JoB No.__39 7 i DATE Reduction Ratio __ 7- ] year + ON — 0 | BFE g Uh : EME LCT] LL LL] LL LL LL LTE TTT t ITT Tm fmm fim TTT fr DOCUMENT SOURCE: MAIN LIBRARY LLL fm tf month ———————— i i L ate AIT ier ti + 7 vo sr — \, f\ (3 0 bs ’ 3 \ . IAs a A. gl i ej i + \ Solthon ty 5 ¥ Fan ai 1) . BB ge < : ) ‘ 59 ’ o n Liga 8 . . ’ dove 3 y . 5, is Y \ ) ~ ’ . > ’ $ 9 * ie * 200 8 + 3 ON THE Immateriality a»#d Immortality OF THE Ss. 0. .U.»L, AND Its Inftinctive Senfe of Goop and Evry; In Oppofition to the Opinions advanced in The Effays introdu&ory to Dr. PriesTLEY’s Abridgment of Dr. Har TLEY’s Obfervations sn Man. N To which are added, Stri&tures on Dr. HARTLEY s “Theory ; _/ Thoughts on the ORIGIN oF EviL ; 2 AND Proof of the contradiGtory Opinions of Dr. Pricey and his Author. WITH AN APPENDIX, In Anfwer to Dr. PRIESTLEY Ss DISQUISITIONS on MATTER anp SPIRIT. By the AUTHOR of The Letters in Proof of a particular, as well as a general Providence, Which were addrefled to DR. HAWKESWORTH (On his Publication of the Voyages round the World) under the Signature of A CHRISTIAN. “I would not therefore be any wy interpreted fo as to oppofe the Immateriality of “ the Soul. On the contrary, I Jee clearly, and acknowledge readily, that “ Matter and Motion, however fubtly divided, or reafoned upon, yield noe “thing more than Matter and Motion fiill,” HarTrLEY’s Obfervations on Man, Vol. I. P. s12. LONDON: Printed for J. DopsLEY, in Pall- Mall, M.D €C¢LXXVIIIL, ay aN 3 ¥ 0! MM CONTENTS Hr 8 rs or Ny 1 G ENERAL bad tendency of the In- 3 ra A i troductory Bays — XO Thelnrlyfon of Snmatérintiy from Man, inconfiftent with the creed of a Diff and with that belief in a future fate, which is derived from the Light of Nature —_— 14 np Y8 The Dottrine of Materialifin, inconfiffent With Scripture ~~ wm——— === 20 | ao Sg Ridiculous confequences attending the ex- ‘A : ek 4 clufion of Immateriality from Man —= 62 - A | Examination of Dr. Prieftley’s arguments | in_fupport of bis difbelref in the Imma- teriality of Man —_— 72 J nie G53 SUS E 4an - 5 /" Confeience, an inftin&ive fenfe of good A and evil, interwoven in our nature by the Creator es — 142 ro - Strictures CONTENTS. Strictures on. Dr. | Hartly $ Theory. | (Tite do@rine of philofophical neceflity, ex- pofed. Denying it to Man, deprives him of popular Liberty,—admitting him to have po- pular Liberty, gives: him philofophical. - The attributes of the Deity, cannot be contradic- tory - - - his KNOWLEDGE, . cannot ‘be fuppofed to counteract his POWER). » w—yeyn Tq, boughs on the Origin of Evil ig De — 2 18 Prog? of the contradictory opinions of Dr. _ Priefiley, and his Author — 296 Conclufon ~ . ~——— ~— 336 Appendix. In anfiver to Dr. Priefiley's Drfgusfitions on Matter and Spirit = 341 _ E- 8 Ss A Yo ON. THE 380 IMMATERIALITY and IMMORTALITY OF THE | 5 O U L ; &e. OTHING can be of trivial mos ment, that falls from the pens of men, who by charaler;-as well as pro= feflion, are generally deemed friends to re= ligion and virtue. The works of thofe who are notorious fof their irreligion, can= not materially affet the interefts they with to deftroy, becaufe mankind are naturally on their guard, againft what flows from a fource which they know to be peftiferous. They read with caution—and carefully ex- amine every fentiment as they advance, that they may not fatally be deceived into error. But when thofe on whom we rely for information, exert their abilities to miflead us, when the phyfician mingles B poifon p EE — - Tay wy ik! 2 ) poifon with his draught—we receive’ it “without diftruft—drink it with confidence —and never fufpe&”, the fatal tendency of the infufion, till its malignity is dif- covered by its effe@s—idnd the principles of 3 life are on the brink of being deftroyed. * Dr. Prieftley’s ingenious works having rendered his name generally known, —and his private charaCter having gained him efteem, he has become armed with powers to do great fervice, or mifchief to the com- munity. If mankind, therefore, ‘are too apt to form their judgment on the autho- rity of others—without being “at the trouble of examinirig for themfelves ‘the foundation on which dangerous doétrines are- grounded—it cannot ‘be wondered if they readily adopt the creed of a diffenting clergyman, fituated as Dr. Prieftley is—- ‘whom they may naturally conclude to be incapable of being either fwayed by. pre- judice, or deceived into error by a defire to -eftablith a favourite hypothefis. ‘He muft for this redfon give me leave to fay, - that inafmuch as he’ might have had good grounds to believe that his fentiments would { 3) ,would have weight with the public, he fhould have. been more attentive to the tendency of his opinions, before he _pub- lithed ‘them to. the world—fince the, more he .imagined: they would have influence, the more he fhould have been: fearful of doing mifchief, .Men of {lender abilities, have this confolation to comperfate for. the want of brilliant parts—that if they can- not do good, it is not in their power to do harm,—and unlefs men of talents are more actuated by a. defire to: recommend virtue, and difcourage vice, than to be celebrated for works which ‘have a con- trary tendency it is much to be lamented that genius has been beftowed, where it is fo unhappily mifemployed. As I think metaphyfical ftudies neither inftry&ive, nor entertaining, I fhould ne- ver have been at the trouble of reading either Dr. Hartley's Obfervations on Man, or the Introductory Effays which Dr. Prieftley has prefixed to his abridgement of that work—if an advertifement which appeared fome time ago, from a Mr. Seton, had not informed me, that in thofe Effays, Dr. Prieftley has denied the immortality of B2 the | « death.” ¢ £) the foul. In confequence of thofe Effays having been publifhed, every news-paper of London circulated the dangerous informa- tion, that Dr. Prieftleyis ¢rather inclined to « think that man does not confift of two ¢ principles fo effentially different from « one another as matter and fpirit—the ‘ one occupying fpace, the other not oc- « cupying any {pace, nor bearing any re- ¢¢ lation to it: fo that” in’ Dr. Pricftley’s declared opinion, his ¢ mind is no more “ in his body than it is in the moon” ——— and that he is ¢ rather inclined to think «¢ that the whole man 1s of fome uniform « compofition, and that the property of « perception, as well as the other’ powers «¢ that are termed mental, is the refult of ¢¢ fuch an organical ftructure as that of « the brain” ----and ¢ confequently that the whole man becomes extinct at oh ¢ ~ So very extraordinary a declaration, led me to read the Effays in which it was to be found and though Dr. Pricftley has, in them, intimated his belief in a ‘refur- _retion— yet as he informs us, immediately after the above extra& *¢ that we have no lbs ¢ hope (5 ) “ hope of furviving the grave but what is ¢¢ derived from the fcheme of revelation’ nS the admiffion of a refurrecion at the end of the world, cannot render - the do&rine which excludes our fouls, lefs dangerous— fince it will be, fhewn in the following pages, that if it be really true that we ¢ do not confift of matter and fpirit—and” that the property of perception, as well ¢ as the other powers that are termed men- “ tal, are the refult of fuch an organical ¢¢ ftruture as the brain”—and that “* con- « fequently, the whole man becomes ex- “ tin at death” all our hopes of 2 futurity are vain, fince the very revelation which promifes it, muft in that event, be {fpurious—and the attributes which we afcribe to God, cannot be his due, and, having deprived him of his attributes, every foundation for the belief that he has revealed his will to man, muft vanith— and we fhould fee ftrgng reafon to doubt whether we do not err, even In our belief that there is fuch a being ex- ifting. If we are once convinced that we may efcape with impunity whilft in this life, B 3 | and _— roo 3 | 1 4 po ke) ¢ C £) the foul. In confequence of thofe Effays having been publifhed, every news-paper of London circulated the dangerous informa- tion, that Dr. Pricftleyis “rather inclined to « think that man does not confift of two ¢ principles fo effentially different from « one another as matter and Jpirit—the “ one occupying fpace, the other not’ oc- « cupying any fpace, nor bearing any re- ¢ lation to it : fo that” in’ Dr. Pricftley’s declared opinion, his mind is rio ‘more “ in his body than it is in the moon” —— and that he is rather inclined to think «¢ that the whole man is of fome uniform ¢ compofition, and that the property of «« perception, as well as the other’ powers «¢ that are termed mental, is the refult of ¢¢ fuch an organical firucture as that of « the brain” ----and ¢ confequently that the whole man becomes extinct at =" « death.” So very extraordinary a declaration, ‘led me to read the Effays in which it was to be found and though Dr. Prieftley has, in them, intimated his belief in a ‘refur- .re@ion— yet as he informs us, immediately after the above extralt that we have ‘no g « hope ¢ tin at death” ( 5 ) “ hope of furviving the grave but what is ¢¢ derived from the fcheme of revelation” — the admiffion of a refurretion at the end of the world, cannot render the do&rine which excludes our fouls, lefs dangerous— fince it will be fhewn in the following pages, that if it be really true that © we ¢¢ do not confift of matter and {pirit—and” that “ the property of perception, as well ¢¢ as the other powers that are termed men- « tal, are the refult of fuch an organical ¢¢ ftruGure as the brain”—and that “ con- « fequently, the whole man becomes ex- all our hopes of a futurity are vain, fince the very revelation which promifes it, muft in that event, be {fpurious—and the attributes which we afcribe to God, cannot be his due, and, having deprived him of his attributes, every foundation for the belief that he has revealed his will to man, muft vanith and we fhould fee ftrong reafon to doubt whether we do not err, even in our belief that there is fuch a being ex- ifting. If we are once convinced that we may efcape with impunity whilft in this life, B 3 | and “judgment, muft we not confefs that her £6) and that annihilation awaits’ us, on death, __if the confideration of future rewards and punithments, is no longer to {timulate and deter,—what is there to prevent out giving a loofe to all our appetites and paf~ fions? What is there to prevent murder, fraud, theft, perjury—and every villainy that wickednefs can devife >—The liber- tine, defirous of feducing the wife, or the daughter of his friend,—relying on the truth of Dr. Prieftley’s doctrine, is fet at liberty from any fears of future punith- ment—and laughs at thofe fecret feelings, which endeavoured to reftrain him from the commiffion of fuch a crime. Ifthe fair fhould have any {cruples—may he not firive to remove them, by informing her, that ¢ Dr. Prieftley is a clergyman, and a ¢ philofopher,—a ‘man who has ftudied «¢ nature, and is efteemed for his piety, ¢ learning, and knowledge—and that ever «Dr. Priofiley has publickly declared «that we can have no fouls, and that ¢ we muft confequently’ be extint at ce death 3” If the lady, unhappily, thould have any dependence on Dr. Pricftley’s danger ¢ 2) danger would be imminent 2—~—What an affiftance to all the libertines of Europe.) .. And what can Dr. Prieftley anfwer, if we fhould afk, was it worth his while, as a,philofopher, (but much lefs as a clergy- man, who, it is to be fuppofed, profefies, and entertains, a zeal for religion) to take fo much pains in the compofition, and publication of a work, written in fupport of a propofition, from which a conclufion muft be drawn, which 1s as dangerous, as it: is uncomfortable ?~—~One would natu- rally, have imagined that when a man of Dr. Prieftley’s facred profeflion—under- took fuch a work, he muft have had an end in view, worthy of fo much fltudy and labour! I thould hope, and make no doubt but it is Ai wifh to encreafe and ftrengthen our belief in a future ftate —then why advance doérines, which, if admitted, weaken fuch a belief by de- priving us of ftrong collateral proofs of ano- ther life ?—Surely the daily icenes which we witnefs—the melancholy prevalence of vice and immorality, (which threatens the deftruction of the ftate, by removing the Bs Joundation a) ra ( 8) foundation of public, a8 well as private vires - ‘tue) might have convinced him- of the danger of deftroying any of the evidences for another life, fince none of them can be deftroyed, without endangering our pre= fent fafety, as well as future happinefs. Dr. Prieftley may repeat to me; (what he has faid in the conclufion of his abridgement of Dr. Hartley's work) that « all who dre enemies of free inquiry, are ¢¢ enemies of truth’—and fo far from de- nying it, I join-in the affertion—but he muft give me leave to remark that thereis avery great difference between a free pri= vate inquiry, and a free public declaration. The ‘Almighty has been pleafed to endue us ‘with ‘reafonable faculties,—~we thall therefore be juftly an{werable if we: fail to exert them in the purfuit of truth-fince otherwifé we cannot avoid idolatry, or be enabled to pay that rational homage, ado ration, and fervice to the: Deity, which refult from the: convition of his attris: butes.: Having by the detection of error, fucceeded in our fearch, it is our duty to expofe falfehoods, which, if not. detefteds ipo; aud confuted, lead our worfbip afiray. Jrom ( 9°) fromits only proper. objesi—or réprefent out Creator in a light, which puts it out-of our power to view him as a father; full of good= nefs and mercy. ‘We thould inform man kifid; to the utmoft of our ability—and there is, in thort, no opinion which I would with to preclude front the public eye, but fuch as tends to weaken, if not overturn, the foundation of virtue—and here we at once find the true criterion, by which the propriety, or impropriety of public decla- rations of opinion, fhould be determined. The cenfurable opinions, publickly de- clared by Dr. Prieftley in his Effays, were fit: only to have been communicated in the clofet, or in private correfpondence be- tween friends—but to publith them to the world, is to infe& the multitude with a peftilence, Ready, and willing as I am, to believe that Dr. Prieftley had no inten- tion to injure religion—and that he had not attended to the bad confequences infe- parable from bis doctrines—yet, fince he has piblithed fuch doctrines, his inten= tion is of no cenfequence—and unlefs he retracts them as publickly as they were savancel, they will do more mifchief wherever (( 190) wherever. they have weighty than he.could ever. do good, though he were to write with the pen of an angel, and preach By. infpiration for thefe fifty years. - I was concerned to find, teo, by he conclufion of Dr. Prieftley’s work; that he has attacked a book *, which very properly ridicules, and expofes the abfurdities, and nonfenfe, which have been publithed by fceptics, who imagined themfelves philo- fophers, becaufe they argued like bedla- mites. Yet my concern does not arife from the leaft apprehenfion that any arguments can poffibly: confute thofe, urged by.Dr. Beattie in his. admirable eflay—(for it is impoflible .to prove truth, falfehood) but I am concerned to find that a pen which might have been of much fervice tothe caufe of religion and virtue, has been em- ployed toaffift the advocates for fceptici{m and infidelity, as well as' to deny the im- mortality of the foul. + I fhall not under- take the defence of Dr. 'Beattie’s work, becaufe I think him much better qualified for it, than I am—and ‘I hope he is: too # Dr. Beatties Effay on the Nature and Thmati tity of Liroth: Goa wari (( x1) searm a friend ‘to virtue; to remain filent;: when Dr. Prieftley attacks a book, weitten to thew the folly of atheifm— but thus much I cannot help faying, that Dr. Beatties Efflay has a dirett ten- dency to make us better men than we are—and that Dr. Prieftley’s Introdu&tory Effays, have as dire a tendency to make us WORSE. ‘What benefit can mankind poffibly de- rive from the information, that ¢¢ the whole <¢ man is of {ome uniform compofition— ¢¢ and that the property of perception, as ¢¢ well as the other powers that are termed ¢¢ mental, is the refult of fuch an organi- ¢ cal firu@ure as that of the brain?” Can we be inftructed in ufeful {cience, or. made better men, by being told, that ¢¢ man does « not confit of two principles fo eflen- ¢¢ tially different from one another as «matter -and {pirit,” fince the inference to be drawn from the propofition, 1s, that ¢¢ the whole man becomes extinct at ¢« death ?"—Yet fuch is the propofition which Dr. Prieftley has advanced, though he had but juft the inftant before confefled tha “ the fubje¢t is beyond our compre- ¢¢ henfion Re n ( rz) « henfion at prefent !"—If fuch was, his opinion, ‘furely it might have been deemed fufficient to prevent him from confidently afferting, : before the clofe of that very fen- tence, that bis mind is no more in bis body; than it is in the moon !—And, if poffible to render this ftrange affertion, ftill more extraordinary, it ‘was made, after having told us, in the preceding leaf, that it is “ only the bare poffibility of the thing, for «¢ which he now contends!” Was it ating like a philofopher, to form fo de- termined an opinion that his mind could be no more in his body than in the moon, with evidences, which only enabled him to contend for the bare poffibility of its truth >——Would the ancient philofo- phers of Greece and Rome have concluded fo peremptorily on a propofition, which they faw was but barely polfible 2 Dr. Prieftley confeffes that he faw it | would ftagger fome perfons that /o much « of the bufinefs of THINKING, fhould ¢¢ be made to depend upon mere matter, as ¢¢ the do&rine of vibrations fuppofes. For, «in fa,” Dr. Prieftley fays, it leaves « nothing to the province of any other «¢ principle, “¢ excluded altogether!” ( 13 ) “principle, ‘except the fimple power: of «¢'pérception’s fo that if it were POSSIBLE « that matter could be endued with ‘this « property,” (which, happily for man- kind, he cannot prove; ‘though he has afferted that we are entirely material, as de- cifively as if be bad proved it ) what then ? Tiet'n$ hear what beneficial difeovery would be made, by finding out that matter could be endued with the property of perception— why, truly, we fhould difcover a glorious incentive to worthy actions, in the certain- ty, that ——<< Immateriality, os far as 9 Li be Juppofed to belong to man, would be —A “difcovery worthy his fabour ! ~—* He confeffes that he fiw it would «¢fagger” fome perfons that ¢ fo much of the bufinefs of thinking «¢'fHould be ‘thade to depend upon mere ¢ matter, as the doltrine" of “vibrations « fuppofes”—and yet feems to regret that matter cannot be proved to be ‘capable of being endued with the property of percep- tion—though' ben; inftead of being only * Seq page 19 of the Effays. 6 faggered,” (: uz )) flaggered;”’ they would: be knocked dow; by the proof that smmateriality -muft: be st: leogeihier excluded from man iin! The, Exclufion of Immateriality from Man inconfifient with. the Creed of a Defi and with that Belief m a Suture State, which is. derived from the Light of Nature. Dr Prieftley proceeds to fay, that, # he ¢« does not know that this fuppofi- “tion need give any concern, except to « thofe who maintain that a future life ¢¢ depends upon the immateriality of the ¢¢ human foul.” .. For argument’s fake, then, let us #1 Dr. Prieftley’s affertion to be true, that none can be ftaggered in their belief of a future {tate, or be concerned” on, find- ing that they have no fouls, but only. {uch as ground their belief, Jalely on their pof- fefling an immaterial principle of life. Yet on this fuppofition, . can’ ‘he ment praife for having deprived every deift of thofe ( 015) thofe hopes of immortality; which he tad -cherifhied; from the belief that he bad? 2 {pirit, avhiehicould not die 2 Dr. Prieftley fays at ¢ it will not «¢ alarm thofe who found all their hopes of << a future exiftence, on the chriftian doc- « ¢rine of a refurre@ion from the dead *.” “No one can believe the {criptures more ftedfaflly than I do—and yet I muft de- clare I' think we cannot pofiibly have too many collateral proofs, to confirm and ftrengthen our faith ‘in a future ftate. Why thould we with to. diminifh: the weight of any fingle argument, which can “be thrown into the f{cale, to fix us in the ‘conviction of fo very falutary a creed ? I fee fufficient grounds for the belief of a future ftate, even independent of what I find in feripture—and if the fcripture tefti- mony can be firengthened by the collateral evidence of our own reafon, how very highly culpable muft Dr. Prieftley appear in the eyes of good men, for having done all in his power to deprive us ‘of any comfort ‘we ‘might derive from the united force of both teftimonies | P * See page 20 of the Effays. Dr. (16 ) Dr. Prieftley informs us that ¢“ our having « recourfe to an immatérial principle, to «¢ account for perception and thought, is «only faying in other ‘words, that we do « pot know in what they confift; for” that ¢¢ no one will fay that he has any concep- « tion how the principle of thought can « have any more relation to immateridlity, ¢¢ than to materiality *.” - IHETho Yes—I will fay it. 1can infinitely eafier conceive perception and thought, belonging to immateriality, than to materiality. The reafon is fo evident, and obvious, that 1 am amazed how it could have ‘efcaped his notice !=——My fenfes compel me, of ne- ceflity to be affured that I am the work of an invifible; ‘Almighty hand——that this incomprehenfible Being muft pervade all fpace, and fill the univerfe with his pre« fence, fince, without his prefence, ‘my heart muft ceafe its fun@ions, and all na- ture muft tunible into ruins. The Almigh- ty, of necefity, therefore, muft be 4 {pi- rit, and of courfe, smmateriagl———Dhis X= iftence, confequently, demonftrates to my * See page 20 of the Effays, conviction, { ay ) tonvidion, that—PERCEPTION AND THOUGHT BELONG TO IMMATE- RIALITY. Lethim thew me, as clearly, and indifputably, perception and thought in confeffed matter—and then I will allow that “he has = faid with truth that ~ %-fio. one can have any conception how “the principle of thought can have any “ ‘more relation to immateriality, than to ‘ materiality.” I have demonftrated the exiftence of thought,’ in immateriality—it temiains with him to thew mesa’ thinking Shone, or a thinking clod of earth——and then, Iwill allow that his argument ‘is philofo+ phical. I confefs that’ nothing appears to me more truly ridiculous than that would be Philofophy; which refufes its affent to eftablithed opinions, merely becaufe it 1s impoffible to account for every circumflance on which they were formed.” If an efta- blithed opinion be nsr only ABOVE my underftanding, but likewife' repugnant to “it=—I will difeard it without ceremony but in any other cafe, I ‘deem it the very height of prefumption and folly. I can conceive, that beings, whofe capacities C are ( 18) are much [uperior to ours, might, in {ome degree, be pardonable, if, prefuming on their extenfive knowledge, they difcarded all opinions which they could not de- monftrate to be mathematically juft—Dbut that - dim-fighted creatures, as we ares thould argue with fuch prefumption== raifes - my aftonithment, and compaf- ion !|—But, what 1s till more fur= prizing, is, when we find the very men, who, but the moment before, refufed their affent to the eftablifhed opi- nions in queftion—in the next, endea~ vouring to eftablifh their own favourite opinions in their. place—=zhough they are ‘as incapable of being Supported by mathema- tical proof, as the opinions which they re- jetted, for want of fuch demonfiration Je ~". Becaufe it ‘is impofiible to demonftrate how {pirit ats on matter, Dr. Prieftley’s philofophy, it feems, obliges him to deny that our thinking principle is immaterial } Have we not, at leaft as good a right, therefore, to expeét that be fhould clearly demonftrate - to us, what manner our brains think 2——1 fancy he will allow that fuch a demonftration cannot be genes ( 19 ) and yet, without the leaft difficulty, he brings himfelf to believe, moft implicitly, that ¢ his mind is no more in his body ¢¢ than it is in the moon,” though he can- not {hew us, where, and by what, our ideas are aflociated ——or, what it is which forms the refolution of beginning to think! Reflecting on the immateriality of #4e eternal mind, furely affords us demonftra- tion every inftant of our lives, that fpirit can, and does, act on matter. Was it not rennin ———_ x an an immaterial power which fathioned us in the womb ? Do not this earth, thefe pla- nets, the whole univerfe! derive their origin from his power? Did he not def- cribe the various circles round our fun, in which the planets were to fly—and is it not his power which {till confines them to their orbits >And having thus found demonftration that {pirit can act on matter, will any man fay that any reafoning can deferve the name of philfophy, which teaches us to doubt fo plain a truth fr— By DARL “hon yA N . WN oi al Why, by “nalogy of reafoning, may we + &% (ini not conclude, that fince the material world was made, and is ftill aCtuated, by a {pirit, our natural bodies are likewife actuated 0 2 by ( 20) by immaterial {pirits > Can Dr. Pricftley poflibly fay, that there is any thing more unphilofophical in making a conclufion, which is fo very naturally drawn by our reafon, than in taking it for granted, with him, that our brains think ? He can as little account for the manner in which the Deity operates on the material world, as that in which our {pirits a on our bodies, "and are a&ed on by ‘them there- fore——if he means to be confiftent— fince he cannot demonttrate how the Deity Jfafbioned bim in the womb, he fhould doubt his being the work of his hand. Obferve into what a labyrinth the publication of “his difbelief has led him ! He is re- ‘duced to the dilemma of admitting the “truth of one or other of thefe following propofitions—and muft acknowledge, either that be finds caufe to doubt his having been formed by an. immaterial fpirit—or—that, without having found caufe to doubt the ex- _ iftence of an immaterial {pirit within his ‘breaft, he has declared himfelf of one “¢¢ uniform compofition not compofed ¢¢ of matter and fpirit, and that the pro- s¢ perty of perception, as well as the other ¢¢ powers C28). “ powers that are termed mental, are the « refult of fuch an erganical ftructure as ¢ that of the brain!"——Therefore he may take his choice—for every argument | that can fupport a doubt of he latter, will plead equally ftrong in fupport of a doubt of the former.— And even fuppofing it otherwife, and that we had oz fuch {trong proof by ana- logy, of our having immaterial {pirits— fhould not the confideration that all nature is beyond our refearches—(the whole world (a myftery paft our underftanding!) have been fufficient to prevent Dr. Prieftley’s thinking it ftrange that we cannot account for the operations of our minds, or the manner of the union between our fouls and bodies ? Are we to deny our full conviction of the truth, that a good ripe peach is fweet, becaufe we cannot demon- ftrate the precife manner, in which what appears an hard, taftelefs confiftence, in its firft fate, acquires afterwards fo much. juice and flavour ? And yet I defy any philofopher upon earth to demonftrate bow the autumnal fun conveys fuch {weetnefs —or bow, and why, the variety in the C3 conftructure ( 22) conftru&ure of the fibres of the different kinds of wood, fhould occafion fuch 2 variety of flavours, and appearances, in the different fruits which are nourifhed by the fame earth, and warmed by the fame fun !——We know that fuch is the fact— and we (who generally find ourfelves right when we believe our fenfes) never dream of doubting its truth though perhaps, it is only becaufe, hitherto, no great phi- lofopher has queftioned it——Dbut I fhall ‘now daily expe to hear it queftioned—— and when it happens, I fhall not be fo much furprized, as I was when Mr, _ Seton’s advertifement ftruck my eye, and informed me that Dr, Prieftley believed his mind as much in the moon, 2s in his body !—— So very furprizing, and inconceiveable does it appear to me, that mere matter can be fuppofed capable of thought, and voluntary motion, that I muft declare I cannot conceive how any living creature can be entirely material, I believe that the Creator has infufed an immaterial intelli= gence into every work of ‘his hand, which lives on the earth, in the air, or in the waters, (; 23 ) waters. They have all their natural in- ftin&s—which inftinés(with the great,and the good Mr. Addifon) I confider as the ef- fects of an immediate impreffion from the Deity. I conclude thofe impreflions to be living principles diftin& from matter. * * | have been often greatly entertained by taking. flies out of water—and obferving all their endeavours to relieve themfelves from their diftrefs. At firft— whilft quite wet—they content themfelves with only crawling—and trailing their wings, which have clung clofe to the body—till, by proceeding fome way, a good deal of the water has been left behind in their track. The little animal, (having ftood fill feveral times, as if to confider whether he was yet free enough to hope for fuccefs from his attempts) then crouches down clofe to the ground, and moves a little forward, in order to wipe his belly——this he repeats feveral times. He then ftands ftill—and raifing himfelf on his legs, twifts his two fore legs acrofs each other, frequently putting them over his head, and round his neck, and conftantly afterwards rubbing his legs againft each other, to remove the wet which they had wiped from the head, &c. He next does the fame with his two hind legs—and with them he wipes his wings on both fides—and having at laft {fucceeded in getting them loofe from his body, he thakes them, and wipes them with his legs,—again walks on—every now and then prefling his belly to the ground, and cleaning himfelf with his fore feet, and his hind, alternately— C 41702 Even ( 22 ) Even a mufcle, an oifter (among the leaft animated of living creatures) whilft lying dry on the fea hore, when the tide is at its loweft ebb, open their thells—their living principles (call them what you pleafe—any thing but matter) inform them that the tide ‘is juft going to return—and they open their fhells, in order to be ready to receive their nourithment. I will not infift on the caufe of their operations— but I fhall find no fault with any man for raifing them as high as he pleafes—I only cenfure thofe who wifh to depreciate man, All I mean to be underftood as maintain- ing, is, that mere matter is incapable of thought, and voluntary motion—and that therefore, every living creature which can move at pleafure, and gives demonftration of apprehending injury, by turning afide out of the way of danger—acts by a living principle diftin& from matter, I know —till finding himfelf fufficiently dry, he flies away. The greateft philofopher could not poflibly take more effeGtual methods to clean and dry himfelf; and per- ceiving fuch evident proofs of thought, even ina fy, 1 conclude it to have fomething in its compofition:~« @iltin@ from matter. ; 4 __ my { 25) I know that this opinion wAll be cons demned by many people, who have not reflected fufficiently on the fubjed, to dif- cover the great difference between the fitu- ation of the inferior orders of creatures, and that of man. Many imagine that to fuppofe the irrational creation to have {pi-- ritual principles, would be to fuppofe them as likely to live in future as we are—but in this idea they are greatly miftaken—for the difference of our fituations would be tri- fling, and inconfiderable indeed, if, (fetting revelation out of the queftion) we founded our hopes of a future life, on our having {pi- ritual principles of which they are deftitute. If I fhould be afked, therefore—{etting revelation entirely out of the queftion— why 1 difbelieve that the brutes are to live after death? I anfwer that I difbelieve their future exiftence, becaufe the higheft orders of brutes are evidently incapable of enjoying mental pleafures. They judge of our looks—remember paft injuries, or be- nefits—but can neither admire, contemplate, nor adore, No brute ever gave theleaft caufe for our imagining him capable of raifing his ideas above the objets of his grofs fenfes. ( 26 ) fenfes. ‘Their enjoyments are entirely ani=- mal (thame on thofe of our fpecies who in, this refpe fo nearly refemble them !)