y*i . j oi/oL r j 7 94th Congress 1 2d Session J COMMITTEE PRINT THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION lilt'","*. ^ \#*. SEPTEMBER 1976 77-634 O U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1976 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ROMAN L. HRUSKLA., Nebraska PHILIP A. HART, Michigan HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania BIRCH BAYH, Indiana STROM THURMOND, South Carolina QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia JOHN V. TUNNEY, California JAMES ABOUREZK, South Dakota Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas STROM THURMOND, South Carolina BIRCH BAYH, Indiana WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia Richard L. Schultz, Chief Counsel Caroline M. Courbois, Assistant to the Chief Counsel Alfonso L. Tarabochia, Chief Investigator Robert J. Short, Senior Investigator Mary E. Dooley, Research Director David Martin, Senior Analyst RESOLUTION Resolved, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, That the report entitled, "The Panama Canal and the Problem of Security" be printed and made available for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary. James O. Eastland, Chairman. Approved: September 24, 1976. (ID LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Washington, D.C., July 7, 1976. James O. Eastland, Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Judiciary Com- mittee, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 2241, Washington, B.C. Dear Mr. Chairman: Earlier this year you requested that I visit Panama for the purpose of making an appraisal for the Subcommittee of the internal security problems affecting the Zone and the Panama Canal itself. I have the honor to submit herewith my report entitled, "The Panama Canal and the Problem of Security". With every best wish, Sincerely, Harold E. Hughes. Enclosure. (l) Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2013 http://archive.org/details/panaproblOOunit THE PANAMA CANAL and the PROBLEM OF SECURITY A report submitted to Honorable James 0. Eastland, Chairman Senate Internal Security Subcommittee by Harold Hughes Special Assistant to the Chairman (3) INTRODUCTION Pursuant to the directive of Senator James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, the Honorable Harold Hughes, Special Assistant to the Chairman, former member of the U. S. Senate and Alfonso L. Tarabochia, Chief Investigator for the Subcommittee, visited Panama in early March to conduct an inves- tigation into certain related matters that might pose a threat to the security of the Panama Canal. In Panama, they had extensive conversations with the Governor of the Canal Zone, the Honorable Harold R. Parfitt, with the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, the Honorable William Jordan, with the Deputy Commander of the Southern Command, General J. Breedlove, with Mr. William Le Brun, the Internal Se- curity Chief for the Canal Zone, and with other officials. This on-the-spot investi- (5) gation was the culmination of several years of research and fact-gathering by the Sub- committee staff, bearing on the problem of the security of the Canal. Aware of the fact that the negotiations between Panama and the United States are at a very delicate stage, the Subcommittee es- tablished prior contact with the State De* partment, the Panama Canal Zone Adminis- tration, and the military authorities of the Southern Command, and it made it clear to them that the proposed investigation would be limited to areas falling within the mandate of the Subcommittee. The report that follows has been submit- ted to the Chairman of the Subcommittee by Mr. Hughes. THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY There axe few issues of international pol- icy that have produced sharper differences in Congress and among the American people than the issue of the Panama Canal. There are many members of Congress who feel that it would be in our national interest to abandon the claim to sovereign powers "in per- petuity" which is written into the original Panama Canal Treaty. They argue that insis- tence on the status quo would constitute a dangerous irritant to our relations not only with Panama but with the whole of Latin Amer- ica; and that our national security could best be served by agreeing to transfer sovereignty over the Canal Zone to the Panamanian govern- ment after a stated period of years, and full operational and military control over the Canal after a further period of years. There are other members of Congress who believe just as strongly that we cannot afford (7) 77-634 O - 76 - 2 8 to turn the control of the Canal over to the Panamanian government because they feel that so small a country could not guarantee the security of the Canal - that it might fall prey at any time to Soviet-Castro infiltra- tion leaving the control of the Canal in hands completely hostile to the United States. They therefore argue that we must not retreat from the language of the original treaty, which, they say, ceded the Canal Zone to the United States "in perpetuity". It is not the function of the Subcommittee to come up with findings designed to resolve this dispute in one direction or the other. In the final analysis, this will be the re- sponsibility of the Administration and of Congress . What is clear, however, is that, no matter what the course or the outcome of the current negotiations, the United States will retain responsibility for the operation and the de- fense of the Canal for a very long time. As long as it retains this control, it will have to confront an array of problems that have a 9 bearing on the security of the Canal Zone and the Canal. The interest of the Subcommittee is jus- tified by the fact that the foreseeable threats to the security of the Canal fall primarily under the heading of internal security. There is little