UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY MICROFILMED 1992 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY PHOTOGRAPHIC SERVICE BERKELEY, CA 94720 MAY BE COVERED BY COPYRIGHT LAW TITLE 17 U.S. CODE REPRODUCTIONS AVAILABLE THROUGH UC BERKELEY GENERAL LIBRARY INTERLIBRARY LOAN OFFICE AUTHOR :Jaeob, John 1812-1858. TITLE : vaets on the native army of India, its organization o 2nd discipline ‘london DATE : 1858 VOLUME : CALL DS Hoy M NEG : 90- NO : px 4174 FILMED AND PROCESSED BY LIBRARY PHOTOGRAPHIC SERVICE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY, CA 94720 JOB NO. ] 7 @ | Le ta DATE 8 9 2 z= Js i REDUCTION RATIO o DOCUMENT = Riri i cor SOURCE =~ EEE GENERAL LIBRARY | UNNUMBERED PAGE [LS] Blank pages are part of pagination sequence in the text. UNNUMBERED PAGE [S] fagination begins on p- 6, PP: [1-5] not de signated. hho Clie fr+19 ar il flanflome "TRACTS ON THE NATIVE ARMY OF INDIA, ITS ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE. BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOB, C.B., &e. &c. REPRINTED BY SMITH, ELDER & CO., 65, CORNHILL. —— 1858. PREFACE. Tae following Papers were written at various periods, commencing in the year 1849. Thinking that they may be interesting, and perhaps useful, at the present time, I now offer them to the public in a collected form. In doing so, I beg to call attention to the last Note, on the Causes of the Existing Outbreak in Bengal. It would have been easy for me to have enlarged on the subject to which it refers, for it is one which I have studied for many years; and it appears to me to be well worthy of the attention of statesmen, and of the research of the learned. It seemed, however, best, by a slight hint only at present, to endeavour to attract the notice of abler men to a matter so generally interesting. JOHN JACOB. NOVEMBER, 1857. REMARKS BY A BOMBAY OFFICER, ON A PAMPHLET ON « THE DEFICIENCY OF EUROPEAN OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF INDIA, BY ONE OF THEMSELVES. PUBLISHED BY JAMES MADDEN, 8, LEADENHALL-STREET, 1849.” ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED 1850 REMARKS ON A PAMPHLET, ETC. Tue author is evidently merely a Bengal officer; when he mentions the army of India, he thinks only of that of Bengal; his ideas of native troops are entirely confined to those of the Bengal army, and he ‘has not even a shadow of suspicion, that there are other native soldiers in the Indian army, besides those of Bengal, and who, though formed of exactly the same raw material, are essentially different from them in training and in discipline, in habit and feeling. The normal state of the Bengal army is such as must appear, to an officer of the Royal or of the Bombay army, as a state of mutiny! I have known the men leave the ranks by hundreds at a time without leave, to cook, to plunder, or what not. Yet such is the force of habit, that the exces-' sive want, or rather total absence of discipline, and all the gross evils which pervade the native army of Bengal, are looked on by the European officers of that army as necessary consequences of employing a 6 native army at all. Having little opportunity of comparing the native soldier of Bengal with others differently educated, their eyes are never opened to the true cause of the existing evils, but, like the author of this pamphlet, they attribute all to the deficiency in the numbers of the European officers, The fact being, that they are already more numerous than is necessary to real efficiency, and that, unless ! means were adopted to improve their quality, addition to the numbers would be hurtful. Our author says (p. 7), “Is it possible to conceive any army worse officered than that of the East India Company ?” | For “East India Company,” read ‘““ Bengal,” and the fact is undoubted. Tt is not possible to conceive an army worse officered than is the Bengal army, not because these officers are too few, but because they mistake their proper functions and act on wrong principles. am The officers of the Bengal army are formed exactly of the same materials as those of the other armies of India; their native soldiers of material in its raw state perhaps somewhat better than that of the others; but from the hour he enters the service, the Bengal officer is #rained # sink the European and adopt the Asiatic. Tn the Bombay army the “feeble Hindoo”. becomes half European, and adopts the feelings and ideas of Europeans, as far as they refer to his position as a soldier, till they become his own. In Bengal, the European becomes half Hindoo, and thus the commanding influence of superior energy 7 and superior moral character (I deny ay Sopen | of intellect) is in a great measure lost. This pervades the whole society in Bengal, but its effects are ios glaringly apparent in the army. In the Bengal ge there is a constant studying of men’s castes, which the EUROPEAN APPEARS TO THINK AS MUCH OF, AND os ESTEEM AS HIGHLY, AS DO THE NATIVES THEMSELVES ; and the sepoys, instead of looking on the a officers as superior beings, are compelled to co & them as bad Hindoos! Instead of being taug fue pride themselves on their soldiership and discip i the sepoys are trained to pride themselves on t i absurdities of caste, and think that their power fa value are best shown by refusing to obey any pers. which they please to say do not accord with t £0 religious prejudices. It is a grave mistake to he that religious feelings have any real influence i be occasions; it is a mistake, which would be ri sae if its consequences were not $0. serious; he certain that the Bengal sepoy 1s a stickler ” ” 2 imaginary rights of caste for the sake of rere power ; he knows well that Government mover 1 h any insult to his creed, however absurd it in ° ; but he knows that by crying out about his caste, e keeps power in his hands, saves himself fom a the hardships of service, and makes his officers a a of him. This is proved by what takes place in t 8 other armies of India. In the army of Bombay, ff ; a Purwarree may, and often does, rise to is a 4 Subadar by his own merit ; in Bengal, > : i would not even be admitted into the ranks, for fear 8 his contaminating those fine gentlemen, the B yet in the Bombay army, the Br brother, or son, may be shoulder to shoulder in t same tent with his dreams not of any ol this subject be rahmins; ahmin (father, , of him of Bengal) stands he ranks, nay ! sleeps in the Purwarree fellow- soldier, and mentioned to a Bombay Brahmin sepoy, as it is sometimes by Bengal officers, always asking the men about their cas answer is, “ What do I care; is he not the soldier of the state 7?” The reply speaks volumes, and shows a state of affairs which the officers of the Bengal army cannot conceive. who are te, the ready The system of promotion in the exactly in keeping with the tability of caste. Bengal army is principle of the Immu- No individual merit can advance, no individual incapacity nor misconduct (unless actually criminal) can retard the promotion of the Bengal Sepoy—seniority alone is considered. What is the consequence ? The men, not feeling that their prospects of advancement in the service depend on the favourable opinions of their European officers, want the most powerful stimulus to good conduct. They are never disciplined (as I understand the word), are often mutinous, and never acquire the knowledge of their profession which may qualify them to hold commissions with advantage to the service. The Bengal native officers are always totally in- efficient, and necessarily so under the present system, | because they are chosen without any regard whatever jection to the arrangement. If | - v { b else. 9 to their fitness to hold commissions, and because oy are almost always worn out with age ai i receive them. It is often objected by Po 0 ok that the pension-list of Bombay 1s nie : a proportion than that of Bengal. It is 50 % : Poor old wretches, feeble in body and- a mind, who would in Bombay have been pensione i ages ago, still remain holding commissions In ’ Does this arrangement cause any Does it really enable a greater Bengal army. 1 he state ? Pe to be maintained at the loos Gos At p. 9, our author alleges “that the Sa » asserted their right to pension for Toa i fitting European garb,” &e., &e. Veins W J " all over! and the observation is the more a ” " a were pensions to be given for such WL ; i in the Bengal army would ever be inclu e i ky pension-list ; for in comparison with his oi y brother, the Bengal sepoy seldom Na at all ; and when he mounts guard, the a Si ® does is to undress! To strip off oi ay 5 “ tight-fitting garb,” stock, accoutremen 5 rab The assertion that few men of any pe a 4 to independence will submit to a hs “ridiculously untrue as a genera rule, " : on it may be to Bengal experience. en of g a = will enter the service su sib vi worth entering, — witnes 1n i Horse. It is certainly true fae 0 officers of artillery and engineers are ou Shdtap the Indian Army: the duties of these office 10 generally quite independent of the number of men under their command, and many more European officers are required with European troops than with natives, owing to the presence of the native officers with the latter. With scientific corps the number of officers has no reference to the number of the men 3 it must be regulated altogether by other circum- stances. Our author remarks on the cavalry that “nothing can exceed the folly of grafting European drill, discipline, arms, and accoutrements on native troopers,” &ec. This remark betrays a lamentable and total ignorance of the princi ples necessary to success in forming an efficient na tive Indian army. The great number of European officers now allowed prevents the native officer, whatever his merit, from attaining a responsible or very respectable position in the army, thereby keeping out of its ranks natives of birth, wealth, and family, and preventing in the native soldier the full development of that love for and pride in the service which are essential to great efficiency. There are alread y too many European officers with reference to regimental duties only. A certain number of European officers is necessary, but very few suffice. Three to a regiment actually present is, perhaps, the best number, The duties of subaltern officers, and even of captains of troops and companies, are most efficiently performed by native officers. If there were but one European officer in a regi- ment, he would, if possessed of proper qualifications, if not trained in a school which makes him half 11 Hindoo, as in the Bengal army, and if um with proper power and authority, soon form En him such a body of native officers as would make the corps far more effective under the one Englishman than it could be under any number of Europeans who held the opinions with regard to native iops which now, to a great extent, prevail among the officers of the Bengal army. The opinions Rp in the pamphlet (page 15) on the subject of native officers are founded on a pernicious fallacy, and oe contrary to every-day experience in the Bombay Tain corps of Scinde Irregular a 1,600 strong, has but five European officers, yeh : has on all occasions proved to be perfectly Hen ’ and is generally believed, by those best able to ju i to be the best native cavalry corps in India. o the Scinde Irregular [Horse is most carefully minutely drilled, and is armed and Gained i be European style, which our author Sonn 0 : ruinous! The squadron and troop commanders J the Scinde Irregular Iorse are natives, yet t i greater part of them perform their duties os wel and in all respects as efficiently, as the best Sam ; officers, whether in quarters, on parade, on the line o tle. Fi 4 are: Sok can understand this, but it 3 nevertheless the truth. There 1s ne native Ff in the Bengal army, horse or foot, in which f e i is carried on with such steady regularity as t ih wl which all is conducted in the Scinde Irregular Horse - 12 — with its 2% Europeans to a regiment. There are no soldiers on earth better disciplined than those of this corps ; their discipline is founded on the mutual pride, confidence, respect, and good feeling, which exist between them and their European officers. They are confessedly among the best native soldiers in India, yet they cost the state less than one-half of the “regular” native soldiers, and they have been trained, educated, and altogether treated after a fashion dia- metrically opposed to Bengal principles. At page 16 of the pamphlet a glimmering of light appears to dawn on the mind of the Bengal officer, and he truly shows why the native officers of Bengal are entirely useless, while those of Bombay and Madras are most efficient. But the proposed remedy is a strange one, such as would never have been conceived by any but a Bengal officer. Surely common-sense would point out that the system of promotion in the Bengal army is the cause of the evil, and that if the best and most efficient men were always chosen for promotion to each grade, the native officers would not be “physically unfit” for the performance of their duties, as our author allows them to be. But this is too true and too simple for the pam- phleteer, and accordingly he proposes to make the native officers young again by appointing more Euro- peans! Was there ever reasoning more weak than this? The native officer in Bengal is useless because of the absurd system of promotion by seniority, and because there is nothing resembling what is usually understood to be discipline in the native army of 13 Bengal; so that the superior (though fearfully costly) energy of the European is required, it is supposed, to enforce obedience. I repeat that the ordinary state of the Bengal army is such as must appear to an officer of the Royal or of the Bombay army to be a state of mutiny. The men are nof taught and trained instinctively to obey orders, and even the European officers are afraid of them. This is not wholly the fault of the regimental officers of Bengal. The evil is produced and perpetuated by the false; ideas formed from the first moment a young officer enters the service in the school of errors, which the native army of Bengal is at present; and by the fatal effects of taking all power from regimental officers and concentrating it at army head-quarters, thus pro- ducing an artificial sameness of dull stagnation, instead of encouraging the natural uniformity of pro- gressive improvement. In the Bombay army, on the contrary, the native officer is invaluable, and his authority is respected, though he be the lowest of the low in caste; because the practice in Bombay is for the European officers to make the Hindoos sorLDIERs; instead of, as in Bengal, the sepoys making the European officers half Hindoos. The argument at page 19 of the pamphlet is amusing ; the Bengal native officers conceal muti-A nies, &c., therefore they are useless,—therefore “we! must have more Europeans!” It is difficult to help’ laughing when such logic is seriously put forward in grave argument. The native officers in Bengal are 14 , hot only useless but hurtful to discipline, because the whole system in force with regard to native soldiers ‘in Bengal is founded on false principles. It would be tedious to proceed with the rest of this pamphlet, the conclusions of the author are deduced from false data throughout, and are absurdly erro- neous. Many European officers are not required by the native army of India; the evils at present existing in the Bengal army are n0f to be remedied by any augmentation of European officers. The distance in feeling between the native and European in the Bengal army, and which spreads from the army throughout the whole population, is now much too great; increasing the numbers of the latter would assuredly no¢ lessen that distance. One of the best reputed native corps in the Indian army has but five Furopean officers to 1,600 men. This corps was raised in 1839; has been employed on all manner f arduous duties; has always been most orderly in uarters and most gallant in the field; has been mployed on many difficult enterprises and has never ailed of success; there has never been a court- artial in the regiment; though called Irregular orse, the corps is as regular as Her Majesty's fe Guards; and its native officers are, as subal- erns, equal to the best Europeans. In short this fis Justly considered as the most efficient corps in the foe While, if the Bengal principles be true t should be the very worst! Turrg 1s MORE PANE T0 oUR INDIAN EMPIRE FROM THE sTATE oF THE 15 BENGAL ARMY, FROM THE FEELING WHICH THERE EXISTS: BETWEEN THE NATIVE AND THE EUROPEAN, AND THENCE SPREADS THROUGHOUT THE LENGTH AND BREADTH OF THE LAND, THAN FROM ALL OTHER CAUSES COMBINED. LET GOVERNMENT LOOK TO THIS IT IS A SERIOUS AND MOST IMPORTANT TRUTH. Let some means be found to make the native soldier love and respect his Iuropean superior; let the latter be worthy of such respect, and Government need neither fear internal disaffection, nor shrink from opposing the Indian army in battle, or any where else, to equal numbers of the best troops on earth. Iow is this state of feeling best insured? Not assuredly by the presence of a great number of ill-qualified European gentlemen, so ignorant or so foolish as to laugh at and treat with open contempt the men they are to lead in battle! Nor by the degrading of the European character by the adoption of native habits. Nor by anything else which such officers as our pamphleteer propose. But much (indeed everything) may be done by introducing a proper system of promotion dependent on merit alone; by giving regimental commanding officers full powers ; placing all regimental patronage (including the appointment of their own staff) in their hands; and attending to their recommendations when officers are required for staff employ away {rom the regiment ; by pensioning off every worn-out native officer ; by enlisting men without the least regard to caste, &c., which should never be alluded to nor thought of; by introducing a strict and proper dis- 16 cipline, and making the men on all occasions do their duty like soldiers, till the habit of obedience, whether in the matter of “tight garb” or anything else, becomes a second nature, and you have engaged in favour of good order and military discipline the influence of “ dustoor” (custom) so irresistible among natives of India. The commanding officer of a regiment, with in- creased power and respectability of position, would feel increased pride in the service; he would do his own duty and make all under him do theirs, At present he has so little power to do good, that in the Bengal army he too often becomes careless of doing evil. The prospects of all under him depending on their own individual merit, a healthy state of mutual support and assistance would soon be established, and no further complaints of the want of a cordial good feeling between the officers and men would be heard, A DISCIPLINE FOUNDED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND ADVANTAGE CANNOT FAIL OF SuUCCEss. Without it no number of European officers would suffice to make decent soldiers of the sepoys of Bengal. NOTE, DATED 5ra MARCH, 1857. As bearing on what has been advanced in these pages, the following regimental order by the com- mandant of the Scinde Irregular Horse is very significant. Extract From ReciMENTAL ORDERS, BY Major J. Jaco, C.B., COMMANDANT OF THE SCINDE IzreEGuLAR HORSE. Jacobabad, 5th October, 1854. The camp at Jacobabad has been, for the last week, the scene of wild disorder, such as is in the highest degree disgraceful to