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 BOOK 18 1.3.H95 c. 1 
 
 HUSIK # HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL 
 
 JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 3 T153 000b3537 7 
 
be ken" 
 
A HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL JEWISH 
 PHILOSOPHY 
 
> 9 -o - 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO ■ DALLAS 
 ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 
 
 LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCDTTA 
 MELBOURNE 
 
 THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. 
 
 TORONTO 
 
A HISTORY OF 
 
 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 BY 
 ISAAC HUSIK, A.M., Ph.D. 
 
 ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 1918 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
COPYMGHT, I916 
 
 By the MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 Set up and electrotyped. Published October, 1916. 
 
This book is issued by the Macmillan Company 
 in conjunction with the Jewish Publication Society 
 of America. 
 
TO 
 
 SOLOMON SOLIS COHEN, M.D. 
 
 AS A TOKEN 
 
 OF 
 
 GRATITUDE AND ESTEEM 
 
PREFACE 
 
 No excuse is needed for presenting to the English reader a History 
 of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy. The English language, poor enough 
 in books on Jewish history and literature, can boast of scarcely any- 
 thing at all in the domain of Jewish Philosophy. The Jewish Ency- 
 clopedia has no article on Jewish Philosophy, and neither has the 
 eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Hastings' Encyclo- 
 pedia of Religion and Ethics will have a brief article on the subject 
 from the conscientious and able pen of Dr. Henry Malter, but of books 
 there is none. But while this is due to several causes, chief among 
 them perhaps being that English speaking people in general and Amer- 
 icans in particular are more interested in positive facts than in tentative 
 speculations, in concrete researches than in abstract theorizing — there 
 are ample signs that here too a change is coming, and in many spheres 
 we are called upon to examine our foundations with a view to making 
 our superstructure deep and secure as well as broad and comprehen- 
 sive. And this is nothing else than philosophy. Philosophical studies 
 are happily on the increase in this country and more than one branch 
 of literary endeavor is beginning to feel its influence. And with the 
 increase of books and researches in the history of the Jews is coming 
 an awakening to the fact that the philosophical and rationalistic move- 
 ment among the Jews in the middle ages is well worth study, in- 
 fluential as it was in forming Judaism as a religion and as a theological 
 and ethical system. 
 
 But it is not merely the English language that is still wanting in a 
 general history of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, the German, French 
 and ItaHan languages are no better off in this regard. For while it is 
 true that outside of the Hebrew and Arabic sources, German books 
 and monographs are the sine qua non of the student who wishes to 
 investigate the philosophical movement in mediaeval Jewry, and the 
 present writer owes very much to the researches of such men as Joel, 
 Guttmann, Kaufmann and others, it nevertheless remains true that 
 there is as yet no complete history of the subject for the student or the 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 general reader. The German writers have done thorough and distin- 
 guished work in expounding individual thinkers and problems, they 
 have gathered a complete and detailed bibliography of Jewish philo- 
 sophical writings in print and in manuscript, they have edited and 
 translated and annotated the most important philosophical texts. 
 France has also had an important share in these fundamental under- 
 takings, but for some reason neither the one nor the other has so far 
 undertaken to present to the general student and non-technical reader 
 the results of their researches. 
 
 What was omitted by the German, French and English speaking 
 writers was accomplished by a scholar who wrote in Hebrew. Dr. 
 S. Bernfeld has written in Hebrew under the title "Daat Elohim" 
 (The Knowledge of God) a readable sketch of Jewish Religious philos- 
 ophy from Biblical times down to " Ahad Haam." A German scholar 
 (now in America), Dr. David Neumark of Cincinnati, has undertaken 
 on a very large scale a History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle 
 Ages, of which only a beginning has been made in the two volumes so 
 far issued. 
 
 The present writer at the suggestion of the Publication Committee 
 of the Jewish Publication Society of America has undertaken to write 
 a history of mediaeval Jewish rationalistic philosophy in one volume 
 — a history that will appeal alike to the scholar and the intelhgent 
 non-technical reader. Treating only of the rationalistic school, I 
 did not include anything that has to do with mysticism or Kabbala. 
 In my attempt to please the scholar and the layman, I fear I shall 
 have succeeded in satisfying neither. The professional student will 
 miss learned notes and quotations of original passages in the language 
 of their authors. The general reader will often be wearied by the 
 scholastic tone of the problems as well as of the manner of the discus- 
 sion and argument. And yet I cannot but feel that it will do both 
 classes good — the one to get less, the other more than he wants. The 
 latter will find oases in the desert where he can refresh himseK and take 
 a rest, and the former will find in the notes and bibUography references 
 to sources and technical articles where more can be had after his own 
 heart. 
 
 There is not much room for originality in a historical and expository 
 work of this kind, particularly as I believe in writing history objec- 
 
PREFACE IX 
 
 tively. I have not attempted to read into the mediaeval thinkers 
 modern ideas that were foreign to them. I endeavored to interpret 
 their ideas from their own point of view as determined by their history 
 and environment and the hterary sources, religious and philosophical, 
 under the influence of which they came. I based my book on a study 
 of the original sources where they were available — and this applies 
 to all the authors treated with the exception of the two Karaites, 
 Joseph al Basir and Jeshua ben Judah, where I had to content my- 
 seK with secondary sources and a few fragments of the original texts. 
 For the rest I tried to tell my story as simply as I knew how, and I hope 
 the reader will accept the book in the spirit in which it is offered — as 
 an objective and not too critical exposition of Jewish rationalistic 
 thought in the middle ages. 
 
 My task would not be done were I not to express my obligations 
 to the PubHcation Committee of the Jewish Publication Society of 
 America to whose encouragement I owe the impulse but for which 
 the book would not have been written, and whose material assistance 
 enabled the pubUshers to bring out a book typographically so attrac- 
 tive. 
 
 Isaac Husik. 
 Philadelphia, 
 
 July, igi6. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface vii 
 
 Introduction xiii 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I. Isaac Israeli i 
 
 II. David ben Merwan Al Mukammas 17 
 
 III. Saadia ben Joseph Al-Fayyumi 23 
 
 IV. Joseph Al-Basir and Jeshua ben Judah 48 
 
 V. Solomon Ibn Gabirol 59 
 
 VT. Bahya Ibn Pakuda 80 
 
 VII. Pseudo-Bahya 106 
 
 VIII. Abraham Bar Hiyya 114 
 
 IX. Joseph Ibn Zaddik 125 
 
 X. Judah Halevi 150 
 
 XI. Moses and Abraham Ibn Ezra 184 
 
 XII. Abraham Ibn Daud 197 
 
 XIII. Moses Maimonides 236 
 
 XIV. Hillel ben Samuel 312 
 
 XV. Levi ben Gerson 328 
 
 XVI. Aaron ben Elijah of Nicomedia 362 
 
 XVII. Hasdai ben Abraham Crescas 388 
 
 XVIII. Joseph Albo 406 
 
 Conclusion 428 
 
 Bibliography 433 
 
 Notes 439 
 
 List of Biblical and Rabbinic Passages 449 
 
 Index 451 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The philosophical movement in mediaeval Jewry was the result of 
 the desire and the necessity, felt by the leaders of Jewish thought, of 
 reconciling two apparently independent sources of truth. In the 
 middle ages, among Jews as well as among Christians and Moham- 
 medans, the two sources of knowledge or truth which were clearly 
 present to the minds of thinking people, each claiming recognition, 
 were religious opinions as embodied in revealed documents on the 
 one hand, and philosophical and scientific judgments and arguments, 
 the results of independent rational reflection, on the other. Revela- 
 tion and reason, religion and philosophy, faith and knowledge, author- 
 ity and independent reflection are the various expressions for the 
 dualism in mediaeval thought, which the philosophers and theologians 
 of the time endeavored to reduce to a monism or a unity. 
 
 Let us examine more intimately the character and content of the 
 two elements in the intellectual horizon of mediaeval Jewry. On the 
 side of revelation, rehgion, authority, we have the Bible, the Mishna, 
 the Tahnud. The Bible was the written law, and represented Uterally 
 the word of God as revealed to lawgiver and prophet; the Talmud 
 (including the Mishna) was the oral law, embodying the unwritten 
 commentary on the words of the Law, equally authentic with the 
 latter, contemporaneous with it in revelation, though not committed 
 to writing until many ages subsequently and until then handed down 
 by word of mouth; hence depending upon tradition and faith in tradi- 
 tion for its validity and acceptance. Authority therefore for the 
 Rabbanites was two-fold, the authority of the direct word of God 
 which was written down as soon as communicated, and about which 
 there could therefore be no manner of doubt; and the authority of 
 the indirect word of God as transmitted orally for many generations 
 before it was written down, requiring belief in tradition. By the 
 Karaites tradition was rejected, and there remained only belief in the 
 words of the Bible. 
 
 On the side of reason was urged first the claim of the testimony of 
 
xiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 the senses, and second the vaHdity of logical inference as determined 
 by demonstration and syllogistic proof. This does not mean that the 
 Jewish thinkers of the middle ages developed unaided from without a 
 system of thought and a Weltanschauung, based solely upon their own 
 observation and ratiocination, and then found that the view of the 
 world thus acquired stood in opposition to the rehgion of the Bible 
 and the Talmud, the two thus requiring adjustment and reconciliation. 
 No! The so-called demands of the reason were not of their own mak- 
 ing, and on the other hand the relation between philosophy and reli- 
 gion was not altogether one of opposition. To discuss the latter point 
 first, the teachings of the Bible and the Talmud were not altogether 
 clear on a great many questions. Passages could be cited from the 
 religious documents of Judaism in reference to a given problem both 
 pro and con. Thus in the matter of freedom of the will one could 
 argue on the one hand that man must be free to determine his conduct 
 since if he were not there would have been no use in giving him com- 
 mandments and prohibitions. And one could quote besides in favor of 
 freedom the direct statement in Deuteronomy 30, 19, "I call heaven 
 and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before 
 thee life and death, the blessing and the curse: therefore choose life, 
 that thou mayest Hve, thou and thy seed." But on the other hand it 
 was just as possible to find Biblical statements indicating clearly that 
 God preordains how a person shall behave in a given case. Thus 
 Pharaoh's heart was hardened that he should not let the children of 
 Israel go out of Egypt, as we read in Exodus 7, 3: "And I will harden 
 Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in the land of 
 Egypt. But Pharaoh will not hearken unto you, and I will lay my 
 hand upon Egypt, and bring forth my hosts, my people, the children 
 of Israel, out of the land of Egypt by great judgments." Similarly 
 in the case of Sihon king of Heshbon we read in Deuteromony 2, 30: 
 "But Sihon king of Heshbon would not let us pass by him: for the 
 Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that 
 he might deliver him into thy hand, as at this day." And this is true 
 not merely of heathen kings, Ahab king of Israel was similarly en- 
 ticed by a divine instigation according to I Kings 22, 20: "And the 
 Lord said. Who shall entice Ahab, that he may go up and fall at 
 Ramoth-Gilead?" 
 
INTRODUCTION xv 
 
 The fact of the matter is the Bible is not a systematic book, and 
 principles and problems are not clearly and strictly formulated even 
 in the domain of ethics which is its strong point. It was not therefore 
 a question here of opposition between the Bible and philosophy, or 
 authority and reason. What was required was rather a rational 
 analysis of the problem on its own merits and then an endeavor to 
 show that the conflicting passages in the Scriptures are capable of 
 interpretation so as to harmonize with each other and with the results 
 of rational speculation. To be sure, it was felt that the doctrine of 
 freedom is fundamental to the spirit of Judaism, and the philosophic 
 analyses led to the same result though in differing form, sometimes 
 dangerously approaching a thorough determinism, as in Hasdai 
 Crescas. ^ 
 
 If such doubt was possible in an ethical problem where one would 
 suppose the Bible would be outspoken, the uncertainty was still 
 greater in purely metaphysical questions which as such were really 
 foreign to its purpose as a book of religion and ethics. While it was 
 clear that the Bible teaches the existence of God as the creator of the 
 universe, and of man as endowed with a soul, it is manifestly difficult 
 to extract from it a rigid and detailed theory as to the nature of God, 
 the manner in which the world was created, the nature of the soul 
 and its relation to man and to God. As long as the Jews were self- 
 centered and did not come in close contact with an alien civilization of 
 a philosophic mould, the need for a carefully thought out and con- 
 sistent theory on all the questions suggested was not felt. And thus 
 we have in the Talmudic literature quite a good deal of speculation 
 concerning God and man. But it can scarcely lay claim to being 
 rationalistic or philosophic, much less to being consistent. Nay, we 
 have in the Bible itself at least two books which attempt an anti- 
 dogmatic treatment of ethical problems. In Job is raised the question 
 whether a man's fortunes on earth bear any relation to his conduct 
 moral and spiritual. Ecclesiastes cannot make up his mind whether 
 life is worth Hving, and how to make the best of it once one finds him- 
 self aHve, whether by seeking wisdom or by pursuing pleasure. But 
 here too Job is a long poem, and the argument does not progress very 
 rapidly or very far. Ecclesiastes is rambling rather than analytic, and 
 on the whole mostly negative. The Talmudists were visibly puzzled 
 
xvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 in their attitude to both books, wondered whether Job really existed 
 or was only a fancy, and seriously thought of excluding Ecclesiastes 
 from the canon. But these attempts at questioning the meaning of 
 life had no further results. They did not lead, as in the case of the 
 Greek Sophists, to a Socrates, a Plato or an Aristotle. Philo in Alexan- 
 dria and Maimonides in Fostat were the products not of the Bible and 
 the Talmud alone, but of a combination of Hebraism and Hellenism, 
 pure in the case of Philo, mixed with the spirit of Islam in Maimonides. 
 
 And this leads us to consider the second point mentioned above, 
 the nature and content of what was attributed in the middle ages 
 to the credit of reason. It was in reality once more a set of documents. 
 The Bible and Talmud were the documents of revelation, Aristotle 
 was the document of reason. Each was supreme in its sphere, and all 
 efforts must be bent to make them agree, for as revelation cannot be 
 doubted, so neither can the assured results of reason. But not all 
 which pretends to be the conclusion of reason is necessarily so in truth, 
 as on the other hand the documents of faith are subject to interpreta- 
 tion and may mean something other than appears on the surface. 
 
 That the Bible has an esoteric meaning besides the Kteral has its 
 source in the Talmud itself. Reference is found there to a mystic 
 doctrine of creation known as "Maase Bereshit" and a doctrine of 
 the divine chariot called "Maase Merkaba." ^ The exact nature of 
 these teachings is not known since the Talmud itself prohibits the 
 imparting of this mystic lore to any but the initiated, i. e., to those 
 showing themselves worthy; and never to more than one or two at a 
 time.^ But it is clear from the names of these doctrines that they 
 centered about the creation story in Genesis and the account of the 
 divine chariot in Ezekiel, chapters one and ten. Besides the Halaka 
 and Agada are full of interpretations of Biblical texts which are very 
 far from the literal and have httle to do with the context. Moreover, 
 the beliefs current among the Jews in Alexandria in the first century 
 B. C. found their way into mediaeval Jewry, that the philosophic 
 literature of the Greeks was originally borrowed or stolen from the 
 Hebrews, who lost it in times of storm and stress.^ This being the 
 case, it was believed that the Bible itself cannot be without some al- 
 lusions to philosophic doctrines. That the Bible does not clearly 
 teach philosophy is due to the fact that it was intended for the salva- 
 
INTRODUCTION xvii 
 
 tion of all men, the simple as well as the wise, women and children 
 as well as male adults. For these it is sufficient that they know cer- 
 tain religious truths within their grasp and conduct themselves ac- 
 cording to the laws of goodness and righteousness. A strictly philo- 
 sophic book would have been beyond their ken and they would have 
 been left without a guide in life. But the more intellectual and the 
 more ambitious are not merely permitted, nay they are obHgated to 
 search the Scriptures for the deeper truths found therein, truths akin 
 to the philosophic doctrines found in Greek literature; and the latter 
 will help them in understanding the Bible aright. It thus became a 
 duty to study philosophy and the sciences preparatory thereto, 
 logic, mathematics and physics; and thus equipped to approach the 
 Scriptures and interpret them in a philosophical manner. The study 
 of mediaeval Jewish rationahsm has therefore two sides to it, the analy- 
 sis of metaphysical, ethical and psychological problems, and the ap- 
 plication of these studies to an interpretation of Scripture. 
 
 Now let us take a closer glance at the rationalistic or philosophic 
 literature to which the Jews in the middle ages fell heirs. In 529 A. D. 
 the Greek schools of philosophy in Athens were closed by order of 
 Emperor Justinian. This did not, however, lead to the extinction of 
 Greek thought as an influence in the world. For though the West was 
 gradually dechning intellectually on account of the fall of Rome and 
 the barbarian invasions which followed in its train, there were signs 
 of progress in the East which, feeble at first, was destined in the course 
 of several centuries to illumine the whole of Europe with its enlight- 
 ening rays. 
 
 Long before 529, the date of the closing of the Greek schools, Greek 
 influence was introduced in the East in Asia and Africa.^ The whole 
 movement goes back to the days of Alexander the Great and the 
 victories he gained in the Orient. From that time on Greeks settled in 
 Asia and Africa and brought along with them Greek manners, the 
 Greek language, and the Greek arts and sciences. Alexandria, the 
 capital of the Ptolemies in Egypt after the death of Alexander, and 
 Antioch, the capital of Syria under the empire of the Seleucidae, 
 were well-known centres of Greek learning. 
 
 When Syria changed masters in 64 B. C. and became a Roman 
 province, its form of civilization did not change, and the introduction 
 
xviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 of Christianity had the effect of spreading the influence of the Greeks 
 and their language into Mesopotamia beyond the Euphrates. The 
 Christians in Syria had to study Greek in order to understand the 
 Scriptures of the Old and the New Testaments, the decrees and canons 
 of the ecclesiastical councils, and the writings of the Church Fathers. 
 Besides rehgion and the Church, the hberal arts and sciences, for 
 which the Greeks were so famous, attracted the interests of the Syrian 
 Christians, and schools were established in the ecclesiastical centres 
 where philosophy, mathematics and medicine were studied. These 
 branches of knowledge were represented in Greek literature, and hence 
 the works treating of these subjects had to be translated into Syriac 
 for the benefit of those who did not know Greek. Aristotle was the 
 authority in philosophy, Hippocrates and Galen in medicine. 
 
 The oldest of these schools was in Edessa in Mesopotamia, founded 
 in the year 363 by St. Ephrem of Nisibis. It was closed in 489 and the 
 teachers migrated to Persia where two other schools became famous, 
 one at Nisibis and the other at Gandisapora, A third school of phil- 
 osophy among the Jacobite or Monophysite Christians was that con- 
 nected with the convent of Kinnesrin on the left bank of the Eu- 
 phrates, which became famous as a seat of Greek learning in the 
 beginning of the seventh century. 
 
 Christianity was succeeded in the Orient by Mohammedanism, 
 and this change led to even greater cultivation of Greek studies 
 on the part of the Syrians. The Mohammedan Caliphs employed 
 the Syrians as physicians. This was especially true of the Abbasid 
 dynasty, who came into power in 750. When they succeeded to the 
 CaUphate they raised Nestorian Syrians to ofl&ces of importance, and 
 the latter under the patronage of their masters continued their studies 
 of Greek science and philosophy and translated those writings into 
 Syriac and Arabic. Among the authors translated were, Hippocrates 
 and Galen in medicine, Euclid, Archimedes and Ptolemy in mathe- 
 matics and astronomy, and Aristotle, Theophrastus and Alexander 
 of Aphrodisias in philosophy. In many cases the Greek writings were 
 not turned directly into Arabic but as the translators were Syrians, 
 the versions were made first into Syriac, and then from the Syriac 
 into Arabic. The Syrian Christians were thus the mediators between 
 the Greeks and the Arabs. The latter, however, in the course of time 
 
INTRODUCTION xiy 
 
 far surpassed their Syrian teachers, developed important schools of 
 philosophy, became the teachers of the Jews, and with the help of the 
 latter introduced Greek philosophy as well as their own development 
 thereof into Christian Europe in the beginning of the thirteenth 
 century. 
 
 We see now that the impulse to philosophizing came from the 
 Greeks, — and not merely the impulse but the material, the matter 
 as well as the method and the terminology. In the Aristotelian writ- 
 ings we find developed an entire system of thought. There is not a 
 branch of knowledge dealing with fundamental principles which is not 
 there represented. First of all Aristotle stands alone as the discoverer 
 of the organon of thought, the tool which we all employ in our reason- 
 ing and reflection; he is the first formula tor of the science and art of 
 logic. He treats besides of the principles of nature and natural phe- 
 nomena in the Physics and the treatise on the Heavens. He discusses 
 the nature of the soul, the senses and the intellect in his ' Psychology." 
 In the ' History of Animals" and other minor works we have a treat- 
 ment of biology. In the Nikomachean and Eudemian Ethics he analy- 
 zes the meaning of virtue, gives a list and classification of the virtues 
 and discusses the summum bonum or the aim of human life. Finally in 
 the Metaphysics we have an analysis of the fundamental notions of 
 being, of the nature of reality and of God. 
 
 The Jews did not get all this in its purity for various reasons. In 
 the first place it was only gradually that the Jews became acquainted 
 with the wealth of Aristotelian material. We are sure that Abraham 
 Ibn Daud, the forerunner of Maimonides, had a thorough familiarity 
 with the ideas of Aristotle; and those who came after him, for example 
 Maimonides, Gersonides, Hasdai Crescas, show clearly that they were 
 deep students of the ideas represented in the writings of the Stagirite. 
 But there is not the same evidence in the earlier writings of Isaac 
 Israeli, Saadia, Joseph Ibn Zaddik, Gabirol, Bahya Ibn Pakuda, 
 Judah Halevi. They had picked up Aristotelian ideas and principles, 
 but they had also absorbed ideas and concepts from other schools, 
 Greek as well as Arabian, and unconsciously combined the two. 
 
 Another explanation for the rarity of the complete and unadulter- 
 ated Aristotle among the Jewish thinkers of the middle ages is that 
 people in those days were very uncritical in the matter of historical 
 
XX INTRODUCTION 
 
 facts and relations. Historical and literary criticism was altogether 
 unknown, and a number of works were ascribed to Aristotle which 
 did not belong to him, and which were foreign in spirit to his mode of 
 thinking. They emanated from a different school of thought with 
 different presuppositions. I am referring to the treatise called the 
 "Theology of Aristotle,"^ and that known as the "Liber de Causis."^ 
 Both were attributed to Aristotle in the middle ages by Jews and 
 Arabs alike, but it has been shown recently ^ that the former represents 
 extracts from the works of Plotinus, the head of the Neo-Platonic 
 school of philosophy, while the latter is derived from a treatise of 
 Proclus, a Neo-Platonist of later date. 
 
 Finally a third reason for the phenomenon in question is that the 
 Jews were the pupils of the Arabs and followed their lead in adapting 
 Greek thought to their own intellectual and spiritual needs. It so 
 happens therefore that even in the case of Abraham Ibn Daud, Mai- 
 monides and Gersonides, who were without doubt well versed in 
 Aristotelian thought and entertained not merely admiration but 
 reverence for the philosopher of Stagira, we notice that instead of 
 reading the works of Aristotle himself, they preferred, or were obliged 
 as the case may be, to go to the writings of Alfarabi, Avicenna and 
 Averroes for their information on the views of the philosopher. In 
 the case of Gersonides this is easily explained. It seems he could read 
 neither Latin nor Arabic^ and there was no Hebrew translation of the 
 text of Aristotle. Averroes had taken in the fourteenth century the 
 place of the Greek philosopher and instead of reading Aristotle all 
 students read the works of the Commentator, as Averroes was called. 
 Of course the very absence of a Hebrew translation of Aristotle's 
 text proves that even among those who read Arabic the demand for 
 the text of Aristotle was not great, and preference was shown for the 
 works of the interpreters, compendists and commentators, like Alfarabi 
 and Avicenna. And this helps us to understand why it is that Ibn 
 Daud and Maimonides who not only read Arabic but wrote their 
 philosophical works in Arabic showed the same preference for the 
 secondhand Aristotle. One reason may have been the lack of historical 
 and literary criticism spoken of above, and the other the difficulty 
 of the Arabic translations of Aristotle. Aristotle is hard to translate 
 into any language by reason of his peculiar technical terminology; 
 
INTRODUCTION xxi 
 
 and the difficulty was considerably enhanced by the fact that the 
 Syriac in many cases stood between the original Greek and the Arabic, 
 and in the second place by the great dissimilarity between the Semitic 
 language and its Indo-European original. This may have made the 
 copies of Aristotle's text rare, and gradually led to their disuse. The 
 great authority which names like Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes 
 acquired still further served to stamp them as the approved expositors 
 of the AristoteHan doctrine. 
 
 Among the Arabs the earliest division based upon a theoretical 
 question was that of the parties known as the ''Kadariya" and the 
 "Jabariya." ^° The problem which was the cause of the difference 
 was that of free will and determinism. Orthodox Islam favored the 
 idea that man is completely dependent upon the divine will, and that 
 not only his destiny but also his conduct is determined, and his own 
 will does not count. This was the popular feehng, though as far as the 
 Koran is concerned the question cannot be decided one way or the 
 other, as it is not consistent in its stand, and arguments can be drawn 
 in plenty in favor of either opinion. The idea of determinism, however, 
 seemed repugnant to many minds, who could not reconcile this with 
 their idea of reward and punishment and the justice of God. How is it 
 possible that a righteous God would force a man to act in a certain 
 manner and then punish him for it? Hence the sect of the " Kadariya," 
 who were in favor of freedom of the will. The Jabariya were the 
 determinists. 
 
 This division goes back to a very early period before the introduc- 
 tion of the Aristotelian philosophy among the Arabs, and hence owes 
 its inception not to reason as opposed to religious dogma, but to a 
 pious endeavor to understand clearly the rehgious view upon so im- 
 portant a question. 
 
 From the Kadariya, and in opposition to the AristoteUan move- 
 ment which had in the meantime gained ground, developed the school 
 of theologians known as the "Mutakallimun." They were the first 
 among the Arabs who dehberately laid down the reason as a source 
 of knowledge in addition to the authority of the Koran and the 
 "Sunna" or tradition. They were not freethinkers, and their object 
 was not to oppose orthodoxy as such. On the contrary, their purpose 
 was to purify the faith by freeing it from such elements as obscured 
 
xxii INTRODUCTION 
 
 in their minds the purity of the monotheistic tenet and the justice of 
 God. They started where the Kadariya left off and went further. 
 As a school of opposition their efforts were directed to prove the 
 creation of the world, individual providence, the reality of miracles, 
 as against the "philosophers," i. e., the Aristotehans, who held to the 
 eternity of motion, denied God's knowledge of particulars, and in- 
 sisted on the unchanging character of natural law. 
 
 For this purpose they placed at the basis of their speculations not 
 the AristoteHan concepts of matter and form, the former uncreated 
 and continuous, but adopted the atomistic theory of Democritus, 
 denied the necessity of cause and effect and the validity of natural 
 law, and made God directly responsible for everything that happened 
 every moment in life. God, they said, creates continually, and he is 
 not hampered by any such thing as natural law, which is merely our 
 name for that which we are accustomed to see. Whenever it rains we 
 are accustomed to see the ground wet, and we conclude that there is 
 a necessary connection of cause and effect between the rain and the 
 wetness of the ground. Nothing of the kind, say the Mutakallimun, 
 or the Mu tazila, the oldest sect of the school. It rains because God 
 willed that it should rain, and the ground is wet because God wills it 
 shall be wet. If God willed that the ground should be dry following 
 a rain, it would be dry; and the one is no more and no less natural 
 than the other. Miracles cease to be miracles on this conception of 
 natural processes. Similarly the dogma of creation is easily vindi- 
 cated on this theory as against the Aristotelian doctrine of eternity 
 of the world, which follows from his doctrine of matter and form, as 
 we shall have occasion to see later. 
 
 The Mu tazila were, however, chiefly known not for their principles 
 of physics but for their doctrines of the unity of God and his justice. 
 It was this which gave them their name of the "Men of Unity and 
 Justice," i. e., the men who vindicate against the unenlightened views 
 of popular orthodoxy the unity of God and his justice. 
 
 The discussion of the unity centered about the proper interpreta- 
 tion of the anthropomorphic passages in the Koran and the doctrine 
 of the divine attributes. When the Koran speaks of God's eyes, 
 ears, hands, feet; of his seeing, hearing, sitting, standing, walking, 
 being angry, smiling, and so on, must those phrases be understood 
 
INTRODUCTION xxiii 
 
 literally? If so God is similar to man, corporeal like him, and swayed 
 by passions. This seemed to the Mu tazila an unworthy conception 
 of God. To vindicate his spirituality the anthropomorphic passages 
 in the Koran must be understood metaphorically. 
 
 The other more difficult question was in what sense can attributes 
 be ascribed to God at all? It is not here a question of anthropomor- 
 phism. If I say that God is omniscient, omnipotent and a living God, 
 I attribute to God life, power, knowledge. Are these attributes the 
 same with God's essence or are they different? If different (and they 
 must be eternal since God was never without them), then we have 
 more than one eternal being, and God is dependent upon others. If 
 they are not different from God's essence, then his essence is not a 
 strict unity, since it is composed of life, power, knowledge; for life is 
 not power, and power is not knowledge. The only way to defend the 
 unity of God in its absolute purity is to say that God has no attri- 
 butes, i. e., God is omniscient but not through knowledge as his 
 attribute; God is omnipotent but not through power as his attribute, 
 and so on. God is absolutely one, and there is no distinction between 
 knowledge, power, and life in him. They are all one, and are his 
 essence. 
 
 This seemed in opposition to the words of the Koran, which fre- 
 quently speaks of God's knowledge, power, and so on, and was ac- 
 cordingly condemned as heretical by the orthodox. 
 
 In the tenth century a new sect arose named the "Ashariya" after 
 Al-Ashari, its founder. This was a party of moderation, and tended to 
 conciliate orthodoxy by not going too far in the direction of rationalis- 
 tic thinking. They solved the problem by saying, "God knows 
 through a knowledge which is not different from his essence." 
 
 The other problem to which the Mu' tazila devoted their attention 
 was that of the justice of God. This was in line with the efforts of the 
 Kadariya before them. It concerned itself with the doctrine of free 
 will. They defended man's absolute freedom of action, and insisted 
 on justice as the only motive of God's deahngs with men. God must 
 be just and cannot act otherwise than in accordance with justice. 
 
 In reference to the question of the nature of good and evil, the 
 orthodox position was that good is that which God commands, evil 
 that which God forbids. In other words, nothing is in itself good or 
 
xxiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 evil, the ethical character of an act is purely relative to God's attitude 
 to it. If God were to command cannibalism, it would be a good act. 
 The Mu'tazila were opposed to this. They believed in the absolute 
 character of good and evil. What makes an act good or bad is reason, 
 and it is because an act is good that God commands it, and not the 
 reverse. 
 
 The foregoing account gives us an idea of the nature of the Mu'tazi- 
 lite discussions of the two problems of God's unity and God's justice. 
 Their works were all arranged in the same way. They were divided 
 into two parts, one dealing with the question of the unity, and the 
 other with that of justice. The proofs of the unity were preceded by 
 the proofs of God's existence, and the latter were based upon a demon- 
 stration that the world is not eternal, but bears traces of having come 
 to be in time. These are the earmarks by which a Mu'taziHte book 
 could be recognized, and the respect for them on the part of the 
 philosophers, i. e., the AristoteUans, was not great. The latter did not 
 consider them worthy combatants in a philosophical fight, claiming 
 that they came with preconceived notions and arranged their concep- 
 tions of nature to suit the religious beUefs which they desired to de- 
 fend. Maimonides expresses a similar judgment concerning their 
 worthlessness as philosophical thinkers. ^^ 
 
 This school of the Mutakallimun, or of the more important part of 
 it known as the Mu'tazila, is of great interest for the history of Jewish 
 rationaHsm. In the first place their influence on the early Jewish 
 philosophers was great and unmistakable. It is no discovery of a 
 late day but is well known to Maimonides who is himself, as has just 
 been said and as will appear with greater detail later, a strong opponent 
 of these to him unphilosophical thinkers. In the seventy-first chapter 
 of his "Guide of the Perplexed," he says, "You will find that in the 
 few works composed by the Geonim and the Karaites on the unity of 
 God and on such matter as is connected with this doctrine, they fol- 
 lowed the lead of the Mohammedan Mutakallimun. ... It also 
 happened, that at the time when the Mohammedans adopted this 
 method of the Kalam, there arose among them a certain sect, called 
 Mu'tazila. In certain things our scholars followed the theory and the 
 method of these Mu'tazila." 
 
 Thanks to the researches of modern Jewish and non- Jewish scholars 
 
INTRODUCTION XXV 
 
 we know now that the Rabbanite thinker Saadia and the Karaite 
 writers, like Joseph Al Basir and Jeshuah ben Judah, are indebted 
 far more to the Mohammedan Mu'tazihtes than would appear from 
 Maimonides's statement just quoted. The Rabbanites being staunch 
 adherents of the Talmud, to the influence of which they owed a 
 national and religious self-consciousness much stronger than that of 
 the Karaites, who rejected the authority of tradition, did not allow 
 themselves to be carried away so far by the ideas of the Mohammedan 
 rationalists as to become their slavish followers. The Karaites are less 
 scrupulous; and as they were the first among the Jews to imitate the 
 Mu'tazila in the endeavor to rationalize Jewish doctrine, they adopted 
 their views in all details, and it is sometimes impossible to tell from the 
 contents of a Karaite Mu'tazilite work whether it was written by a 
 Jew or a Mohammedan. The arrangement of the work in the two 
 divisions of "Unity" and "Justice," the discussion of substance and 
 accident, of the creation of the world, of the existence, unity and 
 incorporeality of God, of his attributes, of his justice, and of human 
 free will, are so similar in the two that it is external evidence alone 
 to which we owe the knowledge of certain Karaite works as Jewish. 
 There are no mediaeval Jewish works treating of religious and theolog- 
 ical problems in which there is so much aloofness, such absence of 
 theological prepossession and religious feeling as in some Karaite 
 writings of Mu'tazilite stamp. Cold and unredeemed logic gives the 
 tone to the entire composition. 
 
 Another reason for the importance of the Mu tazilite school for the 
 history of Jewish thought is of recent discovery. Schreiner has sug- 
 gested ^^ that the origin of the Mu' tazilite movement was due to the 
 influence of learned Jews with whom the Mohammedans came in con- 
 tact, particularly in the city of Basra, an important centre of the 
 school. The reader will recall that the two main doctrines of the 
 Mu tazila were the unity of God and his justice. The latter really 
 signified the freedom of the will. That these are good Jewish views 
 would of course prove nothing for the origin of similar opinions among 
 the Mohammedans. For it is not here a question simply of the dog- 
 matic belief in Monotheism as opposed to polytheism. Mohammed- 
 anism is as a religion Monotheistic and we know that Mohammed was 
 indebted very much to Jews and Judaism. We are here concerned 
 
xxvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 with the origin of a rationalistic movement which endeavors to defend 
 a spiritual conception of God against a crude anthropomorphism, to 
 vindicate a conception of his absolute unity against the threatened 
 multiplication of his essence by the assumption of eternal attributes, 
 and which puts stress upon God's justice rather than upon his omnip- 
 otence so as to save human freedom. Another doctrine of the 
 Mu tazila was that the Koran was not eternal as the orthodox be- 
 lieved, but that it was created. Now we can find parallels for most 
 of these doctrines. Anthropomorphism was avoided in the Aramaic 
 translations of the Pentateuch, also in certain changes in the Hebrew 
 text which are recorded in Rabbinical literature, and known as 
 "Tikkune Soferim," or corrections of the Scribes. ^^ Concern for 
 maintaining the unity of God in its absolute purity is seen in the care 
 with which the men of the Agada forbid any prayer which may have 
 a semblance, however remote, of dualism. ^^ The freedom of the will is 
 clearly stated in the Rabbinic expression, "All is in the hands of God 
 except the fear of Heaven." ^^ And an apparently deterministic pas- 
 sage in Job 23, 13, "But he is one and who can turn him, and what 
 his soul desire th, even that he doeth, " is explained by Rabbi Akiba 
 in the following manner, "It is not possible to answer the words of 
 him who with his word created the world, for he rules all things with 
 truth and with righteousness." ^^ And we find a parallel also for the 
 creation of the Koran in the Midrashic statement that the Torah is one 
 of the six or seven things created before the world. ^'^ 
 
 These parallels alone would not be of much weight, but they are 
 strengthened by other considerations. The Mu'tazilite movement 
 seems to have developed among the ascetic sects, with the leaders of 
 whom its founders were in close relation. ^^ The ascetic literature 
 bears unmistakable traces of having been influenced by the Halaka 
 and the Agada. ^^ Moreover, there is a Mohammedan tradition or 
 two to the effect that the doctrine of the creation of the Koran and 
 also of the rejection of anthropomorphism goes back to a Jew, Lebid- 
 ibn Al-A'sam.2° 
 
 More recently still * C. H. Becker proved from a study of certain 
 Patristic writings that the polemical literature of the Christians 
 played an important role in the formation of Mohammedan dogma, 
 *CJ. Zeitschrift fiir Assyriologie, 1912, 175 ff. 
 
INTRODUCTION sxvii 
 
 and he shows conclusively that the form in which the problem of 
 freedom was discussed among the Mohammedans was taken from 
 Christianity, The question of the creation or eternity of the Koran 
 or word of Allah, is similarly related to the Christian idea of the 
 eternal Logos, who is on the one hand the Word and the Wisdom, 
 and is on the other identified with Jesus Christ. And the same thing 
 holds of the doctrine of attributes. It played a greater role in Chris- 
 tian dogma than it ever did in Judaism prior to the philosophic era 
 in the middle ages. To be sure, the Patristic writers were much in- 
 debted to Philo, in whose writings the germ of the mediaeval doctrine 
 of attributes is plainly evident. But the Mohammedan schools did 
 not read Philo. It would seem, therefore, that Schreiner's view must 
 be considerably modified, if not entirely rejected, in view of the later 
 evidence adduced by Becker. 
 
 The more extreme doctrines, however, of the more orthodox Ash- 
 ariya, such as the denial of natural law and the necessity of cause and 
 effect, likewise the denial of man's abihty to determine his actions, 
 none of the Jews accepted. Here we have again the testimony of 
 Maimonides, who, however, is not inclined to credit this circumstance 
 to the intelligence and judgment of his predecessors, but to chance. 
 His words are, "Although another sect, the Ashariya, with their own 
 pecuhar views, was subsequently established among the Moham- 
 medans, you will not find any of these views in the writings of our 
 authors; not because these authors preferred the opinions of the first 
 named sect to those of the latter, but because they chanced first to 
 become acquainted with the theory of the Mu'tazila, which they 
 adopted and treated as demonstrated truth."^^ 
 
 The influence of the Kalam is present in greater or less degree in the 
 philosophers up to Abraham Ibn Daud and Maimonides. The latter 
 gave this system its death blow in his thoroughgoing criticism, ^^ and 
 thenceforth Aristotelianism was in possession of the field until that 
 too was attacked by Hasdai Crescas. 
 
 Another sect of the Mohammedans which had considerable in- 
 fluence on some of the Jewish philosophical and ethical writers are the 
 ascetics and the Sufis who are related to them. The latter developed 
 their mode of life and their doctrines under the influence of the Chris- 
 tian monks, and are likewise indebted to Indian and Persian ideas. ^^ 
 
xxviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 In their mode of life they belong to the class of ascetics and preach 
 abstinence, indifference to human praise and blame, love of God and 
 absolute trust in him even to the extent of refraining from all effort in 
 one's own behalf, and in extreme cases going so far as to court danger. 
 In theoretical teaching they adopted the emanatistic doctrine of the 
 Neo-Platonic School. This has been called dynamic Pantheism. It is 
 Pantheism because in its last analysis it identifies God with the 
 universe. At the same time it does not bring God directly in contact 
 with the world, but only indirectly through the powers or Bvvdfiei^^ 
 hence dynamic Pantheism. These powers emanate successively from 
 the highest one, forming a chain of intermediate powers mediating 
 between God and the world of matter, the links of the chain growing 
 dimmer and less pure as they are further removed from their origin, 
 while the latter loses nothing in the process. This latter condition 
 saves the Neo-Platonic conception from being a pure system of emana- 
 tion like some Indian doctrines. In the latter the first cause actually 
 gives away something of itself and loses thereby from its fulness. The 
 process in both systems is explained by use of analogies, those of the 
 radiation of light from a luminous body, and of the overflowing of a 
 fountain being the most common. 
 
 The chief exponent of the ethics of the Sufis in mediaeval Jewish 
 literature is Bahya Ibn Pakuda. In his ethical work "The Duties of 
 the Hearts," he lays the same stress on intention and inwardness in 
 rehgious life and practice as against outward performance with the 
 limbs on the one hand and dry scholasticism on the other, as do the 
 Sufis. In matters of detail too he is very much indebted to this Arab 
 sect from whose writings he quotes abundantly with as well as without 
 acknowledgment of his sources except in a general way as the wise 
 men. To be sure, he does not follow them slavishly and rejects the 
 extremes of asceticism and unworldly cynicism which a great many 
 of the Sufis preached and practiced. He is also not in sympathy with 
 their mysticism. He adopts their teachings only where he can support 
 them with analogous views as expressed in the Rabbinical writings, 
 which indeed played an important role in Mohammedan ascetic lit- 
 erature, being the source of many of the sayings found in the latter. ^^ 
 
 The systems of thought which had the greatest influence upon 
 Jewish as well as Mohammedan theology, were the great systems of 
 
INTRODUCTION xxix 
 
 Plato (especially as developed in Neo-Platonism) and Aristotle. 
 These two philosophies not merely affected the thinking of Jew and 
 Mohammedan but really transformed it from rehgious and ethical 
 discussions into metaphysical systems. In the Bible and similarly in 
 the Koran we have a purely personal view of God and the world. God 
 is a person, he creates the world — out of nothing to be sure — but never- 
 theless he is thought of doing it in the manner in which a person does 
 such things with a will and a purpose in time and place. He puts a 
 soul into man and communicates to him laws and prohibitions. Man 
 must obey these laws because they are the will of God and are good, 
 and he will be rewarded and punished according to his attitude in 
 obedience and disobedience. The character of the entire point of view 
 is personal, human, teleological, ethical. There is no attempt made 
 at an impersonal and objective analysis of the common aspects of all 
 existing things, the elements underlying all nature. Nor is there any 
 conscious effort at a critical classification of the various kinds of things 
 existing in nature beyond the ordinary and evident classification found 
 in Genesis — heaven and earth; in heaven, sun, moon and stars; on 
 earth, grass, fruit trees, insects, water animals, birds, quadrupeds, 
 man. Then light and darkness, the seasons of the year, dry land and 
 water. 
 
 In Greek philosophy for the first time we find speculations concern- 
 ing the common element or elements out of which the world is made — 
 the material cause as Aristotle later called it. The Sophists and Soc- 
 rates gave the first impulse to a logical analysis of what is involved in 
 description or definition. The concept as denoting the essence of a 
 thing is the important contribution Socrates made to knowledge. 
 Plato objectified the concept, or rather he posited an object as the 
 basis of the concept, and raised it out of this world of shadows to an 
 inteUigible world of realities on which the world of particulars depends. 
 But it was Aristotle who made a thoroughgoing analysis of thing as 
 well as thought, and he was the master of knowledge through the 
 middle ages alike for Jew, Christian and Mohammedan. 
 
 First of all he classified all objects of our experience and found that 
 they can be grouped in ten classes or categories as he called them. 
 Think of any thing you please and you will find that it is either an 
 object in the strict sense, i. e., some thing that exists independently 
 
XXX INTRODUCTION 
 
 of anything else, and is the recipient of quahties, as for example a man, 
 a mountain, a chair. Or it is a quantity, like four, or cubit; or a qual- 
 ity, like good, black, straight; or a relation like long, double, master, 
 slave; and so on throughout the ten categories. This classification 
 applies to words and thoughts as well as to things. As an analysis of 
 the first two it led him to more important investigations of speech and 
 thinking and arguing, and resulted in his system of logic, which is 
 the most momentous discovery of a single mind recorded in history. 
 As applied to things it was followed by a more fundamental analysis of 
 all real objects in our world into the two elements of matter and form. 
 He argued as follows: nothing in the material world is permanent as 
 an individual thing. It changes its state from moment to moment 
 and finally ceases to be the thing it was. An acorn passes a number of 
 stages before it is ripe, and when it is placed in the ground it again 
 changes its form continually and then comes out as an oak. In ar- 
 tificial products man in a measure imitates nature. He takes a block 
 of marble and makes a statue out of it. He forms a log into a bed. 
 So an ignorant man becomes civilized and learned. All these examples 
 illustrate change. What then is change? Is there any similarity in 
 all the cases cited? Can we express the process of change in a formula 
 which will apply to all instances of change? If so, we shall have gained 
 an insight into a process of nature which is all-embracing and universal 
 in our experience. Yes, we can, says Aristotle. Change is a play of 
 two elements in the changing thing. When a thing affected with one 
 quality changes into a thing with the opposite quahty, there must 
 be the thing itself without either of the opposite qualities, which is 
 changing. Thus when a white fence becomes black, the fence itself 
 or that which undergoes the change is something neither white nor 
 black. It is the uncolored matter which first had the form of white 
 and now lost that and took on the form of black. This is typical of all 
 change. There is in all change ultimately an unchanging substratum 
 always the same, which takes on one quality after another, or as 
 Aristotle would say, one form after another. This substratum is 
 matter, which in its purity is not affected with any quality or form, of 
 which it is the seat and residence. The forms on the other hand come 
 and go. Form does not change any more than matter. The changing 
 thing is the composite of matter and form, and change means separa- 
 
INTRODUCTION xxxi 
 
 tion of the actual components of which one, the form, disappears 
 and makes room for its opposite. In a given case, say, when a statue 
 is made out of a block of marble, the matter is the marble which lost 
 its original form and assumed the form of a statue. In this case the 
 marble, if you take away both the previous form and the present, will 
 still have some form if it is still marble, for marble must have certain 
 qualities if it is to be marble. In that case then the matter underlying 
 the change in question is not pure matter, it is already endowed with 
 some primitive form and is composite. But marble is ultimately 
 reducible to the four elements, fire, air, water, earth, which are simpler; 
 and theoretically, though not in practice, we can think away all form, 
 and we have left only that which takes forms but is itself not any form. 
 This is matter. 
 
 Here the reader will ask, what kind of thing is it that has no form 
 whatsoever, is it not nothing at all? How can anything exist without 
 being a particular kind of thing, and the moment it is that it is no 
 longer pure matter. Aristotle's answer is that it is true that pure 
 matter is never found as an objective existence. Point to any real 
 object and it is composed of matter and form. And yet it is not true 
 that matter is a pure figment of the imagination; it has an existence of 
 its own, a potential existence. And this leads us to another important 
 conception in the Aristotelian philosophy. 
 
 PotentiaHty and actuality are correlative terms corresponding to 
 matter and form. Matter is the potential, form is the actual. What- 
 ever potentiaHties an object has it owes to its matter. Its actual 
 essence is due to its form. A thing free from matter would be all that 
 it is at once. It would not be liable to change of any kind, whether 
 progress or retrogression. All the objects of our experience in the 
 sublunar world are not of this kind. They realize themselves gradu- 
 ally, and are never at any given moment all that they are capable of 
 becoming. This is due to their matter. On the other hand, pure 
 matter is actually nothing. It is just capacity for being anything, and 
 the moment it is anything it is affected with form. 
 
 It is clear from this account that matter and form are the bases of 
 sublunar life and existence. No change, no motion without matter 
 and form. For motion is presupposed in all kinds of change. If 
 then all processes of life and death and change of all kinds presuppose 
 
xxxii INTRODUCTION 
 
 matter and form, the latter cannot themselves be liable to genesis and 
 decay and change, for that would mean that matter is composed of 
 matter and form, which is absurd. We thus see how Aristotle is led 
 to believe in the eternity of matter and motion, in other words, the 
 eternity of the world processes as we know them. 
 
 Motion is the realization of the potential qua potential. This is 
 an Aristotelian definition and applies not merely to motion in the 
 strict sense, i. e., movement in place, or motion of translation, 
 but embraces all kinds of change. Take as an example the warming 
 of the air in a cold room. The process of heating the room is a kind 
 of motion; the air passes from a state of being cold to a state of being 
 warm. In its original state as cold it is potentially warm, i. e., it is 
 actually not warm, but has the capacity of becoming warm. At the 
 end of the process it is actually warm. Hence the process itself is 
 the actualization of the potential. That which is potential cannot 
 make itself actual, for to make itself actual it must be actual, which 
 is contrary to the hypothesis of its being potential. Potentiality and 
 actuality are contradictory states and cannot exist side by side in the 
 same thing at the same time in the same relation. There must there- 
 fore be an external agent, itself actual, to actualize a potential. Thus, 
 in the above illustration, a cold room cannot make itself warm. There 
 must be some agency itself actually warm to cause the air in the room 
 to pass from cold to warm. This is true also of motion in place, that 
 a thing cannot move itself and must be moved by something else. 
 But that something else if itself in motion must again be moved by 
 something else. This process would lead us to infinity. In order 
 that a given thing shall be in motion, it would be necessary for an 
 infinite number of things to be in motion. This is impossible, because 
 there cannot be an infinite number of things all here and now. It 
 is a contradiction in terms. Hence if anything is to move at all, 
 there must be at the end of the finite chain a link which while causing 
 the next link to move, is itself unmoved. Hence the motion existing 
 in the world must be due ultimately to the existence of an unmoved 
 mover. If this being causes motion without being itself in motion 
 it does not act upon the bodies it moves as one body acts upon another, 
 for a body can move another body only by being itself in motion. The 
 manner in which the unmoved mover moves the world is rather to be 
 
INTRODUCTION xxxiii 
 
 conceived on the analogy of a loved object moving the loving object 
 without itself being moved. The person in love strives to approach 
 and unite with the object of his love without the latter necessarily 
 being moved in turn. This is the way in which Aristotle conceives 
 of the cause of the world's motion. There is no room here for the 
 creation of the world. Matter is eternal, motion is eternal, and there 
 is an eternal mind for the love of which all motions have been going 
 on eternally. 
 
 The unmoved mover, or God, is thus not body, for no body can 
 move another body without being itself in motion at the same time. 
 Besides, all body is finite, i. e., it has a finite magnitude. A body of 
 infinite magnitude is an impossibihty, as the very essence of body is 
 that it must be bounded by surfaces. A finite body cannot have an 
 infinite power, as Aristotle proves, though we need not at present 
 go into the details of his proof. But a being which causes eternal 
 motion in the world must have an infinite power to do this. Hence 
 another proof that God is not corporeal. 
 
 If God is not subject to motion, he is not subject to change of any 
 kind, for change involves motion. As matter is at the basis of all 
 change God is without matter, hence he is pure form, i. e., pure ac- 
 tuahty without the least potentiahty. This means that he is what he 
 is wholly all the time; he has no capacities of being what he is at any 
 time not. But if he is not corporeal, the nature of his actuahty or 
 activity must be Thought, pure thinking. And the content of his 
 thought cannot vary from topic to topic, for this would be change, 
 which is foreign to him. He must be eternally thinking the same 
 thought; and the highest thought it must be. But the highest thought 
 is himself; hence God is pure thought thinking himself, thought 
 thinking thought. 
 
 The universe is in the shape of a sphere with the earth stationary 
 in the centre and the heavens revolving around it exactly as appears 
 to us. The element earth is the heaviest, hence its place is below or, 
 which is the same thing, in the centre. This is its natural place; and 
 its natural motion when away from the centre is in a straight line 
 toward the centre. Water is the next heaviest element and its natural 
 place is just above earth; hence the water in the world occupies a 
 position spherical in shape round about the earth, i. e., it forms a 
 
xxxiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 hollow sphere concentric with the earth. Next comes the hollow 
 sphere of air concentric with the other two. Its natural motion when 
 away from its place in the direction of the earth is in a straight line 
 toward the circumference of the world, not however going beyond 
 the sphere of the lightest element of all, namely, fire. This has its 
 natural place outside of the other elements, also in the form of a hollow 
 sphere concentric with the other three. Its natural motion is in a 
 straight line away from the centre of the world and in the direction 
 of the circumference. Our earth, water, air and fire are not really 
 the elements in their purity. Each one has in it also mixtures of 
 the other three elements, the one which gives it the name predom- 
 inating. 
 
 All minerals, plants and animals are formed from these four elements 
 by various combinations, all together forming the sublunar world, 
 or the world of generation and decay. No individual thing in this 
 world is permanent. All are subject to change and to ultimate de- 
 struction, though the destruction of one thing is the genesis of another. 
 There is no annihilation. 
 
 The causes of the various combinations of the elements and the 
 generation and destruction of mineral, plant and animal resulting 
 therefrom, are the motions of the heavenly bodies. These are made 
 of a purer substance than that of the four elements, the ether. This 
 is proven by the fact that the heavenly bodies are not subject to 
 change or destruction. They are all permanent and the only change 
 visible in them is change of place. But even their motions are different 
 from those of the four elements. The latter are in a straight line 
 toward the centre or away from it, whereas the heavenly bodies move 
 in a circle eternally around the centre. This is another proof that 
 they are not composed of the same material as sublunar bodies. 
 
 The heavens consist of transparent spheres, and the stars as well 
 as the planets are set in them and remain fixed. The motions of the 
 heavenly bodies are due to the revolutions of the spheres in which 
 they are set. These spheres are hollow and concentric. The outer- 
 most sphere forming the outer limit of the universe (the world is finite 
 according to Aristotle) is studded with the fixed stars and moves 
 from east to west, making a complete revolution in twenty-four 
 hours. This motion is transmitted to the other spheres which carry 
 
INTRODUCTION xxxv 
 
 the planets. Since, however, we notice in the sun, moon and the other 
 planetary bodies motions in the contrary direction in addition to that 
 from east to west, there must be other spheres having the motions 
 apparent to us in the positions of the planets borne by them. Thus a 
 given body like the sun or moon is set in more than one sphere, each 
 of which has its own proper motion, and the star's apparent motion 
 is the resultant of the several motions of its spheres. Without entering 
 into further details concerning these motions, it will be sufficient for 
 us to know that Aristotle counted in all fifty-five spheres. First 
 came the sphere of the fixed stars, then in order the spheres of Saturn, 
 Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Moon. 
 
 God himself sets the outer sphere in motion, or rather is the eternal 
 cause of its motion, as the object of its desire; and in the same way 
 each of the other motions has also its proper mover, likewise a pure 
 form or spirit, which moves its sphere in the same incorporeal and 
 unmoved manner as God. 
 
 Thus we have in the supra-lunar world pure forms without mat- 
 ter in God and the spirits of the spheres, whereas in the sublunar 
 world matter and form are inseparable. Neither is found separately 
 without the other. 
 
 In man's soul, however, or rather in his intellect we find a form 
 which combines in itself the peculiarities of sublunar as well as celestial 
 forms. When in contact with the human body it partakes of the 
 nature of other sublunar forms exhibiting its activity through matter 
 and being inseparable from it. But it is not destroyed with the death 
 of the body. It continues as a separate form after death. 
 
 The soul, Aristotle defines as the first entelechy of the body. The 
 term entelechy which sounds outlandish to us may be replaced by 
 the word realization or actualization and is very close in meaning to 
 the Aristotelian use of the word form. The soul then, according 
 to Aristotle, is the realization or actualization or form of the body. 
 The body takes the place of matter in the human composite. It has 
 the composition and the structure which give it the capacity for per- 
 forming the functions of a human being, as in any other composite, 
 say an axe, the steel is the matter which has the potentiality or capac- 
 ity of being made into a cutting instrument. Its cutting function 
 is the form of the axe — we might almost say the soul of the axe, if 
 
xxxvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 it were not for the circumstance that it cannot do its own cutting; it 
 must be wielded by someone else. 
 
 So far then the human soul forms an inseparable unit with the body 
 which it informs. As we do not think of the cutting function of an 
 axe existing apart from the axe, so neither can we conceive of sensa- 
 tion, emotion or memory as existing without a body. In so far as the 
 soul is this it is a material form like the rest, and ceases with the dis- 
 solution of the body. But the soul is more than this. It is also a 
 thinking faculty. As such it is not in its essence dependent upon the 
 body or any corporeal organ. It comes from without, having existed 
 before the body, and it will continue to exist after the body is no more. 
 That it is different from the sensitive soul is proven by the fact that 
 the latter is inherent in the physical organ through which it acts, 
 being the form of the body, as we have seen. And hence when an 
 unusually violent stimulus, say a very bright light or a very loud sound, 
 impinges upon the sense organ, the faculty of sight or hearing is 
 injured to such an extent that it cannot thereafter perceive an ordinary 
 sight or sound. But in the rational faculty this is not the case. The 
 more intense the thought occupying the thinking soul, the more ca- 
 pable it becomes of thinking lesser thoughts. To be sure, the reason 
 seems to weaken in old age, but this is due to the weakening of the 
 body with which the soul is connected during life; the soul itself is 
 just as active as ever. 
 
 We must, however, distinguish between two aspects of the rational 
 soul, to one of which alone the above statements apply. Thought 
 differs from sensation in that the latter perceives the particular form 
 of the individual thing, whereas the former apprehends the essential 
 nature of the object, that which constitutes it a member of a certain 
 class. The sense of sight perceives a given individual man; thought or 
 reason understands what it is to be a member of the human species. 
 Reason therefore deals with pure form. In man we observe the 
 reason gradually developing from a potential to an actual state. The 
 objects of the sense with the help of the faculties of sensation, memory 
 and imagination act upon the potential intellect of the child, which 
 without them would forever remain a mere capacity without ever 
 being realized. This aspect of the reason then in man, namely, the 
 passive aspect which receives ideas, grows and dies with the body. 
 
INTRODUCTION xxxvii 
 
 But there is another aspect of the reason, the active reason which has 
 nothing to do with the body, though it is in some manner resident in 
 it during the life of the latter. This it is which enables the passive 
 intellect to become realized. For the external objects as such are in- 
 sufficient to endow the rational capacity of the individual with actual 
 ideas, any more than a surface can endow the sense of sight with 
 the sensation of color when there is no hght. It is the active intellect 
 which develops the human capacity for thinking and makes it active 
 thought. This alone, the active intellect, is the immortal part of 
 man. 
 
 This very imperfect sketch of Aristotle's mode of approach to the 
 ever-living problems of God, the universe and man shows us the wide 
 diversity of his method from that with which the Jews of Bibhcal and 
 Rabbinic tradition were identified. Greek philosophy must have 
 seemed a revelation to them, and we do not wonder that they became 
 such enthusiastic followers of the Stagirite, feeUng as they must have 
 done that his method as well as his results were calculated to enrich 
 their intellectual and spiritual life. Hence the current belief of an 
 original Jewish philosophy borrowed or stolen by the Greeks, and still 
 betraying its traces in the Bible and Talmud was more than welcome 
 to the enlightened spirits of the time. And they worked this unhis- 
 torical belief to its breaking point in their Biblical exegesis. 
 
 Aristotle, however, was not their only master, though they did not 
 know it. Plotinus in Aristotelian disguise contributed not a little to 
 their conception of God and his relation to the universe. The so-called 
 "Theology of Aristotle" ^^ is a Plotinian work, and its Pantheistic 
 point of view is in reahty foreign to Aristotle's dualism. But the middle 
 ages were not aware of the origin of this treatise, and so they attrib- 
 uted it to the Stagirite philosopher and proceeded to harmonize it 
 with the rest of his system as they knew it. 
 
 Aristotle's system may be called theistic and duahstic; Plotinus's is 
 pantheistic and monistic. In Aristotle matter is not created by or 
 derived from God, who is external to the universe. Plotinus derives 
 everything from God, who through his powers or activities pervades 
 all. The different gradations of being are static in Aristotle, dynamic 
 in Plotinus. Plotinus assumes an absolute cause, which he calls the 
 One and the Good. This is the highest and is at the top of the scale of 
 
xxxviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 existence. It is superior to Being as well as to Thought, for the latter 
 imply a duality whereas unity is prior to and above all plurality. 
 Hence we can know nothing as to the nature of the Highest. We 
 can know only that He is, not what he is. From this highest Being 
 proceeds by a physical necessity, as light from a luminous body or 
 water from an overflowing spring, a second hypostasis or substance, 
 the nous or Reason. This is a duality, constituting Being and Knowl- 
 edge. Thus Thought and Being hold a second place in the universe. 
 In a similar way from Reason proceeds the third h3^ostasis or the 
 World-Soul. This stands midway between the intelligible world, of 
 which it is the last, and the phenomenal world, of which it is the first. 
 The Soul has a dual aspect, the one spiritual and pertaining to the 
 intelligible world, the other, called Nature, residing in the lower world. 
 This is the material world of change and decay. Matter is responsible 
 for all change and evil, and yet matter, too, is a product of the powers 
 above it, and is ultimately a derivative of the Absolute Cause, though 
 indirectly. Matter is two-fold, intelligible and sensible. The matter of 
 the lower world is the non-existent and the cause of evil. Matter in a 
 more general sense is the indeterminate, the indefinite and the poten- 
 tial. Matter of this nature is found also in the intelligible world. The 
 Reason as the second hj^ostasis, being an activity, passes from 
 potentiality to actuality, its indeterminateness being made determin- 
 ate by the One or the Good. This potentiality and indeterminateness 
 is matter, but it is not to be confused with the other matter of the phe- 
 nomenal world. 
 
 Man partakes of the intelligible, as well as of the sensible world. 
 His body is material, and in so far forth partakes of the evil of matter. 
 But his soul is derived from the universal soul, and if it conducts itself 
 properly in this world, whither it came from without, and holds itself 
 aloof from bodily contamination, it will return to the intelligible world 
 where is its home. 
 
 We see here a number of ideas foreign to Aristotle, which are found 
 first in Philo the Jew and appear later in mediaeval philosophy. Thus 
 God as a Being absolutely unknowable, of whom negations alone are 
 true just because he is the acme of perfection and bears no analogy to 
 the imperfect things of our world; matter in our world as the origin 
 of evil, and the existence of matter in the intelligible world — all these 
 
INTRODUCTION xxxix 
 
 ideas will meet us again in Ibn Gabirol, in Ibn Daud, in Mainionides, 
 some in one, some in the other. 
 
 Alike in respect to Aristotle as in reference to Plotinus, the Jewish 
 philosophers found their models in Islamic writers. The "Theology of 
 Aristotle" which, as we have seen, is really Plotinian rather than 
 Aristotelian, was translated into Arabic in the ninth century and 
 exerted its influence on the Brethren of Purity, a Mohammedan secret 
 order of the tenth century. These men composed an encyclopaedia of 
 fifty-one treatises in which is combined Aristotelian logic and physics 
 with Neo-Platonic metaphysics and theology. In turn such Jewish 
 writers as Ibn Gabirol, Bahya, Ibn Zaddik, Judah Halevi, Moses and 
 Abraham Ibn Ezra, were much indebted to the Brethren of Purity. 
 This represents the Neo-Platonic influence in Jewish philosophy. 
 The Arab Aristotelians, Al Kindi, Al Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes, 
 while in the main disciples of the Stagirite, were none the less unable 
 to steer clear of Neo-Platonic coloring of their master's doctrine, and 
 they were the teachers of the Jewish AristoteUans, Abraham Ibn 
 Daud, Moses ben Maimon, Levi ben Gerson. 
 
 One other phase must be mentioned to complete the parallelism of 
 Islamic and Jewish philosophy, and that is the anti-philosophic 
 attitude adopted by Judah Halevi and Hasdai Crescas. It was not a 
 dogmatic and unreasoned opposition based simply upon the un- 
 Jewish source of the doctrines in question and their incompatibility 
 with Jewish behef and tradition, such as exhibited itself in the con- 
 troversies that raged around the "Guide" of Maimonides. Here we 
 have rather a fighting of the philosophers with their own weapons. 
 Especially do we find this to be the case in Crescas who opposes 
 Aristotle on philosophic grounds. In Judah Halevi similarly, though 
 with less rigor and Httle technical discussion, we have nevertheless a 
 man trained in philosophic hterature, who found the philosophic 
 attitude unsympathetic and unsatisfying because cold and impersonal, 
 faihng to do justice to the warm yearning after God of the rehgious 
 soul. He could not abide the philosophic exclusion from their natural 
 theology of all that was racial and national and historic in religion, 
 which was to him its very heart and innermost essence. 
 
 In this attitude, too, we find an Arab prototype in the person of Al 
 Gazali, who similarly attacked the philosophers on their own ground 
 
xl INTRODUCTION 
 
 and found his consolation in the asceticism and mysticism of the 
 Sufis. 
 
 We have now spoken in a general way of the principal motives of 
 mediaeval Jewish philosophy, of the chief sources, philosophical and 
 dogmatic, and have classified the Jewish thinkers accordingly as 
 Mutakallimun, Neo-Platonists and Aristotelians. We also sketched 
 briefly the schools of philosophy which influenced the Jewish writers 
 and determined their point of view as Kalamistic, Neo-Platonic or 
 AristoteUan. There still remains as the concluding part of the in- 
 troductory chapter, and before we take up the detailed exposition of 
 the individual philosophers, to give a brief and compendious char- 
 acterization of the content of mediaeval Jewish philosophy. We shall 
 start with the theory of knowledge. 
 
 We have already referred to the attitude generally adopted by the 
 mediaeval Jewish thinkers on the relation between rehgion and philos- 
 ophy. With the exception of Judah Halevi and Hasdai Crescas the 
 commonly accepted view was that philosophy and religion were at 
 bottom identical in content, though their methods were different; 
 philosophy taught by means of rational demonstration, religion by 
 dogmatic assertion based upon divine revelation. So far as the actual 
 philosophical views of an Aristotle were concerned, they might be 
 erroneous in some of their details, as was indeed the case in respect to 
 the origin of the world and the question of Providence. But apart 
 from his errors he was an important guide, and philosophy generally is 
 an indispensable adjunct to rehgious behef because it makes the latter 
 intelligent. It explains the why's and the wherefore's of religious 
 traditions and dogmas. Into detailed discussions concerning the 
 origin of our knowledge they did not as a rule go. These strictly 
 scientific questions did not concern, except in a very general way, the 
 main object of their philosophizing, which was to gain true knowledge 
 of God and his attributes and his relation to man. Accordingly we 
 find for the most part a simple classification of the sources of knowl- 
 edge or truth as consisting of the senses and the reason. The latter 
 contains some truths which may be called innate or immediate, such 
 as require no experience for their recognition, like the logical laws of 
 thought, and truths which are the result of inference from a fact of 
 sensation or an immediate truth of the mind. To these human sources 
 
INTRODUCTION xli 
 
 was added tradition or the testimony of the revealed word of God in 
 the written and oral law. 
 
 When Aristotle began to be studied in his larger treatises and the 
 details of the psychology and the metaphysics became known espe- 
 cially through Averroes, we find among the Jews also an interest in the 
 finer points of the problem of knowledge. The motives of Plato's 
 idealism and Aristotle's conceptualism (if this inexact description may 
 be allowed for want of a more precise term) are discussed with fulness 
 and detail by Levi ben Gerson. He realizes the difficulty involved in 
 the problem. Knowledge must be of the real and the permanent. 
 But the particular is not permanent, and the universal, which is 
 permanent, is not real. Hence either there is no knowledge or there is a 
 reality corresponding to the universal concept. This latter was the 
 view adopted by Plato. Gersonides finds the reality in the thoughts of 
 the Active Intellect, agreeing in this with the views of Philo and 
 Augustine, substituting only the Active Intellect for their Logos. 
 Maimonides does not discuss the question, but it is clear from a casual 
 statement that like Aristotle he does not believe in the independent 
 reahty of the universal (Guide III, i8). 
 
 In theoretical physics the Arabian Mutakallimun, we have seen 
 (p.xxii), laid great stress on the theory of atom and accident as opposed 
 to the concepts of matter and form by which Aristotle was led to 
 believe in the eternity of the world. Accordingly every Mutakallim 
 laid down his physical theory and based on it his proof of creation. 
 This method was followed also by the early Jewish thinkers. The 
 Karaites before Maimonides adopted the atomic theory without 
 question. And Aaron ben Elijah, who had Maimonides's "Guide" 
 before him, was nevertheless sufficiently loyal to his Karaite predeces- 
 sors to discuss their views side by side with those of the Aristotelians 
 and to defend them against the strictures of Maimonides. Saadia, 
 the first Rabbanite philosopher, discusses no less than thirteen er- 
 roneous views concerning the origin and nature of the world, but he 
 does not lay down any principles of theoretical physics explicitly. 
 He does not seem to favor the atomic theory, but he devotes no special 
 treatment to the subject, and in his arguments for creation as opposed 
 to eternity he makes use of the Kalamistic concepts of substance 
 and accident and composition and division. The same is true of 
 
xlii INTRODUCTION 
 
 Bahya Ibn Pakuda. Joseph Ibn Zaddik is the first who finds it neces- 
 sary to give an independent treatment of the sciences before proceed- 
 ing to construct his rehgious philosophy, and in so doing he expounds 
 the concepts of matter and form, substance and accident, genesis and 
 destruction, the four elements and their natures and so on — all these 
 Aristotelian concepts. Ibn Daud follows in the path of Ibn Zaddik 
 and discusses the relevant concepts of potentiaHty and actuality and 
 the nature of motion and infinity, upon which his proof is based of 
 the existence of God. Maimonides clears the ground first by a thor- 
 ough criticism and refutation of the Kalamistic physics, but he does 
 not think it necessary to expound the Aristotelian views which he 
 adopts. He refers the reader to the original sources in the Physics 
 and Metaphysics of Aristotle, and contents himself with giving a list 
 of principles which he regards as estabHshed. Aristotle is now the 
 master of all those who know. And he reigns supreme for over a 
 century until the appearance of the Or Adonai" of Hasdai Crescas, 
 who ventured to deny some of the propositions upon which Maimon- 
 ides based his proof of the existence of God — such, for example, as 
 the impossibility of an infinite magnitude, the non-existence of an 
 infinite fulness or vacuum outside of the limits of our world, the 
 finiteness of our world and its unity, and so on. 
 
 These discussions of the fundamental principles of physics were 
 applied ultimately to prove the existence of God. But there was a 
 difference in the manner of the application. During the earlier period 
 before the "Emunah Ramah" of Abraham Ibn Daud was written, 
 the method employed was that of the Arabian Mutakallimun. That 
 is, the principles of physics were used to prove the creation of the 
 world in time, and from creation inference was made to the existence 
 of a Creator, since nothing can create itseK. The creation itself in 
 time as opposed to eternity was proved from the fact of the composite 
 character of the world. Composition, it was said, implies the prior 
 existence of the constituent elements, and the elements cannot be 
 eternal, for an infinite past time is unthinkable. This method is 
 common to Saadia, Bahya, Joseph Ibn Zaddik, and others. 
 
 With the appearance of Ibn Daud's masterpiece, which exhibits 
 a more direct familiarity with the fundamental ideas of Aristotle, 
 the method changed. The existence of God is proved directly from 
 
INTRODUCTION xliii 
 
 physics without the mediation of the doctrine of creation. Motion 
 proves a mover, and to avoid an infinite regress we must posit an 
 unmoved mover, that is, a first mover who is not himself moved at 
 the same time. An unmoved mover cannot be corporeal, hence he 
 is the spiritual being whom we call God. Ibn Daud does not make 
 use of creation to prove the existence of God, but neither does he 
 posit eternal motion as Aristotle does. And the result is that he has 
 no vaHd proof that this unmoved mover is a pure spirit not in any 
 way related to body. This defect was made good by Maimonides. 
 Let us frankly adopt tentatively, he says, the Aristotehan idea of the 
 eternity of the world, i. e., the eternity of matter and motion. We can 
 then prove the existence of an unmoved mover who is pure spirit, 
 for none but a pure spirit can have an infinite force such as is mani- 
 fested in the eternal motion of the world. Creation cannot be demon- 
 strated with scientific rigor, hence it is not safe to build so important 
 a structure as the existence of God upon an insecure foundation. 
 Show that eternity of the world leads to God, and you are safe no 
 matter what the ultimate truth turns out to be concerning the origin 
 of the world. For if the world originated in time there is no doubt 
 that God made it. 
 
 Thus Maimonides accepted provisionally the eternity of matter 
 and motion, but provisionally only. No sooner did he prove his point, 
 than he takes up the question of the world's origin and argues that 
 while strict demonstration there is as yet none either for or against 
 creation, the better reasons are on the side of creation. 
 
 Gersonides, on the other hand, was a truer Aristotelian than Mai- 
 monides and he decided in favor of the eternity of matter, though 
 not of this our world. 
 
 The Jewish Mutakallimun, as we have seen, proved the existence of 
 God from the fact that a created world impUes a creator. The next 
 step was to show that there is only one God, and that this one God is 
 simple and not composite, and that he is incorporeal. The unity in 
 the sense of uniqueness was shown by pointing out that dualism or 
 pluralism is incompatible with omnipotence and perfection — attri- 
 butes the possession of which by God was not considered to require 
 proof. Maimonides, indeed, pointed out, in his opposition to the 
 Mutakallimun, that if there is a plurality of worlds, a plurality of 
 
xKv INTRODUCTION 
 
 Gods would not necessarily be in conflict with the omnipotence and 
 perfection of each God in his own sphere (Guide I, 75), and he in- 
 ferred the unity of God from his spirituaHty. 
 
 The simpHcity of God was proved by arguing that if he is composite, 
 his parts are prior to him, and he is neither the first, nor is he eternal, 
 and hence not God; and the incorporeality followed from his simplicity, 
 for all body is composite. Maimonides proved with one stroke God's 
 existence, unity and incorporeality. For his argument from motion 
 leads him to conceive of the first mover as a "separate" form or in- 
 tellect. This clearly denotes incorporeality, for body is composed of 
 matter and form. But it also denotes unity, for the immaterial is not 
 subject to numerical distinction unless the one be the cause and the 
 other the effect. But in that case the cause alone is God. 
 
 Next in importance to the proof of God's existence, unity and in- 
 corporeahty, is the doctrine of attributes. We have seen (p.xxiii) how 
 much emphasis the Arabian Mutakalhmun placed upon the problem 
 of attributes. It was important to Jew, Christian and Mohammedan 
 alike for a number of reasons. The crude anthropomorphism of many 
 expressions in the Bible as well as the Koran offended the more sophis- 
 ticated thinkers ever since Alexandrian days. Hence it was neces- 
 sary to deal with this question, and the unanimous view was that the 
 Biblical expressions in question are to be understood as figures of 
 speech. The more difl&cult problem was how any predicates at all 
 can be applied to God without endangering his unity. If God is the 
 possessor of many qualities, even though they be purely spiritual, 
 such as justice, wisdom, power, he is composite and not simple. The 
 Christian theologians found indeed in this problem of attributes a 
 philosophical support for the doctrine of the Trinity. Since God 
 cannot be devoid of power, reason and life, he is trinitarian, though 
 he is one. The difi&culty was of course that the moment you admit 
 distinctions within the Godhead, there is no reason for stopping at 
 three. And the Jewish critics were not slow to recognize this weak- 
 ness in the system of their opponents. At the same time they found 
 it necessary to take up a positive attitude toward the question of 
 attributes so as to harmonize the latter with God's absolute unity. 
 And the essence of the solution of the problem was to explain away 
 the attributes. Saadia says that the ascription of life, power and 
 
INTRODUCTION xlv 
 
 knowledge to God does not involve plurality in his essence. The 
 distinction of three attributes is due to our limited mind and inade- 
 quate powers of expression. In reality the essence of which we predi- 
 cate these attributes is one and simple. This solution did not seem 
 thoroughgoing enough to Saadia's successors, and every one of the 
 Jewish philosophers tried his hand at the problem. All agreed that 
 the attributes cannot apply to God in the same signification as they 
 have when we use them in our own experience. The meaning of the 
 term attribute was investigated and the attributes were divided into 
 classes, until finally in the system of Maimonides this question too 
 received its classical solution. God is conceived as absolutely trans- 
 cendent and unknowable. No positive predicate can apply to him so 
 as to indicate his essence. We can say only what he is not, we cannot 
 say what he is. There is not the faintest resemblance between him 
 and his creatures. And yet he is the cause of the world and of all its 
 happenings. Positive attributes signify only that God is the cause of 
 the experiences denoted by the attributes in question. When we say 
 God is just we mean that he is not unjust, and that he is the cause of 
 all justice in the world. Hence Maimonides says there are no essen- 
 tial attributes, meaning attributes expressive of God's essence, and 
 the only predicates having application are negative and such as desig- 
 nate efifects of God's causal activity in the world. Gersonides was 
 opposed to Maimonides's radical agnosticism in respect of the nature 
 of God, and defended a more human view. If God is pure thought, 
 he is of the nature of our thought, though of course infinitely greater 
 and perfect, but to deny any relation whatsoever between God's 
 thought and ours, as Maimonides does, is absurd. 
 
 From God we pass to man. And the important part of man is his 
 soul. It is proved that man has a soul, that the soul is not material or 
 corporeal, that it is a substantial entity and not a mere quality or 
 accident of the body. Both Plato and Aristotle are laid under con- 
 tribution in the various classifications of the soul that are found in 
 Saadia, in Joseph Ibn Zaddik, in Judah Halevi, in Abraham Ibn Daud, 
 in Maimonides. The commonest is the three-fold division into vegeta- 
 tive, animal and rational. We also find the Platonic division into 
 appetitive, spirited and rational. Further psychological details and 
 descriptions of the senses, external and internal, the latter embracing 
 
xlvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 the common sense, memory, imagination and judgment, are ultimately 
 based upon Aristotle and are found in Judah Halevi, Abraham Ibn 
 Daud and Maimonides, who derived them from Avicenna and Al- 
 farabi. In the Neo-Platonic writers, such as Isaac Israeli, Solomon Ibn 
 Gabirol, Joseph Ibn Zaddik, Moses Ibn Ezra, Pseudo-Bahya, Abraham 
 Bar Hiyya, and so on, we also find reference to the World Soul and its 
 emanation from Intelligence. In the conception of the human soul the 
 Jewish philosophers vary from the Platonic view, related to the 
 BibUcal, that the soul is a distinct entity coming into the body from a 
 spiritual world, and acting in the body by using the latter as its in- 
 strument, to the Aristotelian view that at least so far as the lower 
 faculties of sense, memory and imagination are concerned, the soul is 
 the form of the body, and disappears with the death of the latter. 
 The human unit, according to this opinion, is body-and-mind, and the 
 human activities are psycho-physical and not purely psychical as they 
 are according to Plato. Some writers occupying intermediate positions 
 combine unwittingly the Platonic and Aristotelian views, or rather 
 they use Aristotelian expressions and interpret them Platonically 
 (Saadia, Joseph Ibn Zaddik, Hillel ben Samuel). 
 
 As the influence of the Arab Aristotelians, Alfarabi, Avicenna and 
 especially Averroes, began to make itseK felt, the discussions about the 
 Active Intellect and its relation to the higher Intelligences on the one 
 hand and to the human intellect on the other found their way also 
 among the Jews and had their effect on the conception of prophecy. 
 Aristotle's distinction of an active and a passive intellect in man, and 
 his ideas about the spheral spirits as pure Intelligences endowing the 
 heavenly spheres with their motions, were combined by the Arabian 
 Aristotehans with the Neo-Platonic theory of emanation. The result 
 was that they adopted as Aristotehan the view that from God em- 
 anated in succession ten Intelligences and their spheres. Thus the 
 first emanation was the first Intelligence. From this emanated the 
 sphere of the fixed stars moved by it and the second Intelligence. 
 From this emanated in turn the sphere of Saturn and the third In- 
 telligence, and so on through the seven planets to the moon. From the 
 Intelligence of the lunar sphere emanated the Active Intellect and the 
 sublunar spheres of the four elements. These Intelligences were 
 identified with the angels of Scripture. With some modifications this 
 
INTRODUCTION xlvii 
 
 laeory was adopted by the Jewish AristoteUans, Abraham Ibn Daud, 
 Maimonides, Levi ben Gerson. 
 
 The Active Intellect was thus placed among the miiversal Intelli- 
 gences whose function it is to control the motions of the sublunar 
 world, and in particular to develop the human faculty of reason which 
 is in the infant a mere capacity — a material intellect. Sensation and 
 experience alone are not sufficient to develop the theoretical reason in 
 man, for they present concrete, individual material objects, whereas 
 the reason is concerned with universal truth. The conversion of sense 
 experience into immaterial concepts is accomplished through the aid of 
 the Active Intellect. And at the end of the process a new intellect is 
 produced in man, the Acquired Intellect. This alone is the immortal 
 part of man and theoretical study creates it. Averroes believed that 
 this Acquired Intellect exists separately in every individual so long 
 only as the individual is alive. As soon as the individual man dies, 
 his acquired intellect loses its individuahty (there being no material 
 body to individuate it) and there is only one acquired intellect for the 
 entire human species, which in turn is absorbed into the Active Intel- 
 lect. There is thus no individual immortality. Maimonides, it would 
 seem, though he does not discuss the question in his "Guide," shared 
 the same view. Gersonides devotes an entire book of his "Milhamot 
 Adonai" to this problem, but he defends individuation of the acquired 
 intellect as such and thus saves personal immortality. 
 
 The practical part of philosophy, ethics, the Mutakallimun among 
 the Arabians discussed in connection with the justice of God. In 
 opposition to the Jabariya and the Ashariya who advocated a 
 fatalistic determinism denying man's ability to determine his own 
 actions, some going so far as to say that right and wrong, good and 
 evil, are entirely relative to God's will, the Mu'tazila insisted that man 
 is free, that good and evil are absolute and that God is just because 
 justice is inherently right, injustice inherently wrong. Hence reward 
 and punishment would be unjust if man had not the freedom to will 
 and to act. The Karaites Joseph Al Basir and Jeshua ben Judah dis- 
 cuss the problem of the nature of good and evil and vindicate their 
 absolute character. God desires the good because it is good, and it is 
 not true that a thing is good because God has commanded it. Freedom 
 of man is a coroUary of the goodness of God. The Rabbanites take it 
 
xlviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 for granted that good is good inherently, and God desires and com- 
 mands it because it is identical with his wisdom and his will. Freedom 
 of man does follow as a corollary from the justice of God and it is also 
 taught in the Bible and the Talmud. The very fact of the existence of 
 a divine law and commandments shows that man has freedom. And 
 those passages in Scripture which seem to suggest that God sometimes 
 interferes with man's freedom are explained away by interpretations 
 ad hoc. Our own consciousness of power to determine our acts also 
 is a strong argument in favor of freedom. Nevertheless the subject is 
 felt to have its difficulties and the arguments against free will taken 
 from the causal sequences of natural events and the influence of 
 heredity, environment and motive on the individual will are not 
 ignored. Judah Halevi as well as Abraham Ibn Daud discuss these 
 argimients in detail. But freedom comes out triumphant. It is even 
 sought to reconcile the antinomy of freedom vs. God's foreknowledge. 
 God knows beforehand from all eternity how a given man will act at a 
 given moment, but his knowledge is merely a mirror of man's actual 
 decision and not the determining cause thereof. This is Judah Halevi's 
 view. Abraham Ibn Daud with better insight realizes that the con- 
 tingent, which has no cause, and the free act, which is undetermined, 
 are as such unpredictable. He therefore sacrifices God's knowledge of 
 the contingent and the free so as to save man's freedom. It is no de- 
 fect, he argues, not to be able to predict what is in the nature of the case 
 unpredictable. Maimonides cannot admit any ignorance in God, and 
 takes refuge in the transcendent character of God's knowledge. What 
 is unpredictable for us is not necessarily so for God. As he is the cause 
 of everything, he must know everything. Gersonides who, as we have 
 seen, is unwilling to admit Maimonides's agnosticism and tran- 
 scendentalism, solves the problem in the same way as Ibn Daud. 
 God knows events in so far as they are determined, he does not know 
 them in so far as they are contingent. There is still another possibility 
 and that is that God knows in advance every man's acts because no 
 act is absolutely free. And there is an advocate of this opinion also. 
 Hasdai Crescas frankly adopts the determinist position on the basis of 
 God's knowledge, which cannot be denied, as well as of reason and 
 experience, which recognizes the determining character of tempera- 
 ment and motive. But reward and punishment are natural and nee- 
 
INTRODUCTION xlix 
 
 essary consequences, and are no more unjust than is the burning of 
 the finger when put into the fire. 
 
 In respect to the details of ethical doctrine and the classification of 
 the virtues, we find at first the Platonic virtues and their relation to 
 the parts of the soul, in Saadia, Pseudo-Bahya, Joseph Ibn Zaddik 
 and even Abraham Ibn Daud. In combination with this Platonic 
 basis expression is given also to the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. 
 Maimonides, as in other things, so here also, adopts the Aristotelian 
 views almost in their entirety, both in the definition of virtue, in the 
 division of practical and intellectual virtues, and the hst of the virtues 
 and vices in coimection with the doctrine of the mean. As is to be 
 expected, the ultimate sanction of ethics is theistic and BibUcal, and 
 the ceremonial laws also are brought into relation with ethical motives. 
 In this rationalization of the ceremonial prescriptions of Scripture 
 Maimonides, as in other things, surpasses all his predecessors in his 
 boldness, scientific method and completeness. He goes so far as to 
 suggest that the institution of sacrifice has no inherent value, but was 
 in the nature of a concession to the crude notions of the people who, 
 in agreement with their environment, imagined that God's favor is 
 obtained by the slaughter of animals. 
 
 Among the pecuHar phenomena of religion, and in particular of 
 Judaism, the one that occupies a fundamental position is the revela- 
 tion of God's will to man and his announcement of the future through 
 prophetic visions. Dreams and divination had already been investi- 
 gated by Aristotle and explained psychologically. The Arabs made 
 use of this suggestion and endeavored to bring the phenomenon of 
 prophecy under the same head. The Jewish philosophers, with the 
 exception of Judah Halevi and Hasdai Crescas, followed suit. The 
 suggestion that prophecy is a psychological phenomenon related to 
 true dreams is found as early as Isaac Israeli. Judah Halevi mentions 
 it with protest. Abraham Ibn Daud adopts it, and Maimonides 
 gives it its final form in Jewish rationahstic philosophy. Levi ben 
 Gerson discusses the finer details of the process, origin and nature of 
 prophetic visions. In short the generally accepted view is that the 
 Active Intellect is the chief agent in communicating true visions of 
 future events to those worthy of the gift. And to become worthy a 
 combination of innate and acquired powers is necessary together with 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 the grace of God. The faculties chiefly concerned are reason and 
 imagination. Moral excellence is also an indispensable prerequisite 
 in aiding the development of the theoretical powers. 
 
 Proceeding to the more dogmatic elements of Judaism, Maimonides 
 was the first to reduce the 613 commandments of Rabbinic Judaism 
 to thirteen articles of faith. Hasdai Crescas criticised Maimonides's 
 principle of selection as well as the list of dogmas, which he reduced 
 to six. And Joseph Albo went still further and laid down three funda- 
 mental dogmas from which the rest are derived. They are the exist- 
 ence of God, revelation of the Torah and future reward and punish- 
 ment. 
 
 The law of Moses is unanimously accepted as divinely revealed. 
 And in opposition to the claims of Christianity and Mohammedanism 
 an endeavor is made to prove by reason as well as the exphcit state- 
 ment of Scripture that a divine law once given is not subject to repeal. 
 The laws are divided into two classes, rational and traditional; the 
 former comprising those that the reason approves on purely rational 
 and ethical grounds, while the latter consist of such ceremonial laws 
 as without specific commandment would not be dictated by man's 
 own reason. And in many of these commandments no reason is 
 assigned. Nevertheless an endeavor is made to rationahze these also. 
 Bahya introduced another distinction, viz., the "duties of the heart," 
 as he calls them, in contradistinction to the "duties of the limbs." 
 He lays stress on intention and motive as distinguished from the mere 
 external observance of a duty or commandment. 
 
 Finally, some consideration is given in the works of the majority 
 of the writers to eschatological matters, such as the destiny of the soul 
 after death, the nature of future reward and punishment, the resur- 
 rection of the body and the Messianic period, and its relation to the 
 other world. This brief sketch will suffice as an introduction to the 
 detailed treatment of the individual philosophers in the following 
 chapters. 
 
A HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL JEWISH 
 PHILOSOPHY 
 
MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 ISAAC ISRAELI 
 
 We know next to nothing about the condition of the Jews in Mo- 
 hammedan Eg}^t in the ninth and tenth centuries. But the fact that 
 the two first Jewish writers who busied themselves with philosophical 
 problems came from Egypt would indicate that the general level of 
 intellectual culture among the Jews at that time was not so low as the 
 absence of literary monuments would lead us to believe. Every one 
 knows of Saadia, the first Hebrew grammarian, the first Hebrew lex- 
 icographer, the first Bible translator and exegete, the first Jewish 
 philosopher of mediaeval Jewry. He was born in Egypt and from 
 there was called to the Gaonate of Sura in Babylonia. But not so well 
 known is his earher contemporary, Isaac ben Solomon Israeh, who 
 also was born in Egypt and from there went later to Kairuan, where 
 he was court physician to several of the Fatimide Califs. The dates 
 of his birth and death are not known with certainty, but he is said to 
 have lived to the age of one himdred years, and to have survived the 
 third Fatimide Calif Al-Mansur, who died in 953. Accordingly we 
 may assume the years of his birth and death as 855 and 955 respec- 
 tively. 
 
 His fame rests on his work in theory and practice as a physician; and 
 as such he is mentioned by the Arab annalists and historians of med- 
 icine.^® To the Christian scholastics of mediceval Europe he is known 
 as the Jewish physician and philosopher next in importance to Mai- 
 monides.^^ This is due to the accident of his works having been trans- 
 lated into Latin by Constantinus Afer,^^ and thus made accessible to 
 men like Albertus Magnus, Vincent of Beauvais, Thomas Aquinas and 
 others. For his intrinsic merits as a philosopher, and particularly as a 
 Jev/ish philosopher, do not by any means entitle him to be coupled 
 with Maimonides. The latter, indeed, in a letter which he wrote to 
 
2 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Samuel Ibn Tibbon, the translator of the " Guide of the Perplexed," 
 expresses himself in terms little flattering concerning Israeli's worth as 
 a philosopher.^^ He is a mere physician, Maimonides says, and his 
 treatises on the Elements, and on Definitions consist of windy imagin- 
 ings and empty talk. We need not be quite as severe in our judgment, 
 but the fact remains that Israeli is little more than a compiler and, 
 what is more to the purpose, he takes no attitude in his philosophical 
 writings to Judaism as a theological doctrine or to the Bible as its 
 source. The main problem, therefore, of Jewish philosophy is not 
 touched upon in Israeli's works, and no wonder Maimonides had no 
 use for them. For the purely scientific questions treated by Israeli 
 could in Maimonides's day be studied to much better advantage in 
 the works of the great Arabian Aristotehans, Al Farabi and Avicenna, 
 compared to whom Israeli was mediocre. We are not to judge him, 
 however, from Maimonides's point of view. In his own day and gener- 
 ation he was surpassed by none as a physician; and Saadia alone far 
 outstrips him as a Jewish writer, and perhaps also David Al Mukam- 
 mas, of whom we shall speak later. Whatever may be said of the 
 intrinsic value of the content of his philosophical work, none can take 
 away from him the merit of having been the first Jew, so far as we 
 know, to devote himself to philosophical and scientific discussions, 
 though not with the avowed aim of serving Judaism. The rest was 
 bound to come later as a result of the impulse first given by him. 
 
 The two works of Israeli which come in consideration for our pur- 
 pose are those mentioned by Maimonides in his letter to Samuel 
 Ibn Tibbon spoken of above, namely, the "Book of the Elements," ^° 
 and the "Book of Definitions." ^^ Like all scientific and philosophic 
 works by Jews between the ninth and thirteenth centuries with few 
 exceptions, these were written in Arabic. Unfortunately, with the ex- 
 ception of a fragment recently discovered of the ''Book of Definitions," 
 the originals are lost, and we owe our knowledge of their contents to 
 Hebrew and Latin translations, which are extant and have been pub- 
 lished.^^ We see from these that Israeli was a compiler from various 
 sources, and that he had a special predilection for Galen and Hip- 
 pocrates, with whose writings he shows great familiarity. He makes 
 use besides of Aristotelian notions, and is influenced by the Neo- 
 Pla tonic treatise, known as the "Liber de Causis," and derived from 
 
ISAAC ISRAELI 3 
 
 a work of Proclus. It is for this reason difficult to characterize his 
 standpoint, but we shall not go far wrong if we call him aNeo-Platonist, 
 for reasons which will appear in the sequel. 
 
 It would be useless for us here to reproduce the contents of Israeli's 
 two treatises, which would be more appropriate for a history of me- 
 diaeval science. A brief resume will show the correctness of this view. 
 In his "Book of the Elements" Israeh is primarily concerned with a 
 definite physical problem, the definition of an element, and the number 
 and character of the elements out of which the sublunar world is made. 
 He begins with an Aristotelian definition of element, analyzes it 
 into its parts and comes to the conclusion that the elements are the 
 four weU-known ones, fire, air, water, earth. Incidentally he seizes 
 opportunities now and then, sometimes by force, to discuss points in 
 logic, physics, physiology and psychology. Thus the composition 
 of the human body, the various modes in which a thing may come 
 into being, that the yellow and black galls and the phlegm are resident 
 in the blood, the purpose of phlebotomy, the substantial character of 
 prime form, that the soul is not an accident, the two kinds of blood 
 in the body, the various kinds of "accident," the nature of a "prop)- 
 erty" and the manner in which it is caused — all these topics are dis- 
 cussed in the course of proof that the four elements are fire, air, water, 
 earth, and not seed or the quahties of heat, cold, dryness and moisture. 
 He then quotes the definitions of Galen and Hippocrates and insists 
 that though the wording is different the meaning is the same as that 
 of Aristotle, and hence they all agree about the identity of the elements. 
 Here again he takes occasion to combat the atomic theory of the 
 Mu tazila and Democritus, and proves that a fine is not composed of 
 points. In the last part of the treatise he refutes contrary opinions 
 concerning the number and identity of the elements, such as that there 
 is only one element which is movable or immovable, finite or infinite, 
 namely, the power of God, or species, or fire, or air, or water, or earth; 
 or that the number is two, matter and God; or three, matter, form and 
 motion; or six, viz., the four which he himself adopts, and composition 
 and separation; or the number ten, which is the end and completion 
 of number. In the course of this discussion he takes occasion to define 
 pain and pleasure, the nature of species, the difference between ele- 
 ment and principle. And thus the book draws to a close. Not very 
 
4 MEDIJEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 promising material this, it would seem, for the ideas of which we are 
 in search. 
 
 The other book, that dealing with definitions of things, is more 
 promising. For while there too we do not find any connected account 
 of God, of the world and of man, Israeli's general attitude can be 
 gathered from the manner in which he explains some important con- 
 cepts. The book, as its title indicates, consists of a series of definitions 
 or descriptions of certain terms and ideas made use of by philosophers 
 in their construction of their scheme of the world — such ideas and 
 terms as Intelligence, science, philosophy, soul, sphere, spirit, nature, 
 and so on. From these we may glean some information of the school 
 to which Israeli belongs. And in the " Book of the Elements," too, 
 some of the episodic discussions are of value for our purpose. 
 
 Philosophy, Israeli tells us, is self-knowledge and keeping far from 
 evil. When a man knows himself truly — his spiritual as well as his 
 corporeal aspects — he knows everything. For in man are combined 
 the corporeal and the spiritual. Spiritual is the soul and the reason, 
 corporeal is the body with its three dimensions. In his qualities and 
 attributes — " accidents " in the terminology of Israeli — we similarly 
 find the spiritual as well as the corporeal. Humility, wisdom and 
 other similar quahties borne by the soul are spiritual; complexion, 
 stature, and so on are corporeal. Seeing that man thus forms an 
 epitome, as it were, of the universe (for spiritual and corporeal sub- 
 stance and accident exhausts the classes of existence in the world), 
 a knowledge of self means a knowledge of everything, and a man who 
 knows all this is worthy of being called a philosopher. 
 
 But philosophy is more than knowledge; it involves also action. 
 The formula which reveals the nature and aim of philosophy is to 
 become like unto God as far as is possible for man. This means to 
 imitate the activities of God in knowing the realities of things and do- 
 ing what the truth requires. To know the realities of things one must 
 study science so as to know the various causes and purposes existing 
 in the world. The most important of these is the purpose of the union 
 in man of body and soul. This is in order that man may know reahty 
 and truth, and distinguish between good and evil, so as to do what is 
 true and just and upright, to sanctify and praise the Creator and to 
 keep from impure deeds of the animal nature. A man who does this 
 
ISAAC ISRAELI S 
 
 will receive reward from the Creator, which consists in cleaving to the 
 upper soul, in receiving light from the light of knowledge, and the 
 beauty of splendor and wisdom. When a man reaches this degree, 
 he becomes spiritual by cleaving to the created Hght which comes 
 directly from God, and praising the Creator. This is his paradise 
 and his reward and perfection. Hence Plato said that philosophy 
 is the strengthening and the help of death. He meant by this that 
 philosophy helps to deaden all animal desires and pleasures. For 
 by being thus delivered from them, a man will reach excellence and 
 the higher splendor, and wiU enter the house of truth. But if he 
 indulges his animal pleasures and desires and they become strength- 
 ened, he wUl become subject to agencies which will lead him astray 
 from the duties he owes to God, from fear of him and from prayer 
 at the prescribed time. 
 
 We look in vain in Israeli's two treatises for a discussion of the 
 existence and nature of God. Concerning creation he tells us that 
 when God wanted to show his wisdom and bring everything from 
 potentiality to actuahty, he created the world out of nothing, not 
 after a model (this in opposition to Plato and Philo) , nor for the pur- 
 pose of deriving any benefit from it or to obviate harm, but solely 
 on account of his goodness. 
 
 But how did the creation proceed? A fragment from the treatise 
 of IsraeU entitled "The Book of Spirit and Soul"^^ wiU give us in 
 summary fashion an idea of the manner in which IsraeH conceived 
 of the order and connection of things in the world. 
 
 In the name of the ancients he gives the following account. God 
 created a splendor. This having come to a standstill and real per- 
 manence, a spark of light proceeded from it, from which arose the 
 power of the rational soul. This is less bright than the splendor of 
 the Intelligence and is affected with shadow and darkness by reason 
 of its greater distance from its origin, and the intervening Intelligence. 
 The rational soul again becoming permanent and fixed, there issued 
 from it likewise a spark, giving rise to the animal soul. This latter 
 is endowed with a cogitative and imaginative faculty, but is not per- 
 manent in its existence, because of the two intervening natures be- 
 tween it and the pure light of God. From the animal soul there like- 
 wise issued a splendor, which produced the vegetative soul. This 
 
6 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 soul, being so far removed from the original light, and separated from 
 it by the Intelligence and the other two souls, has its splendor dimmed 
 and made coarse, and is endowed only with the motions of growth and 
 nourishment, but is not capable of change of place. From the vege- 
 tative soul proceeds again a splendor, from which is made the sphere 
 (the heaven). This becomes thickened and materialized so that it 
 is accessible to the sight. Motion being the nature of the sphere, 
 one part of it pushes the other, and from this motion results fire. 
 From fire proceeds air; from air, water; from water, earth. And 
 from these elements arise minerals, plants and animals. 
 
 Here we recognize the Neo-Platonic scheme of emanation as we 
 saw it in Plotinus, a gradual and successive emanation of the lower 
 from the higher in the manner of a ray of light radiating from a lumi- 
 nous body, the successive radiations diminishing in brightness and 
 spirituality until when we reach the Sphere the process of obscuration 
 has gone so far as to make the product material and visible to the 
 physical sense. The Intelligence and the three Souls proceeding from 
 it in order are clearly not individual but cosmic, just as in Plotinus. 
 The relation between these cosmic hypostases, to use a Neo-Platonic 
 term, and the rational and psychic faculties in man Israeli nowhere 
 explains, but we must no doubt conceive of the latter as somehow 
 contained in the former and temporarily individualized, returning 
 again to their source after the dissolution of the body. 
 
 Let us follow Israeh further in his account of the nature of these 
 substances. The Intelligence is that which proceeds immediately from 
 the divine light without any immediate agency. It represents the 
 permanent ideas and principles — species in Israeli's terminology 
 — which are not subject to change or dissolution. The Intelhgence 
 contains them all in herself eternally and immediately, and requires 
 no searching or reflection to reach them. When the Intelligence 
 wishes to know anything she returns into herself and finds it there 
 without requiring thought or reflection. We can illustrate this, 
 he continues, in the case of a skilful artisan who, when he wishes to 
 make anything, retires into himself and finds it there. There is a 
 difference, however, in the two cases, because Intelligence always 
 knows its ideas without thought or reflection, for it exists always and 
 its ideas are not subject to change or addition or diminution; whereas 
 
ISAAC ISRAELI 7 
 
 in the smith a difficulty may arise, and then his soul is divided and he 
 requires searching and thinking and discrimination before he can 
 realize what he desires. 
 
 What has been said so far applies very well to the cosmic Intel- 
 hgence, the vov^ of the Neo-Platonists. It represents thought as 
 embracing the highest and most fundamental principles of existence, 
 upon which all mediate and discursive and inferential thinking de- 
 pends. Its content corresponds to the Ideas of Plato. But the further 
 account of the Intelligence must at least in a part of it refer to the 
 individual human faculty of that name, though Israeli gives us no 
 indication where the one stops and where the other begins. 
 
 He appeals to the authority of Aristotle for his division of Intelli- 
 gence into three kinds. First, the Intelhgence which is always actual. 
 This is what has just been described. Second, the Intelligence which is 
 in the soul potentially before it becomes actual, like the knowledge of 
 the child which is at first potential, and when the child grows up and 
 learns and acquires knowledge, becomes actual. Third, that which is 
 described as the second Intelligence. It represents that state of the 
 soul in which it receives things from the senses. The senses impress the 
 forms of objects upon the imagination {(j>avTaaia) which is in the 
 front part of the head. The imagination, or phantasy, takes them to 
 the rational soul. When the latter knows them, she becomes identical 
 with them spiritually and not corporeally. 
 
 We have seen above the Aristotelian distinction between the active 
 intellect and the passive. The account just given is evidently based 
 upon it, though it modifies Aristotle's analysis, or rather it enlarges 
 upon it. The first and second divisions in IsraeH's account correspond 
 to Aristotle's active and passive intellects respectively. The third 
 class in Israeh represents the process of realization of the potential or 
 passive intellect through the sense stimuli on the one hand and the 
 influence of the active intellect on the other. Aristotle seems to have 
 left this intermediate state between the potential and the eternally 
 actual unnamed. We shall see, however, in our further study of this 
 very difficult and comphcated subject how the classification of the 
 various intellects becomes more and more involved from Aristotle 
 through Alexander and Themistius down to Averroes and Levi ben 
 Gerson. It is sufficient for us to see here how Israeli combines Aris- 
 
8 MEDIjEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 totelian psychology, as later Aristotelian logic and physics, with Neo- 
 Platonic metaphysics and the theistic doctrine of creation. But more 
 of this hereafter. 
 
 From the Intelhgence, as we have seen, proceeds the rational soul. 
 In his discussion of the general nature of the three-fold soul (rational, 
 animal and vegetative) Israeli makes the unhistoric but thoroughly 
 mediaeval attempt to reconcile Aristotle's definition of the soul, which 
 we discussed above (p.xxxv), with that of Plato. The two conceptions 
 are in reality diametrically opposed. Plato's is an anthropological 
 dualism, Aristotle's, a monism. For Plato the soul is in its origin not of 
 this world and not in essential unity with the body, which it controls as 
 a sailor his boat. Aristotle conceives of the relation between soul and 
 body as one of form and matter; and there is no union more perfect 
 than that of these two constituent elements of all natural substances. 
 Decomposition is impossible. A given form may disappear, but 
 another form immediately takes its place. The combination of matter 
 and form is the essential condition of sublunar existence, hence there 
 can be no question of the soul entering or leaving the body, or of its 
 activity apart from the body. 
 
 But Israeli does not seem to have grasped Aristotle's meaning, and 
 ascribes to him the notion that the soul is a separate substance per- 
 fecting the natural body, which has life potentially, meaning by this 
 that bodies have life potentially before the soul apprehends them; and 
 when the soul does apprehend them, it makes them perfect and living 
 actually. To be sure, he adds in the immediate sequel that he does 
 not mean temporal before and after, for things are always just as they 
 were created; and that his mode of expression is due to the impossibil- 
 ity of conveying spiritual ideas in corporeal terms in any other way. 
 This merely signifies that the human body and its soul come into being 
 simultaneously. But he still regards them as distinct substances 
 forming only a passing combination. And with this pretended Aris- 
 totelian notion he seeks to harmonize that of Plato, which he under- 
 stands to mean not that the soul enters the body, being clothed with 
 it as with a garment, and then leaves it, but that the soul apprehends 
 bodies by clothing them with its light and splendor, and thus makes 
 them living and moving, as the sun clothes the world with its light and 
 illuminates it so that sight can perceive it. The difference is that the 
 
ISAAC ISRAELI 9 
 
 light of the sun is corporeal, and sight perceives it in the air by which 
 it is borne; whereas the hght of the soul is spiritual, and intelligence 
 alone can perceive it, not the physical sense. 
 
 Among the conceptual terms in the Aristotehan logic few play a more 
 important part than those of substance and accident. Substance is 
 that which does not reside in anything else but is its own subject. It 
 is an independent existence and is the subject of accidents. The latter 
 have no existence independent of the substance in which they inhere. 
 Thus of the ten categories, in which Aristotle embraces all existing 
 things, the first includes all substances, as for example, man, city, 
 stone. The other nine come under the genus accident. Quantity, qual- 
 ity, relation, time, place, position, possession, action, passion — all 
 these represent attributes which must have a substantial being to re- 
 side in. There is no length or breadth, or color, or before or after, or 
 here or there, and so on except in a real object or thing. This then is 
 the meaning of accident as a logical or ontological term, and in this sig- 
 nification it has nothing to do with the idea of chance. Clearly sub- 
 stance represents the higher category, and accident is inferior, because 
 dependent and variable. Thus it becomes important to know in refer- 
 ence to any object of investigation what is its status in this respect, 
 whether it is substance or accident. 
 
 The nature of the soul has been a puzzle to thinkers and philoso- 
 phers from time immemorial. Some thought it was a material sub- 
 stance, some regarded it as spiritual. It was identified with the 
 essence of nxmiber by the Pythagoreans. And there have not been 
 wanting those who, arguing from its dependence upon body, said it 
 was an accident and not a substance. Strange to say the Mutakalli- 
 mun, defenders of religion and faith, held to this very opinion. But 
 it is really no stranger than the maintenance of the soul's materiality 
 equally defended by other religionists, like Tertulhan for example, 
 and the opposition to Maimonides's spiritualism on the part of Abra- 
 ham ben David of Posquieres. The Mutakallimun were led to their 
 idea by the atomic theory, which they found it politic to adopt as more 
 amenable to theological treatment than Aristotle's Matter and Form. 
 It followed then according to some of them that the fimdamental 
 unit was the material atom which is without quality, and any power 
 or activity in any atom or group of atoms is a direct creation of God, 
 
lo MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 which must be re-created every moment in order to exist. This is 
 the nature of accident, and it makes more manifest the ever present 
 activity of God in the world. Thus the "substantial" or "accidental" 
 character of the soul is one that is touched on by most Jewish writers 
 on the subject. And Israeli also refers to the matter incidentally in 
 the "Book of the Elements." ^^ Like the other Jewish philosophers 
 he defends its substantiality. 
 
 The fact of its separability from the body, he says, is no proof of its 
 being an accident. For it is not the separability of an accident from 
 its substance that makes it an accident, but its destruction when 
 separated. Thus when a white substance turns green, the white color 
 is not merely separated from its substance but ceases to exist. The 
 soul is not destroyed when it leaves the body. 
 
 Another argmnent to prove the soul a substance is this. If the 
 soul were an accident it should be possible for it to pass from the 
 animal body to something else, as blackness is found in the Ethio- 
 pian's skin, in ebony wood and in pitch. But the soul exists only in 
 living beings. 
 
 We find, besides, that the activity of the soul extends far beyond the 
 body, and acts upon distant things without being destroyed. Hence 
 it follows that the soul itself, the agent of the activity, keeps on ex- 
 isting without the body, and is a substance. 
 
 Having made clear the conception of soul generally and its relation 
 to the body, he next proceeds to treat of the three kinds of soul. The 
 highest of these is the rational soul, which is in the horizon of the 
 Intelligence and arises from its shadow. It is in virtue of this soul 
 that man is a rational being, discriminating, receptive of wisdom, 
 distinguishing between good and evil, between things desirable and 
 undesirable, approaching the meritorious and departing from wrong. 
 For this he receives reward and punishment, because he knows what 
 he is doing and that retribution follows upon his conduct. 
 
 Next to the rational soul is the animal soul, which arises from the 
 shadow of the former. Being far removed from the light of Intelli- 
 gence, the animal soul is dark and obscure. She has no knowledge 
 or discrimination, but only a dim notion of truth, and judges by 
 appearance only and not according to reality. Of its properties are 
 sense perception, motion and change in place. For this reason the 
 
ISAAC ISRAELI II 
 
 animals are fierce and violent, endeavoring to rule, but without clear 
 knowledge and discrimination, like the lion who wants to rule over the 
 other beasts, without having a clear consciousness of what he is doing. 
 A proof that the animals have only dim notions of things is that 
 a thirsty ass coming to the river will fly from his own shadow in the 
 water, though he needs the latter for preserving his life, whereas he will 
 not hesitate to approach a lion, who will devour him. Therefore the 
 animals receive no reward or punishment (this in opposition to the 
 Mutakallimun) because they do not know what to do so as to be re- 
 warded, or what to avoid, in order not to be punished. 
 
 The vegetative soul proceeds from the shadow of the animal soul. 
 She is still further removed from the light of Intelligence, and still 
 more weighed down with shadow. She has no sense perception or 
 motion. She is next to earth and is characterized by the powers of 
 reproduction, growth, nutrition, and the production of buds and 
 flowers, odors and tastes. 
 
 Next to the soul comes the Sphere (the heaven), which arises in the 
 horizon and shadow of the vegetative soul. The Sphere is superior 
 to corporeal substances, being itself not body, but the matter of body. 
 Unlike the material elements, which suffer change and diminution 
 through the things which arise out of them as well as through the 
 return of the bodies of plants and animals back to them as their ele- 
 ments, the spiritual substances (and also the sphere) do not suffer 
 any increase or diminution through the production of things out of 
 them. For plants and animals are produced from the elements through 
 a celestial power which God placed in nature effecting generation and 
 decay in order that this world of genesis and dissolution should exist. 
 But the splendor of the higher substances, viz., the three souls, suffers 
 no change on account of the things coming from them because that 
 which is produced by them issues from the shadow of their splendor 
 and not from the essence of the splendor itself. And it is clear that the 
 splendor of a thing in its essence is brighter than the splendor of its 
 shadow, viz., that which comes from it. Hence the splendor of the 
 vegetative soul is undoubtedly brighter than that of the sphere, which 
 comes from its shadow. The latter becomes rigid and assumes a cov- 
 ering, thickness and corporeality so that it can be perceived by sight. 
 But no other of the senses can perceive it because, although corporeal, 
 
12 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 it is near to the higher substances in form and nobihty, and is moved by 
 a perfect and complete motion, motion in a circle, which is more per- 
 fect than other motions and not subject to influence and change. 
 Hence there is no increase or diminution in it, no beginning or end, and 
 this on account of the simplicity, spirituality and permanence of that 
 which moves it. The Intelligence pours of her splendor upon it, and of 
 the light of her knowledge, and the sphere becomes intelligent and 
 rational, and knows, without investigation or reflection, the lordship 
 of its Creator, and that he should be praised and glorified without 
 intermission. For this reason the Creator assigned to the Sphere 
 a high degree from which it cannot be removed, and gave it charge 
 of the production of time and the four seasons of the year, and the 
 month and the day and the hour, and made it ruler of the production 
 of perishable things in this world of generation and dissolution, so that 
 the upper souls may find bodies to apprehend, to clothe with their 
 light, and to make visible in them their activities according to the 
 determination of God. 
 
 The Sphere by its motion produces the four elements, fire, air, 
 water, earth; and the combinations of these in various proportions 
 give rise to the minerals, plants and animals of this world, the highest 
 of whom is man. 
 
 That the elements are those mentioned above and nothing else is 
 proved by the definition of element and its distinction from "prin- 
 ciple." A principle is something which, while being the cause of 
 change, and even possibly at the basis of change, is not itself subject 
 to change. Thus God is undoubtedly the cause of everything that 
 happens in the world. He may therefore be called a principle of the 
 world, but he does not enter with his essence the changing things. 
 Hence it is absurd to speak of God as an element of the sublunar world. 
 Matter, i. e., primary formless matter, does enter all changing things 
 and is at the basis of all change; but it does not itself change. Hence 
 matter also is a principle but not an element. An element is some- 
 thing which is itself a composite of matter and form, and changes its 
 form to become something else in which, however, it is contained 
 potentially, not actually. The product ultimately goes back to the 
 element or elements from which it was made. When we follow this 
 resolution of a given composite into its elements back as far as we can 
 
ISAAC ISRAELI 15 
 
 until we reach a first which is no longer produced out of anything in 
 the same way as things were produced from it, we have the element. 
 Such is the nature of fire, air, water, earth. All things are made from 
 them in the manner above indicated. But there is nothing prior to 
 them which changes its form to become fire, continues to reside po- 
 tentially in fire and returns to its original state by the resolution of 
 fire. The same applies to the other three. 
 
 The matter is now clear. The elements stand at the head of physical 
 change and take part in it. Prior to the elements are indeed matter 
 and form, but as logical principles, not as physical and independent 
 entities. Hence it would seem, according to Israeli, that matter and 
 form are side-tracked in the gradual evolution of the lower from the 
 higher. For the elements, he tells us, come from the motion of the 
 Sphere, the Sphere from the shadow of the Soul, the Soul from the 
 shadow of the Intelligence, the Intelligence is created by God. To be 
 sure he tells us that the Sphere is not body, but the matter of body. 
 Yet the Sphere cannot take the place of prime matter surely, for it is 
 undoubtedly endowed with form, nay is rational and intelligent, as 
 we have seen. 
 
 When Israeli says that prior to the four elements there is nothing 
 but the Omnipotence of God, he means that the sublunar process of 
 change and becoming stops with the elements as its upper limit. What 
 is above the elements belongs to the intelligible world; and the manner 
 of their production one from the other is a spiritual one, emanation. 
 The Sphere stands on the border line between the corporeal and the 
 intelligible, itself a product of emanation, though producing the 
 elements by its motion — a process apparently neither like emanation 
 nor like sublunar becoming and change. 
 
 Creation in Israeli seems to be the same as emanation, for on the one 
 hand he tells us that souls are created, that nothing precedes the four 
 elements except the Omnipotence of God, and on the other that the 
 elements come from the motion of the Sphere, and the souls issue from 
 the shadow of the Intelligence. For matter and form there seems to 
 be no room at all except as logical principles. This is evidently due to 
 the fact that Israeli is unwittingly combining Aristotehan physics 
 with Neo-Platonic emanationism. For Aristotle matter and form 
 stand at the head of sublunar change and are ultimate. There is no 
 
14 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 derivation of matter or form from anything. The celestial world has 
 a matter of its own, and is not the cause of the being of this one except 
 as influencing its changes. God is the mover of the Spheres, but not 
 their Creator, hence he stands outside of the world. This is Theism. 
 In Israeli there is a continuity of God, the intelligible world and the 
 corporeal, all being ultimately the same thing, though the processes 
 in the two worlds are different. And yet he obviates Pantheism by 
 declaring that God is a principle not an element. 
 
 We said before that Israeli takes no avowed attitude to Jewish 
 dogma or the Bible. He never quotes any Jewish works, and there 
 is nothing in his writings to indicate that he is a Jew and is making 
 an effort to harmonize Judaism with philosophy and science. In 
 words he refers to creation ex nihilo, which is not necessarily Jewish, 
 it might be just as well Mohammedan or Christian. But in reality, 
 as we have seen, his ideas of the cosmic process are far enough removed 
 from the orthodox doctrine of creation as it appears in Bible and 
 Talmud. 
 
 Incidentally we learn also something of Israeli's ideas of God's 
 relation to mankind, of his commandments, and of prophecy. God 
 created the world, he tells us, because of his goodness. He wanted 
 to benefit his creatures. This could not be without their knowing 
 the will of God and performing it. The will of God could not be 
 revealed directly to everybody because the divine wisdom can speak 
 only to those in whom the rational soul is mistress and is enlightened 
 by the Intelligence. But people are not all of this kind; for some have 
 the animal soul predominating in them, being on that account igno- 
 rant, confused, forward, bold, murderous, vengeful, unchaste like an- 
 imals; others are mastered by the vegetative soul, i. e., the appetitive, 
 and are thus stupid and dull, and given over to their appetites like 
 plants. In others again their souls are variously combined, giving 
 to their life and conduct a composite character. On this account it 
 was necessary for God to select a person in whom the rational soul is 
 separated, and illumined by the Intelligence — a man who is spiritual 
 in his nature and eager to imitate the angels as far as it is possible 
 for a man to do this. This man he made a messenger to mankind. 
 He gave him his book which contains two kinds of teaching. One 
 kind is spiritual in its nature, and needs no further commentary of 
 
ISAAC ISRAELI 1$ 
 
 interpretation. This is meant for the intellectual and discriminating. 
 The other kind is corporeal, and requires spiritual interpretation. 
 This is intended for the various grades of those who cannot understand 
 directly the spiritual meaning, but who can grasp the corporeal teach- 
 ing, by which they are gradually trained and prepared for the recep- 
 tion of higher truths. These people therefore need instructors and 
 guides because a book alone is not sufficient for the purposes of those 
 who cannot understand. 
 
 Dreams and prophecy are closely related, hence an explanation of 
 the former will also throw light on the latter. A dream is caused by 
 the influence of the Intelligence on the soul in sleep. The Intelligence 
 receives its knowledge directly from God, and serves as a mediator 
 between him and the soul, like a prophet who mediates between 
 God and his creatures. In communicating to the soul the spiritual 
 forms which it received from God, the Intelligence translates them 
 into forms intermediate between corporeality and spirituality in order 
 that they may be quickly impressed upon the common sense, which 
 is the first to receive them. The common sense stands midway be- 
 tween the corporeal sense of sight and the imagination, which is in the 
 anterior chamber of the brain, and is known as phantasy (Aristotehan 
 t^avTaaid). 
 
 That the forms thus impressed on the common sense in sleep are 
 intermediate between corporeal and spiritual is proved by the fact 
 that they are different from the corporeal forms of things seen in the 
 waking state. The latter are obscure and covered up, whereas those 
 seen in sleep are finer, more spiritual and brighter. Proof of this is 
 that a person sees himself in sleep endowed with wings and flying 
 between heaven and earth. He sees the heavens opening and someone 
 speaking to him out of the heaven, and so on. There would be no sense 
 in all this if these phenomena had no spiritual meaning, for they are 
 contrary to nature. But we know that they have real significance 
 if interpreted by a really thoughtful person. The prophets also in 
 wishing to separate themselves from mankind and impress the latter 
 with their qualities, showed them spiritual forms of similar kind, 
 which were preternatural. Hence all who believe in prophecy admit 
 that dreams are a part of prophecy. 
 
 Now these intermediate forms which are impressed upon the com- 
 
l6 MEDIJEFAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 mon sense in sleep are turned over by it to the phantasy and by the 
 latter to the memory. When the person awakes, he recovers the 
 forms from the memory just as they were deposited there by the 
 phantasy. He then consults his thinking power; and if this is spiritual 
 and pure, the Intelligence endows him with its light and splendor and 
 reveals to him the spiritual forms signified by the visions seen in sleep. 
 He is then able to interpret the dream correctly. But if his powers of 
 thought are not so good and are obscured by coverings, he cannot 
 properly remove the husk from the kernel in the forms seen in sleep, 
 is not able to penetrate to the true spirituality beneath, and his in- 
 terpretation is erroneous. 
 
 This explanation does not really explain, but it is noteworthy as 
 the first Jewish attempt to reduce prophecy to a psychological phenom- 
 enon, which was carried fiurther by subsequent writers until it received 
 its definitive form for the middle ages in Maimonides and Levi ben 
 Gerson, 
 
 To sum up, Israeli is an eclectic. There is no system of Jewish 
 philosophy to be found in his writings. He had no such ambitions. 
 He combines Aristotelian logic, physics and psychology with Neo- 
 Platonic metaphysics, and puts on the surface a veneer of theistic 
 creationism. His merit is chiefly that of a pioneer in directing the 
 attention of Jews to the science and philosophy of the Greeks, albeit 
 in Arab dress. There is no trace yet of the Kalam in his writings 
 except in his allusions to the atomic theory and the denial of reward 
 and punishment of animals. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 DAVID BEN MERWAN AL MUKAMMAS 
 
 Nothing was known of Al Mukammas until recently when fragments 
 of his philosophical work were found in Judah ben Barzilai's commen- 
 tary on the Sefer Yezirah.^^ The latter tells us that David Al Mukam- 
 mas is said to have associated with Saadia, who learned a good deal 
 from him, but the matter is not certain. If this account be true we 
 have a second Jewish philosopher who preceded Saadia. His chief 
 work is known by the title of "Twenty Chapters," fifteen of which 
 were discovered in the original Arabic in 1898 by Abraham Harkavy 
 of St. Petersburg. ^^ Unfortunately they have not yet been published, 
 and hence our account will have to be incomplete, based as it is on the 
 Hebrew fragments in the Yezirah commentary above mentioned. 
 
 These fragments are sufficient to show us that unlike Israeh, who 
 shows little knowledge of the Mu'taziHte discussions, Al Mukammas is 
 a real Mu'taziHte and moves in the path laid out by these Moham- 
 medan rationalists. Whether this difference is due to their places of 
 residence (Israeli having lived in Egypt and Kairuan, while Al Mu- 
 kammas was in Babylon), or to their personal predilections for Neo- 
 Platonism and the Kalam respectively, is not certain. Saadia knows 
 the Kalam; but though coming originally from Egypt, he spent his 
 most fruitful years in Babylonia, in the city of Sura, where he was 
 gaon. The centres of Arabian rationalism were, as we know, the cities 
 of Bagdad and Basra, nearer to Babylon and Mesopotamia than to 
 Egypt or Kairuan. 
 
 The first quotation in Judah ben Barzilai has reference to science and 
 philosophy, their definition and classification. Science is the knowl- 
 edge of the reahty of existing things. It is divided into two parts, 
 theoretical and practical. Theoretical science aims at knowledge for 
 its own sake; practical seeks an end beyond knowledge, viz., the pro- 
 duction of something. We call it then art. Thus geometry is a science 
 in so far as one desires to know the nature and relations to each other of 
 
 17 
 
l8 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 solid, surface, line, point, square, triangle, circle. But if his purpose is 
 to know how to build a square or circular house, or to construct a mill, 
 or dig a well, or measure land, he becomes an artisan. Theoretical 
 science is three-fold. First and foremost stands theology, which 
 investigates the unity of God and his laws and commandments. This 
 is the highest and most important of all the sciences. Next comes 
 logic and ethics, which help men in forming opinions and guide them 
 in the path of understanding. The last is physics, the knowledge of 
 created things. 
 
 In the ninth and tenth chapters of his book Al Mukammas discusses 
 the divine attributes. This was a very important problem in the 
 Mu'tazilite schools, as we saw in the Introduction, and was treated in 
 Mu'tazilite works in the first division, which went by the title of 
 "Bab al Tauhid," the chapter on the unity. 
 
 God is one — so Al Mukammas sums up the results of his previous 
 discussions — not in the sense in which a genus is said to be one, nor in 
 that in which a species is one, nor as the number one is one, nor as an 
 individual creature is one, but as a simple unity in which there is no 
 distinction or composition. He is one and there is no second like him. 
 He is first without beginning, and last without end. He is the cause 
 and ground of everything caused and effected. 
 
 The question of God's essence is difificult. Some say it is not per- 
 mitted to ask what God is. For to answer the question what a thing is 
 is to limit it, and the limited is the created. Others again say that it is 
 permitted to make this inquiry, because we can use in our answer the 
 expressions to which God himself testifies in his revealed book. And 
 this would not be limiting or defining his glory because his being is 
 different from any other, and there is nothing that bears any resem- 
 blance to him. Accordingly we should answer the question what God 
 is, by saying, he is the first and the last, and the visible and the hidden, 
 without begirming or end. He is living, but not through life acquired 
 from without. His life is not sustained and prolonged by food. He is 
 wise, but not through acquired wisdom. He hears without ears, sees 
 without eyes, is understanding in all his works, and a true judge in all 
 his judgments. Such would be our answer in accordance with God's 
 own testimony of himself. 
 
 We must on no account suppose that the expressions living, wise, 
 
DAVID BEN MERWAN AL MUKAMMAS 19 
 
 seeing, hearing, and so on, when apphed to God mean the same thing 
 as when we ascribe them to ourselves. When we say God is Hving we 
 do not mean that there was a time when he was not living, or that 
 there will be a time when he will not be hving. This is true of us but 
 not of God. His life has no beginning or end. The same thing applies 
 to his wisdom. It is not acquired hke ours, it has no beginning or 
 end, and is not subject to error, forgetfulness, addition or diminution. 
 It is not strange that his attributes should be so imlike ours, for it is 
 fitting that the Creator should be different from the thing created, and 
 the Maker from the thing made. 
 
 We must, however, analyze the matter of divine attributes more 
 closely. When we say God is living, we may mean he is living with 
 life as his attribute, i. e., that there is an attribute life which makes 
 him living, or we may deny that there is any such attribute in him as 
 life, but that he is living through himself and not through life as an 
 attribute. To make this subtle distinction clear we will investigate 
 further what is involved in the first statement that God is living with 
 life. It may mean that there was a time when God was not hving and 
 then he acquired life and became living. This is clearly a wrong and 
 unworthy conception. We must therefore adopt the other alterna- 
 tive, that the life which makes him living is eternal like him, and 
 hence he was always living from eternity and will continue to be 
 Hving to eternity. But the matter is not yet settled. The question 
 still remains. Is this life through which he hves identical with his be- 
 ing, or is it distinct from his being, or is it a part of it? If we say it 
 is distinct from his being, we are guilty of introducing other eternal 
 beings beside God, which destroys his unity. The Christians are 
 guilty of this very thing when they say that God's eternal life is the 
 Holy Ghost, and his eternal Wisdom is the Son. If we say that his 
 life is a part of his being, we do injury to the other aspect of his unity, 
 namely, his simphcity. For to have parts in one's being imphes com- 
 position. We are forced therefore to conclude that God's life is 
 identical with his being. But this is really tantamount to saying that 
 there is no attribute life which makes him living, or that he is hving 
 not through life. The difference is only in expression. 
 
 We may make this conception clearer by illustrations from other 
 spheres, inadequate though they be. The soul is the cause of life 
 
20 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 to the body, i. e., the body lives through the soul, and when the latter 
 leaves it, the body loses its Ufe and dies. But the soul itself does 
 not live through anything else, say through another soul. For if this 
 were the case this other soul would need again another soul to make it 
 live and this again another, and so on ad infinitum, which is absurd. 
 The soul lives through itself. The same thing applies to angels. They 
 live through their own being; and that is why souls and angels are 
 called in the Sacred Scriptures spirits. A spirit is something that is 
 fine and light and incomposite. Hence their life cannot be due to 
 anything distinct from their being, for this would make them compos- 
 ite. 
 
 This statement, however, that souls and angels are living through 
 their own being must not be understood as meaning that they have no 
 creator who gave them being and life. The meaning merely is that 
 the being which God gave them is different from the being he gave 
 to bodies. Bodies need a soul to become living, the soul is itself living. 
 So in material things, also, the sun shines with its own light and not 
 with light acquired. The odor of myrrh is fragrant through itself, not 
 through anything else. The eye sees with its own power, whereas man 
 sees with the eye. The tongue does not speak with another tongue, 
 man speaks with a tongue, and so on. So we say of God, though 
 in a manner a thousand-fold more sublime, that he is living, but not 
 with a hfe which is distinct from his being; and so of the other attri- 
 butes, hearing, seeing, and so on, that we find in the Scriptural praises 
 of him. 
 
 It is necessary to add that as on the one hand we have seen that 
 God's attributes are identical with his being, so it follows on the other 
 that the various attributes, such as wise, seeing, hearing, knowing, 
 and so on, are not different from each other in meaning, though dis- 
 tinct in expression. Otherwise it would make God composite. The 
 reason we employ a number of distinct expressions is in order to remove 
 from God the several opposites of the terms used. Thus when we say 
 God is living we mean to indicate that he is not dead. The attribute 
 wise excludes folly and ignorance; hearing and seeing remove deafness 
 and blindness. The philosopher Aristotle says that it is truer and more 
 appropriate to apply negative attributes to God than positive. Others 
 have said that we must not speak of the Creator in positive terms 
 
DAVID BEN MERWAN AL MUKAMMAS 21 
 
 for there is danger of endowing him with form and resemblance to 
 other things. Speaking of him negatively we imply the positive 
 without risking offence. 
 
 In the sequel Al Mukammas refutes the views of the dualists, of 
 the Christians and those who maintain that God has form. We 
 cannot afford to linger over these arguments, interesting though they 
 be, and must hurry on to say a word about the sixteenth chapter, 
 which deals with reward and punishment. This no doubt forms 
 part of the second Mu'tazilite division, namely, the "Bab al 'Adl," 
 or section concerning God's justice. 
 
 He defines reward as the soul's tranquillity and infinite joy in the 
 world to come in compensation for the sojourn in this world which 
 she endured and the self-control she practiced in abstaining from the 
 pleasures of the world. Punishment, on the other hand, is the soul's 
 disquietude and sorrow to the end of days as retribution for indulging 
 in the world's evil pleasures. Both are imposed by God with justice 
 and fairness. It is fitting that the promises of reward and threats 
 of punishment consequent upon obedience and disobedience should 
 be specified in connection with the commandments and prohibitions 
 in the Scriptures, because this is the only way to train the soul to 
 practice self-control. A child who does not fear his teacher's punish- 
 ment, or has no confidence in his good will will not be amenable to 
 instruction. The same is true of the majority of those who serve 
 kings. It is fear alone which induces them to obey the will of their 
 masters. So God in commanding us to do what is worthy and pro- 
 hibiting what is unworthy saw fit in his wisdom to specify the accom- 
 panying rewards and punishments that he who observes may find 
 pleasure and joy in his obedience, and the unobservant may be af- 
 fected with sorrow and fear. 
 
 As the world to come has no end, so it is proper that the reward 
 of the righteous as well as the punishment of the wicked should be 
 without end. Arguments have been advanced to show that unlike 
 reward which is properly infinite as is becoming to God's goodness, 
 punishment should have a limit, for God is merciful. On the other 
 hand, it is claimed on the basis of the finiteness of human action that 
 both reward and punishment should be finite. But in reality it can 
 be shown in many ways that reward and punishment should be infinite. 
 
22 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Without naming all the arguments — as many as ten have been ad- 
 vanced — in favor of this view, we may urge some of the more impor- 
 tant. 
 
 It was God's own goodness that prompted him to benefit mankind 
 by giving them laws for their guidance, and not any prior merits on 
 their part which gave them a claim on God's protection. God himself 
 is not in any way benefited by man's obedience or injured by his 
 disobedience. Man knows that it is for his own good that he is thus 
 admonished; and if he were asked what reward he would like to have 
 for his good deeds he would select no less than infinite happiness. 
 Justice demands that punishment be commensurate with reward. 
 The greater the reward and the punishment the more effective are 
 the laws likely to be. Besides in violating God's law a person virtually 
 denies the eternity of him who gave it, and is guilty of contempt; 
 for he hides himself from men, fearing their displeasure, whereas the 
 omnipresence of God has no deterring effect upon him. For such 
 offence infinite punishment is the only fit retribution. 
 
 The question whether the soul alone is rewarded or the body alone 
 or both has been answered variously. In favor of the soul alone as 
 the subject of reward and punishment it has been urged that reward 
 raises man to the grade of angels, who are pure spirits. How then 
 can the body take part? And punishment must be of the same nature 
 as reward. On the other hand, it is claimed that the Bible says noth- 
 ing of man being raised to the status of angels, and we know in this 
 world of physical reward and punishment only. The Garden of Eden 
 of which the Bible speaks is not peopled with angels, and that is where 
 the righteous go after death. 
 
 The true solution is that as man is composed of body and soul, 
 and both share in his conduct, reward and pimishment must attach 
 to both. As we do not understand the nature of spiritual retribution 
 so the composite is equally inconceivable to us. But everyone who 
 believes in the resurrection of the dead has no difficulty in holding 
 that the body has a share in future reward and pimishment. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI (892-942) 
 
 Saadia was the first important Jewish philosopher. Philo of Alex- 
 andria does not come within our purview as he was not mediaeval. 
 Besides his work is not systematic, being in the nature of a commen- 
 tary on Holy Writ, Though Philo was a good and loyal Jew, he stood, 
 so to speak, apart from the real centre of Jewish intellectual and 
 spiritual development. He was on the one hand too closely dependent 
 on Greek thought and on the other had only a Hmited knowledge of 
 Jewish thought and tradition. The Bible he knew only in the Greek 
 translation, not in the original Hebrew; and of the Halaka, which 
 was still in the making in Palestine, he knew still less. 
 
 It was different with Saadia. In the tenth century the Mishna 
 and the Talmud had been long completed and formed theoretically 
 as well as practically the content of the Jew's life and thought. Sura 
 in Babylonia, where Saadia was the head of the academy, was the 
 chief centre of Jewish learning, and Saadia was the heir in the main 
 line of Jewish development as it passed through the hands of lawgiver 
 and prophet, scribe and Pharisee, Tanna and Amora, Saburai and 
 Gaon. As the head of the Sura academy he was the intellectual rep- 
 resentative of the Jewry and Judaism of his day. His time was a 
 period of agitation and strife, not only in Judaism but also in Islam, 
 in whose lands the Jews lived and to whose temporal rulers they owed 
 allegiance in the East as well as in Spain. 
 
 In Islam we saw in the introduction how the various schools of the 
 Kadariya, the Mu tazila and the Ashariya arose in obedience to the 
 demand of clarifying the chief problems of faith, science and life. In 
 Judaism there was in addition to this more general demand the more 
 local and internal conflict of Karaite and Rabbanite which centred 
 about the problem of tradition. Saadia found himself in the midst of 
 aU this and proved equal to the occasion. 
 
