Sy SAR iT ee ae. Py uate Betas ) fy Kien 316 fb BABE DRM SC) ay Pyaates VA Be i Say aK path Fo} J ‘5 ne éi ae sama “fi Ve ig HT G9) Fh 6 I AMerd A 4 Aang hi a6 HRN SAAN a? J , aia! Uy Pie 853! #6 3 BMP Oy my ay Fak 3 Yona: #9, ret sree ie La ie 4 nine i The ciroumstanees under pees these Lectures were written must also be taken into. account in estimating their character, both as a & ~ specimen of the Author's powers, and as a contribution to philo- # sophical literature. ad ; aie William Hamilton ‘was elected to the Chair of Logie and Metaphysics in July, 1836. «In the interval between his appointment wi the commencement of the College Session (November of the Waa year), the Author was assiduously occupied in making prepara- tion for discharaite the duties of his office. The principal part of those duties consisted, according to the practice of the University, in the delivery of a Course of Lectures on the subjects assigned to the chair. On his appointment to the Professorship, Sir William Hamilton experienced considerable difficulty in deciding on the character of the ie + 4 a * ‘if PREFACE. VII course of Lectures on Philosophy, which, while doing justice to the subject, would at the same time meet the wants of his auditors, who were ordinarily composed of comparatively young students, in the second year of their university curriculum. ‘The Author of the articles on Cousin’s Philosophy, on Perception, and on Logic, had already given ample proof of those speculative accomplishments, and that profound philosophical learning, which, in Britain at least, were con- joined in an equal degree by no other man of his time. But those very qualities which placed him in the front rank of speculative thinkers, joined to his love of precision and system, and his lofty ideal of philosophical composition, served but to make him the more keenly alive to the requirements of his subject, and to the difficulties that lay in the way of combining elementary instruction in Philosophy with the adequate discussion of its topics. Hence, although even at this period his methodized stores of learning were ample and pertinent, the opening of the College Session found him still reading and reflecting, and unsatisfied with even the small portion of .matter which he had ’ been able to commit to writing. His first Course of Lectures (Meta- physical) thus fell to be written during the currency of the Session (1836-7). The Author was in the habit of gelfveritfe ‘three Lectures each week; and each Lecture was usually written on the day, or, more properly, on the evening and night, preceding its delivery. ‘The Course of Metaphysics, as it is now given to the world, is the result of. this nightly toil, unremittingly sustained for a period of five months. These Lectures were thus designed solely for a temporary purpose — ; “ the use of the Author’s own classes; they were, moreover, always regarded by the Author himself as defective as a complete Course of Metaphysics; and they never were revised by him with any view to publication, and this chiefly for the reason that he intended to make use of various portions of them which had not been incorporated in if . > 1 Edinburgh Review, 1829. 2 Ibid., 1830. 8 Ibid., 1833. % nil : VIII PREFACE. ' his other writings, in the promised Supplementary Dissertations to Reid’s Works,—a design which his failing health did not permit him to complete. & The Lectures on Logic were not composed until the following Session (1837-8). This Course was also, in great part, written during the currency of the Session. These circumstances will account for the repetition, in some places, of portions of the Author’s previously published writings, and for the numerous and extensive quotations from other writers, which are inter- spersed throughout the present Course. Most of these have been ascertained by references furnished by the Author himself, either in the manuscript of the present Lectures, or in his Common Place Book. These quotations, while they detract in some degree from the originality of the work, can, however, hardly be considered as lessening its value. Many of the authors quoted are but little known in this country; and the extracts from their writings will, to the majority of readers, have all the novelty of original remarks. They also exhibit, in a remarkable degree, the Author’s singular power of appreciating and making use of every available hint scattered through those obscurer regions of thought, through which his extensive reading conducted him. No part of Sir William Hamilton’s writings more completely verifies the remark of his American critic, Mr. Tyler: “There seems to be not even ‘a random thought of any value, which has been dropped along sany, even obscure, path of mental activity, in any age or country, that his diligence has not recovered, his sagacity appreciated, and his judg- ment husbanded in the stores of his knowledge.”’ Very frequently, indeed, the thought which the Author selects and makes his own, : = e ° ° ° . ‘acquires its value and significance in the very process of selection; 1 Princeton Review, October, 1855. This of Philosophy in the Past and in the Future. article has since been republished with the Philadelphia, 1858. Author’s name, in his Essay on the Progress PREFACE. IX and the contribution is more enriched than the adopter; for what, in another, is but a passing reflection, seen in a faint light, isolated and fruitless, often rises, in the hands of Sir William Hamilton, to the rank of a great, permanent, and luminous principle, receives its appropriate place in the order of truths to which it belongs, and proves, in many instances, a centre of radiation over a wide expanse of the field of human knowledge. The present volume may also appear to some disadvantage on account of the length of time which has elapsed between its composition and its publication. Other writings, particularly the Dissertations appended to Reid’s Works,! and part of the new matter in the Discussions, though earlier in point of publication, contain later and more mature phases of the Author’s thought, on some of the questions discussed in the following pages. Much that would have been new to English readers twenty years ago, has, subsequently, in a great measure by the instru- mentality of the Author himself, become well known; and the familiar expositions designed for the oral instruction of beginners in philos- ophy, have been eclipsed by those profounder reflections which have been published for the deliberate study of the philosophical world at large. But, when all these deductions have been made, the work before us will still remain a noble monument of the Author’s philosophical genius and learning. In many respects, indeed, it is qualified to become more popular than any of his other publications. The very necessity which the Author was under, of adapting his observations, | in some degree, to the needs and attainments of his hearers, has also fitted them for the instruction and gratification of a wide circle of general readers, who would have less relish for the severer style in” which some of his later thoughts are conveyed. The present Lectures, * 1 The foot-notes to Reid were, for the most part, written nearly contemporaneously with the present Lectures. x PREFACE. if in depth and exactness of thought they are, for the most part, not equal to the Dissertations on Reid, or to some portions of the Diseus- sions, possess attractions of their own, which will probably recommend them to a.more numerous class of admirers; while they retain, in no small degree, the ample learning and philosophical acumen ‘which are identified with the Author’s previous reputation. Apart, however, from considerations of their intrinsic value, these Lectures possess a high academical and historical interest. For twenty years, —from 1836 to 1856, —the Courses of Logic and Metaphysics were the means through which Sir William Hamilton sought to disci- pline and imbue with his philosophical opinions, the numerous youth who gathered from Scotland and other countries to his class-room ; and while, by these prelections, the Author supplemented, developed, and moulded the National Philosophy, — leaving thereon the inefface- able impress of his genius and learning, —he, at the same time and by the same means, exercised over the intellects and feelings of his pupils an influence which, for depth, intensity, and elevation, was certainly never surpassed by that of any philosophical instructor. Amgpg his pupils there are not a few who, having lived for a season under the constraining power of his intellect, and been led to reflect on those great questions regarding the character, origin, and bounds of human knowledge, which his teachings stirred and quickened, bear the memory of their beloved and revered Instructor inseparably blended with what is highest in their present intellectual life, as well as in their. practical aims and aspirations. : The Editors, in offering these Lectures to the public, are, therefore, encouraged to express their belief, that they will not be found unworthy of the illustrious name which they bear. In the discharge of their own duties as annotators, the Editors have thought it due to the fame of the Author, to leave his opinions to be judged entirely by their own merits, without the accompaniment of criticisms, concurrent or dis- PREFACE. XI sentient. For the same reason, they have abstained from noticing such criticisms as have appeared on those portions of the work which have already been published in other forms. Their own annotations are, for the most part, confined to occasional explanations and verifi- cations of the numerous references and allusions scattered through the text. The notes fall, as will be observed, into three classes: I. Original; notes printed from the manuscript of the present Lectures. These appear without any distinctive mark. Mere Jottings or Memoranda by the Author, made on the manuscript, are generally marked as such. To these are also added a few Oral Interpolations of the Author, made in the course of reading the Lectures, which have been recovered from the note-books of students. II. Supplied; notes extracted or compiled by the Editors from the Author’s Common Place Book and fragmentary papers. These are enclosed in square brackets, and are without signature. Til. Editorial; notes added by the Editors. These always bear the signature “Ep.” When added as supplementary to the original or supplied notes, they are generally enclosed in square bragkets, besides having the usual signature. The Editors have been at pains to trace and examine the notes of the first and second classes with much care; and have succeeded in discovering the authorities referred to, with very few and insignificant exceptions. The Editors trust that the Original and Supplied Notes may prove of service to students of Philosophy, as indications of sources of philosophical opinions, which, in many cases, are but little, if at all, known in this country. The Appendix embraces a few papers, chiefly fragmentary, which appeared to the Editors to be deserving of publication. Several of these are fragments of discussions which the Author had written with XII PREFACE. a view to the Memoir of Mr. Dugald Stewart, on the editorship of whose works he was engaged at the period of his death. They thus possess the melancholy interest which attaches to the latest of his compositions. ‘To these philosophical fragments have been added a few papers on physiological subjects. These consist of an extract from the Author’s Lectures on Phrenology, and communications made by him to various medical publications. Apart from the value of their results, these physiological investigations serve to exhibit, in a depart- ment of inquiry foreign to the class of subjects with which the mind of the Author was ordinarily occupied, that habit of careful, accurate, and unsparing research, by which Sir William Hamilton was so emi- nently characterized. CONTENTS. 1) ORE abl Nh eS a Oa PHILOSOPHY —ITS ABSOLUTE UTILITY, (A) SUBJECTIVE, ba Ce @ had DP 0d 3-4 Sy Ol PHILOSOPHY — ITS ABSOLUTE UTILITY, ye SU ele tid ee ea ea PECL RET LEE PHILOSOPHY —ITS NATURE AND COMPREHENSION, LECTURE IV. PeILOPOPHY:—ITS CAUSES, <0. oe a om, LECTURE V. PHILOSOPHY — THE DISPOSITIONS WITH WHICH IT OUGHT TO BE STUDIED, PAGE 14 31 - 46 ~ XIV CONTENTS. LECTURE VI. PHILOSOPHY.—ATS: METHO Dyin ews oree pyide' fue ees er LE GT Ue es - PHILOSOPHY —ITS DIVISIONS, . wa et ig Sg Oe fBNG SDR 8 Boal Bed Seal Shem Bs PSYCHOLOGY —ITS DEFINITION — EXPLICATION OF TERMS, . eB | UNC TU RE ix EXPLICATION OF TERMS — RELATIVITY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, 107 LE CTU Ra Xx EXPLICATION OF TERMS,” (9.0 26000) 0) ber tewsyghye “yey ye LECTURE) XE. OUTLINE OF DISTRIBUTION OF MENTAL PHAZNOMENA — CON- SCIOUSNESS—ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS, ..- +. + + 126 LE CTU Riva? £. CONSCIOUSNESS—ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS—RELATION TO COG- NITIVE FACULTIES IN GENERAL, «© + + + + «+ . 143 CONTENTS. XV Le C-PUR ie vA. PAGE CONSCIOUSNESS—ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS— RELATION TO COG- NITIVE FACULTIES IN GENERAL, . : : ‘ : ; ; 154 Peete) Ua SEV. + CONSCIOUSNESS — ATTENTION IN GENERAL, ° : te . 171 Peer Ute Be ON CONSCIOUSNESS — ITS EVIDENCE AND AUTHORITY, . : : - 18 Lae RE Oe vl. CONSCIOUSNESS — VIOLATIONS OF ITS AUTHOR:TY, . , iy ey LOS Ti Ge ee He ead: CONSCIOUSNESS — GENERAL PHA NOMENA — ARE WE ALWAYS CONSCIOUSLY ACTIVE? . ; : ane 1g te) Paes, eG ie 6 DURETR NV EET CONSCIOUSNESS — GENERAL PHZNOMENA — IS THE MIND EVER UNCONSCIOUSLY MODIFIED? . pos Hetil PAB oe acm kay Re apn AS LECTURE XIX. CONSCIOUSNESS — GENERAL PHZ NOMENA — DIFFICULTIES AND FACILITIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY, ee ee ee 203 XVI CONTENTS. LE OT RTT. PAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPECIAL COGNITIVE FACULTIES, «139 426F Lio DUR be ex. THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY —I. PERCEPTION —REID’S HISTOR#- CAL VIEW OF THE THEORIES OF PERCEPTION, . ° . J eeTe LEG YU RE wd, Tel. THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY —I. PERCEPTION —REID’S HISTORI- CAL VIEW OF THE THEORIES OF PERCEPTION, . : , oi, eet ro Bins ye Coed bad Bd stad ye Ue Ge Ed A THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY —I. PERCEPTION — WAS REID A NAT- URAL REALIST? . ° : ° s : yikes). alba eae = eee LECTURE XXIV. THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY — I. PERCEPTION—THE DISTINC- TION OF PERCEPTION PROPER FROM SENSATION PROPER, . 327 LEOTURE XX VY: THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY —I. PERCEPTION — OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL REALISM, .0 0 «.+4(s 0s pages LECTURE XXWViI. THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY —I. PERCEPTION — THE REPRESEN- TATIVE HYPOTHESIS, lek pe bk sik sy ahs Usk Ay? raat IR leach ee CONTENTS. XVII LECTURE XXVIII. PAGE THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY —I. PERCEPTION — GENERAL QUES- TIONS IN RELATION TO THE SENSES, . ‘ . : ape Ore Lt Ob UR ew Xx XVI LI. THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY —I. PERCEPTION — RELATION OF SIGHT AND TOUCH TO EXTENSION, . mail, FL Sd hye ; . 384 LECTURE XXIX. THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY —II. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, . ~ 397 Lhe TORE xX XxX Xx. THE CONSERVATIVE FACULTY — MEMORY PROPER, . . . . 4il ER CRT Th weak XX Te , THE REPRODUCTIVE FACULTY—LAWS OF ASSOCIATION, a Pe $A Te CT UR BX xe xe PT: THE REPRODUCTIVE FACULTY— LAWS OF ASSOCIATION — SUGGES- TION —REMINISCENCE, . : : . See ee eee . - 436 TE CTU We He ee DT. THE REPRESENTATIVE FACULTY —IMAGINATION, . wy oyPrey 400 XVIII CONTENTS. LEO 2h Ss ex ta PAGE THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY — CLASSIFICATION — ABSTRACTION, 463 / LEOLUR Bi Rk Ky. THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY — GENERALIZATION, NOMINALISM, AND CONCEPTUALISM, . ° : a ie ° : . : . 473 LECTURE xX XX V4. THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY —GENERALIZATION—THE PRIMUM COGNITUM, . é . . . . : - 489 LE. PU Ral XR XX aver 1, THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY —JUDGMENT AND REASONING, - 002 LEC TRE Rex, THE REGULATIVE: FACULTY, (4 c.0h0.1, Ges i LE CO T-UCR.B XX XIX, THE REGULATIVE FACULTY—LAW OF THE CONDITIONED IN ITS APPLICATIONS — CAUSALITY, : : stipe Pid Vee Ue - 632 LEC TU Ree. THE REGULATIVE FACULTY — LAW OF THE CONDITIONED IN ITS APPLICATIONS — CAUSALITY, : . ; ° “ : ~ « 000 CONTENTS. : ~*~ XIX LECTURE XLI. PAGE SECOND GREAT CLASS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA —THE FEELINGS: THEIR CHARACTER AND RELATION TO THE COGNITIONS AND arg 0 ARR 9 Gi i ea mene ACS a Per OM GEO UR he Ab is THE FEELINGS— THEORY OF PLEASURE AND PAIN, ae was OLE Ty False dy Us teed LLL. THE FEELINGS — HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THEORIES OF PLEAS- URE AND PAIN, . ; : ‘ : : . : ° “ . » 980 an Te Get Be EX TeV: THE FEELINGS — APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF PLEASURE AND PAIN TO THE PHANOMENA, Artie Shaaihieg sate: =, PME ue Teg LECTURE XLV. TF eee EN GSSs THRIR CLASSES SU. Bic.\ i PARRA VIH A et. 618 LECTURE XLVI. THE FEELINGS — THEIR CLASSES — THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME, 623 xx 1% CONTENTS. APPEND xy L.— (4) ACADEMICAL HONORS, 4... 54.) °4 0 3 (B) THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY — FRAGMENTS. (a) PORTION OF INTRODUCTORY LECTURE (1836), : . . (b) M. JOUFFROY’S CRITICISM OF THE SCOTTISH scaeue : : (c) GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL, ; (d) KANT AND REID, ; : . ° ° ° ° : ‘ (e€) KANT’S DOCTRINE OF SPACE AND TIME, . ‘ ‘ ° Il. — PHYSIOLOGICAL. (a) PHRENOLOGY, . r - ; * é : e ° é (6) EXPERIMENTS ON THE WEIGHT OF THE BRAIN, . . 4 (c) REMARKS ON DR. MORTON’S TABLES, . : s ; 4 (d) ON THE FRONTAL SINUS, . , 5 5 2 : P ° Ill.— PERCEPTION, . ; : ‘ 5 ° ° ° : : A ‘ 1v.—LAWS OF THOUGHT, . ° ° . ° . : : . V.— THE CONDITIONED. (a) KANT’S DOCTRINE OF JUDGMENTS, AND AUTHOR’S THEORY OF NECESSITY, ° ° ° ° ry ° ° e ° (0) CONTRADICTIONS PROVING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY _ OF THE CONDITIONED, : ° . : . : (c) THE ABSOLUTE — DISTINCTIONS OF MODE OF REACHING IT, (d) LETTER OF SIR W. HAMILTON TO MR. HENRY CALDERWOOD, (e) THE DOCTRINE OF RELATION, . ‘ 4 ' - t ‘ VI.— CAUSATION — LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. (a) CAUSATION, . : 4 3 . . . . Ale (b) LIBERTY AND NECESSITY, AS VIEWED BY THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL, e e e ° e e e e e e (c) LIBERTY AND NECESSITY, ‘ ; a 3 es : P PAGE 677 679 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. LHCLU RE? PHILOSOPHY—ITS ABSOLUTE UTILITY. (A.) SUBJECTIVE. Grnriemen —In the commencement of a course of instruction in any department of knowledge, it is usual, be- EDELOROR EY - fore entering on the regular consideration of the its benefits and plea- : : Be subject, to premise a general survey of the more important advantages which it affords, and this with the view of animating the student to a higher assiduity, by holding up to him, in prospect, some at least of those benefits and pleasures which he may promise to himself in reward of his ex- ertions. And if such a preparation be found expedient for other branches of study, it is, I think, peculiarly requisite in Phil- ae inte hay osophy, — Philosophy Proper, — the Science of Bene. Mind. For, in the first place, the most import- ant advantages to be derived from the cultiva- tion of philosophy, are not, in themselves, direct, palpable, obtru- sive: they are, therefore, of their own nature, peculiarly liable. to be overlooked or disparaged by the world at large; because to estimate them at their proper value requires in the judge more than a vulgar complement of information and intelligence. But, in the second place, the many are not simply by negative incompetence disqualified for an opinion; they are, moreover, by positive error, at once rendered incapable of judging right; and yet, by positive error, encouraged to a decision. or there are at present afloat, and in very general acceptation, certain superficial misconceptions in regard to the end and objects of education, which render the popular opinion of the comparative importance of its different branches, not merely false, but precisely the reverse of truth; the 2 METAPHYSICS. Lect. I. studies which, in reality, are of the highest value as a mean of intel- lectual development, being those which, on the vulgar standard of utility, are at the very bottom of the scale; while those which, in the nomenclature of the multitude, are emphatically, — distinc- tively, denominated the Useful, are precisely those which, in relation to the great ends of liberal education, possess the least, and least general, utility. In considering the utility of a branch of knowledge, it behooves us, in the first place, to estimate its value as Utility of a branch viewed simply in itself; and, in the second, its: of Knowledge of two value as viewed in relation to other. branches. grand kinds — Abso- ; wee ‘ ° ‘ nie baa Wilaukes Considered in itself, a science is valuable in pro- portion asits cultivation is immediately condu- cive to the mental improvement of the cultivator. This may be called its Absolute utility. In relation to others, a science is valu- able in proportion as its study is necessary for the prosecution of other branches of knowledge. This may be called its Relative utility. In this latter point of view, that is as relatively useful, I cannot at present enter upon the value of Philosophy, —I cannot attempt to show how it supplies either the materials or the rules to all the sciences; and how, in particular, its study is of impor- tance to the Lawyer, the Physician, and, above all, to the Theolo- gian. All this I must for the present pass by. In the former point of view, that is, considered absolutely, or in itself, the philosophy of mind comprises two sev- eral utilities, according as it, 1°, Cultivates the mind or knowing subject, by calling its faculties into exercise ; and, 2°, Furnishes the mind with a certain complement of truths or objects of knowledge. The former of these constitutes its Subjective, the latter its Objective utility. These utilities are not the same, nor do they even stand to each other in any necessary proportion. As the special consid- eration of both is more than I can compass in the present Lecture, I am constrained to limit myself to one alone; and as the subject- ive utility is that which has usually been overlooked, though not assuredly of the two the less important, while at the same time its exposition affords in part the rationale of the method of instruc- tion which I have adopted, I shall at present only attempt an illus- tration of the advantages afforded by the Philosophy of Mind, regarded as the study which, of all others, best cultivates the mind or subject of knowledge, by supplying to its higher faculties the occasions of their most vigorous, and therefore their most improving, exercise. Absolute utility of two kinds — Subject- ive and Objective. Lect. I. METAPHYSICS. 3 There are few, I believe, disposed to question the speculative dig- Practical utility of nity of mental science; but its practical utility Philosophy. is not unfrequently denied. To what, it is asked, is the science of mind conducive? What are its uses? I am not one of those who think that the importance of a study is sufficiently established when its dignity is admitted; for, holding that knowledge is for the sake of man, and not man for the sake of knowledge, it is necessary, in order to vindicate its value, that every science should be able to show what are the advantages which it promises to confer upon its student. I, therefore, profess myself a utilitarian; and it is only on the special ground of its utility that I would claim for the philosophy of mind, what I regard as its peculiar and preéminent importance. But what is a utilitarian? Simply one who prefers the Useful to the Useless—and who does not? But what is the useful? That which is prized, not on its own account, but as con- ducive to the acquisition of something else, — the useful is, in short, only another word for a mean towards an end; for every mean is useful, and whatever is useful is a mean. Now the value of a mean is always in proportion to the value of its end; and the useful being a mean, it follows, that, of two utilities, the one which con- duces to the more valuable end will be itself the more valuable utility. So far there is no difference of opinion. All agree that the useful is a mean towards an end; and that, ceteris paribus, a mean towards a higher end constitutes a higher utility than a mean towards a lower. The only dispute that has arisen, or can pos- sibly arise, in regard to the utility of means (supposing always their relative efficiency), is founded on the various views that may be entertained in regard to the existence and comparative impor- tance of ends. Now the various opinions which prevail concerning the com- parative utility of human sciences and studies, Two errors in the have all arisen from two errors.’ aeteweiite ide The first of these consists in viewing man, not ty of human sciences. as an end wnto himself, but merely as a mean or- ganized for the sake of something out of himself; and, under this partial view of human destination, those branches of knowledge obtain exclusively the name of wseful, which tend to qual- ify a human being to act the lowly part of a dexterous instrument. The Useful. 1 With the following observations may be education, in his article on the study of math- compared the author’s remarks on tle dis- ematics, Edinburgh Review, vol. Ixii., p. 409, tinction between a liberal and a professional reprinted in his Discussions, p. 263.