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 UPON THE 
 
 ROYAL PREROGATIVE N ENGLAND 
 
 ESPECIALLY SINCE 
 
 THE ACCESSION OF THE HOUSE OF BRUM OK, 
 
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 Inaugural-Dissertation 
 
 ae 
 Erlangung der Doktorwiirde 
 | der 
 hohen philosophischen Fakultit 
 cs 
 Ruprecht-Karls-Universitaét zu Heidelberg 
 vorgelegt von 
 
 Frederick Tuckerman 
 
 
 
 
 
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 Amherst, Mass., U.S. A. 
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 Heidelberg. 
 Universitaits-Buchdruckerei von J. Horning. 
 1894. 
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 Ernesti Georgi Friderici Grisanowski, 
 
 medicinae et philosophiae doctoris, 
 
 cuilus ingenium magnum et mores nobiles semper in animo 
 3 grato commemorat, 
 
 memoriae 
 
 hance dissertationem reverenter auctor dicat atque dedicat. 
 
 
 

 
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 CONTENTS. 
 
 page 
 (iui <3 Ea SRN Se ae nt Us Oe I AE eet = 1 
 Anglo-Saxon Period Sheer’ 5) 
 Anglo-Norman Supremacy to the Close of the Middle aces Bp Ve 8 
 RO SOULS etc a EO oe A eo. ee ee 
 The Jure Divino Monarchy . ... a2 
 The Accession of the House of Fremewick to the Beuiicticn of peiedial 
 Rule and Establishment of Popular Government . . . . . . 48 
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 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 —_———— 
 
 An attempt has been made in the following pages to trace 
 the rise and growth of the royal prerogative in England, and 
 to examine to some extent its sources of influence and power 
 at different periods of its history. But more especially has the 
 writer had in view an examination of the extent of the regal 
 authority since the accession of the house of Brunswick. In 
 the ancient Germanic tribes the form and principle of govern- 
 ment appear to have been essentially republican. After the occu- 
 pation of Britain by the Angles, Saxons and Jutes, and through- 
 out the Anglo-Saxon period, we have a history of petty king- 
 doms ruled over, for the most part, by constitutional monarchs, 
 elected by the Witan. The royal authority was limited in extent, 
 and even at times gave way, and became reduced to a shadow, 
 before the power of the national assembly. At other times the 
 kingdoms were virtually governed by oligarchies composed of 
 powerful thanes, or, as sometimes happened, a single thane 
 might be the actual ruler. After the conquest of England by 
 the Normans, constitutional government at once gave place to 
 personal rule and absolutism; and continental feudalism, but in 
 a modified form, became established in England. 
 
 On the Continent it seems to have been the decay of the 
 feudal system that first exalted the royal authority; but in Eng- 
 land this was due in great measure to the changes wrought by 
 the Conqueror in the system itself, which rendered absolutism 
 and feudalism no longer incompatible. The principle of the feudal 
 system was opposed rather than favourable to the principle of 
 
 1 
 
RORY ta elt 
 
 EG) © Giie 
 
 absolute. monarehy, ‘aid on the Continent it was only when the 
 former : had begun. a) degenerate that the latter was set up and 
 eventuaily supplanted it. In England, however, it was otherwise. 
 There absolutism prevailed centuries before it appeared in France 
 or Spain, and C0- -existed with the feudal system. But it was 
 and his Sou successors. The absolutism of the Norman kings 
 gave way in time, owing to the irresistible power of the feudal 
 magnates, to parliamentary control; but on the overthrow of 
 the king's of the house of Lancaster absolutism was again esta- 
 blished, and England took her place among the absolute mo- 
 narchies of Europe. 
 
 Despite the bold assertions of many writers on English 
 history to the contrary, there appears to be no evidence, no 
 authentic proof, of the existence of a Norman parliament, or of 
 an estate of the realm properly speaking, previous to Magna 
 Charta. There is nothing to show that the right of assent to 
 legislative measures and royal ordinances, the right of imposing 
 taxes and of voting subsidies, was even shared by the commune 
 concilium, the concilium ordinarium, or the magnum concilium, 
 or that these assemblies possessed any of the rights and pri- 
 vileges of the Anglo-Saxon witenageméte. Even in Magna 
 Charta no provision was made for the convening, at stated periods, 
 of a national assembly to deal with the grievances of the nation: 
 on the contrary, that ,keystone of English liberty“ left the king 
 the actual ruler and legislator, and in the former capacity he 
 continued with intermissions down into the present century. 
 
 The parliaments of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
 and early part of the fifteenth were in many respects identical _. 
 with those which still sit at Westminster; but there are impor- 
 tant points of difference. The parliament of to-day is in the 
 broadest and fullest sense a ruling body. The anti-Tudor me- 
 diaeval parliaments allowed the king to rule within certain 
 limits. But as they grew stronger they told him what he might 
 do and what he might not do, and when he stretched prero- 
 gative too far, they refused to grand him subsidies, and im 
 
Mia A 
 
 extreme cases they overthrew him. The two great crises of 
 the seventeenth century broke through the monarchy of Divine 
 right and substituted therefor a monarchy of contract. .The 
 promise of parliamentary government at the Revolution, however, 
 was not to be fully realized till our own time, 
 
 The contemporary records and documents show, contrary to 
 the generally accepted teaching, that during the century from 
 1727 to 1827 the kings of the house of Brunswick were rulers 
 in England as well as in Hanover. During the reign of 
 George II. the personal will of the sovereign was a dominant 
 factor in the state. Under his immediate successor the personal 
 influence and authority of the crown still further increased, and 
 during the administration of Pitt became firmly established. It 
 was not until the closing years of the reign of George IV. that 
 the remnant of independent kingship may be said to have ac- 
 tually expired. England is still governed by a cabinet, but by 
 a cabinet no longer responsible to the sovereign, but to parlia- 
 ment and the people. ‘The commons, the lords, and the crown 
 must each and all bow to the popular will when constitutionally 
 expressed, for the silent and powerful growth of democracy has 
 for good or evil gradually absorbed into itself the ultimate 
 decision of the destinies of the nation. 
 
 With the signing of the Roman Catholic Emancipation Bill 
 by George the Fourth on the 14 of April 1829, the long struggle 
 for the complete subversion of the royal prerogative may be 
 said to have finally come to an end. Since the Norman Con- 
 quest, or for nearly eight hundred years, attempts without number 
 had been made to confine the power of the crown within its 
 ancient limits. By gradual encroachments the rights and privi- 
 leges for ages inherent in the people had passed from them to 
 their warlike leaders and had become centred in the person of 
 the sovereign, who thus in time became, what the naticn or tribe 
 had formerly been, the source from which all supreme power in 
 the state emanated. It is only within our own time that the 
 people have regained full possession of their ancient rights and 
 liberties. 
 
Bie EV I ie 
 
 The fundamental notion of regal supremacy in England does 
 not seem to have been originally derived from the Germanic 
 tribes, for the same theoretical and ideal conception of kingship 
 and the kingly office is seen in the polity of all European 
 nations which arose out of the ruins of the Roman Empire.') 
 After the Norman Conquest the king was (and still is theoreti- 
 cally) the absolute ruler,”) the supreme judge,*) the sole proprie- 
 tor of the land,*) the commander-in-chief of all the forces of the 
 realm,°) the fountain of justice and honour,®) indeed the source 
 of all power and authority in the state. He is also the repre- 
 sentative of the kingdom touching all foreign powers; he can 
 make peace or war or ratify treaties at his pleasure.’) Finally, 
 the king is perfect and consequently incapable of doing wrong,*) 
 and never dies.*) Attempts to practically enforce these theo- 
 retical rights have everywhere at different times been made, and 
 have ever met with greater or less resistance. In most instances 
 the issue has been on the whole favourable to the crown; in 
 some the resistance has resulted in its final subversion. 
 
 It will first be necessary to examine briefly the extent of 
 the royal authority during the Anglo-Saxon period, and then to 
 follow the growth and development of the more important attri- 
 butes of the absolute sovereign power after the Norman Conquest. 
 
 1) Although the monarchical theory of modern Europe appears not to 
 have had its origin among the ancient Germans, but to have been derived from 
 the Empire, it is none the less true that many of the German communities 
 were under kings (especially the tribes that established themselves in the Em- 
 pire), but their power was not unlimited or arbitrary (Tacitus, de Mor. Germ. 
 7, 10, et seq.). Arminius, despite his great services to his countrymen, was put 
 to death for assuming (regnum affectans) royal dignity (Tacitus, Annal. 1, 88). 
 
 2) Blackstone, 1, 251. 
 
 3) Ibid. 1, 250, 266. 
 
 4) Ibid. un. 51, 59, 60, 415. 
 
 5) Ibid. 1. 262—264. 
 
 6) Ibid. 1. 271; iv. 2. 
 
 7) Ibid. 1% 252, 257. 
 
 8) Ibid. 1, 246. 
 
 9) Ibid. 1, 249. Vide Appendix, A. & B. 
 
 
 
The Anglo-Saxon Period. 
 
 Under the Anglo-Saxons the crown was elective but the 
 chieftain,’) cyning, cyne-hlaford, duke or king was limited in 
 his authority by ancient usage and the peculiar privileges of 
 the tribe or nation to which he belonged. He was further de- 
 pendent upon his personal qualities for the power he possess- 
 ed and his ability to retain it. The election took place in the 
 witan (gemdte, witenagemote), or national assembly of freemen, 
 in which the supreme authority of the nation resided. The office 
 was not hereditary, according to the rules of lineal descent, 
 though it gradually became a hereditary family right, the king 
 being usually chosen from a particular family. Illegitimacy was 
 no ground of exclusion, and any member of the chosen family 
 was eligible as circumstances might determine, the younger line 
 often being preferred to the elder.?) 
 
 The people (witan) not only possessed the right to 
 choose their king, but they likewise possessed and exercised 
 the right of deposing him for breach of his obligations or vio- 
 lation of his oath.*) According to the laws ascribed to Kad- 
 mund subjects were commanded to ,Swear such fealty to King 
 
 
 
 1) It was not for some time after the settlement of the Jutes and Saxons 
 in Britain that they adopted the title of ,king“, Aella of Sussex (514—519) 
 being the first who styled himself ,Cyning‘ (Baeda, Hist, Hecl. 1.15; Sax. 
 Chron. anno 449, 495). In Northumbria, East Anglia and Mercia the Angles 
 were established many years without any common head (Malmesb. Hunt. Westm. ; 
 Allen, Prerog. 165). 
 
 2) Out of nineteen successions to the throne in the united Saxon monarchy, 
 nearly one-half were irregular. Aelfred takes precedence of his elder brothers, 
 Kadward the Elder of his cousin, and Aethelstan of his legitimate brothers. 
 
 3) Aethelred II., after being dethroned and banished by the Danes, was 
 taken back by his subjects in 1014 upon a pledge of better conduct, and a 
 
Pee Pee ee 
 
 Kadmund as a man owes to his lord.“ On the other hand an 
 oath in return was expected from the king at his coronation to 
 maintain them in all their rights and privileges. Allegiance was 
 thus held to be conditional, and if the king violated his oath, 
 the subjects were released from the allegiance they had sworn.’) 
 
 The personal command of the army was entrusted to the 
 king, and he also appointed the other leaders. The power, 
 however, of deciding as to. war and peace, and the regulating 
 of the distribution and equipment of the contingents rested not 
 with him but with the people.”?) In later times, when the na- 
 tional militia and the personal retainers or vassals of the king 
 became more or less fused, the popular assembly still claimed 
 and asserted the right of giving or withholding its consent in 
 matters touching war.’*) 
 
 The witenagemétes also deliberated upon legal matters, 
 maintenance of the peace, police regulations, ecclesiastical 
 affairs, and taxation.) The ealdormen appear at first to have 
 been elected by the witan, or the king and witan;°) but in 
 later times the right to appoint and depose them rested with the 
 king.®) The shir-geréfas or sheriffs were a free appointment 
 of the king, who could also remove them for cause.’) Prior 
 to the Norman Conquest the power of the great thanes in both 
 the national and county meetings had become paramount at the 
 
 
 
 promise ,to be towards them a faithful hlaford“ (Sax. Chron. 1014). Sigeberht, 
 king of Wessex, was dethroned for his illegal conduct by sentence of his witan 
 (Sax. Chron. 755). Beornred, king of Mercia, was deposed and Offa elected in 
 his place. (Westm. 758). 
 
 1) The forms of withdrawing homage, fealty and allegiance, were observed 
 at the deposition of both Edward II. and Richard I. (vide Appendix C). 
 
 2) Athlr. vi. 32. sec. 3. 
 
 3) Gneist, Const. Hist. 15, 16. 
 
 4) The right of direct taxation was at first unknown to the Anglo-Saxons. 
 Under Aethelred II., with the consent of the witan, £ 10,000 (Danegeld) was 
 raised, with which he bribed the Danish hordes. This tax became permanent, 
 and lasted till the reign of Henry II. 
 
 5) Kemble, Saxons, 11. 126. 
 
 6) Gneist, op. cit. 49. 
 
 7) Athlr. m. 26. 
 
See FTE ice 
 
 expense of the lesser thanes and the royal power.’) After the 
 Conquest the power of the witenagemote was in its turn reduced 
 almost to a shadow, and instead of being the representative 
 assembly of the people or thanes, became the Consilium Regis.*) 
 
 Among the German tribes there appear to have been, ac- 
 cording to Tacitus,*) courts of justice before there were kings. 
 Capital offences were tried in the assemblies of the nation; and 
 questions affecting the life or death of any member of the com- 
 munity were there decided.*) In Anglo-Saxon times, even after 
 the king came to preside over the deliberations of the court 
 in person, the right of pronouncing the sentence still resided 
 in the assembly. 
 
 After Christianity had been adopted by the Saxon monarchs, 
 with the consent of the witenageméte, the king became the 
 protector of the Church, and exercised the right of appointing 
 bishops as well as sanctioning the resolutions of the ecclesiasti- 
 cal councils.®) In course of time matters affecting the external 
 institutions of the Church were sanctioned by the king and 
 national assembly, and in the tenth century the question of 
 monasticism was repeatedly deliberated upon in the witan.°) 
 
 
 
 1) As seen under Aethelred II., Cnut, and especially under Eadward the 
 Confessor. 
 
 2) Until after the Norman Conquest the legislative power appears never 
 to have resided in the monarch alone, but in the witan, or in the witan and 
 king jointly. Ine, king of Wessex, in 688 makes seventy-nine laws at his 
 witenageméte ,with the advice of his prelates, ealdormen, wisemen, and 
 clergy“. So Eadgar, in 971, long after the union of the kingdoms, speaks of 
 the laws which had been made by him and his witan (Ll. Sax. 80). 
 
 3) De Mor. Germ. § 12. 
 
 4) By the Saxon laws private warfare was in certain cases allowed. ,,Eivery 
 man“, says Aelfred, ,may fight for his Hlaford if his Hlaford be attacked; and 
 so may a Hlaford fight for his man“ (Alfr. 42). A man may also fight for his 
 natural-born kinsman (Leg. Hdw. Conf. 12). 
 
 5) Lingard, Anglo-Saxon Church, 1.89; Palgrave, English Commonwealth, 
 1, 173, 174. ,,In the time’ of Wilfrid and Dunstan the king asserted a control 
 over the resolutions of the Church, and over the right of appointing and dis- 
 missing prelates, against Rome as well as against the ecclesiastical councils at 
 home“. (Gneist, op. cit. 31). 
 
 6) Kemble, m.189. By the Kentish law the Church, archbishop, and 
 bishop, in case of theft, were exalted above the king. If any one stole from a 
 
LER SY Ce ak 
 
 Among the ancient Germans the territory possessed by the 
 tribe was considered as the property of the community, and was 
 parcelled out among its inhabitants according to their rank.’) 
 In the early Saxon times the land of the community never be- 
 longed to the chief. Conquered land was always divided among 
 the leaders and their followers, part being given to the king 
 and part being reserved to the state. This custom prevailed . 
 till allodial possessions were supplanted by feudal tenures. The 
 king had the usufruct of portions of ager publicus, or folkland, 
 but he had no exclusive right to alienate it.?) At first the 
 latter could only be granted away (bdcland) by the witan; later, 
 by the king, but only with the assent of the national assembly.’) 
 
 The Anglo-Norman Supremacy to the Close of the 
 Middle Ages. 
 
 In the Anglo-Saxon period, as already stated, the crown 
 was elective, but after the Conquest it gradually ceased to be 
 regarded as a direct grant from the people, though the form 
 of election, as often happens, long survived the reality of a 
 choice.*) The Norman Conqueror and his successors retained 
 all the powers and revenues of their Anglo-Saxon predecessors 
 
 church he had to pay twelve times the value of what he had stolen, from a 
 bishop, eleven times, and from the king nine times the value (Athlb. 1, 4. 9; 
 Athlr. vn. 7). By the Mercian law the compensation for the king (Weregeld) 
 was 7200 shillings, or six times that of a thane, and thirty-six times that of 
 a ceorl. 
 
 1) Tacitus, de Mor. Germ. § 26. 
 
 2) Kemble, 11, 42—87. 
 
 3) ,.Kings were the leaders of the people, not the lords of the soil‘ 
 (Palgrave, 1, 62). Cnut was the first prince that styled himself in his laws , King 
 of all England“ (Kallas Hnglalandes). 
 
 4) William, after he reached London, underwent the ceremony of an election. 
 ‘Rufus, Henry I., and Stephen were raised to the throne by their followers, the 
 two latter being usurpers. Henry II. succeeded in virtue of a treaty with 
 Stephen, which was ratified by the barons. Richard I. took the crown by 
 descent and was the first who took it without the form of an election. John 
 obtained it by election after an interregnum of nearly two months. Until the 
 
ald SAGs Sy pal 
 
 and, as supreme feudal lords over all the land, added to these 
 the newly-acquired feudal rights.) 
 
 As the Norman military system became firmly rooted in the 
 state, the royal prerogative of deciding the question of war and 
 peace became firmly established. The exclusive right of forti- 
 fying castles became likewise a royal privilege.?) The king could 
 now claim the right of personally summoning the thanes, since 
 every vassal and under-vassal of the crown had taken the mili- 
 tary oath of fealty to the king’s person. This oath was binding 
 for both his possessions at home and abroad, intra et extra reg- 
 num.°*) The judicial powers of the king were no longer formal 
 and supplementary as during the Anglo-Saxon supremacy; he 
 was now henceforth the ,,fountain of justice‘ and the supreme 
 judge.*) William issued ordinances and decrees,°) and by means 
 of his arbitrary administrative system punished every infraction of 
 them by fines (amerciaments) °) or sequestration. By these means 
 the royal will received the force of the older resolutions of the 
 national assembly,’) and absolute, purely personal government 
 
 
 
 time of Edward I. usually an interval of a few days elapsed between the death 
 of the king and the accession of his successor. Since the accession of Edward I. 
 in 1272 there has been no interregnum, save where the order of succession was 
 broken by changes of dynasty. 
 
 1) Until the death of Henry II., a century later, there was a continual 
 revolt on the part of the great vassals against the English feudal lordship. 
 
 2) Gneist, op. cit. 128. 
 
 3) Charta, Will. I. 3, c.2; Stubbs, Charters, 83, 84. 
 
 4) Under the name ,Curia Regis“ there existed a wide judicial authority 
 residing in the king of personally appointing and constituting the court in im- 
 portant cases, the king often sitting in person and administering justice himself. 
 The court thus constituted became the forerunner of the justiciarti of later 
 times (Gneist, op. cit. caps. 11, 16, 17). 
 
 5) Will. I. 3; Stubbs, Charters 34. 
 
 6) Madox, Hist. Hach. 1. 526, 1, 65, 66; Leges Hen. I. c. 13. 
 
 7) During the Norman period there are no signs of a legislative assembly. 
 One hundred years after the Conquest, under Henry II., the first beginnings are 
 seen at the assizes of Clarendon and Northampton, (Peers’ Report, 1. 36, 42). 
 Stubbs speaks of the ,nominal* character of the assizes, in which only the 
 theory and form of a national assembly are retained (Const, Hist. 1, 356; 
 Charters, 17: vide also Hist. 1. 276; Charters, 1. 23; Gneist, op. cit., 207, 208). 
 The principal authorities, with the notable exception of Gneist, insist more or 
 less on permanent royal councils at this period (wide Parry, Parl. 10; Hallam, 
 Middle Ages, ir. c. 8, note 13; Stubbs). 
 
Ns AD eee 
 
 became established.’) The Conquest was followed by a great 
 and immediate increase in the property and revenues of the 
 crown, due to wholesale confiscations, extensive reservations, 
 excessive taxation, and fines without number.?) 
 
 Thus the government had become firmly consolidated into 
 a single, and that too an absolute monarchy; but as the Conqueror 
 had won the throne with the support of the ecclesiastical estates, 
 he was now compelled to make some concessions to this almost 
 sovereign power within his dominions.*) The first three kings 
 of the Norman period remained virtually masters of the Church, 
 and exercised the ancient rights of the Anglo-Saxon king touch- 
 ing the appointment of prelates ahd the royal ratification of the 
 resolutions of the councils.*) Under William Rufus the estates of 
 the Church were brought into the feudal system, i. e. granted to 
 be held under the same laws of tenure as the baronies and 
 knights’ fees, with full burden of the feudal service. 
 
 By the centralizing influence of Duke William and Henry I. 
 the conquered people and their conquerors were after a lapse 
 of a century welded into one homogeneous nation, a monarchy 
 at once feudal and national. The vigorous police system (frank- 
 pledge), and the development of the Exchequer into a department 
 
 
 
 1) ,,.Hence the Norman King became possessed of an arbitrary penal juris- 
 diction, such as probably no other potentate of the Middle Ages ever possessed“ 
 (Gneist, op. cit. 162—164). Brougham thinks the Conqueror was not absolute, 
 and holds to the idea of a Norman parliament. 
 
 2) The inheritance of Edward, the possessions of the family of Godwine, 
 and the remainder of the old folkland were immediately seized as royal de- 
 mesnes. The estates of the crown were further increased by the frequent lapsing 
 of fiefs through escheat and forfeiture. The royal desmesnes are given by Cowell 
 and others as 1422 manors, 30 chases, 781 parks, and. 67 forests (Ellis, Inér. 1. 
 228, 229). The crown revenues during this period were derived from many 
 sources, but chiefly from amerciaments, reliefs, wardships and marriage, and from 
 the auxilia, scutagia and tallagia. 
 
 3) They were granted a separate ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the Peter’s 
 pence etc. Under Henry I. the investiture of the archbishop with the ring and 
 staff was abolished. 
 
 4) Stubbs, Const, Hist. 1. 374. At the close of the twelfth century the 
 bishops were elected by the chapters and confirmed by the archbishop; but the 
 royal consent to the choice was still indispensable. 
 
for financial administration and into a royal court,!) both con- 
 tributed to this end. Under the energetic Henry II. the insti- 
 tution of itinerant justices or commissioners attained a definite 
 form.”) In this reign the Court of King’s Bench, under the 
 general name of Curia Regis, probably had its origin.*) With the 
 Assize of Clarendon in 1164, and that of Northampton twelve 
 years later, to which a number of lesser crown vassals were 
 summoned, the idea of a legislative power in the nation tem- 
 porarily revived, but a whole generation passed before another 
 one was held.*) 
 
 Under Henry the mischief done in the reign of Stephen was 
 more than repaired. He weakened the power of the barons, 
 protected the mass of the people, and established order through- 
 out the kingdom. Under him the power of the crown was al- 
 most as great as it had been under his grandfather. He was 
 not only king of England, but lord of Ireland, and ruler of one- 
 third of what is now France. In extent of territory and in 
 amount of revenue, as well as in ability and energy, he was 
 the greatest prince of Western Europe. Although his latter 
 years were full of vicissitudes, and he died defeated and broken- 
 
 1) Brought to its completion under Henry II. The Grand Jury (twelve 
 lawful men in every hundred and four in every township), to present or accuse 
 criminals before the king’s judges, owes its origin to the Assize of Clarendon, 1166. 
 The Lateran Council of 1215 declared that trial by ordeal was unlawful, and in 
 place of the ordeal the Petty Jury of modern times was sworn to decide upon 
 the guilt or innocence of persons accused by the Grand Jury. 
 
 2) Foss, Judges, 1, 174. At the Assize of Northampton, 1176, the counties 
 were divided into six circuits, and three Justiciarzi appointed for each circuit. 
 
 3) By a decree of 24 Henry II. five commissioners were appointed ,,who 
 shall not journey through the land, but shall hear pleas at Court“ (Bened. Petr. 
 266, A. D. 1178; Gneist, op. cit. 229). 
 
 4) ,Assize of Bread“, 5 John, 1204. 
 
 »Henry II. is the first of the three great kings who have left on the con- 
 stitution indelible marks of their own individuality. What he reorganized Ed- 
 ward J. defined and completed. The Tudor policy, which is impersonated in 
 Henry VIII., tested to the utmost the soundness of the fabric; the constitution 
 stood the shock, and the Stuarts paid the cost of the experiment. Hach of the 
 three sovereigns had a strong idiosyncracy, and in each case the state of things 
 on which he acted was such as to make the impression of personal character 
 distinct and permanent“ (Stubbs, Const. 1, 446). 
 
EA bce 
 
 hearted, it might seem that he had put the royal power in Eng- 
 land beyond the possibility of dispute. 
 
 Richard reaped the benefits of his father’s good government; 
 but he himself was no statesman, and he neglected his people 
 and put them to heavy expense for his wars and his ransom. 
 Yet during this reign numerous charters conferring extensive 
 privileges were granted to cities and towns. The system of 
 inquest by juries was maintained and applied to new purposes, 
 and the power of the sheriffs was reduced by a rule that no 
 sheriff should act as a judge in his own county. By an ordi- 
 nance of 1194, the office of coroner was created, which provi- 
 ded that in every county three knights and one clerk should be 
 elected to keep the pleas of the crown (placita coronae). 
 
 John lacked the martial qualities of his brother and was 
 destitute of political sense. From the very beginning of his reign 
 he governed badly, and thus prepared the way for the momentous 
 events of 15 June 1215. By his cowardice, harshness, cruelty, 
 avarice, and sensuality he estranged successively all classes 
 of his subjects. In addition to this he was so rash as to engage 
 in a conflict with the two ablest and most powerful statesmen 
 of the time, Philip Augustus and Innocent III, a conflict which 
 resulted in the loss of the French provinces. and in his own 
 degradation. Thus by his own acts of folly the king, finding 
 himself almost deserted, was forced to accept the articles offered 
 him by the barons, and on the 15% June 1215 he affixed his 
 seal to the Great Charter.') By this act of John, the foundation 
 
 1) The provisions of Magna Charta (which consists of sixty-three articles) 
 applied to the commons as well as to the nobles and clergy, and directed that 
 its benefits should_reach the lower tenants. Principal provisions: — (hb) Rati- 
 fication of Henry’s charter, and confirmation of the freedom of election already 
 granted to the clergy. (2) The regulation of feudal dues and obligations, and 
 reduction of the relevia to fixed payments. No scutagia or auaxilia (i. e. extra- 
 ordinary aid) were to be levied without the consent of the tenants-in-chief 
 (except in the three ancient cases of ,honour and necessity“), and for this 
 purpose only was the king bound to summon a common council of the realm. 
 (3) To London, and all other cities, boroughs, and ports, were guaranteed all 
 their"ancient liberties; and touching the auwxilia (tallagia) of the city of Lon- 
 don, the same rule was to apply as in the case of the aids of the feudal vassals. 
 
oy pepe 
 
 of the English constitution may be said to have been completed. 
 »The Magna Charta‘, says Hallam, ,is still the keystone of 
 English liberty. All that has since been obtained is little more 
 than a confirmation or commentary; and if every subsequent law 
 were to be swept away there would remain the bold features 
 that distinguish a free from a despotic monarchy.‘ 
 
 By Magna Charta legal limits were set to the exercise of 
 royal sovereign rights, and in extreme cases the suspension of 
 
 Merchants were to have their trade and traffic secure, and free from all ar- 
 bitrary impositions and tolls. (4) Civil actions were to be heard in some fixed 
 place, and the civil assizes were to be held once a year in every county by 
 itinerant justices (hence arose the second court of common law, known as the 
 Court of Common Pleas, which continued to exist untii the year 1873). None 
 were to be appointed justices who were not versed in the law of the country, 
 and arbitrary fees exacted for judicial proceedings were to cease. No Vicecome-, 
 no constable of a castle, or local bailiff of the king was henceforth to exercise 
 in his own right criminal jurisdiction. It was provided that no man should be 
 punished without due trial. No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, or da- 
 maged in person or estate, save by the judgment of his peers (judicium parium) 
 or the law of the land“ (Art. 39). This clause contains the germ of the right 
 to trial by jury, and of the right to speedy trial given by the Habeas Corpus 
 Act. (5) For the condemnation of any to an amerciament, a co-operation of 
 the ,good men“ of the neighbourhood was necessary. Fines were to be pro- 
 portioned to the offence, so as not to take from the freeholder his land, from 
 the merchant his merchandise, or from the villein his wainage. (6) All forests 
 made since the accession of John were to be disforested. In every county 
 twelve knights. were to be chosen to inquire into and report on the evil customs 
 in force in the forests, and all such customs were to be abolished. One system 
 of weights and- measures was to be established throughout the kingdom. Many 
 clauses refer to all the freemen, and a few were directly framed in the interest 
 of the villein (e.g. his wainage was not to be taken by way of fine). The 
 charter concludes with a provision intended to secure its observance. The barons 
 were to choose twenty-five of their number to conserve and guard the charter. 
 For any infringement of its provisions any four of the conservators might demand 
 redress from the king and, failing this, were authorised to summon the communa 
 to put constraint upon him by seizing his lands and castles, or by any other 
 means, saving always the liberty of himself, his queen, and children. The charter 
 received its first confirmation (1 Henry III.), at Bristol, 11th Nov. 1216; but 
 the clauses dealing with taxation (Arts. 12, 14), the great council of the realm 
 (Art. 61; subsequently adopted, 1264), and the forests (Art. 47) were omitted. 
 With some omissions and additions it was confirmed for the third time in 
 9 Henry UI., 11th February 1224, and in this form it afterwards took its place 
 among the statutes of the realm. 
 