 We are not here concerned with the vicissitudes of Saadia's personal 
 
 23 
 
24 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 life or of his literary career as opponent of the Karaite sect. Nor can 
 we afford more than merely to state that Jewish science in the larger 
 sense begins with Saadia. Hebrew grammar and lexicography did 
 not exist before him. The Bible had been translated into several 
 languages before Saadia's day, but he was the first to translate it 
 into Arabic, and the first to write a commentary on it. But the great- 
 est work of Saadia, that which did the most important service to the 
 theory of Judaism, and by which he will be best remembered, is his 
 endeavor to work out a system of doctrine which should be in harmony 
 with the traditions of Judaism on the one hand and with the most au- 
 thoritative scientific and philosophic opinion of the time on the other. 
 Israeli, we have seen, was interested in science before Saadia. As a 
 physician he was probably more at home in purely physical discussions 
 than Saadia. But there is no evidence that he had the larger interest of 
 the Gaon of Sura, namely, to construct a system of Judaism upon the 
 basis of scientific doctrine. Possibly the example of Islam was lacking 
 in Israeli's environment, as he does not seem to be acquainted with the 
 theories and discussions of the Mutakallimun, and draws his informa- 
 tion from Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic sources. Saadia was in the 
 very midst of Arab speculation as is evident from the composition of 
 his chef d'ceuvre, " Emunot ve-Deot," Beliefs and Opinions. ^^ 
 
 The work is arranged on the Mu'taziHte model. The two main 
 divisions in works of this character are Unity and Justice. The first 
 begins with some preliminary considerations on the nature and sources 
 of knowledge. It proceeds then to prove the existence of God by 
 showing that the world cannot have existed from eternity and must 
 have been created in time. Creation implies a creator. This is fol- 
 lowed by arguments showing that God is one and incorporeal. The 
 rest is devoted to a discussion of the divine attributes with the pur- 
 pose of showing that God's unity and simplicity are not affected by 
 them. The section on unity closes with a refutation of opposing 
 views, such as those of the duahsts or Trinitarians or infidels. The 
 section on Justice centres about the doctrine of free will. Hence 
 psychology and ethics are treated in this part of the work. To this 
 may be added problems of a more dogmatic nature, eschatological 
 and otherwise. We shall see in the sequel that Saadia's masterpiece 
 is modeled on the same plan. 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI 25 
 
 But not merely the plan and arrangement of his work give evidence 
 of the influence upon Saadia of Islamic schools, many of his arguments, 
 those for example on the existence of God and the creation of the world, 
 are taken directly from them. Maimonides, who was a strong op- 
 ponent of the Mutakalhmun, gives an outline of their fundamental 
 principles and their arguments for the existence, unity and incorporeal- 
 ity of God.^^ Some of these are identical with those of Saadia. Saadia, 
 however, is not interested in pure metaphysics as such. His purpose 
 is decidedly apologetic in the defence of Judaism and Jewish dogma. 
 Hence we look in vain in his book for definite views on the constitu- 
 tion of existing substances, on the nature of motion, on the meaning 
 of cause, and so on. We get a glimpse of his attitude to some of these 
 questions in an incidental way. 
 
 The Mutakallimun were opposed to the Aristotelian theory of mat- 
 ter and form, and substituted for it the atomic theory. God created 
 atoms without magnitude or quality, and he likewise created quali- 
 ties to inhere in groups of atoms. These qualities they called acci- 
 dents, and one of their important discussions was whether an accident 
 can last more than a moment of time. The opinions were various and 
 the accidents were classified according to their powers of duration. 
 That is, there were some accidents which once created continued to 
 exist of their own accord some length of time, and there were others 
 which had to be re-created anew every moment in order to continue 
 to exist. Saadia does not speak of matter and form as constituting the 
 essence of existing things; he does speak of substance and accident, ^^ 
 which might lead us to believe that he held to the atomic theory, 
 since he speaks of the accidents as coming and going one after the 
 other, which suggests the constant creation spoken of by the Mutakalli- 
 mun. On the other hand, when he answers an objection against mo- 
 tion, which is as old as Zeno, namely, how can we traverse an infi- 
 nitely divisible distance, since it is necessary to pass an infinite number 
 of parts, he tells us that it is not necessary to have recourse to the 
 atomic theory or other theories adopted by some Mu tazilites to meet 
 this objection. We may believe in the continuity and infinite divisibil- 
 ity of matter, but as long as this divisibility is only potentially infinite, 
 actually always finite, our ability to traverse the space offers no difii- 
 culty.^^ Finally, in refuting the second theory of creation, which com- 
 
26 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 bines Platonism with atomism, he argues against an atomic theory 
 primarily because of its implications of eternity of the atoms, but 
 partly also on other grounds, which would also affect the Kalamistic 
 conceptions of the atoms/^ These points are not treated by Saadia 
 expressly but are only mentioned incidentally in the elucidation of 
 other problems dealing with the creation of the world and the exist- 
 ence of God. 
 
 Like Israeli Saadia shows considerable familiarity with Aristotelian 
 notions as found in the Logic, the Physics and the Psychology. It is 
 doubtful, however, whether he really knew Aristotle's more important 
 treatises at first hand and in detail. The " Categories," a small treatise 
 forming the first book of Aristotle's logic, he no doubt knew, but the 
 other Aristotelian concepts he probably derived from secondary 
 sources. For while he passes in review all the ten categories showing 
 that none of them is applicable to God,^^ we scarcely find any mention 
 of such important and fundamental AristoteHan conceptions as matter 
 and form, potentiality and actuality, the four causes, formal, material, 
 efl&cient and final — concepts which as soon as Aristotle began to be 
 studied by Al Farabi and Avicenna became familiar to all who wrote 
 anything at all bearing on philosophy, theology, or Biblical exegesis. 
 Nay, the very concepts which he does employ seem to indicate in the 
 way he uses them that he was not familiar with the context in which 
 they are found in the AristoteHan treatises, or with the relation they 
 bear to other views of Aristotle. Thus no one who knew Aristotle at 
 first hand could make the mistake of regarding his definition of the soul 
 as making the latter an accident. ^^ When Saadia speaks of six kinds 
 of motion ^^ instead of three, he shows clearly that his knowledge of the 
 AristoteHan theory of motion was Hmited to the little of it that is 
 contained in the ' Categories." 
 
 We are thus justified in saying, that Saadia's sources are Jewish 
 literature and tradition, the works of the MutakaUimun, particularly 
 the Mu'taziHtes, and Aristotle, whose book on the ''Categories " he 
 knew at first hand. 
 
 Saadia tells us he was induced to write his book because he found 
 that the beHefs and opinions of men were in an unsatisfactory state. 
 While there are some persons who are fortunate enough to possess the 
 truth and to know that they have it and rejoice thereat, this is not 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI 27 
 
 true of all. For there are others who when they have the truth know 
 it not, and hence let it shp; others are still less fortunate and adopt 
 false and erroneous opinions, which they regard as true; while still 
 others vacillate continually, going from one opinion and belief to 
 another. This gave him pain and he thought it his duty to make use 
 of his limited knowledge to help them. A conscientious study of his 
 book will tend to remove doubt and will substitute belief through 
 knowledge for belief through tradition. Another result of such study, 
 not less important, will be improvement of character and disposition, 
 which will affect for the better a man's life in every respect, in relation 
 to God as well as to his fellow-men.'*^ 
 
 One may ask why it is that one encounters so many doubts and 
 difficulties before arriving at true knowledge. The answer is, a human 
 being is a creature, i. e., a being dependent upon another for its exist- 
 ence, and it is in the nature of a creature as such that it must labor for 
 the truth with the sweat of its brow. For whatever a man does or has 
 to do with is subject to time; each work must be accomplished grad- 
 ually, step by step, part by part, in successive portions of time. And 
 as the task before him is at the beginning complex, he has to analyze 
 and simplify it. This takes time; while certainty and knowledge can- 
 not come until the task is accompHshed. Before that point is reached 
 he is naturally in doubt. "^^ 
 
 The sources of truth are three. First is that to which the senses 
 testify. If our normal sense perceives under normal conditions which 
 are free from illusion, we are certain of that perception. 
 
 The judgment is another source of truth. There are certain truths 
 of which we are certain. This apphes especially to such judgments of 
 value, as that truth is good and falsehood is bad. In addition to these 
 two sources of immediate knowledge, there is a third source based upon 
 these two. This is logical inference. We are led to beUeve what we 
 have not directly perceived or a matter concerning which we have no 
 immediate knowledge of the second kind, because we infer it from 
 something else which we have perceived or of which we have immediate 
 certainty. Thus we believe man has a soul though we have never seen 
 it because we infer its presence from its activity, which we do see. 
 
 These three sources are universal. They are not peculiar to a given 
 race or religious denomination, though there are some persons who 
 
28 MEDLEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 deny the validity of some or all of them. We Jews believe in them and 
 in still another source of truth, namely, authentic tradition, ^'^ 
 
 Some think that a Jew is forbidden to speculate or philosophize 
 about the truths of religion. This is not so. Genuine and sincere 
 reflection and speculation is not prohibited. What is forbidden is to 
 leave the sacred writings aside and rely on any opinions that occur to 
 one concerning the beginnings of time and space. For one may find 
 the truth or one may miss it. In any case until a person finds it, he is 
 without a religious guide; and if he does find what seems to him the 
 truth and bases his belief and conduct upon it, he is never sure that 
 he may not later be assailed by doubts, which will lead him to drop his 
 adopted belief. But if we hold fast to the commandments of the Bible, 
 our own ratiocination on the truths of religion will be of great benefit to 
 us.^s 
 
 Our investigation of the facts of our religion will give us a reasoned 
 and scientific knowledge of those things which the Prophets taught us 
 dogmatically, and will enable us to answer the arguments and crit- 
 icisms of our opponents directed against our faith. Hence it is not 
 merely our privilege but our duty to confirm the truths of rehgion by 
 reason. ^^ 
 
 Here a question presents itself. If the reason can discover by itself 
 the truths communicated to us by divine revelation, why was it neces- 
 sary to have recourse to the latter? Why was it not left to the reason 
 alone to guide us in our beUef and in our conduct? The answer is, as 
 was suggested before, that human reason proceeds gradually and does 
 not reach its aim until the end of the process. In the meantime one is 
 left without a guide. Besides not everybody's reason is adequate to 
 discover truth. Some are altogether incapable of this difificult task, 
 and many more are exposed to harassing doubts and perplexities which 
 hinder their progress. Hence the necessity of revelation, because in 
 the witness of the senses all are equally at home, men and women, 
 young and old.^° 
 
 The most important fact of religion is the existence of God. We 
 know it from the Bible, and we must now prove it by reason. The 
 proof is necessarily indirect because no one of us has seen God, nor 
 have we an immediate certainty of his existence. We must prove it 
 then by the method of inference. We must start with something we 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI 29 
 
 do know with certainty and proceed from it through as many steps of 
 logical inference as may be necessary until we reach the object of our 
 search. ^^ 
 
 The world and the things in it are directly accessible to our senses 
 and our judgment. How long has the world been in existence and 
 how did it come to be? The answers to these questions also we do 
 not know through our senses, and we must prove them by a chain of 
 reasoning. There are several possibilities. The world just as it is 
 may have existed from eternity. If so nobody made it; it just existed, 
 and we have no proof of God. The world in its present form might 
 have proceeded from a primitive matter. This h3^othesis only re- 
 moves the problem further back. For, leaving aside the question how 
 did this prime matter develop into the complex world of our experi- 
 ence, we direct our attention to the prime matter itself, and ask, Has it 
 existed from eternity or did it come to be? If it existed from eternity, 
 then nobody made it, and we have no proof of a God, for by God we 
 mean an intelligent being acting with purpose and design, and the 
 cause of the existence of everything in creation. The third alternative 
 is that whether the world was developed out of a primitive matter or 
 not, it at any rate, or the primitive matter, as the case may be, was 
 made in time, that is, it was created out of nothing. If so there must 
 have been someone wlio created it, as nothing can create itself. Here 
 we have proof of the existence of God, It follows therefore that we 
 must first show that the world is not eternal, that it came to be in 
 time, and this is what Saadia does. 
 
 Here are some of his proofs. The world is finite in magnitude. 
 For the world consists of the earth, which is in the centre, and the 
 heavens surrounding it on all sides. This shows that the earth is 
 finite, for an infinite body cannot be surrounded. But the heavens 
 are finite too, for they make a complete revolution in twenty-four 
 hours. If they were infinite it would take an infinite time to complete 
 a revolution. A finite body cannot have an infinite power. This 
 Saadia regards as self-evident, though Aristotle, from whom this 
 statement is derived, gives the proof. Hence the force or power 
 within the world which keeps it going is finite and must one day be 
 exhausted. But this shows also that it could not have gone on from 
 eternity. Hence the world came to be in time.^^ 
 
30 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Another proof is based on the composite character of all things 
 in heaven and earth. Minerals, plants and animals are made up of 
 parts and elements. The heavens consist of spheres, one within the 
 other. The spheres are studded with stars. But composition implies 
 a time when the composition took place. In other words, the parts 
 must have been there first and somebody put them together. Hence 
 the world as we see it now is not eternal. ^^ 
 
 A special form of composition, which is universal, is that of sub- 
 stance and accident. Plants and animals are born (or sprout), grow 
 and decay. These manifestations are the accidents of the plant or 
 animal's substance. The heavenly bodies have various motions, 
 lights and colors as their accidents. But these accidents are not 
 eternal, since they come and go. Hence the substances bearing the 
 accidents, without which they cannot exist, are also temporal like 
 them. Hence our world is not eternal. ^^ 
 
 Finally, past time itself cannot be eternal. For this would mean 
 that an infinite time has actually elapsed down to our day. But this 
 is a contradiction in terms. What is already accomplished cannot 
 be infinite. Infinity is possible only as a potentiahty, for example, 
 we may speak of a given length as infinitely divisible. This merely 
 means that one may mentally continue dividing it forever, but we 
 can never say that one has actually made an infinite number of divi- 
 sions. Therefore not merely the world, but even time must have 
 begun to be.^^ 
 
 It will be seen that the first three argimients prove only that the 
 world in the form which it has now is not eternal. The possibility 
 is not yet excluded of an eternal matter out of which the world pro- 
 ceeded or was made. The fourth argument proves a great deal. It 
 shows that nothing which is subject to time can be eternal, hence not 
 even prime matter. God can be eternal because he is not subject 
 to time. Time, as we shall see later, cannot exist without motion 
 and moving things, hence before the world there was no time, and 
 the fourth argument does not apply to premundane existence. 
 
 To complete the first three arguments Saadia therefore proceeds 
 to show that the world, which we now know came to be in time, must 
 have been made by someone (since nothing can make itself), and 
 that too out of nothing, and not out of a pre-existing eternal matter. 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMJ 31 
 
 If an eternal matter existed before the world, the explanation of 
 the origin of the world is open to two possibilities. One is that there 
 is nothing outside of this matter and the world which came from it. 
 This is absurd, for it would mean that an unintelligent dead thing is 
 the cause of intelligence and life in the universe. We must therefore 
 have recourse to the other alternative that someone, an intelligent 
 being, made the world out of the primitive, eternal matter. This is also 
 impossible. For if the matter is eternal like the maker of the world, it 
 is independent of him, and would not be obedient to his will to adapt 
 itself to his purpose. He could therefore not make the world out of it. 
 
 The only alternative left now is that the author of the universe is 
 an intelligent being, and that nothing outside of him is eternal. He 
 alone is responsible for the existence of the world, which was at one 
 time nothing. Whether he first created a matter and then from it 
 the universe, or whether he made the world outright, is of secondary- 
 importance.^^ 
 
 There is still a possibility that instead of making the world out of 
 nothing, God made it out of himself, i. e., that it emanated from him 
 as light from the sun. This, as we know, is the opinion of the Neo- 
 Platonists; and Israeli comes very close to it as we saw before (p. 6). 
 Saadia is strongly opposed to any such doctrine. 
 
 It is unlikely, he says, that an eternal substance having neither 
 form, condition, measure, place or time, should change into a body 
 or bodies having those accidents; or that a wise being, not subject 
 to change or influence, or comprehensibility should choose to make 
 himself into a body subject to all of these. What could have induced 
 a just being who does no wrong to decree that some of his parts should 
 be subject to such evils as matter and material beings are afflicted 
 with? It is conceivable only in one of two ways. Either they deserved 
 it for having done wrong, or they did not deserve it, and it was an act 
 of violence that was committed against them. Both suppositions 
 are absurd. The fact of the matter is that the authors of this opinion 
 to avoid the theory of creation ex nihilo went from the frying pan 
 into the fire. To be sure, creation out of nothing is difficult to con- 
 ceive, but this is the reason why we ascribe this power to God alone. 
 To demand that we show how this can be done is to demand that we 
 ourselves become creators. ^'^ 
 
32 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 The question what existed in place of the earth before it was created 
 evinces ignorance of the idea of place. By place is meant simply 
 the contact of two bodies in which the one is the place of the other. 
 When there is no earth and no bodies there is no such thing as place. 
 
 The same thing apphes to time. Time means the persistence of 
 existing things in heaven and earth under changing conditions. Where 
 there is no world, there is no time. This answers the objection raised 
 by some, namely, how is it possible that before all these bodies were 
 made time existed void of objects? Or the other difficulty which is 
 closely related, viz., Why did not God create the world before he 
 did? The answer to both is, there was no before and there was no 
 time, when the world was not. 
 
 The following question is a legitimate one. Why did God create all 
 things? And our answer is, there was no cause which made him create 
 them, and yet they were not made in vain. God wished to exhibit 
 his wisdom; and his goodness prompted him to benefit his creatures 
 by enabling them to worship him.^^ 
 
 We have now proved the existence of God as the cause of the exist- 
 ence of all things. We must now try to arrive at some notion of what 
 God is as far as this is in our power. God cannot be corporeal or body, 
 for in our proof of his existence we began with the world which is 
 body and arrived at the notion of God as the cause of all corporeal 
 existence. If God himself is corporeal our search is not at an end, for 
 we should still want to know the cause of him. Being the cause of all 
 body, he is not body and hence is for our knowledge ultimate, we 
 cannot go beyond him. But if God is not corporeal, he is not sub- 
 ject to motion or rest or anger or favor, for to deny the corporeality 
 of God and still look for these accidents in him is to change the ex- 
 pression and retain the idea. Bodily accidents involve body.^^ 
 
 The incorporeahty of God proves also his unity. For what is not 
 body cannot have the corporeal attributes of quantity or number, 
 hence God cannot be more than one.^ And there are many powerful 
 arguments besides against a duahstic theory. 
 
 A unitary efifect cannot be the result of two independent causes. 
 For if one is responsible for the whole, there is nothing left for the 
 other, and the assumption of his existence is gratuitous. If the effect 
 consists of two parts of which each does one, we have really two effects. 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI 33 
 
 But the universe is one and its parts cannot be separated.^^ Again, 
 if one of them wishes to create a thing and cannot without the help of 
 the other, neither is all-powerful, which is inconsistent with the char- 
 acter of deity. If he can compel the other to help him, they are both 
 under necessity. And if they are free and independent, then if one 
 should desire to keep a body alive and the other to kill it, the body 
 would have to be at the same time alive and dead, which is absurd. 
 Again, if each one can conceal aught from the other, neither is all- 
 knowing. If they cannot, they are not all-powerful.^^ 
 
 Having proved God's existence, unity and incorporeality, he pro- 
 ceeds to discuss his most essential attributes, which are. Life, Omnip- 
 otence, and Omniscience. These easily follow from what was said be- 
 fore. We cannot conceive a creator ex nihilo unless he is all-powerful; 
 power implies life; and the thing made carmot be perfect unless its 
 maker knows what it is going to be before he makes it. 
 
 These three concepts our reason discovers with one act of its think- 
 ing effort, for they are all involved in the concept. Maker. There is no 
 gradual inference from one to the other. The reason we are forced to 
 use three expressions is because of the limitations of language. Hence 
 it must not be thought that they involve plurality in God. They are 
 simply the implications of the one expression, Maker, and as that does 
 not suggest plurality in God's essence, but signifies only that there is a 
 thing made by the maker, so the three derivative terms, Living, 
 Omnipotent, Omniscient, imply no more. 
 
 The Christians erred in this matter in making God a trinity. They 
 say one cannot create unless he is living and wise, hence they regard 
 his life and his wisdom as two other things outside of his essence. 
 But this is a mistake. For in saying there are several attributes in him 
 distinct one from the other, they say in effect that he is corporeal — an 
 error which we have already refuted. Besides they do not understand 
 what constitutes proof: In man we say that his life and his knowledge 
 are not his essence because we see that he sometimes has them and 
 sometimes not. In God this is not the case. Again, why only three? 
 They say essence, life, wisdom; why do they not add power, or hearing 
 and seeing? If they think that power is implied in life, and hearing and 
 seeing in wisdom, so is life implied in wisdom. 
 
 They quote Scripture in their support, for example, the verse in 
 
34 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 II Samuel (23, 2), "The Spirit of the Lord spoke through me, and his 
 Word was upon my tongue." "Word" denotes, they say, his attribute 
 of wisdom, and "Spirit" his life, as distinct persons. But they are 
 mistaken. The expressions in question denote the words which God 
 puts into the mouth of his prophets. There are other similar instances 
 which they cite, and in their ignorance of Hebrew take metaphorical 
 expressions literally. If they are consistent, they should add many 
 more persons in the Godhead, in accordance with the many phrases of 
 the Bible concerning the hand of God, the eye of God, the glory of 
 God, the anger of God, the mercy of God, and so on.^^ 
 
 The above discussion, as also that of Al-Mukammas (p. 19), shows 
 clearly the origin of the doctrine of attributes as well as its motive. 
 Both Al-Mukammas and Saadia and the later Jewish philosophers 
 owed their interest in this problem primarily to the Mohammedan 
 schools in which we know it played an important role (see Introduc- 
 tion, pp. xxiii, xxvi) . But there is no doubt that the problem originated 
 in the Christian schools in the Orient, who made use of it to rationahze 
 the dogma of the Trinity. 
 
 There is extant a confession of faith attributed to Jacob Baradasus 
 (sixth century), the founder of the Syrian Church of the Monophysites 
 or Jacobites, in which the phrase occurs that the Father is the Intel- 
 lect, the Son is the Word and the Holy Ghost is Life. In the works of 
 Elias of Nisibis of the Nestorian Church, who lived shortly after 
 Saadia (975-1049), we also find a passage in which the three expres- 
 sions essence, life and wisdom are applied to the three persons of the 
 Trinity. The passage is worth quoting. It reads as follows: "As the 
 essence of God cannot receive accidents, his life and his wisdom can- 
 not be accidents. But whatever is not accident is either substance or 
 person. Hence as the essence of the Creator and his life and his 
 wisdom are not three substances or three accidents, it is proved that 
 they are three persons." ^* 
 
 Monotheism was a fundamental dogma of the Mohammedan faith. 
 Hence it was necessary for their rationalizing theologians to meet the 
 Trinitarians with their own weapons and show that the multiplicity of 
 the divine attributes which they could not deny, since the Koran was 
 authority for it, does in no way affect God's unity. The problem was 
 quite as important for Judaism as it was for Islam, and for the same 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI 35 
 
 reason. Hence Saadia's insistence that inadequacy of language is 
 alone responsible for our expressing God's essential attributes in the 
 three words, Living, Omnipotent, Omniscient; that in reahty they are 
 no more than interpretations of the expression Maker. 
 
 We have now shown that God is one in the two important senses of 
 the word. He is one in the sense that there is no second God beside 
 him; and he is one in his own essence, i. e., he is simple and not com- 
 posed of parts. His Life and his Power and his Wisdom are not dis- 
 tinct one from the other and from his essence. They are all one. 
 We have also proved God's in corporeality. Nevertheless Saadia is not 
 satisfied until he has shown in detail that God cannot be compared to 
 man in any sense, and that the anthropomorphic expressions in the 
 Bible must not be taken literally. In reference to Biblical interpreta- 
 tion Saadia makes the general remark that whenever a verse of Scrip- 
 ture apparently contradicts the truths of reason, there is no doubt that 
 it is figurative, and a person who successfully interprets it so as to 
 reconcile it with the data of sense or reason will be rewarded for it. 
 For not the Bible alone is the source of Judaism, Reason is another 
 source preceding the Bible, and Tradition is a third source coming 
 after the Bible.^^ 
 
 In order to show that God is not to be compared to any other thing 
 in creation Saadia finds it convenient to use Aristotle's classification 
 of all existing things under the ten categories.^^ Everything that 
 exists is either a substance, or it is an accident, i. e., an attribute or 
 quality of a substance. Substance is therefore the first and most 
 important of the categories and is exemplified by such terms as man, 
 horse, city. Everything that is not substance is accident, but there 
 are nine classes of accident, and with substance they make up the 
 ten categories. The order of the categories as Aristotle gives them in 
 his treatise of the same name is, substance, quantity, quality, relation, 
 place, time, position, possession, action, passion. If these categories in- 
 clude all existing things and we can prove that God is not any of them, 
 our object is accomplished. The one general argument is one with 
 which we are already familiar. It is that God is the cause of all sub- 
 stance and accident, hence he is himself neither the one nor the other. 
 Scriptm-e supports our view, as in Deuteronony 4, 15: "Take ye 
 therefore good heed of yourselves; for ye saw no manner of form on 
 
36 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the midst of 
 the fire: lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven image 
 in the form of any figure, the likeness of male or female, the likeness of 
 any beast that is on the earth, the likeness of any winged fowl that 
 flieth in the heaven; the likeness of anything that creepeth on the 
 ground, the likeness of any fish that is in the water under the earth: 
 and lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest 
 the sun and the moon and the stars, even all the host of heaven, thou 
 be drawn away," etc. And tradition is equally emphatic in this re- 
 gard. Our sages, who were the disciples of the prophets, render the 
 anthropomorphic passages in the Bible so as to avoid an objectionable 
 understanding. This is particularly true of the Aramaic translation 
 of the Targum. 
 
 Such terms as head, eye, ear, mouth, lip, face, hand, heart, bowels, 
 foot, which are used in relation to God in the Bible, are figurative. For 
 it is the custom of language to apply such terms metaphorically 
 to certain ideas like elevation, providence, acceptance, declaration, 
 command, favor, anger, power, wisdom, mercy, dominion. Language 
 would be a very inadequate instrument if it confined itself to the 
 literal meaning of the words it uses; and in the case of God we should 
 be limited to the statement that he is. 
 
 What was said of the nouns above mentioned applies also to other 
 parts of speech, such as verbs attributing human activity to God. 
 Such phrases as incline thine ear," open thine eyes," "he saw," 
 " he heard," "he spoke" are figurative. So the expression, "the Lord 
 smelled," which sounds especially objectionable, denotes acceptance. 
 
 The theophanies in the Bible, where God is represented under a 
 certain form, as in Ezekiel, Isaiah and Kings, do not argue against our 
 view, for there are meant specially created forms for the benefit and 
 honor of the prophet. This is what is meant by the Glory of the 
 Lord," and "Shekinah." Sometimes it is simply a created light 
 without an individual form. When Moses asked to see God, he meant 
 the created light. God cannot be seen with the eye nor can he be 
 grasped in thought or imagination. Hence Moses could not have 
 meant to see God, but the created light. His face was covered so 
 that he should not be dazzled by the exceeding splendor of the begin- 
 ning of the light, which is too much for a mortal to endure; but later 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMl 37 
 
 when the brightest part passed by, the covering was taken off and 
 Moses saw the last part of the light. This is the meaning of the ex- 
 pression in Exodus 33, 23, "And I will take away mine hand, and thou 
 shalt see my back: but my face shall not be seen." 
 
 Having treated of God as the creator of the world and having 
 learned something about his attributes, we must now proceed to the 
 study of man, or which is the same thing, to an investigation of God's 
 relations to the rational part of his creation in the sublunar world. 
 That man is endowed with a soul cannot be doubted, for the activities 
 of man's soul are directly visible. The problem which is difficult is 
 concerning the nature of the soul.^^ Here opinions differ, and some 
 regard the soul as an accident of the body, some think it is a corporeal 
 substance like air or fire, while others believe there is more than one 
 soul in man. It will be our task to vindicate our own view against 
 these erroneous ideas. The soul is too important in its functions 
 to be an accident. It is neither air nor fire because it has not the 
 properties of these bodies. And if the soul consisted of two or more 
 distinct parts, the perceptions of sense would not reach the reason, and 
 there would be no co-operation between these two powers. The true 
 view is therefore that the soul of man is a substance created by God 
 at the time when the human body is completed. The soul has no 
 eternal existence before the body as Plato thought, for nothing is 
 eternal outside of God, as we saw before. Nor does it enter the soul 
 from the outside, but is created with and in the body. Its substance 
 is as pure as that of the celestial spheres, receiving its light like them, 
 but is much finer than the substance of the spheres, for the latter are 
 not rational, whereas the soul is. The soul is not dependent for its 
 knowledge upon the body, which without the latter has neither life 
 nor knowledge, but it uses the body as an instrument for its functions. 
 When connected with the body the soul has three faculties, reason, 
 spirit and desire. But we must not think with Plato that these pow- 
 ers form so many divisions or parts of the soul, residing in different 
 parts of the body. All the three faculties belong to the one soul whose 
 seat is in the heart; for from the heart issue the arteries, which give 
 the body sense and motion. 
 
 The soul was put in the body because from its nature it cannot act 
 by itself; it must have the body as its instrument in order thereby to 
 
38 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 attain to perfect happiness, for the soul's functions either purify or 
 defile it. When the soul leaves the body she can no longer repent; 
 all this must be done while she is in the body. Being placed in the 
 body is therefore a good for the soul. If she were left alone, there 
 would be no use in her existence or in that of the body, and hence 
 the entire creation would be in vain, which was made for the sake of 
 man. To ask why was not the soul made so as to be independent of 
 the body is foolish and tantamount to saying why was not the soul 
 made something else than soul. The soul is not in any way harmed 
 by being with the body, for the injury of sin is due to her own free 
 will and not to the body. Moreover, the body is not unclean, nor are 
 the fluids of the body unclean while in the body; some of them are 
 declared in the Bible to cause uncleanness when they leave the body, 
 but this is one of those ordinances which, as we shall see later, are not 
 demanded by the reason for their own sake, but are specially com- 
 manded for a different purpose. As for the sufferings which the soul 
 undergoes by reason of her connection with the body, some are due 
 to her own negligence, such as cold, heat, and so on, others are inflicted 
 by God for the soul's own good so that she may be later rewarded. 
 
 We see here, and we shall learn more definitely later, that Saadia 
 is opposed to the view of the ascetics — a view Neo-Platonic in its 
 origin — that matter and body as such are evil, and that the constant 
 effort of man must be to free the soul from the taint of the body in 
 which it is imprisoned, and by which it is dragged down from its 
 pristine nobility and purity. Saadia's opposition to the belief in the 
 pre-existence of the soul at once does away with the Neo-Platonic 
 view that the soul was placed in the body as a punishment for wrong- 
 doing. The soul was created at the same time with the body, and the 
 two form a natural unit. Hence complete life involves both body and 
 soul. 
 
 We have seen that God's creation of the world is due to his good- 
 ness. His first act of kindness was that he gave being to the things of 
 the world. He showed himself especially beneficent to man in enabling 
 him to attain perfect happiness by means of the commandments and 
 prohibitions which were imposed upon him. The reward consequent 
 upon obedience was the real purpose of the commandments.^^ 
 
 The laws which God gave us through the prophets consist of two 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI 39 
 
 groups. The first embraces such acts as our reason recognizes to be 
 right or wrong, good or bad, through a feeling of approval or disap- 
 proval which God planted in our minds. Thus reason demands that a 
 benefactor should receive in return for his goodness either a kind re- 
 ward if he needs it, or thanks if he needs no reward. As this is a gen- 
 eral demand of the reason, God could not have neglected it in his 
 own case, and hence the commandments that we should serve him, 
 that we should not offend or revile him and the other laws bearing 
 on the same subject. 
 
 It is likewise a demand of the reason that one should prevent the 
 creatures from sinning against one another in any way. Murder is 
 prohibited because it would lead to the destruction of the race and the 
 consequent frustration of God's purpose in creating the world. Pro- 
 miscuous association of the sexes is prohibited in order that man 
 may be different from the lower animals, and shall know his father 
 and other relatives that he may show them honor and kindness. Uni- 
 versal stealing would lead to indolence, and in the end would destroy 
 itself when there is nothing more to steal. In a similar way we can 
 explain all laws relating to social dealings among mankind. 
 
 The second group of laws has reference to acts which are inherently 
 neither right nor wrong, but are made so by the act of God's command- 
 ment or prohibition. This class may be called Traditional in contrast 
 to the first, which we shall name Rational. 
 
 The traditional laws are imposed upon us primarily so that we may 
 be rewarded for obeying them. At the same time we shall find on 
 careful examination of these laws that they also have a rational sig- 
 nification, and are not purely arbitrary. Thus the purpose of sanc- 
 tifying certain days of the year, like Sabbaths and holy days, is that 
 by resting from labor we may devote ourselves to prayer, to the ac- 
 quisition of wisdom, and to converse with our fellows in the interest 
 of religion. Laws of ceremonial purity have for their pm-pose to teach 
 man humihty, and to make prayer and the visitation of holy places 
 more precious in his eyes after having been debarred from his privileges 
 during the period of his uncleanness. 
 
 It is clear that we should not know how to perform the traditional 
 commandments without divine revelation since our own reason would 
 not have suggested them. But even in the case of the rational laws 
 
40 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the general principles alone are known to us from our own reason but 
 not the details. We know in general that theft, unchastity, and so on, 
 are wrong, but the details of these matters would lead to disagreement 
 among mankind, and hence it was necessary that the rational laws 
 also be directly communicated tD us by divine messengers. 
 
 The divine messengers are the prophets.^^ They knew that their 
 revelations came from God through a sign which appeared at the 
 beginning of the communication and lasted to the end. The sign 
 was a pillar of cloud or of fire, or an extraordinary bright light, as we 
 learn in the case of Moses. 
 
 The genuineness of a prophet's message is tested first of all by the 
 nature of the content, and then by his ability to perform miracles. 
 The Israelites would not have believed Moses, notwithstanding his 
 miracles, if he had commanded them to commit murder or adultery. 
 It is because his teaching was found acceptable to the reason that the 
 miracles accompanying it were regarded as a confirmation of Moses's 
 divine mission. 
 
 The Jewish Law^° contains three elements, all of which are necessary 
 for effective teaching. First, the commandments and prohibitions, or 
 the laws proper; second, the reward and punishment consequent upon 
 obedience and disobedience; and third, examples of historical char- 
 acters in which the laws and their consequences are illustrated. 
 
 But the written law would not accomplish its purpose without belief 
 in tradition. This is fundamental, for without it no individual or 
 society can exist. No one can live by what he perceives with his own 
 senses alone. He must depend upon the information he receives from 
 others. And while this information is liable to error either by reason 
 of the informant being mistaken or his possible purpose to deceive, 
 these two possibilities are ehminated in case the tradition is vouched 
 for not by an individual, but by a whole nation, as in the case of the 
 Jewish revelation. 
 
 As Saadia's emphasis on tradition, apart from its intrinsic impor- 
 tance for Judaism, has its additional motive in refuting Karaism, so the 
 following discussion against the possibility of the Law being abrogated 
 is directed no doubt against the claims of the two sister religions, 
 Christianity and Mohammedanism.^^ 
 
 Abrogation of the law, Saadia says, is impossible. For in the first 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI 41 
 
 place tradition has unanimously held to this view, and in the second 
 place the Law itself assures us of its permanent validity, "Moses com- 
 manded us a law, an inheritance for the assembly of Jacob" (Deut. 
 $T„ 4). The law constitutes the national existence of our people; 
 hence as we are assured by the Prophets that the Jewish nation is 
 eternal, the Law must be likewise. We must not even accept the 
 evidence of miracles in favor of a new law abrogating the old. For 
 as we saw before, it was not primarily Moses's miracles that served to 
 authenticate his teaching, but the character of the teaching itself. 
 Now that the law of Moses stood the test of internal acceptability and 
 external confirmation by the performance of miracles, its declaration of 
 permanent validity cannot be upset by any new evidence even if it be 
 miraculous. 
 
 Man ''^ alone of all created things was given commandments and 
 prohibitions, because he is superior to all other creatures by reason of 
 the rational faculty which he possesses, and the world was created for 
 him. Man's body is small, but his mind is great and comprehensive. 
 His life is short, but it was given him to assist him to the eternal life 
 after death. The diseases and other dangers to which he is subject are 
 intended to keep him humble and God-fearing. The appetites and 
 passions have their uses in the maintenance of the individual and the 
 race. 
 
 If it is true that God gave man commandments and that he re- 
 wards and punishes him according to his conduct, it follows that unless 
 we attribute injustice to God he must have given man the power to do 
 and to refrain in the matters which form the subject of the command- 
 ments. This is actually the case and can be proven in many ways. 
 Everyone is conscious of freedom in his actions, and is not aware 
 of any force preventing him in his voluntary acts. The Bible testifies 
 to this when it says (Deut. 30, 19), "I have set before you life and 
 death . . . therefore choose thou life," or (Malachi i, 9), "From your 
 hand has this thing come." Tradition is equally explicit in the state- 
 ment of the Rabbis (Berakot 33b), "Everything is in the hands of God 
 except the fear of God." To be sure God is omniscient and knows how 
 a given individual will act in a given case, but this does not take away 
 from the freedom of the individual to determine his own conduct. 
 For God's knowledge is not the cause of a man's act, or in general of a 
 
42 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 thing's being. If that were so, all things would be eternal since God 
 knows all things from eternity. God simply knows that man will 
 choose of his own free will to do certain things. Man as a matter of 
 fact never acts contrary to God's knowledge, but this is not because 
 God's knowledge determines his act, but only because God knows the 
 final outcome of a man's free deliberation. 
 
 Since it is now clear from every point of view that God does not 
 interfere with a man's freedom of action, any passages in the Bible 
 which seem to indicate the contrary are not properly understood, and 
 must needs be interpreted in accordance with the evidence we have 
 adduced from various sources including the Bible itself. Thus when 
 God says (Exod. 7, 3) "I will harden the heart of Pharaoh," it does not 
 mean, as many think, that God forced Pharaoh to refuse to let Israel 
 go. The meaning rather is that he gave Pharaoh strength to with- 
 stand the plagues without succumbing to them, as many of the 
 Egyptians did. The same method should be followed with all 
 the other expressions in the Bible which appear to teach determin- 
 ism. 
 
 A man's conduct has an influence upon the soul, making it pure or 
 impure as the case may be.^^ Though man cannot see this effect, 
 since the soul is an intellectual substance, God knows it. He also 
 keeps a record of our deeds, and deals out reward and punishment in 
 the world to come. This time will not come until he has created the 
 number of souls which his wisdom dictates. At the same time there 
 are also rewards and punishments in this world as an earnest of what is 
 to come in the hereafter. 
 
 A man is called righteous or wicked according as his good or bad 
 deeds predominate. And the recompense in the next world is given for 
 this predominating element in his character. A righteous man is 
 punished for his few bad deeds in this world, and rewarded for his 
 many good deeds in the world to come. Similarly the wicked man is 
 paid for his good deeds in this world, while the punishment for his 
 wickedness is reserved. This answers the old problem of the pros- 
 perity of the wicked and the misery of the righteous in this world. 
 
 There are also sufferings of the righteous which are not in the nature 
 of punishment for past conduct, but in view of the future so as to 
 increase their reward in the world to come for the trials they endured 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI 43 
 
 without murmuring. The sufferings of little children come under 
 this head. 
 
 On the other hand, a sinner is sometimes well treated and his life 
 prolonged for one of the following reasons: To give him time to repent, 
 as in the case of Manasseh; that he may beget a righteous son, hke 
 Ahaz, the father of Hezekiah; to use him as God's tool to punish others 
 more wicked than he — witness the role of Assyria as Isaiah describes 
 it in chapter ten of his prophecies; for the sake of the righteous who 
 is closely related to him, as Lot was saved for the sake of Abraham; 
 or in order to make the punishment more severe later, as in the case 
 of Pharaoh. 
 
 That there is another world after this one in which man is rewarded 
 and punished can be proved from reason, from Scripture and from 
 tradition.^'* It is not likely from what we know of God's wisdom and 
 goodness that the measure of happiness intended for the soul is what 
 it gets in this world. For every good here is mixed with evil, the latter 
 even predominating. No one is really content and at peace in this 
 world even if he has reached the top of the ladder of prosperity and 
 honor. There must be a reason for this, which is that the soul has an 
 intuitional longing for the other world which is destined for it. There 
 are many things from which the soul is bidden to abstain, such as 
 theft, adultery, and so on, which it desires, and abstention from which 
 causes it pain. Surely there must be reward awaiting the soul for this 
 suffering. Often the soul suffers hatred, persecution and even death 
 for pursuing justice as she is bidden to do. Surely she will be rewarded. 
 Even when a person is punished with death for a crime committed 
 in this world, the same death is inflicted for one crime as for ten crimes. 
 Hence there must be another world where all inequalities are adjusted. 
 
 It is also evident that the men of the Bible beheved in a hereafter. 
 Else why should Isaac have consented to be sacrificed, or why should 
 God have expected it? The same applies to Hananiah, Mishael, 
 and Azariah, who preferred to be thrown into the fiery furnace rather 
 than fall down in worship before the golden image of Nebuchadnezzar; 
 and to Daniel who was thrown into the den of lions for disobeying 
 the order of the king and praying to God. They would not have 
 done this if they did not believe in another world, where they would 
 be rewarded for their sufferings in this one. 
 
44 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Tradition and the Rabbinical literature are filled with reference to a 
 future world. We need mention only one or two. In the Ethics of 
 the Fathers (ch. 4) we read that this world is like the vestibule to the 
 other world. Another statement in the Talmudic treatise Berakot 
 (p. 1 7a) reads that "in the world to come there is no eating and drink- 
 ing, nor giving in marriage, nor buying and selling, but the righteous 
 sit with their crowns on their heads and enjoy the splendor of the 
 Shekinah." 
 
 With regard to the condition of the soul after death and the nature 
 of reward and punishment in the next world, there is a variety of 
 opinions. Those who hold that the soul is corporeal or that it is an 
 accident of the body believe it is destroyed with the death of the body. 
 We have already refuted their opinion. Others, like the Platonists, 
 the Dualists and the Pantheists, who believe in the pre-existence 
 of the soul either as a separate entity or as a part of God, hold that 
 after the death of the body the soul returns to its original condition. 
 Our belief as stated above (p. 37 ) is opposed to this. But there are 
 some calling themselves Jews who believe in metempsychosis, that 
 the soul migrates from one person to another and even from man to 
 beast, and that in this way it is punished for its sins and purged. They 
 see a confirmation of their view in the fact that some persons exhibit 
 qualities which are characteristic of lower animals. But this is absurd. 
 The soul and the body form a natural unit, the one being adapted 
 to the other. A human body cannot unite with the soul of an animal, 
 nor an animal body with a human soul. They try to account by their 
 theory for the suffering of little children, who could not have sinned in 
 their own person. But we have already explained that the suffering 
 of children is not in the nature of punishment, but with a view to 
 subsequent reward, and they must admit that the first placing of the 
 soul in the body and giving it commandments is not in the nature of 
 compensation for any past merit, but with a view to later reward. 
 Why not then explain the suffering of children in the same way? ^^ 
 
 As the body and the soul form a natural unit during life and a man's 
 conduct is the combined effort of the two constituent parts of his being, 
 it stands to reason that future reward and punishment should be im- 
 posed upon body and soul in combination. Hence the doctrine of the 
 resurrection of the body, which is alluded to in the Bible and made into 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI 45 
 
 a religious dogma by the Rabbis, has support also in the reason.^^ 
 Many objections have been advanced against it, but they can be easily 
 answered. The strongest objection might seem to be that which at- 
 tempts to show that resurrection is a logical contradiction. The argu- 
 ment is that the elements making up a given body during life find 
 their way after the death of the person into the body of another, to 
 which they are assimilated and of which they form a part. Hence it 
 is impossible to resurrect two bodies out of the material common to 
 both. But this argument is untrue to fact. Every human body 
 has its own matter, which never enters into the composition of any 
 other body. When the person dies and the body decomposes, each 
 element returns to its place in nature, where it is kept until the resur- 
 rection. 
 
 But there is another event which will happen to Israel before the 
 time of the resurrection. In accordance with the promises of the 
 Prophets we believe that Israel will be delivered from exile by the 
 Messiah.'^'^ Reason also supports this beUef, for God is righteous, and 
 since he has placed us in exile partly as a punishment for wrongdoing, 
 partly for the purpose of trying us, there must be a limit to both. 
 
 Messiah the son of David will come, will deliver Jerusalem from the 
 enemy and settle there with his people. When all the beheving Israel- 
 ites have been gathered from all the nations to the land of Palestine, 
 then will come the resurrection. The Temple will be rebuilt, the light 
 of the Shekinah will rest upon it, and the spirit of prophecy will be 
 vouchsafed to all Israel, young and old, master and servant. This 
 blessed period will last until the end of time, i. e., until this world will 
 give place to the next, which is the place of reward and punishment. 
 
 We describe the future habitation and status of the soul as Garden 
 of Eden (Paradise) and Gehenna.''^ The former expression is intended 
 to suggest happiness, there being nothing pleasanter in the world than 
 a garden. The term Gehenna is associated in the Bible with Tofteh, 
 which was a place of impurity not far from the Temple. In reahty, 
 however, God will create a substance which will combine light and 
 heat in such a way that the righteous will enjoy the hght only, while 
 the wicked will be tortured by the heat. All this Saadia infers from 
 Biblical passages. 
 
 There will be no eating and drinking in the next world, and hence no 
 
46 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 need of a heaven and an earth Uke ours, but there will be place and 
 time, since creatures cannot do without it. There will be no suc- 
 cession of day and night, for these are of use only for our present life 
 and occupations, but will be unnecessary there. There will, however, 
 be a special period for worship. 
 
 Reward and punishment in the next world will both be eternal. 
 It stands to reason that God should promise eternal reward and punish- 
 ment so as to inspire mankind with the highest possible degree of hope 
 and fear, that they may have no excuse for not heeding the command- 
 ments so forcibly impressed upon them. Having made the promise, 
 his justice prompts him to fulfil it, and those who suffer have them- 
 selves to blame. 
 
 We have now completed in outline Saadia's system of Judaism. 
 There are many details which we necessarily had to leave out, espe- 
 cially in the more dogmatic part of his work, that dealing with specific 
 Jewish doctrines, which he constructs on the basis of Rabbinical 
 literature and BibHcal allusions interpreted so as to harmonize with 
 the statements of the Rabbis. Many questions specifically theological 
 and eschatological assumed importance in his mind by reason of 
 his surroundings. I mean the Mohammedan schools and sects, 
 and the Karaite discussions which were closely modelled after them. 
 The most important part of his system philosophically is that 
 which deals with creation and the attributes of God. His discus- 
 sions of the soul and of free will are less thorough, and the details 
 of his doctrines of resurrection, future reward and punishment, the 
 redemption of Israel and the Messiah are almost purely dogmatic. 
 For a scientific ethic there is no room at all in the body of his work. 
 A man's conduct is prescribed for him in the divine commandments, 
 though in a general way the reason sees the right and the wrong of 
 the so-called rational group of laws. Still as an after thought Saadia 
 added a chapter to the "Emunot ve-Deot" in which he attempts to 
 give a psychological basis for human conduct. Noting the various 
 tendencies of individuals and sects in his environment to extremes in 
 human behavior, some to asceticism, some to self-indulgence, be it 
 the lust of love or of power, he lays emphasis on the inadequacy of 
 any one pursuit for the demands of man's complex nature, and rec- 
 ommends a harmonious blending of all things for which men strive.^^ 
 
SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI 47 
 
 God alone, he says, is a real unity, everything else is by the very 
 reason of its being a creature essentially not one and simple, but 
 composite and complex. So man has a love and desire for many 
 things, and also aversion for many things. And as in other objects 
 in nature it takes a combination of several elements to constitute a 
 given thing, so in man it is by a proper systematization of his likes 
 and dislikes that he can reach perfection of character and morals. 
 It cannot be that God intended man to pursue one object all his life 
 to the exclusion of all others, for in that case he would have implanted 
 only one desire in man instead of many. You cannot build a house 
 of stones alone neither can you develop a perfect character by one 
 pursuit and one interest. 
 
 Pursuit of one thing is Hkely to result in harm, for example, over- 
 indulgence in eating brings on disease. Wisdom is therefore needed 
 in regulating one's conduct. The principle here is control of one's 
 likes and dislikes. Of the three faculties of the soul, reason, spirit 
 and desire, reason must be the master of the other two. If any matter 
 occurs to a person's imagination, he must try it with his reason to see 
 whether it is likely to benefit or injure him, and pursue or avoid it 
 accordingly. If, on the other hand, he allows the lower parts of his 
 soul to rule his reason, he is not a moral man. 
 
 The reader will recognize Plato in the last statement. The division 
 of the soul into the three faculties of reason, spirit and desire is Pla- 
 tonic, as we have already seen, and the attempt to base an ethic on the 
 proper relation between the powers of the soul also goes back to Plato. 
 But Saadia tries to show that the Bible too favors this conception. 
 
 When Ecclesiastes tells us (i, 14), "I have seen aU the works that 
 are done under the sun; and, behold, all is vanity and a striving after 
 wind," he does not mean that there is nothing worth striving after, 
 for he would then be condemning the objects of God's creation. His 
 meaning is that it is vain to pursue any one thing to the exclusion of 
 every other. He then proceeds to name three prominent objects of 
 pursuit, wisdom, pleasure and worldly gain — all is vain when taken 
 by itseK. A proper combination of all is to be recommended as is 
 delicately hinted in the same book (2, 3), "I searched in mine heart 
 how to cheer my flesh with wine, mine heart yet guiding me with 
 wisdom, and how to lay hold on folly." 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 JOSEPH AL-BASIR AND JESHUA BEN JUDAH 
 
 I. Joseph Al-Basir {nth century) ^ 
 
 Joseph ben Abraham, euphemistically surnamed on account of his 
 bUndness, al-Basir (the seer), was a Karaite and lived in Babylonia 
 or Persia in the beginning of the eleventh century. His philosophical 
 work is closely modelled on the writings of the Arabian Mutakallimun, 
 the Mu tazilites. Unlike Saadia, who tacitly accepts some of their 
 methods and views, al-Basir is an avowed follower of the Kalam and 
 treats only of those questions which are common to Jew and Moham- 
 medan, avoiding, for example, so important an issue as whether it is 
 possible that the law of God may be abrogated — a question which 
 meant so much to Saadia. The division of his investigation into the 
 two parts. Unity and Justice, is a serious matter with him; and he 
 finds it necessary to tell us in several instances why he chose to treat a 
 given topic under the one or the other heading. In spirit and tem- 
 perament he is a thoroughgoing rationalist. Brief and succinct to the 
 point of obscurity, he betrays neither partiality nor emotion, but 
 fearlessly pushes the argument to its last conclusion and reduces it to 
 its lowest terms. 
 
 Saadia (above p. 28) puts revelation as a fourth source of truth 
 parallel to sense, judgment and logical inference. To be sure he, in 
 one instance (p. 35), speaks of the reason as preceding the Bible even 
 as tradition follows it, but this is only a passing observation, and is 
 properly corrected by the view expressed elsewhere (p. 28) that while 
 a Jew is not forbidden to speculate, he must not set the Bible aside 
 and adopt opinions as they occur to him. Al-Basir does not leave the 
 matter in this unsettled condition. He definitely gives priority — 
 logical priority, to reason. Knowledge, he says, must precede revela- 
 tion. The prophet as the messenger of God cannot be believed on his 
 word, for the opponent may have the same claim. Not only must the 
 
JOSEPH AL-BASIR AND JESHUA BEN JUDAH 49 
 
 prophet authenticate his mission by the performance of a miracle 
 which cannot be explained by natural means, but we must know 
 besides that he who sent him has our good at heart and would not de- 
 ceive us. A knowledge of the existence, power and wisdom of the 
 creator must therefore precede our belief in the prophet's mission. 
 To take these truths from the words of the prophet and then give 
 him credence because God sent him would be reasoning in a circle. 
 The minimum of knowledge therefore which is indispensable before 
 we can make any appeal to the words of the prophet is rational proof 
 of the existence, power and wisdom of God. Having this minimum 
 the person who is not practiced in speculative investigation may rely 
 for the rest of the creed, for example, the unity of God and his other 
 attributes, upon the words of the Bible. For if we know independently 
 that God is Omnipotent and Omniscient, and the prophet can sub- 
 stantiate his claim to be a divine messenger by the performance of 
 genuine miracles, his reliability is established and we are safe in ac- 
 cepting all that he has to say without proof; but the fundamental 
 thing to do is to establish the prophet's reUabihty, and for this an 
 independent source of evidence is necessary. This is the reason. 
 
 Our problem therefore is to prove the power and wisdom of God, 
 which will imply his existence. We cannot do this directly, for we 
 cannot see God. Hence the only method is to prove the existence of a 
 powerful and wise creator through his creation. We must prove his 
 power in doing things which we cannot do, such as the ability to create 
 our bodies. But for this it is necessary to show that our bodies — 
 and the same will apply to the other bodies of the world, and hence to 
 the world as a whole — were created, i. e., that there was a time when 
 they were not. This leads us to an analysis of the constituents of 
 body. All bodies consist of atoms and their "accidents," or condi- 
 tions and qualities. The primary accidents, which are presupposed 
 by all the rest, are the following four, combination, separation, mo- 
 tion and rest. Without these no body can exist, for body is the result 
 of a combination and separation of atoms at rest or in motion. But 
 combination and separation are the acts of a combiner and sepa- 
 rater, as we can infer from the analogy of our own acts. Our acts have 
 ourselves as their creators, hence the acts visible in the combinations 
 and separations of atoms to form bodies must also have their creator. 
 
50 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 The attributes of the creator we infer from the nature of his work. 
 So we call God "Powerful," meaning that he had the power to create 
 the world. As creation denotes power, so the success and harmony 
 of the product argues wisdom; and this power and wisdom thus 
 established are not disproved by an occasional production or event 
 which is not perfect, a monstrosity for example, or disease and suffer- 
 ing. We say in reference to these that God must have a deeper object 
 in view, to inspire mankind with the fear of God, and in order to in- 
 crease their reward in the next world. 
 
 The attribute of Life follows from the other two, for life denotes the 
 possession or capacity of power and knowledge. 
 
 Thus al-Basir has the same three essential attributes as Saadia. 
 His proof of the existence of God is also identical with one of the proofs 
 of Saadia. But he shows himself a more loyal follower of the Kalam 
 by frankly adopting the atomic theory, whereas Saadia opposes it 
 
 (P- 25). 
 
 Other predicates of God are perception, will, unity, incorporeahty 
 and eternity. 
 
 Perception is one of the most important expressions of Hfe, but it 
 must not be confused with knowledge or wisdom. The latter em- 
 braces the non-existent as well as the existent, the former the exist- 
 ent only. It is in virtue of the former attribute that we speak of 
 God as "hearing" and "seeing." 
 
 "WiUing" is another attribute of God, and those are wrong who 
 identify God's will with his knowledge, and define God's wiUing to 
 mean that his works take place in accordance with his knowledge. 
 God's will must be a special attribute since we see in creation traces of 
 free will. To be the will of God it must not reside in anything different 
 from God, and yet it cannot inhere in God as the subject, for only 
 body is capable of being the subject of accidents. The only solution, 
 therefore, is that God exercises his voluntary activity through a will 
 which he creates, a will not residing in any subject. 
 
 This discussion of the nature of God's will seems a case of hair 
 splitting with a vengeance, and al-Basir is not the author of it. As in 
 his other doctrines so in this also he is a faithful follower of the 
 Mu'tazila, and we shall see more of this method in his discussion of 
 the unity of God despite the plurality of his attributes. 
 
JOSEPH AL-BASIR AND JESHUA BEN JUDAH 51 
 
 But we shall first take up the attributes of incorporeality and eter- 
 nity, which can be dismissed in a few words. 
 
 God is eternal because the only other alternative is that he is 
 created. But if so there is a creator, and if the latter is again created, 
 he must Hkewise have a creator, and so we are led to infinity, which 
 cannot be, the infinite regress being in all cases an impossibility ac- 
 cording to an axiom of the Kalam. We must, therefore, have an eter- 
 nal creator somewhere, and he is God. 
 
 From God's eternity follows his incorporeality, for we have shown 
 before that all body is created, since it presupposes combination and 
 separation, and the latter a combiner and separater. 
 
 When we speak of the unity of God we mean first that there is no 
 second God, and then that his own essence has no composition or 
 plurality in it. Two Gods is an absurdity, for the one might desire 
 what the other does not, and he whose will predominates is the real 
 God. It is no objection to say that in their wisdom they would never 
 disagree, because the possibility is there, and this makes the above 
 argument valid. Again, if there were two Gods they would have to 
 be completely alike in their essential attributes, and as space cannot 
 hold them apart, since they are not bodies, what is there to constitute 
 them two? 
 
 The other problem, of God's simplicity, is more difficult. Does not 
 the multipKcity of attributes make God's essence multiple and 
 composite? The form which this question took was this. Shall we 
 say that God is omnipotent through Power, omniscient through 
 Knowledge, and so on? If so, this Power, Knowledge, etc., are created 
 or eternal. If the Power, say, is created, then God must have had 
 power in order to create it, hence was powerful not through Power. 
 If the Power is eternal, we have more than one God, and Power" as 
 an eternal would also be Wise and Living, etc.; Wisdom would also 
 be powerful, living, etc., and so on with the other attributes, a doc- 
 trine closely bordering on Christianity and reminding one of Au- 
 gustine. The principle of monotheism could not allow such a concep- 
 tion as this. If Power is neither created nor eternal, it follows that 
 God is omnipotent not through Power as an external cause or a dis- 
 tinct entity, but through his own essence. The attributes Power, 
 Wisdom, Life, are not anything distinguishable from each other and 
 
52 MEDIJEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 from God's essence. They are modes or conditions of God's essence, 
 and are known along with it. 
 
 The same considerations which prompted us to conceive God as 
 one and simple, make impossible the belief in the eternity of God's 
 word. This was a point much discussed in the Mohammedan schools, 
 and was evidently directed against Christianity, where the Word or 
 Logos was identified with the second person in the Trinity. Eternity, 
 Al-Basir says, is incompatible with the idea and purpose of speech. 
 God speaks with a word which he creates. This adds no new predi- 
 cate to God, but is impHed in his Power. The attribute omnipotent 
 implies that when he wills he can make himseK understood by us 
 as we do through speech. 
 
 We notice that Al-Basir is more elaborate in his discussion of the 
 attributes than Saadia, and like Al-Mukammas he makes use of the 
 formulae of the Kalam, " omnipotent not with Power, omniscient not 
 with Wisdom." Saadia does not follow the Kalam so closely, but is 
 just as emphatic in his endeavor to show that the three essential 
 attributes are only verbally three; conceptually and really they are 
 one. 
 
 The doctrine of the attributes brmgs to a close the section on unity, 
 and the second division of the investigation is entitled Justice and 
 Fairness. The main problems here are the nature of good and evil 
 and the relation of God to them, the question of free will and other 
 subordinate topics, theological and eschatological. 
 
 With regard to the first question two extreme positions are possible, 
 which were actually held by Mohammedan schools of Al-Basir's day. 
 One is that nothing is good or bad in itself, our reason not recognizing 
 it as such; that the divine command or prohibition makes the thing 
 good or bad. Hence, the representatives of this opinion say, God, 
 who stands above his commands and prohibitions, is not bound by 
 them. Good and bad hold for the subject, not for the author. The 
 acts of God do not come within the classification, and hence it is 
 possible that God may do what we regard as injustice. Some, in 
 their endeavor to be consistent and to carry the argument to its last 
 conclusion, did not even shrink from the redudio ad absurdum that 
 it is possible God may lie; for, said they, if I promise a boy sweet- 
 meats and fail to keep my promise, it is no worse than if I beat him. 
 
JOSEPH AL-BASIR AND JESHUA BEN JUDAH 53 
 
 For this school there is no problem of evil, because ethical dis- 
 tinctions do not apply to God's doings. Whatever God does is good. 
 The other school came under the influence of Greek thought and 
 identified the idea of God with the idea of the Good. They maintained 
 that from the nature of God's essence it was not only his duty to do 
 the good, but that it was impossible for him to do anything else. Do- 
 ing good is a necessity of his nature, and our good and evil are also 
 his good and evil. Ethical values are absolute and not relative. 
 
 Neither of these radical views can be maintained. The first is 
 refuted by its own consequences which only very few of its advocates 
 were bold enough to adopt. The possibility of God telling a falsehood, 
 which is imphed in the purely human validity of good and evil, is 
 subversive of all religion. God would then cease to be trustworthy, 
 and there would be no reason for giving him obedience. Besides, if 
 revelation alone determines right and wrong, it would follow that if 
 God chose to reverse his orders, our moral judgments would be turned 
 the other way around, good would be evil, and evil good. Finally, 
 if good and bad are determined by the will of God only, those who 
 do not believe in revelation would be without an idea of right and 
 wrong, but this is manifestly not true. 
 
 But the other opinion, that God is compelled by the necessity of his 
 nature to do the good, is also erroneous. In the first place it detracts 
 from God's omnipotence to say he cannot do wrong. Besides, if he is 
 compelled by an iimer necessity to do the good, he must always have 
 done this, and the world would have existed from eternity. It is just 
 as wrong to say that it is the duty of God to do what is good and useful 
 for man. For this is due to a confusion of the good or generous with 
 the obhgatory. Any deed to which no blame attaches may be called 
 good. If no praise attaches to it either, it is indifferent. If it is deserv- 
 ing of praise and its omission does not call forth blame, it is a generous 
 act. A duty is an act the omission of which deserves blame. 
 
 Now the truth in the question under discussion is midway between 
 the two extremes. God is able to do good as well as evil, and is under 
 no necessity. The notions of right and wrong are absolute and not 
 merely relative. God never does wrong because evil has no attractive 
 power per se. Wrong is committed always as a means to an end, 
 namely, to gain an advantage or avoid an injury. God is not de- 
 
54 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 pendent upon anything; he needs no advantages and fears no injuries. 
 Hence there is nothing to prompt him to do wrong. The good on the 
 other hand attracts us by its inherent goodness, not for an ulterior end. 
 If the good were done only for the sake of deriving some benefit ex- 
 ternal to the good itself, God, who is self-sufficient, would not do 
 anything either good or evil. God does the good always and not the 
 bad, because in his wisdom he sees the difference between them. It 
 was a deed of generosity in God to have created the world and given 
 life to his creatures, but it was not a duty. 
 
 This conception of the nature of good and evil leaves on our hands 
 the problem of evil. Why does a good God permit disease and suffering 
 to exist in the world? In particular, how explain the suffering and 
 death of innocent children and harmless animals? 
 
 The answer of Al-Basir is that infliction of pain may under certain 
 circumstances be a good instead of an evil. In human relations a 
 person is permitted to inflict pain on another in self-defence, or to 
 prevent the pain from becoming worse, as, for example, when a finger 
 is amputated to save the hand. The infliction of pain is not only per- 
 mitted, it becomes a duty in case of retribution, as in a court of justice; 
 and finally it is permitted to inflict temporary pain if it will result in a 
 greater advantage in the future. The last two cases apply also to God's 
 treatment of his creatures. Disease and suffering are either punish- 
 ment for offences committed, or are imposed with a view to later 
 reward. In the case of children the last explanation alone is applicable. 
 They will be rewarded in the next world. At the same time the 
 parents are admonished to repentance and good conduct. 
 
 The most difficult question of the section on justice is that of free 
 will and foreknowledge. Is man master of his actions? If so, how can 
 we reconcile this with God's omniscience, who knows beforehand how 
 the person will act at a given moment? Is man free to decide at the 
 last moment in a manner contrary to God's knowledge? If so, we 
 defend freedom at the expense of God's omniscience. If man is bound 
 to act as God foreknew he would act, divine knowledge is saved, man's 
 freedom lost. Al-Basir has no doubt man is free. Our own con- 
 sciousness testifies to this. When we cut off our finger bitten by a 
 snake, we know that we ourselves did it for a purpose, and distinguish 
 it from a case of our finger being cut off by order of an official, before 
 
JOSEPH AL-BASIR AND JESHUA BEN JUDAH 55 
 
 whom we have been accused or maligned. One and the same act can 
 have only one author and not two, and we know that we are the 
 authors of our acts. There is a much closer connection between an 
 agent and his act than between a knower and his knowledge, which 
 may be the common property of many, and no one doubts that a man's 
 knowledge is his own. 
 
 The dilemma above mentioned with its two horns, of which one 
 denies God's knowledge, the other man's freedom, is puzzling enough, 
 to be sure. But we are not bound to answer it since it is purely hy- 
 pothetical. We do not know of a real instance in which a man's 
 decision tended to be contrary to God's foreknowledge of its outcome. 
 Just as we should refuse to answer the question whether an actual case 
 of injustice on the part of God would prove his ignorance or depend- 
 ence, because we know through irrefutable proofs that God is wise 
 and without need; so here we say man has freedom though God 
 knows he will act thus and so, and refuse to say whether in case the 
 unbeliever turned believer it would prove God's ignorance or change in 
 his knowledge. 
 
 God's creation was a pure act of grace. But once having done this 
 and communicated to us a knowledge of himself and his will, it is now 
 his duty to guide us in the right path, by sending us his prophets. The 
 commandments and prohibitions must never be contrary to the knowl- 
 edge of reason. We must see in the commandments means of guidance, 
 in the prohibitions a protection against destructive influences. If 
 they had not this rational basis, we do not see why God should have 
 imposed them upon us. 
 
 Having given us reason to know his being, and having announced 
 his truth through the prophets, it is his duty to reward those who 
 knew him and were obedient, eternally in the next world, and to pun- 
 ish eternally the unbeliever. If one has merits and sins, they are bal- 
 anced against each other. If the sinner repents of his evil deeds, it is 
 the duty of God to accept his repentance and remit his punishment. 
 
 2. Jeshua hen Jiidah ^^ 
 
 Jeshua ben Judah or, as he is known by his Arabic name, Abu al- 
 Faraj Furkan ibn Asad, was likewise a Karaite, a pupil of Joseph 
 
56 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Al-Basir, and flourished in Palestine in the second half of the eleventh 
 century. His point of view is essentially the same as that of his 
 teacher, Al-Basir. He is also a follower of the Mu'tazilite Kalam and 
 as strong a rationalist as his master. He agrees with Al-Basir that we 
 cannot get certain knowledge of the creation of the world and the 
 existence of God from the Bible, This information must come origi- 
 nally from rational speculation. It should then be applied to the mir- 
 acles of the prophets so as to prove the authenticity of their mission 
 and the truth of their announcements. 
 
 He adopts the atomic theory, though he is opposed to the view that 
 atoms are created ever anew by God from moment to moment, and 
 that there is no natural and necessary sequence or continuity in the 
 phenomena of the world or qualities of bodies, all being due to habit 
 and custom induced in us by God's uninterrupted creations. As in his 
 philosophical discussions he is a follower of the Kalam, so in his legalis- 
 tic works he is indebted to the Mohammedan schools of religious law. 
 
 LikeAl-Basir, Jeshua ben Judah regards as the corner stone of his 
 religious philosophy the proof that the world was created, i. e., that it 
 is not eternal. His arguments are in essence the same, though differ- 
 ently formulated. In their simplest form they are somewhat as 
 follows. The world and its bodies consist of atoms and their accidents. 
 Taking a given atom for the sake of argument we know that it is 
 immaterial to it, so far as its own essence is concerned, whether it 
 occupy one place or another. As a fact, however, it does occupy a 
 definite place at a given moment. This must be due to a cause. And 
 as the atom in question in the course of time changes its place, this 
 shows that the cause which kept it in the former place has disappeared 
 and given way to a new cause, and so on. In other words, the succes- 
 sive causes which determine the positions and motions of the atoms are 
 not permanent, hence not eternal but created. The necessary inference 
 is that the atoms or the bodies, which cannot exist without these 
 created causes (else they couJd not occupy one place rather than 
 another), must also be created. 
 
 Another form of the argument for creation is this. The eternal 
 has no cause. It exists by virtue of its own essence, and is not depend- 
 ent on anything else. If now the atoms were eternal, they would have 
 to persist in the same condition all the time; for any change would 
 
JOSEPH AL-BASIR AND JESHUA BEN JUDAH 57 
 
 imply a cause upon which the atom is dependent, and this is fatal to 
 its eternity. But the atoms do constantly change their condition and 
 place. Hence they are created. 
 
 If the things of the world are created, someone must have created 
 them. This is clear. But there may be room for the supposition that 
 this creative agency is a '^ cause," i. e., an impersonal entity, which by 
 necessity produces other things from itself. Hence we must hasten 
 to say that this conception of the Creator is impossible because in- 
 compatible with our results so far. A necessarily producing cause 
 cannot be without creating, hence an eternal cause implies an eternal 
 effect — which contradicts our idea of a created world proved above. 
 We say, therefore, that the Creator is not a "cause " but an "agent," 
 i. e., one acting with will and choice. 
 
 God is incorporeal because body consists of atoms, and atoms, we 
 have shown, are created. Besides, if he were corporeal, he could not 
 create bodies any more than we can. He would furthermore be limited 
 to a definite place, and the same arguments cited above to prove that 
 atoms are dependent on a cause would apply to him. Finally we as 
 corporeal beings cannot exert an influence on objects except by com- 
 ing in contact with them. God causes the seed to grow without being 
 in contact with it. Hence he is not body, and the scriptural passages 
 apparently teaching the contrary must be explained otherwise. 
 
 Jeshua ben Judah likewise agrees with Al-Basir in regarding the 
 nature of good and evil as absolute, not relative. Like his master he 
 opposes those who make God's command and prohibition the sole 
 creators of good and evil respectively, as on the other hand he refuses 
 to agree with the view that God is bound by necessity to do the good. 
 Our reason distinguishes between good and evil as our senses between 
 white and black. 
 
 Among other arguments in favor of the absolute character of right 
 and wrong, which we have already found in Al-Basir, appears the 
 following. If good and evil mean simply that which God commands 
 and prohibits respectively, and the distinction holds only for us but 
 not for God, it follows that God may do what we think is evil. If 
 this be so, we have no ground for believing in the good faith of the 
 prophet — God might have sent him to deceive us — and the alleged 
 basis of right and wrong is removed. 
 
58 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 We conclude therefore that good and evil are absolute and are bind- 
 ing upon God as well. God can do evil as well as good, but being 
 omnipotent he can accomplish his purpose just as easily by doing 
 good as by doing evil, and hence surely prefers to do good. Besides, 
 all evil doing is the result of some need, but God has no needs, being 
 self-sufficient, hence he does not do evil. 
 
 It follows from the above that God had a purpose in creating the 
 world. For an act without a purpose is vain and hence bad. This 
 purpose cannot have been egoistic, since God is without need, being 
 above pleasure and pain. The purpose must therefore have been the 
 well-being of his creatures. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 
 
 With Gabirol the scene of Jewish intellectual activity changes from 
 the east to the west. Prior to the middle of the tenth century the 
 centre of Jewish learning was in Babylonia. The succession of Geonim 
 in the Talmudical schools of Sura and Pumbadita, and particularly the 
 great fame of Saadia, made all the other Jewish communities of the 
 world look to Babylonia as the spiritual centre. They considered it a 
 privilege to contribute to the support of the great eastern academies 
 and appealed to their spiritual heads in cases of doubt in religious 
 matters. Some of this glory was reflected also upon the neighboring 
 countries under Mohammedan domination, Palestine, Egypt, and 
 Kairuan or northern Africa to the west of Egypt. Thus all the men, 
 Rabbanites as well as Karaites, whom we treated so far Hved and 
 flourished in the east in one of the four countries mentioned. Christian 
 Europe was intellectually on a low level, and as far as scientific studies 
 were concerned, the Jews under Christian rule were no better than 
 their temporal rulers. 
 
 But a new era dawned for Jewish literature with the accession to 
 power of the Umayyad caliph Abd al Rahman III, as head of Moham- 
 medan Spain or Andalusia. He was a liberal man and a patron of 
 learning. Hasdai ibn Shaprut, a cultured and high-minded Jew, was 
 his trusted adviser, and like his royal patron he protected and en- 
 couraged Jewish learning, Talmudical as well as scientific. When 
 Moses ben Enoch, a learned emissary from the Babylonian Academy, 
 was ransomed by the Jewish community of Cordova and made the 
 head of a Talmudical school in that city, the beginning of the end of 
 Babylonian Jewish supremacy was at hand. Moses ben Enoch the 
 Talmudist, Menahem ben Saruk, the grammarian and lexicographer, 
 and Dunash ben Labrat, the poet — all three under the distinguished 
 patronage of Hasdai ibn Shaprut — inaugurated the long line of Spanish 
 Jewish worthies, which continued almost five centuries, constituting 
 
 59 
 
6o MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the golden era of Jewish hterature and making of Spain the intellectual 
 centre of all Jewry. 
 
 Solomon ibn Gabirol was not merely the first Jewish philosopher in 
 Spain, he was the first Spanish philosopher, that is, he was the first 
 philosophical writer in Andalusia. Ibn Badja, the first Mohammedan 
 philosopher in Spain, was born at least a half century after Gabirol. 
 The birth of Gabirol is generally placed in 102 1 and his death in 1058, 
 though some have put it as late as 1070. 
 
 The fate of Gabirol in the history of Jewish Hterature was a peculiar 
 one. Highly celebrated as a synagogal poet in the Sephardic as well 
 as Ashkenazic community, his fame as a great philosopher was early 
 overshadowed by his successors, and his chief work, the "Fountain of 
 Life," was in the course of time quite forgotten. The Arabic original 
 was lost and there was no Hebrew translation. The Tibbonides, 
 Judah, Samuel and Moses, who translated everything worth while in 
 Jewish philology, science and philosophy from Arabic into Hebrew, 
 either did not know of Gabirol's masterpiece or did not think it im- 
 portant enough to translate. To judge from the extant fragments of 
 the correspondence between Samuel ibn Tibbon and Maimonides, it 
 would seem that both were true; that is that Samuel ibn Tibbon had 
 no access to Gabirol's "Fons Vitae," and that if he had had such 
 access, Maimonides would have dissuaded him from translating it. 
 Maimonides actually tells his translator ^^ that the only books worth 
 studying are those of Aristotle and his true commentators, Alexander 
 of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Averroes. Alfarabi and Avicenna are also 
 important, but other writings, such as those of Empedocles, Pythago- 
 ras, Hermes, Porphyry, represent a pre-Aristotelian philosophy which 
 is obsolete, and are a waste of time. The books of Isaac Israeli on the 
 "Elements" and on "Definitions," are no better, seeing that Israeli 
 was only a physician and no philosopher. He is not familiar with the 
 "Microcosmus" of Joseph ibn Zaddik, but infers from a knowledge of 
 the man that his work is based upon the writings of the "Brothers of 
 Purity"; and hence, we may add, not strictly Aristotelian, and not 
 particularly important. Not a word is here said about Gabirol, 
 apparently because Samuel ibn Tibbon had not inquired about him. 
 But from Maimonides's judgment concerning the works of "Em- 
 pedocles," we may legitimately infer that he would have been no more 
 
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 6l 
 
 favorable to Gabirol; for, as we shall see, Gabirol's system is also 
 based upon a point of view similar to that of the so-called "Empedo- 
 cles." What the Tibbonides left undone was, however, partially 
 accomplished about a half century later by the commentator and critic 
 Shem Tob Falaquera (1225-1290). Apparently in agreement with 
 Abraham ibn Daud that Gabirol's profuseness in his philosophic 
 masterpiece made it possible to reduce it to a tenth part of its size, 
 Falaquera did not find it necessary to translate the whole of the 
 "Mekor Hayim" into Hebrew, giving us instead a translation of 
 selected parts, which in his estimation contained the gist of Gabirol's 
 teaching. The absence of a complete Hebrew translation of Gabirol's 
 philosophical work meant of course that no one who did not know 
 Arabic could have access to Gabirol's "Mekor Hayim," and this 
 practically excluded the majority of learned Jews after the first half 
 of the thirteenth century. But the selections of Falaquera did not 
 seem to find many readers either, as may be inferred from the fact that 
 so far only one single manuscript of this translation is known. 
 
 En revanche, as the French would say, the Christian Scholastics 
 of the thirteenth century made Gabirol their own and studied him 
 diligently. His fundamental thesis of a universal matter underlying 
 all existence outside of God was made a bone of contention between 
 the two dominant schools; the Dominicans, led by Thomas Aquinas, 
 opposing this un-Aristotelian principle, the Franciscans with Duns 
 Scotus at their head, adopting it as their own. Ego autem redeo ad 
 sententiam Avicembronis," is a formula in Duns Scotus's discussion 
 of the principle of matter.^^ 
 
 The translation of Gabirol's philosophy into an accessible language, 
 which was not considered desirable by Jews, was actually accomplished 
 by Christians. About a century before Falaquera a complete transla- 
 tion into Latin was made in Toledo of Gabirol's "Fountain of Life," 
 under the title "Fons Vitas." This translation was made at the in- 
 stance of Raymond, Archbishop of Toledo in the middle of the twelfth 
 centmy, by Dominicus Gundissalinus, archdeacon of Segovia, with the 
 assistance of a converted Jewish physician, Ibn Daud (Avendehut, 
 Avendeath), whose name after conversion became Johannes Hispanus 
 or Hispalensis. Unlike the Hebrew epitome of Falaquera this trans- 
 lation was not neglected, as is clear from the role Gabirol's philosophy 
 
62 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 plays in the disputations of the schools, and from the fact that there 
 are still extant four manuscripts of the complete translation, one of 
 an epitome thereof, and there is evidence that a fifth manuscript 
 existed in 1375 in the Papal library .^^ As Ibn Sina was corrupted by 
 the Latin writers into Avicenna, and Ibn Roshd into Averroes, so 
 Ibn Gabirol became in turn, Avencebrol, Avicembron, Avicebron; 
 and the Scholastics who fought about his philosophy had no idea he 
 was a Jew and celebrated as a writer of religious hymns used in the 
 synagogue. He was regarded now as a Mohammedan, now as a 
 Christian. 
 
 This peculiar circumstance will help us to get an inkling of the rea- 
 son for the neglect of Gabirol's philosophy in the Jewish community. 
 It is clear that a work which, like the "Fons Vitae," made it possible 
 for its author to be regarded as a Mohammedan or even a Christian, 
 cannot have had the Jewish imprint very deeply stamped upon its 
 face. Nay more, while the knowledge of its having been translated 
 from the Arabic may have been sufficient in itself to stamp the author 
 as a Mohammedan, there must have been additional indications for 
 his Scholastic admirers to make them regard him as a Christian. An 
 examination of the work lends some semblance of truth to these con- 
 siderations. 
 
 Gabirol nowhere betrays his Jewishness in the ' Fons Vitae." He 
 never quotes a BibHcal verse or a Talmudic dictmn. He does not 
 make any overt attempt to reconcile his philosophical views with 
 religious faith. The treatise is purely speculative as if religious dogma 
 nowhere existed to block one's way or direct one's search. Abraham 
 Ibn Daud, the author of the philosophical treatise "Emunah Ramah" 
 (The Exalted Faith), and the predecessor of Maimonides, criticises 
 Gabirol very severely, and that not merely because he disagrees with 
 him in the conception of matter and finds Gabirol's reasoning devoid 
 of cogency and logical force — many bad arguments, he says, seem in 
 the mind of Gabirol to be equivalent to one good one — ^but principally 
 because Gabirol failed to take a Jewish attitude in his philosophizing, 
 and actually, as Ibn Daud tells us, maintains views dangerous to 
 Judaism (below, p. 198). 
 
 This will easily account for the fact that Gabirol, celebrated as he 
 was as a poet, was lost sight of generally as a philosopher. The matter 
 
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 63 
 
 is made clearer still if we add that his style in the Mekor Hayim" 
 is against him. It is devoid of all merit whether of literary beauty or of 
 logical conciseness and brevity. It is diffuse to a degree and frequently 
 very wearisome and tedious. One has to wade through pages upon 
 pages of bare syllogisms, one more flimsy than another. 
 
 Finally, the point of view of Gabirol was that of a philosophy that 
 was rapidly becoming obsolete, and Maunonides, the ground having 
 been made ready by Ibn Daud, gave this philosophy its death-blow 
 by substituting for it the philosophy of Aristotle. 
 
 We now understand why it is that, with few exceptions here and 
 there, Gabirol's philosophical work was in the course of time forgotten 
 among the Jews, though his name Avicebron as well as some of his 
 chief doctrines were well known to the Scholastic writers. To be sure, 
 even students of Scholastic literature had no direct access to Gabirol's 
 treatise as it was never printed and no one knew whether there were 
 still any manuscripts of it extant or not. The only sources of informa- 
 tion concerning Avicebron's philosophy were Aquinas's refutations, 
 and Duns Scotus's defence, and other second-hand references in the 
 writings of the Scholastics. Who Avicebron was no one knew. It was 
 not until 1819 that Amable Jourdain,^^ in tracing the history of the 
 Latin translations of Aristotle, came to the conclusion that more must 
 be known about the philosophy of Avicebron's "Fons Vitae" if we 
 intended to understand the Scholastics. In 1845 Solomon Munk dis- 
 covered in the national library at Paris the epitome of Falaquera 
 mentioned above, and comparing it with the views of Avicebron as 
 found in the discussions of the Scholastics, made the important dis- 
 covery that the mysterious Avicebron was neither a Mohammedan 
 nor a Christian but a Jew, and none other than the famous poet 
 Solomon ibn Gabirol. Then began a search for copies of a Latin trans- 
 lation, which was rewarded amply. Both Munk and Seyerlen dis- 
 covered manuscript copies of the ' Fons Vitss," and now both the 
 Hebrew epitome of Falaquera and the Latin translation of Gundissali- 
 nus are accessible in print.^^ So much for the interesting history of 
 Gabirol. Now a word as to his views. 
 
 Shem Tob ibn Falaquera, in the brief introduction which he ap- 
 pends to his epitome of the "Mekor Hayim" says, "It seems to me 
 that Solomon ibn Gabirol follows in his book the views of the ancient 
 
64 • MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 philosophers as we find them in a book composed by Empedocles con- 
 cerning the 'Five Substances.' ^^ This book is based upon the prin- 
 ciple that all spiritual substances have a spiritual matter; that the form 
 comes from above and the matter receives it from below, i. e., that the 
 matter is a substratum and bears the form upon it." He then adds 
 that Aristotle attributes a similar view to his predecessors, but that 
 this view is inconsistent with Aristotle's own thinking. For in his 
 opinion what is material is composite and possessed of potentiality. 
 Hence only those things have matter which are subject to generation 
 and decay, and in general change from one state to another. 
 
 Without going into detail as to the nature of this work of Empedo- 
 cles named by Falaquera as the source of Gabirol's views — expositions 
 of these so-called Empedoclean views and fragments from Empedocles's 
 book have been found in Arabian and Hebrew writers ^^ — it is sufficient 
 for us to know that it has nothing to do with the real Empedocles, 
 the ancient Greek philosopher; that it was another of the many spur- 
 ious writings which circulated in the middle ages under famous names 
 of antiquity; and that like the "Theology of Aristotle," and the 
 "Liber de Causis," mentioned in the Introduction (p. xx), it was Neo- 
 Platonic in character. 
 
 Thus Gabirol was a Neo-Platonist. This does not mean that he did 
 not adopt many important Aristotelian conceptions. Neo-Platonism 
 itself could not have arisen without Aristotle. The ideas of matter 
 and form, and potentiality and actuality, and the categories, and so 
 on, had become the fixed elements of philosophical thinking, and no 
 new system could do without them. In this sense Plotinus himself, 
 the founder of Neo-Platonism, is an Aristotelian. When we speak of 
 Gabirol as a Neo-Platonist, we mean that the essence of his system is 
 Neo-Platonic. He is not a dualist, but a monist. God and matter are 
 not opposed as two ultimate principles, as they are in Aristotle. 
 Matter in Gabirol is ultimately identified with God. In this he goes 
 , even beyond Plotinus. For whereas in Plotinus matter occupies the 
 lowest scale in the gradation of being as it flows from the One or the 
 Good (cf. Introduction, p. xxxviii), and becomes equivalent to the non- 
 existent, and is the cause of evil, in Gabirol matter is the underlying 
 substance for all being from the highest to the lowest, with the one 
 exception of the Creator himself.^^ It emanates from the essence of the 
 
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 65 
 
 Creator, forming the basis of all subsequent emanations.^" Hence the '■ 
 spiritual substances of the celestial world, or, to use a more technical 
 and more precise term — since spirit is not located in heaven or any- 
 where spatially — the intelligible world, have matter underlying their 
 form.^^ In fact, matter itself is intelligible or spiritual, not corporeal.^^ ' 
 Corporeahty and materiality are two different things. There are 
 various gradations of matter, to be sure; for the prime matter as it 
 emerges from the essence of the Creator pervades all existence from 
 highest to lowest, and the further it extends from its origin the less 
 spiritual and the more corporeal it becomes until in the sublunar 
 world we have in the matters of its particular objects, corporeal mat- 
 ter, i. e., matter affected with quantity and magnitude and figure and 
 color.^^ Like Plotinus, Gabirol conceives of the universe as a process 
 of a gradually descending series of existences or worlds, as the Kab- 
 balistic writers term them; these cosmic existences radiating or flowing 
 out of the superabundant light and goodness of the Creator. The ' 
 two extremes of this graded universe are God at the one end, and the 
 corporeal world at the other. Intermediate between these are the 
 spiritual substances, Intelligence, Soul and Nature.^^ Man as a ' 
 microcosm, a universe in little, partakes of both the corporeal and 
 intermediate worlds, and hence may serve as a model of the con- 
 stitution of the macrocosm, or great universe. His body is typical 
 of the corporeal world, which consists of the lowest matter, viz., that 
 which has no other form except that of corporeality, or extension, and 
 the forms of figure, color, and so on, borne on top of the extension.^' 
 Body as such is at rest and is not capable of action. To act it needs 
 an agent. Hence it needs an agency to compose its parts and hold 
 them together. We call this agency Nature. Man's body also grows, 
 is nourished and propagates its kind as do plants. This likewise must 
 have its non-corporeal cause. This we call vegetative soul. Man has 
 also sense perception and local motion like the animals. The principle 
 or substance causing this is the animal soul. Man also thinks and 
 reasons and reflects. This is brought about by the rational soul. 
 Finally, man has a still higher function than discursive thought. The 
 latter has to search and to pass from premise to conclusion, whereas 
 the apprehension of the intelligence takes place "without seeking, 
 without effort, and without any other cause except its own essence, 
 
66 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 because it is full of perfection." In other words, it is immediate in- 
 tellectual intuition of which Gabirol speaks here. The Intelligence is 
 capable of this because it has in itself, constituting its essence, all the 
 forms of existence, and knowledge means possession of the forms of 
 the things known. 
 
 As man is typical of the universe, it follows that there are cosmic 
 existences corresponding to the principles or powers just enumerated 
 in man, and the relation of the latter to the former is that of the 
 particular to the general. Hence there is a cosmic Intelligence, a 
 cosmic soul embracing the rational, the animal and the vegetative 
 parts, and a cosmic nature. Of these the more perfect is the cause of 
 the less perfect; hence the order in which we named them represents 
 the order of causation or of emanation from the prime source. 
 The lowest of these emanations is the matter which sustains exten- 
 
 ' sion or magnitude, and with it the process ceases. This matter is no 
 longer the source of an additional form of existence. The various 
 qualities and attributes which inhere in this corporeal matter are 
 
 - caused by the spiritual substances above. For like the prototype of 
 all generosity and goodness the First Essence or God, every one of 
 the spiritual substances proceeding from him has the same tendency 
 of imparting its form or forms to the substance next below it. But 
 
 . the forms thus bestowed are no longer the same as they are in the 
 essence of the bestowing substance, as it depends upon the recipient 
 what sort of form it will receive. An inferior receiving substance will 
 receive a superior form in an inferior way. That is, the form which 
 in the substance above the one in question is contained in a spiritual 
 and unitary manner, will be transformed in the substance below it 
 into something less spiritual, less unified, and more nearly corporeal, 
 i. e., visible and tangible. Hence the visible and tangible, and in 
 general the sensible qualities of particular things in the sublunar 
 world, are in reality descended from a line of spiritual ancestors in 
 the forms of the simple substances. Intelligence, Soul and Nature. 
 But it is their distance from the prime source, which increases with 
 every transmission of influence, together with the cruder nature of the 
 receiving substance, that makes the resulting forms corporeal and 
 sensible. The matter may be made clear if we use the analogy of 
 light, which is invisible as long as it is in air because it penetrates it, 
 
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 67 
 
 but becomes visible when it comes in contact with a gross body which 
 it cannot penetrate. It then remains on the surface condensed, and 
 becomes visible to the senses. 
 
 We thus see that the higher substance acts upon the lower and con- 
 tains all that is found in the latter, though in a more perfect and simple 
 manner. The lower substances flow from the higher and yet the 
 latter are not diminished in their essence and power.^^ 
 
 That ordinary material objects are composed of matter and form 
 is admitted and we need not now prove it, as we have already discussed 
 the subject in the Introduction, where wx gave an outline of the Aris- 
 totelian philosophy. The principle peculiar to Gabirol is that not 
 merely the material objects of the sublimar world, but that the intelli- 
 gible or spiritual substances also are composed of matter and form.®^ 
 Whenever two things have something in common anc^omething in 
 which they differ, that which they have in common is the matter, 
 that in which they differ is the form. Two things absolutely simple 
 must be prime to each other, i. e., they must have nothing in common, 
 for if they have anything in common they have everything in common, 
 and they are no longer two things but one. Hence a spiritual substance 
 must be composite, for it must have something by which it differs 
 from a corporeal substance, and something, viz., substantiality, which 
 it has in common with it. In the same way the intelligible substances, 
 Intelligence and Soul, have their substantiality in common, and they 
 differ in form. Hence they are composed of matter and form, and the 
 matter must be the same in all the intelligible substances; for their 
 differences are due to their forms, hence if their matters also differed, 
 they would have to differ in form, but matter as such has no form. 
 Hence matter in itself is everywhere the same. 
 
 As the Intelligence is the highest existence next to God, and is 
 composed of matter and form, these are respectively the universal 
 matter and universal form, embracing all subsequent matters and 
 forms.^^ Hence the Intelligence in knowing itself knows everything, 
 as everything is contained in it. And as it is prior to everything and 
 the cause of everything it has an immediate knowledge of all things 
 without effort or searching. 
 
 But what is the origin of universal matter and universal form which, 
 in constituting Intelligence, are the fundamental principles of all 
 
68 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 existence? ^^ The answer is they come from the First Essence, God. 
 Unity comes before duaHty or plurality, and there is no true unity 
 except in God. Whatever issues from him is ipso facto, as a product 
 which is not God, afifected with duality. Matter and Form is this 
 duality. Their union is necessary and real, and it is only in thought 
 that we can keep them apart. In reality they form a unit, their union 
 varying in perfection according as they are nearer or further away 
 from their origin. Hence the union is closest in Intelligence, the first 
 divine emanation, and least close in corporeal objects of the sublunar 
 world, where plurality is the order of the day. 
 
 This process by which universal matter and form issue from God 
 may be called creation.^"'' But we must conceive of it on the analogy 
 of water flowing from a fountain in continued and uninterrupted suc- 
 cession. The only difference is that the emanation from God takes 
 place without motion and without time. 
 
 The union of universal form and universal matter must be thought 
 of as a stamping of the form upon the matter. Matter has in itself 
 no actual or definable existence. It serves merely as a tabula rasa, 
 as a potential background, as an empty receptacle, as a reflecting 
 mirror for form to be written, filled out, impressed or reflected therein 
 or upon. Hence we may view God as the spectator, universal matter 
 as the mirror, and universal form as the reflection of the spectator in 
 the glass. God himself does not enter the glass, only his reflection is 
 outlined therein. And as matter and form are really the whole world, 
 it would follow that the universe is a reflection of God, though God 
 remains in himself and does not enter the world with his essence. 
 
 We may also picture to ourselves this impression of form upon matter 
 on the analogy of speech. The speaker's words impress ideas upon 
 the soul of the listener. So God speaks and his Word or Will impresses 
 form upon matter. The world is created by the Word or the Will ^"^ 
 of God. 
 
 In all these similes matter appears as something external to God, 
 upon which he impresses form. But this is not strictly true, since 
 matter has no real existence without form, and has never so existed. 
 The existence of matter and form is simultaneous, and both come from 
 God, matter from his essence, form from his attribute, or his Wisdom, 
 or his Word, or his Will. And yet in God, who is a perfect unity, es- 
 
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 69 
 
 sence and attribute are one. It is the Will of God, not God himself, 
 that must be regarded as the spectator, whose outline is reflected 
 in the mirror of matter in the above simile. It is the Will of God that 
 writes form upon the chart of matter, and thereby produces a world. 
 It is in virtue of the Will that God is said to be in everything. 
 
 But what is this will of God as distinguished from God himself, 
 since in God there can be no duality of any kind? Gabirol's answer 
 is not clear or satisfactory. The will, he says, is identical with God 
 if we consider it apart from its activity; considered as active it is 
 difi"erent from the divine essence. Exactly to describe it is impossible, 
 but the following is an approximation. It is a divine power producing 
 matter and form, binding them together, pervading them throughout 
 their extent above and below, as the soul pervades the body, and mov- 
 ing and ordering everything. 
 
 God himself, or the First Essence, can be known only through the 
 Will as pervading everything, i. e., through his effects in the world. 
 And in this way too only his existence can be known but not his es- 
 sence as he is in himself, because God is above everything and infinite. 
 The soul may know Intelligence because though the latter is above the 
 soul there is some similarity between them. But the First Essence 
 has no similarity to Intelligence, therefore no intelHgence can know it. 
 
 There is a kind of mystic knowledge by which man may come in 
 touch with the spiritual substances and rise even to universal matter, 
 which is above Intelligence. "If you wish to form a picture of these 
 substances," the master says to the disciple in the "Fons Vitse," 
 *'you must raise your intellect to the last intelligible, you must purify 
 it from all sordid sensibility, free it from the captivity of nature and 
 approach with the force of your intelligence to the last limit of intel- 
 ligible substance that it is possible for you to comprehend, until you 
 are entirely divorced from sensible substance and lose all knowledge 
 thereof. Then you will embrace, so to speak, the whole corporeal 
 world in your being, and will place it in one corner of your soul. When 
 you have done this you will understand the insignificance of the 
 sensible in comparison with the greatness of the intelligible. Then 
 the spiritual substances will be before your eyes, comprehending 
 you and superior to you, and you will see your own being as though 
 you were those substances. Sometimes it will seem to you that you 
 
70 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 are a part of them by reason of your connection with corporeal sub- 
 stance; and sometimes you will think you are all of them, and that 
 there is no difference between you and them, on account of the union 
 of your being with their being, and the attachment of your form to 
 their forms." The pupil assures the teacher that he has followed this 
 advice and seen the whole corporeal world floating in the spiritual sub- 
 stances as a small boat in the sea, or a bird in the air. "When you 
 have raised yourself to the first universal matter," replies the 
 teacher, "and illumined its shadow, you will see there the wonder of 
 wonders. Pursue this therefore diligently and with love, because this 
 is the purpose of the existence of the human soul, and in this is great 
 delight and extreme happiness." ^°^ 
 
 But Gabirol does not promise a knowledge of the Most High even 
 through this royal road of ecstasy, unless we suppose that in the prom- 
 ise of seeing in universal matter the wonder of all wonders there may 
 be a covert allusion to a glimpse of the deepest secret of all, the essence 
 of God. 
 
 All knowledge is according to Gabirol embraced in the following 
 three topics, (i) Matter and Form, (2) the Active Word or Will, (3) the 
 First Essence or God. By far the larger part of the "Fons Vitae" is 
 devoted to the first subject. Only brief hints are given of the second 
 and third, and Gabirol refers us to a special work of his on the Will, 
 which he says he wrote. There is no trace of any such treatise. At 
 any rate it is clear from the little that is contained on the Divine Will 
 in the "Fons Vitse" that the Will forms an important element in 
 Gabirol 's philosophy. This is the more remarkable because it is not 
 an essential element in Neo-Platonism, upon which Gabirol's system 
 is based. Nay, the doctrine of a divine will scarcely has any place 
 in the form of emanation taught by Plotinus. The cosmic process is 
 conceived there as necessary and impersonal. And but for the in- 
 troduction of the Will in the " Fons Vitae" we should be forced to 
 understand Gabirol in the same way. The diflSculty in Neo-Platonism 
 is that God is at the same time transcendent and, through his powers 
 or emanations, immanent in the world. God is above all being and 
 at the same time is the cause of and pervades all existence. Gabirol 
 must have felt not merely this purely philosophical difficulty, but as 
 a Jew, Pantheism as well as impersonalism must have been objection- 
 
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 71 
 
 able to him. Hence he mitigates both by introducing the divine will 
 as mediating between God and the world. This brings God in closer 
 and more personal touch with his creation. The cosmic process is 
 not a necessary and impersonal flow or radiation but a voluntary 
 activity having a purpose. The solution is unsatisfactory, as all such 
 solutions are bound to be, because it introduces as many diflSculties 
 as it solves. The nature of this divine Will is ambiguous. If it is God's 
 will, and God is the One in whom there can be no distinctions, we have 
 only a new word, and nothing is solved. If on human analogy we 
 are inclined to take the will seriously, we are endangering God's 
 unity. This dilemma Gabirol does not succeed in removing. His 
 system still has a strong flavor of Pantheism, and moreover his identi- 
 fication of the Will of God with the Wisdom and the Word of God, 
 and his hypostatization of the latter as in a sense a being distinct 
 from God, reminds us strongly of Philo's Logos, which became the 
 Logos of Christianity, the second person in the Trinity. This is the 
 reason why William of Auvergne, bishop of Paris in the thirteenth 
 century, regarded Avicebron as a Christian. And these same reasons 
 were no doubt adequate to estrange Jewish readers, as Abraham ibn 
 Daud expressly tells us about himself, though his terms are general 
 (see above, p. 62). 
 
 Gabirol is also the author of an ethical work which he composed 
 in 1045. Though of little importance philosophically, or perhaps 
 because of this, the "Tikkun Middot ha-Nefesh" (Improvement of 
 the Qualities of the Soul) fared much better than its more important 
 companion, the "Mekor Hayim." Not only did it have the privilege 
 of a Hebrew translation at the hands of the father of translators, 
 Judah ibn Tibbon, but the original Arabic itself is still extant and 
 was recently published with an English translation by Stephen S. 
 Wise (1901).-^'^^ The Hebrew translation also had the good fortune of 
 being reprinted several times. This is due to the fact that the Tikkun 
 Middot ha-Nefesh" is a popular work, dealing with morals, and does 
 not go into metaphysical questions. It is full of Biblical citations, 
 which stamps it as Jewish; and there are also in it quotations from 
 Arabic writers serving to illustrate the argument and lending variety 
 and interest to the style. 
 
 The larger question of the aim of human Hfe is touched on in the 
 
72 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 " Fons Vitae." We are told there that the ultimate aim of man's 
 existence is that the soul should unite with the upper world to which 
 it belongs. -^^^ The particular human soul is according to Gabirol a 
 part, though not in a physical sense, of the cosmic soul, which is one 
 of the universal spiritual substances (see above, p. 66). Hence its 
 own real existence is spiritual and eternal, and independent of the 
 body. Its entrance into the body obscures its spiritual vision, though 
 it does not lose all touch with the higher world from which it came. 
 The senses and the data of sense perception are not an end in them- 
 selves; they are only a means for the soul through them to recall the 
 higher knowledge which was its own in its spiritual existence, and 
 thereby win its return to the inteUigible world. Man's duty therefore 
 in this world is to strive to attain this higher life for his soul. This 
 is brought about by means of knowledge and practice. This knowledge 
 has to do with knowing all things as they really are, and particularly 
 the intelligible substances and the Prime Essence. Practice signifies 
 to keep away as far as possible from things of sense, which are foreign 
 to the soul and might injure it. What more particularly the things 
 are which are beneficial to the soul, and what are injurious, we learn 
 from Gabirol's ethical treatise. Man's soul has a higher and a lower 
 nature. The higher power is the reason or rational soul, the lower is 
 the animal or vegetative soul; and man's business is to see that the 
 reason rules over the lower nature. 
 
 Gabirol does not give us any test by which we can tell whether a 
 given act or feeling belongs to the lower or higher nature except to 
 say that the appetites are diseases of the body which must be cured; 
 that they do not belong to the rational soul, and to satisfy them is 
 not the attainment of a good. Gabirol's method of treating virtue 
 and vice, or rather the virtues and the vices, is to relate them to the 
 five senses and the four humors in man, which in turn correspond 
 to the four elements, fire, air, water, earth, and the four primitive 
 quahties, hot, cold, moist, dry. This division of the elements, the 
 humors, the qualities and the senses was a commonplace of the phys- 
 iological and medical science of the time. We have met it in Isaac 
 Israeli (see above, p. 3), and it goes back to Aristotle and Galen 
 and Hippocrates. The originality, though a queer one to be sure, of 
 Gabirol is to bring the ethical qualities of man into relation with all 
 
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 73 
 
 these. The approximations are forced in every instance and often 
 ludicrous. Instead of attempting to give a psychological analysis 
 of the qualities in question, he lays stress on their physical basis in 
 one of the five senses, as we shall see presently. 
 
 The great world, we are told, was created out of the four elements, 
 and similarly man, the microcosm, also consists of four natures corre- 
 sponding to the elements. Thus the four humors, upon the harmonious 
 combination of which the health of man's body depends, viz., blood, 
 phelgm, black gall, and red gall, correspond respectively to air, water, 
 earth, fire. Man is endowed besides with five senses. If he is wise 
 he will use his senses properly and in the right measure, like a skilful 
 physician who calculates carefully what proportion of each drug 
 should be prescribed. 
 
 The sense of sight is the noblest of the senses, and is related to the 
 body as the sun to the world. The philosophers have a wonderful 
 saying concerning the eye that there are spiritual tints in the soul 
 which are visible in the movements of the eyelids — ^pride and haugh- 
 tiness, humility and meekness. Accordingly the ethical qualities 
 due to the sense of sight are pride, meekness, modesty and impu- 
 dence, besides the subordinate qualities derived from these. 
 
 Pride is common in a person of a warm disposition in whom the red 
 gall predominates. Many wise men exhibit this quality out of place, 
 fools adopt it until they are mastered by it, and it is prevalent in youth. 
 It may be useful when it keeps a man away from vice and unworthy 
 things, inspiring him to rise to nobility of character and the service of 
 God. But generally it is useless and leads to many evils, especially 
 if it causes one to be self-opinionated, refusing to seek the advice of 
 anyone. When a man sees this quahty gaining mastery over him, 
 he should consider the origin and end of existing things. When he 
 sees that all things are destined to pass away, and himself likewise, 
 his pride will change to humility. 
 
 Meekness is closer to virtue than the quality mentioned before, 
 because he who possesses it withholds his desire from seeking grati- 
 fication. It is a quality manifested by the prophets and leads to 
 honor. "The fruits of lowliness," a philosopher has said, "are love and 
 tranquillity." Contentment is of a kind with meekness. The greatest 
 riches are contentment and patience. He who esteems his rank but 
 
74 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 lightly enhances man's estimation of his dignity. A wise man has 
 said, "Be humble without cringing, and manly without being arro- 
 gant. Arrogance is a wilderness and haughtiness a taking refuge 
 therein, and altogether a going astray." 
 
 Modesty is connected with humiHty but is superior to it, for it is a 
 sister of reason, and reason, as everybody knows, is the most important 
 quality, which separates man from beast and brings him near to the 
 angels. You never see a modest person without sense, or a person of 
 good sense who is not modest. A man must be modest not only before 
 others but also to himself. Modesty and faithfulness, it is said, are 
 closely related, and the one cannot be had truly without the other. 
 
 The impudent man is disliked by God and by man, even if he be 
 wise and learned. If one has this quality it is the duty of his friend 
 and associate to break him of it by reproving him. It is of value only 
 when used in defence of the Torah and in behalf of God and the truth. 
 
 Space will not permit us to treat in detail of the other senses and the 
 virtues and vices depending upon them, but we shall indicate briefly 
 Gabirol's method of relating the ethical qualities to the physical 
 senses. 
 
 Thus the sense of hearing, which is next in importance to sight has 
 as its quahties hate, love, mercy and cruelty. It takes some fine 
 insight, he says, to see the connection of these qualities with the sense 
 of hearing, but the intelligent and discerning reader wiU find this 
 hint sufficient. I hope he will not blame me, Gabirol continues, if I 
 do not bring together all the reasons and the scriptural passages to 
 prove this, for human flesh is weak, especially in my case on account 
 of my vexatious experiences and disappointments. We find in the 
 Bible love associated with hearing: Hear, O Israel . . . and thou 
 shalt love the Lord thy God" (Deut. 6, 4). Hate follows hearing in 
 the phrase: "When Esau heard the words of his father . . . and Esau 
 hated Jacob" (Gen. 27, 34-41). Mercy is related to hearing in Exod. 
 (22, 26), "And I will hear for I am merciful." Finally cruelty is to 
 refuse to Hsten, as we find in the case of Pharaoh (Ex. 9, 12), "And 
 the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto 
 them." 
 
 In a similar manner Gabirol proves that the sense of smell has 
 four quahties, anger, favor, envy, wide-awakeness; the sense of taste, 
 
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 
 
 75 
 
 the four qualities, joy, sorrow, regret, calmness; while liberality, 
 niggardliness, courage and cowardice are related to the sense of touch. 
 The relation of the ethical qualities to the senses, humors, elements 
 and primitive physical qualities is exhibited in the following table, 
 as it appears in the Arabic text of the "Aslah al-Ahlak," the original 
 title of Gabirol's ethical work. 
 
 Alike in Respect of Dryness 
 
 
 Anger, Jealousy, ^Niggatdliness^ Grief, 
 
 
 Ciiueltjr 
 
 ■yo^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 
 SB 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 g 
 
 
 ►t3 
 
 5" 
 
 
 "I 
 
 n 
 
 
 •d 
 
 c 
 
 n 
 
 
 n 
 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 o 
 
 
 n 
 
 n> 
 
 
 n 
 
 % 
 
 
 w 
 
 n 
 
 
 B 
 
 n 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 fT 
 
 s 
 
 
 '^ 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 k 
 
 o / \ 
 
 re 
 
 !B 
 
 o 
 
 m 
 
 re 
 
 H 
 
 / \ 
 
 a 
 n 
 
 m 
 
 n 
 
 
 
 '< 
 
 
 
 
 Courage, Joy, I<ove, I<iberality, 
 Good-Will 
 
 \ 
 
 
 
 Q'\ 
 
 Alike in Respect of Moistness 
 
 Among Gabirol's religious poems there is one which interests us 
 particularly because it bears traces of the philosophy of the Fons 
 Vitae." It is the most important of his hymns and is found in the 
 prayer-book of the Sephardic ritual for the Day of Atonement. "The 
 Royal Crown," as the poem is entitled, is an appeal to God for mercy 
 and forgiveness, and is based upon the contrast between the greatness 
 of God and the insignificance of man. The first part is therefore 
 
76 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 devoted to a poetical description of God's attributes and the wonders 
 of the cosmic system, as conceived in the astronomical science of the 
 day. A few quotations will give us an idea of the style and character 
 of the hymn and its relation to the "Fons Vitse." 
 
 "Thine are the mysteries, which neither fancy nor imagination can 
 comprehend ; and the life, over which dissolution hath no power. Thine 
 is the Throne exalted above all height; and the habitation concealed 
 in the eminence of its recess. Thine is the existence, from the shadow 
 of whose light sprung every existing thing; of which we said, under its 
 protecting shadow shall we live. . . , 
 
 "Thou art One, the first of every number, and the foundation of all 
 structure. Thou art One, and in the mystery of the Unity all the 
 wise in heart are astonished; for they cannot define it. Thou art One, 
 and thy Unity can neither be lessened nor augmented; for nothing 
 is there wanting or superfluous. Thou art One, but not such a one as 
 is estimated or numbered; for neither plurality, nor change, form, nor 
 physical attribute, nor name expressive of thy quality, can reach 
 thee. . . ." 
 
 In the same way he treats God's other attributes, existent, living, 
 great, mighty. Then he continues: 
 
 "Thou art light, and the eyes of every pure soul shall see thee; for 
 the clouds of iniquity alone hide thee from her sight. . . . Thou art 
 most high, and the eye of the intellect desireth and longeth for thee; 
 but it can only see a part, it cannot see the whole of thy greatness. . . . 
 
 "Thou art God, who by thy Divinity supportest all things formed; 
 and upholdest all creatures by thy Unity. Thou art God, and there is 
 no distinction between thy godhead, unity, eternity or existence; for 
 all is one mystery; and although each of these attributes is variously 
 named, yet the whole point to one end. 
 
 "Thou art wise, and wisdom, which is the fountain of life, floweth 
 from thee; and compared with thy wisdom, the knowledge of all man- 
 kind is folly. Thou art wise; and didst exist prior to all the most 
 ancient things; and wisdom was reared by thee. Thou art wise; and 
 hast not learned aught from another, nor acquired thy wisdom from 
 anyone else. Thou art wise; and from thy wisdom thou didst cause to 
 emanate a ready will, an agent and artist as it were, to draw existence 
 out of non-existence, as light proceeds from the eye. Thou drawest 
 
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 77/ 
 
 i 
 from the source of light without a vessel, and producest everything 
 without a tool." 
 
 Then follows a description of the constitution of the sublunar 
 world, the terrestrial sphere consisting of part earth, part water, and 
 being surrounded by the successive spheres of air and fire. Then 
 follow in order the spheres of the Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, 
 Jupiter, Saturn, the spheres of the fixed stars, and the outermost 
 sphere embracing all and giving to the entire heaven the diurnal mo- 
 tion from east to west. He then continues: 
 
 "Who can understand thy tremendous mysteries, when thou didst 
 exalt above the ninth orb, the sphere of the Intelligence; that is the 
 inner temple; for the tenth shall be holy to the Lord. This is the 
 sphere which is exalted above all the highest, and which no imagination 
 can reach; and there is the hiding-place, wherein is the canopy for 
 thy glory. . . . 
 
 "O Lord! who can come near thy understanding, when thou didst 
 place on high above the sphere of the Intelligence the Throne of thy 
 glory, where is the glorious dwelling of the hiding-place; there also is 
 the mystery and the foundation (matter) ; so far the intellect may 
 reach and no further; for above this art thou greatly exalted upon thy 
 mighty throne, where no man may come up to thee. . . . 
 
 "Who can comprehend thy power, when thou didst create from the 
 splendor of thy glory a pure lustre? From the rock of rocks was it 
 hewn, and dug from the hollow of the cave. Thou also didst bestow 
 on it the spirit of wisdom, and didst call it soul. Thou didst form it 
 hewn from the flames of intellectual fire, so that its spirit burneth 
 as fire within it. Thou didst send it forth to the body to serve and 
 guard it; it is as fire in the midst of it, and yet doth not consume it; 
 for from the fire of the soul the body was created, and called into existence 
 from nothing, because the Lord descended thereto in fire." 
 
 Here we see the Intelligence spoken of as standing above the heav- 
 enly spheres. This clearly represents the cosmic Intelligence as a 
 creation of God, "which is exalted above all the highest," hence the 
 first product of God's light. And yet the Throne of Glory is said to be 
 placed even above the sphere of the Intelligence. He speaks of it as 
 the mystery and the foundation (Yesod), beyond which the intellect 
 cannot reach. This is apparently a contradiction, but becomes clear 
 
78 • MEDIJEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 when we learn what is meant by the Throne of Glory, and by "founda- 
 tion." In the "Fons Vitse" Gabirol tells us that matter receives form 
 from the First Essence through the medium of the Will, which latter 
 therefore, as it bestows form upon matter, sits in it and rests upon it. 
 And hence, he says, matter is as it were the stool (cathedra) of the 
 One. The word "yesod" (foundation) which Gabirol applies in the 
 "Keter Malkut" (Royal Crown) to the Throne of Glory is the same 
 that Falaquera uses for matter throughout in his epitome of the 
 "Mekor Hayim." Hence it is clear that the Throne of Glory which is 
 above the Intelligence is nothing else than Gabirol's matter. And 
 we know from the "Fons Vitse" that matter is really prior to Intelli- 
 gence as it exists in the knowledge of God, but that in reality it never 
 was, as a creation, without form; and that with form it constitutes the 
 IntelUgence. Finally there is also a reference in the poem to the will 
 as emanating from God's wisdom, and like an ''agent and artist draw- 
 ing existence out of non-existence as light proceeds from the eye." 
 The process of creation is thus compared with the radiation of hght in 
 the sentence just quoted, and likewise in the following: "Thou drawest 
 from the source of light without a vessel, and producest everything 
 without a tool." 
 
 We do not know whether Gabirol wrote any commentaries on the 
 Bible — none are extant, nor are there any references to such works — 
 but from his exegetical attempts in his ethical work discussed above 
 (p. 71 ff.) and from citations by Abraham ibn Ezra of Gabirol's ex- 
 planations of certain passages in Scripture, we gather that like Philo of 
 Alexandria before him and Maimonides and a host of philosophical 
 commentators after him, he used the allegorical method to reconcile 
 his philosophical views with the Bible, and read the former into the 
 latter. ^"^^ 
 
 Thus we are told that Eden represents the presence of God, the 
 garden planted in Eden stands for the angehc beings or, according 
 to another interpretation, for the world of sense. By the river which 
 flows out of Eden is meant prime matter which issues from the essence 
 of God according to the " Fons Vitae." The four divisions of the 
 river are the four elements; Adam is the rational soul, Eve, as the 
 Hebrew name indicates, the animal soul, and the serpent is the vege- 
 tative or appetitive soul. The serpent entices Adam to eat of the 
 
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 79 
 
 forbidden tree. This means that when the lower soul succeeds in 
 controUing the reason, the result is evil and sin, and man is driven 
 out of the Garden, i. e., is excluded from his angeUc purity and be- 
 comes a corporeal being. 
 
 It is clear from all this that Gabirol's omission of all reference to 
 Jewish dogma in the " Fons Vitse" was purely methodological. Phi- 
 losophy, and religion or theology should be kept apart in a purely 
 philosophical work. Apologetics or harmonization has its rights, but 
 it is a different department of study, and should be treated by itself, 
 or in connection with exegesis of the Bible. 
 
 While it is true that Gabirol's influence on subsequent Jewish 
 philosophy is slight — at most we find it in Moses and Abraham ibn 
 Ezra, Abraham ibn Daud and Joseph ibn Zaddik — traces of his ideas 
 are met with in the mysticism of the Kabbala. Gabirol's Fons 
 Vitae" is a peculiar combination of logical formalism with mystic 
 obscurity, or profundity, according to one's point of view. The latter 
 did not appeal to pure rationahsts like Ibn Daud or Maimonides, and 
 the former seemed unconvincing, as it was employed in a lost cause. 
 For Neo-Platonism was giving way to Aristotelianism, which was 
 adopted by Maimonides and made the authoritative and standard 
 philosophy. It was different with the Kabbala. Those who were 
 responsible for its spread in the thirteenth century must have been 
 attracted by the seemingly esoteric character of a philosophy which 
 sees the invisible in the visible, the spiritual in the corporeal, and the 
 reflection of the unknowable God in everything. There are certain 
 details also which are common to both, such as the analogies of irradi- 
 ation of light or flowing of water used to represent the process of crea- 
 tion, the position of the Will, the existence of matter in spiritual beings, 
 and so on, though some of these ideas are common to all Neo-Platonic 
 systems, and the Kabbala may have had access to the same sources 
 as Gabirol. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 
 
 All that is known of the life of Bahya ben Joseph ibn Pakuda is 
 that he lived in Spain and had the office of "Dayyan," or judge of 
 the Jewish community. Not even the exact time in which he lived 
 is yet determined, though the most reliable recent investigations make 
 it probable that he lived after Gabirol and was indebted to the latter 
 for some of his views in philosophy as well as in Ethics. ^''^ So far as 
 traditional data are concerned we have equally reliable, or rather 
 equally unreliable statements for regarding Bahya as an older contem- 
 porary of Gabirol (eleventh century), or of Abraham ibn Ezra (1088- 
 1167). Neither of these two data being vouched for by any but their 
 respective authors, who lived a long time after Bahya, we are left to 
 such indirect evidence as may be gathered from the content of Bahya's 
 ethical work, the " Duties of the Hearts." And here the recent in- 
 vestigations of Yahuda, the latest authority on this subject and the 
 editor of the Arabic text of Bahya's masterpiece (191 2), force upon us 
 the conclusion that Bahya wrote after Gabirol. Yahuda has shown 
 that many passages in the "Duties of the Hearts" are practically 
 identical in content and expression with similar ideas found in a 
 work of the Arab philosopher Gazali (1059-1111). This leaves very 
 Httle doubt that Bahya borrowed from Gazali and hence could not 
 have written before the twelfth century. 
 
 To be sure, there are arguments on the other side, which would 
 give chronological priority to Bahya over Gabirol, ^'^'^ but without 
 going into the details of this minute and difficult discussion, it may 
 be said generally that many of the similarities in thought and expres- 
 sion between the two ethical works of Gabirol and Bahya rather 
 point in favor of the view here adopted, namely, that Bahya borrowed 
 from Gabirol, while the rest prove nothing for either side. In so far 
 as a reader of the "Duties of the Hearts" recognizes here and there 
 an idea met with in Gabirol's "Fons Vitae," there can scarcely be 
 
 80 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 8i 
 
 any doubt that the latter is the more original of the two. Gabirol did 
 not borrow his philosophy or any part thereof from Bahya. Despite 
 its Neo-Platonic character the Fons Vitae" of Gabirol is the most 
 independent and original of Jewish mediaeval productions. The 
 "Duties of the Hearts" owes what originality it has to its ethics, 
 which is the chief aim of the work, and not at all to the introductory 
 philosophical chapter. As we shall see later, the entire chapter on the 
 existence and unity of God, which introduces the ethical teachings 
 of Bahya, moves in the familiar lines of Saadia, Al Mukammas, Joseph 
 al Basir and the other Jewish Mutakallimun, There is besides a 
 touch of Neo-Platonism in Bahya, which may be due to Gabirol 
 as well as to Arabic sources. That Bahya did not borrow more from 
 the " Fons Vitae" than he did is due no doubt to the difference in tem- 
 perament between the two men. Bahya is not a mystic. Filled as 
 he is with the spirit of piety and warmth of heart — an attitude re- 
 flected in his style, which helped to make his work the most popu- 
 lar moral-religious book in Jewish Hterature — there is no trace of 
 pantheism or metaphysical mysticism in his nature. His ideas are 
 sane and rational, and their expression clear and transparent. Gabi- 
 rol's high flights in the "Fons Vitae" have little in common with 
 Bahya's modest and brief outline of the familiar doctrines of the exis- 
 tence, unity and attributes of God, for which he claims no originahty, 
 and which serve merely as the background for his contribution to reli- 
 gious ethics. That Bahya should have taken a few leading notions 
 from the Fons Vitae," such as did not antagonize his temperament 
 and mode of thinking, is quite possible, and we shall best explain such 
 resemblances in this manner. 
 
 As Abraham ibn Ezra in 1156 makes mention of Bahya and his 
 views, ^"^^ we are safe in concluding that the ' Duties of the Hearts" 
 was written between iioo and 1156. 
 
 As the title of the work indicates, Bahya saw the great significance 
 of a distinction made by Mohammedan theologians and familiar in 
 their ascetic hterature, between outward ceremonial or observance, 
 known as " visible wisdom" and "duties of the limbs," and inward 
 intention, attitude and feeling, called hidden wisdom" and "duties 
 of the hearts." ^"^ The prophet Isaiah complains that the people are 
 diligent in bringing sacrifices, celebrating the festivals and offering 
 
82 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 prayer while their hands are full of blood. He informs them that 
 such conduct is an abomination to the Lord, and admonishes them to 
 wash themselves, to make themselves clean, to put away the evil 
 of their deeds from before God's eyes; to cease to do evil; to learn to 
 do well, to seek for justice, to relieve the oppressed, to do justice to 
 the fatherless, to plead for the widow (Isa. 1,11-17). This is a distinc- 
 tion between duties to God and duties to one's fellow man, between 
 religious ceremony and ethical practice. Saadia makes a further 
 distinction — also found in Arabic theology before him — between those 
 commandments and prohibitions in the Bible which the reason itself 
 approves as right or condemns as wrong — the rational commandments 
 — and those which to the reason seem indifferent, and which revelation 
 alone characterizes as obligatory, permitted or forbidden — the so- 
 called " traditional commandments." 
 
 Bahya's division is identical with neither the one nor the other. 
 Ethical practice may be purely external and a matter of the limbs, 
 quite as much as sacrifice and ceremonial ritual. On the other hand, 
 one may feel profoundly moved with the spirit of true piety, love of 
 God and loyalty to his commandments in the performance of a so- 
 called "traditional commandment," like the fastening of a "mezuzah" 
 to the door-post. Bahya finds room for Saadia's classification but 
 it is with him of subordinate importance, and is apphcable only to the 
 "duties of the limbs." Among these alone are there some which the 
 reason unaided by revelation would not have prescribed. The "duties 
 of the heart " are all rational. Like all precepts they are both positive 
 and negative. Examples of positive duties of the heart are, belief 
 in a creator who made the world out of nothing; belief in his unity 
 and incomparability; the duty to serve him with all our heart, to trust 
 in him, to submit to him, to fear him, to feel that he is watching our 
 open and secret actions, to long for his favor and direct our actions 
 for his name's sake; to love those who love him so as to be near unto 
 him, and to hate those who hate him. Negative precepts of this class 
 are the opposites of those mentioned, and others besides, such as that 
 we should not covet, or bear a grudge, or think of forbidden things, or 
 desire them or consent to do them. The common characteristic of all 
 ' duties of the heart is that they are not visible to others. God alone can 
 judge whether a person's feeling and >notives are pure or the reverse. 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 83 
 
 That these duties are incumbent upon us is clear from every point 
 of view. Like Saadia Bahya finds the sources of knowledge, particu- 
 larly of the knowledge of God's law and rehgion, in sense, reason, 
 written law and tradition. Leaving out the senses which are not 
 competent in this particular case, the obligatory character of the 
 duties of the heart is vouched for by the other three, reason, law, 
 tradition. 
 
 From reason we know that man is composed of soul and body, and 
 that both are due to God's goodness. One is visible, the other is not. • 
 Hence we are obhged to worship God in a two-fold manner; with, 
 visible worship and invisible. Visible worship represents the duties 
 of the limbs, such as prayer, fasting, charity, and so on, which are 
 carried out by the visible organs. The hidden worship includes the 
 duties of the heart, for example, to think of God's unity, to believe 
 in him and his Law, to accept his worship, etc., all of which are ac- 
 complished by the thought of the mind, without the assistance of the 
 visible limbs. 
 
 Besides, the duties of the limbs, the obligation of which no one 
 doubts, are incomplete without the will of the heart to do them. 
 Hence it follows that there is a duty upon our souls to worship God 
 to the extent of our powers. 
 
 The Bible is just as emphatic in teaching these duties as the reason. 
 The love of God and the fear of God are constantly inculcated; and 
 in the sphere of negative precepts we have such prohibitions as, "Thou 
 shalt not covet" (Exod. 20, 17); "Thou shalt not take vengeance, 
 nor bear any grudge" (Lev. 19, 18); "Thou shalt not hate thy brother 
 in thy heart" (ib. 17); "You shalt not go astray after your own heart" 
 (Num. 15, 39); "Thou shalt not harden thy heart nor shut thy hand 
 from thy needy brother" (Deut. 15, 7), and many others. 
 
 Rabbinical literature is just as full of such precepts as the Bible, 
 and is if possible even more emphatic in their inculcation. Witness 
 such sayings as the following: " Heaven regards the intention " 
 (Sanh. io6b): "The heart and the eye are two procurers of sin" (Jer. 
 Berak. i), and many others, particularly in the treatise Abot. 
 
 The great importance of these duties is also made manifest by the 
 fact that the punishment in the Bible for unintentional misdeeds is 
 more lenient than for intentional, proving that for punishment the 
 
84 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 mind must share with the body in the performance of the deed. The 
 same is true of reward, that none is received for performing a good 
 deed if it is not done "in the name of heaven." 
 
 They are even more important than the duties of the Umbs, for 
 unUke the latter the obhgation of the duties of the heart is always in 
 force, and is independent of periods or circumstances. Their number, 
 too, is infinite, and not limited, as are the duties of the limbs, to six 
 hundred and thirteen. 
 
 And yet, Bahya complains, despite the great importance of these 
 duties, very few are the men who observed them even in the generations 
 preceding ours, not to speak of our own days when even the external 
 ceremonies are neglected, much more so the class of precepts under 
 discussion. The majority of students of the Torah are actuated by 
 desire for fame and honor, and devote their time to the intricacies of 
 legalistic discussion in Rabbinic literature, and matters unessential, 
 which are of no account in the improvement of the soul; but they neg- 
 lect such important subjects of study as the unity of God, which we 
 ought to understand and distinguish from other unities, and not merely 
 receive parrot fashion from tradition. We are expressly commanded 
 (Deut. 4, 39), "Know therefore this day, and reflect in thy heart, 
 that the Eternal is the God in the heavens above, and upon the earth 
 beneath: there is none else." Only he is exempt from studying these 
 matters whose powers are not adequate to grasp them, such as women, 
 children and simpletons. 
 
 Moreover Bahya is the first, he tells us, among the post-Talmudical 
 writers, to treat systematically and ex professo this branch of our 
 religious duties. When I looked, he says, into the works composed by 
 the early writers after the Talmud on the commandments, I found 
 that their writings can be classified under three heads. First, exposi- 
 tion of the Torah and the Prophets, like the grammatical and lexi- 
 cographical treatises of Ibn Janah, or the exegetical works of Saadia. 
 Second, brief compilations of precepts, like the works of Hefez ben 
 Yazliah and the responsa of some geonim. Third, works of a 
 philosophico-apologetic character, like those of Saadia, Al Mukammas 
 and others, whose purpose it was to present in an acceptable 
 manner the doctrines of the Torah, to prove them by logical 
 demonstration, and to refute the criticisms and erroneous views of 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 85 
 
 unbelievers. But I have not seen any book dealing with the "hidden 
 wisdom." ^^0 
 
 Here we see clearly the purpose of Bahya. It is not the rationah- 
 zation of Jewish dogma that he is interested in, nor the reconciliation 
 of religion and philosophy. It is the purification of rehgion itseh from 
 within which he seeks to accomplish. Sincerity and consistency in 
 our words and our thoughts, so far as the service of God is concerned, 
 is the fundamental requirement and essential value of the duties of the 
 heart. To be sure this cannot be attained without intelligence. 
 The knowledge of God and of his unity is a prerequisite for a proper 
 understanding and an adequate appreciation of our rehgious duties. 
 Philosophy therefore becomes a necessity in the interest of a purer, 
 and truer religion, without reference to the dangers threatening it 
 from without. 
 
 Having found, he continues in the introduction to the "Duties of 
 the Hearts," that all the three sources, reason, Bible and tradition, 
 command this branch of our religious duties, I tried to think about 
 them and to learn them, being led from one topic to another until the 
 subject became so large that I feared I could not contain it all in my 
 memory. I then determined to write the subject down systematically 
 in a book for my own benefit as well as for the benefit of others. But 
 I hesitated about writing it on account of my limitations, the difficulty 
 of the subject and my limited knowledge of Arabic, the language in 
 which I intended writing it because the majority of our people are best 
 familiar with it. But I thought better of it and realized that it was 
 my duty to do what I could even if it was not perfect; that I must , 
 not yield to the argument springing from a love of ease and disincli- 
 nation to effort; for if everyone were to abstain from doing a small 
 good because he cannot do as much as he would like, nothing would 
 ever be done at all. 
 
 Having decided to compose the work, he continues, I divided the 
 subject into ten fundamental principles, and devoted a section of the 
 book to each principle. I endeavored to write in a plain and easy style, 
 omitting difficult expressions, technical terms and demonstrations in 
 the manner of the dialecticians. I had to make an exception in the first 
 section deahng with the existence and unity of God, where the sublety 
 of the subject required the employment of logical and mathematical 
 
86 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 proofs. For the rest I made use of comparisons or similes, adduced 
 support from the Bible and tradition, and also quoted the sages of 
 other nations. ^^^ 
 
 We have already seen in the introduction that Bahya was indebted 
 for his ideas to the ascetic and Sufic literature of the Arabs, and 
 Yahuda, who is the authority in this matter of Bahya's sources, has 
 shown recently that among the quotations of the wise men of other na- 
 tions in Bahya's work are such as are attributed by the Arabs to Jesus 
 and the gospels, to Mohammed and his companions, to the early 
 caliphs, in particular the caliph Ali, to Mohammedan ascetics and 
 
 In selecting the ten general and inclusive principles, Bahya lays 
 down as the first and most fundamental the doctrine of the deity, 
 or as it is called in the works of the Kalam, the Unity. As God is a 
 true imity, being neither substance nor accident, and our thought 
 cannot grasp anything except substance or accident, it follows that 
 we cannot know God as he is in himself, and that we can get a con- 
 ception of him and of his existence from his creatures only. The second 
 section is therefore devoted to an examination of creation. Then 
 follow in order sections treating of the service of God, trust in God, 
 action for the sake of God alone, submission to God, repentance, self- 
 examination, separation from the pleasures of the world, love of God. 
 
 In his discussion of the vmity of God, Bahya follows the same 
 method as Saadia, and the Kalam generally, i. e., he first proves that 
 the world must have been created; hence there must be a creator, 
 and this is followed by a demonstration of God's unity. The partic- 
 ular arguments, too, are for the most part the same, as we shall see, 
 though differently expressed and in a different order. The important 
 addition in Bahya is his distinction between God's unity and other 
 unities, which is not fovmd so strictly formulated in any of his pred- 
 ecessors, and goes back to Pseudo-Pythagorean sources in Arabian 
 literature of Neo-Platonic origin. 
 
 In order to prove that there is a creator who created the world out 
 of nothing we assume three principles. First, nothing can make itself. 
 Second, principles are finite in number, hence there must be a first 
 before which there is no other. Third, every composite is "new," 
 i. e., came to be in time, and did not exist from eternity. 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 87 
 
 Making use of these principles, which will be proved later, we pro- 
 ceed as follows: The world is composite in all its parts. Sky, earth, 
 stars and man form a sort of house which the latter manages. Plants 
 and animals are composed of the four elements, fire, air, water, earth. 
 The elements again are composed of matter and form, or substance 
 and accident. Their matter is the primitive "hyle," and their form 
 is the primitive form, which is the root of all forms, essential as well 
 as accidental. It is clear therefore that the world is composite, and 
 hence, according to the third principle, had its origin in time. As, 
 according to the first principle, a thing cannot make itself, it must 
 have been made by some one. But as, in accordance with the second 
 principle, the number of causes cannot be infinite, we must finally 
 reach a first cause of the world before which there is no other, and this 
 first made the world out of nothing. 
 
 Before criticising this proof, from which Bahya infers more than is 
 legitimate, we must prove the three original assumptions. 
 
 The proof of the first principle that a thing cannot make itself is 
 identical in Bahya with the second of the three demonstrations em- 
 ployed by Saadia for the same purpose. It is that the thing must 
 either have made itself before it existed or after it existed. But both 
 are impossible. Before it existed it was not there to make itself; 
 after it existed there was no longer anything to make. Hence the 
 first proposition is proved that a thing cannot make itself. 
 
 The proof of the second proposition that the number of causes can- 
 not be infinite is also based upon the same principle as the fourth 
 proof in Saadia for the creation of the world. The principle is this. 
 Whatever has no limit in the direction of the past, i. e., had no begin- 
 ning, but is eternal a parte ante, cannot have any stopping point any- 
 where else. In other words, we as the spectators could not point to 
 any definite spot or link in this eternally infinite chain, because the 
 chain must have traversed infinite time to reach us, but the infinite 
 can never be traversed. Since, however, as a matter of fact we can 
 and do direct our attention to parts of the changing world, this shows 
 that the world must have had a beginning. 
 
 A second proof of the same principle is not found in Saadia. It is 
 as follows: If we imagine an actual infinite and take away a part, 
 the remainder is less than before. Now if this remainder is still in- 
 
88 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 finite, we have one infinite larger than another, which is impossible. 
 If we say the remainder is finite, then by adding to it the finite part 
 which was taken away, the result must be finite; but this is contrary 
 to h5^othesis, for we assumed it infinite at the start. Hence it follows 
 that the infinite cannot have a part. But we can separate in thought 
 out of all the generations of men from the beginning those that lived 
 between the time of Noah and that of Moses. This will be a finite 
 number and a part of all the men in the world. Hence, as the infinite 
 can have no part, this shows that the whole number of men is finite, 
 and hence that the world had a beginning. 
 
 This proof is not in Saadia, but we learn from Maimonides ("Guide 
 of the Perplexed," I, ch. 75) that it was one of the proofs used by the 
 Mutakallimun to prove the absurdity of the behef in the eternity of 
 the world. 
 
 The third principle is that the composite is new." This is proved 
 simply by pointing out that the elements forming the composite are 
 prior to it by nature, and hence the latter cannot be eternal, for 
 nothing is prior to the eternal. This principle also is found in Saadia 
 as the second of the four proofs in favor of creation. ^^^ 
 
 We have now justified our assumptions and hence have proved — 
 what? Clearly we have only proved that this composite world cannot 
 have existed as such from eternity; but that it must have been com- 
 posed of its elements at some point in time past, and that hence there 
 must be a cause or agency which did the composing. But there is 
 nothing in the principles or in the demonstration based upon them 
 which gives us a right to go back of the composite world and say of 
 the elements, the simple elements at the basis of all composition, viz., 
 matter and form, that they too must have come to be in time, and 
 hence were created out of nothing. It is only the composite that 
 argues an act of composition and elements preceding in time and by 
 nature the object composed of them. The simple needs not to be made, 
 hence the question of its having made itself does not arise. It was not 
 made at all, we may say, it just existed from eternity. 
 
 The only way to solve this diflficulty from Bahya's premises is by 
 saying that if we suppose matter (or matter and form as separate 
 entities) to have existed from eternity, we are liable to the difl&culty 
 involved in the idea of anything having traversed infinite time and 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 89 
 
 reached us; though it is doubtful whether unformed matter would 
 lend itself to the experiment of abstracting a part as in generations 
 of men. 
 
 Be this as it may, it is interesting to know that Saadia having ar- 
 rived as far as Bahya in his argument was not yet satisfied that he 
 proved creation ex nihilo, and added special arguments for this pur- 
 pose. 
 
 Before proceeding to prove the unity of God, Bahya takes occasion 
 to dismiss briefly a notion which scarcely deserves consideration in 
 his eyes. That the world could have come by accident, he says, is 
 too absurd to speak of, in view of the evidence of harmony and plan 
 and wisdom which we see in nature. As well imagine ink spilled by 
 accident forming itself into a written book.^^^ Saadia also discusses 
 this view as the ninth of the twelve theories of creation treated by 
 him, and refutes it more elaborately than Bahya, whose one argument 
 is the last of Saadia's eight. 
 
 In the treatment of creation Saadia is decidedly richer and more 
 comprehensive in discussion, review and argumentation. This was 
 to be expected since such problems are the prime purpose of the 
 "Emunot ve-Deot," whereas they are only preparatory, though 
 none the less fundamental, in the "Hobot ha-Lebabot," and Bahya 
 must have felt that the subject had been adequately treated by his 
 distinguished predecessor. It is the more surprising therefore to find 
 that in the treatment of the unity of God Bahya is more elaborate, 
 and offers a greater variety of arguments for unity as such. Moreover, 
 as has already been said before, he takes greater care than anyone 
 before him to guard against the identification of God's unity with 
 any of the unities, theoretical or actual, in our experience. There is 
 no doubt that this emphasis is due to Neo-Platonic influence, some of 
 which may have come to Bahya from Gabirol, the rest probably from 
 their common sources. 
 
 We see, Bahya begins his discussion of the unity of God, that the 
 causes are fewer than their effects, the causes of the causes still fewer, 
 and so on, imtil when we reach the top there is only one. Thus, the 
 nimiber of individuals is infinite, the number of species is finite; the 
 number of genera is less than the number of species, until we get to 
 the highest genera, which according to Aristotle are ten (the ten! 
 
