* The University of Chicaya
a nn a ee
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‘THE DANEGELD IN FRANCE
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL’ OF ARTS AND LITERATURE
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
‘DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BY.
EINAR JORANSON
ROCK. ISLAND, ILL.
| . AUGUSTANA BOOK CONCERN, PRINTERS
An | : | 1923 .
Return this book on or before the
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University of Illinois Library
The University of Chicago
THE DANEGELD IN FRANCE
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BY.
EINAR JORANSON
PRIVATE EDITION, DISTRIBUTED BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
REPRINTED FROM
AUGUSTANA LIBRARY PUBLICATIONS, NO. ro
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF DIRECIO™S OF
AUGUSTANA COLLEGE AND THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
ROCK ISLAND, ILLINOIS
1923
HISTORICAL
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BAXTER ADAMS PRIZE IN EUROPEAN
HISTORY FOR 1921
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RF CAEPIOR PRISE LAT Wonca o Warns ar Gag AN. LE «wal. che era, Once. tu aie vitals ¢ wile ot aaa 5—13
PPO COSTRGL OTE S cso chan a Vecurer a brane hk alk Forte ce ad ore onc Pee es 14—25
PART I.
THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
CHAPTER (840-877)
liv Fities Danee ene oL ehh ase oe cies wee ee Bhat de eee re ee 26—38
TES PG, PENG SELIG SOS «obo ce sb te, bie eee nee Pe ees ee 39—44
Tito. Tie Danegela:- OL es 60-S6 Le, occ FS ek ee Oh oie Re oe a ee 45—58
IV. The Danegeld Paid by Robert the Strong in 862.......... 59—61
Vie -biiGhareserd: -O©. GGG. © os en's ace «0k sy ohcle Ogee oe ce ~ 6§2—92
Wis The. TwosDanereldscote STs. us, cae cine suck 8c ily ame eee 938—110
VII. Summary of the Causes which Forced Charles the Bald to
Resort: to ‘the ~Daneseld a eae ie ee eee 111—117
PART -AIL
THE DANEGELD AFTER 877.
Vill-~ The Danegeld. Paid . for: Carloman:in? $84. 2.3. 12a eee 118—140
IX. Payments Made to the Danes in Connection with the Siege
of? Paris’ (886-887) 223 35. esa sc ic a as, aa 141—152
».-Odo’s. First. -Danegeld= (889) s-5 ee, ace a ee 153—157
xm&t.2eOdo’s Second Danegeld’ :.(897)o sine oe oe ee ee eee 158—162
Rudolph’s: Second. Danegeld. (926). e0< vee seers eae 171—174
XIV. Summary of the Reasons for the Payment of Danegeld
After’*the Time of Chariles'the Baltic. ..>-..0n see 175—179
PART III.
LocAL DANEGELD: RANSOM.
may. tvansom: of. Places. = 00 \.. 1 f~ nce teste oN ere Pgtioelt a, one 180—184
ov tey -eAnsOm. Of Persons =... i ma'b puipie 5 inka habla meee tk ee 185—188
PART IV.
GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
XVII. The Institutional Character of the Danegeld............. 189—204
XVIII. The Results of the Danegeld: Its Effect on the Political
and Economic Development of France................ 205—219
5407895
CHAPTER
a:
II.
CONTENTS
APPENDICES.
PAGE
When and Where Was the Assessment For the Danegeld
Paid to the Vikings of the Seine in 877 Prepared?...... 220—229
The Two Tax Documents of 877 and the Capitulary of
LOLET SUL Gare Soba s Wis E> ahs Oe RRR ee SUIS BT Os eo eames 230—235
The Danereld tn Er isla... ces ueetenss 6 rete ean oe eee 236—238
The Danegeld in Lorraine and the East Frankish Kingdom 239—247
Then-Danegeld ind Brittany. ick oa ve seein tae ae 248
BIBLIOGRAPHY
All works cited in this dissertation are included in the following list.
Certain others that have a more or less general relation to the subject as a
whole or to some important part of it have also been included, but many
secondary works that were found to be of slight value have been omitted.
It is confidently hoped that no printed source supplying information either
direct or indirect on the Danegeld in France has been overlooked.
ABBREVIATIONS
AA, SS. J. Bollandus (ed.), Acta sanctorum.
COLL. DE TEXT. Collection de textes pour servir a Vétude et a
Venseignement de Uhistoire.
FORSCH. Z. D. GESCH. Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte. Heraus-
gegeben von der historischen Commission bei
der koniglich bayerischen Akademie der Wissen-
schaften. Gottingen, 1860 ff.
JAHRB. D. D. GESCH. Jahrbicher der deutschen Geschichte. Published
under the auspices of the Munich Academy.
Berlin and Leipzig, 1862 ff.
MeGS HA -SS. Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores.
, SS. RERUM MeErROv. Monumenta Germaniae_ Tlistorica, Scriptores
rerum Merovingicarum.
BT. Monumenta Germaniae historica, Leges.
, HPP. Monumenta Germaniae historica, Epistolae.
fe PORTS LATS Monumenta Germaniae historica, Poetae Latini
medii aevi.
MON. HIST. Brit. Monumenta historica Britannica.
Rey. HIstT. Revue Historique. Paris, 1834 ff.
SS. Rk. G. Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum schola-
rum ex Monumentis Germaniae historicis re-
cusi.
The other abbreviations used in this work will, it is believed, be self-
explanatory.
COLLECTIONS OF SOURCES, REGESTA, ETC.
BALUZE, ETIENNE, ED. Capitularia regum Francorum. Reédited by P. de
Chiniae. 2 vols. Paris, 1780.
BOuMER, J. F. Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs unter den Karolingern, 751—
918. Revised edition by E. Miihlbacher and others. Innsbruck, 1908.
Regesta chronologico-diplomatica Karolorum. Frankfort-am-Main,
1838.
. de l’Ecole des Sartas: Paris 1886 ff. BN Se |
- Du Cancer, CHARLES pU Fresne. Glossariwm mediae et : infimae.
gi New edition by L. Favre. 10 vols. Niort, 1883—1887.
DUCHESNE, A., ED. Historiae Francorum scriptores. 5 vols. Paris, 1636—1649.
_ GALE, T., ED. Historiae Britannicae, Saxonicae, Anglo-Daniae, area XV.
nied 2 vols. Oxford, 1691.
_- Geschichtschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit. Second edition by W. Wattenbach,
ae . - Berlin and Leipzig, 1884 ff.
a GuizoT, M. F., Ep. Collection des mémoires relatifs ad Vhistoire de Vrdnee .
_ 81 vols. Paris, 1824—1885. :
KEMBLE, J. M., ED. Coder diplomaticus aevi Saxonici. 6 vols. London, 1839—
er eLS4 8,
MANSI, J. D., and others, Epp. Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima col-
~ lectio. 81 vols. Florence and Venice, 1759—1798.
; Miene, J. P., ep. Patrologiae cursus completus. Series latina. 221 vols.
ie Do | Paris, 1844—1864.
ae ~Monumenta Germaniae historica. Edited by G. H. Pertz and others. Folio
nies: series: Berlin, 1826—1874; quarto series: ibid., 1876 ff.
oe M onumenta historica Britannica. Edited by H. Petrie assisted by J. Sharpe.
ie London, 1848, _
_ MiiHLENBACHER, EK. See Bohmer, Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs, etc.
eae Se Seriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germa-
Rie Sha niae historicis recusi. Hanover, 1839 ff.
apd eee _ SrRMonD, J., ED. Capitula Caroli Calvi et successorum aliquot Franciae regum.
os Paris, 1623.
Pie
KS
NARRATIVE SOURCES
~ ABBO (monk of St. Germain-des-Prés near Paris). De bellis Parisiacae urbis
3 Shee adversus Normannos libri III. M. G. H., Poet. Lat., IV, part i, |
¥ pe (2 — 102 5
We Chronicon. M. G. H., SS., II, pp. 315—329.
Cow ite ADREVALDUS FLORIACENSIS. Miracula sancti Benedicti. M. G. TL GUNS, eee
aca ee Soren. 474-497: :
bie gees a ; AIMOIN oF Freury. Historiae Francorum libri V. Edited by J. Nicot. Paris,
AI SSS see 1567. .
: re eaet AIMOIN OF ST. GERMAIN. Miracula sancti Germani. AA. SS., May, VI, pp.
PRESS RN ae 786—791, , Sr
BIBLIOGRAPHY 7
ALBERICUS MONACHUS TRIUM Fontrtum. See Chronica Albrici.
Anglo-Saron Chronicle. Edited with notes, ete, by C. Plummer. 2 vols.
(Vol. I: text, appendices, and glossary; vol. Il: introduction, notes,
and index.) Oxford, 1892—1899.
Annales Anglo-Saronici. M. G. H., SS., XIII, pp. 103—120,
Annales sancti Benigni Divionensis. Ibid., V, pp. 37—50.
Annales Bertiniani. Edited by G. Waitz. SS. 7. G. Hanover, 1883.
Edited by Abbé C. Dehaisnes (Les Annales de Saint-Bertin et de
Saint-Vaast). Paris, 1871.
Annales sanctae OColumbae Senonensis. M. G. H., SS., I, pp. 102—109.
Annales Fuldenses. Edited by F. Kurze. SS. 7. G. Hanover, 1891.
Annales sancti Germani minores. M. G. H., SS., TV, pp. 3—4.
Annales Maximiniani. Ibid., XIII, pp. 19—25.
Annales Mettenses. Duchesne, Hist. Franc. scriptores, II, pp. 262—333.
Annales necrologici Fuldenses. M. G. H., SS., XIII, 161—218.
Annales Nivernenses. Ibid., pp. 88—9.
Annales Rotomagenses. ILbid., XXV1, pp. 490—506.
Annales Vedastini. Edited by Abbé C. Dehaisnes (Les Annales de Saint-Ber-
tin et de Saint-Vaast). Paris, 1871.
Annales Xantenses. M. G. H., SS., II, pp. 219—235.
ASSER. Gesta Aelfredi regis. Ibid., XIII, pp. 120—122.
Chronica Albrici monachi Trium Fontium a monacho novi monasterii Hoiensis
interpolata. Ibid., XXIII, pp. 631—950.
Chronicon Britannicum. Bouquet, VII, pp. 221—222.
Chronicon Fontanellense (sive s. Wandregisili). M. G. H., SS., II, pp. 801—
304.
Chronicon Hermanni contracti. Bouquet, VII, pp. 282—237.
Chronicon sancti Mazentii. Ibid., p. 228.
Chronicon monasterii sancti Sergii Andegavensis. Ibid., p. 53.
Chronicon Namnetense. Edited by R. Merlet (La Chronique de Nantes).
Coll. de text. Paris, 1896.
Chronicon sancti Neoti. Gale, Historiae Brit., Saxr., A.—D., scriptores, I, p.
155.
Chronicon Normannorum. M. G. H., SS., I, pp. 582—536.
Chronicon sancti Petri Vivi Senonensis. Bouquet, IX, pp. 32—36.
Chronicon Sigeberti. Ibid., VII, pp. 249—253.
Chronicon Sithiense sancti Bertini. Ibid., pp. 266—270.
Chroniques de Saint-Denis. See Grandes chroniques de Saint-Denis.
Dupo. De moribus et actis primorum Normanniae ducum. Edited by J. Lair
(Mémoires de la Société des antiquaires de Normandie. Série III,
t. 3). Caen, 1865.
EINHARD. Annales. M. G. H., SS., I, pp. 185—218.
Vita Karoli imperatoris. Edited by H. W. Garrod and R. B. Mowat
(Hinhard’s Life of Charlemagne). Oxford, 1915,
ERMENTARIUS. Miracula sancti Filiberti. M. G. H., SS., XV, pp. 298—303.
Ethelwerdi chronicon. Ibid., XIII, pp. 122—128.
FiLopoarD. Annales. Edited by P. Lauer. Coll. de tert. Paris, 1905.
Historia Remensis ecclesiae. M. G. H.. SS., XIII, pp. 409—599.
8 BIBLIOGRAPHY
FLORENTIUS WIGORNIENSIS MONACHUS. Chronicon ex chronicis. Mon. hist.
Brit., I, pp. 522—644.
Foutcwin. Gesta abbatwm sancti Bertini Sithiensium. M. G. H., SS., XIII,
pp. 607—634.
Grandes chroniques de Saint-Denis. Bouquet, VII, pp. 125—151.
Hariutr. Chronique de Vabbaye de Saint-Riquier. Edited by F. Lot. Coll.
de text. Paris, 1894.
HeELMOLD. Chronica Slavorum. M. G. H., SS., XXI, pp. 11—99.
HENRY OF HUNTINGDON. Historiae Anglorum libri VIII. Mon. hist. Brit., I,
pp. 689—763. >
HILDEGAR OF MEAUX. Vita sancti Faronis. Bouquet, VII, pp. 356—358.
HincoMAr. Annales. See Annales Bertiniani.
Opera. Migne, Patr. Lat., CXXV, CXXVI.
LIUTPRAND. Antapodosis. Edited by E. Diimmler (Liutprandi episcopi Cremo-
nensis opera omnia). SS. r. G. Hanover, 1877.
Loup (Lupus) OF F'ERRIERES. LEpistolae. Edited by G. Desdevises du Dézert.
(Lettres de Servat Loup). Paris, 1888.
Miracula sancti Bavonis. Bouquet, VII, p. 1538, note a.
Miracula sancti Bertini. Ibid., pp. 880—381.
Miracula sancti Dionysii. Ibid., p. 365.
Miracula (Translatio) sancti Germani in Normannorum adventu facta [845]
(written by a monk of St. Germain-des-Prés on the command of
Abbot Ebroin). M. G. H., SS., XV, pp. 10—I16.
Miracula sancti Martini abbatis Vertavensis. Ibid., SS. rerum Merov., III,
pp. 564—575.
Miracula sancti Richarii. Ibid., SS., XV, pp. 916—919.
MONACHUS SANGALLENSIS. De gestis Karoli Magni libri II. Ibid., Il, pp.
731— 763.
NiTHARD. Historiarum libri IV. Ibid., II, pp. 649—672.
PASCHASIUS RADBERTUS, ABBAS CORBEIENSIS. Jn threnos sive lamentationes
Ieremiae libri quinque. Migne, Patr. Lat., CXX, cols. 1059—1255.
PoreTaA Saxo. Annales de gestis Caroli Magni imperatoris libri quinque. M.
G. H., SS., I, pp. 227—279.
REGINO. Chronicon. Edited by F. Kurze. SS. r. G. Hanover, 1890.
RicHER. Historiarum libri IIII. Edited by G. Waitz. SS. r. G. Hanover,
1877.
Sermo de relatione corporis beati Vedasti a Bellovaco ad proprium locum,
facta idibus Iulii mensis. M. G. H., SS., XV, pp. 402—404.
THEGAN. Vita Hludovici imperatoris. Ibid., I1, pp. 585—604.
Vita sancti Faronis. See Hildegar of Meaux.
Vita sancti Romani abbatis Autissiodorensis. Bouquet, IX, p. 1385.
WULFSTAN. Homilies. Edited by A. Napier (Wulfstan, Sammlung der ihm
eugeschriebenen Homilien nebst Untersuchungen iiber ihre Echtheit).
Berlin, 1883.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 9
DOCUMENTARY SOURCES
Breviarium missorum Aquitanicum [789]. M. G. H., LL. Sectio II, t. i, pp.
65—66.
Capitula excerpta in conventu Carisiacensi coram populo lecta [877]. Ibid.,
t. ii, pp. 361—363.
Capitula synodi Bellovacensis. Ibid., pp. 387—3ss.
Capitulare Carisiacense [June 14, 877]. Jbid., pp. 355—361.
Capitulare missorum in Theodonis villa datum secundum, generale [805].
Ibdid., t. i, pp. 122—126.
Capitulare Vernense [884]. Jbid., t. ii, pp. 371—3875.
Cartulaire de Vabbaye de St. Sauveur de Redon. Edited by M. A. de Courson
(Collection de documents inedits). Paris, 1863.
Clotharii II Edictum [614]. M. G. H., LL. Sectio II, t. i, pp. 20—23.
Constitutio Carisiacensis de moneta [July, 861]. Jbid., Sectio II, t. ii, pp.
3801—302.
Edictum Compendiense de tributo Nordmannico [877]. IJbid., pp. 353
See infra, appendices i and ii.
Edictum Pistense [June 25, 864]. Jbid., pp. 310—828.
Epistola synodi Carisiacensis ad Hludowicum regem Germaniae directa. Ibid.,
pp. 427—441.
IRMINON. See Polyptyque de Vabbé Irminon.
Libellus proclamationis adversus Wenilonem [June 14, 859]. M. G. H., LL
Sectio II, t. ii, pp. 450—453.
Pippini Capitulare Aquitanicum [768]. Jbid., Sectio II, t. i, pp. 42—48.
Polyptyque de Vabbé Irminon, ow dénombrement des manses, des serfs, et des
revenues de Vabbaye de Saint-Germain-des-Prés sous le régne de
Charlemagne. Edited with prolegomena by B. Guérard. (Documents
de la Société de Vhistoire de Paris). 2 vols. Paris. 1844. (In the
new edition, by A. Longnon [Paris, 1886—1895], Guérard’s prolego-
mena have been reprinted without change.)
Bo4.
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12 BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Ibid., LXXVI (1915), pp. 473—511.
“Le monastére inconnu pillé par les Normands en 845.” Ibid.,
LXX (1909), pp.’ 4883—446.
“Mélanges carolingiens. II. Le pont de Pitres.” Le Moyen Age,
IX (1905), pp. 1—2T.
“Une année du régne de Charles le Chauve. Année 866.” Jbdid.,
VI (1902), pp. 893—488.
Lot, F., AND L. HALPHEN. Le régne de Charles le Chauve (840—877). Pre-
miere partie (840—851). (Bibl. de ’ Ecole des Hautes Etudes. Fasc.
no. 165). Paris, 1909.
LucHaireE, A. Histoire des institutions monarchiques de la France sous les
premiers Capétiens (987T—1180). 2 vols. Second edition. Paris, 1891.
Manuel des institutions francaises, période des Capétiens directs.
Paris, 1892.
MAITLAND, F. W. The Constitutional History of England. Cambridge, 1909.
Domesday Book and Beyond. Three Essays in the Early History
of England. Cambridge, 1897.
Marion, M. De Normannorum ducum cum Capetianis pacta ruptaque socie-
tate. (Dissertation.) Paris, 1892.
Mayer, E. “Zum friihmittelalterlichen Miinzwesen und der angeblichen Karo-
lingischen Bussreduktion.” Vierteljahrschrift fiir Social- und Witrt-
schaftsgeschichte, XIII (1916), pp. 887—860.
MontTe.ivus, O. Kulturgeschichte Schwedens von den iiltesten Zeiten bis zum
elften Jahrhundert nach Christi. Weipzig, 1906.
MULLER, SopHus. Nordische Altertumskunde. German transl. by O. L. Jiriczek.
2 vols. Strassburg, 1879—1898.
NEIESON, N. Customary Rents. . (In Oxford Studies in Social and Legal His-
| tory, ed. by P. Vinogradoff, II, no. IV). Oxford, 1910.
VON NoorDEN, C. Hinkmar, Erzbischof von Rheims. Bonn, 1863.
PALGRAVE, Sir Francis. History of Normandy and England. 4 vols. London,
1851—1864.
ParisoT, R. Le royaume de Lorraine sous les Carolingiens, 843—923. Paris,
1898.
PRENZEL, A. Geschichte der Kriegsverfassung unter den Karolingern von der
Mitte des achten bis zum Ende des neunten Jahrhunderts. Erster
Teil. (Dissertation.) Leipzig, 1887.
Provu, M. Les monnaies carolingiennes. (Catalogue des monnaies francdises
de la Bibliotheque Nationale.) Paris, 1896.
“De la nature du service militaire du par les roturiers aux XIe
et XIle siécles.” Rev. Hist., XLIV (1890), pp. 318—327.
RICHTER, G., AND H. Kony. Annalen des friinkischen Reichs im Zeitalter der
Karolinger. 2 vols. Halle, 1885—1887. (Part of the same authors’
Annalen der deutschen Geschichte im Mittelalter von der Griindung
des frinkischen Reichs bis eum Untergang der Hohenstaufen [to
1137]. 4 vols. Halle, 1873—1898.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 13
Roos, W. “The Swedish Part in the Viking Expeditions.” JPnglish Hist.
Review, VII (1892), pp. 209—223.
Rotu, P. Geschichte des Beneficialivesens von den ai
=
INTRODUCTION 21
for military service. Considered as a tax, and distinguished
from such customary taxes as the annua dona, censum, tributum,
etc., it was virtually the only impost of its kind during the Caro-
lingian period,*® and may be regarded as in most ways an inno-
vation in Carolingian public finance. Similarly, the English
Danegeld was perhaps the only true tax of the Anglo-Saxon
period. It appears to have been levied “by the king with the
counsel of the witan.’’*®
In England the collection of Danegeld was continued, for vari-
ous reasons, after the Viking invasions had ceased; and a strong
monarchy was able eventually to transform this tax into a
regular source of royal revenue. In France Danegeld was not
levied by the crown after 926. Locally, however, the West
Frankish Danegeld probably survived in its abuses. Undoubt-
edly the local authorities often raised ““Danegeld” on their own
account, sometimes perhaps to buy off a group of Vikings, who
otherwise would have subjected their district to plunder and
devastation, but at other times for purposes of a different nature
and having no relation whatever to the Vikings. In other words,
the need of buying immunity from the Northmen very probably
became one of the various pretexts under which the seigniors
levied the illegal and unjust exactions that are so often referred
to in the documents of the later ninth century and thereafter.
Qn this basis I have attempted to show in the following pages
that the Danegeld must have been an important influence in the
establishment of the seigneurial right to tax the unfree peasants
at will and in the development of the arbitrary taille; indeed,
I have even gone so far as to indicate a certain, more or less
attenuated, relationship between the Danegeld on the one hand
and some of the earlier feudal aids on the other.
The contemporary terminology for the Danegeld varies con-
siderably not only as between England and the continent but
also as between different sources for the same country; and even
in one and the same document or narrative account there is no
strict uniformity in terminology. In the West Frankish sources
the tributary Danegeld is usually referred to as tributwm;* but
29 A single exception to this statement is noted infra, chap. xvii and n. 52.
30 Stubbs, op. cit., I, 118, 148; Maitland, Const. Hist., 58, 92. Cf. Dowell,
History of Taxation and Taxes in England, I, p. 11.
31 Infra, chap. i, n. 26; chap. v, n. 65; chap. vi, nn. 17, 19, 47, 97; chap.
22 INTRODUCTION
other names are also applied to it, as census,®? munus,** pecunia
pro pace,** pensum.> The stipendiary Danegeld is called locari-
um or dona.*® Exactio is the ordinary name for the tax levied
to raise Danegeld in France;** but often it is called conjectus*®
and sometimes conlatio.*® Nothing like the word “Danegeld”’
ever occurs in the sources that have to do with the Continent.
Turning to England, we find the curious phenomenon that the
term “Danegeld” does not appear in any document or narrative
account until long after it had lost what may be presumed to
have been its original meaning: tribute paid to the Danes. In
the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle the tributary Danegeld is almost
always called gafol (or gavol) ;*° and the equivalent in the Latin
chronicles and documents is usually tributum or stipendium."
The stipendiary Danegeld is given several different appellations
in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, such as gyld (and strang gyld) ,*”
gafol,* heregiold (and heregyld) :** all of which are rendered in
Latin usually as census or tributum.* The “accepted” or “‘tech-
nical” term for the later royal impost is said to have been geld,
or, in Latin, geldum regis.*® As far as Freeman*’ knew, “the
single appearance of the word [Danegeld] in Domesday,” was
the earliest instance of its use. Plummer,*® however, has called
attention to an earlier occurrence of the term in a charter of
Vili, nn. '39, .76, 825 chap. ix, n. 73; appendix 1, nn. 2, 3.
oa dnyjra, chap. i, nh. 453;- chap: ill, nna36,) 3937 Chap. Vv, al. 4.00:
33 Infra, chap. i, n. 45. For the expression, “Dani munerati,”’ see chap.
WAM es COA, 34) dst O.
34 Infra. chap. i, n. 45.
oo anjra, -chapi vy, 024136:
36 Infra, chap. iii, n. 54; cf. appendix iv, n. 1.
37 Infra, chap. iii, n. 32; chap. vi, n. 114;. appendix 1, n. 2. In the tenth
century we have the phrase, “exactio pecuniae collaticiae’; see chap. xii, n.
Ae rchap. xili, n.«L7,
38 Infra, chap. v, nn. 62, 186; chap. vi, nn. 44, 74.
39 Infra, chap. v, n. 65; cf. supra, n. 37. In one place the word expensis
also seems to refer to such taxes or contributions; see infra, chap. i, n. 46.
40 See ed. Plummer, pp. 127, 128, 133, 138, 142. In Wulfstan’s Homilies
(ed. Napier, p. 162) it is referred to as “‘scandlice nydgyld.” Cf. Hodgkin,
eA VEE OOF SD DR 0 Be
41 See for example Florentius Wigorniensis, Chronicon ex chronicis, Mon.
Hist. Britannica, I, pp. 580, 581, 583, 585, 587; Plummer, Notes, p. 89; Kem-
ble, Codex Diplomaticus Aevi Saxonici, No. 303.
42 Ed. Plummer, pp. 145, 160, 162.
43 Ibid., pp. 154, 155.
44 Ibid., pp. 161, 173.
45 See for example Henry of Huntingdon, Historia Anglorum, IV, Mon.
Hist. Brit., I, pp. 757, 758; Florentius Wigorn., Chron., ibid., p. 589.
46 Round, op. cit., p. 86; Plummer, Notes, p. 219.
47 Op. Cit, 11, 4616;
48° Notes, p. 219.
’
INTRODUCTION 23
Edward the Confessor giving exemption “‘of daenegelde.”’ There
it must have been applied to the stipendiary Danegeld. Even so,
it will be agreed, our only evidence that ‘‘Danegeld” originally
meant “tribute paid to the Danes,” is the word itself. In the
sources of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, documentary as
well as narrative, the word is used sometimes to describe the
stipends paid the Danes during the first half of the eleventh
century, but more often to designate the tax levied for the sup-
port of the English government from the time of the Conqueror
to that of Henry Plantagenet. The fact is that the word ‘Dane-
geld” does not appear in any of the sources that are contem-
porary with the period in which Danegeld was paid as a tribute.
In spite of that fact, however, historians have not used the word
“Danegeld” exclusively for the stipends and the royal tax. They
have also referred to the tributes as “Danegeld.” The result is
that the word Danegeld has acquired three meanings: tribute,
stipend, tax.*® Whether this is fortunate or unfortunate, it
would now be useless to quarrel with what has become settled
usage. Furthermore, this usage serves a very useful purpose;
it indicates the relationship between one of the regular English
taxes of the twelfth century and the original tribute to the
Danes.
But can the term “Danegeld’” properly be applied to the
Frankish tribute? Obviously, there is nothing about the word
itself which would preclude its being used to designate tribute
paid to the Danes elsewhere than in England. On the other
hand, it might be misleading to apply a different name to the
tribute in each of the various countries in which it was exacted.
From what has been said above it is clear that on the Continent
and in England tributes were paid under similar circumstances,
and with a similar object in view, to the same race of invaders ;°°
49 One might go a step farther and say that in the general sense of a tax,
“Danegeld” may mean an impost for any one of three different purposes:
(1) to raise tribute; (2) to raise a stipend for mercenaries; and (3) to
raise revenue for the state. Hogdkin’s view (op. cit., p. 381), that the term
Danegeld ought to be used only in the sense of the tax, but not as referring
to the payment of the tribute itself, is probably correct in strict theory, but
it would be hopeless to attempt to follow it out in practice.
50 It seems hardly necessary for the purposes of the present discussion to
enter upon the much debated question as to the relative numbers of Danes,
Swedes, and Norwegians, respectively, in the Viking armies that operated
in western Europe during the ninth and tenth centuries. Steenstrup’s view
(Normannerne, I, 128-63; II, 319-26), that the leading element and by far
the majority of the Vikings in both France and England were Danes, seems
24 INTRODUCTION
and that these tributes were raised by similar methods. They
are examples of what may be regarded as practically the same
thing in different places. Why, then, should they not be desig-
nated by the same name?*' I may add that this terminology has
already been to some extent sanctioned by usage. Freeman used
it over a generation ago;°** and it has been followed more than
once in recent publications.**
In this dissertation a distinction has been made between gen-
eral and local Danegeld. By the first is meant the tribute or
stipend that was raised throughout considerable portions of the
West Frankish realm by, or with the consent of, the central
authority —the king. The object aimed at, though not always
attained, by the payment of general Danegeld was either the
complete removal from the realm of one or more groups of
Vikings or, in the tenth century, the cessation of hostilities on
the part of the Normans. Local Danegeld, as the name implies,
was paid by the local authorities, to save towns, churches, and
monasteries from destruction, or to ransom prisoners from
captivity.
The treatment in the following pages of the general Danegeld
is intended to be exhaustive. Each payment has been studied in
detail with a view to determining (1) the reasons for it, (2) the
methods by which it was raised, and (3) the effect it may have
produced. Summaries of the causes that led to the payment of
Danegeld in France are given, for the reign of Charles the Bald
in chapter vii, and for the subsequent period in chapter xiv. The
now to be quite generally accepted even by Norwegian scholars (see e. g.
Bugge, Vikingerne, I, pp. 28-29), though there is still considerable difference
of opinion as regards the nationality of individual Viking leaders, for ex-
ample Rollo. Also, it is practically settled that none of the various Viking
expeditions were undertaken exclusively by men of the same nationality;
that probably in every expedition all three Scandinavian countries were rep-
resented to a greater or lesser extent (ibid.; see also Roos, “The Swedish
Part in the Viking Expeditions,” Hnglish Hist. Review, 1892, VII, 209-23).
On the other hand, the Frankish and English chroniclers in most cases could
not, or at least did not, distinguish between Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes.
To them, all the Scandinavians were Nordmanni or, in England, Dani. Cf.
‘Vogel, Die Normannen und das frinkische Reich, pp. 20-24.
51 Though Maitland (op. cit., p. 518) refrained from applying the term
“Danegeld” to the Frankish tax, he suggested that the latter may have been
the model of the English Danegeld. If that is true, it furnishes an addi-
tional reason for referring to both taxes by the same name.
52 See for example op. cit., I, p. 176; and “The Harly Sieges of Paris,” in
his Historical Essays, First Series, p. 243.
53 See Vogel, p. 255; Thompson, “The Commerce of France in the Ninth
Century,” Journal of Political Economy, 1915, XXIII, pp. 867, 874.
INTRODUCTION 25
information we have on the methods used to raise the tribute,
and on its institutional character, is brought together in chapter
xvii. In chapter xviii is presented an estimate of the general
effect of the Danegeld on the political and economic development
of France. The two chapters on local Danegeld (xv, xvi) are
intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive; and what is
said in the appendices concerning the Danegeld in Frisia, Lor-
raine, the East Frankish kingdom, and Brittany, is little more
than a brief statement of the established facts in each case. In
appendix i, I seek to prove that the Danegeld of 877 was assessed
at the Assembly of Kiersy on June 14, 877, and not at Com-
piegne on May 7 of that year, as heretofore believed; and in
appendix ii an attempt has been made to establish the relation
of the two tax documents of the year 877 to the famous Capitu-
lary of Kiersy.
PART Is
THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
(840—877).
CHAPTER I.
THE DANEGELD OF 845.
In March, 845,' a Viking fleet of 120 ships,? under the Danish
chief Ragnar,*® entered the Seine and began slowly to ascend that
river toward Paris. Probably several stops were made on the
way, and the surrounding districts with their churches, monas-
teries, and villae, were thoroughly plundered and devastated.+
Taken completely by surprise, the population of the invaded
regions utterly abandoned every thought of resistance.° Even
the military leaders, counts and seigniors, did not so much as
1 Annales Bertiniani, 845, ed. Waitz, p. 32: “mense Martio.” Cf. Miracula
sancti Germani in Normannorum adventu facta, c. 2, M. G. H., SS., XV, 10.
Aimoin (Miracula sancti Germani, I, c. 1, AA. SS., May, VI, 787) must be in
error when he places the expedition in 846. All the other sources agree that
it was in 845.
2 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “naves centum viginti.” Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.:
“copiosus exercitus Normannorum ... cum valido navium apparatu.”
3 Annales Xantenses, 845, M.G.H., SS., II, 228; Chronicon Fontanellense,
845, ibid., p. 302; Miracula sancti Richarii, I, ¢c. 11, ibid, XV, 917; Miracula
Ss. Germani, c. 20, ibid,, p. 14. This may have been the famous Ragnar Lod-
brok of the Norse sagas. See Vogel, Die Normannen und das frdnkische
Reich, 105; Steenstrup, Normannerne, I, 81, ff.
AMMATac, ss. Germant, e:-3;"Dp. 105 Mirdes. Richart: oC eciicwe ie Bert.
log cit:
5 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: “Ubi [i. e. at the mouth and along the lower
course of the Seine] non invento populo ut antiquitus moris erat, qui eis
bellando resisteret.” This seems to be a reference to the coast guard for-
merly maintained by Charlemagne and to some extent by Louis the Pious,
but neglected by Charles the Bald, whose attention during the early years
of his reign was fully occupied by other matters. Aimoin, loc. cit.: “nemine
sibi resistente.” Cf. Vogel, 54-57, 61, 71, 80-87, 95, 96. On the coast guard,
see also Thompson, “The Commerce of France in the Ninth Century,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 1915, XXIII, 860, n. 1.
CHAPTER I | 27
attempt to make a stand against the enemy.® Seized with un-
reasoning fear, they prepared only for flight.
The Vikings may have halted long enough in Rouen’ to become
convinced of the inability of the Franks effectively to oppose
them and of their own superiority over the Christians in the
matter of military tactics and prowess.° Thus encouraged, the
marauders continued and extended their depredations, mean-
while advancing slowly and cautiously in the direction of Paris.°®
At the news of their approach” the population of the city and its
environs, laymen and ecclesiastics, fled to safety, taking with
them their treasures and the bodies of their saints. The king,
Charles the Bald, was not at hand, and it was felt that there was
no one who might be depended upon to give protection against
the invaders.’ Not until the Northmen had reached a certain
place known as Karoli-venna (Charlevanne) ,** did Charles take
6 Mirac. s. Germani, c. 3, pp. 10-11: “Ibique [i. e. at Rouen] similiter non
reperto exercitu qui contra eos bella committeret. ...Omnes enim princi-
pes bellatorum qui ipsam incolebant terram ...magis se ad fugiendum
quam resistendum, nimia perculsi formidine, preparabant.” Vita Faronis,
c. 122, Bouquet, VII, 357: “nullo resistente.” Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “nullo
penitus obsistente.” Aimoin, loc. cit.: “regionis Principes ...ad_ bellan-
dum pigros timidosque.” Miracula sancti Bertini, Bouquet, VII, 381: “omnis
pene nobilitas istius terrae praeter paucos quos opum ac fundorum copia et
castellorum vel munitionum fiducia detinuerat oe dominos suos vel quo-
cumque tutius eis videbatur discedebant.”
7 Cf. Vogel, 84, 105. A sojourn of at least Several days in Rouen is in-
dicated by the author of the Mirac. s. Germani, c. 4, p. 11, and by Aimoin, loc.
cit.; ef. Chronicon Britannicum, 846, Bouquet, VII, 221. It is not impossible
that the hagiographical writers in describing this and the immediately pre-
ceding events have confused them with the events of 841. The same may be
said of the Chron. Britannicum, the chronology of which is confused.
8 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: “Normanni ... christianum populum ad
bellandum pigrum atque inertem fore putantes ... nemine resistente. .
Cumque cernerent quoniam pugnando nullus eis resisteret, etc.”
9 Ibid.: ““Parisyus pedetentim propinquare coeperunt.”
10 Ibid., c. 5: “Nos vero cum iam certi essemus, missis nostris sepius nun-
tiantibus, quod nostras devenirent in partes, etc.”
11 The bodies of St. Denis and other saints interred in the monastery of
St. Denis were exhumed like the rest, but Charles the Bald, when he came
up, forbade their translation (ibid., c. 8, p. 12). According to one account
(ibid., cc. 5, 7, pp. 11, 12), a goodly part of the wealth of the churches and
monasteries was rescued from the hands of the Vikings. Cf. Mirac. s. Rich-
Gr14,) 10C, Git:
12 Charles the Bald was sojourning at Compiégne and St. Quentin just
then (Lot and Halphen, Le régne de Charles le Chauve, 131 and n. 1). Eb-
roin, the abbot of St. Germain-des-Prés, at this time was absent from his
monastery, having gone to Aquitaine for the purpose of aiding Charles in
pacifying that country (Mirac. s. Germani, c. 5, p. 11). The population of
Paris, especially the ecclesiastics, appears not to have expected help from
any quarter under those circumstances and, hence, prepared to seek safety
in flight.
13 For the location of Karoli-venna, see Vogel, 105; Lot and Halphen, op.
C1845 nS
28 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
any measures to check their advance, but then, it is alleged, the
entire military force of his kingdom was summoned to arms.**
This resort to what may be termed a levée en masse was not
altogether successful. A large number of Franks obeyed the
royal command, but not all.*> The fact that part of those sum-
moned failed to come, is to be explained, partly by the suddenness
of the Viking raid, which precluded the bringing up of troops
from any distance, and partly perhaps by the unwillingness of.
some Franks to fight against the Northmen.'® The troops col-
lected by Charles seem, however, to have outnumbered the army
of the Vikings, and their military equipment is said to have been
better than that of their opponents.*7 Charles himself appears
to have been fully determined to engage the enemy, and he is
reported to have declared himself willing to risk his life, if need
be, in the defense of the church.'* He divided his army into two
14 Mirac. s. Germani, c. 12, p. 12: “Contra quos [Normannos] .. . Karolus
adveniens, iussit, ut omnis exercitus regni sui ad bellandum edwetus illuc
conflueret.” This can hardly be interpreted to mean the military strength of
the entire western realm; regni sui in this case probably includes only the
territories directly subject to Charles, i. e. Francia, Neustria, and Burgundy.
Cf. infra, n. 47; Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 134, n. 2.
15 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: ‘“Multus quidem et innumerabilis populus
venit, sed non totus, ut iusserat, affuit.” See the following note.
16 Jbid.: “copiosum exercitum sed non omnem ad pugnandum volun-
tarium, etc.’ Aimoin, loc. cit.: ““Karolus quia propter subitaneum eorum
ascensum ex toto non poterat, convocata aliqua sui exercitus parte, etc.”
17 In the Mirac. s. Germani, c. 2, p. 10, the army of the Vikings is re-
ferred to as “‘copiosus exercitus Normannorum”; but that group of Vikings
which attacked the Frankish division on the south bank of the Seine, is
described (ibid., c. 12, p. 12) as “nudos ac pene inermes atque paucissimos
homines.” Since the Danish fleet numbered 120 ships, and each vessel
carried anywhere from forty to seventy men, the army of the Vikings prob-
ably consisted of not less than 4,800, nor more than 8,400, men (cf. Vogel,
37-39). For the size of the Frankish army, see the two preceding notes.
The author of the Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit., calls one division of the Frank-
ish army “infinitus exercitus’—a hyperbole, of course. This writer, ibid.,
also refers to the military equipment of the Franks: ‘‘Christianus populus
galeatus et loricatus, scutorum ac lancearum munimine tectus.” The Vita
Faronis, loc. cit., is somewhat obscure: “Quantum ibi attraxerit hoc regnum
populum cum rege Karolo suo nequicquam, terra eum vix sustinente, coe-
lumque sub pelle sua obumbrante, incertum nobis scire miramur numerum.”
Chronica Albrici, M. G. H., SS., XXIII, 734: ‘‘occurreret eis [Nortmannis]
Karolus rex cum exercitu equitum et peditum.’ Thus there were knights
as well as footsoldiers in the army of Charles. That the Frankish power of
defense had been very much weakened by the civil wars which culminated
at Fontenay, and that the Danes knew this and intended to make use of the
opportunity, is indicated by the Chronicon Sithiense, Bouquet, VII, 267:
“Nortmanni ...in Franciam veniunt quam sciebant debilitatem per illud
bellum cruentissimum inter fratres, etc.” Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 134, n.
2, doubt the possibility of collecting an “innumerable people’ in so short
time, unless indeed this “people” consisted of inexperienced footsoldiers.
18 Mirac. s. Germani, c. 12, p. 12: “Karolus ... qui pro defensione s. Dei .
ecclesiae mori paratus erat, etc.” Aimoin, loc. cit.: “[Karolus] erat, uti
be ts
a | Ae
sit aed
CHAPTER I 29
divisions, the larger of which was to remain with him to defend
the monastery of St. Denis, while the other, and smaller, division
was ordered to cross the Seine and hold the south bank of the
river. But all those who had been ordered to go across did not
obey the command, perhaps by reason of disloyalty to the king.’®
About this time the Danes terrified the Christians by executing
a number of captives under their very eyes; and when some of
the Vikings a few days later leaped out of their ships to engage
that division of the Frankish army which was stationed on the
south bank of the river, the Franks fled before them precipitately
and in utter confusion, without so much as striking a blow.”°
This poor performance of one of his divisions seems to have
convinced Charles that the Frankish levies were inferior to the
Northmen, and that it would be unwise to risk a further engage-
ment.*! He therefore retreated with what remained of his hastily
collected army toward the monastery of St. Denis, which he
determined to defend and protect at all costs.
The Vikings, more confident than ever of their military superi-
ority, hastened on to Paris, before which they anchored on
adolescens, animo armisque strenuus ... pugnaturus accessit.” Ann. Bert.,
loc. cit.: “Quibus [Normannis] cum Karolus occurrere moliretur.” Vogel’s
picture, p. 106, of a monarch on his knees before the altar of St. Denis, trem-
bling with fear, etc., seems out of harmony with the statements just quoted.
We may also note, in passing, that if Charles made a vow at this time, it was
at the suggestion of Hincmar the priest, for the latter was not elected arch-
bishop of Rheims until in April. Cf. Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 1385 and n.
2, 143; Diimmler, Geschichte des ostfrdnkischen Reiches, second ed., I, 282.
19 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: “non omnes quibus iussum fuerat abierunt,
non plenam, ut putamus seu credimus, circa eum fidem servantes.” Since
Aimoin, loc. cit., indicates that the division on the south bank of the Seine
was smaller than the other, Diimmler’s statement (op. cit., I, 282), that
Charles divided his army into two halves, is not quite accurate; at least they
were not equal halves. Vita Faronis, loc. cit.: “Cumque non tantam auda-
ciam in pectore concepissent Franci, ut utrasque partes fluminis bello ob-
sedissent, etc.”
20 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit. According to Aimoin, loc. cit., the attack of
the Danes preceded the execution of the captives. Cf. Lot and Halphen, op.
cit., 135, n. 4; Vogel, 107.
21 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “Karolus ... praevalere suos nullatenus posse
prospiceret.”’
22 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: “Karolus ... cernens quod gestum erat,
qui pro defensione s. Dei ecclesiae mori paratus erat, tristis et merens ac
delicata pectora tundens recessit.” Chronica Albrici, loc. cit.: ‘““Karolus cum
exercitu ... non potuerunt prohibere eos, quin Parisius ...intrarent...
et Karolus apud monasterium s. Dionysii resedit.” Aimoin says, I, c. l,
p. 788, that when the people were slipping away from him, Charles decided
to defend St. Denis because he had been specially commended by his father
to this saint. Cf. Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 135, n. 3, 136, n. 1.
30 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
Saturday, March 28, 845.7 The next morning, which happened
to be Easter, they entered and occupied the now deserted city
together with the neighboring monastery of St. Germain-des-
Prés on the south bank of the Seine.** |
Having reached their goal,?> the Danes soon gave evidence of
a willingness to come to terms with the Franks. They dispatched
envoys to Charles the Bald at St. Denis, offering to quit Paris
and the kingdom of Charles in return for the payment of
tribute.”°
The reasons for this policy on the part of the Danes are not
far to seek. Their object at this time was to secure plunder
23 Mirac. s. Germani, c. 14, p. 18: “[Normanni] cursu prepropero sabbato
sancto paschalis solemnitatis Parisyus venerunt.” Chron. Fontanellense, loc,
cit.: “Ragneri ... cum classe sua... usque Parisiis accessit, ac in vigilia
s. paschae, i. e. 5. Kalend. Aprilis, eandem urbem intravit.” Ann. Bert., loc.
cit.: “Loticiam Parisiorum, nullo penitus obsistente, pervadunt.” Cf. An-
nales Fuldenses, 845, ed. Kurze, p. 35; Chronicon Sigeberti, Bouquet, VII,
249.
24 Just how long the Vikings remained in Paris cannot be accurately
determined; according to the Mirac. s. Germani, c. 20, p. 14, it was only a
short time—‘“paucis diebus.”” The various miraculous events which they are
said to have experienced during their sojourn in the monastery of St. Ger-
main-des-Prés, and elsewhere, need not be described or discussed here. They
are related in full by the author of the Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit., pp. 13-16.
25 Cf. Lot and Halphen, op cit., 133, 134, n. 1.
26 Mirac. s. Germani, c. 20, p. 14: “‘[Normanni] legationis causa missos
suos ad regem... dirigunt Karolum, ut eos cum pace et absque inter-
necione sui ad propriam unde venerant redire permitteret patriam.” Aimoin,
1, c. 10, p. 789: “Interea simulato languore, [Normanni] legationis causa
dirigunt ad... Karolum, ut eos cum pace fideles suscipiens, ad propriam
dato Regni tributo redire permitteret patriam.” Vogel, 110, n. 3, claims
that in the passages just quoted the hagiographical writers wilfully mis-
represented the true course of events in the interests of their patron saint,
to whose intervention they wished to ascribe the deliverance of the realm
from further devastation. He insists that “nicht von den Normannen, son-
dern von Karl ging das Anerbieten zu Verhandlungen aus,” and bases his
opinion on the statements in the Annales Bertiniani, the Annales Xantenses,
the Vita s. Faronis, and the Chronica Albrici. I shall quote here the perti-
nent passages in these sources in the order indicated. “Karolus...
praevalere suos nullatenus posse prospiceret, quibusdam pactionibus et
munere septem milium librarum eis exhibito, a progrediendo compescuit ac
redire persuasit.”—‘Alia pars eorum Normannorum Galliam petierunt,
ibique ceciderunt ex eis plus quam sexcenti viri. Sed tamen propter desi-
diam Karoli dedit eis multa milia ponderum auri et argenti ut irent extra
Galliam; quod et fecerunt.”—‘“Cumque non tantam audaciam in pectore con-
cepissent Franci, ut utrasque partes fluminis bello obsedissent, consilium
inierunt ad ruinam et ad interitum per omnia labentia saecula, dato tributo
copiosissimo terrae.”’—‘‘dederunt rex Karolus et populus Normannis pecu-
niam multam, et reversi sunt in terram suam.’—So far as I can see, the
last three of these statements throw no light whatever on the question as to
who first suggested the payment of tribute. The words “a progrediendo
compescuit ac redire persuasit,” in the Annales Bertiniani, at first sight do
give the impression that Charles the Bald took the initiative. But it must
te
CHAPTER I ot
rather than to conquer territory.*7 But in point of fact Paris
had not proved as fruitful a field of plunder as the Vikings had
anticipated. The inhabitants of the city and its environs, par-
ticularly the ecclesiastics, had been forewarned of the impending
danger, and had been able to remove to places of safety at least
a very large part of their money and valuables before the arrival
of the Northmen.*® It is clear, that the latter were not satisfied
with the amount of booty thus far secured, and that they were
determined to have more if that were possible.2® To attempt
plundering operations in the vicinity of Paris was not advisable,
owing to the presence of the king’s army at the monastery of
be remembered that they are a very compressed form of statement, and as
such they really do not contradict the much more detailed accounts of the
hagiographical writers. It is certainly true that Charles by accepting the
terms of the Northmen did restrain the latter from advancing and did per-
suade them to return, even if the Northmen had taken the first step on the
path of negotiation. As will be pointed out in the text, it is not probable
that the Vikings really intended to make any further advance; but, of course,
they did not reveal their actual plans to the Franks. They simply ex-
ploited the existing situation to the full. Vogel is doubtless right when he
says that the hagiographical accounts were written for the express purpose
of glorifying the miraculous powers of St. Germain. But it does not neces-
sarily follow that the writers of those accounts have given a totally false
presentation of the course of events. They may have mistaken or falsified
the motives of the Northmen—and this may explain why the first author of
the Miracula failed to mention the tribute—while giving a substantially
correct and truthful account of their acts. It probably was more or less of
a mystery to the Franks, why the Vikings had not continued farther up the
Seine, why they had changed their plans so soon and offered to retire in
return for the payment of tribute. Cf. Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: “‘quati-
nus a finibus christianorum: tam cito discedere vellent [Normanni].” The
hagiographical writer himself admits that he was not aware of what he
regards as the real reason for the changed policy of the Vikings (the pesti-
lence, etc., sent by St. Germain) until it was revealed to him more than four
years after the event by Count Cobbo. Only with the aid of Cobbo’s story
was he able to clear up the mystery as to the motives of the Vikings and to
exalt the powers of his patron saint. There is, then, in the opinion of the
present writer, no sufficient reason for rejecting the hagiographical account
of the course of events, the details of which are, not contradicted, but passed
over in silence by all the other sources. Cf. Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 138,
whose view is similar to that of Vogel. The latter’s faith in the accuracy
of the Annales Bertiniani, by the way, is not unswerving; see infra, chap. ii,
11,
27 It was not until after the middle of the ninth century that the Vik-
ings began to establish themselves in fortified camps, where they sojourned
at first only during the summer, but later throughout the winter also. Cf.
Vogel, 38, 39, 127, 260, 261. The fact that the Vikings on this occasion. were
willing to depart on the payment of tribute proves, of course, that they had
no territorial ambitions as yet; or, in any case, that their principal object.
was the acquisition of money and treasure. After the Vikings under Oscar
had sacked Rouen, in 841, and had secured the desired amount of booty, they
put to sea in order to avoid an encounter with the Frankish levies moving
against them. Cf. Vogel, 83-85.
28 See supra, n. 11.
29 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “a progrediendo compescuit.”’
32 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
St. Denis.2° They might, indeed, have ascended to some other
point on the Seine and continued operations from there; but at
best this would have been a perilous adventure with an unde-
feated Frankish army left in the rear.*: Neither of these courses
would be necessary, if instead the Franks could be induced to
pay tribute. Accordingly, the Vikings chose what they must
have regarded as the wiser policy.
It is not unlikely that the demand for tribute had been accom-
panied by a threat to proceed farther inland in case of refusal.**
What the Vikings would have done if their demand had been
refused, remains problematical. It is improbable that they had
any serious intention of carrying out their threat, for that would
have permitted the Franks in the meantime to bring up reén-
forcements and to take various measures to cut off the retreat
of the Vikings.**? However that may be, it is certain that the
threat of Ragnar and his associates was effective, and that their
offer was accepted by the Franks.
These considerations seem a sufficient explanation of the policy
adopted by the Northmen, even though they are not mentioned
as such by the contemporary writers. According to the hagio-
graphical account, a mortal disease, to which the Vikings fell
prey while they were sojourning in Paris, and which seriously
depleted their ranks, was the real reason why they entered into
30 See supra, n. 22. When plundering operations were to be undertaken,
the Vikings would scatter in all directions and leave only a small guard at
their ships (Vogel, 38, 39). This, of course, could not be done with a hos-
tile army in the vicinity, which, while the Vikings were absent from their
ships, might have seized or destroyed the latter, thereby cutting off the pos-
sibility of retreat.
31 Vogel admits, p. 105, that even the ascent to Karoli-venna was a daring
exploit fraught with many dangers. Yet up to that time there had been no
resistance whatever.
Oe CLs SUnTa, No 29.
33 In my opinion, no small part of the success of the Vikings on this
occasion must be ascribed to their capacity for bluffing the Franks, who
doubtless believed that the freebooters would have ascended farther up the
Seine to plunder and devastate, if their offer had been refused. It would
have been practically impossible for the Franks to prevent them from so
doing. The real strength of the Vikings lay in their superior mobility.
In their ships they could easily outdistance their pursuers, especially if,
as has been asserted, the majority of the latter were footsoldiers (Lot and
Halphen, op. cit., 134, n. 2). It is true, as pointed out above in the text,
that the Franks might have opposed the Vikings on their return—they
might conceivably have been able to cut off their retreat—but in the mean-
time other places would have been plundered or destroyed. The latter con-
sideration must have been one of the chief reasons why the Franks accepted
the offer of the Vikings; it was better to pay tribute than to expose the
country to the possibility of further devastation.
—-
of tee ~ od
we.
ed
CHAPTER I 33
negotiations with Charles the Bald.** If there is any element of
truth in this story, all that can be said of it is that it gives a
supplemental reason for the offer of the Northmen. There can
be little doubt that the Vikings would have acted as they did,
even if their ranks had not been thinned by the ravages of a
disease.*®
Charles the Bald, though at first unwilling, was finally induced
by certain of his magnates to accept the offer of the Northmen.
The magnates in question are accused of having accepted bribes,
which may or may not be true.**® In any case, the magnates
probably were not anxious to engage in battle with the Vikings
after what they had already seen of the outcome of such war-
fare.**’ It is generally admitted that the West Frankish nobles
and seigniors of this period were narrow, selfish, and unpatri-
otic.** To them, the payment of tribute must have seemed the
most convenient method of securing the removal of the Vikings.
The magnates well knew that if the king, in order to raise the
tribute, should find it necessary to resort to taxation, it would
be easy for them to evade the impost by shifting its burden on
the peasantry.*°
34 Mirac. s. Germani, ce. 19, 20, p. 14.
35 These words of Aimoin, I, c. 10, p. 789, help to explain the “contradic-
tion” referred to by Vogel (p. 110, n. 3): “Interea simulato languore, lega-
tionis causa dirigunt ad ... Karolum, etc.’ The Vikings were past masters
in the art of deception. Cf. Steenstrup, Normannerne, I, 22-28, 366-67;
Vogel, 175-77.
36 Aimoin, loc. cit.: “Rege quidem nolente, Principibus tamen quibusdam
(ut fatebatur) muneribus laesis, ete.” Vita Faronis, loc. cit.: “Cumque non
tantam audaciam in pectore concepissent Franci, ut utrasque partes flumi-
nis bello obsedissent, consilium inierunt ad ruinam et ad interitum per
omnia labentia saecula, dato tributo copiosissimo terrae.” Vogel, 110, n. 3,
seems to believe that it was Charles, and Charles only, who wished to pay
tribute, and that the magnates exercised no influence on him at all in this
matter. He asserts, but of course cannot prove, that the story of the brib-
ing of the magnates was invented by Aimoin solely for the purpose of white-
washing Charles. The author of the Vita Faronis, however, does not agree
with Vogel. A few lines before the passage quoted above, he says: “terra
eum [Karolum] vix sustinente”’; and, according to the same writer, it was
the Franci—which certainly does not mean only the king—who chose the
disastrous policy of paying tribute. Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 138, n. 3,
accept with some modifications the statement of Aimoin.
37 See supra, nn. 6 and 16. Ragnar is reported to have described the
Franks to King Horich of Denmark in the following manner (Mirac. s. Ger-
mani, c. 30, p. 16): “populum ... plus omnibus aliis ad dimicandum tre-
mentem ac pavidum.”
38 Cf. Diimmler, I, 213-15, 221-23; Vogel, 82-83, 90-91, 95-97; supra, nn.
6, 8, 19.
39 According to Sée (Les classes rurales et le régime domanial en France
au moyen dge, 92, 116) and Flach (Les origines de Vancienne France, I,
341-43), the burden of taxation in this period always fell ultimately on the
lower classes of the population, i. e. poor freemen, coloni, and serfs.
Danegeld. 3.
34 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
As for Charles the Bald, he probably came to realize that the
army which had been collected, nobles and freemen alike, was
not to be depended upon and that, in any case, it was not large
enough to inflict a decisive defeat on the Danes.*° And even if
it had been possible, there would have been no time to collect and
bring up more troops; for in the meantime the Vikings might
have proceeded to plunder and devastate other places farther up
the Seine and its tributaries.* On the whole, therefore, it was
safer and more prudent to agree to the payment of tribute than
to expose the country to further devastation or to build any
hopes on the very doubtful issue of an engagement with the
doughty Vikings.*?
A preliminary understanding having been reached and the
tribute agreed upon in principle, Ragnar and the other Viking
chiefs were conducted to the headquarters of Charles the Bald
in the monastery of St. Denis,*® where a formal and definitive
treaty was concluded.
According to the terms of this treaty, the Northmen agreed
to evacuate the kingdom of Charles and never to enter it again,
unless perchance as friends and allies;** in return for which
Charles agreed (1) to allow the Vikings to depart in peace, i. e.
without molesting them in any way on the return journey, and
(2) to pay them as tribute the sum of 7,000 pounds in silver
40 Vogel’s statement, p. 110, “‘Konig Karls Heer hatte sich inzwischen
noch bedeutend verstarkt” is purely gratuitous and contrary to the facts as
indicated by the sources. Aimoin, I, ec. 1, p. 788, claims that the people were
slipping away from Charles: ‘“populo...a_ se labente.’”’ That part of
Charles’s army which was to have defended the south bank of the Seine had
been routed and scattered, and it is very unlikely that this loss had been
compensated for by the arrival of reénforcements. There is certainly noth-
ing which proves their arrival. Just how large the Viking army was cannot
be accurately determined, but it probably numbered not less than 4,800 men
(cf. supra, n. 17). The statement in the Annales Xantenses, loc cit., that
more than 600 Vikings fell at this time, is not corroborated by any other
source, and, like several other statements in these annals, is at least inac-
curate. The writer’s information on the events in the West Frankish king-
dom was probably scant and of the hearsay variety. This also explains why
he attributes the payment of the tribute to Charles’s ‘‘sloth.”
41 That Charles did not have sufficient time to collect an army equal to
the occasion, is asserted by Aimoin; see supra, n. 16.
42 According to the Annales Bertiniani, Charles perceived that his men
would not be able to prevail over the Northmen; see supra, n. 26.
43 Miracula s. Germani, c. 20, pp. 14-15; Aimoin, I, c. 10, p. 789.
44 Aimoin, loc. cit.: ‘“nequaquam ulterius vel fines sui regni, nisi fortasse
auxiliatores, intrarent aut contingerent.” Cf. the similar statement in the
Mirac. s. Germani, c. 20, p. 14. Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “Karolus [Normannos]
... &@ progrediendo compescuit ac redire persuasit.” Ann. Xantenses, loc. cit.:
“ut irent [Normanni] extra Galliam.”
CHAPTER I 35D
(and gold?).*®° Nothing being stipulated as regards the booty
already in the possession of the Vikings, it follows that they
were permitted to keep that.
The evidence as to how this first Danegeld in the West
Frankish kingdom was raised is very incomplete. There are,
however, strong indications that it was obtained by means of a
general tax*® levied especially in Francia, which was the invaded
region, and probably also in Neustria and Burgundy.** The mag-
nates, or perhaps the missi, appear to have collected sums of
45 Aimoin, loc. cit.: “ut Karolus eos [Normannos] cum pace fideles sus-
cipiens, ad propriam dato Regni tributo redire permitteret patriam.” Mirac.
S. Germani, loc. cit.: “si [Karolus] eos [Normannos] inlesos abire permit-
teret, etc.” The Miracula does not mention the tribute. Ann. Bert., loc. cit.:
“quibusdam pactionibus, et munere septem milium librarum eis [Norman-
nis] exhibito.” Ann. Fuldenses, loc. cit.: “[Normanni] tam ab ipso [Karolo]
quam incolis terrae accepta pecunia copiosa cum pace discesserunt.” Cf.
Annales Mettenses, 845, Duchesne, H. F’.. S., III, 302. Ann. Xantenses, loc.
cit.: “{Karolus] dedit eis [Nortmannis] multa milia ponderum auri et ar-
genti.” Chronica Albrici, loc. cit.: “‘pecuniam multam.” Paschasius Radber-
tus, Lamentationes Ieremiae, Migne, Patr. Lat. CXX, col. 1220: “censum
plurimum.” Chronicon Hermanni contracti, Bouquet, VII, 233: “accepta
magna pro pace pecunia.” Cf. infra, n. 55.
46 Cf. Vogel, 111; Wenck, Das frdnkische Reich nach dem Vertrage von
Verdun, 124, n. 2. That the Danegeld was raised by means of a general tax
seems likely for the following reasons: (1) the Vikings appear not to have
left the Seine until late in June or early in July (see infra, n. 53); (2) the
Annales Fuldenses and the Annales Mettenses say, “tam ab ipso [Karolo]
quam incolis terrae accepta pecunia copiosa,’ while the Chronica Albrici
has, “dederunt rex et populus Normannis pecuniam multam’—which indi-
cates that the Danegeld was contributed at least in part by the people; (3)
Loup of Ferriéres, in a letter to Hincmar of Rheims written shortly after
the levy of the Danegeld, speaks of “his expensis quae maiores nostri con-
gregaverunt” (see infra, n. 48); (4) after his return to Denmark, Ragnar is
said to have boasted that he had laid the entire kingdom of Charles under
tribute (see infra, n. 55); (5) Paschasius Radbertus (see the preceding
note) speaks of ‘‘censum plurimum.”
47 At least that would seem to follow, if the entire kingdom of Charles
was subjected to tribute (cf. the alleged boast of Ragnar referred to in the
preceding note). Aquitaine and Brittany of course escaped the Danegeld
altogether, for Charles the Bald had not been able effectively to assert his
authority in either of those countries (see Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 72 ff.,
84 ff., 112 ff., 126, 130, 149 ff.; and ef. Diimmler, I, 244 ff., 248). In fact he
was forced to recognize the independence of Pippin the Younger in Aqui-
taine in June or July, 845 (Lot and Halphen, 149 ff.; Diimmler, I, 288 ff.)
and that of Nominoé in Brittany in the summer of 846 (Lot and Halphen,
166-67; Dimmler, I, 297 f.). The rebel Lambert, who had allied himself
with Nominoé, might well have prevented the collection of any royal tax in
the counties (pagi) of Anjou, Maine, and Nantes (Lot and Halphen, 75 ff.,
117 ff.; Diimmler, I, 244, 247, 289). In Septimania (Gothia) and the Spanish
March the authority of Charles the Bald had been at least in part restored
during the spring of 844 (Lot and Halphen, 97 ff., 120, n. 1; Diimmler, I,
246); but owing to their remoteness from the invaded portion of the realm
and also to the inadvisability of immediately burdening them with taxes, it
seems very doubtful that any Danegeld was collected there. We may assume
that Francia had to furnish the major portion of the tribute, since it was
36 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
money from the great landholders,*® who probably obtained these
sums by levying extraordinary taxes on the peasants and others
subjected to their authority.*® Did the king demand from each
landholder a specific sum proportionate to the number and value
of his holdings? Such-at least was the plan according to which
many later Danegelds were raised,°® and, lacking evidence, we
may conjecture that a similar plan was used on this occasion.
We know that merchants and priests were taxed for some of the
later Danegelds,*: and that at certain times even the treasuries
of the churches had to be emptied in order to raise the sums
demanded.®? Were any such measures necessary in 845? That,
too, must be left to conjecture.
To determine accurately the length of time required to raise
this tribute is out of the question. Since in all probability the
Danegeld was not paid before June—it may have been paid
much later — we may assume that two months or more elapsed
before the entire yield of the tax was in the hands of the royal
officials.**
the invaded district; and it is probable that the neighboring parts of Neus-
tria and Burgundy also were taxed, for the royal authority was maintained
in those regions by the itinerant missi. (Note the following in a document
of Charles the Bald for the year 845: “missis nostris. per universum im-
perium nostrum discurrentibus.’”—Bouquet, VIII, 482. Loup of Ferriéres
tells us that he was a missus in Burgundy in the year 844. Cf. Levillain,
“tude sur les lettres de Loup de Ferriéres,”’ Bibl. de Vécole des chartes,
LXIII, 75-78, 116-17; Thompson, Decline of the Missi Dominici in Frankish
Gaul, 8-9). Eastern Neustria certainly contributed, as is evident from the
testimony of Loup, who was abbot of the monastery of Ferriéres in the
extreme eastern part of Neustria (see the following note).
48 Loup of Ferriéres, Hpistolae, XLII, ed. Desdevises du Dézert, D. 116:
“hoc turbulente Reipublicae tempore, his expensis quae maiores nostri con-
gregaverunt.”’ This seems to.be a reference to the Danegeld. Desdevises du
Dézert dates this letter for the beginning of the year 846, but Levillain, op.
cit., p. 88, has demonstrated that it was written late in August, or in Sep-
tember, 845.
49 This method of raising taxes and other contributions was very com-
mon at the time (see supra, n. 39); and there can be little doubt that the
Danegeld, too, was obtained in this way. Cf. infra, pp. 81 ff.
50 See infra, chap. xvii.
51 See ibid.
52 See ibid.
53 In the Ann. Bertiniani, 845, pp. 32, 33, the departure of the Vikings
from the Seine is not mentioned directly after the negotiation of the treaty
providing for the payment of tribute. Between the description of these two
events Prudentius refers among other things to the treaty by which Charles
the Bald recognized Pippin the Younger as the almost independent ruler of
Aquitaine. Accordingly we may believe—for there is no reason to suppose
that Prudentius here departed from his habit of rough adherence to chrono-
logical sequence—that the Vikings did not quit the Seine until-after Charles
had concluded the treaty with Pippin, which event took place late in June
or early in July (Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 149 and n. 3; ef. Diimmler, I,
CHAPTER I 37
Having received the tribute money, the Vikings in truth sailed
out of the Seine, but they could not resist the temptation to
plunder and devastate a number of places on the seacoast.** After
various adventures and experiences they eventually returned to
Denmark with their booty. The hagiopraphical account repre-
sents Ragnar proceeding to King Horich, to show him the vast
amount of gold and silver he had brought with him, and to boast
not only that he had captured the wealthy city of Paris but also
that he had subjected the entire kingdom of Charles to tribute.*®
What happened to Ragnar and his associates later, is largely
a matter of speculation and need not detain us long. It may be
true that this particular group of Vikings fell prey to a mortal
disease of some kind, which prevented any of them from ever
enjoying the fruits of their expedition.®® But what of that? The
success of their bold enterprise probably interested their country-
289). Even after allowance has been made for a possible interval of several
weeks between the payment of the Danegeld and the final departure of the
Vikings, the date of the payment can hardly be placed prior to the begin-
ning of June. That the total proceeds of a tax levied in March (cf. supra,
nn. 23, 24) could have become available before June, i. e. in less than two
months, does not seem probable (cf. Lot and Halphen, 139, n. 1).
54 Whether these operations really constituted a violation of the treaty
just concluded, cannot be determined, for we do not know the exact location
of the devastated region. If it was outside the West Frankish realm, the
Northmen were of course not guilty of any breach of faith. Ann. Bert., 845,
p. 33. Cf. Vogel, 111 and n. 3; Levillain, op. cit., pp. 90 ff.; Lot and Halphen,
an. Cit... 139 > pn 1;
55 Aimoin, I, c. 12, p. 789: “Ragenarius Dux, ... ante profanum Horich
Nortmannorum Principem cum ingenti superbia veniens, ostendit ei quod
secum hine asportaverat aurum argentumque multum: dixitque quod opina-
tissimam Parisius civitatem captam haberet; ...insuper et quod omne
Karoli Regnum sibi ratione tributi subjugatum haberet.” The Mirac. s.
Germani agree substantially with Aimoin, except that they do not mention
the tribute. The Ann. Bertiniani, loc. cit., tell of a misfortune which befell
the Vikings on their return journey and of its influence on King Horich of
Denmark; cf. Ann. Xantenses, loc. cit. Chronica Albrici, loc. cit.: “[Nor-
manni] reversi sunt in terram suam.”
56 According to the Mirac. s. Germani, c. 31, p. 16, those Vikings who
finally got back to Denmark either died of disease or were executed by King
Horich, who thereby hoped to prevent the pestilence from spreading. Four
Vikings were said to have escaped the king, but it was believed that they
too died very soon. Cf. Aimoin, loc. cit.; Vogel, 112; Steenstrup, op. cit., I,
97-104. The Ann. Bertiniani, loc. cit., tell us that King Horich, after he had
learned of what was regarded as the judgment of God on the followers of
Ragnar, sent envoys to Louis the German, offering to free all Christian cap-
tives and to restore the stolen treasure so far-as possible. His envoys did
in fact appear at the court of Louis the German in October (Ann. Fuldenses,
loc. cit.) and he may have freed the captives (Ann. Xantenses, loc. cit;
Mirac, s. Germani, c. 30, p. 16; Aimoin, I, c. 13, p. 790), but whether he ever
returned the treasure is not known. If any treasure actually was returned,
it very probably was the booty obtained by Horich’s own men in the sack
of Hamburg this same year, and not that which was brought to Denmark
by Ragnar. Cf. Vogel, 100-2, 114—-15.
38 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
men vastly more than the mystery of their death. For these
pioneers had made a veritable discovery,*’ a discovery full of
fascination for the Viking spirit and pregnant with dire con-
sequences for the fortunes of the Franks.
Charles the Bald’s policy of paying tribute was to prove hardly
a palliative, much less a cure, for the malady with which the
West Frankish kingdom had become afflicted. In point of fact,
this first Danegeld had revealed to the freebooters of the North
certain very important facts concerning the western realm of
the Franks: prosperous economic conditions, lack of prepared-
ness against invaders coming by sea, and inability or reluctance
to fight on the part of the aristocracy — on the whole, a most
satisfactory state of affairs from the Viking point of view. The
first Danegeld, therefore, did not deter other Vikings from
adopting the methods and continuing the operations of Ragnar’s
men; on the contrary, it encouraged and invited them to emulate
their example.’*®.
57 It is true that the Vikings had, before this, been levying tribute in
Frisia (see infra, Appendix III), but the Frisian payments were of a local
character and probably were small as compared with those secured in the
West Frankish kingdom. It was the West Frankish kingdom and England
that were destined henceforth chiefly to attract the Vikings.
58 The following in the Vita Faronis, loc. cit., is significant: “Franci.. .
consilium inierunt ad ruinam et ad interitum per omnia labentia saecula,
dato tributo copiosissimo terrae.’’ Paschasius Radbertus, loc. cit., also ap-
pears to have realized that the Danegeld never would bring security against
Viking raids.
THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 39
CHAPTER II.
THE DANEGELD OF 853.
After his first payment of tribute, in 845, Charles the Bald did
not again resort to the Danegeld until 853.1. While there can be
little doubt that Danegeld was actually paid in the latter year,
it must be admitted that our information concerning the payment
and the circumstances that made it necessary is very scant.
On October 9, 852, a large fleet of Danish Vikings, led by the
two chieftains Sydroc and Godfrey, son of Harold, entered the
Seine and ascended that river beyond Rouen as far as Augustu-
dunas.2. Though an army made up exclusively of West Franks
had succeeded in expelling another group of Vikings from their
lodgment on the lower Seine earlier in the same year,’® Charles
the Bald did not deem it advisable to move against the undoubt-
edly larger force under. Sydroc and Godfrey* without some
auxiliaries. He therefore appealed for aid to his elder brother,
Lothaire I, with whom he happened to be at this time on a
friendly footing.© |
Having mobilized their available fighting strength,® the royal
brothers advanced with their armies toward Jeufosse, to which
place the Northmen had in the meantime ascended, and where
they had established themselves for the winter.’ The Franks
1 Favre (Hudes, comte de Paris et roi de France, p. 223) inaccurately
states that the Danes were bought off in 852. The following discussion will
make clear that the Danegeld was paid in 853.
2 Ann. Bertiniani, 852, ed. Waitz, p. 42 and note g); Chron. Fontanel-
lense 852, M.G.H., SS., II, 304; ef. Ann. Fuldenses, 850, ed. Kurze, pp. 39-40.
For the location of Augustudunas, see Vogel, 134, n. 3.
3 Chron. Fontanellense, 851, p. 303; Ann. Bert., 851, p. 41. Cf. Vogel, 133.
4 The Ann. Bert., 852, do not mention Sydroc, but refer, p. 42, to the forces
collected by Godfrey in Denmark as “manus valida,’ and to his fleet as
“multitudo navium.’ The size of the contingent under Oscar, which the
Franks had expelled in June, 852, is nowhere indicated; but since a West
Frankish army ventured to engage these Vikings and forced their with-
drawal from the Seine, it is safe to conclude that their number was small
compared with that of the followers of Godfrey and Sydroc.
5 Ann. Fuld., 850, p. 40: “Ad quorum [Nordmannorum] expulsionem Hlu-
tharius in auxilium vocatus.” Ann. Bert., 852, p. 42; Chron. Fontanellense,
852, p. 304. Cf. Diimmler, I, 347-49; Vogel, 134.
6 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “occurrentibus Lothario et Karolo cum omni suo
exercitu.”
7 Chron. Fontanellense, loc. cit.: “Nortmanni aqua freti deputatam sibi
hiemem exegerunt in loco qui vocatur Ghivoldi fossa.” For the location of
the latter place (Jeufosse), see Vogel, 135, n. 1.
40 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
invested both banks of the Seine at this point,® but they probably
did not succeed in completely isolating the Northmen.® However
that may be, it is certain that the siege was continued through
the winter into the next year (853), and that an attack by storm
was eventually proposed. But this plan proved incapable of
execution, because the army of Charles the Bald for some reason,
refused to fight.*° Charles therefore opened negotiations with
Godfrey and was able to conciliate him by making certain con-
cessions the nature of which is not entirely clear." After this
pact had been made it appears that Godfrey and his men retired
from Jeufosse.*”
The treaty with Godfrey did not, however, secure the with-
drawal of Sydroc and the other Danes. Rather it made them
more troublesome; they now began to pillage, burn, and make
captives, without restraint. It was not until early in March that
the Vikings were induced to desist from these operations.'* The
inducement appears to have come in the form of an agreement
8 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “utramque ripam ... obsident.”’ Cf. the preceding
note.
9 That seems to be implied in the words of the Chron. Fontanellense
quoted in note 7, supra. Certainly the Vikings could not have remained in
Jeufosse throughout the winter unless in the meantime they had been able
to secure provisions. The statement, infra, n. 12, that they pillaged more
freely after the departure of Godfrey, implies that the Franks had not been
able wholly to prevent them from pillaging in the preceding period. |
10 Ann. Fuld., loc. cit.: “Hlutharius ...cum sibi pugnandum esse cum
hoste putaret.” Ann. Bert., 853, p. 42: “nolentibus qui ex parte Karoli erant
inire bellum.”
11 Jbid.: “Karolus ... Godefridum quibusdam pactionibus sibi conciliat.”’
Ann, Fuld., toc. cit.: “Karolus clam mutato consilio Godafridum cum
suis in societatem regni suscepit et terram eis ad inhabitandum dele-
gavit.” Vogel, p. 135, is inclined to accept the testimony of the Annals of
Fulda in this case despite the erroneous chronology of those annals; he be-
lieves that Prudentius, by reason of a desire to shield Charles the Bald, did
not tell the whole truth in the Annals of St. Bertin. This view, it must be
admitted, is certainly tenable; but Vogel’s distrust of the statements of
Prudentius in this case, does not harmonize with his great faith in the
accuracy of what that writer said for the year 845 on a similar subject (see
Supra, chap. i, n. 26). Why should Prudentius have withheld in 853 the
kind of information which he did not hesitate to divulge in 845? Is it not
possible that what he says for 853, instead of being intentionally ‘‘verbliimt,”’
is simply a concentrated form of expression and in that respect very similar
to his entry for 845? Vogel thinks also that the Danegeld of this year (853)
was paid to Godfrey; for a discussion of this question, see infra, n. 24.
