THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964: FIELD INVESTIGATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT Aerial View, looking east, of part of Turnagain Heights slide, Anchorage, shortly after earthquake. The Alaska Earthquake March 27, 1964: V Field Investigations and Reconstruction Effort By WALLACE R. HANSEN, EDWIN Bi ECKEL, WILLIAM E. SCHAEM, ROBERT E. LYLE, WARREN GEORGE, AND GENIE CHANCE An introduction to the story of a great earth- quake—its geologic setting and effects, the field investigations, and the public and private reconstruction eflorts GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROFESSIONAL PAPER 541 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR STEWART L. UDALL, Secretary GEOLOGICAL SURVEY William T. Pecora, Director UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON : 1966 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 FOREWORD In the late afternoon of Friday, March 27, 1964, one of the most violent earthquakes of all time rocked southern Alaska. Suddenly 114 people were killed, thousands were left homeless, more than 50,000 square miles of the, State was tilted to new altitudes, and the resulting property dam- age disrupted the State’s economy. The response to alleviate the effects of the disaster was immediate. The military forces in Alaska rushed to the aid of the civilian community, providing emergency com- munications, food, water, and housing. Within 24 hours the US. Geological Survey had a team of three geologists in Alaska to begin a reconnaissance survey, and they were but the vanguard of many who arrived to conduct scientific and engineering investigations and to advise on the recon- struction effort. The day after the earthquake the President declared Alaska to be a major disaster area and a wide range of relief and reconstruction work began, much of it sponsored by the Office of Emergency Planning. The Corps of Engineers was given responsibility for large parts of the reconstruction effort. Within a week the President by Executive Order established the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska to coordinate the efforts of many Federal agencies; task forces and field teams moved into action. At the time of the disaster it was difficult to envision any good proceeding from it, but the unprecedented cooper- ative efforts of many agencies and institutions, federal, state, and private, and many individuals have enabled the State to recover in large measure and even to move for- ward. This volume contains the story of the earthquake and the succeeding field investigations and reconstruction efforts in which the Geological Survey is proud to have taken part. - W. T. PECORA, Director. 988 / r J/ - y) ,4“ V mm! SCIENCES LIBRARY vy/ ' , .1 Photograph credits: U.S. Army: frontispiece, figures 16, 25, 27, 33, 34, 41, 43, 45—59. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs: figures 60—65. George Plafker: figures 5, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 31, 32, 36, 37. J. E. Sater, courtesy of Arctic Institute of North America: figure 6. M. G. Bonilla: figures 7, 22, 24, 30. H. W. Coulter: figure 12. Arthur Grantz: figures 19, 20. Reuben Kachadooriran: figures 26, 29. W. R. Hansen: figures 21, 28. U.S. Navy: figure 35. C. D. Weingaard: figure 38. Genie Chance: figures 65—67. FOREWORD, by W. T. Pecora. A SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE—ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS, by Wallace R. Hansen and Edwin B. Eckel ___________________ Introduction ______________ Time and magnitude _______ Epicenter ________________ Duration and extent _______ Aftershocks _______________ Previous Alaskan earth- quakes _________________ - Physiographic and geologic setting of the earthquake- Alaska—Aleutian Prov- ince _______________ Aleutian Range--- Alaska Range _____ Coastal Trough Prov- ince-___ ___________ Cook Inlet-Susitna Lowland _______ Talkeetna Moun- tains ___________ Copper River Low- land ___________ Wrangell Moun- tains ___________ Pacific Border Ranges province ___________ Kodiak Mountains- Kenai - Chugach Mountains ----- Gulf of Alaska coastal section_ _ St. Elias Mountains and Fairweather Range _________ Tectonic effects ___________ Effects on communities- _ _ _ Damage to transportation facilities ________________ The Alaska Railroad. . _ Highways ____________ Airports ______________ Ports and harbors _____ Atmospheric effects ________ Possible magnetic effects- _ _ Biologic efl’ects ____________ Page \I UTODP—‘h—lI—IH (DOOOO 10 10 11 12 12 12 14 14 14 17 25 25 27 29 30 33 33 34 CONTENTS A SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE—Con. Damage outside Alaska- _ __ INVESTIGATIONS BY THE GEO- LOGICAL SURVEY, by Wallace R. Hansen __________________ THE WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE—EARTH SCIENCE AP- PLIED To POLICY DECISIONS 1N EARLY RELIEF AND RECON- STRUCTION, by Edwin B. Eckel and William E. Schaem ------ Introduction ______________ Immediate response of the Federal Government _____ Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska- __ Makeup and functions- Duties and accomplish- ments ______________ Estimates of dam- age ____________ Special legislation- Reconstruction plans and sched- uling __________ Long-range eco- nomic planning- Federal financial assistr ance _______________ Termination of the Commission ________ Scientific and Engineering Task Force and its Field Team __________________ History and objectives- Activities and methods- Boundaries of activi- ties ________________ Task Force recom- mendations _________ Anchorage ________ Homer ___________ Seward ___________ KodiakandValdez_ Reactions of Federal agencies and local officials ------------ Public relations _______ Page 36 38 46 46 47 47 48 48 49 49 50 50 51 51 51 53 54 57 57 61 63 64 65 65 THE WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE—Continued Scientific and Engineering Task Force and its Field Team—Continued Evaluation of Task Force effort _________ ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS OF ENGI- NEERS—CLEANUP AND EARLY RECONSTRUCTION, by Robert E. Lyle andWarren George__ _ Introduction ______________ Damage surveys __________ Cleanup and restoration__.. _ Anchorage ____________ Seward _______________ Valdez _______________ Cordova _____________ Homer _______________ Seldovia ______________ Whittier _____________ Other communities- - _ _ RECONSTRUCTION BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS—METHODS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS, by Warren George and Robert E. Lyle___ Introduction ______________ Anchorage ________________ Seward ___________________ Valdez ___________________ Cordova _________________ Seldovia __________________ Homer ___________________ Other communities ________ THE YEAR or DECISION AND Ac- TION, by Genie Chance _______ Introduction ______________ Seward ___________________ Homer ___________________ Kodiak _________ ‘ _________ Native villages ____________ Cordova _________________ Valdez ___________________ Whittier _________________ Girdwood ________________ Anchorage ________________ The Federal Government aids the people of Alaska- SELECTED REFERENCES _________ VII Page 68 99 100 100 103 . 106 Frontispiece. Aerial view of part of Turnagain Heights slide, An— chorage, shortly after earth- quake. 1. 2. 3. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. VIII . Clastic dikes Physio graphic setting of south-central Alaska- Earthquake belts of the world ______________ Epicenters of major Alaskan earthquakes _ . Major physiographic di- visions of Alaska _____ . Rock avalanche on Sur- prise Glacier ________ . Debris flow on Upper Miles Glacier ________ intruded into near-surface sed- iments and overlying snow and ice _________ . The Hanning Bay fault scarp, Montague Is- land ________________ . Shaded relief map of south-central Alaska showing epicenter, major aftershocks, and areas of tectonic land-level changes- - _ Drowned spruce trees on gravel spit in Resur- rection Bay _________ Uplifted sea floor at Cape Clear, Mon- tague Island. in area of greatest recorded uplift _______________ Transverse fissure in Valdez at corner of McKinley St. and Keystone Ave _______ Breakdown of earth— quake damages in Alaska _____________ Remains of native vil- lage of Chenega _____ Damage to railroad yards and petroleum tank farm at Seward- Hinchinbrook Coast Guard dock raised above all but the highest tides ________ Page 10 11 13 15 16 16 18 18 20 20 21 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURES . Scarp at the subsidence trough of the Fourth Avenue slide, Anchor- age ---------------- Damage to 1200 L Street apartment building in Anchorage- --------- Alaska Sales and Serv- ice Building, Anchor- age ---------------- Store building in An- chorage ------------- Toe of Turnagain Heights landslide ex- posed at low tide- - - _ Wooden fence at toe of L Street slide, An- chorage _____________ Rail and highway net of south-central Alaska- Railroad near head of Tumagain Arm ______ Railroad yard and ware- house damage at Seward ------------- Potter Hill slide, An- chorage ------------- Fissure in Seward High- way near Alaska Rail- road station at Port- age ---------------- Richardson Highway near mile 69 --------- Million Dollar Bridge- _ Twentymile River Bridge near Turn- again Arm ---------- Effects of violent surge waves at Whittier_--- Damaged runway at Cordova Airport-- - - - Fire, wave, and sub- marine slide damage at Whittier --------- Fire and wave damage to Seward port facili- ties ---------------- Vessels washed into heart of Kodiak by tsunamis ___________ Page 21 22 23 23 24 24 25 26 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 31 32 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. Uplifted sea floor at Cape Clear, Montague Island -------------- Tectonically elevated shoreline of Latouche Island -------------- US. Geological Survey research vessel Don J. Miller -------------- Map of high- and nomi- nal-risk portions of Anchorage and vicin— ity ----------------- Map showing classifi- cation of earthquake risk areas, Anchorage- Aerial View of damage in Anchorage ---------- Map showing land clas— sification, Homer and Vicinity _____________ Inundation of Homer Spit ---------------- Map showing high- and nominal-risk areas of part of Seward ______ Collapse of Fourth Ave- nue ---------------- Aerial view of Fourth Avenue slide after cleanup ------------- Turnagain Heights land- slide before and after cleanup ------------- 48, 49. Aerial views of Val- 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. dez before and after earthquake -------- Partial cleanup of pe- troleum tank farm area ---------------- Alaska Railroad dock, Seward, after cleanup- Main street of Sel- dovia—with sandbags to keep it from float— ing ----------------- Petroleum tank farm at Whittier after wave and fire damage ----- Government Hill slide- _ New dock and harbor at Valdez ------------- New school at Valdez- _ New site of Valdez and dock facilities _ - _ _ _ _ _ Page 34 35 41 56 58 60 62 62 64 71 74 75 76, 77 78 78 79 80 84 86 86 87 Page Page 58. New boat basin on 61. Remains of a native 65. House rehabilitated in Homer Spit _________ 88 village ______________ 95 place, Anchorage--- 59. New boat basin at 62. Old. Harbor, an Aleut 66. House moved to a safe _ 9 Village ______________ 96 haven, Anchorage---- KOdlak-"ju-"j" 3 63. Old Harbor, a year after 67. House at the toe of the 60- Chenega, a native fishing the quake ___________ 96 L Street slide, Anchor- village ______________ 95 64. New homes at Tatitlek- 97 age ________________ TABLES Page 1. Summary of earthquake damages to Alaskan communities -------------------- 19 2. Summary of estimated damages, August 12, 1964 --------------------------- 49 3. Estimated Federal assistance to Alaska after March 27, 1964, earthquake ______ 50 Page 100 101 102 IX 4“ . w $5, THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964: FIELD INVESTIGATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT A SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE—ITS SETTING INTRODUCTION One of the greatest geotectonic events of our time occurred in southern Alaska late in the after- noon of March 27, 1964. Beneath a leaden sky, the chill of evening was just settling over the Alaskan countryside. Light snow was fall- ing on some communities. It was Good Friday, schools were closed, and the business day was ending. Suddenly without warning half of Alaska was rocked and jarred by the most violent earthquake to occur in North America this century. The descriptive summary that follows is based on the work of many investigators. A large and still-growing scientific literature has accumulated since the earth- quake, and this literature has been freely drawn upon here. In par- ticular, the writers have relied upon the findings of their col- leagues in the Geological Survey. Some of these findings have been published, but some are still being prepared for publication. More— over, some field investigations are still in progress. TIME AND MAGNITUDE Seismologic events such as earthquakes are normally re- corded in the scientific literature AND EFFECTS By WALLACE R. HANSEN and EDWIN B. ECKEL in Greenwich mean time. Green- wich time provides a worldwide standard of reference that obvi- ates the difliculties of converting one local time to another. The Alaskan earthquake of 1964 thus began at about 5 :36 p.m., Friday, March 27, 1964, Alaska standard time, but its onset is oflicially recorded in the seismological lit- erature as 03:36:11.9 to 12.4, Sat- urday, March 28, 1964, Greenwich mean time (US. Coast and Geo- detic Survey, 1964, p. 30). This earthquake has become re- nowned for its savage destructive- ness, for its long duration, and for the great breadth of its dam- age zone. Its magnitude has been computed by the US. Coast and Geodetic Survey as 8.3-8.4 on the Richter scale. Other observato- ries have calculated its magnitude as 8.4 (Pasadena) and 8.5—8.75 (Berkeley) . These computations indicate something of the great size of the earthquake. Few earthquakes in history have been as large. In minutes, thousands of people were made homeless, 114 lives were lost, and the econ- omy of an entire State was dis- rupted. Seismic sea waves swept the Pacific Ocean from the Gulf of Alaska to Antarctica; they caused extensive damage in Brit- ish Columbia and California and took 12 lives in Crescent City, Calif, and 4 in Oregon. Un- usually large waves, probably seiches, were recorded in the Gulf of Mexico. The entire earth vibrated like a tuning fork. EPICENTER The epicenter of this great earthquake has been located in a forlorn wilderness of craggy peaks, glaciers, and fjords at the head of Prince William Sound, on the south flank of the rugged Chugach Mountains, about 80 miles east-southeast of Anchorage (fig. 1, next page). Computations by the Coast and Geodetic ‘Survey fix the epicenter at lat 61.10 N., long 147.7° W.i15 km. The by- pocenter, or point of origin, was at a depth of 291—50 km. However, it is not meant to imply that the earthquake had a point source: During the quake, energy was .re- leased from a broad area south and southwest of the epicenter un- derlying and adjacent to Prince William Sound and theiGulf of Alaska (US. Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1964, p. 31; Grantz and others, 1964, p. 3). Epicenters of most aftershocks were dispersed throughout an area of about 100,000 square miles, mainly along the continental margin of the Aleutian Trench between Prince 1 2 THE ALASKA‘ EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 152° 1.—Physiographic setting of south-central Alaska, including the area principally involved in the Alaska earthqueke of 1964. The epicenter of the main shock is near the north end of Prince William Sound. William Sound and the seaward side of Kodiak Island (fig. 9). This area coincides with a zone of tectonic uplift (Plafker, 1965). DURATION AND EXTENT The total effect of the earth- quake was intensified by the long duration of strong ground motion. The elapsed time can only be surmised from the estimates of eyewitnesses, inasmuch as no re- cording instruments capable of measuring the duration of the shock were in the affected area at the time. Several such instru— ments have since been installed. Some witnesses timed the quake by wrist or pocket watch, and their timings ranged from 11/2 to 7 minutes or more. Most such timings ranged from 3 to 4 minutes, whether measured at Anchorage, Seward, Valdez, or elsewhere. By comparison, the great San Francisco earthquake of 1906 is said to have lasted about 1 minute. Several factors besides \‘ the human element may influence the variation from place to place of the estimated duration of the shock. Shocks are more intense in some geologic settings than in others; the character and ampli- tude of seismic waves passing through one medium are unlike those passing through another of different elastic properties. Ground motion is more intense and sometimes more prolonged over thick unconsolidated fills as at Anchorage or Valdez than over firm bedrock, as in the Chugach Mountains. Under certain ground conditions the intensity of ground motion may be amplified by res- onance. Motions are stronger in high buildings than in low ones, so an observer in a tall building is likely to record a longer du- ration than an observer in a low building. And under certain con- ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS ditions, shaking may be prolonged locally after direct seismic motion has stopped: for example, if land- slides or avalanches, triggered by the earthquake, are in prOgress in the Vicinity. At any rate, even the shortest estimates indicated an earthquake of unusual dura- tion, a duration that had marked effects on the behavior of earth materials and manmade struc- tures and on their susceptibility to damage. The main shock was reportedly felt throughout most of Alaska, including such remote points as Cape Lisburne, Point Hope, Bar- row, and Umiat on the Arctic slope of Alaska and at Unimak Island beyond the tip of the Alaska Peninsula—points 600—800 miles distant from the epicenter. The earthquake was recorded by seismographs throughout the world. It caused significant damage to ground and structures throughout a land area of about 50,000 square miles and it cracked ice on rivers and lakes through- out an area of about 100,000 square miles (Grantz and others, 1964, p. 2). Marked fluctuations of water levels in recording wells were noted at places as far dis- tant as Georgia, Florida, and Puerto Rico (Waller and others, 1965, p. 131). Effects of 'so great an earth- quake hold the utmost interest of scientists and engineers. Few earthquakes have had such marked effects on the crust of the earth and its mantle of soil. Perhaps the effects of no earthquake have been better documented. Early investigation has provided a clear picture of much that happened, but years will pass before all the effects are under- stood. In fact, secondary effects are still in progress. In the fjords and along the shores at tectonically disturbed tidal zones, 3 wholesale extermination of ses- sile organisms has been followed by a slow restoration of the biotic balance. Marine shellfish are now seen attaching themselves to the branches of drowned spruce trees (Hanna, 1964, p. 26). Rivers are regrading their channels to new base levels. Long-term effects on glaciers, shorelines, and the ground-water regimen will bear further watching. But despite its magnitude and its impressive related tectonic effects, the earthquake ranks far below many other great natural disasters in terms of property damaged and lives lost. Less violent earthquakes have killed many more people. The reasons are many: The damage zone of the Alaskan quake has a very low population density; much of it is uninhabited. In Anchorage, the one really populous area in the damage zone, many modern build- ings had been designed and con- structed with the danger of earth- quakes in mind. The generative area of the earthquake was also sparsely in- habited, and the long-period seis- mic vibrations that reached the relatively distant inhabited areas wreaked heavy damage on tall and wide-area buildings but caused mostly light damage to small one-family dwellings of the type prevalent in Alaska (Stein- brugge, 1964, p. 71). According to White (1965, p. 91), attenu- ation of sinusoidal seismic waves at low frequencies should vary as the square of the frequency. Thus, destructive short- period vibrations presumably were atten- uated to feeble amplitudes not far from their points of origin. Most residential buildings, more- over, were cross-braced wood- frame construction, and such buildings usually fare well in earthquakes. THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 Severe earthquakes during last 1,100 years, and resulting casualties [After Hill, 1965, p. 50] Year Place 856 _______ Corinth, Greece __________ 1038 ______ Shansi, China ____________ 1057 ______ Chihli, China ____________ 1170 ______ Sicily ___________________ 1268 ______ Silicia, Asia Minor______-_ 1290 ______ Chihli, China ____________ 1293 ______ Kamakura, Japan ________ 1456 ______ Naples, Italy _____________ 1531 ______ Lisbon, Portugal _________ 1556 ______ Shenshi, China ___________ 1667 ______ Shemaka, Caucasia _______ 1693 ______ Catania, Italy ____________ 1693 ______ Naples, Italy _____________ 1731 ______ Peking, China ____________ 1737 ______ Calcutta, India ___________ 1755 ______ Northern Persia __________ 1755 ______ Lisbon, Portugal _________ 1783 ______ Calabria, Italy ___________ 1797 ______ Quito, Ecuador___________ 1811—12___ New Madrid, Missouri, [LS.A. 1819 ______ Cutch, India _____________ 1822 ______ Aleppo, Asia Minor _______ 1828 ______ Echigo (Honshu) Japan__-_ 1847 ______ Zenkoji, Japan ___________ 1868 ______ Peru and Ecuador ________ 1875 ______ Venezuela and Columbia- _ 1896 ______ Sanriku, Japan ___________ 1897 ______ Assam, India ____________ 1898 ______ Japan ___________________ 1906 ______ Valparaiso, Chile _________ 1906 ______ San Francisco, USA _____ 1907 ______ Kingston, Jamaica ________ 1908 ______ Messina, Italy ___________ 1915 ______ Avezzano, Italy __________ 1920 ______ Kansu, China ____________ 1923 ______ Tokyo, Japan ____________ 1930 ______ Apennine Mountains, Italy. 1932 ______ Kansu, China ____________ 1935 ______ Quetta, Baluchistan ______ 1939 ______ Chfle ___________________ 1939 ______ Erzincan, Turkey _________ 1946 ______ Alaska-Hawaii, U.S.A _____ 1948 ______ Fukui, Japan ____________ 1949 ______ Ecuador _________________ 1950 ______ Assam, India ____________ 1953 ______ Northwestern Turkey _____ 1954 ______ Northern Algeria _________ 1956 ______ Kabul, Afghanistan _______ 1957 ______ Northern Iran ___________ 1957 ______ Western Iran ____________ 1957 ______ Outer Mongolia __________ 1960 ______ Southern Chile ___________ 1960 ______ Agadir, Morocco _________ 1962 _____ ‘. Northwestern Iran________ 1963 ______ Taiwan, Formosa _________ 1963 ______ Skopje, Yugoslavia _______ 1964 ______ Southern Alaska, USA... 1 Principally from seismic sea wave. 2 Does not include 12 deaths in California and 4 deaths in Oregon, by drowning. Deaths 45, 000 23,000 25, 000 . 15,000 60,000 100,000 30,000 60,000 30,000 830,000 80,000 60,000 93,000 100,000 300,000 40,000 30,000—60,000 50,000 41,000 1,500 22,000 30,000 34,000 25,000 16,000 27,000 1,500 122,000 1,500 500 1,400 160,000 30,000 180,000 143,000 1,500 70,000 60,000 30,000 40,000 1150 5,000 6,000 1,500 1,200 1,600 2,000 2,500 1,400 1,200 5,700 12,000 12.000 100 1,000 2114 The timing of the earthquake undoubtedly contributed to the low casualty rate. It was a holi- day; many people who would otherwise have been at work or returning from work were at home. Schools were closed for the holiday. In coastal areas the tide was low; had tides been high, inundation and destruction by sea waves would have been much more severe. Nevertheless, sea waves caused more deaths than all other factors combined. Hill (1965, p. 58) has compiled a chronological list of severe earthquakes dating back more than 1,100 years. Her list, repro— duced at left, places the Alaskan earthquake of 1964 in a proper perspective so far as deaths are concerned. Throughout history, earth— quakes have ranked high among the causes of sudden disaster and death, but many other causes have added as much or more to the misfortunes of mankind. Some of these, such as dam fail— ures, for example, man has brought on himself. Others he has not. The great epidemics of the past are not likely to recur, but disease, famine, floods, and landslides all still take huge tolls. Single tornadoes in the American midcontinent have taken more lives than the Alaska earthquake of 1964; so have mine explosions. In East Pakistan, thousands of lives were lost in 1965 to floods and hurricanes (“cyclones”). It would be irrelevant to enlarge here on natural and manmade disasters. Hill, however, has compiled another table that sheds pertinent further light 'on some of the causes of human misery in the past 600 years, other than earthquakes. Wars have been omitted. ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS Deaths (rounded) from some of the world’s worst man- made accidents and natural disasters [After Hill, 1965, p. 57] Date What and where Deaths 1347—51--- Bubonic plague in Europe 75,000,000 and Asia. 1918 ,,,,,, Influenza throughout the 22,000, 000 world. 1878 ,,,,,, Famine in China ______________ 9,500,000 1887 ______ Flood in China _______________ 900, 000 1556 ______ Earthquake in China______ _ _ _ - 830, 000 1881 ______ Typhoon in Indochina ________ 300,000 1902 ______ Eruption of Mount Pelee, 40,000 West Indies. 1883 ______ Eruption of Krakatoa, near 36,000 Sumatra. 1941 ______ Snow avalanche in Peru _______ 5,000 1963 ______ Overflow of Vaiont Dam in 2, 000 Italy. 1942 ______ Mine explosion Manchuria ..... 1 1,500 1912 ______ Sinking of the Titanic _________ 2 1,500 1871 ______ Forest fire, Wisconsin _________ 1 ,000 1925 ______ Tornado in south-central 700 United States. 1944 ______ Train stalled in Italy __________ 3 500 1928 ______ Collapse of St. Francis Dam, 500 California. 1960 ______ Airliners collided over New 4 134 York City. 1 Actual count 1,549. 2 Known dead 1,513. 3 Passengers sufiocated when the train was caught in a tunnel; actual count 521. 4 Including casualties on the ground. Some of the tolls listed in Hill’s tables differ substantially from those reported by other authori- ties for the same disasters. Per— haps this difference is not surpris- ingin View of the chaos and lack of communication that generally accompany great natural disas- ters and the varying casualty esti- mates, therefore, that appear in the subsequent literature. Hill did not cite the sources of her data, and the some of her figures are questionable; she lists 143,000 deaths in the Tokyo earthquake of 1923, for example, whereas Richter (1958, p. 561, citing Imamura) lists 99,331. For the Messina earthquake of 1908 Hill lists 160,000 deaths, whereas other authors list from 82,000 to 100,- 000. Nevertheless, used with cau- tion, Hill’s tables help to equate the magnitudes of past tragedies, and they provide some basis for comparing one disaster with anoth- er. Compared with the eruption of Mount Pelee in 1902, for exam- ple, or the sinking of the Titanic in 1912, the Alaska earthquake of 1964 took a small toll of lives. In View of the magnitude of the event, the relatively small size of the toll is in some ways remarkable. AFTERSHOCKS The long series of aftershocks that followed the main Alaska \‘le ;.-/\ / a ‘ 5 earthquake gradually diminished in frequency and intensity over a period of several months. Within 24 hours the initial shock was followed by 28 aftershocks, 10 of which exceeded Richter magnitude 6. The epicenters of these shocks were disposed in a zone 50—60 miles wide reaching from Prince William Sound southwest to the Trinity Islands area south of Kodiak (fig. 9). Fifty-five aftershocks with mag- nitudes greater than 4 were rec- orded within 48 hours after the main earthquake, including a shock of magnitude 6.7 on March 29 at 4:18 pm. (March 30, 02:18:05.6 Gmt). Within a week 75 shocks with magnitudes great- er than 4 h-ad been recorded by the US. Coast and Geodetic Sur- vey (1964, table 2). In the 45 days following the earthquake, 728 aftershocks were recorded (Jordan and others, 1965, p. 1323). According to Press and Jackson (1965) about 12,000 aftershocks with magnitudes equal to or greater than 3.5 pro- bably occurred in the 69-day per- iod after the main shock, and several thousand more were recor- ded in the next year and a half (US. Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1965a, p. 44). {- 7 /. ':-_—,:,;,.¥\ ‘2 // IF> :— ' ‘ “/7 77/ / / (Jungf— wfl' .. , \w ‘_\ w. ., // _ ‘\ ”L‘P/ 9 “y .. .- . w. .\ y ’51: . \ k \ n , fit- ‘I A . r._ ‘ . , ’ J. \ A ..~. _ a p}, /o ,, .W ,1, $th 2 i" ”m w “x “W; THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 («((fi’eu / ANCHBRAGE > \ §2>2///a \/ 5‘ (issiééséég 7%? V > < << 70 N 170 E 180 170 W 160 150 140 ARCTIC OCEAN EXPLANATION Magnitude 0 5.3—5.9 O 6.0—6.9 O 7.0-7.7 O 7.75-8.5 Filled circles =hypocenter>50 KM 500 Ml LES PREVIOUS ALASKAN EARTHQUAKES Southern Alaska and the ad- joining Aleuti-an Island chain together constitute one of the world’s most active seismic zones. Extending from Fairbanks on the north to the Gulf of Alaska on the south, the Alaskan seismic zone is but a part of the vast, near-continuous seismically active belt that circumscribes the entire Pacific Ocean basin (fig. 2). Fig- ure 3 shows the distribution of earthquake epicenters of magni- tude 5.3 and greater recorded in Alaska since instrumental mea- surements began, through 1961. Between 1899 and May 1965, seven 2 (left).—Earthquake belts of the world. These belts coincide with the earth’s orogenic zones and contain most of the earth’s active volcanoes. Alaska earthquakes have equaled or exceeded Richter magnitude 8, and more than 60 have equaled or exceeded magnitude 7 (Davis and Echols, 1962). According to Gutenberg and Richter (1949, ta- ble 7) about 7 percent of the seis- mic energy released annually on the globe originates in the Alas- kan seismic zone. This highly active zone is cir- cumferential to the Gulf of Alas- ka and parallel to the Aleutian Trench. It embraces the rugged mountainous region of southern Alaska, Kodiak and the Aleutian Islands, the continental shelf, and the continental slope of the Aleu- tian Trench. Most of the earth- quakes originate at shallow to intermediate, depths—mostly less 3 (left).—Epicenters of major Alaskan earthquakes, 1898—1961. Reproduced from Davis and Echols (1962). More recent earthquakes include the Alaska earthquake of 1964 (magni- tude 8.3—8.4) and the Rat Islands earthquake of 1965 (magnitude 7.75). 231—821 O—66~2 ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS than 50 km—between the Aleutian Trench and the Aleutian Volcanic Arc. Foci are generally deeper away from the trench toward the arc (Gutenberg and Richter, 1949, fig. 7). PHYSIOGRAPHIC AND GEO- LOGIC SETTING OF THE EARTHQUAKE It was noted above that the earthquake was felt throughout nearly all of Alaska, although for various reasons it was not felt in certain local areas distant from the epicenter. The level of in- tensity diminished appreciably northward f rom mountainous southern Alaska to the intermen- tane plateaus of the interior. Da— mage, moreover, was restricted generally to an arcuate area with— in about 150 miles of Prince Wil- liam Sound (Grantz and others, 1964, fig. 1). This area coincided approximately with the area of tectonic land-level change. The ARCTIC GULF OF ALASKA 7 cardinal geographic setting of the earthquake, therefore, was south- ern Alaska south of the Alaska Range, west of the “Panhandle,” and east of the Alaska Peninsula. The four major physiographic divisions of Alaska are shown in figure 4. Each division is a north- westerly extension of a major physiographic division of Canada and conterminous United States. Tectonic effects of the earthquake and significant damage were con- fined largely to the southernmost division of Alaska, the Pacific Mountain System. Physiographic di v i s i o n s of Alaska are definitively described and summarized by Wahrhaftig (1966). They are outlined con- cisely by Wahrhaftig and Gates (1964, p. 27). Those parts of Alaska principally involved in the earthquake have been described by Miller, Black, Barnes, and Wahr— haftig in a summary volume 00 EA” ARCTIC OASTAL PLAIN SCIJO MILES 4.—Major physiographic divisions of Alaska. 8 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 “Landscapes of Alaska,” edited by Howell Williams (1958). The geotectonic setting and structural history of Alaska have been out— lined by Gates and Gryc (1963) and by Gates (1964). Most of the information that follows is ab— stracted from the several reports noted above. The physiographic nomenclature is that of Wahrhaf— tig, who followed and elaborated the early nomenclature of Brooks (1906, 1911). The Pacific Mountain System extends from the southern part of the conterminous United States north through British Columbia and Yukon into Alaska. Not sur- prisingly, therefore, subdivisions of the system in Alaska have geo- logic and physiographic counter- parts in the conterminous States. In mainland Alaska the Pacific Mountain System forms a broad arc, concave toward the south. Two mountainous belts are sepa- rated by a discontinuous belt of lowlands—t h e Alaska-Aleutian Ranges on the north, the Coastal Trough province in the center, and the Pacific Border Ranges on the south. The Alaska-Aleutian Ranges are analogous to the Cas- cade-Sierra Nevada Ranges of Washington, Oregon, and Cali- fornia—these provinces contain eugeosynclinal suites of gray- Wacke, argillite, and volcanic rocks that are variably metamor- phosed, are intruded by batholith- ic plutons, and are surmounted in places by Pleistocene and Recent volcanoes. The Coastal Trough province of Alaska is analogous to the Puget Sound-Williamette Valley-Great Valley of Califor- nia lowland—these provinces con- tain thick fills of Cretaceous and Tertiary sedimentary rocks. The Pacific Border Ranges of Alaska are analOgous to the Olympic Mountains and Coast Ranges. They contain suites of graywacke, slate, and phyllite tightly folded and intruded by silicic to ultra- mafic plutons. The Pacific Mountain System in Alaska is a region of dramatic physiographic contrasts—glacier— clad mountains, active volcanoes, lake—dotted lowlands, great rivers, fjords, and waterfalls framed in a setting of primeval forest on the one hand and trackless tundra on the other. Local relief in some places is astonishing: Mount Mc- Kinley at 20,269 feet, the highest summit in North America, looms above lowlands only a few hun— dred to 3,000 feet above sea level. In the nearby Wrangell Moun- tains, 12,000- to 16,000-foot peaks rise above the floor of the Copper River valley at an altitude of less than 1,000 feet. The abrupt re- lief of the St. Elias Range to the southeast is legendary—Mount St. Elias, visible from tidewater, is 18,008 feet high; Mount Fair- weather, only 15 miles from the Gulf of Alaska, is 15,300 feet high. ALASKA-ALEUTIAN PROVINCE The Alaska-Aleutian province, a region of extreme seismic-tec- tonic activity, includes the Aleu- tian Island chain, the contiguous Aleutian Range on the Alaska Peninsula, and the Alaska Range (figs. 1 and 4). Together they form a great sigmoid wall con- cave northward on the west (the Aleutian Arc) and concave south- ward on the east, altogether total- ing about 3,200 miles in length and averaging, on land, about 60 miles across. ALEUTIAN RANGE The Aleutian Range and its sea- ward extension, the Aleutian Is- lands, surmount ‘a partly sub- merged ridge 20-60 miles wide ex- tending 1,600 miles from Mount Gerdine west of Anchorage to At— tu Island at the west end of the chain. About 80 Quaternary vol- canoes, some deeply dissected but many of them historically active (Coats, 1950), stand 2,000 to more than 12,000 feet above sea level. Mount Gerdine, the highest peak (but not a volcano), stands 12,600 feet above sea level at the north end of the arc. The volcanoes themselves rest on a platform made up largely of deeply eroded volcanic rocks of Tertiary age, in— terbedded with sedimentary rocks of volcanic provenance, all cut by dikes and irregular bodies of gab- bro, diorite, and granite (Powers, in Williams, 1958, p. 61). Although the Alaska earthquake of 1964 was felt throughout much of the Aleutian Range, tectonic and geomorphic efl'ects apparent- ly were negligible. Reportedly, there was ground breakage on the flanks of Augustine Island vol- cano (R. M. Waller, oral com- mun., 1964) . Landslides were trig- gered along steeper slopes as far south as Mount Iliamna. There was extensive ground cracking in the alluvial flats of most rivers and some lake deltas, and ice cracked in all the larger lakes. ALASKA RANGE The Alaska Range forms a great semicircular barrier about 600 miles long that merges imper- ceptibly with the Aleutian Range on the southwest and with the Wrangell and St. Elias Ranges on the southeast. Its faulted north- ern slope is one of the most abrupt mountain fronts in the world (Reed, 1961, p. A3). Despite its height and formida‘ble aspect, however, the Alaska Range is breached by several low passes and river valleys utilized for transpor- tation routes. The crestline of the range is mostly 7,000—9,000 feet high. Isolated massifs of great jagged peaks rise much higher, each the center of extensive sys- tems of icecaps and valley gla— ciers. The two icy summits of Mount McKinley (19,370 and 20,- 269 ft) and their sister peak, Mount Foraker (17,280 ft), domi- nate the range. McKinley and Foraker both are visible on clear days from Anchorage, 130 miles to the south. About 140 miles east of Mount McKinley a second group of high peaks culminates in Mount Hayes (13,700 ft). Internally the Alaska Range consists of a great synclinorium flanked by large longitudinal faults (Brooks, 1911, p. 111). In general, Cretaceous rocks along the center of the fold are bound- ed by Paleozoic and Precambrian rocks in the limbs. All are in- truded by bodies of granitic rock, some batholithic in size. Most of the higher peaks, including the Mount McKinley group, consist of granitic rock. The north peak of Mount McKinley is slate and graywacke (Reed, 1961, fig. 2). 5.—A rock avalanche on the Surprise ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS The Alaska Range was mostly outside the area markedly affect- ed by the earthquake. Strong ground motion was felt well north of the range, however, and relevel- ing suggests possible uplift of nearly a foot (US. Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1965a, p. 16). COASTAL TROUGH PROVINCE The Coastal Trough province sustained severe damage in the March 27 earthquake. Damage to properties and manmade struc- tures was related especially to the relatively high local population density and to the behavior of c e r t a i n Pleistocene formations that underlay parts of the area. Landslides, ground cracks, subsid- ence, and vibration were the chief causes of damage. The province consists of two main lowland belts, the Cook Inlet-Susitna Low— land and the Copper River Low- land, separated by the Talkeetna Mountains. On the east, the Wran- gell Mountains project deep into the Copper River Lowland. Wahr- 9 haftig has divided the Coastal Trough province into several sec- tions on the basis of geologic and physiographic distinctions. COOK INLET-SUSITNA LOWLAND The Cook Inlet—Susitna Low- land is a deep structural basin more than 200 miles long and about 60—70 miles across. It is bounded by the Alaska and Aleu- tian Ranges on the west and north and by the Kenai, Chugach, and Talkeetna Mountains on the east. Its surface is mostly less than 500 feet above sea level, and much of it is submerged beneath the Cook Inlet. It contains such well—known subdivisions as the populous An— chorage Lowland, the agricultural Matanuska Valley, and the petro- leum-rich Kenai Lowland. It is underlain by thick sequences of poorly consolidated coal-bearing rocks of Tertiary age manrtled with glacial, glaciofluvial, and glaciomarine deposits, and flanked by hard-rock mountains on the east and west. Parts of the area Glacier near Harriman Fjord, about 50 miles east of Anchorage. Photograph taken May 29, 1964. 10 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 6.—Debris flow (avalanche) and Upper Miles Glacier, in the Chugach Mountains near mouth of the Copper River. View east from 6,300 feet, April 19, 1964. The flow is approximately 2 kilometers long. have been described by Capps (1916) and by Martin, Johnson, and Grant (1915). The Quatern- ary geology has been described in detail by Karlstrom (1964). TALKEETNA MOUNTAINS The little known Talkeetna Mountains are a dissected high- land of diverse topography and geology, about 100 miles long north to south and 60—70 miles across west to east. Extremely rugged glacier-covered peaks and ridges in the central part, stand- ing 6,000—8,000 feet above sea level, are carved from a large Jurassic batholith that has in- truded older Jurassic volcanics and pre-Jurassic rocks. On the south a large fault (Lake Clark- Castle Mountain fault) separates the hard rocks of the mountains from the softer Cretaceous and Tertiary rocks of the Matanuska Valley. The southeast part of the Talkeetna Mountains consists of soft Jurassic and Cretaceous sandstones and shales overlain by thick Tertiary basalt flows (Brooks, 1911, pl. 9; Capps, 1940, pl. 2; Grantz, 1961). During the earthquake the southern part of the range subsided as much as 2 feet (US. Coast Guard and Geo- detic Survey, 1965a, p. 16). Ava- lanches and landslides were trig- gered in the upper Matanuska Valley and doubtless occurred in the mountains also. COPPER RIVER LOWLAND The Copper River Lowland as here described includes all the area between the Alaska Range on the north, the Wrangell Mountains on the east, the Chugach Mountains on the south, and the Talkeetna Mountains on the west. As thus limited, it includes" marginal areas called the Gulkana Upland in the northwest part of the area and the Lake Louise Plateau in the west (Wahrhaftig, 1966). Thus delineated, it is drained not only by the Copper River itself, but also by the Susitna, which arises in the Alaska Range, flows south into the lowland, then west across the Talkeetna Mountains, and by the Delta River, which heads in the Gulkana upland and flows north across the Alaska Range to the Tanana River. A low pass at the south end of the Talkeetna Mountains connects the Copper River Lowland with the Cook In- let area by way of the Matanuska Valley. The surface of the low- land ranges in altitude from less than 1,000 feet above sea level where the Copper River enters the Chugach Mountains at Wood Canyon (alt 581 ft at Chitina) to more than 3,500 feet in the Gul- kan-a Upland. Most of the area is underlain by perennially frozen ground, and the surface conse- quently is dotted with shallow lakes. Several large lakes are of glacial origin. Bedrock in the northern and western parts of the lowland consists chiefly of green— stone and other metavolcanic rocks of late Paleozoic and Triassic age. In the southern part of the low- land, bedrock consists chiefly of sedimentary rock of Mesozoic age. Most of the lowland, however, is mantled with unconsolidated de- posits of Pleistocene age. On the east is the volcanic pile of the Wrangell Mountains. ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS The earthquake caused ava- lanches, landslides, and ground breakage in the Copper River Lowland. Several buildings were s h i f t e d on their foundations. Throughout the lowland, ice was cracked on lakes and rivers. WRANGELL MOUNTAINS The Wrangell Mountains, aus- tere and beautiful, dominate the landscape of the Copper River re- gion. They are a cluster of great ice-capped volcanoes crowded into an area about 100 miles long, northwest to southeast, and 60 11 miles across, northeast to south- west. To the southeast they merge with the St. Elias Range. Several volcanoes exceed 14,000 feet in altitude, including Mount Black- burn (16,523 ft) the highest in the range, and Mount Sanford (16,- 208 ft). Historically active Mount Wrangell (14,163 ft) still emits steam and vapors. At least a dozen summits exceed 12,000 feet. The volcanoes rest on a base of de- formed Paleozoic and Mesozoic sedimentary and volcanic rocks. During the earthquake the appar— ent subsidence was less than a 7.-—Olastic dikes composed of sand and silt were intruded along fissures into near-surface sediments and overlying snow and ice in the delta of Snow River, Kenai Peninsula. The dikes were left in relief when the snow and ice melted. 12 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 foot at the southwest front of the range. Extensive ground cracks formed in the alluvial flats of the larger rivers in the McCarthy area. PACIFIC BORDER RANGES PROVINCE The Pacific Border Ranges province contains the epicenter of the March 27 earthquake and most of the land areas of major tectonic deformation. It consists of sev- eral mountain ranges, most of which merge laterally with one another. Including some of the world’s most rugged mountains, the province forms the moun- tainous and adjacent coastal low— land border of the Gulf of Alas- ka, an arcuate belt about 1,000 miles long and 20—110 miles across stretching from Kodiak Island 'on the southwest to Sitka Island on the southeast. Included as subdi- visions are the Kodiak Mountains, Kenai-Chugach Mountains, Gulf of Alaska coastal section, St. Elias Mountains, Fairweather Range, and the mountains of the western part of the Alexander Archipel- ago (Wahrhaftig and Gates, 1964, p. 27). Only the Kodiak Moun- tains, Kenai-Chugach Mountains, and the Gulf of Alaska coastal section, described below, were sig- nificantly involved in the earth- quake, although a large clay-silt mudflow was triggered on Ad- miralty Island in the Alexander Archipelago near Juneau, 480 miles from the epicenter (oral commun., Keith Hart, Alaska De— partment of Highways, to Robert D. Miller, US. Geological Sur- vey, 1965). KODIAK MOUNTAINS The Kodiak Mountains (Wahr- haftig, 1966) are a structural- topographic continuation of the Kenai-Chugach Mountains. They form a rugged northeast-trending divide 2,000—4,000 feet high along the crestline of Kodiak Island and slope abruptly to the south- east and more gradually to the northwest to an irregular coast- line modified by many fjords and islands. The mountains consists mostly of argillite and graywacke of Mesozoic age intruded along the main divide by an elongate granitic batholith of Tertiary age (Dutro and Payne, 1957). E0— cene sedimentary rocks along the southeast border of Kodiak Is- land and in the Trinity Islands to the south are downfaulted against the older rocks. Most of Kodiak Island subsided during the earth- quake, but a narrow zone along the southeast coast had no dis- placement, and the outermost headlands on the southeast coast were elevated. Other effects of the earthquake included landslides and avalanches on the steeper slopes, local subsidence and crack- ing of many unconsolidated de- posits, and the cracking of lake ice (Reuben Kachadoorian and George Plafker, written commun., 1966). KENAI-CHUGACH MOUNTAINS The Kenai-Chugach Mountains form the landward closure of P rinc,e William Sound. The greater; part of this region sub- sided during the earthquake, although part of it was elevated. L a n d slid e s, avalanches, and ground cracks were abundant (Hackman, 1965, p. 608; Ragle and others, 1965; Post, 1965; Tut- hill and Laird, 1966). Wahrhaf- tig’s description (1966, p. 40) of the general topography and geo- logy is quoted as follows: . The Kenai-Chugach Mountains form a rugged barrier along the north coast of the Gulf of Alaska. High segments of the mountains are dominated by ex- tremely rugged east-trending ridges 7,000 to 13,000 feet high. Low seg- ments consist of discrete massive moun- tains 5 to 10 miles on a side and 3,000 to 6,000 feet high, separated by a reticulate system of through val- leys and passes 1/2 to 1 mile wide that are eroded along joints and cleavage. The entire range has been heavily glaciated and the topography is char- acterized by horns, aretes, cirques, U- shaped valleys and passes, rock-basin lakes, and grooved and mammilated topography. The south coast is deeply indented by flords and sounds, and ridges extend southward as chains of islands. The north front is an abrupt mountain wall. The Kenai-Chugach Mountains are composed chiefly of dark-gray argillite and graywacke of Mesozoic age [some of these rocks are now known to be of Tertiary age (George Plafker, writ- ten commun., 1965)], mildly meta- morphosed and with a pronounced ver- tical cleavage that strikes parallel to the trend of the range. In the Prince William Sound area large bodies of greenstone are associated with the ar- gillite and graywacke. A belt of Meso- zoic and Paleozoic schist, greenstone, chert, and limestone lies along the north edge of the Kenai and Chugach Mountains. All these rocks are cut by granitoid masses. All the higher parts of the range are buried in great icefields, from which valley and piedmont glaciers radiate. Many glaciers on the south side of the mountains are tidal. Although the earthquake caused many snow and rock- slides that avalanched onto glaciers in the Kenai-Chugach Mountains, there were relatively few slides that seemed to be large enough to materially alter the regimens of the glaciers in the manner pro- posed by Tarr and Martin (1912; Ragle and others, 1965, p. 31, 42). Tarr and Martin attributed rapid advances of glaciers in southeast- ern Alaska in the first decade of the 20th century to avalanching caused by the great Yakutat earthquakes of 1899, a View dis- puted recently by Post (1965). The long-term effect of the snow added to the surfaces of the gla- ciers in the Chugach Mountains, however, will require years to \ evaluate. » ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 13 8.—The Hanning Bay fault scarp, Montague Island, looking northeast. Vertical displacement in the foreground, in rock, is about 12 feet; the maximum measured displacement of 15 feet is at the beach ridge near trees in background. 14 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 Rock avalanches were more numerous in the Chugach Moun- tains than in the Kenai Moun- tains (Ragle and others, 1965, p. 31). A notably large one fell onto the Sherman glacier near Cordova (Post, 1965; George Plafker, oral commun., 1965). ‘ From a study of aerial photo- graphs, Hackman (1965, p. 609) identified 1,958 avalanches and snow slides, 58 combined snow and rock slides, and 20 rock slides in the mountainous areas adjoining Prince William Sound after the March 27 earthquake. It is not known what the normal incidence of spring avalanching is in the Chugach Mountains adjacent to Prince William Sound, or how many of the avalanches were caused by the earthquake, but Hackman suspected that most of them were caused by the earth- quake. GULF OF ALASKA COASTAL SECTION Wahrhaftig (1966) describes the Gulf of Alaska coastal section as an area of diverse topography carved in Tertiary rocks. It ex- tends about 340 miles along the coast in a strip 2—40 miles wide from the vicinity of Cordova on the west to Icy Point on the east, between the Gulf ‘of Alaska to the south and the high Chugach and St. Elias Mountains to the north, It is basically a coastal plain marked by beach and dune ridges, belts of morainal topography, out- wash plains, marine terraces, and enormous piedmont glaciers. It is deeply indented locally by large fjords and by the valley of the Copper River but, for the most part, its coastline is less irregular than that of the rest of southern Alaska. The largest of the pied- mont glaciers, the Malaspina, covers an area the size of Rhode Island. The Bering Glacier is almost as large. Large thrust faults separate the Tertiary rocks of the coast from the older rocks in the mountains. During the earthquake the west- ern part of the section was tec- tonically elevated; the eastern part was little affected. Uplift died out between the Bering Gla- cier and Yakataga (Plafker, 1965, p. 1679). Other great earth- quakes have centered in this area in the past, including the great Yakutat earthquake of 1899 (Richter magnitude 8.6) and the Lituya Bay earthquake of 1958 (magnitude 8), the latter remem- bered for the giant waves gen- erated by avalanching of rock into Lituya Bay (Miller, 1960). As a result of the March 27, 1964, earthquake, slides and slumps oc- curred as far east as Yakataga; unconsolidated deposits cracked and slumped eastward to Yakutat Bay and lake ice cracked as far east as Lituya Bay. ST. ELIAS MOUNTAINS AND FAIRWEATHER RANGE The colossal St. Elias Moun- tains and Fairweather Range are largely peripheral t0 the region affected markedly by the earth- quake but they have had a long history of seismic activity. Ice- clad and drained by glaciers, they are the highest coastal mountains in the world. Among them also are some of the highest and most impressive peaks in North Amer— ica, including Mount Logan (19,— 850 ft) entirely in Canada, Mount St. Elias (18,008 ft), Mount Van- couver (15,700 ft), Mount Hub- bard (14,950 ft), and Mount Fair- weather (15,300 ft), all along the international boundary and all visible from tidewater (B‘ostock, 1948, p. 92). Many other peaks range in height from 12,000 to 17 ,- 000 feet. Little is known of the geology. The Alaska part of the mountains is topographically con- tinuous with the Chugach Moun- tains and is geologically similar. The St. Elias Mountains also merge with the Wrangell Moun- tains and also contain volcanic rocks. Reconnaissance in the Fair- weather-Yakutat Bay area indi- cates bedded sedimentary and vol- canic rocks of Paleozoic and Me- sozoic age intensely folded and faulted. Many of the higher peaks are carved from granitic intrusive rocks (Miller, in Williams, 1958, p. 21). TECTONIC EFFECTS Tectonic effects of the Alaska earthquake of 1964 have been studied and described in detail by Plafker (1965). Crustal defor- mation associated with the earth- quake was more extensive than any known deformation related to any known previous earthquake. From the Wrangell Mountains at the northeast to the Trinity Is- lands south of Kodiak, the zone of land-level changes extended southwest through the epicenter a distance of more than 500 miles (Plafker, 1965, fig. 5). From northwest to southeast it extend- ed at least from the west shore of Cook Inlet to Middleton Island in the Gulf of Alaska, a distance of about 200 miles. Crustal warping may have extended inland as far as the Alaska Range and seaward out onto the continental slope 'of the Aleutian Trench (US. Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1965a, p. 15—16). East along the Alaska coast, deformation died out some- where between the Bering Glacier and Yakataga (Grantz and others, 1964, p. 5). An area of at least 70,000 square miles and possibly 110,000 square miles or more was tectonically elevated or depressed during the earthquake (fig. 9). Areas of uplift and subsidence are separated by a zero line or axis of tectonic tilting that trends southwestward from the vicinity ITS SETTING AND m, flue I r, ~ M; M0 ”3 ~ EFFECTS I W'. a x 9 $4910 ‘ MW CA, a ‘ ‘ ' r .171. mm 51.4 412" ucu 1.2”. “ rs: ' I, .~ - 'lflym;fé \ _ ,, my» 15 ." nae .::LL * St L ”kw,” Locmoa MAP 100 MILES 9.—Map of south-central Alaska, showing epicenter of March 27, 1964, earthquake, major aftershocks, and areas of tectonic land-level changes. Most aftershocks centered in the'area of uplift along the continental margin of the Aleutian Trench between the Trinity Islands and the epicenter of the main shock. Data chiefly from reports by the US. Coast and Geo— detic Survey (1964, 1965a), Grantz, Plafker, and Kachadoorian (1964), and Plafker (1965). of the epicenter to the seaward side of Kodiak and the Trinity Islands (fig. 9). East from the epicenter the zero line passes approximately through Port Val- dez fjord, trends along Heiden Canyon east of Valdez (H. W. Coulter, written commun., 1965), and crosses the Copper River Val- ley about 50 miles above the mouth (Plafker, 1965, fig. 5; Coulter and Migliaccio, 1966). Areas north and northwest of the hingeline sub- sided; areas south and southeast arose. A line of maximum sub- sidence about coincided with the mountain axes of the Kenai Pen- insula and Kodiak Island, where downwarping exceeded 6 feet; up- lift over wide areas of Prince Wil- 10 '(left).——Reddish-brown spruce trees in foreground were drowned when gravel spit in Resurrection Bay area subsided about 3 feet. liam Sound exceeded 6 feet and, in an area of surface rupture on Montague Island, locally exceeded 30 feet (Plafker, 1965). This up- lift deleteriously affected shipping lanes and harbor facilities in parts of Prince William Sound; docks at Cordova and elsewhere were left high and dry during times of low tide. Southwest from Montague Is- land, where bottom soundings show seaward continuations of new fault scraps along old fault lines on the island, the sea bot- tom was uplifted locally more than 50 feet (Malloy, 1964, p. 11 (1eft).—Up1ifted sea floor at Cape Clear, Montague Island, in the area of greatest recorded uplift on land (33 feet). The white coating, about a quarter of a mile wide, consists of the remains of calcareous marine on ganisms that were killed by dessica- tion when their sea-floor home was lifted above high tide. ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 1048). Inferred large-scale uplift of the continental shelf and slope southeast of Montague Island probably generated the seismic sea waves that spread across the Pacific Ocean (Van Dorn, 1964, p. 186; Plafker, 1965, p. 1680). Much, if not all, of the uplift probably accompanied the few minutes of most violent ground shaking during the earthquake (Plafker, 1965, p. 1680). Tectonic changes, both up and down, caused extensive damage to the biota in such areas as coast- al forests, migratory-bird nesting grounds, salmon spawning waters, and shellfish habitats. These effects are described further in subse- q u e n t paragraphs. Land-level changes at Alaskan coastal com- munities are shown in table 1 (p. 19). EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES Earthquake damage to the cities, towns, and villages of southern Alaska was caused by direct seis- mic vibration, ground breakage, mud or sand emission from cracks, ground lurching, subaerial and submarine landslides, fires, sea waves, and land-level changes (Grantz and others, 1964). Not all these factors caused damage in every community. Some com- munities were devastated by only one; the village of Chenega, for example, was destroyed by a sea wave. Overall, landslides prob- ably caused 'the most damage to manmade structures and proper- ty, but sea waves took the most lives. Effects of one factor cannot always be separated from effects of another. Thus, at Seward (Grantz and others, 1964, p. 15; Lemke, 1966) the waterfront was racked by vibration, slides, sea waves, fires, subsidence, and ground cracks. All these factors 17 contributed significantly to the havoc, and all in combination wiped out the economic base of the town. Comparable damage at Valdez, plus the threat of recur- rent damage in the future, forced relocation of the village and aban- donment of the present townsite (Coulter and Migliaccio, 1966). Most of the small coastal Vil- lages in the earthquake zone were damaged chiefly by sea waves, subsidence, or both (Kachadoor- ian, 1965). Among the larger towns, only Cordova was signi- ficantly damaged by uplift, but the native village of Tatitlek and several canneries and residences at Sawmill Bay on Evans Island were also adversely affected by uplift. Direct vibratory damage was significant chiefly in Anchorage and Whittier, although minor vi- bratory damage was widespread through the area of intense shak- ing. At Anchorage several build- ings were destroyed by vibration, and nearly all multistory build- ings were damaged (Berg and Stratta, 1964; McMinn, 1964; Na- tional Board of Fire Under- writers and Pacific Fire Rating Bureau, 1964; Hansen, 1965). At Seward, Valdez, and Whittier, ground vibrations ruptured oil storage tanks, and the spilled pe- troleum quickly caught fire. Ground breakage caused exten- sive damage in Anchorage, Se- ward, Whittier, and Valdez, not only to buildings but also to buried utilities such as water, sew- er, gas, electric, and telephone lines. Cracked ground resulted from the passage of sinusoidal seismic waves through the soil, from lurching, from lateral spreading of soils under gravity, especially near the heads of land- slides, and from differential set- tlement of alluvial and artificial , fills. 18 THE Mud and sand were pumped from ground cracks throughout the damage zone where water tables were shallow in saturated granular soil. At Valdez, and to a lesser extent at Seward (Forest Acres), large volumes of sediment were ejected from cracks into cel- lars and crawl spaces (Coulter and Migliaccio, 1966; R. W. Lem- ke, oral commun, 1965). Submarine and subaerial land- slides triggered by the earthquake caused spectacular damage in An- chorage, Seward, Valdez, Whitt- ier, and Homer (Engineering Geology Evaluation Group, 1964; Grantz and others, 1964; Shan- non and Wilson, Inc., 1964; Han- sen, 1965; Lemke, 1966; Coulter and Migliaccio, 1966; Kachadoor- ian, 1965; Waller, 1966). Four large slides in built-up parts of Anchorage were caused by fail- ures along bluff lines in soft, sen- sitive silty clay whose water con— tent at critical depths exceeded its liquid limit. Failure at An- chorage was mostly subaerial, although the large Turnagain Heights slide failed partly below sea level and slipped part way down the mudflat into Knik Arm of Cook Inlet. At Valdez and Seward, violent shaking spon- taneously liquified granular del- taic materials; slumping which initiated well below sea level car- ried away the waterfronts of both towns. The seaward slopes of the deltas, moreover, were left less stable after the earthquake than they were before. Estimates by the Federal Re- construction and Development Planning Commission for Alas- ka, as of August 12, 1964, indi- cated that total property damage to Alaska by the earthquake ex- ceeded $311 million (fig. 13). This figure does not include loss of personal property or in- $163 MILLION ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 12 (above).—Transverse fissure in Val- dez at corner of McKinley St. and Keystone Ave. Note damage to cm- derblock building where the main fis- sure, foreground, intersects it. Simi- lar ground fractures, with or without sand and mud spouts caused much damage to streets, utilities, and build- ings in many parts of the earthquake- affected area. Schools Utilities $7] MILLION $77 MILLION :‘ ”I“ Homes Highways _ Boats Airports Si ' Military Bases reeis BUS'MSSES Railroads Industries Hydropower Sewers Fisheries FEDERAL STATE AND PRIVATE LOCAL PROPERTY (D°es"°""°'”de 13 (left).—Earthquake damages in losses of per- sonal property or income) Alaska. From estimates by the 0f- fice of Emergency Planning (1964a). come. Not only was the economic base of entire communities de— stroyed, but the resultant loss of income severely crippled the econ- omy of the whole State and de- prived Alaska of a major share of its tax base at the time when funds were most needed to aid in restoration. As also pointed out by the Fed- eral Reconstruction and Develop- ment Planning Commission, the disaster struck at the heart of the State’s economy, inasmuch as nearly half the people of the State reside in the stricken area. About 100,000 of the State’s estimated 265,000 people live in the greater Anchorage area alone. Anchor— age, because of its size, bore the brunt of property damage, but the per capita damage and the actual death toll were much greater in many smaller towns. Although ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS the combined population of Chen- ega, Kodiak, Seward, Valdez, and Whittier is less than 9,000 people, each of these communities lost more lives than Anchorage. Despite the extensive damage at Anchorage to residence and business properties, utilities, and transportation, a large segment of the economy was intact, and re- covery was relatively rapid. But at many small towns and Villages, where virtually entire populations were dependent on one or two in- dustrial enterprises—fisheries, for example—the eflects of the earth- quake were staggering. Whole fishing fleets, harbor facilities, and canneries were destroyed. The native villages of Chenega, Kaguyak, Old Harbor, and Afog- nak, all remote waterfront fishing villages, were nearly or complete- ly destroyed by waves, especially 19 Chenega, population 80 before the earthquake. There, 23 lives were lost, and only the schoolhouse re- mained of the village’s buildings. Six homes were left standing at Old Harbor, where there had been about 35. There were nine homes in Kaguyak and a Russian Ortho- dox Church; all were carried away or destroyed. At Afognak, four homes, the community hall, and the grocery store were carried away by waves; several other homes were moved partly off their foundations (Alaska D e p ar t . Health and Welfare, 1964b) ; and subsidence made the townsite un- inhabitable. The sites of Chenega, Kaguyak, and Afognak have been abandoned in favor of new town- sites. Earthquake damages to com- munities of Alaska are summar- ized in table 1. TABLE 1.——Summary of earthquake damages to Alaskan communities Principal causes of damage Townsite acreage Premises ’I‘ e 01 structures dama ed (estimated) (estimated) yp g A Landslides 3 Place o E 3 3 H q, a l: “ o a '6 3‘ 5% .§ § § .5 5 s: w: v 5 g a 3’. s .. e .. a s =3 w «in *a to m t 2 ~ 3 ‘5 a 3 :1 5 0.. M a a q, ._ a .—. a o g: a ° 14 H 3 "‘ a. a m = :1 L. > o a E 8 a a -—- 3a .0 a a: :1 ° 0 a g a. g e e a a e a s a E o a s a a s .2» E m C: m D m :5 > B kc E Q 94 B Q m m 2 m 3 o E! <: Afognak..- 190 0 x X . 20 2 10 38 23 X X X 0 Anchorage. 244,237 9 . ----- "-- X ...- Cape St. Elias. 4 1 - 15,000 750 X X X X X X X Chenega _____ so 23 - ' " Chugiak-.. . 51 0 . Cordova ............. 1,128 0 ...... Cordova FAA air- port _______________ Eagle Rlver. . Ellemar... . Girdwood. . 36 3 2, 628 8 193 214 1 _ 71 Port Ashton ___________________ Port Nellie Juan _____ 3 Seldovia _____________ , 460 Seward. . .. . 1, 891 Tatitlek . __________ Valdez--. 1, 000 Whittier. .. ..- 70 1 Alaska Depart. Health and Welfare 1964 . 2 82,833 including military personnel. ( ) 3 4,788 including personnel at Kodiak Naval Station. ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 14 (left).—-Remains of the Native vil- lage of Chenega, Prince William Sound, after devastation by waves. 16 (upper right).——Hinchinbrook Coast Guard dock, raised above all but the highest tides by regional uplift in Prince William Sound. Docks at Cordova and elsewhere were also made useless by the same uplift. 15 (below).—Damage to railroad yard and petroleum tank farm at Seward, looking northwest. The extensive damage at Seward, as at Whittier and some other towns, was caused by a combination of submarine slides, waves and fire. .f‘ w, m (I 17 (below).—Scrap at the subsidence trough or graben of the Fourth Avenue slide, Anchorage. The graben dropped 11 feet in response to 14 feet of horizontal movement of the slide block. 18.——The 1200 L Street: apartment: building in Anchorage that was: severely damaged by shaking during the earthquake. None X-shaped fractures caused by vertical shear. ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 23 ‘9 M .- ' ""“ 19.—The Alaska Sales and Service building in Anchorage, which was under construction, partially collapsed during the earth- quake. The building was constructed of prestressed concrete roof T’s which rested on precast reinforced concrete T-col- umns; it had precast reinforced concrete walls. 20.——Store building in Anchorage wrecked by seismic shaking. x —Toe of Turnagain Heights landslide exposed at low tide as viewed from new blufi line, looking northeast toward Anchor- age waterfront. Trees that formerly stood 70 feet above sea level were swept downward and outward into Knik Arm by mass movement of landslide. 22.—A wooden fence which 1a):r ‘athwart the toe of the L Street landslide, Anchorage, was buckled and by compression. \ DAMAGE TO TRANSPORTA- TION FACILITIES THE ALASKA RAILROAD Damage to The Alaska Rail- road, totaling about $27 million (Ofiice of Emergency Planning, 1964a), has been described briefly by Grantz, Plafker, and Kacha- doorian (1964, p. 24). It has been investigated more fully by McCul- loch and Bonilla. Most of the 23.——Rai1 and highway net of south-central Alaska. ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS damage was along the 150 miles of trackage between the terminal at Seward and Anchorage (fig. 24). Damage to the terminal and mar- shaling yards at Seward (de- scribed by Lemke, 1966), was caused by submarine slumping and waves. Two railroad docks val— ued at $4 million were completely destroyed, together with $2 million of freight and 50 freight cars. Between Seward and Anchorage, 25 damage was caused by direct seis- mic shaking, landslides, subsid- ence, ground cracks and lurching, and inundation by high tides. _ Seventeen bridges were damaged or destroyed. Ground slumping along the right-of-way was severe at Kenai Lake and at Potter. In- undation and current scour were severe near Portage. Snow ava- lanches covered trackage along Turnagain Arm. At Anchorage, Damage to these routes was heaviest between Anchorage and Seward. Heavy damage was sustained also along the Copper River Highway east of Cordova. 152° Pmncilklllwm Sound 146° 24 (above).—The rails in this approach to a bridge near the head of Turna- gain Arm were torn from their ties and buckled laterally by streamward movement of the riverbanks. 25 (left).—Railroad yard and ware- house damage a-t Seward caused by submarine slides, waves and fire. Looking west toward railroad ware— houses and docks. 26 (left).—Potter Hill slide on The Alaska Railway near Anchorage. shops and rolling stock were dam- aged by vibration and landslides. North of Anchorage light damage was reported as far as Hurricane. Trackage just south of Matanus- ka was inundated by high tides. The spur line from Portage to Whittier was also severely dam- aged. The port facility at Whit- tier was destroyed (Kachadoorian, 1965). HIGHWAYS Most of the following informa- tion is abstracted from Grantz, P 1 a f k e r, a n d Kachadoorian (1964). Subsequent, more de- tailed studies have been made by Kachadoorian. Highway damage resulted chiefly from destruction of bridges and cracking, collapse, or differential compaction of fills that rested on unconsolidated de- posits. Estimates for repairs alone came to about $21 million (Alas- ka Construction Consultants Com- mittee, 1964). Repairs plus up- grading to higher standards may come to $55—$65 million. The Se- ward Highway was severely dam- aged between Ingram Creek and Potter, where 22 bridges were 27 (right).—Fissures in Seward High- way near The Alaska Railroad sta- tion at Portage, at head of Turnagain Arm. Many bridges were also dam- aged and at some places tectonic sub- sidence and consolidation of alluvial materials dropped both highway and railroad below high-tide levels. destroyed. Between Potter and Anchorage there were many pave- ment breaks caused by difierential subsidence of fills. Damage was light on the Richardson Highway between Glennallen and Valdez. Lurching displaced the alinement laterally at mile 69, and just out- side Valdez there were many pavement breaks where large ground cracks crossed the high- way (Coulter and Migliaccio, 1966). 28 (right).——Richardson Highway near mile 69, showing otfsets of center line stripe caused by lurching. Road em- bankment shifted to right without ap- preciable vertical offset. Chugac-h Mountains in background. 29.~One span of the Million Dollar truss bridge of the former Copper River and Northwe tern Railroad was dropped into the Copper River by the earthquake, and the other truss spans were shifted on their piers. 30.—Twentymile River Bridge near Turnagain Arm of Cook Inlet. The bridge fell into the river and some of the wood piles were driven through the reinforced concrete deck. The adjacent steel railroad bridge (upper right) survived with only minor damage. Both bridges were founded on thick deposits of soft alluvium and tidal flat mud and were subjected to severe seismic vibration. owninmmxiéfliiisf“we: ; The partly completed Copper River Highway was severely dam— aged from Allen glacier to Cor- dova. Nearly every bridge along the route was seriously damaged or destroyed, including the fa- mous Million Dollar Bridge. North from Anchorage the Glenn Highway received mostly minor damage. Part of the high- way, however, was inundated by high tides near Eklutna, and the piers of the Knik River Bridge were damaged. Damage was light on the Sterling Highway between Moose Pass and Homer, except that a bridge was destroyed across the outlet of Kenai Lake (McCulloch, 1966). At Homer, about 41/2 miles of road along Homer Spit was inundated by high tides and damaged by waves and currents. Homer Spit sub- sided 4—6 feet during the earth- quake (Waller, 1966; Stanley in Waller, 1966) . Near Kodiak, highways were severely damaged by sea waves and by tectonic subsidence. ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS AIRPORTS Damage to airports was rela- tively minor, although loss esti- mates totaled about $3.3 million (Alaska Construction Consultants Committee, 1964). Greatest dam- age was at Anchorage Interna- tional Airport, where a life was lost when the control tower col- lapsed under sustained seismic vibration and where minor dam- age was sustained by other build- ings. Also, 20,000 barrels of avia- tion fuel was lost from a ruptured storage tank. Runways and taxi strips were only slightly damaged. At Elmendorf Air Force Base just north of Anchorage, the con- trol tower wasdamaged by cracks from its base to a height of about 15 feet. In Cordova, Homer, Ko- diak Naval Station, Seldovia, Se— ward, and Valdez, damage to run- ways and taxi strips was mostly light. 31 (right).—An indication of the vio- lence of the surge-waves that struck Whittier. 30 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 . ":1m 1 ego-C" “\§ pm .. & 33.-—Fire, wave, and submarine slide damage to railroad and port facilities at Whittier. PORTS AND HARBORS Water transportation is one of Alaska’s vital links with the out- side world and is the base for one of her major industries, commer- cial fishing. Many Alaska com- munities can be reached only by ' water or air. The severe damage to port and harbor facilities, there- fore, was a staggering blow to the State’s economy and health. More- over, destruction of The Alaska Railroad terminal and port facili~ ties at Seward and Whittier, coupled with the destruction of the highway port at Valdez, de- prived Alaska of any ice-free, all- weather ship terminals. Ports and harbors sustained heavy damage from several differ— ent causes. Damage by direct seis- mic vibration generally was sub- ordinate to other secondary causes. Submarine slides, sea W a v e s , ground cracks, fires, subsidence, and uplift all took large tolls. Hardest hit in terms of port and harbor facilities damaged or de- stroyed were Seward, Valdez, Ko- diak, Whittier, Cordova, and Ho- mer. Listed below are estimated major damage losses to ports and harbors; these figures have been gathered from several sources, but mainly from estimates by the Alaska Construction Consultant Committee (1964). Community Damage Seward _____________ $15, 375, 000 Valdez _____________ 3, 585, 000 Kodiak (excluding Naval facilities)--- 2, 165, 000 Whittier ----------- 1 5, 000, 000 Cordova ----------- 1, 645, 000 Homer ------------- 2 460, 000 Woody Island FAA Station ----------- 158, 000 Seldovia ------------ 3 25, 000 Kodiak Naval Sta- tion ------------- 11, 000, 000 1Total damage—port facilities not itemized separately. 2 Excludes $1,250,000 estimate for new small-boat harbor. 3 Estimated cost of raising canneries, commercial buildings, and boardwalk is additional $1,750,000. Submarine sliding at Seward, Valdez, and Whittier generated large local waves that added to the destruction already caused by the slides and shaking (Kacha- doorian, 1965; Coulter and Mig- liaccio, 1966; Lemke, 1966). EX- cept at Whittier, subsequent dam- age was then caused by seismic sea waves generated in the Gulf of Alaska or possibly by seiches ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS (standing waves: Van Dorn, 1964, p. 166; Plafker, 1965; Plafker and Mayo, 1965). When seismic vibration sundered petroleum stor— age tanks in Seward, Valdez, and ‘Whittier, the contents quickly caught fire and added to the de- vastation. At Seward and Val- dez, burning oil that was swept into the bay by submarine sliding was carried back across the water- front by the returning surge of water; docks, piers, and small- boat harbors were thus destroyed by water and fire. At Seward, tugs, fishing boats, and a tanker were washed ashore. At Valdez, more than 40 boats were smashed. At Whittier, the railroad port fa- cilities were swept away. At Kodiak, damage was caused mostly by a succession of huge seismic sea waves, intensified by tectonic subsidence of 5—6 feet. Forty percent of the business dis- trict and many homes were 31 destroyed, as well as 30 percent of the fishing industry facilities and most of the fishing fleet (Tudor, 1964, table 1 and p. 41). Some vessels were washed several city blocks inland where they collided with buildings and houses like great battering rams. At Kodiak Naval Station more than $11 mil- lion damage was inflicted on buildings, materials, and equip- ment by 80-foot sea waves and by subsidence (Tudor, 1964, fig. 3). Piers were covered by 10 feet of water, and the buoyed-up super— structure of the cargo pier shifted off its pilings. Boat-repair shops, gear-storage buildings, and ware- houses were damaged or swept out to sea (Stroh, 1964, p. 254). Port and harbor facilities at Cordova were damaged chiefly by tectonic uplift of about 6‘ feet and subordinately b y s e a w a v e s . Although the immediate effect of uplift was to minimize wave 34.—Fire and wave damage to Seward port facilities. 32 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 damage, it placed docks and piers beyond reach of shipping during low tides. Boats were grounded in the small boat harbor, Orca Inlet shoaled, and passages through the adjacent islands became unnavig- able. Facilities at Homer were dam- aged by subsidence and submarine landsliding. Wave damage was minimal (Waller, 1966). The small-boat harbor disappeared in- to a “funnel-shaped” pool, and a lighthouse that had been on the harbor breakwater subsided into 40—50 feet of water (Grantz and others, 1964, p. 24). Homer Spit, a gravel bar that extends 5 miles into Kachemak Bay and on which various commercial buildings and storage tanks were placed, sub- sided 4—6 feet, partly by local com- paction and lateral spreading and partly by regional tectonic lower- ing (Grantz and others, 1964). During subsequent high tides, fa- cilities on the bar were inundated. Facilities at Seldovia sustained damage chiefly from subsidence. At Woody Island FAA facility outside Kodiak, docks and storage tanks were damaged by seismic sea waves and subsidence. A can- nery at Shearwater Bay was thrown off its foundations by the earthquake and later destroyed by waves. At Cape St. Elias light- house, about 135 miles southeast of the epicenter, a coastguards— man was injured by a rockslide and later drowned by seismic waves (Grantz and others, 1964, p. 6). The Port of Anchorage was damaged by ground displacements along fractures and by direct seis- mic shaking. The main pier lurched laterally 5—19 inches. It sustained large longitudinal and transverse cracks, and several buildings were cracked. Gantry 35.—Tsunamis washed many vessels into the heart of Kodiak. A section of the harbor and partly submerged breakwater can be seen in upper left. cranes on the pier were damaged when they jumped their tracks. Approach roads settled as much as 18 inches. Cement-storage tanks were toppled. Bulk petrol- eum tanks were ruptured, and large quantities of fuel were lost (Berg and Stratta, 1964, p. 44). Throughout coastal areas of the damage zone many fishing vessels and other small craft were de- stroyed by direct wave action or by being battered against docks or the shore. Boats in harbors or tied to docks were hit hardest; vessels underway in deep water were generally undamaged; one fishing boat was sunk with all hands while underway in shallow waters near Kodiak. ATMOSPHERIC EFFECTS Widespread atmospheric effects are sometimes associated with large earthquakes; some have been documented (Richter, 1958, p. 128; Benioff and Gutenberg, 1939, p. 421; Van Dorn, 1964, p. 174). An atmospheric pressure wave attributed to the Alaskan earthquake was recorded by mi- crobarographs at Scripps Insti- tute 'of Oceanography at La J olla, Calif, more than 2,000 miles from the epicenter, and at the Univer- sity of California at Berkeley (Van Dorn, 1964, p. 174; Christ- ensen and Bolt, 1964, p. 1208). This wave must have passed un- noticed at many other stations. It resembled air waves previously recorded from the detonation of large nuclear explosions. The wave traveled at acoustical velo- city, reaching La J olla 3 hours and 19 minutes after the onset of the earthquake (at 06:55 Gmt, March 28, 1965); it was, there- fore, the atmospheric counterpart of the seismic sea waves generated in the Gulf of Alaska. Like the seismic sea waves, the air wave ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS must have been caused by the tec- tonic uplift of the sea floor and the overlying water column. To displace the atmosphere in the form of a pressure wave, uplift must have been very rapid over a very large area, and must have coincided with the time of the most violent earth tremors (Van Dorn, 1964, p. 173—174; Plafker, 1965, p. 1680). The earthquake also generated ordinary sound waves of very low subaudible frequencies in the at- mosphere.1 These sound waves were recorded by the National Bureau of Standards at micro- phone stations in Washington, D.C., Boulder,rColo., and Boston, Mass. Sound waves were radiated by the earthquake at the epicenter and by seismic waves passing through the earth remote from the epicenter, exciting the atmo- sphere with their passage. Thus, the Rocky Mountains and the Mis- sissippi delta were local sources of sound as they vibrated with the passage of the shock. In addi- tion, Rayleigh waves (surface seismic waves) crossing the con- tinent displaced the ground sur- face about 2 inches in the conter- minous United States and pro- duced strong subaudible sound waves that traveled vertically up- ward to the ionosphere, amplify- ing greatly as they ascended. The ionosphere, in turn, oscillated up and down at a rate of Several hundred yards per second in mo- tions that were detected by means of reflected radio waves broadcast from one ground station to another. Atmospheric waves coupled to surface seismic waves were also recorded by a barograph at Berke- 1Reported bva. M. Young and R. K. Cook in papers presented at the meeting of the Acoustical Society of America in Washington, D.C., June 2—5, 1965. 