Pa So Ee: 
 
 the personal government was demanded. The intention was not 
 to subvert the personal authority of the king, but to secure the 
 country against the arbitrary exercise of the royal power by 
 restricting it within legal limitations. 
 
 During the long reign of Henry III. the first attempts at 
 a goverment by the estates of the realm appear.') Passing over 
 the confused and undecided struggle between the incorrigible 
 monarch and his foreign favourites on the one side, and the 
 great barons on the other, we reach the climax at the council 
 at Oxford, 11th June 1258. At this parliament?) a permanent 
 committee of fifteen to act as a sort of regency was chosen.’) 
 The committee for a time exercised the powers of royal govern- 
 ment, and demanded first of all the faithful observance of the 
 charters; next, that the chief justice, chancellor and treasurer 
 should be elected annually; thirdly, that parliament should be 
 held three times a year; and, lastly, that the royal castles 
 should be placed in the hands of Englishmen.*) After the over- 
 throw of Simon de Montfort and the final conclusion of peace, 
 the king took back the appointing power; and such of the rules 
 laid down in the provisions of Oxford as were not at variance 
 with the royal prerogative, were confirmed by him with the con- 
 sent of parliament. During this reign the right of the crown 
 vassals to assent to the imposition of scutagia and aucilia was 
 established by many precedents.°®) The personal will of the king, 
 however, was still the dominant factor in the state, and it was 
 only his constant pecuniary embarrassment which compelled him 
 to frequently summon in council the greater vassals of the realm.°) 
 
 1) No estate of the realm properly speaking existed prior to Magna Charta 
 (Peers’ Rept. 1. 87, 97, seq., 109, seq., 254). 
 
 2) Afterwards called the ,Mad Parliament‘. 
 
 3) Stubbs, Const. Hist. u. 77. 
 
 4) Peers’ Rept. 1, 101—127. 
 
 5) The omission of articles 12 and 14 of Magna Charta, which dealt with 
 the grant of scutagia and auxilia, was compensated for by an effectual practice 
 of grant and refusal (Gneist, op. cit. 267). 
 
 6) Henry III. was in such constant want of money that he was foreed to 
 make concessions. In 1237 he proposed that the great council should not only 
 
Stages 
 
 The greatest gain of this period is seen in the advance of 
 the greater and lesser crown vassals and freemen towards a 
 constitutional position in the state. Deputies from the shires 
 and towns were henceforth to participate (though at first in a 
 modest way) in the deliberations of the nation. Thus the epoch 
 at which the representatives of the commons becomes distinctly 
 manifest was reached.?) 
 
 Under Edward I., a man of great energy, and the great- 
 est monarch since Aelfred, confidence was again restored in the 
 monarchy. The constitutional importance of this reign cannot 
 be over-estimated.”) In it was laid the foundation of the system 
 
 
 
 settle the best manner of collecting an aid, but should also appoint a commis- 
 sion to see that it was properly expended. In 1238 he offered to submit himself 
 to the decision of a commission of fifteen elected to reform the kingdom. In 
 1254 the queen and his brother acting as regents during his absence in Gas- 
 cony, summoned to a great council at Westminster four knights chosen by each 
 shire. This perhaps was the first occasion on which representatives of the coun- 
 ties sat in a great council. Shortly after his dispute with the pope, John as- 
 sembled a council at St. Albans to which were summoned four representatives 
 from each of the townships on the royal demesne. From this it appears that 
 towns, and not shires, were first represented at a council of the king. Still 
 later, John called another council, and issued a summons directing the sheriffs 
 to send four discreet knights from each shire to speak with him concerning the 
 affairs of the realm, but we do not know whether this council ever met. 
 
 1) In the participation in national affairs of the lesser crown vassals and 
 freemen is seen the beginning of the House of Commons. Prior to this period 
 lesser vassals of the crown had been summoned a few times to deliberate touch- 
 ing extraordinary aids or money grants (Parry, op. cit. xir.), now, however, 
 they were called to deal with the business of the nation. In 1258 the lesser 
 vassals were invited to choose two knights in order that these shall appear 
 to deliberate upon the awxilia, In 1261 Simon de Montfort summoned three 
 knights from each county to an assembly at St. Albans to deliberate upon ,state 
 business“, while the king invited the same deputies to a council at Windsor. 
 In 49 Henry II. (20th January 1265), de Montfort, in the king’s name, con- 
 voked a parliament at London, to which were summoned in addition to the pre- 
 lates and greater temporal vassals, two knights from every county, from the 
 cities and burghs two citizens, and from the Cinque Ports each four men 
 (Peers’ Rept. 1. 141—145; Rymer’s Foedera, 1. 449). . 
 
 2) Lord Chief Justice Hale states that in the first thirteen years of Kd- 
 ward’s reign, English law made more progress than in all the centuries from 
 that time until his own day (vide also Blackstone, rv. 425—427). 
 
wt 34 
 
 of legislation, taxation, and judicial procedure. ‘The machinery 
 of the central administration was perfected, and the right of 
 the crown vassals to participate in the government was defi- 
 nitely conceded and acknowledged.*) The king still summoned 
 the lords, knights and burghers at his discretion, and still ini- 
 tiated legislation and issued decrees on his own authority; but 
 in the latter part of the reign the constitutional right of the 
 estates to vote taxes was established, and their advice was 
 asked in the affairs of the nation.”) 
 
 A judicial system with distinct courts of law was now defi- 
 nitely established.*) Constables and justices were appointed, 
 
 
 
 1) During the reign of the three Edwards a series of statutes were enacted 
 by the king with the assent of the estates of the realm (,,By the King by the 
 advice of his Council and the assent of Parliament“). Statutes passed by the three 
 estates could no longer be repealed by simple ordinances. 
 
 2) Under Henry III., but more definitely under his son, a royal council 
 as a permanent governing body was formed for the ordinary business of the 
 state and to assist and advise the king. Connected with the royal council were 
 certain periodical meetings of notable prelates and barons. The meetings were 
 at first convoked four times a year, and later annually. The lords were sum- 
 moned by royal writ, but a selection was exercised by the king, and in the 
 fourteenth century the summons carried no hereditary right to a seat. (Peers’ 
 Rept. 325, 326; ur. 117, 265). The Assembly (Parliament) thus consisted of 
 Spiritual and temporal lords and members of the royal council. ,,The peculiar 
 line of Edward’s reforms, the ever perceptible intention of placing each member 
 of the body politic in direct and immediate relation with the royal power, in 
 justice, in war, and in taxation, seems to reach its fulfilment in the creation of 
 the Parliament of 1295“ (Stubbs, Const. 1. 292). The general right of the 
 estates to consent to all grants of taxes, auxilia, scutagia and tallagia, was 
 established by Edward, 5th November 1297 (25 Edward I. c. 5. 6). This Con- 
 firmatio Chartarum is in a French text (Statutes of the Realm, 1. 124, 125), 
 and in a less perfect Latin text, as statutwm de tallagio non concedendo 
 (Stubbs, Charters, 487, 498). 
 
 3) The establishment of courts of law under Henry III. and Edward I. 
 was a security against arbitrary judgments under the personal government, though 
 the judges were appointed by the king, and invested with his personal judicial 
 authority. He could both remove them and punish them. This occurred repeatedly 
 in the reigns from Edward J. to Richard IJ. (Edward III. 1340, Foss, mr. 262; 
 1345, Ibid. 365). The separation of the administration of justice from the 
 question of evidence, and the concentration of the former in the persons of 
 learned judges took place in this reign, as did also the constitution of juries 
 of the hundreds and counties to determine the question of fact (Stat. West. 1285, 
 Edward I. c. 3). 
 
RI jg as 
 
 from whom subsequently grew the justices of the peace. The 
 power of entail was established; and, lastly, a measure of self- 
 government was extended to the counties and municipalities, 
 The parliament in Edward’s reign was pre-eminently a judicial 
 assembly. The commoners, however, did not share with the 
 Spiritual and temporal lords the royal judicial power; they only 
 participated in the granting of taxes;') but a sign of their grow- 
 ing importance is seen in their virtual assent in the sanction 
 of certain statutes, and in the last year of the reign they were 
 mentioned in the preamble to a statute. Thus under Edward the 
 monarchy became distinctly more constitutional and less mediaeval 
 and personal than in any preceding reign. *) 
 
 In the fifteenth year of the reign of Edward II. appears 
 perhaps the first express recognition of parliament as a legis- 
 lative assembly; and emphasis was now laid upon the fact that 
 where a consent to royal ordinances was to be given, the assent 
 of the commons must be as essential as the assent of the lords.3) 
 It is also significant that the commons now begin to attach 
 conditions to their grants.*) Early in the reign, as an outcome 
 of the monarch’s incapacity for government, an executive coun- 
 cil, under the name of ordainers, was forced upon the king. With 
 
 1) Under Edward I. only a deliberative voice of the commoners was in- 
 tended, and then for the most part touching only the taxation of the counties 
 and towns. In 11 Edward I. (80th September 1283), knights and burgesses were 
 summoned ,to hear and to do such things as should be laid before them on 
 the part of the King“ (Peers’ Rept. 1, 187, 188). This participation developed 
 itself in the form of petitions, common grievances, and motions. 
 
 2) , Thus we may say that in the time of Edward IJ. the English Consti- 
 tution delinitely put on the same essential form which it has kept ever since.“ 
 (Freeman, Const. 123). ,,The Parliaments which Edward gathered at the close 
 of his reign are absolutely identical with those which still sit at St. Stephen’s. 
 At the close of his reign the long struggle of the constitution for actual ex- 
 istence had come to an end“ (Green, 1, 320). 
 
 3) Peers’ Rept. 1, 282, 283. 
 
 4) In 2 Edward II. a twenty-fifth was granted on the condition that the 
 king should redress eight grievances which were laid before him, which he pro- 
 mised to do. The dismissal and exile of Piers Gaveston was made one of the 
 conditions annexed to the first grant of a subsidy to Edward I. (Parl. Hist. 1. 
 56—60). 
 
 2 
 
the support of the commons, however, the king again succeeded 
 in shaking off the obnoxious guardianship of the party of nobles. 
 All the decrees of the ordainers, so far as they violated the 
 prerogative of the crown, were repealed, and it was acknow- 
 ledged that upon questions touching affairs of the crown and 
 state, resolutions could only emanate from the king himself, 
 with the assent of the spiritual and temporal lords or estates. 
 
 The long reign of Edward III., with its constant demands for 
 subsidies, and its frequent parliaments,*) gave the commons a 
 sure feeling of their independence.?) They advanced in this 
 half-century about as much as the prelates and barons in the 
 half century under Henry III.*) The initiative in legislation was 
 now gradually shared between them and the king, and taxation 
 by parliament received further confirmations.*) The king, it is 
 true, arbitrarily imposed taxes; but on the other hand he was 
 met by attempts at encroachment, by the estates, on the royal 
 right. of appointment.°) In the first year of the reign police 
 magistrates or justices of the peace were appointed by royal 
 ordinance in all the counties,®) and in 1360 became a permanent 
 institution.”) The right of impeachment by the commons likewise 
 began in this reign,®) and lastly it was in this reign that par- 
 
 1) Edward III. convened parliament no less than seventy times in thirty- 
 seven of the fifty years of his reign (Gneist, op. cit. 408). 
 
 2) Peers’ Rept. 1. 335, 336. 
 
 3) Gneist, op. cit. 380; Rot. Parl. rv, 98, 135, 211, 242, 277, 371. 
 
 4) By Statute 14 Edward JII. (1340) it was enacted that no charge or 
 aid should henceforth be made but by the common consent of the prelates, 
 earls, barons, and commons of the realm of England in parliament assembled. 
 By this statute the king lost the power of imposing a tallage upon the inhabi- 
 tants of his royal demesne, a power which had not been expel taken away 
 by the Confirmatio Cea 
 
 5) Attempts at encroachment by the estates were made in 15 and 30 Kd- 
 ward III., but the demands that were then granted were in both cases shortly 
 repealed. 
 
 6) 1 Edward III. 
 
 7) 34 Edward III. c. 1. 
 
 8) 51 Edward III. 
 
at Ag (Cee 
 
 liament was definitely divided into two houses.') During the 
 minority of the incapable and indolent Richard IT. the government 
 was in the hands of the council, which discharged the functions 
 of a council of regency. In the second year of this reign, a 
 parliament of the prelates and barons declared itself incom- 
 petent to grant taxes without the commons. The nobles, knights 
 and towns were thus merged in their tax-granting capacity and 
 liability. The commoners increased their control over the dis- 
 bursements of the state. In 2 Richard II. they grant supplies 
 under the condition ,that the King be pleased to declare in what 
 way the great sums which had been granted for the war had 
 been expended,“ and this condition was acceded to.?) In the 
 next year they granted a subsidy with the request to the king 
 »that he may be pleased not to convene another Parliament to 
 tax this poor Commons until one year after date.“*) Impeachments 
 in both houses of the great officers, and their deposition by 
 the king, are frequent in this reign.*) By a re-action and the 
 support of the commons the king freed himself from the control 
 
 ~ 
 
 1) 25 Edward III. The parliament of 1341 (15 Edward IIIL.), which by 
 some is regarded as that at which the final division of the parliament into two 
 houses took place, ,enacted that at each Parliament the ministers should hold 
 themselves accountable for all grievances, that on any vacancy the King should 
 take counsel with his lords as to the choice of the new minister, and that when 
 chosen each minister should be sworn in Parliament. Its form was now settled. 
 The third estate had gained a fuller Parliamentary power. The principle of 
 ministerial responsibility to the Houses had been established by formal statute. 
 But the jealousy of Edward was aroused, and he looked on the new power as 
 ‘a rival to his own. The Parliament of 1341 had no sooner broken up than he 
 revoked by Letters Patent the statutes it had passed, as done in prejudice of 
 his prerogative* (Green, 1. 414, 415). Two years later the parliament also 
 declared the statutes repealed. 
 
 2) Parry, op. cit. 140. 
 
 3) Parl. Hist. 1. 357. 
 
 4) In 7 Richard II. the commons petition against the bishop of Norwich. 
 In 10 Richard IJ. they determine on the impeachment of Lord Chancellor Suf- 
 folk, who was deposed and fined (Parl. Hist. 1, 184—190). In 11 Richard II. 
 the royal chamberlain was arraigned and even the royal judges were condemned 
 to death. In 21 Richard IJ. the archbishop of Canterbury was condemned to 
 banishment for high treason (vide Parl. Rolls, 18—28). 
 
of the great nobles and regained his power, but only to abuse 
 it. Parliament was coerced into repealing all decrees of former 
 years which were aimed at restricting the royal prerogative. 
 Finally the incompetent, arbitrary monarch was formally deposed 
 by a resolution of both houses of parliament, a precedent being 
 thereby established.') 
 
 After the usurpation of the house of Lancaster the throne 
 was no longer founded upon the right of birth alone, but upon the 
 recognition of parliament as well. Thus, under Henry IV. a 
 favourable opportunity was offered for the extension of parlia- 
 mentary powers. The peerage was now consolidated, and the 
 inheritable right of those summoned by custom to a summons 
 to parliament was acknowledged. The constitutional position 
 of the commons improved during the earlier years of this reign. 
 They requested and received a presentation of accounts,”) and 
 acquired a precedence in the voting of subsidies.*) Their co- 
 operation in making statutes also received further confirmation ; 
 but exclusive jurisdiction was still reserved to the upper house. — 
 Henry was compelled by the commons to name sixteen counsel- 
 lors, by whose advice solely he was to be guided, and they 
 were not to be dismissed unless convicted of an offence. No 
 
 1) From the deposition of Richard II. probably dates the idea of regard- 
 ing the prelates as the first estate of the realm, the temporal lords as the sec- 
 ond estate, and the deputies of the counties and towns as the third estate. 
 (Peers’ Rept. 1. 357). Under Richard IJ. appears shortly the ,assent of the 
 prelates, lords and commons“. Under Henry V. the ,,consent“ of the commons is 
 met with. In 11 Henry VI. the expression ,,by the authority of Parliament“ 
 first occurs. (Stubbs, Hist. mr. 465). 
 
 2) ,Under Henry and his immediate successors the Commons gradually make 
 conditions for the employment of the subsidies, and recommended retrenchment in 
 certain branches of the public expenditure, and make the granting of fresh sub- 
 sidies conditional upon the redress of national grievances‘ (Hallam, Const. Hist. 11. 
 84; vide also Rot. Parl. iv, 98, 185, 211, 242, 277, 371; Parl. Hist. 1. 286). 
 
 3) The commons now claimed for themselves the exclusive right of origi- 
 nating money grants, and insisted on the absence of the king while they were 
 discussed. In 5 Henry IV. the commons requested the king to remove four of his 
 ministers together with his confessor, which he did, though protesting he knew 
 of no cause or occasion. (Rot. Parl. 11. 525). 
 
officer of the household was to hold his place for life or for a 
 fixed term. The council was to determine nothing which the 
 common law was capable of determining. Numerous abuses 
 in the council and in the administration were enumerated and 
 prohibited.') During the short but brilliant reign of Henry V. 
 there occur again acts of arbitrary rule on the part of the 
 king.*) But the increased importance of the commons is seen in 
 their being convened to take part in negotiations touching the 
 league with the Emperor Sigismund and the treaty of Troyes, 
 after a great council had declared itself incompetent to deal 
 with these subjects.’) 
 
 The reign of the incapable and insane Henry VI. was at 
 first favourable to the increase of parliamentary functions and 
 privileges. After the death of the Duke of Bedford in 1484, 
 however, the situation of the realm became more and more 
 critical, till in 1455 the storm broke which involved in the war 
 of annihilation the two great dynastic factions. During this 
 wild aristocratic struggle for the political supremacy, which 
 lasted with intermissions for thirty years, government by con- 
 stitutional means was frequently suspended. Under Edward IV. 
 personal rule was again restored and, supported by the com- 
 mons, he declared the rule of the kings of the house of Lan- 
 caster to be usurpation, and by ,bill of attainder* one hundred 
 and fifty-one nobles, knights and clerics guilty of high treason. 
 About one-fifth of the land fell by outlawry and confiscation 
 into the hands of the king. 
 
 During the early part of the Lancastrian rule, parliament, 
 and especially the house of commons, had continued to in- 
 crease its power. The constitutional growth of the previous 
 
 
 
 1) Petition of thirty-one articles, 8 Henry IV. (Rot Parl. 11. 585). 
 
 2) Nicolas, Privy Council, 1. 29, 30. 
 
 3) Henry agreed that no statute should have any force or effect without 
 the express assent of the commons (Brougham, Works, x1.). He however re- 
 fused to concede the privilege of freedom from arrest, though the commons from 
 the first had claimed freedom of speech in parliament. The privilege had seldom 
 been infringed, and in the next reign received recognition. 
 
sey: OE rae 
 
 century had been continued. The commons had secured the 
 right of originating money bills, not to be altered by the house 
 of lords, nor discussed in the presence of the king. They had 
 secured the right of joining as an equal estate of the realm in 
 the passing of laws. They had succeeded during the reign of 
 Henry VI. in preventing any changes in the form of their peti- 
 tions, by bringing in complete bills, to be rejected or accepted 
 as a whole. And they had in more than one instance exercised 
 the right of impeachment. But before the close of the wars 
 of the Roses the constitutional growth of the country had been 
 decidedly checked, and the commons had lost ground, and also 
 in a great measure, their independence. A statute in the eighth 
 year of Henry VI. limited the franchise touching knights of the 
 shire to freeholders of lands and tenements of the value of 
 forty shillings. Thus an aristocratic tone was given to the 
 house. In addition to this the nobility and the crown had 
 begun to tamper with, and exert an influence upon, the elections 
 in the counties. The sheriffs, who exercised the power of sum- 
 moning the deputies from the towns, were likewise brought 
 under the influence of the ruling party.') This decrease in the 
 power and efficiency of the lower house, together with the 
 destruction of the old upper house, had tended greatly to in- 
 crease the importance of the royal council, which now practi- 
 cally usurped the legislative power of both houses. At the 
 close of the reign of Richard IIL, owing to the nearly complete 
 annihilation of the old nobility, and the dependence of the new 
 nobility on the crown, the power of the two houses of parlia- 
 
 ment was about equal. 
 
 The Tudor Absolutism. 
 
 During the last half century of the Middle Ages the foun- 
 dation of the still unfinished, but firmly rooted constitution had 
 
 1) Attempts by the sheriffs at influencing elections and falsifying the re- 
 turns of individual members, especially of knights of the shire, had already been 
 resorted to under Richard I. 
 
Be, ea 
 
 been rudely shaken. This institution had been the growth of 
 centuries. Its foundations had been wrung from an unwilling 
 tyrant. In defence of its principles, two kings had been deposed ; 
 and two had been defeated in open battle, the one being taken 
 captive, the other slain. With the accession of Henry Tudor, 
 upon whom the remnants of the two factions had settled the 
 crown,!) that change in the character of the monarchy is com- 
 pleted which was begun by Edward IV. The constitutional 
 erowth of the nation, which had been steadily advancing since 
 the time of Edward I., was now checked. A personal and vir- 
 tually absolute monarchy had displaced one national and feudal 
 in character. The ancient nobility having been almost exter- 
 minated in the war of mutual destruction, the council and chief 
 officers of state again, as in the fourteenth century, transacted 
 the important business of the realm. The councillors were ap- 
 pointed by the king, and were independent of parliament.’) 
 The intermediate classes having thus disappeared, the mon- 
 arch found himself face to face with the commonalty; but he 
 had little to fear. The commonalty was yet far too weak to 
 act as a check upon its rival, if at this period it could be called 
 such. The Church needed the support of the crown. All its in- 
 fluence was therefore withdrawn from the people, and thrown 
 on the side of the king; and from now until the time of Crom- 
 well the ablest ministers were supplied from its ranks.*) The 
 restricting of the franchise under Henry VI. to freeholders of 
 forty shillings, had brought the representation under the in- 
 fluence of the crown and the county magnates. The commoners 
 _ were thus prevented from acting with their former independence; 
 
 1) Henry adhered to the form of having himself declared king by the 
 parliament. 
 - 2) ,The King’s will is the sole constituent of a privy councillor.* — Coke. 
 3) Under Henry VII. the king’s nominees to episcopal sees were without 
 exception appointed. But the question lay in the background ,,whether the King 
 and nation should accept, at the Pope’s dictation, the nomination of so large a 
 portion of the House of Lords as the bishops really formed“, which ,would 
 have placed the decision of national policy in foreign hands“ (Stubbs, mi. 318). 
 
ea toNeee 
 
 and from~this time begins that slavish, servile, subservient 
 demeanour which, with intermissions, lasted into the present 
 century. 
 
 The opportunity was now offered for establishing and con- 
 solidating a strong monarchy, and Henry, determined and avar- 
 icious, and bent on firmly securing his dynasty, was not slow 
 to grasp the situation and to make good use of it for furthering 
 his ends. The first scheme of his policy was to keep the great 
 barons in subjection; and this he accomplished by abolishing 
 the military liveries, by numerous forfeitures, and by other 
 stringent measures. At the beginning of the reign it was found 
 necessary, in order to cope successfully with the partiality and 
 venality of the sheriffs and the juries, the insolence of the nobles 
 and their armed retainers, to have a strong and energetic police 
 system; and, in addition to this there developed in the council 
 at this time a peculiar new creation. This was the privy council 
 as Star Chamber.') Henry, by illegal methods,?) by the revival 
 of obsolete penal statutes, by an unjust employment of the royal 
 right of escheat and, lastly, by his economy, kept the coffers 
 of the royal treasury well filled. By such means he freed him- 
 self from the necessity of calling frequent parliaments, and in 
 the last seven years of his reign he summoned but one.?) 
 
 1) ,In consideration of existing great tumults and illegal assemblies, cor- 
 ruption and partiality“ the statute 3 Henry VII. (c. 1) empowered the Chancellor, 
 Treasurer, and Keeper of the Privy Seal, together with a bishop, a temporal 
 lord of the council, and two justices of the realm, to examine persons upon 
 royal order, and to punish them for seven offences especially enumerated, among 
 which were sedition, illegal assemblies, factious unions with distinctive liveries 
 and badges. This is the extraordinary criminal power of the king in council 
 which had never ceased, and which was here acknowledged afresh and embod- 
 ied in a commission (Gneist op. cit. 504, 505). 
 
 2) The practise of levying ,,Benevolences“ or forced loans (without any 
 definite prospect of repayment) was first introduced by Edward IV., but was 
 declared illegal by a statute of Richard III. The abuse was revived in 7 Henry VII., 
 and recurred repeatedly, especially in the years 1495, 1505, 1525, and 1545. 
 »Morton’s Fork“ was another clever principle of extortion. 
 
 3) During the reign altogether seven parliaments were summoned; a num- 
 ber quite sufficient doubtless for the monarch’s purposes, as he had no pecuniary 
 
OER eee 
 
 Under Henry VIII. the personal rule attained its full de- 
 velopment. In the king were centred all the forces of the govern- 
 ment. ‘The parliament was merely an unresisting instrument for 
 gratifying the arbitrary caprice of the monarch. The sovereign 
 power was further augmented by the assumption of the ecclesia- 
 Stical supremacy, and the transfer to the crown of the immense 
 power which the church had hitherto wielded. The dissolution 
 and secularization of the monasteries not only supplied him with 
 ereat wealth, with which to bribe the temporal lords, but de- 
 prived the spiritual peerage of twenty-eight seats, thus reducing 
 it to a minority in the house.') 
 
 How completely the parliaments were in the grasp of the 
 king a glance at some of the more important statutes and re- 
 solutions enacted in this reign will show.?) In 1529 the king 
 was released by act of parliament of all the debts he had con- 
 tracted six years previously; and in 1541 this act was fol- 
 lowed by a resolve, that if anyone had been repaid his debt 
 the money was to be refunded by him.*) He was further 
 
 needs, and the seat of actual government lay in the privy council. According 
 to Brougham, Henry VII. was the first king since Henry III. who ever lived 
 within his income (Const. x1. 199). 
 
 1) The crown acquired by this means £ 500,000 personal property, and 
 at least £ 131,000 annual rents from real estate; according to some estimates 
 the amount was far greater. The clergy now lost the character of a separate 
 estate of the realm. The abbots sat for the last time in the upper house, 28 June 
 1539 (31 Henry VIII.). 
 
 2) Bills initiated by the crown were almost invariably accepted. In 1525 
 the king was resisted (though without success) when he levied a tax and after- 
 wards a ,benevolence“*. In 1532 the commons rejected a bill, and Henry, 
 though with a bad grace, submitted. The exercise of parliamentary privileges 
 shows in this period many vicissitudes; but, as a rule, the Tudors respected the 
 personal rights of members. In 35 Henry VIII, the sheriffs of London were 
 committed to prison by the house for arresting a member. In the same year, 
 the privilege of the house was acknowledged as against an order of arrest issued 
 by the council (Nicolas, Proc. vu, 306). Vide also case of Strode, a member of 
 the lower house, 4 Henry VII. (Stat. of the realm, m1. 53). 
 
 3) The parliaments of Henry VIII. showed themselves so compliant, that 
 he is said to have raised more subsidies than all his predecessors together. 
 
roo Opt heme 
 
 empowered, as a general law, on attaining the age of twenty- 
 four, to repeal all acts of parliament made while he was under 
 that age, and even after the regency had ceased he was 
 suffered to rescind whatever had been enacted for six years.’) 
 The act of succession, which annulled the marriage with 
 Catherine of Aragon, was followed by the act of supremacy, 
 which made it high treason to deny to the king the title of 
 supreme head of the Church. Under this act Fisher and More 
 both suffered death.?) With the reformation parliament there 
 was a disposition on the part of both houses to delegate 
 to the king extraordinary powers and even legislation itself. 
 It declared: ,Your high Court of Parliament has full power 
 and authority, not merely to dispense, but also to author- 
 ize a certain person or persons to dispense from these and 
 all other human laws of this your Kingdom.**) The par- 
 liament of 1539 passed the extraordinarily severe measure 
 known as the ,Bill of the Six Articles“, in which were 
 embodied the chief points of the Catholic religion.*) By the 
 same parliament the ordinances of the king in council, if 
 stated to be made under pain of fine and imprisonment, were 
 declared to have the force of statutes, provided ,that no one 
 be injured in real estate, in liberty, or in person, nor the laws 
 
 1) Stat. 28 Henry VIII. c: 17. 
 
 2) ,The servile Parliament married and unmarried the King; legitimized 
 and bastardized his issue, at his nod. In settling the order of succession, they 
 allowed him to alter that order, and to entail the crown at his pleasure (Stat. 
 35 Henry VIII. c.1). Finally, whatever victims he chose to destroy, the Parlia- ~ 
 ment attainted.“ 
 
 Instead of guarding the constitution as a whole from violation, and pre- 
 venting abuses of the executive power against individuals by its penal powers, 
 the Parliaments had become so subservient in their penal functions that under 
 Henry VIII. a dictatorially selfish wilfuiness, under Edward VI. party-passions, 
 and under Mary religious fanaticism had no surer mode of striking their oppon- 
 ents than by the resolutions of Parliament“ (Gneist, op. cit. 480). 
 
 3) Amos, Reform. Parl. 65; cf. 25 Henry VIII. c. 237. 
 4) Gardiner’s Six Articles, or ,,The Bloody Act.“ 
 
See ee Oe 
 
 and customs of the realm subverted thereby.“1) Thus the king 
 by proclamation might make any opinion heretical, and might 
 denounce death as the penalty of holding it. 
 
