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 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 U.S. DEPOSITORY 
 
 INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENT ON THE NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN 
 & HARTFORD RAILROAD AT GREEN'S FARMS, CONN., ON NO- 
 VEMBER 16, 1912. 
 
 December 18, 1912. 
 To the Commission : 
 
 On November 16, 1912, there was a derailment of a passenger train 
 on the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad at Green's 
 Farms, Conn., resulting in the injury of 27 passengers. 
 
 Immediately upon receipt of telegraphic notice of this accident 
 from the railroad company, Assistant Secretary MeGinty proceeded 
 to Green's Farms and inspectors were ordered to the scene of the 
 accident to assist in the investigation. A public hearing regarding 
 this accident was held by me at New Haven, Conn., on November 20, 
 1912, and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Connecti- 
 cut, which had entered upon an investigation on its own initiative, 
 was invited to participate in and was represented at this hearing. 
 The investigation of this accident developed the following facts: 
 The derailed train was westbound passenger train No. 23, known 
 as the Merchants' Limited, running from Boston to New York. It 
 consisted of engine No. 1110, a combination baggage and parlor car, 
 a dining car, two parlor cars, and one observation car, all the cars 
 being of wooden construction and having reenforced steel platforms. 
 Conductor Eoss and Engineman Morley were in charge of this train. 
 Train No. 23 left New Haven at 8.20 p. m., on time, but on ac- 
 count of orders requiring reduced speed at Milford, Naugatuck 
 Junction, and Bridgeport, the train was delayed about four minutes. 
 At about 8.52 p. m. this train passed tower No. 53, at Green's Farms, 
 and it was derailed between this tower and Green's Farms station, 
 approximately 26 miles west of New Haven. The derailment oc- 
 curred just west of a crossover switch west of tower No. 53. 
 
 This division of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad 
 is a four-track line operated under the controlled manual block-signal 
 system. Tracks Nos. 1 and 3 were being used for westbound trains, and 
 tracks Nos. 2 and 4 were being used for eastbound trains. At the time 
 of the derailment train No. 23 was running on track No. 3. At the 
 place where the accident occurred there is a No. 10 crossover leading 
 from track No. 1 to track No. 3. The track is straight and prac- 
 tically level. It is laid with 30-foot rails weighing 100 pounds to 
 
 71190—13 
 
the yard, with an average of 16 ties under each rail. During the 
 past three years all tie renewals have been made with creosoted ties, 
 and at the time of the derailment about 60 per cent of the ties in 
 this vicinity were treated ties. Tie-plates and screw spikes are used 
 on all treated ties, while on ties that are not treated common driven 
 spikes are used. The ties in many instances are double spiked on 
 the outside, while all are single spiked on the inside of the rail. The 
 ties used are of southern pine and native oak and chestnut. The bal- 
 last is of rock, varying in depth from 14 to 18 inches. 
 
 Train No. 23 was reported past Fairfield, about 3 miles east of 
 Green's Farms, at 8.49 p. m. and passed tower No. 53 at 8.52 p. m. 
 Just as this train was passing the tower at Green's Farms the parlor- 
 car conductor, who was riding in the front end of the dining car, 
 heard a thumping noise as though something was dragging under the 
 car. He immediately went back to the rear end of the car and pulled 
 the whistle signal cord, signaling the engineman to stop. The en- 
 gineman answered this signal; looking back he saw the rear end of 
 the dining car tip over to one side, and he applied the air brakes in 
 emergency. When the train came to a stop the engine was about 
 1,400 feet beyond the point of derailment. The engine, tender, 
 combination car, and dining car were still coupled together, although 
 the dining car was derailed. The three rear cars were derailed but 
 did not turn over. They came to a stop about 600 feet to the rear of 
 the front portion of the train. 
 
 An examination of the derailed cars disclosed the fact that the 
 front equalizer bar on the south side of the forward truck of the 
 dining car had been broken. The dining car was built by the Pull- 
 man Co. in 1907, and had been in service since that time. The trucks 
 were standard Pullman six-wheel trucks, having a steel-plated, 
 wooden frame. There are four equalizer bars in each truck of this 
 type, two on each side. The larger end of the forward equalizer bar 
 rests on the forward journal box of the truck, the other end resting on 
 the middle journal box. The larger end of the rear equalizer bar 
 rests on the rear journal box of the truck, the other end resting on 
 the middle journal box, and the two equalizer bars meeting over the 
 middle journal box. The journal boxes are free to move up and 
 down between the flanges of the pedestal jaws, carrying the equalizer 
 bars with them, the ends of the equalizer bars resting on top of the 
 journal boxes. The pedestal is formed in two parts, an inner and 
 an outer jaw, each having two flanges which are cast together, the 
 jaws being bolted to the truck frame. The ends of the equalizer bar 
 come in between the pedestal jaws on top of the journal box and are 
 not visible or accessible for an ordinary inspection. The equalizer 
 bar was made of wrought iron, and at the place where the fracture 
 occurred it was 2>% inches wide and 2f inches thick. 
 