12 That Godfrey and his men left before the other Vikings, is clearly
implied in the following statement (Ann. Bert., loc. cit.): ‘“‘Ceteri Danorum
usque ad mensem Martium inibi absque ulla formidine residentes, cuncta eo
furiosius quo liberius diripiunt, cremant atque captivant.”
13 See the preceding note. Since Charles the Bald signed a diploma at
Kiersy on March 21 (Bouquet, VIII, 522), it seems probable that he had
come to an agreement with the Danes earlier in the month.
CHAPTER II Al
by Charles the Bald to pay tribute. That monarch had for the
second time found it necessary to resort to the Danegeld because
his men were not willing to risk a determined onslaught against
the Vikings."
This reluctance to fight on the part of the West Franks, seems
very strange, especially when contrasted with the apparent
willingness of Lothaire’s men to engage the enemy.'® Were the
West Franks lacking in courage? It is difficult to convince one-
self of that, in view of the fact that they had attacked and
routed a group of Vikings in the spring of the previous year
(852).1° Were the Danes so superior in numbers that it was
hopeless to engage them? That may, indeed, have been the case
sometimes,*? but seems improbable in 852—853, when they were
confronted by two Frankish armies, that of Lothaire as well as
that of Charles.
The most satisfactory solution of this rather knotty problem
will probably have to be sought in connection with the relations
existing between Charles the Bald and his magnates. It was
upon the latter that Charles really had to depend, if he was to
have an army at all. The resisting part of the West Frankish
army at this time consisted, not of the freemen fighting on foot,
but of contingents of mounted knights, each under the leader-
ship of some magnate or seignior.’*® If, therefore, the army of
Charles the Bald refused to enter into conflict with the Danes,
14 See infra, n. 24; cf. supra, chap. i, nn. 19, 22.
15. Cf; supra,- nn. 10.
16 Cf. supra, n. 3. Of course, it cannot be denied that when taken by
surprise or outnumbered, the Franks usually fled before the Vikings; but
since the Vikings ordinarily did likewise under similar circumstances, that
really proves nothing. What we wish to know is why the Franks refused
to fight when that would apparently have been the wiser thing to do. In
the winter of 852-53 the Frankish armies had come to Jeufosse for the
purpose of fighting; Lothaire and his men never thought of anything else,
if we may believe the Annals of Fulda, 850, p. 40. It seems anomalous to
think that the West Franks refused to fight, simply because they were more
cowardly than their neighbors.
17 On many occasions the success of the Vikings was largely due to their
superior mobility, which enabled them to reach their destination before a
Frankish army could be summoned to oppose them, nay before anyone knew
of their approach. See Vogel, 43 and n. 3; cf. infra, chap. vii.
18 Baldamus, Das Heerwesen unter den sptteren Karolingern, in Gierke’s
Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte, IV, pp. 17 ff.,
60 ff., and passim; Roth, Geschichte des Beneficialwesens, pp. 415-16. Vogel,
p. 13, calls attention to the fact that the most energetic and successful re-
sistance to the Vikings was made by the people of those regions where the
system of commendation and vassalage was least developed, i. e. by the
Frisians and the Saxons.
42 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
we understand that this was due to objections raised probably
not so much by the ordinary freemen as. by the magnates and
seigniors. And since it is improbable that the Franks were
either cowardly or outnumbered on this occasion, we must per-
force conclude that: the unwillingness of their leaders to engage
the Vikings was due to the fact that they had no interest in
driving them off.
But why not? Because the expulsion of the foreign enemy
would have enabled the monarch to give his undivided attention
to the reduction of the power of the aristocracy ; a power which,
since the days of Charlemagne, had never ceased to make inroads
on the prerogatives of the crown. There can be no doubt that
Charles the Bald wished to increase, or at least to rehabilitate,
the. power of the monarch. In this effort he was supported by
most of the higher clergy, who recognized in him the protector
of their interests and their property against the greed and un-
scrupulous avarice of the lay nobility.1® The lay nobles, or at least
a large number of them, bitterly opposed the policy of Charles
and, in order to gain their point, were willing, not only to make
indirect use of the Viking invasions, but even to ally themselves
with the Northmen when necessary.”° If sometimes these mag-
nates were not averse to securing the removal of the Vikings by
the payment of Danegeld, it was probably because they them-
selves did not have to bear the burden of the tax levied to raise
the tribute, and because in collecting the impost from their peas-
ants they were able to retain a considerable part for them-
selves.*!
When this general situation is kept in mind, the apparent
helplessness of the West Frankish armies before the Vikings
becomes more intelligible. We begin to understand that the
Danegeld was often the only means whereby the king might hope
to rid his realm of the invaders from the North.” Also, we may
perhaps be able better to appreciate the attempts that have
19 Fustel de Coulanges, Les transformations .de la royauté pendant Tl’é-
poche carlovingienne, 640-66; Diimmler, I, 222, 295, 380-81.
20 Ibid., 381 and n. 1, 412-16, 420-21; cf. Vogel, 151-52.
21 See supra, chap. i, nn. 39, 49.
22 This seems to have been understood by Lothaire, who, despite the fact
that his expedition had proved useless, remained on very friendly terms
with Charles. Evidently Lothaire realized that Charles had done the only
thing possible under the circumstances. Cf. supra, nn. 10, 11, 16; infra, n. 27.
CHAPTER II 43
recently been made* to clear Charles the Bald of the old charges
of cowardice and pusillanimity.
The amount of the Danegeld of 853 is unknown, and very little
can be said concerning the method by which the tribute was
raised. All we know is, that the king prescribed certain con-
tributions to the Northmen, and that these had been paid before
April 22, 853.°* It would seem that the contributions were fur-
nished chiefly if not exclusively by the prelates of the church.”°
The Vikings had ceased plundering probably early in March;
but they did not sail out of the Seine until in June or July.”
In the meantime Lothaire I had returned home from what must
have seemed to him a fruitless expedition.*’
23 For example by Lot and Halphen in Le régne de Charles le Chauve;
even Vogel (see especially pp. 256-57) has at least to a certain extent ven-
tured to depart from the traditional German point of view as represented
by Dtummler and others.
24 Capitulare Missorum Suessionense, M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 267:
“Inbrevient [missi] ... quid etiam Nortmannis per nostram commendatio-
nem sive sine nostra commendatione datum sit.” It is true that this clause
does not appear in all the extant manuscripts of the capitulary, and that
the editors of the Monumenta have relegated it to the obscurity of a foot-
note. But the clause is included in most of the manuscripts, and whether
it ever was an integral part of the capitulary, is a matter of only secondary
importance for our purpose. In any case, the words in the clause prove
beyond peradventure that Charles had ordered contributions to be made to
the Northmen. If the clause was part of the capitulary, the contributions
must have been made before the capitulary was issued, i. e. before April 22,
853. Since the Danegeld had probably been agreed upon early in March (cf.
supra, n. 13), there was ample time to raise the tribute before the issuance
of the capitulary.—I cannot share the view of Vogel, p. 135, that the Dane-
geld was paid to Godfrey. It is not likely that he received both lands and
money. Moreover if the Danegeld was paid to Godfrey, what did the other
Danes receive that induced them to cease plundering in March? Baldamus,
op. cit., p. 29 and n. 71, assumes that the quotation given at the beginning
of this note refers to land, but the context does not bear out his interpreta-
tion.
25 This may be inferred from the position in the capitulary of the clause
referred to in the preceding note; it follows directly after a provision re-
quiring the prelates to submit an inventory of the property of their churches.
The clause indicates also that some of the payments to the Northmen had
been made without royal authorization. These may have been voluntary
contributions to the sum promised by the king; but more probably they
were payments made directly to the Danes, in the form of ransom, by indi-
vidual churches or monasteries, which thereby escaped pillage or destruc-
tion in the period before Charles came to terms with Sydroc and his fol-
lowers.
26 According to the Chron. Fontanellense, loc. cit., in June; but according
to the Ann. Bert., loc. cit., in July.
27 Vogel, p. 136, seems to imply that Lothaire returned home immediately
after Charles had come to an understanding with Godfrey (see supra, n.
11); but the Annals of St. Bertin, 853, p. 42, give the impression that he
did not depart until after the Danes had ceased plundering in March (see
supra, n. 12), and this impression is not weakened by the vague and chrono-
44 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
While the Danegeld of 853 apparently secured a temporary
removal of the Vikings from the Seine,” it did not prevent them
from continuing their devastations with increased fury on the
Loire in the same year;?? and within three years Sydroc had
returned to the Seine.*® It is impossible to determine whether
the Vikings by virtue of these operations were guilty of bad
faith, for we do not know the terms on which they had accepted
the Danegeld.**
logically inaccurate statement in the Annals of Fulda, 850, p. 40. We have
no certain indication that Lothaire was back on his own soil until July 3,
when he signed a diploma at Teodonis villa (Bohmer-Mtihlbacher, Die Reg-
esten des Kaiserreichs unter den Karolingern [1908], p. 475, no. 1159)
28 Sydroc may have gone to Ireland at first. The so-called Annales Inis-
fallenses, 853, O’Connor, Rerum Hibernicarum scriptores veteres, II, 34,
Codex Dubl. (quoted by Steenstrup, Normannerne, I, 113, n. 5), state that
two brothers, Sitricus and Ibarus, came with an expedition to Ireland in 853.
However that may be, Sydroc was again operating in the West Frankish
realm before very long; he was there at least as early as the summer of
856 (see infra, p. 45 and nn. 1-8).
29 See Vogel, 137 ff.
30 Supra, n. 28; ef. Vogel, 150 ff. So far as known, Godfrey did not return
to the Seine, and he is not mentioned in the sources after 855 (Vogel, 408).
31 Cf. supra, n. 24.
THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 45
CHAPTER III.
THE DANEGELD OF 860—861.
In the year 860 Charles the Bald for the third time found it
necessary to have recourse to the Danegeld in order to secure
the removal of Viking invaders from his realm.t Since the
summer of 856° the Seine had been continuously occupied by
several large forces of Danes, who under the leadership of Bjorn
and others*® had established and fortified themselves on the
island of Oscellus, in the Seine, near Jeufosse.t | From this place
they subjected the whole valley of the lower Seine to plunder
and devastation without mercy.’ Paris itself was invaded,°®
and only those monasteries and churches escaped pillage or
destruction for which the ecclesiastics were willing to pay large
sums of ransom money.’ The payment of ransom, moreover,
did not in all cases save a place from being ultimately destroyed.*®
Throughout the year 857 the king was unable to offer any
resistance whatever to the Vikings, owing to the fact that the
nobles of Aquitaine and Neustria were in revolt.° And by the
close of that year many of the magnates in Francia had made
common cause with the insurgents to the south of the Seine.’°
The rebels were in communication with Louis the German, who
1 The most complete and certainly the most satisfactory discussion of the
great Viking invasion of France which began in 856, is that of Lot (“La
grande invasion normande de 856-862,” Bibl. de Vécole des chartes, 1908,
LXIX, 5-62). In describing the events leading up to Charles the Bald’s
agreement to pay Danegeld in 860, I find myself more in harmony with the
conclusions, and in particular the chronology, of Lot than with those of
Vogel (153-55, 160-71, 179-88).
BaloOt,-Op:.ctt:; .p. 6;.n;. 1.
3 Sydroc came first, on July 18, 856; Bjorn arrived on August 19, of the
same year; and another band probably entered the Seine early in 858.
Sydroc left the Seine in 857. See ibid., 7, 18.
4 Ann. Bert., 856, pp. 46-47. Cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 6, n. 4, pp. 11, 25, n. 5.
5 Ann. Bert., 856-61, pp. 46-54. Cf. Lot, op. cit., pp. 11 ff.
6 Paris appears to have been invaded twice within the space of a few
months, first on December 28, 856, and again in the spring of 857. See Lot,
op. cit., p. 11, nn. 3, 4. Lot proves, ibid., p. 12, n. 1, that the Northmen
invaded not only the environs, or faubourgs, of Paris on these occasions,
but the Cité itself. Cf. Thompson, “The Commerce of France in the Ninth
Century,” Journal of Political Economy, 1915, XXIII, p. 864, n. 7.
7 Ann. Bert., 857, p. 48; Aimoin, Mirac. s. Germani, II, c. 10, AA.SS., May,
VI, p. 793. Cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 12 and n. 1, p. 13 and n. 4; and see infra,
chap. xv and nn. 11, 12.
Sant) One cite Dp. 18) 21,) n: 1, p.836; 7
9 Ann: Bert., 857, p. 47.
10 Ibid., p. 48.
46 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
secretly supported them, and who probably was even then re-
volving in his mind the project of invading the territories of
his brother.*: In spite of these threatening conditions, Charles,
in the spring of 858, succeeded in winning back at least part of
the disaffected nobles;!2 and with the aid of his nephew, Lo-
thaire II, the king now undertook to expel the Vikings by force
of arms from their camp at Oscellus.? This fact should be
emphasized, for it goes to show that Charles did not always
prefer diplomacy and tribute to fighting, as some scholars would
have us believe.‘* Indeed, why should he?
The Viking camp on the island of Oscellus was besieged by
the armies of Charles and Lothaire for some twelve weeks, and
there is reason to believe that the Danes might have been brought
to terms if Charles had been permitted to continue the opera-
tions. That, however, was precisely what the lay magnates
of the West Frankish realm wished by any and every means
to prevent. And since this attitude on the part of the nobles
is characteristic of them in the period under discussion, it is
worth while to inquire into the reasons for it.
The nobles realized that if Charles triumphed over the Vikings,
he would be in position to stamp out the revolt in his realm.
This accomplished, he would hardly fail to follow up his ad-
vantage; he would proceed to consolidate and magnify the royal
power at the expense of the privileges and independence of the
aristocracy.*®° And the nobles well knew that in an undertaking
11 See Calmette, “Etude sur les relations de Charles le Chauve avec Louis
le Germanique et Vinvasion de 858-859,” Le Moyen Age, 1899, idee i 2s tit,
Cf. Dummler, I, 412 ff.; Lot, op. cit., pp. 16, 17.
12. .M.G.H. BE Sectio II, t. 2, p. 295, no. 269; Libellus proclamationis
adversus Wenilonem, C55 ,\4010. Ds ASL OL. Calmette, Op. Cit,,, 137,01: 135 Lot;
ODOC a20, 20.
13 Ann. Bert., 858, pp. 48, 50; Chron. Fontanellense, 855, M.G.H., SS., II,
304. Cf. Lot, op. cit., 24 ff.; Vogel, 164. The attack of the Vikings on the
two monasteries of St. Denis and St. Germain-des-Prés at Easter, and their
capture of the abbots Louis of St. Denis and Gauzelin of Glanfeuil, of course
strengthened the king in his determination to expel the Vikings. Immense
sums of ransom money had to be paid the Danes for the release of these
captives, Louis of St. Denis in particular. On this see infra, chaps. xv, xvi;
cf. Lot, op. cit., pp. 19, 20.
14 See for example Vogel, 106, and Diimmler, I, 428, III, 55, 58.
15 Aimoin, Translatio ss. Georgii, Aurelii et Nathaliae ex urbe Corduba
Parisios, II, c. 5, Mabillon, Acta sanctorum, saec. IV, part. II, p. 53 (quoted
by Lot, op. cit., p. 28, n. 3): “sed et victoriam, me dolor!, veluti jam prae
manibus susceptam. ” Cf. Vogel, 164; Lot, op. ee ABOU, RES tere
16 Ann. Fuld., 858, pp. 49-50. Cf. Lot, op. cit., oe and n. 4; von Kalck-
stein, Robert der Tapfere, Markgraf von Anjou, 43 ahs
CHAPTER III AT
of this nature the king would probably have the almost undivided
support of the higher clergy, who looked to him to protect the
property of the church against the encroachments and spolia-
tions of the lay magnates.‘* The attitude of indifference or
negligence on the part of the lay nobility as regards the Viking
invasions, may be explained by the fact that the magnates suf-
fered little or nothing from the ravages of the Northmen at
this time. Since the operations of the Vikings were chiefly
directed against towns, churches, and monasteries, i. e. against
the possessions of the king or the clergy, the magnates were
quite willing by their inactivity to play into the hands of the
Danes, particularly if in so doing they might hope to force the
hands of their opponents, the clergy and the crown."
It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the revolt among
the nobles began to gain ground again in proportion as Charles
pressed the operations against the Danes with more vigor and
determination.*® Many of the fideles who had thus far proved
loyal to the king now joined the ranks of the insurgents. Charles
had hardly gotten the siege operations under way, when repre-
sentatives of the disaffected nobility of the western realm ap-
peared at Frankfort, imploring Louis the German to rescue
the West Frankish kingdom from the “tyranny” of his brother.
Easily persuaded to undertake an invasion which he had pro-
bably been planning for some time, Louis prepared to act at
once, and by September of the same year (858) he had entered
West Frankish territory.*° After that the loyalty of the army
17 Calmette, op. cit., 136-37, 147-49; Duimmler, I, 434-35, 290-95; Thomp-
son, Decline of the Missi, pp. 11-12.
18 This attitude of the West Frankish nobility is well set forth by Gfrorer
in his Geschichte der ost- und westfrankischen Carolinger, I, 281 ff. It is
true that there is plenty of evidence which indicates that the Vikings plun-
dered the rural estates, i. e. the villae and the mansi, as well as the towns
and the ecclesiastical establishments. But the villae and mansi in question
must have been, in the majority of cases at least, those of the church, for
these were. most likely to be left without defenders. It is not conceivable
that the lay nobles would have been as indifferent as they were regarding
the expulsion of the Vikings, if they had suffered from the devastations of
the freebooters to the same extent as the church and the crown (a passage
from the Miracula s. Bertini is very illuminating on this point; see supra,
chap. i, n. 6, end). On the contrary, it is highly probable that the magnates
often regarded the Vikings as their allies. See M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2,
p. 284, ¢..'3; Meanwhile, however, the West Frankish reb-
els, by securing the intervention of Louis in their behalf, had
furnished the Danes with an opportunity to ravage the basin of
the Seine unchecked.** After the expulsion of his brother, Char-
les was for a long time unable to take any measures against the
Vikings ;?> most of the magnates continued to exhibit the spirit
of refractoriness ;*° and the discouraging if not dismaying ex-
periences of the king at the siege of Oscellus must have deterred
him from attempting a new offensive against the freebooters.
These, in consequence, waxed ever bolder in their work of pillage
and devastation.*’
Meanwhile, in the summer of 859, another group of Vikings,
under Weland, had entered the Somme and were now ravaging
the districts in that vicinity.2? The situation was becoming
critical. All of western and northern Francia was menaced by
the Northmen. A large number of the fideles were stili in re-
volt, and as yet good relations between Charles and his brother
had not been reestablished.*® Though the king in his predic-
ament put forth special efforts to bring some of the magnates
21 On this see Lot, op. cit., 27-28; Calmette, op. cit., 140.
22 On the invasion of Louis the German, see ibid., 140 ff.; Cf. Duimmler,
I, 430 ff.
43° Ann, Bert, 859,\p. dL: ch Lot, op. eit... pa 30:
24... Lord.
ZOstias, DP. od:
26 Calmette, op. cit., 149 ff.
27 The only resistance offered to the Danes at this time came from cer-
tain groups of peasants between the Seine and the Loire. These peasants,
however, were not sufficiently well organized to be successful in their under-
taking, and they were soon cut to pieces or dispersed. Ann. Bert., loc. cit.;
cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 32, n.°2, pp. 33. ff.
28 Ann. Bert., 859, p. 52; ef. Lot. op. cit., p. 38. Presumably these Vik-
ings were under the leadership of Weland, though in point of fact he is not
mentioned until 861 (Ann. Bert., 861, p. 55).
29 Lot, op. cit., 40.
ee -
CHAPTER III | 49
of Neustria back to allegiance,*® this move appears ta have been
only in part successful and in any case did not malerially im-
prove the situation as a whole. Fortunately, however, the two
groups of Vikings respectively infesting the basins of the Seine
and the Somme, were not on friendly terms with each other.
Early in 860 the latter group made a proposal to Charles** which
under the existing circumstances must have been very welcome
to him. In return for the payment of a tribute of 3,000 pounds
of silver, they offered to move against the Vikings of the Seine
and either expel them or annihilate them.*? Though there were
those who regarded it as precarious policy to enter into relations
of this nature with the Vikings,** Charles probably felt that he
had nothing to lose and consequently accepted the offer of We-
land’s freebooters. -
It will be noted that the Danegeld to which Charles had now
agreed was of a different character than those paid by him here-
tofore. In 845 and also in 853 the king had entered into direct
negotiations with the particular group of Vikings that he wished
to remove from his realm and had paid them a certain amount
of money as the price of their evacuation of Frankish territory.
But now Charles engaged one group of Vikings as his mercen-
aries and agreed to pay them for the services they were about
to render in driving out another group.** This Danegeld there-
fore, was stipendiary rather than tributary in character. Even
30 Lot, 40-41. Bishop Wenilo of Sens, the only one of the higher clergy
who had supported the cause of Louis the German, was reconciled to Charles
before the close of 859 (Ann. Bert., 859, p. 53).
31 I cannot agree with Lot (op. cit., 41, n. 3) when he says that the initia-
tive to these negotiations may have come from Charles. Lot himself ad-
mits (ibid., 49, n. 1) that the Somme Vikings were determined to enrich
themselves in the kingdom of Charles. The fact that they took hostages
before departing to England in the spring (see infra, n. 39), indicates that
the Vikings wished to hold Charles to his agreement and, therefore, that
their interest in the contract was greater than the king’s. Nothing is said
of any hostages retained by Charles; evidently he regarded them as unnec-
essary (cf. infra, n. 43). Vogel, p. 179, seems to agree with Lot.
32 Ann. Bert., 860, p. 53: “Karlus rex inani Danorum in Somna consis-
tentium pollicitatione pellectus, exactionem ... fieri jubet; nam idem Dani
promiserant, ut, si eis tria milia librarum argenti pondere examinato tri-
bueret, se adversus eos Danos qui in Sequana versabantur ituros eosque inde
aut expulsuros aut interfecturos.”
33 By referring to the offer of the Somme Danes as “inani . . . pollicita-
tione” (cf. supra, n. 32), Prudence, the author of the second part of the
Annals of St. Bertin, reveals that he was one of those who disapproved of
the policy of Charles. |
34 Lot, op. cit., 50, nn. 1, 2, compares Weland and his companions to the
Swiss and German mercenaries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
Vogel, p. 179, likens them to the foederati employed by the Romans.
Danegeld. 4.
5Q THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
if Weland and his men had agreed, as they probably had, that
they themselves would quit the realm after they had forced the
Seine Vikings to withdraw,** the money they received must be
regarded as a payment for definite services to be rendered and
not simply as the. price of their own withdrawal; essentially
it was not a tribute but a stipend. Stipendiary Danegelds, it
is well known, were very common in England at a later period ;°*?
but for the West Frankish kingdom only two payments of this
kind have been recorded, the other one being the Danegeld of
862, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Finding it necessary to resort to taxation in order to raise
the sum named by Weland, the king ordered an exaction to be
levied on (1) the church treasuries, (2) all holdings of land
designated as mansi, and (3) the property of all merchants,
even the poorest. Though the rates of the tax are not specified,
we know that an inventory was to be taken of the houses and
the movables of the merchants, in order to determine the amount
each of these ought to pay.*® Charles probably intended to
collect the exaction only in those parts of his realm which were
directly subject to his authority, viz. Francia, Neustria, and
Burgundy.** As for Aquitaine, that had long been regarded
as a separate kingdom®** and in any case was not plundered from
the Seine; which makes it very doubtful that this Danegeld was
levied there at all.
But it proved impossible or seemed inadvisable to raise the
entire amount of the Danegeld by the time agreed upon.*® The
35 Lot states, op. cit., 52, that Weland had promised Charles not only that
he would expel the Vikings of the Seine but also that he and his companions
would depart. The basis for the latter statement appears to be these words
from the Life of St. Faro (c. 126, Bouquet, VII, 357): “Ita quoque est ab illis
actum, et fide vana illorum acceptum est promissum, ut discedendo utraeque
partes jam ultra nescirent finium nostrorum introitum.”’
352 Cf. supra, pp. 15, 17.
36 Ann. Bert., 860, p. 53: “Karlus rex ... exactionem de thesauris ec-
clesiarum et omnibus mansis ac negociatoribus etiam paupertinis, ita ut etiam
domus eorum et omnia utensilia adpreciarentur et inde statutus census ex-
igeretur, fieri jubet.”’ ;
37 Lot, on. cit., 41, seems to think that the Danegeld was to be levied only
in Francia, but gives no reason for this opinion. It appears legitimate to
conclude that the entire kingdom of Charles the Bald (cf. the following
note) was to be taxed, since there is no statement to the contrary. Cer-
tainly the removal of the Danes would affect Neustria as much as Francia,
and even Burgundy would become more secure as a result.
38 Cf. supra, chap. i. n. 47. Charles, the son of Charles the Bald, had
been crowned king of Aquitaine in 855 (Ditimmler, I, 455).
39 Ann. Bert., 860, p. 53: “Dani in Somna consistentes, cum eis non dare-
CHAPTER III 51
reasons for this can only be conjectured. In the first place,
the territories on either side of the Seine must, as a result of
the numerous payments of ransom money and the immense
booty obtained by the Danes on Oscellus in the recent years,
have been nearly emptied of resources.*® In the second place,
a considerable number of the magnates involved in the recent
revolt against Charles were probably still more or less hostile ;**
and we may suppose that until these had become reconciled to
the king they were not likely to lend him any aid in raising the
Danegeld. Whatever the reasons, Charles certainly was unable
to conclude his bargain with the Danes of the Somme at the
appointed time.** The latter, however, instead of breaking off
relations with the king, took hostages from him and then, in
the early spring (860), departed for England.** The fact that
the Vikings demanded hostages signifies unquestionably that
they meant to hold Charles to his contract, though they were
willing to allow him more time for procuring the sum agreed
upon.**
After an absence of over a year,*? Weland, towards the end
of the spring of 861,*° returned to France, ready to fulfill his
engagements with Charles the Bald and to demand his compen-
sation.** In the meantime the Vikings encamped on the island
tur supradictus census, receptis obsidibus, ad Anglossaxones navigant.”
Soetbeer (Beitrdge zur Geschichte des Geld- und Miinzwesens in Deutschland,
in Forsch. z. d. Gesch., VI, 54, 55) seems to have overlooked the passage
just quoted, and thus arrives at the unwarranted conclusion that the Dane-
geld of 861 was a new tribute, levied and collected after that of 860. He
may have been misled, in part at least, by the erroneous dating of a docu-
ment dealing with the Danegeld of 877. Cf M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 353.
40 See supra, nn. 5, 7, 13; Lot, op. cit., p. 18, n. 4, pp. 18, 19.
41 The following statement does not appear in the Annals of St. Bertin
until 861, p. 55: “pene omnes qui nuper a Karolo ad Hludovicum defecerant
ad Karolum revertuntur et ab eo familiaritate et honoribus redonantur.”’
ae Cts supra, n.-39.
43 See Lot, op. cit., 41, n. 6.
44 Cf. supra, n. 31. There may have been another reason why the Danes
took hostages. In this way they prevented Charles from attempting to expel
the other group of Danes from Oscellus in the meantime; if Charles had
succeeded in doing that independently of the Somme Danes, the latter would
have lost not only the money promised them as Danegeld but also the booty
which they hoped to compel the Danes on Oscellus to disgorge and share
with them (cf. infra, n. 63). Whether or not any such considerations en-
tered the minds of Weland and his followers, it is quite certain that Charles,
for the present at least, had no thought of commencing a second siege of
Oscellus. Cf. Lot, op. cit., 49, n. 1.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., n. 2.
47 Ann. Bert., 861, p. 55: “Dani qui pridem Morinum civitatem incen-
derant de Anglis revertentes, duce Welando cum ducentis et eo amplius
52 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
of Oscellus had made another raid on Paris and had ascended
the Seine as far'as Melun, to which they set fire.** Weland’s
fleet of over two hundred ships now proceeded up the Seine and
laid siege to the Viking stronghold on Oscellus.*® By this time
almost all those nobles who deserted Charles in 858 had returned
to allegiance,®® a fact which may at least in part explain why
the officials of the king now succeeded in obtaining the sum
which it had proved impossible or impracticable to raise during
the early months of the preceding year. And that is not the
whole truth. In point of fact, Charles paid much more to the
Danes in 861 than he had promised them in 860. The reason
for the augmentation of the tribute can only be surmised, for
there is not the slightest attempt at explanation in our sources.”
It seems probable that Weland’s army had been increased in
numbers during its absence, and this may have been urged in
justification of a higher price for its services.*? In any case
there was nothing for Charles to do except to pay what was
demanded, if he wished to save his realm from plunder and
devastation.®® Accordingly, instead of receiving only 3,000
pounds of silver, the sum originally agreed upon, Weland and
his men were paid 5,000 pounds of the precious metal and in
hevibus per Sequanam ascendunt et castellum in insula quae Oscellus dici-
tur a Normannis constructum et eosdem Normannos obsident.”
48 Ibid., p. 54; Loup of Ferriéres, Epistolae, CX XVII, ed. Desdevises du
Dézert, p. 211. Cf. Lot, op. cit., 46.
49 See supra, n- 47.
50 See supra, n. 41.
51 It is true that the amounts of Danegeld demanded in 860 and 861, re-
spectively, are not stated by the same writer; Prudence furnishes the fig-
ures for 860, and Hincmar those for 861; yet I can find no reason to suppose
that either committed an error on this point (Ann. Bert., 860, p. 53; 861,
Dp. bb.
52 The quotation given at the end of this note seems to indicate that some
further negotiations took place between Charles and Weland before the latter
laid siege to Oscellus, and very probably these negotiations had to do with
the higher stipend demanded by the Vikings for their services. Lot, op.
cit., 48, n. 1, credits Charles with having taken the initiative to these nego-
tiations as well as to those of the preceding year (cf. supra, n. 31). I find
it difficult to agree with Lot in either case because (1) our sources attribute
the initiative to the Danes on both occasions; (2) those sources—the Annals
of St. Bertin (Prudence) for 860, and the Miracles of St. Riquier for 861—
are independent of each other; and (3) the Vikings under Weland had an
interest of their own in the continuation of the negotiations. Cf. Vogel, 183.
Mirac. s. Richarii, II, c. 16, M.G.H., SS., XV, 918: “Qui [i. e. quidam Ansleicus
de propagine Danorum progenitus, christianitatis sumens insignia, contuber-
nalis palatii d. Karoli regis] dum legationem praedictorum Danorum, quos
hactenus vis marina in Anglorum sedibus detinet, pro suis negotiis d. regis
orabundos clementiam duceret, ac inde cum congruis responsis redirent, etc.”
53 Ann. Bert. (see the following note): “ne depraedaretur.”
CHAPTER III 53
addition were furnished with large quantities of grain and
cattle.**
Presumably this Danegeld had been procured partly from the
proceeds of the general tax prescribed in 860° and partly per-
haps by additional levies.°° While a considerable part of the
tribute doubtless came from the church treasuries, it must be
assumed that the bulk of it was obtained from the proceeds of
the extraordinary taxes levied on the mansi and on the property
of the merchants. The holders of the mansi were probably also
required to contribute the supplies of cattle and grain demanded
by the Northmen.
Unfortunately, our sources give no details with reference to
how the various taxes levied for the purposes of this particular
Danegeld were collected. It is, however, not improbable that
the method employed on subsequent occasions, and concerning
which we have considerable information, represents a develop-
ment of an earlier practice. On this basis we may assume that
the method of collecting the Danegeld for example in 866 or
in 877 did not differ essentially from that which was employed
in 860—861.°" This would mean, that the great landholders —
the ecclesiastical and lay seigniors — were held responsible by
the king for the taxes levied on the mansi within their domains
or their jurisdiction; that the amount of money which each
seignior was expected to furnish, would vary according to the
number of mansi over which he exercised any sort of control;
and that the officials of the great seigniors — their ministeriales
— forced each holder of a mansus to contribute toward the Dane-
54 Cf. supra: n. 32. Ann. Bert., 861, p. 55: “Ad quorum obsidentium vide-
licet locarium quinque milia libras argenti cum animalium atque annonae
summa non modica de regno suo, ne depraedaretur, exigi Karolus praecepit.”
Vita s. Faronis, Bouquet, VII, 357: ‘“Priores [Nortmanni] vero a sequentibus
Nortmannis, obsessi, nomine regis Caroli sunt devicti, statutis tamen donis
gravissimis auri et argenti ex regno, immensaque adhibita ad haec pro ob-
sidione prioris multitudinis victus abundantia.” It will be noted that ac-
cording to the hagiographer, the Danegeld was paid in both silver and gold.
Some gold may possibly have been obtained from the church treasuries, but
most of the Danegeld was probably paid in silver, for there was very little
coinage of gold in this period. See infra, chap. xviii and n. 55; cf. Soetbeer,
loc. cit., IV, 354; VI, 45 ff.; Guérard, ed., Polyptyque de Vabbé Irminon, first
ed. [1844], I (Prolégoménes), pp. 129-30.
55 Cf. supra, nn. 36-38.
56 See supra, n. 54.
57 A summary of what is known concerning the usual method of collect-
ing the taxes levied for the purposes of the Danegeld, is given infra, chap.
xvii.
54 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
geld whatever he was able to pay. It is probable that the seig-
niors paid their respective quotas to the counts or the missi.
The latter may also have been charged with the collection of
the taxes levied on the church treasuries. To whom the mer-
chants paid their taxes is nowhere indicated. We know, how-
ever, that merchants were under the special protection of the
erown and that in return for this benefit they were obliged to
make an annual, or biennial, contribution, consisting ofa certain
percentage of their profits, to the royal treasury.®* It is not im-
possible that those royal officials who received these regular
dues of the merchants, also collected their taxes toward the
Danegeld.
That the raising of the Danegeld led to abuses and hardships,
will surprise no one who is at. all familiar with the customs of
the period with which we are here concerned.®® Beyond a doubt
more money was collected from the tax-payers than was turned
over either to the king’s officers or to the Vikings.®° The fact
that the Danes insisted on weighing the money before accepting:
it,°* compelled the Frankish tax collectors to refuse all coins
which were not of proper weight or fineness. It seems too, that
the collectors declined to receive money which had been coined
elsewhere than in the local mint; this practice was not in accor-
dance with the wishes of Charles, but it was profitable to the
counts and bishops who were in charge of the various mints of
the kingdom, for they received a certain share of the revenue
obtained through recoinage.*? The Danegeld, therefore, so far
from being an aid to the king in his efforts to secure the univer-
sal acceptance within his kingdom of the money coined in each
and all of the royal mints without distinction, rather encouraged
the increasing tendency in the different localities to use only
those coins which bore the stamp of the local mint.
58 Cf. Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, IV, second ed. [1885], pp.
44, 45, 586.
59 Cf. Sée, Les classes rurales et le reg. dom. en France, p. 92.
60 Cf. infra, chap. xvii and n. 11.
61 In 860 the Vikings had demanded 3,000 pounds of silver pondere exam-
inato (supra, n. 32). Evidently they had reason to suspect not only the
weight and fineness of the Frankish coins, but also the good faith of the
Frankish officials in the process of weighing. See the following note.
62 Constitutio Carisiacensis de moneta [July, 861], M.G.H., LL. Sectio II,
t. 2, pp. 801-2; cf. Soetbeer, loc. cit., VI, 4, 5, 7-9. A tendency to reject
denarii which, though of proper weight and fineness, were for some reason
deemed undesirable, is noticeable at least as early as the time of Charle-
magne (M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. 1, p. 125, c. 18). Exactly what prompted
CHAPTER III 55
The Vikings under Weland had embarked on an enterprise
which proved eminently successful and highly profitable. With
the aid of another group of their countrymen they were able to
force the Vikings on Oscellus to capitulate and to hand over to
them, out of the immense booty collected during a sojourn of five
years in the heart of the West Frankish realm, 6,000 pounds in
gold and silver.** Altogether, therefore, Weland and his men
secured, through this undertaking alone, 11,000 pounds of the
precious metals and, besides, large quantities of victuals.
The Danes did not quit the West Frankish realm until March
of the following year. It is true that they had descended to the
persons to reject these denarii is not stated anywhere in the sources, and
varying solutions of the problem have been offered by different scholars
(See e. g. Prou, Les monnaies carolingiennes, Intro., pp. XXVI ff.; Soetbeer,
loc. cit.; Dopsch, Wirtschaftsentw. d. Karolingerzeit, II, 248-49, 303-4). To
me the theory of Soetbeer seems the most satisfactory. Dopsch accepts this
theory aS a partial, but not an adequate, explanation of why good denarii
were rejected; he then proceeds to invent another theory of his own (loc.
cit., pp. 303-4) and insists that it furnishes the most important reason for
the rejection of the good denarii. In my opinion, the new theory of Dopsch
contains no solution whatever of the problem under consideration, and I
have therefore adopted, and perhaps somewhat amplified, Soetbeer’s expla-
nation, the validity of which is admitted by Dopsch. Soetbeer argues that
the local authorities (counts, bishops, abbots, etc.) when they collected im-
posts due in cash, frequently would accept only money coined in the particu-
lar local mint which they controlled, because in this way they could materi-
ally increase the business of recoinage at that mint, and thus augment their
own income from this source. The consequence of this abuse of power on
the part of the local authorities would be that private individuals would
decline to accept every denarius which, though in other respects perfectly
satisfactory, had not been coined in the local mint. This state of affairs
must have been a serious hindrance to trade and commerce, and it probably
threatened to undermine the universality of the royal coinage. Heavy pen-
alties had therefore been imposed on those who refused a good denarius
simply because it did not bear the stamp of the local mint. But the practice
persisted in spite of the penalties and seems to have been extended as a
result of the payments to the Northmen. After the exaction of the Danegeld
of 860-61, it became necessary to mitigate the penalties for refusing other
than locally coined denarii, and to advise the missi to be more lenient in
the prosecution of those who violated the law; which proves not only that
the missi had been guilty of oppression and extortion, but also that there
were others who profited from the Danegeld besides the Vikings. Before
864, there probably were a number of private and unauthorized mints in
operation, the owners of which did not fail to utilize their advantages in
connection with the levy of the Danegeld. At any rate the coinage edict of
864 expressly forbade coinage anywhere in the entire West Frankish king-
dom except at nine specified places (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 315, c. 12).
Lot, op. cit., 50, n. 2, is certainly in error when he says that the Franks
rejected the denarii in circulation, because they were of bad alloy. Penalties
were imposed when one refused to accept a bonum denarium i. e. merum et
bene pensantem, but it was perfectly legitimate to decline a bad denarius.
63 Ann. Bert., 861, p. 56: “Obsessi ... sex milia libras inter aurum et
argentum obsidentibus donant eisque sociantur.” I understand this to mean
that the besieged paid over, not all the money they had accumulated, but a
considerable part of it—6,000 pounds. Cf. Lot, op. cit., 51-52.
56 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
mouth of the Seine soon after the capitulation of the Vikings
on Oscellus; but the approach of the stormy season made them
reluctant about putting to sea, and they decided that it would
be much more convenient to spend the winter in France.** Nego-
tiations leading to an understanding with Charles on this point
may have followed. Be that as it may, it is certain that the
Northmen reascended the Seine and that they were able to esta-
blish themselves for the winter, without opposition, in various
places along that river and its tributaries.”
About the same time that the Vikings were returning inland,
Charles the Bald set out on his futile expedition to Provence.”
During the winter some of the Vikings could not resist the temp-
tation to plunder. Charles, therefore, who meanwhile had re-
turned from Provence, found it advisable to take the field against
them early in 862. By prompt action and a piece of clever
strategy, he succeeded in cutting off the retreat of an isolated
group of the marauders, who had gone to attack Meaux, and as
a result was able to bring pressure to bear on the rest.*° Toward
the end of February, 862, Weland swore fealty to Charles, and
soon thereafter he persuaded all the Danes to descend the Seine
a second time. At Jumiéges they stopped long enough to repair
their ships, but before the end of March the Northmen had left
France, departing in various directions.”
The policy of engaging one group of invaders to drive out
another in return for the payment of Danegeld, at least had not
proved so signal a failure as some had predicted ;"° and we may
well doubt whether, as things stood in 860, Charles could have
removed the Vikings from his realm in any other way."
The Northmen, as we have seen, did not depart with empty
hands. On the contrary, they carried off what may be regarded
as a by no means negligible portion of the available cash in the
West Frankish kingdom. What effect did the passing of such
large sums of money into the posesssion of an alien enemy have
64 Ann. Bert., 861, p. 56.
65 Such at least is the opinion of Lot, op. cit., 53.
66 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.
67 Ibid.; cf. Lot, op. cit., 538-54.
68 Ann. Bert., 862, p:'57; cf. Lot, on, ‘cit... 55 ff.
69 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.;.Aimoin, loc. cit. c.:18, ps 794.
10 CE supra,-ne 33:
71 See infra, n. 75; cf. Lot, op. cit., 59.
ee)
CHAPTER III 57
upon economic conditions in the invaded country? Unquestion-
ably it would be a mistake to assume that the money taken by
the invaders in the form of tribute and plunder represented a
total loss to the Franks. While it is doubtless true that the
Vikings were in the main parasites, who added little or nothing
to the wealth or resources of the West Frankish kingdom, but
instead used up a very considerable part thereof; on the other
hand we must not fail to note that during the time they remained
in Frankish territory these parasites must have expended large
amounts of their ill-gotten gain in trade. Certainly, all the
money paid to the Northmen did not leave the country. There
is no indication that the Vikings who infested France at this
period engaged in agriculture while they were there. Therefore
they must have had to plunder or buy all their foodstuffs. Prob-
ably they bought more of these than has commonly been sup-
posed; and it is certain that they purchased other things besides
victuals.“ In this way the Vikings of Oscellus doubtless used
up some portion of the money they had obtained through num-
erous payments of ransom and otherwise.** Even the followers
of Weland must have disposed of some part of the Danegeld
during the winter and spring of 861—862. Thus, there can
be little doubt that, in spite of hostilities, a brisk trade was going
on continually between the Franks and the Northmen so long
as the latter remained in the country. This in itself must be
regarded as an advantage, for it could hardly fail to give a
new stimulus to the rather sluggish course of economic life
during the early middle ages.** The Danegeld and the other
payments to the Danes may have emptied many church treas-
uries and may have borne hard on the poorer population, the
peasantry in particular; but, on the other hand, they brought
72 In particular there were frequent sales of armor, weapons and horses
to the Norhmen. See M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 321, c. 25. In this trade
it appears that even ecclesiastics sometimes participated. Cf. Vogel, 207, n. 1.
73 Still it must not be concluded that the Vikings disposed of all their
money and plunder while they were sojourning in France. When the free-
booters on Oscellus surrendered to Weland and his followers, they were able
to pay the latter 6,000 pounds in gold and silver! And they probably had
something left for themselves after that (cf. supra, n. 63).
74 On this whole subject, see Thompson, ‘‘Commerce of France in the
Ninth Century,” loc. cit., pp. 858-59, 865-68, 887; Vogel, 233 ff.
75 That the Danegeld of 860-61 proved a heavy burden on the poorer pop-
ulation is evident from the coinage regulations of 861 (cf. supra, n. 62). In
these Charles almost apologizes for resorting to the Danegeld and declares
that it was the only resort left to him as things stood at the time (see the
quotations given infra, p. 83, n. 114, chap. xvii, n. 20).
58 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
much more money into circulation, not only the money of the
peasants, but also the hoarded treasures of the Church.*® Let it
be remarked too, that the usual amount of money in circulation
during the ninth century must have been much larger than was
until recently assumed. Those who are still inclined to put
very strong emphasis on the self-sufficiency of the villa, or
manor, of this period and on its economic independence of the
outside world, would do well to remember that the Danegeld
was paid in cash by the tax-payers” and that there are other
evidences of the frequent use of money even by coloni and serfs.”
It would seem very strange indeed if the numerous payments
of Danegeld had had no effect whatever on the mining of the
precious metals, silver in particular. The only support for such
a view would be the fact that our sources fail to supply us with
information on the subject. In this case, however, as in most
others, the argument from silence had better be studiously
avoided. To the present writer it does not seem too bold to
assume that as a result of the loss of specie through the pay-
ment of Danegeld, and in order to keep a sufficient amount of
money in circulation, the output of silver ore at the mines had
to be considerably increased.*°
Mention should also be made at this point of another matter,
the full discussion of which must be reserved for the concluding
chapter. From various bits of evidence it becomes clear that
the Danegeld had a salutary effect on the quality of the West
Frankish coinage. The fact that the Vikings insisted on weigh-
ing as well as counting the money that was paid to them, must
have discouraged the tendency to clip and to falsify the coins.*®
76 Cf. Soetbeer, loc. cit., VI, 8, 54; Thompson, op. cit., p. 867.
77 The argument of Dopsch (Die Wirtschaftsentwicklung der Karolinger-
zeit, II, 253-54, 305) on this point seems almost conclusive. Cf. Soetbeer,
loc. cit., p. 54; infra, n. 78. Not only the Danegeld but also the old war
taxes known as hostilitiwum and carnaticum (by this time converted into
redevances) and various. other manorial dues were probably in many cases
paid in money. Cf. Guérard, op. cit., pp. 669-70 and n. 10.
78 The various coinage edicts of Louis the Pious and Charles the Bald
furnish incontrovertible evidence of the frequent use of cash money by all
classes in this period. Practically’ all the coinage regulations are quoted
and elucidated by Soetbeer, loc. cit., pp. 1-112. On the general subject of the
money economy of the Carolingian period, see Dopsch, op. cit., II, 252, ff.
79 Cf. Soetbeer, loc. cit., p. 56.
80 Cf. supra, n. 61; see also infra, chap. xviii and nn. 56-61, especially n. 57.
THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 59
CHAPTER IV.
THE DANEGELD PAID BY ROBERT THE STRONG IN 862.
The various groups of Vikings referred to in the preceding
chapter were in the spring of 862 forced by Charles the Bald
to evacuate the West Frankish kingdom. As they left the Seine,
these marauders separated into several fleets,t the respective
destinations of which probably cannot, and for the present
purpose need not, be determined. We must note, however, that
the larger number of the Vikings proceeded from the Seine
mouth directly to Brittany, where they were joined by another
group of Northmen just returning from an expedition to the
Mediterranean.” It appears that Duke Solomon, of Brittany,
who was hostile to the Franks, engaged the Vikings from the
Mediterranean as his mercenaries, to harry the region of the
lower Loire. But the strategy of the Breton chief was frus-
trated by Robert the Strong, now “duke,” and viceregent of
Charles the Bald, in Neustria. Robert captured twelve of the
Viking ships and killed all the Vikings on them save a few who
escaped by flight. Though this was an important success for
the Franks, it did not solve their whole problem;* there were
the Breton forces still to be reckoned with, and there was the
possibility that Solomon might enlist also the Vikings from the
Seine in his service. But Robert anticipated his Breton ad-
versary in the matter of negotiating with the freebooters from
the, Seine. For a consideration of 6,000 pounds of silver the
latter declared themselves willing to become his mercenaries
and allies against Solomon. The Frankish leader promptly
consented to these terms and sealed his bargain by exchanging
hostages with the Vikings.*®
Was Robert’s payment a Danegeld? To be sure, the money
was not paid expressly in the form of tribute, nor directly for
1 Supra, p. 56 and n. 69.
2 Ann. Bert., 862, p. 57. Cf. Vogel, 178, 187-88; Lot, “La Loire, l’Aqui-
taine et la Seine de 862 a 866,” Bibl. de V’école des chartes, 1915, LXXVI,
473, 477 and n. 3.
3 Ann. Bert., 862, pp. 57-58. On the position of Robert, see Vogel, 190, n.
1; Favre, Hudes, 4, 227 f.; von Kalckstein, Robert der Tapfere, 72, 152 ff.
Gir 20 non. Cli, 419 Nn. 3.
4 Cf. von Kalckstein, op. cit., 77.
5 Ann. Bert., 862, p. 58: “Rotbertus autem Salomonem sustinere non val-
ens, cum praefatis Normannis qui de Sequana exierunt, antequam eos Salo-
mon sibi adversus eum adscisceret, [datis] utrimque obsidibus, in sex mili-
bus argenti contra eundem Salomonem convenit.’ Cf. Vogel, 191.
60 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
the purpose of effecting the removal of the Vikings; it was paid
rather as a stipend in return for the promised aid of the North-
men against the Bretons under Solomon. If, however, Robert
had failed to engage the Vikings from the Seine in the Frankish
service, it is very probable — to Robert it must have been a
foregone conclusion — that these, like their countrymen from
the Mediterranean, would eventually have joined forces with
the Bretons. In the latter case, Solomon would probably have
undertaken a double invasion of the West Frankish realm, di-
recting the Vikings to ascend the Loire on their ships while he
with his Bretons proceeded to attack by land. Thus, in the end
the Vikings would, as usual, have established themselves in a
fortified camp, from which they could probably not have been
dislodged save by the payment of tribute.® All this was avoided
by Robert’s diplomacy, which, while it prevented Solomon from
invading Frankish territory, also kept the Vikings busy in
Brittany.’ Therefore, since the payment of 862 really had the
effect of temporarily keeping the Vikings out of the Loire reg-
ion, there can be little objection to regarding it, like the pay-
ment of 860—61,° as a stipendiary Danegeld.
Our sources indicate neither whence nor how Robert obtained
the Danegeld of 862.° But since the tribute of the preceding
year, Which did not amount to more than 5,000 pounds,’® could
be raised only by means of general taxation,"' it does not seem
probable that a sum of 6,000 pounds could have been secured
without the levy of taxes. Doubtless these taxes fell in large
part if not exclusively upon the population residing within the
limits of the territory subject to Robert’s authority, i. e. in
Neustria.?”
The Danegeld of this year had, as we have seen, been promised
and arranged for by Robert the Strong, ‘duke’ in Neustria.**
Though there is no reason to doubt that Charles the Bald fully
approved of the sagacious expedient to which Robert had re-
6 Arona re, nn.) 19.
7 Vogel, 191-92.
8 See supra, pp. 49-50 and nn. 32, 34, 35, 35a.
9 All the information we have concerning this particular Danegeld, is that
which is furnished by the Annals of St. Bertin (see supra, n. 5).
10 Cf. supra, pp. 52-53 and n. 54.
11 Cf. supra, p. 50 and nn. 36-38, pp. 53-54.
12 Cf. von Kalckstein, op. cit., 77, 152 ff.; Lot, op. cit., 477 and n. 3; Favre,
ODs Ott De
LB eaCt: VSO Owns. os
CHAPTER IV 61
sorted,'* it is none the less true that on this occasion it was one
of the magnates, not the king, who found it necessary practically
to buy off the Vikings. Thus we have here another illustration
of the fact that responsibility for the policy of paying Dane-
geld cannot be fastened exclusively upon Charles the Bald.®
As will be pointed out later in these pages,'® the Danegeld was,
by reason of a peculiar combination of circumstances, virtually
a necessity during the reigns of Charles the Bald and several of
his successors; a necessity from which, it would seem, thére
was no escape for any ruler, royal or otherwise, so long as con-
ditions remained what they were in the latter half of the ninth
century.
The payment of 862, or rather the sequel to it, illustrates also
the fact that the Danegeld never could be more than a temporary
expedient in dealing with the Viking problem. By engaging the
Vikings as his mercenaries and paying them a stipend, Robert
had, indeed, for a time restrained the freebooters from ravaging
Frankish territory and had also warded off a threatened in-
vasion on the part of Solomon of Brittany; the latter, in fact,
found himself so hard pressed by the coalition between Robert
and the pagans, that in the spring of 863 he deemed it advisable
to submit to the king of the Franks.’ The establishment of
friendly relations between Charles the Bald and Solomon, how-
ever, appears to have ruptured the coalition of the Franks with
the Vikings, for the latter began forthwith'* to plunder and
devastate the region to the south of the Loire.t® Robert the
Strong’s payment of Danegeld, therefore, brought security
against the Vikings for hardly a year.*°
14° Gr) Lot, op. ctt., 47.
15 Cf. the three preceding chapters.
16 See infra, chap. vii.
17 Ann. Bert., 863, p. 61. Cf. Vogel, 191-92, 197. Lot; op. cit., 478, under-
estimates, it seems, the value of Robert’s compact with the Vikings. There
can be no doubt that the latter by their operations in Brittany caused Solo-
mon to abandon his plan of invading Neustria. Von Kalckstein, op. cit., 83,
n. 2, calls attention to a passage in Regino’s Chronicle (866, ed. Kurze, p.
91) which indicates that Charles the Bald was preparing to invade Brittany,
but decided to enter into negotiations with Solomon when he saw that the
Bretons were prepared to resist to the uttermost. If Regino’s statement
contains any element of truth, it strengthens the view that the Viking op-
erations had produced a diversion in Brittany; as a result of these opera-
tions the offensive had passed from the Bretons to the Franks.
18 I. e. directly after Solomon’s reconciliation with Charles the Bald.
See Lot, op. cit., 480, nn. 1, 2. °
19 See Vogel, 197 ff.; Lot, op. cit., 479 ff. According to Lot, ibid., 480
and n. 3, the Vikings established themselves in the lower Loire, on an island
which they had occupied once before.
20 From April, 862, to April, 863 (cf. ibid., 477, n. 3, 480, n. 1.)
62 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
CHAPTER V.
THE DANEGELD OF 866.
For some time after the departure of the Vikings from the
Seine in March, 862,’ the general course of events in the West
Frankish realm points to a gradual but steady improvement in
the position of Charles the Bald.2 The Treaty of Coblentz (June
5, 860), which definitively closed the hostilities engendered by
Louis the German’s invasion of the western kingdom in 858
and re-established amicable relations between Charles and his
brother, also probably helped to promote a better understanding
between Charles and his fideles; for after this treaty the rebel-
lious and dissatisfied element among the West Frankish nobility
could no longer look for support to their cause from the king
of the East Franks.* -Perhaps the best illustration of the in-
creasing accord between Charles and the magnates is the co-
operation that was possible at the Assembly of Pitres in June,
864.4
The Edict issued at Pitres indicates a serious intention on
the part of the king — an intention apparently shared and cert-
ainly not opposed by the magnates — to enforce the laws and
to correct or repress the numerous abuses and disorders pre-
vailing in the land, many of which had grown out of the recent
long drawn out occupation of the Seine valley by the Northmen.®
This Edict shows also that the king was determined to provide
adequately against possible future invasion of his realm by the
Northmen ;° that he intended to place the country in such a
state of preparedness as would be sufficient for any emergency.
The measures taken by him with that end in view included not
only a very emphatic restatement in the Hdict of the obligation
for all classes to render military service in defense of the realm ;’
they included also the project of building a fortified bridge at
1 Ann. Bert., 862, p. 57; cf. supra, p. 56 and n. 69.
2 Vogel, 204; cf. 188-90.
3 Dummler, I, 461.
4 Edictum Pistense [June 25, 864], (A.), M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 311.
Cf. Vogel, 203-8.
5 Edictum Pistense, (B.), cc. 6, 7, 25, 31, loc. cit., pp. 3138-14, 321, 323-24;
NO); Calas 228:
6 Ibid., (A.), c. 2, p. 311; (B.), ec. 26, 27, 37, pp. 321-22, 327-28: (0.), ¢.
Lepsis2e:
120th, CBI CO 26,4263. 4 Ons Cal:
CHAPTER V 63
that point on the Seine where the above mentioned assembly
met, i. e. at Pitres.* With the aid of this river fortification
Charles hoped in the future to be able to prevent the Vikings
from ascending the Seine. He appears to have placed a great
deal of confidence in this means of defense; and we may admit
that if it had been properly developed and completed, the scheme
would probably have reduced very materially those advantages
which the possession of ships gave the Northmen over the
Franks.°
It is well known that the military superiority of the Vikings
was due in no small measure to their superior mobility. This
great mobility, in turn, depended largely if not exclusively on
the remarkable rapidity with which they could propel their ships
in the rivers, up stream or down.'® Successfully to oppose an
enemy thus equipped, the Franks would have needed a large
and efficient fleet; but they possessed most of the time no fleet
at all, and never any that was comparable to that of the Vik-
ings.'t Unless, therefore, the Franks would build obstructions
in their principal water courses, and thereby bar the passage
of hostile fleets, they could hardly hope effectively to prevent
the Vikings, either from making sudden surprise attacks on
the large river towns, or from establishing themselves in fort-
ified camps on islands in the rivers. And once the Vikings
had secured a lodgment for themselves on an island, it was well-
nigh impossible for the Franks to eject’ them; because even
such an operation could not be successfully carried out save with
the aid of a fleet.’*
The adoption and development of the idea of a system of
fortified bridges built at strategic points in the lower courses
8 Edictum Pistense, (A), c. 2, p. 311; Ann. Bert., 864, p. 72.
°9 See Lot, “Melanges carolingiens. II. Le pont de Pitres,’ Le Moyen Age,
1905, IX, 1-6, 9.
10 See supra, chap. i, n. 33; ii, n. 17.
11 On this see Vogel, 36 and n.1. The fleet employed by Charles the Bald
at the siege of Oscellus in 858 (cf. supra, pp. 45-48), had been specially
constructed for that purpose, and when Charles was forced to give up the
siege his fleet fell into the hands of the Vikings. See Lot, “La grande in-
vasion normande,” Bibl. de V’école des chartes, 1908, LXIX, 28, n. 3.
12 The Vikings referred to in the preceding note had maintained them-
selves for five years—from 858 to 861—on the island of Oscellus, and their
eventual dislodgment was the work, not of the Franks, but of two groups
of their own countrymen who, of course, had adequate fleets at their dis-
posal (cf. supra, p. 52 and n. 49, p. 55 and n. 63). For another illustration
of the same thing, see Vogel, 148.
64 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
of the rivers, therefore constituted a very important advance
in the Frankish method of defense against the Viking raids;"*
a fact of which Charles himself was probably fully aware.*
Perhaps for this reason and for. others to be mentioned presently,
the king was inclined at the Assembly of Pitres, in 864, to be
somewhat optimistic as regards the future.® Practically all
the magnates had now returned to allegiance;'® they had come
in large numbers to the assembly’ and had brought with them
laborers, implements, carts, and beasts of burden, for the pur-
pose of bringing to completion the work on the bridgehead at
Pitres begun two years earlier..* The Aquitanians gave proof
of their loyalty by delivering into the hands of Charles his
nephew, the traitor Pippin, and even Solomon of Brittany pro-
fessed his submission and allegiance to the king of the West
Franks by paying the customary tribute.’? From a survey
of the general situation in June, 864, one might be led to the
conclusion that whatever the Vikings might henceforth attempt
on the Seine, there was in any case no likelihood that the king
would very soon be placed in such straits as would make it neces-
sary to buy off the foreign enemy by the payment of Danegeld.
Yet Charles the Bald did find himself in just that plight less
than two years after the Assembly of Pitres.*° In order to
ascertain the causes of this rather startling change in the sit-
uation of the king, an attempt must be made carefully to analyze
certain events that transpired in the meantime.
Toward mid-July, 865,71 Vikings had again found their way
to the enticing shores of the West Frankish kingdom. Their
fleet of fifty ships had without delay moved up the river Seine
13 Vogel, 188-89.
14 Edict. Pistense, (A.), ¢c 2, loc. cit., p. 311; Ann. Bert, 864, p. 72. Cf.
Lot; “Le pontde Pitres,” loc... cit, ‘pp. tk; 25-8.
1h Hdict,:Pistense,: A), ce. 1;°2, loc: cit,
16 Ibid., c. 1: “non omnes ...tamen ex maicri parte observastis.” Cf.
Vogel, 204.
17 Edict. Pistense, loc. cit.: “pleniter et cum pace ad hoc nostrum placitum
convenistis.”’
18 Ibid., c. 2; Ann. Bert., 864, p. 72. Cf. Vogel, 204 and n. 3; Lot, op. cit.,
pp. 1, 4 and n. 1.
19 Ann. Bert. 864, p?72. Cis Lot; op. city ep. 04.
20 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81, and see infra.
21 Annales Rotomagenses, 865, M.G.H., SS., XXVI, p. 494. Lot (op. cit.,
p. 5 and n. 1) appears to have overlooked the statement in the Annals of
Rouen relative to the arrival of the Northmen; this, however, does not
invalidate what he says in the note about the date when Charles left Attigny
for Pitres. See infra, n. 25.
A ae
CHAPTER V 65
as far as Pitres.** Beyond this point the freebooters had not
yet advanced, probably because the partly constructed bridge-
head** at Pitres made further progress temporarily impossible
or inadvisable.. The time and labor spent in previous years on
the fortifications at Pitres had, therefore, not been wasted effort.
Even in its state of incompletion, the bridgehead was capable
of functioning for a considerable space of time as an effective
obstacle in the path of the invaders.** Meantime, while the
Vikings were being held in check, Charles mobilized an army*
and with it hastened to meet the enemy at Pitres. But, con-
trary to what might be expected, no engagement took place.
Perhaps the Franks, temporarily relying in the strength of their
fortifications, decided it would be unnecessary to risk an open
battle, or even a sally, so long as the bridgehead could inhibit
the Northmen from advancing. The king, however, on the
advice of his fideles, ordered two more fortified bridges to be
built: one at Auvers on the Oise, and another at Charenton on
the Marne;** the evident purpose of these measures being to
prevent the Vikings from ascending the tributary streams, in
the event that they should succeed in breaking through at Pitres
on the Seine. Also, Charles arranged to have both banks of
the Seine guarded, assigning this task to a certain Adalard and
two relatives of the latter, Hugo and Berengar.** These various
arrangements of the king seem to indicate some doubt on his
part as to whether the fortifications at Pitres could permanently
prevent the Vikings from continuing their course up the Seine.
Yet we must believe that Charles did not apprehend any im-
mediate danger; for, about the middle of the month of Septem-
ber, he journeyed northward to Orville, to enjoy the pleasures
22 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 78.
23 Lot (op. cit., p. 5) and Vogel (p. 213, n. 4) agree that the fortifications
at Pitres were not complete when the Northmen arrived in 865.
24 It is difficult to find any other reason for the fact that the Vikings
halted at Pitres, and the sequel shows that they had intended to advance
much farther up the Seine. Lot admits (op. cit., p. 17) that in 885 the
bridge at Pitres probably did function in the manner indicated.
25 Lot (ibid., p. 5, n. 2, and p. 6) indicates that the Frankish army had
been mobilized before the Northmen entered the Seine, and that upon the
news of their arrival Charles at once set out from Attigny to Pitres. This
appears unlikely in view of the fact that the Northmen entered the Seine in
July, while Charles did not depart from Attigny before the middle of Au-
gust. Cf. supra, n. 21.
26 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 79. Cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 6.
27 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 79: “deputatis custodibus qui utrasque ripas custo-
dirent, etc.”; ibid., p. 80: “Adalardo, cui custodiam contra Nortmannos
[Karolus] commiserat, sed et suis propinquis Hugoni et Berengario, ete.”
Danegeld. 5.
66 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
of the chase,** thereby indicating that he no longer regarded
his own presence in the Seine region as essential. Did he
believe that all necessary precautions against an advance on
the part of the Vikings had now been taken?
Whatever confidence Charles may have had in his measures
of defense was soon put to shame. Hardly had he departed
on his journey northward when the negligence of the guardians
on the Seine became evident. They failed to place any of their
forces on the north bank of the river, and therefore could not,
or at any rate did not, prevent a detachment of about two hun-
dred Vikings from proceeding to Paris for the purpose of secur-
ing wine; moreover, they permitted these freebooters to return
from their futile errand unscathed. It is true, however, that
when, somewhat later, another band of five hundred Northmen
attempted a raid to the south on Chartres, they were repulsed
with losses by the Frankish forces stationed on the left bank
of the Seine.*®
What effect had the two incidents just described on the re-
lations between Charles the Bald and his chief guardian on the
Seine? Did Adalard’s failure to guard the right bank of the
Seine lead the king to suspect disloyalty on the part of his
fidelis?°° And was the later repulse of the Vikings headed for
Chartres, insufficient to allay the suspicion?** While our
sources give no definite answers to these questions, they do
furnish evidence of a growing estrangement between Adalard
and the king. We know that in October, 865, shortly after the
events referred to in the preceding paragraph, Charles the Bald
secured, at a meeting with his brother in Cologne, the cancella-
tion of the proposed marriage of Adalard’s daughter to the son
of Louis the German.** This action on the part of Charles, wheth-
er or not it may be interpreted as having been at least in part
dictated by a desire to revenge the disloyalty of Adalard, could
hardly fail to bring a crisis in the relations between the king
28 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 79.
29 Ibid. Cf: Lot, op, cit., p..7, n.°4.
30 Cf. Lot, “Une année du réfne de Charles le Chauve. Année 866,” Le
Moyen Age, 1902, VI, 435, n. 3, last sentence.
31 It is possible that Adalard and his companions had been charged with
the defense of only the right bank of the river, and that the defense of the
left bank had been committed to others (Lot, “Le pont de Pitres,”’ loc. cit.,
p. 7); if so, there was all the more reason to doubt the good faith of Adalard.
32 Ann, Bert., 865, pp. 79-80.
CHAPTER V 67
and his ambitious vassal. If, as seems probable, these relations
had been strained almost to the breaking point even before the
actual cancellation of the marriage project,** then that event
must unquestionably have been followed by a complete rupture.**
And the sequel of events will point to a deep causal relation
between this rupture on the one hand and the ultimate collapse
of Frankish resistance to the Vikings on the other.
On the return from Cologne Charles was met by the news
that the Vikings had entered the monastery of St. Denis on
October 20, and that they had remained there for almost three
weeks undisturbed by anyone. The marauders were said to
have obtained a vast amount of booty from the monastery and
then, after much devastation, to have returned to their camp,
located only a short distance from St. Denis.** All of which
signified that the Vikings had been able at last to break through
the defenses at Pitres, and that the men appointed to guard
the banks of the Seine — Adalard, Hugo, and Berengar — had
for some reason failed to do their duty. Indeed it seems there
had been no opposition whatever to the Northmen, not even an
attempt to intercept them on their return from St. Denis.*®
In the light of what we know about the relations between
Charles the Bald and Adalard at this time, the meaning of these
facts is clear. We may legitimately conclude that Adalard and
his relatives had, by way of retaliation, purposely neglected the
defense of the Seine in order to embarrass the king; that, there-
fore, these magnates were largely if-not exclusively responsible
for the success of the Viking enterprise and, consequently, for
the creation of a situation which was eventually to lead to the
payment of another Danegeld. And these conclusions are
strengthened by the fact that Charles, after his return from
Cologne, divested Adalard, Hugo, and Berengar of their honores,
on the ground that they had failed to render services of any
value against the Northmen.*'
33 See supra, n. 30.
34 See Lot, op. cit., p. 7, n. 4.
35 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 80; Annales sancti Germani minores, 865, M.G.H..,
SS., IV, p. 3. Cf. Vogel, 214, n. 2.
36 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 80: “[Nortmanni] sine contradictione cuiusquam
ad castra sua... sunt reversi.”
37 Ibid., p. 80; Ann. s. Germani minores, loc. cit. For further information
on the general significance of the humiliation of Adalard, etc., see Vogel, 220,
n. 3:
68 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
The poor performance and bad faith of Adalard and his sup-
' porters did not induce the king to give up all thought of dealing
with the Vikings in a military way. As already indicated, the
Northmen were by this time firmly established on an island in
the Seine near the ntonastery of St. Denis.** Charles seems
to have determined if possible to prevent them from ascending
farther up the river. He stationed guards (scarae) along both
banks of the Seine,*® and entrusted the direction of the opera-
tions of defense to fideles in whom he probably felt he could
repose confidence: Robert the Strong, Count Odo of Chartres,
and certain others whose names we do not know.*® Apparently
satisfied of the sufficiency of these precautionary measures, the
king presently repaired northward to Senlis, to celebrate the
solemnities of Christmas.**
Again the faith of the king in the Frankish power of resistance
and in the loyalty of his fideles was to be shattered. Early
in 866% the Vikings moved up the Seine as far as Melun. The
Frankish troops followed them, one column on each side ot the
river. At Melun the Northmen left their ships and launched
an attack on that one of the Frankish columns, which seemed
the larger and stronger, and which was commanded by Robert
and Odo.*® Contrary to what might have been expected of
troops led by Robert the Strong, these men took to flight without
striking a blow, and the Vikings, having loaded their ships with
booty, returned safely to camp.**
This unfortunate adventure is so out of harmony with what
is otherwise known of the career and the exploits of Robert
38 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 80: “Nortmanni tertia decima Kalend. Novembris
monasterium §S. Dionysii intraverunt; ... post multam depraedationem ad
castra sua non longe ab eodem monasterio sunt reversi.” Cf. ibid., 866, p.
81: “Nortmanni mense Iunio ab insula secus monasterium S. Dionysii
movent.”
39 Ibid., 865, p. 80: “‘dimissis custodibus contra eosdem Nortmannos”; ibid.,
866, p. 81: “‘scarae Karoli ex utraque parte ipsius fluminis [Sequanae] per-
gunt.” Cf. Vogel, 214.
40 Hinemar tells us (Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81) that Robert and Odo com-
manded the larger and stronger of the scarae mentioned in the preceding
note. The names of those who commanded the other scara are not given.
41 Ibid., 865, p. 80. Towards the close of the year, the Vikings had lost
some of their men as a result of various diseases which broke out among
them. Knowledge of this fact led Charles to believe that there was no im-
mediate danger to be feared.
42 Lot, “Une année... de Charles le Chauve,” Joc. cit., 398, n. 2.
43 Cf. ibid., 396, n. 4, 397.
44 Ann. Bert., 866, pp. 80-81.
CHAPTER V 69
the Strong, that one is tempted to inquire whether there may
not have been special reasons for what happened on this occasion.
It is well known that, in 861, very cordial relations had been
established between Charles the Bald and Robert, and that in
consequence thereof the latter had received not only large hold-
ings of land but also the ducatum inter Ligerim et Sequanam.*”
From 861 to 865 Robert was practically ruler, and military com-
mander-in-chief, of the district between the Seine and the Loire;
and as such he rendered very distinguished and very valuable
services by his campaigns against the Northmen and the Bret-
ons,*® respectively. But in 865 Charles divested Robert of the
military authority, and also of certain holdings, in Neustria,
to make room for his eldest son, Louis, surnamed the Stammerer.
Presumably it was by way of recompense for what he had lost
in Neustria, that Robert was granted the counties of Auxerre
and Nevers in Burgundy.** Why Charles made this change can
only be conjectured. It is difficult to believe that it had been
suggested or even approved of by Robert, whose position in
Burgundy certainly did not give him the prestige and power
which he had possessed as the lord and defender of Neustria.*®
With more reason, the affair may be regarded as an indication
that Robert had temporarily lost his influence with the king,
and that the latter was now acting at the instigation of that
party at his court which sought to advance the interests of Prince
Louis.*® In any case, the removal of Robert to Burgundy was
a blunder — a blunder which Charles later found it necessary
to correct so far as possible.°° Meanwhile, after the dismissal
of Adalard and his relatives, the king had summoned Robert
to the defense of the Seine.®** And we have seen how poor an
account Robert gave of himself in the discharge of this com-
mission. Though the scara commanded by Robert and Odo. was
the larger and stronger of the two Frankish divisions, it fled
before the Vikings without striking a blow, and apparently
Robert and Odo fled with it.**
45 Ann. Bert., 861, p. 55; Regino, Chronicon, 861, ed. Kurze, p. 79. Cf.
Vogel, 189, 190 and n. 1, where further references are given on this point. ~
46 Lot, “La Loire, Aquitaine et la Seine de 862 4 866,” Bibl. de lécole
des chartes, 1915, LXXVI, 473 ff.; Vogel, 190-92, 197, 198, 208-10.
47 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 79. Lot, op. cit., 497 and n. 7, 498.
48 Ibid., 497, n. 7.
49 Ibid., 498.
50 Ibid., 501; id., ‘Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 400 ff.
51 Cf. supra, nn. 37, 39, 40.
52 Cf. supra, nn. 438, 44.
70 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
By reason of the fact that we have no record of such or sim-
ilar conduct on the part of Robert on any other occasion, some
students of this period have been inclined to believe, either that
Hinemar is guilty of exaggeration in reporting this event, or
that the fiasco was due to a panic produced among the Frankish
troops by the suddenness of the Viking attack; both of which
views serve admirably to exonerate the character of Robert.**
It should be noted, however, that these explanations of the affair
at Melun are based on an assumption: the assumption that Rob-
ert’s attitude toward the king was still one of undiluted loyalty
and perfect good faith. They fail to take into account the pos-
sibility that Robert had been nettled by his removal from Neu-
stria to Burgundy. It would seem indeed very strange, being
exactly the opposite of what had happened in 858,°* if Robert
had now permitted himself to be superseded by Prince Louis,
with entire good will and without exhibiting any signs of dis-
satisfaction or taking any measures to secure rehabilitation.
It appears much more probable that. though he continued to
exhibit a more or less superficial loyalty in the royal service,
Robert really was looking about for an opportunity to force
Charles to reinstate him in the position he had formerly held
in Neustria; a position whose importance was second only to
that of the king himself.°> Such an opportunity offered itself
at Melun, and Robert knew how to exploit it. This interpre-
tation of Robert’s discomfiture will be found in perfect accord
with later events and on the whole seems much more satisfactory
than those previously referred to.
After the fiasco at Melun Charles gave up all hope of expelling
the Northmen, and even of holding them in check, by military
measures. That was evidently out of the question so long as
he could not count on the loyal co-operation of the fideles; for
without such co-operation it was impossible to secure forces
53 von Kalckstein, Robert d. Tapfere, 101; Vogel, 215; Lot, op. cit., 398,
nn. 1, 3. Later, Lot evidently changed his opinion on this matter; see his
“Le pont. de .Pitres,” voc. cit., 9. n.. 2.
54 On this see von Kalckstein, op. cit., 52 ff.
55 Cf. Lot, “Le pont de Pitres,” loc. cit. In fact, the policy of Robert:-led
precisely to the result indicated in the text. So far from losing the favor
of the king after his disgraceful flight before the Vikings, Robert increased
in that favor and became even more powerful and influential than he had
been before he was transferred to Burgundy in 865. Cf. id., ““‘Une année...
de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 400-2; von Kalckstein, op. cit., 102 ff.; infra,
pp. 90-91 and notes. .
Si
CHAPTER V fai
that would be equal to the task.°° There remained, therefore,
only one alternative for securing the removal of the Vikings,
namely, the payment of Danegeld. Obviously it would be better
to submit to this than to expose the country to further violence
and devastation at the hands of the Vikings. Negotiations with
the invaders were opened,°*’ and Charles the Bald found it neces-
sary to consent to what has usually been regarded as a disgrace-
ful treaty.** That its terms were very humiliating may be ad-
mitted, but responsibility for the treaty must be fixed on the
disloyal and negligent magnates more than on the king. Charles
had throughout the period of this invasion displayed considerable
activity at least in devising and preparing various measures to
hold the Vikings in check; but all his precautions had been
rendered futile by the willful recreancy of those fideles to whom
the operations of defense had been entrusted.°*®
The Northmen agreed to depart from the West Frankish
realm,® and presumably to refrain from further devastation
and plundering, in return for a payment of 4,000 pounds of
silver according to their (the Northmen’s) weight.*t In ad-
dition to this sum of money, the invaders may have demanded
a certain quantity of wine.” The pact further included the
following stipulations: slaves, who had been captured by the
Northmen, but who ran away from them after the conclusion
of the treaty, were to be either returned to the Vikings or re-
56 Ditimmler, I, 222 and n. 1; II, 107; Lot, “La grande invasion nor-
mande,” loc. cit., 7, n. 4; Waitz, D. Verfassungsgesch., III, 560-61; Prou,
“De la nature du service militaire du par les roturiers aux XIe et XIle
siécles,” Rev. Hist., 1890, XLIV, 314.
