z ey f 5 ce a ; ο ος a Pupiications oF THE Univexsrry OF PENNSYLVANIA ey oe si τα : GK ή “SERIES iv “Philology Literature and Archeology ee es we No. 3 ae Ίος With THE ACCUSATIVE . a { Νο AD | a } BA ο μα | ος ον z WwW. A LAMBERTON, A.M. PROFESSOR OF GREEK LANGUAGE AND, DITERA TURE ‘IN THE ας § UNIVERSITY ΟΕ. PENNSYLVANIA f s 3 TOOM Cs ee SLA, GINN & COMPANY ανν iS MAX NIEMEYER = - Agents for ‘United States, Canada ahd Eagiahd : Agent for the Continent of Europe ή FASE Tremont Hise) Boston, US Ay x eae: *~ Halle,.4..8.,Gertnany - Z ο οι ο . ee THE UNIVERSITY eee ο ο OOF IREING@IS ee υ.. LIBRARY THE Papers of this Series, prepared by Professors and others connected with the University of Pennsylvania, will take the form of Monographs on the subjects of Philology, Literature, and Archeology, whereof about 200 or 250 pages will form a volume. The price to subscribers to the Series will be $1.50 per volume; to others than subscribers, $2.00 per volume. é Each Monograph, however, is complete in itself and will be sold sepa- rately. ° It is the intention of the University to issue these Monographs from time to time as they shall be prepared. Each author assumes the responsibility of his own contribution. a PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA. SERIES IN Philology Literature and Archeology νο Νο ο , από GB EE E GARG BR σι aR PA Αλ U SAA | = 9 ..ΗΡΟΣ WITH ΤΗΕ ACCUSATIVE. I]. NOTE ON ΤΗΕ ANTIGONE. BY W. A. LAMBERTON, A. Μ., PROFESSOR OF GREEK LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA. | Ν. D. C. HODGES, MAX NIEMEYER, Agent for United States, Canada and England Agent for the Continent of Europe 47 Lafayette Place, New York, N.Y. Halle, a. S., Germany. PHILADELPHIA: UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS, 1891. ON ΠΡΟΣ WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. In Homer πρός with the accusative in the majority of cases accompanies verbs of motion, or such verbs as in themselves, or by virtue of the context in which they stand, necessarily carry with them the idea of motion: in such constructions the preposition indicates that towards which, it may be that up to which, the motion is directed. The largest exception to this is found in its use with the verbs of saying, speaking and the like; it may be doubted, how- ever, whether we have here so much of an exception, as we might at first be inclined to think: such eapressions as φωνὴν ἀφιέναι (Dem. I., 2), which are not rare in the orators, show how naturally speech was conceived as a form of motion, and the Homeric expression. ἔπεα πτερόεντα indi- cates that originally words uttered were conceived of, in the most literal sense, as words set in motion towards the person addressed. It may be that the idea of motion (by no means figurative, but representing to men of those days a very real conception) had already become somewhat blurred, or rather was already losing something of its clearness ; but that its force was still, though perhaps but dimly, felt, may be seen, I think, from a comparison of the Homeric phrases, εἶπε πρὸς ὃν---θυµόν (A 403) προτὶ ὃν » µυθήσατο θυμόν (P 200), with the later formulas ἄναμνησ- θῆναι, λογίζεσθαι, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτόν, SO Common in the orators. An extension of the use with verbs of saying, with + a weaker hold upon the idea of motion, is found in ὤμοσε r πρὸς ἐμέ, which occurs twice in the Odyssey (£ 331, r 288); σι in this we still have a sense of the passage of words of a ~ definite character (indicated by the verb) from one person to another in actual presence, while we discern a possibility of further expansion towards the expression of manifold (1) 317426 η ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. mutual transactions between persons. In © 364: 7 τοι ὁ μὲν KNaleoKe πρὸς οὐρανόν, αὐτάρ ἐμὲ Ζευς | τῷ ἐπαλεξήσουσαν ἀπ᾿ οὐρανόθεν προἴαλλεν, the cries are spoken of as addressed not to persons, but πρὸς οὐρανόν, and although the gods are felt to be included in the phrase πρὸς οὐρανόν, and the next line with its Ζεύς makes this quite clear, yet there is an attempt, which was to go much further, at overstepping the personal category in the use of πρός with verbs of speech That the cries are uttered not merely ‘heavenward,’ but sent forth to heaven to be heard there, the next line with its am’ οὐρανόθεν proves. With verbs of glancing, looking, peering, the idea of motion was unquestionably present originally; one may cast looks as well as spears, cf π 179: ταρβήσας 8 ἑτέρσωσε Par’ ὄμματα. It is not matter of surprise, then, that Homer sheuld use this construction, which becomes so familiar to us in later Greek; the only wonder is that it does not occur oftener. There are three instances, all in the Odyssey; µ 244: ἡμεῖς μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἴδομεν (cf σκεψάµε- vos O€s νῆα θοήν, µ 247) µ 232: ἔκαμον δέ pot doce πάντη παπταίνοντι πρὸς ἠεροειδέα πέτρην, χ 24: πάντοσε παπταί- νοντας ἐυδμήτους ποτὶ τοίχους. The sense of motion, however, is already leading the way to that of direction, irrespective of motion. The verb τρέπω would seem to have had a large share in causing this development ; compare M 273: µή tis ὀπίσσω τετράφθω ποτὶ vnas, with E 605: ἀλλὰ πρὸς Τρώας τετραμμµένοι αἰὲν ὀπίσσω εἴκετε. The first of these passages has the sense of ‘turning and moving towards,’ while in the second we have the picture of men facing in one direction and mov- ing in the opposite. We find the sense of turning with implication of directed motion in M 273, ι 315: πρὸς ὄρος τρέπε µῆλα Κύκλωψ; of motion to assume, or face in, a certain direction in E 605, ν 29: πρὸς ἠέλιον κεφαλὴν τρέπε and τ 389: ποτὶ δὲ σκότον érpamero; of direction with the idea of motion excluded in µ 80: ἐστὶ σπέος ἠεροειδὲς πρὸς ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 3 ζόφον εἰς "Ἔρεβος τετραμµένον. All of these passages con- tain τρέπω; and there is in them a regular progress from distinct implication of motion of translation, through mo- tion about a fixed point, to direction of position. This point having once been reached, there is no difficulty felt in using this construction with verbs denoting simple situa- tion to denote, not the exact position where the object is to be found, but the line of direction on which it lies from the point of reference assumed by the writer. Of this there are two examples; ν 240: nuév ὅσοι ναίουσι πρὸς ἠῶ T ἠέλιόν τε, HO ὅσσοι µετόπισθε TroTi ζόφον ἠερόεντα, ι25: εἰν ἁλὶ κεῖται πρὸς ζόφον, αἱ δέ 7 ἄνευθε πρὸς Hw 7’ ἠέλιόν τε. It is noteworthy that both of these passages are found in the Odyssey and are, moreover, such as would most early and most easily be adopted, ‘Eastward,’ ‘West- ward.’ From the construction with verbs signifying ‘moving towards and placing, or assuming a position, at,’ there arises a tendency to use πρός with the accusative of posi- tion at or near, the degree of proximity being left to the context to determine. After reading expressions like ποτὶ τοῖχον ἀρηρότες (8 342), ἔστησε πρὸς κίονα (a 127), ἐστά- µεναι πρὸς ἐνώπια (χ 121), πρὸς γοῦνα καθέζετο (σ 395), and others of like character, we experience no shock on coming across M 64: σκόλοπες yap ἐν αὐτῇ ὀξέες ἑστᾶσιν. ποτὶ Savrovs τεῖχος ᾿Αχαιῶν, and H 337: ποτὶ δ'αὐτὸν δεί- µομεν ὦκα πύργους ὑψηλοὺς. In Μ 64, Poulydamas is warn- ing Hektor of the extreme danger of attacking the Greeks, now entrenched behind wail and ditch: the sense is, ‘sharp stakes stand in the ditch, and next them stands the wall of the Greeks.’ The wall is only ‘near’ the stakes; how near is not specified, except so far as the general idea τη. ning through the passage raises in our minds a more definite determination. Leaf’s difficulty about the space between the wall and the ditch is based upon a misunder- standing of ποτί, which he takes in a sense it often bears, 4 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. but not here, as ‘coming up to.’ Lang’s ‘over against them’ is a perfect rendering. This passage calls for two remarks bearing upon after developments in the use of the preposition; first, the plural αὐτούς, helped, of course, by the sense of τεῖχος, suggests, hardly more than suggests, the notion of parallelism ; we feel indistinctly the row of stakes set near, or ‘over against,’ the wall, and ina line with it; a trace of a recognition of this sense in the passage may perhaps be discovered in the curious variant περί: second, the order of the objects, as seen by Pouly- damas, from the side of the Trojans, was, first the ditch with the stakes in it, and then the wall, and yet he speaks of the wall as being ποτὶ a’tovs. Considering the sense from which this use of the preposition was developed, there is here what may be called a change of sides on the part of πρός: our renderings ‘at’ and ‘over against’ leave us in- sensible to this; but the Scholiast’s paraphrase ἐντός would seem to indicate that something of the sort had struck him. If we discard the position of the speaker, again, and look only to the natural relations of the objects, the same peculiarity appears, for it must have been originally more natural to speak of the stakes being πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος, than of the wall as being πρὸς τοὺς σκόλοπας. And so in H 440 we find it said in more natural phrase (natural, that is, according to the relations between them), ἐπ᾽αὐτῷ (ὁ. ¢., τῷ τείχει) τάφρον ὄρυξαν---, ἐν δὲ σκόλοπας κατέπηξαν. In H 337, the meaning probably is ‘at it’ (Leaf renders ‘thereto’) ‘let us build high towers with.speed.’ If we compare this with M 64, it will appear, I think, more rea- sonable not to suppose with Leaf that the wall is to abut upon the sepulchral mound, which would thus be utilized as a part of the fortification, but rather to place the mound inside or on the Grecian side of the wall. In the plural mupyous there is the same suggestion of parallelism that was found in M 64, and, curiously enough, the preposition περί reappears, not, to be sure, as a variant this time, but ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 5 as interpretation in the Scholia. There is not, however, the same change of sides in πρός, since Nestor is not speaking of things already existing in a position fixed with reference to his own, but of a tomb to be first constructed and of the after-construction of a wall, the line of which is to be drawn ποτὶ αὐτόν, so that the natural relations are preserved. The construction easily lends itself to express the reci- procal encounter of conflicting motions. II 768: ai τε πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔβαλον τανυήκεας ὄξζους, Φ 302: τοῦ 8 ὕψοσε γούνατ᾽ ἐπήδα πρὸς ῥόον ἀίσσοντος av’ ἰθύν, οὐδέ µιν ἴσχεν εὐρὺ ῥέων ποταμός. An offshoot of this is the use with verbs of fighting, which appears once in Homer, P 471: πρὸς Τρῶας payeat. But slightly different is P 94: ὁππότ᾽ ἀνὴρ ἐθέλῃ πρὸς δαίµονα φωτὶ µάχεσθαι, for here the expression πρὸς δαίµονα (deo invito) seems to be due to the influence of µάχεσθαι; the same words, in the same sense, but with- out the softening accompaniment of µάχεσθαι, are met ten lines further on (P 104), where they must be regarded as nothing more than a reecho of a construction that had caught the ear as pithy and convenient. In µ 350 we read BovrAop ἅπαξ πρὸς κΌμα χανὼν ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὀλέσσαι, ‘with one gasp at the (inflowing) wave.’ If this be compared with ® 302, it will be seen that from active encounter with opposing motion we have passed to passive reception of it. Achilles makes head against the swollen stream, Eury- lochos will face the wave and receive.it as it flows at him. In an expression of motion, then, as above in one of posi- tion, πρός has, so to say, changed sides; the subject (or agent) does not move at the object, but the object moves at the subject, and this it is that produces the encounter. The fact that in such a case as this the form of the expres- sion is as natural in English as in Greek, is very apt to blind us to what is really peculiar in it. But when we come to the extensions which this use of πρός receives in later Greek, extensions that go beyond the sphere of admissible 6 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. English usage, then we are indeed startled; and yet, when once we recognize the fact that πρὀς can denote the en- counter of reciprocal actions (and this is so natural that we find no difficulty in it), we should be equally prepared to go a short step further and admit that in such cases there may be a syntactical interchange of the active and the pas- sive, of the course of the action and that upon which it spends itself. Usage naturally would put limits in Greek as in English, upon such a transfer, and it would be inter- esting to determine those limits; but the principle should be accepted. But of this I shall have something more to: say further on.—But we may have reciprocity without hos- tility; the encounter may be a friendly one; we may ex- change courtesies as well as blows; Z 235: ὃς πρὸς Τυδεῖ- δην Διομήδεα τεύχε᾽ ἄμειβεν. Giving and taking is one sort of motion. In this passage, and in the passage ὤμοσε πρὸς ἐμέ of ἕ 331 and 7 288, ground is broken for the growth and development of this construction in the expression of compacts and business relations. The temporal use in p 191: ποτὶ ἕσπερα, ‘towards even- ing, is evidently based on the idea of motion transferred from space to time; it is entirely analogous to the πρὸς ζόφον of ν 240, 225. In all the Homeric examples, however clear or obscure the idea of motion may be, the physical relation between subject and object is unmistakeable. It is not proposed here to treat of the history of this construction in post-Homeric literature, but merely to touch upon the main applications of it, as exemplified in the Attic orators, calling attention more particularly to certain de- velopments, which do not seem to have been perfectly apprehended. Though I cannot claim to have made an exhaustive col- lection of examples, a thing which did not enter within my purpose, certain impressions, gathered from the examina- tion I have made, may perhaps be profitably recorded, ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 7 which further investigation may modify, but I do not think will nullify. These may be stated by way of preface. Antiphon is very sparing in his use of the construction. His examples are mostly confined to expressions belonging to, or arising out of, court proceedings ; one is particularly natural in the mouth of an Athenian defendant in a crim- inal suit (ἀνακλαύσασθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς), and another is a gen- eral expression of business dealing and intercourse (πράτ- τειν πρός τινα). Andokides, without indulging largely, has a wider range of use; this is in part, at least, due to the historical matter that enters his orations. Such phrases as σπονδαί, εἰρήνη. συμμαχία πρός τινας are found; but private relations, other than those of business, also appear. In Lysias the sphere of use is considerably extended; he avails himself of it to indicate relations of the most varied kinds (ἔχθρα, διαφορά, φιλονικία, ὀργή, σπουδή, πιστός, δει- yds, κίνδυνος, ὁμολοηγεῖσθαι). Ina couple of instances he appears to have been tempted to make rather bold experi- ments with the construction; one of these may have been a colloquialism, which he had the courage to introduce into the more formal region of written language. Isokrates abounds in the construction; of particularly frequent occur- rence in his speeches is the use with words denoting fitness or capacity, natural or acquired (χρήσιμος, ἁρμόττων, ὠφε- λεῖν, πεπαιδευµένος, καταδεέστερος, συµφέρων, διαφέρειν). This is easily accounted for by the character of his subjects and by the repeated defenses he feels called upon to make of his own scheme for the higher education of the youth of Athens. Isaios, without retiring to the position of Ando- kides or Antiphon, is more restricted than Lysias in range of use, though, perhaps, not in quantity. Aischines, Dein- archos and Lykourgos avail themselves of the construction with comparative freedom; but neither they, nor Isaios, nor Isokrates appear to have ever thought of stepping beyond the lines custom had by this time drawn. Enough for them to take usage as they found it, and turn it to 8 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. account as their purposes and subject matter seemed to demand. In Demosthenes we find the construction fre- quently, though hardly, I think, with such frequency as in Isokrates, and, as might be expected, wherever it is profit- ably available; but, what is more, he has no fear of hazard- ing occasionally, where anything is to be gained by it, a very bold use or even (as he has certainly done in one in- stance, 20. 