33 ley. These waves started at Berke- ley about 14 minutes after the onset of the quake and lasted about 4 hours (Christensen and Bolt, 1964, p. 1208). Localized atmospheric effects in Alaska were related to avalanches triggered by the earthquake in the Chugach Mountains (Tuthill and Laird, 1966). Around the peri- pheries of large snow avalanches, trees were toppled by pressure blasts as the snow plummeted downward. Air blasts commonly accompany large fast-moving ' avalanches, whether such ava- lanches are triggered by earth- quakes ‘or not. The chief prere- quisite is a large cross section of dense swiftly traveling snow (or rock), and the accompanying blast may be caused both by the frontal thrust of the snow and the vacuum created by its passage (Church, 1942, p. 135). Another local efl’ect was a distribution of dust as thin coatings on glaciers adjacent to rock avalanches throughout the Prince William Sound region. POSSIBLE MAGNETIC EFFECTS Magnetic disturbances that be- gan 1 hour 4 minutes before the earthquake momentarily increased the magnetic field at Kodiak by as much as 100 gammas (Moore, 1964, p. 508). Moore has inferred a possible causal relationship be- tween the magnetic disturbances and the earthquake, and a pos- sible means, therefore, of predict- ing major earthquakes by mag- netic monitoring. Why abrupt magnetic disturbances should pre- cede an earthquake is unknown, but “one possibility is that the magnetic events which preceded the Alaska earthquake resulted from piezomagnetic effects of rocks undergoing a change in stress” (Moore, 1964, p. 509). 34 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 36.—Uplifted wave-cut sea floor at Cape Clear, Montague Island. Shows white coating of dessicated calcareous marine organisms and brown stripes or “stalks” of kelp. The stalks are about 2 feet long. BIOLOGIC EFFECTS Probably few earthquakes have so strongly affected the fauna and flora of a region as did the Alaska earthquake of 1964. Moreover, be- cause ‘of the complex interrela- tions of one organism to another, the total biologic effects will not be known for a long time. In the littoral zones of the Prince Wil- liam Sound region, of the Kenai Peninsula, Kodiak and elsewhere, large communities of organisms were adversely affected when pro- nounced crustal changes complete- ly altered the ecologic setting of the shore. Broad expanses of shore and sea bottom were ele- vated above tide water in Prince William Sound, and innumerable m a r i n e organisms were exter- minated. Effects were equally marked in the subsided upper end of Turnagain Arm near Girdwood and Portage, where coastal marsh- lands and forest were inundated by salt water—areas that former— ly had provided winter forage for moose and nesting grounds for migratory birds. Extensive forest- ed and grassland areas on Kodiak and A f o g n a k Islands were drowned, also. Hanna (1964, p. 24) has sum- marized the biologic eifects of the earthquake in the littoral zone of Prince William Sound, and he portrays the extent of the depop- ulation in the following passage: The exposed areas spread out before the observer are many hundreds of square miles, once densely populated by a varied fauna and flora, now com- pletely desolated. Many of the great array of marine animals that you read about when you study zoology are dead. There is now no littoral zone anywhere that the land went up 10 feet or more. Most of the soft-bodied creatures had decomposed or had be- come food for birds by the time of our visit, 2 months after the earthquake, so the odor was not overpowering. The great array of living marine plants, so conspicuous along most coastlines, was gone. The Fucus had turned black from thirst; the calcareous algae were bleached white and so were the many species of green algae. The great fields of big brown kelp were gone, but the individual stalks left their stems and holdfasts, black and bent over, a menace to the unwary foot- man. In many places there were great ac- cumulations of dried starfish; and in one, the dried necks of clams formed a solid mass covering about a square yard. We left to speculation the man- ner in which these objects came to congregate. In some places a shovel could have been used to collect almost pure concentrations of small shells. Bleached remains of Bryozoa and cal- careous algae were so white that the rocky beaches rivalled the snow cov- vered adjacent mountains in bright- ness. During studies that are still in progress, G. D. Hanna and George Plafker jointly examined the dis- tribution of tectonically disturbed zones of sessile organisms. Some of these organisms, such as barna- cles and various algae, grow in response to rigorous water-depth controls, and their postearthquake vertical distribution above or be- low mean high-tide level provides a reliable measure of land dis- placement where geodetic control is unavailable (Tarr and Martin, 1912, p. 29; Plafker, 1965). Other deleterious effects on or— ganisms were caused by sea waves. ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS In addition to the enormous direct destruction caused by the waves themselves, salt water invaded many coastal lakes and destroyed, at least temporarily, the fresh- water habitat. Spawning beds for salmon in some instances were de- stroyed by siltation in river deltas. Direct kills of eggs and fry were caused by disturbance of the gravel beds of streams (Alaska Dept. Fish and Game, 1965). Fish populations were also de- stroyed when streams and lakes temporarily lost water into ground cracks, or when streams were dammed by landslides (Alaska Dept. Fish and Game, 1965). On the other hand, sub- sidence in some areas opened miles of new spawning habitat by 35 inundating previously impassable falls and velocity barriers in coastal streams. The salmon fishery is one of Alaska’s foremost resources, and the full impact of the quake on this fishery will not be realized until the matured 1964 hatch re- turns from the sea to spawn. Spawning areas for pink and chum salmon, which are intertidal spawners, received major damage in nearly all coastal sections affected by sea waves, uplift, or subsidence (Thorsteinson, 1965a). On Kodiak and Afognak Islands, moreover, the waves struck at a critical time when pink salmon fry were just moving from the spawning beds into the stream estuaries. Spawning areas for red 37.—Tectom'cally elevated shoreline, Latouche Island, Prince William Sound. Heavy white encrustation of. barnacles, topped by reddish-brown fucus, marks former mean high-water line. Uplift was about 10 feet. 36 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 and silver salmon were little affected by the earthquake (Alas— ka Dept. Fish and Game, 1965). Sport fisheries, including sal- mon, trout, char, and smelt, all were damaged by environmental disturbances, chiefly by subsi- dence, emergence, and salt-water pollution, especially in spawning areas. Vast numbers of red snapper (red rock cod) were exterminated in Port Valdez, Port Wells, and in the area between Knight Is- land, Chenega Island, and Evans Island, possibly by turbulence or sudden upwelling associated with submarine slumping, or perhaps by sudden pressure changes caused by the passage of high- amplitude surface waves (H. W. Coulter, written commun., 1965). Countless thousands of these fish, which normally are bottom dwell- ers in deep water, were left float- ing dead at the surface (.Grantz and others, 1964, p. 13; Hanna, 1965, p. 25; Coulter and Migliac- cio, 1966). Mortalities of dungeness crab were noted in the Copper River delta area after the earthquake, but the commercial catch appears to have been unaffected. King Crab, a deeper water species, ap- parently was not significantly affected by the earthquake. Although the total crab popula- tion itself was not markedly affected by the earthquake, the crab industry was severely dam- aged by the loss of boats, gear, harbor facilities, and canneries. The loss of fishing vessels amount- ed to about $7 million and of re- lated facilities to about $13 mil- lion. To some extent the loss was offset on the market by unusually heavy catches of crab during the 1964 season, so that the cran harvest was actually larger than usual (Office 'of Emergency Plan- ning, 1964a, p. 23). Much of the commercial clam habitat in Prince William Sound and in the Copper River delta was damaged or destroyed (Alas— ka Dept. Fish and Game, 1965, p. 52). The estimated total loss of clam habitat in the sound was 43 percent, and the reduction in the amount of commercially accessi- ble clam habitat was 31 percent. (More recent observations by G. D. Hanna, oral commun., 1965, led him to believe that the clam mortality was closer to 90 per- cent.) In the Copper River delta and vicinity there was a high mortality of razor clams, duck clams, and cockles. At the Cor- dova small-boat harbor, for ex- ample, the loss of commercial size cockles was about 3.6 per square foot. Razor clams were extermin- ated on the higher bars of the Copper River delta. The mortal- ity of duck clams was as high as 324 per square foot in the Martin River Slough on the east side of the Copper River delta. Duck clams are an important food for sea ducks, divers, and other birds, as well as for the starry flounder. Recovery of clams as a commer- cial resource is expected to be slow. Many of the new beach areas are now unsuited for clam habitat. In suitable areas, more- over, reseeded clams will require 8 to 12 years of growth before reaching commercial size (Alaska Dept. Fish and Game, 1965, p. 52). . The effects of the earthquake on terrestrial wildlife are mixed, and some short-term effects have even been beneficial. Again, only time will disclose the long-term effects. In the mountains, some mountain goats are reported. to have been killed by avalanches, and there probably was some mortality among mountain sheep, deer, and moose. Although uplift adversely affected shellfish habi- tats, it favorably altered nesting habitats of ducks, geese, and trumpeter swans by eliminating flood dangers. The long-term ecol- ogy may be less favorable—a new balance will be established as brush gradually invades upland areas and emergent vegetation spreads over former mudflats; nesting places will shift accord- ingly (Olson, 1964; J. W. Brooks, Director, Div. Game, Alaska Dept. Fish and Game, written commun. to US. Bureau Commercial Fish- eries, Jan. 12, 1965). In tecton— ically subsided areas where ex- tensive fresh-water marshlands and meadows have been invaded by salt water, populations of moose and other grazing animals will have to readjust downward to the new restricted food supply. DAMAGE OUTSIDE ALASKA Secondary damage effects of the earthquake reached far beyond Alaska as seismic sea waves gen- erated on the continental shelf in the Gulf of Alaska spread rapidly a c r o s s the Pacific Ocean to Hawaii, Japan, and Antarctica. The source mechanism of the waves has been investigated by Van Dorn (1964), who concluded that the waves were caused by the sudden displacement of water in the Gulf of Alaska, accompany- ing the uplift of thousands of square miles of sea floor. A maxi- mum wave height of 4 feet was reported in the Antarctic Penin- sula (Palmer Peninsula), but heights in Japan Were only a foot or so (Van Dorn, 1964, p. 187). Hilo, Hawaii, had a 7 -foot wave, but received only minor damage. Apparently the source was direc- tional, the waves radiating pre- ferentially southeastward. Wave heights thus were greater along ° the North American coast than they were in the Aleutian Islands at comparable distances from the source. As the train of sea waves ad- vanced southward it spread dam— age in British Columbia, VVash— ington, Oregon, and California. Heavy damage was localized in Alberni and Port Alberni, BC, in Hot Springs Cove, BC, and in Crescent City, Calif. (US. Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1964a, p. 40). At Alberni and Port Alber- ni, damage to houses and a forest- industries complex totaled several million dollars; 260 houses were damaged, 60 heavily. Of the 17 homes at Hot Springs Cove, 5 were washed away and 10 were heavily damaged. The coast of Washington was damaged lightly. In Grays Har— bor County, the waves destroyed a bridge across the Copalis River and overturned several trailer houses (Tudor, 1964, p. 4). The Oregon coast was struck by 10- to 14-foot waves. Damage was concentrated in estuaries; a family of four was drowned at De Poe Bay. A-t Seaside, where a trailer park was flooded as water backed up the Necanicum River, damaged totalled about $250,000. At Cannon Beach, damages total- led $250,000; power and telephone services were cut off and several houses were toppled off their foundations. At Gold Coast, docks and small boats were smashed in the Rogue River (Tudor, 1964, p. 4). At Coos Bay, an initial wave 10 feet above mean high water was attenuated by crossing wide tidal flats before it reached Pony Point 7 miles up the channel, but at Florence an 8-foot. wave travel- ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS ing up a narrow channel was negligibly dissipated (Schatz and others, 1964, p. 231). In California, minor harbor damage was sustained as far south as San Diego where small craft were destroyed and dock installa- tions were damaged. In San Francisco Bay, water surging through the Golden Gate set adrift a ferry boat and a house boat, and caused about $1 million damage to small boats and berth- ing facilities at San Rafael. At San-ta Cruz, a 35-foot floating dredge was set adrift and a 38- foot power cruiser was crushed (Tudor, 1964, p. 4). At Crescent City, which bore the brunt of wave damage in Cali- fornia, 12 lives were lost despite a 1-hour tsunami warning. Eight boats were sunk, 3 are unaccount- ed for, and 15 capsized. Docks, harbor facilities, and the seawall were heavily damaged. Fifty- four homes were destroyed, 13 were heavily damaged, and 24 were slightly damaged. Forty- two small business buildings were destroyed, 118 were heavily dam— aged, and 29 were slightly dam- aged. Fires were started by the rupture and explosion of 5 bulk— storage oil tanks (Tudor, 1964, p. 61—64). The fifth seismic sea wave to arrive at Crescent City caused most of the damage and took all 12 lives. After the first wave crested at 14.5 feet above mean low low water (MLLW), a sec- ond wave slacked off to 12 feet, followed by two much smaller waves. The townspeople, think— ing that the tsunami was over, had begun to return to the flood- 37 ed area when the fifth wave— coming in on a high tide—crested at 20.5 feet above MLLW. Seiches were generated in var- , ions places remote from Alaska by amplification of direct seismic vi- brations (Donn, 1964, p. 261). In the Gulf of Mexico ofl“ Texas— completely separated physically from any possible effects of tsu- manis—waves as much as 6 feet high damaged small craft. In addition, water was agitated in many swimming pools in Texas and Louisiana (US. Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1964, p. 41). Sur- face-water gages recorded fluctua- tions in Texas, Louisiana, Arkan- sas, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennes- see, Alabama, Georgia, and Pennsylvania (Waller and others, 1965, p. 130). The ground-water regimen was affected throughout much of North A m e r i c a . Water—level fluctuations were noted in wells t h r o u g h o u t the conterminous United States and at points as distant as Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Denmark. Fluctua— tions of as much as 6 cm were re- corded in wells in Denmark (R. C. Vorhis, w r i t t e n commun., 1965). The maximum reported fluctuation was 23 feet in a well at Belle F ourche, S. D. Fluctua- tions apparently were greatest in a broad belt extending southeast from South Dakota and Wiscon— sin, through Missouri and Illinois, and on through Georgia and Florida to Puerto Rico (Waller and others, 1965, p. 131). Most level changes in wells were tem- porary, but some were permanent. The water in some wells was tem- porarily muddied. 38 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 INVESTIGATIONS BY THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY Within hours after the March 27 Alaska earthquake, the Geo- logical Survey had begun to as- semble a force of scientists at the scenes of the disaster in south— central Alaska. To cope with the many problems produced by a disaster of such magnitude, a wide spectrum of capability was need- ed, and the energies of many agen- cies—public and private—were called into play. A sizable need could be filled only by geologists, whose background and training equipped them to solve problems outside the competence of other professional groups. In addition to the massive purely scientific efl'ort called for, geologists were able to assist the stricken Alas- kans not only during the emer- gency of the immediate after- math of the earthquake, but also during the more time-consuming tasks of restoring long-term eco- nomic health. Specialized know- ledge was needed to help evaluate damage in terms of geologic en- vironments and to assure ade- quate remedial measures when re- storing damaged properties. Areas of enduring geologic hazard or po- tential future hazard had to be outlined so that, within the limits of human judgment, recurrences of the March'27 disaster could be avoided. Quick answers were needed to questions Whose diversity spanned the width and breadth of the geological sciences. Much recon- struction work hinged on proper solutions to many geologic prob- lems and proper answers to such geologic questions as: What was the pattern of sea-level changes By WALLACE R. HANSEN throughout coastal southern Alas- ka, and how would it affect, for example, the restoration of har- bor facilities? What was the outlook for fisheries? What were the short-term and long-term effects on water supply, both sur- face and underground? How was devastation related to ground con- ditions, and how could past mis- takes be avoided in the future? What soil environments were susceptible to landsliding, could existing slides be stabilized, and could future slides be avoided? What areas could be considered safe for restoration or repair? In slide areas? Along water- fronts? What safeguards were needed to protect the Federal Government in granting emer- gency repair loans? What steps were needed to restore damaged railroad facilities? Highways and bridges? Where could suit- able supplies of embankment material and riprap be obtained? These and countless other ques- tions pressed on the minds of geologists and laymen alike. For Geological Survey person— nel headquartered in Alaska or already assigned to Alaskan re- search, the earthquake investiga- tion was in some ways a logical extension of their program. But in other ways, and to other par- ticipants, the earthquake meant postponing important but less pressing duties. George 0. Gates, former Chief of the Alaskan Branch of the Survey, was early named coordin- ator at the Washington level of all Geological Survey studies on the earthquake. He shuttled between \Vashington, Alaska, and his headquarters in Menlo Park, Calif, until the fall of 1964, co- ordinating intra-Survey groups, keeping in touch with other Fed- eral agencies, and, in particular, planning the activities of far- flung field parties in Alaska. When the Survey’s activities had progressed to the stage of report preparation, his coordination du- ties were transferred to Edwin B. Eckel. As described in “The Work of the Scientific and Engineering Task Force: Earth Science Ap- plied to Policy Decisions in Early Relief and Reconstruction}? (p. 46), the Geological Survey played an important part in the Federal Reconstruction and De- velopment Planning Commission for Alaska, from its inception until October 1964. G. Donald Eberlein and Ernest Dobrovolny served as Geological Survey rep- resentatives on the Commission’s Scientific and Engineering Task Force in Washington, and Dobro- volny and Eckel served on the Task Force’s Field Team in Alaska, with Eckel as chairman of that group. Though paid and supported by the Geological Sur— vey, these men were directly re— sponsible to the chairman of the Commission. With their col- leagues from the US. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, they played significant roles in advis- ing all Federal agencies involved in the problem as to where Fed- eral funds should or should not be spent on reconstruction or on land stabilization. INVESTIGATIONS BY THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 39 Survey personnel headquartered within the damage zone of Alas- ka, after seeing to the safety and welfare of their families, faced the tasks of cleaning house and picking up after the earthquake; at the same time they attempted to meet the formidable chal- lenges of the earthquake itself and the increased level of opera- tions necessitated by the earth- quake. For some personnel this meant finding new office space to replace quarters destroyed by the quake. By Monday morning following the earthquake, the administra- tive staff of T. B. Ball, manage- ment officer at Anchorage, had contacted all local units of the Geological Survey, had obtained estimates of the situation from each, and had provided Wash- ington with an evaluation of dam— age to property and facilities. A local base of operations was estab~ lished in one of the undamaged offices, temporary space was ob« tained as needed, and salvage operations were begun. Through- out the succeeding months, Ball and his staff and the staff of the local Ground Water Branch pro- vided administrative support for all Geological Survey visitors and assignees, plus the Field Team of the Scientific and Engineering Task Force of the Federal Re- construction and Planning Com- mission for Alaska. Even while cleanup work was in progress, technical investiga~ tions were underway. On Monday following the earthquake, a start was made on a continuing pro- gram of water-well monitoring throughout the damage zone. J. L. Morgan visited and reset all automatic water—level recorders in the Anchorage area. Three of seven recorders were out of opera tion. Marked drops in artesian pressure levels were noted. On 231—821 0—66—4 Tuesday, daily water-level meas- urements were started in Anchor— age, Chugiak, and the Matanuska Valley. Surface Water Branch personnel stationed in Palmer ver« ified streamfiow losses at Anchor- age, and on Wednesday, recon noitered streams and lakes in the Chugach Mountains for possible earthquake effects. Less than 24 hours after the earthquake, Arthur Grantz, George Plafker, and Reuben Kachadoorian arrived at Anchor- age to begin a reconnaissance study of the whole stricken area. These geologists had many years of experience in southern Alaska and a detailed knowledge of much of the affected area. Their investigations took them by plane, helicopter, car, and boat to virtually all parts of the affected area. Their study was directed toward outlining the entire prob— lem in such a way that a prelim- inary view of the effects of the earthquake would be readily avail- able on which to base later and more detailed investigations. Their reconnaissance thus pro- vided first-hand information for subsequent workers, and their pre- liminary report, “Alaska’s Good Friday Earthquake, March 27, 1964” (US. Geol. Survey Circ. 491), published one month after the earthquake, was immediately in great demand. The first print- ing was quickly exhausted and several subsequent printings were necessary. Grantz, Plafker, and Kacha- doorian were the vanguard of a staff of geologists who soon began to arrive. Roger M. Wal- ler assumed the duties of Field Coordinator of Geologi- cal Survey activities at An- chorage. Harold E. Thomas and Charles H. Hembree recon- noitered the hydrologic effects. Ernest Dobrovolny and Robert D. Miller made an extended stay at Anchorage. Henry W. Coulter went to Valdez and Richard W. Lemke went to Seward. A very brief reconnaissance of Valdez had already been made by Robert M. Chapman of Fairbanks. George W. Moore arrived at Kodiak to begin a study of earthquake effects on Kodiak Island. Roger Waller, as Field Coordin- ator, had gained through pre- vious administrative experience in Alaska extensive knowledge of Alaska geology, hydrology, and geography. While in charge of the Ground Water Branch office in Anchorage, Waller had prepared, or shared authorship on, several reports on the geology and ground-water conditions in the greater Anchorage area. During and after his tour of duty as Field Coordinator, Waller made hydro- logic studies of the stricken area and studied the overall effects of the earthquake on the community of Homer on the Kenai Peninsula, where slides and subsidence had curtailed the sea- and tourist- based economy. Robert Miller and Ernest Do- brovolny had written a Geological Survey bulletin on the surficial geology of the Anchorage area, published in 1959, in which earth- quake warnings were sounded and potentially unstable areas were noted. Dobrovolny also had pre- vious experience in the Chilean earthquake. While in Anchorage, Miller and Dobrovolny attended many open meetings with local groups and officials, issuing reas- surances or words of caution, as appropriate. They served as informal consultants to many groups and agencies, including homeowner groups, urban plan- ners, structural engineers, the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the _ Air Force. Meanwhile, they began their own study of land- slides and the relationships be— tween ground conditions and prop- erty damage in the devastated parts of Anchorage. Richard Lemke, who had made earthquake evaluation studies in south-central Chile, began com- prehensive studies in Seward where slides, sea waves, fires, and ground cracks had practically wiped out the town’s economy. Very little geologic work had been done in the Seward area, and in order to evaluate earthquake ef- fects at Seward, Lemke first had to reconnoiter the general geologic setting of Seward before he could map in detail the geology of the city itself. During his stay at Seward, Lemke was an informal consultant to the city, the Alaska Department of Highways, and the Corps of Engineers. He also served as an advisor to urban planning and renewal groups and ? to the contractors of the Corps of Engineers. Henry Coulter, having recently finished mapping the geology of the Valdez quadrangle, evaluated the earthquake damage at Valdez and made recommendations to the local authorities for reconstruction and redevelopment. The damage at Valdez was very similar to that at Seward, and the problems were much the same. Coulter’s recom— mendations led to plans to relocate Valdez in a more suitable geologic setting on the north shore of Port Valdez fiord, about 4 miles west of the present townsite. These plans are now being carried out. Coul— ter also studied the causes and ef- fects of sea waves in Port Valdez. One giant wave destroyed build— ings on shore and left high-water lines 170 feet above the fiord 10 miles west of Valdez at the Cliff mine. CH 27, 1964 Manuel G. Bonilla and David S. McCulloch arrived at Anchorage to begin studies of earthquake ef- fects along the heavily damaged Alaska Railroad. Bonilla had studied earthquake effects in Cal- ifornia and McCulloch had pre— viously done geologic mapping in Alaska. Their findings were made immediately available to The Alaska Railroad agency. They examined nearly all the railroad bridges between Anchorage and Seward, studied several landslides along the route, and mapped ground cracks in the area between Portage and Seward. Their work also included surveys of materials for riprap and roadbed fill, studies of compaction along the right-of- way, and various independent studies unrelated to the railroad at such places as Campbell Blufl' line south of Anchorage, the Seward Highway at Moose Pass, the Eklutna Power Station, and Kenai Lake. They made meas- urements at Kenai Lake to deter— mine the extent of slumping into the lake, the extent and character of high waves generated by land- slides, and the extent and charac- ter of seiching. Immediate heavy demands were placed on the Public Inquiries and Map Sales Oflices of the Geologi- cal Survey in Alaska. For weeks after the earthquake these de- mands were met entirely by the Alaska Distribution Section in Fairbanks. Sales oflices and agencies in Anchorage, Kodiak, Seward, and Valdez were put out of operation by the earthquake, and all their orders had to be filled at Fairbanks. Map sales at Anchorage had been made from the Public Inquiries Office in the Cordova Building—a building so damaged structurally that it had to be evacuated. A temporary sales office was set up by Margaret INVESTIGATIONS BY THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 41 I. Erwin in a vacant grocery store. Even at Fairbanks, maps and supplies were scattered all over the floor when racks and shelving were overturned by the earthquake. Demands were par— ticularly heavy for maps and re— ports that would be helpful in assessing land and coastal changes, in evaluating damage, and in planning rehabilitation of stricken areas. Reuben Kachadoorian in the meantime started a regional study of earthquake effects on land. With a background of 12 years experience in the engineering geology of Alaska, he made de- tailed studies of virtually all major highways in south-central Alaska, including part of the Denali Highway and the Seward, Glenn, Richardson, Edgerton, and Sterling Highways. He and George Plafker examined the Copper River Highway and the Copper River delta. He studied the highway net on Kodiak Is- land, the Matanuska flats, the Robe River flats, the Portage area, part of the Kenai Lowland, Whittier, and Kodiak. Kacha- doorian and Plafker also examin— ed the Cape Hinchinbrook Light- house Station. Kachadoorian gathered information on geology, damage to bridges and roadbeds, the water regimen, subsidence, fractures, areas of ejected sand, eyewitness accounts, and the direc— tion, duration, and type of seis— mic motion. He did reconnais- sance in the Chugach, Kenai, and Talkeetna Mountains, and in the mountains near Katalla. The US. Geological Survey research vessel Dan J. Miller, which was wintering in Seattle, was hurried to Alaskan waters for geological, geophysical, and sub— marine studies in Prince William Sound and Resurrection Bay. A party headed by George Plafker undertook a systematic study of all earthquake effects along the shorelines of the sound and of Resurrection Bay. The Miller served as the base of operations from mid-May to early July. The party included J. E. Case, L. R. Mayo, S. L. Robbins, and William Bastian, all of the Geo- logical Survey. Studies were made of vertical displacements along the shorelines resulting from crustal warping, ground breakage (surface rupture) by faults, submarine slides, the effects of destructive waves along the shorelines, distribution and nature of ground cracks, landslides and avalanches, and seismic shock damage sustained at the smaller communities and habitations throughout the sound area. Plaf— ker later extended these studies on a reconnaissance basis to the outer coast of the Gulf of Alas- ka between Yakutat and Seldovia and to the coast of the Kodiak Islands group, using a helicopter 38,—Immediate1y after the earthquake, the U.S. Geological Survey’s research vessel, the Don J. Miller, sailed to Prince William Sound. ‘3 ’\ i? s . e . Mmfia u s G I- commute 42 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 and seaplane for logistic support. Concurrently with the work in Prince William Sound, Case and Robbins made a reconnaissance gravity survey of the entire area. G. Dallas Hanna, marine biolo- gist of the California Academy of Science, spent 3 weeks with the party in Prince William Sound studying the effects of the earth- quake on the ecology of intertidal fauna and flora. Changes in dis- tribution of the fauna and flora were related in turn to tectonic changes in level of the land. Investigations of the tectonic deformation by the Geological Survey resulted in locating the only known surface faults that accompanied the earthquake, and in delineating a zone of crustal warping that for 500 miles ex- tends parallel to the coast of the Gulf of Alaska. Within this zone, uplifts of as much as 33 feet and subsidence of as much as 7 1/3, feet were noted. These investiga- tions, supplemented by the US. Coast and Geodetic Survey’s re— leveling inland from the coast and measurement of land-level changes at tide—gage stations, showed that crustal warping extends over an area of at least 70,000 square miles. Information on the changes in land level was made immedi- ately available to the US. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game in order to aid in an ap- praisal of the long—range effects of the deformation on salmon spawn- ing grounds and commercial clam beds. It also provided a basis for planning remedial measures by The Alaska Railroad, the Alaska Department of Highways, and private groups that would be re- quired to protect or restore the usefulness of shoreline structures and installations. The data on the permanent crustal warping and surface faulting are of vital scientific interest to geologists and seismologists who are concerned with the cause and mechanism of the earthquake and the destructive seismic sea waves it generated. The findings were promptly made available in a press release and in oral reports to scientific groups. James E. Case, who boarded the Dan J. Miller to record gravity variations, found a large positive anomaly nearly parallel to the zero isobase and probably associ- ated with outcrops of lower Ter- tiary greenstone. In late June, Captain Fair Bryant of the US. Coast and Geodetic Survey ship Surveyor invited David F. Barnes aboard the Surveyor while the Coast and Geodetic Survey was investigating the sea- ward end of the Montague Island fault. During the month of July, Barnes thus had an opportunity to study the seaward extension of the Knight Island anomaly. (During early 1965 he assisted Richard Malloy of the Coast and Geodetic Survey in preparing the reports on the project.) Barnes reoccupied several preearthquake gravity stations later in the sum- mer of 1964 and found that the earthquake had caused measur- able gravity changes. Widespread damage to the coastal parts of southern Alaska was caused by submarine land— slides and locally generated waves. Damage initiated by sliding was compounded by the backwash of the resulting waves, commonly while the earthquake was still in progress. Much prop— erty was thus destroyed and many lives were lost. The effects of the . l . \ l ,\ I. \ \\ x\\\:\ \\\\\ -\ \\\\ '1 ' $7“ jg?) r , ‘ ¥ 7!, INVESTIGATIONS BY THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 43 sliding at the port cities of Sew- ard, Valdez, and Homer were recognized in the initial recon— naissance phase of the investiga- tion. More detailed studies of shoreline damage carried out aboard the Miller indicated that submarine landslides and their accompanying destructive waves were widespread phenomena. The 13 deaths and the damage at the port of Whittier also were caused by local waves generated by sub- marine landslides. The efl'ects of comparable local waves, some of which reached altitudes of 170 feet along the shoreline, were noted throughout the sparsely settled Prince William Sound area and the south coast of the Kenai Peninsula. In early July, Gene A. Rusnak, a marine geologist of the Geolog- ical Survey, equipped the Miller with precision electronic sound- ing gear, bottom-sampling appa- ratus, and seismic equipment (son- oprobe) and began a program of submarine geological and geo- physical study of the slide areas and their resulting deposits on the sea floor. He was assisted in the investigations, which were carried out in July and August, by D. S. McCulloch, L. R. Mayo, and L. L. Benton, Jr. Clifford A. Kaye and Wallace R. Hansen joined the field team at Anchorage. As a consultant to the Scientific and Engineering Task Force of the Federal Recon- struction and Planning Commis- sion for Alaska, Kaye contributed his special knowledge of soil mechanics and clay properties. He also collaborated with Hansen and Miller in landslide studies. Edwin B. Eckel followed shortly to take over the leadership of the field team of the Task Force, a position which Dobrovolny had held on an interim basis. Dobrov- olny and Eckel now devoted full time to their fast-increasing du- ties on Task Force Nine. To obtain quantitative evalua- tions of landslides and ground displacements, Arthur Gervais, Jack R. Helm, and Alfred B. Dodd, topographic engineers, spent 3 weeks at Anchorage work- ing closely with Hansen and Mil- ler; they surveyed precision pro- files across landslides, prepared planetable maps, and established ground control for photogram— metric mapping. Large—scale top- ographic maps of the Turnagain Heights, Government Hill, and Native Hospital landslides were subsequently prepared in Denver, C010,, by photogrammetric meth- ods. 44 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, Regional efiects of the earth— quake in the Cook Inlet area were analyzed by Thor N. V. Karl- strom, assisted by Helen L. Fos- ter. Karlstrom had a detailed knowledge of this area, having spent many seasons of study along Cook Inlet in connection with his Alaskan terrain and permafrost studies. His earthquake evalua— tions covered all phases of the problem as related to that area. He made detailed studies of ground breakage in the Kenai Lowland and did widespread reconnaissance elsewhere in the inlet, noting different types of behavior in different types of ma- terials. He related the regional pattern of fracturing to inferred and mapped tectonic elements, and he studied ground failures in sea bluffs and associated changes in shoreline geomorphology. Miss Foster collaborated mainly in the Kenai Lowland. Previous- ly, she had investigated and re— ported on the Fukui, Japan, earth- quake of 1948. The sparsely settled Copper River basin, northeast of Prince William Sound, sustained rela- tively light, but nevertheless sig- nificant, earthquake damage. This area was examined by Oscar J. Ferrians, J r., by aerial, ground, and aerial-photograph reconnais- sance. Buildings, highways, and bridges in the lowland areas were damaged by vibrations, subsi- dence, and ground cracks. Land- slides were triggered along slopes and blufi lines, avalanches and rockslides in the mountains. Ephemeral cracking was wide- spread on frozen lakes, rivers, muskegs, and flood plains. Effects of the earthquake on glaciers in southern Alaska have been studied by Austin S. Post, as part of a continuing glaciologi- cal investigation that began in 1960. In 1960, 1961, 1963, and 1964 Post examined nearly all the glaciers in Alaska and western Canada by visual aerial inspec— tion and on aerial photographs. He found that the earthquake produced some rockfalls but no significant snow and ice ava- lanches on glaciers. Recent evi~ dence, according to Post, fails to support the widely accepted earth— quake-advance theory of Tarr and Martin that earthquake-trig- gered avalanches have caused rapid short-lived surges in Alas- kan glaciers in the past. Other photogeologic studies were made by Robert J. Hack- man, who reviewed all available postearthquake aerial photo- graphs and prepared reconnais- sance maps showing slides and avalanches. The earthquake had widespread remote hydrologic effects at places as far distant from the source as the southeastern conterminous United States, Puerto Rico, and even Denmark; both surface and underground water supplies were affected. Marked level changes were recorded in many wells and in surface-water bodies. Robert C. Vorhis undertook a study of such effects and found that many ground-water instruments faith— fully recorded the earthquake, in detail comparable to that recorded by highly sophisticated strain seismographs. Vorhis also noted two types of “permanent” ground- water level changes—instantan— eous and gradual. An outcome of early postearth- quake reconnaissance was 'a deci- sion to document on 16-mm color motion-picture film all geologic phases of the earthquake. Hal G. Stephens photographed geologic evidence of subsidence, emergence, compressive and tensive forces, vi- bration, and wave action. He re- corded types and amounts of dam- age to buildings, docks, and vari- 1964 ous other structures, and related the damage to such causes :as vi— bration, landslides, seismic and locally generated sea waves, and submarine slides. All significant parts of the damage zone were photographed from the ground or from the air. This zone included Anchorage and vicinity, the high- way between Anchorage and Val- dez, Valdez and Vicinity, the Cop- per River valley, Cordova, Ho- mer, the Kenai Peninsula, Ko— diak, Portage, Prince William Sound (where the evidence of emergence was most striking), Seward and vicinity, and Whit- tier. An edited, narrated film has been prepared. As the start of a long-term project to monitor crustal changes in southern Alaska, Robert C. Foley and Arthur Gervais estab- lished a network of permanent bench marks on the shores of 17 large lakes within about a 500— mile radius of Anchorage. These bench marks were referenced to the water levels of the lakes, so that the direction and amount of any tilting can be obtained from periodic monitoring. Thus each lake surface is analogous to a giant spirit level. Bench marks were set at the following lakes: Ugashik, Becharof, Naknek, Ili- amna, Kontrashibuna, and Clark on the Alaska Peninsula; Karluk on Kodiak Island; Crescent, Chakachamna, and Beluga at the north end of Cook Inlet; Kenai, Skilak, and Tustumena on the Kenai Peninsula; and Eklutna, George, Tazlina, and Klutina in the Chugach Mountains. One of the Geological Survey’s functions, under its Branch of Waterpower Classification, is to appraise potential hydroelectric powersites on the public lands. Several such sites on the Kenai Peninsula and in the Talkeetna Mountains had been studied by INVESTIGATIONS BY THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 45 Russell G. Wayland and David L. Gaskill some years prior to the 1964 earthquake. After the earth- quake, these sites were reexamined by Wayland and Harold L. Pumphrey to determine if the earthquake had caused any obvi— ous ground changes, such as land- slides, that might alter their classification status. The more accessible sites were visited on the ground, but others were re— examined only from the air, it being recognized that, in any event, detailed ground studies would be needed before any site could be developed. Wayland con- cluded that none of the sites was so modified by the earthquake as to invalidate the earlier prelimin— ary examinations. Geological S u r v e y investiga- tions of the great Alaska earth- quake of 1964 are still in progress and will continue for several years. New data are still being collected and processed, and new concepts are being tested and evaluated. Many level lines and bench marks must yet. be resur- veyed by the US. Coast and Geo- detic Survey, and several years, therefore, may pass before a real- ly synoptic view of regional crus- tal change can be obtained. Many geophysical data must yet be in- terpreted and related to geologic cause and response. Hydrologic changes are still in progress. Some time must pass before the permanent effects of the earth- quake on ground-water aquifers can be screened out from the t r a n s i e n t effects. Long-term effects on glaciers—minimal on most glaciers, perhaps, but great on some—will be watched with great interest. Along the rivers and on the deltas, in the bays and inlets, and along the shorelines, geomorphic changes will continue; studies of effects in these areas have only started. A clear pic- ture of ecologic effects is coming into focus, but many years will pass before all ramifications of new plant and animal relation- ships are clearly apparent. Final- ly, corollary studies are underway in Anchorage, Juneau, and in all coastal towns of southern Alaska to underline possible hazards—of the kinds generated by past earth- quakes—to the future security of these communities. Aided by ex- perience gained from the 1964 earthquake, these studies will help to establish a better relationship between local geologic settings and urban planning, zoning, and in- dustrial development in the State. 