57 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81: “‘Karolus cum eisdem Nortmannis .. . pacisci-
tur.” .
58 Ann. Bert., ed. Dehaisnes, p. 154, note (@); Vogel, 215.
59 Cf. supra, pp. 65 ff.
60 This may be inferred from the fact that the Vikings made preparations
for their departure while they were awaiting the payment of the tribute
(Ann. Bert., 866, ed. Waitz, p. 81, bottom).
61 Ibid., p. 81: “Karolus cum eisdem Nortmannis in quattuor milium libris
argenti ad pensam eorum paciscitur.”’ The words, ad pensam eorum, seem
to indicate that the money was to be weighed by the Vikings on their own
scales. Evidently Frankish and Danish weights were not identical (cf.
Soetbeer, “Beitrige z. Gesch. d. Geld- und Miinzwesens,” Forsch. 2. d. Gesch.,
VI, 55-56. In 860, the Vikings had demanded 3,000 pounds pondere exami-
nato (see supra, chap. iii, nn. 32, 61), which does not necessarily mean that
Danish scales were used in the weighing. What Lot says on this subject
(“Une année ... de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 399, n. 1) is not to the
point; see Soetbeer, op. cit., pp. 8, 9.
62 At least the regni primores were required to furnish a coniectum
toward the Danegeld tam in argento quam et in vino (see infra, n. 136).
72 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
deemed at a price named by the latter; and if one of the North-
men were killed, the Franks were to pay the amount of money
(wergeld) demanded for him.**
To raise the Danegeld, Charles levied taxes — though, as will
be shown, it probably was not intended that they should be con-
strued as taxes — on all the important kinds of property and
resources within his kingdom, which at this time included
Francia, Neustria, and Burgundy.® It appears that four differ-
ent assessments and collections were necessary before the entire
sum demanded by the Vikings was forthcoming.® In the follow-
ing discussion each of the assessments will be studied separately
and in the order it was issued.
By the first assessment, taxes were laid on all dependent hold-
ings of land and on the property of merchants and priests,”
and the payment of the heribannus was required of all free
63 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81.
64 This statement is not intended to imply that all those who owned or
were in possession of property or resources contributed in proportion to
their ability to pay, or that there was no shifting of the burden of taxation;
it refers solely to the manner in which, according to our sources, the taxes
were distributed by the king. It is true that there is no specific mention,
in any of the assessments, of demesnes or dominant holdings (mansi in-
dominicati). But all owners or tenants of such property were at least free-
men; and all freemen were required to pay the heerbann (see infra, n. 68),
_ which, as we shall see, was in this case tantamount to a tax. Moreover, the
demesnes included in the beneficiary holdings, or honores, of the fideles of
the king were, at least in theory, directly affected by the last two assess-
ments; see infra, pp. 87 ff. and nn. 1386, 137, 143. It is true also that the
comparatively scarce kinds of dependent holdings, as for example mansi
censiles and mansi lidiles, were ignored in all the assessments levied by the
king. But, despite that, they probably did not escape taxation; see infra,
n, 69 and ef. n. 124.
65 Cf. supra, chap. iii, nn. 37, 38- Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81: ‘“‘indicta per
regnum suum conlatione ad idem exsolvendum tributum.” These words
surely indicate that the tax was levied in the entire kingdom of Charles the
Bald, including Francia, Neustria, and Burgundy, but not Aquitaine (cf.
Lot, ‘Une année ... de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 412 and n. 2), which
was a separate kingdom (id., ‘“‘La Loire, l’Aquitaine et la Seine,’ loc. cit.,
496-97). Lot takes a different view (‘Une année....de Charles le
Chauve,” loc cit., 400, n. 2), which is based on a supposed analogy between
the Danegeld of 866 and that of 877. In 877 Neustria was, to be sure, not
included in the assessment levied for the Danegeld demanded by the Vik-
ings of the Seine; it applied only to Francia and Burgundy. But there was
a special reason for the exclusion of Neustria from this assessment, namely,
that the Neustrians were to raise another Danegeld for the Vikings of the
Loire, a fact which is carefully pointed out by Hinemar (Ann. Bert., 877, p.
135). For a fuller discussion of this matter, see infra, p. 98 and n. 38. If,
however, it is reasonably certain that the tax of 866 had been levied by
Charles throughout his kingdom, it is very doubtful that it could be col-
lected everywhere. Cf. infra, pp. 89-90.
66 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81; ef. infra, nn. 135, 136.
67 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81: “de unoquoque manso ingenuili exiguntur sex
denarii et de servili tres et de accola unus et de duobus hospitiis unus de-
CHAPTER V 73
Franks. Each mansus ingenuilis was assessed at six denarii,
and each mansus servilis, at three;°’ one denarius was demanded
for each accola® and for every two hospitia,": respectively. The
merchants were required to contribute a tenth of all they pos-
>
sessed ;‘° and the priests similarly were taxed on the basis of
narius et decima de omnibus quae negotiatores videbantur habere; sed et a
presbiteris secundum quod unusquisque habuit vectigal exigitur.” Cf. infra,
nestT9;
68 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81: “heribanni de omnibus Francis accipiuntur.”
The Franci were the liberi homines, as is proved by the Edict. Pistense
[864],(B.), ¢. 34, loc. cit., pp. 325-26, where the two terms are used synony-
mously. They all owed military service, but since the time of Charlemagne
the character and amount of this service had varied according to the re-
sources of each one (ibid., cc. 26, 27, p. 321; cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 558 ff.).
The amount of the heerbann had varied in a similar way (see infra, n. 75).
The term Franci as employed by Hincmar in the quotation given at the be-
ginning of this note must be taken to include not only ordinary freemen,
but also those who possessed jurisdictional rights and were under obligation
to lead the freemen, over whom they exercised such rights to the army
muster (cf. Waitz, op cit., IV, 326 ff., 335, 459 ff., 597, 604; Guérard, ed.,
Polypt. @Irminon, I, (Prolég.), pp. 212 ff.). In other words it must be
assumed that the heerbann, as one of the taxes levied for the Danegeld of
866, was due not only from freemen of lesser rank and fortune, but also—
and at the standard rate of sixty solidi (cf. infra, p. 76)—from all seigniors
who were laymen, including counts and other magnates. The king knew
or ought to have known, through the reports of the counts and the missi,
how many free Franks there were in each pagus, or county (Hdict. Pis-
Pee Sewer Leh Cat A tOC LOLs Done.)
69 Mansi, accola®, and hospitia, are the names applied to the tenures
which, together with the mansus indominicatus on which they depended,
made up a large estate, or villa. The holders of such tenures were, as a
rule, either coloni or serfs; but in the ninth century the character of each
tenure was fixed by custom, and did not depend on the condition of the
tenant. Coloni might hold mansi serviles, and serfs, mansi ingenuiles. The
real distinction between different kinds of dependent tenures was, at this
time, economic. As a rule, more services and redevances were required
from holders of mansi serviles than from those of mansi ingenuiles, regard-
less of whether the actual tenant was a colonus or a serf (cf. Sée, Les
classes rurales et le rég. dom. en France, 28-42, 45-68; Guérard, op. cit.,
233 ff., 277 ff., 577 ff.; Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, I, 212). Lot’s
statement (“Une année ... de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 399, n. 2), that
the “mansus ingenwilis est le manse tenu par un colon,” is inaccurate, for
such tenures were often held by serfs. Cf. Vogel, 215, n. 2. The mansi
lidiles and the mansi censiles are not mentioned by Hincmar as having been
taxed. But he may have meant to include them in the mansi ingenuwiles,
from which they did not at this period essentially differ. The question is
not of much importance, for these holdings were few in number at the time
of Charlemagne, and were rapidly disappearing (Sée, op. cit., 38 ff.).
70 Accola here means a tenure, not a person, as Lot seems to think (op.
cit., 399, n. 3). Evidently the accola was estimated at about one third of the
value of a mansus servilis. See Guérard, op. cit., 426, n. 2, 630 and n. 24.
71 The hospitium, like the mansus and the accola, was a tenure. It is
difficult to determine the character of the hospitiuwm in any precise way,
for it probably varied somewhat according to time and place. Here it is
estimated at half the value of an accola. Cf. ibid., 627 ff.; Sée, op. cit., 638-65.
72 In 860 the amounts paid by merchants toward the Danegeld had been
proportioned to the value of their houses and movables. Cf. supra, chap.
Him. 3G,
74 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
the value of their resources.”* The heribannus, originally a
fine amounting to sixty solidi in each case,’* here appears to be
tantamount to a tax. If, as seems probable, this heerbann was
proportioned to the circumstances of those liable to pay it,”
we may justly regard it, like the other imposts of the first assess-
ment, as in fact though not in theory a tax on property or
resources.”° i
These rates of assessment — the most detailed and specific
that have been thus far furnished — must now be subjected
to closer scrutiny. It seems desirable to ascertain first what
information they yield concerning the legal basis of the Dane-
geld considered as an impost. The question as to how this form
of taxation — unknown throughout the period preceding the
reign of Charles the Bald — was legalized, is, it will be agreed,
one of fundamental importance in the study of the Danegeld,
and particularly in the study of its institutional development.
Very significant from the viewpoint of such an inquiry is the
obligation placed on all free Franks (Francz) to pay the he7v-
bannus, or heerbann. Ordinarily and regularly, the heerbann
of sixty solidi had always been and still was a fine levied on
freémen who when summoned to the army failed to go.” . But
the heerbann with which we are here concerned cannot be con-
73 See supra, n. 67.
74 Brunner,:op. cit., Il,, 213;..cf. supra, n. 68:
75 The heerbann had been so proportioned even by Charlemagne (Waitz,
op. cit., IV, 557, n. 4), but in the later years of his reign Charlemagne seems
to have exacted the full heerbann in each case (ibid., 564, n. 1). However
that may be, it is certain that Charles the Bald in the year 864 exacted a
heerbann proportionate to the resources of the freemen (Hdict. Pistense,
(B.), c. 27, loc. cit., p. 322), for he refers to the “discretionem, quae in pro-
genitorum nostrorum, capitulo XIV continetur,’ which is a restatement of
the capitulary of 805° on this subject. See Baldamus, Das Heerwesen unter
den spdteren Karolingern (in Gierke’s Untersuchungen 2. d. Staats- und
Rechtsgesch., IV), p. 36; Waitz, op. cit., IV, 564, n. 1; Migne, Patr. Lat.,
XCVII, 553; cf. infra, pp. 76—77.
76 This statement is not intended to imply that military service, for the
non-performance of which the heerbann was the regular fine, rested on the
property. In principle and in legal theory, that had always been and doubt-
less still was the obligation of every free man. Hdict. Pistense [864], (B.),
c. 25, loc. cit., p. 322: “ad defensionem patriae omnes sine ulla excusatione
veniant.” Cf. Roth, Gesch. d. Beneficialwesens, 402. On the other hand, it
cannot be denied that we have here an excellent illustration of how the
principles and legal theories of an age lag far behind the facts of that age.
Cf. Brunner, op. cit., II, 202 ff.; Waitz, op. cit., IV, 538; Baldamus, op. cit.,
4-11.
77 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 548, 557 ff.; cf. supra, n. 74.
CHAPTER V 75
sidered a penalty for the non-performance of military service."
It is rather a tax levied as a substitute for military service, and
as such it resembles in some ways the feudal payment which
in England was called scutage.’® Accordingly, the liability of
the Frankish freeman to pay this tax must have rested partly
on his obligation to render military service at the summons of
the king; and partly on a theory in law that the king might, if
he chose, dispense with the personal services and exact instead
what was regarded as the equivalent in money.®*® To indicate
a legal ground, other than this, on which freemen might have
been held liable to contribute toward the Danegeld, would be
difficult if not impossible; since according to a very old and
still at least formally valid principle, they could not be taxed
on either their persons or their property.**
But the collection of the heerbann as a substitute for military
service was, it should be noted, in all likelihood an innovation
due to the exigencies created by the Viking invasions. For,
to say the least, it is extremely doubtful that the predecessors
of Charles the Bald had ever, in theory and principle, exacted
the heerbann otherwise than as a penalty.*? It is true, to be
sure, that the possibility’ of evading active service in the field
had always existed for every freeman who was able and willing
to pay the heerbann.* It is true also, that in the past there had
78 Cf. Baldamus, op. cit., 10. Examples are not wanting of an analogous
use of the word somewhat earlier; see Brunner, op. cit., II, 212 and n. 41;
cf. infra, n. 82.
79 Commutation of military service into a money payment was not un-
known even to the Romans. On the whole subject see Baldwin, The Scu-
tage and Knight Service in England, 1-17; cf. Viollet, Histoire des institu-
tions politiques et administratives de la France, II, 483-34. There is reason
to believe that the Carolingians applied this principle regularly with respect
to merchants. See Baldamus, op. cit., 40-60; and cf. infra, p. 86 and n. 127.
80 Cf. Lot, “Une année ...de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 399, n. 4;
Viollet, op. cit., II, 483 and n. 6.
81 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 112; Brunner, op. cit., II, 234; Viollet, op. cit., I, 323,
82 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 575, n. 4. I cannot agree with Lot when he says
(op. cit., 399, n. 4) that the Capitulary of Thionville of 805 (M.G.H., LL.
Sectio II, t. i, p. 125, c. 19) perhaps offers an example of the commutation
of military service into a money payment. The heerbann, according to that
capitulary, was exacted as a fine for the non-performance of military duty
(cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 557). Brunner, op. cit., II, 212, refers to a money
payment, sometimes called heerbann, which was paid in lieu of the hostili-
tium and carnaticum by the unfree peasants to their seigniors. This is, of
course, not the same thing as the ordinary heerbann of the free Franks,
which, so far as my observations go, was up to this time always paid, in
theory at least, as a fine for the non-fulfillment of military obligations.
83 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 575: “Auf die Strafe kam am Ende alles an. Wer
diese zahlen wollte, konnte zu Hause bleiben.”’
76 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
been many abuses in the collection of the heerbann; frequently,
no doubt, it had been exacted in cases where it was not legit-
imately due.** Perhaps, therefore, what Charles the Bald had
done was not at the time understood to be, or generally recog-
nized as, an innovation. But, however that may have been, the
collection of the heerbann as a tax did in fact introduce a new
principle — a principle based on the legal fiction that the king
had the right to demand from every freeman evther personal
military service or its money equivalent — in the future appli-
cation of which the kings and the great feudal nobles, the latter
being the real successors to the authority of the Carolingian
monarchs, were to secure for themselves important financial
resources.*°
Before dismissing the subject of the heerbann, attention must
be directed once more*® to the fact that this exaction had, even
as early as the time of Charlemagne — when it was in theory
regarded exclusively as a fine — sometimes been graduated in
proportion, more or less, to the means of those who were liable
to pay it. Thus, in 805, freemen possessing movables*’ worth
but one pound, paid a heerbann of not more than five solidi;
others with movables worth two or three pounds, paid ten and
thirty solidi, respectively ; and only those whose personal proper-
ty was valued at six pounds, paid the standard rate of sixty
solidi.8s This graduated scale of the heerbann of 805 is import-
ant, in part because it illustrates the usual policy of Charle-
magne, but more especially because it was also the scale adopted
by Charles the Bald in 864; for we know that in the latter year
Charles the Bald issued a capitulary which, in’so far as it re- _
ferred to the heerbann, was virtually a restatement of the pro-
visions of Charlemagne in 805.°® It is true, however, that in
864 Charles the Bald had levied the heerbann as a fine; was the
tax, in 866, similarly graduated in proportion to the resources
of the tax-payers? ° To this question it is not possible to give
a conclusive answer. But since there is no reason to suppose
that Charles the Bald had changed his policy in this matter
84 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 579, n. 2; Brunner, op. cit., II, 165.
85 See Borrelli de Serres, Recherches sur divers services publics du XIIIe
au XVIIe siécle, 467-528.
86 2-CiSsupra; nn? 68;475:
87 The fine could not be exacted in land or slaves; see Waitz, op. cit., IV,
B5T5) 1783)
88 Ibid., n. 4.
SOIC FSU DTG, 9 lie 1.
CHAPTER V 77
between 864 and 866,°° it seems probable that the graduated
‘scale applied to the heerbann as a fine in 805 and again in 864,
was also followed in 866, when the exaction was levied, not as a
fine, but as one of the taxes to raise the Danegeld.
We have seen that the heerbann demanded for the Danegeld
of 866 was in legal theory a money payment substituted for
active military service. But what was the legal basis of the
other taxes levied for the same purpose? Obviously it will
not be improper, in attempting to find a solution of this problem,
to proceed on the hypothesis that all the taxes for the Danegeld
rested on the same basis; that they were all legalized on the
ground that they were substitutes for the service of war. The
conversion of this hypothesis into a well supported theory will
involve the establishment in fact of the following points: (1)
that each of the people whom the king held responsible for the
taxes was regularly liable to an amount or a degree of military
service which corresponded more or less to the sum of money
now demanded from him for the Danegeld; and (2) that in the
case of these taxpayers just as in that of the men from whom
the heerbann was demanded, there were cogent reasons why
the king should have desired to avoid undisguised taxation and
preferred to exact the contributions on the ground that they
were substitutes for military service.
A glance at the distribution of the taxes for the Danegeld of
866, according to the first assessment, will immediately reveal
the fact that the bulk of these taxes had been levied on various
kinds of dependent holdings — mansi ingenuiles, mansi serviles,
accolae, hospitia —- whose occupants belonged, for the most part,
to the class of unfree peasants. But Frankish law did not re-
quire, or at least had not heretofore required unfree persons —
coloni, servi, and certain others of similar condition — to render
personal military service in the field. That was an obligation
which, in legal principle, rested only on freemen (franc?) .”
Moreover, it must be admited that the unfree peasants, with
exception of those who were attached to the royal domain, owed
neither services nor payments, of any kind, to the king directly;
90 The Hdict. Pistense of 864° (see supra, n. 75) was intended to be an
edict with general application for the future, and not only a temporary regu-
lation for the current year.
91 Brunner, op. cit., II, 202 ff.; Roth, op. city 392 ff.; Waitz, op. cit., IV,
538. Cf. supra, nn. 68, 76.
78 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
they were under direct obligations only to their seigniors.°*?
Accordingly, if we assume for the moment that the taxes levied °
on the dependent holdings were legalized on the ground that they
were substitutes for military service, we are obliged to conclude
that this military service was not owed directly by the peasants
actually occupying those holdings; but, on the same assumption,
that it must have been thus owed by the seigniors in control of
the great estates which included the dependent holdings of the
peasants.
From the seigniors, ecclesiastical as well as lay, the Frankish
kings demanded very important services in time of war. Charle-
magne had required of seigniors, in addition to what was incum-
bent on them as freemen, a special and supplementary service
commensurate with the jurisdictional rights they exercised and
proportioned to the resources at their disposal.°? While it may
be true that some few of the seigniors had by the time of Charles
the Bald been able to free themselves of this burden, there are
not many such cases on record;** and it is safe to assume that
most of the great landholders — bishops, abbots, and lay seign-
iors — could, in principle at least, still be required to render
their share of military service.®® The special military obligation
of a seignior.included not only the duty to lead the freemen
living within his jurisdiction, properly armed and equipped, to
the place where the army was to be mustered;°° it included also
that he furnish a certain number of oxen, wagons, and other
war equipment, sufficient for the needs of his contingent of
fighters.°* The outlay involved in furnishing this matériel was
supplied by the proceeds of certain annual war taxes (hosttli-
tium, carnaticum) levied by the seigniors on the holdings of their
unfree tenants — chiefly on the mansi ingenuiles but also, in
some cases, on the mansi serviles.°® These taxes were collected,
sometimes in kind and sometimes in money, once a year by the
92 Sée, op. cit., 26 ff.; cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 625 and n. 2.
93 Cf. supra, n. 68. On the special obligations of the seigniors, see Guérard,
op. cit., 661; Fustel de Coulanges, Les transform. de la royauté, 519-23;
Roth, op. cit., 409 ff.; Waitz, op. cit., IV, 621 ff.; Brunner, op. cit., II, 212.
94 Guérard, op. cit., II, 675-77; Waitz, op. cit., IV, 583.
95. Cie Prous Op.) cit; Dp. 3232
96 See the letter of Charlemagne to Abbot Fulrad (M.G.H., LL. Sectio tie
t. i. 168), and cf. Roth, op. cit., 408.
97 See the references cited supra, n. 93.
98 Sée, op. cit., 92; cf. Roth, op. cit., 410, n. 97.
CHAPTER V 79
ministeriales of the seignior.*® It may be admitted that Charle-
magne had probably never required either all the freemen or all
the seigniors to render military service each year, and that his
successors had demanded this service from their fideles and their
subjects with much less frequency than Charlemagne;'” but it
must be insisted that none of the Carolingian monarchs had ever
abdicated their right to it. Accordingly, the military obligation
of the Franks, seigniors as well as ordinary freemen, remained
during the reign of Charles the Bald, in principle and in law,
essentially the same as it had been in the time of his grand-
father.‘
Charles the Bald, accordingly, had a perfect legal right to de-
mand from the various seigniors not only the regular military
service due from them as freemen — though this was of course
not due from ecclesiastical seigniors personally — but also, ex-
cept in certain rare instances, the additional service due from
them as seigniors. We have seen that Charles, in exacting the
heerbann for the purposes of the Danegeld, had virtually claimed
with respect to the military service required of freemen as such,
the power to substitute for the specific performance of that serv-
ice the payment of a money equivalent.'°? Why should he not
have claimed the same power with respect to the additional serv-
ices required of the seigniors? Indeed, was not that precisely
what he did when he levied taxes for the Danegeld on all de-
pendent holdings throughout his kingdom? On what other
ground could such taxes have been legally justified?*°*? To the
99 Guérard, in. the Prolégoménes to his edition of the Polypt. d’Irminon,
pp. 660-75, has the most complete discussion of these matters; for other
references see supra, n. 93.
100 Prenzel, Geschichte der Kriegsverfassung unter den Karolingern von
der Mitte des achten bis zum Ende des neunten Jahrhunderts, Erster Teil,
29-37. On the disinclination of the fideles of Charles the Bald to render
military service, cf. Lot, “Une année ...de Charles. le Chauve,” loc. cit.,
434, n. 3; Baldamus, op. cit., 50.
101 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 572 ff., 581; cf. Brunner, op. cit., II, 202: “Da eine
verfassungsmiassige Aufhebung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht nicht erfolgte,
hat sie theoretisch bis zur AuflOsung der frankischen Monarchie bestanden.”
See also Baldamus, op. cit., 13, 40, and passim.
102 See supra, pp. 74 ff.
103 It is perhaps unnecessary to insist that the Danegeld was never re-
garded as part of the dona annua. In 877 the king clearly distinguished
between these two payments by accepting dona annua at the close of the
same assembly at which arrangements were made for raising the Danegeld
of that year (Capitula excerpta in conventu Carisiacensi coram populo
lecta [877], M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 363). The dona annua were ob-
viously not interpreted as substitutes for military service; for we have evi-
dence that they were in many cases required in addition to the military
80 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
latter question it is, of course, very easy to reply that the Dane-
geld was an emergency measure sufficiently sanctioned by the
law of necessity. But if we are to remain content with such
a reply, we must be willing wholly to eliminate from considera-
tion the fact that the emergency referred to, an emergency
which Charles was now endeavoring to terminate by the payment
of tribute, had been created by certain disloyal magnates for the
direct purpose of embarrassing, or forcing the hand of, the king;
we must be willing also—and this is more important—utterly
to ignore the inveterate and deep rooted aversion of the Frankish
freeman, whether in high station or low, to the idea of being
taxed.1°4
These magnates, ever intent upon increasing their power and
prestige; these seigniors, jealously watchful of their rights and
privileges; would they, who otherwise were chiefly interested
in curtailing the prerogatives of the crown, now have consented
to an augmentation of the royal prerogative such as it evidently
had been assumed?” that even ordinary freemen would never
have countenanced? Would they have permitted the establish-
ment of the principle that the king had, even though it were
only in an emergency, the right of taxation? No scholar at all
conversant with the character and ambitions of the West Frank-
ish nobility in the latter half of the ninth century could for a
moment think of answering this question in the affirmative.
And Charles, we may believe, was well aware that an attempt
to raise the Danegeld as an undisguised tax would have proved
abortive. In order to insure even measurable success:for his
policy, the king must have found it necessary so to interpret
his method of raising the tribute as clearly to give the impres-.
service (Waitz, op. cit., IV, 108 and n. 1, 601). The king’s right to the
dona annua, after they had lost their original voluntary character (cf. Fus-
tel de Coulanges, op. cit., 502 ff.), was of course in the main based on cus-
tom; though it is true that according to Hincmar, the church paid them
“causa suae defensionis” (see infra, chap. xvii, n. 43), i. e. in return for the
special protection given it.
104 That the disloyal magnates—especially Adalard, Hugo, and ere near
but also to some extent Robert and Odo—were really responsible for the
emergency of 866 has been shown supra, pp. 65-71. For the general aims
and policy of the West Frankish nobility in the time of Charles the Bald,
see infra, pp. 114-15 and nn. 20, 21. On the Germanic principle that’a free-
man could not be taxed, see the references cited supra, n. 81, and cf. infra,
chap. xvii and n. 58.
105 That this assumption had been made is evident from the fact that
the taxes required of the freemen for this Danegeld were disguised under
the name of heribanni.
CHAPTER V 81
sion that whatever else it might be, it was not really taxation.
Moreover, it must not be forgotten that Charles had levied the
Danegeld on holdings of dependent condition: mansi, accolxe, and
hospitia; not only those included within the royal domain but
all such holdings throughout the realm. But, as we have seen,
the king had no direct authority, financial or otherwise, over
the unfree occupants of these holdings, unless they were attached
to the royal domain.**® Outside the royal domain the king and
his officials entered into direct relations only with seigniors
and freemen, not with the unfree population. The king had,
in other words, no right to tax either the seigniors or their
dependents. Obviously, therefore, the Danegeld would not in
either of these cases have been legal if it had been levied in
theory as a tax; and it has been shown above that illegal tax-
ation would for various reasons have been practically impossi-
ble. Accordingly there remains but one alternative: the neces-
sary basis of the Danegeld assessments levied on the dependent
holdings must have been the king’s right to demand military
-service from the seigniors; a right to which Charles the Bald,
here as in the case of ordinary freemen, subjoined the corollary
that the king might, if he chose, exact a sum of money in lieu of
the actual service.’
At this point it may be proper to discuss a certain problem
that arises in connection with the levy of the Danegeld on de-
pendent holdings. The fact that the seigniors were, by the time
of Charlemagne, in the habit of collecting certain annual war
taxes (hostilitiwum, carnaticum) from the tenants of their de-
pendent mansi, has already been referred to.’ In theory, the
proceeds of these taxes were to be used by the seigniors to meet
their military obligations to the king. But though the peasants
were required to pay the tax each year, the seigniors rendered
106 Cf. supra, nn. 65, 67, 91, 92.
107 It may be added that this theory is not invalidated by the fact that
in certain cases—they are comparatively rare—exemption from military
service had been granted by charters of immunity (Sée, op. cit., 21 ff.;
Brunner, op. cit., II, 294 ff.); for such immunity did not apply when a
levée en masse was necessary to resist foreign invasion (Guérard, op. cit.,
676; Prou, op. cit., 323; Prenzel, op. cit., 46 ff.; cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 315,
317, n. 3, 574, 575; on the origins of the levées en masse see Flach, Les orig.
de Vane. France, I, 317-18; and ef. infra, n. 129). In an emergency such as
that produced by the Viking invasion of 866 Charles had the right to call on
all seigniors for either military service or a money equivalent (cf. supra,
n. 80).
108 See supra, p. 78.
Danegeld. 6.
82 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
military service only when called upon to do so by the mon-
arch;'°? and they were called upon much less frequently by
Charles the Bald than they had been by Charlemagne.*? It
might therefore be conjectured, especially if the Danegeld was
in law a substitute for military service, that the seigniors on
this occasion were expected when they paid their respective
quotas toward the Danegeld, simply to apply to this purpose a
certain portion of the proceeds of the annual war taxes. But
did they in fact take their quotas of the Danegeld from this
regular source of income; or did they raise the Danegeld by
levying on the peasant holdings an additional burden, distinct
and separate from the annual war taxes?
The correct answers to these questions may be easily con-
jectured by anyone at all familiar with the character and meth-
ods of seigneurial exploitation. A sentence of M. Sée’ is so
much to the point here that it deserves to be quoted: “Et tel
est l'un des traits caractéristiques du régime domanial: il n’est
aucune taxe, meme d’ordre public, qui ne retombe tout entiére
sur les classes inférieures.” If the seigniors had applied the
proceeds from the annual war taxes toward the Danegeld, the
latter exaction would not have been felt at all by the peasants;
they would have paid their lords no more in a year when Dane-
geld was levied than they did any other year. In that case the
bulk of the Danegeld would have been paid by the seigniors out
of what they were now inclined to regard as their private
resources."?7. Such, of course, was not the case. The evident
willingness of the seigniors to aid the crown in raising the Dane-
geld, the fact that on many occasions they preferred buying off
the Vikings to fighting them,'’® are sure indications that the
burden of the Danegeld fell on other shoulders than those of
the great landholders. But we need not rely on mere indica-
tions; for we have the direct evidence of Hincmar that the
peasant population had in many cases been reduced to penury in
consequence of the numerous exactions of Danegeld during the
reign of Charles the Bald. Indeed it would appear that the
peasantry, so far from escaping the burden of the tribute, prob-
109 Roth, op. cit., 411 and n. 100; Brunner, op. cit., II, 212.
110 See supra, n. 100.
ADL OD." Cito:
112 Ibid., 92-93, 116.
113 See supra, pp. 33, 41-42; ef. infra, chap. vi.
CHAPTER V 83
ably had to bear its heaviest load.1‘* The annual war taxes
were levied, as a rule, only on mansi ingenuiles. But for the
Danegeld of 866 all dependent mansi, the serviles as well as the
ingenuiles, were taxed; and even the smallest, or least profitable
holdings — accolae and hospitia — did not escape."° It is clear,
therefore, that the Danegeld was levied on a large number of
holdings which were as a rule exempt from the ordinary war
taxes, viz., most of the mansi serviles, and all accolae and hos-
pitia. On the other hand, it must be assumed that tenants of
mansi ingenuiles and, in some cases, of mansi serviles were re-
quired to contribute toward the Danegeld in addition to paying
the annual war taxes.'"* If the contrary had been the case, they
would have escaped those serious hardships in which we know
they were involved as a consequence of the Danegeld.**
The seigniors, accordingly, had contributed little if anything
out of their private resources to meet the first assessment for
the Danegeld of 866.1*° This fact is of considerable importance
in helping us to understand why it was easier for Charles the
Bald to raise a Dangeld and buy off the Vikings than to raise
an army and defeat them.’*? But it is not the whole truth. There
were also other reasons why the seigniors did not in the main
or as a rule object to raising the Danegeld. For them the Dane-
114 This is indicated by Hincmar in a letter written to Louis the Stam-
merer shortly after the exaction of the Danegeld of 877 (Migne, Patr. Lat.,
CXXV, 987): ‘“qualiter ...miser iste populus, qui jam per plures annos
depraedationes diversas et continuas, et per exactiones ad Nortmannos re-
pellendos affligitur, aliquod remedium habeat, ... ut virtutem nobis Deus
reddat contra paganos: quia usque modo jam ante plures annos locum in
isto regno defensio non habuit, sed redemptio et tributum, et non solum
pauperes homines, sed et Ecclesias quondam divites jam evacuatas habent.”
Charles the Bald also refers to the burdensomeness of the Danegeld for the
poorer classes in the Constitutio Carisiacensis de moneta of 861 (M.G.H., LL.
Sectio II, t. ii, 301): “volumus, quia . . . consideratio misericors . . . in hac
commendatione nostra est necessaria propter paupertatem hominum, quia
necesse fuit in istis temporibus coniectum de illis accipere et ad navium
compositionem et in Nortmannorum causa pro regni... salvamento.” The
remainder of this capitulary shows that: in referring to the “poverty of
men,’ Charles was thinking not only of freemen but also of coloni and
servi. Cf. supra, chap. iii, n. 75.
115 In certain exceptional cases they were exacted on mansi serviles. Cf.
supra, n. 98.
116 Cf. supra, n. 67.
ITCr., Flach;-op.’ cit.,. 1,322:
118 Cf. supra, n. 114.
119 The seigniors ought of course to have furnished a heerbann for them-
selves out of their demesnial resources (cf. supra, nn. 64, 68); but if M.
Sée’s view (see the quotation on the preceding page) is correct, it would
seem to follow that even this burden was shifted on the peasantry.
120 Cf. supra, n. 113.
84 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
geld meant not merely a saving of the expense that participation
in a military expedition would have involved; it meant also an
actual augmentation of their financial resources and the estab-
lishment of a precedent of great value in connection with their
exploitation of the peasants.
We have already seen how the seigniors might enrich them-
selves by requiring their subjects to pay the Danegeld in locally
coined money.’** It does not seem probable that the seigniors
and their ministeriales would have gone to the trouble of collect-
ing the Danegeld, unless there had been some prospect of re-
muneration for the service thus rendered.!?? Though the royal
assessment called for a specific tax from each of the various .
kinds of dependent holdings, it is very unlikely that the exact
amount indicated, no more and no less, was collected in each
case.'?3 It is much more likely that the purpose of the assess-
121 See supra, chap. iii, n. 62.
122 We know that the ministeriales received a certain percentage of the
annual war taxes (hostilitiuwm, carnaticum) which they collected from the
tenants of the mansi (Guérard, op. cit., 668 and n. 1; Sée op. cit., 123-24).
We also know that when the count collected the heribannus in his county
he was permitted to retain one-third of the proceeds therefrom (Waitz
op. cit., IV, 578; Flach, op. cit., I, 321, n. 3). It therefore séems probable
that the ministeriales likewise retained a portion of the Danegeld for their
own profit.
123 This view is based on a study of how the hostilitium and carnaticum
were raised. According to Guérard (op. cit., 673-74). these annual war
taxes were not paid directly by each tenant to the abbey of St. Germain.
On the contrary, they were estimated for each fisc in what may be called
lump sums—either in money or in kind—which were paid to the abbey by
its ministeriales. Allowance was made for some variation in the amount
and value of these lump sums, a variation which must have been due not
only to fluctuations in the prices of oxen, etc., but also to changes occurring
from time to time in the situation of the individual tax-payer; sometimes
he was able to pay in kind, sometimes in money; one year he could pay
more, another year less. It was for the ministeriales to adjust these. mat-
ters as best they could, but meanwhile see to it that the abbey received
approximately what was due from each fisc. An arrangement such as this
could hardly have failed to develop numerous irregularities in the collection
of the annual war taxes (cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 625 and n. 3); and these
irregularities were probably increased rather than decreased by reason of
the fact that many mansi supported more than one family of peasants.
(Guérard, op. cit., II, 897). I am inclined to think that there were more
irregularities in the collection of the Danegeld than in that of the hostilitium
and the carnaticum. The amount of these latter had been proportioned, more
or less, to the value or yield of each individual mansus, and doubtless there
were difficulties in the way of collecting more from any mansus than its
tenants were accustomed to pay (ibid., 658-59). But in the exaction of the
Danegeid there was no custom which might help secure equity. In theory,
it is true, the Danegeld had been assessed at one and the same figure for all
mansi ingenuiles, and at another, theoretically invariable figure for all
mansi serviles, etc. But the following considerations lead me to believe
that, in practice, varying amounts of Danegeld were exacted from tenants
CHAPTER V 85
ment was merely to furnish a basis for estimating the proper
contribution of each of the several seigniors, and that the latter
were free to raise the amounts required of them more or less
as they saw fit.1°* However that may have been, we shall not
err in assuming that some arbitrariness and some abuses were
bound to develop in connection with each levy of the Dane-
geld, and that the purpose as well as the result of such abuses
was the enrichment of the seigniors.'*°
In the development of seigneurial exploitation, therefore, the
Danegeld must have been a factor of more than negligible im-
portance. The royal authority had imposed on the seigniors an
obligation to furnish a certain quota of the tribute money de-
manded by the Vikings. That obligation could readily have
been interpreted as conferring upon the seigniors a more or less
general legal right to levy extraordinary contributions on their
unfree dependents.in times of emergency. And it is easy to see
how the seigniors and their agents by the adroit application
of such a theory may in many cases have succeeded in giving
a color of legality to what in fact were arbitrary and unjust
exactions; how precedents established in connection with the
levy of the Danegeld may have aided and perhaps accelerated
the development of the legal principle, so well known in feudal
times, that the unfree peasants were taillables a@ merci.'*®
of the same kind of mansi: (1) mansi of the same class were not always of
the same value even in the time of Charlemagne /(ibid., 601), and by the
time of Charles the Bald the differences in value had been much increased
(ibid., 602-3); (2) the redevances due from mansi of the same class differed
considerably in quantity and nature (ibid., 659, 672 ff.); (3) mansi of one
class were in some cases burdened with the kind of redevances ordinarily
due from mansi of another class (ibid., 659; (4) for these reasons and for
others of a more temporary nature, the ability of tenants of the same kind
of mansi to pay Danegeld must have been very unequal, and, therefore,
(5) the ministeriales obviously found it necessary, as well as profitable, to
adopt the method of exacting in each case the largest amount obtainable.
This view as regards the manner in which the Danegeld was exacted from
the peasant population, appears to me to be in harmony with what is known
about the collection of the annual war taxes and about the general situation
and circumstances of the tenants on the dependent holdings. Cf. Roth,
op. cit., 410.
124 On this basis one might hazard the conjecture that the seigniors com-
pelled every one of their dependents who had any kind of resources on
which he might draw, to contribute toward the Danegeld; in other words,
that the Danegeld was exacted not only from those dependents who occupied
holdings in land—mansi, accolae, hospitia—but also for example from arti-
sans, who may not in all cases have been tenants of even small plots of
land, but whose labors in the crafts or otherwise must have yielded some
measure of resources.
126 Cf. -supra, .n) 114.
126 Luchaire, Manuel des institutions francaises, période des Capétiens
86 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
It now remains to be determined whether the Danegeld con-
tributions required of merchants and priests were, like those
of freemen and seigniors, exacted on the theory that they were
substitutes for military service. As regards the merchants, it
is at least questionable whether they were in general obliged to
render personal military service; it appears more probable that
they were required to contribute toward military expeditions
in some other way, perhaps by payments of money.??7 But what
reason is there to suppose, as between these regular payments
of the merchants and their contributions to the Danegeld, a
difference of legal basis? On the contrary, there is every reason
to believe that since the two exactions were in both cases made
necessary by war, they were also in both cases legalized on the
ground that they were substitutes for military service.
The priests, it is true, had been exempt from personal military
- service, at least since the middle of the eighth century.’**
Whether the predecessors of Charles the Bald had ever required
them to contribute in any way toward the expenses of war,
cannot be determined from the sources at our disposal. But
after Charles the Bald’*®? had introduced the principle that in
the case of a necessitas, or lantweri — 1. e. in a time of great
national danger, as when the country was invaded by a foreign
army'®° — all men without any exception were liable to military
directs, 206-7, 309, 336; cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 342-43; Viollet, op. cit., II,
449-50.
127 Baldamus, op. cit., 40-60. The merchants of the Carolingian period
were under the special protection of the king, and in return for this protec-
tion they were required annually or biennially to pay over to the royal treas-
ury a certain percentage of their profits; but the latter payments, it should
be noted, were probably distinct from the war contributions. (Waitz, op. cit.,
IV, 44-45, 586 and n. 4). Fustel de Coulanges (op. cit., 510, 518) holds that
the merchants were not exempt from military service. He bases his opinion
on a capitulary requiring freemen who had property in movables, but not in
land, to render their share of military service (cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 560
ff.) But this general rule need not necessarily have applied to merchants.
The latter were certainly excused by Louis the Pious from scara service
and from paying heerbann (ibid., 586, n. 4).
TAN OTE 6920 ame 2 14
129 Beyond a doubt it was Charles the Bald who introduced the principle
of universal obligatory military service in the event of foreign invasion.
It is first mentioned in the Conventus apud Marsnam primus [847], III,
Adnuntiatio Karoli, c. 5 (M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. ii, 71): “talis regni in-
vasio, quam lantweri dicunt, ... acciderit, ut omnis populus illius regni
ad eam repellendam communiter pergat.” Cf. Brunner, op. cit., II, 215;
Waitz, op. cit., IV, 574-75. Roth (op. cit., 411) seems to think that this
principle had also applied in the time of Charlemagne; yet he can furnish
no evidence of its application prior to the year 847 (ibid., n. 102). Cf. supra,
n.*107.
130 See Prenzel. op. cit., 46-47 and notes; cf. Baldamus, op. cit., 51 ff.
CHAPTER V 87
service, then priests no longer could be or were regarded as com-
pletely exempt from the burdens of war.'** Accordingly, owing
to the existence of a necessitas, or lantweri, in 866,'*? the lower
clergy, since they had not been called upon to take the field, might
conceivably, by way of substitution, be required to contribute
toward the Danegeld.'** Legally to justify the taxation of the
priests in any other way, would be difficult if not impossible.
The first assessment for the Danegeld of 866 ought, it would
seem, to have yielded vastly more than 4,000 pounds.'** Yet for
some reason it proved inadequate and, consequently, a second
assessment became necessary.’** By this assessment an addi-
tional tax of one denarius was levied on the two most numerous
kinds of dependent holdings: the mansi ingenuiles and the manst
serviles. Even that did not suffice, and Charles finally had to ask
for two successive contributions from the great magnates (regni
primores). These contributions, consisting partly of money and
partly of wine,**® were in each case proportioned to the value of
the honores held by the several magnates.'**
131 Baldamus, op. cit., 52 and n. 75. It is interesting to note that Hincmar
refers to the Danegeld paid by the priests in 866 as vectigal (cf. supra, n. 67).
Another statement of Hincmar (Opera, II, 325, quoted by Waitz, op. cit., IV,
107, n. 3) may shed some light on what he meant by vectigal: “causa suae
defensionis regi ac rei publicae vectigalia, quae nobiscum annua dona vo-
cantur, praestat ecclesia.” Yet the Danegeld must not be confused with the
annua dona (see supra, n. 103).
132 Cf. supra, pp. 64 ff.
133 Cf. Prenzel, op. cit., 46, n. 46.
134 The mansi held by the abbey of St. Germain (Guérard, op. cit., II,
903) ought alone to have yielded nearly 200 pounds; and it is difficult to
believe that that abbey held five per cent of all the mansi in Francia, Neus-
tria, and Burgundy. Moreover, in addition to the taxes laid on the depend-
ent holdings, there were the payments of the freemen, the priests, and the
merchants, which ought to have yielded a considerable sum. These consid-
erations lead me to believe that the first assessment, if it had been generally
paid, would have been ample to raise the entire Danegeld, even according
to Danish weight (cf. supra, n. 61). Cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., Forsch. 2. d.
Gesch., VI, p. 55.
135 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81: “Inde de unoquogque manso, tam ingenuili quam
et servili, unus denarius sumitur.” These words of course imply that a
second assessment was made. .
136 Jbid.: “et demum per duas vices, iuxta quod unusquisque regni pri-
morum de honoribus habuit, coniectum tam in argento quam et in vino ad
pensum quod ipsis Nortmannis pactum fuerat persolvendum contulit.’” The
first five words of this quotation taken together with the quotation in the
preceding note, indicate that all told four successive assessments had been
required in order to raise the Danegeld of 866.
137 The exact meaning of the expression, “iuxta quod unusquisque ... de
honoribus habuit, coniectum” (see the preceding note), is difficult to de-
termine. Does it mean that the nobles were taxed in proportion to the
estimated value of each of their honores as a whole; or does it mean that
they were required to pay a specific sum for each dominant holding (man-
88 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
The fact that the contributions required from the regni pri-
mores were proportioned to the value of their honores, furnishes
additional support for the above propounded theory concerning
the legal basis of the Danegeld. Honores and beneficia, between
which there was in the time of Charles the Bald little if any
distinction,*** were granted by the king principally in order to
enable their holders to perform at the bidding of the monarch
a certain amount of military service.**® It is clear, therefore,
that the king’s right to require the great magnates to contribute
appropriately toward the Danegeld, was based on his right to
demand military service from them in proportion to the number
and value of their benefices or honores;**° and in the case of the
regni primores as in that of the other classes, the king acted on
the principle that he had a right to commute the actual military
service into a money payment."
The,words of Hincmar, superficially at least, seem to indicate
that the magnates paid their contributions to the Danegeld out
of their private—as distinct from their dependents’ — re-
sources.’** The possibility that some may have done that can-
not of course be wholly eliminated, since we have no direct
evidence to the contrary.'*® On the other hand, it is, as we have
seen, a well established fact that all payments of whatever kind
which the seigniors of this period had to make, as a rule were
supplied ultimately by the lower classes of the population, in
particular the unfree peasants. To suppose that the Danegeld
was in this respect an anomaly, is made impossible by the direct
evidence we have of its deleterious effects on the economic con-
sus indominicatus ) within their honores and perhaps, in addition, a part of
the redevances due them from their dependents? We know that they were
taxed on the latter basis in 877 (see infra, chap. vi, n. 42). Is it too bold
to assume that the same arrangement was made in 866?
138 Bourgeois, Le capitulaire de Kiersy-sur-Oise, 129 ff.; Brunner, op. cit.,
TT6256 3° Waltz, 0p. cit. -1V;.215, -216-andenel Clete Berti c09s7 Die oo;
where practically no distinction is made between honores and beneficia, and
where both are said to consist of mansi.
139 Brunner, op.cit., IT, 210-11; cf: 1bid., I, 209; Viollet, op. cit., 1, 439.
140. Waitz;:op..ctt., IV;°597,.n..2--. Cf. Ann: (Bert. 869," p:-08.
141 Cf. supra, pp. 74 ff.
142 Cii supra, 1.1386.
143 Hinemar (see ibid.) does not say that the magnates themselves made
the contribution. He does say that a coniectum in proportion to the number
and value of the honores held by each magnate ad pensum ... contulit.
It does not seem advisable to base the argument that follows in the text on
this peculiarity of statement, but it should be noted that the words of Hinc-
mar do not disprove the argument.
CHAPTER V 89
dition of the peasantry.'** It is in much better accord with the
established facts to believe that the contributions of the regni
primores, and for that matter of all the seigniors, were furnished
largely if not exclusively by their unfree dependents. Many of
these doubtless had to pay considerably more than the amounts
at which their holdings had been assessed by the king. The prob-
ability is that the sums actually paid by the unfree tenants were
determined, not by royal decree, but by the lord or his agents;
and that these sums were always intended to cover at least two
things: (1) the assessment levied by the king and (2) a liberal
profit for the lord and his ministeriales.’** But the regni primores
probably deemed it necessary to increase these sums somewhat
in the case of the peasants on those estates which were held as
honores; in order that the payments of these peasants might
cover not only the two things above mentioned, but also the two
special contributions required of the primores — contributions
which ought strictly to have been furnished by the magnates out
of their private, demesnial resources.'*® Thus, it will be seen,
the Danegeld always, even when it was levied on honores, proved
for the great magnates a much lesser burden than actual military
service; a fact which, as pointed out before, is of considerable
help in trying to understand why it was easier for Charles the
Bald to buy off the Vikings with money than to expel them by
force of arms.'**
Four different assessments'** had been required in order to
raise the sum demanded by the Northmen as the price of their
withdrawal. Why so many levies were necessary, is a very
important and interesting question, but one which cannot be
answered with more than approximate certainty. It has been
pointed out that the magnates and seigniors had, for various
reasons, less objection to furnishing certain quotas of Danegeld
than to equipping themselves and their men for the service of
war. Always, however, there were some seigniors who, by
reason of hostility to the crown, did neither of these things.
Probably a certain number —e. g. Adalard and his following,
perhaps even Robert the Strong for a time — pursued such a
144 Cf. supra, pp. 82-83 and nn. 111, 114.
145 See supra, nn. 119, 122, 123, 124.
146 The heribanni due from the seigniors may have been obtained by them
in a similar way (cf. supra, n. 119).
147 See supra, pp. 82 ff.
148 See supra, n. 136.
90 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
policy in 866. There is, as we have seen, reason to believe that
the first assessment for the Danegeld of this year would have
proved amply sufficient if all the tax-payers had properly re-
sponded.'*® Evidently they did not, since three additional assess-
ments had to be levied in order to secure the required amount
of 4,000 pounds. It is clear, however, that the first assessment
did yield by far the larger part of what was needed, for the
second assessment was calculated to bring a much smaller amount
of money than‘the first.°° The last two contributions, which
were based on the values of the honores held by the primores,
must have aggregated but a small fraction of the whole Dane-
geld.*>+
The agreement with the Vikings had been reached rather
early in the year 866;'°* yet the Danegeld could not be paid until
July, and not until after Robert the Strong had been given back
his commanding position in Neustria.*** Was there any connec-
tion between the latter event and the raising of the Danegeld?
To this question only a hypothetical answer can be given. The
view expressed above regarding the reasons for Robert’s failure
to make a stand against the Vikings at Melun,’* implies that
Robert was taking advantage of the presence of the Vikings for
the furtherance of his own interests. If this view is correct, it
follows that Robert would lend no aid in securing the removal
of the Northmen, at least until Charles had done something
toward rehabilitating the prestige of his ambitious vassal; or,
more specifically, Robert would be reluctant to do his share in
raising the Danegeld, unless and until Charles would reinstate
him as his vicegerent in Neustria.*°> But we know that the
Danegeld was not paid until after Robert had regained his posi-
1492 Ch vsupra,: n, 134:
150, Cr. supra,.n. 135.
151 Lot (“Une année ...de Charles le Chauve,”’ loc. cit., 405-6) sup-
poses that Charles the Bald’s sale of the abbey of St. Bertin to Hilduin for
thirty pounds of gold, on June 19, 866, was largely due to the necessity of
securing more money for the Danegeld. I can find no basis for this conjec-
ture except the fact that the sale took place about a month before the Dane-
geld was paid to the Vikings, which fact really has no particular significance:
152) fbtd.) 3398) N09) 2:
153 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81. Cf. von Kalckstein, op. cit., 102-3; Lot, op. cit.,
400-1.
154 See supra, pp. 68-70.
155 Robert had a large following, particularly in Neustria, where he had
taken an important part in the revolt of 858 (Lot, op. cit., 401). Opposi-
tion on his part would therefore have been a serious obstacle in the collec-
tion of the Danegeld.
CHAPTER V 91
tion in Neustria.*** Accordingly, it seems not too much to say
that among the various considerations'** which led Charles to
readopt Robert the Strong as his most highly favored vassal?**
must be included also the necessity of, or the difficulties encoun-
tered in, raising the Danegeld. There can be little doubt that
Robert and his followers, after their reinstatement, actually did
raise the Danegeld for those honores in Neustria which had been
granted to them, and thereby materially aided Charles in secur-
ing the amount demanded by the Vikings.*®®
It was probably late in June, or early in July,'® that the North-
men quitted their island stronghold near the monastery of St.
Denis. Thence they proceeded to a point farther down the
Seine, where they tarried for a time to repair their ships and to
await the payment of the Danegeld. Meanwhile, Charles, with
a force of workmen and wagons, had repaired to Pitres to com-
plete the fortifications in that place, in order that the Northmen
might not again be able to ascend the Seine.'®*! These measures
on the part of the king indicate that in spite of recent events he
had not lost faith in the fortified bridge as an effective means
of opposing the Viking raids,'** provided he could have the loyal
cooperation of his fideles in the operations of defense.
Towards the end of July the Northmen received their
money,'** and then put to sea. Some of the Vikings proceeded
directly to the pagus Isalgae (Ijsselgau?), in the realm of
Lothaire II. Here they seem to have continued their operations
without encountering any resistance on the part of Lothaire.'’*
156 Cf. supra, n. 153.
157 Other reasons which may have induced Charles to favor Robert as he
did, are given by Lot, op. cit., 402.
158 Lot, op. cit., 401, calls Robert “le vrai roi du pays entre Seine et
Loire.”’
159 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81. Cf. von Kalckstein, op. cit., 102-3.
160 Ann. Bert., 866. This source, in the edition of Waitz, p. 81, reads
“mense Iunio.” Dehaisnes (p. 155) and others have “mense Iulio.” No
explanation of this discrepancy has ever been given so far as I can ascertain.
161 Ann. Bert., 866, pp. 81-82. Cf. Lot, op. cit., 402-3.
162 Adonis Chronicon, 868, M.G.H., SS., II, p. 328. Cf. Lot, “Le pont de
Pitres,” loc. cit., 9. Charles apparently continued in the future to place
much confidence in this means of resistance (ibid., 15 ff.).
163 Ann. Xantenses, 866, M.G.H., SS., II, p. 232: “pagani crudeliter Gal-
liam vastaverunt. Acceptoque inde a Karolo rege innumerabili censu, ad
tempus reversi sunt.” Ann. Bert., 866, p. 82: “Nortmanni mense [ulio mare
intrant.”
164 Ibid.; Ann. Xantenses, 866, loc. cit., p. 232. Cf. Vogel, 217, n. 2; Lot,
“Une année ... de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 403, n. 3.
92 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
But the Seine region was now for ten years left undisturbed by
Vikings.*®
Thus, by reason of the negligence, disloyalty, and self-interest
of his fideles,‘*° Charles the Bald had been compelled for the
fourth time’ to secure the removal of a group of Vikings by the
payment of Danegeld. And on this occasion, as in 860, he had
found it impossible even to raise the Danegeld, until the ambi-
tious demands of the more powerful among the fideles had been
satisfied. The Danegeld, whatever may have been its legal basis,
served only on the one hand further to curtail the royal power
and, on the other, steadily to augment the power of the fideles
politically as well as financially.'®
165 Vogel, 217-18.
166 For an illustration of the total lack of public interest on the part of
the West Frankish nobility at this time, see Lot, op. cit., 480-31.
167 Vogel, p. 216, calls the Danegeld of 866 the third payment of this kind
to the Vikings. He overlooks the Danegeld of 853.
168 Cf. Lot, op. cit., 401-2.
THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 93
CHAPTER VI.
THE TWO DANEGELDS OF 877.
After 866, a period of eleven years elapsed before Charles the
Bald was again. reduced to the necessity of paying Danegeld.
The decade from 866 to 876 on the whole proved to be, for the
greater part of the West Frankish realm, an era of peace, a time
of recuperation from the ravages of the Northmen.: To the
population of the Seine region in particular, which after suffer-
ing the consequences of six successive Viking expeditions? was
doubtless on the verge of complete exhaustion, this period of
tranquillity and recovery must have been especially welcome.
Yet there was in it no promise of security for the future. For
the Northmen had after all not ceased from their destructive
labors; they had only shifted for a time the principal scene of
their plundering operations from the continent to England. And
with the arrival in the Seine, in the year 876, of a seventh expe-
dition of Vikings, the ten years of peace came to an abrupt close.®
The invaders had as usual timed their adventure well. When
the Vikings entered the Seine, Charles was preoccupied with a
project of such great moment to him, that there was small likeli-
hood that he would swerve from it to deal with them. On the
contrary, the Northmen had good reason to believe that they
would be able to establish themselves and gain firm footing in
the kingdom, before anything would be done to expel them or
even to limit the area of their operations.*
This is not the place to give a detailed account of Charles the
Bald’s unsuccessful attempt, on the death of Louis the German
in 876, to gain possession of eastern Lorraine.’ For the purposes
of the present discussion it will suffice to note the relation be-
tween the failure of that enterprise and the success of the Viking
adventure.
It was at Cologne, on the way to the fateful field of Andernach,
that Charles received the news of the arrival of the Vikings.
1 Vogel, 217, 224 ff.
2 In 841, 845, 851, 852, 856-62, and 865-66. On the effects of these expedi-
ditions, see Vogel, 188 ff., 205 ff., and passim.
3 Miracula sancti Dionysii, III, ce. 1-2, Bouquet, VII, p. 365; also see
infra, n. 6. For the activities of the Northmen between 866 and 876, see
Vogel, 217-18, 224 ff.
4 See ibid., 252, and cf. 83 ff.
5 See Diimmler’s account (Gesch. d. ostfr. Reiches, III, 36-38).
94 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
On September 16, so the king was informed, they had entered
the Seine in a fleet numbering about one hundred large vessels.®
These tidings did not induce Charles to abandon his project of
conquest. To him the acquisition of Lorraine probably seemed
the more important thing for the moment; and he may have
trusted that the fortifications at Pitres would prove a sufficient
check to the Northmen until, after a victory over the East Franks,
he would be able to give the Vikings his personal attention.’
Accordingly, Charles continued on his way to Andernach, where,
on October 8, his forces were completely routed by an army of
Saxons and Thuringians commanded by his nephew, Louis the
Saxon.°®
This defeat probably cooled the martial ardor of Charles con-
siderably. At all events an offensive against the Northmen was
now utterly out of the question. To have attempted it would
have been futile, not to say foolhardy, for the army of Charles
had suffered unusually heavy losses at Andernach.’® It is, there-
fore, not surprising that Charles very soon dispatched a group
of nobles, headed by Count Conrad II of Paris, to open negotia-
tions with the Vikings. The envoys were instructed to make the
best bargain possible under the circumstances, and to report to
the king at a placitum which he had summoned to Samoussy for
November 25.11. Whether the embassy of Count Conrad was able
to reach an agreement with the invaders, and whether any
report on this matter was submitted to the king at Samoussy,
we do not know.'? However that may be, it is certain that
6 Ann. Bert., 876, p. 132; Annales Vedastini, 876, ed. Dehaisnes, p. 295.
7 Cf. Vogel, 252. Lot (“Le pont de Pitres,’ Le Moyen Age, 1905, IX, p.
12) believes that either the fortifications at Pitres were not yet completed, or
they were not guarded.
8 Ann. Bert., 876, pp. 132-33.
9 According to the Annals of St. Vaast, Charles, before he opened nego-
tiations with the Vikings, had made an unsuccessful attempt to expel them
by force of arms; but no such attempt is mentioned by Hincmar, and it
seems very unlikely so soon after the catastrophe at Andernach (cf. infra,
Nive):
10 Ann, Bert., 876, p. 133; cf. Vogel, 251.
11 Ann. Bert., 876, p. 184: “Karolus imperator Chuonradus et alios pri-
mores ad Nortmannos qui in Sequanam venerant misit, ut, quocumque modo
possent, foedus cum eis pasiscerentur, et ad condictum placitum [in Sal-
monciaco 15. die post missam s. Martini] ei renuntiarent.” Ann. Vedast.,
loc. cit.: “Unde de redemptione regni cogitare coepit [Karolus].” Cf. Vogel,
252-53. ;
12 Hinemar mentions the fact that the placitum at Samoussy was duly
held, but says nothing of any report as regards the negotiations with the
Northmen. There is good reason to suspect that these first negotiations had
been without definite result, as will appear from what follows in the text.
CHAPTER VI 95
Charles before leaving Samoussy stationed scarae along the
Seine, hoping probably that he might be able in this way at least
to prevent the Vikings from making a further advance.*®
If negotiations with the Northmen had not been altogether
broken off before Charles left Samoussy, they certainly must
have been materially delayed by a very severe illness which fell
upon the king soon after his departure, and from which he did
not begin to convalesce until early in 877.‘t Then, if we may
believe the Annals of St. Vaast, envoys were again dispatched
to the Vikings with instructions to negotiate with them con-
cerning their evacuation of the kingdom in return for the pay-
ment of tribute.° This time a definite understanding was
arrived at,'® the Northmen agreeing to depart for a considera-
tion of 5,000 pounds of silver according to weight.*’
About the same time that the treaty with the Vikings in the
Seine was concluded, or shortly afterward, a similar agreement
was reached with another group of Northmen who for some time
past had been established in the region of the lower Loire.** The
negotiations with the latter appear to have been conducted, not
13 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “Scaras quoque, quae contra Nortmannos secus
Sequanam in procinctu essent, disposuit [Karolus].””’ The Annals of St.
Vaast (loc. cit.), it is true, seem to indicate that Charles for a time had
attempted to take the offensive against the Vikings, though without success:
“Contra quos [Nortmannos] Karolus exercitum dirigit; sed nil utiliter
egere.”’ According to the same source, this offensive preceded an eclipse of
the sun on October 29—i. e. it took place nearly a month before the placitum
was held at Samoussy on November 25. But it is not safe to place too much
reliance on the sequence of events as given in the Annals of St. Vaast.
Some further details as to the probable whereabouts of Charles himself in
October and November, are given by Dtimmler, III, 38, n. 2. The Vikings
entered the monastery of St. Denis on November 30, but appear to have re-
mained there only a short time (Lot, op. cit., pp. 13-14).
14 Ann. Bert., 876-77, p. 134.
15 Ann. Vedast., 877, p. 295: “Karolus legatos misit qui cum Nortmannis
tractarent, ut munerati e regno ejus abirent.” Hincmar makes no men-
tion of this embassy.
16 Ann. Vedast., loc. cit.: “Et facta pactione, etc.”
17 Ann. Bert., 877, p. 135: “Summa vero tributi fuerunt quinque milia
librae argenti ad pensam.” Cf. supra, n. 15, and infra, n. 97. On the sig-
nificance of the provision that the money was to be weighed, see supra,
chap. iii, nn. 61, 62; chap. v, n. 61.
-18 On the long continued occupation of the lower Loire region by the
Northmen, see Vogel, passim, and especially, for their operations between
874 and 878, pp. 248-51. The statement in the text as regards the probable
time when the treaty with the Loire Vikings was made, is based on the fact
that Hinemar mentions this treaty (see the following note) immediately
after he has described the manner in which the Danegeld for the Vikings in
the Seine was raised. ,
96 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
by the king himself, but by the magnates of Neustria,*® among
whom at this time Abbot Hugh functioned as the king’s vice-
regent.2° We have no information concerning the amount of
the tribute which was demanded by the Vikings of the Loire.**
Meanwhile there had arrived in France two papal envoys
bringing letters from John VIII to Charles the Bald. The latter,
it is well known, had in 875, on the death of his nephew, the
Emperor Louis II, undertaken an expedition to Italy, where,
thanks to the friendly attitude of Pope John, he had been able
to secure the imperial title and some nominal recognition of his
suzerainty. Before the emperor left Italy he had given the pope,
whose position was precarious, assurance of his speedy return.?'?
It was the immediate fulfillment of this engagement which
John VIII urged in the letters dispatched to the emperor early
in 877. The pope besought Charles in impetuous terms to come
without further delay to his aid against the Saracens and other
enemies; and he emphasized the necessity of asserting and
establishing the imperial authority in the peninsula.’*. This was
not the first time that John VIII had reminded Charles of his
promise to come to the defense of the Roman church,”* and now
the emperor probably felt that in spite of the various problems
confronting him at. home, he could no longer defer the fulfillment
of his promise to the pontiff.**
Charles, having determined to undertake a second journey to
Italy, at once set about making his preparations. Before he
could start out it was necessary, among other things, to provide
adequately for the general administration of the West Frankish
kingdom during his absence, and for the raising of the tribute
19 Ann. Bert., loc cit.: “Tlli vero, tam episcopi quam et alii qui trans
Sequanam sunt de Neustria, tributum illis Nortmannis qui in Ligeri erant
secundum quod sibi ab eis fuit impositum, undecumque valuerunt, reddere
procuraverunt.”’ ;
20 Vogel, 220-22; cf. Bourgeois, Le capitulaire de Kiersy-sur-Oise, 99 ff.
21 Two considerations lead me to conjecture that it was a smaller amount
than that paid to the Vikings of the Seine: (1) it was to be raised in a
smaller district—only in Neustria, while the other was to be raised in Bur-
gundy as well as in the larger part of Francia; (2) the Vikings in the Loire
were probably fewer in number than those in the Seine (cf. Vogel, 248,
bottom).
21a See Dimmler, II, 388-400.
22 Ann. Bert., 877, pp. 134-35. The letters of John VIII are printed in
Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova, et amplissima collectio, XVII, 27 ff. Cf.
Dtimmler, III, 40.
23 Cf. ibid., 39 ff.; Bourgeois, op. cit., 74 ff.
24 Cf. Dimmler, III, 40-41.
CHAPTER VI 97
due the Northmen of the Seine. It was to arrange these and
other matters that the emperor summoned his magnates to the
famous assembly at Kiersy on June 14.”
It has been supposed that a first assessment for the Danegeld
promised the Vikings of the Seine was prepared at a meeting held
at Compiegne on May 7, six ‘weeks prior to the Assembly of
Kiersy.** But careful study reveals the fact that there is nothing
to support this view except an erroneous superscription added
by some monk, or scribe, of a later period, to one of the two tax
documents evidently drawn up at Kiersy.** There can scarcely
be any doubt that the rates of assessment, as we have them, were
fixed at the Assembly of Kiersy, and that they were part of what
is usually called the Capitulary of Kiersy.** It is true that the
manuscript of this capitulary, in the form that we know it,”
contains only a very brief reference to the Danegeld, a mere
topical statement, indicating that it was one of the subjects
discussed at the meeting.*® But we are fortunate in obtaining
more detailed information from the Annals of St. Bertin,*' the
Annals of St. Vaast,?? and the two tax documents just men-
tioned.**
The money paid as Danegeld to the Vikings of the Seine in
877, was raised in a more limited area than most of the preceding
Danegelds :** only in the kingdom of Francia and in Burgundy.*°
25 Ann. Bert., 877, ed. Waitz, p. 135; ef. ed. Dehaisnes, p. 255, notes (a)
and (b); M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t, ii, pp. 355 ff. As regards the tribute to the
Loire Vikings, see infra, n. 88.
26 See infra, appendix i, nn. 1, 4, 5.
27 See infra, appendix i.
28 According to Bourgeois (op. cit., 68, and passim), this was not a capi-
tulary in the proper sense, but merely a record of deliberations such as
usually preceded the issuance of a capitulary. Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, ‘“‘Les
articles de Kiersy,” Nouvelles recherches sur quelques problemes Whistoire,
417 ff.
29 The text of the Capitulary of Kiersy was preserved to the nineteenth
century in only a single manuscript, which, unfortunately, is now lost.
Practically all that is known about this manuscript may be found in Bour-
geois, op. cit., 11 ff.
30 Capitulare Carisiacense, c. 30, M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. ii, p. 361: “Qual-
iter hoc perficiatur et ad effectum perveniat, quod Nortmannis dari debet
de coniecto.”
Oo 31(,.ed. Waitz, ' p.°135.
32 877, ed. Dehaisnes, pp. 295-96.
33 The documents are printed in M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 354,
under the title Hdictum Compendiense de tributo Nordmannico, and are
there designated respectively as A. and B. On the relation of these docu-
ments to each other and to the Capitulary of Kiersy, see infra, appendix ii.
34 See supra, chap. i, n. 47; chap. iii, n. 37; chap. v, n. 65. Cf. chap. iv
and n. 12.
35 It was doubtless partly for this reason, and because the amount of the
~
Danegeld. 7.
98 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
And it was specifically provided that that part of Francia which
Charles the Bald had acquired by the treaty of Mersen in 870,
was not to be taxed.*® Neustria, which heretofore had usually
been taxed along with Francia and Burgundy,** was not included
in this levy,** manifestly because another and separate Danegeld
was to be raised there for the Vikings of the Loire.*? Aquitaine,
which ‘was regarded as a separate kingdom, had never before
been required to contribute toward the Danegeld, and was not
Neo thi
Danegeld was higher in 877 than in 866, that the mansi indominicati had
to be included, and the rate of the tax on the other mansi increased, in
the assessment of 877 (cf. supra, chap. v, nn. 61, 67-69.) But there were
other reasons, too (see infra, p. 101 and n. 59).
36 Ann. Bert., 877, p. 135: “quomodo tributum de parte regni Franciae
quam ante mortem Lotharii habuit, sed et de Burgundia exigeretur, [Karo-
lus] disposuit.” Ann. Vedast., 877, pp. 295-96: “omne regnum ad hoc tribu-
tum dat ut ab hae liberarentur clade. ... At hi qui in Francia remanserant,
dato tributo, Danos e regno abire coegerunt.” Also in the superscriptions
of the tax documents mentioned above, there are references to the territory
in which the Danegeld was levied; but these convey no additional informa-
tion, and one is inaccurate (cf. infra, appendices i and ii). On the tax in
Burgundy, cf. infra, n. 40. Lot, op. cit., 15, suggests that it would have been
poor policy to tax that part of Francia which had been acquired after the
death of Lothaire II.
37 Except for the Danegeld of 862, which probably was not levied outside
of Neustria (cf. supra, n. 34).
38 Vogel, p. 255, seems to think it possible that Neustria was taxed for
both Danegelds: that paid to the Vikings of the Seine as well as that paid
to the Vikings of the Loire. But Hincmar’s words leave no room for doubt
on this point. He speaks first of the “tributum de parte regni Franciae
quam ante mortem Lotharii [Karolus}] habuit, sed et de Burgundia” (Ann.
Bert., loc. cit.), and then, after he has explained how this was raised, pro-
ceeds to mention another tribute for the Loire Vikings. That, he says, “tam
episcopi quam et alii qui trans Sequanam sunt de Neustria .. . reddere pro-
curaverunt” (ibid.). On the other hand, it is doubtless true that those
seigniors who, like Abbot Hugh, held benefices in Neustria as well as in
Francia or Burgundy, had to contribute toward both Danegelds in 877 (cf.
von Kalckstein, Abt Hugo aus dem Hause der Welfen, Markgraf von Neu-
strien, in Forsch. 2. d. Gesch., XIV, 74.
oo Cr: Supra. an. 18.
40 Bourgeois (op. cit., 98-99) seems to think that in 877 the magnates
of Aquitaine had been asked to contribute, but had refused; and he believes
that the seigniors of Burgundy had likewise refused to pay the Danegeld.
But his hypothesis can not be sustained. It is based on the following falla-
cies: (1) The relations between the fideles assembled at Kiersy and Charles
the Bald were strained, and a revolt was brewing. This theory has been
disposed of by Halphen (“A propos du capitulaire de Quierzy-sur-Oise,”
Rev. Hist., 1911, CVI, 286 ff.). (2) The non-appearance of a magnate at
Kiersy implies that he was not in favor of buying off the Northmen, and
that, therefore, he had refused to contribute to the Danegeld. This is, of
course, nothing more than a gratuitous assumption; and it is invalidated
by the fact that the seigniors had heretofore as a rule been more inclined
to collect the Danegeld than to enter into combat with the Vikings (cf.
supra, chap. v, n. 113, and what follows in the text of that chapter). (3)
The position of that clause in chapter 31 of the Capitulary of Kiersy which
relates to the honores of Boso.and others (in Burgundy), implies that these
CHAPTER VI 99
;
To raise the Danegeld in Francia and Burgundy, a graduated
property and income tax was levied on (1) the dominant and
dependent holdings of land which constituted the honores, or
benefices,** of bishops, abbots, counts, and royal vassals;*? (2)
the property, or resources, of all priests;** and (3) the property
of merchants and townspeople.‘ Presumably the tax did not
yield the whole amount required,*® for it became necessary, as
it had been on at least one preceding occasion,*® to draw also on
men had refused to pay the Danegeld. This argument is, in my opinion,
disposed of infra, in appendix ii (cf. appendix i, n. 5). (4) The theory that a
first, or preliminary assessment for the Danegeld due the Vikings of the
Seine, had been drawn up at Compiégne on May 7. Without this theory,
which represents an attempt to reconcile two conflicting statements in the
sources—and it is a theory which seems to have been in the main accepted
by most scholars—Bourgeois could hardly have constructed the thesis which
he defends in his book. The present writer, however, believes that this
theory must be abandoned, if the argument set forth infra, in appendix i,
is accepted as valid.
41 On the practical identity of honores and benefices at this time, see
supra, chap. v, n. 138; see also infra, n. 48.
42 Edictum ... de tributo Nordmannico, B., loc. cit.: “Episcopi, abbates,
comites ac vassi dominici ex suis honoribus de unoquoque manso indomi-
nicato donent denarios duodecim, de manso ingenuili quatuor denarios de
censu dominicato et quatuor de facultate mansuarii, de servili vero manso
duos denarios de censu indominicato et duos de facultate mansuarii.” Ann.
Bert., 877, p. 135: “de mansis indominicatis solidus unus, de unoquoque
manso ingenuili 4 denarii de censu dominico et 4 de facultate mansuarii, de
manso vero servili duo denarii de censu dominico et duo de facultate mansu-
arii.”” It will be noted that the only difference between these two statements
is that the second is more inclusive than the first. According to Hincmar
all the mansi in the realm were to be taxed, but according to document B.
the tax applied only to those mansi which constituted the honores of the
magnates and the royal vassals (cf. infra, n. 61). Of course, we must re-
gard the document as more accurate than the statement of Hincmar (see
infra, appendix i, n. 14). As regards document A., see infra, appendix, ii.
43 Edictum ... de tributo Nordmannico, B., loc. cit.: “De omnibus vero
ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus ...vel abbas... accipiant ... de _pres-
byteris secundum possibilitatem ...a quo plurimum quinque solidos, a quo
minimum quatuor denarios.” Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “unusquisque episcopus
de presbiteris suae parrochiae secundum quod cuique possibile erat, a quo
plurimum, ete.’ On document A., according to which the priests of
churches held by the emperor appear to be exempt, see infra, appendix ii.
44 Edictum .. . de tributo Nordmannico, B., loc. cit.: “De negotiatoribus
autem vel qui in civitatibus commanent iuxta possibilitatem, secundum
quod habuerint de facultatibus, coniectus exigatur.’” Capitulare Carisia-
cense. c. 31, ibid., p. 361: “Et de cappis et aliis negotiatoribus, videlicet ut
Tudaei dent decimam et negotiatores christiani undecimam.’ This tax is
not mentioned either in the Annals of St. Bertin or in document A.
45 At least that inference may be drawn from the recital of Hinemar,
who does not mention the contribution from the churches until after he has
explained all the details of the tax proper; also it does not seem probable
that the church treasuries would have been drawn upon if the tax had
yielded a sufficient amount. Cf. infra, n. 47.
46 In 860-61; cf. supra, chap. iii, n. 36.
100 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
the church treasuries, each of which contributed in proportion
to the resources at its disposal.*’
The tax on the honores was assessed in accordance with the
following schedule: for each mansus indominicatus*® there
were to be paid twelve denarwi (or one solidus) ;*° for each man-
sus ingenuilis® eight denarii, of which four were to be taken
from the cens due the seignior,®? while the other four were to be
contributed (in addition to the regular redevances due the
seignior) by the holder (or holders) ** of the mansus;°* for each
servile mansus®® four denarit were exacted,°® of which two were
to be taken from the seignior’s cens, and two contributed (like-
wise in addition to the regular redevances) by the tenants.*’
47 Ann. Bert., toc. cit.: “Sed et de thesauris ecclesiarum, prout quantitas
loci extitit, ad idem tributum exsolvendum acceptum fuit.” Ann. Vedast.,
877, p. 295: “Et facta pactione spoliantur ecclesiae, et omne regnum ad hoc
tributum dat.” The fact that the “spoliation’”’ of the churches is mentioned
before the collection of the tax in the Annals of St. Vaast, does not seem to
invalidate the argument given above in n. 45, since Hincmar evidently gives
more detailed, and more accurate, information on the raising of the Dane-
geld. The author of the Annals of St. Vaast probably mentioned first that
feature of the Danegeld which to him seemed most important, or rather,
most reprehensible. That he did not approve of using the treasures of the
church for this purpose is indicated by his characterization of the act as a
“spoliation” (cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., 82-83).