90 MEDIJEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 categories). Again, the causes of the individuals under the categories 
 are five, motion and the four elements. The causes of the elements 
 are two, matter and form. The cause of these must therefore be 
 one, the will of God. (The will of God as immediately preceding 
 universal matter and form sounds like a reminiscence of the "Fons 
 Vitffi".) 
 
 God's unity is moreover seen in the unity of plan and wisdom that 
 is evident in the world. Everything is related to, connected with and 
 dependent upon everything else, showing that there is a unitary 
 principle at the basis. 
 
 If anyone maintains that there is more than one God, the burden 
 of proof lies upon him. Our observation of the world has shown us 
 that there is a God who made it; hence one, since we cannot conceive 
 of less than one; but why more than one, unless there are special 
 reasons to prove it? 
 
 Euclid defines unity as that in virtue of which we call a thing one. 
 This means to signify that unity precedes the unitary thing by nature, 
 just as heat precedes the hot object. Plurality is the sum of ones, 
 hence plurahty cannot be prior to unity, from which it proceeds. 
 Hence whatever plurality we find in our minds we know that unity 
 precedes it; and even if it occurs to anyone that there is more than 
 one creator, unity must after all precede them all. Hence God is one. 
 ' This argument is strictly Neo-Platonic and is based upon the ideal- 
 ism of Plato, the notion that whatever reality or attributes particular 
 things in our world of sense possess they owe to the real and eternal 
 types of these realities and attributes in a higher and intelligible 
 (using the term in contradistinction to sensible) world in which they 
 participate. In so far as this conception is applied to the essences 
 of things, it leads to the hypostatization of the class concepts or 
 universals. Not the particular individual whom we perceive is the 
 real man, but the typical man, the ideal man as the mind conceives 
 him. He is not a concept but a real existent in the intelligible world. 
 If we apply it also to qualities of things, we hypostatize the abstract 
 quality. Heat becomes really distinct from the hot object, existence 
 from the existent thing, goodness from the good person, unity from 
 the one object. And a thing is existent and one and good, because 
 it participates in Existence, Unity and Goodness. These are real 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 91 
 
 entities, intelligible and not sensible, and they give to our world what 
 reality it possesses. 
 
 Plotinus improved upon Plato, and instead of leaving these Ideas 
 as distinct and ultimate entities, he adopted the suggestion of Philo 
 and gathered up all these intelligible existences in the lap of the uni- 
 versal Reason, as his ideas or thoughts. This universal Reason is 
 in Philo the Logos, whose mode of existence is still ambiguous, and is 
 rather to be understood as the divine mind. In Plotinus it is the 
 first stage in the unfoldment of the Godhead, and is a distinct hy- 
 postasis, though not a person. In Christianity it is the second person 
 in the Trinity, incarnated in Jesus. In Israeli, Gabirol and the other 
 Jewish Neo-Platonists, it occupies the same place as the Nous in 
 Plotinus. In Bahya, whose taint of Neo-Platonism is not even skin 
 deep, there is no universal Reason spoken of. But we do not really 
 know what his ideas may have been on the subject, as he does not 
 develop them in this direction. 
 
 To return to Bahya's arguments in favor of the unity of God, we 
 proceed to show that duahsm would lead to absurd conclusions. Thus 
 if there is more than one creator, they are either of the same substance 
 or they are not. If they are, then the common substance is the real 
 creator, and we have unity once more. If their substances are differ- 
 ent, they are distinct, hence Hmited, finite, composite, and hence not 
 eternal, which is absurd. 
 
 Besides, plurahty is an attribute of substance, and belongs to the 
 category of quantity. But the creator is neither substance nor acci- 
 dent (attribute), hence plurahty cannot pertain to him. But if he 
 cannot be described as multiple, he must be one. 
 
 If the creator is more than one, it follows that either each one of them 
 could create the world alone, or he could not except with the help of 
 the other. If we adopt the first alternative, there is no need of more 
 than one creator. If we adopt the second, it follows that the creator 
 is limited in his power, hence, as above, composite, and not eternal,' 
 which is impossible. Besides, if there were more than one creator, it is 
 possible that a dispute might arise between them in reference to the 
 creation. But all this time no such thing has happened, nature being 
 always the same. Hence God is one. Aristotle also agrees with us, for 
 he appUes in this connection the Homeric expression, "It is not good 
 
92 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 to have many rulers, let the ruler be one " (Iliad, II, 204; Arist., 
 Metaphysics, XII, ch. 10, p. 1076a 4).^^^ 
 
 So far as Bahya proves the unity of God he does not go beyond 
 Saadia, some of whose arguments are reproduced by him, and one or 
 two of a Neo-Platonic character added besides. But there is a decided 
 advance in the analysis which follows, in which Bahya shows that 
 there are various kinds of imity in our experience, and that the unity of 
 God is unique. 
 
 We apply the term one to a class, a genus, a species, or an individ- 
 ual. In all of these the multiplicity of parts is visible. The genus ani- 
 mal contains many animals; the species man embraces a great many 
 individual men; and the individual man consists of many parts and 
 organs and faculties. Things of this sort are one in a sense and many in 
 a sense. 
 
 We also apply the term one to an object in which the multiplicity of 
 parts is not as readily visible as in the previous case. Take for example 
 a body of water which is homogeneous throughout and one part is 
 like another. This too is in reality composed of parts, matter and 
 form, substance and accident. It is in virtue of this composition that 
 it is subject to genesis and decay, composition and division, union and 
 separation, motion and change. But all this implies plurality. Hence 
 in both the above cases the unity is not essential but accidental. It is 
 because of a certain appearance or similarity that we call a thing or a 
 class one, which is in reality many. 
 
 Another application of the term one is when we designate by it the 
 basis of mmiber, the numerical one. This is a true one, essential as 
 distinguished from the accidental referred to above. But it is mental 
 and not actual. It is a symbol of a beginning which has no other be- 
 fore it. 
 
 Finally there is the real and actual one. This is something that does 
 not change or multiply; that cannot be described by any material 
 attribute, that is not subject to generation and decay; that does not 
 move and is not similar to anything. It is one in all respects and the 
 cause of multiplicity. It has no beginning or end, for that which has 
 is subject to change, and change is opposed to unity, the thing being 
 different before and after the change. For the same reason the real 
 one does not resemble anything, for resemblance is an accident in the 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 93 
 
 resembling thing, and to be possessed of accidents is to be multiple. 
 Hence the true one resembles nothing. Its oneness is no accident in 
 it, for it is a purely negative term in this appHcation. It means not 
 multiple. ^^^ 
 
 We have now shown that there is a creator who is one, and on the 
 other hand we have analyzed the various meanings of the term one, the 
 last of which is the most real and the purest. It remains now to show 
 that this pure one is identical with the one creator. This can be proved 
 in the following way. The world being everywhere composite contains 
 the one as well as the many — unity of composition, plurahty of the 
 parts composed. As unity is prior by nature to plurality, and causes 
 do not run on to infinity (see above, p. 87), the causes of the world's 
 unity and multiplicity cannot be again unity and multiphcity of the 
 same kind forever. Hence as multiphcity cannot be the first, it must 
 be unity — the absolute and true unity before which there is no other, 
 and in which there is no manner of multiplicity. But God is the one 
 cause of the universe, as we have shown, hence God and this true 
 imity are the same. 
 
 We can show this also in another way. Whatever is an accidental 
 attribute in one thing is an essential element in some other thing. 
 Thus heat is an accidental attribute in hot water. For water may lose 
 its heat and remain water as before. It is different with fire. Fire can- 
 not lose its heat without ceasing to be fire. Hence heat in fire is an 
 essential element; and it is from fire that hot water and all other hot 
 things receive their heat. The same thing apphes to the attribute of 
 imity. It is accidental in all creatures. They are called one because 
 they combine a nmnber of elements in one group or concept. But they 
 are really multiple since they are liable to change and division and 
 motion, and so on. Hence there must be something in which unity 
 is essential, and which is the cause of whatsoever imity all other things 
 possess. But God is the cause of the universe, hence he is this true 
 and absolute imity, and all change and accident and multiplicity are 
 foreign to him.^^'^ 
 
 This unity of God is not in any way derogated from by the ascription 
 to him of attributes. For the latter are of two kinds, "essential" and 
 "active." We call the first essential because they are permanent attri- 
 butes of God, which he had before creation and will continue to have 
 
94 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 when the world has ceased to be. These attributes are three in number, 
 Existing, One, Eternal. We have already proved every one of them. 
 
 Now these attributes do not imply change in the essence of God. 
 They are to be understood in the sense of denying their opposites, 
 i. e., that he is not multiple, non-existent or newly come into being. 
 They also imply each other as can easily be shown, i. e., every one of 
 the three implies the other two. We must understand therefore that 
 they are really one in idea, and if we could find one term to express the 
 thought fully, we should not use three. But the three do not imply 
 multiplicity in God. 
 
 The "active" are those attributes which are ascribed to God by 
 reason of his actions or effects on us. We are permitted to apply 
 them to him because of the necessity which compels us to get to know 
 of his existence so that we may worship him. The Biblical writers 
 use them very frequently. We may divide these into two kinds: 
 First, those which ascribe to God a corporeal form, such as (Gen. i, 27), 
 "And God created man in his image," and others of the same character. 
 Second, those attributes which refer to corporeal movements and 
 actions. These have been so interpreted by our ancient sages as to 
 remove the corporeality from God by substituting the "Glory of God" 
 for God as the subject of the movement or act in question. Thus, 
 (Gen. 28, 13) "And behold the Lord stood above it," is rendered by the 
 Aramaic translator, "and behold the glory of God was present above 
 it." Saadia deals with this matter at length in his Emunot ve- 
 Deot," in his commentary on Genesis, and on the book "Yezirah." 
 So there is no need of going into detail here. We are all agreed that 
 necessity compels us to speak of God in corporeal terms so that all 
 may be made to know of God's existence. This they could not do if 
 the prophets had spoken in metaphysical terms, for not everyone 
 can follow such profound matters. But having come to the knowledge 
 of God in this simpler though imperfect way, we can then advance to a 
 more perfect knowledge of him. The intelligent and philosophical 
 reader will lose nothing by the anthropomorphic form of the Bible, 
 for he can remove the husk and penetrate to the kernel. But the simple 
 reader would miss a very great deal indeed if the Bible were written 
 in the language of philosophy, as he would not imderstand it and 
 would remain without a knowledge of God. 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 95 
 
 Despite its predominant anthropomorphism, however, the Bible 
 does give us hints of God's spirituality so that the thoughtful reader 
 may also have food for his thought. For example, such expressions 
 as (Deut. 4, 15), "Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves; for 
 ye saw no manner of form on the day that the Lord spake unto you in 
 Horeb out of the midst of the fire," and many others are meant to 
 spur on the discriminating reader to further thought. The same 
 applies to all those passages in which the word "name" is inserted 
 before the word God as the object of praise to indicate that we do not 
 know God in his essence. An example of this is, "And they shall bless 
 the name of thy glory" (Neh. 9, 5). For the same reason the name of 
 God is joined in the Bible to heaven, earth, the Patriarchs, in such 
 phrases as the God of the heavens, the God of Abraham, and so on, 
 to show that we do not know God's essence but only his revelation in 
 nature and in history. This is the reason why after saying to Moses, 
 "I am sent me unto you" (Ex. 3, 14), he adds (ib. 15), tell them, "the 
 God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the 
 God of Jacob sent me unto you." The meaning is, if they cannot 
 imderstand God with their reason, let them know me from history 
 and tradition. ^^^ 
 
 In Bahya's treatment of the divine attributes we already have in 
 brief the main elements which Maimonides almost a century later 
 made classic, namely, the distinction between essential and active 
 attributes, and the idea that the former are to be imderstood as deny- 
 ing their opposites, i. e., as being in their nature not positive but 
 negative. The outcome therefore is that only two kinds of attributes 
 are applicable to God, negative and those which are transferred or 
 projected from the effects of God's activity as they are visible in na- 
 ture. Saadia had already made the distinction between essentia] 
 and active attributes, but it was quite incidental with him, and not 
 laid down at the basis of his discussion, but casually referred to in a 
 different connection. Al Mukammas speaks of negative attributes 
 as being more applicable to God than positive, as Philo had already 
 said long before. But the combination of these two, negative and 
 active, as the only kinds of divine attributes is not found in Jewish 
 literature before Bahya. 
 
 It is worth noting also that Bahya does not lay down the three 
 
96 MEDIJEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 attributes, Power, Wisdom and Life as fundamental or essential in 
 the manner of the Christians, the Arab Mutakallimun, and the Jewish 
 Saadia. Bahya, as we have seen, regards as God's essential attributes, 
 existence, imity, eternity. Herein, too, he seems to anticipate Mai- 
 monides who insists against the believers in essential attributes that 
 the attributes, living, omnipotent, omniscient, having a will, are no 
 more essential than any other, but like the rest of the qualities as- 
 cribed to God have reference to his activity in nature. ^^^ 
 
 We have now gone through Bahya's philosophical chapter giving 
 us the metaphysical basis of his ethico-religious views. That his 
 purpose is practical and not theoretical is clear from his definition of 
 what he calls the "acknowledgment of the unity of God with full 
 heart," not to speak of the title of the book itself, the meaning of 
 which we explained at the beginning of this section, and the nine 
 chapters in Bahya's work following upon the first, which constitute its 
 real essence and purpose. To acknowledge the unity of God with 
 full heart means, he tells us, that one must first know how to prove 
 the existence and unity of God, to distinguish God's unity from every 
 other, and then to make his heart and his tongue unite in this concep- 
 tion.^^" It is not a matter of the intellect merely, but of the heart as 
 affecting one's practical conduct. The adequacy of the conception 
 is destroyed not merely by thinking of God as multiple, or by worship- 
 ing images, sun, moon and stars; it is made null and void likewise 
 by hypocrisy and pretence, as when one affects piety before others to 
 gain their favor or acquire a reputation. The same disastrous result 
 is brought about by indulging the low physical appetites. Here the 
 worship of the appetites is brought into competition and rivalry with 
 devotion to the one God.^"^ 
 
 Our object being to trace the philosophical conceptions in mediaeval 
 Jewish hterature, we cannot linger long in the study of the rest of 
 Bahya's masterpiece, which is homiletical and practical rather than 
 theoretic, and must content ourselves with a very brief resume of its 
 principal contents. 
 
 In studying the nature and attributes of God we reached the con- 
 clusion that while a knowledge of him is absolutely necessary for a 
 proper mode of life, we cannot form an idea of him as he is in himself, 
 . and are left to such evidence as we can gather from the world of which 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 97 
 
 he is the author. It becomes our duty, therefore, to study nature, as 
 a whole and in its parts, conscientiously and minutely, in order to 
 reaUze clearly the goodness and wisdom of God as exhibited therein. 
 For various reasons we are apt to neglect this study and miss the in- 
 sight and benefits arising therefrom. Chief among these hindering 
 circumstances are our excessive occupations with the pleasures of 
 this world, and the accidents and misfortunes to which mortal is heir, 
 which blind him to his real good, and prevent him from seeing the 
 blessing in disguise lurking in these very misfortunes. 
 
 But it is clear that man has a duty to study the divine goodness 
 and wisdom as exhibited in nature, else of what use is his faculty of 
 reason and intelligence, which raises him above the beast. If he neg- 
 lects it, he places himself below the latter, which realizes all the func- 
 tions of which it is capable. Bible and Talmud are equally emphatic 
 in urging us to study the wonders of nature. 
 
 The variety of natural phenomena and the laws they exhibit give 
 evidence of the personality of God and the existence of his will. A 
 being without will, acting by necessity of nature, acts with unswerv- 
 ing uniformity. 
 
 Heaven and earth, plant and animal, all creatures great and smaU, 
 bear witness, in their structure and relations, in their functions and 
 mutual service and helpfulness, to the wisdom and goodness of God. 
 Above all is this visible in man, the highest of earthly beings, the 
 microcosm, the rational creature, the discoverer and inventor of arts 
 and sciences. In the laws and statutes which were given to him for 
 the service of God, and in the customs of other nations which take 
 the place of our divine law, we see God's kindness to man in securing 
 his comfort in this world and reward in the next. 
 
 Pride is the great enemy of man, because it prevents him from ap- 
 preciating what he owes to God's goodness. Pride makes him feel 
 that he deserves more than he gets, and bhnds him to the truth. ^-- 
 
 We all recognize the duty of gratitude to a fellow man who has done 
 us a favor, although all such cases of benefit and service between man 
 and man, not excepting even the kindness of a father to his child, will 
 be found on examination to be of a selfish nature. The benefit to 
 self may not in all cases be conscious, but it is always there. It is a 
 father's natxure to love his child as part of himself. Moreover, these 
 
98 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 human favors are not constant, and the person benefited stands 
 comparatively on the same level of existence and worth as his bene- 
 factor. How much greater then is the duty incumbent upon us to 
 appreciate God's favors which are not selfish, which are constant, 
 and which are bestowed by the greatest of all beings upon the smallest 
 of all in respect of physical strength. 
 
 The only way in which man can repay God for his kindness, and 
 show an appreciation thereof is by submitting to him and doing those 
 things which will bring him nearer to God. In order to realize this it 
 is necessary to abandon the bad qualities, which are in principle two, 
 . love of pleasure and love of power. The means enabling one to obtain 
 this freedom are to abstain from too much eating, drinking, idling, 
 and so on, for the first, and from too much gossip, social intercourse, 
 and love of glory for the second. It may be difficult to do this, but 
 one must make up one's mind to it, like the invalid who is ready to 
 lose a limb in order to save his life. 
 
 The problem of free will is perplexing indeed and interferes with the 
 proper attitude toward God and his worship. The best way out of the 
 difficulty is to act as if we were free, and on the other hand to have 
 confidence in God as the author of everything. 
 
 We have seen that the reason bids us recognize our duty to God in 
 return for his goodness to us. At the same time we are not left to the 
 suggestions and promptings of the reason alone. We have a positive 
 law prescribing our conduct and the manner and measure of expressing 
 our gratitude to God. This is made necessary by the constitution of 
 man's nature. He is a composite of body and spirit. The former is at 
 home in this lower world and is endowed with powers and qualities 
 which tend to strengthen it at the expense of the spirit, a stranger in 
 this world. Hence the necessity of a positive law to cure the spirit 
 from the ills of the body by forbidding certain kinds of food, clothing, 
 sexual indulgence, and so on, which strengthen the appetites, and 
 commanding such actions as prayer, fasting, charity, benevolence, 
 which have the opposite tendency of strengthening the reason. 
 
 The positive law is necessary and useful besides because it prescribes 
 the middle way, discouraging equally the extremes of asceticism and 
 of self-indulgence. It regulates and defines conduct, and makes it 
 imiform for old and young, intelligent and unintelligent. It insti- 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 99 
 
 tutes new occasions of worship and thanksgiving as history reveals new 
 benefactions of God to his people in various generations. The law 
 also contains matters which the reason alone would not dictate, and 
 of which it does not understand the meaning. Such are the "tradi- 
 tional commandments." The reason why the law prescribes also 
 some of the principles of the "rational commandments" is because 
 at that time the people were so sunk in their animal desires that 
 their minds were weakened, and there was need of putting both 
 classes of commandments on the same level of positive prescrip- 
 tion. But now the intelligent person observes them in accordance 
 with their distinct origin, whereas the masses simply follow the law 
 in both. 
 
 The admonition of the positive law serves as an introduction to the 
 suggestions of our own reason and prepares the way for the latter. 
 The first is absolutely necessary for the young, the women and those . 
 of weak intellectual power. To worship God not merely because ^ 
 the law prescribes it, but because reason itself demands it denotes a 
 spiritual advance, and puts one in the grade of prophets and pious 
 men chosen of God. In this world their reward is the joy they feel in 
 the sweetness of divine service; in the next world they attain to the 
 spiritual light which we cannot declare or imagine/^^ 
 
 One of the duties of the heart is to trust in God. Apart from the 
 Bible which commands us to have trust in God, we can come to the 
 same conclusion as a result of our own reflection. For in God alone 
 are combined all the conditions necessary to confidence. He has the 
 power to protect and help us, and the knowledge of our needs. He is 
 kind and generous and has a love for us and an interest in our welfare, 
 as we have shown in a previous discussion. Trust in God is of advan- 
 tage religiously in giving a person peace of mind, independence and 
 freedom to devote himself to the service of God without being worried 
 by the cares of the world. He is like the alchemist who changes lead 
 into silver, and silver into gold. If he has money he can make good use 
 of it in fulfilling his duties to God and man. If he has not, he is grate- 
 ful for the freedom from care which this gives him. He is secure 
 against material worries. He does not have to go to distant lands to 
 look for support, or to engage in hard and fatiguing labor, or to exploit 
 other people. He chooses the work that is in consonance with his 
 
lOO MEDIJEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 mode of life, and gives him leisure and strength to do his duty to God 
 and man. 
 
 The suffering of the good and the prosperity of the bad, which ap- 
 parently contradicts our conclusion, is a problem as old as the world, 
 and is discussed in the Bible. There is no one explanation to cover all 
 cases, hence no solution is given in the Bible. But several reasons 
 may be brought forward for this anomaly. The righteous man may 
 suffer by way of punishment for a sin he has committed. He may 
 suffer in this world in order that he may be rewarded in the next. 
 His suffering may be an example of patience and goodness to other 
 people; especially in a bad generation, to show off their wickedness 
 by contrast with his goodness. Or finally the good man may be 
 punished for not rebuking his generation of evil doers. In a similar 
 way we may explain the prosperity of the wicked. 
 
 Trust in God does not signify that one should neglect one's work, 
 be careless of one's life, health and well-being, or abandon one's effort 
 to provide for one's family and dependents. No, one must do all these 
 things conscientiously, at the same time feeling that if not for the help 
 of God all effort would be in vain. In the matter of doing one's duty 
 and observing the commandments, whether of the limbs or the heart, 
 trust in God can apply only to the last step in the process, namely, the 
 realization in practice. He must trust that God will put out of the 
 way all obstacles and hindrances which may prevent him from carry- 
 ing out his resolutions. The choice and consent must come from a 
 man's own will, which is free. The most he may do is to trust that 
 God may remove temptations. 
 
 While it is true that good deeds are rewarded in this world as well 
 as in the next, a man must not trust in his deeds, but in God. It may 
 seem strange that there is no reference in the Bible to reward in the 
 hereafter. The reasons may be the following. Not knowing what the 
 state of the soul is without the body, we could not understand the 
 nature of future reward, and the statement of it in the Bible would 
 not have been a sufficient inducement for the people of that time to 
 follow the commandments. Or it is possible that the people knew by 
 tradition of reward after death, hence it was not necessary to 
 specify it. 
 
 As knowledge of nature and of God leads to trust in him, so igno- 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA lOl 
 
 ranee leads away from it. It is as with a child, who develops in his 
 manner of trusting in things; beginning with his mother's breast and 
 rising gradually as he grows older and knows more, until he embraces 
 other persons and attains to trust in God.^^'* 
 
 We said before (p. 83) that the duties of the limbs are imperfect 
 unless accompanied by the intention of the heart. A man's motive 
 must be sincere. It must not be his aim to gain the favor of his fellow- 
 men or to acquire honor and fame. The observance of the prescribed 
 laws must be motived by the sole regard for God and his service. 
 This we call the "unity of conduct." The meaning is that a man's 
 act and intention must coincide in aiming at the fulfilment of God's 
 will. In order to realize this properly one must have an adequate and 
 sincere conception of God's unity as shown above; he must have an 
 appreciation of God's goodness as exhibited in nature; he must submit 
 to God's service; he must have trust in God alone as the sole author 
 of good and evil; and correspondingly he must abstain from flattering 
 mankind, and must be indifferent to their praise and blame; he must 
 fear God, and have respect and awe for him. When he is in the act 
 of fulfiUing his spiritual obligations, he must not be preoccupied with 
 the affairs of this world; and finally he must always consult his reason, 
 and make it control his desires and inclinations. ^^^ 
 
 Humility and lowliness is an important element conducive to " unity 
 of conduct." By this is not meant that general helplessness in the 
 face of conditions, dangers and injuries because of ignorance of the 
 methods of averting them. This is not humility but weakness. Nor 
 do we mean that timidity and loss of countenance which one suffers 
 before a superior in physical power or wealth. The true himiility 
 with which we are here concerned is that which one feels constantly 
 before God, though it shows itself also in such a person's conduct in 
 the presence of others, in soft speech, low voice, and modest behavior 
 generally, in prosperity as well as adversity. The truly humble man 
 practices patience and forgiveness; he does good to mankind and 
 judges them favorably; he is contented with little in respect to food 
 and drink and the needs of the body generally; he endures misfortune 
 with resignation; is not spoiled by praise, nor irritated by blame, 
 but realizes how far he is from perfection in the one case, and appre- 
 ciates the truth of the criticism in the other. He is not spoiled by 
 
I02 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 prosperity and success, and always holds himself under strict account. 
 God knows it, even if his fellowmen do not. 
 
 Humility, as we have described it, is not, however, incompatible 
 with a certain kind of pride; not that form of it which boasts of physi- 
 cal excellence, nor that arrogance which leads a man to look down 
 upon others and belittle their achievements. These forms of pride 
 are bad and diametrically opposed to true humility. Legitimate 
 mental pride is that which leads a person blessed with intellectual 
 gifts to feel grateful to God for his favor, and to strive to improve 
 his talents and share their benefits with others. ^"^ 
 
 Humility is a necessary forerunner of repentance and we must 
 treat of this duty of the heart next. It is clear from reason as well 
 as from the Law that man does not do all that is incumbent upon him 
 in the service of God. For man is composed of opposite principles 
 warring with each other, and is subject to change on account of the 
 change of his mental qualities. For this reason he needs a law and 
 traditional custom to keep him from going astray. The Bible also 
 tells us that "the imagination of the heart of man is evil from his 
 youth" (Gen. 8, 21). Therefore God was gracious and gave man the 
 ability and opportunity to correct his mistakes. This is repentance. 
 
 True repentance means return to God's service after having suc- 
 ceeded in making the reason the master of the desires. The elements 
 in repentance are, (i) regret; (2) discontinuance of the wrong act; (3) 
 confession and request for pardon; (4) promise not to repeat the 
 offence. 
 
 In respect to gravity of offence, sins may be divided into three 
 classes: (i) Violation of a positive commandment in the Bible which 
 is not punished by "cutting off from the community." For example, 
 dwelling in booths, wearing fringes, and shaking the palm branch. 
 (2) Violation of a negative commandment not so punished. (3) 
 Violation of a negative conmiandment the penalty for which is death 
 at the hands of the court, and being "cut off" by divine agency; for 
 example, profanation of the divine name or false oath. In cases of 
 the first class a penitent is as good as one who never sinned. In the 
 second class he is even superior, because the latter has not the same 
 prophylactic against pride. In the third class the penitent is inferior 
 to the one who never sinned. 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 103 
 
 Another classification of offences is in two divisions according to 
 the subject against whom the offence is committed. This may be 
 a human being, and the crime is social; or it may be God, and we have 
 sin in the proper sense of the term. Penitence is sufficient for forgive- 
 ness in the latter class, but not in the former. When one robs another 
 or insults him, he must make restoration or secure the pardon of the 
 offended party before his repentance can be accepted. And if the per- 
 son cannot be found, or if he died, or is alive but refuses to forgive his 
 offender, or if the sinner lost the money which he took, or if he does not 
 know whom he robbed, or how much, it may be impossible for him to 
 atone for the evil he has done. Still if he is really sincere in his 
 repentance, God will help him to make reparation to the person 
 wronged. ^^^ 
 
 Self-examination is conducive to repentance. By this term is meant 
 taking stock of one's spiritual condition so as to know the merits one 
 has as well the duties one owes. In order to do this conscientiously 
 a man must reflect on the unity of God, on his wisdom and goodness, 
 on the obedience which all nature pays to the laws imposed upon it, 
 disregard of which would result in the annihilation of all things, in- 
 cluding himself. A man should review his past conduct, and provide 
 for his future life, as one provides for a long journey, bearing in mind 
 that life is short, and that he is a stranger in this world with no one 
 to help him except the goodness and grace of his maker. He should 
 cultivate the habit of being alone and not seek the society of idlers, for 
 that leads to gossip and slander, to sin and wrong, to vanity and 
 neglect of God. This does not apply to the company of the pious 
 and the learned, which should be sought. He should be honest and 
 helpful to his friends, and he will get along well in this world. All the 
 evils and complaints of life are due to the fact that people are not 
 considerate of one another, and everyone grabs for himself all that 
 he can, more than he needs. One should examine anew the ideas 
 one has from childhood to be sure that he understands them in the 
 light of his riper intellect. He should also study again the books 
 of the Bible and the prayers which he learned as a child, for he would 
 see them now in a different light. He must try to make his soul control 
 his body, strengthening it with intellectual and spiritual food for the 
 world to come. These efforts and reflections and many others of a 
 
I04 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 similar kind tend to perfect the soul and prepare it to attain to the 
 highest degree of purity, where the evil desire can have no power over 
 her. 128 
 
 In self-examination temperance or abstemiousness plays an impor- 
 tant role. Let us examine this concept more closely. By abstemious- 
 ness in the special sense in which we use it here we do not mean that 
 general temperance or moderation which we practice to keep our body 
 in good order, or such as physicians prescribe for the healthy and the 
 sick, bidding them abstain from certain articles of food, drink, and so 
 on. We mean rather a more stringent abstemiousness, which may be 
 called separation from the world, or asceticism. We may define this 
 to mean abstention from all corporeal satisfactions except such as are 
 indispensable for the maintenance of life. 
 
 Not everyone is required to practice this special form of temperance, 
 nor is it desirable that he should, for it would lead to extinction of the 
 himian race. At the same time it is proper that there shall be a few 
 select individuals, ascetic in their habits of life, and completely sep- 
 arated from the world, to serve as an example for the generality of 
 mankind, in order that temperance of the more general kind shall be 
 the habit of the many. 
 
 The object of God in creating man was to try the soul in order to 
 purify it and make it like the angels. It is tried by being put in an 
 earthy body, which grows and becomes larger by means of food. 
 Hence God put into the soul the desire for food, and the desire for 
 sexual union to perpetuate the species; and he made the reward for 
 the satisfaction of these desires the pleasure which they give. He 
 also appointed the "evil inclination" to incite to all these bodily 
 pleasures. Now if this "evil incUnation" gets the upper hand of the 
 reason, the result is excess and ruin. Hence the need of general ab- 
 stemiousness. And the ascetic class serve the purpose of reinforcing 
 general temperance by their example. 
 
 But in the asceticism of the few there is also a limit beyond which 
 one should not go. Here too the middle way is the best. Those 
 extremists who leave the world entirely and hve the life of a recluse 
 in the desert, subsisting on grass and herbs, are farthest from the 
 middle way, and the Bible does not approve of their mode of life, as 
 we read in Isaiah (45, 18) "The God that formed the earth and made 
 
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 105 
 
 it; he that hath estabUshed it, — not in vain did he create it, he formed 
 it to be inhabited." Those are much better who without leaving for 
 the desert pass sohtary hves in their homes, not associating with other 
 people, and abstaining from superfluities of all kinds. But the best 
 of all are those who adopt the mildest form of asceticism, who separate 
 from the world inwardly while taking part in it outwardly, and assist- 
 ing in the ordinary occupations of mankind. These are commended 
 in the Bible. Witness the prayer of Jacob (Gen. 28, 20), the fasting 
 of Moses forty days and forty nights on the mount, the fasting of 
 Elijah, the laws of the Nazirite, Jonadab ben Rechab, Elisha, prescrip- 
 tions of fasting on various occasions, and so on.^^^ 
 
 The highest stage a man can reach spiritually is the love of God, 
 and all that preceded has this as its aim. True loA^e of God is that 
 felt toward him for his own sake because of his greatness and exalta- 
 tion, and not for any ulterior purpose. 
 
 The soul is a simple spiritual substance which inclines to that 
 which is like it, and departs from what is material and corporeal. 
 But when God put the soul into the body, he implanted in it the 
 desire to maintain it, and it was thus affected by the feelings and de- 
 sires which concern the health and growth of the body, thus becoming 
 estranged from the spiritual. 
 
 In order that the soul shall attain to the true love of God, the reason 
 must get the upper hand of the desires, all the topics treated in the 
 preceding sections must be taken to heart and sincerely and con- 
 scientiously acted upon. Then the eyes of the soul will be opened, and 
 it will be filled with the fear and the love of God.^^" 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 PSEUDO-BAHYA 
 
 It had been known for a number of years that there was a manu- 
 script treatise in Arabic on the soul, which was attributed on the title 
 page to Bahya. In 1896 Isaac Broyde published a Hebrew translation 
 of this work under the title "Torot ha-Nefesh," ("Reflections on the 
 Soul").^^^ The original Arabic was edited by Goldziher in 1907.^^^ 
 The Arabic title is "Ma'ani al-Nafs," and should be translated "Con- 
 cepts of the soul," or "Attributes of the soul." 
 
 There seems little doubt now that despite the ascription on the 
 title page of the manuscript, the treatise is not a work of Bahya. 
 It is very unlikely that anything written by so distinguished an au- 
 thor as Bahya, whose " Duties of the Hearts" was the most popular 
 book in the middle ages, should have been so thoroughly forgotten 
 as to have left no trace in Jewish literature. Bahya as well as the 
 anonymous author refer, in the introductions to their respective works, 
 to their sources or to their own previous writings. But there is no 
 reference either in the "Duties of the Hearts" to the "Attributes of 
 the Soul," or in the latter to the former. A still stronger argument 
 against Bahya as the author of our treatise is that derived from the 
 content of the work, which moves in a different circle of ideas from 
 the "Duties of the Hearts." Our anonymous author is an outspoken 
 Neo-Platonist. He believes in the doctrine of emanation, and arranges 
 the created universe, spiritual and material, in a descending series of 
 such emanations, ten in number. The Mutakallimun he opposes as 
 being followers of the " Naturahsts, " who disagree with the philoso- 
 phers as well as the Bible. Bahya, on the other hand, is a strict fol- 
 lower of the Kalam in his chapter on the "Unity," as we have seen 
 (p. 86), and the Neo-Platonic influence is very sUght. There is no 
 trace of a graded series of emanations in the "Duties of the 
 Hearts." 1^3 
 
 The sources of the "Attributes of the Soul" are no doubt the various 
 
 106 
 
PSEUDO-BAHYA 107 
 
 Neo-Platonic writings current among the Arabs in the tenth and 
 eleventh centuries, of which we spoke in the Introduction (p. xx) 
 and in the chapter on Gabirol (p. 63 f.). Gabirol himself can scarcely 
 have had much influence on our author, as the distinctive doctrine of 
 the "Fons Vitae" is absent in our treatise. The reader will remember 
 that matter and form, according to Gabirol, are at the basis not merely 
 of the corporeal world, but that they constitute the essence of the 
 spiritual world as well, the very first emanation, the Universal In- 
 telhgence, being composed of universal matter and universal form. 
 As we shall see this is not the view of the "Attributes of the Soul." 
 Matter here occupies the position which it has in Plotinus and in the 
 encyclopaedia of the Brethren of Purity. It is the fourth in order of 
 emanations, and the composition of matter and form begins with the 
 celestial sphere, which is the fifth in order. Everything that pre- 
 cedes matter is absolutely simple. At the same time it seems clear 
 that he was familiar with Gabirol's doctrine of the will. For in at 
 least two passages in the "Attributes of the Soul" (chs. 11 and 13) ^^^ 
 we have the series, vegetative soul, spheral impression, [psychic 
 power — omitted in ch. 13], universal soul, intellect, will. 
 
 The "Categories" of Aristotle is also clearly evident in the "At- 
 tributes of the Soul." It is the ultimate source of the definition of 
 accident as that which resides in substance without being a part of it, 
 but yet in such a way that without substance it cannot exist. ^^^ The 
 number of the species of motion as six ^^® points in the same direction. 
 This, however, does not prove that the author read the Categories." 
 He might have derived these notions, as well as the list of the ten 
 categories, from the writings of the Brethren of Purity. The same 
 thing appHes to the statement that a spiritual substance is distin- 
 guished from a corporeal in its capacity of receiving its qualities or 
 accidents without limits. ^^^ This probably goes back to the De Anima 
 of Aristotle where a similar contrast between the senses and the reason 
 is used as an argument for the "separate" character of the latter. 
 The doctrine of the mean in conduct ^^^ comes from the ethics of 
 Aristotle. The doctrine of the four virtues and the manner of their 
 derivation is Platonic, ^^^ and so is the doctrine of reminiscence, viz., 
 that the soul recalls the knowledge it had in its previous life.^^" 
 
 Ibn Sina is one of the latest authors mentioned in our work; hence 
 
io8 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 it could not have been written much before 1037, the date of Ibn 
 Sina's death. The terminus ad quern cannot be determined. 
 
 As the title indicates, the anonymous treatise is concerned primarily 
 with the nature of the soul. Whatever other topics are found therein 
 are introduced for the bearing they have on the central problem. A 
 study of the soul means psychology as well as ethics, for a complete 
 determination of the nature of the soul necessarily must throw light 
 not only upon the origin and activity of the soul, but also upon its 
 purpose and destiny. 
 
 The first error, we are told, that we must remove concerning the soul, 
 is the doctrine of the ''naturalists," with whom the Mu tazilites 
 among the Arabs and the Karaites among the Jews are in agreement, 
 that the soul is not an independent and self-subsistent entity, but only 
 an "accident" of the body. Their view is that as the soul is a cor- 
 poreal quality it is dependent for its existence upon the body and dis- 
 appears with the latter. Those of the Mu tazilites who beUeve in 
 "Mahad" (return of the soul to its origin), hold that at the time of 
 the resurrection God will bring the parts of the body together with its 
 accident, the soul, and will reward and punish them. But the resur- 
 rection is a distinct problem, and has nothing to do with the nature 
 of the soul and its qualities. 
 
 The true opinion, which is that of the Bible and the true philoso- 
 phers, is that the soul is a spiritual substance independent of the 
 body; that it existed before the body and will continue to exist after 
 the dissolution of the latter. The existence of a spiritual substance 
 is proved from the presence of such qualities as knowledge and ig- 
 norance. These are opposed to each other, and cannot be the quali- 
 ties of body as such, for body cannot contain two opposite forms at 
 the same time. Moreover, the substance, whatever it be, which bears 
 the attributes of knowledge and ignorance, can receive them without 
 hmit. The more knowledge a person has, the more capable he is of 
 acquiring more. No corporeal substance behaves in this way. There 
 is always a limit to a body's power of receiving a given accident. We 
 legitimately conclude, therefore, that the substance which bears the 
 attributes of knowledge and ignorance is not corporeal but spiritual. ^^^ 
 
 To understand the position of the soul and its relation to the body, 
 we must have an idea of the structure and origin of the universe. 
 
PSEUDO-BAHYA 109 
 
 The entire world, upper as well as lower, is divided into two parts, 
 simple and composite. The simple essences, which are pure and bright, 
 are nearer to their Creator than the less simple substances which 
 come after. There are ten such creations with varying simplicity, 
 following each other in order according to the arrangement dictated 
 by God's wisdom. As numbers are simple up to ten, and then they 
 begin to be compound, so in the universe the ten simple substances 
 are followed by composite. 
 
 The first of these simple creations, which is nearest to God, is called 
 in Hebrew "Shekinah." The Torah and the Prophets call it "Name" 
 (Exod. 23, 21), also "Kabod," Glory (Is. 59, 19). God gave his name 
 to the nearest and first of his creations, which is the first light, and 
 interpreter and servant nearest to him. Solomon calls it "Wisdom " 
 (Prov. 8, 22); the Greeks, Active Intellect. The second creation is 
 called by the Prophets, "the Glory of the God of Israel " (Ezek. 8, 9); 
 by the Greeks, Universal Soul, for it moves the spheres through a 
 natural power as the individual soul moves the body. The soul 
 partakes of the Intelligence or Intellect on the side which is near to it; 
 it partakes of Nature on the side adjoining the latter. Nature is the 
 third creation. It also is an angel, being the first of the powers of the 
 universal soul, and constituting the life of this world and its motion. 
 
 These three are simple essences in the highest sense of the word. 
 They are obedient to their Creator, and transmit in order his emana- 
 tion and the will, and the laws of his wisdom to all the worlds. The 
 fourth creation is an essence which has no activity or Ufe or motion 
 originally, but only a power of receiving whatever is formed and created 
 out of it. This is the Matter of the world. From it come the bodies 
 which possess accidents. In being formed some of its non-existence 
 is diminished, and its matter moves. It is called "hyle, " and is the 
 same as the darkness of the first chapter in Genesis. For it is a mis- 
 take to suppose that by darkness in the second verse of the first chapter 
 is meant the absence of the light of the sun. This is accidental dark- 
 ness, whereas in the creation story the word darkness signifies some- 
 thing elemental at the basis of corporeal things. This is what is known 
 as matter, which on account of its darkness, i. e., its imperfection and 
 motionlessness, is the cause of all the blemishes and evils in the world. 
 In receiving forms, however, it acquires motion; its darkness is some- 
 
no MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 what diminished, and it appears to the eye through the forms which 
 it receives. 
 
 The fifth creation is the celestial Sphere, where for the first time we 
 have motion in its revolutions. Here too we have the first composition 
 of matter and form; and the beginning of time as the measure of the 
 Sphere's motion; and place. The sixth creation is represented by the 
 bodies of the stars, which are moved by the spheres in which they are 
 set. They are bright and luminous because they are near the first 
 simple bodies, which were produced before time and place. The last 
 four of the ten creations are the four elements, fire, air, water, earth. 
 The element earth is the end of creation." What follows thereafter 
 is "formation" and "composition." By creation is meant that which 
 results through the will of God from his emanation alone, and not out 
 of anything, or in time or place. It applies in the strictest sense to 
 the first three only. The fifth, namely the Sphere, already comes from 
 matter and form, and is in time and place. The fourth, too, enters 
 into the fifth and all subsequent creations and formations. Still, 
 the term creation is applicable to the first ten, though in varying de- 
 grees, until when we reach the element earth, creation proper is at an 
 end. This is why in the first verse in Genesis, which speaks of heaven 
 and earth, the term used is bara" (created), and not any of the other 
 terms, such as "yazar," '"asah," "kanah," "paal," and so on, which 
 denote formation. 
 
 From earth and the other elements were formed all kinds of miner- 
 als, like rocks, mountains, stones, and so on. Then plants and animals, 
 and finally man. 
 
 Man who was formed last bears traces of all that preceded him. 
 He is formed of the four elements, of the motions of the spheres, of 
 the mixtures of the stars and their rays, of Nature, of the Universal 
 Soul, the mother of all, of the Intellect, the father of all, and finally 
 of the will of God. But the order in man is reversed. The first two 
 creations, Intellect and Soul, appear in man last. 
 
 The soul of man, embracing reason and intellect, is thus seen to be 
 a divine emanation, being related to the universal soul and Intellect. 
 On its way from God to man it passes through all spheres, and every 
 one leaves an impression upon her, and covers her with a wrapper, 
 so to speak. The brightness of the star determines the ornament or 
 
PSEUDO-BAHYA iii 
 
 "wrapper" which the soul gets from it. This is known to the Creator, 
 who determines the measure of influence and the accidents attaching 
 to the soul until she reaches the body destined for her by his will. 
 The longer the stay in a given sphere the stronger the influence of the 
 sphere in question; and hence the various temperaments we observe 
 in persons, which determine their character and conduct. For at 
 bottom the soul is the same in essence and unchangeable in all men, 
 because she is an emanation from the Unchangeable. All individual 
 differences are due to the spheral impressions. These impressions, 
 however, do not take away from the soul its freedom of will.^^- 
 
 In the rest of his psychology and ethics the anonymous author 
 follows Platonic theories, modified now and then in the manner of 
 Aristotle. Thus we are told that the soul consists of three powers, 
 or three souls, the vegetative, the animal and the rational. We learn 
 of the existence of the vegetative soul from the nourishment, growth 
 and reproduction evidenced by the individual. The animal soul shows 
 its presence in the motions of the body. The existence of the rational 
 soul we have already shown from the attributes of knowledge and 
 ignorance. 
 
 The vegetative soul comes from certain spheral influences, them- 
 selves due to the universal soul, and ultimately to the will of God. 
 It is the first of the three to make its appearance in the body. It is 
 already found in the embryo, to which it gives the power of motion 
 in its own place like the motion of a plant or tree. Its seat is in the 
 liver, where the growth of the embryo begins. Its function ceases 
 about the twentieth year, when the growth of the body reaches its 
 limit. 
 
 The animal soul springs from the heart. Its functioning appears 
 after birth when the child begins to crawl, and continues until the 
 person loses the power of locomotion in old age. The rational soul 
 resides in the middle of the brain. She knows all things before joining 
 the body, but her knowledge is obscured on account of the material 
 coverings which she receives on her way down from her divine 
 source. ^^^ 
 
 The virtue of the vegetative soul is temperance; of the animal soul, 
 courage; of the rational soul, wisdom. When these are harmoniously 
 combined in the individual, and the two lower souls are controlled 
 
112 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 by the higher, there results the fourth virtue, which is justice, and 
 which gives its possessor the privilege of being a teacher and a leader 
 of his people. In Moses all these qualities were exemplified, and 
 Isaiah (ii, 1-4) in describing the quahties of the Messianic King also 
 enumerates these four cardinal virtues. "The spirit of wisdom 
 and understanding " represents wisdom, " the spirit of coimsel and 
 strength" stands for courage; "the spirit of knowledge and fear of 
 the Lord " denotes temperance; and justice is represented in the 
 phrase, "and he will judge the poor with righteousness." ^^^ 
 
 Virtue is a mean between the two extremes of excess and defect, 
 each of which is a vice. Thus an excess of wisdom becomes shrewd- 
 ness and cunning and deceit; while a defect means ignorance. The 
 true wisdom consists in the middle way between the two extremes. 
 Similarly courage is a mean between foolhardiness and rashness on 
 the side of excess, and cowardice on the side of defect. Temperance is 
 a mean between excessive indulgence of the appetites on one side and 
 utter insensibility on the other. The mean of justice is the result of 
 the harmonious combination of the means of the last three. If the 
 rational soul has wisdom and the two other souls are obedient to it 
 through modesty and courage, their substance changes into the sub- 
 stance of the rational soul, i. e., their bad qualities are transformed into 
 the four virtues just mentioned. Then the two lower souls unite 
 with the rational soul and enjoy eternal happiness with it. On the 
 other hand, if the rational soul follows the senses, its wisdom changes 
 into their folly, its virtues into their vices, and it perishes with them.^'*^ 
 
 The immortality of the soul is proved as follows. Things composed 
 of elements return back to their elements, hence the soul also returns 
 to its own origin. The soul is independent of the body, for its quali- 
 ties, thought and knowledge, are not bodily qualities, hence they 
 become clearer and more certain after the soul is separated from the 
 body than before, when the body obscured its vision like a curtain. 
 The fact that a person's mind is affected when his body is ill does not 
 show that the soul is dependent in its nature upon the body; but that 
 acting as it does in the body by means of corporeal organs, it cannot 
 perform its functions properly when these organs are injured. 
 
 Since death is a decree of God, it is clear that he has a purpose in 
 changing the relations of body and soul. But if the soul comes to an 
 
PSEUDO-BAHYA 1 13 
 
 end, this change would be a vain piece of work of which he cannot 
 be guilty. Hence it follows that the destruction of the body is in 
 order that we may exist in another similar form, similar to the 
 angels. ^^^ 
 
 The purpose of the soul's coming into this world is in order that she 
 may purify the two lower souls; also that she may know the value of 
 her own world in comparison with this one, and in grieving for having 
 left it may observe God's commandments, and thus achieve her re- 
 turn to her own world. 
 
 In the matter of returning to their own world after separation from 
 the body, souls are graded according to the measure of their knowledge 
 and the value of their conduct. These two conditions, ethical and 
 spiritual or intellectual, are requisite of fulfilment before the soul can 
 regain its original home. The soul on leaving this world is like a clean, 
 white garment soaked in water. If the water is clean, it is easy to 
 dry the garment, and it becomes even cleaner than it was before. 
 But if the water is dirty, no amount of dr3ang will make the garment 
 clean. 
 
 Those souls which instead of elevating the two lower souls, vege- 
 tative and animal, were misled by them, will perish with the latter. 
 Between the two extremes of perfection and wickedness there are 
 intermediate stages, and the souls are treated accordingly. Those 
 of the proud will rise in the air and flying hither and thither will not 
 find a resting place. Those which have knowledge, but no good deeds, 
 will rise to the sphere of the ether, but will be prevented from rising 
 higher by the weight of their evil deeds, and the pure angels will rain 
 down upon them arrows of fire, thus causing them to return below in 
 shame and disgrace. The souls of the dishonest will be driven from 
 place to place without finding any rest. Other bad souls will be 
 punished in various ways. Those souls which have good deeds but 
 no knowledge will be placed in the terrestrial paradise until their souls 
 recall the knowledge they had in their original state, and they will 
 then return to the Garden of Eden among the angels. ^^^ 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 ABRAHAM BAR HIYYA 
 
 Abraham bar Hiyya, the Prince, as he is called, lived in Spain in 
 the first half of the twelfth century. He also seems to have stayed 
 some time in southern France, though we do not know when or how 
 long. His greatest merit lies not in his philosophical achievement 
 which, if we may judge from the only work of a philosophical character 
 that has come down to us, is not very great. He is best known as a 
 writer on mathematics, astronomy and the calendar; though there, too, 
 his most important service lay not so much in the original ideas he 
 propounded, as in the fact that he was among the first, if not the 
 first, to introduce the scientific thought current in the Orient and in 
 Moorish Spain into Christian Europe, and especially among the Jews 
 of France and Germany, who devoted all their energies to the Rab- 
 binical literature, and to whom the Arabic works of their Spanish 
 brethren were a sealed book. 
 
 So we find Abraham bar Hiyya, or Abraham Savasorda (a corrup- 
 tion of the Arabic title Sahib al-Shorta), associated with Plato of Tivoli 
 in the translation into Latin of Arabic scientific works. And he him- 
 self wrote a number of books on mathematics and astronomy in He- 
 brew at the request of his friends in France who could not read Arabic. 
 Abraham bar Hiyya is the first of the writers we have treated so far 
 who composed a scientific work in the Hebrew language. All the 
 others, with the exception of Abraham ibn Ezra, wrote in Arabic, as 
 they continued to do until and including Maimonides. 
 
 The only one of his extant works which is philosophical in content 
 is the small treatise "Hegyon ha-Nefesh," Meditation of the Soul.^'*^ 
 It is a popular work, written with a practical purpose, ethical and 
 homiletic in tone and style. The idea of repentance plays an impor- 
 tant role in the book, and what theoretical philosophy finds place 
 therein is introduced merely as a background and basis for the ethical 
 and religious considerations which follow. It may be called a minia- 
 
 "4 
 
ABRAHAM BAR HIYYA 115 
 
 ture "Duties of the Hearts." As in all homiletical compositions in 
 Jewish hterature, exegesis of Bibhcal passages takes up a good deal 
 of the discussions, and for the history of the philosophic movement 
 in mediaeval Judaism the methods of reading metaphysical and ethical 
 ideas into the Bible are quite as important as these ideas themselves. 
 
 The general philosophical standpoint of Abraham bar Hiyya may 
 be characterized as an uncertain Neo-Platonism, or a combination of 
 fundamental Aristotehan ideas with a Neo-Platonic coloring. Thus 
 matter and form are the fundamental principles of the world. They 
 existed potentially apart in the wisdom of God before they were com- 
 bined and thus realized in actuahty.^^^ Time being a measure of 
 motion, came into being together with the motion which followed upon 
 this combination. Hence neither the world nor time is eternal. This 
 is Platonic, not Aristotehan, who believes in the eternity of motion 
 as well as of time. Abraham bar Hiyya also speaks of the purest 
 form as light and as looking at and illuminating the form inferior to 
 it and thus giving rise to the heavens, minerals and plants. ^^^ This 
 is all Neo-Platonic. And yet the most distinctive doctrine of Plotinus 
 and the later Neo-Platonists among the Arabs, the series of emanating 
 hypostases. Intellect, Universal Soul, Nature, Matter, and so on, 
 is wanting in the "Hegyon ha-Nefesh." ^^^ Form is the highest thing 
 he knows outside of God; and the purest form, which is too exalted to 
 combine with matter, embraces angels, seraphim, souls, and all forms 
 related to the upper world. ^^^ With the exception of the names angel, 
 seraphim, souls, this is good Aristotehan doctrine, who also beheves 
 in the movers of the spheres and the active intellect in man as being 
 pure forms. 
 
 To proceed now to give a brief account of Abraham bar Hiyya's 
 teaching, he thinks it is the duty of rational man to know how it is 
 that man who is so insignificant was given control of the other animals, 
 and endowed with the power of wisdom and knowledge. In order to 
 gain this knowledge we must investigate the origins and principles 
 of existing things, so that we may arrive at an understanding of things 
 as they are. This the wise men of other nations have realized, though 
 they were not privileged to receive a divine Torah, and have busied 
 themselves with philosophical investigations. Our Bible recommends 
 to us the same method in the words of Deuteronomy (4, 39), "Know 
 
ii6 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 therefore this day, and reflect in thy heart, that the Lord is God in 
 the heavens above, and upon the earth beneath: there is none else." 
 This means that if you understand thoroughly the order of things in 
 heaven above and the earth beneath, you will at once see that God 
 made it in his wisdom, and that he is the only one and there is no one 
 beside him. The book of Job teaches the same thing, when it says 
 (19, 26) "And from my flesh I shall behold God." This signifies that 
 from the structure of the body and the form of its members we can 
 understand the wisdom of the Creator. We need not hesitate there- 
 fore to study the works of the ancients and the wise men of other 
 nations in order to learn from them the nature of existence. We have 
 the permission and recommendation of Scripture. ^^^ 
 
 Starting from a consideration of man we see that he is the last of 
 created things because we find in him additional composition over and 
 above that found in other creatures. Man is a ^^ rational animal." 
 "Animal" means a body that grows and moves and at last is dissolved. 
 "Rational" refers to the power of knowledge, of inferring one thing 
 from another, and discriminating between good and evil. In this man 
 differs from other animals. Descending in the scale of existence we 
 find that the plant also grows and dies like the animal, but it does not 
 move. Stones, metals and other inanimate bodies on the earth, change 
 their forms and shapes, but unlike plants they have no power of grow- 
 ing or increasing. They are the simplest of the things on the earth. 
 They differ from the heavenly bodies in that the latter never change 
 their forms. Proceeding further in our analysis, we find that body, 
 the simplest thing so far, means length, breadth and depth attached 
 to something capable of being measured. This definition shows that 
 body is also composed of two elements, which are theoretically distinct 
 until God's will joins them together. These are "hyle" (matter) — • 
 what has no likeness or form, but has the capacity of receiving form 
 — and form, which is defined as that which has power to clothe the 
 hyle with any form. Matter alone is too weak to sustain itself, unless 
 form comes to its aid. Form, on the other hand, is not perceptible 
 to sense unless it clothes matter, which bears it. One needs the other. 
 Matter cannot exist without form; form cannot be seen without matter. 
 Form is superior to matter, because it needs the latter only to be seen 
 but can exist by itself though not seen; whereas matter cannot exist 
 
ABRAHAM BAR HIYYA 117 
 
 without form. These two, matter and form, were hidden in God, 
 where they existed potentially until the time came to produce them 
 and reahze them in actu. 
 
 Matter is further divided into two kinds. There is pure matter, 
 which enters into the composition of the heavens, and impure matter, 
 forming the substance of terrestrial bodies. Similarly form may be 
 divided at first into two kinds; closed and sealed form, too pure and 
 holy to be combined with matter; and open and penetrable form, which 
 is fit to unite with matter. The pure, self-subsistent form gazes at 
 and illuminates the penetrable form, and helps it to clothe matter 
 with all the forms of which the latter is capable. 
 
 Now when God determined to realize matter and form in actu, he 
 caused the pure form to be clothed with its splendor, which no hyle 
 can touch. This gave rise to angels, seraphim, souls, and all other 
 forms of the upper world. Not all men can see these forms or conceive 
 them in the mind, because they do not unite with anything which the 
 eye can perceive, and the majority of people cannot understand what 
 they cannot perceive with their corporeal senses. Only those who 
 are given to profound scientific investigations can understand the 
 essence of these forms. 
 
 The light of this pure form then emanated upon the second form, 
 and by the word of God the latter united with the pure matter firmly 
 and permanently, so that there is never a change as long as they are 
 united. This union gave rise to the bodies of the heavens (spheres and 
 fixed stars) which never change their forms. Then the form united 
 with the impure matter, and this gave rise to all the bodies in the 
 sublunar world, which change their forms. These are the four ele- 
 ments, and the products of their composition, including plants. ^^^ 
 
 So far we have bodies which do not change their places. Then a 
 light emanated from the self-subsisting form by the order of God, the 
 splendor of which spread upon the heaven, moving from point to 
 point, and caused the material form (i. e., the inferior, so-called pen- 
 etrable form) to change its place. This produced the stars which 
 change their position but not their forms (planets). From this light 
 extending over the heaven emanated another splendor which reached 
 the body with changing form, giving rise to the three species of living 
 beings, aquatic, aerial and terrestial animals, corresponding to the 
 
Ii8 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 three elements, water, air, earth; as there is no animal life in 
 fire. 
 
 We have so far therefore three kinds of forms, (i) The pure self- 
 subsistent form which never combines with matter. This embraces 
 all the forms of the spiritual world. (2) Form which unites with body 
 firmly and inseparably. These are the forms of the heavens and the 
 stars. (3) Form which unites with body temporarily. Such are the 
 forms of the bodies on the earth. The forms of the second and third 
 classes cannot exist without bodies. The form of class number one 
 cannot exist with body. To make the scheme complete, there ought 
 to be a fourth kind of form which can exist with as well as without 
 body. In other words, a form which unites with body for a time and 
 then returns to its original state and continues to exist without body. 
 Reason demands that the classification should be complete, hence 
 there must be such a form, and the only one worthy of this condition 
 is the soul of man. We thus have a proof of the immortaHty of the 
 soul.^^^ 
 
 These are the ideas of the ancient sages, and we shall find that they 
 are drawn from the Torah. Thus matter and form are indicated in the 
 second verse of Genesis, "And the earth was without form (Heb. Tohu) 
 and void (Heb. Bohu)." "Tohu " is matter; " Bohu" (inn =Ninu) 
 signifies that through which matter gains existence, hence form. 
 "Water " (Heb. Mayim) is also a general word for any of the various 
 forms, whereas "light" (Heb. Or) stands for the pure subsistent form. 
 By "firmament" (Heb. Rakia') is meant the second kind of form 
 which unites with the pure matter in a permanent and unchangeable 
 maimer. "Let there be a firmanent in the midst of the waters'^ 
 (Gen. I, 6) indicates that the "firmament" is embraced by the bright 
 light of the first day, that is the universal form, from which all the 
 other forms come. "And let it divide between water and water " {ib.) 
 signifies that the "firmament" stands between the self-subsistent form 
 and the third kind of form above mentioned, namely, that which unites 
 with body and gives rise to substances changing their forms, hke 
 minerals and plants. The "luminaries " (Heb. Meorot) correspond to 
 the second light mentioned above. We shall find also that the order of 
 creation as given in Genesis coincides with the account given above in 
 the name of the ancient sages. ^^^ 
 
ABRAHAM BAR HIYYA 119 
 
 It would seem as if the self-subsisting form and the two lights 
 emanating from it are meant to represent the Intellect, Soul and 
 Nature of the Neo-Platonic trinity respectively, and that Abraham 
 bar Hiyya purposely changed the names and partly their functions 
 in order to make the philosophical account agree with the story of 
 creation in Genesis. 
 
 With regard to the intellectual and ethical condition of the soul and 
 its destiny, the speculative thinkers of other nations, arguing from rea- 
 son alone and having no divine revelation to guide or confirm their 
 speculations, are agreed that the only way in which the soul, which 
 belongs to a higher world, can be freed from this world of body and 
 change is through intellectual excellence and right conduct. Accordingly 
 they classify souls into four kinds. The soul, they say, may have 
 health, sickness, life, death. Health signifies wisdom or knowledge; 
 sickness denotes ignorance. Life means the fear of God and right 
 conduct; death is neglect of God and evil practice. Every person com- 
 bines in himself one of the two intellectual qualities with one of the 
 two ethical quahties. Thus we have four classes of persons. A man 
 may be wise and pious, wise and wicked, ignorant and pious, ignorant 
 and wicked. And his destiny after death is determined by the class to 
 which he belongs. Thus when a man who is wise and pious departs 
 this world, his soul by reason of its wisdom separates from the body 
 and exists in its own form as before. Owing to its piety it will rise to 
 the upper world until it reaches the pure, eternal form, with which 
 it will unite for ever. If the man is wise and wicked, the wisdom of 
 the soul will enable it to exist without body; but on account of its 
 wickedness and indulgence in the desires of this world, it cannot 
 become completely free from the creatures of this world, and the best 
 it can do is to rise above the sublunar world of change to the world 
 of the planets where the forms do not change, and move about beneath 
 the light of the sun, the heat of which will seem to it like a fire burning 
 it continually, and preventing it from rising to the upper light. 
 
 If the man is ignorant and pious, his soul will be saved from body in 
 order that it may exist by itself, but his ignorance will prevent his 
 soul from leaving the atmosphere of the lower world. Hence the 
 soul will have to be united with body a second, and a third time, if 
 necessary, until it finally acquires knowledge and wisdom, which will 
 
I20 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 enable it to rise above the lower world, its degree and station depend- 
 ing upon the measure of intellect and virtue it possesses at the time 
 of the last separation from the body. The soul of the man who is 
 both ignorant and wicked cannot be saved from the body entirely, 
 and dies like a beast. 
 
 These are the views of speculative thinkers which we may adopt, 
 but they cannot tell us what is the content of the terms wisdom and 
 right conduct. Not having been privileged to receive the sacred Law, 
 which is the source of all wisdom and the origin of rectitude, they 
 cannot tell us in concrete fashion just what a man must know and 
 what he must do in order to raise his soul to the highest degree possible 
 for it to attain. And if they were to tell us what they understand by 
 wisdom and right conduct, we should not listen to them. Our author- 
 ity is the Bible, and we must test the views of the philosophers by the 
 teaching of the Bible. 
 
 If we do this we find authority in Scripture also for belief in the 
 immortality of the soul. Thus if we study carefully the expressions 
 used of the various creations in the first chapter of Genesis, we notice 
 that in some cases the divine command is expressed by the phrase, 
 "Let there be . . . ," followed by the name of the thing to be created; 
 and the execution of the command is expressed by the words, "And 
 there was . . . ," the name of the created object being repeated; or 
 the phrase may be simply, "And it was so," without naming the 
 object. In other cases the expression "Let there be" is not used, nor 
 the corresponding "And there was." 
 
 This variation in expression is not accidental. It is deliberate and 
 must be understood. Upon a careful examination we cannot fail to 
 see that where the expression "Let there be" is used, the object so 
 created exists in this world permanently and without change. Thus, 
 "Let there be light" (Gen. i, 3). If in addition we have the corre- 
 sponding expression, "And there was," in connection with the same 
 object and followed by its name, it means that the object will continue 
 its everlasting existence in the next world also. Hence, "And there 
 was light" {ib.). In the creation of the firmament and the luminaries 
 we have the expression, "Let there be"; the corresponding expression 
 at the end is in each case not, "And there was . . . ," but, "And 
 it was so." This signifies that in this world, as long as it lasts, the 
 
ABRAHAM BAR HIYYA 121 
 
 firmament and luminaries are permanent and without change; but 
 they will have no continuance in the next world. In the creation of 
 the sublunar world we do not find the phrase, "Let there be," at all, 
 but such expressions as, "Let the waters be gathered together" {ib. 9), 
 "Let the earth produce grass" {ib. 11), and so on. This means that 
 these things change their forms and have no permanent existence in 
 this world. The phrase, "And it was so," recording the realization 
 of the divine command, signifies that they do not exist at all in the 
 next world. 
 
 The case is different in man. We do not find the expression, "Let 
 there be," in the command introducing his formation; hence he has 
 no permanence in this world. But we do find the expression, " And 
 the man became (lit. was) a Hving soul " {ib. 2, 7), which means that 
 he will have permanent existence in the next world. The article 
 before the word man in the verse just quoted indicates that not every 
 man lives forever in the next world, but only the good. What manner 
 of man he must be in order to have this privilege, /. e., of what nation 
 he must be a member, we shall see later. This phase of the question 
 the speculative thinkers cannot understand, hence they did not 
 investigate it. Reason alone cannot decide this question; it needs the 
 guidance of the Torah, which is divine. 
 
 Consulting the Torah on this problem, we notice that man is dis- 
 tinguished above other animals in the manner of his creation in three 
 respects, (i) All other living beings were created by means of some- 
 thing else. The water or the earth was ordered to produce them. 
 Man alone was made directly by God. (2) There are three expressions 
 used for the creation of living things, "create" (Heb. bara), "form" 
 (Heb. yazar), and "make" (Heb. 'asah). The water animals have 
 only the first {ib. i, 21), as being the lowest in the scale of animal life. 
 Land animals have the second and the third, "formed" and "made" 
 {ib. I, 25; 2, 19). Man, who is superior to all the others, has all the 
 three expressions {ib. 26, 27; 2, 7). (3) Man was given dominion over 
 the other animals {ib. i, 28). 
 
 As man is distinguished above the other animals, so is one nation 
 distinguished above other men. In Isaiah (43, 7) we read: "Every 
 one that is called by my name, and whom I have created for my glory; 
 I ha-ve formed him; yea, I have made him." The three terms, created, 
 
122 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 formed, made, signify that the reference is to man; and we learn from 
 this verse that those men were created for his glory who are called 
 by his name. But if we inquire in the Bible we find that the nation 
 called by God's name is Israel, as we read {ih. i), "Thus said the Lord 
 that created thee, O Israel, Fear not; for I have redeemed thee, I have 
 called thee by thy name; thou art mine," and in many other passages 
 besides. The reason for this is their belief in the unity of God and 
 their reception of the Law. At the same time others who are not 
 Israelites are not excluded from reaching the same degree through 
 repentance. ■^^'^ 
 
 There is no system of ethics in Abraham bar Hiyya, and we shall 
 in the sequel select some of his remarks bearing on ethics and pick 
 out the ethical kernel from its homiletical and exegetical husk. 
 
 Man alone, he tells us, of all animal creation receives reward and 
 punishment. The other animals have neither merit nor guilt. To be 
 sure, their fortune in life depends upon the manner in which they 
 respond to their environment, but this is not in the way of reward and 
 punishment, but a natural consequence of their natural constitution. 
 With man it is different, and this is because of the responsible position 
 man occupies, having been given the privilege and the ability to con- 
 trol all animal creation. ^^^ 
 
 The psychological basis of virtue in Abraham bar Hiyya is Platonic 
 in origin, as it is in Pseudo-Bahya, though we do not find the four 
 cardinal virtues and the derivation of justice from a harmonious 
 combination of the other three as in the Republic of Plato, to which 
 Pseudo-Bahya is ultimately indebted. 
 
 Man has three powers, we are told, which some call three souls. 
 One is the power by which he grows and multiplies like the plants of 
 the field. The second is that by which he moves from place to place. 
 These two powers he has in common with the animal. The third is 
 that by which he distinguishes between good and evil, between truth 
 and falsehood, between a thing and its opposite, and by which he 
 acquires wisdom and knowledge. This is the soul which distinguishes 
 him from the other animals. If this soul prevails over the lower two 
 powers, the man is called meritorious and perfect. If on the other 
 hand the latter prevail over the soul, the man is accounted like a 
 beast, and is called wicked and an evil doer. God gives merit to the 
 
ABRAHAM BAR HIYYA 123 
 
 animal soul for the sake of the rational soul if the former is obedient 
 to the latter; and on the other hand imputes guilt to the rational soul 
 and punishes her for the guilt of the animal soul because she did not 
 succeed in overcoming the latter. ^^^ 
 
 The question of the relative superiority of the naturally good who 
 feels no temptation to do wrong, and the temperamental person who 
 has to sustain a constant struggle with his passions and desires in or- 
 der to overcome them is decided by Abraham bar Hiyya in favor of the 
 former on the ground that the latter is never free from evil thought, 
 whereas the former is. And he quotes the Rabbis of the Talmud, 
 according to whom the reward in the future world is not the same 
 for the two types of men. He who must overcome temptation before 
 he can subject his lower nature to his reason is rewarded in the next 
 world in a manner bearing resemblance to the goods and pleasures 
 of this world, and described as precious stones and tables of gold 
 laden with good things to eat. On the other hand, the reward of the 
 naturally perfect who is free from temptation is purely spiritual, and 
 bears no earthly traces. These men are represented as " sitting under 
 the Throne of Glory with their crowns on their heads and delighting 
 in the splendor of the Shekinah," ^^^ 
 
 His theodicy offers nothing remarkable. He cites and opposes a 
 solution frequently given in the middle ages of the problem of evil. 
 This is based on the assumption that God cannot be the cause of evil. 
 How then explain the presence of evil in the world? There is no 
 analysis or classification or definition of what is meant by evil. Ap- 
 parently it is physical evil which Abraham bar Hiyya has in mind. 
 Why do some people suffer who do not seem to deserve it? is the 
 aspect of the problem which interests him. One solution that is 
 offered, he tells us, is that evil is not anything positive or substantial. 
 It is something negative, absence of the good, as blindness is absence 
 of vision; deafness, absence of hearing; nakedness, absence of clothing. 
 Hence it has no cause. God produces the positive forms which are 
 good, and determines them to stay a definite length of time. When 
 this time comes to an end, the forms disappear and their negatives 
 take their place automatically without the necessity of any cause. 
 
 Abraham bar Hiyya is opposed to this solution of the problem, 
 though he gives us no philosophic reason for it. His arguments are 
 
124 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Biblical. God is the cause of evil as well as good, and this is the mean- 
 ing of the word "judgment" (Heb. Mishpat) that occurs so often in 
 the Bible in connection with God's attributes. The same idea is 
 expressed in Jeremiah (9, 23) "I am the Lord which exercise loving 
 kindness, judgment and righteousness in the earth." Loving kindness 
 refers to the creation of the world, which was an act of pure grace 
 on the part of God. It was not a necessity. His purpose was purely 
 to do kindness to his creatures and to show them his wisdom and 
 p)ower. Righteousness refers to the kindness of God, his charity 
 so to speak, which every one needs when he dies and wishes to be ad- 
 mitted to the next world. For the majority of men have more guilt 
 than merit. Judgment denotes the good and evil distributed in the 
 world according to the law of justice. Thus he rewards the righteous 
 in the next world, and makes them suffer sometimes in this world in 
 order to try them and to double their ultimate reward. He punishes 
 the wicked in this world for their evil deeds, and sometimes he gives 
 them wealth and prosperity that they may have no claim or defence 
 in the next world. Thus evil in this world is not always the result 
 of misconduct which it punishes; it may be inflicted as a trial, as in 
 the case of Job. Abraham bar Hiyya's solution is therefore that there 
 is no reason why God should not be the author of physical evil, since 
 everything is done in accordance with the law of justice. ^^^ 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 
 
 Little is known of the life of Joseph ben Jacob ibn Zaddik. He lived 
 in Cordova; he was appointed Dayyan, or Judge of the Jewish commu- 
 nity of that city in 1138; and he died in 1149. He is praised as a Tal- 
 mudic scholar by his countryman Moses ibn Ezra, and as a poet by 
 Abraham ibn Daud and Harizi, though we have no Talmudic composi- 
 tion from his pen, and but few poems, whether liturgical or other- 
 wise. ^^^ His fame rests on his philosophical work, and it is this phase of 
 his career in which we are interested here. " 01am Katon " or " Micro- 
 cosm" is the Hebrew name of the philosophical treatise which he wrote 
 in Arabic, but which we no longer possess in the original, being in- 
 debted for our knowledge of it to a Hebrew translation of unknown 
 authorship. ^^^ Maimonides knew Joseph ibn Zaddik favorably, but 
 he was not familiar with the "Microcosm." In a letter to Samuel 
 Ibn Tibbon, the translator of his "Guide of the Perplexed," Mai- 
 monides tells us that though he has not seen the "01am Katon" of 
 Ibn Zaddik, he knows that its tendency is the same as that of the 
 Brothers of Purity {cf. above, p. 60).^^^ This signifies that its trend 
 of thought is Neo-Platonic, which combines Aristotehan physics with 
 Platonic and Plotinian metaphysics, ethics and psychology. 
 
 An examination of the book itself confirms Maimonides's judgment. 
 In accordance with the trend of the times there is noticeable in Ibn 
 Zaddik an increase of Aristotelian influence, though of a turbid kind; 
 a decided decrease, if not a complete abandonment, of the ideas of the 
 Kalam, and a strong saturation of Neo-Platonic doctrine and point 
 of view. It was the fashion to set the Kalam over against the philoso- 
 phers to the disadvantage of the former, as being deficient in logical 
 knowledge and prejudiced by theological prepossessions. This is 
 attested by the attitude towards the Mutakallimun of Judah Halevi, 
 Maimonides, Averroes. And Ibn Zaddik forms no exception to the rule. 
 The circumstance that it was most likely from Karaite writings, which 
 
 125 
 
126 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 found their way into Spain, that Ibn Zaddik gained his knowledge 
 of Kalamistic ideas, was not exactly calculated to prepossess him, 
 a Rabbanite, in their favor. And thus while we see him in the manner 
 of Saadia and Bahya follow the good old method, credited by Mai- 
 monides to the Mutakallimun, of starting his metaphysics with proofs 
 of the world's creation, and basing the existence of God, his unity, 
 incorporeahty and other attributes on the creation of the world as a 
 foundation, he turns into an uncompromising opponent of these much 
 despised apologetes when he comes to discuss the nature of God's 
 attributes, of the divine will, and of the nature of evil. And in all 
 these cases the target of his attack seems to be their Karaite represen- 
 tative Joseph al-Basir, whose acquaintance we made before (p. 48 ff.). 
 
 He laid under contribution his predecessors and contemporaries, 
 Saadia, Bahya, Pseudo-Bahya, Gabirol; and his sympathies clearly 
 lay with the general point of view represented by the last, and his 
 Mohammedan sources; though he was enough of an eclectic to refuse 
 to follow Gabirol, or the Brethren of Purity and the other Neo-Platonic 
 writings, in all the details of their doctrine; and there is evidence of an 
 attempt on his part to tone down the extremes of Neo-Platonic 
 tendency and create a kind of level in which Aristotehanism and 
 Platonism meet by compromising. Thus he beheves with Gabirol 
 that all things corporeal as well as spiritual are composed of matter 
 and form; ^^^ but when it comes to defining what the matter of spiritual 
 things may be, he tells us that we may speak of the genus as the matter 
 of the species — a doctrine which is not so Neo-Platonic after all. For 
 we do not have to go beyond Aristotle to hear that in the definition 
 of an object, which represents its intelligible (opposed to sensible) 
 essence, the genus is like the matter, the difference hke the form. 
 Of the universal and prime matter underlying all created things outside 
 of God, of which Gabirol says that it is the immediate emanation of 
 God's essence and constitutes with universal form the Universal 
 Intelligence, Ibn Zaddik knows nothing. Nor do we find any out- 
 spoken scheme of emanation, such as we see in Plotinus or with a 
 slight modification in the cyclopoedia of the Brethren of Purity, or as 
 it is presupposed in the "Fons Vitae" of Gabirol. Ibn Zaddik does 
 refer to the doctrine of the divine Will, which plays such an important 
 role in the philosophy of Gabirol and of the Pseudo-Empedoclean 
 
JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 127 
 
 writings, which are supposed to have been Gabirol's source. ^^^ But 
 here, too, the negative side of Ibn Zaddik's doctrine is developed at 
 length, while the positive side is barely aUuded to in a hint. He takes 
 pains to show the absurdity of the view that the divine will is a mo- 
 mentary entity created from time to time to make possible the coming 
 into being of the things and processes of our world — a view held by the 
 Mutakallimun as represented by their spokesman al-Basir, but when 
 it comes to explaining his own view of the nature of the divine will, 
 and whether it is identical with God or not, he suddenly becomes 
 reticent, refers us to the writings of Empedocles, and intimates that 
 the matter is involved in mystery, and it is not safe to talk about it 
 too plainly and openly. Evidently Ibn Zaddik was not ready to go 
 all the length of Gabirol's emanationism and Neo-Platonic mysticism. 
 
 The Aristotelian ideas, of which there are many in the "Microcosm," 
 are probably not derived from a study of Aristotle's works, but from 
 secondary sources. This we may safely infer from the way in which 
 he uses or interprets them. An Aristotelian definition is a highly 
 technical proposition in which every word counts, and requires a 
 definition in turn to be understood. In the Aristotelian context the 
 reader sees the methodical derivation of the concept; and the several 
 technical terms making up the definition are made clear by illustrative 
 examples. Aside from the context the proposition is obscure even in 
 the original Greek. Now conceive an Arabic translation of an Aris- 
 totelian definition taken out of its context, and you do not wonder 
 that it is misunderstood; particularly when the interpreter's point of 
 viev\^ is taken from a school of thought at variance with that of Aris- 
 totle. This is exactly what happens to Ibn Zaddik. He quotes ap- 
 provingly Aristotle's definition of the soul, and proceeds to interpret 
 it in a manner not intended by the author of the " De Anima."^®' 
 If he had read the context he could not have misunderstood the def- 
 inition as he did. 
 
 Unlike his predecessors, Ibn Zaddik did not confine himself to a 1 
 special topic in philosophy or to the metaphysical aspects of Judaism. 
 Isaac Israeli and Gabirol discuss special questions in Physics and Meta- 
 physics without bringing them into relation with Judaism or the text 
 of the Bible. Saadia takes cognizance of philosophical doctrine solely 
 with a view to establishing and rationalizing Jewish dogma, and only 
 
128 MEDI/EVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 in so far as it may thus be utilized. Bahya and Abraham bar Hiyya 
 confine their philosophical outlook within still narrower limits, having 
 Jewish ethics as their primary concern. All of the latter make a feature 
 of BibHcal interpretation, which lends to their work the Jewish stamp 
 and to their style the element of homeliness and variety. To this 
 they owe in a measure their popularity, which, however, cannot be 
 said for Abraham bar Hiyya, whose "Hegyon ha-Nefesh" was not 
 printed until the second half of last century. The " Microcosm " of Ibn 
 Zaddik is the first compendium of science, philosophy and theology 
 in Jewish hterature. And yet it is a small book; for Ibn Zaddik does 
 not enter into lengthy discussions, nor does he adorn his style with 
 rhetorical flourishes or copious quotations from Bible and Talmud. 
 The "01am Katon" is clearly meant for beginners, who require a 
 summary and compendious view of so much of physics, psychology, 
 metaphysics and ethics as will give them an idea of the position of man 
 in the world, and his duties, theoretical and practical, in this life, that 
 he may fulfil his destiny for which he was created. It is very possible 
 that Ibn Zaddik modelled his work on the Encyclopaedia of the Breth- 
 ren of Purity, leaving out all that he regarded as imessential or ob- 
 jectional and abridging the rest. 
 
 - Accordingly, the ''Microcosm" is divided into four parts. The 
 first part treats of what is called in the Aristotelian classification of 
 the sciences Physics, i. e., the principles and constitution of the cor- 
 poreal world and its processes. The second treats of man, including 
 anthropology and psychology. The third is devoted to a discussion 
 of the existence, unity, incorporeality and other attributes of God, 
 based upon the doctrine of the creation of the world. This bears the 
 stamp of the Kalam, and is indebted to the writings of Saadia, Bahya 
 and Joseph al-Basir. It covers the topics usually treated by the 
 Mutakallimun in the division of their works, known by the name of 
 "Bab al Tauhid," treatise on Unity, The fourth part corresponds 
 to the "Bab al Adl" of the Kalam, i. e., the second division of Kala- 
 mistic works devoted to theodicy, or vindication of God's justice 
 in his dealings with mankind. Hence it includes theological questions 
 of an ethical nature, like freedom of the will, reasons for divine wor- 
 ship, the nature of reward and punishment, and so on. 
 
 The book was written, Ibn Zaddik tells us, in answer to the question 
 
JOSEPH IBN Z ADD IK 129 
 
 of a pupil concerning the meaning of such terms as perfection" and 
 "permanent good, " used by philosophers. They are not of this world 
 these men say, and yet every man of intelligence should seek them. 
 This is a very difficult subject, made more so by the small number of 
 persons engaged in its study. Particularly in our own generation is 
 this true, that the value of knowledge and investigation is not recog- 
 nized. People are Jews in name only, and men only in outward ap- 
 pearance. Former ages were much superior in this regard. 
 
 Two fundamental requisites are necessary for the knowledge of our 
 subject. They are the knowledge of God, and performance of his 
 wiU. For this purpose we must understand tlie works of the philoso- 
 phers. But these in turn require a knowledge of the preliminary 
 sciences of arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy, and logic. This 
 takes a long time and is likely to weary the student, especially the 
 beginner. I have therefore made it my purpose to show how a man 
 can know himself, for from a knowledge of self he will com.e to a knowl- 
 edge of all. Man is called "Microcosm," a world in miniature, 
 because he has in him represented all the elements of the universe. 
 His body resembles the corporeal world; his rational soul the spiritual 
 world. Hence the importance of knowing himself, and hence the defi- 
 nition of philosophy as a man's knowledge of himself. Philosophy is 
 the science of sciences and the end thereof, because it is the path to a 
 knowledge of the Creator. ^^ 
 
 Here we see at the outset Ibn Zaddik's Neo-Platonic tendency to 
 make a short cut to knowledge through the study of man instead of 
 the painful and laborious mastery of the prehminary sciences. And 
 so it was that the Neo-Platonists added little to Aristotle's study of 
 nature, concentrating their attention upon the intelligible or spiritual 
 world. 
 
 The first thing we must do then is to show that the human body is 
 similar to the corporeal world. This will require an analysis of the 
 structure of the latter. But before examining the objects of knowledge, 
 we must say a word about the process of knowing. Man perceives 
 things in two ways — through sense and through intellect. His senses 
 give him the accidents of things, the sheU or husk, so to speak. He 
 perceives color through sight, sound through hearing, odor through 
 smell, and so on. It takes reason to penetrate to the essence of an 
 
I30 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 object. Take as an example a book. The sense of sight perceives its 
 color, and through the color its form. This is then apprehended by 
 the power of imagination or representation. The latter in turn hands 
 it over to the cogitative power of the rational soul, from the reflection 
 of which results the spiritual reality of the object, which is its knowl- 
 edge. So we see that the reason knows the essence and reality of a 
 thing, whereas the senses know only its husk and its accidents. This 
 same thing is stated by the philosopher in another form. The senses, 
 he says, know only the particular, the universal can be known by the 
 intellect only. This is because the soul is fine and penetrating, while 
 the body is gross, and can reach the surface only. 
 
 We may also classify knowledge from another point of view as 
 necessary (or immediate), and demonstrated (or mediate). Necessary 
 knowledge is that which no sane man can deny. Such knowledge 
 may be of the senses, as the sight of the sun or the sound of thunder; 
 or it may be of the reason, such as that the whole is greater than its 
 parts. We may then enumerate four kinds of things known directly 
 without the help of other knowledge, (i) The percepts of the senses. 
 (2) Truths generally admitted by reason of their self-evidence. (3) 
 Traditional truths, i. e., truths handed down by a rehable and wise 
 man, or by a community worthy of credence. (4) First principles 
 or axioms. These four can be easily reduced to two; for traditional 
 truths ultimately go back to the testimony of the senses; while first 
 principles or axioms are included in self-evident propositions. We 
 thus have two kinds of necessary or immediate knowledge, the data 
 of sense, and self-evident propositions. The latter kind is superior 
 to the former, because man shares sense knowledge with the lower 
 animals; whereas rational propositions are peculiar to him alone. 
 
 Demonstrated knowledge is built upon necessary knowledge, and 
 is derived from it by means of logical inference. ^^^ 
 
 We may now proceed to discuss the principles of the corporeal 
 world. Matter is the foundation and principle of a thing. All things, 
 natural as well as artificial, are composed of matter and form. Wood 
 is the common matter of chair and bed. Their forms are different. 
 So the common matter of the four elements is the prime matter en- 
 dowed with the form of corporeality, i. e., with the capacity of 
 filling place. This form of corporeality makes the prime matter 
 
JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 13 1 
 
 corporeal substance. Matter is relative to form, form is relative to 
 matter. 
 
 Spiritual things also have matter and form. In corporeal artificial 
 things like ring or bracelet, the matter is gold, the form is the form of 
 ring or bracelet, the efficient cause is the art of the goldsmith, the 
 final cause or purpose is the adornment. In spiritual things we may 
 compare genus to matter, species to form, specific difference to effi- 
 cient cause, the individual to the final cause. 
 
 Everything exists either by itself {per se) or in something else. 
 Matter exists by itself, form exists in something else, in matter. Mat- 
 ter is potentially substance; after it assumes a form it becomes actual 
 substance. In reahty there is no matter without form, but in thought 
 we can remove the form and leave the matter. 
 
 Substance may be described as that which bears opposite and chang- 
 ing qualities. No substance can be the opposite of another substance 
 through its substantiality, but through its accidents; for opposition 
 resides in quality. Matter receiving form is substance. Absolute 
 substance is simple and spiritual, for it cannot be perceived through 
 the five senses. When the philosophers say that all body is substance, 
 and that the individual is a substance, they use substance in contra- 
 distinction to accident, meaning that the individual exists by itself, 
 and needs not another for its existence, unlike accidents, which must 
 have something to exist in. 
 
 This absolute substance, which is simple and spiritual, seems to be 
 identical with Gabirol's "substantia quae sustinet decem praedica- 
 menta," the substance which supports the ten categories. Gabirol 
 means by it that which remains of a corporeal substance when we take 
 away from it everything that qualifies it as being here or there, of a 
 particular nature or size, in a given relation, and so on. 
 
 The expression corporeal world includes the celestial spheres and 
 all which is under them. To be sure, the body of the sphere is different 
 from the other bodies in matter and form and qualities. It consists 
 of a fifth nature, different from the four elements. It is not cold, or 
 it would move downward like earth and water. It is not warm, or 
 it would move upward like air and fire. It is not wet, for it would then 
 roll Hke the waves of the sea. Nor is it dry, for it would condense and 
 not move at all. Not being any one of these qualities, which constitute 
 
132 MEDimVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 our four elements, the sphere is not a composite of them either; for 
 the simple is prior to the composite, and we cannot regard the elements 
 of the sublunar world as prior and superior to the spheres. 
 
 The sphere is neither Hght nor heavy. For light and heavy are 
 relative terms. An object is heavy when out of its natural place, light 
 when in its natural place. Thus a stone is heavy when it is away 
 from the earth, which is its natural place, but is light when it comes 
 to rest where it belongs. The sphere is never out of its place or in its 
 place, as it moves constantly in a circle. Hence it is neither light nor 
 heavy. 
 
 Ibn Zaddik's definition of light and heavy as being relative, and 
 dependent on the relation of the object to its natural place is pecuhar, 
 and would lead him to say that fire and air are also heavy when out 
 of their natural place, which is outside of, and above earth and water. 
 But this does not seem in consonance with the Aristotelian use of 
 these terms. According to Aristotle an object is heavy if its tendency 
 is to move to the centre of the world; it is light if it moves away from 
 the centre to the circumference. Hence earth and water are heavy, 
 fire and air are light. The natural place of a body or element is that 
 to which it has a tendency to move, or in which it has a tendency to 
 rest, when left to itself. Hence a body will always move to its natural 
 place when away from it and under no restriction; and its heaviness 
 or lightness does not change with its position. 
 
 To continue, the sphere moves in a circle, the most perfect of all 
 motions, having neither beginning nor end. It is more perfect than 
 all bodies, and the knowledge of God is not hidden from it as it is 
 hidden from us. Whatever moves in a circle must move around a 
 body at rest; for if it moves around another moving body, this second 
 body must have another body around which it moves, and this third 
 body another, and so on ad infinitum, which is impossible. Hence 
 the sphere moves around a body at rest. This is the earth. 
 
 The four elements of the sublunar world are, fire, air, water, earth. 
 In their purity these elements have neither color nor taste, nor odor 
 nor any other sensible property. For the elements are simple bodies, 
 whereas the sensible qualities are the result of the composition of the 
 elements. If air had color, we should see it as we see all colored things; 
 and all other things would appear to us in the color of air, as is the 
 
JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 133 
 
 case when we look through a colored glass. The same argument ap- 
 plies to water. 
 
 The elements change into each other. We see water changing under 
 the effect of heat into vapor, and the vapor condenses again under 
 the influence of cold and changes back to water, namely, rain. Air 
 changes into fire when flint strikes iron. Fire cannot exist here unless 
 it has something to take hold of; otherwise it changes into air. Earth 
 and water change into each other very slowly, because earth is hard 
 to change. 
 
 The basis of the four elements is a substance filling place as a result 
 of its assuming the form of corporeality, i. e., extension in three direc- 
 tions. Filling place, it moves; moving, it becomes warm. When its 
 motion is completed, it necessarily comes to rest and becomes cold. 
 Heat and cold are the active powers, wet and dry are the passive 
 quahties, wet being associated with heat, dry with cold. The mixture 
 of these qualities with the corporeal basis results in the four elements. 
 
 The three natures, mineral, plant, animal are composed of the four 
 elements. When a seed is put in the ground it cannot grow without 
 water, and sunshine and air. These form its food, and food is assimi- 
 lated to the thing fed. Our bodies are composed of the four elements, 
 because they are nourished by plants. The general process of the sub- 
 lunar world is that of genesis and dissolution. The genesis of one 
 thing is the dissolution of another. The dissolution of the egg is the 
 genesis of the chicken; the dissolution of the chicken is the genesis 
 of the four elements; for in the living being the elements are poten- 
 tial, and they become actual when the animal dies. This continuous 
 process of genesis and dissolution proves that this world is not perma- 
 nent, for the basis of its processes is change.^*'" 
 
 The human body corresponds to the corporeal world, and is similar 
 to it in its nature and matter. Man's body is subject to genesis and 
 decay like other objects. It is composed of the elements and returns 
 to them. It has in it the nature of minerals, plants and animals. It 
 has the power of growth, sustenance and reproduction like plants. 
 Man is like animal in having motion and sensation. He has the spir- 
 ited power and the appetitive like other animals. His body is perfect 
 because it has resemblances to all kinds of plants and animals. His 
 body as a whole resembles great trees, his hair is like grass and shrubs. 
 
134 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Animals have various qualities according to the relation of the animal 
 soul to the body. Thus the lion has strength, the lamb meekness, the 
 fox shrewdness, and so on. Mankind includes all of these qualities. 
 In the same way various animals have various instincts resembling 
 arts, such as the weaving of the spider, the building of the bird and 
 the bee, and so on. They also subsist on various foods. Man alone 
 combines all arts and all kinds of food. 
 
 The human body has three dimensions like inanimate bodies. It 
 is also similar to the bodies of plants and animals, and at the same 
 time is distinguished alone among animals by its erect position. This 
 is due to the fact that man's nature is proportionate, and his body is 
 purer and finer than other bodies. Thus we see when oil is pure, its 
 flame rises in a straight line; when the oil is impure the flame is not 
 straight. Another thing proving that man's nature is superior to that 
 of other animals is that the latter live in that element which is akin to 
 their constitution — fish in water, birds in air, quadrupeds on land. 
 Man alone can inhabit all three. Another reason for man's erect 
 position is that he is a plant originating in heaven. Hence his head, 
 which is the root, faces heaven. ^'^^ 
 
 Man has three souls, a plant soul, an animal soul and a rational 
 soul. He must have a plant soul to account for the fact that man 
 grows like other plants and dies like them. For if he can grow without 
 a plant soul, plants can do the same. And if this too is granted, then 
 there is no reason why mountains and stones should not grow also. 
 Again, if man can grow without a plant soul, he can live without an 
 animal soul, and know without a rational soul, which is absurd. 
 
 The faculty of the vegetative soul is the appetitive power, whose 
 seat is in the liver. Its subordinate powers are those of nutrition and 
 growth. Through it man feels the need of food and other natural 
 desires. He has this in common with the lower animals. It is the 
 first power that appears in man while he is still in his mother's womb. 
 First comes the power which forms the combined seed of the male 
 and the female into a human being in its proper form and nature. 
 In doing this it requires the assistance of the "growing" power, which 
 begins its activity as soon as the first member is formed, and continues 
 until the period of youth is completed. This power in turn needs the 
 assistance of the nourishing power, which accompanies the other two 
 
JOSEPH IBM ZADDIK 135 
 
 from the beginning of their activity to the end of the person's life. 
 All this constitutes the plant soul, and it must not be supposed that 
 these powers are separated from one another, and that one is in one 
 place and another in another place. They are all spiritual powers 
 derived from the universal powers in the upper world. 
 
 When the form of the being is complete, the animal soul makes its 
 appearance. This soul is carried in the spirit of the animal or man, 
 which is found in the pure blood of the arteries. There are two mem- 
 branes in every artery, making two passages, one for blood and the 
 other for the spirit or wind. The seat of the animal soul is in the heart, 
 and it is borne in the pure red blood. This is why we see in the heart 
 two receptacles; in one is spirit, in the other, blood. Hence after 
 death we find congealed blood in the one, while the other is empty. 
 Death happens on account of the defective "mixture" of the heart. 
 This means that the four humors of which the body is composed, 
 namely, blood, yellow and black gall and phlegm, lose the proper 
 proportionality in their composition, and one or other of them pre- 
 dominates. An animal does not die unless the mixture of the heart 
 is injured, or the heart is wounded seriously. Death is also caused 
 by disease or injury of the brain. For the brain is the origin of the 
 nerves which control the voluntary activities by means of contraction 
 and expansion. If the chest does not contract, the warm air does not 
 come out; if it does not expand, the cold air does not come in; and if 
 the air does not come in or out, the heart loses its proportionality, 
 and the animal dies. The functions of the animal soul are sensation 
 and motion. This motion may be active as well as passive. The 
 active motions are those of the arteries, and the expansion and con- 
 traction of the chest which results in respiration. The passive motions 
 give rise to the emotions of anger, fear, shame, joy, sorrow. 
 
 Anger is the motion of the spirit within the body toward the outside, 
 together with the blood and the humors. This is found in animals 
 also. Fear is the entrance of the soul within, leaving the surface of 
 the body, and causing the extremities to become cold. Shame is a 
 motion inward, and forthwith again outward. Sorrow is caused in 
 the same way as fear, except that fear is sudden, while sorrow is 
 gradual. This is why fear sometimes kills when the body is weak. 
 Joy is motion outward. Joy may kill too, when it is very great, and 
 
136 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the person is weak and without control. Joy is of the nature of pleas- 
 ure, except that pleasure is gradual, while joy is sudden. 
 
 Pain is that feeling we have when we are taken out of our natural 
 state and put into an unnatural. Pleasure is felt when we are restored 
 to the natural. Take, for example, the heat of the sun. When a 
 person is exposed to it, the sun takes him out of his natural state. 
 Heat is then painful, and pleasure is produced by the thing which 
 restores him to his natural state; in this case a cold spring and a drink 
 of cold water. Similarly a person walking in the snow and cold air 
 feels pain by reason of the cold taking him out of his natural state. 
 Heat then gives him pleasure by restoring him. The same thing 
 applies to hunger and thirst, sleeping and waking, and other things 
 which give us pleasure and pain. Without pain there is no pleasure, 
 and the pleasure varies in accordance with the antecedent pain. 
 
 Life is the effect of the animal soul. The disappearance of the 
 effect does not necessarily involve the disappearance of the cause, 
 as the disappearance of the smoke does not require the cessation of 
 the fire. Death means simply the separation of the soul, not the de- 
 struction thereof. It does not follow because the human soul remains 
 after the death of the body, that the soul of the ox and the ass con- 
 tinues likewise, for the two souls are different. Animals were created 
 for the sake of man, whereas man exists for his own sake. Moreover, 
 man's life is ultimately derived from his rational soul. For if the 
 animal soul of man were the ultimate source of life, the rational soul 
 too would be dependent for its life upon the former, and hence would 
 be inferior to it, which is absurd. It remains then that the rational 
 soul gives existence to the animal soul in man. 
 
 Sleep is the rest of the senses, as death is their entire cessation. 
 The purpose of sleep is to give the brain rest so that the "spirit" 
 of the soul should not be dissolved and the mixture " of the body 
 injured suddenly and cause death. The heart rests continually be- 
 tween contraction and expansion, hence it needs no special rest at 
 night. Waking is the activity of the senses and the exercise of their 
 functions to satisfy the desires of the body. The motions of the soul 
 in the waking state are in the interest of the needs of the body. Dur- 
 ing sleep the soul looks out for itself, for its better world, being then 
 free from the business of the body. If it is pure and bright, and the 
 
JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 137 
 
 body is free from the remnant of food, and the thought is not de- 
 pressed by sorrow and grief — then the soul is aroused in its desire 
 for the future, and beholds wonderful things. ^^^ 
 
 No one can deny that man has a rational soul because speech is an 
 attribute which man has above all other animals. The soul is not a 
 corporeal thing, for if it were it would have to occupy place like body, 
 and would have color and form and other qualities like body. More- 
 over, it would require something else to give it life like body. In other 
 words, the soul would require another soul, and that soul another 
 soul, and so on ad infinitum, which is impossible. Hence the soul is 
 not a corporeal thing. 
 
 Nor can we say that the soul is in the body. For if it were, it would 
 itself be body; since only body can fiU the empty place in another 
 body, as water fills a jar. 
 
 The soul is a substance and not an accident. An accident is a 
 quality which makes its appearance in something else, and has no 
 permanence. If then the rational soul is an accident of the body, 
 it has no permanence, and man is sometimes rational and some- 
 times not. This is absurd, for in that case there could be no purpose 
 in giving him commandments and statutes. 
 
 There are inseparable accidents to be sure, like the color of the 
 Ethiopian's skin. But in that case we know the color is an accident 
 despite its inseparability, from the fact that in other things color 
 is an accident and may be removed. This will not apply to the reason. 
 For we do not find anything in which reason is a removable accident. 
 The moment you remove reason, you remove man, for reason is 
 essential to man. The fact that as a result of an injury a man may 
 lose his reason is no argument against us, for this happens only when 
 an injury is inflicted on the brain, which is the reason's instrument. 
 This accounts for the fact, too, that men in good health if given hen- 
 bane to drink lose their reason, because the drink affects the brain. 
 On the other hand, we see that those afiflicted with a certain disease of 
 the intestines, which causes their death, are more rational and brighter 
 at the time of death than ever before, showing that the soul cannot be 
 an accident depending upon the "mixture" of the body. 
 
 To regard the soul as an accident, while the body is a substance, 
 would make the soul inferior to the body. This is absurd. For we 
 
138 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 have the body in common with the beasts; whereas it is in virtue of 
 the reason that we are given commandments, and reward and punish- 
 ment in the world to come. 
 
 If the soul is neither a corporeal thing nor an accident of body, 
 it must be a spiritual substance. And the best definition of the soul 
 is that of Aristotle, who says it is a substance giving perfection to a 
 natural organic body, which has life potentially. Every phrase in this 
 definition tells. "Substance" excludes the view that the soul is an 
 accident. "Giving perfection" signifies that the soul is that which 
 makes man perfect, bringing him to the next world, and being the 
 purpose not merely of his creation and the composition of his body, 
 but of the creation of matter as well. "Natural organic body" in- 
 dicates that the body is an organon, or instrument in the function of 
 the soul, the latter using the body to carry out its own purposes. The 
 rational soul is like a king; the animal soul is like an ojB&cial before 
 the king, rebuking the appetitive soul. 
 
 In the discussion of the last paragraph we have a good example 
 of the uncritical attitude of Ibn Zaddik toward the various schools 
 of philosophical thought, particularly those represented by Plato and 
 Aristotle. This attitude is typical of the middle ages, which appealed 
 to authority in philosophy as weU as in theology, and hence developed 
 a harmonistic attitude in the presence of conflicting authorities. Aided 
 by their defective knowledge of the complete systems of the ancient 
 Greek philosophers, by the difficulties and obscurities incident to 
 translations from an alien tongue, and by the spurious writings cir- 
 culating in the name of an ancient Greek philosopher, the precise 
 demarcation of schools and tendencies became more and more con- 
 fused, and it was possible to prove that Plato and Aristotle were in 
 entire agreement. Thus Ibn Zaddik has no scruple in combining 
 (unconsciously, to be sure) Platonic and Neo-Platonic psychology 
 with the Aristotelian definition representing quite a different point 
 of view. The one is anthropological duaUsm, regarding the soul as 
 a distinct entity which comes to the body from without. The other 
 is a biological monism, in which the soul is the reahty of the body, the 
 essence of its functioning, which makes the potentially living body 
 an actually living body. We cannot enter here into a criticism of 
 the elements of the Aristotelian definition of the soul as rendered and 
 
JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 139 
 
 interpreted by Ibn Zaddik, but will merely say that it misses com- 
 pletely the meaning of Aristotle, and shows that Ibn Zaddik did not 
 take it from the " De Anima" of Aristotle, but found it without its 
 context in some Arabic work. 
 
 To return from our digression, the three souls, Ibn Zaddik tells us, 
 are spiritual powers; every one of them is a substance by itself of 
 benefit to the body. The rational soul gets the name soul primarily, 
 and the others get it from the rational soul. The Intellect is called soul 
 because the rational soul and the Intellect have a common matter. 
 And hence when the soul is perfected it becomes intellect. This is 
 why the rational soul is called potential intellect. The only difference 
 between them is one of degree and excellence. The world of Intellect 
 is superior, and its matter is the pure hght, Intellect in which there is 
 no ignorance, because it comes from God without any intermediate 
 agency. 
 
 Here we see just a touch of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation, 
 of which the Universal Intellect is the first. But it is considerably 
 toned down and not continued down the series as in Plotinus or the 
 Brethren of Purity. 
 
 The accidents of the soul are spiritual like the soul itself. They 
 are, knowledge, kindness, goodness, justice, and other similar qual- 
 ities. Ignorance, wrong, evil, and so on, are not the opposites of 
 those mentioned above, and were not created with the soul like the 
 others. They are merely the absence of the positive qualities men- 
 tioned before, as darkness is the absence of hght. God did not create 
 any defect, nor did he desire it. Evil is simply the result of the in- 
 capacity of a given thing to receive a particular good. If all things 
 were capable of receiving goods equally, all things would be one thing, 
 and the Creator and his creatures would be likewise one. This was 
 not God's purpose. 
 
 There is a tacit opposition to the Mutakallimun in Ibn Zaddik's 
 arguments against the view that the soul is an accident, as well as 
 in his statement in the preceding paragraph that the bad quaUties 
 and evil generally are not opposites of the good quahties and good 
 respectively, but that they are merely privations, absences, and hence 
 not created by God. This is a Neo-Platonic doctrine. Pseudo-Bahya, 
 we have seen (p. 108 f.), and Abraham bar Hiyya (p. 123 f.) adopt 
 
I40 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the Kalamistic view in the latter point, and solve the problem of evil 
 differently. 
 
 The function of the rational soul is knowledge. The rational soul 
 investigates the unknown and comprehends it. It derives general 
 rules, makes premises and infers one thing from another. Man alone 
 has this privilege. It is in virtue of the rational soul that we have 
 been given commandments and prohibitions, and become liable to 
 reward and punishment. Brute animals have no commandments, 
 because they have no reason. The soul has reason only potentially, 
 and man makes it actual by study. If the reason were actual orig- 
 inally in the soul, there would be no difference between the soul's 
 condition in its own world and in this one; and the purpose of man, 
 which is that he may learn in order to choose the right way and win 
 salvation, would have no meaning. 
 
 The existence of many individual souls, all of which have the soul 
 character in common, shows that there is a universal soul by virtue 
 of which all the particular souls exist. This division of the universal 
 soul into many individual souls is not really a division of the 
 former in its essence, which remains one and indivisible. It is the 
 bodies which receive the influence of the universal soul, as vessels 
 in the sun receive its light according to their purity. Hence the ex- 
 istence of justice and evil, righteousness and wrong. This does not, 
 however, mean to say that the reception of these qualities is independ- 
 ent of a man's choice. Man is free to choose, and hence he deserves 
 praise and blame, reward and punishment. 
 
 The rational soul is destined for the spiritual world, which is a pure 
 and perfect world, made by God directly without an intermediate 
 agency. It is not subject to change or defect or need. God alone 
 created this spiritual world to show his goodness and power, and not 
 because he needed it. The world is not like God, though God is its 
 cause. It is not eternal a parte ante, having been made out of nothing 
 by God; but it wiU continue to exist forever, for it cannot be more 
 perfect than it is. It is simple and spiritual. This applies also to the 
 heavenly spheres and their stars. 
 
 Man is obhged to reason and investigate, as all nations do accord- 
 ing to the measure of their capacities. No animal reasons because it 
 has not the requisite faculty. But if man should neglect to exercise 
 
JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 141 
 
 the power given him, he would lose the benefit coming therefrom and 
 the purpose of his existence. There would then be no difference 
 between him and the beast. 
 
 The first requisite for study and investigation is to deaden the ani- 
 mal desires. Then with the reason as a guide and his body as a model, 
 man acquires the knowledge of the corporeal world. From his rational 
 soul he comes to the knowledge of the existence of a spiritual world. 
 Finally he will learn to know the Creator, who is the only real existent, 
 for nothing can be said truly to exist, which at one time did not exist, 
 or which at some time will cease to exist. When a man neglects this 
 privilege which is his of using his reason, he forfeits the name man, 
 and descends below the station of the beast, for the latter never falls 
 below its animal nature. 
 
 It is very important to study the knowledge of God, for it is the 
 highest knowledge and the cause of himian perfection. The prophets 
 are full of recommendations in this regard. Jeremiah says (31, 2^;^), 
 "They shall all know me, from the least of them even unto their 
 greatest." Amos (5, 6) bids us "Seek for the Lord and you shall 
 live." Hosea likewise (6, 3) recommends that "We may feel it, and 
 strive to know the Lord." ^^^ 
 
 The first loss a man suffers who does not study and investigate is 
 that he does not understand the real existence of God, and imagines 
 he is worshipping a body. Some think God is light. But this is as 
 bad as to regard him body. For light is an accident in a shining body, 
 as is proved by the fact that the air receives the light of the sun, and 
 later it receives the shadow and becomes dark. And yet these people 
 are not the worst by any means, for there are others who do not 
 trouble to concentrate their minds on God, and occupy their thoughts 
 solely with the business and the pleasures of this world. These people 
 we do not discuss at all. We are arguing against those who imagine 
 they are wise men and students of the Kalam. In fact they are ig- 
 norant persons, and do not know what logic is and how it is to be used. 
 
 Before giving our own views of the nature and existence of God, 
 we must refute the objectionable doctrines of these people. Joseph 
 al-Basir in a work of his called "Mansuri" casts it up to the Rab- 
 banites that in believing that God descends and ascends they are not 
 true worshippers of God. But he forgets that his own doctrines are 
 
142 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 no better. Anyone who believes that God created with a newly 
 created will and rejects by means of a newly created rejection has 
 never truly served God or known him. Just as objectionable is their 
 view that God is living but not with life residing in a subject, powerful 
 but not with power, and so on. We shall take up each of these in turn. 
 
 The MutakaUimun refuse to believe that God's will is eternal, for 
 fear of having a second eternal beside God. And so they say that 
 whenever God wills, he creates a will for the purpose, and whenever 
 he rejects anything he creates a " rejection " with which the objection- 
 able thing is rejected. But this leads them to a worse predicament 
 than the one from which they wish to escape, as we shall see. If 
 God cannot create anything without having a will as the instrument 
 in creating, and for this reason must first create a will for the purpose 
 — ^how did he create this will? He must have had another will to 
 create this will, and a third will to create the second, and so on ad 
 infinitum, which is absurd. If he created the first will without the 
 help of another will, why not create the things he wanted outright 
 without any will? Besides, in making God will at a given time after 
 a state of not willing, they introduce change in God. 
 
 As for the other dictum, that God is "living but not with life," 
 "powerful but not with power," "knowing but not with knowledge," 
 and so on; what do they mean by this circumlocution? If they say 
 "living" to indicate that he is not dead, and add "but not with life," 
 so as to prevent a comparison of him with other living things, why 
 not say also, "He is body, but not like other bodies "? If the objection 
 to calling him body is that body is composite, and what is composite 
 must have been composed by someone and is not eternal, the same 
 objection applies to "living." For "living" implies "breathing" 
 and "possessed of sensation," hence also composite and created. 
 If they reply, we mean life peculiar to him, we say why not also body 
 peculiar to him? You see these people entangle themselves in their 
 own sophisms, because they do not know what demonstration 
 means. ^^^ 
 
 Having disposed of the errors of the MutakaUimun, we must now 
 present our own method of investigation into the nature of God. 
 To know a thing, we investigate its four causes — material, formal, 
 efi&cient and final. What has no cause but is the cause of all things, 
 
JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 143 
 
 cannot be known in this way. Still it is not altogether unknowable 
 for this reason. Its essence cannot be known, but it may be known 
 through its activities, or rather effects, which suggest attributes. 
 We cannot therefore know concerning God what he is, nor how he is, 
 nor on account of what, nor of what kind, nor where, nor when. For 
 these can apply only to a created thing having a cause. But we can 
 ask concerning him, whether he is; and this can best be known from 
 his deeds. 
 
 We observe the things of the world and find that they are all com- 
 posed of substance and accident, as we saw before (p. 131). These 
 are correlative, and one cannot exist without the other. Hence neither 
 precedes the other. But accident is "new" (/. e., not eternal), hence 
 so is substance. That accident is new is proved from the fact that 
 rest succeeds motion and motion succeeds rest, hence accidents con- 
 stantly come and go and are newly created. 
 
 Now if substance and accident are both new there must be some- 
 thing that brought them into being unless they bring themselves 
 into being. But the latter is impossible, for the agent must either 
 exist when it brings itself into being, or not. If it exists it is already 
 there; if it does not exist, it is nothing, and nothing cannot do any- 
 thing. Hence there must be a being that brought the world into 
 existence. This is God. 
 
 God is one, for the cause of the many must be the one. If the cause 
 of the many is the many, then the cause of the second many is a third 
 many, and so on ad infinitum; hence we must stop with the one. God 
 is to the world as unity is to number. Unity is the basis of number 
 without being included in number, and it embraces number on all 
 sides. It is the foundation of number; for if you remove unity, you 
 remove number; but the removal of number does not remove unity. 
 The one surrounds number on all sides; for the beginning of number 
 is the one, and it is also the middle of number and the end thereof. 
 For nmnber is nothing but an aggregate of ones. Besides, number 
 is composed of odds and evens, and one is the cause of odd as well 
 as even. 
 
 If there were two eternal beings, they would either coincide in all 
 respects, and they would be one and not two. Or they would differ. 
 In the latter case, the world is either the work of both or of one only. 
 
144 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 If of both, they are not omnipotent, and hence not eternal. If of one 
 only, then the other does not count, since he is not eternal, and there 
 is only one. 
 
 By saying God is one we do not mean that he comes under the 
 category of quantity, for quantity is an accident residing in a sub- 
 stance, and all substance is "new." What we mean is that the essence 
 of God is true unity, not numerical unity. For numerical unity is 
 also in a sense multiplicity, and is capable of multiphcation and divi- 
 sion. God's unity is alone separate and one in all respects. 
 
 God is not like any of his creatures. For if he were, he would be 
 possessed of quality, since it is in virtue of quahty that a thing is said 
 to be like another, and quality is an accident contained in a substance. 
 
 God is self-sufficient and not in need of anything. For if he needed 
 anything at all, it would be first of all the one who created him and 
 made him an existent thing. But this is absurd, since God is eternal. 
 We might suppose that he needs the world, which he created for some 
 purpose, as we sometimes make things to assist us. But this, too, is 
 impossible. For if he were dependent upon the world for anything, 
 he could not create it. It is different with us. We do not create 
 things; we only modify matter already existing. 
 
 Again, if God created the world for his own benefit, then either he 
 was always in need of the world, or the need arose at the time of creat- 
 ing. If he was always in need of the world, it would have existed with 
 him from eternity, but we have already proved that the world is not 
 eternal. If the need arose in him at the time of creation, as heat 
 arises in a body after cold, or motion after rest, then he is like created 
 things, and is himself "new" and not eternal. To say the need was 
 always there, and yet he did not create it until the time he did would 
 be to ascribe inability to God of creating the world before he did, 
 which is absurd. For one who is unable at any given time, cannot 
 create at all. It remains then that he does not need anything, and 
 that he created the world by reason of his goodness and generosity 
 and nothing else. 
 
 The question of God's will is difficult. The problem is this. If 
 God's will is eternal and unchanging, and he created the world 
 with his will, the world is eternal. If we say, as we must, that he 
 created the world after a condition of non-creation, we introduce a 
 
JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 145 
 
 change in God, a something newly created in him, namely, the will 
 to create, which did not exist before. This is a dilemma. My own 
 view is that since God's creating activity is his essence, and his essence 
 is infinite and eternal, we cannot say he created after a condition of 
 non-creation, or that he willed after a condition of non-willing, or 
 that he was formerly not able. And yet we do not mean that the 
 world is eternal. It was created a definite length of time before our 
 time. The solution of the problem is that time itself was created with 
 the world; for time is the measure of motion of the celestial sphere, 
 and if there are no spheres there is no time, and no before and after. 
 Hence it does not follow because the world is not eternal that before 
 its creation God did not create. There is no before when the world is 
 not. 
 
 We objected to the view of the Mutakallimun (p. 142), who speak 
 of God creating a will on the ground that if he can create a will directly 
 he can create the world instead. Our opinion is therefore that God's 
 will is eternal and not newly created, for the latter view introduces 
 creation in God. There is still the difficulty of the precise relation 
 of the will to God. If it is different from God we have two eternals, 
 and if it is the same as God in all respects, he changes when he creates. 
 My answer is, it is not different from God in any sense, and there is 
 no changing attribute in God. But there is a subtle mystery in this 
 matter, which it is not proper to reveal, and this is not the place to 
 explain it. The interested reader is referred to the book of Empedocles 
 and other works of the wise men treating of this subject {cf. above, 
 p. 64). 
 
 God created the world out of nothing, and not out of a pre-existent 
 matter. For if the matter of the world is eternal like God, there is 
 no more reason for supposing that God formed a world out of it than 
 that it formed a world out of God. 
 
 The world is perfect. For we have repeatedly shown that its crea- 
 tion is due entirely to God's goodness. If then it were not perfect, 
 this would argue in God either ignorance or niggardliness or weak- 
 ness. ^''^ 
 
 Most of the ancients avoided giving God attributes for fear of mak- 
 ing him the bearer of quaUties, which would introduce plurality and 
 composition in his essence. The proper view, however, is this. As 
 
146 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 God's essence is different from all other essences, so are his attributes 
 different from all other attributes. His attributes are not different 
 from him; his knowledge and his truth and his power are his essence. 
 The way man arrives at the divine attributes is this. Men have 
 examined his works and learned from them God's existence. They 
 then reflected on this existent and found that he was not weak; so 
 they called him strong. They found his works perfect, and they called 
 him wise. They perceived that he was self-sufficient, without need 
 of anything, and hence without any motives for doing wrong. Hence 
 they called him righteous. And so on with the other attributes. All 
 this they did in order that people may learn from him and imitate 
 his ways. But we must not forget that all these expressions of God's 
 attributes are figurative. No one must suppose that if we do not 
 say he has life, it means he is dead. What we mean is that we cannot 
 apply the term hving to God literally, in the sense in which we apply 
 it to other living things. When the Bible does speak of God as alive 
 and living, the meaning is that he exists forever. The philosopher 
 is right when he says that it is more proper to apply negative attri- 
 butes to God than positive. ^''^ 
 
 Taking a glance at Ibn Zaddik's theology just discussed in its es- 
 sential outlines, we notice that while he opposes vigorously certain 
 aspects of Kalamistic thought, as he found them in al-Basir, the 
 Karaite, his own method and doctrine are not far removed from the 
 Kalam. His proof of the creation of the world from its composite 
 character (substance and accident) is the same as one of Saadia, 
 which Maimonides cites as a Kalamistic proof. We have already 
 spoken of the fact that the method of basing one's theology upon the 
 creation of the world is one that is distinctive of the Kalam, as Mai- 
 monides himself tells us. And this method is common to Saadia, 
 Bahya and Ibn Zaddil^. In his discussion of the attributes Ibn Zaddik 
 offers little if anything that is new. His attitude is that in the lit- 
 eral and positive sense no attribute can be applied to God. We can 
 speak of God negatively without running the risk of misunderstanding. 
 But the moment we say anything positive we do become thus liable 
 to comparing God with other things; and such circumlocutions as 
 the Kalamistic "Living without life," and so on, do not help matters, 
 for they are contradictory, and take away with one hand what they 
 
JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 147 
 
 give with the other. The Biblical expressions must be taken figura- 
 tively; and the most important point to remember is that God's 
 essence cannot be known at all. The manner in which we arrive at 
 the divine attributes is by transferring them from God's effects in 
 nature to his own essence. All this we have already found in Bahya 
 much better expressed, and Bahya is also without doubt the source 
 of Ibn Zaddik's discussion of God's unity. 
 
 We must now review briefly the practical part of Ibn Zaddik's 
 phi^)sophy as it is found in the fourth part of the "Microcosm." 
 In the manner of Bahya he points out the importance of divine service 
 and obedience to the commandments of God, vie\\dng man's duties 
 to his maker as an expression of gratitude, which everyone owes to 
 his benefactor. Like Bahya he compares God's benefactions with 
 those of one man to another to show the infinite superiority of the 
 former, and the greater duty which follows therefrom. 
 
 The commandments which God gave us like the act of our creation 
 are for our own good, that we may enjoy true happiness in the world 
 to come. As it would not be proper to reward a person for what he 
 has not done, God gave man commandments. The righteous as well 
 as the wicked are free to determine their own conduct, hence reward 
 and punishment are just. 
 
 Like Saadia and Bahya before him, Ibn Zaddik makes use of the 
 distinction (or rather takes it for granted) between rational and tradi- 
 tional commandments; pointing out that the latter also have a cause 
 and explanation in the mind of God even though we may not know it. 
 In some cases we can see the explanation ourselves. Take for instance 
 the observance of the Sabbath. Its rational signification is two-fold. 
 It teaches us that the world was created, and hence has a Creator 
 whom we worship. And in the second place the Sabbath symbolizes 
 the future world. As one has nothing to eat on the Sabbath day 
 unless he has prepared food the day before, so the enjoyment of the 
 future world depends upon spiritual preparation in this world. 
 
 In his conduct a man must imitate God's actions by domg good 
 and mercy and kindness. Without the knowledge of God a person's 
 good deeds are of no account and no better than the work of idolaters. 
 In fact it is not possible to do good deeds without a knowledge of God, 
 for he is the source of all good, and there is no true good without him. 
 
148 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 When a fool is seen with good qualities such as mercy and benevolence, 
 they are due to the weakness of his animal soul, the spirited part of his 
 nature. Similarly if this fool abstains from pleasures, it is because 
 of the weakness of his appetitive soul. 
 
 Thus we see that knowledge comes first in importance; for knowl- 
 edge leads to practice, and practice brings reward in the world to 
 come. As the purpose of man's creation is that he may enjoy the 
 future hfe, wisdom or knowledge is the first requisite to this great end. 
 
 The four principal quahties constituting goodness or virtue are 
 (i) knowledge of God's attributes; (2) righteousness or justice; (3) 
 hope; (4) humility. All other good qualities are derived from these. 
 Jeremiah names some of them when he says (9, 23), "I am the Lord 
 who exercise kindness, justice and righteousness on the earth; for in 
 these things I dehght, saith the Lord," Similarly Zephaniah (2, 3) 
 bids us, "Seek ye the Lord, all ye meek of the earth, who have ful- 
 filled his ordinances; seek righteousness, seek meekness." 
 
 The four qualities of wisdom or knowledge, righteousness, hope and 
 humihty are without doubt modified descendants of the four Platonic 
 virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, which we still find 
 in their original form and in their Platonic derivation and psycholog- 
 ical origin in Pseudo-Bahya (c/. above p. in). 
 
 Reward and punishment of the real kind, Ibn Zaddik thinks, are 
 not in this world but in the next. In this way he accounts for the 
 fact of the prosperity of the wicked and the sufferings of the righteous. 
 Another proof that this world cannot be the place of final reward and 
 punishment is that pleasure in this world is not a real good, but only 
 a temporary respite from disease. Pain and pleasure are correlative, 
 as we saw before (p. 136). In fact pleasure is not a good at all; for 
 if it were, then the greater the pleasure, the greater the good, which 
 is not true. Reward in the next world is not a corporeal pleasure 
 at all. 
 
 The evil which happens to the righteous in this world is often a 
 natural occurrence without reference to reward and punishment, and 
 may be compared to the natural pleasures which men derive from the 
 sense of sight and the other senses, and which have nothing to do with 
 reward and punishment. Sometimes, too, this evil is inflicted upon 
 the good man to forgive his sins. Real reward and punishment are 
 
JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 149 
 
 in the future life, and as that hfe is spiritual, the reward as well as the 
 punishment is timeless. 
 
 The Mutakallimun think that animals and little children are also 
 rewarded in the next world for ill treatment, suffering and death 
 which are inflicted upon them in this world. So we find in Joseph al 
 Basir's Mansuri. But this is absurd. If the killing of animals is a 
 wrong, God would not have commanded us to do it, any more than 
 he ordered us to kill human beings in order that he may reward them 
 later. Moreover, we should then deserve punishment for kUUng 
 animals if that is wrong, and there would follow the absurdity that 
 God commanded us to do that for which we deserve punishment. 
 Besides, if the animals deserve reward and punishment, they should 
 have been given commandments and laws like ourselves. If this 
 was not done because animals are not rational, reward and punishment 
 are equally out of place for the same reason. 
 
 When the soul leaves the body in death, if she exercised her reason 
 in the pursuit of knowledge, she will continue her existence forever 
 in the upper world. This is her happiness, her reward and her para- 
 dise, namely, to cleave to her own world, and to shine with the true 
 Hght emanating from God directly. This is the end of the human 
 soul. But if she did not exercise her reason and did not pursue right 
 conduct, she will not be able to return to the spiritual world, for she 
 will have lost her own spirituality. She will be similar to the body, 
 desiring this world and its pleasures. Her fate will be to revolve 
 forever with the sphere in the world of fire, without being able to 
 return to her world. Thus she will be forever in pain, and homeless. 
 
 When the Messiah comes, the pious men of our nation, the Prophets, 
 the Patriarchs and those who died for the sanctification of the name, 
 i. e., the martyrs, will be brought back to life in the body, and will 
 never die again. There will be no eating and drinking, but they will 
 live like Moses on the mountain basking in the divine light. The 
 wicked will also be joined to their bodies and burned with fire.^^^ 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 JUDAH HALEVI 
 
 In Judah Halevi the poet got the better of the rationalist. Not 
 that Judah Halevi was not famihar with philosophical thinking and 
 did not absorb the current philosophical terminology as well as the 
 ideas contained therein. Quite the contrary. He shows a better 
 knowledge of Aristotelian ideas than his predecessors, and is well 
 versed in Neo-Platonism. While he attacks all those views of philoso- 
 phers which are inconsistent to his mind with the religion of Judaism, 
 he speaks in other respects the philosophic language, and even makes 
 concessions to the philosophers. If the reason should really demand it, 
 he tells us, one might adopt the doctrine of the eternity of matter 
 without doing any harm to the essence of Judaism. ^^^ As for the 
 claims of reason to rule our beUefs, he similarly admits that that 
 which is really proved in the same absolute manner as the propositions 
 in mathematics and logic cannot be controverted. But this opinion 
 need cause one no difficulty as there is nothing in the Bible which 
 opposes the unequivocal demands of the reason. ^^^ He cannot consist- 
 ently oppose all philosophy and science, for he maintains that the 
 sciences were originally in the hands of the Jews, and that it was 
 from them that the Chaldeans borrowed them and handed them 
 over to the Persians, who in turn transferred them to Greece and 
 Rome, their origin being forgotten. ^^*^ At the same time he insists 
 that philosophy and reason are not adequate means for the solution 
 of all problems, and that the actual solutions as found in the writings 
 of the Aristotelians of his day are in many cases devoid of aU demon- 
 strative value. Then there are certain matters in theory as well as 
 in practice which do not at all come within the domain of reason, 
 and the philosophers are bound to be wrong because they apply the 
 wrong method. Revelation alone can make us wise as to certain 
 aspects of God's nature and as to certain details in human conduct; 
 and in these philosophy must fail because as philosophy it has no 
 
 150 
 
JUDAH EALEVl 151 
 
 revelation. With all due respect therefore to the philosophers, who 
 are the most reliable guides in matters not conflicting with revelation, 
 we must leave them if we wish to learn the truth concerning those 
 matters in which they are incompetent to judge. 
 
 This characterization of Judah Halevi's attitude is brief and inade- 
 quate. But before proceeding to elaborate it with more detail and 
 greater concreteness, it will be well to sketch very briefly the httle 
 we know of his life.^^^ 
 
 Judah Halevi was bom in Toledo in the last quarter of the eleventh 
 century. This is about the time when the city was taken from the 
 Mohammedans by the emperor Alphonso VI, king of Leon, Castile, 
 Galicia and Navarre. At the same time Toledo remained Arabic 
 in culture and language for a long while after this, and even exerted 
 a great influence upon the civiHzation of Christendom. The Jews were 
 equally well treated in Toledo by Mohammedan emir and Christian 
 king. The youth of Halevi was therefore not embittered or saddened 
 by Jewish persecutions. It seems that he was sent to Lucena, a Jewish 
 centre, where he studied the Talmud with the famous Alfasi, and 
 made friends with Joseph ibn Migash, Ahasi's successor, and Baruh 
 Albalia, the philosopher. A poet by nature, he began to write Hebrew 
 verses early, and soon became famous as a poet of the first order in 
 no manner inferior to Gabirol. His living he made not from his verses, 
 but like many others of his day by practicing the art of medicine. 
 Later in Ufe he visited Cordova, already in its decline through the 
 illiberal government of the Almoravid dynasty. The rulers were 
 strict religionists, imphcit followers of the "fukaha," the men devoted 
 to the study of Mohammedan religion and law; and scientific learning 
 and philosophy were proscribed in their domains. Men of another 
 faith were not in favor, and the Jews who, unlike the Christians, 
 had no powerful emperor anywhere to take their part, had to buy 
 their Hves and comparative freedom with their hard earned wealth. 
 Here Halevi spent some time as a physician. He was admitted in 
 court circles, but his personal good fortune could not reconcile him 
 to the sufferings of his brethren, and his letters give expression to 
 his dissatisfaction. He wrote a variety of poems on subjects secular 
 and religious; but what made him famous above all else was his strong 
 nationahsm, and those of his poems will hve longest which give ex- 
 
152 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 pression to his intense love for his people and the land which was once 
 their own. That it was not mere sentiment with Judah Halevi he 
 proved late in life when he decided to leave his many friends and his 
 birthplace and go to Palestine to end his life on the soil of his ancestors. 
 It was after 1140 that he left Spain for the East. Unfavorable winds 
 drove him out of course to Egypt, and he landed at Alexandria. From 
 there he went to Cairo at the invitation of his admirers and friends. 
 Everywhere he was received with great honor, his fame preceding 
 him, and he was urged to remain in Egypt. But no dissuasion could 
 keep him from his pious resolve. We find him later in Damietta; 
 we follow him to Tyre and Damascus, but beyond the last city all 
 trace of him is lost. We know not whether he reached Jerusalem or 
 not. Legend picks up the thread where history drops it, and tells 
 of Judah Halevi meeting his death at the gates of the holy city as 
 with tears he was singing his famous ode to Zion. An Arab horseman, 
 the story goes, pierced him through with his spear. 
 
 This sketch of Halevi's life and character, brief and inadequate 
 as it is, will prepare us to understand better his attitude to philosophy 
 and to Judaism. His was not a critical intellect whose curiosity is 
 not satisfied until the matter in dispute is proved in logical form. 
 Reason is good enough in mathematics and physics where the objects 
 of our investigation are accessible to us and the knowledge of their 
 nature exhausts their significance. It is not so with the truths of 
 Judaism and the nature of God. These cannot be known adequately 
 by the reason alone, and mere knowledge is not enough. God and 
 the Jewish religion are not simply facts to be known and understood 
 like the laws of science. They are living entities to be acquainted 
 with, to be devoted to, to love. Hence quite a different way of ap- 
 proach is necessary. And not everyone has access to this way. The 
 method of acquaintance is open only to those who by birth and tradi- 
 tion belong to the family of the prophets, who had a personal knowl- 
 edge of God, and to the land of Palestine where God revealed him- 
 self. ^^^ 
 
 We see here the nationalist speaking, the lover of his people and of 
 their land and language and institutions. David Kaufmann has 
 shown that Judah Halevi's anti-philosophical attitude has much in 
 common with that of the great Arab writer Al Gazali, from whom 
 
JUDAH HALEVI 153 
 
 there is no doubt that he borrowed his inspiration. ^^^ Gazali began as 
 a philosopher, then lost confidence in the logical method of proof, 
 pointed to the contradictions of the philosophers, to their disagree- 
 ments among themselves, and went over to the Sufis, the pietists 
 and mystics of the Mohammedan faith. There are a number of re- 
 semblances between Gazali and Halevi as Kaufmann has shown, and 
 there is no doubt that skepticism in respect of the powers of the 
 human reason on the one hand, and a deep religious sense on the other 
 are responsible for the point of view of Gazali as well as Halevi. But 
 there is this additional motive in Halevi that he was defending a per- 
 secuted race and a despised faith against not merely the philosophers 
 but against the more powerful and more fortunate professors of other 
 religions. He is the loyal son of his race and his religion, and he will 
 show that they are above all criticism, that they are the best and the 
 truest there are, Maimonides, too, found it necessary to defend 
 Judaism against the attacks of philosophy. But in his case it was 
 the Jew in him who had to be defended against the philosopher in 
 him. It was no external enemy but an internal who must be made 
 harmless, and the method was one of reconciliation and harmoniza- 
 tion. It is still truer to say that with Maimonides both Judaism and 
 philosophy were his friends, neither was an enemy. He was attached 
 to one quite as much as to the other. And it was his privilege to recon- 
 cile their differences, to the great gain, as he thought, of both, Judah 
 Halevi takes the stand of one who fights for his hearth and home 
 agauist the attacks of foreign foes. He will not yield an inch to the 
 adversary. He will maintain his own. The enemy cannot approach. 
 
 Thus Halevi begins his famous work "Kusari": " I was asked what 
 I have to say in answer to the arguments of philosophers, unbeUevers 
 and professors of other religions against our own." Instead of working 
 out his ideas systematically, he wanted to give his subject dramatic 
 interest by clothing it in dialogue form. And he was fortunate in 
 finding a historical event which suited his purpose admirably. 
 
 Some three or four centuries before his time, the king of the Chazars, 
 a people of Turkish origin living in the Caucasus, together with his 
 courtiers and many of his subjects embraced Judaism. Hasdai ibn 
 Shaprut, the Jewish minister and patron of learning of Cordova, in 
 the tenth century corresponded with the then king of the Chazars, 
 
154 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 and received an account of the circumstances of the conversion. In 
 brief it was that the king wishing to know which was the true reUgion 
 invited representatives of the three dominant creeds, Judaism, Chris- 
 tianity and Mohammedanism, and questioned them concerning the 
 tenets of their respective faiths. Seeing that the Christian as well as 
 the Mohammedan appealed in their arguments to the truth of the 
 Hebrew Bible, the king concluded that Judaism must be the true 
 religion, which he accordingly adopted. This story gave Halevi the 
 background and framework for his composition. He works out his 
 own ideas in the form of a dialogue between the Jewish Rabbi and the 
 king of the Chazars, in which the former explains to the king the 
 essentials of the Jewish religion, and answers the king's questions 
 and criticisms, taking occasion to discuss a variety of topics, religious, 
 philosophical and scientific, all tending to show the truth of Judaism 
 and its superiority to other religions, to philosophy, Kalam, and also 
 to Karaism. 
 
 The story is, Halevi tells us, in the introduction to his book, that 
 the king of the Chazars had repeated dreams in which an angel said 
 to him, "Your intentions are acceptable to God, but not your prac- 
 tice." His endeavors to be faithful to his religion, and to take part in 
 the services and perform the sacrifices in the temple in person only led 
 to the repetition of the dream. He therefore consulted a philosopher 
 about his belief, and the latter said to him, "In God there is neither 
 favor nor hatred, for he is above all desire and purpose. Purpose and 
 intention argue defect and want, which the fulfilment of the intention 
 satisfies. But God is free from want. Hence there is no purpose or 
 intention in his nature. 
 
 ' God does not know the particular or individual, for the individual 
 constantly changes, whereas God's knowledge never changes. Hence 
 God does not know the individual man and, needless to say, he does 
 not hear his prayer. When the philosophers say God created man, 
 they use the word created metaphorically, in the sense that God is 
 the cause of all causes, but not that he made man with purpose and 
 intention. 
 
 The world is eternal, and so is the existence of man. The character 
 and abihty of a person depend upon the causes antecedent to him. 
 If these are of the right sort, we have a person who has the potentiali- 
 
JUDAH HALEFI 155 
 
 ties of a philosopher. To realize them he must develop his intellect 
 by study, and his character through moral discipline. Then he will 
 receive the influence of the 'Active Intellect,' with which he becomes 
 identified so that his limbs and faculties do only what is right, and are 
 ■wholly in the service of the active Intellect. 
 
 "This union with the active Intellect is the highest goal of man; and 
 he becomes like one of the angels, and joins the ranks of Hermes, 
 ^sculapius, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. This is the meaning of the 
 expression 'favor of God.' The important thing is to study the 
 sciences in order to know the truth, and to practice the ethical virtues. 
 If one does this, it matters not what religion he professes, or whether 
 he professes any religion at all. He can make his own religion in order 
 to discipline himself in humility, and to govern his relations to society 
 and country. Or he can choose one of the philosophical religions. 
 Purity of heart is the important thing, and knowledge of the sciences. 
 Then the desired result will come, namely, union with the active 
 intellect, which may also result in the power of prophecy through true 
 dreams and visions." 
 
 The king was not satisfied with the statement of the philosopher, 
 which seemed to him inadequate because he felt that he himself had 
 the necessary purity of heart, and yet he was told that his practice 
 was not satisfactory, proving that there is something in practice as 
 such apart from intention. Besides, the great conflict between Chris- 
 tianity and Islam, who kill one another, is due to the difference in 
 religious practice, and not in purity of heart. Moreover, if the view 
 of the philosophers were true, there should be prophecy among them, 
 whereas in reality prophecy is found among those who did not study 
 the sciences rather than among those who did. 
 
 The king then said, I will ask the Christians and the Mohammedans. 
 I need not inquire of the Jews, for their low condition is sufficient 
 proof that the truth cannot be with them. So he sent for a Christian 
 sage, who explained to him the essentials of his belief, saying among 
 other things. We beheve in the creation of the world in six days, in the 
 descent of all men from Adam, in revelation and Providence, in short, 
 in all that is found in the law of Moses and in the other Israelitish 
 Scriptures, which cannot be doubted because of the publicity which 
 was given to the events recorded therein. He also quoted the words 
 
156 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 of the gospel, I did not come to destroy any of the commandments 
 of Israel and of Moses their teacher; I came to confirm them. 
 
