* c { ^ : r-u^Ti^^-^ ^ 
 
 U.S. DEP O»tTOftY 
 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
 
 REPORT OF THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF SAFETY APPLIANCES 
 COVERING THE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH 
 OCCURRED ON THE NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD 
 RAILROAD NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 
 
 April 24, 1914. 
 To the Commission: 
 
 On October 25, 1913, there was a derailment of a passenger train 
 on the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad near Westerly, 
 R. I., which resulted in the injury of 74 passengers and 3 em- 
 ployees. Investigation of this accident was had in conjunction with 
 the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Connecticut, and a 
 public hearing was held at Providence, R. I., on October 31, 1913. 
 As a result of the investigation of this accident I beg to submit the 
 following report : 
 
 The derailed train was eastbound train No. 26, en route from New 
 York, N. Y., to Boston, Mass. It consisted of three Pullman cars, 
 all equipped with steel underframes, one smoking car, and two 
 coaches, all of wooden construction, hauled by locomotive No. 1309. 
 The train was in charge of Conductor Taber and Engineman Smith. 
 Train No. 26 left Westerly at 9.25 p. m., 14 minutes late, and at 
 about 9.30 p. m. was derailed at a point 1.6 miles east of Westerly 
 while running at a speed estimated to have been between 30 and 35 
 miles per hour. Neither the engine nor the tender were derailed. 
 With the exception of one wheel on the north rail, all of the wheels 
 under the first Pullman car were derailed, while all the other cars in 
 the train were derailed and came to rest on the south side of the track, 
 some of them extending partly over the embankment. 
 
 The train broke in two between the second and third cars, the 
 four rear cars being separated from the forward portion of the train 
 a distance of about 150 feet. Illustration No. 1 is a view looking in 
 a westerly direction, and shows the position of the last four cars 
 after the derailment. 
 
 This part of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad is a 
 double-track line, and trains are operated under the controlled- 
 manual block-signal system. Approaching the point of derailment 
 from the west there are about 2,000 feet of tangent, all on a descend- 
 ing grade of about one-half of 1 per cent. The track is laid with 
 100-pound steel rails, 33 feet in length, single spiked to 18 or 19 
 
2 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 untreated chestnut, oak, and pine ties, no tie-plates being used on 
 straight track. At the point of derailment the track is on a 12-foot 
 fill, chiefly composed of gravel. The ballast is of gravel varying from 
 
 12 to 16 inches in depth. Examination showed this track to be in 
 good condition. It was raining at the time of the derailment. 
 
 Examination of the equipment of the derailed train showed nothing 
 which in any way could have contributed to the derailment. Exami- 
 nation of the track showed that the first indication of anything: wrong 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 3 
 
 was a broken. rail on the south side of the track. West of this broken 
 rail there were no marks of any kind upon the rails or ties, while 
 east of the same the ties had been cut and broken by derailed wheels, 
 the track being torn up for a distance of about 600 feet. East of the 
 initial point of derailment the north rail was torn out of alignment 
 for a distance of about 12 rail lengths, while 12 successive rails on 
 the south side were also torn up. Four of these rails on the south 
 side were separated from each other, the bolts at the rail joints having 
 been sheared off. 
 
 The crew of an eastbound passenger train which passed over this 
 traek less than an hour previous to the derailment testified that 
 they felt no unevenness in the track, and that they did not notice 
 anything which would indicate that there was anything wrong with 
 it. Engineman Smith, of train No. 26, stated that the first thing he 
 noticed was a slight jar or yank. He at once applied the air brakes, 
 and on looking back saw fire flying from underneath the cars. After 
 the accident no defects or damage of any kind were found to exist 
 with respect to the locomotive, and he operated it through to Boston. 
 Fireman Murphy testified that at the time of the derailment he was 
 putting coal on the fire. He did not notice any jar from the driving 
 wheels, being of the opinion that it came from behind the engine. 
 The testimony of the other members of the crew shed no light as 
 to the cause of the accident, their first intimation that there was 
 anything wrong being the shock occasioned by the cars being derailed, 
 coupled with the application of the air brakes. 
 
 This accident was caused by a broken rail. The investigation to 
 determine the reason for the failure of this rail was conducted b> 
 Mr. James E. Howard, engineer physicist, whose report immediately 
 follows : 
 
 REPORT OF ENGINEER PHYSICIST. 
 
 The broken rail which caused the derailment of train No. 26 was 
 a C rail, 100 pounds section, open-hearth steel, of the New York. 
 New Haven & Hartford Railroad's design, manufactured by the 
 Bethlehem Steel Co., April, 1910. heat J-1391. It was laid in the 
 track June 5, 1910, and therefore had been in service for a period 
 of three years and four months at the time of derailment. 
 
 The rail had the following dimensions : 
 
 Height 6 inches. 
 
 Width of head . ' 2f inches. 
 
 Width of base 5$ inches. 
 
 Thickness of web finch. 
 
 Length 33 feet. 
 
 Moment of inertia 47. IS 
 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 The specifications for chemical composition governing its manu- 
 facture and the composition reported as having been furnished were : 
 
 Chemical con- 
 stituents. 
 
 Called for by 
 the specifi- 
 cations. 
 
 Carbon 0.70 to 0.83 
 
 Manganese 60 to .90 
 
 Silicon i .20 
 
 Phosphorus .04 
 
 Sulphur I 
 
 Said to have 
 
 been 
 furnished. 
 
 0.80 
 .76 
 .183 
 .033 
 .046 
 
 The specifications called for a drop test in which a 2,000-pound 
 tup should be dropped from a height of 15 feet, the rail resting upon 
 supports 3 feet apart. It was required that the rail should deflect not 
 more than 1.45 inches on the first blow, nor upon fracture display- 
 less than 6 per cent elongation in 1 inch, or 5 per cent in 2 consecu- 
 tive inches. The drop test made on this heat of steel was reported 
 as having shown a deflection of 0.9 inch. 
 
 This rail showed very little wear as the result of its service in the 
 track. The head retained its shape, and externally the appearance of 
 the rail was good. 
 
 It fractured in three places at the time of derailment, at distances 
 of 1 foot 10 inches, 4 feet 10 inches, and 6 feet 7 inches, respec- 
 tively, from the leaving end. At the first and third of these places 
 transverse fissures were disclosed measuring in diameter about H 
 inches each. The initial line of fracture was probably that which 
 occurred 6 feet 7 inches from the leaving end. The intermediate 
 fracture, believed to have been a secondary one, did not have a trans- 
 verse fissure. 
 
 Photograph, figure No. 2, shows the relative positions of these lines 
 of fracture as they were viewed from the gauge side of the rail. 
 The movement of the train on the rail was from right to left, Line 
 of rupture CC was the first to occur, it is thought. 
 