 The first parliament of Edward VI. abrogated not only all 
 the new treasons of the last reign, but all those created since 
 25 Edward III.,”) thus completely reversing Henry’s home policy. 
 To the treasons of the statute of Edward two were added, viz., 
 a proved public attack in words three times repeated against 
 the kine’s supremacy, and a similar attack in writing, printing 
 or by overt act. Moreover it was enacted by the house of com- 
 mons that no person should be convicted of treason except by 
 the testimony of two witnesses who were to be produced at 
 the trial.8) The high idea of the sovereign power suffered but 
 little during Edward’s minority. The young king’s views of 
 royalty were identical with those of his energetic father. Somer- 
 set regarded himself as the representative of the crown, and 
 one chief cause of his fall was the absorption of all power into 
 his own hands, and his disregard of the rights of the council. 
 
 In the reign of Mary the tendency of parliament to obey 
 the royal dictates appears as strong as ever, The restoration 
 of the Catholic religion and the Romish supremacy was shortly 
 accomplished, and the acts of parliament against the pope were 
 repealed. In her first parliament the commons petitioned the 
 
 1) Statute of Prerogative, 31 Henry VIII. c. 8; repealed on accession of 
 Edward VI. 
 
 2) 1 Edward VI. c. 12. This Bill repealed the acts of Richard II., Henry V., 
 and Henry VIII, against the Lollards; the act of the Six Articles, and those: 
 depending on it; the act of the thirty-fifth year of Henry’s reign, prohibiting 
 the reading of the English Scriptures in churches and to the poor, and all other 
 acts or sentences regarding doctrine or religion. It repealed also statutes passed 
 in Henry’s reign making new felonies, and those giving the authority of law to 
 the king’s proclamation (31 Henry VIII. c. 8; 35 Henry VIII. c. 28). 
 
 3) 5 and 6 Edward VI. c. 11, § 12. The house thus showed its disappro- 
 bation of the manner in which the trial of Protector Somerset had been con- 
 ducted. But for this act of independence parliament was dissolved, and a new 
 and carefully chosen one substituted. 
 
Bede) Oe eee 
 
 queen strongly against the Spanish marriage; but in the next 
 parliament the bill necessary for its consummation was passed. 
 Shortly afterwards three bills, introduced by Gardiner, for the 
 persecution of heretics were only defeated with great difficulty 
 in the upper house. After a new parliament, elected expressly 
 for the purpose,') had abrogated the attainder against Reginald 
 Pole, the legate hastened to England, and a reconciliation be- 
 tween the house and himself shortly took place. On St. Andrew’s 
 day both houses assembled at Whitehall, and received upon 
 their knees absolution from the papal legate. The persecuting 
 statutes of Henry IV. and Henry V., which had been previously 
 annulled, were now re-enacted and put in force. 
 
 The reformation of Henry VIIL., thorough and sweeping 
 though it had been in many directions, had scarcely touched 
 the question of dogma. The dogmatic reformation was fully 
 carried out by the regency of Edward VI., but was quickly sup- 
 pressed under Mary. Finally, Protestantism in England was 
 re-established and brought to completion under Elizabeth, though 
 not precisely in the manner intended either by her father or by 
 the theologians of Edward. By the new act of supremacy, the sove- 
 reign was once more declared the supreme head of the national 
 church, and all the jurisdiction of the papal see was done away 
 with forever. The statute also repealed the acts of the last 
 reign which had revived the statutes against heresies,?) and 
 gave the queen power to appoint commissioners to exercise 
 
 
 
 1) The sheriffs were expressly instructed to send men, ,,such as were of . 
 the wise, grave and catholic sort, such as indeed meant the true honour of God.“ 
 
 Mary’s third parliament rejected a few of her favourite bills. In 2 Mary 
 an indictment was attempted in the king’s bench of those members who had, 
 in consequence of the proceedings touching the question of religion, quitted the 
 house without permission; but this case never came to an issue (Parl. Hist 
 11. 812—335). The parliament which met in Oct. 1555, would only grant a subsidy 
 under the pledge that none of it should go to Philip. It also refused to suffer 
 the firstfruits to be paid to the pope. A parliament so little obsequious to the 
 crown was speedily dissolved, 
 
 2) 1 and 2 Philip and Mary, c. 6. ; 
 
Ewe Oy cya 
 
 ecclesiastical jurisdiction.!) By the act of uniformity (passed 
 in spite of the opposition of all the bishops) all ritual and Church 
 discipline was made subordinate to the regal power.?) 
 
 In her government of the Church Elizabeth was very ar- 
 bitrary and imperious. From the first she had been jealous and 
 tenacious of her supremacy in matters ecclesiastical, and claimed 
 the exclusive initiative in all legislation touching affairs of the 
 Church.*) She likewise asserted a personal right to appoint, sus- 
 pend, and dismiss the bishops. In the parliament of 1571 the house 
 of commons directed its attention almost. wholly to ecclesiastical 
 reforms, and it was in vain Elizabeth attempted to check this 
 interference with what she considered her own prerogative. 
 Many bills of a puritan tendency were introduced, some of which 
 became law, whilst others were allowed to drop either in the 
 upper house or for want of the queen’s assent.*) 
 
 1) 1 Elizabeth, c. 1. The Act of Supremacy declares all ecclesiastical 
 legislation and jurisdiction to be an emanation from the crown, and all officers 
 and servants of the crown are by it compelled to take the ecclesiastical oath 
 of allegiance. Furthermore, by this act the queen was empowered to form ,a 
 Court of High Commission“, which was invested with almost unlimited author- 
 ity in the questions of Church government and discipline. This court in 1583 
 attained its full powers. 
 
 2) 1 Elizabeth, c. 2. Other statutes supplementary were enacted against 
 bulls from Rome, mass, jesuits and priests, sectaries, popish recusants, etc. 
 The Act of Praemunire was extended under Elizabeth so as to subject all the 
 papists of the country to capital punishment for refusing a second time to ab- 
 jure their religion — a law so harsh that the queen never ventured to execute 
 it generally. 
 
 3) Thus in 1593, when one Mr. Maurice brought in a motion for restrict- 
 ing the encroachments of ecclesiastical courts, the speaker refused to put the 
 question till he had communicated with the queen. Maurice was taken into 
 custody, and forbidden again to take his seat in parliament. Her view of the 
 position of the commons is shown by her answer to the speaker of the same 
 parliament, demanding as usual liberty of speech. She replied ,that liberty they 
 should have, but that the liberty consisted in the privilege of saying Yes and 
 No.“ 
 
 4) Strickland, the most prominent member of the puritan party, was rep- 
 rimanded by the queen, and by royal order excluded from. the house. But the 
 commoners asserted their privilege of free speech, and he was re-instated 
 
So Bes 
 
 The prerogative was stretched by Elizabeth in the matter 
 of the monopolies. This vexed question had been broached by 
 the commons as early as 1566, and again quite openly by them 
 in 1572. In 1576, Wentworth, one of the puritan leaders, had, 
 by his complaints against the monopolies she had granted, ex- 
 cited the queen’s anger. Finally, in the last parliament of 
 Elizabeth, which assembled in October 1601, on account of the 
 complaints of this exercise of the royal prerogative, a bill was 
 introduced against them, but while the bill was pending, the 
 queen herself abolished the abuse.') 
 
 HKlizabeth only once, it would appear, interfered to levy 
 money without parliamentary sanction, when she imposed a duty 
 on sweet wine. She also in 1586 made the clergy pay an as- 
 sessment, not voted by convocation; but in principle the right 
 of taxation by parliament remained during the whole of this 
 period fully recognized.?) 
 
 In France, in Spain, and elsewhere in Europe, the idea 
 of the regal power had gradually undergone a change. The 
 feudal notion of the king as a suzerain among peers had given 
 place to a conception of royalty which regarded him as the ar- 
 bitrary master and ruler of the people and sole proprietor of 
 the land. In England this idea had already found its complete 
 -expression under the Norman and early Plantagenet kings.*) But 
 
 
 
 (D’Ewes, Journal, 156, 175, 176). In the parliament of 1597, Elizabeth assented 
 to 43 bills, public and private, and rejected 48 that had passed both houses 
 (Parl. Hist. 1, 905). 
 
 1) Parl. Hist. 1. 9283—9438, I appeal to the judgment of God, that never 
 thought was cherished in my heart, that tended not to my people’s good“ | 
 (Parl, Hist. tv. 480). She closed her address, the last she ever uttered to the 
 commons, with these words: — ,,Though you have had, and may have, many 
 Princes more mighty and wise sitting in this seat, yet you never had, or shall 
 have, any that will be more careful and loving.“ 
 
 2) She once refused a forced loan, on its being offered her by parliament; 
 and where she herself impressed them, she was conscientious in regard to re- 
 payment. 
 
 3) Much earlier therefore than in France. The oath to Philip Augustus 
 contained a promise of fealty, ,so long as the King shall do justice in his court.“ 
 Louis IX. declared rebellion justified against the king who denies justice to his 
 subject, pronouncing the fief of the vassal forfeited who refused to serve his 
 
(inte a Lp 
 
 with the birth of Magna Charta absolutism had gradually given 
 place to a limited monarchy. The causes which enabled the 
 Tudors to reign so absolutely in a limited monarchy are not far 
 to seek. The Thirty Years’ war of the Roses had destroyed 
 the greater part of the ancient nobility, and in its place a new 
 aristocracy had arisen, dependent on wealth and court favour 
 which became pliant tools in the hand of the king, to whom 
 they owed their elevation. The commons, on the other hand, 
 deprived of their natural leaders, had not as yet found sufficient 
 strength among themselves to offer serious resistance to the 
 power of the crown.') Personal government thus became hered- 
 itary in the Tudor sovereigns. Its establishment, however, 
 completed the destruction of feudalism in England, and the power 
 and prestige of the old feudal nobility. 
 
 Under Henry VII. and Henry VIII. the parliament was almost 
 invariably submissive to the sovereign will, and decreed what- 
 ever the caprice of the monarch might fancy. Of this we find 
 few if any signs in the parliaments of the fourteenth, early 
 part of the fifteenth, and seventeenth centuries, — very different 
 indeed were the Tudor parliaments from those which overthrew 
 Richard the Second and Charles the First. Under Henry VII. 
 and his immediate successors the crown did not hesitate to 
 tamper with the elections, and those members who owed their ~ 
 seats directly or indirectly to its influence could naturally be 
 depended upon to serve its ends. Moreover, the commons were 
 restrained, overawed, and rendered submissive to the royal 
 wishes through fear of being attainted by the privy council as 
 Star Chamber. Thus was engendered a mutual distrust among 
 
 mesne lord in the prosecution of the resistance (Montl. Monarch. Franc. 1, 434; 
 Htabl. de S. Lows, c. 49). In a diet held at Roncaglia by the Kaiser Fried- 
 rich I, seventy years after the Norman Conquest of England, it was enacted 
 that in every oath of fealty from a vassal to his lord, the Emperor should be 
 excepted by name (Muratori, Script. Ital. vr, 789). 
 
 1) ,The Commons had not yet gained strength enough to act without 
 the Lords, and the Lords had ceased to be an independent body“ (Freeman, 
 Const. 140). 
 
the members. themselves, which prevented their offering any 
 serious resistance to the encroachments of the crown. 
 
 Under Elizabeth, parliament was often treated with but 
 little respect, and sometimes even with contempt. But on the 
 whole there can be no doubt that it had become more independent 
 and the crown more under restraint in her reign than under 
 that of her father, high as were her notions of prerogative, 
 and submissively as her reproofs were generally received. And 
 the speaker, Onslow, was justified when ‘he said, in an address 
 to Elizabeth, ,By our common law, though there be for the 
 Prince provided many princely prerogatives and royalties, yet 
 it is not such as the Prince can take money or other things, 
 or do as he will at his own pleasure without order, but quietly 
 to suffer his subjects to enjoy their own without wrongful op- 
 pression; wherein other princes by their liberty do take as 
 pleaseth them.“ ?) 
 
 The Jure Divino Monarchy. 
 
 With the accession of James I. began the contest be- 
 tween the crown and the parliament which ended before the 
 close of the century in the final ruin of the Catholic Stuarts 
 and the establishment of the constitution. James Stuart at- 
 tempted to inculcate his one great principle — the doc- 
 trine of absolute supreme sovereignty based upon the idea 
 of the Divine right of kings; but this he did, not in the 
 
 1) Parl. Hist. 1.; Brougham, Const. x1, 214, 215. 
 
 From John Lackland to Henry Tudor, the constitution had grown, little 
 by little, piece by piece, from concessions which, from time to time, had been 
 obtained from the monarch, in return for pecuniary aid. The Plantagenets held 
 parliaments in 130 of their 213 years (Edward I. — Richard III.), altogether 
 193 parliaments. The first three Edwards reigned 105 years and summoned — 
 119 parliaments: Edward I. (1272—1307), 49; Edward II. (1807—1327), 17; 
 Edward III. (1827—1377), 53. The five Tudors reigned 118 years, and sum- 
 moned only 58 parliaments: Henry VIJ. (1485—1509), 7; Henry VIII. (1509— 
 1547), 21; Edward VI. and Catholic Mary (1547—1558), 17; Elizabeth (1558— 
 1603), 13. 
 
Tudor spirit, not with a consciousness of his royal duties and 
 obligations, but merely for the sake of enforcing his personal 
 will. For this perilous experiment his son and grandson paid 
 the penalty. One of the first arbitrary acts of this reign was 
 the unlawful imprisonment by order of the king of ten of the 
 Millenary Petitioners, the Star Chamber having declared that 
 the Millenary Petition tended to sedition and rebellion. The 
 king’s misappreciation of his own powers and prerogative, and 
 his utter miscomprehension of the rights and privileges of the 
 commons, showed itself from the very first.!) In the proclamation 
 summoning his first parliament he presumed to dictate to the 
 electors whom they should elect, and to decide upon the validity 
 of elections.”) This royal meddling gave rise to the quarrel 
 over the member Goodwin which finally terminated in a com- 
 promise between the king and the commons.*) The king however 
 
 1) James I. more than once laid it down in his speeches that, ,,as it is 
 atheism and blasphemy in a creature to dispute what the Deity may do, so it 
 is presumption and sedition in a subject to dispute what a king may do in the 
 height of his power“; ,good Christians“, he adds, ,,will be content with God’s 
 will, revealed in His Word; and good subjects will rest in the king’s will, re- 
 vealed in his law* (King James’s Works, 581). 
 
 2) Under the Tudors the number of members of the lower house was 
 increased by 132, so that 467 members were summoned at the accession of 
 James I. Under James the number of peers was doubled. The higher dignities 
 conferred on peers and the new creations were under James I., 98; under 
 Charles I., 130; under Charles II., 137; and under James II., 11; altogether 376 
 under the Stuarts, against 146 during the period of the Tudors. James I. cre- 
 ated 62 new peers; Charles I., 59; Charles IJ., 64; James II., 8; altogether 193, 
 against which were to be set off 99 extinct-peerages (May, Const. Hist. c. 5; 
 Gneist, op. cit. 592). 
 
 3) One Goodwin had been elected for Buckinghamshire; some years pre- 
 viously he had been outlawed; the proclamation had forbidden the election of 
 outlawed men; the king therefore declared the election void, and secured the 
 return of Sir John Fortescue, a member of the council. The commons insisted 
 upon their right of inquiring into the election of their own members. A com- 
 promise was finally agreed upon, both elections were declared void, and a new 
 writ issued (Parl. Hist. 1, 998—1017). From this time onwards their privilege 
 to decide upon elections has never been questioned. James on assenting to 
 all the bills of his second parliament (1606), explained that he did so ,as a 
 special token of grace or favour, being a matter unusual to pass all Acts with- 
 out any exception.“ 
 
 3 
 
confessed that the house of commons was a court of record, 
 and from henceforth was established the privilege of the house 
 to decide upon disputed elections touching its own members. 
 The commons asserted that their privileges were not of grace, 
 as the king conceived, but of right, and that the high court of 
 parliament was the supreme court of the land. 
 
 The third parliament of this reign met in 1609, and with 
 it began the battle which was to end only with the Revolution. 
 The government had been extravagant and needed money; but 
 before asking the commons for it, the treasurer, Cecil, had first 
 had recourse to various illegal means of obtaining it. He collected 
 loans under privy seals and increased the customs.') But the 
 amounts thus raised proved insufficient and Cecil, in demanding 
 a supply, invited the commons to state their grievances. They 
 took him at his word, and not only directed their attention to 
 the illegal taxation but attacked the whole structure of abso- 
 lute monarchy. Parliament complained of the new impositions, 
 of monopolies, of extraordinary legal authority of the court of 
 High Commission, and of the court of Wales, and lastly they 
 complained of the free use of royal ordinances and decrees, 
 which were held as binding as statutes. The anxiety of the 
 commoners was not without reason. The jure divino idea of 
 the kingly office was in places fast becoming rooted. Not only 
 did this show itself in the language of the Church and in the 
 bearing of her obsequious:officials, but it was likewise shared 
 by the civil lawyers and the lawyers of the equity courts, who 
 wished to put the king into the same position as the emperor 
 had occupied in the Roman theory of law. 
 
 In the next parliament”) (1614) an attempt was made be 
 the king to control legislation by the indirect influence of mem- 
 bers (undertakers), a scheme that only succeeded in arousing 
 
 
 
 1) He imposed a duty on currants and levied customs at the outports, ports - 
 other than those of London and the Cinque Ports. These impositions provoked 
 an appeal to the courts of law, which, however, resulted in a judgment favour- 
 able to the king. 
 
 2) , The Addled Parliament.“ 
 
the anger of the commons, who at once proceeded to discuss 
 their old grievances. James, provoked at his failure, hastily 
 dissolved the parliament, nor did he summon another for seven 
 years. During the ministry of Cecil encroachments on the right 
 of self-taxation had been frequent enough; now other illegal 
 means of raising money were resorted to.') Free gifts were 
 demanded from the nobility, benevolences were collected,”) money 
 was raised by writs under the privy seal, patents and mon- 
 opolies were multiplied, and finally judicial appointments,’) and 
 peerages below the grade of marquess were publicly sold.*) The 
 king opened the parliament of 1621 with an attempt at an 
 apology for his conduct to the last parliament; but the com- 
 moners were not to be turned aside from their chief object. 
 Under the direction of Sir Edward Coke they proceeded to 
 impeach the chief monopolists,°) and denied the power of the 
 crown to grant monopolies. Next they impeached no less a per- 
 son than the Lord Chancellor, Francis Bacon, who was accused 
 of taking bribes and found guilty.®) 
 
 1) The cautionary towns which the Dutch had lodged in the hands of the 
 English as security for the money Elizabeth had advanced, were resold at about 
 a third of their value. 
 
 2) James took a benevolence in 1614, and a second one in 1620. 
 
 3) The king to fill. his coffers, had put vacant places up for sale, and 
 these included judicial appointments, as those of the Attorney-General and the 
 sergeants, for which sums of £ 10,000, £ 4000, and the like were paid 
 (Foss, vi. 3). 
 
 4) James invented the order of Baronet, and sold the title for £ 1000. 
 Some two hundred were created; but not much more than half were at first so 
 disposed of. Under the Stuarts the dignity was granted successively to nine 
 hundred persons. The dignities of baron, viscount, and earl were sold for 
 £ 10,000, £ 15,000, and £ 20,000 respectively (Franklyn, Annals, 33). 
 
 5) The house first proceeded to draw up a petition against any relaxation 
 of the penal laws touching the Roman Catholics. The right of impeachment 
 which had fallen into disuse, was now revived. The chief monopolists Sir Giles 
 Mompesson and Sir Francis Mitchell were impeached, not only because mon- 
 opolies were in themselves odious, but because they denied the power of the 
 crown to grant them. Barnet, a judge of the prerogative court, was impeached 
 for corruption, the bishop of Llandaff for bribery, and the treasurer, Middlesex, 
 for bribery and official corruption. 
 
 6) No less than twenty-two instances were proved against him. 
 
— 36 — 
 
 Having disposed of home questions, the house was pro- 
 
 ceeding to discuss foreign affairs, when the king adjourned it, - 
 
 on the ground that the commons were trenching on the royal 
 prerogative. During the recess he issued a proclamation for- 
 bidding all men to speak of affairs of state. On the re-assem- 
 bling of parliament in January 1622, a long and angry dispute 
 ensued which ended in a vigorous protest in which the commons 
 declared that their privileges were not the gift of the crown 
 but the natural birthright of English subjects, and that all 
 matters of public interest and affecting the welfare of the realm 
 were within their province.') 
 
 The parliament of James I. declared its absolute independ- 
 ence and supremacy. It asserted its exclusive right of taxa- 
 
 tion, suppressed monopolies, and reformed abuses in the courts 
 
 of law. It re-established the right of impeachment, and im- 
 peached and drove from office the highest ministers of the crown. 
 It enforced the right of the lower house to decide upon elec- 
 tions touching its own members. It dealt with questions of 
 religious and foreign policy, and finally it asserted its privilege 
 of freely discussing all matters connected with the welfare of 
 the state. : 
 
 Charles the First had less ability but more courage than 
 his father. He was besides obstinate and unteachable, and, like 
 all his family, deceitful. During his reign he summoned but 
 five parliaments. The first parliament, which assembled on 
 18" June 1625, was unwilling to grant money to prosecute the 
 Spanish war but was quite ready to discuss the affairs of the 
 
 1) This protest so incensed the king that he tore it from the record with 
 his own hand, and at once dissolved the parliament. The most prominent of 
 the opposition, the Lords Oxford and Southampton, with the commoners Philip, 
 
 Pym, Coke and Mallory, were imprisoned. Coke had already been dismissed from _ 
 
 his office in 1616 at the instance of Lord Bacon, because he had asserted the 
 authority of his own court against the court of Chancery and the ecclesiastical 
 courts. This was the first time a Lord Chief Justice had been dismissed from 
 political motives. James declared to his judges ,that he would himself decide 
 legal questions, as he had been told that law depended upon reason, and ag 
 was as well furnished with reason as his judges". 
 
 Lae: 
 
aga iy toys 
 
 Church. In less than two months the parliament was dissolved. 
 The next parliament assembled 6‘ February 1626, and at once 
 proceeded to appoint three committees, one for religion, one for 
 grievances, and one for evils. Apart, however, from the punish- 
 ment of Montague, the committees accomplished but little. Sir 
 John Elliot induced the house of commons to impeach Bucking- 
 ham for the miscarriage of the war with Spain and for general 
 mismanagement. It was only by dissolving the parliament that 
 Charles was able to save his favourite.) 
 
 Charles was now so foolish as to begin a war with France, 
 and having no money from parliament with which to carry it 
 on he sought to raise it by forced loans and other unlawful 
 expedients. Noblemen and gentlemen ”) who refused to lend were 
 imprisoned by order of the privy council, and those of humbler 
 station were impressed to serve as soldiers. Want of money 
 compelled Charles to summon a third parliament in 1628. This 
 parliament drew up the Petition of Right, which declared forced 
 loans, arbitrary arrests, billeting of soldiers upon private houses, 
 and procedure by martial law, unlawful.*) This petition the king 
 was constrained by both houses to acknowledge. This was the 
 first great concession obtained from the crown for two hundred 
 years, and the most important since the confirmation of the 
 charters by Edward I. in 1297. At the reassembling of parliament 
 in 1629, the commons renewed the discussion touching tonnage 
 and poundage, and also prepared to attack the bishops. The 
 
 
 
 
 
 1) .Remember“, said Charles I. to Lord Keeper Coventry, ,,that Parliaments 
 are altogether in my power for their calling, sitting, and dissolution; and, there- 
 - fore, as I find the fruits of them to be good or evil, they are to continue or 
 not to be‘: ” 
 
 2) Five of the gentlemen imprisoned sued for their writ of habeas corpus, 
 but without success. This is known as ,,The Five Knights’ Case“. 
 
 3) The four points of the Petition of Right are: (1) that no freeman shall 
 be compelled to pay any gift, loan, benevolence or tax without the consent of 
 parliament; (2) that no freeman shall be imprisoned or arrested contrary to 
 the law of the land; (8) that soldiers or sailors shall not be quartered upon 
 private houses; (4) that no commission shall be issued in time of peace to try 
 subjects by martial law (Stat. 8 Charles I. c.1; Parl. Hist. mn. 431). Vide 
 Appendix A, 
 
te ee 
 
 king thereupon dissolved the parliament and threw the leaders 
 of the opposition into prison. *) 
 
 Charles was now resolved to govern without a parliament, 
 and for eleven years, 1629—1640, the personal will of the king 
 supplanted the law of the land. With the aid of the ecclesi- 
 astical government, the privy council,*) and a subservient judi- 
 ciary, he set out to undermine the foundations of the consti- 
 tution. The grievances of this reign may be ranged under 
 taxation, the administration of justice, and religion. First the 
 financial rights of parliament were to be abolished. The whole 
 of the customs, tonnage, poundage and impositions were now 
 by the sole authority of the king. This was followed by the 
 tax known as ship-money,’) by distraint of knighthood, by the 
 sale of monopolies, and by exorbitant fines. 
 
 The perversion of the courts of justice began with the ac- 
 cession of the Stuarts, who replaced upright judges by servile 
 and unprincipled men. In 1626, Charles dismissed Lord Chief 
 Justice Crew for refusing to acknowledge the legality of en- 
 forced loans; in 1630, Chief Baron Walter was suspended because - 
 he disputed the legality of a proceeding against members of 
 parliament on account of acts and speeches in the house.*) The 
 
 
 
 1) Elliot died in the Tower, and Valentine and Strode remained there 
 until the meeting of the Short Parliament in 1640. (Judgment annulled 15 
 Car, II.). 
 
 2) The Star Chamber was perhaps a necessity of the times under the 
 Tudors; but under the Stuarts it became an instrument of power by which in- 
 dependence and right were stifled. Banishments, house-searchings, seizures, and 
 refusal of the habeas corpus had now become the rule. From this centre that 
 method of government was developed, which to use Clarendon’s expression ,,com- 
 mands by ordinances what was not commanded by law, forbids what was not 
 forbidden by law, and then again punished disobedience to the ordinances by 
 heavy fines and imprisonment“ (Gneist, op. cit. 549). 
 
 3) Writs were issued requiring ship-money in 1634, 1635, 1636 and 1639. 
 
 4) In 1634 Sir Robert Heath was suspended for his opposition to ship- 
 money, and his place taken by Sir John Finch, speaker of the house. The 
 corruption of the courts was proved by the judgment rendered in the case of 
 Hampden, who had refused in 1636 to pay ship-money, and by the condem- 
 nation of Sir John Elliot, Denzil Holles, and Benjamin Valentine. In the judg- 
 ment against Hampden, Finch said, ,No Act of Parliament can bar the King of 
 
Me SG 
 
 king as head of the Church, zealously asserted his cause against 
 both Catholics and Puritans, and the Church in return was to 
 inculcate in all the duty of absolute submission to the royal 
 will.!) The Puritan controversialists were brought before the Star 
 Chamber and cruelly punished, and Puritan ministers were sum- 
 moned before the court of High Commission and admonished or 
 suspended. 
 
 The resources of the crown were now exhausted, and the 
 necessities of war and the Scotch insurrection drove Charles 
 after eleven years once more to summon a parliament. This 
 parliament sat but twenty-two days. It refused to begin with 
 eranting supplies, and was consequently dissolved on the 
 5th May 1640. The Long Parliament met on the 3rd of November 
 following, and shortly set about reforming the abuses of the 
 royal power.?) The parliament began with the impeachment of 
 Windebank, who had been secretary of state, and Finch, who 
 had been lord keeper; but these ministers saved themselves 
 by flight. It next impeached Strafford of high treason and con- 
 demned him by act of attainder.*) In December Laud was im- 
 peached, after which the house proceeded to more important 
 matters. It declared that no customs duties could be imposed 
 
 
 
 his regality. Acts of Parliament to take away his royal power in defence of his 
 kingdom are void, or Acts to bind the King not to command the subjects, their 
 persons, their property, and I say their money too, for no Acts of Parliament 
 make any difference“. 
 
 1) After Charles on the 5th May 1640 had dissolved the Short Parlia- 
 ment, the ecclesiastics remained behind to enact the canones, which pronounce 
 »every assertion of an independent coactive power besides the royal power to 
 be high treason“. The attempt of Charles in 1637 to force the English liturgy ’ 
 upon the people of Scotland drove them into the agreement known as the na- 
 tional covenant, by which they bound themselves to maintain the presbyterian 
 form of religion and the authority of the king (1638). 
 
 2) ,They must now be of another temper, they must not only sweep the 
 house clean below, they must pull down all the cobwebs which hang round the 
 top and corners. To remove all grievances they must pull up the causes of them 
 by the roots. — Pym. 
 
 3) Parl. Hist. u, 757, 
 
SSS dimes 
 
 without the consent of parliament. By another act ship-money 
 was declared illegal; the judgment against Hampden was can- 
 celled, and the judges who had taken part in these proceedings 
 were put on their trial.’) An act was passed for the limitation 
 of the royal forests, and one forbidding the distraint of knight- 
 hood. The star chamber,?) the council of the north, the council 
 of Wales, and the court of high commission,?) were abolished, 
 and ecclesiastical courts were deprived of the power to inflict 
 fine, imprisonment, or corporal punishment. The parliament 
 forced the king to accept a bill providing that it should not 
 be dissolved, prorogued, or adjourned without its own consent; 
 and finally it passed the first triennial act.*) 
 
 The Petition of Right and the statutes enacted by the Long 
 Parliament till its first adjournment in August 1641°) have the 
 importance of a second Magna Charta. The constitution of 
 England now assumed very nearly its present form. ‘The re- 
 sponsibility of officers of the crown to parliament, the absolute 
 financial control of the house of commons, the supremacy of the 
 common law and of the regular courts of justice, had been 
 asserted beyond the possibility of doubt. 
 
 It is unnecessary for the present purpose to follow the 
 constitutional struggle of the next few years. The struggle 
 for power, first between the Long Parliament and the king, and 
 later between the army and the parliament, finally terminated 
 in the complete subversion of the monarchy, and England be- 
 came a republic.®) The puritan military dictatorship of Crom- 
 
 1) Parl Hist. 11. 700. 
 2) Statute 16 Charles I. c. 10; Parl. Hist. 11, 853—855. 
 