25) a somewhat startling experiment. Motion in the literal and physical sense, motion of translation in a given direction continues in post-Homeric Greek, of course, to be expressed by πρός, precisely as in Homer. The same is true of the use with verbs and ex- pressions implying motion, although, of course, we are not surprised to find expressions of this sort that would look strange in Homer, 6., Isokrates, 17. 52: πρὸς τὴν πόλιν συγγράψας ἐπιστολὴν: ‘having written a letter to (a per- son) in the city.’ The derived notions of direction and of position at or near, likewise persist. It is sometimes diffi- cult to disentangle these two last, or, perhaps, one should rather say both ideas are simultaneously present in some cases ; this being due to the fact that the notion of position may be approached either from the more indefinite sense of ‘moving towards’ or from the more definite of ‘moving towards and taking up a position at.’ cf, Andok. 1. 38: ὁρῶν δὲ αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν σελήνην τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν πλείστων γιγνώσκειν, with which compare Thukyd. 7. 44: ἑώρων δὲ οὕτως ἀλλήλους ὡς ἐν σελήνῃ τὴν μὲν ὄψιν τοῦ σώματος .προορᾶν. In this the idea seems to cover more than the ἐν σελήνῃ of Thukyd., and to imply that they stood in the moonlight ‘facing’ the moon. It may be remarked here, to avoid the necessity of doing so later, that we not in- frequently appear to find different uses of mpos converg- ing to a point, as it were, ina given example, each of them contributing its part towards completing the sense, and by their combination, at the same time, rendering translation more difficult and positive classification in a rigorous gen- ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 9 ealogical scheme almost, if not quite, impossible. Such a phrase, for instance, as τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον κινδύνων (Isokr. 4. 26) unquestionably was developed from the cog- nate and yet quite different phrase, of πρὸς τοὺς πολεµίους κίνδυνοι, but it unquestionably must have been formed under the influence of the same idiom that gave rise to ἡ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμη (Lys. 33. 7). By an easy and natural transition from these uses we pass beyond the sphere of motion and -position in the material world, and get certain transferred senses, in which motion resolves itself into tendency, incitement, further- ance, advance, and position into application or occupation. Instances of the first are Isokr. 15. 67: οἱ λόγοι πρὸς ape- τὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην συντείνουσιν, 15. 277; Aisch.. 1. 96: ἠπεύγετο σφόδρα πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς; 1. 43: παρωξυμµένος πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα; 1. 117: παράκλησις πρὸς ἀρετήν (cf Plat. Leg. 711, B: πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιτηδεύματα προτρέπειν): Ly- kourg. 106: πεπαίδευνται πρὸς ἀρετήν; Isokr. 15. 294, Lys. ° 19. OL: οὐ µόνον πρὸς δόξαν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς χρημάτων λόγον λυσιτελεῖ ὑμῖν; Isokr. 15. 266: τὴν μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ λέγειν µήτε πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ὠφελοῦσαν; Isokr. 13. 20 and 15. 189: peylorny ἔχει δύναμν πρὸς τὴν τῶν λόγων παιδείαν» 8. 32 and 15. 212: οὐδὲν ἄν ἀλλήλους πρὸς ὀπιείκειαν εὐεργετήσαι- μεν; 15. 269: τῶν πράξεων τὰς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν βίον φερούσας, I. 12: πρὀς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδοῦναι. In the last example we have a double transference: First, from motion of translation to growth (ο ἐς ὕψος ἐπιδοῦναι, ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐπιδοῦναι), and secondly, from physical growth to mental and moral. Analogous to this, in so far as elaboration can be analogous to growth, is Isokr. 4. 11: τοὺς πρὸς ὑπερβολὴν πεπονηµέ- vous (λόγους), where the adverbial phrase πρὸς ὑπερβολήν is exactly our ‘to excess.’ It must be confessed that in Isokrates’ day πρὸς ὑπερβολήν was hardly felt except as an adverb; yet the example may stand here as showing how this adverbial phrase originated. Isokr. 15. 156: τοσοῦτον προλαβῶν πρὸς τὸ πλείω κτήσασθαι τῶν ἄλλων. Such ex- 1Ο ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. pressions as πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδεύεσθαι and πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδοῦ- vat, it is often more natural (that is to us English-speaking people) to render ‘to train in virtue,’ ‘to grow in virtue,’ and we may perhaps be led to think that ἀρετή here gives the road along or in which progress is made, rather than the objective point towards which; but a comparison of the two other phrases above given, ἐς ὕψος ἐπιδοῦναι (‘grow in height’) and ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἐπιδοῦναι, will suffice to prove, I think, that such was not the Greek conception. Another false road that must be avoided, if we would not be led astray, is opened for us by the frequent meaning of πρός (to be afterwards referred to), ‘with reference to.” This con- veniently vague phrase is admissible in so many and in so great a variety of connections in English that one is often tempted to rest in it with all its lack of preciseness at the risk of missing, what it is most important for us to secure: an exact perception of the mode and form in which the thought to be rendered presented itself to the Greek mind. When, for instance, we have translated πάσχω πρὸς αὐτόν, ‘I feel,’ or ‘experience with reference to him,’ the chances are nine in ten that the rendering is but a cloak to cover our real ignorance of the import of the Greek words, that is, their import to the mind of the Greek writer and his Greek readers. As regards application or anor baie the analogon in transferred sense of position in the physical world, the ex- treme instance must suffice, the Platonic pds τι εἶναι, ‘to be at (engaged upon) a thing,’ with which may be compared the other Platonic phrase ἐπί τι ὐέναι, or the ἤδη ἐπὶ ταιῦτα πορ:ύσομαι of Dem. 18. 124. In Homer (M 64) we have already found the idea of parallelism of position suggested, if only suggested. It is to be carefully remembered that the denotation of zpos, irrespective of possible connotation, in this passage, was merely ‘at,’ ‘near,’ or perhaps more strictly ‘over against,’ ‘facing.’ The possibility of denoting parallelism did not ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. II belong to πρός originally, nor did it come to it directly from the sense of motion, but only secondarily from that of posi- tion, with the assistance of other words in the sentence. This order of derivation has imposed upon πρός in this application certain limitations, from which it never freed itself. The parallelism it conveys is the parallelism of con- secutive positions, and not that of continuous motion. These consecutive positions, in the first instance, were those of corresponding rows of objects (as of the individual stakes and the corresponding points in the line of wall in M 64), set over against one another; but by an easy exten- sion they might become the positions consecutively as- sumed by two objects, which continue at each and every moment of the time considered to stand over against one another in some unvaried fashion. This form of parallel- ism cannot be put into simple expressions of motion, into which this notion of successive positions does not enter, and so we may not say πρὸς τὸν ποταµόν in the sense in which we may say παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν πορεύεσθαι; the con- trast in the effect of the preposition in such phrases as: ἰέναι πρὸς τὸυς πολεμίους and ἀντιτάττεσθαι πρὸς TOUS πολεμίους will make this clear to every one. But in a transferred sense, where two events or series of events are going on simultaneously, which are so connected the one with the other that there is a fixed relation of correspon- dence between their component parts, so that the amount of progress in the one series finds its perfect analogue in the contemporaneous progress in the other, πρός with the accusative may be, and is, used to denote such correspon- dence. Dem. 29. 9: 6 yap τότ᾽ ἐν wixp@ μέρει τινὶὺ τοῦ παν- TOS ὕδατος μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορήσαµεν, νῦν πρὸς ἅπαν τὸ ὕδωρ αὐτὸ καθ᾽αὑτὸ διδάξειν ἐμέλλομεν, Aisch. I. 109: ἅπαντα διεξελθεῖν πρὸς μικρόν µέρος τῆς ἡμέρας οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπιχειρεῖν, Dem. 41. 30, 43. 8. Again, the idea of progress of events being subordinated, or even lost sight of, the correspondence, in whole and in parts, of spaces in which 12 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. events are, or may be, conceived as occurring, is thus ex- pressed: Aisch. 2. 126: πρὸς ἕἔνδεκα ἀμφορέας ἐν διαµεµε- τρηµένῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ κρίνοµαι, where πρὸς ἕνδεκα ἀμφορέας is to be taken with διαμεµετρηµένῃ and not with κρίνοµαι. Let the component parts of the series fall into the back- ground, and such expressions become possible as Dem. 19. 120: ἀγῶνας Kawods πρὸς διαμεμετρηµένην τὴν ἡμέραν αἱρεῖς διώκων, 53. 17: εἰσελθων εὖ τὸ δικαστήριον πρὸς ἡμέραν διαμεμετρηµένην. These phrases are very inade- quately rendered by the English ‘on,’ for they are not simple expressions of time at, on or about which something is said to take place; they are something very different from πρὸς ἠῶ ἔγρεσθαι, πρὸς ἡμέραν ἐξέγρεσθαι. A corres- pondence is indicated that goes beyond simultaneity of date, a correspondence in length, and consequent nature, - of the suits to the character of the day appointed for them. If it be said that this idea is more of an inference from the participle διαµεμετρηµένην, it may be replied that it is just this participle that brings about the use of mpds, as the preposition best suited to the idea to be expressed, This idea of correspondence is at the bottom of such uses of πρός as πρὸς αὐλὸν ἄδειν, πρὸς ῥυθμὸν ἐμβαίνειν, as well as of the mathematical use in statements of proportion. Correspondence becomes conformity: Lys. 18. 4: οἱ πλεῖ- στοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεταβάλλονται πρὸς τὰ παρόντα, Isokr. 6. 34: πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ βουλεύεσθαι, Aisch. 2. 66: οἱ τῶν συκοφαντῶν λόγοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐφ᾽ ἡμέραν καιρὸυ» λέγονται. Dem. 24. 139: πρὸς τὰς βουλήσεις νομοθετεῖσθαι, Dem. 15. 28: ὁρῶ γὰρ ἅπαντας πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν δύναμιν τῶν δικαί- ων ἀξιουμένους, Dem. 45, 14: ταῦτα ἄλλος ἂν ἄλλως πρᾶ- eve πρὸς τὸν αὑτοῦ τρόπον, Dem. 41. 5: τὴν οἰκίαν ταύτην ἀποτιμῶμαι πρὸς τὰς δέκα μνᾶς (that is, ‘as a set-off to,’ ‘as collateral security for’). In an extreme case conformity gives equality: Dem. 20. 31: πρὸς τοίνυν ἅπαντα τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπορίων ἀφικνούμενον ὁ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου σῖτος εἰσπλέων ἐστίν: cf. Hdt. 8. 44: ᾿Αθηναῖοι μὲν πρὸς πάντας ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 13 τοὺς ἄλλους παρεχόµενοι νῆας ὀγδώκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν, and Ibid. 8. 48: ἀριθμὸς ἐγένετο 6 πᾶς τῶν νεῶν τριηκὸσίαι καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ὀκτώ; the equality is, of course, as these passages show, and as might have been inferred without them, an approximate one, but, as the phrase goes, one that is ‘near enough for all practical purposes.’ Personal conformity, even the determination of life and actions by those of another, or by the interests, wishes or suggestions of another, may be thus conveyed by a sort of abridged construction. The bridge is furnished by such an example as Isokr. 1. 11: δεῖγμα τῆς Ἱππονίκου φύσεως νῦν ἐξενηνόχαμεν, πρὸς ὃ δεῖ σε ζῆν ὥσπερ πρὸς παράδειγµα, νόμον μὲν τὸν ἐκείνου τρόπον ἡγησάμενον, μιμητὴν δὲ καὶ ἑηλωτὴν τῆς πατρῴας ἀρετῆς yevduevov; Dem. το. 226: τοῖς δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ζῶσι καὶ τῆς παρ ὑμῶν TLUAS γλιχοµένοις καὶ μὴ προδεδωκόσι. The extreme instance, Dem. 1Ο. 63: τού- τῷ δὴ πάντ'ἐπίστευον (οἱ Φωκεῖς) καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον πάντἐ- σκόπουν, πρὸς τοῦτον ἐποιοῦντο τὴν εἱρήνην: τούτῳ is Aischi- nes, and the meaning is that the unfortunate Phokians were guided in the views they formed as to their situation and the line of action it called for on their part by the de- clarations Aischines had just before publicly made in the Athenian assembly ; and so, in conformity to the hints thus given and the hopes thus held out, they were deluded into making the peace. It may not be amiss to call attention to the fact that the tenses Demosthenes uses are imper- fects; ‘the views they held and their course in making peace were determined by &c.’ Compare the sentence Immediately preceding: Φίλιππος ἀπηγγέλλετο πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ τούτου ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Φωκέων σωτηρία παρεληλυύέναι. In Dem. 56. 49 we read: µερίζειν τοὺς τόκους πρὸς τὸν πλοῦν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν συγγραφήν, the last words of which convey quite distinctly a stricter sense than that of con- formity in general; they denote conformity to a standard, the συγγραφή gives the standard conformably to which the division of the interest is to be made. Ina business and 14 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. legal phrase of this sort the meaning is so sharply im- pressed as to be unquestionable. In everyday conversa- tional language, however, such phrases are wont to be employed with less preciseness of signification. Α5 the application of a standard is peculiarly natural to the opera- tions of judging, examining and testing, we meet such phrases as κρίνειν, ἐξετάζεσθαι, σκοπεῖν πρὸς τι, “tO judge, examine, investigate, by a certain standard,’ that is, ‘to form our judgments, make our tests according to, or in con- formity with, a certain standard.’ But, as comparison is the method by which the assumed standard is always ap- plied, the notion of the standard in these phrases fades out and that of comparison grows, so that finally we have nothing left but the comparative examination of two ob- jects; the border land between these two, application of standard and simple comparison, will supply examples which may be differently interpreted, though the difference will never have any serious consequences. Isokr. 8. 89: ὥσπερ πρὸς δεῖγμα τοῦτ'. ἀναφέρων: Isokr. 20. 6: οὐ πρὸς τὸ µέγεθος ὧν ἂν λάβωσι τὴν τίµησιν ποιουµένους, Dem. 27. 22: ef τι δεῖ τεκµαίρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ ἀναίδειαν, Dem. 20. 13: οὐ τὸ λυσιτελέστατον πρὸς ἀργύριον σκοποῦν. Isokr. 4. 76: οὐδὲ πρὸς ἀργύριον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔκριναν, Isokr. 15, 34: οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν κρίνουσιν, Isokr. 4. ΙΙ: τούς λόγους πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας σκοποῦσιν, Aisch. 2. 80: χρὴ δὲ τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν καθ ὃν ἐπρέσβευον, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγοὺς πρὸς τὰς δυνάµεις ὧν ἡγοῦντο, Dem. 17. 18: ἵνα πρὸς τὸν ὑπάρχοντα καιρὸν ἕκαστα θεωρῆτε (compare the whole sentence, of which these words are the conclusion), Dem. 18. 315: πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ ἐμαυτοῦ νῦν ἐγὼ κρίνωµαι καὶ θεωρῶμαι; 1η this last passage, with its continuation, there seems to be a wavering between the idea of applying a standard and making a mere comparison; in the words here quoted the ‘standard’ seems to be present, but when we come to the following words πρὸς σὲ καὶ ἄλλον εἴ τινα βούλει, the ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 15 ‘standard’ has given place to an ordinary object of com- parison. Isokr. 12. 4: μὴ παραβάλλωσι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ποικιλίαν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν λόγον) κρίνωσι: This, while giving in its first Ροτίίοη α full-fledged comparison, closes with an equally decided instance of the application of an assumed standard, so that an examination of it will make clear what and how great is the difference ' between the two. | As judgment by a standard and comparison tend to run together, it might be thought that the idea of the standard grew out of that of comparison. While admitting that it might, Ido not think that in the syntax of mpos it really did; nor do I think, on the other hand, that the reverse process took place. It seems to me more likely that the notion of juxtaposition, when expressed with the aid of mpos by certain verbs, especially such as were compounded with παρά, furnished an independent, though cognate, source for the development of the sense of comparison, arid that the two streams ultimately converged, as must often happen. In the use with such verbs as παραβάλλειν the parallelism that leads to comparison, the putting side by side, is conveyed almost solely by the verb; all that πρός contributes is the idea of nearness or approach. From its accompanying such verbs πρός took over to itself some- thing of their peculiar significance, the more easily perhaps from the general sense of parallelism it had already inde- pendently acquired, and was finally found strong enough to bear the whole burden of the conception on its own shoulders unaided, except in so far as the context, in a gen- eral way, might help it out. In Isokr. 5. 142, we have ἀντιπαραβαλών, 7. 62: παραβάλωμεν, 12. 4.: παραβάλλωσι, 12, 227: τὴν παραβολὴν πεποιῆσθαι, Deinarch. 1. 16: παρα Ααλλειν, Isokr. 12. 40: παριστάναι, Lykourg. 68: συµβα λεῖν, Isokr. 15. 158 and Dem. 41. 27: τιθέναι. Isokr. 15 157: τοὺς ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς τέχναις ὄντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους κρι νειν, Isokr. 19, 48: εἴ τίς µε σκοποῖτο μὴ πρὸς ταύτην. 16 On πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. | Dem. 18. 256: τὴν ἐμὴν τύχην πρὸς τὴν σεαυτοῦ σκόπει. In this category no one has ventured so far as Lysias, who has in 1, 2: ἡ αὐτὴ τιμωρία τοῖς ἀσθενεστάτοις πρὸς τοὺς τὰ µέγιστα δυναµένους ἀποδίδοται, ὥστε τὸν χείριστον τῶν αὐτῶν τυγχάνειν τῷ βελτίστῳ. Verbs of glancing and looking, or of directing eyes or sight towards an object, represented by but a small con- tingent in Homer, are common enough in later Greek, and " such expressions as βλέπων πρὸς ὑμᾶς (Aisch, 1. 163) in a literal sense, and πρὸς αὐτὸ µόνον τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συμφὲ- pov ἀποβλέποντας (Aisch. 1. 178), in a transferred sense, hardly need to be quoted. Verbs of speaking, as has been seen, are largely repre- sented in Homer with this construction, largely, that is, when the number of instances is considered, for the list of the verbs so used is somewhat limited (εὐπεῖν, μυθεῖσθαι, ἀγορεύειν, φάναι, ἐνέπειν, and of verbs implying speech, ὀμνύναι and κλαίειν). Later Greek, as might be expected, both uses the construction frequently, and greatly extends the list of verbs so used. All verbs or phrases expressing or implying the address of words to others are now in- cluded in it; and, following the line of the Homeric προτὶ ὃν µυθήσατο θυµόν, verbs of thought, which imply lan- guage addressed to, or held with, oneself, have come to adopt this construction. A still further extension brings in also verbs of declaring, proving, showing and displaying, even where the use of language is not implied. Verbs of speech : Dem. 19. 136: εἰπεῖν, Aisch. 1. 8: πρὸς ὑμᾶς χρή- σασθαι τῷ λόηῳ, 1. 122: πρὸς ἄλλους ἦν ὁ λόγος µοι, 3. 219: πρὸς τὴν ᾿Αθηνᾶν διαλεγοµένου, I. 8: διέξειµι πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, Dem. 29. 4: διεξελθεῖν, Aisch. 2. σοι πι. ὃν ἀντειπεῖν, Lys. 32, 26: πρὸς ὑμᾶς λογίζεσθαι, Aisch. 1. 173: κατεπαγγέλλεται πρὸς αὐτούς, 2. 19: ἀπαγγέλλειν, 3. 189: τὴν ἀνάρρησιν ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἓλληνας, 1581. 2. 18: ἐκεῖνον mpos τοὺς δηµότας ἐπαινεῖν, Cisch, ου... ἐπαινέτης ἦν ἡμῶν πρὸς τοὺς βουλεύοντας, Antiph. A. 6. ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. V7 I: ἀνακλαύσασθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, Aisch. 2. 1: παρακελεύσα- σθαι πρὸς ἄνδρας ὀμωμοκότας (‘address exhortations to’), Isokr. 17. 9: πρὸς ἐμὲ προσεποιεῖτ ἀπορεῖν, Deinarch. 1. 49: ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τινας, Isokr. 17. 9: ἔξαρνος yiyveras πρὸς αὐτούς. Of evidence, promises, oaths uttered to, or in the presence of: Aisch. 2. 19: Κάλει µοι πρὸς οὓς ἐξεμαρ- τύρησεν, Isai. 3. 25: ἐκμαρτυρησάμενος, Isokr. 15, 186: τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἃς ποιούµεθα πρὸς τοὺς πλησιάξειν ἡμῖν βουλο- µένους, Aisch. I. 143: τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν τὴν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, Isokr. 6. 21: τοῖς ὃρκοις οὓς ἐποιήσασθε πρὸς τοὺς προγό- vous, Dem. 19. 318: τοὺς πρὸς Θεττάλους dpxous. Of writ- ten address: Dem. ΤΟ. 174: τὴν γραφεῖσαν ἐπιστολὴν tba’ ἐμοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, 18. 186: ἐν τῇ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐπιστολῃ. Of thought to or with oneself: Isokr. 6. 52 : ἀναμνήσθητε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, Dem. 43. 72: ἐνθυμεῖσθε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς. 16. 9: σκοπεῖσθε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, Dem. 36. 8: λογιζόμενοι πρὸς ἑαυτού. Of declaring, showing, displaying, proving : Dem. 54. 28: πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς εἰσιόντας ἀπέφαινον, Dem. 18. 40: σαφῶς δηλοῖ καὶ διορίζεται πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους. Lykourg. 102: ἐπίδειξιν ποιούµενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἓλληνας, Aisch. 3. 219: τῆς πρὸς ᾿Αλέξανδρον ἐνδείξεως, Lys. 18. 11: παράδειγµα ποιούµενος πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους Tas ἡμε- τέρας συμφορὰς τῆς τῶν τριάκοντα πονηρίας, Isokr. 5. 149: διελθὼν πρὸς αὐτὸν τεκµήριον, Dem. 49. 57: τεκµηρίῳ κατα- χρήσασθαι τούτῳ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, Dem. 49. 58: ἸΚζἀμοὶ τεκµήριον γενέσθω πρὸς ὑμᾶς. The instances of verbs of promising and swearing above given bring us at least half way towards the expression of business dealings and relations. A still further approach is to be found in the following: Isai. 9. 24: πρὸς Κλέωνα διωµολοηγήσατο. Lys. I. 21: τῶν πρὸς ἔμ᾽ ὠμολογημένων, Isokr. 14. 29, Andok. I. 120: τὴν πρὸς ἐμὲ ὁμολοηίαν. This category, which has but a foreshadowing in Homer, receives, as might be expected, a large development in the orators. Business dealings and relations, personal conduct a 18 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. between man and man, social intercourse, relations between gods and men in matters of religious duty and piety, inter- national relations—all these come to be expressed by this construction. Ἱράττειν: Lys. 17. 1: τὰ πεπραγμέν ἡμῖν πρὸς ᾿Βράτωνα, Isokr. 17. 22: ἐγω & ἠξίουν πρὸς μὲν Mev- έξενον πράττειν ὅτι βούλοιτο, Dem. 36, 3: τὰ πραχθέντα τούτῳ πρὸς Πασίωνα, Dem. 37. 6, Dem. 45.2. Contracts and agreements: Isokr. 15. 79: τὰ συμβόλαια τὰ γιγνόµενα πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, Isokr. 17. 2,17. 23, Dem. 32. 2, 34. 3; Dem, 48, 9: συνθήκας ἐγράψαμεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, Aisch. 2. 47: τοὺς πρὸς Δημοσθένην αὐτῷ συγκειµένους λόγους, Lys. 25. 34: δίκαιον ἡγούμεθ᾽ εἶναι πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς τοὺς πολίτας ταῖς συνθήκαις ἐμμένειν, Isokr. 18. 27: περὶ συνθη- κῶν τὴν ψῆφον οἴσετε As οὐδεπώποτε οὐθ ὑμῖν πρὸς ἑτέρους οὔτ ἄλλοις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐλυσιτέλησε παραβῆναι, Dem. 58. 19: διοικἠσαµένου πρὸς Ἐτησικλέα (‘having made an arrange- ment with’), 58. 20: Partnership: Dem. 48. 28: τῆς κοι- νωνίας τῆς πρὸς τοῦτον ταῦτ᾽ ἐγὼ ἀπέλαυσα. Division of an estate: Isai. 7. 25: τὸ ἡμικλήριον πρὸς ταύτην νειμάμε- vos. Of amore general character are the two following, signifying the taking of certain measures or the adoption of a certain course in a matter of business dealing: Dem. 40. 4Ο: εἰ Kat πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἐπιεικές ἐστι ταῖς διαι- ταῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι, πρὸς ye τοῦτον ἁπάντων δικαιότατον ἦν οὕτω προσφέρεσθαι, Dem. 48. 22: ὄντινα τρόπον ἄσφαλέ- στατα προσοισόµεθα πρὸς τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντα». Quite peculiar is Dem. [58] 1: ἀτυχήσαντος πρὸς τὴν πόλιν καὶ ὀφλόντος δὲκα τάλαντα (cf. Lys. 14. 41: πρὸς τὴν πόλιν δεδυστυχήκασιν, ἄλλως δὲ κόσµιοί εἰσι): In the first clause of Dem. 40. 40, just cited, and in this last from pseudo Dem. 58. 1, the preposition has the sense of ‘in dealing with’ or ‘in his. dealings with; that is, from frequent use with verbs denoting explicitly dealings or relations per- taining to the sphere of business, it has become capable of denoting such special kind of relations when used with verbs, which in themselves carry no such implication; the ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 19 context, of course, lends its aid, but the difference between the weight of meaning borne by πρός in these examples and in such cases as πράττειν πρός τινα, νέµεσθαι πρός τινα, is evident; πράττειν and νέµεσθαι are much more out- ‘spoken in heli indication of sphere than is the postponed ὀφλόντος δέκα τάλαντα, for example, of [58]. 1. That the latter phrase, however, has its weight in helping πρόὀς to its specific meaning, is clear from a comparison of the pas- sage quoted from Lysias, which has a supplementary clause of a quite different character. When the notion of business becomes by usage specified and restricted within more narrow limits, and lkewise when it becomes generalized so as to ‘cover and include wider relations, the construction still persists. Dem. 33. 12: ὥστε µήτε τούτῳ πρὸς ἐμὲ μήτ᾽ éwol πρὸς τοῦτον Tpayp’ εἶναι μηδέν: the speaker has just said that the contract between them had been annulled, so that there was no matter or business left to call for legal adjustment ; πρᾶγμα here 1s not confined to the strict sense of lawsuit, but it approaches such a limitation. In Ant. 6. 12: ἐτύγχανε yap µοι πρά- γµατα ὄντα πρὸς ᾿Αριστίωνα καὶ Φιλίνον, ἃ ἐγω περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην, ἐπειδή περ εἰσήγγειλα, ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως ἀπο- δεῖξαι τῇ Boudry, we have the legal sense pure and simple ; the business consisted entirely in the legal proceedings. In Dem. 45. 13: συνέβαινεν ἐκείνως μὲν ἕνα εἶναι, πρὸς ὃν τὰ πράγµατα ἐγίγνετό pol, ὡς δ'οὗτοι µεμαρτυρήκασι, πρὸς πολλούς, the sense is vaguer and more indefinite, and the English ‘with whom I would have to deal’ is satisfactory enough; but the character of the dealing is after all felt to be legal, the ἕνα and the πολλούς being false witnesses, who are to be prosecuted. In the first of these three ex- amples the πρᾶγμα is a business relation, viewed as the basis of a legal action; in the second it is the legal action itself; in the third it is again the basis of the suit, but it is now a complication not arising out of business, strictly so called, certainly not out of commercial relations. In Dem. 20 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 48. 46: διαμαρτύρασθαι ὅτι αὐτῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔτι πρᾶγμα πρὸς τὰς συνθήκας ταύτας ‘to protest that he had nothing ~ more to do with this contract’ (cf the ground for the pro- test in the preceding words ὡς οὑκέτι κυρίων οὐσῶν τῶν συνθηκῶν ἐμοὶ καὶ τούτῳ), we have an extension of the use of πρᾶγμα with this construction in two ways; first, though still used with reference to a matter of a strictly business character, πρᾶγμα has gone over to the more general sense of ‘business,’ ‘affair,’ ‘concern; and second, the relation is no longer one between persons, but between one of the parties to the contract and the contract itself. In Dem. 21. 195: ὥστε καὶ πρὸς οὓς μηδέν ἐστί σοι πρᾶγμα. λυπεῖσθαι τὴν σὴν θρασύτητα, the idea of business has altogether disappeared, and that of ‘dealings with’ in the widest and vaguest sense been completely substituted. Though, of course, such a more general sense lies in the πρᾶγμα to begin with, and only waits time and opportunity to declare itself, it is not so clear that it lies in the combi- nation πρᾶγματα πρός τινα; the application of this con- struction to the expression of action towards dealing with (in any way) is too vague and abstract to be an early use; it is more natural to suppose that the process was from the more specific use, which had already, in one Homeric in- stance, shown its readiness to start into vigorous life, to the more general. It is not surprising that when πρᾶγμα had thus lost its definiteness of signification, it began to be possible to dispense with the word, at least in negative phrases. Between persons: Dem. 45. 22: ἀλλ᾽ ἐῶ Ἰηφι- σοφῶντα ' οὔτε γὰρ νῦν µοι πρὸς ἐκεῖνόν ἐστιν, οὔτ᾽ ἐμαρτύ- ρησεν οὐδέν: ‘I am not now dealing with him;’ the nature of the dealing is implied in the circumstances, ‘I am not prosecuting him.’ Isokr. 4. 12: ἐμοὶ & οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἐστί (cf just below the ex- planatory phrase : πρὸς οὓς---περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ποιήσοµαι τοὺς λόφους), ‘I am not dealing with,’ here then, to all in- tents and purposes, is ‘I am not addressing.’ From these ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 21 examples it is seen that this construction εἶναί τινι πρός τινα may be used in its vaguest sense, even when back of that a more explicit sense, not necessarily connected with business, is running in the speaker’s mind, provided only that more particular application be implied clearly in the context, or afterwards explicity stated. Between persons and things: Dem. 56. 26: περὶ τῶν δανειστῶν, ovs φασι συγκεχωρηκέναι λαβεῖν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τοὺς eis 'Ῥόδον τόκους, ἔστι μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῦτο, ‘that action of theirs has nothing to do with us, does not concern or affect us.’ So Dem. 18. 21. οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ: This form in such cases, which gives mpos a personal régime, is commoner than that of Dem. 48. 46. These last examples already trench upon the sphere of personal relations. Aisch. 1. 51: ὁ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα τοῦτο πράττων, Isokr. 1. 1: ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους συνηθείαις, Isokr. 2. 47: συνουσία. Dem. 52. 16: σύνοδος, Isokr. 3. 40: κοινωνία, Lys. 16. 10: πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οὕτω βε- Θίωκα, Lys. 12. 23: οὔτε πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς τοιαῦτα ὑπαάρχει οὔτε πρὸς ἐμέ, Dem. 19. 236: οὐδὲν ἐμοὶ πρὸς τού- τους OLKELOV ουδὲ κοινὸν γέγονεν, Isokr. 1. 31: μηδὲ πρὸς Tas τῶν πλησιαζόντων apyas ἀπαντᾶν, Dem. 21. 144: μµεγάλαι πρὸς τὸν ὃδῆμον εὐεργεσίαι, Dem. 21. 1: τὴν ὕβριν, ᾗ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρῆται Medias, Dem. 37. 33: πρὸς ἐπικλήρους ἀδικήματα, Aisch. 3. 233: 1) χάρις πρὸς bv ἐχαρίζετο ἄδηλος γεγένηται, Dem. 19. 139: πίνων καὶ Φφιλανθρωπευόμενος πρὸς αὐτούς, Dem, 21. 139: δεινοί τινές εἰσι φθείρεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους (‘give themselves over to, body and soul,’ ‘sell their’ soul to,’ as it were), Aisch. 1. 70: ὅστις αὑτὸν κατήσχυνε πρὸς Ηγήσανδρον, οὐ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν πρὸς τὸν πόρ- νον πεπορνεῦσθαι (cf. 1. 52: πεπορνευµένος"' ὁ γὰρ εὐκῆ τοῦτο Kal πρὸς πολλοὺς πράττων). Lys. 14. 41: πρὸς τὴν πόλιν δεδυςτυχήκασιν, ἄλλως δὲ κὀσμιοί εἰσι (cf. Dem. 58. 1, above quoted). The personal passes over into the political in Lys. 14. 42: ἀδίκως καὶ παρανόμως πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πολι- τευόµενοι. In both these aspects the relations between 22 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. men are disturbed by discord and disagreements, and these again give opportunity for reconciliations and removal of grievances. From both points of view, therefore, expres- sions of variance and of the composition of difftculties be- tween individuals fall naturally into the employment of this construction. Variance: Lys. 32. 1: αἴσχιστον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς οὐκείους διαφέρεσθαι, Isai. 5. 1: διαφέρεσθαι, Dem. 27. Ι: ὥστε µηδεµίαν ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸς τοῦτον διαφοράν, Andok. 2. 140: διαφορά, Dem. 48. 7: διαφέρεσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. Isokr. 16. 16: διαφέρεσθαι, Isokr. 12. 55: διαβάλλειν, Isokr. 17. ΙΟ: es διαβολὴν καταστῆσαι, Aisch. 1. 152: διαβολὴν γενέσθαι, Isokr. 17. 27: διαβολή, Dem. 55. 5: μηδὲν ὑμῖν ἦν δυσχερὲς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, Dem. 41. Ο: ἵνα μηδὲν δυσχε- pes ἡμῖν εἴη πρὸς ἀλλήλουο. Composition and adjustment of differences: Isokr. 17. 20: ἐὰν διαλλαηγῶμεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. Isokr. 18. 7: διαλλάττεσθαι, Deinarch. 1. 99: διαλ- λάττεσθαι, Lys. 13. 80: διαλλαηγαὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, Dem. 4Ο. 43: ὅπως ἀπαλλαγη πρὸς ἐμέ, Dem. 38. 1: γεγενηµένων ἀμφοτέρων τούτων (ἀφέσεως Καὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς) τῷ πατρὶ πρὸς Ναυσίμαχον, Dem. 28. 24: πρὸς τοὺς πράξαντας διαλυσαµέ- vous, Isai. 2. 40: ποιησαµένους τῆς ἔχθρας διάλυσιν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Relations and behavior towards the gods: Isai. 6. 49: πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβεῖν, Lykourg. 94: τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐσέβειαν, Isokr. 10. 31: εὐσέβεια, Dem. 59. 74: τῆς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλαβείας. Dem. 5ο. 109 : τὸ ἀσέβημα τὸ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς. All relations that exist between individual men are possible between states, and admit in this case of the same construction, which is naturally extended to others of a similar character, but more particularly international. Isokr. 14. 9: οὐδ ὁμολογόυμενα φαίνονται διαπραττόµενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Isokr. 5. 39: ἰσομοιρῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, Isokr. 12. 42: πρὸς Αργείους καὶ Μεσσηνίους διείλοντο τὴν χώραν, Andok. 4. 18: πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις συνεθέµεθα, Dem. 23. 167: γράφει τὰς συνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ΓΚηφισόδοτον, Dem. 6. ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 23 21: ὁμιλίαι, Isokr. 4. 43: συγγένεια, Dem. 14. 36: διαφέρε- oat, Isokr. 5. 35: διαφορά, Dem. 14. 12: διαφορά, Isokr. 5. 37: εἰ πρός τινας αὐτῶν (τῶν πόλεων) andes τί σοι (Φιλίππῳ) συµβέβηκεν, Dem. 20. 63: τοῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀδι- κήµασι, Isokr. 3. 33: διαλλάττεσῦαι, Isokr. 4. 94: διαλλα- yat, Isokr. 12. 160: διαλύεσθαι, Aisch. 2. 12: διαλύεσθαι. Isokr. 4. 43: σπεισαµένους πρὸς ἀλλήλους, Andok. 1. 80: σπονδαὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγένοντο, Aisch. 2. 30: τὰς πρὸς Περδίκκαν ἀνοχάς, Andok. 3. 2: εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι. Isokr. 12. 188: εἰρήνην συγγράφεσθαι, Dem. 20. 54: εἰρήνη ἐγένετο, Dem. 19. 54: εἰρήνη, Aisch. 2. 60: εἰρήνη, Dein- arch 1. 28: τῷ γράψαντι πρὸς Φίλιππον εἰρήνην, Andok. 3. 30: συμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι, Andok. 3. 65 and 95: cup- µαχία. Very personal in the relations and actions it sug- gests is Isokr. 12. 159: οὔτε νῦν αἰσχύνονται διακολ.ακευό- µενοι πρὸς τὸν ἐκείνου (βασιλέως) πλοῦτον. Expressions of conflict and hostility, which may be included in the general category of dealings and relations, but certainly to begin with were hardly felt as belonging there, are frequently found with πρός in this construction. The single µάχεσθαι of the Iliad has increased in number and drawn in its train a variety of cognate words. Aisch. 1. 64: ὅστις ὧν πρὸς οὕστινας ἐπολέμει, Dem. 5. 16: πολε- μεῖν, Dem. 5. 14: πόλεμος, Dem. 4. 3: πόλεμος, Aisch. 2. 172: καταστάντες πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους εἰς πόλεμον ο πο Όση 18. 151: πόλεμος πρὸς τοὺς ᾽Αμϕισσέας ἐταράχθη, Aisch. 2. 106: συνταράττειν πρὸς ἀλλήλας ras πόλεις, Isokr. 8. 20: ταραχῆς els ἣν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καθέσταµεν, Dem. 23. 103: ἡ γὰρ ἐκείων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ταραχὴ καὶ ὑποψία, Dem. 15. 24: παρατάττεσθαι, Dem. 16. 6: παρατάττεσθαι, 15οΚτ. 9. 61 : ἀντιτάξας τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώµην πρὸς τὰς οὕτως ὑπερμεγέθεις ππαρασκευάς, Aisch. 3. 16: ἀντιτάττειν τὸν νόµον πρὸς τὴν τούτων ἀναίδειαν, Dem. 4. 47: πρὸς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀγωνίσα- σθαι, Dem. 8. 33: πρὸς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐκεῖνός ἐσθ) ὁ ἀγών, Dem. 53. Ι4: ἀγώνων por συνεστηκότων πρὸς αὐτούς, Aisch. 3. 189: τοὶς μὲν πύκται ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγών πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τοῖς 24 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. & ἀξιοῦσι στεφανοῦσθαι πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρετή», Isokr. 7. 73: πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ἀρετὴν ἁμιλλητέον ἡμῖν ἐστι, Lys. 3. 40: Φιλονικεῖν, 15οΚτ. 4. 19, φιλονικία, Dem. 9. 14: ἔρις καὶ Φιλο- νικία, Isokr. 4. 166: πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας, ἀμφισρητεῖν (cf. Lykourg. 108), Isai. 7. 2 and 21: ἀμφι- σβητεῖν, Lys. 17. 5: ἀμφισβήτησιν ποιεῖσθαι, Andok. 2. 26: ὁ πρόπαππος στασιάσας πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήµου, Lys. 26. 22: στασιάζειν, Isokr. 4. 79: στάσεις ποι- εἶσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. In Isokr. 3. 18: διὰ τὰς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς φιλοτιµίας, the idea is rivalry in ambitious hopes and projects: the ordinary force of φιλοτιμία πρὀς τινα in the orators is quite different. Here belongs, as finding its justification in the suggestion of conflict, the use of πρός with κινδυνεύειν and κίνδυνος. As κίνδυνος runs very close at times to μάχη in signification, if it does not quite reach it, it seems not unnatural to suppose that µάχεσθαι πρός τινα led to the adoption of κινδυνεύειν πρὀς τινα, which in turn opened the door for κινδύνους ποιεῖσθαι πρός τινα. Lys. 16. 18: τῶν κινδυνεύειν ἐθελόντων πρὸς τοὺς πολεµίους, Isokr. 4. 67: διακινδυνεύειν͵, Isokr. 4. 135: κινδυνεύειν͵ Isokr, 12. 83: κινδυνεύειν, Isokr. 17. 2: κινδυνεύειν, Dem. 15. 24: κινδυνεύειν., Deinarch. 2. 26: κινδυνεύειν, Dem. 50. 21: κιν- δύνους κινδυνεύειν πρὀς τε χειμῶνα καὶ πρὸς πολεµίους. Isokr. 4. 173: τοὺς κινδύνους πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιησώµεθα, Isokr. 6. 42: κινδύνους ποιεῖσθαι, Dem. 48. 29: κίνδυνον ποιεῖσθαι, Isokr. 12. 61: τῶν κινδύνων τῶν ἅμα Kal πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς γενοµένων, Lys. 16. 12: τοὺς κινδύνους τοὺς πρὸς τοὺς πολε- pious, Isokr. 4. 65: τῶν πρὸς Ἠὐρυσθέα κινδύνων, Lykourg. 130: κίνδυνος, Lys. 19. 20: πολλῶν κινδύνων ὑπαρχόντων πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τοὺς πολεµίους. In Isokr. 4. 26 we read: εὑρήσομεν γὰρ αὐτὴν (τὴν πόλιν) τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλε- μον κινδύνων αἰτίαν otcav, where τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον κινδύνων (cf. Isokr. 4. 142) is a general expression, ‘dangers incurred in war. Of course, we have not in these words precisely the same construction in all respects as is exem- plified above in such phrases as τοὺς πρὸς τοὺς πολεµίους ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 25 κινδύνους: but, whatever the degree of difference may be, it is the offspring and natural extension of just these uses; it required but a slight change to substitute τὸν πόλεμον, used, perhaps, at first of a particular war, actually waged, for τοὺς πολεµίους: that is, of the notion of opposition made for that of opponents. After this the generalization would be as natural as in the case of of πολέμιοι. Other more indefinite senses of πρός, ‘in the way of,’ ‘with a view to, ‘with regard to,’ would lend their aid in the develop- ment, and the sense in the end would probably be much the same as in the phrase τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην, which is found in Lys. 33. 7. Partaking of the character of both the preceding classes are the legal uses of the construction, in which the orators, from the prevailing character of their orations, so much abound: cf πράγµατα of legal proceedings on the one side, and ἀγωνίζεσθαι, of ‘fighting’. one’s case in the courts on the other. Dem. 18. 16: ἀγωνίζεσθαι, Lys. 109. IL: aywv, Isokr. 14. 3: ἀγών, Dem. 43. 1: ἁγών, Lys. 17.5: ἀντιδικῶν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, Isai. ΤΙ. 9: ἀντιδικεῖν, Isai. 5. 31: THY πρὸς Λεωχάρην δίκης, Dem. 27. 26: πρὸς τὴν δίκην ἥττηνται περὶ αὐτῶν, Dem. 20. 1: πρότερόν µοι δίκης γενοµέ- νης πρὸς Αφοβον, Dem. 37.2: δύση, Dem. 45.64: δίκη. Dem. [7]. 41: πρὸς Καρδιανοὺς δεῖ ὑμᾶς διαδικάζεσθαι, Aisch. 3. 146: διαδικασίαν ἔφη γράψειν τῷ βήματι πρὸς τὸ στρατή- γιου, Isai. δ. 3: τὴν κρίσιν οὐ δεῖ por νοµίζξειν, εἶναι πρὸς τὸν εἰληχότα του κλήρου τὴν δίκην, Deinarch. 1. 87: κρίσει Ποσειδῶν ἀποτοχωὼν τοῖς ὑπὲρ ᾿Αλιρροθίου πρὸς ἼΑρη γενο- µένοις ἐνέμεινεν + αὗται αἱ σεμναὶ θεαὺὶ τῇ πρὸς ᾿Ὀρέστην κρίσει, Isai. 11. 27: λαχεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους, ibid.: τῆς πρὸς ewe λῆξεως, Dem. 45. 41: ὅταν εἰσίω πρὸς τοὺς ταῦτα µεµαρ- τυρηκότας, Dem. 37. 1: πρὸς Πανταίνετον παρεγραψάµην, Dem. 45. 40: παραγράφεσθαι. In Dem. 33. 23: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτροπὴ τούτῳ πρὸς Παρμένοντα τρίτον ἔτος γέγονε we have the legal προς, but under somewhat peculiar circumstances, for this ἐπιτροπή is a joint act of both the parties to the 26 ON zpos WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. suit, who here are οὗτος and ἸΠαρμένων, and not an act by one of them as against the other, cf § 14: πεισθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων eis ἐπιτροπὴν ἔρχονται, καὶ γράψαντες συνθή- κας ἐπιτρέπουσιν ἑνὶ μὲν διαιτητῇ κ.τ.λ. It is the implication in ἐπιτροπὴ of this agreement detween them so to refer the points in dispute, and that solely, that makes πρόὀς here a possible construction. In this instance, πρόὀς has come in through the door of ‘business relations. —Connected with these expressions for instituting proceedings at law are words of accusation, first in a legal and then in a general sense ; no attempt is here made to separate the two senses. Isokr. 4. 68: πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐγκλήματα ποιησάµενοι, Dem. 36. 14: ἔγκλημα ποιεῖσθαι, Dem. 18. 151: ἐγκλήματα καὶ πόλεμος πρὸς τοὺς ᾿᾽Αμφισσέας ἐταράχθη, Dem. 37. 18: ἔγκλημα εἶναί τινι πρός τινα, Dem. 41. 4: τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγκλη- µάτων, Isokr. 18. 41: τῶν κατηγοριῶν ais ἔξεστι χρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς μηδέν ἡμαρτηκότας, Isokr. 11. 40: περὶ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κακηγορίας (mutual). Another use of πρός in legal phraseology is to indicate the court or magistrate before whom suit is brought, or definite acts pertaining to the suit are performed. Such an instance as Dem. 34. I: οὐδεμίαν πώποτε δίκην πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰσῆλθον probably shows how this usage arose, and the idea that the preposition in such cases conveyed, however indistinctly, to the mind of a Greek. Lys. 17. 8: πρὸς οὓς αἱ δίκαι ἐλήχθησαν, Lys. 23. 4: τῶν λαχόντων αὐτῷ δίκας πρὸς τὸν πολέμαρχον, Isai. 11. 33: λαχέτω πρὸς τὸν ἄρχον- τα, Lys. 26. 14: ἔστι δὲ τούτοις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀγών, Lys. 32. 2: ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν πρὸς τούτους (Sc. τοὺς δικαστάς) ἐγκλημά- των, Andok. 1. 73: ἐγγυὰς ἠγγυήσαντο πρὸς τὸ δηµόσιον, Isokr. 17. 14: διεγγυῶντος Μενεξένου πρὸς τὸν πολέμαρχον τὸν παῖδα. Aisch. 3. 20: ἐγγράφειν πρὸς τοὺς λογιστᾶς, Dem. 37. 6: αἴτιον ἑαυτῷ πρὸς τὸ δηµόσιον γενέσθαι τῆς ἐγγραφῆς. Isai. 6. 44: πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀπέγραψαν αὐτούς, Isokr. 18. 6: πρὸς αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν ἄρχοντα) τὴν φάσιν τῶν χρημάτων ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. αρ ἐποιεῖτο, Dem. 27. 51: κελεύοντος & ἐμοῦ πρὸς τὸν διαιτητὴν ἐπιδεικνύναι ταῦτα. We have already noticed in other connections how πρός, after its use with expressions of specific signification, had become naturalized and thoroughly habitual, acquired the power to denote the same specific relations with other words that certainly admitted them, sometimes suggested them, but did not directly express them; at times, indeed, all the suggestion that was needed was given by the gen- eral trend of the context. or the general region in which the thought of the passage fouhd its natural habitat. The same remark falls to be made as to the denotation of hos- tility and of dealings at law. In Isokr. 