in which we believe, is that which is at once Infinite and Absolute, — wdiich is at once unlimited and unrestricted. The term Unconditioned has been employed in a twofold signification, as denoting either the entire absence of all restriction, or, more w^idely, the entire absence of all relation. The former we regard as its only legitimate application. The Absolute is that which is free from all necessary relation, that is, which is free from every relation as a condition of existence; but, it may exist in relation, provided DISTIN'CTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 37 that relation be not a necessary condition of its existence, that is, provided the relation may be re- moved without affecting its existence. Sir William employs the term Unconditioned in the more ex- tended signification, that is, as implying the absence of all relation, and that, as we hope afterwards to show, most unwarrantably. It is enough for our purpose, in the meantime, simply to remark, that whichever signification be employed, the Absolute as postulated by Sir William, is equally excluded. If Unconditioned be taken to mean iinresfricted, that is, in every sense unlimited, then this Absolute, as limited, is excluded. If Unconditioned be taken to mean unrelated, that is, in every sense free from re- lation, again this Absolute, as related, is excluded. This applies equally to the absolute whole, and to the absolute part indicated by Sir William, since both exist by relation. In conclusion, we use the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Unconditioned as applicable to only one existence. As applied to this one Being, they are nearly synonymous, though each may be regarded as having a peculiar shade of meaning. The Infinite expi-esses the entire absence of all limitatiun, and is applicable to the one Infinite Being in all his attri- butes. The Absolute expresses perfect independence both in being and in action. The Unconditioned indicates entire freedom from every necessary rela- tion. The wlioic three unite in expressing the entire 38 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. absence of all restriction. But, let this be particularly observed, they do not imply that the one Infinite Being cannot exist in relation, they impl}'- only, that He cannot exist in a necessary relation, that is, if He exist in relation, that relation cannot be a necessary condition of his existence. . CHAPTER III. EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S DOCTRINE OF A NEGATIVE NOTION OF THE INFINITE. In the previous Chapter, we liave stated the grounds upon which we exchide from consideration the Absokite, which has been distinguished b}^ Sir Wilham Hamilton, as opposed to the Infinite. Our future discussion will, therefore, be entirely occupied with a consideration of the possibility of a knowledge of the In finite, and we now proceed to direct attention to the theory of Sir William on this question. His doctrine is, that "the Unconditioned, {i.e., the Infinite,) is incognisable and inconceivable ; its notion being only the negative of the Conditioned, (i.e., the finite,) which last can alone be positively known or conceived." Sir William thus asserts that the Infinite is inconceivable, and yet, in the very next clause, he speaks of " its notion," and it seems con- sidered enough to defend the rather glaring contra- diction, that the notion is called a negative one. " A negative notion" is certainly a rather strange ex- pression, and as to the thing intended to be indicated. 40 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THK INFINITE. \\G are sorry that we cannot coincide in its adoption. This so called negative notion is what is assigned by Sir William as the Philosophy of the Infinite, since, according to him, our notion of the Infinite is a negative notion. Whenever M. Cousin reasons that our notion of the finite implies a notion of the Infinite, — no such thing, says Sir William, there are no two such relative notions in the mind as the finite and the Infinite ; our notion of the Infinite is obtained by the mere negation of the qualities of the finite, — it is a negative notion. Now, we maintain, with M. Cousin, that our notion of a finite object, implies also the notion of an Infinite object ; that our notion of a finite being, implies the notion of an Infinite Being. Let us, then, hear Sir William's argument. His words are these ; YL Cousin " maintains that the idea of the Infinite or Absolute, and the idea of the finite or relative are equally real, because the )totion of the one necessarily suggests the notion of the other." In answer to this. Sir William says, " Correlatives certainly suggest each other, but cor- relatives may, or may not, be equally real and positive. In thought, contradictories necessarily imply each other, for the knowledge of contradictories is one. But the reality of one contradictory, so far from iiuaranteeinfj; the realitv of tlie other, is nothing; else than its negation. Thus every positive notion (the concept of a thing b}' what it is) suggests a negative notion, (the concej't of ;i thing by wliat it NEGATIVE NOTION OF TIJK INFINITE. 41 is not); and the highest positive notion, the notion of the Conceivable, is not without its corresponding negative in the notion of the Inconceivable. But tliough these mutually suggest each other, the positive alone is real ; the negative is only an abstraction of the other, and, in the highest generality, even an abstraction of thought itself. It, therefore, behoved M. Cousin, instead of assuming the objective correality of his two elements on the fact of their subjective correlation, to have suspected, on this very ground, that the reality of the one was inconsistent w^ith the reality of the other.'"-' Our first remark on this quotation concerns the irrelevant chai-acter of its reasoning. We ask the reader's attention to the first and last sentences in the quotation ; to the statement in the first, of what is the question to be discussed, and to the statement in the last sentence, wdiich, while it professes to be an adverse decision against M. Cousin's position, as indicated in the first, is in reality a decision upon a question altogether different. The words which we have placed in italics in the two sentences will at once reveal our meaning. M. Cousin's position, as stated in the first sentence, is that "the idea of the infinite, and the idea of the finite are equally real," — that both are real idean. In liis conclusion. Sir William asserts, that M. Cousin ought not to have assumed " the objective coi-reality (»f his two elements * Discussions, p. '27. 42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. on the fact of their subjective correlation." Sir Wilham ends by asserting, that M. Con.sin ought not to have assumed the objective correlation of his two elements, an assumption luhich is not contained in M. Cousins position, as stated by Sir William himself ; and, in the very same breath, Sir William admits the fact of their subjective correlation, which is precisely M. Cousin's position, and the point ichich Sir William himseJf professes to overturn. M. Cousin certainly maintains the objective correality of the two elements, but the point which the Scotch philosopher here brings up, is M. Cousin's assertion of their subjective correality. It was with this that Sir William had to grapple, and so far from overturning it, he ends by admitting it as a fact. An examination of the whole quotation will reveal what does seem either unac- countable vagueness, or similar irrelevancy. For example, take the second sentence, — " Correlatives certainl}'- suggest each other, but correlatives may, or may not, be equally real and positive." Now, does this mean that correlatives may, or may not, be subjectively real ; or, that they may, or may not, be ob- jectively real. If the former, the statement is legiti- mate as an objection, though, as we think, false as a proposition, which we hope presently to show ; if the latter, it has nothing to do with the question raised in the paragraph from which the quotation is taken. Let us now, however, proceed to examine some- what more minutely the argument of Sir William in NEGATIVE NOTION OF THE INFINITE. 43 reference to correlatives, and his doctrine concerning our knowledge of the Infinite based upon it. His argument is this, — That there are in the mind certain correlative notions, onlj one of which is positive, the other being negative ; that the correlative notions of the finite and of the Infinite belong to this class ; and, that the notion of the Infinite is only negative. We shall consider, — I. The assertion that there are in the mind certain correlative notions, one of which is a positive notion, and the other a negative notion. In the w^ords of Sir William, " correlatives may, or may not, be equally real and positive," that is to say, there may be in the mind certain correlatives, of which only one term can be positively realized in thought. The question thus reduces itself to this, — what is our knowledge of relatives 1 Does the knowledge of relatives involve a knowledge of both terms of the relation '{ This question Sir William answers in the negative. He says, that relatives may, or may not, be positive, — that in some cases one term of the relative is positive, and the other negative. To this we answer, that to think a negation is not to think at all, consequently, a relation between a positive and a negative is no relation at all. We can think no such relation, and "a negative notion" is a contradiction in terms, since, according to Sir William's own statement, "negative thinking" is "a negation of thought.""''' * Discussions, p. 578. 44 THE IMIILOSOPHY f)F THE INFINITE. It is thus apparent, that, in the relation between a positive notion, and ^Yhat is called " a negative notion," there is one of the terms which involves the negation of all thought, that is, which cannot be thought ; and, not to think both terms of a relation, is not to think a relation at all. How is it possible to think, or how can there possibly be, a relation between that which is and that which is not, — between something and nothing, — between entity and non- entity, — between existence and that which does not exist ? In fact, how can a relation exist, when there is only one existent term 1 But, let us hear Sir William again ; he says, — " Every positive notion (the concept of a thing by what it is) suggests a negative notion, (the concept of a thing by what it is not)." We regret being under the necessity of thus, step by step, taking up a position antagonistic to the venerated author of the " Discussions on Philosophy," yet we cannot avoid it. We deny, then, that every positive notion we have of any object, at the same time raises in our mind a negative notion. Since Sir William distinctly states that negative thinking is the absolute negation of thought, how can he speak of a positive notion sur/gestijiff a negative notion ? How can an absolute negation of thought be suggested to the mind "? And yet, a negative notion seems something after all, — it is named a " concei)t," — a concept of a thing by what it is not. A rare conccj)t verily ! How can we form NEGATIVE NOTION OF THE INFINITE. 45 a concept of a tiling by what it is not 1 Truly the attempt would involve either an absolute negation of thought, or something very difierent from the object of search. An examination of such asserted correlatives as a positive and a negative notion of the same object, will show that only one of the asserted relatives is real, and, consequently, that no relation exists. Take such instances as these, — round and not-round, — square and not-square, — hard and not-hard, — strong and not-strong. Any of these may suffice as illus- trations. If we take round and not-round, and think an object as round, on examining our consciousness, we shall find that there is no such thought accom- panying it in our mind as this negative notion, called not-round. Suppose that the object be a stone, and that we think the stone as round. Let us then attempt to think the stone as not round, and it will be found that we cannot realize the stone as an object of thought, except under some particular form, — that while w^e think it round, we can have no negative notion of it, no concept of the stone by what it is not, — to think it as not round, we must think it as square, triangular, or some other form, — we must have a positive notion of it, as of some particular shape. It is one of the simplest and most surely determined points in philosophy, that we can think only inasmuch as we think an object in existence, and that to think an ol)jcct in existence, w^c must 46 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. think it as possessed of certain positive qualities. We cannot form a concept of an object by thinking away certain qualities ; nay more, we cannot even think away one quality without realizing in thought some other positive quality. We, therefore, main- tain that consciousness does not harmonise with the assertion, that " every positive notion (the concept of a thing by what it is) suggests a negative notion, (the concept of a thing by what it is not)." Still further, we deny the doctrine of Sir William, that we may pronounce objects to be contradictory, which are themselves inconceivable. It is a plain dictate of reason, That objects must he capable of being conceived or apprehended, before we are entitled to pronounce them contradictory.'^ Contradiction is only a species of relation, and all contradictories must be conceivable, for we can judge and pronounce them to be contradictory only inasmuch as we can apprehend or conceive them both separately and in relation. For example, death and life are contra- dictories ; we cannot think a person both dead and alive at the same time, but we have no difficulty in first thinking a person alive, and then thinking the same person dead. Having thus, by an act of simple * The application of this maxim, so simple in itself, yet so resolutely overlooked, would be of immense value both to Philosophy and Theology. Strict conformity with it, would save us from many of the difficulties into which we have very unnecessarily pressed ourselves. A work containing nothing but the simple application of this maxim to the most intricate questions in Philosophy and Theology, would be a most important acquisi- tion to our literature. NEGATIVE NOTION OF THE INFINITE. 47 appreliension, formed a conception of life and death, we can, bj an act of judgment, pronounce life and death contradictory, that is, a living man contradictory of a dead man. Or, as Sir William is fond of press- ing us up to the highest generalities, and insisting that we shall there find examples fatal to our assertion, let us take one of these. Let us take existence, which, according to Sir William's reasoning, has its corresponding contradictory notion of non- existence. Now, we have already asserted, that to think non-existence is impossible ; it ma}^ therefore, at first sight, appear that this example is fatal to our assertion, that things pronounced contradictory must be equally apprehensible. But, while it is true, that we cannot think non-existence, for there is no such thing, it is equally true, that we cannot think abstract existence, for there is no such thing. We only think existence as we think something existing ; the con- tradictory here, then, is the same thing existing and not existing. But this, too, is a mere abstraction. There is no such thing as an object simply existing ; it can exist only as possessed of certain characteristics, that is. a substance can exist only as possessed of certain qualities, therefore, we can think an object existing only as we think it possessed of certain qualities or characteristics. It is thus apparent, that the real contradictory is an existing object possessed at the same time of contradictory attributes or qualities, both of which it is quite possible to think, 48 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THK INFINITE. not at the same time certaiul^s but first the one, and then the other ; consequently, our assertion stands true, that things pronounced contradictory must be conceivable.* In fact, it is a mere delusion to name an abstraction, and ask us to think its contradictory, for we only think an abstract quality by thinking an individual to which it belongs. A mere abstraction is itself unthinkable, consequently, its contradictory is unthinkable ; and they are both unthinkable, simply because neither the one nor the other exists, or can exist. This is the case with the notion of the conceivable presented by Sir William, with an assertion that we cannot think the inconceivable. He says — " the highest positive notion, the notion of the conceivable, is not without its corresponding negative in the notion of the inconceivable. But, though these mutually suggest each other, the positive alone is real ; the negative is only an abstraction of the other, and even an abstraction of thought itself." In reply to this, we affirm that the professed contradictory i-e- latives are not relatives at all. We at once admit that " the notion of the inconceivable " is unthink- able, because there is no such thing ; but, " the notion of the conceivable" is also unthinkable, for * As a corollary of the doctrine above stated, we hold that there is only one condition the violation of which rendei's thought inijjossible, namely, that of Relativity. Things pronounced contradictoi-y must be conceivable. The only objects, therefore, which cannot be thought, are those which do not come into relation with the mind. We cannot at present, however, attempt the full development of this point. NEGATIVE NOTION OF THE INFINITE. 49 there is no such thing. What is the notion of the conceivable 1 It is a mere abstraction which has no existence in the mind. Or, to simplify, what is the conceivable ? There is no such thing. There may be a conceivable something, but to regard the con- ceivable, that is, the abstraction, as something, is a mere delusion. We know the conceivable only as we are conscious of conceiving something. When we conceive something, and have thus got out of the abstract into the real, it may be maintained that the conception of this something has a relative, namely, the non-conception of this something. But, what is the non-conception of one thing \ It is only the conception of another thing. Or we may rise to the consciousness of the conception, which may be said to have a relative in the non-consciousness of the conception. But what is the non-consciousness of a particular act of conception \ It is the conscious- ness of another act of mind, which may be an act of conception, or of memory, or of any other power. It is utterly in vain to attempt, by rising to abstrac- tions and generalities, to overthrow the assertion, that to know a relation is to know both terms, for we think an abstraction or generality only by apply- ing it to some individual. We therefore hold — That the knowledge of relatives is one, and that in every relation both terms are known as subjectively real and positive. We shall say nothing further in defence of our proposition than merely quote a pas- 50 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. sage from Sir William Hamilton himself. He says, " The conception of one term of a relation neces- sarily^ implies that of the other ; it being the very nature of a relative to be thinkable, only through the conjunct thought of its correlative. For a relation is, in truth, a thought, one and indivisible ; and while the thinking a relation necessarily involves the tlwught of its two terms, so it is, with equal neces- sity, itself involved in the thought of either,'"^' Such is this philosopher's statement in reference to our knowledge of relatives, and 3^et, is it not strange that the same author, when reasoning against M. Cousin, should have written thus: — "Correlatives certainly suggest each other, but correlatives may, or may not, be equally real and positive. . . . Every positive notion (the concept of a thing by what it is), suggests a negative notion (the concept of a thing by what it is not); and the highest positive notion, the notion of the conceivable, is not without its cor- responding notion of the inconceivable. But, though these mutually suggest each other, the positive alone is real ; the negative is only an abstraction of the other, and in the highest generality even an abstrac- tion of thought itself. "f We say, is it not strange that the same author should indite both of these pas- sages 1 What is meant by saying that contradic- tories necessarily " suggest each other " — that " in thought they necessarily imply each other" — and * Reid's Works, Sup. Diss., p. 91 1.- f Discussions, p. 27. NEGATIVE NOTION OF THE INFINITE. 51 jet that in some contradictories one term involves " an abstraction of thought itself V Having thus shown that we agree with Sir Wil- liam Hamilton when he asserts that " the conception of one term of a relation necessarily implies that of tlie other," and that we do not agree with him when he maintains that there are certain relatives one of the terms of which implies "an abstraction of thought itself," we proceed to consider — 11. The assertion that our notion of the Infinite is only negative. We have, in the opening of this chap- ter, given a brief quotation from Sir William Hamil- ton, in which he maintains this doctrine, and we shall now quote another passage in further illustration of his opinion. He says, — "The unconditionally un- limited, or the Infinite, cannot positively be construed to the mind ; [it] can be conceived, only by a thinking away from, or abstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself is realized ; consequently the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative — negative of the conceivable itself""' Both in this passage and in the one already quoted, w^e are presented with the assertion that our notion of the Infinite is a negative notion. It seems as though Sir William admits that we have some con- ception of the Infinite, for we are said to have a ''notion'' of it ; and then it is added that this "no- * Discussions, page 12. In this quotation wc omit tlie reference to the Absolute, as being already set aside. 52 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. tion " is not similar to the notion which we have of finite objects, for our author calls it a ''negative notion." But suddenly the language takes a turn, and this " negative notion " becomes " negative of the conceiv- able itself," and the Infinite is pronounced " incog- nisable and inconceivable." This sounds amazingly like embracing an opinion only to repudiate it ; pay- ing an acknowledgment to a commonly received opinion only to deny it in the broadest terms. A negative notion, and yet the negation of the conceiv- able, the abstraction of thought ! We protest against making this negative notion a point upon which to turn a mere play upon words, which, we submit. Sir William often does ; at one time using the term as though it implied some act of mind, and at another asserting that it involves the total absence of thought. We have already show^n that a negative notion is a contradiction in terms, and can indicate nothing, since a negative notion is no notion at all. Sir Wil- liam, however, often uses the term as though it did imply an act of thought, and he even indicates the mental process by which the negative notion is re- alized. He says that a negative notion " can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or abstrac- tion of, those conditions under which thought itself is realized." Now to " conceive " the Infinite, to " think away," and to " abstract " certain conditions, are all phrases which indicate some mental process, which must of course end in some positive mental NEGATIVE NOTION OF THE INFINITE. 53 result ; and, therefore, it ^voul(;l seem that this negative notion must be some actual mental pheno- menon. Let us, then, direct attention to the process which Sir William traces as resulting in our notion of the Infinite, which is declared to be a mere negative no- tion. What is meant when it is said that our notion of the Infinite is obtained " bj thinking away from, or abstraction of, those conditions under which thought itself is realized ?" To thinh away the con- ditions under which thought is realized, is certainly a strange enough statement of a strange process, but thus much seems evident, that, since we can only " conceive '' the Infinite by thinking away the conditions under which thought is realized, to think the finite is to think the conditions under which thought is realized. Let us, then, imagine a finite object, and let us endeavour to " think away " or " abstract " from this object those characteristics which specially constitute it finite. Let us take this finite object, and, still retaining it as an object of thought, let us endeavour to "think away" from it the hmits or boundaries which chai-acterise it as finite. Now, as w^e have already shown, in order to think, we must think an object existing, and in order to think an object existing, we must think it pos- sessed of certain qualities. It is thus appai-ent that we can " think away " the qualities at present be- longing to a bod}', only by thinking it possessed of 54 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. certain other properties in their stead. If a body be yellow, we can think away the quality of yellow- ness, only by thinking it I'ed, brown, or some other colour. It is impossible simply to think away cei'- tain qualities ; we think away one quality only by thinking the existence of another. Let us, therefore, "think away" the boundaries or limitations of a finite object, and what is the result 1 It will not do for Sir William to assert at this point, that to do so is "to think away the conditions under which thought is realized," for this is to beg the whole question, and deny the validity of the process which he has himself indicated. Granted that we think a finite object ; granted that, retaining the object, we think away its limits ; and it follows by a mental necessity that we think the object as extending without limita- tion, that we think it as unlimited, that we think it as Infinite. Simply to think away the finite qualities is an impossibility ; to think away the finite qualities of an object by thinking the object possessed of op- posite qualities, is to realize the Infinite. It is, thei-e- fore, manifest, that one of two conclusions is neces- sary. Either — Ist, That we can have no notion of the Infinite, since a mei'e " thinking away from, or abstraction of," the limits of the finite is impossible, and a " negative notion " is an absurdity. Or — 2d, That to think away the limits of an object, and yet retain the object of thought, is to think it, that is NEGATIVE NOTION OF THE INFINITE. 00 have a positive notion of it, as extending without limitation — as unlimited. We are shut up to one or other of these assertions, for it is manifest that ^Ye must have either a positive notion of the Infinite, or no notion of it at all. The necessary conditions of thought exclude any middle course, and render a negative notion an impossibility. The language employed by Sir William is so very peculiar that it would be difficult to determine to which of the conclusions he expresses his adhesion'. Passages may be quoted from his discussions on the Infinite, which seem to turn in both directions. We shall briefly direct attention to each of the conclu- sions above stated, and shall endeavour to determine the relation which the statements of Sir William hold to both. It may be affirmed, — 'Ist, That we can have no notion of the Infinite, since a mere " thinking away from, or abstraction of," the limits of the finite is impossible, and a " ne- gative notion " is an absurdity. We have already presented the grounds on which it is evident that a " negative notion " is a term wdiich has no counter- part in existence, which has no real existence in the mind. We have already shown that we can only think away one thing, by thinking some other object or quality. The mind must think ; in the exei'cise of thought, there must be an object of thought ; therefore, every act of thought must involve a posi- tive notion of something. It is just as impossible to 56 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. think away a certain existence, without realizing another positive existence, as it is to think without thought. We can think only inasmuch as we think an object ; we can think an object only inasmuch as we think it possessed of certain properties ;* therefore, to think away the positive qualities of an object is an impossibility. The only w^ay in which we can think away one object, is by the introduction of another object. It is, therefore, evident that a " negative notion " is a contradiction in terms, and that the mere " thinking away " the qualities of an object is a mental impossibility. From this, it fol- lows by necessary consequence, that simply to think away the limits or boundaries of a finite object, and thus obtain a " negative notion " of the Infinite is impossible. This, therefore, condemns as inadmis- sible what has been called a " negative notion," and, at the same time, excludes all such assertions as, — that the Infinite " can be conceived by a thinking away from, or abstraction of," the qualities of the finite ; " that the notion of the Unconditioned is only * We are aware that logicians tell us that all objects are embraced under one or other term of every pair of contradictories, but the thing is, psycho- logically considered, a blunder. The logical doctrine of contradictory terms seems to us altogether erroneous. AVho M'ould think of embracing all things under the terms " green " and " not-green ?" AVho would desci-ibe the mind as not-green ? Who would describe the mind as not-Ctesar ? Who would describe a donkey as not-Socrates ? AVc believe that, what logicians have called contraries, are the only real contradictories. AVe believe that the so-called contradictories cannot be realized in thought without thinking what is called a contrary. AVe cannot think not-green, except by thinking brown, yellow, or some otlier colour. TJicse we con- sider the only contradictories. NEGATIVE NOTION OF THE INFINITE. 57 negative,'' " its notion being only negative of the con- ditioned," and precludes any assertion of a " notion " of the Infinite, as inconsistent with the assertion that we can know^ nothing beyond the finite. We thus set aside the doctrine of a negative notion of the Infinite — of a " conception " of the Infinite " only by a thinking away from, or abstraction of," the qualities of the finite— of a "notion of the Un- conditioned " by a negation of the properties of the conditioned. This being done, the only alternative which re- mains for any one who denies a positive notion of the Infinite, is to deny altogether the possibility of a?ii/ notion of the Infinite, to aflEirm that we know, and can know, only the finite. Accordingl}^ as we have already remarked, Sir William brings into exercise another set of phrases, denying all know- ledge of the Infinite. Thus he asserts that " the Unconditioned (i.e., the Infinite) is incognisable and inconceivable ;" that " the unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, cannot jiositively be construed to the mind ;" that the attempt would involve a " negation of the conceivable itself." This, then, is the final result of Sir William Hamilton's doctrine — that we have no notion of anything but the finite, — that we can have no notion of the Infinite. Now, we will frankly admit that our consciousness revolts against such a doctrine — that there is in it something antago- nistic to the entire tendencies of our nature — and. 5S THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. though it will be sufficient for us, by an independent course of argument, to establish for man a positive notion of the Infinite, we shall endeavour in the meantime to throw out a few suggestions subversive of this doctrine, leaving it to a future course of ob- servation to establish that it is contradictory of the fundamental principles of reason, and of the facts of consciousness. We remark, ifi the first place, that the doctrine which denies the possibility of a notion of anything more than the finite, leaves the existence and use of the term Infinite altogether unaccountable. If, as the author of this theory asserts, we can form no notion of anything but the finite, how has the term Infinite been introduced into language 1 Words eve merely the sipnhols of thoughts. If, then, all the objects which come within our knowledge are finite, how have we come to think or speak of an object which was never known b}'' us *? and how have we given a fixed appellation to an existence which is altogether unknown '? How have we come to use a word wdiich, according to this theory, is not the symbol of any notion ? How have we come to distinguish what is to us indistinguishable ? In the somewhat quaint but racy language of Locke, — "It helps not our ignorance to feign a know- ledge, where we have none, by nlakiug a noise wdth sounds, without clear and distinct significations.'" Again, viewing the term infinite as relative to the NEGATIVE NOTION OF THE INFINITE. 