 The king was not convinced by the Christian belief, and called a 
 Mohammedan doctor, who in describing the specific tenets of Mo- 
 hammedanism also mentioned the fact that in the Koran are quoted 
 the Pentateuch and Moses and the other leaders, and the wonderful 
 things they did. These, he said, cannot be denied; for they are well 
 known. 
 
 Seeing that both Christian and Mohammedan referred to the law 
 of Moses as true, and as evidence that God spoke to man, the king 
 determined to call a Jewish sage also, and hear what he had to say. 
 
 The Jewish "Haber, " as Judah Halevi calls him, began his discourse 
 by saying, We Jews believe in the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, 
 who took the children of Israel out of Egypt, supported them in the 
 wilderness, gave them the land of Canaan, and so on. 
 
 The king was disappointed and said, I had determined not to con- 
 sult the Jews in this matter at all, because their abject condition in 
 the world did not leave them any good quality. You should have 
 said, he told the Jew, that you believe in him who created the world 
 and governs it; who made man and provides for him. Every religionist 
 defends his belief in this way. 
 
 The Jew replied, The religion to which you refer is a rational religion, 
 established by speculation and argument, which are full of doubt, 
 and about which there is no agreement among philosophers, because 
 not all the arguments are vahd or even plausible. This pleased the 
 king, and he expressed a wish to continue the discourse. The Rabbi 
 then said. The proper way to define one's religion is by reference to 
 that which is more certain, namely, actual experience. Jews have 
 this actual experience. The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob spoke 
 to Moses and delivered the Israelites out of Egypt. This is well 
 known. God gave Israel the Torah. To be sure, all others not of 
 Israel who accept the Law will be rewarded, but they caimot be equal 
 to Israel. There is a peculiar relation between God and Israel in 
 which the other peoples do not share. As the plant is distinguished 
 from the mineral, the animal from the plant, and man from the ir- 
 rational animal, so is the prophetic individual distinguished above 
 other men. He constitutes a higher species. It is through him that 
 
JUDAH HA LEV I 157 
 
 the masses became aware of God's existence and care for them. It 
 was he who told them things unknown to them; who gave them an 
 account of the world's creation and its history. We count now forty- 
 five hundred years from the creation. This was handed down from 
 Adam through Seth and Enos to Noah, to Shem and Eber, to Abra- 
 ham, Isaac and Jacob, to Moses, and finally to us. Moses came only 
 four hundred years after Abraham in a world which was full of knowl- 
 edge of heavenly and earthly things. It is impossible that he should 
 have given them a false account of the division of languages and 
 the relations of nations without being found out and exposed. 
 
 The philosophers, it is true, oppose us by maintaining that the world 
 is eternal. But the philosophers are Greeks, descended from Japheth, 
 who did not inherit either wisdom or Torah. Divine wisdom is found 
 only in the family of Shem. The Greeks had philosophy among them 
 only during the short time of their power. They borrowed it from the 
 Persians, who had it in turn from the Chaldeans. But neither before 
 nor after did they have any philosophers among them. 
 
 Aristotle, not having any inherited tradition concerning the origin 
 of the world, endeavored to reason it all out of his own head. Eternity » 
 was just as hard to believe in as creation. But as he had no true 
 and reliable tradition, his arguments in favor of eternity seemed to 
 him to be the stronger. Had he lived among a people who had re- 
 liable traditions on the other side, he would have found arguments 
 in favor of creation, which is more plausible than eternity. Real 
 demonstration cannot be controverted; and there is nothing in the 
 Bible which opposes what the reason unequivocally demands. But 
 the matter of eternity or creation is very difficult. The arguments 
 on one side are as good as those on the other. And tradition from 
 Adam to Noah and Moses, which is better than argument, lends its 
 additional weight to the doctrine of creation. If the believer in the 
 Torah were obliged to hold that there is a primitive eternal matter 
 from which the world was made, and that there were many worlds 
 before this one, there would be no great harm, as long as he believes 
 that this world is of recent origin and Adam was the first man.^^* 
 
 We see now the standpoint of Judah Halevi, for the "Haber" is 
 of course his spokesman. Philosophy and independent reasoning 
 on such difficult matters as God and creation are after all more or 
 
IS8 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 less guess work, and cannot be made the bases of religion except for 
 those who have nothing better. The Jews fortunately have a surer 
 foundation all their own. They have a genuine and indisputable 
 tradition. History is the only true science and the source of truth; 
 not speculation, which is subjective, and can be employed with equal 
 plausibihty in favor of opposite doctrines. True history and tradition 
 in the case of the Jews goes back ultimately to first hand knowledge 
 from the very source of all truth. The prophets of Israel constitute 
 a higher species, as much superior to the ordinary man as the ordinary 
 man is to the lower animal, and these prophets received their knowl- 
 edge direct from God. In principle Judah Halevi agrees with the 
 other Jewish philosophers that true reason cannot be controverted. 
 He differs with them in the concrete application of this abstract 
 principle. He has not the same respect as Maimonides for the actual 
 achievements of the unaided human reason, and an infinitely greater 
 respect for the traditional beliefs of Judaism and the Biblical expres- 
 sions taken in their obvious meaning. Hence he does not feel the 
 same neccessity as Maimonides to twist the meaning of Scriptural 
 passages to make them agree with philosophical theories. 
 
 According to this view Judah Halevi does not find it necessary 
 with the philosophers and the Mutakallimun painfully to prove the 
 existence of God. The existence of the Jewish people and the facts 
 of their wonderful history are more eloquent demonstrations than 
 any that logic or metaphysics can muster. But more than this. The 
 philosophical view of God is inadequate in more ways than one. It 
 is inaccurate in content and incorrect in motive. In the first place, 
 they lay a great deal of stress on nature as the principle by which 
 objects move. If a stone naturally moves to the centre of the world, 
 they say this is due to a cause called nature. And the tendency is to 
 attribute intelligence and creative power to this new entity as an as- 
 sociate of God. This is misleading. The real Intelligence is God alone. 
 It is true that the elements, and the sun and moon, and the stars exert 
 certain influences, producing heat and cold, and various other effects in 
 things material, by virtue of which these latter are prepared for the re- 
 ception of higher forms. And there is no harm in caUing these agencies 
 Nature. But we must regard these as devoid of intelligence, and as 
 mere effects of God's wisdom and purpose. ^^^ 
 
JUDAH HALEVI 159 
 
 The philosopher denies will in God on the ground that this would 
 argue defect and want. This reduces God to an impersonal force. 
 We Jews believe God has will. The word we use does not matter. 
 I ask the philosopher what is it that makes the heavens revolve con- 
 tinually, and the outer sphere carry everything in uniform motion, 
 the earth standing immovable in the centre? Call it what you please, 
 will or command; it is the same thing that made the air shape itself 
 to produce the sounds of the ten commandments which were heard, 
 and that caused the characters to form on the Tables of Stone. ^^® 
 
 The motive of the philosopher is also different from that of the be- 
 liever. The philosopher seeks knowledge only. He desires to know 
 God as he desires to know the exact position and form of the earth. 
 Ignorance in respect to God is no more harmful in his mind than 
 ignorance respecting a fact in nature. His main object is to have 
 true knowledge in order to become like unto the Active Intellect and 
 to be identified with it. As long as he is a philosopher it makes no 
 difference to him what he believes in other respects and whether he 
 observes the practices of religion or not.^^^ 
 
 The true belief in God is different in scope and aim. What God is 
 must be understood not by means of rational proofs, but by prophetic 
 and spiritual insight. Rational proofs are misleading, and the heretics 
 and unbelievers also use rational proofs — those for example who believe 
 in two original causes, in the eternity of the world, or in the divinity 
 of the sun and fire. The most subtle proofs are those used by the 
 philosophers, and they maintain that God is not concerned about us, 
 and pays no attention to our prayers and sacrifices; that the world 
 is eternal. It is different with us, who heard his words, his commands 
 and prohibitions, and felt his reward and his punishment. We have 
 a proper name of God, Jhvh, representative of the communications 
 he made to us, and we have a conviction that he created the world. 
 The first was Adam, who knew God through actual communication 
 and the creation of Eve from one of his ribs. Cain and Abel came 
 next, then Noah and Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and so on to Moses 
 and the Prophets, who came after him. All these called him Jhvh 
 by reason of their insight. The people who received the teaching 
 of the Prophets, in whom they beheved, also called him Jhvh, because 
 he was in communication with men; and the select among them saw 
 
i6o MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 him through an intermediate agency, called variously, Form, Image, 
 Cloud, Fire, Kingdom, Shekinah, Glory, Rainbow, and so on, proving 
 that he spoke to them.^^^ 
 
 As the sun's light penetrates different objects in varying degrees, 
 for example, ruby and crystal receive the sun's light in the highest 
 degree ; clear air and water come next, then bright stones and polished 
 surfaces, and last of all opaque substances like wood and earth, which 
 the hght does not penetrate at all; so we may conceive of different 
 minds varying in the degree to which they attain a knowledge of God. 
 Some arrive only as far as the knowledge of "Elohim," while others at- 
 tain to a knowledge of Jhvh, which may be compared to the reception 
 of the sun's light in ruby and crystal. These are the prophets in the 
 land of Israel. The conception involved in the name "Elohim" no 
 intelligent man denies; whereas many deny the conception of Jhvh, 
 because prophecy is an unusual occurrence even among individuals, 
 not to speak of a nation. That is why Pharaoh said (Exod. 5, 2), "I 
 know not Jhvh." He knew "Elohim," but not Jhvh, that is a God 
 who reveals himself to man. "Elohim" may be arrived at by reason- 
 ing; for the reason tells us that the world has a ruler; though the 
 various classes of men differ as to details, the most plausible view 
 being that of the philosophers. But the conception of Jhvh cannot 
 be arrived at by reason. It requires that prophetic vision by which 
 a person almost becomes a member of a new species, akin to angels. 
 Then the doubts he formerly had about " Elohim " fall away, and he 
 laughs at the arguments which led him to the conception of God and of 
 unity. Now he becomes a devotee, who loves the object of his devo- 
 tion, and is ready to give his life in his love for him, because of the 
 great happiness he feels in being near to him, and the misery of being 
 away from him. This is different from the philosopher, who sees in the 
 worship of God only good ethics and truth, because he is greater than 
 all other existing things; and in unbelief nothing more than the fault of 
 choosing the untrue. ^^^ 
 
 Here there is clearly a touch of religious poetry and mysticism, 
 which reveals to us Halevi's real attitude, and we have no dif&culty 
 in understanding his lack of sympathy with what seemed to him the 
 shallow rationalism of the contemporaneous Aristotelian, who fan- 
 cied in his conceit that with a few logical formulae he could penetrate 
 
JUDAH HA LEV I l6l 
 
 the mysteries of the divine, when in reality he was barely enabled to 
 skim the surface; into the sanctuary he could never enter. 
 
 Though, as we have just seen, Halevi has a conception of God as a 
 personal being, acting with purpose and will and, as we shall see 
 more clearly later, standing in close personal relation to Israel and the 
 land of Palestine, still he is very far from thinking of him anthropo- 
 morphically. In his discussion of the divine attributes he yields to 
 none in removing from God any positive quality of those ascribed 
 to him in the Bible. The various names or appellatives applied to 
 God in Scripture, except the tetragrammaton, he divides, according 
 to their signification, into three classes, actional, relative, negative. 
 Such expressions as "making high," "making low," " making poor," 
 almighty, strong, jealous, revengeful, gracious, merciful, and so on, 
 do not denote, he says, feeling or emotion in God. They are ascribed 
 to him because of his visible acts or effects in the world, which we judge 
 on the analogy of our own acts. As a human being is prompted to 
 remove the misery of a fellowman because he feels pity, we ascribe 
 all instances of divine removal of misery from mankind to a similar 
 feehng in God, and call him merciful. But this is only a figure of 
 speech. God does remove misery, but the feeling of pity is foreign 
 to him. We call therefore the attribute merciful and others like it 
 actional, meaning that it is God's acts which suggest to us these ap- 
 pellations. 
 
 Another class of attributes found in the Bible embraces such ex- 
 pressions as blessed, exalted, holy, praised, and so on. These are 
 called relative, because they are derived from the attitude of man to 
 God. God is blessed because men bless him, and so with the rest. 
 They do not denote any essential quality in God. And hence their 
 number does not necessitate plurality in God. Finally we have such 
 terms as living, one, first, last, and so on. These too do not denote 
 God's positive essence, for in reality God cannot be said to be either 
 living or dead. Life as we understand it denotes sensation and motion, 
 which are not in God. If we do apply to God the term living, we do 
 so in order to exclude its negative, dead. Living means not dead; 
 one means not many; first means not having any cause antecedent to 
 him; last means never ceasing to be. Hence we call these attributes 
 negative. ^^^ 
 
l62 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 We see that Judah Halevi is at one with Bahya and Joseph ibn 
 Zaddik in his understanding of the divine attributes. The sHght 
 difference in the mode of classification is not essential. 
 
 This God chose Israel and gave them the ten commandments in 
 order to convince them that the Law originated from God and not 
 from Moses. For they might have had a doubt in their minds, seeing 
 that speech is a material thing, and believe that the origin of a law or 
 religion is in the mind of a human being, which afterwards comes to 
 be believed in as divine. For this reason God commanded the people 
 to purify themselves and be ready for the third day, when they all 
 heard the word of God, and were convinced that prophecy is not 
 what the philosophers say it is — a natural result of man's reason 
 identifying itself with the Active Intellect through the help of the 
 imagination, which presents true visions in a dream — but a real com- 
 munication from God. Not only did they hear the word of God, but 
 they saw the writing of God on the Tables of Stone. 
 
 This does not mean that we believe in the corporeality of God; 
 Heaven forbid, we do not even think of the soul of man as corporeal. 
 But we cannot deny the things recorded, which are well known. 
 Just as God created heaven and earth, not by means of material tools 
 as a man does, but by his will, so he might have willed that the air 
 should convey articulate sounds to the ear of Moses, and that letters 
 should be formed on the Tables of Stone to convey to the people the 
 ideas which he wanted them to know. They might have happened 
 in a still more wonderful way than I have been able to conceive. 
 
 This may seem like an unwarranted magnifying of the virtues of 
 our people. But in reality it is true that the chain of individuals from 
 Adam to Moses and thereafter was a remarkable one of godly men. 
 Adam was surely a godlike man since he was made by the hand of 
 God and was not dependent on the inherited constitution of his par- 
 ents, and on the food and climate he enjoyed in the years of his growth. 
 He was made perfect as in the time of mature youth when a person 
 is at his best, and was endowed with the best possible soul for man. 
 Abel was his successor in excellence, also a godly man, and so down 
 the line through Seth and Noah, and so on. There were many who 
 were unworthy and they were excluded. But there was always one 
 in every generation who inherited the distinguished qualities of the 
 
JUDAH HALEFI 163 
 
 Adam line. And even when, as in the case of Terah, the individual 
 was unworthy in himself, he was important as being destined to give 
 birth to a worthy son, who would carry on the tradition, like Abraham. 
 Among Noah's sons, Shem was the select one, and he occupied the 
 temperate regions of Palestine, whereas Japheth went north and Ham 
 went south — regions not so favorable to the development of wis- 
 dom. ^^^ 
 
 The laws were all given directly to Moses with all their details so 
 that there is no doubt about any of them. This was absolutely neces- 
 sary, for had there been any detail left out, a doubt might arise re- 
 specting it which would destroy the whole spiritual structure of Ju- 
 daism. This is not a matter which philosophical reasoning can think 
 out for itself. As in the natural generation of plant and animal the 
 complexity of elements and conditions is so great that a slight tilting 
 of the balance in the wrong direction produces disease and death, so 
 in the spiritual creation of Israel the ceremonies and the laws are all 
 absolutely essential to the whole, whether we understand it or not, 
 and none could be left to speculation. All were given to Moses. 
 
 Moses addressed himself to his own people only. You say it would 
 have been better to call all mankind to the true religion. It would be 
 better also perhaps that all animals should be rational. You have 
 forgotten what I said about the select few that worthily succeeded 
 Adam as the heart of the family to the exclusion of the other members, 
 who are as the peel, until in the sons of Jacob all twelve were worthy, 
 and from them Israel is descended. These remarkable men had divine 
 qualities which made them a different species from ordinary men. They 
 were aiming at the degree of the prophet, and many of them reached 
 it by reason of their purity, holiness and proximity to the Prophets. 
 For a prophet has a great influence on the one who associates with 
 him. He converts the latter by awakening in him spirituality and a 
 desire to attain that high degree which brings visible greatness and 
 reward in the world to come, when the soul is separated from the senses 
 and enjoys the heavenly light. We do not exclude anyone from the 
 reward due him for his good works, but we give preference to those 
 who are near to God, and we measure their reward in the next world 
 by this standard. Our religion consists not merely in saying certain 
 words, but in difiicult practices and a hne of conduct which bring us 
 
l64 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 near to God, Outsiders too may attain to the grade of wise and pious 
 men, but they cannot become equal to us and be prophets. ^^^ 
 
 Not only is Israel a select nation to whom alone prophecy is given 
 as a gift, but Palestine is the most suitable place in the world for com- 
 munion with God, as a certain spot may be best for planting certain 
 things and for producing people of a particular character and tem- 
 perament. All those who prophesied outside of Palestine did so with 
 reference to Palestine. Abraham was not worthy of the divine cove- 
 nant until he was in this land. Palestine was intended to be a guide 
 for the whole world. The reason the second Temple did not last 
 longer than it did is because the Babylonian exiles did not sufficiently 
 love their fatherland and did not all return when the decree of Cyrus 
 permitted them to do so.^^^ 
 
 Israel is the heart among the nations. The heart is more sensitive 
 than the rest of the body in disease as in health. It feels both more 
 intensely. It is more hable to disease than the other organs, and on 
 the other hand it becomes aware sooner of agencies dangerous to its 
 health and endeavors to reject them or ward them off. So Israel is 
 among the nations. Their responsibility is greater than that of other 
 nations and they are sooner punished. "Only you have I loved out 
 of all the families of the earth," says Amos (3, 2), " therefore will I 
 visit upon you all your iniquities." On the other hand, God does not 
 allow our sins to accumulate as he does with the other nations until 
 they deserve destruction. "He pardons the iniquities of his people 
 by causing them to pass away in due order." As the heart is affected 
 by the other organs, so Israel suffers on account of their assimilation 
 to the other nations. Israel suffers while the other nations are in peace. 
 As the elements are for the sake of the minerals, the minerals for the 
 sake of the plants, the plants for the sake of the animals, the animals 
 for the sake of man, so is man for the sake of Israel, and Israel for the 
 sake of the Prophets and the pious men. With the purification of 
 Israel the world will be improved and brought nearer to God.^^^ 
 
 Associated with Israel and Palestine as a third privilege and dis- 
 tinction is the Hebrew language. This is the original language which 
 God spoke to Adam. The etymologies of Biblical names prove it. 
 It v/as richer formerly, and has become impoverished in the course 
 of time like the people using it. Nevertheless it still shows evidence 
 
JUDAH HALEVI 165 
 
 of superiority to other languages in its system of accents which shows 
 the proper expression in reading, and in its wonderful system of vowel 
 changes producing euphony in expression and variation in meaning. ^^^ 
 The highest type of man, we have seen, is the Prophet, for whose 
 sake Israel and the whole of humanity exists. He is the highest type 
 because he alone has an immediate knowledge of Jhvh as distinguished 
 from "Elohim," the concept of universal cause and power, which 
 the philosopher also is able to attain. Jhvh signifies, as we have seen, 
 the personal God who performs miracles and reveals himself to man- 
 kind through the prophet. We wish to know therefore how Judah 
 Halevi conceives of the essence and process of prophetic inspiration. 
 We are already aware that he is opposed to the philosophers who re- 
 gard the power of prophecy as a natural gift possessed by the man of 
 pure intellect and perfect power of imagination. To these Aristote- 
 lians, as we shall have occasion to see more clearly later, the human 
 intellect is nothing more than an individualized reflection, if we may 
 so term it, of the one universal intellect, which is — not God, but an 
 intellectual substance wholly immaterial, some nine or ten degrees 
 removed from the Godhead. It is called the Active Intellect, and its 
 business is to govern the sublunar world of generation and decay. 
 As pure thought the Active Intellect embraces as its content the entire 
 sublunar world in essence. In fact it bestows the forms (in the Aris- 
 totelian sense) upon the things of this world, and hence has a timeless 
 knowledge of all the world and its happenings. The individualized 
 reflection of it in the human soul is held there so long as the person is 
 alive, somewhat as a drop of water may hold the moon until it evapo- 
 rates, and the reflection is reabsorbed in the one real moon. So it is 
 the Active Intellect which is the cause of all conceptual knowledge 
 in man through its individualizations, and into it every human in- 
 tellect is reabsorbed when the individual dies. Some men share more, 
 some less in the Active Intellect; and it is in everyone's power, within 
 limits, to increase and purify his participation in the influence of the 
 Active Intellect by study and rigorous ethical discipline. The prophet 
 differs from the ordinary man and the philosopher in degree only, 
 not in kind. His knowledge comes from the influence of the Active 
 Intellect as does the knowledge of the philosopher. The difference is 
 that in the prophet's case the imagination plays an important role 
 
1 66 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 and presents concrete visions instead of universal propositions, and 
 the identification with the Active Intellect is much closer. 
 
 This conception of prophecy, which in its essentials, we shall see, 
 was adopted by Abraham ibn Daud, Maimonides and Gersonides, 
 naturally would not appeal to Judah Halevi. Prophecy is the preroga- 
 tive of Israel and of Palestine. The philosophers have nothing to do 
 with it. A mere philosopher has no more chance of entering the king- 
 dom of prophecy than a camel of passing through the eye of a needle.* 
 Have the philosophers ever produced prophets? And yet, if their 
 explanation is correct, their ranks should abound in them. Prophecy 
 is a supernatural power, and the influence comes from God. The 
 prophet is a higher species of mortal. He is endowed with an internal 
 eye, a hidden sense, which sees certain immaterial objects, as the 
 external sense sees the physical objects. No one else sees those forms, 
 but they are none the less real, for the whole species of prophetic 
 persons testify to their existence. In ordinary perception we tell a 
 real object from an illusion by appealing to the testimony of others. 
 What appears to a single individual only may be an illusion. If 
 all persons agree that the object is there, we conclude it is real. The 
 same test holds of the prophetic visions. All prophets see them. Then 
 the intellect of the prophet interprets the vision, as our intellect in- 
 terprets the data of our senses. The latter give us not the essence of 
 the sensible object, but the superficial accidents, such as color, shape, 
 and so on. It is the work of the reason to refer these qualities to the 
 essence of the object, as king, sun. The same holds true of the prophet. 
 He sees a figure in the form of a king or a judge in the act of giving 
 orders; and he knows that he has before him a being that is served and 
 obeyed. Or he sees the form in the act of carrying baggage or girded 
 for work; and he infers that he is dealing with a being that is meant 
 for a servant. What these visions really were it is not in all cases 
 possible to know with certainty. There is no doubt that the Prophets 
 actually saw the hosts of heaven, the spirits of the spheres, in the 
 form of man. The word angel in the Bible (Heb. Mal'ak) means mes- 
 senger. What these messengers or angels were we cannot tell with 
 certainty. They may have been specially created from the fine ele- 
 mentary bodies, or they belonged to the eternal angels, who may be 
 
 *Tliis simile represents Halevi's thought. He does not use this expression. 
 
JUDAH HALEVI 167 
 
 the same as the spiritual beings of whom the philosophers speak. 
 We can neither reject their view nor definitely accept it. Similarly 
 the expression, "The Glory of Jhvh," may denote a fine body following 
 the will of God and formed every time it has to appear to a prophet, 
 or it may denote aU the angels and spiritual beings. Throne and Char- 
 iot and Firmament, and Ofannim and Galgalim, and other eternal 
 beings constituting, so to speak, the suite of God. 
 
 Even such phrases as, "They saw the God of Israel" (Exod. 24, 10), 
 "He saw the form of Jhvh" (Num. 12, 8), the Rabbinic expression 
 "Maase Merkaba" (work of the divine chariot, cf. above, p. xvi), 
 and the later discussions concerning the "Measure of the divine 
 stature" (Shi ur Komah), must not be rejected. These visual images 
 representative of God are calculated to inspire fear in the human soul, 
 which the bare conception of the One, Omnipotent, and so on, cannot 
 produce. "^ 
 
 As Judah Halevi is unwilling to yield to the philosophers and explain 
 away the supernaturaHsm of prophecy, maintaining rather on the 
 contrary that the supernatural character of the prophetic vision is 
 an evidence of the superior nature of Israel as well as of their land and 
 their language, so he insists on the inherent value of the ceremonial 
 law, including sacrifices. To Saadia, and especially to Bahya and 
 Maimonides, the test of value is rationality. The important laws of 
 the Bible are those known as the rational commandments. The 
 other class, the so-called traditional commandments, would also turn 
 out to be rational if we knew the reason why they were commanded. 
 And in default of exact knowledge it is the business of the philosopher 
 to suggest reasons. Bahya lays the greatest stress upon the command- 
 ments of the heart, i. e., upon the purity of motive and intention, upon 
 those laws which concern feeling and belief rather than outward 
 practice. Judah Halevi's attitude is different. If the only thing of 
 importance in rehgion were intention and motive and moral sense, 
 why should Christianity and Islam fight to the death, shedding un- 
 told human blood in defence of their religion. As far as ethical theory 
 and practice are concerned there is no difference between them. Cere- 
 monial practice is the only thing that separates them. And the king 
 of the Chazars was told repeatedly in his dreams that his intentions 
 were good but not his practice, his religious practice. To be sure the 
 
1 68 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ethical law is important in any religion, but it is not peculiar to religion 
 as such. It is a necessary condition of social life, without which no 
 association is possible, not even that of a robber band. There is 
 honesty even among thieves. Religion has its peculiar practices, 
 and it is not sufficient for an Israelite to observe the rational command- 
 ments alone. When the Prophets inveigh against sacrifices; when 
 Micah says (6, 8), "He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and 
 what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love 
 mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God," they mean that the cere- 
 monies alone are not sufficient; but surely a man is not fully an Israel- 
 ite if he neglects the ceremonial laws and observes only the rational 
 commandments. We may not understand the value of the ceremonial 
 laws, the meaning of the institution of sacrifices. But neither do we 
 understand why the rational soul does not attach itself to a body 
 except when the parts are arranged in a certain manner and the ele- 
 ments are mixed in a certain proportion, though the reason needs not 
 food and drink for itself. God has arranged it so, that only under 
 certain conditions shall a body receive the light of reason. So in the 
 matter of sacrifices God has ordained that only when the details of 
 the sacrificial and other ceremonies are minutely observed shall the 
 nation enjoy his presence and care. In some cases the signfficance 
 of certain observances is clearer than in others. Thus the various 
 festivals are also symbolic of certain truths of history and the divine 
 government of the world. The Sabbath leads to the belief in the 
 exodus from Egypt and the creation of the world; and hence inculcates 
 belief in God.^^^ 
 
 In his views of ethics Judah Halevi is more human than Bahya, 
 being opposed to all manner of asceticism. The law, he says, does 
 not demand excess in any direction. Every power and faculty must 
 be given its due. Our law commends fear, love and joy as means of 
 worshipping God; so that fasting on a fast day does not bring a man 
 nearer to God than eating and drinking and rejoicing on a feast day, 
 provided all is done with a view to honoring God. A Jewish devotee 
 is not one who separates himself from the world. On the contrary, 
 he loves the world and a long life because thereby he wins a share in 
 the world to come. Still his desire is to attain the degree of Enoch 
 or Elijah, and to be fit for the association of angels. A man hke this 
 
JUDAH HA LEV I 169 
 
 feels more at home when alone than in company of other people; 
 for the higher beings are his company, and he misses them when 
 people are around him. Philosophers also enjoy sohtude in order to 
 clarify their thoughts, and they are eager to meet disciples to discuss 
 their problems with them. In our days it is difficult to reach the posi- 
 tion of these rare men. In former times when the Shekinah rested in 
 the Holy Land, and the nation was fit for prophecy, there were people 
 who separated themselves from their neighbors and studied the law 
 in purity and holiness in the company of men like them. These were 
 the Sons of the Prophets. Nowadays when there is neither prophecy 
 nor wisdom, a person who attempted to do this, though he be a pious 
 man, would come to grief; for he would find neither prophets nor 
 philosophers to keep him company; nor enough to keep his mind in 
 that high state of exaltation needed for communion with God. Prayer 
 alone is not sufficient, and soon becomes a habit without any influence 
 on the soul. He would soon find that the natural powers and desires 
 of the soul begin to assert themselves and he will regret his separation 
 from mankind, thus getting farther away from God instead of coming 
 nearer to him. 
 
 The right practice of the pious man at the present day is to give 
 all the parts of the body their due and no more, without neglecting 
 any of them; and to bring the lower powers and desires under the 
 dominion of the higher; feeding the soul with things spiritual as the 
 body with things material. He must keep himself constantly under 
 guard and control, making special use of the times of prayer for self- 
 examination, and striving to retain the influence of one prayer imtil 
 the time comes for the next. He must also utiHze the Sabbaths and 
 the festivals and the Great Fast to keep himseK in good spiritual trim. 
 In addition he must observe all the commandments, traditional, 
 rational, and those of the heart, and reflect on their meaning and on 
 God's goodness and care.^^^ 
 
 Judah Halevi has no doubt of the immortahty of the soul and of 
 reward and punishment after death, though the Bible does not dwell 
 upon these matters with any degree of emphasis. Other religions, 
 he admits, make greater promises of reward after death, whereas 
 Judaism offers divine nearness through miracles and prophecy. In- 
 stead of saying. If you do thus and so, I will put you in gardens after 
 
I70 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 death and give you pleasures, our Law says, I will be your God and 
 you will be my people. Some of you will stand before me and will go up 
 to heaven, walking among the angels; and my angels will walk among 
 you, protecting you in your land, which is the holy land, not like the 
 other nations, which are governed by nature. Surely, he exclaims, we 
 who can boast of such things during life are more certain of the future 
 world than those whose sole rehance is on promises of the hereafter. 
 It would not be correct, the Rabbi says to the king of the Chazars, 
 who was tempted to despise the Jews as well as their religion because 
 of their material and pohtical weakness, to judge of our destiny after 
 death by our condition during life, in which we are inferior to all 
 other people. For these very people, like the Christians and Mo- 
 hammedans, glory in their founders, who were persecuted and de- 
 spised, and not in the present power and luxury of the great kings. 
 The Christians in particular worship the man who said, "Whosoever 
 smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if 
 a man . . . take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also " (Matth. 
 5, 39). Accordingly our worth is greater in the sight of God than if 
 we were prosperous. It is true that not all of us accept our miserable 
 condition with becoming humihty. If we did, God would not keep 
 us so long in misery. But after all there is reward awaiting our people 
 for bearing the yoke of the exile voluntarily, when it would be an easy 
 matter for any one of us to become a brother to our oppressors by 
 the saying of one word. 
 
 Our wise men, too, have said a great deal about the pleasures and suf- 
 ferings awaiting us in the next world, and in this also they surpass the 
 wise men of other rehgions. The Bible, it is true, does not lay stress 
 on this aspect of our belief; but so much is clear from the Bible also, 
 that the spirit returns to God. There are also allusions to the immor- 
 tality of the soul in the disappearance of Elijah, who did not die, and 
 in the belief of his second coming. This appears also from the prayer of 
 Balaam, " Let me die the death of the righteous, and may my last end be 
 like his" (Num. 23, 10), and from the calling of Samuel from the dead. 
 The idea of paradise (Gan Eden) is taken from the Torah, and Gehenna 
 is a Hebrew word, the name of a valley near Jerusalem, where fire al- 
 ways burned, consuming unclean bones, carcases, and so on. There is 
 nothing new in the later religions which is not already found in ours. ^^* 
 
JUDAH HALE VI 171 
 
 An important ethical problem which Judah Halevi discusses more 
 thoroughly than any of his predecessors is that of free will, which he 
 defends against fatalistic determinism, and endeavors to reconcile 
 with divine causality and foreknowledge. We have already seen 
 (p. xxi) that this was one of the important theses of the Mu' tazilite 
 Kalam. And there is no doubt that fatalism is opposed to Judaism. 
 A fatalistic determinist denies the category of the contingent or 
 possible. He says not merely that an event is determined by its 
 proximate cause, he goes further and maintains that it is determined 
 long in advance of any of its secondary causes by the will of God. 
 It would follow then that there is no way of preventing an event 
 thus predetermined. If we take pains to avoid a misfortune fated 
 to come upon us, our very efforts may carry us toward it and land us 
 in its clutches. Literature is full of stories illustrating this behef, 
 as for example the story of (Edipus. Against this form of belief 
 Judah Halevi vindicates the reaUty of the contingent or possible as 
 opposed to the necessary. No one except the obstinate and perverse 
 denies the possible or contingent. His preparations to meet and avoid 
 that which he hopes and fears prove that he beheves the thing amen- 
 able to pains and precautions. If he had not this belief, he would fold 
 his hands in resignation, never taking the trouble to supply himself 
 with arms to meet his enemy, or with water to quench his thirst. To be 
 sure, we may argue that whether one prepare himself or omit to do so, 
 the preparation or neglect is itself determined. But this is no longer 
 the same position as that maintamed at the outset. For we now 
 admit that secondary causes do play a part in determining the result, 
 whereas we denied it at first. The will is one of these secondary 
 causes. Accordingly Judah Halevi divides all acts or events into four 
 classes, divine, natural, accidental and voluntary. Strictly divine 
 events are the direct results of the divine will without any intermediate 
 cause. There is no way of preparing for or avoiding these; not, that 
 is, physically; but it is possible to prepare oneself mentally and 
 morally, namely, through the secrets of the Torah to him who knows 
 them. 
 
 Natural events are produced by secondary causes, which bring 
 the objects of nature to their perfection. These produce their effects 
 regularly and uniformly, provided there is no hindrance on the part 
 
172 MEDmVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 of the other three causes. An example of natural events would be the 
 growth of a plant or animal under favorable conditions. Accidental 
 events are also produced by secondary causes, but they happen by 
 chance, not regularly and not as a result of purpose. Their causes 
 are not intended for the purpose of bringing perfection to their chance 
 effects. These too may be hindered by any one of the other three 
 causes. An example of a chance event might be death in war. The 
 secondary cause is the battle, but its purpose was not that this given 
 person might meet his death there, and not all men die in war. 
 
 Finally, voluntary acts are those caused by the will of man. It is 
 these that concern us most. We have already intimated that the hu- 
 man will is itself a secondary cause and has a role in determining its 
 effect. It is true that the will itself is caused by other higher causes 
 until we get to the first cause, but this does not form a necessary chain 
 of causation. Despite the continuous chain of causes antecedent to 
 a given volition the soul finding itself in front of a given plan is 
 free to choose either of the two alternatives. To say that a man's 
 speech is as necessary as the beating of his pulse contradicts experience. 
 We feel that we are masters of our speech and our silence. The fact 
 that we praise and blame and love and hate a person according to 
 his deliberate conduct is another proof of freedom. We do not blame 
 a natural or accidental cause. We do not blame a child or a person 
 asleep when they cause damage, because they did not do the damage 
 deliberately and with intention. If those who deny freedom are 
 consistent, they must either refrain from being angry with a person 
 who injures them deliberately, or they must say that anger and praise 
 and blame and love and hate are delusive powers put in our souls in 
 vain. Besides there would be no difference between the pious and the 
 disobedient, because both are doing that which they are by necessity 
 bound to do. 
 
 But there are certain strong objections to the doctrine of freedom. 
 If man is absolutely free to do or forbear, it follows that the effects 
 of his conduct are removed from God's control. The answer to this 
 is that they are not absolutely removed from his control. They are 
 still related to him by a chain of causes. 
 
 Another argument against free will is that it is irreconcilable with 
 God's knowledge. If man alone is the master of his choice, God cannot 
 
JUDAH HALEVI I7S 
 
 know beforehand what he will choose. And if God does know, the man 
 cannot but choose as God foreknew he would choose, and what be- 
 comes of his freedom? This may be answered by saying that the 
 knowledge of a thing is not the cause of its being. We do not deter- 
 mine a past event by the fact that we know it. Knowledge is simply 
 evidence that the thing is. So man chooses by his own determination, 
 and yet God knows beforehand which way he is going to choose, 
 simply because he sees into the future as we remember the past.^"" 
 
 Judah Halevi's discussion of the problem of freedom is fuller than 
 any we have met so far in our investigation. But it is not satisfactory. 
 Apart from his fourfold classification of events which is open to criti- 
 cism, there is a weak spot in the very centre of his argument, which 
 scarcely could have escaped him. He admits that the will is caused, 
 by higher causes ending ultimately in the will of God, and yet main- 
 tains in the same breath that the will is not determined. As free 
 the will is removed from God's control, and yet it is not completely 
 removed, being related to him by a chain of causes. This is a plain 
 contradiction, unless we are told how far it is determined and how 
 far it is not. Surely the aspect in which it is not determined is abso- 
 lutely removed from God's control and altogether uncaused. But 
 Judah Halevi is unwilling to grant this. He just leaves us with the 
 juxtaposition of two incompatibles. We shall see that Hasdai Crescas 
 was more consistent, and admitted determinism. 
 
 We have now considered Judah Halevi's teachings, and have seen 
 that he has no sympathy with the point of view of those people who 
 were called in his day philosophers, i. e., those who adopted the teach- 
 ings ascribed to Aristotle. At the same time he was interested in 
 maintaining that all science really came originally from the Jews; and 
 in order to prove this he undertakes a brief interpretation of the 
 "Sefer Yezirah" (Book of Creation), an early mystic work of unknown 
 authorship and date, which Judah Halevi in common with the un- 
 critical opinion of his day attributed to Abraham. ^^ Not to lay 
 himself open to the charge of inconsistency, he throws out the sug-^ 
 gestion that the Sefer Yezirah represented Abraham's own specu- 
 lations before he had the privilege of a prophetic communication from 
 God. When that came he was ready to abandon all his former ration- 
 ahstic lucubrations and abide by the certainty of revealed truth. ^^ 
 
174 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 We may therefore legitimately infer that Judah Halevi's idea was that 
 the Jews were the originators of philosophy, but that they had long 
 discarded it in favor of something much more valid and certain; 
 whereas the Greeks and their descendants, having nothing better, 
 caught it up and are now parading it as their own discovery 
 and even setting it up as superior to direct revelation. 
 
 Natural science in so far as it had to do with more or less verifiable 
 data could not be considered harmful, and so we find Judah Halevi 
 taking pains to show that the sages of Rabbinical literature cultivated 
 the sciences, astronomy in connection with the Jewish calendar; 
 anatomy, biology and physiology in relation to the laws of slaughter 
 and the examination of animal meat (laws of "Terefa").^^ 
 
 But so great was the fascination philosophy exerted upon the men 
 of his generation that even Judah Halevi, despite his efforts to shake 
 its authority and point out its inadequacy and evident inferiority 
 to revelation, was not able wholly to escape it. And we find accord- 
 ingly that he deems it necessary to devote a large part of the fifth 
 book of the Kusari to the presentation of a bird's eye view of the cur- 
 rent philosophy of the day. To be sure, he does not give all of it 
 the stamp of his approval; he repeatedly attacks its foundations and 
 lays bare their weakness. At the same time he admits that not every 
 man has faith by nature and is proof against the erroneous arguments 
 of heretics, astrologers, philosophers and others. The ordinary mortal 
 is affected by them, and may even be misled for a time until he comes 
 to see the truth. It is therefore well to know the principles of religion 
 according to those who defend it by reason, and this involves a knowl- 
 edge of science and theology. But we must not, he says, in the man- 
 ner of the Karaites, advance all at once to the higher study of theology. 
 One must first understand the fundamental principles of physics, 
 psychology, and so on, such as matter and form, the elements, nature, 
 Soul, Intellect, Divine Wisdom. Then we can proceed to the more 
 properly theological matters, like the future world, Providence, and 
 so on. 
 
 Accordingly Judah Halevi gives us in the sequel a brief account 
 such as he has just outlined. It will not be worth our while to re- 
 produce it all here, as in the first place Judah Halevi does not give it 
 as the result of his own investigation and conviction, and secondly 
 
JUDAH HA LEV I 175 
 
 a good deal of it is not new; and we have already met it in more or less 
 similar form before in Joseph ibn Zaddik, Abraham bar Hiyyah, and 
 others. We must point out, however, the new features which we did 
 not meet before, explain their origin and in particular indicate Judah 
 Halevi's criticisms. 
 
 In general we may say that Judah Halevi has a better knowledge 
 of Aristotelian doctrines than any of his predecessors. Thus to take 
 one example, which we used before (p. 138), Aristotle's famous defi- 
 nition of the soul is quoted by Isaac Israeli, Saadia, Joseph ibn Zaddik 
 as well as by Judah Halevi. Israeli does not discuss the definition in 
 detail. ^°^ Saadia and Ibn Zaddik show clearly that they did not un- 
 derstand the precise meaning of the definition. Judah Halevi is the 
 first who understands correctly all the elements of the definition. 
 And yet it would be decidedly mistaken to infer from this that Judah 
 Halevi studied the Aristotelian works directly. By a fortunate dis- 
 covery of S. Landauer ^°^ we are enabled to follow Judah Halevi's 
 source with the certainty of eyewitnesses. The sketch which he gives 
 of the Aristotelian psychology is taken bodily not from Aristotle's 
 De Anima, but from a youthful work of Ibn Sina. Judah Halevi 
 did not even take the trouble to present the subject in his own words. 
 He simply took his model and abridged it, by throwing out all argu- 
 mentative, illustrative and amplificatory material. Apart from this 
 abridgment he follows his authority almost word for word, not to 
 speak of reproducing the ideas in the original form and order. This 
 is a typical and extremely instructive instance; and it shows how 
 careful we must be before we decide that a mediaeval writer read a 
 certain author with whose ideas he is familiar and whom he quotes. 
 
 In the sketch of philosophical theory Judah Halevi first speaks of 
 the hyle {vXrf) or formless matter, which according to the philosophers 
 was in the beginning of things contained within the lunar sphere. The 
 "water" in the second verse of Genesis ("and the spirit of God moved 
 upon the face of the water") is supposed by them to denote this prim- 
 itive matter, as the "darkness" in the same verse and the "chaos" 
 ("Tohu") in the first verse signify the absence of form and compo- 
 sition in the matter (the Aristotelian o-reprjai^;). God then willed 
 the revolution of the outermost sphere, known as the diurnal sphere, 
 which caused all the other spheres to revolve with it, thereby produc- 
 
176 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ing changes in the hyle in accordance with the motions of the sphere. 
 The first change was the heating of that which was next to the lunar 
 sphere and making it into pure fire, known among the philosophers 
 as "natural fire," a pure, fine and light substance, without color or 
 burning quality. This became the sphere of fire. The part that was 
 further away changed as a result of the same revolution into the sphere 
 of air, then came the sphere of water, and finally the terrestrial globe 
 in the centre, heavy and thick by reason of its distance from the place 
 of motion. From these four elements come the physical objects by 
 composition. The forms (in the Aristotelian sense) of things are 
 imposed upon their matters by a divine power, the "Intellect, and 
 Giver of Forms"; whereas the matters come from the hyle, and the 
 accidental proximity of different parts to the revolving lunar sphere 
 explains why some parts became fire, some air, and so on. 
 
 To this mechanical explanation of the formation of the elements 
 Judah Halevi objects. As long as the original motion of the diurnal 
 sphere is admittedly due not to chance but to the will of God, what is 
 gained by referring the formation of the elements to their accidental 
 proximity to the moving sphere, and accounting for the production of 
 mineral, plant and animal in the same mechanical way by the acciden- 
 tal composition of the four elements in proportions varying according to 
 the different revolutions and positions of the heavenly bodies? Besides 
 if the latter explanation were true, the number of species of plants 
 and animals should be infinite like the various positions and formations 
 of the heavenly bodies, whereas they are finite and constant. The 
 argument from the design and purpose that is clearly visible in the ma- 
 jority of plants and animals further refutes such mechanical explana- 
 tion as is attempted by the philosophers. Design is also visible in the 
 violation of the natural law by which water should always be above 
 and around earth; whereas in reality we see a great part of the earth's 
 surface above water. This is clearly a beneficent provision in order 
 that animal life may sustain itself, and this is the significance of the 
 words of the Psalmist (136, 6), "To him that stretched out the earth 
 above the waters." 
 
 The entire theory of the four elements and the alleged composition 
 of all things out of them is a pure assumption. Take the idea of the 
 world of fire, the upper fire as they call it, which is colorless, so as not 
 
JUDAH HALEVI 177 
 
 to obstruct the color of the heavens and the stars. Whoever saw such 
 a fire? The only fire we know is an extremely hot object in the shape 
 of coal, or as a flame in the air, or as boiling water. And whoever 
 saw a fiery or aery body enter the matter of plant and animal so as to 
 warrant us in saying that the latter are composed of the four elements? 
 True, we know that water and earth do enter the matter of plants, 
 and that they are assisted by the air and the heat of the sun in causing 
 the plant to grow and develop, but we never see a fiery or aery body. 
 Or whoever saw plants resolved into the four elements? If a part 
 changes into earth, it is not real earth, but ashes; and the part changed 
 to water is not real water, but a kind of moisture, poisonous or nu- 
 tritious, but not water fit for drinking. Similarly no part of the plant 
 changes to real air fit for breathing, but to vapor or mist. Granted 
 that we have to admit the warm and the cold, and the moist and the 
 dry as the primary quahties without which no body can exist; and 
 that the reason resolves the composite objects into these primary 
 qualities, and posits substances as bearers of these qualities, which 
 it calls fire, air, water and earth — this is true conceptually and theoret- 
 ically only. It cannot be that the primary qualities really existed 
 in the simple state extra animam, and then all existing things were 
 made out of them. How can the philosophers maintain such a thing, 
 since they believe in the eternity of the world, that it always existed 
 as it does now? 
 
 These are the criticisms of their theory of the elements. According 
 to the Torah God created the world just as it is, with its animals and 
 plants already formed. There is no need of assuming intermediate 
 powers or compositions. The moment we admit that the world was 
 created out of nothing by the will of God in the manner in which 
 he desired, all difl&culties vanish about the origin of bodies and their 
 association with souls. And there is no reason why we should not 
 accept the firmament, and the waters above the heaven, and the 
 demons mentioned by the Rabbis, and the account of the days of the 
 Messiah and the resurrection and the world to come.^^ 
 
 Another theory he criticizes is that developed by Alfarabi and 
 Avicenna, the chief Aristotehans of the Arabs before Averroes. It is 
 a combination of Aristotelianism with the Neo-Platonic doctrine 
 of emanation, though it was credited as a whole to Aristotle in the 
 
178 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 middle ages. We have already seen in the Introduction (p. xxxiv) that 
 Aristotle conceived the world as a series of concentric spheres with 
 the earth in the centre. The principal spheres are eight in number, 
 and they carry in order, beginning with the external sphere, (i) the 
 fixed stars, (2) Saturn, (3) Jupiter, (4) Mars, (5) Mercury, (6) Venus, 
 (7) Sun, (8) Moon. To account for the various motions of the sun and 
 the planets additional spheres had to be introduced amounting in all to 
 fifty-six. But the principal spheres remained those mentioned. Each 
 sphere or group of spheres with the star it carries is moved by an in- 
 corporeal mover, a spirit or Intelligence, and over them all is the first 
 unmoved mover, God. He sets in motion the outer sphere of the fixed 
 stars, and so the whole world moves. There is nothing said in this of 
 the origin of these spheres and their intelligible movers. On the other 
 hand, in the Neo-Platonic system of Plotinus all existence and particu- 
 larly that of the intelligible or spiritual world issues or emanates from 
 the One or the Good. Intellect is the first emanation, Soul the second, 
 Nature the third and Matter the last. 
 
 On accoimt of the confusion which arose in the middle ages, as a 
 result of which Neo-Platonic writings and doctrines were attributed 
 to Aristotle, Alfarabi and Avicenna worked out a scheme which 
 combined the motion theory of Aristotle with the doctrine of emana- 
 tion of Plotinus. The theory is based upon a principle alleged to be 
 Aristotle's that from a unitary cause nothing but a unitary effect can 
 follow. Hence, said Avicenna, God cannot have produced directly 
 all the world we see in its complexity. He is the direct cause of the 
 first IntelUgence only, or first angel as Judah Halevi calls him. This 
 Intelligence contemplates itself and it contemplates its cause. The 
 effect of the latter act is the emanation of a second intelligence or 
 angel; the effect of the former is a sphere — that of the fixed stars, of 
 which the first Intelligence is the mover. The second Intelligence 
 again produces a third Intelligence by its contemplation of the First 
 Cause, and by its self-contemplation it creates the second sphere, 
 the sphere of Saturn, which is moved by it. So the process continues 
 until we reach the sphere of the moon, which is the last of the celestial 
 spheres, and the Active Intellect, the last of the Intelligences, having 
 in charge the sublunar world. 
 
 This fanciful and purely mythological scheme arouses the antago- 
 
JUDAH HALEVI 179 
 
 nism of Judah Halevi. It is all pure conjecture, he says, and there is 
 not an iota of proof in it. People believe it and think it is convincing, 
 simply because it bears the name of a Greek philosopher. As a matter 
 of fact this theory is less plausible than those of the "Sefer Yezirah"; 
 and there is no agreement even among the philosophers themselves 
 except for those who are the followers of the same Greek authority, 
 Empedocles, or Pythagoras, or Aristotle, or Plato. These agree not 
 because the proofs are convincing, but simply because they are mem- 
 bers of a given sect or school. The objections to the theory just 
 outlined are manifold. In the first place why should the series of 
 emanations stop with the moon? Is it because the power of the 
 First Cause has given out? Besides why should self-contemplation 
 result in a sphere and contemplation of the First Cause in an IntelH- 
 gence or angel? It should follow that when Aristotle contemplates 
 himself he produces a sphere, and when he contemplates the First 
 Cause he gives rise to an angel. Granting the truth of the process, 
 one does not see why the mover of Saturn should not produce two more 
 emanations, one by contemplating the Intelligence immediately above 
 it, and the other by contemplating the first IntelHgence, thus making 
 four emanations instead of two.^"*^ 
 
 In his outline of the philosophers' psychology, which as we have 
 seen (p. 175) is borrowed verbally from Avicenna, what is new to us 
 is the exposition of the inner senses and the account of the rational 
 faculty. We must therefore repooduce it here in outline together 
 with Judah Halevi's criticism. 
 
 The three kinds of soul, vegetative, animal and rational, we have 
 already met before. We have also referred to the fact that Judah 
 Halevi analyzes correctly the well-known Aristotelian definition of 
 the soul. We must now give a brief account of the inner senses as 
 Judah Halevi took it from Avicenna. The five external senses, seeing, 
 hearing, touching, smelling and tasting, give us merely colors, sounds, 
 touch sensations, odors and tastes. These are combined into an ob- 
 ject by the common sense, known also as the forming power. Thus 
 when we see honey we associate with its yellow color a sweet taste. 
 This could not be done unless we had a power which combines in it 
 all the five senses. For the sense of sight cannot perceive taste, nor 
 can color be apprehended by the gustatory sense. There is need there- 
 
i8o MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 fore of a common sense which comprehends all the five external senses. 
 This is the first internal sense. This retains the forms of sensible 
 objects just as the external senses present them. Then comes the 
 composing power or power of imagination. This composes and divides 
 the material of the common sense. It may be true or false, whereas 
 the common sense is always true. Both of these give us merely forms; 
 they do not exercise any judgment. The latter function belongs to 
 the third internal sense, the power of judgment. Through this an ani- 
 mal is enabled to decide that a given object is to be sought or avoided. 
 It also serves to rectify the errors of reproduction that may be found 
 in the preceding faculty of imagination. Love, injury, beUef, denial, 
 belong likewise to the judging faculty together with such judgments 
 as that the wolf is an enemy, the child a friend. The last of the in- 
 ternal senses is that of factual memory, the power which retains the 
 judgments made by the faculty preceding. 
 
 In addition to these sensory powers the animal possesses motor 
 faculties. These are two, the power of desire, which moves the animal 
 to seek the agreeable; and the power of anger, which causes it to reject 
 or avoid the disagreeable. All these powers are dependent upon the 
 corporeal organs and disappear with the destruction of the latter. 
 
 The highest power of the soul and the exclusive possession of man 
 (the faculties mentioned before are found also in animals) is the ra- 
 tional soul. This is at first simply a potentiality. Actually it is a 
 tabula rasa, an empty slate, a blank paper. But it has the power 
 (or is the power) of acquiring general ideas. Hence it is called hylic 
 or material intellect, because it is like matter which in itself is nothing 
 actual but is potentially everything, being capable of receiving any 
 form and becoming any real object. As matter receives sensible forms, 
 so the material intellect acquires intelligible forms, i. e., thoughts, 
 ideas, concepts. When it has these ideas it is an actual intellect. It 
 is then identical with the ideas it has, i. e., thinker and thought are 
 the same, and hence the statement that the actual intellect is "intel- 
 ligent" and " intelligible " at the same time. As matter is the principle 
 of generation and destruction the rational soul, which is thus shown 
 to be an immaterial substance, is indestructible, hence immortal. 
 And it is the ideas it acquires which make it so. When the rational 
 soul is concerned with pure knowledge it is called the speculative or 
 
JUDAH HALEVI l8i 
 
 theoretical intellect. When it is engaged in controlling the animal 
 powers, its function is conduct, and is called the practical intellect. 
 The rational soul, i. e., the speculative intellect, is separable from 
 the body and needs it not, though it uses it at first to acquire some of 
 its knowledge. This is proved by the fact that whereas the corporeal 
 powers, like the senses, are weakened by strong stimuli, the reason is 
 strengthened by hard subjects of thought. Old age weakens the body, 
 but strengthens the mind. The activities of the body are finite; of 
 the mind, infinite. 
 
 We must also show that while the rational soul makes use of the 
 data of sense perception, which are corporeal, as the occasions for 
 the formation of its general ideas, it is not wholly dependent upon 
 them, and the sense data alone are inadequate to give the soul its 
 intellectual truths. Empirical knowledge is inductive, and no induc- 
 tion can be more general and more certain than the particular facts 
 from which it is derived. As all experience, however rich, is neces- 
 sarily finite, empirical knowledge is never universally certain. But 
 the soul does possess universally certain knowledge, as for example the 
 truths of mathematics and logic; hence the origin of these truths can 
 not be empirical. How does the soul come to have such knowledge? 
 We must assume that there is a divine emanation cleaving to the 
 soul, which stands to it in the relation of light to the sense of sight. 
 It is to the illumination of this intellectual substance and not to the 
 data of sense perception that the soul owes the universal certainty 
 of its knowledge. This divine substance is the Active Intellect. As 
 long as the soul is united with the body, perfect union with the Active 
 Intellect is impossible. But as the soul becomes more and more per- 
 fect through the acquisition of knowledge, it cleaves more and 
 more to the Active Intellect, and this union becomes complete after 
 death. Thus the immortality of the soul is proved by reason. It is 
 based upon the conviction that the soul is an immaterial substance 
 and that its perfection Hes in its acquisition of intellectual ideas. ^^ 
 
 Judah Halevi cannot help admitting the fascination such specula- 
 tion exercises upon the mind of the student. But he must warn him 
 against being misled by the fame of such names as Plato and Aristotle, 
 and supposing that because in logic and mathematics the philosophers 
 give us real proofs, they are equally trustworthy in metaphysical 
 
l82 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 speculation. If the soul is, as they say, an intellectual substance 
 not limited in place and for this reason not subject to genesis and de- 
 cay, there is no way to distinguish one soul from another, since it is 
 matter which constitutes individual existence. How then can my 
 soul be distinguished from yours, or from the Active Intellect and 
 the other Intelligences, or from the First Cause itself? The souls of 
 Plato and Aristotle should become one so that the one should know the 
 secret thoughts of the other. If the soul gets its ideas through divine 
 illumination from the Active Intellect, how is it that philosophers do 
 not intuit their ideas at once like God and the Active Intellect, and 
 how is it they forget? 
 
 Then as to their ideas about immortality. If immortality is a neces- 
 sary phenomenon due to the intellectual nature of the soul and de- 
 pendent upon the degree of intellectual knowledge it possesses, how 
 much knowledge must a man have to be immortal? If any amount 
 is sufficient, then €very rational soul is immortal, for everybody knows 
 at least the axioms of logic and mathematics, such as that things 
 equal to the same thing are equal to each other, that a thing cannot 
 both be and not be, and so on. If a knowledge of the ten categories 
 is necessary, and of the other universal principles which embrace 
 existence conceptually, though not practically, this knowledge can 
 be gotten in a day, and it is not likely that a man can become an 
 angel in a day. If on the other hand one must know everything not 
 merely conceptually but in detail, no one can ever acquire universal 
 knowledge and no one is immortal The philosophers may be excused 
 because this is the best they can do with the help of pure reason. We 
 may commend them for their mode of life in accordance with the moral 
 law and in freedom from the world, since they were not bound to 
 accept our traditions. But it is different with us. Why should we 
 seek peculiar proofs and explanations for the immortality of the soul, 
 since we have promises to that effect whether the soul be corporeal 
 or spiritual? If we depend upon logical proof, our life will pass away 
 without our coming to any conclusion. ^°^ 
 
 Judah Halevi takes issue also with the Mutakallimun. These, as 
 we know, were Mohammedan theologians who, unlike the philoso- 
 phers, were not indifferent to religion. On the contrary their sole 
 motive in philosophizing was to prove the dogmas of their faith. 
 
JUDAH HALEFI 183 
 
 They had no interest in pure speculation as such. Judah Halevi 
 has no more sympathy with them than with the philosophers. Owing 
 to the fact that the Karaites were implicit followers of the Kalam and 
 for other reasons, no doubt, more objective, he thinks less of them 
 than he does of the philosophers. The only possible use, he tells us, 
 of their methods is to afford exercise in dialectics so as to be able to 
 answer the arguments of unbelievers. To the superficial observer 
 the MutakaUim may seem to be superior to the prophet, because 
 he argues, whereas the latter afi&rms without proving. In reahty, 
 however, this is not so. The aim of the MutakaUim is to acquire the 
 belief which the prophet has by nature. But his Kalam may injure his 
 belief instead of confirming it, by reason of the many difficulties and 
 doubts it introduces. The prophet, who has natural belief, teaches 
 not by means of dialectic discussion. If one has a spark of the true 
 belief in his nature, the prophet by his personaUty will benefit him by 
 a slight hint. Only he who has nothing of true behef in his nature 
 must have recourse to Kalam, which may benefit him or injure. 
 
 Judah Halevi follows up this general comment by a brief sketch 
 of the system of the Kalam, but we need not enter into this matter 
 as there is Httle there that we do not already know, and there is no 
 detailed criticism on the part of Judah Halevi. ^^° 
 
 The Rabbi concludes his discourse with the king of the Chazars 
 by declaring his intention to leave the land in order to go to Jerusalem. 
 Although the visible Shekinah is no longer in Palestine, the invisible 
 and spiritual presence is with every born Israelite of pure heart and 
 deed; and Palestine is the fittest land for this communion, being 
 conducive to purity of heart and mind.^^^ 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 MOSES AND ABRAHAM IBN EZRA 
 
 I. Moses ihn Ezra 
 
 Among the Jewish Neo-Platonists must be included the two Ibn 
 Ezras, Moses and Abraham. They were contemporary and came 
 from Spain. Moses, the older of the two, was born at Granada about 
 1070 and died after 1138. Abraham, who travelled all over the world, 
 was born at Toledo in 1092 and died in 1167. Neither is particularly 
 famous as a philosopher. Moses's celebrity rests on his poetic pro- 
 ductions, secular as well as religious, which are highly praised by 
 Harizi, above even those of Halevi. Abraham is best known as a 
 grammarian and BibHcal commentator, particularly the latter, though 
 his versatility is remarkable. Besides grammar and exegesis he wrote 
 on mathematics, astronomy and astrology, on religious philosophy, 
 and was a poet of no mean order; though, as Zunz says,^^^ "flashes 
 of thought spring from his words, but not pictures of the imagination." 
 
 All that is accessible in print of Moses Ibn Ezra's philosophical 
 treatise is a Hebrew translation of extracts under the title "Arugat 
 ha-Bosem " (Bed of Spices). ^^^ If we may judge of the rest of the work 
 by these Hebrew fragments, we should say that philosophy was not 
 Ibn Ezra's forte. He dabbled in it as any poet of that age did, but 
 what caught his fancy was more the mysteriously sounding phrases 
 of celebrated authorities like Pythagoras, Empedocles, Socrates, 
 Plato, Aristotle, Hermes (whom he identifies with Enoch), than a 
 strictly reasoned out argument. Accordingly the Hebrew selections 
 consist of little more than a string of quotations on the transcendence 
 and unknowableness of God, on the meaning of philosophy, on the 
 position of man in the universe, on motion, on nature and on intellect. 
 It is of historical interest to us to know that Moses ibn Ezra, so famous 
 as a poet, was interested in philosophy, and that the views which 
 appealed to him were those of Ibn Gabirol, whose "Fountain of Life" 
 
 184 
 
MOSES AND ABRAHAM IBN EZRA 185 
 
 he knew, and from which he quotes a celebrated mystical passage. 
 A few details will suffice to make this clear. 
 
 Man is a microcosm, a world in miniature, and there is nothing 
 above or below, the counterpart of which is not found in man. There 
 is no sphere, or star, or animal, or plant, or mineral, or power, or 
 nature, but something similar, mutatis mutandis, is found in man. 
 The ten categories, which according to the philosophers embrace all 
 existence, are also found, all of them, in man. The perfection of 
 man's creation points to a wise Creator. Man comes after multi- 
 plicity, God is before multiplicity. Man is like the great imiverse, 
 and in both the spiritual cannot come in direct contact with the 
 corporeal, but needs intermediating powers to bring the extremes to- 
 gether. In man soul and spirit stand between intellect and body. 
 
 Hence a man must know himseK before he can know the universe, 
 else he is like a person who feeds other people while he is himself 
 hungry. To know the Creator, the soul must first know herself, and 
 this is one of the definitions of philosophy, to know one's own soul. 
 He who can strip his soul of his corporeal senses and worldly desires, 
 and rise to the sphere will find there his reward. Other similarly 
 ascetic and mystical expressions are quoted from Aristotle (!), Pythag- 
 oras, and ''one of the modern philosophers." The last is none other 
 than Ibn Gabirol, and the passage quoted is the same as that cited 
 above, p. 69. 
 
 Unity precedes the unitary object as heat comes before the hot 
 object. Unity alone is self-subsistent. Numerical unity is prior to 
 two, and is the very root and essence of number. God's unity is above 
 all other unities, hence it cannot be described, because it has no cause, 
 being the cause of everything else. As our eye cannot see the sun by 
 reason of its very brilliance, so our intellect cannot comprehend God 
 because of the extreme perfection of his existence. The finite and 
 imperfect cannot know the infinite and perfect. Hence no names can 
 apply to God except metaphorically. When we say that God knows, 
 we mean that he is knowledge itself, not that knowledge is an attribute 
 which he possesses. Socrates (!) said in his prayers, "Thou art not far 
 from me so that I should raise my voice to thee, nor art Thou near 
 imto me that I should content myself with a low whisper and the 
 meditation of the heart; nor art Thou on any side of me so that I 
 
l86 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 may turn toward Thee; for nearness and distance have measure, 
 but there is no measure between me and Thee. Thou art united with 
 me and embracest me more closely than my intellect and soul." 
 
 He who knows most of the secret of the Creator, knows least; and 
 he who knows least, knows most. As the limbs of the body and the 
 senses cannot know the intelligible ideas because the latter are superior 
 to them, so the intellect cannot know the essence of the Creator be- 
 cause he is above the sphere of the intellect. Although the intellect 
 is spiritual, it cannot comprehend the Creator because he is above 
 all intellectual powers, and is infinite. What is infinite has no division 
 or multiplication, or part or whole. 
 
 The Gentiles make use of the anthropomorphic expressions in the 
 Bible to annoy us, charging us with believing in a corporeal God. 
 Would that we had strength to silence their impudence by a crushing 
 reply. But alas! their tyranny prevents us from raising our voice. 
 But it is still more aggravating to hear men of our own people, heretics, 
 repeating the same charge against the Bible and Talmud, when they 
 ought to know better, since the expressions in question are meta- 
 phorical. Saadia has made this sufficiently clear. 
 
 The Active Intellect is the first of God's creations. It is a power 
 emanating from the Will. It is a simple, pure and transparent sub- 
 stance, bearing in itself the forms of all existing things. The human 
 intellect is known as the passive intellect. The rational soul is a pure 
 substance giving perfection to a natural body, etc. It is inferior to 
 the intellect, and the animal soul is inferior to the rational. The 
 soul is the horseman, the body represents the soldiers and the arms. 
 As the horseman must take care of his arms that he may not be put 
 to death, so the soul must take care of the body that she may not 
 perish. And the senses must be taken into account, for the powers of 
 the soul are dependent upon the powers of the body. If the food of 
 the body is in proper proportion, the activity of the soul is proper 
 and right. Similarly if one neglects moderation in food, he is bound 
 to suffer morally and spiritually. 
 
 The above selections, which are representative of the accessible 
 portion of Moses ibn Ezra's philosophical treatise, except that such 
 recurring phrases have been omitted as "And the philosopher said," 
 * And they say, " etc., show that the work is nothing but a compilation 
 
MOSES AND ABRAHAM IBN EZRA 187 
 
 of sayings on various philosophical topics, without any attempt on 
 the author's part to think out the subject or any part thereof, for 
 himself. 
 
 2. Abraham ibn Ezra 
 
 Abraham Ibn Ezra did not write any special work on philosophy, 
 and his importance lies chiefly in his Biblical commentary, which 
 unlike that of Rashi, is based upon a scientific and philological founda- 
 tion. Ibn Ezra was thoroughly familiar with Arabic and well versed 
 in the philological, scientific and philosophical studies cultivated by 
 Arabs and Jews in his native land. For reasons not known to us — 
 poverty was very likely one of them — he left his native Spain and 
 wandered as far as Rome in the east, Egypt and Morocco in the 
 south, and London in the north. Everywhere he was busy with 
 literary activity, and as he wrote in Hebrew his purpose must have 
 been, as the result certainly proved to be, the enlightenment of the 
 non-Arabic speaking Jews of England, France and Italy, by bringing 
 before them in a language that they knew the grammar of Hayyuj, 
 the mathematics and astronony of the Greeks and the Arabs, the 
 philosophy of Neo-Platonism, and the scientific and rationalistic 
 spirit generally, as enlightened Spain had developed it in Jew and 
 Arab alike. 
 
 We are interested here more particularly in Ibn Ezra's philosophical 
 views. These are scattered through his Biblical commentaries and 
 in a few other small works devoted to an investigation of the laws of 
 the Pentateuch and the meaning of the names of God.^^* For though 
 Ibn Ezra favors tlie philological method as the best way to arrive at 
 the true meaning of Scripture, and decries allegory as well as Midrash 
 when pushed too far, and though his commentary is for the most 
 part based upon the philological method of interpretation, he was too 
 much a child of his age to be able to refrain from finding in the Bible 
 views akin to those he learned from Gabirol, the Brethren of Purity 
 and what other philosophical Uterature of the Arabs he read and was 
 influenced by. And so he, too, the grammarian and philologist, suc- 
 cumbed to the aUegorical and symbolical method he condemned. 
 Without denying the historical reality of the Garden of Eden, the 
 Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life, he also sees in these expres- 
 
l88 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 sions symbols of cosmological, psychological and ethical ideas. In 
 the fashion of Philo he sees in Eden a representation of the higher 
 world of the divinity, in the Garden the intermediate world of the 
 spheres and Intelligences, in the river issuing from the Garden the 
 substance of the sublunar world, in the four heads into which the river 
 divides the four elements, and so on. He speaks of these s3anbolic 
 meanings as the ''secrets," and so we have the secret of the Garden, 
 of the rivers, of the coats. And in the same way he speaks of the 
 secret of the Cherubim, of the ark and the Tabernacle. These objects 
 also symbolize metaphysical and cosmological truths. He was a be- 
 liever in astrology, and laid this pseudo-science also under contribu- 
 tion in the interpretation of Holy Writ. Here the various numbers 
 found in the Bible in connection with ritual prescriptions, the construc- 
 tion of the Tabernacle, and so on, were of great service to Ibn Ezra 
 in his symbolizations. Like Philo and the Neo-Pythagoreans he 
 analyzes the virtues and significances of the different numbers, and 
 thus finds a s)anbol in every number found in the Bible. Writing as 
 he did for the Jews of central Europe, who were not trained in secular 
 science and philosophy, Ibn Ezra was not prepared to shock the sen- 
 sibilities of his readers by his novel and, to them, heretical views; and 
 hence he expressed himself in cryptic phrases and allusions, which 
 often make his meaning difficult if not impossible to decipher. This, 
 taken together with the fact that his views are not laid down any- 
 where systematically and in connected fashion, but are thrown out 
 briefly, often enigmatically, in connection with the explanation of 
 Biblical verses and phrases, accounts for the difference among critics 
 concerning the precise doctrines of Abraham Ibn Ezra. 
 
 Of his predecessors among the Jewish philosophers Ibn Ezra shows 
 closest relation to Solomon ibn Gabirol. He does not quote the 
 "Fountain of Life," but he names its author as a great thinker and 
 writer of poems, and shows familiarity with Gabirol's doctrines. 
 Like Gabirol he says that all except God consists of substance (matter) 
 and form. Not only the sublunar things, subject to generation and 
 decay, but the higher incorporeal things, also, are in essence two, i. e., 
 are composed of two elements, subject and predicate. God alone is 
 One; he is subject only and not predicate. And Ibn Ezra also has some 
 allusion to the divine Will as taught by Gabirol. 
 
MOSES AND ABRAHAM IBN EZRA i8g 
 
 In giving a connected sketch of Ibn Ezra's philosophical ideas, the 
 most one can do is to collect all the sayings bearing upon our subject 
 which are found scattered through Ibn Ezra's writings, and classify 
 them and combine them into a connected whole. This has been done 
 before by Nahman Krochmal ^^^ and by David Rosin,^^® and we shall 
 follow the latter in our exposition here. 
 
 God is the One. He gives forms to all things, and is himself all 
 things. God alone is the real existent, all else is an existent by virtue 
 of him. Unity is the symbol of God because in mmiber also the unit 
 is the foundation of all number, and yet is not itself number. It 
 exists by virtue of itself and needs not the numbers that come after. 
 At the same time the unit is also aU number, because all number is 
 made up of the unit. God alone is one, because he alone is not com- 
 posed of matter and form, as everything else is. God has neither 
 likeness nor form, for he is the creator of all things, i. e., of all likeness 
 and form. He is therefore incorporeal. In God the subject knowing 
 and the object of his knowledge are one and the same thing. Else 
 he would not be one. In knowing himself, therefore, he knows the 
 universe. God as the cause and creator of all things must know all 
 things, the universal as well as the particular, the world soul as well 
 as the various species, and even every single creature, but he knows 
 the particular in a general way. For God knows only what is perma- 
 nent, whereas the particular is constantly changing, hence he does 
 not know the particular as such, but only as involved in the general 
 and permanent. 
 
 As God is incorporeal he is not subject to corporeal accidents or 
 human feelings. Hence the many expressions in the Bible which as- 
 cribe such accidents and feelings to God must be understood as meta- 
 phors. It is a psychological necessity for man wishing to communicate 
 his ideas to other men to speak in human terms, whether he speak of 
 beings and things inferior or superior to him. The result is that the 
 metaphor he finds it necessary to employ either raises or lowers the 
 object to which it refers. It elevates the sub-human and lowers the 
 superhuman to the human. This is the explanation of such phrases 
 as "the mouth of the earth" the "hand of the Jordan," the " head of 
 the dust of the world," and so on, in which the figure is that of 
 personification. And the fundamental explanation is the same in 
 
igo MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 such phrases as "The Lord repented," "The Lord rested," "The 
 Lord remembered," "He that dwelleth in heaven laughs," and so 
 on, where the process is the reverse of personification. The motive 
 common to both is to convey some idea to the reader. 
 
 The Hebrew word "bara," ordinarily translated "created," which 
 implies to most people the idea of creatio ex nihilo, Ibn Ezra renders, 
 in accordance with its etymology, to limit, to define, by drawing or 
 incising a line or boundary. Having said this, Ibn Ezra, in his wonted 
 mysterious manner, stops short, refusing to say more and preferring 
 to mystify the reader by adding the tantalizing phrase, "The intel- 
 ligent will understand." He means apparently to indicate that an 
 eternal matter was endowed with form. In fact he seems to favor 
 the idea of eternal creation and maintenance of the universe, the re- 
 lation of which to God is as the relation of speech to the speaker, which 
 exists only so long as the speaker speaks. The moment he ceases 
 speaking the sounds cease to exist. 
 
 The two ideas of eternal emanation of the world from God after 
 the manner of the Neo-Platonists and of an eternal matter which God 
 endows with forms, are not really quite consistent, for the latter 
 implies that matter is independent of God, whereas according to the 
 former everything owes its existence and continuance to God, from 
 whom it emanates. But it is difficult from the fragmentary and la- 
 conic sayings of Ibn Ezra to extract a consistent and certain system. 
 
 The world consists of three parts, three worlds Ibn Ezra calls them. 
 The highest world consists of the separate Intelligences or angels, 
 including the world-soul of which the human soul is a part. The 
 intermediate world consists of the spheres, planets and fixed stars. 
 Finally the lower world contains the four elements and the product 
 of their various mixtures, minerals, plants, animals, man. These 
 three worlds, Ibn Ezra appears to intimate in his oracular manner, 
 are symboHzed by the three divisions of the Tabernacle, the holy of 
 holies typif3dng the world of spirits, the holy pointing to the spheres, 
 while the outer court represents the sublunar world. 
 
 The highest world, the world of Intelligences and angels, is eternal, 
 though it too is dependent upon God for its existence. The angels, 
 too, are composed of matter and form, and their function is to move 
 the bodies of the intermediate world, the spheres and their stars. 
 
MOSES AND ABRAHAM IBN EZRA 191 
 
 Through the instrumentality of the heavenly bodies, the angels form 
 the lower world. This amounts to saying that the corporeal world 
 is the last stage in the descending series of emanations from the One, 
 and is preceded by the heavenly bodies and the Intelligences. The 
 angels are also the immediate agents in prophetic inspiration. 
 
 Not all mention of angels in the Bible, however, must be identified 
 with a separate Intelligence or a spheral soul (for the latter too is 
 called angel by Ibn Ezra). There are instances of the expression 
 angel which refer to a momentary, special creation of a light or air 
 for the special benefit of the people. This explains a number of the- 
 ophanies in the Bible, such as the burning bush, "the glory of the 
 Lord," the cloud in the wilderness, and so on. 
 
 The intermediate world of spheres is also eternal and consists of 
 nine spheres, that of the Intelligences making up the perfect number 
 ten. The nine spheres are arranged as follows, the spheres of the 
 seven planets, the sphere of the fixed stars, and the diurnal sphere 
 without stars, which gives the motion from east to west to the whole 
 heaven. 
 
 The lower world, the sublunar and corporeal world of generation 
 and decay, was created in time. This, however, does not mean that 
 there was time before this creation, for time exists only with motion 
 and change. Creation here signifies the formation of the chaotic 
 matter. As God cannot come in contact with the material and change- 
 able (we have already seen that he cannot know it as such), it follows 
 that this lower world was not made directly by him, but by the angels, 
 hence the word "Elohim" is used in the first chapter of Genesis, 
 which means primarily the angels, and secondarily God as acting 
 through the angels. 
 
 In this lower world man is the noblest creature. By means of his 
 soul he may attain eternal life as an individual like God and the 
 angels {i. e., the Intelligences), whereas all other creatures of the lower 
 world are permanent in species only but not as individuals. This 
 is the meaning of the expression in Genesis, "Let us make man in 
 our image," in the image, that is, of God and the angels. Man is a 
 microcosm, a universe in little, for like the great universe he consists 
 of a body animated by a soul. 
 
 As the noblest part of man is his soul, it becomes his duty to know 
 
192 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 it. He must know whether it is substance or accident, whether it will 
 die when it is separated from the body, and for what purpose it was 
 brought into union with the body. In order to learn all this one 
 must first study the preparatory branches, grammar, logic, mathe- 
 matics and physics. In the study of psychology we learn that man 
 has three souls, vegetative, animal and rational, and the latter alone 
 is immortal. It is a part of the world soul, having existed before it 
 came into the body, and under favorable conditions will return again 
 to the world soul when separated from the body. The condition 
 which must be fulfilled by the soul before it can return to the world 
 soul is the acquisition of wisdom, for this is the purpose for which it 
 was put into the body, namely, in order that it may learn the work 
 of its master and observe his commandments. There are many sci- 
 ences, but they are related to each other, all leading up to the one 
 highest science, the knowledge of God and his goodness. A person 
 must advance gradually in studying the work of God from the knowl- 
 edge of minerals, plants, animals, the human body, to the knowledge of 
 the spheres and heavenly bodies, the causes of eclipses, etc., and from 
 this he will gradually come to know God. The commandments of 
 the Bible are also of importance for this purpose. To understand 
 the secret of the commandments is to gain eternal life. For wisdom 
 is the form of the soul, and hence the soul does not die like a body. 
 
 The reward of the soul is re-absorption in the world soul of which 
 it is a part, and the punishment of the unworthy soul that neglected 
 to acquire knowledge is destruction. What Ibn Ezra means by the 
 Hebrew word "abad" (ordinarily rendered to perish, to be destroyed) 
 is not clear. It is hard to see how a pre-existing soul can perish ut- 
 terly. Rosin suggests that Ibn Ezra is alluding to transmigration, ^^^ 
 but it is not clear. 
 
 We have seen that Ibn Ezra holds that the events of the sublunar 
 world and the destinies of men are governed by the positions and 
 motions of the heavenly bodies, which in turn are determined by the 
 Intelligences or angels. The heavenly bodies, he tells us, follow neces- 
 sary laws imposed upon them, and are not responsible for any good 
 or evil which results to mankind from them, since the effects are not 
 of their intention, and they cannot change them if they would. Ac- 
 cordingly it is foolish to pray to the heavenly bodies in order to appease 
 
MOS£S AND ABRAHAM IBN EZRA 193 
 
 them and prevent evil, as some of the heathen are accustomed to do. 
 The motions of the heavenly bodies are determined and invariable, 
 and no prayer will change them. This, however, does not mean to 
 say that no one can escape the evil which is destined for him in the 
 stars. Ordinarily, it is true, God does not know the particular indi- 
 vidual as such. He knows him only as imphed in the whole, and his 
 destiny is determined accordingly. But there are exceptions when a 
 person by developing his soul and intellect, as we saw above, succeeds 
 in his lifetime in separating his soul from the corporeal and particular, 
 and brings it into contact with the spiritual and universal. In that 
 case he attracts to himself the special providence of God, which enables 
 him to evade the evil threatened by his star, without in any way chang- 
 ing the star's natural course or ordinary effects. How this is done, 
 Ibn Ezra illustrates by an example. ^^^ Suppose, he says, that it is 
 fated according to the stars that a given city shall be flooded by a 
 river and its inhabitants drowned. A prophet comes and warns them, 
 urging them to repent of their evil ways before their fate is sealed. 
 They obey him, return to God with all their heart and leave the city 
 to offer prayer to God. The river rises in their absence, as often hap- 
 pens, and floods the city. The wolf is satisfied and the lamb is whole. 
 The decree of the stars is not interfered with, and the good man is 
 delivered from evil. In this way Ibn Ezra endeavors to reconcile 
 natural law (or astrological fatahsm) with the ethical purpose of divine 
 providence. And he also vindicates free will and responsibility. The 
 rational soul of man has power, he says, to counteract in part the 
 indications of the stars, though it cannot annul them entirely. The 
 punishment of the wicked is that they are left entirely to the fates 
 determined for them by their constellations. 
 
 The highest good of man, we have seen, is the knowledge of God 
 and his work. There are two ways of knowing God. One is through 
 a study of nature, the work of God. This is described in the first 
 part of the nineteenth Psalm, "The Heavens declare the glory of God; 
 and the firmament showeth his handiwork." But there is a second 
 and, in a sense, a better way of knowing God. This is derived from 
 his revelation in the Law. As we are told in the second part of the 
 above Psalm {v. 7), "The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul." 
 The law of the Lord restores the soul, Ibn Ezra says, by removing 
 
194 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 doubt from it. For the first method of knowing God, with all its 
 importance for the man of wisdom and reason, is not fit for all persons; 
 and not everything can be proved by reason. Revelation in the Law 
 is necessary for the simple minded. "I am the Lord thy God" (Exod. 
 20, 2) is a hint to the philosopher, who need not depend on hearsay, 
 for real knowledge is proved knowledge. But as not everyone is in 
 a position to have such knowledge, the Bible adds, "which brought 
 thee out of the land of Egypt." This all can understand, the simple 
 minded as well as the philosopher. The Law has also a practical 
 purpose, to strengthen the rational soul so as to prevent the body from 
 gaining the upper hand. 
 
 God's messenger, through whom his will is made known, is the 
 prophet. He seeks retirement so as to get in communion with God, 
 and receives such influence as he is capable of getting. Moses was the 
 greatest of the prophets. He was able to communicate with God 
 whenever he chose, whereas the others had to wait until the inspira- 
 tion came. The revelation of God to Moses was without an inter- 
 mediary, and without visions and likenesses. Moses' saw the things 
 presented to him in their true form. 
 
 The laws may be divided into i. Innate or rational laws, i. e., 
 laws planted by God in the mind of every rational being. There 
 are many such in the Torah. All the laws of the Ten Commandments 
 belong to this class, with the exception of the Sabbath. Hence all 
 mankind beheve in them, and Abraham observed them all before ever 
 the Law was given on Sinai. 2. Hidden laws, i. e., laws, the reason of 
 which is not given. We must not suppose for a moment that there is 
 any law which is against reason, Heaven forbid! We must observe 
 them all, whether we understand the reason or not. If we find a 
 law that apparently is unreasonable, we must assume that it has some 
 hidden meaning and is not to be taken in its Uteral sense. It is our 
 duty, then, to look for this hidden meaning, and if we cannot find 
 it, we must admit that we do not understand it. 
 
 The laws may also be classified as i. Commandments of the heart, 
 2. Commandments of the tongue, and 3. Commandments of action. 
 An example of commandments of the heart is, "Thou shalt love the 
 Lord thy God," "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart," 
 and so on. To the commandments of the tongue belong the reading 
 
MOSES AND ABRAHAM IBN EZRA 195 
 
 of the Shema, grace after meals, the priestly benediction, and so on. 
 The laws of the third class are so numerous that there is no need of 
 mentioning them. The laws of the heart are the most important of all. 
 The reader will recognize in this two-fold classification Saadia's divi- 
 sion of the laws into rational and traditional, and Bahya's classification 
 of duties of the heart and duties of the limbs. This second class in- 
 cludes Ibn Ezra's second and third classes, tongue and action. ^^^ 
 
 The problem of evil Ibn Ezra solves by saying that from God comes 
 good only. The world as a whole is good; evil is due to the defect of 
 the object receiving higher influence. To argue that because of the 
 small part of evil the whole world, which is good, should not have 
 been created, is foolish. 
 
 The highest good of man is to develop his reason. As the traveller 
 and the captive long to return to the land of their birth and be with 
 their family, so the rational soul is eager to rise to the upper world 
 which is not made of clay. This it can do only if it purifies itself from 
 the uncleanness of corporeal desire which drags it down, and takes 
 pains to know its own nature and origin, with the help of Wisdom 
 whose eyes are undimmed. Then she will know the truth, which will 
 remain indelibly impressed upon her when she separates from the 
 body, where she was put for her own good. The suffering she under- 
 went here for a time will give place to everlasting rest and joy. All 
 man's work is vain, for man can neither create nor annihilate a sub- 
 stance. All his corporeal activity consists in combination and separa- 
 tion of accidents. The only thing of value is the fear of God. But no 
 man can rise to this stage until he has ascended the ladder of wisdom, 
 and has acquired understanding.^^" 
 
 More concretely the way to purify the soul from the body is by 
 uniting the rational and spirited soul, as Plato has it, against the ap- 
 petitive, and giving the reason the mastery over the spirited soul as 
 well. A moderate degree of asceticism is to be recommended as 
 favoring the emancipation of the soul from the tyranny of the body. 
 This is the meaning of the institution of the Nazirite; and the offering 
 he must bring after the expiration of his period is to atone for the sin 
 of returning to a life of indulgence. But one should not go to extremes. 
 Too much praying and fasting results in stupefaction. It is a mistake 
 to develop one side of one's nature at the expense of another. Every 
 
196 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 one of the three souls (the rational, the spirited and the appetitive) 
 must be given its due. 
 
 But the most important activity of man, which leads to eternal 
 life and happiness, is the knowledge of God. This knowledge cannot 
 be attained at once. It must be preceded by a study of one's own 
 soul and of the natural sciences. Through a knowledge of oneself 
 and nature, one arrives finally at a knowledge of God. The soul, 
 originally a tabula rasa, is gradually perfected by the ideas which 
 theoretical speculation acquires. These ideas are identified with the 
 rational soul, and there results the acquired Intellect, which, as ab- 
 solutely immaterial, is immortal and becomes one with the world 
 soul of which it is a part. During life complete union with the spiritual 
 world is impossible. Even Moses could only see the "rear part" of 
 God. But when one has during life kept as far as possible away from 
 the sensuous and corporeal, then at the time of death, when the soul 
 is separated from the body, he will be completely absorbed in the 
 world soul and possess the knowledge of God. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 ABRAHAM IBN BAUD 
 
 What was poison to Judah Halevi is meat to Abraham Ibn Daud. 
 We must, he says, investigate the principles of the Jewish rehgion 
 and seek to harmonize them with true philosophy. And in order to 
 do these things properly a preHminary study of science is necessary. 
 Nowadays all this is neglected and the result is confusion in funda- 
 mental principles, for a superficial and Uteral reading of the Bible 
 leads to contradictory views, not to speak of anthropomorphic con- 
 ceptions of God which cannot be the truth. Many of our day think 
 that the study of philosophy is injurious. This is because it frequently 
 happens in our time that a person who takes up the study of philosophy 
 neglects religion. In ancient times also this happened in the person 
 of Elisha ben Abuya, known by the name of Aher. Nevertheless sci- 
 ence was diligently studied in Rabbinic times. Witness what was said 
 concerning Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai, Samuel and the Synhedrin.^^^ 
 It cannot be that God meant us to abstain from philosophical study, 
 for many statements in the Bible, such as those relating to freedom 
 of the will, to the nature of God and the divine attributes, to the 
 creation of the world, and so on, are a direct stimulus to such investi- 
 gation. Surely mental confusion cannot be the purpose God had in 
 mind for us. If he preferred our ignorance he would not have called 
 our attention to these matters at all.^^^ 
 
 This, as we see, is decidedly a different point of view from that of 
 Judah Halevi. The difference between them is not due to a difference 
 in their age and environment, but solely to personal taste and tempera- 
 ment. Toledo was the birthplace of Ibn Daud as it was of Halevi. 
 And the period in which they lived was practically the same. Judah 
 Halevi's birth took place in the last quarter of the eleventh century, 
 whereas Ibn Daud is supposed to have been born about 1 1 lo, a differ- 
 ence of some twenty-five or thirty years. The philosopher whom 
 Judah Halevi presents to us as the typical representative of his time 
 
 197 
 
198 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 is an Aristotelian of the t3^e of Alfarabi and Avicenna. And it is 
 the same type of philosophy that we meet in the pages of the "Emunah 
 Ramah " (Exalted Faith), Ibn Baud's philosophical work.^-^ Whereas, 
 however, Judah Halevi was a poet by the grace of God, glowing with 
 love for his people, their religion, their language and their historic 
 land, Ibn Baud leaves upon us the impression of a precise thinker, 
 cold and analytical. He exhibits no graces of style, eloquence of dic- 
 tion or depths of enthusiasm and emotion. He passes systematically 
 from one point to the next, uses few words and technical, and moves 
 wholly in the Peripatetic philosophy of the day. In 1161, the same 
 year in which the Emunah Ramah was composed, he also wrote a 
 historical work, "Sefer Hakabala" (Book of Tradition), which we 
 have; and in 1180, regarded by some as the year of his death^ he 
 published an astronomical work, which is lost. This gives an index 
 of his interests which were scientific and philosophic. Mysticism, 
 whether of the poetic or the philosophic kind, was far from his nature; 
 and this too may account for the intense opposition he shows to 
 Solomon Ibn Gabirol. On more than one occasion he gives vent to 
 his impatience with that poetic philosopher, and he blames him princi- 
 pally for two faults. Choosing to devote a whole book to one purely 
 metaphysical topic, in itself not related to Judaism, Gabirol, we are 
 told by Ibn Daud, gave expression to doctrines extremely dangerous 
 to the Jewish rehgion. And apart from his heterodoxy, he is philo- 
 sophically incompetent and his method is abominable. His style is 
 profuse to the point of weariness, and his logic carries no conviction. ^^^ 
 
 While Abraham Ibn Daud is thus expressly unsympathetic to Ga- 
 birol and tacitly in disagreement with Halevi (he does not mention 
 him), he shows the closest relation to Maimonides, whose forerunner he 
 is. We feel tempted to say that if not for Ibn Daud there would have 
 been no Maimonides. And yet the irony of history has willed that 
 the fame of being the greatest Jewish philosopher shall be Maimon- 
 ides's own, while his nearest predecessor, to whose influence he owed 
 most, should be all but completely forgotten. The Arabic original 
 of Ibn Daud's treatise is lost, and the Hebrew translations (there are 
 two) lay buried in manuscript in the European hbraries until one of 
 them was pubUshed by Simson Weil in 1852.^-^ 
 
 Abraham Ibn Daud is the first Jewish philosopher who shows an 
 
ABRAHAM IBM BAUD 199 
 
 intimate knowledge of the works of Aristotle and makes a deliberate 
 effort to harmonize the Aristotelian system with Judaism. To be 
 sure, he too owes his Aristotelian knowledge to the Arabian exponents 
 of the Stagirite, Alfarabi and Avicenna, rather than to the works 
 of Aristotle himself. But this peculiarity was rooted in the intellec- 
 tual conditions of his time, and must not be charged to his personal 
 neglect of the sources. And Maimonides does nothing more than 
 repeat the effort of Ibn Daud in a more brilliant and masterly fashion. 
 
 The development of the three religious philosophies in the middle 
 ages, Jewish, Christian and Mohammedan, followed a similar line of 
 progression. In all of them it was not so much a development from 
 within, the unfolding of what was impHcit and potential in the original 
 germ of the three respective religions, as a stimulus from without, 
 which then combined, as an integral factor, with the original mass, 
 and the final outcome was a resultant of the two originally disparate 
 elements. We know by this time what these two elements were in 
 each case, Hellenic speculation, and Semitic religion in the shape of 
 sacred and revealed documents. The second factor was in every case 
 complete when the process of fusion began. Not so the first. What I 
 mean is that not all of the writings of Greek antiquity were known to 
 Jew, Christian and Mohammedan at the beginning of their philoso- 
 phizing career. And the progress in their philosophical development 
 kept equal step with the successive accretion of Greek philosophical 
 literature, in particular Aristotle's physical, psychological and meta- 
 physical treatises, and their gradual purgation of Neo-Platonic ad- 
 hesions. 
 
 The Syrian Christians, who were the first to adopt Greek teachings, 
 seem never to have gone beyond the mathematical and medical works 
 of the Greeks and the logic of Aristotle. The Arabs began where 
 their Syrian teachers ended, and went beyond them. The Mutakal- 
 limim were indebted to the Stoics, ^-^ the Pure Brethren to the Neo- 
 Platonists; and it was only gradually that Aristotle became the sole 
 master not merely in logic, which he always had been, but also 
 in physics, metaphysics and psychology. Alfarabi, Avicenna and 
 Averroes represent so many steps in the Aristotelization of Arabic 
 philosophy. 
 
 Christian mediaeval thought, which was really a continuation of 
 
200 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the Patristic period, likewise began with Eriugena in the ninth cen- 
 tury under Platonic and Neo-Platonic influences. Of Aristotle the 
 logic alone was known, and that too only in small part. Here also 
 progress was due to the increase of Aristotelian knowledge; though 
 in this case it was not gradual as with the Arabs before them, but 
 sudden. In the latter part of the twelfth and the early part of the 
 thirteenth century, through the Crusades, through the Moorish civi- 
 lization in Spain, through the Saracens in Sicily, through the Jews 
 as translators and mediators, Aristotle invaded Christian Europe 
 and transformed Christian philosophy. Albertus Magnus, Thomas 
 Aquinas, Duns Scotus, WiUiam of Occam are the results of this trans- 
 formation. 
 
 The same thing holds true of the Jews. Their philosophizing career 
 stands chronologically between that of their Arab teachers and their 
 Christian disciples. And the hne of their development was similar. 
 It was parallel to that of the Arabs. First came Kalam in Saadia, 
 Mukammas, the Karaites Al Basir and Jeshua ben Judah. Then Neo- 
 Platonism and Kalam combined, or pure Neo-Platonism, in Bahya, 
 Gabirol, Ibn Zaddik and the two Ibn Ezras, Abraham and Moses. 
 In Judah Halevi, so far as philosophy is represented, we have Neo- 
 Platonism and Aristotelianism. Finally in Ibn Daud and Maimonides, 
 Neo-Platonism is reduced to the vanishing point, and Aristotelianism 
 is in full view and in possession of the field. After Maimonides the 
 only philosopher who deviates from the prescribed path and endeavors 
 to uproot Aristotehan authority in Judaism is Crescas. All the rest 
 stand by Aristotle and his major domo, Maimonides. 
 
 This may seem like a purely formal and external mode of char- 
 acterizing the development of philosophical thought. But the char- 
 acter of mediaeval philosophy is responsible for this. Their ideal of 
 truth as well as goodness was in the past. Knowledge was thought to 
 have been discovered or revealed in the past,^-^ and the task of the 
 philosopher was to acquire what was already there and to harmonize 
 contradictory authorities. Thus the more of the past literature that 
 came to them, the greater the transformation in their own philosophy. 
 
 The above digression will make clear to us the position of Ibn Daud 
 and his relation to Maimonides. Ibn Daud began what Maimonides 
 finished — the last stage in the Aristotelization of Jewish thought. Why 
 
ABRAHAM IBN DAUD 201 
 
 is it then that so little was known about him, and that his important 
 treatise was neglected and practically forgotten? The answer is to 
 be found partly in the nature of the work itself and partly in historical 
 circumstances. 
 
 The greatest and most abiding interest in intellectual Jewry was after 
 all the Bible and the Talmud. This interest never flagged through 
 adversity or through success. The devotion paid to these Jewish 
 classics and sacred books may have been fruitful in original research 
 and intelligent application at one time and place and relatively barren 
 at another. Great men devoted to their study abounded in one coun- 
 try and were relatively few in another. The nature of the study 
 applied to these books was affected variously by historical con- 
 ditions, political and economic; and the cultivation or neglect of 
 the sciences and philosophy was reflected in the style of Biblical 
 and Talmudical interpretation. But at all times and in all coun- 
 tries, under conditions of comparative freedom as well as in the 
 midst of persecution, the sacred heritage of Israel was studied 
 and its precepts observed and practiced. In this field alone fame was 
 sure and permanent. All other study was honored according to the 
 greater or less proximity to this paramount interest. In times of 
 freedom and of great philosophic and scientific interest like that of the 
 golden era in Spain, philosophical studies almost acquired independent 
 value. But this independence, never quite absolute, waned and waxed 
 with external conditions, and at last disappeared entirely. If Ibn 
 Daud had made himself famous by a Biblical commentary or a halakic 
 work, or if his philosophic treatise had the distinction of being written 
 in popular and attractive style, like Bahya's "Duties of the Hearts," 
 or Halevi's Cusari," it might have fared better. As it is, it suffers 
 from its conciseness and technical terminology. Add to this that 
 it was superseded by the "Guide of the Perplexed" of Maimonides, 
 published not many years after the "Emunah Ramah," and the 
 neglect of the latter is completely explained. 
 
 Abraham ibn Daud tells us in the introduction to his book that 
 it was written in response to the question of a friend concerning the 
 problem of free will. The dilemma is this. If human action is de- 
 termined by God, why does he punish, why does he admonish, and 
 why does he send prophets? If man is free, then there is something 
 
202 MEDIJEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 in the world over which God has no control. The problem is made 
 more diflScult by the fact that Biblical statements are inconsistent, 
 and passages may be cited in favor of either of the theories in question. 
 This inconsistency is to be explained, however, by the circumstance 
 that not all Biblical phrases are to be taken literally — their very 
 contradiction is a proof of this. Now the passages which require 
 exegetic manipulation are in general those which seem opposed to 
 reason. Many statements in the Bible are in fact intended for the 
 common people, and are expressed with a view to their comprehension, 
 and without reference to philosophic truth. In the present instance 
 the objections to determinism are much greater and more serious 
 than those to freedom. In order to realize this, however, it is necessary 
 to investigate the principles of the Jewish religion and seek to har- 
 monize them with true philosophy. This in turn cannot be done 
 without a preliminary study of science. A question like that of de- 
 terminism and freedom cannot be decided without a knowledge of 
 the divine attributes and the consequences flowing from them. But 
 to understand these we must have a knowledge of the principles of 
 physics and metaphysics. ^^^ Accordingly Abraham Ibn Daud devotes 
 the entire first part of the "Emunah Ramah" to general physics and 
 metaphysics in the Aristotelian conception of these terms. 
 
 Concerning the kind of persons for whom he wrote his book, he 
 says, I advise everyone who is perfectly innocent, who is not interested 
 in philosophical and ethical questions like that of determinism and 
 freedom on the ground that man cannot grasp them; and is entirely 
 unconcerned about his ignorance — I advise such a person to refrain 
 from opening this book or any other of a similar nature. His ignorance 
 is his bUss, for after all the purpose of philosophy is conduct. On 
 the other hand, those who are learned in the principles of religion and 
 are also famiUar with philosophy need not my book, for they know 
 more than I can teach them here. It is the beginner in speculation 
 who can benefit from this work, the man who has not yet been able 
 to see the rational necessity of beliefs and practices which he knows 
 from tradition. 
 
 That the principles of the Jewish religion are based upon phil- 
 osophic foundations is shown in Deuteronomy 4, 6: "Keep there- 
 fore and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding 
 
ABRAHAM IBN DAUD 203 
 
 in the sight of the peoples, which shall hear all these statutes, and say, 
 surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people." This 
 cannot refer to the ceremonial precepts, the so-called "traditional" 
 commandments; for there is nothing in them to excite the admiration 
 of a non-Jew. Nor can it refer to the political and moral regulations, 
 for one need not profess the Jewish or any other religion in order to 
 practice them; they are a matter of reason pure and simple. The 
 verse quoted can only mean that the other nations will be seized 
 with admiration and wonder when they find that the fundamental 
 principles of the Jewish religion, which we received by tradition and 
 without effort, are identical with those philosophical principles at 
 which they arrived after a great deal of labor extending over thousands 
 of years. ^^^ 
 
 Ibn Daud is not consistent in his idea of the highest aim of man. 
 We have just heard him say that the purpose of philosophy is conduct. 
 This is true to the spirit of Judaism which, despite all the efforts of 
 the Jewish philosophers to the contrary, is not a speculative theology 
 but a practical religion, in which works stand above faith. But as 
 an Aristotelian, Ibn Daud could not consistently stand by the above 
 standpoint as the last word in this question. Accordingly we find 
 him elsewhere in true Aristotehan fashion give priority to theoretical 
 knowledge. 
 
 Judging from the position of man among the other creatures of the 
 sublunar world, we come to the conclusion, he tells us, that that which 
 distinguishes him above his surroundings, namely, his rational soul, 
 is the aim of all the rest; and they are means and preparations for it. 
 The rational soul has two forms of activity. It may face upward and 
 receive wisdom from the angels (theoretical knowledge). Or it may 
 direct its attention downwards and judge the other corporeal powers 
 (practical reason). But it must not devote itself unduly or without 
 system to any one occupation. The aim of man is wisdom, science. 
 Of the sciences the highest and the aim of all the rest is the knowledge 
 of God. The body of man is his animal, which leads him to God. 
 Some spend all their time in feeding the animal, some in clothing it, 
 and some in curing it of its ills. The latter is not a bad occupation, 
 as it saves the body from disease and death, and so helps it to attain 
 the higher life. But to think of the study of medicine as the aim of 
 
204 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 life and devote all one's time to it is doing injury to one's soul. Some 
 spend their time in matters even less significant than this, viz, in 
 studying grammar and language; others again in mathematics and in 
 solving curious problems which are never likely to happen. The 
 only valuable part here is that which has relation to astronomy. 
 Some are exclusively occupied in "twisting threads." This is an ex- 
 pression used by an Arabian philosopher,^^" who compares man's 
 condition in the world to that of a slave who was promised freedom 
 and royalty besides if he made the pilgrimage to Mecca and celebrated 
 there. If he made the journey and was prevented from reaching 
 the holy city, he would get freedom only; but if he did not undertake 
 the trip he would get nothing. The three steps in the realization of 
 the purpose are thus: making the preparations for the journey, getting 
 on the road and passing from station to station, and finally wandering 
 about in the place of destination. One small element in the prepara- 
 tion for the journey is twisting the threads for the water bottle. Medi- 
 cine and law as means of gaining a livelihood and a reputation repre- 
 sent the stage of preparing for the journey. They are both intended 
 to improve the ills of life, whether in the relations of man to man as 
 in law; or in the treatment of the internal humors as in medicine. 
 Medicine seems more important, for on the assumption of mankind be- 
 ing just, there would be no need of law, whereas the need for medicine 
 would remain. To spend one's whole life in legal casuistry and the 
 working out of hypothetical cases on the pretext of sharpening one's 
 wits, is like being engaged in twisting threads continually — a little 
 is necessary, but a great deal is a waste of time. It would be best 
 if the religious man would first learn how to prove the existence of 
 God, the meaning of prophecy, the nature of reward and punishment 
 and the future world, and how to defend these matters before an un- 
 believer. Then if he has time left, he may devote it to legalistic dis- 
 cussions, and there would be no harm. 
 
 Self-examination, in order to purify oneseK from vices great and 
 small, represents the second stage of getting on the road and travelling 
 from station to station. The final stage, arriving in the holy city 
 and celebrating there, is to have a perfect knowledge of God. He who 
 attains this is the best of wise men, having the best of knowledge, 
 which deals with the noblest subject. The reader must not expect 
 
ABRAHAM IBN DAUD 205 
 
 to find it all in this book. If he reads this and does not study the sub- 
 ject for himself, he is like a man who spent his time in reading about 
 medicine and cannot cure the simplest ailment. The knowledge of 
 God is a form that is bestowed from on high upon the rational soul 
 when she is prepared by means of moral perfection and scientific study. 
 The prophet puts all three functions of the soul on the same level, 
 and gives preference to knowledge of God. "Thus saith the Lord," 
 says Jeremiah (9, 22), "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom 
 [rational soul], neither let the mighty man glory in his might [spirited 
 soul], let not the rich man glory in his riches [nutritive soul]: but let 
 him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth 
 me. . . ." Jeremiah also recommends {ib.) knowing God through 
 his deeds — "That I am the Lord which exercise loving-kindness" — 
 in order that man may imitate him.^^^ 
 
 We have now a general idea of Ibn Baud's attitude and point of 
 view; and in passing to the details of his system it will not be necessary 
 to rehearse all the particulars of his thought, much of it being common 
 to all mediaeval writers on Jewish philosophy. We shall confine our- 
 selves to those matters in which Ibn Baud contributed something new, 
 not contained in the writings of his predecessors. 
 
 Following the Aristotelian system, he begins by describing substance 
 and accident and gives a list and characterization of the ten categories. 
 This he follows up by showing that the classification of the ten cate- 
 gories hes at the basis of the 139th Psalm. It needs not our saying 
 that it must be an extraordinary mode of exegesis that can find such 
 things in such unusual places. But the very strangeness of the phe- 
 nomenon bears witness to the remarkable influence exerted by the 
 Aristotehan philosophy upon the thinking of the Spanish Jews at 
 that time.232 
 
 From the categories he passes to a discussion of the most fundamen- 
 tal concepts in the Aristotehan philosophy, matter and form. And 
 here his method of proving the existence of matter is Aristotehan 
 and new. It is based upon the discussion in Aristotle's Physics, 
 though not necessarily derived from there directly. Primary matter, 
 he says, is free from all form. There must be such, for in the change 
 of one thing to another, of water to air for example, it cannot be the 
 form of water that receives the form of air; for the form of water dis- 
 
2o6 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 appears, whereas that which receives the new form must be there. 
 Reason therefore leads us to assume a common substrate of all things 
 that are subject to change. This is primary matter, free from all 
 form. This matter being at the basis of all change and becoming, 
 could not itself have come to be through a similar process, or we should 
 require another matter prior to it, and it would not be the prime matter 
 we supposed it to be. This last argument led Aristotle to the concept 
 of an eternal matter, the basis of becoming for all else besides, itself 
 not subject to any such process. It is an ultimate, to ask for the origin 
 of which would signify to misunderstand the meaning of origin. All 
 things of the sublunar world originate in matter, hence matter itself 
 is the unoriginated, the eternal. 
 
 Ibn Daud as a Jew could not accept this solution, and so he cut the 
 knot by saying that while it is true that matter cannot originate in 
 the way in which the composite objects of the sublunar world come 
 to be, it does not yet follow that it is absolutely ultimate and eternal. 
 God alone is the ultimate and eternal; nothing else is. Matter is a 
 relative ultimate; relative, that is, to the composite and changeable 
 objects of our world; but it is itself an effect of God as the universal 
 cause. God created it outright. 
 
 Prime matter, therefore, represents the first stage in creation. The 
 next stage is the endowment of this formless matter with corporeality 
 in the abstract, i. e., with extension. Then come the specific forms of 
 the four elements, then their compounds through mineral, plant 
 and animal to man. This is not new; we have already met with it in 
 Gabirol and Ibn Zaddik. Nor is the following significant statement 
 altogether new, though no one before Ibn Daud expressed it so clearly 
 and so definitely. It is that the above analysis of natural objects 
 into matter, universal body, the elements, and so on, is not a physical 
 division but a logical. It does not mean that there was a time when 
 prime matter actually existed as such before it received the form of 
 corporeality, and then there existed actually an absolute body of pure 
 extension until it received the four elements. No, nothing has exist- 
 ence in actu which has not individuality, including not only form, 
 but also accidents. The above analysis is theoretical, and the order 
 of priority is logical not real. In reality only the complete compound 
 of matter and form (the individual) exists. 
 
ABRAHAM IBN BAUD 207 
 
 Allusion to matter and form is also found in the Bible in Jeremiah 
 (18, iff.)) "Arise and go down to the potter's house . . . Then I 
 went down to the potter's house, and, behold, he wrought his work 
 on the wheels . . . Behold as the clay in the potter's hand ... " "^^ 
 
 The next important topic analyzed by Ibn Daud is that of motion. 
 This is of especial importance to Ibn Daud because upon it he bases 
 a new proof of the existence of God, not heretofore found in the works 
 of any of his predecessors. It is taken from Aristotle's Physics, prob- 
 ably from Avicenna's treatises on the subject, is then adopted by Mai- 
 monides, and through his example no doubt is made use of by Thomas 
 Aquinas, the great Christian Scholastic of the thirteenth century, 
 who gives it the most prominent place in his "Summa Contra Gen- 
 tiles." 
 
 Ibn Daud does not give Aristotle's general definition of motion as 
 the " actualization of the potential qua potential " {cf. above, p. xxxii), 
 but his other remarks concerning it imply it. Motion, he says, is 
 applied first to movement in place, and is then transferred to any 
 change which is gradual, such as quantitative or qualitative change. 
 Sudden change is not called motion. As the four elements have all 
 the same matter and yet possess different motions — earth and water 
 moving downward, fire and air upward — it cannot be the matter 
 which is the cause of their motions. It must therefore be the forms, 
 which are different in different things. 
 
 Nothing can move itseff. While it is true that the form of a thing 
 determines the kind of motion it shall have, it cannot in itself produce 
 that motion, which can be caused only by an efi&cient cause from 
 without. The case of animal motions may seem like a refutation of 
 this view, but it is not really so. The soul and the body are two dis- 
 tinct principles in the animal; and it is the soul that moves the body. 
 The reason why a thing cannot move itself is because the thing which 
 is moved is potential with reference to that which the motion is in- 
 tended to realize, whereas the thing causing the motion is actual with 
 respect to the relation in question. If then a thing moved itself, 
 it would be actual and potential at the same time and in the same 
 relation, which is a contradiction. The Bible, too, hints at the idea 
 that every motion must have a mover by the recurring questions con- 
 cerning the origin of prophetic visions, of the existence of the earth, 
 
2o8 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 and so on. Such are the expressions in Job (38, 36, 37): "Who hath 
 put wisdom in the inward parts?" "Who can number the clouds by 
 wisdom?" In Proverbs (30, 4): "Who hath estabhshed all the ends 
 of the earth?" and in many passages besides. ^^^ 
 
 The question of infinity is another topic of importance for proving 
 the existence of God. We proceed as follows: An infinite line is an im- 
 possibility. For let the Hnes c 1 a be infinite in the 
 
 directions h, d. Take away from cd a finite length =ce, and pull 
 up the line ed so that e coincides with c. Now if ed is equal to ab, 
 and cd was also equal to ab by hypothesis, it follows that ed = cd, which 
 is impossible, for ed is a part of cd. If it is shorter than cd and yet is 
 infinite, one infinite is shorter than another infinite, which is also 
 impossible. The only alternative left is then that ed is finite. If 
 then we add to it the finite part ce, the sum, ce -\-ed = cd, will be finite, 
 and cd being equal to ab by hypothesis, ab is also finite. Hence there 
 is no infinite line. If there is no infinite line, there is no infinite sur- 
 face or infinite solid, for we could in that case draw in them infinite 
 lines. Besides we can prove directly the impossibility of infinite sur- 
 face and solid by the same methods we employed in line. 
 
 We can prove similarly that an infinite series of objects is also an 
 impossibility. In other words, infinite number as an actuality is im- 
 possible because it is a contradiction in terms. A nvunber of things 
 means a known number; infinite means having no known number. 
 A series is something that has beginning, middle and end. Infinite 
 means being all middle. We have thus proved that an actual infinite 
 is impossible, whether as extension or number. And the Bible also 
 alludes to the finiteness of the universe in the words of Isaiah (40, 12): 
 "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand . , . ," 
 intimating that the universe is capable of being measured. 
 
 We must prove next that no finite body can have an infinite power. 
 For let the line ae a l c 2 e be a finite line having an infinite 
 power. Divide into the several parts ab, be, cd, de, etc. If every one 
 of the parts has an infinite power, ab has an infinite power, ac a greater 
 infinite power, ad a still greater, ae a still greater, and so on. But 
 this is absurd, for there cannot be anything greater than the infinite. 
 It follows then that each of the parts has a finite power; and as the 
 sum of finites is finite, the line ae also has a finite power. All these 
 
ABRAHAM IBN DAUD 209 
 
 principles we must keep in mind, for we shall by means of them prove 
 later the existence and incorporeality of God.^^^ 
 
 As the concepts of physics are essential for proving the existence 
 of God, so are the principles of psychology of importance in showing 
 that there are intermediate beings between God and the corporeal 
 substances of the world. These are called in the Bible angels. The 
 philosophers call them secondary causes. 
 
 Accordingly Ibn Daud follows his physical doctrines with a discus- 
 sion of the soul. There is nothing new in his proof that such a thing 
 as soul exists. It is identical with the deduction of Joseph Ibn Zaddik 
 {supra, p. 134). Stone and tree and horse and man are all bodies and 
 yet the last three have powers and functions which the stone has not, 
 viz., nutrition, growth and reproduction. Horse and man have in 
 addition to the three powers above mentioned, which they have in 
 common with tree, the powers of sensation and motion and imagina- 
 tion, which plants have not. Finally man is distinguished above all 
 the rest of animal creation in possessing the faculty of intelligence, 
 and the knowledge of art and of ethical discrimination. All these 
 functions cannot be body or the result of body, for in that case all 
 corporeal objects should have all of them, as they are all bodies. We 
 must therefore attribute them to an extra-corporeal principle; and 
 this we call soul. As an incorporeal thing the soul cannot be strictly 
 defined, not being composed of genus and species; but we can describe 
 it in a roundabout way in its relation to the body. He then gives 
 the Aristotehan definition of the soul as "the [first] entelechy of a 
 natural body having life potentially" {cf. above, p. xxxv). 
 
 Like many of his predecessors who treated of the soul, Ibn Daud 
 also finds it necessary to guard against the materialistic theory of 
 the soul which would make it the product of the elemental mixture 
 in the body, if not itself body. This would reduce the soul to a phe- 
 nomenon of the body, or in Aristotelian terminology, an accident of 
 the body, and would deprive it of all substantiality and independence, 
 not to speak of immortahty. How can that which is purely a resultant 
 of a combination of elements remain when its basis is gone? Accord- 
 ingly Ibn Daud takes pains to refute the most important of these 
 phenomenalistic theories, that of Hippocrates and Galen. Their 
 theory in brief is that the functions which we attribute to the soul 
 
2IO MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 are in reality the results of the various combinations of the four ele- 
 mentary qualities, hot, cold, moist, dry. The more harmonious and 
 equable the proportion of their union, the higher is the function result- 
 ing therefrom. The difference between man and beast, and between 
 animal and plant is then the difference in the proportionality of the 
 elemental mixture. They prove this theory of theirs by the observation 
 that as long as the mixture is perfect the activities above mentioned 
 proceed properly; whereas as soon as there is a disturbance in the mix- 
 ture, the animal becomes sick and cannot perform his activities, or dies 
 altogether if the disturbance is very great. The idea is very plausible 
 and a great many believe it, but it is mistaken as we shall prove. 
 
 His refutation of the "accident" or "mixture" theory of the soul, 
 as well as the subsequent discussion of the various functions, sensuous 
 and rational, of the tripartite soul, are based upon Ibn Sina's treat- 
 ment of the same topic, and we have already reproduced some of it 
 in our exposition of Judah Halevi. We shall therefore be brief here 
 and refer only to such aspects as are new in Ibn Daud, or such as we 
 found it advisable to omit in our previous expositions. 
 
 His main argument against the materialistic or mechanistic theory 
 of the soul is that while a number of phenomena of the growing animal 
 body can be explained by reference to the form of the mixture in the 
 elementary qualities, not all aspects can be thus explained. Its growth 
 and general formation may be the result of material and mechanical 
 causes, but not so the design and purpose evident in the similarity, to 
 the smallest detail, of the individuals of a species, even when the 
 mixture is not identical. There is no doubt that there is wisdom here 
 working with a purpose. This is soul. There is another argument 
 based upon the visible results of other mixtures which exhibit proper- 
 ties that cannot be remotely compared with the functions we attribute 
 to the soul. The animal and the plant exhibit activities far beyond 
 anything present in the simple elements of the mixture. There must 
 therefore be in animals and plants something additional to the elements 
 of the mixture. This extra thing resides in the composite of which it 
 forms a part, for without it the animal or plant is no longer what it is. 
 Hence as the latter is substance, that which forms a part of it is also 
 substance; for accident, as Aristotle says, is that which resides in 
 a thing but not as forming a part of it. 
 
ABRAHAM IBN BAUD 211 
 
 We have now shown that the soul is substance and not accident. 
 We must still make clear in which of the four senses of the Aristote- 
 lian substance the soul is to be regarded. By the theory of exclusion 
 Ibn Daud decides that the soul is substance in the sense in which we 
 apply that term to "form." The form appears upon the common 
 matter and "specifies" it, and makes it what it is, bringing it from 
 potentiality to actuality. It is also the efficient and final cause of the 
 body. The body exists for the sake of the soul, in order that the soul 
 may attain its perfection through the body. As the most perfect 
 body in the lower world is the human body, and it is for the sake of 
 the soul, it follows that the existence of the sublunar world is for the 
 sake of the human soul, that it may be purified and made perfect by 
 science and moral conduct. 
 
 While we have proved that soul is not mixture nor anything like 
 it, it is nevertheless true that the kind of soul bestowed upon a given 
 body depends upon the state of the mixture in the elementary quahties 
 of that body. Thus we have the three kinds of soul, vegetative, 
 animal and human or rational. We need not follow Ibn Daud in his 
 detailed descriptions of the functions of the several kinds of soul, as 
 there is little that is new and that we have not already met in Joseph 
 Ibn Zaddik and Judah Halevi. Avicenna (Ibn Sina) is the common 
 source for Halevi and Ibn Daud, and the description of the inner senses 
 is practically identical in the two, with the slight difference that 
 Halevi attributes to the "common sense" the two functions which 
 are divided in Ibn Daud between the common sense and the power of 
 representation. 
 
 The soul is not eternal. It was created and bestowed upon body. 
 When a body comes into being, the character of its mixture determines 
 that a soul of a certain kind shall be connected with it. The other 
 alternatives are (i) that the soul existed independently before the 
 body, is then connected with the body and dies with the death of the 
 latter; or (2) it remains after the death of the body. The first al- 
 ternative is impossible; because if the soul is connected with the body 
 in order to die with it, its union is an injury to the soul, for in its 
 separate existence it was free from the defects of matter. The second 
 alternative is equally impossible; for if the soul was able to exist with- 
 out the body before the appearance of the latter and after its extinc; 
 
212 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 tion, of what use is its connection with the body? Far from being of 
 any benefit, its union with the body is harmful to the soul, for it is 
 obliged to share in the corporeal accidents. Divine wisdom never 
 does anything without a purpose. 
 
 The truth is that the soul does not exist before the body. It arises 
 at the same time as, and in connection with body, realizing and ac- 
 tualizing the latter. Seed and sperm have in them the possibility of 
 becoming plant and animal respectively. But they need an agent 
 to bring to actuality what is in them potentially. This agent — an 
 angel or a sphere, or an angel using a sphere as its instrument — be- 
 stows forms upon bodies, which take the places of the previous forms 
 the bodies had. The sphere or star produces these forms (or souls) by 
 means of its motions, which motions ultimately go back to the first 
 incorporeal mover, by whose wisdom forms are connected with bodies 
 in order to perfect the former by means of the latter. 
 
 Now the human soul has the most important power of all other 
 animals, that of grasping intelligibles or universals. It is also able to 
 discriminate between good and evil in conduct, moral, poHtical and 
 economic. The human soul, therefore, has, it seems, two powers, 
 theoretical and practical. With the former it understands the simple 
 substances, known as angels in the Bible and as "secondary causes" 
 and "separate intelligences" among the philosophers. By this means 
 the soul rises gradually to its perfection. With the practical reason 
 it attends to noble and worthy conduct. All the other powers of the 
 soul must be obedient to the behests of the practical reason. This 
 in turn is subservient to the theoretical, putting its good quahties at 
 the disposition of the speculative reason, and thus helping it to come 
 into closer communion with the simple substances, the angels and God. 
 This is the highest power there is in the world of nature. 
 
 We must now show that the rational power in man is neither itseK 
 body nor is it a power residing in a corporeal subject. That it is not it- 
 self body is quite evident, for we have proved that the lower souls too, 
 those of animals and plants, are not corporeal. But we must show 
 concerning the rational power that it is independent of body in its 
 activity. This we can prove in various ways. One is by considering 
 the object and content of the reason. Man has general ideas or uni- 
 versal propositions. These are not divisible. An idea cannot be 
 
ABRAHAM IBN BAUD 213 
 
 divided into two halves or into parts. Reason in action consists of 
 ideas. Now if reason is a power residing in a corporeal subject, it 
 would be divisible like the latter. Take heat as an example. Heat is 
 a corporeal power, i. e., a power residing in a body. It extends through 
 the dimensions of the body, and as the latter is divided so is the 
 former. But this is evidently not true of general ideas, such as that 
 a thing cannot both be and not be, that the whole is greater than its 
 part, and so on. Hence the rational power is independent of body. 
 
 Ibn Daud gives several other proofs, taken from Aristotle and 
 Avicenna, to show that reason is independent, but we cannot reproduce 
 them all here. We shall, however, name one more which is found in 
 the "De Anima" of Aristotle and is based on experience. If the rea- 
 son performed its thinking by means of a corporeal organ like the 
 external senses, the power of knowing would be weakened when 
 confronted with a difficult subject, and would thereby be incapaci- 
 tated from exercising its powers as before. This is the case with the 
 eye, which is dazzled by a bright light and cannot see at all, or the 
 ear, which cannot hear at all when deafened by a loud noise. But 
 the case of knowledge is clearly different. The more difficult the sub- 
 ject the more is the power of the reason developed in exercising itself 
 therein. And in old age, when the corporeal organs are v/eakened, 
 the power of reason is strongest. 
 
 Although it is thus true that the rational soul is independent of the 
 body, nevertheless it did not exist before the body any more than the 
 lower souls. For if it did, it was either one soul for all men, or there 
 were as many souls as there are individual men. The iirst is impossi- 
 ble; for the same soul would then be wise and ignorant, good and bad, 
 which is impossible. Nor could the separate souls be different, for 
 being all human souls they cannot differ in essence, which is their 
 common humanity. But neither can they differ in accidental quali- 
 ties, for simple substances have no accidents. They cannot therefore 
 be either one or many, i. e., they cannot be at all before body. 
 
 Nor must we suppose because the reason exercises its thought 
 functions without the use of a corporeal organ that it appears full 
 fledged in actual perfection in the person of the infant. Experience 
 teaches otherwise. The perfections of the human soul are in the child 
 potential. Later on by divine assistance he acquires the first principles 
 
214 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 of knowledge about which there is no dispute, such as that two things 
 equal to the same thing are equal to each other, that two contrary 
 predicates cannot apply to the same subject at the same time in the 
 same relation, and so on. Some of these are the fundamental prin- 
 ciples of mathematics, others of other sciences. Then he progresses 
 further and learns to make premises and construct syllogisms and 
 argue from the known to the iinknown. We have thus three stages 
 in the development of the reason. The first potential stage is known 
 as the hylic or potential intellect. The second is known as the actual 
 intellect, and the third is the acquired intellect. If not for the body the 
 person could not make this progress. For without body there are no 
 senses, and without senses he would not see how the wine in the barrel 
 ferments and increases in volume, which suggests that quantity is 
 accident and body is substance. Nor would he learn the distinction 
 between quality and substance if he did not observe a white garment 
 turning black, or a hot body becoming cold. There is need therefore 
 of the body with its senses to lead to a knowledge of the universals. 
 But this knowledge once acquired, the soul needs not the body for 
 its subsequent existence; and as the soul is not a corporeal power, 
 the death of the body does not cause the extinction of the soul. 
 
 Some think that because the soul is the form of the body it is de- 
 pendent upon it and cannot survive it, as no other form survives its 
 substance. But this inference is not vaUd. For if the human soul 
 is included in the statement that no form survives its matter, we 
 assume what we want to prove, and there is no need of the argument. 
 If it is not as a matter of fact included, because it is the question at 
 issue, its comparison with the other observed cases is simply a matter 
 of opinion and not decisive. 
 
 The reader will see that the problem of the rational soul gave Ibn 
 Daud much concern and trouble. The pre-existence of the soul as 
 Plato teaches it did not appeal to him for many reasons, not the least 
 among them being the statement in Genesis (2, 7), "And God breathed 
 into his nostrils the breath of life," which seems to favor the idea of the 
 soul originating with the body; though, to be sure, a harmless verse of 
 this kind would not have stood in his way, had he had reason to favor 
 the doctrine of pre-existence. Immortality was also a dogma which 
 he dared not deny. The arguments against it seemed rather strong. 
 
ABRAHAM IBN BAUD 
 
 215 
 
 From the doctrine of the soul's origin with the body and its being 
 fitted to the material composition of the latter, would seem to follow 
 the soul's extinction with the death of the body. The same result 
 was apparently demanded by the observation that the intellect de- 
 velops as the body matures, and that without the senses and their 
 data there would be no intellect at all. The fluctuation of intellectual 
 strength with the state of bodily health would seem to tend to the 
 same end, against the doctrine of immortality. Moreover, the Aristo- 
 telian definition of the soul as the entelechy or form of the body, if 
 it applies to the rational faculty as well as to the lower powers, implies 
 necessarily that it is a form like other forms and disappears with the 
 dissolution of its substance. To avoid all these pitfalls Ibn Daud 
 insists upon the incorporeal character of the reason's activity, i. e., 
 its independence of any corporeal organ, and its increasing power 
 in old age despite the gradual weakening of the body. He admits 
 that its development is dependent on the data of sense perception, 
 but insists that this is not incompatible with its freedom from the 
 body when fully developed and perfected. As for its being a form of 
 body, not all forms are alike; and it is not so certain that the rational 
 power is a form of body. Neither the difficulties nor the solution are 
 of Ibn Baud's making. They are as old as Aristotle, and his successors 
 grappled with them as best they could. 
 
 There is still the question of the manner of the soul's survival. 
 The same reasons which Ibn Daud brings forward against the possi- 
 bility of the existence of many souls before the body, apply with 
 equal cogency to their survival after death. If simple substances 
 having a common essence cannot differ either in essence or in accident, 
 the human souls after the death of the body must exist as one soul, 
 and what becomes of individual immortality, which religion promises? 
 Ibn Daud has not a word to say about this, and it is one of the weak 
 points religiously in his system as well as in that of Maimonides, 
 which the critics and opponents of the latter did not fail to observe. 
 
 Before leaving the problem of the soul Ibn Daud devotes a word 
 to showing that metempsychosis is impossible. The soul of man is 
 suited to the character of his elemental mixture, which constitutes 
 the individuality of his body. Hence every individual's body has its 
 own peculiar soul. A living person cannot therefore have in him a 
 
2i6 ^ MEDIjEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 soul which formerly resided in a different body unless the two bodies 
 are identical in all respects. But in that case it is not transmigration 
 but the re-appearance of the same person after he has ceased to be. 
 But this has never yet happened. 
 
 Finally Ibn Daud finds it necessary to defend the Bible against 
 those who criticize the Jews on the ground that there is no mention 
 of the future world and the existence of the soul after death in the 
 Bibhcal writings. All the rewards and punishments spoken of in the 
 Bible, they say, refer to this world. His answer offers nothing new. 
 Judah Halevi had already tried to account for this phenomenon, 
 besides insisting that altogether devoid of allusion to the future world 
 the Bible is not. Ibn Daud follows in Halevi's footsteps {cf. above, 
 p. 170). 2^^ 
 
 Abraham Ibn Daud closes the first, the purely scientific part of 
 his treatise, by a discussion of the heavenly spheres and their motions. 
 In accordance with the view of Aristotle, which was shared by the 
 majority of writers throughout the middle ages, he regards the spheres 
 with their stars as living beings, and their motions as voluntary, the 
 result of will and purpose, and not simply " natural," i. e., due to an 
 unconscious force within them called nature. One of his arguments 
 to prove this is derived from the superiority of the heavenly bodies 
 to our own. Their size, their brightness and their continued duration 
 are all evidence of corporeal superiority. And it stands to reason that 
 as the human body, which is the highest in the sublunar world, has a 
 soul that is nobler than that of plant or animal, so the heavenly bodies 
 must be endowed with souls as much superior to the human intellect 
 as their bodies are to the human body. The Bible alludes to this 
 truth in the nineteenth Psalm, "The heavens declare the glory of 
 God. . . . There is no speech nor language. ..." The last expression 
 signifies that they praise God with the intellect. There are other 
 passages in the Bible besides, and particularly the first chapter of 
 Ezekiel, which m.ake it clear that the heavenly bodies are living and 
 intelligent beings; not, to be sure, in the sense of taking nourishment 
 and growing and reproducing their kind and making use of five senses, 
 but in the sense of performing voluntary motions and being endowed 
 with intellect. ^^^ 
 
 We have now concluded our preliminary discussion of the scientific 
 
ABRAHAM IBN BAUD 217 
 
 principles lying at the basis of Judaism. And our next task is to study 
 the fundamental doctrines of Jewish theology which form the highest 
 object of knowledge, dealing as they do with God and his attributes 
 and his revelation. The first thing to prove then is the existence of 
 God, since we cannot define him. For definition means the designa- 
 tion of the genus or class to which the thing defined belongs, whereas 
 God cannot be put in a class. As the essence of a thing is revealed 
 by its definition, we cannot know God's essence and are limited to a 
 knowledge of his existence. 
 
 The principles for this proof we have already given. They are that 
 a thing cannot move itself, and that an actual infinite series is impossi- 
 ble. The argument then proceeds as follows: Nothing can move itself, 
 hence everything that moves is moved by something other than itself. 
 If this is also moving, it must be moved by a third, and so on ad in- 
 finitum. But an actual infinite series of things moving and being moved 
 is impossible, and unless we ultimately arrive at a first link in this 
 chain, all motion is impossible. Hence there must be a first to account 
 for the motion we observe in the world. This first must not itself 
 be subject to motion, for it would then have to have another before 
 it to make it move, and it would not be the first we supposed it to be. 
 We have thus proved, therefore, the existence of a primum movens 
 immobile, a first unmoved mover. 
 
 We must now show that this unmoved mover is incorporeal. 
 This we can prove by means of another principle of physics, made 
 clear in the first part. We showed there that a finite body cannot 
 have an infinite power. But God is infinite. For, being immovable, 
 his power is not affected by time. Hence God cannot be body. 
 
 This proof, as we said before, is new in Jewish philosophy. In 
 Bahya we found a proof which bears a close resemblance to this one {cf. 
 above, p. 87); but the difference is that Bahya argues from being, Ibn 
 Daud from motion. Bahya says if a thing is, some cause must have 
 made it to be, for a thing cannot make itself. As we cannot proceed 
 cd infinitum, there must be a first which is the cause of the existence 
 of everything else. The objection here, of course, is that if a thing 
 cannot make itself, how did the first come to be. 
 
 The Aristotelian proof of Ibn Daud knows nothing about the origin 
 of being. As far as Aristotle's own view is concerned there is no 
 
2i8 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 temporal beginning either of being or of motion. Both are eternal, 
 and so is matter, the basis of all genesis and change. God is the eternal 
 cause of the eternal motion of the world, and hence of the eternal 
 genesis and dissolution, which constitutes the life of the sublunar 
 world. How to reconcile the idea of eternal time and eternal motion 
 with the doctrine that an actual infinite is impossible we shall see 
 when we treat Maimondes (p. 251). Ibn Daud does not adopt eternity 
 of motion even hypothetically, as Maimonides does. But this merely 
 removes the difficulty one step. For the infinity which is regarded 
 impossible in phenomena is placed in God. But another more serious 
 objection is the adoption of an AristoteHan argument where it does 
 not suit. For the argument from motion does not give us a creator 
 but a first mover. For Aristotle there is no creator, and his proof is 
 adequate. But for Ibn Daud it is decidedly inadequate. We are so 
 far minus a proof that God is a creator ex nihilo. Ibn Daud simply 
 asserts that God created matter, but this argument does not prove it. 
 As to the incorporeality of God Aristotle can prove it adequately 
 from the eternity of motion. If a finite body (and there is no such 
 thing as an infinite body) cannot have an infinite power, God, whose 
 causing eternal motion argues infinite power, is not a body. Ibn 
 Daud's attempt to prove God's infinity without the theory of infinite 
 motion on the ground that time cannot affect what is immovable, 
 is decidedly less satisfactory. On the whole then this adoption of 
 Aristotle's argument from motion is not helpful, as it leads to eternity 
 of matter, and God as the mover rather than the Creator. Gersonides 
 was frank enough and bold enough to recognize this consequence 
 and to adopt it. We shall see Maimonides's attitude when we come 
 to treat of his philosophy. 
 
 Ibn Daud may have been aware of the inadequacy of his argument 
 from motion, and therefore he adds another, based upon the distinc- 
 tion between the "possible existent" and the "necessary existent" 
 — a distinction and an argument due to Alfarabi and Avicenna. A 
 possible existent is a thing whose existence depends upon another, 
 and was preceded by non-existence. It may exist or not, depending 
 upon its cause; hence the name possible existent. A necessary existent 
 is one whose existence is in itself and not derived from elsewhere. 
 It is a necessary existent because its own essence cannot be thought 
 
ABRAHAM IBN BAUD 219 
 
 without involving existence. Now the question is, Is there such a 
 thing as a necessary existent, or are all existents merely possible? 
 If all existents are possible, we have an infinite series, every link of 
 which is dependent for its existence upon the link preceding it; and 
 so long as there is no first there is nothing to explain the existence of 
 any link in the chain. We must therefore assume a first, which is 
 itself not again dependent upon a cause prior to it. This is by defini- 
 tion a necessary existent, which is the cause of the existence of every- 
 thing else. This proof is compatible with God as a Creator. 
 
 Having shown the existence and incorporeality of God we must 
 now prove his unity. We shall base this proof upon the idea of the 
 necessary existent. Such an existent cannot have in it any multi- 
 plicity; for if it has, its own essence would not be able to keep the 
 elements together, and there would be need of an external agent to 
 do this. But in this case the object would be dependent upon some- 
 thing else, which is incompatible with the idea of a necessary existent. 
 
 Nor is it possible there should be two necessary existents; for the 
 necessary existent, we have just shown, must be of the utmost sim- 
 plicity, and hence cannot have any attribute added to its essence. 
 Now if there is a second, there must be something by which the first 
 differs from the second, or they are identical. Either the first or the 
 second therefore would not be completely simple, and hence not a 
 necessary existent. 
 
 We have thus shown that God is one both in the sense of simple 
 and in the sense of unique. To have a clear insight into the nature 
 of his unity, we must now show that nothing else outside of God is 
 really one, though we apply the term one to many things. No one 
 will claim that a collective is one; but neither is an individual really 
 one, for an individual man, for example, consists of many organs. 
 You might think that a homogeneous and continuous elementary 
 mass like air or water is one. But this is not true either, for everything 
 that is corporeal is composed of matter and form. If then we set 
 aside corporeal objects and aim to find real unity in mathematical 
 entities like line and surface, which are not corporeal, we are met with 
 the difl&culty that line and surface are divisible, and hence potentially 
 muitiple. But neither are the simple intellectual substances, like the 
 angels, true ones; for they are composed of their own possible existence 
 
220 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 and the necessary existence they acquire from another. The only 
 being therefore that may be a true one is that which is not corporeal 
 and not dependent upon another for its existence. 
 