 The train left the track southerly through the opening made by 
 the three fragments shown on figure No. 2 and the opening made by 
 succeeding rails east of this point. To the west of the line of rupture 
 CC the track remained intact. 
 
 Subsequent to the derailment an additional fracture was made 
 when removing the rail from the track, at a place about 5^ feet west 
 of line of rupture CC. At this place a transverse fissure 1| inches in 
 diameter was displayed. The rail was then shipped to Providence, 
 where two more transverse fissures were disclosed upon raising one 
 end of the rail and allowing it to fall upon a concrete walk from a 
 height of about 6 feet. These fissures measured If inches and five- 
 eighths inch in diameter, respectively. 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 
 
 In all, five transverse 
 fissures were displayed 
 in the rail, each of 
 which was located on 
 the gauge side of the 
 head. In resume these 
 fissures were located at 
 the following distances 
 from the leaving end of 
 the rail : 1 foot 10 inches, 
 6 feet 7 inches, 12 feet 
 1 inch, 17 feet 8 inches, 
 and 21 feet. 
 
 A second rail, from the 
 same heat as the above, 
 was removed from the 
 track and its structural 
 condition examined. 
 This rail, branded 
 "Bethlehem Open 
 Hearth 100B IIII 10/' 
 was taken from the track 
 adjacent to or near the 
 broken rail. Both were 
 laid at the same time, 
 and each was exposed to 
 the same conditions of 
 service. 
 
 These rails were tested 
 in part at the Bureau of 
 Standards, while con- 
 tributory work was done 
 at the Washington Navy 
 Yard and bj r the New 
 Haven Railroad at its 
 New Haven laboratory 
 and at the works of the 
 Bethlehem Steel Co- 
 followed by a metallo- 
 graphic examination by 
 Mr. Wirt Tassin. 
 
 The report of the Bu- 
 reau of Standards upon 
 the chemical composi- 
 
 
 9^JP/I?U0JJ_ 
 
 CA 
 
 
 W£>/p ?// '9JD99/J 
 
 ^ 
 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 tion of the steel, slag determination, metallographic examination, and 
 tensile tests follows: 
 
 REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF STANDARDS. 
 
 CHEMICAL ANALYSIS. 
 
 In Table I are shown the results of chemical analysis of rails 1 
 and 2 taken at three places. 
 
 
 
 Table I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Location. 
 
 Car- 
 bon. 
 
 Sul- 
 phur. 
 
 Phos- 
 phorus. 
 
 Man- 
 ganese. 
 
 Sili- 
 con. 
 
 Nickel. 
 
 Oxides 
 and 
 slag. 
 
 Chro- 
 mium. 
 
 Rail 1: 
 
 Near running surface of head 
 
 Junction of web and head 
 
 Flange of base 
 
 0.83 
 .82 
 .84 
 
 .8.3 
 .85 
 .84 
 
 0.039 
 .040 
 .043 
 
 .040 
 .041 
 .039 
 
 0.063 
 .061 
 .063 
 
 .058 
 .060 
 .059 
 
 0.78 
 .79 
 .79 
 
 .79 
 
 .79 
 .80 
 
 0.166 
 .164 
 .166 
 
 .157 
 .147 
 .152 
 
 0.081 
 .049 
 .069 
 
 .29 
 .27 
 .29 
 
 / 0.11 
 \ .23 
 I .14 
 \ .26 
 / -17 
 \ .19 
 
 .07 
 .04 
 .07 
 
 0.05 
 .05 
 .04 
 
 .05 
 
 Rail 2: 
 
 Near running surface of head 
 
 Junction of web and head 
 
 .02 
 .03 
 .02 
 
 
 
 It will be noted that the two rails, barring slag, are practically of 
 identical composition. 
 
 The agreement between the three positions in each rail is also good, 
 except with respect to nickel and slag in No. 1, showing no apprecia- 
 ble segregation, if any, of the chemical constituents. The difference 
 as to nickel may be due to errors of analysis where such small amounts 
 are concerned, and are probably without significance. 
 
 Attention should be called to the values reported for slag and 
 the question of slag and oxide analysis in general. The methods 
 used for both are very unsatisfactory, in that we have no real knowl- 
 edge that they are reliable, but a good deal of reason to believe that 
 they fail to tell us what they purport to tell. That is to say, in the 
 ase of slag we do not know if all slag is obtained by the method 
 used, i. e., insolubility in iodine, or how much of what may be re- 
 ported as slag is such. For instance, in the present case, the silica 
 percentage in the slag found in No. 1 does not exceed 20 per cent, 
 by actual test of several samples. This means less than 50 per cent 
 of silicate slag, if all the silica comes from that ; but if any iron sili- 
 cide is included in the silica found, the slag percentage should be 
 lowered by an indeterminate amount. 
 
 Again, this slag (ignited) carries about 9.8 per cent P 2 O s , 
 which we may suppose to have belonged to iron phosphide. If so, 
 and if the composition of the phosphide is Fe 3 P, and if again this 
 became converted during ignition to Fe 2 O s and P 2 5 , we must deduct 
 the oxygen corresponding to this change, which in the present in- 
 stance would be 14.5 per cent. 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 7 
 
 Still again, the slag contained a little chromium in unknown con- 
 dition. Allowing for the maximum amount of real (silicate) slag 
 permissible as deduced from the silica percentage and of iron silicide 
 and phosphide, there remains a large probable deficiency, which may 
 perhaps be made up by oxide of iron or some oxide other than one of 
 manganese, which element is not present in the slag from either rail 
 (calcium is also absent). If the slag carried carbide and silicide 
 of iron, the iron and silicon of these would be left after ignition as 
 Fe^C^ and SiO.,. The variations in slag noted for rail 1 may be due 
 to actual local variations in slag content or perhaps in part to uncer- 
 tain analysis. 
 
 It is probable that the slag analyses are comparable for the two 
 rails, since these are otherwise of very exactly the same composition. 
 It is of interest to note that the rail No. 1 which failed in service had 
 three or four times as much slag as the other rail from the same 
 heat in the same track, suggesting a greater inherent weakness refer- 
 
 le to this cause. 
 
 METALLOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION. 
 
 A section of rail No. 1 was cut 5 inches back of break, 12 feet from 
 receiving end, polished and etched electrolytically by being made the 
 anode in a bath of ammonium chloride. By this treatment the areas 
 of segregation are shown by dark spots and streaks. Figure No. 3 
 shows the appearance of the section after this treatment. The web 
 sIioavs a considerable amount of segregation, but the metal of head 
 and base is not seriously affected. A section of rail No. 2 treated in 
 the same way shows a structure nearly identical with that of rail No. 
 1, as shown on the same figure. The amount of segregation shown by 
 these two sections may be regarded as typical and appears to bear 
 no intimate relation to the formation of the transverse fissures found 
 in rail No. 1. 
 