or no danger that any nation will seek to seize the Canal through overt mili- tary action because such a challenge would almost certainly be regarded as a casus belli by any administration. Among the foreseeable threats to the security of the Canal are: (1) The continuing danger that Castroite elements and other extremists could seize on some incident to incite anti-American riots in the Canal Zone, similar to the riots of 1964; (2) The possibility of terrorist actions directed against the locks of the Canal, or against the retaining dams; (3) The possibility - hopefully remote - that the Castro government would seek to take control of the Panamanian government by infil- tration and subversion - or by means of a coup 10 on the style of the attempted subversive coup in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Some General Observations : Americans in the Canal Zone, with whom we discussed Panamanian Nationalism, from Governor Parfitt on down, told us that all Panamanians - conservative and middle-of- the-road as well as radical - are united in the desire to reassert Panamanian sover- eignty over the Canal Zone sometime in the not- too-distant future, and that this is a simple fact of life with which we must reckon in our policy decisions. The secrecy surrounding the current ne- gotiations on the Panama Canal has - perhaps inevitably - generated speculation and appre- hension. Convinced that this was having an impact on the morale of the employees under his jurisdiction, Governor Parfitt told us that he had sought the assistance of the U.S. Embassy in an effort to allay the anxiety of his employees. Apparently because secrecy is regarded as essential to the conduct of 11 the negotiations, Governor Parfitt said that he had been unable to obtain specific answers to many pressing questions - with the result that those who had expressed concern on one ground or another still continue to do so. Economic and Social Problems and Their Bearing on Security : The security of the Canal Zone is clearly linked to the morale and loyalty of the work force, both American and Panamanian. This is an exceedingly delicate situation because the Panamanian employees, quite understandably, insist on complete equality of treatment with the American employees, and on the elimination of certain inequities that are a heritage from the past and smack of colonialism. Governor Parfitt has approached this sit- uation with courage, tact and understanding. He frankly concedes that Panamanians in the Canal Zone have had many legitimate griev- ances, and that there has been a tendency on the part of U.S. Canal employees to look down upon the Latin American employees and to seg- 12 regate them socially. He says that this mentality is now being overcome, despite the lingering suspicions of the Panamanians. He admits, however, that many American employees are strenuously opposed to any improvements in the living standards, educational or employ- ment benefits for non-American employees, if these improvements are to be achieved, as they perceive the matter, at their own expense. In an attempt to deal with this situation, Governor Parfitt has recently taken a number of initiatives dealing with Canal Zone schools, employment policies, housing policies, and se- curity positions. In the case of the school system, Governor Parfitt has recommended the termination of sep- arate schools for Latin American students. While these schools were well-intentioned in the beginning, the Governor now says candidly that today this separate school system is unan- imously rejected by the Panamanians. American employees of the Canal Zone strongly protest that the proposed integration of the school 13 system will drastically affect the quality of the schools. To this, the Governor has replied that it is his intention to fully protect the quality of the schools. Under Governor Parfitt's proposed plan, the Latin American schools in the Canal Zone would be phased out in two stages. In phase one, the Latin American students en- tering grades K-4 in March 1976 would be given a choice of attending the U.S. schools in the Canal zones or in schools in Panama. If they elect to go to schools in Panama, the school costs, including transportation, would be taken care of by the Panama Canal Company and the Canal Zone government. However, if they elect instead to go to U.S. schools in the Canal Zone, they would be given four months of transitional training from April through July of 1976, and in August they would be assigned to a U.S. elementary school. In the second phase of the plan, terminating in De- cember 1979 and December 1980, students in higher grades would also be given the option of attending Canal Zone U.S. schools, or going 14 to school in Panama, or, if they so desired, they could continue to attend Latin American high schools in the Canal Zone until the last of the current student body graduates in De- cember 1979 or December 1980. The proposal also stipulates that Latin American teachers qualified under the Canal Zone U.S. schools certification requirements will be transferred to the U.S. schools. Governor Parfitt has also recommended greater job opportunities for Panamanians and enhanced opportunities for advancement. This has resulted in apprehension among the Amer- ican work force that the new policy will re- sult in fewer job opportunities and promotion opportunities for Americans in the Zone. Tension has been reduced somewhat on this score by assuring American employees that no indi- vidual will lose his job, and that changes will be effected only as jobs are vacated through retirements, promotions, and so on. The effect of the new employment policy on the mix of U.S. and non-U. S. employees will be 15 minimal for years to come. Opportunities for advancement for Pana- manians have in the past been seriously re- stricted by the stipulation