59 term finite, how have we come to affirm a relation, where only one term of the asserted relation is known by us ? How have we come to affirm a relation when we are unable to recognise any relation, inasmuch as one of the asserted relatives is impossible to thought 1 We have such relative terras as organic and inorganic, animate and inanimate, but how have we come to the use of the relative terms finite and infinite, if we can perceive no such relation, since all the objects of thought are asserted to be finite objects 1 We remark, in the second place, that Sir William Hamilton, in denying the possibilit3^of a notion of any- thing more than the finite, conti"adicts his own state- ments. We shall quote a few passages from Sir William in illustration of the manner in which he speaks of the Infinite Being, and as unintentional, yet obvious, admissions that we have some notion of the Infinite God. For example, he says, — " The Divinity, in a certain sense, is revealed ; in a certain sense is concealed ; he is at once known and un- known." Now, this is precisely our conviction in reference to our knowledge of the Infinite ; we do not affirm that we know the Infinite in all its extent, we say only, with Sir William in this instance, that the Infinite is in a certain sense known, in a certain sense unknown. But, to what does this amount ? To the admission of a positive notion of the Infinite ; to an admission that the Infinite is " in a cci'tain sense" known. In the quotation which we have 60 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. given, we have first the admission of an Infinite Personahty. Now, if it be true that we can have no notion of anything but the finite, how do we come to this notion of the Divinity, that is, of an Infinite Personahty 1 How is it admitted that the Divinity is, in a certain sense, " known" by us ■? Nor can it be affirmed that we know him as finite, for our notion of the Deit}'', whatever it be, is such that we at once recognise hmitation as inconsistent with His nature. For the admission of this, let us take another passage. In reasoning against M. Cousin's untenable doctrine concerning the Deity as an Absolute cause, Sir William says, — " The subjection of the Deity to a necessity, is contradictory of the fundamental postulate of a Divine nature." Here is another admission that we have a positive notion of the Infinite Being, and such a notion of Him that we recognise subjection to necessity as inconsistent with the Divine nature. Now, if the Deity be in any sense restricted or limited, he is subject to a necessity; but our notion of the Deity is such that we at once perceive that "the subjection of the Deity to a necessity" is contradictory of the Divine nature ; therefore our notion of the Deity is such that we cannot think Him in any sense restricted, we cannot think Him subjected to any necessity or limitation — we think Him, and can think Him, onl}"" as un- limited, as unrestricted, as Infinite. One other quotation must suffice. Sir William NEGATIVE KOTIOX OF THE INFINITE. Gi says, — " The Divine nature is identical with the most perfect nature, and is also identical with the first cause. If the first cause be not identical with the most perfect nature, there is no God, for the two essential conditions of His existence are not in com- bination." Here we have the statement that " the Divine nature is identical with the most perfect nature." Now, the most perfect nature is that which is in " subjection to no necessity," or limita- tion, and is therefore unlimited, unrestricted, Infinite. Such, then. Sir William admits, is our notion of the Deity, that to our mind " the subjection of the Deity to a necessity is contradictory of the fundamental postulate of a Divine nature." Such is " the funda- mental postulate of a Divine nature" implanted in our mind, that we reckon the Divine nature as identical with the most perfect nature, and therefore as unrestricted and Infinite. Before concluding this Chapter, we shall briefly notice the other alternative which may be adopted in professing to pass by a negative process to a notion of the Infinite, which notion shall be in a certain sense positive. There are, as we have seen, certain indications in the course of Sir William's reasoning, that he intended to regard his negation as, after all, involving some sort of notion of the Infinite. He seems often to speak as if the " thinking away" of positive attributes were really a mental process, and as if the object of thought were retained, even 62 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. though its finite characteristics have been absti-acted. We therefore affirm, — 2osi- NEGATIVE THINKING. 67 tivc knowledge of the quality which we call solid, we never could have used the term not-liquid. So we hold it to be with the Infinite. Had all the objects of our knowledge been finite, we never could have come to the use of the term infinite. We therefore entirely deny the existence of any such " mental ac- tivity" as has been called " negative thinking," and we wholly repudiate the doctrine which has been built upon it. CHAPTER IV. TKACES OF THE INFINITE. We have thus, to a considerable extent, opened up the question under discussion. We have shown the only sense in which we admit the existence of an unconditioned object, either externally or ill thought. Sir William Hamilton has distin- guished two objects, which he pronounces un- conditioned ; the unconditionally limited, or the Absolute ; and, the unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite. Having made this distinction, he says, that those " who employ the terms Absolute, Infinite, Unconditioned, as only various expressions for the same identity, are imperatively bound to prove, that their idea of tlie one corresponds, — either with that Uh.conditioned tue have distinguished as the Abso- lute, — or ivith that Unconditioned we have distin- (jidshed as the hi finite, — or that it includes both, — or that it excludes both. This they have not done, and, we suspect, have never attempted to do.'' This we ha\e attempted, and we have stated, that we TRACES OF THE INFINITE. 69 hold, as philoso|)hers in general have held, that tliei-e is no Unconditioned but the Infinite, — the uncon- ditionally unlimited. We admit the existence of no such thing, either in thought or otherwise, as an unconditionally limited, an Absolute in the sense in Mdiich Sir William employs that term. We do not, therefore, ask any such question, as whether we can know the unconditionally limited,- — the Absolute as distinguished by this philosopher. Our question is only this, — Can w^e know any thing which transcends the finite 1 Can we know the Infinite 1 Can we know an Infinite Being ? Can we be said, in any sense, to know an Infinite God ? Let us, in this Chapter, briefly sketch some of the striking images, and mysterious thoughts in connexion Avith this matter, which sometimes pass through the mind, and which deserve to be recorded. Our thoughts pass fi'om object to object, — we roam through the expanse of space and the duration of time, — multitudes crowd upon us, and still there is no end. Thus, we stand on ocean's shore, and sea billows roll before us, — we look and look again, but still we find no end. The eye stretches further over the watery expanse, but still, beyond each mountain wave, there is a wave to come ; and, through the lurthest bursting spray, the billows I'ise and foam. The last stretch of the eye finishes mid misty vapour, and all things are seen in dim outline, but still the mind thinks of the accunuilated host of 70 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. waters which roll beyond. The eye can fix no certain limit, and as little can the mind. We may turn from gazing upon the breadth of moving waters, but we escape not from the mysterious swelling thoughts, which pass through the mind. Still the noise of many waters comes to our ears, like sounds bursting from the unfathomable recesses of hollow caverns, where the waters have rolled and echoed through untold ages. The shore seems to be the border of an immeasurable expanse, — the air seems to have vibrated throughout unnumbered years with the sound of the constant roar, — and we seem to float in mystery, a conscious atom in the boundless expanse. This is but a specimen of many objects of thought, which seem to be realized by us as types of the Infinite ; which raise in us thoughts mysteiious and imperfectly defined, but which are not only positive and real, but most powerful in their influence, — thoughts which involve no negative notion, but which realize in us something like a notion of the unfathom- able, — the immeasurable, — the unfinishable, — the In- finite. 'Tis true, these thoughts are not clearly defined ; they are not distinctly and sharply marked off", like the majority of the thoughts which pass through the mind ; they are mysterious, they are wavering, they are ill-defined,— but that philosophy is imperfect which would neglect them, — that examination of the mental phenomena is partial which does not find TRACES OF THE INFINITE. 71 them, — tliat psychology is unfaithful \vhich does not record them. Such thoughts are not few, nor are they trifling in their influence. They are abundantly realized, and while they exist, they sway man's whole being with a mysterious power. Let us direct our eyes tO'the dark blue sky, when no cloud shades its azure hue. Reclining upon some green bank, let us look directly upward, — let us fix our attention upon that my- sterious firmament, till the earth and all its objects sink from our view, and we are conscious of nought but the blue expanse. We seem to be raised from oft' this earthly scene, — we are not conscious of any connexion with it, — we are not conscious even of its existence, — we seem to be freed from connexion with every thing material. As something ethereal, we seem to float in mid air, — we seem to move in im- measurable space, where height and depth are not, and where length and breadth are unknowai. Who has gazed upon the cloudless sky, and has not been conscious of this 1 Who that has a taste for nature's beauty, has not often realized it '? Who that has felt thus, would not record his experience in the words of one who has been deeply conscious of such thoughts, — " The sky was cloudless, — the blue depths seemed the express types of infinity.''* Or, w^e may alter the scene. Suppose that clov.ds begin to darken the sk3'^ and that these roll in dark •'•<■ Uc Quincey. 7:2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. and threatening appearance till the sky is hid. We watch these clouds as they appear and move on. Whence come they ? From some mysteiious store- house, which seems unem|)tied by their absence and unfilled by their presence ; or rather, from some im- mensity where they roll unimpeded, where they find no end, and of which but a small portion is within the range of our vision. Higher we mount, and further look, but still they come. Thought, with angel's wing, can onward move, but still the clouds are found ; and further — further — further still, but yet there is no end. Or, let us turn thence, and fly on wings of thought, till w^e again reach the first cloud that passed us. Let us concentrate our atten- tion upon it — let us watch it as it moves. Whither does it go 1 It seems to glide in endless space. We watch it as it goes. It finds nothing to impede — there is no terminating wall from which it re- bounds — there is nothing which makes it stay — it finds no end. Now, let us look across the whole extent of our vision, and we see that black and threatening clouds are crowded everywhere, a dis- mal type of greater hosts, of which we can find no end. As we stand and gaze, the lightning's flash breaks through the darkest cloud, and seems to open to us a portal, through which we may look and catch a glimpse of the immensity beyond. Tell us not that we know nothing of the Infinite, as w^e stand with solemn awe, and watch these opening portals TKACES OF THE INFINITE. 73 in that dark and cloudy wall. Tell us not that the notion is a negative one, as we stand overwhehned and awed by the consciousness of our littleness as an atom in the midst of such immensity. We might present many instances in which man's thoughts seem to dwell upon objects for which he can find no, limits, and which, therefore, he does not think as finite ; we must, however, content ourselves with only one or two more. Who has not sat in the open aii' on a summer's evening at twilight, and found his thoughts roaming- he knew not whither, and was conscious of himself existing, but he knew not where 1 The shades of evening come on ; darkness begins to cover all things, and the outline of surrounding objects be- comes faint and dim. With a mysterious and un- defined consciousness, we watch the objects around us, till the limits, formerly indistinct, are not even recognised. All things seem to have relapsed into a mysterious unity, and, with the exception of the thinking Me, we regard all things as one great whole, the limits of which we can nowhere find. This unity is the object concerning which we think ; the thoughts of it absorb all our attention ; 3^et we do not think it limited. Or, let us endeavour to trace the mysterious con- nexion between cause and effect, which regulates the many changes which are going on in the world around us. We start on a course, which seems clear 74 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. and plain enough, but, as we proceed, we find our thoughts become more intently engaged, we continue to move onwards, but still as we advance we can find ourselves no nearer an end than before. We find ourselves engaged in a flight of thought, in which we may indeed continue, but for which we can find no limits. We are sure that all upon w.hich we arc engaged is real, yet it seems immeasurable. Our mind may follow such a course, but wc cannot follow it to its conclusion, for always as we advance we find it stretching mysteriously before us. As we pursue the train of thought which we have now delineated, we can well imagine that we hear the voice of stern Logic asserting that tliis is not a demonstration of a knowledge of the Infinite. Be it so ; we care not. We remember having somewhere read of a mathematician, who, after he had perused Milton's " Paradise Lost," asked what it proved. Be it said by some severe logician, that we have not yet proved that man has a knowledge of the Infinite ; we say, we care not. Everything in its place ; and Logic too. We hope we have already given some satisfaction in matter of a logical kind, and we ex- pect to give an additional supply of similar material before we have finished. We have not in these re- marks been attempting to prove anything — w^e have never made any attempt to draw an inference. We have sought only to give utterance to consciousness — we have sought only to give expression to thoughts TRACES OF THE INFINITE. VO wliicli often pass through the mind — we hiive sought only to reveal some of the objects upon which the mind often dwells m3'steriously — but we say not yet that in any of these we have a knowledge of the Infinite. The illustrations are intended merely to indicate how much our thoughts seem to border on the Infinite. Although we have not attempted to connect any process of reasoning, or determinate conclusion w^ith the illustrations which we have presented above, it is, at the same time, known that our purpose in this Treatise, is to establish for man a knowledge of something more than the finite — a knowledge, to some extent, of the Infinite. It is therefore natural that difficulties should arise in the mind of the reader, in reference to any illustrations which may be presented. We shall therefore here consider an argument urged by Sir William Hamilton against our position, and which may already have occurred to the minds of some of our readers, in perusing the phases of thought described in the previous part of this Chapter. The argument is urged against M. Cousin, when presenting certain examples of a knowledge of the Infinite. Sir William reasons that if in these examples we imagine that w^e obtain a knowledge of the Infinite, " we only deceive our- selves, by substituting the indefinite for the infinite, than which no two notions can be more opposed." Now, before answering this argument, we would, 7G THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. with all deference, ask Sir William a question, in reference to his own consistency in stating the argu- ment. Before doing so, it is necessary to present a statement of Sir William's, which is given in another part of his critique upon M. Cousin. He says, the Indefinite "is subjective" — the Infinite "is objective :" the Indefinite " is in our thought" — the Infinite " is in its own existence." That is to say, the Indefinite is a characteristic of our thought ; while the Infinite is an object about which we think. This w^e quite admit ; but if it be true, as Sir William asserts, then we ask. How is it that in the previous quotation, he comes to speak of the Infinite and the Indefinite as equally notions, that is^ as equally subjective f How is it that, in speaking of the Infinite and Indefinite, he says, " than which no two notions can be more opposed V There can be no doubt that the In- definite is entirely subjective, in other words, it is not the object wdiich is indefinite, it is only our knoiv- ledge of it which is indefinite. On the other hand, the Infinite is entirely objective, that is, the object of thought is infinite, but we do not speak of infinite thought ; in fact, the whole of Sir William's argu- ment is to prove this, for to say that our thought is infinite, is to say that our finite mind exercises infi- nite thought.* Yet how does Sir William, in the passage above quoted, speak of the Infinite and In- * We admit tliis with the utmost frankness, as a jjroof that we cannot know the Infinite in all its extent. But then we do not hold that we can know the Infinite in nil its extent, nor did we ever hold such an opinion. TRACES OF THE INFINITE. 77 definite as two notioiii', than which no two can be more opposed ? Is not this to surrender his whole argument against the conceivabihtj of the Infinite ? Is not this to admit that we have a notion of the Infinite — that we do think it 1 We therefore submit that Sir William's argument against M. Cousin's illustrations is inconsistent in its statement. AVe submit that, if M. Cousin has confounded the distinc- tion between the Infinite and the Indefinite, Sir William lias equally confounded them. Now, then, for Sir ^A iUiam's argument as such. The argument is this, — that if, in any instance, we imagine that we obtain a knowdedge of the Infinite, " we only deceive ourselves by substituting the in- dejiriite for the infinite." While we endeavour to answer this argument, let it be remembered that both Sir William and we have this common ground, — that the Indefinite is only a characteristic of thought ; while the Infinite is an object of thought. With this distinction clearly before us, we answer to Sir William's assertion, that we are not confounding the indefinite with the infinite; w^e are keeping them as distinct as different things can be kept distinct ; and it is just because they are distinct that we profess to establish for man a knowledge of the Infinite. We admit to Sir William that the knowdedge wdiich we have been describing, and the knowledge of the Infinite, which we intend to desciibe at still greater length, is an indefinite hiowledqe. But it is an 78 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. indefinite knowledge of what 1 Of this. It is an indefinite knowledge of an infinite object. It is not a knowledge of the finite, for we can find no limits ; according to our own consciousness, and according to Sir William's statement, it is an indefinite know- ledge of something ; therefore it is an indefinite knowledge of the infinite. We profess nothing but an indefinite knowledge, but it must be a knowledge of something, and as not of the finite, it must be of the infinite.'" Sir William's ai-gument we consider valid, if viewed as a refutation of the assertion that we have a clear and definite knowdedge of the Infi- nite. But, on the other hand, Sir William maintains for himself that we can have no knowledge of the Infinite. This conclusion we consider no more valid than the other, for it does not follow that, since we have not a clear and definite knowledge of the Infi- nite, therefore we can have no knowledge of it at all. Though we cannot have a clear and definite know- ledge of the Infinite, we can have an indefinite know- ledge of it. While it is true that the finite mind * In a note, Sir William says, — " Aristotle's definition of the InfaiU, (of the a-Trii^ov in contrast to the do^Krroii) — 'that of which there is always something beyond,' may be said to be a definition only of the Indefinite. This I shall not gainsay. But it v.'as the only Infinite which he contem- plated; and it is the only Infinite of which we can form a notion." Not exactly. Say rather, it is the only notion u-hich u-e can form of the Infinite. And we will add, Aristotle's definition expresses precise/t/ the doctrine we maintain. In reference to Sir William's assertion, that Aristotle's defi- nition indicates only the Indefinite, we hold it decisive to reply, that there is no such thing as an indefinite object. Our notion may be indefinite, but Die object nnist be either finite or infinite; and our notion of tlio Infinite is a notiDu of "that of which there is alwnys something beydud." TKACES OF THE INFINITE. 7i) cannot have infinite thoughts, we hold it equally true that the finite mind can have finite thoughts concerning an infinite object. While wo hold it true that the finite mind cannot have distinct and definit* knowledge of an infinite object ; we hold it equally true that the finite mind may have an indefinite knowledge of an infinite object. In so far as Sir William maintains that we cannot have a clear knowledge of the Infinite in all its extent ; and in so far as M. Cousin maintains that we can have some knowledge of the Infinite ; we con- sider that they are both right. But, in so far as Sir William maintains that we can know nothing beyond the finite, we consider him wrong. We shall, at this point, make only one remark further, in reference to our own doctrine, lest any one should be led inadvertently to adopt against us an argument which might seem very plausible, but which, if examined, is obviously null. What we mean is, if any one should reason thus, — Since we admit that the finite being has only finite thoughts, it therefore follows that this professed knowledge of the Infinite is, after all, only a knovdedge of the finite. Such an objection were only an unjust quibble. Our argument is this : — Since the finite mind can have only finite thoughts, then our knowledge of the Infinite can be only finite — can be only limited — can be only indefinite. Our knov.ledge is finite, but the object is infinite. 80 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THlil INFINITE. Finally here, we remark that the course of obser- vation pursued in the former part of this Chapter is meant as illustrative of our conviction that the thoughts of man constantly border on the Infinite, and to some degree enter upon it. It is meant as an array oi presumptim evidence against Sir William Hamilton's doctrine that we can know nothing beyond the finite, — that we cannot know anything of the Infinite. It is meant as the utterance of conscious- ness, which may lead the reader as he advances to observe for himself, and judge according to the evidence. We however distinctly recognise that we have yet to prove, that we have an indefinite know- ledoe of the Infinite. CHAPTER V. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFINITE IN THE RELATION OF TIME. [SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON AND M. COUSIN.] We proceed now to endeavour to establish our opinion, that man does obtain a certain knowledge of the Infinite ; that, while he cannot know it clearly and distinctly in all its extent, he does obtain an indefinite knowledge of it ; and that he obtains this knowledge in entire conformity with the necessary conditions of his thoughts. We do not affirm that man can comprehend the Infinite in the sense of embracing it in all its extent ; but w^e do affirm, that man can to some extent apprehend the Infinite, that is, that he can, and does form some conception of the Infinite. Every existence, in order to be known, must come into relation with the mind as an object of thought. There may, however, be degrees of knowledge regu- lated by the distinctness with which the object is recognised. The more clearly the object is defined, F 82 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the more distinct is the knowledge of it which we obtain. The object of thought may stand clearly defined, and the knowledge of it be perfectly distinct. But, on the other hand, the object may be so partially defined, as to render the knowledge of it indistinct and incomplete. Still, although this be the case, it is to some extent known, and does exist in relation to the mind as an object of thought. Every man is daily conscious of such partial and indistinct con- ceptions, where the object, though recognised and related to the mind as an object of thought, never- theless hangs shrouded to some extent in mystery. It does exist as an object of thought, since it could not be known without this, yet it is indistinct, and not grasped in all its extent ; if you will, our knowledge of it is imperfect. The object is there, — it is real, — it is known,— though it be but imperfectly known. We are but delineating consciousness, — we are but giving it utterance, when we say, that there is much only imperfectly known, — there is much which flits indistinctly before us, and haiigs in mystery, — there is much which may be said, to be both known and unknown, — to some extent known, in all its extent unknown. While this is the case, it is sufficiently plain that the condition of thought, which has been called the law of Relativity, meets with perfect compliance, that is to say, the existence is in relation with the mind as an object of thought, though it be but imperfectly known. In every THE INFINITE IN THE RELATION OF TIME. »3 instance, there is, and must be, an object of tliouglit, and however indistinct our knowledge of it, the object is such, as to stand related to the thinking subject. Whether this is the case with the Infinite, will shortly appear. We proceed now to present the positive instances in which we consider that we realize a notion of the Infinite — not certainly a clear and distinct notion of the Infinite in all its extent, yet an indefinite knowledge of the Infinite. In the first place, we, along witli M. Cousin, find our conception of the Infinite in the notions of Time and Space, as necessary conditions of thought. We cannot think except in Time, yet we cannot think Time finished ; we can- not think objects existing except in Space, yet we cannot think Space limited. Let us, in this Chapter, consider our notion of Time. Whenever an occurrence is recognised b}' us, it is realized as taking place in time. If we examine our consciousness, we will find that this recognition of timc'is a constituent element in every act of thought. Every event is realized in time ; every object exists in time ; thought is possible only under the recogni- tion of time ; and we cannot imagine an existence apart from time. If time is thus unceasingly recog- nised in all our thoughts, it is of imj)ortancc that we endeavour to determine how it is realized. Wo have seen that all objects ai'o iccognised by us as existing in time, and from this, it is manifest that time is 84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. realized in every act of thought. If we carefully examine consciousness, and its various phenomena, we will find, that as each object comes up before the mind, it is thought as existing in time. This we find to be a rule without exception, — a fact clearly testified by every act of consciousness. There is no possi- bility of escaping this conception of time, as that in which all events occur. Let us try as we may, the conception of time still comes up as a constituent element in the very act of thought, in which we attempt to escape its presence. Thus far, then, our examination of consciousness proves, that a conception of time is a constituent element in every act of thought. We have examined our consciousness, — we have traced the phenomena as they have arisen in our mind, and everywhere have we found that a con- ception of time is involved. Analyzing consciousness mainly with a view to detect this conception, we find it universally present. Now, directing attention to the various objects which, one after another, have come up before the mind in the successive acts of consciousness, we perceive that these objects, how^ever diversified their nature, alwa3^s come into the mind in relation with time. We thus find, that, in every act of thought, time is realized as a necessary relative accompanying the object of thought. Again, though it is true that we cannot realize an object except in relation with time, it is equally true that we cannot realize time except in relation with THE INFINITE IN THE KELATION OF TIME. 85 an object. Let us try to realize time as the sole object of thought, apart from every other existence, and we shall find that it is impossible. Let us try to remove every other object from existence, and retain this as the only object of thought, and we shall fail. Let us endeavour to imagine the whole universe out of existence, still time is realized as the condition of the act of thought ; and, whatever we imagine out of existence, we ourselves still exist, and exist in time. Let us examine our consciousness, and we shall find that we never could have formed any con- ception of time, without the conception of some object existing in time. As M. Cousin has very well shown, if we consider the matter in the logical order, time must first exist, in order that objects may exist in time ; but, viewing the matter in the chronological order, the object must first be thought, in order that it may be thought existing in time. If this distinction be carefully considered, it will bring out the point which we now seek to establish, that time is ahvays realized as a necessary relative accompanying the object of thought, and never as itself the sole object of thought. If we were anxious to be more exact, and were confining ourselves to mere psychological delineation, Ave would say, that in realizing time and the object in time, the one is not realized as first, and the other as second, but they are realized in one and the same act of thought. In recognising an object, we recognise it only as existing in time. The 86 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. recognition of the event occurring, and of the time in which it occurs, is thus simultaneous. It is in the recognition of the event, that we have the conception of time ; and this is the only manner in which time is realized by the mind. We, therefore, maintain, that time is realized only as a relative accompanying the object of thought ; that is to say, it is never realized as the sole object of thought. It is thus apparent that when we think an object, it is thought as existing in Time ; the object and Time are thought as the two terms of one relation, and are, therefore, thought in a single act of conception. There is, however, this peculiarity to be observed about the relation, that Time is a standing or con- stant term in every such relation. The objects of thought may change — they are constantly changing; but every object which comes into the mind is thought only in relation with time. It is thus that time is the necessary or constant term of the relation in which any object is thought. Having thus shown, that Time is a necessary re- lative in every act of thought, it is manifest that Time is a condition of thought. But, what do we mean when we say, that Time is a necessary condi- tion of thought ? What is it that we realize in con- sciousness, and which we" seek thus to describe \ Time is a condition of thought in the sense that it accompanies every object of thought To take an ilhistrniion from the material world, it is the atmos- THE INFINITE IN THE DELATION OF TIME, 87 phei-e ill which every object of thought moves. Time is a condition of thought, inasmuch as no object can be reahzecl in tliought without it ; but, it is not a condition in the sense oUtmitimj the object of thought, or even in any way influencing that object, otherwise than in affording it mental or subjective existence. On the other hand, though Time is reahzed only as a concomitant of the object of thought, tlie object does not in any sense limit or restrict time. On the one hand. Time does not limit the object ; and, on the other hand, the object does not limit Time. We trust that it is now sufficiently apparent that Time is a necessary concomitant of every object of thought ; and, therefore, that its conception is a necessary condition of every act of thought. Now, let us continue to direct attention to our own con- sciousness, and, by a careful analysis, let us endea- vour still more fully to bring out the nature of our conception of Time. We have seen that every object is thought as existing in Time, and that every event is thought as occurring in Time. We think an object existing, and we think it occupying its position in Time — it is recognised as a phenomenon appearing in the vast expanse. But, although the object is thought as existing in Time, Time is certainly not thought as linn'ted by this object ; we think Time as stretching far beyond, l^t us add on object after object, still Time is naH/ed as stretching be- yond — Time is realized as the grand immensity in 88 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. which they all exist. Continue to crowd in objects — add event to event, still Time is recognised as stretching forth, and still there is room for more. Accumulate the objects in existence, till the mind begins to labour on account of the effort, still Time is realized as outstretching them all, and mysteriously spreading forth beyond their limits. Eagerly may we long to penetrate into that mysterious expanse — we may i-aise in imagination limit after limit — still that expanse stretches out, mysterious as before — unlimited and illimitable. The objects are limited, we ourselves are limited, still we exist in this ex- panse, w^e cannot get without it, we cannot reach its limits, yet we have a conception of it in every act of thought. The characteristic of our conception of Time, which has now been indicated, and which reveals that we cannot by any accumulation of objects reach the limits of time, marks a very decided contrast between this condition of thought, and many of the other conditions to which we are subjected. The point of contrast is, that this condition does not exclude any object from the mind, while other conditions have an exclusive characteristic. This condition pre- sents no barrier to the recognition of any object whatsoever, while many other conditions admit to the mind only such objects as possess certain qualities, which qualities imply conformity with the nature of the conditions. Time is not restrictive or exclusive ; THE INFINITE IN THE RELATION OF TIME. 89 most other conditions are exclusive. We, therefore, denominate Time an Irrestrictive Condition of thought.'