— ED. 4 METAPHYSICS. LECTAL ' The second, and the more dangerous of these errors, consists in regarding the cultivation of our faculties as subordinate to the acquisition of knowledge, instead of regarding the possession of knowledge as subordinate to the cultivation of our faculties ; and, in consequence of this error, those sciences which afford a greater number of more certain facts, have been deemed superior in utility to those which bestow a higher cultivation on the higher faculties of the mind. As to the first of these errors, the fallacy is so palpable, that we may well wonder at its prevalence. It is mani- fest, indeed, that man, in so far as he is a mean for the glory of God, must be an end unto him- self, for it is only in the accomplishment of his own perfection, that, as a creature, he can manifest the glory of his Creator. Though therefore man, by relation to God, be but a mean, for that very reason, in relation to all else is he an end. Wherefore, now speaking of him exclusively in his natural capacity and temporal relations, I say it is manifest that man is by nature necessarily an end to himself,— that his perfection and happiness constitute the goal of his activity, to which he tends, and ought to tend, when not diverted from this, his general and native destination, by pecu- liar and accidental circumstances. But it is equally evident, that, under the condition of society, individual men are, for the most part, to a greater or less degree, actually so diverted. To live, the individual must have the means of living; and these means, (unless he already possess them,) he must procure,—he must purchase. But purchase with what? With his services, 7. e.— he must reduce himself to an instrument,—an instrument of utility to others, and the services of this instrument he must barter for those means of subsistence of which he isin want. In other words, he must exer- cise some trade, calling, or profession. | Thus, in the actualities of social life, each man, instead of being solely an end to himself, — instead of being able to make everything subordinate to that full and harmonious development of his indivi- dual faculties, in which his full perfection and his true happiness consist, —is, in general, compelled to degrade himself into the mean or instrument towards the accomplishment of some end, external to himself, and for the benefit of others. Now the perfection of man as an end, and the perfection of man as a mean or instrument, are not only not the same, they are, in reality, generally opposed. And as these two perfections are different, so the training requisite for their acquisition is not identical, and has, ac- Man an end unto himself. Liberal and _ profes- sional education. Lect. I. METAPHYSICS. 5 cordingly, been distinguished by different names. The one is styled Liberal, the other Professional education, — the branches of knowl- edge cultivated for these purposes being called respectively liberal and professional, or liberal and lucrative, sciences. By the Germans, the latter are usually distinguished as the Brodwissenschaften, which we may translate, Zhe Bread and Butter Sciences. A few of the professions, indeed, as requiring a higher development of the higher faculties and involving, therefore, a greater or less amount of liberal education, have obtained the name of liberal professions. We must, however, recollect that this is only an accidental and a very partial exception. But though the full and harmonious develop- ment of our faculties be the high and natural destination of all, while the cultivation of any professional dexterity is only a contin- gency, though a contingency incumbent upon most, it has, however, happened that the paramount and universal end of man,—of man absolutely, —has been often ignorantly lost sight of, and the term useful appropriated exclusively to those acquirements which have a value only to man considered in his relative, lower, and accidental character of an instrument. But, because some have thus been led to appropriate the name of useful to those studies and objects of knowledge, which are conducive to the inferior end, it assuredly does not follow that those conducive to the higher have not a far preferable title to the name thus curiously denied to them. Even admit- ting, therefore, that the study of mind is of no immediate advan- ‘tage in preparing the student for many of the subordinate parts in the mechanism of society, its utility cannot, on that account, be called in question, unless it be asserted that man “liveth by bread alone,” and has no higher destination than that of the calling by which he earns his subsistence. The second error to which I have adverted, reverses the relative subordination of knowledge and of intellectual cultivation. In refutation of this, I shall attempt briefly to show, jirstly, that knowledge and jin- tellectual cultivation are not identical; secondly, that. knowledge is itself principally valuable as a mean of intellectual cultivation ; and, lastly, that intellectual cultivation is more directly and effec- tually accomplished by the study of mind than by any other of our rational pursuits. But to prevent misapprehension, I may premise what I mean by knowledge, and what by intellectual cultivation. By knowledge is understood the mere possession of truths; by intellectual cultiva- Misapplication of the term useful. Knowledge and in- tellectual cultivation. 1 Schelling, Vorlesungen itber die Methode des Academischen Studium, p. 67. — Ep. 6 METAPHYSICS Lect. I, tion, or intellectual development, the power, acquired through exercise by the higher faculties, of a more varied, vigorous and pro- tracted activity. In the first place, then, it will be requisite, I conceive, to say | but little to show that knowledge and intellec- tual development are not only not the same, but stand in no necessary proportion to each other. This is manifest if we consider the very different conditions under which these two — qualities are acquired. The one condition under which all powers, and consequently the intellectual faculties, are developed, is exercise. The more intense and continuous the exercise, the more vigorously developed will be the power. But a certain quantity of knowledge, —in other words, a certain amount of possessed truths,—does not suppose, as its condition, a corresponding sum of intellectual exercise. One truth requires much, another truth requires little, effort in acquisition ; and, while the original discovery of a truth evolves perhaps a maximum of the highest quality of energy, the subsequent learning of that truth elicits probably but a minimum of the very lowest. But, as it is evident that the possession of truths, and the devel- opment of the mind in which they are deposited, Re Ph yor mental Yareimot identical, I proceed, in the second place, exercise the superior : : ; wae to show that, considered as ends, and in relation to each other, the knowledge of truths is not su- preme, but subordinate to the cultivation of the knowing mind. The question —Is Truth, or is the Mental Exercise in the pursuit of truth, the superior end ?—this is perhaps the most curious theoretical, and certainly the most important practical, problem in the whole com- pass of philosophy. For, according to the solution at which we ar- rive, must we accord the higher or the lower rank to certain great departments of study; and, what is of more importance, the char- acter of its solution, as it determines the aim, regulates from first to last the method, which an enlightened science of education must adopt. : But, however curious and important, this question has never, in so far as I am aware, been regularly discussed. Nay, what is still more remarkable, the erroneous alternative has been very generally assumed as true. The consequence of this has been, that sciences of far infe- rior, have been elevated above sciences of far superior, utility ; while education has been systematically distorted,—though truth and nature have occasionally burst the shackles which a perverse theory had imposed. The reason of this is sufficiently obvious. At first Not identical. Popular solution of this question. Lect. I. METAPHYSICS. v4 sight, it seems even absurd to doubt that truth is more valuable than its pursuit; for is this not to say that the end is less important than the mean ?—and on this superficial view is the prevalent misappre- hension founded. A slight consideration will, however, expose the fallacy. | Knowledge is either practical or speculative. In practical knowl- edge it is evident that truth is not the ultimate end; for, in that case, knowledge is, ex hypo- thesi, for the sake of application. The knowledge of a moral, of a political, of a religious truth, is of value only as it affords the preliminary or condition of its exercise. In speculative knowledge, on the other hand, there may indeed, at first sight, seem greater difficulty; but fur- ther reflection will prove that speculative truth is only pursued, and is only held of value, for the sake of intellectual activity: “Sordet cognita veritas” is a shrewd aphorism of Seneca. A truth, once known, falls into comparative insignificance. It is fiow prized, less on its own account than as opening up new ways to new activity, new suspense, new hopes, new discoveries, new self-gratulation. Every votary of science is wilfully ignorant of a thousand established facts, — of a thousand which he might make his own more easily than he could attempt the discovery of even one. But it is not knowledge, —it is not truth, — that he principally seeks; he seeks the exercise of his faculties and feelings; and, as in following after the one he exerts a greater amount of pleasurable energy than in taking formal possession of the thou- sand, he disdains the certainty of the many, and prefers the chances of the one. Accordingly, the sciences always studied with keenest interest are those in a state of progress and uncertainty; absolute certainty and absolute completion would be the paralysis of any study; and the last worst calamity that could befall man, as he is at present constituted, would be that full and final possession of specu- lative truth, which he now vainly anticipates as the consummation of his intellectual happiness. Practical knowledge ; its end. The end of specula- tive knowledge. “ Quesivit ceelo lucem, ingemuitque reperta.”’ 1 But what is true of science is true, indeed, of all human ac- tivity. “In life,” as the great Pascal observes, “we always believe that we are seeking repose, while, in reality, all that we ever seek is agitation.”* When Pyrrhus proposed to subdue a part of the 1 Virgil, n. iv. 692. — Ep. ed. Faugére): “‘Ils croient chercher sincére- 2 Pensées, partie i. art. vii. § 1, (vol. ii. p. 34, | ment le repos, et ne cherchent en effet que 8 METAPHYSICS. Lect. 1. world, and then to enjoy rest among his friends, he believed that what he sought was possession, not pursuit; and Alexander assur- edly did not foresee that the conquest of one world would only leave him to weep for another world to conquer. It is ever the contest that pleases us, and not the victory. Thus it is in play; thus it is in hunting; thus it is in the search of truth ;* thus it is in life. The past does not interest, the present does let satisty, the future alone is the object which engages us. “ (Nullo votorum fine beati) Victuros agimus semper, nec vivimus unquam.” 2 fa “Man never is, but always to be, blest.” 3 The question, I said, has never been regularly discussed, — prob- ably because it lay in too narrow a compass; but no philosopher appears to have ever seri- ously proposed it to himself, who did not re- solve it in contradiction to the ordinary opinion. A contradiction of this opinion is even involved in the very term Philosophy; and the man who first declared that he was not a coos, or pos- sessor, but a qiAdcodos,! or seeker of truth, at once enounced the true end of human speculation, and embodied it in a significant name. Under the same conviction Plato defines man “the hunter of truth,”> for science is a chase, and in a chase the pursuit is always of greater value than the game. How resolved by philosophers. “Our hopes, like towering falcons, aim At objects in an airy height, But all the pleasure of the game Is afar off to view the flight.’ 6 “The intellect,” says Aristotle, in one passage, “is perfected, not by knowledge but by activity;”’ and in another, “The arts Vagitation.” ‘Le conseil qu’on donnait 4 Pyrrhus, de prendre le repos qu’il allait cher- cher par tant de fatigues, recevait bien des difficultés.’”? — Ep. 1 ‘‘ Rien ne nous plait que le combat, mais non pas la victoire... Ainsi dans le jeu, ainsi dans la recherche de la vérité. On aime 4 voir dans les disputes le combat des opin- ions; mais de contempler la vérité trouvée, point du tout . . . Nous ne cherchons jamais les choses, mais la recherche des choses.”— Pascal, Pensées, vol. i. p. 205, ed. Faugére.—Ep. W. Hamilton, however, probably meant Soc- rates. See lecture III., p. 47.— Eb. 5 This definition is not to be found in the Platonic Dialogues; a passage something like it occurs in the Luthydemus, p.290. Cf. Diog. Laert., lib. viii. Pythagoras, §8.—’Ev T@ Biq, of wey avdparodédeis pvovta, Sdéns Kal macovetlas Snpatal’ of St PiAdcogor, ais &Anselas. — ED. 6 Prior, Lines to the Hon. C. Montague. Brit- ish Poets, vol.vii. p. 893, (Anderson’s ed.) — ED. 2 Manilius, Astronomicon, lib. iv. 4.— Eb. 8 Pope, Essay on Man, i. 96.— Ep. 4 Pythagoras, according to the ordinary account; see Cicero, Tusc. Quest. vy. 38. Sir 7 Said of moral knowledge, Eth. Nic. i. 3: Tédos ov yv@ols, GAAG mpakis. Cf. ibid. i. 7, 18: 4. 8, 9} ix. 7,45 xi Oy hye Met., xi. 7: ‘H vod évépyeta (wr. — Ep. Lect. I. METAPHYSICS. 9 + and sciences are powers, but every power exists only for the sake of action; the end of philosophy, therefore, is not knowledge, but the energy conversant about knowledge.” * Descending to the schoolmen: “The intellect,” says Aquinas, “commences in opera- tion, and in operation it ends;”? and Scotus even declares that a man’s knowledge is measured by the amount of his mental activity —.“tantum scit homo, quantum operatur.”® The profoundest thinkers of modern times have emphatically testified to the same great principle. “If,” says Malebranche, “I held truth captive in my hand, I should open my hand and let it fly, in order that I might again pursue and capture it.”* “Did the Almighty,” says Lessing, “holding in his right hand Zrwth, and in his left Search after Truth, deign to tender me the one I might prefer, —in all humility, but without hesitation, I should request Search after Truth2® “Truth,” says Von Miiller, “is the property of God, the pursuit of truth 1s what belongs to man;”°® and Jean Paul Richter: “It is not the goal, but the course, which makes us happy.” But there would be no end of similar quotations. ’ But if speculative truth itself be only valuable as a mean of in- tellectual activity, those studies which deter- Mee ae Say. tone. tho faculties to a more vigorous exertion, titled to the appella- E A : i Setoieperd. will, in every liberal sense, be better entitled, absolutely, to the name of useful, than those which, with a greater complement of more certain facts, awaken them to a less intense, and consequently to a less improving exer- cise. On this ground I would rest one of the preéminent utilities of mental philosophy. That it comprehends all the sublimest ob- jects of our theoretical and moral interest ;—— that every (natural) conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth and the fature destiny of man, is exclusively deduced from the philesophy 1 Thi sentence seems to be made up from __plicat premissas ad conclusionem. Sic igitur two separate passages in the Metaphysics, lib. patet quod actualitas scientie est ex applica- viii. c. 2. Tlaca: ai téxvar ral ai mointikal tione cause ad effectum’? Compare Quast. Kal emoriuo Suvdues eiotv, Lib. viii.c. ii, “An acquisitio scientix sit nobis per doc- 8: Téros 8 h évépyeta, Kat TovTov xdpw trinam— for his view of the end and means f dvvayis AapBdvera ... Kal Thy Sew- of education. — Ep. pntixhy (@xovow) wa Vewpdouw' BAN ov 4 [**Malebranche disait avec une ingéni- Sewpovar iva SewpyntiK hy éxwouw. — Ep. euse exagération, ‘Si je tenais Ja vérité cap~ 2 This is perhaps the substance of Summa, tive dans ma main, j’ouvrirais la main afin de Pars i., Q. Ixxix., art. ii. and iii. — Ep. poursuivre encore la vérité.’ »” —_ Mazure, Cours 3 These words contain the substance of the de Philosophie, tom. i. p. 20.) doctrine of Scotus regarding science, given 5 Eine Duplik, § 1; Schriften, edit. Lach- in his Questiones in Aristotelis Logicam, p. 818 mann, x. p. 49.— ED. — Super. Lib. Post.,Q.i. ‘‘ Scire in actu,” says 6 [Die Wahrheit ist in Gott, ums bleibt the subtle doctor, ‘est quum aliquis cognoscit das Forschen.’?] majorem et minorem, et, simul cum hoc, ap- 7 Compare Discussions, p. 40. 2 10 METAPHYSICS. Lect. 1 of mind, will be at once admitted. But I do not at present found the importance on.the paramount dignity of the pursuit. It is as the best gymnastic of the mind,—as a mean, principally, and almost exclusively, conducive to the highest education of our noblest powers, that I would vindicate to these speculations the necessity which has too frequently been denied them. By no other intellectual application is the mind thus reflected on itself, and its faculties aroused to such independent, vigorous, unwonted, and continued energy;—by none, therefore, are its best capac- ities so variously and intensely evolved. “By turning,” says Burke, “the soul inward on itself, its forces are concentred, and are fit- ted for greater and stronger flights of science; and in this pursuit, whether we take or whether we lose our game, the chase is cer- tainly of service.” ! These principles being established, I have only now to offer a few observations in regard to their application, Application of the that is, in regard to the mode in which I conceive CROURA EE ie that this class ought to be conducted. From of philosophy. what has already been said, my views on this subject may be easily anticipated. Holding that the paramount end of liberal study is the development of the stu- dent’s mind, and that knowledge is principally useful as a mean of determining the faculties to that exercise, through which this development is accomplished, — it follows, that I must regard the main duty of a Professor to consist not simply in communicating information, but in doing this in such a manner, and with such an accompaniment of subsidiary means, that the information he con- veys may be the occasion of awakening his pupils to a vigorous and varied exertion of their faculties. Self-activity is the indispensable condition of improvement ; and education is only education, — that is, accomplishes its purpose, only by affording objects and supply- ing incitements to this spontaneous exertion. Strictly speaking, every one must educate himself. But as the end of education is thus something more than the mere communication of knowledge, the com- munication of knowledge ought not to be all that academical education should attempt. Be- fore printing was invented, Universities were of primary impor- tance as organs of publication, and as centres of literary conflu- ence: but since that invention, their utility as media of communi- cation is superseded; consequently, to justify the continuance of Universities; their main end. 1 On the Sublime and Beautiful, p. 8. — Ep. Lect. I. METAPHYSICS. 11 their existence and privileges, they must accomplish something that cannot be accomplished by books. But it is a remarkable cirecum- stance that, before the invention of printing, universities viewed the activity of the pupil as the great mean of cultivation, and the communication of knowledge as only of subordinate importance ; whereas, since that invention, universities, in general, have gradu- ally allowed to fall into disuse the powerful means which they possess of rousing the pupil to exertion, and have been too often content to act as mere oral instruments of information, forgetful, it would almost seem, that Fust and Coster ever lived. It is acknowledged, indeed, that this is neither the principal nor the proper purpose of a university. Every writer on academical edu- cation from every corner of Europe proclaims the abuse, and, in this and other universities, much has been done by individual ef fort to correct it.’ But though the common duty of all academical instructors be the cultivation of the student, through the awakened exercise of his faculties, this is more especially incumbent on those to whom is in- trusted the department of liberal education; for, in this depart- ment, the pupil is trained, not to any mere professional knowledge, but to the command and employment of his faculties in general. But, moreover, the same obligation is specially imposed upon a professor of intellectual phil- osophy, by the peculiar nature of his subject, and the conditions under which alone it can be taught. The phenomena of the external world are so palpable and so easily described, that the experience of one observer suffices to render the facts he has witnessed intelligible and probable to all. The phenomena of the internal world, on the contrary, are not capable of being thus described: all that the prior observer can do, is to enable others to repeat his experience. In the science of mind, we can neither understand nor be convinced of anything at second hand. Here testimony can impose no belief; and instruc- tion is only instruction as it enables us to teach ourselves. A fact of consciousness, however accurately observed, however clearly described, and however great may be our confidence in the observer, is for us as zero, until we have observed and recognized it ourselves. Till that be done, we cannot realize its possibility, far less admit its truth. Thus it is that, in the philosophy of mind, instruction can do little more than point out the position in which the pupil ought to place himself, in order to verify, by his own The true end of lib- eral education. The conditions of in- struction in intellec- tual philosophy. 1 Compare Discussions, p. 772. — Ep. 12 METAPHYSICS. Lect. I. experience, the facts which his instructor proposes to him as true. The instructor, therefore, proclaims, od ¢ir0ocodia, dAAA pidocoderr ; he does not profess to teach philosophy, but to philosophize. It is this condition imposed upon the student of doing every- thing himself, that renders the study of the Use and importance mental sciences the most improving exercise of of examinations in a g is daasor Putiésdpny: intellect.. But everything depends upon the condition being fulfilled; and, therefore, the pri- mary duty of a teacher of philosophy is to take care that the student does actually perform for himself the necessary process. In the first place, he must discover, by examination, whether his instructions have been effective, — whether they have enabled the pupil to go through the intellectual operation; and, if not, it be- hooves him to supply what is wanting, — to clear up what has been misunderstood. In this view, examinations are of high importance to a professor ; for without such a medium between the teacher and the taught, he can never adequately accommodate the character of his instruction to the capacity of his pupils. But, in the scond place, besides placing his pupil in a condition to perform the necessary process, the instructor The intellectual in- ought to do what in him lies to determine the structor must seek to “79 5 ° influence the will of PUPI’s will to the performance. But how is his pupils. this to be effected? Only by rendering the ef- fort more pleasurable than its omission. But every effort is at first difficult, — consequently irksome. The ulti- mate benefit it promises is dim and remote, while the pupil is often of an age at which present pleasure is more persuasive than future good. The pain of the exertion must, therefore, be overcome by associating with it a still higher pleasure. This can only be effected by enlisting some passion in the cause of improvement. We must awaken emulation, and allow its gratification only through a course of vigorous exertion. Some rigorists, I am aware, would proscribe, on moral and religious grounds, the employment of the passions in education; but such a view is at once false and dan- gerous. The affections are the work of God; they are not radically evil; they are given us for useful purposes, and are, therefore, not super- fluous. It is their abuse that is alone reprehensible. In truth, however, there is no alternative. In youth passion is prepon- derant. There is then a redundant amount of energy which must be expended; and this, if it find not an outlet through one affec- tion, is sure to find it through another. The aim of education is thus to employ for good those impulses which would otherwise be The place of the pas- sions in education. Lect. I. METAPHYSICS. 13 turned to evil. The passions are never neutral ; they are either the best allies, or the worst opponents, of improvement. “ Man’s na- ture,” says Bacon, “runs either to herbs or weeds; therefore let him seasonably water the one, and destroy the other.” * Without the stimulus of emulation, what can education accomplish? The love of abstract knowledge, and the habit of application, are still un- formed, and if emulation intervene not, the course by which these are acquired is, from a strenuous and cheerful energy, reduced to an inanimate and dreary effort; and this, too, at an age when pleas- ure is all-powerful, and impulse predominant over reason. The result is manifest. These views have determined my plan of practical instruction. Regarding the communication of knowledge as a high, but not the highest, aim of academical instruction, I shall not content my- self with the delivery of lectures. By all means in my power I shall endeavor to rouse you, gentlemen, to the free and vigorous exercise of your faculties; and shall deem my task accomplished, not by teaching Logic and Philosophy, but by teaching to reason _and philosophize.’ 1 Essay xxxviii.— ‘Of Nature in Men.” 2 For Fragment containing the Author’s — Works, ed. Montagu, volume i. p. 183.— views on the subject of Academical Honors, ED. see Appendix I.