 Sections for microscopic examination were taken from head, web 
 and base of each of the two rails. The metal in the head was ex- 
 amined both from the gauge side and opposite portion. Except for 
 an increase of grain size in the head and occasional slag threads, the 
 structure is very uniform throughout. As near as can be judged, the 
 microstructure of the two rails is identical. The metal consists of an 
 intimate mixture of pearlite crystals, i. e., saturated or eutectoid steel. 
 The method of etching used, 2 per cent nitric acid in alcohol, darkens 
 the pearlite ; the lighter appearance of many of the crystals is due to 
 the different reflection of the light caused by the orientation of the 
 crystals. 
 
 In the interstices between many of the crystals are areas of very 
 coarse pearlite. Such areas are numerous and are found scattered 
 uniformly throughout the whole mass. In these areas the two con- 
 stituents of pearlite (ferrite or pure iron and cementite or carbide of 
 
8 
 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 iron) are in particles of sufficient size (i. e., plates) that the weaken- 
 ing effect upon the metal as a whole must be appreciable. 
 
 These areas can not be well represented in a photomicrograph of 100 
 diameters magnification. They appear as small light-colored grains. 
 
 After annealing, these interstitial pearlite areas are more pro- 
 nounced and distinct. 
 
 •J & 
 
 ■3 « i 
 
 °-S 
 
 
 ■go 
 
 a s 
 
 c3 _ 
 
 S 03 
 
 « ~ o 
 
 . (S T3 
 
 o s d 
 
 2; 3 * 
 
 el .&•- 
 
 o e 
 ^ >- 
 
 End views A and B in figure No. 4 show the typical appearance of 
 the transverse fissures abundant in the head of rail No. 1. No fis- 
 sures were found other than on gauge side of the rail. The metal im- 
 mediately adjacent to such fissures was examined in detail. Sections 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 
 
 41897—14 2 
 
10 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 were taken perpendicular to the face of the fissure and the metal im- 
 mediately back of the break examined. It was not found to differ 
 materially in structure or constituents from that of the rail as a 
 whole. Photomicrographs C and D show the structure of the metal 
 just back of fissures at breaks 12 feet and 15 feet 4 inches, respectively, 
 from the receiving end of the rail. It consists of the same mixture of 
 pearlite crystals as is found throughout the body of the rail. There 
 appears to be no unusual segregation of slag or foreign inclusions 
 to be found here. 
 
 Specimens were taken from each of the two rails after annealing 
 a section of the head of each. The occurrence and distribution of in- 
 terstitial areas of coarsely laminated pearlite are here more evident. 
 Both rails show considerable free cementite, which has coalesced as 
 boundaries of the grains as a result of the annealing process. Cement- 
 ite is the carbide of iron, F 3 C, and is the hard, brittle constituent 
 of high-carbon steels (annealed) and cast irons. It occurs here, not 
 uniformly distributed throughout, but is more or less segregated. A 
 sample was taken from rail No. 1 after annealing just back of the 
 face of one of the transverse fissures. The specimen shows consid- 
 erable quantities of free cementite. The estimated carbon content of 
 such spots is over 1 per cent. The amount of cementite found in 
 specimens from rail No. 1 was considerably more than in the samples 
 from rail No. 2. This, however, may be only fortuitous. Before an- 
 nealing, such free cementite can not be detected with certainty be- 
 cause it exists as isolated particles which, during annealing, coalesce 
 to form the grain boundaries and also because the metal contains in- 
 clusions of various natures which, under the conditions, can not be dif- 
 ferentiated from the cementite particles with certainty. 
 
 The chemical analysis indicates a carbon Content of (0.82) or very 
 slightly different from the eutectoid composition (0.85). The occur- 
 rence of so much free cementite may be attributed to the restraining 
 action of the manganese content. The carbon is retained in the con- 
 dition normally characteristic of a steel of higher carbon content. 
 Such steel will have properties approximating those of the steel whose 
 true carbon content is equal to the apparent content of the steel under 
 discussion. 
 
 Tensile samples which had been cut from rail No. 2 were submitted 
 after having received the heat treatment stated in the tabulation of 
 the tensile tests. The structure, so far as can be distinguished under 
 the microscope, is the same in all. They are all in the indefinite stage, 
 sorbite, preceding the revolution into pearlite, which takes place in 
 the critical range. The tempering temperatures were not chosen at 
 wide enough intervals to show any decided structural change. 
 
 The critical or recalescence point of this steel was determined to be 
 about 1250° F. The very coarse-grained structure of the rail is due 
 to rolling at a temperature very much higher than the critical range. 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 
 
 11 
 
 The weakening effect of slag associated with coarse structure would 
 have been lessened by rolling and finishing at lower temperatures. 
 
 
 '«/«-- s^p""" 
 
 WKtKmS^ ; 
 
 1 • ipsa 
 
 . . •.'•i.V' 
 
 C D 
 
 No. 5. — A. View of one of the coarse interstitial pearlite areas, rail No. 1; magnification 250 diame- 
 ters; etched with 2 per cent nitric acid. Such areas are very numerous throughout the body of the 
 rail and must exert an appreciable weakening effect upon the whole. 
 
 B. Section from head of rail No. 1, after annealing; magnification 250 diameters; etching, hot sodium 
 picrate. In the unannealed specimens the free cementite does not occur in the form of definite cell 
 boundaries. These are caused by the coalescing of smaller particles during the annnealing process. 
 The indefinite dark circular spots are the cut ends of the slag threads and not free cementite. 
 
 C Photomicrograph from the base of rail No. 1, section parallel to the rolling; magnification 100 
 diameters; etching, 2 per cent alcohol solution of nitric acid. The structure is a jumbled mass of 
 pearlite crystals. The long dark streaks are slag threads. There are coarse interstitial pearlite areas. 
 (The photomicrographs of the head and web showed similar structure, i 
 
 D. Photomicrograph of tensile specimen from head of rail No. 2, after heat treatment, quenched in 
 oil from temperature of 1,400° F. and drawn at 1,250° F. Magnification 250 diameters. 
 
 All five heat-treated specimens have sorbitic structure. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 1. No unusual segregation of impurities is found. 
 
 2. The structure throughout the section of the rail is very uniform. 
 
12 
 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 3. The metal immediately, adjacent to the " transverse fissures " 
 appears to be of the same nature as throughout the rest of the rail. 
 
 4. No unusual segregation of impurities or " slag " can be associated 
 with the transverse fissures ; " slag streaks," however, are present here 
 in the usual numbers as are found throughout the rest of the head. 
 
 5. The occurrence of the interstitial areas of very coarse pearlite 
 must have an appreciable weakening effect upon the metal as a whole. 
 
