I (XA^Ca » ^ • VJ io .-AaJ (M)~i:L^r^\.jn^JC (J 9 UNIV. OF FU LliS. PgCUMINTS DEPI [ A ftl ' U.S. DEPOWTORY INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVES- TIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE PHILADEL- PHIA & READING RAILWAY NEAR WOODMONT, PA., ON DECEMBER 5, 1921. December 23, 1921. To THE Commission : On December 5, 1921, there was a head-end collision between two passenger trains on the Philadelphia & Reading Railway near Wood- mont, Pa., which resulted in the death of 20 passengers, 2 employees on duty, and 5 employees off duty, and injury to 65 passengers and 5 employees. This accident was investigated in conjunction with representatives of the Public Service Commission of the Common- wealth of Pennsylvania, LOCATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION. This accident occurred on the Newton Branch of the New York Division. This branch leads off from the double track of the New- York iShort Line Branch at Cheltenham, Pa., and is single track from Cheltenham to Newtown, Pa., a distance of 16.6 miles. The move- ment of trains is governed by time-table and train orders, eastbound trains being superior by direction. In addition there is a block sys- tem, part of which is automatic and part manual ; from Cheltenham eastward to Bryn Athyn, a distance of 5.4 miles, the automatic block system is used, the signals being of the inclosed-disk type, while from Brjn Athyn to Newton, the end of the line, a manual block sig- nal system is in use. There are two telegraph block sections, one from Bryn Athyn to Churchville, a distance of 5.7 miles, while the other is from Churchville to Newtown, a distance of 5.5 miles. Be- tween Bryn Athyn and Churchville there is an intermediate non- block station, Southampton, where trains frequently meet. The first station west of Bryn Athyn is Huntingdon Valley, 0.7 mile distant. At this station there are two automatic block signals, 713 for eastbound trains and 713-A for Avestbound trains. Bryn Athyn station is located on the south side of the track, the telegraph office being in the station. Seventy-three feet east of the telegraph 32136—22- 2 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. office, and also located on the south side of the track, is a telegraph block signal. This signal is a two-position semaphore signal of the upper-quadrant type, having one arm; it governs eastbound trains only, a flag being used when there are train orders for w^estbound trains. About 515 feet east of this signal is the point of a switch which leads to a spur track extending westward paralleling the main track on the south and ending near the telegraph block signal ; this track was used as a passing siding. One hundred and seventy feet east of the point of the switch is located automatic bJock signal TIG, which is the first of the automatic block signals governing westbound trains. The track circuit controlling signal 713 begins at a point about 1,500 feet east of signal 716. Between the point of the switch and signal 716, the track passes over a steel bridge about 50 feet in length, span- ning a small stream. Beginning at Bryn Athyn station and proceed- ing eastward, there is a ^-degree curve to the left which extends to the point of the switch. From the point of the switch eastward the line is tangent for a considerable distance. Trees located on the north side of the right of way obstruct the view of signal 716 from Bryn Athyn station. The point of collision was about 1.3 miles east of Bryn Athyn, and 0.8 mile west of Woodmont ; it occurred in the middle of a rock cut about 200 feet in length and having a maximum depth of 30 feet. The cut is located on a compound curve to the south about 1,000 feet in length, having a maximum curvature of 7 degrees. On ac- count of this curve and cut, the range of vision was much restricted, and there was little opportunity for either engineman to see the opposing train. The Aveather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 7.55 a. m. DESCRIPTION. Westbound passenger and milk train Xo. 154, en route from New- town to Philadelphia, was in charge of Conductor Stout and Engine- man F. Eook, and consisted of engine 265 and 5 cars. It left New- town at 6.50 a. m., arrived at Churchville at 7.06 a. m., departed at 7.12 a. m., 5 minutes late, and arrived at signal 716 at 7.28 a. m. The train was brought to a stop at signal 716. because it did not have suffi- cient time to make Huntingdon Valley, its time-table meeting point, for superior train No. 151, also because signal 716 was in the stop po- sition. A flagman Avas sent ahead and after a fcAv minutes, the train folloAving him, pulled doAvn to Bryn Athyn station and unloaded passengers. While at the station the crcAv received form ID train order No. 9, reading as foUoAvs: Disregard signal 716 and run carefully. Complete 7.31 a. ni. After discharging passengers and receiving the train order, a flagman Avas sent back, and train No. 154 backed up to a point about 5.5mi. O.ami, O.Smi Signal 713-A Newtown (Block Station) ChurchviUe (Block Station) Southampton Woodmont Point ot Accident Paper Mills Signal 716 Point ot Switch Spur Track Manual Block Signal ByrnAthyn (Block Station) Huntingdon VaUeyjSignal 713 Not to Scale. DIAGRAM SHOWING RELATIVE LOCATION OF STATIONS, SIGNALS, ETC. TO POINT OF ACCIDENT. Digitized by Vr\e Internet Arclnive in 2012 witln funding from University of Florida, George A. Smathers Libraries with support from LYRASIS and the Sloan Foundation http://www.archive.org/details/reportofchiefi1921t ACCIDENT NEAR WOODMONT, PA. 3 100 feet east of signal 716 in order that train No. 151, upon arrival, might pull up and back