 Considering the question of unity from a different aspect, in its 
 relation, namely, to the thing designated as one, we find that unity 
 never forms the essence of anything called by that name; but is in 
 every case an accident. Thus if it were the essence of man as man 
 that he is one, there could not on the one hand be many men, and on 
 the other there could not also at the same time be one horse, one tree, 
 one stone. In God his unity cannot be an accident, since as simple 
 he has no accidents. Hence his unity is his essence. And if we ex- 
 amine the matter carefully we find that it is a negative concept. It 
 involves two things. First, that every other unity involves plurality 
 in some form or another. And second that being unhke anything 
 else, he cannot bear having other things associated with him to make 
 the result many, as we can in the case of man. A, for example, is one; 
 and with B, C, and D he becomes many. This is not apphcable to 
 God.23« 
 
 The divine attributes form the next topic we must consider. Here 
 Ibn Daud offers little or nothing that is essentially new. He admits 
 neither essential nor accidental attributes, for either would bring 
 pluraHty and composition in the nature of God. The only attributes 
 he admits are negative and relative. When we speak of God as cause 
 we do not place any special entity in his essence, but merely indicate 
 the dependence of things upon him. The truest attributes are the 
 negative, such as that he is not body, that his existence is not depend- 
 ent upon another, and so on; the only difficulty being that negative 
 attributes, though removing many doubts, do not give us any positive 
 information. All the anthropomorphic attributes in the Bible endow- 
 ing God with human functions like sleeping and waking, or ascribing 
 to him human limbs, eyes, ears, hands, feet, etc., must be understood 
 metaphorically. For the Bible itself warns us against corporealizing 
 God, "Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves; for ye saw no 
 manner of form on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb" 
 (Deut. 4, 15), When the Bible speaks of God's anger and favor, 
 the meaning is that good deeds bring man near to God and cause 
 happiness which is known as paradise ("Gan Eden "), and bad deeds 
 
ABRAHAM IBN BAUD 221 
 
 remove far away from God and lead to misfortune, called Gehenna. 
 It is like the apparent motion of the trees and the mountains to the 
 traveller, when in reality it is he that is moving. So here God is said 
 to approach and depart, to be angry with and favor, when in reality 
 it is man who by his deeds comes near to God or departs far from him. 
 When we assign many attributes to God we do not mean that there is 
 any multiplicity in his nature. This cannot be. It is like the case of 
 a man whose eyes are not properly co-ordinated. He sees double 
 when there is only one. So we too suffer from intellectual squinting, 
 when we seem to see many attributes in the one God. 
 
 The most common and most important attributes are the following 
 eight: One, existent, true, eternal, living, knowing, wilHng, able. It 
 can be easily shown (and Ibn Daud does proceed to show, though 
 we shall not follow him in his details) that all these are at bottom 
 negative. Unity means that there is nothing like him and that he is 
 indivisible. Eternal means he is not subject to change or motion. 
 True means he will never cease existing and that his existence does 
 not come from another, and so on with the rest. 
 
 He closes his discussion of the attributes by intimating that he has 
 more to say on this topic, but had better be content with what has 
 been said so far, for a more thorough discussion of these matters in a 
 book might do harm to those who do not understand and interpret 
 the author's words incorrectly. This reminds us of Maimonides's 
 adjuration of the reader to keep what he finds in the "Guide of the 
 Perplexed" to himself and not to spread it abroad. Philosophy clearly 
 was a delicate subject and not meant for intellectual babes, whose 
 intellectual digestion might be seriously disturbed. ^^^ 
 
 We have now concluded our theory of God and his attributes; and 
 in doing so we made use of principles of physics, such as matter and 
 form, potentiality and actuality, motion and infinity. The next step 
 is to prove the existence and nature of intermediate spiritual beings 
 between God and the corporeal objects of the superlunar and sub- 
 lunar worlds, called angels in the Bible, and secondary causes by the 
 philosophers. For this purpose we shall have to apply the principles 
 we have proved concerning the soul and the motions of the heavenly 
 bodies. We have proved above that the human soul is at first in the 
 child intelligent potentially and then becomes intelligent actually. 
 
222 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 This requires an agent, in whom the end to which the potential is 
 proceeding is always actual. As the rational soul is neither body nor 
 a corporeal power, this actual agent cannot be either of these, hence 
 it is neither a sphere nor the soul of a sphere, but it must be a simple 
 substance called Active Intellect. The prophets call it "Holy Spirit" 
 C'Ruah Ha-Kodesh"). We thus have a proof of the existence of at 
 least one such simple intellectual substance, or angel, the relation of 
 which to the human soul is as that of Kght to vision. Without light 
 vision is potential, light makes it actual. So the active intellect makes 
 the potential soul actual and gives it first the axioms, which are uni- 
 versally certain, and hence could not have originated by induction 
 from experience. 
 
 Similarly we can prove the existence of other simple substances 
 from the motions of the heavenly spheres. We have already shown 
 that the spheres are living beings and endowed with souls. But souls, 
 while causing motion in their bodies are at the same time themselves 
 in a sort of psychic motion. This must be caused by unmoved movers, 
 or intellects, who are also the causes of the souls. To make this diffi- 
 cult matter somewhat clearer and more plausible, we may instance 
 an analogy from famihar experience. A ship is made by the ship- 
 builder, who is its corporeal cause. But there is also an incorporeal 
 cause, likewise a ship, viz., the ship in the mind of the shipbuilder. 
 The analogy is imperfect, because the incorporeal ship in the mind 
 of the builder cannot produce an actual corporeal ship without the 
 builder employing material, such as wood, iron, etc., and in addition 
 to that expending time and physical exertion on the material. But 
 if he had the power to give the form of a ship to the material as soon 
 as the latter was prepared for it without time and physical manipula- 
 lation, we should have an instance of what we want to prove, namely, 
 the existence of simple immaterial substances causing forms to ema- 
 nate upon corporeal existences. This is the nature of the active in- 
 tellect in its relation to the soul of man, and it is in the same way that 
 the philosophers conceive of the motions of the heavenly spheres. 
 God is the first unmoved mover. The angels or simple substances 
 stand next to him ; and they, too, are always actual intelligences, and 
 move the heavenly bodies as the object of love and desire moves the 
 object loving it without itself being moved. The heavenly bodies 
 
ABRAHAM IBN DAUD 223, 
 
 move therefore because of a desire to perfect themselves, or to become 
 like unto their movers. 
 
 So far Ibn Daud agrees with the philosophers, because the doctrines 
 so far expounded are not incompatible with the Bible. But when the 
 philosophers raise the question, How can the many originate from the 
 One, the manifold universe from the one God, and attempt to answer 
 it by their theory of successive emanations, Ibn Daud calls a halt. 
 The human mind is not really so all-competent as to be able to answer 
 all questions of the most difficult nature. The doctrine of successive 
 emanations is that elaborated by Alfarabi and Avicenna, which we 
 have already seen quoted and criticized by Judah Halevi {cf. above, 
 p. 178 f.). It is slightly more complicated in Ibn Daud, who speaks of 
 the treble nature of the emanations after the first Intelligence — an 
 intelligence, a soul and a sphere — whereas in Halevi's account there 
 were only two elements, the soul not being mentioned. ^^° 
 
 We have so far dealt with the more theoretical part of theology 
 and religion, so much of it as may be and is accepted by nations and 
 religions other than Jews. It remains now to approach the more 
 practical and the more specifically Jewish phases of religion; though 
 in the purely ethical discussions and those relating to Providence 
 we have once more a subject of general application, and not exclusively 
 Jewish. 
 
 As the introduction to this second part of the subject, Abraham Ibn 
 Daud devotes a few words to the theoretical defence of tradition, or 
 rather of mediate knowledge. He does so by analyzing the various 
 kinds of knowledge. Knowledge, he says, is either intelligible or 
 sensible. Sensible knowledge is either directly perceived by the sub- 
 ject or received by him from another who perceived it directly, and 
 whom he believes or not as the case may be. That is why some things 
 believed by some people are not believed by others. The ignorant 
 may think that this weakness is inherent in matters received from 
 others. As a matter of fact such indirect knowledge is at the basis 
 of civiHzation and makes it possible. If every man were to judge 
 only by what he sees with his own eyes, society could never get along; 
 there would be no way of obtaining justice in court, for the judge 
 would not put credence in witnesses, and the parties would have to 
 fight out their differences, which would lead to bloodshed and the 
 
224 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 disruption of social life. The different attitude of different persons 
 to a given matter of belief is due not necessarily to the uncertainty 
 of the thing itself, but to the manner in which the object of the belief 
 came down to us. If a thing rests upon the testimony of one man, 
 its warrant is not very strong. But if a whole nation witnessed an 
 event, it is no longer doubtful, unless we suppose that the account 
 itself is due to one writer, and the event never happened. We shall 
 discuss these matters in the sequel. ^^^ 
 
 Having justified in a general way the knowledge derived from the 
 testimony of others by showing that society could not exist without 
 depending upon such knowledge; though admitting at the same time 
 that caution should be exercised and criticism in determining what 
 traditional testimony is valid or not, we now take up one of these 
 traditional phenomena which plays perhaps the most important role 
 in Jewish theology, namely, the phenomenon of prophecy. Before 
 discussing the traditional aspect of this institution and its purpose 
 in the history of rehgion we must consider it from its natural and psy- 
 chological aspect. 
 
 The explanation of Ibn Daud — it was not original with him, as we 
 have already seen the non-religious philosopher in Halevi's Cusari 
 giving utterance to the same idea, and in Jewish philosophy Israeli 
 touches on it — the explanation of Ibn Daud is grounded in his psychol- 
 ogy, the Aristotelian psychology of Avicenna. The first degree of 
 prophecy, he says, is found in true dreams, which happen to many 
 people. Just as waking is a state of the body in which it uses the 
 external as well as the internal senses, so sleeping is a state of the body 
 in which the soul suppresses the external senses by putting them to 
 sleep, and exercises its "natural" powers only, such as the beating of 
 the heart pulse, respiration, and so on. The internal senses are also 
 at work during sleep, or at least some of them. In particular the power 
 of imagination is active when the external senses are at rest. It then 
 makes various combinations and separations and brings them to the 
 common sense. The result is a dream, true or false. When the senses 
 are weak for one reason or another this power becomes active and, 
 when not controlled by the reason, produces a great many erroneous 
 visions and ideas, as in the delusions of the sick. 
 
 The Deity and the angels and the Active Intellect have a knowledge 
 
ABRAHAM IBN DAUD 225 
 
 of the past, present and future, and we already know that the soul, 
 i. e., the rational soul, receives influence from the Active Intellect as 
 a natural thing in every person. Now just as it gets from it science 
 and general ideas, so it may receive a knowledge of hidden things if 
 the soul is adequately prepared. The reason it cannot receive in- 
 formation of hidden things from the Active Intellect in its waking 
 state, is because the soul is then busy in acquiring knowledge through 
 the senses. In sleep, too, it may be prevented by the thick vapors 
 rising from the food consumed during the day, or by anxiety due to 
 want of food or drink. The imagination also sometimes hinders this 
 process by the constant presentation of its foolish combinations to 
 the common sense. But sometimes this power comes under the con- 
 trol of the reason, and then the rational soul is prepared to receive 
 hidden things from the Active Intellect. In those cases the imagina- 
 tion transforms these facts into images, which are true dreams. If 
 they concern an individual or a particular event, we do not call them 
 prophecy, or at least the share of prophecy they may have is very 
 small. We call them prophetic dreams when they concern important 
 matters and have reference to a whole nation or nations, and come 
 to pass in the distant future. An example of such a dream is that 
 recorded in Daniel 7, i. 
 
 Sometimes the information comes to the prophet without the aid 
 of an image, when the reason prevails over the imagination, like the 
 dream of Abraham at the "covenant of the pieces" (Gen. 15, i2ff.). 
 Sometimes, also, the activity of the senses does not prevent the pro- 
 phet from seeing the hidden things of the future, and he receives pro- 
 phetic inspirations while awake. The prophet sometimes faints as 
 he is overcome by the unusual phenomenon, at other times he succeeds 
 in enduring it without swooning. All these cases can be illustrated 
 from the Bible, and examples will readily occur to the reader who is 
 famihar with the various instances and descriptions of prophetic 
 visions and activities in Scripture. 
 
 The purpose of prophecy is to guide the people in the right way. 
 With this end in view God inspires a proper man as a prophet and 
 gives him superior powers to perform miracles. Not every man is 
 capable of prophecy, only one who has a pure soul. For the most 
 part the prophetic gift is innate, at the same time study and good 
 
226 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 associations help to develop this power in him who has it. Witness 
 the "company of prophets," whose example inspired Saul (i Sam. 
 19, 20), and EUsha as the disciple of Elijah. 
 
 While we thus see Ibn Daud, unlike Halevi, adopting the philo- 
 sophical explanation of prophecy, which tries to bring it within the 
 class of natural psychological phenomena and relates it to dreams, 
 he could not help recognizing that one cannot ignore the supernatural 
 character of Bibhcal prophecy without bemg untrue to the Bible. 
 He accordingly adds to the above naturahstic explanation a number 
 of conditions which practically have the effect of taking the bottom 
 out of the psychological theory. If Judah Halevi insists that only 
 Israehtes in the land of Palestine and at the tune of their political 
 independence had the privilege of the prophetic gift, we realize that 
 such a behef is of the warp and woof of Halevi's innermost sentiment 
 and thinkmg, which is radically opposed to the shallow rationahsm 
 and superficial cosmopoHtanism of the "philosophers" of his day. 
 But when the champion of Peripateticism, Abraham Ibn Daud, after 
 explaining that prophecy is of the nature of true dreams, and though 
 in most cases innate, may be cultivated by a pure soul through study 
 and proper associations — repeats with Judah Halevi that the time and 
 the place are essential conditions and that Israelites alone are privi- 
 leged in this respect, he is giving up, it seems to us, all that he pre- 
 viously attempted to explain. This is only one of the many indications 
 which point to the essential artificiality of all the mediaeval attempts 
 to harmonize a given system of philosophy with a supernaturalistic 
 standpoint, such as is that of the Bible. It is not in this way that the 
 Bible is to be saved if it needs saving. ^^^ 
 
 The next practical question Ibn Daud felt called upon to discuss 
 was that of the possibility of the Law being repealed, abrogated or 
 altered. This he found it necessary to do in order to defend the Jewish 
 standpoint against that of Christianity in particular. How he will 
 answer this question is of course a foregone conclusion. We are only 
 interested in his manner of argument. He adopts a classification of 
 long standing of the Bibhcal laws into rational and traditional. The 
 first, he says, are accepted by all nations and can never be changed. 
 Even a band of thieves, who disregard all laws of right and wrong as 
 they relate to outsiders, must observe them in their own midst or they 
 
ABRAHAM IBN BAUD 227 
 
 cannot exist. These laws bring people of different nationalities and 
 beliefs together, and hence there can be no change in these. Nor 
 can there be any alteration in that part of the Law which is historical 
 in content. An event of the past cannot be repealed. 
 
 It only remains therefore to see whether abrogation may possibly 
 be compatible with the nature of the traditional or ceremonial laws. 
 Without arguing like the philosophers that change of a divine law is 
 incompatible with the nature of God, which is unchangeable, our 
 sages nevertheless have a method of explaining such phrases as, "And 
 it repented the Lord that he had made man" (Gen. 6, 6), so as to 
 reconcile the demands of reason with those of tradition. Now if 
 there were laws of the traditional kind stated in the Bible without 
 any indication of time and without the statement that they are eternal, 
 and afterwards other laws came to change them, we should say that 
 the Lord has a certain purpose in his laws which we do not know, but 
 which is revealed in the new law taking the place of the old. But as a 
 matter of fact the Bible states explicitly in many cases that the laws 
 are not to be changed, "A statute for ever throughout your genera- 
 tions" (Num. 10, 8, and passim). Arguments from phrases like, 
 "Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth, etc." 
 (Is. I, 14), have no validity, for there is no indication here that sacri- 
 fices are abolished. The meaning of Isaiah is that sacrifices in con- 
 junction with wrong living are undesirable. 
 
 Our opponents also argue that Biblical expressions to the effect 
 that the laws are eternal prove nothing, for we know of similar in- 
 stances in which promises have been withdrawn as in the priesthood 
 of Eli's family and the royalty of the house of David, where likewise 
 eternity is mentioned. We answer these by saying, first, that in 
 David's case the promise was withdrawn only temporarily, and will 
 return again, as the Prophets tell us. Besides the promise was made 
 only conditionally, as was that made to Eli. But there is no state- 
 ment anywhere that the Law is given to Israel conditionally and that 
 it will ever be taken away from them. 
 
 The claim of those who say that the laws of the Old Testament 
 were true, but that they were repealed and the New Testament took 
 its place, we meet by pointing to a continuous tradition against their 
 view. We have an uninterrupted tradition during two thousand 
 
228 MEDIJEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 four hundred and seventy- two years that there was a man Moses who 
 gave a Law accepted by his people and held without any break for 
 two thousand four hundred and seventy-two years. We do not have 
 to prove he was a genuine prophet since they do not deny it. 
 
 Some of them say that in the captivity in Babylon the old Law was 
 forgotten and Ezra made a new law, the one we have now. This is 
 absurd. The law could not have been forgotten, for the people did 
 not all go into captivity at one time. They were not all put to death; 
 they were led into exile in a quiet fashion, and there were great men 
 among them like Hananiah, Mishael, Azariah, Daniel and others who 
 surely could not have forgotten the Law. Besides Ezra could never 
 have had the consent of all the people scattered everywhere if he had 
 made a law of his own. As a matter of fact the Law as we have it 
 is the same in all details throughout the world. ^^^ 
 
 The next problem we must consider is the perennial one — the 
 problem of evil and of freedom. It is the purpose of the entire book, 
 as Ibn Daud tells us in his introduction. 
 
 The further a thing is removed from matter the more perfect is 
 its knowledge. For, as we have already said, it is matter that hinders 
 knowledge. All defect and evil is the result of the potential. Hence 
 the farther a thing is removed from potentiality the more perfect it 
 is and the freer it is from defect. God's essence is the most perfect 
 thing there is; and as he knows his essence, his is the most perfect 
 knowledge. God knows, too, that his perfection is not stationary 
 in him, but that it extends and conmiunicates itself to all other things 
 in order. And the further a thing is from him the less is its perfection 
 and the greater is its imperfection. We have thus a graduated series, 
 at one end the most perfect being, at the other the least perfect, viz., 
 matter. 
 
 Now it is impossible from any point of view, either according to 
 reason or Bible or tradition, that evil or defect should come from God. 
 Not by reason, for two contradictories in the same subject are impossi- 
 ble. Now if good and evil both came from God, he would have to be 
 composite just like man, who can be the cause of good and evil, the 
 one coming from his rational power, the other from the spirited or 
 appetitive. But God is simple and if evil comes from him, good can- 
 not do so, which is absurd. Besides, the majority of defects are pri- 
 
ABRAHAM IBN DAUD 229 
 
 vational in character and not positive, like for example darkness, 
 poverty, ignorance, and so on, which are not things, but the negations 
 of light, wealth, wisdom, respectively. Being negative, not positive, 
 they are not made by any body. 
 
 One may argue that it is in the nature of man that he should have 
 understanding and perfection; and if God deprives him of it, he does 
 evil. The answer is that the evil in the world is very small in com- 
 parison with the good. For evil and defect are found only in things 
 composed of the elements, which have a common matter, receiving 
 forms in accordance with the mixture of the elementary qualities 
 in the matter. Here an external cause sometimes prevents the form 
 from coming to the matter in its perfection. The seed, for example, 
 depends upon the character of the soil which it finds for its growth. 
 Now it does not follow that God was bound to give things the highest 
 perfection possible. For in that case all minerals would be plants, 
 all plants animals, all animals men, all men angels; and there would 
 be no world, but only God and a few of the highest angels. In order 
 that there shall be a world, it was necessary to make a graduated series 
 as we actually have it. And as a matter of fact the very defects in 
 the material composites are a good when we have in view not the par- 
 ticular thing but the whole. Thus if all men were of a highly intel- 
 lectual type, there would be no agriculture or manual labor. 
 
 Now there are men whose temperament is such that they cannot 
 distinguish between right and wrong, and they follow their inchna- 
 tions. To counteract these bad qualities God gave his commandments 
 and warnings. This shows that it is not impossible to oppose these 
 evil tendencies, for in that case the commandments would be useless. 
 The acts of man come neither under the category of the necessary, 
 nor under that of the impossible, but under the category of the 
 possible. 
 
 There are two senses in which we may imderstand the term possible. 
 A thing may be possible subjectively, i. e., in relation to our ignorance, 
 though objectively it may be necessary and determined. Thus we in 
 Spain do not know whether the king of Babylon died to-day or not; 
 and so far as we are concerned, it is possible that he is dead or that 
 he is ahve. In reality it is not a question of possibility but of neces- 
 sity. God knows which is true. The same thing applies to the oc- 
 
230 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 currence of an eclipse in the future for the man who is ignorant of as- 
 tronomy. Such possibihty due to ignorance does not exist in God. 
 
 But there is another sense of the word possible; the sense in which 
 an event is objectively undetermined. An event is possible if there 
 is nothing in the previous chain of causation to determine the thing's 
 happening in one way rather than another. The result is then a 
 matter of pure chance or of absolute free will. Now God may make 
 a thing possible in this objective sense, and then it is possible for him 
 also. If you ask, but is God then ignorant of the result? We say, this 
 is not ignorance. For to assume that it is, and that everything should 
 be determined like echpses, and that God cannot create things pos- 
 sible, means to destroy the order of the world, of this world as well as 
 the next. For why shall man engage in various occupations or pursue 
 definite lines of conduct since his destiny is already fixed? 
 
 The truth of the matter is that there are several orders of causes. 
 Some are directly determined by God, and there is no way of evading 
 them; others are entrusted to nature, and man is able to enjoy its 
 benefits and avoid its injuries by proper management. A third class 
 contains the things of chance, and one may guard against these also. 
 So we are bidden in the Bible to make a parapet on the roofs of our 
 houses to guard against the possibility of falling down. Finally there 
 is the fourth class, those things which depend upon the free choice of 
 the individual. Right and wrong conduct are matters of choice, 
 else there would be no use in prophets, and no reward and punishment. 
 When a person makes an effort to be good, his desire increases, and 
 he obtains assistance from the angels. 
 
 Since freedom is supported by reason. Scripture and tradition, the 
 passages in the Bible which are in favor of it should be taken hteraUy, 
 and those against it should be interpreted figuratively. When the 
 Bible says that God hardened Pharaoh's heart, it means simply that 
 Pharaoh was allowed to proceed as he began. AH the ancient sages 
 of our nation were in favor of freedom. ^^* 
 
 If we compare the above discussion of the problem of freedom with 
 that of Judah Halevi (above, p. 171), we see that Ibn Daud is more 
 consistent, whatever we may think of his success in solving the in- 
 soluble problem. He frankly insists on the absolute freedom of the 
 will and on the reality of the objectively contingent, not shrinking 
 
ABRAHAM IBN BAUD 231 
 
 before the unavoidable conclusion that the events which are the 
 results of such freedom or chance are no more known beforehand to 
 God than they are to man. And he tries to avoid the criticism of 
 attributing imperfection to God by insisting that not to be able to 
 foretell the contingent is not ignorance, and hence not an imperfec- 
 tion. The reader may think what he pleases of this defence, but there 
 seems to be a more serious difficulty in what this idea implies than 
 in what it explicitly says. 
 
 If the contingent exists for God also, it follows that he is not the 
 complete master of nature and the world. To say as Ibn Daud does 
 that God made the contingent, i. e., made it to be contingent, sounds 
 like a contradiction, and reminds one of the question whether God can 
 make a stone so big that he cannot lift it himseK. 
 
 His proofs in favor of freedom and the contingent are partially 
 identical with those of Judah Halevi, but in so far as he does not 
 explicitly admit that the will may itself be influenced by prior causes 
 he evades, to be sure, the strongest argument against him, but he 
 does so at the expense of completeness in his analysis. Halevi is less 
 consistent and more thorough, Ibn Daud is more consistent, because 
 he fails to take account of real difficulties. 
 
 In the final outcome of their respective analyses, Halevi maintains 
 God's foreknowledge at the expense of absolute freedom, or rather 
 he does not see that his admissions are fatal to the cause he endeavors 
 to defend. Ibn Daud maintains absolute freedom and frankly sacri- 
 fices foreknowledge; though his defence of freedom is secured by blind- 
 ing himself to the argument most dangerous to that doctrine. 
 
 Abraham Ibn Daud concludes his ' Emunah Ramah" by a dis- 
 cussion of ethics and the application of the principles thus discovered 
 to the laws of the Bible. He entitles this final division of his treatise, 
 "Medicine of the Soul," on the ground that virtue is the health of 
 the soul as vice is its disease. In his fundamental ethical distinctions, 
 definitions and classifications he combines Plato's psychology and the 
 virtues based thereon with the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, 
 which he also applies in detail. He omits wisdom as one of the Pla- 
 tonic virtues and, unlike Plato for whom justice consists in a harmony 
 of the other three virtues and has no psychological seat peculiar to it, 
 Ibn Daud makes justice the virtue of the rational soul. 
 
232 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 The end of practical philosophy is, he says, happiness. This is 
 attained, first, by good morals; second, by proper family hfe; and 
 third, by means of correct social and poHtical conduct. 
 
 The human soul consists of three principal faculties, vegetative, 
 animal, rational. Corresponding to these the principal virtues and 
 vices are also three. The vegetative power, whose functions are nour- 
 ishment, growth and reproduction, is related to appetite, and is called 
 the appetitive soul. The animal power as being the cause of sensation, 
 voluntary motion, cruelty, revenge, mercy and kindness, is called 
 the spirited soul, because these quaUties are dependent upon the energy 
 or weakness of the spirit. The rational power has two aspects. One 
 is directed upwards and is the means of our learning the sciences and 
 the arts. The other aspect is directed downwards, and endeavors to 
 control (successfully or not as the case may be), the two lower powers 
 of the soul, guarding them against excess and defect. This function 
 we call conduct, and virtue is the mean between the two extremes of 
 too much and too httle. The mean of the appetitive power is tem- 
 perance; of the spirited power, bravery and gentleness; of the rational 
 soul, justice. "^^ 
 
 Justice consists in giving everything its due without excess or defect. 
 Justice is therefore the highest of all quahties, and is of value not 
 merely in a person's relations to his family and country, but also in 
 the relations of his powers one to another. The rational power must 
 see to it that the two lower faculties of the soul get what is their due, 
 no more and no less. This quality has an important application also 
 in the relations of a man to his maker. It is just that a person should 
 requite his benefactor as much as he received from him, if possible. 
 If he cannot do this, he should at least thank him. Hence the reason 
 for divine worship, the first of commandments. This quahty, the 
 greatest of men possessed in the highest degree. Moses "said to him 
 that did the wrong, wherefore smitest thou thy fellow? " (Ex. 2, 13). 
 And when the shepherds came and drove away the daughters of the 
 priest of Midian, ''Moses stood up and helped them, and watered 
 their flock" {ih. 17). This is the reason why God sent him to deliver 
 Israel. 
 
 God showed the care he had of his nation by revealing himself to 
 them, and thus showing them the error of those who think that God 
 
ABRAHAM IBN BAUD 233 
 
 gave over the rule of this world to the stars, and that he and the angels 
 have no further interest in it. Hence the first commandment is "I 
 am the Lord thy God," which is followed by "You shall have no other 
 gods," "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain" 
 (Ex. 20, 2ff.)- "Remember the Sabbath day" is for the purpose of 
 condemning the behef in the eternity of the world, as is evident from 
 the conclusion, "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, 
 the sea, and all that in them is . , . " {ib. 11). "Honor thy father 
 and thy mother" {ib. 12) is intended to inculcate the duty of honoring 
 the cause of one's being, including God. Thus the first five command- 
 ments all aim to teach the revelation and Providence of God. The 
 rest deal with social and poHtical conduct, especially the last one, 
 "Thou shalt not covet," which is important in the preservation of 
 society. 
 
 The commandment to love God involves the knowledge of God, 
 for one cannot love what one does not know. A man must know there- 
 fore God's attributes and actions. He must be convinced likewise 
 that no evil comes from God, or he cannot love him as he should. 
 He may fear him but not with the proper fear. For there are two kinds 
 of fear, and the one that is commanded is fear of majesty and awe, 
 not fear of punishment. 
 
 Divine service means not merely prayer three times a day, but 
 constant thought of God. To develop and train this thought of God 
 in us we are commanded to put on phylacteries and fringes, and to 
 fasten the "mezuzah" to our door posts. For the same reason we 
 celebrate the festivals of Passover, Tabernacles, Hanukkah and 
 Purim, as a remembrance of God's benefits to our people. All these 
 observances are ultimately based upon the duty of thanking our 
 benefactor, which is part of justice, the highest of the virtues. 
 
 Among moral virtues we are also commanded to practice suppres- 
 sion of anger, and its inculcation is emphasized by making it a divine 
 attribute, "The Lord, the Lord, a God full of compassion and gra- 
 cious . . ." (Ex. 34, 6). Other virtues of the same kind are, not to 
 repay evil for evil, not to be jealous, to practice humility like Moses, 
 and so on. In fact all the virtues laid down by ethical philosophers are 
 found better expressed in the Bible. 
 
 In respect to family virtues, we are bidden to care for and protect 
 
234 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the members of our family, wife, children and slaves. Of social virtues 
 we have love of our neighbor, honesty in deahng, just weights and 
 measures, prohibition of interest and of taking a pledge from the poor, 
 returning a find to the loser, and a host of other teachings. 
 
 There are, however, some of the traditional laws, the purpose of 
 which is not known, especially the details of sacrifices and the like. 
 In explanation of these we must say that the law consists of a rule 
 of life composed of several parts. First is belief; second, moral quaU- 
 ties; third, family life; fourth, social and political life; fifth, the com- 
 mandments above referred to, which we shall characterize as dic- 
 tated by divine wisdom, though we do not understand them. Not 
 all the parts of the Law are of the same order of value. The funda- 
 mental portion and the most important is that dealing with belief. 
 Next in importance are the laws governing social and moral conduct, 
 without which society is impossible. That is why all nations agree 
 about these; and there is honesty even among thieves. The last 
 class of commandments, whose purpose is not known, are the least 
 in importance, as is clear also from statements in the Bible, such as, 
 "I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that 
 I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt offerings 
 or sacrifices. ..." (Jer. 7, 22). At the same time we cannot deny 
 that there are some reasons for their observance. Thus sacrifice leads 
 to repentance as a result of reflection, even if the person does not 
 confess his sin, as he is bidden to do in certain cases. 
 
 In fact there is one aspect which gives this class of commandments 
 even greater importance than the social duties. It is the principle 
 of implicit obedience even when we do not see the value of the com- 
 mandment. I do not mean that a man should not study science, 
 particularly what concerns the knowledge of God. This is not to be 
 recommended. But when a man is convinced that there is such a 
 thing as genuine prophecy, showing God's providence, as we see in 
 the case of Moses who delivered his nation, performed wonders for 
 them and was always honored and believed — he should not balk at 
 the acceptance of some laws given by such a divine man simply be- 
 cause he does not understand them. Abraham is a good example. 
 For when God promised him that Isaac would become a great nation, 
 and then commanded him to sacrifice his only child, he did not ask 
 
ABRAHAM IBN DAUD 235 
 
 any questions and was ready to do God's behest. His example is meant 
 to be followed by all. This is the purpose of these subtle command- 
 ments, which are made with wisdom. Through them we may see the 
 difference between beUef and unbehef.^^® 
 
 The above discussion is extremely typical of the rationalistic atti- 
 tude of Ibn Daud and his school, which includes such men as Mai- 
 monides, Gersonides and others. Reason, theory, science, explana- 
 tion — these are the important considerations in things philosophical, 
 as well as things religious. Theory is more important than practice, 
 and belief stands higher than mere conduct. No wonder that Maimon- 
 ides was not satisfied until he elaborated a creed with a definite num- 
 ber of dogmas. Dogmas and faith in reason go together. It is the 
 mystic who is impatient of prescribed generalities, for he is constantly 
 refreshed by the living and ever flowing stream of individual experi- 
 ence. The rationalist has a fixed unchangeable Idea or reason or 
 method, whose reality and value consists in its unity, permanence 
 and immutability. In favor of this hypostatised reason, the ration- 
 alist Ibn Daud is ready to sacrifice so fundamental an institution as 
 sacrifice in the face of the entire book of Leviticus, pretending that a 
 single verse of Jeremiah entitles him to do so. But the Jew Ibn Daud 
 in the end asserted himself, and he finds it necessary to admit that 
 in a sense these non-rational laws may be of even greater importance 
 than the rational; not, however, as a simple believer might say, be- 
 cause we must not search the wisdom of God, but for the reason that 
 unreasoned obedience is itseK a virtue. 
 
 In conclusion we remind the reader that Ibn Daud was the precursor 
 of Maimonides, touching upon, and for the most part answering every 
 question treated by his more famous successor. Ibn Daud was the 
 first to adopt Aristotelianism for the purpose of welding it with Ju- 
 daism. He showed the way to follow. Maimonides took his cue from 
 Ibn Daud and succeeded in putting the latter in the shade. Historic 
 justice demands that Ibn Daud be brought forward into the light 
 and given the credit which is deservedly his due. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 MOSES MAIMONIDES 
 
 With Maimonides we reach the high water mark of mediaeval Jewish 
 philosophy. He was by far the most comprehensive mind of mediaeval 
 Jewry, and his philosophy was the coping stone of a complete system 
 of Judaism. In his training and education he embraced all Jewish 
 literature, Bibhcal and Rabbinic, as well as all the science and phi- 
 losophy of his day. And his literary activity was fruitful in every im- 
 portant branch of study. He was well known as a practicing physician, 
 having been in the employ of the Caliph's visier at Cairo (Fostat), 
 and he wrote on medical theory and practice. He was versed in 
 mathematics and astronomy, and his knowledge of these subjects 
 served him in good stead not merely as an introduction to theology 
 and metaphysics, but was of direct service in his studies and writings 
 on the Jewish calendar. It goes without saying that he knew logic, 
 for this was the basis of all learning in mediaeval times; but in this 
 branch, too, Maimonides has left us a youthful treatise,^^'^ which 
 bears witness to his early interest in science and his efforts to recom- 
 mend its study as helpful to a better understanding of Jewish litera- 
 ture. 
 
 But all these activities and productions were more or less side issues, 
 or preparations for a magnum opus, or rather magna opera. From 
 his youth we can trace the evident purpose, not finally completed 
 until toward the end of his brilliant and useful career, — the purpose 
 to harmonize Judaism with philosophy, to reconcile the Bible and 
 Talmud with Aristotle. He was ambitious to do this for the good of 
 Judaism, and in the interest of a rational and enlightened faith. Thus 
 in his commentary on the Mishna,^^^ the earliest of his larger works, 
 he had already conceived the idea of writing a composition of a har- 
 monizing nature, viz., to gather all the homiletical disquisitions of 
 the Talmud (the "derashot") and explain them in a rationalistic 
 manner so as to remove what appears on the surface to be offensive 
 
 236 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 237 
 
 to sound reason. But instead of proceeding at once to the performance 
 of this cherished object of his philosophic ambition, he kept it in his 
 bosom, brooding over it during a hfe of intense Hterary and practical 
 activity, until it was in the end matured and brought to fruition in 
 a manner quite diflferent from that at first intended. The book ex- 
 planatory of the Rabbinic legends was given up for reasons which 
 will appear later. But the object that work was to realize was carried 
 out in a much more effective manner because it was delayed, and was 
 published toward the end of his life as the systematic and authorita- 
 tive pronouncement of the greatest Jew of his time. The "Guide 
 of the Perplexed" would not have attracted the attention it did, it 
 would not have raised the storm which divided Jewry into two opposed 
 camps, if it had not come as the mature work of the man whom all 
 Jewry recognized as the greatest Rabbinic authority of his time. 
 Others had written on philosophy before Maimonides. We have in 
 these pages followed their ideas — Saadia, Gabirol, Ibn Zaddik, Abra- 
 ham Ibn Daud. The latter in particular anticipated Maimonides in 
 almost all his ideas. None had the effect of upsetting the theological 
 equiHbrium of Jewry. Everyone had his admirers, no doubt, as well 
 as his opponents. Gabirol was forgotten, Ibn Zaddik and Ibn Daud 
 were neglected, and Jewish learning continued the even tenor of its 
 course. Maimonides was the first to make a profound impression, 
 the first who succeeded in stirring to their depths the smooth, though 
 here and there somewhat turbid, R.abbinic waters, as they flowed not 
 merely in scientific Spain and Provence, or in the Orient, but also in 
 the strictly Talmudic communities of northern France. It was the 
 Commentary on the Mishna and the Talmudic code known as the 
 "Yad ha-Hazaka" that was responsible for the tremendous effect 
 of the "More Nebukim" ("Guide of the Perplexed"). 
 
 In these two Rabbinical treatises, and particularly in the "Yad 
 ha-Hazaka," the Rabbinic Code, Maimonides showed himself the 
 master of Rabbinic literature. And all recognized in him the master 
 mind. Having been written in Hebrew the Code soon penetrated all 
 Jewish communities everywhere, and Maimonides's fame spread 
 wherever there were Jews engaged in the study of the Talmud. His 
 fame as a court physician in Egypt and as the official head of Oriental 
 Jewry enhanced the influence of his name and his work. Jealousy 
 
238 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 no doubt had its share in starting opposition to the Code itself even 
 before the publication of the "Guide," and during the lifetime of 
 its author. When the "More Nebukim" was translated from the 
 original Arabic into Hebrew, so that all could read it, and Maimonides 
 was no longer among the living, the zealots became emboldened and 
 the storm broke, the details of which, however, it is not our province 
 to relate. 
 
 For completeness' sake let us set down the facts of his life. Moses 
 ben Maimon was born in the city of Cordova on the fourteenth of 
 Nissan (30th of March) at one o'clock in the afternoon, on a Sabbath 
 which was the day before Passover, in the year 1135. It is not often 
 that the birth of a medijeval Jewish writer is handed down with such 
 minute detail. Usually we do not even know the year, to say nothing 
 of the day and the hour. Cordova had long fallen from its high estate. 
 It was no longer the glorious city of the days before the Almoravid 
 conquest. And it was destined to descend lower still when the fanati- 
 cal hordes of the Almohades renewed the ancient motto of the early 
 Mohammedan conquerors, "The Koran or the Sword." 
 
 Maimonides was barely thirteen when his native city fell into the 
 hands of the zealots from Morocco, and henceforth neither Jew nor 
 Christian dared avow his faith openly in Cordova. Adoption of 
 Islam, emigration or death were the choices held out to the infidel. 
 Many Jews adopted the dominant faith outwardly — that was all that 
 was demanded of them — while in the secret of their homes they ob- 
 served Judaism. Some emigrated, and among them was the family 
 of Moses' father. For a time they wandered about from city to city 
 in Spain, and then crossed over to Fez in Morocco. This seems to us 
 like going from the frying pan into the fire, for Fez was the lion's den 
 itself. The conquerors of Cordova came from Morocco. And there 
 seems to be some evidence too that the Maimon family had to appear 
 outwardly as Mohammedans. Be that as it may, Maimonides did not 
 stay long in Fez. On the i8th of April, 1165, the family set sail for 
 Palestine, and after a month's stormy voyage they arrived in Acco. 
 He visited Jerusalem and Hebron, but did not find Palestine a prom- 
 ising place for permanent residence and decided to go to Egypt. He 
 settled in Old Cairo (Fostat), and with his brother David engaged in 
 the jewel trade. His father died soon after, and later his brother met 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 239 
 
 an untimely death when the ship on which he was a passenger on one 
 of his business trips was wrecked in the Indian Ocean. Thereafter 
 Maimonides gave up the jewel business and began to practice medicine, 
 which at first did not offer him more than the barest necessities. But 
 in the course of time his fame spread and he was appointed physician 
 to Saladin's grand visier Alfadhil. He was also made spiritual head * 
 of the Jews of Egypt, and what with his official duties as court physi- 
 cian, leader of the Jewish community, practicing physician among the 
 people, and his literary activities, Jewish and secular. Rabbinical 
 and scientific, he was a busy man indeed; so much so that he dissuades 
 Samuel Ibn Tibbon, the translator of the "Guide," from pa)dng him a 
 visit on the ground that he would scarcely have time to spare to see 
 him, much less to enter into scientific discussions with him.^*^ Mai- 
 monides died on Monday, December 13 (20 Tebeth), 1204. 
 
 The philosophy of Maimonides is contained in the "Guide of the 
 Perplexed," his last great work, which was published in Arabic in 
 1190.^^° Some philosophic and ethical material is also found in the 
 introductory chapters of his commentary on the Mishnaic treatise 
 "Abot" (the so-called "Eight Chapters "—" Shemonah Perakim"),^^! 
 in the introduction to the eleventh chapter (Helek) of the Talmudic 
 treatise "Sanhedrin," and in the introductory sections of the Code 
 ("Hilkot Yesode ha-Torah" and "Hilkot Deot"). Here, however, the 
 treatment is popular and elementary, and is intended for popular 
 consiunption. He lays down results in their simplest form without 
 discussing their origin or the arguments pro and con. The " Guide of 
 the Perplexed," on the other hand, is intended for a special class of 
 persons, for the sophisticated; for those who are well trained in science 
 and philosophy, not to speak of Bible and Talmud, and are as a result 
 made uneasy by the apparent disagreement of philosophical teaching 
 with the ideas expressed in the Biblical and Rabbinic writings. His 
 purpose is deliberately apologetic and concordistic. The work is not 
 a treatise of science or philosophy. The latter are presupposed. He 
 introduces philosophic principles, AristoteKan or Kalamistic, only 
 with a view to their relation to Jewish theology. And he either accepts 
 them, provisionally or absolutely, if he regards them as proven, as 
 true and useful; or he refutes and rejects them if untenable. In the 
 * Not a paid post. 
 
240 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 former case he shows by proper interpretation that similar principles 
 are taught in Bible and Talmud; in the latter he contents himself by 
 proving that Aristotle or the Mutakallimun, as the case may be, did 
 not prove their point. 
 
 His method, in general, of quieting the doubts of the "perplexed" is 
 the old one — as old as Philo and beyond — of regarding Biblical phrases 
 as metaphors and allegories, containing an esoteric meaning beside 
 or opposed to the literal. Accordingly he lays the greatest stress on 
 the explanation of Scriptural "homonyms," as he calls them, borrow- 
 ing an Aristotelian term. A homon3an is a word which has more than 
 one meaning; a word which denotes several things having nothing in 
 common. Thus when I apply the word dog to the domestic animal we 
 know by that name, as well as to Sirius, known as the dog-star, I use 
 dog as a homonym. The star and the animal have nothing in common. 
 So the word "merciful," one of the attributes of God in the Bible, is a 
 homonym. That is, we denote by the same word also a quahty in a 
 human being; but this quahty and that which is denoted by the same 
 word when applied to God have nothing in common. They are not 
 merely different in degree but in kind. In fact, as Maimonides insists, 
 there is really nothing in God corresponding to the word merciful. 
 
 There are besides certain passages in the Bible which while having 
 an acceptable meaning when taken literally, contain besides a deeper 
 signification which the practiced eye can detect. Thus in the descrip- 
 tion of the harlot in the seventh chapter of Proverbs there is beside 
 the plain meaning of the text, the doctrine of matter as the cause of 
 corporeal desires. The harlot, never faithful to one man, leaving 
 one and taking up with another, represents matter which, as Aristotle 
 conceives it, never is without form and constantly changes one form for 
 another. 
 
 There is really nothing new in this, and Philo apart, whom Mai- 
 monides did not know, Ibn Daud anticipated Maimonides here also in 
 making use of the term "homon3an" as the basis of this method of 
 interpretation.^^^ But whereas Ibn Daud relegates the chapter treating 
 of this principle to a subordinate place, his interest being as he teUs us 
 primarily ethical — to solve the problem of free will; Maimonides places 
 it in the very centre of his system. The doctrine of attributes as 
 leading to a true conception of God, — of God as absolutely incorporeal 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 241 
 
 and without any resemblance or relation whatsoever to anything else — 
 is the very keystone of Maimonides's philosophical structure. His 
 purpose is to teach a spiritual conception of God. Anything short of 
 this is worse than idolatry. He cannot reconcile the Bible to such a 
 view without this " homonymic " tool. Hence the great importance of 
 this in his system; and he actually devotes the greater part of the first 
 book of the "Guide" to a systematic and exhaustive survey of all 
 terms in the Bible used as homonyms. ^^^ All this is preparatory to his 
 discussion of the divine attributes. 
 
 This consideration will account also for the fact that, systematic 
 and logical thinker as he was, he perpetrates what might appear at 
 first sight as a logical blunder. Instead of first proving the existence 
 of God and then discussing his nature and attributes, as Saadia, 
 Bahya, Ibn Daud and others did before him, he treats exhaustively 
 of the divine attributes in the first book, whereas the proof of the 
 existence of God does not appear until the second book. This inver- 
 sion of the logical order is deliberate. Maimonides's method is directed 
 ad hominem. The Jews for whom he wrote his "Guide" did not 
 doubt the existence of God. But a great many of them had an inade- 
 quate idea of his spiritual nature. And apparently the Bible counte- 
 nanced their anthropomorphism. Hence Maimonides cast logical 
 considerations to the wind, and dealt first with that which was nearest 
 to his heart. The rest could wait, this could not. 
 
 I promised in my commentary on the Mishna, he tells us in the 
 introduction to the "Guide," to explain the allegories and "Mid- 
 rashim" in two works to be entitled "The Book of ReconciHation " 
 and "The Book of Prophecy." But after reflecting on the matter 
 a number of years I decided to desist from the attempt. The reasons 
 are these. If I expressed my explanations obscurely, I should have 
 accomplished nothing by substituting one imintelligible statement 
 for another. If, on the other hand, I were really to make clear the 
 matters that require explanation, the result would not be suitable 
 for the masses, for whom those treatises were intended. Besides, 
 those Midrashim when read by an ignorant man are harmless because 
 to such a person nothing is impossible. And if they are read by a 
 person who is learned and worthy, one of two things is likely to happen. 
 Either he will take them literally and suspect the author of ignorance, 
 
242 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 which is not a serious offence; or he will regard the legendary state- 
 ments as containing an esoteric meaning and think well of the author 
 — which is a good thing, whether he catch the meaning intended or 
 not. Accordingly I gave up the idea of writing the books mentioned. 
 In this work I am addressing myself to those who have been philoso- 
 phizing; who are believers in the Bible and at the same time know 
 science; and are perplexed in their ideas on account of the homony- 
 mous terms. 
 
 Having made clear Maimonides's chief interest and purpose in his 
 masterpiece we need not follow his own method of treatment, which 
 often gives the impression of a studied attempt to conceal his inner- 
 most ideas from all but the initiated. At least he is not willing that 
 anyone who has not taken the trouble carefully to study and scruti- 
 nize every chapter and compare it with what precedes and follows, 
 should by a superficial browsing here and there arrive at an under- 
 standing of the profound problems treated in the work. He believes 
 that the mysterious doctrines passing by the name of '' Maase Bereshit " 
 and "Maase Merkaba" in the Talmud {cf. Introduction, p. xvi) 
 denote respectively Physics and Metaphysics — the very sciences 
 of which he treats in the "Guide." Accordingly he tells us that fol- 
 lowing the instructions of the Rabbis he must not be expected to give 
 more than bare allusions. And even these are not arranged in order 
 in the book, but scattered and mixed up with other subjects which he 
 desires to explain. For, as he says, "I do not want to oppose the di- 
 vine intention, which concealed the truths of his being from the 
 masses." 
 
 "You must not suppose," he continues, " that these mysteries are 
 known to anybody completely. By no means. But sometimes the 
 truth flashes upon us and it is day; and then again our natural consti- 
 tution and habits shut them out, and we are again in darkness. The 
 relative proportion of light and darkness which a person enjoys in 
 these matters, makes the difference in the grade of perfection of great 
 men and prophets. The greatest of the prophets had comparatively 
 httle if any darkness. With those who never see light at all, namely 
 the masses of the people, we have nothing to do in this book." 
 
 Finally he adjures the reader not to explain to anyone else the novel 
 ideas found in his work, which are not contained in the writings of 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 243 
 
 his predecessors. Heaven knows, he exclaims, I hesitated long before 
 writing this book, because it contains unknown matters, never before 
 treated by any Jewish writer in the "Galut." But I rehed on two 
 Rabbinic principles. One is that when it is a question of doing some- 
 thing for a great cause in a critical time, it is permitted to transgress 
 a law. The other is the consciousness that my motives are pure and 
 unselfish. In short, he concludes, I am the man who, when he finds 
 himself in a critical position and cannot teach truth except by suiting 
 one worthy person and scandalizing ten thousand fools, chooses to 
 say the truth for the benefit of the one without regard for the abuse 
 of the great majority. 
 
 As we are not bound by Maimonides's principle of esoterism and 
 mystery, nor are we in fear of being an offence and a stumbling block 
 to the fools, we shall proceed more directly in our exposition of his 
 philosophy; and shall begin with Maimonides's general ideas on the 
 need of science for intelligent faith and the relation thereto of Jewish 
 history and literature. 
 
 The highest subject of study is metaphysics or theology, the knowl- 
 edge of God (c/. below, p. 285). This is not merely not forbidden 
 in the Bible, but it is directly commanded. When Moses says, "That 
 I may know thee, to the end that I may find grace in thy sight" (Exod. 
 33, 13), he intimates that only he finds favor with God who knows 
 him, and not merely who fasts and prays. ^^^ Besides, the command- 
 ment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," cannot be fulfilled with- 
 out a study and understanding of the whole of nature. ^^^ Thus, 
 as we shall see, it is only by a study of physics that we come to under- 
 stand that affection is a defect and must therefore be removed from 
 the conception of God. The same thing applies to the ideas of po- 
 tentiahty and actuahty. We should not know what they signify 
 without a study of physics, nor should we understand that potentiality 
 is a defect and hence not to be found in God. It is therefore a duty 
 to study both physics and metaphysics for a true knowledge of God.^^^ 
 At the same time we must recognize that human reason has a limit 
 and that there are matters which are beyond its ken. Not to realize 
 this and to deny what has not been proved impossible is dangerous, 
 and may lead a man astray after the imagination and the evil desires 
 which quench the light of the intellect. And it is this the Bible and 
 
244 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the Rabbis had in mind in such passages as, "Hast thou found hoxiey? 
 eat so much as is sufficient for thee; lest thou be filled therewith, and 
 vomit it " (Prov. 25, 16); or in the following from the Mishna, "Who- 
 ever pries into four things, had better not come into the world, m., 
 what is above and what is below, what was before and what will be 
 after " (Hagigah, ch. 2). The meaning is not, as some fools think, 
 that the Rabbis forbid the use of the reason entirely to reach what is 
 in its power. It is abuse of the reason that they prohibit, and neglect 
 of the truth that the human reason has a limit. ^^^ 
 
 Accordingly while the study of metaphysics and the explanation of 
 the allegories of Scripture are thus shown to be a necessity of intelli- 
 gent belief, it is not proper to begin with these difficult subjects. One 
 must first be mature intellectually and possessed of the preliminary 
 sciences. Otherwise the study of metaphysics is likely not merely 
 to confuse the mind in its behef, but to destroy belief entirely. It is 
 like feeding an infant on wheat bread and meat and wine. These are 
 not bad in themselves, but the infant is not prepared to digest them. 
 That is why these matters are given in the Bible in the form of alle- 
 gories, because the Bible is intended for all — men, women and children 
 — not because metaphysical ideas are injurious in themselves, as some 
 fools imagine, who believe they are wise men. For beginners it is 
 sufficient that they have the right view by tradition and know the 
 existence of certain beings, without being able to prove the opinions 
 they hold, or to understand the essence of the being in the existence 
 of which they believe. This they will acquire gradually if they are 
 capable. ^^^ 
 
 There are five causes preventing the study of metaphysics on the 
 part of the general masses. First, the difficulty of the subject itself. 
 Second, the limitations of all people's minds at the beginning. Third, 
 the great amount of preparatory training that is necessary, and which 
 everybody is not ready to undertake, however eager he may be to 
 know the results. And to study metaphysics without preliminary 
 training is worse than not to study it at all. For there is nothing in 
 existence except God and his creation. To know God's existence 
 and what is and is not proper to ascribe to him we must examine his 
 creation; and thus arithmetic, the nature of number, and the proper- 
 ties of geometrical figures help us a great deal in determining what 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 245 
 
 attributes are inapplicable to God. Even much more important for 
 metaphysics is the study of spherical astronomy and physics, which 
 throw light on the relation of God to the world. Then there are some 
 theoretical topics which, while not directly of help in metaphysics, 
 are useful in training the mind and enabling it to know what is true 
 demonstration. One who wishes therefore to undertake the study of 
 metaphysics, must first study logic, then the mathematical sciences 
 in order, then physics, and not until he has mastered all these intro- 
 ductory branches should he take up metaphysics. This is too much 
 for most people, who would die in the midst of their preparatory 
 studies, and if not for tradition would never know whether there is 
 a God or not, not to speak of knowing what attributes are applicable 
 to him and what are not. 
 
 The fourth cause which keeps people away from the study of met- 
 aphysics is their natural disposition. For it has been shown that 
 intellectual qualities are dependent upon moral; and the former can- 
 not be perfect unless the latter are. Now some persons are temper- 
 amentally incapable of right thinking by reason of their passionate 
 nature; and it is foolish to attempt to teach them, for it is not medicine 
 or geometry, and not everybody is prepared for it. This is the reason, 
 too, why young men cannot study it, because of the passions which 
 are still strong in them. Finally as a fifth reason, the necessities of 
 the body and its luxuries, too, stand in the way of a person's devoting 
 enough time and attention to this subject. ^^^ 
 
 Like many others before him, Christians as well as Jews, Mai- 
 monides also believed that in ancient times the Jews diligently cul- 
 tivated the sciences, which were gradually forgotten on account of 
 foreign domination. Maimonides adds another reason for their dis- 
 appearance, namely, that they were not disseminated abroad. They 
 were confined to a select few and were not put dov/n in writing but 
 handed down by word of mouth. As a result only a few hints are 
 found in the Talmud and Midrashim, where the kernel is small and 
 the husk large, so that people mistake the husk for the kernel.^*' 
 
 He then traces the history of philosophical thinking in Jewish 
 mediaeval literature from the time of the Geonim, and tells us that the 
 little that is found of the Kalam concerning the Unity of God and 
 related topics in the works of some of the Geonim and the Karaites 
 
246 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 in the East is borrowed from the Mutakallimun of the Mohammedans 
 and constitutes a small fraction of the writings of the latter on this 
 subject. The first attempt in this direction among the Moslems was 
 that of the party known as the Mu'tazila, whom our people followed. 
 Later came the party of the Ashariya with different opinions which, 
 however, were not adopted by any of our people. This was not due, 
 he tells us, to a deliberate decision in favor of the Mu tazila, but 
 solely to the historical accident of their chronological priority. On the 
 other hand, the Spanish Jews of Andalusia adopted the views of the 
 philosophers, i. e., the Aristotelians, so far as they are not in conflict 
 with our religion. They do not follow the Mutakallimun, and hence 
 what httle of the subject is found in the works of the later writers of 
 this class resembles our own method and views. ^®^ 
 
 There seems no doubt that whatever other Spanish writers Mai- 
 monides had in mind, whose works are not extant, his characterization 
 fits admirably the "Emunah Ramah" of Abraham Ibn Daud {cf. 
 above, p. 217), and in a less degree it is also true of Ibn Gabirol, Bahya, 
 Judah Halevi, Moses and Abraham Ibn Ezra. Bahya as we saw above 
 (p. 86) still retains a good deal of Kalamistic material and so does 
 Ibn Zaddik (p. 126). As for Mukammas, Saadia and the two Karaites 
 Al Basir and Jeshua ben Judah, we have seen (pp. 17, 24, 48, 56) that 
 they move wholly in the ideas of the Mutakallimun. It becomes of 
 great interest for us therefore to see what Maimonides thinks of these 
 Islamic theologians, of their origins, of their methods and of their phil- 
 osophical value. Maimonides's exposition and criticism of the prin- 
 ciples of the Mutakallimun is of especial interest, too, because up to 
 recent times his sketch of the tenets of this school was the only ex- 
 tensive account known; and it has not lost its value even yet. We 
 shall, however, be obliged to abridge his detailed exposition in order 
 not to enlarge our volume beyond due limits. Besides, there is no 
 occasion for repeating what we have already said of the Kalam in our 
 Introduction (p. xxi ff.); though the account there given was not 
 taken from Maimonides and does not follow his order. 
 
 Maimonides is aware that the Arabs are indebted to the Christians, 
 Greeks as well as Syrians. The Mu'tazila and Ashariya, he says, 
 base their opinions upon premises and principles borrowed from Greek 
 and Syrian Christians, who endeavored to refute the opinions of the 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 247 
 
 philosophers as dangerous to the Christian rehgion. There was thus 
 a Christian Kalam prior to the Mohammedan. ^^^ Their method was to 
 lay down premises favorable to their religion, and by means of these 
 to refute the opinions opposed to them. When the Mohammedans 
 came upon the scene and translated the works of the philosophers, 
 they included in their work of translation the refutations composed by 
 the Christians. In this way they found the works of Philoponus, 
 Yahya ben Adi and others; and adopted also the opinions of the pre- 
 Socratic philosophers, which they thought would be of help to them, 
 though these had already been refuted by Aristotle, who came after. 
 Such are the atomic theory of matter and the behef in the existence of 
 a vacuum. These opinions they carried to consequences not at all 
 contemplated by their authoritieSj^ who were closer to the philosophers. 
 
 To characterize briefly the methods of the MutakaUimun, Mai- 
 monides continues, I would say that the first among them, the Greeks 
 and the Mohammedans, did not follow reality, but adopted principles 
 which were calculated to help them in defending their religious theses, 
 and then interpreted reality to suit their preconceived notions. The 
 later members of the school no longer saw through the motives of their 
 predecessors and imagined their principles and arguments were bona 
 fide refutations of philosophical opinions. 
 
 On examination of their works I found, he continues, that with 
 sUght differences they are all alike. They do not put any trust in 
 reality and nature. For, they say, the so-called laws of nature are 
 nothing more than the order of events to which we are accustomed. 
 There is no kind of necessity in them, and it is conceivable they might 
 be different. In many cases the MutakaUimun follow the imagination 
 and call it reason. Their method of procedure is as follows. They first 
 state their preliminary principles, then they prove that the world is 
 ''new," i. e., created in time. Then they argue that the world must 
 have had an originator, and that he is one and incorporeal. All the 
 MutakaUimun foUow this method, and they are imitated by those of 
 our own people who follow in their footsteps. 
 
 To this method I have serious objections, continues Maimonides, 
 for their arguments in favor of the creation of the world are not con- 
 vincing unless one does not know a real demonstration from a dialec- 
 tical or sophistic. The most one can do in this line is to invaUdate 
 
248 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the arguments for eternity. But the decision of the question is by no 
 means easy, as is shown by the fact that the controversy is three 
 thousand years old and not yet settled. Hence it is a risky policy to 
 build the argument for the existence of God on so shaky a foundation 
 as the "newness" of the world. The best way then, it seems to me, is 
 to prove God's existence, unity and incorporeality by the methods of 
 the philosophers, which are based upon the eternity of the world. 
 Not that I believe in eternity or that I accept it, but because on this 
 hypothesis the three fundamental doctrines are vahdly demonstrated. 
 Having proved these doctrines we will then return to the problem of 
 the origin of the world and say what can be said in favor of creation. ^^^ 
 This is a new contribution of Maimonides. All the Jewish writers 
 before Halevi followed in their proofs of the existence of God the 
 method designated by Maimonides as that of the Kalam, Judah 
 Halevi criticised the Mutakallimun as well as the philosophers in the 
 interest of a point of view all his own (p. 176 fif., 182). Ibn Daud tacitly 
 ignored the Kalam and based his proof of the existence of God upon 
 the principles of motion as exhibited in the Aristotelian Physics, with- 
 out, however, finding it necessary to assume even provisionally the eter- 
 nity of motion and the world (p. 217 ff.). His proof of the incorporeal- 
 ity of God is, as we have seen {ibid.), weak, just because he does not 
 admit the eternity of motion, which alone implies infinity of power in 
 God and hence incorporeality. Maimonides is the first who takes 
 deliberate account of the MutakalUmun, gives an adequate outline 
 of the essentials of their teaching and administers a crushing blow to 
 their principles as well as their method. He then follows up his destruc- 
 tive criticism with a constructive method, in which he frankly admits 
 that in order to establish the existence, unity and incorporeality of 
 God — the three fundamental dogmas of Judaism — beyond the possibil- 
 ity of cavil, we must make common cause with the philosophers even 
 though it be only for a moment, until they have done our work for us, 
 and then we may fairly turn on our benefactors and taking advantage 
 of their weakness, strike them down, and upon their lifeless arguments 
 for the eternity of the world establish our own more plausible theory 
 of creation. The attitude of Maimonides is in brief this. If we were 
 certain of creation, we should not have to bother with the philosophers. 
 Creation implies the existence of God. But the question cannot be 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 249 
 
 strictly demonstrated either way. Hence let us prove the existence of 
 God on the least promising hypothesis, namely, that of eternity, and 
 we are quite secure against all possible criticism. 
 
 Of the twelve propositions of the Mutakallimun enumerated by 
 Maimonides as the basis of their doctrine of God, we shall select a few 
 of the most important. ^^* 
 
 1. The Theory of Atoms. The entire universe is made up of in- 
 divisible bodies having no magnitude. Their combination produces 
 magnitude and corporeality. They are all alike. Genesis and dissolu- 
 tion means simply the combination or rather aggregation of atoms and 
 their separation. These atoms are not eternal, as Epicurus believed 
 them to be, but created. 
 
 2. This atomic theory they extend from magnitude to time. Time 
 also according to them is composed of moments or atomic units of 
 time. Neither magnitude, nor matter, nor time is continuous or in- 
 finitely divisible. 
 
 3. Applying these ideas to motion they say that motion is the 
 passage of an atom of matter from one atom of place to the next in 
 an atom of time. It follows from this that one motion is as fast as 
 another; and they explain the apparent variation in speed of different 
 motions, as for example when two bodies cover unequal distances 
 in the same time, by saying that the body covering the smaller dis- 
 tance had more rests in the intervals between the motions. The 
 same thing is true in the flight of an arrow, that there are rests even 
 though the senses do not reveal them. For the senses cannot be 
 trusted. We must follow the reason. 
 
 Maimonides's criticism of the atomic theory of matter and motion 
 just described is that it undermines the bases of geometry. The 
 diagonal of a square would be the same length as its side. The proper- 
 ties of commensurability and incommensurability in lines and sur- 
 faces, of rational and irrational lines would cease to have any meaning. 
 In fact all that is contained in the tenth book of Euclid would lose its 
 foundation. 
 
 4. The atom is made complete by the accidents, without which it 
 cannot be. Every atom created by God, they say, must have acci- 
 dents, such as color, odor, motion, and so on, except quantity or 
 magnitude, which according to them is not accident. If a substance 
 
250 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 has an accident, the latter is not attributed to the body as a whole, 
 but is ascribed to every atom of which the body is composed. Thus 
 in a white body every atom is white, in a moving body every atom 
 is in motion, in a living body every atom is aUve, and every atom is 
 possessed of sense perception; for life and sense and reason and wisdom 
 are accidents in their opinion like whiteness and blackness. 
 
 6. Accident does not last more than one moment of time. When 
 God creates an atom he creates at the same time an accident with it. 
 Atom without accident is impossible. The accident disappears at 
 the end of the moment unless God creates another of the same kind, 
 and then another, and so on, as long as he wants the accident of that 
 kind to continue. If he ceases to create another accident, the sub- 
 stance too disappears. 
 
 Their motive in laying down this theory of accidents is in order 
 to destroy the conception that everything has a peculiar nature, of 
 which its quahties and functions are the results. They attribute 
 everything directly to God. God created a particular accident at 
 this moment, and this is the explanation of its being. If God ceases 
 to create it anew the next moment, it will cease to be. 
 
 7. All that is not atom is accident, and there is no difference be- 
 tween one kind of accident and another in reference to essentiality. 
 All bodies are composed of similar atoms, which differ only in acci- 
 dents; and animality and humanity and sensation and reason are all 
 accidents. Hence the difference between the individuals of the same 
 species is the same as that between individuals of different species. 
 The philosophers distinguish between essential forms of things and 
 accidental properties. In this way they would explain, for ex- 
 ample, why iron is hard and black, while butter is soft and white. 
 The Mutakallimun deny any such distinction. All forms are acci- 
 dents. Hence it would follow that there is no intrinsic reason why man 
 rather than the bat should be a rational creature. Everything that 
 is conceivable is possible, except what involves a logical contradiction; 
 and God alone determines at every instant what accident shall com- 
 bine with a given atom or group of atoms. 
 
 8. It follows from the above also that man has no power of agency 
 at all. When we think we are dyeing a garment red, it is not we who 
 are doing it at all. God creates the red color in the garment at the 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 2$! 
 
 time when we apply the red dye to it. The red dye does not enter 
 the garment, as we think, for an accident is only momentary, and 
 cannot pass beyond the substance in which it is. 
 
 What appears to us as the constancy and regularity of nature is 
 nothing more than the will of God. Nor is our knowledge of to-day 
 the same as that of yesterday. Yesterday's is gone and to-day's is 
 created anew. So when a man moves a pen, it is not he who moves 
 it. God creates motion in the hand, and at the same time in the pen. 
 The hand is not the cause of the motion of the pen. In short they 
 deny causation. God is the sole cause. 
 
 In respect to human conduct they are divided. The majority, 
 and the Ashariya among them, say that when a person moves a 
 pen, God creates four accidents, no one of which is the cause of the 
 other. They merely exist in succession, but no more. The first acci- 
 dent is the man's will to move the pen; the second, his ability to move 
 it; the third, the motion of the hand; the fourth, the motion of the pen. 
 It follows from this that when a person does anything, God creates 
 in him a will, the abihty and the act itself, but the act is not the effect 
 of the ability. The Mu' tazila hold that the abUity is the cause of the 
 effect. 
 
 9. Impossibility of the Infinite. They hold that the infinite is im- 
 possible in any sense, whether actual or potential or accidental. That 
 an actual infinite is impossible is a matter of proof. So it can be and 
 has been proved that the potential infinite is possible. For example 
 extension is infinitely divisible, i. e., potentially. As to the accidental 
 infinite, i. c, an infinity of parts of which each ceases to be as soon as 
 the next appears, this is doubtful. Those who boast of having proved 
 the eternity of the world say that time is infinite, and defend their 
 view against criticism by the claim that the successive parts of time 
 disappear. In the same way these people regard it as possible that 
 an infinite number of accidents have succeeded each other on the 
 universal matter, because here too they are not all present now, the 
 previous having disappeared before the succeeding ones came. The 
 Mutakallunun do not admit of any kind of infinite. They prove it 
 in this way. If past time and the world are infinite, then the number 
 of men who died up to a given point in the past is infinite. The num- 
 ber of men who died up to a point one thousand years before the 
 
252 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 former is also infinite. But this number is less than the other by the 
 number of men who died during the thousand years between the two 
 starting points. Hence the infinite is larger than the infinite, which 
 is absurd. If the accidental infinite were really impossible the theory 
 of the eternity of the world would be refuted at once. But Alfarabi 
 has shown that the arguments against accidental infinity are invalid. 
 
 ID. Distrust of the Senses. The senses, they say, cannot be regarded 
 as criteria of truth and falsehood; for many things the senses cannot 
 see at all, either because the objects are so fine, or because they are 
 far away. In other cases the senses are deceptive, as when the large 
 appears small at a distance, the small appears great in the water, and 
 the straight appears broken when partly in water and partly without. 
 So a man with the jaundice sees everything yellow, and one with red 
 bile on his tongue tastes everything bitter. There is method in their 
 madness. The motive for this sceptical principle is to evade criticism. 
 If the senses testify in opposition to their theories, they reply that 
 the senses cannot be trusted, as they did in their exp! .nation of motion 
 and in their theory of the succession of created accidents. These are 
 all ancient theories of the Sophists, as is clear from Galen. ^^^ 
 
 Having given an outline of the fundamental principles of the Muta- 
 kallimun and criticised them, Maimonides next gives their arguments 
 based upon these principles in favor of creation in time and against 
 eternity. It will not be worth our while to reproduce them here as 
 they are not adopted by Maimonides, and we have already met some 
 of them though in a somewhat modified form before {cf. above, 
 pp. 29 £f.).2«6 
 
 The Kalamistic proofs for the unity of God are similarly identical 
 for the most part with those found in Saadia, Bahya and others, and 
 we need only mention Maimonides's criticism that they are inadequate 
 unless we assume with the Mutakallimun that all atoms in the uni- 
 verse are of the same kind. If, however, we adopt Aristotle's theory, 
 which is more plausible, that the matter of the heavenly bodies is 
 different from that of the sublunar world, we may defend dualism by 
 supposing that one God controls the heavens and the other the earth. 
 The inability of the one to govern the domain of the other would not 
 necessarily argue imperfection, any more than we who believe in the 
 unity of God regard it as a defect in God that he cannot make a thing 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 253 
 
 both be and not be. This belongs to the category of the impossible; 
 and we should likewise class in the same category the control of a 
 sphere that is independent of one and belongs to another. This is 
 purely an argumentum ad hominem, for Maimonides does not regard 
 the sublunar and superlunar worlds as independent of each other. 
 He recognizes the unity of the universe. ^^^ 
 
 Maimonides closes his discussion of the Kalamistic system by citing 
 their arguments for incorporeality, which he likewise finds inadequate, 
 both because they are based upon God's unity, which they did not 
 succeed in proving (Saadia, in so far as he relates the two, bases 
 unity upon incorporeality), and because of inherent weakness. ^^ 
 
 Having disposed of the arguments of the Mutakallimun, Mai- 
 monides proceeds to prove the existence, unity and incorporeality 
 of God by the methods of the philosophers, i. e., those who, like Al- 
 farabi and Avicenna, take their arguments from Aristotle. The chief 
 proof ^^^ is based upon the Aristotelian principles of motion and is 
 found in the eighth book of Aristotle's Physics. We have already met 
 this proof in Ibn Daud (cf. above, p. 217), and the method in Mai- 
 monides differs only in form and completeness, but not in essence. 
 There is, however, this very important difference that Ibn Daud 
 fights shy of Aristotle's theory of the eternity of motion and time, 
 thus losing his strongest argument for God's infinite power and in- 
 corporeaHty (cf. p. 218); whereas Maimonides frankly bases his entire 
 argument from motion (provisionally to be sure) upon the Aristotelian 
 theory, including eternity of motion. With this important deviation 
 there is not much in this part of the Maimonidean discussion which 
 is not already contained, though less completely, in the "Emunah 
 Ramah" of Abraham Ibn Daud. We should be tempted to omit 
 these technical arguments entirely if it were not for the fact that it is 
 in the form which Maimonides gave them that they became classic 
 in Jewish philosophy, and not in that of Ibn Daud. 
 
 The second proof of God's existence, unity and incorporeality, 
 that based upon the distinction between "possible" and "necessary" 
 existent, ^'^'^ which has its origin in Alfarabi and Avicenna, is also 
 found in Ibn Daud.^'^^ The other two proofs ^^^ are Maimonides's 
 own, i. e., they are not found in the works of his Jewish predecessors. 
 
 As in the exposition of the theory of the Mutakallimun Maimonides 
 
254 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 began with their fundamental principles, so here he lays down twenty- 
 six propositions culled from the Physics and Metaphysics of Aristotle 
 and his Arabian commentators, and applies them later to prove his 
 points. He does not attempt to demonstrate them, expecting the 
 reader to take them for granted, or to be familiar with them from a 
 study of the philosophical sources. Ibn Daud presupposed less from 
 his readers, having written as he said, for beginners; hence he proves 
 many of the propositions which Maimonides lays down dogmatically. 
 Possibly Maimonides expected his readers to be familiar with the 
 work of his immediate Jewish predecessor. 
 The twenty-six propositions of the philosophers are as follows: 
 
 1. There can be no infinite object possessing magnitude. 
 
 2. There cannot be an infinite number of bodies possessing magni- 
 tude, all at the same time. 
 
 3. There cannot be an infinite chain of cause and effect, even if 
 these links are not possessed of magnitude, for example, intellects. 
 
 4. Change is found in four categories. In substance — genesis and 
 decay. In quantity — growth and diminution. In quality — qualitative 
 change. In place — motion of translation. 
 
 5. All motion is change, and is the realization of the potential. 
 
 6. Motion may be per se, per accidens, forcible, partial, the latter 
 coming under per accidens. An example of motion per se is the motion 
 of a body from one place to the next; of motion per accidens, when the 
 blackness of an object is said to move from one place to another. 
 Forcible motion is that of the stone when it is forced upward. Partial 
 motion is that of a nail of a ship when the ship moves. 
 
 7. Every changeable thing is divisible; hence every movable thing 
 is divisible, i. e., every body is divisible. What is not divisible is not 
 movable, and hence cannot be body. 
 
 8. That which is moved per accidens is necessarily at rest because 
 its motion is not in itself. Hence it cannot have that accidental mo- 
 tion forever. 
 
 9. A body moving another must itself be in motion at the same 
 time. 
 
 10. Being in a body means one of two things: being in it as an 
 accident, or as constituting the essence of the body, like a natural 
 form. Both are corporeal powers. 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 255 
 
 11. Some things which are in a body are divided with the division of 
 the body. They are then divided per accidens, like colors and other 
 powers extending throughout the body. Some of the things which con- 
 stitute the body are not divisible at all, like soul and intellect. 
 
 12. Every power which extends throughout a body is finite, because 
 all body is finite. 
 
 13. None of the kinds of change mentioned in 4 is continuous ex- 
 cept motion of translation; and of this only circular motion. 
 
 14. Motion of translation is the first by nature of the motions. For 
 genesis and decay presuppose quahtative change; and qualitative 
 change presupposes the approach of the agent causing the change to 
 the thing undergoing the change. And there is no growth or diminu- 
 tion without antecedent genesis and decay. 
 
 15. Time is an accident following motion and connected with it. 
 The one cannot exist without the other. No motion except in time, 
 and time cannot be conceived except with motion. AVhatever has no 
 motion does not come under time. 
 
 16. Whatever is incorporeal cannot be subject to number, unless it 
 is a corporeal power; in which case the individual powers are num- 
 bered with their matters or bearers. Hence the separate forms or 
 Intelligences, which are neither bodies nor corporeal powers, cannot 
 have the conception of number connected with them, except when they 
 are related to one another as cause and efi'ect. 
 
 17. Everything that moves, necessarily has a mover, either outside, 
 like the hand moving the stone, or inside like the animal body, which 
 consists of a mover, the soul, and a moved, the body proper. Every 
 mobile of the last kind is called a self-moving thing. This means that 
 the motor element in the thing is part of the whole thing in motion. 
 
 18. If anything passes from potentiality to actuahty, the agent 
 that caused this must be outside the thing. For if it were inside and 
 there was no obstruction, the thing would never be potential, but al- 
 ways actual; and if there was an obstruction, which was removed, the 
 agency which removed the obstruction is the cause v/hich caused the 
 thing to pass from potentiality to actuahty. 
 
 19. Whatever has a cause for its existence is a "possible" existent 
 in so far as itself is concerned. If the cause is there, the thing exists; 
 if not, it does not. Possible here means not necessary. 
 
256 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 20. Whatever is a necessary existent in itself, has no cause for its 
 existence. 
 
 21. Every composite has the cause of its existence in the composi- 
 tion. Hence it is not in itself a necessary existent; for its existence is 
 dependent upon the existence of its constituent parts and upon their 
 composition. 
 
 22. All body is composed necessarily of two things, matter and 
 form; and it necessarily has accidents, viz., quantity, figure, situation. 
 
 23. Whatever is potential and has in it a possibility may at some 
 time not exist as an actuaUty. 
 
 24. Whatever is potential is necessarily possessed of matter, for 
 possibility is always in matter. 
 
 25. The principles of an individual compound substance are matter 
 and form; and there must be an agent, i. e., a mover which moves the 
 object or the underlying matter until it prepares it to receive the form. 
 This need not be the ultimate mover, but a proximate one having a 
 particular function. The idea of Aristotle is that matter cannot move 
 itself. This is the great principle which leads us to investigate into the 
 existence of the first mover. 
 
 Of these twenty-five propositions, Maimonides continues, some are 
 clear after a little reflection, some again require many premises and 
 proofs, but they are all proved in the Physics and Metaphysics of 
 Aristotle and his commentators. My purpose here is, as I said, not to 
 reproduce the writings of the philosophers. I will simply mention 
 those principles which we must have for our purpose. I must add, 
 however, one more proposition, which Aristotle thinks is true and 
 more deserving of belief than anything else. We will grant him this 
 by way of hypothesis until we explain what we intend to prove. The 
 proposition is: 
 
 26. Time and motion are eternal and actual. Hence there must be 
 a body moving eternally and existing actually. This is the matter 
 constituting the substance of the heavenly bodies. Hence the heavens 
 are not subject to genesis and decay, for their motion is eternal. This 
 presupposes the possibility of accidental infinity {cf. above, p. 251), 
 Aristotle regards this as true, though it does not seem to me that he 
 claims he has proved it. His followers and commentators maintain 
 that it is a necessary proposition and demonstrated. The Mutakalli- 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 257 
 
 mun, on the other hand, think it is impossible that there should be an 
 infinite number of states in succession {cf. ibid.). It seems to me it is 
 neither necessary nor impossible, but possible. This is, however, not 
 the place to discuss it.^''^ 
 
 Now follows the classical proof of the existence of God from motion. 
 It is in essence the same as that given by Ibn Daud, but much more 
 elaborate. We shall try to simplify it as much as possible. The num- 
 bers in parentheses in the sequel refer to the preliminary propositions 
 above given. 
 
 We start with something that is known, namely, the motion we see 
 in the sublunar world, the motion which is involved in all the processes 
 of genesis and decay and change generally. This motion must have 
 a mover (25). This mover must have another mover to move it, and 
 this would lead us to infinity, which is impossible (3). We find, how- 
 ever, that all motion here below ends with the motion of the heaven. 
 Let us take an example. The wind is blowing through an opening in 
 the waU. I take a stone and stop up the hole. Here the stone is 
 moved by the hand, the hand by the tendons, the tendons by the 
 nerves, the nerves by the veins, the veins by the natural heat, the 
 natural heat by the animal soul, the animal soul by a purpose, namely, 
 to stop the hole from which the wind comes, the purpose by the wind, 
 the wind by the motion of the heavenly sphere. But this is not the 
 end. The sphere must also have a mover (17). This mover is either 
 outside the sphere it moves or within it. If it is something outside, it 
 is either again a body like the sphere, or an incorporeal thing, a "Sep- 
 arate Intelligence." If the mover of the sphere is something within the 
 sphere, two alternatives are again possible. The internal moving 
 power of the sphere may be a corporeal force extended throughout the 
 body of the sphere and divisible with it hke heat, or an indivisible 
 power like soul or intellect (10, 11). We thus have four possibilities 
 in all. The mover of the heavenly sphere may be (a) a body external 
 to the sphere; (b) a separate incorporeal substance; (c) an internal 
 corporeal power divisible with the division of the sphere; (d) an internal 
 indivisible power. Of these four, (a) is impossible. For if the mover 
 of the sphere is another body, it is likewise in motion (9) and must 
 have another to move it, which, if a body, must have another, and so 
 on ad infinitum, which is impossible (2). The third hypothesis, (c), 
 
258 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 is likewise impossible. For as the sphere is a body it is finite (i), and 
 its power is also finite (12), since it is divisible with the body of the 
 sphere (11). Hence it cannot move infinitely (26). Nor can we adopt 
 the last alternative, (d). For a soul residing within the sphere could 
 not alone be the cause of continuous motion. For a soul that moves 
 its body is itself in motion per accidens (6); and whatever moves per 
 accidens must necessarily sometime stop (8), and with it the thing set 
 in motion by it will stop also. There is thus only one alternative left, 
 (b), viz., that the cause of the motion of the sphere is a "separate" 
 {i. e., incorporeal) power, which is itself not subject to motion either 
 per se or per accidens; hence it is indivisible and unchangeable (7, 5). 
 This is God. He cannot be two or more, for " separate " essences which 
 are not body are not subject to number unless one is cause and the 
 other effect (16). It follows, too, that he is not subject to time, for 
 there is no time without motion (15). 
 
 We have thus proved with one stroke God's existence as weU as his 
 unity and incorporeality. But, it will be observed, if not for the 
 twenty-sixth proposition concerning the eternity of motion, which im- 
 plies an infinite power, we should not have been forced to the alter- 
 native (b), and could have adopted (c) as well as (d). That is, we 
 might have concluded that God is the soul of the heavenly sphere 
 resident within it, or even that he is a corporeal force pervading the 
 extension of the sphere as heat pervades an ordinary body. But we 
 must admit that in this way we prove only the existence of a God who 
 is the cause of the heavenly motions, and through these of the processes 
 of genesis and decay, hence of all the life of our sublunar world. This 
 is not the God of Jewish tradition, who creates out of nothing, who is 
 the cause of the being of the universe as well as of its life processes. 
 Maimonides was aware of this defect in the Aristotelian view, and he 
 later repudiates the Stagirite's theory of eternal motion on philosoph- 
 ical as well as religious grounds. Before, however, we speak of Mai- 
 .monides's attitude in this matter, we must for completeness' sake 
 briefly mention three other proofs for the existence of God as given by 
 Maimonides. They are not strictly Aristotelian, though they are 
 based upon Peripatetic principles cited above and due to the Arabian 
 commentators of Aristotle. 
 
 The second proof is as follows. If we find a thing composed of two 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 259 
 
 elements, and one of these elements is also found separately, it follows 
 that the other element is found separately also. Now we frequently 
 find the two elements of causing motion and being moved combined in 
 the same object. And we also find things which are moved only, 
 but do not cause motion, as for example matter, or the stone in the 
 last proof. It stands to reason therefore that there is something that 
 causes motion without being itself subject to motion. Not being 
 subject to motion, it is indivisible, incorporeal and not subject to 
 time, as above. 
 
 The third proof is based upon the idea of necessary existence. There 
 is no doubt that there are existing things, for example the things we 
 perceive with our senses. Now either all things are incapable of decay, 
 or all are subject to genesis and decay, or some are and some are not. 
 The first is evidently untrue for we see things coming into, and pass- 
 ing out, of being. The second hypothesis is likewise untrue. For if 
 all things are subject to genesis and decay, there is a possibility that 
 at some time all things might cease to be and nothing should exist at 
 all. But as the coming and going of individuals in the various species 
 in the world has been going on from eternity, the possibiHty just 
 spoken of must have been realized— a possibility that is never reahzed 
 is not a possibility — and nothing existed at all at that moment. But 
 in that case how could they ever have come into being, since there was 
 nothing to bring them into being? And yet they do exist, as ourselves 
 for example and everything else. There is only one alternative left, 
 therefore, and that is that beside the great majority of things subject 
 to genesis and decay, there is a being not subject to change, a necessary 
 existent, and ultimately one that exists by virtue of its own necessity 
 
 (19). 
 
 Whatever is necessary per se can have no cause for its existence 
 (20) and can have no multipHcity in itself (21); hence it is neither a 
 body nor a corporeal power (12). 
 
 We can also prove easily that there cannot be two necessary exist- 
 ents per se. For in that case the element of necessary existence would 
 be something added to the essence of each, and neither would then 
 be necessary per se, but per that element of necessary existence which 
 is common to both. 
 
 The last argument against dualism may also be formulated as fol- 
 
26o MEDIjEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 lows. If there are two Gods, they must have something in common — 
 that in virtue of which they are Gods — and something in which they 
 differ, which makes them two and not one. If each of them has 
 in addition to divinity a differential element, they are both composite, 
 and neither is the first cause or the necessary existent (19). If one 
 of them only has this differentia, then this one is composite and is 
 not the first cause. 
 
 The fourth proof is very much like the first, but is based upon the 
 ideas of potentiality and actuality instead of motion. But when we 
 consider that Aristotle defines motion in terms of potentiality and actu- 
 ality, the fourth proof is identical with the first. It reads in Maimon- 
 ides as follows: We see constantly things existing potentially and com- 
 ing into actuality. Every such thing must have an agent outside (18). 
 It is clear, too, that this agent was first an agent potentially and then 
 became one actually. This potentiaHty was due either to an obstacle 
 in the agent himself or to the absence of a certain relation between the 
 agent and its effect. In order that the potential agent may become an 
 actual agent, there is need of another agent to remove the obstacle or 
 to bring about the needed relation between the agent and the thing to 
 be acted upon. This agent requires another agent, and so it goes ad in- 
 finitum. As this is impossible, we must stop somewhere with an agent 
 that is always actual and in one condition. This agent cannot be ma- 
 terial, but must be a " separate " (24). But the separate in which there 
 is no kind of potentiaHty and which exists per se, is God. As we have 
 already proved him incorporeal, he is one (16).^^* 
 
 We must now analyze the expressions incorporeal and one, and see 
 what in strictness they imply, and how our logical deductions agree 
 with Scripture. Many persons, misled by the metaphorical expressions 
 in the Bible, think of God as having a body with organs and senses 
 on the analogy of ours. Others are not so crude as to think of God 
 in anthropomorphic terms, nor are they polytheists, and yet for the 
 same reason, namely, misunderstanding of Scriptural expressions, 
 ascribe a plurahty of essential attributes to God. We must therefore 
 insist on the absolute incorporeality of God and explain the purpose 
 of Scripture in expressing itself in anthropomorphic terms, and on 
 the other hand emphasize the absolute unity of God against the be- 
 lievers in essential attributes. 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 261 
 
 Belief in God as body or as liable to suffer affection is worse than 
 idolatry. For the idolater does not deny the existence of God; he 
 merely makes the mistake of supposing that the image of his own 
 construction resembles a being which mediates between him and God. 
 And yet because this leads to erroneous belief on the part of the people, 
 who are inclined to worship the image itself instead of God (for the 
 people cannot discriminate between the outward act and its idea), 
 the Bible punishes idolatry with death, and calls the idolater a man 
 who angers God. How much more serious is the error of him who 
 thinks God is body! He entertains an error regarding the nature of 
 God directly, and surely causes the anger of God to burn. Habit 
 and custom and the evidence of the literal understanding of the Bib- 
 lical text are no more an excuse for this erroneous belief than they are 
 for idolatry; for the idolater, too, has been brought up in his wrong 
 ideas and is confirmed in them by some false notions. If a man is not 
 himself able to reason out the truth, there is no excuse for his refusing 
 to listen to one who has reasoned it out. A person is not an unbeliever 
 for not being able to prove the incorporeaHty of God. He is an un- 
 believer if he thinks God is corporeal. ^'^^ 
 
 The expressions in the Bible which have led many to err so griev- 
 ously in their conceptions of God are due to a desire on the part of 
 their authors to show all people, the masses including women and 
 children, that God exists and is possessed of all perfection, that he is 
 existent, living, wise, powerful, and active. Hence it was necessary 
 to speak of him as body, for this is the only thing that suggests real 
 existence to the masses. It was necessary to endow him with motion, 
 as this alone denotes life; to ascribe to him seeing, hearing, and so on, 
 in order to indicate that he understands; to represent him as speaking, 
 in order to show that he communicates with prophets, because to the 
 minds of common people this is the only way in which ideas are com- 
 municated from one person to another. As we are active by our sense 
 of touch, God, too, is described as doing. He is given a soul, to denote 
 that he is alive. Then as all these activities are among us done by 
 means of organs, these also are ascribed to God, as feet, hands, ear, 
 eye, nose, mouth, tongue, voice, fingers, palm, arm. In other words, 
 to show that God has all perfections, certain senses are ascribed to 
 him; and to indicate these senses the respective organs are related 
 
262 MEDIjEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 to them, organs of motion to denote life, of sensation to denote under- 
 standing, of touch to denote activity, of speech to denote revelation. 
 As a matter of fact, however, since all these organs and perceptions 
 and powers in man and animals are due to imperfection and are for 
 the purpose of satisfying various wants for the preservation of the 
 individual or the species, and God has no wants of any kind, he has 
 no such powers or organs. ^^^ 
 
 Having disposed of crude anthropomorphism we must now take 
 up the problem of attributes, which endangers the unity. It is a 
 self-evident truth that an attribute is something different from the 
 essence of a thing. It is an accident added to the essence. Otherwise 
 it is the thing over again, or it is the definition of the thing and the 
 explanation of the name, and signifies that the thing is composed of 
 these elements. If we say God has many attributes, it will follow 
 that there are many eternals. The only belief in true unity is to think 
 that God is one simple substance without composition or multiplicity 
 of elements, but one in all respects and aspects. Some go so far as to 
 say that the divine attributes are neither God's essence nor anything 
 outside of his essence. This is absurd. It is saying words which have 
 nothing corresponding to them in fact. A thing is either the same 
 as another, or it is not the same. There is no other alternative. The 
 imagination is responsible for this error. Because bodies as we know 
 them always have attributes, they thought that God, too, is made 
 up of many essential elements or attributes. 
 
 Attributes may be of five kinds: 
 
 1. The attributes of a thing may be its definition, which denotes its 
 essence as determined by its causes. This everyone will admit cannot 
 be in God, for God has no cause, hence cannot be defined. 
 
 2. An attribute may consist of a part of a definition, as when we 
 say, "man is rational," where the attribute rational is part of the 
 definition of man, " rational animal " being the whole definition. This 
 can apply to God no more than the first; for if there is a part in God's 
 essence, he is composite. 
 
 3. An attribute may be an expression which characterizes not the 
 essence of the thing but its quality. Quality is one of the nine cate- 
 gories of accident, and God has no accidents. 
 
 4. An attribute may indicate relation, such as father, master, son. 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 263 
 
 slave. At first sight it might seem as if this kind of attribute may be 
 applicable to God; but after reflection we find that it is not. There 
 can be no relation of time between God and anything else; because 
 time is the measure of motion, and motion is an accident of body. 
 God is not corporeal. In the same way it is clear that there cannot 
 be a relation of place between God and other things. But neither 
 can there be any other kind of relation between God and his creation. 
 For God is a necessary existent, while everything else is a possible 
 existent. A relation exists only between things of the same proximate 
 species, as between white and black. If the things have only a com- 
 mon genus, and still more so if they belong to two different genera, 
 there is no relation between them. If there were a relation between 
 God and other things, he would have the accident of relation, though 
 relation is the least serious of attributes, since it does not necessitate 
 a multiplicity of eternals, nor change in God's essence owing to change 
 in the related things. 
 
 5. An attribute may characterize a thing by reference to its effects 
 or works, not in the sense that the thing or author of the effect has 
 acquired a character by reason of the product, like carpenter, painter, 
 blacksmith, but merely in the sense that he is the one who made a 
 particular thing. An attribute of this kind is far removed from the 
 essence of the thing so characterized by it; and hence we may apply 
 it to God, provided we remember that the varied effects need not 
 be produced by different elements in the agent, but are all done by 
 the one essence. 
 
 Those who believe in attributes divide them into two classes, and 
 number the following four as essential attributes, not derived from 
 God's effects like "creator," which denotes God's relation to his 
 work, since God did not create himself. The four essential attributes 
 about which all agree are, living, powerful, wise, possessed of will. 
 Now if by wise is meant God's knowledge of himself, there might be 
 some reason for calling it an essential attribute; though in that case 
 it implies "living," and there is no need of two. But they refer the 
 attribute wise to God's knowledge of the world, and then there is no 
 reason for calling it an essential attribute any more than the word 
 "creator," for example. In the same way "powerful" and "having 
 will" cannot refer to himself, but to his actions. We therefore hold 
 
264 MEDIzEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 that just as we do not say that there is something additional in his 
 essence by which he created the heavens, something else with which 
 he created the elements, and a third with which he created the Intel- 
 ligences, so we do not say that he has one attribute with which he 
 exercises power, another with which he wills, a third with which he 
 knows, and so on, but his essence is simple and one.^'''^ 
 
 Four things must be removed from God: (i) corporeality, (2) 
 affection, (3) potentiality, (4) resemblance to his creatures. The 
 first we have already proved. The second implies change, and the 
 author of the change cannot be the same as he who suffers the change 
 and feels the affection. If then God were subject to affection, there 
 would be another who would cause the change in him. So all want 
 must be removed from him; for he who is in want of something is po-, 
 tential, and in order to pass into actuaUty requires an agent having 
 that quality in actii. The fourth is also evident; for resemblance in- 
 volves relation. As there is no relation between God and ourselves, 
 there is no resemblance. Resemblance can exist only between things 
 of the same species. All the expressions including "existent" are 
 applied to God and to ourselves in a homonymous sense (c/. above, 
 p. 240). The use is not even analogical; for in analogy there must be 
 some resemblance between the things having the same name, but not 
 so here. Existence in things which are determined by causes (and 
 this includes all that is not God), is not identical with the essence of 
 those things. The essence is that which is expressed in the definition, 
 whereas the existence or non-existence of the thing so defined is not 
 part of the definition. It is an accident added to the essence. In 
 God the case is different. His existence has no cause, since he is a 
 necessary existent; hence his existence is identical with his essence. 
 So we say God exists, but not with existence, as we do. Similarly 
 he is living, but not with life; knowing, but not with knowledge; pow- 
 erful, but not with power; wise, but not with wisdom. Unity and 
 plurality are also accidents of things which are one or many as the 
 case may be. They are accidents of the category of quantity. God, 
 who is a necessary existent and simple cannot be one any more than 
 many. He is one, but not with unity. Language is inadequate to 
 express our ideas of God. Wishing to say he is not many, we have 
 to say he is one; though one as well as many pertains to the accidents 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 265 
 
 of quantity. To correct the inexactness of the expression, we add, 
 "but not with unity." So we say "eternal" to indicate that he is not 
 "new," though in reality eternal is an accident of time, which in turn 
 is an accident of motion, the latter being dependent upon body. In 
 reality neither "eternal" nor "new" is apphcable to God. When we 
 say one, we mean merely that there is none other like him; and when 
 Scripture speaks of him as the first and the last, the meaning is that 
 he does not change. 
 
 The only true attributes of God are the negative ones. Negative 
 attributes, too, by excluding the part of the field in which the thing 
 to be designated is not contained, bring us nearer to the thing itself; 
 though unlike positive attributes they do not designate any part of the 
 thing itself. God cannot have positive attributes because he has no 
 essence different from his existence for the attributes to designate, and 
 surely no accidents. Negative attributes are of value in leading us to a 
 knowledge of God, because in negation no plurality is involved. So 
 when we have proved that there is a being beside these sensible and 
 intelligible things, and we say he is existent, we mean that his non- 
 existence is unthinkable. In the same way living means not dead; 
 incorporeal is negative; eternal signifies not caused; powerful means 
 not weak; wise — not ignorant; wilHng denotes that creation proceeds 
 from him not by natural necessity like heat from fire or light from the 
 sun, but with purpose and design and method. All attributes there- 
 fore are either derived from God's effects or, if they have reference 
 to himself, are meant to exclude their opposites, i. e., are really neg- 
 atives. This does not mean, however, that God is devoid of a quality 
 which he might have, but in the sense in which we say a stone does 
 not see, meaning that it does not pertain to the nature of the stone 
 to see.^''^ 
 
 All the names of God except the tetragrammaton designate his 
 activities in the world. Jhvh alone is the real name of God, which be- 
 longs to him alone and is not derived from anything else. Its meaning 
 is unknown. It denotes perhaps the idea of necessary existence. All 
 the other so-called divine names used by the writers of talismans and 
 charms are quite meaningless and absurd. The wonderful claims 
 these people bespeak for them are not to be believed by any intelligent 
 man.^*^^ 
 
266 MEDIMVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 The above account of Maimonides's doctrine of attributes shows us 
 that he followed the same line of thought as his predecessors. His 
 treatment is more thorough and elaborate, and his requirements of the 
 religionist more stringent. He does not even allow attributes of rela- 
 tion, which were admitted by Ibn Daud. Negative attributes and 
 those taken from God's effects are the only expressions that may be 
 applied to God. This is decidedly not a Jewish mode of conceiving 
 of God, but it is not even Aristotelian. Aristotle has very little to say 
 about God's attributes, it is true, but there seems no warrant in the 
 Httle he does say for such an absolutely transcendental and agnostic 
 conception as we find in Maimonides. To Aristotle God is pure form, 
 thought thinking itself. In so far as he is thought we may suppose him 
 to be similar in kind, though not in degree, to human thought. The 
 only source of Maimonides's ideas is to be sought in Neo-Platonism, in 
 the so-called Theology of Aristotle which, however, Maimonides never 
 quotes. He need not have used it himself. He was a descendant of a 
 long line of thinkers, Christian, Mohammedan and Jewish, in which 
 this problem was looked at from a Neo-Platonic point of view; and 
 the Theology of Aristotle had its share in forming the views of his 
 predecessors. The idea of making God transcendent appealed to 
 Maimonides, and he carried it to the limit. How he could combine 
 such transcendence with Jewish prayer and ceremony it is hard to 
 tell; but it would be a mistake to suppose that his philosophical deduc- 
 tions represented his last word on the subject. As in Philo so in Mai- 
 monides, his negative theology was only a means to a positive. Its 
 purpose was to emphasize God's perfection. And in the admission, 
 nay maintenance, of man's inability to understand God Hes the solu- 
 tion of the problem we raised above. Prayer is answered, man is pro- 
 tected by divine Providence; and if we cannot understand how, it is 
 because the matter is beyond our limited intellect. 
 
 Having discussed the existence and nature of God, our next prob- 
 lem is the existence of angels and their relation to the "Separate 
 Intelhgences " of the philosophers. In this matter, too, Ibn Daud 
 anticipated Maimonides, though the latter is more elaborate in his 
 exposition as well as criticism of the extreme philosophic view. He 
 adopts as much of Aristotelian (or what he thought was Aristotelian) 
 doctrine as is compatible in his mind with the Bible and subject to 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 267 
 
 rigorous demonstration, and rejects the rest on philosophic as well as 
 religious grounds. 
 
 The existence of separate intelligences he proves in the same way as 
 Ibn Daud from the motions of the celestial spheres. These motions 
 cannot be purely "natural," i. e., unconscious and involuntary like the 
 rectilinear motions of the elements, fire, air, water and earth, because 
 in that case they would stop as soon as they came to their natural 
 place, as is true of the elements (cf. above, p. xxxiii) ; whereas the spheres 
 actually move in a circle and never stop. We must therefore assume 
 that they are endowed with a soul, and their motions are conscious 
 and voluntary. But it is not sufficient to regard them as irrational 
 creatures, for on this hypothesis also their motions would have to 
 cease as soon as they attained the object of their desire, or escaped 
 the thing they wish to avoid. Neither object can be accomplished by 
 circular motion, for one approaches in this way the thing from which 
 one flees, and flees the object which one approaches. The only way 
 to account for continuous circular motion is by supposing that the 
 sphere is endowed with reason or intellect, and that its motion is due 
 to a desire on its part to attain a certain conception. God is the object 
 of the conception of the sphere, and it is the love of God, to whom the 
 sphere desires to become similar, that is the cause of the sphere's mo- 
 tion. So far as the sphere is a body, it can accomplish this only by 
 circular motion; for this is the only continuous act possible for a body, 
 and it is the simplest of bodily motions. 
 
 Seeing, however, that there are many spheres having difi"erent kinds 
 of motions, varying in speed and direction, Aristotle thought that this 
 difference must be due to the difference in the objects of their con- 
 ceptions. Hence he posited as many separate Intelligences as there 
 are spheres. That is, he thought that intermediate between God and 
 the rational spheres there are pure incorporeal intelligences, each one 
 moving its own sphere as a loved object moves the thing that loves it. 
 As the number of spheres were in his day thought to be fifty, he as- 
 sumed there were fifty separate Intelligences. The mathematical 
 sciences in Aristotle's day were imperfect, and the astronomers thought 
 that for every motion visible in the sky there must be a sphere, not 
 knowing that the inclination of one sphere may be the cause of a 
 number of apparent motions. Later writers making use of the more 
 
268 MEDimVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 advanced state of astronomical science, reduced the number of In- 
 telligences to ten, corresponding to the ten spheres as follows: the 
 seven planetary spheres, the sphere of the fixed stars, the diurnal 
 sphere embracing them all and giving all of them the motion from east 
 to west, and the sphere of the elements surrounding the earth. Each 
 one of these is in charge of an Intelligence. The last separate Intel- 
 ligence is the Active Intellect, which is the cause of our mind's passing 
 from potentiaHty to actuahty, and of the various processes of sub- 
 lunar life generally. 
 
 These are the views of Aristotle and his followers concerning the sep- 
 arate Intelligences. And in a general way his views, says Maimonides, 
 are not incompatible with the Bible. What he calls Intelligences the 
 Scriptures call angels. Both are pure forms and incorporeal. Their ra- 
 tionahty is indicated in the nineteenth Psalm, "The heavens declare 
 the glory of God." That God rules the world through them is evident 
 from a number of passages in Bible and Talmud. The plural number in 
 "Let us make man in our image" (Gen. i, 26), "Come, let us go down 
 and confuse their speech" {ib. 11, 7) is explained by the Rabbis in the 
 statement that " God never does anything without first looking at the 
 celestial 'familia.'" (Bab. Talm. Sanhedrin 38b.) The word "look- 
 ing" (" Mistakkel ") is striking; "^^^ for it is the very expression Plato 
 uses when he says that God looks into the world of Ideas and produces 
 the uni verse. ^^^ 
 
 For once Maimonides in the last Rabbinic quotation actually hit 
 upon a passage which owes its content to Alexandrian and possibly 
 Philonian influence. Having no idea of the Alexandrian School and of 
 the works of Philo and his relation to some theosophic passages in the 
 Haggadah, he made no distinction between Midrash and Bible, and 
 read Plato and Aristotle in both alike, as we shall see more particularly 
 later. 
 
 Maimonides's detailed criticism of Aristotle we shaU see later. For 
 the present he agrees that the philosophic conception of separate 
 Intelligences is the same as the Biblical idea of angels with this excep- 
 tion that according to Aristotle these Intelligences and powers are all 
 eternal and proceed from God by natural necessity, whereas the 
 Jewish view is that they are created. God created the separate Intel- 
 ligences; he likewise created the spheres as rational beings and im- 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 269 
 
 planted in them a desire for the Intelhgences which accounts for their 
 various motions. 
 
 Now Maimonides has prepared the ground and is ready to take up 
 the question of the origin of the world, which was left open above. He 
 enumerates three views concerning this important matter. 
 
 1. The Biblical View. God created everything out of nothing. 
 Time itself is a creation, which did not exist when there was no world. 
 For time is a measure of motion, and motion cannot be without a 
 moving thing. Hence no motion and no time without a world. 
 
 2. The Platonic View. The world as we see it now is subject to 
 genesis and decay; hence it originated in time. But God did not make 
 it out of nothing. That a composite of matter and form should be 
 made out of nothing or should be reduced to nothing is to the Plato- 
 nists an impossibility like that of a thing being and not being at the 
 same time, or the diagonal of a square being equal to its side. There- 
 fore to say that God cannot do it argues no defect in him. They be- 
 lieve therefore that there is an eternal matter, the effect of God to be 
 sure, but co-eternal with him, which he uses as the potter does the clay. 
 
 3. The Aristotelian View. Time and motion are eternal. The 
 heavens and the spheres are not subject to genesis and decay, hence 
 they were always as they are now. And the processes of change in 
 the lower world existed from eternity as they exist now. Matter is 
 not subject to genesis and decay; it simply takes on forms one after 
 the other, and this has been going on from eternity. It results also 
 from his statements, though he does not say it in so many words, that 
 it is impossible there should be a change in God's will. He is the cause 
 of the universe, which he brought into being by his will, and as his 
 will does not change, the universe has existed this way from eternity. 
 
 The arguments of Aristotle and his followers by which they defend 
 their view of the eternity of the world are based partly upon the na- 
 ture of the world, and partly upon the nature of God. Some of these 
 arguments are as follows: 
 
 Motion is not subject to beginning and end. For everything that 
 comes into being after a state of non-existence requires motion to 
 precede it, namely, the actualization from non-being. Hence if motion 
 came into being, there was motion before motion, which is a contra- 
 diction. As motion and time go together, time also is eternal. 
 
270 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Again, the prime matter common to the four elements is not sub- 
 ject to genesis and decay. For all genesis is the combination of a pre- 
 existing matter with a new form, namely, the form of the generated 
 thing. If therefore the prime matter itself came into being, there must 
 be a previous matter from which it came, and the thing that resulted 
 must be endowed with form. But this is impossible, since the prime 
 matter has no matter before it and is not endowed with form. 
 
 Among the proofs derived from the nature of God are the following: 
 
 If God brought forth the world from non-existence, then before 
 he created it he was a creator potentially and then became a creator 
 actually. There is then potentiality in the creator, and there must 
 be a cause which changed him from a potential to an actual creator. 
 
 Again, an agent acts at a particular time and not at another be- 
 cause of reasons and circumstances preventing or inducing action. 
 In God there are no accidents or hindrances. Hence he acts always. 
 
 Again, how is it possible that God was idle an eternity and only 
 yesterday made the world? For thousands of years and thousands 
 of worlds before this one are after all as yesterday in comparison with 
 God's eternity. 
 
 These arguments Maimonides answers first by maintaining that 
 Aristotle himself, as can be inferred from his manner, does not regard 
 his discussions favoring the eternity of the world as scientific demon- 
 strations. Besides, there is a fundamental flaw in Aristotle's entire 
 attitude to the question of the ultimate principles and beginnings of 
 things. All his arguments in favor of eternity of motion and of the 
 world are based upon the erroneous assumption that the world as a 
 whole must have come into being in the same way as its parts appear 
 now after the world is here. According to this supposition it is easy 
 to prove that motion must be eternal, that matter is not subject to 
 genesis, and so on. Our contention is that at the beginning, when 
 God created the world, there were not these laws; that he created 
 matter out of nothing, and then made it the basis of all generation 
 and destruction. 
 
 We can also answer the arguments in favor of eternity taken from 
 the nature of God. The first is that God would be passing from po- 
 tentiality to actuality if he made the world at a particular time and 
 not before, and there would be need of a cause producing this passage. 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 271 
 
 Our answer is that this appHes only to material things but not to im- 
 material, which are always active whether they produce visible re- 
 sults or not. The term action is a homonym (c/. above, p. 240), and 
 the conditions applying to it in the ordinary usage do not hold when 
 we speak of God. 
 
 Nor is the second argimient conclusive. An agent whose will is 
 determined by a purpose external to himself is subject to influences 
 positive and negative, which now induce, now hinder his activity. A 
 person desires to have a house and does not build it by reason of ob- 
 stacles of various sorts. When these are removed, he builds the house. 
 In the case of an agent whose will has no object external to itseK this 
 does not hold. If he does not act always, it is because it is the nature 
 of will sometimes to will and sometimes not. Hence this does not 
 argue change. ^^^ 
 
 So far our results have been negative. We have not proved that 
 God did create the world in time; we have only taken the edge off 
 the Aristotelian arguments and thereby shown that the doctrine of 
 creation is not impossible. We must now proceed to show that there 
 are positive reasons which make creation a more plausible theory 
 than eternity. 
 
 The gist of Maimonides's arguments here is that the difference 
 between eternity and creation resolves itself into a more fundamental 
 difference between an impersonal mechanical law as the explanation 
 of the universe and an intelligent personality acting with will, purpose 
 and design. Aristotle endeavors to explain all motions in the world 
 above the moon as well as below in terms of mechanics. He succeeds 
 pretty well as far as the sublunar world is concerned, and no one who 
 is free from prejudice can fail to see the cogency of his reasoning. 
 If he were just as convincing in his explanation of celestial phenomena 
 on the mechanical principle as he is in his interpretation of sublunar 
 events, eternity of the world would be a necessary consequence. 
 Uniformity and absolute necessity of natural law are more compatible 
 with an eternal world than with a created one. But Aristotle's method 
 breaks down the moment he leaves the sublunar sphere. There are 
 too many phenomena unaccounted for in his system. 
 
 Aristotle tries to find a reason why the heavens move from east to 
 west and not in the opposite direction; and his explanation for the 
 
272 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 difference in speed of the motions of the various spheres is that it is 
 due to their relative proximity to the outer sphere, which is the cause 
 of this motion and which it communicates to all the other spheres 
 under it. But his reasons are inadequate, for some of the swift mov- 
 ing spheres are below the slow moving and some are above. When he 
 says that the reason the sphere of the fixed stars moves so slowly 
 from west to east is because it is so near to the diurnal sphere (the 
 outer sphere), which moves from east to west, his explanation is 
 wonderfully clever. ^^^ But when he infers from this that the farther 
 a sphere is from the fixed stars the more rapid is its motion from west 
 to east, his conclusion is not true to fact. Or let us consider the exist- 
 ence of the stars in the spheres. The matter of the stars must be differ- 
 ent from that of the spheres, for the latter move, whereas the stars are 
 always stationary. Now what has put these two different matters 
 together? Stranger still is the existence and distribution of the fixed 
 stars in the eighth sphere. Some parts are thickly studded with stars, 
 others are very thin. In the planentary spheres what is the reason 
 (since the sphere is simple and uniform throughout) that the star 
 occupies the particular place that it does? This can scarcely be a 
 matter of necessity. It will not do to say that the differences in 
 the motions of the spheres are due to the separate Intelligences for 
 which the respective spheres have a desire. For the Intelligences 
 are not bodies, and hence do not occupy any position relative to 
 the spheres. There must therefore be a being who determines their 
 various motions. 
 
 Further, it is argued on the philosophical side that from a simple 
 cause only a simple effect can follow; and that if the cause is composite, 
 as many effects will follow as there are simple elements in the cause. 
 Hence from God directly can come only one simple Intelligence. This 
 first Intelligence produces the second, the second produces the third, 
 and so on {cf. above, p. 178). Now according to this idea, no matter 
 how many Intelligences are produced in this successive manner, the 
 last, even if he be the thousandth, would have to be simple. Where 
 then does composition arise? Even if we grant that the farther the 
 Intelligences are removed from the first cause the more composite they 
 become by reason of the composite nature of their ideas or thoughts, 
 how can we explain the emanation of a sphere from an Intelligence, 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 273 
 
 seeing that the one is body, the other Intellect? Granting again this 
 also on the ground that the Intelligence producing the sphere is com- 
 posite (since it thinks itself and another), and hence one of its parts 
 produces the next lower Intelligence and the other the sphere, there 
 is still this difficulty that the part of the Intelligence producing the 
 sphere is simple, whereas the sphere has four elements — the matter 
 and the form of the sphere, and the matter and the form of the star 
 fixed in the sphere. 
 
 All these are difificulties arising from the Aristotelian theory of 
 mechanical causation, necessity of natural law and eternity of the 
 world. And they are all removed at a stroke when we substitute 
 intelligent cause working with purpose, will and design. To be sure, 
 by finding difl&culties attaching to a theory we do not disprove it, 
 much less do we prove our own. But we should follow the view of 
 Alexander, who says that where a theory is not proved one should 
 adopt the view which has the least number of objections. This, we 
 shall show, is the case in the doctrine of creation. We have already 
 pointed out a number of difficulties attaching to the Aristotelian view, 
 which are solved if we adopt creation. And there are others besides. 
 It is impossible to explain the heavenly motions as a necessary me- 
 chanical system. The hypotheses made by Ptolemy to account for 
 the apparent motions conflict with the principles of the Aristotelian 
 Physics. According to these principles there is no motion of trans- 
 lation, i. e., there is no change of place, in the heavenly spheres. Also 
 there are three kinds of motion in the world, toward the centre (water, 
 earth), away from the centre (air, fire) and around the centre (the 
 celestial spheres). Also motion in a circle must be around a fijxed 
 centre. x\ll these principles are violated in the theories of the epicycle 
 and eccentric, especially the first. For the epicycle is a sphere which 
 changes place in the circumference of the large sphere. 
 
 Finally, an important objection to the doctrine of eternity as taught 
 by Aristotle, involving as it does necessity and absolute changelessness 
 of natural phenomena, is that it subverts the foundations of rehgion, 
 and does away with miracles and signs. The Platonic view {cf. above, 
 p. 269) is not so bad and does not necessitate the denial of miracles; 
 but there is no need of forcing the BibHcal texts to that opinion so long 
 as it has not been proved. As long as we believe in creation all possible 
 
274 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 questions concerning the reasons for various phenomena such as proph- 
 ecy, the various laws, the selection of Israel, and so on, can be an- 
 swered by reference to the will of God, which we do not understand. 
 If, however, the world is a mechanical necessity, all these questions 
 arise and demand an answer. ^^^ 
 
 It will be seen that Maimonides's objections to eternity and mechan- 
 ical necessity (for these two are necessarily connected in his mind), are 
 twofold, philosophic and religious. The latter objection we may con- 
 ceive Maimonides to insist upon if he were living to-day. Mechanical 
 necessity as a universal explanation of phenomena would exclude free 
 will and the efficacy of prayer as ordinarily understood, though not 
 necessarily miracles, if we mean by miracle simply an extraordinary 
 phenomenon not explicable by the laws of nature as we know them, 
 and happening only on rare occasions. But in reality this is not what 
 we mean by miracle. A miracle is a discontinuity in the laws of nature 
 brought to pass on a special occasion by a personal being in response 
 to a prayer or in order to realize a given purpose. In this sense mir- 
 acles are incompatible with the doctrine of necessity, and Maimon- 
 ides's objections hold to-day, except for those to whom religion is in- 
 dependent of the Bible, tradition or any external authority. 
 
 As concerns the scientific objections, the case is different. We may 
 allow Maimonides's negative criticism of the Aristotelian arguments, 
 namely, that they are not convincing. His positive criticism that 
 Aristotle's interpretation of phenomena on the mechanical principle 
 does not explain all the facts is not valid. Aristotle may be wrong 
 in his actual explanations of particular phenomena and yet be correct 
 in his method. Modern science, in fact, has adopted the mechanical 
 method of interpreting phenomena, assuming that this is the only way 
 in which science can exist at all. And if there is any domain in which 
 mechanical causation is still denied, it is not the celestial regions about 
 which Maimonides was so much concerned — the motions of the heav- 
 enly bodies have been reduced to uniformity in accordance with nat- 
 ural law quite as definitely as, and in some cases more definitely than, 
 some terrestrial phenomena — but the regions of life, mind and will. 
 In these domains the discussion within the scientific and philosophic 
 folds is still going on. But in inanimate nature modern science 
 has succeeded in justifying its method by the ever increasing number 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 275 
 
 of phenomena that yield to its treatment. Maimonides fought an 
 obsolete philosophy and obsolete scientific principles. It is possible 
 that he might have found much to object to in modern science as well, 
 on the ground that much is yet unexplained. But an objection of this 
 sort is captious, particularly if we consider what Maimonides desires 
 to place in science's stead. Science is doing its best to classify all 
 natural phenomena and to discover the uniformities underlying their 
 behavior. It has succeeded admirably and is continually widening 
 its sphere of activity. It has been able to predict as a result of its 
 method. The principle of uniformity and mechanical necessity is 
 becoming more and more generally verified with every new scientific 
 discovery and invention. 
 
 And what does Maimonides offer us in its stead? The principle of 
 intelligent purpose and design. This, he says, is not open to the objec- 
 tions which apply to the AristoteKan principles and methods. It is as 
 if one said the coward is a better man than the brave warrior, because 
 the latter is open to the danger of being captured, wounded or killed, 
 whereas the former is not so liable. The answer obviously would be 
 that the only way the coward escapes the dangers mentioned is by 
 running away, by refusing to fight. Maimonides's substitution is 
 tantamount to a refusal to fight, it is equivalent to flight from the 
 field of battle. 
 
 Aristotle tries to explain the variation in speed of the different 
 celestial motions, and succeeds indifferently. Another man coming 
 after Aristotle and following the same method may succeed better. 
 This has actually been the case. Leverrier without ever looking into 
 a telescope discovered Neptune, and told the observers in what part 
 of the heavens they should look for the new planet. Substitute Mai- 
 monides's principle, and death to science! Why do the heavenly 
 bodies move as they do? Maimonides replies in effect, because so 
 God's wisdom has determined and his wisdom is transcendent. There 
 is no further impulse to investigation in such an answer. It is the 
 reply of the obscurantist, and it is very surprising that Maimonides 
 the rationalist should so far have forgotten his own ideal of reason and 
 enlightenment. He is here playing into the hands of those very Mu- 
 takallimun whom he so severely criticises. They were more consistent. 
 Distrustful of the irreligious consequences of the philosophical theories 
 
276 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 of Aristotle and his Arabian followers, they deliberately denied causa- 
 tion and natural law, and substituted the will of God as interfering 
 continuously in the phenomena of nature. A red object continues red 
 because and as long as God creates the "accident " red and attaches 
 it to the atoms of which the object is composed. Fire taking hold 
 of wood burns it and reduces it to ashes because God wills at the 
 particular moment that this shall be the result. The next moment 
 God may will otherwise and the fire and the wood will lie down in 
 peace together and no harm done. This makes miracles possible and 
 easy. Maimonides would not think of going so far; he has no names 
 harsh enough to describe this unscientific, unphilosophic, illogical, ir- 
 rational, purely imaginary procedure. But we find that he is himself 
 guilty of the same lack of scientific insight when he rejects a method 
 because it is not completely successful, and substitutes something 
 else which will always be successful because it will never tell us any- 
 thing at all and will stifle all investigation. Were Maimonides living 
 in our day, we may suppose he would be more favorably inclined to 
 the mechanical principle as a scientific method. 
 
 Having laid the philosophical foundations of religion in proving 
 the existence, unity and incorporeality of God, and purposeful crea- 
 tion in time, Maimonides proceeds to the more properly religious 
 doctrines of Judaism, and begins with the phenomenon of prophecy. 
 Here also he follows Aristotelian ideas as expressed in the writings 
 of the Arabs Alfarabi and Avicenna, and was anticipated among the 
 Jews by Ibn Daud. His distinction here as elsewhere is that he went 
 further than his model in the manner of his elaboration of the doctrine. 
 
 He cites three opinions concerning prophecy: 
 
 1. The Opinion of the Masses. God chooses any person he desires, 
 be he young or old, wise or ignorant, and inspires him with the pro- 
 phetic spirit. 
 
 2. The Opinion of the Philosophers. Prophecy is a human gift and 
 requires natural aptitude and hard preparation and study., But 
 given these qualifications, and prophecy is sure to come. 
 
 3. The Opinion of Judaism. This is very much like that of the 
 philosophers, the only difference being that a man may have all the 
 qualifications and yet be prevented from prophesying if God, by way 
 of punishment, does not desire that he should. 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 277 
 
 Prophecy is an inspiration from God, which passes through the 
 mediation of the Active Intellect to the rational power first and then 
 to the faculty of the imagination. It is the highest stage a man can 
 attain and is not open to everyone. It requires perfection in theo- 
 retical wisdom and in morals, and perfect development of the imagina- 
 tive power. This latter does its work when the senses are at rest, 
 giving rise to true dreams, and producing also prophetic visions. 
 Dream and prophecy differ in degree, not in kind. What a man thinks 
 hard in his waking state, that the imagination works over in sleep. 
 Now if a person has a perfect brain; develops his mind as far as a man 
 can; is pure morally; is eager to know the mysteries of existence, its 
 causes and the First Cause; is not susceptible to the purely animal 
 desires, or to those of the spirited soul ambitious for dominion and 
 honor — if a man has all these qualifications, he without doubt receives 
 through his imagination from the Active Intellect divine ideas. The 
 difference in the grade of prophets is due to the difference in these 
 three requirements — perfection of the reason, perfection of the imagi- 
 nation and perfection of moral character. 
 
 According to the character and development of their reasons and 
 imaginations men may be divided into three classes. 
 
 1. Those whose rational faculties are highly developed and receive 
 influences from the Active Intellect, but whose imagination is defec- 
 tive constitutionally, or is not under the influence of the Active In- 
 tellect. These are wise men and philosophers. 
 
 2. When the imagination also is perfect in constitution and well 
 developed under the influence of the Active Intellect, we have the 
 class of prophets. 
 
 3. When the imagination alone is in good condition, but the in- 
 tellect is defective, we have statesmen, lawgivers, magicians, dreamers 
 of true dreams and occult artists. These men are so confused some- 
 times by visions and reveries that they think they have the gift of 
 prophecy. 
 
 Each of the first two classes may be further divided into two accord- 
 ing as the influence from above is just sufficient for the perfection 
 of the individual himself, or is so abundant as to cause the recipient 
 to seek to impart it to others. We have then authors and teachers 
 in the first class, and preaching prophets in the second. 
 
278 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Among the powers we have in varying degrees are those of courage 
 and divination. These are innate and can be perfected if one has 
 them in any degree. By means of the power of divination we some- 
 times guess what a person said or did under certain conditions, and 
 guess truly. The result really follows from a number of premises, but 
 the mind passes over these so rapidly that it seems the guess was 
 made instantaneously. The prophet must have these two faculties 
 in a high degree. Witness Moses braving the wrath of a great king. 
 Some prophets also have their rational powers more highly developed 
 than those of an ordinary person who perfects his reason by theoretical 
 study. The same inspiration which renders the activity of the imagi- 
 nation so vivid that it seems to it its perceptions are real and due 
 to the external senses — this same inspiration acts also upon the ra- 
 tional power, and makes its ideas as certain as if they were derived 
 by intellectual effort. 
 
 The prophetic vision (Heb. Mar'ah) is a state of agitation coming 
 upon the prophet in his waking state, as is clear from the words of 
 Daniel, "And I saw this great vision, and there remained no strength 
 in me: for my comeliness was turned in me into corruption, and I 
 retained no strength" (Dan. 10, 8). In vision also the senses cease 
 their functions, and the process is the same as in sleep. 
 
 Whenever the Bible speaks of prophecy commg to anyone, it is 
 always through an angel and in a dream or vision, whether this is 
 specifically stated or not. The expression, "And God came to . . . 
 in a dream of the night," does not denote prophecy at all. It is merely 
 a dream that comes to a person warning him of danger. Laban and 
 Abimelech had such dreams, but no one would credit these heathens 
 with the prophetic power. 
 
 Whenever an angel is met in Scripture speaking or communicating 
 with a person, it is always in a dream or vision. Examples are, Abra- 
 ham and the three men, Jacob wresthng with the angel, Balaam and 
 the ass, Joshua and the angel at Jericho; — all these were in a dream 
 or vision. Sometimes there is no angel at all, but merely a voice that 
 is heard by such as are not deserving of prophecy, for example Hagar, 
 and Manoah and his wife. 
 
 The prophets see images in their visions. These images are some- 
 times interpreted in the vision itself; sometimes the interpretation 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 279 
 
 does not appear until the prophet wakes up. Sometimes the prophet 
 sees a likeness, sometimes he sees God speaking to him, or an angel; 
 or he hears an angel speaking to him, or sees a man speaking to him, 
 or sees nothing at all but only hears a voice. 
 
 In this way we distinguish eleven grades of prophecy. The first 
 two are only preparatory, not yet constituting one who has them a 
 prophet. 
 
 1. When one is endowed by God with a great desire to save a com- 
 munity or a famous individual, and he undertakes to bring it about, 
 we have the first grade known as the "Spirit of God." This was the 
 position of the Judges. Moses always had this desire from the moment 
 he could be called a man, hence he killed the Egyptian and chided the 
 two quarreling men, and delivered the daughters of Jethro from the 
 shepherds, and so on. The same is true of David. Not everyone, 
 however, who has this desire is a prophet until he succeeds in doing 
 a very great thing. 
 
 2. When a person feels something come upon him and begins to 
 speak — words of wisdom and praise or of warning, or relating to social 
 or religious conduct — all this while in a waking state and with full 
 consciousness, we have the second stage called the "Holy Spirit." 
 This is the inspiration which dictated the Psalms, the Proverbs, 
 Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Daniel, Job, Chronicles and the other 
 sacred writings (Hagiographa). Balaam's discourses also belong to 
 this class. David, Solomon and Daniel belong here, and are not in the 
 same class with Isaiah, Jeremiah, Nathan, Ahiah, and so on. God 
 spoke to Solomon through Ahiah the Shilonite; at other times he spoke 
 to him in a dream, and when Solomon woke up, he knew it was a dream 
 and not a prophecy. Daniel's visions were also in dreams. This is 
 why his book is classed in the third division of the BibHcal writings 
 (Hagiographa), and not in the second (Prophets). 
 
 3. This is the first grade of real prophecy, i. e., when a prophet 
 sees a picture in a dream under the proper conditions, and the picture 
 is explained to him in the dream itself. Most of the dreams of Zecha- 
 riah are of this nature. 
 
 4. When he hears speech in a prophetic dream, but does not see 
 the speaker, as happened to Samuel in the beginning of his career. 
 
 5. When a man speaks to him in a dream, as we find in some 
 
28o MEDimVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 of the prophecies of Ezekiel, "And the man said unto me, son of 
 man. . . ." 
 
 6. When an angel speaks to him in a dream. This is the condition 
 of most prophets, as is indicated in the expression, "And an angel 
 of God said to me in a dream." 
 
 7. When it seems to him in a prophetic dream as if God is speaking 
 to him; as we find in Isaiah, "I saw the Lord , . . and he said, 
 whom shall I send and who will go for us" (Isa. 6, i, 8). 
 
 8. When a vision appears to him and he sees pictures, like Abraham 
 at the covenant of the pieces (Gen. 15). 
 
 9. When he hears words in a vision, as in the case of Abraham, 
 "And, behold, the word of the Lord came unto him saying, This man 
 shall not be thine heir" (Gen. 15, 4). 
 
 10. When he sees a man speaking to him in a prophetic vision. 
 Examples, Abraham in the plain of Mamre, Joshua in Jericho. 
 
 1 1 . When he sees an angel speaking to him in a vision, like Abraham 
 in the sacrifice of Isaac. This is the highest degree of prophecy, 
 excepting Moses. The next higher stage would be that a prophet 
 should see God speaking to him in a vision. But this seems impossible, 
 as it is too much for the imaginative faculty. In fact it is possible 
 that in a vision speech is never heard at all, but only likenesses are 
 seen. In that case the eleven grades are reduced to eight. 
 
 All the details of actions and travels that are described in prophetic 
 visions must not be understood as having actually taken place, as for 
 example Hosea's marrying a harlot. They appear only in the 
 prophet's vision or dream. Many expressions in the prophets are 
 h)^erbolical or metaphorical, and must not be taken literally. 
 
 Moses was the greatest of the prophets. He alone received his 
 communications direct from God. All the others got their divine 
 messages through an angel. Moses performed his miracles before 
 the whole people as no one else did. The standing stiU of the sun pro- 
 duced by Joshua was not in the presence of all the people. Besides 
 it may be the meaning is that that day seemed to the people the 
 longest of any they experienced in those regions. Moses alone, by 
 reason of his superiority to all other prophets before or after, called 
 the people to the Law. No one before him did this, though there 
 were many prophets before Moses. Abraham taught a few people, 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 281 
 
 and so did others. But no one like Moses said to the people, "The 
 Lord sent me to you that you may do thus and so." After Moses all 
 the prophets urge upon the people obedience to the law of Moses. 
 This shows that the law of Moses will never change. For it is perfect, 
 and any change in any direction would be for the worse. ^^^ 
 
 From the theoretical part of philosophy we pass to the practical. 
 This includes ethics and other topics related thereto, theodicy, provi- 
 dence, free will and its compatibility with God's omniscience. To 
 give his ethical doctrine a scientific character, Maimonides bases it 
 upon a metaphysical and psychological foundation. The doctrine 
 of matter and form gives him a convenient formula underlying his 
 ethical discussion. Sin and vice are due to matter, virtue and goodness 
 to form. For sensuous desires, which are due to matter, are at the 
 basis of vice; whereas intellectual pursuits, which constitute the no- 
 blest activity of the soul, the form of the living body, lead to virtue. 
 We may therefore state man's ethical duty in broad philosophical 
 terms as follows: Despise matter, and have to do with it only so far 
 as is absolutely necessary. ^^^ This is too general to be enlightening, 
 and it is necessary to have recourse to psychology. Ethics has for its 
 subject-matter the improvement and perfection of character. Mak- 
 ing use of a medical analogy we may say that as it is the business of 
 the physician to cure the body, so it is the aim of the moral teacher 
 to cure the soul. We may carry this figure further and conclude that 
 as the physician must know the anatomy and physiology of the body 
 before he can undertake to cure it of its ills, so the moraUst must know 
 the nature of the soul and its powers or faculties. 
 
 In the details of his psychology Maimonides follows Alfarabi in- 
 stead of Avicenna who was the model of Judah Halevi and Ibn Daud 
 (pp. 175, 211). 
 
 The soul consists of five parts or faculties: the nutritive, the sensi- 
 tive, the imaginative, the appetitive and the rational. The further 
 description of the nutritive soul pertains to medicine and does not 
 concern us here. The sensitive soul contains the well known five 
 senses. The imaginative faculty is the power which retains the forms 
 of sensible objects when they are no longer present to the external 
 senses. It also has the function of original combination of sense 
 elements into composite objects having no real existence in the out- 
 
282 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 side world. This makes the imagination an unreliable guide in matters 
 intellectual. 
 
 The appetitive faculty is the power of the soul by which a person 
 desires a thing or rejects it. Acts resulting from it are the pursuit 
 of an object and its avoidance; also the feelings of anger, favor, fear, 
 courage, cruelty, pity, love, hate, and so on. The organs of these 
 powers, feelings and activities are the members of the body, like the 
 hand, which takes hold of an object; the foot, which goes toward a 
 thing or away from it; the eye, which looks; the heart, which takes 
 courage or is stricken with fear; and so with the rest. 
 
 The rational faculty is the power of the soul by which a person re- 
 flects, acquires knowledge, discriminates between a praiseworthy 
 act and a blameworthy. The functions of the rational soul are practi- 
 cal and theoretical. The practical activity of the reason has to do 
 with the arts directly, as in learning carpentry, agriculture, medicine, 
 seamanship; or it is concerned with reflecting upon the methods and 
 principles of a given art. The theoretical reason has for its subject- 
 matter the permanent and unchangeable, what is known as science 
 in the true sense of the term.^^*^ 
 
 Now as far as the commandments, mandatory and prohibitive, 
 of the Bible are concerned, the only parts of the soul which are involved 
 are the sensitive and the appetitive. For these are the only powers 
 subject to control. The nutritive and the imaginative powers func- 
 tion in sleep as well in waking, hence a person cannot be held responsi- 
 ble for their activities, which are involuntary. There is some doubt 
 about the rational faculty, but it seems that here too a person is re- 
 sponsible for the opinions he holds, though no practical acts are in- 
 volved. 
 
 Virtues are divided into ethical and intellectual (dianoetic); and 
 so are the contrary vices. The intellectual virtues are the excellencies 
 of the reason. Such are science, which consists in the knowledge of 
 proximate and remote causes of things; pure reason, having to do with 
 such innate principles as the axioms; the acquired reason, which we 
 cannot discuss here; clearness of perception and quick insight. The 
 intellectual vices are the opposites or the contraries of these. 
 
 The ethical virtues are resident in the appetitive faculty. The 
 sensitive soul is auxihary to the appetitive. The number of these 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 283 
 
 virtues is large. Examples are; temperance, generosity, justice, 
 modesty, humility, contentment, courage, and so on. The vices of 
 this class are the above qualities carried to excess, or not practiced 
 to the required extent. The faculties of nutrition and imagination 
 have neither virtues nor vices. We say a person's digestion is good 
 or it is poor; his imagination is correct or it is defective, but we do not 
 attach the idea of virtue or vice to these conditions. 
 
 Virtue is a permanent and enduring quahty of the soul occupying 
 an intermediate position between the two opposite extremes each 
 of which is a vice, sinning by exceeding the proper measure of the 
 golden mean or by falhng short of it. A good act is that form of con- 
 duct which follows from a virtuous disposition as just defined. A bad 
 act is the result of a tendency of the soul to either of the two extremes, 
 of excess or defect. Thus temperance or moderation is a virtue. It 
 is the mean between over-indulgence in the direction of excess, and 
 insensibility or indifference in the direction of defect. The last two 
 are vices. Similarly generosity is a mean between niggardliness and 
 extravagance; courage is a mean between foolhardiness and cowardice; 
 dignity is a mean between haughtiness and loutishness; humihty is 
 a mean between arrogance and self-abasement; contentment is a 
 mean between avarice and slothful indifference; kindness is a mean 
 between baseness and excessive self-denial; gentleness is a mean be- 
 tween irascibility and insensibihty to insult; modesty is a mean be- 
 tween impudence and shamefacedness. People are often mistaken 
 and regard one of the extremes as a virtue. Thus the reckless and 
 the foolhardy is often praised as the brave; the man of no backbone 
 is called gentle; the indolent is mistaken for the contented; the in- 
 sensible for the temperate, the extravagant for the generous. This is 
 an error. The mean alone is worthy of commendation. 
 
 The ethical virtues and vices are acquired as a result of repeated 
 practice during a long time of the corresponding acts until they become 
 a confirmed habit and a second nature. A person is not born virtuous 
 or vicious. What he will turn out to be depends upon the way he is 
 trained from childhood. If his training has been wrong and he has 
 acquired a vicious disposition in a particular tendency, he may be 
 cured. And here we may borrow a leaf from the book of medicine. 
 As in bodily disease the physician's endeavor is to restore the disturbed 
 
284 MEDIMVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 equilibrium in the mixture of the humors by increasing the element 
 that is deficient, so in diseases of the soul, if a person has a decided 
 tendency to one of the vicious extremes, he must as a curative measure, 
 for a certain length of time, be directed to practice the opposite ex- 
 treme until he has been cured. Then he may go back to the virtuous 
 mean. Thus if a person has the vice of niggardliness, the practice 
 of liberality is not sufi&cient to cure him. As a heroic measure he must 
 practice extravagance until the former tendency has left him. Then 
 he may return to the liberal mean. The same thing applies to the 
 other virtues, except that it is necessary to use proper judgment in 
 the amount of practice of a vicious extreme necessary to bring about 
 a satisfactory result. Too great deviation and too long continued 
 from the mean would in some cases be dangerous, as likely to develop 
 the opposite vice. Thus it is comparatively safe to indulge in extrava- 
 gance as a cure for niggardliness; the reverse process must be used 
 with caution. Care should likewise be taken in trying to wean a 
 person away from a habit of insensibility to pleasure by means of 
 a regime of indulgence. If it is not discontinued in time, he may 
 become a pleasure seeker, which is even worse than total indifference. 
 
 It is in this way that we must explain the conduct of certain pious 
 men and saints who were not content with following the middle way, 
 and inclined to one extreme, the extreme of asceticism and self-abase- 
 ment. They did this as a measure of cure, or because of the wicked- 
 ness of their generation, whose example they feared would contaminate 
 them by its contagion. Hence they lived a retired and solitary life, 
 the life of a recluse. It was not meant as the normal mode of conduct, 
 which would be as unwholesome to the soul as an invalid's drugs 
 would be dangerous if taken regularly by a person of sound health. 
 
 The will of God is that we should follow the middle way and eat 
 and drink and enjoy ourselves in moderation. To be sure, we must be 
 always on our guard against slipping into the forbidden extreme, 
 but it is not necessary for this purpose to inflict additional burdens 
 upon ourselves or to practice mortification of the flesh and abstention 
 from food and drink beyond what is prescribed in the Law. For 
 many of the regulations in the Pentateuch have been laid down for 
 this very purpose. The dietary laws, the laws of forbidden marriages, 
 the laws of tithes, the laws prescribing that the corner of the field, 
 
MOSES MAI MON IDES 285 
 
 the dropped and forgotten ears and the gleanings of the vintage should 
 be left to the poor, the laws of the sabbatical year, the Jubilee, and 
 the regulations governing charity — all these are intended to guard 
 us against avarice and selfishness. Other laws and precepts are for 
 the purpose of moderating our tendency to anger and rage, and so 
 with all the other virtues and vices. Hence it is folly and overscrupu- 
 lousness to add restrictions of one's own accord except in critical 
 instances, as indicated above. 
 