good soldiers. A shameful uproar has been going on day and night, and this .under the pretence of religious ceremonies. The commanding officer has nothing to do with religious ceremonies. All men may worship God as they please, and may act and believe as they choose, in matters of religion ; but no men have a right to annoy their neighbours, or to neglect their duty, on pretence of serving God. The officers and men of the Scinde Horse have the name of, and are supposed to be, excellent soldiers, and not mad Fukkeers. | B 18 They are placed at the most advanced and most honourable post in all the Bombay presidency. The commanding officer believes that they are in every way worthy of their honour, and would be sorry if} under his command, they ever become unworthy of their high position. The commanding officer feels it to be the greatest honour to command such soldiers, but that it would be a disgrace to be at the head of a body of mad and disorderly Fukkeers and drummers. He therefore now forms the Scinde Irregular Horse, that in future, no noisy processions, nor any disorderly display whatever, under pretence of reli gion, or of anything else, shall ever be allowed , or in the neighbourhood of, any camp of the Scinde Trregular Horse. This order is to be read on the first of every month until further orders, and is to be hung up in the Bazar in the town of Jacobabad, and at the Cutchery. By order, (Signed) W. L. Briaas, Lieut. Adjutant 2nd Regt. S. I. H. When this order was issued, immediately after the “ MonurrumM,” 1854, there were in the camp, and adjoining the town of J acobabad, some ten thousand bigoted Mussulmans, yet not a dissentient voice, not the slightest murmur of opposition, was ever heard from even a single individual man. The order has since invariably been strictly enforced, and no attempt 19 has ever been made to evade or to infringe it. The good sense of the soldiers and the people had been habitually cultivated by Colonel Jacob; and even in such an order as this, which directly interfered with their religious ceremonies, he carried the minds of all with him, as he knew that he would do. A discipline which so controls and guides the minds of men, while developing and increasing their individual power and sense of freedom, must absolutely be founded on true and lasting principles. Apply these principles generally, let rEAsoN rule in place of ‘‘ REGULATION,” and with tenfold military power really at our service, one half of the cost of our Indian armies might be saved to the State. A FEW REMARKS THE BENGAL ARMY AND FURLOUGH REGULATIONS, WITH A VIEW TO THEIR IMPROVEMENT. BY A BOMBAY OFFICER. REPRINTED FROM THE EDITION OF 1851, WITH CORRECTIONS. REFORMS IN THE BENGAL ARMY. Sir C. Napier, in his Farewell Order to the Indian army, has placed in a strong light before the public the deficiency of right moral feeling and of honour- able pride, which he says exists, and which, to a, certain extent, assuredly does exist, among the European officers of Bengal; and which has caused such lamentable effects in every part of the army of that Presidency. The defects and indiscipline of the Bengal army, even as compared with the other armies of India, in which also numerous evils, faults, and deficiencies might be pointed out, are manifold and glaring. It is only a portion of these defects of the Bengal army which Sir C. Napier has attacked, or rather which he has mentioned ; for his last order, however . speciously worded, appears more like a parting curse on the army, the command of which he was compelled to resign, than a serious attempt to remedy the evils which he asserts exist in it. By his own showing, the late Commander-in-Chief, for more than a year before the publication of that order, was fully aware of the existing state of affairs, yet apparently no effort whatever was made by him to correct it while he 24 had the power of doing so. On the contrary, instead of endeavouring to reform the army of Bengal, Sir C. Napier was setting that army an example of gross insubordination and contempt of authority. With what grace could he inculcate the necessity of submission to discipline on his subordinates, when he himself was perseveringly and continually guilty of disobedience to the lawful authority of his superiors. Those best acquainted with the subject, and with the man, cannot persuade themselves that the publica- tion of the order abovementioned was really intended to benefit the army of Bengal or the Indian army generally. Sir C. Napier has censured the officers of Bengal for certain faults, and to some extent he is undoubtedly right in his remarks, but his censures would have possessed more force, and his precepts have been regarded with more respect, had his practice and proceedings been different from what they were. The judgment of the late Commander-in-Chief appears even more questionable with respect to another order, which was issued by him a very short time before the more notorious farewell address. His order regarding promotions in the Native army of Bengal is the one alluded to. The evident and unavoidable consequence of fully carrying into effect such an order, is the entire ruin of the Bengal army. This will be shown hereafter Sir C. Napier asserts that the proceedings commor among the officers of the Bengal army prove them to be no gentlemen. Be this as it may, assuredly he what use is it for the zealous European officers to “endeavour to instruct the Native, and to make him 25 has himself, by his last order, done his utmost to make them no officers; talent, skill, energy, high principle, and soldier-like pride fall alike crushed and powerless under such a system of promotion as Sir C. Napier has ordered to be strictly enforced | with regard to the Native army of Bengal. Of really, and not in name only, a soldier? of what use is it for the latter to endeavour to learn, when neither instruction, nor acquirement, nor merit of any kind avails to advance the sepoy a single step ? Nothing but the most deplorable ignorance and folly on the one hand, or the deepest hatred and malice on the other, could have given rise to such a fatal measure. Notwithstanding his Baggage Corps, and other incredible absurdities in India, no one has ever accused Sir C. Napier of imbecility. But the ¢rascally Government,” “the man Hogg,” and the ¢ poor and suffering people,” are undeniable evidences of his virulent enmity. Under all the circumstances of the case, Sir C. Napier must be considered an incompetent witness, and his acts, words, and writings must, by honest and sober men, be held to be of no weight whatever with regard to the Native army of India. Of the Natives he absolutely knew nothing. Witness his remarks about the Soobadars, &c., and the officers he detested, as the faithful servants of a “rascally Government.” 26 Rejecting then all Napierian abuse, and presump- tuous ignorance regarding the army of India, let us inquire what really are the defects and wants of the Native army of Bengal, and the best methods of remedying and supplying them. Let the officers of the Bengal army apply themselves fairly and honestly to the task of reform, where reform is really needed, - AND LET THEM NOT FLATTER THEMSELVES, AS IT TOO OFTEN IS THE CASE, that THEY HAVE REMEDIED A DEFECT WHEN THEY HAVE ONLY CONCEALED IT, OR DENIED ITS EXISTENCE ; old sores must be laid open with an unsparing hand, and the caustic be freely applied, before they can be properly healed ; let not the patient think the surgeon an enemy because he gives pain. For myself I shall endeavour to write exactly as if I were myself an officer of the Bengal army; my judgment may be erroneous, and my opinions unsound, but my motives are undoubtedly good : they are the wish, honestly to serve my honourable masters and my country, and to benefit, in my humble capacity, the Service to which I am proud to belong. I have jrorved altogether twenty-three years, have never been absent from my duty, and have long commanded a Native corps of high repute: during the course of my service, I have seen a good deal of the Bengal army, and have conversed much with its officers. With the opportunities and experience above- mentioned, my observations and opinions may be useless, and unsound, but they cannot justly be deemed presumptuous, or hasty. The most serious faults existing in, and peculiar Wms dnt 27 to the Bengal army, appear to me to be as follow : — First.—The absence of the highest moral tone and of a simple and vigorous Anglo-Saxon honesty in dealing with Asiatics on the part of the English officers of the army of Bengal. Secondly.— The want of power placed in the hands of regimental commanding officers; the want of confidence reposed in, and support afforded to them, by the Commander-in-Chief and by Government. Thirdly.—The most pernicious system of drawing pay by companies direct from the divisional pay- master instead of by regiments, which again tends to bring regimental commanders in contempt, and to reduce their power and usefulness. Fourthly.— The most defective system of conducting officers’ messes. Fifthly.—The entire absence of a proper confidence between the officers and the Native soldiers. Sixthly.—The most pernicious practice of attending to the caste of Native soldiers, thereby frequently excluding from our ranks the best material for soldiers, and enlisting the very worst. Seventhly.—The very bad, and fatally injurious system of promotion existing with respect to Native officers and soldiers. io Eighthly.—The entire absence of a proper disci- pline throughout the Native part of the Bengal army. : Ample proof of the first mentioned fault is found in proceedings towards mutineers,—in the late orders 28 to the Bengal army regarding Courts of Requests, &c.,—in disclosures which have been made regarding gambling affairs, banking transactions, &ec.,—too notorious to require detailing, and too extensive and numerous to be attributable to causes affecting indi- viduals only. These proofs are public and patent to all men. The defect being admitted, where shall we look for the cause and the remedy ? One cause appears to me to consist in the lowering of the English character, {by insensibly adopting Asiatic habits, manners, and feelings ; the Anglo-Saxon becoming partly merged in the Hindoo. This is extensively the case in the army of Bengal. : From the moment a young officer sets foot in the Bengal Presidency, he is perpetually reminded that every English idea and habit is the sure mark of a griffin (that is of a fool). He must not go out in the sunshine, he must travel in a palki instead of on horseback, he must be punkaed, and tattied, and God nows what else; he must have a kAhansamaun, a kidmutgar, a sirdar bearer and bearers, and a host of other servants, one for his pipe, another for his umbrella, another for his bottle, another for his chair, &e., all to do the work of one man; and which work would be done by one man in the case of a Bombay griffin. By all these people the youth is called Ghur- reeb purwar, Khoodabund, &c. &c. This state of affairs bewilders the new comer, till, resigning himself to his fate, he becomes accustomed to it, and gradually loses part of the manliness of the 29 Anglo-Saxon character. -With the external luxurious and lazy habits of Hindustan, he imperceptibly adopts somewhat of oriental morality. Another cause is the difficulty existing in Satuning) furlough to Europe, which, if removed, would effect a wonderful improvement on the tone of Indian society ; this cause, although of grave importance, 1s, of course, not peculiar to Bengal, but common to all India. The remedy is evident, LET IT BE THE FASHION.TO sp Excusm. Itis fallacy to suppose that the climate compels to be otherwise. There are faults enough I suppose in the European society of the Western Presidency, but assuredly it is ten times more English than that of Bengal, yet the climate is no better than that of the latter. Let the griffin have no more than two body ser vants at most, let him have no one in his service| who will not do such work as his master bids him) do; if the Hindoos object to such service, there a plenty of Mussulmans, ready, willing, and able to take their places, and with no more prejudices than a Christian. : Let the young man never enter a palki, but ga about on the back of his pony ; let him not fear th sun, it may tan his cheeks, but it will not Tort him. It is your effeminate gentlefolk, who live in dark houses, artificially cooled with a dozen Hindoos at work, with fans and flappers to beat the flies off them, who suffer by exposure, not the hardy young Englishman, who, if not intemperate, soon becomes ' ' : ) 30 acclimated ; and the more readily so the less he regards the sunshine, which is healthy enough in moderation ; experto crede. Let him, in short, while studying the character of y the natives of India as deeply as possible, and making himself completely acquainted with their habits {thoughts, feelings, modes of expression, &c., ls, vour himself by all means in his power to remain a thoroughly Excrisn gentleman. As he succeeds in doing so, he will assuredly succeed in commanding the respect and regard of every native around him, JArL our rower 1x Inpra musts ox THIS. ay it down as an absolute cert We may J fre ainty, that the millions I natives which a handful 11 1 , $ whicha handful of Englishmen govern in fas vast continent, will not consent to be governed by 7 » “ » . i | handful of their equals. Our power consists in bur being essentially different from them, and in their elief in our moral superiority only. The only thing vhich can endanger the existence of this power, is the estruction or weakening of that belief. h The state of the body will often affect the mind ; abits an 's will ac d manners will act on, and be reacted on, by morals and religion. 1: 1 ™ . ° . : et us then be English in all things, to the utmost of our power, internally and externally, in religion and in morals, in habits and in feelings, allowing absolute freedom of opinion and fair and all will be well. The second evil is notorious, it has been frequently remarked on, its existence is everywhere acknow- ledged, and its effects are lamentable. The com- play to all men, 31 manding officer of a regiment in the Bengal army is almost powerless for good, he is allowed to do nothing, his men are almost taught to despise him, and in many instances of late years the sepoys have been allowed and encouraged to forward written complaints against their commanders direct to army head- quarters. What can be worse than this? It is utterly destructive of all military discipline and soldierlike pride. The third and fourth mentioned evils are closely connected with the second. In the Bengal army the practice prevails of each commander of a company drawing pay for that company himself separately, direct from the divisional paymaster, so that the pecuniary transactions of the regiment are carried on in a great measure independently of the com- manding officer, and often without his knowledge ; as, for example, has appeared in some late disclosures regarding banking transactions, wherein the officers commanding companies appear to have made arrange- ments with divisional paymasters for the recovery, by regular instalments, of payments on account of various banking transactions, without the commanding officers of the regiment krfowing anything of the matter. All these also tend to reduce the useful power of regi- mental commandants, and make them be despised. With regard to messes, the state of affairs is very bad. In some regiments no mess exists. The main- taining a mess is not only not made compulsory, but even where a mess is maintained it is optional with officers whether to belong to it or not. Such a state 32 of affairs is fraught with the worst consequences; it breaks a regiment up into separate parties, and gives rise to all manner of ill feeling. It also lessens the power and good influence of the commanding officer in an extraordinary degree. It takes away much of the support which a commander quietly and imper- ceptibly receives from all well-disposed officers, [who have a proper pride in their noble profession ; and it enables others, who may be ill-disposed, to work mischief unperceived, till its effects become apparent in the bad state of the regiment. The remedy for all these evils is in the hands of _ the Commander-in-Chief, and of Government : let the commander of a regiment be systematically and effectually supported in the exercise of his legitimate powers ; let those powers be as ample as possible in every respect; regarding regimental affairs, let all turn, centre, and rest on him; and with these full powers, make him responsible that all goes well. If it do not, displace him from his command. Let there be a regimental paymaster to whom the company officers send their muster rolls, and whose duty it is to draw the pay of the regiment, under the authority of the regimental commander. Let the mess be a public institution, to belong to which is compulsory on all officers. Let the com- manding officers be held responsible that it be conducted with due and proper regard to economy, comfort, and propriety, and give them full power to enforce such a state of things. There is nothing new * This defect has lately been to some extent remedied. 33 in these rules, they exist with the happiest effects in the other armies of India, and would be equally advantageous to that of Bengal. The fifth evil is notorious, and is plainly proved by men deserting their officers in the field, by frequent mutinies, &c., where nothing has been known by the officers of what was going on, until it resulted in open resistance to authority. The causes of this are various, part depending on what has been mentioned above, but chiefly on the abominable system of re- cognising caste in our ranks, and on the absurd _ system of promotion, whereby the Native officers are absolutely useless. The remedies are of course as described with respect to those causes. The sixth evil is of a very grave and important nature. The effect of enlisting men of a certain caste, or creed, to the exclusion of others in the Indian army, is to subject that army to the control, not of the Government and of the Articles of War, but to that of Brahmins and Goseins, Moollahs and Fukkeers. By this system, a man is not to be chosen on account of his fitness to be a soldier, his willingness and strength, docility and courage, but because he is a twice-born worshipper of Vishnoo. Whatever his other qualifications, if a man think that a stone with a patch of red paint on it is Nor to be wor- shipped as the Creator, still more, if he have been a shoemaker, &c., he is not to be admitted into the ranks of the Bengal army, for fear of offending the lazy and insolent Brahmins. The consequences are Cc 34 ruinous to discipline. By reason or THis A NATIVE SOLDIER in Bengal 1s FAR MORE AFRAID OF AN OFFENCE AGAINST CASTE THAN OF AN OFFENCE AGAINST THE ArticLes oF WAR, AND BY THIS MEANS A DEGREE OF POWER RESTS WITH THE PRIVATE SOLDIER, which is entirely incompatible with all healthy rule. TREACHERY, MUTINY, VILLANY OF ALL KINDS MAY BE CARRIED ON AMONG THE PRIVATE SOLDIERS, UNKNOWN TO THEIR OFFICERS, TO ANY EXTENT, WHERE THE MEN ARE OF ONE CASTE oF IlINDOOS, AND WHERE THE RULES OF CASTE ARE MORE REGARDED THAN THOSE OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE. To such an extent does this evil exist, that I have known a Bengal commanding officer express his regret at being compelled to dis- charge an excellent sepoy, because the other men had discovered him to be of inferior caste, and had demanded his dismissal. To a Bombay officer such a state of affairs appears incredible, it amounts to open mutiny ; but it is the normal state of the Bengal army at present. It is curious, that though the Bengal sepoys have contrived to have it believed that their religion is concerned in this business of caste, in our ranks nothing is further from the truth. In conjunction with the system of promotion which prevails, THIS ATTENTION TO CASTE KEEPS ALL REAL POWER IN THE HANDS OF THE PRIVATE SOLDIERS ; and, as they think, saves them from much trouble and annoyance ; but, when they assert that this evil is a necessary consequence of their religion, the Bengal sepoys state the contrary to truth. This is positively proved by that which takes place 35 in the army of Bombay, wherein hundreds and thou- sands of men from Hindustan, from the same villages, ’ of the same caste, and even of the same families, brothers by the same fathers and mothers, as the fine gentlemen of the Bengal army, are seen in the ranks, shoulder to shoulder, nay, even sleeping in the same tent with the Mahratta, the Dher, and the Purwarree, without scruple or thought of objection. The one prides himself on being a Hindoo, the other on being a soldier. Which pride is the best for our purpose? This system of regarding caste is the original cause of many other evils in the Bengal army ; and much of what has been said regarding the adoption of Asiatic manners, tells again heavily here.