-' We ask special attention to this distinction, for if it be clearly understood what is meant when we characterize Time as an Iiixstridive Condition of thought, and if we have clearly established that this is a characteristic of Time as realized in conscious- ness, we have gained our point, and we have shown that our Conception of Time involves a recognition of the Infinite. Let this characteristic of Time as an Irrestrictive Condition of thought be carefully observed. Time is a condition of thought, but it is, if we may so speak, the willing and ready condition of any object, or number of objects. It is an irrestrictive condition, ready to admit any number of objects, provided only that the objects comply with, what may be called, the restrictive conditions. We have shown how Time is an irrestrictive condition, and, for the purpose of more fully bringing out the contrast, we may take an example of a rcusBioiis. lie says, — " While we regard as conclusive, Kant's Analysis of Time and Space into formal necessities of thought, (willionf, hmvever, '«/iiiiUiiilies condition, therefore, time is only a form of THE INFINITE IN THE DELATION OF TIJIE. 103 the conditioned. Having subverted the premises, we have ah'ead}' invalidated the conclusion ; but what we wisli observed, is that we have here again pre- sented the fallacy, that relation is inconsistent with the nature of the Absolute and Infinite. Our reply is brief. The Absolute may exist in relation, pro- vided that relation be not necessary to its existence ; the Infinite may exist in relation, provided there be nothing in the relation to resi?ict it. If however, it be argued, that since, according to our own doctrine, every object is thought as existing in time, it therefore follow^s, that the object and time are thought in relation ; vfe at once admit it. If it be farther maintained, that, since to be related is to be conditioned, therefore, time is only a form of the conditioned ; we also grant it. We have ali'eady most fully stated this, and shown how much is in- volved in the admission thus made. We have shown that, when we say that time is a condition of thought, it is not so in a restrictive sense, — it does not limit an object, — it is irrestiictive. In so far as time is a condition of thought, it does not prevent the ad- mission of any object into thought, nor does it i-estrict the progress of any series of events, however great. This, then, is the sense in which we assert that time is a condition of thought, and what does this admission imply \ Docs it in:iply that the notion we have of time is not of time as infinite \ Most assuredlv not. It h^ir William assert, that because 104 THE rHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. time is thought in relation witli an object, it is not tlionght as infinite, we most distinctly deny it. If a relation subsists, and the one object does not limit the other, then there is nothing in the relation to prevent one of the terms being infinite. If Sir William assert, as he does, that the mere existence of a relation involves the impossibility of the existence of an unconditioned, then we say, that there is no unconditioned in existence, for Time is related to the events occun-ingin it, — Space is related to the objects existing in it, — God is related to the beings created by Him. We must either cease to apply the term Unconditioned to the Infinite, or this is an appli- cation of it by far too strict. It seems a matter perfectly plain, that if there be nothing in the rela- tion to necessitate limitation or restriction, the Infinite may exist in relation,^ — may be known in i-elation. It is utterly untenable to assert, that because the knowledge which w^e have pointed out is given in relation, therefoi'e, it is not a knowledge of the Infinite. It is a mere fiction, conjured up to shut us out from all connexion with the Infinite, — to exclude us even from existence, — in fact, to requii'e that Crod should annihilate all his creatures, in order that he may exist as unconditioned, which again imj)lies. that in the act of creation. He had '■ determined to pass from the better to the worse." We admit that time is a condition of thought, but this only proves, that to think the Infinite, is a THE i>;fikite in the uelatiok of time. 105 necessary condition of thougJit. Time we must think, vet we cannot think it as finite, and thus it is, that we are necessitated to think it as Infinite. So far fiom being unable to lealize the Infinite, our thought is so conditioned, that we cannot think without realizing it. Having thus |)i'esented the grounds on which we defend our consistency in professing a knowledge of the Infinite in rehition, and, in a certain sense, as conditioned, we proceed to consider Sir Wilham's next argument against a knowledge of the Infinite. Sir. William admits, that we cannot think an object existing, except as existing in time. He admits farther, that we cannot think time as finite, and yet, in the next paragraph, he asserts that we cannot think it as infinite. These two positions seem strangely inconsistent. According to this statement, we think time, — we must think it, and yet, we think it 7ieither asjinife nor as wjinite ! We had imagined that there could be only two ways of it. But, let us proceed to consider this more in detail. Sir William says : — " Is the Absolute conceivable of Time ? Can wo conceive time as unconditionally limited ? We can easily represent to oui'selves time undci- any relative limitation of commencement and termination ] but we are conscious to ourselves of nothing more clearly, than that it would be equally possible to think without th(»uuht, as to eonstiue to the mind anal>so]ute com- ion THE rniLosoPHY of the infinite. inencemcnt, or an absolute termination of time ; that is, a beginning and an end beyond wliicli time is conceived as non-existent." In the passage Avliich we have now quoted, there are two distinct statements ; one affii*ming a cer- tain manner in which w^e can conceive time, and another affirming a certain manner in which we can- not conceive time. We sliall consider these in their order. First, — It is affirmed, that "we can easily represent to ourselves time under any relative limitation of commencement and termination." Does this state- ment hai-monize with our consciousness ? We think not. We ma}^ at any point in time place objects, from which we may calculate, but in doing so, we have merely set up lai\d-marks, we have raised mere artificial distinctions, wliich may indeed suffice to give us a conception of the relative position of events, but which have no counterpart in time, or in our conception of it. We ma}^, if we choose, concentrate attention on a given event, and speak of time com- mencing with that event and terminating with another, but there was in reality, neither any com- mencement of time, nor any termination of time in the case. Time did not stop before the one event, and again conmience with it ; nor did it terminate with the other event, and recommence after it. Neither in reality, nor in thought, is there any such thing as this so called division of time. Time does THE INFINITE IN THE RELATION OF TIME. 107 not beo;in with the event, but the event begins in time ; time does not terminate with the event, but the event terminates in time. If we examine consciousness, when we pi-ofess to think time rela- tively commencing or terminating, we shall find that we are dealing merely with the relative position of events or objects which exist in time.* On this point, however, w^e need not dwell, since it does not materially affect the main position, that the grand conception of time is a conception of the Infinite. Though Sir William maintains that we can think time as relatively limited, he nevertheless admits, that we must always think time stretching beyond any such limit, and there thus remains, even on his own doctrine, a sufficient basis for our theory of the knowledge of time as infinite, We maintain that the so called relative limitation of time is no limita- tion of time at all, but is the mere distribution of the events which occur in time. The point is one which concerns the psychology of the question, and a care- ful examination of consciousness convinces us that we have aiven a correct statement of the matter. * A striking illustration of our position will be obtained, if wc consider the various methods by which our artificial divisions of time have been fixed. What we have called our divisions of time, have been regulated by the dark- ness and the light, — by the position of the sun in the heavens, — by the shadow on the dial, — by the motion of the sand in an hour-glass, — by the oscillations of a pendulum,— by the revolutions of the moon, — by the revolu- tions of the earth, — or, rising to a more philosophical view, we have divided time into great epochs, dating from great events in the history of our i-ace. So true is it, that what has been called the relative limitation of time, is a mere distribution of the events which occur in time. 108 THE THILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. There is another passage in which Sir WilHani same time, that space is an external realit}^ Just as we have a conception of substance, though not a perception of it ; so have we conception of space, though it is not perceived. To assert that space is nothing distinct from body, is absurd, for, as Locke has well said, " either this space is some- thing, or nothing ; if nothing be between two bodies, they must necessarily touch ;" but all bodies do not touch ; therefoi'e, there is something between them, and that something we call space. If we be asked what this space is, we cannot tell. What it is in its essence, we know not, and if difficulties crowd upon ,is concerning its existence, they result simply fi-om ■ur ignorance of its nature. Still, we have a con- %Hl:ilELATioN ik;^slaCe. 121 ception of it, and we necessarily think it as unre- Since our doctrine in reference to our knowledge of space, bears a striking resemblance to what we have stated concerning our notion of time, and is supported by arguments very nearly similar, we shall not require to dwell upon it so long as was found necessary in vindicating our views in reference to time. We shall, however, briefly direct attention to the arguments which Sir William Hamilton has act^»ailced against our position. Sir William says, — " Space, like time, is only the intuition or the concept of a certain correlation of existence, — of existence, therefore, pro tanto, as con- ditioned. Itis thus itself only a form of the conditioned." Here also, w^e premise that when Sir William speaks of space as an " image or concept," Ave under- stand him thus to describe our notion of space, while he at the same time holds that space is an external reality. The evidence for this we have already pre- sented. In reference to the statement itself, we deny that our notion of space is obtained in the perception of the relation of external objects. We can take a sinqle object, we can in thought separate it from all others, and yet w^e think that single object existing in space. Moreover, we think space stretching beyond all the objects of thought ; even beyond the last object which we can reach in our greatest effort. 122 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. And again, if space is only " tlie concept of a certain correlation of existence,'' how do we think of it, and how does Sir WilHam speak of it, as a whole, a unity, a totality/^ If we have faithfully described our consciousness in the previous i)art of this Chapter, Sir William's argument falls. Apart from the description of our conception of space given by Sir William, the aigument, as we understand it, is this, — Our notion of space is obtained only by relation ; to be related is to be conditioned ; therefore, we know space only as conditioned. The natural inquiry on hearing this presented as an argument against our doctrine, that we know space, not as finite, but as infinite, is, — May not the Infinite exist in relation, and, therefore, be known in relation, and be conditioned to the extent to wliich relation involves condition '? Aiier the definition we have given of the sense in which the relation of space to the object involves condition, we do not see that any one can for a moment hesitate in saying, that the Infinite may exist in relation, and may, to that extent, be conditioned. We have already shown that God stands in a certain relation to His creatures, and in this case is conditioned, but who will deny that God is Infinite '? In the same * Suppose we were to substitute for tlie term space, 'Sir AVilliam's definitiun of it, how would many of his sentences read? Take an example. " Thought is equally powerless in realizing a notion either of the ubsolate totality, or of the infnite immensity of [a correlation of existences]." What kind of corniatiuii is that which is a totality ? A correlation wliich is an immensity ! THE INFINITE IN THE RELATION OF SPACE. 123 manner, we may admit that space is known in rela- tion, and, thei-efore, in that sense, as conditioned ; but, who will examine his own consciousness, and saj that he thinks space as limited 1 Yet, tliink space he must, and if he do not think it as limited, he must think it as unlimited. Sir William, then, asserts that the conception of space is a condition of thought. We admit it. But, what does it prove ? It only proves this, — that our thought is so conditioned, that we must think space, and that we must tliink it as infinite. It proves that, by the very conditions which render thought possible, we are compelled to think infinite space. We are necessitated by the conditions of our thought, to think all things in space ; we think space as the immensity which contains all things, and which can- not be limited, — ^which is infinite. We, therefore, consider that Sir AVilliara's argu- ment is of no weight against a knowledge of space as unlimited. The two ternis, conditioned and un- conditioned, ought to be entii-ely precluded from application in this matter, or the term unconditioned ought to be employed in a meaning much more re- sti'icted than that in which it is employed by Sir William, when the above is made an argument against the knowledge of the Infinite. We would greatly prefer were the terms entirely discarded, for the term unconditioned is constantly in danger of being applied in a signification by much too wide. 124 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINPfE. We conceive that it is the use of this term in a manner unwarrantably extensive, which has afforded a cover for the arguments of Sir WilHam, under which their fallacious character has not been detected. It is also an improper application of this term un- conditioned, but, strangely enough, at the very opposite extreme, which has led Sir William to postulate his Absolute, and describe it as the uncon- ditionally limited. Sir William's next statement is this, — " Thought is equally powerless in realizing a notion either of the absolute totality, or of the infinite immensity, of space." Before giving the rest of the quotation, we linger to inquire if the contrast here put between an absolute totality and an infinite immensity does not seem to imply, however unintentionally, that the infinite immensity is not an absolute totality, and, therefore, that philosophers applied to the infinite that which did not belong to it, when they called it absolute 1 We think this is implied, and most erroneously implied, for if anything be absolute, cer- tainly it must be the infinite ; and, if it be not implied. Sir William has failed to mark out a specific differ- ence between the Infinite and the Absolute, which he has distinguished. Here, also, the whole confusion finds cover under the use of the term unconditioned. If the absolute be infinite, then it is identical with the infinite ; if it be not identical with the infinite, it is finite. The latter being the conclusion, we rea- THE INFINITE IN THE RELATION OF SFACE. 125 son thus, — It is admitted on both sides that we do think space ; but, it is also admitted on both sides, that we cannot think space as finite ; therefore we think space as infinite. We now proceed to give the remaining part of the quotation, wliich, apart from that upon which we have just commented, contains the entire argu- ment of Sir Wilham on this point. He says, — " Time and Space, as wholes, can neither be conceived as absolutely limited, nor as infinitely unlimited ; so their parts can be represented to the mind neither as absolutely itidividual, nor as divisible to infinity. The universe cannot be imagined as a whole, which may not also be imagined as a part ; nor an atom imagined as a part, which may not also be imagined as a whole." The first statement here requii-ing consideration is, that space " can neither be conceived as abso- lutely limited, nor as infinitely unlimited." That it cannot be conceived as absolutely limited, we of course admit, since we hold that it cannot be con- ceived as in any sense limited. But, can it not be conceived as infinitely unlimited ? If this mean, can we clearly and distinctly conceive it as infinite in all its extent, we answer that we make no such asser- tion. But, if it mean, can we obtain any knowledge of it as infinite, we as decidedly answer that we can. We do not intend entering again upon a defence of this position ; we hope we have presented our 126 THR I'lIILOSUl^HY OF THE INFINITH. arguments witli sufficient clearness and fulness in the commencement of this Chapter, and by that statement we are pre^^ared to abide. We shall only add here, that we consider Sir William's argument inconsistent with itself in saying that we must thinh space; then, that we cannot think space ^i^ finite ; and yet, that we cannot think it as infinite. If we do think it, which this philosopher admits, then, we must think it either as finite or as infinite ; and, since we cannot think it as finite, we must think it as in- finite. We hold that it is a clearly revealed fact of con- sciousness that we think space as infinite. Has, then, Sir William entirely failed to recognise the fact, which, we assert, is so distinct ? Let us introduce to our readers another passage on this point, which Sir William has penned elsewhere. In the Supplemen- tai-y Dissertations to Reid's Works, Sir William says, — "Space being conceived as infinite (or rather being inconceivable as not infinite) and the place occupied by body finite," &c.'" Now, how does Sir William reconcile these two statements — that space cannot be " conceived as infinitely unlimited "^ — and that space is " conceived as infinite V Again, what is meant by the parenthesis ? Having made the state- ment, truth as it is, Sir William seems to o;rudo;e it, and attempts in a parenthesis to make a reservation destructive of the previous admission. But, what is * Reid's Works, p. 847. THE INFINITE IN THE RELATION OF SPACE. \'27 gained by it '? " Space being conceived as infinite (or rather being inconceivable as not infinite)." Why rather the one way than the other "? We see no difference, except that the former is the more natural, the latter the more awkward. What does it signify whether we say, that water is conceived as liquid, or rather, is inconceivable as not liquid ; — ■ that body is conceived as extended, or rather, is inconceivable as not extended ;— that space is con- ceived as infinite, or rather, is inconceivable as not infinite 1 Either way, it is an admission that w^ater is conceived as liquid, body as extended, and space as mjinite. The next statement of Sir William concerning space which requires consideration, is that its " parts can be represented to the mind, neither as absolutely individual, nor as divisible to infinity!' Now, what does Sir William mean by the parts of space \ We cannot think parts of space. W^e think space only as a unity — as a totality which is one and indivisible. We cannot realize in thought the division of space. To divide is to limit, and to think limits is not to think space, but to think an object existing in space. Let us consider our consciousness, and we shall find that we never do realize in thought, and never can realize in thought, the division of space. How is space realized in the mind at all 1 We think an ob- ject, and in the act of thought, we find that there is [issociated with the object the notion of space as all 128 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. around and all beyond it. We think the object only as we think space beyond it, that is, space is the condition of the act of thought. Along with the object, then, w^e recognise space as extending be3^ond — we think the space, yet we cannot think it as finite. Can w^e then, begin in thought to divide space as recognised 1 This is impossible. Space, one and identical, comes up wdth every object of thought — we cannot alter it — we cannot attempt to experi- ment upon it either by dividing or by adding. We may enlarge or diminish the object which we recog- nise in thought, but we can in no w^ay assign limits to space, or divide it up into portions or parts. But, if this be the case, then what are the exam- ples which Sir William gives as illustrative of his argument ? He says, — " The universe cannot be imagined as a whole, which may not also be imagined as a part ; nor an ato7n be imagined as a part, which may not also be imagined as a whole." How^ is this 1 We had expected to hear about space, and Sir Wil- liam begins to speak about the universe and its atoms. Our author confounds space with body, he makes the two identical — and immediately begins to speak of the universe and its atoms. Sir William seems to have felt that this argument could not be illustrated if he kept entirely to space as recognised in conscious- ness, and he accordingly either passed from space altogether, or identified it w^ith the object of thought. The universe is not space, it is an object in space ; THE INFINITE IN THE RELATION OF SPACE. 129 its atoms ai'e not space — they are not parts of space; they are objects in space, and they are parts of the universe. Again, and with all deference, we submit that Sir William's argument is based on an error, and is thus invalidated. Once more, Sir William says, — " Considered in itself, space is positively inconceivable, — as a whole either infinitely unbounded, or absolutely bounded ; as a part either infinitely divisible, or absolutely indivisible. Space is positively conceivable — as a mean between these extremes ; in other w^ords, we can think it either as an indefinite whole, or as an indefinite part." Our answer to this is plain. If space can be conceived neither as infinitely unbounded, nor as absolutely bounded, how can it be conceived at ain The thing is impossible. What mean is there between the unbounded and the bounded "? There is none. Sir William, however, afl&rms that there is such a mean, namely, the indefinite. This is startling enough. The mean between an unbounded whole, and a bounded whole, is an indefinite whole ! There is no such thing as an indefinite whole. Our knowledge of an object may be indefinite, but the object itself is not indefinite. This, the final state- ment of Sir Vrilliam's doctrine concerning our notion of space, is overturned by his own admission,''' that the indefinite is subjective, that is, pertains to our conception ; while tlte infinite is oI)jecilre, that is, * Discussions, p. 14. I f.. 130 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. pertains to the external object. This being tlie case, there is no such thing as an indefinite whole. We have, therefore, a conception of space as an infinite whole. In conclusion, we maintain, notwithstanding all the arguments of Sir William to the contrary, that in space we obtain a knowledge of the infinite, though it is only an imperfect and indefinite know- ledge. We must think space ; we cannot think it as finite ; therefore, we must think it as infinite. We do think space ; and, such being the case, we must think it either as limited or as unlimited ; we cannot think it as limited ; therefore we must think it as unlimited. While this is the case, our mind cannot embrace the infinite in all its extent — it can- not obtain a distinct knowledge of the entire immen- sity of the infinite — therefore, our knowledge must be, and is, an indcfimte knowdedge of the infinite. Creatures in a boundless immensity, we look out pon the objects which move in the wide expanse. We seem but atoms ever existing in _the infinite, constantly related to it, mysteriously linked with it. From it we cannot be dissevered; not even in thought can wo tear ourselves away, and say of space that we know it not. We look upon the objects which are around us, but their limits we refuse to acknow- ledge as restrictions to us. Something mysterious there is beyond them, something in which they hang, somewhat in which thev move, which has no limits. THE INFINITE IN THE RELATION OF SPACE, 131 which knows no end. We look upon the earth around us; we look upon the myriads of worlds above us ; wdth one comprehensive glance we embrace them all, and with strange feelings of awe creeping over us, w^e feel that we, and all that host, hang in a mysterious, unhmited expanse — The Infinite. CHAPTER VIL THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. We pass now from the mere subjective conditions of thought, which place all our conceptions in rela- tion with the infinite ; and we come to consider what is our knowledge of the one Infinite Being — what is our knowledge of the only Being who is in- finite in all his attributes. As we have already repeatedly remarked, we find, and must find, all our knowledge of this Infinite Being in relation. It is only as this Infinite Being exists in relation that he can be known ; and it is only by recognising him in a particular relation, or in various relations, that we can obtain any knowledge of him. It is especially at this i:)oint of the discussion, that we feel constrained to lift our decided protest against Sir William Hamilton's definition of the infinite as un- conditioned — as that which does exist, and can exist, only as free from all relation. Sir William defines the infinite as the unconditionnlly unlimited : that is, ho THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 133 defines the Infinite as the unUraited, apart from all conditions, and consequently as free from all relations, since according to him to be related is to be condition- ed. According, therefore, to this definition, it must be maintained that, before the act of creation, God was infinite ; by the act of creation, he ceased to be infinite, that is, he became finite. We do not by any means intend to assert that Sir William believes that God, as now existing, is not an infinite God ; but we say that Sir William must either give up this defini- tion of the infinite, or be must cease to believe in the existence of an infinite God. We have no diflSculty in making our choice, nor will men in general find any ; and we can account for Sir William's maintain- ing this definition only by believing that he never contemplated its application in this manner. It is of course admitted that, before the act of creation, God did exist as an infinite God ; we are not arguing with an}^ one who would attempt to deny this, nor do we believe that it can be philosophically denied. Grant- ing that, before the creation, God did exist as an in- finite God, what was there in the act of creation, or what is there in the existence of created objects, which proves that God has ceased to be infinite, or which in any way prevents him existing as infinite ? Before the creation God was unlimited, and what was there in the act of creation to limit God "? What is there in the existence of created objects to limit God ? God, indeed, exists in relation to his creatures. 