— and of courfe they are not fitted for a {pi- ritual exiftence, where there can be no mat- ter to afford them pleafure. ‘Incapable of .afmiring — contemplating —and praifing the works of God—and confequently zzca- pable of knowing, and adoring him, their minds are not formed for a fpiritual: and we are therefore com- ..exitence pelled to conclude that they find anni~ " hilation on death. Befides the attributes of the Deity do not require their future exiftence. They are incapable of moral good, or evil —and confequently cannet be objects. for rewards and punithments. Juftice and goodnefs demand no retribution where neither praife nor cenfure can be due. Our minds, on the contrary, muff have been created for the enjoyment of 1mmor= tality, becaufe our bigheft gratificatons are [pivitual. Happily freed from the incums brance | of matter, we may hope to fly throughout the univerfe, with minds en- larged, and rendered capable of examining I into {27 ) into the countlefs wonders of creation. With the univerfe laid open to our view— the hidden laws of matter—thofe wonder= ful fecrets of nature, which now excite our curiofity, explained to us by fupe- rior intelligences, we muft have endlefs fubje@ for contemplation, and admira- tion and of courfe, an endlefs fource of praife, love, gratitude, and joy.: With ideas thus exalted—capacities thus improved—and our knowledge of God, and his works, encreafing through a feries of millions of ages without end—— what rapture muft we feel whilt we adore! ~ Brutes are not fitted for fuch enjoy- ments. Their pleafures, are all fenfual. Their calamities, arrive unexpeted, and overwhelm them, unfeared. My dog would lick my hand, whilft it pointed a knife at his heart. Troubled by no cares— fubje& to no forrows—diftrefled by no af- fliGions—nhe is happy in ."e prefent grati- fications of his fenfes.. He looks not for= ward beyond the prefent moment—but, unimbittered, drinks his cup—filled up to the brim. - The pointer which had for years (25 ) years been his companion in the field, dies unlamented—the mother of his offspring , too, is fent for ever from him—and he is not diftrefled at her lofs, Brutes there- fore, muft be extinct at death and—for thefe very reafons—man muft live for ever— or——(twith reverence I fay it) his Maker has been lavith of his beft gifts, in vain— has given him mental powers, only to render life wretched and raifed him above the brutes, only to make that eleva- tion painful—and lead him to envy them their fenfual pleafures, zever followed by remorfe—their infenfibility of paft fuffer- ings, and inapprehenfion of future misfor- tunes. But this cannot pofiibly be the cafe, becaufe fuch a diftribution of the facul- ties and abilities which we poflefs, demands of goodnefs and mercy—and feems to re= quire of juftice, that they fhould be pro- du&ive of happinefs, and not the caufe of pain. It isimpofiible that minds, capable of admiring the creation, and of adoring its author, could have ever been intended for annihilation, | The miferies, too, endured by good men, and the apparent benefits enjoyed by villains, ( 29 ) villains, indifputably demand a retribution, Somewhere. The weak fight of man, can- not perceive it, bere—we therefore expelt it in a future life. ii "But it may be afked, is it not poflible that there may be a retribution on earth, though we cannot perceive it? It may be {aid that, we, it is true, fec many whom awe think virtuous, humane, benevolent— firiiggling under the calamities of life— deprived of health, or fortune—or wound- ed by the lofs of their moft loved re- latives—but that, if properly borne, thefe feeming evils are productive of piety, re- fignation, and peace—and that the pleafing feelings which confequently are infufed into theif minds, more than counterba- lance their diftrefles. Or, it may be afked, may not thofe good actions, “and thofe appearances, for which wwe have given them fuch credit, have fprung from motives, which render their fituations in life, fully adequate to their deferts ?——That we fee the vicious, the unjuft, the ‘unmerciful—-in health, pro- fperity, and power—blefled in their for- tunes, and in their families=——but may not their { 30} their inward feelings, dearly. counterbaa lance their outward enjoyments?—Or, may fot thofe crimes which we know them to have committed, have been more the confequence of error, than bad inten= tion ? Or may not the fituations of the offenders, in a great meafure extenuate their offences—and fome private acts, lau dably intended, counterballance the crimes with which they have been publickly charged ? I anfwer, that we cannot poffibly fup- pofe but that great villains frequently efcape thofe punithments which they have deferved—and that the vicious, the frau- dulent, and the voluptuous, enjoy the good things of life, in cafe and affluence. Re- peated crimes blunt the flings of confci~ ence—and no longer awake to thofe feel- ings which punifh better men for their offences—and even good men for their ca- {ual relapfes—the wicked certainly remain at eafe amidft gratifications, the recollection of which would leave a deep wound in the ‘breaft of a lefs hardy offender. And though we may be frequently miftaken in our opinion of thofe whom we think virtuous, having { 31 ) having perhaps imagined fpecious appear« arices, reallities———yet charity demands our belief that the virtuous are often op- prefled, and drag on a wretched life. For, let the inward comforts infufed into their minds, be ever fo great, yet thofe comforts can not {top the tear of anguifh, on {ee~ ing darling infants, and their loved parent, in want of bread. If death were finally to clofe our exiftence, I cannot fee how the attributes we afcribe to the Deity, can be juftified—for if thefe afflictions, were not intended to awaken us from evil courfes —try our fortitude—give birth to refigna- tion—fhew us the vanity of life; and the infufficiency of earthly enjoyments to con- vey fatisfaCtory happinefs,—or that zbeir wants and diftrefles may ferve to awaken the virtues of others, by affording objects for their compaflion I really cannot fee that either goodnefs or mercy could be dif- coverable, in the government of the world. Put rials out of the queftion, and how could the miferies of the. virtuous, be fuffered by Infinite Goodnefs ? And how could thofe miferies be called trials ~—or what end could Infinite Goodnefs pofiibly C32) poffibly - intend they fhould ferve, if this life ‘were to clofé: pur exiftence? Why torture; needlesly, a fet of poor infignifi~ cant awretehes of an hour, with mifeties, which were never to produce any future benefit? Virtuous mifery, is; therefore, “incompatible. with our notionis'of a good, merciful God==and ‘confequently, our be~ lief in fuck 2 God, compels us likewifc ta believe in a future fate. To ‘expect anni hilation on death, is, of courfe, to be’ an Atheiff—for 1 think it 1s impoffible to dotibt a life beyond the grave, and yet bea lieve in fuch a God, as we worfbip. Even the pleafure that we feel from felf- approbation, and the pains with which we are tormented, when condemned by our minds, in my opinion, clearly demonttrate that we are to be accountable in a fature life. ‘Our fenfe of right and wrong, proves that we are immortal—for we cannot {fup- pofe that thie Almighty would have wanton* ly tortured us with the {tings of confcience, any more ‘than ‘he thas, the beafts of the field, if we, like them, were to perifh. If ‘we ‘had" beer ‘defigned, ‘merely to ani- mate thls grofs bodies—with an exiftence bounded Cis: ) bounded by the life of ‘man, his goodnefs would never have imbittered the fweets,: that are within the reach of the beings. of a day—like the brutes, we thould - have. been permitted to tafte every pleafure, uns: alloyed: by any fenfe of guilt. A thirft, for knowledge, which can never. be gra=, tified, would not have been implanted 3 a. mind which was tobe chained to earth; would never have been bent on the {kies.. The Almighty=—who does nothipg in. vain—would never have given, us abalitics, to comprehend the order of our {yftem—= and. amidft the meridian blaze, difcover. the planets in their career, if we were, the. animals of a century, only born to be—— infenfible. - Why, fhould fuch. miferable. reptiles, have been turned afide from. the dull paths of life, and the fenfual pleafures of the brute—to contemplate heavens—. on which their eyes are fo {oon to be for ever clofed ? It. is impoflible to reflect on. oui abilities and propenfities, and yet doubt our being defigned for immortality. Do we fee any of the creatures, inha- biting earth—air—or water-—pofiefied of gifts that are ufelefs }—Are they ‘not all, D : with (€ 34) ) Jives they ‘were to lead dmemSight | would be an incumbranee to the mele—we theve- fore find him blind !==«Volumes might ‘be filed “with. inftances; to ‘prove that though’ the- beneficent ‘parent « of thie: afi verfe has ‘been profufe of This!gifts, | where they were neceffary— he has never thrown them ‘away, by lavithing them, whete'they - ight be with-held without inconvenience _ ¢o-his creattire: By analogy-of reafonifig, therefore; “we may’ with: certainty con ‘clade; that ithe powers; and the bents of our - minds, | prove “imconteltably their ‘immbor- talitysiies sad FEET EHY enim | a3 Beyond: all difpute, the Almighty would pot have been-lefs kind to ‘us; than-he has been to -the brutes—for £beir time is not throws away in ufelefs. refcarches—for tiem would ours; if the defire of knowledge had not-been-excited-in-us, ‘in order torfit, + anid prepare is for theenjoymentofamexift- i poffible‘to convince me that'T an: “motiith« 31 mortal, <1 fhould, ‘frony’ that moment; en- - ndeavour; alkitiimy power, to avoid locking shpinto the hieavens—in ‘order that Tmig . ({ +38) diotobe tantaliged with the view of - worles, Uiwhich'I am-nevér to be permitted to ex- -plote. 7k thould: carefully fhun every - rationab-intercourfe ‘that could ténd to ex- salt my ideas above the brute, which I _ifhould zhen be coitipelled to confider as my riequal==and: who mift confequently be “viewed by me; with envy. srk voi Iohope Ithave fhewn,: fatisfaCtorily; that ‘ai#binking Deft, in whofe: perfon ‘I have thus far argued, has grounds :to- expeét a future fate, in! confequence of his belief «in ‘an infinitely: good, méreiful, wife, juft, ‘almighty power. “Let Dr.-Prieftley fucceed in convincing that Deift, that no immaterial principle of : fife dwells within him, and the ‘Doctor it orice effeGually cutshim off from ‘cevery-hope that he had entertained, on the firength of thofe arguments which I have ~airged==his whole. hope being founded upon ‘the: belief, that be bad an immortal mind, which could not die. Let Dr. Prieftley talk: to ~ >+him of the promife of a refurtetion from - therdead; and: he: will {mile at himfr be difbelieves the firipture which-contains it. If - he! has been made a convert to the opinions ‘which Dr. Prieftley has advanced in his In- D 2 troductery t 36 ) woduory Effays, he in vain attempts to comfort him—for he can derive no ‘comfort but from a proper view of the fallacy. of; his arguments, and a detection of the {and, on which his foundation is: eftablifhed. If he entertained a former. juft fenfe of the dignity of his fituation in the: fcale of beings, with what an agony of forrow mufk he lament his degradation to a level with the brutes! He will inform Dr. Prieftley, - that fince be Jinds be bas NO SOUL ta be immortal, he is compelled to.-bid a final adieu to every expectation of a life beyond the grave, becaufe he knows that his body is not immortal—and that corruption can be its only inheritance |-——With ‘grief of heart he feels affured on: Dr: Prieftley’s agthority——(on the facred authority of a clergyman—of a man, whole profefion it is, to inftrué !) that his ¢¢ whole man ¢ is of fome uniform compofition, and <¢ that the property of perception; as well #¢ as the other powers that ;are. termed « mental, are the refult of fuch an organi- « cal ftruture as: that of the brain” *=—e ¥ See the XXth page of Dr. Prieftley’s ELivs. and { 37) and in this melancholy—this ‘mortifying convi@ion—he i is neceffitated to join iffue with Rim, by admitting, that ¢¢ confe- ¢¢’ quently the whole man becomes extiné ct at death!” From that moment, all his hopes of immortality mufl be at an end !—Deprefled by the misfortunes of life, he can no more derive comfort from looking forward to a future exiftence—but muft, like the beafts which perith, expe& annihilation on death !|-——He cannot be ftupidly vain enough to imagine, that if his thinking principle is to be totally ex- tinguithed at death—rzbe fame as if it bad never been the Almighty will favour him with a NEW CREATION, g/f¢er having thought proper toannibilate the OLD! — Every argument by which he had flat- tered himfelf into a fond hope of a future life, is rendered vain and delufive by the belief in the extinction of bis exiftence for if they were infufficient motives, in the breaft of infinite goodnefs, to induce the Deity to con- tinue bim in being---they muft confequently be infufficient motives Zo occafion bis new Dg. creation ‘ ~ X73 g FON ati tS L0G | SB Battreites epeation=-=for the Almighty would not have formed him entirely material, (by . infufing | into him #p [fpiratual effence. to Jurvive cor=_ - * ruption) if he had intended ‘to blefs hit ~ in future, with abilities fo contemplate, ad- mire, and adore his perfection. I have hitherto only pointed out the pernicious confequences which Dr. Prieft-- ley’s Effays muft produce-on every Desf who may he fwayed by them---and 1 Believe that every good man who refiefts ary the preceding and following pages, will join with me in afferting, that even al- though he had the moft convincing is dences of the truth of ‘his dodtrine, faf- ficient to amount to mathematical demofis ftration, yet a mere regard for the happinefs of ‘mankind, 'fhould have Wwith-held his pen---fince he could not pofiibly make cofi- verts fo his creed, without depriving then of thofe hopes, nd fetting then at liberty from thofe fears, which have excited them to virtue, and deterred them from vice.'~ "Before [ ‘examine Dr. Prieftley’s argus ments ih favour of his Creed---let me try ‘what effec, 2 belief in the non-exiftence of ? TR an ( 39 ) duce on an unprejudiced wind, which had hitherto believed in fcriptare. “We have feen that it- would entirely. «deprive the Deift of every hope or fear of futurity——- wo {hall find that it would have as bad an effc@ on the mind of # thinking chriftian. no PART II The: Dottrine of Matersalfm, inconfiffent iw with Scripture. ods ~g HERE is a rule which fhould be A invariably adhered to, in the un- derftanding of fcripture. We thould ne- ver prefume to ftray from the exprefs, ob- vious, literal meaning—unkfs where we find that the letter; is incompatible with any of the known attributes of God——or abfolutely contradi&ory to, and inconfiftent with, that reafon which ‘he has given us to be our. guide. + In every other cafe, we are bound ftrictly to adhere to the words of the text——but where the meaning evi- dently. derogates from either his goodnefs, fs D4 mercy, ( 40.) mercy, orjuftice, we are compelled to make the tenour. of ‘feripture, ‘fefve as ‘a kéy'to decypher whatever texts: appear ‘incorfi- patible ‘with bis attributes=or with ‘our reafon. 193 T30annw. “No man can fay that it is inconfiftent with the ‘goodnefs, mercy, juftice, ' or wifdom of God, that he thould have in- fufed an xtherial {park of life into man, which is to furvive corruption, if, ‘therefore, 1 find evident diftin&ions made in’ feripture, between our fouls and bodies; I will not allow of their exprefs, and moft obvious meaning being explained away? 1 will read; and underftand them, literally— becaufe fo far from placing the Deity in an unamiable point of view, they render him jultly an: obje& for our moft unbounded love, gratitude, efteem, reverence, and sdoration——and whatever places him in fuch:a light, muft be as agreeable to our reafon, as it is -confiftent with his attri bates. ; wy -» We find in fcripture, that death is de= fcribed by fleep—which thews us, that it was not intended: we fhould confide death as the. extinétion of our. exiftence=but only as C a ) a6 -a {hott fate-of inaction, ior kind of ins fenfibility, (during which we fill exift) be- tween our clofing our eyes upon this world, and our opening them upon that exiftenee, | which is to be eternal. Thus in the ele- venth chapter of John, we read that ¢¢ thefe things faid he: (Chrift) and «s after that he faith unto them, our friend « Lazarus fleepeth ; but 1 go that I may « gqwake him, out of fleep.” Even his very Difciples were deceived by: his manner of exprefling \. himfelf—for—<¢- then faid ¢¢-his Difciples, Lord, if he Jeep, he {hall ¢ do well, - Howbeit Jefus {pake of his ¢¢ death: but they thought that he had «s, fpoken of: taking reft in fleep. Then faid «¢, Jefus unto fhem, plainly, Lazarus is ¢s dead,” In the 7th chapter of the Ads, we read, to the fame effet——*¢ and they ef ftoned: Stephen, calling upen God, and « faying, Lord Jefus receive my Spirit. «¢ And he kneeled down, and cried « with a loud voice, lay not this fin to « their charge. | And he fell aflecp. Ma- « thew—chapter 27th, -and the graves «¢ were opened ; and many bodies of the « faints which fept, arofe.” 1 could in= a {tance («42 ) riiarier of exprefiion-vbut-hie: above are He ferigtards Nikewie always take fim cviliefit ‘difin@ion betwen dur oulss(or livitrg principles) End our boliesyseniiand- this mf Have been intended, tb itwdul- cate an iden of vue wot being ofa << aiHtifori compofition’—but confifting ‘of two’ principles—u foul, ‘or living princi-. ple; dmmaterial—sand a body material. Thus, ia the 34th chapter of Ecclefiafticus; we tead, that *¢ the ypirit of ‘thofé (that ¢¢ fear'the Lord, thall live, for their hope! ¢t is in hit ‘that faveth them. « Blefled is - « the foul of him ‘that feareth the Lord; - «« He raifeth up the foul, &c.” Is not this, plinly -intimating, that we have an imma~ terial principle, which furvives the body:? Out Saviour emphatically enforces this do&rine. 1n the 1oth chapter.of Mathew, he svarns us—S-and fear mot, them ‘which! cecil the Body; bit are not able to kill the; coon + but rather fear him; which is, «able to deftroy BOTH fout-and. body, in- cvshell”, This text furely is too, fireny to'neéda comment. If it does not inform. 3 : us, Wey SOIR : FLT iA (‘43:) wis; that we ave zw diflinét principles; © 1 cannébt peadis—sdfor. the word * burh,” cannot be applied tO the fingular humber; Inirthe 6th chapter; our Saviour afks 3 queftion which firengthéns my argument zak what is a tan ‘profited if he {hall guin the whole world; and lofe his own sou) Or what thall a man give in ex= scichanpe Forhis foul 2” In other words— of what confequence is it to us, if we fhould; by fraud, or any finfal means, fucceed in Obtaining the utmoft of = oir withes-=—=every htirhan advantage that the world can afford us, if we barter, in retutn, the future welfare of the immate- rial principle, which thinks, ‘and ads, within us? Thus ¢¢ whoever will fave his «hfe, fhall lofe it; but whofoever thall ««'Bafe his fe, for my fake, and the Gofpel’s, ¢c:the Taine hall fave it,” + © | Fetus Chrift inculcates in that text, that the exiftence’ of ‘this lump of ‘earth we ~ how animate, ‘does not deferve the name of life=—for, that by faving the life we now efijoy—=(by ‘any improper means, incof- fiftent ‘with true’ religion) we, in fact lofe our kife of Bappinefs in future, which 18 (24) = is:the ‘only, 6bjet worth our 'purfuit: Te “afferss that we furvive the grave. “We are to'love God: «© with all the bears, and with wall the wunderfanding, and with all’ ‘the « foul, and with all" the Srreng th’ wm— and here, evidently, the heart, underftand- ‘ing, foul, and ftrength, ‘are afl intended + figuratively to fignify ‘the thinking principle —to inform us, that mere profeflions’ of love——and outward als of devotion, have no effe& with God—— that he difregards the dody——words, (the expreflions made by the body,) he will not attend to, un= lefs the living principle within, is fervently raifed to him, faserely aarrfpomding with thafe words. : ‘Lukey claptet 8th, oid he” (Jefias Chrift) ¢ put them all out, and took; her ¢¢ by the hand, ‘and called, {aying, maid, 6. aie And ber fpirit CAME AGAIN, juftice, ( 63) “Jaftice, and ‘our ‘belief in fcripture, pro- vided it be granted that we ‘aré now uni- “formly ‘and “entirely material,—and that whether ‘we determine bythe common fenfe of man," or by the declarations of 'CHfift, we are equally affured that unlefs we have now permanent immaterial princi~ ‘ples of life, ‘we fhall never exift in another ftate. Let us try whether the idea of our being deftitute of immaterial fpirits, otight not to lead every man who is of that ‘opinion, fo deny the jufiice of any punifbments after a certain term of years, EVEN HERE—and to demand a total change in our body of criminal laws. For, 1191f we are entirely material, no man can with juflice be executed, fora murder that was committed twenty years ago. I might trike off half that time, and fay, ten years, ~ nay, | believe I might fafely fay feven years —fince it is computed, that in that time, every man undergoes an entire change of body. If there be no permanent principle exifting in man, to conftitute his identity “Liwe cannot be the very fame men, new, which we ‘were, at that period of time (whenever it was) when we were compofed of {( 64 ) of different particles of matter, This is felfe evident——it is undeniable. Anatomifts demonttrate, by experiments made on animals, after they had been for longer, and fhorter portions of time fed. with madder—that even our very bones are continually chan ging—fome parts con= ftantly reducing into lymph, and going off through the lymphatic veflels, into the blood—from whence they either affift in. recruiting other parts of the body, or go off in fome of the various fecretions which are every moment carrying on in the feve~ sal parts of the body. The blood is per petually changing——conflantly receiving recruits from the lymphatic, and laeal veflels— (the former conveying the juices which have been melted down, and im- bibed by their very fine mouths—and the latter the nutriment from our food) and as conftantly going off in large quantities by infenfible perfpiration—as well as by emp- tying itfelf into the liver, kidnies, &c, and glands—where it is changed into bile, urine, &c. while other portions of the blood are replacing thofe parts of the body, which require to be recruited. In youth— and ( 6s ) and until we are arrived at_our prime— the’ técrit, exceeds ‘the wate: :—they ¢ con-. tinue then equal, till we begin. to defcend the Hit ind. then the wafte, exceeds, the réctutt, i in the fame proportion that the Itter had once exceeded the former. Thus the ‘bones of young people,’ are. more folid than thofe of old—and their mufcles more firm and compact. The medullary fub- ftance of the brain, as well as the other parts of the. body, is perpetually changing —to that if, (as Dr. Pricftley believes, ) we are of an « uniform compofition”— and have 70 ‘immaterial part—it muft de- monftrably follow, that our identity cannat continue many yeors—and that Iam not— and cannot be, the fame man now, I was twenty years ago—for I moft indifputably have not now in my material compofition, a J ngle moft minute particle or drop of the Jame juice, which I bad in my body at that time,— and therefore; if I had committed a murder twenty years ago, I could not; July be tried for it, morw—fince the body which did the crime, is now fcattered over the face of the earth; and is as incapable of being punifhed, if found, as it 1s im- F poffible (66) poffible to find it. Surely.every man pif therefore fee the injuftice: of eves temparal. punifhments after a pertam térmiof yearsy on the admiffion of Dr. Prieftley’s ftrangely! unaccountable doérine—fince: it excludes the only principle which can pofiibly conftis tute our identity—becaufe our immatersal principle is the only part of us, which can poffibly be permanent. We are all of us cer- tain of our identity—we know, and are: convinced of our being the fame people! now, we were in youth—and confequently as we are. as certain that we cannot hdve the very fame bodies now, which werhad: then, we have demonftration that we muft have immaterial {pirits,; «which remain, and conftitute our identity, -notwithftand- ing the continual changes daily, and hourly making in our bodies :=———we are otherwife certain, that fo far from its being pofible that a future retribution can -be made, confiftent with juftice—it will not admit of punithments being inflicted for crimes, even in this life—if they have been committed. from: feven, to any numben of yeats before, 10 re BE ESF EL But (67) JiButthefe are'not the only abfurd confe- quences that attend the very rational doc- trine of the Materialifts. If, as Dr. Prieft- ley faysy it isthe apparent: material body, which thinks; wills; “defires, hopes, fears, loves, = hates, grieves, rejoices either every part of the .organical body is em= ployed in thefe operations, and has its hare of the power of underflanding, or—it is fome particular part, oriparts, whichis, or are, honoured with ‘the exclufive enjoyment of thefe high powers. It. follows, ‘that, wif the powers of thinking, &c. belong torthe ‘whole ‘perfon, in the grofs—every bone and cartilage—every mufcle—every fibresiof every mufcle—the heart, lungs, liver; &ce &c.. &c. claims, and merits, cach, its particular fhare in the perceiving and thinking faculty. © Now=—if this be the cafe, a man muft lofe part of his thinking principle, on lofing a' leg—but if he thould happen to lofe both his'legs—and, perhaps, an arm befides— ot both—he ought to lofe half, if not more than halfiof his thinking principle—for he certainly will then have loft near half of his material frame! If he was a fenfible F 2 man, (68 1) man; prior to; his amputation==he {hould confiftently: afterwards not: be ‘above. half as fenfible 1—In this: cafe: people’ thould be cautious how they pared their inails, or cut their hair-—left they loft, with their “hair and nails, part of their reafon ! If Dr. Prieftley thould reply that this « does not affect his'doétrine, for he does «¢ not fuppofe that every part of the body, « has a fhare in the thinking principle— ~¢¢ this is an exclufive privilege which: he « affigns to the medullary fubftance of «¢ the brain” ——=yet this will not alter the cafe, or in the leaft ‘prevent the abfurd confequences above frated—for the {uppo- fition that the powers of thinking, &c. ‘belong folely to the medullary fubftance, forces us to conclude that thofe who lofe part of their brain, lofe fo much of their under ffanding——and the contrary of this, we know to be the matter of falt—=—-for, ‘to my certain knowledge, an officer had a piece ‘of ‘his fkull, of above two. inches long, and one broad, ‘cut out of his head, “by a ftroke of a broad fword, at the battle of Prefton Pans, in the year 174 s—(which piece of the fkull hung by a bit of {kin— 1 and ( 69 ) and the officer carried it for years, in his purfe) and it was a truth publickly known, that a very large quantity of the brain came out at the wound—-infomuch that his re- covery greatly furprized every one who had heard of his fituation ; for all the {urgeons had declared they thought him pait hope——yet he regained his perfect health * —-was as fenfible as ever——and his friends never had any caufe to think that his #z- derftanding was in the leaft impaired—or, (to {peak in the language of a Materialift) ‘e—decreafed in the leaft in its fze ! though he loft fo very large a quantity of that ¢ mafs of matter,” which Dr. Prieftley ¢¢. thinks we may by this time be prepared “¢ to admit” may pofiibly have ¢¢ been ¢¢ formed by the Almighty Creator, with ¢¢ {uch exquifite powers with refpect to ¢¢ vibrations, as thould be {ufficient for all ¢¢ the purpofes abovementioned 1+; and the “¢ purpofes’ alluded to, (as abovemen- tioned) were no lefs than the purpofes per- formed by what we term the fou for, * Owing, under God, to the care, and great fkill of his furgeon, a Mr. Trotter, whois now dead. t+ See page 18 of the Effays. 