* The Bombay sepoy, whatever faults he may have, has one great excellence, which is, that he looks on the European soldier as his model in all things pertaining to soldiership, and endeavours to imitate him. Like the European soldier, the native sepoy of Bombay will turn his hand to any labour which he may be ordered to execute. If the lines require cleaning, &c., &c., a working party of sepoys is ordered out as a matter of course, with pickaxe and powrah, and the work is well done. The technical term “working party” is as familiar in the mouth of a Bombay sepoy as “shoulder arms.” * The fact is, that when, without giving offence, the English She shows, by his habitual conduct towards the sepoys, that he Beet caste prejudices, &c., to be marks of INFERIORITY, which excite on y is pity and regret, the sepoys endeavour to keep all such caste preju es &e., as much as possible out of sight, will never allow them to interfere with duty, and will never willingly obtrude them on notice at all. C2 / 36 Nay, I have known more than once, the men of a Bombay regiment to volunteer for such work as building their officers’ houses, mess-room, &c., and to do the work well, too, making the bricks, mixing the mud, &c., &c., entirely by themselves. This would not be credited by the greater part of the Bengal army, and to such a state of helplessness has the recognition of caste in the ranks brought the Bengal sepoy, that a regiment of Native Cavalry, as I have repeatedly witnessed, is unable to picket, unsaddle, or groom its horses, until the arrival of its syces and grass-cutters, sometimes, as I have seen, for several hours after the arrival of the regiment at its ground. In a Bombay regiment, before that time had elapsed, the horses would have been picketed, groomed, fed, and watered, stables would have been over, the tents pitched, and the men have had their breakfast. To such an incredible extent has this helplessness been carried and recognised by authority, that a Bengal sentry cannot think of striking the gong at his own quarter-guard, and men called “ Gunta Pandays” are actually maintained, and paid for by Government, to _ do this duty for them. It is the Khansamaum, Kitmutgar, Hookah -burdar, &c., &c., over again. The remedy is obvious ; never allow any reference to caste when enlisting men. "If others now in the service object, let them be told that Government does not care one pin whether its sepoys be Hindoos, or Mussulmans, or Brahmins, or Purwarrees, so long as they be good soldiers, and that, if they do not like the - rules of the service, they may leave it. If they still 37 object, or make-any difficulty about the matter, dis- charge them on the spot. There are millions of better men ready to occupy their places. Let also the use of entrenching tools be part of the drill of the sepoy, as much as is the musket exercise, and when he has learnt this, let him be occasionally employed in working parties, &c., to prevent his forgetting it again: This trifle would be found to possess much more importance than at first sight appears to attach to it. The seventh evil, the bad system of promotion, is the worst of all; its effects are crushingly ruinous. In the Bengal army, the promotion of natives is made to depend on seniority only, so that if a man keep clear of actual crime, and lives long enough, he must become a commissioned officer, however unfit for the office. Under this system, the private soldier feels himself entirely independent of his officers; he knows that they neither hasten nor retard his advance in the service. He has nothing to do but to live and get through his duties with listless stupidity, and with the least possible trouble to himself. No exertion on his part can help him ;—talent, courage, fidelity nor good conduct are of any avail. Confidence and pride in each other, between men and officers, cannot exist. There is no real co-operation ; for the one being powerless to aid, the other becomes careless of offending. This is the effect on the private soldier ; the system is equally, if not more baneful, as respects the Native officers, commissioned and non-commis- 38 sioned. The whole of the Native commissioned officers are entirely useless, the amount of their pay is a dead loss to the state, every one of them 1s unfit for service by reason of imbecility produced by old age, or, where in rare instances the man ma not be altogether in his second childhood, he entirely useless from having been educated i" a bad school. All should have been pensioned long ago: but, alas! if the present system of promotion bo continued, the getting rid of these poor old gentle- men, who cut such painfully ridiculous figures in the Bengal regiments, would be of no use whatever, for the non-commissioned officers who would have ® be promoted in their places, are but little better ; even the very naiques (corporals), are almost too old for service. How very different is the state of affairs under a proper system of promotion by merit alone. It gives the commanding officers of regiments and companies a good deal more trouble certainly in making promotions, but how are they repaid ? If they really and honestly do their best to choose the men for promotion without partiality, favour, or affection, but by merit and fitness alone, it is in found that every man in the regiment (at least all who are fit to be in our ranks) exerts himself to aid his officers. A degree of vigour and activity amount- ing to a new life is infused into every part of the regiment. The men seeing all the prizes of the service within their reach, exert themselves to obtain them. They can only obtain their end by becoming 39 good soldiers, by learning their duty, and performing it to the satisfaction of their superiors. The Native officers being chosen with regard alone to their qualifications and their fitness to hold com- missions, are alike proud of the distinction they have acquired by their appointments and able to perform their duties. They are not enfeebled by age, and the consciousness that their respectability and success in life depend on their own conduct, makes them exert themselves willingly and zealously in maintaining the discipline and reputation of the service in which they acquire honour. The ill effects of the one system, and the excellencies of the other, appear to me so self-evident, and have been both proved on so large a scale, that I should consider it to be insulting to the understanding of my readers were I to enlarge on if, if it were not for the astonishing fact that such an evil system of promotion still actually exists In Bengal, and has been lately enforced in spite of reason, common-sense, and experience, by Sir Charles Napier. With such a system of promotion, the good and the bad, the clever and the foolish, the brave and the timid, the energetic and the imbecile, are nearly on a par. The officers are powerless for good, and the men, keeping just clear of open violence, have their own way in all things. Ir IS ASTONISHING, AND SAYS MUCH FOR THE GOODNESS OF THE RAW MATERIAL OF THE BENGAL ARMY, THAT UNDER SUCH ARRANGEMENTS, THE WHOLE FABRIC HAS NOT ENTIRELY FALLEN TO PIECES. THE THING IS ROTTEN THROUGH- 40 OUT, AND DISCIPLINE THERE IS NONE, BUT IT IS WONDERFUL THAT EVEN THE OUTWARD SEMBLANCE OF AN ARMY HAS BEEN STILL MAINTAINED UNDER SUCH DEPLORABLE MISMANAGEMENT. The eighth evil, the want of discipline, is the necessary consequence of much that has already been described. In speaking of want of discipline, I do not only mean that which is shown by A, muti- nies and misconduct on extraordinary occasions but also as evinced in the ordinary every-day rm of duty in the Bengal army; this is such, as to be almost incredible to an officer of the Royal army or of the other armies of India. The first thing done by a Bengal sepoy when he mounts guard, is to strip himself of arms, accoutrements, and dothing ; the muskets are piled, and a sentry is posted, oh remains, generally (not always), properly accoutred &c.; all the others, including monedviesionan officers, disarm and strip; if there be any water near, they go and dabble in it after the fashion of all Hindustanees, otherwise they cover themselves with sheets and go to sleep, quite naked, with the exception of a lungootee. When the sentry thinks that he has been on long enough, he bawls out for some one to relieve him; after a while, up gets a sepoy from beneath his sheet, and after a few yawns and stretches, puts on his clothes and accoutrements but does not take his musket—that would be dio much trouble, and endanger upsetting the whole pile ; / he then goes to the sentry, takes his musket from him, and occupies his place ; away goes the relieved 41 man and strips like the others. No naique attends with the relief, he remains fast asleep under his sheet. Now this state of things I have myself seen in hundreds of cases. It is so astonishing to a Bombay officer that he cannot help remarking on it, yet I have been assured by numerous Bengal officers that this is the regular way of mounting guard. It should be borne in mind, also, that in the Bengal army four men are allowed to a sentry, instead of three as with other armies; so that a sepoy with them is on sentry only six hours alto- gether during his tour of twenty-four hours, instead of eight as usual. But it is by no means uncommon in the Bengal Army to relieve a guard once a week, and even at longer intervals, when the state of affairs above- mentioned must take place, even if it were not so on other occasions. This was the case when the Bombay and Bengal troops met at Peshawur, and considerable grumbling and complaining took place when Sir H. Dundas insisted on the guards being relieved daily. To the mind of any practical soldier, no further proof is necessary on this subject—want of discipline. He must at once see, that where guards are relieved weekly, where the sentries relieve each other as they please, and where the whole guard strips naked, there can be mo discipline whatever. It is useless to ask whether a man can read and write, when you find that he does not know a letter of his alphabet. If it were necessary, however, I could adduce abundance of other facts to the same purport. "The remedy is 42 apparent from what has been said before. Such are some of the reforms peculiarly required by Bengal. But there are many others, equally requisite, with regard to the Native Indian army generally, for Instance with respect to the regimental orderly room. The commanding officer of every regiment should, every day of his life, hold his orderly room in some convenient public place, where the commanding officer, his staff, and all the European officers not otherwise engaged, should assemble. Here all regi- mental business should be transacted in public; every man in the regiment should have an opportunity, every day, of seeing his commanding officer. Everything being done with perfect openness in the presence of all the English officers, many common sources of discontent and of grievance, real or ima- ginary, would be removed. Every officer would be habitually well acquainted with everything relating to the regiment, and would be undergoing a course of education calculated better than any other to fit him for command in his turn. While the habitual daily presence of all the English officers around their commanding officer would afford him the best possible support in doing right, and impose the most effective check on wrong, a very ordinary mortal might, under such an MS be safely trusted with absolute powers, while. to officer’s qualifications could ever be for a moment doubtful. Where everything is open to the public, common-sense has the fairest chance of prevailing, and “regulation” need be but little intruded. 43 Officers need be troubled as little as possible with form, dress, ceremony, and matters of etiquette, at their daily orderly room; and the inconvenience of daily attendance would speedily be overcome by an increasing feeling of interest in all regimental affairs, and all irksomeness would be removed by the grant of leave of absence when required for any rational purpose. The arrangement here contemplated appears to me to be of the very highest importance to the welfare of the Native army of India; and I may observe that I have myself practised what I here teach, for fifteen years together, with the happiest effects. I will now conclude with a few observations on the late order concerning passing in the Native languages, by which, with the best possible intentions, our honourable masters have done such an amount of injustice to their servants, that if the order be really and strictly carried into effect, the greatest injury to the Army and to our Indian Empire must ensue. In the first place, the Honourable Court of Directors proclaim, that the only post in their service for which a knowledge of the Native languages is not a necessary qualification, is the command of their regular Native soldiers ; officers who do not pass, are to remain with their regiments. Secondly. An officer, by natural talent and study, may be a first-rate engineer, or peradventure an astronomer, but nature may have denied him the peculiar talent of acquiring language, and he has in consequence neither passed in Hindus- tanee, Mahratta, nor Persian. Government require 44 an engineer or an astronomer; by the order of the Honourable Court, they must appoint, not the man who is well acquainted with astronomy and physical science, but some one whose leisure has been occupied, and whose mind has been improved, by the study of the indecent and obscene stories and of the childish fables of which the “Hindustanee literature consists, but who knows not a vernier from a mural quadrant, nor Jupiter from Venus. Nature has given us all, even the best of us, but very limited faculties ; some excel in one respect, some in another ; each may do excellently well if placed in that position for which his natural talents and abilities are suited ; but, to attempt to force all men to be linguists, is no more reasonable than to compel them to be all of one size of body; what between stretching and compressing, the whole human race might be destroyed, but mo uniformity of size would be produced. Tt is quite as unreasonable to say that a man is unfit for Staff employ because he has not the gift of tongues, as it would be to say so because he was no musician ; a want of an organ of language is probably quite as common as the defect of the organ of tune. But does either deficiency imply that the man is fit to command the Native infantry soldiers of the Indian army and fit for nothing else. Has any Government on earth such an amount of talent at its disposal, that it can afford to press all into one mould without fatal injury to efficiency. I have served my honourable masters long, and at least zealously, They have told me that I have done 45 them good service, and they have given me high praise. I have never been absent from my duty, and have always performed it to the full satisfaction of my superiors. I am tolerably acquainted with the natives of India, in intimate association with whom I have passed the best part of my life. But, on the other hand, I have not passed in any language, and cannot read even the Bagh-o-Bahar. Wherefore, I am virtually told by my honourable masters, that as I have been so long in their service, they will not now positively turn me out, as incapable, from the place I have held with so much undeserved praise from them during the last ten years; but my lieutenants, who have hitherto, I flatter myself, held me in some con- siderable respect and esteem, and whom I have endeavoured to confirm in what seem to me to be soldierlike ideas, are now told, that to prevent my bad example affecting them, to prevent their becoming such an imbecile as their commander, in spite of his thinking them the best men in the army to be his lieutenants, and his never having had a fault to find with one of them, and in spite of all their zealous and gallant services, and their honourable wounds, they are now told, I say, they shall all be turned out of their appointments if they do not immediately pass an examination in the Hindustanee language. That is to say, that seven years’ honest and zealous exertion, and brilliant service in the field, including a most honourable share in hard fought and important battles and sieges, with frequent commendation in public despatches, &c., altogether imply, in the 46 opinion of our honourable masters, a degree of merit and capacity not to be compared to that acquired by the study of filthy Hindustanee stories. Let the Honourablé Court at once rescind an order which will defeat the object contemplated in it ; which has disgusted, or will disgust, many of their best, most tried, and most valued servants; which will make contempt and ill-feeling take the place of honest pride and generous zeal ; and which cannot but deeply injure their army, and India in general. I have had abundant opportunity of judging of this matter, and I solemnly assure my honourable masters, that it is notorious that their officers, who have passed in the language, are not only not the most able of their servants, but that they have, as a body (there are brilliant exceptions, of course), less know- ledge of that language for practical purposes than the unpassed ; that is if language be intended to facilitate the communication of ideas between man and man, and not for concealing thoughts. This may appear paradoxical, but a little consideration soon shows that it must be so. While the young man has been studying books, the other has been studying men. I have, on hundreds of occasions, seen a youthful genius who had passed in the language, entirely at a loss to understand the expressions used by a common peasant, and quite incapable of maintaining a conver- sation with him, while one of the unpassed, who could not read a word in a Hindustanee book, but had been accustomed to associate with the people, would talk with the man with perfect fluency. A knowledge of 47 the people of India, of their thoughts, habits, feelings, beliefs, desires, wants, &c., is learnt, not from Hin- dustanee books; but from intercourse with the people themselves. And my honourable masters may well believe me, when I tell them that such knowledge is of far more importance to their service and to India, than the most intimate acquaintance with all the Hindustanee books ever written. Another subject of vital importance to India, not only to the army, but to all the services, and to the whole people of the country, natives as well as Europeans, is the furlough regulations. The existing rules are not adapted to the present state of things; they belong to days long gone by, when a period of twelve months or more was necessary to receive from England an answer to a letter from Bombay. Moreover, the present rules regarding leave of} absence are excessively unfair in another respect.’ Their tendency in every way is to favour the least valuable servants of Government— those who are continually suffering from real or imaginary sickness, and on that account continually absent from their duty. It is an undoubted physiological fact, that hard working, energetic men, who continually exercise themselves in bodily and mental occupation, suffer the least from ill health. They have no time to be sick. Authorities are agreed on this point. For example, Copland (Med. Lect. page 562) says :— ¢« When the mental energies are depressed by grief, anxiety, disappointment, fear, &c., the powers of life are less able to oppose the debilitating causes of disease which invade them from without, and of which nature, all the exciting causes of fevers, particularly those which are specific or contagious and miasmal, generally partake in a most marked manner. On the other hand, when the mind is elevated by success, by hope, by confidence, and the other exciting passions, the ‘depressing causes make little or no impression upon the constitution, and individuals thus circum- stanced almost always escape from diseases, which readily invade the fearful, the dejected and the disappointed.” Again, Copland Med. Dict. page 920, para 118: ‘ Confidence, continued mental occupation, and moderate excitement, are especially efficacious in resisting the causes of most fevers. “ There 1s a moral courage sometimes possessed by persons, the weakest perhaps in respect of physical power, that enables them to resist infectious and epidemic influences, more successfully than the most robust, who are not thus mentally endowed.” On the other hand, it is certain that a large portion of the sickness which causes so many officers to be absent from their duty in India, is produced by feebleness of character, by idleness, laziness, listless- ness, or languor. Now, I would not for a moment wish to lessen the indulgences granted by a beneficent Government to such of its faithful servants as might have the mis- fortune to be suffering from ill health. I would leave 49 the rules regarding leave of absence on sick certificate as they are, but assuredly I would so order matters, that long continued, honest, unremitting, and valuable labour should be deemed to constitute, at least as good a title to the favour of a furlough to England, as the want of health alone. Moreover, if such furlough were obtainable at moderate intervals, and with greater facilities than at present, the number of sick certificates would assuredly be immensely decreased. It is probable, that after a while they would almost | wholly disappear. The evil done, both to England and to India, by! the present furlough regulations, is incalculable. A large proportion of the Indian officers who can now return to England, is composed of those worn out in the service, of the aged, the feeble, the sickly, the discontented, the idle, and the lazy; while the energetic, the active-minded, the able, the zealous, and the strong, are compelled, for the most part, to remain at their work in India, without any inter- mission, without a day of real rest, until their failing vigour qualify them also for the indulgence of a visit to their native land. In English society, by reason of this state of affairs, India is not fairly represented. The real working men of India, the soldiers, the magistrates, the statesmen, all those men of clear heads, strong minds, and active habits, by whose practised intelligence and honourable labours our Indian Empire is held together, have little connection D with, or influence on, the English public. They are very rarely seen in England. From this cause it proceeds, that in the imagina- tion of the people of England, the idea of an Indian officer, military or civil, is always connected with those of rice and curry, and diseased livers. From this cause chiefly results the deplorable igno- rance regarding Indian affairs, which prevails, even among educated gentlefolk, in England. How easily might all these evils be rectified. Let us have recourse to a principle as old as the history of man—the institution of the Sabbath. This at once satisfies all our wants, and meets every difficulty in every single point, while no objection whatever can be brought against it, save by those who would wish, if possible, still to retain a dark veil between India and England, for their own sup- posed private advantage, but to the grievous injury of both countries. ; My proposal is to give every officer, civil or mili- jtary, every seventh year to himself, if he wished to avail himself of the indulgence, to allow him, during that period, to go wherever it might please him to go, whether in India or any other part of the world, to allow him during that year to receive nis ruLL INDIAN ALLOWANCES, to retain his staff appointment if he held jone, but during his absence not to receive the staff ‘salary, which should go to the officer who might officiate until his return. If an officer should wish to remain in India, even in the very camp in which he was serving, and there to enjoy his sabbatical year, 51 he should be allowed to do so. The year should be his own to employ as he pleased. If an officer chose to allow his sabbath to pass by, and to wait till he had served twelve years, he should! be allowed two years’ rest on furlough ; after eighteen years’ uninterrupted work, three years should be! allowed, and so on. The consequences of this arrangement would be great and numerous, and all of them good. Good for the Government, good for the people, and good for the services. The amount of vigour infused into Indian society, by this means, would be almost incre- dible. Hope, looking forward to the enjoyment of the Sabbath, would stimulate even the lazy and the idle to work hard during the six years of labour. The continual return to England, and reflux into India, of the tide of Europeans, would be to the body moral and politic exactly what the circulation of the blood is to the animal body. England would be our lungs, the old blood would be there aérated, and new life, health, and strength, thereby sent flowing vigorously to every corner and extremity of our empire. Energy and health would everywhere take the place of languor and disease. The outcry for more Europeans would be at an end, for those now in the service would be found willing and able cheerfully to do well double the amount of work which is now thought to tax their powers too highly. THERE WOULD BE A FAR MORE EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE EMOLUMENTS OF STAFF APPOINTMENTS BY D 2 52 REASON OF THE NUMBER OF OFFICIATING MEN. There would also be a far greater number of men well acquainted with, and ready efficiently to perform, the duties of such appointments, to the great advantage of the service, which now often suffers from the inexperience of new incumbents. Society in the two countries would become one, and all manner of blessings would indirectly follow. Let any man of sound common-sense, and a tolerable knowledge of the subject, think over the matter, and he must be convinced at once of the truth of the conclusions set forth above. The doctrine is founded on the laws of nature, and its truth will be the more apparent the more those laws are studied. JOHN JACOB. REMARKS NATIVE TROOPS OF THE INDIAN ARMY. BY MAJOR JOHN JACOB. LONDON, 1834. REMARKS ON THE NATIVE TROOPS. On all sides we hear outcries regarding the state of the Native army of India. The most conflicting opinions are given to the world, and continually uttered in conversation, with regard to the merits of the Indian soldiers, the number of officers, with Native regiments, &c. Little light has lately been thrown on the matter, and as directly opposite opinions cannot both be just, much false doctrine has been promulgated, and much truth concealed. The subject of the Native army of India was long ago discussed, and most ably handled by Sir John Malcolm (wide his Political History and Government of India). He well knew the Native soldier: his words have now, in some instances, proved pro- phetic. The position of European officers of Native regi- ments, whether in command or otherwise, is no longer a favourite position, and the Native army has been thereby ruined, as he foretold that it would be. (Particularly the army of Bengal.) A RR Re, 56 Every offiter of a Native regiment of the line now endeavours to get away from his corps, to escape from regimental duty, by every effort in his power. The “REFUSE” only remain. All proper feeling is thus totally destroyed between the Native soldier and his European superior. p At the same time the genius of the Indian, of the Oriental generally, has been so little ar that with the best possible intentions at Fendguriors a greatest possible evil has been caused by the on : to Joverh and treat the sepoy like an Englishman ? The Anglo-Saxon thinks that everyditng which unnecessarily interferes with his freedom is wron He thinks and acts on the principle that all men i equal rights ; self-government is natural to him. Not so the Oriental ; he insists on beine governed, and considers being compelled to alvin on the greatest oppression and tyranny. He expects to be ruled, and to be ruled well, if sick he will perha rebel and destroy his bad rulers; but in no — will he endeavour to establish freedom, which he neither wants nor understands, at least not as an Enolishman wants and understands it: the Oriental eres sets 2 ii tyrant, who he hopes will rule better than Two races of men, with principles of action and feelings so different, can never be successfully man- pol by adopting one system and forcing it alike on Force the Oriental to take his share in the govern- ment, and you will at once have no edn. at all 37 On the contrary, self-government is essential to the Anglo-Saxon race. These principles are felt as much, and are of as much force in our Indian army, as in respect to the Indian people generally. But they do not appear to be fully understood by either our generals or our statesmen. The Native soldiers, to be in a really efficient state, must look on their immediate commander, the head of the regiment, as their absolute prince, as the para- mount authority, as far as they are concerned. Concentrating all real power at head-quarters of the army, and leaving mone to the commanding officers of regiments, has been attended with ruinous results. In many instances the sepoy has been allowed and encouraged to look on his regimental commander as his natural enemy ; and in the Bengal army, at least, to forward secret complaints against him to army head-quarters. While courts-martial, articles of war, rules and regulations, bewilder the Native soldier, and 611 his mind with the idea that his officers are wishing to keep him out of his rights, he knows not what, but certainly important ones, or such a fuss would not be made about them. The only principle of military discipline which a Native Indian soldier thoroughly understands is obedi- ence to his commanding officer. He cannot, without great injury to efficiency, be taught to look beyond him. | On the regimental commander he should, and 58 must, to be in a healthy state, wholly depend Enlistment, discharge, promotion to all ranks aod everything else, should rest with the regimen) commander alone. There should be no articles of war (at least none of the nature of those at present In force, to the ruin of our Native army) ; but the commanding officer should have full powers in his own right over his men. The want of power entrusted to regimental com- manders is one enormous evil now existing in our Native army. It is perhaps of another very great error. The seniority rise among the officers of a Native regiment, originally appointed at hazard, renders it mmpossible at present to ensure there being at the head of each Native regiment a man capable of wield- ne the powers nécessary to govern it efficiently and well. a necessary consequence This is the great difficulty experienced at head- quarters; this is the stumbling block of all honest reformers, and must be overcome and removed before anything can be done towards effectually remedying existing difficulties. The posting of officers to Native regiments, without regard to qualification, is a proceeding attended with ruimous consequences. The presence of unselected Europeans, in such numbers as are at present borne on the strength of Native corps of the line, is not less ruinous. Qualifications, not numbers, are necessary for the leaders of Native Indian soldiers. One active, 59. energetic, right-feeling, and right-thinking English gentleman can, even when alone, infuse an excellent spirit into thousands of these Eastern soldiers, till they will follow him anywhere, obey him in all things, and feel the greatest pride in acting in his absence as they know he would wish them to do if present. The feelings thus engendered are most powerful and most honourable. The Native officers and men feel the deepest gratitude towards him who has raised their moral, intellectual, and worldly position, and are actuated by the strongest wish and energetic zeal to show that they are worthy of the respectable position in which they find themselves. With thirty Europeans, on the contrary, instead of one, the Native officer finds himself of no importance, and the sepoy becomes a lifeless auto- maton. The Englishman becomes too common to be held in proper and wholesome respect. He is seen holding no important position, but in the performance of trifling duties which any Native officer or non-com- missioned officer would do equally well. He is often seen idling away his time in frivolous, or wasting his energies in vicious, pursuits. The prestige of the superior race is thus destroyed, while it too often happens that the European officer, having nothing important to ccupy him, loses somewhat of his own self-respect. The young boy is placed in command of the old/ Soobadar, from whom, when anything is to be done, 60 the has to crave instruction ; and the men see that far from taking a pride in them and in the sori ’) their European officers are generally 'longin iy be removed from them, craving intensely for : appointments, &c. The example of the idle, the evil-minded, and the indifferent does more harm than the ol ca remedy. To be in a healthy state the Native "hin should never see his European officer living an idl useless life, or holding a degraded or unim position. While the European officer is b proud of his men, and as Sir J. Malcolm most Wi observed (Government. of India, Appendix E , ar : graph 25), it should be arranged that the Rp of Native corps should be the most sought after of all existing appointments. : : A most unwise adoption of every useless form of office, paper-work, style of dress, and accoutrements has accompanied the excess of indifferent Ecropena officers with the Native Indian army. Real efficienc has been in all things sacrificed to SE Voluminous “ returns,” &ec., on paper, pervert ho attention of commanding officers and adjutants from their really important duties, while knapsacks basket-hats, stocks, tight clothing, pipe-clayed belts, and other unspeakable absurdities, introduced in mutation of European follies, are quite sufficient to crush and cripple the soldiers without much effort on the part of an enemy. But it is not my intention at present to enter into minute details. My wish is now only to set forth the 61 true principles on which the efficiency of our Native Indian army depends. I will, therefore, now briefly endeavour to show how, in my opinion, all the defects now existing in our Native Indian army may be remedied. | It is first, perhaps, necessary that I should state my own opportunities of forming sound opinions on these matters. “Wherefore I may mention that my first seven years of service were passed at the head- quarters of an European battalion of artillery, in those ‘days exactly similar to an European regiment of infantry. I then for nearly three years com- ~ manded a detached company of Native artillery with a field battery. I then held a civil appointment in Guzzerat, and next served with the horse and foot artillery in Affghaunistan, Beloochistan, &ec., and since 1841 I have commanded the Scinde Irregular Horse. This corps consists of two regiments, each 800 strong ; with each of these regiments I have only two European officers under me. During the last seven years the Scinde Irregular Horse has been posted, and actively employed on the Scinde frontier, and during the whole period of its existence, the corps has been constantly on actual service of some kind or other. The men composing the corps are not Scindees or Beloochees, of whom there is not a single man in its ranks, but the whole 1,600 men are Hindustanees and Deccanees. The raw material is exactly like that of the sepoys of the Bengal and Bombay armies, chiefly resembling the former. Three-fourths of the 62 men are Mussulmans, the remainder Hindoos. The sepoys, then, of the Scinde Irregular Horse, are fair average specimens of the Indian soldiers. I have been allowed to manage, discipline, and govern the corps in every way pretty much according to my own ideas, without interference from any one wherefore, during the twelve years past, the prin ciples acted on must have been well tested in practice and have resulted unmistakeably in good or evil, There can remain no room for doubt as to whether three Kuropean officers suffice for a Native Indian regiment, or otherwise. The conduct of the corps when on service has appeared in various public despatches, Parliamentary proceedings, &c., wherefore it is not necessary here to enter into detail regarding it. Other particulars less known are not less significant. as to its state, with its two and a half Europeans to a regiment. There are ten permanent outposts on the Scinde frontier held by detachments of the Scinde Irregular Horse, of various strengths, from 40 to 120 men each: these outposts are all commanded by Native officers. A high degree of intelligence and vigilance is required to conduct their duties properly, yet no European officers could perform these duties better than they are performed at present. The Native officers command their troops and squadrons everywhere, and occasionally a regiment on parade, with as much readiness and faclity as European officers of average ability and acquirement. While both officers and men are ready, willing, and 63 able to do effective service against any enemy in any part of the world. Another fact is very significant, and is, I think, unique. On referring to the defaulters’ books of the two regiments, I find that during full five years past but 53 men of