134 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. but who will assert that he is in any sense limited by them ? We say, therefore, that in so far as the term un- conditioned is defined as indicating what is unrestrict- ed or unlimited, it is applicable to the infinite God ; but in so far as it is defined as indicating the absolute negation of all relation, it is not applicable to the infinite God. If, therefore. Sir William assert that the infinite is that which is unrestricted and unlimited, we admit it, but rejoin that the infinite may nevertheless exist in relation. If, however. Sir William assert, as he does, that the infinite is that whose existence involves the absolute negation of all relation, we reply that no such infinite exists, — we plead for the knowledge of no such infinite, — and, consequently, Sir William's arguments to prove the impossibility of any know- ledge of such an infinite are entirely apart from the question. Sir WiUiam Hamilton, in defining the infinite, and in arguing in reference to it, plainly deals with a mere abstraction, for Avhich no one pleads, either in existence or in thought. It is the Infinite which Sir William considers, rather than the only infinite Being. He takes the term infinite, and characterizes it as unlimited, unrelated, unconditioned, w^hich are only so many more words heaped around the term infinite. What, then, is this infinite % It is nothing — it is a mere abstraction which has no existence, either externally, or in any man's thoughts. The THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 185 infinite is tlius regarded as that which is absolutely free from everything else, and unconnected with an^'thiiig. \Ye say again, that this is a mere abstrac- tion which has no existence, and which has been most unwarrantably introduced, thereby perplexing the whole question. M. Cousin has very well remarked that there is a tendency towards two false and opposite extremes in contemplating the infinite God. The one is that which arrives at Pantheism, and identifies God with all creation ; the other is that wdiicli makes God a mere Abstraction, whose exist- ence requires the entire negation of everything else. Pantheism does not separate God from the entire material world, and makes it impossible for God to exist except as the w^orld exists. A metaphysical abstraction runs to the very opposite extreme, and makes it impossible for God to exist in relation to anything else. It makes God an " absolute unity, so far superior and prior to the world, as to be foreign to it, and to make it impossible to comprehend how this unity could ever depart from itself, and how, from a principle like this, the vast universe, with the variety of its forces and phenomena, could proceed.'"^ It is wholly with this abstraction that Sir William deals, and we cannot but regret that such a philoso- pher as he, has, by taking this unwarrantable view of the infinite, endeavoured to establish the utter impossibility of any knowledge of the infinite, and, * Preface to second edition of M. Cousin's '• Fragments Pljilosophiques." 136 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. consequently, of the infinite God. Most assuredly the infinite as described by Sir William cannot be known ; but, more than that, it does not exist ;— it is nothing. Yet God does exist, and, though in direct violation of Sir William's definition, he exists as infinite and yet in relation ; and in so far as rela- tion is a necessary condition of knowledge, God in existence perfectly reahzes that relation, and in this respect there is no obstacle to our knowledge of him. We have already had occasion to contend against this mistake of the abstract for the real, and in this, we conceive, lies the key to almost the whole of Sir William's arguments against a knowledge of the In- finite. In endeavouring to determine whether we have a knowledge of the infinite, we are not to take an abstract term, and enter upon a course of abstract reasoning. We are not to assume a principle, and thence proceed to draw certain inferences, as if these must coincide with the facts of consciousness. The question is one of psychology ; what we have to consider are mental data, or facts of consciousness ; and we have to inquire whether in these we find a knowledge of something more than the finite. It is not an abstraction with which we deal, — it is not a knowledge of an abstraction for which we seek. Godis not an abstraction. He is not a Being whose existence prevents all being besides. He is not an exclusive Unity who exists alone, and who is bound by a mysterious necessity which prevents the existence of aught else. In the eloquent language of M. Cousin, — " The God of consciousness is not an abstract God — a solitary monarch exiled beyond the limits of creation on the desert throne of a silent Eternit}^^ — ■ an absolute existence, vvhich resembles even the negation of existence.''"'" The infinite God can exist in relation ; He does exist in the relation of cause ; and we hope presently to vindicate for man a knowledge of Him in this re- lation. Before, however, we endeavour to determine what is the notion we have of God as the great First Cause, it will be necessary to consider what is the correct doctrine in reference to our notion of causality — in other words. What is the true tlieor}^ of cause and effect '? Here, too. Sir William Hamilton holds a doctrine at variance from that of other philosophers; and here again we regret to differ from him. According to Sir William's doctrine, " a cause is simply everything without which the effect would not result." As a necessary consequence of this definition of a cause, Sir William asserts that a plu- I'ality of causes is necessary for the production of an effect. " A new appearance" is said to be that which presents the occasion for our judgment of causality. Sir William says, — " AVhen aware of a new appear- ance, we are unable to conceive that therein has * " Fragments Philosopliiqucs," preface de la premiere (idition, — " Le Dieu de la conscience n'est pas un Dieu abstrait, un roi solitaire relegue par dela la creation sur le trone desert d'une eternite silcncieuse et d'une existence absolue (jui ressomble au ni'ant incinc de Texistcnce." 138 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. originated any new existence, and are therefore constrained to tliink that what now appears to ns under a new form, had previously existence under others. These others (for they are always plural) are called its cause ; and a cause (or more properly causes) we cannot but suppose. . . . We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible, that the complement of existence has been either increased or diminished. We cannot conceive either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something, or on the other, something becoming nothing. . . . The mind is thus compelled to recognise an absolute identity of exist- ence in the effect and in the complement of its causes, — between the causatum and the causa. We think the cause to contain all that is contained in the effect ; the effect to contain nothing but what is contained in the causes. Each is the sum of the other." It thus appears that Sir Wilham makes our notion of causality convertible with the necessity of thinking continuance of existence. The notion of causality is made to result from the conditio?! of our thought, by which we are required to think everything as exist- ing, and existing in time ; and, as we cannot think a thing beginning to exist, we must think that it previously existed under a different form, that is, that it had a cause. This theory, therefore, analyses " the judgment of causality into a form of the mental law of the conditioned," as applied to a thing thought under the form of existence relative in Time. It is THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE, 139 thus stated by Sir William, — " We cannot know, we cannot think a thing, except under the attribute of Existence ; we cannot know or think a thing to exist, except as in Time ; and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in time, and think it ahsolutehi to commence or terminate." This doctrine has certainly many of the merits which Sir William claims for it. It has simphcity, and it postulates no new power to account for the phenomenon. These are undoubted advantages, and ought to ensure its preference over all others, provid- ed the doctrine is in accordance with facts, and suffi- cient to account for the phenomenon. But, unless it do this, no degree of simplicity, or of unity, can save it ; and, as it appears to us insufficient to ex- plain the phenomenon, we are again constrained to take a different course from that of Sir WiUiam. In endeavouring to refute this doctrine, we shall, for the sake of greater precision, distinguish our various arguments under separate paragraphs, regu- larly enumerated. 1st, Our notion of causality is not convertible with that of continued existence. In other words, our notion of causahty cannot be reduced to simple com- pHance with that condition of thought, which requires that we think every thing as existing. Sir William says, that we cannot conceive a thing beginning to be, because we cannot think a time when the object did not exist. This we consider a fallacy. We 140 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. have, ill a previous Chapter, shown that time is recognised by us as a condition of thought, and that we cannot think it apart from an object. Now, it is true, that we cannot drop the one term of the rela- tion, namely, the object, and think time apart from the object. It does not thence follow, however, that we cannot think a time when this object did not exist. We most distinctly deny the fundamental principle upon which this doctrine is built, that the causal judgment is only an instance in which our thought complies with the condition that every thing must be thought as existing. Let us test its application in a particular instance. For example, a sculptor gets a block of marble, out of which he forms a statue. When we view the statue, we recognise a new form of existence, or, in the language of Sir William, we recognise " a new appearance." There has been some change, and, if the doctrine of this philosopher be true, the manner in which we think the production of this change, is by thinking the form under which the object previously existed. According to Sir William, to think it as it previously existed, is to think its cause ; and this is a specimen of our notion of causality. Now, we ask, is it so 1 We think not. We ask our readers to realize the following course of thought, and say, if in so doing, they have been conscious of the notion of causality. A statue beautifully cut in marble stands before us ; it cannot always have existed in that form ; it T!IE INFINITE BEING AS FIE8T CAUSE. 141 formerly existed as a rough block of marble. Think of a statue en; formerly a block of marble, and you have all that Sir William's doctrine grants as in- A'olved in the notion of causality. But, we ask, have you, in thinking this, realized the notion of causality? We venture to affirm that the phenomenon, \vhicli we denominate the causal judgment, is never hei'e realized, far less accounted for. Sir William says, — " We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible, that the complement of existence has either been increased or diminished." Be it so ; what is not now hard marble, lies as dust at the base of the statue ; but what then. Further, says Sir William, — " We are constrained to think that what now appears to us under a new form, had previously existence under others.'" We would have said, under another ; but, be it even as it is put, and let us proceed. We conceive that statue, and that dust at its base, as previously existing in one block ; we ask, what then 1 We have admitted it all, but what has this to do with the cause which produced the change 1 We realize this change ; we think the statue and the dust at its base ; we think them both as previously existing in one block of marble ; but that there was a cause which jjroduccd this change, and that we must think such a cause, are facts apart from all this. But, Sir William may reply, that we have after all, taken only one of the forms under which the statue previously 142 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. existed. Well, we had thought that it had all previousl}'^ existed in the block of marble. Where else are we to find one of the forms under which the statue previously existed ? It will be said, that the image of it previously existed in the mind of the sculptor. To this we might reply, that the image of the statue, and the statue itself, are two very different things. The statue is without us, but the image originally in the mind is still there, and can never get beyond it. But, for the sake of brevity, we shall simply remark, that there is many an image in the mind which is never realized in external reality, and it is thereby manifest, that the image is not the cause of the external manifestation. Again, it may be asserted, that the operative energy of the sculptor has gone forth from him, and is embodied in the work. Now, if this energy has gone forth fi-om the sculptor, who will assert that it exists in the statue 1 And, if it be not there, where is it 1 Has not the sculptor all the energy he ever had ? If it be true, that the effect is only the complement of what previously existed, what is there in that statue which once belonged to tlie sculptor, but is no longer his ? We can see how much of the block of marble exists in the statue, but not how much of the sculptor is there. And, besides all this, the mere change in the form of existence, does not realize in us our notion of cause. On this ground, we consider tliat the THE INFINITE BEING AS FIKST CAUSE. 143 doctrine of Sir AVilliam does not realize the pheno- menon, far less account for it/'" 2d, The theoiy fails to recognise the element of poiver, which necessarily belongs to our notion of causality. This naturally follo^YS from what we have maintained in the previous paragraph. In the ex- ample there given, we have shown, that to think the effect under tlie form in which it previously existed, is not to think its cause. It may be true, that what now exists as an effect, is thought as previously existent in some different form ; but this does not by any means embrace that mental phenomenon, by which we necessarily think that there nuist have been some ccmse for the change ; in other words, that there has been some poiver in operation to pi'o- duce the result. If we examine our consciousness, we shall find, that there is always an element of power in our notion of a cause, a fact for which the theory of Sir William entirely fails to account. Our notion of causality is not embraced under the notion of mere existence ; it is not embraced under the notion of a mere continuance of existence ; it is not even embraced under the notion of a change in the form '*■ We would call special attention to an article of sti-iking ability on the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, which is to be found in the North British Review, vol. xviii. It is pervaded by the true philosophic spirit, — manifests extensive learning, — and is charactei-ized by thorough grasp of thought. Some portion of the article is occupied with an examination of Sir William Hamilton's theory of causality, and we most willingly acknow- ledge, that we have been, in part, anticipated in our objections to Sir William's theory on cause and effect, by the able and much esteemed autlior of that article. 144 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. of existence. A cause is that on account of which the change occurs ; it is that which produces the change. Take the example of a stone broken in two by the stroke of a hammer. We perceive the two pieces of stone, we think them as having previously existed in one whole ; but, we have yet to think that a certain power has separated them, before we have realized our notion of causality. Thus, and thus only, can we think a cause. Without realizing in the mind the necessary belief, that there has been an operation of power, we fail to identify our notion of causality ; and, as neglecting this, the theory of Sir William does not embrace the phenomenon to be explained. 3d, The theory errs in asserting a plurality of causes for every effect. Is it true, as is asserted, that Vv^e think two or more causes for every effect 'i Common language does not seem to indicate that this is the common belief. Sir William has scarcely announced it, when, in the very next clause, he feels the difficulty of simply expressing it, and says, — " a cause (or more properly causes) we cannot but suppose." The singular finds expression, notwithstanding the theory. But, how does the theory agree with our conscious- ness 1 Out of a piece of iron a man makes a plough- share. Sir William asserts that our notion of causality results from the necessity of thinking the object as existing, and this necessitated the assertion of a duality of causes. A^^ell, in the case pi'csentcd, THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 145 to think the plough-share as previously existing, is to think the iron ; do ^\e, then, think the iron as one cause, and the man as another 1 Is the iron realized in our thought as a cause of the plough- share 1 Sir William defines a cause as " simply every thing without which the effect would not result ;" no doubt, then, without the iron there could have been no plough-share ; do w^e, therefore, think the iron as a cause, and does Sir AVilliam give a correct definition of a cause 1 There can be no hesitation in the answer. The assertion that the iron is a cause of the plough-share, is a palpable violation of our consciousness. No man was ever heard to speak thus. Our notion of a cause is that of an operating power, and we do not consider the iron as such. The man is the only cause in the case ; there is a cause, and but one. We say, therefore, that Sir William is wrong in defining a cause as "every thing without which the effect would not result." There are many things without which an effect would not result, which we, nevertheless, do not tliink as causes. Take another example. Some water falls upon a sheet of paper and spoils it. Without the water, the paper could not have been spoilt ; without the paper, there would have been none to spoil. The presence of both of these was necessary for the occurrence of the result. This is perfectly cleai'. But, who thinks of saying, that this paper has been spoilt by the combined influence of 146 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the paper and the water, for without the presence of either, the effect could not have resulted. The thing is ridiculous. The water, and the water alone, was the cause of spoihng the paper. These three assertions, that we are necessitated to think a cause, since we must think the effect as previously existing ; that a cause is every thing without which an efl'ect would not result ; and that a plurality of causes is necessary for every effect, embrace the foundation of Sir William's theory, and fall together. There may, or there may not, be a plurality of causes, but such plurality is no necessity in the case. Uh, The theory errs in asserting that " a new appearance" or " event" affords the only occasion on which the causal judgment results. Most assuredly, as this theory asserts, we can think an object only as existing ; but there is another point which is fatal to this theory of causality, we may think an object existing in its present form, and, without any thought in reference to change in the form of its existence, we think a cause for its existence in its present form. Take an example. A steam-engine stands before us, entire in every respect ; we recognise no change from the rough materials to the beautiful mechanism ; our first glance reveals the thing complete ; there is no change going on, — no event taking place, — no new appearance being gradually evolved, yet we necessarily affirm, that there must originally have been some cause. We do not think it as previously THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 147 existing, so that our notion of cause is not originated there ; we think it as now existing, but still our notion of causality is not in that ; but, luJiile we think ^t existing, we also think it as caused, or having a cause. A relative change in the form of existence, — a new appearance, — is not necessary to originate in us our notion of cause. Nay more, not only do we think a cause, though we perceive no change, but we think that there must be a cause ivhy there is no change. We necessarily think that there must be a cause why all the parts of the steam-engine keep combined ; we necessarily think a cause why a body remains at rest ; we necessarily think a cause why the particles of matter adhere. The necessity of thinking existence does not by any means give us the necessity of thinking a cause. These two are perfectly distinct, and constitute separate conditions of thought. It is erroneous to assert that the causal judgment consists " in the universal necessity of which we are conscious, to think causes for every event." The causal judgment consists in the universal necessity of which we are conscious, to think a cause for every existence. 5th, The theory fails to account for the necessity of thinking a cause for every existence. This asser- tion is virtually involved in the preceding observa- tions, but we are anxious to distinguish it. The mere perception of the existence of an object necessi- tates the conviction that it had a cause. Sir Wil- 148 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. liam endeavours to explain why, on perceiving a new existence, we must think a cause, and that is, because we must think the object as previously existing. But this theory entirely overlooks the fact in con-^ sciousness, that we think a cause, not only for every change in the form of existence, but for every exist- ence apart from all change. The theory fails to re- ' cognise all the instances in which the causal judg- ment originates, and, consequently, fails to explain these. Sir William's theory maintains that there is a necessity to think causes for every change ; we assert that the mind is necessitated to think a cause for every existence, even though there should be no manifestation of change. 6th, The theory errs by asserting that the effect is the complement of being contained in the cause. Sir William says, — " We think the causes to con- tain all that is contained in the effect ; the effect to contain nothing but what is contained in the causes. Each is the sum of the other." This assertion, natur- ally growing out of Sir William's doctrine, carries its destruction in its front. We have already shown that the mere material out of which the effect is formed, is not thought as a cause. In so far, there- fore, as the material exists in the effect, it is not tlie cause existing in the effect. But, if we consider the real cause, that is, the efficient cause, it will be found that Sir William's statement is inapplicable. The cause, even a.'^ a cause, is not absorbed in the effect. THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 149 The joower of the sculptor remains after his statue is finished. If it be said, that the particular exertion of power is gone, we grant it ; but it has not passed into the statue. If cause and effect be " each the sum of the other," it necessarily follows that when the effect begins to exist, the cause must cease to exist. The sculptor will cease to be so, after his first effort. His power as a sculptor will be absorbed in his first statue. Let the mechanic put forth his first effort, and his power as a mechanic will have gone. For the rest of his life he may stand with stupid gaze and look at the well finished and smoothly polished piece of dead matter, into which his me- chanical powder has passed. On this theory, each individual must, in absolute verity, be a being of one work, and a man of one idea.* 7th, The theory errs in viewing causality only in the physical world, and not in the mental. Accord- ing to Sir William's system, we attribute the various mental phenomena to a distinct individual which we call mind. Let us, then, apply his doctrine of caus- ality in this instance. We are conscious of some mental phenomenon. According to this doctrine, we must think it as existing ; and so we do. Further, says our author, we cannot think it be- ginning to exist. Is this true ? We more than * On this theory, how will Sir William account for the cause of motion ? When we see a wheel moving, out of what is the motion evolved ? — out of the previous state of rest? 150 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. doubt it, but so says Sir William, and let us follow him in the proof. He says, we must think the phenomenon existing in time, and we cannot think a time in which it did not exist. We have already pointed out what we consider the fallacy in this, and it were easy to do so now ; but, for the sake of argu- ment, let us admit the assertion. Let it be granted, then, that we cannot conceive a time when this phenomenon did not exist. The statement is plainly contradictory, but let it be granted. Well, we are conscious of the commencement of its existence as a phenomenon at the present time. Where was it before that ? Was it in the mind, though not in consciousness ? Have we been wrong in considering that the phenomena rising in consciousness are newly originated existences ? Did these phenomena all ex- ist in the mind before 1 This were indeed a trans- cendent doctrine of " innate ideas." We fear that this would be a proud assertion of human wisdom, rather than, what its author so appropriately designs his doctrine to be, " a discipline of humility." But, we bethink ourselves, Sir William saith somewhat of causes for every effect. If, then, the mental pheno- menon be the perception, for example, of a stone ; did that mental phenomenon find previous existence in the stone ? If this be true, there may yet be hope for a system of Materialism. 8th, On the hypothesis of a Fi?\st cause, the theory involves a system of Pantheism. It may seem THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 151 strange, yet it is not the less true, that, at one ex- treme, Sir William makes the Infinite such an abstrac- tion as to render the Avhole creation impossible ; and, at the other extreme, identifies the \Yhole creation with God, and thus finishes in Pantheism. It is said, that extremes meet ; and, with terrible inconsistency, do these extremes meet here. Notwithstanding our high respect for Sir William, we cannot refrain from taking our stand against the doctrine which he has presented on this point. But let us not be misun- derstood. We do not say that Sir William beheves in Pantheism ; we are very far from thinking any such thing. But, we say, that his doctrine involves the assertion that we are necessitated to think the creation in accordance with the Pantheistic system ; in other words, that Pantheism, as being a real trans- script of our consciousness, is true philosophy. We go far with Sir William in his assertion of the weak- ness of the human mind ; but we do not believe that the limits assigned to our mind are such as, in any one instance, to necessitate a false conclusion. Were this the case, it would necessitate this other admis- sion, that, in the language of reprobation applied to certain theories by Sir WilHam, God had made " our nature a lie." But, let us see hoAv Sir William's doctrine of caus- ality involves Pantheism. Having stated that we think the cause for every effect by thinking the effect as previously existing under another form, he says, 1,')2 THE FHlLOSOrilY OF THE INFINITE. — '" We cannot conceive, either, on tlie one hand, nothing becoming something, or, on the other, some- thing becoming nothing. When God is said to create the universe out of nothing, we think this by sup- posing that he evolves the imiverse out of himself T^ Such is the doctrine of Sir WiUiara on this point, and such, we are sorry to add, is also the doctrine of M. Cousin. They equally present this assertion in reference to the manner in which we think the act of creation, and thus equally maintain that we can in thought realize the act of creation only in accordance with the Pantheistic system, — that Pan- theism is the transcript of our consciousness, — that it is, therefore, true philosophy. W^e frankly accept M. Cousin's indignant disclaimer of Pantheism, as presented in the Second Edition of his " Philosophical Fragments," in reply to some of his opponents, and we admire the earnestness of it. We freely state that we do not believe that either Sir W^illiam Hamil- ton, or M. Cousin, is a personal believer in Pantheism. But, we say that the theories of both essentially in- volve Pantheism. It is generally said, that in the act of creation, God created all things out of nothing. In reply to this. Sir William says, — " We cannot conceive nothing becoming something." Now, who ever said we could % Our author might have stopped in the middle of the sentence, and said " we cannot conceive nothing." Disciissious. p. o8D. THE n^FlNlTE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 153 To think nothing is not to think at all. When we are able to think nothing, it is time enough to ask US to think nothing becoming something. When we think, we must think something, which is only in other words to say that we cannot think nothing ; and what does it serve to tell us that we cannot think nothing hecomhuj something 1 What has this to do w^ith the act of creation, or with the manner in which we think it 1 Very little indeed, we suspect. We do not suppose that any man would say that we can think the act of creation by thinking- something evolved out of nothing. The absurdity of such a statement is manifest, and by whatever method we conceive the act of creation, it is at once admitted that this is not the manner. Has, then, Sir William given the true account of the manner in which we think the act of creation 1 He says, — " When God is said to create the universe out of nothing, we think this by supposing that he evolves the universe out of himself" Is this the manner in which w^e think the creation 1 We most distinctly deny it. It gives a revulsion to our whole nature. It gives the lie to our consciousness, to say that w^e think the creation as evolved out of God — that we think these mountains and valleys, these rocks and rivers, the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, the fish of the sea, as evolved out of God — as previously existing in God — as i)art of God. This universe evolved out of God ! It is an insult 154 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. to our consciousness to say that we think this material universe as evolved out of God. It was necessary for Sir William to make such an assertion in order to save his theory of causality ; but it w^as dangerous to test the validity of the theory at such a point ; the assertion of it here is a fatal error ; it is that which wdll ensure its universal rejection ; and, as finding no response in our consciousness, as being a violation of that consciousness, it stands convicted as philosophically false. It requires no reasoning or demonstration to establish its falsity. The assertion requires only to be stated and brought into contrast with our consciousness, in order to find that it cannot be maintained. Let us imagine that we stand at the point of creation, and perceive the material universe dart into existence — the actual commencement of material substance. What have we here 1 We are conscious of the origin of this new existence. We necessarily think that it had a cause, — that some operating power has brought it into existence. But, do we think that this material substance previously existed in the cause ^ Do we think that the cause is material ? By the nature of the case it is impossible ; by our consciousness, the statement is false. But, says Sir William, we can- not conceive nothing becoming something. Certainly not, for that were to think nothing, wdiich is impossi- ble. Well then, he continues, "Creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of THE INFINITE BIDING AS FIRST CAUSE. 