46 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 THE WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE—EARTH SCIENCE APPLIED TO POLICY DECISIONS IN RECONSTRUCTION INTRODUCTION The prompt and direct applica- tion by the Federal Government of knowledge drawn from earth scientists and engineers to the problems of reconstruction that resulted from the Alaska earth— quake of March 27, 1964, was uni- que in the history of disasters. Consequently, the story of how this knowledge was applied de— serves to be put on record, if only for study by those involved in future problems of the same sort. The Scientific and Engineering Task Force, an arm of the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska, was the vehicle for gathering en- gineering and earth—science in- formation from all available sources, for interpreting it, and for making recommendations to Federal agencies on matters that involved the stability of buildings or their foundations. The Federal Government’s part in the reconstruction effort must be described briefly in order to put the work of the Task Force in proper perspective, for the part played by the Federal Govern- ment in aiding Alaskans, begin— ning with the first throes of dis— aster and continuing throughout the reconstruction period, was very great. The full story of government participation would require sev— eral volumes, but the following 2Structural engineer, Office of Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army. Wash- ington, D.C. By EDWIN B. ECKEL and WILLIAM E. SCHAEM2 ——.— summary of the immediate re— sponse by military and civilian agencies and of the work accom- plished through a novel commis- sion established by the President to coordinate the work of all Fed- eral agencies will serve to give the necessary background here. Much of the material in the following paragraphs is based on, or quoted from, a highly significant report entitled “Response to Disaster,” prepared by the Federal Recon— struction and Development Plan— ning Commission for Alaska (1964). IMMEDIATE RESPONSE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERN- MENT While the Federal Government was organizing its relief efiort, the military gave immediate aid to the civilian community and supple— mented the help given by State and local groups and by individ- uals. Most communications sys- tems had, of course, been disrupt- ed. The first word from outlying areas, and to the rest of the United States, was sent out through a patchwork system of radio stations belonging to ham operators, fishing vessels, oil com— panies, and various State and Federal agencies. Within minutes after the earthquake, the US. Army Alaskan Command and the Elmendorf Air Force Base at Anchorage started the task of re- storing regular telephone and radio communications among the stricken towns and between them and the rest of the United States. EARLY RELIEF AND Within 3 hours, military water tanks began supplying water in Anchorage, and less than 48 hours later water-purification units had been flown in to Anchorage; other relief supplies were airlifted to isolated communities. Fort Rich- ardson and Elmendorf Air Force Base provided guard troops, served thousands of meals, and offered emergency housing. At Kodiak the Navy provided meals, blankets, and many tons of supplies, plus the services of more than 1,000 men for emergency work. Similar military aid went to nearly every inhabited place that had been hit by the earth- quake or by its aftermath of fire and flood. The day after the earthquake, in response to a request from the Governor, the President declared Alaska to be a major disaster area. This declaration meant different things to different people—rang- ing from apprehension to wild hopes of immediate and complete relief—depending on their prior experiences and the degree of shock that they lrad already ex— perienced. Actually it merely vide the immediate financial and meant that governmental machin- ery could be set in motion to pro- material help that was needed. Thus began a series of unprece- dented emergency measures execu- ted or financed by the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP). Un- der Public Law 81—875, OEP had the major responsibility for assist- ing State or local units in disaster— WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 4:7 stricken areas to make emergen- cy repairs and to restore public facilities. The authority provided by the law and substantial funds available from the President’s Di- saster Relief Fund were used speedily and effectively by OEP. The philosophy adopted was to provide assistance as broadly and flexibly as possible within the spirit and intent of Public Law 81—875. A wide range of relief and re— construction work began at once, much of it at the request of, and eventually repaid by, the Office of Emergency Planning, and some by other Federal agencies using their regular authorities and funds or special ones made avail- able by the President’s designa- tion of a disaster area. The Army Corps of Engineers contracted for debris clearance, restoration of public utilities, and repair of docks and other com- munity facilities in Anchorage, Seward, Valdez, Whittier, and elsewhere. The Navy’s Bureau of Yards and Docks aided Kodiak in the same way. The Alaska Railroad of the Department of the Interior assessed its damages and began repairs. The Bureau of Public Roads of the Department of Commerce worked with the Alaska Department of Highways to restore the highway system. The Departments of Health, Edu— cation and Welfare, Labor, Agri- culture, and Commerce, the Coast Guard of the Treasury Depart- ment, and several independent agencies also took part in the early recovery effort. These government actions, both State and Federal, were essential, but much of the success of the early work was due to fraternal, social service, religious, civic, and private business organizations and to individuals. These gr ou p s worked effectively, unselfishly, / and in complete cooperation with governmental units, yet with the heartwarming spirit of independ— ence and self help so characteristic of the people of Alaska. F E D E R A L RECONSTRUC- TION AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING COMMISSION FOR ALASKA MAKEUP AND FUNCTIONS Some means had to be found to coordinate and streamline the efforts of the many Federal agen— cies that had parts to play in the relief and rebuilding of stricken Alaska. On April 2, 1964, less than a week after the earthquake, President Johnson issued Execu— tive Order 11150 (Federal Regis- ter Doc. 64—3378), establishing the Federal Reconstruction and De— velopment Planning Commission for Alaska. This group, hereafter called the Reconstruction Com- mission, or more simply the Com— mission, was directly responsible to the President. It was composed of the heads of all Departments and independent agencies that had any direct financial or technical parts to play in the reconstruction effort. Members were: '74 2 /% a@> W’\ a LQ? \ ‘4‘ f7 /~ ‘ // Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman Secretary of Defense Secretary of the Interior Secretary of Agriculture Secretary of Commerce Secretary of Labor Secretary of Health, Educa- tion, and Welfare Director, Office of Emergen- cy Planning Administrator, Federal Avia— tion Agency Chairman, Federal Power Commission Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency Administrator, Small Busi‘ ness Administration Dwight. A. Ink was lent to the Commission by the Atomic Ener- gy Commission to serve as Execu— tive Director, Frank C. DiLuzio of Senator Anderson’s staff was named as assistant to the Chair- man, and VVilmot L. Averill of the Office of Emergency Planning was made Deputy Executive Di— rector. The remainder of the small staff, which never num- bered more than 25 people, was recruited for full or part time from the staffs of Senator Ander- 48 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, son’s Senate Committees or from some of the Commission’s con— stituent agencies. The Reconstruction Commis- sion established the Alaska Field Committee, composed of repr - sentatives of those agencies on the Commission which had offices in Alaska. Burke Riley, Regional Coordinator, Department of the Interior, was chairman of the Field Committee. This group pro- vided effective coordination at field level for problems which cut across agency lines. The Alaska Field Committee also worked closely and to advantage with the parallel State group established by the Governor—the Alaska Re- construction and Development Planning Commission, headed by Joseph II. Fitzgerald, Coordinator. The Commission was unique in several significant respects. First, it was the first Federal commis- sion of this kind that combined the legislative and executive arms of government. Second, by its very composition as well as by the wording of the Executive order, decisions reached by the Commission had the effect of Presidential orders on all con— stituent agencies. Lastly, the Commission probably set a rec— ord by terminating its existence as soon as its major tasks were accomplished. Established on April 2, 1964, it was complete— ly dissolved 6 months later by Executive Order 11182 on Octo- ber 6, 1964. The functions of the Commis- sion, as defined by the Executive order were as follows: Sec. 2. Functions of the Commission. (a) The Commission shall develop co- ordinated plans for Federal programs which contribute to reconstruction and to economic and resources devel- opment in Alaska and shall recom- mend appropriate action by the Fed- eral Government to carry out such plans. (b) When the Governor of Alaska has designated representatives of the State of Alaska for purposes related to this order, the Commission shall cooperate with such representatives in accomplishing the following: (1) Making or arranging for sur- veys and studies to provide data for the development of plans and programs for reconstruction and for economic and resources development in Alaska. (2) Preparing coordinated plans for reconstruction and economic and re- sources development in Alaska deemed appropriate to carry out existing stat- utory responsibilities of Federal, State. and local agencies. Such plans shall be designed to promote optimum bene— fits from the expenditure of Federal, State. and local funds for consistent objectives and purposes. (3) Preparing recommendations to the President and to the Governor of Alaska with respect to both short- range and long-range programs and projects to be carried out by Federal, State, or local agencies, including rec- ommendations for such additional Fed- eral or State legislation as may be deemed necessary and appropriate to meet reconstruction and development needs. DUTIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS The Reconstruction Commis- sion’s varied duties and accom— plishments can be grouped under four general headings: (1) esti— mates of damage and the work required for reconstruction, (2) drafting of special legislation, (3) initiation, scheduling, and co— ordination of reconstruction and financial relief, and (4) long- range economic planning and rec— ommendations. ESTIMATES OF DAMAGE First estimates of the amount and nature of damages sustained by Alaska were made by many State, Federal, and local agencies within a few hours or days after the earthquake. These estimates were soon followed by more com- prehensive ones. In addition to analyses of their own installations made by such agencies as the De— 1964 partment of Defense, the Alaska Department of Highways, and The Alaska Railroad, a broad study was made by the Alaskan Construction Consultants Commit- tee—a group appointed by the chairman of the Commission. This committee, whose members were drawn from the Associated Gen- eral Contractors of America and the International Union of Op- erating Engineers, inspected the damage to private and public property, reviewed the manpower situation, and reported its esti- mates of damage to the Commis— sion (Alaskan Construction Con- sultant Comm., 1964). The Alas- ka State Housing Authority co- operated with the Fedenal Hous- ing and Home Finance Agency in estimating damages to private real property. Under sponsorship of the Commission, the American Institute of Architects and the Engineers Joint Council also established a team to advise the Commission and the Governor both as to reconstruction plans and the long-range development program (Am. Inst. Architects and Engineers Joint Council Comm., 1964). Based on these and other sources, the Commission’s esti- mate of damages, as of August 12, 1964, is shown in table 2. In addition to estimates of the dollar values of damaged proper— ties, it was essential to the plan‘ ning of a rebuilding program that the nature of the landslides and submarine slides that had caused much of the damage be under- stood in detail. To this end the Office of Emergency Planning financed and greatly expedited an intensive program of soils inves- tigations. The program was con- ducted by the Corps of Engineers in Anchorage, Seward, Valdez, and Homer. The results of these studies, plus the results of the WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 49 TABLE 2.——Summary of estimated damages, August 12, 1964 [Condensed from Federal Reconstruction and Devel. Plan. Comm. Alaska, 1964, p. 11] Public Property : Federal : Military ___________________ Nonmilitary ________________ Non-Federal: State and local ______________ Highways __________________ Private property : Real _________________________ Personal _____________________ $35,610,000 35,641,000 107,373,000 155,568,000 $234, 192, 000 77, 000, 000 No estimate. —————— 77, 000, 000 Total damage, excluding personal property and loss of income ____________ 311,192,000 e 1 Includes all highways on Federal-aid system; highways to be restored to preearthquak condition. Estimated cost of highway construction to 1964 design standards is $65,088,000. seismic engineering and geologic investigations that were carried on by the US. Coast and Geodetic Survey and the US. Geological Survey, respectively, formed the basis for the recommendations made to the Commission by the Scientific and Engineering Task Force, whose activities are de- scribed below. SPECIAL LEGISLATION It was apparent that Alaska would require even more aid than could be provided under existing programs or legislative authori- ties. The Commission, therefore, took a leading part in working with the Bureau of the Budget, with its own constituent agencies and those of the State, and with the Congress in preparing needed legislation. Two principal legislative ac— complishments resulted. The first accomplishment was a request from the President for extension of his authorization to provide transitional grants to Alaska. When Alaska became a State in 1959, Congress provided transi- tional grants of $28.5 million to help the State assume the respon- sibilities for public services that had earlier been provided to the Territory by the Federal Govern- ment. It was obvious that earth- quake damages would lead direct- ly to cuts in tax bases and other sources of revenue. The Congress agreed with the need for con— tinuance of the transitional—grants policy and appropriated about $41 million, for the period ending June 30, 1966, to be used to carry on essential State and local serv- ices. The Commission’s second large accomplishment in the legislative field was the drafting of the Alas- ka Omnibus Bill (S. 2881 and H. R. 11438, 88th Cong, 2d Sess.), which was transmitted to the Congress on May 27, 1964, was later passed with several sig- nificant amendments, and became law 011 August 19, 1964. The Omnibus Bill provided for many changes in existing laws so that a maximum of disaster aid could be provided in a minimum of time. Among the more sig- nificant items were the following: 1. The Federal Share of Federal- aid highway costs was in- creased from 50 percent to 94.9 percent. 2. The Corps of Engineers was authorized to modify civil works projects, such as ex- pansion of small-boat har- bors, to meet prospective fu- ture requirements. 3. Certain lending agencies were authorized to adjust the in- debtedness of borrowers. 4. The Housing and Home Fi— nance Administration was authorized to contract for as much as $25 million for urban renewal projects; the Federal share of the partici- pation was increased from 75 percent to 90 percent. 5. The Federal Government was authorized to purchase as much as $25 million of State of Alaska bonds. 6. The President was authorized to grant a total of $5.5 mil- lion to the State, 011 a 50— 50 matching basis, to adjust or retire mortgage obliga- tions on family dwellings. RECONSTRUCTION PLANS AND SCHEDULING The Commission also played a leading part in drawing up plans and schedules for reconstruction, in coordinating the work of Fed- eral, State, and local agencies, and in expediting actual work schedules. The plans had to take cognizance of the fact that the normal construction season in Alaska is very Short and that there were immediate needs that must be met. On the other hand, it. was considered undesirable to put all reconstruction work on a crash basis, for this would have tended toward price inflation and importation of non-Alaskan labor, both of which would have weak- ened the Alaskan economy. For these reasons, efi'orts were made to compromise between the needs for immediate high-priority work and the desire to stretch out the reconstruction on projects of 50 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 lower priority. Despite these com- promises, however, the Commis- sion emphasized speed throughout its work, both in releasing a flow of funds to bolster the economy and in the physical reconstruction of facilities. Emergency repairs to utilities and highways were of course given first priority. The exten- sive geologic and soils investiga— tions that were needed as a basis for reconstruction plans at An- chorage, Seward, Valdez, and elsewhere were next in priority. Engineering design of reconstruc— tion projects followed closely; preliminary designs, indeed, paral- leled basic soils investigations in some places. Finally, bids were examined and contracts awarded. In addition to aiding in the re- construction of utilities and other public properties, it was essential that the Federal Government help strengthen the State’s economy by providing all possible aid and en— couragement to private individ— uals and business groups—from the individual homeowner to the lending institutions. In this work the Commission again played an important part. Normal disaster— aid policies were liberalized and expedited; longer term loans at lower interest rates were per- mitted, and owners who had lost their properties or suffered ex- tensive damages were released from all or part of their debts to the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Veterans Ad- ministration, and the Small Busi- ness Administration. Further re- lief was provided by income-tax deductions and rebates based on property losses. Rebates were ex- pedited by the Internal Revenue Service by the use of the risk maps prepared by the Scientific and Engineering Task Force, de- scribed below, that is, properties within the “high-risk” areas, as designated by the Task Force, were automatically assumed to have suffered losses; hence rebates could be made immediately and without further investigation. LONG-RANGE ECONOMIC PLANNING Even though the Commission was preoccupied with immediate problems of reconstruction, it could not lose sight of the long- term needs of Alaska. To this end, and to the extent possible under applicable law, it gave its backing to construction of facili- ties that were more modern, larger, or safer than would have been called for by reconstruction of facilities merely to their pre- earthquake condition. For exam- ple, it recommended the recon- struction of rail facilities at Se- ward, the rebuilding of highways to modern design standards, the complete relocation of the town of Valdez, and the enlargement of several small-boat harbors. The Commission also made a series of strong recommendations for more research on scientific and engineering subjects, designed to aid in the prediction and under- standing of earthquakes and their effects, hence to provide better safeguards to the public in the event of future earthquakes, whether in Alaska or elsewhere. FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE The Federal financial assist- ance that was made available by the Alaska Omnibus Bill and by existing legislation is shown in table 3. TABLE 3.—Estimaled Federal assistance to Alaska after March 27, 1964, earthquake [Slightly condensed from Federal Reconstructitin and Dcvel. Plan. Comm. Alaska, 1964, p. 20 Millions afdollars Federal aid to State and local governments: Disaster relief ______________ Transitional grants ___________ Highways __________________ Urban renewal grants _________ Purchase of Alaska bonds _____ Planning advances ___________ 60— 70 17— 23. 5 43— 63 25'— 40 10— 25 . 3— 0. 5 155. 3—222. 0 Federal aid to private individuals and groups: Loans by Small Business Administration, Depts. of Interior, Agriculture _______ ___________________ 60 —70 Forgiveness and other adjustments on outstanding loans _____________________ Tax refunds and offsets _______ ___________________ 7—10 __________________ 20—30 87 —110 Restoration of Federal facilities and direct Federal opera- tions : Defense facilities ____________ The Akaska Railroad ________ All other Federal agencies- _ _ _ Total (rounded) ___________ ___________________ 35. 6 ___________________ 19. 6 325-414 WORK OF THE The fact that the estimated funds made available for recon- struction by the Federal Govern- ment exceed the estimates of dam- age caused by the earthquake is in part due to the provisions to upgrade some facilities—such as highways and small—boat basins—— to better than preearthquake con- dition. In part it also means that the damage estimates do not in— clude losses of personal property and income, whereas these were covered in various ways in au- thorizations for assistance. What— ever the specific reasons, however, it is generally recognized that the Federal Government must con- tinue to aid in Alaska’s economic development for some years to come. The earthquake of 1964, disastrous though it was, can thus be thought of as actually having given impetus to government po- licies and philosophies that were already in being. TERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION The Reconstruction Commis- sion was dissolved by Executive Order 11182 (Federal Register Doc. 64—10178) on October 6, 1964. In its place the President estab- lished a Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska, to be headquartered in Alaska, and a President’s Re— view Committee for Development Planning in Alaska, with the Secretary of Commerce designated as Chairman. The same Executive Order transferred to the Direc- tor of the Office of Emergency Planning the residual functions of the Reconstruction Commission with respect to earthquake recon- struction. So long as the Presi— dent’s declaration of a major earthquake disaster remained in effect, the Office of Emergency Planning was given responsibility of “developing coordinated plans SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE .” ,/ ’/, ‘ _ // f,.,,”/;///W” / ,‘ ,, Wm \ \g x"II/m” I ////”I 51 for Federal programs which con- tribute to reconstruction in Alas- ka and recommending appropri- ate action by the Federal Govern— ment to carry out such plans.” SCIENTIFIC AND ENGI- NEERING TASK FORCE AND ITS FIELD TEAM HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES From the standpoint of the earth sciences and their applica— tion to the reconstruction prob- lems of Alaska, one of the most significant of the Commission’s actions was the establishment of the Scientific and Engineering Task Force. On April 7, 1964, shortly after the Federal Recon- struction and Development Plan- ning Commission for Alaska was established, it appointed eight special task forces; later it added a ninth one, which is the subject of this section. Each task force was composed of representatives from selected Federal agencies and each was to assist the Com- mission in developing coordinated plans in a single area of study. The original task forces were: 1. Community facilities Economic stabilization Financial institutions Housing . Industrial development . Natural resources . Ports and fishing . Transportation 9: to t“ macaw It became evident that a ninth task force was needed to advise the Commission on those aspects of geology, soils, and related en- gineering knowledge that had a bearing on reconstruction plans. 011 April 25, 1964, the Commis— sion’s chairman, Senator Ander- son, established the Scientific and Engineering Task Force. This group, which became better and more simply known in Alaska and Washington as Task Force 9, was one of the more active among the Commission’s task forces. Its rec— ommendations played a significant 52 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 part in guiding reconstruction de- cisions in Anchorage, Seward, Homer, Valdez, and Kodiak. Its basic charter follows: The first objective of the Scientific and Engineering Task Force is to ad- vise the Commission immediately as to the physical parameters in Alaska which should be considered in connec- tion with reconstruction, on the basis of information available now. These recommendations will be submitted to the Commission in a form applicable to reasonable, practical and economi- cal reconstruction. The second objective for the Scien- tific and Engineering Task Force is to participate in the conduct of a scien- tific study. \Vhile it is recognized that a decision has not been made as to the manner in which the long- range scientific study of Alaska will be made, this task force fully endorses the need of such a study for the fol- lowing reasons: This earthquake, one of the major ones of history, provides a unique opportunity to obtain and make widely known reliable scientific and technical data concerning the cause and effect of seismic disturbances. Concerted ef— fort in the scientific and engineering investigation of the Alaska earthquake and its related phenomena should be executed. The study should include such things as methods to predict the initial shock and after shocks of fu- ture earthquakes, a better understand- ing of the geologic and geomorphic fac- tors affecting earthquake damage, the development of more efficient seismo- logical equipment, better understand- ing of the generation and propagation of seismic seawaves, better under- standing of the engineering aspects of earthquakes, improvement and appli- cation of structural engineering cri- teria for earthquake-resistant struc- tures, and the improvement and appli- cation of techniques for minimizing destruction and loss of life in the fu- ture. In practice, the urgencies of the situation were such that the Task Force had to devote nearly all of its energies to the first of the two objectives described above. It did, however, make definite recommen- dations to the Commission con- cerning the need for long-range scientific studies (Federal Recon- struction and Devel. Plan. Comm. Alaska, 1964, p. 54—58), and many of the ideas of its members have borne fruit in the plans for further scientific studies by the U .S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, the US. Geological Survey, and other public and private agencies. The Scientific and Engineering Task Force saw the need for a field element, stationed in Alaska, to meet its immediate require- ments for geological, earth me— chanics, and engineering infor- mation relative to zoning and reconstruction problems. On April 30, 1964, it established a Field Team and assigned it two primary duties. The first was to develop and coordinate the exe- cution of specific plans for field studies pertinent to reconstruc- tion. The second duty was to recommend to the Task Force, and through it to the Commission, those areas suitable for recon- struction and to establish interim zoning and design criteria to guide construction in this earth— quake—prone region. The Task Force was author— ized to draw on the talents of Federal agencies and their con— sultants as required to augment memberships in both Task Force and Field Team. Also, in com- pliance with Executive Order 11150, the Field Team was re- quired to work very closely with State, local, and Federal repre- sentatives in the field. All members of Task Force and Field Team were paid and supported by their parent organ- izations. The US. Geological Survey in Anchorage provided a secretary and office facilities and services, and the Alaska Dis— trict Engineer’s office, Corps of Engineers, was extremely gener— ous in providing facilities for press conferences, reproduction facilities, and many other aids to the Field Team’s work. By courtesy of Senator Ernest Gruening, the Field Team was stationed in his office in the Fed- eral Building, Anchorage. This address was not widely known, but the door was always open to officials or private citizens. Personnel of the Task Force and Field Team are listed below: Scientific and Engineering Task Force S. Theodor Algermissen, Data Analy- sis and Research Branch, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Commerce Ernest Dobrovolny, Engineering Ge- ology Branch, Geological Survey, In- terior G. Donald Eberlein, Alaskan Geology Branch, Geological Survey, Interior Robert H. Nesbitt, Civil Works, Of- fice of Chief of Engineers, Department of Army, Defense William E. Schaem, Military Con- struction, Office of Chief of Engineers, Department of Army, Defense (Chair- man) Charles A. Whitten, Ofl‘ice of Phys- ical Sciences, Coast and Geodetic Sur- vey, Commerce (Note: Because he was also assigned to Anchorage with the Field Team, Dobrovolny played only a small part in direct Task Force work.) Field Team Ove Carstensen, North Pacific Divi- sion, Corps of Engineers, Department of Army, Defense William K. Cloud, Seismological Field Survey, Coast and Geodetic Sur- vey, Commerce Ernest Dobrovolny, Engineering Ge- ology Branch, Geological Survey, In- terior Edwin B. Eckel, Special Projects Branch, Geological Survey, Interior (Chairman) W. Harold Stuart, North Pacific Division, Corps of Engineers, Depart- ment of Army, Defense In addition to these members, Karl V. Steinbrugge, a consul— tant to the Coast and Geodetic Survey, worked effectively with the Field Team and added greatly to its strength. On occasion, other members of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Geological WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 53 Survey, and the Corps of Engin- eers took part in some of the Field Team’s conferences and meetings. They also supplied it with needed facts and opinions based on their own field obser- vations. Dwight A. Ink, execu- tive director of the Commission, kept in close personal touch with both Task Force and Field Team, and gave them constant strong support, as did members of his staff. In particular, Colonels Harry N. Tufts and William J. Penly, who alternated between Alaska and IVashington, provided direct liaison between Task Force, Field Team, and various govern- mental agencies. These men were helpful in many ways and added greatly to morale during some trying moments. The degree of detachment from their parent organizations varied widely among the participants of both Task Force and Field Team. Some were completely detached, and were thus able to give full at— tention to their duties for the Com- mission, whereas others were expected to perform these duties in addition to full-time regular duties for their parent organiza— tions. The responsibilities of the Task Force and its Field Team were so demanding that those members who were nearly or quite relieved of regular duties pro- vided most of the continuity and performed, perhaps, a dispropor- tionate share of the work. Credit for the choice of such a group of experts and specialists and for their release from other duties must go to the foresight of the heads of their parent agen- cies. However, the fact that members, despite great differences in technical backgrounds and personalities, could work together as a well-balanced team must be ascribed to chance. thatever the causes, the results were good. The Task Force was dissolved on October 6, 1964, at the same time as its parent Commission. The Field Team had already ceas- ed to function as a unit at the conclusion of its final reports on Anchorage and Homer, dated September 8, 1964. Individual members of both Task Force and Field Team continued to carry some responsibilities intermit- tently for a few months, chiefly by responding to queries from various citizens or agencies as to the application of the Task Force recommendations. Even though there was no longer any effective enforcement mechanism, all rec— ommendations with respect to land classification and use were still being followed by Federal agencies at. the time this report was sent to the printer. ACTIVITIES AND METHODS As it evolved, the principal responsibility of the Task Force and its Field Team was to make firm recommendations to the Com- mission and its constituent agen- cies as to where Federal funds should or should not be spent for ground stabilization, for repair of damage, or for complete recon- struction or relocation of struc— tures and facilities. Despite this seeming preoccupation with finan- cial matters, all members of the Task Force and Field Team kept constantly in mind that their primary responsibility was for the public safety. This fact doubt- less led to recommendations that were more conservative than they otherwise might have been. By the time the Task Force was organized, the Alaska Dis- trict, Corps of Engineers, had already been designated by the Oflice of Emergency Planning as the responsible agency for devel oping most of the basic infor- mation that was essential for final recommendations. This situation called for the closest possible co- operation between the users and gatherers of basic data—that is, between the Task Force and Field Team on the one hand and the Corps of Engineers and its con— sultants and contractors on the other. Much of the credit for the cordial and friendly cooperation that ensued belongs to Col. Ken- neth T. Sawyer, Alaska District Engineer, and to Warren R. George, Chief, Engineering Divi- sion, Alaska District Office. The Field Team participated in thorough discussions of the soils— exploration program of the Corps of Engineers when it was being formulated and scheduled with the contractor firm of Shannon and Wilson, Inc. All suggestions and requests made by the Field Team were accepted by the Dis- trict Engineer, and the responsi- bility for carrying them out was added to the contractor’s job. These suggestions included the drilling of several additional holes and testing of samples therefrom, the electric logging of some ex- ploratory holes and geologic ex- amination of samples, and the completion and equipment of a few holes as observation wells for future studies of the ground- water regime. Members of the Task Force and the Field Team and scientific colv leagues from their parent orga- nizations were welcome at all times to follow the progress of the exploratory work, to examine records or samples, to View lab- oratory or field tests, or to discuss mutual problems with members of the Corps or its contractors and consultants. Except for thorough reviews of the formal interim re- ports, however, such contacts were deliberately kept to a mini- mum in order to avoid interfer- 54 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, ence with the progress of the soil- exploration program. In all its series of recommenda- tions on parts of Anchorage, the Field Team adhered to a rigid schedule that paralleled a sim— ilarly rigid schedule of reports on its soils investigations by the Corps of Engineers and its con- tractor, Shannon and Wilson, Inc. By joint decision of the Commis- sion, the Alaska District Engin- eer, and the contractor, the results of the soil program were reported in segments and on specified dates. It is to the credit of the Shan- non and Wilson firm and the Corps of Engineers that each of the deadlines was met, despite the fact that the entire schedule called for the telescoping into a very few weeks of work that would have ordinarily required many months. For each segment of the report- and-recommendation process, the Shannon and Wilson firm pre- sented both written and oral re- ports to the Alaska District Engineer and his staff. Consul- tants retained by both the con- tractor firm and its sponsor took part in the discussions either in person or by telephone. The Scientific and Engineering Task Force Field Team shared in all the presentations and therefore had an opportunity to make sug- gestions, ask questions, and under— stand fully the basic facts that had been gathered and the mean- ing of the recommendations made by Shannon and Wilson, Inc., to the Corps of Engineers. After each initial presentation, the Field Team commonly met with Corps of Engineers person— nel, and generally with one or more of the Corps consultants, to discuss the matter more fully and to translate the findings from the soil-exploration program, first into a set of official engineering decisions by the Corps of Engin- eers and finally into a map that divided the area under study into various categories of risk from the standpoint of reconstruction. At this point the Field Team drew on the specialized know- ledge of its own members or on the knowledge of their colleagues who were engaged in field studies sponsored by the parent organiza- tions. The final recommendations and risk maps thus represented the combined judgment of a large group of scientists and engineers, each of whom was a specialist in one or more facets of the im- mediate problem. The Task Force, which presented the recom- mendations to the Commission for approval, and the Field Team, which reported the final decisions to city officials and the public, necessarily assumed primary re- sponsibility for their validity. In conference with the Alaska District Engineer, his staff, and consultants to the Corps of Engi— neers, the Field Team commonly drafted a press notice. The text was dictated to the Task Force chairman in Washington by tele- phone, and accompanying maps were either sent by airmail or were described in detail by tele— phone. The Task Force in Wash- ington studied each proposed release, revised it as necessary, and obtained approval of the Fed- eral Reconstruction Commission. This approval, whether given by its executive oflicers or by the full Commission, constituted a firm policy decision by the Fed— eral Government that applied to all agencies involved in financing the reconstruction efforts. When word of Commission approval of a given set of recom- mendations reached Anchorage, the Alaska District Engineer’s of— fice and the Field Team met with 1964 the mayor and other city and State officials; representatives of all local news media were invited. The District Engineer and his staff and consultants explained the recent fiindings of the soil- exploration program, and the chairman of the Field Team an— nounced and explained the Task Force recommendations that had been adopted by the Commission. Copies of the press notices and maps, issued jointly by the Task Force and the Corps of Engin- eers, were distributed, and the availability of extra copies for interested individuals or groups was announced. The conferences commonly lasted several hours, providing ample opportunity for questions, discussion, explanation of details, and expressions of opinion. As a general rule, the Anchorage City Council met shortly after the close of the press conference and made its own deci- sions concerning the impact of the Task Force recommendations on the City’s activities. BOUNDARIES 0F ACTIVITIES The Task Force was concerned almost .exclusively with the land stability and reconstruction prob- lems of Anchorage, Seward, Val- dez, Homer, and, to a lesser- de— gree, of Kodiak. Many other towns and cities had also suffered severe damage, but it was not of a nature that called for the spe— cial skills or knowledge of Task Force members in assessing dam— age or in planning reconstruction. Damage by waves or fire, for in- stance, was due to transitory causes; there was little that the Task Force could contribute other than to encourage long-range stu- dies aimed at better prediction of earthquakes or their effects, such as tsunamis. Cordova, which had been affected by tectonic uplift and consequent withdrawal of the WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 55 sea, suffered great losses. So also did towns like Kodiak, where tectonic downdrop and sea waves drowned port facilities or the en- tire town. Because of our pres- ent inability to predict earth- quakes and their tectonic eifects, such changes in land and sea level can only be considered as per— manent. or semipermanent in terms of human time. Recon- struction had to be planned and conducted on this basis with little or no interpretation of local geo- logic or seismic conditions. Structural engineers, including those on the Task Force and Field Team, recognized very early after the earthquake that, except in the areas of ground failure, those structures designed in accordance with sound design criteria for seismic areas and constructed in accordance with sound construc- tion practices generally withstood the temblor without major dam- age. The Task Force, therefore, tended to ignore seismic damage to specific structures. Instead, it directed most of its efforts toward problems of land stability—that is, to determining which parts of the several cities were unstable or might be made so by another great earthquake. It was the belief of the Task Force, supported by the Commission, that decisions to re- build or to raze specific damaged structures—so long as they stood on stable ground—were the re- sponsibility of city officials and private engineers and architects. The responsibilities of the Task Force were more general than this, and were in part discharged by its continual stress on the re- commendation that the construc— tion of all new buildings or the 7 / 1, //%/r// N» M x ’ '1 f” ll[,¢~’ ill/l." . VIII,” //4/ ilj/gié’llf/ W22: 1'!!!" lln. ' 1/4"] ._,~ 1/ .u .347/ , e y’aif? reconstruction of earthquake-dam- aged structures must be in strict conformity with the requirements of the latest edition of the Uni- form Building Code for Seismic Zone 3 (Internat. Conf. Bldg. Officials, 1964). Similarly, but for other reasons, the Task Force played only a small part in reconstruction plans for airports, railroads, or high- ways. TheSe three kinds of facil— ities were separately funded, largely by the Federal Govern— ment, so there was little need for recommendations from the Task Force to guide the Reconstruction Commission or its constituent agencies. Only at Seward and Anchorage, where The Alaska Railroad’s reconstruction pro— blems were linked inextricably with those of the cities, did the Task Force and Field Team act as advisors to railroad officials. l? f; , '0'}? '71” t," 7’1] A / >_ 1 [/4], // , \‘4\‘,'» l / ,, ' “,7 ’t 4/62? //l \J 56 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27 , 1964 150°OO’ 55' 149°50’ FF Y5 b?» ANCHORAGE Merrill Field Lake Spenard ' nal Internatlo : BOWLING RD 61°10’ ‘ 0 . a 0 SE WARD EXPLANATION C Nominal-risk area Little likelihood of landslides exceptfor small slumps, largely in artificial fill. In all other respects risks are no greater than is normally expected in the construction industry. Current Uniform Building Code, as identified with Seismic Zone 3, applies % High-risk area Requires further study before final determina- tims can be made as to stability Voy‘llvél o 3 MILES | l 61 “05’ This 39.