that only Ameri- cans could fill the many so-called "security 11 positions, which have traditionally included a majority of all positions, as well as all senior positions in the police force, fire force, and Canal security force. It is Gov- ernor Parfitt's position that this require- ment is an anachronism. He believes that the non-U. S. citizens are rightfully proud of the part they play in the Panama Canal team and that they are resentful of any challenges to their loyalty. They are, in consequence, disposed to regard the limitation on security positions as a strategem for assuring that all the better paid positions go to U.S. cit- izens, in violation of treaty commitments calling for equality of employment opportunity I would be inclined to agree. In the revised security criteria he has proposed, Governor Parfitt has made certain recommendations designed "to achieve a balance 16 between providing upward mobility for Pana- manian employees and maintaining an adequate level of security." In the case of the ap- proximately 185 positions now designated as "security" because they involve access to classified information, the proposed new security criteria says that "an effort will be made to reduce the number of such security positions to the lowest number possible, com- mensurate with safeguarding national security information." The Governor's paper agrees that any individual having access to classi- fied information must possess an appropriate security clearance. It points out that this is not the same thing as designating the position a "security position", which has had additional restrictive implications. In the case of the Police Department, the Fire Department, and the Canal Protection Department, the proposed new security cri- teria, in the interest of upward mobility, establishes maximum percentages of security positions for the different grades. In the 17 case of the Fire Department, for example, only 25% of the class 4 positions - (class 4 positions are sergeants) - will be considered "security"; 75% of the class five positions - (lieutenants) - will be considered "security"; and 1001 of the class 7 - (captains) - will be so classified. Roughly similar percentages are suggested for the Police Department and Canal Protection Department. The new criteria would certainly help to improve the lot of Panamanian employees of the Canal Company and the Canal Zone govern- ment. However, they could be regarded by the Panamanian employees as a continuation, at a lower level, of the discrimination to which they have been subjected in the past. Re- gardless of this, the new criteria represent a major step in the right direction. Acknowledging that some of his proposals are highly controversial, Governor Parfitt underscores the fact that they were the sub- ject of prolonged and painstaking deliberations He believes we must seek to avoid any lengthy 18 open confrontations between Americans residing in the Zone and Panamanians. He points out there is no possible way in which the rela- tively small number of American employees could independently operate the Canal effi- ciently for a prolonged period of time. "We must depend," he says, "on the earned loyalty and support of all of our employees during times of distress and disturbances." The willingness of the American employees of the Panama Canal to accept an upgrading of Panamanian employees that may be partly at their expense has been adversely effected by certain planned economies in the operation of the Canal. The proposed economies have been justified on the ground that the Canal has been losing money for the past two years. According to the Canal Zone local of the American Fed- eration of Government Employees, these economies include the elimination of the 15% tropical pay differential for Panama Canal employees, certain reductions in the generous leave system hereto- fore in force, and cuts in personnel and ser- vices in areas of community life, including 19 the schools and health services. Instead of cutting back on operating costs in this manner, the local urges that serious consideration be given to increasing Panama Canal tolls. They point out that more than half the ships using the Canal are foreign flag vessels, that the cost of Canal tolls is a very small percentage of the total cost of carrying goods by sea, and that, despite a 20% toll increase in 1974, the overall in- creases, compared to a 1950 base, lag far behind price increases in other sectors. They say that, in effect, this puts the Pana- ma Canal employees in the position of having to subsidize shipping. In arguing in the favor of maintaining the privileged salary and leave systems of the past, the Union points out: "The U.S. citizen employees of the Panama Canal Company are, in a sense, captive employ- ees. The Personnel Director of the Company has stated that Company policy is to hire individ- uals for a career, not for a job, and that he 20 looks for someone who will stay with the Com- pany throughout his working life. The mul- titude of specialized jobs required by the Canal take training and time to learn, and don't provide the kind of varied experience that would permit an employee to easily trans fer back to the States. Making a career with the Panama Canal Company has traditionally required commitment, and the recruitment in- centives of the tropical pay differential, the leave system, and a stable community life provide the necessary attraction for making that commitment. 