155 existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity." What have we here ? " The evolu- tion of existence from possibility into actuality." What is " existence f It is nothing, except in so far as an individual existence is indicated. In this case, therefore, it is either nothing, or it is the material universe. It cannot be the material universe, for that has just begun ; and if it be not that, it is nothing, and to talk of its evolution is absurd. But, let us grant that it is the material universe. Well, if it be the evolution of the universe, whence is it evolved ? From " possibility," says Sir William. And where is that 1 This is only an attempt to escape under the use of general terms. The mean- ing seems to be, that in the creation, God put forth into action, or " actuality," the power to create, which he previously possessed the " possibility" of doing. This expresses a doctrine sufficiently correct, were it not for the accompanying assertion that God exercises this power by evolving the universe out of himself. Applying the phraseology to second causes, it would be said that the formation of a steam-engine " is the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality." In this case, it is quite true that the man had previously the ability to make an engine, and the materials had the ability of being made into an engine, but out of what was the engine evolved ? Out" of the materials certainly, and not out of the man. Where, then, were the materinls out of which 156 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. God evolved the universe ? Tliej were nowhere. There were none ; therefore, in the work of creation we cannot talk of the evolution of the created object. Were we to express what \ve hold to be our notion of creation, w^e would say that creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the origin of exist- ence, by the fiat of the Deity. We think the fact of the existence of the universe whenever it springs into being, but the hoiu is beyond our reach. From the existing universe we have obtained a conception of God, we, therefore, think the world existing in time up to the point of creation. If, in thought, w^e pass beyond that, the world as the one term of the relation is dropj)ed, that is to say, w^e withdraw our thoughts from it, it ceases to be an object of thought, and God alone is thought as existing in Time. We say, then, that creation is the origin of existence by the fiat of the Deity. But, retorts Sir William, we cannot think the origin of existence, therefore we must think that the universe previously existed in God, since it did not till now exist in a created form. Now, it is ad- mitted by this philosopher, that we think the universe as beginning to exist in its present form. Well, is not that to think its origin 1 What necessitates us to think that it previously existed in another form "? We feel no such necessity. But, says Sir William, we cannot think a time when it did not exist ; we cannot think a time when there was nothing ; we THE INFINITP: Br.TKO AS FIRST CAUSE. 1.j7 cannot think nothing becoming something. Now, we admit that we think tlie universe as existing in time. AVell, it is said, we cannot think a time when it did not exist. To this we reply, that we cannot think a time when nothing existed, yet we can easily think a time when the w^orld did not exist — a time when God alone existed. We have already shown, that time is a condition of thought, and that we cannot think time without thinking an object in it. When we think the universe existing in time, we cannot drop the one term of the relation, namely, the universe, and think time existing without any object. By a necessity of our nature, this is impos- sible. But this does not render it impossible for us to think a time when the world did not exist. Such a time we do think, when God alone existed. We think the universe existing in time, and we think God existing in time before the universe, but we feel no mental necessity to think " the sum of existence " involved in the existence of God alone, as ider.tical with " the sum of existence " involved in the joint existence of God and the universe. We think the universe existing, and before it ^ve think God exist- ing, but we feel no mental necessity to think that the universe was evolved out of God. In fact, we feel mentally necessitated to think that the material universe could not have previously existed as part of the Great Spirit. Let us again imagine the work of creation, and 158 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. see what are the facts of consciousness. We imagine the universe beginning to exist ; its existence is reaUzed as a phenomenon. If, then, we are asked, how does it come into existence 1 We answer that that does not come within our observation, and is, therefore, beyond the range of our siDeculation. To attempt to answer the question, were to violate the first principle of sound philosophy. All that we can affirm is, that we now recognise the world springing into existence, and we think an operating power, the Great First Cause as producing it. We think the universe as now existing — as a new existence — as an increase in the sum of being. It has nothing to do with this to tell us that we cannot think time previously existent and separate from the universe — that we cannot make time the object of thought, and think it before the universe began — as if this were essential to thinking the non-existence of the universe. When we are asked to think the time before a certain house was erected, we realize that time simply by thinking of events which occurred, or of objects which existed before that house was built. So with the Creation, — we think the time when the world did not exist, by thinking God as alone existent. We have no more difficulty in thinking a time when the world did not exist, than in thinking a time when that house did not exist. Nor need Sir WiUiam start any difficulty in reference to the possibility of our conception of God as he existed THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 15f) before the creation, since his own theory implies sucli a conception. If, as he says, we think the world evolved out of God, it is plainly implied that we think God as previously existent. We, however, admit that we cannot understand hoiu God ojDerates without materials, for we have no experience of such an exertion of causal energy ; but we think God as the cause which produces the effect ; and we have no difficulty in thinking the object as beginning to exist. We at once recognise the absurdity of the assertion that God separated from himself a part of His essence, and so operated upon it as to produce the universe. Sir William himself recognises this in the last quotation we have given, when he speaks of the creation of the universe, as its evolution from possibility into actuality. This is a quiet way of admitting that it did not previously exist, but that there was previously in God the power to produce it ; which is a very different doctrine from that in- volved in the assertion, that we think the act of creation by supposing that God " evolves the universe out of himself." When, therefore, we say that God made all things out of nothing, it is not meant that notliing became something. It is meant that God operated luitliout materials — that the world was originated by an act of power — -by the fiat of the Deity. Ez nihilo, nihil fit, is either a truth or a falsehood accoi'ding to the relation in which it is taken. If by it be meant IGO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. that something cannot be evolved out of nothing — that nothing cannot become something, it is true. If by it be meant that God cannot without materials originate a new existence, it is false. We might use against Sir William on this point one of his own arguments against M. Cousin. And thus — almost in Sir William's own words, — " On this theory, God is not distinct from the world; the creature is a modification of the Creator." " On this hypothesis, one of two alternatives must be ad- mitted ;" God must " pass either from the better to the worse, or from the worse to the better," both of which are absurd. 9th, On this theory, the conception of a First Cause is an impossibility. We have shown that, on the hypothesis of a First Cause, the theory is pantheistic, but even that hypothesis is altogether inconsistent with the theory. In the theory of Sir William Hamil- ton, the notion of a First Cause is a borrowed con- ception. Its author speaks of the universe as evolved out of God, but how has he obtained the conception of God, or of a First Cause ? Not in accordance with his own theory, most certainly. According to his theory, the causal judgment arises from the fact that " we are constrained to think, that what now appears to us under a new form, had previously an existence under others." Now, if we account for a new appearance by thinking it as it previously ex- isted, we must again account for that previous exist- THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 161 ence by thinking it as having existed under a different form at a time still more antecedent, and so on for ever. On this theory, we are dealing with a constant chain of causes, without the possibility of reaching an absolute cause ; we are engaged upon the ever varying forms of existence without the pos- sibility of reaching absolute existence. Let us, then, suppose that we reach the point at which the uni- verse is created ; according to the theory under consideration, we think that the universe previously existed under a different form. Now, if this be all that is involved in our conception of the cause of the world, for aught w^e know, that form may also be the result of a change, and the previous form may also have been the result of a change, and so on for ever. The alleged necessity of thinking a present existence as previously existing under a dif- ferent form, can never give the necessity to think an original and absolute existence. How, then, does Sir William obtain the conception of that First Cause, from whom all things are said to have been evolved 1 Not in accordance with his own theory assuredl3^ He can reach it only by reverting to the notion of a First Cause as a necessary conviction of the mind, and thus must overturn his whole theory. That we have a necessary conception of a First Cause, we consider the true doctrine ; but of this hereafter. For the reasons thus stated, we consider tliat Sir L 1(>2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. William's theory of causality does not account for the phenomenon, and is altogether unsatisfactory. We have occupied considerable space in discussing this question, but we have deemed it necessary, inasmuch as it concerns the true account of our notion of God as the great First Cause. We might have presented other objections, but we have already dwelt at sufficient length on the matter. For example, we might have remarked that Sir William's theory erroneously professes to be based upon a weakness of the mind. Does it prove weakness of mind, that in order to think, we must think sometlimg existing in time 1 Does it jorove weakness of mind that we cannot think nothing? What a power of mind it would be to be able to think nothing — to think and yet not to think ! To think, and to think existence are convertible terms, and is not thought precisely the poiver of the mind 1 The doctrine of causality which we adopt, is that held by the majority of modern philosophers, though it ma}^ be with some variations in the manner of statement and in the mode of defence. Our doctrine is this, — That it is a necessar}'- condition of human intelligence — a first principle of the mind — to think a cause for every existence, except the great First Cause, who is the cause of all things else, and is him- self uncaused, unchangeable, and absolute. We do not say in the language of some, " that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause which produced THE INFINITE BEING AS FIKST CAUSE. 163 it." Ill our statement of the principle, we intend to indicate that the mind is necessitated to think a cause for every existence, even though we should not recognise it when beginning to exist. We mean to indicate that, by the causal judgment, we are not only necessitated to think a cause for every object which we recognise as beginning to exist ; but we are also necessitated to think that every object which we recognise as existing, must have begun to exist, and must have had a cause for so beginning ; except the one Infinite and Eternal Being. The world in which we live is not brought under our observation as be- ginning to exist, yet we necessarily think that it did begin to exist, and that it was the operation of a cause which realized its origin. We say, therefore, that to think a cause for every existence is a necessary condition of human intelligence— a first principle of the mind — an ultimate datum of consciousness, which cannot be demonstrated, yet which cannot be doubted, and which must be thought by all men. In reference to tliis theory Sir William says, that it " certainly does account for the phenomenon." Since, therefore, we consider that the causal judg- ment is necessary to all men, and since we consider that all other theories, Sir William's included, have failed to account for the phenomenon, we maintain the theory now stated as fully accounting for the phenomenon, and as the only tenable theory on the question. 164 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Notwithstanding, however, Sir William's admission of the sufficiency of the theory, he urges against it one or two objections, a reply to which we feel our- selves constrained to attempt. The first objection which we shall consider, is stated by Sir William in the following terms, — " If there be postulated an express and positive affirma- tion of intelligence to account for the mental deliver- ance, — that existence cannot absolutely commence ; we must equally postulate a counter affirmation of intelligence, positive and express, to explain the counter mental deliverance, — that existence cannot infinitely not commence. . . . But they are contra- dictories ; and, as contradictories, they cannot both be true. On this theory, therefore, the root of our nature is a lie."'" To this we reply that we do not hold both. We deny the existence of any such thing as a " mental deliverance, that existence cannot absolutely commence." Upon ground already stated, we altogether deny that our notion of causality is convertible with the thought of con- tinued existence. We expressly deny that we are necessitated to think that every object wdiich we recognise as beginning to exist must have previously existed under a different form. We therefore alto- gether deny the asserted "mental deliverance, — that existence cannot absolutely commence ;" it is no part of our theory, consequently our theory is not * Discussions, p. 595. THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 165 chargeable with the inconsistency of holding both contradictories. We hold it as a mental deliverance that everything but God did absolutely begin to exist — that nothing but God has had infinite exist- ence — or, in the more awkward language of the quo- tation, "that existence cannot infinitely not com- mence." We do assert the fact of two mental de- liverances, but certainly not of two which are mutually contradictory. They are these : — First, That there is a cause for the existence of every object in its pre- sent form : Secondly, That all things, except God, had an absolute commencement,* that is, that there was a First Cause. These two are not contradictories ; and against our theory as embracing these, the ob- jection is inapplicable. If, however, the objection to Sir William's theory which we have indicated above be admitted as valid, namely, that the necessity to think existence relative in time is not a weakness, but a power, the present objection, which he urges against our theor^^, turns with destructive effect upon his own, since he asserts that the two contradictories are both the deliverances of consciousness. The next objection is expressed thus, — "To suppose a positive and special principle of causality, is to sup- pose that there is expressly revealed to us, through intelhgence, an affirmation of the fact that there exists * By " absolute commencement,''^ we mean tlie origin of being ■without previously existing materials ; not origin without dependent relation on a cause. The former we regard as Sir William's meaning; on any other supposition, the asserted contradiction vanishes. 166 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. 110 free causation; that is, that there is no cause which is not itself merely an effect, existence being only a series of determined antecedents and determined consequents."* Does then our doctrine imply a denial of free will ? We are persuaded that it does not. Let us examine our consciousness, and ascertain what facts are therein presented. We are conscious of an act of volition. In accordance with the theory which we have presented, w^e necessarily refer this phenomenon to a certain power which we call Mind. Some may say that we refer the phenomenon to the power of will as its cause. So, indeed, we may, but it is to be remembered that the division of the powers of the mind is merely theoretical, and instituted for philosophical purposes. The powers of the mind are not separate existences. When we speak of the various powers of the mind, we mean thus to indicate only the several relations in which the mind, that is, the individual mind, can operate. Well, then, when we are conscious of an act of will, we refer it' to some cause, and that cause we call Mind. Is the mind, then, an effect 1 Yes. It was created by God. Does this involve the impossibility of freedom ? We recognise no such impossibility. We are conscious of an act of volition ; we refer it to a cause which we call mind ; but in so doing we find nothing fatal to the freedom of the mind. We find no difficulty in thinking the act of volition * Discussions, p. 595. THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 167 as a new existence, which did in consciousness abso- lutely begin to exist ; and we have no difficulty in thinking that the mind was the originating power. Our theory of causality acknowledges the necessity of referring the phenomenon to a cause ; but it recognises no necessity to affirm that the cause of this phenomenon was another previously existing phenomenon ; and so on ad infinitum. Such " a series of determined antecedents and determined consequents" would be essential, in order to establish Necessity or Fatalism, and invalidate Freedom, but consciousness reveals no such series, and our theory does not assert its existence. Let us, however, hear 8ir WilHam again on this point. He says, — " Moral liberty does not merely consist in the power of doing what ive will, but in the power of willing ivliat ive luill. For a power over the determinations of our Will supposes an act of Will that our Will should determine so and so ; for we can only freely exert power through a rational determination or volition.'"-' Now, what is meant by " willing to will 1" Was any one ever conscious of this ? Was any one ever conscious of willing to will what he wills ? Was any one ever conscious of such a series passing through his mind ? No man ever was, or ever could be. And if no one is conscious of it, by what right is it affirmed that such a series is necessary in order to free volition ? * Ileid's Works, p. 5!)!), (Note A.) 168 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. We are not at all conscious of willing to will, in order to that freedom of will of which we are conscious. The whole assertion about the necessity of such a series is a mere fabrication. Look again at Sir William's statement. He says, — " We can only freely exert power through vohtion." Well, if we freely exert power through volition, the very first act of volition involves a free exertion of power, and no previous act of volition is necessary to secure free exertion. If, as is asserted, we freely exert power through vol/Hon, it is utterly ridiculous to assert, that for the free exertion of power in volition we require a previous act of volition. We therefore consider that Sir William's objection entirely breaks down, while our theory of causality stands uninjured, and presents no obstacles to freedom of w ill. Having thus stated our doctrine of causality, and vindicated it from the assaults of Sir William, we shall now briefly state M. Cousin's opinion in refer- ence to our notion of God as First Cause. His assertion is, that we think God not only as a cause, but as an absolute cause, by wdiich he means a cause which must act. According to M. Cousin, it is not merely a fact that God has put forth causal energy in the act of creation, and that he now exists as the cause of every other existence ; but, by the very con- stitutionof hisnature,God \Ycisnecessitated to put forth causal energy, or, in his own language, wasnecessitated to "pass into act." According to this doctrine, there- THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 169 fore, God Mvasnotmerely able to create, but necessitated to create : Creation was a necessary act.* In defence of such a doctrine we say nothing ; and for it we offer no apology. When we consider the influence of the transcendental philosophy of Germany upon M. Cousin, it is not difficult to understand how he was led to propound a doctrine so untenable. Attracted by the beauties of German transcendental- ism, yet painfully conscious of certain marks of failure, he sought to obliterate the defects, and, by a few clever touches, to fill in the parts in a manner con- formable with the whole. But, woe to the efforts of Eclecticism ! What had been professedly improved, had only been made worse than before. We do not dwell upon this error of M. Cousin, which is only one of many faults into which he seems to have been led by a too ardent admiration of a system. The doctrine has been demolished by Sir William Hamil- ton with a master's hand. Never was artillery more powerful, directed with more terrible effect. We pass now from the opinion of M. Cousin, and proceed to the completion of our purpose in the present Chapter. We have seen that, by a first principle of our mind, we necessarily think a cause for every existence. Do we, then, think every existence as a mere link in an eternal chain of causes ? We * According to M. Cousin's doctrine, God mud act as a cause. According to Sir William's doctrine God cannot act as a cause, for the unconditioned cannot exist in relation. Liotli are vicious extremes. 170 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. do not. Without reasoning upon the matter, the mind instinctively perceives the absurdity of such an assertion. While the general principle that there is a cause for every existence is implanted in the mind as a native possession, there is placed along with it, as a necessary principle of the mind, the revelation of one grand exception, of one Being, the Cause of all causes, himself uncaused. No man, who even cursorily reflects upon his own consciousness, can honestly assert that these two principles are unknown to him. We do not intend to dwell here at great length upon the position of Atheism, in denying the existence of God. Atheism is a lie in the utterance, and a lie against the clearest of all evidence — the consciousness of a man's own mind. Let a man examine his own consciousness, and say if he does not find there the necessary beliefs, that there must be a cause for every event, and that there must be a First Cause for every existence. Let any man examine his own consciousness and he will find these principles in his mind. He will find that he cannot begin to demonstrate their truth, but he cannot doubt them, he must believe them. We admit that, upon any other ground than that of a necessary principle of the mind, these words were nothing but mere dogmatism ; but, with that foundation, they are the words of truth.* * When ^Ye speak of a necessary j^rinciple of the miud, as the only grouud whicli warrants uncompromising assertion, apart from demonstration, we THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 171 Let US examine our consciousness, and attempt clearly to delineate the facts revealed. The mind thinks of the wide world, on whose broad sur- face we seem so small — of the high towering rocks, which, ill dread silence, stand as tokens that man below and they above are equally subject to a higher power — of the vast expanse of waters, by some my- sterious tie hung freely in the hollows of the earth — of the host of stars, midst which our world is but a speck — of that mysterious power by which the earth is rent and made to quake— of the shade which creeps athwart the central luminary, and, with a power be- yond our control, wraps us in thick darkness. By a necessity of our nature, we must think that all these had a cause. But, was that cause itself an effect ? and, if so, must we go back in a regressive process from effect to cause, never coming to an end 1 We feel that this is an absurdity which cannot recommend itself to our reason. Let us endeavour to reahze an unending chain, in which each cause is itself an mean in the sphere of mental philosophy, which finds all its materials in the revelations of consciousness. And why do these necessary principles of the mind stand supreme and bej'ond the reach of dispute ? Because they are implanted in the mind by God — they are a direct revelation from God. May we not, then, have other facts of equal certainty otherwise revealed 1 Certainly. The facts of an external revelation, in other words, the facts of Scripture. These two, the facts of the internal revelation, that is to say, the necessary principles of the mind, and the facts of the external revelation, that is to say, the truths of the Bible, we may maintain with uncompro- mising stediiistness, apart from all demonstration. They are both the revelations of God. It is the singular harmony, and mutual adaptation of these two, which secius to us the strongest proof of the divine origin of the Scriptures — a course of proof which might be developed with great advan- tage to the (Jhristian evidences. 172 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. effect, developed by some previously originated cause, and we shall fail. Let us endeavour to imagine an eternal chain of causes — a succession of operating- powers, without some originating power, and we shall find that we not only cannot realize such a thing, but we cannot believe in it, inasmuch as it is in direct violation of a necessary conviction of our mind. We cannot believe in a course of operations without an originating power. We cannot believe in a process of development without some origin of the process. It is the acknowledged necessity of the human mind to believe in some uncreated source, as the Origin of all things. It is the very nature of the causal judgment to think a power for the origin of all things. We find these two necessary convic- tions both involved in the relation of causality ; — that there is a cause for the existence of every object in its present form ; and that there is a primary Cause for the origin of all existence. On the one hand, we cannot believe in an unending i-egression of finite causes. The very attempt is felt to involve something antagonistic to our nature — something which our very constitution stamps as impossible. We cannot believe in such a thing. On the other hand, we have a necessary belief, which establishes positive truth, and which afiirms that there is an uncreated infinite Being, who by his own power originated all things. This we find we must believe ; nothing else can be reft-arded as siifiicient ; this alone THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 173 is satisfactory. We may wish that it were false ; by vainly directing the mind to curious speculation, we may turn our attention from it ; but, while we endeavour to account to ourselves for the origin of all things which now exist, we must think an infinite and eternal Creator. We must think a primary Cause for all causes ; an unbeginning Origin of all existence ; a centi"al Power from which comes all activity ; an everlasting Fountain of Life, from which flows all vitality. Such, we say, is the revelation of consciousness. We have endeavoured to ascertain what we do think, what we do believe, what we must believe. We have given exclusive attention to the internal phenomena, regardless of the objections which may be busily urged as we announce their character. Now, how- ever, we can imagine that we hear the voice of the objector asserting that all is a fabrication. In answer to such an assertion, we can only ask each one to examine his own consciousness ; to attempt satisfactorily to account to his own mind for the origin of all things : and he will find that he instinc- tively thinks an uncreated Power as the originator of every thing. A re we indignantly asked if we deny the fact that there are men who assert that they do not believe in a First Cause 1 We admit that there are such men. As there have been men who have denied the existence of the external world ; so there have been men who, admitting its existence, 174 THK PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. have denied the existence of a First Cause ; and we think the former class the more consistent of the two. There have been men who have theoretically maintained that there is no universe, and w^ho have yet confessed that they found themselves necessi- tated to believe in its existence. And so, there have been men who have denied the existence of a First Cause — who have theoretically maintained that there is no such Being — and who have accomplished this simply by withdrawing their attention and fixing it upon the mere forms of a theory. But, this we will say of such men, that if they were as honest as the former class, they w^ould admit that they feel them- selves practically necessitated to believe in the exist- ence of the First Cause, wdiose existence they theo- retically deny. Let a man refuse to turn his atten- tion to the facts of the question, and he may main- tain an^^thing to his own satisfaction, no matter how^ monstrous it may seem to others. Let him refuse to apply his mind to the circumstances in which the conviction we have described will arise ; let him abide by his own peculiar forms of thought, and refuse to examine their foundation ; and he may theoretically maintain his unbelief with perfect satis- faction. But, let him theoretically maintain Atheism as he ma3^ he cannot live it. If he be at all a re- flective man, the inquiry will often arise in his mind, whence come I, and whence have come all these ob- jects around me 1 And with such thoughts in his THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 175 mind, he will find the truth pressed upon him — he cannot escape it — he must admit it. The still, small voice of consciousness saith, — that there was an in- finite and eternal Creator of all things. Man may rush from the truth, he may stifle the inquiry, he may escape from it by turning his thoughts to other objects. But, let him raise the inquiry, let him prosecute it, and, as he is a living, intelligent being, w^ith the soul of humanity within him, and possessed of all its principles, he must Beheve. The upholder of Atheism will observe that we do not profess to prove the existence of a First Cause. We do not profess to demonstrate the fact. We maintain that it is above proof — that it is beyond all demonstration. We maintain that it can be neither doubted nor demonstrated, but is a ti'uth necessary to the mind — a truth which must be believed. Not, indeed, a truth which is always present to the mind — not a truth which cannot be shunned ; but a truth which must be realized if we seek to account to ourselves for the origin of all things ; a principle which, when raised in the mind, cannot be doubted, and, in arising, stands supreme. We do not uphold the argument from design as a demonstration logically exact. On the contrary, we maintain that we never can have a logical demonstration of the existence of God. The creation of the universe is only a finite manifestation of power, and from that we can never infei- the Infinite. Evei-y such argu- 17G THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. ment is incompetent, as embracing more in the conclusion than is involved in the premises. We therefore do not at all profess to present any argument which will be a satisfactory demonstration of a First Cause, — but we make no such profession, because we believe that, in every such attempted demonstration, the notion of the First Cause is involved in the very first step. Man necessarily has the notion in his mind — he needs no proof of it — any attempt to prove it would involve its assumption in starting, but man finds himself so constituted that he cannot get rid of it. All the use we would make of what has been called the argument from design is as an illustration — as presenting a course of thought in which the conception of a First Cause will arise — as originating an inquiry which, if prosecuted, must terminate in belief Let any man honestly carry out the inquiry in reference to the origin of all things, and he will find that he can no longer doubt — that by the constitution of his mind he must believe in the existence of an infinite and eternal First Cause.