—Map showing high- and nominal-risk portions of Anchorage and vicinity, generally excluding military lands. map and an accompanying press notice were issued May 19, 1964, by the Scientific and Engineering Task Force as the first of a series of interim recommendations to the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Com- mission for Alaska. WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 57 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS ANCHORAGE The first set of Task Force rec- ommendations on Anchorage was made by the Field Team to city officials and the public on May 19, 1964. Figure 39 is a simplified and greatly reduced version of the map that accompanied the press announcement. The base for this map and those which accompanied later releases on Anchorage con— sisted of parts or' all of the US. Geological Survey topographic map of Anchorage and Vicinity at a scale of 1 : 24,000, with a 20- foot contour interval. Later de- terminations of “risk” lines were also plotted on a much larger scale for office use so that the relations of risk lines to individual pro- perties could be determined where needed. The May 19 map, from which military lands were generally ex- cluded, divided Anchorage into two categories—areas where risks were considered “nominal,” and those where risks were considered “high” and were to be studied further before final determina— tions could be made as to stability. The intent of this first map was to “release” as much of Anchorage and its surroundings as possible so that reconstruction and repair, financed wholly or in part by Fed- eral agencies, could go ahead. The boundaries of the high-risk areas were drawn conservatively, in the hope that they would not have to be enlarged later with consequent damage to public faith and morale or to changes in the Federal lending agencies’ plans. With one or two minor exceptions, where new information from the soils-exploration program made it necessary to expand the high-risk areas slightly to protect the public safety, this hope was realized. Delineation of the areas to be classed as high risk was based on the Field Team’s knowledge of the underlying geology as drawn from an earlier report by Miller and Dobrovolny (1959), on personal observations by Field Team mem— bers and their professional col- leagues, and on the maps prepared by the Engineering Geology Evaluation Group (1964). In the first, as in all later recommenda- tions, the Task Force made it clear that any new building or repair work, regardless of the risk classi— fication of specific properties, should be in strict conformity with the requirements of the Uniform Building Code for Seismic Zone 3 (Internat. Conf. Bldg. Officials, 1964). After the first report of May 19, four other interim Task Force reports successively reduced the Anchorage areas classified as “high risk, subject to further stu- dies.” These reports were based primarily on the Shannon and Wilson explorations, and the re- sultant recommendations, hence, followed closely the reporting schedule that had been established for the soils studies. The Task Force recommendations of June 26, 1964, dealt entirely with the Fourth Avenue slide area, that of July 8 with the L—K Street slide area and the relatively undam- aged downtown part of Anchor- age that lies between the Fourth Avenue and the L—K Street slides. The Turnagain Heights slide area was treated in the Task Force re— port of July 14, 1964, and a mis- cellaneous group of smaller but significant slides were covered in the report of July 27. This latter group included the Romig Hill, Government Hill, First Avenue (including the Alaska Native Hospital), and Chester Creek areas. The general location of all these areas is indicated on figure 39. In all the interim reports just mentioned, additional intermedi- ate categories, other than “nomi- nal risk” and “high risk” were in- troduced. Generally these were aimed at identifying areas where the land was considered unsafe for building unless certain stabi- lization procedures recommended by the consultants to the Corps of Engineers were put into effect The term “provisional nominal risk” was used for such areas with or without subcategories to define land on which special restrictions should be applied even where sta— bilization was effected. This de- tailed land classification had its value in formulating plans for stabilization and in the search for legal and financial means of doing so, but in practice the Federal lending agencies adopted only two classifications to guide their deci- sions. That is, land classified as “nominal risk” by the Task Force was open to Federal aid; all other lands, regardless of the qualifying adjectives used by the Task Force, were classed as “high risk” for loan purposes. The final report of the Task Force was made to city and State officials and to the public on Sep- tember 8, 1964. It was based on the final comprehensive report to the Corps of Engineers by Shan- non and Wilson, Inc., and on thor- ough discussions in Anchorage by Corps of Engineers staff and con- sultants, several members of the Commission staff, and most mem- bers of both the Task Force and its Field Team. The joint release announcing the final recommenda- tions is reproduced below, and the map that accompanied it is shown in figure 40, next page. 58 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 RM IST AVE A ANCHORAGE Memll Lake Spenard RNA 4 (9 gene a}? s Q 9 EXPLANATION Nominal-risk area Little likelihood of landslides except for small slumps, largely in artificial fill. In all other respects risks are no greater than is normally expected in the construction industry where struc- tures are built on a thick sequence of unconsolidated sediments. Current Uniform Building Code for Seismic Zone 3 applies both to new buildings and to plans for rehabilitation of earth— quake-damaged structures. Special engineering consideration should be given to construction near the top, at the base, and on steep slopes, especially wherever the Bootlegger Cove Clay is present. No filling, cutting, or construction should be permit- ted that will steepen or increase the load on or above these slopes Provisional-nominal-risk area Reclassification to “nominal-risk” in these areas is contingent on stabilization of adjacent slide areas or stabilization within the areas themselves. If stabilization is not effected, land will be ‘ ‘high-risk” classification Unstable area Land considered unstable in the event of future earthquakes unless stabilization is attained. No new construction and only limited rehabilitation is recommended unless stabilization is attained. It is recommended that after stabilization new buildings on Fourth Avenue, L—K Streets, and Government Hill slides be limited to light structures not over two stories high. No buildings are recommended on the Turnagain Heights slide between the bluff and tidewater, nor on the First Avenue slides, even after stabilization. If stabilization is not effected, land will be “high-risk” classification 40.—Map showing classification of earthquake risk areas, Anchorage and vicinity. This map and a press notice released Sep- tember 8, 1964, represent the final recommendations in risk classification of Anchorage by the Scientific and Engineering Task Force. WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 59 JOINT RELEASE—U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT, ALASKA TASK FORCE 9, ALASKA RECONSTRUCTION COMMISSION Final Recommendations on Risk Classifications, Anchorage and Vicinity For Release September 8, 1964 Task Force 9 made its final recom- mendations on earthquake-risk classiv fications to the Alaska Reconstruction Commission. All parts of Anchorage and vicinity are now classified as “Nominal Risk” or “Provisional Nominal Risk”—sub- ject to successful stabilization of ad- jacent slide areas. Even if stabiliza- tion is effected certain restrictions on construction or rehabilitation in these areas are considered necessary. Fed- eral, State, and City Oflicials are in- vestigating technical means of stabili- zation and exploring the possibility of financing the needed work for stabili- zation. At joint meetings held in Anchorage over the past several days, members of the Task Force from Washington and its Alaskan counterpart field team studied the final comprehensive re- port to the Corps of Engineers on soil studies by the firm of Shannon and Wilson, Inc. Findings of these investi— gations were discussed in detail with experts of the Corps, Shannon and Wilson, Inc., and outstanding consul» tants to both organizations. Based as they are on the best professional judgements of all concerned, these recommendations represent joint con- currence by Task Force 9 and the Corps of Engineers. For those parts of the 4th Avenue, 1st Avenue, L-K Streets, Turnagain Heights and Government Hill areas that actual- ly slid during the Good Friday earth- quake, certain stabilization measures are considered necessary tO assure the future safety of these and adjacent areas. It is believed that even though these areas are reasonably safe under normal static conditions, dynamic stresses from future similar earth- quakes would cause renewed disas- trous movements either in the dis- turbed areas or in adjacent land. In general, stabilization will probably take the form of regrading of the sur— face, drainage, some form of buttress— ing, or some combination of these. It is not within the responsibilities of the Task Force to make specific rec- ommendations as to the methods Of stabilization to be applied. These tech- nical and economic questions are under study by Federal, State, and City officials and decisions are expected in the near future. Fourth Avenue. Specific designs for stabilization of the Fourth Avenue area between Barrow Street on the east and I Street on the west are now be- ing completed under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers. When the stabilization work is completed, all of that area will be returned to Nomi- nal Risk. In the Slide area below Fourth Avenue and between Barrow and E Streets, however, construction should be limited to parks, parking areas, and light occupancy structures not over two stories in height. Even for such structures, certain restric- tions must be imposed on depths of ex— cavations or fills and on weights of buildings to prevent an unbalance of the buttress which could impair or destroy its effectiveness. In all of the Fourth Avenue slide area between Barrow and I Streets and bounded on the south by a line running from Barrow Street to F Street midway between Fifth and Sixth Avenues and along Fourth Avenue between F Street and I Street, it is anticipated that normal consolidation of the underlying soils will result in some vertical and horizontal move- ment. Because this condition can be expected to result in localized differ- ential movement, both horizontal and vertical, particular attention must be given to the design Of structures and their foundations so that such move ments may be accommodated without undue damage to the building. L-K Slide Area. Additional studies in the L-K Slide Area have resulted in the conclusion that a significant portion of the area may be returned to Nominal Risk classification if cer- tain stabilization action iS taken. These measures may be a combination of slope flattening, drainage, and buttress- ing. Stabilization would permit the area landward of the graben to be re- turned to Nominal Risk. In the re- maining area toward Knik Arm (sea- ward), it is anticipated that stabiliza- tion, if undertaken, may require re- moval of some existing buildings. The extent of such removal cannot be fore- cast until detailed designs for stabil- ization are completed. The same design precautions should be applied in the area above the graben line as are outlined for the Fourth Avenue Slide area. In the area below the graben line and toward Knik Arm construction should be lim- ited to light occupancy structures not over two stories in height. Turnagain Slide. The Turnagain Area has been classified as “Provisional Nominal Risk Area." The area above the present bluff is recommended for unrestricted residential construction after its stability is assured by strengthening of the slide. Because of the complex nature of the slide, no construction other than drives or walks - should be permitted on the slide area. The area west of Turnagain Heights shown as “High Risk Final Classifi- cation” on the 27 July risk classifica- tion map has been included in the Pro- visional Nominal Risk Area. Among the methods being considered for sta- bilization are a series of underground charges and sand drains to disturb and cause consolidation of weak clays to provide a buttress, or freezing of a belt Of clays for the same purpose. The buttress provided by either Of these methods, or a combination of the two, would be located in the slide area be- low the present scarp (bluff). A test section will be required to determine the most effective method and estab- lish technical criteria for the final de- Sign. First Avenue-Native Hospital. The First Avenue slide, close to the Na- tive Hospital, occurred on a hillside that had probably been oversteepened by excavation at the toe in past years. Recommended remedial measures, all of them comparatively minor, include slope flattening, buttressing and im- proved surface drainage. If this work is done, the area occupied by the Na- tive Hospital, as well as nearby land, would be classed as Nominal Risk. No buildings are recommended in this actual slide area even if stabiliza- tion is accomplished. No stabilization measures are con- sidered necessary for the area be- tween Barrow Street and the Native Hospital but Similar restraints on the use of steep slopes are applicable there. Government Hill. It is believed that the slide at Government Hill School can be stabilized in its present extent by means of Simple grading and drain- age. If it is desirable to restore the toe of the slide to its pre-earthquake 60 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 :a“ I,‘ 4 "1"? ill—Aerial view of Turnagain slide area shortly after earthquake, looking east toward Seward Highway; Northern Lights Boulevard in upper right. The Scientific and Engineering Task Force recommended that stabilization measures be applied to land broken by landslides, but that no building be permitted in this area even if stabilization is efiected. With such stabilization, the remainder of Turnagain Heights area would be classed as nominal risk, even though many homes and utilities were slightly damaged during the earthquake. position, this can be done by means of a relatively small buttress. If sta- bilization is effected.“ the land near and above the slide would be classed as Nominal Risk. Construction on the regraded or buttressed slope should be restricted to light buildings not more than two stories in height, and special attention given to their design because of the danger of settlement that can be expected. ltmnig Hill. A small rotational land- slide developed on the slope of Romig Hill just north of West Anchorage High School. Minor regrading is rec— onnnended to stabilize the slope. While no other slopes on either side of Ches— ter Creek failed during the earthquake and no remedial measures are neces- sary, it is recommended that no fill be placed on the top of the slopes and that meandering of Chester Creek be kept under surveillance to insure the stream does not undercut the hill. Other than the areas discussed a— bove, all other parts of Anchorage and vicinity are classified as “Nominal Risk.” This means that the Task Force considers there is little like- lihood of landslides except for small slumps. largely in artificial fill. In all other respects, risks are considered to be no greater than is normally ex- WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 61 pected in the construction industry in seismic areas where structures are built on a thick sequence of uncon- solidated sediments. Special engineer— ing consideration should be given to design and construction on any steep slope or near the top or base of such slope. Examples of such slopes, some of which were earlier classed as “High Risk,” are the Point Campbell and Rabbit Creek bluifs along Turnagain Arm, the Point VVoronzof bluffs, Romig Hill, the steep slopes on both sides of Ship Creek, and the steep slopes between the City Docks and the top of Government Hill. No filling, cutting or construction should be permitted on these or similar slopes that will steep— en them or increase the loads on or above them. In all areas, design and construction for both reconstruction and new struc- tures should be in strict accordance with the provisions of current edition of the Uniform Building Code for Seismic Zone 3. Particular attention should be given to the foundation'con- (litions existing at each specific site and due recognition taken of design requirements that are imposed by such conditions. The Task Force 9 Field Team was formed to rate areas of Anchorage and other quake-damaged cities for the Alaska Reconstruction Commission as a guide in developing insurance and loan policies of Federal lending agen- cies. Its findings are to be considered as advisory but by no means manda- tory to City oflicials. Throughout its work, protection of human life, as well as of property, has been para- mount in the Field Team’s consid- erations. Based on the history of earthquakes in Alaska the possibility of another major earth shock cannot be overlooked. With the present state of knowledge, the year, the month, the day, the hour or the location cannot be predicted. Prudence, however, dic- tates that the public should be pro- tected against another disastrous earth- quake, should one occur at any time. For these reasons the field team firmly believes that stabilization and strict adherence to the requirements of good design and construction practice for active seismic zones represent minimal safeguards for the public. Future Observations. The Task Force strongly endorses recommendations by the Shannon and Wilson firm that a continuing program of technical ob- servations be carried on by local and other authorities. Such observations might provide knowledge of natural stabilization of underlying clay strata and might ultimately serve as a basis for gradual relaxation of building re- strictions. These recommendations in- clude the following. Many piezometers (to measure level and pressures of water in the clays beneath the City) were installed during the soils studies. These should be observed on a con- tinuing basis in order to detect changes due to future earthquakes, large or small. Similarly, slope indicators that have been installed to measure even slight land movements should be ob- served regularly. When regrading and stabilization for the various slide areas is put into effect, a system of accurate horizontal and vertical surveys should be instituted in order to determine changes due to settlement of artificial ground or to movements caused by future earth shocks. Enlargement of the strong-motion seismograph record- ing net in the Anchorage area, par- ticularly to study the effects of earth- quakes on the soft clays that underlie the city, is already being undertaken by the Federal Government. With these final recommendations to the Alaska Reconstruction Commission, Task Force 9 and its field team have completed their responsibilities in the Anchorage area. Final reports on Seward, Valdez, Kodiak, and Homer have been made to the Commission. The Task Force 9 Field Team in- cludes Edwin B. Eckel, Chairman, and Ernest Dobrovolny, both of the U.S. Geological Survey, Denver; Harold Stuart, Division geologist, and Ove Carstensen, structural engineer, both of U.S. Army Engineer Division, North Pacific, Portland; William K. Cloud, seismologist, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, San Francisco. William E. Schaem, Office of the Chief of Engi- neers, \Vashington, DC, is Chairman of Task Force 9, which, like the Field Team. is made up of professionals loaned by the Corps of Engineers, the Geological Survey, and the Coast and Geodetic Survey. Consultants to the Alaska District, Corps of Engineers, are: Dr. Ralph B. Peck, Professor of Foundation En- gineering, University of Illinois; Mr. Thomas F. Thompson, consulting en- gineering geologist, Burlingame, Cali- fornia; Dr. Laurits Bjerrum, Director Norwegian Geotechnical Institute, Os- lo, Norway. Consultants assisting Shannon and Wilson, Inc., are: Dr. Harry B. Seed, Professor of Civil Engineering, Uni- versity of California; Dr. Neil Twel- ker, consulting engineer, Seattle; Dr. Richard Meese, University of Washing- ton; Mr. Robert Spence, consultant, Vancouver. The Corps of Engineers studies have been under the direction of Colonel Kenneth T. Sawyer, until recently District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, Alaska, and his successor Col- onel Clare F. Farley, and Mr. Warren George, Chief, Engineering Division. Alaska District. Copies of the comprehensive final Shannon and Wilson, Inc., report on the soil studies in the Anchorage area, dated 28 August 1964, have been de- posited with City ofl‘icials by the Alas- ka District Corps of Engineers. Copies are also available for public inspec- tion at the Oflice of the District Engi- neer, Elmendorf Air Force Base. Copies of the final report will be available to the public upon further printing at cost. HOMER Task Force recommendations on Homer were released to the town’s Mayor on September 8, 1964, and to Anchorage news media the following day. Al- though the Corps of Engineers was deeply involved in plans for restoring damaged harbor facil- ities, it had not had to schedule subsurface soil explorations as at Anchorage, Seward, and Valdez. For this reason, the announcement was not made jointly with the Corps, although the Field Team had discussed its findings with the District Engineer. Aside from several brief visits by mem- bers of the Field Team, the recom- mendations were based almost entirely on reports by Roger M. Waller, a member of the U.S. Geological Survey who had been assigned to follow up his earlier studies of the area’s ground—water resources with a study of earth- quake damages. Waller’s com- 62 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 R. 14 Wt Rt 13 W. m u 1 10 ‘ n 12 7 a N5 E N 1% fldw gm: 9:31?“ 6 Creek A 5.87 \ a 4? o / % é Q (i or W 6’ 14 13 :1 18 17 16 [6621’ I <7; 55 ’T‘W‘N 23 2‘ \m N EXPLANATION E Stable area Risks no greater than normally ex- pected in the construction industry, Current Uniform Building Code for Seismic Zone 3 applies both to new buildings and to plans for rehabilitation of earthquake- damaged structures Area subject to moderate erosion or inundation High tides, on Homer Spit; moderate wave erosion, bluffs along sections 24, 19, and 20; potential earth/low, sections 10, 17, and 18. Considered safe for new construction or repairs only if adequate provision is made for indicated hazards. Current Uniform Building Code for Seismic Zone 3 applies both to new buildings and to plans for rehabilitation of earthquake- damaged structures Area subject to accelerated erosion Accelerated bluff erosion, south of Palmer Creek and near Millers Landing New construction or repair of existing structures not recommended Area subject to high tides and potential slides Area subject to high tides and po- tent slides, pending artificial fill- ing and clarification ofsubmarine slope stability; New construction or repair of existing structures, other than highway, not recom- mended Note: Classification of areas on Homer Spit should be considered as temporary, pending observation of results of natural or artificial changes in shape and height of Homer Spit KACHEMAK BAY Lnnd'u End Motel 42.—Map showing land classification, Homer and vicinity; released to Homer oificials on September 9, 1964, by the Scientific and Engineering Task Force. 43.—Homer Spit. WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 63 plete report appears as a chapter in USGS Professional Paper 542. As shown in figure 42, the Task Force report adopted differ- ent risk classifications for Homer than had been applied in Anchor— age and other cities. Instead of such terms as “nominal,” “provi- sional nominal,” and “high risk,” it classified areas of Homer as “stable,” “subject to moderate erosion or inundation,” “subject to accelerated erosion,” and “sub- ject to high tides and potential slides.” Only for the last two categories did the Task Force rec- ommend against new construction or repair of existing structures. The difference in treatment of the risk categories at Homer was due to the fact that most of the danger of renewed earth move- ments there was related to earth— quake-induced subsidence of the area and consequent increased ero- sion by wave action, or to danger of further submarine landslides off the tip of Homer Spit. More- over, it was realized that any risk classifications at Homer might well be less permanently valid than those at Anchorage, Valdez, and elsewhere. There was not enough offshore informa- tion available to permit firm judgements as to the stability of the end of Homer Spit. Also, further uncertainty existed be— cause the future shape and char- acter 0f the spit cannot be determined until a new pattern of erosion and deposition of spit materials is established. The first of these uncertainties was resolved within a few months as a result of intensive studies off the end of the spit by the Corps of Engineers. These studies pro— duced suflicient evidence that there is little danger of disas- trous submarine slides even in the event of another earthquake. Ac- 1 cordingly, late in 1965 the District Engineer recommended that the restrictions be removed. Former members of the Task Force and Field Team were asked to review these recommendations and con- curred in them informally. A long—term study of beach—erosion processes was begun in 1964 by the Corps of Engineers. When its results become available it may be possible for the town of Homer to relax even further the restric— tions recommended by the Task Force in 1964. SEWARD The Task Force made two sets of recommendations to the Com- mission on Seward; these recom— mendations were based on visits to the town by Field Team mem- bers, on detailed geologic reports by Richard W. Lemke of the US. Geological Survey, and on a soils report to the Corps of Engineers by Shannon and Wilson, Inc. The first report, released to the Mayor of Seward on July 17, 1964, and to Anchorage news media the following day, had to do with the suburban subdivisions of Clearview and Forest Acres and the Eads site at Lowell Point. Inasmuch as the Corps of Engin- eers was not involved in explora- tion in these areas, the recom~ mendations were made solely by the Field Team and Task Force, with only informal consultation with Corps of Engineers officials. The Clearview and Forest Acres subdivisions were classified in two categories — “nominal risk,” in which the hazards from another earthquake were considered no greater than are normally ex— pected in the construction indus- try, and “limited risk.” This latter classification included the land that had been strongly frac- tured by the earthquake. Within such areas, ,it was recommended that all new foundations be of reinforced concrete and that all concrete or masonry work be rein- forced and interconnected. On the basis of Richard W. Lemke’s findings that Lowell Point had incurred damage from waves only, none from ground fractures 0r submarine slides, that area, "on which it was desired to build a marine way, was placed in the nominal-risk category. These sub— urban areas are the more fully described by Lemke in a chapter in USGS Professional Paper 542 of this series. Recommendations on Seward proper were made in a joint Corps of Engineers and Task Force report, released to the May- or of Seward on July 24, 1964, and to news media in Anchorage on July 25. These recommenda- tions were based on the findings . of Shannon and Wilson (1964b), on the opinions of consultants to the Corps of Engineers, and on the geologic investigations of Lemke, who was considered for this purpose to be a member of the Field Team. The greater part of Seward was classified as “nominal risk,” with consequent eligibility for Federal aid, providing that the current Uniform Building Code for Seis- mic Zone 3 was followed in all design and construction work (fig. 44, next page). The waterfront area, carefully defined in detail on the map was classed as “high risk,” and the firm recommendation was made that it be reserved for parks or other uses that do not involve large congregations of people. The waterfront land within the high-risk line is frac— tured and weakened as a result of the submarine landslides that destroyed the Seward dock facil- ities, and the Field Team and Corps of Engineers believed that another large earthquake might cause further submarine sliding , within the area designated as 64 THE Nominal-risk area Little likelihood of landslides except for small slumps, largely in artificial fill. In all other respects risks are no greater than is normally expected in the construc- tion industry. Current Uniform Build- ing Code for Seismic Zone 3 applies both to new buildings and to plans for reha- bilitation of earthquake-damaged struc- tures JEFFERSON AVENUE .mm5mmia-eue [lllllllllfllllllllll [[[Ulllllflllllflll] [[fllllfllfllllflllll [[Dlllllllfllfllflll mmm mmm FEDElAl EXPLANATION / High-risk area Land considered unstable, particularly in event of future earthquakes; no econom- ically feasible means of stabilization known. No repair, rehabilitation, or new construction involving use of Federal funds is recommended, except for grad- ing and light fill ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 <7 \‘1 \_ 4} Approximate of high tide BAY HARBOR § 0 400 800 1200 MLLW Mean lower low water line 44.—)Iap showing high- and nominal-risk areas of a part of Seward; released to Seward city officials on July 25, 1964, by the high risk. The line between high- and nominal-risk areas was based in part on the distribution of visible earth fractures, but in greater part on differences in the underlying geologic materials. KODIAK AND VALDEZ Recommendations on both K0- diak and Valdez were made to the Commission, but because they were merely endorsements of reconstruction plans that were already adopted and had been publicized, no public announce- ments were made by the Task Force. Kodiak was visited on May 20, 1964, by members of the Field Scientific and Engineering Task Force. Team, who conferred with city and US. Navy officials and in— spected most of the damaged areas from the air or on the ground. A brief report by George W. Moore of the US. Geological Survey was also studied. Damage at and near Kodiak was caused by tectonic subsidence and flooding by nonbreaking sea surges, plus a small amount of subsidence due to compaction of sediments. Except for harbor facilities, most Navy and civilian buildings were founded on bed- rock. Short of another major earthquake which could cause tec- tonic uplift, renewed subsidence, or seismic sea waves, there are no apparent reasons to expect further trouble. The Field Team, there- fore, endorsed plans that were already under way for reconstruc- tion and relocation of town and harbor facilities, subject to its usual requirements that all design and construction be in strict ac- cordance with the Uniform Build- ing Code for Seismic Zone 3. The Task Force agreed with these recommendations and transmitted them to the Commission on May 28, 1964. The Field Team visited Valdez on May 17, 1964., inspected the existing devastated town and the 1600 FEET ‘fikg—A (he/\x WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 65 proposed relocation site, and con- ferred with city and Corps of Engineers oflicials. The Field Team also had access to thorough geologic information, both on and off shore, that was being assem- bled by Henry W. Coulter, US. Geological Survey, and Ralph R. Migliaccio, Alaska Department of Highways. Their detailed report on Valdez and its environs ap- pears as a chapter in USGS Pro- fessional Paper 542. The destruction of nearly all of Valdez, the long history of floods from the Valdez glacial stream, and the obvious instability of the shoreline, all argued strongly for abandonment of the townsite. Accordingly, Coulter and Migliac- cio had early recommended to city and Federal officials that it would be safer to rebuild town and dock facilities at the “old” townsite, 4 miles northwest of Valdez. The geologic and topographic condi- tions there were considered to be far superior to those of the pres- ent town, an opinion that was subsequently reaflirmed by the soils explorations of Shannon and ‘Vilson, Inc. The Task Force agreed with these recommenda- tions, which had already been adopted by the city, and trans- mitted them to the Commission. As usual, the endorsement was made subject to the requirement that design and construction con- form to the current edition of the Uniform Building Code for Seis- mic Zone 3. REACTIONS OF FEDERAL AGEN- CIES AND LOCAL OFFICIALS Reactions of the principal Fed- eral agencies to recommendations by the Task Force were uniform- ly favorable. All its recommen— dations were adopted as policy with but little debate and With- out essential change. There was some tendency to soften the pol- icies, such as by permitting loans for repair of buildings within zones designated as “high risk— no Federal funds recommended.” This softening was not unex- pected. The prime mission of the Reconstruction Commission, hence of the Task Force, was to put Federal dollars and skills to work in helping rebuild Alaska quickly and safely. Local oflices of the main agen- cies were given policy guidance quickly and firmly by their parent agencies and bureaus. Nearly all fell into line at once and wel— comed the guidance provided them. A few local officials at first seemed reluctant to depart from long-established routine proce- dures of letting contracts, author- izing loans, reviewing reports, and similar activities. Such instances were rare, and none resulted in delays of more than a day or two in adopting the new policies, for the Commission was alert and issued unmistakable orders for compliance from the highest levels of the agencies involved. As was true of the Federal agencies, the mayors and other city officials of all the towns in— volved were uniformly coopera- tive and receptive toward the Task Force and its work. Such co- operation might have been ex- pected because all the towns were necessarily dependent on the Fed- eral Government for funds and for much of the actual recon- struction work, but cordial co- operation went far beyond the necessities that were so imposed. The city officials gave freely of their time and services and they gracefully accepted Task Force decisions—even those that were disappointing. At all times the Task Force took care to make it clear that its responsibility was only to the Commission and that it had neither right nor desire to dic- tate to local communities or indi- viduals. The Task Force’s firm recommendations as approved by the Commission became binding on its constituent Federal agen- cies. These same recommenda- tions, however, were in efiect only advisory to local officials with respect to zoning, applications of building codes, issuance of build— ing permits, or even to requests for Federal financial aid in initi- ating ground stabilization meas— ures. PUBLIC RELATIONS Coverage of announcements by the Task Force and Field Team by Alaskan news media—news- paper, radio, and television—was uniformly superb. This reaction was particularly welcome because it was so contrary to widely held beliefs among technical people'to the efiect that “reporters garble everything and seek only for sen- sationalism.’7 It also fostered a receptiveness ‘on the part of the public that would have been lack— ing had the news media, inad- vertently or otherwise, created a less favorable climate for the work of the Field Team. Not the least of the departures from normal governmental prac— tice was the fact that all formal decisions made by the Task Force were transmitted to the Commis- sion in the form of proposed press notices. When approved, these were ready for distribution as policy guides to the Federal agen- cies, and were also ready .for re- lease to the public. News media representatives were present at all report conference-s between city and State officials, the Corps of Engineers, and the Field Team. At each such meeting, the latest set of recommendations was ex- plained and press notices and 66 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, accompanying risk maps were dis— tributed. The Task Force findings were immediately and fully reported to the public by all news media, often by means of extra editions of the newspapers or by special broadcasts. In addition to com- plete news stories, plus occasion— al editorial comment, each of the texts and accompanying maps was reproduced in full by local newspapers, and the maps were exhibited on television. This prompt, complete, straight- forward, and sympathetic re- porting of the Task Force recommendations by all news media had much to do with a calm and generally favorable acceptance by the public. There were dissidents, of course, for each set of decisions perforce contain- ed bad news for some property owners, investors, or others. But nearly all the public accepted the bad medicine with the good, gracefully if not happily. Such reliance on the part of the public could not have been achieved without the kind of treatment that was accorded by the news media. This treatment, in turn, was apparently based on a firm conviction on the part of the news media representatives that they were getting the com- plete truth, good and bad, from the Task Force and its Field Team, and that the decisions were based on their best judg- ments of real facts, scientifically and objectively evaluated. In Anchorage there was one long and undesirable hiatus in public information. This ex- tended from the release of the ini- tial Task Force report of May 19, 1964, to the report of June 26, 1964, on the Fourth Avenue slide area. This period of silence, which lasted more than a month, covered the time that it took the Corps of Engineers to mobilize its soils-exploration program, to test the samples recovered by drilling, and to interpret the re— sults. The public, however, want- ed and needed more information and reassurance than it received during this period. The situation was possibly even worse at Sew— ard. After the initial cleanup operations there, when funds were spent freely and employment was at a peak, there followed a long period of apparent governmental inaction when local business and employment fell toward the van~ ishing point. As at Anchorage, the reason for this hiatus in activ- ity and in public information was the necessity of waiting for adequate scientific and technical information on which to base re— construction plans. For Homer and Seward, the Field Team first conferred with the mayor of each town, discuss— ing the recommendations and their possible impact and giving him copies of the pertinent press notices and maps. First an- nouncements were made by the mayors through local radio and newspaper media. On the day following such releases, press notices were given to Anchorage news media for broader distribu— tion, and impromptu conferences were held with individual report ers who requested further infor- mation. Recommendations on Valdez and Kodiak were made by the Task Force to the Commission, but inasmuch as they were merely corroborations of decisions that had already been made by the town officials, and had been Widely publicized, there was no need to make news announcements to the public. The favorable reaction of press and public was quite different from that accorded the early re- 1964 ports and recommendations of the Anchorage Engineering Geology Evaluation Group. As suggested in an understatement by Schmidt (1964), the initial reactions of both news media and public to the Group’s work were marked by strong tones of dismay and cries that might be aptly paraphrased as “Geologists and other scientists, go home!” The entirely different public reactions to work of the Task Force and its Field Team can perhaps be attributed to four factors: (1) passage of time that had allayed some of the earlier panic, (2) a conviction reached by the news media and trans- mitted to the public that the Task Force decisions were honest and objective, (3) the local group, competent and objective as it was, was at a disadvantage simply be— cause “a prophet is without honor in his own country,” and—per- haps most important—(4) the fact that the Task Force progres— sively reduced the areas classified as high risk, whereas the Evalua- tion Group had recommended complete evacuation of all unsta- ble areas. Successful public relations were not attained as easily as the fore- going paragraphs would make it appear. In fact, there were fac- tors working against the Task Force of which its members were not even aware until long after it had disbanded. For an under- standing of these factors, we can- not do better than to quote directly from a discerning mem- ber of the press. Genie Chance, an editorial reporter for one of the Anchorage radio and televi— sion stations, who covered all the activities of the Task Force, was asked to review the manuscript of this paper. Parts of Mrs. Chance’s letter to one of the writ— ers are quoted below,‘ with her permission: WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE In your report, you refer to a “long and undesirable hiatus in public in- formation” that lasted from May 19, 1964, to the report of June 26, 1964. You give good reasons for this hiatus and for the one at Seward. Actually, however. the lack of understanding of Federal Government activities prior to your first report of May 19 had al- ready created difficulties with respect to public acceptance of the Task Force and its findings. The problem was this: On March 28, 1964, President Johnson declared this a disaster area. The initial reac- tion of the people was shock. Every- one knew we had been hit hard, but they had no conception of what it was to be declared a disaster area. This is something you read about hap— pening other places, not at home. Ap- prehension gave way to hope—the first real hope that there would truly be a tomorrow—with the explanations that the declaration merely set the mach‘ inery into motion for the Federal Gov- ernment to move swiftly to give help. This meant that red tape could be cut \ -/. 