 6. The occurrence of free cementite, which in itself is a weak, brittle 
 constituent, is a serious defect and may have a direct bearing on the 
 formation of the "'transverse fissures " developed in rails of such com- 
 position. 
 
 Tensile tests. 
 
 SPECIMENS FROM RAIL NO. 1. 
 
 Description. 
 
 Diameter. 
 
 Sectional 
 area. 
 
 Elastic 
 limit. 
 
 Tensile 
 strength. 
 
 Elonga- 
 tion. 
 
 Contrac- 
 tion of 
 area. 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 
 Inches. 
 1.129 
 
 1.129 
 
 1.129 
 .505 
 
 .505 
 
 .505 
 .505 
 .505 
 .505 
 .505 
 .505 
 
 Sq. in. 
 1.00 
 
 1.00 
 
 1.00 
 .20 
 
 .20 
 
 .20 
 .20 
 .20 
 .20 
 .20 
 .20 
 
 Pounds 
 per sq. in. 
 
 Pounds 
 
 persq.in. 
 
 60, 000 
 
 78, 600 
 
 77, 300 
 135,500 
 
 91,000 
 
 145, 800 
 145,500 
 146,300 
 148, 700 
 146,000 
 142, 000 
 
 Per cent. 
 (') 
 
 (') 
 
 (') 
 4.5 
 
 (') 
 
 11.0 
 12.0 
 10.0 
 11.0 
 11.0 
 10.0 
 
 Per cent. 
 (') 
 
 (') 
 
 W 
 
 4.5 
 
 C 1 ) 
 
 17.0 
 17.0 
 9.0 
 15.0 
 15.0 
 14.5 
 
 
 ture. 
 Head of rail, outside half from 
 west end. 
 Do 
 
 60,000 
 
 55,000 
 60,000 
 
 65,000 
 
 65,000 
 65,000 
 
 65,000 
 65, 000 
 65,000 
 65,000 
 
 Do. 
 Do. 
 
 Head of rail, from west end, 
 
 near center of head. 
 Head of rail, from west end, 
 
 outside of head. 
 Web of rail, from west end — 
 Do 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 Do. 
 
 Base of rail, from west end 
 
 Do 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 1 Inappreciable. 
 SPECIMENS FROM RAIL NO. 2. 
 
 
 1. 129 
 
 1.00 
 
 
 49, 800 
 
 9.0 
 
 t 1 ) 
 12.5 
 
 
 
 .505 
 
 .20 
 
 65,000 
 
 144, 400 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 .505 
 .505 
 .505 
 .505 
 .505 
 1.128 
 
 .20 
 .20 
 .20 
 .20 
 .20 
 1.00 
 
 65, 000 
 70, 000 
 65,000 
 70,000 
 70, 000 
 60, 000 
 
 77, 500 
 140, 800 
 147,000 
 149, 000 
 150,400 
 
 66, 300 
 
 1.0 
 3.0 
 10.5 
 11.0 
 10.0 
 0) 
 
 .5 
 3.5 
 13.5 
 15.5 
 15.0 
 0) 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do 
 
 Do. 
 
 Head of rail, middle of, an- 
 
 ( 2 ) 
 
 nealed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Head forged down and an- 
 nealed. 
 
 1.129 
 
 1.00 
 
 
 95,400 
 
 1.6 
 
 0) 
 
 ( 3 ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Head forged down to 1-inch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 diameter, annealed, re- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 heated to 1,400° F., and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 quenched in oil, then drawn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 as described: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Drawn at 1,000° F 
 
 .505 
 
 .20 
 
 105,000 
 
 150, 800 
 
 15.5 
 
 37.5 
 
 Silkv. 
 
 1,080° F 
 
 .505 
 
 .20 
 
 90,000 
 
 148,000 
 
 17.0 
 
 42.0 
 
 Do. 
 
 1,150° F 
 
 .505 
 
 .20 
 
 95,000 
 
 148,900 
 
 17.0 
 
 41.0 
 
 Do. 
 
 1,200° F 
 
 .505 
 
 .20 
 
 95,000 
 
 150, 850 
 
 18.0 
 
 38.0 
 
 Do. 
 
 1,250° F 
 
 .505 
 
 .20 
 
 100,000 
 
 144, 000 
 
 16.0 
 
 37.0 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 Inappreciable. - Oranular blue-black spot § by \ inch. :i Granular; broke in head at root of thread. 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 13 
 
 DROP TESTS AT THE WORKS OF THE MARYLAND STEEL CO. 
 
 Drop tests were made at the works of the Maryland Steel Co. on 
 one piece of rail No. 1 and two pieces of rail No. 2. Prior to these 
 tests the second rail was broken in several places by bending loads 
 applied in the testing machine at the Bureau of Standards, but none 
 of the fractured surfaces showed transverse fissures. The drop tests 
 were made with the rail sections head up, supports 3 feet apart, 2,000 
 pounds tup, height of fall 15 feet. The rails were tested at a tem- 
 perature of 90 degrees. 
 
 Rail No. 1 sustained the first blow without rupture, showing a de- 
 flection of 0.84 inch. It broke on the second blow, with an extension 
 of the metal of G per cent. The sections from the second rail each 
 broke on the first blow, neither developing appreciable extension. 
 The appearance of these pieces is shown by figure No. 6. The upper 
 rail in the cut represents No. 1. The middle and lower sections were 
 those from rail No. 2. 
 
 It will be noted that rail No. 1, which failed in the track and caused 
 the derailment of train No. 26, successfully passed the prescribed drop 
 test, displaying an extension of 6 per cent as required, while the sec- 
 ond rail, which failed to meet the drop test, did not fail in the track. 
 
 The fracture near the bolt holes of one section of rail No. 2, was 
 secondary, occurring when this fragment struck the bed of the drop 
 testing machine succeeding the blow of the tup. 
 
 The section of rail No. 2, represented by the lower figure of the cut, 
 did not fracture under the place directly struck by the tup, but 
 sheared out a fragment 22 inches long, symmetrical with the supports. 
 
 In prescribing only 6 per cent extension of the metal under the 
 drop test, as an index of the ultimate ductility of the steel, it may be 
 said that such extension, developed as it is under transverse stress, is 
 not far above the zero limit of ductility. In the milder grades of 
 steel the extension under transverse stresses commonly exceeds many 
 times that witnessed in the tensile tests of the metal. In these two 
 rails the reverse was true. The 2-inch tensile specimens from the 
 bases of these rails showed 10 and 11 per cent extension, which, equated 
 for specimens of greater length of uniform section, would still be 
 more than the extension in the drop test of rail No. 1, which was 
 6 per cent, while No. 2 failed with zero extension. 
 