* * With all deference, we must be allowed thus strongly to question both the wisdom and the conclusiveness of the common arguments to 2}rove the existence of a God. Well do we remember the complicated feelings of anxiety wliicli passed through our mind, when we first began to consider these arguments — when it seemed that we were required to determine whether the existence of God should be one of the articles of our belief. Early dogmatic instructions made a due impression, and found a response in our mind, but these arguments for the first time startled us with the suspicion that the conclusion might be false. Left to ourselves there was no difficulty ; steering through these arguments there was doubt and uncertainty. Such we consider the natural tendency of these arguments, and, while such doubts arise, the mind may fiiil to observe that they militate against the arf/ume/tt, witliout aifccting tho/act. THE INFINITE BEING AS FIKST CAUSE. 177 When we look upon the objects around us, -we necessaril}' think a First Cause for every existence. What, then, is our notion of a cause 1 and what is our notion of the First Cause 1 As we have ah-eady shewn, our notion of cause is a notion of power. Now, our notion of power is only relative, that is to say, we know power only in relation to its effects. We think a cause, therefore, as the power which \ produces certain effects ; and according to the nature of the effect produced, will be our notion of the producing cause. Such is the manner in which we form our notion of a cause ; how do we obtain a notion of the great First Cause ^ We look across our world ; in thought we endeavour to embrace the wide universe ; and as Ave do so, we find rising within us the necessary belief that there was an independent First Cause, by whom all these were brought into existence. The entire universe is the creation — He is the Creator : that vast system of worlds is the effect — He is the Cause. We think of world after world ; system after system ; and all the host as one grand whole, and we think the First Cause as the mysterious power which produced all these. We stand over- whelmed before power so great ; and our whole soul swells with conscious testimony to the great reality. Strangely we feel our weakness as we stand, a mere speck on a distant orb of the vast universe. Strangely we feel the greatness of God, the Being l)y whose iM 178 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. fiat these worlds were first made to roll in space. We imagine ourselves a conscious spectator of that mighty act ; and dread solemnity reigns in our soul. We are in the very presence of the great God, and are surrounded by the tokens of his power. He has created all ; He is maintaining all ; His hand seems strangely upholding all. In the midst of such an awful manifestation of power, when we think of the Being by whom it is exercised, do we think that this may be all he can do— do we find any tokens that this may be the limit of his power 1 No. We are possessed by the all-absorbing thought of power so great, exercised by Him who is the great First Cause — high and alone — with naught above to influ- ence Him — with naught around to restrict Him — and all things formed as but a proof of what he ivilled to do. Limits ! We cannot find them — we cannot realize them in thought. To limit that power there muSt needs be some one higher, but there is none, — we think Him, and must think Him, as the Eternal and Supreme. All things are fitted to raise in our mind the thought of this Infinite cause. Our own earth, with its marvellous formations, is a suffi- cient connecting-link to raise our thouglits to the mighty Originator. The imperfect glance which we can take of the many worlds which float around us in space, expands our thoughts still further, and gives us a deeper consciousness of the Infinite. The loud-sounding thunderbolt, as it rolls and echoes THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 179 through imHmited space, strikes to the very deptlis of our heart, till it throbs with those emotions which are the conscious acknowledgment of the God who thunders. Every finite cause is the associating link which leads us to the Infinite. We may think that a certain cause has been itself modified by some previously existing cause, which again has been influ- enced by some other, but we cannot think that there is an unending chain of these finite causes, — we cannot believe such a thing. We must think a Being who is possessed of infinite power, that is, whose power is not limited by any other power, but who is himself the source of all power. From these remarks, we think it obvious that we have some notion of the infinite Being as First Cause. We have a relative manifestation of the power of that Being in the works of creation. Since the uncondi- tioned Being has made such a relative manifestation of himself, it is plain that we can form some notion of him as thus existing, that, in fact, the thought of the creation necessitates the thought of the Creator. What, then, is the notion we have of the First Caused Our notion of the First Cause is the notion of a Being- possessed of power. Do we, then, think that power as limited or as unlimited 1 We consider that the answer is plain. The First Cause is thought as a Being of unlimited power. We cannot think his power as limited, for to think limits is to think a limiting power, and the terms of the relation are, the 180 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Creator producing, — all things produced. There is, therefore, no power which can limit ; we cannot think his power as Hmited ; we must think the First Cause as the original source of all power — as infinite Power itself. Can we, then, form a perfect notion of infinite power 1 This is clearly impossible. We form our notion of it only in accordance with its relative manifestation. We think the First Cause as the power producing all things, but we cannot think that power as limited ; therefore we must think it as unlimited. We cannot think it as finite ; therefore we must think it as infinite. In the same manner we form our conception of the wisdom of the Supreme Being. Everywhere do we find the traces of this wisdom, and we must con- template it as infinite, since there is none higher. Not that our finite minds can fully fathom the depths of divine wisdom, but, realizing the proofs of that wisdom, we cannot regard it as limited, we must regard it as absolute and infinite. Thus, in our con- ception of the First Cause, do we obtain the notion of absolute power and absolute wisdom. By a necessity of our mind, we do think a First Cause for all existence. We do not think that First Cause as a negation of the finite ; we do not merely think away limits ; we recognise a real object of thought, and that object is an infinite Being — infinite in every respect — with nothing in existence which could possibly limit him. W^hen we think the First THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 181 Cause as revealed in relation with the works of crea- tion, we recognise in our own consciousness the knowledge of something real. If we may be allowed the expression, we feel in realizing this act of thought, that its object is of all objects the most real — strange and mysterious, it is true — yet, pre-eminently 7ral. We confess that our knowledge of that Being is par- tial and indefinite. Does it, then, by the very dim- ness of its perception, by the very indefiniteness and imperfection of its realization, produce a weak and transient impression on tlie mind ? Nay, the very reverse is the case. Of all the objects of knowledge, there is none which so impresses the mind ; none which exercises such an influence over us ; none which spreads over the mind such feelings of awe. Its presence calls forth a response from the whole soul, and raises from the very depths of our nature the most powerful emotions which reign in the mind. With such testimony within us ; with the conscious- ness of intensity of emotion ; we assert that our knowledge of the- infinite Creator i^ pre-eminentlij real and positive. Let us now endeavour to sum up our argument in a manner somewhat approximating to logical ex- actness. We consider that the mind has a necessary belief in the existence of an infinite Being in the relation of First Cause. In thinking the world, and in thinking the First Cause as the creating power which brought it into existence, we regard it beyond 182 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. all dispute that the infinite Being has come into re- lation with the mind as an object of thought. Apart from the question concerning our knowledge of the Creator, and how we think such an object, it seems to us plain and undeniable that, in thinking the relation of cause and effect in this instance, the infinite Being is recognised as an object of thought. Both terms in every relation must be thought, and just as truly as we think the creation, do we think the Creator; just as truly as we think the first eff'ect, do we think the First Cause ; just as truly as we think the finite world, do we think the infinite God. The mere thought of a finite power necessitates the thought of an infinite power ; and, just inasmuch as we think an infinite Being, do we realize the First Cause of all things. In no other way can we realize our belief in a Fii-st Cause for all existence. From the ver}^ nature of the case, it is plain that the one infinite Being has come into relation with our mind as an object of thought. Whatever may be the nature of our act of thought, and whatever the object may seem to be as recognised in thought, we wish it distinctly observed, that the object as existing, and as in relation with our mind is the really Infinite — the one infinite Being. In reference to the nature of our thought, it may be argued, that, as our thought is finite, it cannot embrace the infinite, it cannot give anything more than a knowlcdo-e of the finite. Now, wc at once THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 183 admit, that our thought is finite, and cannot embrace the infinite, that is, cannot know it i7i all its extent. But, does it thence follow that we can have no know- ledge of the infinite Being 1 Is it impossible to have a limited knowledge of an infinite object I We think not. We do not consider the argument a valid one, that, since our thought is finite, therefore the object of thought must be finite. We do not consider that an object in order to be known must be completely known — must be wholly embraced. We hold that if an object, whether finite or infinite, be brought into relation with the mind, it can be known. For example, the mariner afloat on the Atlantic can make that ocean an object of thought. He does not recognise it in all its extent, nor does he recog- nise it as limited, for it is to be observed that the limits are to be found in his power of vision, and not in the object as seen, since he may reach the limits to whicli his power of vision leads him, and still find the ocean rolling beyond. So with our knowledge of the Infinite. If the infinite come into relation with our mind, it does not follow that we cannot know it, because our knowledge is limited. The mind is not restricted to the knowledge of only such things as it can fully embrace, or completely know. By the necessity to think a First Cause for all existence, the infinite God is brought into relation with our mind, and as such lie is known. That our powers are limited, by no means proves that 184 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. every object of thought is similarly limited, or is thought as limited. It proves that our thought is limited, but not that the object of thought is limited ; the limits are in our mind and not in the object ; and at the very point at which we are conscious of the limits of our own mind, we recognise the object as stretching beyond us. We may, therefore, have a limited, or imperfect knowledge of an object — an indefinite knowledge of the Infinite. The object of thought may be the really Infinite, though imper- fectly known. We admit, then, that we have only a limited knowledge of the infinite Being, but it does not thence follow that we think Him as finite. We think Him without thinking limits ; apart from all limits ; and with the impossibility of thinking limits. We do think Him ; we cannot think him as limited ; therefore we must think Him as un- limited. In reference to the actual manifestation of power in the work of creation, it may be argued, that there is a manifestation of only finite power, inasmuch as we recognise on\j a limited result. Now, it is evi- dent, from what we have already said, that the relative manifestation of power in the work of crea- tion introduces us to a knowledge of that Being who has revealed the results of this exercise of power. From the nature of the case, we must think this Being as infinite, inasmuch as he is in his existence underived and independent. Our thought does not THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 185 realize Him as finite, and cannot so realize Him. But it is true, that, in the work of creation we see the manifestation of onlj a limited degree of powei', but we do not, therefore, think the Creator as a Being possessed of limited poive?\ We do think Him as a Being possessed of power ; we cannot think Him possessed of onlj^ limited power ; therefore, we must think Him as a Being possessed of unlimited power. The truth of our position will be at once revealed, if we reflect that our notion of the supreme First Cause equally arises whether we consider a greater or a smaller portion of the work of creation — whether we consider our world alone, or the worlds which roll around us. The mere thought of a finite exist- ence necessitates the thought of an infinite Being ; the mere thought of a finite power necessitates the thought of an infinite power. We cannot think a finite power as original and underived ; we must think the underived power as infinite, for to think a being as finite is only to necessitate our rising a step higher to an independent and infinite Being ; there- fore, we must think the original Being as infinite. We do not mean to say, that we can embrace the infinite ; but, we do mean to say, and we think Sir William Hamilton will admit the statement, that we must think an original and independent Cause producing all things, and we cannot think that originating power ^s finite. We may constitute any existence more or less minute, an object of thought. 186 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. and we may form a notion of God's power from this effect. We may extend our thoughts to objects more numerous and complex, and our notion of God's power expands with the objects. We may extend our thought so as to embrace the world, and still our notion of God's power enlarges. In all this we are conscious of our thought expanding, still, it is true, our thought is limited, yet in all that course of thought one Being is the object of thought, and that Being is infinite — the same power is the object of thought, and that power is un- limited. As we extend our thoughts over the works of God's creation, we form our notion of his power and wisdom by the works which we consider; as our thought expands, our notion of his power and wisdom en- larges. In each step we are conscious that our know- ledge is limited ; and yet, in each step, we are conscious that it is the same power we contemplate, but we never in thought find limits to that power. We extend our thought beyond our globe to the other worlds which roll in space, and our thought of God's power extends, yet still no limits to that power. The astronomer turns his telescope to the heavens, and worlds on worlds start u|) before him, and with deeper awe his thought has gained a wider reach of that infinite power. Thus do our thoughts expand, and still we find that power. As the mind progresses, it is conscious of limits only in itself ; it has found, and can find, no limits in that power. THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. 187 In the contemplation of other objects, the mind is conscious of hmits both in itself and in the object, but here the object of thought is the one infinite Being, who can have no restriction. In contemplat- ing this mysterious Power, our thought expands with thrilling awe and stirring interest, a jo^^ous foretaste of pleasures yet unfelt, and a conscious proof of a higher destiny, with still extending powers. And even here our thoughts expand, and still the great one Power is found ; and further still our mind ex- tends, and still that power is there — one and un- changeable — one and uncircumscribed — the infinite Power — the infinite God. CHAPTER VIII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFINITE BEING IN THE RELATION OF MORAL GOVERNOR. The notion of an infinite Being does not arise in the mind merely when we recognise the First Cause and the universe which he has created. Man is not merely a being gifted with the exercise of a reason- ing power ; he does not merely inquire into the origin of all things, and pursue courses of elaborate investigation. He is, indeed, attracted by the multiplied and marvellous appearances of an exter- nal universe ; by the wonders of vegetation, now retiring into dormant stillness, and again with new vigour stretching forth its arms to welcome the summer's sun, and move to the sweet music of the breezes ; by the complicated organism of the animal creation ; and by the huge masses of material form, rolling in the expanse of space. With feelings of admiration and awe he beholds such objects, and rises from them to their origin — to the Being from whom they came ; and thus his mind is conscious of having come into relation with the gi'oat First THE INFINITE BEING AS MORAL GOVERNOR. 189 Cause — with the wisdom which devised — with the power which created — with the might wdiich sustains all things. We say that, while this is one relation in w^hich the mind comes into contact with the infinite Being, it is not the only one. Man has within his own mind, and independent of everything else, a necessary notion of a Being infinite and supreme. Man is a being necessarily discriminating between right and wrong, possessed of a conviction of moral obligation, conscious of merit and demerit, and there- fore possessed of the notion of a supreme moral Governor. In short, Man is a moral being, and, therefore, he must have the notion of a moral Gov- ernor. Our purpose, then, in the present Chapter, is to examine into the mental phenomena common w^ithin the moral sphere, and thus endeavour to reveal the God of conscience. The reader w^ill remember what we previously stated in the first Chapter, — that this is the relation in which Kant admits the notion of the Infinite Being, as a necessary postulate of what he has c^iWed practical reason, which is conversant with what man ought to do. Upon the most satisfactory grounds, Kant maintains as a j)art of his philosophy, that man, in order to be a moral being, must have the notion of a moral Governor as a regulative principle. There is, however, another point in the system of Kant, certainly most unaccountable in its assertion, and most pernicious in its results. He maintains that a 190 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. distinction is to be made between things as they apjoear, and as they really are — between phenomena and real existences. He thus asserts that principles necessary to our mind, and consequently true in relation to us, are not therefore absolutely true. In accordance with this theory, the notion of a supreme moral Governor becomes a mere regulative principle^ necessary to realize the entire constitution of a moral being. It is, in his estimation, a necessary condition of the existence of a moral being, without affording us any certain criterion of the real existence of a supreme Being. Now, such an assertion is a manifest violation of the very nature of these neces- sary principles of the mind, which prompt us to regard them as absolute truth, not merely relative to us, but necessary in themselves. To deny this is to assert that reason is deceptive, and therefore that the principles necessary to our mind are false — that philosophy is impossible — and that the philosophy of Kant is wrong in saying so. It puts the axe to the root of the tree, and leaves us nothing upon which to stand. Kant's principle, therefore, bears on its front its own condemnation, and an examination into our consciousness will show that the necessary principles of the mind must be held as themselves presenting absolute truth.* * As Sir William Hamilton lias very well said in a Note in the second edition of the Discussions, (p. 633,) Kant is "the intellectual Samson, he casts down not only Metaphysic and Rational Psychology, but Philosophy itself, and the Kantian doctrines are among the ruins." THE INFINITE BEING AS MORAL GOVERNOR. 191 AVhen we examine our consciousness, we discover in the mind many first principles which w^e cannot demonstrate, the truth of which we never thought of attempting to prove, and yet they are principles which we cannot doubt, but Avhich we necessarily believe. Even from a logical point of view, it is manifest that this must be the case, for, since the act of reasoning is an act of comparison, it is plain that there must be certain fixed and original principles upon which comparison is instituted, and all reasoning proceeds. Just as truly as the stream must have a fountain, and the building a foundation — so must each mind have its fountain of truth, a blessed communication from the fountain of all truth ; so must each process of reasoning have in the mind a sure foundation upon which the superstructure may rest. Among these first principles we find some which mark off" for themselves a peculiar sphere. They do not exist as the basis of intellec- tual truth ; they do not belong to the same sphere as those first principles which afford the criterion by which to test the validity of the operations and de- cisions of the judgment. They single out the actions of men, and find their application by viewing these actions in a peculiar relation. They are not con- cerned with the intellectually true, but with the morally good. To borrow the distinction of Kant, they are not concerned with what man can hioiv, but with what man ought to do. 192 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. We find in consciousness the recognition of a peculiar quality as belonging to our actions. By the very constitution of our nature, b}'" a necessity of our mind, ^ve distinguish between the right and the wrong — between the morally good and the morally bad. If Mve are asked, what is this quality of good- ness or badness in actions 'i — we cannot reply. We do not attempt a logical definition, because it is im- possible. We can find no answer except that we think, and must think, certain actions as good and others as evil. We have within our mind a certain standard by which w^e test our actions ; conformity to this standard necessitates that we pronounce the action right ; antagonism to this standard necessitates that we pronounce the action wTong. The principles which constitute this standard are implanted in our nature, and we admit them for no other reason than that we must. They are part of our being, and we can no more deny them than w^e can deny our own nature. It is true that they may not exist in the mind of each individual in a systematized order ; it is true that the great majority of men, not being- given to reflection upon their ow^n consciousness, may have no very distinct knowledge of their particular existence, but their existence and authority are never- theless tacitly acknowledged. In the ordinary ex- perience of men, the existence of these principles is recognised in the consciousness that our nature leads us to discriminate between actions as morally right THE INFINITE BEING AS MORAL GOVERNOK. 1 98 or wrong. Each man finds in himself the conscious- ness of this necessity, and he perceives its recognition on the part of all those who are around him. The principles of right and wrong are the spontaneous upspringing of the soul— the free utterances of our moral constitution. The principles of morality are thus an essential part of our being, authoritative and final, and in no way dependent either upon individual experience, or upon external circumstances. They draw their entire authority from the Creator who implanted them in the mind. To deny this, were to overturn the foundation of all morality, and make an ethical system an impossibility. If there be no fixed prin- ciples, then, there can be no morality at all, and each man must be allowed to follow the bent of his inclination. On this supposition, there can be no uniform standard of right. Some will approve of an action, while it is condemned by others, and pro- nounced a matter of total indifference by a third party. There can be no public opinion uniformly approving of one class of actions, and as uniformly condemning another, and men will fail to recognise any fitness between a wrong action and its punish- ment. Now, all this is not a correct account of the state of matters among men. Every individual is conscious of the exercise of judgment on moral actions, and let him only carefully observe and N 194 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. analyse these mental acts, and he will find that they must be traced to certain fixed principles, which we have always taken for granted, and which we have always believed just because we must. Look around upon society, and the same fact is at once apparent. Notwithstanding that there are points of detail upon which men may differ, the great leading outlines of morality are so fixed and unwavering, that it is clearly manifest that there are certain universally admitted princijDles — certain necessary truths — con- stituting the basis of morality. Along wdth these principles of right and wrong, there is the conscious- ness of obligation to perform what is right, and shun what is wrong, and both taken together imply in the mind the notion of the Supreme Being, who has drawn the line between right and wrong, and to whom we are responsible. Some, indeed, have maintained that the happiness or misery resulting from actions is that which deter- mines their character, and that our moral judgments are based upon experience. Such a doctrine pro- ceeds upon a very partial examination of human nature ; it is glaringly one-sided ; and exceedingly pernicious in its results. Look at this doctrine, as it professes to determine what constitutes virtue, and what constitutes vice. A virtuous action is said to be that action which leads to happiness ; and a vicious action, that which leads to misery. Does the mind assent to the doctrine THE INFINITE BEING AS MORAL GOVEHNOK. 195 that this is what constitutes the moral character of actions, and that it is thus we invariably judge of moral actions ? We think that the slightest reflection will show that this is not the case. Let us only re- flect upon our own consciousness, and we shall find that we often pronounce our judgment upon actions altogether irrespective of consequences, and this fact again forces upon us the conclusion, that there are in the mind certain fixed principles by which we judge of our own actions and of the actions of others. We find that in the action pronounced virtuous there is something which we admire and commend irre- spective of consequences. There are certain actions which harmonize with the constitution of the mind : and there are others which cause an entire revulsion. Again, who will affirm, that the purpose for which God made man an intelligent and moral being, was simply to follow after happiness % Who will assert that happiness is the one great aim which has been set before men, and in attaining which they shall have gained the grand purpose of their being 1 The whole character of our moral being is against such an assertion ; its constitution is based upon a more exalted foundation ; it looks forth upon a more noble' prospect. We cannot enter into detail, or dwell at great length upon this question, but the daily incidents of life clearly show the insufficiency and inconqiletcness of the doctrine of happiness, as a basis for a moral 196 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. system. Take into account the depravity of man's nature, and you find but too many instances in which a man must resist his desire after happiness, if he is to adhere to what is morally right. The individual feels all the tendencies of his nature impelling him in one direction — the alluring charms of pleasure dazzle his eye — yet the calm, still voice within, pro- claims the action wrong. Nay more, how many in- stances do we find, in which man has to resist not only the evil tendencies of his nature, but even the better emotions of the soul — when he must set aside the claims of aff'ection — when he must waive his desire for the approbation of others — and when, under the guiding influence of stedfast princiiDle, he advances on his course — a moral hero, though he may have to endure the grief of friends, and the scorn of the universe. There are thus many instances in which happiness does not determine ^vhat is morally right. But, moreover, while we thus endeavour to determine the character of an action by the nature of its conse- quences, we cannot take into account the self-appro- bation or remorse, which may be experienced after the action is done, since this would be to beg the whole question. Self-approbation is felt only when we have done an action which we have previously judged to be right ; and remorse is felt only when we have done an action which we have previously judged to be wrong. Both self-approbation and THE INFINITE BEING AS MORAL GOVERNOR. 197 remorse are possible only after a determination of the character of the action. It is thus apparent, that the possibility of either of these emotions arising in the mind, can become evident only after we have determined the moral character of the action. To attempt to take these into consideration in judging of the character of the action is absurd, and involves a petitio principii. If, then, these consequences of an action are excluded, we have considerably dimi- nished the number of instances in which we may determine the moral character of actions by their consequences. We, therefore, do not consider that the doctrine of happiness gives a complete view of our moral nature, though we admit that it possesses a share of truth. We admit that there is a principle in our mind by which we approve of those actions which lead to the greater happiness of our fellow-men, but it is an exceedingly imperfect examination of our mental constitution which terminates with this as the entire sum of our moral nature. A careful examination of our consciousness will lead to the result which we have stated, that our judgment of the moral character of actions is based upon certain universal and necessary principles im- planted in our mind. These we regard as the first principles of morality, which are to regulate all our actions. The complement of these principles we call conscience, and, in strict philosophical propriety, wc 198 THE PHILOSUPHY OF THE INFINITE. limit the use of this term exclusively to the designa- tion of these principles. We are aware that the term conscience is used by many philosophical writers in a much wider signification. It has been made to embrace the judgment, memory, and such feelings and emotions as shame, remorse, and self- approbation. Such a complication of phenomena we consider most unphilosophical, and in total viola- tion of the supreme principle which must regulate the classification of all mental phenomena. An investigation into the nature of the mind, thus results in the conclusion, that we are endowed with the power of conscience, that is to say, that we possess certain necessary principles by which we determine the moral character of actions. These principles have been implanted in the mind, they are a universal possession, and cannot be doubted. We do not mean to assert, that these principles are always consciously present in the mind. We admit that, by a determined course of perversity in thought and action, they may be kept in artificial conceal- ment ; but still, these pi-inciples are there, and, how- ever morally hardened any man may be, the calm presentation of these principles will compel him to admit their authority. Man may, by a constant effort, keep these principles out of view, but once let his attention be directed to them, and he will find himself unable to deny them, even though he would. Nay, even his best efforts will not succeed in keeping THE INFINITE BEING AS MORAL GOVERNOR. 