— Eb. LECTURE ITT PHILOSOPHY—ITS ABSOLUTE UTILITY. (B.) OBJECTIVE. In the perverse estimate which is often made of the end and : objects of education, it is impossible that the Science of Mind,— Philosophy Proper,—the Queen of Sciences, as it was denominated of old, should not be degraded in common opinion from its preéminence, as the high- est branch of general education; and, therefore, before attempting to point out to you what constitutes the value of Philosophy, it becomes necessary to clear the way by establishing a correct no- tion of what the value of a study 1s. . , Some things are valuable, finally, or for themselves, — these are ends; other things are valuable, not on their own account, but as conducive towards certain ulterior ends, — these are means. The value of ends is absolute, —-the value of means is relative. Absolute value is properly called a good,—relative value is properly called a utility? Of goods, or absolute ends, there are for man but two, — perfection and happiness. By perfection is meant the full and harmonious development of all our faculties, corporeal and mental, intellectual and moral; by happiness, the complement of all the pleasures of which we are susceptible. Now, I may state, though I cannot at present attempt to prove, and I am afraid many will not even understand Human perfection the statement, that human perfection and hu- and happiness coin- a cre * . cide. man happiness coincide, and thus constitute, m reality, but a single end. For as, on the one hand, the perfection or full development of a power is in propor- tion to its capacity of free, vigorous, and continued action, so, on The value of astudy. Ends and means. 1 It is to be observed, that the Lectures the Course. This circumstance accounts for here printed as First and Second, were not the repetition of the principal doctrines of uniformly delivered by the Author in that Lecture I. in the opening of Lecture I1.— Ep. order. The one or other was, however, 2 [Cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic., lib. i., ¢. 7, §1.] © usually given as the Introductory Lecture of Lect. IL. METAPHYSICS. 15 the other, all pleasure is the concomitant of activity; its degree being in proportion as that activity is spontaneously intense, its prolongation in proportion as that activity is spontaneously con- tinued; whereas, pain arises either from a faculty being restrained in its spontaneous tendency to action, or from being urged to a degree, or to a continuance, of energy beyond the limit to which it of itself freely tends. To promote our perfection is thus to promote our happiness; for to cultivate fully and harmoniously our various faculties, is simply to enable them by exercise, to energize longer and stronger without painful effort; that is, to afford us a larger amount of a higher quality of enjoyment. | Perfection (comprising happiness) being thus the one end of our existence, in so far as man is considered either as an end unto himself, or as a mean to the glory of his Creator; it is evident that, absolutely speaking, that is, without reference to special cireum- stances and relations, studies and sciences must, in common with all other pursuits, be judged useful as they contribute, and only as they contribute, to the perfection of our humanity, — that is, toa, our perfection simply as men. It is manifest that in this rela- tion alone can anything distinctively, emphatically, and without qualification, be denominated useful; for as our perfection as men is the paramount and universal end proposed to the species, what- ever we may style useful in any other relation, ought, as con- ducive only to a subordinate and special end, to be so called, not simply, but with qualifying limitation. Propriety has, however, in this case, been reversed in common usage. For the term Useful has been exclusively bestowed, in ordinary language, on those branches of instruction which, without reference to his general cultivation as aman or a gentleman, qualify an individual to earn his livelihood by a special knowledge or dexterity in some lucra- tive calling or profession; and it is easy to see how, after the word had been thus appropriated to what, following the Germans, we may call the Bread and Butter sciences, those which more prox- imately and obtrusively contribute to the intellectual and moral dignity of man, should, as not having been styled the useful, come, in popular opinion, to be regarded as the useless branches of instruction. Criterion of the util- ity of a study. As it is proper to have different names for different things, we may call the higher utility, or that conducive to the perfection of a man viewed as an end in himself, by the name of Absolute or Gen- General and Partic- ular Utility. 16 METAPHYSICS. | Lecr. IL eral; the inferior utility, or that conducive to the skill of an indi- vidual viewed as an instrument for some end out of himself, by the name of Special or Particular. Now, it is evident, that in estimating the utility of any branch of education, we ought to measure it both by the one kind of utility and by the other; but it is also evident, that a neglect of the former standard will lead us further wrong in appreciating the value of any branch of common or general instruction, than a neglect of the latter. It has been the tendency of different ages, of different coun- tries, of different ranks and conditions of society, to measure the utility of studies rather by one of these standards, than by both. Thus it was the bias of antiquity, when the moral and intellectual cultivation of the citizen was viewed as the great end of all po- litical institutions, to appreciate all knowledge principally by the higher standard; on the contrary, it is unfortunately the bias of our modern civilization, since the accumulation, (and not too the distribution), of riches in a country, has become the grand problem of the statesman, to appreciate it rather by the lower. In considering, therefore, the utility of philosophy, we have, first, to determine its Absolute, and, in the second place, its Special utility—I say its special utility, for, though not itself one of the professional studies, it is mediately more or less conducive to them all. In the present Lecture I must, of course, limit myself to one branch of this division; and even a part of the first or Absolute utility will more than occupy our hour. Limiting myself, therefore, to the utility of philosophy as es- timated by the higher standard alone, it is further to be observed, that, on this standard, a science or study is useful in two different ways, and, as these are not identical, —this pursuit being more useful in the one way, that pursuit more useful in the other, — these in reality constitute two several standards of utility, by which each branch of knowledge ought to be separately measured. The cultivation, the intellectual perfection, of a man, may be estimated by the amount of two different ele- Absolute utility ofa ments; it may be estimated by the mere sum science of twokinds— — O¢ truths which he has learned, or it may be Objective and Subjec- ; tive. estimated by the greater development of his ; faculties, as determined by their greater ex- ercise in the pursuit and contemplation of truth. For, though this may appear a paradox, these elements are not merely not Philosophy: its Ab- solute utility. thos TE METAPHYSICS. . 17 convertible, but are, in fact, very loosely connected with each other; and as an individual may possess an ample magazine of knowledge, and still be little better than an intellectual barbarian, so the utility of one science may be principally seen in affording a greater number of higher and more indisputable truths, — the utility of another in determining the faculties to a higher energy, and consequently to a higher cultivation. The former of these utilities we may call the Objective, as it regards the object- matter about which our cognitive faculties are occupied; the other Subjective, inasmuch as it regards our cognitive faculties them- selves as the subject in which knowledge is inherent. I shall not at present enter on the discussion which of these utilities is the higher. In the opening lecture of last year, I endeavored to show that all knowledge is only for the sake of energy, and that even merely speculative truth is valuable only as it determines a greater quantity of higher power into activity. In that lecture, I also endeay- ored to show that, on the standard of subjective utility, philosophy is of all our studies the most useful; inasmuch as more than any other it exercises, and consequently develops to a higher degree, and in a more varied manner, our noblest faculties. At present, on the contrary, I shall confine myself to certain views of the importance of philosophy, estimated by the standard of its Objective utility. The discussion, I am aware, will be found somewhat disproportioned to the age and average ca- pacity of my hearers; but, on this occasion, and before this audi- ence, I hope to be excused if I venture for once on matters which, to be adequately understood, require development and _ illustra- tion from the matured intelligence of those to whom they are presented. Considered in itself, a knowledge of the human mind, whether we regard its speculative or its practical impor- tance, is confessedly of all studies the highest and the most interesting. “On earth,” says an ancient philosopher, “there is nothing great but man; in man, there is nothing great but mind.”? No other study fills and satisfies the soul like the study of itself. No other science presents an object to be compared in dignity, in absolute or in relative value, to that which human consciousness furnishes to its own contemplation. What is of all things the best, asked Philosophy: its Ob- jective utility. The human mind the noblest object of spec- ulation. 1@Phavorinus, quoted by Joannes Picus' Basil.—Ed.] For notice of Phavorinus, see Mirandulanus, In Astrologiam, lib. iii. p. 351, Vossius, De Hist. Grec., lib. ii. c. 10, — Eb. 3 18 METAPHYSICS. Lect. IL. Chilon of the Oracle. “To know thyself,” was the response. This is, in fact, the only science in which all are always interested ; for, while each individual may have his favorite occupation, it still . remains true of the species, that “‘The proper study of mankind is man.” 1 «Now for my life,” says Sir Thomas Browne, “it is a miracle of ‘ thirty years, which to relate were not a his- ‘ tory, but a piece of poetry, and would sound to common ears like a fable. “For the world, I count it not an inn, but an hospital; and a place not to live, but to die in. The world that I regard is myself; it is the microcosm of my own frame that I cast mine eye on; for the other, I use it but like my globe, and turn it round sometimes, for my recreation. Men that look upon my outside, perusing only my condition and fortunes, do err in my altitude; for I am above Atlas his shoulders. The earth is a point not only in respect of the heavens above us, but of that heavenly and celestial part within us. That mass of flesh that circumscribes me, limits not my mind. That surface that tells the heavens it hath an end, cannot per- suade me I have any. I take my circle to be above three hundred and sixty. Though the number of the ark do measure my body, it comprehendeth not my mind. Whilst I study to find how I am a microcosm, or little world, I find myself something more than the great. There is surely a piece of divinity in us; something that was before the elements, and owes no homage unto the sun, Nature tells me, I am the image of God, as well as Scripture. He that understands not thus much hath not his introduction or first lesson, and is yet to begin the alphabet of man.”? But, though mind, considered in itself, be the noblest object of speculation which the created universe presents to the curiosity of man, it is under a certain relation that I would now attempt to illustrate its utility; for mind rises to its highest. dignity when viewed as the object through which, and through which alone, our unassisted. reason can ascend to the knowledge of a God. The Deity is not an object of immediate contemplation; as existing and in him- self, he is beyond our reach; we can know him only mediately through his works, and are only warranted in assuming his ex- Sir Thomas Browne quoted. Relation of Psychol- ogy to Theology. 1 Pope, Essay on Man, ii. 2.— Ep. 2 Browne’s Religio Medici, part ii.§ 11. Discussions, p. 311. — Ep. Lect. IL METAPHYSICS. 19 istence as a certain kind of cause necessary to account for a cer- tain state of things, of whose reality our facul- ties are supposed to inform us. The affirmation of a God being thus a regressive inference, from the existence of a special class of effects to the. existence of a special character of cause, it is evident, that the whole argument hinges on the fact, — Does a state of things really exist such as is only possible through the agency of a Divine Causé? For if it can be shown that such a state of things does not really exist, then, our inference to the kind of cause requisite to account for it, is necessarily null. This being understood, I now proceed to show you that the class of phenomena which requires that kind of cause we denominate a Deity, is exclusively given in the phenomena of mind,— that the phenomena of matter, taken by themselves (you will observe the qualification, taken by themselves), so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God, would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation, —that the study of the external world taken with, and in subordination to, that of the internal, not only loses its atheistic tendency, but, under such subservience, may be rendered conducive to the great conclusion, from which, if left to itself, it would dissuade us. We must first of all then consider what kind of cause it is which constitutes a Deity, and what kind of effects they are which allow us to infer that a Deity must be. The notion of a God is not contained in the notion of a mere : First Cause; for in the admission of a first cause, Bee ofaGod Atheist and Theist are at one. Neither is this notion completed by adding to a first’ cause the attribute of Omnipotence, for the atheist who holds matter or necessity to be the original principle of all that is, does not con- vert his blind force into a God, by merely affirming it to be all- powerful. It is not until the two great attributes of Intelligence and Virtue (and be it observed that virtue involves Liberty) — I say, it is not until the two attributes of intelligence and virtue or holiness, are brought in, that the belief in a primary and omnipo- tent cause becomes the belief in a veritable Divinity. But these latter attributes are not more essential to the divine nature than are the former. For as original and infinite power does not of itself constitute a God, neither is a God constituted by intelligence and virtue, unless intelligence and goodness be themselves con- jomed with this original and infinite power. For even a crea- Existence of Deity an inference from a special class of effects. These afforded ex- clusively by the phex- nomena of mind. 20 METAPHYSICS. Lect. II. tor, intelligent, and good, and powerful, would be no God, were he dependent for his intelligence and goodness and power on any higher principle. On this supposition, the perfections of the creator are viewed as limited and derived. He is himself, therefore, only a dependency, — only a creature ; and if a God there be, he must be sought for in that higher principle, from which this subordinate principle derives its attributes. Now is this highest principle (ca — hypothesi all-powerful), also intelligent and moral, then it is itself alone the veritable Deity; on the other hand is it, though the author of intelligenée and goodness in another, itself unintelligent, | __then is a blind Fate constituted the first and universal cause, and atheism is asserted. The peculiar attributes which distinguish a Deity from the original omnipotence or blind fate of the atheist, Conditions of the — eing thus those of intelligence and holiness of -proof of the existence : : : : es will, — and the assertion of theism being only the assertion that the universe is created by intelligence, and governed not only by physical but by moral laws, — we have next to consider how we are warranted in these two affirmations, 1°, That intelligence stands first in the absolute order of existence, —in other words, that final preceded efficient causes ; and, 2°, That the universe is governed by moral laws. The proof of these two propositions is the proof of a God; and it establishes its foundation exclusively on 1. Is intelligence the phenomena of mind. I shall endeavor, lh Pee Sie ie gentlemen, to show you this, in regard to both ina fe be these propositions ; but, before considering how moral law ? far the phenomena of mind and of matter do and do not allow us to infer the one position or the other, I must solicit your attention to the characteristic con- trasts which these two classes of phenomena in themselves exhibit. In the compass of our experience, we distinguish two series of facts, —the facts of the external or material Contrasts of thephe- world, and the facts of the internal world or nomena of matter and 3 : A A a. world of intelligence. ‘These concomitant series of phenomena are not like streams which merely run parallel to each other; they do not, like the Alpheus and Arethusa, flow on side by side without a commingling of their waters. They cross, they combine, they are interlaced; but not- withstanding their intimate connection, their mutual action and reaction, we are, able to discriminate them without difficulty, be- cause they are marked out by characteristic differences. The phenomena of the material world are subjected to immu- Lect. IL. METAPHYSICS. 21 table laws, are produced and reproduced in the same invariable succession, and manifest only the blind force of a mechanical necessity. The phenomena of man, are, in part, subjected to the laws of the external universe. As dependent upon a bodily organization, as actuated by sensual propensities and animal wants, he belongs to matter, and, in this respect, he is the slave of necessity. But what man holds of matter does not make up his personality. They are his, not he; man is not an organism,—he is an intelli- gence served by organs.1. For in man there are tendencies, — there is a law,—which continually urge him to prove that he is more powerful than the nature by which he is surrounded and penetrated. He is conscious to himself of faculties not comprised in the chain of physical necessity, his intelligence reveals prescrip- tive principles of action, absolute and universal, in the Law of Duty, and a liberty capable of carrying that law into effect, in opposition to the solicitations, the impulsions of his material na- ture. From the coéxistence of these opposing forces in man there results a ceaseless struggle between physical necessity and moral liberty ; in the language of Revelation, between the Flesh and the Spirit; and this struggle constitutes at once the distinctive char- acter of humanity, and the essential condition of human develop- ment and virtue. In the facts of intelligence, we thus become aware of an order of existence diametrically in contrast to that displayed to us in the facts of the material universe. There is made known to us an order of things, in which intelligence, by recognizing the uncon- ditional law of duty and an absolute obligation to fulfil it, recog- nizes its own possession of a liberty incompatible with a depend- ence upon fate, and of a power capable of resisting and conquer- ing the counteraction of our animal nature. Now, it is only as man is a free intelligence, a moral power, that he is created after the image of God, and it Consciousnessoffree- ig only as a spark of divinity glows as the life fom) and of 2 ‘ow of of our life in us, that we can rationally believe duty, the conditions of 3 . Theology. in an Intelligent Creator and Moral Governor of the universe. For, let us suppose, that in man intelligence is the product. of organization, that our conscious- ness of moral liberty is itself only an illusion; in short, that acts of volition are results of the same iron necessity which determines 1[‘‘ Mens cujusque, is est quisque; noneafig- Somnium Scipionis, e. 8—after Plato.] Cf. ura, que digito demonstrari potest.”,— Cicero, Plato, Alc. Prim. p.130, and infra, p. 114,— Ep. 92 METAPHYSICS. Lect. IL the phenomena of matter, —on this supposition, I say, the founda- tions of all religion, natural and revealed, are subverted.’ The truth of this will be best seen by applying the supposition of the two positions of theism previously stated —viz., that the notion of God necessarily supposes, 1°, That in the absolute order of existence intelligence should be first, that is, not itself the pro- duct of an unintelligent antecedent; and, 2°, That the universe - should be governed not only by physical but by moral laws. Now, in regard to the former, how can we attempt to prove that the universe is the creation of a free original First condition of the : : ‘ ates pl Fake Hate Wik intelligence, against the counter-position of the from Psychology. An- atheist, that liberty is an illusion, and intelli- alogy between our ex- gence, or the adaptation of means to ends, only alps Pe il the product of a blind fate? As we know no- thing of the absolute order of existence in itself, we can only attempt to infer its character from that of the partic- ular order within the sphere of our experience, and as we can affirm naught of intelligence and its conditions, except what we may discover from the observation of our own minds, it is evident that we can only analogically carry out into the order of the uni- verse the relation in which we find intelligence to stand in the order of the human constitution. If in man intelligence be a free power, —in so far as its liberty extends, intelligence must be independent of necessity and.matter; and a power independent of matter necessarily implies the existence of an immaterial subject, —that is, a spirit. If, then, the original independence of intelli- gence on matter in the human constitution, in other words, if the spirituality of mind in man, be supposed a datum of observa- tion, in this datum is also given both the condition and the proof of a God. For we have only to infer, what analogy entitles us to do, that intelligence holds the same relative supremacy in the universe which it holds in us, and the first positive condition of a Deity is established, in the establishment of the absolute priority of a free creative intelligence. On the other hand, let us suppose the result of our study of man to be, that intelligence is only a product of matter, only a reflex of organization, such a doctrine would not only afford no basis on which to rest any argument for a God, but, on the contrary, would positively warrant the atheist in deny- ing his existence. For if, as the materialist maintains, the only intelligence of which we have any experience be a consequent of matter, —on this hypothesis, he not only cannot assume this Psychological Mate- rialism : its issue. 1 See Discussions, p. 623. — Ep. & Lect. II. METAPHYSICS. 