11 The facts set forth above will help to illustrate how delicate and complicated the situation is. A policy designed to satisfy the essential aspirations of the non-American employees in the Canal Zone has produced con- cern and some resistance in the ranks of the American employees. But despite the resis- tance he has encountered, Governor Parfitt feels - quite rightly, in my opinion - that we have to move, with all deliberate speed, 21 towards a policy of equality. He believes this to be morally right and essential to the tranquility and security of the Canal Zone. Security and the Need for Restraint: The security of the Panama Canal Zone can be adversely effected by statements and actions on either side reflecting a lack of restraint. Because of this, inflammatory rhetoric or inflammatory actions can be difficult to manage. The situation was not helped, for example, when General Omar Torrijos, Supreme Revolutionary Leader of Panama, exhorted his people, on the occasion of anti-Imperialist week, in these terms: "The present North American negotiators have told us that now we have come up with the business of sovereignty that has never been reaffirmed before with so much vehemence and that they have never been told here was a people that was ready to make a sacrifice in order to have its flag flying over this territory of ours. 22 "Apparently this is a language to which they are not used. It appears that we have taken them by surprise, because our country is not talking to them about financial ben- efits but is telling them that the Canal problem is a sentimental problem and that we give much more importance to the flag than to any economic benefit. "Undoubtedly the economic benefits have to come to us by force of gravity because the Canal is a necessary passageway that the world has used and a property through which the whole of humanity benefits. And if the whole of humanity benefits, it is also log- ical that the country that gave its entrails for the construction of this passageway has to receive economic benefits." And then Torrijos made it clear what the intentions of his government were with the regard to the peaceful flow of communications between the government of Panama and the United States: "Because if there is no satisfactory 23 treaty for our nation and for our people, there is something inevitable that is going to happen. It will come by internal com- bustion and it will be an explosion of the Panamanian people. The National Guard has two alternatives. There are two alterna- tives left to Omar Torrijos as a head of the National Guard - to suppress this patriotic rebellion of the people, or to lead it. And I will not suppress it." The key phrase in this statement seems to be "if there is no satisfactory treaty for our nation"; but in view of past occurrences affecting the Panama Canal Zone, one must examine this statement and its implications carefully. The Incidents Involving the Panamanian National Guard : Certain actions taken by the Panamanian National Guard in late December 1975 and early January of this year also had a highly de- stabilizing effect. At the very least, Pres- ident Torrijos must have had knowledge of 24 these actions. Before discussing these inci- dents, it might be useful to say a few words about the structure, role, and history of the Panamanian National Guard. As a military organization, the Panamanian National Guard, which is also Panama 1 s law enforcement agency, is not large numerically; nor is it well-equipped. It has a logistical system which is not capable of maintaining a line of supply and communications for more than a few days at a time. Translated into practical terms, it has a reserve of fuel and food supplies for approximately 76 hours for most of its posts. The most important role of the Panama- nian National Guard is riot control, a role for which it is very well-trained and has demonstrated its capabilities in the past. We have had good cooperation with them most of the time, but should there be a decision not to cooperate, the effect could be quite troublesome. This is a fact that cannot be overlooked when the internal security of the 25 Canal Zone is at stake. During the 1964 riots, the Panamanian National Guard abstained from intervening at the initial stages of the riots, thus allowing the ringleaders to take over a situation that could have been otherwise managed by a joint effort of the Panama Canal Zone police and the Panamanian National Guard. When it finally inter- vened, the riots stopped almost instantly. This erratic performance on the part of the Panamanian National Guard has several times characterized its handling of demonstrations against the United States. Because of the career and promotion system, the officer cadre supports General Torrijos and thus represents the support base for the government. Most of the high ranking officers of the Panamanian National Guard are the product of training in U.S. military schools in the Panama Canal Zone and are intimately familiar with methods used by the U.S. military. 26 The series of incidents involving activ- ities of the Panamanian National Guard with- in the Canal Zone was described in a lengthy newsletter put out by the Police Union in early January 1976. For some reason, these events were not carried by the American press. According to this newsletter, Captain Ferrufino of the Panama National Guard, on December 23, 1975, presented a formal written request that the Republic of Panama be allowed to post Panama National Guards within the boundary areas of the Canal Zone. On the following morning, December 24th, while Governor Parfitt and other Canal Zone officials were meeting to discuss the request, the Panama National Guard, acting unilaterally, posted 10 to 14 of its traffic patrolmen along a border road which is in the Canal Zone. A short while later, the PNG patrolmen started issuing "courtesy" citations and parking tickets to passing motorists and to Canal Zone vehicles legally parked within the Zone. According to the Police Union newsletter, the PNG had 27 arranged to have photographers on hand to take pictures of the citations being issued. When Major Gordon of the Canal Zone Police Division met later that morning with Major Garrido, Chief of the Panama Traffic