48 The mansus indominicatus was the demensne, or home farm—dominant
holding—to which the mansi ingenuiles and mansi serviles were attached,
and on which the labor services owed by the tenants were performed (cf.
Séé, Les classes rurales et le rég. dom. en France, 28 ff.). Since the term
honores at this time usually was applied to very important benefices
(Waitz, D. Verfassungsgesch., IV, 16 and n. 1), perhaps we may infer that
the honores ordinarily consisted of several mansi indominicati with their
dependent tenures (cf. Guérard, ed., Polypt. @Irminon, I (Prolég.), 565-67,
579-82, 891). ee
49 See supra, n. 42.
50 Cf. supra, chap. v, n. 69.
51 See supra, n. 42.
52 The cens was a real, as distinct from a personal, redevance. It varied
in amount, probably according to custom, and was payable sometimes in
money, sometimes in kind (Sée, op. cit., 78-83). By this time the cens had
probably come to include the old war taxes (cf. ibid., 116); at any rate,
while the terms hostilitium and carnaticum disappear in the course of the
ninth century (cf. Du Cange, Glossarium, s. v.),-the taxes which they rep-
resented certainly continued to be collected (Waitz, op. cit., IV, 624; Guér-
ard; ov. cit;*661 f1.).- Cli supra, pp. T8 att
53 Many mansi supported more than one family of peasants (Guérard,
OD: CU aot ya
54 In other words, the tenant of a mansus ingenuilis was, in theory, to
pay toward the Danegeld only four denarii out of what remained of his
income after he had paid all other dues which he owed. But ef. infra, pp.
102-3.
55 Cf, supra, chap. vy, n. 69.
56 See supra, n. 42.
57 What is said supra, nn. 52-54, applies here also, mutatis mutandis.
CHAPTER VI 101
In the preceding chapter it was shown that the Danegeld must
be regarded, in its legal aspects, as a money payment which
the king claimed the right to exact as a substitute for the mili-
tary service owed by all freemen. We have also seen how, in
866, all freemen, including those of very moderate fortune, were
required to contribute toward the Danegeld by paying a heer-
bann.** But in 877 no tax, not even a disguised one, was laid
on freemen as such. And an examination of the schedule of as-
sessments for the Danegeld of this year will show that it fails
to provide for any taxes whatsoever on allodial property. All
of which may, superficially at least, seem to invalidate the theory
that the Danegeld was, in legal principle, a substitute for mili-
tary service. It must be remembered, however, that in the ninth
century the freeman of moderate fortune, and with him his
allodial property, was rapidly disappearing. Long before the
close of the reign of Charles the Bald, the Carolingian armies
of freemen had in large part been superseded by armies made up
almost exclusively of groups of vassals. The latter, unless they
were royal vassals, were not under the direct command of the
king, or the king’s officials as such; they were subject only to
the control of their lords, the great seigniors, lay and ecclesi-
astical.°® Moreover, the principle that the seigniors owed mili-
tary service, not so much because they were freemen as because
they were benefice holders, and that they owned it strictly in pro-
portion to the size or value of their benefices, was now rapidly
gaining headway.®’ These facts will probably serve to explain
why the Danegeld of 877 was levied, not on the allodial property
of any freeman, nor on benefices held of other lords than the king,
but only on the honores® held directly of the king by bishops, ab-
bots, counts, and royal vassals; and they clearly indicate that
58 Supra, chap. v, pp. 73 ff.
59 Diimmler, I, 222, 322-24; Baldamus, Das Heerwesen wu. d. spat. Karo-
lingern (in Gierke’s Untersuch. 2. d. Staats- u. Rechtsgesch., IV), pp. 32 ff.,
39;. Prou, ‘‘De la nature du service militaire, etc.,”’ Rev. Hist., 1890, XLIV,
314-15; Fustel de Coulanges, Les transform. de la royauté, 509-23, 640-65;
Flach, Les orig. de Vanc. France, I, 317-22; Lot, “La grande invasion nor-
mande,” Bibl. de l’école des chartes, 1908, LXIX, 7, n. 4; Brunner, D. Rechts-
gesch., II, 202 ff. The facts referred to above in the text may explain why
no attempt was made at this time to collect the heerbann as a tax for the
Danegeld. Owing to the impoverishment of those freemen who were not
seigniors, and to the dwindling of their numbers, it was probably felt that
at best a collection of the heerbann would have yielded very little. It is,
unfortunately, impossible to estimate how much the heerbann, as a tax for
the purposes of the Danegeld, had yielded in 866 (cf. supra, pp. 73-77).
60 Baldamus, op. cit., 28 ff., 34-35; Waitz, op. cit., IV, 597 and n. 2; ef.
Ann, Bert., 869, p. 98.
102 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
the holder of .a honor was by the king held liable to ezther military
service or its money equivalent — Danegeld.
There are certain indications of an attempt to lighten the
_ burden of the Danegeld for the poorer classes on this occasion.
Accolz and hospitia, which had been taxed in 866,*? were exempt
in 877, theoretically at least.°* And the taxes on the mansi in-
genuiles and serviles were in the latter year divided in such wise
that only one half was to be paid by the holder (or holders)
of the mansus, the seignior being required to furnish the other
half from the customary cens paid him by his tenants. In 866,
the tenants of dependent mansi, had been required to furnish
the entire tax laid on their holding, and this tax was to be paid
in addition to the cens due the seignior, which was at that time
left untouched by the Danegeld.** It must be assumed, there-
fore, that the king now wished the seigniors to contribute a
very considerable part of the Danegeld out of what may be
regarded as their resources — in contradistinction to those of
their tenants — and that those provisions of the assessment of
877 by which taxes were laid on the mansz indominicati and on
the lord’s cens,®® were intended to secure this result.
But did they? Though this question can not be answered
categorically, for want of sufficient and direct evidence, the
evidence that we do have®® seems to imply that in practice
the assessment of 877 was regarded very much in the same.
way as that of 866 had been.** We may believe that while
the seigniors probably raised amounts of money corresponding
more or less to those for which they were responsible according
to the assessment, yet they arranged to have the whole burden
of the entire tax — even that part of it which they had been
ordered by the king to contribute out of their resources — fall
61 Cf. supra, nn. 41, 42. That there was still an important distinction
between benefices and allodial property, and that the magnates of the West
Frankish realm usually possessed both kinds, is proved by that provision in
chapter 10 of the Capitulary of Kiersy which permits a fidelis in a given
case to transfer his honores to a relative, though he retains his allodium
(loc. cit., p. 358). Cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., 130 ff.; Fustel de Coulanges,
Nouvelles recherches, 427, 466 ff.
62 See supra, chap. v, nn. 67, 70, 71.
63 I. e. they are not mentioned in the assessment.
64 Cf. supra, pp. 79-85.
65. Cf. supras mn. 342 552 54, 57.
66 See supra, chap. v, n. 114; cf. infra, n. 114.
67 Cf. supra, pp. 81 ff.
CHAPTER VI 103
on the peasantry.®* It is, for this reason, very improbable that
each tenant paid for his holding the exact amount specified in
the assessment, i. e. four denarii for a mansus ingenutlis and
two denarii for a mansus servilis. It is much more likely that
the assessment was regarded by the seigniors merely as a sched-
ule according to which the quotas for which they were held
responsible would be computed.®® To raise his full quota, a
seignior probably found it necessary to exact from each one of
his tenants — even from those occupying accolx and hospitia —
as large a sum as the tenant could be forced to pay.”° This levy
of Danegeld, therefore, so far from proving a special hardship
for the seigniors, simply provided them with another oppor-
tunity to exploit their peasantry and to accelerate the develop-
ment of the principle that the unfree peasant was taillable a
merci." Small wonder that the magnates did not object to the
Danegeld; they were probably beginning to regard it as a sub-
stantial, if somewhat irregular, source of income.
The tax levied on the priests in 877," varied in proportion
to the property or resources of each, but apparently no priest
was wholly exempt.*? The maximum paid by any priest was
five solidi (or sixty denarii) ; some paid four solidi, others three,
two, or only one; and the minimum was four denari."* For the
68 According to Sée, this was a general rule applying not only to the
Danegeld, but to all taxes of whatever kind. See supra, p. 82.
69 This opinion is strengthened by the wording of document B. (see
supra, n. 42), which requires the benefice-holders to give (donent) “de uno-
quoque manso, etc.” It is true that document A. has accipiat, but this docu-
ment was superseded by B. (cf. infra, appendix ii).
70 It is not impossible that the seigniors also forced the unfree peasants
on their allodial lands to contribute toward the Danegeld, in spite of the
fact that seigniors themselves were not required to furnish anything toward
the Danegeld by virtue of their ownership of such lands; cf. Ann. Vedast.,
877, p. 295: “omne regnum ad hoc tributum dat.”
71 Cf. supra, pp. 84 f.
72 It has been shown above that the contributions of the priests probably
were regarded as war taxes, and a substitute for actual military service;
see supra, pp. 86 f. Cf. also what Hincmar said regarding the military obliga-
tions of the bishops (quoted by Waitz, op. cit., IV, 597, n. 2).
73 See the following note, and cf. supra, n. 43.
74 Hdictum ... de tributo Nordmannico, B., loc. cit.: “De omnibus vero
ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus de suo episcopatu vel abbas de sua solum-
modo abbatia, in cuiuscumque episcopi sint parrochia, accipiant cum misso
episcopi, in cuius parrochia sunt, de presbyteris secundum possibilitatem
quinque solidos vel quatuor vel tres vel duos vel unum solidum; a quo pluri-
mum quinque solidos, a quo minimum quatuor denarios. De ecclesiis vero
imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassallorum imperialium, tam
de illis, qui cum imperatore pergent, quam et illis, qui remanserint, epis-
copus, in cuius parrochia consistunt, secundum praedictum modum coniec-
tum accipiat.” Ann. Bert., 877, p. 135: “unusquisque episcopus de presbi-
104 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
collection of the priests’ taxes special provisions were made,”
evidently at the instigation and in the interest of their eccle-
siastical superiors.*®° The prelates would probably not have
tolerated the collection by lay seigniors of taxes due from clergy-
men; such a procedure would have been sure to lead to abuses
and the establishment of bad customs.** And then the pre-
lates doubtless preferred to secure for themselves the profits
accruing from the collection of those taxes.** As a general rule,
therefore, only bishops were authorized to collect the taxes of
the priests. But an exception was made in the case of those
priests who held parishes that were dependent on monasteries ;*°
their contribution was to be collected by the abbot and the
bishop’s missus jointly.*° Thus, even in this case, provision was
made for episcopal supervision. In all other cases each bishop
had the exclusive right of collection within the limits of his
diocese. This right applied not only to churches directly under
the bishop’s control, but also to those which had lay patrons,
such as the emperor, the empress, counts, or royal vassals.*'
With reference to churches held by counts or royal vassals it
was specifically provided that the bishop was to collect not only
teris suae parrochiae secundum quod cuique possibile erat, a quo plurimum
quinque solidos, a quo minimum 4 denarios episcopi de singulis presbiteris
acciperent et missis dominicis redderent.”
75 See the preceding note. It will be observed that Hincmar, in his sum-
mary (cf. infra, appendix i, n. 14) of the assessment, does not give all the
provisions with regard to the collection of the taxes from the priests. They
are given in document 4A., as well as in B., and these documents differ very
little from each other on this point. The differences that do occur will be
pointed out in the following notes.
76 This statement and the following one are based on ae nature of the
provisions made; but cf. infra, n. 78.
77 That such abuses and bad customs had been common during the recent
period, is indicated by the following passage from Hincmar’s letter to
Louis the Stammerer in 877 (Migne, Patr. Lat., CXXV, 987): “ut Ecclesiae
in isto regno per occasionabiles circadas et per indebitas consuetudinarias
exactiones, quae tempore Pippini, Caroli et Ludovici non fuerunt, ante annos
viginti impositas non affligantur.” Cf. also’ chapter 8 of the decisions of
the Synod of Fismes in 881 (quoted by Diimmler, III, 150, n.:2, and 151, n.
1): “quatenus ecclesiae in isto regno... per indebitas consuetudinarias
exactiones, quae tempore Pippini, Caroli et Hludovici non fuerunt, sed
moderno tempore impositae fuerunt, non affligantur.”
78 It is at least an interesting fact that the only copy of the Capitulary
of Kiersy of which we have any knowledge, was found on a manuscript
containing dispositions very favorable to the church (cf. Bourgeois, op. cit.,
26).
79 This is mentioned in both tax documents, but not by Hincmar.
80 Cf. supra, n. 74. The codperation of the bishop's: missus is mentioned
only in tax document B.
81 The churches of the emperor himself are specifically mentioned in
document B. (cf. supra, n. 74), but not in A. (cf. infra, appendix ii).
CHAPTER VI 105
from those priests whose patrons were to accompany the em-
peror to Italy, but also from those whose patrons were to remain
in France.*? The purpose of this provision is fairly clear.
Charles did not wish to have it appear that those seigniors who
were permitted to remain in France, were to have any oppor-
tunities for financial gain of which those whom he designated
to accompany him to Italy would not be able to avail themselves.*®
It is obvious, of course, that the collection of the Danegeld was
regarded, not as a burdensome duty, but as a very valuable
and highly profitable right..* The arrangement to have the
prelates collect the taxes from the priests is therefore in per-
fect accord with the general policy of Charles the Bald to seek
support for his various enterprises from the higher clergy rather
than from the lay nobility.*° In making his preparations for
the Italian expedition Charles could probably not have chosen
any other policy, for a very large majority of the lay magnates
were bitterly opposed to the expedition; and in spite of the favor
shown by the king to the bishops, many of these eventually joined
hands with the revolting nobles.*®
The contributions exacted from merchants toward the tribute
of 877 were, as usual, proportioned to the fortune of each.*'
Evidently all merchants without exception were taxed.** Several
82 This provision occurs in both documents. The version in B., given
supra, n. 74, may be compared with that in A., given here: “De ecclesiis
vero, quas comites et vassalli dominici habent, seu de illis, qui cum seniore
nostro pergere debent, sive qui remanserint, episcopus, in cuius parrochia
consistunt, secundum praetaxatum modum accipere procurabit.”’
83 A provision such as the one just noted may have been necessary also in
order to enable the bishops to collect from the priests in question, in the
event that the patron should fail to give his consent, or in case he should
be absent in Italy when the bishop’s officials came to collect. In view of
the probability that the tax-payers would avail themselves of any and every
pretext to escape the tax, a special emphasis on the bishop’s right to collect,
particularly from those priests whom they did not themselves appoint, and
whose incomes they did not control, may have been absolutely indispensable.
84 If the contrary be assumed, the various provisions relating to the col-
lection of the priests’ taxes seem to lose their point.
85 Cf. Dimmler, I, 295, 382 and n. 4, 434 ff.; III, 55 ff. An army raised
by Charles the Bald in 866 is said to have consisted principally of episcopal
contingents (Ann. Bert., 866, p. 84).
86 Ann. Vedast., 877, p. 296: “Contra voluntatem ...suorum... [Karo
lus] iterum Italiam ingressus est.” Hincemar tells of the conspiracy formed
by Abbot Hugh and Counts Boso and Bernard against Charles, after he had
reached Italy: “Qui [i. e. Hugh, Boso, and Bernard] una cum aliis regni
primoribus, exceptis paucis, et episcopis adversus eum [Karolum] conspiran-
tes coniuraverunt” (Ann. Bert., 877, p. 136). On this whole subject, cf.
Bourgeois, op. cit., 69-126.
87 See supra, n. 44, and infra, appendix ii.
88 At least no exemptions are mentioned. The tax on the merchants, as
106 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
different classes are mentioned: itinerant merchants (cappi?),**
resident merchants or townsmen, Jews and Christians.°° So
far as the contribution to the Danegeld was concerned, no di-
stinction was made, except possibly as between Jews and Chris-
tians. According to one source,®' the former were taxed at
one tenth, the latter at one eleventh (of their property?) .°%”
We have no direct information as to who were authorized to
collect these taxes. But it is well known that during the Caro-
lingian period merchants were under the special protection of
the king, and that in return for this protection they were re-
quired to make an annual or biennial contribution to the royal
treasury ;°° therefore it does not seem too bold to presume that
in the case of the Danegeld, too, the merchants paid their taxes
to the usual royal officials.
After the various local authorities had collected the taxes due
within their respective territories or jurisdictions, they were,
according to Hincmar, to turn over the amounts thus raised to
the missit dominici..t The missi, whose office was at this time
in the process of becoming territorialized,* are probably not
on the other classes, probably was interpreted as a substitute for military
service (cf. supra, p. 86).
89 Lot (‘Le pont de Pitres,” loc. cit., 14, n. 2) and Thompson (“Com-
merce of France,” Journal of Polit. Economy, 1915, XXIII, 874 and n. 6)
believe that the negotiatoribus of document B. must be itinerant merchants,
since they are contradistinguished from those qui in civitatibus commanent.
But who were the cappi referred to in chapter 31 of the Capitulary of
Kiersy? The latest theory offered in solution of this very vexing problem
‘is that of Thompson (op. cit., 882-87), who suggests that the cappi may have
been Syrian merchants trading in France, with their headquarters at the
emporium of Chappes, just above Troyes, on ihe upper Seine.
90 Cf: supra: nn. 87, 89.
91 The Capitulary of Kiersy (supra, n. 44). As to the value and reliabil-
ity of this part of the capitulary, see infra, appendix ii.
92 In 866 all merchants, apparently without any distinction, had been re-
quired to pay one tenth of “all they seemed to have’’; in 860 the rate of their
tax was not specified, but it was based on a valuation of their houses and
movables, and even the poorest had to contribute. Cf. supra, chap. v, n. 67;
chap. iii, n. 36. If a distinction was made in 877 between Jews and Chris-
tians, and in favor of the latter, it is the only instance of its kind on record
for this period.
93 Chiaswora, chap. Vion 127,
94 See supra, n. 74, end. I interpret Hincmar’s words to mean that the
seigniors in general, not only the bishops, were to remit the Danegeld to
the missi. This feature ofthe collection is mentioned only by Hincmar.
95 On the whole subject see Thompson, Decline of the Missi Dominici, 19
ff. The following passage from chapter 18 of the Capitulary of Kiersy is
illuminating: “Et missi nostri, qui per per omne regnum nostrum constituti
sunt, missaticum nostrum prout eis opportunum fuerit, agere non negligant.”
This seems to imply that the office of the missi had become territorial, or
at least that it was no longer merely temporary. It is not a question of
appointing or reappointing missi, but of admonishing those who held that
office to be faithful and diligent in the discharge of their duties.
CHAPTER VI 107
to be distinguished from the principes regni, or primores, who,
according to the Annals of St. Vaast, were engaged in the collec-
tion of the Danegeld.*®
Charles the Bald had entrusted the general supervision of
the raising of the tribute to his son, Louis the Stammerer, and
those primores who were to remain with Louis in France. The
collection of the taxes had been begun probably late in June
or early in July, but was not completed until some time after
the emperor had departed for Italy, hardly before the middle
of August and possibly later.’ Since it became necessary event-
ually to draw on the church treasuries,°** it must be assumed
either that the assessment prepared at Kiersy had proved in-
adequate or that unexpected difficulties were encountered in
the collection of the tax, the latter being the more probable.°®
96 See the following note.
97 Ann. Vedast., 877, pp. 295-96: “Et dum in his [i. e. the collection of the
Danegeld] principes regni occupantur, Karolus imperator ad hoc negotium
perficiendum Hludowicum filium suum delegit in regno cum suis primoribus
relinquendum, et iterum iter parat quo Italiam pergeret. ... Papiaeque
civitate Johannes papa ei occurrit... . At hi qui in Francia remanserant,
dato tributo, Danos e regno abire coegerunt.” Folewin, Gesta abbatum
sancti Bertini Sithiensium, c. 87, M.G.H., SS., XIII, p. 622: “Karolus...
Romam properare volens post medium Iulium de Francia iter arripuit.” The
diplomas of Charles confirm the statement of Folewin (Bohmer-Mihlbacher,
Die Regesten d. Kaiserreichs u. d. Karolingern, nos. 1815-24), as do the
Miracula s. Dionysii (cf. Lot, “Le pont de Pitres,”’ loc. cit., 16, n. 2). In
view of the fact that the collection of the Danegeld was not at most more
than barely begun when Charles set out for Italy, it is impossible to assume
a connection between the large treasure which the emperor took with him
on his journey (Ann. Bert., 877, p. 135), and the raising of the Danegeld.
The treasure in question may have consisted, at least in part, of the annua
dona which certain seigniors presented to the king immediately after the
Assembly of Kiersy had been dissolved (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 363,
lines 7 ff.). Cf. supra, chap. v. n. 103. Gfrorer’s theory. (Gesch. d. ost- wu.
westfrink. Carolinger, II, 141, 163), that this Danegeld really was, in large
part, a Romersteuer, was disposed of by von Noorden (Hinkmar, Erzbischof
von Rheims, 334, n. 6), who substituted for it another, equally untenable
theory (cf. infra, appendix ii and n. 6). ;
98 See supra, n. 47.
99 It is not unlikely that in many cases the poorer people had become
so impoverished as not to be able to pay the taxes levied upon their hold-
ings (cf. infra, n. 114). The letter written by Hinemar to Louis the Stam-
merer about this time, and referred to by Flodoard (Historia Remensis ec-
clesiae, III, c. 19, M.G.H., SS.; XIII, 510) as being “de coniecto Normannis
dando,” may have dealt with these and other difficulties in the collection of
the tax. It is a noteworthy fact that the draft on the church treasuries is
not included in either of the tax documents drawn up at Kiersy. Perhaps
Hinemar in his letter to Louis had suggested some other way of raising the
remainder of the tribute. That he disapproved, fully as much as the author
of the Annals of St. Vaast (cf. supra, n. 47), of delivering the treasures of
the churches into the hands of the pagans, is evident from what he says in
another letter to Louis (cf. infra, n. 114).
108 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
With the aid of the contributions from the churches, however,
the primores were finally able to bring together the needed sum
of 5,000 pounds, which they then paid over to the Northmen.’°°
It has already been indicated that another tribute was. mean-
while being raised in Neustria, to secure the removal of the
Northmen in the Loire.'°! Our information on this Danegeld
is very scant. We know, however, that the Neustrian bishops
and magnates had undertaken to procure it, probably with the
consent if not at the instigation of Charles the Bald, and per-
haps under the direction of Abbot Hugh who functioned in
the capacity of viceroy in this region.'°? The words of Hincmar,
who is our only source here, seem to imply that there was no
attempt at any orderly and regulated assessment, but that the
magnates, probably by the application of coercive measures in
cases where such seemed necessary, collected money wherever
there was any to be had.'°** How long they were occupied in
this, no doubt very profitable, task cannot be ascertained. The
amount demanded by the freebooters of the Loire remains like-
wise unknown, though it was probably a smaller sum than that
paid to the Vikings of the Seine.’
The magnates in Francia and Burgundy, after they had paid
the Danegeld, forced the Northmen of the Seine to evacuate
the realm.'"> The Neustrian magnates, on the other hand, ap-
pear to have been unable to secure the removal of the Vikings
from the Loire.*°° Why, we do not know. It may be that it
had proved impossible to raise the sum of money demanded;
or the Vikings, after they had received the money, may have ©
repudiated their agreement, and remained in spite of their
100 Cf. supra, n. 97.
101 See supra, nn. 18, 19, 21.
102 Cf. supra, n. 20.
103 That is my interpretation of the following: ‘“‘tributum ... secundum
quod sibi [i, e. the magnates of Neustria] ab eis [Nortmannis] fuit imposi-
tum, undecumque valuerunt, reddere procuraverunt” (Ann. Bert., 877, p.
135).
104 The reasons for this conjecture are given supra, n. 21. It has also
been shown that the magnates of Neustria as such, were not, so far as we
know, required to raise any part of the Danegeld paid to the Vikings of the
Seihe (see supra, n. 38).
105 See supra, n. 97.
106 In the following year (878) Louis the Stammerer was constrained by
Abbot Hugh to undertake what proved to be a fruitless expedition against
them (Ann. Bert., 878, p. 140; cf. Vogel, 257 ff.).
CHAPTER VI 109
promise to evacuate.’ However that may be, it is certain that
the Loire region was not entirely cleared of Vikings until 882.1°°
The Danegelds of 877 were the last levied during the reign
of Charles the Bald, for that monarch died on the return from
his second expedition to Italy. There can be no doubt that
the tributes of this year had, like those of preceding years,
proved a heavy burden on the tax-payers; a burden which, more-
over, had been very inequitably distributed. Unquestionably
it was the unfree peasants and the priests — that part of the
population which, though most numerous, was the least able
to pay — who had furnished the great bulk of the tax money.
And if the merchants, who shared the burden with the peasants
and the priests, were in some instances well situated economic-
ally, many were doubtless comparatively poor men;'"’ besides,
their property had been taxed at a much higher rate than that
of the others. The seigniors, on the other hand, who could and
who ought to have born the heaviest share of taxation, not
only escaped their part of the burden altogether, by shifting
it on the peasantry, but very probably were enriched as a result
of the abuses to which they resorted in collecting the taxes of
their dependents.
As the cumulative result of six successive levies''' of general
Danegeld''? — all during the reign of Charles the Bald — there
was now in the West Frankish realm an unusual degree of
pecuniary distress. If we may believe Hincmar, the laboring
classes had been impoverished, and the church treasuries.
emptied. Beyond that, abuses of various kinds, depredation,
and rapine were current everywhere; but right and justice were
dead. All of which, according to our informant, was a con-
sequence of the corrupt policy of buying off the Northmen when
they should have been resisted with the sword. In a letter to
Louis the Stammerer, written at the time of his accession to
the throne, Hincmar earnestly admonished the new monarch
107 The latter conjecture seems the more probable. Even the Seine Vik-
ings, after they had received the tribute, did not evacuate until they were
forced so to do. Cf. supra, n. 97.
108 Vogel, 259, 347 ff.
10544 0n Bert. 877, pi 13Ts +
110 For a reference to very poor merchants, see supra, chap. iii, n. 36.
111 In 845, 853, 860-61, 862, 866, and 877. See supra.
112 In addition to these levies of general Danegeld, there had also been
a number of exactions of local Danegeld, or ransom, in various places (see
infra, chaps. xv, xvi).
110 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
to take counsel with God and with his fideles as to how some
measure of relief might be brought to the wretched and pitiable
populace, exhausted by continual depredations and by exactions
of Danegeld. And he added: “May justice and equity, which
now are as it were dead, be revived among us; may God once
more endue us with valor and martial strength, so that we may
be able to resist our pagan enemies: for until now there has
for many years been no thought of defense in this kingdom,'*
but only of ransom and tribute; and not only poor men, but
even churches once rich, have become impoverished.’’'**
113 This is not strictly true, as shown passim in the preceding pages,
and by Lot, op. cit., 1-27. Cf. Vogel, 257.
114 Epistola ad Ludovicum Balbum (Migne, Patr. Lat., CXXV, 987-88):
“Quarto, ut inveniatis cum Deo et vestris fidelibus, qualiter istae rapinae
et depraedationes in isto regno cessent, et miser iste populus, qui jam per
plures annos depraedationes diversas et continuas, et per exactiones ad Nort-
mannos repellendos affligitur, aliquod remedium habeat, et justitia et judi-
cium, quae quasi emortua apud nos sunt, reviviscant, ut virtutem nobis
Deus reddat contra paganos: quia usque modo jam ante plures annos locum
in isto regno defensio non habuit, sed redemptio et tributum, et non solum
pauperes homines, sed et Ecclesias quondam divites jam evacuatas habent.”
THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 111
CHAPTER VII.
SUMMARY OF THE CAUSES WHICH FORCED CHARLES THE BALD
TO RESORT TO THE DANEGELD.
No one at all familiar with the character of Charles the Bald
as it is revealed in his various activities, could say that he was
a model ruler. But it must be insisted that Charles was neither
exclusively nor mainly responsible for the policy of securing
the removal of the Vikings by the payment of Danegeld.? Each
time he agreed to pay tribute, except possibly in 877, Charles
was virtually forced to do so by the attitude of his magnates.’
Usually it was the magnates who were responsible for the crea-
tion of a situation out of which the king saw no better means
of escape than that afforded by the Danegeld. And if it is true
that the situation in 877 was not one for which the nobles can
be held responsible, it is also true that Charles could not have
foreseen the coming of the Vikings when he proceeded to the
invasion of Lorraine, and that after the defeat at Andernach
there remained no method of procuring the removal of the in-
vaders other than the payment of tribute. Moreover, we must
not forget that in 862 Robert the Strong had been quite willing
to pay a stipendiary Danegeld to the Vikings of the Seine in
return for their services against the Bretons;® and that, in 877,
Abbot Hugh and the magnates of Neustria rather than enter
into conflict with the Northmen of the Loire, chose to pay them
tribute.° There is not the slightest evidence to prove that the
lay seigniors ever were opposed to the payment of Danegeld
on principle, or that for this reason they ever refused to collect
the taxes levied to raise the tribute;’ on the other hand, there
is considerable evidence which indicates that they secured a
substantial profit each time they collected such taxes from their
1 Cf. Diimmler, III, 54 ff.
2 Diimmler. (ibid., p. 58) seems to hold Charles exclusively responsible
for the policy of paying tribute, and practically all the older students of this
period do likewise. Vogel (p. 257) and Lot (“Le pont de Pitres,’ Le Moyen
Age, 1905, LX, p. 9, and elsewhere) are inclined to regard the policy of pay-
ing Danegeld as the only resource left after military efforts had proved
bacaee supra, pp. 33 ff., and n. 36, pp. 40 ff., 45 ff., 66-71.
4 This is also the view of. Vogel (p. 257). ;
5 Cf. supra, chap. iv.
6 Cf. supra, chap. vi.
7 The contrary opinion of Bourgeois on this point is erroneous. See
supra, chap. vi., n. 40.
112 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
dependents." We have reason to believe that if the military
forces of the realm had been under the complete control, and
at the free and immediate disposal of Charles, he would seldom
if ever have resorted to the expedient of buying off the North-
men. With Charles the Danegeld was a matter, not of choice,
but of necessity ; with the nobles it appears to have been a matter
of profit, a deliberate policy, based on selfish material interest.
Yet, while Charles the Bald cannot be held excluively respon-
sible for the policy of paying Danegeld, it is none the less true
that he was the first monarch who was forced to adopt that
policy.’ A principal reason for this is found by some scholars
in the character of Charles, which has been represented as very
weak and, on the whole, despicable. That the personality of
Charles the Bald: fades into insignificance when compared with
that of his great ancestors, particularly Charlemagne, will not
be denied. But Charles was undoubtedly a much stronger
monarch than his father, Louis the Pious; and what evidence
is there to show that he was so very much weaker than Lothaire
I or even Louis the German??? It is not true that Charles, un-
like his brothers, was by nature disinclined to engage in military
exploits, and for that reason would rather pay Danegeld than
resist the Northmen by force of arms.*t The fact is that he
8 See supra, pp. 538-54 and notes, pp. 81-85, 102-3.
9 We have no evidence that any monarch prior to Charles the Bald ever
consented to the payment of Danegeld. It is true, however, that the Vikings
had compelled the Frisians to pay local Danegeld in Charlemagne’s time and
on several occasions during the reign of Louis the Pious. For a discussion
of these payments and their relation to the Danegeld in France, see infra,
appendix iii.
10 Cf. supra, n. 2. No one, perhaps, would deny that Charles the Bald
was a stronger ruler than Louis the Pious. But until recently the opinion
has prevailed that the character and personality of Charles the Bald was
far weaker than that of Louis the German. See especially Dimmler’s (II,
412 ff.) eulogy on Louis the German, and ef. this with his unfavorable at-
titude toward Charles the Bald (III, 54 ff.). A careful comparison of what
is known concerning the lives of the two brothers leads one to doubt the
correctness of this opinion, which undoubtedly has been colored by national
sympathies as well as by preconceived ideas and inherited notions (Bour-
geois, Le capit. de Kiersy-sur-Oise, 161-67, 194-98, 200-2; Lot, “Une année
. . . de Charles le Chauve,” Le Moyen Age, 1902, VI, 398, n. 3). Recently,
however, there have been attempts to arrive at a more correct and just
estimate of the character of Charles the Bald. Such attempts, of course,
have been made chiefly by French scholars: Fustel de Coulanges, Bour-
geois, Lot, and others. But at least one German scholar, namely Vogel, has
recently given indications of a sounder judgment on this subject (pp. 256-
57), though it is apparent that he can divorce himself from the older opinion
only with great difficulty (pp. 106, 110 and n. 3). Cf. also Thompson, Decline
of the Missi Dominici, p. 18.
11 Cf. Vogel (256-57), who discards the view of Dummler (III, 55).
5 IMS Se ae a
wey" é ¥ Py
t 4 es w
CHAPTER VII 113
did resist the Vikings in a military way whenever that was
possible; and in the latter part of his reign, when he had come
to a fuller appreciation of the significance of the Norse inva-
Sions, he was very active in providing for the military defense
of the exposed portions of his realm.'”
The foregoing detailed study of each of the various occasions
on which Danegeld was paid between 845 and 877, will, I believe,
substantiate the view that Charles the Bald was compelled to
adopt this policy by reason of a very peculiar combination of
circumstances; a combination which had not existed before his
time, and which during his time appears to have been more fully
developed in the western kingdom than in any other part of the
Frankish realm. These circumstances may be grouped under
eight general heads, as follows:
(1) The great change which took place after the death of
Louis the Pious in the frequency, the character, and the purpose,
of the Viking expeditions. It was no longer a question merely
of an occasional raid by a small band of freebooters looking
only for plunder. In the time of Charles the Bald the activities
of the Vikings almost reached their climax. There was hardly
a year of his reign when some part of the kingdom was not
occupied or raided by the Northmen. They came now in large,
well organized, and highly disciplined armies under the com-
mand of chieftains whose strategy and general military skill
was on the whole superior to that of the Franks; and they
purposed not only to enrich themselves with the fruits of pillage,
but also to secure territory, make settlements, and establish
colonies.*®
(2) The kingdom of Charles the Bald was more exposed to
the Viking expeditions than any of the other Frankish states,
owing to the fact that it had the longest coast-line.'* Therefore,
the only adequate defense against the Vikings would have been
an efficient fleet. But that means of defense the Franks did not
possess.*° Furthermore, the coast-guard formerly maintained
12 Lot, “Le pont de Pitres,” loc. cit., 1-17.
13 Vogel, 39-44, 125-27; ef. 49.
14 Cf. ibid., 86-87.
15 Charles the Bald’s efforts to create a fleet were not successful (cf.
supra, p. 49 and nn. 11, 12). It is curious that no attempt was ever made
to organize a fleet of river craft by utilizing the barges belonging to the
abbeys. On this see Thompson, “Commerce of France,” Journal of Polit.
Economy, 1915, XXIII, p. 870, n. 3.
Danegeld. 8.
114 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
by Charlemagne had by the time of Charles the Bald fallen into
decay.*® ;
(3) The wealth and material resources of the western king-
dom probably were more considerable than those of the other
Frankish kingdoms and, therefore, its power of attraction for
the Vikings was greater.’
(4) After the death of Charlemagne, the steady decline of
the power and prestige of the crown had been accompanied by
an increasing tendency toward independence on the part of the
local magnates and great seigniors; in other words, the rapidly
developing influence of feudalism had tended to weaken the posi-
tion, and destroy many prerogatives, of the king. Perhaps the
most important feature of this development was the practice
of commendation, which eventually tranformed the Frankish
army of freemen into one consisting of vassals and their retain-
ers. This metamorphosis in the character of the army materially
reduced the military power of the king; henceforth he was
virtually impotent if deserted or disobeyed by the magnates.*®
(5) After the division of the Frankish realm between the
sons of Louis the Pious, and the exhaustion resulting from the
civil wars waged by Louis the German and Charles the Bald
against Lothaire I, the Frankish power of resistance was much
lowered. The matter of defense in each one of the kigdoms,
but particularly in that of the west, which was more exposed
than the others, now became a very difficult problem to solve;'®
and one which was further complicated by reason of its con-
nection with point 4 above, and points 6, 7, and 8 below.
(6) The perverse character of the West Frankish nobility;
their increasing greed and selfishness and their declining, if not
utter lack of patriotism. Hostile to the interests both of the
higher clergy and of the crown, the lay magnates lusted to gain
possession of and to exploit the lands, the revenues, and all the
accumulated wealth of the church; while they regarded the ten-
ure of honores, or public functions, merely as opportunities for
pecuniary gain. Some went to the extreme of forming secret
16 Cf. supra, chap. i, n. 5.
17 Dimmler, I, 221.
18 See especially Fustel de Coulanges, Les transform. de la royauté, 616-
66; cf. the references given supra, chap. vi, n, 59.
19 Vogel, pp. 82-83; cf. p. 65 and n. 4,
CHAPTER VII 115
alliances with the pagans, and few hesitated to make indirect
use of the Viking operations in the furtherance of their own
ends. The ravages of the invaders concerned them little, so
long as their own property and interests were not at stake. Us-
ually secure from attack in their rural strongholds, they had
no desire to take the field against the Vikings for the purpose
of defending churches, monasteries, and towns. Moreover, war-
fare with the Northmen, besides being always a very uncertain
adventure, was from the viewpoint of the magnates an enter-
prise of rather doubtful value; if successful it might strengthen
the hands of the king, and it always involved much expense with
little hope of pecuniary gain. Payment of Danegeld was, with
the nobles, the preferred method of securing the removal of the
Vikings. By this expedient the magnates, in the first place,
_ escaped all danger and all expense; for if to raise the tribute
taxes were levied also on demesnial holdings, these taxes could
easily be shifted on the peasantry. And, in the second place, the
magnates in collecting the taxes due from their dependents were
able to reap a considerable harvest for themselves.”°
(7) The revolts of the West Frankish nobles, and the support
given the rebels by Louis the German. These revolts were due,
in large part, to attempts made by Charles the Bald to check the
growing independence and disobedience of the nobles, and toward
rehabilitating the position and the prerogatives of the crown.”
(8) The ambitious projects of Charles the Bald to annex Lor-
raine and to secure the undisputed recognition of his imperial
authority in Italy.??. The fateful preoccupation of Charles with
20 Richer’s description (Historiae, I, c. 4, ed. Waitz, pp. 3-4) of conditions
at the close of the ninth century is also applicable to the time of Charles
the Bald: “cum regnorum principes nimia rerum cupidine sese preire con-
tenderent, quisque ut poterat rem dilatabat. Nemo regis provectum, nemo
regni tutelam querebat. Aliena adquirere summum cuique erat. Nec rem
suam provehere videbatur, qui alieni aliquid non addebat. Unde et omnium
concordia in summam discordiam relapsa est. Hine direptiones, hine in-
cendia, hinc rerum pervasiones exarsere. Quae cum immanissime agita-
rentur, piratae...ad rerum immanitatem incitantur.” Ermentarius
(Miracula sancti Filiberti, M. G. H., SS., XV, 302) adds the following to
his recital of events for the year 850: ‘‘omnes fugam arripiunt, rarus est qui
dicat: ‘state, state, resistite, pugnate pro patria, liberis et gente!’ Sicque
torpentes atque invicem dissidentes, quod defendere debuerant armis, tri-
butis redimunt, ac christianorum pessumdatur regnum.” For a fuller dis-
cussion of these matters and additional. details, see Diimmler, I, 222, 228-29,
420-21; cf. Flach, Les orig. de Vance. France, I, 147-48 and passim; Favre,
Eudes, 221 ff.; supra, pp. 26-27 and n. 6, 33-34, 41-438, 45-49, 66-71; infra,
chap. ix.
21 Cf supra, pp. 37-39 and notes.
22 For detailed discussion of these enterprises, see Diimmler, III, 32 ff.
116 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD
these projects in the last years of his reign was doubtless one of
the principal reasons why Danegeld had to be paid in 877.”
Moreover, these unwise and unsuccessful enterprises helped to
exhaust the resources needed for the defense of the home lands.
These various circumstances, which apply in particular to the
western kingdom, combined to form during the reign of Charles
the Bald that peculiar situation which must be regarded as the
real reason why he was constrained to pay Danegeld. To assume
that Louis the German, or any other contemporary ruler, could
have done better than Charles the Bald in a similar situation, is
either to ignore the essential facts in the case, or to under-
estimate the power of the controlling forces of the age.**
On the accession of Louis the Stammerer, Hincmar voiced the
hope that the ensuing reign would be one of better accord be-
tween king and magnates than that of Charles the Bald had
been; that, consequently, there would be a revival of public
spirit, of patriotism, and of military valor; that the policy of
buying off the foreign enemy would be discontinued; and that
the abuses engendered by the exaction of the Danegeld would
be gradually stamped out.?> But all such hopes were to prove
vain. On several occasions the successors of Charles the Bald
found themselves in situations out of which they could devise
no means of escape other than the one to which he had resorted,
because in the nature of the case there was no other.
It will perhaps be agreed that in the situation analyzed above
the most important single factor, next to the Vikings themselves,
was the attitude of the West Frankish nobility. Almost always it
was the magnates who were chiefly responsible for the conditions
which forced the king to fall back on the Danegeld as a last
resort. For this reason, the policy of paying Danegeld must be
regarded as much less the policy of the king than of the mag-
nates. And the truth of this assertion is further illustrated by
the fact that Danegeld continued to be paid in the West Frankish
kingdom long after the death of Charles the Bald. His succes-
sors, who are distinguishable from the other magnates only by
23 Cf. supra, pp. 93-96; Vogel, 83 ff.
24 We know that Lothaire II on at least one occasion found it necessary
to resort to the Danegeld (see infra, appendix iv). As for Louis the Ger-
man, he “never raised a finger to repel the numerous inroads of the North-
men in Saxony” (Vogel, 257).
25 See supra, chap. vi, n. 114.
CHAPTER VII i Fa Lf
their royal title, were not in position to oppose the policy of the
all-powerful aristocracy.*° There was to be no change in this
policy until the magnates began to realize that the continued
pursuit of it would undermine their own interests.”
26 Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit., 640-66, 689-702; Baldamus, Heer-
wesen (in Gierke’s Untersuch. 2. d. Staats- u. Rechtsgesch., IV), pp. 32-34;
Flach op. cit., I, 147-48.
27 Cf. infra, chap. xiv.
DAR TelLt
THE DANEGELD AFTER 877.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE DANEGELD PAID FOR CARLOMAN IN 884.
The payment of Danegeld in the West Frankish realm did not
cease with the death of Charles the Bald in 877.' Only seven
years after that date, in 884, the Vikings were again in position
to demand tribute; and they received then a larger sum than
they had on any preceding occasion, indeed the largest ever paid
them by the Franks.’
If Louis the Stammerer, the immediate successor of Charles
the Bald, did not find it necessary to resort to the Danegeld, this
may be explained not only by the brevity of his reign (877—79),
but also by the fact that during these years the Danish Vikings
made England the principal theater of their operations.? It is
to be noted, moreover, that many Vikings about this time gave
up their former habits, and reconciled themselves to a more
settled and domesticated mode of existence in what came to be
called the Danelaw.
1 Cf. supra, p. 116.
2 What follows in the next succeeding paragraphs, down to the establish-
ment of the Vikings at Condé (see infra, p. 122 and n. 22), is not intended to
be more than a brief summary of the Viking movements and the general
situation in the West Frankish kingdom, from the death of Charles the Bald
to the time of Carloman. It is based largely on the detailed discussion of
this period given by Vogel (pp. 260-311); in some cases, however, references
are given also to the work of Ditimmler (III, 113-71, 198-258).
3 Vogel, 260-63. It is true that a band of Vikings was operating in the
lower Loire during the reign of Louis the Stammerer (cf. supra, pp. 108-9 and
nn. 106-8), and that the latter made an attempt to aid Abbot Hugh in ex-
pelling them. But the king fell ill on this expedition, and, so far as known,
nothing ever came of it. In any case, the Loire was not cleared of Vikings
until the time of Louis III (882). See Vogel, 257-59, 311.
THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 119
There was, however, among the Danes in England, a more
adventurous element, the members of which could not or would
not resign themselves to peaceful pursuits. Quite naturally these
came to regard conditions in England as less and less satisfac-
tory for their purposes, in proportion as Alfred the Great was
able to increase the efficiency and the resisting power of the West
Saxon fyrd. The numbers of this adventuorous element were
much augmented by the arrival in the Thames, about the year
878, of a fresh group of Vikings from Denmark. These adven-
turers and freebooters, old and new, soon coalesced to form the
nucleus of a very large and powerful military organization, later
known as the “great army” of the Danes.
Abandoning England as a land of small opportunities for
plunder and tribute, these Vikings in the summer of 879 trans-
ported themselves across the channel to the Frankish realm,
where conditions were from their point of view much more in-
viting. Their landing, in July, on the coast of Flanders at a
point not far from Calais, marked the beginning of a long period
of calamities for the Franks; a period during which the Vikings
plundered, burned, and massacred almost at will throughout the
entire region between the Rhine and the Seine. This disastrous
epoch did not come to a close until in 892, when the “great army”’
at last returned to the Thames, its original point of departure.*
To follow all the movements of this army after its arrival in
Frankish territory, does not fall within the scope of the present
treatise. But an attempt must be made to explain how that
situation arose which in 884 led to the payment of another
Danegeld.
On the death of Louis the Stammerer, in 879, certain mag-
nates of the West Frankish kingdom, under the leadership of
Abbot Gauzelin and Count Conrad of Paris, endeavored to ex-
clude Louis and Carloman, the two youthful sons of the Stam-
merer, from the succession to the throne. This party of oppo-
sition allied itself with Louis the Younger, king of the East
Franks, who, on the invitation of the rebels, at once under-
took to invade and conquer the kingdom to the west. The plan
was foiled only by the prompt action of Abbot Hugh, guardian
and protector of the young princes; by the concession of western
Lorraine, Hugh induced Louis the Younger to give up his am-
4 Vogel, 371-72.
120 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
bitious project and to return home. In September of the same
year (879) he was able to secure the coronation of his two royal
wards.®
New troubles, however, did not long wait to announce them-
selves. In October occurred the revolt of Boso, who was recog-
nized and crowned as king in Burgundy;* and in January of
the following year (880), Louis the Younger, at the instigation
of Abbot Gauzelin and Count Conrad,’ renewed his invasion
of the western kingdom. }
Probably it was the threatening activities of the Northmen
at this time which induced the Franks to compose their griev-
ances, and to give attention to the real dangers facing them.®
With the retirement of Louis the Younger, and the reéntrance
of the West Frankish rebels into royal favor, it became possible
at last to proceed to a division of the western realm between
the two (elder) sons of Louis the Stammerer: Francia and
Neustria were to constitute the kingdom of Louis III; while
Aquitaine, Burgundy, and Gothia fell to the lot of Carloman.?
There can be no doubt that the events above described were
well kown to the Northmen, and that the latter intended to
avail themselves of the favorable opportunity created by the
domestic quarrels and rivalries of the Franks. After its ar-
rival in Flanders in July, 879, the “great army” had proceeded
at once to plunder and devastate the valleys of the Yser, Lys,
and Scheldt. In November the Vikings established themselves
in winter quarters at Ghent; and from that point as a center,
they rapidly extended their plundering operations in all direc-
tions. Owing to the preoccupation of the Franks, which we
have noted above, the freebooters met with practically no re-
sistance.’° The blow dealt by Louis the Younger (of the East
Franks) in February, 880, to one division of the “great army,”
at Thiméon in Lorraine,'' was hardly more than an incident;
and during the spring and summer of 880 both Louis III and
5 Dimmler, III, 113-18; cf. Vogel, 263.
6 Dummler, III, 121-27.
7 Gauzelin and Conrad were the leaders of a party of nobles opposed to
that of Abbot Hugh. It appears that they were jealous of Hugh, whose
influence with Louis III was from their point of view altogether too great.
Ann. Vedast., 880, ed. Dehaisnes, p. 302 and note (a).
8 Dtiimmler, III, 127-33; cf. Vogel, 266-67.
9 Dummler, III, 137-38.
10 Vogel, 264, 266.
11 J/bid., 267-69.
CHAPTER VIII 121
Carloman were occupied in a futile endeavor to subjugate Boso
in Burgundy.’ It is true that in the meantime Abbot Gauzelin
had been charged with the defense of Francia; but his ambitious
project to wipe out the ‘“‘great army” at Ghent, ended in miser-
able failure, and served only to increase the audacity of the
invaders."
In November the Viking camp was moved from Ghent to
Kortrijk, on the Lys, from which place the entire region as far
south as the Somme, was subjected to pitiless devastation. So
heartrending was the lamentation that arose as a result of the
terrible calamities which his land suffered at the hands of the
Vikings, that Louis III, abandoning the attempt to reduce Boso
to obedience, determined to give his exclusive attention to the
Northmen. In June, 881, he moved against them with con-
siderable forces, and on August 3 won a brilliant victory, over
a large division of the “great army” at Saucourt (in the Vimeu,
just south of the mouth of the Somme). Some eight or nine
thousand Danes are said to have fallen in this engagement."
Thenceforth the Vikings probably harbored a wholesome fear of
the military prowess of Louis III. Discovering presently that
conditions in the East Frankish realm were now better adapted
for their purposes, the invaders gave up their camp at Kortrijk,
and proceeded both by land and by water to Elsloo, on the
Meuse. Here they began, in November 881, the construction
of a very strong camp, from which the valleys of the Meuse,
the Rhine, and the Moselle, were to be plundered.*®
In the West Frankish realm there followed, after the events
just described, a period of comparative quiet. It was, however,
not of long duration — hardly a year." On August 5, 882,
Louis III, the hero of Saucourt, died;'* and in the following
month his brother Carloman, a mere youth, was acknowledged
king of the entire West Frankish realm.1® About the same
12 Dummler, III, 137-388.
13 Vogel, 269 ff.
1470 f Dummicr, sill. 153~ if,
15 Vogel, 269-75.
16 Ibid., 280 ff.
Aap Deo Li it.
18 Diimmler, III, 207. In July, 882, hardly a month before his death,
Louis III appears to have concluded an arrangement with the Northmen of
the Loire by which the latter were persuaded to put to sea in the fall of that
year. Just what the terms of the agreement were we do not know. See
Vogel, 349, 350 and n. 1.
19 Dimmler, III, 207, 228.
Ze THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
99
time the “great army,” under the leadership of Godfrey, Sieg-
fried, Vurm, and Hals, had abandoned its camp at Elsloo and,
in accordance with a treaty concluded with Charles the Fat,’°
had evacuated the territories of the East Franks." Godfrey
probably retired to his newly acquired fiefs in Frisia; while
Siegfried and his followers sailed out of the Meuse only to
ascend the Scheldt as far as Condé, where, in October, 882, they
established themselves in a fortified winter camp.”?
The usual operations were promptly commenced, and the
entire territory west and south to the Somme was _ speedily
plundered.”* Carloman made some attempt to check the inva-
ders but was able to accomplish little, since his right-hand man,
Abbot Hugh, was absent in Germany,** and since several of the
magnates refused to aid him.?° The Northmen, evidently aware
of this situation, proceeded to make the most of their opportun-
ity. Plundering and burning, they advanced to the vicinity of
Rheims. It was doubtless feared that they would attack the
episcopal city itself; for Hincmar hastily collected the relics
and treasures of his church and with these fled beyond the
Marne.”®° Undaunted by the scant success of his earlier effort,
Carloman for the second time ventured with his meager forces
to oppose the invaders. Having engaged and defeated one group
of Vikings, he compelled another hastily to fall back and to
rejoin the main army; and the latter, though not attacked, yet
deemed it prudent to return to the camp at Condé.*’
But this was only a partial and temporary success. In De-
cember (882) the pagans recommenced their operations, ad-
vancing as far as the Oise without meeting any resistance.”*
20 See infra, appendix iv.
21 Part of the “great army” may have remained for some time in the
district of the lower Rhine or of the Meuse. See Vogel, 294 and n. 4.
22 fbid., 312 and n. 1. Cf. Dimmler (III, 209, n. 1), who quotes some
additional sources.
23 Ann. Veduast., 882, pp. 314-15.
24 Abbot Hugh had departed in November on an embassy to Charles the
Fat. Hugh at this time was the most influential magnate in the western
kingdom, the real ruler in fact, and the defense of the realm had been
specially entrusted to him. Cf. Diimmler, III, 207, n. 5.
25 Ann. Bert., 882, ed. Waitz, p. 154.
26 ?bid. Hinemar asserts that the Vikings intended to conquer the king-
dom (of Francia?). The aged archbishop died in exile from his see on
December 21, 882 (cf. Diimmler, III, 209-10). The Annals of St. Bertin, it
may be noted, were not continued after his death.
27 Ann. Bert., 882, p. 154; Ann. Vedast., 882, pp. 314-15. Cf. Vogel, 313-14.
28 Ann. Vedast., 882, p. 315.
CHAPTER VIII 123
Abbot Hugh, who had by this time returned home, now collected
his men and united them with the army of the king. Together
they inflicted some minor losses on the Vikings and forced them
back to their ships.*® But all to no avail. Early in 883 the
Vikings again set forth on their work of destruction, and again
Carloman’s efforts to check them met with no success.*® In the
spring, however, the “great army” quitted its camp at Condé
and proceeded to Flanders, to spend the summer plundering that
territory.**
Carloman, who may have been aware of the plans of the
Northmen,* in the fall (883) again placed himself at the head
of his army and took up a position at Miannay (in the Vimeu),
on the left bank of the lower Somme; doubtless hoping that he
might be able successfully to resist the Vikings should they at-
tempt to ascend the Somme.*® That the young monarch was
doing everything in his power to protect the kingdom, can hardly
be denied. But his efforts proved all in vain. Towards the close
of October, the whole “great army” arrived at a place on the
right bank of the Somme directly opposite that occupied by the
forces of Carloman; and about the same time the Danish fleet
entered the mouth of the river.** Whether an engagement took
place is not known, but Carloman and his army were forced to
flee beyond the Oise.*°
The Vikings then advanced up the valley of the Somme to
Amiens, where they prepared to spend the winter*® — a terrible
winter for the population between the Somme and the Seine.
The entire region was laid waste; monasteries and churches,
houses and villages, were burned to the ground. The North-
29 Ann. Vedast., 882, p. 315.
30 Ibid., 883, p/.316. Cf. Vogel, 315, n. 1.
31 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 316.
32 This may be inferred from the fact that he took up his position at a
point which commanded the entrance to the Somme. Cf. infra, n. 34.
33 Ann. Vedast., 883, pp. 316-17.
34 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 317: “Nortmanni vero, octobrio mense finiente,
Latuerum cum equitibus et peditibus atque omni supellectili veniunt. Naves
quoque per mare Sumnam fluvium ingressae, ete.” Regino, Chronicon, 884,
ed. Kurze, p. 121: “Nortmanni, qui ab Haslon recesserant, Somnam fluvium
intrant ibique consederunt.” SHthelwerdi chronicon, III, 884, M.G.H., SS.,
XIII, p. 123; Florentius Wigorn., Chronicon ex chronicis, 884, Mon. historica
Britannica, pp. 560-61; Annales anglo-saxonici, 884, M.G.H., SS., XIII, pp.
104-5. Cf. Vogel, 315.
35 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 317: “regem cunctumque exercitum ejus fugere
compulerunt [Nortmanni], atque Hisam fluvium transire fecerunt.”
36. Ibid.
124 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
men, according to the Annals of St. Vaast, “ceased not to take
Christian people captive and to kill them. . . . Through all the
streets lay bodies of the clergy, of laymen, nobles and others,
of women, children, and suckling babes. There was no road
nor place where the dead did not lie; and all were filled with
sorrow and despair when they saw the Christian people brought
almost to the verge of destruction.’** Encountering no resist-
ance whatever,*® the Vikings threw ‘off all restraint and con-
verted the country subject to their raids into an immense sham-
bles. It became patent that something had to be done at once
to stem the tide of destruction, or all would be lost.
In tardy recognition of this fact, the West Frankish mag-
nates assembled at Compiégne early in 884, to discuss what
measures ought to be taken by them — not by the king — to
secure the removal of the Danes.*® So far as we know, the
37 Ann. Vedast., 883-84, pp. 317-18. The translation of this passage in-
serted into the text above, is, except for a few emendations, that given by J.
H. Robinson in his Readings in European History (Chicago, Ginn and Com-
pany, 1906), I, p. 164.
38 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 317: “nemine eis [Nortmannis] resistente. Tune
Franci, videntes Nortmannorum res prospere in omnibus accrescere, etc.”
39 Ibid. (this follows immediatedly after the words quoted in the preced-
ing note): “quemdam Danum christianum, Sigefridum nomine, mittunt ad
eos, qui caute cum eis de redemptione regni ageret.” Jbid., 884, p. 318:
“Interim, quia rex juvenis erat, omnes principes Compendio palatio con-
veniunt, tractaturi quid illis esset agendum; initoque consilio, Sigefridum
.. mittunt ut cum principibus suae gentis tractaret, ut tributum accip-
erent, et a regno abirent.’ As appears from the above quotations, the
Annals of St. Vaast contain two separate recitals regarding the embassy of
Siegfried. According to the first of these, the negotiations with the Danes
were begun before the end of the year 883; while according to the second,
they did not commence until early in 884. Though there is no disagreement
between the two recitals, except in the matter of the dates, it is true that
the first lacks certain details given in the second and does not follow the nego-
tiations to their conclusion. It is possible that Siegfried was sent before the
close of the year 883, but that no agreement with the Vikings could be
reached until February, 884 (cf. von Kalckstein, Abt Hugo, in Forsch. 2. d.
Gesch., XIV, 120-21). The basis for this view is the fact that the entry for
883 mentions only the sending of Siegfried, the purpose of his mission, and
his arrival in Amiens; while the entry for 884 goes on to describe the protrac-
tion of the negotiations and the final arrangement. I am inclined, however,
to take a different view. Two important considerations lead me to believe
that the entry for 883 is erroneous, and that the magnates did not decide to
parley with the Danes until early in 884 (Vogel, p. 316, apparently takes a
similar view, but without giving any reasons for it). In the first place,
it is very strange that a medieval annalist, and particularly one with as
great a love for brevity as the annalist of St. Vaast, should have repeated
at the beginning of his entries for 884 information which he had already
given at the end of his recital for 883; secondly, it is very improbable that
the Danes would have engaged in the terrible devastation described at the
beginning of 884, if, in fact, negotiations for the payment of tribute were
already under way. On this basis, therefore, I venture the following con-
CHAPTER VIII 125
magnates came together on their own initiative — there is no
evidence that they had been summoned by the king — and they
tried to justify the taking of matters into their own hands by
urging the youthfulness of Carloman. Of the deliberations of
the magnates no record has come down to us save that, having
taken counsel, they decided to open negotiations with the Viking
leaders, to sound them cautiously as to their demands, and if
possible to persuade them to evacuate the kingdom in return for
the payment of tribute. There is no indication of any kind
that it entered the minds of the magnates to get rid of the Danes
in some way other than by payment of tribute.*°
Before we seek to penetrate into the motives of the magnates
when they adopted this course, it will be desirable first to try
to ascertain whether their explanation of Carloman’s failure to
check the advance of the Northmen — namely that it was due
to his youth and inexperience —* is the true one. It must be
admitted that despite all the efforts of the young monarch to
check the ravages of the Vikings, these had increased rather
that diminished.” Just why this was so, why Carloman had
not been able to offer effective resistance, is, of course, a ques-
tion of capital importance in an attempt to determine the raison
d’étre of the Danegeld of 884. Was it principally because of
immaturity and lack of military ability? Or was it rather be-
cause he had not been properly supported? Or were there per-
haps other reasons? While it is difficult to elicit from our
sources thoroughly satisfactory answers to these questions, the
jecture. The person who wrote the entries for 884 was, it would seem, not
aware of any previous entry relative to the embassy of Siegfried. It is
possible, therefore, that the annals beginning with 884 were not written by
the person who had made the entries for the preceding period. We know
that the author of the Annals of St. Vaast was an inmate of the monastery
of that name (see Dehaisnes’ note on p. 307 of his edition of these annals) ;
we know also that Rodulf, the abbot of St. Vaast, died in 883 (ibid., 883, p.
317). Rodulf may have been the author of the annals until his death in
883; some later scribe in possession of this earlier part of the work, but
not of the remainder, may have added at the end of the manuscript in his
possession the sentences referring to Siegfried, without indicating, possibly
without knowing, that the negotiations with the Danes were begun in 884
and not in 883.—See also infra, n. 69.
40 Compare with this the deliberations of the East Franks in 882. They
appear to have had no other thought than that of expelling the invaders by
force of arms. See infra, appendix iv.
41 Cf. supra, n. 39.
42 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 317: ‘“Franci, videntes Nortmannorum res pros-
pere in omnibus accrescere, etc.” Regino, Chron., 884, loc. cit., p. 121:
“Quorum [Normannorum] creberrimas incursiones cum Carlomannus sus-
tinere non posset, etc.” Cf. supra, pp. 121 ff.
126 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
considerations set forth in the following paragraph may serve
to throw some light on the general situation. Obviously it would
be a serious error to attribute the ill success of the Franks ex-
clusively to the youth and inexperience of their king unless,
indeed, no other reasons for it were apparent. Our first task,
accordingly, must be to note the other factors entering into the
situation, and to determine, so far as we may, the relative im-
portance of each of these.
It is generally admitted that the “great army” was one of the
largest Viking forces with which the Franks ever had to con-
tend.*® On the other hand, it is very improbable that Carloman
had ever had_at his command anything approaching an adequate
number of troops.** The freemen who owed military service were
growing ever less in number,* and there is reason to believe
that their diminution in the recent period had been very rapid.*°
For some time past the real military strength of the kingdom
had been, not the army of freemen under the leadership of the
counts, but the contingents of vassals led by the great mag-
nates.** Though some of the latter may have come to the aid
of Carloman,** it is very doubtful that even a majority of the
magnates had properly supported the young monarch in his
military endeavors.*® We must note also that with regard to
organizations, tactics, and leadership, the Franks were as yet
43 Steenstrup, Normannerne, I, 209-17; Vogel, 262-63, 315, 325.
44 Cf. supra, pp. 121 ff.; infra, n. 49.
45 Cf. supra, chap. vi, n. 59; p. 114 and n. 18.
46 Hincmar, Ad episcopos regni admonitio altera, c. xv (Migne, Patr. Lat.,
CXXV, 1016): “in tantum ... affligerentur pauperes, ut inde prius in ex-
ercitu plures ire poterant, vix aliqui modo ire praevaleant.” These words
were written by Hincmar at the close of the year 882, shortly before he died.
47 Cf. supra, chap. vi, n. 59.
48 At the time the Northmen came to Rheims in 882, Hincmar’s men were
with the army of Carloman (Ann. Bert., 882, p. 154). Abbot Hugh, after
he had returned from Germany, collected his forces and joined the king (cf.
supra, p. 123); Hugh (accompanied by his men?) was with Carloman also at
Miannay (cf. ibid.) according to a document issued at that place (Bouquet,
IX, 431; cf. Dimmler, III, 207, n. 5 and v. Kalckstein, op. cit., p. 120).
49 According to the Annals of St. Vaast (882, p. 290), Hugh’s absence in
Germany in 882 was very unfortunate “quia Karlomannus non habuit unde
Nortmannis posset resistere, quibusdam regni primoribus ab ipsius auxilio
se retrahentibus.” Later in the same year Carloman is said to have op-
posed the Northmen “cum quibus potuit” (ibid., p. 291); which seems to
imply that there were comparatively few men at the king’s disposal. In’
connection with the ravages of the Vikings in 882, and again in 883, we
meet the words, “nemine sibi [eis] resistente” (ibid., pp. 315, 317). -
me We
CHAPTER VIII Lae
inferior to the Northmen.®® There can hardly be any doubt that
engagements between equal numbers of Vikings and Franks, even
when the latter were under the direction of their ablest men,
had so far usually ended in favor of the Vikings.*! There is,
furthermore, conclusive evidence that the Frankish army of this
period was sadly lacking in morale.®* These facts speak for
themselves; doubtless they were the real reason for Carloman’s
failure to defeat the Northmen. His lack of experience and
insight may perhaps have had something to do with the matter;
but it is at best very doubtful whether a more mature ruler
placed in the same circumstances as Carloman, could have suc-
ceeded in forcibly expelling the Northmen.**
Remains now to explain the reasons for the policy of the West
Frankish magnates. Why did they not give better support to
the military efforts of Carloman? What made them prefer to
resort to the Danegeld? Attention should be called to the fact
that this was not the only course open to them.®* They might,
conceivably, have chosen to support the military policy of the
king and, in accordance therewith, have attempted by a united
effort forcibly to expel the Danes from the realm. But they
50 Vogel, 39-41, 43-44; ef. Vander Linden, “Les Normands a4 Louvain,”
Rev. Hist., 1917, CXXIV, 69, 70 and n. 1. If it is true that the superiority
of the Vikings in leadership and tactics began to wane towards the close of
the ninth century (Vogel, 44), this change is certainly not noticeable before
the siege of Paris in 885-86 (cf. ibid., 337-38, 368-69).
51 To support and illustrate this statement, it seems necessary only to
cite a few examples, such as the following: the engagement at Brissarthe in
866, where Robert the Strong was killed (Vogel, 218-19); the miserable
defeat and rout of the troops under Abbot Gauzelin in 880 (ibid., 269-70) ;
the sanguinary defeat of Duke Brun’s Saxon army in the same year (ibid.,
276). Louis III’s victory over the Vikings at Saucourt (see supra, p. 121) is
doubtless to be explained in part by the probable numerical superiority of
the Franks (cf. Vogel, 274); like other lesser successes of the Franks, its
importance has no doubt been much exaggerated not only by tradition (ibid.,
273, n. 1), but also by the contemporary annalists (see Vander Linden, op.
cit., pp. 66-67).
52 Robbery had become so common among the West Franks that it must
have been a serious risk for anyone to leave his holdings for any length of
time. The man who went to perform the army service required of him
might return home only to find himself plundered of all or most of what he
possessed. Quite naturally many preferred not to go. Of those who actually
went to the army many are said to have gone merely for the sake of thereby
securing more favorable opportunities for plunder and pillage. All of which
must have had a disastrous effect on the morale of the army (Capit. Ver-
nense, M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 371, lines 37-38; p. 372, lines 2 ff.
Cf. infra, n. 61 and supra, n. 35).
53 Vogel (p. 316) apparently takes a different view; but cf. v. Kalckstein,
op: ¢cit., Dei.
54 Vogel, loc. cit., thinks it was, or at least believes the magnates thought
so.
128 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
did not. Why? Obviously on one or both of the following
grounds: (1) Knowing the strength and military superiority of
the Northmen, the magnates believed it impossible to defeat
them under existing circumstances; or (2) the magnates had
a special interest in securing their removal by the payment of
Danegeld.
As regards the first of these points, the following considera-
tions may suffice. If we admit that the Vikings were superior
to the Franks in military qualities, and that their “great army”’
had outnumbered the army of Carloman,** it is still difficult
to believe that the Frankish resources in men and matériel,
potentially at least, were not far greater than those of the
Vikings.°° And while the army of Carloman had been lacking
in morale,*’ it can not be conceded that the Franks in all cases
were inferior to the Northmen in personal valor.®* If the Vik-
ings had the advantage of superior leadership, it is nevertheless
true that there were men of considerable ability among the
Franks, such as Abbot Hugh, Abbot Gauzelin, Count Odo, and
others.°® With these assets in their favor, there seems to be
some reason for believing that if the Franks had set aside their
selfish personal interests, and had patriotically united their ef-
forts in defense of their land and their possessions, they would
in the end have prevailed over the Vikings.®° And since this
5D Cf. supra; nn. 49, 50:
56 The point here is that Carloman’s army had represented but a small
fraction of all the military resources of the western kingdom—even exclu-
sive of Aquitaine and Burgundy. If all the “effectives’” of Francia and
Neustria, or even a majority of them, could have been brought into the
field, it seems to the present writer that they must have far outnumbered
the entire “great army.” At the siege of Paris (885-86) the “great army”
is said to have numbered some forty thousand men, and Vogel (p. 325) be-
lieves this to have been “die grosste normannische Armee, die je auf frank-
ischem Boden vereinigt worden war.” Yet, this army was but a fraction of
the surplus male population of Denmark. It does not seem possible that the .
total male population of Denmark—or even of Scandinavia—could have been
greater than that of Francia and Neustria (Levasseur, La population fran-
caise, I, 132-41, estimates the population of France in the ninth century at
five and one-half millions; in Hildebrand’s (ed.) Sveriges historia, III, 282;
the population of Sweden with Finland and its other possessions, in the
sixteenth century, is estimated at one-half million). Can there be any
doubt, then, that the potential military strength of the western Franks, had
it been available, would have been overwhelmingly greater than that of the
Viking forces?
of CLOSUDTO.G I D2:
58 Vogel, 39, 44.
59 v. Kalckstein, op. cit., p. 126; Vogel, 323. Cf. Eckel, Charles le Simple,
p. 3.
60 After the payment of the Danegeld, which doubtless proved far heavier
CHAPTER VIII 129
was recognized at the time, in fact almost taken for granted,”
we are perforce driven to the conclusion that the real or principal
reason for the policy of the magnates was, not any diffidence
in their own ability to resist and even to defeat the Northmen,
but rather a preference to secure their removal by the payment
of Danegeld, a preference which grew out of the purely selfish
interests to which these magnates were committed.
What has been said above is not intended to imply that the
Frankish magnates had entered into conspiracy with the Vikings
in the matter of the Danegeld. The fact that they eventually
took measures to secure the removal of the invaders, is evidence
that even from their point of view the presence of the Danes,
with its attendant destruction of life and property, was an evil,
which sooner or later had to be cured in some way.” For this
very reason, however, their failure to support the military efforts
of Carloman, and their dilatory tactics in general, seem all the
more striking. Not until the northern part of Francia had been
converted into a shambles, did the magnates evince anything
like a serious concern in the welfare of their country.®* Were
than had been expected (cf. infra, pp. 131-32), the Franks did unite their
forces, and prepared to support Carloman in case the Vikings should violate
the terms of their agreement. See infra, n. 96.
61 The following quotations from Carloman’s Capitulare Vernense, issued
in March, 884 (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, pp. 371 ff.), may suffice to illus-
trate the point referred to in the text: “[p. 371] non est autem mirum, si
pagani et exterae nationes nobis dominantur nobisque temporalia tollunt, dum
unusquisque proximo suo per vim tollit, unde vivere debet, ete. [p. 372] Nos
vero praedamur fratres nostros, et idcirco pagani merito nos nostramque sub-
stantiam depraedantur. Quomodo igitur securi poterimus pergere contra
inimicos ... nostros, cum ‘rapina pauperis inclusa est in domo nostra’?
Et non solum domi reclusa est, verum etiam plerumque evenit, ut pleno
ventre rapina in hostem quidam proficiscantur. Et quomodo poterimus ini-
micos nostros devincere, cum sanguis fratrum nostrorum ab ore nostro dis-
tillat, et manus nostrae plenae sunt sanguine et brachia pondere miseriarum
et rapinarum gravantur totaque virtus animi corporisque debilitatur?’ On
two occasions the annalist of St. Vaast, after having described the ravages
of the Vikings, adds with a reproach: “nemine eis [Normannis] resistente”
(supra, n. 49). Cf. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., p. 122.
62° Cf. supra, n. 39.
63 Cf. supra, pp. 123-25. The statement in the text applies to the mag-
nates as a class, or a body. It is true that a few individuals among them,
like Hincmar and Abbot Hugh, may have given Carloman some support (cf.
supra, n. 48). Still, even Hugh did not, so far as we know, lift a finger
against the Vikings after they had established themselves at Amiens in 883
and were devastating the valleys of the Seine and the Oise. That was per-
mitted to go on nemine eis resistente (supra, n. 49). v. Kalckstein’s words
(op. cit., p. 120): “Da man ihren Fortschritten kein Ziel zu setzen ver-
mochte,” are misleading, for not the slightest attempt was made to check
the Vikings after they had reached Amiens. It must not be assumed that
Hugh had any insuperable objections to the policy of paying Danegeld. We
Danegeld. 9.
130 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
they endeavoring now, as on several occasions during the reign
of Charles the Bald, to create a situation out of which the pay-
ment of Danegeld would offer the only avenue of escape?: It is
certain that when the magnates finally convened for the purpose
of dealing with the Viking problem, they had no solution to offer
other than the payment of tribute.** ;
With the general character and interest of the magnates in
the western kingdom we are sufficiently familiar. It has been
pointed out above that, as between fighting the Northmen and
paying them tribute, the magnates usually preferred to pay
tribute.°*> And for good reasons. In the collection of the tribute
they were able to shift the burden of the tax so that it fell almost
exclusively on the subject population. Not only did the magnates
themselves escape the tax altogether, but in most cases they
were probably enriched by it. And, besides, it furnished them
with a valuable precedent to which appeal might be made in
connection with future exploitations of the peasantry.®’ There
is, therefore, little room for doubt as to the motives by which
the magnates were actuated in the formation of their policy on
this occasion. From their point of view warfare with an enemy
who was their superior in strategy and.tactics, if not in numbers,
was unnecessary when it could be avoided by payment of tribute.
Warfare, moreover, involved expense, hardships, even bodily
danger. That method of removing the Vikings would hardly be
know that he had agreed to it in 877 (cf. supra, pp. 95-96 and nn. 19, 20, p.
108), and since he was present at the assembly of magnates in Compiégne in
884—which included omnes principes (see supra, n. 39, and cf. v. Kalckstein,
op. cit., p. 121)—-we may infer that Hugh, as the foremost of the magnates,
was closely identified with the policy there and then adopted.
64 Cf. cunra, pp. 124-25 and n. 40.
65 Cf. supra, pp. 114-15 and n. 20.
66 Ibid.
67 This matter is well illustrated by Hincmar in the last of his extant
writings, Ad episcopos regni admonitio altera (cf. supra, n. 46): “[e. xiv]
De oppressione pauperum providendum est, quia in eorum afflictione Deus
offenditur. . . . Providendum est ne affligantur in aedificiis superfluis, in
exactione hostili, si Deus pacem pro sua misericordia tribuerit, ete. [c. xv]
quando enim sperant aliquid lucrari, ad legem se convertunt [sc. comites
et vicarii, vel etiam decani]: quando vero per legem non aestimant acqui-
rere, ad capitula confugiunt: sicque interdum fit, ut nec capitula pleniter
conserventur, sed pro nihilo habeantur, nec lex.” While it is true that
Hincmar is here referring particularly to those abuses that were con-
nected with summonses to courts of law and with the fines levied in conse-
quence of failure to appear, there can be little doubt that other abuses were
legalized by a similar method of procedure. Cf. Flach, Les origines de Vane.
France, I, 342-44, and passim.