 The purpose of all human life and activity is to know God as far as 
 it is possible for man. Hence all his activities should be directed to 
 that one end. His eating and drinking and sleeping and waking and 
 motion and rest and pleasure should have for their object the mainte- 
 nance of good health and cheerful spirits, not as an end in themselves, 
 but as a means to intellectual peace and freedom from worry and care 
 in order that he may have leisure and abihty to study and reflect 
 upon the highest truths of God. Good music, beautiful scenery, 
 works of art, splendid architecture and fine clothing should not be 
 pursued for their own sake, but only so far as they may be necessary 
 to relieve the tedium and monotony of toil and labor, or as a curative 
 measure to dispel gloom and low spirits or a tendency to melancholy. 
 The same thing appHes to the arts and sciences. Medicine is of as- 
 sistance in maintaining bodily health and curing it of its ills. The 
 logical, mathematical and physical sciences are either directly helpful 
 to speculative theology, and their value is evident; or they serve to 
 train the mind in deduction and analysis, and are thus indirectly 
 of benefit for the knowledge of God.^^^ 
 
 The ethical quaUties similarly conduce to intellectual perfection, 
 and the difference between one prophet and another is in large measure 
 dependent upon relative ethical superiority. Thus when the Rabbis 
 say that Moses saw God through a luminous mirror, and tlie other 
 prophets through a non-luminous, the meaning is that Moses had 
 intellectual and moral perfection, so far as a human being is capable 
 of having them, and the only partition separating him from a complete 
 vision of God was his humanity. The other prophets had other de- 
 fects besides, constituting so many additional partitions obscuring 
 the divine view.^^^ 
 
 Some foolish astrologers are of the opinion that a man's character 
 
286 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 is determined in advance by the position of the stars at the time of 
 his birth. This is a grave error, as can be shown from reason as well 
 as tradition. The Bible as well as the Greek philosophers are agreed 
 that a man's acts are under his own control, and that he himself and 
 no one else is responsible for his virtues as well as his vices. It is true 
 that a person's temperament, which is constitutional and over which 
 he has no control, plays an important role in his conduct. There is 
 no denying that men are born with certain tendencies. Some are 
 born phlegmatic, some are passionate and hot-blooded. One man has 
 a tendency to fearlessness and bravery, another is timid and back- 
 ward. But while it is true that it is more difficult for the hot-blooded 
 to develop the virtue of temperance and moderation than it is for the 
 phlegmatic, that it is easier for the warm-tempered to learn courage 
 than it is for the cold-tempered — these are not impossible. Virtue, 
 we have seen before, is not a natural state, but an acquired possession 
 due to long continued discipline and practice. One man may require 
 longer and more assiduous practice than another to acquire a certain 
 virtue, but no matter what his inherited temperament, he can acquire 
 it if he undertakes to do so, or if properly trained. If man's character 
 and conduct were determined, all the commandments and prohibi- 
 tions in the Bible would be in vain, for without freedom command 
 has no effect. Similarly there would be no use in a person's endeavor- 
 ing to learn any trade or profession; for if it is determined beforehand 
 that a given individual shall be a physician or a carpenter, he is bound 
 to be one whether he studies or not. This would make all reward and 
 punishment wrong and unjust whether administered by man or by 
 God. For the person so rewarded or punished could not help doing 
 what he did, and is therefore not responsible. All our plans and 
 preparations would on this supposition be useless and without mean- 
 ing, such as building houses, acquiring food, avoiding danger, and so 
 on. All this is absurd and opposed to reason as well as to sense. It 
 undermines the foundation of religion and imputes wrong to God. The 
 Bible says distinctly, "See, I have set before thee this day life and 
 the good, death and the evil . . . therefore choose thou life. . . ." 
 (Deut. 30, 15, 19.) 
 
 There are some passages in the Bible which apparently lend color 
 to the idea that a person's acts are determined from on high. Such 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 287 
 
 are the expressions used in relation to Pharaoh's conduct toward the 
 IsraeUtes in refusing to let them go out of Egypt. We are told there 
 that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh that he should not let the 
 Israehtes go. And he did this in order to punish the Egyptians. The 
 criticism here is twofold. First, these expressions indicate that a 
 person is not always free; and second, it seems scarcely just to force 
 a man to act in a certain way and then to punish him for it. 
 
 The explanation Maimonides gives to this passage is as follows: 
 He admits that in Pharaoh's case there was a restriction of Pharaoh's 
 freedom. But this was a penal measure and exceptional. Normally 
 a man is free, but he may forfeit this freedom if he abuses it. So 
 Pharaoh's primary offence was not that he would not let the children of 
 Israel go out of Egypt, His sin consisted in his tyrannical treatment 
 of Israel in the past, which he did of his own accord and as a result of 
 free choice. His loss of freedom in complying with Moses's request 
 to let the Israelites go was already in the nature of a punishment, and 
 its object was to let all the world know that a person may forfeit his 
 freedom of action as a punishment for abusing his human privilege. 
 To be sure God does not always punish sin so severely, but it is not for 
 us to search his motives and ask why he punishes one man in one way 
 and another in another. We must leave this to his wisdom. 
 
 Another argument against free will is that it is incompatible with 
 the knowledge of God. If God is omniscient and knows the future as 
 well as the past and the present, he knows how a given person will act 
 at a given moment. But since God's knowledge is certain and not 
 liable to error, the person in question cannot help acting as God long 
 foreknew he would act, and hence his act is not the result of his free 
 will. Maimonides's answer to this objection is virtually an admission 
 of ignorance. He takes refuge in the transcendence of God's knowl- 
 edge, upon which he dwelt so insistently in the earlier part of his 
 work (p. 260 ff.). God is not qualified by attributes as we his creatures 
 are. As he does not live by means of life, so he does not know by 
 means of knowledge. He knows through his own essence. He and 
 his existence and his knowledge are identical. Hence as we cannot 
 know his essence, we cannot have any conception of his knowledge. 
 It is mistaken therefore to argue that because we cannot know a future 
 event unless it is already determined in the present, God cannot do so. 
 
288 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 His knowledge is of a diflferent kind from ours, and he can do what we 
 cannot. ^^^ 
 
 The next problem Maimonides takes up is the doctrine of evil. 
 The presence of evil in the world, physical as well as moral, was a 
 stumbling block to all religious thinkers in the middle ages. The 
 difficulty seems to find its origin in Neo-Platonism, or, farther back 
 still, in Philo of Alexandria, who identified God with the Good. If he 
 is the Good, evil cannot come from him. How then account for the 
 evil in the world? The answer that was given was extremely unsat- 
 isfactory. It was founded on a metaphysical distinction which is as 
 old as Plato, namely, of matter as the non-existent. Matter was con- 
 sidered a principle without any definite nature or actual being, and 
 this was made the basis of all imperfection, death, sin. Evil partakes 
 of the non-existence of matter, it is nothing positive, but only a nega- 
 tion or privation of good as darkness is the absence of light; hence it 
 needs no creator, it has no efficient cause, but only a deficient cause. 
 In this way physical evil was accounted for. Moral evil as the result of 
 man's inhumanity to man could easily be explained by laying it to the 
 charge of man's free will or even to the free will of the fallen angels as 
 Origen conceives it. This removes from God all responsibihty for 
 evil. We shall find that Maimonides has nothing essentially new to 
 contribute to the solution of the problem. 
 
 Strictly speaking, he says, only a positive thing can be made, nega- 
 tion or privation carmot. We may speak loosely of the negative being 
 produced when one removes the positive. So if a man puts out a 
 light, we say he made darkness, though darkness is a negation. 
 
 Evil is nothing but the negation of the positive, which is good. All 
 positive things are good. Hence God cannot be said to produce evil. 
 The positive thing which he produces is good; the evil is due to defect 
 in the thing. Matter also is good so far as it is positive, i. e., so far as 
 it causes continued existence of one thing after another. The evil 
 in matter is due to its negative or privative aspect as the formless, 
 which makes it the cause of defect and evil. All evil that men do to 
 each other is also due to negation, namely, absence of wisdom and 
 knowledge. 
 
 Many people think there is more evil in the world than good. Their 
 mistake is due to the fact that they make the experience of the Individ- 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 289 
 
 ual man the arbiter in this question, thinking that the universe was 
 made for his sake. They forget that man is only a small fraction of 
 the world, which is made by the will of God. Even so man should be 
 grateful for the great amount of good he receives from God, for many 
 of the evils of man are self-inflicted. In fact the evils befalling man 
 come under three categories. 
 
 1. The evil that is incident to man's nature as subject to genesis and 
 decay, i. e., as composed of matter. Hence arise the various accidents 
 to which man is liable on account of bad air and other natural causes. 
 These are inevitable, and inseparable from matter, and from the gen- 
 eration of individuals in a species. To demand that a person of flesh 
 and blood shall not be subject to impressions is a contradiction in 
 terms. And with all this the evils of this class are comparatively few. 
 
 2. They are the evils inflicted by one man upon the other. These 
 are more frequent than the preceding. Their causes are various. And 
 yet these too are not very frequent. 
 
 3. These are the most common. They are the evils man brings upon 
 himself by self-indulgence and the formation of bad habits. He injures 
 the body by excess, and he injures the mind through the body by per- 
 verting and weakening it, and by enslaving it to luxuries to which 
 there is no end. If a person is satisfied with that which is necessary, 
 he will easily have what he needs; for the necessaries are not hard to 
 get. God's justice is evident in affording the necessaries to all his 
 creatures and in making all the individuals of the same species similar 
 in power and ability. ^^^ 
 
 The next problem Maimonides discusses is really theoretical and 
 should have its place in the discussion of the divine attributes, for it 
 deals with the character of God's knowledge. The reason for taking 
 it up here is because, according to Maimonides, it was an ethical ques- 
 tion that was the motive for the formulation of the view of the oppo- 
 nents. Accordingly the problem is semi-ethical, semi-metaphysical, 
 and is closely related to the question of Providence. 
 
 Observing that the good are often wretched and the bad prosperous, 
 the philosophers came to the conclusion that God does not know in- 
 dividual things. For if he knows and does not order them as is proper, 
 this must be due either to inability or to jealousy, both of which are 
 impossible in God. Having come to this conclusion in the way in- 
 
290 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 dicated, they then bolstered it up with arguments to justify it pos- 
 itively. Such are that the individual is known through sense and God 
 has no sensation; that the number of individual things is infinite, and 
 the infinite cannot be comprehended, hence cannot be known; that 
 knowledge of the particular is subject to change as the object changes, 
 whereas God's knowledge is unchangeable. Against us Jews they argue 
 that to suppose God knows things before they are connects knowledge 
 with the non-existent; and besides there would be two kinds of knowl- 
 edge in God, one knowledge of potential things, and another of actual 
 things. So they came to the conclusion that God knows only species 
 but not individuals. Others say that God knows nothing except his 
 own essence, else there would be multiplicity in his nature. As the 
 entire dif&culty, according to Maimonides, arose from the supposed 
 impropriety in the government of individual destinies, he first dis- 
 cusses the question of Providence and comes back later to the problem 
 of God's knowledge. ^^^ 
 He enumerates five opinions concerning Providence. 
 
 1. The Opinion oj Epicurus. There is no Providence at all; every- 
 thing is the result of accident and concurrence of atoms. Aristotle has 
 refuted this idea. 
 
 2. The Opinion oj Aristotle. Some things are subject to Providence, 
 others are governed by accident. God provides for the celestial 
 spheres, hence they are permanent individually; but, as Alexander 
 says in his name. Providence ceases with the sphere of the moon. 
 Aristotle's doctrine concerning Providence is related to his belief in 
 the eternity of the world. Providence corresponds to the nature of 
 the object in question. As the individual spheres are permanent, 
 it shows that there is special Providence which preserves the spheres 
 individually. As, again, there proceed from them other beings which 
 are not permanent individually but only as species, namely, the species 
 of our world, it is clear that with reference to the sublunar world 
 there is so much Providential influence as to bring about the per- 
 manence of the species, but not of the individual. To be sure, the 
 individuals too are not completely neglected. There are various powers 
 given to them in accordance with the quality of their matters; which 
 powers determine the length of their duration, their motion, percep- 
 tion, purposive existence. But the other incidents and motions in 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 291 
 
 individual human as well as animal life are pure accident. When a 
 storm scatters the leaves of trees, casts down some trunks and drowns 
 a ship with its passengers, the incident is as accidental with the men 
 drowned as with the scattered leaves. That which follows invariable 
 laws Aristotle regards as Providential, what happens rarely and with- 
 out nile is accidental. 
 
 3. The View of the Ashariya. This is the very opposite of the pre- 
 ceding opinion. The Ashariya deny all accident. Everything is 
 done by the will of God, whether it be the fall of a leaf or the death 
 of a man. Everything is determined, and a person cannot of himself 
 do or forbear. It follows from this view that the category of the pos- 
 sible is ruled out. Everything is either necessary or impossible. It 
 follows also that all laws are useless, for man is helpless, and reward 
 and punishment are determined solely by the will of God, to whom 
 the concepts of right and wrong do not apply. 
 
 4. The Opinion of the Mu tazila. They vindicate man's power to 
 do and forbear, thus justifying the commands and prohibitions, and 
 the rewards and punishments of the laws. God does not do wrong. 
 They also believe that God knows of the fall of a leaf, and provides 
 for all things. This opinion, too, is open to criticism. If a person is 
 born with a defect, they say this is due to God's wisdom, and it is 
 better for the man to be thus. If a pious man is put to death, it is to 
 increase his reward in the next world. They extend this to lower 
 animals also, and say that the mouse killed by the cat will be rewarded 
 in the next world. 
 
 The last three opinions all have their motives. Aristotle followed 
 the data of nature. The Ashariya refused to impute ignorance 
 to God. The Mu' tazila object to imputing to him wrong, or to deny- 
 ing reason, which holds that to cause a person pain for no offence is 
 wrong. Their opinion leads to a contradiction, for they say God 
 knows everything and at the same time man is free. 
 
 5. The Opinion of our Law. A fundamental principle of the law of 
 Moses is that man has absolute freedom in his conduct, and so has 
 an irrational animal. No one of our religion disputes this. Another 
 fundamental principle is that God does no wrong, and hence all reward 
 and punishment is justly given. There is only one exception men- 
 tioned by the Rabbis, what they call "suffering for love," i. e., mis- 
 
292 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 fortunes which are not in the nature of punishment for sins committed, 
 but in order to increase reward. There is no support, however, for 
 this view in the Bible. All this applies only to man. Nothing is 
 said in the Bible or in the Talmud of reward and punishment of ani- 
 mals. It was adopted by some of the later Geonim from the Mu - 
 tazila. 
 
 After citing these five opinions on the nature of Providence, Mai- 
 monides formulates his own to the following effect: 
 
 My own belief in the matter, not as a result of demonstration, but 
 based upon what seems to me to be the meaning of Scripture is that 
 in the sublunar world man alone enjoys individual Providence. All 
 other individual things besides are ruled by chance, as Aristotle says. 
 Divine Providence corresponds to divine influence or emanation. 
 The more one has of divine influence, the more one has of Providence. 
 Thus in plants and animals divine Providence extends only to the 
 species. When the Rabbis teU us that cruelty to animals is forbidden 
 in the Torah, the meaning is that we must not be cruel to animals 
 for our own good, in order not to develop habits of cruelty. To ask 
 why God does not provide for the lower animals in the same way as 
 he does for man, is the same as to ask why he did not endow the ani- 
 mals with reason. The answer would be, so he willed, so his wisdom 
 decreed. My opinion is not that God is ignorant of anything or is 
 incapable of doing certain things, but that Providence is closely re- 
 lated to reason. One has as much of Providence as he has of the in- 
 fluence of the divine reason. It follows from this that Providence is 
 not the same for all individuals of the human species, but varies with 
 the person's character and achievements. The prophets enjoy a 
 special Providence; the pious and wise men come next; whereas a 
 person who is ignorant and disobedient is neglected and treated like 
 a lower animal, being left to the government of chance.^^^ 
 
 Having disposed of the question of Providence, we may now resume 
 the discussion undertaken above (p. 289) of the nature of God's knowl- 
 edge. The idea that God does not know the particular things in our 
 world below is an old one and is referred to in the Bible often. Thus, 
 to quote one instance from the Psalms, the idea is clearly enunciated 
 in the following passage, "And they say [sc. the wicked]. How doth 
 God know? And is there knowledge in the most High? Behold, 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 293 
 
 these are the wicked; and, being alway at ease, they increase in riches. 
 Surely in vain have I cleansed my heart, and washed my hands in 
 innocency . . ." (73, 11-13). The origin of this notion is in hmnan 
 experience, which sees the adversity of the good and the prosperity 
 of the wicked, though many of the troubles are of a man's own doing, 
 who is a free agent. But this view is wrong. For ignorance of any 
 kind is a defect, and God is perfect. David pointed out this when he 
 said, "He that planted the ear shall he not hear? He that formed 
 the eye shall he not see?" (94, 9). This means that unless God 
 knows what the senses are, he could not have made the sense organs 
 to perceive. 
 
 We must now answer the other metaphysical arguments against 
 God's knowledge of particulars. It is agreed that no new knowledge 
 can come to God which he did not have before, nor can he have many 
 knowledges. We say therefore (we who are believers in the Torah) 
 that with one knowledge God knows many things, and his knowledge 
 does not change as the objects change. We say also that he knows 
 all things before they come into being, and knows them always; hence 
 his knowledge never changes as the objects appear and disappear. 
 It follows from this that his knowledge relates to the non-existent 
 and embraces the infinite. We beheve this and say that only the 
 absolutely non-existent cannot be known; but the non-existent whose 
 existence is in God's knowledge and which he can bring into reality 
 can be known. As to comprehending the infinite, we say with some 
 thinkers that knowledge relates primarily to the species and extends 
 indirectly to the individuals included in the species. And the species 
 are finite. The philosophers, however, decide that there cannot be 
 knowledge of the non-existent, and the infinite cannot be compre- 
 hended. God, therefore, as he cannot have new and changing knowl- 
 edge knows only the permanent things, the species, and not the 
 changing and temporary individuals. Others go still further and 
 maintain that God cannot even know the permanent things, because 
 knowledge of many things involves many knowledges, hence multi- 
 pUcity in God's essence. They insist therefore that God knows only 
 himself. My view is, says Maimonides, that the error of all these 
 people is that they assume there is a relation of resemblance between 
 our knowledge and God's knowledge. And it is surprising that the 
 
294 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 philosophers should be guilty of such an error, the very men who 
 proved that God's knowledge is identical with his essence, and that 
 our reason cannot know God's essence. 
 
 The difference between our knowledge and God's knowledge is 
 that we get our knowledge from the data of experience, upon which 
 it depends. Each new datum adds to our knowledge, which cannot 
 run ahead of that which produces it. It is different in the case of 
 God. He is the cause of the data of experience. The latter follow 
 his knowledge, and not vice versa. Hence by knowing himself he knows 
 everything else before it comes into being. We cannot conceive of 
 his knowledge, for to do this would be to have it ourselves. ^^^ 
 
 The last topic Maimonides considers in his philosophical work is 
 the reason and purpose of the commandments of the Bible, partic- 
 ularly the ceremonial precepts which apparently have no rational 
 meaning. In fact there are those who maintain that it is vain to search 
 for reasons of the laws where none are given in the Bible itself; that 
 the sole reason in those cases is the will of God. These people labor 
 under the absurd impression that to discover a rational purpose in 
 the ceremonial laws would diminish their value and reduce them to 
 human institutions. Their divine character and origin is attested in 
 the minds of these people by their irrationality, by the fact that they 
 have no human meaning. This is clearly absurd, says Maimonides 
 the rationalist. It is tantamount to saying that man is superior to 
 God; and that whereas a man will command only that which is of 
 benefit, God gives orders which have no earthly use. The truth is 
 quite the reverse, and all the laws are for our benefit. ^^^ 
 
 Accordingly Maimonides undertakes to account for all the laws of 
 the Bible. The Law, he says, has two purposes, the improvement of 
 the body and the improvement of the soul or the mind. The improve- 
 ment of the soul is brought about by study and reflection, and the 
 result of this is theoretical knowledge. But in order to be able to 
 realize this perfectly a necessary prerequisite is the improvement of 
 the body. This is inferior in value to perfection of the soul, but comes 
 naturally and chronologically first as a means to an end. For bodily 
 perfection one must have health and strength as far as one's constitu- 
 tion permits, and for this purpose a person must have his needs at 
 all times. Social life is necessary for the supply of the individuals' 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 295 
 
 needs, and to make social life possible there must be rules of right 
 and wrong to be observed. ^^® 
 
 Applying what has just been said to the Law, we may divide its 
 contents broadly into four classes, (i) Precepts inculcating true 
 beliefs and ideas, such as the existence of God, his unity, knowledge, 
 power, will, eternity. (2) Legal and moral precepts, such as the incul- 
 cation of justice and a benevolent disposition for the good of society. 
 (3) The narratives and genealogies of the Law. (4) The ceremonial 
 prescriptions. 
 
 Of these the purpose of the first two divisions is perfectly clear and 
 admitted by aU. True beliefs and ideas regarding God and his govern- 
 ment of the world are directly conducive to the highest end of man, 
 knowledge and perfection of the soul. Honorable and virtuous con- 
 duct is a preHminary requisite to intellectual perfection. The gen- 
 ealogies and narratives of the Bible are also not without a purpose. 
 They are intended to inculcate a theoretical doctrine or a moral, and 
 to emphasize the one or the other, which cannot be done so well by a 
 bare statement or commandment. Thus, to take a few examples, 
 the creation of the world is impressed upon the reader beyond the 
 possibiHty of a doubt by a circumstantial narrative of the various 
 steps in the process, the gradual peopling of the earth by the mul- 
 tiplication of the human race descended from the first paif;"and so on. 
 The story of the flood and of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah 
 has for its purpose to emphasize the truth that God is a just judge, who 
 rewards the pious and punishes the wicked. The genealogy of the 
 kings of Edom in Genesis (36, 31) is intended as a warning to Israel 
 in the appointment of kings. These kings of the Edomites were all of 
 them foreigners not of Edom, and it is probable that the history of 
 their tyrannical rule and oppression of their Edomite subjects was 
 well known to the people in Moses's time. Hence the point of the 
 enumeration of the list of kings and their origin is to serve as a de- 
 terring example to the Israelites never to appoint as king of Israel a 
 man who came from another nation, in accordance with the precept 
 in Deuteronomy (17, 15), "Thou mayest not put a foreigner over thee, 
 which is not thy brother." ^^'' 
 
 There remains the division of the ceremonial laws, which are the sub- 
 ject of dispute. The purpose in these precepts is not evident, and 
 
296 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 opinions are divided as to whether they have any purpose. I will en- 
 deavor to show, says Maimonides, that these also have one or more of 
 the following objects: to teach true beliefs and opinions, to remove 
 injustice and to inculcate good qualities. 
 
 Abraham grew up among the Sabeans, who were star worshippers 
 and believers in the eternity of the world. The object of the law is to 
 keep men away from the erroneous views of the Sabeans, which were 
 prevalent in those days. The Sabeans beUeved that the worship of 
 the stars helps in the cultivation of the ground to make it fruitful. 
 For this reason they think highly of the husbandmen and laborers on 
 the land. They also respect cattle and prohibit slaughtering them be- 
 cause they are of benefit in the cultivation of the land. In the interest 
 of agriculture they instituted the worship of the stars, which they be- 
 lieved would cause the rain to fall and the earth to yield its fertility. 
 On this account we find the reverse of this in the Bible, telling us that 
 worship of the stars will result in lack of rain and infertility. 
 
 In the life of nature we see how one thing serves another, and certain 
 objects are not brought about except through certain others, and de- 
 velopment is gradual. So, for example, a young infant cannot be fed 
 on meat and solid food, and nature provides milk in the mother's 
 breast. Similarly in governing the people of Israel, who were living 
 in a certain environment, God could not at once tear them away from 
 the habits of thought to which they were accustomed, but he led them 
 gradually. Hence as they were accustomed to sacrificing to the stars, 
 God ordered them to sacrifice to him, the object being to wean them 
 away from the idols in the easiest way possible. This is why the 
 prophets do not lay stress on the sacrifices. To be sure, it was not 
 impossible for God to form their minds so that they would not require 
 this form of training, and would see at once that God does not need 
 sacrifices, but this would have been a miracle. And while God does 
 perform miracles sometimes for certain purposes, he does not change 
 the nature of man; not because he cannot, but because he desires man 
 to be free and responsible. Otherwise there would be no sense in laws 
 and prophets. 
 
 Among the purposes of the law are abstention from self-indulgence 
 in the physical appetites, like eating and drinking and sensuous pleas- 
 ure, because these things prevent the ultimate perfection of man, and 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 297 
 
 are likewise injurious to civil and social life, multiplying as they do 
 sorrow and trouble and strife and jealousy and hate and warfare. 
 
 Another purpose is to inculcate gentleness and politeness and 
 docility. Another is purity and hohness. External cleanliness is also 
 recommended, but not as a substitute for internal. The important 
 thing is internal purity, external takes a secondary place. 
 
 Maimonides ends the discussion of the Pentateuchal laws by dividing 
 them into fourteen classes (following in this the divisions in his great 
 legal code, the "Yad Ha-Hazakah") and explaining the purposes of 
 each class. It will be useful briefly to reproduce the division here. 
 
 1. Those laws that concern fundamental ideas of religion and 
 theology, including the duty of learning and teaching, and the institu- 
 tions of repentance and fasting. The purpose here is clear. Intellec- 
 tual perfection is the greatest good of man, and this cannot be attained 
 without learning and teaching; and without wisdom there is neither 
 good practice nor true opinion. Similarly honoring the wise, swearing 
 by God's name, and not to swear falsely — all these lead to a firm belief 
 in God's greatness. Repentance is useful to guard against despair 
 and continuance in evil doing on the part of the sinner. 
 
 2. The precepts and prohibitions relating to idolatry. Here are 
 included also the prohibition to mix divers kinds of seeds in planting, 
 the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three 
 years of its growth, and against wearing a garment made of a mixture 
 of wool and flax. The prohibition of idolatry is evident in its purpose, 
 which is to teach true ideas about God. The other matters above 
 mentioned are connected with idolatry. Magic is a species of idolatry 
 because it is based on a belief in the direct influence of the stars. All 
 practices done to produce a certain effect, which are not justified by a 
 reason or at least are not verified by experience, are forbidden as 
 being superstitious and a species of magic. Cutting the beard and the 
 earlocks is forbidden on a similar ground because it was a custom of 
 the idolatrous priests. The same thing applies to mixing of cotton and 
 flax, to men wearing women's garments and vice versa, though here 
 there is the additional reason, to prevent, namely, laxness in sexual 
 morality. 
 
 3. The precepts relating to ethical and moral conduct. Here the 
 purpose is clear, namely, to improve social life. 
 
298 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 4. The rules relating to charity, loans, gifts, and so on. The pur- 
 pose is to teach kindness to the poor, and the benefit is mutual, for 
 the rich man to-day may be poor to-morrow. 
 
 5. Laws relating to injury and damages. The purpose is to remove 
 wrong and injustice. 
 
 6. Laws relating to theft, robbery, false witnesses. The purpose is 
 to prevent injury by punishing the offender. 
 
 7. The regulation of business intercourse, like loan, hire, deposits, 
 buying and selling, inheritance, and so on. The purpose here is social 
 justice to make life in society possible. 
 
 8. Laws relating to special periods, such as the Sabbath and the 
 festivals. The purpose is stated in each case in the Law itself, and 
 it is either to inculcate a true idea like the creation in the case of the 
 Sabbath, or to enable mankind to rest from their labors, or for both 
 combined. 
 
 9. The other practical observances like prayer, the reading of 
 "Shema," and so on. These are all modes of serving God, which lead 
 to true opinions concerning him, and to fear and love. 
 
 10. The regulations bearing upon the temple and its service. The 
 purpose of these was explained above in connection with the institu- 
 tion of sacrifice, namely that it was a concession to the primitive ideas 
 and customs of the people of those times for the purpose of gradually 
 weaning them away from idolatry. 
 
 11. Laws relating to sacrifices. The purpose was stated above and 
 under 10. 
 
 12. Laws of cleanness and uncleanness. The purpose is to guard 
 against too great familiarity with the Temple in order to maintain 
 respect for it. Hence the regulations prescribing the times when one 
 may, and the occasions when one may not, approach or enter the 
 Temple. 
 
 13. The dietary laws. Unwholesome food is forbidden, also un- 
 clean animals. The purpose in some cases is to guard against excess 
 and self-indulgence. Some regulations like the laws of slaughter and 
 others are humanitarian in their nature. 
 
 14. Forbidden marriages, and circumcision. The purpose is to 
 guard against excess in sexual indulgence, and against making it an 
 end in itself. ^^^ 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 299 
 
 To sum up, there are four kinds of human accomplishments or 
 excellencies, (i) Acquisition of wealth, (2) Physical perfection, 
 strength, beauty, etc., (3) Moral perfection, (4) Intellectual and spirit- 
 ual perfection. The last is the most important. The first is purely ex- 
 ternal; the second is common to the lower animals; the third is for the 
 sake of one's fellowmen, in the interest of society, and would not exist 
 for a solitary person. The last alone concerns the individual himself. 
 Jeremiah expresses this truth in his statement, "Thus saith the Lord, 
 Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man 
 glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches: but let him 
 that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth me, 
 that I am the Lord which exercise loving kindness, judgment and 
 righteousness in the earth" (Jer. 9, 22). "Wise man" in the above 
 quotation means the man of good morals. The important thing, 
 Jeremiah says, is to know God through his actions and to imitate 
 
 Jjjjjj 299 
 
 Maimonides's ethics as well as his interpretation of the Pentateu- 
 chal laws is intellectualistic, as the foregoing account shows. And 
 it is natural that it should be. The prevailing trend of thought in 
 the middle ages, alike among the Arabs, Jews and Christians, was of 
 this character. Aristotle was the master of science, and to him in- 
 tellectual contemplation is the highest good of man. The distinction 
 of man is his rational faculty, hence the excellence and perfection of 
 this faculty is the proper function of man and the realization of his 
 being. This alone leads to that "eudaimonia" or happiness for which 
 man strives. To be sure complete happiness is impossible without 
 the complete development of all one's powers, but this is because the 
 reason in man is not isolated from the rest of his individual and social 
 life; and perfection of mind requires as its auxiliaries and preparation 
 complete living in freedom and comfort. But the aim is after all the 
 life of the intellect, and the "dianoetic" virtues are superior to the 
 practical. Theoretic contemplation stands far higher than practical 
 activity. Add to this that Aristotle's God is pure thought thinking 
 eternally itself, the universal mover, himself eternally unmoved, and 
 attracting the celestial spheres as the object of love attracts the lover, 
 without itself necessarily being affected, and the intellectualism of 
 Aristotle stands out clearly. 
 
300 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Maimonides is an Aristotelian, and he endeavors to harmonize 
 the intellectualism and theorism of the Stagirite with the diametri- 
 cally opposed ethics and religion of the Hebrew Bible. And he is 
 apparently unaware of the yawning gulf extending between them. 
 The ethics of the Bible is nothing if not practical. No stress is laid 
 upon knowledge and theoretical speculation as such. The wisdom and 
 the wise man of the book of Proverbs no more mean the theoretical 
 philosopher than the fool and the scorner in the same book denote 
 the one ignorant in theoretical speculation. "The beginning of wis- 
 dom is the fear of the Lord." This is the keynote of the book of Prov- 
 erbs, and its precepts and exhortations are practical and nothing 
 else. That the Pentateuchal law is solely concerned with practical 
 conduct, religious, ceremonial and moral, needs not saying. It is so 
 absolutely clear and evident that one wonders how so clear-sighted 
 a thinker like Maimonides could have been misled by the authority 
 of Aristotle and the intellectual atmosphere of the day to imagine 
 otherwise. The very passage from Jeremiah which he quotes as 
 summing up his idea of the summum bonum, speaks against him, 
 and he only succeeds in manipulating it in his favor by misinterpret- 
 ing the word "wise." Whatever the wise man may denote in the 
 book of Proverbs, here in Jeremiah he is clearly contrasted with the 
 person who in imitation of God practices kindness, judgment and 
 righteousness. The word does not denote the theoretical philosopher, 
 to be sure, but it approximates it more closely than the expression 
 describing the ideal man of Jeremiah's commendation. 
 
 It is in line with Maimonides's general rationalistic and intellectual- 
 istic point of view when he undertakes to find a reason for every com- 
 mandment, where no reason is given in the Law. He shows himself in 
 this an opponent of all mysticism, sentimentality and arbitrariness. 
 Reason is paramount. The intellect determines the will, and not even 
 God's will may be arbitrary. His will is identical with his reason, 
 hence there is a reason in everything that he wills. We may not in 
 every case succeed in finding the reason where he himself did not 
 choose to tell us, but a reason there always is, and the endeavor on 
 our part to discover it should be commended rather than condemned. 
 
 The details of his motivation of the ceremonial laws are very in- 
 teresting, and in many cases they anticipated, though in a cruder 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 301 
 
 I 
 form, the more scientific theories of modern critics. Take his inter- 
 pretation of the institution of sacrifices. Take away the personal 
 manner of expression, which might seem to imply that God spoke to 
 Moses in some such fashion as this: You and I know that sacrifices 
 have no inherent meaning or value. They rather smack of supersti- 
 tion and idolatry. But what can we do? We cannot, i. e., we must 
 not, change the nature of these people. We must train them gradually 
 to see the truth for themselves. They are now on the level of their 
 environment, and believe in the efficacy of kilUng sheep and oxen to 
 the stars and the gods. We will use a true pedagogical method if 
 we humor them in this their crudity for the purpose of transferring 
 their allegiance from the false gods to the one true God. Let us then 
 institute a system of sacrifices with all the details and minutiae of 
 the sacrificial systems of the heathens and star worshippers. We 
 shaU impose this system upon our people for the time being, and in 
 the end as they grow wiser they will outgrow it — take away this mode 
 of expression in Maimonides's interpretation, which is not essential, 
 and the essence may be rendered in more modern terms thus. Man 's 
 religion is subject to change and development and progress like all 
 his other institutions. The forms they successively take in the course 
 of their development are determined by the state of general intelli- 
 gence and positive knowledge that the given race or nation possesses. 
 The same thing holds of religious development. The institution of 
 sacrifices is prevalent in all religious communities at a certain stage 
 in their career. It starts with human sacrifice, which is later discarded 
 and replaced by sacrifices of animals. And this is again in the course 
 of time discontinued, leaving its traces only in the prayer book, 
 which in Judaism has officially taken the place of the Temple service. 
 While the merit of Maimonides in foreshadowing this modern 
 understanding of ancient religion cannot be overestimated, it is clear 
 that in some of his other interpretations of Jewish ceremonial, he is 
 wide of the mark. His rationahsm could not take the place of a knowl- 
 edge of history. His motivation of the dietary laws on the score of 
 hygiene or of moderation and self-restaint is probably not true. Nor 
 is the prohibition against mixing divers seeds, or wearing garments 
 of wool and flax mixed, or shaving the corner of the beard, and so on, 
 due to the fact that these were the customs of the idolaters and their 
 
302 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 priests. If Maimonides was bold enough to pull the sacrificial system 
 down from its glorious pedestal in Jewish tradition and admit that 
 being inherently nothing but a superstition, it was nevertheless in- 
 stituted with such great pomp and ceremony, with a priestly family, 
 a levitical tribe and a host of prescriptions and regulations, merely 
 as a concession to the habits and prejudices of the people, why could 
 he not apply the same method of explanation to the few prohibitions 
 mentioned above? Why not say the ancient Hebrews were forbidden 
 to mix divers seeds because they had been from time immemorial 
 taught to believe that there was something sinful in joining together 
 what God has kept asunder; and in order not to shock their sensibili- 
 ties too rudely the new religion let them have these harmless notions 
 in order by means of these to inculcate real truths? 
 
 Before concluding our sketch of Maimonides we must say a word 
 about his Bible exegesis. Though the tendency to read philosophy 
 into the Bible is as old as Philo, from whom it was borrowed by Clem- 
 ent of Alexandria and Origen and by them handed down to the other 
 Patristic writers, and though in the Jewish middle ages too, from 
 Saadia down, the verses of the Bible were employed to confirm views 
 adopted from other considerations; though finally Abraham Ibn Daud 
 in the matter of exegesis, too, anticipated Maimonides in finding the 
 Aristotelian metaphysic in the sacred scriptures, still Maimonides 
 as in everything else pertaining to Jewish belief and practice, so in 
 the interpretation of the Bible also obtained the position of a leader, 
 of the founder of a school and the most brilliant and most authorita- 
 tive exponent thereof, putting in the shade everyone who preceded 
 him and every endeavor in the same direction to which Maimonides 
 himseK owed his inspiration. Maimonides's treatment of the Bible 
 texts and their application to his philosophical disquisitions is so much 
 more comprehensive and masterly than anything in the same line 
 done before him, that it made everything else superfluous and set 
 the pace for manifold imitation by the successors of Maimonides, 
 small and great. Reading the Bible through AristoteUan spectacles 
 became the fashion of the day after Maimonides. Joseph Ibn Aknin, 
 Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Jacob Anatoli, Joseph Ibn Caspi, Levi Ben 
 Gerson and a host of others tried their hand at Biblical exegesis, and 
 the Maimonidean stamp is upon their work. 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES ' 303 
 
 We have already spoken of Maimonides's general attitude toward 
 the anthropomorphisms in the Bible and the manner in which he ac- 
 counts for the style and mode of expression of the Biblical writers. 
 He wrote no special exegetical work, he composed no commentaries 
 on the Bible. But his "Guide of the Perplexed" is full of quotations 
 from the Biblical books, and certam sections in it are devoted to a 
 systematic interpretation of those Biblical chapters and books which 
 lend themselves most easily and, as Maimonides thought, imperatively 
 to metaphysical interpretation. It is impossible here to enter into 
 details, but it is proper briefly to point out his general method of 
 treating the BibHcal passages in question, and to state what these 
 passages are. 
 
 We have already referred more than once to the Talmudic expres- 
 sions '' Maase Bereshit" (Work of Creation) and "Maase Merkaba" 
 (Work of the Chariot). Maimonides says definitely that the former 
 denotes the science of physics, i. e., the fundamental notions of nature 
 as treated in Aristotle's Physics, and the latter signifies metaphysics 
 or theology, as represented in Aristotle's Metaphysics. The creation 
 chapters in Genesis contain beneath their simple exterior of a generally 
 intelligible narrative, appealing to young and old alike, women as 
 well as children, a treatment of philosophical physics. And similarly 
 in the obscure phraseology of the vision of Ezekiel in the first and 
 tenth chapters of that prophet's book, are contained allusions to the 
 most profound ideas of metaphysics and theology, concerning God 
 and the separate Intelligences and the celestial spheres. As the Rabbis 
 forbid teaching these profound doctrines except to one or two worthy 
 persons at a time, and as the authors of those chapters in the Bible 
 clearly intended to conceal the esoteric contents from the gaze of the 
 vulgar, Maimonides with all his eagerness to spread abroad the light 
 of reason and knowledge hesitates to violate the spirit of Bible and 
 Talmud. His interpretations of these mystic passages are therefore 
 expressed in allusions and half-concealed revelations. The diligent 
 student of the " Guide, " who is familiar with the philosophy of Aris- 
 totle as taught by the Arabs AJfarabi and Avicenna will be able with- 
 out much difficulty to solve Maimonides's allusions, the casual reader 
 will not. Without going into details it will suffice for our purpose to 
 say that in the creation story Maimonides finds the Aristotelian 
 
304 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 doctrines of matter and form, of the four elements, of potentiality 
 and actuality, of the different powers of the soul, of logical and ethical 
 distinctions (the true and the false on one hand, the good and the bad 
 on the other), and so on.^°° In the Vision of Ezekiel he sees the Peri- 
 patetic ideas of the celestial spheres, of their various motions, of their 
 souls, their intellects and the separate Intelligences, of the Active 
 Intellect, of the influence of the heavenly bodies on the changes in 
 the sublunar world, of the fifth element (the ether) and so on.^^^ Don 
 Isaac Abarbanel has already criticized this attempt of Maimonides 
 by justly arguing that if the meaning of the mysterious vision of 
 Ezekiel is what Maimonides thinks it is, there was no occasion to wrap 
 it in such obscurity, since the matter is plainly taught in all schools 
 of philosophy. ^°^ We might, however, reply that no less a man than 
 Plato expresses himself in the Timaeus in similarly obscure terms con- 
 cerning the origin and formation of the world. Be this as it may, 
 Munk is certainly right when he says that if, as is not improbable, 
 Ezekiel's vision does contain cosmological speculations, they have 
 nothing to do with the Aristotelian cosmology, but must be related 
 to Babylonian theories". ^°^ 
 
 Another favorite book of the Bible for the exegesis of philosophers 
 was the book of Job. In this Maimonides sees reflected the several 
 views concerning Providence, divine knowledge and human freedom, 
 which he enumerates (p. 290 ff.).^^^ 
 
 The influence of Maimonides upon his contemporaries and imme- 
 diate successors was indeed very great, and it was not confined to 
 Judaism. Christian Scholastics and Mohammedan theologians stud- 
 ied and used the Guide of the Perplexed. Maimonides himself, it 
 seems, though he wrote his "Guide" in the Arabic language, did not 
 desire to make it accessible to the Mohammedans, fearing possibly that 
 some of his doctrines concerning prophecy might be offensive to them. 
 Hence he is said to have instructed his friends and disciples not to 
 transliterate the Hebrew characters, which he in accordance with 
 general Jewish usage employed in writing Arabic, into Arabic char- 
 acters. But he was powerless to enforce his desire and there is no 
 doubt that such transcriptions were in use. Samuel Tibbon himself, 
 the Hebrew translator of the "Guide," made use of manuscript copies 
 written in Arabic letters. We are told that in the Mohammedan 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 305 
 
 schools in the city of Fez in Morocco, Jews were appointed to teach 
 Maimonides's philosophy, and there is extant in Hebrew translation 
 a commentary by a Mohammedan theologian on the twenty-five 
 philosophical propositions laid down by Maimonides as the basis of 
 his proof of the existence of God (p. 254).^''^ 
 
 The influence of Maimonides on Christian scholasticism is still 
 greater. We have already said (p. 199 f.) that the philosophical renais- 
 sance in Latin Europe during the thirteenth century was due to the 
 introduction of the complete works of Aristotle in Latin translation. 
 These translations were made partly from the Arabic versions of the 
 Mohammedans, partly from the Greek originals, which became 
 accessible after the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 
 1207.^° Before this time the scope of philosophical research and in- 
 vestigation in Christian Europe was limited, and its basis was the 
 Platonism of St. Augustine and fragments of Aristotle's logic. In 
 general Platonism was favorable to Christian dogma. Plato according 
 to Augustine came nearest to Christianity of all the ancient Greek 
 philosophers.^"'' And the dangers to Church doctrine which lurked 
 in philosophical discussion before the thirteenth century were a tend- 
 ency to Pantheism on the part of thinkers imbued with the Neo- 
 Platonic mode of thought, and an undue emphasis either on the unity 
 of God as opposed to the Trinity (Abelard), or on the Trinity at the 
 expense of the unity (Roscellinus of Compiegne) — conclusions re- 
 sulting from the attitudes of the thinkers in question on the nature 
 of universals. 
 
 In the early part of the thirteenth century for the first time, the 
 horizon of the Latin schoolmen was suddenly enlarged and brilliantly 
 illumined by the advent of the complete Aristotle in his severe, exacting 
 and rigorous panoply. All science and philosophy opened before the 
 impoverished schoolmen, famished for want of new ideas. And they 
 threw themselves with zeal and enthusiasm into the study of the new 
 philosophy. The Church took alarm because the new Aristotle con- 
 stituted a danger to accepted dogma. He taught the eternity of the 
 world, tiie uniformity of natural law, the unity of the human intellect, 
 denying by implication Providence and freedom and individual im- 
 mortality. Some of these doctrines were not precisely those of Aris- 
 totle but they could be derived from Aristotelian principles if inter- 
 
3o6 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 preted in a certain way; and the Arab intermediators between Aris- 
 totle and his Christian students had so interpreted him, Averroes in 
 particular, who gained the distinction of being the commentator par 
 excellence of Aristotle, was responsible for this mode of interpretation; 
 and he had his followers among the Masters of Arts in the University 
 of Paris. These and similar tendencies the Church was striving to 
 prevent, and it attempted to do this at first crudely by prohibiting 
 the study and teaching of the Physical and Metaphysical works of 
 Aristotle. Faihng in this the Papacy commissioned three represent- 
 atives of the Dominican order to expurgate Aristotle in order to render 
 him harmless. You might as well think of expurgating a book on 
 geometry! The task was never carried out. But instead something 
 more valuable for the welfare of the Church was accomplished in a 
 different way. Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas undertook the 
 study of Aristotle and the interpretation of his works with a view to 
 harmonizing his teachings with the dogmas of Christianity. Albertus 
 Magnus began the task, Thomas Aquinas, his greater disciple, the 
 Maimonides of Christian philosophy, completed it. And in this under- 
 taking Maimonides was Thomas Aquinas's model. ^"^ 
 
 The Guide of the Perplexed was translated into Latin not long after 
 its composition. ^°^ Before Albertus Magnus, Alexander of Hales, the 
 Franciscan leader, and William of Auvergne, the Bishop of Paris, had 
 read and made use of Maimonides's philosophical masterpiece. Al- 
 bertus Magnus was still more diligent in his adoption of Maimonidean 
 views, or in taking account of them, where he is opposed to their 
 adoption. But it remained for Thomas Aquinas, who made the most 
 systematic attempt in the mediaeval schools to harmonize the philos- 
 ophy of Aristotle with the doctrine of the Church, to use Maimonides 
 as his guide and model. Like Maimonides he employs Aristotelian 
 proofs for the existence of God, proofs based on the eternity of motion; 
 and like him Aquinas argues that if motion is not eternal and the world 
 was made in time, the existence of God is still more readily evident. 
 In his discussion of the divine attributes, of angels, of Providence, of 
 Prophecy, of free will, of the ceremonial laws in the Pentateuch, 
 Thomas Aquinas constantly takes account of Maimonides's views, 
 whether he agrees with them or not. It is no doubt an exaggeration 
 to say that there would have been no Aquinas if Maimonides had not 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 307 
 
 preceded him. For Aquinas had access to the works of Aristotle and 
 his Arabian commentators, the former of whom he studied more dil- 
 igently than Maimonides himself. But there is no doubt that the 
 method of harmonizing Aristotelian doctrine with traditional teaching 
 so far as the common elements of Judaism and Christianity were con- 
 cerned was suggested to Aquinas by his Jewish predecessor. It is not 
 our province here to go into details of the system of Aquinas to show 
 wherein he agrees or disagrees with Maimonides, nor is it possible to do 
 more than mention the fact that after Aquinas also, Duns Scotus, the 
 head of the Franciscan school, had the "Guide" before him, and in 
 comparatively modern times, such celebrities as Scaliger and Leibnitz 
 speak of the Jewish philosopher with admiration and respect. ^^" 
 
 That Maimonides's influence upon Jewish theology and thought was 
 deep and lasting is a truism. The attitude of the prominent theologians 
 and philosophers who succeeded him will appear in the sequel in con- 
 nection with our treatment of the post-Maimonidean writers. Here a 
 word must be said of the general effect of Maimonides's teaching upon 
 Jews and Judaism throughout the dispersion. His fame as the greatest 
 Jew of his time — great as a Talmudical authority, which appealed to 
 all classes of Jewish students, great as a physician with the added 
 glory of being a favorite at court, great as the head of the Jewish 
 community in the East, and finally great as a philosopher and sci- 
 entist — all these qualifications, never before or after united in the 
 same way in any other man, served to make him the cynosure of all 
 eyes and to make his word an object of notice and attention throughout 
 the Jewish diaspora. What he said or wrote could not be ignored 
 whether people liked it or not. They could afford to ignore a Gabirol 
 even, or an Ibn Daud. But Maimonides must be reckoned with. 
 The greater the man, the greater the alertness of lesser, though not less 
 independent, spirits, to guard against the enslavement of all Judaism 
 to one authority, no matter how great. And in particular where this 
 authority erred in boldly adopting views in disagreement with Jewish 
 tradition, as it seemed to many, and in setting up a new source of truth 
 alongside of, or even above, the revelation of the Torah and the author- 
 ity of tradition, to which these latter must be bent whether they will or 
 no — his errors must be strenuously opposed and condemned without 
 fear or favor. This was the view of the traditionalists, whose sole 
 
3o8 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 authorities in all matters of theology and related topics were the words 
 of Scripture and Rabbinic literature as tradition had interpreted them. 
 On the other hand, the rationalistic development during the past three 
 centuries, which we have traced thus far, and the climax of that 
 progress as capped by Maimonides was not without its influence on 
 another class of the Jewish community, particularly in Spain and 
 southern France; and these regarded Maimonides as the greatest 
 teacher that ever lived. Their admiration was unbounded for his 
 personaUty as well as his method and his conclusions. His opponents 
 were regarded as obscurantists, who, rather than the object of their 
 attack, were endangering Judaism. All Jewry was divided into two 
 camps, the Maimunists and the anti-Maimunists; and the polemic and 
 the struggle between them was long and bitter. Anathema and coun- 
 ter anathema, excommunication and counter excommunication was 
 the least of the matter. The arm of the Church Inquisition was in- 
 voked, and the altar of a Parisian Church furnished the torch which 
 set on flame the pages of Maimonides's "Guide" in the French capital. 
 More tragic even was the punishment meted out to the Jewish in- 
 formers who betrayed their people to the enemy. The men responsible 
 had their tongues cut out. 
 
 The details of the Maimunist controversy belong to the general 
 historian.^ ^^ Our purpose here is to indicate in brief outline the 
 general effect which the teaching of Maimonides had upon his and sub- 
 sequent ages. 'The thirteenth century produced no great men in 
 philosophy at aU comparable to Moses Ben Maimon or his famous 
 predecessors. The persecutions of the Jews in Spain led many of 
 them to emigrate to neighboring countries, which put an end to the 
 glorious era inaugurated three centuries before by Hasdai Ibn Shap- 
 rut. The centre of Jewish liberal studies was transferred to south 
 France, but the literary activities there were a pale shadow compared 
 with those which made Jewish Spain famous. Philosophical thought 
 had reached its perigee in Maimonides, and what followed after was 
 an attempt on the part of his lesser disciples and successors to follow 
 in the steps of their master, to extend his teachings, to make them 
 more widespread and more popular. With the transference of the 
 literary centre from Spain to Provence went the gradual disuse of 
 Arabic as the medium of philosophic and scientific culture, and the 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 309 
 
 age of translation made its appearance. Prior to, and including, 
 Maimonides all the Jewish thinkers whom we have considered, with 
 the exception of Abraham Bar Hiyya and Abraham Ibn Ezra, wrote 
 their works in Arabic. After Maimonides Hebrew takes the place 
 of Arabic, and in addition to the new works composed, the com- 
 mentaries on the "Guide" which were now written in plenty and the 
 philosophico-exegetical works on the Bible in the Maimonidean spirit, 
 the ancient classics of Saadia, Bahya, Gabirol, Halevi, Ibn Zaddik, 
 Ibn Daud and Maimonides himself had to be translated from Arabic 
 into Hebrew. In addition to these religio-philosophical works, it was 
 necessary to translate those writings which contained the purely sci- 
 entific and philosophical branches that were preliminary to the study 
 of religious philosophy. This included logic, the various branches 
 of mathematics and astronomy, medical treatises and some of the 
 books of the Aristotelian corpus with the Arabic compendia and com- 
 mentaries thereon. The grammatical and lexical treatises of Hayyuj 
 and Ibn Janah were also translated. The most famous of the host 
 of translators, which the need of the times brought forth, were the 
 three Tibbonides, Judah (11 20-1 190), Samuel (i 150-1230) and Moses 
 (fl. 1240-1283), Jacob Anatoli (fl. 1194-1256), Shemtob Falaquera 
 (1225-1290), Jacob Ben Machir (1236-1304), Moses of Narbonne 
 (d. after 1362), and others. Some of these wrote original works besides. 
 Samuel Ibn Tibbon wrote a philosophical treatise, " Ma'amar Yikkawu 
 ha-Mayim," ^^^ and commentaries in the Maimonidean vein on Ecclesi- 
 astes and the Song of Songs. His greater fam.e rests on his translation 
 of the " Guide of the Perplexed." He translated besides Maimonides's 
 "Letter on Resurrection," the "Eight Chapters," and other Arabic 
 writings on science and philosophy. Moses Ibn Tibbon was prolific 
 as an original writer as well as a translator. Joseph Ibn Aknin 
 (11 60-1 2 26), the favorite pupil of Maimonides, for whom the latter 
 wrote his "Guide," is the author of treatises on philosophical topics, 
 and of exegetical works on certain books of the Bible and on the 
 Mishnic treatise, the "Ethics of the Fathers."^^2a j^cob Anatoli, 
 in addition to translating Ptolemy's Almagest and Averroes's commen- 
 taries on Aristotle's logic, wrote a work, "Malmad ha-Talmidim," 
 on philosophical homiletics in the form of a commentary on the Penta- 
 teuch. ^^^ Shemtob Falaquera, the translator of portions of Gabirol's 
 
3IO MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 "Fons Vitae," ^^^ is the author of a commentary on the "Guide," en- 
 titled "Moreh ha-Moreh," ^^^ and of a number of ethical and psycho- 
 logical works.^^® Jacob Ben Machir translated a number of scientific 
 and philosophical works, particularly on astronomy, and is likewise 
 the author of two original works on astronomy. Joseph Ibn Caspi 
 (i 297-1340) was a very prolific writer, having twenty-nine works 
 to his credit, most of them exegetical, and among them a commentary 
 on the "Guide." ^^^ Moses of Narbonne wrote an important com- 
 mentary on the " Guide," ^^^ and is likewise the author of a number of 
 works on the philosophy of Averroes, of whom he was a great admirer. 
 The translations of Judah Ibn Tibbon, the father of translators as 
 he has been called, go back indeed to the latter half of the twelfth 
 century, and Abraham Ibn Ezra translated an astronomical work as 
 early as 1160. But the bulk of the work of translation is the product 
 of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The result of these trans- 
 lations was that scientific and philosophical works became accessible 
 to all those who knew Hebrew instead of being confined to the lands 
 of Arabian culture. Another effect was the enlargement of the He- 
 brew language and the development of a new Hebrew dialect with a 
 philosophical and scientific terminology. These translations so far 
 as they relate to pure science and philosophy were neglected in the 
 closing centuries of the middle ages, when conditions among the Jews 
 were such as precluded them from taking an interest in any but purely 
 religious studies. Continuous persecutions, the estabhshment of 
 the Ghettoes, the rise of the Kabbala and the opposition of the pietists 
 and mystics to the rationalism of the philosophers all tended to the 
 neglect of scientific study and to the concentration of all attention 
 upon the Biblical, Rabbmic and mystical literature. The Jews at 
 the close of the middle ages and the beginning of modern times with- 
 drew into their shell, and the science and learning of the outside had 
 Kttle effect on them. Hence, and also for the reason that with the 
 begmning of modern times all that was mediaeval was, in the secular 
 world, relegated, figuratively speaking, to the ash-heap, or literally 
 speaking to the mouldering dust of the library shelves — for both of 
 these reasons the very large number of the translations above men- 
 tioned were never printed, and they are still buried on the shelves of the 
 great European libraries, notably of the British Museum, the national 
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 3 II 
 
 library of Paris, the Bodleian of Oxford, the royal library of Munich, 
 and others. The reader who wishes to have an idea of the translating 
 and commenting activity of the Jews in the thirteenth and following 
 centuries in the domains of logic, philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, 
 medicine and folklore is referred to the monumental work of the late 
 Moritz Steinschneider, the prince of Hebrew Bibliographers, "Die 
 Hebraischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als 
 Dolmetscher, " (The Hebrew translations of the middle ages, and 
 the Jews as dragomen) Berlin, 1893, containing 1077 pages of lexicon 
 octavo size devoted to brief enumerations and descriptions of extant 
 editions and manuscripts of the translations referred to.^^^ 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 HILLEL BEN SAMUEL 
 
 In the post-Maimonidean age all philosophical thinking is in the 
 nature of a commentary on Maimonides whether avowedly or not. 
 The circle of speculation and reflection is complete. It is fixed by the 
 "Guide of the Perplexed," and the efforts of those who followed Mai- 
 monides are to elaborate in his spirit certain special topics which are 
 treated in his masterpiece in a summary way. In the case of the more 
 independent thinkers like Levi ben Gerson we find the further attempt 
 to carry out more boldly the implications of the philosophical point 
 of view, which, as the latter thought, Maimonides left implicit by 
 reason of his predisposition in favor of tradition. Hasdai Crescas 
 went still farther and entirely repudiated the authority of Aristotle, 
 substituting will and emotion for rationalism and logical inference. 
 Not knowledge of God as logically demonstrated is the highest aim 
 of man, but love of God. But even in his opposition Crescas leans on 
 Maimonides's principles, which he takes up one by one and refutes. 
 Maimonides was thus the point of departure for his more rigorous 
 followers as well as for his opponents. In the matter of external 
 sources philosophical reflection after Maimonides was enriched in re- 
 spect to details by the works of Averroes on the Arabic side and those 
 of the chief Christian scholastics among the Latin writers. Albertus 
 Magnus and Thomas Aquinas furnished some material to men like 
 Hillel of Verona in the thirteenth century and Don Isaac Abarbanel 
 in the fifteenth. Maimonides was limited to the Aristotelian exposi- 
 tions of Alfarabi and Avicenna. The works of Averroes, his contem- 
 porary, he did not read until toward the end of his life. After his 
 death Averroes gained in prestige and influence until he succeeded in 
 putting into the shade his Arabian predecessors and was regarded by 
 Jew and Christian alike as the Commentator of Aristotle par excellence. 
 His works were rapidly translated into Hebrew and Latin, and the 
 Jewish writers learned their Aristotle from Averroes. The knowledge 
 
 312 
 
HILLEL BEN SAMUEL 313 
 
 of the Arabic language was gradually disappearing among the Jews of 
 Europe, and they were indebted for their knowledge of science and 
 philosophy to the works translated. Philosophy was dechning among 
 the Arabs themselves owing to the disfavor of the powers that be, and 
 many of the scientific writings of the Arabs owe their survival to the 
 Hebrew translations or transcriptions in Hebrew characters which 
 escaped the proscription of the Mohammedan authorities. 
 
 The one problem that came to the front as a result of Averroes's 
 teaching, and which by the solution he gave it formed an important 
 subject of debate in the Parisian schools of the thirteenth century, 
 was that of the intellect in man, whether every individual had his own 
 immortal mind which would continue as an individual entity after the 
 death of the body, or whether a person's individuaUty lasted only as 
 long as he was alive, and with his death the one human intellect alone 
 survived. This was discussed in connection with the general theory of 
 the intellect and the three kinds of intellect that were distinguished by 
 the Arabian Aristotelians, the material, the acquired and the active. 
 The problem goes back to Aristotle's psychology, who distinguishes 
 two intellects in man, passive and active (above., p. xxxvi). But the 
 treatment there is so fragmentary and vague that it gave rise to 
 widely varying interpretations by the Greek commentators of Aris- 
 totle, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, as well as among the 
 Arabs, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes. The latter insisted on the 
 unity of the intellect for the human race, thereby destroying individual 
 immortahty, and this Averroistic doctrine, adopted by some Masters 
 of Arts at the University of Paris, was condemned among other her- 
 esies, and refuted in the writings of Albertus Magnus and Thomas 
 Aquinas. Maimonides does not discuss these problems in detail in 
 his "Guide." He drops a remark incidentally here and there, and it 
 would appear that for him too, as for Averroes, the intellect when in 
 separation from the body is not subject to individual distinction, that 
 there cannot be several human intellects, since matter is the principle 
 of individuation and the immaterial cannot embrace a number of in- 
 dividuals of the same species. ^^^ The problem of immortality he does 
 not treat ex professo in the "Guide." Hence this was a matter taken 
 up by his successors. Hillel ben Samuel as well as Levi ben Gerson 
 discuss this question in detail. 
 
314 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Hillel ben Samuel does not tower as a giant in mediaeval Jewish 
 literature. His importance is local, as being the first devotee of Jewish 
 learning and philosophy in Italy in the middle of the thirteenth cen- 
 tury, at the close of a period of comparative ignorance. The Italian 
 Jews before his time contributed little to knowledge and learning 
 despite their external circumstances, which were more favorable than 
 in some other countries. Hillel ben Samuel (12 20-1 295) was a strong 
 admirer of Maimonides and undertook to comment on the " Guide of 
 the Perplexed." He defended Maimonides against the aspersions of 
 his opponents, and was so confident in the truth of his master's teach- 
 ings that he proposed a conference of the learned men of Jewry to 
 judge the works and doctrines of Maimonides and to decide whether 
 the "Guide" should be allowed to live or should be destroyed. An- 
 other interest attaching to Hillel ben Samuel is that he was among the 
 first, if not the first Jew who by his knowledge of Latin had access to 
 the writings of the scholastics, to whom he refers in his "Tagmule ha- 
 Nefesh" (The Rewards of the Soul) as the "wise men of the nations." 
 He was also active as a translator from the Latin. 
 
 His chief work, which entitles him to brief notice here, is the "Tag- 
 mule ha-Nefesh" just mentioned.^-^ He does not offer us a system of 
 philosophy, but only a treatment of certain questions relating to the 
 nature of the soul, its immortality and the manner of its existence 
 after the death of the body, questions which Maimonides passes 
 over lightly. With the exception of the discussion relating to the 
 three kinds of intellect and the question of the unity of the ac- 
 quired intellect for all mankind, there is not much that is new or 
 remarkable in the discussion, and we can afford to pass it by with 
 a brief notice. 
 
 Men of science know, he tells us in the introduction, that the valu- 
 able possession of man is the soul, and the happiness thereof is the final 
 purpose of man's existence. And yet the number of those who take 
 pains to investigate the nature of the soul is very small, not even one 
 in a hundred. And even the few who do undertake to examine this 
 subject are hindered by various circumstances from arriving at the 
 truth. The matter itself is difficult and requires long preparation and 
 preliminary knowledge. Then the vicissitudes of life and the short- 
 ness of its duration, coupled with the natural indolence of man when 
 
HILLEL BEN SAMUEL 315 
 
 it comes to study, completely account for the lack of true knowledge 
 on this most important topic. 
 
 Induced by these considerations Hillel ben Samuel undertook to 
 collect the scattered notices in the extensive works of the philosophers 
 and arranged and expounded them briefly so as not to discourage those 
 who are in search of wisdom. His purpose is the knowledge of truth, 
 which is an end in itself. He desires to explain the existence of the 
 soul, its nature and reward. The soul is that which makes man man, 
 hence we should know the nature of that which makes us intelligent 
 creatures, else we do not deserve the name. 
 
 Another reason for the importance of knowing the nature of the 
 soul is that error in this matter may lead to more serious mistakes in 
 other departments of knowledge and behef . Thus if a man who calls 
 himself pious assumes that the soul after parting from the body is 
 subject to corporeal reward and punishment, as appears from a literal 
 rendering of passages in Bible and Talmud, he will be led to think that 
 the soul itself is corporeal. And since the soul, it is believed, comes 
 from on high, the upper world must have bodies and definite places, 
 and hence the angels too are bodies. But since the angels are emana- 
 tions from the divine splendor, God too is body! Thus you see how 
 serious are the consequences of a belief, in itself perhaps not so danger- 
 ous, as that of the corporeahty of the soul.^^^ 
 
 We must first prove the existence of the soul. This can be shown 
 in various ways. We see that of natural bodies some take food, grow, 
 propagate their like, while others, Uke stones, do not do these things. 
 This shows that the powers and functions mentioned cannot be due to 
 the corporeal part of the objects performing them, else stones, too, 
 would have those powers, as they are also corporeal like the rest. 
 There must therefore be a different principle, not body, which is 
 responsible for those activities. We call it soul. 
 
 As all existents are divided into substance and accident, the soul 
 must be either the one or the other. Now an accident, according to 
 Aristotle, is that which may be or not be without causing the being or 
 destruction of the object in which it is. But the body cannot be a living 
 body without the soul. Hence the soul is not an accident; it is there- 
 fore a substance. Substance may be corporeal or incorporeal. The 
 soul cannot be a corporeal substance, for all body is divisible, and sub- 
 
3i6 MEDIjEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ject to motion and change, whereas the soul, as will be shown later, is 
 not movable, not changeable and not divisible. It might seem that 
 the soul is subject to motion, since it descends into the body and rises 
 again when it leaves the body. But this is not so. Descent and ascent 
 when thus applied to the soul are metaphorical. The union of soul and 
 body is not a spatial relation. The upper world from which the soul 
 comes is not corporeal, hence there is no such thing as place there, nor 
 anything limited by space. Hence the coming of the soul from the 
 spiritual world and its return thither are not motions at all. The rela- 
 tion of the soul to the body is as that of form to matter, as Aristotle 
 says. 
 
 Granted that the soul's union with and separation from the body 
 are not motions, is not the soul subject to motion while in the body? 
 Hillel's answer is that it is not, and he proves his point in the pre- 
 scribed fashion by making use of Aristotle's classification of motion 
 into (i) genesis and (2) decay, (3) increase and (4) diminution, (5) 
 qualitative change and (6) motion proper, or motion of translation. 
 He then undertakes to show that the soul can have none of the kinds 
 of motion here enumerated. The arguments ofier nothing striking 
 or interesting, and we can afford to omit them. It is worth while, 
 however, to refer to his interpretation of emotion. The passage of 
 the soul from joy to grief, from anger to favor, might seem to be a 
 kind of motion. Hillel answers this objection by saying that these 
 emotions do not pertain to the soul as such. Their primary cause is 
 the state of mixture of the humors in the body, which affects certain 
 corporeal powers in certain ways; and the soul shares in these affec- 
 tions only so far as it is united with the body. In its own nature the 
 soul has no emotions. 
 
 We can also prove that the soul is not divisible. For a divisible 
 thing must have parts. Now if the soul is divided or divisible, this 
 means either that every part of the soul, no matter how small, has 
 the same powers as the whole, or that the powers of the soul are the 
 resultant of the union of the parts. The first alternative is impossible, 
 for it leads us to the absurd conclusion that instead of one soul every 
 person has an infinite number of souls, or at least a great number of 
 souls. The second alternative implies that while the soul is not actu- 
 ally divided, since its powers are the summation of the parts, which 
 
HILLEL BEN SAMUEL 317 
 
 form a unit, it is potentially divisible. But this signifies that at some 
 time this potential divisibility will be realized (or potentiality would 
 be vain and meaningless) and we are brought back to the absurdity 
 of a multiplicity of souls in the human body. 
 
 Having shown that the soul is not movable, changeable or divisible, 
 we are certain of its incorporeality, and we are ready to give a defini- 
 tion of the soul. Hillel accordingly defines the soul as "a stage of 
 emanation, consisting of a formal substance, which subsists through 
 its own perfection, and occupies the fourth place in the emanatory 
 process, next to the Active Intellect. Its ultimate source is God 
 himself, who is the ultimate perfection and the Good, and it emanates 
 from him indirectly through the mediation of the separate Powers 
 standing above it in the scale of emanation. The soul constitutes 
 the first entelechy of a natural body." ^^^ 
 
 The above definition is interesting. It shows that Hillel did not 
 clearly distinguish the AristoteUan standpoint from the Neo-Platonic, 
 for in the definition just quoted, the two points of view are combined. 
 That all mediceval Aristotelianism was tinged with Neo-Platonism, 
 especially in the doctrine of the Active Intellect, is well known. But 
 in Hillel's definition of the soul we have an extreme form of this pe- 
 culiar combination, and it represents a step backward to the stand- 
 point of Pseudo-Bahya and Ibn Zaddik. The work of Ibn Daud and 
 Maimonides in the interest of a purer Aristotelianism seems not to 
 have enlightened Hillel. The Neo-Platonic emanation theory is 
 clearly enunciated in Hillel's definition. The soul stands fourth in 
 the series. The order he has in mind is probably (i) God, (2) Separate 
 Intelligences, (3) Active Intellect, (4) Soul. We know that Hillel 
 was a student of the Neo-Platonic "Liber de Causis" {cf. above, 
 p. xx), having translated some of it into Hebrew, and he might have 
 imbibed his Neo-Platonism from that Proclean book. 
 
 Continuing the description of the soul in man, he says that the 
 noblest part of matter, viz., the human body, is endowed with the ra- 
 tional soul, and becomes the subject of the powers of the latter. 
 Thereby it becomes a man, z. e., a rational animal, distinguished from 
 all other animals, and similar to the nature of the angels. 
 
 The Active Intellect causes its light to emanate upon the rational 
 soul, thus bringing its powers out into actuality. The Active Intellect, 
 
3l8 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 which is one of the ten degrees of angels, is related to the rational 
 power in man as the sun to the power of sight. The sun gives light, 
 which changes the potentially seeing power into actually seeing, and 
 the potentially visible object into the actually visible. Moreover, 
 this same light enables the sight to see the sun itself, which is the cause 
 of the actualization in the sight. So the Active Intellect gives some- 
 thing to the rational power which is related to it as light to the sight; 
 and by means of this something the rational soul can see or under- 
 stand the Active Intellect itself. Also the potentially intelligible ob- 
 jects become through this influence actually intelligible, and the man 
 who was potentially intelligent becomes thereby actually intelligent. 
 
 Intellect ("sekel") in man is distinguished from wisdom ("hokmah"). 
 By the former power is meant an immediate understanding of abstract 
 principles. The latter is mediate understanding. Wisdom denotes 
 speculation about universals through inference from particulars. 
 Intellect applies directly to the universals and to their influence 
 upon the particulars.^^* 
 
 Hillel next discusses the live topic of the day, made popular by 
 Averroes, namely, whether there are in essence as many individual 
 souls as there are human bodies, or, as Averroes thought, there is 
 only one universal soul, and that its individualizations in different 
 men are only passing incidents, due to the association of the universal 
 soul with the hvmian body, and disappear when the body dies. The 
 ''sages of the Gentiles," Hillel tells us, regard Averroes's notion as 
 heretical, and leading besides to the absurd conclusion that the same 
 soul is both rewarded and punished; a view which upsets all religion. 
 Averroes employs a number of arguments to prove his point, among 
 them being the following. If there are many souls, they are either 
 all existing from eternity or they are created with the body. The 
 first is impossible, for since the soul is a form of the body, we should 
 have actually an infinite number of forms, and this would necessitate 
 the actual existence of an infinite number of bodies also; else the 
 existence of these souls for the purpose of joining the bodies would be 
 in vain. But it is absurd to suppose that there has been from eternity 
 an infinite number of bodies created like the number of souls, and 
 yet they have not become real bodies with souls until now. 
 
 The second alternative is also impossible. For if there are many 
 
HILLEL BEN SAMUEL 319 
 
 souls which came into being with the bodies, they either came from 
 nothing or from something. From nothing is impossible, for nothing 
 comes from nothing except by way of creation, which is a miracle; 
 and we do not believe in miracles unless we have to. That they came 
 from something is also impossible; for this something can be neither 
 matter nor form. It cannot be matter, for form, the actual and 
 superior, cannot come from the potential and inferior. It cannot be 
 form, for then form would proceed from form by way of genesis and 
 dissolution, which is not true. Matter is the cause of generation and 
 dissolution, not form. We are thus forced to the conclusion that the 
 soul is one and eternal, one in substance and nimiber; and that it 
 becomes many only per accidens, by virtue of the multiplicity of its 
 receiving subjects, comparable to the light of the one sun, which 
 divides into many rays. 
 
 The Bible cannot help us to decide this question, for its expressions 
 can be interpreted either way. Hillel then undertakes to adjudicate 
 between the contending views by striking a compromise. He feels 
 that he is contributing to the solution of an important problem by 
 an original suggestion, which he says is to be found nowhere else 
 expressed with such clearness and brevity. 
 
 Here again Hillel's Neo-Platonic tendencies are in evidence. For he 
 assumes both a universal soul and a great number of individual souls 
 emanating from it in a descending series. The objection that forms 
 cannot come from other forms by way of generation and dissolution, 
 Hillel says, is not valid, for no such process is here involved. Genera- 
 tion and dissolution is pecuhar to the action of body upon body, which 
 is by contact. A spiritual form acts upon other forms not through con- 
 tact, because it is not limited by time or place. We know concerning 
 the Intelligences that each comes from the one previous to it by way 
 of emanation, and the same thing applies to the issue of many human 
 souls from the one universal soul. After death the rational part of 
 every soul remains; that part which every soul receives from the 
 Active Intellect through the help of the possible or material intellect, 
 and which becomes identified with the Active and separate Intellect. 
 This is the part which receives reward and punishment, whereas the 
 one universal soul from which they all emanate is a divine emanation, 
 and is not rewarded or punished,^ ^^ 
 
320 . MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 We must now discuss further the nature of the three grades of in- 
 tellect. For this it will be necessary to lay down three preliminary 
 propositions. 
 
 1. There must be an intellect whose relation to the material intellect 
 is the same as that of the object of sense perception is to the sense. 
 This means that just as there must be a real and actual object to 
 arouse the sense faculty to perceive, so there must be an actual in- 
 telligible object to stir the rational power to comprehend. 
 
 2. It follows from i that as the material sense has the power of 
 perceiving the sensible object, so the material intellect has the power 
 of perceiving this other intellect. 
 
 3. If it has this power, this must at some time be realized in aciu. 
 Therefore at some time the material intellect is identified with the 
 other intellect, which is the Active Intellect. 
 
 We must now prove i. This is done as follows: We all know that 
 we are potentially intelligent, and it takes effort and pains and study 
 to become actually intelligent. In fact the process of intellection has 
 to pass several stages from sense perception through imagination. 
 Now our intellect cannot make itself pass from potentiality to ac- 
 tuality. Hence there must be something else as agent producing this 
 change ; and this agent must be actually what it induces in us. Hence 
 it is an active intellect. 
 
 The material intellect has certain aspects in common with the sense 
 faculty, and in certain aspects it differs. It is similar to it in being 
 receptive and not active. But the mode of receptivity is different 
 in the two. As the intellect understands all forms, it cannot be a 
 power residing in a body in the sense of extending through it and being 
 divided with the division of the body, as we see in some of the powers 
 of sense. This we can prove as follows: 
 
 1. If the intellect were receptive in the same manner as the senses, 
 it would receive only a definite kind of form, as for example the sense 
 of sight does not receive taste. 
 
 2. If the intellect were a power in body and had a special form, it 
 could not receive that form, just as for example if the eye were colored, 
 it could not perceive colors. 
 
 3. If the intellect were a corporeal power, it would be affected by 
 its object and injured by a powerful stimulus, as is the case in the 
 
HILLEL BEN SAMUEL 321 
 
 senses of sight and hearing. A dazzling light injures the eye, a deafen- 
 ing noise injures the ear, so that thereafter neither sense can perform 
 its normal function properly. This is -not true with the intellect. 
 An unusually difficult subject of thought does not injure the intellect. 
 
 4. If the intellect were similar in its activity to sense perception, 
 it would not be self-conscious, as the sense faculties cannot perceive 
 themselves. 
 
 5. The intellect, if it were like sense, would not be able to compre- 
 hend a thing and its opposite at the same time, or it would do so in 
 a confused manner, as is the case in the powers of sense. 
 
 6. The intellect perceives universals; the sense, particulars. 
 
 This being the case, there is a difference of opinion as to the natvue 
 of the material intellect. Some say that it has no definite nature 
 in itself except that of possibiUty and capacity, though it is different 
 from other possibilities in this respect that it is not resident in, and 
 dependent upon a material subject like the others. That is why 
 Aristotle says that the material intellect is not anything before it 
 intellects; that it is in its essence potential with reference to the 
 intelUgibilia, and becomes actual when it understands them ac- 
 tually. 
 
 Themistius says it is not any of the existents actually, but a poten- 
 tial essence receiving material forms. Its nature is analogous to 
 that of prime matter; hence it is called material intellect. It is best 
 to call it possible intellect. Being a potential existent it is not subject 
 to generation and dissolution any more than prime matter. 
 
 Alexander of Aphrodisias thinks the material intellect is only a 
 capacity, i. e., a power in the soul, and appears when the soul enters 
 the body, hence is not eternal a parte ante. 
 
 Averroes holds that the possible intellect is a separate substance, 
 and that the capacity is something it has by virtue of its being con- 
 nected with the body as its subject. Hence this capacity is neither 
 entirely distinct from it nor is it identical with it. According to him 
 the possible intellect is not a part of the soul. 
 
 Which of these views is correct, says Hillel, requires discussion, 
 but it is clear that whichever of these we adopt there is no reason 
 opposing the conjunction of the possible intellect with the Active. 
 For if it is an eternal substance, potential in its nature, like primary 
 
32 2 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 matter, then it becomes actual when it understands the intelligible 
 objects. The same is true if it is a capacity residing in the soul. 
 
 Hillel is thus of the opinion in this other question debated in those 
 days, whether the intellect of man is capable of conjunction during 
 life with the angelic Active Intellect, that it is. The Active Intellect, 
 he says, in actualizing the material intellect influences it not in the 
 manner of one body acting upon another, i. e., in the manner of an 
 efficient or material cause, but rather as its formal or final cause, 
 leading it to perfection. It is like the influence which the separate 
 Intelligences receive from one another, the influence of emanation, 
 and not a material influence comparable to generation. This recep- 
 tion of influence from the Active Intellect on the part of the potential 
 is itself conjunction. It means that the agent and the thing acted 
 upon become one, and the same substance and species. The material 
 intellect becomes a separate substance when it can understand it- 
 self.326 
 
 Before taking up the more theological problem of reward and pun- 
 ishment, he devotes the last section of the theoretical part of his book 
 to a discussion of the relation of the possible or material intellect to the 
 rest of the human soul. This problem also arose from Averroes's inter- 
 pretation of the Aristotelian psychology, and is closely related to the 
 other one of the unity of the human intellect. It is needless for us to 
 enter into the technical details which are a weariness to the flesh of the 
 modern student, but it is worth while to state briefly the motives 
 underlying the opposing views. Averroes, who had no theological 
 scruples, interpreted Aristotle to mean that the part of the soul which 
 was intimately associated with the body as its form, constituting an 
 indissoluble organism in conjunction with it, embraced its lower fac- 
 ulties of sense, imagination and the more concrete types of judgment. 
 These are so intimately bound up with the life of the body that they 
 die with its death. The reason on the other hand, which has to do with 
 immaterial ideas, or intelligibles as they called them, is eternal and 
 is not the form of the body. It is a unitary immaterial substance and 
 is not affected by the life or death of the body. To be sure it comes in 
 contact with the human soul during the life of the body, thus bringing 
 into existence an individualized human reason as a passing episode. 
 But this individualized phase of the intellect's life is dependent upon 
 
HILLEL BEN SAMUEL 323 
 
 the body and ceases when the body dies, or is reabsorbed in the univer- 
 sal intellect. 
 
 The theological implications of this view were that if there is any 
 reward and punishment after death, it would either have to be ad- 
 ministered to the lower faculties of the soul, which would have to be 
 made immortal for the purpose, or if the rational soul is the subject of 
 retribution, this cannot aflfect the individual, as there is no individual 
 rational soul. Hence the Christian opponents of Averroes, like Al- 
 bertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas (Hillel speaks of them here as the 
 "Rehgionists," or the "Sages who believe in religion"), endeavored 
 to vindicate for the Aristotehan definition of the soul as the form of the 
 body, also the rational part, thus maintaining the view that the reason 
 too has an individual existence both during life and after death. 
 Thomas Aquinas, as a truer interpreter of Aristotle, goes so far as to 
 maintain that the Active Intellect itself is also a part of the human 
 soul, and not one of the angelic separate Intelligences. Neither Mai- 
 monides nor Hillel ben Samuel, nor any other Jewish philosopher was 
 able to depart so widely from their Arabian masters or to undertake 
 an independent study of Aristotle's text, as to come to a similar con- 
 clusion. Hence the Active Intellect in Jewish Philosophy is unan- 
 imously held to be the last of the Angelic substances, and the proximate 
 inspirer of the prophet. The discussion therefore in Hillel's work con- 
 cerns the possible intellect, and here he ventures to disagree with 
 Averroes and decides in favor of the possible intellect as a part of the 
 soul and the subject of reward and punishment. ^^'' 
 
 Concerning the nature of reward and punishment after death 
 opinions are divided. Some think that both reward and punishment 
 are corporeal. Some say reward is spiritual, punishment is corporeal; 
 while a small number are of the opinion that both are spiritual. Hillel 
 naturally agrees with the latter and gives reasons for his opinion. If 
 the soul, as was shown before, is incorporeal, immaterial and a formal 
 substance, it cannot be influenced by corporeal treatment. For cor- 
 poreal influence implies motion on the part of agent and patient, and 
 the pervasion of the influence of the former through the parts of the 
 latter; whereas a spiritual substance has no parts. Besides, if reward 
 and punishment are corporeal, and Paradise is to be taken literally, 
 then why separate the soul from the body, why not reward the living 
 
324 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 person with eternal life and give him the enjoyment of paradise while 
 on earth? The effect would be much greater upon the rest of mankind, 
 who would see how the righteous fare and the wicked. The objection 
 that this would make people mercenary does not hold, for they are 
 mercenary in any case, since they expect reward; whether in this life 
 or in the next makes no difference. Reward must therefore be spir- 
 itual, and so must punishment, since the two go together. ^-^ 
 
 When God in his kindness favored the human race by giving them 
 a soul, which he united with the body, he also gave them the possibiUty 
 of attaining eternal happiness. For this purpose he arranged three 
 grades of ascent, viz., the three intellects spoken of above, the material 
 or possible intellect, the acquired intellect (this is the actual function- 
 ing of the possible intellect and the result thereof) and the active in- 
 tellect. The second intellect is partly speculative or theoretical and 
 partly practical. The theoretical intellect studies and contemplates 
 all intelligible existents which are separate from matter. There is 
 nothing practical in this contemplation, it is just the knowledge of 
 existents and their causes. This is called the science of truth, and is 
 the most important part of philosophy. 
 
 The practical intellect is again divided into the cogitative and the 
 technological. The former decides whether a thing should be done or 
 not, and discriminates between the proper and the improper in human 
 actions and qualities. It is important as a guide to the happiness of 
 the soul because it instructs the appetitive power in reference to those 
 things which are subject to the will, and directs it to aim at the good 
 and to reject the evil. 
 
 The technological intellect is that by which man learns arts and 
 trades. The practical intellect is also theoretical in the sense that it 
 has to think in order to discriminate between the proper and the im- 
 proper, and between the beneficial and injurious in all things pertaining 
 to practice. The difference between the speculative and practical 
 intellects is in the respective objects of their comprehension, and 
 hence is accidental and not essential. The objects of the theoretical 
 intellect are the true and the false; of the practical, the good and the 
 bad. The acquired intellect gives these intelligibles to the soul through 
 the possible intellect, and is intermediate between the latter and the 
 Active Intellect, which is one of the separate Intelligences above soul. 
 
HILLEL BEN SAMUEL 325 
 
 The Active Intellect watches over the rational animal that he may 
 attain to the happiness which his nature permits. 
 
 Men differ according to their temperamental composition and their 
 human conduct. This leads to differences in the power of understand- 
 ing and in the amount of influence received from the Active Intellect. 
 Hillel quotes Maimonides in support of his view that the prophetic 
 stage is an emanation of glory from God through the medium of the 
 Active Intellect, which exerts its influence upon the rational power 
 and upon the imagination, so that the prophet sees his vision objec- 
 tified extra animam. The three conditions requisite for prophecy are 
 perfection in theory, perfection in imagination and perfection in 
 morals. The first without the second and third produces a philosopher; 
 the second without the first and third gives rise to a statesman or 
 magician. 
 
 It is important to know, he tells us, that the cultivation of the reason 
 and imagination alone is not sufl&cient. Practice of the command- 
 ments is very important. Hence a man must guide properly the two 
 powers of sense perception and desire, which are instruments of the 
 rational power. For, as Maimonides says in his commentary on 
 Aboth (c/. p. 282), all observance and violation of the commandments, 
 good and bad qualities depend upon those two powers. Without a 
 proper training of these the influence of the active intellect upon the 
 reason and imagination may lead to evil. 
 
 Beginning with sense perception a man must train all his five senses 
 to attend only to what is good and to turn away from evil. When he 
 satisfies his sensuous desires, he must do this in order to preserve his 
 body that he may be enabled to serve God in the best possible 
 way. 
 
 The same applies to the power of desire. This is the power which 
 directs one to pursue the agreeable and shun the disagreeable. From it 
 proceed also courage, confidence, anger, good will, joy, sorrow, humil- 
 ity, pride. All these qualities must be used in the service of God. If 
 a man do this, he will attain the grade of an angelic being even during 
 life, and will be able to perform miracles like the prophets and the 
 sages of the Talmud. 
 
 After death the souls of such men reach even a higher degree than 
 they had before entering the body, as a reward for not allowing them- 
 
326 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 selves to be degraded by their corporeal desires, but on the contrary- 
 directing these to higher aims.^-^ 
 
 As for the nature of reward and punishment more particularly, we 
 may say that the soul of the wicked loses all the glory promised to her 
 and descends to a position lower than was hers originally. She is ex- 
 pelled from the land of life and remains in darkness forever, without 
 returning to her original station. Knowing what she has lost, she will 
 feel continuous distress, sorrow and fear, for the power of imagination 
 remains with the soul after death. But there is no physical burning 
 with fire. On the other hand, the soul of the righteous will return to 
 God. 
 
 The doctrine of the resurrection and the explanation for it are a 
 further proof that the soul after death is not punished corporeally. 
 The motive of the resurrection is that the soul and body may receive 
 their compensation together as in life. If then the retribution of the 
 soul is corporeal, there is no need of resurrection. ^^° 
 
 Hillel then proceeds to show that the words of the Rabbis which 
 seem to speak for corporeal retribution are not to be taken literally. 
 In this connection it is worth while to reproduce his classification of 
 the contents of the Talmud and his attitude toward them. He enu- 
 merates six classes. 
 
 1. Passages in the Talmudic and Midrashic literature which must 
 be taken literally. These are the discussions of the Halaka (the legal 
 and ceremonial portions). To pervert these from their literal meaning, 
 or to maintain that the intention of the law is the important thing 
 and not the practice of the ceremony, is heresy and infidelity; though 
 it is meritorious to seek for an explanation of every law, as the Rabbis 
 themselves do in many instances. 
 
 2. Passages which should be understood as parables and allegories 
 with a deeper meaning. These are the peculiar Haggadahs, or the 
 strange interpretations of Biblical verses where no ceremonial precept 
 is involved. 
 
 3. Statements similar to those of the Prophetical books of the 
 Bible, which were the result of the influence of the Active Intellect 
 and came to the sages in a dream or in the waking state, speaking of 
 the future in an allegorical manner. These are the extraordinary 
 tales found in the Talmud, which cannot be understood literally, as 
 
HILLEL BEN SAMUEL 327 
 
 they involve a violation of the order of nature; and no miracle must 
 be believed unless for a very important reason. 
 
 4. The homilies addressed to the people on the occasion of holidays 
 for the purpose of exhorting them to divine worship and observance 
 of the Law. Many of these are hyperbolical in their expression, 
 especially in the promises concerning the future blessings in store 
 for the people. These were in the nature of encouragement to the 
 people to make their burdens easier to bear. Here belong also unusual 
 interpretations of Bibhcal verses, explanations which do not give the 
 original meaning of the verse in question, but are suggested in order 
 to interest the people. We must add, too, stories of the good things 
 that came to pious people in return for their piety. These must be 
 taken for the most part literally, unless they are clearly improbable. 
 
 5. Jokes and jests by way of relief from the strain of study. Hy- 
 perboles belong here. 
 
 6. Narratives of miracles done for pious people, such as reviving 
 the dead, punishing with death by means of a word, bringing down 
 rain, and so on. All these must be taken literally. To disbelieve is 
 heresy. This is true only where the alleged miracles were done for a 
 high purpose, otherwise we need not believe them. 
 
 The reason the Bible and the Talmud express themselves in corpo- 
 real terms concerning reward and punishment is in order to frighten 
 the people and to impress them with the terrible punishment conse- 
 quent upon wrongdoing. The people do not understand any reward 
 and punishment unless it is physical and corporeal. In reality spirit- 
 ual existence is more real than physical.^^^ 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 LEVI BEN GERSON 
 
 Among the men who devoted themselves to philosophical investi- 
 gation in the century and a half after Maimonides's death, the greatest 
 and most independent was without doubt Levi ben Gerson or Ger- 
 sonides, as he is also called. There were others who were active as 
 commentators, translators and original writers, and who achieved 
 a certain fame, but their work was too little original to merit more 
 than very brief notice in these pages. Isaac Albalag^^^** (second half 
 of thirteenth century) owes what reputation he enjoys to the boldness 
 with which he enunciated certain doctrines, such as the eternity of 
 the world and particularly the notion, well enough known among the 
 Averroists of the University of Paris at that time and condemned 
 by the Church, but never before aimounced or defended in Jewish 
 philosophy — the so-called doctrine of the twofold truth. This was 
 an attitude assumed in self-defence, sincerely or not as the case may 
 be, by a number of scholastic writers, who advanced philosophic 
 views at variance with the dogma of the Church. They maintained 
 that a given thesis might be true and false at the same time, true for 
 philosophy and false for theology, or vice versa. ^^^ Shera Tob Fala- 
 quera (12 25-1 290) is a more important man than Albalag. He was a 
 thorough student of the AristoteUan and other philosophy that was 
 accessible to him through his knowledge of Arabic. Munk's success 
 in identifying Avicebron with Gabirol (p. 63) was made possible 
 by Falaquera's translation into Hebrew of extracts from the "Fons 
 Vitse." Of great importance also is Falaquera's commentary of Mai- 
 monides's " Guide, " which, with that of Moses of Narbonne (d. after 
 1362), is based upon a knowledge of Arabic and a thorough familiarity 
 with the Aristotelian philosophy of the Arabs, and is superior to the 
 better known commentaries of Shemtob, Ephodi, and Abarbanel, 
 Falaquera also wrote original works of an ethical and philosophical 
 character. 
 
 328 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 329 
 
 Joseph Ibn Caspi (i 297-1340) is likewise a meritorious figure as a 
 commentator of Maimonides and as a philosophical exegete of Scrip- 
 ture. But none of these men stands out as an independent thinker 
 with a strong individuahty, carrying forward in any important and 
 authoritative degree the work of the great Maimonides. Great Tal- 
 mudic knowledge, which was a necessary qualification for national 
 recognition, these men seem not to have had; and on the other hand 
 none of them felt called upon or able to make a systematic synthesis 
 of philosophy and Judaism in a large way. 
 
 Levi ben Gerson (i 288-1344) was the first after Maimonides who 
 can at all be compared with the great sage of Fostat. He was a great 
 mathematician and astronomer; he wrote supercommentaries on 
 the Aristotelian commentaries of Averroes, who in his day had become 
 the source of philosophical knowledge for the Hebrew student; he 
 was thoroughly versed in the Talmud as his commentary on the 
 Pentateuch shows; and he is one of the recognized Biblical exegetes 
 of the middle ages. Finally in his philosophical masterpiece "Mil- 
 hamot Adonai" (The Wars of the Lord),^^^ he undertakes to solve 
 in a thoroughly scholastic manner those problems in philosophy and 
 theology which Maimonides had either not treated adequately or 
 had not solved to Gersonides's satisfaction. That despite the techni- 
 cal character and style of the "Milhamot," Gersonides achieved such 
 great reputation shows in what esteem his learning and critical power 
 were held by his contemporaries. His works were all written in He- 
 brew, and if he had any knowledge of Arabic and Latin it was very 
 limited, too limited to enable him to make use of the important works 
 written in those languages.^^^ His fame extended beyond the limits of 
 Jewish thought, as is shown by the fact that his scientific treatise deal- 
 ing with the astronomical instrument he had discovered was translated 
 into Latin in 1377 by order of Pope Clement VI, and his supercom- 
 mentaries on the early books of the Aristotelian logic were incor- 
 porated, in Latin translation, in the Latin editions of Aristotle and 
 Averroes of the i6th century.^^^ 
 
 Levi ben Gerson's general attitude to philosophical study and its 
 relation to the content of Scripture is the same as had become common 
 property through Maimonides and his predecessors. The happiness 
 and perfection of man are the purpose of religion and knowledge. 
 
330 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 This perfection of man, or which is the same thing, the perfection of 
 the human soul, is brought about through perfection in morals and 
 in theoretical speculation, as will appear more clearly when we dis- 
 cuss the nature of the human intellect and its immortality. Hence 
 the purpose of the Bible is to lead man to perfect himself in these two 
 elements — morals and science. For this reason the Law consists of 
 three parts. The first is the legal portion of the Law containing the 
 613 commandments, mandatory and prohibitive, concerning belief 
 and practice. This is preparatory to the second and third divisions 
 of the Pentateuch, which deal respectively with social and ethical 
 conduct, and the science of existence. As far as ethics is concerned 
 it was not practicable to lay down definite commandments and pro- 
 hibitions because it is so extremely difi&cult to reach perfection in 
 this aspect of life. Thus if the Torah gave definite prescriptions for 
 exercising and controlling our anger, our joy, our courage, and so on, 
 the results would be very discouraging, for the majority of men would 
 be constantly disobeying them. And this would lead to the neglect 
 of the other commandments likewise. Hence the principles of social 
 and ethical conduct are inculcated indirectly by means of narratives 
 exemplifying certain types of character in action and the consequences 
 flowing from their conduct. The third division, as was said before, 
 contains certain teachings of a metaphysical character respecting the 
 nature of existence. This is the most important of all, and hence 
 forms the beginning of the Pentateuch. The account of creation is a 
 study in the principles of philosophical physics. ^^^ 
 
 As to the relations of reason and belief or authority, Levi ben 
 Gerson shares in the optimism of the Maimonidean school and the 
 philosophic middle age generally, that there is no opposition between 
 them. The priority should be given to reason where its demands 
 are unequivocal, for the meaning of the Scriptures is not always clear 
 and is subject to interpretation.^^'' On the other hand, after having 
 devoted an entire book of his "Milhamot" to a minute investigation 
 of the nature of the human intellect and the conditions of its immor- 
 tality, he disarms in advance all possible criticism of his position from 
 the religious point of view by saying that he is ready to abandon his 
 doctrine if it is shown that it is in disagreement with religious dogma. 
 He developed his views, he tells us, because he believes that they are 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 331 
 
 in agreement with the words of the Torah,^^^ This apparent contra- 
 diction is to be explained by making a distinction between the abstract 
 statement of the principle and the concrete application thereof. In 
 general Levi ben Gerson is so convinced of man's prerogative as a 
 rational being that he cannot believe the Bible meant to force upon 
 him the behef in things which are opposed to reason. Hence, since 
 the Bible is subject to interpretation, the demands of the reason are 
 paramount where they do not admit of doubt. On the other hand, 
 where the traditional dogma of Judaism is clear and outspoken, it is 
 incumbent upon man to be modest and not to claim the infallibility 
 of direct revelation for the Hmited powers of logical inference and 
 deduction. 
 
 We must now give a brief account of the questions discussed in the 
 "Milhamot Adonai." And first a word about Gersonides's style and 
 method. One is reminded, in reading the Milhamot, of Aristotle as 
 well as Thomas Aquinas. There is no rhetoric and there are no super- 
 fluous words. All is precise and technical, and the vocabulary is small. 
 One is surprised to see how in a brief century or so the Hebrew lan- 
 guage has become so flexible an instrument in the expression of Aris- 
 totelian ideas. Levi ben Gerson does not labor in the expression of his 
 thought. His hnguistic instrument is quite adequate and yields nat- 
 urally to the manipulation of the author. Gersonides, the minute 
 logician and analyst, has no use for rhetorical flourishes and figures 
 of speech. The subject, he says, is difficult enough as it is, without 
 being made more so by rhetorical obscuration, unless one intends to 
 hide the confusion of one's thought under the mask of fine writing. ^^^ 
 Like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, he gives a history of the opinions 
 of others in the topic under discussion, and enumerates long lists of 
 arguments pro and con with rigorous logical precision. The effect 
 upon the reader is monotonous and wearisome. Aristotle escapes this 
 by the fact that he is groping his way before us. He has not all his 
 ideas formulated in proper order and form ready to deliver. He is 
 primarily the investigator, not the pedagogue, and the brevity and 
 obscurity of his style pique the ambitious reader and spur him on to 
 puzzle out the meaning. Not so Thomas Aquinas and the scholastics 
 generally. As the term scholastic indicates, they developed their 
 method in the schools. They were expositors of what was ready made, 
 
332 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 rather than searchers for the new. Hence the question of form was an 
 important one and was determined by the purpose of presenting one's 
 ideas as clearly as may be to the student. Add to this that the logic 
 of Aristotle and the syllogism was the universal method of presenta- 
 tion and the monotony and wearisomeness becomes evident. Levi ben 
 Gerson is in this respect like Aquinas rather than like Aristotle. And 
 he is the first of his kind in Jewish literature. Since the larger views 
 and problems were already common property, the efforts of Gersonides 
 were directed to a more minute discussion of the more technical de- 
 tails of such problems as the human intellect, prophecy. Providence, 
 creation, and so on. For this reason, too, it will not be necessary for 
 us to do more than give a brief resume of the results of Gersonides's 
 lucubrations without entering into the really bewildering and hair- 
 splitting arguments and distinctions which make the book so hard on 
 the reader. 
 
 We have already had occasion in the Introduction (p. xxxvi) to refer 
 briefly to Aristotle's theory of the intellect and the distinction between 
 the passive and the active intellects in man. The ideas of the Arabs 
 were also referred to in our treatment of Judah Halevi, Ibn Daud and 
 Maimonides (pp. i8o f., 213 f., 282). Hillel ben Samuel, as we saw 
 (p. 317 ff.), was the first among the Jews who undertook to discuss in 
 greater detail the essence of the three kinds of intellect, material, ac- 
 quired and active, as taught by the Mohammedan and Christian Scho- 
 lastics, and devoted some space to the question of the unity of the ma- 
 terial intellect. Levi ben Gerson takes up the same question of the 
 nature of the material intellect and discusses the various views with 
 more rigor and minuteness than any of his Jewish predecessors. His 
 chief source was Averroes. The principal views concerning the nature 
 of the possible or material intellect in man were those attributed to 
 Alexander of Aphrodisias, the most important Greek commentator of 
 Aristotle (lived about 200 of the Christian Era), Themistius, another 
 Aristotelian Greek commentator who lived in the time of Emperor Jul- 
 ian, and Averroes, the famous Arabian philosopher and contemporary 
 of Maimonides. All these three writers pretended to expound Aristotle's 
 views of the passive intellect rather than propound their own. And 
 Levi ben Gerson discusses their ideas before giving his own. 
 
 Alexander's idea of the passive intellect in man is that it is simply 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 7,7,$ 
 
 a capacity residing in the soul for receiving the universal forms of 
 material things. It has no substantiality of its own, and hence does 
 not survive the lower functions of the soul, namely, sensation and 
 imagination, which die with the body. This passive intellect is actual- 
 ized through the Active Intellect, which is not a part of man at all, but 
 is identified by Alexander wdth God. The Active Intellect is thus pure 
 form and actuality, and enables the material or possible intellect in 
 man, originally a mere potentiahty, to acquire general ideas, and 
 thus to become an intellect with a content. This is called the actual 
 or acquired intellect, which though at first dependent on the data of 
 sense, may succeed later in continuing its activity unaided by sense 
 perception. And in so far as the acquired intellect thinks of the purely 
 immaterial ideas and things which make up the content of the divine 
 intellect (the Active Intellect), it becomes identified with the latter 
 and is immortal. The reason for supposing that the material intellect 
 in man is a mere capacity residing in the soul and not an independent 
 substance is because as having the capacity to receive all kinds of 
 forms it must itself not be of any form. Thus in order that the sense 
 of sight may receive all colors as they are, it must itself be free from 
 color. If the sight had a color of its own, this would prevent it from 
 recei\'ing other colors. Applying this principle to the intellect we make 
 the same inference that it must in itself be neutral, not identified with 
 any one idea or form, else this would color all else knocking for admis- 
 sion, and the mind would not know things as they are. Now a faculty 
 which has no form of its owm, but is a mere mirror so to speak of all 
 that may be reflected in it, cannot be a substance, and must be simply 
 a power inherent in a substance and subject to the same fate as that 
 in which it inheres. This explains the motive of Alexander's view and 
 is at the same time a criticism of the doctrine of Themistius. 
 
 This commentator is of the opinion that the passive intellect of 
 which Aristotle speaks is not a mere capacity inherent in something 
 else, but a real spiritual entity or substance independent of the lower 
 parts of the soul, though associated with them during the life of the 
 body, and hence is not subject to generation and destruction, but 
 is eternal. In support of this view may be urged that if the passive 
 intellect were merely a capacity of the lower parts of the soul, we 
 should expect it to grow weaker as the person grows older and his 
 
334 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 sensitive and imaginative powers are beginning to decline; whereas the 
 contrary is the case. The older the person the keener is his intellect. 
 The difficulty, however, remains that if the human intellect is a real 
 substance independent of the rest of the soul, why is it that at its 
 first appearance in the human being it is extremely poor in content, 
 being all but empty, and grows as the rest of the body and the soul is 
 developed? 
 
 To obviate these difficulties, Averroes in his commentary on the 
 De Anima of Aristotle practically identifies (according to Levi ben 
 Gerson's view of Averroes) the material intellect with the Active 
 Intellect. The Active Intellect according to him is neither identical 
 with the divine, as Alexander maintains, nor is it a part of man, as 
 Themistius and others think, but is the last of the separate Intelh- 
 gences, next to the spiritual mover of the lunar sphere. It is a pure 
 actuahty, absolutely free from matter, and hence eternal. This 
 Active Intellect in some mysterious manner becomes associated with 
 man, and this association results in a temporary phase represented by 
 the material intellect. As a result of the sense perceptions, images of 
 the external objects remain in the imagination, and the Active Intel- 
 lect takes hold of these images, which are potentially universal ideas, 
 and by its illumination produces out of them actual ideas and an 
 intellect in which they reside, the material intellect. The material 
 intellect is therefore the result of the combination of the Active In- 
 tellect with the memory images, known as phantasmata {<^avrd(j[iaTa), 
 in the human faculty of imagination. So long as this association exists, 
 the material intellect receives the intelligible forms as derived from 
 the phantasmata, and these forms are represented by such ideas as "all 
 animal is sensitive," "all man is rational," i. e., ideas concerning the 
 objects of this world. This phase of man's mind ceases when the body 
 dies, and the Active Intellect alone remains, whose content is free 
 from material forms. The Active Intellect contemplates itself, a pure 
 intelligence. At the same time it is possible for man to identify him- 
 seK with the Active Intellect as he acquires knowledge in the material 
 intellect, for the Active Intellect is like light which makes the eye see. 
 In seeing, the eye not merely perceives the form of the external object, 
 but indirectly also receives the light which made the object visible. 
 In the same way the human soul in acquiring knowledge as implicit 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 335 
 
 in its phantasmata, at the same time gets a glimpse of the spiritual 
 light which converted the phantasma into an explicit idea (cf. above, 
 p. 320). When the soul in man perfects itseK with all the knowledge 
 of this world it becomes identified with the Active Intellect, which 
 may be likened to the intellect or soul of the corporeal world. 
 
 In this combination of the views of Alexander and Themistius 
 Averroes succeeds in obviating the criticisms levelled at the two 
 former. That the power of the material intellect grows keener with 
 age though the corporeal organs are weaker, supports Averroes's doc- 
 trine as against Alexander, to whom it is a mere capacity dependent 
 upon the mixture of the elements in the human body. But neither 
 is he subject to the objection applying to Themistius's view, that a 
 real independent entity could scarcely be void of all forms and a mere 
 receptacle. For the material intellect as it really is in itself when not 
 in combination with the human body is not a mere receptacle or 
 empty potentiality. It is the Active Intellect, which combines in 
 itself all immaterial forms and thinks them as it thinks itself. It is 
 only in its individualized aspect that it becomes a potential intellect 
 ready to receive all material forms. 
 
 But what Averroes gains here he loses elsewhere. There are certain 
 considerations which are fatal to his doctrine. Thus it would follow 
 that theoretical studies which have no practical aim are useless. 
 But this is impossible. Nature has put in us the ability as well as 
 the desire to speculate without reference to practical results. The 
 pleasure we derive from theoretical studies is much greater than that 
 afforded by the practical arts and trades. And nature does nothing 
 in vain. Theoretical studies must therefore have some value. But 
 in Averroes's theory of the material intellect they have none. For 
 all values may be divided into those which promote the life of the body 
 and those which lead to the final happiness of man. The former is 
 clearly not served by those theoretical speculations which have no 
 practical aim. On the contrary, they hinder it. Deep students of the 
 theoretical sciences forego all bodily pleasures, and often do without 
 necessities. But neither can there be any advantage in theoretical 
 speculation for ultimate human happiness. For human happiness 
 according to Averroes (and he is in a sense right, as we shall see later) 
 consists in union with the Active Intellect. But this union takes 
 
336 MEDIMVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 place as a matter of course according to his theory at the time of death, 
 whether a man be wise or a fool. For the Active Intellect then ab- 
 sorbs the material. 
 
 Another objection to Averroes's theory is the following. If the 
 material intellect is in essence the same as the Active Intellect, it is 
 a separate, immaterial substance, and hence is, like the Active In- 
 tellect, one. For only that which has matter as its substratum can 
 be quantitatively differentiated. Thus A is numerically different from 
 B, though A and B are both men {i. e., qualitatively the same), because 
 they are corporeal beings. Forms as such can be differentiated quali- 
 tatively only. Horse is different from ass in quality. Horse as such 
 and horse as such are the same. It follows from this that the material 
 intellect, being like the Active Intellect an immaterial form, cannot 
 be numerically multiplied, and therefore is one only. But if so, no 
 end of absurdities follows. For it means that all men have the same 
 intellect, hence the latter is wise and ignorant at the same time in 
 reference to the same thing, in so far as A knows a given thing and B 
 does not know it. It would also follow that A can make use of B's 
 sense experience and build his knowledge upon it. All these inferences 
 are absurd, and they all follow from the assumption that the material 
 intellect is in essence the same as the Active Intellect. Hence Aver- 
 roes's position is imtenable.^^ 
 
 Gersonides then gives his own view of the material intellect, which 
 is similar to that of Alexander. The material intellect is a capacity, 
 and the prime matter is the ultimate subject in which it inheres. But 
 there are other powers or forms inhering in matter prior to the material 
 intellect. Prime matter as such is not endowed with intellect, or all 
 things would have human reason. Prime matter when it reaches the 
 stage of development of the imaginative faculty is then ready to 
 receive the material intellect. We may say then that the sensitive 
 soul, of which the imaginative faculty is a part, is the subject in which 
 the material intellect inheres. The criticism directed against Alexan- 
 der, which applies here also, may be answered as follows. The material 
 intellect is dependent upon its subject, the sensitive soul, for its exist- 
 ence only, not for the manner of receiving its knowledge. Hence 
 the weakening or strengthening of its subject cannot affect it directly 
 at all. Indirectly there is a relation between the two, and it works 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 337 
 
 in the reverse direction. When the sensitive powers are weakened 
 and their activities diminish, there is more opportunity for the in- 
 tellect to monopolize the one soul for itself and increase its own ac- 
 tivity, which the other powers have a tendency to hinder, since the 
 soul is one for all these contending powers. It follows of course that 
 the material intellect in man is not immortal. As a capacity of the 
 sensitive soul, it dies with the latter. What part of the human soul 
 it is that enjoys immortality and on what conditions we shall see later. 
 But before we do this, we must try to understand the nature of the 
 Active Intellect. ^"^ 
 
 We know now that the function of the Active Intellect is to actualize 
 the material intellect, i. e., to develop the capacity which the latter 
 has of extracting general ideas from the particular memory images 
 (phantasmata) in the faculty of imagination, so that this capacity, 
 originally empty of any content, receives the ideas thus produced, 
 and is thus constituted into an actual intellect. From this it follows 
 that the Active Intellect, which enables the material intellect to form 
 ideas, must itself have the ideas it induces in the latter, though not 
 necessarily in the same form. Thus an artisan, who imposes the form 
 of chair upon a piece of wood, must have the form of chair in his mind, 
 though not the same sort as he realizes in the wood. Now as all the 
 ideas acquired by the material intellect constitute one single activity 
 so far as the end and purpose is concerned (for it all leads to the 
 perfection of the person), the agent which is the cause of it all must 
 also be one. Hence there are not many Active Intellects, each re- 
 sponsible for certain ideas, but one Intellect is the cause of all the ideas 
 realized in the material intellect. Moreover, as this Active Intellect 
 gives the material intellect not merely a knowledge of separate ideas, 
 but also an understanding of their relations to each other, in other 
 words of the systematic unity connecting all ideas into one whole, 
 it follows that the Active Intellect has a knowledge of the ideas from 
 their unitary aspect. In other words, the unity of purpose and aim 
 which is evident in the development of nature from the prime matter 
 through the forms of the elements, the plant soul, the animal soul 
 and up to the human reason, where the lower is for the sake of the 
 higher, must reside as a unitary conception in the Active Intellect. 
 
 For the Active Intellect has another function besides developing 
 
338 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the rational capacity in man. We can arrive at this insight by a con- 
 sideration undertaken from a different point of view. If we consider 
 the wonderful and mysterious development of a seed, which is only 
 a piece of matter, in a purposive manner, passing through various 
 stages and producing a highly complicated organism with psychic 
 powers, we must come to the conclusion, as Aristotle does, that there 
 is an intellect operating in this development. As all sublunar nature 
 shows a unity of purpose, this intellect must be one. And as it can- 
 not be like one of its products, it must be eternal and not subject to 
 generation and decay. But these are the attributes which, on grounds 
 taken from the consideration of the intellectual activity in man, we 
 ascribed to the Active Intellect. Hence it is the Active Intellect. 
 And we have thus shown that it has two functions. One is to endow 
 sublunar nature with the intelligence and purpose visible in its proc- 
 esses and evolutions; the other is to enable the rational power in man 
 to rise from a tabula rasa to an actual intellect with a content. From 
 both these activities it is evident that the Active Intellect has a knowl- 
 edge of sublunar creation as a systematic unity. 
 
 This conception of the Active Intellect, Levi ben Gerson says, will 
 also answer all the difficulties by which other philosophers are troubled 
 concerning the possibility of knowledge and the nature of definition. 
 The problems are briefly these. Knowledge concerns itself with the 
 permanent and universal. There can be no real knowledge of the 
 particular, for the particular is never the same, it is constantly 
 changing and in the end disappears altogether. On the other hand, 
 the universal has no real existence outside of the mind, for the ob- 
 jectively real is the particular thing. The only really existing man is 
 A or B or C ; man in general, man that is not a particular individual 
 man, has no objective extra-mental existence. Here is a dilemma. 
 The only thing we can really know is the thing that is not real, and the 
 only real thing is that which we cannot know. The Platonists solve 
 this difficulty by boldly declaring that the universal ideas or forms 
 are the real existents and the models of the things of sense. This is 
 absurd. Aristotle's solution in the Metaphysics is likewise unsatisfac- 
 tory. Our conception, however, of the Active Intellect enables us 
 to solve this problem satisfactorily. The object of knowledge is not 
 the particular thing which is constantly changing; nor yet the logical 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 339 
 
 abstraction which is only in the mind. It is the real unity of sublunar 
 nature as it exists in the Active Intellect. 
 
 The problem of the definition is closely related to that of knowledge. 
 The definition denotes the essence of every individual of a given 
 species. As the individuals of a given species have all the same def- 
 inition, and hence the same essence, they are all one. For what is 
 not in the definition is not real. Our answer is that the definition 
 represents that unitary aspect of the sublunar individuals which is in 
 the Active Intellect. This aspect is also in a certain sense present in 
 every one of the individual objects of nature, but not in the same 
 manner as in the Active Intellect. ^^^ 
 
 We are now ready to take up the question of human immortaHty. 
 The material intellect as a capacity for acquiring knowledge is not 
 immortal. Being inherent in the sensitive soul and dependent for its 
 acquisition of knowledge upon the memory images (phantasmata) 
 which appear in the imagination, the power to acquire knowledge 
 ceases with the cessation of sense and imagination. But the knowl- 
 edge already acquired, which, we have shown above, is identical with 
 the conceptions of sublunar nature in the Active Intellect, is indestruc- 
 tible. For these conceptions are absolutely immaterial; they are 
 really the Active Intellect in a sense, and only the material is subject 
 to destruction. The sum of acquisition of immaterial ideas constitutes 
 the acquired or actual intellect, and this is the immortal part of man. 
 
 Further than this man cannot go. The idea adopted by some that 
 the human intellect may become identified completely with the Active 
 Intellect, Levi ben Gerson rejects. In order to accomphsh this, he 
 says, it would be necessary to have a complete and perfect knowledge 
 of all nature, and that too a completely unified and wholly immaterial 
 knowledge just as it is in the Active Intellect. This is clearly im- 
 possible. But it is true that a man's happiness after death is dependent 
 upon the amount and perfection of his knowledge. For even in this 
 life the pleasure we derive from intellectual contemplation is greater 
 the more nearly we succeed in completely concentrating our mind on 
 the subject of study. Now after death there will be no disturbing 
 factors such as are supplied in this world by the sensitive and emo- 
 tional powers. To be sure this lack will also prevent the acquisition 
 of new knowledge, as was said before, but the amount acquired wiU 
 
340 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 be there in the soul's power all at once and all the time. The more 
 knowledge one has succeeded in obtaining during life, the more nearly 
 he will resemble the Active Intellect and the greater will be his hap- 
 piness.^^^ 
 
 The next topic Levi ben Gerson takes up is that of prognostication. 
 There are three ways in which certain persons come to know the 
 future, dreams, divination and prophecy. What we wish to do is to 
 determine the kind of future events that may be thus known before- 
 hand, the agency which produces in us this power, and the bearing this 
 phenomenon has on the nature of events generally, and particularly 
 as concerns the question of chance and free will. 
 
 That there is such knowledge of future events is a fact and not a 
 theory. Experience testifies to the fact that there are certain people 
 who are able to foretell the future, not as a matter of accident or 
 through a chance coincidence, but as a regular thing. Diviners these 
 are called, or fortune tellers. This power is even better authenticated 
 in prophecy, which no one denies. We can also cite many instances of 
 dreams, in which a person sees a future event with all its particulars, 
 and the dream comes true. All these cases are too common to be 
 credited to chance. Now what does this show as to the nature of the 
 events thus foreseen? Clearly it indicates that they carmot be chance 
 happenings, for what is by chance cannot be foreseen. The only con- 
 clusion then to be drawn is that these events are determined by the 
 order of nature. But there is another implication in man's ability 
 to foretell the future, namely, that what is thus known to man is first 
 known to a higher intellect which communicates it to us. 
 
 The first of these two consequences leads us into difl&culties. For if 
 we examine the data of prognostication, whether it be of dream, 
 divination or prophecy, we find that they concern almost exclusively 
 such particular human events as would be classed in the category of 
 the contingent rather than in that of the necessary. Fortune tellers 
 regularly tell people about the kind of children they will have, the 
 sort of things they will do, and so on. In prophecy similarly Sarah was 
 told she would have a son (Gen. i8, lo). We also have examples of 
 prognostication respecting the outcome of a battle, announcement of 
 coming rain, — events due to definite causes — as well as the prediction 
 of events which are the result of free choice or pure accident, as when 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 341 
 
 Samuel tells Elisha that he will meet three men on the way, who will 
 give him two loaves of bread, which he will accept; or when the 
 prophet in Samariah tells the prophet in Bethel that he will be killed 
 by a lion. The question now is, if these contingent things can be 
 known in advance, they are not contingent; and if these are not, none 
 are. For the uniform events in nature are surely not contingent. If 
 then those events usually classed as contingent and voluntary are not 
 such, there is no such thing as chance and free will at all, which is 
 impossible. 
 
 Our answer is that as a matter of fact those contingent happenings 
 we call luck and ill luck do often come frequently to certain persons, 
 whom we call lucky or unlucky, which shows that they are not the 
 result of pure chance, and that there is some sort of order determining 
 them. Moreover, we know that the higher in the scale of being a 
 thing is, the more nature takes care to guard it. Hence as man is the 
 highest being here below, it stands to reason that the heavenly bodies 
 order his existence and his fortune. And so the science of astrology, 
 with all its mistakes on account of the imperfect state of our knowl- 
 edge, does say a great many things which are true. This, however, 
 does not destroy freedom and chance. For the horoscope represents 
 only one side of the question. Man was also endowed with reason and 
 purpose, which enable him whenever he chooses to counteract the 
 order of the heavenly bodies. In the main the heavenly bodies by 
 their positions and motions and the consequent predominance of cer- 
 tain elemental qualities in the sublunar world over others affect the 
 temperaments of man in a manner tending to his welfare. The social 
 order with its differentiation of labor and occupation is worked out 
 wonderfully well — better than the system of Plato's Republic — by the 
 positions and motions of the heavenly bodies. If not for this, all men 
 would choose the more honorable trades and professions, there would 
 be no one to do the menial work, and society would be impossible. 
 At the same time there are certain incidental evils inherent in the 
 rigid system which would tend to destroy certain individuals. To 
 counteract these unintended defects, God endowed man with reason 
 and choice enabhng him to avoid the dangers threatening him in the 
 world of nature. 
 
 The solution of our problem then is this. These human events have 
 
342 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 a twofold aspect. They are determined so far as they follow from the 
 order of the heavenly bodies; and in so far they can be foretold. They 
 are undetermined so far as they are the result of individual choice, and 
 in so far they cannot be known beforehand. There are also pure chance 
 events in inanimate nature, bearing no relation to human fortune. 
 These cannot be foretold.^^^ 
 
 We said above that there must be an intellect which knows these 
 contingent events predicted in dreams, divination and prophecy and 
 imparts a knowledge of them to these men. This can be no other than 
 the Active Intellect, whose nature we discussed above. For the Ac- 
 tive Intellect knows the order of sublunar things, and gives us a knowl- 
 edge of them in the ideas of the material intellect. Moreover, he is 
 the agent producing them through the instrumentality of the heavenly 
 bodies. Hence the heavenly bodies are also his instrument in ordering 
 those contingent events which are predicted in dreams and prophetic 
 visions. 
 
 The purpose of this information is to protect man against the evil 
 destined for him in the order of the heavenly bodies, or in order that 
 he may avail himself of the good in store for him if he knows of it. 
 
 There is a difference in kind between prophecy on the one hand and 
 divination and dream on the other. Prophecy comes from the Active 
 Intellect directly acting on the material intellect. Hence only intel- 
 ligent men can be prophets. Divination and dream come from the 
 Active Intellect indirectly. They are caused by the heavenly bodies, 
 and the action is on the imagination. The imagination is more easily 
 isolated from the other parts of the soul in young people and simple- 
 tons. Hence we find examples of dreams and divination among them. ^^^ 
 
 In discussing the problem of God's knowledge, Gersonides takes 
 direct issue with Maimonides. The reader will recall that the question 
 turns upon the knowledge of particulars. Some philosophers go so far 
 as to deny to God any knowledge of things other than his own essence; 
 for the known is in a sense identified with the knower, and to bring 
 in a multiplicity of ideas in God's knowledge would endanger his 
 unity. Others, however, fell short of this extreme opinion and ad- 
 mitted God's knowledge of things other than himself, but maintained 
 that God cannot know particulars for various reasons. The particular 
 is perceived by sense, a material faculty, whereas God is immaterial. 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 343 
 
 Particulars are infinite and cannot be measured or embraced, whereas 
 knowledge is a kind of measuring or embracing. The particulars are 
 not always existing, and are subject to change. Hence God's knowl- 
 edge would be subject to change and disappearance, which is impos- 
 sible. If God knows particulars how is it that there is often a viola- 
 tion of right and justice in the destinies of individual men? This 
 would argue in God either inability or indifference, both of which are 
 impossible. 
 
 Maimonides insists on God's knowledge of all things of which he is 
 the creator, including particulars. And he answers the arguments 
 of the philosophers by saying that their objections are valid only if 
 we assume that God's knowledge is similar to ours, and since with us 
 it is impossible to know the material except through a material organ, 
 it is not possible in God. As we cannot comprehend the infinite; 
 as we cannot know the non-existent, nor the changing without a change 
 in our knowledge, God cannot do so. But it is wrong to assume this. 
 God's knowledge is identical with his essence, which these same 
 philosophers insist is unlike anything else, and unknowable. Surely 
 it follows that his knowledge is also without the least resemblance 
 to our knowledge and the name alone is what they have in common. 
 Hence all the objections of the philosophers fall away at one stroke. 
 We cannot in one act of knowing embrace a number of things differing 
 in species; God can, because his knowledge is one. We cannot know 
 the non-existent, for our knowledge depends upon the thing known. 
 God can. We cannot know the infinite, for the infinite cannot be 
 embraced; God can. We cannot know the outcome of a future event 
 unless the event is necessary and determined. If the event is contin- 
 gent and undetermined we can only have opinion concerning it, 
 which may or may not be true; we are imcertain and may be mistaken. 
 God can know the outcome of a contingent event, and yet the event 
 is not determined, and may happen one way or the other. Our knowl- 
 edge of a given thing changes as the thing itself undergoes a change, 
 for if our knowledge should remain the same while the object changes, 
 it would not be knowledge but error. In God the two are compatible. 
 He knows in advance how a given thing will change, and his knowledge 
 never changes, even though that which was at one moment potential 
 and implicit becomes later actual and explicit. 
 
344 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 At this point Gersonides steps in in defence of human logic and 
 sanity. He accuses Maimonides of not being quite honest with him- 
 self. Maimonides, he intimates, did not choose this position of his 
 own free will — a position scientifically quite untenable — he was forced 
 to it by theological exigencies. ^^^ He felt that he must vindicate, by 
 fair means or foul, God's knowledge of particulars. And so Gersonides 
 proceeds to demolish Maimonides's position by reducing it adabsurdum. 
 
 What does Maimonides mean by saying that God knows the con- 
 tingent? If he means that God knows that the contingent may as 
 contingent happen otherwise than as he knows it will happen, we do 
 not call this in us knowledge, but opinion. If he means that God 
 knows it will happen in a certain way, and yet it may turn out that 
 the reverse will actually take place, then we call this in our case error, 
 not knowledge. And if he means that God merely knows that it may 
 happen one way or the other without knowing definitely which will 
 happen, then we call this in our experience imcertainty and perplexity, 
 not knowledge. By insisting that all this is in God knowledge because, 
 forsooth, God's knowledge is not like our knowledge, is tantamount 
 to saying that what is in us opinion, uncertainty, error, is in God 
 knowledge — a solution far from complimentary to God's knowledge. 
 
 Besides, the entire principle of Maimonides that there is no relation 
 of resemblance between God's attributes and ours, that the terms wise, 
 just, and so on, are pure homonyms, is fundamentally wrong. We at- 
 tribute knowledge to God because we know in our own case that an 
 intellect is perfected by knowledge. And since we have come to the 
 conclusion on other grounds that God is a perfect intellect, we say 
 he must have knowledge. Now if this knowledge that we ascribe to 
 God has no resemblance whatsoever to what we understand by knowl- 
 edge in our own case, the ground is removed from our feet. We 
 might as well argue that man is rational because solid is continuous. 
 If the word knowledge means a totally different thing in God from 
 what it means in us, how do we know that it is to be found in God? 
 If we have absolutely no idea what the term means when applied to 
 God, what reason have we for preferring knowledge as a divine attri- 
 bute to its opposite or negative? If knowledge does not mean knowl- 
 edge, ignorance does not mean ignorance, and it is just the same 
 whether we ascribe to God the one or the other. 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 345 
 
 The truth is that the attributes we ascribe to God do have a resem- 
 blance to the same attributes in ourselves; only they are primary in 
 God, secondary in ourselves, i. e., they exist in God in a more perfect 
 manner than in us. Hence it is absurd to say that what would be in 
 us error or uncertainty is in God knowledge. Our problem must be 
 solved more candidly and differently. There are arguments in favor 
 of God's knowing particulars (Maimonides gives some), and there 
 are the arguments of the philosophers against the thesis. The truth 
 must be between the two, that God knows them from one aspect 
 and does not know them from another. Having shown above that 
 human events are in part ordered and determined by the heavenly 
 bodies, and in part undetermined and dependent upon the individ- 
 ual's choice, we can now make use of this distinction for the solution 
 of our problem. God knows particulars in so far as they are ordered, 
 he does not know them in so far as they are contingent. He knows 
 that they are contingent, and hence it follows that he does not know 
 which of the two possibilities will happen, else they would not be 
 contingent. This is no defect in God's nature, for to know a thing 
 as it is is no imperfection. In general God does not know particulars 
 as particulars but as ordered by the universal laws of nature. He 
 knows the universal order, and he knows the particulars in so far as 
 they are united in the universal order. 
 
 This theory meets all objections, and moreover it is in agreement 
 with the views of the Bible. It is the only one by which we can har- 
 monize the apparent contradictions in the Scriptures. Thus on the 
 one hand we are told that God sends Prophets and commands people 
 to do and forbear. This implies that a person has freedom to choose, 
 and that the contingent is a real category. On the other hand, we find 
 that God foretells the coming of future events respecting human des- 
 tiny, which signifies determination. And yet again we find that God 
 repents, and that he does not repent. All these apparent contradic- 
 tions can be harmonized on our theory. God foretells the coming of 
 events in so far as they are determined in the universal order of nature. 
 But man's freedom may succeed in coimteracting this order, and the 
 events predicted may not come. This is signified by the expression 
 that God repents. 3^^ 
 
 Levi ben Gerson's solution, whatever we may think of its scientific 
 
346 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 or philosophic value, is surely very bold as theology, we might almost 
 say it is a theological monstrosity. It practically removes from God 
 the definite knowledge of the outcome of a given event so far as that 
 outcome is contingent. Gersonides will not give up the contingent, 
 for that would destroy freedom. He therefore accepts free will with 
 its consequences, at the risk of limiting God's knowledge to events 
 which are determined by the laws of nature. Maimonides was less 
 consistent, but had the truer theological sense, namely, he kept to 
 both horns of the dilemma. God is omniscient and man is free. He 
 gave up the solution by seeking refuge in the mysteriousness of God's 
 knowledge. This is the true religious attitude. 
 
 The question of Providence is closely related to that of God's knowl- 
 edge. For it is clear that one cannot provide for those things of which 
 he does not know. Gersonides's view in this problem is very similar 
 to that of Maimonides, and like him he sees in the discussions between 
 Job and his friends the representative opinions held by philosophers 
 in this important problem. 
 
 There are three views, he says, concerning the nature of Providence. 
 One is that God's providence extends only to species and not to in- 
 dividuals. The second opinion is that God provides for every individ- 
 ual of the human race. The third view is that some individuals are 
 specially provided for, but not all. Job held the first view, which is 
 that of Aristotle. The arguments in favor of this opinion are that 
 God does not know particulars, hence cannot provide for them. 
 Besides, there would be more justice in the distribution of goods 
 and evils in the world if God concerned himself about every in- 
 dividual. Then again man is too insignificant for God's special 
 care. 
 
 The second view is that of the majority of our people. They argue 
 that as God is the author of all, he surely provides for them. And 
 as a matter of fact experience shows it; else there would be much more 
 violence and bloodshed than there is. The wicked are actually pun- 
 ished and the good rewarded. This class is divided into two parts. 
 Some think that while God provides for all men, not all that happens 
 to a man is due to God; there are also other causes. The others 
 think that every happening is due to God. This second class may 
 again be divided according to the manner in which they account for 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 347 
 
 those facts in experience which seem to militate against their view. 
 Maintaining that every incident is due to God, they have to explain 
 the apparent deviation from justice in the prosperity of the wicked 
 and the adversity of the righteous. One party explains the phenome- 
 non by saying that the prosperity and the adversity in these cases 
 are only seeming and not real; that they in fact are the opposite of 
 what they seem, or at least lead to the opposite. The second party 
 answers the objection on the ground that those we think good may 
 not really be such, and similarly those we think bad may not really 
 be bad. For the way to judge a person's character is not merely by 
 his deeds alone, but by his deeds as related to his temperament and 
 disposition, which God alone knows. Eliphaz the Temanite belonged 
 to those who think that not all which happens is due to God; that 
 folly is responsible for a man's misfortune. Bildad the Shuchite 
 beheved that all things are from God, but not all that seems good and 
 evil is really so. Zophar the Naamathite thought we do not always 
 judge character correctly; that temperament and disposition must be 
 taken into account. 
 
 Of these various opinions the first one, that of Aristotle, cannot be 
 true. Dreams, divination, and especially prophecy contradict it 
 flatly. All these are given to the individual for his protection (cf. 
 above, p. 342). The second opinion, namely, that God's providence 
 extends to every individual, is likewise disproved by reason, by ex- 
 perience and by the Bible. We have already proved (p. 345) that 
 God's knowledge does not extend to particulars as such. He only 
 knows things as ordered by the heavenly bodies; and knows at the 
 same time that they may fail to happen because of man's free will. 
 Now if God punishes and rewards every man according to his deeds, 
 one of two things necessarily follows. Either he rewards and punishes 
 according to those deeds which the individual is determined to do by 
 the order of the heavenly bodies, or according to the deeds the in- 
 dividual actually does. In the first case there would be often injus- 
 tice, for the person might not have acted as the order of the heavenly 
 bodies indicated he would act, for he is free to act as he will. The 
 second case is impossible, for it would mean that God knows partic- 
 ulars as particulars — a thesis we have already disproved. Besides, 
 evil does not come from God directly, since he is pure form and evil 
 
348 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 comes only from matter. Hence it cannot be said that he punishes 
 the evil doer for his sin. 
 
 Experience also testifies against this view, for we see the just suffer 
 and the wicked prosper. The manner in which Eliphaz, Bildad and 
 Zophar wish to defend God's justice will not hold water. Man's own 
 folly will account perhaps for some evils befalling the righteous and 
 some good coming to the wicked. But it will not account for the 
 failure of the good man to get the reward he deserves, and of the 
 wicked to receive the punishment which is his due. The righteous man 
 often has troubles all his life no matter how careful he is to avoid them, 
 and correspondingly the same is true of the wicked, that he is prosper- 
 ous, despite his lack of caution and good sense. To avoid these objec- 
 tions as Eliphaz does by saying that if the wicked man himself is not 
 punished, his children will be, is to go from the frying pan into the fire. 
 For it is not just either to omit to punish the one deserving it, or to 
 punish another innocent man for him. Nor is Zophar's defence any 
 better. For the same man, with the same temperament and disposi- 
 tion, often suffers more when he is inclined to do good, and is prosper- 
 ous when he is not so scrupulous. Bildad is no more successful than 
 the other two. The evils coming to the righteous are often real and 
 permanent. But neither does the Bible compel us to believe that God 
 looks out for all individuals. This is especially true in reference to 
 punishment, as can be gathered from such expressions as "I will hide 
 my face from them, and they shall be given to be devoured" (Deut. 31, 
 17), or "As thou hast forgotten the law of thy God, so will I myself 
 also forget thy children" (Hosea 4, 6). These expressions indicate 
 that God does not punish the individuals directly, but that he leaves 
 them to the fate that is destined for them by the order of the heavenly 
 bodies. True there are other passages in Scripture speaking of direct 
 punishment, but they may be interpreted so as not to conflict with 
 our conclusions. 
 
 Having seen that neither of the two extreme views is correct, it 
 remains to adopt the middle course, namely, that some individuals are 
 provided for specially, and others not. The nearer a person is to the 
 Active Intellect, the more he receives divine providence and care. 
 Those people who do not improve their capabilities, which they possess 
 as members of the species, are provided for only as members of the 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 349 
 
 species. The matter may be put in another way also. God knows 
 all ideas. Man is potentially capable of receiving them in a certain 
 manner. God, who is actual, leads man from his potentiality to 
 actuality. When a man's potentialities are thus realized, he becomes 
 similar to God, because when ideas are actualized the agent and the 
 thing acted upon are one. Hence the person enjoys divine providence 
 at that time. The way in which God provides for such men is by 
 giving them knowledge through dream, divination or prophecy or 
 intuition or in some other unconscious manner on the individual's part, 
 which knowledge protects him from harm. This view is not in con- 
 flict with the truth that God does not know particulars as such. For 
 it is not to the individual person as such that providence extends as a 
 conscious act of God. The individualization is due to the recipient 
 and not to the dispenser. One may object that after all since it is 
 possible that bad men may have goods as ordered by the heavenly 
 bodies, and good men may have misfortune as thus ordered, when 
 their attachment to God is loosened somewhat, there is injustice in 
 God if he could have arranged the heavenly spheres differently and 
 did not, or incapacity if he could not. The answer is briefly that the 
 order of the spheres does a great deal of good in maintaining the 
 existence of things. And if some Httle evil comes also incidentally, 
 this does not condemn the whole arrangement. In fact the evils come 
 from the very agencies which are the authors of good. The view of 
 providence here adopted is that of Elihu the son of Barachel the 
 Buzite in the book of Job (ch. 32), and it agrees also with the opinion 
 of Maimonides in the "Guide of the Perplexed" (c/. above, p. 292).^'*^ 
 Instead of placing his cosmology at the beginning of his system and 
 proceeding from that as a basis to the other parts of his work, the 
 psychology and the ethics, Levi ben Gerson, whose "Milhamot 
 Hash em" is not so much a systematic work as an aggregation of dis- 
 cussions, reversed the process. He begins as we have seen with a 
 purely psychological analysis concerning the nature of the human 
 reason and its relation to the Active Intellect. He follows up this 
 discussion with a treatment of prognostication as exhibiting some of 
 the effects of the Active Intellect upon the reason and imagination of 
 man. This is again followed by a discussion of God's knowledge and 
 providence. And not until all these psychological (and in part ethical) 
 
350 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 questions have been decided, does Levi ben Gerson undertake to give 
 us his views of the constitution of the universe and the nature and 
 attributes of God. In this discussion he takes occasion to express his 
 dissatisfaction with Aristotle's proofs of the existence of the spheral 
 movers and of the unmoved mover or God, as inadequate to bear the 
 structure which it is intended to erect upon them. It will be remem- 
 bered that the innovation of Abraham Ibn Daud and Maimonides in 
 making Jewish philosophy more strictly Aristotelian than it had been 
 consisted in a great measure in just this introduction of the Aristotelian 
 proof of the existence of God as derived from the motions of the heav- 
 enly bodies. Levi ben Gerson 's proofs are teleological rather than 
 mechanical. Aristotle said a moving body must have a mover out- 
 side of it, which if it is again a body is itself in motion and must have a 
 mover in turn. And as this process cannot go on ad infinitum, there 
 must be at the end of the series an unmoved mover. As unmoved 
 this mover cannot be body; and as producing motion eternally, it can- 
 not be a power residing in a body, a physical or material power, for no 
 such power can be infinite. Gersonides is not satisfied with this proof. 
 He argues that so far as the motions of the heavenly bodies are con- 
 cerned there is no reason why a physical power cannot keep on moving 
 them eternally. The reason that motions caused by finite forces in 
 our world come to a stop is because the thing moved is subject to 
 change, which alters its relation to its mover; and secondly because 
 the force endeavors to move the object in opposition to its own tend- 
 ency, in opposition to gravity. In the case of the heavenly bodies 
 neither of these conditions is present. The relation of the mover to the 
 moved is always the same, since the heavenly bodies are not subject 
 to change; and as they are not made of the four terrestrial elements 
 they have no inherent tendency to move in any direction, hence they 
 offer no opposition to the force exerted upon them by the mover. A 
 finite power might therefore quite conceivably cause eternal motion. 
 Similarly an unmoved mover cannot be body, to be sure, but it may 
 be a physical power like a soul, which in moving the body is not itself 
 moved by that motion. Aristotle's proofs therefore are not sufiScient 
 to produce the conviction that the movers of the spheres and God 
 himself are separate Intelligences. ^^^ 
 
 Gersonides accordingly follows a different method. He argues 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 351 
 
 that if a system of things and events exhibits perfection not here and 
 there and at rare intervals but regularly, the inference is justified 
 that there is an intelligent agent who had a definite purpose and de- 
 sign in establishing the system. The world below is such a system. 
 Hence it has an intelligent agent as its author. This agent may be 
 a separate and immaterial intelligence, or a corporeal power like a 
 soul. He then shows that it cannot be a corporeal power, for it would 
 have to reside in the animal sperm which exhibits such wonderful 
 and purposive development, or in the parent animal from which the 
 sperm came, both of which, he argues, are impossible. It remains 
 then that the cause of the teleological life of the sublunar world is an 
 immaterial power, a separate intellect. This intellect, he argues 
 further, acts upon matter and endows it with forms, the only mediat- 
 ing power being the natural heat which is found in the seed and sperm 
 of plants and animals. Moreover, it is aware of the order of what it 
 produces. It is the Active Intellect of which we spoke above (p. 337). 
 The forms of terrestrial things come from it directly, the heat residing 
 in the seed comes from the motions of the spheres. This shows that 
 the permanent motions of the heavenly bodies are also intelligent 
 motions, for they tend to produce perfection in the terrestrial world 
 and never come to a standstill, which would be the case if the motions 
 were "natural" like those of the elements, or induced against their 
 nature like that of a stone moving upward. We are justified in saying 
 then that the heavenly bodies are endowed with intellects and have 
 no material soul. Hence their movers are pure Intelligences, and 
 there are as many of them as there are spheres, i. e., forty-eight, or 
 fifty-eight or sixty-four according to one's opinion on the astronomical 
 question of the number of spheres. 
 