5. 122: ἀποχρησά- µενον τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, although ἀποχρή- σασθαι is a verb of the most general character, the un- mistakeable sense is ‘use against,’ ‘use in war against.’ The general sense of the passage, which is an exhortation _to Philip to turn his attention to the war with Persia Iso- ' krates was so fond of preaching, puts this limitation upon the meaning of πρός just as completely as if he had said in so many words ἀποχρησάμενον τοῖς τοιούτοις εἰς πόλε- pov πρὸς τ. β. of. Isokr. 12. 219: ὅσοι τοῖς πράγµασι τοῖς εὑρημένοις ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ, τούτοις ἐπὶ βλάβη χρώµενοι τυγχά- νουσι μὴ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς els τὴν αὑτῶν χώραν εἰκβάλλοντας, where the words ἐπὶ βλάβῃ specialize the sense of the participle χρώμµενοι to that of hostile, harmful use. It is to be re- marked, however, that even here these words would doubt- less have been omitted had it not been for the ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ that precedes, since the whole context, and especially the words τοὺς-- εἰσβάλλοντας make it quite clear that by τοῖς πράγµασι are meant what are called a line or two further on τοῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιτηδεύμασιν. cf. also Isokr. 4. 174: εἰ ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις ταῖς ἐκ τούτων (sc. τῶν κινδύνων τῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς) γεγενηµέναις πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον κατα- χρήσασθαι δόξειεν ἡμῖν. In the legal sphere a remarkable τος ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. instance has been quoted above, Dem. 33. 23 ; another may be found in Dem. 39. 15: εἰ τις δίκην ἐξούλης αὐτῷ λαχὼν μηδὲν ἐμοὶ φαίη πρὸς αὑτὸν εἶναι, κυρίαν δὲ ποιησάµενος ἐγγράψαι, τί μᾶλλον av ein τοῦτον ἢ ἐμὲ ἐγγραφώς. This is just as clear ας if he had said μὴ ἐμοὶ φαίη ταύτην πρὸς αὑτὸν εἶναι, since the definiteness that would thus be given by ταύτην to the application of πρὀς has ceased to be neces- sary: what is wanted in this respect may be gathered ftom the context. Inthe category of international dealings and relations an example is furnished us of this extension of the force of πρός in Isokr. 5. 15. After speaking of Philip as πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν κεκτηµένον ὅσην οὐδεὶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἃ µόνα τῶν ὄντων καὶ πείθειν καὶ βιάζεσθαι πέφυκεν - ὧν οἶμαι καὶ τὰ ῥηθησόμενα προσδεήσεσθαι, the writer adds: µέλλω γάρ σοι συμβουλεύειν προστῆναι τῆς τετῶν Ελλήνων ὁμονοίας καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους στρατείας : ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πείθειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἓλλληνας συμφέρον, τὸ δὲ βιάζεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους χρήσιμον. Philip, he says, by his wealth and power, has the ability both to persuade and to constrain, both of which the project to be proposed will call for; this project is nothing less than the union of Greece under Philip’s presidency and a joint attack upon Persia, and his ability to persuade will be helpful in his dealings and negotiations with the Greeks, as his military force will be useful in the campaign against the barbarians. One may render πρὀς here in both cases, if one wishes, - ‘as regards,’ or by any other suitable general phrase, but none the less it will denote clearly in the one case the sort of dealings implied in προστῆναι τῆς ὁμονοίας in the one case, and in στρατείας in the other. Placed in different connection and in a different atmosphere of thought, πρός in the two cases would change its sense to suit. The ex- treme instances of this development of πρός in the denota- tion of dealings, intercourse and relations are found in the frequent phrases τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, τὰ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, τὰ πρὸς ἐμέ, etc., etc. ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 2004 Very interesting is the fact, frequently illustrated in the examples already given, that out of the concrete’ ex- pression of the action of a definite person by means of a verb, arises the abstract expression of action (of a specified or unspecified person) by means of the corresponding noun, and that, as this construction with πρός is used in the one case, so it is also in the other. Such a process, easy and natural enough in itself, may have been facilitated by the possibility of periphrasis afforded by the use of ποιεῖσθαι, or some similar word, with the proper verbal noun. We may not only say λέγειν πρὀς τινα, but λόγους ποιεῖσθαι πρόὀς τινα, λόγῳ χρῆσθαι mpds τινα and λόγος πρός τινα: ἀγωνίζομαι πρὀς τινα through ἀγὼν γίγνεταί wor πρός τινα leads to ἄγων πρός τινα: similarly we find κινδυνεύειν πρός τινα, κίνδυνον ποιεῖσθαι πρός τινα, and ultimately κίνδυνος πρός τινα. It is worth noticing, too, that expressions of this sort were found capable of large extension, especially in words of relation rather than of action, so that, in some cases, the construction came to be possible with the noun, although the corresponding verb did not admit of it. We may not say φιλεῖν πρὀς τινα, but we may and do say φιλίαν ποιεῖσθαι πρὀς τινα and φιλία πρός τινα. Cognate with this, carried along by it and helping in turn to carry it along, is a modification of the force of πρός when used with verbs and expressions of action; a modifi- cation that runs through all the categories and not seldom alters the meaning. Throwing off the restriction to the signification of action of one person upon a second, when both are in actual presence the one of the other, it takes the more abstract sense of direction of activity towards. This has three important results: frs¢, it opens the way to what I may call a secondary direction of activity, which may be simultaneous with a quite different primary direc- tion of the same activity ; our words, for example, may be spoken to, and in the hearing of, one person while meant for another who perhaps may not be there to hear them 30 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. spoken; ‘second, it makes it possible to use words, which primarily can only express action personal at once in sub- ject and object, to denote action secondarily directed to- wards things and events ; {ηέγα, it permits extension of this construction to a wider circle of verbs. As instances of the first take the following: Dem. 18. 40: σαφῶς δηλοῖ καὶ διορίζεται ἐν τῇ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐπιστολῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ συμμάχους, Dem. 18. 196: ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὦ δικασταί (the persons addressed) καὶ τοὺς περιεστηκότας καὶ ἀκροωμένους (persons not addressed, but welcome hearers), ἐπεὶ πρός ye τοῦτον (person not ad- dressed, nor thought of as listening; but yet ‘le discours est A son addresse,’ is meant for him) Bpaxyds καὶ σαφὴς ἐξήρκει λόγος; of the second: Aisch. 3. 17: πρὸς τὸν ἄφυ- κτον λόγον βραχέα βούλομαι προειπεῖν; of the third: Dem. 27. 8: οὐδ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἀποκρύψασθαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἐδυνή- θησαν. Isokr. 4. 82: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς οὖκ εἰσὶν ἁρμόττοντες λόγοι, Isai. 11. 30: πρὸς ὃν μὴ ὅτι γένος εἶχον ἄμεινον εὐπεῖν, Aisch. 3. 236: ἡδέως ἂν ἐναντίον ὑμῶν ἀναλοηγισαίμην πρὸς τὸν γράψαντα τὸ ψήφισμα, Dem. 33. 8: ἀνθαπολοηγησάμενος πρὸς τοῦτον, Dem. 22. 19: ὅτι det μοι πιθανὴν ία πρὸς ὑμᾶς, Dem. 23. 123: ερ πρόὀφασις προ ὑμᾶς, Isokr. 18. 30: τίνας πίστει πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους εὑρήσομεν, Ant. By 2: ἕνα πρὸς ἕνα λόγον ἀπολογηθείς, Lys. 19. IT: ἀπολοηεῖσθαι πρὸς δόξαν ἣν ἔνιοι ἔχουσι, Lys. 19. 51: πρὸς διαβολὴν ἀπολοπγεῖσθαι, Lys. 26. 4: πρὸς τούτους τοὺς λόη- ους ἀντειπεῖν, Isai. 2. 17: πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν ἀντευπεῖν, 1881. 10. 22: πρὸς νόμους καὶ δίκαιον πρᾶγμα ἀντιλέγειν, Dem. 4s. 44: πρὸς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀναίδειαν προειπεῖν ὑμῖν, Aisch. 9. 205: ἀπολογεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸν τῶν ὑπευθύνων νόμον, πρὸς τὸ παρ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, Aisch. 2. 11: πρὸς τόλµαν καὶ τερατείαν διαμνημονεῦσαι, λέγεω πρὸς enna δοκήτους διαβολάς, Isai. 3. 79: πρὸς τὴν τούτου µαρτυρίαν τεκµήριόν ἐστι τοῦτο, Dem. 54. 26: γράφοντας μαρτυρίας οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, Aisch. 3. 203: τὰς ἐσομένας πρὸς ταῦτα προφάσεις, Dem. 19. 310: ἐνθυμεῖσθε πρὸς μὲν τὰ ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 31 τούτου παιδία, πρὸς δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ τούτου δάκρυα, Dem. 20. 146: πρόὀς τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν (‘have opinion of’), Aisch. 2. 176: μνησικακεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, Isai. 11. 9: ἀμφισβητεῖν πρὸς διαθήκας, Isokr. 4. 188: πρὸς τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἅμιλλαν, Isokr. 18. 31: πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον καλῶς ἀγωνίζε- σθαι, Dem. 30. 3: πρὸς παρασκευὰς λόγων καὶ μάρτυρας 6 ἀγών ἐστιν, Deinarch, 3. 20: διαδικάζεται πρὸς τὴν πονηρίαν, Dem. 35. 32: πρὸς τὸ πλοῖον οὐδὲν ἦν αὐτοῖς συμβόλαιον, Aisch. 2. 38: διατριβὴν ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς λόγους tds, Isokr. I. 37: μηδενὶ χρῶ πονηρῷ πρὸς τὰς διοικήσεις, Isokr. 15. 193: πρὸς ὑμᾶς συστέλλειν τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν, Dem. 15. 96: πρός τινας ὑποστέλλεσθαι, Deinarch. 3. 13: ὑποστέλλεσθαι, Aisch. I. 115: πρὸς Φιλόξενον ἀνήλωσε, Isokr. 15. 140: οὐκ ἀποκρύψομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, Dem. 45. 58: πρὸς µαρτυρίαν τινά, tv ἐξορκώσαιμι, ἀναστάντος ἐμοῦ, Isokr. 9. 69: τὰς παρασκευὰς τὰς πρὸς Aaxedatpoviovs. Here falls to be placed Dem. 52. 24: οἶμαί τί µοι καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι πρὸς τὴν ἀλαζονείαν τὴν τούτου: the speaker has just promised .to prove a certain fact, when he adds these words: ‘I think that in this I will score a point of importance against,’ mpos indicating the ‘bearing’ the promised proof will have. A somewhat similar case is found in Dem. 37. 57: ἀλλὰ τί τούτων ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, Ilavtaivere; these words follow a mention of certain outward defects in speech and action, which the opponent had harped upon in the hope of preju- dicing the jury, and the point that is made is that such matters have no bearing upon the case as between the speaker and Pantainetos, that these unfortunate peculiari- ties of his have never wrought harm to Pantainetos in their business transactions ; the rhetorical question that follows, πολλὰ Kal δεινὰ πέπονθας., must not be left out of sight in considering the meaning of this passage. Out of this use of πρός grows the general and indefinite sense, so often met with, ‘in reference to,’ ‘with a view to,’ ‘with regard to.’ This again receives specific application in two directions: either the events with a view to which 32 ON zpos WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. action is taken are future, and then they supply the pur- pose of the action; or these events precede, and then they mark the occasion for the action. Of the indefinite sense the following are examples: Lys. 26. 24: πρὸς ταῦτα βου- λεύεσθαι, Isokr. 1. 28: πρὸς τὸν ἄλλον βίον petpiws αὐτὴν ἀγάπα, Isokr. 9. 46: τῇ πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους ᾿εὐβουλία, Dem. 36. 31: εἰ πρὸς γένους δόξαν ἀναίνει Φορμίωνα κηδε- στήν, Aisch. 2. 3: ἀπίθανος ὧν πρὸς τὴν ὑποψίαν ταύτην (‘untrustworthy as regards, in the matter of, such a sug- gestion of suspicion’), Aisch. 2. 165: πρὸς τὸ παρὸν τὰ Αέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν. Lykourg. 69: πρὸς τὸν ἐπιόντα κίν- δυνον καλῶς βουλευσάμενον, Lys. 33. 7: τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόὀλε- μον ἐπιστήμην. In the particular sense of purpose we have: Lys. 9. 15: προφάσεως οὐδεμιᾶς πρὸς ἔχθραν ὑπαρ- χούσης, Lys. 19. 22: προσδεῖν πρὸς τὸν μισθὸν τοῖς πελτα- σταῖς, Isokr. 4. 40: τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς πρὸς ἡδονὴν µεμηχανημέ- vas (cf. the frequent phrases πρὸς ἡδονὴν λέγειν, πρὸς χάριν λέγειν), Isokr. 4. 47: φιλοσοφία 7 πρὸς τὰς πράξεις ἡμᾶς ἐπαίδευσε, Isokr. 5. 25: ὑπειλήφασι τοὺς μὲν (τῶν λόγων) πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν καὶ πρὸς ἐργολαβίαν (cf 12. 271 and 15. 1), Isokr. 13. 5: πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν ed) βουλευόμενοι, Isokr. 15. 183: τὰ σχήματα Ta πρὸς ἀγωνίαν εὑρημένα, Dem. 23. 199: Μένωνι δώδεκα τάλαντα δόντι πρὸς τὸν πὀλεμον, Dem. 49. 5: ἵν ᾖ αὐτοῖς γνώριµα τά τε ληφθέντα καὶ τὰ τεθέντα πρὸς τοὺς λοηισμούς (‘against the audit’). In the sense of occasion we have: Isokr. 15. 175: τοὺς μὲν διαβεβληµένους πρὸς αὐτήν (sc. τὴν φιλοσοφίαν), 1.6. ‘by reason of, on ac- count of,’ Dem. 23. 177: λαβὲ τὸ ψήφισμα ἃ πρὺς TAD! ὑμεῖς ἐψηφίσασθε. Here belongs πρὸς ταῦτα --- ‘therefore.’ The notion of activity directed towards an object easily passes into that of attitude assumed or held toward it. Where persons are concerned, attitude may be external or internal, it may imply the actuality or the possibility, as manifested by outward and visible tokens, of a certain course of action, or nothing more than the disposition or frame of mind that lies behind such an attitude. Moreover ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 33 such a disposition may, as regards its nature, either bea thing of the emotions, as generally between persons, or a certain adaptation of powers intellectual or physical, a capacity of some sort, as mostly between persons and pur- suits, modes of life, lines of action. Where persons are not concerned, or not directly concerned, except as they are implied in the qualities and states that belong to them, the resultant notion will be that of adaptability, helpful- ness, suitableness. It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a line between attitude (externally manifested, but not yet active) and disposition in citing examples, nor is it easily possible either to draw a firmer line between the dis- position of emotion and that of capacity; for the same words are constantly used in all these cases, a fact which, while it causes this difficulty, at the same renders it a matter of little importance, by showing us that no syntactic advantage is to be gained by attempting any differentia- tion. An exception should be made to this last statement as regards adjectives. To judge from the practice of the orators, and this, I think, is a fair basis for judgment, ad- jectives which denote suitableness or capacity, intellectual or physical, natural or acquired, are frequently construed with πρός and the accusative, whereas adjectives of the emotions (φίλος, ἐχθρός and the like), which are inspired by, and felt towards, persons, are very rarely so construed, and this, although the corresponding nouns are quite frequent with πρὸς. To these nouns allusion has already been made; and the fact here stated makes it all the more probable that φιλία πρός τινα, which has no sufficient basis in φίλος any more than it has in Φφιλεῖν, is due to Φφιλίαν ποιεῖσθαι πρός τινα. where the verb ποιεῖσθαι has made the construction possible. 