23 order to be reversed in the relations of an intelligence beyond his observation, but, if he argue logically, he must positively conclude, that, as in man, so in the universe, the phenomena of intelligence or design are only in their last analysis the products of a brute necessity. Psychological materialism, if carried out fully and fairly to its conclusions, thus inevitably results in theological atheism ; as it has been well expressed by Dr. Henry More, nallus in micro- cosmo spiritus, nullus in macrocosmo Deus.' I do not, of course, | mean to assert that all materialists deny, or actually disbelieve, a God. For, in very many cases, this would be at once an unmer- ited compliment to their reasoning, and an unmerited reproach to their faith. Such is the manifest dependence of our theology on our psy- chology in reference to the first condition of a Second condition of Peity,—the absolute priority of a free intelli- Pajeroer OF 8. Dely+ +. ‘gence..) But; this is perhaps even more conspic- drawn from Psychol- 2 yj ogy. uous in relation to the second, that the uni- verse is governed not merely by physical but by moral laws, for God is only God inasmuch as he is the Moral Governor of a Moral World. Our interest also in its establishment is incomparably greater, for while a proof that the universe is the work of an omnipotent intel- ligence, gratifies only our speculative curiosity,— a proof that there is a holy legislator by whom goodness and felicity will be ultimately brought into accordance, is necessary to satisfy both our intel- lect and our heart. A God is, indeed, to us only of practical interest, inasmuch as he is the condition of our immortality. Now, it is self-evident, in the first place, that, if there be no moral world, there can be no moral governor of such a world; and, in the second, that we have, and can have, no ground on which to believe in the reality of a moral world, except in so far as we ourselves are moral agents. This being undeniable, it is further evident, that, should we ever be convinced that we are not moral agents, we should likewise be convinced that there exists no moral’ order in the universe, and no supreme intelligence by which that moral order is established, sustained, and regu- lated. Theology is thus again wholly dependent on Psychology; for, with the proof of the moral nature of man, stands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity. 1 Cf. Antidotus adversus Atheismum, lib. iii. 1679); and the Author's Discussions, p. 788. c. 16, (Opera Omnia, vol. ii. p. 148, Londini, —Eb. oa bd 24 METAPHYSICS." . ene But in what. does the character of man as a moral agent consist ? Man is a moral agent only as he is account- Wherein the moral able for his actions,—in other words, as he is ie “agai regl nad the object of praise or blame; and this he is, only inasmuch as he has prescribed to him a rule of duty, and as he is able to act, or not to act, in conform- ity with its precepts. The possibility of morality thus depends on the possibility of liberty; for if man be not a free agent, he is not the author of his actions, and has, therefore, no responsi- bility, —no moral personality at all. Now the study of Philosophy, or mental science, operates in three ways to establish that assurance of human Philosophy operates liberty, which is necessary for a rational belief In three ways, in estab- lishing assurance of first place, an attentive consideration of the phenomena of mind is requisite in order to a luminous and dis- tinct apprehension of liberty as a fact or, datum of intelligence. For though, without philosophy, a natural conviction of free agency lives and works in the recesses of every human mind, it requires a process of philosophical thought to bring this conviction to clear consciousness and scientific certainty. In the second place, a pro- found philosophy is necessary to obviate the difficulties which meet us when we attempt to explain the possibility of this fact, and to prove that the datum of liberty is not a mere illusion, For though an unconquerable feeling compels us to recognize ourselves as accountable, and therefore free, agents, still, when we attempt to realize in thought how the fact of our liberty can be, we soon find that this altogether transcends our understand- ing, and that every effort to bring the fact of liberty within the compass of our conceptions, only results in the substitution in its place of some more or less disguised form of necessity. For, —if I may be allowed to use expressions which many of you can- not be supposed at present to understand,— we are only able to conceive a thing, inasmuch as we conceive it under conditions ; while the possibility of a free act supposes it to be an act which is not conditioned or determined. The tendency of a superficial philosophy is, therefore, to deny the fact of liberty, on the prin- ciple that what cannot be conceived is impossible. A deeper and more comprehensive study of the facts of mind overturns this conclusion, and disproves its foundation. It shows that, —so far from the principle being true, that what is inconceivable is im- possible, — on the contrary, all that is conceivable is a mean be. in our own moral nature, in a moral world, human liberty. and in a moral ruler of that world. In the et ae ee % Lect. II. Mi peuvarase 95 tween two contradictory extremes, both of which are inconceiva- ble, but of which, as mutually repugnant, one or the other must be true. Thus philosophy, in demonstrating that the limits of thought are not to be assumed as the limits of possibility, while it admits the weakness of our discursive intellect, reéstablishes the authority of consciousness, and vindicates the veracity of our primitive convictions. It proves to us, from the very laws of mind, that while we can never understand how any original datum of intelligence is possible, we have no reason from this inability to doubt that it is true. A learned ignorance is thus the end of philosophy, as it is the beginning of theology. In the third place, the study of mind is necessary to counter- balance and correct the influence of the study of matter; and this utility of Metaphysics rises in proportion to the progress of the natural sciences, and to the greater attention which they engross. | An exclusive devotion to physical pursuits, exerts an evil influ- ence in two ways. In the first place, it diverts from all notice of the phenomena of moral liberty, which are revealed to us in the recesses of the human mind alone; and it disqualifies from appreciating the import of these phzenomena, even if presented, by leaving un- cultivated the finer power of psychological reflection, in the exclu- sive exercise of the faculties employed in the easier and more amusing observation of the external world. In the second place, by exhibiting merely the phzenomena of matter and extension, it habituates us only to the contemplation of an order in which everything is determined by the laws of a blind or mechanical necessity. Now, what is the inevitable tendency of this one-sided and exclusive study? That the student becomes a materialist, if he speculate at all. For, in the first place, he is familiar with the obtrusive facts of necessity, and is unaccustomed to develop into consciousness the more recondite facts of liberty; he is, there- fore, disposed to disbelieve in the existence of phenomena whose reality he may deny, and whose possibility he cannot understand. At the same time, the love of unity, and the philosophical presump- tion against the multiplication of essences, de- ae i Br aria termine him to reject the assumption of a second, fine: and that an hypothetical, substance, — ignorant as he is of the reasons by which that assump- tion is legitimated. _In the infancy of science, this tendency of » Twofold evils of ex- clusive physical study. 1 See Discussions, p. 634. — Ep. £ 26 | METAPHYSICS. Lect. IL physical study was not experienced. When men first turned their attention on the phenomena of nature, every event was viewed as a miracle, for every effect was considered as the operation of an intelligence. God was not exiled from the universe of mat- ter; on the contrary, he was multiplied in proportion to its pha- nomena. As science advanced, the deities were gradually driven out; and long after the sublunary world had been disenchanted, they were left for a season in possession of the starry heavens. ‘The movement of the celestial bodies, in which Kepler still saw - the agency of a free intelligence, was at length by Newton re- solved into a few mathematical principles; and at last even the irreguiarities which Newton was compelled to leave for the mirac- ulous correction of the Deity, have been proved to require no supernatural interposition; for La Place has shown that all con- tingencies, past and future, in the heavens, find their explanation in the one fundamental law of gravitation. But the very contemplation of an order and adaptation so aston- ishing, joined to the knowledge that this order and adaptation are the necessary results of a brute mechanism,— when acting upon minds which have not looked into themselves for the light of which the world without can only afford them the reflection, — far from elevating them more than any other aspect of external crea- tion to that inscrutable Being who reigns beyond and above the universe of nature, tends, on the contrary, to impress on them, with peculiar force, the conviction, that as the mechanism of nature can explain so much, the mechanism of nature can ex- plain all. . “Wonder,” says Aristotle, “is the first cause of philosophy:”! but in the discovery that all existence is but ‘ eae mechanism, the consummation of science would ei ee ex. be an extinction of the very interest from which tinguished. it originally sprang. ‘Even the gorgeous ma- jesty of the heavens,” says a religious philoso- pher, “the object of a kneeling adoration to an infant world, sub- dues no more the mind of him who comprehends the one mechan- ical law by which the planetary systems move, maintain their motion, and even originally form themselves. He no longer won- ders at the object, infinite as it always is, but at the human intel- . lect alone which in a Copernicus, Kepler, Gassendi, Newton, and La Place, was able to transcend the object, by science to termi- nate the miracle, to reave the heaven of its divinities, and to 1 Metaphysics, book i.2,9. Compare Plato, Theetetus, p. 155.— Ev. Lect. IL. METAPHYSICS. Qt exorcise the universe. But even this, the only admiration of which our intelligent faculties are now capable, would vanish, were a future Hartley, Darwin, Condillac, or Bonnet, to succeed in display- ing to us a mechanical system of the human mind, as compre- hensive, intelligible, and satisfactory as the Newtonian mecha- nism of the heavens.”?! To this testimony I may add that, should Physiology ever suc- ceed in reducing the facts of intelligence to Phenomena of matter, Philosophy would be subverted in the subversion of its three great objects, — God, Free-Will, and Immortality. True wisdom would then consist, not in speculation, but in repressing thought during our brief transit from nothingness to nothingness. For why? Philosophy would have become a meditation, not merely of death, but of annihilation; the precept, Know thyself, would have been replaced by the terrific oracle to Cidipus — ‘‘ May’st thou ne’er know the truth of what thou art;” and the final recompense of our scientific curiosity would be wailing, deeper than Cassandra’s, for the ignorance that saved us from despair. The views which I have now taken of the respective influence of the sciences of mind and of matter in relation Coincidence of the to our religious belief, are those which have ae? a ENS oi heer deliberately adopted by the profoundest previous phi- losophers. . thinkers, ancient and modern. Were I to quote to you the testimonies that crowd on my recol- lection to the effect that ignorance of Self is ignorance of God, I should make no end, for this is a truth proclaimed by Jew and Gentile, Christian and Mohammedan. I shall content myself with adducing three passages from three philosophers, which I select, both as articulately confirming all that I have now advanced, and because there are not, in the whole history of speculation, three authorities on the point in question more entitled to respect. The first quotation is from Plato, and it corroborates the doc- trine I have maintained in regard to the condi- tions of a God, and of our knowledge of his existence. “The cause,” he says, “of all impiety and irreligion among men is, that reversing in themselves the relative subordi- nation of mind and body, they have, in like manner, in the uni- verse, made that to be first which is second, and that to be second Plato. 1 Jacobi, Werke, vol. ii. p. 52-54. Quoted in Discussions, p. 312. — Ep. 98 METAPHYSICS. Lect. Il. which is first; for while, in the generation of all things, intel- ligence and final causes precede matter and efficient causes, they, on the contrary, have viewed matter and material things as abso- lutely prior, in the order of existence, to intelligence and design; and thus departing from an original error in relation to them- selves, they have ended in the subversion of the Godhead.”! The second quotation is from Kant; it finely illustrates the influ- ences of material and mental studies by con- trasting them in reference to the very noblest object of either, and the passage is worthy of your attention, not only for the soundness of its doctrine, but for the natural and unsought-for sublimity of its expression: “Two things there are, which, the oftener and the more steadfastly we consider, fill the mind with an ever new, an ever rising admiration and reverence; — the STARRY HEAVEN above, the MORAL LAW within. Of neither am I compelled to seek out the reality, as veiled in darkness, or only to conjecture the possibility, as beyond the hemisphere of my knowledge. Both I contemplate lying clear before me, and connect both immediately with my consciousness of existence. The one departs from the place I occupy:in the outer world of sense; expands, beyond the bounds of imagination, this connection of my body with worlds rising beyond worlds, and systems blending into systems; and protends it also into the illimitable times of their periodic movement —to its commencement and perpetuity. The other departs from my invisible self, from my personality; and represents me in a world, truly infinite indeed, but whose infinity can be tracked out only by the intellect, with which also my con- nection, unlike the fortuitous relation I stand in to all worlds of sense, I am compelled to recognize as universal and necessary. In the former, the first view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an animal product, which, after a brief and that incomprehensible endowment with the pow- ers of life, is compelled to refund its constituent matter to the planet — itself an atom in the universe—on which it grew. The other, on the contrary, elevates my worth as an intelligence even without limit; and this through my personality, in which the moral law reveals a faculty of life independent of my animal nature, nay, of the whole material world: —at least if it be permitted to infer as much from the regulation of my being, which a conformity with that law exacts; proposing, as it does, my moral worth for Kant. 1 De Legibus, book x. pp. 888, 889. Quoted iii., Lond. ed.), and Eternal and Immut. Mor- in Discussions, p. 812. Compare Cudworth, ality, book iv., ¢: vi. § 6, seg. — Ep. Intell. System, C. Vv. § iv. (p..485 et sey. of vol. Lect. IL. METAPHYSICS. 99 the absolute end of my activity, conceding no compromise of its imperative to a necessitation of nature, and spurning, in its infinity, the conditions and boundaries of my present transitory life.”? The third quotation is from the pious and profound Jacobi, and it states the truth boldly and without disguise in regard to the relation of Physics and Met- aphysics to Religion. “But is it unreasonable to confess, that we believe in God, not by reason of the nature® which conceals him, but by reason of the supernatural in man, which alone reveals and proves him to exist? “Nature conceals God: for through her whole domain Nature reveals only fate, only an indissoluble chain of mere efficient causes without beginning and without end, excluding, with equal neces- sity, both providence and chance. An independent agency, a free original commencement within her sphere and proceeding from her powers, is absolutely impossible. Working without will, she takes counsel neither of the good nor of the beautiful; creating nothing, she casts up from her dark abyss only eternal transformations of herself, unconsciously and without an end; furthering, with the same ceaseless industry, decline and increase, death and life, — never producing what alone is of God and what supposes liberty, —the virtuous, the immortal. “ Man reveals God; for man by his intelligence rises above na- ture, and in virtue of this intelligence is conscious of himself as a power not only independent of, but opposed to, nature, and capable of resisting, conquering, and controlling her. As man has a living faith in this power, superior to nature, which dwells in him; so has he a belief in God, a feeling, an experience of his existence. As he does not believe in this power, so does he not believe in God; he sees, he experiences naught in existence but nature, — necessity, — fate.” * Such is the comparative importance of the sciences of mind and of matter in relation to the interests of religion. These uses of Psy- But it may be said, how great soever be the Brpeh ePOke EMPEY: rvalud’ of philosophy in this respect, were man seded by the Christian ; rion left to rise to the divinity by the unaided ex- ercise of his faculties, this value is superseded under the Christian dispensation, the Gospel now assuring us of Jacobi. 1 Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Beschluss. world of Matter, in contrast to the world of Quoted in Discussions, p 310.— Ep. Intelligence.] — Oral Interpolation, supplied 2 [In the philosophy of Germany, Natur and from Reid*s Works, p. 216.— Ep. its correlatives, whether of Greek or Latin 3 Von den Gottlichen Dingen. « Werke, iii. p. derivation, are, in general, expressive of the 424-26.— Ep. 30 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. II. all and more than all philosophy could ever warrant us in surmis- ing. It is true, indeed, that in Revelation there is contained a great complement of truths of which natural reason could afford us no knowledge or assurance, but still the importance of mental science to theology has not become superfluous 1 in Christianity ; for whereas anterior to Revelation, religion rises out of psychology as a result, subsequently to revelation, it supposes a genuine philos- ophy of mind as the condition of its truth. This is at once mani- fest. Revelation is a revelation to man and concerning man; and man is only the object of revelation, inasmuch as he is a moral, a free, a responsible being. The Scriptures are replete with testi- monies to our natural liberty; and it is the doctrine of every Christian church, that man was originally created with a will capa- ble equally of good as of evil, though this will, subsequently to the fall, has lost much of its primitive liberty. Christianity thus, by universal confession, supposes as a condition the moral nature of its object; and if some individual theologians be found who have denied to man a higher liberty than a machine, this is only another example of the truth, that there is no opinion which has been una- ble to find not only its champions but its martyrs. The differ- ences which divide the Christian churches on this question, regard only the liberty of man in certain particular relations, for fatalism, or a negation of human responsibility in general, is equally es to the tenets of the Calvinist and Arminian. In these circumstances it is evident, that he who disbelieves the moral agency of man must, in consistency with that opinion, disbe- lieve Christianity. And therefore inasmuch as Philosophy, — the Philosophy of Mind, —-scientifically establishes the proof of human liberty, philosophy, in this, as in many other relations not now to be considered, is the true preparative and best aid of an enlightened Christian Theology. LECTURE ITI. THE NATURE AND COMPREHENSION OF PHILOSOPHY. I wave been in the custom of delivering sometimes together, more frequently in alternate years, two systematic courses of lec- tures, — the one on Psycuouoey, that is, the science which is con- versant about the phenomena of mind in general, —the other on Loaric, that is, the science of the laws regulating the manifestation and legitimacy of the highest faculty of Cognition, — Thought, strictly so denominated —the faculty of Relations, —the Under- standing proper. As first, or initiative, courses of philosophy, — each has its peculiar advantages; and I know not, in truth, which ~ Ishould recommend a student to commence with. What, however, I find it expedient to premise to each is an Introduction, in which the nature and general relations of philosophy are explained, and a summary view taken of the faculties (particularly the Cognitive faculties), of mind. In the ensuing course, we shall be occupied with the General Philosophy of Mind. You are, then, about to commence a course of philosophical dis- cipline,—for Psychology is preéminently a phil- osophical science. It is therefore proper, before proceeding to a consideration of the special objects of our course, that you should obtain at least a general notion of what philosophy is. But in affording you this information, it is evident that there lie considerable difficulties in the way. for the definition, and the divisions of philosophy are the results of a lofty generalization from particulars, of which particulars you are, or must be presumed to be, still ignorant. You cannot, therefore, it is manifest, be made adequately to comprehend, in the commencement of your philo- sophical studies, notions which these studies themselves are in- tended to enable you to understand. But although you cannot at once obtain a full knowledge of the nature of philosophy, it is desirable that you should be enabled to form at least some vague conception of the road you are about to travel, and of the point to which it will conduct you. I must, therefore, beg that you will, for What Philosophy is. 82 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. II. the present, hypothetically believe,—believe upon authority, — what you may not now adequately understand; but this only to the end that you may not hereafter be under the necessity of tak- ing any conclusion, upon trust. Nor is this temporary exaction of credit peculiar to philosophical education. In the order of nature, belief always precedes knowledge, — it is the condition of imstruc- tion. The child (as observed by Aristotle) must believe, in order that he may learn;! and even the primary facts of intelligence, — the facts which precede, as they afford the conditions of, all knowl- edge, — would not be original were they revealed to us under any other form than that of natural or necessary beliefs. Without further preamble, therefore, I shall now endeavor to afford you some | general notion of what philosophy is.’ In doing this, there are two questions to be answered :— Ist, What is the meaning of the name? and, 2d, What is the meaning of the thing 2? An answer to the former question is afforded in a nominal definition of the term philosophy, and in a history of its employ- ment and application. In regard to the etymological signification of the word, you are aware that Philosophy is a term of Greek origin —that it is a compound of ¢idos, a lover or friend, and godia,? wisdom— speculative wis- dom. Philosophy is thus, literally, a love of wisdom. But if the grammatical meaning of the word be unambiguous, the history of its application is, I think, involved in considerable doubt. Accord- ing to the commonly received account, the designation of philosopher (lover or suitor of wisdom) was first assumed and applied by Pythagoras ; whilst of the occasion and circumstances of its assump- tion, we have a story by Cicero,* on the authority of Heraclides Ponticus ;° and by Diogenes Laertius, in one place,* on the authority Two questions re- garding Philosophy. Philosophy — the name. Commonly referred to Pythagoras. 1 Soph. Elench. c. 2.— ED. 2 On comprehension of Philosophy inter Antiquos, see Brandis, Geschichte der Philoso- phie, etc., vol. i. § 6, p. 7, seq. Srt ob TA auvdpdmiva, ayadd (nrovow. ‘H dé dpdynots wept Ta avdpadmva, Kad mepl, Gv éott BovaAevoacda. From the long commen- tary of Eustratius, the following extract will 3 Zopia in Greek, though sometimes used in a wide sense, like the term wise applied to skill in handicraft, yet properly denoted spec- ulative, not practical wisdom or prudence. See Aristotle, Eth. Nic. lib. vi. c. 7, with the commentary of Eustratius. [Avd Avataydpor, kal Oadrjy Kat tovs ToLodTous, copods per, gpovivovs 8 ot dacw elvat, Bray LOwow ayvoovvTas Ta Tuuhpovs’ éavrots* Kal mep- irTd wey, Kal Savuaord, kad xarewd, Kad Sada eidévar abtovs pacw, axpnors 8, be sufficient: "AAAd 7d TéAos TOU codod H Seopia THs GANelas eotl, kal H Tod vvTOS kaTdAnyis* ovx) d€ Tt mpaxtdy ayaddv. TIpaxtoyv ydp éotw dyaddy 7d did mpatews kaTopxovpevov, Sewpla 5é mpdtews ETEpa.— Ep. 4 Tusc. Quast. lib. v. c. 3. 5 Heraclides Ponticus— scholar both of Plato and of Aristotle. 6 Lib. 1. 12. Lect. III. - METAPHYSICS. - $3 of Heraclides, and in another,! on that of Sosicrates, — although it is doubtful whether the word Sosicrates be not in the second pas- sage a corrupted lection for Heraclides;? in which case the whole probability of the story will depend upon the trustworthiness of Heraclides alone, for the comparatively recent testimony of Iam- blichus, in his Life of Pythagoras, must go for nothing. and Plotinus, among many others,! observes that our knowledge is perfect as it is one. The love of unity is by Aristotle applied to solve a multitude of psychological phenomena.2 St. Augustin even analyzes pain into a feeling of the frustration of unity. “Quid est enim aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens? Unde luce clarius apparet, quam sit illa anima in sui corporis universitate avida unitatis et tenax.”? This love of unity, this tendency of mind to generalize its knowledge, leads us to anticipate in nature a corresponding uniformity; and as this antici- pation is found in harmony with experience, it not only affords the efficient cause of philoso phy, but the guiding principle to its discoveries. “Thus, for instance, when it is observed that solid bodies are compressible, we are induced to expect that liquids will be found to be so likewise; we subject them, consequently, to a series of experiments; nor do we rest satisfied until it be proved that this quality is com- mon to both classes of substances. Compressibility is then pro- claimed a physical law,—a law of nature in general; and we ex- perience a vivid gratification in this recognition of unconditioned universality.” Another example; Kant,‘ reflecting on the differences among the planets, or rather among the stars revolving round the sun, and having discovered that these differences betrayed a uni- form progress and proportion, —a proportion which was no longer to be found between Saturn and the first of the comets, — the law of unity and the analogy of nature, led him to conjecture that, in the intervening space, there existed a star, the discovery of which would vindicate the universality of the law. This anticipation was verified. Uranus was discovered by Herschel, and our dissatisfac- of unity ;’ Love of unity a guiding principle in philosophy. 1 Enn. iii. lib. viii. ¢. 2, on which Ficinus says: ‘‘ Cognoscendi: potentia in ipso actu cognitionis unum quodammodo sit cum ob- jecto, et quo magis sit unum, eo perfectior est cognitio, atque vicissim — Ep. Enn, vi. lib. ix. c. 1: "Aperh 5¢ Wuxjjs Bray eis Ev, kal eis ulay duoroylay évwS7. . . » Xviii. 9, where it is used to explain the higher pleasure we derive from those narratives that relate toa single subject. — Ep. 3 De Libero Arbitrio, lib. iii. 28. [St. Au- gustin applied the principle of Unity to solve the theory of the Beautiful: ‘Omnis pul- chritudinis forma unitas est.” Epist, xviii.] *Ereid)) Ta mdvra. eis év tiryet, Snutoupyovca Kal mAdtTovea Kal poppodca Kad cuvTdr- tovoa. Proclus,—Tvaéois ovdevds eorat Tov bYTWY, EiTws uy CoTL TH EV . . . OdSE Adyos fora’ Kal yap 6 Adyos ek ToAAaY eis, eimep réAcios’ Kal yvaots, Stay 7d yweoKov ev yivnta mpds To yywordy. In Platonis Theologiam, p. 76 (ed. 1618). — Ep. 2 See De Memoria, § 5, for application of this principle to the problem of Reminiscence. Cf. Reid's Works, p. 900. See also Problems, — Oral Interp. 