1‘77!“ 1. 4M“, "II KW WI ”Ill/ll” all/#17” ”film/ll It?» 7..» '07» ”7”:un lll’lllifiiN I 7Wfig and the affected communities would be back on their feet in short order. Of course, people who are already in a state of shock when they are promised immediate help have an en— tirely different concept of the term “immediate help” than those who are giving the assistance. Consequently, when each day brought news about the arrival of a different group of Federal oflicials or specialists, the hope for quick action blossomed. But each group soon left Alaska after making a quick tour of damaged areas and after making glowing promises to the public as to the aid that would be forthcoming quickly. After their de- parture, the fulfillment of their prom— ises appeared to bog down in red tape—the very thing that we had been told would not happen. In retrospect. we realize that the Federal agencies were moving more rapidly and were streamlining their procedures more than ever before. But their speed had to be properly balanced with cautiOn lest precedents be set that could be abused in the future. But to the vic- ! IN,» “I7.“ ..7 ””0wa . .W ‘\:‘ 1/! / . Illllllflllr' , "In/nun / v} ‘0? 1. ‘\§ 77’0‘, .“ M'” II 7:77: flll’mmml III ‘I1 Am null" I, ‘H‘qunl ”‘1 7!; ’; /////r“ v////// / /4,,rnm' Av WWII 67 tims who were adrift in a sea of un- certainty, the slightest delay seemed like an eternity. Initial cleanup and rescue operations had been done ex- peditiously and effectively, and basic utilities had been restored, but the public wanted to know what the future had in store for them—whether they could rebuild their damaged homes and stores, or whether, indeed, large parts of their towns and cities would be abandoned and rebuilt elsewhere. Employers worried about meeting pay- rolls and feared that each day of in- decision pushed them closer to the brink of bankruptcy. Disillusionment and bitterness took root. And then, Task Force Nine slipped silently into town. The word was around that you were here—but no— body cared. Everybody had already learned about these groups of special- ists from Outside. But they soon found out that this group was dif- ferent. After a long and continuous diet of platitudes it was rather hard to swallow the bitter truth. And yet, Task Force Nine, unlike the others ./l\ I" ”4 4 f r 1 4’ Jami“ 7:7" / a ‘ ' 7‘ [xii/[’1 Fl. um ,1 7 ]1|! / (”fl/j 4.1”“ , ,Ay‘ ' I ,W/l‘é / //1/ 4 7t / 7:77 777.. .. ital 4r a.— "III . ””5! // #2:); ///IT HA?!” 1% 7;” //fl////%fl//// /////r I / f 44“,, 577 &% é) 68 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, who had preceded them, was prescrib- ing just this. Of course, there was an outcry. And it became even worse when there were no progress reports for another five weeks. The silence made the Task Force activities sus- pect. This created an attitude among the citizens that had to be corrected. You must have public confidence before you can get public cooperation. This need to get the public on your side was strange to scientists who are unaccustomed to conducting investiga- tions and studies under constant public scrutiny. It was against all your train- ing as scientists and engineers to say anything to the public until the final decision had been reached. It seemed logical to you to assume that un- founded rumors would spread if any— thing were said in the interim. However, rumors did spread during the periods of official silence. They were the kind of speculations that un- dercut public confidence in the studies. A people who are emotionally and ec- onomically distraught and frustrated quite often will believe anything—even those who are quite reasonable under normal circumstances. And since there was oflicial silence, unfounded rumors had a fertile field. During this period, background in- formation could have been periodically released that would have kept the peo- ple informed on the project without giving any reason to speculate on the results. For example, the members of Task Force Nine could have been presented to the public as individual human be- ings. Their previous experiences could be highlighted to give prestige and importance to the project at hand. This would have built up public con fidence in the individuals so that their findings would be more readily ac- cepted. These “human-interest” stories on the scientists and engineers could be interspersed with stories on each type of study being made in the overall project—how the procedure was de- veloped, where it has been used before, why it is necessary or desirable, how its results will be used in relation to other tests. In the Task Force press conferences, these techniques were ex- plained simultaneously with the re- lease of the results. It was too much to absorb at one time. If the pro- cedures and techniques are understood in advance, the results are a little less startling. Some of the descriptions of Anchorage landslides and what caused them, as described by Shannon and Wilson would have made good full-page picture stories in the news- papers or could have been used on TV stations with explanatory commentary. This could be done in advance of the announcement of the test results and recommendations. And this could be used to occupy the minds of the public while the scientists and engineers are performing their studies. This would also release them from much public pressure. We of the news media were probably greatly at fault in this area. We could have dribbled this information out during the periods of lull. But it was a new experience for us, too. And you will very seldom go into a disaster area and find yourself dealing with local people experienced in dealing with such matters. When everything was released at once, the most imv portant part was the result and rec- ommendation of the Task Force. Nat- urally, we went into this thoroughly. But, by so doing, we minimized the story of how the results were ob- tained. Hereafter, I recommend that the horse be put before the cart—create interest in the personnel and the pro- cedures first. Then the findings of the scientists and engineers and the pro- cedures will hear more credence. And, too, this method would leave little time for the public to wonder what’s going on and to start rumors. My suggestions are not an indict- ment of Task Force Nine, the Field Team, or any other agency. But, perhaps, ‘ this review of some of the obstacles your group faced and con- quered will help forestall similar prob- lems in any such assignment in the future. There was a job of great magnitude and unprecedented difficulty to per- form, and it was handled admirably. Although the work was begun in a climate of resentment, the Task Force and Field Team very successfully over- came public suspicion and bitterness. And this was no easy task. EVALUATION OF TASK FORCE EFFORT In the certain knowledge that the Federal Government will one day be called on for massive as- sistance in similar disasters some- where in the United States, it 1964 seems well to record our thoughts, positive and negative, as to the concept and accomplishments of the Scientific and Engineering Task Force. We feel that the Task Force was a very worthwhile compon- ent of the Government’s recon- struction effort, both in concept and accomplishment. This view is perhaps prejudiced, based as it is on the opinions of two wri— ters who were intimately associ— ated with the venture from its inception. But the validity of our personal opinions gains sub- stance from the favorable reac- tions of the Commission and its chairman, and those of the Fed- eral agencies, local officials, and the public. The greatest single factor in the success of the Task Force concept was the unfailing support that was accorded it ‘by the Reconstruction Commission and its constituent agencies. Some of the shortcomings that marked the Task Force opera— tions were unavoidable, in that they resulted from the hurry and confusion that would character— ize the early recovery period after any great natural disaster. Thus, there were many times when the Field Team and Task Force wished for more basic data, for more time to study the data that were available, or for more oppor- tunity to make their own inde— pendent field observations. Time schedules simply did not permit the realization of these wishes, so that final judgments repre- sented the best possible compro- mises between available knowledge and available time. As described above, the Task Force early adopted a guiding policy of basing all its decisions and recommendations on scientific and engineering grounds—and of avoiding economic, political, or emotional ones so far as possible. WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 69 This general policy is to be recom— mended to any similar future or- ganization, together with a warning as to the pitfalls that may develop if the policy is ig- nored. Good and continuous relations with the press, and through it with the public, are considered essential to the success of any fu- ture Task Force effort of the sort described here. The experience of the Scientific and Engineering Task Force was excellent in this regard. Even so, there were some shortcomings in public relations, and future groups might do well to heed the lessons learned in Alaska. These are described in the section “Public Relations” (p. 65). The direct assignment of Task Force and Field Team members to the Reconstruction Commis- sion, with freedom from admini- strative or technical control by their parent agencies, was largely beneficial. It permitted much faster actions than would have been possible had decisions re- quired coordination and transmit- tal through the several parent agencies. The fact that the Task Force was free to call on services and knowledge from its parent organizations also gave it strength and breadth that it would not have had otherwise. The avail- ability of this help was well known to the Task Force, and was drawn on freely. Field per- sonnel of the parent agencies, however, were possibly too poorly informed as to the responsibilities and restrictions imposed on the Task Force and Field Team. All such personnel were happy to contribute freely of their know- ledge or services. Some of them, however, did not fully realize that the Task Force was only advisory to the Commission, hence were disappointed that it took less than positive action at times. This kind of minor misunderstanding might have been avoided by im- proved lines of communication. The desirability of an advisory group of scientific and engineer- ing specialists, separate from the group charged with gathering the requisite basic information, may be open to some debate. There is much to be said in favor of pro- viding for independent objective judgments, which would be diffi- cult to obtain from those involved in the pressures of day to day operations. But such pyramiding of advisory and research groups, aside from its overtones of bu- reaucracy, adds one or more delay- ing steps in reaching decisions, and it could conceivably have led to confusion, contention, or jeal- ousies. None of these eventuali- ties occurred during the Alaska earthquake studies, largely be- cause of the good will of all those involved. Both Task Force and Field Team were of about optimum size and composition for efficien- cy and responsiveness to needs. In View of the emphasis on soils engineering that characterized the exploratory program, it might be argued that soils—engineering tal- ent should have replaced some of the geologic skills directly repre- sented on the Task Force and Field Team. This argument, how- ever, would lead to fruitless dis- cussion as to the overlapping fields of soil mechanics and engi— neering geology; such a discus- sion is not appropriate here. The fact is that the best knowledge available in both fields was brought to bear on all problems, through the Corps of Engineers, its contractor and consultants, and the Task Force Team and its own advisors. The abrupt early termination of the Reconstruction Commission and its Task Forces had both good and bad effects. It served to relax or remove the pressures of Federal dictation and control as soon as practicable, freeing the people of Alaska to shoulder most of their own burdens in their own way. On the other hand, it left dangling a series of firm Task Force recommendations with no very clear plans for enforcement. Moreover, there were no proce- dures set up for adjusting the recommendations or of relaxing restrictions after ground stabili- zation measures are effected. 70 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS—CLEANUP AND EARLY INTRODUCTION The Alaska earthquake, which occurred at 5:36 pm. on Good Friday, March 27, 1964, was the greatest single disaster in the State’s history. The joint mili- tary-civilian effort in cleaning up the debris, providing emergency facilities, and going on to rebuild permanent replacement facilities was one for which all participants may be justly proud. This paper concerns the activi- ties of the US. Army Engineer District, Alaska, of the Corps of Engineers (referred to herein- after as the “Alaska District”) in connection with their assigned responsibilities in solving the com- plex problems resulting from the catastrophe. The responsibilities of the Alaska District in recon- struction activities were directed by Colonel Kenneth T. Sawyer, District Engineer until August 22, 1964, at which time he was re— lieved by Colonel Clare F. Farley, the succeeding District Engineer. Colonel Byron M. Kirkpatrick was Deputy District Engineer un- til June 1965, and Mr. Warren George was Chief of the Engi- neering Division during the full restoration period. The Corps of Engineers was formally requested to assume the responsibility for repair and re— storative work in the disaster area within the purview of Public Law 3Project Engineer, Emergency Restora- tion, Alaska District, Corps of Engineers, US. Army. ‘ Chief, Engineering Division, Alaska Dis- trict, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. RECONSTRUCTION By ROBERT E. LYLES and WARREN GEORGE‘ 875 by letter dated March 31, 1964, from the Director, Office of Emergency Planning, Executive Office of the President, Washing- ton, D. C. The Corps of Engi- neers proceeded with the repair and restorative work through its own personnel and by contract, w h ere necessary, immediately upon receipt of individual re- quests from Office of Emergency Planning. The requests were in- itiated as a result of appeals for aid from public entities and were relayed to the Alaska District for action through the North Pacific Division of the Corps of Engi- neers, US. Army. The Office of Emergency Planning received re- quests for aid from the State of Alaska; the cities of Anchorage, Seward, Valdez, Homer, Cordova, Seldovia, Kenai, Girdwood, and Whittier; the Palmer and An— chorage school districts; and the Spenard Public Utility District. The requests were transmitted to the Alaska District for necessary action. The Federal Reconstruc- tion and Development Planning Commission was extremely active during the reconstruction phase, and it was for Task Force Nine of this commission that the Alas- ka District undertook the exten- sive soils investigation in the An- chorage, Seward, and Valdez areas. Similar requests were re- ceived from the Department of Interior’s Alaska Railroad, the Alaska State Housing Authority acting for the Urban Renewal Administration, the Alaskan Air Command, and the US. Army, Alaska. The scope of the work accomp- lished under the provisions of PL 87 5 generally falls in the fol— lowing categories: (1) perform- ing protective and other work es- sential for the preservation of life and property on both public and private lands; (2) debris and wreckage clearance; (3) tempor- ary repair to and temporary re- placement of public facilities, ex— cept as reserved to other Federal agencies; and (4) furnishing technical assistance, execution of surveys, and submission of recom- mendations and reports to Office of Emergency Planning relative to PL 875 activities. The District operations in con- nection with PL 87 5 were con- ducted primarily as civil-works activities. Administrative and professional judgments are re- quired in determining the eligi- bility of projects under this law, particularly as it relates to emer- gency repairs and temporary re- placement. PL 875 was interpret- ed as intending to provide Federal assistance to alleviate damage, hardship, and suffering occasioned by disaster, but not to provide for improvement or betterment. The work specifically assigned the Corps of Engineers consisted of demolition and debris clear- ance; emergency restoration of public utilities; and the rebuild- ing of docks, schools, hospitals, and other essential facilities in most of the damaged areas of the State. The Corps of Engineers partici- pates in restoration of channels, breakwaters, and harbors through funds appropriated annually un- der the “rehabilitation” category. This was the source of funds util— ized in restoration or rehabilita- tion of the Kodiak and Seldovia harbors as well as dredging of the original Cordova harbor. These three harbors were still intact after the earthquake and thus qualified for rehabilitation funds. At Homer, Seward, and Val- dez, complete new harbors were required; consequently reconstruc- tion of new harbors equivalent to the previous installations was ac- CLEANUP BY THE CORPS complished under PL 875. EX- pansion was also desired and eco- nomically justified; therefore, the Corps of Engineers, with funds appropriated by Congress in the supplemental A la 5 k a Omnibus Bill, financed the expansion part of these three harbors and also the expansion work at Cordova har- bor. In addition to the work listed above, PL 87—99 funds were util- ized by the Corps in furnishingr the engineering support requested by the Office of Emergency Plan- ning for that phase of the pro— gram. This large item included supervision and administration 0F ENGINEERS 71 costs for construction contracts and support for all other types of PL 875 work. The Alaska District organized three new Resident Engineer Offices, at Anchorage, Valdez, and Seward, and a number of project offices at the smaller towns to maintain close contact with the communities in developing proj- ects. Contracts were awarded for debris clearance, demolitions, and such emergency repairs to sewers, water supplies, communications, and power—distribution systems as w e re necessary for minimum standards of health, safety, and the conduct of business. Concur- 45.fi0011apse of Fourth Avenue near 0 Street, Anchorage, due to landslide caused by the earthquake. 72 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 rently, some 65 engineers in emer- gency disaster teams were sent to Alaska from the Walla Walla, Seattle, and Portland Districts of the North Pacific Division, to de- velop the scope of specific proj— ects and make cost estimates for work requiring more deliberate design. The Alaska District negotiated many contracts with architect-en- gineer firms to design projects de- fined by the survey teams. A size- able cost-plus-fixed-fee contract was negotiated with a master ar- chitect-engineer firm to augment the engineering staff of the Alas- ka District to insure that the de- signs conformed to standards and met community needs. All con- tracts with specific architect-en- gineers were negotiated by the Alaska District engineering staff. To as large an extent as possible, local and Alaska architect-engi- neer firms were used to accomplish the design in order to utilize local resources as much as possible in helping the damaged economy, to effect closer control of the work, and to speed up the construction effort. T his architect-engineer effort required a great deal of cri- teria assembly, definition of scope, and close contract control to in— sure appropriate end results. One of the major problems in every community, and particular- ly in the smaller ones, was the serious disruption of the local economy. Destruction of estab- lished businesses reduced employ— ment drastically and threw peo- ple out of work when they could least afford it. To provide ur- gently needed employment and to channel as much of the restora- tion work as possible to the hard- hit local residents, construction contracts were sized to allow the maximum participation by local bidders. Utility contracts were put out in successive increments. This approach had an added ad- vantage in allowing the architect- engineers to produce bidding documents earlier than if large segments of the utility system were included in one contract; it was also effective in shoring up the local economies and at the same time accomplishing the as- signed mission quickly. DAMAGE SURVEYS The immediate problem posed by the earthquake was to deter- mine the extent of damages to civilian communities, to military installations, and to transporta- tion facilities, including rivers and harbors. Engineer disaster teams were organized on a crash basis to survey the damages and furnish guidance for emergency restoration to insure public safe- ty, maintain health, and to restore communications and economic in- tercourse. Within a few days all areas had had reconnaissance cov— erage by these groups. Survey teams used light aircraft and wheeled surface vehicles in their checkup. Particular emphasis was placed on damage assessment of the affected schools and hospitals in all the communities. Many schools suffered severe structural damage and were declared unsafe in part or whole. Undamaged or lightly damaged schools were re- occupied only after a very close verification of the structural ade— quacy by the Alaska District. Actually, owing to the seriousness of follow-on shocks, each build- ing was checked at least twice and some were checked three times. A vital and most important part of the program was the as- sembling of adequate technical in- formation to serve as a basis for engineering decisidn making. As stated, engineering firms were em- ployed by contract to help in this work. Several of the contracts were for inspection of water and sewer systems and underground and overhead electrical distribu- tion systems, to obtain data on which to base the design for re- storation and reconstruction. Ob- viously, detection of all damage could not be done quickly with as- surance of complete coverage, without special equipment. It was, therefore, necessary to de- pend upon visual inspection for accomplishment of the more ur- gent repairs on an emergency basis. Provisions for testing cer- tain water mains were included in the contracts for inspection, and test requirements were established on the same basis as would be used for new construction. Acceptance of lines tested on this basis gave the communities assurance that the repaired system would be as trouble—free as possible. In the interim before temporary water lines could be laid, or emer- gency repairs made to the perma— nent water systems, the furnishing of potable water to the inhabit- ants was a major consideration. The US. Army, Alaska, set up water points in all the areas of waterline damage. This procedure assured a safe chlorinated supply of drinking water until surface lines were laid or permanent lines repaired. The determination of the loca- tion of damage and the delinea- tion of repair methods for sewer restoration were more complex than for the water—distribution system. Damage to sewers was not confined to slide areas, nor was it obvious at the ground sur- face as breaks in the water mains often were. Photographic and di- rect visual inspection of the sew- ers was employed to determine the location and nature of individual line breaks. Manholes were in— spected at the same time that cam- era crews were using them for access to the sewer. Photographs were made at 3-foot intervals along the pipe in all storm and sanitary sewers less than 24 inches in diameter where damage w as suspected to exist, and direct vis- ual inspection was undertaken in all such sewers 24 inches and larger. Approximately 700,000 linear feet of storm and sanitary sewers was inspected by contract in the Anchonage area alone during the summer of 1964. Photography was of two types, one being the “inspectoline” process, in which a 16-mm single—frame automatic camera with stroboscopic flash equipment was used. This equip— ment is suitable for pipelines 8 inches and larger, and it was found that color film gave better results than black and white film. The other method utilized a 30- mm double-frame stereoscopic au- tomatic camera, equipped with stroboscopic flash equipment and a heating device to prevent lens fogging; this method produced black and white stereo-paired photographs of excellent quality. CLEANUP AND RESTORATION ANCHORAGE Anchorage, the largest city in Alaska, has a metropolitan pop- ulation of approximately 100,000. It is on a bluff overlooking Knik Arm, a part of Cook Inlet. Principal damage to the An- chorage area was caused by land- slides, ground subsidence, and fis- sures resulting from the earth— quake. The city w-as not affected by tidal waves. The major de- struction occurred in the main business district along Fourth Avenue, in the K—L Street area west of the business district, in the Government Hill area ad- CLEANUP BY THE CORPS joining Elmendorf Air Force Base on the north side of the city, and in the Turnagain Heights residential area overlook- ing Cook Inlet south of the city. : Priority attention was given to debris clearance and utility re- pair. The emergency design was characterized by on-t‘he-spot de— velopment, initiation of work by letter contract, and control by a field force into which a design and cost. capability was inte— grated. Emergency repairs were made to the utilities on a tem— porary basis until more definite information could be gathered on which to base the final remedial solution. The USAF Hospital at Elmen- dorf Air Force Base, which was evacuated immediately after the earthquake, was reoccupied in a week. The Presbyterian Hospi- tal also was evacuated to permit cleanup but was reoccupied in a shorter time period. The Provi— dence Hospital, located in an area less affected by the quake, con- tinued in operation. These last two hospitals are privately man- aged facilities. The public psy- chiatric hospital, in the same area as the Providence Hospital, con- tinued in operation. Emergency work was com- pleted on the municipal dock, on the backup storage area, and on other damaged port facilities in- cluding construction of a tempor— ary petroleum offloading facility in the Anchorage harbor. SEWARD Seward, on the Kenai Penin- sula about 80 miles south of An- chorage, has a population of only 3,000 in the city and surrounding district, but occupies an import- ant place in the economy of the State. It has an ice-free harbor and is the southern terminus of OF ENGINEERS 73 The Alaska Railroad and the An- chorage-Seward Highway. The city’s preearthquake econ- omy was to a considerable extent dependent 011 its transportation industry which included exten- sive railroad yards and freight staging areas. Fish—processing plants and storage facilities for petroleum products were also a part of the economy. All were located in the waterfront area. Massive destruction of facilities along the waterfront was inflicted by submarine slides and tidal waves. An immediate result of the seismic shocks was the rupture of fuel storage tanks. The fuel quickly caught fire and flames spread over half a mile of water- front. Submarine la n d slid es caused the subsidence of about 4,- 000 feet of the waterfront into Resurrection Bay, and took with them storage tanks and other waterfront facilities including the municipal dock. Tidal waves generated by the earthquake to a height of 30 feet destroyed the railroad docks and leveled the remaining facilities along the waterfront. Buildings, boats, and railroad cars were added to the debris already de- posited by ground shocks and slides. The industrial area along the waterfront was completely de- stroyed and the petroleum offload- ing facilities, canneries, and docks were swept away. The standby powerplant was destroyed and the small—boat harbor was rendered useless. Emergency repairs to utilities were initiated by letter contracts and were so programmed that they were progressively operation- al in a very short time. An initial contract for emergency debris cleanup was issued early in April 1964, and additional contracts have been issued periodically. 74 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 eta—Aerial View of Fourth Avenue slide ‘area,.Anch0rage, after initial cleanup of debris, looking northwest; Westward Hotel in top center. 47.—Tumagain Heights landslide before and after partial cleanup by Corps of Engineers. Arrow marks same house in both views. 76 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 48.——Aerial view of Valdez showing waterfront and city before the earthquake, looking northwest. Note the dike built around the town to protect it from floods of the Valdez glacial stream. CLEANUP BY THE CORPS 0F ENGINEERS 77 4!).—Aerial View of Valdez showing waterfront and city after the earthquake, submarine slides, and waves, looking northwest. Note complete removal of docks and recession of shoreline. Temporary (lock (lower right) was built after the earthquake. 50.—Partial cleanup of petroleum tank farm area, Seward, looking northwest. ail—The Alaska Railroad dock, Seward, after initial cleanup of damaged warehouse and debris, looking north. By the spring of 1965, the water- front was cleared of all un-salvage- able material. The salavageable material was stockpiled or trans— ported away from the waterfront. At Seward, debris clearance alone was a major task, costing more than $2.5 million. VALDEZ Valdez, a small fishing port with a population of about 600, is 120 miles east of Anchorage and is the southern terminus of the Rich— ardson Highway which extends northward to Fairbanks. Damage to Valdez was the re- sult of both tremors and tidal waves. Ground shocks cracked 52.—Main business “street” of Seldovia. CLEANUP BY THE CORPS 0F ENGINEERS buildings, opened fissures in the streets, and ruptured waterlines and sewerlines. Waves generated by the slide were followed by a series of tidal waves, the fourth and highest completing the devas- tation of the harbor, the water- front area, and half of the down- town business area. The small- boat harbor, fuel storage terminal, and piers were destroyed, as well as the entire fishing fleet except for two boats that were out at sea. The location of Valdez after the earthquake was considered a high-risk area, subject to future waterfront slides and tidal flood- 79 ing. It was declared unsuitable for rehabilitation and a new site was selected in a safer location about 4 miles west of the old site. A minimum amount of repair work was performed at the old site to provide emergency services for the inhabitants until accommoda- tions could be provided at the new site. Debris was removed from the old town and emergency re- pairs to the city, hospital, school, and utilities completed. A tem- porary barge terminal to serve the immediate needs of the city was constructed and has been in use since June 1964. Regional subsidence due to earthquake caused flooding by high tides; sandbags were placed along boardwalk to prevent it from floating. 53.—Petroleum tank farm at Whittier after wave and fire damage, looking west. CORDOVA Cordova is a fishing port of about 1,100 inhabitants and is about 45 miles southeast of Valdez. Damage resulted from an earth- quake-induced uplift of about 6 feet, local fracturing of the ground, and a tidal wave which floated away houses and boats along the waterfront and damaged canneries and pier and dock facil- ities. Emergency work by the Alaska District consisted of removal of debris and wreckage attributable directly to the earth- quake, and restoration of essential public utilities. HOMER The fishing community of Hom- er has about 1,200 inhabitants and is on Kachemak Bay at the south— west end of Kenai Peninsula. It is the terminus of the Sterling Highway, which runs northward to connect with the Anchorage- Seward Highway. Its deep-water ice-free port accommodates cargo freighters and barges. The earth- quake caused some damage to downtown Homer, principally to the hospital and a new elementary school. A combination of general land subsidence and high water inflicted severe damage to port facilities and made the docks and canneries unusable. The small- boat-harbor protection works in part were severely damaged. Emergency work by the Alaska District consisted of cleaning up, in the interest of safety, health, and sanitation, the debris and refuse caused by the earthquake. SELDOVIA Seldovia, a fishing community of about 550 inhabitants, is 20 miles across Kachem'ak Bay from Homer. Land subsidence, a result of the earthquake, lowered the waterfront about 3 feet and ex- posed structures along the board- walk to flooding during the higher tides. Emergency work consisted of (1) furnishing and placing sandbags on the board\ 'alk to keep it in place during high tides and (2) miscellaneous work in connec- tion with repairs to streets, utilities, and airfield. WHITTIER Whittier is an ice-free seaport and a terminus of The Alaska Railroad located on Prince Wil- liam Sound approximately 60 miles southeast of Anchorage. Emergency work consisted of the removal of debris caused by the earthquake. Much of the com— mercial petroleum industry at the port was severely damaged and burned, as were the railroad-car- unloading facilities of The Alaska Railroad. OTHER COMMUNITIES The Alaska District personnel accomplished inspections, emer- gency repairs, and miscellaneous work pertaining to earthquake-in- curred damages at Chugiak, Dil- lingham, Fire Island, Girdwood, Glennallen, Hope, Kenai, King Salmon, Klawock, Kodiak Island, Larson Bay Village, Moose Pass, Nikishka, Ninilchik, Orca Inlet, Soldatna, Spenard, and Tatit- lek. Reconnaissance and reports were also made concerning dam- age to the Seward and Sterling Highways, the Cooper Lake trans- mission line, and the intake section of the Eklutna Power Project. THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 81 RECONSTRUCTION BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS—METHODS INTRODUCTION Because of the short construction season and the severity of Alaska winters, careful attention had to be given to coordination of the project planning for permanent restoration or for reconstruction of facilities damaged or destroy— ed by the Alaska earthquake. A studied pattern was followed dur- ing reconstruction planning to in- sure a sound rehabilitation and reconstruction program. First, emergency repairs to the essential facilities such as utilities and transportation were made. Sec- ond, extensive geologic and soils studies were made to determine where facilities should be per- manently reconstructed. Third, the projects were designed, some- times concurrently with the soil— study program. Finally, the pro- jects were advertised and con— tracts were awarded for construc- tion. Urban-renewal project plan- ning, which became an influence in some of the reconstruction ef- fort, was incorporated with the restoration of facilities at Anchor- age, Cordova, Seldovia, Seward, and Valdez. The Urban Renewal Administration, the Alaska Hous- ing Authority, the several com- munities, and the US. Army En- gineer District, Alaska, of the Corps of Engineers (hereafter re— ferred to as the “Alaska District”) 5Chief, Engineering Division, Alaska Dis- trict, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. 