34 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. I. Or THE ATTITUDE OF PERSONS. This construction is an everyday matter, with the verbs of disposition or attitude, διακεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, πεφυκέναι, an adverb (with πεφυκέναι an adjective may be used, as with εἶναι) being added to describe the position or attitude : διακεῖσθαι: of disposition towards persons: Lys. 3. 4: ἀνοητότερον, Isokr. 12. 48 : οἰκειότατα, Isokr. 16. 15: πιστῶς, Dem. 53. 14: οἰκείως. Towards things: Isokr. 14. 36: κοσµἰώτερον, Isokr. 9. 5: Φφιλοτιμοτέρως, Lykourg. 4. 8: καταδεέστερον. ἔχειν: towards persons: Isai. 7. 8: ἐχθρῶς, Isokr. 11. 3: εὐνοικῶς, Isokr. 19. 47: καλῶς, Dem. 52. 20: οὕτως. Ly- kourg. 15: εὐσεβῶς, ὁσίως, φιλοτίμως, Isokr. 9. 58: περι- Seas, Dem. 54. 42: οὕτως. Towards things: Isokr. 16. 5: ἐρρωμένως, Deinarch. 3. 14: παρέργως, Lykourg. 104: οὗ- τως, Aisch. 1. 167: ὀλιγώρως. πεφυκέναι: towards things: Isokr. 15. 187: καλῶς, Isokr. 15. 274: κακῶς, Lykourg. 132: μάλιστα, Lys. 19. I: δεινός. | Some verbs both indicate a disposition and describe it without need of an adverb: φιλοτιμεῖσθαι: Lys. 29. 14, Dem. 21. 17, Aisch. 2. 106; all of relation towards persons. Isokr. 4. 47: φιλοσοφίαν ἢ ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπράνυνε, Dem. 23. 12: πολῖται γεγενηµένοι Kal ἄλλως ἐσπουδακότες πρὸς ὑμᾶς. The disposition may be both indicated and described by an adverb: Isokr. 4. 41: τὴν διοίκησιν οὕτω Φφιλοξένως κατεσκευάσατο Kal πρὸς ἅπαντας οἰκείως, Isokr. 12. 48: πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀλλοτρίως καὶ πολεμικῶς τὴν αὑτῶν διοικοῦντες. The disposition or attitude may be given and described by an adjective : towards persons: Lys. 21. 10: παρεσκευα- σάµην τὸ πλήρωμα πρὸς ἐκεῖνον axodovOor, Isokr. 3. 34: πρὸς δὲ -οὺς δίκαιον ἐμαυτὸν παρέχων, Dem. 21. 1ΙΟΙ: μέτριος, OKr. I. 30: ὁμιλητικός, Isokr. 1. 31: φιλόνικος, Isokr. 4. ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 35 106: ἄπειροι κινδύνων, ἐλεύθεροι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, ἀστασίαστοι δὲ πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες πρὸς πάν- τας ἀνθρώπους (cf. 4. 150), Lys. 30. 26: ἀγαθὸς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, Dem. 23. 154: ἀφυλάκτων ὄντων ὡς ἂν πρὸς φίλον τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρα, Dem. 19. 206: δειλός, Dem. 23. 150: ἐχθρός; here belongs Dem. 19. 27: ἄπιστος, Dem. 37. 54: τίς ἐγω πρὸς τοὺς συμβάλλοντας ἄνθρωπος καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δεοµένους εὖὐμί, since the answer to the question would necessarily be μέτριος, or some such adjective. Towards things: Isokr. 2. 22: τοῖς Edvous τὴν πόλιν πάρεχε πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια νόµιµον, Aisch. 1. 1: µέτριον ἐμαυτὸν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων παρεσχηκώς, Isokr. 12. 32: τοὺς πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐάρμοστον ἔχοντας. Isokr. 4. 150: ὄχλος κινδύνων ἄπειρος, πρὸς μὲν τὸν πόλεμον ἐκλελυμένος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν δουλείαν ἄμεινον πεπαιδευµένος (cf. 4. 106, above), Lykourg. 9. 82: ἀγαθὸς πρὸς τὸν κύνδυ- vov (cf. Lys. 30. 23, above), Aisch. 3. 152: ἀχρηστότατος, Gavpaciwraros, Isokr. 5. 18: καταδεέστερον, Isokr. 5. 81: ἀφυέστατος. Isokr. 15. 131: ἀφυής, Isokr. 7. 74: εὐφυέστα- τος, διαφέρων (see below), Isokr. 15. 267: εὐμαθέστερος, Lys. 19. 1: δεινός, Isokr. 9. 20: δεινός, Isokr. 3. 56: ταπει- vos, Isokr. 10. 39: ταπεινός. Noun of attitude depending upon ἔχειν or ἄγειν: Isokr. 7. 51: πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἡσυχίαν εἶχον Kal πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας εἰρήνην ἦγον (cf. Isokr. 4. 106, above). | Noun of disposition depending on ἔχειν, with attribu- tive adjective: Dem. 19. 222: ἔχθραν πατρικὴν ἔχουσι πρός µε. With predicative adjective: Isokr. 4. 57: ἀείμνηστον τὴν ὀργήν, Isokr. 4. 174: τὰς εὐνοίας ἀληθινάς (similar in effect is Dem. 54. 42: οὕτως τὴν ὀργὴν ἔχειν πρὀς τινα, though by reason of the adverb οὕτως this belongs above.) Noun with συμβαίνειν, γίγνεσθαι, ὑπάρχειν, εἶναι : ἀπέχθεια: Dem. 19. 17, 19. 221: ἔχθρα: Dem. 19. 34, Dem. Poon bryant 2.2) ys) 18. 5 δοκούς, στ Ἴδομτ. 14. 9», 36 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. Isokr. 19. 32, Isai. 7. 27; ὀργή: Dem. 54. 6; φιλία; Isokr. 15. 101, Isai. 7. 29, Andok. 1, 141: ξενίαι καὶ φιλότητες : πίστις: Deinarch. 3. 18; Φιλοτιμία: Dem. 20. 69, Dem. 59. 33 (with ποιεῖσθαι): οὐκειότης: Dem. 19. 22; σπουδή: Leys! Ἡ, Noun without verb: ἀπέχθεια: Dem. 18. 31, Dem. 19, 12, Aisch. 2. 105; éy@pa: Dem. 18. 163, Dem. 58. 4, Aisch. 3. 217, Asch, 2. 140,\Isokr, 4.15, Isokr. 4. Το Ἴοι ο. ὀργή: Dem. 40. 29, Lys. 25. 5, Isokr. 15. 139; ἀηδία: Dem. 19. 193: wavia: Isokr. 12. 14; ὑποψία: Dem. 48. 18; Φόβος: Dem. 16. 10; ὁμόνοια : Isokr. 4. 3, Deinarch. 3. 19; Φιλία: Dem. 33. 24, Isokr. 9. 57, Isokr. 14. 33, Isokr. 16. 28, Isokr. το. 41, Deinarch. 1. 19, Lykourg. 1. 35; εὔνοια: Lys. 18. 3, Aisch. 1. 150, Aisch. 2. 118, Isokr. 3. 61: πίστις : Lys. 12. 67, Aisch. 1. 132, Deinarch. 3. 10; ἀπιστία: Aisch. I. 161; φιλοτιμία: Dem. 19. 173, Aisch. 3. 212, Aisch. 3. 19; χάρις: Deinarch. 3. 21. Dem. 54, 36: ἑτοιμότης bon καὶ ola πρὸς TO ποιεῖν OTL οὖν ὑπάρχει. II, ΟΕ SuITABILITY, HELPFULNESS, ETC. Aisch. 1. 41: ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, Isokr. 1. 10: ἡγεῖτο εἶναι πρὸς ἑταιρίαν πολλῷ κρείττω φύσιν νόµου, Isokr, 4. 40: τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τοῦ βίου χρησίµας, Isokr. 15. 263: χρησίµην εἶναι τὴν παιδείαν πρὸς τὰς πρά- ξεις, Isokr. 6. 76: τοὺς τόπους τοὺς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον συμφέ povras, Isokr. 8. 31: συµφέρων, Isokr. 7. 44: πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν nppottev, Isokr. 15. 10: ἁρμόττων, Isokr. 21. 11: τεκµήριον πρὸς ἅπαντα ἱκανόν, Isokr. 12.9: τὴν φύσιν εἰδως πρὸς τὰς πράξεις ἀρρωστοτέραν καὶ µαλακωτέραν, Isokr. 7. 30: εὐκαί- pos συνέβαινεν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν τῆς χώρας. Under this head must be put the use with διαφέρειν, frequent in Isokrates, to denote superior capacity for some- thing, or superiority of capacity in a given direction. Isokr. 3. 17: ὅσον ai µοναρχίαι πρὸς τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέ- ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. a7 ρουσιν, Isokr. 4. 53: ὅσον διαφέρουσι αἱ µείζους τῶν συµµα- χιῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, Isokr. 4. 72: πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς κινδύνους διενεγκόντες (‘superior in encountering ’), Isokr. 6, 4: οὐ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἐτῶν πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν eb διαφέροµεν ἀλλήλων, 18ο]κτ, 11. 17: πρὸς τὰς τέχνας εὑρήσομεν αὐτοὺς πλέον διαφέροντας τῶν περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἐπιστήμας. There are two passages, one in Isokrates and the other in Aischines, that call for something more than registration: examination and, if possible, explanation is needed. Isokr. 2, 2: τὸ συμβουλεύοντα Kal τῶν ποιημάτων Kal TOV συγγραμ- µάτων χρησιµώτατα μὲν ἅπαντες νοµίζουσιν, οὐ μὴν ἡδιστά y ἀκούουσιν, ἀλλὰ πεπόνθασιν ὅπερ πρὸς τοὺς νομοθετοῦν- τας ' καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνους ἐπαινοῦσι µέν, πλησιάζειν δὲ βούλονται τοῖς συνεξαμαρτάνουσιν ἀλλ’ ov τοῖς ἀποτρέπουσιν. AAisch. 3. 144: καὶ ταῖτ οὐκ ἐγὼ μὲν κατηγορῶ ἕτεροι δὲ παραλεί- πουσιν, ἀλλὰ κἀγω λέγω καὶ πάντες ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ ὑμεῖς σύνιστε καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεσθε . ἐκεῖνο γάρ πεπόνθατε πρὸς Δημοσθένην + συνείθισθε non τἀδικήµατα αὐτοῦ ἀκούειν, ὥστε οὐ θαυμάζετε . δεῖ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ANN’ ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι. The force of the πρὸς in these passages is something quite different from that of ὑπὸ with the geni- tive when construed with πάσχω, as may be seen on com- paring Plat. Apol. 17 A: ὅτι ὑμεὶς πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα ' ἐγώ δ᾽ οὖν ὑπ αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην ' οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. In this passage the πεπόνθατε denotes a condition of mind due to the action of the persuasive eloquence of the accusers. It is that elo- quence that is insisted upon as productive of effect upon the subject of πεπόνθατε, and so these accusers are the subject of the explanatory phrase οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον; they are active, the hearers passive. But in the passages from Isokrates and Aischines these réles are reversed: ‘the moral instructors’ in the one passage and Demosthe- nes (or rather his crimes, but the distinction is unimport- ant for our purposes) in the other are the odjects of the 38 On πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. verbs in the explanatory phrases; not their action upon others, but the action or attitude of others towards them is the point to be made. It may be said that what is felt towards these by others is produced by their action upon those others; but even when this is the case, it can only be an inference from passages constructed like the above, itis not what they directly signify: the distinction is an © important one in many cases; but in the passage from Aischines such an inference is even expressly excluded, for he does not say, ‘Demosthenes has made you obtuse to his misdeeds,’ but ‘you have heard them so often spoken of by others that you have ceased to regard them.’ We have here then no substitute of πρός with the accusative for ὑπὸ with the genitive, a case of which (though even then the sense is modified) I shall notice further on, nor a reversal of direction in the force of πρός, of which I shall also adduce several examples; but πρός is here used in a regular fashion that need give us no surprise and would not if we would only try to understand it. Now, shall we stop with rendering πρός ‘towards,’ and conclude that we have nothing here but a phrase similar to διακεῖσθαι πρός twa? In Plato's Apol. 21c: ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγω σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, it is impossible {ο take πρός as having no more force than it would have with the words οὕτω πως διετέθην͵ although the τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον is ‘a feeling of this sort came over me,’ and although, as in the cases given above, the continuation is: καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτώ, ἔδοξέ µοι ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφός---εἶναι δ ov; which expresses most decidedly a feeling towards him and an opinion of him. And the reason why this substitution is impossible is just the presence of σκοπῶν, which is not merely ‘in my investigation,’ but a repetition in abbreviated form of the διασκοπών τοῦτον that immediately precedes, so that, though we may say in notes ‘construe πρὸς ὃν with ἔπαθον, we are compelled somehow, grammatically or On πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 39 otherwise, to work σκοπῶν into the connection as well. Let us now look at another passage in Plato. Gorg. 485 B-D: ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένου.. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω ᾧ ἐτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω ψελλιξόμενον, χαίρω * ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγοµένου παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί mot δοκεῖ χρῆμα εἶναι + ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃτις ψελλιζομένου ἢ παί- ζἕοντα ὁρᾷ, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. Tav- τὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντα». παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ µειρακίῳ ὁρῶν Φφιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι ' ὅταν δὲ 67 πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι Φιλοσοφοῦντα, πληγῶν por δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ. Here again πάσχω πρός τινα appears with similar explanatory phrases, expressing the speaker's opinion of or feeling towards the ¢vAocogovvtes; and it would seem easy enough here to regard πάσχω πρὀς as quite parallel as to the force of the preposition with δια- κεῖμαι πρός; but yet one cannot help feeling that, if πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας amounted to no more than this, the extended explanation that follows might have dispensed with its ὅταν ἴδω. ὅταν ἀκούσω, παρὰ νέῳ---ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν, etc. Why not simply say: ‘the lisping child is a pleasure to me,’ ‘the man who lisps ought, in my opinion, to get a thrashing’? If this seem like hair-splitting, and the free- dom of choice an author is supposed to have in his mode of expression be brought forward to account for the intro- duction of these words, I might say that in Greek writing which appealed so much more to the ear and less to the eye than does our literary tongue (cf. the passage from Iso- krates now under discussion), a form of expression once entered upon was very likely to be kept up and the develop- ment of an idea already succinctly expressed was very likely to be made through the development on a larger scale of the form of expression first chosen. But, apart from any such general consideration, it is remarkable that in all these examples we have, closely connected with the 49 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. construction under discussion, such words as ἀκούουσιν _ Csokr.), ἀκούειν (Aisch.), σκοπῶν, διασκοπῶν, διαλεγόμενος (Apol.), ἴδω, ἀκούσω, ὁρῶν (Gorg.): now, all this points in one direction and indicates one general force of πρός, which, however, takes color in each case from the particu- lar circumstances of that case. In Isokrates the sense is ‘when we hear them;’ in Aischines, ‘when they hear Demosthenes’ (or ‘his crimes,’ for which the name is only a short cut) ‘mentioned ;’ in the Apology, ‘when I exam- ined him and conversed with him;’ in the Gorgias, ‘when I saw, ’etc.: the general sense being ‘ when they are brought before us’ in the material world or, it may be, in the world of thought ; and it is this vague relation indicated by πρὀς (the context giving it particularization) that gives rise to the ‘feelings’ in us rather than the persons themselves, In all questions of business or personal dealings and relations, of attitude of persons towards others or even towards things, of dispositions, and especially of feelings towards persons, the idea of reciprocity is ever at hand to suggest itself. If A deals with B, B necessarily is not only dealt with by A, but deals with A; if A is at war with B, so is B with A; more, if A is friendly to B, we are quite ready to presume that B is friendly to A. It is a proverb with us that ‘children love those that love them.’ It is not surprising, therefore, that in expressions denoting such relations πρός with the accusative should distinctly imply a reverse relation of precisely the same sort. What we are not so readily prepared to expect is that, passing through this phase of mutuality of relation, it should ever come to express principally, if not solely, the reverse or re- actionary side of the relation: yet such is the case. I shall first give some examples to show that the sense of reciprocity of action or relation was to the feeling of the Greeks sufficiently near the surface to be distinctly felt, and then other examples, in which the return action or answering attitude is so far emphasized as at least to be ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 41 the most prominent idea expressed by the construction. I do this the more readily because I have never seen it distinctly stated, though I have long observed the use, and lately in various editions of the classics have seen it as I think, misunderstood. I wish first of all to insist upon it, that what I am touching upon is reciprocal or responsive action precisely similar in kind to that which calls it forth, and not attitude based upon expectation of, and likely to result in, return of a different kind. In such cases the construction does not at all differ from those already con- sidered, the implication being given, not by the πρός, but by the other word. Such expressions as Φφιλοτιμεῖσθαι πρός τινα, φιλοτιμία mods τινα do not belong here, for, although we do read in Dem. 20. 82: τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλο- τιµίαν τοῦ πατρός, and, a little further on, καὶ μᾶλλον εἵλε- το μὴ ζην ἤ καταισχΏναι τὰς παρ) ὑμῶν ὑπαρχούσας αὐτῷ τιµάς: what the people render is not φιλοτιµία, but τιµαί, and the suggestion of this return is rather in the φιλοτι- µία than in the πρό. This construction of φιλοτιμεῖσθαι and Φιλοτιμία is so commonly cited as an illustration of cases which come properly under the present category and are of quite different import, therefore, as to show that this application of πρός has been little understood. Try to say φιλοτιµία πρὸς ἀλλήλους, and see what a difference comes necessarily over the sense of the noun (67. Isokr. 3. 18: τὰς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς Φιλοτιµίας, already quoted). First, then, let me show that the Greeks did feel the suggestion of reciprocity contained in πρός, z2., that when using πρός with only one member of a relation, they felt the mutuality of the relation as completely at times as if πρὸς ἀλλήλους had been used. Dem. [7]. 41: πρὸς Καρδια- νοὺς δεῖ ὑμᾶς διαδικάζεσθαι εἴ τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς διαφερεσθε . διαφέρονται δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, σκεψασθε ed περὶ μικροῦ: here the feeling of action and respondent reaction is exceed- ingly clear. In English we would be compelled to say: 42 ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. ‘If you have any dispute with them, but you have a dispute - | with them ;’ we could not say as the Greek puts it: ‘If you have a dispute with them, but they have a dispute with you.’ Dem. 50. 28: καὶ ἐγγυηταὶ αὐτοὶ (ᾖθελον) γίγνεσθαι ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ἢ μὴν ἔσεσθαι αὐτῷ ort ἂν καὶ τοὶς ἄλλοις τριηράρχοις πρὸς τοὺς διαδόχους ᾖ; where ἐγώ is the trierarch and αὐ- τός his διάδοχος in that office; we would hardly say in Eng- lish: ‘My successor in office should be as fairly dealt with by me, as other trierarchs were by their successors in office,’ or if we did, we should miss the meaning of the Greek. Isai. 7. 11: αἱ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἔχθραι, where it is distinctly added that it was unknown which of them was responsible for the enmity, and just above, in 7. 8, we read of the same persons ἐχθρῶς ἔχοντες τὸν πάντα χρόνον διετέλεσαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. There can be no doubt that the words used in 7. 11 were felt to convey (and not merely imply or carry with them by way of suggestion) the same meaning as the more explicit phrase of 7. 8. It may be re- marked here that the so frequent phrase πρὸς ἀλλήλους and its equivalent πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτούς must have contributed largely and potently to the development of this force in the preposition ; but that this was only a contribution to a ten- dency already inherent, the other exemples show, and the traces of an incipient force of the kind that were above found in Homer but confirm this. Isokr. 1. 2: ἀπέσταλκά σοι Tovde τὸν λόγον δῶρον, τεκµήριον μὲν τὴς πρὸς ἡμᾶς εὐνοίας, σημεῖον δὲ τῆς πρὸς Ἱππόνικον συνηθείαςε: ἡμᾶς in this sentence is, of course, Isokrates’ usual substitute for ἐμέ, used to prevent hiatus. This πρός ἡμᾶς and the πρὸς Ἱππόνικον that follows mean precisely the same thing, ‘between me and Hipponikos,’ the change of expression being solely dictated by the desire of avoiding tautology, just as τεκµήριον in the one clause becomes σημεῖον in the second, without any stress being laid upon the difference between these synonyms. Such practical identity of signi- ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 43 fication could not have arisen, had not the reciprocal force of πρός been very strongly felt. The most remarkable example is yet to be given; it is found in Lys. 14. 2: πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῖν διαφορᾶς ὑπαρχούσης: ‘Our fathers being already at loggerheads.’ This has all the appearance of one of those colloquial short cuts, so common in all lang- uages, in which, for the sake of brevity and pith of ex- pression, logical exactness is thrown to the winds. It could only have been formed on the model of πρὸς ἀλλή- λους and the πρός has here not merely the connotation of reciprocity of relation, but the positive denotation of inter- relation; it gives us not one side ina given relation that is reciprocated, but both sides with the bond that unites them in the relation. With no help beyond that supplied by the number of πατέρας (a somewhat similar power of suggestion in a plural with πρός has already been noticed in Homer), the preposition has taken to itself the mutual- ity given to πρός ἀλλήλους by the pronoun. It is worth observing that in no other way could Lysias have conveyed all he desired to say in so few words or with such force. This is Lysias’ boldest experiment in the use of πρός with the accusative, and it is not surprising that it seems to stand alone in the cultivated language of literature; it doubtless fell back into the region of colloquialism whence it must have sprung and where the orator found it. But though it was felt that πρός (unaided by ἀλλήλους or some such word) was only suitable when one side of a relation was specified, this sense of the possible reciprocity of such relations, when πρός had acquired the power to convey it, gave rise to an occasional indifference to which side it was that was mentioned, where one was to be made specially prominent as source and the other as object of action or feeling. So that finally it became possible, as the following examples will show, to express thus not action directed towards some person or thing only, or even action and reaction looked upon as forming one reciprocating 44 ON zpos WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. whole, but the reverse or return action or feeling alone; that is, πρός τινα expressing a relation zowards, comes, first, to express (as we have just seen) a reciprocated relation in terms of the person Zowards whom it exists, and, second, a like relation in terms of the other person concerned, Z.é., the person ¢owards whom the reaction, but from whom the original action proceeds. Lys. 18. 6: τοιαῦτα ἐνομίζετο τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῷ πρὸς TO ὑμέτερον πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ Sid τοὺς προγόνους καὶ αὐτόν, ὥστε οὐκ ἄν rol? ἑτέρας ἐπιθυμῆσαι πολιτείας . συνῄδεσαν γὰρ ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως τιμωμένοις, καὶ πολλαχοῦ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κεκινδυνευκόσι κ.τ.λ. This example is on the fence; his relations and those of his ancestors {ο the state are explained first’ by the honors they had received from the state, and then by the services they had rendered ¢o the state. Had the explanation stopped with τιµωµένοις, we would have been completely over the fence, as we are in the following instances. Lys. 13. 82: τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας διέκειτο, οὐδεὶς γὰρ αὐτῷ διελέγετο. In this case the second clause makes the nature of the relation clear; it is the attitude of the citizens to him, not his to them, that is important for the orator’s pur- pose. Lys. 10. 22: τίνος ὄντος ἐμοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγκλήματος, ‘what charge have you against me.’ In this passage, over- looking this use of πρός with the accusative, Franke act- ually proposed to alter ὑμᾶς to ὑμῶν! Lys. 16. 10: πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οὕτω βεβίωκα ὥστε µηδεπώποτε μηδὲ πρὸς ἕνα μηδὲν ἔγκλημα «γενέσθαι, where ἕνα is evidently the person who is thought of as bringing the complaint. Dem. 1. 7.: ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἐγκλημάτων μι- σοῦσι, βεβαίαν εἰκὸς τὴν ἔχθραν αὐτοὺς ὑμὲρ ὧν φοβοῦνται καὶ πεπόνθασιν ἔχειν; φοβοῦνται and more particularly πεπόνθασιν make it impossible to regard αὐτούς as denoting any persons but those who make the complaint by reason of the treatment they have received. Isokr. 8. 38: πότερα χρήσωµαι ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἢ κατασιωπὴσω, δείσας τὴν πρὸς ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 45 ὑμᾶς ἀπέχθειαν; ‘your hostility to me’ is the notion that worries the orator’s mind. In every way similar to this is Dem. 6. 3: ἡμεῖς οἱ παριόντες τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπέχθειαν ὀκνοῦντες. Very clear is Dem. 14. 37: ἡσυχίαν μὲν yap ἐχόντων ὑμῶν ὕποπτος ἂν ein τοιοῦτό τι πράττων, πόλεμον δὲ ποιησαµένων προτέρων εἰκότως ἂν δοκοίη διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔχθραν τοῖς ἄλλοις φίλος εἶναι βούλεσθαι: the en- mity unmistakably arises from the side of the Athenians. Dem. 19. ὃς: ὑμῖν μὲν τὴν ἔχθραν τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους µείξω, Φιλίππῳ δὲ τὴν χάριν πεποίηκεν: Aischines’ action in the matter of the peace, on his return from the second embassy, it is charged, was the cause of the increased enmity not of the Athenians towards Thebes, but of the Thebans towards Athens, as well as for the increased gratitude of the The- bans to Philip. Dem. 18. 262: ἦν γάρ ἄσπονδος καὶ ἀκήρυ- κτος ὑμῖν πρὸς τοὺς θεατὰς πόλεμος: it was the audience surely that ‘made war’ on the actors and not the actors upon the audience. In Dem. 18. 238: τὰ πρὸς τοὺς OnBal- ους δίκαια means your rights as towards (‘in dealing with’) the Thebans, what you may rightfully demand of them and what they are in justice bound to render you. In Dem. 48. 46: αὑτῷ οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἔτι πρᾶγμα πρὸς τὰς συνθήκας ταύ- τας, when compared with Dem. 18. 21: οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ, a similar interchange of the sides in a relation may be ob- served. This apparent syntactical reversal of the relation be- tween. agent and object in such relations gave Demosthenes the opportunity to attempt one more bold experiment for the sake of concise expression of a complex activity. In Dem. 20. 25 we read: χωρὶς δὲ τούτων vuvi τῇ πὀλει, δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν ὄντοιν, πλούτου καὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἅπαντας πιστεύεσθαι, ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς πίστεως ὑπάρχον. There is something more here than the more common tf’ ἁπάντων πιστεύεσθαι would express, or even than the παρά tum πιστεύεσθαι of Dem. 23. 4, which Weil in his note quotes for comparison ; 46 | ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. ‘to be trusted by all,’ or ‘in the minds of,’ or ‘on the part of all,’ does not cover the whole meaning. Demosthenes, throughout the oration, is urging the duty of fulfilling to the letter engagements once undertaken. He is here. answering the plea that by abolishing the ἀτέλεια the city will have more money, and though he might say that, while wealth is not to be despised, ‘general confidence, which we already possess, is also a valuable thing,’ yet why does he not say, ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων, which would fully express this sense? Why substitute the startling πρὸς ἅπαντας ὃ He does so simply because he wishes his audience, not merely to feel the importance of general confidence but to see quite clearly that the keeping of engagements entered into with individuals and states, which he is urging, is the only way to secure that confidence; πρὸς ἅπαντας is a short cut to the intimation of this fact, for the πρός explicitly introduces the idea of ‘dealing with.’ The rendering ‘in our dealings with all’ would seem at first to satisfy all re- quirements; but it loses sight of the fact that no Athenian, in hearing these words, could fail to find in them a sug- gestion of those other more familiar phrases, πιστὸς εἶναι πρός τινα, πίστις πρός τινα, expressing fidelity and loyalty. I do not believe any of Demosthenes’ hearers could catch the sound of these words without recognizing instinctively and at once that confidence on the one side rests on good faith on the other; a thought, moreover, that the double- entendre in the πίστεως that follows would but emphasize. My rendering, then, of the passage would be ‘that our dealings with all men should command their confidence in us.’ Just afterwards, in reply to those who sneeringly say, ‘what has a city without means to do with what others think of her and her acts?’ Demosthenes prays that, whether rich or poor, Athens may always have τό ye πιστοῖς εἶναι καὶ βεβαίοις δοκεῖν διαµένειν, ‘the reputation of fidel- ity and steadfastness in her engagements,’ where πεστεύ- ON πρός WITH THE ACCUSATIVE. 47 εσθαι, now reduced to the lower level of opinion, is resolved into πιστοῖς εἶναι δοκεῖν; an indication, it seems to me, that πίστις. on the part of Athens, was clearly present in thought to Demosthenes when he said πρὸς ἅπαντας πί- στεύεσθαι. Compare again § 44 of the same oration, where, with reference to Epikerdes of Kyrene, it is said: τοῦτον τὸν-- τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἔχοντα OVXL τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἀφαιρήσεσθε (οὐδὲ γὰρ οὔσῃ χρώμενος φαίνεται), ἀλλὰ τὸ πιστεύειν ὑμῖν, οὗ τί γένοιτ’ ἂν αἴσχιον: here, in a particular instance, is given the opposite of the general πρὸς ἅπαντας πιστεύ- εσθαι, only in this case the compact statement is split up into its constituent parts, ‘break faith with him, and you lose his trust in you; what shame could be greater?’ It must be borne in mind. that such a use of πρός with the passive verb was not a familiar one, and that consequently it could not be used without putting a good deal of a strain upon πρός; which is an additional reason for refusing to be satisfied with easy-coming explanations that lay no special stress upon the preposition, leave it in fact quite pointless. 4 | - A ON SOPHOCLES’ ANTIPHONE: Lines 750-757. Beginning, for the sake of clearness. of connection, with 748, this passage runs thus, according to the tradi- tional arrangement: KPEQN. 6 yodv λόγος σοι πᾶς ὑπὲρ κείνης ὅδε. ΑΙΜΩΝ. καὶ cod γε κἀμοῦ, καὶ θεῶν τῶν νερτέρων. KP. ταύτην ποτ’ οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὡς ἔτι ζῶσαν yapeis. 