 3) Statute 16 Charles I. c. 11. This statute deprived the crown of the — 
 
 power to issue a commission to try a person. 
 
 4) Stat. 16 Charles I. c. 1; repealed 16 Charles I. Parl. Hist. 1. 718, 719. 
 
 5) The last concession of the king was his assent to the bill excluding 
 bishops from parliament. 
 
 6) An act of parliament of the 19th May 1649 declared the people of 
 England to be ,a Commonwealth and Free State.“ The monarchy and house of 
 lords were expressly abolished by resolution of parliament as being ,,unneces- 
 sary and dangerous to the liberties of the people‘. 
 
 = ~~! 
 
Soe Aeteang 
 
 well,') wisely as it was in many respects conducted, failed to 
 bring contentment to the people. Men of all parties looked 
 with serious apprehension on the continuance of military rule — 
 and longed to return to constitutional government. 
 
 | A Convention Parliament met near the end of April 1660, 
 and to this parliament Charles sent from Breda a declaration 
 in which he offered freedom of conscience, an indemnity for past 
 offences, and payment of arrears to the army. The parliament 
 on receiving this declaration acknowledged Charles as king, and 
 in May he returned to England. The Convention Parliament voted 
 the subsidy of tonnage and poundage to the king for life, abol- 
 ished military or feudal tenures, and declared in force all acts 
 of the Long Parliament to which Charles I. had assented. The 
 new parliament which met in 1661 was at first strongly royalist.?) 
 It declared that there was no legislative power in either or 
 both of the houses without the sanction of the king, that the 
 sole command of the forces of the country was undoubtedly 
 vested in the crown, and that neither house of parliament could 
 lawfully levy any war, offensive or defensive, against the king. 
 The parliament then proceeded, with the hope of extirpating 
 Puritanism, to pass four persecuting statutes, viz. the corporation 
 act, the act of uniformity, the conventicle act,*) and the five 
 mile act. At the king’s desire the triennial act of 1641‘) was 
 repealed.°) 
 
 The profligacy of the court, the corruption of the officials, 
 and the disasters of the war with Holland, led the parliament, 
 in 1666 to pass an act for taking account of the supplies which 
 had been voted, and commissioners were appointed for that 
 
 
 
 1) , Where his own authority was at all concerned, this soldier of the Re- 
 public was more violent than any hereditary despot“ (Clarendon x1. 172). 
 
 2) Known as the Cavalier or Pensionary Parliament, 1661—1679. 
 
 3) A second conyenticle act, more stringent than the first, was passed 
 in 1672. / 
 4) Parl. Hist. rv, 290. 291. 
 
 5) The new parliament annulled the judgment against Sir John Elliot and 
 his associates (15 Car. II.), and liberty of speech of members was henceforth 
 never again called in question (Hatsell, Procedure, 1. 86, 208 seq., 251 seq.). 
 
eS 2A eee ee 
 
 purpose. From this time it was a recognized principle that 
 supplies should be applied only to their specific objects.1) In 
 1672 the king attempted to legislate in ecclesiastical matters, 
 and issued the declaration of indulgence, suspending all the 
 laws which imposed penalties on religious opinion;?) but when 
 parliament met the following year it compelled Charles to recall 
 the declaration, and the same year passed the test act, which 
 excluded all but members of the Church of England from any 
 public office.) In 1678 Lord Danby, the treasurer, was im- 
 peached of high treason *) on account of his negotiations with 
 Louis XIV.°) Danby pleaded the command of the king for what 
 he had done; but the commons once more asserted the respon- 
 sibility of ministers to parliament. Danby then pleaded a pardon 
 which he had obtained from the king; but the commons held 
 that the king could not stop the process of an impeachment by 
 
 
 
 1) Clarendon, the Lord Chancellor, had attempted to resist the encroach- 
 ments of the house of commons, but in 1667, being impeached by the house, he 
 was forced to fly. 
 
 2) As early as 1662 Charles, for political reasons, wished to grant liberty 
 of conscience to the Catholics. This would have been carrying out in part the 
 Declaration of Breda. In 1663, however, the commons presented him with an 
 address, in which they denied that he was in any way bound by the promises 
 of the Declaration, and gave him to understand that he did not possess that 
 dispensing power which he claimed. Charles was soon to experience the truth of 
 his father’s saying, that ,,Parliaments, like cats, grow cursed with age“. 
 
 3) 25 Car. II. c. 2. By this act James, duke of York, was cbliged to re- 
 sign the office of lord high admiral, and Clifford that of treasurer. Thus the 
 Cabal was broken up. The final overthrow of the policy of the Cabal was secured 
 when the commons compelled the king, by a threatened refusal of supplies, to 
 conclude a separate peace with Holland. In 1678 the papists disabling act was 
 passed, excluding Roman Catholics from parliament (repealed 1828). 
 
 4) During this reign forty ministers and high officials were impeached. 
 
 5) Danby’s views and methods of government are shown by the attempt in 
 1675, to render an oath against resistance to the royal authority in all cases, 
 and against any attempt to change the government of church or state, obliga- 
 tory on all placeholders and all members of either house of parliament. Again, 
 in the parliament of 1677, for maintaining that the late lengthened prorogation 
 of parliament was illegal, Lords Shaftesbury, Salisbury, Wharton, and the Duke 
 of Buckingham were imprisoned in the Tower, where they remained for more ~ 
 than a year, 
 
DR 12 RS 
 
 granting a pardon before sentence had been given.') In order to 
 save Danby the king dissolved parliament, but the next parlia- 
 ment decided that a dissolution did not break off an impeach- 
 ment once begun.”) In this parliament, the third that Charles 
 had summoned, a bill was introduced to prevent the duke of 
 York from succeeding to the crown, but before it could be passed 
 in the lower house the king dissolved parliament.*) In this 
 brief parliament time had been found for one great statute, 
 namely, the act of habeas corpus.*) 
 
 In 1665 the revocable appointment of judges was resumed, 
 and led to an abuse of the royal right of appointing which had 
 already characterized the two previous reigns. During this 
 reign three lord chancellors, three chief justices, and six justices 
 were dismissed for political reasons,°) their places being filled 
 by creatures of the king. Thus by means of corrupt, venal, 
 and servile judges the political trials were conducted in ac- 
 cordance with the wishes of the king. With their assistance he 
 compelled the city of London and the boroughs throughout Eng- 
 land to surrender their charters, in return for which new ones 
 were conferred which restricted municipal privileges to a very 
 limited number of persons in each town. 
 
 In 1683 the Rye-house plot for the assassination of the king 
 was revealed by one of its members. The discovery of the plot 
 and punishment of the members rendered Charles for the time 
 absolute. He was enabled to disregard the law and to continue 
 beyond the time fixed by law without a parliament, and he was 
 
 1) This question was settled in favour of the commons by the act of set- 
 tlement in 1701. 
 
 2) This question was also decided in favour of the commons in the course 
 of the impeachment of Warren Hastings. 
 
 3) In the next parliament the exclusion bill was passed in the lower house 
 but rejected by the lords, whereupon the commons refused to pass any money 
 bill till the exclusion bill was carried. In the fifth and last parliament of this 
 reign a new exclusion bill was introduced, but as the commons would listen to 
 no compromise, the king dissolved the parliament. 
 
 4) Shaftesbury was the prime author of this act (Gneist op. cit. 602). 
 
 5) Foss, vir. 4. 
 
also able to allow the duke of York, contrary to law, to take 
 his seat again at the council, and again to have the manage- 
 ment of the navy. 
 
 James II., the last king who held the crown by Divine right, 
 had less sense but more energy than his brother. In the first 
 moment of excitement he declared in a speech to the council, 
 his determination to rule constitutionally and before all things 
 to support the English Church. Contrary to this declaration, 
 however, one of his first acts was to order that the custom 
 duties should continue to be paid as hitherto, though they had 
 legally expired with the death of the late king. 
 
 The parliament which assembled on the 22nd May 1685, 
 was almost wholly composed of Tories, and proved its loyalty 
 by settling upon the king for life a revenue of nearly £ 1,900,000 
 sterling. Greatly encouraged, and with his authority strength- 
 ened by the unsuccessful rebellion of Argyle and Monmouth, 
 James thought he could bring about the repeal of the test and 
 the habeas corpus acts, and the creation of a standing army, 
 thus securing to Roman Catholics a monopoly of office and 
 emolument and establishing the royal supreme power. But the 
 parliament at its second session would not hear of repeal, and 
 refused to grant supplies for a standing army. On account of 
 the king’s violation of the test act, a petition against this 
 infrmgement was carried in the house, at the same time the 
 supplies granted only amounted to half what the king demanded. 
 
 The king, by means of his ecclesiastical supremacy, estab- 
 lished the court of ecclesiastical commission, similar in aims to 
 the old court of high commission which the long parliament 
 had abolished. He exercised his prerogative of dispensing with 
 penal statutes in England and suspended their action in Scot- 
 land, especially in regard to the appointment of Catholics, and 
 in this he was sustained by a subservient bench of judges.') 
 
 
 
 1) James filled the king’s bench with his own creatures, and in three 
 years went so far as to dismiss twelve judges. Herbert and Withers were in 
 1685 dismissed from the king’s bench for refusing to issue a legal decree at 
 the king’s behest; Jones, Montagu, Charleton and Nevil were dismissed in 1686 
 
eae Ae 
 
 Being upheld by the courts he was emboldened to publish a 
 declaration of Indulgence in 1687, and another in the following 
 year. By these declarations he suspended not only the statutes 
 which inflicted penalties upon Roman Catholics and Noncon- 
 formists, but also the statutes which excluded them from any 
 kind of preferment.') The chief unconstitutional acts of this 
 brief reign may be summarized as follows: — (1) The admis- 
 sion of papists into the public service; (2) the establishment 
 of the high commission court; (8) the dismissal of officers for 
 refusing to support the policy of the court; (4) the confiscation 
 of the charters; (5) the degradation of the judicial bench; and 
 (6) the trial of the bishops for a respectful petition.?) 
 
 On the 22nd of January 1689, William of Orange summoned, 
 by the advice of the peers, a Convention Parliament. On the 
 28 of January the commons declared that ,King James IL, 
 having endeavoured to subvert the constitution of the kingdom 
 by breaking the original contract between king and people, 
 and by the advice of Jesuits and other wicked persons having 
 violated the fundamental laws, and having withdrawn himself 
 out of the kingdom, had abdicated the Government, and that 
 
 because of their scruples as to the king’s power of dispensation, and Powell and 
 Holloway in 1688, on account of their vote in the trial of the seven bishops 
 (Gneist, op. cit. 600). 
 
 1) James, wishing to suspend the test act, obtained a decision from the 
 judges, that the laws were ,the King’s own laws“, from which the dispensing 
 power of the king was deduced. After the expulsion of James II. not one of the 
 ten judges who were then in office was found worthy of being retained. Henry III, 
 and his Plantagenet successors had frequently made use of the non obstante clause. 
 Attempts were however made to restrain it, and its use did not pass without 
 
 remonstrance (Math. Paris, Hist. Major, ed. 1640, 854). 
 
 2) As the rights of parliament became more and more firmly established, 
 the sphere for the exercise of the royal prerogative became more and more 
 limited and circumscribed. The attempts made by James I. and Charles I. to 
 undermine the foundations of the parliamentary constitution, having proved 
 perilous, were not repeated. But on the other hand, after the Restoration, and 
 in the following century, the royal control of the administrative and legislative 
 machinery by wholesale bribery, shameless abuse of the appointing power, in- 
 timidation of juries, traffic in titles, control of elections, and intimidation of 
 members of parliament, was assured. 
 
Ee. pete 
 
 the throne had thereby become vacant.“ And further, ,that it 
 hath been found by experience to be inconsistent with the safety 
 and welfare of this Protestant kingdom to be governed by a 
 popish prince.° 
 
 On the 13" of February 1689, the Convention offered the 
 crown to William and Mary jointly, accompanying the offer by 
 the presentation of the Declaration of Rights,'!) asserting the 
 »true, ancient, and indubitable rights of the people of this realm.“ 
 
 The Convention Parliament which was converted by act into 
 a regular parliament, enacted three important measures, — the 
 mutiny act, the toleration act,?) and the Bill of Rights. By the 
 mutiny act*) special laws were provided for enforcing discipline 
 in the army and special courts created to administer these laws. 
 The act was made for a year only, but was henceforth passed 
 annually; thus enabling the parliament to exercise a control over 
 
 
 
 1) After the flight of James the Declaration of Rights was drawn up, which 
 defined the royal authority and further restricted it. It covered in the main the 
 points in which the rights and privileges of government had in the last reign 
 been abused, and it was signed as a preliminary to his election by the Prince 
 of Orange. It runs thus: — Declaration of Rights, asserting the ,true, ancient, 
 and indubitable rights of the people of this realm“. (1) That the making or 
 suspending law without consent of parliament is illegal. (2) That the exercise 
 of the dispensing power is illegal. (3) That the ecclesiastical commission court 
 and other such like courts are illegal. (4) That levying of money without con- 
 sent of parliament is illegal. (5) That it is lawful to petition the king. (6) That 
 the maintenance of a standing army without the consent of parliament is illegal. 
 (7) That it is lawful for Protestants to keep arms, (8) That elections of mem- 
 bers of parliament must be free. (9) That there must be freedom of debate in 
 parliament. (10) That excessive bail should never be demanded. (11) That juries 
 should be impaneled and returned in every trial. (12) That. grants of estates as 
 forfeited before conviction of the offender are illegal. (13) That parliament 
 should be held frequently. 
 
 2) The toleration act of 1689 was the first legal recognition of diversity 
 of religious opinion. 
 
 3) 2 William and Mary, c. 5, sess. 2, c.14. The power of the sword is 
 thus only given for a year to the sovereign, the act being passed yearly and 
 for a year each time. Questions of peace and war, which are peculiarly within 
 the province of prerogative, have been determined not infrequently by the inter- 
 position of parliament. From the reign of Edward III. parliament hasbeen con- 
 sulted by the crown, and has freely offered its advice on questions of peace and 
 
SK Ape oe 
 
 the army. The Bill of Rights,") passed 16 December 1689, was 
 a parliamentary enactment of the Declaration of Rights, repeating 
 the provisions of that paper, settling the succession as detailed, 
 and enacting that no papist could wear the crown. In voting 
 supplies the parliament assumed as a right the practice which 
 had grown up during the reign of Charles I. of requiring esti- 
 mates and accounts of supplies needed and used, and introduced 
 the system of passing appropriations for specified objects from 
 which they could not be diverted. The second parliament of 
 William III. passed the triennial act,”) limiting the duration of 
 parliament to three years. The intermission of parliament for 
 more than three years was once more forbidden by this act. 
 The Act of Settlement,*?) which was the work of the fifth 
 parliament of this reign, not only settled the order of succes- 
 sion to the crown, but also contained some provisions of great 
 constitutional importance. It was enacted that whosoever should 
 hereafter come to the possession of the crown was to join in 
 communion with the Church of England as by Jaw established. 
 It was enacted that-no person who had an office or place of 
 profit under the king, or received a pension from the crown, 
 should be capable of serving as a member of the house of com- 
 
 war (Edward III., Parl. Hist. 1, 122; Henry VII., Ibid. 452; James I, Ibid. 
 1293; Anne, Ibid. vr. 609). Thus this is not a modern invasion of the royal 
 prerogative, but an ancient usage. But not until the power of parliament had 
 prevailed over prerogative had it the means of enforcing its advice. At the pre- 
 sent time the sovereign can never enter into any war, or pursue any negotiation, 
 without a positive certainty that the parliament will assent to it and support 
 the necessary operations, whether of hostility or commercial regulations (Brough- 
 am, Works, x1. 254). 
 
 1) The Bill of Rights concludes in these words: — ,,And they do claim, 
 demand, and insist upon, all and singular the premises, as their undoubted rights 
 and liberties“ (Stat. 1 William and Mary, sess. 2, c. 2). 
 
 2) This act (Stat. 6 William and Mary) remained in force till the passage 
 of the septennial act (1 George I. ch. 2, c. 38). 
 
 3) 12 and 13 William III. c.2. This enactment illustrates the decay of 
 the belief in the hereditary right of succession. The exclusion bills of the pre- 
 vious generation had been defeated by the force of this belief. But now a Tory 
 parliament passed a law to set aside the hereditary right of succession when- 
 ever the next heir to the crown was not in communion with the Church (vide 
 Appendix D). 
 
ease | eta 
 
 mons.') It was enacted that the sovereign of Great Britain 
 should not leave the kingdom without the consent of parliament; 
 that the country should not be involved in war for the defence 
 of the foreign possessions of the sovereign; that no foreigner 
 should receive a grant from the crown, or hold office, civil or 
 military; that ministers should be responsible for the acts of 
 the sovereign, and that judges should hold office for life unless 
 guilty of misconduct.?) 
 
 The principal constitutional events of the reign of Anne 
 were the parliamentary union of England with Scotland in 1707, 
 and the attempt to restore the intolerant church policy of the 
 reign of Charles II. by the passage of the schism act and of the 
 bill against occasional conformity.*) 
 
 The Accession of the House of Brunswick to the Extinction 
 of Personal Rule and Establishment of Popular Government. 
 
 Kngland had been slow to accept the principle of succession 
 by parliamentary instead of hereditary right. Since 1688 the 
 struggle had been continuous, and had reached a crisis in the 
 closing years of Anne. But with the death of the queen the 
 power of the Tories came to an end. The new dynasty was well 
 aware that from them-nothing was to be expected but indiffer- 
 ence, and the king willingly therefore placed himself in the 
 hands of the Whig party. William III. had found himself simi- 
 larly placed, but he knew something of English politics whereas 
 
 1) This clause in the Act of Settlement was directed against placemen and 
 pensioners, but in a few years it had to be repealed. It was then enacted that 
 only persons holding offices created since 1706 were to be incapable of sitting 
 in the house; but it was added that a member accepting any office under the 
 crown, other than a commission in the army, should be obliged to offer himself 
 for re-election. 
 
 2) Nearly every clause of this bill seemed aimed against the king’s former 
 conduct. 
 
 3) The bill against occasional conformity was passed in 1711, and the — 
 schism act in 1714; both measures were repealed in 1718. 
 
SE Age 
 
 George I. knew nothing. George therefore confined his attention 
 to the politics of Germany, especially as they related to Hanover. 
 The care of governing England he devolved upon the party 
 which could be trusted to defend his title to the throne. His 
 indifference to English politics was productive of two important 
 results. The first was to make the Whig party, or Whig oli- 
 garchy, supreme in England for nearly half a century; the other 
 was to reduce yet further the power of the crown, already so 
 much diminished by the Revolution.’) 
 
 More important than any legislative innovation made during 
 the reign of the first two Georges, was the development of the 
 cabinet in the modern sense. At the accession of the Tudor 
 dynasty the custom was revived of the monarch presiding at 
 the meetings of the council. This practice was continued during 
 the period of the Stuart kings, and after the Revolution by Wil- 
 liam III. and Queen Anne, the latter presiding regularly at the 
 weekly cabinet councils.”) George I., being unable to speak the 
 language, thought it useless to attend the meetings of the min- 
 isters, and by the end of George II.’s reign it had become 
 ,unusual* for the king to be present at deliberations of the 
 council. But there occurred one instance of the practice soon 
 after the accession of George III.*) Since that time it has be- 
 come the firmly established usage of the constitution that the 
 
 
 
 1) A measure known as the peerage bill, but which never became law, 
 illustrates the weakness of the crown at this period and the aristocratic ten- 
 dencies of many of the Whigs. In the session of 1719 the ministers introduced 
 a bill depriving the crown of the power of indefinite. peer creation, and provid- 
 ing that the number of peers should never exceed by more than six the number 
 then actually existing, and that the king should have power only to keep the 
 number up to that limit. In the previous reign (1712) Harley and St. John had 
 made use of the royal prerogative to neutralize the influence of the Whigs in 
 the upper house by the creation of twelve new Tory peers, which gave them 
 a permanent majority in that body. Pitt greatly extended the influence of the 
 crown in the house of commons, and diminished the importance of that body, 
 by transferring many of his adherents among the landed gentry to the upper 
 house (Brougham, Works, x1. 268). 
 
 2) Hardwicke, State Papers, 11. 452; Campbell, Chan. tv. 287. 
 
 3) Waldegrave, Memoirs, 66; Harris, Life of Hardwicke, mm. 231. 
 
 4 
 
cabinet consults together apart from the sovereign.') With the 
 rise of party government the absence of the king from the 
 meetings of his ministers became all the more an obvious 
 necessity. The king being prevented by his position from making 
 common cause with either party, party government could not 
 be complete until the king was practically deprived of his share 
 in governing. 
 
 George the Third was twenty-two years of age when he 
 ascended the throne. Though possessed of a narrow under- 
 standing, he was laborious, resolute, and had a genuine wish 
 to be a good king. He was not wanting in kingly virtues, nor, 
 thanks to his training, in princely prejudices.?) His education, 
 otherwise neglected,?) had raised his estimate of the personal 
 rights of a king in the government of his people. In 1752 com- — 
 plaints had been made that the prince was surrounded by Jacob- 
 ite preceptors, who were instructing him in arbitrary and un- 
 constitutional principles of government.*) His mother, the Prin- 
 cess Dowager of Wales, ,whose ambition yielded to none,“ *) 
 had taught him high notions of prerogative (her ideas of the 
 right and authority of a sovereign being derived from German 
 courts), and had encouraged him with the oft-repeated exhorta- 
 tion of ,George, be King.“*) Her constant friend and adviser 
 in this and other family matters had been Lord Bute, then 
 Groom of the Stole, who had thereby acquired the greatest in- 
 fluence over the young prince. The views which filled his mind 
 were those Bolingbroke had developed in his ,Idea of a Patriot 
 King.“ ”) The beneficent rule of a powerful monarch governing 
 his people by his own will, but for their good, was the ideal 
 he had been taught to set before him. 
 
 1) Campbell, Chan. mt. 191. 
 
 2) Waldegrave, Mem. 9. 
 
 3) Dodington’s Diary, 171; Walpole, Mem. 1. 55; Brougham, Works, 1. 11. 
 
 4) Vide debate in house of lords, 22nd March 1753; Walpole, Mem. tv. 
 139; Dodington’s Diary, 190, 194, 197, 228. 
 
 5) Walpole, DZem.1. 12; Adolphus, Hist. 1. 12. 
 
 6) Rockingham, Mem. 1, 3. 
 
 1) Works, tv. 274, 281, 282. 
 
SCN; | erase 
 
 He was ambitious and resolved not only to reign but to 
 govern, and would not be content with that division of power 
 which gave the substance to the Whig aristocracy and the shadow 
 to the Hanoverian king. His first duty therefore was to free 
 the prerogative from the state of captivity and servitude into 
 which it had fallen during the reign of the first two kings of 
 his house, by breaking down the confederacy of the great Whig 
 oligarchy.*) His second object was to annihilate party govern- 
 ment by restoring to the crown its freedom of choice and action. 
 He wished personally to direct the administration of public af- 
 fairs and the policy of his ministers, and himself to distribute 
 the patronage of the crown. He had a strong will, plenty of 
 courage, and some talent for intrigue; and it was with the de- 
 liberate intention of restoring the royal authority, and thereby 
 exalting the kingly office, that the young king began his reign, 
 and of this object he never lost sight. 
 
 Nor was this scheme as impracticable as at first sight it 
 might appear. George had been brought up on English soil, and 
 could say in his first speech to a new parliament, ,Born and 
 educated in this country, I glory in the name of Briton.‘ ?) He 
 was popular with the mass of his subjects; he was especially 
 popular with the Tories. The great majority of the Tories had 
 never been earnest Jacobites, and after the failure of the re- 
 bellion of 1745, the Jacobite party was virtually extinct.*) The 
 Tories could therefore indulge their natural disposition to support 
 the royal prerogative by rallying round the young monarch. The 
 Whigs were suffering from the ill effects of too much prosperity. 
 Political power still remained in their hands, but they were now 
 broken up into a number of small factions,‘) held together by 
 
 1) Grenville Papers, 1. 117. 
 
 2) Rose, Corresp. u. 189. : 
 
 ®) ,They abjured their ancient master; but retained their principles“ 
 (Walpole, Mem. 1. 15), 
 
 4) ,This was the age of small factions“ (Lord John Russell, Introd. to 
 vol. 11, Bedford Corresp.). 
 
— 5B 
 
 alliances rather than by union, and representing great families 
 or cliques rather than great principles. 
 
 The system of government which the king found at his 
 accession did not please him. He was jealous of ministers who 
 derived their authority from parliament. He wished to choose 
 them himself, to direct their policy, and to dismiss them when 
 they ceased to comply with his wishes. Having determined to 
 be himself the ruler, he could tolerate no independent will in 
 the government. In accordance with this view he drew up his 
 first speech to parliament without consulting the secretary of 
 State. 
 
 With the dissolution of parliament the changes in the min- 
 istry began. The first object of the king and his secret coun- 
 cellors was to get rid of Pitt and the existing ministry. Pitt 
 had resolved to declare war against Spain which had concluded 
 a secret treaty of alliance with France against Great Britain.") 
 His colleagues shrank from taking so bold a step, and the king 
 supporting them, the minister was forced to resign. Lord Bute 
 and three of his followers, Legge, Townshend, and Dashwood, 
 were now admitted to the cabinet. The Duke of Newcastle, 
 who had kept all patronage in his hands, found places filled 
 without his knowledge, and complained that he was met with — 
 the uniform answer that it was the king’s desire. In May 1762, 
 he resigned; and Bute, who was already practically supreme 
 in the council, became prime minister. The king and Bute now 
 proceeded to carry out by intimidation and other means their 
 favourite principles. These were peace at almost any price, 
 the abandonment of continental connections, the humbling of the 
 Whig party, and the restoration and increase of the power of 
 the crown. The king seized the opportunity of the passage of 
 the Peace of Paris through parliament to begin his attack on 
 the Whigs. By means of the purchase of votes,?) the victory — 
 
 
 
 1) Ann, Reg. 1761, 43; Grenville Papers, 1. 391, 405; Chatham, Cor- 
 resp. 11. 159. 
 
 2) The paymaster’s office became a shop for the purchase of votes, £ 200 
 being the least price given. 
 
Se, oo 
 
 remained with the king. All who ventured to express disap- 
 proval of the peace were made to feel the king’s displeasure. 
 Not only privy councillors and lords-lieutenant;: but, many: betty 
 officers and public servants were dismissed fér’this ‘offense. i) 
 
 Lord Bute had neither the ability nor the regcvution' hecessary 
 to carry out the unconstitutional policy of the ‘king, hut this 
 was scarcely sufficient reason for his sudden ve estgnati on; -which 
 may have been due, to his intense unpopularity, ‘and hls pre- 
 ference for the irresponsible power of the favourite to tire dangers 
 and responsibility of the minister. He named Grenville for his 
 successor, but failed to find in him so pliant a tool as he had 
 hoped, as the latter was as fond of power as the king himself. The 
 chief claims of the Grenville or Triumvirate ministry to distinc- 
 tion were its arbitrary proceedings against Wilkes, the taxation 
 of America, which he himself is said to have suggested,”) and 
 its depriving military officers of their commands for political 
 Opposition. General Conway and others for their votes in par- 
 liament had been deprived of their commands and positions.’) 
 Thus the privileges of parliament no longer afforded protection 
 against the king’s displeasure. The right of freedom of speech 
 in parliament which had been asserted for centuries,*) was again 
 placed in jeopardy, and members who exercised their right of 
 opposing the measures of the government did so at their peril.) 
 
 1) This success was followed by the wholesale dismissals from office of 
 those who owed their positions to Whig patronage. The duke of Devonshire, 
 for declining to attend a cabinet council, was rudely deprived of the office of 
 chamberlain, and the king with his own hand scratched his name off the list 
 of privy councillors. All placemen who had voted against the peace were dis- 
 missed. Newcastle and Rockingham were removed from their lord-lieutenancies, 
 Lord Shelburne, General Conway and Colonel Barré, were deprived of their 
 commissions for their votes on the question of general warrants. Earl Temple 
 and many others, including even tax-gatherers and custom house officials, ex- 
 perienced the effects of the royal displeasure. 
 
 2) Bancroft, Amer. Rev. 11. 207. 
 
 3) Chatham, Corresp. 1. 275; Walpole, Mem. 11. 65. 
 
 4) Rot. Parl. 11. 456, 611; 4 Henry VIII. c¢. 8. 
 
 5) »To commit General Conway to prison as James I. had committed Sir 
 Edwin Sandys, and as CharlesI. had committed Selden and other leading mem- 
 
EWA, Bak 
 
 Yet to this violation of their freedom, the commons submitted 
 with scarcely a murmur.') The king had virtually ceased to 
 deperia: upon. the advice of his favourites, and assumed direct 
 control of legislation, administration, and patronage.’) 
 
 In: 1768 ‘the ’king had his first attack of insanity, and on 
 his resoevery ‘he desired a regency bill to be passed.’) Acting 
 on the’ advice of Grenville he consented to the exclusion from 
 the bill of the name of the Princess Dowager, on the ground 
 that were it“inserted, the commons would demand its omission. 
 On the contrary however, on the introduction of the bill, a large 
 majority of the house voted for its insertion, and it became ob- 
 vious to the king that he had been the victim of a trick. For 
 this he could not forgive Grenville, and he at once set about 
 
 
 
 bers of the House of Commons, could not now have been attempted. Nor was 
 the ill-omened venture of Charles I. against the five members likely to be re- 
 peated; but the King was violating the same principles of constitutional govern- 
 ment as his arbitrary predecessors. He punished as far as he was able those 
 who had incurred his displeasure for their conduct in Parliament; and denied 
 them the protection which they claimed from privilege and the laws of their 
 country“ (May, Const. 1.). 
 
 1) Parl. Hist. xvi. 1765. 
 
 2) Bedford Corresp. 111, 264. 
 