3 “ vibrations EE EL | ] 1 TH | i B81 4h t i i % bi 1H i i i i i A 4 i al a i 1 i i bi Xn wi 1 ik i a teach sae te a TE — nso (70) Ee ¢ vibrations ‘in the brain,” ‘Dt. Priéttley fags, ¢ it will be feen; ‘account fot all the « phoioména of the binian mind and Whit f (€¢ we ufually call 1ts different operations, «« with refpeét to fenfations, and ideas of « every kind *.” According to’ this doc- trine, fince the officer loft fucha quantity “of the mafs of matter, which was formed “with fuch exquifite powers, as to be enabled to perform all the offices of the foul, he ought to have loft, jut as much of that mind, which we term the foul, as be bff “of bis brain—but this did nor happen,’ for his foul was as large as before the battle! But if the medullary fubftance, be the alone bhinking principle, it fill will not prevent “the ridiculous confequences which I'have lately mentioned, “as attending the ampu- tation of limbs, &c. For The nerves will in’ this cafe, have an undoubted right to 2 Share in the thinking principle, for they all contain a medullary fubftance, and all originally proceed from ‘the brain. I think theré are thirty pair of nerves—ten of which, go immediately * Sec page 17 of the Effays. from ({ Zt) from the brain—and the other t wenty from the fpinal marrow—but as the fpinal mar- row is a kind of continuation of the brain —the nerves that, proceed from the {pine, may be faid to proceed from the brain. ‘Mark the confequence. Having proved that if the brain thinks, the medullary fubfiance of the nerves (which proceed from the thinking brain) have a right fo- think, lkewife - - - - and certain, as we are, that thefe fame thinking nerves are {pread over the whole body, and throughout every part of every limb, it follows, that whenever a limbis amputated, a large portion of the thinking nerves muft be cut off with it—and that therefore, when a man happens to lofe both his legs, he fhould lofe z third part of his mind |———The idea is too ridicu- lous to be credited out of bedlam ! / F 4 PART {' sax Examination of Dr. Pricfiley's Arguments in Support of his difbelicf in the Immateriality : of Man °« on r AVING not only found fuch very H ridiculous confequences attend the idea of our having nothing immaterial in our compofition,—but that likewife it de- prives us of every hope of a future ftate, that can be derived either from revelation, or the light of nature—I propofe next to examine the principal arguments which Dr. Prieftley has urged in his Introductory Effays, by way of fupporting his opinion that his mind is as much in the moon as in his body. Its to be concluded that a man of his characer—profeflion—&ec. would certainly have deemed it neceflary, and proper, to give the world the beft rea- fons in his power, in fupport of fo very extraordinary an affertion, after having publifhed it {o freely—and_ confequently, if nothing which can be termed fatisfac- a tory Ee per SRS TR (73) tory argument, can be found in fupport of his opinion, (either confidering His ar- guments fingly or in one view) which can afford the ‘fhadow of proof that it was formed on good grounds— we may fairly" take for granted that fuch proof was, and is, beyond his reach—and that his opinion was formed, without any conviction which could have been produced by found argu- ment. : pig But before I enter on this examination, I cannot avoid making a few remarks on Dr. Prieftley’s publication—and taking {ome notice of the reafon he has affigned for giving us Dr. Hartley's work, thus abridged — newly modified—and ufthered into the world, by Introdutory Effays of his own compofition. He fays, in the beginning of his preface, that ¢¢ it has long been the opinion of all «¢ the admirers of Dr. Hartley among his «acquaintance, as well as his own, that ¢« Dr. Hartley’s Obfervations on. Man ¢¢ could not have failed to have been more «¢ generally read, and his Theory of the ¢« Human Mind to have prevailed, if it - <¢ had Eo — a e i & = d : $s, i bony > Be 2 Ly : Tg = a B so pp Eo _— at i EA = oe RRO ee a Ce == = ae a Fo (740), «¢ had: been made more intelligible ,: and ¢s if the work had not been: clogged with ¢s a whole fyftem of moral-and religious «c knowledge; which however excellent, « is, in a great meafure, foreign to it. -. «¢ Both thefe obftacles it:is” Dr. Prieft- ley's “¢ obje& in this publication to re- ¢¢ move, &c.” | OF Is not this informing us, in plain terms; that however excellent, in Dr. Prieftley’s opinion, Dr. Hartley’s whole fyftem: of moral and religious knowledge is,—yet, one. of the motives that induced him to undertake the work I now cenfure——was —to frike out that whole [yftem, in the lump! ~'= = = On Dr. Prieftley’s own authority, therefore, we have indifputable informa- tion—that he did zo# enter upon this work with a view, difpaflionately, and free from prejudice, fo inveffigate truth in order that, by new difcoveries of the glorious perfections of God, evidenced by: his works, we might be made wifer and better but that he entered upon it, witha partial defign to favour an bypot befis==—tbhe sbious confequences of which, be bad never confi chai REE K #5 )) confidered tis + + =< We muft charitably take for granted, at leaft; that 'he never confi dered ‘them—==for that is the only ex- cufe that can ‘be made for: his publica- tion. : | | 71 It is ‘curious enough, too, to obferve the method Dr. Prieftley adopted, in order to anfwer the declared end, which he fays he had in view. ' In order to have Dr. Hartley's obfervations on man, more ge- nerally read, and 44s Theory of the Hu- man Mind, prevail—he cuts off from his work, the only part of it which could have conveyed ufeful information, by omitting a whole fyftem of moral and religious knowledge, which, in Dr. Prieftley’s opi- nion ¢¢ clogged’ Dr. Hartley's work, al- though Dr. Prieftley confefles it is. ex- cellent—and not entirely, but only ¢ in “a great meafure, foreign to it.” One would have imagined that fuch a {yftem, foreign, or not foreign to the work, thould have been preferved with care by the hand of a clergyman—(efpecially fince inter- mixed with fuch dangerous matter asl fhall foon quote from Dr. Hartley's work) and deemed by him, at leaft, worthy of no- 6 fice, ld Le Sa a LSS - = STR en ST ( 76 ) tice; howevér ‘fuch knowledge’ may be difregarded by the bulk of ‘mankind. « But the truth, is, Dr. Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, Dr. Frieltley: con- feffes, ¢ fuppofes that there is an interme- . *¢ diate elementary body, between the mind « and the grofs body ; which may exift, and ¢¢ be the means of giving pleafure or pain « to the fentient principle after death— ~ « and. Dr. Prieftley wifhed, it feems, to « prevent his fcheme being burthened ~«¢ with fuch an incumbrance as’ this” —— fince it rather ftood a little in the way of thofe favourite doctrines, which he was fo defirous to eftablith, in order to turn our fouls adrift out of our bodies, and leave them to fhift for themfelves wherever they could find thelter ! Thus laudably incited, he fet about his work, to abridge, ‘and new-model Dr. Hartley's two volumes. Dr. Hartley be- lieved in our having an immaterial princi- ple, which furvives death———Dr. Prieftley affirms, that we are all matter, and are to be extinct at death !——Dr. Hartley gives us a whole fyftem of moral and religious knowledge——which Dr. Prieftley ex- cludes { 7 ) chudessfrom his work s—=-and yet he pubr lithes in his, preface, as his; profefled mor tive for. his, publication, his. defire that Dr. Hartley's obfervations may be gener- ally. read, and is Theory prevail— to effect. which—- Dr. Prieftley introduces Dr. Hartley's new-modgled work, with effays. which contradict his opinions—and to eftablith. Dr. Hartley's Theory, Dr. Prieftley recommends———=/bis own!!! I take for granted, that Dr. Hartley fore- Caw. the dreadful . confequences which at- tend the belief in our being entirely material —for be carefully exprefled himfelf in bis own work, in a manner, which thews how forry be would have been to have had it imagined that he could pofiibly clpoufe a do&rine, capable of leading us to conclude that we have no living principle diftinct from matter. In his 33d Page—Vol, I. he fays, » ¢¢ It may be proper to remark here, that <¢.I do not, by thus afcribing the perform- « ance of fenfations to vibrations excited < in the medullary fubftance, in the leaft ¢«« PRESUME #0 affert, OR INTIMATE, « THAT MATTER CAN BE ENDU- «<« ED ( 78 ) « BD WITH THE POWER of SENS. ¢« TION.” Dr. Hartley fawsit of fuch a dangerous tendency, ‘the’ fuppofition’ that’ MATTER could be CAPABLE" of PER- CEPTION, that ‘he would mot even «« PRESUME to intimate” fuch: a doc- trine, much lefs <* affere” it. Dr. Prieitley was not *¢ burthened’ with fuch’ feruples, —or—perhaps, we may charitably fuppofe, that he did not ftudy the f{ubjed, fo feri- ‘oufly as his author feems to have done-=~— and that his eye did not penetrate fo deep into the confequences of the doctrine, as Dr. Hartley's did. This is the only excufe that can be’ made’ for Dr. Prieftley. It is poflible however, that he will not chufe to have his condué&t’ excufed, in the manner which my friendly pen has attempted’ to apologize for his publication. Perhaps he would" rather have us believe, ‘that he took this flight, Sully apprized of the evils that might attend 7¢, than that he adventured, 'rafhly, with=' out any previous examination of ‘the con- foguences, $213 OF 1A ZHIVET sili “Tt appears by Dr. Hartley's ‘publication of his own work, that he really never en= tertained the leaft idea of our being entirely: compofed ( 79 ) cofnpofed “of ‘matter——fo far ‘from it— hé concludes 4¢ that vibrations are of a “¢..corporeals fenfations and ideas of a men- « sul ‘nature.’ | He adds, “if we fuppofe ¢¢, an infinitefimal’ elementary body, to be << intermediate between the SOUL, and ¢.grofs ‘body, wbich appears. to be NO «« IMPROBABLE SUPPOSITION, then <¢.the changes in our fenfations, ideas, and “ motions, may correfpond to the changes ¢«¢ made in the medullary fubftance, only «¢ as far as thefe correfpond to the changes ¢«¢ made in the elementary body.” ' Dr. Hartley's Theory, therefore, ftands free from: the objections I have made to Dr. Prieftley’s—fince, by Dr. Hartley's allowing that’ we have immaterial principles—the Chriftian, and the Deift, will be in no danger of being ¢¢ flaggered” in their ex- petation of a future fate but they cannot have faith in the publication which Dr. Prieftley has. given us of Dr. Hart- ley’s work, without inevitably commenc- ing Atheifts. . How far Dr. Prieftley is juftifiable in having taken fo great a liberty with, Dr, Hartley's work, I will not take upon me to) determine—but if authors rally have a right to force another's work bslogmio into ( So ) into the world, fo firangely altered from the fenfc in which the writer intended it fhould be underffood—it is to, be hoped, for the benefit of pofterity, that fome good man may new drefs Dr. Prieftley’s publication of Dr. Hartley and leave out the whole of the introductory Effays, in order that the Theory may ‘nat be ¢¢ burthened” with docrines, which are incompatible with religion, either natural, or revealed. : | : Let us now examine on what grounds Dr. Prieftley has contended for our being entirely material, He begins his firft Effay, by informing us, that ¢ fince all fenfations and ideas «¢ are conveyed to the mind by means of «¢ the external fenfes, or more properly by ¢¢ the nerves belonging to them, fenfations, ¢¢ 35 they exift in the brain, muft be {uch «¢ things as are capable of being tran{mit-~ « ted by the nerves; and fince the nerves «and the brain are of the fame fubftance, ¢¢ the affe@ion of a nerve during the tran{- « miffion of a fenfation, and the affection «¢ of the brain during the perceived pre- « fence of it, are probably the fame.” That : ( 81) i That all fenfations and ideas are .cofis veyed to: us .by means ‘of the external fenfes—(except thofe which the Almighty is pleafed torgive us by intuition) is no= thing new. Mankind have long known that put our eyes, and we are Plindace break the drums. of out ears; and we are we can neither tafte nor fmell. We know likewife, that the texture of - the nerves. and. of the brain, is fimilar————and for ought we know, or need care, < the afs “ feCtion of a nerve during the tranfmiffion “ of 2 fenfation, and the affe@ion of the “ brain during the perceived prefence of it, are probably the fame.” It matters not to us, whether they are, or not. We know that the thinking, immaterial princi- ple isclofely, and intimately conneed with the brain, by ties which elude our fearche and muft remain invifible, until a new life ftrengthens our fight. = We know that the nerves are a continuation of the brain—and that through their intervention, the princi- ple of life is communicated throughout the whole body——confequently #4a# prin- ciple of life muft be intimately conneed with the nerves, becaufe it is fo with the G brain, A = ee FR ! | | i | i vi | i ] att EE ii | v | ki id |! | CO | | ii ; 1 1 | y | he hi i | 9 | . Hi | | i I 1 | $i | A . § | | bl! ; I EE |! (AE U i 4 J 1 fg i i I 4g y | | @ j i | . | i U kK! Hill | { ht | | pi 4 | | } § 1 hi Ww Ti a 4H | Ls 8 it I 4 d ! | i A Se EE RE ee Se a Ee TE i eS Po ance might, ¢( 82 } brain, from whence: they all fpring—— vided, the mufle to which it conveyed fecling, becomes inftantly paralytic. How is it poffible. to. fuppofe that any wdeas except thofe that. are intuitive, could be excited in an human mind, during its connection with the body, but by means of the external feafes? Though this thould be the cafe, it will convey no: information. — nox can it afford Dr. Pricftley: the thou- fandth: part of an inch of ground, on which to build a foundation for his dodtrine. Matter, indifputably affects our minds-—and our minds affeét our bodies—but bow, they reciprocally affect cach other, is a myftery, out of the power of man tofolve. Dg. Prieft- Jey fays trucly—that. * what fenfations, or ¢¢ ideas, are, astheyexift in the mind, or fen= ~ « gi¢nt principle, we have no.more know- ¢s ledge of, than.we have of the: mind or « fentient principle itfelf’—and one might have expected, that is: certainty of our 1gno~ of itfelf, have been-fufficient to have prevented Dr. Prieftley’s: aflerting. fo: decifively, that, praperly. peaking, his «¢. mind: is 7o more IN: lus BODY than it is: « IN ( 8) “IN ne MOON.” * Since he lias given us {uch demonflration of the po/fGhis that his mind might have been a A (for we know that it was nor 7 bis "my Jor any beneficial plirpofe to mankind, at feat, at the time he made that pofitive affertion) he might, with jut’ as much certainty, have given: us the exak fize, propor tiin, — qualities of the man, or men in the ie as have afferted, “ that properly — * his mind is not in his body” —o — haps—indeed his having been 7 be Sh at ie me, is the beft excufe his feltnds ean think of, for t ei iblicati of fucli an ora elk Ai : If it were Dr. Prieftley’s intention infest, that becayfe all a ‘¢ are conveyed to the mind by rads of ’ the external fenfes”—and becaufe ¢ fen ’ {ations as they exift in the brain, mf be fuch things as are capable of being ““ tran{mitted by the nesves,” that eels as the mind is operated on by matter, it is: mofk probably it(elf muterial—this ” an mfesence that does not in the leaft follswes for though matter affords fubje@ for my * See th See {he 20:h page of Dr. Prieftley’s Effays. G2 ideag——a A win EE ————— eo 2st meg TE EW ee ora cr ra ( 8) ideas—and originally excited them, we can fhut our eyes, and enter on a train of reafoning, of which matter muft be utterly incapable. | Dr. Pricftley fays, that « the bufinefs | «¢ of philofophy will be abundantly fatif- « fied, if we be able to point out’ fach a «¢ probable affe@ion of the brain, as will « correfpond to all the variety of fenfations "« and ideas, and the affections of them, ¢¢ of which we are confcious*”—-and L hd in to know, whether #be bufinefs of philofophy is not as abundantly Jatisfied, by afcribing our fenfations and ideas to an immaterial principle, incomprehenfibly im- planted within us by the hand of infinite wifdom,- and Almighty power, as by adopting Dr. Prieftley’s Hypothefis, and afcribing our fenfations and ideas, to the texture of our medullary fubftance, and to the convolutions of our brain ?—— I {hould imagine that before the bufi- « nefs of philofophy” could be abun- « dantly fatisfied” with eur bemg able > « point out fuch a probable affetion © « the brain as will correfpond to all the 2 variety of fenfations and ideas, and the # See the beginning of the firft E flay — middle of page the 7th. ¢¢ affections ( 8 ) «¢ affe@ions of them, of which ‘we are “¢ confcious,” it would be deemed neceflary to underftand what it is which the affe&tion of the brain, snforms; what it is which is confeious of ideas——-what it is which feels ! ———In order to be philsfophical, is it Dr. Prieftley’s opinion that we fhould incon- Miftently reject ome hypothefis, merely be- caufe it is above our comprehenfion—in order to adopt another, which is not only as much above our comprehenfion, but is likewife repugnant to our reafon? That mere matter can ‘think, as we think, 1s furely as incomprebenfible, at leaft as the manner of the union between our fouls and bodies. But, the defire to be deemed A PHILOSOPHER, quite intoxicate fome minds, and bewilders their {fenfes | — Like an ignis fatuus in view of an incon fiderate traveller—it leads men out of the plain broad roads in which they might have proceeded, with credit to themfelves, and advantage to the community—and decoys them into quagmires, where they are laughed at by patling travellers !— Whether. external fenfations are occafi- oned in the brain, by means of ¢¢vibra- C3: tions” | ! | | ( 86 ) ¢ tions” ~——or * impreflions at the extre~ ¢ mity of a nerve,” are ¢* tran{mitted to ¢ the brain by means of a fluid with which ¢ the nerve is filled; the nerves for that “ purpofe” having formerly been «{uppofed ¢¢ to be tubelar”——is not in the leaft ma- terial either in fupport of the hypothefis which Dr. Prieftley has advanced, or in contradi@ion to it. It is enough for us to know, that by the intervention ‘of the nerves; and their communication with the brain, we fee, hear, {mell, tafte, and feel. We are compelled to think it enough, at leaft—for nothing fhort of a miraculous information; can ever pofiibly acquaint us, in what manner the operations of the nerves ‘on the brain, excite thofe five fenfations, If I admit it to have been demonftrated, that thofe five fenfations are occafioned by vibrations, communicated to the brain, along the nerves, I remain, notwithitand- ing, to the full as ignorant as I was before, in what manner the vibrations, on, or in, the brain, affe& that living principle which 7s fenfible of thofe five fenfations, It appears to Dr. Pricftley, that the fyftem of vibrations correfponds to all be" knows {9% ) knows concerning ideas and their affec- tions, but it appeared very differently to the author he recommends. Dr. Prieftley makes the fyftem of vibrations, render all oceafion for an immaterial thinking princi- ple unneceflary—whilft Dr. Hartley, on the contrary, would nor “¢ prefume even to in- << timate that matter can be endued with ¢ the power of fenfation.” «That fenfations are foanfinitied to the <¢ brain in the form of vibrations, is ren< <¢ dered wery probable from the well “¢ known phenomena of the .more per= “« felt fenfes, as feeing and hearing.” — I firmly believe it—Iet it be granted. Dr. Prieftley fills up many pages with what I cannot perceive tends in the leaft to efta- blith his favourite hypothefis, to the exclu+- {ion of our immaterial principles. He informs us that « one vibration “ having been fufficiently imprefled, it ““ may be conceived that the region of ¢¢ the brain affeCted by it will retain a dif- « pofition to the fame vibrations in pre< “ ference to others: fo that thefe vibra- “ tions may take place from other caufes ¢ than the original one. But thefe vibra- + G4 ¢ tions ( 88) ¢¢ tions will neceflarily differ confiderably ¢¢ in ftrength, and other circumftances, ¢¢ from’ original vibratiens; which" pro- ec vides for the difference between -the « ideas of prefent objects, and the fame © «¢ jdea excited without the prefence of the « objet.” Now this, we find, is very often pofitively not the matter of fait for I dare fay that every perfon knows by his own repeated experience; that his ideas have been as ffrongly excited by the remembrance of abfent objets, and of paft feenes, as they poffibly could have been by a fight of thofe very objects, and a re-a&ion of thofe very fcenes. In many inftances, it is univerfally admitted, that imagination exceeds the reality— whereas if Dr. Prieftley’s doctrine held good, ideas excited by prefent objelts muft always furpafs in ftrength thofe ex cited by objects which are abfent. “i * The phenomena of vibrations corre- £¢ {pond happily enough to the difference ¢¢ between pleafurable and painful fenfa- ¢¢ tions; becaufe they feem to differ only “ in degree, and te pafs infenfibly into one ¢¢ another.” ( 8 ) << another: %*” (I have fhewn in the pre-' ceding pages, that fo far thould 7 be from deriving any *¢.bappinefs,” from the belief in the do&rine, which feems to afford Dr. Prieftley fo much felicity—it would make me as miferable a man as lives.) ¢ Thus 5¢ a moderate ‘degree of warmth is plea- ¢¢ fant, and the pleafure encreafes with «¢ the heat to 3 certain degree, at which ¢¢ it begins to be painful; and beyond ¢< this the pain encreafes with the degree ¢¢ of heat, juft as the pleafure had done ¢¢ before.” i bow in In the example Dr. Prieftley has in- ftanced—and in many others, his affertion holds good. It is certain that pain fre- quently commences, only where pleafure ends—but, to be of any fervice to Dr. Hartley's do@rine of vibratiens, it is ne- ceffary that it fhould hold good in every inftance, or pain and pleafure cannot be faid to differ only in degree they muft likewife differ eflentially in 4nd. There are many inftances where it does not hold good, - The edge of a razor, if applied to * See page 16 of the Eflays. my (9) my {kin, cannot pofiibly afford me any pleafurablé fenfation—even on its firft ap= plication (unlels my fkin is chy zbrongh difeafe) for it gives me abfolute pain, the very moment it begins to cut. Many fi- milar exaniples might be inftanced. By the next extract which I thall make from Dr. Prieftley’s Effays, I fhall prefent the world with a manner of arguing which I fancy no one will approve. I will not imagine that he purpofely argued’ as if he had but the moment before, de- monftrated the truth of his fundamental pofition—with a view to delude bis readers into a ¢onclufion that be bad really made a previous demonfiration of its truth—but 1 will fay, that he feems to have ftrangely deceived himfelf. . Becaufe he conceives that he has proved that a thing may be the cafe; he inftantly takes for granted that it is the cafe! « = - - Attend to the argu- ment. ~«¢ If it be admitted, as I think it muft ¢ be, that, for any thing that yet appears, ¢ vibrations in the brain may accompany, ¢¢ and be the caufe of all our ideas, there ¢¢ remains only one property of ideas, or ¢ rather ( 91 ) ¢¢ rather of the mind, relating to them, ¢¢ to which if the dorine of vibrations ¢¢ can be fuppofed to correfpond, the ¢¢ whole theory will be eftablithed, and ¢ that is the affociation of ideas. TFor it ¢s will be feen that this fingle property «« ‘comprehends all the other affections of ¢¢ our ideas, and thereby accounts for all « the phenomena of the human mind, ¢¢ and what we ufually call its different €¢ operations, with refpeét to fenfations and - s¢ ideas of every kind. *” So that ¢ if it be admitted, as” Dr. Prieftley thinks * it muft be, that, for ¢¢ any thing that yet appears, vibrations in ¢¢ the brain MAY accompany, and be-the ¢¢ caufe of all our ideas”—in his opinion, ferioufly, and in his perfect fenfes, ¢ there ¢¢ remains only one property of ideas, or «¢ rather of the mind relating to them, «« to which, IF the do@rine of vibrations ¢¢ can be SUPPOSED to correfpond, the ¢ aphole theory will be’—~what Pee——ren= dered POSSIBLE, we may conceive f—— No—by no means - - - - ¢ jf vibrations # See page 17 of the Effays, MAY ( 92 ) MAY agcompany &c.”—and ¢ if the doc- “ trine ‘can be” but ¢ fuppofed to corre-. “¢ fpond” - - - - why then, by the irre- filtible power of magic—in one moment | em—t¢ the whole. theory will be ESTA- ¢¢ BLISHED ! I” The eagernefs with which Dr. Prieft- ley purfued what he. conceived to be de monftrable evidence in proof of his fa- vourite hypothefis—made him, (as fre- quently happens in the chace) over-run his fcent, and conclude that he had nearly overtaken the obje@ of his purfuit, when, in fad, even admitting his argument to have its utmoft weight, he was only bring- ing the truth of his hypothefis within the limits of bare poflibility !~——Should a philofopher take far granted that a thing is “certain, the moment he finds it po/fible 2— Concluding, however, that he had effectu- ally eftablithed his theory—he proceeds to inform us that ¢¢ It will be feen that this fingle pro- «¢ perty comprehends all the other affec- «¢ tions of our ideas”— - - - - here he quits his doubtful manner of exprefling himfelf = = » = no more 7f”s==or ““ may’s ==0k ( 93) Or [fuppofé’s"—but, having only found. that po/ffibly (for aught, perhaps, that can be faid to demonftrate that 1t 1s not {o) vibrations in the brain may be the caufe of our ideas—and that Jf that doctrine can be fuppofed to cérrefpond with that pro- perty of ideas which he terms, the affoct- ation of ideas—why then he at once gecz= fively afferts that « it will be feen that this «« fingle property ‘comprehends all the «¢ other affe&ions of our ideas, and thereby «¢ accounts for all the phenomena of the ¢¢ human mind, and what we ufually call « its different operations, with refpect to « enfations and ideas of every kind | | 1x2 Suppofe we try how Dr. Prieftley’ s man- ner of reafoning will appear, with only a few alterations. We fhall then difcover whether his argument really eftablifhes his theory, even admitting that the doctrine of vibrations, and affociations, pafibly may be the occafion of all our mental opera- tions. 1 fhall put his words ‘in Italics, to diftinguifh them from my own addi- tions. ~ ® See page 16 of the Effays. If ( 94) If it be admitted, as I think it muff be, that for any thing thet yet appears, an im- material principle of life, gracioufly in« fufed into us by the Almighty, may accom pany us wherever we go, and be the caufe of all our ideas— there will not remain any one property of ideas, or rather of the mind relating to them, to be accounted for by any other fuppofition—and then ze whole theory revealed to us in the fcriptures, and found conformable to our beft reafon, ws be ¢ftablifbed. For it will be feen that the *fpititual effence infufed into us by the De< ity, comprebends, and is the fource of aif our affections, as well as of all our ideas— and thereby (without its being neceflary to fearch for any other caufe) accounts for all the phenomena of the haman mind, and what we ufually call its different operations, with refpelt to fenfations, and ideas of every kind. - Dr. Prieftley informs us, too, that ¢ our having recourfe ta an immaterial “¢ principle, to account for perception and ¢¢ thought, is only faying in other words, ¢¢ that we do not know in what they con= “ fit ; for no one will fay, that he has “ any conception how the principle of | ‘¢ thought 2 ( 95 ) «¢ thought can have any more selation to ¢¢ immateriality than to materiality” ¥— and he feems not. to have made the expe- siment in what light this kind of argu- ment appears, when reverfed. ‘Why may not J, in the fame manaer I made my laft parody, retort on him with! treble force, and infift; that g Bis having recourfe to the doétrine of vibrations making impreflions on the me- dullary fubftances of qur brains, (where ideas he fays are affociated~——and which medullary fubftances perform, alone, all the offices of what we term, the mind) thus fuppofing our minds, as. well as bo» dies, mechanical, in order Zo. account jor perception and. thought-—is only Saying in other words, that be does not know in what they. confit 5 for no one will truly fay. that be has. any. conception how. the principle of thought ‘can bave any more relation to ma~ teriality than fo immateriality. All his arguments might be turned againft him with equal force. * See page 20 of the Effays. Dr. ( g6 ) Dr. Prieftley ¢ does riot expe& that this “ general view of the dorine of vibra: « tions will fatisfy thofe’ who are accuf- «¢ tomed to confider all matter in the moft “ grofs and - general manner, as if it was ‘¢ fubje& to no laws but thofe of the five ‘“ mechanical powers, which was. a turn ¢¢ of thinking that prevailed very much “¢ ‘about half a century ago; fo that even ‘¢ phyficians attempted to explain the na~ ‘“ ture of difeafes, and” the operation of ¢¢ medicines, by the mere forms and weight «¢ .of the particles of the different folids ¢¢ and fluids, and the common laws of hy- ¢¢ droftatics.” * o's In truth he had no reafon to expe& that any view, ever {fo general, or minute, would fatisfy perfons, who were not as. ready, and willing as he appears to have been, to conclude a do&rine certain, be~ caufe it is poffible: Phyficians having at. tempted to explain the nature of difeafes, and. the .operation of medicines, ‘by the mere forms and. weight of the particles of the different folids and fluids, was not more % See page 18 of the Effays. abfurd, ¢ 97 ) abfurd, than the attempt to convince us that we are entirely material, merely be« caufe we cannot find out in what manner {pirit can be confined by matter—whilft, at the fame moment, we feem intimately. acquainted with the manner i which mat- ter thinks=—which, I do conclude, is, at leaft, equally incomprehenfible. ‘¢ But as this {yftem has been abandoned, ““ in confequence of our becoming ac- “¢ quainted with the more {ubtle and im- ‘“ portant laws of matter exhibited in ¢ chymical operations; fo now that we ¢ {ee that the laws and affe&ions of mere ““ matter are infinitely more complex than ““ we had imagined, we may by this time, ““ I fhould think, be prepared to admit “ the poffibility of a mafs of matter like the ‘“ brain, having been formed by the Al- ““ mighty Creator, with fuch exquifite ¢ powers, with refpe&t to vibrations, as . ‘ fhould be fufficient for all the purpofes “ abovementioned ; though the particu “¢ lars of its conflitution, and mode of af- “¢ fetion, may far exceed our compre- ‘““ henfion. And it is only the bare pg/i- ‘“ bility of the thing that I now contend H for)’ ( 98 ) for.” * "If it had been only the bare poffi= bility of the thing, for which Dr. Prieftley had contended, I fhould never have thought of taking up my pen on this fubjet. He thinks, that by this time, we fhould be prepared to admit the po/fbility of fuch a mafs of matter, as the brain, ‘having fuch exquifite powers with refpect to vibrations, as to anfwer all the purpofes of an immate- rial thinking principle,—and fuppofe that we were now, even prepared to think’ it poffible , that would not furely lead zs, as it has Aim, to think it #rue. The diftance between poffibility, and certainty—is very great—and a// men have not the fame defire: to fly from poffibility, inone page, to cer tainty, in the next. He fays that «when the attention of philofophers fhall have ~ «¢ been fufficiently turned to the fubject, «¢ in confequence of the general {cheme ¢¢ appearing to deferve it, more light, he ¢« doubts not, will be thrown uponit.” * ¢¢ wr] fhould be very glad to be in- formed what leads him to think that * Sec page 18 of the Effays. + See ditto, the : SR aE” Te hh. as a = Ch Ln os fame RS a SS Sih EN (99) the general fcheme appears #0 deferve the attention of philofophers ? What poffible benefit could mankind receive by the con- vidtion—if it were poflible to afford con- viion; that we are entirely material ? If no ufeful knowledge; or poffible advan- tage cotild be derived from it—-and that conviction would be productive of fuch numberlefs evils—furely fo far from the fchemie’s deférving the attention of philo- fophers, in order to throw more light upon it, with the view of its being adopted —if it were pofiible that any light could have that effe@; they fhould rather purpofely leave it in darknefs. There 1s but one reafon why good men thould zof be againik lights being thrown on it—and that is— the more light that is directed to it, the more its abfurditiecs will be confpicu- ous. In the very net paragraphi, Dr. Prieflt=+ ley gives a reafon, which, of itfelf, 1s fuf- ficient to thew the bad effets his dolirine may produce. He confefles that ¢¢ it will ¢ ftagger fome perfons, that fo much of ¢¢ the bufinefs of thinking fhould be mads “ to depend upon mere matter, as the H 2 «¢« doltrine Re : wi, “ay * ra i ( 2¢°,) ¢ doltrine of vibrations fuppofes” ¥ mmm will it {tagger them when they find that it is only « the dare poffibility of the thing ¢ for which he contends?” Yes—fay. his converts, it does ftagger us—for though Dr. Prieftley only contends for the bare poflibility in one moment—he is certain, in the next, that we confift only of one uniform compofition—and that his mind is no more in his body than it is in the moon ! - - - - He fays that * it has been the opinion of many philofophers, and among others, “ of Mr. Locke ; that for any thing that “ we know to the contrary, a capacity of ‘¢ thinking might be given to matter.” Granted—and what then? I will fuppofe —for I do believe, that there is nothing impofiible to God, except the commiffion of evil—but how can his dorine be proved, by admitting that every thing is pofiible to God? It is pal ble that thers may be human creatures in the moon, fifty feet high—yet the pofibility of there being men in the moon, of fifty feet height, ® See page 19 of the Effays, + See ditto. ; 1S ( ‘101 ) 1s by no means an ‘argument, with us of its reality. Juft as little weight would it have with me, were informed of the po/~ Sibility of my having no foul. The nature of the evidence, requifite for a proof in both cafes, is equally removed from our reach—but we may innocently amufe our- elves with philofo ofc phizing about tbe probable height of the men in’ the moon—becaufe their being tall, or thort, cannot derogate from the attributes of God, or have confequen- ces, prejudicial to man—but the depriving us of our fpiritual principles, immediately attacks the’ Deity—and “tends to deprive man of thofe hopes ‘and fears of futurity, which are fo requifite to eee us juft and virtuous. ‘After having told us that many philofo- “phers, ‘and Mr. Locke among the number —think, that for any thing we know to the contrary, a capacity of thinking might be given to matter, ‘Dr. Prieftley informs us, that ¢ Dr, Hartley, however, not- ‘ withftanding his hypothefis would be “ much helped by it, feems to think other- wife.” * Dr. Prieftley exprefles aftonith- *® See page 19 of the Effays. H 3 ment (102. ) ment at Dr. Hartley’ s not choofing to fup- ~ pofe matter capable of thinking, notwith- Sanding bis bypothefis would be much helped a; fr Should. the helping an bypotbefis, be confideration with a philofopher in his purluit of truth? Surely not—and Iam perfuaded it would be none with Dr, Prieft- Jey—Dbut certainly thefe heedlefs words might authorize the uncharitable to ffpedt, that if he had been. i in Dr., Hartley's fitua- tion, the defire of helping his hypothefis might have made him zat guite fo ready to make an ingenuous declaration’ of his opi- nion, if it made againft the doctrines which he wifhed to recommend, Let it be granted that all our five fenfes, are enjoyed—in confequence of vibrations affe@ing the different nerves———which nerves affect the brain what then ?