199 the first principles of morality from his mind ; he is a moral being, and his very life involves the conscious recognition of the authority of these principles. It is, therefore, evident that man is a being possessed of fixed principles, by which the moral character of actions is determined. But, this is not all, there is also in the mind a principle by which man recognises that he is under obligation to the SujDreme Being, to perform what is right, and avoid what is wrong. Possessing, as he does, the know- ledge of what is right, and what is wrong, he is also conscious that this knowledge implies duty, he feels that he is responsible to the Infinite God. Duty, obligation, responsibility, are terms which do not admit of a logical definition, yet they express wdiat is constantly recognised in the consciousness of all. Here, then, is another relation in which arises a knowledge of the infinite God, — a knowledge which, we maintain, is necessary to the human mind, — necessary to make man a moral being. Some, indeed, who have admitted that man is a moral being, have nevertheless denied that he has a necessary belief in the existence of God ; but, a more contradictory position could scarcely be conceived. A moral being who has no belief in the existence of God, is an irapossibihty. If there be no God, how can there be any morality, — how can there be any virtue, — how^ can there be any responsibility 1 IIow^ can our actions be riaht or wronjr. if thei'o be no 200 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Supreme Being, whose nature is the standard of all right "? How can we be responsible for our actions, if there be no supreme moral Governor, who has fixed the character of all actions, and who shall call us to account ? We have said, that there are in our mind certain first principles of morality, which are our standard of right, but what standard are they, unless they have been implanted in the mind by the Supreme Being, wdiose nature is the standard of all right, and the source of all goodness ? The know- ledge of right and wrong, and the consciousness of obligation, necessarily imply the belief in a Supreme Being. This must be the basis of the whole moral system, else the structure falls. A moral being must have the belief in a moral Governor, in order to be a moral being. It will be granted, then, that man, as a moral being, must have a belief in a supreme moral Governor ; but, it will be denied, that we have a knowledge of that infinite Being. That w^e know the Supreme Being as moral Governor, we consider no less clear, than that we believe in his existence. We have seen, that there are in the mind certain first principles by wdiich we determine the character of actions, and that there is, besides, a principle by which we recognise that we are responsible for our actions. Now, from this it is perfectly plain, that we must know the Supreme Being to whom we are responsible, — that we must so know Him as to THE INFINITE BEING AS MORAL GOVERNOR. 201 recognise a distinct personality, — that we must so know Him as to recognise His moral nature, — that we must so know Him as to recognise our distinct relationship to Him. In order to act upon the moral principles implanted in our mind, and, in order at all to feel our responsibility, we must so know the Supreme Being, as to be certain that the moral principles which we are necessitated to recognise, are in accordance with His moral nature, and are thus conformable to the standard to which w^e are responsible, and by which we shall be judged. God's nature is the ultimate standard of all right, and His will is the expression of His nature, so that it matters not, whether we say that a thing is right, because it is in accordance with God's nature; or, because it is in accordance with God's ivill, — the standard is the same in both cases. But, this is manifest, that fixed principles of morality, and a consciousness of obligation, in order to exist in the mind, must be accompanied by a knowledge of the Supreme Being, Avho has imposed the standard, and the obligation to observe it. These two : — the knowledge of moral principles ; and the knowledge of a supreme moral Governor, arc the two inseparable terms of a relation. Each is necessary to the other. Take away the one, and you destroy the other. Since, therefore, man is in possession of moral principles, he must also be in possession of the notion of a supreme moral Governor. 202 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Accordingly, if we examine consciousness, we will find a complete verification of what is so apparent from the nature of the case. We find ourselves constantly weighing our actions by the standard which we possess. We recognise an action, the performance of which is clearly marked as a part of our duty, and immediately the Supreme Being becomes an object of solemn thought, we recognise our relation to Him, we perceive that His will demands our performance of the action. Nay, more, so positive is our knowledge of the Infinite God, that we feel that He is observing us. There is no negation here. These thoughts are too real, — their impression is too deep, — their influence is too solemnizing to admit of a doubt. Again, we feel tempted to com- mit an action which conscience condemns. Depraved tendencies incline us, — circumstances favour us, — but God is present with us, and the consciousness of that overawes us, and that man is hardened, indeed, who can smother that consciousness, and proceed with the action. We say not that these thoughts are always realized ; we acknowledge the darkening influences of habitual violation of the moral standard ; but there are times when all men feel what we have described ; and a man never recognises the obliga- tion of the principles of morality, without also recognising the Being to whom he is responsible. Nor have we exhausted the facts of consciousness, which establish our position. We have not merelv THE INFINITE BEING AS MOEAL GOVERNOR. 203 certain necessary principles of moral rectitude, — ^Ye have not merely the consciousness of obhgation, — we have also certain feelings and emotions, which per- form an important part within the moral sphere. We have feelings of satisfaction and remorse, which rise in the mind according to the character of our actions. When we are condemned and scorned by those around us for the discharge of what we perceive to be duty, what is that feeling of full satisfaction, but the conscious approval of the Supreme Being ? And when we have done wrong, what is that voice of vexation and misei-y which is heard within 1 What is the bitter feeling of remorse, but the confession of the soul to the consciousness of the presence, and of the moral character, and of the disapprobation, and of the power of the infinite Being. Such are the mental phenomena recognised as belonging to the moral sphere. We are conscious of a moral distinction between actions, — we are conscious that some actions are right, and others wrong, — we are conscious of obligation to perform the one class, and shun the other, — we are conscious of self-approbation, if we have done what is right ; and of self-condemnation, if we have done what is wrong, — and, according to the character of our actions, peace soothes the soul, or remorse troubles the heart. Take these mental phenomena, and try to account for lliem. try to explain tlicm, without 204 THE FHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the knowledge of the one infinite Being, and it will be found impossible, — these principles will be found inexplicable and contradictory. Try to realize them in consciousness, without also realizing the knowledge of the one infinite God, and you try in vain. But, admit the real and positive knowledge of the infinite Being, and the enigma is explained, the difiiculty is solved, and you have the great central fact, which gives order and unity to the whole. Give us the notion of the supreme and infinite Personality, — supreme in moral authority, — infinite in purity and holiness, — and then we can realize the notion of moral right and wrong, as that which He has ordained ; then we can realize the notion of obliga- tion, as that which He demands ; then we have peace, because He approves ; then we have fear, because He condemns. The knowledge of the supreme moral Governor is a necessity of our nature. Say not that we have no notion of the infinite Being, our own consciousness contradicts the assertion, the universal experience of humanity is against it, and in multiplied instances, the knowledge of His character and actual presence is so vivid, as to make the soul exult in the approval of a satisfied God, or tremble in an agony of dismay under the frown of the Almighty. Thus it is that our whole moral being testifies to the knowledge of a supreme moral Governor. And what is the notion we have of this moral Governor 1 THE INFINITE BFJNG AS MOKAL GOVEKNOl?. 20") Is it not merely another view of the infinite Being, whom we have already realized in the relation of First Cause "? It is obviously another view of the infinite God, as he stands related to us as moral Governor. Can any one realize this moral Governor as a finite being 1 Is that supreme Being, who im- planted in our mind the standard of right, and who holds us in strict obligation for the discharge of his will, a finite being 1 Let any man try to realize such a tliought, and the impossibility of it will at once force itself on his conviction. If God is a being restricted and finite, then, as a moral being, he must be in subjection to a higher being, who is supreme, and the source of all right. But, by the nature of the case as already determined, he is the supreme being and ultimate source of all right, therefore he cannot be in any sense restricted or finite. It is thus evident that, while we necessarily possess a notion of the moral Governor, w^e cannot think him as re- stricted or finite ; therefore we think him as a Being unconditioned, unrestricted, infinite. We do not say that we can form a complete conception of the in- finite God ; we do not say that we reach to a perfect notion of the infinite ; but we do say, and we think it has been made sufficiently evident, that lue have a positive hnowledge of the infinite Being. We find limits to our powers of thought, but none to the object ; we find the circle of our knowledge enlarging, but still we find the object stretching 206 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. beyond. As possessed of moral principles, we recognise a supreme moral Being ; as conscious of obligation, we recognise a supreme moral Governor ; and we recognise in him the one supreme Being, identical with the First Cause, who made all things, and made us intelligent and moral creatures. In him we recognise the Absolute Morality. CHAPTER IX. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFINITE BEING AS THE OBJECT OP WORSHIP. We proceed now to indicate the final instance in which we consider that a knowledge of the Infinite Being is obtained by man. Man is not merely an intelligent being, he is not merely a moral being, he is, by his very nature, a religious being. Not only must he account for the existence of all things, and thus rise from the creation to the great First Cause ; not only is he conscious of moral judgments and a sense of obligation, which must be accompanied by a knowledge of the supreme moral Governor ; but, there are also emotions of reverence and adoration passing through the mind, which have for their im- mediate object the one true God, In examining consciousness for the evidence of the existence and universality of these phenomena, it is not necessary that it be proved that they are recognised in the constant experience of all, or that they invariably exercise a regulating influence over the actions of men. We are persuaded that careful 208 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. observation will show that the emotions of veneration and awe are natural to man, that they spring up in the mind from conscious relation to the adorable Divinity, and that they find natural utterance in the words of devotion. While, however, we maintain that these emotions are natural to man, and that he is by his very constitution a rehgious being, we do not by any means deny that emotions the very re- verse may predominate in the minds of many, until it might even seem as if all trace of a religious nature had been obliterated from the soul. It is granted that these emotions may be restrained, and their existence in consciousness almost forgotten, until it may be supposed that they are gone for ever. It is granted that they may have been experienced in early life with a full flow of vigour, and yet have gradually receded, until they have been lost from the view,— just as the stream, gurghng from the rock, has slowly diminished under the powerful rays of a summer's sun, until its refreshing waters have ceased to flow, and left a parched channel. But just as the waters of the fountain may be treasured in the store-house below, though they do not spring forth to the view, so the principles and emotions which constitute man a rehgious being are treasured deep in his nature, though adverse influences have driven them from their appointed position in. the soul. And just as the brook bursts forth again when favourable influences return, so do the religious THK INFINITE BEING AS THE OBJECT OF WOKSIIIP. •20'J emotions spring up in the heart of man, sounding from the depths of his nature like the noise of many waters. While we maintain the position now indicated, we do not overlook the facts which seem so strongly to contradict the existence of a religious nature in many. We do not forget that there are some who maintain the transparent absurdity that man has no religious nature ; that what are called the religious emotions are the effects of mere illusions pressed upon the mind by a designing priesthood ; and that the Deity himself is a mere fabrication and nonentity. It is true that such a position is held by some, but as well might it be affirmed that hunger and thirst are mere fictitious desires, originated and fostered by designing men, whose business it is to supply our wants. If the sceptical doctrine be true, how have men been so long deceived 1 Sceptics have not been wanting throughout the whole course of the world's history, who have declared that religion is a mere delusion, and yet how is it that people still insist upon behov- ing the contrary ? How is it that men have always admitted the authority of religion, and do still con- tinue to admit it ? The fact cannot be accounted for upon any other ground than upon the admission that religion is an essential part of man's nature. In individual instances men may deny it if they choose, yet it is a fact well known to any one accus- tomed to reflect upon the operations of his own o 210 THE J'HILOSOPIIY OF THE INFINITE. mind, tliat the emotions of reverence and adoration come at times upon the soul with the utmost power, and awaken us to such consciousness of the reality of our relation to the Deity, as not to admit of the shadow of a doubt. The disposition to doubt, and even the possibility of doubting, have passed away, and the soul is filled with the awful consciousness that it is in the immediate presence of the infinite and eternal Spirit. We know that men can war against such feelino-s, and endeavour to banish them from the mind ; but the mere fact that it requires so much effort, is a proof that such emotions are deeply rooted, and that they readily tend to spring up in conscious- ness when suitable circumstances arise. Our position may be theoretically denied, and is, in fact, often enough thus treated, but practically the thing is impossible, and men are betrayed into its admission, however contrary to their inclinations. We affirm that the plain testimony of consciousness is, that it is a necessity of our nature to adore a Supreme Being — that we do realize the infinite God as an object of thought — and that we so realize the existence and nature of that God, that he becomes the object of the deepest reverence, that the contem- plation of his attributes raises within us the most powerful emotions of the heart, and that these emo- tions find their natural and unrestricted expression in the language of fervent devotion. We say that these are phenomena essential to the human mind, THE INFINITK BEING AS THE OBJECT OF WORSHIP. 211 and that consciousness is tlie unimpeachable witness to the truth of our statement. The facts are neces- sary, and therefore common to mankind generally, so that the case may be fearlessly referred to each individual, to be settled in accordance with his own experience. The facts to which we now refer are indeed more liable to be concealed from notice, than are the primary facts of intelligence, inasmucli as they belong to the moral and religious part of our nature, wdiich has become perverted in a manner which cannot be affirmed of the reasoning powei's. Yet, notwithstanding the peculiar difficulty which pertains to those mental facts which are now produ- ced as evidence, notwithstanding that the depravity of our nature involves facts glaringly antagonistic to those which are now selected, we maintain that these religious emotions are so essentially a part of our nature, tliat they cannot be torn from the mind, and that they will, and must, arise in consciousness, when circumstances favourable to their development are presented. If it be true, then, as we have asserted, that the religious emotions are essential to the nature of man, and are thus common to all men, it is to be expected that we shall find obvious proofs of the universality of their existence in the experience and history of all ages. It is to be expected that we shall find the traces of the religious element of man's nature, even though that element has had all along to struggle 21l2 THE rillLOSOrHY OF THE INFINITE. against moral corruption in order to obtain its natu- ral manifestation. We acknowledge the propriety of such an expectation, and we shall willingly, though briefly, consider whether such evidence of our position has been afforded. We do not ask that the most favourable instances be taken ; we do not ask that the effects of the Christian religion, received by direct revelation, be taken into account, although it is obviously the work of that religion to revive the religious nature of man, to free it from the bonds of corruption, and to raise it to its proper eminence. We ask only, whether or not w^e find traces of the existence of religious faith, and of religious emotions, among men in general, how^ever much they are morally and re- ligiously debased. We ask only, whether a man, let him be as degraded as he may, does not, just because he is a man, possess a religious nature, wdiich involves the belief in an infinite God — wdiich involves a know- ledge of that God — which involves the emotions of awe and veneration — and wdiich leads to devout adoration, and fervent supplication for mercy and favour. Start with the most unfavourable examples. Take the men who scoff" at everything religious, who openly declare their unbelief in a God to be worshipped, and who treat with scorn the acknowledged reverence of others for a supreme Divinity. Take such an instance as this, and trace the history of such men. You may THE INFINITE BEING AS THE (OBJECT OF WOliSHIP. 213 watch their long course of profanity, and, observing their conduct, you may think them very consistent, you may consider their unbehef unwavering, their profanity unrestrained, and their scorn of religion unmitigated. We ask not what have been their thoughts and emotions in the silence and retirement of their own consciousness. From our conviction of the necessary character of the religious principles and emotions, we believe that these may often have arisen in their mind, in a manner which has made them tremble within themselves, though they have furiously maintained their position ; yet, we ask not that this be brought to the support of our case. We ask only that you carefuhy examine their external conduct, and you will find them scorning the religious exercises of others with the utmost bitterness, and de- scribing it all as rank hypocrisy. But let these men be placed with other members of the race in circumstances of imminent peril, which seem to threaten utter de- struction. Let them voyage afar on the perilous deep — let the blackest clouds gather overhead — let the lightning's flash dart among them — let the peals of thunder break above them with the most terrific crash — let the timbers begin to creak — and let the waters pour in upon them ; see then the terror depicted on every countenance — see them fall with bended knee and outstretched arm, looking upwards, and with the deepest ngony, and the intcnsest earnestness, cit- ing aloud for mercy and deliverance. Many in that 214 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. coinj)ariy ma}'' have been previously indifferent to re- ligious matters, but now these entreaties are poured forth, as the irresistible utterance of the deeply-rooted consciousness that there is a God, with whom alone rests the power to send deliverance, and who ought to be adored. Observe the professed sceptics in such circumstances, and it will be found that they do not object to the proposal that some one cr}^ to God for deliverance ; it may even be found that they themselves engage in such entreaty ; or if this be not the case, there is not one of them who would dare to stand in the midst of that company in these circumstances, and scoff at their religious exercises, as he would have done but an hour before, had any one assei'ted their entire dependence upon the Deity. There are thousands whose indifferentism could not stand such a test as that ; there are hundreds more whose scepticism would give way before such a test ; and the remnant, if there be any, would not venture to scoff at the manifestation of religious emotions on such an occasion. The case which we have presented is no mere fancy picture, but one which might be illustrated by many examples. Again, let us embrace a wider sphere of obsei-va- tion. Let us examine the entire course of history, and we find among all nations, and in all ages, the practice of religious rites and ceremonies, forming an unbroken line of evidence by which it is proved that man is, by his \ery constitution, a religious THE INFINITE BEING AS THE OBJECT OF WORSHIP. iZlj being. It is true that we find in many of tliese religious rites much to condemn. Yet, in the midst of all tliat darkness and immoraUty, we detect the working of necessary religious principlesand emotions, which struggle for expression in external forms. If these pi'inciples and emotions were the mere result of education, then w^ould they disappear when men sink into a state of ignorance and barbarism. They would vanish as the arts and sciences disappear, when man sinks into a state of heathenism. But however deep the degradation into which man may - have sunk, we have never yet discovered a race altogether destitute of the notion of a Supreme Being. \ie have found the religious emotions darkened ; we have found them injured by prejudices, and weakened by vices ; but still we have had no difficulty in detecting the traces of their existence. In the midst even of heathen darkness, we have noticed the faint pencils of light coming forth from the depths of the human soul ; despite the superincumbent mass of corruption, we have found the religious element in man's nature retaining its vitality, and ever struggling foi'th into notice. It has indeed been perverted ; it has fallen from its pristine glory ; the notion of the Deity has become debased ; yet, perverted and weakened though it be, the i-eligious element is still there, and man, even in his most degraded state, ha.s a con- ception of the Deity. 216 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. A closer examination will still more strongly con- firm our position. The evidence already adduced is demonstrative of the fact, that man is by a necessity of his nature, a religious being. But, let us look a little more closely into the religious history of the race, and it will be found, that even debased tribes have much higher notions of the Supreme Being, than external manifestations would seem to indicate. It is true, that we find heathen nations so far lowering their sense of propriety, as to represent the Deity in an external form. But, though this be the case, we are very doubtful if an instance could be found in which the block of carved wood or stone was taken as the actual Deity, and not merel}'' as a representative of the Supreme Being. It is true, that we find the people in heathendom bowing down before these blocks of wood, but in this we discover only a known characteristic of the human mind. For, the more the hunian mind is uncultivated and debased, the more difficult does it become to engage the thoughts upon an object purely spiritual, and the more strongly is the necessity felt for having an external representation of the internal conception. In such a state, the external and objective pre- dominates over the internal and subjective. This is plainly the principle by wliich to account for the uniform tendency of barbarous nations to adopt an external representation of the Deity, Avhich is more or less rude, according to the degree of degi'adation THE INFINITE BEING AS Til?: OBJECT OF WORSHIP. 217 to whicli the mind may have sunk. It is a further perversion in the same direction, when men proceed to ascribe to distinct divinities the different powers or spheres of action pertaining to the one Supreme Being. When this tendency of the mind is kept in view, it will at once appear, that there is need for caution before we infer, that those who bow before some graven image, always consider it to be the true divinity. That this is the natural tendency of image-worship, we readily grant ; that it is the pre- dominating state of mind of the more degraded, seems no less obvious ; yet there is evidence that this is not the primary conviction, common to every worshipper, which (sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, it may be) forms the foundation of their distorted religious system. As we see the savage bow before that image, and manifest all the signs of fear as he approaches it, we verily believe that, for the time, the image is to him no mere representation, but the real Divinity. But, when w^e see that same savage looking upon his image broken to atoms, and yet realizing that his God is not destroyed ; that His powers to bless, or to injure, are not diminished ; when we find that he trembles at the accident, and hastens to set up a new image ; when we find him worshipping this image, or another one as his God ; we again detect the fundamental conviction struggling into notice and asserting its reality. 218 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. In all the phases of external development mani- fested by the religious element in man's nature, we discover the traces of the recognition of an all- powerful and omniscient Supreme Being. We find that such a Being is feared, as seeing and knowing what men cannot discover, and as possessing un- limited power to inflict punishment upon those who offend. Everywhere may we find more or less evident tokens of this natural tendency of the human mind to worship a Supreme Being, finding external manifestation in some rude representation, or imaged forth in the Jupiter of the Romans, or in the Zeus of the Greeks. Altering now our sphere of observation, and looking around for any common expression of the natural feelings and emotions of the human mind, we readily turn to the Poetry and the Philosophy of mankind. Listen to the voice of Poetry from the earliest ages, and you will hear it, in stately accents, address the Deity, and plead for guidance from above. Listen as it breathes the deepest emotions of the heart, and you will hear it swell forth in notes of exultation, as it sings of a love which is infinite. Follow it as it wanders through the scenes of surrounding beauty, and you will be gradually wafted upwards to the Father of all Goodness. Listen to its description of the commotions of nature, and you will hear the solemn tones guide with i-everent awe to the presence of the great Almighty. THE INFINITE BEING AS THE OBJECT OF WOKSHIP. 219 Listen as it tells of mortal woes and miseries endured, and you will hear it plead in tones of agony for mercy to the wronged, and cry aloud for vengeance on the vicious and the vile. Trace the course of Philosophy for the last two thousand years, and you will find it ever resting in the one great centre. Without the fundamental conception of an infinite God, man is a contradiction, and Philosophy an impossibility.* Thus it is that Philosophy has ever recognised this great truth, and has all along given utterance to this necessary conviction of the human mind. Just as surely as Philosophy has given expression to the language of consciousness, just so surely has the recognition of a Supreme Being been decided and strong. And, if at any time, the voice of Scepticism has been raised, and the existence of God has been theoretically denied, it has totally failed to drive the conviction from the mind, and exclude its statement from its due position in Philosophy, Scepticism may have attempted to shake the conviction which leads us to trust in an infinite God, but it has only called forth a more searching scrutin}', which has overturned its own system, and has left the challenged principle immovable as before. Never was there a more complete and satisfactory course of evidence than that which may be traced ■•^ In the langu.'ipc ot M. ('uu.-iii : — • La religion est l;i pliilosujiliic ilr !>.-] L'cc hiiniainc." 220 TH?: PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINPrE. throughout the whole history of man, in proof of the universal recognition of the infinite God. Every- where you may trace the outlines of the evidence, stretching before you into all ages, a great and obvious fact, which can be accounted for on no other theory than that which we maintain, — that man has the conception of a Supreme Being, whom he reverences and adores. We might still further en- large the sphere of our evidence. We might mount to the higher stand-point afforded by the Christian religion, — we might mark its effects in awakening and reviving the religious nature of man, — we might reveal the lofty conceptions of the Deity, which it has afforded even to its humblest disciples, — and, then, we might fairly conclude, that the very first step in this process supposes the possibility of realizing a positive notion of the infinite God, — nay, pre- supposes the actual existence of such a conception, as the ground-work of the whole. We might take this higher ground, but we refrain ; our argument does not require that we dwell upon it, and all are familiar with the nature of the evidence. Taking, then, the evidence which we have briefly sketched, it is plain that there is here no mere negation. It is obvious, from the very nature of the case, that the i-eligious emotions suppose a direct and positive conception of the Divine Being. If, then, we have a positive conception of the Deity, what is its nature ? It is tlie conception of a Being of THE INFINITE BEING AS THE UBJECT OF WOKSHIl'. 221 absolute holiness, — of absolute love. It is still a conception of the one Supreme Being, it is still the recognition of Him who is God over all. Here, then, we have our conception of absolute love, — of that love w^hich cannot be restricted, — which can in no sense be regarded as limited. Try even in thought to limit or restrict the object of worship, and you instantly destroy the conception. A God restricted is manifestly to us no God at all. Tell us that the object of thought is limited, and you only raise in our mind the necessity to rise to a higher Being, who is supreme and infinite. We have a positive notion of the Divine Being, and a positive notion of Him as an infinite Being, for to think Him as finite is an impossibility. There is no method of escaping this conclusion, and an impartial examination of consciousness can present no motive for attempting it. Consciousness reveals the conception of the infinite God, and the instinctive utterances of prayer ai-e the undeniable and external manifestation of it. A positive conception it is, though imperfect, indefinite, and mysterious, and a conception which will enlarge, just in proportion as the mind realizes more of the evidence of the goodness and love of the infinite God. CHAPTER X. FINAL STATEMENT OP THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. We have now presented the course of evidence by which we think it clearly established that man possesses a positive conception of the Infinite. A careful and impartial examination of the facts of consciousness will clearly show that this is a necessity of his nature. Trace the thoughts of man, and it will be found that they are necessarily linked to the Infinite, that they recognise all things as existing in infinite space and time, and that the infinite God is the grand conception of the mind. In conclusion, we wish to present a concise state- ment of the course of argument which Ave have pur- sued, and of the doctrine which we have stated and defended. Our purpose in presenting such a state- ment is that the reader may have within short com- pass a clear view of our doctrine, and may thus the more readily test its results. In entering upon a consideration of the Philosophy of the Infinite, we have, as a preliminary point, en- FIN.