 3) George III.’s first attack of insanity in 1765, it appears, was concealed 
 from the public (Adolphus, 1. 175; Mahon, y. 96). The letters of Lord Gren- 
 ville, 1788—89, in the Buckingham Papers, show that the ministers had at 
 that time no suspicion of his having been previously insane. The king’s second 
 attack occurred in 1788~89, and he was declared incapable of carrying on the 
 business of the country; the third attack, 1801, deprived him of reason and his 
 condition was considered critical; in the fourth, 1804, his mind was not so 
 alienated as in the two previous illnesses; by the fifth and last attack in 1810, 
 he was wholly bereft of reason and rendered nearly blind. The illnesses of 
 George III. involved political considerations of great importance, affecting the 
 prerogative of the crown, the rights of the royal family, the duties of ministers, 
 and the authority of parliament. The laws of England recognized no incapa- 
 city in the sovereign, and made no provision for his guardianship. During the 
 illness of the king in 1788, Pitt produced a very stringent bill, which refused 
 the Prince of Wales the right of making peers or granting places, the principle 
 being that as the king was likely to recover, he should on resuming his func- 
 tions, find things as little altered as possible. To this proposed bill the royal 
 assent was given by a commission in the king’s name; but had it become law 
 it would have established a dangerous precedent, as it would have shown that 
 
~ tae 
 
 eetting rid of him. For seven weeks, according to Walpole,') 
 the country was practically without a government. The duke 
 of Cumberland had applied to Pitt to form a ministry, and the 
 latter had stated his terms. These were, that an alliance with 
 the Protestant powers of Europe should be formed to balance 
 the family compact, that general warrants should henceforth be 
 declared illegal,?) and that officers dismissed for political reasons 
 should be restored. These conditions the king was prepared 
 to concede, and everything seemed to promise success, when 
 Pitt, after an interview with his brother-in-law, Earl Temple, 
 decided that his obligations to him would prevent his taking 
 office.*) Thus the king was thrown back into the hands of his 
 old ministry. But he now determined to rid himself.of them, 
 even at the cost of accepting the Whigs. After further futile 
 negotiations with Pitt, he surrendered himself to the very men 
 whom he most dreaded. Under the Rockingham ministry, which 
 now succeeded, many of the obnoxious measures of the preceding 
 ministry were repealed. The proscription of Whig nobles and 
 their adherents ceased for the time, and general warrants were 
 condemned. This administration, according to Burke, also ,dis- 
 countenanced, and it is hoped for ever abolished, the dangerous 
 and unconstitutional practice of removing military officers, for 
 their votes in Parliament.‘ °) 
 
 But the king continued to direct the policy of his ministers, 
 especially in the disputes touching the taxation of the American 
 colonies. The ministry had also to contend against the oppo- 
 
 
 
 parliament could legislate without a king, and that the crown was but a name 
 and without real authority. On this occasion Pitt claimed for parliament an ab- 
 solute authority to nominate any regent it might please, even without the sanc- 
 tion of the crown. 
 
 1) Memoirs, nu. 192. 
 
 2) General warrants had already been declared illegal in 1763 by the Lord 
 Chief Justice. 
 
 3) Walpole, Mem. 1. 165. 
 
 4) Temple had come to terms with George Grenville, and was planning a 
 family Grenville Ministry. 
 
 5) ,Short account of a Late Short Administration.“ 
 
sition of office holders and pensioners to measures which they 
 approved.') This system, said Burke, ,produced neither the 
 security of a free government, nor the energy of a monarchy 
 that is absolute.**) The ministry, after trying in vain to induce 
 Pitt to join them, were dismissed in July 1766. The government 
 of Rockingham had been distinctly a party government, and his 
 policy was much too liberal and independent to please the king. 
 
 Pitt was now induced to accept the administration, though 
 the duke of Grafton nominally held the office of prime minister, 
 Pitt taking a peerage as Lord Chatham and the office of privy 
 seal. He first tried to win the Bedford party, but he would 
 not give them enough. He then proceeded to introduce a num- 
 ber of Tories and courtiers into the administration, thus de- 
 liberately assisting the king in his great scheme, — the destruc- 
 tion of party distinctions.’) After October 1768, Chatham re- 
 signed office, and the king was again left entirely free to direct 
 the administration of affairs.4) Grafton without views of his 
 own, was nothing but the passive instrument of the royal will. 
 
 On the retirement of Grafton in January 1770, George with 
 much quickness and decision took advantage of the disunion and 
 want of cordial alliance among the opposition. To him it was 
 of paramount importance to retain his friends in office and to 
 avoid a new parliament elected in the present excited state of 
 the nation. The king sent immediately for Lord North, the 
 
 1) Walpole, Mem. u. 822; Rockingham, Mem. 11. 53; May, op. cit. 1. 
 
 2) ,,Present Discontents“, Works, u. ,It is the nature of despotism“, says 
 Burke, ,to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary pleasure; 
 and to annihilate all intermediate situations between boundless strength on its 
 own part, and total debility on the part of the people. To get rid of all this 
 intermediate and independent importance, and to secure to the court the un- 
 limited and uncontrolled use of its own vast influence, under the sole direction 
 of its own private favour, has for some years past been the gieat object of 
 policy“ (Present Discontents, 1. 314, 315). 
 
 3) Burke says, when Lord Chatham ,had accomplished his scheme of ad- 
 ministration, he was no longer minister“ (Speech on American Taxation, Rocking- 
 ham, Mem. nu. 148). 7 
 
 4) Walpole, Mem. ur. 62, 67n. 
 
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 chancellor of the exchequer, who reconstituted the old ministry. 
 North was favourable to prerogative, and during his administra- 
 tion the power of the crown still further increased. With his 
 accession the unstable character of the government ceased. 
 Resting on the king, being but the instrument for carrying out 
 the arbitrary measures of his master, and thus commanding the 
 support of all royal influence, North was able to bid defiance to 
 all opposition for years.') Thus far the crown had been strength- 
 ened by the support of the people, who were willing enough to 
 assist the king in weakening the power of the Whig party. Thus 
 during the first ten years of constitutional struggle the policy 
 of the king had triumphed. During this period and that which 
 followed, the royal authority was constantly employed in the 
 repression of liberty, both at home and in the colonies; and 
 this principle, Lord North, sustained by a servile and corrupt 
 house of commons, was able to uphold. 
 
 The king had been much distressed and displeased by the 
 disgraceful marriages contracted by two of his brothers and by 
 other members of the royal family. With the view therefore of 
 guarding against such matrimonial alliances in future the royal 
 marriage bill was passed. In 1718 George I. maintained that 
 he had the power, by virtue of his prerogative, to direct the 
 education of his grandchildren and also to dispose of them in 
 marriage to the exclusion of the authority of the prince. This 
 question was decided in the king’s favour.’) George III. now 
 asserted in the present bill that no descendant of George IL., 
 save the issue of princesses married abroad, should be capable 
 of contracting matrimony before the age of twenty-five without 
 the king’s previous consent; otherwise the marriage should be 
 null’ and void. After that age they must give twelve months’ 
 notice of their intended marriage to the privy council, unless 
 in the meantime it be petitioned against by both houses of 
 parliament.’) In 1718 this assertion of the prerogative was 
 
 -1) Parl. Hist. xvi. 842; Walpole, 1. 95n. 
 
 2) Blackstone, 1, 219. 
 
 3) Fox resigned his seat at the Admiralty Board in order to oppose this 
 measure. 
 
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 sustained by judicial opinion only in so far as it applied to the 
 grandchildren of the monarch. George III. claimed the right 
 of control over the marriages of his brothers, uncles and cou- 
 sins. This question was first submitted for an opinion to the 
 judges: — ,Is the King entrusted by law with the care and 
 approbation of the marriages of the descendants of his late 
 Majesty George II., other than his present Majesty’s own child- 
 ren during their minorities?“ As the question propounded em- 
 braced all the descendants of the late king, without as well 
 as within the kingdom, nine judges answered it in the negative, 
 but they admitted the care') and approbation as applied to the 
 children and grandchildren of the king and of the heir pre- 
 sumptive to the crown; ,but to what other branches of the — 
 royal family such care and approbation extend, we do not find 
 precisely determined.“ ?) It might be reasonable to prescribe 
 rules against the marriage of members of the royal family with 
 a subject, or with a Roman Catholic, without the royal consent, 
 but this arbitrary measure’) not only extended the minority of 
 princes and princesses to twenty-five, but gave the king the 
 sole and absolute control over royal marriages. Moreover by 
 means of a parliament subservient to the crown the marriage 
 could be perpetually prevented. But here again the personal 
 will of the king was supreme against all opposition, and to- 
 wards those who opposed him he was implacable.*) 
 
 The king was determined upon the suppression of insub- 
 ordination in America, and the destruction of Wilkes in Eng- 
 land, but at the final outcome the victory remained with the 
 
 
 
 1) The prerogative of the king touching the education of his grandchild- 
 ren, which had been established in 1718, was again asserted in 1804 in regard 
 to the princess Charlotte, of whom the king claimed the guardianship. 
 
 2) Parl. Hist. xvu. 387. 
 
 3) Lord Chatham, in a letter to Lord Shelburne, 3rd April 1772, thus ex- 
 pressed himself touching this bill: — ,,The doctrine of the Royal Marriage Bill 
 is certainly new-fangled and impudent, and the extent of the powers given, 
 wanton and tyrannical“ (Corresp. tv. 203). 
 
 4) While the bill was pending in parliament the king wrote to Lord North 
 as follows: — ,I expect every nerve to be strained to carry the Bill. It is not 
 
— 59 — 
 
 colonies and with Wilkes.') When Lord Chatham was about to 
 move an address for dissolving parliament in connection with 
 the Wilkes affair, the king’s resentment knew no bounds. He 
 was even prepared to resist what he deemed an invasion of 
 his prerogative, by military force.”) During the negotiations in 
 1778 for the admission to the ministry of Chatham and other 
 leaders of the opposition, he said in a letter to Lord North 
 (15th March), ,Honestly, I would rather lose the Crown I now 
 wear, than bear the ignominy of possessing it under these 
 shackles.‘ *) Had George understood his position as a consti- 
 tutional king he would at this time have consented to form a 
 new ministry from the leaders of the opposition. In 1779: it 
 was openly avowed in the house of commons by Lord George 
 Germaine, that the king was his own minister; and Fox lam- 
 ented, ,that his Majesty was his own unadvised minister*.‘) 
 In the debate on the address at the opening of parliament, 
 25th November 1779, Fox again called attention to the fact that 
 the king was his own minister.*) 
 
 In the beginning of 1780 public meetings were held and peti- 
 tions presented in favour of economic reforms. Complaints were 
 made of the undue influence of the crown, and of the patronage 
 and corruption by which it was maintained.*) On the 6th of 
 April Dunning moved his famous resolution in a committee of 
 the whole house, which by a majority of 18 passed slightly 
 
 
 
 a question relating to administration, but personally to myself; therefore I have 
 a right to expect a hearty support from every one in my service, and I shall 
 remember defaulters“ (Fox, Mem. 1. 75, 76; Brougham, mr. 79). This measure 
 was reluctantly adopted by the ministers. It is evident from the king’s language 
 that no person who voted against the bill could continue to hold office under 
 the crown. 
 
 1) On the 3rd of May 1782, the resolutions rejecting Wilkes as a member 
 of parliament were expunged ,as subversive of the rights of electors“ (Parl. 
 Hist. xx. 1407). 
 
 » 2) Massey, Hist. 1. 489. . 
 
 3) Fox, Mem. 1, 189; Brougham, Works, m1, 108. 
 
 4) Fox, Mem. 1. 2038. 
 
 5) Parl. Hist. xx. 1120. 
 
 6) Parl. Hist. xx, 1370; Ann, Reg. xxin, 85. 
 
amended; ,that the influence of the crown has increased, is 
 increasing, and ought to be diminished‘.') In the upper house 
 Rockingham observed: ,It was early in the present reign pro- 
 mulgated as a Court axiom, that the power and influence of 
 the Crown alone was sufficient to support any set of men his 
 Majesty might think proper to call to his councils.*”) The 
 motion of the Earl of Shelburne for an inquiry into the public 
 expenditure was followed by an attempt at intimidation of 
 peers, several being deprived of their lord-lieutenancies. -At 
 the meeting of parliament on the 27th of November 1781, com- 
 plaints again arose in both houses of the crown influence. The 
 duke of Richmond said that the ,interior cabinet* had been 
 the ruin of the country.*) Rockingham‘) and Fox’) spoke in 
 the same strain.°) 
 
 The year 1781 had been a most disastrous one for British 
 arms, and greatly hastened the downfall of the now tottering 
 ministry. Early in 1782, the commons presented an address 
 against the further prosecution of offensive war to which they 
 received an evasive answer. On the 27th of February General 
 Conway moved, ,that the house will consider as enemies to 
 his Majesty and this country all who shall advise, or by any 
 
 1) Parl. Hist. xxt. 347. 
 
 2) Ibid. xx, 1346. 
 
 3) Ibid. xxir. 651. 
 
 4) Ibid. xxu, 655. 
 
 5) Ibid. xxtr. 706, 1064. 
 
 6) The systematic corruption of members of parliament is said to have 
 begun under Charles II., in whose reign it was practised to the largest extent 
 (Lecky, Highteenth Century, 1, 366). Out of 550 members of the first parliament 
 of George I., 271 were placemen; and the first parliament of George I. con- 
 tained 257 office-holders, pensioners and sinecurists (May, op. cit. 1. 317). The 
 place bill of 1743 did some good in excluding a certain number of inferior 
 place-holders from parliament (Hallam, Const. chaps. xv. xv1.; Fischel, Hnglish 
 Const. 433). Bribery at elections was condemned by a law of William III. (7 Wil- 
 liam III. c. 4), and another measure against it was passed in 1729 (2 George IL. 
 c. 24; Parl. Hist. xu. 648). The number of electors in the year 1768 is given 
 by Massey (Hist. 1. 338) as 160,000. The total number at the close of the cen- 
 tury probably did not exceed 200,000. 
 
means attempt, the further prosecution of offensive war on the 
 continent of America, for the purpose of reducing the revolted 
 colonies to obedience by force.“ This resolution was agreed to 
 without a division.!) The motion of Sir John Rous on the 15th 
 of March, ,that the House could no longer repose confidence 
 in the present, ministers“, was lost by only nine votes.?) North 
 saw that further struggle was hopeless, and on the 20th com- 
 pelled the king to allow him to declare the administration at 
 an end. 
 
 The king’s influence during Lord North’s ministry was 
 paramount. ,Not only did he direct the minister in all im- 
 portant matters of foreign and domestic policy, but he instructed 
 him as to the management of debates in Parliament, suggested 
 what motions should be made or opposed, and how measures 
 Should be carried. He reserved to himself all the patronage, -- 
 he arranged the entire caste of the administration, settled the 
 relative places and pretensions of ministers of state, of law 
 officers, and members of the household, — nominated and pro- 
 moted the English and Scotch judges, — appointed and trans- 
 lated bishops, nominated deans and dispensed other preferments 
 in the Church. He disposed of military governments, regiments 
 and commissions, and himself ordered the marching of troops. 
 He gave and refused titles, honours and pensions. All this im- 
 mense patronage was persistently used for the creation and 
 maintenance in both Houses of Parliament of a majority directed 
 by the King himself.*) Louis XIV. could not have been more 
 royal: he enjoyed the consciousness of power, and felt himself 
 every inch a king.“*) The defeat of the ministry on the Conway 
 measure was a victory for the house, which, in spite of the 
 great influence of the crown, had been able to bring to a close 
 
 1) Purl. Hist. xxn. 1064, 1086, 1089. 
 
 2) Parl. Hist. xxm. 1171, 1172. 
 
 3) This immense mass of patronage which George kept so firmly in his 
 own grasp, had been in the reigns of his Hanoverian predecessors practically 
 usurped by the ministers of the crown. 
 
 4) May, Const. 1. 50; Green tv, 252, 
 
Relies st 
 
 the American war. Lord North’s resignation was the complete 
 defeat for the time of the king’s plans; but George was ob- 
 stinate and determined, and he had no intention as yet of giving 
 up the fight. Lord Shelburne having refused the premiership, 
 Rockingham undertook to form a ministry consisting of equal 
 numbers of the two sections of the liberal party.') This ministry 
 however, would have soon gone to pieces from its want of 
 coherency, had not the death of Rockingham dissolved it. The 
 king at once offered the premiership to Shelburne, and William 
 Pitt,”) as yet but twenty-three years of age, became chancellor 
 of the exchequer. Several of the old ministers retained their 
 places, but Fox refused to serve under Shelburne, and the greater 
 part followed their leader; and thus arose a split, which proved 
 to be final, between the two sections of the Whigs. 
 
 Fox and North now combined to eject Lord Shelburne’s 
 vovernment, and they chose as their test question the terms 
 of the peace of Versailles and Paris. In parliamentary influence 
 the coalition proved to be quite irresistible, and the minister 
 finding himself in a minority upon resolutions which had been 
 moved condemnatory of the peace, at once resigned. After some 
 weeks of ineffectual struggles the king was again forced to yield 
 to the combination against him, and to accept the coalition 
 ministry (North and Fox) under the duke of Portland. Nothing 
 could have been more distasteful to him; but this ministry which 
 appeared so irresistible was destined to be of short duration, 
 and the faction movement which seemed to have thwarted for 
 ever the policy of the king, proved in the sequel the means of 
 establishing his policy for the rest of the reign. 
 
 
 
 1) Rockingham, Keppel, Lord John Cavendish, the Duke of Richmond, and 
 Fox of the one party; Shelburne, Camden, General Conway, Lord Ashburton 
 (Dunning), and the Duke of Grafton of the other. The Tory Lord Thurlow, the - 
 Lord Chancellor, held the balance between them. Fox said, ,provided we can 
 stay in long enough to give a good stout blow to the influence of the crown, I 
 do not think it much signifies how soon we go out after* (Mem. 1. 316, 317). 
 
 2) Who, to use the expression of Erskine, was ,,hatched at once into a 
 minister by the heat of his own ambition“ (Parl. Hist. xxiy. 277). 
 
The attempts of the coalition to restrain the influence of 
 the king!) so exasperated him, that he openly opposed his 
 ministers and plotted to secure their downfall.?) He also threat- 
 ened to leave the country and retire to Hanover.*) By the 
 use of his name, and the tactics of 1766, ,The King’s Friends,“ 
 — Fox’s India bill, which had passed the lower house, was 
 defeated in the house of lords.4) The action of the king in 
 the house of lords caused great indignation in the house of 
 commons, and provoked a resolution, ,that to report any 
 opinion of his Majesty with a view to influence votes is a 
 high crime and misdemeanour derogatory to the honour of the 
 Crown, a breach of the fundamental privileges of Parliament, 
 and subversive of the Constitution.“ °) But the bill was rejec- 
 
 1) North now said, ,the appearance of power is all that a king of this 
 country can have“ (Fox, Mem. 1. 38). 
 
 2) , When George IJ. found he was obliged to accept the united admini- 
 stration of the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt, he reluctantly released his faith- 
 ful adherent Lord Waldegrave from the task, the latter pledging himself to be 
 ready on all proper occasions to oppose his Majesty’s ministers and his Ma- 
 jesty’s son“ (Waldegrave, Mem. 137). The opposition of George II. to his mini- 
 sters (through his instrument Waldegrave) was doubtless exerted with due care 
 and moderation. No king of the house of Hanover had been present at the 
 deliberations of the legislature (Hatzell, 1. 871n; Chitty, Prerog. 75). 
 
 3) , Nothing is more easy“, said Lord Thurlow; ,,but you may not find it 
 so easy to return, when your Majesty becomes tired of staying there“ (May, 
 Const. 1. 55). 
 
 4) The king supplied Temple with a paper to show to any lord he pleased, 
 the purport of which was, ,that his Majesty allowed Earl Temple to say 
 that whoever voted for the India Bill was not only not his friend, but would 
 be considered by him as an enemy, and if those words were not strong enough, 
 Karl Temple might use whatever words he might deem stronger and more to the 
 purpose“ (Buckingham, Mem. 1. 288, 289). ,,T'wo systems of administration 
 were to be found; one which should be in the real secret and confidence; the 
 other merely ostensible, to perform the official and executory duties of Govern- 
 ment. The latter were alone to be responsible, while the real advisers, who 
 enjoyed all the power, were effectually removed from all the danger. Thus Par- 
 liament was to look on as if perfectly unconcerned, while a cabal of the closet 
 and backstairs was substituted in the place of a national administration“ (Pre- 
 sent Discontents, 1, 315, 316). 
 
 5) Comm. Journ, xxxix. 842. 
 
iggy Nee 
 
 ted, and on the 18" of December the king dismissed the ministers, 
 refusing even to see them personally. 
 
 Pitt, who had declined to form a ministry. on the fall of 
 the Shelburne administration, now came to the king’s assistance, 
 and in him a compromise between George and Fox was effected. 
 But with his acceptance of the premiership a contest began 
 which, to quote the words of Dr. Johnson, was to decide , whether 
 the nation should be ruled by the sceptre of George III. or by 
 the tongue of Fox.“ An address had been delivered to the king 
 praying against either an adjourment or dissolution, to which 
 his majesty had returned a favourable reply. The king had 
 the undoubted prerogative of appointing and dismissing -his 
 ministers and of dissolving the parliament; the appeal of both 
 in the last instance being to the people. But this appeal the 
 commons wished to deny the king, and threatened to withhold 
 supplies unless the Pitt ministry was dismissed.!) The oppo- 
 sition in thus endeavouring to force the king by a majority of 
 the house went beyond the constitutional limits of their power. 
 While the great struggle between Pitt and Fox was going on . 
 the king’s anxiety was very great, and he wrote to Pitt as fol- 
 lows: — ,Should not the Lords stand boldly forth this Constitu- 
 tion must soon be changed; for if the only two privileges of 
 the Crown be infringed, — that of negativing bills which have 
 passed both Houses of Parliament,”) and that of naming the 
 
 1) From the thirteenth century to the Bill of Rights the commons had 
 times without number asserted their right to grant taxes, and by means of this 
 power they had again and again wrung concessions from arbitrary monarchs 
 and thereby advanced the liberties of the people. In the time of the Stuarts it 
 ‘was no unusual occurrence for the commons to refuse to grant subsidies to the 
 king (Parl. Hist. 1, 35; ry. 757, 879, 1000, 1379). In 1781 it was proposed by 
 a member to delay granting supplies for a few days in order to extort from 
 North a pledge touching the American war. It was then admitted that no such 
 proposal had been made since the Revolution (Parl. Hist. xxi. 751). The pre- 
 cedent of 1784 is the solitary instance in which the commons have exercised 
 their power of delaying the supplies. They were provoked to use it by the un- 
 constitutional exercise of the influence of the crown; but it failed of its object. 
 
 2) ,1 hope,“ he wrote to Lord North in 1774, ,the Crown will always be 
 able, in either House of Parliament, to throw out—a bill; but I shall never 
 
oer ines 
 
 ministers to be employed, — I cannot but feel, as far as re- 
 gards my person, that I can be no longer of utility to this country, 
 nor can with honour continue in this island.“ 1) 
 
 But the attempts against the royal prerogative resulted 
 after a brief though severe struggle in a complete triumph for 
 Pitt and the king.*) The king had expelled one ministry and 
 retained another in defiance of the house of commons. Not only 
 had he overcome and ruined a party which he hated, but he 
 had established the ascendency of the crown, which henceforth, 
 for nearly fifty years, continued to prevail over every other 
 power in the state. Hitherto it had been the policy of the king 
 to employ men of little genius (who had been, with but few 
 exceptions, pliant instruments for carrying out his personal 
 wishes), instead of leaving the country to be governed, — as 
 a free state should be, — by its ablest and most popular states- 
 men.*) The late triumph of the king would naturally tend to 
 exalt his idea of prerogative, and he now possessed a minister 
 whose views in most respects were in accord with his own, 
 
 consent to use any expression which tends to establish that at no time the right 
 of the Crown to dissent is to be used“ (Brougham, Works, ur. 85). 
 
 1) Tomline, Life of Pitt, 1, 341. 
 
 2) ,,Pitt had maintained the right of the King to appoint him, the duty 
 of Parliament to consider his measures, and his own right to advise the King 
 to dissolve Parliament, if those measures were obstructed.“ In 1675, in the reign 
 of Charles II., parliament had assumed the right of advising the crown touch- 
 ing the exercise of the prerogative of dissolution (Lords’ Journ. xu. 33). But 
 it was not definitely and clearly established until the year 1784, that where there 
 is a conflict between the personal opinions: of the sovereign and those of a 
 majority of the house of commons, the latter, and not the former, is to prevail; 
 unless, indeed, a dissolution and a new election should reverse the decision of 
 the previous parliament. The precedent of 1784 established the rule that if the 
 ministers chosen by the crown do not possess the confidence of the house of 
 commons, they may advise an appeal to the people, with whom rests the ulti- 
 mate decision. This course was followed in 1807, 1831, 1834, 1841, 1857 and 
 1859 (Lord J. Russell, Mem. of Fox, 1, 245). After Pitt had by firmness and 
 moderation overcome the opposition in the house, he advised the king to dis- 
 Solve the parliament. The elections made it evident that the feeling of the nation 
 was entirely with him, no less than 160 of Fox’s friends having lost their seats, 
 
 2) Lord John Russell, Introd. to vol. 11. Bedford Corr. 2 seq. 
 
 5 
 
eat G Gees 
 
 and to whom he could safely entrust the carrying out of the 
 Tory principles of government and the guardianship of the rights 
 of the crown.!) The power and influence of the crown now 
 became nearly absolute. The king desisted to some extent from 
 the independent exercise of his authority, but the royal power 
 as wielded jointly by himself and his minister was greatly in- 
 creased.”) Parliamentary opposition to such a combination was 
 
 1) In a letter from William Pitt to Karl Temple, 22nd July 1783, it ap- 
 pears that Lord Thurlow had endeavoured, without expressing definite views of 
 his own, or committing the king, to ascertain Pitt’s political intentions, more 
 particularly in reference to parliamentary reform and to the system of personal 
 government of which Lord North’s ministry had been an instrument. He throws 
 out a suggestion. that the king in accepting the coalition ministry had ,gone 
 through the worst.“ Pitt, at this time, declares frankly and clearly against the 
 unconstitutional influence of the crown, and for electoral reform, and is dis- 
 inclined to resume office except on these principles. (Dropmore Manuscripts, 
 Hist. MSS. Comm. 138, app. pt. m1. 215, 216). . . 
 
 2) Throughout Pitt’s administration, as well as before it and afterwards, 
 »every act and appointment was submitted to the king, not nominally but really 
 for the purpose of his exercising a judgment upon it“ (Parl. Deb. xxit. 334). 
 The purely personal acts of George were legion. He forced Lord Holderness to 
 retire from the wardenship of the Cinque Ports to make way for Bute (Life 
 of Hardwicke, ir. 242; vide also Rose, Corresp. 11. 191, who gives a somewhat- 
 different account), In 1792 he conferred that office upon Pitt, and would listen 
 to no recommendation in favour of any one else (Stanhope, 1. 160). After the 
 death of Pitt, he conferred it upon Lord Hawkesbury in the same way (Yonge, 
 Infe of Liverpool, 1, 209). Against the wishes of Pitt he appointed Dr. Manners- 
 Sutton to the see of Canterbury (Stanhope, iv. 252; Rose, Corresp. 1. 82—91). 
 He refused to confer a dukedom upon Earl Temple, and expressed his deter- 
 mination to grant no more dukedoms except to princes of the blood (Stanhope, 
 1, 164; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, 11. 419). Under George III. there were 
 created 268 peers and 528 baronets. Langmead asserts (p. 702), that after Pitt’s 
 accession the king’s will was no longer supreme, as during the administration 
 of North. George was certainly powerful enough to force Pitt’s resignation 
 in 1801 on the Roman Catholic question, and on again taking office in 1804 
 the king refused to allow him to have Fox in the cabinet. Pitt put an end to 
 the government of the faction of ,,the king’s friends‘, but he did not put an 
 end to the personal rule of the king. George says in a letter to Pitt, 18th 
 February 1786, ,It is very unpleasant to me to observe by Mr. Pitt’s note that 
 he has been detained at the House of Commons by the fertile imagination of 
 Mr. Burke“, etc. (MSS. of P. V. Smith, Hist. MSS. Comm. 12, app. pt. 1x. 350). 
 
Beal get Ay Sle 
 
 futile, and if beyond the pale of the house complaints were made 
 the arm of the law was strong and swift to silence them. In- 
 deed to oppose the minister had become high treason to the 
 state.1) Thus in Pitt, ,the heir of the coalition,“ was found a 
 minister whom the king would tolerate and the country support. 
 But in spite of the king’s confidence in and dependence upon 
 Pitt, whenever their views of policy were at variance the temper 
 of the monarch was as unyielding as ever. The fall of the 
 great minister was due entirely to the personal will of his royal 
 master. 
 
 At the assembling of the first united parliament of Great 
 Britain and Ireland early in 1801, Pitt, in fulfilment of a vague 
 promise to the Irish, was preparing a measure for the relief of the 
 Irish Roman Catholics.2) The chancellor, Lord Loughborough, 
 and Lord Auckland having pursuaded the king, so it was said, 
 that to consent to any such measure would be a breach of his 
 coronation oath,®) the latter stated openly to Dundas, that he 
 ,should hold anyone who supported it as his personal enemy.“ 
 The king wrote to Pitt urging him to remain in office and to 
 drop the measure, and suggested as a compromise that they 
 both should agree to be silent on the subject; but Pitt was as 
 determined as the king, so the latter accepted his resignation.*) 
 
 1) May, Const. 1. 77. 
 
 2) ,George III., and the majority of the nation, perceived in the Roman 
 Catholic Church not merely an ecclesiastical but an essentially political insti- 
 tution, which owing to its extension over all the States of the inhabited globe, 
 and to its claim to external sway over the life of nations, as well as to its 
 pretensions to a complete recognition of sovereignty in its spiritual head, was 
 incompatible with the constitution of the country. This view was so deeply 
 rooted in George III., that all attempts made to pass an act of toleration were 
 foiled by his unyielding will* (Gneist, op. cit. 713). 
 