4 Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des. Himmels, 1755; Werke, vol. vi. p. 88. Kant’s conjecture was founded on a supposed pro- gressive increase in the eccentricities of the planetary orbits. This progression, however, is only true of Venus, the Earth, Jupiter, and Saturn. The eccentricity diminishes again in Uranus, and still more in Neptune. Sub- sequent discoveries have thus rather weak- ened than confirmed the theory. — Ep. 50 METAPHYSICS. Leer. IV. om tion at the anomaly appeased. Franklin, in like manner, surmised that lightning and the electric spark were identical; and when he — succeeded in verifying this conjecture, our love of unity was grati- fied. From the moment an isolated fact is discovered, we en- deavor to refer it to other facts which it resembles. Until this be accomplished, we do not view it as understood. This is the © case, for example, with sulphur, which, in a certain degree of tem- perature melts like other bodies, but at a higher degree of heat, instead of evaporating, again consolidates. When a fact is gen-_ eralized, our discontent is quieted, and we consider the generality itself as tantamount to an explanation. Why does this apple fall to the ground? Because all bodies gravitate towards each other. Arrived at this general fact, we inquire no more, although ignorant ~ now as previously of the cause of gravitation; for gravitation is nothing more than a_name for a general fact, the why of which we know not. A mystery, if recognized as universal, would no longer appear mysterious. : e “But this thirst of unity, —this tendency of mind to generalize its knowledge, and our concomitant belief in the. & uniformity of natural phenomena, is not only” — Love of unity a source of error. , i Bn Sis an .effective mean of discovery, but likewise an abundant source of error. Hardly is there a similarity de- tected between two or three facts, than men hasten to extend 7 ge to all others; and if, perchance, the similarity has been detected — by ourselves, self-love closes our eyes to the contradictions which our theory may encounter from experience.”* “I have heard,” says Condillac, “of a philosopher who had the happiness of think- ing that he had discovered a principle which was to explain all the wonderful phenomena of chemistry, and who, in the ardor of his self-gratulation, hastened to communicate his discovery to a skilful chemist. ‘The chemist had the kindness to listen to him, and then calmly told him that there was but one unfortunate cir- cumstance for his discovery, — that the chemical facts were precisely the converse of what he had supposed them to be. ‘ Well, then, said the philosopher, ‘have the goodness to tell me what they are, that I may explain them on my system.” We are naturally dis- posed to refer everything we do not know to principles with which we are familiar. As Aristotle observes,’ the early Pythagoreans, who first studied arithmetic, were induced, by their scientific predi- lections, to explain the problem of the universe by the properties of 1 Garnier, Cours de Psychologie, p. 192-94. 2 Traité des Systémes, chap. xii. CGwvres [Cf Ancillon, Nouv, Mélanges, i. p- 1, et seq.] Philos. tom. iv. p. 146 (ed. 1795). 3 Metaph. i. 5. — ED. ms ty uy ix ie 7 Lect. IV. METAPHYSICS. 51 number ; and he notices also that a certain musical philosopher was, in like manner, led to suppose that the soul was but a kind of har- mony.’ The musician suggests to my recollection a passage of Dr. Reid. “Mr. Locke,” says he, “mentions an eminent musician who believed that God created the world in six days, and rested the seventh, because there are but seven notes in music. T myself,” he continues, “knew one of that profession who thought that there could be only three parts in harmony —to wit, bass, tenor and ‘treble; because there are but three persons in the Trinity.” ? The alchemists would see in nature only a single metal, clothed with the different appearances which we denominate gold, silver, copper, iron, mercury, etc., and they confidently explained the mysteries, not only of nature, but of religion, by salt, sulphur, and mereury? Some of our modern zovlogists recoil from the possibility of nature working on two different plans, and rather than renounce the unity which delights them, they insist on recognizing the wings of insects in the gills of fishes, and the sternum of quadrupeds in the an- tennx of butterflies, — and all this that they may prove that man is only the evolution of a molluscum. Descartes saw in the physical world only matter and motion ;* and, more recently, it has been maintained that thought itself is only a movement of matter’ Of all the faculties of the mind, Condillac recognized only one, which ‘transformed itself like the Protean metal of the alchemists ; and he maintains that our belief in the rising of to-morrow’s sun is a sensa- tion.® It is this tendency, indeed, which has principally determined philosophers, as we shall hereafter see, to neglect or violate the original duality of consciousness; in which, as an ultimate fact, — a self and not-self, —mind knowing and matter known, — are given in counterpoise and mutual opposition ; and hence the three Unita- rian schemes of Materialism, Idealism, and Absolute Identity.” In fine, Pantheism, or the doctrine which identifies mind and matter, —the Creator and the creature, God and the universe, — how are we to explain the prevalence of this modification of atheism in the most ancient and in the most recent times? Simply because it carries our love of unity to its highest fruition. To sum up what 1 De Anima, i. 4; Plato, Phedo, p. 86. The 5 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to Matter same theory was afterwards adopted by Aris- and Spirit, sect. iii. p. 24, et. seq.; Free Discus- totle’s own pupil, Aristoxenus. See Cicero, sions of Materialism and Necessity, pp. 258, 267, Tusc. Quest. i. 10. — Ep. et. seq. — Ep. 2 Intellectual Powers, Ess. vi. chap. viii.; Coil. 6 TI yO de : Works, p. 473. ihe preceding illustrations are borrowed 3 See Brucker, Hist. Philosophig, vol. iv. p. from Garnier, Psychologie, p. 194. — Ep. 677, et. seg. — Ep. 7 See the Author’s Supplementary Disser 4 Principia, pars ii. 23. — Ep, tations to Reid, note C.—Ep. 52 METAPHYSICS. Lect. IV. has just been said in the words of Sir John Davies, a highly philosophic poet of the Elizabethan age : — “ Musicians think our souls are harmonies ; Physicians hold that they complexions be; Epicures make them swarms of atomies : Which do by chance into our bodies flee. One thinks the soul is air; another fire; Another blood, diffus’d about the heart; Another saith the elements conspire, And to her essence each doth yield a part. Some think one gen’ral soul fills every brain, As the bright sun sheds light in every star; And others think the name of soul is vain, And that we only well-mix’d bodies are, Thus these great clerks their little wisdom show, While with their doctrines they at hazard play; Tossing their light opinions to and fro, To mock the lewd,! as learn’d in this as they; For no craz’d brain could ever yet propound, Touching the soul so vain and fond a thought; But some among these masters have been found, Which, in their schools, the self-same thought have taught.” 2 To this love of unity — to this desire of reducing the objects of our knowledge to harmony and system—a Influence of precon- ~~ ggyurce of truth and discovery if subservient to ceived opinion reduc- ible to love of unity. observation, but of error and delusion if allowed to dictate to observation what phenomena are to be perceived; to this principle, I say, we may refer the influ- ence which preconceived opinions exercise upon our perceptions and our judgments, by inducing us to see and require only what is in unison with them. What we wish, says Demosthenes, that we be- lieve ;? what we expect, says Aristotle, that we find *— truths which have been reéchoed, by a thousand confessors, and confirmed by ten thousand examples. Opinions once adopted become part of the .I Lewd, according to Tooke, from Anglo- Saxon, Lewed, past participle of Lewan, to mislead. It was formerly applied to the (lay) people in contradistinction from the clergy. See Richardson, Eng. Dict., v. Lewd. —ED. 2 On the Immortality of the Soul, stanza 9, et seq. > ¢ 3 BovAera Tovs exacros Kad olera, De- mosth. Olynth. iii. p. 68. — Eb. 4 Rhet. ii. 1. TO pev emisupovrt eal evéA- wit burt, cay H ue eo duevor nov, Kal %oec- Sau Kat &yaddv tocoSat patvera, TE OF amra- Met Kal SvoxepaivovTi, T robvavrlov, — Ep. Lect. IV. METAPHYSICS. 53 intellectual system of their holders. If opposed to prevalent doc- trines, self-love defends them as a point of honor, exaggerates what- ever may confirm, overlooks or extenuates whatever may contradict. Again, if accepted as a general doctrine, they are too often recog- nized, in consequence of their prevalence, as indisputable truths, and all counter appearances peremptorily overruled as manifest illu- sions. Thus it is that men will not sce in the phenomena what alone is to be seen ; in their observations, they interpolate and they expunge; and this mutilated and adulterated product they call a fact. And why? Because the real phenomena, if admitted, would spoil the pleasant music of their thoughts, and convert its factitious harmony into discord. “ Que volunt sapiunt, et nolunt sapere quee vera sunt.” In consequence of this, many a system, professing to be reared exclusively on observation and fact, rests in reality mainly upon hypothesis and fiction. A pretended experience is, indeed, the screen behind which every illusive doctrine regularly retires. “There are more false facts,” says Cullen,’ “current in the world, than false theories ;” — and the livery of Lord Bacon has been most ostentatiously paraded by many who. were no members of his household. Fact, — observation, — induction, have always been the watchwords of those who have dealt most extensively in fancy. It is now above three centuries since Agrippa, in his Vanity of the Sciences, observed of Astrology, Physiognomy, and Metoposcopy, (the Phrenology of those days), that experience was professedly their only foundation and their only defence : “Solent omnes ille di- vinationum prodigiose artes non, nisi experientiz titulo, se defendere et se objectionum vinculis extricare.”? It was on this ground, too, that, at a later period, the great Kepler vindicated the first of these arts, Astrology. For, said he, how could the principle of a science be false where experience showed that its predictions were uni- formly fulfilled.” * Now, truth was with Kepler even as a passion; and his, too, was one of the most powerful intellects that ever cultivated and promoted a science. To him, astronomy, indeed, owes perhaps even more than to Newton. And yet, even his great mind, preéccupied with a certain prevalent belief, could observe and judge only in conformity with that belief. This tendency to look at realities only through the spectacles of an hypothesis, is perhaps seen most conspicuously in the fortunes of medicine. The history 1 [St. Hilarii, lib. vii., De Trinitate, sub his Materia Medica, vol. i. ¢. ii. art. iv., second init.] edition. — Ep. 2 For Cullen’s illustrations of the influence 8 Opera, vol. ii. c. 33, p. 64: of a pretended experience in Medicine, sce 4 De Stella Nova, c. 8,10; Harmonice Mundi, lib. iv. c. 7.—Ep. 54 METAPHYSICS. . Lect. IV. of that science is, in truth, little else than an incredible narrative of the substitution of fictions for facts; the converts to an hypothesis, (and every, the most contradictory, doctrine has had its day), regu- larly seeing and reporting only in conformity with its dictates.’ The same is also true of the philosophy of mind; and the variations and alternations in this science, which are perhaps only surpassed by those in medicine, are to be traced to a refusal of the real phenom- enon revealed in consciousness, and to the substitution of another, more in unison with preconceived opinions of what it ought to be. Nor, in this commutation of fact with fiction, should we suspect that there is any mala fides. Prejudice, imagination, and. passion, sufficiently. explain the illusion. “ Fingunt simul cre- duntque.”? “When,” says Kant, “ we have once heard a bad report of this or that individual, we incontinently think that we read the rogue in his countenance; fancy here mingles ;with observation, which is still farther vitiated when affection or passion interferes.” “The passions,” says Helvetius,” “not only concentrate our attention on certain exclusive aspects of the objects which they pre- sent, but they likewise often deceive us in showing these same objects where they do not exist. The story is well known of a par- son and a gay lady. They had both heard that the moon was peopled, — believed it, —and, telescope in hand, were attempting to discover the inhabitants. If I am not mistaken, says the lady, who looked first, I perceive two shadows; they bend toward each other, and, I have no doubt, are two happy lovers. Lovers, madam, says the divine, who looked second; oh fie! the two shadows you saw are the two steeples of a cathedral. This story is the history of man. In general, we perceive only in things what we are de- sirous of finding: on the earth as in the moon, various preposses- sions make us always recognize either lovers or cathedrals.” Such are the two intellectual necessities which afford the two, principal sources of philosophy : —the intellec- tual necessity of refunding effects into their causes ;? — and the intellectual necessity of car- rying up our knowledge into unity or system. But, besides these sntellectual necessities, which are involved in the very existence of our faculties of knowledge, there is another powerful subsidiary to the same effect, — in a certain affection of our capacities of feeling. This feeling, according to circumstances, is denominated surprise, astonishment, admiration, wonder, and, when blended with the Auxiliary cause of philosophy—W onder. 1 See the Author’s Article ‘On the Revolu- 3 Del Esprit, Discours i. chap. ii. tions of Medicine,” Discussions, p. 242. — Ep. 4 [This expression is employed by Sergeant. 2 Tacitus, Hist. lib. ii. c. 8. — En. See Method to Science, p. 222. Cf. pp. 144, 145.] 5 uigeay Lect. IV. METAPHYSICS. 55 intellectual tendencies we have considered, it obtains the name of curiosity. This feeling, though it cannot, as some have held, be allowed to be the principal, far less the only, cause of philosophy, is, however, a powerful auxiliary to speculation; and, though inade- quate to account for the existence of philosophy absolutely, it adequately explains the preference with which certain parts of philosophy have been cultivated, and the order in which philosophy in géneral has been developed. We may err both in exaggerating, and in extenuating, its influence. Wonder has been contemptuously called the daughter of ignorance ; true, but wonder, we should add, is the mother of knowledge. Among others, Plato, Aristotle, Plu- tarch, and Bacon, have all concurred in testifying to the influence of this principle. “ Admiration,” says the Platonic Socrates in the Theetetus,' —“admiration is a highly philosophical affection ; in- deed, there is no other principle of philosophy but this.”— “That philosophy,” says Aristotle, “was not originally studied for any practical end, is manifest from those who first began to philosophize. It was, in fact, wonder which then, as now, determined men to phi- losophical researches. Among the phenomena presented to them, their admiration was first directed to those more proximate and more on a level with their powers, and then rising by degrees, they came at length to demand an explanation of the higher phe- nomena, —as the different states of the moon, sun, and stars, — and the origin of the universe. Now, to doubt and to be aston- ished, is to recognize our ignorance. Hence it is that the lover of wisdom is in a certain sort a lover of mythi, (pirduvIds zws), for the subject of mythi is the astonishing and marvellous. If then, men philosophize to escape ignorance, it is clear that they pursue know- ledge on its own account, and not for the sake of any foreign utility. This is proved by the fact; for it was only after all that pertained to the wants, welfare, and conveniences of life had been discovered, that men commenced their philosophical researches. It is, therefore, manifest that we do not: study philosophy for the sake of anything ulterior ; and, as we call him a free man who belongs _ to himself and not to another, so philosophy is of all sciences the only free or liberal study, for it alone is unto itself an end.”?—« It is the business of philosophy,” says Plutarch, “to investigate, to admire, and to doubt.”> You will find in the first book of the De Augmentis of Bacon,‘ a recognition of the principle “admiratio 1 P. 155.— Ep. Vol. ii. § 885; eet 3& rod gidocodeiv, %n, 2 Metaph. lib.i.c.2. See also for a passage rd (nreiv, Td Savudcew, ra amopeiv. ~ Ep. to # similar effect, Rhetoric, lib. i, c. 11. 4 Vol. viii. p. 8, (Montagu's ed.) $ Plutarch, Mep) rod Ei rod év AeAgois, 56 METAPHYSICS. Lect. IV. est semen sapientie,” and copious iustrations of its truth, — illus- trations which I shall not quote, but they deserve your private study. No one, however, has so fully illustrated the play and effect of this motive as a distinguished philosopher of this country, Adam Smith; although he has attributed too little to the principal, too much to the subsidiary, momenta. He seems not to have been aware of what had been, previously to him, observed in regard to: this principle by others. You will find the discussion among his posthumous essays, in that entitled The Principles which lead and direct Philosophical Inquiries, illustrated by the History of As- tronomy ;—to this I must simply refer you. We have already remarked, that the principle of wonder affords an explanation of the order in which the differ- ent objects of philosophy engaged the attention of mankind. The aim of all philosophy is the discovery of principles, that is, of higher causes ; but, in the procedure to this end, men first endeavored to explain those phenomena which attracted their attention by arousing their wonder. The child is wholly absorbed in the observation of the world without; the world within first engages the contemplation of the man. As it is with the individual, so was it with the species. Philosophy, before attempting the problem of intelligence, endeav- ored to resolve the problem of nature. The spectacle of the exter- nal universe was too imposing not first to solicit curiosity, and to direct upon itself the prelusive efforts of philosophy. Thales and Pythagoras, in whom philosophy finds its earliest. representatives, endeavored to explain the organization of the universe, and to sub- stitute a scientific for a religious cosmogony. Jor a season their successors toiled in the same course; and it was only after philoso- phy had tried, and tired, its forces on external nature, that the human mind recoiled upon itself, and sought in the study of its own nature the object and end of philosophy. The mind now became to itself its point of departure, and its principal object ; and its progress, if less ambitious, was more secure. Socrates was he who first decided ‘this new destination of philosophy. From his epoch man sought in himself the solution of the great problem of exist- ence, and the history of philosophy was henceforward only a devel. opment, more or less successful, more or less complete, of the inscription on the Delphic temple —Tvave ceavrév — Know thyself. * Affords an explation of the order in which objects studied. 1 Plato, Protagoras, p. 843.— Ep. [See Géruzez, Nouveau Cours de Philosophie, p. 1.1 ON ee EE oe is LECTURE V. THE DISPOSITIONS WITH WHICH PHILOSOPHY OUGHT TO BE STUDIED. Havine, in the previous Lectures, informed you, — 1°, What Philosophy is, and 2°, What are its Causes, I would now, in the third place, say a few words to you on the Dispositions with which Philosophy ought to be studied, for, without certain practical con- ditions a speculative knowledge of the most perfect Method of procedure, (our next following question,) remains barren and unap- plied. “To attain to a knowledge of ourselves,” says Socrates, “we must banish prejudice, passion, and sloth;”! and no one who neg- lects this precept can hope to make any progress in the philosophy of the human mind, which is only another term for the knowledge of ourselves. In the first place, then, all prejudices, — that is, all opinions formed on irrational grounds, —ought to be First condition of removed, A preliminary doubt is thus the fun- Die diag | damental. condition of philosophy ; and the ne- phy,— renunciation of ] PAY, prejudice. cessity of such a doubt is no less apparent than is its difficulty. We do not approach the study of philosophy ignorant, but perverted. “There is no one who has not grown up under a load of beliefs — beliefs which he owes to the accidents of country and family, to the books he has read, to the society he has frequented, to the education he has received, and, in general, to the circumstances which have concurred in the formation of his intellectual and moral habits. These beliefs may be true, or they may be false, or, what is more probable, they may be a medley of truths and errors. It is, however, under their influence that he studies, and through them, as through a prism, that he views and judges the objects of knowledge. Everything is therefore seen by him in false colors, and in distorted relations. And this is the rea- [See Gatien-Arnoult, Doctrine Philosophique, p. 89.] 8 58 METAPHYSICS. Lect. V. son why philosophy, as the science of truth, requires a renunciation of prejudices, (pre-judicia, opiniones pra-judicate),— that is, con- clusions formed without a previous examination of their grounds.” * In this, if I may without irreverence compare things human with things divine, Christianity and Philosophy coin- In this Christianity Gide,—for truth is equally the end of both. i cr as) | haps the primary condition which our Sa- viour requires of his disciples? That they throw off their old pre- judices, and come with hearts willing to receive knowledge and un- derstandings open to conviction. “Unless,” He says, “ye become as little children, ye shall not enter the kingdom of heaven.” Such is true religion; such also is true philosophy. Philosophy requires an emancipation from the yoke of foreign authority, a renunciation of all blind adhesion to the opinions of our age and country, and a purification of the intellect from all assumptive beliefs. Unless we can cast off the prejudices of the man, and become as children, do- cile and unperverted, we need never hope to enter the temple of philosophy. It is the neglect of this primary condition which has mainly occasioned men to wander from the unity of truth, and caused the endless variety of religious and philosophical sects. Men would not submit to approach the word of God in order to receive from that alone their doctrine and their faith; but they came in general with preconceived opinions, and, accordingly, each found in revelation only what he was predetermined to find. So, in like manner, is it in philosophy. Consciousness is to the philosopher what the Bible is to the theo- logian. Both are revelations of the truth, — and both afford the truth to those who are content to receive it, as it ought to be received, with reverence and submission. But as it has, too frequently, fared with the one revelation, so has it with the other. Men turned, indeed, to consciousness, and professed to re- gard its authority as paramount, but they were not content humbly to accept the facts which consciousness revealed, and to establish these without retrenchment or distortion, as the only principles of their philosophy ; on the contrary, they came with opinions already formed, with systems already constructed, and while they eagerly appealed to consciousness when its data supported their conclusions, they made no scruple to overlook, or to misinterpret, its facts when these were not in harmony with their speculations. Thus religion and philosophy, as they both terminate in the same end, so they both depart from the same fundamental condition. “ Aditus ad reg- a Consciousness and the Bible. 1 [Gatien-Arnoult, Doct. Phil., pp. 89, 40.] LECT ¥. METAPHYSICS. 59 num hominis, quod fundatur in scientiis, quam ad regnum celorum, in quod, nisi sub persona infantis, intrare non datur.” } But the influence of early prejudice is the more dangerous, inas- much as this influence is unobtrusive. Few of us are, perhaps, fully aware of how little we owe to ourselves, —how much to the influence of others. “Non licet,” says Seneca, “ire recta via; trahunt in pra- vum parentes; trahunt servi; nemo errat uni sibi sed dementiam spargit in proximos accipitque invicem. Et ideo, in singulis vitia populorum sunt, quia illa populus dedit ; dum facit quisque pejorem, factus est. Didicit deteriora, deinde docuit: effectaque est ingens illa nequitia, congesto in unum, quod cuique pessimum scitur. Sit ergo aliquis custos, et aurem subinde pervellat, abigatque rumores et reclamet populis laudantibus.” ? Man is by nature a social animal. “He is more political,” says Aristotle, “than any bee or ant.”