CHAPTER VIII 131
chosen by men devoid of public spirit, utterly selfish and greedy;
they would prefer a method which, while it was much more con-
venient, might also yield them a financial return.®®
Having agreed in principle as to the policy they were to pursue,
the nobles at once proceeded to open negotiations with the
Vikings.® For this purpose they employed as their envoy a
certain Siegfried, a Christian Dane, who was at that time a
fidelis of the West Frankish king.* It was probably felt that a
native Dane might be able to drive a better bargain with the
Vikings than a Frank. Siegfried was instructed to enter into
parley with the Viking leaders, and to propose to them in a
discreet and cautious manner that they accept tribute and depart
68 These traits of the magnates evidently were well known to the Vikings.
In the following year (885), when Charles the Fat sent an army of Lor-
rainers and West Franks against the Northmen at Louvain, the latter are
said to have affected surprise at seeing the nobles of the western kingdom
engaged in such an enterprise, and to have taunted them saying: “Why did
you come to us? That was not necessary. We know who you are; you
desire that we return to you; which we shall do” (see infra, n. 110). Van-
der Linden (op. cit., p. 70) doubts that these words ever were spoken by
the Northmen, and supposes that the annalist of St. Vaast inserted them in
his narrative merely for the purpose of making it interesting and dramatic;
in other words, Vander Linden would reduce this passage to a mere artifice
of style without any element of truth in it whatever (ibid., p. 67). His
opinion probably has been formed too hastily, and evidently is not the result
of any comparison of the style of the annalist of St. Vaast with those of
other writers of this period. Conclusions that are based exclusively on what
are supposed to be the general characteristics of the literary style of an
epoch, are at best very precarious. No one, perhaps, would deny that the
literary device of letting the dramatis personae talk, was frequently em-
ployed by the writers of the ninth century, and especially by the hagio-
graphers. But it will not do to carry the generalization too far and assume
that every author of that period habitually made use of this device. In
particular, it must not be assumed that the annalist of St. Vaast used it
very much, for, if my observations are correct, this is the only occasion on
which he ever put words into the mouths of the persons who figure in his
narrative. Even in describing the siege of Paris, which offered plentiful
opportunities for the employment of this device (cf. the poem of Abbo,
which abounds with such artifices), the annalist of St. Vaast refrained from
using it. In fact, the most distinguishing characteristics of his style are its
brevity (cf. supra, n. 39) and its freedom from rhetorical embellishments
and literary artifices. For these reasons I prefer to believe with Ditimmler
(III, 237, 349; cf. Vogel, 320) that the words accredited by the annalist of
St. Vaast to the Northmen do contain the substance of a sarcastic remark
actually made by the Vikings to the western magnates. A contrary opinion
must certainly be supported by more convincing arguments than those ad-
vanced by Vander Linden, if it is to gain general acceptance:
69 Cf. supra, n. 39. Regino (884, p. 121) states that it was Carloman who
promised to pay the Danegeld. But his information is at best very inac-
curate, and certainly is not to be given precedence over that furnished by
the Annals of St. Vaast. Cf. supra, nn. 76, 105, 106.
70 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 318: “Sigefridum Danum, christianum regique
fidelem, qui nepos fuerat Hrorici Dani, etc.” Cf. supra, n. 39. On the
identity of Siegfried, see Vogel, 316, n. 2.
132 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
from the kingdom.’ This commission Siegfried faithfully dis-
charged. Setting out from Compiégne, he went by way of Beau-
vais to the Viking headquarters at Amiens, and there presented
the proposals of the Frankish magnates to the leaders of the
“great army.’’? The Vikings, conscious of their advantage,
evidently demanded an enormous tribute as the price of their
withdrawal,** much to the surprise and disappointment of the
Frankish magnates; the latter had, in all probability, expected
to pay an amount of money corresponding more or less to the
sums paid at previous times.“ Quite naturally, therefore, re-
peated efforts were made to induce the Danes to lower their
demands; and Siegfried was compelled to journey back and forth
between Compiegne and Amiens a number of times before an
agreement could be reached.** Finally after very protracted
negotiations, the Vikings named as the price of their withdrawal
a tribute of 12,000 pounds of pure and tested silver according
to Norse weight, to be levied on Carloman and the Franks."
71 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 317: “qui [i. e. Sigefridus] caute cum eis [Nort-
mannis] de redemptione regni ageret.” Jbid., 884, p. 318 (cf. supra, n. 39):
“Sigefridum ... mittunt, ut cum principibus suae gentis tractaret, ut tribu-
tum acciperent, et e regno abirent.”
72 Ibid., 883, p. 317: ‘“TIlle [Sigefridus] vero Bellovagum venit, et ita
Ambianis perrexit ad exercendum injunctum sibi negotium.”’ Jbid., 884, pp.
318-19 (cf. supra, n. 39): “At ille quod sibi injunctum fuit, opere implere
studuit, Ambianis venit, primoribus gentis quae sibi fuerant dicta enuntiat,
etc.”
73 Regino, 884, p. 121: “Mox avidae gentis animi ad optinendam pecuniam
exardescunt, ete.’ Ann. Fuldenses, III, 884, ed. Kurze, pp. 101-2: ‘Nord-
manni, qui regnum illius [Karlomanni] praedis et incendiis longo tempore
fatigaverunt, audaciores effecti, etc.”
74 At least I can suggest no other reason for the protraction of the ne-
gotiations.
75 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 319: “et post longam et diuturnam concionem in
eundo et redeundo, renuntiando nunc his nunc illis, ete.”
76 Ibid.: “ad ultimum 12 milia pondera argenti cum suo pondere imposu-
erunt {[Nortmanni] regi et Francis in tributum.” Regino, 884, p. 121: “et
XII milia pondera argenti puri atque probati exigunt totidemque annis
pacem promittunt.” The last statement of Regino must be regarded as both
inaccurate and false. He probably meant twelve years, not twelve thousand;
i. e. totidem must be taken to refer, not to the word milia—that would be
absurd—but to the numerals X/J only. Even so, the truth of his statement
may be doubted. No other source indicates that the treaty was made fora
definite term of years. This may be one of those numerous errors in Re-
gino’s Chronicle that are to be attributed to the author’s uncritical adher-
ence to tradition and hearsay (see Dtimmler’s introduction to Regino in
Geschichtschreiber d. d. Vorzeit, IX Century, XIV, p. x; cf. Lot, “Une année
. . . de Charles le Chauve,” Le Moyen Age, 1902, VI, 427, n. 4; Vander Lin-
den, op. cit., 65-66). Ann. Fuld., III, 884, p. 102: “duodecim milia librarum
auri et argenti ab illa regione tributi nomine exegerunt.” I am inclined to
doubt that any part of the Danegeld was paid in gold, partly because there
is no mention of it either in the Annals of St. Vaast or in Regino’s Chronicle
CHAPTER VIII 138
This was, so far as we know, the heaviest Danegeld ever de-
manded by the Vikings in Frankish territory ;** and it was levied
at a time when the ruin, desolation, and loss of life, caused by
the Northmen, seemed perhaps more appalling than ever before.*®
The agreement with the Danes evidently was reached on or
shortly before February 2, for from that date a truce was de-
clared to and including the month of October.’® The truce being
guaranteed by an exchange of hostages, even that part of the
West Frankish population which dwelt north of the Oise — and
which therefore had been most directly exposed to the ravages of
the Vikings*°—began henceforth to enjoy some measure of secur-
ity. But in the East Frankish kingdom, beyond the Scheldt,
the devastation continued as before.*!
The evidence relating to the method by which the Danegeld of
—the first of which must be regarded as more reliable on this point than the
Annals of Fulda—and partly because the accuracy of the Bavarian (Fulda)
annalist may be gravely questioned; according to him, this Danegeld was
neither agreed to nor paid until after the death of Carloman, which is
obviously not correct (cf. Vogel, 317, n. 1; Dimmler, ITI, 229, n. 3). Abou-
el-Cassim, an Arabic writer of the tenth century, whose information appears
to be badly confused, has this to say of Carloman: “Ce fut ce roi acheta des
Madgiousses une paix de sept ans au prix de 600 rattals d’or et de 600
rattals d’argent” (cited by Depping, Histoire des expéditions maritimes des
Normands, 201, n.2). We know that Berengar raised a large tribute for
the Hungarian king, Taxis, who invaded Italy in 947 (see .Liutprand, Anta-
podosis, V, 33, ed. Duimmler, p. 118). Is it possible that Abou-el-Cassim
confused Carloman with Berengar, and the Vikings with the Magyars?
77 The next highest Danegeld is that of 845, which amounted to 7,000
pounds (cf. supra, chap. i, n. 45). It is true that the amounts of the Dane-
gelds paid between 889 and 926, inclusive, are unknown; but it does not
appear likely that they were as high as the tribute for 884, since on the
later occasions the Vikings did not have such decided advantages over the
Franks as they did in 884. To my mind, the reign of Carloman marks the
culmination of the Viking invasions in the West Frankish kingdom (cf.
Vogel, p. 259, last paragraph).
78 The plaint of the annalist of St. Vaast, given supra, p. 124, seems to
justify this statement. Cf. Vogel, 316 and n. 1.
79 Ann. Vedast:, 884, p. 319: “datis obsidibus ad invicem, coeperunt hi
qui trans Hisam erant, aliquatenus securi esse. A die itaque purificationis
s. Mariae usque mense octobrio inter eos haec securitas data est.”
80 Cf. the preceding note. I can not agree with Vogel (p. 317) that trans
Hisam should be translated “southeast of the Oise.” In that case, the popu-
lation on either side of the Somme, which had suffered most, would have
obtained no relief. The truce must have applied to all that portion of the
western kingdom in which the “great army” had been operating, i. e. to the
entire district between the Scheldt, the Oise, and the Seine. There is no
evidence that the Vikings had extended their ravages southeast of the
Oise at this time. If they had, the magnates would hardly have assembled
at Compiégne, on the Oise, to deliberate. Cf. supra, p. 124 and n. 39, and see
the following note.
81 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 319: “Sed Nortmanni trans Scaldum ... more
sibi solito . . . devastant, etc.”
134 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
884 was raised, is very scant.®? All we really know is that a
general tax was levied for the purpose,** and, probably because
the tax did not yield the required amount,** that it became neces-
sary also to draw on the church treasuries. Perhaps we shall
not go far wrong if we assume that this Danegeld was secured
by methods very much akin to those employed for a similar pur-
pose in 877.°° Whether or not a graduated assessment was pre-
pared, proportioned in each case to the value of holdings in land
or to other sources of income, it may be taken for granted that
the burden of the tax fell, as usual, on that part of the population
which was least able to pay ;°° in other words, that the holders of
mansi, together with priests and merchants, were forced to pay
not only what might be regarded as their legitimate share, but
also that additional amount which, in justice, ought to have been
contributed by their seigniors.**
The sources at our disposal do not permit us to arrive at any
satisfactory conclusion as regards the territorial limits within
which this Danegeld was raised. There can be no doubt that the
tax was levied in Francia, which had been chiefly exposed to the
operations of the “great army.’’** Whether Neustria, Aquitaine,
and what remained of Burgundy, also were required to con-
tribute, must be left to conjecture. It seems hardly possible
that the largest tribute ever demanded by the Vikings on the
continent,®® could have been raised in Francia alone. On most
previous occasions (when the sums required were much smaller)
it had been usual to tax Neustria and Burgundy as well as
Francia ;°° and after the recent devastations Francia was, in 884,
more exhausted than ever. Since Carloman was now ruler of
82 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 319: “Post sanctum itaque pascha inchoatur tribu-:
tum persolvi, spoliantur ecclesiae et ecclesiastica mancipia, tandem soiuto
tributo, mense octobrio finiente, adunantur Franci, etc.”
83 I take it that the words, “inchoatur tributum persolvi” (see he pre-
ceding note), imply a collection of taxes levied to raise the Danegeld; the
expression, “spoliantur ... ecclesiastica mancipia,’ undoubtedly indicates
that the serfs on the lands of the church were required to contribute toward
the Danegeld.
84 In 877 the church treasuries were drawn upon only after the proceeds
of the tax had proved inadequate (cf. supra, chap. vi, nn. 45, 47). The
words, “spoliantur ecclesiae ... tandem soluto tributo” (cf. supra, n. 82),
lead me to believe that this holds true also for 884.
85 Cf. supra, pp. 99 ff.
86 Cf. supra, pp. 102-38 and n. 68, p. 109.
87 Cf. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., p. 123.
88 Cf. supra, n. 80.
89 Cf. supra, n. 77.
90 See supra, pp. 97-98 and nn. 34, 37-40.
CHAPTER. VIII 135
the entire West Frankish realm (not including Lorraine and the
kingdom of Boso),*t and since all the magnates are said to have
been assembled when they decided to buy off the Vikings,°*? it is
possible to argue that the whole kingdom of Carloman, at least
all of it outside of Aquitaine,®* was required to contribute in
884.°* But no statement can be made on this subject with any
degree of assurance. — At least seven months were required to
raise the enormous tribute; the first payments to the Danes were
made shortly after Easter (April 16), but the final installment
could not be paid until the end of October.®®
After the tribute had been liquidated, the Frankish magnates,
suspicious of the good faith and the intentions of the Vikings,
mobilized their forces, and prepared to offer armed resistance to
the invaders in the event that they should fail to live up to their
engagements.°® But the Vikings set fire to their camp and de-
parted from Amiens toward the sea-coast. Carloman and the
Franks, having crossed the Oise, followed the retreating Danes
at some distance, evidently to make sure of their departure.*’
91+Cf. supra,.p.-121° and n. 19.
92 Cf. supra, n. 39. The fact that the magnates who assembled at Com-
piégne are sometimes referred to as Franci (Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 317; 884,
p. 319), is of no significance as regards their number or nationality. The
Franci are also said to have invited Charles the Fat to become the ruler of
the West Frankish kingdom (Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 320); yet we know that
Charles the Fat was recognized as king not only in the North, but also in
Aquitaine (Dtimmler, III, 235, n. 1). See also infra, n. 95.
93 Aquitaine had thus far never been required to contribute toward the
Danegeld (cf. supra, p. 98 and n. 40). It seems very doubtful that a tribute
for Vikings operating from the Somme would have been raised in southern
France.
94 vy. Kalckstein (op. cit., p. 123) believes that Abbot Hugh supervised the
collection of the Danegeld in Neustria.
95 See supra, n. 82. I interpret the words, “‘inchoatur tributum persolvi”
(cf. supra, n. 83), as signifying that the tribute was paid to the Vikings
in successive installments, according as it could be'collected from the tax-
payers. Since the first installments were paid after Easter, it may be
assumed that the collection of the Danegeld from the subject population had
begun at, or even before, Easter (i. e. April 16, according to v. Kalckstein,
op. cit., p. 123). It will be remembered that the Franks had agreed to raise
the Danegeld on, or probably before, February 2 (cf. supra, n. 79). v. Kalck-
stein (op. cit., p. 123) believes that the Danegeld was assessed at the As-
sembly of Ver in March. But it seems more probable that this had been
done at Compiégne in February. All the magnates had been present at
Compiégne (cf. supra, n. 39), but only part of them came to Ver (M.G.H.
LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 371, line 22), and the Danegeld is not even mentioned
in the Capitulare Vernense.
96 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 319: “mense octobrio finiente, adunantur Franci,
ut si Nortmanni inmutari fidem vellent, eis resisterent.”
97 /bid.: “Nortmanni vero sua castra incendunt, atque ab Ambianis rece-
dunt; rex vero et Franci, transito Hysa, lente itinere eos insequuntur.”
Regino, 884, p. 121: “Accepta tam ingenti pecunia, funes a litore solvunt,
naves conscendunt et marina litora repetunt.”
136 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
Arrived at Boulogne, the Vikings took counsel among themselves
as to future operations. They finally separated into two groups,
some going to England, while others proceeded to the old king-
dom of Lothaire. The latter group eventually established itself
for the winter in a camp constructed at Louvain, on the River
Dyle.°®
Hardly had the Frankish army disbanded, after the departure
of the Vikings, when Carloman was accidentally wounded by one
of his companions on a hunting expedition.®® The young monarch
survived but a few days, passing away on December 12, 884, in
the eighteenth year of his life.°° This left a five year old boy,
Charles — later called the Simple —the nearest heir to the
western kingdom.'"' It was recognized that the situation did
not permit the experiment of elevating a mere child to the throne;
and we may assume that the experiences of the magnates during
the reign of Carloman did not incline them to set up a regency
under a man like Abbot Hugh.’*? Also there is reason to believe
that the nobles were now fully alive to the danger that threat-
ened their own interests if they permitted the Vikings to con-
tinue their operations unchecked and with impunity.’ The
tribute of 884 had doubtless been far heavier than the magnates
had expected ;'°* and they probably wished to avoid the necessity
of having to pay another Danegeld, at least for some time. But
98 Ann. Vedast., 884, pp. 319-20: ‘‘Praedicti vero Dani iter agentes Bo-
noniam veniunt; ibique agentes consilium, quid sibi faciendum est, pars
illorum mare transiit, atque pars Luvanium in regno quondam Hlotharii;
ibique sibi castra statuunt ad hyemandum.” See also Regino, 884, p. 122
(quoted infra, n. 106); Hthelwerdi Chron., III, 884, ioc. cit., p. 123; Floren-
tius Wigorn., 885, loc. cit., p. 561; Ann. Anglo-Saxonici, 885, loc. cit., pp.
104-5. On the sojourn of the Northmen at Louvain, see Vander Linden, op.
cit., 64-81.
99 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 320.
100 Dummler, III, 232 and n. 1.
LOL bid... 233:
102 Though Hugh had enjoyed the favor of Louis III and Carloman, whom
he had loyally supported (cf. supra, p. 120 and n. 7, pp. 122-23), and though
he doubtless had a considerable following (cf. supra, p. 122 and n. 24), it is
also true that there was a party strongly opposed to the advancement of his
interests (cf. supra, nn. 7, 49). Cf. Eckel, op. cit., p. 3.
103 Cf. supra, pp. 124-25. In 885 the western magnates, at the request of
Charles the Fat, actually took part in an expedition against the Viking
camp at Louvain, outside their own boundaries. It is true that the expedi-
tion ended in failure, but it was the first occasion on which the West Franks
ever went to engage the Northmen beyond the limits of the western king-
dom (Ann. Vedast., 885, p. 321; cf. infra, p. 1388). The determined resistance
of the Franks at the siege of Paris (see infra, chap. ix), is another indication
of a change in their attitude as regards the Viking invasions.
104 Cf. supra, p. 182 and nn. 73, 74.
1
—
bi
~~
CHAPTER VIII 187
it was rumored, and possibly believed by some, that the leaders
of the “great army,” having learned of the death of Carloman,
regarded the recent treaty as no longer binding and were there-
fore demanding that the successor of Carloman, whoever he
might be, pay another tribute of 12,000 pounds as the price of
peace.?°> Whether the Vikings had really made any such demand
is doubtful,'°* but the rumor to that effect may indicate what was
feared. In any case, it is clear that the magnates felt they could
afford to take no risks. Passing over the claims of the boy
105 What I have interpreted as a rumor current among the Franks, is by
Regino presented as a fact (884, p. 122): “Nordmanni cognita morte regis
protinus in regnum revertuntur. Itaque Hugo abba et ceteri proceres lega-
tos ad eos dirigunt, promissionem et fidem datam violatam esse proclamant.
Ad haec illi respondent, se cum Carlomanno rege, non cum alio aliquo foedus
pepigisse [but cf. supra, n. 76]; quisquis ille esset, qui ei in regnum suc-
cederet, eiusdem numeri et quantitatis pecuniam daret, si quiete ac pacifice
imperium tenere vellet. Territi huiuscemodi mandatis optimates regni ad
Carolum imperatorem missos dirigunt eumque ultro in regnum invitant, etc.”
In this case, as in the one cited before (supra, n. 76), Regino’s statements
are not corroborated by any other writer, and we may well doubt whether
what he says is literally true. His information on what took place at this
time is at best very inaccurate. To be convinced of this, one needs only
compare his entries for the year 884 with those for 886, and note how he
confused the chronology of the events he was describing. A second Dane-
geld of 12,000 pounds was certainly never paid by the Franks. Cf. the fol-
lowing note. '
106 Both Diimmler (III, 233) and Vogel (318-19) accept the testimony
of Regino on this point (cf. the preceding note) without question. But
neither of them has given sufficient attention to what Regino says in the
context. Both assume that the Vikings did not learn of Carloman’s death,
and therefore did not demand a second Danegeld, until after they had
reached Louvain. But that is not what Regino says (884, pp. 121-22): “Ac-
cepta tam ingenti pecunia funes a litore solvunt [Nortmanni], naves con-
scendunt et marina litora repetunt. ...Nortmanni cognita morte regis
protinus in regnum revertuntur, etc.” (see preceding note). These words
imply that the Northmen learned of the death of Carloman before they had
left the sea-coast, and that it was thence, and not from Louvain, that they
returned to the western kingdom (cf. supra, n. 98). Not until the end of his
recital for 884 does Regino state that the Northmen left the Somme and
proceeded to Louvain (p. 122): “His etiam diebus Nortmanni a Somna
exeunt et rursus in regno Lotharii revertentes in loco, qui dicitur Lovon,
castrametati sunt in confinio eiusdem regni et continuis incursionum in-
festationibus utraque regna fatigant.” A passage almost identical with the
one just quoted occurs again for 886 (p. 125). All this is very confused.
And since there is not a word in any other source regarding a demand for
a second Danegeld, I am not only inclined to doubt that such a demand was
ever made; I question also whether the Northmen returned inland imme-
diately upon receiving news of Carloman’s death. There is every reason to
believe that they did not reénter the western kingdom until after their
sojourn at Louvain (cf. the following page and n. 110). Diimmler (III, 234,
n. 1) apparently believes what Regino says about the demand for a second
Danegeld, but thinks he goes too far when he asserts this to have been the
reason why the western magnates gave their allegiance to Charles the Fat
(cf. the preceding note). The statements in the Annals of Fulda (III, 884,
pp. 101-2) on these matters, are confused and altogether unreliable (cf.
supra, n. 76, end; Vogel, 317, n. 1).
138 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
Charles, they gave their allegiance to Emperor Charles the
Fat,?°’ who, in spite of his weakness in matters military and
otherwise, was at that time the most prominent figure among
all the Franks, partly because of his imperial position, but more
on account of the powerful SE ote he had as ruler of the
eastern kingdom. yee
Charles the Fat seems to have recognized the necessity of ex-
pelling the Northmen from his realm; for one of his first acts,
after he had received the homage and fealty of his new vassals
early in 885, was to order a combined army of West Franks and
Lorrainers to proceed against the stronghold of the Vikings at
Louvain.'®® It is certain that from this time, if not before, the
leaders of the “great army” ceased to consider themselves bound
by the terms of their treaty with Carloman and the western mag-
nates in 884.1*° Within a few months the Vikings left their camp
at Louvain, and proceeded by land and sea to the Seine.*"*
Rouen was taken on July 25, 885, and by November of the same
year the memorable siege of Paris had begun.'™
In return for the enormous tribute of 12,000 pounds of silver,
the western kingdom had enjoyed peace for a period of less than
eighteen mouths.'*? Though we possess no direct evidence on the
point, there can scarcely be any doubt that the Danegeld had been
raised only with very great difficulty,* coming as it did after a
period during which the country had suffered terribly from de-
vastation and plundering.*® Whatever may have been the mo-
107 Ann. Vedast., 884, 885, p. 320. Cf. the two preceding notes.
108 Dimmler, III, 233-35.
109 Ann. Vedast., 885, p. 321. According to Regino (see supra, n. 106),
both kingdoms, the western as well as the eastern, had been raided by the
Vikings from their camp at Louvain. Cf. Vander Linden, op. cit., p. 69.
110 This is indicated by the jeers with which the Vikings greeted the
Franks from the western realm (Ann. Vedast., 885, p. 821): “Francosque qui
venerant ex regno Karlomanni irrisere Dani: Ut quid ad nos venistis? non
fuit necesse; nos scimus qui estis; et vultis ut ad vos redeamus; quod
faciemus.” That this was not an idle threat is sufficiently demonstrated
infra in the text. Cf. supra, n. 68.
Jit Ann. Vedest.,. 88b,.. p.. 321; -Regino, 887, 1p... 126.) Cre Vozel320,,/n2. 3,
where some additional references are given.
112 Ann. Vedast., 885, pp. 321-23. Cf. Vogel, 320 ff.
113 From February 2, 884, when the truce was declared (see supra, n. 79),
to about July 25, 885, when the Viking army entered Rouen.
114 The words of the annalist of St. Vaast (cf. supra, n. 82): “spoliantur
ecclesiae et ecclesiastica mancipia, tandem soluto tributo,” and the long
period required to raise the tribute, are indications to this effect. OF ot
Dummler, III, 230.
115 Cf. supra, pp. 123-24.
x "Pe
CHAPTER VIII 139
tives of the magnates when they entered into negotiations with
the Vikings,'** it is fairly clear that for the present they had had
enough of the policy of paying tribute, and that their eyes had
been opened to the imminent danger with which their own inter-
ests were threatened by the operations of the “‘great army.’’*?
Yet it would undoubtedly be a mistake to suppose that the
strengthening of the resistance to the Vikings which followed
the payment of this Danegeld,''® resulted from a sudden outburst
of patriotism or a spontaneous birth of public spirit on the part
of the magnates."*® They probably remained quite as self-seek-
ing and greedy as before; and their interests were the same as
they had always been. But they found themselves in a somewhat
changed situation. The Vikings of this period were not loose
bands of freebooters bent solely on the acquisition of plunder;
they were a strongly organized “great army,’ which had come
for the purpose of conquest, and with the intention of establish-
ing colonies and making permanent settlements in the conquered
territory.’*° At this time there was no ambitious monarch*?
whose schemes of strengthening the royal power had to be frus-
trated by keeping him occupied with the Northmen, as was the
case in the time of Charles the Bald.1*?. The real danger in the
present situation lay in the fact that the monarch was not suf-
ficiently strong to be able to give protection against the foreign
enemy. Such a situation was a direct menace to the private
interests of the magnates.'**And the recognition, by the nobles,
of that menace furnishes the only satisfactory explanation of
their unusual efforts to prevent the return of the “great army”
to their country after 884, their stout resistance to the Vikings
at the siege of Paris (885—86), and their refusal to buy the
removal of the invaders by the payment of another Danegeld—***
for the next chapter will make clear that the Danegeld which
eventually was paid to the Vikings at Paris, was agreed to and
116 Cf. supra, pp. 124 ff.
117 Cf. supra, p. 132 and n. 74, p. 136.
118 See supra, n. 103 and cf. Vogel, 44, 321 ff.
119 Cf. supra, pp. 128-31, 114-17.
120 See supra, n. 26. Cf. Vogel, 260-61; Vander Linden, op. cit., 64-65.
121 It will be agreed that Emperor Charles the Fat was not regarded as
such.
112 See supra, pp. 114-17.
123 This is well brought out by Fustel de Coulanges (Les transform. de
la royauté, 695-96) when he explains why the western magnates chose
Charles the Fat instead of Charles the Simple as their king in 884. Cf.
supra, pp. 136-38.
124 These matters are taken up for discussion in the following chapter.
140 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
furnished, not by the defenders of the city, but by Emperor
Charles the Fat.
The situation above described did not, however, last very
long.‘*> We shall find Odo and Rudolph paying Danegeld under
circumstances not essentially different from those which had
forced Charles the Bald to resort to this expedient.?*°
125 Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit., 696—97.
126 See infra, chaps. x—xiv; cf. supra, chap. vii.
THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 141
CHAPTER IX,
PAYMENTS MADE TO THE DANES (886—87) IN CONNECTION
WITH THE SIEGE OF PARIS.
At the close of the preceding chapter attention was called
to that peculiar situation which during and after the year 884
led to a temporary strengthening of the resistance offered by
the magnates of the western kingdom to the Viking invaders.
But it was also pointed out that this determined effort of the
Frankish nobles to expel the Danes, did not prevent the in-
vaders from securing a payment of Danegeld from Charles the
Fat before they quitted Paris.‘ In truth, two money payments
were made to the Danes in connection with the famous siege
of 885—86, though only one of these can be regarded, in any
proper sense, as a Danegeld; and we shall find that even this
differed in several ways from preceding Danegelds.
No attempt will be made here to tell again the whole story
of the siege of Paris.? But if the reasons for the two payments
just mentioned are to be made at all clear, it will be necessary
briefly to review the general course of the siege operations, and
to examine certain details in connection with the negotiations
that took place between the Franks and the Vikings.
The “great army” had arrived before Paris on November 24,
885.2 The following day, Siegfried, one of the Viking leaders,
appeared before Bishop Gauzelin, requesting that the Danes
be permitted to ascend the Seine, and promising on this con-
dition to spare the city of Paris from destruction or damage.‘
When this request was peremptorily refused, the Vikings on
November 26 and 27 attempted, though in vain, to take the city
by storm.’ They thereupon proceeded to a regular investment
1 See supra, pp. 139-40.
2 The most detailed and accurate secondary account of the siege of Paris
is that of Favre (Hudes, 17-68); other more or less detailed descriptions are
given by Vogel (320 ff.) and Diimmler (III, 260 ff.). Freeman (“The Early
Sieges of Paris,’ in Historical Essays, First Series, 212-56) has the only
account in English that even approaches completeness. For other references
see Vogel, 324, n. 6. My sketch of the earlier part of the siege is based in
part, but by no means exclusively, on the work of Favre.
3 Favre, 35; cf. Vogel, 324, n. 5.
4 Favre, 35-36.
5 Ibid., 36-39.
142 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
of the place, meanwhile engaging intermittently in plundering
raids throughout the surrounding district.°®
Up to February, 886, comparatively small progress was made
in the siege operations, although the Vikings had very large
forces at their disposal.*. Under the staunch and able direction
of Bishop Gauzelin and Count Odo,’ the Franks had thus far
baffled every attempt of the Vikings to gain entrance to the city
or to break down the system of defenses.° But on February
6 the Danes, aided by a flood of the Seine, finally captured and
destroyed one of the protecting towers.’° This misfortune in-
duced Bishop Gauzelin to appeal for aid to Count Henry in
Saxony, one of the ablest leaders of the East Franks in their
warfare with the Northmen.': For certain reasons that are not
entirely clear, Henry was able to accomplish little or nothing;
after having spent a month or more in a futile attempt to secure
an engagement with the Vikings in the open field, he returned
home towards the beginning of April.
The departure of Count Henry left the brave defenders of
Paris with no present hope of aid or succor. After another
attack on the citadel, which was sanguinarily repulsed,** the
Danes moved their camp from the north to the south bank of
the Seine,'‘ where they would have the river between themselves
6 Favre, 39 ff.
7 Ibid., 35 and n. 2, 39-43; cf. Vogel, 324-25.
8 Favre, 26 ff.
9 Ibid., 438-46.
10 Ann. Vedast., 886, ed. Dehaisnes, pp. 323-24. Cf. Favre, 46 ff.
11 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 324; Abbo, De bellis Parisiacae urbis, II, lines
3-4, M.G.H., Poetae Latini, IV, Part I. See also Favre, 48-51.
12 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 324; Abbo, II, lines 3-22; Regino, Chron., 887, ed.
Kurze, p. 125; Ann. Fuld., III, 886, ed. Kurze, 104.
13 Abbo, II, lines 15-22. This attack appears to have been overlooked
by most writers on the subject, including Favre.
14 Abbo, II, lines 34-40. I agree with Favre (52, n. 2) in rejecting the
view of Steenstrup (Normannerne, II, 225) and Dummler (III, 266), that
only part of the Viking army — i. e. Siegfried and his men — crossed the
Seine to erect a new camp. Undoubtedly it was the entire “great army”
which changed its place of encampment. But it seems to me that all writ-
ers on this subject, including Favre (52, n. 2) and Vogel (331) err when
they assert that the Viking camp was moved on the advice of Siegfried.
This assertion is based on a misinterpretation of the following words of Sieg-
fried to his companions (Abbo, II, lines 32-33): “‘ ‘Hane linquite sedem, Hic
non stare diu nostrum manet, hine sed abire!’” Here Siegfried is not urg-
ing the Vikings merely to transfer their camp from one place to another, but
to go away, to depart, abire; in other words, to give up the siege of Paris and
go elsewhere. To my mind it seems that Abbo here uses the verb abire in ex-
actly the same sense as he does in lines 64-65, where there can be no question
as to its meaning (see infra, n. 32). Furthermore, the reason assigned by
CHAPTER IX 143
and any hostile relief force coming, as it most likely would,
from the north.” There was, however, nothing on which the
besieged might base any hopes of a change in the general situa-
tion, for the Vikings fortified themselves very strongly and
prepared to continue the siege.’° Indeed, the prospect must
have seemed gloomy enough, and it is hardly to be wondered
at, if, under such circumstances, the defenders of Paris began
to consider the possibility of putting an end to the siege, or at
least of securing the withdrawal of part of the “great army,”
by means of bribery."’
Aware that such a scheme would be successful only if some
Viking chief with considerable prestige and influence could be
interested in it, the Franks determined to approach ‘‘King” Sieg-
fried with a proposal of this nature.** A meeting arranged
between Siegfried and Odo,'® seems to have resulted in an agree-
ment that Siegfried was to attempt to induce his fellow leaders
and their men to give up the siege and to retire from Paris.*°
Hardly had this compact been made, however, when a group
of Vikings appeared, ready to overpower Odo and carry him
Abbo in lines 31-32 for what he represents Siegfried as saying in lines 32-
33, would be meaningless if Siegfried were suggesting only that the camp
be moved; “conspiciens Sigemfredus nostros in agone esse feros’”—Siegfried
perceived that the Parisian Franks were impetuous in battle, and therefore
he advocated that the Vikings move their camp from one side of the city to
the other (!); in truth, a poor remedy against the impetuosity of the
Franks! The usual misinterpretation of this passage is probably due to an
erroneous translation of the word ergo in line 34; it should not be translated
“therefore” or “consequently,” but “now when’; for it is used to resume the
discussion dropped in line 22, or, more exactly, to bring the reader’s atten-
tion back to what happened at the time Count Henry returned to Germany
(see line 15).
15 Vogel, 331. Favre’s view (p. 52), that the camp was transferred by
reason of a disease which broke out among the Vikings, seems less probable.
16 Abbo, II, lines 37-40.
17 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 324: “Episcopus vero, corde confractus ex gravi
damno, ...mandans ut... [Heinricus] ei et populo christiano subveniret.
. sed Heinricus nil ibi profecit; atque in suam rediit regionem. Gozlinus
vero, dum omnibus modis populo christiano juvare studeret, cum Sigefrido,
rege Danorum, amicitiam fecit, ut per hoc civitas ab obsidione liberaretur.”
Cf. infra, nn. 24-26.
18 Cf. Vogel, 40, n. 3, 325 and n. 3; Favre, 35, n. 9.
19 Abbo, II, line 23: ‘‘Rege Sigemfedo simul ast Odone loquente.” Cf.
supra, n. 17. According to the Annals of St. Vaast it was Gauzelin, but ac-
cording to Abbo it was Odo, who conducted the negotiations with Siegfried.
This need raise no difficulty if it be remembered that the two men were
cooperating, and that Odo may well have undertaken this mission at the
suggestion, or at least with the approval, of Gauzelin, who probably was ill
at this time (Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 325). Gauzelin held the supreme com-
mand at Paris until his death gave it to Odo (Favre, 54, n. 3).
20 Cf. tafra, ‘n. 22.
144 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
off as a prisoner. But Odo stood his ground, and the Viking
band was driven off by a number of Franks who had rushed
forward to the aid of their leader.*: Siegfried now took occa-
sion to point out to his fellow Vikings the fierce valor of Odo’s
men in battle, hoping by such argument to persuade them that
it would be useless to continue the investment of Paris, and
better policy to go elsewhere.”?
But it proved very difficult for Siegfried to convince the other
Danes on these points,** and eventually he found it advisable
to reopen his negotiations with the Franks on a narrower basis.
It was now agreed that whether or not the other Danes could be
persuaded to do so, Siegfried and his men were to depart from
Paris in return for the payment of the comparatively small sum
of sixty pounds of silver.** It is quite possible that Siegfried
had been promised a larger bribe — for this payment can not
be regarded as anything else*> — if he should finally succeed in
persuading his fellow countrymen to follow him.*® Indeed, he
made a second attempt, but without result.27 The Danes, su-
specting, or possibly knowing, that Siegfried was advancing his
own ends rather than theirs, refused to follow him.2* Where-
upon Siegfried challenged them to attack Paris without his aid.*°
Though this challenge was accepted, the attack resulted only in
21 Abbo, II, lines 24-30.
22 Ibid., lines 31-33: “Conspiciens Sigemfredus nostros in agone / Esse
feros, inquit sociis: ‘Hane linquite sedem,/ Hic non stare diu nostrum
manet, hine sed abire!’” Cf. supra, n. 14.
23 They seem to have ignored his suggestions; at least Abbo (II, lines
31-40) has nothing to say of any reply from them.
24 Abbo, II, lines 41-42: “Denique rex dictus [i. e. Sigefredus] denas
capiens argenti / Sex libras nitidi nobis causa redeundi, ete.” The Annals
of St. Vaast (cf. supra, n. 17) mention the compact with Siegfried, but say
nothing of the money payment. The other sources do not mention the agree-
ment with Siegfried at all.
25 A payment of sixty pounds of silver hardly constitutes a Danegeld
of the type that has so far been studied in this dissertation. Danegeld was
paid by the Franks when they were unable, or unwilling, to offer any
further resistance to the Vikings; and it was paid in amounts compared
with which the sum accepted by Siegfried was a mere pittance. All we
know about the policy of the Vikings in the past would lead us to believe
that they would have been quite willing to raise the siege of Paris, if the
Franks had been ready to pay Danegeld. Cf. infra, n. 31 and see also pp. .
146-147.
26 This conjecture is based on the fact that Siegfried, even after he had
received the bribe, made efforts to persuade the Vikings to give up the siege
and follow him seaward. See the following note, and cf. Favre, 53, first two
lines.
27 Abbo, II, lines 43-47.
28 Ibid., line 47: “his [Normannis] autem nolentibus.”
29 Ibid., lines 48-52.
CHAPTER IX 145
losses for the Northmen — two of their “kings” among the
rest.*° Yet, in spite of the repulse, the bulk of the Danish army
chose to continue the siege operations, doubtless in the hope that
eventually they would be able either to reduce Paris or, at the
least, to secure a large sum of money, a veritable Danegeld, as
the price of their retreat.*t But Siegfried, satisfied that without
his aid little could be accomplished by the besieging army, now
collected his own men and withdrew from the Seine.*?
The departure of Siegfried brought small relief to the defen-
ders of Paris. After the death of Gauzelin, in April 886,°* the
Northmen pressed the siege with redoubled vigor, and there
were violent conflicts every day for a long time.’* Odo, who
was now in supreme command, at length decided to apply for
aid to Emperor Charles the Fat.*® But that monarch, for some
reason that has never been made quite clear, was in no haste
to relieve the hard pressed town, and did not arrive at Paris
until late in September, or early in October.*®
Meanwhile Count Henry, whom the emperor probably had
sent on a reconnoitering exploit in advance of his main army,
had fallen into a trap prepared by the Northmen, and had been
*killed.*7 Henry’s death was a severe blow to the emperor,** and
30 Abbo, II, lines 53-60.
31 Jbid., lines 66-67: ‘Mox hilaris Sequanam liquit [Sigefredus] pro
munere sumpto / Sic alii facerent, eadem si tune meruissent.” This pass-
age indicates that the other Northmen would have followed Siegfried’s ex-
ample, if they had been properly rewarded. Vogel’s view (p. 331), that the
Parisians were willing to pay tribute, appears to be unfounded.
32 Abbo, II, lines 61-66: “Sigemfredus ovans, ridens morientibus inquit: /
‘Nunc ... urbem capitote, / ...!’ / Inde suis: ‘Abeamus,’ ait, ‘tempus
venit ecce, / Quo gratum fuerit nobis istine abiise!’ / Mox hilaris, etc.” (see
preceding note). Siegfried returned to the Seine in November (see infra,
pp. 96-97 and n. 66; cf. Favre, p. 53, n. 4, p. 63).
so, Dummler, Ill, 267,)n. 2;
34 Abbo, II, lines 154-62; Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 325.
35 Abbo, II, lines 163-65. The Annals of St. Vaast (886, p. 325) represent
Odo as applying for aid to the principibus regni, whom he requested to not-
ify the emperor of the the sad plight of Paris. Cf. Flodoard, Historia Rem-
ensis ecclesiae, IV, c. 5, M.G.H., SS., XIII, p. 563.
36 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 326; Ann. Fuld., III, 886, p. 105.- See also BOhmer-
Miihlbacher, Regesten, nos. 1723a, 1725a; cf. Vogel, 334, n. 5; Favre, 59, n. 4.
37 The death of Count Henry occurred on August 28, 886 (Annales necro-
logici Fuldenses, M.G.H., SS., XIII, p. 185; ef. Dtimmler, III, 269 and n. 2).
The Annals of St. Vaast (886, p. 326), but not Abbo, state that Henry had
been sent in advance by the emperor. The details in connection with the
second expedition, and the death, of Henry are given by Regino (887, pp.
125-26), but many of his statements are no doubt inaccurate (cf. Favre,
57, n. 1; Vogel, 334, n. 3). See also Ann. Fuld., III, 886, p.-105. Cf v.
Kalckstein, Geschicte des franzdsischen Konigtums, I, 40, n. 4.
38 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 326: “‘sed quia dux periit, ipse [imperator] nil
utile gessit.”
Danegeld. 10.
146 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
a great loss to the Franks. It ought to have emphasized the
necessity of bringing immediate succor to the defenders of Paris.
Yet Charles apparently made no effort to accelerate his move-
ments.°*?
When the emperor finally did appear before the city, at the
head of a very large and splendid, though motley, host,*® he
accomplished nothing which, in the opinion of his contempora-
ries and of later historians, was at all commensurate with what
the situation demanded or his resources permitted.*t We get
the impression from the sources that precisely at the time when
he had it in his power to deliver a crushing blow against the
invaders, he failed to strike,*? and instead opened up negotia-
tions,*® which in November, 886, led to the conclusion of a very
pusillanimous treaty.** The Northmen were given permission
to proceed to Sens and the Burgundian territories, with the
understanding that they might spend the winter there, plunder-
ing at will;* also they were promised a tribute of 700 pounds
39 Abbo (II, lines 219-330) recounts the various events which took place
at Paris between the death of Count Henry and the arrival of Charles the
Fat. Cf. Vogel, 333; Favre, 59; Dttmmler, III, 270.
40 Abbo, II, 330-34: “Hn princeps de quo canitur, circumdatis armis / >
Omnigenis, caelum veluti splendoribus astreis, / Induperator adest Karolus
comitatus opimo / Diversi populo labii, tentoria figens / Sub Martis pedibus
montis speculamque secundum.” Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 326: “[imperator]
Carisiacum veniens cum ingenti exercitu, etc.’ Jbid.: “Parisius venit cum
manu valida.”
41 Ibid. (ef. note (a) on p. 327): “ipse [imperator] nil utile gessit.” Re-
gino, 887, p. 127: “[Imperator] nil dignum imperatoriae maiestati in eodem
loco gessit.” Ann. Fuld., Cont. Ratisb., 886, p. 114: “Sparum prospere actis
rebus.” Cf. Favre, 59; v. Kalckstein, op. cit., I, 42; Vogel, 335; Dtimmler,
III, 271. See also infra, n. 44.
42 According to‘the Annals of St. Vaast (886, p. 327), Charles, after his.
arrival in the vicinity of Paris, not only had forced the Northmen to aban-
don one of their camps and to retire across the Seine, but also had sent re-
enforcements into the town; besides, he had led his own army across the
river to a position from which, it may be presumed, a successful attack
might have been launched against the principal camp, and main force, of the
Vikings. Abbo (II, lines 315-29) tells of how a certain detachment from the
imperial army, aided by the Parisians, had defeated and put to flight a
group of Northmen before Charles arrived with the bulk of his forces.
43 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 327: “indeque coeperunt, quia hyems imminebat,
missi ad invicem discurrere, ut imperator pacem cum Danis faceret.”
44 Ibid.: “factum est vere consilium nimis miserum.” Abbo, II, line 389:
“foedere ... fragili.” For the date of the treaty, see Favre, 61, n. 1;
Bohmer—-Miihlbacher, op. cit., no. 1733a.
45 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 327: “via sine impedimento attributa, ut Bur-
gundiam hyeme depraedarent.” Abbo, II, line 338: ‘“Annuiturque feris lici-
tum Senones adeundi.” Regino, 887, p. 127: “‘concessis terris et regionibus;
quae ultra Sequanam erant, Normannis ad depredandum.” Ann. Fuld., III,
886, p. 105: “quibusdam per Burgundiam vagandi licentiam dedit’” (cf. the
following note).
CHAPTER IX 147
of silver, payable in March of the following year; after the te-
ceipt of, and in return for, this payment, they were to return
to their own country.*®
Thus, in spite of the long and brave resistance of the defenders
of Paris, in spite of the departure of Siegfried, in spite also of
the great Frankish army which had come to relieve the city,
the Vikings had triumphed. What the Parisians had sought
by herculean efforts and by great sacrifices to prevent, what they
had steadfastly denied the Vikings — tribute and free passage
up the Seine — was conceded to them, almost without a murmur,
by the emperor at whose request Bishop Gauzelin and Count
Odo had undertaken to hold Paris at all costs.*7 The language
used by a German scholar to describe a similar event in 882,
could be used with even greater propriety in this case; for indeed
we have here “das jammervollste Schauspiel, das sich tiberhaupt
in der Geschichte der normannischen Einfalle den Blicken
bietet.’’*s
Why did Charles conclude a so humiliating treaty? To this
question our sources give three different answers. In the first
place, the winter season was approaching ;*® which was indeed
true, but does not seem a sufficient reason for the treaty. Sec-
ondly, Charles wished to chastise the population wltra Sequanam
46 Abbo, II, lines 339-40: “Septies argenti libris causa redeundi / Martis
mense datis centum sua ad impia regna.” Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 327: “nam
utrumque, et civitatis redemptio illis promissa est et data, et via sine im-
pedimento, ete.” (ef. the preceding note). Ann. Fuld., III, 886, p. 105,
wrongly state that the permission to plunder Burgundy was given to one
group of Vikings, and the Danegeld to another: ‘quibusdam per Burgundiam
vagandi licentiam dedit, quisbusdam plurimam promisit pecuniam, si a regno
eius statuto inter eos tempore discederent.” Regino (cf. the preceding note)
mentions the permission to plunder Burgundy, but not the tribute. A com-
parison of these statements, and an analysis of the various factors that
serve to explain the nature of the treaty (infra, pp. 147-50), lead me to con-
clude that the annalist of St. Vaast is not entirely accurate when he refers
to the money payment as civitatis redemptio. There is reason to believe
(cf. Abbo and the Annals of Fulda) that the payment was, not a mere ran-
som for the city of Paris—a local Danegeld (see infra, chap. xv)—but a
general Danegeld, i. e. a payment made to secure the eventual evacuation
of Frankish territory by the “great army.” Cf. infra, n. 83.
47 Abbo, I, lines 36-59. Cf. supra, p. 141; Favre, 36; Vogel, 325. Even
if it be admitted that Gauzelin and Odo were defending their own interests
at the same time that they proved their fidelity to the emperor, that does
not lessen the pusillanimity of the latter.
48 Vogel (291, cf. 325) applied these words to the treaty which Charles
the Fat concluded with the “great army” in 882. But at that time the Vik-
ings were not dispatched into the heart of the Frankish realm to plunder,
and they had not been held at bay for a whole year (see infra, appendix iv).
49 Abbo, II, 341: “Tune glaciabantur torpentis saecla Novembris.” Ann.
Vedast. (see supra, n. 438).
148 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
for refusing him obedience; which is doubtful, at the least.°°
Thirdly, Charles was terrified at the news of Siegfried’s return;
which was not true, for Charles did not learn of the approach
of Siegfried until some time after he had concluded the treaty.**
In the opinion of the present writer, a more satisfactory
explanation of the course followed by the emperor, may be found
in his diseased physical condition,®*? and in his dejected state
of mind, the latter due to the loss of his right hand man, Count
Henry.*® Charles was by nature timorous,** and now he simply
could not muster sufficient courage to attack the Danes, who,
it must be remembered, had a very large army at their disposal.*°
This view is strengthened by the fact that the emperor, in order
50 Regino, 887, p. 127: “feo quod incolae illarum [sc. terrarum et regionum
‘quae ultra Sequanam erant] sibi obtemperare nollent.” This reason is given
by Regino only. But here, as elsewhere, Regino’s testimony can hardly be
accepted at its face value (cf. Vander Linden, “Les Normands 4 Louvain,”
Rev. Hist., 1917, CX XIV, 65-66; Lot, ‘“‘La Loire, l’Aquitaine et la Seine, etc.,”
Bibl. de Vécole des chartes, 1915, LXXVI, 507, note; id., ‘“‘Une année... de
Charles le Chauve,” Le Moyen Age, 1902, VI, 427, n. 4), and we have noth-
ing to corroborate it. Dtimmler’s early conjecture that Charles the Fat
wished to employ the Northmen against Boso in Lower Burgundy, is im-
probable, and has long ago been abandoned even by Dtimmler himself (see
Favre, 62, n. 1 and Diimmler, II, 317, n. 4). Cf. Wenck, Hrhebung Arnulfs,
DPN a;
51 This reason is given only in Ann. Fuld., III, 886, p. 105: ‘“[imperator]
inde contra Nordmannos profectus est. Ubi dum aliquanto tempore morare-
tur, Heimrih comes a suis desertus et ab hostibus circumdatus occiditur.
Interea Sigifrid cum magna multitudine Nordmannorum caeteris, qui ibi
residebant, auxilium laturus venit ac christianis magnum intulit metum.
Unde imperator perterritus quibusdam per Burgundiam vagandi licentiam
dedit, etc.” (see supra, n. 46). Most writers, including Favre (61, n. 1) and
Dutmmler (III, 271, n. 2), accept this as one of the probable reasons for the
treaty. But the Annals of St. Vaast (886, pp. 327-28) state explicitly that
Charles was not apprised of the return of Siegfried into the Seine until
after the conclusion of the treaty, and these annals certainly are more reli-
able on this point than those of Fulda. The latter are inaccurate also with
reference to the terms of the treaty (cf. supra, n. 46).
52 On the return journey to Germany Charles fell very ill -(Ann. Fuld.,
III, 886, p. 105; ibid., Cont. Ratisb., 887, p. 115; Abbo; II, line 342), and he
seems always to have suffered more or less from nervous disorders. See
Diimmler, III, 286; cf. Vogel, 333.
53 Ann.. Vedast., 886, p. 326: “Ille [imperator] vero audito [sce. mortuo
Heinrici] multum doluit ...sed quia dux [Heinricus] periit, ipse [impe-
rator] nil utile gessit.”
54 Dummler, III, 290-92.
55 Prior to the departure of Siegfried the “great army” at Paris was, so
far as known, the largest host ever collected by the Vikings in the ninth ~
century (see Steenstrup, op. cit., I, 214-17; Favre, 35; ef. supra, chap. viii,
n. 56). Even after Siegfried’s departure the numbers of the besiegers must
have been very large (cf. Favre, 52, n. 2), and many Franks are said to have
made common cause with them (Flodoard, Hist. Rem.:eccl., IV, ¢. 5, loc. cit.,
p. 563). In the following winter Siegfried’s army is said to have numbered
5,000 men (Vogel, 336, n. 3).
CHAPTER IX 149
to avoid an armed conflict, agreed to furnish the tribute in
return for which Paris was to be spared, out of his own resour-
ces.°° The Parisians, aware of the strength of their citadel,
and unwilling to have their past efforts go for naught, evidently
had refused to raise any money on their own account to buy off
the invaders. They were willing to continue the fight if neces-
sary, but the emperor was not. |
These relations between the emperor and the Parisians may
aid us in understanding why Burgundy was conceded to the
Danes as a field for plunder. Undoubtedly the Northmen had
demanded the privilege of spending the winter in some interior
region of France.** They could not very well have been sent
into the valley of the Marne, for the Parisians — Count Odo and
Bishop Askrich, in particular — probably raised objections,
based on the fact that they, or their relatives, had large holdings
and important interests in that district.°° But there was no
objection to letting loose the fury of the invaders in Burgundy
— particularly against the town and pagus of Sens — for the
relations between the Parisians and the Burgundians were at
that time very strained.® Add to this the fact that Burgundy
was a rich country, so far practically untouched by the Vik-
ings,*t and one may easily comprehend why an agreement was
reached on this point.
We may conclude, then, that while the principal reason for this
treaty was the personal disinclination of Charles the Fat to
enter into a sanguinary conflict with the Northmen, and his
consequent willingness to accept what must be regarded as highly
unsatisfactory terms, yet the concession to plunder Burgundy,
rather than some other interior district, probably was in part
due to Parisian influence. That the policy of Charles was sup-
ported by some of the East Franks, who dreaded the incon-
veniences of a return journey during the winter season, is quite
56 See infra, n. 73.
bi; Cr. Supra, un: 25, 31.
58 From the time the Vikings entered the Seine, in the fall of 885, it had
been their plan to penetrate into the hinterland (see Abbo, I, lines 40 ff.,
and cf. Favre, 35-36). If they had not demanded this privilege from Charles,
we may be certain that it would not have been accorded them; for, of course,
Charles had come to Paris with the intention of expelling the Vikings from
his territories.
59 A later treaty with the Parisians expressly prohibited the Northmen
from entering the Marne (Abbo, II, lines 411-16). Cf. Favre, 66; infra, p.
152 and n. 80.
60 Favre, 62, n. 2; cf. 66.
61 Abbo, II, lines 343-46.
150 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
probable; but, by reason of the determined resistance, and the
endurance, of the defenders of Paris, and in view of the general
condemnation of the treaty by contemporary chroniclers,” it
must be assumed that the majority of the Franks, and partic-
ularly those of the west,** did not approve of the imperial policy.
Before quitting Paris, Charles appointed Askrich successor
to Bishop Gauzelin, and invested Count Odo with the fiefs for-
merly held by Odo’s father, Robert the Strong.°* Thereupon
the emperor set out on the return journey to Germany;° the
speed of his travel no doubt being accelerated somewhat by the
news of the return of Siegfried into the valley of the Oise.°®
Meanwhile, the Northmen who had been besieging Paris
hastened to avail themselves of the terms of the recent treaty;
they moved up the Seine, entered the Yonne, and, on November
30, 886, laid siege to the episcopal city of Sens.®’ According
to one account,®* Evrard, the archbishop of that place, immed-
iately entered into negotiations with the invaders, and succeeded
62 Cf. supra, nn. 41, 44.
63 A large number of the western magnates appear to have been present
at Paris when the treaty was concluded. Cf. Favre, 60.
64 Abbo, II, lines 335-37; Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 327; Regino, 887, pp. 126-
2%... CL... Favre, 60, :69-~ ff:
65 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 327; Abbo, II, line 342.
66 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 327: “necdumque se de eo [Suessione] moverat
loco, et ecce Sigefridus rex . . . Hysam fluvium ingressus, ete.” Ann. Fuld.,
III, 886, p. 105 (cf. supra, n. 51).
67 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 328; Abbo, II, lines 343-46; cf. Regino, 888, pp.
130-31. Regino states that the Parisians refused to permit the Vikings to
ascend the Seine, and that the latter therefore dragged their ships for 2,000
paces overland, after which they launched them again and proceeded up the
river. But this statement is not corroborated by any other source, and I
am inclined, with Diimmler (III, 272, n. 2) and Vogel (337 and n. 1), to
reject it, not because the Vikings could not have performed such a feat—-
it was a common thing with the Varangians in Russia—but because the
recital of Regino can seldom be relied upon when his statements are not
confirmed by other writers (cf. supra, n. 50). For the date of the siege of
Sens, see Annales sancti Columbae Senonensis, 886, M.G.H., SS., I, p. 104,
and cf. Bohmer—Mthlbacher, op. cit., no. 1733c, where November 10 evidently
is a misprint for November 30. i
68 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 328: “Evrardus, archiepiscopus ipsius civitatis,
statim cum eis de redemptione civitatis agi coepit, et obtinuit quod voluit.”
Regino (888, p. 131), Chronicon sancti Petri Vivi Senonensis (Bouquet,
IX, 33), and Vita sancti Romani abbatis Autissiodorensis (ibid., 135), do
not mention any negotiations; according to them, Sens was besieged contin-
uously for six months, from November 30 to sometime in May, but with-
stood all attempts of the Northmen to take it. Favre (64, n. 3) thinks that
the essential agreement of these three sources is a sufficient reason for re-
jecting the statement in the Annals of St. Vaast. I can not share his faith
in those sources. As noted before (supra, nn. 50, 67), Regino’s statements ©
can seldom be accepted without corroboration. The fact that the other two
are local sources does not necessarily make them reliable, as Favre seems to
o% Pe?) a
j =
~re™ 7 *
_CHAPTER IX 151
in buying them off.°® Other sources indicate that the siege of
Sens was continued for several months.*° However that may
be, it is certain that the Vikings spent the winter in Burgundy,
which they are said to have devastated so thoroughly that it was
left practically a wilderness.”
In May, 887, the Vikings returned to Paris for the purpose
of receiving the Danegeld promised them by Charles the Fat.”
To secure the tribute for the invaders, Askrich, the bishop of
Paris, journeyed to Kirchen in Alemannia, where the emperor
was sojourning in June, 887. Having obtained the promised
amount apparently without difficulty, Askrich on his return paid
it over to the Northmen.®
We possess no information whatever as to how this Danegeld
of 886—87 was raised, and conjectures on the subject would be
idle. Compared with preceding Danegelds, the amount of this
one was very small — only 700 pounds; in that respect it offers
a marked contrast to the enormous tribute of 12,000 pounds
paid in 884.‘* Yet it must not be supposed that the Vikings had
made a bad bargain, for doubtless the proceeds of their perfectly
legitimate plundering operations in Burgundy,’ had been very
think; it should be remembered that they are not contemporary; the Vita
s. Romani was written in the eleventh, and the Chron. s. Petri Vivi Seno-
nensis in the twelfth, century. Whether the information contained in them
was derived from some older and more reliable source, which is now lost,
remains to be proved. Meanwhile it seems advisable to follow the Annals
of St. Vaast, which usually may be relied upon, and with which the state-
ment in the Ann. s. Columbae Senonensis (886, loc. cit., p. 104) may be
reconciled. Cf. Chronica Albrici, 888, M.G.H., SS., XXIII, p. 745, and see
Steenstrup, op. cit., II, 231.
69 If the city of Sens really was ransomed, this is but one example of the
“numerous payments of local Danegeld that were made during this period.
This whole matter is taken up for discussion infra, chap. xv.
70 See supra, n. 68.
71 Regino, 888, p. 131; Annales sancti Benigni Divionensis, 887, M.G.H.,
SS., V, p. 40; Chron. s. Petri Vivi Senon., loc. cit., p. 33; Vita s. Romani
Abb. Autiss., ibid., p. 185. Cf. Favre, 65.
72 According to the terms of the treaty with Charles the Fat, the Dane-
geld was to have been paid in March (cf. supra, n. 46). But from the An-
nals of St. Vaast (887, pp. 328-29) it would appear that the money was not
paid until late in the spring. Cf. Abbo, II, line 347. The Ann. s. Columb.
Senon, indicate that the Northmen retired from Burgundy in May (cf. supra,
n. 68). See Bohmer—Miihlbacher, op. cit., no. 1749a.
73 Ann. Vedast., 887, p. 329: “Dani vero Parisius regressi propter tribu-
tum ab imperatore promissum; pro qua re Askrichus ad imperatorem abiit,
et pro quo ierat, rediens, secum detulit. Datoque tributo, etc.” Odo appears
also to have been present at Kirchen, and may have accompanied Askrich
thither. Cf. Favre, 65; Dimmler, III, 278-79; Bohmer-—Mihlbacher, op. cit.,
no. 1749a.
74 See supra, chap. viii, nn. 76, 77.
75 Cf. supra, n. 45.
152 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
considerable. The Danegeld of 886—87 also differs from its
predecessors in that it came from the eastern, not from the west-
ern, kingdom. By whatever method the tribute was raised, it
is certain that the western Franks did not contribute toward
it."° Therefore, despite the fact that it was paid to secure the
removal of the Vikings from the West Frankish realm, this pay-
ment had no influence on the institutional development of the
Danegeld in France.
After they had received the tribute, the Vikings, in accord-
ance with the terms of their treaty with Charles the Fat, ought
to have returned to their own country.” But the absence of
the emperor, and perhaps of Odo,** may have encouraged them
to disregard the treaty. They made a desperate attempt to
ascend the Seine a second time.*® This design of the Northmen,
though at first resisted and checked, was afterwards consented
to, by the Parisians, on condition that the Danes enter no other
river than the Seine.*®° But after the freebooters had once
passed the Parisian bridges, they violated this second treaty,
as they had the first one, entered the Marne, and established
themselves in a fortified camp at Chessy, some twelve kilometers
distant from Meaux.*t From this stronghold they continued
to plunder and devastate in the usual way throughout Cham- —
pagne and northern Burgundy.*
The tribute paid by Charles the Fat had utterly failed to se-
cure the result aimed at, namely, the return of the Danes to
their own country.** In fact, the emperor’s whole policy with
reference to the Vikings had proved worse than useless.
76 See supra, n. 73, and cf. nn. 25, 31.
17 Cf. supra, n. 46.
78 Odo is not mentioned among those who opposed the Vikings when they
tried to reascend the Seine. Cf. Favre, 66, n. 2.
79 Abbo, II, lines 388-95. Regino, 889, p. 123, inaccurately says that the
Parisians refused to permit the Northmen to descend the Seine.
80 Abbo, II, lines 396-423. The Annals of St. Vaast, 889, p. 327, say:
“quia nullus erat qui eis resisteret, iterum per Sequanam Maternam fluvium
ingressi.” It is not true that there was no resistance offered when the Vik-
ings, in violation of the treaty, attempted to reascend the Seine, for the evi-
dence of Abbo on this point cannot be disregarded. But if the statement in
the Annals of St. Vaast applies only to the ascent of the Marne—which did
not take place until after the Northmen had come to terms with the Pari-
sians—it is, in the main, true.
81 Ann. Vedast., 887, p. 329; cf. Asser, Gesta Aelfredi regis, M.G.H., SS.,
XIII, 122; Ann. Anglo-Saxonici, ibid., 106. See also Favre, 67, n. 1.
82 Ann. Vedast., 887, p. 330.. Cf. Vogel} 342.
83 Of course, the fact that Paris escaped destruction at the hands of the
Vikings must be attributed, not to the payment of the Danegeld, but to the
valor and endurance of its defenders. See supra, p. 149 and notes, and cf.
nn. 25, 31, °46, 80.
ie)
THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 15
CHAPTER X.
Opo’s FIRST DANEGELD (889).
The Danish army which in the year 887 had ascended the
Marne and established itself in a fortified camp at Chessy,' spent
the following winter (887—88) in plundering and devastating
the valley of the Meuse and parts of Burgundy.? Early in the
summer of 888 the Vikings invested the city of Meaux, which
eventually was forced to capitulate, and then, on June 14, was
burned and almost totally destroyed.* The Vikings remained in
the vicinity of Meaux throughout the summer and early fall of
888.4
Meanwhile Odo, who on February 29, 888, had been crowned
king at Compiégne,° fearing that the Northmen might attempt
again to besiege Paris, took measures to forestall such eventu-
ality by collecting an army in a fortified camp protecting the
city. The Danes, indeed, returned to the Seine toward the be-
ginning of November, but did not proceed to Paris, presumably
because of Odo’s measures of defense.‘ Instead they ascended
the Seine to the Loing, on the banks of which they established
themselves for the winter. Their plundering operations were
extended into Neustria, Burgundy, and Aquitaine,’ and did not
1 See the preceding page and n. 81.
2 Ann. Vedast., 887, ed. Dehaisnes, p. 330.
3 Ibid.. 888, pp. 333-34; Abbo, II, lines 453-66, M.G.H., Poetae Latini, IV,
Part I; Annales Nivernenses, 888, M.G.H., SS., XIII, 89. See Vogel, 343,
344 and n. 1; cf. Favre, Hudes, 116, n. 5.
4 Ann. Vedast., 888, p. 334. Presumably it was part of this Viking army
which was engaged, and decisively defeated, by Odo at Montfaucon on June
24, 888 (ibid., p. 332; Abbo, II, lines 491 ff.; cf. Vogel, 344, n. 1). For the
significance of this event, see Favre, 108 and n. 8; Vogel, 344-45; Dummler,
III, 320-23.
5 Favre, 89 and nn. 4, 5.
6 Ann. Vedast., 888, p. 334: “Circa autumni vero tempora Odo rex, adu-
nato exercitu, Parisius venit; ibique castra metatus est prope civitatem, ne
iterum ipsa obsideretur.”
7 I agree with Vogel (345, n. 3) in rejecting Diimmler’s statement (III,
345) that the Vikings returned to Paris at this time. The only basis for it
is the chronologically inaccurate account of Regino (890, ed. Kurze, p. 134),
which, by the way, also has led Steenstrup (Normannerne, II, 237) to certain
erroneous conclusions.
8 Ann. Vedast., 888, p. 334: “Nortmanni vero per Maternam in Sequanam
regressi, indeque navigantes et iter per terram facientes, Luviam fluvium
ingressi, circa ejus littora sedem sibi firmant.” Cf. Favre, 117-18 and notes.
9 Ann. Vedast., 889, p. 335: “Dani vero more suo Burgundiam, Neustriam
atque partem Aquitaniae, nullo resistente, igno et ferro devastant.” Cf.
Vogel, 346, n. 1.
154 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
cease until the following summer (889), when, probably in early
July, their army and fleet appeared again, and for the last time,
before Paris.’°
Odo was there to meet them with a large army of Franks,
Aquitanians, and Burgundians, summoned together from the
various territories in which his authority had been recognized."*
Some bitter fighting’? appears to have taken place for a short
time, but we get the impression that, on the whole, the Franks
were getting the upper hand.*® This initial success, however,
was not followed up; very soon the fighting ceased,** and negotia-
tions were commenced.*®> These were concluded by the payment
10 Ann. Vedast., 889, p. 335: “Circa autumni vero tempora Parisius re-
gressi [Dani], ete.” Abbo, II, line 467: “Denique Luteciae revolant [Dani]
ad culmina tutae.”’ See also the diplomas of Odo in Bouquet, IX, 447, 448,
and in Favre, op. cit., appendix, pp. 236-38. Cf. Regino, 890, pp. 134-385.
The Vikings may have had intentions of returning to Paris earlier in the
year. At any rate, Odo, who in January had journeyed to Aquitaine, for the
purpose of receiving the submission of the magnates of that country, deemed
it necessary temporarily to interrupt these proceedings, and hasten back to
defend Francia against the Northmen (cf. Favre, 123). Perhaps it was a
false alarm, for Odo soon returned to Aquitaine. However that may be, the
Northmen certainly did arrive at Paris in July, when Odo again left Aqui-
taine to oppose them. The presence of the Vikings, as well as of Odo, at
Paris in July, is proved by the diplomas cited above. The expression, circa
autumni tempora, in the Annals of St. Vaast, is very indefinite, and does
not invalidate the testimony of the diplomas. In the poem of Abbo the arri-
val of the Northmen at Paris is mentioned immediately after the descrip-
tion of the siege and surrender of Meaux. But Abbo was not attempting to
present these events in chonological order. Cf. Favre, 127, n. 4.
11 Abbo, II, lines 468-72: “‘Convocat hue omnes proprios per regna moran-
tes; / En, sine iam numero prestans Odo nectit: / Francigeni approperant
alta cum fronte superbi, / Calliditate venis acieque, Aquitania, linguae, /
Consilioque fugae Burgun—adiere—diones.” Ann. Vedast., 889, p. 335: “Con-
tra quos [Danos] Odo rex venit.”
12 That in some cases at least the fighting was of the bitterest sort, while
it lasted, may be deduced from Abbo’s account’of the valorous deeds of Ade-
mar, Sclademar, and Anscheric (II, lines 474-90). It is also attested to by
Regino, 890, pp. 134-35.
13 The ascendancy of the Franks in the conflict is indicated in the fol-
lowing lines of Abbo’s second book: 473, 483-84, 489-90. Cf. v. Kalckstein,
Gesch. d. franz. Konigtums, I, 63.
14 Abbo, II, line 473: “Sessio fit non longa satis frustrata triumpho.”
15 Ann. Vedast., 889, p. 335: ‘‘nuntiis intercurrentibus.” This source has
no mention of any fighting. According to Regino (890, p. 135), there were
no negotiations. Instead the Vikings, when they perceived that they could
not reach their goal in any other way, again (?)—sSee supra, chap. ix, n. 67—
resorted to the stratagem of dragging their ships overland for some distance.
But the information of Regino is not reliable, and cannot invalidate the
testimony of the Annals of St. Vaast (cf. Vogel, 347, n. 1). Favre thinks
(p. 128) that the treaty with Odo did not permit the Northmen to pass
under the Parisian bridges, and that they were therefore forced to drag
their ships overland; but this interpretation does not harmonize with what
Regino says (pp. 134-35): “civibus ... audaciter reluctantibus, Nortmanni
desperatis rebus naves per terram ... trahunt.”
CHAPTER X 155
to the Danes of a sum of money, in return for which they retired
from Paris and quitted the Seine." The Viking army did not
proceed very far beyond the limits of the West Frankish realm;
it invaded the Cotentin — which was then held by the Bretons*'
—and, having established itself in the vicinity of St. Lo, laid
siege to that place.*®
The motives that led Odo to enter into negotiations with the
Vikings, and eventually to pay them tribute, can only be con-
jectured. In spite of the bold front presented by the Franks,
those of Neustria as well as those of Francia,'’® and of the brave
deeds performed by a few heroic individuals,” there is reason to
believe that some contingents in Odo’s army engaged the enemy
in only a half-hearted way, or not at all. The Aquitanians, it is
intimated, preferred negotiation to fighting,” while the Burgun-
99
dians are accused of having suggested flight ;°? which indicates
not only that Odo could not place entire confidence in his troops,
but also that there was considerable opposition to his policy of
energetic resistance.**? To have continued the struggle under
such circumstances would have been unwise, if not foolhardy ;**
and there remained but one alternative — the payment of Dane-
geld.
16 Ann. Vedast., 889, p. 335: “[Dani] munerati ab eo [Odone] regressi a
Parisius, relicto Sequana.” Freeman (Historical Essays, First Series, p.
243), we may note, calls this payment a Danegeld.
17 The county of Coutances had been held by the Bretons since 867. See
Vogel, 227; cf. 358.
18 Ann. Vedast., 889, pp. 335-36; Regino, 890, p. 1385; Anglo-Saxon Chron-
icle, 890, ed. Plummer. pp. 82, 83.
19 Abbo, II, line 470: “Francigeni approperant alta cum fronte superbi.”
The Franks, i. e. the population, or rather the vassals, of Francia and
Neustria are here contrasted with those of Aquitaine and Burgundy, re-
ferred to in lines 471-72 (see supra, n. 11).
20 Abbo, II, lines 474-90; cf. supra, n. 12.
21 I take that to be the implication (cf. supra, n. 19) of these words of
Abbo (II, line 471): “Calliditate venis acieque, Aquitania, linguae.” They
are differently interpreted in Guizot, Collection des mémoires, VI, p. 59.
22 Abbo, II, line 472: “‘Consilioque fugae Burgun-adiere—diones.” Accord-
ing to Favre, p. 85, there was a party opposed to Odo in Burgundy.
23 That such was the policy of Odo is shown by the measures ne had al-
ready taken to oppose the Vikings (see supra, pp. 153-54 and nn. 6, 11).
24 Cf. Vogel, p. 347, and Favre, p. 128, who seem to think that the inten-
tion of the Northmen to make a descent on Brittany, also may have influ-
enced Odo to treat with them. This is possible, but the sources do not indi-
cate that Odo was aware of the plans of the Vikings. v. Kalckstein, op. cit.,
p. 63, suggests that Odo may have been forced to cease fighting because his
vassals’ period of military service had expired; which is a pure, and im-
probable, conjecture. What evidence is there that, in the ninth century,
military service could be required of vassals only for a certain length of
time? If that had been the case, the siege of Paris (885-86) would have
been of shorter duration.
156 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
Evidently Odo found himself in a situation that did not essen-
tially differ from those which had forced Charles the Bald to
resort to the Danegeld.*> It has been indicated above**® that for
certain reasons the policy of the western magnates with regard
to the Vikings underwent a change toward the close of the reign
of Carloman; that for some time after the year 8847' the opposi-
tion offered to the invaders was stronger and more determined
than it had been in the preceding period. This change of policy,
however, was only temporary,”* and by 889 it had lost most of its
yaison détre. With the accession of Odo the magnates again
found their interests jeopardized by the ambition of a vigorous
monarch, anxious to rehabilitate the power of the crown, and
determined to secure the submission of all the great vassals in
his kingdom.”? It may be true that the nobles of this period were
somewhat better aware of the significance of the Viking inva-
sions than those of a preceding generation,*® and, consequently,
that they were more willing, and better prepared, to engage the
Northmen than their predecessors had been.*: Yet, like the
latter, they were inclined to regard the advancement of the royal
power and the exaltation of the monarch as a greater menace to
their interests than foreign invasion,*” and they did not hesitate,
on occasion, to make use of the presence of the Vikings in the
furtherance of their own ends and to defeat the projects of the
crown.**
25 Cf. supra, chap. vii.
26 Supra, pp. 139-40.
27 The altered policy prevailed some four or five years, and was respon-
sible for the election to the West Frankish throne not only of Charles the
Fat in 884 (cf. supra, p. 139 and n. 123), but also of Odo in 888 (see Favre,
78-80); on both occasions Charles the Simple was passed over because it was
felt that the exigencies produced by the Viking invasions did not permit the
elevation of a mere child to the throne.
28 Gf. supra, p..140 and n. 125;
29 The severe treatment of the rebel Waucher of Laon is an illuminating
illustration of Odo’s attempts to assert his royal authority (Favre, 143-45).
For examples of his efforts to gain recognition as overlord in the various
parts of his realm, see ibid., 94, 99, 106, 116, 126, 129, 194-95.
30 See supra, pp. 135-40 and n. 103; cf. pp. 114-17.
31 The determined resistance offered to the Vikings at Paris, during the
siege of 885-86 and on a later occasion (cf. supra, p. 147 and n. 47, p. 152 and
n. 80), is an indication to that effect.
32 Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, Les transform. de la royauté, 696-97; Favre,
194—95.
33 Even Charles the Simple at one time probably was considering an alli-
ance with the Vikings against Odo. It is true that Archbishop Fulk of
Rheims severely censured such a policy, and that Charles never allied him-
self with the enemies of the Christians. But it is also true that certain
supporters of Charles had suggested to him this method of gaining the
CHAPTER X 157
The amount of the Danegeld of 889 is unknown, and we have
no information as to whence or how it was obtained.** It may
be assumed, however, that the methods of assessment and collec-
tion which had been developed during the reign of Charles the
Bald,** were resorted to now also. Thus, the right of the seign-
iors to tax their subject peasantry @ merci, was further strength-
ened wherever the Danegeld was exacted.*®
This Danegeld effected what Charles the Fat had aimed at, but
failed to secure, when he paid tribute to the Danes in 887;** for
the invaders now sailed out of the Seine and evacuated the West
Frankish realm.** But this result cannot be attributed to the
Danegeld alone. The compliance of the Vikings was no doubt
due, partly at least, to the presence of a large Frankish army at
Paris;°° and probably for a similar reason the agreement with
Odo could not be immediately disregarded, as the one with
Charles the Fat had been. Yet, within a comparatively short
time this treaty too was violated. In the autumn of the next
year (890), after having suffered defeat at the hands of the
Bretons, the Vikings returned to the Seine; and before long their
ships were ascending the Oise.*°
throne; which illustrates the truth of the statement made in the text. See
Flodoard, Historia Remensis ecclesiae, IV, c. 5, M.G.H., SS., XIII, pp. 565-
66; cf. Favre,, 187-89, 221-23.
34 All we know about this particular payment of Danegeld is derived
from the passage in the Annals of St. Vaast quoted supra, n. 16. The state-
ments of Vogel, p. 346, Dimmler, III, 346, and Favre, p. 128, to the effect that
the Danegeld of 889 probably was small, are purely conjectural.