 3) ,1 can give up my crown and retire from power; I can quit my palace 
 and live in a cottage; I can lay my head on a block and lose my life; but I 
 cannot break my coronation oath“ (Lord Eldon). 
 
 4) Philpotts, Quart. Rev. xxxvi. (1827), 285—295. George proposed as a 
 compromise ,that he [the king] should maintain henceforth utter silence on 
 the question, and that Mr. Pitt on his part should forbear to bring it forward“; 
 but, adds the king, ,further I cannot go“ (Stanhope, Life of Pitt, u. 393), 
 
eS §@R Se 
 
 George now had an attack of his old trouble, and charged 
 Pitt with being the cause of it. Whereupon that statesman sent 
 a message to the king in March, promising that, whether in or 
 out of office he would absolutely abandon the Catholic relief 
 question during the king’s reign.') Thus he was willing to re- 
 main, upon the terms dictated by the king, at the head of the 
 administration. But George had no desire for the return of 
 either Pitt or Grenville; and Addington naturally objected to 
 relinquishing the place he had just gained. 
 
 The new ministry was conservative, submissive, and without 
 great ability, and according to the king’s own letters he was 
 now ,freed from the restraint which the character and position 
 of Mr. Pitt had imposed upon him, and now possessed a minister 
 whose intellect was not so commanding as to overpower and 
 subdue his own.“ But after three years of existence the weak 
 and incompetent Addington ministry which had been mainly 
 upheld by the influence of the crown,”) was obliged to make way 
 for Pitt.*) On account of the war, Pitt wished to form a strong 
 and comprehensive government, and to have as little oppositien 
 as possible. He therefore urged the admission of both Fox 
 and Grenville to the ministry, but the king was inflexible; Gren- 
 ville he would admit, but Fox never.*) Pitt consented to ex- 
 clude Fox, but he still hoped to obtain the support of Grenville. 
 The latter, however, declared that he would not take office 
 without Fox. Thus finding the two sections of the opposition 
 closed against him, the Foxites, — because their chief had been 
 proscribed by the king; the Grenvilles, because he had acquies- 
 
 
 
 1) Stanhope, Life of Pitt, ur, 803—306; Malmesbury, Diary and Cor- 
 resp, 1v. 81; Colchester, Diary, u. 211. 
 
 2) Stanhope, loc. cut. 1v. 161, 165. 
 
 3) The king disliked the return of Pitt and wished to retain Addington, 
 whom he had found very complacent. 
 
 4) George said in a note to Addington, ,,Mr. Fox is excluded by the ex- 
 press command of the King“ (Stanhope, loc. cit. m. 226). Pitt, speaking of the 
 king’s resolute determination at this time, said to Chancellor Eldon, » Never, in 
 any conversation I have had with him in my life, has he so baffled me” 
 (Ibid. 226). 
 
Bea RO ae 
 
 ced in this proscription, — no resource was left to Pitt but to 
 form a government upon a narrow Tory basis. Thus had Pitt 
 again yielded to the prejudices of the king. Though he still 
 had the confidence of the monarch, the latter continued to form 
 his own independent opinions and to be guided by them. He 
 still exerted a large influence in the distribution of the patronage 
 and dictated the policy of the government.*) 
 
 The death of Pitt on the 23rd of January 1806, was shortly 
 followed by the breaking up of his cabinet, which was not so 
 constituted as to be able to stand without him. The king was 
 now obliged to turn to the opposition, and to summon Lord 
 Grenville. This necessarily implied the admission into the cabinet 
 of Fox, in spite of the king’s aversion to him, as it was quite 
 impossible, on account of the close political alliance they had 
 formed, for either Grenville or Fox to accept office without the 
 other. In this ministry, known as ,the ministry of all the talents“, 
 was included with questionable wisdom Lord Ellenborough, the 
 lord chief justice. It had been the policy of the English laws 
 to render the judges independent of the crown,”) but now the 
 first criminal judge became one of its confidential advisers. The 
 appointment of Ellenborough was severely condemned both in 
 debate and by public opinion, and it has since been held that 
 such a position is incompatible with high judicial duties.*) Be- 
 fore the formation of the new ministry was entirely completed, 
 the king took alarm at a supposed invasion of the royal pre- 
 rogative. Lord Grenville had proposed some changes in the ad- 
 ministration of the army, and that it should cease to be sub- 
 ject to the direct control of the crown, through the commander- 
 in-chief. The king insisted that the control of the army rested 
 with the crown alone, and the ministers could not interfere 
 
 
 
 1) Rose, Corresp. 1. 122, 124; Stanhope, loc. cit. Iv. 233, 252). 
 
 2) 13 William III. c. 32; 1 George III. c. 23. 
 
 3) Campbell, Justices, 1. 451; Chan. vi, 584. 
 
 4) The correspondence between the marquess of Buckingham, lord lieu- 
 tenant of Ireland, and W. W. Grenville contains abundant evidence of the direct 
 interference of the king in both civil and military appointments. The letters 
 prove that George kept vigilant watch on Buckingham’s exercise of military 
 
beyond the levying of troops, their pay and equipment. To this 
 view Grenville and Fox yielded, and promised that no changes 
 should be introduced into the government of the army without 
 the king’s approbation.') Thus the question remained in abeyance. 
 The ministry now attempted to again bring forward a measure 
 for removing so much of the disabilities both of the Roman 
 Catholics and Dissenters as affected their position in the army 
 or navy. But against the Catholic claims the king was set with 
 inflexible determination, and every act of concession which was 
 proposed he viewed with the utmost repugnance. A bill for the 
 purpose of remedying a glaring anomaly touching the rank of 
 Irish officers in England was laid before the king, and was sup- 
 posed to have received the royal assent.?) The king’s ,friends* 
 in parliament, however, were prepared to oppose the measure, 
 had not the ministry deemed it advisable to withdraw it. Thus 
 was the king again on the point of interfering with the freedom 
 of parliamentary deliberations. After the measure was finally 
 dropped the ministers drew up a minute of the cabinet, reserv- 
 ing to themselves the right of avowing their sentiments if the 
 petition from the Catholics, which was at that time in prepara- 
 tion, was presented, and of submitting to the king from time 
 to time such measures as they deemed advisable for the good 
 
 patronage, carefully scrutinized his lists, demurred to every irregular nomination, 
 and finally rejected all that were prompted by private partiality. On the 14th 
 September 1788, Buckingham writes to Grenville as follows: — ,I am at pres- 
 ent in the most painful and doubtful situation. The king refuses not one or 
 two, but almost* every recommendation, whether connected with civil government, 
 or pressed upon me by the Commander-in-Chief, or originating in private regard“ 
 (Dropmore MSS. 1. c. 355). In spite of Pitt’s renewed appeals the king unquali- 
 fiedly denied the request to bestow a dukedom on Buckingham (Buckingham- 
 Grenville Correspondence, Dropmore MSS. J. c. 537—539). It may be mentioned 
 in passing that the letters at Dropmore were never shown to either Buckingham, 
 for his ,Court and Cabinets of George III.,“ or Stanhope, for his ,,Life of Pitt“. 
 
 1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 26; Life of Sidmouth, 415. 
 
 2) At first a clause merely was introduced into the annual mutiny bill 
 enabling the king to confer military commissions on any of his subjects with- 
 out distinction of religion, the object being to permit Roman Catholics to hold 
 commissions in the army. 
 
of the country. Upon this the king demanded from them a 
 withdrawal of their minute, and a written declaration that they 
 would never under any circumstances propose to him further 
 concessions to the Roman Catholics or ever offer him any advice 
 upon the subject.') Such a pledge it was of course impossible 
 for any constitutional ministers to give, and it was upon this 
 point, — a point of real constitutional importance, — that the 
 ministry were dismissed.?) Thus came to an end in March 1807, 
 after not quite fourteen months’ existence, the nearest approach 
 to a Whig administration which was in power during the forty- 
 seven years from 1783 to 1830. 
 
 On the 19" of March, the duke of Portland was instructed 
 to form a new ministry. His health was such that his pre- 
 miership could be little more than nominal, so that when 
 Perceval became chancellor of the exchequer, he virtually 
 assumed the lead of the new administration. The same 
 exercise of prerogative that secured the ministry of Pitt and 
 supported the weak ministry of Addington, now again intro- 
 duced into the cabinet men entirely satisfactory to the king, 
 — pledged to oppose the great liberal measures of the day, and 
 really answerable for the unconstitutional pledge the king had 
 demanded from his late ministry. The dismissal of the last 
 ministry and the conduct of the incoming one provoked much 
 comment. ‘The constitutional danger involved in such an exer- 
 cise of prerogative was discussed in both houses, and attempts 
 were made to establish two points of constitutional law. First, 
 that it is contrary to the first duties of the confidential ser- 
 vants of the crown to restrain themselves by any pledge, ex- 
 pressed or implied, from offering to the king any advice which 
 the course of circumstances may render necessary for the wel- 
 
 
 
 1) Colchester’s Diary, 11. 101—104; Rose, Corresp, u, 8328—331. 
 
 2) Vide letter from Viscount Melville to the duke of Portland, 19th Oct. 
 1806, in which he speaks of the personal independence of the sovereign, his 
 power to rid himself of an administration, and the security for the maintenance 
 of the royal authority, etc. (Lowther MSS., loc. cit. 18, pt. vir. 211, 212). 
 
Sa" aie 
 
 fare and security of the empire;’) and, secondly, that it was 
 impossible for the king to act without advice.*) In support of 
 these doctrines the opposition thought themselves secure of a 
 majority. But so great was the influence of the crown, and so 
 strong the Protestant feeling of the country, that they found 
 themselves in a minority of more than thirty. A speedy dis- 
 solution of parliament was determined upon, and the main issue 
 raised by this appeal to the constituencies was the propriety 
 of the recent exercise of prerogative. The appeal was success- 
 ful, the new election placing the ministry in possession of a 
 majority which secured its permanence. We have here the final 
 triumph of the policy of George III. The will of the king had 
 once more prevailed, and was not again to be called in question. 
 His own power, confided henceforth to the Tory ministers, was 
 supreme.°) 
 
 
 
 1) This flagrantly unconstitutional pledge, Sir Samuel Romilly maintained 
 in parliament, would have rendered any ministers who gave it guilty of a high 
 crime and misdemeanor (Parl. Deb. 1x. 327). 
 
 2) In upholding this last point, Romilly asserted that there could be no 
 exercise of prerogative in which the king could act without some advice. No 
 constitutional doctrine is more important than this, for without it the king, who 
 theoretically can do no wrong, would be answerable for his own acts. A reso- 
 lution condemning the acceptance of pledges by ministers, .which should bind 
 them not to offer any advice to the crown, was moved in both houses. In the 
 lords it was suppported by 90 against 171 votes; in the commons by 226 
 against 258 votes. Thus in the lower house the course taken by the king nar- 
 rowly escaped a distinct censure (Memoirs of Romilly, 1. 193—195). 
 
 0) Lord Grenville in his private letters (15th December 1808), attributes 
 the continuance of the government in its existing state of weakness entirely to 
 the support and influence of the king. Speaking of the ministers he says: — 
 »1f they change hands at all it can only be because they are quarrelling among 
 themselves; for I am pursuaded, so long as the King chooses to continue them, 
 these very men will command the majorities of both Houses with as much cer- 
 tainty as ever.“ He says again: — ,I am satisfied these people or any people, 
 may command under the King’s influence a majority in Parliament; and it would 
 have the appearance of a struggle for power, at a time when a man must in- 
 deed be of a most depraved ambition, to wish for the appearance and respon- 
 sibility of governing the country, with the certainty that a Court intrigue would 
 be incessantly at work, with ample means of depriving him of all power to be 
 of real use“ (Buckingham, Court and Cabinets, 1v. 288, 299). 
 
See Be 
 
 Towards the close of the year 1810 the king became hope- 
 lessly insane, and in the February following the bill restricting 
 the regent was passed, and the Prince of Wales took the oaths 
 before the privy council. The prince with a better education, 
 but -with less ability and far less character than his father, 
 was averse to business and the responsibilities of royalty, yet 
 whenever his own feelings or interests were concerned he was 
 almost as imperative as his predecessor. The Perceval ministry 
 continued in office till the assassination of Perceval.in May 1812. 
 After much negotiation, the regent finally entrusted Lord Liver- 
 pool with the reconstruction of the old administration, and hence- 
 forth the ascendency of Tory politics which George III. had 
 established, and which the regent had been expected to over- 
 throw, was maintained more firmly than ever. By the influence 
 of the crown it had been created, and by the same influence it 
 was sustained during the regency and throughout the reign of 
 George IV. All opposition being thus defeated, and the ministers 
 and the court party being thus agreed, the prince regent had 
 no further need of personal interference in the government of the 
 country.’) The crown and its ministers continued to rule supreme 
 over parliament, the press, society, and the public opinion of 
 
 
 
 1) George IV., unlike his father, was always unpopular, even before he 
 became regent, and this tended naturally to lessen his personal influence. Indeed, 
 instead of his popularity supporting the ministry, the difficulty was for the 
 ministry to support his unpopularity, and to uphold the respect for the crown 
 when it encircled the head of such a sovereign (Lewis, 420, 421). That his 
 conduct to his wife did not tend to increase the respect in which he was held, 
 the following just remark made by Myr. Stuart Wortley (afterwards Lord 
 Wharnecliffe) in 1813 amply shows: — ,I have as high notions of royalty as 
 any man, but I must say that all such proceedings contribute to pull it down. 
 I am very sorry that we have a royal family who do not take warning from 
 what is said and thought concerning them. They seem to be the only persons 
 in the country who are wholly regardless of their own welfare and respectability. 
 I would not have the Prince Regent lay the flattering unction to his soul, and 
 think his conduct will bear him harmless through all these transactions. I say 
 this with no disrespect to him or his family; no man is more attached to the 
 House of Brunswick than I am, but had I a sister in the same situation with 
 her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales, I should say that she was exceed- 
 ingly ill-treated“ (Parl. Deb. xxiv. 1152; Memoirs of Horner, 11, 142). 
 
sete oie, gS 
 
 the country. In 1822 Mr. Brougham introduced a resolution on 
 the subject of the influence of the crown. He declared that the 
 influence of the crown was ,unnecessary for maintaining its 
 constitutional prerogatives, destructive of the independence of 
 Parliament, and inconsistent with the well-governing of the 
 realm.“ He pronounced the influence of the crown to have been 
 greatly increased since Dunning’s famous resolution in 1780. 
 This motion was negatived by a large majority.’) 
 
 In 1827 the Roman Catholic question was again brought for- 
 ward, the settlement of which had now become almost a necess- 
 ity. George III. had turned out two ministries upon this ques- 
 tion. Pitt had been compelled to abandon it on account of the 
 king’s unyielding will, and the same question had proved the 
 ruin of Lord Grenville’s ministry. The great organization known 
 as the Catholic Association, which had been formed by O’Connell 
 in 1823, now finally compelled parliament to recognize their 
 existence and claims. In 1825 a relief bill was introduced into 
 parliament, and passed the commons by a considerable majority; 
 but by means of the opposition of the duke of York it was rejected 
 in the house of lords. Shortly after this Sir Francis Burdett 
 introduced a resolution that the affairs of Ireland required im- 
 mediate and earnest attention; but a new election had strength- 
 
 
 
 1) Ayes 101, Noes 216 (Parl. Deb. 2nd ser. vir. 1266). In 1811 the Prince 
 Regent appointed Dr. Jackson to the bishopric of Oxford against the wishes of 
 Perceval (Buckingham, Regency, 1, 172). In 1821 George refused to allow the 
 readmission of Canning into the ministry (Yonge, Life of Liverpool, m1. 142—150); 
 but a year later, at the intercession of Wellington, he very reluctantly yielded 
 (Ibid. ur. 194202). The king took offence at a speech of Denman at the queen’s 
 trial, and refused for years to confer upon him the rank of king’s counsel 
 (Arnould, Life of Denman, 1. oxvt.). He also notified his prime minister of his 
 intention to appoint his private secretary Sir Herbert Taylor te a vacant post 
 in the office of the adjutant-general (Wellington, Dispatches, 3rd ser. rv. 668— 
 672). In 1829 he filled vacancies in the constableship of Windsor Castle and 
 in the colonelcy of the 1st Life Guards, without informing his minister (Lewis, 
 Letters, 394). In 1830 George attempted to exercise the prerogative of mercy 
 in behalf of one Comyn, sentenced to death in Ireland for arson, without taking 
 the advice of his ministers Wellington and Peel; but he subsequently withdrew 
 the order (Wellington, Dispatches, Civ. ser. 6, 553—577). 
 
SS Tees 
 
 ened the anti-Catholic feeling, and the resolution was lost. In 
 1828 it became evident to Wellington and Peel that an attempt 
 to settle the question was a lesser evil than to continue to 
 leave it open, and that this could only be effected by the re- 
 conquest of Ireland, the repeal of the union, or the emancipation 
 of the Catholics. The chief obstacle to its settlement by eman- 
 cipation was the attitude of the king. At length in January 
 1829, the latter consented that the question should be brought 
 before the cabinet. But the very day before the bill was to 
 be introduced into parliament, he sent for Wellington, Lynd- 
 hurst and Peel, declared he had been misunderstood, and with- 
 drew his sanction. The ministers at once resigned, but the 
 same night Wellington received a letter, in which the king 
 said that he was convinced of the impossibility of forming 
 another ministry, and begged them to remain. ‘This they agreed 
 to do only on condition that they had his leave to declare that 
 the measure was introduced with his consent.’?) The proposed 
 bill substituted a new form of oath for the old oaths of suprem- 
 acy, allegiance and abjuration. If a Catholic bound himself to 
 support the state and not to injure the Church, he could sit in 
 either house of parliament, had a perfect equality with his Pro- 
 testant neighbours, and was eligible for all offices, civil, military 
 or municipal, with the exception of the office of regent, of lord 
 chancellor, of viceroy of Ireland, or royal commissioner of the 
 general assembly of Scotland. From offices connected with the 
 church, or participation in Church patronage, he was naturally 
 excluded. The Roman Catholic Church was to be left a dissent- 
 ing community, unendowed and unrestricted, but the use of 
 episcopal titles, the increase of monks, and the introduction of 
 more jesuits was forbidden. The bill passed by a majority of 
 178 in a house of 452; and was carried in the upper house by 
 213 to 209. The king now seemed inclined to deny that he 
 had ever authorized his ministers to bring in the bill, and re- 
 
 
 
 1) At the suggestion of Peel, the king gave his sanction in writing 
 (Memowrs of Peel, 1, 343—350). 
 
ss Fo aa 
 
 presented himself as forced to consent by repeated threats of 
 resignation. But Lord Eldon told him that his consent had been 
 given, and that it could not now be withdrawn. The interview 
 closed in the midst of petulant and childish exclamations of 
 anger on the part of the king, but the royal assent was at 
 once given, and the Catholic emancipation bill became law on 
 the 14 of April 1829. 
 
 Since the death of George IV., with but few exceptions, 
 and those for the most part unimportant, the exercise of the 
 royal prerogative has been strictly confined within constitutional 
 limits. Under William IV., who was conscientious but weak, 
 the last effort to ,be a king“ was unsuccessfully made. A few 
 months after his accession the state of feeling in parliament and 
 in the country had necessitated the retirement of the Wellington 
 administration, and forced upon the king a liberal ministry pledged 
 to the cause of parliamentary reform.') From such a ministry 
 George III. would have very speedily set himself free, and 
 George IV., after giving a doubtful assent to their policy, would 
 have reserved his confidence and sympathies for their opponents. 
 But William IV. took the constitutional course and gave the 
 new administration his confidence. On the first of March 1831, 
 Lord John Russell introduced the first draft of the reform bill, 
 which after a seven nights’ debate was admitted to the first 
 reading, but only passed the second by 302 to 301. The par- 
 liament, which had been assembled under the influence of the late 
 government, now checked the further progress of the bill. The 
 ministry having been twice defeated in three days, declared that 
 they could do nothing but resign. The king however refused 
 their resignation, and declared his determination to dissolve par- 
 liament, which he did in person.?) The new house was favourable 
 
 1) Chatham said in 1770, ,,Before the end of this century, either the Par- 
 liament will reform itself from within, or be reformed with a vengeance from 
 without* (Parl. Hist. xvu. 223n). Chatham’s words might have proved true had 
 it not been for the terror inspired by the excesses of the French Revolution, 
 whereby political reform in England was retarded for forty years. 
 
 2) The king at first expressed a strong wish not to dissolve the house, as 
 the parliament was in its first session, but Lord Wharnecliffe, the leader of the 
 
to reform, and passed the second reform bill by 345 to 239, but 
 in October the lords threw it out by a majority of forty-one. 
 The ministry still having the confidence of the commons, pre- 
 sented a third bill in December 1831, which finally passed the 
 house by a majority of 116. The bill passed the second reading 
 in the house of lords, but its final passage was jeopardized by 
 an amendment of Lyndhurst. The ministers, accordingly, de- 
 manded the creation of a sufficient number of new peers to carry 
 the bill. The king refused, and the ministry hereupon resigned. 
 However, after Wellington, to whom the king applied, had vainly 
 endeavoured to form a cabinet, the latter was obliged to have 
 recourse to his former ministry, and agreed to the creation of 
 new peers. But anxious to avoid so extreme a measure, the 
 king addressed a circular letter to the dissentient peers re- 
 questing them to refrain from voting, whereupon the bill passed 
 by 106 to 22.') William, though at first opposed to the reform 
 bill, ultimately gave it his support, and it was due to his per- 
 sonal influence that it finally became law. A new creation of 
 peers, had it been necessary, would have been an extraordinary 
 measure and one seldom to be employed, but at the same time 
 it would have been the lawful exercise of an undoubted pre- 
 rogative.”) The interference of the king, on the other hand, with 
 _ the freedom of the house of lords, though exerted in a popular 
 and worthy cause, was an unconstitutional act.?) But it was 
 
 opposition, moved an address to the king, remonstrating against the intended 
 dissolution. This ill-judged piece of violence the king considered as trenching 
 on his prerogative, and he immediately declared his determination to dissolve 
 the house (Lord John Russell, Memoirs of Fox, u. 246). 
 
 1) William peremptorily declined to give the royal assent in person to the 
 bill, though strongly urged by the ministers to do so (Grey, Corresp. 1. 462—467; 
 Roebuck, Whig Ministry, 11. 334). 
 
 2) ,1t was fortunate for the Constitution that the Peers, acting under the 
 Sage counsels of the Duke of Wellington, prevented our having recourse to a 
 measure so full of peril. When I [Lord Brougham] went to Windsor with Lord 
 Grey, I had a list of 80 creations, made up of peers’ eldest sons, Scotch and 
 Trish peers, and men without families (Brougham, Works, x1. 270). 
 
 3) A second personal interference of the king occurred in 1834, in a reply 
 to an address for the safety of the Established Church in Ireland (Ann. Reg. 
 1834, 43). 
 
ht 7 eee 
 
 resorted to, not with the intention of augmenting the power of 
 the crown, but for the purpose of restoring harmony in the par- 
 liament and in the country. 
 
 In 1834 William endeavoured to assert his personal wishes 
 in the choice of a ministry without reference to the will of 
 parliament. The Grey ministry, having lost the confidence of 
 the king on the question of the appropriation of the surplus 
 revenues of the Church in Ireland, had given way to the ministry 
 of Lord Melbourne. Shortly after this, the king, thinking that 
 public opinion was leaving the Whigs and going over to the 
 Tories, and that the transition would be accelerated by a change 
 of ministry, dismissed Melbourne and instructed him to send for 
 Wellington, who took control of affairs until Peel could be sum-_ 
 moned from Rome. The Peel-Wellington ministry found itself 
 confronted by a hostile house of commons, and was soon driven 
 to the necessity of dissolving parliament. The elections returned 
 a house more favourable to the existing government, but still 
 gave a considerable majority to the Liberals. In less than two 
 months the ministers were forced to retire and the Melbourne 
 administration was reinstated.') 
 
 Here again the right of the king to dismiss his ministers, 
 though enjoying the confidence of parliament, is unquestionable; 
 but constitutional usage had prescribed that the right should 
 be exercised solely in the interests of the state. In 1834 there 
 was no ground for dismissing the ministry but the personal 
 wish of the king. Even the grounds which had enabled George III. 
 to rid himself of the coalition ministry and the ministry of ,all 
 the talents” were wanting. In 1783 the ministers were. not 
 
 
 
 1) Upon the restoration of the Melbourne ministry in 1835, the king stip- 
 ulated that Lord Brougham should not be replaced in the office of lord chan- 
 cellor (Ann. Reg. 1835, 237). But under William IV. the independent exercise 
 of judgment in matters of prerogative occurred but seldom. He declined to confer 
 a peerage upon Admiral Sir J. Saumarez, though urgently requested by the prime 
 minister, Karl Grey, and only finally consented when he learned of the acute 
 illness the disappointment had caused the old officer (Grey, Corresp. 1. 339, 350). 
 He also refused a licence to Captain Marryat, permitting him to wear his French 
 order (Vide ,,Memoir“ prefixed to Bohn’s ed. of The Pirate). 
 
Et. Tae 
 
 dismissed until they had been defeated in the upper house upon 
 the India bill; and in 1807 they were at issue with the king 
 upon a grave constitutional question before he proceeded to 
 form another ministry. In the time of George III. the influence 
 of the crown, in the event of a dissolution of parliament and 
 an appeal to the country, would certainly have secured a ma- 
 jority for the new administration. But by the experiment of 
 William in 1834-35, — an experiment not likely to be repeated, 
 — the effect of the Reform Act in lessening the influence of 
 the crown was conclusively shown.’) 
 
 In 1839 the ministry of Lord Melbourne, having but slight 
 support, thought it best to resign, and the formation of the new 
 ministry was entrusted to Sir Robert Peel. In submitting the 
 list of his supporters to the queen he informed her that it would 
 be necessary to change some of the chief ladies of her house- 
 hold. Towards the close of the reign of George II. it had become 
 customary to make changes in the household establishment of 
 the sovereign upon a change of ministry,”) and since 1812 the 
 offices in the household were included in ministerial changes.*) 
 
 
 
 1) , Throughout its history the House of Commons has had struggles with 
 the Crown, the House of Lords, the Courts of Law, the press, and the people. 
 At one time straining its own powers, at another resisting encroachments upon 
 its just authority: successful in asserting its rights, but failing in its usurpations, 
 it has gradually assumed its proper position in the state —- controlling all other 
 powers, but itself controlled and responsible. The more it has been brought 
 under the control of public opinion, — the greater has been its moderation and 
 forbearance. The increased power of the House of Commons under an improved 
 representation has been indisputable. Responsible to the people, it has at the 
 same time wielded the people’s strength. No longer subservient to the crown, 
 the ministers and the peerage, it has become the predominant authority in the 
 state. While its authority was uncertain and ill-defined, — while it was strugg- 
 ling against the Crown, jealous of the House of Lords, distrustful of the press, 
 and irresponsible to the people, it was tempted to exceed its constitutional 
 powers; but since its political position has been established it has been less 
 provoked to strain its jurisdiction.“ 
 
 2) Parl. Deb. xxi. 412, 431. 
 
 3) When George III. in 1782 dismissed the North ministry he was obliged 
 to substitute for the earl of Hertford, who had been chamberlain for fifteen 
 years, the earl of Effingham, whom he disliked; and Lord Bateman was obliged 
 
The queen, however, consulted the outgoing ministry as to the 
 constitutional necessity of the change, and they advised her 
 that it was not necessary. She thereupon wrote to Peel that 
 ,having considered the proposal made by him to remove the 
 ladies of her bedchamber, she could not consent to adopt a 
 course which she considered to be contrary to usage, and which 
 was repugnant to her feelings.“ Peel wrote in answer that his 
 sense of public duty compelled him to adhere to the opinion he 
 had expressed, and that on this condition only would he accept 
 office. The queen again sought advice of her late ministers. 
 A cabinet council was held, and their opinion was thrown into 
 the shape of a formal minute, in which they said that ,it was 
 reasonable that the great offices in the Court and situations in 
 the household held. by members of Parliament should be included 
 in political arrangements“, but they were ,not of opinion that_ 
 a similar principle should be extended to offices held by Jadies 
 in Her Majesty’s household.“') This incident resulted in the 
 restitution of the Whig government, and its maintenance in 
 office till 1841, when it lost the confidence of the house. Sir 
 Robert Peel, his principle touching changes in the household 
 being now admitted, consented to form a ministry. 
 
 In 1851 the relations and duties of a secretary of state 
 to the crown, in the transaction of official business, were de- 
 finitely expressed. Lord Palmerston, foreign secretary, gave 
 an opinion without previously obtaining the consent of the 
 
 to resign his office as master of the buckhounds (Schlosser, tv. 332). ,,It is 
 become no uncommon spectacle in this country to see men promoted by the 
 King to the highest offices and richest preferments which he has in his power 
 to bestow, who have been distinguished by their opposition to his inclination“ 
 (Paley b. vi. c. 7). 
 
 1) ,,Parliament will never tolerate so monstrous an arrangement for the 
 detriment of the State, as the retaining in high office, about the sovereign’s 
 person, the wife or the sister of a leader of opposition. It was their bounden 
 duty to inform the Queen that such a thing is utterly unknown to the Consti- 
 tution of the kingdom, and utterly repugnant to all its principles“ (Brougham, 
 Works, 1x. 430, 432); Parl. Deb. xiv, 985, et seq. . 
 
eR pas 
 
 sovereign, thus putting himself in the place of the crown. For 
 this violation of duty he was removed from office.’) 
 
 The question was raised in 1856,”) whether there existed 
 in the crown the prerogative of creating, without the sanction 
 of the house, an indefinite number of life peerages conferring 
 the right of sitting and voting in parliament.*) This question 
 was settled unwisely in the negative in 1869. At that time 
 the queen attempted to make life peers, and the house of lords 
 refused to admit her-claim. They said her power had decayed 
 into non-existence; she once had it, they allowed, but it had 
 ceased by long disuse.*) 
 
 Concluding Observations. 
 