* But the ex- Source of the power —_istence of society, from a family to a state, sup- of custom. Man a so- : : P aditdhidar poses a certain harmony of sentiment among its members; and nature has, accordingly, wisely implanted in us a tendency to assimilate in opinions and habits of thought to those with whom we live and act. There is thus, in every society great or small, a certain gravitation of opinions to- wards a common centre. As in our natural body, every part has a necessary sympathy with every other, and all together form, by their harmonious conspiration, a healthy whole; so, in the social body, there is always a strong predisposition, in each of its members, to act and think in unison with the rest. This universal sympathy, or fellow-feeling, of our social nature, is the principle of the different spirit dominant in different ages, countries, ranks, sexes, and periods of life. It is the cause why fashions, why political and religious enthusiasm, why moral example, either for good or evil, spread so rapidly, and exert so powerful an influence. As men are naturally prone to imitate others, they consequently regard, as important or insignificant, as honorable or disgraceful, as true or false, as good or bad, what those around them consider in the same light. They love and hate what they see others desire and eschew. This is not to be regretted ; it is natural, and, consequently, it isright. Indeed, were it otherwise, society could not subsist, for nothing can be more ap- parent than that mankind in general, destined as they are to occu- pations incompatible with intellectual cultivation, are wholly inca- pable of forming opinions for themselves on many of the most impor- Influence of early prejudice unobtrusive. 1 Bacon, Nov. Org. lib. i, aph. xviii. 2 Epist. xciv. 3 Polit. i. 2.— Ep. 60 METAPILYSICS. Lect. V. tant objects of human consideration. If such, however, be the in- tentions of nature with respect to the unenlightened classes, it is manifest that a heavier obligation is thereby laid on those who en- joy the advantages of intellectual cultivation, to examine with dili- cence and impartiality the foundations of those opinions which have any connection with the welfare of mankind. Ifthe multitude must be led, it is of consequence that it be led by enlightened conductors. That the great multitude of mankind are, by natural disposition, only what others are, is a fact at all times so obtrusive, that it could not escape observation from the moment a reflective eye was first turned upon man. “The whole conduct of Cambyses,” says Hero- dotus,! the father of history, “towards the Egyptian gods, sanctu- aries, and priests, convinces me that this king was in the highest de- gree insane, for otherwise he would not have insulted the worship and holy things of the Egyptians. If any one should accord to all men the permission to make free choice of the best among all customs, undoubtedly each would choose his own. That this would certainly happen can be shown by many examples, and, among others, by the following. The Xing Darius once asked the Greeks who were resident in his court, at what price they could be induced to devour their dead parents. The Greeks answered, that to this no price could bribe them. Thereupon the king asked some In- dians who were in the habit of eating their dead parents, what they would take not to eat but to burn them; and the Indians answered even as the Greeks had done.” Herodotus concludes this narrative with the observation, that “Pindar had justly entitled Custom — the Queen of the World.” ; The ancient skeptics, from the conformity of men in every country, their habits of thinking, feeling, and Skeptical inference : : ° : a from the influence of 2c “L2Y» 2nd from the diversity of different nations outs. in these habits, inferred that nothing was by na- ture beautiful or deformed, true or false, good or bad, but that these distinctions originated solely in custom. The modern skepticism of Montaigne terminates in the same assertion ; and the sublime misanthropy of Pascal has almost carried him to a similar exaggeration. “In the just and the unjust,” says he, “we find hardly anything which does not change its character in chang- ing its climate. Three degrees of an elevation of the pole reverses the whole of jurisprudence. A meridian is decisive of truth, and a few years of possession. Fundamental laws change. Right has its epochs. A pleasant justice which a river or a mountain limits. 1 Lib. iii. 37, 38. Lect. V. METAPHYSICS. 61 Truth, on this side the Pyrenees, error on the other!”? This doc- trine is exaggerated, but it has a foundation in truth ; and the most zealous champions of the immutability of moral distinctions are unanimous in acknowledging the powerful influence which the opinions, tastes, manners, affections, and actions of the society in which we live, exert upon all and each of its members. 2 Nor is this influence of man on man less unambiguous in times of social tranquillity, than in crises of social convul- This influence of sion. In seasons of political and religious reyo- oe aa ese lution, there arises a struggle between the resist- aiden vielen. ing force of ancient habits and the contagious sympathy of new modes of feeling and thought. In one portion of society, the inveterate influence of custom prevails over the contagion of example ; in others, the contagion of example prevails over the conservative force of antiquity and habit. In either case, however, we think and act always in sympathy with others. “We remain,” says an illustrious philosopher, “submissive so long as the world continues to set the example. As we follow the herd in forming our conceptions of what is respectable, so we are ready to follow the multitude also, when such conceptions come to be questioned or rejected; and are no less vehement reformers, when the current of opinion has turned against former establish- ments, than we were zealous abettors while that current continued to set in a different direction.” * Thus it is that no revolution in public opinion is the work of an individual, of a single cause, or of a day. When the crisis has arrived, the catastrophe must en- sue; but the agents through whom it is appar- ently accomplished, though they may accelerate, cannot originate its occurrence. Who believes that but for Luther or Zwingli the Reformation would not have been? Their individual, their per- sonal energy and zeal, perhaps, hastened by a year or two the event; but had the public mind not been already ripe for their revolt, the fate of Luther and’ Zwingli,in the sixteenth century, would have been that of Huss and Jerome of Prague in the fifteenth. Woe to the revolutionist who is not himself a creature of the revolution! If he anticipate, he is lost; for it requires, what no individual can supply, a long and powerful counter-sympathy in a nation to un- twine the ties of custom which bind a people to the established and { Relation of the indi- vidual to social crises. 1 Pensées, partie i. art. vi. § 8, (vol. ii. p. 126, krafte und Willenskrifte des Menschen, ii. 325, ed. Faugére.) (ed. 1806.) ; 2 See Meiners, Untersuchungen tiber die Denk- 3 Ferguson’s Moral and Political Science, vol. i. part. i. chap. ii. § 11, p. 185. 6 2, METAPHYSICS. LEeorey. the old. This is finely expressed by Schiller, in a soliloquy from the mouth of the revolutionary Wallenstein : — Schiller. “‘ What is thy purpose? Hast thou fairly weighed it? Thou seekest ev’n from its broad base to shake The calm enthroned majesty of power, By ages of possession consecrate — Firm rooted in the rugged soil of custom — And with the people’s first and fondest faith, As with a thousand stubborn tendrils twined. That were no strife where strength contends with strength. It is not strength I fear —I fear no foe Whom with my bodily eye I see and scan; Who, brave himself, inflames my courage too. It isan unseen enemy I dread, Who, in the hearts of mankind, fights against me — Fearful to me but from his own weak fear. Not that which proudly towers in life and strength Is truly dreadful; but the mean and common, The memory of the eternal yesterday, Which, ever-warning, ever still returns, And weighs to-morrow, for it weighed to-day ; Out of the common is man’s nature framed, And custom is the nurse to whom he cleaves. Woe then to him whose daring hand profanes The honored heir-looms of his ancestors! There is a consecrating power in time; And what is gray with years to man is godlike. Be in possession, and thou art in right; The crowd will lend thee aid to keep it sacred.” } This may enable you to understand how seductive is the influence of example; and I should have no end were I to quote to you all that philosophers have said of the prevalence and evil influence of s) prejudice and opinion. Testimonies of phil- osophers to the power of received opinion. We have seen that custom is called, by Pindar and Herodotus, ; the Queen of the World —and the same thing is expressed by the adage — “Mundus regitur opinionibus.” “Opinion,” says the great Pascal, “disposes of all things. It constitutes beauty, justice, happiness ; and these are the all in-all of the world. I would with all my heart see the Italian book of which I know only the 1 Wallenstein. (Translated by Mr. George Moir.) Act. i. scene 4, p. 15. ¥ ioe yey ee. v x ae th a ak Lect. V. METAPHYSICS. 63 title, — a title, however, which is itself worth many books — Della opinione regina del mondo. I subscribe to it implicitly.”? “ Cou- tume,” says Regnier, “‘Coutume, opinion, reines de notre sort, Vous réglez des mortels, et la vie, et la mort! ” “ Almost every opinion we have,” says the pious Charon, “we have but by authority; we believe, judge, act, live and die on trust, as common custom teaches us; and rightly, for we are too weak to decide and choose of ourselves. But the wise do not act thus.” 2 “ Every opinion,” says Montaigne, “ is strong enough to have had its martyrs ;”* and Sir W. Raleigh —“It is opinion, not truth, that travelleth the world without passport.”4 “ Opinion,” says Heracli- tus, “is a falling sickness ;”* “and Luther—“O doxa! doxa! quam es communis noxa.” In a word, as Hommel has it, “ An ounce of custom outweighs a ton of reason.” ® Such being the recognized universality and evil effect of preju- dice, philosophers have, consequently, been unan- Philosophers unani- imoug in making doubt the first step towards yh ead Sem philosophy. Aristotle has a fine chapter in his the first step to phil- osphy. Metaphysics’ on the utility of doubt, and on the things which we ought first to doubt of; and he concludes by establishing that the success of philosophy depends on the art of doubting well. This is even enjoined on us by the Apostle. For in saying “ Prove” (which may be more correctly translated tesé) — “Test all things,” he implicitly commands us to doubt all things. “ He,” says Bacon, “who would become philosopher, must com- mence by repudiating belief ;” and he concludes one of the most remarkable passages of his writ- ings with the observation, that “were there a single man to be found with a firmness sufficient to efface from his mind the theories and notions vulgarly received, and to apply his intellect free and without prevention, the best hopes might be entertained of his success.”* “To philosophize,” says Descartes, “seriously, and to good effect, it is necessary for a man to renounce all prejudices ; in other words, to apply the great- Bacon. Descartes. 1 Pensées, partie i. art. § vi. 8. [Vol. ii. p. 4 Preface to his History of the World. 52, ed. Faugére. M. Faugére has restored 5 Diog. Laert. lib. ix. § 7. the original text of Pascal — “ La’imagination 6 [Alex. y. Joch (Hommel), Uber Belohnung dispose de tout.” The ordinary reading is und Strafe,p. 111. See Krug. Philosophisches L’opinion.— Ep.] Lexikon, vol. vy. p. 467, art. Gewohnheit.] 2 De la Sagesse, liv. i. chap..xvi. 7 Lib. ii. c. 1.— Ep. 8 Essais, liy. i. chap. xl. 8 “Nemo adhuc tanta mentis constantia in- 64 . METAPHYSICS. Lect. V. est care to doubt of all his previous opinions, so long as these have not been subjected to a new examination, and been recognized as true”! But it is needless to multiply authorities in support of so obvious a truth. The ancient philosophers refused to admit slaves to their instruction. Prejudice makes men slaves; it disqualifies them for the pursuit of truth ; and their emancipation from preju- dice is what philosophy first inculcates on, what it first requires of, its disciples.? Let us, however, beware that we act ‘not the part of revolted slaves; that in asserting our liberty we do not run into license. Philosophical doubt is not an end but a mean. We doubt in order that we may be- lieve ; we begin that we may not end with doubt. We doubt once that we may believe always; we renounce authority that we may follow reason ; we surrender opinion that we may obtain knowledge. We must be protestants, not infidels, in philosophy. “There is a | great difference,” says Malebranche, “ between doubting and doubting—We doubt through passion and brutality; through blindness and malice, and finally through fancy and from the very wish to doubt; but we doubt also from prudence and through distrust, from wisdom and through penetration of mind. The former doubt is a doubt of darkness, which never issues to the light, but leads us always further from 16; the latter is a doubt which is born of the light, and which aids in a certain sort to produce light in its turn.” Indeed, were the effect of philosophy the establishment of doubt, the remedy would be worse than the disease. Doubt, as a permanent state of mind, would be, in fact, little better than an intellectual death. The mind lives as it believes, —it lives in the affirmation of itself, of nature, and of God; a doubt upon any one of these would be a diminution of its life, —a doubt upon the three, were it possible, would be tan- tamount to a mental annihilation. It is well observed, by Mr. Stewart, “that it is not merely in order to free the mind from the influence of error, that it is useful to examine the foundation of established opinions. It is such Philosophical doubt. Malebranche. Stewart. ventus est, ut decreverit, et sibi imposucrit, theorias et notiones communes penitus abo- lere, et intellectum abrasum et equum ad particularia, de integro, applicare. Itaque illa ratio humana quam habemus, ex multa fide, et multo etiam casu, nec non ex puerili- bus, quas primo hausimus, notionibus, far- rago quedam est, et congeries. Quod siquis ztate matura, et sensibus integris, et mente repurgata, se ad experientiam, et ad partic- ularia de integro applicet, de eo melius sper- andum est.’ —Nov. Org. i. aph. xevil.; Works, vol. ix. p. 252, (Montagu’s ed.) See also om- nino Nov. Org. i. aph. Ixviii. 1 Prin. Phil. pars i. § 75. [Cf. Clauberg, De Dubitatione Cartesiana, cc. i. ii. Opera, p. 1131. — Ep.] 2 [Cf. Gatien-Arnoult, Doct. Phil., p. 41.] 3 Recherche de la Vérité, liv. i chap. xx. § 3. * —* i : bai id tas ol Lect, V. METAPHYSICS. 65 an examination alone, that, in an inquisitive age like the present, ean secure a philosopher from the danger of unlimited skepticism. To this extreme, indeed, the complexion of the times is more likely to give him a tendency, than to implicit credulity. In the former ages of ignorance and superstition, the intimate association which had been formed, in the prevailing systems of education, between truth and error, had given to the latter an ascendant over the minds of men, which it could never have acquired if divested of such an alliance. The case has, of late years, been most remarkably reversed: the common sense of mankind, in consequence of the growth of a more liberal spirit of inquiry, has revolted against many of those absurdities which had so long held human reason in captiy- ity ; and it was, perhaps, more than could have been reasonably ex- pected, that, in the first moments of their emancipation, philosophers should have stopped short at the precise boundary which cooler re- flection and more moderate views would have prescribed. The fact is, that they have passed far beyond it; and that, in their zeal to destroy prejudices, they have attempted to tear up by the roots many of the best and happiest and most essential principles of our nature. That implicit credulity is a mark of a feeble mind, will not be disputed ; but it may not, perhaps, be as generally acknowledged, that the case is the same with unlimited skepticism: on the contrary, We are sometimes apt to ascribe this disposition to a more than ordinary vigor of intellect. Such a prejudice was by no means unnatural; at that period in the history of modern Europe, when reason first began to throw off the yoke of authority, and when it unquestionably required a superiority of understanding, as well as of intrepidity, for an individual to resist the contagion of prevailing superstition. But, in the present age, in which the tendency of fashionable opinions is directly opposite to those of. the vulgar, the philosophical creed, or the philosophical skepticism, of by far the greater number of those who value themselves on an emancipation from popular errors, arises from the very same weakness with the credulity of the multitude ; nor is it going too far to say, with Rous- seau, that ‘he who, in the end of the eighteenth century, has brought himself to abandon all his early principles without discrim- ination, would probably have been a bigot in the days of the League. In the midst of these contrary impulses of fashionable and vulgar prejudices, he alone evinces the superiority and the strength of his mind, who is able to disentangle truth from error; and to oppose the clear conclusions of his own unbiassed faculties to the united clamors of superstition and of false philosophy. Such are the men whom nature marks out to be the lights of the 9 66 METAPHYSICS. Lect. V. world; to fix the wavering opinions of the multitude, and to im- press nites own characters on that of their age. ”* In a word, philosophy is, as Aristotle has justly expressed it, not the art of doubting, but the art of doubting well? In the second place, in obedience to the precept of Soda the passions, under which we shall include sloth, ought to be subjugated. Aristotle. Second practical condition, — subjuga- tion of the passions. consequently deprive it of the power of carefully considering all that the solution of a question requires should be examined. A man under the agitation of any lively emotion, is hardly aware of aught but what has immediate relation to the pas- sion which agitates and engrosses him. Among the affections which influence the will, and induce it to adhere to skepticism or error, ae there is none more dangerous than sloth. The Sloth. greater proportion of oekan are inclined to spare themselves the trouble of a long and laborious inquiry; or they fancy that a superficial examination is enough ; and the slight- est agreement between a few objects, in a few petty points, they at once assume as evincing the correspondence of the whole throughout. Others apply themselves exclusively to the matters which it is ab- solutely necessary for them to know, and take no account of any opinion but that which they have stumbled on,—for no other rea- son than that they have embraced it, and are unwilling to recom- mence the labor of learning. They receive their opinion on the authority of those who have had suggested to them their own; and they are always facile scholars, for the slightest probability is, for ay all the evidence that they require. Pride is a powerful impediment to a progress in knowledge. Under the influence of this pas- sion, men seek honor, but not truth. They do not cultivate what is most valuable in reality, but what is most valuable in opinion. They disdain, perhaps, what can be easily accomplished, and apply themselves to the obscure and recondite; but as the vulgar and easy is the foundation on which the rare and arduous is built, they fail even in attaining the object of their ambition, and remain with only a farrago of confused and ill-assorted notions. In all its Pride. 1 Coll. Works, vol. ii.; Elements, vol. i, book 4 yap barepov edmopia Avois TOY mpoTeEpoy ii. § 1, p. 68, ef seq. &ropoupevwy éotl, Avew F ov FoTw dyvo- 2 Metaph. ii. 1. “Eorts 8& rots evropioa oovras Tov Secudy. —ED. BovAopevas mpovpyou 7d Siqmopi) gat KaA@s* These ruffle the tranquillity of the mind, and hg ae Lect. V. METAPHYSICS. 67 phases, self-love is an enemy to philosophical progress; and the his- tory of philosophy is filled with the illusions of which it has been the source. On the one side, it has led men to close their eyes against the most evident truths which were not in harmony with their adopted opinions. It is said that there was not a physician in Europe, above the age of forty, who would admit Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood. On the other hand, it is finely ob- served by Bacon, that “the eye of human intellect is not dry, but receives a suffusion from the will and from the affections, so that it may almost be said to engender any sciences it pleases. For what a man wishes to be true, that he prefers believing.”? And, in another place, “if the human intellect hath once taken a liking to any doctrine, either because received and credited, or because other- wise pleasing, — it draws everything else into harmony with that doctrine, and to its support; and albeit there may be found a more powerful array of contradictory instances, these, however, it eitner does not observe, or it contemns, or by distinction extennates and rejects.” ? 1 Nov. Org. lib. i. aph. xlix. 2 Ibid. xlvi. LECTURE VI. THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY. THE next question we proceed to consider is,— What is the true Method or Methods of Philosophy ? There is only one possible method in philosophy; and what aes been called the different methods of different philosophers, vary from each other only as more or less perfect applications of this one Method to the objects of knowledge. All method! is a rational progress,— a progress towards an end; and the method of philosophy is the roseuan conducive to the end which philosophy pro- poses. The ends,—the final causes of philoso- phy,—as we have seen,—are two;—first, the discovery of effi- cient causes; secondly, the generalization of our knowledge into unity;—two ends, however, which fall together into one, inas- much as the higher we proceed in the discovery of causes, we necessarily approximate more and more to unity. The detection of the one in the many might, therefore, be laid down as the end to which philosophy, though it can never reach it, tends continually to approximate. But, con- sidering philosophy in relation to both these ends, I shall endeavor to show you that it has only one possible method. Considering philosophy, in the first place, in relation to its first end,—the discovery of causes, — we have seen that causes, (taking that term as synonymous for all without which the effect would not be,) are only the coéfficients of the effect; an effect being nothing more than the sum or complement of all the partial causes, the concurrence of which constitute its existence. This being the case,—and as it is only by experience that we discover Method a progress towards an end. Philosophy has but one possible method. This shown in rela- tion to the first end of Philosophy. 1 {On the difference between Order and _ post aliam; Methodus ut unam per aliam.” Method, see Facciolati, Rudimenta Logice, Cf. Zabarella, Op. Log., pp. 189, 149, 228, 225; parsiv. c. i. note: ‘“‘ Methodus differt ab Or- Molinzus, Log., p. 284 et seq. Pp 244 et seq., ad. dine; quia ordo facit ut rem unam discamus 1618.) Lect. VI METAPHYSICS. 69 what particular causes must conspire to produce such or such an effect, — it follows, that nothing can become known to us as a cause except in and through its effect; in other words, that we can only attain to the knowledge of a cause by extracting it out of its effect. To take the example, we formerly employed, of a neutral salt. This, as I observed, was made up by the conjunction of three proximate causes, — viz. an acid, —an alkali, — and the force which brought the alkali and the acid into the requisite approximation. This last, as a transitory condition, and not always the same, we shall throw out of account. Now, though we might know the acid and the alkali in themselves as distinct phenomena, we could never know them as the concurrent causes of the salt, unless we had known the salt as their effect. And though, in this example, it happens that we are able to compose the effect by the union of its causes, and to decompose it by their separation, —this is only an accidental circumstance; for the far greater number of the objects presented to our observation, can only be decomposed, but not actually recomposed, and in those which can be recom- posed, this possibility is itself only the result of a knowledge of the causes previously obtained by an original decomposition of the effect. | In so far, therefore, as philosophy is the research of causes, the one necessary condition of its possibility is the decomposition of effects into their constituted causes. This is the fundamental procedure of philosophy, and is ealled by a Greek term Analysis. But though analysis be the fundamental procedure, it is still only a mean towards an end. We analyze only that we may comprehend; and we comprehend only inasmuch as we are able to reconstruct in thought the com- plex effects which we have analyzed into their elements. This mental reconstruction is, therefore, the final, the consummative procedure of philosophy, and it is familiarly known by the Greek term Synthesis. Analysis and synthesis, though commonly treated as two different methods, are, if properly understood, only the two necessary parts of the same method. Each is the relative and the correlative of the other, Analysis, without a subsequent synthesis, is incomplete; it is a mean cut off from its end. Synthesis, without a previous analysis, is baseless; for synthesis receives from analysis the elements which it recomposes. And, as synthesis supposes analysis as the pre- requisite of its possibility, —so it is also dependent on analysis for the qualities of its existence. The value of every synthesis de- pends upon the value of the foregoing analysis. If the precedent Analysis. Synthesis. 