Section, he strongly protested the intrusion of the members of the Panama National Guard and he asked Major Garrido to remove his men from the Canal Zone. Major Garrido, in reply, agreed that his men had overreacted, but he told Major Gordon that he could not comply with the request for removal - although he did remove some of his men. Major Garrido said that the Panama National Guard had infor- mation that leftist Panamanian students were planning demonstrations in the area, between Christmas and January 9, 1976, and that the National Guard would like to have "observers" on the Canal Zone side of the border during that period of time only. The matter was taken up with Governor Parfitt, and the Governor agreed that, beginning December 24th through January 9th, 28 two National Guard patrolmen would be per- mitted to accompany Canal Zone policemen in their patrol cars as "observers". According to the Police Union news- letter, the two Panama National Guardsmen assigned as observers engaged in several provocative actions. (For more details, the Police Union newsletter is attached as an appendix.) These incidents generated a good deal of tension at the time, but thanks to Governor Parfitt's firm but dip- lomatic handling of the situation, things never really got out of hand - and it is my understanding that there has been no repetition of such incidents since January. The Canal Zone Police and the Question of Security : The Canal Zone Police are the first line of defense against the possibility of violent demonstrations, originating in the Canal Zone or on the Panama side. In conversation with the Internal Secu- rity Chief of the Panama Canal Zone, Mr. 29 William Le Brun, regarding the employment of the Panama Canal Zone police, the fol- lowing information was obtained. At present there are 262 policemen employed by the Panama Canal Company. A breakdown of the positions is attached, divided by U.S. and non-U. S. citizens and their location of employment. Because the new proposals for the integration of the Panama Canal Police force are discussed extensively in the proposals of Governor Parfitt, this section will cover only the operational activities of the Panama Canal police as it relates to riot control. The police force is organized in ten- man riot squads, equipped with riot control equipment. The use of firearms is autho- rized only in extreme situations and by the Governor. It is obvious from the numbers available and the size of the territory that the Panama Canal Zone police could not secure the borders of the Zone in the event of a crisis. For this reason, there is a 30 special contingency plan to be implemented in time of emergency. Under Panama Canal Zone law it is the responsibility of the Governor to call for assistance from the military command, which would be placed on alert and the primary operational respon- sibility would be turned over to the mil- itary while the civil forces picked up support roles. In the Governor's absence, his duties would be taken over by the Lt. Governor. According to the operational plans, the police are prepared to respond imme- diately, and a simultaneous alert can be implemented in 5 to 10 minutes when there is available intelligence regarding im- pending disorders. This reaction time is lengthened to lh to 2 hours when there is no intelligence. It should be pointed out that we consider our intelligence systems to be adequate. Great emphasis is placed on training, and the military forces to be utilized have 31 had daily exercises to familiarize themselves with the locale and installations because the Governor can ask the military to supply guards for the Canal installations. Some military personnel are presently utilized as guards at locks and power stations. The operational plan by both the Canal Zone police and the military is obviously sound, and is based on an excellent system of intelligence, supported by daily contact with the intelligence community. There is a Joint Intelligence Committee which includes the Ambassador, the Governor, and the plan- ning officer of the Southern Command. It is chaired by the intelligence officer of the Zone. The Question of Cuba and the Security of the Panama Canal : Castro Cuba has the capability of posing .the principal threat to the security of the Panama Canal. This is so because of Castro ! s continuing hostility to the United States, because of his continuing commitment to rev- 32 olution throughout Latin America, because of his training programs for Latin American guerrillas and terrorists, and because of his recently demonstrated willingness to project Cuban revolutionary power thousands of miles across the ocean for the purpose of installing a pro-Communist regime in Angola. The Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security has received information since the early 60's on Castro infiltration in Panama. The Subcommittee's files contain numerous reports and items of information on this subject which are available to the Chairman. The inordinate interest displayed by the Cuban government in the Panamanian situation finds another expression in the fantastically inflated size of the Cuban Embassy in that country, which is now reported to be operating with a personnel of approximately 60 staff members. It must be assumed that many of these are members of the DGI and that their real activities 33 have little to do with their diplomatic status. There is also a continuing flow of travelers from Cuba to Panama and vice versa. President Torrijos is certainly not a Castroite; he has even expelled from Panama certain leftist radical elements he considered too extreme. The relationship between Pres- ident Torrijos and the Communist left" is probably aptly summarized in the following paragraphs from the U.S. Communist Party organ, "Peoples World", of January 17, 1976: "Torrijos 1 government is regarded by Panama's