 After the Norman Conquest all the power of the state was 
 centred in the king. The idea of a Norman parliament, as a 
 successor to the Anglo-Saxon witenagemoéte, and forerunner of 
 the modern legislative body, is one to which most of the con- 
 stitutional writers on English history cling with rare tenacity. 
 They see in the curia and concilium of the Norman kings, not 
 
 1) ,The Queen requires, first, that Lord Palmerston will distinctly state 
 what he proposes in a given case, in order that the Queen may know as dis- 
 tinctly to what she is giving her royal sanction. Secondly, having once given 
 her sanction to such a measure that it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by 
 the minister. Such an act she must consider as failing in sincerity towards the 
 Crown, and justly to be visited by the exercise of her constitutional right of 
 dismissing that Minister. She expects to be kept informed of what passes be- 
 tween him and foreign ministers before important decisions are taken based upon 
 that intercourse; to receive the foreign despatches in good time; and to have 
 the drafts for her approval sent to her in sufficient time to make herself ac- 
 quainted with their contents before they must be sent off.“ 
 
 2) The Wensleydale peerage. 
 
 3) Parl. Deb. cxu. 1170—1180. 
 
 4) Parl. Deb. cxcv. 452 et seq.; cxovi. 1648 et seq.; cxovur. 1337—1403. 
 In 1859 the queen differed with the prime minister and the foreign secretary 
 upon a question of foreign policy. The whole cabinet was then appealed to, 
 when the queen’s opinion was sustained (Martin, Prince Consort, 1v. 458, 
 484, 486). 
 
 6 
 
=" BOy as 
 
 only a deliberative assembly, but one also possessing legis- — 
 lative and judicial functions. But there is no evidence to show 
 that such was the case, or that there existed. prior to Magna — 
 Charta an estate of the realm properly speaking.') 
 
 Under William I., William Rufus, and Henry L., the barons 
 were held in check, and the most rebellious among them for- 
 feited their lands and honours. Under Stephen the nobles broke 
 away, but only to destroy each other by the sword. At the 
 close of this period the original Norman nobility was nearly 
 extinct, and the new nobility which took its place was in a 
 great degree English. Its best men were patriots, and had be- 
 come the leaders of the people in the struggle for freedom. 
 
 To reduce the power of the magnates was a principal aim 
 of Henry II. He took back all the crown lands which Stephen 
 or Matilda had granted in the course of the civil war to the 
 lords who supported them, and he enforced the destruction of 
 all castles built without the king’s licence. He weakened yet 
 further the power of the feudal barons by the introduction of 
 scutagium (shield money), on payment of which the tenants-in- 
 chief were released from personal military service. Under John 
 the barons again obtained the upper hand, and in June 1215, 
 wrung from the unwilling monarch his consent to the provisions 
 of Magna Charta. This instrument, though intended to secure 
 the people in future from the grievances which they had suf- 
 fered during the reign, also restored to them some of their 
 ancient rights and privileges. But we shall search in vain in 
 Magna Charta for any article or clause providing for the period- 
 ical assembling of the feudal magnates — prelates, earls, bar- 
 ons, — to deliberate upon and deal with the grievances and 
 taxation and other business of the realm. What had become of 
 
 1) Peers’ Rept. u1. 87, 97 et seq., 109 et seq. 254; Gneist, op. cit. 205 et seq 
 Allen says ,,The name, and probably also the constitution of the. Anglo-Saxon 
 national assembly, was changed at the coming of the Normans; but its func- 
 tions remained the same, and continue so in our parliament of to-day“ (Edinb. 
 Rev. xxxy. 10). Stubbs also leans to the view of a constitutional right on 
 the part of the nobles to assent to acts of legislation (Const. 1. 276; Charters, 
 il, Zo). 
 
ee OU 
 
 the ancient national assembly or the ,Norman parliament‘ ‘) of 
 the English historians? It is plain that the sole right of the 
 king to legislate was left unimpaired by Magna Charta. He 
 was still free to promulgate ordinances, provided they did not 
 infringe the provisions of the charter; and he was only bound 
 to call a council of his tenants-in-chief in the event of an ex- 
 traordinary aid being required. In the struggle for the observ- 
 ance of the Great Charter the English parliament had its origin. 
 
 Edward I. laboured to perfect the institutions of his country, 
 and the English constitution, as we know it, may be said to 
 date from his reign. He saw that a king who could rule 
 with the co-operation of his people would be greater and more 
 powerful than one who ruled without it. Following the precedent 
 set by the great de Montfort, he wrought out a parliament re- 
 presentative of the three estates of the realm; and from his 
 death down to the Reform Act of 1832, parliament has altered 
 but little in outward form, though it has varied vastly in actual 
 power. ‘Thus in the third estate he found a counterpoise to the 
 power of the nobles and clergy. But Edward had not forgotten 
 the barons’ war, and he determined to lessen the power of the 
 nobles still further. With this object he instituted the inquiry 
 known as Quo Warranto?*) Another expedient was the distraint 
 of knighthood; and a third, for the same purpose, was the Sta- 
 tute Quia Emptores (1290), which modified the feudal system 
 of tenure. But despite Edward’s efforts to conserve and aug- 
 ment the power of the crown, it received in this reign a sub- 
 stantial check. By the confirmation of the charters in 1297, 
 a limit was set to the royal power in matters touching taxation. 
 
 1) ,,The feudal parliament in arms“, of the permanent feudal Curia Regis, 
 or of an estate of the realm formed by ,,the proud barons of the twelfth cent- 
 ury“ (Peers’ Rept.; Gneist op. cit.). 
 2) Earl Warrenne, when asked to produce his titles to the lands he in- 
 herited from his forefathers, unsheathed his sword, and said, ,My ancestors 
 came in with William the Bastard and won these lands by the sword, and by 
 the sword I will defend them. William did not conquer for himself alone, nor 
 was it for such an end that my ancestors lent him their assistance,“ 
 
Se Rr 
 
 The common consent of the realm was now necessary to the 
 imposition of any new tax; and what was more to the point, 
 there was now a constitutional authority, namely the parliament, 
 to see that this condition was observed. In Anglo-Saxon times 
 the royal power had been limited and controlled by three great 
 constitutional principles: First, the king was bound to conduct 
 the executive administration according to the laws of the land; 
 secondly, he could not legislate without the consent of the na- 
 tional assembly; and lastly, he could impose no tax without the 
 consent of that body. After the Conquest these rights of the 
 people were usurped by the Norman king, and came in time 
 to be regarded as prerogatives of the crown. Now, after the 
 lapse of centuries, the right of taxation was again vested in the 
 people, and the crown was shorn of one its prerogatives. 
 
 Since the accession of Edward I. the principle of heredit- 
 ability has been established, and no interregnum is legally re- 
 cognized in a succession to the throne, save where the line has 
 been broken by change of dynasty.') But the title to the crown 
 in the period following Edward I. had been more than once 
 created by parliament. Henry IV. and his descendants ruled by 
 the will of the people, — they were kings by a parliamentary 
 title. Hence parliament gained a great accession of power under 
 the rulers of the house of Lancaster. But this power was 
 destined to be short-lived. From the accession of Edward IV. 
 the strength of parliament begins to decline, and the strength 
 of the crown begins to revive. 
 
 Passing over the period of the Tudors, which has already 
 been dealt with, we find that from the death of Elizabeth to 
 the close of the civil war the parliament made continual en- 
 croachments on the prerogative of the crown. ,The slavish 
 Parliament of Henry VIII. had grown into the murmuring Parlia- 
 ment of Queen Elizabeth, the mutinous Parliament of James I.,”) 
 
 
 
 1) Howell, State Z'rtals, u. 626; Blackstone, 1, 196. 
 
 2) In the reign of James I. the gentry at length felt themselves strong 
 enough to step into the place of the nobility, who had in the anti-Tudor period 
 guided the constitutional advances of the nation. 
 
SoG; Ghee 
 
 and the rebellious Parliament of Charles I. The steps were 
 many but the energy was one — the growth of the English 
 middle-class and its animation under the influence of Protestant- 
 ism.“ Elizabeth was the central figure of her reign, and in 
 most respects had been the mistress alike of Church and state. 
 In time of war or internal disorder she granted extraordinary 
 powers by ordinances,') and also granted her officers dispens- 
 ation from existing laws. She directed her parliament to ab- 
 stain from discoursing of matters of state,?) and it was the 
 constant language of the queen and her ministers that that as- 
 sembly ,ought not to deal, to judge or to meddle with her Ma- 
 jesty’s prerogative royal.“ *) 
 
 The Stuart kings were destitute of all sense of duty. They 
 were entirely occupied with furthering the interests of their own 
 house. The Church became in their hands an instrument for in- 
 creasing the royal power, and they were the first who carried 
 on a traffic in judicial offices, peerages, and titles. They pos- 
 sessed little or no capacity for statecraft or military leadership. 
 James I. was pedantic;*) Charles I., deceitful, obstinate, and 
 aimless;°) Charles II., selfish and dissolute; and James IL, 
 bigoted and cruel. Under these kings the royal prerogative was 
 nothing more than an instrument by which to compass the 
 
 
 
 1) ,And yet there was combined with the prerogative of the Crown the 
 idea of an extraordinary dictatorial power residing in the King, which in any 
 State crisis could thrust aside the self-imposed barriers, laws, and judicial con- 
 stitution, and find a remedy by extraordinary measures, jurisdiction, and ordin- 
 ances — an extraordinary power which was made frequent use of by the Tudors, 
 and frequently abused by the Stuarts, and was only in later centuries further 
 restricted and reduced to a minimum“ (Gneist, op. cit. 452). 
 
 2) D’Ewes, Journ, 479. 
 
 3) D’Ewes, Journ. 645; Parl. Hist. 1. 765, 7833—802. For an account of 
 the conflict between the queen and the parliament in 1566, touching the mar- 
 riage and succession question, vide Parl. Hist. 1, 710—716. 
 
 - 4) Called by his admirers ,The British Solomon“, and by the Duc de 
 Sully ,,the wisest fool in Europe“. 
 
 5) ,1 am not without hope,“ he wrote to Digby, ,,that I shall be enabled 
 to bring either the Presbyterians or the Independents over to my side, that one 
 party may wear the other out, and I be really once more King.“ But Charles’s 
 ,Juristisch-priesterliche* nature (Ranke, u. 565) had now met its match, 
 
eB 
 
 destruction of the rights of parliament and the people. But 
 during the government of the first two Stuarts and the common- 
 wealth, the supreme power in the state was gradually trans- 
 ferred from the crown to the house of commons. The political 
 problem, which had so long foiled its efforts, how to make its 
 will the law of administrative action without itself undertaking 
 the task of administration, was thus drawing nearer to a solu- 
 tion.!) After the Restoration no extraordinary legislation was 
 attempted by the council, and encroachments on the part of the 
 executive were much less frequent than under the Tudors. By 
 the abolition of the star chamber’) all extraordinary powers of 
 jurisdiction had passed from the king in council to the king in 
 parliament. Thus all the rights and privileges of parliament 
 were more effectually exercised than ever before.*) 
 
 The passing of the Bill of Rights in 1689 restored to the 
 monarchy the character which it had lost under the Tudor and 
 Stuart kings. The right of parliament to depose the king, to 
 change the order of succession, and to choose a new ruler, had 
 again been exercised. All claim to rule by Divine right, or by 
 hereditary right independent of the will of the people, was effect- 
 ually put an end to by the election of William and Mary. Their 
 title, and that of their successors, to the English throne rested 
 solely on an act of parliament.*) But the Bill of Rights did more 
 
 1) Green, nr. 336. 
 
 2) Stat. 16 Charles I. c. 10. 
 
 3) How much power the parliament had gained in the matter of control 
 over the administration, the frequent impeachments and attainders after the 
 Restoration attest. The principle that ministers of the crown, though appointed 
 by the king, were responsible to parliament for their acts and policy was now ~ 
 becoming firmly rooted, At the instance of the commons Stafford was sent to 
 the scaffold, Clarendon died in exile, Danby suffered a long imprisonment in 
 the Tower, and Oxford, Bolingbroke, and Ormond were disgraced and ruined. 
 In 1696 Fenwick, being implicated in a plot for the assassination of the king, 
 was condemned by bill of attainder, being the last person so condemned, 
 
 4) William and Mary and Anne were sovereigns solely by virtue of the 
 Bill of Rights (Stat. 1 William and Mary, sess. 2 c. 2); George I. and his sue- 
 cessors by virtue of the Act of Settlement (12 and 13 William III. c. 2). 
 
ac ihe ge coe 
 
 than change the dynasty which sat on the throne. It decided 
 in favour of the people and against the king all the principal 
 questions which had been contested throughout the Stuart period. 
 By the Bill of Rights the prerogative of the crown, the right 
 and privilege of the parliament, and the personal and political 
 liberty of the subject were secured. The constitutional rights 
 _ of parliament were now out of danger, and, theoretically, at any 
 rate, the house of commons, by its sole right to tax the nation 
 and its resolve to grant none but annual supplies, had become 
 the supreme power in the state.') Practically, however, the 
 supreme power was still vested in the sovereign, and continued 
 to be for nearly a century and a half longer. The rule of 
 parliament was now definitely established, but the mode of exer- 
 cising that rule parliament had yet to learn. The theory of 
 government, which was a consequence of the triumph at the 
 Revolution, was in the years immediately succeeding that event 
 not understood. The notion of a king with duties ornamental 
 rather than real, had as yet scarcely entered men’s minds. The 
 king was still expected to have the direction of the executive, 
 to be in fact his own prime minister, and the effect of this 
 was to make him responsible for the government. The gradual 
 substitution of a parliamentary ministry, which should serve as 
 an intermediate body between the commons and the crown, 
 and save the latter from direct responsibility, is the great con- 
 stitutional change which was completed on the accession of the 
 house of Hanover. 
 
 The able and energetic William of Orange, the greatest 
 statesman of his day, was by no means a nominal sovereign. 
 He was the actual ruler of the people, his own minister of 
 foreign affairs, and his own commander-in-chief. His aim was 
 to be king of the whole nation, not the chief of the party that 
 had placed him on the throne. He desired above all things the 
 cessation of faction and the union of parties; and with this ob- 
 ject in view he began by taking the fittest men for ministers 
 
 1) Since 1688 the crown has never attempted to govern without parliament 
 (Todd, Parl. Gov. 1, 4). 
 
ue Berea 
 
 irrespective of their political opinions. But he found by ex- 
 perience that, an administration thus composed was weak in 
 itself, and could not command the hearty support of parliament. 
 Acting on the suggestion of Sunderland he finally determined 
 to place himself entirely in the hands of the Whig party. As 
 a result of this there was established in 1696 the first united 
 ministry in English history. It was led by the chiefs of the Whig 
 party, of which the leaders were Somers, Halifax, Russell, and 
 Wharton (known afterwards as the Junto).') William was jealous 
 of his prerogative, and he did not hesitate to refuse his assent 
 to measures which, though they had passed both houses of par- 
 liament, failed to meet his approval.?) But the parliament sup- 
 ported by the national feeling and prejudices was strong, and 
 the king had to submit to a reduction of the standing army, to 
 the dismissal of his favourite Dutch guards, to the resumption 
 bill, and to a limitation upon his personal expenditure.*) 
 
 Under the vacillating Anne the crown regained much of the 
 personal influence which it had lost through William’s unpopu- 
 larity. William, while ruling in home matters more or less by 
 the advice of his ministers, had not only exercised the power 
 of rejecting bills passed by the two houses, but had kept entirely 
 in his own hands the control of foreign affairs. Marlborough, 
 who appreciated the greatness of William’s European schemes, 
 
 
 
 1) To Sunderland is due the new ministerial system, i. e. of choosing the 
 ministers of the crown exclusively from among the members of the party which 
 was strongest in the lower house. 
 
 2) The right of veto was exercised during the whole reign of William II. 
 In 1692 the king refused his assent to a bill establishing the independence of 
 the judges by law (Burnet, Hist. 86). He also rejected the triennial bill of 
 1692 and the place bill of 1694. 
 
 3) After 1694 the only restraint on the press was the law of libel. Under 
 Elizabeth the censorship of the press was vigorously enforced by the privy 
 council (ordinances of 1559, 1585). James I. and Charles I. both kept the press 
 under severe restraint, and the Long Parliament was not more liberal. Soon 
 after the Restoration a law was passed to enforce a censorship of the press, 
 but this expired in 1679. In 1694 the licensing act expired, and was not again 
 renewed. 3 
 
we os BOs 
 
 now stepped into the late king’s place so far as directing the 
 foreign policy of the country was concerned. Anne, however, 
 never yielded even to him her exclusive right of dealing with 
 Church preferment, and she presided regularly to the last at the 
 cabinet councils of her ministers. She stated her wishes, and 
 when necessary anticipated opposition by abruptly closing the 
 sitting.1) No sovereign since the death of Anne has appeared 
 at a cabinet meeting,”?) or has ventured to refuse his assent to 
 an act of parliament.*) Under William III. the system of co- 
 alition or mixed ministries had not proved a success, as thereby 
 the royal authority was not only diminished, but useful legis- 
 lation was impeded as well; and it was probably Anne’s im- 
 patience of this system that mainly contributed to place Harley 
 and St. John in the seats of Walpole and Godolphin. It was 
 against the weight of these organized connections, thus ,tied 
 and linked“ together, that the crown struggled at intervals with 
 varying success from the Revolution of 1688 to the Reform Bill 
 of 1832.*) 
 
 1) Hardwicke, State Papers, u. 482. 
 
 2) The custom of the sovereign presiding at meetings of the council is said 
 to have been abandoned about the close of the 14th century. But be this as it 
 may, it was revived by the Tudor and Stuart monarchs, and after the Revolution 
 was a regular practice with William III. and Anne. 
 
 3) The royal prerogative of pronouncing a veto was exercised for the last 
 time in May 1707, when the queen refused her assent to the Scotch militia 
 bill (18 Lords’ Journ. 481, 506; Somerville, Hist. Anne, 11. 299). Twice 
 within a century acts of parliament have received the royal assent and yet 
 failed to come into operation from neglect of the crown to perform some act 
 which was necessary to give them effect. One of these acts was Bentham’s pan- 
 opticon project’ passed in 1794 (34 George III. c.4; 52 George III. c. 144). 
 George disapproved of the plan, and perhaps from his dislike to the author 
 refused to enforce the act (Bentham, Works, x1. 102, 106). In 1850 an act was 
 passed under the auspices of Lord Romilly to improve the system of registration 
 of assurances in Ireland (13 and 14 Vict. c. 72). It has, however, never been 
 put in operation. Under the house of Brunswick the power of refusal has never 
 been directly exercised... But it was not likely to be exercised by George I.; 
 George II. would scarcely have ventured to exercise it; and George II]. had no 
 occasion. 
 
 4) ,It is possible that a ministry so tied and linked together (i. e. as 
 Godolphin’s) may be apt to act rather as regents than servants, and, consequently, 
 must depress the royal authority.“ (Portland Papers). 
 
> Gee 
 
 The tendencies of George I. were entirely in the direction 
 of absolute government, but for various reasons he learnt to 
 accustom himself to a system of government under which the 
 great William had constantly chafed. Among the causes which 
 contributed to the decline of the personal influence of the sove- 
 reign and the power of the crown at his accession was the 
 fact that the Tory party, the jure divino party, the party of 
 high prerogative, was opposed to the house of Brunswick and 
 regarded the kings of that house as usurpers. George, not un- 
 naturally, looked for support to the Whig party, the party to 
 which he owed his elevation to the throne, and being ignorant 
 of the language, and without commanding abilities, he was con- 
 tent to entrust the affairs of the kingdom to the leaders of the 
 Whig aristocracy. He retained some voice in matters touching 
 the foreign policy of the country, but in domestic politics he 
 surrendered ,everything“ into the hands of his ministers. 
 
 Thus under the first English king of the house of Brunswick, 
 as under Edward the Confessor, and the later Merowingians under 
 the dominion of the majores domus, the kingship was reduced to a 
 mere shadow of sovereignty. But the writers on English history 
 generally go a step further than this, and employ the same or 
 similar language in speaking of the reign of George II. We 
 read that, ,from the accession of the house of Hanover to the 
 accession of George III. the royal authority was reduced to a 
 shadow“; that, ,under the two sovereigns who followed Anne 
 the power of the Crown lay absolutely dormant“; that, ,the 
 first two Georges had some say touching foreign policy, but in 
 domestic politics they surrendered everything into the hands 
 of their ministers*. Many more passages denoting the impo- 
 tency of the crown at this period might be cited, but one from 
 Hallam, who is less emphatic than some, but whose language 
 is vigorous enough, will suffice: — ,George J. trusted his 
 ministers with the entire management of the kingdom, content 
 
 to employ its great name for the promotion of his electoral 
 
 interests. This continued in a less degree to be the case with 
 his son, who though better acquainted with the language and 
 
Ps SERPS ae 
 
 more jealous of his prerogative, reserved almost his whole at- 
 tention for the politics of Germany,') ... so that during the 
 reign of the first two Georges the personal authority of the 
 sovereign seems to have been at the lowest point it has ever 
 reached. ‘ *) 
 
 Such is the language of most of the writers on this period, 
 but it does not appear to be entirely borne out by the facts. 
 The Hardwicke Papers, the Rutland, Charlemont, Towns- 
 hend, and Lowther Manuscripts, afford frequent examples of 
 George II.’s active and successful interference in the govern- 
 ment of the country. At the beginning of his reign he had in- 
 tended all his ministers to be of the nature of clerks; they were 
 not to give advice but to receive orders. But he says, ,the Queen 
 has subverted all my notions and schemes, and I shall have 
 but one minister and that one Walpole*.*) To her he turned 
 over the Church patronage, and it remained chiefly in-her hands 
 till her death in 1737. In military affairs George II. was vir- 
 tually supreme. He would have no one at the head of the army 
 but himself,‘) and he exercised a direct control over changes 
 and promotions in the service.°) To a large extent he was not 
 only the chooser of his ministers, but the director also of all 
 the more important measures propounded by them; and into 
 every political step taken he seems to have entered fully, 
 even to the very details.°) ,I flatter myself*, writes Henry 
 
 1) Hallam, Const. m1, 290. 
 
 2) Hallam, Tbid., u1. 293. 
 
 3) Hervey, Mem. 1. 187. 
 
 4) Hervey, Mem, 11. 101. 
 
 5) Viscount Barrington, secretary at war, in a letter to John Manners, 
 marquess of Granby, dated 12th January 1760, writes that the King has told 
 Lord Ligonier that he would give the cornetcy in the Blues vacant by Captn. 
 Lascelles’s promotion to one of his pages named Byng. He insists that cornet- 
 cies in the Horse are the proper provision for his pages. ... 1 have been 
 obliged to obey“ (Rutland MSS., J. c. 12, app. pt. v. 853). Many other letters 
 in this collection testify to the king’s control over changes and promotion in the 
 guards and other branches of the service (vide pp. 227, 260, 267, 312). 
 
 6) Harris, Hardwicke, 111, 222, 519. George complains that he has been 
 »forced“ and ,threatened“ into receiving new men into the ministry, and com- 
 
49.09 ae 
 
 Fox,') ,you will not think me impertinent nor be sorry when I ac- 
 quaint you, that the King has declared his intention to make 
 me Secretary of State and give me charge of his affairs in the 
 House of Commons.“ According to Waldegrave*) George had 
 more knowledge of foreign affairs than most of his ministers.’) 
 
 The correspondence between George IJ. and Lord Towns- 
 hend shortly after his accession, shews to what a large extent 
 the king interfered in the details of government,*) and how 
 frequently the letters submitted to him for his approval were 
 changed and “altered. Under date of February 1729-30, the 
 king writes: ,I think with the alteration I have made, this 
 article may pass; but in relation to the succession of Juliers if 
 I should give any promise to the King of Prussia, I shall lose 
 entirely the hopes of getting the four electors of the Palatine 
 family, which will be of much more consequence to me than 
 the other. So it is impossible to flatter him of my being either 
 neutral, or favouring his pretensions.“ The king refused Wal- 
 pole’s request to confer the presidentship of the council on the 
 duke of Devonshire; and he also refused, under any consideration, 
 to make Charles Stanhope a lord of the admiralty.°) During 
 the summer of. 1740 Walpole was constantly thwarted by the 
 king, and many of the requests of the minister were refused.°) 
 
 
 
 plains to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke that ,Ministers are the King in this 
 country“ (Harris, 1. 106—109; Coxe, Life of Pelham, 1, 202; Mahon, Hist. 1m. 
 280). For George II.’s opinion of English politics, vide also Waldegrave, Mem. 
 132, 133. 
 
 1) Henry Fox to Mrs. Katherine Lowther, 29th September 1755 (Lowther 
 MSS., loc. cit. 13, pt. vir. 128). 
 
 2) Waldegrave, Mem. 5. 
 
 3) ,, What a strange country is this! I have never known but two or three 
 men in it who understood foreign affairs.‘ — George II. 
 
 4) Townshend Manuscripts. 
 
 5) Coxe, Mem. of Walpole, 1. 300; cf. also letter from Lord Townshend 
 to Stephen Poyntz, 3rd June 1828. 
 
 6) Coxe, Mem. of Walpole, 1, 623. The king positively refused to appoint 
 Mr. Trevor envoy and plenipotentiary at the Hague in the room of Horace Wal- 
 pole (Coxe, Ibid. 624). He refused to pardon Admiral Byng who was sentenced 
 by court-martial to be shot, though urged to do so by Pitt, Bedford and Lord 
 Temple (Walpole, Afem. u. 326). 
 
BGA wee. 
 
 It was the same during the administration of Pelham. He de- 
 clined that minister’s request to remove the duke of Bedford 
 from his office as secretary of state,') and he dismissed Earl 
 Temple from the ministry in 1757, simply because he ,could 
 not stand him.‘*) He was strongly averse, says Harris, to 
 making additions to the peerage, and refused to create new 
 peers.’) From the letters of Adderley to the earl of Charle- 
 mont it appears that the king did not hesitate to interfere in 
 the election of members of parliament.*) 
 
 From the examples cited, and which might easily be mul- 
 tiplied, it is quite evident that George II. played a greater 
 part in English politics than has generally been allowed. He 
 was an arbitrary ruler in a constitutional monarchy. The ob- 
 servations on his character by James, first earl of Charlemont, 
 written shortly after his death, bear out this view. He says, 
 ,»aeorge II. was a man of strict honour, . . . a friend to 
 liberty, he was yet tenacious of his regal dignity, and his de- 
 meanour always preserved that air of conscious superiority so 
 necessary in the first magistrate of a mixed monarchy. Con- 
 stitutionally brave, he loved and cherished that virtue in others, 
 and preserved all those qualities which usually accompany cour- 
 age. His temper was warm and impetuous, but he was good- 
 natured and sincere. Unskilled in the royal talent of dissimu- 
 lation, he was always what he appeared to be. He might offend, 
 but, he never deceived.“*°) He had a good understanding and 
 clear insight within a certain. compass, and was fond of 
 business. He also possessed, says Harris,°) great discernment of 
 
 1) Coxe, Mem. of Pelham, tr, 136. 
 
 2) Waldegrave, Mem. 107. 
 
 3) Harris, Hardwicke, m1, 519. 
 
 4) Adderley writes to Charlemont, 8th April 1755, that the king ,inter- 
 feres in the Armagh election petition®; and in a letter of 15th April 1755, he 
 speaks of ,the King intermeddling* in the election (Charlemont MSS. loc. cit. 12, 
 app. x. 212, 215). 
 
 5) Charlemont MSS. Joc. cit. 12, app. x. 18, 14. 
 
 6) Harris, Hardwicke, 11, 222. 
 
ct eee 
 
 character, both as regards the abilities of the men he selected 
 for his ministers, and the degree of confidence he should re- 
 pose in them; and, according to Hallam, the earlier years of 
 his reign were ,the most prosperous season that England has 
 ever experienced. “ 
 
 George, as a volunteer, had early distinguished himself at 
 Oudenarde. His appearance at the battle of Dettingen, where 
 he acquitted himself with undaunted bravery, ,was the last 
 occasion’, says Harris,') ,on which a British sovereign graced 
 by his presence the battle field. And it must be admitted that 
 the behaviour of the monarch, in this the closing act of the 
 martial career of the royalty of England, was in all respects 
 worthy of the courage and spirit which had always characterized 
 the arms of this nation in the contest of war.‘?) 
 
 George III. was destined to play the first and the last great 
 part in English politics since the accession of the house of 
 Brunswick. He insisted on being the king de facto as well as 
 de jure, and he succeeded remarkably well. If during the reign 
 of the first George the power of the Whig families had reduced 
 the kingship to a shadow of sovereignty, the third of the name, 
 by his unyielding will and resolution, succeeded in turn in re- 
 ducing government by parliament almost to a shadow. At his 
 accession the country was governed, according to Walpole, by 
 an oligarchy composed of two hundred noblemen representing 
 the great Whig families. The influence and irresistible power 
 of these ,families of the Revolution* had been upheld by un- 
 bounded parliamentary and official corruption, patronage, and 
 
 
 
 1) Harris, Hardwicke, 11. 223. 
 