70 METAPHYSICS Lect. VL analysis afford false elements, the subsequent synthesis of these elements will necessarily afford a false result. If the elements furnished by analysis are assumed, and not really discovered, —in other words, if they be hypothetical, the synthesis of these hypo- thetical elements will constitute only a conjectural theory. The legitimacy of every synthesis is thus necessarily dependent on the legitimacy of the analysis which it pre-supposes, and on which it founds. | These two relative procedures are thus equally necessary to each other. On the one hand, analysis without syn- thesis affords only a commenced, only an incom- plete, knowledge. On the other, synthesis with- out analysis is a false knowledge,— that is, no knowledge at all. Both, therefore, are absolutely necessary to philosophy, and both are, in philosophy, as much parts of the same method as, in the animal body, inspiration and expiration are of the same vital func- tion. But though these operations are each requisite to the other, yet were we to distinguish and compare what ought only to be considered as conjoined, it is to analysis that the preference must be accorded. An analysis is always valuable; for though now without. a synthesis, this synthesis may at any time be added; whereas a synthesis without a previous analysis is radically and ab initio null. So far, therefore, as regards the first end of philosophy, or the discovery of causes, it appears that there is only one possible method, —that method of which analysis is the foundation, syn- thesis the completion. In the second place, considering philosophy in relation to its second end, the carrying up our knowledge into unity,—the same is equally apparent. : Everything presented to our observation, whether external or internal, whether through sense or self-conscious- Only one possible — yess, is presented in complexity. Through sense, aGhe shown in rel the objects crowd upon the mind in multitudes, ion to the second end of Philosophy. and each separate individual of these multi- . tudes is itself a congeries of many various qual- ities. The same is the case with the phenomena of self-conscious- ness. Every modification of mind is a complex state; and the different elements of each state, manifest themselves only in and through each other. Thus, nothing but multiplicity is ever pre- sented to our observation; and yet our faculties are so limited that they are able to comprehend at once only the very simplest conjunctions. There seems, therefore, a singular disproportion between our powers of knowledge and the objects to be known. Constitute a single method. Lecr. VI. METAPHYSICS. 71 How is the equilibrium to be restored? This is the great problem proposed by nature, and which analysis and synthesis, in combina- tion, enable us to solve. For example, I perceive a tree, among other objects of an extensive landscape, and I wish to obtain a full and distinct conception of that tree. What ought I to do? Divide et impera: I must attend to it by itself} that is, to the exclusion of the other constituents of the scene before me. I thus analyze that scene; I separate a petty portion of it from the rest, in order to consider that portion apart. But this is not enough, the tree itself is not a unity, but, on the contrary, a complex assemblage of elements, far beyond what my powers can master at once. I must carry my analysis still farther. Accordingly, I consider successively its height, its breadth, its shape; I then proceed to its trunk, rise from that to its branches, and follow out its different ramifications; I now fix my attention on the leaves, and severally examine their form, color, ete. It is only after having thus, by analysis, detached all these parts, in order to deal with them one by one, that I am able, by reversing the process, fully to compre- hend them again in a series of synthetic acts. By synthesis, rising from the ultimate analysis step by step, I view the parts in relation to each other, and, finally, to the whole of which they are the constituents; I reconstruct them; and it is only through these two counter-processes of analysis and synthesis that I am able to con- vert the confused perception of the tree, which I obtained at first sight, into a clear, and distinct, and comprehensive knowledge. But if analysis and synthesis be required to afford us a perfect knowledge even of one individual object of sense, still more are they required to enable the mind to reduce an indefinite multitude of objects, — the infinitude, we may say, of nature, — to the limits of its own finite comprehension. To accomplish this, it is requisite to extract the one out of the many, and thus to recall multitude to unity, — confusion to order. And how is this performed? The one in the many being that in which a plurality of objects agree, — or that in which they may be considered as the same; and the agreement of objects in any common quality being discoverable only by an observation and comparison of the objects themselves, it follows that a knowledge of the one can only be evolved out of a foregoing knowledge of the many. But this evolution can only be accomplished by an analysis and a synthesis. By analysis, from the infinity of objects presented to our observation, we select some. These we consider apart, and, further, only in certain points of 1 [On the subject of analysis and synthesis, compare Condillac, Logique, cc. i. ii.] 7a METAPHYSICS. Lect. VI. view, —and we compare these objects with others also considered in the same points of view. So far the procedure is analytic. Having discovered, however, by this observation and comparison, that certain objects agree in certain respects, we generalize the qualities in which they coincide, —that is, from a certain number of individual instances we infer a general law; we perform what is called an act of Induction. This induction is erroneously viewed as analytic; it is purely a synthetic process.! For example, from our experience, — and all experience, be it that of the individual or of mankind, is only finite, — from our limited experience, I say, that bodies, as observed by us, attract each other, we infer by induction the unlimited con- clusion that all bodies gravitate towards each other. Now, here the consequent contains much more than was contained in the antecedent. Experience, the antecedent, only says, and only can say, this, that, and the other body gravitate, (that is, some bodies gravitate); the consequent educed from that antecedent, says,— all bodies gravitate. The antecedent is limited, — the consequent unlimited. Something, therefore, has been added to the antecedent in order to legitimate the inference, if we are not to hold the con- sequent itself as absurd; for, as you will hereafter learn, no con- clusion ‘must contain more than was contained in the, premises from which it is drawn. What then is the something? If we consider the inductive process, this will be at once apparent. The affirmation, this, that, and the other, body gravitate, is con- nected with the affirmation, all bodies gravitate, only by inserting between the two a third affirmation, by which the two other affirma- tions are connected into reason and consequent, —that is, into a logical cause and effect. What that is I shall explain. All scien- tific induction is founded on the presumption that nature is uniform in her operations. Of the ground and origin of this presumption, I am not now to speak. I shall only say, that, as it is a principle which we suppose in all our inductions, it cannot be itself a product of induction. It is, therefore, interpolated in the inductive reason- ing by the mind itself. In our example the reasoning will, accord- ingly, run as follows: ! This, that, and the other body, (some bodies,) are observed to gravitate 5 Induction. 1 It may be considered as the one or the simpler and more convenient point of view: other, according as the whole and its parts and in this respect Induction is properly syn- are viewed in the relations of comprehension thetic. See the Author’s Discussions, p, 173. or of extension. The latter, however, isthe — Eb. Lect. VI. METAPHYSICS. 73 But, (as nature is uniform in her operations,) this, that, and the other body, (some bodies,) represent all bodies, — Therefore all bodies gravitate. Now, in this and other examples of induction, it is the mind which binds up the separate substances observed and collected into a whole, and converts what is only the observation of many particulars into a universal law. This procedure is manifestiy syn- thetic. Now, you will remark that analysis and synthesis are here abso- lutely dependent on each other. The previous observation and comparison, —the analytic foundation,—are only instituted for the sake of the subsequent induction, —the synthetic consumma- tion. What boots it to observe and to compare, if the uniformities we discover among objects are never generalized into laws? We have obtained an historical, but not a philosophical knowledge. Here, therefore, analysis without synthesis is incomplete. On the other hand, an induction which does not proceed upon a compe- tent enumeration of particulars, is either doubtful, improbable, or null; for all synthesis is dependent on a foregone analysis for whatever degree of certainty it may pretend to. Thus, considering philosophy in relation to its second end, unity or system, it is mani- fest that the method by which it accomplishes that end, is a method involving both an analytic and a synthetic process. Now, as philosophy has only one possible method, so the His- tory of philosophy only manifests the conditions Pe vIA CLS ie of this one method, more or less accurately ful- more or less accurate led. There are aberrations in the method, — fulfilment of thecon- no aberrations from it. ditions of the one “ Philosophy commenced with the first act of Hanae reflection on the objects of sense or self-con- Earliest problem of : Piliihopliy, sciousness, for the purpose of explaining them. And with that first act of reflection, the method of philosophy began, in its application of an analysis, and in its application of a synthesis, to its object. The first philosophers naturally endeavored to explain the enigma of external nature. The magnificent spectacle of the material universe, and the mar- vellous demonstrations of power and wisdom which it everywhere exhibited, were the objects which called forth the earliest efforts of speculation. Philosophy was thus, at its commencement, phys- ical, not psychological; it was not the problem of the soul, but the problem of the world, which it first attempted to solve. «And what was the procedure of philosophy in its solution of this problem? Did it first decompose the whole into its parts, in 10 ’ The history of phi- 74 METAPHYSICS. Lect. VI. order again to reconstruct them into a system? This it could not accomplish ; but still it attempted this, and nothing else. A com- plete analysis was not to be expected from the first efforts of intel- ligence; its decompositions were necessarily partial and imperfect} a partial and imperfect analysis afforded only hypothetical ele- ments; and the synthesis of these elements issued, consequently, only in a one-sided or erroneous theory. “Thales, the founder of the Ionian philosophy, devoted an especial study to the phenomena of the mate- rial universe; and, struck with the appearances of power which water manifested in the forma- tion of bodies, he analyzed all existences into this element, which he viewed as the universal principle,—-the universal agent of cre- ation. He proceeded by an incomplete analysis, and generalized by hypothesis the law which he drew by induction from the obser- vation of a small series of phenomena. “The Ionic school continued in the same path. They limited themselves to the study of external nature, and sought in matter the principle of existence. Anaximander of Miletus, the country- man and disciple of Thales, deemed that he had traced the primary cause of creation to an ethereal principle, which occupied space, and whose different combinations constituted the universe of mat- ter. Anaximenes found the original element in air, from which, by rarefaction and condensation, he educed existences. Anaxa- goras carried his analysis farther, and made a more discreet use of hypothesis; he rose to the conception of an intelligent first cause, distinct from the phenomena of nature; and his notion of the Deity was so far above the gross conceptions of his contempo- raries, that he was accused of atheism. “Pythagoras, the founder of the Italic school, analyzed the proper- ties of number; and the relations which this analysis revealed, he elevated into principles of the mental and material universe. Mathematics were his only objects; his analysis was partial, and his synthesis was consequently hypothetical. The Italic school developed the notions of Pythagoras, and, exclusively preéccupied with the rela- tions and harmonies of existence, its disciples did not extend their speculation to the consideration either of substance or of cause. “Thus, these earlier schools, taking external nature for their point of departure, proceeded by an imperfect analysis, and a pre- sumptuous synthesis, to the construction of exclusive systems, — in which Idealism, or Materialism, preponderated, according to the kind of data on which they founded. s Thales and the Ionic School. Pythagoras and the Htalic School. Lect.- VI. METAPHYSICS. _ 75 “The Eleatic school, which is distinguished into two branches, the one of Physical, the other of Metaphysical, speculation, exhibits the same character, the same point of departure, the same tendency, and the same errors. “These errors led to the skepticism of the Sophists, which was assailed by Socrates,—the sage who determined The Sophists. Soc- « ° ° ° ee a new epoch in philosophy by directing obser- vation on man himself, and henceforward the study of mind becomes the prime and central science of philosophy: “The point of departure was changed, but not the method. The observation or analysis of the human mind, though often profound, remained always incomplete. Fortunately, the first disciples of Socrates, imitating the prudence of their master, and warned by the downfall of the systems of the Ionic, Italic, and Eleatic schools, made a sparing use of synthesis, and hardly a pretension to system. “Plato and Aristotle directed their observation on the phe- nomena of intelligence, and we cannot too highly admire the profundity of their analysis, and even the sobriety of their synthesis. Plato devoted himself more particularly to the higher faculties of intelligence; and his disciples were led by the love of generalization, to regard as the intellectual whole, those portions of intelligence which their master had analyzed; and this exclusive spirit gave birth to systems false, not in themselves, but as resting upon a too narrow basis. Aris- totle, on the other hand, whose genius was of a more positive character, analyzed with admirable acuteness those operations of mind which stand in more immediate relation to the senses; and this tendency, which among his followers became often exclusive and exaggerated, naturally engendered systems which more or less tended to materialism.” ? The school of Alexandria, in which the systems resulting from those opposite tendencies were combined, en- deavored to reconcile and to fuse them into a still more comprehensive system. Eclecticism, — conciliation, — union, were, in all things, the grand aim of the Alexandrian school. Geographically situated between Greece and Asia, it endeavored to ally Greek with Asiatic genius, religion with philosophy. Hence the Neoplatonic system, of which the last great representative is Proclus. This system is the result of the long labor of the Socratic schools. It is an edifice reared by synthesis out of the materials Eleatic School. Plato and Aristotle. School of Alexan- dria. Proclus. 1 Géruzez, Nowveau Cours de Philosophie, p. 4-8. Paris, 1834, (2d ed.) 76 METAPHYSTIOS: Lect. VI. which analysis had collected, proved, and accumulated, from Soc- rates down to Plotinus. But a synthesis is of no greater value than its relative analysis; and as the analysis of the earlier Greek philosophy was not com- plete, the synthesis of the Alexandrian school was necessarily im- perfect. In the scholastic philosophy, analysis and observation were too often neglected in some departments of phi- losophy, and too often carried rashly to excess in others. After the revival of letters, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the labors of philosophy were prin- cipally occupied in restoring and illustrating the Greek systems; and it was not until the seventeenth century, that a new epoch was determined by the genius of Bacon and Descartes. In Bacon and Descartes our modern philosophy may be said to originate, inasmuch as they were the first who made the doctrine of method a principal object of considera- tion. They both proclaimed, that, for the attainment of scientific knowledge, it is necessary to observe with care,—that is, to an- ulyze; to reject every element as hypothetical, which this analysis does not spontaneously afford; to call in experiment in aid of observation; and to attempt no synthesis or generalization, until the relative analysis has been completely accomplished. They showed that previous philosophers had erred, not by rejecting either analysis or synthesis, but by hurrying on to synthetic induc- tion from a limited or specious analytic observation. They pro- pounded no new method of philosophy, they only expounded the conditions of the old. They showed that these conditions had rarely been fulfilled by philosophers in time past; and exhorted them to their fulfilment in time to come. They thus explained the petty progress of the past philosophy ;—and justly anticipated a gigantic advancement for the future. Such was their precept, but such unfortunately was not their example. There are no phi- losophers who merit so much in the one respect, none, perhaps, who deserve less in the other. | Of philosophy since Bacon and Descartes, we at present say . nothing. Of that we shall hereafter have fre- Result of this his- : torical sketch of phi. UCRt occasion to speak. But to sum up what ideas. this historical sketch was intended to illustrate. There is but one possible method of philoso- phy,—a combination of analysis and synthesis; and the purity . The Scholastic Phi- losophy. Philosophy from the revival of letters. Bacon and Descar- tes. Lect. VI. METAPHYSICS. 77 and equilibrium of these two elements constitute its perfection. The aberrations of philosophy have been all so many violations of the laws of this one method. _ Philosophy has erred, because it built its systems upon incomplete or erroneous analysis, and it can only proceed in safety, if from accurate and unexclusive observa- tion, it rise, by successive generalization, to a comprehensive SYS- tem. LECTURE VII. THE DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY. I wave already endeavored to afford you a general notion of what Philosophy comprehends: I now proceed to say something in regard to the Parts into which it has been divided. Here, however, I must limit myself to the most famous distributions, and to those which, as founded on fundamental principles, it more immediately concerns you to know. For, were I to attempt an enumeration of the various Divisions of Philosophy which have been proposed, I should only confuse you with a multitude of con- tradictory opinions, with the reasons of which you could not, at present, possibly be made acquainted. Seneca, in a letter to his young friend Lucilius, expresses the wish that the whole of philosophy might, like the spectacle of the universe, be at once sub- mitted to our view. “ Utinam quemadmodum universi mundi facies in conspectum venit, ita philosophia tota nobis posset occurrere, simillimum mundo spectaculum.”! But as we cannot survey the universe at a glance, neither can we con- template the whole of philosophy in one act of consciousness. We can only master it gradually and piecemeal; and this is in fact the reason why philosophers have always distributed their science, (constituting, though it does, one organic whole,) into a plurality of sciences. The expediency, and even necessity, of a division of philosophy, in order that the mind may be enabled to embrace in one general view its various parts, in their relation to each other, and to the whole which they constitute, is admitted by _ every philosopher. “Res utilis,” continues Seneca, “et ad sapi- entiam properanti utique necessaria, dividi philosophiam, et ingens corpus ejus in membra disponi. Facilius enim per partes in cog- nitionem totius adducimur.”? But, although philosophers agree in regard to the utility of such a distribution, they are almost as little at one in regard to the parts, as they are in respect to the definition, of their science ; and, indeed, their differences in reference to the former, mainly arise from their Expediency of a di- vision of Philosophy. 1 Epist. Ixxxix. — 2 Epist. 1xxxix. Lecr. VII. - METAPHYSICS. 79 discrepancies in reference to the latter. For they who vary in their comprehension of the whole, cannot agree in their division of the parts. The most ancient and universally recognized distinction of philo- sophy, is into Theoretical and Practical. These ‘The mostancient di- 5.6 discriminated by the different nature of their vision into Theoretical Z ‘ y f een ends. Theoretical, called likewise speculative, and contemplative, philosophy, has for its high- est end mere truth or knowledge. Practical philosophy, on the other hand, has truth or knowledge only as its proximate end, — this end being subordinate to the ulterior end of some practical ac- tion. In theoretical philosophy, we know for the sake of knowing, scimus ut sciamus: in practical philosophy, we know for the sake of acting, scimus ut operemur.' I may here notice the poverty of the English language, in the want of a word to express that practical activity which is contradistinguished from mere intellectual or speculative energy,— what the Greeks express by mpdocew, the Germans by handeln. The want of «22 a word occasions frequent ambiguity; for, to express the species which has no appropriate word, we are compelled to employ the generic term active. Thus our philosophers divide the powers of the mind into Intellectual and Active. They do not, however, thereby mean to insinuate that the powers called intellectual are a whit less energetic than those specially denominated active. But, from the want of a better word, they are compelled to employ a term which denotes at once much more and much less than they are desirous of expressing. I ought to observe that the term practical has also obtained with us certain collateral significations, which render it in some respects unfit to supply the want.? But to return. This distinction of Theoretical and Practical philosophy, was first explicitly enounced by Aristotle;* and the at- History of the dis- tempts of the later Platonists to carry it up to tinction of Theoretical alt Prastiodl, Plato and even to Pythagoras, are not worthy of statement, far less of refutation. Once pro- mulgated, the division was, however, soon generally recognized. The Stoics borrowed it, as may be seen from Seneca: *— “ Philo- sophia et contemplativa est et activa; spectat, simulque agit.” It The term Active. 1 Ocwpntiniis uev Emorhuns TéA0s GAHS- —} wointixh } Sewpntixh, Cf. Metaph. x. 7; €ia, mpaxtikns 8 epyov. Arist. Metaph. A Top. vi. 6, viii. 8. But the division had been minor, c.1; ‘‘ or as Averroes has it, Per specu- at least intimated by Plato: Politicus, p. 258: lativam scimus ut sciamus, per practicam scimus Tarp tolvuv, cuumdcas emorhuas dialper, ut operemur.”? — Discussions, p. 184. — ED. Thy wey mpaxtixhy mpocermdv, Thy d¢ pdvos 2 Cf. Reid’s Works, p. 511, n. +. —Ep. yvwotihy., — ED. 3 Metaph. v.1: Tlaca Sidvowa 4) mpaxtinh 4 Ep. xcy. 10. 80 “METAPHYSICS. Lror. VIL was also adopted by the Epicureans; and, in general, by those Greek and Roman philosophers who viewed their science as versant either in the contemplation of nature (pvou), or in the regulation of human action (um) ;! for by nature they did not denote the ma- terial universe alone, but their Physics included Metaphysics, and their Ethics embraced Politics and Economics. There was thus only a difference of nomenclature; for Physical and Theoretical, — Ethical and Practical Philosophy,— were with them terms abso- lutely equivalent. I regard the division of philosophy into Theoretical and Practical , as unsound, and this for two reasons. The division of Phi- The first is, that philosophy, as philosophy, is near Beat Datta only cognitive, — only theoretical ; whatever lies ical and Practical un- fi eaciud. beyond the sphere of speculation or knowledge, transcends the sphere of philosophy; conse- quently, to divide philosophy by any quality ulterior to speculation, is to divide it by a difference which does not belong to it. Now, the distinction of practical philosophy from theoretical, commits this error. For, while it is admitted that all philosophy, as cognitive, is theoretical, some philosophy is again taken out of this category on the ground, that, beyond the mere theory, —the mere cognition, — it has an ulterior end in its application to practice. But, in the second place, this difference, even were it admissible, would not divide philosophy; for, in point of fact, all philosophy must be regarded as practical, inasmuch as mere knowledge, —that is, the mere possession of truth,—Jis not the highest end of any philosophy, but, on the contrary, all truth or knowledge is valuable only inasmuch as it determines the mind to its contemplation, — that is, to practical energy. Speculation, therefore, inasmuch as it is not a negation of thought, but, on the contrary, the highest energy of intellect, is, in point of fact, preéminently practical. The practice of one branch of philosophy is, indeed, different from that of another ; but all are still practical; for in none is mere knowledge the ulti- mate, — the highest end. Among the ancients, the principal difference of opinion regarded the relation of Logic to Philosophy and its branches. But as this controversy is of very subordinate importance, and hinges upon distinctions, to explain which would require considerable detail, I~ 1 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. vii. 14: Tov 5€ tdarrovow os Kal Thy AoyiKhy Sewplay éx- Siueph THY didocodidy broctncawevwy Bev- Bdddovta, Sencca, Ep. 1xxxix.: “ Epicurei opdvns pev 6 Kodogdvios, 7d duvoixdy &ua quas partes philosophi# putaverunt esse, Nat- kal Aoyindy, ws acl tives, wetTipxeTo, uralem, atque Moralem: Rationalem remov- Apxéaaos 8& 6 Adnvaios 7d gvoixdy nal erunt.” —Eb. hoixdy? wed 08 Twes Kal Tov Enixoupoy Lect. VIL. METAPHYSICS. 