the 1st regiment, and 52 of the 2nd, have been brought before me, and punished for various offences, great and small. Of these offences, many were committed by the same individual on different occasions, and the total number of offenders of every kind during five years amounts to 80 out of 1,600 men, or 1 in 100 per annum. This corps, then, with five European officers to two regiments, is not inferior to its neighbours in conduct in quarters or efficiency in the field. The principles contended for shave, therefore, to this extent, proved true in practice. It is necessary to bring forward these instances, because our highest authority, Sir John Malcolm, asserts (Minute on the State of the Bombay Army, 25th March, 1828, Para. 6) that with few officers, though answering admirably for local purposes, Native regiments would not be fit for general duties. This opinion of Sir John’s, events have since proved, as shown above, to be eironeous. The pre- sence of a great number of European officers, and the assimilation of everything to an European model, however absurd that model may be, has enabled the Native army to accord in all outward appearances, ceremonies, and forms, to the European armies, but its real efficiency has been thereby destroyed.. A 64 sepoy of the line, dressed in a tight coat, trousers in which he can scarcely walk, and cannot stoop at all, bound to an immense and totally useless knapsack, so that he can hardly breathe, strapped, belted, and pipe-clayed within a hair’s breadth of his life, with a rigid basket chako on his head, which requires the skill of a juggler to balance there, and which cuts deep into his brow if worn for an hour, and with a leather stock round his neck, to complete his absurd costume, when compared with the same sepoy clothed, armed, and accoutred solely with regard to his comfort and efficiency, forms the most perfect example of what is madly called the ¢ Regular” system with many European officers, contrasted with the system of common-sense now recommended for adoption. Let the common-sense system be adopted, and nearly one-half of the cost of the Native army of India might be saved to the State by reduction in the number of European officers, while the real strength and military power of the army would be more than doubled. It is quite as absurd to force all our European forms of courts-martial, &c., &c., on our Native soldiers as it is to force them to cripple themselves with our ridiculous chakos, &ec., instead of their own most soldier-like, easy, and neat puggrees. Let the foolish system which crushes the Native soldier, and requires so many Europeans to render him useless, all go together. Abolish it in fofo, and have recourse to common-sense, reason, and experience. It will not be difficult, if prejudice be lost sight of 65 for a while, to show how principles similar to those proved to lead to good results, can be applied with overpowering advantage to the Native army of India rally. rc ron officers only, and those carefully selected and entrusted with full powers, must be appointed to Native regiments. Three officers to a regiment would suffice. Let four be appointed—a commandant, a second in com- mand, an adjutant, and a quartermaster. dd No army rank solely to be regarded, but individuals - to be selected on the professed principle, at least, of being best qualified. | Sir John Malcolm proposed that the regiments of officers should be retained as they now stand in the “Army List,” but not have regiments of men attached to them. All officers of the Native Indian army to be, in fact, unattached, and that from the whole body properly qualified individuals should be selected for staff appointments, &c., &c. The plan appears a good one, and practicable enough, but it appears to me that we have a better. Let all the officers of the Indian army be borne on the strength of the European portion of it. We know that any amount of excess of English officers with English regiments can do no harm, and the number of officers of artillery and engineers are totally irrespective of the’ numbers of the men of those corps. Suppose, then, in round numbers, the Bombay army to be composed as follows :— : 66 Let each regiment or battalion of officers consist of— 2 Colonels. 4 Lieutenant-Colonels. 4 Majors. 16 Captains. 16 Lieutenants. 16 Ensigns. 58 Total. Say that there be six battalions of artillery, 58 each Three battalions of engineers . Four European regiments of infantry i One 5 4 cavalry . . 158 —— Total European officers for the whole army ~~ 812 Of these there would be appointed to—say 30 Native infantry regiments at 4 each . 120 6 Native cavalry regiments : . 4 Staff appointments—say : SEE Sick and on furlough : . : 80 ——— Total : . 404 Remaining for duty with 14 European bat- talions . : ‘ . . . . 408 (I would have no Native artillery). Numbers and details might be altered and re-arranged to any extent, but the above will show the principle on which a sufficient fund of European energy and talent might be placed at the disposal of the Indian 67 Government for the performance of public duties of all kinds. The highest appointments being the prizes for the most worthy. While the principle of posting a few selected officers to Native regiments, instead of a crowd taken at hazard, might be fully carried out, and for all manner of duty the individual most fitted might easily be selected without incurring the enor- mous cost of more Europeans, or having to face the apparently insurmountable difficulties of an Indian staff-appointment corps (it is nonsense calling it a staff corps, which means quite a different thing). The appointments to Native regiments, both of horse and foot, should be considered as the highest prizes of all in their various grades, and should be made so both in station and emolument. The allowances should be such as to cause the commands of Native corps to be sought after by lieutenant-colonels, and to have commandants of that rank in the army would be an advantage, but rank alone should never be con- sidered in such appointments. The principle of giving them to those best qualified for them should always be acted upon and strictly followed out. All pipe-clay, metaphorical and actual, should be at once abolished ; black leather accoutrements should be adopted, and no difficulties should be made or allowed to exist with regard to the introduction of improvements generally, in respect to arms, clothing, accoutrements, and all else. The pay of both men and officers should be increased, and every man should be compelled (as in good Silidar corps) at all times and in all E 2 68 places to be provided with sufficient carriage for his kit, &c. ; These principles might perhaps be better followed out by placing all the European gentlemen required for the public service in India, whether civil or military, on one unattached list, letting them rise in the list by seniority only, calling them generals, colonels, &c., &c., as at present, and assigning to each grade a proper and liberal amount of pay even while unemployed. 3 From this general stock all officers might be selected according to merit and qualificatibn for every appoint- ment and duty whatsoever, the amount of pay as to the ‘ unemployed” being allowed to all grades of officers while on leave on any account in any part of the world, and on retirement from the service. | Under such arrangements and so organized, the Native army of India would be fully capable of going anywhere and doing anything. It would be equal to the encounter with equal numbers of any troops in continental Europe, and of course far superior to any Asiatic enemy. It is a grave mistake to suppose, as we are often told, that it is necessary to enlist men of the northern tribes, Patans, Belooche, Goorkas, &c., to enable our Indian army to encounter successfully the warlike tribes now on our Indian frontier. The Mussulmans of Hindustan are the very best men for our army. The Patans, &ec., are faithless and treacherous. These Hindustanees are very bold, brave, strong, well-made, active men, fully equal in 69 these Tespects to the Affghauns (though the latter be the stouter-looking of the two). They are genesally most excellent horsemen, and many enlist in our cavalry regiments, but under the present system no great numbers are found in the infantry corps of the line. As an example of the qualities of these Hindustanee horsemen, I may point to the fact that very lately a regular Persian battalion—perfectly well drilled, armed, accoutred, &c., after the best European model, composed of splendid men who stood perfectly firm, bold, and confident in their array—was ridden over and utterly destroyed by Major John Forbes and the 3rd Regiment of Bombay Light Cavalry. Have any soldiers ever done better? There cannot be better Eastern soldiers than these men make when properly treated. They have scarcely more prejudices -of religion, &ec., than Englishmen, whatever the Bengal officers may fancy ; they have most liberal ideas as compared with those of the Hindoo sepoys, to whom they are in every way superior beings. With all this they are the most faithful and trustworthy of any men in India; they are, in fact, more like gentlemen than any other class of Indians. With such men in our ranks, and a fixed head- quarters for each regiment, where their families could remain in safety and comfort while the corps might be absent on service, the Native troops of the Indian army might be employed on foreign service for any length of time, and at any distance from their homes ; 70 and the time may possibly not be far distant when their services may be of the greatest value. There is one erroneous opinion, with regard to our Native Indian troops, which would appear unworthy of notice, were it not that it has lately proceeded from those considered to be high authorities on these matters, but who in truth were totally ignorant of the feelings and springs of action of our Indian soldiery. I allude to the often-expressed opinion, that if wo were to make too much of our Native officers, they would take the command from us. Nothing can possibly be more unfounded, more contrary to truth than such an idea. We hold India by BEING IN REALITY as in reputation a superior race to the Asiatic. If this natural superiority did not exist, we should not and could not retain the country for one week. Whatever tends to make European gentlemen “cheap,” to lessen their evident value, to hold up their vices rather than their virtues to the view of ~ the natives, to show them to the Indians only in inferior positions where their powers are not called forth, and where they have little influence for good, must tend to destroy in mo slight degree the hold which we have on the people. Whatever raises the European character in the eyes of the natives of India and in reality, must greatly add to our security and power. The Native officers feel the greatest devotion and gratitude towards their European commanders who 71 most succeed in raising their character and position. The more the European is able to improve them, the greater does he appear in their estimation. They cannot govern themselves, they are too proud to sub- mit to an equal, but they will all with the greatest delight and pride submit to the English gentleman, whom they all acknowledge and feel to be their superior. If we really are a morally superior race, governed by higher motives and possessing higher attributes than the Asiatics, the more the natives of India are able to understand us, the more they will know and feel this, and the firmer will be our power. If we are not superior to the Indians, the attempt to retain our sovereignty will be as hopeless and vain as it would be vicious. : : England neither can be nor wishes to be powerfu in evil. Let us strive to do what good we can, and we shall prosper; no other principles will succeed. To attempt to keep the nations of India or the Native soldiers of the Indian army in darkness and ignorance, in the hope of increasing our power over them, will be as contemptible and base as it would be unwise and useless. The better example we set them, the more we make them feel the value of truth and «honesty, the more we can raise their moral and intellectual powers, the firmer must we stand as their rulers. JOHN JACOB. I have just received and read a posthumous work of ' ‘ 72 Sir C. J. Napier’s, edited by Sir W. Napier, and entitled, “ Defects, Civil and Military, of the Yudion Government,” and in continuation of the subject of a paper lately sent to you by me on the native troops of the Indian army, I think it right to offer Ee remarks on a passage in the work above mentioned relating to promotion of native officers by seniorit : (pages 235 to 240). : In page 235, line 20, the substitution of “and” by the author for “or” in the original, which he pretends to quote, completely alters the sense. | But without any reference to anonymous pam in or unknown “Bombay officers,” ], John acob, Commandant of the Scinde Irregular Horse, plainly and deliberately assert that any one who wishing well to the Native army of India odvantes promoting the Native officers and vetienniisistiod officers of that army by seniority only, must un- My means of forming correct opinions on these Di have been stated in my paper on the Native ndian army above alluded to, and | ‘ 3 ne a ) | ed not be here 3 The assertion of Sir C. or Sir W. Napier, page ) 37, of the book above mentioned, that, ¢ according i Bombay officer,” it is right to place the brave 0 sepoy at the caprice of prejudiced and ignorant Sar officers,” is simply a falsehood. The ombay officer ” never asserted any such thing, but J ’ he strongly advocated the having as commanding 0 73 officers men not governed by caprice, ignorance, &c., and leaving the promotions to #iem, and I now assert that such is the only wise course of proceeding... A better instance need not be adduced as an example than that mentioned (at page 237) of the drill- corporal. > Men are often very good soldiers, having three or four medals on their breasts, &c., who are as unfit to be drill-masters as any old woman taken at haphazard out of a village; yet such men are, according to our author, to be promoted, if senior, rather than one really efficient. It is difficult enough to find half-a-dozen really good drill-masters in any regiment; but if they are to be chosen not by qualification but by seniority, it would be far better to have none at all. The seniority system, so far from being just, is the greatest possible injustice to the really deserving men, while it holds out the greatest possible encouragement to the lazy, the idle, and the good-for-nothing. Throw everything open to fair competition, and let the best man win. This is the style of justice which sepoys and all other men really like best in their hearts. Let there be no favouritism, but let the European officers honestly and continually endeavour to choose the best men for promotion, and the best possible feeling will assuredly be created and maintained between them and their Native soldiers. I and all my officers have acted on these principles for twelve years with one regiment, and for eight years past with two regiments, and with what effect ! 74 though I have but two European officers under me for each regiment. The whole corps of the Scinde Irregular Horse is as if it had but one heart and mind ; any difference of feeling on common interest between the officers and men would be as unnatural as a quarrel between a man’s hand and limbs. Witiess my order prohibiting all noisy processions, &ec., &c at the Mohurrum, given above. a The evidence of hostile witnesses is also very strong proof in our favour. : Sir W. Napier has assailed me personally with all manner of Coarse and vulgar scurrility, and gross and infamous falsehoods. He cannot be supposed capable of partiality towards me and mine; but even he with all the peculiar and characteristic a ong Re in his writings, dare not tlie otherwise than in ld "al ii terms of high praise of our At page 191 of the “ Administration of Scinde.” he says, after describing our proceedings at Shohpoer in 1845, “It was a fine example of, generous dis- cipline.” Again, at page 262, “The Scinde horse- men (the Moguelaces) whose matchless ability for irregular warefare did not keep them from rt the foremost in the field, and charge when solid hosts were to be broken.” It is true that this passage is mingled with numerous false assertions, such as that Sir C. Napier “In a measure created the Scinde Irregular Horse,” and placed Major Jacob in command, &c. The truth being that the Scinde Horse, raised in 75 1839, had done a great deal of excellent work, and seen a very great deal of the hardest service, under Curtis, Clarke, and Malcolm, during the three years previous to Sir Charles Napier’s arrival in Scinde ; while I, their present commander, selected not by Sir C. Napier, but by Colonel Outram, received the command in December, 1841, and have held it ever since. The corps has been increased since I joined it from 500 to 1,600 men, and was 600 strong when Sir C. Napier arrived in Scinde. The discipline of the corps then being allowed on all hands to be excellent, the principles on which it has been so long formed and led cannot be bad. Those principles have been constantly and perse- veringly applied, in spite of all prejudice and opposition, from men esteemed of authority in these matters, during a period of twelve years, with the happiest effect. A new generation of soldiers has sprung up under them. I have now in my ranks hundreds of fine young men, some of them Native officers, the sons of my old soldiers, who were little boys when I received the command: these indeed form our best men, they are born and bred soldiers. In several instances the sons have superseded their old fathers in rank ; one even obtained his commission while his father, a most respectable and efficient soldier, but totally unfit for further promotion, as he himself well knew, was still a naique (corporal). Every man has been chosen, to the utmost of my ability, by merit, fitness, and qualifications alone, and every member of 76 the corps is pleased, contented, and happy thereat. A soldier-like pride is, under such a system, created mn ev ery man’s breast ; he scorns to owe his promotion to favour or seniority. The highest Native officers gentlemen of birth and property as well as rank % the army (be it remembered), place their sons in our ranks as private soldiers, asking for them no favour whatever, but letting them take their chance with the rest. Men are required to pass an examination in drill, &ec., before they are considered eligible for promotion, and no length of service nor any brave deeds are allowed to supersede the necessity of this. The system works admirably; and while others have been writing and theorising, we have reduced these things to the test of actual experience. Similar principles adopted in the whole Native army of India would necessarily produce similar effects. : At page 240 Sir Charles, or his editor Sir W. Napier, again pretends to quote the words of the “Bombay officer,” thus—¢ The Bombay officer says those who study Hindustanee books cannot study Hindustanee men, and that those who study the language necessarily know less of it than he who don’t study it.” This quotation is wholly and wilfully false! The pamphlet from which it is pretended to have ‘been extracted is now before me: nothing of the kind appears in it; but at page 27 of the pamphlet appears the following passage: “I have had