3 
 
 That part of the forward equalizer bar on the south side of the for- 
 ward truck of the dining car which rests on top of the front journal 
 box was broken off. The larger part of this fracture was new. There 
 was a small defect or crack about 1^ inches long and T \r inch deep in 
 the under side of the equalizer bar in the angle where it rested on the 
 corner of the forward journal box. This defect was so small and so 
 located that it could not have been discovered by any inspection unless 
 the equalizer bar had been removed from the truck, and the fracture 
 itself was hidden and could not have been discovered by any ordinary 
 inspection unless the equalizer bar had become displaced. It is 
 believed that the fracture started with this flaw in the equalizer bar, 
 and that it progressed very rapidly, so that the faulty bar would not 
 have been noticeably defective at the point where the last inspection 
 was made. The cars in this train were inspected on arrival in Bos- 
 ton the night before, and again after the train was made up for this 
 trip. Between Boston and the point where the accident occurred 
 the cars were inspected at Providence, New London, and New Haven. 
 At New Haven a broken dynamo belt was discovered dragging under 
 the dining car, and while an inspector was removing this belt the 
 foreman inspector himself inspected the south side of the forward 
 truck of the dining car ; he found nothing out of order. 
 
 About three-quarters of a mile east of the point where the derail- 
 ment occurred there was a mark on a tie outside of the south rail, 
 and between that point and the crossover switch where the derail- 
 ment occurred 13 similar marks were found, caused by the broken 
 equalizer bar which had dropped sufficiently to strike the higher ties. 
 The bottom of the broken equalizer bar was worn smooth, while at the 
 turn near the front end of the car it was scarred on the sides. At the 
 crossover the marks on the ties indicated that the equalizer bar had 
 struck the insulated joint and the block at the heel of the frog; near 
 the switch point the marks were deeper and more numerous than 
 elsewhere. It w T as evident that the loosened equalizer bar had caused 
 the journal box and pedestal in the middle of the truck to become 
 defective and break down, allowing the equalizer bar to drop. The 
 equalizer bar dragged through the trailing switch, springing the 
 switch point, pushing the stock rail out of place, and allowing the 
 wheels to drop from the rails. 
 
 On the roadway, some distance east of where the derailment in- 
 curred, the spring and spring seat which ride on top of the equalizer 
 bar were found, but the equalizer bar itself did not come out of the 
 truck until beyond the point of the derailment, It was found near 
 the dining car after the train came to a stop. 
 
 It is estimated that the speed of the train at the time of the derail- 
 ment was approximately 60 miles per hour. The schedule of this 
 train prescribes 46 minutes for a distance of 40 miles, between New 
 
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 Haven and Stamford. At the time of tht -„.miein the train had 
 been delayed about 4 minutes; there were no speed restrictions in 
 effect at this point, the track was straight and the grade was practi- 
 cally level, so that conditions seemed favorable for making up lost time. 
 The distance which the engine, combination car, and dining car ran 
 after the emergency application of the brakes indicates that the train 
 was running at high speed. Engines were changed at New Haven ; 
 the air brakes were tested there and found in good condition. The 
 engineman used the brakes between New Haven and Green's Farms 
 and he stated that they operated properly. 
 
 This derailment was caused by the breaking of the equalizer bar of 
 the forward truck of the dining car, allowing the spring to come out 
 and the truck to break down; and by the equalizer bar wedging in 
 the crossover switch, throwing the rails out of alignment and allow- 
 ing the wheels to drop off the rails. There was a defect in this 
 equalizer bar, but it was so slight that it could not have been dis- 
 covered by diligent inspection. It was impossible to determine what 
 was the immediate cause of its fracture at this time. 
 
 Respectfully submitted. 
 
 H. W. Belnap, 
 Chief Inspector of Safety Appliances. 
 
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