75ο. ΑΙ. 948 οὖν θανεῖται καὶ θανοῦσ) ὀλεῖ τινά. KP. 7 κἀπαπειλῶν ὦδ' ἐπεξέρχει θρασύς : ΑΙ. ris & ἔστ ἀπειλὴ πρὸς κενὰς γνώµας λέγειν. KP. κλαίων φρενώσεις, dv φρενῶν αὐτὸς κενός. | ΑΙ. εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ᾖσθ', εἶπον ἄν σ᾿ οὐκ eb φρονεῖν. 755. KP. «φυναικὸς wv δούλευμα, μὴ κώτιλλέ µε. ΑΙ. βούλει λέγειν τι καὶ λέγων μηδὲν κλύειν. KP. ἄληθες: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ, τὀνδ᾽ Ὄλυμπον, ἴσθ᾽ ὅτι, / 3 \ / / b] . χαίρων ἐπὶ ψ.όγοισι δεννάσεις ἐμέ. Objection has been made to this arrangement, by reason of the outburst of Kreon, ἄληθες: κ.τ.λ. which, it is claimed, is hardly justified by the words of Haimon im- mediately preceding, and again that μὴ κώτιλλέ µε (‘seek not to wheedle me’) is too weak to follow the strong, bold words εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ᾖσθ', εἶπον ἂν σ᾿ οὐκ εὐ φρονεῖν. Accord- ingly transpositions have been suggested and adopted by some editors, which should remove this double blemish. It naturally occurred to such as desired to reconstruct the lines, to put 755 immediately before 758; that seemed to satisfy the first difficulty, and it only remained to find a setting for the misplaced 756, which should equally satisfy (48) On SopHocLEs’ ANTIPHONE. 49 the demand for logical propriety of sequence. Two ways were suggested for this: 1. It was proposed by Enger to remove 756 and 757 from their place and insert them, retaining their order, after 749. By this means it was believed that μὴ κώτιλ- λέμε would be amply justified by the καὶ cod γε of Haemon in 749. | 2. Donner proposed to effect an equally logical ar- rangement with less violence to tradition by interchanging 755 and 757. The μὴ κὠτιλλέ µε are then justified by D’Ooge, who adopts this arrangement, by rendering 756: ‘Yes, I do not wish to hear; desist, minion of a woman, from wheedling me.’ A third arrangement has been made by Pallis. He follows Enger in placing 755 after 749, but arranges the rest after 756 in the order 755, 754, 757, 750-753, thus mak- ing the words κενὰς γνώµας the exciting cause of Kreon’s frantic ἄληθες: Prof. Jebb, in his admirable edition, has done well in retaining the manuscript order of the lines, and has some interesting and instructive remarks in his support of that order. He calls attention to the fact that if, in 755, the stress be laid upon the condition εὖὐ μὴ πατὴρ ἠσθία), the apparently soft phrase μὴ κώτιλλέ µε will be amply justified, for Kreon will in effect be saying, ‘Filial respect restrains you from charging me with folly! Do you think to cajole me?’ I may add to what he says, that there is no neces- sity for endeavoring to soften the harshness of what Hai- mon says in this line. He is thoroughly provoked, it seems to me, and what he lays stress upon is the charge of folly, which he had not previously explicitly made; the quality- ing clause, εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ἠσθ(α). does not really soften the statement; it merely means that his relationship to Kreon, and that only, has tied his tongue. But to Kreon the words convey something different: he had already shins ake 50 On SopHocLes’ ANTIPHONE. words κενὰς yvoues heard himself impugned as a fool (a sense that Haimon did not intend to put into them at all), so that what is new to him and attracts his attention is this very εὖ μὴ πατὴρ ἠσθία), which he takes to be an empty profession of filial respect, with the purpose of taking the edge off the insolent κενὰς γνώµας. As to 757, which Jebb prints as a question, he finds in that, under the circum- stances a climax, such as is required, in that it is Haimon’s assertion of his ‘right to maintain his own views against his father’s,—6ua δίκης ἰέναι, as Kreon puts it (742).’ The climax unquestionably is there, but I shall endeavor to prove it even stronger than Prof. Jebb’s interpretation would make it. In his negative criticism Jebb is satisfied with saying that by Enger’s proposed arrangement ‘we lose nothing; but neither do we gain.’ This appears to me hardly suffi- cient; we do lose something very important, as I shall endeavor to show further on. Donner’s interchange of 755 and 757 is settled very effectually by the question as to the aptness of 756 as a reply to 757, for D’Ooge’s explanatory translation can hardly be accepted as satisfactory; but at the same time the fitness of the sequence 754-757 is very questionably granted. Pallis’ arrangement is not specifically criticized. But a general remark, intended apparently to apply to all three, is appended, which deserves special attention; it is this: ‘The fact is that, in a stormy altercation, we do not look for a closely logical texture, etc., delicately graduated cres- cendo. The remark is just and would have merited, per- haps, a fuller development, and even a more general appli- cation. In a dramatic scene it is not only the logic of thought that demands consideration ; there is also the logic of character and the logic of situation to be taken into account. If we cannot present to ourselves the succession of speeches dramatically, that is, if the dead words of the On SopHocLes’ ANTIPHONE. 51 printed page be not transformed into the living utterances of human beings in definite situations, we cannot fail to misunderstand and misjudge the productions of genuine playwrights. And this dramatic realization of written dia- logue is for all of us a matter by no means easy; the fam- iliar contrast between a play read in the closet and a play interpreted by actors to eye and ear on the stage is suffi- cient at once to explain and to prove my meaning. If we could but hear the author’s instructions to his actors as to attitude, gesture and tone of voice, new light could be thrown on the sense and connection of many a passage obscure either in itself or in its connection. Unfortunately, we cannot get this help; and in default of it, it behooves us to be very careful in our logical analysis of the text and in the conclusions we draw from it; we must endeavor to represent to our own minds the utterances in the light of the character in whose mouth they are put, and also as modi- fied by the situation in which that character finds himself at the moment; moreover, we must likewise endeavor to determine the sound (and consequent sense) they would have to the other characters who share in the dialogue. To neglect these precautions and attempt to pass upon the dialogue as a mere logical arrangement of abstract thoughts is quite sure to lead us astray. Now this mistake, it seems to me, as Jebb has rightly recognized, is at the basis of all the readjustments that have been proposed of the present passage. But I am also persuaded that had he followed out to its full extent the principle he has hinted at, he would have taken his stand in favor of the manuscript tra- dition more vigorously, and would hardly have admitted that ‘we lose nothing’ by Enger’s arrangement, much less that ‘other arrangements are possible, and would be nearly as good.’ Kreon was narrow-minded, autocratic, obstinate, weak. His decree, refusing burial to Polyneikos, was due simply to his narrow-mindedness, which prevented his taking into 52 | On SopHocies’ ANTIPHONE. account any considerations except the ‘raison d’état,’ as in modern phrase he might have called it. His decree once issued, on grounds that satisfied himself, he demanded ab- solute unquestioning obedience to it; for he, as ruler of the state, is supreme, autocratic ; if he does not say ‘L’état c’est moi, he says something very like it (1. 738)+ οὐ τοῦ κρατοῦντος ἡ πόλις νοµίζεται; When news is brought of the violation of his ordinance and the chorus timidly sug- gest that perhaps there may be divine interference here, he bursts out in a rage at them: Gods favor wickedness! No! there are rebels to authority in the state, and these have found tools to do this outrage for a bribe, and he swears by Zeus that the punishment shall be commensurate with the crime; not death only, but death in torment! When Antigone, caught in the act, is brought before him, and appeals to this same Zeus, by whom he has sworn, and to Justice, invoking the authority of those unwritten prin- ciples of right, that antedate and lie at the foundation of all proper human enactments, he has no ear for a plea he cannot understand: proud and stubborn, her stubbornness must be broken, her pride brought low; insolent, she dares defy the laws of her country, and with added insolence pre- sumes to justify the deed and glory in it; she must die. In his interview with Haimon, he goes over the same nar- row ground: obedience to the powers that be is the sum total of man’s duty: ἀναρχίας δε μεῖζον οὐκ ἐστὶ κακόν (672): σφῴζξει τὰ πολλὰ σώμαθ) ἡ πειθαρχία. There is, of course, added the still more imperative duty of obedience to paternal authority; but it is very clear that for Kreon the peculiar validity even of this principle lies in his con- sciousness that “eis the father. When in reply to Kreon’s harangue, Haimon ventures gently to suggest that there are two parties in the state, the rulers and the ruled, and that some regard must, for expediency’s sake, be paid to the sentiments of the latter, who at present are murmuring against his decree, adding at the close that one should On SOPHOCLES’ ΑΝΤΙΡΗΟΝΕ. 53 always be ready to listen to good advice; and the chorus, timidly again, chime in with a plea that Haimon’s words be listened to, Kreon’s obstinacy breaks forth: οἱ τηλικοίδε καὶ διδαξόµεσθα δὴ | φρονεῖν bm’ ἀνδρὸς τηλικοῦδε τὴν φύσιν: Then follows the stichomythy between Haimon and Kreon, in which there is no argument on Kreon’s part, but an ever angrier reiteration of the position he has already taken, his wrath growing as he feels more and more the weakness of his own position, until he begins at last to callnames: ὦ παγκά- κιστε (742), ὦ μιαρὸν ἦθος καὶ γυγαικὸς ὕστερον (746), γυναι- KOS WY δούλευμα, (756). Haimon, who has endeavored to ap- proach his father in the most careful manner, setting forth _ that father’s own true and best interests as the motives that prompt his interference, for a while keeps his temper passably well, though he cannot avoid retorting the charge of youth (735) and declaring that such principles of rule as Kreon’s would better become the ‘monarch of a desert;’ but, finally, stung by his father’s taunts, threats, and, most exasperating of all, misinterpretation of words in- nocently uttered, he loses all control of himself, and says: ‘your fatherhood alone keeps me from calling you a fool;’ Kreon’s reply to this γυναικὸς ὢν δούλευμα, μὴ κὠτιλλέ µε, ‘Prate not to me of fatherhood, thou slave of a woman,’ breaks the back of his endurance and he replies βούλει λέγειν τι καὶ λέγων μηδὲν κλύειν, ‘Thou wouldest speak and then have no reply.’ Now this was the exact truth, and Kreon knew it; he would have no reply, no argument as to his decree; but none the less was it the most unpleasant thing that his son could have said, for it meant, as uttered, you can assign no really satisfactory reasons for your act, and take refuge in shutting the mouths of your advisers: Kreon was obstinate and weak, as I have said, and while perfectly satisfied with the justness of his attitude at first, he had heard since other considerations, advanced, partly by Antigone, partly by his son, some based upon grounds of 54 On SopHOCLES ANTIPHONE. higher principles, some upon expediency and his own per- sonal interests, which were new to him, and to which, when heard, he had no rational answer to give; he had accordingly, like all obstinate and weak men in such case, sought a refuge in anger, taunts and threats, only to have the utter weak- ness of his attitude unmasked in these words by his son in the presence of his people, as represented by the chorus. Whoever has seen an obstinate man so brought to bay, will not wonder at his shriek (ἄληθες:) of rage. What has been said, I think, justifies me in wishing that Prof. Jebb had changed the interrogation mark at the end of 757 toaperiod: to throw Haimon’s words into a question, weakens them and renders them by so much less appropriate to their place. It is but just to observe, however, that Prof. Jebb in his translation of the line (given above) does not use the inter- rogative form: the punctuatian of the text is therefore probably a typographical oversight. In view of the above, too, I must think that any alteration of the order of the lines would cause a serious loss; this, however, will appear yet more clearly from what follows. There is nothing more characteristic of a weak and obstinate person, who finds in an argument that grows gradually into an alter- cation, that he is having the worst of it, than that he should lose his head and reply to isolated words and phrasés rather than to the sense of his opponent’s utterances. So with Kreon here. The phrase θεῶν τῶν νερτέρων of 749 catches his ear and leads to 750: ταύτην mor οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὡς ἔτι ζῶσαν γαμεῖς: ‘sheis dead for you.’ The last words of 751 (which Haimon utters more to himself than his father) are misinterpreted and lead to 752. So the κενὰς yropmas * of 753, which are not meant to charge his father with being a fool, but declare only the folly of his present purpose, are misunderstood as of general application to all Kreon’s acts, and draw forth the threat of 754, ending with the taunting reecho of κενό. This charge of folly wrings from Haimon his counter-charge, the bitterness of which is On SOPHOCLES’ ANTIPHONE. 55 hardly qualified by the condition εὖ μὴ πατὴρ ἠσθ(α). To Kreon, who had already heard, as he thought, the charge » of folly in 753, this condition, though not so meant by Haimon, seemed the significant phrase: hence the con- temptuous rejection of 756; a rejection accompanied by a repetition in more offensive form yet of the taunts of ll. 740, 746, 747, in so offensive a form, indeed, as to cause Haimon to break all bounds and utter to the ears of his scarce crediting father the verte vérité of 757. Enger’s transposition breaks the above indicated con- nection between 749 and 750, that between 755 and 756, and really destroys the climax of the close by substituting a charge of folly for one of inveterate obstinacy and pig- headedness, which is the worst an obstinate man can hear. Donner’s breaks the connection between 754 and 755, and destroys the climax. Pallis’ breaks the connection between 749 and 750, misses the connection between κενὰς γνώµας (753) and κενὸς (754) and like the others destroys the real climax. There is none of these arrangements, then, by which something is not lost; there is none by which anything is really gained. “an να ν > aiyh, δι A ΄ y wr - Hae wet RG: η : ΜΙΤ τοι ον η ο v oo OF ILLINOI IS-U = .. π i ee ss 12 ας ο] πα cae Tobe with tie. Ἐν 7 ο Nc | | sBy? ΜΗ ΙΑΝ A. LAMDER TON, Professo. at t a ος The Gambling Games of the Chinese in : ee: By STEWART. Guu, Secretary of the : Museum of A x | Recent αρα οι Explorations a the valley. of th ~ By Cuarres Ὁ. Abgort, Curator « of the- Museum αν Americ gee” Phe Terrace fae Persepolis. me BY iia) W. ik ae ο Professor a Comparative I ae πρι ορ of ιάδα, ων. Kin ) Bas cay Poe ην νι Protector of Semitic Lan Hi Ἱ By. ALFRED. » GODBNAN, Associat ο “Two Plays of. Miguel ‘Sanchez, ο] Divino. Cera: ay} Hueco. A. Renvent, ‘Professor of ie ae An Ye iV ‘ Nin es “ageNTs: POR, ‘UNI rey