6Project Engineer, Emergency Restora- tion, Alaska District, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS By WARREN GEORGE 5 and ROBERT E. LYLE ° cooperated very closely in order to coordinate and satisfy long-range urban development needs. The ul— timate objectives of the urban- renewal projects, which are to pro- vide earthquake-damaged com— munities with better land utiliza- tion, to rehabilitate blighted areas, and to provide more effective traf- fic patterns, had consideration in this effort. Urban-renewal appli- cation and planning procedures were expedited in order to meet the urgent community needs. Because of the extensive earth- quake-induced slides, it was felt that a major soils, geology, and foundation study of these land- slides in over seven areas of An- chorage would lbe needed. Prime aerial photographs were secured by three flight agencies on March 28 and 29; these have proved to be very valuable. An investigation of the land- slides and other earthquake dam- age was initiated on March 29, 1964, by the Anchorage Engi- neering Geology E v a l u a t i o 11 Group under authorization of the Alaska Housing Authority and the city of Anchorage. As part of this early efl’ort, Arctic Alaska Testing Laboratories, An- chorage, conducted borings, field measurements, and laboratory tests in the principal slide areas and generally throughout the city. To meet the need for a major study in the soils, geology, and foundation fields of the landslide— affected areas in Anchorage, an operational organization was se- lected which consisted of an arch- itect-engineer group to function under supervision of the Alaska District’s Engineering Division for the investigation and reports, plus a board of consultants for advice, monitoring, and review. Authority to proceed in this man- ner, requested early in April from higher authority, was re- ceived on April 16. The soils-mechanics and found- ations firm of Shannon and Wil- son, Inc., of Seattle was se- lected and a fixed-price contract covering such work at Anchor- age, Seward, and Valdez was negotiated on April 25, 1964. This contract required Shannon and Wilson to provide comprehensive soils— and geological-engineering assistance to the Alaska District, to begin field investigations with- in 10 days at Anchorage, to cover each of five principal slide areas as a separate entity and adjacent areas in the city of Anchorage as well, and to determine: (1) the mechanics of the slide move- ments, (2) existing static stabil- ity of affected areas, (3) stability of affected areas if subjected to future shocks, (4) static and dynamic stability of areas not affected, and (5) methods for improving the stability of exist- ing or potential landslide areas. Separate work was also as- signed at Valdez and Seward, Alaska. Because of the value of the property affected by the landslides and the need for financing reconstruction, all work at Anchorage was programmed 82 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 for completion in units on a rig- orous schedule which dovetailed with the Alaska District’s as- signed responsibilities and which also took cognizance of the ur- gent need for reliable engineer- ing and geologic information by other Federal agencies, the city, the State of Alaska, and the private sector. At the same time, the Alaska District engaged, as a board of consultants group, Ralph Peck of the University of Illinois, Laurits Bjerrum, Director of the Nor- wegian Geological Institute, and Thomas F. Thompson of Bur- lingame, Calif. This group of eminent soils and geology experts was constituted to monitor the progress and direction of the soils and geology studies of the Alaska District and its soils, geology, and foundations contrac- tor, Shannon and Wilson, Inc., to recommend needed changes; to review reports and findings; and to advise the District Engineer on his courses of action in par- ticipation with Federal, State, and city oflicials concerned with planning recovery from the dis- aster and reconstruction of public facilities. Shannon and Wilson, Inc., commenced work on May 4 1964, and Within 48 hours had three soil~sampling (drilling) rigs to- gether with supply and inspec- tion services :in operation. On May 11 the firm established its Anchorage field office, at which time seven rigs were in operation nearly around the clock on two slide areas, a bucket auger was digging man-sized-access holes for geologic inspection of critical un- derground areas, a group was in~ stalling piezometers and slope— movement indicator assemblies, and another group was taking seismic measurements in the slide areas. By May 29 most of the geophysical exploration had been completed, Shannon and Wilson’s slide-project leaders had each reviewed his slide area or areas, subsurface data collection was proceeding with 15 drilling rigs functioning in the field, two lab- oratory groups were clarifying and testing samples, and the slope-indicator, vane—shear, and piezometer-installation crews were well along in their work. Work programs were reviewed on May 28 and 29 by the con- sultant board. Changes made in- cluded: more emphasis on bucket— auger inspection holes, additional piezometer installations and vane shears, improved sampling tech- niques, more inquiry into the earthquake vibrational spectrum, and acceleration of dynamic tri- axial testing. The work of the investigation was voluminous and of great var- iety, and it resulted in compre- hensive engineering data on each slide and surrounding area. Sub— surface profiles were developed from some 150 borings, includ- ing undisturbed sample borings, vane-shear borings, and bucket- auger holes. Geophysical and geological explorations were un— dertaken, piezometers w e r e installed, and observations of earthquake-induced ground move« ment were made. Comprehensive laboratory investigations were conducted on undisturbed and re- constituted samples, including dy- namic-strength tests, mineralogi— cal and paleontological studies, as well as conventional classification, consolidation, and strength tests. Laboratory strength tests showed the weak zone of the Bootlcgger Cove Clay (Pleistocene) to have shear strength in the range of 0.35— 0.40 ton per square foot and sen- sitivities in the range of 25— 50. Special dynamic strength tests, in which specimens were subjected to pulsating triaxial loads, showed that 50 cycles of stress could result in failure 'of the clay at a stress level approx- imately 60—80 percent of the stat- ic strength. Similar tests on loose sands from the same stra- tum indicated that failure would occur at cyclic stress levels of the same order of magnitude. On June 24, 1964, Shannon and Wilson delivered its first prelimi- nary report on the Fourth Avenue slide area to the Alaska District, its board of consultants, the city of Anchorage, the Office of Emer- gency Planning, and representa- tives of the Federal Reconstruc- tion and Development Planning Commission for Alaska, including the Scientific and Engineering Task Force (“Task Force Nine”). This report enabled Task Force Nine, the engineering group of the Planning Commission, to re- vise risk-area classifications for the Fourth Avenue slide areas and other areas of greater Anchorage. Shannon and Wilson delivered its remaining preliminary reports in the same manner, to about the same group of officials, on the fol— lowing dates: Date Report of slide at— Oral Written presentation preliminary report L Street _____________ June 29. 1964 July 6, 1964 Turnagain ,,,,,,,,,,, July 6, 1964 July 11, 1964 Government Hill, First Avenue, Romig Hill. . _ V", July 20, 1964 July 25, 1964 Each of these timely presenta- tions gave factual engineering data concerning the causes and effects of the landslides that had occurred during the earthquake, together with recommendations for remedial measures including design criteria. Task Force Nine immediately assigned suitable risk classifications, which were pub- lished in the newspapers along RECONSTRUCTION BY THE CORPS 0F ENGINEERS 83 with a semitechnical explanation of the Alaska District’s findings concerning stability and restora- tion of the landslide area. The Office of Emergency Planning and the District Engineer also quick- ly utilized the reports as back- ground for important engineering decisions as to restoration of pub- lic facilities and stabilization in each landslide area. Early in August, Shannon and Wilson compiled -all data into a final written report which on August 10 and 11 was given a thorough review by the board of consultants and by representatives of the Alaska District, of the North Pacific Division, and of the Office of the Chief of Engineers. The report was printed and issued on August 28, 1964. It presents the results of the investigation in detail, gives explanations as to what occurred, and makes final recommendations as to design criteria for remedial measures and land uses. The report concluded that (1) the strong ground-motion waves from the earthquake—gen- erated shear stresses in the upper critical soils of the Bootlegger Cove Clay, which underlie parts of Anchorage, caused failure in these soils and permitted horizontal sliding toward the blufi's in loca- tions where height, declivity, and other physical parameters were most unfavorable to stability; (2) though all slide areas are sta- ble under present static condi— tions, all may be expected to ex- perience additional movements of varying magnitudes in another great earthquake; (3) all areas which failed can be stabilized against another earthquake of similar magnitude and duration by means of slope flattening, but- tressing, improvement of subsur- face drainage, and other well- established procedures; (4) settle— ment of the ground surfaces, in and adjacent to the slide areas, will occur over a period of years due to consolidation of the slide- disturbed clay and sand strata, especially within the graben and pressure-ridge parts; (5) many of the bluff slopes in the vicinity of Anchorage underlain by the Bootlegger Cove Clay are of mar— ginal static and dynamic stability, and oversteepening or overloading of existing slopes by excavations at the base or by construction of fills or heavy structures near the crest or on the slope may result in localized landslides; and (6) ground motions during earth- quakes will likely be greater near the crest of such slopes than else- where. ANCHORAGE Restoration of schools that were not in slide areas was initiated im- mediately after the spring semes— ter. All the schools that had light to moderate damage were carefully investigated by archi- tect-engineer firms and repaired by construction contract in time for the beginning of the fall se- mester in .1964. Repair of two of the more seriously (1 a m a g e d schools, Denali Elementary and West High School,' took much longer. Denali was made avail- able for use at the beginning of the second semester. Government Hill Elementary was destroyed and could not be rebuilt in the same location because of unstable soil conditions. A new school was designed and was ready for occu— pancy in August 1965 on land made available to the school dis- trict by the US. Air Force. After determination that the important West Anchorage High School, which was very heavily damaged, was in a nominal-risk area, stu— dies were made to evaluate its re- storation. Design and construc- tion proceeded in three separate phases. In phase 1 the moderate- ly damaged auditorium wing was restored, in time to allow use by the school district for the first se- mester of 1964. Phase 2 consist- ed of the restoration of the severe- ly damaged classroom wing, which was turned over to the school district for use at the be- ginning of the second semester. In phase 3, a new one-story class- room wing to replace the original second story will be constructed; this project was scheduled for com- pletion by the beginning of the fall term, September 1, 1965. In order to accomplish these sched- ules, school-repair contracts re- quired double shifting of work by the contractor and specified high liquidated damages. These measures were effective in procur- ing completely usable structures in time for the start of school. School-repair contracts a l o n e totaled $5.6 million. All consid— ered, the school program was car— ried on quite well, but some dou- ble shifting of students was nec— essary. Repair of underground utilities, as well as the restoration of schools, had priority. S u r f a c e waterlines were laid immediately after the earthquake to provide service in the major slide areas where underground lines were seriously damaged. Water pipe f or the permanent restoration was purchased while designs were still being developed, and the pro- curement lead time was thus cut to an absolute minimum. Essential permanent restoration of water service in all areas was completed well before freezeup, and the sur- face lines were then dismantled. The 24-inch wood-stave supply main from the treatment plant to the city was extensively dam— aged along part of its route. A mile and a half of this line was 84 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, bypassed by laying a new cast—iron main. This line and the new wells drilled to replace those destroyed assure a continued dependable water supply. A detailed pitome- ter survey of the water system re- vealed additional points of im- portant leakage outside of the var- ious slide areas; these were re- paired. Repair of structural dam- age at the municipal water-treat- ment plant completed the perma- nent restoration of the water-sup- ply system. 54.——Govemment Hill slide area, Anchorage, showing damage to elementary school. After emergency work to re— store the sewer system to a rea- sonably workable condition, a major effort was made to photo graph all lines with known or suspected damage. This was done to be sure all breaks were properly identified and repaired. Repair contracts were developed progressively as photography re- vealed the need. All essential sewer repair was accomplished before freezeup, and less criti- cally needed restoration was de— 1964 ferred until 1965. Work under contract to be finished in 1965 completed the restoration of all Anchorage and Spenard Public Utility District sewers. The municipal electrical distri— bution system, both overhead and underground, was damaged ex- tensively. An effective tool for examination of underground ducts was a television camera lent, complete with crew, by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. This loan enabled the Alaska Photograph taken shortly after earth- quake, looking nomthwest Undamaged far corner of school was preserved for future use when remainder of school was razed. Alaska Communication Service toll building and microwave tower (right) were undamaged. RECONSTRUCTION BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS 85 District to pinpoint damage in ducts and eliminate the need for a “find-and-fix” type contract. All work essential to restoration of an operable system was com- pleted before the normal heavy winter electrical loads. Most of the damage to the municipal telephone system was in the slide areas. Necessary re- pairs were made early by city crews. The television camera was again effective in locating damage to ducts. Repair of the system was completed in the spring of 1965. Street repairs were deferred until 1965 because utility repair required the removal of pave- ment in many areas late in the fall. All pavement restoration was completed by August 1965. Many utility and street-repair contracts were required to com- plete the work. Public buildings belonging to the city of Anchorage had minor to moderately heavy damage and were repaired before winter. The State Mines and Minerals Building was located in the Fourth Avenue slide area and consequently was completely de- stroyed. A new facility was scheduled for completion by Au— gust 1965. After completion of the soils investigation and the review by the ‘board of consultants, it was apparent that stabilization of the major slide areas would be es- sential, not only to restore the areas to use, but also to protect adjacent property. Accordingly, a buttress system was designed for the Fourth Avenue slide area. Funds for this project were made available by the Urban Renewal Administration through the Alas- ka Housing Authority. The pro- ject was expanded to include the construction of a complete new utility system and a street system. Design was completed and con- struction started in 1965 as soon as real estate became available. This major undertaking will be one of great importance to the downtown business area. In the Turnagain slide area, testing was initiated in the fall of 1964 to determine the most feasible method of stabilization. Both blasting and mechanical disturbance of the sensitive clay developed drawbacks that made use of these stabilization methods unattractive. Electro-osmosis treatment was also explored. A test model consisting of 22 rail- road rails as probes introducing direct current at varying voltages and amperages to the clay has been successful in increasing soil strength. Although the results of some of these experiments were promising, it became apparent that the slide material had spontaneously re- gained most of its original strength. Accordingly, the Alas- ka District decided in mid-1966 that stabilization measures, other than protection of the shoreline, were unnecessary. SEWARD The permanent restoration of the utilities and the public schools of the city of Seward was completed in 1964. Addi— tional restoration under way in- cluded the State Court and Office Building, the City Maintenance Shop, and replacement of the 3000—kw standby electrical-gen— eration facility. All the facilities are being funded by the Oflice of Emergency Planning except the powerplant, which is funded jointly by the Oflice of Emer- gency Planning and the city. The publicly owned and oper- ated waterfront facilities, which include a small-boat basin, city dock, and associated facilities are being reconstructed under the authority of the Office of Emer- gency Planning and the Corps of Engineers. These waterfront facilities represent a most im~ portan-t part of the economy of Seward because of its fishing and recreational activities. Facilities for The Alaska Rail- road, which include a dock suit- able for berthing two 600-foot vessels and allied offloading stor— age facilities and marshaling yard, are being constructed at the northerly end of Resurrection Bay where the shore area is being raised by using material dredged to deepen the harbor in the vicinity of the docks. These facilities also have great economic importance to the town and to the railroad. VALDEZ The permanent reconstruction effort in Valdez is unique in that the decision was made to relocate the entire city in an area which is not subject to instability in the event of a future earthquake. The reconstruction project is being un- dertaken under the joint sponsor- ship of the Ofl‘ice of Emergency Planning, the Urban Renewal Ad- ministration, and the Corps of Engineers. The new city encom— passes an area of approximately 200 acres. The general city plan- ning was done by the Alaska Housing Authority under the sponsorship of the Urban Renew- al Administration; the design and construction of the streets and utilities, high school, elementary school, and municipal building are being accomplished by the Alaska District under the spon— sorship of the Office of Emergen- cy Planning. The utility and street systems in the new town- site represent a sizable investment, 55.—Dock and boat harbor under construction at new site for Valdez, looking east; winter of 1964—65. 56.—Elementary school constructed during the autumn of 1964 at new site for Valdez, looking northeast. If RECONSTRUCTION BY THE CORPS 57.—New site of Valdez and dock facilities (foreground). head of Port Valdez. Loss of the Valdez by U.S. Geological Survey geologists to abandon the town tific and Engineering Task Force concurred in this recommendation. and also mean that there is no danger of offshore slides. funded jointly by the Office of Emergency Planning and the Alaska Housing Authority. The sea-oriented economy of the city is being reconstructed at the new townsite. The facilities com- pleted or under construction are a city dock and two dry-storage warehouses and a small-boat har- 231—821 0—66—7 bor. Waterfront facilities, fund- ed by the Oflice of Emergency Planning and the Corps of Engi- neers also comprise major instal- lations. The two new schools and the city hall replace structures badly damaged. A complex consisting of a State Highway District Headquarters OF ENGINEERS 87 Old Valdez, devastated by the earthquake is at center (left) at waterfront by submarine slides, extensive earthquake damage throughout the town, and the ever-present danger of flooding by Valdez glacial stream (note dikes around town) led to recommendations and to rebuild Valdez on the flat near Mineral Creek. The Scien- Bedrock ridges along shore protect the new townswite office building and maintenance depot shops and a state hospital with beds for 150 mentally re- tarded patients and 15 acute pa— tients is being constructed on a 30-acre tract adjacent to the new city limits. These facilities are important additions to the return of the economic health of the city. 88 THE ALAsKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 CORDOVA At Cordova, the land rose rather than settled, as at most other coastal communities, so the small—boat harbor was rendered useless for anchorage of small craft. Basically, the problem was to deepen the old small—boat har- bor and expand it to provide moorage for the boats which, prior to the earthquake, moored in bays and inlets surrounding the Cordova area. In execution the operation became somewhat com- plicated. It was necessary to pro- vide moorage for small boats with- in the harbor, to provide a new ferry terminal, and to maintain access to two canneries while dredging was in progress. The total effort represents a major project jointly supported by the Office of Emergency Planning and the Corps of Engineers. The quake severely damaged the w 0 o d — s t a v e water-supply line bringing water to the city from a distant source, and some sewage facilities were wrecked. Total utility repairs represent a sizable investment. 58.—Partially completed new boat basin on Homer Spit, 1 slides was near new riprapped breakwater on left side of spit. SELDOVIA Structural damage to the town of Seldovia was comparatively light. The major problem here was that the whole area settled about 31/2 feet, and put in serious jeo— pardy the business district of the town. The business district is pri« marily on docks along the board— walk, which runs the full length of the waterfront. The tsunami broke floats loose from within the small- boat harbor but did very little other damage. The first order of business after the earthquake was to raise the breakwaters for the harbor 4 feet to their original height. Other work consisted of restoration of damaged utilities and reconstruction of the airfield by raising the runway above high tide. A number of contracts to eflect this restoration were neces- sary. The Alaska Housing Authority developed an urban—renewal proj- ect for rebuilding and raising the complete waterfront area. This project consisted of demolition of the boardwalk and other struc- tures along the waterfront, the construction of a breakwater, with fill to form new land upon which property owners could rebuild canneries and other businesses. Work was accomplished in stages in 1965 and 1966 to allow removal of cannery equipment and rebuild- ing with a minimum of down time. This unusual project required much detailed effort and coordina— tion. It was jointly funded by the Alaska Housing Authority and the Office of Emergency Planning. HOMER The town of Homer itself had only light damage, but the Homer Spit, site of the city dock and the small-boat harbor and other commercial facilities, sub— sided 6 feet; heavy damage re- sulted. It was impossible to reconstruct the harbor in its original location, so a new harbor has been constructed within the Spit. A new main breakwater was required, and a part of the old breakwater was utilized as an entrance breakwater. Inner har- bor facilities and a new city dock completed the waterfront facil— ooking south. Former basin destroyed by subsidence and submarine Land’s End Hotel is at extreme end of spit. RECONSTRUCTION BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS 89 ities for Homer. These were major efforts. The access to these facilities will be provided by a Federal road system which will require extensive reconstruction. The Alaska District conducted an investigation, funded by the Office Of Emergency Planning, to determine the long-term effect A report was completed in Au- gust 1965. OTHER COMMUNITIES Restoration and reconstruction Of harbor facilities were accom- plished at Kodiak and Orca Inlet and the harbor at Tatitlek was dredged. These were major con- which restoration of public buildings and utilities was accom- plished are Moose Pass, Kenai, C‘hugiak, Palmer, Glennallen, Girdwood, Hope, Whittier, and Klawock. Work was not great in terms of funds spent but restoration effort in each place was of large importance to the of the quake on the Homer Spit. tracts. Other communities in community concerned. w/ "/ ”/4, :y/ // I», W, / // ?// “7” Hf//////l ,///7///////// _ ”WW/7 ,/ / \,\\ / I 7/ by"; / r/ , \ %/ I «/ £71 /1{, w/ 7 . mu! / / ~‘7 / a M / / / ‘ / d 1411‘; ’ , - a; M 90 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION INTRODUCTION- During those first dark, cold hours after the Alaska earth- quake of March 27, 1964, it was difficult to visualize any good coming out of such tragedy. But a new and better Alaska has ris- en from the rubble. Alaska was a young State— barely 5 years old. Newly formed boroughs had been in existence for less than 3 months. (A borough is an intermediate governmental district similar to a county or a parish in other States.) The organization of the boroughs had been slow and cautious. No budgets had been set—no taxes collected. Alaskans were deliberate in setting up another government entity. As one resident said, “They were just trying to set up shop when they had to cope with this emer- gency—they hadn’t even learned how to cope with the ordinary day—to—day stuff yet.” The town of Homer was to have been in- corporated just 5 days after the earthquake. There could hardly have been a more diflicult period for new, inexperienced city of- ficials to take ofiice. The Federal Government’s transitional grants to assist Alas— ka’s move from territorial status to Statehood were almost at an end. At Juneau, the State leg— islature was trying to trim the proposed $75.9-million budget during the final days of its an- nual session. So much was need- 7Radio news commentator and public- relations consultant, Anchorage, Alaska. By GENIE CHANCE 7 ed, and yet the tax base was so limited. Most State revenues came from south-central Alaska where many coastal towns and villages sus- tain seafood industries, where metropolitan Anchorage burgeons with 100,000 people, and where the ports of Seward and Whittier handle freight for interior Alas— ka via The Alaska Railroad. Tax revenues from this area dic- tated to a large degree the amount that could be spent on State government functions dur- ing the next fiscal year. First with a gentle roll and then a sudden jolt, nature made the proposed budget a worthless piece of paper. The entire State would suffer from the losses sus- tained in the quake-stricken area. Miraculously, few people were killed, but valuable, taxable prop— erty lay in worthless heaps of rubble, and the State’s economy was crushed. SEWARD Seward, a community of about 2,000 people, lies at the foot of 3,200-f00t Mount Marathon at the head of Resurrection Bay. It was settled at the turn of the 20th century when a private company attempted to build a railroad into interior Alaska. Although that venture failed, Seward was kept alive when the US. Government began to build The Alaska Rail- road in 1914. Seward is the ocean terminus of the 540-mile long rail- road, and the community’s eco~ nomic mainstay for the past 50 years had been longshorlng. In recent years there had been speculation that S e w a r d w a s doomed to become a ghost town because of her dependence on a declining water—oriented c om - meroe and the railroad. Since the 1950’s, more and more freight was being trucked into the State via the Alaska Highway. The pop— ulation of Seward slowly dwind- led as disenchanted residents sought greener pastures. However, in 1963 an energetic group of civic leaders determined to put new life into their town. Through their enthusiasm and tenacity, Seward won the coveted “All American City” award. A big celebration was planned for April 4, 1964. But—on March 27, earthquake triggered submarine landslides destroyed most of the waterfront and flames from ruptured petrol- eum storage tanks were swept into town by tsunamis. Thirteen peo- ple lost their lives before the rest of the townspeople fled to the safe- ty of higher ground. Seward was desolate. Some thought Seward was dead. One year later, the visitor was impressed with Seward’s spirited determination to live. Federal funds, of course, were essential to the reconstruction of public facil— ities in the town, and the decision of the many Federal agencies to “Save Seward” was welcome news. Seward herself valiantly joined in the fight. With the lossmf the docks, the railroad, and the fish canneries, the only immediate source of in- come was employment on the Fed— eral reconstruction projects. Mayor Perry Stockton said that, although a few people had to move elsewhere to find work, the city as a whole did not suffer financially in the year following the quake. Realizing that finan— cial support from the “crash” con— struction program would end by 1966, the city leaders concentrated on attracting industry. The city applied to the State government for title to about 70 acres of re- claimed tidelands that had been filled with materials dredged from the harbor. Using $36,000 from capital improvement funds, the city built a cold—storage plant adjacent to the new city dock. The facility was then leased to a private fishing cooperative under an agreement which would amor- tize the investment within 5 years. Seward’s fishing fleet resumed operations when the plant opened in June 1965. Before the quake a bond issue had been approved to pave many THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION of the city streets. The work was postponed until 1965 so that un- derground water and sewer lines could be repaired by the Corps of Engineers. About one-fourth of Seward was unsafe for the uses to which it had been put before the quake. The Urban Renewal Administra- tion negotiated the acquisition and redevelopment of the unsta- ble land, and by March 1965 an estimated 95 percent of it had been purchased from the private owners. About three-fourths of the displaced families relocated within the town; their relocation was made possible by the cash purchase of their properties by Urban Renewal. The $1.9-mil- lion project calls for redevelop- ment of the 148-acre waterfront area for light industrial and re- creational uses. Several homes were rebuilt with private capital during the first summer after the earthquake. By March 1965, six new homes, a new church, and a parsonage were under construction. As for the future, Mayor Stockton said, “We are doing everything possible to entice in- dustry. Even if it’s one that will only create two jobs, we will do anything we can to assist them.” In June 1965, Stockton reported that a second fish-processing plant was negotiating a lease in the newly reclaimed tidelands near the small—boat harbor. Restau- rants, recreational facilities, and equipment-repair shops were in- terested in leasing additional lots on a long-term basis. In Seward the year of decision had also been a year of action. HOMER Homer, Alaska, is a small com— munity on the southwest coast ‘of the Kenai Peninsula. Homer is 91 often called the “Cape Cod of Alaska.” The population of about» 1,500 people depends pri- marily on commercial fishing and a seasonal tourist trade for its livelihood. Nestled along a bluff line, Homer faces Cook Inlet on the west and Kachemak Bay on the south. A gravel bar 41/2 miles long, extends from the foot of the bluff out to deep water. It was on this natural pier, now known as the Spit, that the town of Homer was first established in 1896. The original colony of 75 people, representing the Alas- ka Gold Mining Co., was headed by Homer Pennock. The com— munity was named in his honor. Long before the town was created, the area had been ex- ploited by Russian fur traders and an English coal mining company. As the town itself moved to the blufi’, the Spit was used for recreation and industry. On the extreme tip of the Spit stood Land’s End Hotel, a favorite of tourists and commercial fisher- men. Next to the hotel was the city dock where fishermen un- loaded daily catches of king crab and where freighters and tankers deposited fuel and supplies. A petroleum tank farm sat near the center of the Spit. A small-boat harbor and three seafood-process- ing plants nearby were focal points of the local economy. On Friday, March 27, 1964, Glen Sewell and some friends were putting finishing touches on a new restaurant, the Porpoise Room. The grand opening was to be next day, a symbol of Atri- umph over disaster for Sewell and all who knew him. When the original Porpoise Room had burned down a few months ear— lier, it was only partly covered by insurance. With the assist- 92 THE ALAsKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 ance of friends and family, Sewell had built the attractive new structure 'on the Spit. The ground floor, made of concrete blocks, contained storage rooms, refrigeration units, kitchens, and an apartment for the owner. Exterior stairways led patrons to a wide observation platform and unobscured views of Cook Inlet, Kachemak Bay, and the sur- rounding mountains. The Por- poise Room would be a popular tourist attraction. As the Porpoise Room began to shake, Sewell ran outside. From across the Spit to the southwest, a huge crack moved toward him and between his feet before he could move. His brother ran from the building and fell into another crack. As the two struggled to their feet, a man’s voice shouted, “Look at the boat harbor!” In a great vortex the water suddenly withdrew from the harbor floor. Boats sank into the mud, and the rock jetty surrounding the harbor dis— appeared. The Porpoise Room staggered and settled as 6 feet of mud filled the ground floor. No one realized then that the whole Spit had subsided several feet. The waters of the bay rushed back in. The city dock shud- dered, and erratic tides coursed the main floor of Land’s End Hotel. The town of Homer itself had relatively minor damage, but it was Virtually cut ofi from the rest of the world. Investigators an- nounced that the Spit had sunk as much as 6 feet and it would be inundated regularly by high tides. The canneries, Homer’s major industry, stood in the water ——their expensive machinery ru- ined by salt water. But without a harbor and a dock, the fishing fleet could not operate anyway. Homer, moreover, could not re- ceive fuel and freight from marine carriers without a dock and with- out the Spit’s access to a natural deep-water harbor. S u p p l i e s could not be trucked in because the highway to Anchorage, 160 miles to the north, had been de- stroyed. Tourism was curtailed. Because other communities had sustained far more sensational damage, Homer’s plight went vir- tually unnoticed. There were 113 businesses in the Homer area, most of them operating with very limited capital. The 1964 tourist season was out of the question and, with the future of water—oriented industries in grave danger, Homer faced slow economic strangulation. One year later Homer Thomp— son, local real estate broker and civic leader, said that the Federal Small Business Administration and the Army Corps of Engi- neers’ projects financed by the Ofiice of Emergency Planning had kept the town’s economy from col- lapse. The Small Business Ad- ministration made disaster loans to hard—pressed business men, and the Corps of Engineers began re- construction of the city dock and small-boat h a r b o r. Thompson estimated that a total of more than $3 million was spent in public and private reconstruction in Homer during the first 12 months follow- ing the earthquake. Material dredged from a new small-boat harbor was used to raise the land around it. With a loan from the Small Business Ad- ministration, Glenn Sewell rebuilt the Porpoise Room on the newly filled location. It was open for business in May 1965 in time for the tourist season. The owners of two fish-processing plants also be— gan reconstruction adjacent to the small-boat harbor. The Alaska Highway Depart- ment announced plans for a $1 million project that would re- construct and raise the road along the Spit to a level 2 feet above the new high tides. Residents of Homer sought to broaden the economic base of the town. Japanese industrialists in- terested in establishing a pulp- chip plant on the Kenai Peninsula were impressed with the possibili- ties of Homer. Negotiations were under way for a proposed $3.5- million plant. It would be built on the Spit near the small-boat harbor and would ship 16,000 to 18,000 tons of pulp chips annually from Homer to Japanese paper mills. The operation would uti- lize timber on the Peninsula and would furnish year-round employ- ment for about 7 0 persons. Homer officials indicated that an Amer- ican firm was also interested in such a plant if Japanese plans do not materialize. In addition, local development corporations were investigating the possibilities of a 36-unit motel with a large convention hall and dining rooms, three more seafood— processing p 1 a n t s , a freight- handling business, a sawmill, a restaurant, a supermarket, and several equipment-repair shops. Considerable research was being conducted on other diversifications such as agriculture, meat pro— ducing and processing, and forest products. KODIAK Kodiak was first established by Russian fur traders in 1792 on the southwest coast of Kodiak Island. Eight years later it was relocated on the northeast tip of the island where it stands today. Kodiak has the distinction of be- ing the oldest existing Alaskan community established by white settlers. In 1964 an expanded influx of tourists was expected with the 59.—New boat basin at Kodiak looking northwest. new service of the State ferry- liner that would link Kodiak with the mainland. During and after World War II the United States Navy base near the town of Kodiak contributed to the economy of the area, but the most important industry was fishing and seafood processing. Kodiak had one of the most pro- ductive king-crab industries in south-central Alaska, producing some 17 million pounds in 1963. The crab fleet was working when the earthquake struck. Captains at first thought that lines had become entangled in their propellers. Vessels at dock were helpless as the harbor first overflowed, then drained dry, only to be refilled with a huge, rushing wave. People in town struggled to evacuate buildings along the waterfront. Survivors headed for high ground where they watched as boats, harbor buoys, and drifting dock deck- ings battered houses, stores, can- Former basin was destroyed by tsunami and subsidence. neries, and garages that just moments before had been blocks from the shoreline. By 3 a.m., the waves had sub- sided. At dawn the town began counting its losses. All but one cannery had disappeared. The rock jetty protecting the small- boat harbor was destroyed. The waves had washed into the town, sweeping away everything in their paths and depositing the debris as far as five blocks in land. 94 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 One year later, however, Ko- diak was a bustling little city. The Office of Emergency Plan- ning financed the reconstruction of publicly owned waterfront facilities. The small—boat har- bor, completed by the end of February 1965, was packed with fishing vessels—many of them replacements of those destroyed by the tsunami. The city fathers were planning a big expansion program to accommodate a larg- er fleet. Although the 1964 sea- son showed a drop to about 12 million pounds of king crab at Kodiak, the processing plants were forging ahead with im- provements. Owners of all plants destroyed had either rebuilt or had announced intentions of doing so. Kodiak residents were cheered by the expected arrival of a new floating crab cannery that plan— ned full operations during the entire 1965 season. Virtually the entire downtown area—34% acres—was being re- developed through an $8-million Urban Renewal program. By spring of 1965 most of the land parcels in a planned commercial core facing the boat harbor had been allocated to purchasers. Utilities had been installed, but paving of streets and sidewalks had not yet begun. Construction had begun on the first privately owned structure within the urban renewal area. Before the earthquake a hous— ing development of about 300 units stood practically empty on the outskirts of the town. One year later all units were filled and would-be residents had to place their names on a 6-months waiting list. At Kodiak Naval Station the construction of 170 housing units was anticipated. The State ferry was making weekly calls at Kodiak, tourism had increased, and accommoda- tions for visitors were adding rapidly to the skyline. Two new motels, complete with restaurant, coffee shop, and lounges were built with a total investment of about $700,000. The Beach— comber, a former Canadian cruise ship, had been turned into a seaside hotel. The city was weighing the possibility of at- tracting the convention trade. During the 12 months follow- ing the earthquake, Kodiak also received increased freight service from Alaska Steamship Co.’s freighters and from the vanships of Sea-Land, Inc., which operate also between Anchorage and Seattle. The innovation of van— ship service provided aid to Kodi- ak’s canneries and fish-processing plants. Refrigerated vans were parked beside the processing plants, the finished products were moved directly from the plants to the vans, and then aboard ship; thus the expense of rebuilding new warehouse space was eliminated. The Kodiak Island Improve- ment Corp, organized under the Small Business Administration’s community development program (commonly called the “502” pro- gram), was an economic stimulus to the community. Through this program more commercial and industrial enterprises were antici- pated. Some of those proposed are three additional fish-process- ing plants (which would give the town more production capacity than it had before the earth- quake), an electrical supply and contracting firm, a marine supply and equipment company, two rec- reational resorts, a small—craft repair facility, service stations, garages, a telephone company, and a bus company. Also anticipated in the near future was the private construction of a complete marine- ways to handle repairs to any size ship working in Alaskan waters. As proposed, it would be compar- able to any such facility on the west coast of the United States and would eliminate long voyages to Seattle or San Francisco for repairs. NATIVE VILLAGES Chenega (fig. 60) was a native fishing Village of about 80 persons. Living on a small island in the southwest part of Prince William Sound, the Villagers had no tsunami warning. Within min- utes after the onset of the earth- quake, a wall of water swept across the shoreline, took 23 lives and left hardly a scrap of wood to mark the site. The survivors huddled throughout the cold night on a snow-covered hillside. The next day they were airlifted to Cordova across the sound where the village council held a general meeting in the temporary shelter of a Cordova church and decided unanimously not to return to ‘Chenega. Within a few days the villagers agreed to settle at Tatitlek, another native village where they had relatives and where land 'was available for homes. Sixteen new homes were built for Chenegans by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (fig. 64). Fish- ing and hunting equipment pur- chased With disaster funds enabled the men to resume their occupa— tions as fishermen and seal hunters. Kaguyak and Old Harbor, two native villages on the east coast of Kodiak Island, also were devas- tated by waves. Several lives were lost at Kaguyak and all the village’s 9 homes were destroyed. Old Harbor was more fortunate—— no deaths, but 29 out of 35 homes were lost. No one wanted to return to Kaguyak. Seven fam- ilies joined relatives at Alitak, a village on the southwest side of Kodiak Island. Five families went with Old Harbor residents to rebuild that village. 