Marxist-Leninist party, the Peoples Party of Panama (PPP) as 'petty bourgeois in composition and nationalist in essence." "The new government took on an anti- Imperialist stand under the pressure of democratic forces,' Galdomero Gonzales, a leading member of the PPP, wrote in the June "World Marxist Review'." The Subcommittee has evidence that a significant number of men holding important positions in the government have, over the 34 years, either been involved with the pol- itical left in Panama, or have been involved in the disturbances of 1959, 1964 and 1965, or have openly professed their sympathies for Castro Cuba. The Subcommittee has evidence that at least three officers of the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence were invited by Colonel Manuel Noriega Moreno, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, to act as advisors to the Panamanian National Guard for a period of two months in 1973. With Panamanian nationalism as such, an accomodation acceptable to both sides seems possible. It seems highly question- able, however, that the Castroite elements in Panama would be prepared to settle for any solution that the United States would find acceptable. Most responsible Panamanians - and these are by far the majority - seek to achieve their objectives primarily through peaceful methods and negotiations - but it would be 35 prudent to anticipate that the Castroite elements, many of whom may have been trained in the Cuban schools for guer- rillas and terrorists, may be committed to the course of violence. I believe most Panamanian nationalists desire a continued American presence to be worked out through peaceful negotiations. Any Castro influence, on the other hand, in Panama will be committed to the total eviction of the American presence - economic, political and military - from Panama. American policy should therefore strive to help the moderate Panamanian nationalists extricate themselves from the embrace of the Castroites who masquerade under the guise of nationalism. There is reason to believe that this can be done. 36 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS : 1. I believe that Governor Parfitt has made excellent judgements in recommending changes in the areas of schools, housing, and job opportunities for our Panamanian employees in the Zone. Though this creates tensions within the American community, it should relieve tensions between nationalist Panamanians and the Zone authorities. 2. Our intelligence community there has an excellent grasp of what is taking place over all, and we can have confidence in their capacities . 3. Overall, there is an attitude of coop- eration in controlling any Zone border dis- turbances. In the case the cooperation is lacking, the U.S. has more than adequate capacity to respond to any need ultimately. 4. Our military capacity is such we need not be concerned with any military action from the outside. Terrorist action on a local basis against locks or dams would be 37 more difficult to control, but I believe we have the best possible contingency plans to cover any problem. I have con- fidence in our military, political, and intelligence groups there. 5. There will be constant attempts by Castro elements and other leftist groups to bring pressure against the U.S. presence in Panama. Overall, I believe the Pana- manians do not want this. The negotiations underway should work to our advantage in this situation. However, constant alert- ness and awareness to what they are doing is essential for the future. APPENDIX THE CANAL ZONE POLICE LODGE LODGE NO. 1798, AFGE Box No. 1994 Balboa, Canal Zone NOV 1975 office of the president Uilliam R. Drumraond TO j All Union members and Presidents and delegates of the CLU-hTC Dear Brothers and Sisters* I v;ish to present to you my views on a motion, made "oy myself that has been tabled. It is an opposite motion to a previous one vihich uas voted down. As you know, the CLU President has been contacted with the proposition of trading the treaty annex for our support of this proposed treaty or at least our non-opposition of that treaty. My motion is, in effect, not to engage in that contact nor to mako that commitment. To add validity to this contact, General Torrijos indicated in his October 11, 1975 address that he wanted dialogue with the people in tho Canal Zone. Further, the State Department has indicated that they will protect the interests of the Canal Zone Umpl.yccs. It has been indicated that this contact is not in labor nor is this an official contact. However, on its face it appears to be a valid contact. In order to best explain my position, I think you should understand why I am against ' ing our hopes to this Labor Anno--. To begin with, there is nothing in this Annex that I object to. On the contrary, I believe it to be the best position possible for the employees in the Canal Zone. However, as you know, I have been to Uashington five times in the last nine months. During that time I have discussed this annex \ri. th all that would take the time to listen. I have given these people copies of tho annex to study. I have re-contacted many of the same people, labor representatives and Congressmen, so that I could got a feel as to what their position was on this subject. Officially; most labor representatives indicate upport for this annex. Un-officially they have indicated that this annex doesn't stand a chance of getting the necessary legislation for its enactment into law. Officially; most Congressional Representatives who will havo to vote on the legislation for its enactment have politely indicated that it is rather "broad" and "extensive". Unofficially, most Congressional Picprescntativos have indicated that little if any of it stands a chance of being enacted into lav/ - even given that it was annexed to the treaty. Like you, prior to making these trips, I was