 Now as the Active Intellect knows the order of sublunar existence 
 in its unity, and the movers of the respective spheres know the order 
 of their effects through the motions of the heavenly bodies, it follows 
 that as all things in heaven above and on the earth beneath are re- 
 lated in a unitary system, there is a highest agent who is the cause 
 of all existence absolutely and has a knowledge of all existence as a 
 unitary system. ^^° 
 
 The divine attributes are derived by us from his actions, and hence 
 they are not pure homonyms (cf. p. 240). God has a knowledge of 
 
352 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the complete order of sublunar things, of which the several movers 
 have only a part. He knows it as one, and knows it eternally without 
 change. His joy and gladness are beyond conception, for our joy also 
 is very great in understanding. His is also the perfect Life, for under- 
 standing is life. He is the most real Substance and Existent, and he 
 is One. God is also the most real Agent, as making the other movers 
 do their work, and producing a complete and perfect whole out of 
 their parts. He is also properly called Bestower, Beneficent, Gracious, 
 Strong, Mighty, Upright, Just, Eternal, Permanent. All these at- 
 tributes, however, do not denote multiplicity.^^^ 
 
 From God we now pass again to his creation, and take up the prob- 
 lem which caused Maimonides so much trouble, namely, the question 
 of the origin of the world. It will be remembered that dissatisfied 
 with the proofs for the existence of God advanced by the Mutakal- 
 limun, Maimonides, in order to have a firm foundation for the central 
 idea of religion, tentatively adopted the Aristotelian notion of the 
 eternity of motion and the world. But no sooner does Maimonides 
 establish his proof of the existence, unity and incorporeality of God 
 than he returns to the attack of the Aristotelian view and points out 
 that the problem is insoluble in a strictly scientific manner; that 
 Aristotle himself never intended his arguments in favor of eternity 
 to be regarded as philosophically demonstrated, and that they all 
 labor under the fatal fallacy that because certain laws hold of the 
 world's phenomena once it is in existence, these same laws must have 
 governed the estabUshment of the world itself in its origin. Besides, 
 the assumption of the world's eternity with its corollary of the neces- 
 sity and immutability of its phenomena saps the foundation of all 
 religion, makes miracles impossible, and reduces the world to a ma- 
 chine. Gersonides is on the whole agreed with Maimonides. He 
 admits that Aristotle's arguments are the best yet advanced in the 
 problem, but that they are not convincing. He also agrees with Mai- 
 monides in his general stricture on Aristotle's method, only modifying 
 and restricting its generality and sweeping nature. With all this, 
 however, he finds it necessary to take up the entire question anew 
 and treats it in his characteristic manner, with detail and rigor, and 
 finally comes to a conclusion different from that of Maimonides, 
 namely, that the world had an origin in time, to be sure, but that it 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 353 
 
 came not ex nihilo in the absolute sense of the word nihil, but devel- 
 oped from an eternal formless matter, which God endowed with form. 
 This is the so-called Platonic view. 
 
 We cannot enter into all his details which are technical and fatigu- 
 ing in the extreme, but we must give a general idea of his procedure 
 in the investigation of this important topic. 
 
 The problem of the origin of the world, he says, is very difficult. 
 First, because in order to learn from the nature of existing things 
 whether they were created out of a state of non-existence or not, we 
 must know the essence of existing things, which is not easy. Secondly, 
 we must know the nature of God in order to determine whether he 
 could have existed first without the world and then have created it, 
 or whether he had to have the world with him from eternity. The 
 fact of the great difference of opinion on this question among thinkers, 
 and the testimony of Maimonides that Aristotle himself had no valid 
 proof in this matter are additional indications of the great difficulty 
 of the subject. 
 
 Some think the world was made and destroyed an infinite number 
 of times. Others say it was made once. Of these some maintain 
 it was made out of something (Plato) ; others, that it was made out of 
 absolute nothing (Philoponus, the Mutakallimun, Maimonides and 
 many of our Jewish writers). Some on the other hand, namely, Aris- 
 totle and his followers, hold the world to be eternal. They all have 
 their defenders, and there is no need to refute the others since Aris- 
 totle has already done this. His arguments are the best so far, and 
 deserve investigation. The fundamental fallacy in all his proofs is 
 that he argues from the laws of genesis and decay in the parts of the 
 world to the laws of these processes in the world as a whole. This 
 might seem to be the same criticism which Maimonides advances, 
 but it is not really quite the same, Maimonides's assertion being 
 more general and sweeping. Maimonides says that the origin of the 
 world as a whole need not be in any respect like the processes going 
 on within its parts; whereas Gersonides bases his argmnent on the 
 observed difference in the world between wholes and parts, admitting 
 that the two may be ahke in many respects. 
 
 In order to determine whether the world is created or not, it is 
 best to investigate first those things in the world which have the ap- 
 
354 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 pearance of being eternal, such as the heavenly bodies, time, motion, 
 the form of the earth, and so on. If these are proven to be eternal, 
 the world is eternal; if not, it is not. A general principle to help us 
 distinguish a thing having an origin from one that has not is the fol- 
 lowing: A thing which came into being in time has a purpose. An 
 eternal thing has no purpose. Applying this principle to the heavens 
 we find that all about them is with a purpose to ordering the sublunar 
 world in the best way possible. Their motions, their distances, their 
 positions, their numbers, and so on are all for this purpose. Hence 
 they had a beginning. Aristotle's attempts to explain these condi- 
 tions from the nature of the heavens themselves are not successful, 
 and he knew it. Again, as the heavenly bodies are all made of the 
 same fifth element (the Aristotelian ether), the many varieties in 
 their forms and motions require special explanation. The only satis- 
 factory explanation is that the origin of the heavenly bodies is not 
 due to nature and necessity, which would favor eternity, but to will 
 and freedom, and the many varieties are for a definite purpose. Hence 
 they are not eternal. ^^^ 
 
 Gersonides then analyzes time and motion and proves that Aris- 
 totle to the contrary notwithstanding, they are both finite and not 
 infinite. Time belongs to the category of quantity, and there is no 
 infinite quantity. As time is dependent on motion, motion too is 
 finite, hence neither is eternal. Another argument for creation in 
 time is that if the world is eternal and governed altogether by neces- 
 sity, the earth should be surrounded on all sides by water according 
 to the nature of the lighter element to be above the heavier. Hence 
 the appearance of parts of the earth's surface above the water is an 
 indication of a break of natural law for a special purpose, namely, 
 in order to produce the various mineral, plant and animal species. 
 Hence once more purpose argues design and origin in time. 
 
 Finally if the world were eternal, the state of the sciences would 
 be more advanced than it is. A similar argument may be drawn from 
 language. Language is conventional; which means that the people 
 existed before the language they agreed to speak. But man being 
 a social animal they could not have existed an infinite time without 
 language. Hence mankind is not eternal. ^^^ 
 
 We have just proved that the world came into being, but it does 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 355 
 
 not necessarily follow that it will be destroyed. Nay, there are reasons 
 to show that it will not be destroyed. For there is no destruction ex- 
 cept through matter and the predominance of the passive powers 
 over the active. Hence the being that is subject to destruction must 
 consist of opposites. But the heavenly bodies have no opposites, 
 not being composite; hence they cannot be destroyed. And if so, 
 neither can the sublunar order be destroyed, which is the work of 
 the heavenly bodies. There is of course the abstract possibility of 
 their being destroyed by their maker, not naturally, but by his will, 
 as they were made; but we can find no reason in God for wishing to 
 destroy them, all reasons existing in man for destroying things being 
 inapplicable to God.^^^ 
 
 That the world began in time is now established. The question 
 still remains, was the world made out of something or out of nothing? 
 Both are impossible. The first is impossible, for that something out 
 of which the world was made must have had some form, for matter 
 never is without form, and if so, it must have had some motion, and 
 we have a kind of world already, albeit an imperfect one. The second 
 supposition is also impossible; for while form may come out of noth- 
 ing, body cannot come from not-body. We never see the matter of 
 any object arise out of nothing, though the form may. Nature as 
 well as art produces one corporeal thing out of another. Hence the 
 generally accepted principle, "ea: nihilo nihil fit.'^ Besides it would 
 follow on this supposition that before the world came into existence 
 there was a vacuum in its place, whereas it is proved in the Physics 
 that a vacuum is impossible. The only thing remaining therefore is 
 to say that the world was made partly out of something, partly out 
 of nothing, i. e., out of an absolutely formless matter. 
 
 It may be objected that to assume the existence of a second eternal 
 thing beside God is equivalent to a belief in dualism, in two gods. 
 But this objection may be easily answered. Eternity as such does 
 not constitute divinity. If all the world were eternal, God would 
 still be God because he controls everything and is the author of the 
 order obtaining in the world. In general it is the qualitative essence 
 that makes the divine character of God, his wisdom and power as 
 the source of goodness and right order in nature. The eternal matter 
 of which we are speaking is the opposite of all this. As God is the 
 
356 MEDimVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 extreme of perfection so is matter the extreme of imperfection and 
 defect. As God is the source of good, so is matter the source of evil. 
 How then can anyone suppose for a moment that an eternal formless 
 matter can in any way be identified with a divine being? 
 
 Another objection that may be offered to our theory is that it is 
 an estabhshed fact that matter cannot exist at all without any form, 
 whereas our view assumes that an absolutely formless matter existed 
 an infinite length of time before the world was made from it. This 
 may be answered by saying that the impossibiUty of matter existing 
 without form applies only to the actual objects of nature. God put 
 in sublunar matter the nature and capacity of receiving all forms in 
 a certain order. The primary qualities, the hot and the cold and the 
 wet and the dry, as the forms of the elements, enable this matter to 
 receive other higher forms. The very capacity of receiving a given 
 form argues a certain form on the part of the matter having this 
 capacity; for if it had no form there would be no reason why it should 
 receive one form rather than another; whereas we find that the re- 
 ception of forms is not at random, but that a given form comes from a 
 definite other form. Man comes only from man. But this does not 
 apply to the prime matter of which we are speaking. It may have 
 been without form. Nay, it is reasonable to suppose that as we find 
 matter and form combined, and we also find pure forms without mat- 
 ter, m., in the separate Intelligences, — it is reasonable to suppose 
 that there is also matter without form. 
 
 Finally one may ask if the world has not existed from eternity, 
 what determined the author to will its existence at the time he did 
 and not at another? We cannot say that he acquired new knowledge 
 which he had not before, or that he needed the world then and not 
 before, or that there was some obstacle which was removed. The 
 answer to this would be that the sole cause of the creation was the 
 will of God to benefit his creatures. Their existence is therefore due 
 to the divine causality, which never changes. Their origin in time 
 is due to the nature of a material object as such. A material object 
 as being caused by an external agent is incompatible with eternity. 
 It must have a beginning, and there is no sense in asking why at this 
 time and not before or after, for the same question would apply to 
 any other time. Gersonides cites other objections which he answers, 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 
 
 357 
 
 and then he takes up one by one the AristoteUan arguments in favor 
 of eternity and refutes them in detail. We cannot afford to reproduce 
 them here as the discussions are technical, lengthy and intricate. ^^^ 
 
 Having given his philosophical cosmology, Gersonides then under- 
 takes to show in detail that the Biblical story of creation teaches the 
 same doctrine. Nay, he goes so far as to say that it was the Biblical 
 account that suggested to him his philosophical theory. It would be 
 truer to say that having approached the Bible with Aristotelian 
 spectacles, and having no suspicion that the two attitudes are as far 
 apart as the poles, he did not scruple to twist the expressions in Gen- 
 esis out of all semblance to their natural meaning. The Biblical text 
 had been twisted and turned ever since the days of Philo, and of the 
 Mishna and Talmud and Midrash, in the interest of various schools 
 and sects. Motives speculative, religious, theological, legal and 
 ethical were at the basis of Biblical interpretation throughout its long 
 history of two millennia and more — the end is not yet — and Gersonides 
 was swimming with the current. The Bible is not a law, he says, which 
 forces us to beheve absurdities and to practice useless things, as some 
 people think. On the contrary it is a law which leads us to our per- 
 fection. Hence what is proved by reason must be found in the Law, 
 by interpretation if necessary. This is why Maimonides took pains 
 to interpret all BibHcal passages in which God is spoken of as if he 
 were corporeal. Hence also his statement that if the eternity of the 
 world were strictly demonstrated, it would not be difficult to inter- 
 pret the Bible so as to agree. But in the matter of the origin of the 
 world, Gersonides continues, it was not necessary for me to force the 
 Biblical account. Quite the contrary, the expressions in the Bible 
 guided me to my view.^^^ 
 
 Accordingly he finds support for his doctrine that the world was 
 not created ex nihilo, in the fact that there is not one miracle in the 
 Bible in which anything comes out of nothing. They are all instances 
 of something out of a pre-existent something. The miracle of the oil 
 in the case of Ehsha is no exception. The air changed into oil as it 
 entered the partly depleted vessel. The six days of creation must not 
 be taken literally. God's creation is timeless, and the six days in- 
 dicate the natural order and rank in existing things proceeding from 
 the cause to the effect and from the lower to the higher. Thus the 
 
358 MEDIyEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 movers of the heavenly bodies come before the spheres which they 
 move as their causes. The spheres come before the terrestrial elements 
 for the same reason. The elements are followed by the things com- 
 posed of them. And among these too there is a certain order. Plants 
 come before animals, aquatic animals before aerial, aerial before 
 terrestrial, and the last of all is man, as the most perfect of sublunar 
 creatures. All this he reads into the account of creation in Genesis. 
 Thus the light spoken of in the first day represents the angels or sep- 
 arate Intelligences or movers of the spheres, and they are distinguished 
 from the darkness there, which stands for the heavenly bodies as the 
 matters of their movers, though at the same time they are grouped 
 together as one day, because the form and its matter constitute a unit. 
 The water, which was divided by the firmament, denotes the prime 
 formless matter, part of which was changed into the matter of the 
 heavenly bodies, and part into the four terrestrial elements. Form 
 and matter are also designated by the terms "Tohu" and ''Bohu" in 
 the second verse in Genesis, rendered in the Revised Version by "with- 
 out form" and "void." And so Gersonides continues throughout the 
 story of creation, into the details of which we need not follow him.^^'^ 
 
 The concluding discussion in the Milhamot is devoted to the prob- 
 lem of miracles and its relation to prophecy. Maimonides had said 
 that one reason for opposing the Aristotelian theory of the eternity 
 of the world is that miracles would be an impossibility on that assump- 
 tion. Hence Maimonides insists on creation ex nihilo, though he ad- 
 mits that the Platonic view of a pre-existent matter may be reconciled 
 with the Torah. Gersonides, who adopted the doctrine of an eternal 
 matter, finds it necessary to say by way of introduction to his treat- 
 ment of miracles that they do not prove creation ex nihilo. For as was 
 said before all miracles exhibit a production of something out of some- 
 thing and not out of nothing. 
 
 To explain the nature of miracles, he says, and their authors, it is 
 necessary to know what miracles are. For this we must take the 
 Biblical records as our data, just as we take the data of our senses in 
 determining other matters. On examining the miracles of the Bible 
 we find that they may be classified into those which involve a change 
 of substance and those in which the substance remains the same and 
 the change is one of quality or quantity. An example of the former is 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 359 
 
 the change of Moses's rod into a serpent and of the water of Egypt 
 into blood; of the latter, Moses's hand becoming leprous, and the 
 withering of the hand of Jeroboam. We may further divide the mir- 
 acles into those in which the prophet was told in advance, as Moses was 
 of the ten plagues, and those in which he was not, as for example the 
 reviving of the dead by Elijah and many other cases. Our examina- 
 tion also shows us that all miracles are performed by prophets or in re- 
 lation to them. Also that they are done with some good and useful 
 purpose, namely, to inculcate behef or to save from evil. 
 
 These data will help us to decide who is the author of miracles. 
 Miracles cannot be accidental, as they are performed with a purpose; 
 and as they involve a knowledge of the sublunar order, they must 
 have as their author one who has this knowledge, hence either God or 
 the Active Intellect or man, i. e., the prophet himself. Now it is not 
 reasonable to suppose that God is the author of miracles, for miracles 
 come only rarely and are of no value in themselves but only as a means 
 to a special end, as we said before. The laws of nature, however, 
 which control all regular events all the time, are essentially good and 
 permanent. Hence it is not reasonable to suppose that the Active 
 Intellect who, as we know, orders the sublunar world, has more im- 
 portant work to do than God. Besides if God were the author of 
 miracles, the prophet would not know about them, for prophetic 
 inspiration, as we know (p. 342), is due to the Active Intellect and 
 not directly to God. 
 
 Nor do we need waste words in proving that man cannot be the 
 author of miracles, for in that case the knowledge of them would not 
 come to him through prophetic inspiration, since they are due to his 
 own will. Besides man, as we have seen, cannot have a complete 
 knowledge of the sublunar order, and hence it is not likely that he can 
 control its laws to the extent of changing them. 
 
 There is therefore only one alternative left, namely, that the author 
 of miracles is the same as the inspirer of the prophets, the controlling 
 spirit of the sublunar world, whose intellect has as its content the 
 unified system of sublunar creation as an immaterial idea, namely, the 
 Active Intellect, of whom we have spoken so often. The prophet 
 knows of the miracles because the Active Intellect, who is the author 
 of them, is also the cause of the prophetic inspiration. This will 
 
360 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 account too for the fact that all miracles have to do with events in the 
 sublunar world and are not found in the relations and motions of the 
 heavenly bodies. The case of Joshua causing the sun and moon to 
 stand still is no exception. There was no standing stiU of the sun and 
 moon in that case. What is meant by the expressions in Joshua 10 is 
 that the Israehtes conquered the enemy in the short time that the 
 sun occupied the zenith, whUe its motion was not noticeable for about 
 an hour, as is usually the case about noon. In the case of Isaiah 
 moving the sun ten degrees back for Hezekiah (Isai. 38, 8), there was 
 likewise no change in the motion of the sun, but only in that of the 
 cloud causing the shadow. 
 
 Miracles cannot be of regular occurrence, for if natural phenomena 
 and laws were changed by miracle as a regular thing, it would signify 
 a defect in the original order. Miracles cannot take place to violate 
 the principle of contradiction, hence there can be no miracles in ref- 
 erence to mathematical truths, nor in matters relating to the past. 
 Thus a miracle cannot make a thing black and white at the same time; 
 nor a plane triangle whose angles are less than two right angles; nor 
 is it possible by miracle now to make it not to have rained in Jeru- 
 salem yesterday, when as a matter of fact it did rain. For all these 
 involve a denial of the logical law of contradiction that a thing cannot 
 be and not be at the same time.^^^ 
 
 A prophet is tested (i) by being able to foretell miracles before 
 they come, and (2) by the realization of his prophetic messages. The 
 question is raised concerning the statement of Jeremiah that one may 
 be a true prophet and yet an evil prophecy may remain unfulfilled 
 if the people repent. Does this mean that a good prophecy must 
 always come true? In that case a good deal of what comes within 
 the category of the possible and contingent becomes determined and 
 necessary! The answer is that a good prophecy too sometimes fails 
 of realization, as is illustrated in Jacob's fear of Esau after he was 
 promised protection by God. But this happens more rarely on account 
 of the fact that a man endeavors naturally to see a good prophecy 
 realized, whereas he does his best to counteract an evil prophecy. ^^* 
 
 Gersonides's entire discussion of miracles shows a deep seated 
 motive to minimize their extent and influence. The study of science 
 and philosophy had the effect of planting in the minds of the mediaeval 
 
LEVI BEN GERSON 361 
 
 philosophers a great respect for reason on the one hand and natural 
 law on the other. A study of history, archaeology and literary criti- 
 cism has developed in modern times a spirit of scepticism regarding 
 written records of antiquity. This was foreign to mediaeval theologi- 
 ans generally. No one doubted for a moment the accuracy of the 
 Biblical records as well as their inspiration in every detail. Hence 
 prophecy and miracles had to be explained or explained away. Inter- 
 pretation held the place of criticism. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 
 
 The chronological treatment of Jewish philosophy which we have 
 followed makes it necessary at this point to take up a Karaite work 
 of the fourteenth century that is closely modelled upon the "Guide 
 of the Perplexed." In doing this we necessarily take a step backward 
 as far as the philosophical development is concerned. For while it 
 is true that the early Rabbanite thinkers like Saadia, Bahya, Ibn 
 Zaddik and others moved in the circle of ideas of the Mohammedan 
 Mutakallimun, that period had long since been passed. Judah Halevi 
 criticized the Kalam, Ibn Daud is a thorough Aristotelian, and Mai- 
 monides gave the Kalam in Jewish literature its deathblow. No 
 Rabbanite after Maimonides would think of going back to the old 
 arguments made popular by the Mutakallimun — the theory of atoms, 
 of substance and accident in the Kalamistic sense of accident as a 
 quality which needs continuous creation to exist any length of time, 
 the denial of law and natural causation, the arguments in favor of 
 creation and the existence of God based upon creation, the doctrine 
 of the divine will as eternal or created, residing in a subject or existing 
 without a subject, the world as due to God's will or to his wisdom, 
 the nature of right and wrong as determined by the character and 
 purpose of the act or solely by the arbitrary will of God — these and 
 other topics, which formed the main ground of discussion between the 
 Mu' tazilites and the Ashariya, and were taken over by the Karaites 
 and to a less extent by the early Rabbanites in the tenth and eleventh 
 centuries, had long lost their significance and their interest among 
 the Rabbanite followers of Maimonides. Aristotelianism, introduced 
 by Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes among the Arabs, and Ibn Daud 
 and Maimonides among the Jews, dominated all speculative thought, 
 and the old Kalam was obsolete and forgotten. Gersonides no longer 
 regards the Kalamistic point of view as a living issue. He ignores it 
 entirely. His problems as we have seen are those raised by the Aver- 
 
 362 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 363 
 
 roistic system. In this respect then a reading of Aaron ben Ehjah's 
 "Ez Hayim" (Tree of Life) ^^° affects us like a breath from a foreign 
 clime, like the odor of a thing long buried. And yet Aaron ben Elijah 
 was a contemporary of Levi ben Gerson. He was born about 1300, 
 and died in 1369. He lived in Nicomedia, Cairo, Constantinople. 
 The reason for the antiquated appearance of his work lies in the fact 
 that he was a Karaite, and the Karaites never got beyond the Mu' ta- 
 zilite point of view. Karaism was only a sect and never showed after 
 the days of Saadia anything like the life and enthusiastic activity 
 of the great body of Rabbanite Judaism, which formed the great 
 majority of the Jewish people. The Karaites had their important 
 men in Halaka as well as in religious philosophy and Biblical exegesis. 
 Solomon ben Yeroham, Joseph Ha-Maor (Al-Kirkisani), Joseph Al 
 Basir (p. 48 ff.), Jeshua ben Judah (p. 55 ff.), Yefet Ha-Levi, Judah 
 Hadassi, Aaron ben Joseph — all these were prominent in Karaitic 
 literature. But they cannot be compared to the great men among 
 the Rabbanites. There was no Maimonides among them. And Aaron 
 ben Elijah cherished the ambition of being to the Karaites what 
 Maimonides was to the Rabbanites. Accordingly he undertook to 
 compose three works representing the three great divisions of Karaitic 
 Judaism — a book of Laws, a work on Biblical exegesis and a treatise 
 on religious philosophy. The last was written first, having been com- 
 posed in 1346. The "Sefer Ha-Mizvot," on the religious command- 
 ments, was written in 1354, and his exegetical work, known as "Keter 
 Torah" (The Crown of the Law) was published in 1362. It is the 
 first that interests us, the *'Ez Hayyim." As was said before, this 
 book is closely modelled upon the "More Nebukim," though the 
 arrangement is different, being more logical than that of the "Guide." 
 Instead of beginning, as Maimonides does, with interpreting the 
 anthropomorphic expressions in the Bible, which is followed by a 
 treatment of the divine attributes, long before the existence of God 
 has been proved or even the fundamental principles laid down upon 
 which are based the proofs of the existence of God, Aaron ben Elijah 
 more naturally begins with the basal doctrines of physics and meta- 
 physics, which he then utilizes in discussing the existence of God. 
 As Maimonides brought to a focus all the speculation on philosophy 
 and religion as it was handed down to him by Arab and Jew, and 
 
364 MEDIMVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 gave it a harmonious and systematic form in his masterpiece; so did 
 Aaron ben EUjah endeavor to sum up all Karaitic discussion in his 
 work, and in addition declare his attitude to Maimonides. The 
 success with which he carried out this plan is not equal. As a source 
 of information on schools and opinions of Arabs and Karaites, the 
 "Ez Hayyim" is of great importance and interest. But it cannot 
 in the least compare with the "Guide" as a constructive work of 
 religious philosophy. It has not the same originality or any degree 
 remotely approaching it. The greater part of the Aristotelian mate- 
 rial seems bodily taken from Maimonides, and so is the part dealing 
 with the anthropomorphic expressions in the Bible. There is a differ- 
 ent point of view in his exposition of the Mu'taziHte physics, which 
 he presents in a more systematic and favorable light than Maimonides, 
 defending it against the strictures of the latter. But everywhere 
 Aaron ben Elijah lacks the positiveness and commanding mastery 
 of Maimonides. He is not clear what side of a question to espouse. 
 For the most part he places side by side the opposed points of view 
 and only barely intimates his own attitude or preference. Under these 
 circumstances it will not be necessary for us to reproduce his ideas 
 in extenso. It will be sufficient if we indicate his relation to Mai- 
 monides in the problems common to both, adding a brief statement 
 of those topics which Aaron ben Elijah owes to his Karaite predeces- 
 sors, and which Maimonides omits. 
 
 His general attitude on the relation of religion or revelation to 
 reason and philosophy is somewhat inconsistent. For while he en- 
 deavors to rationalize Jewish dogma and Scriptural teaching like 
 IMaimonides, and in doing so utilizes Aristotelian terminology in 
 matters physical, metaphysical, psychological, ethical and logical, 
 he nevertheless in the beginning of his work condemns philosophy 
 as well as philosophers, meaning of course the Aristotelians. ^^^ He 
 nowhere expressly indicates the manner of reconciling this apparent 
 contradiction. But it would seem as if he intended to distinguish 
 between the philosophical method and the actual teachings of the 
 Aristotelians. Their method he approves, their results he condemns. 
 The Aristotelians taught the eternity of the world, the immutability 
 of natural law, God's ignorance of particulars and the absence of 
 special Providence. These doctrines must be condemned. Maimon- 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 365 
 
 ides too rejects these extreme teachings while praising Aristotle and 
 maintaining that philosophy was originally a possession of the Israelit- 
 ish people, which they lost in the exile. Aaron ben Ehjah is not willing 
 to follow the philosophers as far as Maimonides. He admits positive 
 attributes in God, which Maimonides rejects; he admits an absolute 
 will in God and not merely a relative like Maimonides; he extends 
 God's providence to all individuals including irrational creatures, 
 whereas Maimonides limits special providence to the individuals of 
 the human species, and so on. And so he condemns the philosophers, 
 though he cannot help using their method and even their fundamental 
 doctrines, so far as they are purely theoretical and scientific. He is 
 willing to go the full length of the Aristotehans only in the unity and 
 incorporeality of God, though here too he vindicates sense perception 
 to God, i. e., the knowledge of that which we get through our sense 
 organs. He too like the philosophers insists on the importance of 
 the reason as the instrument of truth and knowledge. Abraham was 
 the first, he tells us, who proved the existence of God with his intellect. 
 Then came the law of Moses, which strengthened the same idea. The 
 Gentiles hated and envied Israel for their superiority and their true 
 opinions; hence they endeavored to refute their ideas and establish 
 others in their stead. This was the work of the ancient Greek philoso- 
 phers, who are called enemies in the Bible (Psalms 139, 21). At the 
 time of the second Temple, seeing that the Jewish religion and its 
 teachings were true, they took advantage of the advent of Jesus to 
 adopt his false teachings, thus showing their hatred and envy of Israel. 
 At the same time, however, they were obliged to borrow some views 
 and methods of proof from Israel, for religion as such is opposed to 
 philosophy. StiU the true nature of God was unknown to them. 
 Then came the Arabs, who imitated the Christians in adopting a 
 belief different from Judaism, at the same time borrowing views from 
 the Bible. These are the Mu'tazila and the Ashariya. Later when 
 on account of the exile differences arose among the Jews, there were 
 formed the two parties of the Karaites and the Rabbanites. The 
 Karaites followed the Mu' tazila, and so did some of the Rabbanites, 
 because their views coincided with those of the Bible, from which 
 they were borrowed. The views of the philosophers as being opposed 
 to the Bible they naturally rejected. Nevertheless some Rabbanites 
 
366 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 adopted the views of the philosophers, though beheving in the Bible. 
 This is a mistake, for even the Christians rejected the views of the 
 philosophers. ^^^ 
 
 Here we see clearly the difference in general attitude between Aaron 
 ben Elijah and Maimonides. The latter has no use whatsoever for 
 the Mu' tazila. He realizes the immeasurable superiority of the Aris- 
 totelians (this is the meaning of the word philosophers in mediaeval 
 Jewish and Arabic literature). His task is therefore to harmonize 
 the Bible with Aristotelian doctrine wherever possible. Aaron ben 
 Elijah is still, in the fourteenth century, a follower of the Kalam, and 
 believes the Mu' tazila are closer to Scripture than Aristotle. He is 
 two centuries behind Maimonides philosophically, and yet he has 
 the truer insight because less debauched by Aristotelian learning. 
 
 As was said before, Aaron ben Elijah follows a more logical arrange- 
 ment in the disposition of his work than Maimonides. In reality it is 
 the old arrangement of the Kalamistic works (c/. p. 24). The pur- 
 pose of all Jewish investigators, he says, is the same, namely, to prove 
 the existence and nature of God, but there is a difference among them 
 in the method of proving God's existence. Some base their proofs 
 on the assumption of the creation of the world, others on that of the 
 world's eternity. The Mutakallimun follow the former method, the 
 philosophers, the latter. Their respective views of the origin of the 
 world are determined by their opinions concerning the principles of ex- 
 istence and the existent, that is, the fundamental principles of physics 
 and metaphysics. Accordingly Aaron ben Elijah finds it necessary 
 to give a preliminary account of the Kalamistic as well as the philo- 
 sophic theories, as Maimonides did before him (p. 249 ff.). It is not 
 necessary for us to reproduce here his sketch of the philosophical 
 views, as we know them sufficiently from our studies of Ibn Daud and 
 Maimonides. But it will be of value to refer to his account of the 
 Kalamistic principles, though we have already discussed them in the 
 introduction (p. xxi) and in our study of Maimonides (p. 249 ff.). This 
 is due principally to the fact that Aaron ben Elijah endeavors to de- 
 fend the Mutakallimun against Maimonides's charge that they were 
 influenced by preconceived notions and allowed their religious views 
 to dictate to them their interpretation of nature, instead of letting 
 the latter speak for itself. Thus Maimonides specifically accuses 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 367 
 
 them of having adopted the atomic theory of the pre-Aristotehan 
 philosophers not because they were really and independently con- 
 vinced of its scientific truth — how could that be since Aristotle proved 
 it impossible? — but because on this theory they could prove the crea- 
 tion of the world, which they must at all hazards maintain as a re- 
 ligious dogma fundamental in its nature, since upon it is based the 
 proof of the existence of God. 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah denies this charge, maintaining the philosophical 
 honesty of the Mutakallimun. Epicurus too, he says, believed in 
 the atomic theory, though he regarded the world as eternal. Hence 
 there is no necessary connection between atoms and creation.^®^ The 
 atomic theory is defensible on its own merits, and the motives of the 
 Mutakallimun in adopting it are purely scientific, as follows: Accord- 
 ing to the Mutakallimun there are only body or substance and its 
 accidents or qualities. This is the constitution of material objects. 
 There are, however, two kinds of qualities or attributes, viz., "char- 
 acters," and accidents. Characters are such attributes as are essential 
 to body and without which it cannot exist. Accidents may disappear, 
 while body continues. Since, then, body may exist with or without 
 accidents, there must be a cause which is responsible for the attach- 
 ment of accidents to body when they are so attached. This cause we 
 call "union." When a body is "united " with accidents it owes this 
 to the existence of a certain something, a certain property, let us say, 
 in it which we have called "union." Hence when the body is "sepa- 
 rated " from accidents, when it is without accidents, it is because there 
 is no "imion." Further, every body possessed of magnitude or ex- 
 tension is divisible, hence it must have "union" to hold its parts to- 
 gether. But this "union" is not essential to all existents; for we have 
 seen that its function is to unite accidents with body. And as acci- 
 dents are separable while body may continue to exist without them, 
 "union" disappears together with the accidents. Bodies without 
 "union " are therefore possible and real. But we have just seen that 
 all bodies possessing magnitude have "union." It follows therefore 
 that if there are "union "-less bodies, they are without magnitude, 
 and hence atoms. This is the proof of the atomic theory and it has 
 nothing to do with the matter of the origin of the world.^^^ As a 
 matter of fact the Mutakallimun believe that the atoms were created 
 
368 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ex nihilo. But the creation of the world can be proved whichever \'iew 
 we adopt concerning the nature of the existent, whether it be the atomic 
 theory of the Mutakallimun or the principles of matter and form of 
 the Aristotelians. The important principle at the basis of this proof 
 is the well-known Kalamistic one that if an object cannot do without 
 an attribute originating in time, the object itself has its origin in time. 
 Now on either view of the constitution of the existent, body must 
 have form or accidents respectively, and as the latter are constantly 
 changing, body or matter has its origin in time, hence the world is not 
 eternal. 
 
 Besides, not to speak of the inconclusive character of the philosoph- 
 ical arguments in favor of eternity and the positive arguments for 
 creation (all or most of which we have already met in our previous 
 studies, and need not therefore reproduce Aaron ben Elijah's version 
 of them), the philosophers themselves without knowing it are led to 
 contradict themselves in their very arguments from the assumption 
 of eternity. The doctrine of creation follows as a consequence from 
 their own presuppositions. Thus on the basis of eternity of motion 
 they prove that the heavenly spheres are endowed with soul and in- 
 tellect, and their motions are volimtary and due to conceptions which 
 they endeavor to realize {cf. p. 267). This makes the sphere a com- 
 posite object, containing the elements, sphericity, soul, intellect. Every- 
 thing composite is a possible existent, because its existence depends 
 upon the existence of its parts. What is a possible existent may also 
 not exist. Moreover, that which is possible must at some time become 
 actual. Hence the sphere must at some time have been non-existent, 
 and it required an agent to bring it into being. We are thus led to con- 
 tradict our hypothesis of eternity from which we started.^^^ 
 
 Creation is thus established, and this is the best way to prove the 
 existence, unity and incorporeality of God. Maimonides attempts 
 to prove creation from the peculiarities of the heavenly motions, 
 which cannot be well accounted for on the theory of natural causes. 
 Adopting the latter in the main, he makes an exception in the case of 
 the spherical motions because the philosophers cannot adequately ex- 
 plain them, and jumps to the conclusion that here the philosophical 
 appeal to mechanical causation breaks down and we are dealing with 
 teleology, with intelligent design and purpose on the part of an in- 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 369 
 
 telligent agent. This leads to belief in creation. But this argument 
 of Maimonides is very weak and inconclusive. Ignorance of causes 
 in a special case, due to the limitations of our reason, proves nothing. 
 Mechanical causes may be the sole determinants of the heavenly 
 motions even though the philosophers have not yet discovered what 
 they are (c/. above, p. 270 ff.).^^^ 
 
 Nor is Maimonides to be imitated, who bases his proof of the exist- 
 ence of God on the theory of eternity. The Bible is opposed to it. 
 The Bible begins with creation as an indication that this is the basis of 
 our knowledge of God's existence, revelation and providence. This 
 is the method Abraham followed and this is what he meant when he 
 swore by the "most high God, the creator of heaven and earth " (Gen. 
 14, 22). Abraham arrived at this behef through ratiocination and 
 endeavored to convince others. The same thing is evident in the 
 words of Isaiah (40, 26), "Lift up your eyes on high and see who 
 created these." He was arguing with the people who believed in 
 eternity, and proved to them the existence of God by showing that 
 the world is created. All these indications in the Bible show that the 
 doctrine of creation is capable of apodeictic proof. ^^'' 
 
 The reader will see that all this is directed against Maimonides, 
 though he is not mentioned by name. Maimonides claimed against 
 the Mutakallimun that it is not safe to base the existence of God upon 
 the theory of creation, because the latter cannot be strictly demon- 
 strated. And while he believed in it himself and gave reasons to show 
 why it is more plausible than eternity, he admitted that others might 
 think differently; and hence based his proofs of God's existence on the 
 Aristotelian theory of eternity in order to be on the safe side. It is 
 never too late to prove God's existence if the world is created. We 
 must be sure of his existence, no matter what the fate of our cosmolog- 
 ical theories might be. This did not appeal to the Karaite and Muta- 
 kallim, Aaron ben Elijah. His idea is that we must never for a mo- 
 ment doubt the creation of the world. To follow the procedure of 
 Maimonides would have the tendency of making people believe that 
 the world may be eternal after all, as happened in fact in the case of 
 Gersonides. Aaron ben Elijah will not leave a way open to such a 
 heresy. 
 
 In the doctrine of attributes Aaron ben Elijah likewise maintains 
 
370 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the views of the Mu'tazilite Karaites against the philosophers, and 
 especially against Maimonides. The general problem is sufficiently 
 familiar to us by this time, and we need only present the sahent points 
 in the controversy. The question is whether there are any positive 
 attributes which may be applied to God as actually denoting his 
 essence — hence positive essential attributes. Maimonides denied it, 
 the Karaites affirmed it. The arguments for Maimonides's denial we 
 saw before (p. 262 f.). And his conclusion is that the only attributes 
 that may be apphed to God are the negative, and those positive ones 
 which do not denote any definite thing corresponding to them in God's 
 essence, but are derived from the effects of God's unitary and simple 
 being on the life of man and nature. He is the author of these effects, 
 and we characterize him in the way in which we would characterize 
 a human being who would do similar things; but this must not be 
 done. 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah insists that there are positive essential attributes, 
 which are the following five: Omnipotent, Omniscient, Acting with 
 Will, Living, Existent. He agrees with Maimonides that these essen- 
 tial attributes must be understood in a manner not to interfere with 
 God's simpHcity and unity, but is satisfied that this can be done. For 
 we must not conceive of them as additions to God's essence, nor as so 
 many distinct elements composing God's essence, but as representing 
 the multiplicity of powers issuing from him without detriment to his 
 unity. We call them essential attributes, meaning that they are the 
 essence of God, but not that they are different from each other and 
 each makes up part of God's essence. We do not know God's essence, 
 and these terms are simply transferred from our human experience, 
 and do not indicate that God's activity can be compared to ours in 
 any sense. 
 
 The five attributes above named are all identical with God's simple 
 essence. "Livmg" denotes ability to perceive, hence is identical with 
 "Omniscient." "Acting with will" likewise denotes just and proper 
 action, which in turn involves true insight. Hence identity of will and 
 knowledge. "Omnipotent" also in the case of an intellectual being 
 denotes the act of the intellect par excellence, which is knowledge. 
 And surely God's existence is not distinct from his essence, else his 
 existence would be caused, and he would not be the necessary existent 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 371 
 
 all agree him to be. It follows then that God is one, and his essence is 
 nevertheless all these five attributes. 
 
 There are all the reasons in the world why we should apply attri- 
 butes to God. The same reason as we have for applying names to 
 anything else exists for giving names to God. In fact it would be 
 correct to say that we should have more names for God than for any- 
 thing else, since in other things we can avoid naming them by point- 
 ing to them, as they can be perceived by the senses. Not so God. 
 We are forced to use words in talking about him. God has given him- 
 self names in the Bible, hence we may do the same. 
 
 Maimonides and his school endeavor to obviate the criticisms of the 
 philosophers, who are opposed to all attributes, by excluding all but 
 negative terms. But this does not help the matter in the least. A 
 negative attribute is in reahty no different from a positive, and in the 
 end leads to a positive. Thus if we say "not mineral," "not p^ant," 
 we clearly say "animal." The advocates of negative attributes an- 
 swer this criticism by saying that they understand pure negation 
 without any positive implications, just as when we say a stone is "not 
 seeing," we do not imply that it is blind. But this cannot be, for 
 when they say God is "not ignorant," they do not mean that he is not 
 "knowing" either, for they insist that he is power and knowledge and 
 life, and so on. This being the case, it is much more proper to use pos- 
 itive attributes, seeing that the Prophets do so. When they say that 
 the Prophets meant only to exclude the negative; that by saying, 
 "Able," "Knowing," they meant to exclude "weak" "ignorant," they 
 ipso facto admit that by excluding the latter we posit the former. 
 
 The arguments against positive essential attributes we can easily 
 answer. By saying that certain attributes are essential we do not 
 claim to know God's essence. All we know is God's existence, which 
 we learn from his effects, and according to these same effects we char- 
 acterize God's existence by means of attributes of which also we know 
 only the existence, not the essence. For we do not mean to indicate 
 that these terms denote the same thing in God as they denote in us. 
 They are homonyms, since in God they denote essence, whereas in 
 us they are accidents. The plurality of attributes does not argue 
 plurality in God, for one essence may perform a great many acts, and 
 hence we may characterize the essence in accordance with those acts. 
 
372 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 The error of composition arises only if we suppose that the various 
 acts point to various elements in their author. Of the various kinds of 
 terms those only are applicable to God which denote pure essence or 
 substance like knowledge, power; and those denoting activity like 
 creating, doing, and so on.^^^ 
 
 In reference to the will of God Aaron ben Elijah refuses to agree 
 with the peculiar view of the Mutakallimun; but unlike Maimonides, 
 who can afford to ignore their discussions entirely and dismiss their 
 fanciful notion with a word ( Guide," I. 75, proof 3), Aaron ben 
 Elijah takes up the discussion seriously. The Mutakallimun (or the 
 Ashariya, according to Aaron ben Elijah) were in dread of anything 
 that might lend some semblance to eternity of the world. Hence 
 they argued, If the will of God is identical with his essence like the 
 other essential attributes, it follows that as his essence is eternal and 
 unchangeable so is his will. And if we grant this, then the objects 
 of his will too must be eternal and unchangeable, and we have the 
 much abhorred doctrine of the eternity of the world. To avoid this 
 objectionable conclusion they conceived of God's voluntary acts 
 as due to an external will. But this external will also offered diffi- 
 ficulties. It cannot be a power or quality residing in God as its sub- 
 ject, for God is not a material substance bearing accidents. It can- 
 not be a quality inherent in another subject, for then it would not 
 be God's will at all; it would be the will of this other being, and God's 
 acts would be determined by someone else. They were thus forced to 
 assume a subject-less will newly created with every act of God. This 
 notion Aaron ben Elijah rejects on the ground that a subject-less will 
 is an impossibility. An accident must have a subject, and will im- 
 plies life as its subject. Besides, the relation between God and this 
 subject-less accident, will, would be the cause of much logical difficulty. 
 Aaron ben Elijah therefore accepts the ordinary sane view that the 
 will of God is identical with his essence; that God wills through his 
 own essence. And he does not fear that this will lead to eternity of the 
 world. He identifies God's will with his wisdom, and God's wisdom 
 with right action. As we do not know the essence of God's wisdom, 
 so we do not know how it is that it prompts him to realize his will at 
 one time and not at another, though his will is always the same.^^^ 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah also follows his party in attributing to God sense 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 373 
 
 perception, not, to be sure, the same kind of perception as we have, 
 acquired by means of corporeal organs; for this is impossible in God 
 for many reasons. God is not corporeal, and he cannot be affected 
 or changed by a corporeal stimulus. But it is clear beyond a doubt 
 that nothing can be more absurd than to suppose that the creator of 
 the sense organs does not understand the purpose which they serve 
 and the objects which they perceive. What we mean then is that the 
 objects which we perceive with our senses God also perceives, though in 
 an incorporeal manner. Hence it does not follow that there is any 
 change in God due to the external object he perceives, nor that the 
 multiplicity of objects involves plurality in God; for even our power 
 of perception is one, though it perceives many things and opposite. 
 We conclude then that God has perception as well as intelligence, but 
 they are not two distinct powers in him. It is the object perceived 
 that determines the power percipient. Hence one and the same power 
 may be called perception when we are dealing with a sensible ob- 
 ject, and intelligence when it has an intelligible as its object.^'^" 
 
 In his discussion of the nature of evil we once more are brought in 
 contact with Kalamistic views recalling the old Karaite works of the 
 eleventh century {cf. pp. 52, 57). Thus the notion that good and bad 
 are adjectives applied to acts not in view of their inherent character, 
 which is per se neither good nor bad, but solely to indicate that they 
 have been commanded or forbidden; the idea that only the dependent 
 subject can do wrong, but not the master, since his will is the source 
 of all right and wrong — these views are frequently discussed in the 
 Mu'tazilite works of Arabs and Karaites. The Rabbanites scarcely 
 ever mention them. Aaron ben Elijah enumerates six views on the 
 nature of evil, with all of which except the last he disagrees. The 
 opinion named above that an act is made good or bad by being com- 
 manded or prohibited, he refutes as follows: Such a view removes the 
 very foundation of good and bad. For if the person in authority 
 chooses to reverse his order, the good becomes bad, and the bad good, 
 and the same thing is then good and bad, which is absurd. Besides, 
 if there are two authorities giving opposite orders, the same act is 
 good and bad at the same time. To say that God's command alone 
 determines the character of an act is incorrect, because as long as 
 commanding and prohibiting as such determine the goodness or bad- 
 
374 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ness of an act, the person issuing the command is immaterial. We do 
 say quite generally that an act which God commands is good, and one 
 which he prohibits is bad ; but we mean by this merely that the com- 
 mand or prohibition is an indication to us, who are ignorant of the 
 true nature of acts. 
 
 Again, on this theory of the value of acts, what will you do with 
 such an act as the investigation of the existence and nature of God? 
 Surely such an important matter cannot be indifferent. It must be 
 good or bad. And yet we cannot apply to it the above test of com- 
 mand and prohibition, for this test implies the existence of God, 
 which the act endeavors to prove. It follows therefore that the value 
 of an act is inherent in it and not determined and created by command 
 and prohibition. 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah is similarly dissatisfied with another view, which 
 regards evil as a negation. We have heard this opinion before and 
 we know that Maimonides adopted it (p. 288). Its motive as we 
 know is to remove from God the responsibility for evil. If evil is 
 nothing positive it is not caused by the activity of an agent. All 
 essential activity is good, and all the acts of God are good. Evil 
 consists in the absence of good ; it is due to matter, and does not come 
 from God. Aaron ben Elijah objects properly that as good is a positive 
 act, a doing of something positive, so is evil, even on the theory of its 
 negative character, a removal of something positive, hence a positive 
 act. Besides, granting all that the opponent claims, the argument 
 should work both ways, and if God is not held responsible for the 
 evil in the world because it is mere privation, why should man be 
 held responsible for doing evil, i. e., for removing the positive? He 
 clinches his argument by quoting Isaiah (5, 20), "Woe unto those who 
 say of evil it is good, and of good it is evil . . . that put bitter 
 for sweet, and sweet for bitter." Good and evil are placed parallel 
 with sweet and bitter, which are both positive. Hence the Bible is 
 opposed to the negative conception of evil. 
 
 His own view is that good and evil are qualities pertaining to an 
 act by reason of its own nature, but these are not absolute concep- 
 tions like true and false. The good and the bad are conventional 
 constructs, and the value of an act is relative to the end or purpose it 
 serves. The purpose of human convention in regarding certain acts 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 375 
 
 as good and others as bad is the protection of the human race. An act 
 which conduces to human welfare is good, one that mihtates against 
 it is bad. Still there are instances in which an act generally regarded 
 as bad may assume a different character when in the given instance 
 it serves a good purpose, as for example when pain is inflicted to ob- 
 viate more serious danger. The surgeon, who amputates a leg to save 
 the patient's life, does good, not evil. The Judge, who punishes the 
 criminal with imprisonment or death for the protection of society and 
 to reahze justice, does good, not evil. In this way we must explain 
 the evil which God brings upon man. God cannot be the cause of 
 evil. For evil in man is due to want or ignorance. Neither is found 
 in God, hence he has no motive to do wrong. All the evil of which we 
 complain is only apparent. In reality it is good, because it is 
 either brought upon us to prevent still greater evils, or it is in the 
 nature of just punishment for wrongdoing. In either case it is a 
 good.^'''^ 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah's discussion of Providence follows closely the 
 plan of the corresponding arguments in Maimonides. The problem 
 is treated by both in connection with God's knowledge, and both 
 maintain that the real motive of those who denied God's knowledge 
 of particulars is their observation of apparent injustice in the happen- 
 ings of this world {cf. above, p. 289). Both again preface their own 
 views of the question of Providence by a preliminary statement of 
 the various opinions held by other sects. Here too the two accounts 
 are in the main similar, except that Aaron ben Ehjah is somewhat 
 more detailed and names a few sects not mentioned by Maimonides, 
 among them being the Manicheans and the followers of the Syrian 
 Gnostic Bardesanes. In their own views, however, Aaron ben Elijah 
 and Maimonides differ; the latter approaching the view of Aristotle, 
 the former that of the Mu'tazUa. 
 
 Maimonides as we know (p. 292) denies special providence for the 
 individuals of the sublunar world with the exception of man. In the 
 case of the lower animals, the species alone are protected by divine 
 providence, hence they will continue forever, whereas the individual 
 animals are subject to chance. Man, as a rational animal, is an ex- 
 ception. He is a free and responsible agent, hence he is under divine 
 guidance and is rewarded and punished for his conduct. The extent 
 
376 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 of the divine care depends upon the degree to which the individual 
 develops his reason, actualizing his potential intellect. 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah argues that this view is erroneous, for it is not 
 proper to make a distinction between God's knowledge and his provi- 
 dence. If it would argue imperfection in God not to know certain 
 things, the same objection applies to limiting his providence, and the 
 two should be coextensive. To say that God's providence extends to 
 superior and important things and ignores the inferior is to make God 
 guilty of injustice. Aaron ben Elijah believes therefore that Provi- 
 dence extends to all individuals, including animals. And he quotes 
 the Bible in his support, ''The Lord is good to all, and his mercies are 
 over all his works," (Ps. 145, 9), and, "Thou shalt not plough with 
 an ox and an ass together " (Deut. 22, 10). Maimonides, he says, was 
 led to his opinion by his idea that death and suffering always involve 
 sin; and not being able to apply this dictum to the suffering of animals 
 that are slaughtered, he removed Providence from their individuals 
 entirely. When the Bible orders us to consider the feelings of the ani- 
 mal, he says the object is to train our own faculties in mercy, and pre- 
 vent the formation of habits of cruelty, not for the sake of the animal. 
 But he cannot remove all difficulties in this way. What will he do 
 with the case of a person born crippled, and the sufferings of little 
 children? The idea that death and suffering in all cases involve sin 
 must be given up. Maimonides is also wrong when he says that re- 
 ward is purely intellectual and is dependent upon the development of 
 the "acquired intellect." It would follow from this that right con- 
 duct as such is not rewarded; that it serves merely as a help to realizing 
 the acquired intellect. All this is opposed to Biblical teaching. ^'^^ 
 
 The prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the righteous 
 Aaron ben Elijah endeavors to explain as follows. The prosperity of 
 the wicked may be due to former good deeds; or by way of punish- 
 ment, that he may continue in his evil deeds and be punished more 
 severely. It may be in order that he may use the good fortune he 
 has in whatever way he pleases, for good or ill. Finally his good 
 fortune may be given him as a matter of grace, like his creation. 
 Correspondingly we may explain the adversity of the righteous in a 
 similar manner. It may be due to former sins. If he has no sins, his 
 sufferings may be intended to test him in order to add to his reward. 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF N I COM EDI A 377 
 
 If he dies without having enjoyed life, he will be rewarded in the 
 next world. The pleasures of this world must not be considered. 
 For since they are given as a matter of grace, they may come or not 
 without involving any injustice. When a man has both good deeds 
 and sins, he may be rewarded for his good deeds and punished for 
 his bad, or he may be paid according to the element which predomi- 
 nates. Those who are born crippled and the sufferings of children 
 will be rewarded later. In reference to the slaughter of animals, 
 Aaron ben Ehjah does not agree with the Mu' tazila that the animals 
 will be recompensed for their undeserved sufferings. There is no 
 immortal part in animals, hence no reward after death. He can assign 
 no reason for their sufferings except that men need them for food, 
 but he sees nothing wrong in taking an animal's life for food, for as 
 the life of animals was given to them as a matter of grace, there is 
 no wrong in taking it away. However, to inflict pain in a way dif- 
 ferent from the manner permitted by God is wrong. '^^ 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah lays great stress upon what he considers an im- 
 portant difference of opinion between the Rabbanites and the Karaites 
 concerning the nature and purpose of divine punishment. The Rab- 
 banites according to him insist that "there is no death without sin, 
 nor suffering without guilt," whereas the Karaites admit that some 
 of the sufferings of the righteous are not in the nature of punishment 
 at all, but are what are known as ''chastisements of love." Their 
 purpose is to increase the man's reward later in the future world, 
 and at the same time they have a pedagogical value in themselves 
 in strengthening the person spiritually. Accordingly Aaron ben 
 Elijah, who in the main follows the opinions of the Karaites, differs 
 with the Rabbanites and particularly Maimonides in the interpre- 
 tation of the "trials" of Adam, Abraham, Job. 
 
 So far as Job is concerned, we know the opinions of Maimonides 
 on the subject. In his "Guide of the Perplexed" he interprets the 
 book of Job in connection with his discussion of Providence {cf. above, 
 p. 304). In the general nature of suffering the idea of "chastisement 
 of love" is quite famihar to the Rabbis, though Maimonides does 
 not care to insist on it, claiming that there is no support for it in the 
 Bible. The idea of "trial" according to him is neither that God may 
 know what he did not know before; nor is it to make a man suffer 
 
378 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 that he may be rewarded later. The purpose of trial is that mankind 
 may know whatever it is desired to teach them in a given case. In 
 the trial of Abraham when he was told to sacrifice Isaac, there was a 
 two-fold reason; first, that all may know to what extent the love of 
 God may go in a pious man; and second to show that a prophet is 
 convinced of the reality of his visions as an ordinary person is of the 
 data of his senses.^^* 
 
 The book of Job is to Maimonides a treatise on Providence, and 
 the five characters in the drama represent the various opinions on 
 the nature of Providence as they were held by different schools of 
 philosophy and theology in Maimonides's day. Job has the Aristote- 
 lian view that God cares nothing for man. Eliphaz represents the 
 correct Jewish view that everything is reward or punishment for 
 merit and demerit. Bildad maintains the Mu'tazilite opinion that 
 many misfortunes are for the purpose of increasing reward in the 
 world to come. Zophar stands for the view of the Ashariya that 
 all is to be explained by reference to the will of God, and no questions 
 should be asked. Elihu finally insists that the individual man is the 
 object of the divine care, but that we must not compare God's provi- 
 dence with our own interest in, and care for things; that there is no 
 relation at all between them except in name {cj. above, p. 304). The 
 Rabbis, who do not make of Job a philosopher, naturally do not under- 
 stand the matter as Maimonides does, but they nevertheless agree 
 with him that Job deserved the punishment he received. The Karaites 
 on the other hand classed Job's sufferings with "chastisements of love," 
 which would mean that Job was a perfect man and did not deserve 
 any punishment. The sole motive for inflicting pain and tribulation 
 upon him was to reward him the more later. 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah agrees in the main with his Karaite predecessors 
 that Job was not punished for any fault he had committed. He does 
 not see in the arguments of Job's friends any difference of opinion 
 on the general question of Providence, and Job was not an Aristotelian. 
 Unlike Aristotle, he did beheve in God's care for man, as is evident 
 from such statements as (Job 10, 10), Behold like milk didst thou 
 pour me out, and like cheese didst thou curdle me." The Karaites, he 
 holds, are correct in their main contention that Job's sufferings were 
 not in the nature of punishment for previous guilt and wrongdoing, 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 379 
 
 but they are mistaken in supposing that Job was altogether right in 
 his conception of the meaning and reason of his sufferings; that they 
 had no other purpose except to increase his reward in the future. 
 Aaron ben EHjah then explains his own view of "trial." 
 
 Man, he says, is composed of body and soul, and must therefore 
 endeavor to gain this world and the next. If he is punished for guilt 
 or offence, the punishment corresponds to the offence. Corporeal 
 guilt is followed by corporeal punishment, spiritual guilt by spiritual 
 punishment. Adam offended spiritually and was punished spiritually 
 by being driven from the Garden of Eden as will be explained later. 
 Abraham endeavored to do justice to both the constituent parts of 
 his being; and hence God in his kindness, wishing to strengthen Abra- 
 ham spiritually, gave him the opportunity in the trial of Isaac. At 
 the same time the physical suffering was compensated by the promise 
 to Abraham of the continuity of Isaac's descendants. Job's sufferings 
 were of the same kind, except that they came to him without his 
 knowledge and without his being told their purpose. And at first 
 he thought they were in order to give him future reward, but without 
 any use in themselves. Later he discovered that they benefited him 
 directly by increasing his spiritual strength. ^''^ 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah differs also from Maimonides in reference to the 
 purpose of the world. Maimonides maintains that while there is 
 sense in inquiring for the purpose of the parts of the world, the ques- 
 tion of the ultim.ate purpose of the world as a whole is meaningless. 
 The purpose of a given event or law of nature lies in its relation to 
 the other events and laws, hence there is a relative purpose in particu- 
 lar things; thus, given the existence of animals they must have food, 
 sense perception, and so on. But if we ask why the universe as a 
 whole, the only answer that can be given is God's wisdom, which 
 we do not understand. In particular Maimonides will not admit 
 that the world is for the sake of man, as this view clashes with ex- 
 perience and makes it impossible to explain a great many phenomena 
 in nature, which are distinctly of no benefit to man and take no cogni- 
 zance of his interests. ^'^^ Aaron ben Elijah agrees with Maimonides 
 that God's wisdom rather than his arbitrary will, as the Ashariya 
 maintain, must be appealed to in answering the question of the pur- 
 pose of the world. But he is inclined to regard man as the purpose 
 
380 MEDI/BVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 of the lower world, admitting that we cannot know the purpose of the 
 higher worlds of the spheres and Intelligences, as they transcend the 
 powers of our comprehension.^''^ 
 
 We can pass over Aaron ben Elijah's discussion of prophecy very 
 briefly because there is no new attitude or contribution in his views. 
 Without saying it, he reluctantly perhaps, leans upon Maimonides, 
 and with apparent variations in form really adopts the classification 
 of the "Guide" (p. 277). He gives no psychological explanation of 
 prophecy because he disagrees with the philosophers, to whom proph- 
 ecy is a purely natural gift which cannot fail to manifest itself when 
 the requisite conditions are there, namely, perfection in intellect and 
 imagination. In fact when he gives the different views on the nature 
 of prophecy, he refuses to identify what seems to stand in his book 
 for the view of Maimonides (the fourth view) with that of the fol- 
 lowers of the Mosaic law. Whereas Maimonides following the philoso- 
 phers insists on the two important elements in prophecy, namely, 
 intellect and imagination, adding thereto also moral perfection, 
 Aaron ben Elijah in giving the opinion of those who follow the law 
 of Moses, says nothing of the imagination. He insists only on per- 
 fection in intellect and in ethical character. This difference is, how- 
 ever, only apparent; and further on he refers to the imagination as 
 an important element, which determines, in its relation to the reason, 
 the character of a man as a prophet or a mere statesman or philosopher 
 — all in the manner of Maimonides. 
 
 His idea of the purpose of prophecy he develops, as it seems, with an 
 eye to the criticism of the Brahmins of India, whom he quotes as 
 denying prophecy, though admitting Providence, on the ground that 
 it can serve no purpose. The reason alone, they say, is sufficient to 
 decide what is right and what is wrong. Accordingly Aaron ben Elijah 
 meets their objection as follows: It is true that man might have gotten 
 along without prophecy through the laws which his own reason estab- 
 lished for right and wrong, good and evil. Those who followed these 
 rational laws would have attained long life, and the others would have 
 perished. But a good man living in a bad environment would have 
 been involved in the downfall of the majority, which would not be just. 
 Hence it was necessary that God should warn the man, that he might 
 save himself. This is the first beginning of prophecy. Witness Noah 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 381 
 
 and Lot. Abraham was a great . advance on his predecessors. He 
 endeavored to follow God's will in respect to both body and soul. 
 Hence God saved him from the danger to which he was exposed in Ur 
 of the Chaldees, and wanted to benefit his descendants also that they 
 should perfect their bodies and their souls. This is impossible for a 
 whole nation without special laws to guide them. This is particularly 
 true of the "traditional" laws (ceremonial), which are not in them- 
 selves good or bad, but are disciplinary in their nature. 
 
 A prophet must have both intellectual and ethical perfection. For 
 he must understand the nature of God in order to communicate his 
 will; and this cannot be had without previous ethical perfection. 
 Hence the twofold requirement. This is the reason, he says, why we 
 do not believe in the religions of Jesus and Mohammed, because they 
 were not possessed of intellectual perfection. And besides they tend to 
 the extinction of the human species by reason of their monastic and 
 celibate ideal. They were misled by the asceticism of the prophets, 
 who meant it merely as a protest against the material self-indulgence 
 of the time, and called attention to the higher life. But those people 
 in their endeavor to imitate the prophets mistook the means for the 
 end, with the result that they missed both, perfection of soul as well as 
 of body, and merely mortified the flesh, thinking it the will of God. 
 Hence, Aaron ben Elijah continues, we shall never accept a religion 
 which does not preach the maintenance of this world as well as of the 
 next. Not even miracles can authenticate a religion which preaches 
 monasticism and celibacy. 
 
 Moses was superior to the other prophets. All the others received 
 their messages in a vision or a dream, Moses had his inspiration while 
 awake. The others were inspired through the medium of an angel, 
 i. e., through the imagination, hence their language abounds in alle- 
 gories and parables. Moses did not use the imagination, hence the 
 plain character of his speech. The others were overcome by the vision 
 and physically exhausted, as we read in Daniel (10, 17), "There re- 
 mained no strength in me, and no breath was left in me." Moses was 
 free from this weakness — "And the Lord spoke unto Moses face to 
 face, as a man speaketh unto his neighbor " (Exod. 33, 11). The others 
 required preparation, Moses did not. Moses's testimony, too, was 
 stronger than that of all the rest. His authority in the end was made 
 
382 MEDIMVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 plain to all the people directly and openly, so that there remained not 
 a shred of a doubt. This is why we accept his law and no other, be- 
 cause none is so well authenticated. The Law cannot change without 
 implying that the standard of perfection has changed, or the world has 
 changed, or God's knowledge has changed. All this is impossible. 
 The Law says besides, "Thou shalt not add thereto, and thou shalt 
 not diminish therefrom" (Deut. 13, i). Therefore, concludes Aaron 
 ben Elijah the Karaite, we do not believe in the oral or traditional law 
 because of the additions to, and subtractions from, the written law 
 which it contains.^^^ 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah agrees with Maimonides that all the command- 
 ments of the Bible, including the ceremonial laws, have a purpose and 
 are not due to the arbitrary will of God. The ceremonial laws are 
 for the sake of the rational, serving a pedagogical and disciplinary 
 purpose, and the Law as a whole is for the purpose of teaching the 
 truth and inculcating the good. He goes further than Maimonides 
 in vindicating the rational and ethical purpose of all the details of the 
 various laws, and not merely of the several commandments as a whole 
 {cj. above, p. 294).^'^^ 
 
 A problem that occupied the minds of the Mutakallimun, Arabs 
 as well as Karaites, but which Maimonides does not discuss, is the 
 piupose of God's giving commandments to those who he knew would 
 remain unbelievers, and refuse to obey. That God's knowledge and 
 man's freedom co-exist and neither destroys the other, has already 
 been shown.^^" If then God knows, as we must assume, that a given 
 person will refuse to obey the commandments, what is the use of 
 giving them to him? And granting that for some reason unknown to 
 us they have been given, is it just to pimish him for disobedience when 
 the latter might have been spared by not giving the man in question 
 any commandments? 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah answers these questions by citing the following 
 parallel. A man prepares a meal for two guests and one does not come. 
 The absence of the guest does not make the preparation improper, for 
 the character of the act does not depend upon the choice of the guest 
 to do or not to do the desire of the host. The invitation was proper 
 because the host meant the guest's benefit. To be sure, the case is not 
 quite parallel, and to make it so we must assume that the host expects 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 383, 
 
 that the guest will not come. His intention being good, the invitation 
 is proper. In our problem knowledge takes the place of expectation. 
 God does not merely expect, he knows that the man will not obey. 
 But as God's desire is to benefit mankind and arouse them to higher 
 things, the command is proper, no matter what the person chooses to do. 
 
 To punish the man for disobedience is not unjust because God in- 
 tended to benefit him by the command. If he disobeyed, that is his 
 lookout. If the benefit could have been had without the command, 
 then the punishment would be unjust, but not otherwise. 
 
 If only good men were commanded and the rest ignored, the danger 
 would be that the former being thereby assured of reward, might be 
 tempted to do wrong; and the others in despair might be worse than 
 they would be imder ordinary circumstances. God saw that man has 
 evil tendencies, and needs warning and guidance from without. And 
 just as he gave men understanding and ability to believe though he 
 knew that a given person would not avail himself thereof, so he gave 
 all men commandments, though he knew that some would not obey.^^^ 
 
 The rest of the book is devoted to such questions as reward and 
 punishment after death, immortality of the soul, the problem of the 
 soul's pre-existence, the nature of the future life, repentance — ques- 
 tions which Maimonides left untouched in the ' Guide " on the ground 
 that whatever religion and tradition may say about them, they are not 
 strictly speaking scientific questions, and are not susceptible to phil- 
 osophical demonstration. 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah proves that there must be reward and punishment 
 after death. For as man is composed of body and soul, there must be 
 reward for each according as man endeavors to maintain and perfect 
 them. Thus if a man cares for his body alone, he will be rewarded in 
 his body, i. e., in this world. The other man who looks out for both 
 body and soul must have the same reward in this world as the other, 
 since their physical efforts were similar. At the same time he must 
 have something over and above the other in the nature of compensa- 
 tion for his soul, and this must be in the next world. 
 
 The prosperity of the wicked and the misery of the righteous are 
 also to be explained in part, as we have seen (p. 376), by reference to 
 their respective destinies in the next world, where the inequalities of 
 this world will be adjusted. 
 
384 MEDIjEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Finally, material reward cannot be the consequence of intellectual 
 and spiritual merit; it would mean doing the greater for the sake of the 
 smaller. And besides the soul is not benefited by physical goods and 
 pleasures, and would remain without reward. Hence there must be 
 another kind of reward after death. In order to deserve such reward 
 the soul must become wise. At the same time the common people, 
 who observe the ceremonial commandments, are not excluded from a 
 share in the world to come, because the purpose of these laws is also 
 intellectual and spiritual, as we said before (p. 382), and hence their 
 observance makes the soul wise, and gives it immortality. This last 
 comment is clearly directed against the extreme intellectualism of 
 Maimonides and Gersonides, according to whom rational activity 
 alone confers immortality (p. 339).^^^ 
 
 The considerations just adduced imply the immortality of the soul, 
 to which they lend indirect proof. But Aaron ben Elijah endeavors 
 besides to furnish direct proof of the soul's continuance after the death 
 of the body. And the first thing he does is to disarm the criticism of 
 the philosophers, who deny immortality on the ground that the soul 
 being the form of the body, it must like other material forms cease 
 with the dissolution of the things of which they are the forms. He 
 answers this by showing that the soul as the cause of knowledge and 
 wisdom — immaterial faculties — is itself immaterial. Being also the 
 cause of the body's motion, it is not itself subject to motion, hence not 
 to time, and therefore not destructible like a natural form. Besides 
 the composition of body and soul is different from that of matter and 
 form in the ordinary sense. For in the former case each of the con- 
 stituent parts is already a composite of matter and form. The body 
 has both matter and form, and the soul has likewise. For the acquired 
 intellect is the form of the soul, which is the matter. Other proofs 
 are as follows: The rational soul performs its functions without help 
 from the body, hence it is independent in its existence. The proof of 
 the last statement is that the power of the rational soul is not limited, 
 and does not become weary, as a corporeal power does. Hence it 
 can exist without the body. Again, as the corporeal powers grow 
 stronger, the intellectual powers grow weaker, and vice versa as 
 the corporeal powers grow weaker in old age, the intellect grows 
 stronger. Hence the soul is independent of the body, and when 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 385 
 
 the physical powers cease entirely in death, the intellect is at its 
 height. ^^^ 
 
 The question of the soul's pre-existence before coming in contact 
 with the body, Aaron ben Elijah answers in the affirmative, though 
 his arguments in favor of the opposite view are stronger. His sole 
 argument in favor of its pre-existence is that the soul, being a self- 
 subsisting substance and not an accident, is not dependent upon the 
 body, and must have existed before the body. The consequence which 
 some have drawn from this supposition combined with the soul's 
 immortality, namely, that the soul is eternal, he refuses to adopt. 
 The soul existed before the body, but like all things which are not 
 God it was created in time. 
 
 Though we have thus seen that the soul existed before the body, it 
 is mistaken to suppose that it was completely developed. For though 
 the gradual progress in knowledge and understanding as the individual 
 matures proves nothing for the soul's original imperfection, as we may 
 account for this progress by the gradual adaptation of the physical 
 elements to the functions of the soul, there is a more vahd objection. 
 If the soul was perfectly developed before entering the body, all souls 
 should be alike when they leave it, which is not the case. We come to 
 the conclusion therefore that the soul does acquire knowledge while 
 in contact with the body. The human soul is a unit, and from its 
 connection with the body arise the various powers, such as growth, 
 life, reason. When the soul is separated from the body, those powers 
 which functioned with the aid of the body perish; the others remain.^^^ 
 
 In the matter of eschatology Aaron ben Elijah gives a number of 
 views without declaring himself definitely for any of them. The main 
 difference among the three points of view quoted concerns the possi- 
 bility of the resurrection of the body, and the meaning of the terms 
 "revival of the dead" ("Tehiyat ha-metim") and "the world to come" 
 ("01am ha-ba"). Aaron ben Elijah seems to incline to the first, in 
 favor of resurrection. 
 
 We must endeavor, he says, to get some notion of final reward and 
 punishment. For without any idea of its nature a man's hope or fear 
 is taken away from him, and he has no motive for right conduct. To 
 be sure it is not possible to get a clear understanding of the matter, but 
 some idea we must have. The first view which he seems to favor is 
 
386 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 that revival oj the dead and world to come are the same thing; that the 
 end of man is the resurrection of the body and its reunion with the 
 soul. This is the future Hfe, and this is meant by reward and punish- 
 ment. There is Bibhcal support for this view in such expressions as, 
 "Thy dead shall live, thy dead bodies shall arise" (Isa. 26, ig). "The 
 Lord killeth, and maketh alive; he bringeth down to the grave and 
 bringeth up " (i Sam. 2, 6). There is nothing to object in this, he says, 
 for the same God who made man of the dust can revive him after 
 death. Besides, there seems to be a logical propriety in bringing soul 
 and body together for reward and punishment just as they were during 
 conduct in life. When the soul is once reunited with the body in the 
 resurrection, it is never separated again. The expression ^^ garden of 
 Eden " for paradise is a figure of speech for eternal life free from pain. 
 
 The second opinion is expressed by those who do not believe in 
 bodily resurrection. The end of man according to these is the return 
 of the soul to the world of souls. This is the meaning of "world to 
 come"; and "revival of the dead" means the same thing. For it is 
 not possible that the soul should be reunited with the body, which is 
 temporary in its nature and subject to dissolution. Besides, the body 
 has organs, such as those of food and reproduction, which would be 
 useless in the future life. The advocates of this theory also believe in 
 transmigration of souls as a punishment. Aaron ben Elijah rejects 
 metempsychosis on the ground that there is some relation between a 
 soul and its body, and not every body can receive every soul. 
 
 Aaron ben Ehjah also quotes without comment the classification, 
 already familiar to us (p. 119), of himian souls into (i) dead, (2) alive, 
 (3) healthy, and (4) sick. Death denotes evil deeds; life, good deeds; 
 health, intellectual knowledge; disease, ignorance. This classification 
 is applied in determining the destiny of the soul after death. If one is 
 alive and healthy, i. e., has knowledge and good deeds, he has a share 
 in the world to come. If he is healthy and dead (knowledge + evil 
 deeds), the soul is kept in an intermediate world forever. If he is alive 
 and sick (good deeds + ignorance), the soul rises to the upper air, 
 whence it returns again and again to the body until it acquires wisdom 
 to be able to rise to the world of angels. If he is dead and sick (evil 
 deeds + ignorance), the soul dies like an animal. 
 
 Finally, the third opinion is a combination of resurrection and 
 
AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 387 
 
 "future world." Seeing that some of the functions of the soul are per- 
 formed with the help of the body, while others are not, the advocates 
 of this view maintain that the soul will be rewarded in both condi- 
 tions — with the body, in resurrection, without the body, in the world 
 to come. 
 
 If a man has merits and demerits, his good and evil deeds are bal- 
 anced against each other, and the surplus determines his reward or 
 punishment according to its nature.^^^ 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 HASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS (1340-1410) 
 
 The influence of Aristotle on Jewish thought, which began as early 
 as Saadia and grew in intensity as the Aristotelian writings became 
 better known, reached its high water mark in Ibn Daud, Maimonides 
 and Gersonides. To Maimonides Aristotle was the indisputable 
 authority for all matters pertaining to sublunar existence, but he re- 
 served the right to differ with the Stagirite when the question con- 
 cerned the heavenly spheres and the influences derived from them. 
 Hence he denied the eternity of motion and the fundamental prin- 
 ciple at the basis of this Aristotelian idea, that necessity rules all 
 natural phenomena. In his doctrine of creation in time, Maimonides 
 endeavored to defend God's personality and voluntary and purposeful 
 activity. For the same reason he defended the institution of miracles. 
 Gersonides went further in his rationalistic attitude, carried the 
 Aristotelian principles to their inevitable conclusions, and did not 
 shrink from adopting to all intents and purposes the eternity of the 
 world (strictly speaking the eternity of matter), and the limitation of 
 God's knowledge to universals. Aristotle's authority was now su- 
 preme, and the Bible had to yield to Aristotelian interpretations, as 
 we have seen abundantly. Maimonides and Gersonides were the 
 great peaks that stood out above the rest; but there was any number 
 of lesser lights, some who wrote books and still more who did not 
 write, taking the great men as their models and looking at Jewish 
 literatiire and belief through Aristotelian spectacles. Intellectualism 
 is the term that best describes this attitude. It had its basis in psychol- 
 ogy, and from there succeeded in establishing itself as the ruling 
 principle in ethics and metaphysics. As reason and intellect is the 
 distinguishing trait of man — the part of man which raises him above 
 the beast — and as the soul is the form of the living body, its essence and 
 actuating principle, it was argued that the most important part of 
 man is his rational soul or intellect, and immortality was made de- 
 
 388 
 
HASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS 389 
 
 pendent upon theoretical ideas. Speculative study made the soul; 
 and an intellect thus constituted was immortal, for it was immaterial. 
 The heavenly world, consisting of the separate Intelligences and cul- 
 minating in God, was also in its essence reason and intellect. Hence 
 thought and knowledge formed the essence of the universe. By 
 thought is man saved, and through thought is he united with the 
 Most High. All else that is not pure thought acquires what value it 
 has from the relation it bears to thought. In this way were judged 
 those divisions of Judaism that concerned ceremony and ethical prac- 
 tice. Their value consisted in their function of promoting the ends of 
 the reason. 
 
 Judah Halevi, influenced by Al Gazali, had already before Mai- 
 monides protested against this intellectualistic attitude in the name 
 of a truer though more naive understanding of the Bible and Jewish 
 history. But Judah Halevi's nationalism and the expression of his 
 poetical and religious feelings and ideas could not vie with the dom- 
 inating personality of Maimonides, whose rationalistic and intellectual- 
 istic attitude swept everything before it and became the dominant 
 mode of thinking for his own and succeeding ages. It remained for 
 Hasdai Crescas (born in Barcelona, in 1340), who flourished in Chris- 
 tian Spain two centuries after Maimonides and over a half century 
 after Gersonides, to take up the cudgels again in behalf of a truer 
 Judaism, a Judaism independent of Aristotle, and one that is based 
 more upon the spiritual and emotional sides of man and less upon the 
 purely intellectual, theoretical and speculative. Himself devoid of 
 the literary power and poetic feeling of Judah Halevi, Crescas had this 
 in common with the mediaeval national poet that he resented the 
 domination of Jewish belief and thought by the alien Greek specula- 
 tion. In a style free from rhetoric, and characterized rather by a severe 
 brevity and precision, he undertakes to undermine the Aristotelian 
 position by using the Stagirite's own weapons, logical analysis and 
 proof. His chief work is the "Or Adonai," Light of the Lord.^^^ 
 
 Agreeing with all other Jewish writers that the existence of God is 
 the basis of Judaism, he sees in this very fact a reason why this prin- 
 ciple cannot be regarded as one of the six hundred and thirteen com- 
 mandments. For a commandment implies the existence of one who 
 commands. Hence to regard the belief in the existence of God as a 
 
390 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 commandment implies the very thing which the commandment ex- 
 presses. The existence of God therefore as the basis of all command- 
 ments cannot itself be a commandment. Besides only those things 
 can form the objects of a command which can be controlled by the wUl. 
 But a matter of belief Hke the existence of God is not subject to will, 
 it is a matter of fact and of proof. ^^'^ 
 
 Maimonides, as we know, based his proofs of the existence, unity 
 and incorporeality of God upon twenty-six philosophical propositions 
 taken from the works of Aristotle and his Arabian interpreters. As 
 he was not writing a book on general philosophy, Maimonides simply 
 enumerates twenty-five propositions, which he accepts as proved by 
 Aristotle and his followers. To these he adds provisionally another 
 proposition, number twenty-six, concerning the eternity of motion, 
 upon which he bases his proof of the existence of God in order to be 
 safe from all criticism. In the sequel he discusses this last proposition 
 and shows that unlike the other twenty-five, it is not susceptible of 
 rigid demonstration, and the arguments in favor of the origin of mo- 
 tion and the world in time are more plausible. 
 
 Crescas goes further than Maimonides, and controverts most of the 
 other propositions as well, maintaining in particular against Aristotle 
 and Maimonides that an infinite magnitude is possible and exists 
 actually; that there is an infinite fullness or void outside of this world, 
 and hence there may be many worlds, and it need not follow that the 
 elements would pour in from one world into the next, so that all earth 
 should be together in the centre, all fire together in the outer circum- 
 ference, and the intermediate elements, air and water, between these 
 two. The elements may stay in their respective worlds in the places 
 assigned to them. It will not be worth our while to wade through 
 all the technical and hair-splitting discussions of these points. The 
 results will be sufiicient for our purpose. 
 
 The proof of the existence of an unmoved mover in Aristotle and 
 Maimonides is based upon the impossibility of a regress to infinity. 
 If Hasdai Crescas admits the infinite, the Aristotehan proof fails. 
 Similarly God's unity in Maimonides is among other things based 
 upon the finiteness of the world and its unity. If infinite space is 
 possible outside of this world, and there may be many worlds, this 
 proof fails for God's unity. So Crescas takes up in detail all the Mai- 
 
HASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS 391 
 
 monidean proofs of the existence, unity and incorporeality of God and 
 points out that they are not vahd because in the first place they are 
 based upon premises which Crescas has refuted, and secondly were 
 the premises granted Maimonides's results do not follow from them.^^^ 
 It remains then for Crescas to give his own views on this problem 
 which, he says, the philosophers are unable to solve satisfactorily, 
 and the Bible alone is to be relied upon. At the same time he does 
 give a logical proof which in reality is not different from one of the 
 proofs given by Maimonides himself. It is based upon the distinction 
 insisted upon by Alfarabi and Avicenna between the "possible exist- 
 ent" and the "necessary existent." Whatever is an effect of a cause 
 is in itself merely possible, and owes the necessity of its existence to 
 its cause. Now, argues Crescas, whether the number of causes and 
 effects is finite or infinite, there must be one cause of all of them which 
 is not itself an effect. For if all things are effects they are "possible 
 existents" as regards their own nature, and require a cause which will 
 make them exist rather than not. This self -subsisting cause is God.^^^ 
 
 He then endeavors to prove the unity of God in the two senses of 
 the term; unity in the sense of simplicity, and unity in the sense of 
 uniqueness. Unity as opposed to composition — the former sense of 
 the term — is neither the same as the essence of a thing, nor is it an 
 accident added to the essence. It cannot be essence, for in that case 
 all things called one would have the same essence. Nor is it accident, 
 for that which defines and separates the existing thing is truly called 
 substance rather than accident; and this is what unity does. Accord- 
 ingly Crescas defines unity as something essential to everything ac- 
 tually existing, denoting the absence of plurality. This being true, that 
 existent which is before all others is most truly called one. Also that 
 being which is most separated from other things is best called one.^^'' 
 
 Crescas disagrees with Maimonides's opinion that no positive at- 
 tributes can be applied to God, such as indicate relation to his crea- 
 tures, and so on. His arguments are that we cannot avoid relation 
 to creatures even in the term "cause," which Maimonides admits; and 
 in the attributes of action — the only kind of positive attributes al- 
 lowed by Maimonides — it is implied that before a given time God did 
 not do a particular thing, which he did later, a condition in God which 
 Maimonides will not admit. Besides, if there are no positive attri- 
 
392 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 butes, what could be the meaning of the tetragrammaton, about 
 which Maimonides has so much to say? If it expressed a negative at- 
 tribute, why was its meaning kept so secret? Crescas's own view is 
 that there are positive attributes, and that there is a relation between 
 God and his creatures, though not a similarity, as they are far apart, 
 the one being a necessary existent, the other a possible existent; one 
 being infinite, the other finite.^^^ 
 
 We must now try to show that God is one in the sense that there 
 are no other Gods besides. We may proceed as follows: If there are 
 two Gods, one of them controls only part of the world or he does not 
 control it at all. The first is impossible because the unitary world 
 must be due to one agent. But there may be more than one world 
 and hence more than one agent. This is, however, answered by the 
 thought that being infinite in power one could control them all. There 
 is still another alternative, viz., that one agent controls the whole 
 world and the other does nothing. Here speculation can go no further, 
 and we must have recourse to Scripture, which says, "Hear, O Israel, 
 the Lord our God, the Lord is One." ^^^ We see here that Crescas is 
 interested in discrediting the logic chopping of the philosophers. 
 No merely logical argument, is his idea, can give us absolute certainty 
 even in so fundamental a doctrine as the unity of God. Like Judah 
 Halevi, Crescas took his inspiration from Algazali, whose point of 
 view appealed to him more than that of Maimonides and Gersonides, 
 who may be classed with Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes. 
 
 Having discussed the fundamental principles of all religion and 
 philosophy, namely, the existence and nature of God, Crescas next 
 takes up the following six fundamental dogmas of Judaism, God's 
 knowledge of existing things, Providence, Power, Prophecy, Freedom, 
 Purpose. 
 
 There are three things to be remembered in the matter of God's 
 knowledge. He knows the infinite, for he knows particulars. He 
 knows the non-existent, as he knows the future; and his knowledge 
 of the contingent does not remove its contingent character. Mai- 
 monides and Gersonides had difficulty with this problem and we know 
 their respective solutions. Gersonides, for reasons metaphysical as 
 well as ethical, does not scruple to limit God's knowledge to universals. 
 Maimonides endeavors to reconcile the dilemma by throwing the 
 
HASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS 393 
 
 blame upon our limited understanding. In God's knowledge which 
 is toto cosh different from ours, and of which we have no conception, 
 all oppositions and contradictions find their ultimate harmony. 
 Crescas, as we might naturally expect, agrees with Maimonides in 
 this matter rather than with Gersonides. To limit God's knowledge 
 is opposed to the Bible, and would involve us in greater difficulties 
 than those we endeavor to escape. ^^^ 
 
 Related to the question of God's knowledge is the problem of Provi- 
 dence. For God must know the individual or thing for which he pro- 
 vides, and if God has no knowledge of particulars, there can be no 
 such thing as special providence. This latter as we know is virtually 
 the opinion of Gersonides {cf. p. 345). Crescas, we have seen, defends 
 God's knowledge of particulars, hence he sees no difficulty in special 
 providence on this score. He takes, however, the term in a broad 
 sense. All evidence of design in nature, all powers in plant and animal 
 which guide their growth, reproduction and conservation are due 
 to God's providence. Providence, he says, is sometimes exercised 
 by God directly, without an intermediate voluntary agent, some- 
 times with such mediation. God's relations to Moses and to the 
 Israelites in Egypt at the time of the tenth plague were without inter- 
 mediate agency. In all other cases there is mediation of angels, or 
 prophets, or wise men, or, according to some, the heavenly bodies, 
 which are living and intelligent beings. 
 
 Providence itself is of different kinds. There is the most general 
 and natural exhibited in the equipment of the various species of plant 
 and animal life for their protection and growth and conservation. 
 There are the more special powers found in the human race. These 
 forms of providence have httle to do with the person's deserts. They 
 are purely dependent upon the constitution and influence of the stars. 
 Then there is the more special providence of the Jewish nation, then 
 of the male members of this nation, and of the priests and the levites. 
 Finally comes the special providence of the individual, who is rewarded 
 and punished according to his conduct. The reward and punishment 
 of this world are not strictly controlled by conduct, the reward and 
 punishment of the next world are. In this last remark Crescas cuts 
 the knot which has been the cause of so much discussion in religious 
 philosophy. If the real reward and punishment are in the next world. 
 
394 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the righteous in 
 this world do not form so great a problem. At the same time an 
 explanation of this pecuhar phenomenon is still wanting. For surely 
 the righteous man does not deserve to suffer for his righteousness, 
 even though his good deeds will not go unrewarded in the next world. 
 In this discussion also Crescas takes issue with the intellectualistic 
 point of view of Maimonides and particularly Gersonides. The 
 solution of these men that evil does not come from God directly 
 but by accident and by reason of matter, and the corollary drawn 
 therefrom that God does not punish the wicked directly, that he merely 
 neglects them, leaving them to the accidents of nature and chance, 
 Crescas does not approve. Nor is he more favorably inclined to the 
 theory that the good man is provided for because the more he culti- 
 vates his mind, the more closely he comes in contact with God, in 
 whom are contained actually all the ideas of which man has some 
 potentially. His main criticism is that the theory is opposed to clear 
 statements in the Bible, which imply special and individual reward 
 and punishment in a miraculous and supernatural manner, which 
 cannot be due to intellectual perfection, nor to the order of the heav- 
 enly bodies. Besides, if a man who is highly intellectual did much 
 wrong, he should be punished in his soul, but on the intellectuahst 
 theory such a soul is immortal and cannot be destroyed. 
 
 Accordingly Crescas goes back to the religious doctrine of reward 
 and punishment as ordinarily understood. God rewards and punishes 
 because man obeys or disobeys his will and command. The com- 
 plaint raised on account of the misery of the good and the prosperity 
 of the wicked he answers by saying that real reward and punishment 
 are in the next world. The goods and evils of this world are also to be 
 considered, and he gives the ordinary excuses for the apparent devi- 
 ation from what ought to be, such as that evil is sometimes a good in 
 disguise and vice versa; that one sometimes inherits evil and good from 
 one's parents; that the individual is sometimes involved in the des- 
 tinies of the majority, and so on, and so on. Evil in the sense of moral 
 evil, i. e., wrong, does not come from God, it is true, but punishment 
 does come from God, and as its aim is justice, it is a good, not an 
 evil. The providence extended to Israel is greatest. There is more 
 Providence in Palestine than elsewhere, not because there is any 
 
HASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS 395 
 
 difference in the relation on God's side, but there is on the side of the 
 man enjoying this providence. His character and disposition change 
 with the place, and similarly with the time and the season. Hence 
 certain seasons of the year, like that about the time of the Day of 
 Atonement, are more propitious for receiving God's providence. ^^* 
 
 Another fundamental doctrine of Judaism is God's omnipotence. 
 Weakness would be a defect. Hence God can do everything except 
 the contradictory. His power is infinite not merely in duration, but 
 also in intensity. From Aristotle's proof of the necessity of an im- 
 movable mover as based upon the eternity of motion (p. 256 f.), we 
 gather only that God's power is infinite in duration; whereas our 
 doctrine of creation ex nihilo shows that there is no relation at all be- 
 tween God's power and the work he does; hence his power is infinite. 
 This is shown also in the miracles, some of which took place instan- 
 taneously, as the destruction of the first born in Egypt at midnight 
 precisely. Crescas insists that the ass of Balaam did speak, and refers 
 with disapproval to those who doubt it and say it was in a vision 
 (Gersonides).^^^ 
 
 In his discussion of Prophecy the interest lies once more in his 
 anti-intellectualistic attitude. Maimonides agrees with the philoso- 
 phers that the prophetic power is a psychological process attainable 
 by the man who in addition to moral perfection possesses a highly 
 developed intellect and power of imagination. To anticipate the ob- 
 jection that if this be so, why are there no prophets among the philoso- 
 phers, Maimonides adds that divine grace is necessary besides, and 
 that if this is lacking, one may have all the qualifications and yet 
 not be a prophet. Crescas sees the forced nature of this explanation, 
 and once more frankly returns to the plain intent of Scripture and 
 Jewish tradition that the prophet is the man chosen by God because 
 he is a student of the Torah and follows its commandments, and be- 
 cause he cleaves to God and loves him. The prophet receives his 
 inspiration from God directly or through an intermediate agent, and 
 the information received may concern any topic whatsoever. It is 
 not to be limited to certain topics to the exclusion of others, as Ger- 
 sonides tries to make out; and its purpose is to give guidance to the 
 prophet himself or to others through him.'^^ 
 
 The most original contribution of Crescas to philosophical theory 
 
396 MEDIjEFAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 is his treatment of the ever living problem of freedom. So fundamental 
 has it seemed for Judaism to maintain the freedom of the will that no 
 one hitherto had ventured to doubt it. Maimonides no less than Judah 
 Halevi, and with equal emphasis Gersonides, insist that the individual 
 is not determined in his conduct. This seemed to be the only way to 
 vindicate God's justice in reward and punishment. But the idea 
 of man's freedom clashed with the doctrine of God's omniscience. 
 If nothing in the past determines a man's will in a given case, then up 
 to the moment of the act it is undetermined, and no one can know 
 whether a given act will take place or its opposite. On the other hand, 
 if God does know everything in the future as well as in the past, man 
 is no longer free to act in a manner contrary to God's foreknowledge. 
 This difficulty was recognized by Maimonides as well as by Gerson- 
 ides, and they solved it in different ways. Maimonides gives up neither 
 God's omniscience nor man's absolute freedom, and escapes the di- 
 lemma by taking refuge in his idea of God's transcendence. Human 
 knowledge is incompatible with human freedom; God's knowledge is 
 not like human knowledge, and we have no conception what it is. But 
 it is consistent with human freedom. Gersonides, who objects to 
 Maimonides's treatment of the divine attributes, and insists that they 
 must resemble in kind though not in degree the corresponding human 
 attributes, can avoid the difficulty only by a partial blunting of the 
 sharp points of either horn of the dilemna. Accordingly he maintains 
 freedom in all its rigor, and mitigates the conception of omniscience. 
 God's omniscience extends only to the universal and its consequences; 
 the contingent particular is by definition not subject to foreknowledge, 
 and hence it argues no defect in God's knowledge if it does not extend 
 to the undetermined decisions of the will. 
 
 Crescas embraces the other horn of the dilemma. God's omnis- 
 cience must be maintained in all its rigor. It is absurd to suppose 
 that the first universal and absolute cause should be ignorant of any- 
 thing pertaining to its effects. Is man then not free? Has he no 
 choice at all, no freedom in the determination of his conduct? If so 
 how justify God's reward and punishment, if reward and punishment 
 are relative to conduct and imply responsibility? Crescas's answer 
 is a compromise. Determinism is not fatalism. It does not mean that 
 a given person is preordained from eternity to act in a given way, no 
 
HASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS 397 
 
 matter what the circmnstances are. It does not mean that command 
 and advice and warning and education and effort and endeavor are 
 useless and without effect. This is contradicted by experience as well 
 as by the testimony of Scripture. But neither is it true on the other 
 hand that a person's will and its conduct are causeless and undeter- 
 mined until the moment of action. This idea is equally untrue to 
 reason and experience. We know that every effect has a cause and the 
 cause has a cause, and this second cause has again a cause, until we 
 reach the first necessary cause. Two individuals similar in every re- 
 spect would have the same will unless there is a cause which makes 
 them different. We have already intimated that God's foreknowledge, 
 which we cannot deny, is incompatible with absolute freedom, and 
 in the Bible we have instances of God's knowing future events which 
 are the results of individual choice, as in the case of Pharaoh. The onl^ 
 solution then is that the act of will is in a sense contingent, in a sense 
 determined. It is contingent in respect to itself, it is determined by 
 its cause, i. e., the act is not fated to take place, cause or no cause. If it 
 were possible to remove the cause, the act would not be; but given 
 the cause, the effect is necessary. Effort is not in vain, for effort is 
 itself a cause and determines an effect. Commandments and pro- 
 hibitions are not useless, for the same reason. Reward and punish- 
 ment are not unjust, even though antecedent causes over which man 
 has no control determine his acts, any more than it is unjust that fire 
 burns the one who comes near it, though he did so without intention. 
 Reward and punishment are a necessary consequence of obedience 
 and disobedience. 
 
 This is a bold statement on the part of Crescas, and the analogy 
 between a man's voluntary act in ethical and religious conduct and 
 the tendency of fire to burn irrespective of the person's responsibility 
 in the matter can be valid only if we reduce the ethical and religious 
 world to an impersonal force on a plane with the mechanism of the 
 physical world order. This seems a risky thing to do for a religionist. 
 And Crescas feels it, saying that to make this view public would be 
 dangerous, as the people would find in it an apology for evil doers, not 
 understanding that punishment is a natural consequence of evil. 
 This latter statement Crescas does not wish to be taken in its literal 
 strictness, nor should the analogy with the burning fire be pressed 
 
398 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 too far. For it would then follow even if a person is physically com- 
 pelled to do evil that he would be punished, just as the fire would not 
 refrain from burning a person who was thrown into it by force. The 
 determination of the will, he says, must not be felt by the agent as a 
 constraint and compulsion, else the act is not free and no punish- 
 ment should follow; for command and prohibition can have no effect 
 on a will constrained. Reward and punishment have a pedagogical 
 value generally, even if in a given case they are not deserved. Even 
 though in reality every act is determined, still where there is no ex- 
 ternal compulsion the person is so identified with the deed that it is 
 in a real sense the product of his own soul, bringing about a union 
 with, or separation from God; and hence reward and punishment are 
 necessarily connected with it. Where there is external compulsion, 
 on the other hand, the act is not in reality his own and hence no reward 
 or punishment. 
 
 The question arises, however, why should there be punishment for 
 erroneous belief and opinion? These have nothing to do with the will, 
 and are determined if anything is, i. e., the person having them is 
 constrained to believe as he does by the arguments, over which he has 
 no control. This matter offers no difficulty to those who, like Mai- 
 monides and Gersonides, regard intelligence as the essence of the soul, 
 and make immortality dependent upon intellectual ideas. A soul 
 acquiring true ideas, they say, becomes ipso facto immortal. It is not 
 a question of right and wrong or of reward and punishment. But this 
 is not the Biblical view, and if it were true, there would be no need of 
 the many ceremonial regulations. Geometry would play a greater 
 role in immortality than the Torah. Crescas's answer is that reward 
 and punishment in this case are not for the beHef itself, but rather 
 for the pleasure one finds in it and the pains one takes to examine it 
 carefully. Even in conduct one is not rewarded or punished for deeds 
 directly, but for the intention and desire. Deed without intention is 
 not punished. Intention without deed is; though the two together 
 call for the greatest punishment or reward. "A burnt offering," say 
 the Rabbis, "atones for sinful thoughts; sin committed through com- 
 pulsion is not punished." ^^^ 
 
 It is of interest here to know that Spinoza, as has been shown by 
 Joel,''^^ owed his idea of man's freedom to Crescas. He also like Crescas 
 
HASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS 399 
 
 denies the absolute indeterminism of a person's conduct that is in- 
 sisted upon by the majority of the mediaeval Jewish philosophers. And 
 Joel shows moreover that Spinoza's final attitude to this question 
 as found in his Ethics was the outcome of a gradual development, and 
 the result of reading Crescas. In some of his earUer writings he in- 
 sists that anything short of absolute omniscience in God is unthink- 
 able. He sees the difficulty of reconciling this with man's freedom, 
 but is not ready to sacrifice either, and like Maimonides decides that 
 we must not deny it simply because we cannot understand it. Later, 
 however, he maintains that God's omniscience and man's freedom are 
 absolutely incompatible, and solves the difficulty in a manner similar 
 to that of Crescas by curtailing freedom as formerly understood. 
 
 The next topic of which it is necessary to have a clear idea for a 
 complete understanding of Judaism, is the purpose of the Law, and in 
 general the purpose of man. Here also appears clearly the anti- 
 intellectualism of Crescas and his disagreement with Maimonides and 
 Gersonides. The final purpose of the Law is of course, he says, a 
 good. The Bible teaches us to perfect our morals; it inculcates true 
 beliefs and opinions; and it promises by means of these happiness of 
 body and happiness of soul. Which of these four is the ultimate end? 
 Clearly it must be the best and most worthy. And it seems as if this 
 quality pertains to the eternal happiness of the soul, to which as an 
 end the other three tend. Corporeal happiness is a means to the 
 perfection of the soul since the latter acts through the means of 
 bodily organs. Similarly moral perfection assists in purifying the soul. 
 As for perfection in ideas, some think that it alone makes the soul 
 immortal by creating the acquired intellect, which is immaterial and 
 separate, and enjoys happiness in the next world incomparably 
 greater than the joy we feel here below in the acquisition of knowledge. 
 There is a difference of opinion as to the subject-matter which bestows 
 immortality. According to some it is all knowledge, whether of sub- 
 lunar things or of the separate substances. According to others it is 
 only the knowledge of God and the angels that confers immortality. 
 All these views are wrong from the Scriptural as well as the philosophi- 
 cal point of view. 
 
 The Bible makes it clear repeatedly that eternal life is obtained by 
 performance of the commandments; whereas according to the others 
 
400 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 practical observance is only a means and a preparation to theory, 
 without which practice alone is inadequate. According to Scripture 
 and tradition certain offences are punished with exclusion from eternal 
 life, and certain observances confer immortality, which have nothing 
 to do with theoretical truths. 
 
 But philosophically too their views are untenable. For it would 
 follow from their opinions that the purpose of the Law is for something 
 other than man, for the acquired intellect is "separate," and hence 
 cannot be the form of man. It is different in kind from man, for unlike 
 him it is eternal as an individual. Besides it is not true that the ac- 
 quired intellect is made as a substance by its ideas, whUe being sep- 
 arate from the material intellect; for as immaterial it has no matter as 
 its subject from which it could come into being. It must therefore 
 come into being ex nihilo, which is absurd. 
 
 And there are other reasons against their view. For if aU knowledge 
 confers immortality, one may acquire it by studying geometry, which 
 is absurd. And if this privilege can be gained only by a knowledge of 
 God and the separate substances, the objection is still greater; for, as 
 Maimonides has shown, the only knowledge that may be had of these 
 is negative; and it is not likely that such imperfect knowledge should 
 make an eternal intellect. 
 
 If then theoretical knowledge does not lead to immortality as they 
 thought, and the other perfections are preparatory to theoretical, it 
 follows that the ultimate purpose of the Law and of man is attained 
 primarily neither by theory alone nor by practice alone, but by some- 
 thing else, which is neither quite the one nor the other. It is the love 
 and fear of God. This is demanded alike by Scripture, tradition and 
 philosophy. That it is the view of religion is clear enough from the 
 many passages in the Bible urging love of God. But it is also de- 
 manded by philosophy. For the soul is a spiritual substance, hence it is 
 capable of separation from the body and of existing by itself forever, 
 whether it has theoretical knowledge or not; since it is not subject to 
 decay, not being material. Further, the perfect loves the good and the 
 perfect; and the greater the good and the perfection the greater the 
 love and the desire in the perfect being. Hence the perfect soul loves 
 God with the greatest love of which it is capable. Similarly God's 
 love for the perfect soul, though the object as compared with him is 
 
HASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS 401 
 
 low indeed, is great, because his essence and perfection are great. 
 Now as love is the cause of unity even in natural things, the love of 
 God in the soul brings about a unity between them; and unity with 
 God surely leads to happiness and inunortahty. As love is different 
 from intellectual apprehension, the essence of the soul is love rather 
 than intelligence. 
 
 There are many Talmudical passages confirming this view logically 
 derived. We are told that the souls of the righteous enjoy the splendor 
 of the Shekinah, and the wicked suffer correspondingly. This agrees 
 with our conception of immortality and not with theirs. For enjoy- 
 ment is impossible on their showing, though they try to make it 
 plausible. Pleasure is different from apprehension; and as the essence 
 of the acquired intellect is apprehension, there is no room for the 
 pleasure, the intellect being simple. According to our view love is re- 
 warded with pleasure. The pleasure we feel here below in intellectual 
 work (Gersonides, p. 339) proves nothing, for it is due to the eff'ort 
 and the passing from potential knowledge to actual knowledge, i. e., 
 to the process of learning. Proof of this is that we find no pleasure in 
 axioms and first principles, which we know without effort. But the 
 acquired intellect after the death of the body does not learn any new 
 truths, hence can have no pleasure. 
 
 The Rabbis also speak of definite places of reward and punishment, 
 which cannot apply to the acquired intellect, since it is a "separate" 
 substance and can have no place. The soul as we understand it can 
 have a place, just as it is connected with the body during life. 
 
 The Rabbis often speak of the great reward destined for school 
 children. But surely the acquired intellect cannot amount to much 
 in children. The truth is that the soul becomes mature and complete 
 as soon as it acquires the rational faculty in the shape of the first 
 principles or axioms. Then it is prepared for immortaUty as a natural 
 thing without regard to reward. 
 
 The purpose of the soul as we showed is to love God. This object 
 the Bible attains by the commandments, which may be classified with 
 reference to their significance in seven groups. They exalt God; they 
 show his great kindness to us; they give us true ideas concerning the 
 nature of God; they call our attention to his providence; they give 
 us promises of corporeal and spiritual reward; they call our attention 
 
402 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 to God's miracles in order to keep our attention from flagging; and 
 finally they command love of God and union with him as the final aim 
 of man.^^^ 
 
 In addition to the six fundamental doctrines of Judaism mentioned 
 above (p. 392), there are true beliefs which are essential to Judaism, 
 and the denial of which constitutes heresy; though they are not as 
 fundamental as the other six, in the sense that the Law would con- 
 tinue to exist without them. They are (i) Creation, (2) Immortality, 
 (3) Reward and Punishment, (4) Resurrection, (5) Eternity of the 
 Law, (6) The superiority of Moses to the other prophets, (7) The 
 priest's learning the future through the Urim and Tumim, (8) Belief in 
 the Messiah. The list of thirteen articles of the creed given by Mai- 
 monides (c/. below, p, 409) is open to criticism. If he meant fundamen- 
 tal dogmas, there are not as many as thirteen; there are no more than 
 seven or eight — the six mentioned before (p. 392), and, if one chooses, 
 the existence of God, making seven, and revelation as the eighth. On 
 the other hand, if Maimonides meant to include "true beliefs," there 
 are more than fifteen, the six enumerated above (p. 392), existence of 
 God and revelation, and the eight "true beliefs" named at the head 
 of this section, not counting a great many specific commandments.'*'"' 
 
 Having made this criticism of Maimonides's thirteen articles, Cres- 
 cas proceeds to discuss every one of the eight true beliefs named at 
 the beginning of the last paragraph. For our purpose it will not be 
 necessary to reproduce the minute arguments here. We will select 
 a few of the more important topics and state briefly Crescas's attitude. 
 
 The doctrine of creation formed the central theme in Maimonides 
 and Gersonides. It was here, as we have seen, that Maimonides 
 stopped short in his devotion to Aristotle and took pains to show that 
 the arguments of the latter in favor of eternity are not valid, and that 
 Aristotle knew it. He endeavored to show, moreover, that the doc- 
 trine of creation can be made more plausible than its opposite, and 
 hence since creation is essential to Judaism, it must be regarded as a 
 fundamental dogma. Gersonides could not see his way clear to accept- 
 ing creation ex nihilo, among other things because as matter cannot 
 come from form, the material world cannot come from God. Accord- 
 ingly he compromised by saying that while the present world as it is 
 is not eternal, it came from a primitive "hyle" or matter, which was 
 
HASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS 403 
 
 eternal. Thus our world is dependent for its forms upon God, for its 
 matter upon the prime and eternal "hyle." 
 
 Here Crescas takes up the problem and points out that whether we 
 accept or not an eternal "hyle," everything that exists must be de- 
 pendent upon God as the only necessary existent. Everything out- 
 side of him, be it eternal matter or not, is only a possible existent and 
 owes its existence to God. Creation ex nihilo means no more. To be 
 sure, if we assume that the existence of the world and its emanation 
 from God is eternal, because his relation to his product is the same at 
 all times, it will follow that the emanation of the world from God is a 
 necessary process. But necessity in this case does not exclude will, 
 nay it implies it. For the only way in which anything can come from 
 a rational cause is by way of conception. The rational cause forms a 
 conception of the world order and of himself as giving existence to 
 this world order as a whole and in its parts. Will means no more 
 than this. This will also solve the old philosophic difficulty, how can 
 the many come from the One. Our answer is that the good God 
 created a good world. The goodness of the world is its unity, i. e., 
 the parts contribute to making a whole which is good. On the other 
 hand, an agent is perfectly good when he acts with will. God's will 
 also makes miracles possible. Moreover, eternal creation is not in- 
 consistent with continued creation, and we have creation ex nihilo 
 every moment. Maimonides is wrong therefore when he thinks that 
 eternity would upset Judaism and make miracles impossible. Creation 
 in time is therefore not a fundamental dogma with which Judaism 
 stands and falls. At the same time it is a true belief as taught in the 
 first verse of Genesis. '^''^ 
 
 Another of the true beliefs is reward and punishment. This con- 
 sists of two kinds, corporeal and spiritual. Corporeal is spoken of in 
 the Bible and is not opposed to reason. For as the purpose of creation 
 is to do man good and enable him to achieve perfection, it stands to 
 reason that God would remove any obstacles in the way of man's 
 perfecting himself, and this is the kind of reward mentioned first, "All 
 the diseases which I put upon the Egyptians I shall not put upon thee, 
 for I the Lord am thy healer" (Exod. 15, 26). Punishment is pri- 
 marily for the same purpose. 
 
 As for spiritual reward and punishment, they are not mentioned 
 
404 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 specifically in the Bible, but the Talmud is full of it. Rationally they 
 can be explained as follows. As the soul is spiritual and intellectual, 
 it enjoys great pleasure from being in contact with the world of spirit 
 and apprehending of the nature of God what it could not apprehend 
 while in the body. On the other hand, being restrained from the world 
 of spirit and kept in darkness gives it pain; and this may lead to its 
 ultimate destruction. The essence of the soul, as was said above, is 
 not intellectuality, but love and desire; hence pain may destroy it. 
 
 The reason spiritual reward and punishment, which is the more 
 important of the two, is not mentioned in the Bible, is because it was 
 taken as a matter of fact. Corporeal reward and punishment was 
 not so regarded, hence the need of specifying it. 
 
 A difficulty that presents itself is. How is it consistent with justice to 
 punish the soul by itself, when it was the composite of body and soul 
 that sinned? This may be answered by saying that the soul is the form 
 of the body and does not change when separated. Hence, being the 
 more important of the two elements composing man, it receives the 
 more important punishment, namely, spiritual. 
 
 Besides, it is true that the composite also receives compensation. 
 And this is the purpose of resurrection.^*^^ 
 
 Resurrection of the body is not universal, but is reserved only for 
 some, as is clear from the passage in Daniel (12, 2), "And many of 
 those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to ever- 
 lasting life, and some to disgrace and everlasting abhorrence." At 
 the same time it is difficult to know who these some are. It cannot 
 be the perfect and the good only, since some of those rising will go "to 
 disgrace and everlasting abhorrence." We can decide this better 
 later, when we have learned more of resurrection. 
 
 The variety of opinions concerning the time of the resurrection 
 Crescas endeavors to reconcile by supposing that all agreed it would 
 take place as soon as the Temple was built, but that the Messiah 
 would precede the building of the Temple by some length of 
 time. 
 
 The purpose of the resurrection is to strengthen behef in those who 
 have it and to impress it upon those who have it not. At the time of 
 the resurrection those who come back to life will tell the Hving how 
 they fared when their souls left their bodies. Another purpose of 
 
HASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS 405 
 
 resurrection is, as mentioned above, in order to reward and punish the 
 composite of body and soul which acted during life. 
 
 The dogma of resurrection is regarded so seriously by the Rabbis, 
 who exclude the unbehever in it from a portion in the world to come, 
 because in this act is completed the form of man; and because thereby 
 is realized the justice of God, and the faith is strengthened in the 
 minds of the believers. 
 
 It seems at first sight impossible that the elements of the body, 
 which were dispersed at the time of the body's death and formed part 
 of other substances, can be gathered together again. But it is not 
 really so strange, for in the first place God may so arrange matters 
 that these elements may be in a position to return. Besides, this is not 
 really necessary. It is quite suflBcient that God create a body exactly 
 like the first in temperament and form, and endow it with the old soul, 
 which will then behave like the old person; and being endowed with 
 memory besides, the identity of personality will be complete. 
 
 For the purpose of showing God's justice and strengthening man's 
 faith it is sufficient to resurrect the perfectly good and the completely 
 bad. The intermediate classes do not deserve this extraordinary 
 miracle, and their spiritual reward will be sufficient. ^^^ 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 JOSEPH ALBO (1380-I444) 
 
 Of the post-Maimonidean philosophers Crescas is the last who con- 
 tributes original views of philosophical value. Joseph Albo, of Mon- 
 real in Aragon, is of Uttle importance as a philosopher. He rehashes 
 the problems which occupied a Maimonides, a Gersonides and a 
 Crescas, and sides now with one, now with the other. He benefited by 
 the writings of his predecessors, particularly Maimonides, Crescas, and 
 Simon Duran; ^^^ and the philosophical discussions in the last three 
 sections of his " Book of Roots " (" Sefer Ikkarim ") give the impression 
 of an eclectic compilation in the interest of a moderate conservatism. 
 The style is that of the popularizer and the homilist; and to this he owes 
 his popularity, which was denied his more original teacher, Crescas. 
 
 But philosophy as such was not Albo's forte, nor was it his chief 
 interest. While it is true that all the Jewish thinkers of the middle 
 ages were for a great part apologetes, this did not prevent a Mai- 
 monides or a Gersonides from making a really thorough and dis- 
 interested study of science and philosophy; and often their scientific 
 and philosophic conviction was so strong that the apologia was pro 
 philosophia sua rather than pro Judaismo. The central theme there- 
 fore in the majority of Albo's philosophical predecessors was the 
 equally metaphysical and theological, of God and his attributes. 
 These were proved by reason and confirmed by Scripture and tradi- 
 tion. Judaism had to be formulated and defended with a view not so 
 much to the dangers threatening from Christianity and Moham- 
 medanism as to those endangering all religions alike, namely, the 
 opinions of science and philosophy as taught especially by the Aristote- 
 lians. Hence Maimonides treated for the most part of the same prob- 
 lems as the Mohammedan Mutakallimun before him, and Thomas 
 Aquinas the Christian had no scruple in making the Jewish philos- 
 opher's method his own when he undertook to defend the Catholic 
 faith "contra Gentiles." 
 
 406 
 
JOSEPH ALBO 407 
 
 Different were the circumstances as well as the attitude of Joseph 
 Albo. The purely philosophic interest was not strong in his day. He 
 was not confronted by the necessity of proving the existence and in- 
 corporeality of God by reason. No one doubted these things and they 
 had been abundantly written about in times gone by. In the interest 
 of completeness and for the benefit of those who were not trained in 
 technical philosophy, Albo found it desirable to restate the results 
 of previous discussions of these topics in a style more accessible to the 
 readers of his day. But the central interest in his age was shifted. It 
 was a time of religious disputations and forced conversions. Albo him- 
 self had taken part in such a disputation held at Tortosa in 14 13- 14, 
 and he had to defend Judaism against Christianity. He had to show 
 his own people that Judaism was the true religion and Christianity 
 spurious. Hence it was religion as such he had to investigate, in order 
 to find what marks distinguished a divine law from a human, and a 
 genuine divine law from one that pretended to be such. To make 
 this investigation logically complete he had to show that there must 
 be such a thing as a divine law, and that no such law can be conceived 
 without assuming certain basal beliefs or dogmas. A discussion of 
 rehgious dogma was essential, for upon the nature of these funda- 
 mental behefs depended one's judgment of a given law and its char- 
 acter as divine or human, genuine or spurious. Hence the title of 
 Albo's treatise, "Book of [religious] Roots [dogmas]." And while 
 it is true that Maimonides, the systematizer and codifier, could not 
 fail to put down in his commentary on the Mishna a list of articles 
 of the Jewish creed, nothing is said of this in his philosophical work, 
 the ' Guide of the Perplexed." With Albo the estabUshment of the 
 fundamental dogmas is the central theme. 
 
 At the same time Albo was anticipated even in this, his more origi- 
 nal contribution. Crescas, his teacher, had written, beside the "Or 
 Adonai," a work against Christianity.^"'* And in the "Or Adonai" 
 itseK he devotes considerable space to the question of the fundamental 
 dogmas of Judaism, and takes occasion to criticize Maimonides for 
 his faulty method in the selection of the thirteen articles, on the 
 ground that he did not distinguish between what was fundamental 
 and what was derivative. This suggestion gave Albo his cue, which 
 he developed in his own way.^''*^ 
 
4o8 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Human happiness, Albo tells us, depends upon theory and practice, 
 as Aristotle says. But the human mind is inadequate to know by 
 itself the truth touching these two. Hence there is need of something 
 superior to the human mind which will define right practice and the 
 true ideas. This can be only by divine guidance. Hence everyone 
 must be able to tell the divine legislation from those which are not 
 divine. For this it is necessary to know what are the principles with- 
 out which a divine law cannot exist. This is the purpose of the book, 
 to explain the essential principles of a divine law.^"^ 
 
 A knowledge of the principles of religion would seem easy, for all 
 people profess some religion or other, and hence are presumed to 
 know upon what their religions are based. But this question has not 
 been treated adequately before, and there is no agreement among 
 previous writers about the number of the principles or their identity. 
 Some say there are thirteen (Maimonides), some say twenty-six, some 
 six (Crescas), without investigating what are the principles of divine 
 religion generally. For we must distinguish between the general 
 principles which pertain to divine legislation as such and hence are 
 common to all religions, and special principles which are peculiar to a 
 particular religion. 
 
 Seeing the importance of this subject, Albo continues, I undertook 
 this investigation. I came to the conclusion that there are three general 
 principles of divine religion, existence of God, Revelation, and Reward 
 and Punishment after death. Then there are special principles pecul- 
 iar to a particular religion. From the general principles ("Ikkarim") 
 follow particular or derivative principles ("Shorashim.") ^^ 
 
 The investigation of the principles of religion is a delicate matter 
 because one is in danger of being reckoned an infidel if he denies 
 what is considered by others a fundamental dogma. Thus according 
 to Maimonides the belief in the Messiah is fundamental, and he who 
 denies it is a heretic and has no share in the world to come. And yet 
 Rabbi Hillel in the Talmud (Sanhedrin, 99a) said, "Israel need expect 
 no Messiah, for they had the benefit of one in the days of Hezekiah, 
 King of Judah." On the other hand, Maimonides does not regard 
 creation ex nihilo as fundamental, whereas others do; and to their 
 mind Maimonides is open to the charge of unbelief. 
 
 The truth is that only he is an unbeliever who deliberately and know- 
 
JOSEPH ALBO 409 
 
 ingly contradicts the Bible. A person who believes in the Bible but 
 is led mistakenly to misinterpret it, and denies real principles because 
 he thinks the Bible does not require us to believe them as principles, or 
 does not require us to believe them at all, is guilty of error and in need 
 of forgiveness, but is not a heretic.^ 
 
 Having thus defined his attitude and purpose, Albo proceeds to 
 criticize the list of dogmas laid down by Maimonides and modified 
 by Crescas, and then defends his own view. A fundamental principle 
 ("Ikkar," lit. root) is one upon which something else depends and 
 without which this latter cannot exist. Maimonides counts thirteen 
 principles of Judaism as follows; (i) Existence of God, (2) Unity, (3) 
 IncorporeaUty, (4) Eternity, (5) He alone must be worshipped, (6) 
 Prophecy, (7) Superiority of the prophecy of Moses, (8) Revelation, 
 (9) Immutability of the Law, (10) God's Omniscience, (11) Reward 
 and Punishment, (12) Messiah, (13) Resurrection.^"^ This list is open 
 to criticism. If Maimonides intended to admit strict principles only 
 without which Judaism cannot exist, we understand why he named 
 (i)> (6), (8), (10), (11), which are general principles of any divine 
 religion, and (7) and (9) as special principles of Judaism. But we can- 
 not see why he included (2) and (3). For while they are true, and every 
 Jew should believe them, Judaism can be conceived as existing with- 
 out them. It is still more strange that (5) should be counted as a 
 principle. To be sure, it is one of the ten commandments, " Thou shalt 
 have no other Gods before me. . . . Thou shalt not bow thyself down 
 to them, nor serve them" . . . (Exod. 20, 35), but Judaism can be 
 conceived to exist even with the belief in a mediator. Similarly it is 
 not clear why (13) should be considered as a fundamental dogma. 
 On the other hand, he omitted Tradition and Free Will as beliefs es- 
 sential to any divine religion. 
 
 If, in defence of Maimonides, we say that he intended to name not 
 only fundamental principles, but also true beliefs, whether fundamental 
 or derivative, then there are many others he might have mentioned, 
 such as creation ex nihilo, belief in miracles, that God rests in Israel 
 through the Torah, and so on. 
 
 Another writer counts twenty-six principles, including everything 
 that occurred to his mind, such as the attributes of eternity, wisdom, 
 life, power, will and others, counting paradise and hell as two, and other 
 
4IO MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 absurd ideas. Others again,'*"^ criticizing Maimonides's principles, 
 reduce them to six, viz. (i) God's knowledge, (2) Providence, (3) 
 Power, (4) Prophecy, (5) Free Will, (6) Purpose, adding thereto the 
 three proved by Maimonides, God's existence, unity and incorporeality. 
 The objection to this list is that it does not contain the special dogmas 
 of Judaism, and does not give us a principle by which we can distin- 
 gmsh between the genuine and spurious divine religion. For the dog- 
 mas named in the above list give us the necessary requirements for a 
 divine law, but not the sufficient. We may have all these principles and 
 yet not have a divine religion. As to Free Will and Purpose, they are 
 essential to divine legislation to be sure, but not qua divine; they are 
 also essential to a conventional human law. Divine religion has a 
 special purpose peculiar to it.^^° 
 
 Having laid bare the defects in the attempts at a list of fundamental 
 dogmas of Judaism made by his predecessors, Albo categorically lays 
 down the following three principles as fundamental to divine religion : 
 (i) Existence of God, (2) Providence, and reward and punishment, 
 (3) Revelation. 
 
 To justify this statement Albo finds it necessary to make clear 
 what is meant by divine law or religion, and what relation it bears 
 to other laws, not divine. This necessitates an explanation of exist- 
 ing laws and their motives and causes. 
 
 Animal life, we are told, may be divided into three classes according 
 to the mode of Uving adopted by each. Beasts of prey live separately 
 and not in groups. Mankind must live in communities, as one individ- 
 ual is dependent upon the work of another, and social life is essential 
 to their existence. Intermediate between beast of prey and man are- 
 the gregarious animals, which keep together not as a matter of neces- 
 sity, as is the case in man, but for convenience, for the sake of being 
 together. Man is social by nature; and in order to make communal 
 life possible, there must be some order in the community which pro- 
 hibits violence, robbery, and so on. This is known as "natural law." 
 In addition to this there are in many places "conventional laws," 
 made by kings and emperors, regulating more carefully and with 
 greater detail than the natural law the affairs of the members of the 
 community. 
 
 But this is not all. There is still another kind of law due directly 
 
JOSEPH ALBO 411 
 
 to God's providence. The providence of God is seen even in the 
 lower animals, in the constitution of their bodies, not merely in mat- 
 ters essential to the preservation of the animal, but also in the interest 
 of comfort and convenience, as for example the duplication of the 
 sense organs. It stands to reason therefore that there is a divine 
 influence which provides for man even to a greater degree. This 
 providence may extend only to one individual, but this person brings 
 about the perfection of the race; just as in the individual man the heart 
 is instrumental in giving life to all the other limbs. The law which 
 is promulgated through this person is a "divine law." 
 
 The term "law" ("Dat") applies to any system of directions em- 
 bracing a large aggregate of men, whether it contains many commands 
 or one. There are thus three kinds of law, natural, conventional 
 and divine. Natural law is the same for all persons, times and places. 
 Conventional law is ordered by a wise man or men in conformity with 
 the necessity of the persons, times and places, as the reason dictates, 
 without special divine suggestion. Divine law is ordered by God 
 through a prophet. The purpose of natural law is to remove wrong 
 and promote right, keeping men from robbery and theft so that so- 
 ciety may be able to exist. Conventional law goes further and tends 
 to remove the unseemly and to promote the becoming. Divine law 
 has for its purpose to guide men to true happiness, which is the happi- 
 ness of the soul and its eternal life. It points out the way to follow 
 to reach this end, showing what is the true good for man to pursue, 
 and what is the real evil which one must shun; though it also lays 
 down the law of right and wrong like the other two,"*^^ 
 
 The conventional law is inferior to the divine in a number of ways. 
 
 The conventional law only orders human conduct for the purpose 
 of improving social life, but does not concern itself with perfection 
 in theoretical speculation and knowledge, which leads the soul to 
 eternal life. The divine law embraces both the parts upon which 
 human perfection depends, conduct and theory. It embraces the 
 becoming and unbecoming (practice) , and the true and untrue (theory). 
 As the Psalmist has it, "The Law of the Lord is perfect, restoring 
 the soul" (Psal. 19, 8). 
 
 The conventional law, being human, cannot always decide with 
 certainty what is becoming and what unbecoming. It is liable to 
 
412 MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 error. This is particularly the case in matters of theory, such as the 
 creation or eternity of the world. The divine law gives us certainty 
 in all things, "The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the 
 simple" {ih.). 
 
 The person guided by the conventional law is not sure that he is 
 always guided aright; hence he cannot feel the satisfaction and the 
 joy of the man whose guide is the divine law, making him certain 
 of being right — "The precepts of the Lord are upright, rejoicing the 
 heart" {ib. 9). 
 
 The conventional law can give general rules only, but is unable to 
 advise in a particular case. So Aristotle in the Ethics points out that 
 virtue is a mean, but he cannot determine exactly the proper measure 
 at a given time. This is the function of the divine law — "The com- 
 mandment of the Lord is clear, enlightening the eyes" {ib.). 
 
 The conventional law is subject to change in the course of time. 
 Witness the marriage of sisters in the early period of Adam and Abel. 
 The divine law alone does not change — "The fear of the Lord is pure, 
 enduring for ever" {ib. 10). 
 
 The conventional law cannot estimate exactly the merited amount 
 and kind of reward and punishment; whereas, "The ordinances of 
 the Lord are the truth; they are just altogether" {ib.).^^"^ 
 
 Freedom and Purpose are principles of conventional law. Without 
 freedom there is no sense in giving orders. For this reason Freedom 
 and Purpose are not correctly given as fundamental dogmas of divine 
 law, for while the latter cannot get along without them, they are not 
 peculiar to divine law as such, but are common also to conventional 
 law. This is why Maimonides omitted Freedom in his creed. The 
 same is true of Purpose in general. The divine law, however, has a 
 special purpose, perfection and eternal life, hence Maimonides did 
 include it in his list.^^^ 
 
 The fundamental dogmas of divine law are, as we said before, 
 Existence of God, Revelation, Reward and Punishment. It is evident 
 that there cannot be a divine law without the first two. The third 
 is also necessary; for the purpose of divine law must be a perfection 
 greater than the conventional law can accomplish. This is eternal 
 life, and is signified by Reward and Punishment. 
 
 As all agree that the Law of Moses is divine, it is proper to use it as 
 
JOSEPH ALBO 413 
 
 a standard in order to discover what a divine law must have. Accord- 
 ingly if we examine the first four chapters of Genesis, we find the prin- 
 ciple of the existence of God in chapter one, describing creation. The 
 second and third chapters give evidence of revelation, or communi- 
 cation of God with man for the purpose of directing his conduct. 
 Finally in the Cain incident in chapter four is illustrated the third 
 dogma of Reward and Punishment.^ ^^ 
 
 Creation ex nihilo is a true belief but not a fundamental principle. 
 For though the Aristotelian view of eternity is heretical, as it takes 
 away the possibility of miracles, nay even the possibility of Moses and 
 the Messiah (for these could exist only after the lapse of an infinite 
 munber of individuals), one who believes like Plato in a primitive 
 matter is not necessarily in contradiction with the Biblical miracles, 
 for they were not ex nihilo '^^^ (cf. above, p. 358). 
 
 It is not sufiicient to believe in the three principles mentioned to be 
 considered a believer and to be entitled to a share in the world to come. 
 One must believe also in the derivative principles following from them. 
 Thus from the existence of God follow his unity and incorporeaiity. 
 And if a man does not believe in incorporeaiity, he disbelieves in the 
 real nature of God, and it is as if he denied the original principle. 
 
 The derivative principles (" Shorashim "= roots) are as follows. 
 From existence of God are derived four: (i) Unity, (2) Incorporeaiity, 
 (3) Independence of time, (4) Freedom from defects. From Revelation 
 are derived three: (i) God's knowledge, (2) Prophecy, (3) Authenticity 
 of God's messenger. From Reward and Punishment is derived one — 
 Providence in the sense of special Providence. In all there are eleven 
 dogmas.^^® 
 
 A particular commandment of the Law is not reckoned either as a 
 fundamental principle or as a derivative. He who trangresses it is a 
 sinner and is punished for his misdeed, but is not a heretic who loses his 
 share in the world to come, xmless he denies that the commandment in 
 question is from God. In that case he comes in the category of those 
 who deny revelation. Similarly the belief in tradition is not a principle 
 because it is a particular commandment. Unity of God is a principle 
 though it is apparently a special commandment, because the term 
 unity contains two concepts; first, that God is one and there is not 
 another like him; second, that being one and free from any multiplicity 
 
414 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 or composition, he is the cause of all the multiplicity in the world. 
 The latter is not a particular commandment, but a principle derived 
 from the existence of God. The former is a particular commandment. 
 If particular commandments were regarded as principles, we should 
 have as many principles as there are commandments in the Bible.^^^ 
 
 The above distinction between the two senses of the term unity, one 
 of which is rationally derived from the existence of God, whereas the 
 other not being so derivable is not a principle, and is given in the 
 Bible as a special commandment, is clearly due to Crescas, who after 
 a few attempts at proving the unity of God in the sense of excluding 
 duaUsm, gives it up as incapable of proof logically, and falls back upon 
 the testimony of Scripture, "Hear, Israel, the Lord our God, the 
 Lord is One." The other sense of the word unity Crescas proves by 
 reason. Hence Albo counts it among the derivative principles {cf. 
 above, p. 392). 
 
 If a particular commandment is not a principle, which means that a 
 fundamental or derivative dogma cannot itself be a commandment, 
 but must he at the basis of all commandments, the question arises 
 whence come these principles, and who is to warrant their truth. In 
 the sciences we know that the basal principles of a given science are 
 not proved in that science itself, but are borrowed from another 
 science in which they are proved. Thus physics takes the concepts of 
 substance and accident from metaphysics. In turn the latter takes 
 the idea of a first mover from physics. Among the laws, too, the con- 
 ventional law takes its principles, freedom and purpose, from political 
 philosophy. Whence does divine law take its principles? The exist- 
 ence of God can be demonstrated philosophically from premises going 
 back to axioms and first principles. But this is not true of Prophecy 
 and Providence. 
 
 The answer Albo gives to this question is that of Judah Halevi and 
 Crescas. The principles of the divine law are known empirically, 
 i. e., by experience. Adam knew of the existence of God, of prophecy 
 and reward and punishment from personal experience. Similarly 
 Noah and Abraham. Nowadays we know the law by tradition, but the 
 majority of the principles thus known are so certain that there is 
 neither difference of opinion nor doubt entertained by anyone con- 
 cerning them. Such is the status for example of the principle of 
 
JOSEPH ALBO 415 
 
 Revelation. Other principles again, like the existence of God, are, as 
 was said before, known by theoretical speculation.'*^^ 
 
 To find out whether a religion professing to be of divine origin is 
 really so or not, it must be examined first with reference to the three 
 fundamental, and the other derivative principles. If it opposes them, 
 it is spurious and not genuine. If it is not opposed to the principles in 
 question, it must be further examined with a view to determining 
 whether the promulgator is a genuine messenger of God or not. And 
 the test here must be a direct one. Miracles and signs are no conclu- 
 sive proof of prophecy, and still less do they prove that the person 
 performing them is a messenger sent by God to announce a law. They 
 merely show that the person is considered worthy of having miracles 
 performed through him, provided the miracles are genuine and not 
 performed through magic. The test of the prophet and the messenger 
 of God must be as direct as it was in the case of Moses, where the 
 people actually saw that he was addressed by God and commissioned 
 with a message for them."*^^ 
 
 This opinion of Albo is clearly intended as a defence of Judaism 
 against Christianity's claim that Jesus performed miracles, a claim 
 which the Rabbis of the middle ages were incHned to recognize. 
 
 In addition to the three fundamental and eight derivative principles 
 of divine legislation, there are six dogmas, which every follower of 
 the Mosaic law must beUeve. They are (i) Creation ex nihilo, (2) Supe- 
 riority of Moses to other prophets, (3) Immutabihty of the Law, (4) 
 That human perfection can be attained by any one of the command- 
 ments of the Law, (5) Resurrection, (6) Messiah. 
 
 Creation ex nihilo is neither a fundamental nor a derivative prin- 
 ciple of religion generally or of Judaism specially because, as we saw 
 before (p. 413), they can exist without this dogma. At the same time 
 it is a truth which it behooves every religionist and particularly every 
 Jew to believe. It follows from the principle of the existence of God. 
 If God cannot create ex nihilo, there is a defect in him. For creation 
 ex nihilo is admitted in a certain sense even by those who hold that 
 the world is eternal. They admit that God is the cause of everything 
 else; hence matter is his effect through the mediation of the separate 
 Intellect. But how can a separate Intellect be the cause of matter if 
 there is no creation ex nihilo. This is ex nihilo as much as anything 
 
4i6 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ca.n be. To say that we can find no reason why he should create at a 
 particular time rather than at another, and hence the world must be 
 eternal, is no argument; for this reasoning can apply only to action 
 from necessity. Voluntary action is just of this kind, that it takes 
 place at a particular time. 
 
 In the above argument for creation the reader will not fail to see 
 reminiscences of Maimonides as well as Crescas {cj. pp. 271 and 403). 
 
 The superiority of Moses to other prophets is not essential to Juda- 
 ism, nevertheless it behooves every Jew to believe it, as it is included 
 in the principle of Revelation, and the Bible tells us, " And there 
 arose not a prophet since then in Israel like unto Moses" (Deut. 34, 
 10). 
 
 The Immutability of the Law will be treated in detail later. Here 
 it will suffice to say that while it is not a sine qua non of Judaism, every 
 Jew should believe it, as it is included in the derivative principle of the 
 Authenticity of God's messenger. 
 
 It stands to reason that human perfection can be attained by the 
 performance of any one of the commandments of the Law. For if it 
 requires the performance of all the commandments for this purpose, 
 then the Law of Moses makes it more difficult to reach perfection 
 than the previous laws, which is not in consonance with the statement 
 of the Rabbis that "God gave Israel so many laws and command- 
 ments because he wished to make them meritorious" (Tal. Bab. 
 Makkot, 23 b). 
 
 Resurrection wiU be treated more at length later. It must be be- 
 lieved because it has been accepted by Israel and has come down to 
 us by tradition. The same thing applies to the belief in the Messiah. 
 This is also a traditional belief and is related to the principle of Re- 
 ward and Punishment, though it is not like the latter indispensable 
 either to religion in general or to Judaism in particular. ^^^ 
 
 The difference, it will be seen, between Albo and Maimonides in the 
 question of Jewish dogmas is simply one of classification and grading. 
 Albo includes in his enumeration all the thirteen dogmas of Mai- 
 monides with the exception of the fifth, namely, that God alone be 
 worshipped, but instead of placing them all on the same level of im- 
 portance as equally essential to the structure of Judaism, as Mai- 
 monides apparently intended, Albo divides them into three categories 
 
JOSEPH ALBO 41) 
 
 of descending rank as follows: fundamental principles, derived prin- 
 ciples, true beliefs. Of Maimonides's list the last two, Messiah and 
 Resurrection, belong to the last category. None the less Albo believed 
 strictly in both and held it incumbent upon every Jew to believe in 
 them. It was only a question of the status of a person who mistakenly 
 denies these true beliefs. According to Maimonides, it would seem, 
 he would be called a heretic and be excluded from a share in the world 
 to come equally with one who denied the existence of God; whereas 
 according to Albo a person so guilty is a sinner and needs forgiveness, 
 but is not a heretic. Of the other eleven dogmas of Maimonides, (i), 
 (8) and (11) are placed by Albo in his first class, (2), (3), (4), (6) and 
 '^lo) belong to the second class, while (7) and (9) come under true be- 
 liefs along with Messiah and Resurrection. The difference between 
 the first and the second class is purely logical and not practical. As 
 we saw before (p. 413), one who denies incorporeality (a principle of 
 the second class) disbeheves in the true nature of God, which is tan- 
 tamount to denying the principle of the existence of God. 
 