— We know that they are affected by means of the nerves—and what fignifies it to us how they are affeed ?——The inquiry is curjous—and may afford matter for inno- cent amufement, if we do not attempt ta build dangerous doctrines upon hypathefifes— of the truth of which we muff neceffarily be plways doubtful. Suppofe that the brain affected (103 ) affe@ed by, vibrations, from thofe which the nerves communijcate—in all cafes wherein. our external fenfes are concerned, —Why fhould not our fouls be informed by wibrations, AS well as by any other mode of intelligence ? Dr, Pricftley’ s doctrine of affociation i is not in the leaft eftablithed by admitting, that when our minds are affected by mat- ter, that matter affects them, by vibrating the nerves, and by thofe vibrations being communicated to the brain. The doirine of affociation might be equally true, al- though the brain were affected by any other means—and it may be falfe, although the do&rine of vibrations be true, + Previous to the reading of the follow- $ “ ing treatife, the object of which i 15 to de- « dyce all the phenomena of thinking From the 6 jingle principle of affociatign, it may not « be unufeful to have a general view of <¢ the fyltem ; in which the principal ¢¢ outlines may be ‘brought nearer toge- « ther, and the whole feen at one view*” * Here Dr, Prieftley avows that the /o/e ob- * See page 22—beginning of the {econd Eflay. H 4 ject (- 104 ) ject of ‘the treatife, was, #0 deduce all the phenomena of Hiprhiny Jrom the fingle prin- ¢iple of affectation - = = = in other words— that the fingle obje®, was, to lead man- kind to believe they are entirely material ! -That this was bis ¢ obje®®” in writing his Effays, and in making the abridge- ‘ment, we cannot doubt, becaufe we have the information from himfelf, and fee it in every page—but that it was Dr. Hart- ley’s <¢ objet” 1n writing his work, we cannot believe—Dbecaufe Ae has in the moft explicit terms, declared his belief in our having immaterial principles, which {urvive death. * I firmly believe that if Dr. Hartley could have forefeen the pub- lication which has been made of his work, he would have committed it'to the flames ; for he feems to haye been zealous for the prefervation of virtué—and he muft there- fore have feerr with horror, the ufe that has been made of his doérine. ¢ The mechanical affociation of ideas ¢ that has been frequently preferited to the ¢ mind at the fame time, was, I believe, * See the cleventh part of this Eflay. ¢ firfk ( 105 ) fitft noticed by Mr. Locke; but he has « recourfe to it ‘only to explain thofe fym- ¢ pathies, and antipathies which he calls *_ ¢ unnatural, in oppofition to thofe which ¢ 'he fays are born with us; and he refers ¢ them to * trains of motion in the animal « {pirits, which, once fet a going, con- ¢ tinue in the fame fteps they have been ¢¢ ufed to, which, by after-treading, are ¢¢ worn into a {mooth path, and the mo- «¢ tion in it becomes eafy, and as it were « natural. As far as we can comprehend «¢ thinking, thus ideas feem to be pro- ¢¢ duced in our minds; or if theyare not, «¢ this may ferve to explain their following «¢ one another in an habitual train, when «once they are put into that tra&, as well « a5 it does to explain fuch motions of the ¢ body.” We are informed, then, by Dr. Prieft- ley’s own account, that Mr. Locke's only motive for having had recourfe to the do@rine of aflociation, was, ¢ to explain ¢ thofe fympathies, and antipathies which ¢ he calls unnatural, in oppofition to thofe ¢ which he fays are born with us.” He never dreamed of having recourfeto it, in Ee RTE eh © ons. as EE Td ( 106 ) in ordér to prove that we have no. {piritual principle, and are of courfe to be.extinct atideath. dic io ooidheaite hen jedindse ~#¢.Suppofing the human mind to have « acquired a frock of ideas, by means of the « external f{enfes, and that thefe, ideas ¢ have been varioufly aflociated together ; ¢¢ {o that when one of them is prefent, it «¢ will introduce fuch others as it has the «¢ peareft connection with, and relation ¢¢ to, nothing more feems to be neceffary “ to explain. the phenomena of memory. ¢¢ For we have no power of calling up any ¢¢. idea at pleafure, but only recolle& fuch «¢ as have a connection, by means of for- «mer affociations, with thofe that are at < any. time prefent to the mind. Thus s¢ the fight, or the idea, of any particular « perfon, generally fuggefts the idea of ¢¢ his name, becaufe they have been fre- «« quently aflociated together. If that ¢¢ fails to introduce the name, we are at a « Jofs, and cannot recolle& it at all, till «¢ fome other aflociated circumftance helps ¢¢ us. In naming a number of werds ina « fentence, or lines in a poem, the end of «seach preceding word being connefted 1 with ( 17 ) with the beginning of the fucceeding ¢¢ one, we can eafily repeat them in that «« order; but we are not able to repeat ¢«« them backwards, till they have been ss frequently named in that contrary or- «¢_der. By this means, however, we ac- s¢ quire a facility of doing it, ‘as may be ¢ found by the names of number from « from one to twenty.” ¥ Admitting all this to be true; it only fhews (what no one denies) that the me- mory may be affifted by recollecting cor- refponding circumftances—but how can it in the leat degree tend to fupport Dr Prieftley’s favourite idea of our having no immaterial principle of life? By his own confeffion, he has been at all this " 4 trouble, fimply to eftablith that opinion—- we muft therefore keep this intention of his, conftantly in view as we procecd— and in the examination of all his argu- ments, try them by endeavouring to difco- yer whether they juftify his pofitive decla- ration of his difbelief in the received opi- nion of our having immaterial principles of life, # Sce page 25 of the Effays. ‘ The il i it: £ | 1 EL pe! in ii | $0 44 b ( 108 nN The very manner of expreflion, which it is not in Dr. Prieftley’s power to avoid, fhews the abfurdity of his hypothefis. He began the paragraph in which he made the extra from Mr. Locke (which I have juft inferted) with thefe words—¢ the me- ¢ chanical . aflociation of ideas that has '¢ been frequently prefented to the mind,” &c.—and he began the laft paragraph which I have extraéted, with, ¢ fuppofing ¢ the human MIND to have acquired a ¢ ftock of ideas by ‘means of the external ¢ fenfes’ &c.—thus, by a confeffion, which he has been compelled to make againft himfelf, he has given his teftimony in fupport of our immateriality. What would he have us underftand by ¢ tbe “ mind?” He has allowed that me- chanical affociations of ideas are prefented to the mind—by which he certainly im- plies that there is a fomething within us (not explained by him) which can acquire a ftock of ideas, and can have recourfe to that hoard, at pleafure. His own manner of writing, fhews the abfurdity of the doc- trine which he wifhes to fupport lem ~. What is it, which gffociates ideas ? What 16 ( 109 ) is it, which acquires ideas P——Where are they ftored ? Dr. Prieftley fays that the ¢ mind” is informed by vibrations affecting the brain, by means of the nerves— granted—but bow do the vibrations of the brain raife confcioufnefs—thought—reflec- tion ? In what are they raifed ?—He fays that various ideas are affociated—and that different affociations, form complex ideas—but where are they aflociated ? Where formed? What is it, which thinks, reflets, reafons?—Thefe are plain quef- tions, and abfolutely require direst anfwers. If Dr. Prieftley cannot give direct an{wers —anfwers which [hall be deemed fatisfaltory— will he not be highly cenfurable for having made fuch a public declaration, of what was not warranted by bis underflanding 2 In the 2d page of Dr, Prieftley’s firft Eflay, he very properly expofes the folly of fuppofing that the brain itfelf can haye ideas written on it. Ile fays that “ to «¢ affift the imagination, indeed, but by ‘“ no means in any confiftency with the “ notion of a nervous fluid, it had been “¢ conceived that ideas refembled characters ‘ drawn on a tablet; and that the lan- 8 ‘ guage tis ) # puage in which we generally fpeak of ¢t jdeas and their affections, is borrowed ¢¢ from this hypothefis. But neither can ¢« any fuch tablet be found in the brain, « nor any fiyl, by which to make the « charaers upon it ; and though fome of ¢¢ the more fimple phenomena of ideas; ¢ ag their being more or lefs deeply uz- « preffed, their being retained a longer or «¢ a fhorter time, being capable of being «¢ revived at pleafure, &c. may be pretty «« well explained by the hypothefis of fuch ¢ 4 tablet, and charaters upon it, it is ¢ wholly inadequate to the explanation of « other, and very remarkable phenomena ¢ of ideas, efpecially their mutual affo- « ciation. Befides this hypothefis {ug- ¢ gefts nothing to explain any of the ““ mental operations refpe@ing ideas.” Having thus, himfelf, with fuch pro- priety ridiculed the abfurdity of {uppofing that ideas can be really imprefled, or written on the brain, I fhould be very glad to be informed in what manner he conceives ideas are affociated by, or 7, the brain. He fays that thus the fight, or « the idea of any particular perfon, gener- « ally "Nn ( err )) ¢¢. ally fuggefts the idea of his name, be- ¢¢’ caufe ‘they have been frequently affoci~ ¢ ated together; but I afk, (and I mut frequently repeat my queftion) where are they affociated, and by what are they re- membered ? Dr. Prieftley confefies that the brain neither prefents us with the view of a <“ tablet” on which they can be written, nor of any ¢ fyle’ which could write them.—We are therefore, and muft always be, bewildered, when he talks of ideas being affociated, until he informs us WHERE they are affociated, and what if 7s which is confcious of their aflociation. He finds fault with the hypothefis of 2 figle, and tablet, becaufe it “ fuggefts no- <¢ thing to explain any of the mental oper- «“ ations refpetting ideas” but forgets that his own bypothefis leaves us equally in the dark ! What does he mean by ““ mental operations?” He denies our having minds—(for he affirms that his mind is as much in the moon as in his body)— and yet he talks of mental operations, as if be believed be had a MIND, to operate Bons Dr. Prieftley tells us that, {uppofing ¢¢ the human mind to have acquired a ¢ {tock of ideas by means o” the external y ¢¢ fenfes,” CRT Ea ad he ( 112 ) ¢ fenfes,”. (here we find, he .cannet help continuing to take for granted, that we have minds to. acquire, ideas) ‘and that. «¢ thefe ideas have been varionfly affociated . together ; fo. when one of them is pre= ¢ fent, it will introduce fuch others as it ¢¢ has the neareft conneion with, and «« relation to, ‘nothing more Jeems to be ne- “ ceffary to. explain the phenomena 7 A et MEMORY. ” He muft excufe me— - a vaft deal more is * neceflary” ~and “thould have been thought fo by a man who wifhes to write like a philofopher— for a philofopher fhould have explained to us what it is which remembers——and this is an omiffion which I muft often remark, fince opportunities are fo frequently afford- ed me of thewing how inconfiftently Dr. Prieftley has written againft the exiftence of that immaterial principle, which we term, the mind. Before he proceeded any farther, he {hould have thought that information requifite to lay before becaufe, without that _infor- us mation, his whole theory muft be unintelligible. We can underftand Dr. Hartley, becaufe be founds his Theory on. the received opimion that ¢ man confifis “of ( 113) ““ of two parts—body and mind*’=—and: ont, the fixed belief that the mind is a fometbing; diftin& from, though conne@ed with, "thé body. The firft ink he ufed in his work, was employed #n declaring his belief in what Dr. Priefley denies! Dr. Hartley took for granted that none but lunaticks, (or men in the moon,) can doubt our having imma- terial thinking principles—and thofe think + ing principles, are what he repréfents, as -affociating ideas—and (by means of the ‘external fenfes, and of what, he fays, ““ [pring up of themfelves in our minds)” acquiring ideas. Dr. Hartley, like a phi- lofopher, Jegan his work at the foundation— Dr. Prieftley, on the contrary, has pre- {ented us with a ftru@ure, 7 the clouds /—: He bas reverfed the order of building, and finifhed "his attic ftory, without dream ing of his foundation ! How could he pofiibly imagine that fuch a work could ftand ? Dr. Prieftley has made his i” and 26th pages contradi& each other. In the gth, we read that ideas are *¢ capable of being « * See the beginning of his Introtultion=-the Ex- tracl, is in the 11th Part. I ¢ revived prin A rt A le et — nm im A le Ss rt ( 114 ) «revived at pleafure”’—==butin the 26th, we find he thinks otherwife—for he:fays ¢¢ wwe have no powerof calling up any.idea at «¢ plegfiire, but only recollect fuch as have «« a conneion, by means of former affor 5 ciations, with thofe that are atany time “* prefent to the mind.” noir ag Hw .. Now I do not underftand how. it-can be trae, at the fame time, that ideas are «¢ capable of being revived at pleafure i and that * we have no power of calling up ¢ any idea at pleafure.”—but 1t verefies the old adage—* great wits, have {hort me- ¢¢ mmories ”—Here I might remark too, that Dr. Prieftley again reafons upon the fuppofition of his having an immaterial thinking principle—for what elfe does he mean. that we fhould underftand by the word mind, which he mentions with a much eafe, as if he really believed that it was more in bis body than in the moon 8 bree He fays that « we have no power of re- « collecting, &c. "—pray what does he mean by the word ¢¢ we 7] ivourme- ' dullary fubftance? what 1s it, which has “ no power of recolleéting ¢” a (%¥n5.) ‘That our'minds are frequently obliged tohave recourfe toaffociated circumftances, in order to" recollect’ paft “eccurrences i | ] | 4 3} ] 1 i+ | | i if i | | | } | | | TT Rl » (158) are not quite-deaf, can hear—~and whe:are not quite ‘blind, can fee——and" juft the fame, all men’ who are not quite ideots, can diftinguith good from’ evil,~and they rife, in degrees, to the enjoyment of the fenfes of feeing, bearing, and under- flanding—from the dull of ‘hearing, dim- fighted, and weak in Amind—till' we arrive at the top of the ladder, and find thofe whofe perceptions of all kinds; are quick, keen, clear, and ftrong. But if a ‘man, for example, chufes to live ‘in a " courfe of adultery, or fraud, or any kind of villainy—we cannot fuppofe that he will be filly enough to confefs to the world that he thinks adultery, or fraud, is cri- ‘minal————nay, perhaps, (and moft likely) by a continued courfe of ‘life, in conftant commiflion of the favourite crime, he may render his feelings fo callous (and certainly muft render them fo callous) that his con- fcience will ceafe to remonftrate—and he may then fucceed in deceiving himfelf into the fuppofition that his guilt is not fo great, as good men deem it, - - - but yet —if he was ingenuous enough to fay the truth—he would confefs, that af particu- Jar periods of his life, the crime had ap- | peared ( 159 ) speared to him in its proper light, and hehad been feverely flung by his own mind, ‘however he had, at laft, by diflipation, and an.indulgence of his appetites, blunted the {tings of his confcience, and filenced {fo troublefome a monitor. rr X cannot poffibly believe that ¢¢ though ¢¢ the {hape and colour of a flower, appear ¢¢ the fame to every human eye, one man ¢ pradtifes as a moral duty, what another “¢ looks upon with abhorrence, and re- ¢ flects om with remorfe.” It will hold good, if applied to religious duty, becaufe the papift thinks he is performing an ac- ceptable fervice to God, whilft adoring a wafer, or walking barefoot on pebbles— but in moral duties, it is impofiible that one. man fhould pra&tife what he really thinks his duty, if it be of fuch a nature, that another who is equally fenfible, can poflibly look on it with abhorrence, and refle&t on it with remorfe. One man may, indeed, practife as a moral duty, through weaknefs of underflanding, what an- other, of better fenfe, may think, wot -.@a moral duty—but then it cannot be of {uch a dreadful nature, as to be ¢ looked ‘“ on with abhorrence, and reflefted on “ with - ( 160 ) ¢«. with remorfe,” becaufe fuch thocking crimes are notorious to all mankind, how- ever they may be committed through the allowed afcendancy of their appetites and paffions, over their reafon and judgment. Let it be admitted, that there is no certain infhinétive knowledge of good and evil in the mind of man but that all our feelings are the effet of education, babit, cuftom— and then I fhould be glad to know, whe- ther we might not be very apt to think any inward repugnance to commit a crime, (to which we may be ftrongly tempted) the effe@& of prejudice? And would not this doubt of the criminality of the a&, weaken our refiftance againit the pow- erful temptation, if the doubt were un- happily to arife in our minds, at the mo- ment when the temptation is a&ting ftrong- ly on our imaginations? It cannot be de- nied. Dr. Prieftley’s opinion muft be very agreeable to thofe whofe lives are loofe— but though it may affift in quieting their apprehenfions for the prefent—jyet the re- monftrances of confcience will notwith- ftanding, at intervals, interrupt, and alloy their pleafures—for every man feels in his “eart, howeves he may deny it with his lips ( 161 ) lips=——tlils is virtuous——that is vicious ~this is good, that is evil - - ~ there- fore ‘Dr. Prieftley’s conclufion (¢‘ now a ‘“ thing that varies with education and ine ‘““ ftraGion, as moral fentiments are ‘“ known to do, certainly has the appear ‘“ ance of being generated by a feries of ‘“ different impreflions in fome {uch man- ““ ner as he has endeavoured to de- ‘“ {cribe.*”) falls to the ground, becaufe the opinion on which it was founded, is erroneous. Dr. Prieftley has not been ahtmed to affert that ¢¢ the moft thocking crimes that ‘“ men can commit, are thofe of /mjuftice ‘“ and murder, and yet it is hardly pofiible ““ to define any circumftances, in which ““ fome part of mankind have not without ‘ the leaft fcruple or remorfe, {cized the ‘“ property or taken away the lives of «¢ others, fo that the definition of thefe « crimes muft vary in every country. 4’ Having advanced fuch a pofition—fo hap= pily calculated to preferve the morals of mankind—refolved on not letting it re« * See the bottom of page 42 of the Effays. i See page 44 of ditto. M a A an SA bi in ( 162 ) main in the chances that any of his readers thould overlook the conclufion which: he intended fhould be drawn from it———he proceeds to inform us, that, ¢‘ now an idea, ¢¢ or feeling, that depends upon arbitrary ¢¢ definition, cannot be, properly fpeak- “¢ ing, natural, but muft be factitious.*” ~~ How can we wonder if the com- monality and even all ranks of men, who do not fearch, and think for themfelves, henceforward run wild with- out reftraint, and give a loofe to all their appetites and paffions ? What muit the world think of religion, and its teach- ers, when they fee a man, in whofe per- fon they imagine the refpectable characters of the clergyman and the philofopber dre uni- ted ; in one moment, haranguing from the pulpit againft vice and immorality—and in the next, informing them by his pen, “¢ that injuftice and murder” (two crimes which ftrike at the very exiftence, as well as happinefs of mankind,) are not crimes againft the light of nature, but are made fuch by arbitrary definition—and con- fequently may not really be crimes, though * See the 44th page of the Effays. 8 we ( 163 ) we think ‘them fuch, owing to our edu- cations, habits, and cuftoms !—Good God |==Where were Dr. Prieftley’s feel- ings for the welfare of the community, ‘when he publithed fuch a do&rine! | “That there are villains in all countries, who commit murder and robbery, is cer- tain but Dr. Prieftley has afferted that they never feel remorfe, and I thould be very glad to be informed how he could pofiibly afcertain that fa. Has he been ‘enabled to penetrate into the fecret receflfes of their minds, and witnefs all their in- ward feelings ? If not,” how can he be juftified in having fo decifively afferted, as truth, what, for ought he can pofiibly know to the contrary, may be falfe? Can be feel the inward reproaches that torture others 2—-We find, then, that he has moft unwarrantably attempted to cftablifth a moft dangerous doctrine, on a pofition—which, fo far from having a right to take for granted, as he has done—he can have no foundation to conceive, poffible! ‘But, as has been thewn before, every day's experience proves that the moft abandoned villains feel dreadful remorfe, | M 2 and (164) arid are driven by it to confefs their criifies, and voluntarily fly for refuge into the Cells of Newgate; what lefs than Omnipo- tence could inflict fuch agonies? Did they proceed from ideas imbibed by education? No for they had none. Were they the effe&® of example? No for they had aflociated with the moft hardened of mankind. Could they have been oc- cafioned by habit? No-——for they had been accuftomed to laugh at confcience, and hear it ridiculed. = This demonftrates, therefore, that though we owe a great deal of our knowledge of moral good and evil, to education—yet, though it has been ever fo much negleGted, or ever fo bad—good and evil, will, notwithftand- ing, be known by intuition when we ar- rive at manhood. I place the poor ignorant wretches of the Roman Catholic religion, ina ftate lefs liable to punifhment than the Indians and Hottentots—becaufe though the papifts live in countries into which the gofpel’ has found its way, the knowledge which it conveys, is not within their reach—and ‘they are as unacquainted with its precepts as the inhabitants of the Antipodes. Thefe | people ( 165 ) people, have -the advantage of being in a ftate of nature—but the papift is in a ftate infinitely worfe, becaufe he gives up the guide within his breaft, having been taught a religion that invefts his prieft with the direGtion of his conduét. He murders at his command! but this does not prove that he has no feeling that murder is a crime—he murders, becaufe the light of nature has been for a few moments obfcured by art. I do not argue that men may not be perfuaded out of their fenfes, for nothing is more com- mon but though they give up their fenfes, it cannot prove that they had zo Jfenfes to give up——and though the papift murders at his prieft’s inftigation—and moft likely in the flurry of his mind, prior to the deed, as well as during the a¢t, he feels no fenfe of its crimmnality, yet I can have no conception of its being pofiible but that he muft afterwards, when cool, be ftung with the recolleGtion of his act. At leaft we can have no proof that he never feels remorfe—and we have .confequently no right to conclude that his mind is al- ways at eafe, when there is fo much reafon to conclude otherwife. M3 Education, LL ee SRR ER ER EEE Br on Si a SM ER SLs SSE TE 5 er A ERR i | t ( 166 ) Education; cuftom, ‘and ‘habit; opera’ ting oh a ‘weak ‘mind, may, and often’'does,’ occafion remorfe for actions perfeétlyin~ nocent—for the minds of weak people are capable of being warped, and of receiving an early biafs,which no arguments can ever remove. It is more frequently biafled on religious fubjets, than on any other—! and ‘the abfurdity of fome of the doctrines believed by many of the good people of thefe kingdoms, fhews that men may be; brought to credit the moft felf-evident falfehoods. This holds in matters of opini~ on on religious temets—but not on points of moral duty—I mean on thofe points of moft importance, fuch as murder, adultery, perjury, theft, &c. Imuft take for grant- ed, that the Indians and Hottentots are capable of pleafing and offending God fince, otherwife, I could not believe that ae are—and they can be capable of pleaf- ing and offending him, only by feeling by ~ intuition, in fome very few cafes, howto do either.” But yet thefe poor people com« mit crimes, without offending God, which in‘enlightened countries, would be highly offenfive. He has been pleafed to reveal his will, in a very particular manner in the (167 ) the gofpel +—and therefore we, who have the liberty of reading it, muft be highly. culpable and criminal whenever we tranf. grels its laws, though the untutored fa-. vages commit thofe very erimes with in-, nocence. To imagine that all mankind have a fenfe of their complete duty impref- fed on their minds, would be to render the. gofpel ufelefs—and yet on the other hand, to f{uppofe the favages of the defart inca- pable of either pleafing or offending God, is to conclude him fo indifferent about the ations of man, as to render it incredible that the gofpel fhould be a divine revela- tion. | (La to For, what are the firongeft ‘arguments in favour of revelation ? On what grounds are we certain that God has revealed his will to man? We found our belief upon our conviction that he is infinitely juft, good, and merciful. We conclude that a Being, poflefled of thofe attributes, would never have formed the mind of man,’ with {uch abilities, and fuch a thirft for knowledge, if he was indifferent to his conduct, ' and incapable of being pleafed at his endeavours to recommend himfelf to his favour, or offended at his flagrant 3 M4 impiety ( 168 ) impiety * and difobediénce)” Prom his love, therefore, to ~man-ievidenced fo firikingly by ‘his gifts, and providential care—and by the ‘infinite purity of the divine nature, we conclude that he wifhes all his rational offspring ‘to approach as near as poffible to his perfe@tion—and "that hé muft confequently have revealed to "them fuch laws and precepts, as are necef- Tary to lead them into that purity of man= ners, “and thofe virtues which he approves. Where thofe laws and precepts have never been publithed, the people will not befo firictly - accountable but thofe ‘who have had it in their power to read the gof- pel, will be judged, not by what ‘they knew, but by what they might have known—while thofe on the other hand, who have nos had an opportunity of know- ing his revealed will, will be judged, fingly by the lights which were within their breafts, “and the ufe they made of them, according ! Zo their abilities. “Admit therefore the ‘love of God to man—and his attention to his conduét to be fuch as to have induced him to reveal his will, in the manner in which we are AHS made ( 169 ) made acquainted with it. by the gofpel— and (Dr. Prieftley muft admit likewife, that. {o large a majority of mankind, as are yet, and, have been in paft ages, un- acquainted with the gofpel, either are now, and have been, incapable of plea- fing or offending God—or they muft otherwile have an inftinctive feeling in. their breafts, which in fome few: nflances points out to them what they ought to do, or avoid, There muft be an inftin&ive fenfe of good and evil, imprefled onthe mind of man, wunlefs our alltions can neither pleafé or offend God, and we are never to-be accountable in_future—— but if this be the cafe, the attributes of mercy, goodnefs, and juftice, which we afcribe to him, can- pot be his due—and having denied his at- tributes, we may as well deny his being. Revelation did not appear till ages after the creation—and even at this very moment, the parts of the world where it has ap- peared, and been admitted as the rule of life, are very inconfiderable when com- pared with the globe, Can it be revela- tion only, then, which has conveyed the will of God to man? If fo, of all God’s creatures Sn a TEE OE OEE EEE REESE 5 EE a A a as wy es CEERI Re ET SET SARS =e rs eS ea ie en be eet a Ee ( 2270 }) creatures man is-moft detached from: his Creator—and we may aflert, withoutany rifk: of being in an error, that hes too indifferent about the ations of mankind, in general; togender it credible that he: has revealed. his will to the very inconfiderable portion. of them, who have been made acquainted with it by the bible. Therefore, if we: mean to be confiftent—to be convinced: that man has no inftinétive {enfe of moral. good and evil, is, to be convinced that the. bible is no revelation from God - ~ = that we are, too infignificant, to be accountable —and cannot poflibly have been defigned: for another life: = - - - nay, it is to be convinced that we exift by chance; and; that there is no God for it is at leaft, tantamount the fame to us, whether a God exifts, or not, if we are too inconfiderable. for his attention, and live here, :deftitute. of his protection and regard, and without any hope of a life beyond the grave. , But we cannot, even for a moment, fup- pofe this to be the cafe, if we. reflet on! the wonderful mechanifm of our. bodies, and the wifdom that is confpicuous through every part - - - for in every view we ( 171) we take, we! fee the hand of wifdom: and ‘goodnefs, ‘as vifibly as the hand of power. The fuppofition, would be in~ jurious to him ‘in the higheft degree —for it equally detracts from his great nefs to imagine any thing too minute, or inconfiderable—as to conceive any thing too vaft, and extenfive for his attention. The Almighty is as GREAT in the for- mation of animalcule, feen only with the fineft glafies, ‘as in the creation of the thoufands of vifible {funs, and thoufands" of invifible fyftems, which are believed to be enlightened by their rays. His compre- henfive mind, equally pervades both ex-: tremes—and while boundlefs {pace cannot prefcribe limits to his expanfion—and my- riads of fyftems roll beneath his feet, the mite is not too diminutive for his infpec- tion—and could not exift, if his energy were to be withdrawn. Befides—if we believe in the ommipre- fence of God, how can we poffibly doubt his attention to the thoughts and ations of rational free agents, who feel themfelves confcious of a liberty to do good or evil at pleafure ? ( 172) pleafure »eQr—=if we believe in his omni- Jetence, can we conceive that he £nows how we either ufe, or abufe his. gifts, without approving and condemning, as he knows we merit praife or cenfure ? Is this con fiftent with his purity, goodnefs, and juf- tice ? We have demonftration, there- fore, that the belief in the Almighty’s having impreflfed no inftin&ive fenfe of " moral good and evil on our minds, is in- compatible with a. belief in his being om- niprefent, omnifcient, juft, pure, and good, fince it is the height of abfurdity to 1ma- gine that purity and goodnefs can be an zi- different {pecator of vice and virtue - - or that juice can help punifhing and re- warding thofe acions, which omniprefence muft witnefs, and omniftience. know. Yet, to attend to our condut—approve and condemn——reward and . punith, without having given any previous intimation of what is daudable and culpable, would be {fo unjuit and cruel, that to: fuppofe the Deity ca- pable of a&ing in-fuch a manner, is im- pious and fhocking }——"Thele confidera+ tions, alone, demonilrate the. falfehood and abfurdity of the fuppofition. 