convinced that if a treaty came we would be protected bocauso the AFL supported the annex and it was included in the 1967 treaty. After my first two trips, and I had received tho infor- mation as set out above, I was contci. that the AFL-CIO was well aware that tho demands in this annex would not be accepted by the Stato Department and in turn they - the AFL - would come out against tho treaty. I am now convinced that wc have maneuvered ourselves into a most dangorous position if a treaty comes, not because wc support the annox, but bocauso we have mado it our primary and tota 1 position. (39) 40 I am convincod of this for the following reasons: 1. This annex can "be included in tho treaty and still not get the legislation for its enactment. To prove this point I rofcr to the "Ileraor- andum of Understandings" enacted into " w pursuant to the 1955 Treaty. I remind you that the tre-.ty was approved by both Houses of Congress, while this pr.rt of the treaty was enacted by separate legislation. (p.L. 05-550) • I invite you to read the Congrcssior A debate on the '55 Treaty as well as tho hearing record on P.L. 35-550 which will further substantiate my asser- tion that this annex hr\sn't got a chruicc of enactment. 2. To -dd to this, tho last time out, I checkod out the '67 treaty which is still classified ~.s "secret" although published in the papers. I admit that ray check was a vcr' vursory one, therefore I do not assort that the following is fact but rather something that should be investigated. I found in that treaty a very ambiguous reference to employee benefits con- tained in Article twenty or twenty-one. I did not find tho labor annex that wo have been led to believe is contained in that treaty. Again, I am not asserting th .t it is not there - but only that I could not find it at the time. I was disturbed but not overly alarmed r.bout this course of cvonts since, as I have st-.tcd, even i. it were included in the treaty, I havo been led to believe that it has no chance of being enact od into law. 3. In order for us to get this annex enacted into law we would neod the full force of the AFL-CIO, the State Department, the Civil Scrvico Commission, rjid most of these Conservative md. Liberal Congressmen that -re against this treaty, as well as those that .are pro-treaty. Honestly isle yourself if those groups arc prepared to exert the effort necessary to do this. I remind you that it would take the cooperation of all of these groups to get this .annex enacted into law. Hy distrust for the promises of the State Department and Panama should be the s^nc as yours out of experience I am convinced that their promises mean mothing. The Civil Service Commission, on the other hand has a great deal to lose if this low was enacted. It would disrupt the whole systom for the benefit of some throe thousand employees even if you exclude the non-U. S. employocs. It would set a formidable legal precedent for every other government employee in the Service bent on equal rights, notwithstanding all we have heard of what took place in Guam or Okinawa. The enactment of this rjinex would entail multi-millions over a protracted period. Further, if wc accept this proposition, wc will havo undercut our only allies in this problem in the Congross. Logic tells you that you do not insult a Congre30: an and then ask him to support you on an issue that may have weak- ened his position to begin with. He may get some liberal pro-troaty Congress- men to support the annex legislation, but I remind you that this is a non- partisan issue. There ire many conservative pro-treaty Congressmen that their whole position on the faot tint they believe the Canal Zone employocs to be selfish colonialists. Our acceptance of this proposition can only entrench them in their belief. ilany liberals iso havo this belief. It is foolish to suggest that they need not know. Ho would be left with the support of the AFL-CIO . They in turn would havo to exert all of their lobbying effort to convinco an already hostile Congress that we d . They would be facod with strong oppooition from the Civil Sorvioc Commission t Lo On tho other hand, what can bo Lose by l iking opposition to this treaty? in? 41 At its worst we con lose tho treaty annex which, as I have stated, is a false premise as a primary position anyway. Theoretically, if the annex i3 not included, vie would havu the support of the AFL-CIO to add to our alii OS When ratification time coraos around. 3ven if this effort failed and the treaty was ratified, wo would still have an oven stronger base in which to get some aort of legislation to protect ourselves. I ara convinced that Wo would be in a much stronger position without the annex than with the annex left up to the State Department for support in its enactment. Do we have a viable position? I believe that we do but our weakest point is that we have gained the reputation, true or false, of selfish colonialists. Without this stigma, wo would not be in the position that we aro in today. Natural as it may be to want to protect your job within the United States, it is looked upon as gross selfishness two thousand miles away. He are put at a great disadvantage. I have enclosed a statement that puts all the arguments of the State Depart- ment to rest. I believe it to be a true,, logical, reasonable, and just solution which will be to the benefit ofall parties concerned for many years to come. It is not based on self interest, and if this idea is adopted, the only interests that will lose are the communist interests and the corrupt. Let me warn you that if this body does not take a firm position one way or the other, wo are going to lose by default. The State Department and the Government of Panama are making every effort here and in the Unitod States to sell this proposed treaty, lie, as well as the people of Panama are fast becoming the victims. Vie