abundant oppor- tunity of judging of this matter, and I solemnly assure 77 my honourable masters that it is notorious that their officers, who have passed in the language, are not only not the most able of their servants, but that they have, as a body (there are brilliant exceptions of course); less knowledge of that language for practical purposes than the unpassed. That is if language be intended to facilitate the communication of ideas between man and man, and not for concealing thoughts. This may appear paradoxical, but a little consideration soon shows that it must be so. « While the young man %as been studying Hindus- tanee books, the other has been studying Hindustanee men. I have on hundreds of occasions seen a youth- ful genius who had passed in the language, entirely at a loss to understand the expressions used by the common peasant, and quite incapable of maintaining a conversation with him ; while one of the unpassed, who could not read a word in a Hindustanee book, but had been accustomed to associate with the people, would talk with the man with perfect fluency. A knowledge of the people of India, of their thoughts, habits, feelings, beliefs, desires, wants, &c., is- learnt not from Hindustanee books, but from intercourse with the people themselves; and my honourable masters may well believe me when I tell them that such’ knowledge is of far more importance to their ‘service and to India than the most intimate acquaintance with all the Hindustanee books ever written.” In this passage the author of the pamphlet asserts, that which I also here state to be a fact, that the 8 i 79 “passed” men, as a body, have not (or at least had not) studied the language or the habits, &e., of the people so well as the * unpassed,” and that the latter are, or at least were, practically the better informed of the two classes in these respects. Undoubtedly officers should speak the language of A notable and somewhat ludicrous example of the mischievous effects of this Hindustanee regulation occurred lately. I had been requested to raise, by volunteers from the Scinde Irregular Horse, a body of Silidar Cavalry, for a particular service ; the arrangements were placed their men; it is folly to suppose otherwise ; but the examination before a committee, as at present con- ducted, is often no criterion of proficiency in this respect. The best practical linguists, and those best acquainted with the ideas of the sepoys, ‘are often rejected, while many a man so perfectly master of the grammar and phraseology of the Moonshees and the elegancies of the language on paper, ” to be wholly unintelligible to the se with éclat. poy, passes The best security for fitness is the opinion and approval of the commanding officers, who, if treated with proper consideration, and allowed sufficient power, would take very good care that their subalterns were well qualified. Again, if passing an examination in the Hindus- tanee language (no# knowledge of the language, be it remembered, which is a different affair) be a necessary qualification for officers serving with Native troops 1t seems strange that, by the orders now in force the only situations in the Indian service for which sud passing is not required are those of officers doing regimental duty. “Officers who do not pass are to remain with their regiments.” JOHN JACOB. wholly in my hands; I requested that to command this body of horse a certain officer might be appointed who had seen hard service, in the course of which he was twice severely wounded, who had served under me formerly as adjutant in the Scinde Irregular Horse for about six years together, and who was in every respect highly qualified. This officer, recommended by me, had however not “passed” in Hindustanee, although he could speak, read, and write the language well enough ; my request was therefore refused, and a gentleman who had “passed” in many languages was appointed instead. The qualifications of this officer in other respects appear never to have been thought of (there is apparently no regulation” to the effect that a “passed” officer should know anything of the work which he is expected to perform), and whatever his merit may have been otherwise, he had never seen any service, and appeared to know rather less about Silidar- Cavalry, and the true principles of com- manding Native Indian soldiers, than a spinster, yet he was preferred to my old adjutant. The effect has been exactly what might have been reasonably expected ; an excellent body of horse, formed and ready for immediate service some fifteen months ago, 80 has been nearly ruined, and has never yet done a day's duty. In this one little instance alone, the Hin- dustanee regulation has cost the State already, in hard cash, at least a lac of rupees of utterly useless expenditure. ON THE CAUSES OF THE DEFECTS EXISTING IN OUR ARMY, AND IN OUR MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS. « The laws of the mind are, in many respects, analogous to those of the body. « Confine a man in a gaol, deny him open air and exercise, and his body falls into decrepitude. «Lock up in this manner a whole generation, turn the key like- wise on their descendants, and the race of man, shut out from their natural relationship with sun, air, and space, would soon become extinct. “ This is a feat which, happily, no despotism can accomplish. It can, however, do what is nearly as bad, and tends indirectly to the same result. It can steep the minds of successive generations in Cimmerian darkness, it can imprison the thoughts of nations, it can lock up the mouths of a people until everything like independent expression of opinion dies out, and the mind, in the absence of that freedom which is as necessary to its preservation as locomotion to the body, becomes paralyzed through sheer inaction.”— WEST. REV. vol. iii., p. 446. TO THE EDITOR OF THE “TIMES.” SIR, Being one of those whom experience and reason convince that your writings on the English army are likely to prove of the highest importance, and of great national benefit, I beg to offer you some observations of my own on the subject, which may possibly be found useful. F 2 84 The primary cause, then, of all the evil existing in our army and military arrangements, is the existence of a rule which systematically crushes individual thought, original ideas, and mental improvement ; and which treats any approach to the free action of the understanding as criminal—as mutiny or treason. Is it to be wondered at that, however excellent the raw material of our army, it should be found, under such training, at an immense distance behind the position which the general advance of our nation in moral and intellectual power ought to have enabled the English army to hold ? To attempt to reform, that is to improve on, the present system, is futile. It must be entirely aban- doned, and new principles adopted directly the oppo- site of those now acted on, or continual failure may be expected. The military arrangements should be thrown open to public view and public opinion: evil things cannot bear the light and will disappear before it; generally without the harsh exertion of force or punishment. Reason, good sense, good feeling, with individual activity and practical knowledge, should be the guides; and the rule should be to endeavour to develope these as much as possible in all members of the army, of whatever rank. At present in our army every law of nature is subverted, and the attempt is made, by means of a special and exclusive code of laws, to substitute force for reason ; to maintain imbeciles in positions of com- 85 mand, and to set up as leaders those fitted by nature only to follow. The special code for the army is an enormous evil, The most gross deception must have been practised, or the most benighted ignorance must exist, when the Parliament and the people of England can be per- suaded to place such a power for harm in the hands inistry of the Crown. i ig io of the Mutiny Act is. altogether injurious to England's military foree ; it possesses no redeeming qualities, no beneficial effects what- Lt advisedly in this, having served nearly thirty years in our army without ever being absent from my work ; having for a long series of years com- manded a large body of soldiers after Yayheowi fashion; and having expended on this subject an amount of thought and labour which few men have ever had either the inclination or opportunity to EE by long actual experience, that no special laws are necessary for the good government of soldiefs. Those commanders whose object is good —who proceed towards that object on right fs ciples in accordance with Bature’s Jaws—who po to men’s best and highest qualities instead of to the most base—who endeavour to cultivate, draw forth, and aid in the development of, the powers and good qualities of those under them—will always be able to lead without the support of unreasonming authority ; while it is certain that the more intellectual the men 86 really become, the more easy will it be for real Intellectual and moral power to govern them. The military code enables the wrong man to be kept uppermost, and all manner of outrages on common-sense to be practised in the army, without much scandal, until the time for real warlike ex- ertion arrives. Then real workmen are absolutely necessary, and the amateurs at once fail. While the steam-engine is at rest and its fire is out, any one may pretend to be competent to its manacement : but get up the steam and the real engineer alone 2 able to maintain, and to guide with safety and utility, the mighty power of the machine. ot This has well been shown in our war with Russia. There has been plenty of power. Our glorious soldiers are still unmatched in fight and ow a martyr’s endurance of misery; but these noble on riors have been systematically trained to helplessness The natural qualities of the men make them » the actual shock of battle and in the struggle of : er sonal combat, the most formidable soldiers the wh oe il they are the best and bravest of the earth ; Bn their military education done for these It has merely crippled them, body and soul! What the stock, the belts, the pipeclay, the ti ht coat, the knapsack, &c., &c., are to ~ er bodies, their moral and intellectual training has re to their minds : they must only think oe Frederic’ soldiers prayed, according to relation os The men can do nothing for themselves, while their 87 amateur leaders and heads of departments can neither feed, clothe, shelter, nor move the army. At the commencement of operations our generals endea- voured to enforce regulations regarding stocks and jackets, &c. And with such matters many of them seem alone competent to deal. Under our present system there can be no long reach of understanding of military affairs, and no practical readiness in handling and supplying the wants of soldiers in the field: it seems abundantly certain that thousands of our English merchants are really better able to command an English army than many of our general officers. The ignorance of the first principles on which depends the power of maintaining armies in the field, which exists among the officers of the British army, is as wonderful as it is profound; and it is shared and has been displayed by those officers who have, owing to the truth having been concealed from the public, even obtained a high reputation in the field. The antipathy and even horror which many officers of the English army show towards a crowd of camp- followers (that which in India is called the bazar) and baggage animals, seem ludicrous to the really experienced soldier. Herein is a good test of the mighty difference between cleverness and genius. The clever mind brightly sees a little ; genius grasps, commands, and works with, all that bears on the subject in hand: cleverness is full of strong prejudice; genius is inde- 88 pendent of local circumstances, but sees and follows nature's truth everywhere and in all things. That clever general, Sir Charles Napier, went half mad at the first sight of the camels, &e., accompany- ing his little force in Scinde ; and in consequence perpetrated the excessive folly of a baggage corps, which enormously increased the defect that he en- deavoured to correct; or rather, which created a really great and solid evil in the place of one purely imaginary. The mighty genius of the Duke of Wellington, on the contrary, caused that general to pride himself on having in his Indian campaigns a month’s provisions in his bazar, and on inducing the immense mass of followers, &c., implied in this, always to accompany his army in the field. Success in war often depends wholly on the know- ledge and conduct of such matters; but the English army neglects and despises them. To be ready for war, these things should be studied and attended to in time of peace. Our soldiers of all ranks should be less separated from other citizens; they should be taught and enabled to do more for themselves—to be more handy, and ready at all manner of expedients ; and, in a word, the REASONING FACULTIES, individual de- velopment and action, should be more cultivated, and less time thrown away on foolish trifles. Let officers and men be supplied with the means of providing themselves with proper tents, and with the means of carrying them, and other necessary 89 articles of equipment, when required : let such means ALwAYs be ready and maintained in efficient order ; cease to crush the backs of our invaluable English- men with the load of an ass, and let them have the means of keeping proper beasts of burden for the purpose of carrying these loads. Let each regiment have permanent head-quarters, where a considerable district around may be inte- rested in the conduct of the corps in the field ; where recruits may be enlisted, and where families, pen- sioners, &c., may reside in comfort during the absence of the regiment in the field. Here also let there be a regimental bazar, the greater portion of which should always accompany the regiment wherever it may move. ; Let the pay and position of our soldiers be such as to draw to our ranks the flower of our peasantry. Let there be a liberal scale of pensions allowed for all ranks of officers and men, both for wounds and long service. : Let the service be such that dismissal from 1t may be felt as a grievous punishment. Let promotion to the highest ranks be open to all who may deserve it. GL Let even the Marshal’s baton be within the reach of the grasp of the private soldier who may prove himself worthy and able to wield it. : Whatever effort it may cost England to bring about all this, will be amply, and far more than amply, repaid by the glorious result. For the rest, the admission of common-sense, and 90 the operation of public opinion where no concealment is allowed, will necessarily at once sweep away the enormous and wasteful follies of half-pay, purchase and sale of commissions, unwieldy and inefficient weapons, unfit clothing and accoutrements, and all similar follies, Allow the principle of admitting the free exercise of reason and common-sense under the eyes of the public, and all evil must disappear ; while the best men for every post, and the best means of effecting every object, must soon be known, known, must be employed. In the adoption of such pr and, when once inciples exists the remedy for every defect ; yet this seems not to hav thought of on any hand, and h late writers on the subject. It may be well to instance two of these—namely, ““ Jacob Omnium,” in your journal, and Colonel Michael Maxwell Shaw, in the Naval and Military Gazette. Colonel Shaw commanded dur e been as not been noticed by ing a period of two years in Upper Scinde, where the Scinde Irregular Horse was serving, and he supposes the acknowledged excellence of this cavalry corps to be in great measure owing to the men composing it being water drinkers and “vegetarians,” and that the men of this and of other Silidar corps hire out their horses to each other. Yet the facts are that the men of the Scinde Irregular Horse eat very nearly as much beef and mutton daily, and (though the men be sober fellows enough) drink nearly as much strong drink as English soldiers ; with whom the men of the Scinde 91 ] ily t ith Irrecular Horse fraternize far more readily than w = . indoos of the line. : a habitual use of animal food is a great p it, the men advantage in the field ; and, by reason of : Sen of the Seine Irregular Horse can generally iited ; more easily than can be the ¢ vegetarian ar 3 indoos. : : ® Moreover, it is a positive fact, that, as Solin f 5 ‘Lo ; : % ; eral service, and in particular as cavalry so bs oenera : Sn th best of the Hindoos are absolutely op ; he y ¢ i 1 | f Hindustan, ] '] vith the Mussulmans o In comparison wit > ; 0 the Ca found in_the ranks of the Irregular Cavalry I 7 sr adapted but the one race of men is very much better : p i" | ive Knglish ideas ene than the other to receive English ideas, and to 1an by English training. rs ; 1 1en in the ¢ go "The practice of n ps 2 / ere 18 nothin to each other is totally unknown, and there 1 Jou g i il; : in the le in the relation of Silidar to Bhargheer uz i 1 such hiring. resembling suc o we Vv It 1 Gr that ¢ Jacob Omnium” should os Ee he wor have remembered that the best cavalry t » : 'e been so y od to have be acknowledged ever saw (and : a a iversal consent) was an Knglish Silidar corps— unive : iL Ironsides of Cromwell! i The excellence of these soldiers di a : : » NYY ~ 10 : » small men, or heavy or light, ir bei oe men or-_sma y their being larg : pT, jor anything else with respect to their me Ee — © : : d by their high moral nature an It was caused by Q or private soldiers of Cromwell were eagerly 92 sought for to be officers elsewhere, while the whole history of the world could not show their peers. “ Jacob Omnium ” classes the Irregular Cavalry of India together as if it were all alike. to know the Scinde Irregular Horse w that this corps is quite as different from aif others in the Indian army as the English Dragoons are from Russian Cossacks. But I happen ell, and know This difference is not in degree Major Jacob has endeavoured, an to apply to the Asiatic soldie made the soldiers only, but in essence. d with some success, r the principles which of Cromwell irresistible, That is to improve the moral and intellectual being of the men-—to lead them upwards and onwards by their best and noblest attributes, and not through sordid hopes and fears—to make them love their duty and do it because it is right to do so. Even with the poor Asiatic something in this way, for it is working in the ri in the path of nature’s laws, which constitutes him man on his brain, body. Of late years, many regiments of the Indian Irregular Cavalry have attempted to imitate the Scinde Irregular Horse, in respect to arms, accoutre- ments, &c., and in so doing may less partially succesful. Each Scinde horseman “ Jacob Omnium ” double-barrel carbin may be done ght direction— Man’s power—that and not brute—depends not his muscles ; on his mind, not his have been more or (not every third man, as supposes) carries an excellent ¢. In imitation of this corps, 93 " some decent species of firearm is gradually Gk adopted by others, and the nr old matchloc is earing even in Bengal. : 3 oy cpp of the men of the iiss Irregular Horse is excellent ; but it 1s oo ; things that the strength of the corps depen : ii matters are effects Ny aig causes. u ; understood elsewhere. gin the size and weight of the men, boy that the efficiency of either horse or ee as depends. Under proper pa particular me in their proper places. ee 4 on the sensible “J he Omnium ”, appears sometimes to think) oy soldiers’ fitness and capacity by the yard, or weigh ound. ji a P one of Major J acob’s regiments Scinde Irregular Horse, a young Native : ing some eighteen stone ; yet this man proved a to be as active and energetic in body and min Ji ; as efficient a light horseman, as any of the 3 weights ; and he never found any difficulty in mounting imself proper] : i vk i To, the mere fact of a ia ee of a proper size can never correctly determine his i; as a cavalry soldier. Men of gigantic Pfs a certainly not to be preferred ; Dost these he rejected if otherwise well qualified. Foolish equip ments distress man and beast far more than Ben pounds of flesh. The inconveniences of the nothing can overcome ; but a good, though weighty 94 rider, often fatigues a horse less than a much lighter man of inferior skill. If proper principles be acted on, all defects and errors must soon disappear. If such principles be not understood or not acted on, everything will go wrong, although adjustments and corrections be continually applied to particular points. 