35 See supra, 'chaps. v, vi; infra, chap. xvii.
36 Cf. supra, pp. 85, 102-8, and notes.
37 See supra, p. 152 and n. 83.
38 See supra, p. 155 and n. 16.
39 Ibid. and n, 11. Favre, pp. 128-29, indicates that Odo probably re-
mained at Paris with his fideles for some time after the departure of the
Vikings.
40 Ann. Vedast., 890, p. 336: “Brittani vero viriliter suum defensavere
regnum, atque afflictos Danos Sequanam redire compulerunt. Imminente
vero festivitate omnium Sanctorum, Dani, per Sequanam Hisam ingressi,
etc.” Cf. Vogel, 359 ff.; Favre, 132 ff.
158 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
CHAPTER XI.
Opo’s SECOND DANEGELD (897).
Shortly before the end of his reign, Odo, the brave defender of
Paris and valiant léader of the West Franks, for the second time
found it necessary to agree to the payment of Danegeld.t The
circumstances surrounding this event will be briefly set forth.’
In the year 896 a few hundred Vikings, under the leadership
of a certain Huncdeus,*® left their companions in England, and
in five ships sailed across the channel toward the French coast.‘
They entered the Seine, and immediately began to plunder and
devastate the surrounding districts in the usual manner.® Since
they were penniless when they departed from England,°® we may
assume that their plundering operations were inspired by a
desire to repair their fortunes just as speedily as opportunities
permitted.” Just then the opportunities probably were excellent,
for Odo was occupied with other affairs, and did not offer any
resistance to the freebooters.* The preoccupation of Odo at this
1 As king of the West Franks Odo had paid Danegeld for the first time in
889 (see the preceding chapter); as count of Paris, and in conjunction with
Bishop Gauzelin, he had also, in 886, paid a bribe of sixty pounds to Sieg-
fried, thereby securing the removal of that chieftain and his.men from
Paris. See supra, chap. ix, nn. 24-26.
2 There is only one principal source for this Danegeld—the Annals of
St. Vaast; but some additional information as to contemporary conditions
and events may be gleaned from Abbo and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. Cf.
Vogel, 373-79; Favre, Eudes, 187-93; Hckel, Charles le Simple, 26 ff., 64 ff.;
Dummler, III, 435-36; Steenstrup, Normannerne, II, 282-85; v. Kalckstein,
Gesch. d. franz. Konigtums, I, 105-6.
3 For a discussion of the name and identity of Huncdeus, see Vogel, 373,
n. 2, and Steenstrup, op. cit., I, 157-59. For the numbers of the Vikings, see
Favre, 187 and n. 4. Steenstrup (op. cit., II, 282, n. 3) believes that Rollo
too came to France at this time; but cf. Vogel, 376, n. 3.
4 Ann. Vedast., 896, p. 353: “Et per idem tempus iterum Nortmanni cum
duce Hundeo nomine et quinque barchis iterum Sequanam ingressi.” Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle, 897, ed. Plummer, p. 89. The chronology of the latter
source, beginning with the entries for 879 and for some time thereafter, is
one year in advance. See Plummer’s Notes to his edition of the Anglo-Saxon
Chronicle, p. 95; cf. Vogel, 373, n. 1; Steenstrup, op. cit., II, 74, n. 1.
5 See infra, n. 8.
6 Anglo-Sax. Chron., loc. cit.
7 Cf. Favre, 187.
8 Ann. Vedast., 896, p. 353: “et dum rex ad alia intendit, magnum sibi et
regno malum accrescere facit.” Abbo, II, lines 583-91: “Et iterum misero
gemitu loquor affore sevos / Allofilos. Terram vastant populosque truci-
dant, / Circumeunt urbes pedibus, regnantis et aedes, / Ruricolas prendunt,
nexant et trans mare mittunt. / Rex audit, nec curat, Odo; per verba re-
spondit, / O quam responsi facinus! non ore dedisti / Tale tuo, demon
certe proprium tibi favit; / Non tua mens procurat oves Christo tibi missas?
CHAPTER XI 159
time proved very detrimental both to his own interests and. to
those of the kingdom, as the sequel will show.®
Encouraged by success and by the lack of resistance, the in-
vaders soon grew bolder in their projects; moreover, their num-
bers were increased presently by the arrival of more Vikings,
who, it may be presumed, likewise came from England.*® Shortly
before Christmas the Northmen left the Seine and proceeded up
the Oise as far as Choisy-au-Bac, near the confluence of the
Oise and the Aisne, where they established themselves in a
fortified camp." From this stronghold the entire surrounding
district as far east as the Meuse, was pillaged throughout the
winter and spring of 897.'°
Odo, unable to postpone resistance any longer, now moved
against the Vikings with a (comparatively) large army.*® He
encountered them as they were returning from a plundering
raid, but was able to accomplish little; if an engagement took
place it was indecisive.‘* To be sure, the numerical superiority
of the Franks” was not altogether without effect; for the Vikings,
in order that they might not expose themselves to the danger of
/ Longius ille tuum forsan nec curet honorem.” Cf. Vogel, p. 375, who
thinks Odo was prevented by illness from defending his realm. This view
is not based on any statement in the sources for the year 896, and seems to
be invalidated by these words in the Annals of St. Vaast: “dum rex ad alia
intendit,” which by no means imply illness on the part of Odo. Cf. v. Kalck-
stein, op. cit., 105-6.
9 As noted in the text, the invaders at this time probably numbered only
a few hundred men and therefore could easily have been expelled. Later
their numbers were greatly increased, until finally they were able to defy
any Frankish levy that Odo might send against them. Abbo, II, lines 592-
95: “Haec ubi fata receperunt probitate neglecti, / Exultant hilares, barcas
agitantque per omnes / Gallia quis amnes fruitur, terram pelaguque / In
dicione tenent totum, tutore ferente!” See also the Annals of St. Vaast
(quoted in the preceding note and infra, n. 22).
10 Ann. Vedast., 896, p. 353: “Nortmanni vero jam multiplicati, etc.’’ Vo-
gel, 376, n. 3, conjectures that Rollo, who later became the first duke of
Normandy, may have been among those Vikings who came from England
to France at this time. Cf. supra, n. 8.
11 Ann. Vedast., 896, p. 353: “[Nortmanni] paucis ante nativitatem diebus
Hisam ingressi, Cauciaco sedem sibi, nullo resistente, firmant.”
12 JIbid., 897, p. 354: “Post haec usque Mosam in praeda exierunt [Nort-
manni] nullo sibi resistente.”’
13 Favre, p. 189, denies that Odo accompanied the Frankish army, but on
insufficient grounds; see Vogel, 376, n. 4. On the size of Odo’s army, see
infra, n. 15. ‘
14 Ann. Vedast., 897, p. 354: “A praeda vero illis Nortmannis reverten-
tibus occurrit regis exercitus; sed nil profecerunt.”
15 The Franks perhaps were more numerous (see the following note)
than the Northmen just then; later it was the other way (see infra, n. 22).
Odo’s army could not have been large except in a relative sense. Cf. infra,
pe
160 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
being besieged, prudently ascended their ships and retired to the
Seine. There was, however, no further attempt to dislodge them,
and the Vikings continued during the summer to harry the
country and collect booty.*®
Meanwhile, Charles the Simple, who was disputing Odo’s
claims to the West Frankish throne," had entered into amicable
relations with the invaders,'® and was thinking of allying him-
self with them in order to defeat his rival.’® It is true that this
project was never carried into effect, and that, on the contrary,
a reconciliation took place between Charles and Odo.”° Yet the
possibility of such an alliance must have caused Odo some anx-
iety, and may help to explain his future policy with regard to the
Vikings.*?
Toward the close of the summer of 897, the numbers of the
invaders had become so large as to inspire them with the confi-
dence that they might ravage the remaining parts of Odo’s king-
dom with impunity; a confidence of which their fearful devas-
tations gave ample proof.22. Recognizing that it would be haz-
ardous to attempt anything against the Vikings as things then
stood, Odo resolved to make use, once more, of the only remain-
ing method whereby he might hope to rid his kingdom of these
pestiferous parasites. He opened negotiations looking to the
removal of the Northmen in return for the payment of Danegeld.
16 Ann. Vedast., 897, p. 854: “Verum Nortmanni ad naves reversi, timentes
multitudinem exercitus ne obsiderentur, in Sequanam redierunt; ibique tota
demorantes aestate praedas agebant, nullo sibi resistente.”
17 On the strife between the partisans of Odo and Charles the Simple, see
Kekel, op. cit., 13-27; Favre, 158-90; Dummler, III, 382-436. These civil
wars, while they lasted, probably prevented Odo from opposing the Vikings
with anything more than merely local levies (Vogel, 375).
18 At Easter, 897, Charles the Simple acted the sponsor at the baptism of
Huncdeus, the Viking chieftain (Ann. Vedast., 897, p. 354). Did Charles
demand that Huncdeus be baptized as the prerequisite for an alliance be-
tween them (cf. Eckel, p. 25)? Steenstrup’s assumption (op. cit., II, 284,
n. 1), that Charles at first had opposed the Vikings and vainly appealed to
Odo for aid, is not warranted by the passage in Abbo’s poem to which he
refers.
19 Flodoard, Hist. Rem. ecclesiae, IV, c. 5, M.G.H., SS., XIII, p. 565. Cf.
Vogel, 377 and n. 1; Eckel, 61-64; supra, chap. x, n. 33.
20 Ann. Vedast., 897, pp. 354-55. Cf. Favre, 190-91.
21. Cf. Vogel, 378; Eckel, 27.
22 Ann. Vedast., 897, p. 355: “Nortmanni vero, jam in multitudine fidentes,
omnes reliquias regni ferro et igne devastant.’. Several lines before this
quotation the annalist stated that the Northmen spent the entire summer
along the Seine (see supra, n. 16).
CHAPTER XI 161
After the treaty had been concluded, the Viking army proceeded
southward, beyond the Loire, to pass the winter in Aquitaine.
The reasons which induced Odo to agree to the payment of
Danegeld at this time are fairly clear, and, in substance, similar
to those which had led to the payment of the tribute on previous
occasions. Reference has already been made to the numerical
superiority attained by the Viking army,*‘ and to the possibility
of an alliance between the Vikings and some of the supporters
of Charles the Simple.?> These two considerations alone may
have sufficed to induce Odo to act as he did; which is only another
way of saying that the king was forced to resort to the Danegeld
by reason of the attitude of his magnates. But if the difficulties
of Odo’s position are to be fully appreciated, we must remember
also that during his reign there had been a heavy and continued
drain on the military resources of the West Franks, and that
Odo himself was no longer in possession of that energy, endur-
‘ance, and resourcefulness, which in early and middle life had
characterized the defender of Paris.*° Having concluded the
treaty with the Northmen, Odo retired to the castle of La Fére,
on the Oise, where he was struck down with a serious illness,”
which on January 1, 898, ended his life.°*
Concerning the amount of money promised the Vikings in 897
we have no specific information. Owing to the self-confidence
and arrogance which their large numbers fostered,”’ it is improb-
able that the invaders would have consented to retire except for
a very considerable compensation. The sources are silent also
on the questions of how and where the Danegeld was to be raised.
Indeed, there is some reason to doubt whether the tribute prom-
ised in 897 was ever paid.°°
23 Ann. Vedast. (this quotation follows immediately after the one given
in the preceding note): “Unde rex misit ad eos, regnum redimere volens;
et, facto placito, super Ligerim hiemandi gratia pergunt.” Since the prepo-
sition super in the last sentence is used with a verb of motion, it ought to be
translated beyond; Favre (p. 192, bottom) translates it on, which to me
seems inaccurate.
24.01. rewp7a;, ni. -9,. 17; 22.
2p Cf. supra, nu. .18, 19.
26 Cf. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 106; Eckel, 28.
27 Ann. Vedast., 897, p. 355.
28 Ibid., 898, pp. 355-56.
29 See supra, n. 22.
30 The annalist of St. Vaast (see supra, n. 23), who is our only source of
information for this Danegeld, says merely that Odo wished to ransom the
Danegeld. 11.
162 CHAPTER XI
However that may be, the Vikings subjected not only Aqui-
taine but also Neustria to ruthless devastation before, in the
spring, they returned to their ships in the lower Seine.*! Even
then the Northmen did not evacuate the realm; instead they
undertook a plundering raid into Francia, on the return from
which they were intercepted, though without important results,
by a small Frankish army led by Charles the Simple, now mon-
arch of the western kingdom.*
kingdom, and that he concluded a treaty with the Vikings on this basis. .
It is not stated anywhere that the Danegeld was paid. We know that Odo
was taken ill shortly after he had come to terms with the Northmen, i. e.
late in October (cf. Favre, 193), and that he died on January 1, 898 (see
supra, n. 28); it is not impossible that these circumstances occasioned much
delay in levying the taxes for the Danegeld. After the accession of Charles
the Simple the attempt to raise the tribute may have been definitely aban-
doned; at least the activities of the Vikings about that time (see the fol-
lowing note) seem to indicate that they no longer entertained any hope of
receiving the money promised by Odo.
31 Ann. Vedast., 898, p. 356: “Nortmanni vero verno tempore rediere ad
naves, vastata Aquitaniae parte atque Neustria, insuper plurimis eversis
castris, interfectisque habitatoribus.” Favre (192-93) seems to imply that
Odo by the treaty of 897 had consented to the plundering operations of the
Northmen in Aquitaine and Neustria, and he finds little difference between
Odo’s policy on this occasion and that of Charles the Fat in 886, who then
permitted the Vikings to plunder Burgundy (cf. supra, p. 146 and n. 45). I
am inclined to doubt that Odo consented to any plundering by the Vikings
at least in Neustria, which was his own country. After the conclusion of
the treaty the Vikings proceeded beyond the Loire (cf. supra, n. 23)—i. e.
into Aquitaine, not Neustria—to spend the winter. Evidently it had been
agreed that they were to sojourn there only during the stormy season and
while they were awaiting the payment of the Danegeld; for it is inconceiv-
able that Odo would have agreed to pay tribute for anything less than their
(eventual) evacuation of the realm. Nothing is said of any plundering by
the Vikings during the last months of 897. They seem to have refrained
from that so long as they still hoped to receive the promised Danegeld. But
when it became apparent that this was not forthcoming, the Vikings at once
resumed hostile tactics; and these were not confined to Aquitaine, but in-
cluded Neustria as well, and later were extended also to Francia (see the
following note).
32 Ann. Vedast., 898, pp. 356-57.
THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 163
CHAPTER XII.
RUDOLPH’S FIRST DANEGELD (923—24).
After the treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte in 911, by which Charles
the Simple ceded part of the region afterwards called Normandy
to Rollo and his followers,‘ one might conjecture that so far as
France was concerned there would be no further occasion for
paying tribute to the Northmen. Yet the West Franks were
required to pay Danegeld at least twice after the event referred
to, first in the year 924 and again in 926.2 It must be admitted
that the reasons which made the first of these payments neces-
sary, are somewhat obscure; and in order to render them at all
comprehensible, it seems desirable to review briefly the course
of events in France during the preceding twelvemonth.?
The year 923 is not without significance in the political, and
more especially in the dynastic, history of France. It was then
that the fortunes of Charles the Simple were broken, beyond
hope of recovery, on the field of Soissons. For though Robert
of Paris, the Capetian rival of Charles, was killed in this engage-
ment, his forces were completely victorious over those of the
Carolingian. All the efforts of Charles to rehabilitate himself
1 On the treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte, see Eckel, Charles le Simple, 75 ff.
2 The Danegeld of 926 is taken up in the next chapter. Lauer’s statement,
in his edition of the Annals of Flodoard, p. 35, n. 1, that Henry I of Ger-
many in 924 agreed to buy peace from the Normans, is a gross error, due
either to a misprint or to carelessness on the part of an otherwise very ac-
curate scholar. Henry paid tribute, not to the Normans, but to the Magyars
(Waitz, Jahrbiicher des deutschen Reichs unter Konig Heinrich J, Third
edition [1885], p. 78).
3 The principal if not the only source of information for this Danegeld
and that of 926 are the contemporary Annals of Flodoard. Richer in his
Historiae has something to say on the Danegeld of 924, but fails to mention
any payment in 926. His account was not written until the close of the
tenth century. For the preceding period Richer depended largely on the
Annals of Flodoard, and the value of his supplementary statements is very
doubtful (see the edition of Waitz, Intro., pp. vi ff.). For detailed discus-
sions of the course of events in the West Frankish kingdom during this
period, see Lauer, Robert et Raoul, 20-45; Lippert, Geschichte des west-
frinkischen Reiches unter Konig Rudolf, 31-58; v. Kalekstein, Gesch. d.
franz. Konigtums, I, 161-72; cf. Eckel, Charles le Simple, 116-33. In Eng-
lish there is a very brief account by Freeman (Norman Conquest, I, Third
edition, pp. 175-77) and a more detailed one by Palgrave (History of Nor-
mandy and England, II, 50-60). Neither of these is now of much value.
The work of Palgrave in particular has become very antiquated. It contains
numerous errors and inaccuracies, some of which pertain to the Danegeld;
but it seems unnecessary at this date to refute or even to signalize them.
cae | : hee aed
164 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
proved vain. Abandoning this unfortunate scion of Charle-
magne, the western magnates gave their allegiance to Rudolph
of Burgundy, who was crowned king of France at Soissons on
July 13, 923.4 Not long thereafter the wily and ambitious Her-
bert, count of Vermandois, by a successful ruse obtained posses-
sion of the unsuspecting Carolingian and threw him into prison.®
An army of Northmen now advanced into Francia, ostensibly
for the purpose of supporting the cause of Charles, who had
appealed to them for aid several times before he was imprisoned.
This army was composed chiefly of the followers of Ragenold,
who for some time had had their rendezvous near the Loire;
besides these, however, it also included a large contingent from
Rouen, i. e. from Rollo’s army. Ragenold appears to have been
the leader of the combined Scandinavian forces. While Count
Herbert of Vermandois was sojourning with King Rudolph in
Burgundy,’ the Northmen subjected the territory west and north
of the Oise to devastation and plunder.® It is true that the vassals
of Herbert, aided by other nobles, offered effective resistance to
the enemy, killed several hundred of them, and compelled the
4-Mlodoard;' Ann., 923, p. 14 and n..3.) Cf. Lauer,’cp. cit, 6-19:
5 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 15; Richer, I, 47, pp. 380-31. Cf. Lauer, 20-24.
In spite of several temporary releases from prison, the captivity of Charles
the Simple was ended only by his death on October 7, 929 (cf. Eckel, 127-35;
Lippert, 32-35).
6 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 15: “Interea Ragenoldus, princeps Nordmanno-
rum qui in fluvio Ligeri versabantur, Karoli frequentibus missis jampridem
excitus, Franciam trans Isaram, conjunctis sibi plurimis ex Rodomo, de-
praedatur.” Cf. Richer, I, 46, p. 30: “Nortmannis quoque usque ad effectum
suasit [Karolus], adeo ut regi fidem spondere eique ut iuberet militare vel-
lent. Qui cum regi militaturi occurrere pararent, a Gallis intercurrentibus
inhibiti sunt. Unde et eorum suppetiis rex privatus est.” Jbid., c. 48, p. 31:
“Haec [i. e. the capture and incarceration of Charles the Simple] dum
agerentur, pyratae Gallias irruperunt, ete.” Lauer, p. 24, indicates that
Ragenold also had grievances of his own. Lippert, p. 34, asserts that for the
Northmen the captivity of Charles was “nur ein Vorwand ftir... Raube-
reien’’; cf. ibid., pp. 35-36.
7 Flodoard, Anvz., 923, p. 15: “et sic ipse Heribertus Rodulfum regem in
Burgundiam prosecutus est.” Cf. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 163.
8 Cf. ibid. Lauer, p. 24, and Lippert. p. 36, seem to be of the opinion that.
Ragenold’s men had crossed the Oise and were operating in the region east
of that river. But Flodoard (see supra, n. 6) says, “Ragenoldus ... Fran-
ciam trans Isaram ... depraedatur’”’; this must mean that the Vikings were
devastating that part of Francia which from Flodoard’s point of view was
trans Isaram. Therefore, since Flodoard was writing at Rheims (see Lauer’s.
edition of Flodoard’s Annals, Intro., pp. vi, xvi), it fellows that he referred
to the territory west and north of the Oise. Doubtless most if not all of the
invaded territory lay within the jurisdiction of Count Herbert of Verman-
dois; for it was his vassals who first offered resistance to the Northmen
(Flodoard, Ann., 928, p. 15), and it was he who had imprisoned Charles the
Simple. in whose behalf Ragencld is said to have taken up arms.
CHAPTER XII 165
rest to seek refuge within the Norman strongholds.° Yet the
ravaging continued, and eventually Hugh the Great, Duke of
Francia, felt that it was necessary to summon the king to the
rescue.
Rudolph, in response to this summons, immediately left Bur-
gundy and proceeded to Compiégne on the Oise.*® Learning now
that the Normans had devastated the territory of Beauvais, the
king hastened thither, accompanied by Archbishop Seulf of
Rheims, Count Herbert of Vermandois, and others.1: By way
of retaliation, he penetrated with the Frankish forces into Nor-
mandy and began to harry that land after the fashion of the
Vikings.
From these measures of reprisal Rudolph was called away to
receive the homage and fealty of the magnates of Lorraine.
Counts Hugo and Herbert were left to oppose the Normans and
to prevent them from crossing: the Oise.** In the latter endeavor
the Frankish magnates were not successful, but they retaliated
by ravaging in Normandy. These guerilla tactics could not be
continued indefinitely, and at last both sides were ready for
negotiation. The Normans promised Count Herbert, Arch-
9 Flodoard, Ann., 923, pp. 15-16. Cf. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 163.
10 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 16: “Quibus urgentibus causis, rex Rodulfus
ab Hugone, filio Rotberti, accitus de Burgundia venit ad Compendia super
Isaram.”
11 Jbid.: “et audito quod Nordmanni pagum Belvacensem depraedabantur,
illo transiit cum Seulfo archiepiscopo et Heriberto comite, aliisque quibus-
dam et electis viris fortibus.’”’ That Flodoard is here referring to the Nor-
mans, not to the Loire Vikings under Ragenold, is evident from what fol-
lows (see the next note).
12 Jbid., pp. 16-17: “Itta fluvio transito, ingressus est terram, quae dudum
Nordmannis ad fidem Xpisti venientibus, ut hance fidem colerent et pacem
haberent, fuerat data; partem quoque ipsius terrae rex cum Francis, quia
ipsi Nordmanni pacem quam pepigerant, propter promissiones Karoli, qui
eis latitudinem terrae pollicitus fuerat, infregere, caedibus et igne devastat.”
13 Ibid., p. 17: “His vero eum rebus intentum legati adeunt Lotharien-
sium, se suaque ipsi subdere spondentium; quorum legatione revocatus ab
hac devastatione, cum primatum qui secum aderant, consilio Lothariensibus
obviam pergit, Hugone et Heriberto comitibus ad praesidium patriae trans
Isaram retictis.”” Lippert, p. 36, comments thus on Rudolph’s policy at this
juncture: “auch er [Rudolf] konnte sich dem Zuge seiner Zeit und seiner
Stellung nicht entziehen; die Ausdehnung seines Herrschaftsgebiets tiber
das weite Reich Lothars musste wie allen Westfranken auch ihm als hoh-
erer, ruhmvollerer Gewinn gelten als die definitive Ziichtigung der norman-
nischen Rauber, welche ja seine Vasallen durchfiihren konnten.”’
14 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 17: “Interea Nordmannis quosdam pagos nos-
tros trans Isaram et nostratibus eorum terram depraedantibus, crebris al-
ternatim directis legationibus, ete.”
166 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
bishop Seulf, and the other French nobles, that they would make
peace on condition that they be granted as large an extent of
territory on the left bank of the Seine as they demanded; also
the Normans sent hostages to King Rudolph — who was then at
Laon, having returned from Lorraine — and accepted his pro-
posal of a truce until the middle of May in the following year
(924) .15
Meanwhile Henry I of Germany, on the invitation of certain
magnates hostile to Rudolph, had invaded Lorraine, and was
attempting to coerce the nobility of that region to transfer their
allegiance to him. These efforts, however, proved somewhat
premature. Apprised that Rudolph was preparing to oppose
him with a very large army, summoned together not only from
Francia but also from Burgundy, Henry deemed it advisable
temporarily to postpone the execution of his project, and speedily
retired to Germany.*®
Rudolph was now ready to give his attention to the seigniors
of the south, Duke William II of Aquitaine in particular, who
had so far refused him allegiance.’ But we are informed that
at the beginning of the year 924, and before the king set out on
his expedition to Aquitaine, there was levied in Francia an ex-
action for the purpose of raising a sum of money to be paid to
the Northmen as the price of peace.'* In view of the fact that
15 Flodoard, Ann., 923, pp. 17-18: “pacem Heriberto comiti et Seulfo archi-
episcopo pollicentur ceterisque Francis qui cum ipsis contra Nordmannos
sedebant, si tamen eis terra daretur quam spaciosam petebant ultra Sequa-
nam. Rodulfo interea rege, ut dictum est [p. 17], Laudunum reverso, obsides
illi mittunt et inducias ab eo usque ad medium Maium accipiunt.’’ A few lines
before this quotation (p. 17) Flodoard stated that Rudolph was detained in
Lorraine toto pene ... autumno. It is therefore probable that the truce with
the Normans was concluded in September or October, 923. Cf. v. Kalckstein,
CDCR ee IGA niwe2:
16 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 18. Cf. Parisot, Le Royaume de Lorraine sous
les Carolingiens, p. 667; Lauer, 25-26; Lippert, 36-37.
17 See the following note, and cf. Lauer, 27; Lippert, 38-39.
18 Flodoard, Ann., 924, p. 19: “Anno DCCCCXXIIII incipiente, fit exactio
per Franciam pecuniae collaticiae, quae Nordmannis [probably the Normans;
see infra, in the text] pacto pacis daretur, et Rodulfus rex prefectionem
parabat in Aquitaniam, quia Willelmus, ejusdem regionis princeps, subdi
sibi differebat.” Richer, I, 48, p. 31: “Haec dum agerentur [cf. supra, n. 6],
pyratae Gallias irruperunt, pecudum armentorumque abductione multarum-
que opum exhaustu cum plurimorum capitivitate terram depopulantes. Quo-
rum impetum rex dolens, suorum usus consilio, exactionem pecuniae collati-
tiae fieri exactoribus indixit, quae hostibus in pacis pacto conferretur. Et
collata, ad votum commune paciscuntur atque in sua concedunt. Rex vero,
licet merens, ad adia se contulit. Exercitum itaque in Aquitaniam adversus
CHAPTER XII 167
the recent warfare had not issued wholly in favor of the Scan-
dinavians'® — it was they, not the Franks, who had furnished
hostages*® — it seems rather disconcerting now to find the North-
men in a position to demand, and the Franks willing to agree to,
the payment of tribute. Which group of Northmen had made
this demand, and what considerations had induced the Franks
to yield?
>
Answers to these questions must be largely in the form of con-
jecture, for the annalists, though they furnish us with the facts,
offer hardly a word of explanation.*: In all probability the Dane-
geld was paid to the Northmen of the Seine, i. e. the Normans,
with whom Rudolph had arranged a truce the preceding year.”
The continued hostile attitude of the Loire Northmen, led by
Ragenold, seems to preclude the possibility of the tribute having
been paid, either in whole or in part, to them.** It is not impos-
sible that the Normans had stipulated for the payment of Dane-
eius principem Wilelmum parat, eo quod subdi sibi contempneret.” This
portion of Richer’s account (cf. the edition of Waitz, p. 31, n. 3) depends on
the Annals of Flodoard. It must be assumed that the details added by
Richer, such as Rudolph’s grief at having to resort to the Danegeld and his
consultation with the magnates, are wholly gratuitous. Richer does not
mention the truce which had been arranged with the Normans prior to the
payment of the Danegeld, nor does he distinguish the Loire Vikings under
Ragenold from the Normans under Rollo.
19 See supra, n. 14. Lippert, p. 38, says: “‘Keiner von beiden Teilen
konnte sich einen entscheidenden Sieg zuschreiben.”’ Lauer, p. 27, agrees
that there had been no decisive encounter.
20 See supra, n. 15. Cf. Lippert, p. 38; Lauer, p .27.
21 Flodoard says (supra, n. 18) simply that the Danegeld was paid to the
Northmen; he has no explanation whatever of the reasons why the Franks
agreed to pay tribute, unless, indeed, we assume that a causal relation is
implied between the two events described in the sentence quoted supra,
n. 18. Richer (see ibid.) would have us believe that the Northmen, as a
result of their tactics of devastation, had the Franks completely at their
mercy—in other words, that the latter had no choice in the matter of paying
Danegeld; which is not true (see supra, n. 19; ef. nn. 3, 18).
22 Cf. supra, n. 15. This is also the opinion of Lauer, p. 27, and of Lip-
pert, p. 38.
23 In 924 the truce with the Normans was ended by a definitive peace (see
infra, n. 35; ef. nn. 25, 27). But this, according to Flodoard, did not affect
the Loire Vikings (Ann., 924, pp. 24-25): “Ragenoldus cum suis Nordman-
nis, quia nondum possessionem intra Gallias acceperat, terram Hugonis inter
Ligerim et Sequanam depopulantur.” Later, after William II of Aquitaine
and Hugh the Great had come to terms with Ragenold—probably by per-
mitting him free passage through their territories (Lippert, p. 44)—the
latter transferred his plundering operations to Burgundy (Flodoard, Ann.,
924, 925, pp. 25 ff.). Cf. Lauer, 33-34.
168 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
geld before they agreed to the truce in 928;7* or it may be that
Rudolph, by subsequent negotiations, had secured an extension
of the truce in return for the promise of tribute.*> In any case,
it seems pretty clear. that the king by this measure was merely
taking precautions against the possible reopening of hostilities
by the Normans during the period when he expected to be occu-
pied with the business of securing submission in Aquitaine.*®
There is no reason to suppose that the Danegeld secured anything
more than an extension of the truce.*’ A definitive peace with
the Normans was not concluded until the late summer or early
24 In his recent work (Robert et Raoul, p. 27) Lauer takes the view that
when the Normans gave hostages in 923 (cf. supra, n. 15), they did so in
return for the promise of tribute. When he published his edition of the
Annals of Flodoard, Lauer was of the opinion (p. 24, n. 5) that the Dane-
geld was arranged for in a separate treaty concluded early in 924.
25 The treaty which formally terminated the period of truce (see infra,
n. 35) was probably concluded long after the middle of May (cf. supra,
n. 15), as will appear from the following. Rudolph’s illness (Flodoard,
Ann., 924, p. 23; ef. Lippert, 41-43) must be placed in the period after April
9 (Lauer, ed., Ann. de Flodoard, p. 23, n. 4), when he was at Chalon-sur-
Sadne in Burgundy. Before he fell ill, but after April 9, Rudolph partici-
pated in the Assembly of Attigny. It was directly after that event, and
while he was preparing an expedition to Lorraine, that the illness came upon
him. After a time he began to convalesce, but soon suffered a relapse, and,
despairing of recovery, was brought to the monastery of St. Remy at Rheims,
where he remained for four weeks. A careful consideration of these facts
leads me to believe that Rudolph could not have left Rheims before June 1.
Thereupon he proceeded to Soissons and thence to Burgundy. At this point
in his narrative Flodoard (pp. 23-24) states that “Heinricus [the Fowler]
aeque ... valitudine corporis tota detinetur aestate’; which brings us to
the summer months—July or perhaps August. Next Flodoard refers to an
outbreak of hostilities between certain nobles and then, finally, to the con-
clusion of peace with the Normans (see infra, n. 35). Seven or eight lines
further on (p. 25, line 2) he mentions the Synod of Trosly, held in October.
There is, therefore, good reason to believe that the treaty with the Normans
was not concluded much prior to September 1, and possibly later (cf. v.
Kalckstein, op. cit., 167 and n. 1); which means that the truce had been
prolonged from three to four months beyond the time originally agreed upon. |
v. Kalckstein (ibid., 165) believes that Rudolph concluded a definite treaty
of peace with the Normans when he agreed to the Danegeld; but see infra,
n. 20 and ict: supra, ns724.
26 Cf. supra, nn. 18, 21. This is also the opinion of Lauer, p. 27, and of
Lippert, p. 38.
27 The contrary view of v. Kalckstein (cf. supra, n. 25) is hardly tenable.
If a definitive peace had been concluded when the Danegeld was paid, early
in 924, it would be impossible to explain why another peace treaty, and one
so disadvantageous to the Franks, was necessary later in the same year,
since Flodoard has not a word concerning any reopening of hostilities in the
intervening period. The fact that the Franks, by the treaty concluded in
the fall of 924 (see infra, n. 35), yielded to the demands made by the Nor-
mans at the cessation of hostilities in 923 (see supra, n. 15), also indicates
that there had been no final settlement with the Normans in the meantime.
2 oS ee .
CHAPTER XII 169
fall of 924,** by which time the submission of Aquitaine was an
accomplished fact.?°
For the Danegeld of 924 our sources offer no information
whatever as regards amount, rates of assessment, or method of
collection.*® Probably it was a considerable sum, since, as
already stated, it had to be raised by means of an exaction, or
general tax, levied throughout Francia — which, roughly de-
scribed, then comprised the territory between the Epte, the
Seine, the upper Meuse, and the Scheldt.*t Presumably the
money was raised by methods very similar to, if not identical
with, those that had been developed for this purpose in the
preceding century.*? 3
Not until several months after the submission of Aquitaine,
were the Franks ready to make peace with the Normans. Ru-
dolph was then in Burgundy, convalescing from a serious ill-
ness.**? It was therefore left to Counts Hugo and Herbert and
Archbishop Seulf to arrange the terms of the treaty. We are
assured, however, that the magnates acted with the king’s con-
sent when, yielding to the demands put forward by the Normans
25. Cie Supra, Nn. 325:5. infra, n° 35.
29 Rudolph had returned from Aquitaine before April 6 (Lippert, 41, 108);
ef. Flodoard, Ann., 924, p. 20 and n. 1, p. 21).
30 All the information we have on this Danegeld is given supra, n. 18.
Richer states that the king entrusted the collection of the tax to exactores.
It would be futile to speculate on the identity of these officials, since, in all
probability, Richer himself only assumed that they must have existed and
functioned. In asserting that this Danegeld was raised by a personal tax,
Lauer, p. 27, is evidently following Lippert, p. 38, who refers to it as “wohl
eine Art aussergewOhnlicher Kopfsteuer, die es sonst nicht gab.’ For this
view I can find no basis. Pecunia collaticia (see supra, n. 18) cannot be
interpreted to mean a capitation tax. The adjective collaticius does not
appear in DuCange’s Glossarium; in Harper’s Latin Dictionary it is said to
be of post-Augustan usage and to mean “brought together,” “raised by con-
tribution,” or “mingled.” The second of these meanings is quite appropriate
for the connection in which Flodoard uses the word; furthermore, it may —
indicate that this Danegeld, like those of the ninth century, was not col-
lected in strict accordance with a royal assessment, but that each tax-payer
was forced to contribute whatever his resources permitted (see supra, chap.
Vier. 133) .
31 Longnon, Atlas historique de la France, Text, pp. 85-86; cf. Lauer, ed.,
Ann., de Flodoard, p. 24, n. 10. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 165, assumes that
when Rudolph in the spring of 924 granted Hugh the Great the county of
Maine—which soon afterward was ceded to the Normans (see infra, n. 35)—
he did so partly in order to indemnify him for his contributions toward the
Danegeld.
32 These are summarized infra, chap. xvii.
33 Cf. supra, nn. 25, 28. 4
170 CHAPTER XII
in 923,°* they ceded to them the districts of Maine and Bessin.*®
This peace, of course, did not prevent the Vikings under Rage-
nold, who as yet had received no grant of territory in France,
from plundering and devasting on their own account.?* What
was worse, it failed to keep the Normans pacified for more than
a brief interval. In 925 Rollo’s men invaded Beauvais, Amiens,
Arras, and Noyon, thereby violating the compact of the previous
year.*"
34 Cf. supra; ne 1d;
35 Flodoard, Ann., 924, p. 24: “Nordmanni cum Francis pacem ineunt sac-
ramentis per Hugonem et Heribertum comites, Seulfum quoque archiepis-
copum, absente rege Rudulfo: ejus tamen consensu terra illis aucta, Cino-
mannis et Baiocae pacto pacis eis concessae.” Lauer, p. 32, asserts that
before he left Rheims (cf. swpra, n. 25), Rudolph had charged the magnates
to conclude peace with the Normans. Lippert, p. 43, indicates that these
matters were arranged at Soissons a little later.
36 See supra, n. 23. Ragenold probably was incensed at having been ex-
cluded from the negotiations with the Franks, and he must have regarded
the increase in the holdings of the Normans with envy. Cf. Lauer, p. 33.
37 Flodoard, Ann., 925, pp. 29-30: ‘‘Nordmanni de Rodomo foedus quod
olim pepigerant irrumpentes, pagum Belvacensem atque Ambianensem depo-
pulantur, etc.”
THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 Ea
CHAPTER XIII.
RUDOLPH’S SECOND DANEGELD (926).
At the close of the preceding chapter it was indicated that the
peace which the West Franks concluded with the Normans under
Rollo in 924 was violated by the latter in the following year.'
After they had devastated the district about Beauvais, and had
burned Amiens aud Arras, the Normans proceeded to Noyon,
which they intended to subject to a like fate. In this, however,
they were only partially successful; though the suburbs, or fau-
bourgs, were enkindled, a sally by the castellani, aided by the
suburbani, forced the Normans to retire some distance, and at
least part of the faubourgs was cleared of the enemy. In the
meantime Frankish contingents had invaded Norman territory,
ravaging and burning as they advanced; while Count Herbert
of Vermandois undertook to strengthen the resistance along the
Oise.” In this way a general diversion was produced, which com-
pelled the Normans speedily to return to the defense of their
own lands.*®
King Rudolph, who had returned from Burgundy to Francia
about this time, presently ordered a general mobilization of the
Franks against the Normans.‘ One division of the Frankish
army, under the leadership of Counts Herbert of Vermandois
and Arnulf of Flanders, moved against the Norman stronghold
of Eu, near the mouth of the Somme; this citadel was taken and
demolished, many Normans were killed, and the victorious
Franks brought back with them a large amount of booty.°®
1 See supra, p. 170, n. 37. The sources and the secondary works which
contain references to this Danegeld are given in note 3 of the preceding
chapter. Lippert, p. 49, has some discussion of the probable reasons for the
violation of the treaty by the Normans. v. Kalckstein’s statement (op. cit.,
169), that the Normans under Rollo broke their compact with the Franks
at the instigation of Ragenold, is pure conjecture; yet Lauer, p. 37, seems
inclined to accept it. v. Kaleckstein (ibid.) also believes that the terms of
the peace of 924 had not been fully executed.
2 Flodoard, Ann., 925, p. 30.
3 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
4 Ibid., p. 31. Cf. Lauer, 38; Lippert, 50.
5 Flodoard, Ann., 925, p. 31. Richer (I, 49-50, p. 32) states, inaccurately
no doubt, that King Rudolph participated in the storming of the fortress of
Eu; also Richer fails to distinguish the Vikings under Ragenold from the
Normans. Cf. Lippert, 51 and n. 1.
6 Flodoard, Ann., 925, pp. 31-32; Richer, I, 50, p. 32. Cf. Lippert, 51
and n. 2.
i NF pes THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
Early in 926 the Franks resumed their offensive,’ this time
under the direction of King Rudolph himself, aided by Count
Herbert. An engagement took place (at Fauquembergue?) in
the county of Artois.° The Normans eventually were forced to
retire, but not until they had killed Helgaud, the Count of Pon-
thieu, and inflicted serious wounds on King Rudolph, who, in
consequence thereof, withdrew to Laon.’® In spite of the con-
siderable losses which they had suffered, the Normans were able
to proceed eastward as far as the county of Porcien, which they
subjected to devastation and pillage."
As if that were not enough, the inhabitants of this region soon
learned that a band of Hungarians had crossed the Rhine and
were desolating the territory just to the east of them with fire
and sword. About the same time — probably in April — Duke
William of Aquitaine broke his allegiance and raised the banner
of revolt.1°> Conditions had suddenly shaped themselves in such
a way that Rudolph found it necessary to come to terms with one
group of adversaries in order that thereby he might be enabled
7 Flodoard, Ann., 925, p. 32, indicates that Hugh the Great, Duke of
France, meanwhile had concluded a separate peace with the Normans, from
which, however, the magnates of the maritime districts, such as the Counts
of Flanders and Ponthieu, were excluded (cf. Lippert, 51, 52 and n. 1; Lauer,
39-40). Also, Flodoard mentions, near the close of his recital for the year
925 (p. 33), that the entire nobility of Lorraine swore allegiance to Henry I
of Germany, thus violating their fealty to Rudolph (cf. supra, chap. xii, n.
13). Cf. Lauer, 40; Lippert, 52-53; v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 170.
8 Flodoard, Ann., 926, p. 33.
9 Ibid. Lippert, p. 56, n. 1, and Lauer, p. 43, n. 2, believe that the battle
referred to by Flodoard here is to be identified with that of Fauquembergue,
mentioned by Folcwin in Gesta atbatum sancti Bertini Sithiensium, ec. 101,
M.G.H., SS., XIII, p. 626.
10 Flodoard, Ann., 926, p. 33; Richer, I, 51, pp. 32-33. Cf. Lippert, 55—56.
11 Flodoard, Ann., 926, p. 34: ‘‘Nordmanni, usque in pagum Porcensem,
silvestria loca depraedantur.”’
12 Ibid.: “Hungari quoque, Rheno transmeato, usque in pagum Vonzinsem,
praedis incendiisque desaeviunt.’”’ Immediately after this Flodoard mentions
an eclipse of the moon on April 1, and then describes the translation of the
various relics, Hungarorum metu (cf. infra, n. 20). For other references on
the Hungarian invasion, see Lauer, 44, n. 1
13 Flodoard, Ann., 926, p. 35 (cf. n. 3): “Hine [i. e. after the Danezgeld
had been paid and peace concluded with the Normans—see infra, nn. 17, 21]
exercitus ex Francia Burgundiaque cum Rodulfo rege et Heriberto comite
proficiscitur super Ligerim et, acceptis obsidibus, ab urbe Nivernensi, quam —
frater Willelmi contra regem tutabatur, in Aquitaniam ad persequendum
Willelmum qui a rege forte desciverat, transeunt, ete.” This passage indi-
cates that the revolt of William of Aquitaine probably preceded (desciverat—
the pluperfect tense) the compact with the Normans. Cf. v. Kalckstein, op.
CT ALTA,
CHAPTER XIII 173
to oppose the others with better hope of success.‘ An under-
standing was arrived at with the Normans, who, as usual, were
willing to make peace in return for the payment of Danegeld.*
The amount of the tribute demanded by the Normans in 926
is unknown; but probably it was a large sum.'® Though we know
that an exaction was levied in both Francia and Burgundy for
the purpose of raising this Danegeld,’* we possess no information
with reference to the distribution of the tax or the rates of assess-
ment; presumably the seigniors procured the money in the usual
way, by collecting from their dependents what each one could be
induced or forced to pay.*®
Rudolph’s policy on this occasion must probably be regarded
as very fortunate.’® Since the Hungarian invasion above referred
to, proved: to be but a passing danger, the king was, after the
pacification of the Normans,*! free to give his attention once
more to the rebellious William of Aquitaine. There was, it is
14 Cf. Lauer, 43; Lippert, 57. Since Hugh the Great, Duke of France, had
concluded a separate treaty with the Normans in 925, whereby his own ter-
ritories were made secure from devastation (cf. supra, n. 7), Rudolph prob-
ably could not count on any aid from him against the Normans. Cf. v. Kalck-
stein, Op. cit., 169-71.
15 See infra, n. 17.
16 I infer that from the fact that it was raised in both Francia and Bur-
gundy (see the following note).
17 Flodoard, Ann., 926, pp. 34-35: “Exactio pecuniae collaticiae Nord-
mannis pacto pacis dandae publice fit per Franciam atque Burgundiam.”
Flodoard describes this Danegeld in almost the same words as that of 924
(see supra, chap. xii, n. 18). Richer, on the other hand, does not even
mention the Danegeld of 926.
18 Cf. supra, chap. xii, n. 30.
19 It was fortunate for Rudolph and those northern seigniors whose in-
terests at this moment happened to coincide with those of the king. It is
well known that these nobles—Herbert of Vermandois in particular—were
now supporting Rudolph not only against the Normans, but also against the
magnates of Aquitaine; the latter, as well as the Normans, ostensibly were
committed to the cause of Charles the Simple, though in reality that was
only a pretext for the advancement of their own interests. On this see
Eckel, 107 ff., 123-33; Lauer, 33-34, 52, 56-57, and passim; Lippert, 25-31,
38-39, 47, 59 and n. 1, and passim.
20 Still it produced much alarm, as is evident from the hurried removal
of the bodies of the saints (cf. supra, n. 12). See Lippert, 56-57; Lauer,
44-45, :
21 Flodoard, Ann., 926, p .35: “Data igitur pecunia, pax utrimque est cum
juramento firmata.” The Danegeld was paid probably late in April or early
in May (see supra, n. 12; ef. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 171, last line).
174 CHAPTER XIII
true, a second invasion of the Magyars;*? but like the first one,
it only postponed for a time the final settlement of the question
of Aquitaine. If, on the other hand, the king had had also the
Normans to deal with, it seems very doubtful whether he could
ever have accomplished his purpose in the south. The fact that
Rudolph was not at any time during the remainder of his reign
preoccupied with the Normans, must doubtless be considered a
principal reason for his eventual success in securing the sub-
mission of the southern seigniors.7*
The peace which the Normans had concluded with the Franks
in 926 was, unlike those of preceding years, to be of long dura-
tion ;** and the Danegeld of 926 is significant as probably being
the last Danegeld ever exacted from the Franks, at all events
the last of which there is any record.”°
22 Flodoard, Ann. (this quotation follows immediately after the one given
supra, n. 13): “insequunturque [se. Rodulfus rex et Heribertus comes]
fugientem [Willelmum] donec rumor infestationis Hungarorum quod iterum
jam Rhenum transissent, exercitum in Franciam repedare coegit.” Cf.
supra, n. 12. See also Lippert, 57 and n. 2; Lauer, 45; v. Kalckstein, op.
Ct. A (2)
23 Aquitaine was not completely subdued until some time after the death
of Charles the Simple (October 7, 929). Cf. supra, n. 19, and see Lauer,
55-60, 67-68; cf. 78.
24 Cf. what Lauer says in-his edition of Flodoard’s Annals, p. 35, n. 2.
The Vikings under Ragenold continued to make trouble in Aquitaine until,
it is said, they were almost annihilated by Rudolph in 930 (Flodoard, Ann..,
930. p. 45). Probably many survived, or more arrived soon afterward, for in
931 they were able, under a new leader, Incon, to gain possession of (a large
part of ?) Brittany (ibid., 931, pp. 51-52).
25 It does not seem impossible that stipendiary Danegelds of a more or
less local character continued to be levied after this date. At any rate
Normans were employed, probably as mercenaries, on several occasions by
various French seigniors, and at one time, in 945, by Louis d’Outre—Mer
(Flodoard, Ann., 939, p. 72; 945, p. 96; 948, p. 117; 949, pp. 124, 125).
THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 175
CHAPTER XIV.
SUMMARY OF THE REASONS FOR THE PAYMENT OF DANEGELD
AFTER THE TIME OF CHARLES THE BALD.
The payment of tribute to the Northmen in the West Frankish
kingdom did not cease with the death of Charles the Bald.' It has
been shown above that the Danegeld was resorted to at least six
times after 877: in 884, 887, 889, 897, 924, and 926. But while
the circumstances which led to the payment of Danegeld in the
later period were more or less similar to those which had forced
Charles the Bald to make use of this expedient,” it would be in-
accurate to say that the situation throughout remained wholly
unaltered. After the reign of Carloman certain changes took
place not only in the relative strength and advantages of the
Franks and the Northmen, but also in the policy of the magnates
— their attitude to the king on the one hand and to the Vikings
on the other. The latter point will be illustrated by what follows
in the succeeding paragraphs of this chapter. As regards the
former it may suffice to say here that the Vikings retained the
military superiority until towards the close of the ninth century,
when it began gradually to pass to the Franks.? Why, under
those conditions, it should have been necessary for the Franks
to continue to pay Danegeld even in the tenth century, can be
made clear only by specific references to the facts in each case.
The first Danegeld after the death of Charles the Bald, that of
884, was agreed to at a time when the havoc created by the
Vikings perhaps had reached its climax.‘ It is impossible to
deny that the magnates were responsible for permitting this
situation to arise. They had neglected or refused to support the
military efforts of Carloman, and when it finally became impos-
sible for them longer to defer action, they had nothing to propose
save the payment of tribute. The motives which induced the
nobles to pursue a course of this kind need not be set forth again.
It is clear that in the main they were still adhering to the policy
which had been characteristic of them in the time of Charles the
Bald; selfish material interest dictated that it was more con-
1 Cf. supra, pp. 116-17.
2 Cf. supra, chap. vii.
3 Cf. Vogel, p. 44.
4 Cf. supra, chap. viii and n. 78.
176 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
venient and more profitable to pay the Vikings than to resist
them with the sword.°
It is true, however, that a change in the policy of the western
magnates becomes apparent about this time or shortly afterward.
The immoderate sum demanded by the Northmen in 884, together
with their unprecedented ravages in the preceding period, seem
to have awakened the magnates to a realization of the true sig-
nificance of the Viking incursions and to the fact that a continued
policy of inaction would gravely imperil their own interests.°®
A temporary stiffening of the West Frankish resistance to the
Northmen in the period between the election of Charles the Fat
in 884 and that of Odo in 888, is very noticeable especially in
Francia and Neustria, the regions which were most exposed to,
and which had suffered most from, the Viking raids... When
Charles the Fat promised to pay Danegeld to the besiegers of
Paris in 886, he did so probably against the wishes of the West
Frankish nobility, and more particularly against the wishes of
Odo and the Parisians,* whose heroic resistance during the
recent siege seemed by the emperor’s compliance to be rendered
futile.°
Firmness, however, did not for more than a brief interval
characterize the attitude of the western magnates toward the
Vikings. After Odo’s accession to the throne the nobles reverted
to their old policy of temporizing with the invaders. Odo, though,
nay rather because, he was a strong monarch, found it necessary
to buy off the Northmen on two different occasions. The condi-
tions under which he was forced to resort to this expedient do
not essentially differ from the circumstances which had made
the Danegeld necessary in the time of Charles the Bald. The
great vassals, those of Aquitaine and Burgundy in particular
refused or were reluctant to codperate with the king in his at-
tempts to expel the enemy by military measures. They were
apprehensive lest the complete removal of the Vikings might
5 See supra, pp. 125-31; ef. chap. vii.
6 Cf. supra, pp. 135-40.
TU Cia supra, ’p..1b6 and ‘ns 27;
8 Cf. supra, pp. 146-50.
9 But while it is true that the action of Charles the Fat thwarted the im-
mediate purpose of the Parisians, it would be inaccurate to say that the
defense of Paris had been utterly fruitless. The impregnable citadel on the
Seine henceforth proved a serious obstacle to the movements of the Vik-
ings. Cf. Vogel, 337-38.
( eit Pee ie, ek 2a Pt So!
ea a
“ae Pins :
CHAPTER XIV 177
make possible a rehabilitation of the power of the crown, which
from their point of view would have been a greater calamity
than the evils attendant on the presence of the Northmen. Some
of the magnates simply were jealous of the rising fortunes of
the man they had elevated to the throne; others opposed Odo by
reason of their real or pretended attachment to the cause of the
Carolingian dynasty in the person of Charles the Simple. Prob-
ably all the seigniors were more or less influenced by their own
economic interest in the levying of the Danegeld, which, it may
be presumed, still yielded them a financial return, and also tended
further to strengthen the legal principle so advantageous to the
seigniors, viz., that the unfree peasant was taillable a merci.
The Danegelds of the tenth century are not strictly identical
with those of the ninth. They were not paid to a group of
itinerant Vikings, who temporarily held the Franks more or less
at their mercy. These last Danegelds were paid to the Normans,
who by this time were permanently established on Frankish soil
and had been formally admitted into the political organization
of the West Frankish realm." The purpose of these payments
was, not to secure the removal of the Normans from the king-
dom,’? but only to procure a cessation of hostilities on their part.
10 See supra, pp. 155-56, 160-61. Cf. Eckel, Charles le Simple, pp. 8-9.
11 By the treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte, on which see Eckel, 87 ff. In spite
of the political relations established by the treaty of 911, the Franks and
the Normans for some time afterward continued to engage in intermittent
hostilities with each other. The causes of these hostilities were (1) the
ostensible support given by the Normans to the cause of Charles the Simple,
and (2) their efforts to enlarge their holdings in France. It was only nat-
ural that the Normans, so far as they took any part in the political affairs
of the West Frankish realm, should have supported the Carolingian; for it
was to him they owed their legal adoption within the Frankish state, and
only from him might they expect further favors. Both Robert and Rudolph
were supported by those Frankish seigniors who were particularly hostile
to the Normans. The ambition of the latter to widen their boundaries by
new grants, or by conquests, served to antagonize those neighboring Frank-
ish nobles who realized that if the Normans were to be satisfied, it would be
at their expense. The magnates who were most active in opposing the
further expansion of the Norman duchy at the close of the first quarter of
the tenth century were Count Hugh the Great of Paris, Count Herbert of
Vermandois, and the lords of the maritime districts, such as the Counts of
Flanders and Ponthieu. It was they rather than the king who offered the
most continued and effective resistance to the Normans, though in so doing
they were probably not inspired by anything more noble than the desire
to defend their own interests (cf. Lauer, ed, Annals of Flodoard, pp. 17, n. 1,
24, n. 5). The probable reasons for King Rudolph’s occasional participation
in the wars with the Normans are indicated in the following note.
12 The West Frankish kingdom had by this time been transformed into a
congeries of feudal states, which were only loosely held together by the
Danegeld. 12.
178 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877
Why did the Franks need to resort to the Danegeld in the
tenth century? Chiefly because King Rudolph and the magnates
who supported him'* could not, or would not, devote themselves
exclusively or even primarily to the subjugation of their enemies
in the west. Various other projects also engaged their attention
projects which to them, no doubt, seemed more important than
a final settlement with the Normans.** Among these may be
mentioned the attempts to force the seigniors of the south, espe-
clally Duke William II of Aquitaine, to recognize Rudolph; the
unsuccessful struggle to keep Lorraine from falling into the
hands of Henry I of Germany; the incessant warfare with Rage-
nold and the Vikings of the Loire; and, finally, the resistance to
the Magyars, who invaded the West Frankish kingdom twice
during the year 926. This constant preoccupation was doubtless
the principal reason why the Franks were unable to terminate
their intermittent hostilities with the Normans by a military
decision. In order to be able to take the field against the insub-
ordinate southern magnates, and also, on one occasion, in order
recognition of a common overlord or a common danger (cf. Eckel, pp. 4-\.
32 ff.). According to the preceding note, it was not the entire West Frank-
ish realm which under the leadership of its monarch offered: resistance to
tne Normans. The opposition came only from those northern seigniors
whose interests were directly menaced, and, to some extent, from the kiug.
lt is very improbable, however, that Rudolph took part in this struggle with
the intention of ultimately expelling the Normans from France; he was
hardly attempting anything more than to check their territorial expansion
and in that he was not so vitally interested as were the magnates. hu-
dolph’s participation in the hostilities with the Normans is rather to be
explained on the following grounds. In the first place, he was regarded as
a usurper by the Normans, who, refusing him their allegiance, preferred, for
uhe reasons stated in the preceding note, to support the cause of Charles the
Simple. Also, policy dictated to Rudolph, in the early years of his reign a:
ijeast, that it would be advisable to come to the aid of, and to make coinmuon
cause with, those magnates to whom he owed his throne, i. e. Herbert ox
Vermandois and Hugh the Great in particular; otherwise they might fail
him in the projects in which he was especially interested, such as the ae
quisition ot Lorraine, the subjugation of Aquitaine, ete.; and Herbert of
Vermandois always had it in his power to liberate, and to set up against
Rudolph, his rival Charles the Simple. Furthermore, Rudolph’s own duchy
of Burgundy was to some extent exposed to the ravages of the Loire Vik-
ings under Ragenold, who were the allies of the Normans. Finally, the
fact that success in the Norman wars would lend prestige to his person and
to the crown, also was doubtless a consideration of some importance with
Rudolph. Thus the interests of the king so far coincided with these of the
northern seigniors as to result in a cooperative effort on their part to resist
the encroachments of the Normans.
13 I. e. most of the northern seigniors (cf. the two preceding notes, and.
see supra, chap. xili, n. 19).
14 Cf. Lippert (quoted supra, chap. xii, n. 13).
peo OHARA CF ie PO: 179
t to ‘repel the Magyars, Rudolph and his supporters found it neces-
eee sble to buy the inaction of the Normans; the Dane-
hat 24 seems to have procured only a truce, or the extension
Ie Rae of. it? ut that of 926, fortunately, brought permanent peace.
. +4 has s it too bold to presume that in adopting this policy, the king
; ee ie rt oige the northern magnates were influenced also by a custom of
Rox x | long standing, and by their own economic interest in the levy of
the Danegeld ?"°
ae | “TB Gi: the two preceding chapters.
A:
Se pete
4 » ‘
i ail ave + » bf, ‘ 4? +f T f a a, . F ;
Sy es ee ey See Te eee ae ene. ee “Aa
PAR eis
LOCAL DANEGELD: RANSOM.
CHAPTER XV.
RANSOM OF PLACES.
So far exclusive attention has been given to what may be
called the general Danegeld — those payments of tribute, which
were made to the Vikings or the Normans on behalf of the West
Frankish kingdom as a whole, and which in large part were
raised by means of general taxation in considerable portions of
the western realm. As pointed out before,t however, there were
also other payments made to the Vikings in the West Frankish
kingdom, payments decidedly local in character, but which none
the less may properly enough be referred to as Danegeld; for
there is no reason why that term should be restricted to mean
only those payments which were made on behalf of the kingdom
as a whole. These local payments were in the form of ransom
(1) of places and (2) of persons. To distinguish them from the
general Danegeld, they are referred to in this dissertation as
local Danegeld.
It is very unlikely that the sources at our disposal offer any-
thing like a complete record of all the occasions on which local
Danegeld was paid. Doubtless many payments were made to
the Vikings for the purpose of saving a town or a monastery from
destruction, or of redeeming prisoners from captivity, of which
no mention is made either by the annalists or by the hagiograph-
ical writers. What information has been handed down on this
subject must therefore be regarded as merely illustrative of
what probably were happenings of frequent occurrence in the
1 Cf. supra, introduction.
CHAPTER XV 181
ninth century. In the present chapter a survey will be attempted
of those comparatively well known occasions? on which the West
Franks® by the payment of ransom secured indemnity at the
hands of the Vikings for monasteries, churches, towns, etc.; the
consideration of the ransom of persons being reserved for the
following chapter.
The first instance on record of the payment of local Danegeld
in the West Frankish realm appears to be in 841. In that year,
when Charles the Bald and Louis the German were engaged in
their struggle with Lothaire I, a fleet of Vikings under the chief-
tain Oscar had entered the Seine and set fire to Rouen. Thence
they proceeded up the river to the monastery of Jumieges, which
likewise was burned.‘ It was to save their monastery from a
similar fate that the monks of St. Vandrille (Fontanelle) on
May 25 paid a ransom of six pounds (of silver?) to the Vikings ;°
and probably several other monasteries followed their example
at this time.® The following year (842) the population of Quen-
towic, after having been despoiled of most of its movables by the
Vikings, finally induced them to spare the buildings of the town
in return for the payment of ransom, the amount of which is
2 I do not claim, however, that the instances of the payment of ransom
which I have brought together in this and the following chapter include all
cases on record. In spite of my constant watchfulness for payments of this
kind, it is quite possible that I may have missed some examples. This dis-
sertation is primarily a study of the general Danegeld; and what is said
concerning ransom, or local Danegeld, is intended to be illustrative rather
than exhaustive.
3 Local Danegeld was paid also in Frisia, Brittany, and the East Frank-
ish kingdom. See infra, appendices iii, iv, and v.
4 Ann. Bert., 841, pp. 24-25; Chron. Fontanellense, 841, M.G.H., SS., II,
p. 301; Ann. Rotomagenses, 841, ibid., XXVI, p. 494. See also the marginal
note added to the Poem Celebrating the Battle of Fontenay, M.G.H., Poetae
Mane, Ut, D: e181, 1.) 4.
5 Chron. Fontanellense, 841, loc. cit., p. 301: “8 Kal. Iunii redemptum est
Fontinellense coenobium libris 6.” Cf. the following note. According to an
anonymous writer of the eleventh century, the monks of St. Vandrille as a
result of this payment were reduced to penury, and at last were forced to
seek refuge in flight (Appendix secunda ad Chron. ifontanellense, Bouquet,
VII, p. 281): “Monachi qui sub ingenti metu...in praefato Fontinellae
monasterio ea adhuc tempestate in ambiguo potius pendere quam vitam
videbantur agere. Nam secundo dato paganis pretio se locumque redemer-
ant: et vero deficiente jam pecunia, et invalescente persecutionis immani-
tate, fugae praesidium deliberarunt ad postremum arripere.”
6 Ann. Bert., 841, p. 25: “omnia monasteria seu [quae]cumque loca flu-
mini Sequanae adhaerentia aut depopulati sunt aut multis acceptis pecuniis
territa reliquerunt.”
182 LOCAL DANEGELD
unknown.’ In the winter of 852—53 it is likely that a number
of churches and monasteries in the vicinity of the lower Seine
bought immunity from plunder or destruction by paying ran-
som to the Northmen under Sydroc.* Orleans was saved from
destruction in 856, probably because its bishop agreed to pay
the ransom of gold demanded by the Northmen.? When the
Vikings who had established themselves on the island of Oscellus
in the Seine invaded Paris in 857,*° they burned all but three of
the Parisian churches, and these were spared only because a
heavy ransom “of many solidi’ was paid for them.! Later in
the same year all the monasteries in that vicinity found it neces-
sary to pay ransom in order not to be destroyed.”
In 863 the town of Poitiers secured immunity from destruction
by the payment of ransom, though that did not prevent the
Vikings from burning the church of St. Hilary.1®? Ransom on a
larger scale was demanded from the inhabitants of southwestern
Neustria (Maine, Anjou, and Touraine) in 869 by the Vikings
7 Ann. Bert., 842, p. 28: “Ha tempestate Nordmannorum classis in env
borio quod Quantovicus dicitur repentino sub lucem adventu depraedationi-
bus, captivitate et nece sexus utriusque hominum adeo debachati sunt, ut
nihil in eo praeter aedificia pretio redempta relinquerent.” Cf. Nithard,
Historiae, IV, ¢. 3, M.G.H., SS., II, p. 669; Anglo-Saxon Chron., 839, ed.
Plummer, pp. 64-65; Chronicon sancti Neoti, 842 (ed. T. Gale, Historiae
Britannicae, etc., scriptores, I, p. 155). For the location of Quentowic, see
the references given by Vogel, p. 88, n. 1.
8 See supra, p. 41, n. 16. In the spring of 853 Charles the Bald secured
the removal of these Vikings, evidently by the payment of a (more or less)
general Danegeld (see supra, pp. 39-44).
9 Adrevaldus Floriacensis, Miracula sancti Benedicti (M.G.H., SS., XV, PD.
494): “[Nortmanni] Aurelianis perveniunt captamque urbem auro distra-
hunt, Agio tunc temporis praesulatum praefatae urbis gerente; sicque ad
tempus recedentes, etc.” Cf. Ann. Bert., 856, p. 46. Cf. Vogel, 153, n. 1.
10 See supra, chap. iii, n. 6.
11 Ann. Bert., 857, p. 48: ‘Dani... basilicam b. Petri et s. Genovefae
incendunt et ceteras omnes praeter domum s. Stephani et ecclesiam s. Win-
centii atque Germani praeterque ecclesiam s. Dionisii, pro quibus tantum-
modo ne incenderentur multa solidorum summa soluta est.” Cf. supra, p.
45°and in. ‘7:
12 Aimoin, Miracula s. Germani, II, c. 10, AA.SS., May, VI, pp. 792-93:
“Redimebantur omnia in circuitu vicina monasteria, ne illorum saevitia
impositis ignibus cremarentur.” See Lot, “La grande invasion normande,”
Bibl. de Vécole des chartes, 1908, LXIX, 13, 187 Cf. supra, p. 45. ;
13 Ann. Bert., 868, p. 66: ‘“Nortmanni Pictavis venerant, et sub redemp-
tione civitate servata, ecclesiam s. Hilarii magni confessoris incenderint.”’
Cf. Chronicon sancti Maxentii, Bouquet, VII, 228, which does not mention
the ransom, and states that Poitiers was devastated. See also Lot, “La
Loire, Aquitaine et la Seine,” Bibl. de Vécole des chartes, 1915, LXXVI,
483-84.
CHAPTER XV 183
of the lower Loire. The latter had learned of Charles the Bald’s
intention to have fortifications built around the towns of Le Mans
and Tours, in order that these might serve as strongholds against
the Northmen. Realizing that the carrying out of these plans
would mean curtainment of their opportunities for plunder, the
Vikings demanded as the price of peace in this region a ransom
consisting of a large sum of money, together with considerable
quantities of grain, wine, and live stock. But there is nothing to
indicate that this demand was ever complied with."*
Hinecmar in his old age was confronted with the problem of
having to raise a ransom for his episcopal city of Rheims. Ina
letter to Bishop Hetilo of Noyon in 880* the archbishop declared
that the amount of money demanded by the Vikings was so large
that it would be impossible to raise it, especially since every-
thing of value had already been plundered. Whether this ransom
ever was paid cannot be determined.*® The bribe by which
Bishop Gauzelin and Count Odo secured the withdrawal of Sieg-
fried from the siege of Paris-in 886, though it has been discussed
before,’ also, perhaps, should be referred to in connection with
the payments of local Danegeld. Finally there is, as we have
seen, reason to believe that Bishop Evrard of Sens paid ransom
to the Vikings who, later in the same year (886), had laid siege
to his episcopal seat.'®
Thesé instances of the payment or demand of ransom must, as
pointed out before, probably be regarded only as examples of
what were matters of frequent occurrence in the period of the
Viking invasions.’® They are another indication that money
was needed frequently, and in large quantities, to buy peace from
the Scandinavian invaders. Whence the money was obtained
that was paid by the local authorities to save a monastery,
14 Ann. Bert., 869, p. 107: “Karolus vero civitates trans Sequanam ab
incolis firmari rogavit, Cynomannis scilicet ac Turonis, ut praesidio contra
Nortmannos populis esse possent. Nortmanni autem hoc audientes, multam
summam argenti, frumenti quoque et vini ac animalium ab incolis terrae
ipsius quaesierunt, ut cum eis pacem facerent.” Cf. Vogel, 234-35.
15 Flodoard, Hist. Rem. ecclesiae, III, c. 23, M.G.H., SS., XIII, p. 534:
“ceteris omnibus depredatis tanta quaerebatur [barbari] pro civitate re-
demptio, quantam explere non valeret [Hinemarus].” Cf. Vogel, 267, n. 4.
16 Vogel, p. 267, seems to be of the opinion that the ransom really was
paid. This may be true, but I can find nothing that proves it.
17 See supra, p. 144 and n. 25.
18 See supra, pp. 150-51 and nn. 68, 69.
19 See supra, pp. 180-81 and nn. 2, 3.
184 CHAPTER XV
a church, or a town from destruction, can be only conjectured.
Doubtless considerable sums were taken from the ecclesiastical
treasuries, and much of the plate belonging to churches and
monasteries was used, for this purpose.*° But it is also probable
that the local authorities, bishops, abbots, counts, or lay seigniors,
sometimes availed themselves of another method to raise ransom
money. The crown levied taxes to raise the general Danegeld.**
Why could not local Danegeld be secured in the same way? It
must be admitted that such procedure would be in harmony with
the general tendency of the age —to shift all burdens so that
ultimately they fell on the peasantry.”? After all, did the tax-
payer always know — did he ever know — by whom the contri-
butions he was called upon to make toward the Danegeld, had
been authorized; whether by the king, or only by some local
potentate, perhaps his own seignior? What he was beginning
to. realize more and more definitely, must have been that his
seignior had or claimed the right to tax him ad voluntatem when-
ever he was in need of money. If there is any element of truth
in this conjecture, it follows that the local Danegeld, like the
general Danegeld, was a not unimportant factor in the develop-
ment of the legal principle that the unfree peasant was tazllable
a merci.2*
20 This also, of course, holds true for the general Danegeld. Hence we
can easily understand why many churches and monasteries were emptied
of their financial resources (cf. supra, n. 5) and stripped of their ornaments
by the close of the reign of Charles the Bald. Cf. supra, p. 110 and n. 114.
21 The methods by which the general Danegeld was raised are summarized
infra, chap. xvii.
BLO LNSUDTA, Dio2s
23 Cf. infra, chap. xviii.
LOCAL DANEGELD 185
CHAPTER XVI.
RANSOM OF PERSONS.
It may seem, on first consideration, that payments made for
the purpose of redeeming persons taken captive and held for
ransom by the Vikings, can not properly be included in a treatise
on the Danegeld. And if the money paid for this purpose had
been obtained by methods entirely different from those which
were used to raise the general Danegeld, this view would perhaps
be justified. But we know that on at least one occasion such ran-
som money was secured by a procedure very similar to that em-
ployed for raising the general Danegeld; and one is therefore in-
clined to suspect that the same method may have been resorted to
on other occasions, even though there is no direct evidence to that
effect. For this reason it seems appropriate briefly to set forth
in this chapter some instances of the ransom of persons taken
captive by the Vikings in the West Frankish realm.t Doubtless
these instances are but examples of what became a very common
occurrence during the course of the ninth century.’
On May 28, 841, the monks of St. Denis proceeded to the
Vikings who under the leadership of Oscar were ravaging the
Seine in that year,* to redeem 68 Christian captives; for these
they were required to pay a ransom of 26 pounds (of silver?) .*
Many of the Franks taken prisoner by the Vikings who devas-
tated Nantes in 843, were afterwards redeemed by those who
had survived the catastrophe and escaped capture.°®
1 On the ransom of captives in Frisia, Brittany, and the East Frankish
kingdom, see infra, appendices iii, iv, and v.
2 See also the reservation expressed supra, chap. xv, n. 2.
3 Cf. supra, pp. 180-81 and nn. 4-6.
4 Chron. Fontanellense, 841, M.G.H., SS., II, p. 301: “5 Kal. Junii venerunt
monachi de s. Dionysio, redemeruntque captivos sexaginta octo libris viginti
sex.” Ann. Bert., 841, p. 25: “Interea pyratae Danorum.. .-Rotumam ir-
ruentes, rapinis, ferro ignique bachantes, urbem, monachos reliquumque vul-
gum et caedibus captivitate pessumdederunt et omnia monasteria seu [quae]-
cumque loca flumini Sequanae adhaerentia aut depopulati sunt aut multis
acceptis pecuniis territa reliquerunt.”
5 Ohronicon Namnetense, ec. 6, ed. Merlet, p. 17: “Post haec, erasis omni-
bus opibus cum gregibus captivorum utriusque ordinis, sexus, aetatis ad
naves remeant. Ad quorum postmodum redemptionem plurimum a cladis
superstitibus collatum est.” Cf. Ann. Bert., 843, p. 29; Miracula sancti Mar-
tini abbatis Vertavensis, c. 8, M.G.H., SS., rer. Merov., III, 573. See also
Vogel, 94-95.
o « ~~ os" a i. we. Ber tes! Sere PAE Aid ee eg Ee i a?! Ay y ANY Pe Gan pa Pinte
RS RE MME AN a CN UR, CURE Oe Mm EE MMe
/ ; AP ey SIND Fo y i ye * VOR OVROM He Td | mh}
a4 : ‘ f , mes yy 3 " ’ P \
Iie,
186 LOCAL DANEGELD
Immense sums of ransom money were paid to the Vikings
encamped on the island of Oscellus in the Seine during the period
from 856 to 861.° These Vikings, it would seem, were tireless
in their efforts to devise schemes and artifices by which they
might capture Frankish nobles, to be held for high ransom.’ The
best evidence of the excellent results of this business is the huge
amount of money they were able to amass.* Their greatest suc-
cess was scored in the capture (858) of the two half-brothers
Louis and Gauzelin, abbots of St. Denis and Glanfeuil, respect-
ively.’ Louis in particular — who was the grandson of Charle-
magne, and as archchancellor occupied the position of first rank
at the court of Charles the Bald'?®° — proved a highly remunera-
tive catch.1 While it is impossible to arrive at a final conclusion
as regards the exact amount paid for his release, we may be sure
that it was not less than 688 pounds of gold and 3,250 pounds
of silver.** Probably only a fraction of the enormous ransom’
6 See supra, pp. 45 ff.
7 Aimoin, Miracula s. Germani, ¢. 10, AA.SS., May. VI, p. 793: “Stude-
bantque [Nortmanni] praeterea vicibus aequis, quatenus aliquas nobilium
gratia pecuniae capere possent; unde (veluti ex mitissimi viri Domini Hlu-
dowici Abbatis redemptione) non modicum et incomparabile acquirebant
lucri negotium. Et quotiescumque tale quid agere disposuissent, dissimula-
hant se multis diebus ante nullatenus quoquam ire, ne cui illorum furtivus
innotesceret adventus.” ;
& This is referred to by Aimoin (see the preceding note); and we know
that when the Vikings on Oscellus finally surrendered to the followers of
Weland in 861, they were able to pay to the latter the snug sum of 6,000
pounds, which probably represented only part of the money in their pos-
session at that time. See supra, p. 55 and n. 68.
9 Ann. Bert., 858, p. 49: “Pars altera eorundem pyratarum Ludowicum
abbatem monasterii S. Dyonisii cum fratre ipsius Gauzleno. capiunt eisque
redemptionis suae gravissimam multam imponunt.” The father of Louis and
Gauzelin was Rorgon, Count of Maine. Louis was the fruit of an illegitimate
union of Rorgon with Rotrude, the daughter of Charlemagne. Gauzelin
probably was the youngest son of Rorgon with his wife Blichilde. See v.
Kalckstein, Robert d. Tapfere, pp. 136-41, 165.
10 Cf. Lot, “La grande invasion normande,”’ Bibl. de Uécole des chartes,
1908; LXIX. p. 19 and n): 3:
11 Vita 8S. Faronis, c. 124, Bouquet, VII, p. 357: “Clarior autem atque
potentior Princeps insignis de nomine Ludovicus, Pastor Ecclesiae S. Dion-
ysii, quae caput extollit super ceteras Ecclesias terrarum potentia dignita-
tis, et principatum omni honore sapientiae ac religionis, impotens fuit ab
eorum captivatione se observare. Cujus redemptione ponderibus inaestima-
bilibus auri et argenti ablata est omnis gloria et ornatus atque decor ab
universis Ecclesiis regni, atque ipsa aurea Roma se spoliatam suo decore
aliquo modo sentit.”