\L STATEMENT. 223 deavoured to maintain against Sir AVilliam Hamilton, that the problem of the unconditioned is one. That is to say, there is only one unconditioned, namely, the Infinite ; for, of the Infinite alone can it be affirmed, that it is subject to no restrictions or rela- tions as the necessary condition of its existence. Sir William has maintained that the problem is twofold. Besides the Infinite, he asserts that there is another unconditioned, namely, the Absolute. As examples of the latter, he mentions an absolute whole, and an absolute part, that is, "a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole," and " a part so small that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts." Against this we argue, that an ab- solute part is a contradiction in terms, since a part is nothing except as related to a whole. Equally contradictory is an absolute whole, which is made up of relative pai'ts, for the whole exists only as the sum of the parts. Either way, the Absolute is de- duced from the relative, or evolved out of it, which is an impossibility. It is thus apparent that even though the absolute whole and absolute part, indi- cated by Sir AVilliam, Mere realized, neither of them would be really absolute. Both would be related on one side, the whole being related to the pai'ts, and the part being related to the whole. Moreover, everything short of the Infinite is limited ; limitation is a necessary rovdilum of its existence ; therefore. 224 Tin<: riiiLosoPHY op the infinite. no limited object can be unconditioned, in other words, there can be no unconditioned but the Infi- nite. There is, therefore, no absohite whole — no absolute unity — except the Infinite, which is one and indivisible. We have, thus, limited the discussion to a single unconditioned object, namely, the Infinite, which is altogether unlimited or unrestricted. On this point, Sir William Hamilton maintains that the Infinite is that which is out of relation, and which cannot exist in relation ; consequently, the Infinite cannot be realized in thought, since thought involves relation. The Infinite is by its very nature unconditioned, and consequently cannot be made an object of thought, since to think is to condition. To this we reply, that such an Infinite is an impossibility not only in thought, but in existence, so long as we exist and other objects exist around us. Moreover, granted that the Infi- nite exists, and it is plain that it may exist in rela- tion, provided there be nothing in that relation to limit or restrict it. Granted that an infinite Being- exists, and if there be nothing in the existence of created objects to limit the infinite One, he may exist in the relation of Creator. Finally, if the act of thought, though limited itself, does not limit the object of thought ; and if thought may be exercised on an object whose entire extent is not realized by the mind ; then, the Infinite may be the object of thought. PINAL STATEMENT, 225 Having maintained that the Infinite cannot exist in relation, and therefore cannot exist as an object of thought, Sir Wilham is next led to assert that the only manner in which we can form a conception of the Infinite is by a " negative notion." To this we reply, that a " negative notion " is no notion at all, and that, irrespective altogether of our knowledge of the Infinite, a " negative notion," as defined by Sir William, is a mental impossibility, and its state- ment psychologically untenable. To obtain a " ne- gative notion " by thinking away the positive quali- ties belonging to an object is altogether impossible. We can think, only as we think existence ; and we can think away certain qualities only by thinking- certain other positive qualities in their stead. We, therefore, set aside the doctrine of a negative notion as incompetent. On these grounds, we have felt ourselves con- strained to differ from Sir William Hamilton, and take up a position antagonistic to that which he occupies. Not, indeed, without regret have we found ourselves under the necessity of adopting this course, yet, notwithstanding the powerful logic of this esteemed philosopher, we are altogether unable to coincide with his conclusions. The doctrine which we maintain concerning our knowledge of the Infinite, and which has been fully developed and illustrated in the preceding pages, may be briefly stated thus: — p 226 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. I. That man does realize a positive notion of the Infinite. II. That this notion of the Infinite is not reahzed by any course of addition or progression (either in space or time) which, starting from the finite, seeks to reach the infinite, and is not the result of any logical demonstration. III. That this notion of the Infinite is a fact, or ultimate datum, of consciousness, involved in the constitution of the mind, and arising in various relations. IV. That this notion of the Infinite, though real and positive, is only partial and indefinite ; capable of enlargement, but not of perfection. From this statement of our theory, it is plain, that we altogether deny the validity of the law^ which Sir Wilham Hamilton has laid down under the name of the law of the Conditioned. Sir William's doctrine on this point is briefly stated, thus : — " Conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought." We have already presented evidence sufficient to prove, that we have a knowledge of something more than the limited, whence it follows, that "conditional limitation" is not a fundamental law of the possibility of thought. The exact position which we occupy in relation to Sir William Hamilton's law of the conditioned, may be described wdthin small compass. When Sir William says, that " conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the FINAL STATEMENT. 227 possibility of thought," we deny it, — but when he says, that thought is only of existence conditioned, and that by existence conditioned, he means " exist- ence relative," that is, " existence thought under relation," we admit it. We admit that all our knowledge is of the relative, but we assert, that there may he a relative knowledge both of the finite and of the Infinite. While, however, we maintain that we have a conception of the Infinite, we at the same time hold, that our knowledge of it is only imperfect, and, therefore, we most heartily and fully concur in the principle laid down by Sir William, that " the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence." But, this principle we hold, rather as the result of our own doctrine, than of the doctrine of Sir Wilhara. If, as this philosopher says, our knowledge is only of the limited, how is it that we at once recognise the validity of the principle, that " the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence 1" On our doctrine, which admits a partial recognition of the Infinite, the fact is at once explained. We assert a knowledge of the Infinite, but only an indefinite knowledge, therefore, we at once recognise the principle, that the limits of our knowledge are not to be regarded as the limits of existence. Tell us that we can have no knowledge of the Infinite, and we reply that, on such a doctrine, faith in God is an impossibility. ]kit, grant the conception of the Infinite which we 228 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. have maintained, jDartial and indefinite though it be, and our faith has obtained a firm basis. The positive notion of the Infinite, which we pro- fess, is first revealed in our notion of Time and Space as necessary conditions of thought. In saying that Time, while an external reality, is a condition of thought, we mean that, in thinking an object, it is a mental condition that we think it as existing in Time. Still further. Time is an irrestridive condition of thought. By this we mean, that, while the con- ception of Time is a necessary condition of thought, you may crowd into it object after object, to the very utmost hmit of your power, still time is con- ceived as stretching beyond, and presents no barrier to any extension of the objects of thought. Accumu- late object after object, and still accumulate, yet time stretches beyond, unrestricted and unrestricting, — unlimited and illimitable. The same is true of Space. It also is an irre- strictive condition of thought. Conceive an object existing in Space, and then croAvd into space object after object, and try if this condition of thought will restrict you in your progress. You try in vain. There it is mysteriously stretching far beyond. Press onward to the full limit of your power, yet so marvellous is the nature of this condition of thought, that it does not restrict you even there, and is realized only as unended and unending. It is thus manifest, that both in Time and S[iace, we realize a FINAL STATEMENT. 229 notion of the Infiiiite. Both must be thought, and are thought stretching beyond any hmits which we assign, so that the grand conception equally of Time and Space, is one which realizes them as unlimited. The next point to which we come, is the positive notion which we have of a supreme and infinite Being. The conception of infinite Space, and infinite Time, is given us as the introduction to this higher conception. From the conception of infinite Space, we rise to the conception of a God who fills all Space ; and from the conception of infinite Time, we rise to the conception of a God who ever has existed, and ever wall exist. Bv a necessity of our nature, we are constrained to think a great First Cause as the originator of all other objects. An examination of our mind, reveals this as a fact of consciousness. We look around upon all the objects which come within our observation, and we must think that they had a cause. We do not reach our notion of First Cause by anj^ process of reasoning, inasmuch as such a process would be logically in- competent, as inferring an infinite cause from a limited manifestation of power. Yet we do, and must think a First Cause, and such is our notion of the First Cause, that we cannot think Him as a finite Being. Tell us that such a Being is finite, and immediately you raise the necessity to think a cause for His existence. The First Cause must be thought as an infinite Cause, since the mere thou2;ht of a finite 230 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Being, necessitates the tliouglit of a Superior Being. Take away the conception of the Infinite, and the existence of the finite is an enigma, and man's nature a contradiction. In the mere conception of a hmited Being, there is given the notion of a Supreme Being; in the mere conception of the finite, there is given the conception of the Infinite. Directing attention to another sphere, we bring under review the moral nature of man. Here we find, that the principles of right and wrong, and the consciousness of obligation, necessarily imply a positive conception of the Supreme Being as Moral Governor. Moral obligation necessarily involves the notion of a Being, Supreme and Infinite, to whom we are responsible. Once assert that such a moral being is finite, and immediately you raise in our mind the necessity to think a Supreme Being to whom he is responsible. Thus it is that the conception of a finite moral Being necessarily originates the con- ception of a supreme moral Being, to whom he is responsible, and the only conception we can form of an irresponsible moral Being, is a Supreme Being, unrestricted and infinite. In the conception of a finite and responsible moral Being, there is given the conception of an Infinite and Supreme moral Beino-. Thus it is, that there is treasured up in the depths of our moral nature a notion of the Infinite Being, without which notion, moral distinctions . would be impossible, and obligation could not exist. • FINAL STATEMENT. .^t'^/^V .'' Finally, man must worship, and to worship a negation, is not only bleak and barren in theory, but impossible in practice. All worship supposes a direct object of worship, and a positive conception of that object as infinite and sujDreme. A " negative notion" is nothing, and is of no value whatever, in the attempt to explain the religious nature of man. On no other condition can the act of worship be realized, than by a positive notion of the Supreme Being. Nor, as has been already made apparent, can we conceive the Supreme Being, except as unrestricted and infinite. Tell us that the object of thought is not the Infinite Being, and we instantly reply, that, if this be the case, he cannot be the object of worship, so much is a positive conception of the Infinite God, a necessity of the religious nature of man. These, then, are the instances in which we obtain a knowledge of the Infinite, and, in each of them, it will be observed, that we recognise the Infinite only in its relation with the finite. Events are recog- nised in relation with infinite Time ; objects are thought in relation with infinite Space ; finite exist- ences are thought in relation with an infinite Cause ; moral agents in relation with an infinite Governor ; religious beings in relation with an infinite God. In the three last instances, we have a conception of the Supreme Being, we therefore identify the object of thought- ai one, and in these three relations we obtain -our conception of the unchangeable One. 232 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Thus do we realize our conception of the infinite and eternal God, as a Cause, wise and powerful ; as a Governor, just and true ; as a God, glorious and holy. In our conception, therefore, of the infinite Being, we realize a conception of absolute power, absolute wisdom, absolute morality, and absolute love. Such is a brief outline of the doctrine which we maintain in reference to our knowledge of the Infi- nite, and which we have presented as entirely op- posed to the doctrine of Sir William Hamilton, and as differing considerably from the theory of M. Cousin, though agreeing with his theory in its lead- ing characteristics. Let us now endeavour to pre- sent a statement, at once exact and concise, of the relative position of the theories of these two philo- sophers, and of the relation which our doctrine holds to both. In this sketch, we will present the doctrine of M. Cousin as developed in the work criticised by Sir William Hamilton, premising, however, that his views seem now considerably modified. In entering upon the question, all the three doc- trines start from common ground. There is a com- mon principle admitted both by Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin, and with which we most fully concur, — -That thought is possible only on the condition of relation, which necessarily involves plurality. The fact which this principle is meant to express is this, — That thought can be realized only iuasmuch as FINAL STATEMENT. 233 there is an object of thought, and that of each object we recognise only its relative quahties. In accordance with this principle, every act of thought implies a relation between the mind and an object of thought. Since, therefore, every act of thought implies a rela- tion ; and since every relation embraces two terms ; it necessarily follows that every act of thought in- volves plurality. It is thus admitted that thought is possible only under the condition of relation, dif- ference, and plurality. Thus far, there is no diver- sity of opinion. At the very next step, however, we find the point of divergence. Having satisfied ourselves concerning the instrument to be employed — that is, thought ; and concerning the sole condition cf its employment — that is, relation or plurality ; we next direct at- tention to the object concerning which the question is raised — that is, the Infinite. In considering the object, we find that the Infinite has been described in a manner which has compli- cated the discussion, and has been the cause of almost all the difierence of opinion on the question. Sir William Hamilton has described the Infinite as that which cannot exist in relation, and from this he has inferred, that, since all knowledge implies relation, there can be no knowledge of the Infinite. To escape this conclusion, M. Cousin has asserted that the In- finite must exist in relation. We hold a middle position. In opposition to Sir William, we maintain 234 THE PfllLOSOPHY UF THE INFINITE. that the Infinite may exist in rehition, if there be nothing in the relation to Hmit it. In opposition to M. Cousin, we maintain that the Infinite Being does exist in relation, but we deny that He must exist in relation. In order to escape from the extreme that God cannot exist in relation, it is not necessary that we rush to the opposite extreme, that God must exist in relation. It is enough that we maintain that God may exist in relation, and that he does so exist. Here, then, is the point of difference. Sir William Hamilton andM. Cousin take each adifi'erent course, and we take a third. Sir AYilliam Hamilton reasons thus : — The absolute, as absolutely one, involves the negation of all plurality ; knowledge is possible only on the condition of plurality ; tlierefore, a knowledge of the Absolute is impossible. M. Cousin endea- vours to escape the dijEculty by raising us to a unity of consciousness with the Absolute, asserting that the Divine Intelligence is subject to the same condi- tion of plurality as we are, and making the Deity the grand unity in which we exist. Thus it is main- tained that in self-consciousness we have a knowledge of the Infinite. We adopt a tliird course, and equally reject the theory which deals with a mere abstrac- tion ; and, the theory which reduces God to the conditions of humanity, or raises humanity to unity with God. Sir William Hamilton reasons thus : — The Infinite as absolute, is absolutely one ; human knowledge FINAL STATEMENT. 235 implies plurality ; therefore, there can be no know- ledge of the Infinite. Now, if this argument be valid, it not only proves that the Infinite cannot be known, but also that the Infinite cannot exist. If "absolute unity is convertible with the absolute negation of plurality," we may just as well reason thus : — The Infinite, as absolute, is absolutely one ; but the existence of finite objects implies plurality ; therefore, the Infinite cannot exist. Sir William's position is obviously erroneous, inasmuch as he deals W'ith a mere abstraction. If w^e take the Absolute, and define it as, that w^hose existence involves the negation of all plurality ; it necessarily follows, not only that no one can know it, but also that no one can exist along with it. Grant Sir William's definition, and his conclusion necessarily follow^s, and even involves more than his statement of it. But this is an absolute wdiich does not exist, and for which no one pleads. We, therefore, set aside Sir William's position as wholly irrelevant. M. Cousin regards the Absolute as that which must exist in relation, and he has proceeded accordingly to form a theory, which has involved him in a whole host of contradictions. According to him, Reason, as a universal possession of mankind, constitutes no part of our individuality. According to him, " Rea- son is not individual, but universal and absolute " — it is not human, it is divine. The process by wdiich this startlino; conclusion is reached is this : — The 236 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. idea of the finite, and the idea of the Infinite, and their relation are the constituent " elements " of rea- son — thej " are not an arbitrary product of human reason" — "thev constitute this reason/' This bein<^ the case, they constitute " reason in itself," " eternal reason and absolute intelligence," that is, " Divine intelligence itself" Ideas are " modes of being of the Eternal Intelligence." Transfer, then, the ideas of the one and the many, of the finite and the infi- nite, and their relation "from human intelligence to absolute intelligence," and you have the real essence of the Deity. Such is the startling and dangerous doctrine which is clothed in all the beauty of the eloquent diction of the French philosopher. M. Cousin may " hope " that " the preceding theory will no longer be treated as Pantheism," but most certainly there is little ground for such a hope. He may lightly say, that " Pantheism, at the present time, is the bugbear of feeble imaginations." We most heartily wish that it had been a greater bugbear to him, and that " imagination " had had less to do with his theory. The fallacy of the theory is too glaring to require much comment. It were easy to show that it is involved in a labyrinth of contradictions ; but we must be brief. When it is asserted that the idea of the finite, and the idea of the infinite, and their relation, are the constituent elements of reason, M. Cousin trans- cends consciousness. These three ideas are indeed FINAL STATEMENT. 237 facts given in consciousness, but to assert that they constitute the essence of reason, is to go beyond consciousness, and violate the acknowledged condition of philosophising. Again, even though the theory were true as regards human reason, it is altogether unwarrantable thence to infer its validity as applied to the Divine Intelligence. Here again we must recall M. Cousin within those limits which he has acknowledged as the only legitimate sphere of philo- sophy. Consciousness knows nothing of the Divine essence, and all such speculation is unwarrantable. Finally the theory is directly contradictory of our necessary conception of the Supreme Being. Accord- ing to this theor}^ the finite as well as the infinite, is a constituent element of the Divine nature — the finite is only a mode or manifestation of the Infinite. Thus it is that J\I. Cousin says that God is at once " one and many ;" " infinite and finite together ;" " at the same time God, Nature, and Humanity." A theory more contradictory of our conception of the Deity can scarcely be conceived. Yet such was the doctrine of M. Cousin, as developed in the Introduction to the "History of Philosophy," published in 1828, and criticised by Sir William Hamilton in the following- year. As we have already hinted, he seems now, however, to have very considerably modified his opinions, although he has not, so far as we are aware, withdrawn his theory, or retracted those extreme expressions which we have quoted above. 238 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINPrE. We deem it only fair, however, to state that, by various indications in his more recent works, he seems now to hold a doctrine very much resembling that which we have announced. Having thus set aside the theory of Sir William Hamilton, and the theory of M. Cousin as originally presented, we are led to adopt a distinct doctrine. We maintain that the Infinite, as absolute, is that which is essentially independent and unrestricted, but which may nevertheless exist in relation, and be thus recognised by the mind. We equally deny that the Infinite camiot exist in relation, and that the Infinite must exist in relation. We reject the doctrine of Sir William Hamilton, and we as decidedly lift onr protest against the doctrine of M. Cousin. Place, then, to opposite sides the untenable theories of Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin, — the one as irrelevant, and the other as erroneous, — and clear ground is left in the centre. This position is left untouched and secure — That the Infinite can exist in relation, provided that relation do not restrict it. Having vindicated the possibility of the existence of the Infinite in relation, — having shown that the Infinite may come into relation with our mind as an object of thought — we next present the instances in which the infinite Being is thus realized. An examination of consciousness shows that we must think a Supreme Being, and that, since we cannot FINAL STATEMENT. 239 think Him finite, we must think Him as infinite. While it is thus shown that the Infinite is reahzed by us as an object of thought, it is at the same time found that our notion of the Infinite is onl}^ partial and indefinite, inasmuch as the finite cannot embrace the Infinite. Such, we conceive, to be the true Philo- sojDh}'" of the Infinite. We are persuaded that, if the more extreme points were abandoned, Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin do not differ so much as they seem. We consider that it would not be diflicult to show that, apart from these extreme points, these two philoso- phers are at one. For example, we find Sir William sa^^ing, — " The -Divinity, in a certain sense, is reveal- ed ; in a certain sense, is concealed : He is at once known and unknown." Having stated this opinion, he has felt that M. Cousin Avould readily accept the statement, and he asks, "Am I wi-ong in thinking that M. Cousin would not repudiate this doctrine'?" So far from repudiating it, we believe M. Cousin would at once adopt it as his own. This may appear when we consider that M. Cousin has stated, that he holds " at once the comprehensibility and incomprehensi- bihty of God." He says, — " God reveals himself to us," but " it is not true that we are able absolutely to comprehend God." " It is equally an error to call God absolutely comprehensible, and absolutely in- comprehensible." These passages from Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin we consider as direct 240 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. admissions of the validity of the doctrine we have maintained, and at the same time, as directly contradictory of the extreme positions involved in their own theories. Let, then, these two philosophers abide by the passages we have quoted. Let Sir William lay aside the definition of the Infinite as that which cannot exist in relation — as that which involves the negation of all plurahty. Let him lay aside his doctrine of the impossibility of a knowledge of the Infinite, as dealing w^ith an abstraction which does not exist. On the other hand, let M. Cousin lay aside his doc- trine of the impersonality of reason — let him lay aside the doctrine that reason is absolute and divine — let him cease every attempt to raise us to a unity of consciousness with the Absolute Being. Let Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin agree to do this, and there is an end to the controversy, and this doc- trine stands out as a common conclusion, — That the Infinite Being is recognised as an object of thought — that he is positively known, though not absolutely known — that our knowledge of the Infinite is real and positive, though only partial and indefinite. Examine consciousness with the utmost strictness, and we are satisfied that the more minute the exami- nation the more obvious will be the conclusion that this is the true doctrine concerning our knowledge of the Infinite. Search the experience of man, and you will find that he is not an isolated being, wan- riXAL STATEMENT. Ii41 deriiig amid a crovv'd of finite objects, and ignorant of aught else. Anal^^ze his consciousness, and you will find that his whole being is mysteriously linked to the Infinite, and that a conception of the Infinite God is a necessity of his nature. He, and the objects around him, move in a boundless expanse, from which there is no transit ; he has been suddenly introduced into unending time, from which there is no egress ; he is indissolubl}" connected with the Great Jehovah; and the grand centre of his thought and action is the Infinite God. tDLNBUHU!£ : T. CO-N'SXABLE, I-EINTER, TO liER .MAJi;3TY. PUBLICATIONS OF THOMAS CONSTABLE AND CO. Ill handsome Hvo, witli Portraits, &c., COMPLETE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF DUGALD STEWART, Esq., comprising, among other large Adflitions, a concluding Chapter of his Dissertation, Lectures on Political Economy, &c. &.C. With a Biographical Memoir of the Author by Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Vol. I. just ready. After the death of Rt-id, Dugald Stewart was the head of what has been denominated " The Scottish School of Philosophy ;" long before his death he was indeed universally acknowledged as the most distinguished liv- ing philosopher of Great Britain, and likewise as one of the best writers in the language. His published works are considerable, both in number and extent, and are also conversant with the most important parts of Philo- sophy, — historical, speculative, and practical. Of these works, the earlier have been frequently reprinted ; but from circumstances, merely private, and which it is unnecessary to specify, new editions of his later writings have been withheld, and a collection of the whole, which ought long ago to have appeared, has only now become possible. This Collection, which it is proposed forthwith to publish, will appear in handsome 8vo, and may extend to nine, perhaps to ten, volumes. It will not be merely a uniform re-impression of the former Publications. These it will of course comprise, — following the most authentic Edition, with the Author's ]\Ianuscript Corrections, and his frequent and important Addi- tions ; — but in the extensive literary remains of Mr. Stewaut, besides the Writings thus left prej>ared for the Press, there are others which may afiford valuable extracts to be incorporated in the already published Treatises, — or to be otherwise annexed to them. 'i he work of selecting from the Manuscripts, and, in general, of editing the Collection, has been undertaken by Sir William Hamilton, who will likewise supply a ilenioir of the Author. The contents of the Publication are as follows ; and, in so far as at pre- sent appears, they will occupy nine volumes. 1. DiSSEKTATION, EXHIBITING A GeNEEAL ViEW OF THE PROGRESS OF Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy. This will comprise numerous and extensive additions, and a Chapter hitherto unpublished, exhibitini; a concluding view of "Tendencies and Results." -, o, 4. Elements of the Philosophy of the Human IMind. 3 vols. To this will be prefixed Part 1st of the Outli^ks op Moral PiiiLOsopuy, con- taining the Outline of the Philosophy of Mind. The first volume will contain the relative Addenda published iu the third, which are still in copyright. In the second volume will api)ear various Insertions and ('"■,■ rcctions. The Outlimes also have some Additions. WORKS PUBLISHED BY THOMAS CONSTABLE & CO. WORKS OF DUGALD STEWAUT.— Continued— i>. Philosophical Essays. This volume miiy be considered iii- almost a part of tiie hist work. — Large additions. (j, 7. Philosophy of the Active and ^Ioeal Powers. 2 vols. There will be prefixed Part 2d of the Outlines of Mobai Philosophy, con- taining the Outline of the Ethical Piiilosophy — Considerable Additions. 8. Lectures on Political Economy. That is, on Political Philosophy in its widest signification. Now first published. Part 3d of the Outlines of Moral Philosophy, containing the Outline of the Political Philosophy, wiU be jirefixed. *J. Biographical Memoirs of SiMiTH, Robertsox, and Keiu. Additions ; with Memoir of the Author by Sir William Hamh.toj^. Bi/ the Count Agenor dr Gasjxir'in. THE SCHOOLS OF DC>UI3T AND THE SCHOOL OF FAITH. Translated h;/ A iithorit I/. Crown 8vo, price 5s. " A valuable contribution to the literature of the Christian Evidences, and a masterly defence of the canonioity and divine authority of the Sacred Scriptures." — Literary Gazette. " An able plea for the strictly Protestant interpretation of the Scriptures." — Atlienceinn. " We know no book which furnishes so convenient a manual of the class of topics to which it relates, and we shall be surprised if it does not become very extensively popular." — Dublin Daily Kxpres.i. 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