1855. EXTRACTS, &e. &ec. Extract from Notes on ““ Sir C. NaPIER'S ADMINIS TRATION IN SCINDE,” by Major Joun Jacos, printed 1851. “The sepoy formerly looked on his regiment as his home, because his European officers had power over him for evil or for good ; he looked no higher than the regimental commander. « Now the regimental officer is despised by the sepoy, who laughs at his ¢ passionate young subaltern : or his staid old colonel alike, and appeals to army head-quarters. His regiment is no longer his home; he has been taught to look beyond it; and the result is now the total destruction of all healthy discipline in the army of Bengal.”—(page 120.) Extract from Notes on Sir C. Napier's Posthumous Work “ On tue Derecrs or THE INDIAN Go- VERNMENT,” published by Major Joun JAcos, 1854. ¢« Where the Native army is in a proper state, nothing will induce the sepoys to attempt to remedy 96 a supposed grievance by force, nor even to represent it, except through their European officers, to whom they entirely trust for protection. The seniority system, chiefly (with other causes), has ruined the discipline of the Bengal army, and destroyed mutual confidence hetween officers and men. The evil influ- ence of the state of affairs in the larger body is, I fear, fast communicating itself to the Bombay army also.” “I deny the possibility of the sepoys mutinying while their English officers are alive and do their duty. Men are not suddenly most vicious; and would never mutiny for trifles when they knew that the First ster must be that which even they know and feel to be a detestable crime—the murder of their officers. Let the officers have calmly made up their minds to be obeyed or be killed, and there would be little disobedience ! “ To show they were in earnest, let the first man guilty of open mutiny be shot on the spot by his com- manding officer, and the thing would spread no further ; let there be no talking or reasoning with the offenders on such occasions. “It is not that officers want the determination necessary to carry out this course successfully, but such proceedings are Nor THE rasmION at present, and the officers FEEL DOUBTFUL oF sUPPORT AT ARMY - Heap-Quarters. Yet what is here advocated is undoubtedly wholesome, good, and merciful.” 97 ¢ Caste should never be noticed or RECOGNISED AT ALL; but it is a positive fact that, where a proper discipline and a proper soldierly pride exist, the men of high caste give less trouble about their caste than the low-caste men. “ The cry about caste among the sepoys of Bengal has no real connection with their religion. It is maintained as good policy to ENABLE THEM TO KEEP POWER IN THEIR OWN HANDS. ¢ All these mutinies are caused by the absurd system which insists on having imbecile Native officers and insolent soldiers. “ Let commanding officers have power to dismiss with punishment and infamy on the’spot such knaves as “those here alluded to, and promote none but deserving men, and such ¢ jests’ would not pass. “ The Native soldier should look up to his European officer as his god; and he will do so, if properly treated. “ Government might enlist a million of excellent men in India in a day, in spite of any impertinent opposition on the part of Brahmins, &e. “ If the commanding officers had more power, and were left to make their own arrangements with their corps, there would always be with each regiment a good body of ¢ Omeydwars’ (candidates for enlist- ment), ready instantly to take the places of any discharged men. There are generally fifty or more of these Omeydwars with the Scinde Irregular Horse, so that we have always the pick of good, seasoned, half-trained men eager to serve. G 08 “The Native officers in Bengal are purposely made powerless for evil or for good. Why, then, blame these poor old gentlemen? Make them really efficient by promoting, not the oldest, but the most able and most deserving men; make their advancement depend only on their merits, AS ESTIMATED BY THEIR REGL- MENTAL COMMANDER, and you will have no mutinies.” “ There never was anything of religion in reality in any of these mutinies. I know this well ; and I have not formed and led large bodies of sepoys, for the best part of my lifetime, without knowing the thoughts and feelings of the men with whom I have been so long and so intimately associated. It is certain also that the people of India generally have little or no sympathy with these mutinous sepoys, and that, when disarmed, they are absolutely powerless for evil they have no moral power whatever, conscious as they are of being criminals.” “ It may be right to raise Goorka Battalions, but the Hindustanees, properly organized, are as good soldiers as any. They are quite misunderstood in Bengal. “ There is no sort of breach of faith concerned in the matter of the promotion question, for the sepoys on enlistment know and think nothing about their rights of promotion : they enlist to obey orders and to serve the State; their ideas of seniority, &c., are always acquired after they enter the service, under the influence of a vicious system. Any one who 99 honestly advocates the promotion of natives by seniority only, must undoubtedly be deplorably igno- rant of the real merits of the matter, whatever his reputation or position. “If the old and influential officers of the Bengal army knew by experience the working of the con- trary system, the pernicious one now prevailing could not exist in Bengal. As it is, its very existence of course proves that it meets with their approval. They prefer the only system with which they are well acquainted ; but this proves nothing in its favour, when compared to others with which they are not . » acquainted. “To enlist the Goorkas, &c., may be wise; but it is Nor WISE to allow the DISCIPLINE AND OBEDIENCE of your soldiers to depend on THEIR good will and pleasure only. While it is certain that the Goorkas would soon be as bad soldiers as those of the Bengal army at present, if treated in the same way. : “The work of most staff appointments requires superior qualifications, and involves superior responsi- bilities, to those belonging to the command of a com- pany of sepoys. “If higher qualifications be required, you must pay for them, or you will not get them. “ The real error is in employing such numbers of costly Europeans in command of Native companies, whose duties would be just as well, or better, per- formed by Native officers properly chosen, and formed in a good school.” ] G 100 “It 1s quite possible to select for a large army, when the matter is rightly understood. Tt is the quantity of power given out by the European brains, not the number of European bodies employed, which controls the Native soldiers. “ European officers do not improve their Native officers by ‘mixing’ with them, but by BEING REALLY superior to them in moral qualities and high prin- ciples. The two races cannot be kept too distinct. Any approach to the adoption of Native habits is a deplorable error. It is even so as regards a matter so comparatively trifling as dress. The admission into the service of the sons of Native women as “ Kuropean’ officers also has in some instances caused incalculable mischief.” “ The commanding officer of every regiment, Native and European, should hold “orderly-room’ every day of his life in some public place, hearing every man who has anything to say to him. “I see no objection to men being properly dressed on these occasions. But there should be no more form or ceremony than may be found necessary for good order. Coming to the commanding officer at Improper times and in an improper manner, if per- mitted, gives rise to backbiting or the reputation of it. Everything should be quite open and public between the officers and men. All the officers not otherwise engaged SHOULD ATTEND these ‘ orderly- rooms’ parLy. This is one of the most important points of all regarding the discipline of the army. I 101 have practised what I teach myself for twenty years, and write from experience, as well as reason. “ The idea of equality between the Native soldiers and their English officers is aBsurp. If we are not a superior race, we cannot hold India at all. : “If we are so, the more we improve the capacity of the Native officers the more they will perceive this truth. I know this well from practical experience and study. ¢ Those likely to assert equality with their European officers—unless these latter degrade themselves by adopting Asiatic morals and principles ii be silly persons, not likely to prove very formidable. # Nu Note to be added at foot of Page 12 of “ REMARKS ON THE NATIVE Troops orf THE INDIAN ARMY, BY Major Joun Jacos.” ¢« After the fullest study of the subject, I am con- vinced that Sir John Malcolm’s original proposal was better than mine, in one respect; and that the best possible arrangement would be to have all the officers in one list unattached, rising in army rank by seniority in the whole body; and from this general list to select for every duty whatever,—regimental, staff, military, political, and civil. I would pay even the unemployed officers fairly, so as to keep them easily above sordid wants. The mere presence of a number of English gentlemen would be of the utmost advantage to our | 102 rule in India; while most of them would , while ‘unemployed,’ BE ENGAGED 1 N QUALIFYING THEMSELVES FOR EMPLOYMENT, which they could only do in this country,” OBSERVATIONS ON A SCHEME FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY, BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOB, C.B. a a a 3 4 . = £2 2 OBSERVATIONS, &. At Sea, 13th October 1857. Tue faults which have led to the existing lamentable state of the Native army of India are not those of individuals, but of systems. | Whatever may be the general causes which have now convulsed the Eastern world —and these are ., not unknown to me— it is certain that no external influence would have sufficed to have turned our own Native Indian Army against us, had not that army been internally in a most weak and unhealthy state. This weak state has not been the primary cause of the outbreak which has taken place, but the absence of healthy strength in our army has certainly enabled external influences, which otherwise would have passed unnoticed, to act with fatal effect. The cause of our weakness is inherent in our Indian military system. We have, since the great Madras mutiny in 1809, sedulously persisted in sepa- rating the sepoy from his European regimental superiors. We have endeavoured to place him “ en rapport” with the Commander-in-Chief, a potentate who is generally as a myth to the Native soldier! and have made him despise his own European officers, and cease to regard them as superiors. This state of things acts and reacts on both parties; and perhaps the most fatal effect of long 106 persistence in the system we have, pursued, is th actual degradation of the European wind hi h follows on the stagnation which it produces i The sepoy has been taught to despise his English officers, and to consider them as his natural and the English officers have consequently become oo a certain extent, unworthy of his respect. 14 Without due exercise, the strongest natural powers fade and disappear. Slavery unfits men for A AND THE POWER OF COMMANDING COMES WITH THE EXERCISE OF MAND. ar The Natives of India are quite incapable of self- government. They do not in the least understand what it means. They cannot conceive that a po can have any rights whatever, not dependant on 4 Javour of the Sovereign. They expect their Soverei : to govern them absolutely, and according to his ol superior knowledge and ability, not according: to fy Instructions. : : Ee y We have never appeared to them to have acted as : a : : ne have, on the contrary, w a ie Asiatic to be, marks of FEAR and of distrust of our own rights ‘throughout Whole administration; and we ho with dns 4 able mfatuation, Aitherto wild a a Limoor on the throne of his fathers as Em is y India at Delhi! We hold India as forejon ey only ; but we have been perpet SER SY petually proclaiming to ¢ Natives of India that they are our equals, th t we only rule as their representatives, ad by Fn 107 sufferance, that they are not bound to obey us, and that we have no right to command them. Our “Regulations,” civil and military, are all to the same effect. Our Articles of War form a ludicrous specimen of this unwise system. The English soldier, as a free citizen, 1s on an equality with his officer: he has rights ‘as such which he well understands, and which he is able to make use of ; and a portion of such rights he voluntarily surrenders on entering the army. Our Mutiny Act defines what portion of such rights he thus surrenders ; and he retains all others. The pre-existing equality is the very essence of the Articles of War. But this equality is precisely what does NOT exist with respect to the Indian soldier, he does not even want such equality ; he understands nothing about it. In his ordinary state, before enlisting as a soldier, he must either be a despot himself, or be subject to despotic rule. It is indeed only because the European officer is a superior being by nature to the Asiatic, that we hold India at all. The Native of India enters our service without an idea beyond that of implicit obedience to his officers being his duty. He cannot even imagine any other state of things, if the officers are to have any autho- rity over him at all. Yet, with amazing absurdity, the first thing we do! is to read and explain to him our Articles of War, 108 in gw impress on him the belief that his nazural an nar: ) ordinary state is to be one of disobedience to his officers ; and that he is not bound to obey them, except . . ; » . ) In certain special instances defined by the Articles > He soon perceives that his Sh ony their demeanour, formed in the regulation school, shows that they 1 hey do not in the least ex 1 20) ect hi to be obedient. His obedience is alw : i. Government, treated as pected favour. Nothing can be weaker than this. Such a state of things must tend to dey worst qualities of both parties, The army is officers are quite power- ays, even by a great and somewhat unex- elope the ae Native and European. » theretore, not hound together b any strong internal force, AND gy : £ ) THE LEA PRESSURE FROM WITHOUT MUST vi IT TO FALL TO PIECES % Brought up in such a s | a school, but few of of on Native Indian Army can be Ao qua ied to carry out the measures necessary fi yy re-organization of that army. Ta An almost superhuman power of ori and character would be re successfully to resist the baneful influence which he has passed half a lifetime or i un But it would be most unjust now is isi officers of the army of Bengal with sever oy ment for what has occurred, and the Chorin a have here proposed seems calculat y : ed difficulty in this respect. to meet every Under the arr el ginal thought quisite to enable a man angements indicated, it will, ere long ’ 109 be discovered what each officer on the general list may be fit for ; and he may then be employed accord- ingly to the greatest advantage. If, on fair trial, he appear to be totally useless, let him be removed, and let him retire on full or half- pay, according to his period of service. Dut, in the variety of work required to be performed in India, this will rarely be requisite. It is essential to the successful working of the organization proposed, that the officers on the unem- ployed list should be fairly and even liberally paid. The presence alone of a number of English gentlemen in India is attended with much advantage to the English Government ; and these should have the means of living respectably, and of pursuing those studies and occupations which may qualify them for public employment in this country. Under a system by which every man must feel that his standing and advancement in the service, and in society, depended wholly on his own industry, acquire- ment, and cultivated natural powers, the greatest possible amount of mental power and moral growth must be developed, and, while the numbers oi Euro- peans in the public service in India might even ultimately be much reduced, their commanding power would be very greatly, almost infinitely, increased. Where cases of abuse of power occur—as occur they must, and will—let them be dealt with individually. Avoid, as much as possible, making general regulations, which destroy all healthy mental development. Avoid striving too much after out- 110 ward uniformity ; the same just principles, applied equally well and with equal success by different men, may cause different arra ngements with respect to unimportant details. No two leaves on a tree may be exactly alike, but the same vital process has produced all from the same substances. Forcing all men’s minds into one mould is fatal to mental power. Let the system be such as to tend to cultivate and to develope such power. Tet men apply their powers as they find best adapted—to produce the desired effect, making them strictly responsible for results. If officers will not exert themselves, or if they have done their best in vain, and the results are unsatis- factory, such officers ar e in their wrong places ; remoy e them to the unemployed list, till work more fitted for their powers be ready for them. The obvious obj jection to the organization proposed, is the difficulty of finding for the higher commands, time will properly qualified officers But it is certain that speedily remedy this, the school will s00n Jorm such officers, and nothing else will do so. We must expect to meet with some difficulties at first, in remedying such long-continued and deep-seated errors; but if our principles of action be sound, their tendency in practice will be to bring about the best possible state of affairs. However the details may be arranged and carried out, it appears to me to be quite certain that until the principles here maintained be acknowledged and 111 be acted on, the British Indian Empire can never in a sound or satisfactory state. : ee the subject with all the ihe! research and observation, and with oll the Ps : thought I could bring to bear on 1 Shine = : in practice, opportunities of applying, on a 3 e be extensive scale, the ‘principles which I advocate, a as have fallen to the lot of few men living. 