 The mechanical work required to rupture steels of high elastic limit 
 but incapable of permanent set is small compared with the work re- 
 quired to rupture mild steels which display the extension usual in 
 structural steels. If the indications of the present tests are confirmed 
 and it is found that rails normally of limited extension tend to fail 
 under the effect of rapidly applied loads without appreciable set, 
 
14 
 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 15 
 
 this feature in the use of hard steels will demand early considera- 
 tion, in which striking velocities and temperatures of the rail should 
 be included. 
 
 The striking velocity of the tup with 15 feet height of drop, as 
 prescribed in current specifications, is a low velocity compared with 
 ordinary train speeds. 
 
 TESTS BY THE NEW YORK, NEW II.W i:\ d HARTFORD h' ULROAD CO. 
 
 The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. conducted an 
 examination, which comprised tensile tests, chemical analyses, metal- 
 lographic examination, and drop teste, the later at the works of the 
 Bethlehem Steel Co., other parts at its New Haven laboraory. In 
 addition to supplying data confirming the information from other 
 sources, this examination resulted in showing the presence of a con- 
 siderable number of incipient fissures in the head of rail No. 1, at 
 places where the ordinary manifestations of transverse fissures were 
 not in evidence. That is, the fissures had not reached the advanced 
 stage in which they would ordinarily be detected by visual inspection. 
 Deep etching, with nitric and hydrochloric acids, developed short 
 transverse cracks or incipient fissures which were thus rendered 
 plainly visible to the eye. They ranged in length from a few hun- 
 dredths of an inch to three-eighths inch. So far as could be judged 
 the zone of greatest structural disturbance was in the head over the 
 gauge side of the web and toward the gauge side. The etching being 
 very deep not unlikely brought into view fissures which originally 
 were less easily discerned. 
 
 A group of these incipient fissures is shown in figure No. 7, (a) and 
 (b). The fissures are here shown about natural size, the same group 
 appearing in both (a) and (b). In the latter they are partially ob- 
 literated by rough polishing the surface while removing some longi- 
 tudinal scratches and introducing others. The location of the zone in 
 which these fissures were found leads to the inference that we are here 
 examining the same class of phenomenon witnessed in the larger 
 transverse fissures, which ultimately result in the complete fracture 
 of the rail. If such is the case, structurally, a more general disinte- 
 grating effect has been brought about than indicated by the display of 
 transverse fissures in the rail — that is, influences which tend toward 
 the formation of transverse fissures are not localized at those places 
 only where fissures have reached an advanced stage of development. 
 
16 
 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
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ACCIDENT NEAE WESTERLY, E. I., ON OCTOBEE 25, 1913. 17 
 
 Other rails were taken from service by the New York, New Haven 
 & Hartford Railroad Co., and used in this examination. One, an E 
 rail, designated as No. 10, was taken from the track under the sup- 
 position that it belonged to the same heat of steel as No. 1, which 
 caused the derailment. Analysis, however, showed that it came from 
 another heat. Check analysis at the steel works showed the follow- 
 ing composition : 
 
 Carbon, O.S3. Manganese, 0.49. Phosphorus, 0.020. Sulphur, 0.052. 
 
 This rail did not break, as others had, when lifted with a magnet 
 and dropped bodily from a height of 9^ feet. When ruptured under 
 the regular drop test, head up, three breaks were made, each of 
 which were reported as having shown clean metal, free from trans- 
 verse fissures. A test of the metal from the gauge side of the head 
 showed a tensile strength of 122,000 pounds per square inch, with a 
 contraction of area of 20 per cent. 
 
 The Bethlehem Steel Co. in reporting upon the examination of the 
 material pertaining to this inquiry state: 
 
 As in all other cases of rails developing transverse fissures in the head, no 
 segregation of any kind was found in the rails to account for this defect. There 
 was no difference found between the inicrostructure of the core of the fissures, 
 the bright parts of the fissure, or any other part of the rail. All fissures 
 occurred on the gauge side of the head of the rails. 
 
 A rail rolled in the same year and month and branded the same 
 as rail No. 1, but which had not been used in the track, was taken 
 from a spare rail post and cut up for examination. The chemical 
 composition of this rail was found to be : 
 
 Carbon, 0.84. Manganese, 0.87. Phosphorus, 0.037. Sulphur, 0.025. 
 
 A tensile specimen of 1 square inch sectional area and 10 inches 
 long, taken from the center of the head, gave the following results : 
 
 Elastic limit, 60,000 pounds per square inch. 
 Tensile strength. 148,000 pounds per square inch. 
 Elongation, 6.3 per cent. 
 Contraction of area, 6.9 per cent. 
 Appearance of fracture, granular. 
 
 Sections of several rails included in this inquiry were cut out for 
 photographic purposes, metallographic examination and check de- 
 termination of the carbon at the Washington Navy Yard. Metallo- 
 graphic examination was made by Mr. Wirt Tassin, with the assist- 
 ance of Mr. Paul E. McKinney. 
 
18 
 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 REPORT OF METALLOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION BY MR. WIRT TASSIN. 
 
 The material examined included two specimens identified as 
 " Westerly Kail No. 1, which failed in the track," with five specimens 
 identified as " Rail No. 10, which had been in service, but did not fail 
 in the track." 
 
 All work done was metallographic. 
 
 WESTERLY KAIL NO. 1, WHICH FAILED IN THE TRACK. 
 
 Figures 8a, 8b, and 8c show macroscopic transverse fissures in the 
 rail head, as seen at a magnification of 8, on a specimen taken from 
 the " west end " of the rail. They are plainly visible to the unaided 
 eye and are not associated with slag, sulphide, or oxide areas, nor 
 are they accompanied by segregations of any kind. 
 
 Sb Sc 
 
 No. 8. — Macroscopic transverse fissures in the head of rail No. 1, near its west end. Magnifi- 
 cation 8 diameters. Fissures are not associated with slag, sulphide, or oxide areas, nor 
 accompanied by segregations of any kind. 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 
 
 19 
 
 Figure 9a, at a magnification of 315, using a B. and L. 8 mm. 
 objective and a 15x eyepiece, shows a transverse microscopic fissure 
 as seen on a longitudinal section cut from the " east end " of the 
 rail and located at about the upper center of the head. The fissure 
 could be readily traced for a distance of 1 mm., 0. 1574s inch. 
 
 Figure 9b, at a similar magnification, is another transverse fissure 
 whose length could be traced for 11 mm., 0.43807 inch. 
 
 Figure 9c, at a magnification of 315, shows a typical area of 
 incipient fissures. 
 
 r ■.% 
 
 9b 
 No. 9. Microscopic transverse fissures from head of rail No. 1, near its east end; magnification 313 
 
 diameters. 
 9a was traced for a length of 0.157 inch. 
 9b for a length of 0.433 inch. 
 9c shows a typical area of incipient fissures. These fissures are not associated with and have no rela- 
 
 tionlto any areas of sulphide, slag, or other inclusions. 
 