have the tools at our disposal \;ith irhich to counteract . lie are using one tool, a mailing campaign, but that is not nearly onough. Another tool at your disposal is the now revised Snyder amendment. I marvel at how little significance this body seems to attach to that amendment, say as compared to the Senate and House treaty Resolutions. This amendment is the senso of the whole House and the Senate. It must be signed by the President. It goes a long way further than these resolutions; locally as can be seen by tho fact of the Torrijos' accomodation on October 11, 1975* and this proposition to solicit our supp* . This amendment does not just say the Canal, it says the Canal Zone as well. This was one of the major issues fought over between the Department of State and the Congress. As it was, this amendment could have gone either way; which indicates to me, and I am sure the State Department feels the same way, that the House is not retreating from their position. If that amendment could be described as being lost at all, I personally blame this body for that loss. I want you to stop and think that there were at least 150 groups working to pass this revised amendment. The original amendment was passed by tho House twice without revision. On tho third time, a twice rovised amendmont passed by 11 votes. This issue could have been decided the other way by only six Swing votes. Knowing how the house votes, I am sure that this is exactly how the revised amendment was decided. Had wo had a man in the States who could convince just six Representatives, I doubt that we would be getting the covert contacts from our own State Department. No amount of mail can effect this. You must be ablo to personally make eye- ball contact to change situations such as the abovo. 42 To make natters worso, you toll no ono national Representative that was even aware or made any effort to swine those votes in the right direotion. I tell you that there was not one. Issues as vitally inportant to us as this one arc lost to us by default. To give you an example of what wo can do, I was in tho States when this issue was brought up the two previous times. I certainly do not lay claim to winning those times, but I know damned well, had I been there I could have convinced six men to vote- our way. No one is going to fight our battles if uo don't help fight them ourselves. It takes money even if you lose. But if you don't even make the effort to try we arc certainly going to loso. '..'e are not as weal: as our opponents would have us bcliove. But wo must use the tools wo have avoiiiblo to us. It is utter stupidity to think that our problems can be put off until tomorrow. I have suggested, on a number of occasions, of sending a permanent legis- lative representative to the States. You have answered that by excuses ranging f ro > it is not the right time to it costs too much money. You have all benefited from the several trips that this Union has made to Washington. I had hoped that you would finally realize through those examples just how important it is to havo a mail up there; not only to counter the enormous lobbying effort now being conducted, but also to work on current labor problems. I have started a public information corporation so that wo could combat the depressing apathy and propaganda put out by the State Department and Panama both horc and in tho States. You have refused to support this organization. You take the position that by supporting this corporation you nay alienate your chances in respect to the labor annex. Look around you. The State Department and those pushing this proposed treaty have inundated the States with propaganda, thoy have intensely lobbied the Congress and National Labor for support on their position. They have gone into the Department of the Army and the Company/Government to soil that position. They have solicit^* " the Civic Councils and arc now coming to us indirectly. Uo all know what results they have or have not achieved in these areas men- tioned. Tho very fact that HO are being approached, and especially in the manner that we arc being .approached should indicate a weakness in their position as well aa an inherent weakness in any promises made to us should v/c accept this proposition. Tho last tool wo have, and tho most formidable, is the truth. In all honesty, I sometimes wonder why I even attend these meetings. Timo and time .'.gain, I havo been told that you won't do anything for yourself or tho people you represent, raid you refuse to allow anyone else to talc a the action for you. The only counter I havo for this is the assertion that you aro being Misled and misinformed. I do not expect you to take at f.-.cc value What I have stated herein. I urge you to seek out for yourself, b fore it ir; Loo late, the truth of the matter. This Union can no longor bo burdonod by hesitation, inactivity, and suspicion. I am not q irosontatlvo. Nor do I have timo to sit down with each and every one ad explain each detr.il and every action and the legal 43 basis for a certain position, which I might add, has always boon for the benefit of this body. I think history will boar mo out, I wish to empha- size that there is just not enough tiao for all of this. I have outlined what I believe to be the right and the wrong thing to do in this matter based on experience . I leave it up to you to make your decisions, I urge you not to act irresponsibly 5 but rather to make a sound, logioal decision or two. The Bible says the "meek" will inherit the earth, but history says that the forceful, and docisivc will inherit the fruits of the meek. Sincerely yours, Hi Hi an R. Druumond THE CANAL ZONE POLICE LODGE LODGE NO. 1798, AFGE Box No. 1994 Balboa, Canal Zone OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT WILLIAM R. DRUMMOND O UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 3 12b2 0MEM6 5101