2 Sut ( 73 ) “But view it in another light. - Have'we ot demonftration that by vatious inftinéts imprefled” oft’ the’ minds of the irrational création, the Almighty has directed them to whatever is neceflary for their welfare, and the continuation of their {pecies? All nature proclaims the truth ! Does edu- cation, habit, or cuftom, teach the f{wal- low to build her neft? Does not every bird, of every kind, build exactly like thofe of her fpecies, though feparated by an impaffable diftance? To what, then, can this be attributed, but to the great eternal Mind, operating upon the living principles of all his creatures? Is it poffible to account, in any other way, for the aftonithing variety of inftints in the different {pecies of creatures, and the uniformity of thofe inftinéts in every crea- ture of the fame tribe? And fhall we fee {uch demonftrable traces of divine infor- mation on the minds of the beaits of ‘the field, fowls of the air, fithes of the deep, and ‘infe&s of the earth—and yet doubt his’giving any intimation to man, of what is to 'inftru&, and ‘prompt him, in his pur {uit ( 172 ) purfuit of prefent, and future happinefs? Can we conceive, that after having been fo bountiful of his impreflions to the rep- tiles of the earth, the Almighty has formed man, capable of paying him a rational homage and fervice, and yet has turned him adrift, without any internal fenfe of what can pleafe or offend him? All good ‘men know experimentally, that the moft delightful tranquillity infeparably attends that attention to their duty, which refults from a conviction of the attributes of God, and a confequent defire to recommend themfelves to his favour. They feel, that under all the misfortunes and afflictions of life, the dependence, and refignation, which flow from that conviction, convey hope, confidence, and peace. However dif- trefled they may be in mind, body, or for- tune, they look forward with humble confi- dence to better days—or reft affured that infinite wifdom fees that thofe afflictions are falutary—fince otherwife, infinite good- nefs and mercy would not permit them. Therefore fince the peace of an approving confcience, is fuch a perpetual fource of happinefs, ( "173 ) happinefs, can we doubt but that feelings «capable of producing fuch effects, are im- mediately imprefled on the mind, by that Being, in’ whofe effence we breathe, and ‘who is alone able to afford it fuch enjoy- ments ? And: why fhould we rack our ima- ginations, and exert our powers, in the endeavour to inculcate’ the opinion that our mental feelings are mechanical, as well as the motions of our bodies, fince thofe feelings are fo well accounted for, in a method productive of virtue-—and fo con=- fiftent with the attributes of God? Why thould we fuppofe that the Deity never acts upon our minds, when we know, that heis never a moment abfent from us !—Weare certain that he is continually within us, and around us, or our hearts muit ceafe to beat—and that it is his energy, alone, which every inftant prolongs life—Is the fuppofition, then, of his impreffing pain and pleafure on our minds (according: as we offend, or pleafe him) fo very unrea~ fonable'in Dr. Prieftley’s opinion, when he recolle@s that the Deity fills all: fpace with his prefence, and that we breathe in the ( 176 ) the midft of his effence? If he is ex= panded throughout the univerfe, and per- vades every particle of matter, how can Dr. Prieftley imagine it poflible for minds, {fo intimately blended with his effence, (as ours muft be) to be infehfible of his ap- probation and difpleafure ? The idea ap- pears to me as unphilfophical as it is 1ir- religious ! Or, where is there any thing more ex- traordinary, -or incredible, in the idea that the fenfe of good and evil has been im- planted in our breafts by the Almighty, than thofe other abilities of the under» ftanding which we are known to poflefs ? What do we mean when we fay that {uch a perfon * has fine natural parts?” Edu- cation, and good company, are neceflary to polith the mind but can any edu- cation, or any company, convey a fine un~ derftanding, where it has not been given by nature? ‘or can any want of education, 8c. prevent a perfon’s fhewing a good un- derftanding, if it has been given by providence ? Woodhoufe, the thoe-maker of Hales Owen, (among thoufands of others) is a proof that it cannot——for 6 without ( 177) without having had any education; of advantage whatever, he wrote poems which furprized all who read them. Sup+. pofe infants, of different hatural parts, to be educated exactly in the fame way, and all with the fame opportunities of affoci< ating ideas—~will the fame caufes produce the {ame effe@s on their different minds ? We know they will not—=and does not this demonftrate that there is a fomething in the mind, which no education can give, or take away ? And if it be true that we enjoy any underflanding from God, beyond doubt the fenfe of moral good and evil, 1s not wanted-——cannot be wanted, unlefs Dr. Prieftley will fay that #4is fenfe, of all others, is leaf} neceflary to man—for if it be even as neceflary as any other we pofiefs, he muft either deny that our mental endowments are the gifts of God, or fuppofe #/¢ endowment, with- held, which, of all others, it was moft incumbent on infinite goodnefls and mercy to difpenfe==if the purfuit of virtue, be neceflary to lead us to prefent, and future happinefs. And Dr. Prieftley cannot deny that our underftandings, as well as the N organs (178 ) organs of our ‘bodies, muft have been formed by the power of (God, and be- ftowed ‘by his goodnefs, becaufe to deny this, “is to fuppofe the nobleft part of ‘man —formied’ by chance~—and this leads to Atheifin, For if a man would be juftly termed an Atheift, for denying that our bodies were created by an Almighty power —(hould he not be equally deemed fuch, for denying that the faculties of the mind were his gift? : ¥et if it be true that conicience is generated by the cafual circumitances of life—our mental powers muft have been formed as cafially for af it was re- quifite that ezy mental power fhould be pofiefied it cannot be denied that the fenfe of moral good and evil is the moft requifite; - unlefs = the prefent, and future happinefs of man, are deemed the Cif- cumitances of leaft moment to him ;— from. which it follows, that if zbat fenfe which is #of requifite, has zot been inter- woven in our nature— but chance direlts whether we poflefs it, or not—no fatisfac- tory reafon can be given why every other faculty of the mind may not have been formed in the fame cafual mannerm—and no (agg, ) —no. longer believing our underftandings to have been the work of a God, I can have no difficulty in denying that my body, proceeded from his hand. Befides—if the millions of mankind who have never feen the bible, ‘could neither pleafe or offend God, they ‘could not have been candidates for future happinefs, becaufe they could not have been “in a ftate of probation—and if fo large a portion of mankind have not been in a ftate of probation, candidates for another life, how can we have any right to fuppofe ourfelves any more fuch candi- dates, than they were—for we know that we are all originally equal in the fight of God, and that “© he is no refpeter of per- fons ?” ‘Therefore if man has no internal rule of a&ion, there cannot be a future ftate —and if no future ftate, this impious confequence follows—we worfhip an ideal being, fince he cannot be juft good, or merciful = - - = how dreadful!—how fthock- ing the idea ! Though fuch are the confequences which follow Dr. Prieftley’s do@rine, yet he per- fits in his endeavour to throw down every diftin&ion between moral good and evil, N 2 by AE end EET iti emg wlan agua OEE Eo od AR eg con ( 180 ) by making it dependent on edugarionsssor he fays, (41 cA E0 “ J was: my(elf cdicated fo triaily and «¢ properly, that the hearing of the flighteft ¢¢ cath, or irreverent ufée of ‘the name of ¢¢ God, gives me a fenfation that is more ¢¢ than imental. It is next to thuddering, «« and thoufands; I doubt not, - feel the “¢ fame; whereas other perfons, and nen ¢ of trict virtue and honour in other re- ¢¢ {pets, I am confident, from my" own ¢¢ obfervation, feel not the leaft moral im- “¢. propriety in the greateft poffible profane= “¢ nefs of fpeech. But by-a different edu- ¢¢ cation, I might have been as profane as ¢ they, and without remeorfe; and (with ¢¢ the fame fenfibility to impreflions in ge- ¢¢ neral, though equally indifferent to them ¢¢ all) my education would have given them ‘¢ my exquifite fenfibility in this refpeét. *** Dr. Prieftley’s faying that the hearing any “¢ irreverent ufe of the name of God, ‘gives ¢ him a fenfation more than mental,” would lead ‘us to ‘conclude that he believes ‘there is fomething mental in his compofition—but as he has denied any belief-in his Hovads 3 * See page 27 of i Effuys mind ( 181 ) mind, I muft confefs myfelf unable to con- ceive his meaning, . A fenfation’s being more than: mental; conveys ‘no idea: whatever to me. It would be unintelligible, even if written by a believer: in our having imma- terial . principles—~becaufe any feeling that 1s more than mental, is of courfe above-hu-: man. conception,. and confequently above human knowledge—~and how can we con ceive an idea of what is above conception— or underftand what is above human know- ledge? How much more; extraordinary, then, muft Dr. Priefileys reprefenting a fenfation, as being “ more than mental,” ap- pear to us, when we recolle@ his declara- tion that Ais mind is no more in bis body than sn the moon 2. Is not this enough to convince him of the abfurdity of his declaration, fince he finds that even he himfelf, who, by his own account, has confefledly no mind, can- not help exprefling- himfelf as if" be did not entertain a fingle doubt of the contrary? He mentions the human mind in almoft every page, as if be were convinced of its exifience | Here; ' too———as well as in" his very cenfurable affertion relative to the murderer N 3 and ( 182 1) and the robber, he has declared his belief in what iz is impeffible in the nature of things. be can be. certam- is druel——JFaw can. he know that men who are fovety profane, ne- ver feel the leaft: fing, or fenfe of the cri- minality of their profanenefs?: It is impof- ible. oii Sides To mies fH If Dr. Prieftley - bad: {aid that he knew men of Ari& Jowsur, 5. who feel not the Jeaft « impropriety in the greatclt, poflible pro- « fanenefs-of {peech,” no notice would have been: taken of his aflertion. I believe there are many men of the firi¢teft honour, in - every acceptation -of the word, who: give themfelves no trouble about #e/igion—and confequently indulge themfelves in the cuf- tom of being profane; without fuffering the knowledge of its criminality, to. interrupt their pleafures, though they cannot help being fometimes fenfible that they are not aGing right,—but | I. hold, that virtue, 1s capable of being eitablithed on mo other bafis, but religion+—and that confequently; where there ts no religions there can be NO VIR- TUE. For, WE "To have « iri. virtue,” is to have per- Severed in an habit of thinking, and alting, conformable ( 183 ) conformable to the precepts of religion— in confequence of having uniformly cherifbed ¢ conflant fenfe of the attributes of God. With- out a conftant fenfe of : the attributes of God, it is abfolutely impoffible for any perfon living, to al fo as to have the tenour of their condué, ftrictly virtuous, StriG virtue is the refult of a predo- minant defire in the heart to recommend one’s {elf to his favour—arifing from that love, and gratitude, which accompanies the conviion of his parental care and goadnefs, Can any man, then, be faid to have ac- quired an habit of thinking, and alting, conformable to the precepts of religion=— or to have cherithed a conftant fenfe of the attributes of God, who, by #e greateft “_poffible”’ profanation of that {peech, which was given him for purpofes the moft falu- tary, hourly hurls défiance at his throne? To feel not the leaft reverential awe, or re- {fpect, for the name of the fource of nature great Lord of life—almighty governor, di- recor, and fuftainer of the univerfe . +... is ‘#bis to have that uniform fenfe of his at- tributes, without which it is impoflible to be firictly virtuous? !! N 4 Qur j En agi er tr § i ¥ J } 4 v i | (184) Our paflions and appetites, are fo difficult to be reftrained and governed,. that. they Jfometimes gain a temporary afcendant over men of the ftriGeft honour, even when that honour is joined to, and aided by, the moft deep-rooted, and ftrongeft fenfe of religion — for perfection’ is not on earth, and there is no human virtue incapable of being firs prized off its guard, by thole natural pafiigns and propenfities, which are perpetually af- failing even the beft of men—how much lefs, then, can honour be {fuppofed capable of enabling men to refift temptation, if that honour be unfuffained by religion 2e—1It is the refifiance of temptation, alone, which con= Sritutes virtue—and temptation: can be re- fitted, only by that defire to be approved: by: God, which nothing but religion can in fpire—how then can men who are fo pro: fane without remorfe, be deemed {triétly , virtuous !- with the fenfe of the attributes of God; which they earneftly with to hol. —but thaogh ‘people of {trict virtue, Jog fines fray from ts paths, through nady “41 VerLerce ‘When we {peak of men. being ftrictly virtuous, we do not mean, that they never think, or a®, inconfiftent; ( 185 ) vertence,’ “and ‘the violence of fome fudden temptation, yet they never commit evil, pre- meditately~for if ‘they do, they inftantly forfeit ‘every claim to virtue. To live in the commiffion “of ¢ any known crime, or pre- meditately to lay a Jebeme to do evil, is to commit open; and daring hoftilities againft Heaven—and fo far from being compatible with ftri& virtue, it is only confiftent with practical ‘atheifm. It follows, therefore that a If <* the feeling not the leaft moral im- “ propriety in the greateft poflible profane- “¢ nefs of {peech,” is incompatible with the character of a religious perfon—and if virtue cannot {ubfift without religion--no man can. juftly ‘be termed frictly virtuous, who. by living as defcribed by Dr. Prieftley, proves himfelf' deftitute of religion. Convinced, that ‘a wilful perfeverance in any known crime, effetually filences confcience, fo. that ‘the defcent from evil to evil—from fmall * crimes, to great ones, becomes cafy, and certain—the virtuous perfon - ‘18 inceflantly watchful to preferve the moft delicate fenfibility of guilt, as the only fafe-guard from danger. He refufes to tafte any i | | | t f ' f rm —— tt tl. a SENET Sena a aig Sa ead RE ta Ce Sr cor Se EE RSE oa = —— eT EE a ai (186) uy. joy, while a. gonfeious fenfe of evil re- mains on his mind, unexpiated by. repent- ance.and prayer—for in, is eftimation, no- thing: deferves the, name, of, sgppinefi but that ingxpreffible compofure, and {erenity of mind, which is the infeparable attendant on the confcioufnefs of the favour of him who reads the heart—and, of which—thofe who have never felt, and enjoyed it, can no more conceive an idea, than a man: born blind can judge of colours. To be for a moment of cool refle@ion, deprived of fo much pleafure, leads to.a loathing of the ad, by which the relapfe from virtue was occafioned—and to that filent, {elf-humiliation before the father of fpirits, which infures his pardon and blef- fings.. . ‘Though education has certainly great ef- fel on our minds, I cannot think that by a different education, Dr. Prieftley «¢ might haye been as profane as” his men of ftri& virtue ; becaufe, though, his edu- cation had been ever fo much neglected, yet, his philofophical turn, of mind would have led him to examine the works of na- ny and contemplate their author—and, of courfe, he thould have been led into a re- verence for his name, For the fame i | r { 2937 ) « Dr. Pricftley’s education would’ 7ef have ¢¢ given’; his men, of fri virtue, “5 his ex- « guifite {eafibility in this refpect”—at leaft. might ‘mot have given it to them, becaufe we have often feen thofe turn out. very pro- fligate, who had been educated with the t= moft propriety and care. Thofe, on the other hand, who have had no education— and have been all their lives in company with the greateft villains, are not wicked through ignorance of their offences. To prove this, if. we were to go. to St. Giles’s, or Drury-lane, and afk the greateft blafphemer we could meet with, whether lie does not know that a profanation of the name of God, is finful——we fhould find that if he could for once fpeak truth, he would J) fay, “yes.” It is notin confequence of any ignorance of what is right and wrong, that he blafphemes—far from it—the crime is occafioned, not by his want of know- ledge of what is good and evil—but by his want of defire to afl right. Having been repeatedly inattentive to the admonitions of confcience, his confcience ceafed to remon- firate. | Though Dr. Prieftley has given us no proof whatever in fupport of his affertion, 5 that r———— ee ————— R 188 ) that we have no principle that is innate, or natural—he feems to imagine that bis decifive opinion that we bave no fuck principle, thould be fufficient authority. for our faking it for granted—for he imme- diately proceeds to fay, (jufl as if be bad de- monfirated it) ¢ now no principle conceived “ to be innate, or natural, can operate more « certainly or more mechanically than this , «¢ which” he ¢ Zzows to have been acquired : with refpect to” himfelf. ¢ But without « reflection -and obfervation, and judging id by” his ““ own prefent feelings” he «¢ thould have concluded, without the leaft ¢< apprehenfion of being miftaken, that the: ¢¢“ dread of an oath had been natural, and ¢¢’ invariable in mankind. ** That a veneration for the name of I like all other good difpofitions, is to be. ‘¢ acquired”—1is indifputable. He, who never contemplates the wonders of creation, nor reflets on the attributes of the Al- mighty .- - - on the bleffings with which he has furrounded us—and the providence by which we ‘are preferved—cannot poffibly have fuch a refpect for his name, as the * See the 45th page of the Effays | perfon EOI": - (i139 ) perfon who daily employs his mind in con- templating his wifdom, power, and good- nefs. The fwearer, too—of all criminals, is leaft liable to feel remorfe, becaufe, of all’ ‘criminals, he commits his crime maf} frequently and of courfe, by being moft habituated to it, becomes the leaft fenfible of ‘its repetitions. Let a man be ever {fo much addicted to any other great crime, yet it is impoffible that he can repeat that crime, the thoufandth part fo often as the fwearer profanes the name of God—for he does it, perhaps, fifty times in a fentence. He at lift, really does not know when he fwears—The fwearer, there- fore, will not probably feel remorfe for his profanenefs, till a death-bed, or fome great affliction, aroufes him from his infenfibility. The fame cannot be fo truly faid of any other offender, becaufe no other crime can pof- Sfibly be made fo common. Yet—becaufe (by dint of perfeverance in wickednefs—and contempt of thofe inward repugnances which are felt till people are hardened by a courle of guilt) it is poffible for men to reconcile themfelves to the moft atrocious crimes, Dr. Prieftley affirms it follows that no principle of goodnefs, or fenfe of evil, can be innate! 6 — His a RE — SEE Sum Eas Sa HL hod Sr rT Nh E os eee Pm a HE ST EN SE RSE = Bon = Eo Aree iy eS Ae a a ( 190 ) —His argument runs—that if, principles of goodnefs,were innate, they muft be inva~ riably felt by mankind - - - = he gives us no proof that they are woz invariably: felt by mankind«—and yet, though: it is abfalutely impofiible for any perfon to give fuch proof, he takes for granted at once that shey are not invariably felt—and then, (as if he had de- monftrated his propofition,) he draws. his conclufion from it, though it is a conclufion which muft have the moift fatal effe&s, where-ever his doltrine is embraced—for confcience muff then inflantly be defpifed. | Dr. Prieftley could not furely have been ferious, when he aflerted, that ¢¢ whether ‘ the feelings which accompany the ideas ¢¢ of virtue and vice be inftinéive, or ac- ¢¢ quired, their operation is the very fame; ‘¢ fo that the interefts ‘of virtue may be ¢¢ equally fecured on this fcheme as on any ¢¢ other. *¥’ Will the interefts of virtue be fecured, if a belief in our having no in- ftinétive fenfe of good and evil, leads us, as I have thewn it would, to doubt, nay dif- believe, a future ftate, and even the very being of a God ? If Dr. Prieftley really believes that we * See page 45 of the Effays. have ( wi ) have no fuchiinftinGive fenfe—and another. man is convinced that confcience isa moni-: tor implanted by Heaven, muft not be be as. likely to reverence its admonitions, as Dr. Prieftley will be to defpife, and difregard. them! Do we not reverence admonitions. in proportion as we refpect the authority which admonifbes 2 Can it be doubted that a per- fon of Dr. Prieftley’s opinion, will be more apt to give a loofe in thofe indulgences which confcience forbids; than another would be, who believes confcience to be an inftin& impreffed on our minds by the Almighty ? With what furprize, then, muft we hear Dr. Prieftley fay, that ¢ whether the feel- ¢¢ ings which accompany the ideas of virtue « and vice be inftiné&ive, or acquired, their “operation is the very fame”—and that <«¢ the interefts of virtue may be equally «¢ fecuared on that f{cheme, as on any «¢ other!” Is it philofophical to deny a propofition, againft the truth of which one cannot pro- duce a fingle fatisfatory evidence? It is true, we are ignorant in what manner ideas arife in our minds—Dbut are we not equally ignorant in what manner we move our fingers? Dr. Prieftley knows that at his pleafure ( 192 ) pleafure- he can. contrat the finews of his hand——but can he inform me bow his will a&s upon thofe finews, fo as to oc- cafion that contraction ? If not, then pray would this ignorance authorize him to deny that his will atl on his finews? I. {uppofe he will not fay it would—then as little can it authorize him to deny that there is a fpi- ~ ritual principle in man—and that the Al- mighty has imprefled 2 fenfe of good and evil on our minds, merely becaufe he can- "not comprehend zbe manner in which our fouls are united to our bodies—and by which the Almighty holds {uch intelligence with his creatures. P A R T VII Strittures on Dr. Hartley's Theory. Shall now make fome obfervations on Dr. Hartley's work, fince, by Dr. Prieft- y's partial publication of it, fcarcely any but its exceptionable parts have been {ent abroad into the world. The many excel- lent fentiments which are found in Dr, Hartley's books, in fome degree counter- ballance the evil tendency of his dotrine of neceflity—and I therefore fhould not have thought it neceffary to comment on thafc,. parts ( 193 ) parts which deferve cenfure, if Dr. Prictt- ley had fuffered Dr. Hartley s work to res main in its own form ——but republithed as it now appears from Dr. Prieftley’s hand, to be filent would be criminal. The publi- cation of his abridgement may lead: many people to read the exceptionable parts of Dir! Hartley’ s work, who, otherwife, might nes ver have been at the trouble of perufing i it, I certainly am myfelf among that fum- ber—and I therefore think it my duty to do my utmoft in order to confute thofe arguments, which I deem dangerous—and expofe thofe abfurdities and inconfiftencies, which, when expofed, muft lead reafonable men to reje& Ais doctrine of neceflity, and confequently, Dr. Prieftley’s of aflociation, —{ince, on the credit of Dr. Hartley's tef- timony, Dr. Prieftley’s hypothefis cannot be well founded, if Dr, Hartley's Be bafe~" lefs. Dr. Hartley was fully fatisfied, and certain, that if the do@rine of affociation of ideas be admitted, it muft infeparably draw after it, that of neceffity——and fond of his hypothefis refpecting affociation, on the one hand—and yet clearly perceiving that unles its companion, nec?) ity, could be explained in a manner confiftent with 0 God’s | | — ste et ni ER te Fe A Se Ne, a... LL LA ik] PL O - » God's attributes, onthe other—=t 3 lity of its truth, muft prove the falfehoed . of hiscdoérine of affociation; abd he: these- fore laboured. to: reboncile. neceffity,. with Jthe.divine juftice, ngoodnefs; ard merey.io oc. For-this purpafe, Dr. Hartley diyidad feewill,: into two kinds—philofophical~— -ipif practical, or popular—=admitted ‘our -poffefiing the latter—but: denied our having the former——and by this- means deceived _himfelf into belief that, he-had fet men at liberty to-do good or evil, and yet main- tated #hut neceflity, without which, he was -fenfible that his doé&rine of the aflociation bef ideas, wonld be overturned. dug i,o-In:the courfe of the following pages, iI _pelieve I thalldemonftrate fatisfactorily, that the différence between the: two kinds of free! will, attempted: to: be) proved by Dr. ( ag4 ) o impo ffit- ~4 . Hartley, was imaginary~—and that we either poflefs both kinds, or neither | If Dr. Hat- ley's Strong defire to eftablifh his hypothefis, _had not prevented his deteGing the decep- tion ‘which blinded him; kam convinced he would have shanged his opinion, and rer nounced his doctrine. of affociation of ideas, the momerit. that: he. found it drew 2 €OO~ eo ar wu feguence n { ¥ » had ", ( 195 ) fequence after it, incompatible 'withothe sattributes of God, and repugnant to our reafon. He was deceived into ‘an imagiira- ‘tion, that man could: enjoy his: popular, or. pralical free will, without: that which he defined to be philofophical—-and he ~was thence led to believe that the neceffty which refulted from the do&rine of -affoci= ation, did not in the leaft degree: deprive man of that kind of free will, which:he acknowledged to be indifpenfably requifite to render him accountable for his actions. ‘We may conclude from his preface: (which Dr. Prieftley has allowed to. appear dn: his publication) with what horrour he would ‘have: viewed any doctrine ithat® rendered ‘man incapable of being rewarded or punifhi- ed, with fuftice. It thews, too,-how fedr- ful be was, lefttiuad man ‘a@ions; ‘nor in the ultimaté happinefs’ of all mankind—=for with regard to the firft;® heallows ‘that we poflefs that “s:voluritary segpower; ‘over our affeciony “and actions;’ “Shy which wel ddliberare, fufpend; and chafe;™ ~3a0and’ Tfhduld be' very glad to know,’ howe Bich 4 power, is, ‘er cin 'be, confiftent’ with gircumftances ‘of bodyand mind, in'the. without amiindbcemént] we : have! not the” s¢> fame manner; and with the fame certainty, | power: obo begining motion tymel write’ sssgqg other effeCts do from their mechanical : tHiseflay;- for example; induced: -by a hope" 18013 6 caufes 3 : 2a) that ( (202) that it nay be. of ule to mankind, and pey= haps, ‘even to. Da.' Prieftléy—Dbut: edn: it therefore ‘follow, that! becaufe ‘kde not write without’ having an’ end in-view, 1 had not the woluntary power to begin-the motion - of taking pen, papet, and ink, and placing myfelf at’ this table P—=Does it not: this moment entirely: depend on'myfelf, whether E: fhall continue the motion: of writing, or: chufe to ‘walk into''ithe ftreets?=+And if T (hould: be" induced by. the mildnefs of the air, ‘to prefer the motion, of my legs, to that of ‘my right hand, can it be {aid that" Ihave not the power of *¢ beginning” which - motion pleafe 2~=There, isc certainly no ‘s badily: motion” this’ moment “* exifting Cin” my “¢brain’wrne ¢ vibrations” which can prevent my exerting the full power of beginning any motion I pleafe—nor can any perfon fay, without being very abfurd, that becaufe 4-do not move, without having an end in view, I therefore have nat a «¢. power of ‘beginning motion |” - Pro Hartley: fays, that: < if by free will ‘;/hemeaned.any thing different from thefe “two definitions of it, :it may not perhaps ¢“:he inconfiltent with the mechani{m of ¢#ithe smind these laid down.” “Now itis. WOO ““ curious ”» (“7205 ) cisiotis to obferve what it 15 ‘which he thinks ‘en be 'meaned by free will, different from «¢_thefe two definitions of it.” * Thus, If ¢ Ifree will be defined the ‘power of Ading we what a, perfon defires, or wills to do, of “ ‘deliberating, fufpending ‘chufing, &c: << jor of refifting the ‘motives to ‘fenfuality, ‘wibitioh, réfertmert, &c. free will, un= we ‘der cértain limitations, ‘is ‘not only con= é ‘fiftent with the doctrine of mechanifin, «bit even flows from’it ; fince itappears « “fromthe foregoing theoty, that voluntary ¢ and femivoluntary powers of calling up « ideas, of exciting and ‘reftraining affec- «tions, and of performing and fufpending “¢ alions, arife from the'mechanifm of our <¢ natures. - This may- be called free ‘will «in the popular and practical fenfe, in ¢« contradifti@®ion to that which is oppofed «¢ to mechanifm, and which may be called «free will in the philofophical fenfe.” Now how can any ‘man in his fenfes fay, that if I have the power of doing what I de- Sire, or will to do, 1. am, notwithflanding, deftitute of the * power of beginning «motion ?”’