20 
 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 In each instance it will be noted that these fissures are not asso- 
 ciated with and have no relation to any areas of sulphide, slag, and 
 other inclusions. This is further shown in figures 10a, 10b, and 10c, 
 which are at the same magnification and show seams of such inclu- 
 sions with a complete freedom from microscopic or incipient fissures. 
 
 The general structure of the rail is sorbitic. There is little or 
 no lamellar pearlite, no free cementite or ferrite. The sulphide, slag, 
 and oxide areas are small and sparingly distributed. There are no 
 segregations. 
 
 . -: 
 
 10b 
 
 10c 
 
 No. 10. Showing slag and sulphide seams in head of rail No. 1. Magnification 315 diameters. At these 
 seams there was complete freedom from microscopic or incipient fissures. 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 21 
 
 RAIL NO. 10, WHICH HAD BEEN IN SERVICE BUT DID NOT FAIL IN THE TRACK. 
 
 Figure 11 is a sketch showing the location in the rail of the sections 
 •xainined. 
 
 {jduge 5/c/e 
 
 <Sect/on—4— 
 /rrepv/ar ot/f//hes /no'/cafe f~/s sured 'Areas 
 
 No. 11.— Cross section of rail No. 10, showing manner of cutting up for examination, and location of 
 
 fissured areas found therein. 
 
22 
 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 Figure 12a, magnification 315, shows incipient transverse fissures 
 in the center of the head of section A. 
 
 Figure 12b, magnification and real field as in figure 12a, is from 
 the lower center of the head of section A and shows incipient fissures. 
 
 12b . 
 
 No. 12. Incipient fissures found in the head of rail No. 10. 
 
 12a represents fissures found in the center of the head, in section of rail marked " A. 
 
 12b, fissures found in the lower center of the head. Magnification, 315 diameters. 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 
 
 23 
 
 Figures 13a and 13b. magnification 315, show the small ness of the 
 seams of slag and sulphide as found in section A. 
 
 13b 
 
 No. 13. From head of rail No. 10, section marked "A," showing the smallness of the seams of slag and 
 sulphide. Magnification, 315 diameters. 
 
24 
 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 Figures 14a, 14b, and 14c, magnification 315 diameters, show typical 
 incipient fissures as found in specimen B. Figures 15a and 15b show 
 analogous fields in section D. 
 
 14b 
 
 14C 
 
 No. 14. Typical incipient fissures found in head of rail No. 10, section marked "B. 
 
 315 diameters. 
 
 Magnification, 
 
 Figure 15c shows one of the largest of the sulphide-slag areas and 
 illustrates the smallness of these inclusions. 
 
 Specimens C and E (see fig. 11) show no incipient fissures and no 
 abnormalities of structure. 
 
 Plotting the fissured areas as seen in figure 11, it will be noted 
 that they are practically limited to the gauge side at or near the 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., OK OCTOBER 25, 1913. 
 
 25 
 
 center of the head and are in the regions immediately affected by 
 the wheel loads. 
 
 15a 
 
 15b 15c 
 
 No. 15. Typical incipient fissures found in the head of rail No. 10, section marked "D," represented by 
 15a and 15b. One of the largest sulphide-slag areas of rail No. 10, illustrating the smallness of these inclu- 
 sions is represented by 15c. Magnification, 315 diameter?. 
 
 The opinion is advanced that these fissures are set up by these 
 loads, and in support of this the statement is made that new rails 
 which had not been in the track and which have as high and even 
 higher carbon content do not show under the microscope similar 
 fissured areas. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 The Westerly rail No. 1 shows nothing in its structure to indicate 
 any abnormalities in the mill practice. The rail is comparatively free 
 from slag, sulphide, and oxide areas. None of the areas showing 
 
26 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 macroscopic or microscopic fissures can be correlated with areas con- 
 taining sulphide, slag, oxide, or segregations. 
 
 Rail No. 10 shows nothing in its structure to indicate any abnor- 
 malities in the mill practice. Slag, sulphide, and oxide areas are 
 very sparingly distributed and are relatively small. Numerous in- 
 cipient fissures are present and are located in the head on the gauge 
 side. 
 
 The general structure of the two rails is such as to warrant the 
 statement that they are of a carbon content that will not afford a 
 toughness and ductility comparable with that of a properly treated 
 rail of a lower carbon content, hence the transverse fissures. 
 
 To remedy this condition two courses are open — fix the upper 
 carbon limit and prescribe the mill treatment which will insure the 
 maximum toughness and ductility with a sufficient strength, or reduce 
 the wheel loads. The former plan is to be preferred. 
 
 The metallographic examination by Mr. Tassin completed the 
 present examination of the material pertaining to this derailment. 
 
 Concerning the prevalence of transverse fissures in steel rails, of a 
 macroscopic order, not referring at this time to those microscopic, of 
 such dimensions as are menacing to the safety of railway travel, they 
 are believed to be numerous. Forty-six transverse fissures of recent 
 occurrence have been reported in 32 rails. Instances have been re- 
 ported in which five transverse fissures have been found in the same 
 rail within the limits of 3 feet. They are present in both open-hearth 
 and Bessemer steels. They are not confined to the product of the rail 
 mills of one section of the country. They occur over ties and between 
 ties, near the ends of the rails and along the middle of their lengths, 
 on tangents and in the upper as well as the lower rails on curves. 
 But one general remark can be made — they persistently appear on the 
 gauge side of the head. 
 
 In their maximum state of development they have been witnessed 
 in 100-pound rails having attained a superficial area of 3.3 square 
 inches, leaving practically only the web and the base intact. Our 
 investigation shows without question that these hidden fissures in 
 some rails reach such a state of development before discovery as to 
 destroy nearly the entire head of the rail, therefore it is not reassur- 
 ing that other rails of similar composition, working under similar 
 conditions of service, are not free from these interior defects. The 
 continuance of conditions which have resulted in derailments, at- 
 tended with loss of life and injury to passengers and employees, 
 places a great responsibility upon all who can in any manner aid 
 in the inauguration of measures which will tend immediately to 
 ameliorate these irrave conditions. 
 
ACCIDENT NEAK WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 27 
 
 Reference has been made in earlier derailment reports to causes 
 which are believed to be contributory to the formation and develop- 
 ment of transverse fissures. Data have since been gathered, some of 
 which are embodied herein, illustrating the probable sequence of 
 events which attend their formation, from the results of which the 
 contributory causes more clearly admit of recognition. Tracing the 
 fissures in the reverse order of their development, they are followed 
 down from the larger ones of rails broken in the track having dark- 
 ened oxidized surfaces to those of an earlier stage of development, of 
 smaller diameter with bright silvery surfaces, which have not yet 
 extended to the outer surface of the rail and therefore retain the 
 brightness of freshly fractured surfaces. 
 