12 The figures given in the text are taken from the following note added
to a manuscript of the ninth century (Catalogue général des manuscripts
des bibliotheques publiques de France, XX XIX, pp. 123-24): “Datum est in
redemptione Hludovici, abbatis, a parte Sancti Dionysii, de auro libr{[as]
CCCCCCLXXXVITI, de argento libr[as] III mil[ia] CCL, excepto vasaill[os]
et illorum femin[as] et parentes illorf[um].” According to the usual in-
See Oe OE Sarees ee ee eee ee SL a EAA Cad ROE be. we Me
, —- = aa
CHAPTER XVI 187
terpretation (cf. Vogel, p. 161), these words mean that the monastery of
St. Denis alone furnished 688 pounds of gold and 8250 pounds of silver. and
that this sum did not include the additional amounts paid by the vassals of
the monastery and their wives and relatives. Lot, op. cit., p. 20. n. 2, is
probably justified in rejecting this interpretation on the ground that the
monastery of St. Denis could not have possessed such vast resources. It.
must be admitted that the meaning of the words in this note is not clear;
and unless supplementary evidence is produced, it will probably always re-
main more or less a matter of conjecture. Lot assumes that the words 4
parte should be ad partem, and then proceeds to reconcile the contents of
the note with the following passage in the Annals of St. Bertin (for what
precedes the following, see supra, n. 9): “Ob quam [multam] multi thesauro-
rum ecclesiarum Dei ex regno Karli, ipso jubente, exhausti sunt. Sed his
minime sufficientibus, ab eodem rege et omnibus episcopis, abbatibus, comi-
tibus ceterisque viris potentibus multa ad suppletionem praedictae summae
certatim coniata sunt.’ He identifies the 688 pounds of gold and the 3250
pounds of silver with the contributions ordered by Charles the Bald from
the churches in his kingdom, and supposes that the amounts which the
note says were furnished by the vassals of the monastery of St. Denis and
their wives and relatives, are those which according to the Annals of St.
Bertin were furnished by the king and all the bishops, abbots, counts, and
other magnates, to complete the required amount. The latter part of Lot’s
hypothesis is open to criticism. It is impossible to admit that the group
whic: included the king and all the bishops, abbots, counts, and other mag-
nates is identical with the group which consisted of the vassals of the mon
astery of St. Denis together with their wives and relatives. I shall there-
. fore make bold to present another hypothesis. This will be based prin-
cipally on a different interpretation of the last eight words in the note:
“excepto ... illorfum].” The old interpretation of these words is based
on the tacit assumption that the only person ransomed by or for the monas-
tery of St. Denis (Gauzelin was ransomed by the Church of Rheims—see
infra, n. 18) was Louis, its abbot. But there is good reason to believe that
the Vikings had captured a number of Franks, and that all of these were
held for ransom, the amount varying in each case according to the import-
ance of the person concerned. Aimoin (see supra, n. 7) indicates that the
. Vikings were intent on capturing a number of nobles, and that he refers to
the ransom of Abbot Louis as an example of how they amassed lucre:
“quatenus aliquas nobilium gratia pecuniae capere possent; unde (veluti ex
... Hludowici Abbatis redemptione) non modicum et incomparabile ac-
quirebant lucri negotium.”’ We know that the Vikings fell upon the Parisian
churches at Easter, when they knew that there would be a large concourse
of people in the various places of worship (Lot, op. cit., p. 19). Doubtless
- many vassals of the monastery of St. Denis, together with their wives and
dependents (I take it that parentes here signifies ‘‘subjects” or ‘“depend-
ents” rather than “relatives’’), alsc were present at Paris on this occasion.
It is very likely that the Vikings forced some of these to accompany Abbot
Louis into captivity; and thus the monastery of St. Denis found it neces-
sary to ransom not only its abbot, but also some of its vassals and their
dependents. If this hypothesis is correct, the note quoted above weuld
mean that 688 pounds of gold and 3250 pounds of silver were paid for the
ransom of Abbot Louis, but that this sum did not include the money paid
to redeem the vassals of thé monastery with their wives and dependents.
The Annals of St. Bertin state how the ransom of Louis was raised, and I
refer to this infra in the text and in n. 17. The ransom of the vassals and
their dependents presumably was raised by the monastery itself in the
usual way (see infra, n. 17).
13 On the assumption that the ratio of silver to gold at this time was
about 12: 1 (see Mayer, “Zum friihmittelalterlichen Mtinzwesen,” Viertel-
jahrschrift fiir Social- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 1916, XIII, p. 352, n. 1),
the total ransom would amount to not less than 11,506 pounds of silver (cf.
188 CHAPTER XVI
\
could be provided by the monastery of St. Denis.1¢ Charles the
Bald found it necessary to empty the treasuries of many churches
in his kingdom," and it is alleged that the church of Rome also
parted with some of its treasure, for this purpose.*® When even
such sacrifices did not bring the required amount, large contribu-
tions were eagerly furnished by the king and all the bishops,
abbots, counts, and other magnates, to make up what was lack-
ing.1* The amount paid for the ransom of Abbot Gauzelin is
nowhere indicated, but we know that it was furnished by the
church of Rheims, of which Gauzelin had formerly been a
priest.*®
The method by which the ransom of Abbot Louis of St. Denis
was raised probably illustrates the usual procedure in raising
money for purposes of this kind. It proves that the treasures
of the ecclesiastical establishments were drawn upon not only
for the general Danegeld, but also for the payment of ransom.
When these did not suffice, or were not available, as perhaps in
the case of laymen, contributions were voluntarily furnished by,
and at a later period probably were required from, those seign-
iors upon whom the captive had a claim of any kind.’® To assume
that such contributions were supplied by the seigniors out of
their own private resources, would be to ignore the prevailing
customs of the ninth century. Beyond a doubt the peasantry
was frequently taxed not only for the general, but also for the
local Danegeld, and for the ransom of persons no less than for
the ransom of places.*° |
Vogel, p. 216). The heaviest general Danegeld ever paid by the West Franks,
that of 884 (see supra, chap. viii), amounted to 12,000 pounds of silver.
14 OP supra. Nn. 12.
15 Ann. Bert., 858, p. 49 (quoted supra, n. 12).
16 See supra, n. 11.
17 Lot (op. cit., p. 20) fails to note that according to the Annals of St.
Bertin the king too made a contribution, and he assumes that “the king
levied a special impost on the bishops, abbots, counts, and royal vassals.”
The Annals of St. Bertin (quoted supra, n. 12) indicate that the contribu-
tions of the magnates were voluntary: ‘‘multa ad suppletionem praedictae
summae certatim conlata sunt.” However that may be, it is very improb-
able that the magnates furnished their contributions out of their own. re-
sources. We may believe that they were raised in the usual way, i. e. by
taxing the peasantry (cf. supra, pp. 183-84).
18 Flodoard, Hist. Rem. ecclesiae; III, c..24, M.G.H., SS., XITI, p. 536: “Ut
reminiscatur quia Remensis ecclesia eum [Gauzlenum] regeneravit in
Christo tonsumque in clericum sub religione nutriverit et docuerit, de cap-
tione paganorum redemerit, etc.” ,
19 See infra, chap. xviii.
20 Cf. supra, n. 17; see also p. 184.
mee E TV:
GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
CHAPTER XVII.
THE INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER OF THE DANEGELD IN FRANCE.
The various circumstances which serve to explain why the
West Franks resorted to the Danegeld have been summarized
above’ and do not need to be set forth again. In this chapter
those facts will be brought together which throw some light on
the institutional character of the Danegeld, and in the following
one will be presented an estimate of its effect on the political
and economic development of France.
According to the records that we have, twelve or thirteen pay-
ments of general Danegeld? were made to the Vikings in the West
Frankish realm.* Our information concerning the methods by
which the money* for this purpose was raised is not complete.
We have unimpeachable evidence that taxation was resorted to
in five instances (860—61, 866, 877,° 924, 926); in four other
1 Supra, chaps. vii, xiv.
2 On the local Danegeld, see infra, p. 204.
3 It will be remembered that there were two payments in 877, and that it
is doubtful whether the Danegeld promised by Odo in 897 ever was paid.
Soetbeer’s catalogue of the various payments of Danegeld (Forsch. ¢. d.
Gesch., VI, 54-56) is very inaccurate. Among other errors we may note
that he regards the Danegeld of 860 as the first general tribute; also he
assumes that an annual tribute of 5,000 pounds was paid after 877, for which
there is no basis whatever.
4 As a rule the Danegeld appears to have been paid in money or plate
(see the following chapter, p. 214); but on two occasions food supplies were
furnished in addition to the money payment: grain and cattle in 861, wine
in 866. The magnates are said to have contributed the wine (supra, p. 71
and n. 62, p. 87 and n. 136). Whence the supplies of grain and cattle came in
861 cannot be definitely determined, though it may be presumed that ulti-
mately the peasants could no more escape this burden than that of the
Danegeld. Cf. supra, pp. 53 ff.
5 The Danegeld paid to the Vikings of the Seine in 877 certainly was
raised by taxation, and that paid to the Vikings of the Loire in the same
year probably was.
190 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
instances (845, 853, 877,° 884) the evidence is indeed somewhat
scant, but what there is of it points in the direction of taxation;
and in the remaining four instances (862, 886, 889, 897) there
is no evidence at all as to how the money was obtained. It should
be added that in one of the last mentioned cases (886) the money
came from outside the western kingdom; and, therefore, the
method by which that payment was raised is of no importance
for the institutional development of the Danegeld in France.
We know also that on at least three occasions (860—61, 877,
884) the Danegeld was made up in part by drafts on the treas-
ures of the ecclesiastical establishments. From these premises
it seems legitimate to conclude that the general Danegeld usually
was secured by resorting to taxation, though in some cases it
was found necessary also to draw upon the treasures of the
church; and we may assume that one or both of these methods
were used on those occasions for which there is no specific
evidence.
The information that we have on the form and distribution
of the taxes levied to raise the Danegeld is very limited in scope.
Only for the last three payments during the reign of Charles
the Bald — those of 860—61, 866, and 877 — do we get anything
like particulars. Yet so far as they go, these particulars are
very valuable, illustrating in all probability the usual procedure
in the levying of the tax.
They indicate, in the first place, that the ordinary and most
common unit of taxation was the holding of land known as the
mansus. In 860 Charles the Bald is said to have levied a tax
on all the mansi of his kingdom. In 866 he levied a similar tax,
but. discriminated between mansi ingenuiles and mansi serviles
in such wise that he assessed the former at six, and the latter
at three, denarii each; and by a second assessment — which
proved necessary in order to raise the tribute of that year —
he laid an additional tax of one denarius on both these kinds ot
mansi; so that, all told, the mansi ingenuiles were taxed at seven,
and the mansi serviles at four, denarzi in 866. For the Dane-
geld of 877, land taxes were laid on only those mansi which con-
- stituted the honores of bishops, abbots, counts, and royal vassals;
but all the mansi comprising a honor were taxed on that occa-
6 1) refer here to the Danegeld paid to the Vikings of the Loire (cf. the
preceding note). ‘
PTA Sree ee i ' ,
> = well oi ee mat ws
a r
CHAPTER XVII 191
sion; not only mansi ingenuwiles and serviles, but also the dom-
inant holdings known as mansi indominicati. These were asses-
sed at the rate of twelve denarii (or one solidus) ; while taxes
of eight and four denarii were required for mansi ingenuiles
and serviles, respectively. It was provided in the case of the
the latter (mansi ingenuiles and serviles) that the holders were
to pay only one half of the taxes required for their mansus; the
other half to be taken from the cens, ov redevance, paid to the
seignior. If the latter arrangement was made with the inten-
tion of placing the burden of taxation on those who could best
afford to bear it, the probability is that it failed of its purpose,
as will appear more clearly later in the discussion.
The taxation of demesnial holdings, it should be noted, appears
to have been exceptional. The only time that the mansus in-
dominicatus was specifically mentioned as a unit of taxation for
the Danegeld, was in 877; and then it referred, not to all mans.
indominicatt, but only to those that were included in honores
held of the king by bishops, abbots, counts and royal vassals.
It is true, however, that in 866 there had been required from
each of the magnates two successive contributions of money
and wine, proportioned to the value of their honores; and this
may imply that the tax of that year was, in theory, laid on
mansi tndominicati as well as on dependent mansi.. Whether
the tax of 860, which is said to have been laid on all mansi, ap-
plied also to the demesnes, may be doubted. In any case there
is, save for this vague statement relative to the tax of 860, io
evidence that taxes for the Danegeld were ever laid on demesniai
holdings other than those included in honores held of the king;
and of the taxation of the latter we have at most two instances.
Land tenures of less extent or value than the mans? were taxed
on at least one occasion; in 866 one denarius was exacted for
each accola, and, likewise, one denarius for every two hospitiu.
All the taxes so far referred to were taxes on land or the
income from land. But the Danegeld was raised also by taxes
on all kinds of property and on incomes other than the income
trom land. Thus, merchants were required to contribute on
at least three known occasions: in 860—61, 866, and 877. In
860 a careful and exact evaluation of their property was
? Cf. supra, p. 87 and n. 137.
192 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
ordered; and taxes were levied not only on their houses, but
also on their movables (merchandise and household goods) ; even
the poorest of them could not escape the tax. In 866 they were
required to contribute one tenth of all they possessed. A dis-
crimination may have been made between Christian and Jewish
merchants in 877; the former are said to have contributed only
one eleventh of their resources, while the Jews were required to
pay one tenth, as before.®
Priests, too, were taxed for the Danegeld at least twice: in
866 and in 877. The tax was graduated in proportion to their
resources and income.’ No specific rates are given for 866,
but in 877 the assessments ranged from a minimum of four
denarii to a maximum of five solid.
Another form of taxation for the Danegeld was the collection
of the heerbann from the freemen. Of this there is only one
instance (866), but it is of great significance. Originally the
heerbann had been a fine of sixty solidi, imposed on those free-
men who failed to respond to the summons to military service.
Since the time of Charlemagne, however, both the military serv-
ice and the heerbann had, as a rule, been graduated in propor-
tion to the resources of the freemen; and there is reason to
believe that it was so graduated in 866. The important thing
about the heerbann of 866 is the fact that it was collected as a
tax, not as a fine; in that fact may be found a clew to the legal
basis of the Danegeld. But the development of this point must
be postponed to a later stage in the discussion... We turn now
to a résumé of what is known concerning the collection of the
Danegeld.
The direct evidence as to how the Danegeld was collected from
the tax-payers is very unsatifactory, and must be supplemented
by what is known about the methods of collecting other con-
tributions — taxes and redevances — at the same period. There
8 The question as to whether this discrimination between Jewish and
Christian merchants really applies to the Danegeld of 877 remains some-
what doubtful. See infra, appendix ii.
9 Originally at least, one part of the income from the tithe went to the
support of the priest. It is true that from the ninth century onward the
seigniors in many cases usurped the tithes, ceded them, sold them, infeu-
dated them, ete. (Imbart de la Tour, “Les paroisses rurales, etc.,” Rev. Hist.,
1897, LXIII, pp. 30-32). It must be assumed that those priests who still
retained a share of the tithe were taxed for the Danegeld on the basis of
their total resources, including the income from the tithe.
Mae eee ok
CHAPTER XVII 193
can be no doubt that on all seigneurial estates the taxes for the
Danegeld were collected from the peasant population — the
holders of dependent mansi, accolx, and hospitia — not by the
officers of the crown, but by the agents of the seignior, his
ministeriales..° In the collection of the tax the latter evidently
did not consider themselves bound by the rates of assessment
prescribed by the monarch, but exacted from the peasants the
largest amounts possible in each case, thus securing not only
what was demanded by the king, but also a substantial profit
for the seignior and themselves. It is very probable that the
official assessment of the tax was regarded only as a basis for
calculating the amount which the individual seignior ought to
turn over to the king. Indeed, we may believe that the seig-
niors succeeded in shifting the entire burden of taxation, even
that part of it which they ought to have born themselves, upon
their dependent peasantry."
It may be inferred that the taxes paid by the priests in 866%
were collected by the officials of their patrons; the latter being,
in some cases the bishop of the diocese, in others the abbot of
a monastery, and in still others a lay seignior. But in 877 it
was specifically provided that the bishops were to collect the
taxes of all priests, except those whose churches were dependent
on monasteries; in the latter case the collection was to be made
by the abbot and the bishop’s missus jointly. The taxes of the
priests, like those paid by the other classes, probably were not
applied exclusively to the purposes of the Danegeld; doubtless
a considerable portion was appropriated by those who enjoyed
the right of collection.’
There is no evidence whatever as to who were authorized to
collect the taxes of the merchants. Probably they were paid
to those officials of the fise who received the annual or biennial
contributions required by the king in return for the special pro-
tection he extended to merchants."*
10 Supra, pp. 77-79 and nn. 92, 99, p. 84 and nn. 122, 123, p. 99, n. 42, p. 103,
x Misia: pp. 84-85 and nn. 122, 123, pp. 88-89, 102-3 and nn. 68-71; cf. p.
108, n. 103.
12 The inference is “based on the special provisions made in 877; these
indicate that certain changes were made in the method of collection for that
year which seem to imply a previous method of the kind suggested above.
Cf. supra, pp. 103-5.
13 Jbid.; cf. nn. 77, 78, 84.
14 Supra, p. 86, n. 127, pp. 105-6.
Danegeld, 18.
-
194 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The heerbann, as a fine, was usually paid to the missi, and
there is no reason to suppose that a different arrangement was
made when it was levied as a tax toward the Danegeld.
Thus, except in the cases of merchants and freemen, the taxes
for the Danegeld were collected, in the first instance, by the
officials (ministeriales) of the local authorities, seigniors and
prelates. The latter, in turn, were responsible to the king for
the taxes levied by him on the property and income of themselves
and their dependents, the peasants and the priests. On at least
one occasion (877) these local authorities — bishops, abbots,
counts, and royal vassals — were instructed’ to pay over their
respective quotas to the royal missi.1° This instruction perhaps
illustrates the usual arrangement during the time of Charles the
Bald,** and that arrangement may possibly have prevailed as late
as the reign of Odo.’* According to the doubtful testimony of
Richer, the Danegelds of the tenth century were collected by
(royal?) exactores.*°
It would be interesting to know something about the method
of procedure employed by the officials of the king when they
were engaged in the work of distributing, apportioning, and
fixing the rates of the taxes for the Danegeld. Did they plan
to secure on each occasion only what had been demanded by the
Vikings; or did they arrange for the collection of a larger
amount, part of which was to be used for other purposes than
the Danegeld? Was it their intention to distribute the tax
fairly and equitably between the various classes of tax-payers,
and, if so, did they succeed in this endeavor? In apportioning
15 Charlemagne sometimes had the heerbann collected by special hari-
bannatores; but as a rule this was undoubtedly one of the functions of the
missi (Waitz, D. Verfassungsgesch., IV, 577 and n. 3, 578 and nn. 1-8).
Charles the Bald in 864 prescribed that the heerbann was to be collected
as before, i. e. by the missi (Edictum Pistense, c. 27, M.G.H., LL. Sectio II,
t. 2, p. 322; cf. supra, chap. v, n. 75). I have been unable to find any refer-
ences to haribannatores for the time of Charles the Bald and thereafter.
16 Supra, chap. vi, n. 74.
17 Supra, pp. 106-7 and nn. 94-97; cf. p. 36 and n. 48, p: 54, n. 62.
18 Cf. Thompson, Decline of the Missi, pp. 19-20; Viollet, Les inst. polit.
de la France, I, 305-7. That the institution of the missi had not entirely
disappeared by the time of Odo is proved by the following passage from a
charter issued by that monarch in 899 (Favre, Hudes, p. 237): ‘“‘Precipien-
tes ergo iubemus ut nullus comes seu vicecomes aut aliquis ex saecularibus
iudicibus vel ex missis nostris discurrentibus in praefato coenobio ... po-
testative mansiones accipiat aut paratas ... vel inferendas ab eo exigere
praesumat.”’
19 Supra, p. 166, n. 18, p. 169, n. 30.
See 7 —_— *—
<<
CHAPTER XVII 195
and fixing the rates of the taxes, did they have at their disposal,
and for their guidance, any kind of information — general or
specific — on which to base calculations and estimates as to the
probable net yield of the tax? Unfortunately, the information
that we possess on these matters is very sparse.
There is no evidence which proves that the monarch ever
applied the proceeds of the Danegeld to any other than their
proper purpose.*° It is true that Charles the Bald on one occa-
sion was suspected of having done something of that kind.*?
But his own vigorous protest against this imputation, together
with the undeniable fact that there had been numerous abuses
in the collection of this particular Danegeld (that of 860—61),
seems to make it impossible for us to regard the suspicion against
the king as well grounded. On the other hand, it cannot be
doubted that those who collected the Danegeld in the first in-
stance very often exacted from the tax-payers more than was
necessary to fill the quota required of them by the king.”
The question as to whether the royal officials intended to
distribute the impost equitably between the various classes of
20 The following passage from the Const. Garisiac. de moneta of 861
M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, pp. 301-2) has sometimes been taken to indicate
that the Danegeld of 860-61 was raised not only to pay off the Vikings, but
also to provide and equip a fleet: ‘“necesse fuit in istis temporibus coniec-
tum de illis accipere et ad navium compositionem et in Nortmannorum causa
pro regni, sicut res coniacet, salvamento, ut omnes cognoscant, qui non quaes-
tum inhonestum, sed publicam regni utilitatem quaerimus.” This interpre-
tation, however, will not bear criticism. The fleet referred to was em-
ployed by Charles the Bald when he attempted to expel the Vikings from
Oscellus in 858 (cf. supra, pp. 45-47, 63., n. 11). He did not agree to pay
Danegeld to the other group of Vikings, under Weland, until early in 860
(supra, pp. 48-49). Therefore, the passage just quoted must be taken to imply
two levies of taxes, one probably in 857 or 858 for the construction of the
fleet, and another in 860-61 for the purposes of the Danegeld. See also
suprd,: p,°107, ni-97:
21 The last part of the quotation given in the preceding note practically
proves that Charles the Bald had been accused of seeking a quaestum in-
honestum when he levied the Danegeld in 860-61. It is an interesting fact
that when Berengar, King of Italy, levied taxes for a tribute to the Magyars
in 947, he retained for his own profit a considerable part of the money thus
raised (Liutprand, Antapodosis, V, 33, ed. Dimmler, 1877, p. 118): “Per
id tempus Taxis, Hungariorum rex, magno cum exercitu in Italiam venit.
Cui Berengarius non ex propria pecunia, sed ex ecclesiarum ac pauperum
collectione X modios nummorum dedit. Fecit autem hoc, non ut populi
curam haberet, sed ut hac occasione magnam pecuniam congregaret. Quod
et fecit. In omni enim utrius sexus homo, tamque ablactatus quam lactens,
pro se nummum dedit; quibus aes commiscens, ex paucis X modios fecit;
caeteram vero partem, et quicquid ex ecclesiis tulit, sibi retinuit.” The
Magyars evidently were less exacting as regards the quality of the coins
they accepted than were the Vikings (cf. infra, pp. 214-15).
22 Supra, p. 193, n. 11, p. 194, n. 16.
196 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
the population is somewhat difficult to answer. It cannot be
denied that in the official assessments there are certain indica-
tions of an endeavor to fix the rates more or less in proportion
to the ability to pay. The taxes of merchants and priests were
assessed on the basis of a valuation of their resources; the heer-
bann of 866 probably was graduated in proportion to the amount
of property possessed by the freemen; the taxes on the depend-
ent holdings of land varied according as they were mansi in-
genuiles, mansi serviles, accolx, or hospitia; the taxes on a
mansus indominicatus were higher than those on a dependent
mansus; and honores, or benefices, were taxed in proportion to
their value or income. But whether these provisions were in-
tended to be anything more than a basis for calculating the total
amounts due from those who collected the taxes in the first in-
stance, remains doubtful. We have only one bit of evidence
which points in that direction. It is the provision in the doc-
uments for the year 877 which specifies that only one half of
the tax laid on a dependent mansus was to be paid by the holder ~
of the mansus, while the other half was to be taken from the
cens, or redevance, due the seignior. It does not seem possible
that the king at any time could have enforced a rigid adherence
to the provisions of the official assessments, since in most cases
his officers did not deal directly with the actual taxpayers.
Sometimes — as, for example, to raise the Danegeld demanded
by the Vikings of the Loire in 877 — no regular assessment was
attempted; the magnates were authorized to raise the needed
sum in whatever way they could. Assessment or no assessment,
the probability is that the seigniors and prelates always succeeded
in shifting the tax on their dependents; that the king was well
aware of this abuse, but unable to prevent it. We may believe
that the lower classes, peasants and priests in particular, usually
were required to pay much more than the amount that was
legitimately due from them.** And it may be assumed that
the peasants, whose holdings were taxed oftener than any other
kind of property, furnished by far the larger part of the money
collected as Danegeld.
The rates of taxation prescribed in the assessments may have
been fixed on the basis of a rough estimate as to the amount that
would be required from each unit of taxation in order to raise
23 Supra, p. 193, nn. 11-13.
ae
CHAPTER XVII 197
the sum demanded by the Vikings. At least it is possible to
point to the existence of certain prerequisites for making such
an estimate. We have evidence which indicates that the king
sometimes took an inventory of the benefices held from him ;**
the counts and the missi were required to report from time to
time on the number of freemen in each county that were liable
to military service;?> the polyptiques of the abbeys prove that
records were kept by the ecclesiastical establishments, of the
number and kinds of mansi within their domains, and also of
the number and status of their tenants; it may be inferred that
similar records were kept by the lay seigniors;*° undoubtedly
the bishops had records of the resources of all the priests within
their dioceses; and the royal fise very probably possessed some
information as regards the resources of the merchants.** Per-
haps these considerations make it impossible to regard the pre-
scribed rates of taxation as mere guesses on the subject of what
each unit of taxation ought to contribute in order to raise a
specific sum of money. On the other hand, however, it seems
very unlikely that the royal officials ever could have secured,
as the basis for their calculations, a body of fiscal information
that was at all complete or accurate. Whether all of the records
referred to above were constantly at their disposal, may with
good reason be doubted. But even if they had been, the officials
probably would have been unable to estimate in advance just
how many seigniors would fail to remit all or part of the quotas
for which they were held liable, and what portion of the tax
for various other reasons could never be collected. The best
proof of this is the fact that on some occasions more than one
assessment was necessary,*> while on others the required amount
could be raised only by drawing on the treasures of the church.”°
24 Ann. Bert., 869, p. 98: “[Karolus] per omne regnum suum litteras misit,
ut episcopi, abbates et abbatissae breves de honoribus suis, quanta mansa
quisque haberet, futuras Kalendas Mai deferre curarent, vassalli autem
dominici comitum beneficia et comites vassallorum beneficia inbreviarent et
praedicto placito aedium breves inde deferrent, etc.”
25 See for example Hdictum Pistense (864), c. 27, M.G.H., LL. Sectio II,
t. 2; p. 321.
26. Cf. Dopsch, Wirtschaftsentwicklung d. Karolingerzeit, I, 299-300.
27 This may be deduced from the obligation of the merchants to pay over
to the fise a certain percentage of their profits. See supra, p. 86, n. 127.
28 In 860-61 there appear to have been at least two assessments (supra,
pp. 50-53); in 866 there were four (supra, p. 87, n. 136, p. 89).
29 Supra, p. 190.
4
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198 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The raising of the Danegeld appears to have been a com-
paratively slow process, especially when more than one assess-
ment proved necessary in order to secure a given amount or
when the amount was unusually high. Ordinarily it must have
been a matter of several months; rarely, if ever, could a Dane-
geld be collected in less than two or three months;*° and seven
months were necessary, to raise the enormous tribute of 12,000
pounds in 884.*}
So far as known, the general Danegeld was never levied
throughout the entire West Frankish realm. We have no cert-
ain indication that it ever was raised in Aquitaine, not even
when the tribute was paid to Vikings operating from the Loire.**
Except in 886, when the entire Danegeld was furnished by
Charles the Fat from Germany,** Francia appears to have been
taxed for all the Danegelds paid to Vikings operating in northern
France, including the Normans. This probably holds true of
Neustria and Burgundy also, save for the following exceptions:
neither of these countries was taxed for the Danegeld of 924;%4
Neustria did not contribute toward the payment to the Seine
Vikings in 877, but furnished the entire amount paid to the
Loire Vikings in that year.** Also, the stipendiary Danegeld
of 862 was raised in Neustria alone.*?
What has been said above sufficiently demonstrates that the
Danegeld was in fact an extraordinary direct tax levied by royal
authority, within large and well defined portions of the West
Frankish kingdom, on various kinds of property and resources.
It was not the only direct tax known to the Carolingian period.
Such burdens as the annua dona, and, in certain cases,** the
census, tributum, inferenda, etc., must also be classified as direct
30 Nearly three months were required for 7,000 pounds in 845 (supra, p.
36 and n. 53); five or six months for 4,000 pounds in 866 (supra, pp. 90-91);
probably three months for 5,000 pounds in 877 (supra, pp. 107-8). The some-
what anomalous tribute of 853 appears to have been raised in less than two
months (see supra, chap. ii, n. 24).
31 Supra, p. 185 and n. 95.
32 Supra, pp. 60, $7-98 and nn. 37-40.
33 Supra, pp. 149-52 and n. 738.
34 Supra, p. 169.
35 Supra, pp. 97-98 and nn. 36-40.
36 Supra, p. 60.
37 In those cases where they had not been transformed into private
redevances.
,
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P i? r * 4 , * o 4 , ““ > pe j ; ' ‘ , : 1)
CHAPTER XVII 199
taxes.** But these were paid, each year or oftener,*® not on the
basis of an assessment prepared for each occasion, but according
to custom.*® Also, though regular, they were not general, taxes.
In theory, the annua dona were required only of the great seign-
iors ;** while census, tributum, etc., were exacted (as royal taxes)
only in those cases where they had not yet become private
redevances.*” In the case of these customary taxes, moreover,
no distinction appears to have been made, at least from the point
of view of the uses to which they were put, between the income
of the state and that of the king.** They were for both, no doubt,
but mostly for the king.**
38 This was denied by Waitz (op. cit., IV, 111 ff.); but most French his-
torians have taken the other view (see e. g. Flach, Les orig. de Vanc. France,
III, 344 and n. 1; Viollet, op. cit., I, 321 ff.). Dopsch is strongly of the
opinion that a very considerable part of the Carolingian revenues was de-
rived from taxation (op. cit., II, 333 ff., 342).
39 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 107, n. 2.
40 This is not denying that changes in custom took place occasionally,
nor that customs varied. The point is simply that particular rates were not
prescribed each time the taxes were to be paid (see Waitz, op. cit., IV, 108—
11, 113-20). While Dopsch (op. cit., II, 334-40) insists that these burdens
were, not private redevances, but true taxes, he does not deny their cus-
tomary character. Cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 338-41; III, 344 and n. 2; Glasson,
Histoire du droit et des institutions de la France, II, 480-83.
41 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 110; cf. 106 and nn. 2, 3; Glasson, op. cit., II, 483.
42 Ibid., 480-82; Viollet, op. cit., I, 322-24; Dopsch, op. cit., II, 334 ff.
43 According to Dopsch (ibid., 333 and n. 6), the proceeds of the annua
dona were intended to cover the expenditures of the state rather than those
of the monarch; special gifts for the latter purpose being termed dona
privata. The principal basis for this argument is the following statement
of Hincmar (Opera, II, 325): “causa suae defensionis regi ac rei publicae
vectigalia, quae nobiscum annua dona vocatur, praestat ecclesia.” But
surely this passage does not prove Dopsch’s point; rather it begs the ques-
tion; for Hincmar here fails to distinguish between the expenditures of the
king and those of the state—the annua dona are for both. The fact that the
dona privata were paid in addition to the dona annua does not prove that
there was a distinction in the uses to which they were applied. In some
cases perhaps the dona privata were voluntary; that would distinguish them
from the annua dona, which for a long time had been “‘gifts’’ only in name.
On this whole subject, see Waitz, op. cit., IV, 5-6, 105-7. Lot (‘‘Le Pont de
Pitres,” Le Moyen Age, 1905, IX, pp. 3, 4, 10 and n. 2, p. 11 and n. 1) thinks
the annua dona were used at least in part for the building of defenses, such
, as the Pont de Pitres.
44 It is difficult to find any evidence of disbursements in the Carolingian
period that were made for purely public purposes and which redounded pri-
marily to the benefit of the people as a whole or to that of the state. Glasson
(op. cit., II, 482) declares that at this period there were practically no state
expenditures, since the services required by the state either were performed
gratuitously or were rewarded by the proceeds from land grants and from
fines levied in the law courts. Waitz (op. cit., IV, 9 ff.) is of practically the
same opinion, though his statements are more guarded and accurate. Cf.
Flach, op. cit., III, 485 ff.
200 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It has been asserted*® that in addition to these regular taxes —
annua dona, census, tributum, inferenda —the sources of the
Carolingian period also give evidence of three extraordinary
taxes other than the Danegeld. They are said to have been the
following: (1) a contribution for the poor prescribed by Charle-
magne in 780;*° (2) a collection of alms in 810 for the restora-
tion of churches in Jerusalem;** and (3) an exaction levied by
Louis the German to secure money for the redemption of Chris-
tian captives in the Holy Land.*® On closer examination, how-
ever, it will be found that none of these exactions really was a
tax in any strict sense. Furthermore, they can not be regarded
as contributions either to the king or to the state.
The Danegeld differs not only from such more or less obligatory
contributions toward benevolent purposes, but also from the
aforementioned customary taxes, in several respects. In the first
place, it approached nearer than did any of these to being a
general tax. In 866 probably no one who held property or pos-
sessed resources of any important kind could legitimately have
escaped the Danegeld.*® If the assessments were less compre-
hensive on other occasions, and if in 877 (and thereafter?) the
Danegeld was, as a land tax, levied only on benefices held of the
king,®® the fact remains that no other tax of the Carolingian
45 By Dopsch, op. cit., II, 254, 339.
46 This contribution was required from bishops, abbots, abesses, counts,
and royal vassals, in proportion to their resources (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II,
t. 1, p. 52). Dopsch (op. cit., II, 254) calls it a poor tax (Armensteuer),
and asserts that such taxes were levied ‘‘zu wiederholten Malen.” It is true
that Charlemagne often gave instructions on the subject of how the poor
were to be taken care of; but I can find no evidence that he ordered specific
contributions for the indigent on more than a single occasion—in 780. Fur-
thermore, this contribution can not be regarded as in theory a tax; it was
an obligation to give alms which Charlemagne imposed at the suggestion
of his prelates; if he was legislating at all, it was for the church, but cer-
tainly not for the state. Cf. Sommerlad, Die wirtschaftliche Tdtigkeit der
Kirche, II, 110 ff.
47 The only information we have on this matter is the following (M.G.H.,
LL., Sectio II, t. 1, p. 154, « 18): “De elemosina mittenda ad Hierusalem
propter aecclesias Dei restaurandas.’’ Dopsch’s argument (op. cit., II, 254,
n. 2) that the word elemosina here should be interpreted in the sense of a
tax is very weak, and in any case is-invalidated by what I have said in the
preceding note.
48 The exaction is thus described by the Monk of St. Gall (M.G.H., SS.,
II, p. 753, c. 9): “totam Germaniam, quae temporibus ... Hludowici de
singulis hobis regalium possessionum singulos denarios reddere compulsa
est.” This exaction, it will be noted, was collected only on the royal domain.
So far from being in any sense a general tax, as Dopsch thinks (op. cit., II,
254 and n. 2), it was simply an extraordinary redevance.
49 Supra, p. 72, n. 64.
50 Supra, pp. 99-102 and nn. 42, 61.
CHAPTER XVII 201
period (excluding the ecclesiastical taxes) was laid on more
kinds of property, and paid by a larger number of persons than
the Danegeld. In the second place, the Danegeld, unlike the cus-
stomary taxes, was as a rule levied in accordance with special
royal assessments which prescribed particular rates for each
occasion. Graduated in proportion to the amount or value of
property and resources, these rates, theoretically at least, applied
uniformly throughout the entire territory about to be taxed.
Finally, in contradistinction to all the taxes and contributions
above mentioned, the Danegeld was a specific tax for the direct
benefit of the state as such —for the defense of the kingdom.
Legally it could not be, and probably it never was, raised by the
king for any other than its proper purpose.*'
The only tax of this period that seems at all analogous to the
Danegeld is the exaction levied by Charles the Bald in 857, or
858, for the purpose of securing funds to equip a fleet against
the Vikings. So far as we know, such a tax was not levied on
more than the single occasion noted.*”
In the late ninth and early tenth centuries, after the regular
direct taxes to the crown — annua dona, census, tributum, in-
ferenda — either had wholly ceased to be paid or had been trans-
formed into private redevances,** these extraordinary taxes —
the Danegeld and the fleet tax — may be regarded as virtually
the only remaining evidences of a public or state economy in the
West Frankish kingdom.**
But if it seems clear to us of the present day that the Danegeld
in certain respects was a new departure in Carolingian public
finance, it remains very doubtful whether the tax-payers of the
ninth and tenth centuries recognized it as such. We have seen
that the machinery employed to collect the Danegeld was, in
large part and essentially, not the machinery of the state, but
that of the seigneurial regime. Very seldom —so far as we
know, only in the case of freemen and possibly in that of mer-
_ chants — did the officials of the king enter into direct relations
with the actual tax-payers. While tillers of the soil and priests
had to bear the burdens of taxation, it was not they, but their
51 Supra, p. 195 and n. 21.
52 Ibid., n. +20.
53 Glasson, op. cit., II, 481, 483; Viollet, op. cit., I, 324; Dopsch, op. cit.,
II, 343-44.
54 Cf. Viollet, op. cit., I, 324.
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202 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
seigniors and patrons, who were held responsible for the taxes
by the monarch.®® A sufficient amount of Danegeld could never
have been raised without the codperation of the local authori-
ties.°° It was to their ministeriales that most of the money was
paid in the first instance. The officials of the crown had no con-
trol over the great bulk of the tax money until, after having been
collected from the tax-payers, it was paid over by the seigniors
and the prelates to the royal missi. We have also seen that in
most cases the Danegeld was collected, probably not in strict
accordance with the royal assessments; but in such manner, and
in such amounts, as would enable the seigniors and the prelates,
after they had remitted their quotas to the missi, to retain a sub-
stantial profit for themselves, while they escaped having to fur-
nish anything out of their own resources. For peasants and
priests, therefore, the chief if not the only distinction between
payments toward the Danegeld on the one hand, and redevances
on the other, must have been that in the case of the former there
was no custom to regulate the amount that might be demanded.*’
Again, it may be doubted whether the king levied the Danegeld,
in theory, as a tax. It does not seem likely that seigniors, pre-
lates, and freemen would have submitted to being formally taxed.
Very probably the old Germanic principle that the free man
could not be subjected to taxation either on his person or his
property was still too strong to be brushed aside, even in the
case of a great national emergency.** By what right, then, did
Charles the Bald and his successors levy the Danegeld? On what
principle was the exaction legally justified? In my opinion, the
key to this problem is to be found in the collection of the heer-
bann for the purposes of the Danegeld. By collecting the heer-
bann as Danegeld, Charles the Bald altered its character. In
that form it was not a penalty for negligence or refusal to render
55 Supra, pp. 192-94.
56 Supra, pp. 50-54, 90-91.
57 Supra, p. 84, n. 123.
58 On this point I venture to differ with Dopsch (op. cit., II, 338 ff.), who
assumes that the existence of the Danegeld and the other extraordinary
burdens referred to above (p. 200) is enough to prove that the principle of
immunity from taxation had by the time of Charlemagne ceased to be re-
spected. I have shown (supra, p. 200, nn. 47-49) that none of these extra-
ordinary exactions with exception of the Danegeld can be regarded as a true
tax. In the following I shall endeavor: to prove that even the Danegeld
was not in the strict theory of the ninth century a tax, but merely a money
payment substituted for military service.
TGA Pen Me Ce ett ge ae tT a Wal ee
| 4 P . ‘
CHAPTER XVII . 203
military service, but a money payment substituted for military
service. The legal basis of the heerbann was the same in both
cases: the king’s right to require military service of all freemen
at their own expense. But when he exacted heerbann as Dane-
geld, the monarch must have acted on the theory that he had a
right either to the personal military service or to its money equiv-
alent, and that it lay within his discretion to determine which
of the two was to be demanded on any occasion.*®® On this basis
the king was legally justified in exacting Danegeld not only from
freemen, but also from seigniors and prelates; for the latter were
liable to render military service, no longer only in proportion to
the number of freemen within their jurisdiction,®° but — at the
time of Charles the Bald and thereafter — in proportion to the
size or value of their benefices.*t Moreover, after Charles the Bald
had introduced the principle of the levée en masse — the prin-
ciple that in the event of a necessitas (foreign invasion) it was
the duty of all men, regardless of class, to take up arms in defense
of their country —it was possible to collect Danegeld from all
classes of the population, even priests, on the ground that it was
a substitute for military service at a very critical time.*? And,
‘indeed, that must have been the legal basis of the Danegeld:
it was interpreted as a substitute for the military service owed
by all men to the monarch as the defender of the land and its
people against foreign invasion. To legitimize the taxation for
the Danegeld on any other basis has proved difficult if not im-
possible.*®*
There is no evidence that the French monarchs continued to
collect Danegeld after the cessation of the Viking invasions and
the pacification of the Normans. So far as can be ascertained,
59 To this theory there could be little objection, since the average free-
man would far rather pay the heerbann than render military service. See
supra, pp. 74-77.
60 Supra, pp. 77 ff.
61 Supra, pp. 87-88, 101.
62 Supra, pp. 86-87. Cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 317-18, 321 and n. 2; III, 343, 473
and n. 2.
63 Vuitry (Le régime financier de la France, I, 92-93) regarded the Dane-
geld as an evidence of the survival of the tradition of Roman taxation into
the ninth and tenth centuries. Dopsch (op. cit., II, 339-40) assumes that
the taxing power was derived from “der plenitudo potestatis des frankis-
chen Konigs,” and in particular from the royal right to issue bans. The
latter part of this view, it will be noted, may be reconciled with my theory
that the Danegeld was a substitute for military service. Waitz (op. cit., IV,
120) referred to the Danegeld as a Heersteuer, but did not attempt to fix
its legal basis. .
204 CHAPTER XVII
the last levy of Danegeld as such, in France, took place in 926.
In its local abuses the Danegeld may, indeed, have survived,**
and this point will be discussed in the following chapter; but as
a form of general taxation, authorized by the monarch in the
interests of the kingdom as a whole, and applied uniformly
throughout considerable portions of the West Frankish realm,
the Danegeld disappears after 926. Between the latter date and
1146, when Louis VII levied the first royal aid to provide funds
for his participation in the Second Crusade, there is no evidence
of the collection of anything resembling a general tax, as distinct
from a redevance or a feudal aid, by a king of France.® In this
respect the history of the French Danegeld offers a striking con-
trast to that of the English Danegeld, which, after its revival by
William the Conqueror, constituted a very important part of
the regular royal revenues, and was collected under the name of
Danegeld as late as 1162 by Henry II.®
The fragmentary evidence that we have on the subject of the
local Danegeld — paid as ransom money for towns, churches,
monasteries, or captives — leads me to believe that it was raised
by the same, or similar, methods as the general Danegeld. While
the treasures of ecclesiastical establishments were doubtless
often drawn upon, it may be presumed that when these were not
available or did not suffice, taxes in the form of extraordinary
redevances, were levied on the local population.*’ We know that
in the case of the ransom of Abbot Louis in 858 it not only
proved necessary to empty many church treasuries; the king
and the magnates also had to furnish large contributions which
they raised probably by taxing their peasantry.”
64 Vogel, p. 386, conjectures that Rollo, after his establishment in Nor-
mandy, levied tribute on the peasants who had remained in the land.
65 Luchaire, Manuel, pp. 578-79; id., Histoire des institutions monarchi-
ques de la France, second ed. (1891), I, 125-28; Vuitry, op. cit., 390-91.
Clamageran (Hist. de Vimpot, I, 193-94; cf. 278-79) fails to note the Dane-
geld of 926 and (wrongly) gives 1147 as the date of the aid levied by Louis
VII. Flach (op. cit., III, 349-50) asserts that the royal right to levy a
general impost was not irremediably lost after the Danegeld ceased to be
collected, that the royal aid of 1146 proves the survival of the principle.
66 Round, Feudal England, p. 500; ef. supra, introduction.
67 Supra, pp. 183-84, 188.
68 Supra, pp. 186-88.
GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 205
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE RESULTS OF THE DANEGELD: ITS EFFECT ON THE POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF FRANCE.
Some of the results of the policy of paying Danegeld have been
referred to from time to time in the foregoing discussion. These
may now be summarized and brought into relation with certain
other matters not yet mentioned.
It is probably true that the Franks never expected to put an
end to the Viking invasions by the payment of Danegeld: that
they made use of this expedient only for the purpose of gaining
a temporary respite from plunder and devastation, and in the
hope that they would be able sufficiently to strengthen their
power of resistance in the meantime.’ Yet this hope was never
realized. Each payment of tribute served only, on the one hand
to whet the appetite of the invaders for more money, and on the
other to lessen the inclination, and therefore the ability, of the
Franks to resist their enemies by military measures.” The very
knowledge that in the last resort the Vikings always could be
bought off, undoubtedly made both nobles and freemen as a rule
disinclined to risk the somewhat doubtful issues of armed con-
flicts with an enemy who in military efficiency was their supe-
rior... And though Charles the Bald and other monarchs in
general were forced by a peculiar combination of circumstances,
and presumably against their own wishes, to resort to the Dane-
geld, there is not wanting evidence that even they, at times when
they desired to pursue some object of their choice, culpably
neglected the defense of the realm and relied upon the venality
of the Vikings.t The Danegeld, therefore, not only failed to
secure the immediate end at which it was aimed; it also had the
disastrous effect of further weakening the resisting power of
the Frankish army, and it led to a serious decline in patriotism
and public spirit among all classes, but chiefly perhaps among
the magnates. The economic advantages which each levy of
Danegeld yielded them must have proved a strong temptation to
the seigniors. They much preferred bying off the Vikings to
1 Cf. the statement of Charles the Bald quoted infra, appendix i, n. 35.
2 Supra, p. 38 and n. 58, p. 110 and n. 114.
3 Supra, pp. 113 ff., 175-79.
4 Supra, pp. 115-16, 146-47, 178-79.
206 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
fighting them, and thereby increased the tendency of suberdi-
nating the vital interests of the realm to the pursuit of private
aims and wholly selfish ends.°
The policy of paying Danegeld also had the effect of detracting
from the prerogatives and the prestige of the monarch at the
same time that it increased the wealth, the independence, and tne
power of the nobility. It has been shown?’ that the policy of pay-
ing Danegeld usually was the policy of the magnates, seldom that
of the king; that the magnates in most cases forced the king to
this expedient by refusing or neglecting to render the military
service demanded of them; that, furthermore, they were enriched
by each levy of the Danegeld on their subjects. With the trans-
formation of the Frankish army of freemen into an aggregation
of feudal vassals, the monarch was rendered powerless to defend
his realm against invasion whenever the magnates and seigniors
refused him their obedience and military support.’ By com-
pelling the monarch to resort to the Danegeld, the magnates
extracted from him what must have been regarded by his sub-
jects as a confession of weakness, an admission that he was no
longer capable of properly discharging his prime function of
defense against a foreign enemy.® Meanwhile, the monarch
found himself almost wholly dependent on these same magnates
even for the raising of the Danegeld; for without their aid and
cooperation it was just as impossible to collect a sufficient amount
of money as to raise an adequate number of troops.® Moreover,
by their control of the collection of the Danegeld, the magnates
were able not only to hold in leash or to embarrass the monarch;
they were able also to develop new financial rights in relation
to the peasants and others who dwelt upon their lands or were
subject to their jurisdiction, thereby augmenting in a general
way the power and authority which they already possessed over
their dependents.*°
It is in connection with the matter just mentioned that one of
the most important results of the Danegeld must be sought. The
Supra, chaps. vii, xiv.
Ibid.
Sanssliaee p. 114 and n. 18, p. 126, nn. 45, 46. See also Baldamus, Heerwesen,
Da a “hia matter see Fustel de Coulanges, Les transf. de la royauté, 616-
66; cf. Flach, Les orig. de Vanc. France, I, 145 ff.
Supra, pp. 50-53, 89-92; 196, 201-2. Cf. Flach, op. cit., III, 155, 474 ff.
10 Supra, pp. 81-85 and nn. 123-26, pp. 102-3 and nn. 69, 70, p. 108 and n.
103. Cf..- Mach, wp. citi, I, 31722.
~1o O1
ee)
Cove
CHAPTER XVIII 207
Danegeld was not raised in strict accordance with the royal
assessments issued for that purpose; it was exacted in a more or
less arbitrary way by the agents of the seigniors, the purpose
being to secure not only the exact quota demanded of each seign-
ior by the monarch, but also an additional amount sufficient for
the needs, or the avarice, of each individual magnate and his
ministeriales..:1. The fact that the seigniors were charged by
royal authority to collect the Danegeld from their dependents
must have led to many abuses in the form of illegal and unjust
exactions.’* It is true that the seigniors had no legal right to
collect Danegeld except when they had been instructed to that
effect by the king. But it is doubtful whether they always con-
sidered themselves bound by that limitation.'*®* We know that
the local authorities often entered into bargains with the Vikings
on their own account, for the purpose of saving a town, a church,
a monastery from destruction, or to ransom prisoners from cap-
tivity. In such cases it was probably felt that counts, bishops,
and abbots were as justified in raising by local taxation the sums
they had bargained for as the king was in raising larger tributes
by general taxation. In other words, the general Danegeld must
have helped to legitimize the levies of local Danegeld.** Further-
more, it was not difficult to find a pretext for levying an exac-
tion.> The Vikings were all but ubiquitous in the West Frankish
realm during the ninth century. Their presence in some locality,
or the rumor of it, might easily be taken advantage of by a
seignior to levy Danegeld on his own account, and without any
intention of using it for the purpose indicated.’® His subjects
and dependents probably were wholly ignorant regarding the
uses to which their money was put, once it left their hands. In
any case it would have availed them little to question the legality
11 Supra, pp. 192-93, 195-96, 201-2.
12 Supra, pp. 82-83. Cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 318 ff.
13 M. Flach has the following to say as regards the contributions exacted
from the peasants in this period (op. cit., I, 342): “Le chef eut droit a des
contributions chaque fois qu’une dépense exceptionelle s’imposait a lui. Or,
qui done allait Gtre juge de l’utilité ou de la nécessité de la dépense,—on
pourrait ajouter—de sa réalité? L’obligation du sujet eut pour mesure |’in-
térét du maitre et sa puissance.”
14 Supra, pp. 183-88.
15 The chicanery practiced by the magnates and the local officials is de-
scribed by Hinemar; see supra, p. 130, n. 67.
16 Cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 384-86.
208 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
or the justice of the exaction.1’ Meanwhile, the right of the
seigniors to levy exactions on their dependents in times of need
was being ever more firmly established.'* When in the opinion
of the seignior such need arose, and an exaction was levied to
meet it, the seignior, or his officials,’® prescribed the amounts
that were to be collected from the individual tax-payers. On
these occasions, therefore, the dependents of the seignior came
to be regarded as taxable at any figure determined by their lord
or his agents.”°
We know that in the earlier feudal period the unfree peas-
ants were held to be taillables a merci; they might be required
to pay an arbitrary imposition known as the tazlle — the amount
of which was determined by the lord — whenever the latter
chose to impose it.*t. The taille is not referred to as such be-
fore the eleventh century, but it must have come into existence
much earlier.*? The origin of the taille is a subject that is
still veiled in much obscurity, but there seems to be a general
consensus of opinion that it grew out of the illegal and unjust
exactions which are so often referred to in the documents of
the .ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries.*? Of course there
were illegal and unjust exactions long before the first levy of
Danegeld in 845.74 Yet the complaints about such exactions
seem to increase in number after the middle of the ninth century.
17 Of. ibid., 342-48, 425 ff.; Sée, Les classes rurales et le rég. domanial
en France,’ 107-11.
18tCin wach, op. eit. 41,. 414° ff.
19 Doubtless many illegal exactions were originated by the ministeriales
of the seigniors (Flach, op. cit., I, 380-81) and by the advocates, or lay de-
fenders, of churches and monasteries (ibid., 435 ff.; Sée, op. cit., 474 ff.).
20 See Flach, op. cit., I, 342-43; cf. 466, 467 and n. 1.
21 See ibid., 348-44; Luchaire, Manuel, 206-7, 309-10, 336, 422; Vuitry,
Etudes sur le régime financier, 104, 268-74; cf. Sée, op. cit., 177-78, 215, 356,
357; Clamageran, Hist. de l’impot, I, 199-201. For the later development
of the taille, its regulation, and its connection with the feudal aids, see
infra, pp. 210-11 and n. 35. I am now concerned only with one of its origins.
22 See the authorities cited in the preceding note. So far as I know, the
earliest reference to the taille, eo nomine, is found in a diploma issued in
the year 1060 (quoted by Championniére, De la propriété des eaux couran-
tes, p. 496): “Quasdam injustas consuetudines, talliam videlicet et omnes
alias oppressiones.” It is also mentioned about the year 1080 in the Pan-
carte blanche de Saint-Martin de Tours, fol. 180 (quoted by Flach, op. cit.,
JI, 419, n. 1): “Hugo castelli S. Maurae dominus avariciae faucibus instinctus
per violentiam suam homines S. Martini de S. Hyspano talliavit et talliam
reddere coegit.”’
23 Flach, op. cit., I, 342-44; ef. 384-85, 408;)n. 2, 421, n. 3, 433,'nn. 1, 2.
See also Glasson, Hist. dw droit et des inst. de la France, IV, 439-41, 445 ff.;
Sée, op. cit., 318-26.
24 See infra, n. 80. Cf. Dopsch, Wirtschaftsentw. d. Karolingerzeit, I, 294,
2957 and nN? 1.
CHAPTER XVIII 209
In several of these complaints it is indicated that the exactions
in question had not been levied before the period of the Viking
invasions and the reign of Charles the Bald.*®° The methods used
by the seigniors to raise their quotas of Danegeld*® were not very
different from those employed later in the exaction of the arbi-
trary taille;** and the right of the seigniors to exact such tailles
from their peasants, without being in any way obliged to them
in return, save to protect them, could easily have been developed
in connection with the levies — legal and illegal — of Danegeld.*®
It cannot be affirmed that the taille grew out of the Danegeld
exclusively, and still less that there would have been no taille,
if there had been no Danegeld. Doubtless there would have been
plenty of opportunities for levying exactions, even if there had
been no Viking raids;*° and the best corroboration of this state-
ment is the fact that illegal exactions are mentioned long before
the Viking period — even in Merovingian times.** But it is not
25 Capitula Synodi Bellovac. [April, 845], M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. 2, p.
388, c. 5: “Ut ab ecclesia mihi commissa indebitas consuetudines et iniustas
exactationes de caetero non exactetis, sed sic eas conservetis, sicut tempore
avi et patris vestri conservatae fuerunt.” LHpistola Synodi Carisiac. ad
Hludovicum regem Germ. [Nov. 858], c. 14, ibid., p. 487: “Iudices denique
villarum regiarum constituite, qui non sint cupidi ... Et servos regios iu-
dices non opprimant, nec ultra quod soliti fuerunt reddere tempore patris
vestri ab eis exigant; neque per angarias in tempore incongruo illos affli-
gant; neque per dolos aut per mala ingenia sive inconvenientes precationes
colonos condemnent.” Flach explains (op. cit., I, 385, n. 1) that in the docu-
ment just quoted it is a question not only of public (royal) officials, but
also of powerful vassals (fortiores vassi), of seigniors and of protectors
(domini vel patroni). Cartulaire de Saint-Etienne de Dijon, MS., fol. 17
[circa 912], quoted by Flach, ibid., n. 2: “quidam homines servientes et
fideles Ecclesiae S. Stephani Divionensis ... conquesti sunt et reclama-
verunt humiliter dicentes quod quidam eorum praepositi ... novello tem-
pore post Nortmannicam emersionem quoddam genus servitii ex XIII eorum
colonicis per occasionem et potestatem ultra censum solitum quod legitime
debebant illis imposuerunt, modium videlicet musti ad opus praepositorum
ex una quoque colonica vinum reddente, quod numquam antea fecerant nec
ipsi, nec patres aut avi eorum, et per quosdam annos III et potestate hoc ab
illis extorserint eosque in hoc facto afflixerint, ete.’ The document goes on
to say that the matter complained of was investigated, found true, and pro-
hibited in the future. See also supra, chap. vi, n. 77.
26 See the preceding chapter, pp. 192-97, 201-2.
27 I. e. both the Danegeld and the tallia ad voluntatem were more or less
arbitrarily exacted from the lower classes of the population. Cf. Luchaire,
Manuel, p. 309.
28 Cf. supra, pp. 207-8 and nn. 138, 21.
29 On the whole subject of the origins of the various seigneurial rights,
see Flach, op. cit., I, 315 ff.; cf. Sée, op. cit., 308-26.
30 Clotharii II Edictum [Oct. 18, 614], M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. 1, p. 22,
c. 8: “Ut ubicumque census novus impie addetus est et a populo reclamatur,
iuxta inquaesitione misericorditer emendetur.” Pippini Capitulare Aquitani-
Danegeld. 14.
210 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
too much to say that the Danegeld must have been a very im-
' portant factor in the development of the taille, and particularly
in the development of the legal theory that the unfree peasants
were taillables a merci.**
The local Danegelds that were paid for the purpose of ransom-
ing prisoners from captivity must have contributed something
toward the development of the feudal aids.*? Perhaps none of
these aids appears earlier, or was more common, in France, than
that one which was due from the vassals when a captive lord had
to be ransomed.**? Just as the ransom payments of the ninth
century probably were raised by means of forced contributions
from the peasantry, so we know that the feudal aids were secured
by levying extraordinary tailles on the laboring classes.**
cum [768],ibid., p. 43, c. 4: “Ut ad illos pauperes homines magis non tollant
nisi quantum legitime reddere debent.” Breviarum missorum Aquitanicum,
ibid., p. 65, ce. 5: “ut ad illos pauperes nova aliqua consuetudo inposita fuit
postea.”’
31 Objection to the argument presented above could perhaps be taken on
the ground that the Danegeld was a tax on property and resources, while
the arbitrary taille seems to have been, originally, a charge on persons. The
difficulty thus raised is, however, more apparent than real, and results from
drawing too sharp a distintion between charges resting on persons and
those laid on land. The arbitrary taille, it is said, was exacted only from
persons of servile status—the taillables—never from the so-called free vil-
leins (Sée, op. cit., 177-78, 215, 357-58). But we are told also that the
classification of a tenant, either a villein or a serf, depended more on the
condition of his tenure than on the status of his person; that, speaking
generally, condition was less personal than real (ibid., 157-58, 166-67, 171,
216-17). It would seem, therefore, that the question as to whether the ar-
bitrary taille should be classified as personal or as real, is at least not a
matter of first importance. The Danegeld, it has been shown, was exacted
from the holders of mansi ingenwiles, mansi serviles, accolae, and hospitia,
without regard to the personal status of the respective tenants (cf. supra.
chap. v, nn. 69-71, 123). The fact that they were tenants of such holdings
made them taxable for the Danegeld. Probably the same fact made them
subject to other exactions, legal and illegal; with the result that in the
course of time they came to be regarded as taxable at will. It will be ad-
mitted that this view is in harmony with the generally accepted theory that
the serfs of the feudal period—as distinct from the free villeins—were the
descendants not only of the servi, but also of the coloni, who occupied de-
pendent mansi in Carolingian times (Sée, op. cit., 157). A distinctive feature
of the latter period was the degradation of the freeholders, most of whom
became dependents of the great seigniors. That a small number of the later
villeins were descendants of Carolingian freeholders who by various means
had escaped degradation into serfdom, will not be denied; but by far the
majority of the later villeins had reached that status by virtue of the eman-
cipation movement in the twelfth century and thereafter. The emancipation
of the serf meant, among other things, that he could no longer be subjected
to the arbitrary taille (ibid., 219 ff., 239 ff.). The tailles levied on villeins
were limited to certain occasions, very much like the feudal aids due from
vassals. On the relation between the two, see infra, n. 35.
32 Cf. supra, p. 188:
33 See Haskins, Norman Institutions, pp. 21-22; cf. pp. 19-20.
34 Luchaire, Manuel, pp. 206-7.
CHAPTER XVIII 211
Again, it is possible to show a more general connection between
the Danegeld and the feudal aids. The latter, it is well known, in
many cases were developed from the taille; they represent the
regulation and limitation of what was once a wholly arbitrary
exaction.*®> Therefore, on the basis of a relation between the
local abuses of the Danegeld and the origin of the taille,*® it may
be asserted that the influence of the Danegeld is traceable in the
development of the earlier feudal aids. Between the Danegeld,
regarded as a money payment substituted for military service,
and some of these feudal aids there was, in principle, little differ-
ence. This is true particularly of the aide de lost, which toward
the close of the reign of Philip Augustus became an important
source of royal revenue.**
In an illuminating article on the commerce of France in
the ninth century, Professor Thompson: has called attention
to the influence of the Danegeld on trade and exchange: “The
immense sums of money which the Northmen extorted ... in
the form of Danegeld must sometimes have had a tonic effect
upon trade. Since the decline of the Roman Empire Gaul, in
common with all the West, had experienced an enormous reduc-
tion in the amount of currency in circulation. Most of it had
been drawn off to the East, or else hoarded. Now it was forcibly
brought into the light of day. Clipped or counterfeited as much
of the coin was, it yet seems to have stimulated exchange, and
Charles’s (Charles the Bald is meant) endeavors to purify and
to regulate the coinage and to establish a uniform system of
weights and measures may reasonably be taken as the symptoms
of an awakening trade.’’** “The Norse armies were dogged by’
adventurous peddlers and merchants, and much of their booty
must have been disposed of soon after its taking.’’*® ‘Evidently
commerce could not have suffered everywhere, but on the other
hand in many places must have been stimulated. The Northmen
undoubtedly disturbed things seriously, but often sold their booty
in the land.*? New markets must have arisen through the decay
35 Luchaire, loc. cit.
36 Cf. supra, pp. 206-10.
37 Luchaire, Manuel, pp. 579-80, 597-98; Sée, op. cit., 593 ff.
38 Thompson, “‘The Commerce of France in the Ninth Century,’ Journal
of Political Economy, 1915, XXIII, p. 867.
39 Ibid., pp. 865-66.
40 An excellent example of this is given in Ann. Fuld., III, 882, ed. Kurze,
p. 98. During a truce between the Franks and the Northmen at Elsloo (see
212 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
of the old ones or by the change of location in the case of estab-
lished places too greatly exposed.’’*
To this general estimate of the effect of the Danegeld on com-
merce perhaps only a few particulars need be added.*?
So far as we know, the Vikings, while they were sojourning in
France, engaged neither in agriculture nor the industrial arts;
and it is difficult to see how they could have found time for such
pursuits, since they were almost constantly occupied in raiding,
plundering, and devastating. They could hardly have brought
with them from Scandinavia either food or military equipment
in any very large quantities. This consideration must be kept
constantly in mind if one wishes to gain anything like a correct
appreciation of the volume of trade between the Vikings and the
Franks. It lends an added significance to the evidences of ex-
change between the two peoples.** It indicates that the Vikings
needed to purchase and did purchase, with the money which
came into their possession through tribute and plunder, not only
weapons, armor (bruniae), horses, and other necessities of war,**
but also large quantities of foodstuffs, wine, cattle, etc.*® The
infra, appendix iv), the latter opened the gates of their camp and permitted
the Franks to enter: “Nostrates autem calliditatis illorum expertes eandem
munitionem ingressi sunt, alii quidem causa negotiandi, alii vero pro loci
firmitate consideranda.” See also infra, n. 45.
41 Thompson, op. cit., 866-67. Cf. v. Kalckstein, Robert d. Tapfere, p. 93.
For the new markets, see M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 318, ¢. 19. In 873
the Northmen requested from Charles the Bald the privilege of having a
market during the winter (see infra, n. 45).
42 On the Vikings as traders, see also Bugge, ‘‘Die nordeuropdischen
Verkehrswege im friihen Mittelalter und die Bedeutung der Wikinger fiir
die Entwicklung des europadischen Handels und der europaischen Schiffahrt,”
Vierteljahrschrift f. Sozial- u. Wirtschaftsgesch., IV, 1906, 227 ff.; Vogel,
417-18, is of the opinion that, in general, Bugge has overestimated the stim-
ulating influence of the Vikings on the commerce and trade of the Frankish
realm. See also Bugge’s Vesterlandenes Indflydelse paa Nordboernes og
saerlig Nordmaendenes ydre Kultur, Levesaet og Samfundsforhold i Vi-
kingetiden (Skrifter udgivne af Videnskabs-Selskabet i Ohristiania. II.
Historisk-filosofisk Klasse. 1904. No. 1), chap. iv; Vogel, 206, 233, 243, 293,
‘294, 314, 376; Steenstrup, Normannerne, I, 367; II, 367; Weinhold, Altnor-
disches Leben, 104-5, 114-17. |
43 Not only laymen, but even the clergy, monks and nuns, seem to have
traded with the Northmen. LHdictum Pistense, c. 25, M.G.H., LL. Sectio II,
t..2, p. 8325; see the varying manuscript (Cod. 3), printed in a note at the
bottom of p. 325.
44 Ibid., p. 321, c. 25. Cf. Thompson, op. cit., 866 and n. 1; Vogel, 233.
45 The following may serve to illustrate the point referred to in the text.
Ann. Bert. 869, p. 107: “Karolus vero civitates trans Sequanam ab incolis
firmari rogavit, Cynomannis scilicet ac Turonis, ut praesidio contra Nort-
Imannos populis esse possent. Nortmanni autem hoc audientes, multam
summam argenti, frumenti quoque et vini ac animalium ab incolis terrae
CHAPTER XVIII 213
fact is that the Vikings did not always evacuate the realm as
soon as they had received the Danegeld. Ordinarily they simply
proceeded to some other region,*® and after the payment of 861
they were permitted to spend the winter in various encampments
along the Seine.*’ It seems obvious, therefore, that all the money
paid to the Vikings in the form of Danegeld did not leave France;
some part of it must have been used to purchase the necessities
of life and of war. But the benefits derived from this temporary
stimuation of trade must not be overestimated. As will be shown
later, they were more than counterbalanced by the direct eco-
nomic losses suffered as a result of the payment of tribute.*®
The Danegeld must have intensified to some extent the labors
of those engaged in agriculture and industry; for they produced
or manufactured most of the things wanted by the Vikings.*®
Peasants, artisans, and seigniors now found opportunities to
dispose of more than was required for their own needs and for
the ordinary market demand.*® This is not merely additional
evidence that the landed estate of the later Carolingian period
was less “self-sufficient” and independent of the outside world
than was formerly believed, and that the money economy of the
ninth and early tenth centuries was considerable;*! it also indi-
cates that production for the market, in some places at least,
must have been directly stimulated by the payments of Danegeld.
Since huge payments of tribute and an increased volume of
trade call for a larger supply of money, there can be little doubt
—though direct evidence is wanting — that the mining of the
precious metals, particularly of silver, had to be increased in
ipsius quaesierunt, ut cum eis pacem facerent.” Jbid., 873, p. 124: ‘“Petie-
runt autem [Nortmanni], ut eis in quadam insula Ligeris fluvii usque in
mense Februario residere et mercatum habere liceret, etc.” See also supra,
p. 189, n. 4.
46 Supra, pp. 44, 61, 91, 108-9, 136 ff., 152.
47 Supra, pp. 55-56.
48 See infra, pp. 216 ff.
49 On this and the following, cf. supra, pp. 56-58 and notes. It is an in-
teresting fact, though without any necessary relation to the Danegeld, that
Frisian or North French cloth was used at the royal courts of Scandinavia
in the ninth century, and that swords made in France by Frankish or Flem-
ish artisans have been found in the Scandinavian lands (Bugge, “Die nord-
europdischen Verkehrswege, etc.,” loc. cit., p. 254).
50 That there was throughout the Carolingian period a production for the
market, in agriculture as well as in manufactured articles, has been abun-
dantly demonstrated by Dopsch, op. cit., I, 262 ff., 296 ff.; II, 155-79.
51 See Dopsch, op. cit., II, 234-77; Thompson, op. cit., 872-73, 887.
Pines’ GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
order to keep a sufficient number of coins in circulation.®? Doubt-
less the plate of the churches was sometimes used in the pay-
ment of the Danegeld.®* Yet most of the tribute probably was
paid in specie,** ordinarily silver, though on a few occasions part
may have been in gold.*®
The steady and continued improvement in the quality of the
West Frankish coinage during the latter half of the ninth cen-
tury must be ascribed in part to the influence of the Danegeld.*°
It would seem that the invaders accepted tribute money only
after they had first counted and then weighed it;°’ the weighing
being done either by the Vikings on their own scales,°* or by the
52 See Soetbeer’s article on Carolingian coinage in Forsch, 2. d. Gesch., VI,
8-9, 538-54, 56. This scholar presumed (p. 54) that most of the silver in the
West Frankish realm was mined at Melle in southern Poitou (now Melle-sur-
Béronne in the département Deux-Séevres—see Vogel, 123).
53 Supra, chap. vi, n..114; chap. xvi, n. 11. When it is said that drafts
were made on the church treasuries for the Danegelds of 860, 877, and 884,
this does not necessarily mean that the contribution consisted of plate.
54 Supra, p. 58 and nn. 77, 78. Cf. Dopsch, op. cit., II, 305.
55 In 845 and in 861 part of the Danegeld may have been paid in gold (see
Supra, pp. 34-35 and n. 45, p. 37 and n. 55, pp. 52-53 and n. 54). The annalist
of Fulda is probably inaccurate when he states that the Danegeld of 884 was
paid in gold and silver (supra, p. 132, n. 76). On the other occasions the
evidence indicates that the payments were made in silver. Though the
later Carolingians appear to have retained the system of bimetallism
(Dopsch. op. cit., II, 279), it is probably true that by far the larger part of
the money in circulation consisted of silver coins (ibid., 306). Still there
was undeniably a large supply of gold in the Frankish realm (ibid., 138,
173-74, 256-57, 306-8.) A very large monastic treasure of exclusively Arabic
gold is mentioned in the Sermo de relatione corporis beati Vedasti, c. 4
M.G.H., SS., XV, p. 402, lines 40-41). The Vikings doubtless secured through
plunder and trade a considerable part of this supply of gold (supra, p. 55
and n. 63; cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 22). For purposes of transportation
gold, by reason of its lesser bulk and weight, must have been preferred to
silver.
56 That the quality of the West Frankish coinage was improved during
the ninth century is well known (see Dopsch, op. cit., II, 303 ff.; Soetbeer,
op. cit., VI, 9, 10, 13-14). I do not wish to deny that there were other
reasons for this besides the Danegeld. My contention is simply that the
Danegeld was one of several factors making for an improved coinage. The
old theory of Dummler (I, 470, 548), Steenstrup (op. cit., II, 367), and
others, that the Danegeld led to counterfeiting and depreciation of the coin-
age, is no longer tenable.
57 At least that inference may be drawn from the following statement of
Regino (Chron. 884, ed. Kurze, p. 122; cf. supra, p. 137, n. 105): “[Nort-
manni]- respondent se cum Carlomanno rege, non cum alio aliquo foedus
pepigisse; quisquis ille esset, qui ei in regnum succederet, eiusdem numeri
et quantitatis pecuniam daret, etc.”
58 Supra, p. 71, n. 60, p. 182, n. 76. Cf. Montelius, Kulturgeschichte Schwe-
dens, p. 277. According to Soetbeer (op. cit., VI, 55-56), the Scandinavian
weights were four per cent. heavier than the Frankish. But Montelius (op.
cit., 193, 278) believes that, in Sweden at least, the Roman libra of 327.5
CHAPTER XVIII 215
Franks on Frankish scales under the careful supervision of the
Vikings.°® Moreover, on one occasion the latter are said to have
demanded silver of pure and tested quality ;°° which probably
means that they would accept only such coins as were of proper
fineness. In any case these are indications that bad money could
seldom if ever be pawned off on the Northmen. Accordingly, all
coins that were clipped, or for other reasons below weight, or
that contained too much alloy, must have tended to drop out of
circulation, since they could not be used in the payment of the
Danegeld.*' Indeed, the latter must have been a very important
factor in the development of a general demand for money of
proper weight and fineness.
Did the Danegeld have any effect on the coinage system of the
West Frankish kingdom? It isa significant fact that in the time
of Charles the Bald many persons, even among the lower classes,
refused to accept in trade and otherwise coins that did not bear
the stamp of the local mint. Evidently this fact reflects another,
and preceding, fact; namely that the ministeriales of the local
authorities had been instructed by their superiors to accept in
the payment of redevances and taxes — the Danegeld in partic-
ular —'only money whose weight and fineness could not be ques-
tioned, that is to say, locally coined money. Doubtless the desire
to avoid the task of having to weigh and test each coin might
have prompted such an instruction; but probably it was dictated
also, and in larger measure, by the economic interests of those
seigniors who controlled or possessed the mints — some of which
had never been authorized by the king and were illegal — and
who wished to enrich themselves by the profits accruing to them
from the process of recoinage.®*? The Danegeld, therefore, so far
from having aided Charles the Bald in his efforts to control and
unify the coinage of the realm,® on the contrary must have tended
to frustrate those efforts. On the increasing tendency of the
seigniors to establish private mints, sometimes with and some-
grams had by this time been superseded by the medieval mark (= 200
grams). In the last named work there is an illustration (p. 278) of a
bronze scale found in Sweden and presumably of the type ordinarily used
by the Vikings. See also Bugge, Vesterlandenes Indflydelse, loc. cit., p. 306.
59 Supra, p..49, n. 32, p. 54; -n. 61; cf. p. 95,-n.°17; p..147, n. 46.
60 In 884; see supra, p. 132, n. 76.
61 Cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 8-11.
62 See supra, p. 54, n. 62. Cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 8-10.
63 Edictum Pistense, cc. 8-24, M.G.H:, LL., Sectio II, t. 2, pp. 314-20. Cf.
Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 9-22;supra, p. 54, n. 62.
216 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
times without royal sanction — a very noticeable feature of the
later ninth and especially of the tenth century** — the Danegeld
must have had, if any, a stimulating effect.
Finally it should be said that the Danegeld led to a very serious
impoverishment of the West Frankish realm.® Between 845 and
926, i. e. Within a period of about eighty years, we have recorded
twelve or possibly thirteen payments of general Danegeld.*® The
total sum of money represented by those payments cannot be
determined, since on only seven occasions are we informed of the
amounts paid. For the Danegeld of 853, and for the payments
made by Odo and by Rudolph, we have no figures whatever, and
we do not know how much was paid to the Vikings of the Loire
in 877. The total of the seven known amounts aggregates the
sum of 39,700 pounds of silver;*’ perhaps the remaining pay-
ments would at least double that figure and possibly triple it.®
In the latter case, the general Danegeld alone would represent
a loss to the Western Franks of over 100,000 pounds of silver®
or its equivalent in other commodities.7° The amount of money
paid to the Northmen in the form of ransom, or local Danegeld,
64 On this see Flach, op. cit., III, 345-48 and notes; Sée, op. cit., 421-22.
Cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 23-37; Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit., 663 and n. 1;
Viollet, Les inst. polit. de la France, I, 331-33; v. Kalckstein, Gesch. d. franz.
Konigtums, I, 165 and n. 2.
65 Cf. supra, pp. 109-10, nn. 112, 114, p. 138 and n. 114.
66 Supra, p. 189 and n. 3.
67 7,000 pounds in 845
5,000 “ 861
6,000 “ “* 862
4,000 “* “* 866
7,000 >= *“ 877 (to the Seine Vikings)
120005" * 884
Pa Use “ 886 (furnished by Charles the Fat from Germany)
Total 39,700 pounds.
68 In England each successive payment of tribute was as a rule larger
than the preceding one (cf. supra, pp. 17-18 and notes). On this basis it may
be conjectured that the Frankish Danegelds in the time of Odo and Rudolph
were heavier than the payments made by Charles the Bald. I doubt, how-
ever, for the reasons stated supra, p. 133, n. 77, that a Danegeld larger than
that of 884 was ever paid by the Franks.