—1If I have the power of doing what ‘I defire—and my. defire, is, to begin my “n———muft 1 ‘not then, dave the : power ( 206 ;) power: to begin motion, | fince otherwife, T-abfolutely have ot the powers of doing what id defire 2 of 202 pop ... «I therefore maintain that the definition of free will into two. kinds; philofophical and popular, is abfurd—fince they muft beeither both enjoyed, or both wanted.:: If I have po- pular free will, I muft likewife have philo- fophical—and if I have zor philofophical free will, I certainly am deftitute of popular. ‘They go together, and cannot be feparated —it is a diftinction, without a difference ! —When, therefore, in order to enforce the opinion of mechanifm, to the exclufion of philofophical free will, Dr. Hartley urges the following argument, 7£it be. admitted to prove our not having philofopbical free will, it muft plead equally ftrong againft that popular free will, without which, Dr. Hartley allows that there can ‘be no fuch thing as good and evil, virtue and vice. . It either. proves nothing, or proves too muehi Thus he argues—¢* firft, then, it is evident «to, and allowed by all, that the actions ¢ of mankind proceed, in many cafesy “¢ from motives, that is; from the influersce ¢¢ which the’ pleafures “and "pains of ‘feps «¢! fation; imagifiation, ambition," felf=ind “*tereft, fympathy, theopathy, and the 9 ¢¢ moral (0207 ) <4; moral fenfe;! have over them! And thefe \#& qnptivesifeemy to ad like all other caufes. ¢«« When the motive is ftreng,- the action '«s iis performed with vigour when ‘weak, st sfeeblys’ When a contrary. motivesinter- ss: vierres, | litrichecks or .oversrules, 1n. pros ss cportion 10 itsirelative: ftrength,. as: far as <${ohe can! judge... So: that where the mo- gives dre the fame, the ations cannot ‘be ot: differents where: the. motives are differ- sesent; the a&ions cannot be the fame.” = AThat we a, from motites==is certain-— becaufe otherwife, we fhould:not be reafon~ able: ‘creatures’ But if we: remain quite paffive, and’ the motives ‘which influence our actions; rife up {pontaneoufly, and 1m- pell us into action, independent of our powers ~othen, I fhall readily allow, we cannot bé faid to! have philofophical free will, but I muft; atthe fame time affert, that we can a0ith as little reafon be. faid fo bave, popular. Like feathers, placed on: aneminence, in a eal, the direction in which they. are ta be blown, depends on the fir wind that rifes— and:it would be as unjuft fo punifth man for: being burried away into evil, byrtemp-~ tation=oas to impute criminality tothe fea-’ thers, for flying eaft with the weftern wind. i 0 +3 0} vedic mv) 9 nlf <, : o : : » A wa y wild AM 3 - 5 A ’ Cea 3 1 “ Sf iL 100k ( 208 ) if, on the other hand—although we are ine fluenced by motives, we havea power with in our breafts, by which we can at pleafure have recourfe to other motives, and examine by which motives it #5 beff to be influenced, ~ we then, by recovering POPULAR free will, regain poffeffion of PHILOSOPHICAL. It'is by the poffeflion of this power, that the mind holds its empire——for when this power is loft, we are faid to be out of our fenfes—and then our acts can neither be good fior evil. It is in #he power of our minds to tefle@ on whatever motives we pleafe, at the fovereign command of our arbitrary pleafure, that free will confifts—and if we have it not, we are mere machines, i incapa= ble of vice or virtue. But if we Aagve that power, and do not chufe to ufe it—we then become criminal for not having exerted it. I am not a free agent if I am under 2 neceflity of yielding to a temptation to-day, becaufe I chofe to give way to it, yefterday. When yefterday tempted to do evil, 1 willed NOT #0 exert that will to refit which I might have exerted, (in order to refle® on motives to virtue)—and which if I had ex erted, the reflections which would have arifen in my mind moft probably would 2 have ( 260 ) Have produced 4° contempt for thofe vicioas motives, by ‘which it was my will 20 be then nflubnced—but unlefs it can be proved that I am this day bound to wi#/ a thing, becdufe I willed it yefterday, it will follow, that 1 may this day, in the hour of temptation, wil, to think of virtuous motives, which might, and moft probably would, influence me ‘td refift the evil. Tf Tam this day in the fame fittation I was yefterday—not only tempted in the fimé manner, but my will holds like- wife the fame to-day, as it did then——of courfe I hall WILL, not to call up any vir uous reftraining motive—and I therefore thall certainly commit the fame evil—but then, that evil cannot be faid to have Been com- mitted of necelf ity, becaufe it was folely owing to my own will, that 1 finned, fince I ight bave willed to call in virtuous inducements tomy aid. Deny this, and popular free wil, is taken away, as well as philofophical. “If we are incapable’ to-day, of avoiding a ‘repetition of that ‘evil which we commit- ted yefterday, provided we are tempted pre- cifely in the fame manner—it follows, that, all” our "good * or evil ations depend, not ’ upon us, Le free aj agents, but upon Cafualtits which” “deprive us’ of 7 Jr ‘compel’ us Ee i } | | - = ( 210 ) us to be. good or wicked, (according as hey happen to wi. The agtiansy then, in fad, ceafe to be either good or 'wiiekedw—andiin _that.view—man cannot bey with juftice; di- ‘able either to rewards or punifhmentsiocl .gannot forefee that a temptation will prefent Jitlelf to-morrow~——1I therefore ‘cannot be punifhed for not avoiding; ‘what I" did not forefee—and if I cannot “help being .over- “powered by that temptation, (by-any:exet- ~tiom:of my will) when it’ does -arrivey:1 £ v a. ( 5213 1) upon thefe, fubjecs ;- the one popular, «¢_and when applied to God, ‘anthropomor- ¢¢. phitical ;. the other philofophical ; and « that the notion of popular liberty is fuffi- ¢«¢_cient to obviate thefe difficulties, while «« we keep to the popular language alone ; «¢ alfo, that the philofophical language does «¢ of itfelf obviate thefe difficulties, while ¢« we keep to it alone ; but that if we mix s¢ thefe languages, then, and not till then, « infuperable difficulties will arife, as might ¢ well be expected.” Dr, Hartley was very right in thus en- deavouring to prevent our mixing lan- guages,which metaphyfical madnefs or folly reconciled to his own mind, and fatisfied him of the poffibility of their remaining fepa- rate. But the fa@ happens to be, that if we with to find truth, confute error, and reafon like men whom metaphyfic has not blinded, and infatuated—we are compelled to mix thefe abfurd languages ; which bave #0 ex- iftence, and muft be unintelligible to every « brain,” where common fenfe prefides. If one language, informs us that three and three; are fix—and another, that three and three, are twenty—and if each of thefe lan- guages fatisfies us very well, while we ad- Pj here (214) Rere to it, alone=—but we fiid, the momerit we mix them, that 'it ‘cannot be tree, ‘at thie fame time, ‘that three and ‘three, sre fix~= and that three and three, are twenty—thould we not be irrefiftibly 1éd to deny that a fyf- tem of arithmetic, founded upon two fuck languages, could poffibly be free from error ? — Can philofophers,” like children,’ bé amufed with empty founds? Are we blindly to have faith in a'do@rine—which it is found cannot be true, ‘until contradictory pofitions can agree? Can two oppofite opinions be both well founded ? If thefe fame two lan- guages (fit only for the mouth of Don Quix- te!) are found incompatible with each other, fhall we keep them feparate, inorder that we may be deccived by the abfurdities which they mean to recommend to us 2 Are we to fay that men may juftly be punithed for vice, becaufe they have liberty «#0 re- # Jif} the motives to fenfuality” - - = - have "a voluntary power over their affections and “ aftions, by which they can deliberate, fu- “ pend, and’ chufe’—and yet, after having but juft given man, every pofiible liberty that can be déemed requifite to render him’ per- fectly mafter of his own actions, and at free liberty 0 refit the motives to ferfuality, Of to indul ge ( 315 ) indulge them——are we. to be fo very abfurd and ridiculous as to affert in the fame breath, that ¢¢ all the ations of man proceed ultimately « from God?” ll! Y There are fins in the world, if, then, all the actions of man proceed ultimately from God, the confequence is impious. If all the actions of man proceed ultimately from God, no fin can juitly be afcribed to man. Man either zs, or is not, a free agent, ——if he fe a free agent, then a// ations do not ultimately proceed from God—fince man might avoid thofe fins which he com- mits, and commit thofe fins which he avoids, and if he be not a free agent, then there are no fuch things as virtue and vice, good and evil——and man cannot juftly be punithed for not counteralting the will of omnipotence. | Yet, ftrangely inconfiftent as Dr. Hart- ley’s preceding arguments have been—they are, if poflible, found more fo, in the fol» lowing train of reafoning which I am going to take notice of. He thinks we cannot have philofophical liberty, becaufe the docs « trine of philofophical free will is the « caufe and fupport of much pride and ¢ f{elf-conceit ; and this fo much the more, Ty era == a ae (1216 ) go as'ft isa ‘doltrine not only allowed, but #igven infifted upon and requiréd, and made « effential to the diftinction between virtue if and vice. ¥ Hence men are commanded, A as it were, to fet a value tipon their own “altions, by efteeming them their own in ¢ the higheft fenfeof the words, and taking “ the merit of them to themfelves. ' For * philofophical free will fuppofes that God % ‘has given to each man a {phere of a&ion, “ in which he does not interpofe; but leaves " man to act entirely from himfelf, inde- é* pendently of his Creator; and as, upon #® Ayewand it is *¢ infifted upon, and required, and ¢ made eflential to the diftincion between virtue and “¢ vice,” even by Dr. Hartley bim/elf, notwithftanding he is here denying our having fuch 2 liberty—left— (as he js 'juft’going to fay) we fhould * be proud and felf-con- ¢¢ ceited ?”’ Read his own words in the 54th page of the fecond volume—as.follows, ¢ It may be obferved that ¢ when any action is commended or blamed, this is al- “ways done upon the fuppofition that the action under ~ #—W ith what agony muft the wicked be made acquainted with the plea- {ures perpetually enjoyed by the happy ! - - - How muft they be afflicted, by the know- ledge that the capacities of the pure fpirits are enlarging, in proportion as they are made acquainted with the wonders of cre-- ation—and that in proportion as they are inftructed by the happy fpirits, who have made nearer approaches to the Deity, their powers of enjoyment encreafe with their knowledge, and receive ftrength from gra- tification—perpetually rifing to more extatic pleafures | What, but annihilation, can give reft, or a moment’s eafe to a departed {pirit, which refle@ts on the delights which might have been purchafed—and feels its in- capacity to tafle them, even if they could be than the continuance of fenfual defires, in a fpiritual nature ! ——How much ought this confideration to lead us to do all in our power to gain fuch an afcendancy over our appetites, whilft in our prime of life, asto render them, even in our full vigour, fubfervient to religion and reafon !——How much ought this to in- cite us to acquire, and improve, a relifh for mental pleafures—and fet us on our guard againft every indul- gence that is forbidden by confcierice! YT 2 obtained ( 276 ) obtained on the condition that they could be relifbed ! ——No confinement is neceflary to feclude them from heaven——for though permitted to enter it, heaven, to them, would become a place of torment!— Their taftes vitiated——no defire of know- ledge acquired no acquaintance coms- menced with the Almighty - - - their fa- culties neglected their Jabits all formed by vice, and no objects to gratify Sfenfuat appe~ tites, which bave become inordinate by' n= dulgence—where can they fly from torture ! What can afford them eafe! Envy, rage, hatred, difappointment—and, above all, an agony of grief at the recollection of that folly, of which they have {uch lamentable demonftration, muft purfue them with more than fcorpion’s flings, and render thought infupportable | — Dreadful fituation! hor- rid ftate of being! Wherever they fly, the moft diftraéting refleftions muft purfue them ! How will they curfe that depra- vity of mind, that unaccountable ideotifm, which led them to negle&t the diamonds at their feet, and run wild after the bubbles, which burft as they embraced them! With what unutterable contempt muft they look down off all the purfuits that formerly engrofied ( 277 ) ‘engrofled their attention—and on the falfe opinions of mankind; which gave them va- Jue! — And yet, unable to help longing for a. repetition of their vicious 'ehjoyments, they muft be condemned to with for what they defpife ! Then, fince it is impoflible for wicked minds to be at peace, while they retain the confcioufnefls of what they might have been, and what they are, how can we f{uppofe, li- terally, that 2// men fhall in Chrift be made alive? Since long confirmed habits of premeditated evil, cannot be got the better of, but by annihilation—(or till the nature is changed, fo as to amount almoft to a new creation—) the wicked muft remain mife- rable, while they remain confcious. Confe- quently, if, by the words, ¢ fo in Chrift “¢ {hall all be made alive,” it is intended that we thould underftand that ¢// mankind are, through him, to efcape future punith- ment, and be happy, we find that this is abfolutely impoffible in the prefent nature of things—becaufe the wicked, cannot derive happinefs from a fpiritual exiftence, and muff be miferable, unlefs the Almighty works a miracle in their favour, dy altering that order of things which be has thought pro- T 3 per (278 ) ; per to ordain—and preventing thofe natural effects, which their caufes were intended ‘to produce. ‘We find that it is impoflible,.too, becaufe Chrift himfelf has ‘exprefsly faid that the wicked will be punifhed—and fince revelation, and reafon, jointly affure us of this truth, we are compelled to deny that all mankind are to be fo made alive in Chrift, as to efcape future punifloment, and be bappy. From whence it follows, that 7f all men died in Adam, in the fame fenfe, that all men are to be made alive in Chrift—(which the words import) it is as impoffible that all mankind can be punifbed for Adam’s fake, as that all mankind can efcape punithment for Chrift’s and we therefore conclude, that we die in Adam, only by inberiting that flefb which was created to corrupt, and zhofe appetites, and paffions, which prompt us to evil—and that we are made alive in Chrift, only by bis having defcended to point out the road to lsfe— fet us an example in every virtue—and qualify bimfelf to be received by the Almighty, as a mediator and interceffor for man. Befides if the fin of Adam is imputed to us, fo as to fubje& us to punifhment for pis fin—what becomes of the juflice, good- nefi, and mercy of God !=——The idea blaf- phemes ("279 ) phemes his attributes. It fhocks my, na- ture, -and is repugnant to my reafon. I could as eafily believe a wafer to be the real body of Chrift—that two and two are a thoufand—or that the fame thing, is, and is not, at the fame time. If there were no way of underitanding {cripture, without ad- mitting this do@rine, I fhould bold it to be a fufficient reafon for difbelieving that there bas been any revelation from God. How can we be furprized if religion is laughed at, and ridiculed, while men take fuch pains to per- fuade us that it is founded upon a doctrine, which divefts the Almighty of that juftice, goodnefs, and mercy, without which his omnipotence would be frightful ?- His idea would excite my fear—but never my love. I could never repofe confidence in his government. Even in common life, can we have dependence on thofe, whom we know to be cruel, unjuft, and infincere De Should we not execrate the tyrant, who could condemn a youth to the torture, be- caufe his grandfather had offended before he was born ? As little can we be anf{wer- able for the offence of a man, who finned fix thoufand years before we were in being. I had no more power to prevent Adam's eat- T 4 ing ( 280 ) ing the apple, than I have now to make the world, wife, virtuous, and honeft—it would therefore’be as confiftent with juftice, to fend me to Tyburn for a murder commnyit= ted in the Antipodes, as to throw upon:my fhoulders any part of the weight of Adams fin. Our own fins, Heaven knows! are weighty enough, and heavier. than we need wifh them, without having Adams fruit flung into our fcale.. JERE GA IVE And even if we {fuppofe that Adam'and Eve, by carefully avoiding the place where the forbidden tree grew, had efcaped fin— what reafon have we thencé to imagine but that their defcendants would have fallen into vice, when the ground on which: they ftood became more flippery, and the hill they had to climb became more fteep? Adam and Eve were as capable of commiting fin, before they finned, as afterwards—and if fo, why might not their children have finned, though their parents had not? If z4e capa- bility of finning, had not been deemed efien- tial to the conftitution of man, no apple- tree in Eden would have been prohibited— and fince it was deemed eflential, in Adam, ‘why fhould we fuppofe it ‘would not have been as effential in bis children 2 We can “Be | have ( 281) have no right. to. fuppofe, that Adam and Eve's not having eaten the apple, would have prevented, our inheriting that propen- fity to evil, which it was deemed proper for Adam and Eve to paffefs, even when they came from: their Maker's band. . When in their “fate of innocence, they were capable of fin- ning, for they did fin, when in that Slate confequently their defcendants could not have inherited a nature, better than that with which their firft parents bad. been endued at their creation. The defcendants of Adam muft therefore have inherited a nature, ca- pable of finming—and confequently, amidft the temptations which have multiplied with the {pecies, the propenfities which we feel, as men, muft have led us to abufe that free will, which we received from God—and have made the world exactly what it 15, nokt- withflanding Adam’ sinnocence. We Know that the Almighty chofe that we {hould be the kind of creatures that we now are, rather than be in a fate ,of perfection incapable of fin- ning, becaufe otherwife, Ae would not have created fuch a creature as mon—and we have thence every reafon to conclude, that he re- ceives, more pleafure from. the imperfect ebedience—firm truft—rational adoration— humble ( 282 )) humble confidence, and implicit refignation of the good men on earth —however. they are liable to err, and fail—than with the fervice of angels, who are incapable of fwerv- ing from’ virtue. We, it ‘1s: true, cannot without horror refle&t on’ the cruelties and villainies which are -daily committed—but we fhould not therefore prefume to con- demn a whole, of which we fee only a pars. It is impofiible for us to know, how frequent- Iy even the greateft erimes of the worft men, are productive of good—and he therefore ‘can only eftimate the balance, in whofe view ‘the whole account of good and evil lies open. If man were not, what he is—(a fallible creature, endued with a rational mind, and liberty to act as he pleafes,) the moft ado- ‘rable attribute, mercy——1like the diamend concealed in the mine—would fhine in vain, unobferved. We know of no other intelligent anfwerable agents—who, like man, have propenfities to vice, difpofitions: to- virtue, and power to chufe between thém and as fuch, are the only kind of beings who can be objects of mercy——if there were none fuch exifting, mercy, in God, would be an ideal attribute, which it would be impof- fible could be underftood by his creatures, : fince ( 283 ) fince they could have no opportunity of fee- ing its operation. Offending man_(fincere- ly concerned for his offences, humbly im-~ ploring pardon, and anxioufly folicitous to amend,) is. the miner who draws forth the mercy of God—the moft brilliant perfe&tion of omnipotence! and. holds it up, in the view of admiring worlds. - For, What is mercy ¢ Mercy implies suffice refrained, and favour foewn where punifh- ment bas been deferved. Punifbment mut bave been deferved, before mercy can operate. GOODNESS may difpenfe its bleflings, where there has been no criminality—Dbut bleflings, fo difpenfed, are given by suffice and not by mercy. Thofe, confequently, who conceive ju/~ tice and mercy to be jarring attributes, hard to be reconciled, thew that they are igno- rant what mercy means. It is impoflible that juftice and mercy can ever interfere, where goodnefs, wifdom, and knowledge, are united. Knowledge, wifdom, and good- nefs—{o far from being prevented by guftice, from fhewing mercy—are. prompted and di- rected dy juftice, to fhew mercy to repentance and amendment, It is the province of juf- tice, to arrange our abilities, opportunities— and ( 284 ) and ‘the affiftances we have received from Heaven—in one fcale—and in the other, our propenfities, temptations, and infirmities, It is juftice who holds the’ ballance—and points out the objets to mercy. Theyare twin fifters, affeGtionate friends who never difagree. Mercy never fmiles, until fhe has diftinguithed her objet, by the infeription of juftice, confpicuous in: capitals. on ‘the front, GUILT --- NOT THE EFFECT OF PREMEDITATION, BUT OF SUR- PRIZE. VICE - - -- UNIFORMLY. COMBATED, THOUGH SOMETIMES INEFFECTUALLY. PIETY TO GOD —DEPENDENCE: ON HIS ATTRI- BUTES—BENEVOLENCE TO MAN. Then why thould we condemn the pre- fent conftitution of man, and think it unfit to have been formed as itis? If it were in- capable of evil, the mercy of God could have no objec on which it could a&. Will any man fay that it is improper the mercy of God fhould have objets on which it can alt >=——Will any man fay that it is impro- per fo glorious an attribute fhould be dif- played to his creatures f——=Yet {choolmen cenfure that ftate of things, without which, ; ~~ neither ( 285 ) neither angels nor men could be made ac- quainted with - the perfections: of their Creator! OE Thy GLB We cannot fay that it is improper there {hould be rational minds in a creation, fo formed as to be capable of good and evil—— and of being rewarded or punifhed confift- ent ‘with juftice—and yet if we had no pro- penfities to evil, fiuch would be the fituation, at leaft as far as we'can know, for our good altions would then ceafe to be good. Hu- manity, benevolence, a tender {ympathy for the diftreffes of mankind, for example, has great weight with good minds in recommend- “ing to their favour—yet as fuch a difpofition of heart is tbe effec? of nature, it cannot in the leat recommend to the favour of God, un- lef it be accompanied by thofe earneft en- deavours to avoid evil, which can alone tefti- fy a defire to pleafe him. We can earneftly endeavour to avoid evil, only by an uniform difpofition to combat our appetites and paf- fions. Unlefs the ruling propenfity of the mind, be babitually refified, and generally with effeéd, our charity, and all thofe good difpofitions which we poffefs by nature, will have no weight in recommending us God. one This ( 286 ) This is ftrikingly exemplified in the’ gofpel *—where the young man afked Jefus Chrift what he fhould do to inherit eternal life. ‘The man, it was found, bad kept the commandments from bis youth up—but as Jefus Chrift knew, that Ass evil propenfity, or ftrong paffion, prompted him to an improper Irve of money, he tried him, fingly by his manner of regulating zbat paflion—for he defired him to ¢ fell” his property, and “ give to the poor, and he fhould have «¢ treafure in heaven.” We find, however, that ¢ the young man, on hearing that ‘ faying, went forrowfully away, for he ¢¢ had great poflfeflions”—and (by not hav- ing cultivated in his mind, a proper fenfe of the attributes of God,) was deftitute of the only principle which could have enabled him to refift his ftrong propenfity. If he had fre- quently refleted on the Almighty, as his Creator, preferver, and friend—as a Being, continually prefent—with goodnefs, and juftice, to reward or punifh, as he. thould approve or condemn—he would have been fo accuftomed to combat his paflfion for money, that when a worker of miracles bid * 19th chapter of Mathew. him (287 ) him Sell, and give to the poor, and ‘be fhould bave treafire in Heaven, his heart would have been eafily inclined to obey the injunc- tion—and fo far from having gone forrow- fully away, he would have rejoiced in giv- ing the required teftimony of his defire to recommend himfelf to God. The young man was therefore tried, under what fubjec- tion be bad brought bis favourite propenfity— as the only way to prove bis defire to pleafe the Almighty. The virtues which refulted from the natural difpofition of his heart, had no weight in his favour, decau/e unaccompanied by the only proof that he could have given, of bis’ love for, duty to, and dependence on, bis Creator. We therefore find, that bis having done no murder—committed no adultery—ne- wer having been difbonéfi—never having borne falfe witnefs—and always having honoured bis father and mother—and bis having practifed all thefe great virtues from bis youth up—_ig- nified nothing in the fight of God—were confidered as no virtues sz Aim, becaufe bis paffions did not prompt bim to any breach of them. Though his life had been, in all thefe circumftances, fo very irreproachable from ( 288 ) from. his . youth up—-(which: Jefus= Cheift, who had power from Ged to know: his hears, admitted, yet his failure in properly combate ing that propenfity by which alone be was tobe tried, made our Saviour exclaim to his Dif= ciples, ¢ verily I fay unto you, that a rich «¢ man fhall hardly enter into the kingdom “¢ of heaven.” He knew, that ofall the pro= penfitics which {way the human heart, the paflion for money is the moft dangerous— inafmuch as it is fo apt to. deceive people into an opinion that they are guilty of no crime, in with-holding what they errone- oufly imagine to be their own——and, at: the fame time, to blunt every amiable feeling —and render the heart callous to every ten= der fentiment. On the authority of Jefus’ Chrift, the mifer can ¢¢ bordly” ever a&, fo as to recommend himfelf to the favour of God, or efteem of man. If relieving the diftrefles of the unfortd~ nate, were to have weight with God, when the perfons who give the relief, determi-- nately perfevere in the indulgence of their appetites and Ppaflions—the moft- profligate men and women in the kingdom, might be, fuppofed to ftand high in his favour —fer - , «8 @ IRL Ras there ( 289.) there are thofe, who are vicious, profti« gate, abandoned——deftitute of {hame, as. well as. of public: and private prin- “ciple——who are notwithftanding, hu- mane, and charitable. In our eftimation ~on finding humanity, and charity, in Such chara&ers, it in fome degree extenu- ates their offences——but it cannot in the leaft extenuate them, with God becaufe be muft know that their charities are dif- penfed, not in oppofition to any avaricious propenfity but in order to gratify the na- tural bent, which, for wife, and beneficent purpofes, he imprefled on their minds at their birth. It cannot be urged, that fince the propenfities which prompt to vice, were implanted by the Creator, as well as thofe which prompt to charitable actions, the Jormer thould weigh no heavier againft them, than the letter for them——becaufe the good difpofitions, found nothing to oppofe them in their breafls—the giving way to them, fo far from being oppofed by their judge- ment, thwarting their inclinations, or de- priving them of any pleafure, gave rife to pleafing ideas—and confequently, muit be known by the Almighty to afford uo zeffi- mony of their duty to bim, or of their defire to U pleafe ¢ 290) pleas imi bt ¢ the viciots’ propenfities, THE 0 cofitrary, though natdral, ‘vere coun- teratied by z powerful monitor putpofely | im- planted, to advife” againft’ ‘indulging to Binkisty to the’ ‘commands of God—an {Herefore ‘cannot be premeditately indulged, without hurling defiance at the power who has. cottmimded that they Joould be refrained by religion “and reafon. The vicrous’ propen- ties, ‘tod, by prompting ‘to an indulgence of ‘appetite, tempt to fenfuat pleafire—there- fore ‘the not yielding to the temptation, is pleafing to So becaufe he knows that’ giv- ing way to would have afforded 3 grat ification Zand Fd io ‘motive could have been powerful ‘enough to have occafioned re- iffanice, but zbe defire to pleafe him, fear 20 offend bim—the grateful fenfe of b bis paft good- nefs, ‘and ftedfaft dependence on his future. protection, whillt that protection is de fforved, by a refolution to avoid wilful di ifobedie sence. ‘When 'fuch a difpofition of ‘mind is de- monftrated, by an uniform defire to ‘avoid évil, ‘then, and then only, the giving way # the benevolent feelings, can recommend tthe favour of the Almighty—for no good: qualities, can, in n the Jeaft degree, counter- balance Ad ( dor Batatice premeditated ouilt, daily accumulat- ed'in fp fe of donfeienice. It is impofiible for. the’ beft men on earth ‘to glory,” Or entertain an improper fenfe of their owt merit, when (they refle@ that any amiable quilities they may poflefs, are enjoyed inde- pendent of their power—and when they recolle&, how frequently they fwerve from their duty, This leads good men to look more into the feaded parts of their own charader, ‘than into thofe which appear brighteft. They refle®, more on the im- purities they have entertained in their minds, and which they might have excluded—and on the relapfes into vice, which they might have avoided—than on thofe amiable a&ions from which they bad no temptations to refirain them, — —and confequently——-though the virtuous tenour of their lives—Aabitual piety —defire to avoid evil—fincere contrition on its remembrance, and confidence in God's attributes, produce refignation, truft, and peace, they are {olicitous, notwithftanding, that their account may be obliterated—and- that when they go to judgment, they may meet—not, frit juftice—but mercy. - Ss ch are the benefits we derive from evil, Its makes good men, humble and refigned— U2 raifes (292 ) raifes their views toa glorious futurit; —-ana frequently réminds them of ‘the inftability of earthly happinefs. 