 Next earlier appear fine cracks, not easily discernible to the eye 
 until the steel has been etched, preceded by other cracks still finer of 
 a microscopic order, but of measurable length to the eye if the 
 cracks were of sufficient width to be seen, eventually leading to the 
 detection of microfissures and the fragmentary or partial separation 
 of the microconstjtuents. These indications folloAv each other in 
 such order that they appear to belong together, representing different 
 stages in the loss of structural integrity and destruction of the metal 
 of the rail. 
 
 Such are the indications which pertain to rails which have been 
 in service. They have been looked for, but not found, in steel which 
 has not been in service, of similar composition and concurrent manu- 
 facture. As the evidence stands the formation of such fissures seems 
 attributable to track conditions and to those stresses which reach a 
 maximum in the metal of the rail at the head. 
 
 Steel of the composition of these rails in inherently a strong steel. 
 Music wire is drawn from steel of 0.85 carbon and in the form of 
 fine wire displays great strength. Records of such wire show a 
 tensile strength exceeding 450,000 pounds per square inch. This 
 grade of steel, in the form of hot-rolled, cylindrical bars, also, will 
 endure repeated stresses applied many million times, as high as 
 40,000 pounds per square inch. Furthermore, in these rails the steel 
 has displayed, in specimens from unaffected parts of the cross section, 
 tensile strength in round numbers ranging from 140,000 to 150,000 
 pounds per square inch. The strength possessed by steel of this 
 carbon content shows that in dealing with rails of such composition 
 we have a metal which in its original state has high physical 
 properties. 
 
 The spontaneous rupture of steels from internal causes occasion- 
 ally occurs with metal hardened by heating and quenching. Intense 
 internal strains are set up by sudden quenching which, if not amelio- 
 rated by drawing the temper, may occasion spontaneous rupture. 
 Coils of hard-drawn wire have shown fractured ends developed a few 
 
28 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 hours after drawing. Castings also have failed spontaneously. 
 These examples, however, refer to other classes of material than rails, 
 while internal tendencies, if any of special account exist in steel 
 rails due to casting or rolling conditions, have not so far as known 
 materially contributed toward rupture, Internal strains are left in 
 steel rails as in all hot rolled and naturally cooled steel, modified 
 by shape, weight of section, and rate of cooling, and higher strains 
 may exist in hard steels over those of lower grades in composition. 
 These features are all known to exist, and while in a strict sense they 
 are not negligible factors in the use of steels, nevertheless so far as 
 pertains to the formation of transverse fissures in steel rails they 
 are not held to be vital. 
 
 In reference to the relative strength of steel at the interior and 
 exterior of the shapes in the different passes of the bloom and 
 rail mills : The metal at the interior has been found lower in tensile 
 strength than that near the surface, in the early passes. However, 
 when the finished rail is reached these differences are inconspicuous, 
 but with the thinner sections of the web and base commonly showing 
 higher strength than the heavier section of the head. In this inquiry 
 the strength of metal at the center of the head of an unused rail, one 
 taken from a spare rail post, was found to be 148,000 pounds per 
 square inch. This indicated normal strength, showing no inherent 
 weakness in the metal of that portion of the head in which the weak- 
 ened steel of rails, taken from the track, has been found. 
 
 Gagging is an operation common in all rail mills. Necessarily 
 the elastic limit of the metal must be exceeded in this operation, 
 otherwise no permanent straightening would result, and since the 
 elastic limit must be exceeded, it follows that the higher the elastic 
 limit of the steel the greater will be the overstraining force required 
 to effect the straightening. 
 
 The actual bending force required for the purpose obviously may 
 be modified by regulating the distance between the supports of the 
 gagging press, but the resultant longitudinal strain in the rail must 
 in any event be sufficient to balance the internal strains which tend 
 to cause the rail to return to its original bent shape. These internal 
 strains will be greater in steels of high physical properties than in 
 mild grades of metal. In prescribing hard steel for rails these 
 severe internal conditions will necessarily be encountered. 
 
 Significance would attach to these several features in searching 
 for causes leading to the development of transverse fissures if inti- 
 mate relations were found to exist between them and such defects. 
 While not entirely disassociated, their influence and mutual rela- 
 tions seem remotely connected. Evidence connecting the formation 
 of transverse fissures with these primitive conditions is less direct 
 than that which attaches to track conditions. 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 29 
 
 In reviewing the results of this inquiry it will be noted that the 
 tensile strength of a rail of substantially the grade of metal repre- 
 sented in rail No. 1 was 148,000 pounds per square inch. This 
 strength was found at the center of the head of a rail which had not 
 been in service, but one which was rolled in the same year and month 
 and by the same manufacturer as rail No. 1. Microscopically, no 
 fissures were found in this unused rail. 
 
 Eail No. 1 and its companion No. 2 showed substantially the same 
 strength in each of their webs and bases, closely approached by the 
 metal in some parts of their heads. . Metal from the head of No. 1, 
 forged down and heat treated, gave correspondingly high results. The 
 normal strength of the steel, as indicated in these tests, ranged from 
 140,000 to 150,000 pounds per square inch. In general, however, the 
 metal in the. heads of both rails, taken in the condition the rail came 
 from the track, showed impaired strength. A tensile specimen from 
 the head of rail No. 1 fractured at 60,000 pounds per square inch, 
 while a corresponding specimen from No. 2 failed at 49,800 pounds 
 per square inch. An annealed specimen from No. 2 had a tensile 
 strength of 66,300 pounds per square inch. The latter ruptured at 
 a preexisting defect, an interior fissure of small size, which was 
 shown by an oxidize'd spot at the circumference of the test piece. 
 Tests conducted by the New Haven Railroad on these features of the 
 case furnished corroborative results. The metal in the head of each 
 rail was in a weakened condition. 
 
 The metallographic examination of No. 1 showed the presence of 
 incipient fissures and a condition of structural unsoundness existing 
 in different parts of the length of the rail. This unsoundness affected 
 the metal in the center of the head and on the gauge side. A gener- 
 ally shattered state characterized the metal of certain parts of the 
 head, while in other parts of the cross section of the rail the steel was 
 intact. 
 
 Although rail No. 1 had developed transverse fissures and had 
 broken in the track, while No. 2 had not experienced such extreme 
 vicissitudes, nevertheless the weakened condition of the metal in the 
 head of each was about the same. Had rail No. 2 been kept in the 
 track it is believed that it would eventually have developed the same 
 kind of fissures as shown by No. 1. The zones in which this state of 
 weakness was found where located in the same places in each rail and 
 closely coincided with the zone of disturbed metal which had been ex- 
 perimentally made in reciprocating tests of rails under high wheel 
 pressures. 
 
 Another rail of this series was microscopically examined, one taken 
 from the track after the same period of service as rail No. 1, from 
 which it differed in having lower phosphorus and manganese. Its 
 
30 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 phosphorus content was 0.020; manganese, 0.49. This rail showed 
 similar incipient fissures to those of No. 1. 
 