into the spur track to meet train No. 154, the track not being long enough to hold the latter train. After train No. 151 had arrived and backed in on the spur track, train No. 154 proceeded and passed Bryn Athyn station without stopping, ac- cording to Operator Clayton's block record, at 7.4G a. m. ; the dis- patcher's train sheet, however, showed the train departing at 7.44 a. m., this time having been changed from 7.54 a. m. Westbound passenger train No. 156, en route from Newtown to Philadelphia, in charge of Conductor Smith and Engineman J. Rook, was made up in the following order: Engine 278, coaches 833, 925, 1026, and 970, and combination coach and baggage car 490, all of wooden construction. The train left Newtown at 7.30 a. m. and at 7.41 a. m. arrived at Churchville, where the manual block signal was in the stop position. The conductor went to the telegraph office and received form 31 train order No. 11, reading as follows: No. 151 will meet No. 156 at Bryn Athyn. No. 151 take siding. Com- plete 7.44 a. m. The conductor delivered a copy of the order to the engineman, who read it; the block signal was cleared and the train departed, as shown by the records, at 7.45 a. m. It passed Woodmont and while running at a speed estimated to have been between 30 and 35 miles an hour it collided with eastbound train No. 151. Eastbound passenger train No. 151, en route from Philadelphia to Newtown, was in charge of Conductor Evans and Engineman Yeakel. It was hauled by engine 167 and consisted of combination baggage and passenger car 489, of wooden construction, and coaches 1093 and 1071, of steel-underframe construction. It left Philadel- phia at 6.48 a. m., and passed Fox Chase, 3.3 miles west of Hunting- don Valley, at 7.20 a. m., on time. At Huntingdon Valley, a non- telegraph station and its time-table meeting point with train No. 154, it found automatic block signal 713 in the stop position. A flag- man was sent ahead and after waiting a few minutes the train fol- lowed him to Bryn Athyn, arriving, the train sheet record shows, at 7.42 a. m. Upon arrival at Bryn Athyn the telegraph block signal was found in stop position, while train No. 154 was standing on the main track east of signal 716. Conductor Evans sent word to his engineman to pull up and back in on the siding, but the engineman insisted that they get an order to do so. Conductor Evans went to the telegraph office and receiA'ed form 31 train order No. 11, read- ing as follows : No. 151 will meet No. 156 at Bryn Atbyn. No. 151 take siding. Complete 7.46 a. m. After receiving the train order. Conductor Evans returned to his train and delivered a copy of the order to the engineman, while the 4 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. oj^erator came out on the platform and assisted in handling bag- gage; the train then pulled ahead under flag protection and backed in on the siding. AVhen the switch was closed, train Xo. 154 de- parted; then the switch was again opened and train No. 151 pulled out, dejiarting, as shoAvn by the records, at 7.46 a. m. A stop was made at Paper Mills station, 0.7 mile east of Bryn Athjm, to let off some trackmen, after which the train proceeded and had gone about 0.5 mile when, while running at a speed estimated to have been 25 or 30 miles an hour, it collided with train No. 156. The impact forced both engines upward, engine 167, of train No. 151, coming to rest bottom up, headed west and on top of its own tender, while engine 278, of train No. 156, was on top of engine 167. The combination car of train No. 151 was partially telescoped by the tender of engine 167. The forward end of the second car of train No. 151 was also partially telescoped by the rear of the combination car, while the rear car remained on the rails and was only slightly dam- aged. The first coach of train No. 156 was completely telescoped by the tender of engine 278. The next car was partially telescoped at its forward end by the wreckage, while the rear truck remained on the rails. The third, fourth, and fifth cars of train No. 156 Avere practi- cally undamaged by the collision. The wreckage took fire immedi- ately, the first car of each train being completely destroyed. The fire spread quickly and destroyed the superstructures of the second and third coaches of train No. 156 and of the second coach of train No. 151. It is probable that many of the deaths were the result of the fire that followed the collision. The employees on duty killed were the firemen of each train. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE. Conductor Evans, of train No. 151, stated that upon arrival at Bryn Athyn he w^ent to the telegraph office and signed and received train order No. 11. He read it in a low tone of voice and was under the impression that it was an order to meet train No. 154 at Biyn Athyn. After receiving the order he walked to the engine and delivered a copy of it to the engineman, neither of them reading it to the other or making any comment whatever. His train then pulled down and backed in on the siding; after train No. 154 had departed the switch was opened, the train pulled out of the siding and pro- ceeded without a clearance card or other permission from the operator at Bryn Athyn, although the block signal was in the stop position. He stated it was his understanding that a train order was sufficient authoiity for a train to pass a block or train-order signal in the stop position Avithoiit a clearance card. He did not show his copy of the train order to his trainmen, as they were both attending to the ACCIDENT NEAR WOODMONT, PA. 5 switches at tlie time, l)ut he put it uiidei- (lie bii<;gagemaster's box in the ba