69 Cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 56; Vogel, 216. According to Prou (Les mon-
naies carolingiennes, Introd., p. XLV), the intrinsic value of the Carolingian
denarius was about .45 modern French francs. One hundred thousand Caro-
lingian pounds would then be equal to nearly eleven million francs, or more
than two million dollars in American money. Such calculations, however,
are of almost no value, for it has proved impossible to determine in any ac-
curate way the purchasing power of money in the Carolingian period
(Dopsch, op. cit., II, 299 ff.).
70 Those commodities for which some part of the Danegeld had been the
purchase price (see supra, pp. 211-13). :
CHAPTER XVIII 217
it is impossible even to conjecture. Of course, it must be admitted
that the Danegeld, general and local, does not represent by far
all the treasure secured by the Vikings. There can scarcely be
any doubt that the invaders secured more treasure through
plunder than through the payment of tribute;7* and in the im-
poverishment of the realm the Danegeld was certainly a less
important factor than the destruction of property and the devas-
tation of the land. None the less, the Danegeld does represent a
very serious economic loss to the Western Franks. We know
that all the money secured by the Vikings was not used up by
them while they sojurned in France.** A considerable part of
the supply of money and precious metals must have been drained
off to Scandinavia or England.** Furthermore, even if it is
admitted that the huge payments to the Vikings tended tem-
porarily to stimulate trade and to encourage a somewhat larger
output in agriculture, industry, and mining, the fact remains
that the Vikings themselves produced little or nothing, that they
were parasites on the native population in the West Frankish
kingdom, and, as such, only used up the fruits of the labor of
others. It is true that all parts of the kingdom did not suffer
equally. Francia and Neustria probably were most affected, for
the population there always was required to contribute toward
the Danegeld. Burgundy, too, was taxed on most occasions; but
it was less often subjected to devastation and pillage than Fran-
cia and Neustria. As for Aquitaine, we do not know with cer-
tainty whether the general Danegeld ever was levied in that
country, but there probably were frequent payments of ransom.”
Ti Cl supra,-p.. bb. and: n,.63,_p,.57, n. 73.
72 See supra, p. 37 and nn. 55, 56, p. 55 and n. 63, p. 57, n. 73, p. 91 and n.
163, p. 108 and n. 105, pp. 136 ff., p. 157 and n. 38; cf. appendix iv. See also
Chronicon Britannicum, 873, Bouquet, VII, p. 222; Chronicon Monasterii S.
Sergii Andegav., ibid., p. 53; Ann. Fuld. 873, loc. cit., pp. 80-81.
73 The fact that only a few~less than fifty—Frankish coins dating from
the eighth or ninth century have been found in the three Scandinavian
countries (Montelius, op. cit., p. 269) does not, of course, prove the con-
trary. In any case, no inference could be drawn from such finds as regards
the influence of the Danegeld either on France or Scandinavia, since it
would be impossible to distinguish the coins that reached Scandinavia
through the ordinary channels of trade from those that were brought there
as part of the Danegeld. It is an interesting fact that a very large amount
of silver. in the form of ornaments and also in bars and ingots, and dating
from the Viking period, has been found in Scandinavia. On this see Sophus
Miller, Nordische Altertumskunde (German translation by O. L. Jiriczek),
II, 285 ff.; Montelius, op. cit., 273, 276, 285-88.
74 Supra, p. 198.
218 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Danegeld involved an inestimable economic loss to the
church in the western kingdom.** The treasures of churches
and monasteries’® were frequently drawn upon to furnish what
could not be raised by taxation. At the end of the reign of
Charles the Bald many formerly wealthy ecclesiastical establish-
ments had been completely exhausted, and this, according to
Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, was due to the deplorable policy
of paying tribute to the Vikings.” Probably many more churches
had been forced to give up their treasures before the last Dane-
geld was paid in 926.8 In this connection we should remember
also that priests were not exempt from the Danegeld;*® and that
those peasants who were settled on the lands of the church were
probably required to contribute more regularly than other peas-
ants. A monarch like Charles the Bald, who pursued a policy
of favoritism toward the higher clergy,*° doubtless relied on the
church to furnish the financial aid which, at critical moments,
was often refused him by the lay magnates.*t In this way the
Danegeld must have served to increase the antagonism of the
clergy toward the lay seigniors ;** the latter, as has been noted,**
usually preferred the policy of paying tribute; and their recre-
ancy in the matter of defending the land against the pagan enemy
is constantly, and very bitterly, emphasized by the contemporary
chroniclers and hagiographers,* all of whom were ecclesiastics.
We may agree with Dummler*® that if any direct public benefit
was derived from the policy of paying Danegeld, it was a wholly
negative one; the Danegeld served only to distribute over large
portions of the West Frankish kingdom the burdens and losses
75 It is also true, of course. that the church suffered more from the plun-
dering raids of the Vikings than did the lay seignors (cf. supra, p. 47 and
NLS )
76 For an interesting catalogue and description of the treasure of a mon-
astery, see Hariulf, Chronique de lVabbaye de Saint-Riquier, II, c. 10, ed.
Lot; pp. 67-11.;_III, c. 3, pp. 86 ff.
77 Supra, pp. 109-10 and n 114; cf. p. 138, n. 114.
78 By the middle of the tenth century most of the bishoprics in western
France were without any appreciable resources (Lot, Htudes sur la régne de
Hugues Capet, pp. 217, 232 and n. 8).
79 Supra. p. 192.
80 Supra, p. 42 and n. 19, pp. 46-47 and n. 17, p. 105 and n. 85.
81 Cf. supra. p. 43 and n .25.
82 Cf. supra, p. 47 and n. 18, p. 100, n. 47, pp. 109-10 and n. 114, pp. 116-17,
D:-1.29, n=61, p, 130.n.-.67:
83 Supra, pp. 205-6 and notes.
84 See for example supra, pp. 26-27, nn. 6, 8, pp. 109-10, n. 114, p. 115, n.
20 0DsL29;/4 61:
Sb OD CH. PLE 42;
CHAPTER XVIII 219
which the regions directly exposed to the Viking raids would
otherwise have had to bear alone. The study of the Danegeld is
a study of what in the economic sense must be regarded as a
non-productive factor. The importance of such factors, how-
ever, is not always wholly neglible. Their effect on contemporary
institutions and conditions may often be at least a partial expla-
nation of why those conditions and institutions disappear, or are
metamorphosed into something that seems entirely new. Per-
haps the following may be said as regards the importance of the
subject that has been studied in the preceding pages: it would be
impossible thoroughly to understand the general political and
economic development of France during the transition period of
the ninth and tenth centuries, if the influence of the Danegeld
were left totally out of consideration.
APPENDIX:
WHEN AND WHERE WAS THE ASSESSMENT FOR THE DANE-
GELD PAID TO THE VIKINGS OF THE SEINE
IN 877 PREPARED?
Most scholars who have touched upon the subject of the tribute
promised the Northmen of the Seine in 877, are agreed that an
assessment for this Danegeld was prepared at Compiegne on
May 7.' The sole basis for this is the superscription of a docu-
ment which gives the rates of the assessment.” Since, however,
this superscription does not agree with the Annals of St. Bertin,
which state that the assessment was made at Kiersy on June 14,°
1 See the following: Bouquet, VII, 123, note (e); Pertz in M.G.H., SS., I,
503, n. 94; Dehaisnes, ed. Ann. Bert., p. 255, note (c) ; Waitz, ed. Ann. Bert., p.
135, n. 4; Krause in M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 353, lines 28 ff.; Gfrorer,
Gesch. d. ost- u. westfrdnk. Carolinger, II, 142; von Kalckstein, Abt Hugo
in Forsch. 2. d. Gesch., XIV, pp. 73-74; Dummler, III, 42, n. 1; Steenstrup,
Normannerne, II, 185; Bourgeois, Le capitulaire de hiersy-sur-Oise, 81 (last
two lines), 82 and n. 1; id., L’assemblée de Quierzy-sur-Oise, in Etudes @his-
toire du moyen dge dédiées a Gabriel Monod, 139, n. 1; Lot, “Le pont de
Pitres,” Le Moyen Age, 1905, IX, 14, 15 and n. 2; Vogel, 253-54.
2 Hdictum Compendiense de tributo Nordmannico, B. M.G.H., LL., Sectio
II, t. ii, p. 354: “Anno incarnationis dominicae DCCCLXXVII, Nonis Maii
in Compendio palatio de aliqua, sed non de tota parte regni, quod domnus
imperator Karolus habuit, antequam iunior Hlotharius aefunctus fuisset,
haec constituta est exactio Nortmannis, qui erant in Sequana, tribuenda, ut
a regno eius recederent.” Another and similar document, for the same year
and the same purpose (A, ibid.), has the following superscription: “Haec ex-
actio a Nortmannis, qui erant in Sequana tempore Karoli regis, de suo
regno fuit facta, ut ab ipsius regno recederent.” In this appendix we shall
be concerned primarily with document B. But see infra, p. 229.
3 Ann. Bert., 877, ed. Waitz, p. 135: “Inde [Karolus] placitum suum gen-
erale Kalendis Iulii [i. e. June 14 (see below)] habuit, ubi per capitula,
qualiter regnum Franciae filius suus Hludowicus cum fidelibus eius et regni
primoribus regeret, usque dum ipse Roma rediret, ordinavit, et quomodo
tributum de parte regni Franciae quam ante mortem Lotharii habuit, sed
et de Burgundia exigeretur, disposuit,... . Dominus autem imperator
Karolus de Carisiaco Compendium, indeque per Suessionis ad Remum civi-
tatem ... peragens, etc.” Bouquet—VII, 123, note (c)—believing that
Hincmar had committed an error, suggested that the date Kalendis Iulii
(Bouquet has Kalendas Julii), in the above quotation, ought to be corrected
to XVIII Kal Jul. Pertz (M.G.H., SS., I, 502, n. 92) was of a different
APPENDIX I 221
some students have assumed that Hinemar, the author of this
portion of the Annals of St. Bertin, confused, in so far as the
levy of the Danegeld was concerned, the proceedings of the
assembly at Kiersy on June 14 with those of the assembly at
Compiégne on May 7.* M. Bourgeois, on the other hand, un-
willing to believe that Hincmar could have erred so grossly in
matters on which he was so well informed as the levy of the
Danegeld and the Assembly of Kiersy, has endeavored to recon-
cile the superscription of the tax document with the statements
of Hincmar, by arguing that there were two distinct assess-
ments: the first at Compiegne on May 7, and the second at Kiersy
on June 14.°
opinion. He had observed that when in the manuscript calendars the words
Kalendae, Nonae, and Jdus were written in majuscules they signified, not
those days in each month which were specifically known as the calends, the
nones, or the ides; but the first day of those periods in each month during
which the days were numbered with reference to the calends, the nones, and
the ides, respectively. Thus KALEND. IUL. meant, not July 1 (the day of
the calends of July), but June 14 (the eighteenth day before the calends
of July), the whole period from June 14 to July 1 being designated as (the
period of) the calends of July. Hincmar, accordingly, when he wrote KA-
LEND. IUL., evidently meant the beginning (first day) of the period of the
calends of July, which is June 14, precisely the day on which the Assembly
of Kiersy convened. Fustel de Coulanges (Nowvelles recherches, p. 417,
n. 1), who is of the same opinion as Pertz, calls attention to another sen-
tence of Hincmar which may illustrate how this manner of reckoning time
originated (Schedula, t. II, c. 17, Migne, Patr. Lat., CXXVI, 587): “Plures
kalendae mensis augusti pertransierunt, etc.”
4 The assumption seems to have originated with Bouquet, whose dictum
was accepted by Pertz, Dehaisnes, Waitz, Dimmler, and Krause; and appar-
ently also by Gfrorer, von Kalckstein, and Steenstrup. See the references
cited for these supra, n. 1. That Hincemar should have been so misjudged
is all the more striking, in view of the fact that a specific reference to the
Danegeld in the Capitulary of Kiersy (cf. infra, n. 16), proves that the
raising of this tribute was one of the important matters arranged at the
assembly of June 14.
5 This argument of Bourgeois (L’assemblée de Quierzy-sur-Oise, loc. cit.),
though evidently accepted by Lot and Vogel (see the references given supra,
n. 1) is, in my opinion, not convincing. The superscription of the tax docu-
ment (cf. supra, n. 2) says that at Compiégne the tax was levied on part,
but not on the whole, of the kingdom of Charles such as it was before the
death of Lothaire IJ. This, it will be noted, is a very indefinite statement;
one which really does not convey any information as to exactly what part
of the realm of Charles was or was not taxed. According to Bourgeois’ in-
terpretation, the statement means the entire kingdom of Charles the Bald
as it was in 870 with exception of Burgundy. That is, to be sure, the only
interpretation which the principal hypothesis of Bourgeois will permit. But
it is obviously not the only interpretation possible. When it is said that
only part of the realm of 870 was taxed, it does not necessarily follow that
Burgundy was not taxed. It is quite possible that the writer meant to
include Burgundy and to exclude some other division of the kingdom of
Charles the Bald, as for example Neustria, where another Danegeld was
being raised at the same time for the Vikings of the Loire (see supra, pp. 95-
yiyidye APPENDIX I
Both views, it will be noted, rest in last analysis on the assump-
tion that the superscription of the tax document is a thoroughly
reliable source of information. One group of scholars regards
the authority of the superscription sufficient to controvert the
evidence furnished by Hincmar in the Annals of St. Bertin;
while Bourgeois and his followers, though they are not disposed
to rule Hincmar out of court, none the less retain their confidence
in the truth of what is said in the superscription. It is clear,
therefore, that both views will be rendered untenable if it can
be shown that the superscription is a less trustworthy source of
information than Hincmar. And if it can be established that the
evidence of the superscription is utterly unreliable, we must
perforce fall back upon the Annals of St. Bertin and the Capitu-
lary of Kiersy as our only trustworthy sources of information
on this point.°®
That an authentic document has higher testimonial value than
a narrative account, is in historical science a canon which it
would be stupid to challenge. What we are now concerned with,
however, is, not a document proper, but the superscription of a
document. Was this superscription originally part of the docu-
ment at the head of which it now appears; or was it placed there
by a later hand?
To me it seems that the latter view must be adopted, and for
several reasons. A careful study of the body of the document,
i. e. the provisions of the assessment, reveals the fact that there
the present and future tenses are used exclusively :‘ an indication
96,108). The fact is that this statement is too indefinite to admit of any con-
clusions as to its exact meaning. Again, Bourgeois asserts that according to
Hinemar, the tax at Kiersy was levied on the whole kingdom of Charles the
Bald as it was in 870 and also on Burgundy. But this is not accurate. Hinc-
mar does say that at Kiersy a tax was levied on that part of the kingdom
of Francia which Charles had before 870 and also on Burgundy. The words
of Hincmar certainly do not imply a previous assessment, from which Bur-
gundy had been exempted, nor do they necessarily indicate a larger tax area
than that referred to in the superscription. We may note, finally, that the
superscription, whatever may be its meaning, has practically no historical
value if it was, as I will attempt to show in the following, added to the tax
document by a later hand.
6 Cf. supra, nn. 3, 4; infra, n. 16. The later compilations, such as the
Continuation of Aimoin (Historiae Francorum, V, [ed. Nicot, Paris, 1567])
and the Grandes chroniques de St. Denis (Bouquet, VII, 146), are, of course,
not reliable; the latter, in particular, are very inaccurate and confused. Cf.
infra, pp. 226 ff.
7 Edictum ... de tributo Nordmannico, B, loc. cit.: ‘“donent ...sint...
accipiant ...sunt... pergent ...remanserint ... consistunt ... accipiat
. commanent ... habuerint ... exigatur.”
APPENDIX I 223
that it was written before the actual collection of the Danegeld.
Hinemar, on the other hand, in giving the substance of the docu-
ment in the Annals of St. Bertin, used the past tense:* an indi-
cation that he wrote after the Danegeld had been collected. The
same holds true of the superscription, where the tenses (past
and pluperfect) of the verbs are so employed as to prove beyond
peradventure that it was not written until after the death of
Charles the Bald and the departure of the Northmen.® Again,
a comparison of the vague denotation, in the superscription, of
the territory in which the Danegeld was to be levied — “de
aliqua, sed non de tota parte regni, quod domnus imperator
Karolus habuit, antequam iunior Hlotharius defunctus fuisset’”—
with the very specific statement of Hincmar — “de parte regni
Franciae quam ante mortem Lotharii habuit, sed et de Burgun-
dia’”’ — shows unmistakably that Hincmar, who was a contem-
porary, had much more accurate information on this point than
the writer of the superscription, who for all we know may not
have lived until long, possibly centuries, after the events he
referred to.'°
Moreover, while it may be true that Hincmar is not always an
infallible authority on the events and conditions of his time, yet
what he says in this connection must be given considerable
weight.‘ He was himself present at the Assembly of Kiersy,’?
and therefore may be presumed to have known what was decided
there. Another indication that he was particularly well informed
as regards the levy of the Danegeld, is the fact that he wrote a
letter on that subject to Louis the Stammerer.'® Also, it is very
significant that his statements in the Annals of St. Bertin rela-
tive to the apportionment of the taxes levied at Kiersy, in the
8 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “habuit . .. exigeretur,’ disposuit ... erat ... ac
ciperent ...redderent ... extitit .. . acceptum fuit . . . fuerunt.”
9 See supra, n. 2.
10) Chesupra., tn?-2, 33:5.
11 Cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., 139.
12 See the letter to Louis the Stammerer written shortly after the death
of Charles the Bald (Migne, Patr. Lat., CXXV, 988).
13 Flodoard, Historia Remensis ecclesiae, III, c. 19, M.G.H., SS., XIII, p.
510. Evidently this letter (which is not the same as the one to which ref-
erence was made in the preceding note) was written while Charles the Bald
was in Italy, and certainly before the emperor’s death, for the latter event
is mentioned by Flodoard a little farther on in the same chapter; the letter
probably was composed during the collection of the Danegeld, and may have
contained advice on that subject (cf. swpra, chap. vi, n. 99).
224 APPENDIX I
main agree with the provisions given in the body of the tax
document.** | | |
These various considerations lead me to believe (1) that the
superscription was not part of the original document; (2) that
the superscription was added to the document by some scribe of
a much later period; (3) that the scribe in question did not
possess accurate information concerning the territorial limits
within which the Danegeld was levied; and, consequently, (4)
that the statements of Hincmar in the Annals of St. Bertin are
a much more trustworthy source of information than those of
the scribe in the superscription, both as regards the territory in
which the taxes for the Danegeld were levied and also with
reference to the time and place at which the assessment of these
taxes was prepared.
From what has been said above it follows that if the Annals
of St. Bertin and the superscription of the tax document disagree
as to the time and place at which the taxes were assessed, the
statements of Hincmar ought to be given greater credence. Now
Hinemar, though he does speak of an assembly of bishops at
Compiegne on May 1, fails to mention any meeting there on
May 7. According to Hincmar, there was but one assessment
for this Danegeld and it was prepared at the Assembly of Kiersy
on June 14.1° And belief in Hincmar’s accuracy here, far from
14 Hinemar omits certain details given in the documents, regarding the
levy of the taxes on the mansi and the resources of the priests; and he does
not say anything about the taxation of the merchants, which is mentioned
in document B and in chapter 31 of the Capitulary of Kiersy, but not in
document A (cf. supra, n. 2). On the other hand, Hincmar speaks of a
contribution from the church treasuries, which is not referred to in either
of the tax documents (cf. supra, chap, vi, n. 99); and he alone informs us
that the bishops after collecting the money from the priests were to pay it
over to the missi dominici. The documents, of course, were drawn up for
the specific purpose of furnishing official instruction as to where, how, and
by whom, the Danegeld was to be collected. Hincemar wrote his account
after the Danegeld had been collected, and for historical purposes only;
therefore, he did not consider it necessary to give all the details that ap-
peared in the official documents, though he did think it worth while to give
some additional information as to how the required sum was finally ob-
tained. See also appendix ii.
15 Ann. Bert., 877, p. 135: “Kalendis Mai episcopos Remensis provinciae,
sed et aliarum provinciarum Compendio convocavit, et ecclesiam quam in
eodem oratorio construxerat cum multo apparatu in sua et nunciorum apos-
tolicae sedis praesentia ab eisdem episcopis consecrari fecit. Inde placitum
suum generale Kalendis Iulii habuit, etc.’ (cf. supra, n. 3). Evidently all
the bishops did not reach Compiégne at the appointed time; in any case the
church was not dedicated until May 5 (Bouquet, VIII, 660; Bohmer-Miihl-
bacher, Die Regesten d. Kaiserreichs u. d. Karolingern, no. 1809; cf. Diimm-
ler 41546 21):
APPENDIX I 225
being undermined, is strengthened by the additional evidence
furnished by chapter 30 of the Capitulary of Kiersy.° For while
this does not give the details of the assessment, it proves none
the less that the levying of the Danegeld was one of the important
matters taken up at the Assembly of Kiersy. Nor may we over-
look the significance of that clause in both of the tax documents
which distinguishes those counts and royal vassals who were
to accompany Charles to Italy from those who were to remain
in France. Such a distinction would hardly have been made until
after it had been arranged that some of the fideles were to go
with the emperor, while others were to remain at home. And
this we know was one of the arrangements made at the Assembly
of Kiersy.**’ It is also worth noting that the collection of the
Danegeld evidently did not begin until after the Assembly of
Kiersy ;1* which would be very strange if the assessment had been
prepared and the levy ordered fully six weeks before. Surely
this evidence, direct and indirect, outweighs the very question-
able testimony of the superscription.'®** Indeed it seems there
can be no room for doubt that this Danegeld was assessed at
Kiersy on June 14; and that the old view of an assessment at
Compiégne on May 7, must be discarded.
But, it may be asked, how was the writer of the superscription
led, or rather misled, to believe that the assessment took place
at Compiegne on May 7? My present answer to this question,
and particularly to the last part of it —i. e. the question of how
the date May 7 was obtained — can be only hypothetical and ten-
tative. There were produced during the middle ages a large
number of historical compilations based more or less remotely
on the Annals of St. Bertin, all of which must be studied and
16 M.G.H., LL., Seetio II, t. ii, 361: “Qualiter hoc perficiatur et ad effec-
tum perveniat, quod Nortmannis dari debet de coniecto.”
17 Edictum ... de tributo Nordmannico, A, loc. cit.: “De ecclesiis vero,
quas comites et vassalli dominici habent, seu de illis, qui cum seniore nos-
tro pergere debent, sive qui remanserint, etc.” B, ibid.: ““‘De ecclesiis vero
imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassallorum imperialium, tam de
illis, qui cum imperatore pergent, quam et illis, qui remanserint, ete.” Capi-
tulare Carisiacense, c. 7, ibid., pp. 357-58: “[This is the reply of the assem-
bled jfideles to a point raised by the emperor] in vestra dispositione erit,
qui in isto regno remaneant, vel qui post vos in vestrum adiutorium per-
gant.” Those whom Charles selecied to follow him to Italy are named in
chapter 25 (p. 360). The question of the Danegeld evidently was not dis-
cussed at the assembly until after these other matters had been settled; it
is the subject with which chapter 30 (p. 361) of the capitulary deals.
18 Cf. supra, p. 107 afid n. 97.
19 A very good catalogue, and critical account, of these compilations is
given by Bourgeois in his Le capit. de Kiersy-sur-Oise, pp. 155 ff.
Danegeld. 15.
226 APPENDIX I
collated before anything like a final opinion on this subject can
be formulated. To some of these works I have not yet been able
to obtain access. I venture to believe, however, that careful |
examination of these various compilations will eventually estab-
lish the correctness.of at least the fundamental part of what is
here set forth. |
An erroneous impression as regards the place and date at
which the tribute for the Vikings of the Seine in 877 was
assessed, may easily be acquired from a cursory, uncritical read-
ing of the Annals of St. Bertin. In these annals Hinemar fails,
it is true, to mention any meeting whatsoever on May 7. But he
does state that for May 1 Charles the Bald had summoned an
assembly of bishops to Compiegne, where a church recently con-
structed was then to be dedicated. After having described this
dedication ceremony at Compiégne on the calends of May, Hinc-
mar proceeds at once to speak of the other assembly on June 14,
but without indicating here in any way that this later assembly
met at Kiersy.?° Not until after he has related what took place
at the assembly of June 14, does he give even the slightest inti-
mation that this assembly met at a place other than that at
which (Compiégne) the assembly of the calends of May had met.
Indeed, all he says is that Charles now — i. e. after the assembly
of June 14 — proceeded from Kiersy to Compiégne, and thence
to Soissons, etc.*? Hincmar, accordingly, does not expressly state
that the assembly of June 14 met at Kiersy; this is a fact which
must be inferred from what follows in his narrative. Even a
careful reader of this passage in the Annals of St. Bertin is likely
to gain from it the (erroneous) impression that two assemblies
were held at Compiegne, one on May 1 and the other on June 14.
It must be remembered, moreover, that until the eighteenth
century, the “famous” Capitulary of Kiersy was practically un-
known, and that during the middle ages most of the informa-
tion, or rather misinformation, that was current concerning the
reign of Charles the Bald, was obtained, not from the Annals
of St. Bertin, but from either the Continuation of Aimoin or,
more often, the Grandes chroniques de St. Denis.?? The Con-
tinuation of Aimoin, though often inaccurate, is, so far as that
portion of it which has to do with the dedication of the church
20 See supra, n. 15. a
21 See supra, n. 3; cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
22 For a good discussion of this whole subject, see ibid., 155 ff.; cf. 4 ff.
APPENDIX I 227
at Compiégne and the Assembly of Kiersy is concerned, on the
whole a fairly accurate reproduction of the Annals of St. Bert-
in. But the Grandes chroniques de St. Denis, on the other
hand, are very misleading, as will appear from the following
quotation: ‘““Es Kalendes de May fist assembler concile a Com-
piegne des evesques de la province de Rains et des autres pro-
vinces: si fist dedier l’eglise de S. Cornile, que il avait fondée
en son propre palais, en la presence des prelaz et des messages
Vapostole. La meismes [i. e. at Compiégne] fist-il parlement
de barons; et fu ordené comment Looys ses fiuz governeroit le
roiaume par le conseil des barons jusques a tant que il fust
retornez de Rome; et puis comment il recevroit le treu de l’une
des parties du roiaume de France, qui estoit accostumez a rendre
avant la mort le roi Lothaire, et du roiaume de Borgoigne. .. .
Ces choses ensi ordenées, li empereres se parti de Compiegne**
et s’en ala a Soissons, de Soissons a Rains, etc.’’”°
When one stops to reflect upon the meager facilities which
the writer of the superscription had to learn the truth — and
his abundant opportunity to secure misinformation — with
reference to the occasion at which the assessment of the Dane-
geld was prepared, the wonder is, not that this well-intentioned
individual committed the errors he did, but that he failed to
commit more. ‘Knowledge of the fact that an important assem-
bly had convened at Kiersy in the year 877 could never have
been gained from a reading of the Grandes chroniques de St.
Denis, where it is not even hinted at. And it will perhaps be
agreed that even the most lynx-eyed of modern scholars would
hardly be able to detect either in the Continuation of Aimoin
or in the Annals of St. Bertin the obscure implication that the
assembly of June 14 met at Kiersy, wnless he were already
acquainted with that fact. The scholar with a previous knowl-
edge of the Assembly of Kiersy will doubtless find both in the
Annals of St. Bertin and in the Continuation of Aimoin con-
firmation of what he already knows. But it may be safely
23 The Continuation of Aimoin, it is true, has Kal. Junii where the An-
nals of St. Bertin have Kal. Iulii. See supra, n. 3, and cf. Bourgeois, op. cit.,
158. One manuscript, however, of the Annals of St. Bertin (see ed. Waitz,
p. 135, note b; ed. Dehaisnes, p. 255, note 1) also has Kal. Iuniis (or Junit).
24 Here the redactor, by omitting Kiersy (cf. supra, n. 3), perhaps at-
tempted to rectify what he may have regarded as an error in the Annals of
St. Bertin or in the Continuation of Aimoin.
25 Bouquet, VII, 146. Cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., 159.
228 APPENDIX I
asserted that a person not in possession of this information would
never, by reading any or all of these narrative accounts, become
aware that the assembly at which the Danegeld was assessed
met at Kiersy; such a reader would, like the redactor of the
Grandes chromques de St. Denis and the writer of the super-
scription, inevitably draw the conclusion that this assembly had
met at Compiégne.
With reference to the date of the assembly at which the
Danegeld was assessed, the three narratives vary widely: ac-
cording to the Grandes chroniques it was es Kalendes de May;*°
according to the Continuation of Aimoin, Kalendas Junti; and
according to the Annals of St. Bertin, Kalendis Iulw.* Yet
none of these dates agree with that given in the superscription:
Nonis Maii.2® Whence or how the latter date was obtained, can
for the present be only conjectured. So far as my observations
go, the nones of May (May 7) are not given, as the date of the
preparation of the assessment, in any source except the super-
scription of the tax document.*® If the writer of the superscrip-
tion, like the redactor of the Grandes chroniques de St. Denis,
was under the impression that the tribute was assessed at Com-
piegne on the calends of May,*° then obviously the word Nonis
in the superscription is simply a clerical error — committed
either by the original writer or by some later copyist — for
Kalendis. It is also possible, though in my opinion unlikely,
that the author of the superscription, in writing Nonis, was
attempting to rectify what he may have regarded as a mistake
on the part of the Continuator of Aimoin. According to the
latter, as we have seen, the taxes were assessed, not Kalendis
26 That must have been the belief of the redactor of the Grandes chro-
niques de St. Denis, for he does not indicate that there was any interval
between the dedication of the church and the parlement de barons (see the
quotation on the preceding page). Bourgeois (op. cit., 159) is not quite
accurate when he says that this redactor (a monk of St. Denis) confused
the assembly held at Kiersy in June with that held at Compiégne in April;
he did not confuse it with an assembly held at Compiégne in April.
but with the one which met there on May 1, or rather, May 5 (cf. supra,
Tato):
27 See supra, n. 238.
28 See supra, n. 2.
29 Nor have I, as yet, found it applied anywhere to the dedication of the
church at Compiégne (which really took place on May 5; see supra, n. 15),
or to the Assembly of Kiersy. It is not impossible, however, that further
research on this point, in the sources referred to supra, p. 225 and n. 19, may
yield results.
SUsk Le SUPT, N. 20;
APPENDIX I 229
Iulii as Hinemar says, but Kalendas Junii: i. e., if we accept the
interpretations of Pertz and Fustel de Coulanges — mutatis
mutandis — May 14.2: But two weeks — from the dedication
of the church on May 1 to the preparation of the assessment
on May 14 — may have seemed tothe writer of the superscrip-
tion too long a time for a placitum to be in session; and, accord-
ingly, he may have substituted, as the date of the assessment,
Nonis Mai for Kalendas Juni, since the first of these dates
would better comport with the usual duration of an assembly.
To conclude: If Hinemar is right in indicating that the
assessment of the tribute for the Vikings of the Seine was
prepared at Kiersy on June 14 — and if what has been above
set forth be accepted as a sound argument, there remains nc
valid reason for doubting the truth of Hincmar’s testimony
on this point—then it follows that the two tax documents
which heretofore have been referred to as the Hdict of Com-
piegne Concerning the Tribute to the Northmen,*? must in the
future be regarded as part of, or at least as having a close con-
nection with chapter 30 of the Capitulary of Kiersy.** More-
over, the fact that the details of the assessment as given in the
two tax documents essentially agree with the details as given
by Hinemar in the Annals of St. Bertin,** is a further indication
that these documents in their original form were drawn up at
the Assembly of Kiersy on June 14, and, consequently, that the
assessment of this Danegeld took place there and then,** but not
at Compiegne on May 7.
Sie Cf Supra, nn. 23; - 3.
32 See M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, 353-54, where the two documents are
classified respectively as A and B (cf. supra, n. 2).
33 Cf. supra, n. 16, and see appendix ii. Though no longer extant, there
were doubtless many other documents which, like the two tax documents
above referred to, served to fill out such chapters in the Capitulary of Kiersy
as have come down to us only in the form of a title or a summary (cf.
Halphen, “A propos du capitulaire de Quierzy-sur-Oise,’ Rev. Hist., 1911,
CVI, 288, 294).
34 Cf. supra, n. 14.
35 The preamble of the document known as Capitula excerpta in con-
ventu Carisiacensi coram populo lecta (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, 361) is
in accord with the view presented above: “XVI Kalendas praedicti mensis,
d. imperator Karolus adnuntiavit generaliter in populam de suo itinere
Roman et... quia ordinatum habebat, quomodo Nortmanni de isto regno
expellantur et postea defendantur, ete.’ This announcement referred, of
course, to the measures just completed at Kiersy.
APPENDIX II.
THE ‘Two Tax DOCUMENTS OF 877 AND THE CAPITULARY
OF KIERSY.
Attention has been directed several times in the preceding
pages to two tax documents, designated respectively as A and B,
and containing provisions for the assessment of the Danegeld
due the Vikings of the Seine in 877.1. These documents were,
so far as I can tell, first published by Sirmond in 1623.2. Un-
fortunately, however, Sirmond did not indicate whence he had
obtained them. The manuscript to which he presumably had
access is now probably lost; in any case it has escaped the ex-
ploratory efforts of all later editors, including Krause.* These
have, consequently, been obliged simply to reprint the documents
in the form in which they were originally published by Sirmond.*
Obviously, therefore, textual criticism is here out of question;
we must be content to study these documents in the only form
in which they now exist or are accessible.
Concerning the date of the two documents little need be said
here. The error of Sirmond, Pertz, and others, in referring
document A to the Danegeld of 861,° was long ago made evident.®
1 Cf. supra, p. 97 and n. 33; and see appendix i.
2 Sirmond, Capitula Caroli Calvi et successorum aliquot Franciae regum,
pp. 421 ff.
3 See M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 353, lines 14-15.
4 The text of the documents as given by Krause, the latest editor, is
quoted infra, n. 9. Cf. Duchesne, Historiae Francorum scriptores [1636],
II, pp. 460-61; Baluze, Capitularia regum Francorum [1677; ed. de Chiniac,
1780], II, pp. 257-58; Bouquet, VII, 697; Pertz, M.G.H., LL., I, 476, 536. In
all these editions the text of the documents is identical, save for certain
variations in punctuation and capitalization.
5 Dummler (III, 42, n. 1) and Krause (M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. ii, 353,
lines 16 ff.) are unquestionably wrong in making Pertz (M.G.H., LL., I, 476)
the author of this error. It was Sirmond who, in a note to his edition of
the Capitula (cf. supra, n. 2), first ascribed document A to the year 861.
Sirmond’s note was quoted by Baluze (II, p. 806) and Bouquet (VII, 697,
note a); a fact which makes the oversight on the part of Dtimmler and
Krause the more surprising.
6 See the references to Diimmler and Krause in the preceding note.
APPENDIX II ewer: WI
Perhaps no scholar familiar with the history of the ninth cen-
tury would now venture to deny that each of the documents
contains a draft of an assessment drawn up in 877 for the pur-
pose of raising the tribute then due the Northmen of the Seine.’
But unless the argument which I have set forth in the preceding
appendix is utterly false and misleading, this assessment was
prepared, not at Compiegne on May 7 as most recent scholars
have concluded, but at the Assembly of Kiersy on June 14.
Accordingly there must have been a very close connection be-
tween the two tax documents and that part (chapter 30) of the
Capitulary of Kiersy which has to do with the Danegeld.®
But what is the relation of these two tax documents to each
other?? Comparing them, we note at once that the language
7 von Noorden (Hinkmar, 334, n. 6, 335) argued that document A con-
tained the assessment levied in Neustria (in 877) to raise the Danegeld for
the Northmen of the Loire (cf... supra, pp. 67, 71). But Dummler (loc. cit.)
correctly signalized this as an unwarranted assumption.
8 Cf. supra, p. 229 and n. 33. The question as to whether chapter 31 of
the Capitulary of Kiersy has reference to the Danegeld is discussed infra,
pp. 233 ff.
9 For the superscriptions of the documents, see supra, appendix i, n. 2.
These superscriptions, which differ on several points, are of no value in
attempting to establish the relations of the documents to each other. It has
already been pointed out (cf. supra, appendix i) that the superscription of
B was added at a later period, and that it is inaccurate and misleading.
The superscription of A, while correct so far as it goes, is very vague; the
tenses of its verbs clearly indicate that it was written long after the docu-
ment proper (cf. supra, p. 222 f.). The following is the text of the documents
as given by Krause. A (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 354): “Unusquisque
episcopus, qui habet abbatiam, aut abbas, qui similiter habet abbatiam, aut
comes, qui aeque habet abbatiam, de suo manso indominicato similiterque
et de vassallorum accipiat de manso indominicato denarios duodecim, de
manso ingenuili quatuor denarios de censu dominicato et quatuor de sua
facultate, de servili vero duos denarios de censu et de sua facultate duos.
De omnibus vero ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus vel abbas de sua solum-
modo potestate accipiant de presbyteris a quocumque plurimum solidos quin-
que et de unoquoque iuxta quod possibile fuerit, ita ut a quo plurimum
quinque solidos, a quo minimum quatuor denarios. De ecclesiis vero, quas
comites et vassalli dominici habent, seu de illis, qui cum seniore nostro per-
gere debent, sive qui remanserint, episcopus, in cuius parrochia consistunt,
secundum praetaxatum modum accipere procurabit. De ecclesiis vero im-
peratricis episcopus similiter accipiet praetaxato modo.” B (ibid.): “Epis-
copi, abbates, comites ac vassi dominici ex suis honoribus de unoquoque
- Manso indominicato donent denarios duodecim, de manso ingenuili quatuor
denarios. De ecclesiis vero imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassal-
vero manso duos denarios de censu indominicato et duos de facultate man-
suarii. De omnibus vero ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus de suo episcopatu
vel abbas de sua solummodo abbatia, in cuiuscumque episcopi sint parro-
chia, accipiant cum misso episcopi, in cuius parrochia sunt, de presbyteris
secundum possibilitatem quinque solidos vel quatuor vel tres vel duos vel
unum solidum; a quo plurimum quinque solidos, a quo minimum quatuor
denarios. De ecclesiis vero imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassal-
lorum imperialium, tam de illis, qui cum imperatore pergent, quam et illis,
ribs be APPENDIX II
of B is somewhat clearer and more concise than that of A. And
while the provisions of the one in the main coincide with those
of the other, yet they are not identical. The taxation provided
for in B is more comprehensive than that contemplated in A.
According to A, only mansi appertaining to monasteries were
taxed, and apparently not all of these, for the document men-
tions only the monasteries held by bishops, abbots, and counts,
but not those held by royal vassals; while according to B taxes
were due from royal vassals as well as bishops, abbots, and
counts, and they were due for the mansi of all their honores,
which included not only monastery lands but all lands given by
the king in benefice.t° B requires all priests, including those
attached to churches held by the emperor, to pay a tax; and it
has a clause (at the very end) which prescribes a contribution
from merchants and townsmen. In A there is no mention either
of the priests of imperial churches or of merchants and towns-
men. The provision in B, that when an abbot collects the taxes
from the priests under his jurisdiction he must do so in con-
junction with the missus of the bishop of the diocese, is also
lacking in A.
It would be very anomalous if the more comprehensive and
more detailed document (B) had preceded the other (A). We
must assume, on the contrary, that B is a revised version of A.
This, it may be noted, was also the view of Diimmler, who
characterized A as “nur ein Entwurf, der, als nicht um-
fassend genug, dem andern weichen musste.”"t Krause, though
he accepts this view, adds that the words “cum seniore nostro”
indicate, in his opinion, that this document was drawn up by
the magnates.’? I cannot convince myself of that. Royal offi-
cials may very well, in drawing up a preliminary draft, have
used such an expression. Moreover, it must be remembered that
chapter 30 of the Capitulary of Kiersy — to which, in my opin-
ion, both documents owe their origin’® — dealt with one of those
qui remanserint, episcopus, in cuius parrochia consistunt, secundum prae-
dictum modum coniectum accipiat. De negotiatoribus autem vel qui in
civitatibus commanent iuxta possibilitatem, secundum quod habuerint de
facultatibus, coniectus exigatur.”
10-Cfsipra;-chap: v, n. 138.
11 Dummler, loc. cit.
12 M.GH.,-LL. Sectio il, .t. ii, p. 353, lines. 22 ff,
13 See the preceding page and n. 8.
APPENDIX II 233
questions on which the assembled fideles did not give their
opinion.‘
These various facts and considerations appear from my point
of view to justify the following hypothesis: (1) both tax doc-
uments were drawn up by the king’s officials at the Assembly
of Kiersy on June 14, and were intended to be inserted into
chapter 30 of the Capitulary of Kiersy — a chapter which, in
the version we have, consists merely of the following topical
statement: “Qualiter hoc perficiatur et ad effectum perveniat,
quod Nortmannis dari debet de coniecto”’ ;* (2) document A was
written first, but was, after some deliberation by the king and
his officials, declared inadequate and therefore discarded; (3)
a new document, B, more comprehensive in scope, was then
drawn up; this was regarded as sufficient for the purpose, and
therefore became part of the Capitulary of Kiersy in its final
and completed: form.
Something remains to be said with reference to the second
clause in chapter 31 of the Capitulary of Kiersy: “Et de cappis
et aliis negotiatoribus, videlicet ut Iudaei dent decimam et nego-
tiatores christiani undecimam.’® It is of considerable import-
ance to determine whether this clause deals with the same sub-
ject and the same persons as the following sentence at the end
of document B: “De negotiatoribus autem vel qui in civitatibus
commanent iuxta possibilitatem, secundum quod habuerint de
facultatibus, coniectus exigatur.’*? We know that document PB
refers to the Danegeld, but does chapter 31 of the Capitulary
of Kiersy also refer to the Danegeld? That we do not know.
Chapter 31 of the Capitulary contains two clauses, the first of
which is concerned with the honores of Boso and others, the
second with a tax on merchants.'® Bourgeois'® assumes that the
tax on the merchants must have been for the purposes of the
Danegeld, and then concludes that the first clause, which refers
14 M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 358, lines 30-31. Cf. Bourgeois, Le capit.
de Kiersy-sur-Oise, 27-68; Halphen, “A propos du capitulaire de Quierzy-sur-
Oise,” Rev. Hist., 1911, CVI, 287-88, 294.
15 M.G.H.. LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 361. See supra, appendix i, n. 33, and cf.
Fustel de Coulanges, Nowvelles recherches, 434-35.
16 Capilulare Carisiacense, c. 31 (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 361): “De
honoribus Bosonis, Bernardi et Widonis et aliorum illarum partium. Et de
cappis et aliis negotiatoribus, videlicet ut Iudaei dent decimam et negotia-
tores christiani undecimam.”
17 Cf. supra, n. 9.
18 Cf. supra, n. 16.
1LS.0ne citi, -p.. 82.
234 APPENDIX II
to the honores of Boso et al., must have had a similar purport.
The correctness of this conclusion may be questioned. In the
first place, it need not be assumed that there was any connection |
between the raising of the Danegeld and the question of the
honores of Boso and his associates. Charles may well have had
other reasons for considering the latter question, reasons that
grew out of the mounting ambition and the recent activities of
Boso; he may have wished to take precautions against the ac-
cumulation of too much power in the hands of vassals whose
good faith there was reason to suspect.”° In the second place,
it is very strange that the clause concerning the merchants,
if it really refers to the Danegeld, was not included in chapter
30, which was devoted to that subject. We cannot suppose that
in the case of Boso and his associates there was a closer con-
nection with merchants than there was in the case of the other
magnates. These considerations lead me to believe (1) that
there is no connection whatever between the first and second
_ clauses in chapter 31 of the Capitulary of Kiersy; and (2) that
the second clause, which refers to a tax on merchants, was not
originally part of chapter 31, but was wrongly inserted there
by some scribe at a later time. Whether or not this second clause
refers to the Danegeld, cannot be definitely determined. If it
does, then it certainly belongs with chapter 30, just as the two
tax documents above referred to. In that case, furthermore,
this clause must be regarded as a revision and amendment of
the last sentence in document B, for that does not specify the
exact rate of taxation in the case of the merchants; it merely
20 Cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., pp. 83 ff. The fact that Boso is referred to as
carissimus Dux noster in a diploma issued by Charles at Besancon on August
11 (Bouquet, VIII, 672-3), does not necessarily invalidate the assumption that
at the Assembly of Kiersy Charles had considered the advisability of reducing
the number of honores held by Boso and some other powerful vassals. We
know that soon after Charles had reached Italy, Boso and his associates entered
into open revolt against the emperor (Ann. Bert., 877, p. 136). Boso was
not present at the Assembly of Kiersy, (Bouquet, IX, 255), and very likely
his relations with Charles had been strained since the spring. At most, the
mention of Boso in the diploma of August 11 indicates a temporary, and
probably only an apparent, reconciliation. Seeman (Boso von Niederbur-
gund, 37-43) apparently takes the view that Charles the Bald did not sur-
mise any danger of revolt on the part of Boso until after he had reached
Italy, and after the vassals had refused to come to his aid against Karlmann.
In that case, it must be assumed that Charles at the Assembly of Kiersy
raised the question of Boso’s honores for other reasons than those suggested
above. Even so, however, there is nothing which proves a connection be-
tween that question and the levy of the Danegeld; it seems to me that the
reasoning which leads Bourgeois to this conclusion really has for its prin-
cipal basis the rather dangerous argument post ergo propter.
APPENDIX II | 235
provides for a tax according to fortune. But no positive state-
ment can be made on this point. The clause may not refer to
the Danegeld at all. The taxation of merchants, Christian as
well as Jewish, was certainly not limited to occasions when
Danegeld had to be raised.** It is even possible that originally
this clause had no relation whatever to the Capitulary of Kiersy.
But how did the clause in question come to find a place in
chapter 31 of the Capitulary? To this only a hypothetical an-
swer can be suggested, for the original manuscript of the
Capitulary of Kiersy is no longer in existence.** In medieval
manuscripts marginal notes, or glosses, are matters of very
frequent occurrence. It is not at all impossible that what now
constitutes the second clause in chapter 31, was originally only
a marginal gloss inserted by some scribe who knew or assumed
that what he wrote pertained to the assessment of the Dane-
geld.2*?> Now, it is well known that in the process of copying
manuscripts scribes often incorporated glosses into the body
of the text to which the glosses referred.** In this case, a gloss,
applying to chapter 30, and written in the margin opposite that
chapter, which is very brief, would probably have extended far
enough down the page so as to be opposite chapter 31 as well
as chapter 30.*° A later scribe may, out of ignorance or care-
lessness or both, easily have incorporated with chapter 31 what
originally was a gloss applying to chapter 30.°°
21 See Waitz, D. Verfassungsgesch., IV, 44-45.
22 Bourgeois, op. cit., p. 11. At least that part of the manuscript which
contained the text of the Capitulary has been lost.
23 According to Falke (Die Geschichte des deutschen Handels, p. 36),
merchants were taxed regularly, and not only for the Danegeld, at the rate
of one tenth for Jews and one eleventh for Christians. He seems to indicate
that these rates of assessment had applied at least as early as the reign of
Louis the Pious. If this opinion were correct, any official would have
known the rates at which merchants were taxed, and the clause in document
B covering this point would have been quite sufficient for its purpose, even
though it did not give the specific rates. Unfortunately, Falke does not
support his statement by any reference to the sources, and it is probably
an unwarranted generalization based only on the arrangement for 877. Cf.
MICE I tle 2UV et ba0,: Nos d.
24 Cf. Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode, ed. 1903, p. 348.
25 This was called to my attention by Professor J. W. Thompson, of the
University of Chicago.
26 For a somewhat similar hypothesis, applying to chapter 25 of the Ca-
pitulary of Kiersy, see Halphen, op. cit., p. 293, n. 3.
APPENDIX ITI.
THE DANEGELD IN FRISIA.
The payment of tribute to the Vikings, which is a character-
istic feature of the history of the ninth and tenth centuries both
in the West Frankish kingdom and in England, appears to have
had its origin in Frisia during the later period of the reign of
Charlemagne. Between the years 810 and 852, there have been
recorded five different instances of the exaction of Danegeld
from the Frisians.
In 810, while Charlemagne was tarrying at Aachen meditating
on an expedition against King Godfrey of Denmark, news was
brought him that a Danish fleet numbering two hundred vessels
had landed in Frisia. The report went on to state that the
Vikings, after having ravaged all the islands adjacent to the
Frisian coast, had transported themselves over to the mainland,
where they had defeated the Frisians in three successive engage-
ments. Complete masters of the situation, the Vikings had then
imposed a tribute on the conquered. Concerning the amount of
this tribute we know only that when Charles was informed of the
Viking raid, the Frisians had already liquidated the sum of
100 pounds of silver.t. This amount they had raised apparently
by taxation.”
The next levies of Danegeld in Frisia took place during the
later years of the reign of Louis the Pious, in 836 and 837
respectively. In the former year the Northmen are said, after
having set fire to Antwerp and the emporium of Witla, to have
1 Hinhard, Annales, 810, M.G.H., SS., I, 197; Annales Maximiniani, 810,
ibid., XIII, 24; Annales Mettenses, 810, Duchesne, Hist. Franc. scriptores,
III, 295; Poeta Saxo, V, lines 403-4, M.G.H., SS., I, 274; Einhard, Vita Karoli,
cee. 14, 17, ed. Garrod and Mowat, pp. 16, 20.
2 Hinhard, Ann., loc. cit.: “Danosque victores tributum victis inposuisse,
et vectigalis nomine centum libras argenti a Frisionibus iam esse solutas.”
APPENDIX III Zot
accepted tribute from the Frisians. The amount of this tribute
is not indicated.*
In 837 Vikings were able, by reason of the unpreparedness
or disloyalty of the Frisians, to effect a landing on the island
of Walcheren. Several counts and other magnates were put
to death, while others were taken prisoner and held for ransom.
Then the invaders exacted tribute, or census, as they pleased;
they are said to have obtained an infinite amount of money of
diverse kinds. Proceeding on to the mainland, the Vikings de-
vastated Dorstadt in the same year, and received more tribute
from the Frisians of that region.‘
In 846 — the year following that in which Ragnar secured
the first Danegeld in the West Frankish kingdom — when Frisia
was included in the realm of Lothaire I, the Northmen, we are
informed, made themselves masters of almost the entire prov-
ince and collected as much census there as they desired. Lo-
thaire, though fully aware of the outrage, was powerless either
to prevent or to avenge it; and so the Vikings, having filled their
vessels with booty and with captives, sailed away unmolested.°®
The last Danegeld recorded for Frisia was exacted in 852.°
In that year the Northmen arrived in a fleet numbering 252
ships. Large demands were made on the Frisians, who evidently
paid or produced what was required of them. Whereupon the
invaders lifted anchor and proceeded elsewhere.’
None of these payments, it will be noted, had been sanctioned
by the ruler who at the time was vested with sovereign authority
in Frisia. In that respect the Frisian Danegeld differs both
from the West Frankish and the English Danegelds, which,
whether tributary or stipendiary, were always paid by, or in
3 Ann. Fuldenses, 836, ed. Kurze, p. 27. For the location of Witla, see
Vogel, 70, n. 4.
£A°Ann. Fuld... 837,: p. 28; Ann. Bert., 837, p. 13; Ann. Xantenses,-3a1,
M.G.H., SS., II, 226; Thegan, Vita Hludovici imperatoris, ibid., 604.
5 Ann. Bert., 846, p. 33; Ann. Xant., 846, loc. cit., 228.
6 In 873 the Viking leader Rodulf, through his envoys, demanded tribute
from the population of the Ostergau. The demand, however, was refused
by the Frisians, who declared they paid taxes only to their king, Louis the
German, and his sons. In the hostilities which followed, Rodulf was killed
and his forces were defeated. See Ann. Fuld., 873, loc. cit., p. 80; Ann.
Xant., 873, loc. cit., 219; Ann. Bert., 873, p. 124. Cf. Vogel, 244 ff. On Dudo’s
improbable statement (De moribus et actis primorum Normanniae ducum,
II, cc. 8-10, ed. Lair, pp. 148-50) that Frisia was by Rollo subjected to pay-
ment of tribute, see Vogel, p. 279.
7 Ann. Bert., 852, p. 41; ef. Miracula sancti Bavonis, Bouquet, VII, p. 153,
note a.
possible
whence -
these tri
to
‘b
he
oi
Be
APPENDIX IV.
"THE DANEGELD IN LORRAINE AND THE EAST FRANKISH
KINGDOM.
Only one Danegeld has been recorded for the kingdom of
Lorraine as such. It was raised in the year 864 by Lothaire II,
who for this purpose exacted 4 denarii from every mansus in his
whole realm. The entire sum of denarii (what this amounted
to is not indicated) was paid, as a stipendiary Danegeld it is
said, to the Northman Rodulf and his men.‘ In addition to the
money, the Vikings received also a number of cattle and large
quantities of flour, wine, and beer.’
Doubtless Lothaire was here following the example set by
Charles the Bald,* who, it will be remembered, in 860 had for a
similar consideration engaged the Vikings under Weland to
expel another group of Northmen established on the island
of Oscellus in the Seine.t But why Lothaire had found it neces-
sary to resort to this measure is not made clear; nor do we
learn of any services rendered by the Vikings in return for the
stipend they had received.°
* ok * *
In 882, several years after eastern Lorraine had by the treaty
of Mersen been annexed to the East Frankish kingdom, Emperor
Charles the Fat paid Danegeld to the Vikings encamped at Elsloo
1 Ann. Bert., 864, p. 67: “Hlotharius, Hlotharii filius, de omni regno suo
quattuor denarios ex omni manso colligens, summam denariorum cum
multa pensione farinae atque pecorum necnon vini ac sicerae Rodulfo Nor-
manno, Herioldi filio, ac suis locarii nomine tribuit.”
2 The word sicera (see the preceding note) is by Richter (Annalen des
friinkischen Reichs im Zeitalter der Karolinger, II, 398, note a) said to mean
“beer”: Vogel, p. 196, translates it “sherbet” (an intoxicating drink); Du-
cange (Glossarium, s. v.), after indicating that the term, which is of Hebrew
origin, was applied to any intoxicating drink except wine, explains how
sicera was brewed.
3 Cf. Diimmler, II, 76.
4 See supra, pp. 48 ff.
5 Vogel (loc. cit.) scouts the idea that this payment was a stipend and
maintains it was pure tribute.
240 APPENDIX IV
on the Meuse. The circumstances leading up to this payment
are of sufficient interest and importance to be set forth in some
detail.®
The first half of the year 882 was, with respect to the incur-
sions of the Northmen, undoubtedly one of the most critical
periods in the history of the East Frankish kingdom. Under
the leadership of the two “kings” Godfrey and Siegfried, and
of the two princes Vurm and Hals, the Scandinavian invaders |
had plundered, burned, and laid waste virtually every place of
importance in the territory comprising the valleys of the lower
Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt. From the entire region most
of the inhabitants, and in particular the monks and the clergy,
had fled before the devastation of the Northmen.’
Though several attempts were made by the East Franks to
check the enemy, they were all unsuccessful. To cap the climax,
Louis the Younger, who was the stronger and abler of the two
surviving sons of Louis the German, passed away on January
20, 882. The news of his death served only to increase the
audacity of the pagans, who now ascended the Rhine to plunder
Coblenz, and made a feint on Mainz. They proceeded still
6 The principal sources for the events to be here described are the third
and fourth portions of the Annals of Fulda, Regino’s Chronicle, the Annals
of St. Bertin, and the Annals of St. Vaast, to which may be added Helmold’s
Chronicles of the Slavs, though the latter is not contemporary. The third
part of the Annals of Fulda (Mogontiacensis), written by Meginhard,
breathes hostility not only to Charles the Fat, but also to the principal ad-
visers of the latter, in particular to Liutward, the archchaplain of the em-
peror and bishop of Vercellae, and to Count Wigbert, of whose position and
career we know very little. (He may have been a vassal of Hugo, the son
of Lothaire II. Hugo certainly had a vassal by that name, whom he later
put to death.—Regino, ed. Kurze, pp. 120-21; cf. Dummler, III, 202, n. 2.)
Perhaps partly on account of hostility to the emperor and the latter’s en-
tourage, and partly for other reasons, Meginhard expresses a very strong
disapproval of the.manner in which Charles dealt wih the Northmen. The
Continuatio Ratisbonensis of the Annals of Fulda seems to have been writ-
ten by a supporter of Charles and his policy. The value of each of these
narratives, therefore, must be discounted in proportion to its author’s an-
tipathies or sympathies. Regino does not attempt to pass judgment on
Charles the Fat and his policy, but it is clear that he was not satisfied with
the results of that policy (‘“‘conatus eius parum effectum obtinuit’—882, p.
119). Hinemar, the author of that part of the Annals of St. Bertin with
which we are here concerned, may have lacked complete information on
what was actually done at this time; he is inclined to regard Charles as a
coward. The author of the Annals of St. Vaast gives merely the main facts _
in the case and does not in any way reveal his own attitude toward the
emperor and his policy. Helmold, writing almost three centuries after the
events he describes, is somewhat inaccurate, and wishes to emphasize the
inertia and foolishness of Charles.
7 On this and the following, cf. Vogel, 281 ff.
APPENDIX IV 241
farther up the Moselle, attacked Treves, and even threatened
Metz, in the heart of upper Lorraine.
The only remaining son of Louis the German, Charles the Fat,
was absent in Italy, whither he had gone to accept from the
pope the imperial crown. Messengers despatched to Charles
apprised him of the danger to which his realm was exposed, and
urged him to hasten northward to defend his German subjects
against the ravages of the Vikings. The emperor, indeed, lost
no time in returning. In May he held a general assembly at
Worms, where all the vassals of the East Frankish realm swore
him allegiance. At the same assembly measures were devised
for the expulsion of the Northmen, who in the meantime had
established themselves in a fortified camp at Elsloo on the Meuse,
just below Maastricht.
In June or early in July was mobilized an immense army, in-
cluding contingents from all the German stems within the realm
of Charles. This force proceeded northward in two columns,
one on each side of the Rhine, to Andernach, where the columns
were united. From Andernach a detachment of Bavarians and
Franks, under Arnulf of Carinthia and Henry of Saxony re-
spectively, was sent forward to attack, and to capture if possible,
those Northmen who might be found outside the fortifications
of Elsloo. Though this preliminary maneuver was for some
reason unsuccessful, the men engaged in it were able to rejoin
the main army without having suffered serious losses.*®
Thereupon Charles at once advanced with his entire army
to Elsloo, laid siege to the Viking camp, and invested it for a
neriod of twelve days in the month of July. On July 21 a very
severe hailstorm wrought havoc among both besiegers and be-
sieged, causing the death of many men and animals in both
camps. This may have discouraged the emperor and some of
the Franks, who very probably regarded the storm as evidence
of divine wrath — God would punish the sins of his people
8 This episode is mentioned only in the Cont. Ratisb. of the Annals of
Fulda, the author of which attributes the failure of the movement to treach-
ery on the part of certain Franks who, according to current rumor, had been
bribed. Vogel (p. 289, p. 290, n. 1; cf. pp. 293, 294) brands this rumor as
false and ascribes the failure to the watchfulness of the Scandinavian spies.
Danegeld. 17.
242 APPENDIX IV
by refusing to grant them victory over their enemies.” At. all
events Charles was induced to enter into negotiations with the
Northmen immediately or soon after the storm.
The initiative to these negotiations had, I believe, been taken
by the Northmen,'and in particular by Godfrey, their most
distinguished and most powerful leader.*° It was certainly an
opportune moment for a move of this kind, in view of the pre-
vailing discouragement among the Franks, resulting from the
effects of the storm. But Godfrey was probably too sagacious
to rely exclusively on his opponents’ dejected state of mind
for the success of his enterprise. He seems to have secured
the intervention in his behalf of at least two men who stood
close to the emperor, namely Bishop Liutward and Count Wig-
bert. In any case, these men were later accused by their enemies
of having accepted bribes from the Northmen; an accusation
the truth of which may of course be challenged, but which carn-
not be definitely proved false.
After it had been arranged that the Franks were to furnish
9 Though the storm is mentioned only by the author of the Cont. Ratisb.,
p. 108, there is no reason to doubt the truth of his statement. Regino tells
us (p. 119) that the great effort of Charles to expel the Northmen met with
little success, “indignatione caelesti super populum christianam religionem
profanantem deseviente.” Hincmar, after having mentioned the arrival of
Charles before the Viking camp, says significantly (Ann. Bert., p. 153):
“concidit cor: eius.’”’ What we know in general of the character and courage
of Charles the Fat, certainly lends color to the theory that it was this storm
and its results, interpreted as an adverse sign from heaven, which, in part
at least, undermined the earlier confidence of the emperor in the ability of
his army to overcome the Northmen (cf. Dimmler, III, 201, n. 6). Besides
it must be remembered that the statement in Part III of the Annals of Fulda
(p. 98) to the effect that the Northmen were at their last gasp, terror
stricken, and despairing of their lives, is no doubt an exaggeration, the pur-
pose of which was to belittle Charles and to emphasize his cowardice. In
any case, Charles had at the time no means of ascertaining actual condi-
tions among the Northmen. The Viking army was perhaps numerically
inferior to the Frankish, but still it was a very large army. On its fighting
qualities it is not necessary again to expatiate. On the other hand, it is
very doubtful ‘that the Frankish investment of Elsloo was. complete; the
Vikings may have been able to avail themselves of their ships on the Meuse.
On this see Vogel, p. 290, n. 3, p. 291, n. 3.
10 The Annals of St. Bertin, Regino, and the Cont. Ratisb. give no definite
information as to whether it was the Northmen or the Franks that first
suggested negotiation. But Part III of the Annals of Fulda gives us to under-
stand that the initiative came from the Vikings, who had bribed Bishop
Liutward and Count Wigbert to suggest to the emperor that he desist from
the siege and enter into negotiations with Godfrey. The Annals of St. Vaast
also indicate that it was Godfrey who first began to negotiate.
Danegeld. 16.
| t]
WY i} }
APPENDIX IV P43, |
hostages to the Northmen, Godfrey'' went to meet the emperor
at a place some six miles distant from Elsloo. The Viking
/ leader offered to cease plundering the East Frankish kingdom
- during the lifetime of Charles, and to become a Christian and
accept baptism,'? on condition (1) that he be invested with the
counties and fiefs in Frisia which had formerly been held by
“ his countryman Rorich; (2) that Gisla, the daughter of Lothaire
2 . II, be given him in marriage;'* and (3) that his fellow Norse-
man Siegfried (and also Vurm and Hals?) be paid a sum of
money amounting to 2,412 or 2,080 pounds of gold and silver.
These terms were accepted by Charles, probably at the sugges-
tion of his advisers, Liutward and Wigbert in particular.
}
Charles the Fat has been severely criticized, by his contem-
poraries and by modern historians alike, for what they call his
pusillanimity in dealing with the Northmen on this occasion."
Almost all those who have written on the subject are of the
opinion that it was the manifest duty of Charles to annihilate
the invaders by pressing the siege operations, or by forcing them
to engage in a battle the outcome of which, it is assumed, could
11 The statement in the Cont. Ratisb. that it was Siegfried, not Godfrey,
who went to confer with Charles, appears to be an error (Dtmmler, III, 203,
b n. 2; Vogel, 291, n. 6, 292, n. 2). I believe the error should be attributed to
the original annalist rather than some later copyist; for in the enumeration
of the various Viking leaders a few lines before, Siegfried is mentioned first
and Godfrey second, which almost proves that in the mind of the annalist
Siegfried was manu validior. But since all the other sources agree in stat-
ing that the treaty was made with Godfrey, not with Siegfried, we must
conclude that the author of the Cont. Ratisb. was misinformed on this point.
12 On the baptism of Godfrey, see Dummler, III, 203, n. 1.
13 This marriage alliance is not mentioned at all by Hinemar (Vogel’s
assertion, p. 292, n. 2, to the contrary notwithstanding) nor in Part III of
the Annals of Fulda. The author of the Cont. Ratisb. states that it took
place in the following year. Regino and the author of the Annals of St.
Vaast, however, give it as one of the conditions on which Godfrey agreed
to become a Christian in 882. DuUmmler and Vogel, using the argument ex
silentio, conclude that Regino and the author of the Annals of St. Vaast in
some inexplicable way got the marriage alliance mixed up with the treaty
of 882, that in reality this marriage was not agreed upon until the following
year, and that it had nothing to do with the treaty of 882. But it seems
preferable to avoid the argument from silence and to attempt to reconcile
the statements of Regino and the author of the Annals of St. Vaast with
those of the Cont. Ratisb. It is quite possible that the marriage had been
agreed upon in connection with the treaty of 882, but was not consummated
until the following year. Cf. Vogel, 292, n. 2; Dummler, III, 203, n. 1. Vogel
admits, p. 299, n. 4, that Charles the Fat may have proposed the marriage.
14 Cf. Diimmler, III, 202 and n. 1; Bohmer-Miihlbacher, Regesten, no.
1639b. Vogel, p. 291, refers to the negotiations as “das jammervollste
Schauspiel, das sich tiberhaupt in der Geschichte der normannischen Hin-
’ . ‘falle den Blicken bietet.” Cf. supra, p. 147.
244. \ . APPENDIX IV
not have been doubtful; he should never have consented to enter
into negotiations with the enemy at all, and the fact that he
did so at a time when he might have destroyed them, is but
too convincing proof of his cowardice.'®
It may be admitted that Charles was lacking in valor and
-resoluteness. - Yet, before passing too severe judgment on what
he did at this time, we shall do well to reflect that Frankish
victory need not necessarily have followed an armed conflict
at Elsloo.'® Moreover, was not the policy of converting the
Northmen and of granting fiefs to one of their strongest leaders, —
precisely the method whereby the Viking problem in the West
Frankish realm in the end was solved?"
The money consideration received by the Northmen was, we
may note, comparatively small. It could not possibly have had
the same importance as the other provisions of the treaty. That
treaty itself was, so far as we can judge, a contract between
Charles on the one hand and Godfrey on the other, as princi-
pals.!® There is no evidence to show that the other Viking leaders,
such as Siegfried, Vurm, or Hals, engaged themselves to the
emperor’ in any way whatsoever.*° The quid pro quo demanded
and received by Godfrey for himself was (1) the counties and
fiefs in Frisia, and (2) the marriage alliance with Gisla, daughter
fovCie Dummier, III, 202, 203.
16 See supra, n. 9. Cf. the defeat of the Saxons under Duke Brun (Vogel,
276 ff.) and the failure of the Franks under Louis the Younger to force the
Northmen at Nimwegen to capitulate (ibid., 278 ff.).
17 That Charles and his counsellors, especially Liutward, really intended
to follow a policy of conciliation with the Northmen by which the latter
might be brought under the softening influences of the Christian religion,
may be gathered even from a source so hostile to Charles as Part III of the
Annals of Fulda. Meginhard there tells us that Godfrey had been intro-
duced to Charles by Liutward, and that the emperor, after the manner of
Ahab, received the Norseman as a friend and himself raised him from the
baptismal font. Later he tells us, in a very indignant tone, how Charles
refused to take revenge or to break off negotiations with Godfrey on ac-
count of some insults heaped on the Franks by the other Northmen in the
meantime; and how severely Charles punished anyone of his soldiers who
killed a Northman while the negotiations were pending, even if the North-
man in question had tried to enter the Frankish camp; all of which seems
to indicate that Charles had had in mind a rapprochment with the pagans.
Whether this was a wise policy, and whether it was likely to bring the de-
sired results, are other matters which do not concern us for the moment.
On the possibility of a “German Normandy,” see Vogel, p. 295.
18 See supra, n. 11.
19 This does not, of course, preclude an arrangement between Godfrey on
the one hand and his fellow Northmen on the other.
20 Dtimmler’s assertion (III, 203 and n. 1) to the contrary notwithstand-
ing. The ‘“Klausel” referred to by Dtimmler in the note contains the prom:
ise, not of Siegfried, but of Godfrey (see supra, n. 11).
/
‘ 1
!
APPENDIX IV | 2AB,,
of Lothaire II. It is true that Godfrey also accepted moncy,
but this he used as a means of inducing the other Vikings to
quit the territories subject to Charles the Fat.*! Accordingly,
the money payment must be regarded as the least important part
of the treaty.** Undoubtedly Godfrey realized that the other
Northmen would not have been content to see him in exclusive
possession of all the fruits of the treaty; therefore, after a gen-
eral understanding had been arrived at, he persuaded the em-
peror to grant him this “subsidy” in order that with it he might
secure the retreat of his fellow warriors.
The exact amount of money received by Godfrey is somewhat
doubtful. Some of our sources refer to it very indefinitely or
say nothing about it.** Two sources are more specific, but do
not agree. According to one of these it was 2,412 pounds of
gold and silver ;** according to the other, 2,080 pounds or a little
more.*’> The latter figure, it is said, was based on reckoning
a pound as being worth 20 solidi.
This Danegeld was not raised by taxation. Charles appears
to have secured the entire amount by drawing on the treasuries
of those churches which had escaped being plundered by the
21 The author of the Cont. Ratisb. makes clear that the money was first
paid to Godfrey, but gives no information as to how he used it. Meginhard
(in Part III of the Annals of Fulda), speaking of Charles’s relations with
Godfrey, says the money was paid to inimicis. Rezgino and Hinemar state
explicitly that the fiefs were given to Godfrey, and the money to Siegfried.
From these statements I draw the conclusion expressed above in the text.
22 The money is referred to in Cont. Ratisb. as gifts (munera) presented
by Charles to Godfrey just before the latter was about to return to the Vik-
ing camp, and two days after the treaty proper had been concluded. In
fact this writer gives the impression that the money payment was not really
required by the terms of the treaty; that rather it was gratuitous on the
part of Charles, who thereby wished to strengthen the bonds of friendship
with Godfrey. Even Meginhard (Part III of the Annals of Fulda), who
strongly disapproves of the treaty, does not speak of the money payment
until after he has made clear the other and principal features of the treaty;
he declares that the payment of the money was a greater crime than the
handing over of the counties and benefices, since the money was taken
from the church treasuries; to this writer it was tantamount to paying
tribute, yet he explains that Charles in paying over the money, did so on
the advice of some scoundrels—which seems to imply that it was not really
necessary or required by the terms of the treaty. Regino and Hinemar do
not speak of the money until after they have discussed the terms made with
Godfrey, and then state that it was paid to Siegfried and the other North-
men. The Annals of St. Vaast do not mention the money at all.
23 Regino, p. 120, says quite indefinitely: “immensum pondus auri et
argenti”’; Ann. Bert., p. 153: “plura milia:argenti et auri.”
24 Ann. Fuld., Part III, p. 99.
25 Ibid., Cont. Ratisb., p. 108.
of: the churcle Preneree reer as. ba gift: te hos
: However good the intentions of the emperor ‘and his advisers ~
: that Charles gained neither prestige nor popularity thereby.”
been forced to give up any part of the immense booty which
the Vikings sent off to Scandinavia on two hundred heavily
laden vessels.** Godfrey and his men probably withdrew to their
newly granted fiefs in Frisia ;** while Siegfried, Vurm, and Hals,
with their followers, repaired — after they had set fire to De-
-_-venter, a Frisian port, and had made some attempts at plunder-
ing along the lower Rhine —to the West Frankish realm, to
cet “ commence fresh plundering operations.**
26 Ann. Fuld., III, p. 99.
as counter with the Northmen. The revenues of the see during the period of
oh the vacancy were by Charles the Fat allowed to Hugo, the son of Lothaire
together with the marriage of Godfrey to Hugo’s sister Gisla (cf. supra, p.
243 and n. 13) leads one to suspect that Hugo had possibly been one of the
_ intermediaries between the Northmen and Charles the Fat. The treaty of
- 882 certainly redounded to the advantage of Hugo. ;
with Hugo, whose sister he marr ‘ied about the same time (ibid., p. 100).
but | recently been plundering and destroying their ssh a 30
may have been in concluding the treaty of 882, it is certain
: ~
Again fortune had favored the Vikings. So far from having
they had gathered together in the past months, the freebooters —
were now furnished with more money or plate. A large part
of this plunder, together with a number of captives, was by
*k k k %
27 Ann. Bert., p. 153.
28 The bishop had been killed earlier in the same year in a hostile en-
Il—much to the disgust of Hinecmar (Ann. Bert., p. 153). This fact taken —
29 Cf. Ann. Fuld., III, loc. cit.
30 Cf. 1bid.; Ann. Bert., loc. cit.
31 See Regino, loc. cit.; Helmold, Chronica Slavorum, 1, 7, M.G.H., SS.,
Me onl OCLs Dummier, III, 204,
32 Ann. Fuld., III, p. 99.
33 Ibid. In the following year (883) Godfrey entered te a close ainanes
34 See Vogel, p. 294.
APPENDIX IV PINT.
That there were both in Lorraine and in the East Frankish
kingdom numerous payments of local Danegeld, i. e. ransom
payments for persons and places, can not be doubted. But only
one instance thereof has, so far as my observations go, been
chronicled. It is that of Count Eberhard, who in the year 880
was ransomed at a “very great price’ by his mother Evesa.
How Evesa obtained this ransom money is not indicated.*® Du-
do’s story of the ransom of Reginar Langhals of Hainaut by his
wife in the same year, in return for all the gold in the duchy, is
probably legendary.*®
35 Regino, 881, p. 117; cf. Vogel, p. 278.
36 See Dudo, De moribus et actis primorum Normanniae ducum, Il, e. 10,
ed. Lair, p. 150;- cf. Vogel, pp. 279-80.
- ‘APPENDIX V.
- THE DANEGELD IN BRITTANY.
Whether a general Danegeld was ever paid to the Northmen
in Brittany, must be regarded as doubtful. It is true, however,
that in 847 the Breton duke Nominoé, after he had been thrice
defeated by the Vikings and finally put to flight, opened nego-
tiations with the invaders and was able, by the presentation of
“oifts,’” to induce them to evacuate his territory.t These gifts
may or may not have consisted of money. That the Northmen
were willing, on occasion, to accept considerations other than
money, is certain. For in the year 869 Solomon, the second
successor of Nominoé, could make peace with the pagans by
furnishing them with five hundred cows.’
Local Danegeld was doubtless paid in Brittany, as elsewhere,
on many occasions. But the recorded instances thereof are but
few in number. Bishop Courantgenus of Vannes was in all
probability ransomed from Viking captivity in the year 854.°
In the following year the monks of St. Sauveur de Redon ran-
somed Count Pascwet of Vannes, by handing over to the North-
men a chalice and a paten, both of gold, and weighing together
as much as 67 solidi. Later, however, this same Pascwet did
not hesitate to pay a stipendiary Danegeld — the amount of
which is not indicated — to a group of Vikings whom he en-
gaged to aid him as mercenaries against his rival Vurfand, count
of Rennes.°
1 Ann. Bert.. 847. p. 35: “Dani partem inferioris Galliae quam Brittones
incolunt adeuntes, ter cum eisdem bellantes, superant; Nomenogiusque vic-
tus cum suis fugit, dein [per] legatos muneribus a suis eos sedibus amovit.”
2 Regino, 874, ed. Kurze, p. 108; cf. Ann. Bert., 869, p. 107. See Vogel,
Devcon.
3 See Cartulaire de Saint-Sauveur de Redon, ed. de Courson, XL, p. 369,
Binet bee Dao.) Cl. Vozel, p. 145:
4 The sacred vessels were later redeemed from the pagans by Pascwet.
Cart. de Saint-Sauveur de Redon, XXVI, p. 21; cf. Vogel, p. 150.
5 Regino, 874, p. 107.
TO THIS ESSAY THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION AWARDED THE HERBERT
BAXTER ADAMS PRIZE IN EUROPEAN HISTORY FOR 1921.
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