 Loss in tensile strength, the display of macroscopic and microscopic 
 fissures, and the development of transverse fissures, all seem to be 
 associated phenomena, and from the location of the affected metal 
 seem traceable to the action of wheel loads for their development. 
 No other cause is recognized as being present to which their formation 
 could be ascribed. 
 
 The general condition of the steel in these tests outside of the 
 affected zone was good and possessed of normal strength. The me- 
 tal lographic structure was the same at the fissures as in other por- 
 tions of the rail. There were no slag inclusions or indications of the 
 presence of slag at the transverse fissures where the rail fractured, 
 nor was slag found at the microfissures, of which there were many 
 examples in the different rails. Slag inclusions did not, so far as can 
 be ascertained, locate either the places of incipient fissures or the 
 larger transverse fissures of the broken rail. Since such inclusions 
 would be acicular in shape, in size not materially detracting from the 
 sectional area of the steel, and drawn out parallel to the length of the 
 rail, they would not be expected to exert any appreciable influence on 
 the strength of the rail against longitudinal stresses. A number of 
 slag streaks were specially examined for the purpose of ascertaining 
 whether incipient fissures had their origin at such streaks, but no 
 fissures were found associated with them. Metallographically nor- 
 mal mill practice is indicated. 
 
 In conclusion it appears — 
 
 That the derailment of train No. 26 was due to a broken rail. 
 
 That the rail fractured under this train by reason of the presence 
 of transverse fissures in its head, one of which was located 6 feet 7 
 inches from the leaving end and is believed to have been the place of 
 initial fracture. 
 
 That five transverse fissures were found in the rail ranging in diam- 
 eter from five-eighths inch to If inches. 
 
 That fissures of lesser extent were present in both this rail and a 
 companion rail of the same heat, each of which had had the same term 
 of service in the track. 
 
 That the metal in the heads of these rails was in a weakened state 
 in certain affected zones, the affected zones being located near the 
 center of the head and toward the gauge side. 
 
 That the weakened and structurally impaired metal shown in the 
 tensile tests was confirmed by tht metallographic examination. 
 
 That the steel in other parts of the rail was structurally sound and 
 possessed of normal strength. 
 
 That no slag inclusions were associated with the transverse fissures 
 nor with the microfissures. 
 
ACCIDENT NEAR WESTERLY, R. I., ON OCTOBER 25, 1913. 
 
 31 
 
 That fissures were present in different stages of development, 
 associated with each other apparently as to a common cause, the 
 microscopic examination indicating that such fissures were located 
 in metal otherwise structurally sound. 
 
 That microscopic fissures were present in certain other used rails, 
 which had not yet developed full-sized transverse fissures, furnishing 
 evidence that such rails were approaching a state in which full-sized 
 fissures would eventually be formed. 
 
 That the proximate causes to which the transverse fissures in 
 broken rail No. 1 are ascribed are high wheel loads with their attend- 
 ing strains, evidence of other causes not having been found. 
 
 That testimony is to the effect that a considerable number of rail 
 failures have recently occurred by reason of the presence of transverse 
 fissures. 
 
 That conditions which were precursors to the formation of trans- 
 verse fissures in broken rail No. 1 exist in other rails now in service. 
 
 That the presence in the track and continued use of rails of the 
 same or similar composition to rail No. 1 and exposed to the same 
 service conditions is a source of danger. 
 
 That evidence acquired indicates that transverse fissures may be 
 and are formed through the action of high wheel loads upon hard 
 steel rails. 
 
 It is manifestly evident from the above report and conclusions of 
 Mr. Howard, which are concurred in, that in this type of rail failures 
 there is presented a serious situation. Rail failures of other types 
 have been the cause of many accidents. 
 
 The figures contained in the following table are taken from the 
 monthly accident reports made to the Commission by the railroads 
 and show r the number of derailments caused by broken rails which 
 have occurred yearly since July 1, 1901, together with the casualties 
 and monetary loss resulting therefrom : 
 
 Year. 
 
 Number 
 of acci- 
 dents. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Injured. 
 
 Damage, 
 
 including 
 
 cost of 
 
 clearing 
 
 wreckage. 
 
 1902 
 
 1903 
 
 1904 
 
 1905 
 
 1906 
 
 1907 
 
 1908 
 
 1909 
 
 78 
 150 
 176 
 201 
 220 
 308 
 238 
 196 
 
 5 
 12 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 12 
 16 
 5 
 24 
 12 
 52 
 17 
 
 207 
 204 
 139 
 465 
 635 
 699 
 433 
 498 
 369 
 463 
 1,065 
 827 
 
 $128, 769 
 166,140 
 157,682 
 257,519 
 254,862 
 284,675 
 296,327 
 191,842 
 293,899 
 292, 749 
 511,778 
 401,551 
 
 1910 
 
 243 
 249 
 363 
 340 
 
 1911 
 
 1912 
 
 1913 
 
 Total.. 
 
 2,762 
 
 175 
 
 6,004 
 
 3,237,793 
 
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 
 
 32 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COIV 3 1262 08856 1989 
 
 This enumeration of casualties refers to a period the greater part 
 of which elapsed before rail failures by transverse fissures were 
 known or had become so prevalent as they now appear. The tabu- 
 lated results, however, emphasize the importance which the subject 
 of safety in rails has assumed. To those elements of danger existing 
 in the past is now added this type of failure shown in the develop- 
 ment of interior fissures. On account of the insidious character of 
 these fissures and the fact that they are progressive in their devel- 
 opment, and so far as is known no system of inspection has been 
 found that will detect them until they have reached the surface of the 
 rail, make it extremely difficult to suggest any preventive against 
 future accidents of this character. 
 
 Although as noted in previous reports dealing with rails failing on 
 account of transverse fissures, it seems apparent that a remedy lies in 
 the diminishing of wheel pressures and the lowering of direct com- 
 pressive bending and shearing stresses. 
 
 From the constant increase in rail breakages occurring from this 
 new type of failure, it would appear that the danger zone in the 
 use of steel rails as at present manufactured has been reached, since 
 the study of the rails here under discussion appears to indicate that 
 transverse fissures are the direct result of high-wheel pressures act- 
 ing upon hard steel. A complete investigation of rail, track, and 
 wheel load conditions for the purpose of determining the effect 
 thereon of the recent types of locomotives and cars, with their greatly 
 increased wheel loads, should be undertaken for the purpose of sci- 
 entifically determining this matter and ascertaining a remedy. 
 
 Eespectfully submitted. 
 
 H. W. Belnap, 
 Chief Inspector of Safety Appliances. 
 
 o 
 
 WASHINGTON : OOVERXMENT miNTINC OFFIPE : 191-1