 2) Frederick the Great, in his Histoire de mon Temps, gives the following 
 account of George II. at Dettingen: ,,The King was on horseback, and rode for- 
 ward to reconnoitre the enemy: his horse frightened at the cannonading, ran 
 away with his Majesty, and nearly carried him into the midst of the French 
 lines: fortunately one of his attendants succeeded in stopping him. George then 
 abandoned his horse, and fought on foot, at the head of his Hanoverian bat- 
 talions. With his sword drawn, and his body placed in the attitude of a fencing- 
 master who is about to make a lunge. in carte, he continued to expose himself, — 
 without flinching, to the enemy’s fire.“ 
 
 &, 
 
bribery, with brief intermissions, for nearly seventy years. The 
 first great effort of George III. was to rescue the sovereignty 
 from them, and restore ,to the English people the blessings of 
 their old free monarchy.‘’) To wrest the power from the Whig 
 aristocracy, however, could only be done effectually by a reso- 
 lute king, and one capable of asserting his prerogative. Such 
 a king George III. proved to be. Though he failed to annihilate 
 party government, he succeeded in subverting government by 
 the Whig party. In only three years of the fifty active years 
 of his reign was he obliged to endure a ministry thoroughly 
 distasteful to him. In 1765 he was forced to accept Rockingham, 
 but only for a year. When North was driven into retirement 
 in 1782, he was again compelled to accept a united ministry 
 under Rockingham; but this administration would have soon 
 gone to pieces of itself had not the death of the premier in a 
 few months dissolved it. In 1783 George was obliged to accept 
 the coalition, but in eight months he overthrew it, and substi- 
 tuted therefor a ministry led by the greatest statesman of the 
 day, and one on whom he could depend to maintain and uphold 
 the authority of the crown. This administration lasted eighteen 
 years, and, with the single exception of Walpole, no prime 
 minister since Cecil had held office so long. The Grenville 
 ministry of 1806-7, though displeasing to him, the king at first 
 found pliant enough. When, however, they refused to relinquish 
 
 . their constitutional right to offer him advice touching the 
 
 Catholic concession, he dimissed them. 
 
 Though George failed to break down party government, or 
 to restore permanently the supremacy of the crown over the 
 parliament, he succeeded in making the crown the supreme 
 power in the state during his own reign and that of his suc- 
 cessor. But it should not be forgotten that the triumph of the 
 policy of the king and Pitt was in great measure due to the 
 influence exerted by the excesses of the French Revolution, 
 which effectually checked all political reform and liberal legis- 
 
 1) Lord Beaconsfield. 
 
Wa Sap Os 
 
 lation for nearly forty years.') ,The real contest,“ says May, 
 ,was between aristocracy and monarchy and not aristocracy 
 and democracy.“ And again, he says,”) ,but it is characteristic 
 of the British Constitution and a proof of its freedom from the 
 spirit of democracy, that the more dominant the power of the 
 House of Commons the greater has been its respect for the 
 law, and the more carefully have its acts been restrained 
 within the proper limits of its own jurisdiction.* Will any one 
 now maintain that England is anything but a democratic re- 
 public ruled under monarchical forms, or that ,the spirit of de- 
 mocracy“ is inconsistent with respect for the law? 
 
 There is sufficient testimony (though scrupulously and sys- 
 tematically overlooked by his numerous detractors) to show that 
 George III. was not the ,stiff-necked and bigoted individual of 
 very limited intelligence* of Brougham,*) or the ,meddling 
 maniac® of Bagehot.*) Indeed, it is seriously to be doubted 
 whether a king whose distinguishing qualities were mental dul- 
 ness and obstinacy could have been the positive factor in the 
 state-system that George certainly was. It is also questionable 
 whether a ruler of commanding intellect and uncommon saga- 
 city, similarly placed, could have accomplished more. He was 
 the first to realize the effect of the stamp act on America, and 
 consented to its repeal.°) Eldon, who filled the office of lord 
 chancellor from 1801—1827,°) declared that he could not remem- 
 ber having taken the king any state paper of importance ,which 
 he did not alter, no one which he did not alter for the better.* *) 
 
 
 
 1) ,Fly from the French constitution.“ — Burke. 
 
 2) Const. 11, 83, 
 
 3) Statesmen, 1. 10. 
 
 4) Const. 87. 
 
 5) The king preferred the repeal of the stamp act to enforcing it by the 
 sword; but the policy of modification he would have preferred to either (Wal- 
 pole, Mem. 11. 258, 259, 331n, Hist. 1, 281; Albemarle, Rockingham, 1. 269; 
 Massey, Hist. 1, 211, 212; Grenville Diary, etc.). 
 
 6) With the exception of the year 1806, when the office was filled by 
 Lord Erskine. 
 
 7) Campbell, Chan. vit. 253n. 
 
mete OTe 
 
 Even Bagehot says,') ,he knew the forms of public business as 
 well or better than any statesman of his time ;“ and ,if, in addi- 
 tion to his capacity as a man of business and to his industry, 
 he had possessed the higher faculties of a discerning statesman, 
 his influence would have been despotic.“ 
 
 George III. always exercised a considerable influence in- 
 dependent of that which he exerted through his ministers. His 
 shrewdness and insight into men’s motives, his manly courage, 
 his moral and respectable life, his sympathies with the preju- 
 dices of the country, and his genuine wish to be a good king, 
 according to the measure of his understanding, all contributed 
 to this end. If he wished to undermine or weaken his ministers, 
 he used this influence against them; if he wished to support 
 and strengthen them, he used it in their favour. But it was 
 a substantial influence, which made itself felt throughout the 
 fifty years of his active reign, and both Fox and Lord Grenville, 
 in their private letters, equally bear testimony to its reality.’) 
 
 Probably no hereditary sovereign, says Harris,*) ever did 
 more by his own individual measures to advance the real power 
 and welfare of his country than he. He was patriotic and un- 
 selfish.*) He extended the colonial possessions. He encouraged 
 science, art,’) and literature. His attention was directed to 
 manufactures, and the pursuit of agriculture he not only upheld 
 but studied. The constitutional measure adopted at the com- 
 mencement of his reign, the establishment of the absolute inde- 
 pendence of the judges as regards the crown, originated with him. 
 In these respects he was certainly ,a King“ and ,a patriot King.“ 
 
 1) Const. 77, 
 
 2) Lewis, Hssays. 
 
 3) Life of Hardwicke, 11. 228, 229. 
 
 4) How little he allowed his own private feelings to interfere with the 
 discharge of his duty is shown in his promotion to the lord chancellorship and 
 advance to a high rank in the peerage of Lord Camden, who not only had de- 
 cided a case of great public importance against the crown, but had given an 
 adverse decision in a matter where the king himself was personally concerned 
 (Harris, 239, 240). 
 
 5) He founded the Royal Academy. 
 
a ORs 
 
 Since the reign of George III. the personal influence of the 
 sovereign in the executive administration has steadily declined. 
 It has however been asserted at intervals with effect. Under 
 George IV. the influence of the crown remained paramount, ,yet 
 the remnant of independent kingship may be said to have ex- 
 pired on the day 1829 when he gave his consent to the Bill for 
 Roman Catholic Emancipation.‘ 1) The battle of the constitution 
 had to be fought against the immense resources and unyielding 
 will of George III., and it was only by enlarging the liberties 
 of the people that the influence of the crown was gradually 
 brought under control and into harmony with modern ideas. By 
 the Reform Act and the regulation of the civil list?) in the reign 
 of William IV. the chief sources of crown and court influences 
 were finally removed. Since then the policy of the ministers 
 has been directed by parliament and public opinion, and not by 
 the will of the sovereign or the intrigues of the court. ‘The 
 settlement of ,the bedchamber question“ in 1841, was the final 
 acknowledgment of constitutional principles; and it is now many 
 years since any question of moment has arisen touching the 
 undue exercise of the royal prerogative or influence of the crown. 
 
 The sovereign has no longer the power to reject bills.*) It 
 is a fiction of the past to ascribe to him legislative power, for 
 he has long ceased to have any. The ancient theory holds that 
 the king is the executive, but the prime minister is the prin- 
 cipal executive of the British constitution, and ,the sovereign 
 a cog in the mechanism.“ ‘Theoretically and in form the min- 
 isters are still the servants and counsellors of the crown, but 
 
 
 
 1) Gladstone, Gleanings, 1. 38, 78. ,,While the personal influence of the 
 sovereion in the Government of the country has steadily decreased since the 
 reign of George III., the power of the Crown, as wielded by its ministers, has 
 continued to increase from the Revolution down to the present time.“ Such is 
 the language of Langmead (p. 706), and May puts it even stronger (Const. 1.). 
 Why continue to call it the power of the crown? Such language is, to say the 
 least, ambiguous. 
 
 2) Vide Appendix E. 
 
 3) The Queen must sign her own death-warrant if the two Houses unan- 
 imously send it up to her“ (Bagehot, Const. 57, 58). 
 
in reality they are the servants and advisers of the majority in 
 the house of commons and are responsible to that body alone.') 
 The prime minister was formerly the free choice of the crown. 
 In 1827 Wellington declared that this was the sole act of per- 
 sonal government now exercised by the king,”) and in 1845 Peel 
 said: ,I offer no opinion as to the choice of a successor, that 
 is almost the only act which is the personal act of the sovereign; 
 it is for the sovereign to determine in whom her confidence 
 shall be placed.“*) But this was not strictly true even in Wel- 
 lington’s time. George IV. strove long against Canning’s recall 
 to power, and Peel himself could scarcely have been an accept- 
 able person to the queen after ,the bedchamber question,* and 
 yet she felt constrained to invite him to take office in 1841. 
 In 1859, on the overthrow of the Derby ministry, to avoid re- 
 curring to Palmerston, her Majesty desired a cabinet with Lord 
 Granville as premier, but she was forced to accept Palmerston.*) 
 
 A few years ago the sovereign objected to the return to 
 office of a former premier, who was personally displeasing to 
 her, but without avail. The prime minister is no longer the 
 free and unbiassed choice of the crown. The sovereign must 
 accept the recognized leader of the predominant party.°) When, 
 
 1) It was only in 1739, according to Hallam, that the principle of the 
 irresponsibility of the crown and the responsibility of ministers was for the first 
 time recognized in a public debate (Middle Ages, 111, 232, note). 
 
 2) Torrens, Melbourne, 1, 233; Colchester, Diary, ur, 501. 
 
 3) Parl. Dep. uxxxtn. 1004. 
 
 4) In giving the opinion which led to his dismissal in 1851, it should not 
 be forgotten that Lord Palmerston acted not only without the knowledge of the 
 sovereign, but also before consulting his colleagues in the ministry. It should 
 likewise be borne in mind that in controlling one minister the sovereign still 
 acts upon the advice and responsibility of another — her first minister (J. Rus- 
 sell, Parl. Deb. cxix. 91; May, 1. 134, 185). The constitutional right of dis- 
 missing a minister, asserted in the queen’s memorandum of August 1850, on 
 the relations of a secretary of state to the crown, is now practically placed at 
 the disposal of the premier and the cabinet. 
 
 5) ,Lhe King has incontestibly the privilege to choose his own ministers ; 
 excellent delusion! The aristocracy choose them; the heads of that aristocratic 
 party which is the most powerful must come into office whether the King like 
 
ca ¢ (' f We 
 
 however, the predominant party is not agreed who shall lead it, 
 the sovereign may then have a voice in the selection. Ex- 
 perience has shown that the power of dismissing a government 
 with which parliament is satisfied, and of dissolving that parilia- 
 ment upon an appeal to the people, is not a power which the 
 king will again be likely to exercise,') and it may be said to 
 have dropped out of the reality of the English constitution. 
 
 The present influence of the sovereign is moral, and ,it 
 operates,“ says Gladstone, ,through the will and reason of the 
 ministry, not over or against them. It would be an evil and a 
 perilous day for the Monarchy were any prospective possessor 
 of the Crown to assume a claim for himself final, or preponder- 
 ating, or even independent power, in any one department of the 
 State.“ The duties of the sovereign are now formal and orna- 
 mental, and the few prerogative-rights still remaining to the 
 crown are only exercised under the advice of a ministry pos- 
 sessing the confidence of a majority in the house of commons.?) 
 The crown has been shorn of its ancient prerogatives, and the 
 king has long ceased either to rule or to govern, and must be 
 content to reign. But what the crown has lost in power and 
 influence, it has gained in security and peace. 
 
 it or not“ (Bulwer, Hngland and the English). Elsewhere Bulwer says, ,,The 
 King cannot form a cabinet out of men unknown to the aristocracy, but he en- 
 joys the prerogative of seeing two parties fight and of crowning the victor“. 
 The actual exercise of the prerogative then consists in ,,crowning the victor’. 
 
 1) Last exercised in 1834—35 by William IV. 
 
 2) ,His habits and tastes are always matters of notoriety, and often of 
 imitation. Access to his society is always coveted. He may give that access in 
 a manner useful, or mischievous, or absolutely indifferent. He may call to his 
 court those who are most distinguished by genius or by knowledge; or those 
 whose only merit is their birth or their station; or parasites, buffoons, or profli- 
 gates. ven in the appointment of ministers, he may sometimes exercise a sort 
 of selection. He is sometimes able to delay, for a short period, the fall of those 
 whom he likes, and the accession of those whom he dislikes, and he can some- 
 times permanently exclude an individual“ (Brougham, Political Philosophy). 
 
Appendix A. (. 4, 37.) 
 
 Such then, according to the highest legal authorities, are 
 the sovereign and transcendent attributes of the English king. 
 But we-have constantly to distinguish between the real king 
 and the ideal king; the real prerogative and the ideal prerog- 
 ative; between the king who really does nothing and the king 
 who nominally does everthing. Only in this way is it possible 
 to reconcile the contradictory assertions of the various writers 
 on English constitutional law. 
 
 »By the word prerogative,“ says Blackstone, ,we usually 
 understand that special pre-eminence which the king hath over 
 and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course of 
 the common law, in right of his royal dignity. It signifies, in 
 its etymology (from prae and rogo), something that is required 
 or demanded before, or in preference to, all others‘ (Com. 1. 
 239). According to Stephen, the royal prerogative is usually 
 exercised by delegation (Com. 11. 473). 
 
 The theoretical extent of the royal prerogative (vide Black- 
 stone, 1. 237—281) may be briefly shown as follows: (1) The 
 sovereign is the representative of the state towards foreign 
 powers, and has the sole power of sending ambassadors to 
 foreign states and receiving ambassadors at home. (2) It is 
 also the sovereign’s prerogative to make international treaties, 
 and to decide as to war and peace; (3) he has the prerog- 
 ative of rejecting provisions of parliament;') (4) he has the 
 
 1) The sovereign is a constituent part of the supreme legislative power; 
 
 and, as such, has the prerogative of rejecting such provisions in Parliament as 
 he judges improper to be passed“ (Stephen, Com. 11. 504). 
 
— 102 — 
 
 military command over every branch of the armed force; (5) he 
 is the fountain of justice, with the rights of appointment that 
 flow therefrom; (6) he is the supreme guardian of the peace; 
 (7) he is the source of honour, of office, and of privilege (here 
 he is the parent of them, but not the parent in 5); (8) he is 
 the arbiter of commerce;') (9) he is the head and supreme 
 governor of the established Church. 
 
 We are taught by Blackstone, that the law ascribes ,to 
 the King sovereignty or pre-eminence‘ ;?) though we had been 
 previously told, that the legislative and of course the supreme 
 and absolute authority of the state is vested in parliament.® %) 
 Thus in legal conception the ideal king is supreme; but in 
 practice ,the power of parliament is absolute and without con- 
 trol. It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the 
 making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, 
 reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all 
 possible denomination, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military 
 or criminal; this being the place where that absolute, despotic 
 power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is 
 entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms.**) Thus, from 
 the foregoing passages we are forced to the conclusion that it 
 is to the king in his ideal capacity, and not to the real king, 
 that unqualified sovereignty is ascribed. 
 
 We are further taught, that no one born in any part of 
 the king’s dominions, and within his protection, can by any act 
 of his own renounce his allegiance.°) But notwithstanding this 
 language we are told, ,that resistance to the person of the 
 King is justifiable, when by his misgovernment of the kingdom 
 the existence of the state is endangered, and the public safety 
 
 
 
 1) ,First, the establishment of public marts. Secondly, the regulation of 
 weights and measures. Thirdly, money to give it authority or make it current“ 
 (Stephen, 11. 492—536). 
 
 2) Blackstone, 1. 241. 
 
 3) Ibid. 1. 147. 
 
 4) Ibid. 1. 160, 162. 
 
 5) Bacon’s Abridgment, Praerog. C. 1. 
 
— 1038 — ; 
 
 proclaims such resistance necessary.“1) We must leave _ ,to 
 future generations, whenever necessity and the safety of the 
 whole shall require it, the exertion of those inherent (though 
 latent) powers of society, which no climate, no time, no con- 
 stitution, no contract, can ever destroy or diminish.“ ?) 
 
 By a fiction of the law all justice is said to emanate from 
 the king. All jurisdiction is exercised in his name, and all 
 subordinate magistrates derive their authority from his commis- 
 sion. No action can be raised against him. No one can sum- 
 mon him to appear in a court of justice. , Who,* exclaims Finch, 
 »Shall command the King?*) But before the reign of Edward I. 
 the king might have been sued as a common person;*) so at 
 any rate it is stated in the Year Books of the time of Ed- 
 ward III.°) Staundforde,®) however, who wrote on the prerog- 
 ative in the reign of Elizabeth, doubts whether a subject could 
 ever have maintained such an action against the king’; because 
 Bracton,’) who lived in the time of Henry III., states there is 
 no remedy by assize against the king, who has no superior but 
 God. We find here again the same confusion of language and 
 Seeming contradiction of thought as appear in the later writers 
 on constitutional law. In another part of his book Bracton as- 
 serts, ,that the King has not only a superior in the law, which 
 made him King, but in his court composed of his earls and 
 barons, who have a right to put a bridle in his mouth, should 
 he be without bridle, that is, without law.“ *) The same language 
 
 1) Blackstone 1. 245, 251. In Castile if the king attempted ought to his 
 own dishonour, or the prejudice of his kingdom, his subjects were entitled and 
 even required by law to resist his will, and remove evil counsellors from his 
 person (Partidas pt. 2. t. 13. 1. 25; Allen, Prerog. 87). 
 
 2) Blackstone, 1, 245, 251. 
 
 3) Ibid. 1. 242. In the exertion of lawful prerogative the sovereign is and 
 ought to be absolute. The king hath a prerogative in all things that are not 
 injurious t» the subject“ (Finch. L. 84. 85). 
 
 4) Comyn, Digest. Action. C. 1. 
 
 5) One of the judges asserts that he has seen a writ beginning with these 
 words: ,,Praecipe Henrico, regi Angliae* (Allen, Prerog. 96). 
 
 6) Haxposition of the King’s Praerog. C. 15, f. 42. 
 
 De Dervy, ©. 10, £174 b. 
 
 Shoe Mh Ge LOS def) 34. 
 
— 104 — 
 
 is repeated in Fleta. ,The King,“ says the author of that 
 treatise, ,has in the government of his people a superior in the 
 law which made him King, and a superior in his court, that is 
 to say, in his earls and barons*.') 
 
 When the lords tacked to the Petition of Right a clause 
 subversive of its object; when they proposed as an addition to 
 that statute a declaration, that it was tendered to his Majesty 
 ,»with due regard to leave entire that sovereign power with 
 which he was entrusted for the protection, safety, and happiness 
 of his people;“ Sir Thomas Wentworth, afterwards earl of Straf- 
 ford, replied, ,If we admit of this addition, we shall leave the 
 subject worse than we found him. Let us leave all power to 
 his Majesty to punish malefactors; but these laws are not ac- 
 quainted with sovereign power.“ ,Prerogative,“ says the illus- 
 trious Coke, ,is part of the law; but sovereign power is no 
 parliamentary word. Magna Charta and all our statutes are 
 absolute, without any saving of sovereign power. Let us take 
 heed what we yield unto. Magna Charta is such a fellow that 
 he will have no sovereign.‘ ,I know,* said Pym, ,how to add 
 sovereign to the King’s person, but not to his power. We can- 
 not leave to him a sovereign power; for he was never possessed 
 of it.* *) 
 
 B. (p. 4.) 
 
 The king is held in law to be the source or fountain of honour 
 as well as of justice, and he possesses in fact the sole power 
 of dispensing honours and dignities.*) This prerogative it ap- 
 pears, he shared like others, in former ages, with his subjects. 
 In times of chivalry knighthood was the rank most highly 
 
 1) L.1. c.17. § 9. The king of Spain could be sued by any of his sub- 
 jects in his courts of law (Marina, Ensayo Historico critico, § 47, 53. Vide 
 also Matthew Paris, 1236 [edit. 1640], 421; Allen, 98). 
 
 2) Parl. Hist. 0. 357, 358. 
 
 3) Blackstone, 1, 171. 
 
7 
 
 PREPS Th oe il 
 
 - a «FOB* ==: 
 
 esteemed and most eagerly coveted and sought after. But this 
 honour, it was in the power of any private person, who was 
 himself a knight, to bestow. It was not till a period compara- 
 tively modern, that the right to confer the honour of knighthood 
 was vested exclusively in the crown.') 
 
 C. (p. 6.) 
 
 It was decided by the courtly spirit of the judges in the 
 reign of James I. that allegiance is due to the king in his 
 natural capacity (i. e. to his person)*?,) and not in his politic 
 or ideal capacity. But this anomaly in the constitution, which 
 was calculated to subvert every principle of liberty, by denying 
 all right of resistance, was fated to enjoy a short-lived triumph. 
 In 1642 the two houses of parliament declared the sounder 
 principles of the monarchy,’) but pushed them to a fatal excess. 
 
 They assumed to themselves the supreme power of the state, 
 
 retaining nothing of monarchy but the name. What they accom- 
 plished was the reverse of what had been attempted by lawyers 
 and churchmen, when they bestowed on the kings of the Bar- 
 barians all the rights and pretensions of the Roman emperors. 
 In the one case despotism was established under a semblance 
 of law; in the other, a republic was constituted in fact.*) The 
 Restoration abrogated this declaration, and put the prerogative 
 on the basis of passive obedience. The Revolution, founded upon 
 the right of resistance, once more expunged this doctrine from 
 
 - the statute book.®) 
 
 1) Allen, 125. 
 
 2) Even Coke so held: allegiance is ,,tyed to the body natural of the King 
 and not to his body politick* (Howell, State Trials, 11. 566—570; Lords’ Journ. 
 24th Feb. 1606-7). 
 
 3) Rushworth, rv. 551; Comm. Journ. 5th and 6th June 1642; Lords’ 
 Journ. 6th June 1642, 
 
 4) Allen, 83, 84. 
 5) Blackstone, 1. 245, 251. 
 
ae MOO oe 
 
 D. (p. 47.) 
 
 The succession to the crown is in general -hereditary, but — 
 the right of inheritance may be changed or limited by act of 
 parliament. The hereditary right is not indefeasible.’) 
 
 »the Crown in England is hereditary by the common law 
 of the land. While I speak of a hereditary, I by no means in- 
 tend a jure divino title to the throne.* ”) 
 
 The Revolutionary arrangement, grounded entirely upon the 
 will of the people in a state of resistance to their hereditary 
 rulers, is the whole foundation of the title by which the house 
 of Brunswick now enjoys the crown. It is a rare fortune, and 
 peculiar to England, that we have a family on the throne who 
 have no legitimate pretensions to the crown but what they 
 derive from parliament. The Act of Settlement which is the 
 sole foundation of their title, has cut off all obsolete claims, 
 whether derived from Ecgberht or from the Conqueror.’) 
 
 E. (p. 98.) 
 
 It became a maxim of English law, that all lands and 
 tenements possessed by the king, belong to him in right of 
 his crown, and descend with it to his successor. By the adop- 
 tion of this principle the king was restrained from making be- 
 quests of landed property by will, but he still retained the 
 power of giving away lands of the crown in his life-time.*) 
 That this power was abused it is needless to say. The rapa- 
 city of favourites and prodigality of the court led parliament 
 
 
 
 1) 1 Elizab. c. 3, sess. 1; 1 William and Mary, sess. 2, ¢.2; 12 and 18 
 William III. c. 2. 
 
 2) Blackstone, 1. 209. ,,That the Crown is, by common law and consti- 
 tutional custom, hereditary; and this in a manner peculiar to itself; but that 
 the right of inheritance may from time to time be changed or limited by Act 
 of Parliament; under which limitations the Crown still continues hereditary“ 
 (Blackstone, 3. 191). 
 
 3) Blackstone, 1. 217; also Allen, loc. cit. - 
 
 4) Comyn, Digest. Prerog. d. 64, 88. 
 
a 
 
 aca ta 3 
 
 frequently to interfere, and at length an effectual remedy for 
 the evil was accomplished by a statute of Queen Anne,!) which 
 restrained the power of alienation to grants for three lives, 
 or 31 years. The little that remained of the ancient possess- 
 ions of the state was thus secured from further dilapidation. 
 In the reign of George III., the ancient Anglo-Saxon scheme 
 was restored, the crown lands being again vested in the public,”) 
 while the king obtained the right of acquiring landed property 
 by purchase, and of devising it by will.*) 
 
 It was at the Revolution that a limitation was for the first 
 time imposed upon the personal expenditure of the sovereign. 
 The annual revenue of Charles II., from all sources, was 
 £ 1,200,000, and this was fixed by parliament as the ordinary 
 revenue of the crown. The revenue of James II. amounted to 
 £ 1,900,000 a year, out of which the king was expected in time 
 of peace to support the royal dignity and civil government, and 
 
 also the public defence; but whatever remained was at the 
 
 king’s disposal*.) At the accession of William and Mary, how- 
 ever, parliament fixed the annual revenue of the crown in time 
 of peace, at «£ 1,200,000, of which about x 700,000 (derived 
 from the hereditary revenues of the crown, and from a part of 
 the excise duties) was separately appropriated to what was 
 afterwards called the king’s civil list, comprising the personal 
 expenses of the king, the support of the royal household, and 
 also the payment of civil offices and pensions, which were more 
 fairly chargeable to the remaining portion of the crown revenue 
 devoted to the strictly public expenditure of the state.®) On 
 the accession of Anne the land revenue was no longer sufficient 
 for the support of the crown, having been impaired by former 
 
 kings and queens. It was now determined that the king’s regu- 
 
 lar and domestic expenses should be restricted to a fixed 
 
 ) 1 Anne, c. 7. 
 
 ) 1 George III. c. 1. 
 
 ) 89 and 40 George III. c. 88. 
 
 ) Parl. Est. v. 151; Hallam, Const. 1. 279. 
 
 ] 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5) Parl. Hist. vy. 193; Comm. Journ. x. 438. 
 
2 {05 
 
 annual sum distinct from the other departments of public expend- 4 
 
 iture, and this principle was adhered to in the next reign.’) 
 At the accession of George II. the civil list was: increased from 
 £ 700,000 to ¢ 800,000. Under George III. parliament first ac- 
 quired the direct control of the personal expenses of the king, 
 who, for an annual sum of <¢ 800,000, surrendered to the nation 
 his life interest in the hereditary revenues.”) In 1777 the civil 
 list was increased to £ 900,000, ,for the support of his house- 
 hold, and the honour and dignity of the crown.‘ George IIL. 
 also enjoyed considerable further income from other sources, but 
 in spite of this he was compelled to make repeated application 
 to the nation for the payment of debts upon the civil list. The 
 arrears paid off during his reign amounted to £ 3,398,000.*) 
 George IV. received £ 845,727, also the hereditary revenues of 
 Scotland, «< 109,000, the civil list for Ireland, £ 250,000, and 
 from other sources.°) William IV. surrendered all these sources 
 of revenue, and received in return a civil list of #£ 510,000 
 with removal of civil charges (£ 75,000 pension list). The civil 
 list of the present sovereign is fixed at £ 385,000 («€ 1,200 pen- 
 sions).°) In the last three reigns parliament has not been asked 
 to discharge debts.’) 
 
 
 
 1) 1 George I. c¢. 1. 
 
 2) 1 George III. c. 1. 
 
 3) Parl. Hist. xix, 227. 
 
 4) Rept. Civil List, 1815, 4; Parl. Deb. xxxix. 144; May, 1. 243. . The 
 personal frugality of George III. was great. His debts were due to his struggle 
 to establish the ascendency of the crown, by systematic bribery of members of 
 
 parliament with places and pensicns, and direct gifts of money. Between 1769 
 
 and 1777 nearly £ 600,000 had been spent in secret service. At the time the 
 civil list was increased there was a strong expression, on the part of Sir 
 Fletcher Norton, of the feeling of the house, that under the existing pressure 
 
 of taxation such extravagant use of public money was much to be blamed, — - 
 
 words which were subsequently formally accepted by the house as their own. 
 Both Anne and George I. incurred debts, the former £ 1,200,000, the latter 
 £ 1,000,000. 
 
 5) 1 George IV. c. 1; Rept. Civil Gov. Charges, 1831. 
 
 6) Parl. Deb. xxx1x. 137 et seq. 
 
 7) Rept, Civil List, 1838. 
 
a 2 
 
 Lebenslauf. 
 
 -Geboren wurde ich, Frederick Tuckerman, Sohn von Frederick Goddard 
 Tuckerman, Juristen und Schriftsteller, und seiner Ehefrau Hannah geb. Jones, 
 am 7, Mai 1857 zu Greenfield in Massachusetts. Nachdem ich den ersten Unter- 
 richt in der Privatschule meines Heimatstiadtchens empfangen hatte, besuchte ich 
 von Herbst 1869 bis Sommer 1873 die S. Mark’s Schule zu Southborough in Mass. 
 Vom Herbst 1874 bis Sommer 1878 besuchte ich das Staats-Collegium zu Amherst 
 nnd die Universitat Boston, wo ich im Jahre 1878 den Grad Scientiae Baccalaurei 
 erwarb. Von Herbst 1879 bis Sommer 1882 widmete ich mich in der Harvard 
 Universitat dem Studium der Medicin, und im Jahre 1882 erwarb ich den Doctor- 
 grad. Wihrend 1882 und 1883 studierte ich in London und Berlin. Michaelis 
 1892 bis Ostern 1893 studierte ich an der Universitat zu Berlin Geschichte und 
 englische Litteratur und von Ostern 1893 bis Ende Sommer-Semester 1894 des- 
 gleichen an der Universitit zu Heidelberg. Vorlesungen hoérte ich der Herren Pro- 
 fessoren: Curtius, Koepp, Marcks, Meinardus, E. Schmidt, Sternfeld, v. Treitschke, 
 Wagener in Berlin; Erdmannsdorffer, Ihne, Kleinschmidt, Schick, Winkelmann in 
 Heidelberg. 
 
 
 

 
 ae,