4 Wi have never failed of success. They are 8 va application, being founded on natural wis nd carried out fairly in India, they would speedily be our Asiatic soldiers quite as trustworthy as their Juropean brethren in arms. a : : THE GOODNESS OF THE SEpOY on PENDS ON WHAT HIS ous OFFI VSTILS INTO HIS MIND. A Sy MATERIAL HAS NO ON FOR GOOD, AND VERY LITTLE FOR Tm] e The native Indian soldiers are to us ey y exactly like the limbs of our bodies nae on 4 They are the bones and muscles of the whole fi a of which the Europeans are the brains and ee and when the latter are healthy and vigorous, the former will always be perfectly obedient, and strong our bidding. a gi on has ht the brains, and > 18 2 surprising that the limbs should have Jost all #4 i vital force, and be moved about wonsylsivly I er action of any external influence to which they may be subjected. ig (Signed) JOHN JACOB. SCHEME FOR THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES OF INDIA. The Queen of England formally to assume the style and title of Empress of India. The Armies of the several Indian Presidencies to be henceforth styled the Royal Armies of India, In each of these Armies, the whole of the European officers of the Cavalry and Infantry of all ranks, and the European officers of the Artillery and Engineers above the rank of Colonel, to be formed into one General Gradation List, in which, under ordinary circumstances, all will rise by seniority. Rank in this list to be the only permanent rank, all regimental and other rank being temporary only, and to continue only so long as officers may be serving with Regiments, or be otherwise actively employed. In case of officers being promoted for good service, &c., by the Queen, they are to take their places in the General Gradation List, according to the dates of their promotions, and to enjoy every advantage exactly as if they had risen to such places by seniority only. This General Gradation List to be styled the Unemployed List. All the officers borne on jt who may hold no special appointments, will reside in India at such places as Government may direct, but will perform no public functions. A fourth Presidency and fourth Army to be 113 added to India. Our Bombay and Bengal Armies together being divided into three equal parts for this purpose. The new Presidency and Army to be styled the North-West Presidency, &c. The whole establishment of European officers may be somewhat less than at present; but under the proposed arrangement the number of officers to form the whole General List can readily be adjusted in practice to meet the demands of the public service. When these are once correctly ascertained, no further will probably be requisite. ge pho of tho strength of the present Army of Bombay, the following Establishment might be proper :— Des. Colonels. Lieut.-Cols. Captains. Lieutenants. 50 3 Artillery . . 5 10 » jo 4 Engineers . 4 3 3 No. 6 30 30 Cavalry . ' 3 Infantry . 188 66 330 330 45 45 90 450 450 Generals 5, Lieutenant Generals 10, Major Generals 15. 3 The several ranks of officers while unemployed in India, to receive pay as follows— Generals ‘ : . . 1,500 Rs. per mensem. Lieutenant-Generals . ‘ 1,200 Major-Generals : : : 1 300 Colonel . . ‘ . : Lieutenant-Colonel . . i Captain . x . ‘ 200 Lieutenant , . . : These rates of pay to be received wherever residing, by permission, in India, and the like number of pounds per annum being allowed to each while absent from H 114 India on leave to Europe. The option of retiring on full pay of the rank attained to in the General List to be allowed after 30 years’ residence in India, and after 20 years on half-pay. Leave of absence to be granted at the discretion of the Local Governments. No distinction to be made with regard to leave on account of ill-health, or of private affairs. Subscriptions to Military and all other Funds to cease to be compulsory. A distinct and separate Civil Service to be pro- spectively abolished. All Candidates appointed to the Indian Service to be educated at a Military College in England, and to reside at such College for at least two years, and not more than four years. The minimum age for ad- mission to be fourteen, and the maximum eighteen years. The course at the College to include full instruction in mechanical and in physical science generally, and in political economy, also riding, rifle practice, and hardy exercises. The residence at the College to be free of all pecu- niary charge to the Cadet, unless he decline proceeding to join the Service in India in due course, in which case—to cover all cost to the State, he should pay at the rate of 100Z per annum for the period during which he has resided at the College. From the General List formed as above mentioned, officers are to be selected for every species of public employment, Civil and Military. For each Native Indian Infantry Regiment, the 115 establishment of English officers may be as follows. The pay assigned to each being in all cases Staff pay, to be drawn in addition to the pay due to each according to his rank in the General List. But though an officer may hold a lower rank on the General List than that which is assigned to his position in a regiment, &c., the temporary rank is always to hold good for precedence and command during the period of employment. For a Native Indian Regiment. 1 Colonel Rs. 600 Regimental pay i 1 Lieutenant Colonel ,, 400 { addition to unemp boyd 2 Captains (to be Adjutant and pay 2 Jer ran Quartermaster) “each 300 J Genera . For the Cavalry, the like Establishment to be allowed, with an allowance of one hundred rupees per mensem extra to each rank, to meet the cost of horses and other expenses. For the General Staff of the Army. 1 Major-General, to be Adjutant-General of the Army with Staff pay “El ‘ . : ‘ ii el, to be Deputy Adjutant-Genera . . al ST Te for the Quartermaster-G eneral’s Department. Rs. 1,500 500 For a Brigade of any strength. Rs. 1,000 Staff pay. 1 Major-General 00 Be 1 Captain (Major Brigade) . : aa For a Division. . 3,000 Staff pay. 1 Lieutenant-General ‘ ‘ ; : Rs " : P 1 Lieut.-Colonel (Adjutant-General) . in i Quartermaster-General) " : , 200: 1 Captain (Aide-de-Camp) : : il $i . Proper office establishment, &c., &c., to be allowe 116 to Commanding and Staff Officers. ance, &c., as usual. All officers, when absent on leave beyond the Division in which they may be serving, are to receive unemployed pay only, and if other officers act for them when absent even within the Division otherwise os ol i the rule is to be in force, io officer acting for the a 1vi I oy Te oes receiving his Staff pay in Officers of the rank of Captain on the General List to be considered eligible for selection for any of the higher regimental ranks. Lieutenants on the General List are not to be considered as eligible for higher regimental or other active employment than the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. At their own request, and with the approbation of Regimental Commanding Officers, any unemployed officers may be attached to do duty with Regiments without extra pay. The recommendations of officers commanding Regi- ments, with respect to the appointment of officers to fill vacancies in their corps, or to their removal there- from to the Unemployed List, in consequence of proved Incapacity, to be attended to. All enlistments, discharges, promotions to and re- ductions from every rank of Native officers and soldiers, are to rest with the Colonels of Regiments and are to be signified by them, with reasons, &c if necessary, in Regimental Orders. y Articles of War for Native Indi ndian t entirely abolished. Ee Company allow- ES i N . a si et a Er SR RR ra I eee Sl 117 Colonels commanding Native Regiments to have full magisterial authority over all ranks of Natives in their regiments, soldiers and followers. The extent of such powers to be the infliction of imprisonment, with hard labour, for a period of seven years, without the confirmation of higher authority being required; to imprisonment with hard labour for fourteen years, subject to the confirmation of the General Officer commanding the Brigade ; to trans- portation or capital punishment, subject to the confirmation of the General Commanding the Division or Field Force. Regimental Lieutenant- Colonels and Captains are likewise to have magisterial power under the control of the Colonel commanding their Regiment, and to such extent as he may think proper to authorize. In all cases involving the award of a graver punishment than three months’ imprisonment with hard labour, the infliction of a corporal punishment of twenty-five lashes, or of a fine above fifty rupees, regular proceedings of the trial are to be recorded in full, to be laid before the General Officer commanding, when required. Cases of less serious nature may be dealt with summarily on due investigation by the Commanding Officer at public orderly-room, a record of all such summary proceedings being kept in a book provided for the purpose for the inspection of the General Officer commanding. Colonels of Regiments are to be held strictly and 118 solely responsible to their superior officers and to th State, and not to the Native Indian soldier for oi propriety of such proceedings. : Permanent head-quarters to be established for each Regiment, and carriage to be kept up at all times For the European Infantry, the establishment of officers per Regiment may be : — 1 Colonel R . : . Rs. 600 Staff : 2 Lieut.-Colonels, each . » 400 gd 10 Captains, each . . 300 1 Adjutant y : : . 300) To 1 Quartermaster : . Sol tn ie 10 Lieutenants, each 200 Rs. per to 9 Artillery and Engineer officers each to be in a separate General List up to the rank of Colonel inclusive ; and thereafter to be incorporated into the General List of the whole army. The senior Colonel of Artillery or Engineers, when senior in the Cl being promoted to Major-General as vacancies Uk occur. Unemployed pay to be the same for all arms Employed pay, whether Regimental or Ordusies, &ec., to be allowed as for the Cavalry. Each Battalion of Artillery to have field officer and staff as for an European Regiment, the numb of Captains and Lieutenants being regaled thas to a to the number on leave, ni fa the Ordnance and other professional All Artillery officers in India to be considered ““ employed” when not on leave. i 119 In the Ordnance Department, the rank and pay of the various grades to be adjusted as follows :— as Colonel. Lieutenant-Colonel. Captains. Lieutenants. Senior Commissary » Deputy . ‘ Commissaries-of Division Assistant ” Engineer officers attached to the Engineer corps, or holding other military appointments, to be on the same footing as Artillery officers ; but the duties of Engineer officers generally in India are purely civil, and their salaries, &c., must be adjusted specially for each appointment. In all appointments other than military, officers will receive their unemployed military pay, in addi- tion to such emolument as may be assigned to them in their civil capacities; and when absent on leave, or on any account other than public duty, beyond the range of their immediate superior, they will receive only the unemployed rates of pay. JOHN JACOB. e Green Arbour Court. London: Printed by Sarr, ELper and Co., Littl NOTEK ON THE CAUSES OF THE INDIAN OUTBREAK. Referred to at page 95. Tue causes of the mutiny in Bengal are known to me to be as follow: — . The very ancient Cyclar system of religion, once universally, and still very generally, taught in secret throughout the world, from China to Mexico, and from Norway to Ceylon, has always been the real foundation of every faith in the East, whatever the exoteric doctrines might be. According to this system, a Conqueror, Messiah, or Saviour, is to appear on the earth during each solar cycle, which cycle was at different” periods held to consist of 666, 608, and 600 years. This was the secret doctrine of the Essenes, the Carmelites, the Templars, the Druses, &c. &c. in the Old, and of the Mexicans in the New World. It still forms part of the esoteric religion of China, of Thibet, of Moscow, and of the Greek Church generally, and is most probably taught in a very secret chapter at Rome also. It was certainly taught secretly in the Romish Church up to the thirteenth century. It always formed a secret doctrine of the Mahome- dan religion. I 122 The Mahomedans, esteeming Jesus to have been the ninth, hold Mahomed to have been the tenth Avatar, or Messiah, appearing in due course. The new Saviour, or the renewed divine incarna- tion, was expected to appear within six years after the commencement of a new solar cycle of 600 years, &c. His expected appearance at the regular period, after Mahomed, was the cause of the Crusades, of the preparation by the Church of Rome of the ‘“ Evangelium Eternum ”-- « Everlasting Gospel,” or “ Gospel of the Holy Ghost,” as it was also termed, and of the intention to deify St. Francis. The second period after Mahomed arrived shortly after the commencement of the present century, and now another secret doctrine of the Cyclar religion also points to the present time as one in which ~ extraordinary change is to occur. It is held that 1260 years after the appearance of the tenth Avatar, which Mahomed is held to have been, struggle of the nations of the earth will ta after’ which a terrible ke place, is to commence the millenium, — a thousand years of peace and visible Divine rule throughout the world. This doctrine has been known and taught in secret in every Mahomedan school of religion throughout “the East; and as the expected time drew near, a deep feeling prevailed at Constantinople and elsewhere, that the end of Islam and of the Turkish Empire was fast approaching. This feeling regarding the near approach of some very great changes among governments, thrones, and nations, which was and is prevalent throughout the 123 East, has been largely used for political Su Russia. One of the chief schools of this ye i r trine has long been at Moscow, and ey thence maintained with the initiated in dis dd 51 proper moment the Sick Man” was to be no more, the Turkish Empire was to i pes and the greater portion of it to lapse to t Elan * TZR, whose very title expresses a deep i : y this secret doctrine. (Vide a fon tr 608, et seq.) Protestantism alone, of a A of the world, knows Ta of SH RE 3 England would have nothing to is Be ith ils of the ¢ Sick Man.” The time being oe gt in her strength and all hs eres influences in the ni a ei = 5 rn Powers. Contrary to a ation, a unable to separate France Wi and failing of success in Kurope, he > so i and died. His son, possibly less deep y ini : , 5 nly less confident of success, wished to stop i Yio with which his father ‘had been i 4 and which he hoped to have held in control. But Te —_ once roused would not subside fhe swell had passed over the whole East. hr : « Saviour ” had arisen in China; and in a Shah had loudly and publicly declared in ro 2 oe 2 clamations that the shadow of the King 0 > oh again about to spread 2H fe on as In 5 R and Avatar). oe i are secretly taught to those who i ike 1 f Buddhism, are deeply initiated alike In the sehnols 0 w 124 Hindooism, and Mahomedanism ; and, indeed, there are esoteric doctrines in nearly all the Kiowa reli- gions of the earth except the Protestant churches. The members of al] religions in India, who are well Instructed in the mysteries of their own faith, worked on by Russian influences, were fully properod for great and violent changes. : The Persians invaded India, and in an ill-omened hour we invaded Persia by sea, leaving India to the mercy of the Brahmans of Oude, The strongest and clearest warnings were unheeded and the weakest patt—the rotten part—of our Tadtin Empire, the Bengal army, gave way. Hap THIS NATIVE ARMY OF BENGAL BEEN IN A TOL LERABLY SOUND STATE, THE DISTURBING WAVE WOULD HA i VE PASSED OVER OUR INDIAN Empire UNFELT AND UNKNOWN to the uninitiated in the esoteric doctrines of the mystics. Had a proper discipline prevailed ; had the sepoys of Bengal been well affected towards. their European officers ; had those European officers been dan respected as it is natural for the native of India to fear and to respect the English gentleman ; had the power of the European officer | s in the native armi . . ey of India over their sepoys not BEEN ADMITTED TO A KNOWLEDGE OF THE MYSTIC DOC- T RINES, AND OF THEIR TENDENCY. Tuey COULD NoT JF 0 HAVE BEEN TRUSTED WITHOUT RISK OF BETRAYAL. Nor A NATIVE INDIAN SOLDIER WOULD HAVE BEEN INITIATED. it our rulers seemed to have gone mad. Every- thing i 101 g was done to aid religious fanaticism and to 125 destroy soldier-like discipline. Nothing appeared in the eyes of authority to be so criminal as to speak truth on these subjects, while to AssiMILATE WITH THE PRACTICE IN BENGAL” was the eternally-repeated universal rule in India. Foreseeing the fearful ill consequences of this mad- ness, I wrote and published nearly eight years ago (in the beginning of 1850) these words :— “ THERE IS MORE DANGER TO OUR INDIAN EMPIRE FROM THE STATE OF THE BENGAL ARMY, FROM THE FEELING WHICH THERE EXISTS BETWEEN THE NATIVE AND THE EUROPEAN, AND THENCE SPREADS THROUGH- OUT THE LENGTH AND BREADTH OF THE LAND, THAN FROM ALL OTHER CAUSES COMBINED. LET GoOVERN- MENT LOOK TO THIS; IT IS A SERIOUS "AND MOST IM- PORTANT TRUTH. — Tracts on the Indian Army, p. 13. For reiterating such warnings, and particularly for a letter on the subject published in the London Times in December 1853, I was severely and repeatedly reprimanded in the public General Orders in India, and was from England threatened with disgraceful expulsion from the Service. I then only replied to my blind but well-meaning persecutors, that TIME WOULD SHOW THE CORRECTNESS OF MY VIEWS AND THE JUSTICE OF MY CONCLUSIONS. And, in truth, every word has been fully and terribly verified. Then nothing appeared incredible except the truth. Deeply impressed with the truth, I persevered, standing alone against all the world raving against me. But I strove in vain to prevent the evil which I so clearly foresaw, though I trust not without some useful effect as to remedying it. 126 The real causes of the Indian outbreak, and all its attendant horrors, appear to be wholly unknown and unguessed at by any one of the numerous persons who have lately been treating of them. It is impos- sible to enter FuLLY into them here; they must be hidden from the uninitiated. They can, indeed, be fully known to those only who (as I have done) have laboured earnestly and diligently to master the secret mysteries on which they have depended. But whenever the truth has been proclaimed in time to remedy and to save, the proclaimer has always been met with ridicule, abuse, and violence, or all combined. What can be more significant than these words, published in the year 1836 in that wonderful mine of truth and ancient learning, the Anacalypsis ?” “In the province of Oude (Zfouda or J udea), in North India, the people still flatter themselves with the hopes of a Saviour, of whom they know nothing, except that he is to be a tenth Outar or Ontar. He is to be called the Spotless, because he is to be born of a pure virgin. He is expected to appear in the province of Oude, i. e., Youdia. He will destroy all distinctions, and establish happiness on earth. As these people did not accept Mahomed for their last Avatar or incarnation, all their seminaries of ancient learning were destroyed, and they still, like the J ews, continue in expectation of they know not what.” Anacalypsis, Vol. I, p. 684, published 1836.) But ¢ Who hath heard our report, and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed ?” JOHN JACOB. END OF TITLE END OF REEL PLEASE REWIND.