60,—Chenega, a small native fishing village on the coast of Prince William Sound. 61.—The day after the earthquake, scattered pieces of scrap lumber and an occassional stump were all that remained of several native villages. 96 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 62.—Just moments before the earthquake, the school teacher at Old Harbor snapped this picture of the quiet little Aleut village. As villagers ran to the safety of a nearby hilltop, they saw huge waves wash away all their worldly possessions. Afognak, on an island of the same name, was a village of 38 homes, one store, a 2-story school— house, a community hall, and a sawmill, all lined‘up single file along three—quarters of a mile of bay. For centuries the Aleuts had made their livelihoods from the sea. When the earth shook, the older people remembered stories told by their grandfathers about walls of water that could swallow whole Villages—they headed for the hills, and were saved. But when the waters rushed into their “protected” bay, 23 homes were destroyed or damaged beyond re- pair. The general store floated inland and stopped against trees almost half a mile from shore. As the water rushed out, fishing boats crunched on the bottom of the harbor. The sawmill and the community hall floated out to sea. Soon, exceptionally high tides began to flood the townsite; when it became clear that the island of Afognak had subsided, the village council decided that the town must 'be relocated. Problems and uncertainties immediately arose. Legally, the agencies that work with the native villages could only 63—016. Harbor a year after the quake. For the first time the villages were enjoying the comfort and convenience of community light, water, and. sewer systems. rebuild the 23 destroyed homes. The 15 families whose homes still stood could expect no assistance in building new homes at the new site. The Villagers were afraid to remain at Afognak, but they didn’t want to ‘be divided, either. Lions International, 49th Dis- trict, came to the rescue with needed supplies augmented by lumber donated by firms in Washington and Oregon. In appreciation the villagers voted unanimously to name the new settlement Port Lions. The native men labored beside skilled work- ers from the Mennonite Disaster Service who volunteered their services for reconstruction. On December 12, 1964, the first barge- load of people and possessions moved into Port Lions. One year after the disaster, res- idents of Port Lions could look out into a peaceful cove and smile at the sight of fishing boats bob- bing gently in the waves. Each family had a comfortable home, a generator produced electricity for each house, and sewer and water systems were being built. A 3- mile access road led to a 2,600—foot landing strip. The new school scheduled for construction in the summer of 1965 would make the community building (used tempor- arily for classes) available for vil- lage affairs. All this was made possible by the determined hard work of the villagers, Bureau of Indian Affairs, US. Public Health Service, Department of Educa- tion, Federal Aviation Agency, Alaska Division of Lands, Lions International, Red Cross, Men— nonites, Salvation Army, and a host of others. The story was the same in the other villages. Forty—one new homes sparkled in the sun at Old Harbor, 7 new homes at Alitak THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION 64.—At Tatitlek, new homes were built to modern standards, with villagers furnishing much of the labor. Community utilities were installed to upgrade living con- ditions in the seven affected native villages. sheltered the villagers from Ka- guyak, and 14 new homes were built at English Bay—all this quite a change to people whose previous experience with running water had been confined to rivers and streams. CORDOVA Cordova, a fishing community of about 1,200 year-round resi- dents, was once a busy port on Prince William Sound. It was settled in 1904 as ocean terminus for the Copper River and North— western Railway of the Morgan— Guggenheim syndicate. From 1904: to 1938, $48 million in high- grade copper ore was delivered from the Kennecott mine, 193 miles northeast in the Chitina Val- ley, to Cordova for shipment to the continental United States. Since 1938, when the mine was closed, the town of Cordova has depended wholly on salmon, clam, shrimp, and crab fisheries and processing. During the height of the fishing season each summer, the population would double. As the only major community in south—central Alaska without a land-link to the rest of the State, Cordova sought continually to have a highway built along the old abandoned railroad bed. Res- idents felt that this would open the way to a broader economy by creating access to still-rich min- eral deposits, timber, and potential agricultural development in the Copper River valley. By 1958 some 39 miles of the needed road- way had been completed. Fire razed an entire city block in downtown Cordova on May 1, 1963, and completely destroyed business houses and the dwellings of 27 families. Less than 1 year later, earthquake and tsunamis wreaked havoc once again—this time along the waterfront. In the two disasters about 100 family dwellings had been destroyed, and the housing situation was critical. But the earthquake was even more critical in its impact on the 97 waterfront facilities and fishing industry. Fifteen - foot waves moved the dock off its pilings, and washed away the sawmill, boat landings, and homes. Tec- tonic forces that uplifted the shoreline left Cordova without deep water during low tides. Even though fish canneries sus- tained relatively light damage to buildings and equipment, they began to close down 'or move out because the 'boats couldn’t come in to unload. Sloughs around the town that had yielded rich catches of salmon were high and dry. One year later Cordova was still struggling. Only one out of nine canneries was operating. It proc— essed crabs on a limited basis. Very little construction was tak- ing place in private housing, but the Corps of Engineers was mov- ing fast ahead with a new harbor and dock. The city applied to the State for title to 41/; acres of reclaimed tidelands adjacent to the new city dock. The area had been filled by the Corps of Engineers during dredging operations of the harbor. Several small businesses that had been displaced by the expansion of the harbor temporarily relo- cated in the filled area until details of a proposed Federal Urban Re— newal program could be worked out. A spokesman for the city indicated that another 2 to 3 years would pass before the land would be stable enough for heavy indus- trial and commercial use. But plans for the future were being made. Through the Small Business Administration’s “502” program, a $218,000 loan was granted to Theodore Seafoods, Inc., for a freezer ship. The new firm would employ new con- cepts in processing and marketing that hopefully would increase the 5-month fishing season to a year- round business. 98 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 A proposal was made by the newly organized Cordova Hydro- electric Corp. to build a plant on Power Creek just outside the town. A contract was signed whereby the city would purchase the power to supplement the municipally owned system. The facility would also provide stor— age for the city’s water system. Financing was being sought through the Small Business Ad- ministration and the Rural Elec— trification Association. Other anticipated projects in- cluded a shopping center, two more fish-processing plants, a sawmill, a facility for boat re- pairs, and a 50-space trailer park. VALDEZ Valdez was a quaint little town of about 1,200 people. At- the head of long, narrow Valdez Arm ofl? Prince William Sound, it lay beneath towering snow— capped mountains. Large gla- ciers filled nearby valleys in the Chugach Range. The beauty of the area was renowned. Valdez came into being in the 1890’s as an entry for gold rush— ers headed for the Klondike. It was the coastal point nearest to the United States and to the in- terior of Alaska. To eliminate the necessity of crossing Canad- ian territory, the United States Army built a military trail from the port town to the Yukon. After accommodating military units and adventurous fortune- seekers, the Valdez trail eventu- ally became the Richardson Highway. Valdez thrived as the ocean terminus of the 363-mile land link with Fairbanks deep in the heart of Alaska. Like most coastal towns in the 49th State, Valdez depended on water-oriented commerce and in- dustry for its existence. In 1958 the community hit an economic low when much of the freight shifted to the port of Seward for delivery by The Alaska Rail— road. Since that time it was mainly supported by a State mental hospital, a division of the State highway department, a re- latively small fishing industry, and the summer tourist trade. Good Friday, 1964, had been a joyous reminder at Valdez that spring was near. A festive air greeted the arrival of the steam- ship C’hena at the city dock. Merchants, parents, and children looked on with interest as long- shoremen and deck hands pre- pared to unload. The sudden convulsions of the earthquake turned the pleasant scene into incredible cataclysm. The dock quickly broke to pieces and—~with its warehouses and every man, woman, and child on it—disappeared from sight. The steamship Ghana lurched. Her bow rose 30 feet on an incoming wave, then crashed down Where the dock had stood moments be- fore. The waters of Valdez Arm surged furiously through the town as the earth opened in crazy-quilt cracks. Survivors fled up the highway as flames from wrecked oil tanks engulfed the remains of their town’s waterfront. The outside world rushed to the aid of these valiant people as they began to pick up the pieces, but there was one more blow yet to come: geologists an- nounced that the entire townsite had subsided, and that the un- stable ground was subject to further slippage toward the sea. In April 1964—just a few days after the quake—Valdez resi— dents voted to move their town— site. On the advice of geologists, a location was selected on a 125- acre tract 4 miles away, where Mineral Creek empties into Val- dez Arm. In the fall of 1964, the new elementary school was dedicated. It was the only structure in the new townsite, and children were transported by bus 4 miles from their homes to their classrooms. Meanwhile, the Corps of Engi- neers, with funds from the Office of Emergency Planning, began building the new harbor and dock. Realizing that the move to the new townsite must be made in stages, the people first patched up their old town. Some homes offered temporary protection with only minimum repairs. Mobile homes were utilized by others, but the critical housing shortage caused the population to dwindle to about 850 people. Business- men wiped out by the disaster signed on with construction crews. Work continued on federally financed harbor, dock, and ware- house facilities throughout the winter. Other federally financed construction such as the under- ground water and sewer systems, the municipal powerplant and distribution system, streets and curbs, and a high school, muni— cipal, and State buildings had to await the spring thaw. Until public facilities had been restored, the residents could scarcely think of building homes and businesses at the new town- site. At first it was hoped that private construction could be started by the spring of 1965, but such expectations proved un— reasonable, and the big move was postponed. The city planning commission, with the cooperation of the Alaska Housing Authority, had completed a preliminary layout for the new town in September 1964. In the months that fol- lowed, details were worked out for city planning, zoning and subdivision ordinances, and build- ing, electrical, plumbing, and housing codes. Advisory bodies to the city council prepared modern regulations. Public hear- ings were held to assure that the new rules were equitable and just, and would assure orderly growth. By March 27, 1965, the first anni- versary of the earthquake, all the new codes, regulations, and ordin- ances necessary for systematic con— struction of a new city had been adopted “by the voters of Valdez. During this time, also, negotia- tions were under way with the Federal Urban Renewal Admin— istration for disposition of prop— erty within the old townsite. The proposal for the entire site was to develop it into a recreation area. The capital gained by property owners in the sale of their land to Urban Renewal was to aid them in buying new sites in the Mineral Creek location. Residents formed the Valdez Development Corp. to assist busi- ness and industrial enterprises through the Small Business Ad- ministration’s “502” p r o g r :a m . Through this program, other local residents organized the Val- dez O cean Products, Inc., to build a proposed $750,000 sea- food-processing plant in the new townsite. The plant was designed to incorporate the latest techni- ques in seafood processing, in- cluding vacuum sealing in plastic containers, ultracold freezing, and automatic controls. In June 1965, $400,000 of common stock was offered for sale to citizens of the State. The Valdez Breeze report— ed that the remainder of the capi- tal would be sought from the Small Business Administration through the Valdez Development Corp. THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION Although this project was the only such actually underway by June 1965, 17 other proposals were anticipated. These represent- ed all types of service facilities, including those for fisheries, tour- ism, and recreation. With the completion of the city dock and one of two warehouses by the Corps of Engineers, the Alaska Steamship Lines sched— uled a freighter visit on July 8, 1965—the first such ship to visit Valdez since the fateful arrival of the Chem. WHITTIER The ice-free port of Whittier was built as a military installa- tion during World War II. Lying at the head of the Passage Canal on the west end of Prince Wil- liam Sound, it had been virtually shut down in recent years. Al-, though it was ravaged by tsu- nami and fire on March 27, 1964, it was utilized by The Alaska Rail- road during the following year as its port of entry for freight 99 bound for other parts of south- central and central Alaska. A private corporation pur- hased and renovated an aban~ doned apartment complex to de- velop a recreational resort, the Chenega Inn. Though its op- erations were limited, the Chene- ga Inn opened in the summer of 1964. By the middle of May 1965, it was in full-scale opera- tion with accommodations rang— ing from dormitories and singles to family arrangements. Visitors could enjoy the new cafeteria, a luxurious dining room, and a rus— tic-style lounge. Full facilities for small boats were available, as well as rental vessels and other necessities for boating, fishing, and hunting. A 70-passenger yacht offered daily 7 -hour cruises through some of the finest scenery in the world, giving a View of 18 glaciers, 8 of which enter tidewater. Via rail- road, boats, and small aircraft, tourists traveled to Whittier, a vital community once more. 100 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 GIRDWOOD Girdwood, a hamlet of 80 resi- dents, sat on the shore of Turn» again Arm beside the towering Chugach Mountains. It subsided during the earthquake, and relo- cation was necessary. Residents preferred to remain near their year-round industry, the Mount Alyeska ski resort. Federal land was selected farther up the valley, available under the statehood land withdrawal program. Within the next 12 months the new city boasted a school (about half the population are children), a library, a community center, a grocery store, post office building, a small cafe, a new church, and a new community water well. And for the first time in its history, Girdwood had electric lights—- three of them. City oflicials had requested land for development as a municipally operated trailer park. Twenty-six lots had been released for private ownership, and the city was pushing for more so that their community might grow in the future. ANCHORAGE Anchorage is Alaska’s largest city. Born as a tent town in 1914 at the mouth of Ship Creek on Cook Inlet, it was a supply base for construction of The Alaska Railroad. The following year, a 312-acre tract on the higher area south of the creek was Cleared and surveyed. In the original townsite 100 lots were reserved for Federal and municipal pur- poses, and 887 lots were auctioned for private use. From a popula- tion of 2,000 people in 1915, An- chorage had grown to approxi- mately 50,000 within expanded city limits covering 15 square miles in 1964. An estimated 100,- 000 reside in the greater Anchor- age area. 65.—Some homes were repaired on their original sites despite advice to move them. This house, tilted off its foundation in earthquake—triggered landslides along the bluff line, was rehabilitated in place by the owner-occupant. The period of greatest growth was between 1950 (11,200) and 1964. This was also the time of the building boom that added millions of dollars worth of new homes, apartment buildings, ho- tels, shopping centers, office build- ings, hospitals, schools, stores, and bank buildings and a university. Growth in the private sector was matched by more millions of dollars spent on new public facil- ities. Multimillion—dollar struc- tures were built by the State to house the State court system and a psychiatric hospital. The city- owned port, an $8-million project commenced in 1959, was dedicated on July 8, 1961. The $1.5-million Public Safety Building, dedicated in August 1961, provided a com- bined headquarters for the police and fire departments. A $1.8-mil- lion water-filtration plant was dedicated on June 30, 1962. The discovery of oil and gas on the Kenai Peninsula, south of Anchorage, led to optimism of rising prosperity as the city be- came the service center for one more industry. Anchorage was building toward a greater future when the earthquake struck. Property owners lost tens of millions of dollars; much of the loss cannot be evaluated in dollars and cents alone. It represented years of planning, personal sacri- fice, and labor on the part of the owners and their families. If An- chorage was to rebuild, these very people would have to decide whether to reinvest in an uncer- tain future. Answers were not easy, but they were made quickly: Rebuild! And the recovery period was almost as dramatic and breathtaking as the earthquake. The plight of those whose homes were destroyed by land— slides was well publicized. But many more people whose homes were not destroyed but were de- clared unsafe for human occu- pancy faced critical decisions and financial disaster in the months that followed. Many of these homes had sustained relatively lit- tle damage, but because of their location near slide areas, Federal lending agencies could not pro- vide money for repairs. The city THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION 66.—A home moved from a hazardous area to a safe haven. ordered their removal to safer lo— cations, and the owners, already facing big mortgages, faced addi- tional investments in new lots, re- pairs, new utilities, and all the other expenses of building a home. A few could afford to repair their homes and risk remaining on their original sites (fig. 65), but many others accepted the offer by the Corps of Engineers to move their homes to safety with- out charge. The city provided temporary home sites until the owners could obtain permanent locations. Some houses still stood in the temporary spots a year later. A typical story is that of a beautiful home in an exclusive neighborhood called Turnagain- by-the-Sea. Before the earth- quake, the house was several blocks from the bluff. After the quake, the new bluff line was just a few feet from the door. The preearthquake valuation of the house was $72,000 and the mort— gage on it was $21,000. Its postearthquake value was set at $3,000; the lot was valued at $900. Just 3 months before the earthquake, the lot next door had been sold for $15,000. After the owner purchased land south of the city, built a base- ment, and had the house moved to its new location by the Corps of Engineers, he reported that he had spent more than the original investment to return the house to its preearthquake condition. Although Federal funds were not available for repairs to prop- erties within the L Street slide zone in downtown Anchorage, private money was used. Owners reasoned that they could not aban- don properties that represented their life savings, and, defying the warning that they stood in danger of destruction in the event of another earthquake, they pro- ceeded with repairs even though some of the ground had moved as much as 14 feet laterally. In the private sector, damaged businesses were rebuilt with speed and imagination—some rebuilt 101 with Federal aid and some with- out. Many new businesses were launched soon after the earth- quake and were carried along by the momentum generated by the reconstruction boom. Spectacular gains were noted in many areas of business. The following are but a few examples. In the downtown area, a 14- story 4:50-room hotel that was being enlarged at the time of the earthquake, though significantly damaged, was repaired and re- opened for business only a few weeks behind schedule. New fa- cilities include an impressive penthouse restaurant which af- fords unobstructed views of 000k Inlet and the Chugach Moun- tains. Another large hotel, nine stor- ies high, was still on the draw- ing board at the time of the earthquake. It was started in August 1964 and was completed the following June. Construction proceeded throughout the long Alaskan winter. Several attractive motels were built in the area between down- town and Anchorage Interna- tional Airport. Plans were announced in June 1965 for con- struction of a large hotel near the airport. Two automobile agencies north of downtown were rebuilt with finanical backing of the Small Business Administration. Les- sons learned from the earthquake were applied to the new designs. A downtown grocery store, de- stroyed by the quake, reopened at a new location south of town and enjoyed the best business year in its 25-year history. A five-story downtown depart- ment store, which had been dam- aged beyond repair, Vvas replaced on the same site by a new build- ing three stories high but of twice the ground space, and a new auto- 102 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 mobile service department was planned for 1966. A damaged bank building was dismantled down to its steel frame and completely rebuilt. One year later, assets of the bank had increased almost $8.5 million. Another bank, formerly a drive- in bank, was enlarged to nine stories. Two new theater build- ings replaced one that was destroyed in the 4th Avenue land- slide. The Anchorage Natural Gas Corp., a private utility that de— livers gas from the Kenai Penin- sula, sustained about $1 million damage. Repairs were completed before the following winter, and on June 15, 1965, the board of di- rectors voted a capital investment budget of an additional $1 mil- lion. All the activity in the down- town area did not overshadow the fact that the city continued to edge out from the bluff line along Ship Creek and Knik Arm and to reach toward the foot of the Chugach Mountains. New motels, restaurants, a creamery, a medical center, a bank, office buildings, and other services appeared along Northern Lights Boulevard about a mile south of downtown An- chorage. New homes stood in areas that had been the “boon— docks” a few months earlier. Construction of a large shop- ping center at Northern Lights and Minnesota Drive, just a few blocks from the newly rebuilt West High School, began in May 1965. Just east of that, a housing development was being moved to make room for the growing Northern Lights Shopping Center. Developers planned to triple its size. Still farther east, at the inter- section of Northern Lights Boule- vard and Seward Highway, land clearance signaled the beginning 67.—A few homes situated at the toe of the L Street slide remained precariousiy perched on makeshift foundation‘s 15 months after the earthquake. of another shopping center cover— ing 20 acres. Plans were an- nounced for another large shop- ping center a short distance away at the corner of Seward Highway and International Airport Road. These are but a few of the in- credible stories of accomplish- ments in Anchorage, the city that refused to give up, but they are typical of the optimistic attitude found throughout the area. Achievement and expansion were the key words with the city gov- ernment too. A record—breaking sum of $34,548,678 was spent by the city of Anchorage by Decem- ber 31, 1964. Only about $6145 million of this went into earth- quake repairs and replacement projects. As new projects in the c a p i t a l improvement program were completed, design work pro- ceeded on others. V o t e r s overwhelmingly ap- proved a bond proposition to ex- pand the telephone system which already served 27,098 customers. Approval was also given to issue bonds for $1,750,000 for the con- struction of a petroleum tanker dock and an extension of the existing dock at the port of An- chorage. The port showed a pro- fit of $218,115 in 1964—the first time in its 4-year history it was out of the red. During the year, 800,000 tons of cargo was handled by the city dock—an increase of 820 percent over the year 1963. And these figures do not include the cargo handled by three pri- vate docks nearby. This growth was due to several factors. When other port fa- cilities in south-central Alaska were wiped out, oil companies moved operations to Anchorage where the port was operational. Many tons of emergency supplies went over the city docks in the early months of recovery. And on May 10, 1964, the cargo ships of Sea-Land Services, Inc., began a weekly schedule from Seattle to Anchorage. The winter of 1964— 65 was the first time that the port of Anchorage had been used year- round. The Anchorage International Airport, operated by the Alaska Division of Aviation, launched a four—stage multimillion-d 0 1 l a r building program. The Federal Aviation Agency, operator of the control tower at the busy termi- nal, spent approximately $850,000 for the construction of a new building. The old one had col- lapsed, killing one man. The new O-design tower—one of the first of its type to be built by the agency—went into operation in February 1965. A $900,000 two-story building was planned by the State to pro- vide space for agencies directly involved with international flights. Another $300,000 pro- ject would provide an enlarged parking area. The present termin- al building had been enlarged, and a $750,000 satellite building is scheduled for construction. Five-sided in design, it will pro- vide badly needed parking for five giant jets, which eventually will be refueled through outlets to eliminate fuel-truck traffic. The Federal Government has granted stopover privileges in Anchorage to four foreign air- lines that fly regular routes be- tween Europe and the Orient. This means that the foreign tour- ist trade can be cultivated. The year 1965 was a record year for tourism in Alaska. Many people who had planned to visit the 49th State in 1964 had been discouraged by the earth- quake, but airlines, travel agen- cies, and other tourist services re- ported that 1965 was the biggest money-making year in history. 231F321 o—ee—ks THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION This was good news to Alaska. Although her vast natural re- sources were being slowly and solidly developed for stable eco- nomic growth, she could count also on unexcelled natural beauty to attract the tourist dollar. The petroleum industry had already made a sizable contribu— tion to the economy of south-cen- tral Alaska and to the State as a whole. Explorations continued at a rapid pace. In the spring of 1965 it was anticipated that $20 million more would be expended in petroleum activity in the com- ing year. THE FEDERAL GOVERN- MENT AIDS THE PEOPLE OF ALASKA Even before March 1964, giant steps had been taken toward the fulfillment of Alaska’s promise, but Alaska could not fulfill it alone. Within a few days after the earthquake, after emergency re- lief measures had been taken, the President established the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska and appointed Senator Clinton P. Anderson chairman. On the rec- ommendations of the Commission, Congress approved $23.5 million in additional transition grants to supplement the $28.5 appropri- ated in 1959 to assist the new 103 State in assuming responsibilities carried by the Federal Govern- ment when the area was a terri- tory. These funds were needed immediately in Alaska to main- tain essential public services and to help State and local govern- ments overcome their loss of rev- enue. On the advice of the Commis— sion, many other changes were made to further expedite assist- ance in the reconstruction and up- grading of highways and harbors. Federal agencies were empowered to adjust mortgages they held or insured. Long-term, low-interest loans were made available to the private sector. Federal participa- tion in urban renewal programs was raised to a limit of $25 mil- lion for the entire State. Federal purchase of Alaskan capital-im- provement bonds was authorized. The director of the Oflice of Emer- gency Planning described the entire legislative package as a “landmark in Federal aid after natural disaster.” The Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks were designated by the Office of Emergency Planning to act as agents for the restoration and reconstruction of public fa- cilities. The Bureau of Yards and Docks concentrated on the city of Kodiak. The Corps of Engineers handled the Office of 104 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 Emergency Planning projects in Anchorage, Seward, Homer, Val- dez, Seldovia, Cordova, Gird— wood, and Whittier. The Fed- eral Bureau of Public Roads as— sumed responsibility for most of the highway and road projects under its own authorities. The Alaska Highway Depart- ment estimated that projects totaled $84.9 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965. Much of this sum came under the Fed- eral-aid highway program, and more than half of it was spent in the earthquake-affected part of the State. Most of the projects involving airports were assigned to the Fed- eral Aviation Agency. Close to $1.3 million would be expended when all projects were completed. Additional millions were to be programed by the State for ex- pansion and improvement of State-operated airports. The Alaska Railroad, operated by the US. Department of the Interior, sustained heavy damage to 186 of its 536 miles of tracks and bridges, and about 300 units of rolling stock were total losses. The job of laying new track be- gan the morning after the earth- quake, and within a few weeks trains began to operate cautious- ly over the line. On April 20, 1964, the first sea-train barge was unloaded at Whittier and the car- go was delivered by rail to way points north. On September 14, a triumphant crew brought the first train into Seward since the earthquake. In the first 12 months following the earthquake, the railroad had spent $20 million in. specially ap- propriated emergency funds for repairs. Another $3 million had been requested of Congress. Bridges were replaced. The road- bed in subsided areas of Turn- again Arm had to be rebuilt above high tides. Some 150 units of rolling stock had been replaced. The Alaska Railroad had been self-supporting in its operations since 1941, and had been inde- pendent as far as capital improve- ments were concerned since 1955. During the year following the earthquake, its income was down a million dollars from the loss of three petroleum—haul contracts, because two oil companies had moved their operations to An- chorage when their Whittier facilities were wiped out. How- ever, railroad officials instituted economies and announced their intention to remain within the railroad’s income. The Small Business Adminis- tration streamlined procedures to make loans available to hard- hit homeowners and businessmen. Required bank participation in loans was reduced from 20 to 10 percent. Disaster loans were made to cover expenses of relocating buildings. Loans to homeowners were made on longer terms and at lower rates of interest than pre- viously. The loan ceiling to busi- nessmen was raised from $100,000 to $250,000. As of March 31, 1964, the Small Business Administration had ac- cumulated loans in Alaska amounting to $22,249,000. This figure included applications that were later withdrawn, refunded, or paid in full. Little more than a year later, at the close of the business day on April 9, 1965, home and business loans approved in Alaska totaled $74,869,420. These loans covered the State from Barrow on the Arctic Ocean to Unalaska in the Aleutian Is- lands, and from Nome on the Bering Sea to Ketchikan in southeastern Alaska. Through the Small Business Administration’s Community De- velopment Program, local devel- opment corporations were estab- lished throughout the State by the middle of June 1965. These organizations could borrow money from the Small Business Admin— istration to finance business, com- mercial, and industrial ventures of benefit to the communities. Prior to the earthquake only one such corporation was in existence in Alaska, and it had not been active. By the middle of June 1965, the Small Business Admin- istration was doing business with ‘48 concerns. Not only cities such as Anchorage benefited, but also smaller towns and some 17 native villages. A spokesman for the S In all Business Administration anticipated that within the second postearthquake year, the loans ap- proved for the creation, diversifi- cation, and improvement of indus- tries would exceed $20 million. Additional loans of more than $1 million were approved by the Department of the Interior to aid the fisheries. The Federal Housing Adminis- tration held mortgage insurance on 93 homes that were totally de— stroyed in Anchorage. There were no FHA mortgages in the other communities struck by the earth- quake and tsunamis. Aside from h omes totally destroyed, 596 FHA-insured homes were suitable for rehabilitation on their origin- al sites; '70 were moved to safer locations. As of May 1, 1965, an estimated 25 homes were still on their originial sites, neither re- paired nor occupied. By that date, only 35 homes had been returned to the FHA by the mortgagors. The “1200 L,” a 14-story apart- ment building with an estimated $1 million damage, and its down- town twin, the Mount McKinley Building, were returned to FHA. Each one had an existing mort- gage of about $1.5 million. In June 1965, the “1200 L” was sold to high bidder for $57 5,000. The new owners anticipated it would be ready for partial occupancy within 90 days. The Mount Mc— Kinley Building had not been put up for bid. The value of the FHA-insured properties that were lost in the disaster amounted to $6,234,897. Between April 1964, and March 31, 1965, commitments for a total of $25,256,850 had been issued by the FHA for 938 housing units. To further assist the State’s re- covery, special congressional legis- THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION lation authorized Federal pur- chasers a total of $25 million of State bonds, or a loan in that amount. In addition, the Housing and Home Finance Agency was authorized to purchase $7.2 mil- lion in State bonds for comple- tion of Alaskan capital-improve- ment programs. When the Federal Government moved to the aid of the 49th State, it was protecting an invest- ment made 100 years earlier. Through the years the $7 million purchase price of Alaska has been repaid m‘anyfold to the nation. By 105 the end of the 19th century, more gold than the original purchase price had been mined in Alaska and sent to the United States. Gold mining was negligible by 1964 but the State boasts of many still-rich mineral deposits, and other natural resources and grow- ing industries promise to make continuing contributions to the national wealth. During the year of decision and action, resolute Alaskans, with the generous aid of their Nation, worked with quiet determination toward a brighter future. 106 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 Most of the significant technical and semitechnical reports of the Alaska earthquake of March 27, 1964, that had been published or were in press when this volume was sent to the printer are listed below, as are all citations to the geological literature in the present paper and some additional earlier publications that may be useful as background material. The lit- erature on the earthquake is already voluminous, and will Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 1965, Post-earthquake fisheries evaluation; an interim report on the March, 1964 earthquake effects on Alaska’s fishery resources: Ju- neau, Alaska, 72 p. Alaska Department of Health and Wel- fare, 1964a, Good Friday earth— quake called on resources of all in State: Alaska’s Health and \Velfare, v. 21, June 1964, p. 5—7. 1964b, Preliminary report of earthquake damage to environ- mental health facilities and serv- ices in Alaska: Juneau, Alaska Dept. Health and Welfare, En- vironmental Health Br., 46 p. Alaska Department of Highways, 1964, Annual report, 1964: Juneau, Alas- ka, 41 p. Alaskan Construction Consultants Com- mittee [1964], Reconstruction and development survey of earthquake damages in Alaska: Prepared for Federal Reconstruction and Devel- opment Planning Commission for Alaska, 98 p. ‘ Alexander, R. L., 1964, Where the ar- chitect stands on the team: an in- troduction to aseismic design, in The Alaskan earthquake: Am. Inst. Architects Jour., v. 42, no. 6, p. 39— 42. American Institute of Architects and Engineers Joint Council Commit- tee, 1964, The restoration and de- velopment of Alaska—Report pre- pared for the Governor of Alaska: Anchorage, Alaska, Federal Re— construction and Devel. Planning Comm. for Alaska, 61 p. SELECTED! REFERENCES become more so in the years to come. This interim bibliography is necessarily incomplete; however, it may lead researchers to many re- ports that were written while the earthquake was fresh in mind, but which appeared in ephemeral, ob— scure, or limited-edition publica- tions. The staff of the Alaskan Earth- quake Committee of the National Academy of Sciences contributed Anderson, L. 0., and Liska, J. A., 1964, Wood structure performance in an earthquake in Anchorage, Alaska, March 27, 1964: U.S. Forest Serv- ice Research Paper FPL 16, 12 p., illus. Barnes, D. F., 1966, Gravity changes during the Alaska earthquake: J our. Geophys. Research, v. 71, no. 2, p. 451—456. Becker, J. G., 1965, Roadway damage, pt. 2 of Highway destruction in Alaska: Am. Highways, v. 43, no. 4, p. 27—29, Washington, D.C., Am. Assoc. State Highway Oflicials. Benioff, Hugo, and Gutenberg, Reno, 1939, Waves and currents record- ed by electromagnetic barographs: Bull. Am. Meteorol. Soc., v. 20, p. 421—426. Berg, Eduard [1964], The Alaskan earthquake of March 1964: Alaska Univ. Geophys. Inst. Ann. Rept, 1963-64, p. 69—82. 1965, The Alaskan earthquake, its location and seismic setting, in Science in Alaska, 1964: Alaskan Sci. Cont, 15th, College, Alaska, 1964, Proc., p. 218—232. Berg, G. V., and Stratta, J. L., 1964, Anchorage and the Alaska earth- quake of March 27, 1964: New York, Am. Iron and Steel Inst, 63 p. Bolt, B. A., 1964, Seismic air waves from the great 1964 Alaska earth- quake: Nature, v. 202, no. 4937, p. 1095—1096. Bonilla, M. G., and McCulloch, D. S., 1965, Engineering geologic efiects of the March 27, 1964, earthquake greatly to this bibliography. This group, led by Earl F. Cook and William L. Petrie, Division of Earth Sciences, made determined efforts to track down all pertinent commentaries on all aspects of the earthquake. Copies of the papers collected, as well as bibliographic references to them, were made available to Geological Survey personnel for use in preparation of their reports. on The Alaska Railroad [abs]: Geol. Soc. America Spec. Paper 82, p. 15—16. Bostock, H. S., 1948, Physiography of the Canadian Cordillera, with spe- cial reference to the area north of the 55th parallel: Canada Geol. Survey Mem. 247, pub. 2483, 106 p. Bredehoeft, J. D., Cooper, H. H., Jr., Papadopulos, I. S., and Bennett, R. R., 1965, Seismic fluctuations in an open artesian water well: U.S. Geol. Survey Prof. Paper 525—0, p. 51—57. Brevdy, June, 1964, Alaskan project, 1964: Target vulnerability studies, recovery research; San Francisco, US. Naval Radio]. Defense Lab. TR—751, 106 p. Britt, R. H., 1965, Earthquake damage repair at Sitkinak Loran Station: The Engineer’s Digest (US Coast Guard). CG—133, no. 149, p. 35-37 (0ct.—Nov.—Dec. 1965). Brooks, A. H., 1906, The geography and geology of Alaska, a summary of existing knowledge: U.S. Geol. Survey Prof. Paper 45, 327 p. 1911, The Mount McKinley re- gion, Alaska: U.S. Geo]. Survey Prof. Paper 70, 234 p. Burton. L. R., 1966, Television examina- tion of earthquake to underground communication and electrical sys- tems in Anchorage, in Logan, M. K., Effect of the earthquake of March 27 , 1964, on the Eklutna hydroelec- tric power system, Anchorage, Alaska: U.S. Geol. Survey Prof. Paper 545—A, 30 p. (In press.) California Department of Water Re- sources, 1965, The Alaskan earth- quake: California Dept. Water Re- sources Bull. 116—5, 64 p. Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 1964, Future predic- tion of earthquakes?: Canadian Mining Metal]. Bull, v. 57, no. 626, p. 658. Capps, S. 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