'Confidefing'it in'this light, the conftitution of “man: is’ found wifely formed, and the ‘work of the Al= mighty is juftified. = Evil, is found infepa= rable from a ftate of trial and probation and to have been permitted, iff confequence of the goodnefs of the Creator. hostlsdw But the attributes of the Almighty are xo? defencible, if Dr. Prieftley’s doGrines are well founded, for if man be of oneuni= form compofition—entirely material—to be ‘ex= sing at death—and if be be deftitute of any n= finétive fenfe of moral good and evil—neither cevelation nor reafon afford him any hope for" ‘another life—and moral, and natural evil, immediately become of courfe, ins compatible with goodnefs, juftice, and mer- cy. = The evils of life muft immediately’ be- come infupportable, becaufe the only coms fort of the wretched, muft be removed. The world is therefore greatlyindebted to Dr. Pricttley for having endeavoured fo re- moe every hope and fear: of futurity, which envhurdges ‘the’ good; ‘and deters the wicked ag well as for shaving done ‘all® in his power fo deprive thofe who are happy, of their moft fubftantial (293) Jubflantial pleafures—and thafe wha are mi- Jerable ‘of their only confolation. The cer- tainty of, another life—and that evil, for wife ends, is permitted, dy goodnefi—makes ussrefigned under the affliGtions of life, and enables us to enjoy tranquillity and content- ment, under every viciffitude and circum- ftance of fortune—for how can be be over- whelmed by misfortune, or inconfolable un- der calamity, who knows that the diftrefs which occafioned it,was permitted b yinfinite goodnefi—and that if the right ufe be made of ity infinite power will render it conducive to-happinefs,when znfinite wifdom fees it moft expedient ? Imprefled with fuch a de- lightful conviction, wherever he goes he bears about within his breaft, an inexhauf> tible ftore of comfort. No human power can rob him of his hoard—for his treafure is encircled by - - - his heart. The confciouf- nefs of guilt, unatoned for by repentance, can alone render him wretched. No pain ~=no ‘ficknef§-—no misfortune,—no depri- vation of wife, children, parents, or friends, can choak up, or remove, that rifing {pring of‘joy, which overflows, and diffufes itfelf, through his: foul, on looking forward to the period: of his fufferings, and the commence- Uj ment Sr — — ES een wo em SH TE RU ORES. ( 204 ) mencement . of » his incongeivable enjoys ments, « No gloomy.. apprehenfion. of, our being: too inconfiderable for; ithe notice, of | Qmanipotence, can throw ia: fhade over his bright profpe——for he perceives in every ohje& that furrounds him, that the greatndfs of the Almighty is. as difcoverable in, the moft minute works of his wifdom and pow+. er, asin the moft ftupendous. His attris butes,—the abilities, and, propenfitics with whieh he has endowed, and prompted man, —and the permiffion of moral and natural evil—all unite in affording conviction, that Je is attentive to our waysy and has made us capable of good and evil, that we: may be fit, objects for rewards and punifhments, in, which goodnefs and mercy. will predo~ minate. ,, He knows that if the various af ficions, which through moral and natural evil, diftrefs mankind —were not intended to awaken us to a view of owt offences, and lead us to prepare for a: better life— their permiffion would be inconfiftent with good- nefs—fince it would zben be of no confe~ quence ‘whether we amend our lives, or not - == WE thould be tortured i in vainm——and, t0 torture. in wan, 1 inconfiftent with the nature of a Sod, whots ¢ffence i is LOVE, ‘ 1 . ((o95)) If fuch are the ‘confolations’ arifing” from the conviGtion of ‘a future: ftate=~what cen- fures can be {ufficiently févere, on the man ~who through the vanity: of being fipgular «and of receiving applaufea asa phifofopher, (by fupporting an hypothefis, as abfurd, and without proof; as it is mortifying and high- ly dangerous in its tendency) weakens; if not removes, the hopes. of another dite Die Surely no. expeflation: of applaufe, fl able; nthe breaft of @- "good man, to* get! the better of his apprehenfions for the morality anid happisefs of his fellow-creatures |= The author, therefore, who publicly writes in‘favour of what leads to infidelity *—= pays but a fad compliment - to the judge+ ment of mankind—for fince fio man would publifth what he imagined would bein general difupproved, ‘bis publication demonflrates that be! thinks their tofle vitiated—thetr under= Jlanding contemptible—and their wong Tem gardlefs of tbe we glare of the commnniiy,’: * To write in favour of the sterility of iad exclufion of an immaterial principle—it has been fhewn in the preceding pages, is to write in favour of a dot- trine, whickr cannot be triiey if God bas made a revelation of his: Will if wn are to live in a future flate—or, i in- deed, ——if there be any God exi iffingy——1 therefor e ufe the word—infidelity. U 4 PART (Hoy oA 1 aenasss ily OF baie eu 45.1 3 ta casos ody esi normmb yoheH 1 3k O Roe R. ¥ VE Klas #* hot) 10 AG. ¢ 00 Prob of. the contradifiory injons sof | Dr. : vi Prieftley, and 5 pe 7. | HE next ‘obje@ I have'in view; is to 470 examine, more minutely “haf Thave Hiihérto done; whether the doGgines which Dr. Prieftley has" endeavoured to” inculcdte’ in“His Introdu&ory Eflays, agree wh we of Dr. Hartley; “Pir, with refpe&t to ‘man’s having #o- thing’ immaterial ‘in. his compofition,—— fecondly, ‘his extin@ion at death,— =third- Ij, his ‘having no hope of furviving’ ‘the grave, but what is afforded ‘by revelation, ——and’ fourthly, confcience being" no'in- fin@ive fenfe, interwoven in our nature’by thie Cheitor—but ‘the cafual refult of édu- cation; “habit, cuftom. Dr. Prieftley has’ publicly efpoufed thefe opinions, while recom=’ mending. Dr. Hartley's Theory let us exa- mine what Dr. Hartley, himfelf, fays ‘on tHefe fubje@s—and try whether if his The- ory. were to prevail, accordin to Dr. Pricft- ley's with—the doctrines of his Introdue-, : tory, Effays would be eftablifhed, Let FIBA | (( 297 j Let us attend to the manneriin which Dr. Hartley demonftrates the immateriality of God *-—and! “then judge” ‘whether his ar- gument is not nearly, if not quite as con- clufive, in favour of the imateriality of man. . #¢. Since God is. the caufe . of .all things; ¢¢_asjappears from. the, foregoing. propofifi- “ |-Ons, -he muft be: the caufe of all the mo= «tions in the. material world. : If. there “¢; fore God. be. not -an immaterial being, ¢¢ then matter may be the caufe of all the « motions in the material world. But, mat- “_ter 15.4 mere paff pve thing, OF. WHOSE. « VERY ESSENCE IT IS, #0 be endued, s« apith AVIS INERTIE ; for this vis in-, “ ortie. prefents tfelf immediately an all our “_obfervations .and. experiments upon it, and ¢¢ JS INSEPARABLE FROM.IT EVEN “ IN IDEA.” So Dr. Hartley thought— but: Dr. PRIESTLEY'’s ideas can CONCELVE, . what Dr. Hartley deemed inconceivable !—— «When we confider any of the active pow-. “ers of matter, as they are called, fuch as_ “ Sravitasion,, magneti(m,. elericity, or, Sik A “>f} a y * See ye : 36 wl. 2, Dr. Hartley's 5 - Obfervations IN ~ o on Man. haMifdsfts od bfvow 2ysied Bie" - Ro Of 4% the attractions and repulfions which take #¢:iplace invithe ¢obefiofis and feparations Of <5: the fimall particles ‘of natural bodies; and ¢¢ endeavour to refplve thefe: into fome %¢ higher and fimpler principles, be vis in- ““ ertie is always the common bafis upon which “: ape endeavour) toereft: our. folutionsi. For s¢:the active party, which is: :fuppofed to « generate the gravitation, magneti{ms;&c. « in the paflive one, muff have :a motion, «¢ and avis inertie, “whereby it. endeavours ¢ to perfift in that motion, elfe it could - ¢¢. have no power; and; by parity of vea- «¢/fon, the |paflive party 'muft have aivis «¢ inertiz dlfo, elfe it could neither make «¢ refiftance to the active party, nor imprefs «¢ smotion on. foreign bodies. Let us pro- 8¢ ceed therefore as far as we pleafe in a)ferids of fucceffive folutions, we hall always find a §¢ quis sneriie inherent in matter, and A MO= « TION DERIVED TO IT, FROM ¢«« SOME FOREIGN CAUSE. "If this s¢ .caufe be fuppofed matter always, we thall “. be!carried on to aninfiniteferies of folu- “4 tions, i each of which the fame precife dif- $s. ficulty. awill> recur, without our at all ap- ¢¢1 proaching to the removal of it. Whence, «according to the mathematical doctrine i? 5 o“ of ( 299 ) ¢5 of ultimate. naties; not even an: infinite ¢4, feries, were that peflible in this cafe, cond 6, remove it, ‘We: muft-thérefore op fome- 5, :wherey: 7d, fippife the requifite: motion fo 8: beimpartedi to the fubtle: matter; BY «, SOMETHING: WHICH" 18 NOT ¢&.. MATTER ;-i- ex fince Godnis: the ulti- <¢, mate author of all motion, we nufi fp ¢ poic him tobe immaterial. = #5 The fame thing may be inferred: thus : if there be, nothing ‘but matter in. the sl .world, ‘then/ithe motions and modifica- s¢ tions of matter muft be the caufe of in- “ telligence. + BUT" EVEN FINITE IN- ¢ TELLIGENCES, SUCH AS THAT «OF MAN, forinftance, fhew fo much frill «and defign in their confitution, AS ALSO ¢¢. TO. SHEW, that their caufes, i. e. the « appropriated motions and modifications ““ of matter, muft be appointed and conduéied $ bya prior and SUPERIOR intelligence. ¢¢ The finite intelligence of God, therefore, ¢ proved in the third propofition, -fince it «_refults from the motions 4nd modifica- ‘tions of matter, requires another infinite «. intelligence to.dire@ its motions, which ¢¢ is.abfard, God is therefore proved to be ¢: immaterial from his infinite'intelligence. €¢ K { 300 ) omei]g is 'tede, rindesd; that our fenfes ton wtoyey nothing tous but 'impteflions from Since: therefore, «¢ on the other hand, MERE MATTER “appears quite unable to account for ‘the «. SIMPLEST and MOST ORDINARY «phenomena, we muft either fuppoje an im- material fubflance, or elie fuppofe that «matter has fome powers’ and. properties, < different and fuperior to THOSE WHICH «s. APPEAR. But this lait fuppofition: 1s «the fame in effect as the firft,; though:on es: account of the imperfeGion of language, «jt: feems to be different.’ 1 ull vioviiilon Here, by the way, on the authority of Dr. Hartley, we may aflert, that if, becauie ¢1:wecan have no iexprefs originabideasrof «any. things: material ones,” ¢¢ weare led to « conclude that there is nothing but matter «in the wniverfe,” we ¢“evidéntly” ndifco= 1 Ba “ ver ( 301 ) vers$%aiprejudice drawn fiom ous fituations” ~afid -that-fuech an .argument, is taken ««. merely from our. ignorance, and the nar- «.rownefs: of our. faculties.” ——=Does not Dr. Hartley's manner of reafoning, in; proof of the immateriality of God, plead likewife in favour of the immateriality of man? To admit his argument to have any force, is to allow that minds, capable of thinking, and ating, as our minds do, muft be immate- rial—and that the idea of their being other- wife; is, inconceivable. He proceeds, <¢¢ It does indeed follow frem this theory, ¢¢ that matter, if it could be endued withthe «. moft imple kinds of fenfation”~—(which his 'arguments prove it could not, from the «sais inertie,” with which ¢¢ 7 is its very .¢f- Jence to be endued”’) © it might alfo arrive at « all that intelligence of which the human « mind is poffeffed :” (who doubts it— But it is moft unpardonable in thofe who pofitively affert their difbelicf in our imma- teriality, until they can demonfirate that matter CAN be endued with thought, rea- fon; judgement) ¢ whence this . theory ¢: muft be allowed to overturn all the:ar- «¢,,guments “which are ufually urged for the « jmmateriality of the foul from the fub- | “ tlety ( 302 } «0 flety'of thé internal ented; and of the ra- te tional faculty. "But I no Wiys PRESUME “bo deterntine whether Matter can bd induced se aoith fenfition or nd. > THis is a point fo- “ reign to" ‘the fubje& ‘of ‘my’ enduiric. “ It is fufficient for the that" there i is 4'cer- “ tain connection of one kind or other be- “¢ tween the fenfations of the foul, and the ¢¢ motions excited in the medullary “fub- “¢‘ftance of the brain; which is hie all ‘ phyficians and shifofopliers” allow.’ = And what I very readily admit. ‘We muft know that the body affe@s the mind—and we likewife know that it is by means of the netves affeCting the brain—and I have no more objection to this happening by means of ‘vibrations, than by any other mode. But Dr. Hartley was fo defirous—{o anxious to make it clear that Ze did not argue for our matefiality, that, not fatisfied with the de- clardtion which I have juft copied— he added in his next paragraph,” . “4¢ Fvould not therefore be any way inter- “¢ preted fo as to oppofe the immateriality “ of ‘the foul. "On the contrary, I fee clear- “ly, and’ acknowledge readily, that matter “and motion, however fubtly divided, or “ v reaforied upotl, yield nothing more than 4 matter ( 303 ) “ matter and motion fill.” Could any de- ¢laration be more explicit, or decifive? If matter and motien, however fubtly divided or reafoned up, yield nothing more than matter and motion flill——what muft be thought of the firange conceptions of men, who believe mere matter capable of thinking, &e. &c. &ct “In Dr. Hartley’ s: Introduction, too, (which Pr. Prieftley has republifhed i in his abridge- ment we find more proof of Dr. Hartley's belicf in the immateriality of the foul. His whole theory is founded on that belief —for it begins bis Introducion, and may therefore juftly be termed he foundation-of his work. ~ « Man confifts of fwa parts, body and ‘a “mind. The firft is fubjected to our fenfes “ and enquiries, in the fame manner as the “¢ other parts of the external material world. kL The laft is a fubftance, agent, princi- w ple, ‘&c. to which we refer the fenfa- ~—~The human mind has indifputably a proper prefence in the body —or it could not be contained in it— and muft move, when the body moves—or elle the body would /feave if behind——-it is Dr. Prieftley, alone, who has denied that his (348 ) his mind is any more in his body, than in the moon. ie EA el LL AVING made thefe neceflfary re- marks on the introduéiion to the dif- quifitions, let us attentively examine'the arguments which Dr. Prieftley has urged in the body of his work. No perfon would chufe to refide in a houfe, the foundation of which, was found to be infecure. Let us then carefully view the ground, on which Dr. Prieftley has founded his do&trines and if it fhall ap- pear rotten, and unfafe—no wife man will depend on the fuperftructure, however fpe- cious it may feem at firft fight. Dr, Prieft- ley thus begins his difquifitions. ¢«« J am forry to have occafion to begin ¢¢ thefe difquifitions on the nature of matter ¢ and fpirit, with defiring my reader to re- ~¢ cur to the univerfally received rules of «¢ philofophizing, {uch as are laid down by s¢ Sir Ifaac Newton at the beginning of his ¢¢ third Book of Principia. But though €¢ we ee Re aE Moi ER SR ( 349 we have followed thefe rules pretty clofely in other philofophical refearches, it ap- pears tome that we have, without any rea- fon in the world, entirely deferted them in this. Wehave {uffered ourfelvesto be guid- ed by them in our inquiriesinto the caufes of particular appearances in nature, but have formed our notions, with refpe to the moft general and comprebenfive prin- ciples of human knowledge, without the leaft regard, nay in direct contradiction, to them. And I am willing to hope, that when this is plainly pointed out, the in- confiftency of our conduct in thefe cafes cannot fail to ftrike us, and be the means of inducing the philofophical part of the world to tread back their fteps, and fet out again on the fame maxims which they have actually followed in their progrefs. For my own part, I pro- fefs an uniform and rigid adherence to them: but then I muft require that my own reafoning be tried by this, and by no other teft. ¢¢. The firft of thefe rules as laid down by Sir Ifaac Newton, is that we aie to adit no more caufes of things than are fufficient (141 fo ( 350 ) «29 explain appearances 3 and the fecond is sc that, to the fame effelts we muft; as far as << poffible, alfign the fame caufes.”’ Now-—granting that we were rigidly to follow the rules, by which Dr. Prieftley has been pleafed to require us to try his reafon- ing, 1 thal thew thathis doétrine will be found erroneous, though tricd, even by his own teft. But I will by no means admit that we fhould be confined to thofe rules—even though they are fufficient to overturn his do@rine—becaufe it is proper that whenmen publifh fentiments, which have an evident tendency to weaken the hopes, and remove the fears of futurity—the evil tendency of {uch fentiments, fhould of 7z/elf be fufficient to make the book which contains them, be confidered by every good mind, as a public nuifunce—and to fubjedt its author to juft cenfure, for having thewn fo much indiffer- ence about the public fafety and happinefs of mankind, by an endeavour to throw down thofe barriers, which religion has ere@ed for their protection. That Dr. Prieftley’s doctrines bave that evil tendency, 1 believe has been fhewn, In the preceding pages—as well as that they are inconfiftent | with ia ET ei bigs.) with {cripture, and contrary to the light of nature—I fhall therefore now confine my- felf to an examination of thofe arguments by which he has, in his late prodedtion, endeavoured ‘to recommend his opltioiit, And, Firft, with refpe& to Sir Ifaac Newton's rules—that “ we are to admit no more caufes “ of things than are fufficient to explain ap- ¢¢ pearances; and, that, to the fame effelts, ““ wemuft, as far as poffible, affign the fame ‘ caufes.” Thefe rules, at the fame time that they prohibit us from admitting more caufes than are {ufficient to explain appearances, abfo- lutely require us to admit a fuficient caufe— and as Dr. Hartley’s theory of vibrations, and affociation of ideas, neceflarily prefup- pofes the refidence of {ome principle, which is not, and cannot be, the objet of fight— unlefs Dr. Prieftley can demonftrate to us, what it 1s which is fenfible of the vibrations communicated to the brain, by the nerves —what it is which affociates the ideas which have been produced by thofe vibrations—it muft be allowed that his theory is m/fuf- cient to explain the appearances which firike the mind on confidering its powers—and then Sir RE Te eT TTS Ca —, { 8 § } i] 5 i Ig | nm } | k ) i ; |. LE | q | fd | 1 | | y \ 1 | | | I W -. | 4 i" i I | | / H | gd En i hi] | | 1 @ | i ‘ | | | | | I | | f iH I | . | i 8 | | TH I { iH I. | | ( 352 ) Sir Ifaac Newton's rules of philofophizing oblige us to difcard a theory. which we bave found fo incapable of infiructing us—and his rules direc us to have recourfe to a. better guide than Dr. Prieftley, to conduct. us in our fearch after truth. hi The brain, it is true, is moft curioufly conftructed to receive impreffions from the five fenfes—and we know. that it is, through the intervention of the brain.alone, that.we are {enfible of bodily pain or pleafure—but {till Dr. Priefiley’s theory leaves a great vas cancy—and is by no means fatisfattory to thofe who are not ready to be amufed by words. J How a mafs of matter can bink, feems to me as inconceivable, as how fpirit is united to matter. The brain vibrates—but wba 15 i¢ which is confeious of the vibration ?—A picture is formed by the optic nerve—but what is it which can at pleafure replace that picture, by recollection, after a thoufand other pictures have been prefented in its place ? I retire where no found can reach my car—I {hut my eyes—and can employ my mind for hours—refletting on all the paft fcenes of my life, and entertaining my- (If, by forming imaginations of what may happen ( 353 ) happen in future. * Can it be conceived that it Is the white maf that we fee on removing the Skull, which was the ruminating being who thus refleted on the paft, and formed ima- ginations of the future ? | ——Was it #bat white heap of convoluted pipes, and weffels, which checked fome thoughts as they rofe {pontaneoufly—and determined on dwelling on others - = - chufing them, and arranging them at pleafure ? | —To me, I muft declare, there is nothing can appear more inconceiv- able. The fpider’s web is fo conftructed, that none of its threads can be touched, without vibrating the part which the fpider had prepared for his feat—but the web would vibrate in vain, jf no fpider were to be Jenfible of its vibration. As the {pider receives imprefiions from his web, our minds are in- formed by our brain,—remove the fpider —and his web will zo longer convey intelli gence, = = - remove the mind—and tbe brain, like the web, will be ufelefs. Therefore Sir Ifaac Newton's rules of phi- hofophizing, which Dr. Prieftley thinks are fo favourable to his hypothefis—and to whofe authority he refers fo often—overturn its foundation, and fhould induce him ¢ # “tread back bis fleps, and fet out again on the Aa “ Jame ( 835% ) «fume masiins whith” the TRUELY *pbilo- «< fophival part of bengorld, bide adtudlly fol- « Jowed in their progrefs.” If he wifhes'to be ‘eotifidered as ‘a “philofopher, he muft think'it ‘heceftary to admit a cattfe of things ] fuffe cient to explain appedrances—Sand’ firiée bis theory’ is found nfifficient, tet’him no longét qudte the rules ‘of a~ man; “who, 7 akve, would reprobate ‘his docttine—and whe, dedi Teft rules “which obhge us ‘to Bive recor fe to an immaterial Pprinciple=and ‘to nb ofher==when we wifh to account for ‘the ope- rations ‘of the hirinan ‘mind. Conftqueritly, fince Dr. Prieftley has confeffed, ‘that “¢ fo “ Yong as we follow ‘thefe maxitns, we may « be Confident that we wall on fure'ground;; « "bist ‘the moment we “depart from them, «¢ ye wander in ‘the regions ‘of mere fancy, # 2nd are only entertaining ourfelves ‘and «¢ others with our own crude imaginations ¢¢ ‘4nd “conceits”——Mhe ‘ffands condemned by bis own law—and falls by bis oton pen. ‘Dr. Prieftley’s method of endeavouring ta prove that we are of one uniférrh’ compofi- tion, and ‘that #bar compofition ‘is eftirely matérial—is rather extraordinary. ‘He wifh- es it ‘to be ‘thought that there is nothinZ fpiritual in man-—and ‘in order to corned 6 { 355 ) us that we are nothing but matter, be does all in bis power to convince us that there is no Such thing in nature !—~His arguments tend to prove this, if they tend to prove any thing —for he feems inclined to believe that all ¢“ the folid matter in the folar {yftem might ‘be contained within a nutfhell.”—and I think that having comprefled the fun, pla- nets, and their moons, within fo {mall a compafs, he might, without any great ex- ertion, have annihilated them entirely. He does not indeed exprefsly fay that it is his belief that we might all be packed up, and crammed nto a filbert—but he informs us that < it has been afferted, and the affertion ““ bas never been difproved’—and—<¢ that ¢ for any thing we know to the contrary” it may be fo*., When this quotation appears in its proper place, I fancy no one will deny but that it is an opinion which Dr. Prieft- ley had it much at his heart to recommend —for the train of argument which precedes, and follows it, renders it indifputable. I thall tranfcribe moft part, if not the whole of it—convinced that the reafoning needs only be held up to view, to fhew the ab- See the 17th page of the Difquifitions. - Aaz furdity DE ee Be ER a ve 5 ee ¥ i Ri i J i i i | I | a gen — IE R I —— pots. pas TT E ( 356 ) furdity of che’ foundation for that hy pothefis which excludes immateriality from: man. CAI JAD. HL yobs «WT is afferted, and generally’ taken for 1 ¢ granted, that matter is neceffarily «Shall a creature—who bears about in his own perfon, the moft aftonithing de- monfitration ¥ Page 18, Difquifitions, vol. 1. ee ee Pe en ME — a ( 206 ) monftration of wifdom and power——and who can no more eftimate the ability of his Creator, than he can ftop the planets in their flight prefume to ufe the word “ diffe- “.rylt,” when contemplating Ais power who formed the univerfe ?! As well might animalcule too diminutive to be feen, without glaffes—pretend to fix limits to the ocean which furrounds the globe, by their knowledge of the drop of water, in which they fwim, as ina fea—as fceptics, (who fancy themfelves philofopbers) vainly prefume to form an eftimate of the power of omni- potence, by the Shallow reafon which they fo unpardonably mifapply ! CVH: AY PW, TE come now to Dr. Prieftley’s third fe&tion where he treats “ of ¢ the fentient principle in man’ ———and be- gins to draw his conclufions. « In the two preceding fections I have «¢ endeavoured to rectify the notions which ‘we have been taught to entertain concern- ¢ ing matter, as not being that impenetrable “ snert fubflance that we had imagined it to ¢¢ be.” (With what force of argument, proof, L397) proof, and confifiency with common fens, the reader will determine for himfelf. ) ¢ This, being admitted, will greatly facili- ¢¢ tate our farther progrefs in thefe difquifi- “¢ tions ; as I hope we thall not confider mat- “ ter with that contempt and difguft, with “¢ which it has generally been treated ; there ¢¢ being nothing.in its real nature that can “ juftify fuch fentiments refpecting it.” * Mott indifputably ! Let it be “ admit- “ ted” that our fenfes deceive us when they lead us to imagine that we really break our heads againft a ftone, when, in fad, we only break them againtt zhe repelling power which exifts at a real diffance from that flone—and then, a mind (I beg the Doctor’s pardon—I fhould have faid, a medullary fubfance) pre- pared to admit {uch an abfurdity, as a pof- tion granted, is prepared to have its pro- “ grefs greatly facilitated in” its improve- ments, from the ftudy of ¢ thefe difquifi- “ tions"—or indeed of any difquifitions which the moft renowned knight of La Mancha could oblige the world with, were he now alive to favour it with fimilar difco- verses in ufeful fcience. But—if it were pof- fible to argue on fuch a {ubject, without | laughing * Page 24 Difquifitions, vol. 1. { 308 3 laughing at the numberlefs inconfiftencies and abfurdities, on the one fide—or being warmed by the fhocking tendency of the do@rine, on the other—I fhould deny, that even if it were found true, that when F think I touch a ftone, I only touch 77s repel- ling power, it would therefore follow, that the little piece of matter, in the centre of that great flone, (which emitted the power that broke my head) is one whit more likely to think, reafon, and judge—than if 1t really were, what, to my deceiving optics, it feems to be, a great, hard ftone. Its want of folidity, would not in the leaft degree, ¢¢ raife it in my efteem” for I thould till be convinced, that ¢ the altual well ex- «« gmined appearances” of matter—afford us not the leaft thadow of ground for conceiv- ing it pofiible, that whether it be folid, or not folid—penetrable, or impenetrable it is capable (without a miracle) of exerting thofe powers, which we afcribe to the hu- man foul. ¢ And, therefore,” (not as one who takes the liberty of affuming the title of “ g philofopber” * but as a plain man, who only pretends to have that fhare of un- * See page 16, conclufion of the middle paragraph, Difquifitions. 5 derftanding ( %309 J derftanding which is common to mankind) ‘“ I am not authorized to conclude that any “ fuch a thing exifls,” as thought, and {fenfation, in matter. Befides, if I am to be fo very fceptical as to difbelieve the evidence of my fight, and touch, which both concur in aflurine me that the objets around me, are, in orl what they appear, and feel to btsetiliy fhould not I be as feeptical with refpe to the exiftence of that fame repelling power, which Dr. Prieftley feems fo certain is emitted from matter P—Have I any better reafon to believe his word, than to believe my own fenfes ? If I cannot be certain that I really touch this table—how am I to be certain that I touch Dr. Priefiley’s re- pelling power 2—I find that it is the practice of Dr. Prieftley—as it was of Mr. Hume— to be fceptical, where he ought to be certain —and to be certain—not where he ought to doubt, but where he ought to difbelieve ! Thus, he will not be certain that he did 7 touch his table—though he had every evidence that his fenfes, and the united voice of man- kind could afford him of the truth that he bad touched it Yet—{ceptical as he was in that point, his doubts vanifh, where hay {thould have arifen—and without any, even the ( 400 .) the leaft difficulty, he feels aflured that he touched a repelling power—of the exiftence of which, fo far from his having had the thadow of demontftration for its reality demon- ration has been made of its non-exiftence f Therefore fince Dr. Prieftley grounds his whole hypothefis, on the idea that mat- ter is not that inert, [fluggifb folid thing, which the world thinks it—Dbut that it 1s a fomething, or a nothing, which exifts, or does not exift— (for I believe whoever reads his book, will not be able clearly to under- ftand whether he would have us believe there 7¢ fuch a thing=—or is zz0t / ) which fubftance, or no fubfiance, emits a power of repul- fion, which power, alone, we touch—when we think we touch real matter, and fince we have had demonftration, that in this opinion he is moft certainly mif- taken—we cannot have more fatisfactory proof that his dorine is built upon an er- ror, and therefore mult be erroneous. I have extraGed cvery material argument—1I might fay, every argument he has made ufe of, in order to lead us into an opinion that we do matter injuftice, and that it really is of an # By the experiment mentioned, of the two bullets. 3 higher ( 401 ) higher nature ‘than we think jt may mean the body alone—but OE Prieftley’s plan, it at a i o n be any difference. | . ee ri pin organized in o thinking matter. What is the perfor ! ; by #he man who has juft been defined 2 : :. organized [jftem of thinking matter! = : P pofe, that any of us were to be afked, pray, « Sir, is not that man, (whol fee in the oppo- ¢ fite window) the perfor you Wesd es, ¢¢ tioning to me a few days ago? Wala not the perfon who thus addrefled, Sone fe his friend to be out of his {fenfes, i he were to reply—"* really Sir, that 1s : : «¢ perfon whom 1 mentioned to you—bu «¢ ‘not the man I mentioned ? ! meee} fancy » . . \ # Pages 156, and 1575 Difquifitions, voi. 1. that AE ( 435 ) - that the querift would not readily enter in~ - to, the diftin&ion ! But I dare fay that there are people in the world, who will take for granted, that though they cannot ‘perceive the diftin€tion Dr. Prieftley men- tions, yet the diftinGtion muft certainly be propery,—or be would not have made it—but I muft beg leave, on #45 occafion, to follow his example—and fince he will not believe that {pirit can be united to matter, decaufe be cannot comprehend in what manner the union 2s effected—he cannot wonder at me, if I refufe to admit a diftin&ion, which, to me muft remain unintelligible, unl I perceive a difference. Dr. Prieftley proceeds ‘¢ the diftinc- “ tion I have mentioned may appear a para- ““ dox, but in fa& fimilar diftin@ions are not uncommon *, and they may illuftrate ‘“ one another.” Now for the illuftration. “ Afk any Perfon to thew you the River Thames, and he will point to water flowing in a certain channel, and you- ¢€ ic ““ will find that he does not confider the ‘““ banks, or the bed of theriver, to be any * Far from it—for they abound in the Difquifitions, and in Hume's works. Ffa2 “ part (436 ) «« part of it. And yet though the water « be continually and vifibly changing, fo ¢¢ a5 not to be the fame any one day with «¢ the preceding, the ule of language proves ¢¢ that there is a fenfe in which it may be ¢ called, to every real purpofe, the fame «¢ per that it Was a thoufand years ago. «¢ So alfo the Nile, the Euphrates, and the ¢¢ Tiber have an identity as rivers, indepen- <¢ dently of the water, of which alone they « confit. - In the fame manner Jorefts, ¢¢ which confift of frees growing in certain ¢ places, preferve their identity, though all - which they confift decays ¢¢ the trees of «¢ and others grow up 1 their places. «« In like manner, though every perfon «¢ {hould be (atisfed of what I believe is ¢¢ pot true *, that, : the courfe of nutri- ¢ tion, digeftion and egeftion, every par= « ticle of the body, and even of the brain ¢«¢ (and 1t (hould be taken for granted that ¢¢ the whole man confifted of nothing * But what, nevertbelefs 1S true,’ whoo B. Prieftley believes it, ©of not. Every pe 2 vi body, (brain not excepted,) 13 perpmely Sy S the particles of which it 1s compofed- : ha the lymphatic veflels, and arteries, neceffarily pr fuch a change. RT 6 £437 1) y clfe) was entirely changed, and that €é this change, though gradual and in- ¢¢ fenfible, could be demonftrated to take « place completely in the courfe of a year, «“ we thould, I doubt not, {till retain the ¢¢ idea of a real identity, and {uch a one as’ ‘“ would be the proper foundation for ap- ¢¢ probation, or felf-reproach, with refpect ““ to the paft, and for hope and fear with “ refpe®t to the future. A man would ¢¢ claim his wife, and a woman her hufband, “ after more than a year’s abfence, debts ¢¢ of a year’s ftanding would not be con- ¢¢ fidered as cancelled, and the villain who « had abfconded for a year would not ¢ efcape punifhment. «In fa@, the univerfal and firm belief « of this hypothefis would make no change «« whatever in our prefent condudt, or in «¢ our fenfe of obligation, refpeing the du- ««_ties of life, and the propriety of rewards ‘“ and punifhments ; and confequently all “ hopes and fears, and expectations of every <«¢ kind, would operate exactly as before. «« For notwithftanding the complete change «« of the man, there would be no change «¢« of what I fhould call the perfon dng ¥ Pages 157, 158, and 159, Difquifitions, vol. 1. Ffj Now ( 438 ) Now is it poflible for the moft fuperficial, reader to help perceiving that Dr. Prieftley is arguing upon a fallacy p—We call the, River Thames, the fame now, that it was, a thoufand years ago, becaufe there is a fuc-, ceffion of water from the fame fources—=— and becaufe if that water ceafed to flow, it would ceafe to be a river. We find, then, that it is effentially neceffary to a river, that its waters {hould be perpetu~ ally changing——and confequently we do not change its name———01 think 1t different to day, from what 1t was fifty years ago, on account of that. change in its waters, which is neceffary to confiitute is. what it is termed. 