 Before concluding this general discussion of the fundamental dog- 
 mas of religion and Judaism, Albo undertakes to answer two questions 
 which must have been near his heart, and which were on the tongues 
 no doubt of a great many honest people in those days of religious 
 challenge and debate. The first question is. Is it proper, or perhaps 
 obligatory, to analyze the fundamental principles of one's religion, 
 to see if they are true; and if one finds another rehgion which seems to 
 him better, is one permitted to adopt it in place of his own? Albo 
 sees arguments against both sides of the dilemma. If a man is allowed 
 to analyze his religion and to choose the one that seems best to him, 
 it will follow that a person is never stable in his behef, since he is 
 doubting it, as is shown by his examination. And if so, he does not 
 deserve reward for belief, since belief, as Albo defines it elsewhere 
 (Pt. I, ch. 19), means that one cannot conceive of the opposite being 
 true. Again, if he finds another religion which he thinks better and is 
 allowed to exchange his own religion for the new one, he will never be 
 sure of any religion; for he may find a third still better, and a fourth, 
 and so on, and as he cannot examine all the possible religions, he will 
 remain without any religious convictions. 
 
 On the other hand, if he is not allowed to investigate the foundations 
 
4i8 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 of his belief, it follows either that all religions alike bring their believer 
 happiness, no matter how contradictory they are, which is absurd; 
 or God would seem unfair if only one religion leads its devotees to 
 happiness and no one is allowed to change his religion for one that 
 seems to him the true one. 
 
 The answer of Albo to this interesting question is characteristic. 
 It shows that he armored himself in advance, before he risked such a 
 delicate question. He makes it clear that it really does not expose 
 to any danger the religion of Judaism, the mother of the other two, 
 which they came to supersede. If all religions in the world, Albo tells 
 us, were opposed to one another, and regarded each other as untrue, 
 the above difficulty would be real. But it is not so. All religions 
 agree in respect to one of them that it is divine; but they say that it 
 is superseded. Hence every religionist who is not a Jew must investi- 
 gate his religion to see if it is justified in opposing the religion which 
 is acknowledged to be divine. Similarly the professor of the admit- 
 tedly divine religion should investigate to see if his religion is tempo- 
 rary or eternal. In this investigation he must first see if the religion 
 conforms to the principles of divine religion above mentioned. If 
 it does this and in addition endeavors to order human affairs in ac- 
 cordance with justice, and leads its devotees to human perfection, 
 it is divine. It is still, however, possible that it is the work of a wise 
 man of good character. It is therefore necessary to investigate the 
 character of the promulgator, to find out whether he is a genuine 
 divine messenger or not. This test, as was said above (p. 415), must 
 be a direct test and not an indirect.^^^ 
 
 The other question is whether there can be more than one divine 
 religion. Apparently there can be only one, since the giver is one, 
 and the recipients are of one species. But in reality the receivers vary 
 in temperament according to difference in inheritance and environ- 
 ment. Hence there may be a difference in the law according to the 
 character of the people for whom it is intended. Since, however, the 
 difference is due to the receiver and not to the giver, it must reside 
 in those elements which are dependent upon the receiver, i. e., in 
 particulars and details, not in the principles, fundamental or derived. 
 So the Noachite and the Mosaic laws differ only in details, not in 
 fundamental principles. ^^^ 
 
JOSEPH ALBO 419 
 
 We have now completed the exposition of the part of Albo's teach- 
 ing that may be called distinctly his own. And it seems he was aware 
 that he had nothing further to teach that was new, and would have 
 been content to end his book with the first part, of which we have 
 just given an account. But his friends, he tells us in the concluding 
 remarks to the first part of the "Ikkarim,"^^^ urged him to proceed 
 further and discuss in detail the principles, fundamental and derived, 
 the true beliefs and the so-called "branches," which he barely enu- 
 merated in the first part. He was persuaded by their advice and added 
 the other three sections, each devoted to one of the three fundamental 
 dogmas and the corollaries following from it. Here Albo has nothing 
 new to teach. He follows the beaten track, reviews the classic views 
 of Maimonides, takes advantage of the criticisms of Gersonides and 
 Crescas, and settles the problems sometimes one way sometimes 
 another, without ever suggesting anything new. Accordingly it 
 will not be worth our while to reproduce his discussions here. It will 
 suffice briefly to indicate his position on the more important problems. 
 
 The second section deals with the existence of God and the derived 
 principles and branches growing out from this root. In proving the ex- 
 istence of God he refers to Maimonides's four proofs {cf. p. 257 ff.), and 
 selects the third and fourth as really valid and beyond dispute. The 
 first and second are not conclusive; the one because it is based upon 
 the eternity of motion, which no Jew accepts; the other because the 
 major premise is not true. It does not follow if one of the two elements 
 a, b, of a composite a-\-b \s> found separately, that the other must be 
 found existing separately likewise.^^* 
 
 We have seen that from the principle of the existence of God follow 
 four derivative dogmas, unity, incorporeal! ty, independence of time, 
 freedom from defects. We are now told that from these secondary 
 roots issue a number of branches. From Unity it follows that no at- 
 tributes either essential or accidental can be applied to God, such as 
 wisdom, strength, generosity, and so on, for they would cause multi- 
 plicity. From incorporeality we infer that God is not subject to cor- 
 poreal affections like fear, sorrow, joy, grudge, and so on. Independ- 
 ence of time implies infinite power and want of resemblance to other 
 things. Freedom from defect implies absence of such qualities as 
 ignorance, weakness, and so on.^^^ 
 
420 MEDIjEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 In the discussion of the divine attributes Albo has nothing new to 
 ofifer, but instead he argues forward and backward, now with Mai- 
 monides, now against him, reproducing a good deal of Maimonides's 
 classification, embodying some material of Bahya on unity, and after 
 this rambling and not very consistent discussion, he comes to the con- 
 clusion that none but active and negative attributes are applicable to 
 God; and yet some essential attributes too must be his, but these 
 must be understood as implying only the aspect of perfection, and not 
 that other aspect of attribute which is responsible for multiplicity.^-^ 
 
 He asks the question so often asked before, How can multiplicity 
 come from unity? And after giving Ibn Sina's scheme of the emana- 
 tion of the Intelligences one after the other, and criticizing it in the 
 manner of Gazali and Maimonides, he gives his own solution that the 
 variety and multiplicity of the world tends to one end, which is the 
 order of the world. And thus are reconciled plurality and unity. 
 {cf. Gersonides above, p. 351).^^^ 
 
 He discusses the question of angels or Intellects, gives the views of 
 the philosophers concerning their nature and number, each being the 
 effect of the superior and the cause of the inferior, and objects to their 
 idea on the ground that these cannot be the same as the Biblical angels, 
 who are messengers of God to mankind. He then gives his own view 
 that the number of angels is infinite, not as the philosophers say ten or 
 fifty, and that they are not related to each other as cause and efifect, 
 but that though they are immaterial Intellects they are individuated 
 and differentiated according to the degree of understanding they have 
 of God.428 
 
 In discussing the second fundamental principle. Revelation, Albo 
 argues in the good old fashion that man is the noblest creature of the 
 sublunar world, and the most distinctive and noblest part of man — 
 his form and essence — is the theoretical reason. Hence the purpose of 
 man must be the realization of the theoretical intellect. At the same 
 time, and with little consistency, Albo takes the part of Judah Halevi 
 and Crescas, employing their arguments, without naming them, that 
 the philosophers and the philosophizing theologians are wrong who 
 make human immortality, perfection and happiness depend solely 
 upon intellectual activity. He comes to the conclusion, therefore, that 
 spiritual understanding, which gives perfection of soul when in com- 
 
JOSEPH ALBO 421 
 
 bination with practice, is not acquisition of ideas but the intention of 
 doing the will of God in the performance of good deeds, and not that of 
 pleasure or reward. ^"^ 
 
 This being so, it becomes an important question what are the prac- 
 tices which tend to human perfection, and what are those which tend 
 the other way. In general we may conclude, as like desires and re- 
 joices in like, that those deeds which give the soul pleasiue before and 
 after performance are good and helpful, while those which cause 
 subsequent pain, regret and sorrow are bad, and tend away from the 
 soul's perfection. 
 
 But the criterion of pleasure and pain just suggested is not sufficient 
 as a guide in conduct, for a great deal depends upon a man's tempera- 
 ment. What a hot-blooded man may commend and find pleasure in, 
 the phlegmatic temperament will object to, and will feel discomfort in 
 doing. Besides, as the good deed is always a mean between two ex- 
 tremes, which it is hard to measure precisely; and as the good deed is 
 that which pleases God, and beyond generalities we cannot tell what 
 does, and what does not please God, since we do not know his essence, 
 it was necessary for man's sake that God should reveal his will to man- 
 kind through a prophet. Thus Revelation is proved by reason.^^'' 
 
 This leads to the problem of prophecy, one of the derivative prin- 
 ciples of Revelation. The divine influence from which man gets a 
 knowledge of the things pleasing and displeasing to God, he cannot 
 obtain without the divine will. Instead of magic, divination, and 
 communication with evil spirits and the dead, which the ancient 
 heathen employed in order to learn the future, God sent prophets to 
 Israel, to tell the people of the will of God. Foretelling the future was 
 only secondary with them. Prophecy is a supernatural gift, whether 
 it takes place with the help of the imagination or not. If it were a 
 natural phenomenon dependent upon the intellectual power of the 
 individual and his faculty of imagination, as the philosophers and some 
 Jewish theologians think, there should have been prophets among the 
 philosophers. 
 
 Here again we see Albo adopt the view of Halevi and Crescas against 
 the intellectualism of Maimonides and Gersonides. His further 
 classification of the grades of prophecy is based upon Maimonides, 
 though Albo simplifies it. Instead of eleven Albo recognizes four 
 
422 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 grades in all, including that of Moses. The great majority of man- 
 kind, he says, stop with the ability to analyze, such as is exhibited in 
 the analysis of things into matter and form, and so on, though not all 
 of them go so far. But there are some few who go farther and are 
 enabled to speak words of wisdom and to sing praises to God without 
 being able to account for the power. This is the holy spirit ("Ruah 
 ha-Kodesh"). Some go still farther, and through the strength of their 
 reason and imagination they dream true dreams and receive prophe- 
 cies; though, the imagination having the upper hand, they struggle 
 very hard and tremble and faint, almost losing their soul. This is 
 the first stage of prophecy. The second stage is when the imagination 
 and reason are equal. In that case there is no struggle or fainting. 
 Visions come to the prophet at night in dreams, or in a revery at day- 
 time. The forms that appear are not real, but the meanings they 
 convey are. Such are the figures of women, horses, basket of summer 
 fruit, and so on, in the visions of Zechariah and Amos. The third 
 stage is when the reason gets the better of the imagination and there 
 are no forms or images, but real essences and ideas, like the visions of 
 Ezekiel, which represent real things in the secrets of nature and divinity. 
 The prophet in this stage also hears an angel speaking to him and giv- 
 ing him information of importance to himself or others. In all these 
 cases the will of God is essential. No preparation can replace it. 
 Finally the fourth stage is reached when the imagination does not 
 come into play at all. In this stage there is no angel or form, and the 
 message comes to the prophet at daytime while he is awake. He hears 
 a voice telling him what he desires to know; and whenever he chooses 
 he can summon this power. Moses alone attained to this final stage. 
 Outside of the prophets, the righteous and the pious have various 
 degrees of power according to the degree of their union with God. 
 Some can in this way influence the powers of nature to obey them, as 
 a person can, by thinking of food, make his mouth water. So they 
 can by taking thought cause rain and storm. Others can bring down 
 fire from above and revive the dead. 
 
 Through the influence of a prophet the gift of prophecy may some- 
 times rest upon individuals who are themselves unprepared and un- 
 worthy. Witness the revelation on Sinai where the entire people, six 
 hundred thousand in number, were endowed with the spirit of prophecy, 
 
JOSEPH ALSO 423 
 
 and that too of the highest degree, like Moses himself. The prophetic 
 medium reflects the spirit of prophecy on others as a smooth surface 
 reflects the light of the sun upon dark bodies. This is why prophecy 
 is found only in Israel and in Palestine, because the ark and the Tables 
 of Stone, upon which the Shekinah rests, reflect the divine spirit 
 upon those who are worthy and have in them something resembling 
 the contents of the ark, namely, the Torah and the commandments.^^^ 
 
 Among the true beliefs we have seen (p. 416) that Immutability 
 of the Law is related to the principle of Revelation. Hence this is 
 the place to discuss this question. Can a divine religion change with 
 time or not? It would seem at first sight that it cannot. For the giver 
 expresses his will in the Law, and his will never changes. The receivers 
 are the same, i. e., the same nation, and a nation does not change. Fi- 
 nally the purpose of the Law or religion is to give people true opinions, 
 and these never change. 
 
 And yet on further reflection there seems no reason why religion 
 should not change with the change of the recipient, as the physician 
 changes his prescription with the progress of the patient, and as a 
 matter of fact we find that the commandments given to Adam were 
 different from those given to Noah and to Abraham and to Moses. 
 Adam was not allowed to eat meat, Noah was. Abraham was com- 
 manded circumcision. High places were at first permitted and later 
 forbidden. Maimonides makes the immutability of the Law a funda- 
 mental dogma, relying upon the commandment, "Thou shalt not add 
 thereto, and thou shalt not diminish therefrom" (Deut. 13, i). But in 
 the first place the verse refers to changes in the mode of observing the 
 laws; and besides, it says nothing about God himself changing the 
 Law. 
 
 The phrases "an eternal statute," "throughout your generations," 
 "it is a sign for ever," are no proof of the eternity of the Law; for 
 not all commandments have these expressions attached, and this 
 shows rather that the others are subject to change. Besides, the ex- 
 pressions, for eternity," and so on, are not to be taken absolutely. 
 They are often used to express finite periods of time. 
 
 After the Babylonian Exile two changes were made. They changed 
 the characters in which the Bible was written, and the order and names 
 of the months, beginning with Tishri instead of Nisan. There is no 
 
424 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 reason, therefore, why other laws might not change, too. We i^eed 
 not, then, regard Immutability of the Law as a fundamental dogma 
 with Maimonides. Hasdai Crescas also classes it with true beliefs 
 and not with fundamental principles. 
 
 Albo resolves the problem as follows: A matter that is revealed by 
 God himself cannot be changed by a prophet unless it is changed by 
 God himself. The first two commandments, "I am the Lord thy God, 
 &c.," and "Thou shalt not have other gods, &c.," were heard by the 
 people directly from God without the intervention of Moses, hence 
 they cannot be changed by any prophet. It follows therefore that 
 the three fundamental dogmas, existence of God, Revelation and 
 Reward and Punishment can never be changed by a prophet, for 
 they are implied in the first two commandments, which were heard 
 from God himself. The rest of the commandments, as they were 
 heard from God through the interpretation of Moses, can be changed 
 by a prophet as a temporary measure. The other laws which were 
 given by Moses may be changed by a later prophet even permanently. 
 But the prophet must be greater than Moses, and he must show this 
 by the greatness, number, publicity and permanence of his miracles, 
 which must excel those of Moses. He must likewise show that he was 
 sent by God to change the Law, as clearly as Moses proved that he 
 was sent to give it. But it is unlikely that any such prophet will 
 come, for the Torah says that there never was or will be any prophet 
 like Moses. ^^2 
 
 Before discussing the third fundamental dogma, Albo finds it de- 
 sirable to dispose first of a few other problems imphed by this dogma, 
 one of which, God's knowledge, was postponed to this place, though it 
 is connected with Revelation, because it cannot well be separated in dis- 
 cussion from the problem of Freedom. Providence is the other related 
 problem, which is derived from the dogma of Reward and Punishment. 
 
 There is nothing that is new in Albo's treatment of knowledge and 
 Freedom. He insists like Maimonides that God must be omniscient, 
 and on the other hand the contingent cannot be denied, and neither 
 can freedom. He gives the stock arguments, which it is not necessary 
 to reproduce at this late hour. And his solution is that of Maimonides 
 that in God human freedom and divine Omniscience are reconcilable 
 because God's knowledge is not our knowledge. ^^^ 
 
JOSEPH ALBO 425 
 
 Nor is there anything original in Albo's discussion of the problem 
 of Providence. He recognizes with Maimonides and others that a 
 strong argument against special Providence is the observed inequality 
 between the destinies of men and their apparent merits. And he en- 
 deavors in the well worn method to give reasons and explanations 
 for this inequality which will not touch unfavorably God's justice or 
 his special Providence. The reasons are such as we met before and 
 we shall not repeat them. Albo also gives a few positive arguments 
 to prove the reahty of special Providence for man. He sees in various 
 natural and human phenomena evidence of deviation from the merely 
 "natural" as demanded by the principles of Aristotle's Physics or 
 the laws of uniformity. This shows special Providence. Thus the 
 existence of dry earth, the heaviest element, above water, cannot be 
 accounted for by the laws of Physics. The phenomenon of rain can- 
 not be reduced to law, hence it argues will and purpose and Providence. 
 Admonition in dreams is direct evidence of special Providence, and 
 it is scarcely likely that man, who has special equipment above the 
 other animals in his reason, should not also receive special care above 
 that which the lower animals have. Now they are protected in the 
 species, hence man is provided for as an individual. ^^* 
 
 Having disposed of the auxiliary dogmas, Albo takes up the funda- 
 mental principle of Reward and Punishment. He cites various 
 opinions on the subject, which are dependent upon the idea one enter- 
 tains concerning the nature of the soul. Thus if one holds that the 
 human soul is not different in kind from the animal soul, it follows that 
 as there is no reward and punishment for the animal, there is none for 
 man. And if one regards the human soul as merely a capacity or 
 possibility of intelligence he must necessarily conclude that the soul 
 perishes with the body and there is no spiritual reward and punish- 
 ment after death. The only reward there is must therefore be cor- 
 poreal, during life. On the other hand, our general experience, which 
 brings before us many cases of good men suffering and bad men en- 
 joying prosperity, wovJd seem to argue against corporeal reward and 
 punishment in this world. This taken together with the philosophical 
 opinion that the soul is an immaterial and indestructible substance 
 gives rise to the third view that the only recompense is spiritual after 
 death. None of these views is satisfactory to Albo. The first two 
 
426 MEDIJEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 because they are based upon an erroneous notion of the soul. All 
 agree, philosophers as well as theologians, that the human soul is 
 different in kind from the soul of the animal; and it is likewise admitted 
 that the human soul is immortal. His criticism of the third view so 
 far as it is based upon the intellectuahst idea that the thing of highest 
 value is intellectual effort, and the only reward is immortahty which 
 intellectual activity engenders, is similar to that of Halevi and Crescas 
 in its endeavor to refute this notion and to substitute for it the reli- 
 gious view that the soul is an independent substance having a capacity 
 for intelligence in God's service. The degree in which a person realizes 
 this service determines his reward and punishment. The argument 
 from experience Albo does not answer here, but we may suppose he 
 regards it as answered by what he said in his discussion of Providence, 
 where he tries to account for the prosperity of the wicked and the 
 adversity of the righteous. 
 
 Albo's own view accordingly is that which he also attributes to 
 the Bible that there is a twofold reward, in this world and in the next. 
 There is still a difference of opinion concerning the nature of the true 
 and ultimate reward, whether it is given to the soul alone, or to body 
 and soul combined in resiurection. He quotes Maimonides's opinion, 
 with whom he agrees, that the real reward is purely spiritual enjoyed 
 by the soul alone. To be sure, after the coming of the Messiah the 
 bodies of the righteous will be resurrected to make known abroad 
 God's wonders, or to give these people bodily pleasure for the pain 
 they suffered during life, or to give them additional opportunity to 
 acquire perfection so that they may have a greater reward later. But 
 this state of resurrected life will last only for a time, and then all will 
 die again, and the souls will enjoy spiritual life forever. 
 
 The other opinion, held by Nachmanides, is that the real and ul- 
 timate reward is that of body and soul united to everlasting life. 
 Albo is not satisfied with this view, his objections being among others 
 that if only the perfect are resurrected, the rest will remain without 
 any reward at all, not to mention the difficulty that it is not likely 
 that the human body — a perishable thing — will change into a matter 
 that will last forever. 
 
 As to the natiure of reward and punishment after death, Albo tells 
 us that reward will consist in the soul's realization that its endeavors 
 
JOSEPH ALSO 427 
 
 in this world were correct, and in the next world it will be prepared to 
 join the spiritual beings, which will give it great joy. The erring 
 soul will find itself in a position where it will still desire the corporeal 
 pleasures of this world, but will not be able to have them for want of 
 corporeal organs. At the same time it will also entertain the other 
 more natural desire of a spiritual substance to join the other spiritual 
 beings in the other world. This feeling too it will not be able to satisfy 
 because of its want of perfection. This division of desires unsatisfied 
 wUl cause the soul excruciating torture, and this is its punishment. ^^^ 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Our task is done. We have now reached the limit we have assigned 
 ourselves. We have traced objectively and with greater or less detail 
 the rationalistic movement in mediaeval Jewry from its beginnings in 
 the ninth and tenth centuries in Babylon among the Karaites and 
 Rabbanites to its decline in Spain and south France in the fifteenth 
 century. We have followed its ascending curve from Saadia through 
 Gabirol, Bahya and Ibn Daud to its highest point in Maimonides, 
 and we likewise traced its descent through Gersonides, Crescas and 
 Albo. We took account of its essential nature as being a serious and 
 conscientious attempt to define a Jewish Weltanschauung in the midst 
 of conflicting claims of religions and philosophies. The Jewish sacred 
 writings had to be studied and made consistent with themselves in 
 regard to certain ethical and metaphysical questions which forced 
 themselves upon the minds of thinking men. In this endeavor it 
 was necessary to have regard to the system of doctrine that was grow- 
 ing up among their Mohammedan neighbors and masters — itself 
 inherited from Greece — and adjust its teachings to those of Judaism. 
 The adjustment took various forms according to the temperament 
 of the adjuster. It embraced the extremes of all but sacrificing one of 
 the two systems of doctrine to the other, and it counted among its 
 votaries those who honestly endeavored to give each claim its due. 
 The system of Judaism was the same for all throughout the period 
 of our investigation, excepting only the difference between Karaites 
 and Rabbanites. This was not the case with the system of philosophic 
 doctrine. There we can see a development from Kalam through Neo- 
 Platonism to Aristotelianism, and we accordingly classified the Jewish 
 thinkers as Mutakallimun, Neo-Platonists or Aristotelians, or com- 
 binations in varying proportions of any two of the three systems 
 mentioned. 
 
 It was not our province to treat of the mystic movement in mediaeval 
 Jewry as it developed in the Kabbalistic works and gained the ground 
 5delded in the course of time by the healthier rationalism. To com- 
 
 428 
 
CONCLUSION 429 
 
 plete the picture it will suffice to say that as the political and economic 
 conditions of the Jews in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries dete- 
 riorated, and freedom and toleration were succeeded by persecution 
 and expulsion, the Jews became more zealous for their own spiritual 
 heritage as distinguished from foreign importations; philosophy and 
 rationalism began to be regarded askance, particularly as experience 
 showed that scientific training was not favorable to Jewish steadfast- 
 ness and loyalty. In suffering and persecution those who stuck to 
 their posts were as a rule not the so-called enlightened who played 
 with foreign learning, but the simple folk who believed in Torah and 
 tradition in the good old style. The philosophical and the scientific 
 devotees were the first to yield, and many of them abandoned Juda- 
 ism. "^^^ Thus it was that mysticism and obscurantism took the place 
 of enlightenment as a measure of self-defence. The material walls of 
 the Ghetto and the spiritual walls of the Talmud and the Kabbala 
 kept the remnant from being overwhelmed and absorbed by the hos- 
 tile environment of Christian and Mohammedan. The second half of 
 the fourteenth, and the fifteenth century were not favorable to phil- 
 osophical studies among the Jews, and the few here and there who 
 still show an interest in science and philosophy combine with it a belief 
 in Kabbala and are not of any great influence on the development of 
 Judaism. 
 
 Shemtob ben Joseph ibn Shemtob (ab. 1440) author of a work en- 
 titled ''Emunot," ^^^ is a strong opponent of Greek science and phil- 
 osophy. He is not content with attacking the lesser lights and ex- 
 tremists like Albalag or Gersonides or Abraham ibn Ezra. He goes 
 to the very fountain-head of Jewish Aristotehanism and holds Mai- 
 monides responsible for the heresies which invaded the Jewish camp. 
 He takes up one doctrine after another of the great Jewish philosopher 
 and points out how dangerous it is to the true Jewish faith. Judah 
 Halevi and Nachmanides represent to him the true Jewish attitude. 
 The mysteries of the Jewish faith are revealed not in philosophy but 
 in the Kabbala, which Maimonides did not study, and which he would 
 not have understood if he had studied it, for he had no Kabbalistic 
 tradition. 
 
 Unlike Shemtob, his son Joseph ben Shemtob (d. 1480) ^^^ shows 
 great admiration for Aristotle and Maimonides. But he is enabled to 
 
43© MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 do so by lending credence to a legend that Aristotle in his old age re- 
 canted his heretical doctrines, in particular that of the eternity of the 
 world. Joseph ben Shemtob made a special study of Aristotle's Ethics, 
 to which he wrote a commentary, and endeavored to show that the 
 Stagirite's ethical doctrines had been misunderstood; that the highest 
 good of man and his ultimate happiness are to be sought according 
 to Aristotle not in this world but in the next. It was likewise a mis- 
 understanding, he thinks, when Maimonides and others make Aris- 
 totle deny special Providence. True science is not really opposed to 
 Judaism. At the same time he too like his father realizes the danger 
 of too much scientific study, and hence agrees with Solomon ben Adret 
 that the study of philosophy should be postponed to the age of matu- 
 rity when the student is already imbued with Jewish learning and 
 religious faith. 
 
 The son of Joseph, bearing the name of his grandfather, Shem- 
 tob ben Joseph (fl. ab. 1461-89), followed in his father's 
 footsteps,^^^ and wrote a commentary on the "Guide of the 
 Perplexed" of Maimonides, whom he defends against the attacks of 
 Crescas. 
 
 Isaac ben Moses Arama (1420-1494) ^^^ is the author of a 
 philosophico-homiletical commentary on the Pentateuch entitled, 
 "Akedat Yizhak," and a small treatise on the relations of philosophy 
 and theology. He was also interested in Kabbala and placed Jewish 
 revelation above philosophy. 
 
 Don Isaac Abarbanel (1437-1508),*^^ the distinguished Jewish states- 
 man who went with his brethren into exile at the time of the expulsion 
 of the Jews from Spain in 1492, was a prolific writer on Biblical ex- 
 egesis and religious philosophy. Though a great admirer of Maimon- 
 ides, on whose "Guide" he wrote a commentary, and whose thirteen 
 articles of the creed he defended against the strictures of Crescas and 
 Albo, he was nevertheless an outspoken opponent of the rationalistic 
 attitude and has no phrases strong enough for such men as Albalag, 
 Gersonides, Moses of Narbonne and others, whom he denounces as 
 heretics and teachers of dangerous doctrines. He does not even spare 
 Maimonides himself when the latter attempts to identify the tradi- 
 tional "Maase Bereshit" and "Maase Merkaba" with the Aristo- 
 telian Physics and Metaphysics (c/. above, p. 303 f.), and adopts Kab- 
 
CONCLUSION 431 
 
 balistic views along with philosophic doctrines. He is neither original 
 nor thoroughly consistent. 
 
 His son Judah Leo Abarbanel (1470-1530) ^^^ is the author of a 
 philosophical work in Italian, "Dialoghi di Amore," (Dialogues of 
 Love), which breathes the spirit of the Renaissance of the fifteenth and 
 sixteenth centuries in Italy. It is under the influence of Plato and 
 Plotinus and identifies God with love, which is regarded as the essential 
 principle of all life and activity in the world, including even the in- 
 organic natural processes. There is no attempt made to construct 
 a Jewish philosophy, and though all evidence is against it, some have 
 made it out that Judah Abarbanel was a convert to Christianity. 
 
 In the same country, in Italy, Judah ben Yechiel Messer Leon of 
 Mantua ^^^ (1450-1490) made a name for himself as a student of 
 Cicero and of mediaeval Latin scholasticism. He wrote a rhetoric in 
 Hebrew based upon Cicero and Lactantius, and composed logical works 
 based upon Aristotle's Latin text and Averroes. As an original student 
 of philosophy he is of no importance. 
 
 Two members of the Delmedigo family of Crete, Elijah (1460- 1498) 
 and Joseph Solomon, ^^^ are well known as students of philosophy and 
 writers on philosophical and scientific subjects. 
 
 Thus the stream of philosophical thought which rose among the 
 Jews in Babylonia and flowed on through the ages, ever widening and 
 deepening its channel, passing into Spain and reaching its high water 
 mark in the latter half of the twelfth century in Maimonides, began to 
 narrow and thin out while spreading into France and Italy, until at 
 last it dried up entirely in that very land which opened up a new world 
 of thought, beauty and feeling in the fifteenth century, the land of the 
 Renaissance. Jewish philosophy never passed beyond the scholastic 
 stage, and the freedom and light which came to the rest of the world 
 in the revival of ancient learning and the inventions and discoveries 
 of the modem era found the Jews incapable of benefiting by the bless- 
 ings they afforded. Oppression and gloom caused the Jews to retire 
 within their shell and they sought consolation for the freedom denied 
 them without in concentrating their interests, ideals and hopes upon 
 the Rabbinic writings, legal as well as mystical. There have appeared 
 philosophers among the Jews in succeeding centuries, but they either 
 philosophized without regard to Judaism and in opposition to its 
 
432 MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 fundamental dogmas, thus incurring the wrath and exclusion of the 
 synagogue, or they sought to dissociate Judaism from theoretical 
 speculation on the ground that the Jewish religion is not a philosophy 
 but a rule of conduct. In more recent times Jewry has divided itself 
 into sects and under the influence of modern individuahsm has lost 
 its central authority making every group the arbiter of its own belief 
 and practice and narrowing the religious influence to matters of 
 ceremony and communal activity of a practical character. There are 
 Jews now and there are philosophers, but there are no Jewish phi- 
 losophers and there is no Jewish philosophy. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 GENERAL WORKS 
 
 Solomon Munk, Melanges de Philosophic Juive et Arabe, Paris 1859, pp. 
 
 461-51 1. A brief historical resume of philosophical authors and books. 
 
 German translation by Beer, Philosophie und philosophische Schrift- 
 
 steUer der Juden, Leipzig, 1852. English translation by Isidor KaUsch, 
 
 Philosophy and Philosophical Authors of the Jews, Cincinnati, 1881. 
 A. ScHMEEDL, Studien liber jiidische, insonders jiidisch-arabische ReUgions- 
 
 philosophie, Wien, 1869. 
 MoRiTZ EiSLER, Vorlesungen iiber die jiidischen Philosophen des Mittel- 
 
 alters (3 parts), Wien, 1870-84. 
 David Kaufmann, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der jiidischen 
 
 Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters von Saadia bis Maimuni, Gotha, 
 
 1877. 
 
 Simeon Bernfeld, !3N-iB>^n riTnn N^DiDi^Jsn nnijin, wnhi^ nyn, Warsaw, 
 
 1897. 
 
 S. HoROViTZ, Die Psychologic bei den judischen Religions-Philosophen 
 
 des Mittelalters, von Saadia bis Maimuni, Breslau, 1898-1912 (includes 
 
 so far Saadia, Gabirol, Ibn Zaddik, Abraham ibn Daud). 
 J. PoLLAK, "Entwicklung der arabischen und judischen Philosophie im 
 
 Mittelalter" in Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. XVII 
 
 (1904), pp. 196-236, 433-459- 
 Ueberweg-Baumgartner, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 
 
 II, loth ed., Berhn, 1915, pp. 385-403. 
 David Neumark, Geschichte der judischen Philosophie des Mittelalters, 
 
 nach Problemen dargesteUt, vol. I, Berlin, 1907, vol. II, part I, 
 
 Berhn, 1910. 
 Ignaz Goldziher, Die jiidische Philosophie in Allgemeine Geschichte der 
 
 Philosophie, von W. Wundt, etc. (Die Kultur der Gegenwart I, 5), 
 
 pp. 70-77 (2nd ed., pp. 301-337). 
 
 Kalam in Jewish Philosophy 
 
 Martin Schreiner, Der Kalam in der judischen Literatur, Berlin, 
 
 1895. 
 
 ^ This bibliography contains a selection of the more important works of exposi- 
 tion. For original sources see the notes. 
 
 433 
 
434 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Isaac Israeli 
 
 Jacob Guttmann, Die philosophischen Lehren des Isaak ben Salomon 
 Israeli, Miinster i. W. 191 1. 
 
 Al Mukammas 
 Abraham Harkavy, in Russian periodical Woskhod, Sept. 1898. 
 
 Saadia 
 
 Jacob Guttmann, Die Religionsphilosophie des Saadia, Gottingen, 1882. 
 D. J. Engelkemper, Saadja Gaon's religionsphUosophische Lehre iiber 
 die heilige Schrift, iibersetzt und erklart, Miinster, 1903. 
 
 Joseph Al Basir 
 
 P. F. Frankl, Ein Mu'tazilitischer Kalam aus dem 10. Jahrhundert, Wien, 
 
 1872. 
 MiKSA Klein, Juszuf Al-Baszir, Al-Kitab Al-Muhtavi, Budapest, 1913. 
 Erno Morgenstern, Juszuf Al-Baszir, Al Kitab Al Muhtavi, Budapest, 
 
 1913- 
 
 Jeshda ben Judah 
 
 Martin Schreiner, Studien iiber Jeschu'a ben Jehuda, Berlin, 1900. 
 
 Solomon ibn Gabirol 
 
 S. Munk, Melanges, etc., Paris, 1859, pp. 151-306. 
 
 Seyerlen, in Zeller's Theologische Jahrbiicher, vols. XV and XVI. 
 
 Jacob Guttmann, Die PhUosophie des Salomon ibn Gabirol, Gottingen, 
 
 1889. 
 David Kaufmann, Studien iiber Salomon ibn Gabirol, Budapest, 1899. 
 
 Bahya ibn Pakuda 
 
 David Kaufmann, "Die Theologie des Bachja Ibn Pakuda," in " Gesam- 
 melte Schriften von David Kaufmann " (ed. Brann), vol. II, Frank- 
 furt a. M., 1910, pp. 1-98. 
 
 J. H. Hertz, Bachya, The Jewish Thomas a Kempis, New York, 1898 (in 
 Sixth Biennial Report of the Jewish Theological Seminary Association). 
 
 Pseudo-Bahya 
 
 Jacob Guttmann, "Eine bisher unbekannte, dem Bachja ibn Pakuda 
 zugeignete Schrift," Monatschrijt /, G. u. W. d. J., vol. XLI (1897), 
 p. 241 ff. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 435 
 
 Abraham bar Hiyya 
 Jacob Guttmann, in Monatschrift f. G. u. W. d. J., 1900. 
 
 Joseph ibn Zaddik 
 
 Max Doctor, Die Philosophic des Joseph Ibn Zaddik, nach ihren Quellen, 
 insbesondere nach ihren Beziehxingen zu den Lauteren Briidern und zu 
 Gabirol untersucht, Miinster, 1895. 
 
 Leopold Weinsberg, Der Mikrokosmos, ein angeblich im 12. Jahrhundert 
 von dem Cordubenser Joseph ibn Zaddik verfasstes philosophisches 
 System, nach seiner Echtheit untersucht, Breslau, 1888. 
 
 JUDAH HaLEVI 
 
 Ad. Frankl-Grun, Die Ethik des Juda Halevi, Bihn, s. a. 
 
 Davh) Kauemann, Jehuda Halewi, Versuch einer Charakteristik, Breslau, 
 
 1877; reprinted in " Gesammelte Schriften " (ed. Brann), Frankfurt 
 
 a. M., 1910, vol. II, pp. 99-151. 
 David Neumark, Jehuda Hallevi's Philosophy in its Principles, Cincinnati, 
 
 1908. 
 Julius Guttmann, Das Verhaltniss von ReHgion und Philosophic bei Jehuda 
 
 Halewi, in Israel Lewy's Festschrift (ed. Brann and Elbogen), Breslau, 
 
 1911, pp. 327-358. 
 
 Abraham ibn Ezra 
 
 Nachman Krochmal, ptn ^3nj miO, Warsaw, 1894, p. 266 ff. 
 
 David Rosin, Die Religionsphilosophie Abraham ibn Esras, in Monatschrift 
 
 /. G. u. W. d. J. vols. XLII (1898) and XLIII (1899). 
 G. Orschansky, Abraham ibn Esra als PhUosoph, Breslau, 1900. 
 
 Abraham ibn Daud 
 
 GuGENHEiMER, Die Rcligionsphilosophic des R. Abraham ben David ha- 
 Levi nach dessen noch ungedruckter Schrift Emuna Rama in ihrem 
 inneren imd historischen Zusammenhangc entwickelt, Augsburg, 1850. 
 
 Jacob Guttmann, Die Rehgionsphilosophie des Abraham ibn Daud aus 
 Toledo, Gottingen, 1879. 
 
 Maimonides 
 
 M. Joel, Die Rehgionsphilosophie des Mosc ben Maimon, Breslau, 1876. 
 
 SmoN B. ScHEYER, Das Psychologische System des Maimonides, Frank- 
 furt a. M., 1845. 
 
 David Rosin, Die Ethik des Maimonides, Breslau, 1876. 
 
 Moses ben Maimon, sein Leben, seine Werkc imd sein Einfluss, heraus- 
 gegeben von der GeseUschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaft des Ju- 
 denthimis, Band I, Leipzig, 1908. 
 
436 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Louis-Germain Levy, Maimonide, Paris, 191 1 (Les Grands Philosophes). 
 J. MiJNZ, Moses ben Maimon, sein Leben und seine Werke, Frankfurt a. 
 
 M., 1912. 
 M. Joel, Verhaltniss Albert des Grossen zu Moses Maimonides, Breslau, 
 
 1876. 
 Jacob Guttmann, Der Einfluss der Maimonidischen Philosophic auf das 
 
 christliche Abendland, in Moses ben Maimon (see above), pp. 135-230. 
 David Kaufmann, Der "Fiihrer" Maimuni's in der Weltliteratur, Archiv 
 
 fur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. XI (1898), pp. 335-376; reprinted 
 
 in " Gesammelte Schriften " (ed. Brann), Frankfurt a. M., 1910, vol. II, 
 
 pp. 152-189. 
 J. P. Wickersham Crawford, The Vision Delectable of Alfonso de la Torre 
 
 and Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed, Publications of the Modern 
 
 Language Association of America, XXVIII, 2 (1913), pp. 188-212. 
 Isaac Husik, An Anonymous Medieval Christian Critic of Maimonides, 
 
 Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, vol. II, 1911, pp. 159-190. 
 
 Gersonides 
 
 M. Joel, Lewi ben Gerson als ReHgionsphilosoph, Breslau, 1862. 
 
 Isidore Weil, Philosophie Religieuse de Levi ben Gerson, Paris, 1868. 
 
 Benzion Kellermann, Die Kampfe Gottes von Lewi ben Gerson, 
 Uebersetzung und Erklarung des handschriftlich revidierten Textes, 
 Erster Teil, Berlin, 1914. Contains the German translation of the 
 first book of the " MiUiamot Adonai." The translation is faulty in 
 many places, as the present writer has shown in an article entitled, 
 " Studies in Gersonides," which will appear in the Jewish Quarterly 
 Review, New Series, in the course of the year 191 7. 
 
 Hasdai Crescas 
 
 M. Joel, Don Chasdai Creskas' rehgionsphilosophische Lehren in ihrem 
 geschichtlichen Einflusse dargestellt, Breslau, 1866. 
 
 Philipp Block, Die Willensfreiheit von Chasdai Kreskas, Miinchen, 1879. 
 
 Julius Wolfsohn, Der Einfluss Gazali's auf Chisdai Crescas, Frankfurt 
 a. M., 1905. 
 
 David Neumark, "Crescas and Spinoza," in Commemoration of the Fifth 
 Centenary of the Publication of the "Or Adonai"; in Year Book of the 
 Central Conference of American Rabbis, XVIII, 1908, pp. 277-318. 
 
 Joseph Also 
 
 Samuel Back, Joseph Albo's Bedeutung in der Geschichte der jiidischen 
 Religionsphilosophie, Breslau, 1869. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 437 
 
 Jaulus, in Monatschrift f. G. u. W. d. J., 1874, p. 462 ff. 
 A, Tanzer, Die Religionsphilosophie Joseph Albo's nach seinem Werke "Ik- 
 karim" systematisch dargestellt und erlautert, Frankfurt a. M., 1896. 
 
 Biblical Exegesis 
 
 W. Bacher, Die Bibelexegese \ der judischen Religionsphilosophen des 
 
 Mittelalters vor Maimuni, Budapest, 1892. 
 ID., Die Jiidische Bibelexegese vom Anfange des zehnten bis zum Ende des 
 
 fiinfzehnten Jahrhunderts, Treves, 1892, reprinted from Winter und 
 
 Wiinsche, Die jiidische Literatur seit Abschluss des Kanons, II, 239- 
 
 339, where a full bibliography is given. 
 ID., Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v. Bible Exegesis, §§ 14-16. 
 
 Influence of Jewish Philosophy on Scholasticism 
 
 The works of Joel, Guttmann, Kaufmann, Crawford and Husik mentioned 
 
 above under Maimonides; and besides 
 Jacob Guttmann, Das Verhaltniss des Thomas von Aquino zum Judenthum 
 
 und zur jiidischen Litteratur, Gottrngen, 1891. 
 id.. Die Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in ihren Beziehungen zum 
 
 Judenthum und zur jiidischen Literatur, Breslau, 1902. 
 For further references see the notes. 
 
NOTES 
 
 [Black figures denote the page, the Hght figures the notes] 
 
 XV, I. See below, p. 395 £f. 
 xvi, 2. Talm. Bab. Hagiga iib. 
 
 3. Ibid. 
 
 4. See Zeller, Die Philosophie der 
 Griechen, III, 2, 3d ed. p. 347; Mai- 
 monides, Guide of the Perplexed, I, ch. 
 71, beginning. 
 
 xvii, 5. See Wenrich, De Auctorum 
 Graecorum Versionibus et Commen- 
 tariis Syriacis, Arabicis, Armeniacis 
 Persicisque, Leipzig, 1842, p. 4 ff; De 
 Boer, Geschichte der Philosophie im 
 Islam, Stuttgart, 1901, p. i7ff (EngUsh 
 translation by Jones, London, 1903, pp. 
 1 1-30) . Duval, La Litterature Syriaque 
 2nd ed., Paris, 1900, ch. XIV, § 2, p. 
 
 253 ff- 
 
 XX, 6. See Dieterid, Die Theologie 
 des Aristotles (Arabic text), Leipzig, 
 1882; German translation by the same, 
 Leipzig, 1883. 
 
 7. See Bardenhewer, Die Pseudo- 
 aristotelische Schrift iiber das reine 
 Gute, bekannt unter dem Namen Liber 
 de causis, Freiburg i. Br., 1882. 
 
 8. See Valentinus Rose, Deutsche 
 Literaturzeitimg, 1883, p. 843. 
 
 9. See Husik, Judah Messer Leon's 
 Commentary upon the " Vetus Logica," 
 Leyden, 1906, p. 11, 97 note. 
 
 xxi, 10. For the following sketch of 
 the Kalam see Goldziher, Vorlesungen 
 uber den Islam, Heidelberg, 1910, 100 ff, 
 127 f. 
 
 xxiv, II. See below, p. 247. 
 
 XXV, 12. See Schreiner, Der Kalam in 
 der jiidischen Literatur, Berhn, 1895, 
 p. 3; ibid., Studien iiber Jeschu'a ben 
 Jehuda, Berhn, 1900, p. 12 ff. 
 
 xxvi, 13. See L. Ginzberg, in Jewish 
 
 Encyclopedia, s. v. "Anthropomor- 
 phism." 
 
 14. See Talm. Bab. Berakot, 33b. 
 
 iniK ppnK>o Dmo dhid. 
 
 15. See Talm. Bab. Megillah, 25b. 
 
 16. Schreiner, Studien iiber Jeschu'a 
 ben Jehudah, p. 15 note 2. 
 
 17. See Bab. Talm. Pesakim, 54a, 
 
 Cn ''b^:^) Tnai min — min jn \bti) 
 .iD-n n^^i'N-i ^3:p 'n 
 
 18. Schreiner 1. c. p. 12. 
 
 19. Ibid. 
 
 20. Schreiner, Der Kalam in der 
 jiidischen Literatur, p. 3, 4. 
 
 xxvii, 21. Guide of the Perplexed, I, 
 ch. 71. 
 
 22. See below, p. 246 ff. 
 
 23. See Goldziher, Vorlesungen iiber 
 den Islam, p. 155 ff. 
 
 xxviii, 24. See Yahuda, AI-Hidaja 'Ha 
 Fara'id Al-Qulub des Bachja ibn Joseph 
 Ibn Paquda, Leyden, 191 2, p. 53 ff. 
 
 xxxvii, 25. Cf. above, note 6. 
 
 I, 26. See Steinschneider, Die He- 
 braischen Uebersetzungen des Mit- 
 telalters imd die Juden als Dolmetscher, 
 Berlin, 1893, § 479 and notes. 
 
 1, 27. See Guttmann, Die Scholastik 
 des dreizehnten Jahrhvmderts in ihxen 
 Beziehungen ziun Judenthum und zur 
 jiidischen Literatur, Breslau, 1902, 
 
 p. 55 ff. _ 
 
 28. Omnia Opera Ysaac, Lugduni, 
 (Lyons), 1515. 
 
 2, 29. See D"aOin nnjN, ed. Am- 
 sterdam, p. X4b. 
 
 30. S. Fried, Das Buch iiber die Ele- 
 mente (nniD^Pl "^QD), Drohobycz, igoo. 
 
 439 
 
440 
 
 NOTES 
 
 31. Published by Hirschfeld in "Fest- 
 schrift zum achtzigsten Geburtstag 
 Moritz Steinschneiders," Leipzig, 1896, 
 pp. 131-141; cf. also pp. 233-4. 
 
 32. See note 28 and the two preced- 
 ing notes. 
 
 5, Z2,- 1^2Jm nnn IDD published by 
 Steinschneider in the Hebrew periodi- 
 cal ?D"l3n I, pp. 401-405. Cf. Gutt- 
 mann, Die philosophischen Lehren des 
 Isaak ben Salomon Israeli, Miinster 
 i. W., 1911, p. 31, note i. 
 
 10, 34. Fried, n'^"lD^^ "isd, p. i2f. 
 
 17, 35. Berlin, 1885, pp. 65, 77-83, 
 
 151-154- 
 
 36. See the Russian paper Woskhod, 
 September, 1898. 
 
 24, 37. Arabic text edited by S. 
 Landauer, Kitab al-Amanat wa'l- 
 I'tiqadat, Leyden 1880. The Hebrew 
 translation of Judah ibn Tibbon has 
 been published in many editions. The 
 references in the following notes are 
 to the Yozefov edition. 
 
 25, 2>?>- Cf. below, p. 249 ff. 
 
 39. Pt. I, ch. I, third argument, 
 p. 58 of Yozefov edition. 
 
 40. Ibid., fourth argument, p. 59. 
 
 26, 41. Ibid., ch. 3, p. 63 ff.; cf. Gutt- 
 maim, Die Religionsphilosophie des 
 Saadia, Gottingen, 1882, p. 45 f. 
 
 42. Pt. II, chs. 9-12, pp. 95-101. 
 
 43. Pt. VI, ch. I, p. 149. 
 
 44. Pt. II, ch. 2, pp. 88-9. 
 
 27, 45. Introduction, pp. 38-39. 
 46. Ibid., p. 40. 
 
 28, 47. Ibid., pp. 43-48. 
 48. Ibid., p. 48. 
 
 49- P- 49- 
 SO. p. 51. 
 
 29, 51. Pt. I. Introduction, p. 54 f. 
 52. Ibid., ch. I, p. 56. 
 
 30, 53. Ibid., p. 57. 
 
 54. Ibid., p. 58. 
 
 55. Ibid., p. 59. 
 
 31, 56. Ch. 2, p. 60 £f. 
 
 57. Ch. 3, third opinion, p. 66 £f. 
 
 32, 58. Ch. 4, pp. 80-82. 
 
 59. Pt. n. Introduction, p. 86. 
 
 60. Ibid., ch. I, p. 88. 
 
 33, 61. Pt. I, ch. 3, fifth opiDion, 
 p. 68. 
 
 62. Pt. II, ch. 2, p. 89. 
 
 34, 63. Ibid., chs. 4-5, pp. 91-93. 
 64. See Graf, Die Philosophic und 
 
 Gotteslehre des Jahja ibn 'Adi und 
 spateren Autoren, Miinster, 1910, 
 p. 32, note, p. 52. 
 
 35, 65. Ill, ch. 10, p. 122; V, ch. 8, 
 p. 147; VII, ch. 2, p. 165. 
 
 66. II, chs. 9-12, pp. 95-102. 
 
 37, 67. VI, chs. 1-4, pp. 148-156. 
 
 38, 68. Ill, chs. 1-3, pp. 104-110. 
 
 40, 69. Ibid., chs. 4-5, pp. lio- 
 ns- 
 
 70. Ch. 6, pp. 113-114. 
 
 71. Chs. 7-9, pp. 114-121. 
 
 41, 72. IV, pp. 124-136. 
 
 42, 73. V, chs. 1-3, pp. 136-140. 
 
 43, 74. IX, chs. 1-4, pp. 185-190. 
 
 44, 75. VI, ch. 8, pp. 160-162. 
 
 45, 76. VII, chs. 1-9, pp. 162-174. 
 
 77. VIII, pp. 175-185. 
 
 78. IX, chs. 5-1 1, pp. 190-197. 
 
 46, 79. X, pp. 197-215- 
 
 48, 80. The following sketch is based 
 upon Frankl, Ein Mu'taziHtischer 
 Kalam aus dem loten Jahrhundert, 
 Wien, 1872. 
 
 55, 81. The following sketch is 
 based upon Schreiner, Studien uber 
 Jeschu'a ben Jehuda, Berlin, 1900. 
 
 60, 82. D"nO-in ni"lJN (Letters of 
 Maimonides), ed. Amsterdam, p. 14b. 
 
 61, 83. See Munk, Melanges de 
 Philosophie Juive et Arabe, Paris, 1859, 
 p. 291 ff; Guttmann, Die Scholastik 
 des Dreizehnten Jahrhunderts, Breslau, 
 1902, pp. 60-85. Id., Die Philosophie 
 des Salomon ibn Gabirol, Gottingen, 
 1889, p. 54 ff. This last work and 
 that of Munk represent the best ex- 
 position and criticism of Gabirol's 
 philosophy and of his sources and in- 
 fluences. 
 
 62, 84. Cf. Baeumker, Avence- 
 
NOTES 
 
 441 
 
 brolis Fons Vitae, Miinster, 1892-95, 
 Prolegomena. 
 
 63, 85. Jourdain, A., Recherches 
 Critiques sur Page et I'origine des 
 traductions Latines d' Aristote, 2 ed. 
 Paris, 1843, P- 197 note. 
 
 86. Munk, Melanges, etc. (see 
 note ?,:i), contains the Hebrew extracts 
 of Falaquera. The Latin translation 
 was published by Clemens Baeumker 
 in the Beitrage zur Geschichte der 
 Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. I, 
 pts. 2-4 (cf. above note 84). See also 
 Seyerlen in Theologische Jahrbiicher, 
 edited by Zeller, XV and XVI. 
 
 64, 87. Cf. Munk, Le Guide des 
 Egares, II, p. 25, note i, end. 
 
 88. See Kaufraann, Studien uber 
 Salomon ibn Gabirol, Budapest, 1899. 
 
 89. Baeumker, Fons Vitae, V, p. 
 313, 6. 
 
 65, 90. F. V. V, 333-335, Falaquera 
 in Munk's Melanges, V, §§ 67-69. 
 
 91. F. V. IV, 8 ff., Falaquera IV, § i. 
 
 92. F. V. V, 296, 10. 
 
 93. F. V. IV, 243, 10. 
 
 94. F. V. Ill, p. 196, 5 ff., Falaq. 
 HI, § 10. 
 
 95. F. V. Ill, 208, 15; Falaq. Ill, 
 §44. 
 
 67, 96. F. V. Ill, 175, 10 ff.; Falaq. 
 Ill, § 27 ff. 
 
 97. F. V. IV, 2ii,9ff., 213, i7ff., 217, 
 II ff., 218, 18; Falaq. IV, §§ 1-4 and ff. 
 
 98. F. V. V, 258, 19; 259, i; 268, 
 8, 14, is; 322, 12; Falaq. V, § 55. 
 
 68, 99. F. V. V, 306, 7 ff.; Falaq. 
 V, § 34 ff. 
 
 100. F. V. V, 330, 15 ff.; Falaq. V, 
 §64ff. 
 
 loi. F. V. V, 326, 3 ff.; Falaq. V, 
 §6off. 
 
 70, 102. F. V. Ill, 204, 13 ff.; Falaq. 
 
 in, § 37. 
 
 71, 103. S. Wise, "Improvement of 
 the Moral Qualities," New York, 1901. 
 (Columbia University Oriental Studies, 
 vol. I.) 
 
 72, 104. F. V. I, 4, 24 ff.; Falaq. I, 
 §2. 
 78, 105. See Munk, Melanges, 166 ff. 
 
 80, 106. Yahuda, Prolegomena zu 
 einer erstmaUgen Herausgabe des 
 Kitab Al-Hidaja Tla Fara'id Al-Qulub, 
 Frankfurt a. M., 1904, 12 ff.; id., Al- 
 Hidaja 'Ila Faraid Al-Qulub des Bachja 
 ibn Joseph ibn Paquda, Ley den, 19 12, 
 63 f. 
 
 107. Neumark, Geschichte der jiid- 
 ischen Philosophie des Mittelalters, I, 
 Berhn, 1907, 485-493- 
 
 81, loS. In his commentary on 
 Deut. 32, 39. Cf. Yahuda, Prolegomena, 
 p. 12, note 2, where 35 should be cor- 
 rected to 39. 
 
 109. Yahuda, Al-Hidaja, etc., p. 97. 
 
 85, no. nnnijn nam (Duties of the 
 
 Hearts) ed. Warsaw, 1875, Introduc- 
 tion, pp. 9-28. 
 
 86, III. Ibid., Introduction, 28- 
 37- 
 
 112. Yahuda, Al-Hidaja, pp. 53- 
 112. 
 
 88, 113. Duties of the Hearts, I, 
 chs. 1-6, pp. 41-58. 
 
 89, 114. Duties, I, ch. 6, pp. 57-8. 
 
 92, 115. Ibid., ch. 7, pp. 58-69. 
 
 93, 116. Ch. 8, pp. 69-72. 
 117. Ch. 9, pp. 72-76. 
 
 95, 118. Ch. 10, pp. 76-84. 
 
 96, 119. Guide of the Perplexed I, 
 ch. 53- 
 
 120. Duties, ch. i, p. 44. 
 
 121. Ibid., ch. 10, end, p. 92 f. 
 
 97, 122. Duties, II, pp. 95-137. 
 99, 123. Ill, pp. 138-197. 
 loi, 124. IV, pp. 198-256. 
 
 125. Duties, 2nd volume, part V, 
 
 PP- 3-35- 
 
 102, 126. VI, pp. 36-58. 
 
 103, 127. VII, pp. 58-82. 
 
 104, 128. VIII, pp. 82-126. 
 
 105, 129. IX, pp. 126-150. 
 130. X, pp. 151-168. 
 
 106, 131. Broyde, Les Reflexions sur 
 I'ame par Babya ben Joseph ibn Pa- 
 
442 
 
 NOTES 
 
 kouda, Paris, 1896; Hebrew title, 130 
 
 K'Bjn nmn. 
 
 132. Goldziher, Kitab Ma'anI al- 
 nafs, Berlin, 1907. 
 
 133. See Guttmann in " Monatschrift 
 fiir Geschichte und Wissenschaft des 
 Judenthums," XLI (1897), 241 ff. 
 
 107, 134. Arabic text, p. 41, 12 and 
 46, 2; Hebrew, p. 55, i and 61, 5. 
 
 135. Ch. 2, p. 4, 29 (Heb. p. s, last 
 line). 
 
 136. Ibid., p. 6, I (Heb. p. 7, 3). 
 
 137. Ibid., p. s, 16 f. (Heb. 6, 16 f.). 
 
 138. Ibid., ch. 9, p. 34, 13 ff- (Heb. 
 p. 44, 10). 
 
 139. Ch. 2, p. 6, 6 ff. (Heb. p. 7, 
 8f.). 
 
 140. Ch. 12, p. 42, 23 (Heb. p. 56, 23). 
 
 108, 141. Chs. 1-2. 
 
 111, 142. Chs. 16-17. 
 143. Chs. 6 and 11-12. 
 
 112, 144. Ch. 2. 
 145- Ch. 9. 
 
 113, 146. Ch. 7. 
 147. Chs. 19 and 21. 
 
 114, 148. K^Sjn IVJn "IDD, edited by 
 Freimann, Leipzig, i860. German 
 title, Sefer Hegjon ha-Nefesch. 
 
 115, 149. p. 2a. 
 
 150. Ibid., also 4b. 
 
 151. See, however, below, p. 119. 
 
 152. p. 2b. 
 
 116, 153. p. I. 
 
 117, 154. pp. 1-2. 
 
 118, 155. pp. 4b-5a. 
 156. pp. 2b-4a. 
 
 122, 157. pp. 5b-8a. 
 158. p. 8b ff. 
 
 123, 159. p. iia. 
 160. pp. 10-12. 
 
 124, 161. p. 30b ff. 
 
 125, 162. See Doctor, Die Philosophie 
 des Joseph ibn Zaddik, Miinster, 1895, 
 pp. 1-3; Horovitz, Der Mikrokosmos 
 des Joseph Ibn Saddik, Breslau, 1903, 
 I-II. 
 
 163. Horovitz, Mikrokosmos, XIII, 
 ff. 
 
 i64. Letters of Maimonides, ed. 
 Amsterdam, 14b. 
 
 126, 165. Horovitz, Mikrokosmos, 7, 
 24-8, 2. 
 
 127, 166. Ibid., 44-46; 53-54; cf. be- 
 low, p. 145. 
 
 167. Ibid., p. 37, 2 ff.; cf. below, 
 p. 138. 
 
 129, 168. pp. 1-2. 
 
 130, 169. pp. 3-6. 
 
 133, 170. pp. 7-19- 
 
 134. 171- PP- 19-25. 
 137, 172. pp. 25-33. 
 
 141, 173. pp. 33-43. 
 
 142, 174. pp. 43-47- 
 
 145, 175- PP- 47-57- 
 
 146, 176. pp. 57-58. 
 
 149, 177- PP- 59-79- 
 
 150, 178. Al-Chazari, I, 67, ed. 
 Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1887, p. 29, 
 24. 
 
 179. Ibid., p. 29, 19-20. 
 
 180. I, 63; II, 66; pp. 29 and 125. 
 
 151, 181. See Kaufmann, Jehuda 
 Halewi in " Gesammelte Schriften," 
 Frankfurt a. M., 1910, vol. 2, pp. 99- 
 
 151- 
 
 152, 182. Al-Chazari IV, 13, 15; p. 
 
 253, 18 ff., 257, 6 ff. 
 
 IS3» 183. Kaufmann, Geschichte 
 der Attributenlehre in der jiidischen 
 Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters, 
 Gotha, 1877, pp. 1 19-140. 
 
 157, 184. Al-Chazari I, 1-67, pp. i- 
 29. 
 
 158, 185. Ibid., 70 ff., p. 31 ff. 
 
 159, 186. II, 6; p. 75, 22 ff. 
 187. IX, 13; p. 253, 18 ff. 
 
 160, 188. IV, 3; p. 229, 10 ff. 
 189, Ibid., 15 ff.; p. 257, 6 ff. 
 
 161, 190. II, 2-4; pp. 71-75. 
 
 163, 191. I, 87 ff.; p. 39 ff. 
 
 164, 192. I, 99 ff.; p. 53 ff. 
 
 193. II, 10 ff.; p. 77 ff. 
 
 194. Ibid., 36 ff.; p. 103 ff. 
 
 165, 195. Ibid., 68 f.; p. 125 f. 
 
 167, 196. IV, 3 ff.; p. 237, 9 ff. 
 
 168, 197. II, 26, p. 95; 48, p. 107 f. 
 
NOTES 
 
 443 
 
 169, 198. Ibid., 50, p. 109, 24 f.; m, 
 I ff., p. 141 ff. 
 
 170, 199. I, 109 fE.; p. 59 ff. 
 
 173, 200. V, 20 ff., p. 337 ff. 
 
 201. IV, 25, p. 267 ff. 
 
 202. Ibid., 27, p. 283 f. 
 
 174, 203. Ibid., 29 ff., p. 285 ff. 
 17s, 204. See above, p. 8. 
 
 205. Zeitschrift der deutschen 
 morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, XXIX 
 (1875), PP- 335-418. 
 
 177, 206. V, I ff., p. 29s ff. 
 
 179, 207. IV, 25, p. 281, 24 ff. 
 
 181, 208. V, 12, p. 311 ff. 
 
 182, 209. Ibid., 14, p. 323 ff. 
 
 183, 210. Ibid., 16 ff., p. 331 ff. 
 211. Ibid., 22 ff., p. 357 ff. 
 
 184, 212. Quoted by Bacher in Jewish 
 Encyclopedia, s. v. Ibn Ezra, Abraham. 
 
 213. Published by Dukes in "Zion," 
 II, Frankfurt a. M., 1842, pp. 117- 
 123, 134-137, 157-159, 175- Cf. also 
 Literaturblatt des Orients, X, 748, where 
 Dukes pubUshes a brief passage from 
 the "Arugat Habosem," not found in 
 "Zion." He derived it from a different 
 manuscript. 
 
 187, 214. Jesod Mora, published with 
 German translation by M. Creizenach, 
 Frankfurt a. M., and Leipzig, 1840. 
 Hebrew title N11D *71D\ Sefer Ha- 
 Schem, ed. Lippmann, 1834. Cf., 
 Bacher, Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v. 
 
 189, 215. prn ''3UJ miD, Warsaw, 
 
 1894, ch. 17 (pDDH nnan), pp. 266 ff. 
 
 216. Die Religionsphilosophie Abra- 
 ham Ibn Esra's, in " Monatschrift fiir 
 Geschichte und Wissenschaf t des Juden- 
 thums," 42 and 43 (1898 and 1899). 
 
 192, 217. Ibid., 42 (1898), pp. 454- 
 
 455- 
 
 193, 218. Commentary on Exod. 33, 
 21, towards the end of the long ex- 
 cursus. 
 
 195, 219. Commentary on Exod. 20, 
 2. 
 
 220. Introduction to his commentary 
 on Ecclesiastes. 
 
 197, 221. Emunah Ramah (Heb. 
 title HDI njlON), published with 
 German translation by Simson Weil, 
 Frankfurt a. M., 1852, p. 2 (Heb.), 
 
 222, Em. Ram., p. 83. 
 
 198, 223. See note 221. 
 
 224. Em. Ram., 2-3. 
 
 225. See note 221. 
 
 199, 226. See Horovitz, Ueber den 
 EinJBuss der griechischen Philosophie 
 auf die Entwicklung des Kalam, Bres- 
 lau, 1909. 
 
 200, 227. But see below, p. 354, 1. 31. 
 
 202, 228. Em. Ram., p. i ff. 
 
 203, 229. Ibid., 4. 
 
 204, 230. Al Gazali. Cf. Guttmann, 
 Die Religionsphilosophie des Abraham 
 ibn Daud aus Toledo, Gottingen, 1879, 
 p. 117, note. 
 
 205, 231. Em. Ram., 44-46. 
 232. Ibid., 4-8. 
 
 207, 233. Ibid., 9-13. 
 
 208, 234. Ibid., 13-15. 
 
 209, 235. Ibid., 15-20. 
 216, 236. Em. Ram., 20-41. 
 237. Ibid., 41-43- 
 
 220, 238. Em. Ram., 44-51. 
 
 221, 239. Ibid., 51-57- 
 
 223, 240. Ibid., 57-69. 
 
 224, 241. Ibid., 69-70. 
 
 226. 242. Ibid., 70-75. 
 228, 243. Ibid., 75-81. 
 230, 244. Ibid., 93-98. 
 
 232, 245. See Guttmann, Die Reli- 
 gionsphilosophie des Abraham Ibn 
 Daud, p. 220, note 2. 
 
 235, 246. Ibid., 98-104. 
 
 236, 247. jrjinn ni^o -nxn, Bresiau, 
 
 1828. For other editions and interesting 
 information concerning this treatise 
 see Steinschneider, Die Hebraischen 
 Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters, Berhn, 
 1893, § 251, and Die Arabische Litera- 
 tiur der Juden, Frankfurt a. M., 1902, 
 p. 208, 5. 
 
 248. Introduction to the eleventh 
 chapter (ch. Helek) of the treatise San- 
 hedrin. 
 
444 
 
 NOTES 
 
 239, 249. Letters of Maimonides, ed. 
 Amsterdam, pp. i3b-i4. 
 
 250. The Arabic text was pub- 
 lished with a French translation and 
 extremely valuable notes by Solomon 
 Munk, under the title, Le Guide des 
 figares, 3 volumes, Paris, 1856-66. Eng- 
 lish translation by M. Friedlander in 
 3 vols., London, 1881-1885, re-issued 
 in one volume, with omission of notes, 
 London, 1910. For other translations, 
 editions and commentaries see Kauf- 
 mann, "Der 'Fiihrer' Maimunis in der 
 Weltliteratur," Archiv fiir Geschichte 
 der Philosophie, XI (1898), pp. 335- 
 376, republished in Kaufmann's Gesam- 
 melte Schriften ed. Brann, vol. 2, 
 Frankfurt a. M., 1910, pp. 152-189. 
 See also Friedlander's translation, Lon- 
 don, 1910, p. XXVII ff. 
 
 251. The Arabic text was published 
 with a German translation by M. Wolff 
 under the title, Musa Maimtini's Acht 
 Kapitel, 2nd edition, Leyden, 1903. 
 Hebrew text with English translation 
 by Joseph I. Gorfinkle, The Eight 
 Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics, 
 New York, 191 2 (Columbia University 
 Oriental Studies, vol. VII). 
 
 240, 252. Emunah Ramah, p. 81 ff. 
 
 241, 253. Guide, I, chs. i, 3-16, 18- 
 30, 37-45, 64-67, 70. 
 
 243, 254. Ibid., ch. 54. 
 255- ni, 28. 
 
 256. I, 55- 
 
 244, 257- I, 32. 
 258. Ibid., ch. 33. 
 
 245, 259. Ch. 34. 
 260. Ch. 71. 
 
 246, 261. Ibid. 
 
 247, 262. Cf., however, above, p. 
 XXV f . (the view that Kalam originated 
 in Judaism). 
 
 248, 263. Ch. 71. 
 
 249, 264. The following numbers do 
 not correspond to those of Maimonides. 
 
 252. 265. Guide, I, 73. 
 266. Ibid., 74. 
 
 253, 267. Ibid., 75. 
 
 268. Ibid., 76. 
 
 269. See below, p. 257. 
 
 270. Below, p. 259. 
 
 271. Above, p. 218. 
 
 272. Below, p. 258, last line, and 260. 
 257> 273. Guide II, Introduction. 
 
 260, 274. Ibid., ch. I. 
 
 261, 275. Ch. 36. 
 
 262, 276. Ch. 46. 
 
 264, 277. Ibid., chs. 51-53- 
 
 265, 278. Chs. 55-58. 
 279. Ch. 61. 
 
 268, 280. See Munk, Guide des 
 Egares II, p. 69, note i. 
 281. Guide II, chs. 3-6. 
 
 271, 282. Chs. 13-18. 
 
 272, 283. Munk understands the pre- 
 ceding sentence differently. See his edi- 
 tion, vol. II, p. 157, note 2. 
 
 274, 284. Guide II, chs. 19-25. 
 
 281, 285. Ibid., chs. 32-48. 
 286. Ill, ch. 8. 
 
 282, 287. " Eight Chapters," ch. i. 
 285, 288. Ibid., chs. 2-5. 
 
 289. Ch. 7. 
 
 288, 290. Ch. 8. 
 
 289, 291. Guide III, chs. 10-12. 
 
 290, 292. Ibid., ch. 16. 
 292, 293. Ibid., chs. 17-18. 
 
 294, 294. Ibid., chs. 19-21. 
 
 295. Ibid., chs. 26 and 31. 
 295, 296. Ibid., ch. 27. 
 
 297, Ibid., ch. 50. 
 
 298, 298. Ibid., chs. 29-50. 
 
 299, 299. Ibid., ch. 54. 
 304, 300. Ibid., II, ch. 30. 
 
 301. Ibid., Ill, chs. 1-7. 
 
 302. See Munk, Le Guide des £gar6s, 
 III, p. 8, note. 
 
 303. Ibid. 
 
 304. Guide III, chs. 22-23. 
 
 305. 305. See Kaufmann, Der 
 Fiihrer Maimflnis in der Weltliteratur 
 in Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philoso- 
 phie XI (1898) p. 314 f.; reprinted in 
 Kaufmann's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. 
 Brann, Frankfurt a. M., 1910, p. 158 f. 
 
NOTES 
 
 445 
 
 306. See Jourdain, Recherches cri- 
 tiques sur I'age et I'origine des traduc- 
 tions Latines d'Aristote, 2nd ed., Paris, 
 1843. German transl. by Stahr, Halle, 
 183 1. 
 
 305, 307. Augustine, De Civitate 
 Dei, Book VIII, ch. 5, "Nulli nobis 
 quam isti [sc, Platonici] propius ac- 
 cesserunt"; ch. 9, "Platonem de Deo 
 ista sensisse, quae multum congruere 
 veritati nostrae religionis agnoscunt." 
 
 306, 308. See Mandonnet, Siger de 
 Brabant et TAverroisme Latin au 
 XIII™® Siecle, Louvain, 191 1, chs. 1-2; 
 Isaac Husik, An Anonymous Medieval 
 Christian Critic of Maimonides, Jewish 
 Quarterly Review, New Series, vol. 
 II, Phila. 191 1, p. 159 ff. 
 
 309. See J. Perles, "Die in einer 
 Miinchener Handschrift aufgefundene 
 erste lateinische Uebersetzung des 
 Maimonidischen Fiihrers", in Monat- 
 schrift fiir Geschichte und Wissen- 
 schaft des Judenthums, XXIV (1875), 
 
 p. 9ff. 
 
 307, 310. See M. Joel, Verhaltniss 
 Albert des Grossen zu Moses Maimon- 
 ides, Breslau, 1876, in M. Joel, Bei- 
 trage zur Geschichte der Philosophic, 
 Breslau, 1876. J. Guttmarm, Das Ver- 
 haltniss des Thomas von Aquino zum 
 Judenthum und zur jiidischen Literatiur, 
 Gottingen, 189 1; id., Die Scholastik des 
 dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in ihren Be- 
 ziehungen zum Judenthum und zur 
 jiidischen Literatur, Breslau, 1902; id., 
 Der Einfluss der Maimonidischen Philo- 
 sophic auf das christUche Abendland, in 
 "Moses ben Maimon," vol. I, Leipzig, 
 1908. 
 
 308, 311. See Graetz, History of the 
 Jews, index volume, s. v., " Maimunist 
 Controversy." 
 
 309, 312. Published by M. L. Bis- 
 hches, Pressbiu-g, 1837. 
 
 312a. Edited by W. Bacher under 
 the title "Safer Musar," Berlin, 
 1910 
 
 313. Published by the "Mekize Nir- 
 damim" Society, Lyck, 1866. 
 
 310, 314. PubUshed by Munk in Me- 
 langes de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, 
 Paris, 1859. 
 
 315. Published by Bisliches, Press- 
 burg, 1837. 
 
 316. See Munk, Melanges, p. 494, 
 note i; H. Malter, Shem Tob Pal- 
 quera, in Jewish Quarterly Review, 
 new series, vol. i, pp. 151-181, 451- 
 Soi. 
 
 317. PubUshed by Werblimer, Joseph! 
 Kaspi . . . Commentaria hebraica in 
 R. Mosis Maimonides Tractatum 
 Dalalat al Haiirin, Frankfurt a. M., 
 1848. 
 
 318. Edited by Goldenthal, Wien, 
 1852. 
 
 311,319. The English reader will also 
 find a good deal of material in the 
 pages of the Jewish Encyclopedia under 
 the names of the translators and writers 
 above mentioned. 
 
 313, 320. Guide I, ch. 74, 7th proof, 
 end. 
 
 314, 321. Published by the "Mekize 
 Nirdamim," Lyck, 1874. 
 
 315, 322. Tagm. Hanef. i. 
 
 3i7> 323. Ibid., ib-7b. The defini- 
 tion occurs, p. 7b, 11. 28 flf. 
 
 318, 324. Ibid., 8a. 
 
 319, 325. Ibid., 8a-ioa. 
 
 322, 326. Ibid., ioa-i3b. 
 
 323, 327. Ibid., i3b-i9b. 
 
 324, 328. Ibid., 2oa-2ib. 
 
 326, 329. Ibid., 2ib-24b. 
 330. Ibid., 24. 
 
 327, 331. Ibid., 25a-32. 
 
 328, 331a. See Heimann Auerbach, 
 Albalag und seine Uebersetzvmg des 
 Makasid al-GazzaHs, Breslau, 1906, 
 p. vii f.; Guttmann, Die Stellung des 
 Simon ben Zemach Duran in der 
 Geschichte der jiidischen ReUgions- 
 philosophie in Monatschrift fiir Ge- 
 schichte imd Wissenschaft des Juden- 
 thums, vol. LVII (1913), p. 184 f. 
 
446 
 
 NOTES 
 
 328, 332. See Maywald, Die Lehre 
 von der zweifachen Wahrheit, Berlin, 
 1871; Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant 
 et rAverroisme Latin au XIII™^ 
 Siecle, Louvain, 1911, vol. i, p. 148 ff. 
 
 3291 333. First edition, Riva di 
 Trento, 1560; modern edition, Leipzig, 
 1866. The references in the sequel are 
 to the Leipzig edition. 
 
 334. See Husik, Judah Messer Leon's 
 Commentary on the "Vetus Logica," 
 Leyden, 1906, p. 11. 
 
 335. See Joel, Lewi ben Gerson als 
 Religionsphilosoph, Breslau, 1862, p. gf. 
 (in M. Joel, Beitrage zur Geschichte 
 der Philosophie, Breslau, 1876). 
 
 330> 33^- Introduction to Gersonides' 
 commentary on the Pentateuch. 
 
 337. Introduction to "Milhamot 
 Adonai," pp. 6-7. 
 
 331, 338. Milhamot I, ch. 14, p. 91. 
 
 339. Ibid., Introduction, p. 8. 
 
 336, 340. I, chs. 1-4, pp. 12-35. 
 
 337, 341. Ibid., ch. 5, pp. 35-3^- 
 
 339, 342. Ch. 6, pp. 36-48. 
 
 340, 343. Ibid.,chs. 10-12, pp. 61-88. 
 342, 344. Milhamot II, chs. 1-2, 
 
 pp. 92-98. 
 
 345. Ibid., chs. 3, 5 and 6, pp. 98 f., 
 104, III f. 
 
 344, 346. Milhamot III, ch. 3, p. 132. 
 
 345, 347- ni, chs. 1-6, pp. 120-150. 
 
 349, 348. IV, chs. 1-7, pp. 151-187. 
 
 350, 349- V, 3, ch. 6, p. 264 f. 
 351,350. Ibid., chs. 4-6, pp. 247- 
 
 264. 
 
 352, 351. Ch. 12, pp. 278-285. 
 
 354, 352. VI, I, chs. 1-9, pp. 293- 
 328. 
 
 353. Ibid., chs. 10-13, pp. 328-353; 
 ch. 15, p. 356 f. 
 
 355, 354. Ch. 16, pp. 359-361. 
 
 357, 355- Chs. 17-28, pp. 362-416. 
 
 356, VI, 2, ch. I, p. 419- 
 
 358, 357- VI, 2, chs. 1-8, pp. 418- 
 441. 
 
 360, 358. Ibid., chs. 9-12, pp. 441- 
 460. 
 
 359. Chs, 13-14, pp. 460-463. 
 
 363, 360. Published by DeHtzsch and 
 Steinschneider, Leipzig, 1841. 
 
 364, 361. Ez Hayim, p. 4. 
 
 366, 362. E. H., pp. 3-5. 
 
 367, 363- P- 15, 1- 6 f., also p. 18, 
 1. 10 f. 
 
 364. Ch. 4, pp. 12-13, 1. 24. 
 
 368, 365. Ch. 9, pp. 26-27. 
 
 369, 366. p. 17, 1. 16. 
 
 367- p. 33- 
 
 372, 368. Chs. 66-72, pp. 80-89. 
 369. Ch. 75, pp. 93-Q6. 
 
 373, 370. Chs. 76-78, pp. 96-99. 
 
 375, 371- Chs. 79-81, pp. 100-107. 
 
 376, 372. Chs. 82-89, pp. 107-133. 
 
 377, 373- Ch. 89, pp. 133-136. 
 
 378, 374. "Guide" III, 24. 
 
 379, 375- Ez Hayim, ch. 90, pp. 136- 
 144. 
 
 376. "Guide" III, chs. 12, 13, 25 end. 
 
 380, 377. Ez Hayim, ch. 94, pp. 149- 
 
 154- 
 
 382, 378. Chs. 96-100, pp. 160-176. 
 
 379. Chs. 101-102, pp. 177-181. 
 
 380. Ez Hayim, pp. 116-117. 
 
 383, 381. Ch. 103, pp. 181-185. 
 
 384, 382. Chs. 104-105, pp. 185-187. 
 
 385, 383. Ch. 106, p. 187 ff.; ch. 109, 
 p. 194 ff. 
 
 384. Chs. 107-108. 
 387, 385. Chs. 110-112. 
 
 389, 386. Ed. Ferara, 1556 (no pagi- 
 nation) . 
 
 390, 387. "Or Adonai," Introduc- 
 tion, pp. 6-7 (not numbered). 
 
 391, 388. Book I, sections 1-2. 
 
 389. Ibid., section 3, ch. 2. 
 
 390. Ibid., ch. 3. 
 
 392, 391. Ibid. 
 
 392. Ibid., ch. 4. 
 
 393, 393- Book II, section L 
 395, 394- Ibid., section 2. 
 
 395. Section 3. 
 
 396. Section 4. 
 398, 397. Section 5. 
 
 398. See M. Joel, "Don Chasdai Cres- 
 kas' religionsphilosophische Lehren," 
 
NOTES 
 
 447 
 
 Breslau, 1866 (in M. Joel, Beitrage 
 zur Geschichte der Philosophic, Breslau, 
 1876), p. 54 f. 
 
 402, 399. Or Adonai, II, section 6. 
 400. Ibid., Ill, introduction. 
 
 403, 401. Ibid., section i. 
 
 404, 402. Section 3. 
 
 405, 403. Section 4. 
 
 406, 403a. Simon ben Zemach Duran 
 (1361-1444). He was a relative of 
 Gersonides, a Rabbinical authority, 
 and the author of a scientific and phil- 
 osophical work, entitled "Magen Abot." 
 Unlike his more distinguished relative, 
 Simon Duran was opposed to the ex- 
 treme views adopted by such men as 
 Albalag, Moses of Narbonne or Ger- 
 sonides himself, and favored a return 
 to the more moderate standpoint of 
 Maimonides. Without laying any 
 claim to originality his work shows 
 wide reading and familiarity with the 
 scientific and philosophic literature 
 of the time. See Guttmann, " Die Stel- 
 lung des Simon ben Zemach Duran in 
 der Geschichte der jiidischen Reli- 
 gionsphilosophie," in Monatschrift fiir 
 Geschichte und Wissenschaf t des Juden- 
 thums, vol. 52 (1908), pp. 641-672, 
 vol. 53 (1909), pp. 46-97, 199-228. 
 From Guttmann's investigations it 
 appears that Albo cannot claim any 
 originality even for the reduction of the 
 fundamental dogmas of Judaism to 
 three. The first part of the "Ikkarim" 
 turns out to be a compilation from 
 Crescas and Duran, and is no more 
 original than the rest of the book. 
 When we consider that though he owes 
 the central point of his contribution to 
 Duran, Albo never mentions him, the 
 charge of plagiarism brought against 
 him is not far from justified. See below, 
 p. 407. 
 
 407, 404- D^VIjn npj; Slt3^3, pub- 
 lished by Ephraim Deinard, Carney, N. 
 J., 1904. The work was originally com- 
 posed in Spanish, and was translated 
 
 into Hebrew by Joseph Ibn Shem- 
 tob. 
 404a. See also note 403a. 
 
 408, 405. nnpyn ISD, ed. Warsaw, 
 1877, pp. 13-14- 
 
 406. Ibid., pp. 14-17. 
 
 409, 407. pp. 21-25. 
 
 408. In the introduction to his com- 
 mentary on the eleventh chapter of the 
 Mishnic treatise Sanhedrin (chapter 
 Helek). 
 
 410, 409. Crescas; cf. above, p. 392. 
 
 410. Ikkarim, I, ch. 3, pp. 25-31. 
 
 411, 411. Chs. 4-7, pp. 31-39. 
 
 412, 412. Ch. 8, pp. 39-46. 
 
 413. Ch. 9, pp. 46-48. 
 
 413, 414. Chs. 10-11, pp. 48-58. 
 
 415. Ch. 12, pp. 58-60. 
 
 416. Chs. 13 and 15, pp. 60-61 and 
 64-68. 
 
 414, 417. Ch. 14, pp. 61-64. 
 
 415, 418. Ch. 17, pp. 7 -76. 
 419. Ch. 18, pp. 76-78. 
 
 416, 420. Ch. 23, pp. 84-86. 
 
 418, 421. Ch. 24, pp. 87-90. 
 
 422. Ch. 25, pp. 90-92. 
 
 419, 423. Ch. 26, p. 93. 
 
 424. Book II, chs. 4-5, pp. 107-114. 
 
 425. Ibid., ch. 7, pp. 1 1 7-1 18. 
 
 420, 426. Chs. 8-10, pp. 1 18-125. 
 
 427. Chs. 11-13, pp. 125-140. 
 
 428. Ch. 12, pp. 129-133. 
 
 421, 429. Book III, chs. 1-5, pp. 197- 
 214. 
 430. Chs. 6-7, pp. 214-218. 
 
 423, 431. Chs. 8-11, pp. 218-228. 
 
 424, 432. Chs. 13-20, pp. 229-246. 
 433. Book IV, chs. 1-6, pp. 279-294. 
 
 425. 434- Chs. 7-15, pp. 294-313. 
 427, 435. Chs. 29-35, PP- 338-356. 
 429, 436. See Guttmann "Die Familie 
 
 Schemtob in ihren Beziehungen zur 
 Philosophic," Monatschrift fur Ge- 
 schichte und Wissenschaft des Juden- 
 thums, vol. 57 (1913), P- 177 ff- 
 
 437. See Guttmann as in preceding 
 note. 
 
 438. See preceding note. 
 
448 
 
 NOTES 
 
 430, 439. See note 436. 
 
 440. See Jewish Encyclopedia s. v. 
 
 441. J. E. s. V. 
 
 431, 442. See Zimmels, "Leo He- 
 braeus, ein jiidischer Philosoph der 
 Renaissance," Leipzig, 1886; Appel, 
 "Leone Medigos Lehre vom Wei tall 
 und ihr Verhaltniss zu griechischen 
 
 und zeitgenossischen Anschauungen," 
 in Archiv fiir Geschichte der Phil- 
 osophie, vol. XX, pp. 387-400, 496- 
 520; Munk, Melanges, pp. 522-528. 
 
 443. Husik, "Judah Messer Leon's 
 Commentary on the Vetus Logica," 
 Ley den, 1906. 
 
 444. Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v. 
 
LIST OF BIBLICAL AND RABBINIC QUOTATIONS 
 
 Bible 
 
 Genesis: i, i, p. no; i, 2, p. 118; 
 I, 3, p. 120; I, 6, p. 118; I, 9, p. 121; 
 
 1, II, p. 121; I, 21, p. 121; I, 25, p. 
 121; I, 26, pp. 121, 268; I, 27, pp. 94, 
 121; I, 28, p. 121; 2, 7, p. 121, 214; 
 
 2, 19, p. 121; 6, 6, p. 227; 8, 21, p. 
 102; II, 7, p. 268; 14, 22, p. 369; 
 ch. 15, p. 280; 15, 4, p. 280; 15, 12 &., 
 p. 225; 18, 10, p. 340; 27, 34-41, p. 
 74; 28, 13, p. 94; 28, 20, p. 105; s6, 
 
 31, P- 295- 
 
 Exodus: 2, 13, p. 232; 2, 17, p. 
 232; 3, 14, P- 95; 5, 2, p. 160; 
 7, 3, pp. xiv, 42; 9, 12, p. 74; 
 15, 26, p. 403; 20, 2, pp. 194, 233; 
 20, 11-12, p. 233; 20, 17, p. 83; 20, 
 35, P- 409; 22, 26, p. 74; 23, 21, p. 
 109; 24, 10, p. 167; 32, II, P- 381; 
 33, 13, P- 243; 33, 23, p. 37; 34, 6, 
 P- 233. 
 
 Leviticus: 19, 17, p. 83; 19, 18, 
 p. 83. 
 
 Numbers: 10, 8, p. 227; 12, 8, 
 p. 167; IS, 39, p. 83; 23, 10, p. 170. 
 
 Deuteronomy: 2, 30, p. xiv; 4, 
 15, PP- 35, 95; 4, 39, PP- 84, IIS, 220; 
 6, 4, P- 74; 13, I, PP- 382, 423; 15, 7, 
 p. 83; 17, IS, p. 29s; 30, 15, P- 286; 
 
 12, p. 208; 40, 26, p. 369; 43, I, p. 
 122; 43, 7, p. 121; 45, 18, p. 104; 59, 
 19, p. 109. 
 
 Jeremiah: 7, 22, p. 234; 9, 22-23, 
 pp. 124, 148, 205, 299; 18, I ff., p. 
 
 207:31, 33, P- 141- 
 
 Ezekiel: 8, 9, p. 109. 
 
 Hosea: 4, 6, p. 348; 6, 3, p. 141. 
 
 Amos: 3, 2, p. 164; 5, 6, p. 141. 
 
 Micah: 6, 8, p. 168. 
 
 Zephaniah: 2, 3, p. 148. 
 
 Malachi: I, 9, p. 41. 
 
 Psalms: 19, p. 216; 19, 2, p. 
 193; 19, 7, P- 193; 19, 8, p. 411; 
 19, 9-10, p. 412; 73, 11-13, p. 293; 
 94, 9, P- 293; 136, 6, p. 176; 139, 
 p. 205; 14s, 9, p. 376. 
 
 Proverbs: 8, 22, p. 109; 25, 16, 
 p. 244; 30, 4, p. 208. 
 
 Job: 10, 10, p. 378; 19, 26, p. 116; 
 23, 13, P- xxvi; ch. 32, p. 349; 38, 
 36-37, p. 208. 
 
 ECCLESIASTES: I, I4, p. 47; 2, 3, 
 p. 47. 
 
 Daniel: 7, i, p. 225; 10, 8, p. 278; 
 10, 17, p. 381; 12, 2, p. 404. 
 Nehemiah: 9, 5, p. 95. 
 
 Mishna and Talmud 
 Berakot (Bab. Tal.): 17 a, p. 44; 
 
 30, 19, pp. xiv, 41, 286; 3 1, 1 7, p. 348; 33 b, p. xxvi, note 14, p. 41. 
 
 33, 4, P- 41; 34, 10, p. 416. 
 Joshua: ch. 10, p. 360. 
 
 I. Samuel: 2, 6, p. 386; 19, 20, 
 p. 226. 
 
 II. Samuel: 23, 2, p. 34. 
 I. Kings: 22, 20, p. xiv. 
 Isaiah: i, 14, p. 227; i, 11-17, p. 408; 106 b, p. 83. 
 
 p. 82; 5, 20, p. 374; 6, I, 8, p. 280; Makkot: 23 b, p. 416. 
 
 II, 1-4, p. 112; 26, 19, p. 386; 40, Abot: ch. 4, p. 44. 
 
 449 
 
 Berakot (Jer. Tal.): I, p. 83. 
 Pesaktm: 54 a, p. xxvi, note 17. 
 Megillah: 25 b, p. xxvi, note 15. 
 Hagigah: ch. 2, p. 244; 11 b, p. 
 xvi, notes 2 and 3. 
 
 Sanhedrin: 38 b, p. 268; 99 a, 
 
INDEX 
 
 Aaron ben Elijah, xli, 362-387; 
 relation to Maimonides, 363 f.; to 
 the Mu'tazila, 364; reason and 
 faith, 364 f.; physics, 366 ff.; 
 defends atomic theory, 367 f.; 
 creation, ibid.; existence of God, 
 368 f.; unity, ibid.; incorporeality, 
 ibid.; attributes, 369 f.; wiU of 
 God, 372; problem of evil, 373 f., 
 376 f.; Providence, 375 f.; reward 
 and punishment, 379, 383; pur- 
 pose of the world and of man, 
 379 f.; prophecy, 380 f.; immu- 
 tability of the Law, 382; reason of 
 the commandments, ibid.; im- 
 mortality, 384; resurrection, 385 f. 
 
 Aaron ben Joseph, 363 
 
 Abarbanel, Don Isaac, 304, 312, 328, 
 430 
 
 Abarbanel, Judah Leo, 431 
 
 Abd Al Rahman III, 59 
 
 Abelard, 305 
 
 Abraham bar Hiyya, xlvi, 114-124; 
 standpoint, 115; physics, 116 f.; 
 matter, ibid.; form, 117 ff.; intel- 
 lect, soul and nature, 119; ethics, 
 119, 122 f.; reward and punish- 
 ment, 119, 122 ff.; immortality, 
 120 f.; problem of evil, 123 f.; 128, 
 
 139, 17s, 309, 435 
 i^lsculapius, 155 
 Afer, Constantinus, i 
 Aher, 197 
 Akiba, Rabbi, xxvi 
 Al-Ashari, xxiii 
 Albalag, Isaac, 328, 429, 430, 447, 
 
 note 403a 
 
 Albalia, Barun, 151 
 
 Al Basir, Joseph, xxv, xlvii, 48-55; 
 priority of reason, 48; atomic 
 theory, 49; existence of God, 49 f.; 
 creation, ibid.; attributes, 50; 
 divine will, ibid.; eternity, 51; 
 incorporeahty, unity, simplicity, 
 ibid, f.; God's word, 52; ethics, 
 ibid, f.; problem of evil, 54; 
 freedom, 54 f.; and foreknowledge, 
 ibid.; reward and punishment, 55; 
 56, 57, 81, 126, 127, 128, 141, 146, 
 200, 246, 363, 434 
 
 Albertus Magnus, i, 200, 306, 312, 
 
 Albo, Joseph, 1, 406-427; standpoint, 
 406 ff.; purpose of his work, 408; 
 principles of rehgion, ibid.; crit- 
 icism of Maimonides's 13 articles, 
 409 ff.; Albo's own view, 410 f.; 
 divine law distinguished from 
 natural and conventional, 408 ff.; 
 freedom, a principle, 41 2 ; creation, 
 413, 415; existence of God, 419 f.; 
 attributes, 420; angels, ibid.; 
 revelation, 420 f.; prophecy, 421; 
 immutability of the Law, 423; 
 God's knowledge, 424; and hu- 
 man freedom, ibid.; Providence, 
 425; reward and punishment, 
 42s f.; 428, 430, 436, 447, note 
 403a 
 
 Alexander of Aphrodisias, xviii, 7, 
 60, 290, 313, 321, 332, 334, 335, 
 336 
 
 Alexander the Great, xvii 
 
 Alexander of Hales, 306 
 
 451 
 
452 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Alfadhil, 239 
 
 Alfarabi, xx, xxi, xxxix, xlvi, 2, 26, 
 
 60, 177, 178, 198, 199, 218, 223, 
 
 252, 253, 276, 281, 302, 312, 313, 
 
 362, 391, 392 
 Alfasi, 151 
 Algazali, xxxix, 80, 152, 153, 389, 
 
 392, 420, 443, note 230 
 Ali, 86 
 
 Al-Kirkisani, Joseph Ha-Maor, 363 
 Almohades, 238 
 Alphonso VI, 151 
 Al-Mansur, i 
 Almoravid, 151 
 Anatoli, Jacob, 302, 309 
 Angels, xlvi; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 
 
 190 f.; in Ibn Daud, 221 f.; in 
 
 Maimonides, 266 f.; in Albo, 420 
 Anthropomorphism, xxii, xxvi, xlv, 
 
 35, 95, 186, 260 f. 
 Appel, 448, note 442 
 Aquinas, Thomas, 1,61,63, 200, 207, 
 
 306, 307, 312, 313, 323, 331, 332, 
 
 406 
 Arama, Isaac, 430 
 Archimedes, xviii 
 AristoteUans, xl, 150, 165, 246, 364, 
 
 365, 366, 368, 428 
 Aristotle, xvi, xviii, xix, xx, xxi, 
 
 xxix ff., xxxvii, xxxix, xl, xU, xlii, 
 
 xlv, xlvi, 7, 8, 9, 13, 20, 26, 60, 62, 
 
 64, 72, 89, 92, 107, III, 126, 132, 
 
 138, 139, 155, 157, 173, 175, 177, 
 178, 179, 181, 182, 184, 185, 199, 
 200, 206, 207, 210, 213, 216, 217, 
 218, 236, 240, 247, 252, 253, 254, 
 256, 258, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 
 271, 273, 274, 275, 276, 290, 291, 
 299, 300, 303, 305, 306, 307, 309, 
 312, 313, 315, 316, 321, 329, 331, 
 332, 333, 334, 338, 346, 347, 35°, 
 352, 353, 354, 366, 367, 375, 378, 
 388, 389, 390, 395, 402, 408, 412, 
 425, 429, 430, 431 
 
 "Arugat Habosem," 184 
 
 Ashariya, xxiii, xxvii, xlvii, 23, 246, 
 251, 291, 362, 36s, 372, 378, 379 
 
 Atomic theory, in the Kalam, xxii, 
 249 f.; in Saadia, 25; in Al Basir, 
 49; in Jeshua ben Judah, 56; in 
 Aaron ben Elijah, 367 f. 
 
 Attributes, doctrine of, in the Kalam, 
 xxiii, xxvii, xl, xHv; in Saadia, 
 xhv, 2)3 f-; in Mukammas, 18 ff.; 
 in Al Basir, 50; in Bahya, 93 f.; 
 in Ibn Zaddik, 145 f.; in Judah 
 Halevi, 161 ff.; in Ibn Daud, 220 
 f.; in Maimonides, xlv, 262 ff.; in 
 Levi ben Gerson, xlv, 344 f., 351 f.; 
 in Aaron ben EUjah, 369 f.; in 
 Crescas, 391 f.; in Albo, 420 
 
 Auerbach, Heimann, 445, note 331a 
 
 Augustine, xH, 51, 305, 445, note 307 
 
 Averroes (Ibn Roshd), xx, xxi, xxxix, 
 xli, xlvi, xlvii, 7, 60, 62, 125, 177, 
 199, 306, 309, 310, 312, 313, 318, 
 321, 322, 323, 329, 332, 334, 335, 
 336, 362, 392, 431 
 
 Avicebron, see Gabirol, Solomon 
 Ibn 
 
 Avicenna (Ibn Sina), xx, xxi, xxxix, 
 xlvi, 2, 26, 60, 62, 107, 108, 175, 
 177, 178, 179, 198, 199, 207, 210, 
 211, 213, 218, 223, 224, 253, 276, 
 281, 302, 312, 313, 362, 391, 392, 
 420 
 
 Bacher, W., 437, 443, notes 212 and 
 214; 445, note 312a 
 
 Back, Samuel, 436 
 
 Baeumker, Clemens, 440, note 84; 
 441, notes 86 and 89 
 
 Bahya, Ibn Pakuda, xix, xxviii, 
 xxxix, xlii, 1, 80-105; duties of the 
 limbs and duties of the heart, 
 82 f.; sources of knowledge, 83; 
 creation, 86 ff.; unity, 89 f.; attri- 
 butes, 93 f.; study of nature, 96 f.; 
 
INDEX 
 
 453 
 
 gratitude to God, 97 f.; submis- 
 sion to God, 98; freedom, ibid.; 
 the laws, 98 f.; trust in God, 99 f.; 
 "vmity of conduct," loi f.; humil- 
 ity, ibid.; repentance, 102; self- 
 examination, 103; temperance, 
 104; asceticism, ibid.; love of 
 God, 105; 106, 126, 128, 146, 147, 
 162, 167, 168, 195, 200, 201, 217, 
 241, 246, 252, 309, 362, 428, 434 
 
 Baradaeus, Jacob, 34 
 
 Bardenhewer, 439, note 7 
 
 Bardesanes, 375 
 
 Becker, C. H., xxvi, xxvii 
 
 Beer, 433 
 
 Bernfeld, Simon, viii, 433 
 
 Bisliches, M. L., 445, notes 312 and 
 
 315 
 Bloch, Philipp, 436 
 Brahmins, 380 
 Brethren of Purity, xxxix, 60, 107, 
 
 125, 126, 128, 139, 187, 199 
 Broyde, Isaac, 106, 441, note 131 
 
 Cicero, 431 
 
 Clement VI, Pope, 329 
 
 Clement of Alexandria, 302 
 
 Chazars, 153 
 
 Crawford, J. P. W., 436 
 
 Creation, in Kalam, xxii, xlii, 24, 
 247, 252; in Saadia, xlii, 24; in 
 IsraeK, 5 ff.; in Al Basir, 49 f.; in 
 Jeshua ben Judah, 56; in Gabirol, 
 68; in Bahya, xlii, 86 ff.; in Pseudo 
 Bahya, no; in Abraham bar 
 Hiyya, 116 ff.; in Ibn Zaddik, 
 xlii, 143; in Judah Halevi, 157; in 
 Abraham ibn Ezra, 190; in 
 Maimonides, 269 ff.; in Levi ben 
 Gerson, 352 f.; in Aaron ben 
 Elijah, 367 f.; in Albo, 413, 415 
 
 Creed, articles of, 1; in Maimonides, 
 409 f.; in Crescas, 392 ff.; in 
 Albo, 410 f. 
 
 Creizenach, M., 443, note 214 
 Crescas, Hasdai, xv, xix, xxvii, 
 xxxix, xl, xlii, xlix, 1, 173, 200, 312, 
 388-405; standpoint, 389; exist- 
 ence of God, 389 f.; imity, 391 
 f.; attributes, ibid.; fundamental 
 dogmas of Judaism, 392 ff.; God's 
 knowledge, 392 f.; Providence, 
 393 f.; problem of evil, 394; 
 prophecy, 395; freedom, 396 f.; 
 influence on Spinoza, 398 f.; pur- 
 pose of the Law, 399 f . ; immortal- 
 ity, 400; creation, 402; criticism of 
 Maimonides's 13 articles of the 
 creed, 402, 404; reward and pun- 
 ishment, 403 f.; resurrection, 404 
 f.; 406, 407, 408, 409, 414, 416, 
 419, 420, 421, 424, 426, 428, 430, 
 436, 447, notes 403a and 409 
 'Cusari," see "Kusari" 
 
 Daud, Abraham Ibn, xix, xx, xxvii, 
 xxxix, xlii, xliii, xlv, xlvi, xlvii, 
 xlviii, xlix, 61, 62, 62>, 71, 79, 125, 
 166, 197-235; standpoint, 197 f.; 
 Ibn Daud neglected, 201 ; purpose 
 of his book, 201 f.; duty to study 
 philosophy, 202; relative value of 
 the sciences, 203 f.; categories, 
 205; physics, 205 ff.; matter and 
 form, ibid.; motion, 207; infinity, 
 208; psychology, 209 ff.; rational 
 soul, 212 ff.; the three kinds of 
 intellect, 214; immortality, 215; 
 metempsychosis, 215 f.; the heav- 
 enly spheres, 216; existence of 
 God, 217 ff.; incorporeality, 217; 
 luiity, 219 f.; attributes, 220 f.; 
 angels, 221 f.; active intellect, 222; 
 emanation of Intelligences, 223; 
 tradition, 223 f.; prophecy, 224 f.; 
 abrogation of the Law, 226 f.; 
 freedom, 201 f., 229 ff.; problem of 
 evil, 228 f.; and foreknowledge, 
 
454 
 
 INDEX 
 
 229 f.; ethics, 231 £f.; virtues, 232; 
 reason of commandments, 233 f.* 
 237, 240, 241, 246, 248, 253, 254, 
 257, 266, 267, 276, 281, 302, 307, 
 309, 317, 332, 350, 362, 366, 388, 
 428, 435 
 
 De Boer, 439, note 5 
 
 "Definitions, Book of," 2, 4, 60 
 
 Deinard, E., 447, note 404 
 
 Delitzsch, 446, note 360 
 
 Delmedigo, Elijah, 431 
 
 Delmedigo, Joseph Solomon, 431 
 
 Democritus, xxii, 3 
 
 Dieterici, 439, note 6 
 
 Doctor, Max, 435, 442, note 162 
 
 Dominicus Gundissalinus, 61, 63 
 
 Dukes, 443, note 213 
 
 Dunash ben Labrat, 59 
 
 Duns Scotus, 61, 63, 200, 307 
 
 Duran, Simon, 406, 447, note 403a 
 
 "Duties of the Hearts," 80, 81 
 
 Duval, 439, note 5 
 
 "Eight Chapters," 239 
 
 Eisler, Moritz, 433 
 
 "Elements, Book of," 2, 3, 4, 10, 60 
 
 Elias of Nisibis, 34 
 
 EHsha ben Abuya, 197 
 
 Empedocles, 60, 61, 64, 126, 127, 
 145, 179, 184 
 
 "Emunah Ramah," 198 
 
 "Emunot ve-Deot," 24 
 
 Engelkemper, D. J., 434 
 
 Entelechy, xxxv, 209 
 
 Ephodi, 328 
 
 Epicurus, 290, 367 
 
 Eriugena, 200 
 
 Ethics, in Jewish Philosophy, xlvii, 
 f.; in Saadia, 46 f.; in Al Basir, 
 52 f.; in Jeshua ben Judah, 57; 
 in Gabirol, 71 £f.; in Abraham bar 
 Hiyya, 119 ff.; in Ibn Zaddik, 148; 
 in Judah Halevi, 168; in Abraham 
 ibn Ezra, 195; in Ibn Daud, 228 
 
 ff., 231 ff.; in Maimonides, 281 
 ff.; in Hillel ben Samuel, 325. See 
 also "Virtue." 
 
 Euclid, xviii, 90 
 
 Evil, Problem of, in AI Basir, 54; in 
 Abraham bar Hiyya, 123 f.; in 
 Ibn Zaddik, 148; in Abraham ibn 
 Ezra, 19s; in Ibn Daud, 228 f.; 
 in Maimonides, 288 f.; in Aaron 
 ben Elijah, 373 f.; in Crescas, 394 
 
 Exegesis, Biblical, xvi, xxxvii; in 
 Saadia, 35; in Gabirol, 78 f.; in 
 Abraham ibn Ezra, 187 f.; in 
 Maimonides, 302 ff.; in Levi ben 
 Gerson, 3S7f.;437 
 
 "Ez Hayim," 363 
 
 Ezekiel, Vision of divine chariot, 
 xvii, 303 
 
 Falaquera, Shem Tob, 61, 63, 64, 
 309, 328, 441, note 86 
 
 "Pons Vitae," 60, 61, 72, 80, etc. 
 
 "Fountain of Life," see "Pons 
 Vitffi" 
 
 Frankl, P. P., 434, 440, note 80 
 
 Prankl-Griin, Ad., 435 
 
 Freedom of the Will, xiv, xlvii; in 
 Saadia, 41 f.; in Al Basir, 54 f.; 
 in Bahya, 98; in Judah Halevi, 
 xlviii, 171 ff.; in Abraham ibn 
 Ezra, 193; in Ibn Daud, xlviii, 
 229 f.; in Maimonides, xlviii, 285 
 ff.; in Crescas, xlviii, 396 ff.; in 
 Albo, 412, 424 
 
 Freimann, 442, note 148 
 
 Pried, S., 439, note 30; 440, note 34 
 
 Priedlander, M., 444, note 250 
 
 Gabirol, Solomon Ibn, xix, xxxix, 
 xM, 59-79; fate of G. in Jewish 
 Literature, 60 f.; tendency of his 
 work, 63 f.; G. a Neo-Platonist, 
 64; his doctrine, 64 ff.; emanation, 
 65; matter in spiritual substances, 
 
INDEX 
 
 455 
 
 65,67; man typical of the universe, 
 65; Intelligence, Soul, Nature, 66; 
 matter, 66 f.; creation, 68; will, 
 68 f., 70; mystic knowledge, 69 f.; 
 ethics, 71 ff.; the virtues, 72 f.; 
 the "Royal Crown" (Keter Mal- 
 kut), 75 f.; Bibhcal exegesis, 78 f.; 
 influence on Jewish Philosophy, 79; 
 on Kabbala, ibid.; 80, 81, 89, 91, 
 107, 126, 127, 131, 151, 184, 185, 
 187, 188, 198, 200, 206, 237, 246, 
 307, 309, 328, 428, 434 
 Galen, xviii, 2, 3, 72, 209, 252 
 Genesis, creation story, xvii, xxix, 
 
 303 
 
 Gersonides, see Levi ben Gerson 
 
 Ginzberg, L., 439, note 13 
 
 God, in Aristotle, xxxiii; existence of 
 G. in Kalam, xlii, 24, 247; in 
 Saadia, xlii, 28 £f.; in Al Basir, 
 49 f.; in Jeshua ben Judah, 57; in 
 Bahya, xlii, 86 ff.; in Ibn Zaddik, 
 xlii, 143; in Ibn Daud, xlii f., 
 217 ff.; in Maimonides, xliii, 248, 
 257 ff.; in Levi ben Gerson, 350 f.; 
 in Aaron ben Elijah, 368 f.; in 
 Crescas, 389 ff.; in Albo, 419 f. 
 
 Goldenthal, 445, note 318 
 
 Goldziher, Ignaz, 106, 433, 439, 
 notes 10 and 23; 442, note 132 
 
 Gorfinkle, Joseph I., 444, note 251 
 
 Graetz, H., 445, note 311 
 
 Graf, 44c, note 64 
 
 Gugenheimer, 435 
 
 " Guide of the Perplexed," 239 
 
 Guttmann, Jacob, 434, 435, 436, 
 439, note 27; 440, notes 2>i, 41 and 
 83; 442, note 133; 443, notes 230 
 and 245; 445, notes 310 and 331a; 
 447, notes 403a, 436 and 437 
 
 Guttmann, Julius, 435 
 
 Halevi, Judah, xix, xxxix, xl, xlv, 
 xlvi, xlviii, xlix, 125, 150-183; his 
 
 standpoint, 150, 152, 157 f.; his 
 life, 151 f.; philosophy and reli- 
 gion, 152; influence of Algazali, 
 152 f.; the "Kusari," 153 ff.; the 
 "philosopher's" creed, 154 f.; 
 the Christian's, 155 f.; the Mo- 
 hammedan's, 156; the Jew's, 156 
 ff.; creation, 157; existence of 
 God, 158; wiU, 159; motives of 
 philosopher and beUever, 159 f.; 
 meaning of the name of "Jhvh," 
 159 f., 165; of "Elohim," 160, 
 165; mysticism in H., 160; attri- 
 butes, 161 ff.; incorporeality, 162; 
 superiority of Israel, 162 f.; need 
 of revelation, 163; superiority of 
 Palestine, 164; Israel the heart 
 among the nations, 164; superior- 
 ity of the Hebrew language, 164 f. ; 
 prophecy, 165 f.; the active Intel- 
 lect, 165 f.; the ceremonial law, 
 167 f.; ethics, 168 f.; immortahty, 
 169 f., 181 f.; future world and 
 reward and punishment, 170; 
 freedom, 171 ff.; and foreknowl- 
 edge, 172 f.; interpretation of 
 "Sefer Yezirah," 173 f.; the Rab- 
 bis knew the sciences, 174; exposi- 
 tion of the current philosophy, 
 i74ff.; H. understands Aristotle's 
 definition of the soul, 175; physics, 
 
 175 ff.; matter, 175; criticism, 
 
 176 f.; emanation of Intelligences, 
 178; criticism, 178 f.; psychology, 
 179 f.; criticism, 181 f.; 197, 198, 
 200, 201, 210, 211, 216, 223, 224, 
 226, 230, 231, 246, 248, 281, 309, 
 332, 362, 389, 392, 396, 414, 420, 
 421, 426, 429, 435 
 
 Harizi, Judah, 125, 184 
 Harkavy, Abraham, 17, 433 
 Hasdai Ibn Shaprut, 59, 153, 308 
 Hayyuj, 187, 309 
 Hefez ben YazHah, 84 
 
456 
 
 INDEX 
 
 "Hegyon ha-Nefesh," 114 
 
 Hermes, 60, 155, 184 
 
 Hertz, J. H., 434 
 
 Hillel ben Samuel, xlvi, 312-327; 
 standpoint, 314; the soul, 314 £f.; 
 definition of soul, 317; active 
 intellect, 317 fif.; reward and pun- 
 ishment, 323 ff.; prophecy, 325; 
 ethics, ibid.; resurrection, 326; 
 interpretation of Rabbinic writ- 
 ings, 326 f., 332 
 
 Hippocrates, xviii, 2, 3, 72, 209 
 
 Hirschfeld, 440, note 31; 442, note 
 178 
 
 "Hobot ha-Lebabot," see "Duties 
 of the Hearts" 
 
 Homonym, 240, 351, 371 
 
 Horovitz, S., 433, 442, notes 162, 
 163 and 165; 443, note 226 
 
 Husik, Isaac, 436, 439, note 9; 445, 
 note 308; 446, note 334; 448, 
 note 443 
 
 Hj^ostasis, xxxviii, 6, 91, 115 
 
 Ibn Aknin, Joseph, 302 
 
 Ibn Badja, 60 
 
 Ibn Caspi, Joseph, 302, 310, 329 
 
 Ibn Daud (Aven Death), 61 
 
 Idn Daud, Abraham, see Daud, 
 
 Abraham Ibn 
 Ibn Ezra, Abraham, xxxix, 79, 80, 
 81, 114, 184, 187-196; Bibhcal 
 exegesis, 187 f.; unity of God, 189; 
 in corporeality, ibid.; creation, 190; 
 matter, ibid.; the universe, 190 f.; 
 Intelligences, ibid.; angels, ibid.; 
 soul, 191 f.; reward and punish- 
 ment, 192; transmigration, 192; 
 freedom, 193; and foreknowledge, 
 ibid.; knowledge of God, 193 f.; 
 prophecy, 194; classification of 
 the laws, 194; problem of evil, 
 19s; ethics, ibid.; 200, 246, 309, 
 310, 429, 435 
 
 Ibn Ezra, Moses, xxxix, xlvi, 79, 125, 
 184-187; man a microcosm, 185; 
 definition of philosophy, 185; 
 unity of God, ibid.; active intel- 
 lect, 186; 200, 246 
 
 Ibn Migash, Joseph, 151 
 
 Ibn Janah, 84, 309 
 
 Ibn Roshd, see Averroes 
 
 Ibn Sina, see Avicenna 
 
 Ibn Zaddik, Joseph, xix, xxxix, 
 xlii, xlv, xlvi, xlix, 60, 79, 125- 
 149; standpoint, 125 f.; division of 
 his book, 128; purpose, 129; 
 definition of philosophy, 129; 
 process and sources of knowl- 
 edge, 129 f.; physics, 130 ff.; 
 matter and form, ibid. ; substance, 
 131; the sphere, 131 f.; the four 
 elements, 132 f.; the human body, 
 133 f.; the soul, 134 f.; the three 
 souls, ibid.; the emotions, ibid.; 
 life, 136; death, ibid.; sleep and 
 waking, ibid.; the rational soul, 
 137; definition of soul, 138; in- 
 tellect, 139; world soul, 140; duty 
 to use the reason, ibid.; criticism 
 of the Kalam, 141 f.; creation, 
 143; existence of God, ibid.; 
 unity, ibid.; self-sufficiency, 144; 
 wiU of God, ibid.; attributes, 145 
 f.; commandments, 147; rational 
 and traditional, ibid. ; the virtues, 
 148; reward and punishment, 148; 
 evil, 148 f.; Messiah, 149; 162, 175, 
 184, 200, 206, 209; 211, 237, 246, 
 
 309,317,362,435 
 
 'Ikkarim," 406 
 
 Immortality, in Pseudo-Bahya, 112 
 f.; in Abraham bar Hiyya, 120 f.; 
 in Judah Halevi, 169 f., 181 f. ; 
 in Ibn Daud, 215; in Levi ben 
 Gerson, 339 ff.; in Aaron ben 
 Elijah, 384; in Crescas, 400 
 
 Incorporeahty, in Kalam, xliv, 253; 
 
INDEX 
 
 457 
 
 in Saadia, 32; in Al Basir, 51; in 
 Jeshua ben Judah, 57; in Judah 
 Halevi, 162; in Abraham ibn 
 Ezra, 189 f.; in Ibn Daud, 217; 
 in Maimonides, xliv, 257 ff., 260 
 flf.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 368 f. 
 
 Infinity, in Kalam, 251 f.; in Saadia, 
 25, 30; in Bahya, 86, 87; in Ibn 
 Daud, 208; in Maimonides, 251 f., 
 254, 256 f.; in Crescas, 390 
 
 Intellect, active, xli; in Jewish 
 Philosophy, xlvi f.; acquired i., 
 xlvii; active i. in prophecy, xlix, 
 109; in Ibn Zaddik, 139; in Judah 
 Halevi, 155, 162, 165, 181; in 
 Moses ibn Ezra, 186; in Ibn 
 Daud, 222; in Maimonides, 268, 
 277; in Hillel ben Samuel, 317 ff.; 
 in Levi ben Gerson, 337 £f. See 
 also "Intelligence," "Soul" 
 
 Intelligence, xlvi; in Israeli, 6 f.; in 
 Gabirol, 65, 66; in Pseudo-Bahya, 
 109; in Abraham bar Hiyya, 119; 
 in Abraham ibn Ezra, 190 f.; in 
 Maimonides, 266 f. 
 
 Israeli, Isaac, xix, xlvi, xlix, 1-16; 
 Maimonides on I., i f.; his works, 
 2; his sources, ibid.; theory of 
 the elements, 3, 12; definition of 
 philosophy, 4; creation, 5 ff.; 
 Intelhgence, 6 f.; Soul, 8 ff.; three 
 kinds of soul, 10 ff.; element and 
 principle, 12 f.; prophecy, 15; 17, 
 24, 31, 60, 72, 91, 127, 175, 224, 
 434 
 
 Jabariya, xxi, xlvii 
 
 Jacob ben Machir, 309, 310 
 
 Jacobites, xviii, 34 
 
 Jaulus, 437 
 
 Jeshua ben Judah, xxv, xlvii, 55-58; 
 priority of reason, 56; atomic 
 theory, ibid.; creation, ibid.; exist- 
 ence of God, 57; incorporeality. 
 
 ibid.; good and evil, ibid.; 200, 
 
 246, 363, 434 
 Jesus, xxvii, 86, 91 
 Job, XV, xxvi, 304, 346, 377 f. 
 Joel, M., 398, 435, 436, 445, note 
 
 310; 446, notes 335 and 398; 447, 
 
 note 398 end 
 Johannes Hispanus, 61 
 Joseph ben Shemtob, 429, 430, 447, 
 
 note 404 
 Joseph ibn Zaddik, see Ibn Zaddik, 
 
 Joseph 
 Jourdain, A., 63, 441, note 85; 
 
 445, note 306 
 Judah ben Barzilai, 17 
 Judah Hadassi, 363 
 Judah Halevi, see Halevi, Judah 
 Judah Messer Leon, 431 
 Justinian, xvii 
 
 Kabbala, 79, 429, 430 
 Kadariya, xxi, xxii, xxiii, 23 
 Kalam, xxiv, xxvii, 16, 17, 48, 50, 52, 
 55, 86, 106, 125, 128, 141 f., 146, 
 154, 171, 183, 200, 245, 246 ff., 
 
 362, 366, 428, 433, 439, note 
 10 
 
 Kalisch, Isidor, 433 
 
 Karaites, xiii, xxiv, xxv, xli, xlvii, 23, 
 24, 48, 55, 59, 108, 125, 126, 146, 
 154, 174, 183, 200, 245, 246, 362, 
 
 363, 364, 365, 370, 2>7S, 377, 378, 
 428 
 
 Kaufmann, David, 152, 153, 433, 
 434, 435, 436, 441, note 88; 442, 
 note 181; 444, notes 250 and 305 
 
 Kellermann, Benzion, 436 
 
 "Keter Malkut," see "Royal 
 Crown" 
 
 Kindi, Al, xxxix 
 
 Klein, Miksa, 434 
 
 Knowledge, sources of, xl; in Saadia, 
 27 f.; in Bahya, 83; in Ibn Zaddik, 
 129 f. 
 
4S8 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Koran, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxvi, xxvii, 
 
 xxix, xliv, 34, 156 
 Krochmal, Nahman, 189, 435 
 "Kusari," 153 
 
 Lactantius, 431 
 
 Landauer, S., 175, 440, note 37 
 
 Laws, rational and traditional, 1; in 
 Saadia, T)?> f.; in Ibn Zaddik, 147; 
 in Abraham ibn Ezra, 194; in Ibn 
 Daud, 233 f.; in Maimonides, 294 
 £f . ; in Aaron ben Elijah, 382 
 
 Lebid ibn Al-A'sam, xxvi 
 
 Leibnitz, 307 
 
 Leverrier, 275 
 
 Levi ben Gerson, xix, xx, xxxix, xli, 
 xliii, xlvii, xlix, 7, 16, 166, 217, 
 235, 302, 312, 313, 328-361; 
 standpoint, 329 f.; reason and 
 authority, 330 f.; his style and 
 method, 331 ; the passive intellect, 
 332 ff.; active intellect, 337 ff.; 
 problem of knowledge, 338; of 
 definition, 339; immortality, 339 
 f.; prognostication and prophecy, 
 340 flf.; and the contingent, ibid.; 
 God's knowledge, 342 flf.; attri- 
 butes, 344 f., 351 f.; Providence, 
 346 fl.; existence of God, 350 f.; 
 origin of the world, 352 f.; eter- 
 nal matter, 355 f.; interpretation 
 of creation story in Genesis, 357; 
 miracles, 358 f. ; 362, 363, 369, 384, 
 388, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 398, 
 399, 401, 402, 406, 419, 420, 421, 
 428, 429, 430, 436, 447, note 403a 
 
 Levy, Louis-Germain, 436 
 
 "Liber de Causis," xx, 2, 64, 317 
 
 Lippmann, 443, note 214 
 
 Logos, xxvii, xH, 52, 71, 91 
 
 "Ma'amar Yikkawu ha-Mayim," 
 
 309 
 "Maase Bereshit," xvi, 242, 303, 
 
 430 
 
 "Maase Merkaba," xvi, 242, 303, 
 430 
 
 Maimonides, Moses, xvi, xix, xx, 
 xxiv, XXV, xxvii, xxxix, xh, xlii, 
 xliii, xlv, xlvi, xlvii, xlix, 1, i, 2, 16, 
 25, 60, 62, 63, 79, 88, 95, 96, 114, 
 125, 126, 146, 153, 158, 166, 167, 
 198, 199, 200, 201, 207, 218, 221, 
 235, 236-311; his life, 238 f.; his 
 chef d'ceuvre, 239 f.; his method, 
 240; his standpoint, 240 ff.; im- 
 portance of science, 243 f.; dif- 
 ficulty of metaphysics, 244 f.; 
 sketch of Jewish Philosophy, 
 
 245 f.; exposition of the Kalam, 
 
 246 ff. ; propositions of the "philos- 
 ophers," 254 ff.; existence of God, 
 257 ff.; unity, ibid.; incorporeality, 
 ibid., 260 flf.; attributes, 262 ff.; 
 meaning of "Jhvh," 265; angels, 
 266 f . ; origin of the world, 269 ff. ; 
 emanation of Intelligences, 272 f.; 
 criticism of Aristotle, 271 ff.; 
 psychology, 281 ff.; virtue, 282 ff.; 
 freedom, 285 ff.; and foreknowl- 
 edge, 287 f.; problem of evil, 
 288 ff.; God's knowledge, 289 ff.; 
 reason of the commandments, 
 294 ff.; Bible exegesis, 302 ff.; 
 influence of M., 305 ff.; on 
 Scholasticism, 305-307; on Ju- 
 daism, 307-311; 312, 313, 314, 
 317, 323, 325, 329, 332, 342, 343, 
 
 344, 345, 346, 350, 352, 353, 357, 
 358, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 368, 
 
 369, 370, 371, 372, 374, 375, 376, 
 377, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384, 
 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 
 395, 396, 398, 399, 400, 402, 403, 
 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 412, 416, 
 417, 419, 420, 421, 423, 424, 425, 
 426, 428, 429, 430, 431, 435, 447, 
 note 403 a 
 " Malmad Hatalmidim," 309 
 
INDEX 
 
 459 
 
 Malter, H., vii, 445, note 316 
 
 Mandonnet, P., 445, note 308; 446, 
 note 332 
 
 Manicheans, 375 
 
 Matter, rejected by Mutakallimun, 
 xrii; doctrine of, in Aristotle, xxix 
 ff.; in Plotinus, xxxviii; as source 
 of evil, 38; in Gabirol, 66 f.; in 
 Pseudo-Bahya, 109; in Abraham 
 bar Hiyya, 117; in Ibn Zaddik, 
 130 fif.; in Judah Halevi, 175; in 
 Abraham ibn Ezra, 190; in Ibn 
 Daud, 205 f.; in Maimonides, 256, 
 270; in Levi ben Gerson, 355 f. 
 
 Maywald, 446, note 332 
 
 "Mekize Nirdamim," 445, notes 313 
 and 321 
 
 " Mekor Hayyim," see " Fons Vitae " 
 
 Menahem ben Saruk, 59 
 
 Messiah, in Saadia, 45; in Ibn Zad- 
 dik, 149; in Crescas, 402, 404; in 
 Albo, 408 
 
 Metempsychosis, see Transmigra- 
 tion 
 
 "Microcosmus," 60, 125 
 
 "Milhamot Adonai," 329 
 
 Miracles, in Levi ben Gerson, 
 358 f. 
 
 Mohammed, xxv, 86 
 
 Monophysites, xviii, 34 
 
 "More Ha-moreh," 310 
 
 "More Nebiikim," 238 
 
 Morgenstern, Erno, 434 
 
 Moses ben Enoch, 59 
 
 Moses ben Maimon, see Maimonides 
 
 Moses of Narbonne, 309, 310, 328, 
 430, 447, note 403a 
 
 Motion, in Aristotle, xxvi; in Ibn 
 Daud, 207; in Maimonides, 254, 
 269 
 
 Mukammas, David Al, 2, 17-22; 
 definition of science and philos- 
 ophy, 17 f.; attributes, 18 ff.; 
 unity, 18; reward and punishment, 
 
 21 f.; 34, 52, 81, 84, 95, 200, 246, 
 434 
 
 Munk, Solomon, 63, 304, 328, 433, 
 434, 440, note 83; 441, notes 86, 
 87 and 105; 444, notes 250, 280 
 and 302; 445, notes 314 and 316; 
 448, note 442 
 
 Miinz, J., 436 
 
 Mutakallimun, xxi f., xl, xli, xlvii, 
 9, II, 24, 25, 26, 48, 81, 88, 96, 
 106, 125, 126, 127, 128, 139, 142, 
 145, 149, 158, 182, 183, 199, 240, 
 246-253; 256, 27s, 352, 353, 
 362, 366 f., 369, 372, 382, 406, 
 428 
 
 Mu'tazila, xxii ff., xxvii, xlvii, 3, 17, 
 21, 23, 24, 26, 48, 108, 171, 246, 
 251, 291, 292, 362, 36s, 366, 375, 
 377 
 
 Nachmanides, 426, 429 
 
 Nature, in Plotinus, xxxviii; in 
 Gabirol, 65, 66; in Pseudo-Bahya, 
 109; in Abraham bar Hi37ya, 119 
 
 Neo-Platonic, xx, xxviii, xxxix, xlvi, 
 2, 6, 13, 24, 38, 64, 79, 81, 86, 89, 
 
 90, 92, 106, 107, 114, 115, 125, 
 126, 127, 129, 138, 139, 177, 178, 
 199, 200, 266, 305, 317, 319 
 
 Neo-Platonism, xxix, 17, 64, 70, 79, 
 
 91, 114, 150, 187, 200, 266, 288, 
 317,428 
 
 Neo-Platonists, xl, 31, 64, 91, 106, 
 
 184, 199 
 Neo-Pythagoreans, 188 
 Nestorians, xvui, 34 
 Neumark, David, viii, 433, 435, 
 
 436, 441, note 107 
 "Nous," xxxviii, 7, 91 
 
 "01am Katon," see "Microcosmus" 
 "Or Adonai," 389 
 Origen, 288, 302 
 Orschansky, G., 435 
 
460 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Perles, J., 445, note 309 
 
 Philo, xvi, xxvii, xxxviii, xli, 23, 91, 
 95, 188, 240, 266, 268, 288, 302 
 
 Philoponus, 247, 353 
 
 Philosophy, and religion, xiii; con- 
 tent of Jewish P., xl-1; defined by 
 IsraeH, 4; by Ibn Zaddik, 129; 
 by Moses Ibn Ezra, 185 
 
 Physics, in Kalam, xxii, xh; in 
 Aristotle, xxx; in Israeli, 3, 5, 12; 
 in Saadia, xH; in Ibn Zaddik, 
 xlii, 130 fif.; in Judah Halevi, 175 
 ff.; in Ibn Daud, xlii, 205 ff.; in 
 Maimonides, xlii, 254 ff., 269 ff.; 
 in Levi ben Gerson, 352 f., 355 f.; 
 in Aaron ben Elijah, xli, 366 ff. ; in 
 Crescas, xlii, 389 
 
 Plato, xxix, xli, xlv, 5, 7, 8, 37, 47, 
 90, 91, 122, 138, iss, 179, 181, 
 182, 184, 195, 231, 268, 269, 288, 
 
 304, 30s, 353, 413, 431 
 
 Plato of Tivoli, 114 
 
 Plotinus, XX, xxxvii f., xxxix, 6, 64, 
 65, 91, 107, IIS, 126, 139, 178, 431 
 
 Pollak, J., 433 
 
 Porphyry, 60 
 
 Proclus, XX, 3 
 
 Prophecy, xlvi, xlix f.; in Israeli, 
 xlix, 15; in Saadia, 40; in Judah 
 Halevi, xlix, 165; in Abraham ibn 
 Ezra, 194; in Ibn Daud, xlix, 
 224 ff.; in Maimonides, xlix, 276 
 ff.; in Hillel ben Samuel, 325; in 
 Levi ben Gerson, xlix, 340 ff.; in 
 Aaron ben EUjah, 380 f.; in 
 Crescas, 395; in Albo, 421 
 
 Providence, xl; in Maimonides, 290 
 ff. ; in Levi ben Gerson, 346 ff . ; in 
 Aaron ben EUjah, 375 f.; in 
 Crescas, 393 f.; in Albo, 425 
 
 Pseudo-Bahya, xlvi, xlix, 106-113; 
 standpoint, 106 f.; the soul, 108 
 ff.. Ill ff.; Intelligence, Soul, 
 Nature, 108 f., no; matter, 109; 
 
 creation, no; virtue, 112; im- 
 mortality, II 2 f . ; reward and pim- 
 ishment, 113; 122, 126, 139, 148, 
 
 317, 434 
 Ptolemy, xviii, 273, 309 
 Pythagoras, 60, 179, 184, 185 
 Pythagoreans, 9 
 
 Rashi, 187 
 
 Raymond, Bishop of Toledo, 61 
 Reason, and authority, xiii; r. in 
 Aristotle, xxxvi; active and pas- 
 sive, xxxvi f.; in Plotinus, xxxviii; 
 r. as a source of knowledge, xl; 
 r. and authority in Levi ben Ger- 
 son, 330 f. See also "Intellect," 
 "Soul" 
 Resurrection, 1; in Saadia, 44 f.; in 
 Hillel ben Samuel, 326; in Aaron 
 ben Elijah, 385 f . ; in Crescas, 404 
 Reward and Pimishment, xlvii, 
 xlviii, 1; in Mukammas, 21 f.; in 
 Saadia, 42 f.; in Al Basir, 55; in 
 Pseudo-Bahya, 113; in Abraham 
 bar Hiyya, 119 ff.; in Ibn Zaddik, 
 148; in Judah Halevi, 170; in 
 Abraham Ibn Ezra, 192; in Hillel 
 ben Samuel, 323 ff.; in Aaron ben 
 EUjah, 379, 383; in Crescas, 403 f.; 
 in Albo, 425 f. 
 RosceUinus of Compiegne, 305 
 Rose, Valentinus, 439, note 8 
 Rosin, David, 189, 192, 435 
 "Royal Crown," the, 75 f. 
 
 Saadia, xix, xxv, xli, xUi, xlv, xlvi, 
 xlix, I, 17, 23-47; his "Emunot 
 ve-Deot," 24 f.; modeUed on the 
 Kalam, ibid.; atomic theory, 25; 
 reason for writing, 26 f.; sources 
 of truth, 27 f.; speculation not 
 forbidden, 28; necessity of revela- 
 tion, ibid.; existence of God, 
 28 ff.; incorporeaUty, 32; imity, 
 
INDEX 
 
 461 
 
 32 f.; attributes, 2,2> ^v categories 
 inapplicable to God, 35 f.; the- 
 ophanies, 36; soul, 37 f.; laws and 
 commandments, 38 f.; rational 
 and traditional, ibid.; prophecy, 
 40; written and oral law, 40; 
 abrogation of Law, 40 f.; freedom, 
 41 f.; and foreknowledge, ibid.; 
 reward and punishment, 42 f., 46; 
 future world, 43 f.; resurrection, 
 44 f.; ethics, 46 f.; 48, 50, 52, 59, 
 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 
 95, 96, 126, 127, 128, 146, 147, 167, 
 17s, 186, 19s, 200, 237, 241, 246, 
 252, 253, 302, 309, 362, 363, 388, 
 428, 434 
 
 Sabeans, 296 
 
 Saladin, 239 
 
 Samuel, 197 
 
 Scahger, 307 
 
 Scheyer, Simon B., 435 
 
 Schmiedl, A., 433 
 
 Schreiner, M., xxv, xxvii, 433, 434, 
 439, notes 12, 16, 18 and 20; 440, 
 note 81 
 
 "SeferHa-Kabbala," 198 
 
 Seyerlen, 62,, 434, 441, note 86 
 
 Shemtob ben Joseph, 430 
 
 Shemtob ben Joseph ibn Shemtob, 
 429 
 
 Socrates, xxix, 155, 184, 185 
 
 Solomon ben Adret, 430 
 
 Solomon ben Yeroham, 363 
 
 Sophists, xxix 
 
 Soul, in Aristotle, xxxv; world soul 
 in Plotinus, xxxviii; s. in Jewish 
 philosophy, xlv f.; world-soul in 
 Jewish Neo-Platonists, xlvi; s. in 
 IsraeU, 5, 8 ff.; in Saadia, 37 f.; 
 in Gabirol, 65, 66; in Pseudo- 
 Bahya, 108 £f.; in Abraham bar 
 Hiyya, 119; in Ibn Zaddik, 134 f., 
 137 f.; world-soul in Ibn Zaddik, 
 140; s. in Judah Halevi, 179 ff.; in 
 
 Abraham Ibn Ezra, 191 f.; in 
 Ibn Daud, 209 ff.; in Maimonides, 
 281 ff.; in HUlel ben Samuel, 314 
 ff.; in Crescas, 400. See also 
 "InteUect," "Reason" 
 
 Spinoza, 398 f. 
 
 "Spirit and Soul, Book of," 5 
 
 Steinschneider, Moritz, 311, 439, 
 note 26; 440, notes 31 and 33; 443, 
 note 247; 446, note 360 
 
 St. Ephrem of Nisibis, xviii 
 
 Sufis, xxvii f.; 86, 153 
 
 Syrians, xvii ff., 199, 246 
 
 "Tagmule ha-Nefesh," 314 
 
 Tanzer, A., 437 
 
 Themistius, 7, 60, 313, 321, 332, Z3i, 
 
 334, 335 
 "Theology of Aristotle," xx, xxxix, 
 
 64, 266 
 Theophrastus, xviii 
 Tibbon, Judah Ibn, 71, 309, 310 
 Tibbon, Moses Ibn, 309, 440, note 37 
 Tibbon, Samuel Ibn, 2, 60, 125, 239, 
 
 302, 309 
 "Tikkun Midot ha-Nefesh," 71 
 "Torot ha-Nefesh," 106 
 Tradition, xiii, xH, 28, 223 f. 
 Transmigration, in Saadia, 44; in 
 
 Abraham ibn Ezra, 192; in Ibn 
 
 Daud, 215 f. 
 Trinity, xliv, 33, 34, 7i, Qi 
 Truth, twofold, 328 
 "Twenty Chapters," 17 
 
 Ueberweg-Baumgartner, 433 
 Unity of God, in Kalam, xxii, xliii f., 
 252; in Mukammas, 18; in 
 Saadia, 32 f.; in Al Basir, 51; in 
 Bahya, 89 f.; in Ibn Zaddik, 143; 
 in Moses ibn Ezra, 185; in Abra- 
 ham ibn Ezra, 189; in Ibn Daud, 
 219 f. ; in Maimonides, xliv, 2575.; 
 in Aaron ben Elijah, 368 f.; in 
 Crescas, 391 f. 
 
462 INDEX 
 
 Vincent of Beauvais, i William of Occam, 200 
 
 Virtue, xlix; in Gabirol, 72 f.; in Wise, Stephen S., 71, 441, note 103 
 
 Pseudo-Bahya, 112; in Ibn Zad- WolflF, M., 444, note 251 
 
 dik, 148; in Ibn Daud, 232; in Wolfsohn, Julius, 436 
 Maimonides, 282 ff. 
 
 Yahuda, 80, 86, 439, note 24; 441, 
 Weil, Isidore, 436 notes 106, 108, 109 and 112 
 
 Weil, Simson, 198, 443, note 221 Yahya ben Adi, 247 
 
 Weinsberg, Leopold, 435 Yefet Ha-Levi, 363 
 
 Wenrich, 439, note 5 "Yezirah, Sefer" 17, 94, 173, 179 
 
 Werbluner, 445, note 317 Yohanan ben Zakkai, 197 
 Will of God, in Al Basir, 50; in 
 
 Gabirol, 68 f.; in Bahya, 90; in Zeller, 439, note 4; 441, note 86 
 
 Ibn Zaddik, 144; in Aaron ben Zeno, 25 
 
 Elijah, 372 Zimmels, 448, note 442 
 
 William of Auvergne, 71, 306 Zunz, Leopold, 184 
 
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