1ts being confidered, not to have loft its identity by its change of water, can be productive of no bad confe- quence. But if the river were 2a thinking being—capable of doing good and cvil—of feeling pain and pleafure, and of being re- warded and punifhed——We fhould then do it very great injuftice if we punifhed 1t to day, for having drowned a man a week ago. If the water, had, fenfation and thought——the water that drowned; 2 man a week ago, when fhooting the bridge 6. — inftead ( 439 ) —inftead of thinking, and feeling, under London Bridge to day—would be thinking, and feeling, on the coafts of France or Holland! We fhould ‘probably conceive it diflicult zo apprebend the guilty particles, blended amidit the’ particles of the German Ocean—and therefore, I am of opinion that the mur- derer would mott likely efcape, unpurfued !— Yet, for the honour of humanity, and juftice, I cannot imagine that the laws of England would be fo cruel to feize the inno- cent water, but lately emerged from the earth— and punifh it, for a crime which it had not committed. And if the trees of any foreft, compofed the members of a thinking Being —who could at pleafure move its branches —1 dare fay that no equitable laws would ordain a foreft of mew trees to be burned to day, becaufe the trees that grew on the fame ground, a thoufand years ago, and fince which had been long decayed, and deftroyed had knocked men’s brains out. Regiments, for example, flill preferve their names, and identity as regiment sm——— though the men of which they con- fit, are perpetually changing. The Royal Welth Fuzileers—the Royal Englith—the Royal Scotch—the 1ft, 2d, 3d Regiments Ff4 of ( 440 ) of Foot, &ci—=are fill; denominated; 2s when: firlt raifed—=but will Dr. Priefticy fay that it would therefore be jaft to decimate one of thofe regiments, #ow, on a proof thata regiment, diftinguifhed by that name, bans ed a town, and maflacred ‘its inhabitants, fifty years ago? Juftice ‘would refufe to punifh that regiment, on being informed that there is not a man in it mew, who was in it zhen——and yet it is certainly as much ¢he fame regiment, as the Thames, ‘1s the fame river. Neither can I believe, that if ‘we were as certain of its being the me- dullary fubftance of the brain, which forms the thinking being, we, each ‘of us, term, ¢¢ ype’—as that the water of the Thames this day, was in the bowels of theuearth a weckrago—we fhould deem it by any means; juft, that'we fhould be hanged to day, for a murder, that different particles of a different medullary fubflance, committed twenty years ago. + We now think it, jut, that no term of w years {hould fcreen the murderer from: punithment——becaufe we are confcious of Yuan : being the fame people ‘we were twenty years ago and under the conviction of our identity, We think, act, and determine. Even ( 241 ) Even Dr. Prieftley, bimfelf,- while writing the -paflage which I have but juft tran{- eribed, could not poflibly have any right to determine that if we were Jatisfied by a de- monfirations of our having no permanent thinking principle, we thould norwithfand- ng, ‘retain the idea of a real identity” — think rewards and punithments, for aGions done twenty years ago, juft-——and have any hope, or fear, of what is to happen a thoufand years hence. For ever Dr. Prieft- Jey cannot diveft himfelf of the idea of his having a mind, at the very moment when he 1s afferting that it may be in the moon, as:much as in his body for he argues conftantly ‘under the idea of the prefuppofed belief, that there is a fomething which affoci- atesy. flores, and bas recourfe to, ideas, at pleafure. However {ceptical he may im- agine himfelf—even his very f{ceptici{m, fhould prevent the certainty of his having no fpiritual principle. Doubts, ceafe, where certainty, commences. Is is zm- poffible that he can demonfirate that he has no fpiritual principle and therefore he can have no more right fo zake for granted that he is.all matter—without being able ta make ( 442 ) make fuch a demonfiration—=than he can im-. agine he has, to feel affured that he is all matter #ill demonfiration is made to bim. that be bas a fpirit. He fhould not de- mand demonftration, till he can give it— then how can we conceive it poflible that Dr. Prieftley can have felt affured (even whilft he was writing) that he has no {pi- ritual principle——fince we know that all demontftration of it, is far beyond his reach ? We know him to be incapable of taking a thing for granted, without prosf—and therefore conclude, that ke wrote under a deception, without perceiving it. «Admitting, therefore, that. the man « conlifts wholly of matter, as much as the ««. giver does of water, or theforeft of trees, and «¢ that this matter thould be wholly changed « in the interval between death and the re- «¢ furre@ion; yet, if, after this ftate we ¢s (hall all know one another again, and ¢¢ converfe together as before, we fhall be, « to all intents and purpofes, the fame s perfons.” Never, fure, was there a more excellent ¢¢ IF,” than, that in the above fentence !|——This is jut faying, that if, at the refarreCtion, we fhould find ourfelves the fame perfons—why—we fhould BE— the ( 443 ) the [ame perfons'! I'I——A pofition, which I will venture to fay, no perfon. living will controvert |—But this is faking for grantedy: the very thing we deny———and until Dr. Pricftley ‘can prove, that our want of a permanent principle, will not prevent our knowing each other at the refurrection, and. remembering the pat feenes on this earth—he cannot have any right to fuppofe that {uch a knowledge, and remembrance will occur to us at the refurreGtion fince it is hard- ly pofiible to conceive any fuppofition, more extravagant, and void of probability, if it be true that it is the brain, alone, which thinks. In the grave, our brain will turn to corruption which corruption will enrich the earth—which earth will feed cattle—which cattle will feed men,—and thofe men will feed thoufands in the fame round—fo that in Dr. Prieftley’s brain, and mine, this moment, there may be particles from the brains, of many thoufand men and women of former ages. On this hypo- thefis I thould imagine that there would. be a ftrange confufion of medullary fubftances— and [rambling for brains at the refurrection —fince Lord knows how many hundreds, who lived ages ago, may lay claim to dif- ferent ( 444 ) ferent particles of ours—while we may have an equal right. to demand particles from as many hundreds, who are to live between our death and the refurreGion! - - = Yet hus is the hypothefis which Dr. Prieftley thinks obviates difficulties! «« However, notwithftanding I give this ¢ olution of the difficulty” (but where is. that folution to be found {—We have feen none ! ) « for the fatisfaction of {cepti- ¢ cal and metaphyfical perfons, I myfelf ¢¢ believe the doctrine of the refurrection of ¢¢ he dead in another and more literal fenfe. ¢¢ Death, with its concomitant putrefaction, « and difperfion of parts, is only a decom- «¢ pofition ; and whatever is decompafed, may «be recompofed by the Being who firft com- “ pofed it;” (undoubtedly, may” —but our Saviour has aflured us that they will zot be recompofed, fince we are to rife ¢¢ incor- ““ ruptible” and are then to be ‘¢ as the angels «¢ avhich are in Heaven *,”—therefore the «« word MAY” isoutofthe queftion—) “and ¢¢ I doubt not but that, in the proper fenfe «¢ of the word, the fame body that dies fhall «¢ rife again, not with every thing that 1s <¢ gdventitious and extraneous (as all that we * Mark, chap. xii. “receive (445 ) ‘¢ receive by nutrition) but with the fame cc Stamina, or thofe particles that really be- «longed to the germ of the organical “ body *.” But in what does the ¢“ famina” confift? What is ¢¢ the germ”! Anato- mifts point out zo fuch parts in the human body. They know no part in the whole frame, that is not perpetually changing. Exclude an immaterial principle, and there is nothing permanent in man. ¢« This idea of the doctrine of the refur- «¢ rection is perfectly agreeable to the light ¢¢ in‘which St. Paul reprefents it (though I <¢ {hould not condemn his comparifon, if it «¢ {hould not be found to be fo complete) <¢ when he compares it to a feed that hasbeen ¢¢ {own in the earth, and become feemingly «¢ dead. For the germ does not die.” f*— then is not this admitting that there is a fomething in man, which is zo# ¢¢ extinct at <¢ death” ? which ¢ does not die” ?—This is all we require this, Dr. Prieftley bere admits and yet this is what his Introductory Effays, and tenour of his arguments in his Difquifitions, tends to * Page 162, Difquilitions, vol. 1. 4+ Page 162 ditto. deny ' L446) deny laf St. Paul compares: out death, - v6 that ‘of a‘ feed, which, ‘though « feem- sngly configned to putefraction, Still preferves © ftsbeing—revives, and flourithesagain-furely we are to underftand by his fimile, that there is a permanent principle in man, which fur- vives corruption—and Jprings up With new life, on its being Jeemingly defiroyed. 1 Dr. Prieftley endeavours’ to defend his * having declared it as his opinion, in-his Ef- fays, that the whole man becomes extinct at death”s=by telling us, that whoever + .obje@s to its propriety, ¢ betrays an! igtio- “«¢ tance of the real meaning of the Englifh 4 word. Some of them,” he fays; ¢ {eem , 4 to have fuppofed that by zbe extinétion of wes the whole man, 1 mean the abfolute ann:- ~«& bilation of him, fo that when a man dies, «¢ whatever it was that conftituted him, < ceafes to exifi*. Butthenl muft have fup- « pofed that the moment a man is dead, he « abfolutely vanifbes away, fo that his friends ¢¢ can find nothing of him to carry to the ~« grave.” Dr. Prieftley 1n vain attempts to explain away the meaning of his cenfur- # Indifputably < ceafes to exif” as a MAN, if he be % extingl”—although the dead lump of matter does not se VANISH atoay | | = NAY able C (i447) ." ahle expreffion=-for if an hundred thoufand ~«men ‘were to .read the paflage, they would .~ally to 'a man, conclude’ be intended. it ‘i fhiould be underftood as his opinion, that on ‘death, whatever it is, which thinks and ails on ‘man, << CEASES TO EXIST” ~—~—IS *NG@:MORE. His whole argument tends to prove this, or means nothing——for he informs us, that nce ¢¢ the whole man is of .¢ fome uniform .compofition, and that the *.%¢: property of perception, as well as the -=¢¢. other powers that are termed mental, are -#¢: the refult of fuch an organical ftructure [14¢:as that of the brain ;”—it follows, ¢¢ confe- 1%: quently” that ¢¢ the whole man becomes “6 éxtinét at death.” Will Dr. Prieftley fay “uthat:it is poffible for any man to help un- derftanding from thence, that, oz death, there is nothing tn man but what dies! Becaufe the dead body does not vani/b away, fo that nothing can be found to carry to the grave w==-Would any perfon fay that fon the fup~ pofition thabtbere is no foul in man, ) therefore the perfonswha thought and acted in it, re- mained fill in exiftence Surely not !— Saying that ¢ the whole man becomes ex- Ce tin at death,” implies that the MAN is extinc?, though the body has not vanifbed away— ( 448 ) sway—** that the whole man” —¢very part of that before bad being IS no more~~—— therefore Dr. Prieftley’s word, ¢ extin&” muft be underftood iz its general fenfe—and if he intended it, in. any other, he thould have expreffed himfelf ; differently- and made it impoflible to underftand the paf- fage, in the obvious fenfe in which it appears. Cc HA P IX T is rather extraordinary to find a perfon, in one page, inferring that a doctrine is falfe, becaufe it was not entertained by the ancients—and in another, inferring falfe- hood from its antiquity. Thus Dr. Prieft- ley fays, that ¢¢ in the account of the death «of Jofeph, it is faid they embalmed bim, and < he was put into a coffin in Egypt.” He withes us to remark that it is not faid that «¢ there was any part of him that was nof <¢ embalmed, and that could not be put into « 5 coffin. Our different notions dictate a «¢ very different language. Upon our grave- ¢¢ {tones we never fee infcribed, Here lies [uch ( 449 ) “ fuch a perfon, but always here lies the ““ body, or the remains, or what was ‘mortal “¢ of fuch a perfon. Such an influence have “ ideas upon language and cuffoms ; and the ¢¢ {fame would they have had upon the lan- ‘‘ guage and cuftoms of thofe ancient times ¢¢ if the ideas and notions had then ex- “ ifted *.” ‘And #herefore, the inference to be drawn, is, that the opinion is erro- neous, fince, in ancient times, no idea, or notion, of our foul’s furviving our bo- dies, was held or maintained. Then, it feems, the ideas and notions of the foul’s immortality, did zo exift in ‘© ancient “¢ times’ ! If fo, how comes it that we read, in another part of the Difquifitions J, that < the common opinion of the foul of ¢ man f{urviving the body, was introduced ¢ into Chriftianity from the oriental and ““ Greek philofopby ¢” How comes it that, in another page f too, we read, that, ¢ as far ‘¢ as we are able to collet any thing con- ““ cerning the hiftory of this opinion” (the * Page 122, Difquifitions vol. 1. + Page 156, ditto. T Page 168, ditto. Gg opinion ( 450 ) opinion of the foul being a fubftance fo «¢ diftin& from the body, as to be unaffeted “ by its death, and able to fubfift, and « even to be more free and happy without «« the body” *)—¢ it is evidently not the “ growth of Greece or Rome, but was RE- «« CEIVED by the philofopbers of thofe coun~ «¢ ries either from Egypt, or the countries « more to the Eaft”? - - - Methinks this is proving the do&rine to be pretty anci- ent! And bere, its being fo, feems to be an argument jor its falfebood !—And yet Dr. Pricftley infers its falfechood from its want of antiquity; proved, in his opinion, by 1ts not having been mentioned in the account of Jofeph’s death, ¢ that there was any ¢ part of him that was not embalmed, ¢¢ and that could not be put into a coffin —as if it could be juftly inferred, from Such a fi ecification baving been deemed un- neceffary, that they did not believe in mams having any part which furvives death ! t Yet if Dr. Prieftley thinks that an opi- ‘nion’s or having been entertained by the ancients, is an argument for its being erro- # Pag and top of 168, Difquifitions, vol. 1. age I 7s P Er ; a + Dr. Hartley was clearly of opinion that the Jews : . Lr. y* believed in a future ftate—See the quotation from iM, pages 210 and 320 of this Eflay. ! ncous (“43 ) neous—why does he infer its being errone- ous, from its having a more ancient daté than the Greek, and Roman empires é—Nay— he makes it doubtful how far back the opi- nion may have been entertained—fince he tells us *, that ¢ the Greeks in general re- ““ fer it to the Egyptians, but Paufanias gives “ it to the Chaldeans, or the Indians I” ¢¢ It would be moft natural, however, at “ firft, to afcribe the caufe of thought to ‘“ fomething that made a wvg#b/le difference ‘“ between a living and a dead man; and ““ breathing being the moft obvious differ- ““ ence of this kind, thofe powers would “ be afcribed to his éreath: and accord- “ ingly we find, that in the Hebrew, Greek, ‘“ and Latin languages, the name of the foul ““ 1s the fame with that of 4reath. From ‘“ whence we may fafely infer, that origi- ““ nally it was confidered as nothing elfe +” - - = - What! - - = Though Dr. Pricftley had, only" three pages before, acknowledged that the opinion of ¢ the foul being a fub- «“ ftance, fo diftinct from the body as to be ““ unaffected by its death, and able to {ub- * Page 168, Difquifitions, vol. 1. + Page 171 ditto, Ggsa -flt (452) « fift, and even to be more free and happy ¢« without the body,” was an opinion ¢¢ evi- “ dently not the growth of Greece or Rome, «but was received by the philofophers of “«¢ thofe countries,” the Lord knows how many ages ago!!! CH A P.'X % X y HEN the reader recollects, that in Dr. Prieftley’s Introductory Effays, he argues againft man’s having any inftinétive fenfe of good and evil— he will rather be furprized on being informed that Dr. Prieft- ley thinks brutes capable of morality. He tells us, that a writer who he had been quot- ing from, ¢ injures the brutes very much, ¢¢ when, to account for the difference in «¢ the divine difpenfations to them and us, «¢ he {uppofes them to be deftitute of mora- «« [ity and liberty BY, Now no creatures can be capable of alt- ing from a fenfe of morality, but {uch as are, in [ome way or other, informed that # Page 237 of the Difquifitions, vol. 1. fome ( 433 ) fome actions are good and laudable==and others, wicked, and obnoxious to cenfure and punifthment. If, for argument’s fake, we admit, with Dr. Prieftley, that there is no inftinctive fenfe of good and evil, in man, —yet {till man may be {uppofed capable of morality, becaufe he may be informed of what is good and wicked, by education —and by hearing the fentiments of others, —but I thould be glad to know, how brutes attain that requifite knowledge. It cannot be from their outward {enfes—forit is im- poflible they can learn what is moral, or im- moral. It cannot be by revelation—for they cannot read. If they have any idea of mora- lity, therefore, it muft be -by #/linélf—and can Dr. Prieftley conceive that drutes have that inftin&ive fenfe of good and evil, which be denies to MAN ?! «« And yet it is evident that brutes have ¢¢ the rudiments of all our faculties, with- «« out exception; fo that they differ from ¢¢ us in degree only, and not in kind *.” Are not CONTEMPLATION and DE- #% Page 275, Difquifitions, vol. 1. Gg VOTION, ( 454 ) VOTION, faculties of the mind ? And have we any reafon to conceive brutes cap- able of contemplating the wonders of cre- ation, and the perfections of their author ? Have brutes ever thewn any figns of ado- ration, and devotion ?—If not, how can it be (id that © brates bave the rudiments ¢ of all or Faculties 2” They differ from ¢ ws,” mor “in degree only,” but eflenti- ally, “in hind’—and Dr. Pricftley’s re- preféntation is therefore unjuft, Were Ito comment on every fimilar infrance of mif- reprefentation, and inconfiftency—I thould write three volumes, inftead of one. J { 455 ) Chil Al: Pao Xl In Anfwer to Liufirations” of what Dr. Hartley, and Dr. Priefiley term, ¢ Pbilo- “ fophical Neceffity.” IF CANNOT take leave of Dr. Prieftley, A without making a few remarks on his ¢¢ Illuftrations cf Philofophical Neceflity.” In the Preface to the 2d volume of Difqui~ fitions * he fays, ¢¢ Tam well aware that, notwith{tanding «¢ all that ever can be advanced in favour of ¢¢ thofe conclufions, great and glorious as they really are in themfelves, it requires ¢ {fo much ftrength of mind to comprehend “¢ them, (that I with to fay it with the ¢¢ leaft offence poffible) I cannot help con- ¢¢ fidering the do&rine as that which will «¢ always diftinguith the real moral philo- ¢ fopher from the reft of the world;” (and again, near the clofe of the paragraph—) ¢ if the do&rine have any bad effets, it is €< * XXIV Page. Gg 4 “ a proof ( 456 ) «ca proof with me that it was never clearly ¢¢ underftood, &c.” : That Dr. Prieftley is endued with that «« STRENGTH OF MIND,” < which < ail] always DISTINGUISH #be REAL ¢ MORAL PHILOSOPHER, from the “ ye} of the world,”—and enable HIM ““ tg comprehend,” whatever can be under- ftood by human intelleéts——1I take for granted the world will very readily admit ;— and fince thofe, whofe ¢“ ftrength of mind’ elevates them above ¢¢ the reff of the “¢ aworld,” fhould be induced by the con- fideration of their own ¢° diftinguifbed”’ abi- lities, to make allowances for the want of {uch gifts, in others— who think them- [elves upon a level with mankind) 1 am {ure Dr. Prieftley will make favourable aliow- ances for any‘ want of underftanding I may betray, by the declaration of my ina- bility to comprehend a do¢trine—which— (in confequence of my being no philsfopber, ) appears to me to be involved in contra- dictions. No perfon can in ftronger terms exprefs a difbelief in the calviniftical doétrine of predeflination, than Dr. Prieftley has done — (and ( 457 ) ~——(and I believe that no doctrine can be more reprobated, by every unprejudiced mind) if—therefore, I can prove that his do&rine of philofophical neceflity, is pre- cifely the fame with Dr. Hartley's *, (which I thould hope I have fhewn to be as incom- patible with a belief in our having what he, as well as Dr. Prieftley terms popular [free will, as the predeftination of the Cal- vinifts) and terminates precifely in the fame conclufions I {fuppofe it will be deemed {ufficient to thew that it muft be erroneous. Dr. Prieftley acknowledges 4+ that ¢¢ where “ a difpofition to vice has preoccupied the ¢ mind, he is very well fatisfied, that but ““ too many facts might be alledged in proof “ of it, that the doltrines of Calvinifm ¢¢ have been actually fatal to the remains of ¢ wirtue, and have driven men into the ‘¢. moft defperate and abandoned courfe of ¢ wickednefs; whereas the dotrine of ne- ¢ ceflity, properly underftood, cannot pof- ¢¢ {ibly have any fuch effet, but the con- ¢ trary.” (That he was miftaken in the latter part of this paffage, fhall be f{atis- * See the 8th Part of this Effay. + 162 Page, Difquifitions, vol. 2. factorily ( 458 ) fattorily fhewn in the following pages.) And again, in the 155th page of the 2d vol. of the Difquifitions, Dr. Prieftley ad- mits, that < if any fiftem of Speculative “ principles can operate as an axe at 2 root ““ of all virtue and goodnefs, 1t 1s this.” The reafon Dr. Prieftley very juftly affigns for this * (among others) is, that ¢¢ the ¢ Calviniftic {yftem entirely excludes the “ popular notion of free will, viz. the ki “ berty, or power, Ol doing what we « pleafe, virtuous or vicious, 2s belonging “ to every perien, in every fituation; (but here, as well as above, he adds, what will be found impoffible)—¢ which is per- « fe@ly confiftent with the doctrine of phi- «¢ lofophical neceflity, and indeed refults ¢¢ from it.” Dr. Prieftley fays + that ¢ the eflential « difference between the two {chemes” (of Calviniftical predeftination, and philofophi- cal neceflity) “is this: the Neceffarian be- ¢« lieves that his own difpofitions and 1 a&ions are the neceflary and fole means ¢¢ of his prefent and future happinefs ; fo * Page 158, Difquifitions, vol. 2. + 153d Ditto. “ nat, ( 459 ) that, in the moft proper fenfe of the words, it depends entirely upon Aimfelf whether he be virtuous or vicious, hap- py or miferable, juft as much as it de- pends upon the farmer himfelf {owing his fields and weeding them, whether he will have a good crop ; except. that, in favour of the do&rine of neceflity, where morals are concerned, his endeavoursin the former cafe are much more certain in their effe@& than in the latter; which view of things cannot but operate tomake him exert himfelf to the utmoft, in pro- portion to his regard for his own hap- pinefs ; his fuccefs being certain in pro- portion to his exertion of himfelf.” Now—for proof that this is impofiible, I believe I need only refer my reader back to the evidence that is produced in the 8th and oth parts of this eflay, to thew that the doctrine of philofophical neceflity deprives us of popular liberry and is therefore as deftru&tive of virtue, and as incompatible with God’s attributes, as the Calviniftical creed and, in fact, that with refpe& to predeftination, 7 is productive of all its bad confequences. But as it is proper 1 thould thew ( 460, ) (hew Dr. Pricftley’s philofophical neceflity, to be the fame with Dr. Hartley s—I thall give extracts from the fecond volume of his Difquifitions, to prove how very incon- fiftently he has written—and how irre concileable what follows, is—with the quotations I have made from him in this ve se 8gth page, 2d vol. Difquifitions, Dr. Prieftley fays, as to the hackneyed ‘ objection to the do&rine of neceflitys from « its being inconfiftent with the idea of « virtue and vice, praife and blame, it «« may be fully retorted upon its opponents. «¢ For as to their boafted Jelf-determining « power (Were the thing pofiible in itfelf, «¢ ‘and did not imply an abfurdity) by which «« they pretend to have a power of ating «¢ independently of every thing that comes « under the defcription of matrve, I {cruple ¢ pot to fay, that it 1s as foreign to every ¢¢ jdea of virtue and vice, praife a blame, «sas the grofleft kind of mechanifm, that ¢«¢ the moft blundering writer 1n defence of «¢ liberty ever afcribed to the advocates of « moral neceflity.” Here Dr. Prieftley 1auchs at the idea of our having “¢ a felf- S s determining ( 461 ) ¢ determining power.” If we have nor the power of felf-determining, with refpe&t to our a&ions, how can it be faid that ¢ it « depends entirely upon ourfelves whe- “¢ ther we be virtuous or vicious, &c?” And can our ating from motives, be faid to prevent our having that ¢ felf- determining power,” for which, alone, we contend ?—If acting from motives, be in- confiftent with the pofleflion of a felf- determining power, the Almighty himfelf, (with reverence I fay it) can have no felf-de- termining power—for is be not actuated by motives ? |! l—Can Dr. Prieftley conceive that zhe welfare of his creatures their pre- Sfervaton, and bappinefs the governing them, confiftent with juftice, goodnefs, mercy, have no influence on the actions of the Al- mighty ?~—-And are not thefe, motives 2— Yet will Dr. Prieftley therefore fay, that ze Almighty is governed by neceffity ? But man is more in pofleffion of a felf- determining power, when confidered in this view, than even the Almighty for the Deity is variably influenced by worthy motives—while man, on the contrary, is often prompted by thofe which are wicked. His 10 ET Be RES ERE UNE TES ———— i, Rk ri r= ( 462.) His felf-determining power, however, en- ables him #0 chufe whether he will give way to fuch motives, or liften to thofe which confcience {uggelts but the Deity, not being fubje to temptation, can be prompt- ed to no a&ion that is not wife, juft, and good—and the tendency of every action, muit be fo open to his view, that it is im- poflible he can ever hefitate—yet he muftbe notwithftanding at liberty—-and therefore, ince the being influenced by motives, fubjects the Deity to no neceffity of ation it cannot be fard to Lave that effect on man. To imagine, that becaufe man does not a& without defign, he is not a free being, is the moft extraordi- nary imagination that can be conceived. Men indifputably act from motives—but yet they chufe the motives by which they 26. When they afk for the affiftance of Heaven, they do not afk to be driven into 2 virtuous courfe, while they are to remain paffive—but that {uch affiftance may, from time to time, be given, as is neceffary to afford a counterpoife to their appetites and pafiions. When that is granted, they full remain at liberty to determine whether they will be fwayed by the motives to virtue, and goodnefs, which are prefented by confcience 2 wn OY ( 463 ) —or thofe to vice and wickednefs, which are prefented by their appetites—as well as by. pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, and malevolence. Grant that temptations to vice and wickednefs, prefent motives, unexpec?- edly and cafually— (which really happens) — and that i# was not in the power of thofe who bave given way to them to have afted differ- ently, and then how can they be juftly confidered as having deferved punifbment !— Dr. Prieftiey will fay, ¢ becaufe it was their ““ own fault that their minds, prior to the ““ temptation, were not more averfe to vice ““ and difpofed to virtue” (and this I fhall very readily admit) but then I muft de- mand, bow came their minds to be Jo difpofed 2 —Muft it not have been owing to former in- dulgences, Jormer gratifications —— former crimes, thatthe evil habit was formed?—And then muft not #bgfe former crimes—/ go ever Jo far back )—have fl] been occafioned by temptations, which may havebeen as unforefeen and cafial 2—And 7f as unforefeen and cafual ~—and the agent could not otherwife than at as be did---1 muft again return to my queftion, bow can they be juftly confidered as deferving punifbrrent ¢ How can they be faid to bave bad the popular liberty, which Dr. 3 Prieftley a on ——— Br, RA Ry a TA SWE = lh Ee i RR A ea ess % | 3 \ / } \ » } | § Ne ! |g N ( 464 ) Priettley admits is pofieffed by man P In his fecond page, vol. 2, he fays that he i al- «« lows to man all the liberty, or power, «« that is pofible in itfelf, and to which the ¢¢ ideas of mankind in general go, which is «the power of doing whatever they will or pleafe, both with refpect to the operations ¢¢ of their minds, and the motions of their «« bodies, uncontrolled by any foreign principle «or caufe.”—but how can they do as they will or pleafe, if they could not but give way to the vicious motive, if they yielded—or help refifting it, if they preferved their vir- tue >—All praife, or blame, become equally unjuft. Yet Dr. Pricftley allows that we can do what we pleafe, notwithftanding he in- fifts* that ¢ according to the eftablifhed laws ¢c of nature, no event could have been other- «¢ wife than it bas been, 1s, OF 7s to be, and « therefore all things paft, prefent, and to «¢ come, areprecifely what the Author of Na- « ture really intended them to be, and has made « provifion for.” Now I thould be glad to know in what words could the maf? rigid Cal- vinift, exprefs bimfelf more decifively, in favour of predeftination 2—If the Almighty pre- ordained; before I was born, that aol aCl ¢ LY # In the 8th Page of his fecond Volume. oY Ee Sa (465) a&t *¢ precifely” as I have done, and am to di=< bow can I have had ** the power of doing what - ever 1 will, or pleafe” 2! How can I a& as I pleafe,” in future?! = - = = Can I al- ter < the eflablifbed laws of nature?”- =-- Can Fait IN OPPOSITION TO WHAT HAS BEEN ¢ APPOINTED BY GOD”? * I confefs I have not “_firength of mind to ¢¢ comprehend,” how fuch contradictory doc- trines can be reconciled—and if it be impof- fible to be a * real moral philofopher,” with= out being able to underftand how con- tradiftory pofitions, can be at the fame time, equally true—I never defire to be ‘ Jif~ “ tinguifbed from the reff of the world,” by proving myfelf deficient. in—COMMON SENSE. To conclude, I think, with Dr. Prieftley, that *“ sz is high time to abandon thefe random “ bypotbefifes, and to form our conclufions, with ¢ refpéit to tbe faculties of the MIND, as ““ well as the properties and powers of MAT - “ TER, by an attentive obfervation of # Page 153, Difquifitions, vol. 2. a Hh * FACTS, i SE Ta, . — Ps a a Pa ET a eb LBS FUER NSB i cy ib on Fe Bl Se . / (466) «« FACTS, and CAUTIOUS suferences from «¢ them *.” If Dr. Prieftley in future, forms his conclufions of the faculties of the mind, and the properties of matter, by an attentive ebfervation of falls, and cautious inferences from them—he will not be led into mifre- prefentations and inconfiftencies=-