81 shall content myself with saying, —that, by the Platonists, Logic was regarded both as a part, and as the instru- Controversy among ment, of philosophy;—by the Aristotelians, ancients regarding the ek 20) nae, Ee . F Bes tts keigtbrric (Aristotle himself is silent), as an instrument, Philosophy. but not as a part, of philosophy;—by the Stoics, as forming one of the three parts of philo- sophy, — Physics, or theoretical, Ethics, or practical philosophy, being the other two.! Bat as Logic, whether considered as a part of philosophy proper or not, was by all included under the philoso- phical sciences, the division of these sciences which latterly prevailed among the Academic, the Peripatetic, and the Stoical sects, was into Logic as the subsidiary or instrumental doctrine, and into the two principal branches of Theoretical and Practical Philo- sophy. ” It is manifest that in our sense of the term practical, Logic, as an instrumental science, would be comprehended under the head of practical philosophy. [ shall take this opportunity of explaining an anomaly which you will find explained in no work with which I am acquainted. Certain branches of philosophical knowledge are called Arts,—or Arts and Sciences indifferently ; others are exclusively denominated Sciences. Were this distinction coincident with the distinction of sciences speculative and sciences practical, — taking the term practical in its ordinary acceptation, — there would be no difficulty ; for, as every practical science necessarily involves a theory, nothing could be more natural than to call the same branch of knowledge an art, when viewed as relative to its practical application, and a science, when viewed in relation to the theory which that application sup- poses. But this is not the case. The speculative sciences, indeed, are never denominated arts; we may, therefore, throw them aside. The difficulty is exclusively confined to the practical. Of these some never receive the name of arts; others are called arts and sciences indifferently. Thus the sciences of Ethics, Economics, Politics, Theology, etc., though all practical, are never denominated arts; whereas this appellation is very usually applied to the practical sciences of Logic, Rhetoric, Grammar, ete. Application of the terms Art and Science. 1 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Anal. Prior. Laertius, vii. 89; Pseudo-Plutarch, De Plat. p- 2, (ed. 1520). Ammonius, In Categ. c. 4; Phil. Proem. It is sometimes, but apparently Philoponus, In Anal. Prior. f. 4; Cramer’s without much reason, attributed to Plato. Anecdota, vol. iv. p. 417. Compare the Au- See Cicero, Acad. Quest. i.5; Eusebius, Pref. thor’s Discussions, p. 182. The division of Evan. xi. 1; Augustin, De Civ. Dei. viii. 4 Philosophy into Logic, Physics, and Ethics, —ED. probably originated with the Stoics. See 2 Sext. Empir. adv. Math. vii. 16.— Ep. Bt ‘ 82 METAPHYSICS. Lace. VIL That the term art is with us not coéxtensive with practical science, is thus manifest; and yet these are frequently confounded. Thus, for example, Dr. Whately, in his definition of Logic, thinks that Logic is a science, in so far as it institutes an analysis of the process of the mind in reasoning, and an art, in so far as it affords practical rules to secure the mind from error in its deductions; and he de- fines an art the application of knowledge to practice.* Now, if this view were correct, art and practical science would be convertible terms. But that they are not employed as synonymous expressions is, as we have seen, shown by the incongruity we feel in talking of the art of Ethics, the art of Religion, etc., though these are emi- nently practical sciences. The question, therefore, still remains, Is this restriction of the term art to certain of the practical sciences the result of some acci-. dental and forgotten usage, or is it founded on any rational principle which we are able to trace? The former alternative seems to be the common belief; for no one, in so far as I know, has endeavored to account for the apparently vague and capricious manner in which the terms art and science are applied. The latter alternative, how- ever, is the true; and I shall endeavor to explain to you the reason of the a eaten of the term art to certain practical sciences, and not to others. You are aware that the Aristotelic philosophy was, for many cen- turies, not only the prevalent, but, during the middle ages, the one exclusive philosophy in Europe. This philosophy of the middle ages, or, as it is commonly called, the Scholastic Philosophy, has exerted the most extensive influence on the languages of modern Europe; and from this com- mon source has been principally derived that community of expres- sion which these languages exhibit. Now, the peculiar application of the term art was introduced into the vulgar tongues from the scholastic philosophy; and was borrowed by that philosophy from Aristotle. .This is only one of a thousand instances which might be alleged of the unfelt influence of a single powerful mind, on the as- sociations and habits of thought of generations to the end of time; and of Aristotle is preéminently true, what has been so beantifully said of the ancients in general :— Its historical origin. “The great of old! The dead but sceptred sovrans who still rule Our spirits from their urns.” 2 Now, then, the application of the term art in the modern lan- 1 See Discussions, p. 181, — Ep. 2 Byron’s Manfred, Act. iii. Scene iv. e Lxcr. VII. METAPHYSICS. 83 guages being mediately governed by certain distinctions which the capacities of the Greek tongue allowed Aristotle to establish, these distinctions must be explained. In the Aristotelic philosophy, the terms pags and apaxrucds, — that is, practice and practical, were employed both in a generic or looser, and in a special or stricter signification. In its generic meaning mpaks, practice, was opposed to theory or speculation, and it comprehended under it, practice in its special meaning, and another codrdinate term to which practice, in this its stricter signification, was opposed. This term was zotnows, Which we may inadequately translate by production. The distinction of mpaxtikos and zourixds consisted in this: the former denoted that action which terminated in action, —the latter, that action which resulted in some permanent product. For example, dancing and music are practical, as leaving no work after their performance; whereas, painting and statuary are productive, as leaving some product over and above their energy.1 Now Aristotle, in formally defining art, defines it as a habit pro- ductive, and not as a habit practical, és zocy- Tun peta Adyov=;—and, though he has not always himself adhered strictly to this limitation, his definition was adopted by his followers, and the term in its application to the practical sciences, (the term practical being here used in its generic meaning), came to be exclusively confined to those whose end did not result in mere action or energy. Accordingly as Ethics, Politics, ete., pro- posed happiness as their end, — and as happiness was an energy, or at least the concomitant of energy, these sciences terminated in action, and were consequently practical, not productive. On the other hand, Logic, Rhetoric, etc., did not terminate in a mere, — an evanescent action, but in a permanent,—an enduring product. For the end of Logic was the production of a reasoning, the end of Rhetoric the production of an oration, and so forth.? This dis- tinction is not perhaps beyond the reach of criticism, and I am not here to vindicate its correctness. My only aim is to make you Tlpagcs. Tloinots. Why Ethics, Poli- tics, etc., designated Sciences; Logic, Rhe- toric, etce., Arts. 1 See Eth. Nic. i.1. Atapopa 8€ tis dal- veTal TOV TéAwY" Th Mev yap eiowy evépyelat Ta 5& map’ aitas %pya tid. Ibid. vi. 4; Magna Moralia, i. 85. Cf. Quintilian, Insti- tut. lib. ii. c. 18. — Ep. 2 Cf. Burgersdyck, Institut. Log. lib. i. § 6. Logica dicitur roveiy, id est, facere sive efficere syllogismos, definitiones, etc. Neque enim verum est, quod quidam aiunt, roe7y semper significare ejusmodi actionem, qua ex pal- pabili materia opus aliquod efficitur quod etiam post actionem permanet. Nam Poetica dicta est amb Tod Tovety que tamen palpabi- lem materiam non tractat, neque opus facit ipsa Poetz fictione durabilius. Quod enim poemata supersint,id non est ab ea actione qua efficiuntur sed a scriptione. Atque hee de genere. See also Scheibler, Opera, Tract. Procm. § iii. p. 6. —Ep. 84 METAPILYSICS. Lect. VIL aware of the grounds of the distinction, in order that you may comprehend the principle which originally determined the applica- tion of the term art to some of the practical sciences and not to others, and without a knowledge of which principle the various employment of the term must appear to you capricious and unintel- ligible. It is needless, perhaps, to notice that the rule applies only to the philosophical sciences, — to those which received their form and denominations from the learned. The mechanical dexter- ‘ties were beneath their notice; and these were accordingly left to receive their appellations from those who knew nothing of the Aris- totelic proprieties. Accordingly, the term art is in them applied, without distinction, to productive and unproductive operations. We speak of the art of rope-dancing, equally as of the art-of rope- making. But to return. The division of philosophy into Theoretical and Practical is the most important that has been made; and it 13 that which has entered into nearly all the dis- tributions attempted by modern philosophers. Bacon was the first, after the revival of letters, who essayed a distribution of the sciences and of philosophy. He divided all human knowl- edge into History, Poetry, and Philosophy. Philosophy he dis- tinguished into branches conversant about the Deity, about Nature, and about Man; and each of these had their subordihate divisions, which, however, it is not necessary to particularize.* Descartes? distributed philosophy into theoretical and practical, with various subdivisions; but his followers adopted the division of Logic, Metaphysics, Physics, and Ethics.* Gassendi recognized, like the ancients, three parts of philosophy, Logic, Physics, and Ethics, * and this, along with many other of Gassendi’s doctrines, was adopted by Locke.’ Kant dis- tinguished philosophy into theoretical and prac- tical, with various subdivisions ;° and the distribution into theoreti- cal and practical was also established by Fichte.’ Universality of the division of Philoso- phy into Theoretical and Practical. Bacon. Descartes and his followers. Gassendi; Kant; Fichte. Locke; 1 Advancement of Learning, Works, vol. ii. pp. ‘ 100, 124, (ed. Montagu.) De Augmentis Scien- tiarum, lib. ii. c. 1, lib. iii. ¢. 1; Works, vol. viii. pp. 87, 152. — Ep. 2 See the Prefatory Epistle to the Principia. — Ep. 3. See Sylvain Regis, Cours entier de Philoso- phie, contenant la Logique, la Metaphysique, la Physique, et la Morale. Cf. Clauberg: — “Physica .... Philosophia Naturalis dic- itur; distincta a Supernaturali seu Metaphys- ica, et a Rationali seu Logica, necnon a Morali seu Practica. Disput. Phys. i., Opera, p. 54. —ED. 4 Syntagma Philosophium, Lib. Procem. ¢. 9. ( Opera. Lugduni, 1658, vol. i. p. 29.)— Eb. 5 Essay, book iv. ch. 21.— Ep. 6 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Methodenlehre, c. 3.— ED. 7 Grundlage der gesammten Wissenchaftslehre, § 4. (Werke, vol. i. p. 126.)— Eb. Lecr. VIL METAPHYSICS. 85 I have now concluded the Lectures generally introductory to the proper business of the Course. In these lec- tures, from the general nature of the subjects, I was compelled to anticipate conclusions, and to depend on your being able to supply a good deal of what it was impossible for me articulately to explain. I now enter upon the consideration of the matters which are hereafter to occupy our attention, with comparatively little apprehension, — for, in these, we shall be able to dwell more upon details, while, at the same time, the subject will open upon us by degrees, so that, every step that we proceed, we shall find the progress easier. But I have to warn you, that you will probably find the very commencement the most arduous, and this not only because you will come less inured to difficulty, but because it will there be necessary to deal with prin- ciples, and these of a general and abstract nature ; whereas, having once mastered these, every subsequent step will be comparatively easy. Without entering upon details, I may now summarily state to you the order which I propose to follow in the ensuing Course. This requires a preliminary exposition of the different departments of Philosophy, in order that you may obtain a comprehensive view of the proper objects of our consideration, and of the relations in which they stand to others. Science and philosophy are conversant either about Mind or about Matter. The former of these is Philoso- phy properly so called. With the latter we have nothing to do, except in so far as it may enable us to throw light upon the former, for Metaphysics, in whatever latitude the term be taken, is a science, or complement of sciences, exclusively occupied with mind. Now the Philosophy of Mind, — Psychology or Metaphysics, in the widest signification of the terms,—is threefold; for the object it immediately proposes for consideration may be either, 1°, Pax- NOMENA in general; or, 2°, Laws; or, 3°, InrErENcEs, — Resutrs. This I will endeavor to explain. The whole of philosophy is the answer to these three questions: 1°, What are the Facts or Phenomena to be observed? 2°, What are the Laws which regu- late these facts, or under which these phenom- ena appear? 3°, What are the real Results, not immediately manifested, which these facts or phenomena war- rant us in drawing ? If we consider “thie mind merely with the view of observing and Conclusion of In- troductory Lectures. Order of the Course. Distribution of the Philosophical Sci- ences. The three grand questions of Philos- Ophy. 86 METAPHYSICS. | Lecr. VIL. generalizing the various phenomena it reveals, — that is, of analyz- ing them into capacities or faculties, — we have one mental science, or one department of men- tal science; and this we may call the Puanomz- NoLocy oF Minp. It is commonly called Psycuo.ogy — Empir- 1ca Psyconoiocy, or the Inpuctive Pumosorny of Minp; we might call it Paanomenat Psycnorocy. It is evident that the divisions of this science will be determined by the classes into which the phenomena of mind are distributed. If, again, we analyze the mental phenomena with the view of discovering and considering, not contingent ap- I. Phenomenology of Mind. II. Nomology of secs pearances, but the necessary and wniversal facts, — i.e. the Laws, by which our faculties are gov- erned, to the end that we may obtain a criterion by which to judge or to explain their procedures and manifestations,—we have a science which we may call the Nomotocy or Minp,— NoMOLOGICAL psycuotogy. Now, there will be as many distinct classes of Nomo- logical Psychology, as there are distinct classes of mental phenomena under the Phenomeno- logical division. I shall, hereafter, show you that there are Three great classes of these phenomena, — viz. 1°, The phenomena of | our Cognitive faculties, or faculties of Knowledge; 2°, The phe- nomena of our Feelings, or the phenomena of Pleasure and Pain; and, 3°, The phenomena of our Conative powers, —in other words, the phenomena of Will and Desire. (These you must, for the present, take upon trust).’ Each of these classes of phenomena has accordingly a science which is conversant about its Laws. For as each proposes a different end, and, in the accomplishment of that end, is regulated by peculiar laws, each must, consequently, have a different science conversant about these laws, —that is, a different Nomology. ; There is no one, no Nomological, science of the Cognitive facul- ties in general, though we have some older treatises which, though partial in their subject, afford a name not unsuitable for a nomology of the cognitions, — viz. Gnoseologia or Gnostologia. There is no independent science of the laws of Perception; if there were, it might be called Adsthetic, which, however, as we shall see, would — be ambiguous. Mnemonic, or the science of the laws of Memory, has been elaborated at least in numerous treatises; but the name Anamnestic, the art of Recollection or Reminiscence, might be equally well applied to it. The laws of the Representative faculty, Its subdivisions. 1. Nomology of the Cognitive faculties. 1 See infra. Lect. XI. p, 183, et seg. — Ep. Lect. VII. METAPHYSICS. 87 — that is, the laws of Association, have not yet been elevated into a separate nomological science. Neither have the conditions of the Regulative or Legislative faculty, the faculty itself of Laws, been fully analyzed, far less reduced to system; though we have several deservedly forgotten treatises, of an older date, under the inviting name of Noologies. The only one of the cognitive faculties, whose laws constitute the object-matter of a separate science, is the Elaborative,—the Understand- ing Special, the faculty of Relations, the faculty of Thought Proper. This nomology has obtained the name of Locic among other appellations, but not from Aristotle. The best name would have been Dianoetic. Logic is the science of the laws of thought, in relation to the end which our cognitive faculties propose, —?. e. the Trur. To this head might be referred Grammar, — Universal Grammar,— Philosophical Grammar, or the science conversant with the laws of Language, as the instrument of thought. The Nomology of our Feelings, or the science of the laws which . govern our capacities of enjoyment, in relation to the end which they propose, — 7. e. the PLEASURABLE, — has obtained no precise name in our language. It has been called the Philosophy of Taste, and, on the Continent especially, it has been denominated sthetic. Neither name is unobjectionable. The first is vague, metaphorical, and even delusive. In regard to the second, you are aware that aic-Jyo.s in Greek means feeling in general, as well as sense in par- ticular, as our term feeling means either the sense of touch in particular, or sentiment, — and the capacity of the pleasurable and painful in general. Both terms are, therefore, to a certain extent, ambiguous; but this objection can rarely be avoided, and Aisthetic, if not the best expression to be found, has already been long and generally employed. It is now nearly a century since Baumgarten, a celebrated philosopher of the Leibnitzio-Wolfian school, first applied the term Aisthetic to the doctrine which we vaguely and periphrastically denominate the Philosophy of Taste, the theory of the Fine Arts, the science of the Beautiful and Sublime,! etc., — and this term is now in general acceptance, not only in Germany, but throughout the other countries of Europe. The term Apolaustic would have been a more appropriate designation. Finally, the Nomology of our Conative powers is Practical Philosophy, properly so called ; for practical philosophy is simply the science of the laws regulative of our Will and Desires, in relation to the end Logic. 2. Nomology of the feelings. 8. Nomology of the Conative Powers. 1 Baumgarten’s work on this subject, entitled Zsthetica (two vols.), was published in 1750- 58.— Ep. 88 METAPHYSICS. Lect. VII. ‘which our conative powers propose,—d.e¢. the Goop. This, as it considers these laws in relation to man as an individual, or in relation to man as a member of society, will be divided into two branches, — Ethics and Poli- tics; and these again admit of various subdivisions. So much for those parts of the Philosophy of Mind, which are conversant about Phenomena, and about Laws. The Third great branch of this philosophy is that which is engaged in the deduction of Inferences, or Results. In the First branch, — the Phenomenology of mind, — philoso- phy is properly limited to the facts afforded in consciousness, considered exclusively in them- selves. But these facts may be such as not only to be objects of knowledge in themselves, but likewise to furnish us with grounds of inference to something out of themselves. As effects, and effects of a certain character, they may enable us to infer the analogous character of their unknown causes; as phenom- ena, and phenomena of peculiar qualities, they may warrant us in drawing many conclusions regarding the distinctive character of that unknown principle, of that unknown substance, of which they are the manifestations. Although, therefore, existence be only revealed to us in phenomena, and though we can, therefore, have only a relative knowledge either of mind or of matter; still, by inference and analogy, we may legitimately attempt to rise above the mere appearances which experience and observation afford. Thus, for example, the existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul are not given us as phenomena, as objects of immediate knowledge; yet, if the phenomena actually given do necessarily require, for their rational explanation, the hypotheses of immortality and of God, we are assuredly entitled, from the existence of the former, to infer the reality of the latter. Now, the science con- versant about all such inferences of unknown being from its known manifestations, is called Onrotocy, or Metapnysics Proper. We might call it INFERENTIAL PsycHoLoey. The following is a tabular view of the distribution of Philosophy as here proposed :— Ethics; Politics. III. Ontology, or Metaphysics Proper. Facts, — Phenomenology, Empirical Psychology. Cognitions. Feelings. Mind or Conative Powers (Will and Desire). Cc ’ r Cognitions, — Logic. onsezousness “) Laws, — Nomology, Rational Feelings, — “sthetic. Psychology. ie ean Conative Powers. { Political Philesophy. [ Results, — Ontology, Infer- ( Being of God. ential Psychology. Immortality of the Soul, etc. In this distribution of the philosophical sciences, you will observe Lect. VIL METAPILYSICS. 89 that I take little account of the celebrated division of philosophy into Speculative and Practical, which I have already explained to you,! for I call only one minor division of philosophy practical, — viz. the N omology of the Conative powers, not because that science is not equally theoretical with any other, but simply because these powers are properly called practical, as tending to practice or overt action. Such is the distribution of Philosophy, which I venture to pro- pose as the simplest and most exhaustive, and I shall now proceed, in reference to it, to specify the particular branches which form the objects of our consideration in the present course. The subjects assigned to the various chairs of the Philosophical Faculty, in the different Universities of Europe, Distribution of eub- were not calculated upon any comprehensive Sea TA Os view. of the parts of philosophy, and of their Philosophy in the Uni- E : Se versities of Europe. natural connection. Our universities were founded when the Aristotelic philosophy was the dominant, or rather the exclusive, system, and the parts distrib- uted to the different classes, in the faculty of Arts or Philosophy, were regulated by the contents of certain of the Aristotelic books, and by the order in which they were studied. Of these, there were always Four great divisions. There was first Logic, in relation to the Organon of Aristotle; secondly, Metaphysics, relative to his books under that title; thirdly, Moral Philosophy, relative to his Ethics, Politics, and Economics; and, fourthly, Physics, relative to his Physics, and the collection of treatises styled.in the schools the Parva Naturalia. But every university had not a full complement of classes, that is, did not devote a separate year to each of the four subjects of study; and, accordingly, in those seats of learning where three years formed the curriculum of philosophy, two of these branches were combined. In this university, Logic and Met- aphysics were taught in the same year; in others, Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy were conjoined; and, when the old practice was abandoned of the several Regents or Professors carrying on their students through every department, the two branches which had been taught in the same year were assigned to the same chair. What is most curious in the matter is this, — Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul being, (along with his lesser treatises on Memory and Reminiscence, on Sense and its Objects, etc.) included in the Parva Naturalia, and, he having declared that the consideration of the soul was part of the philosophy of nature,? the science of Mind Meaning of the term. 1 See ante, p. 80.— Ep. wept Wuxis, } mdons ) ris rodurns. Cf. 2 De Anima, i. 1. voixod 7d Sewp7 oat Metaph.v.1. AjAov was Bet ev Tors puoikors 12 90 METAPHYSICS. Lect. VII was always treated along with Physics. The professors of Natural Philosophy have, however, long abandoned the philosophy of mind, and this branch has been, as more appropriate to their departments, taught both by the Professors of Moral Philosophy and by the Pro- fessors of Logic and Metaphysics, — for you are not to suppose that metaphysics and psychology are, though vulgarly used as synon- ymous expressions, by any means the same. So much for the his- torical accidents which have affected the subjects of the different chairs. I now return to the distribution of philosophy, which I have given you, and, first, by exclusion, I shall tell you what does not concern us. In this class, we have nothing to do with Practical Philoso- phy, —that is, Ethics, Politics, Economics. But, with this excep- tion, there is no other branch of philosophy which is not either specially allotted to our consideration, or which ‘does not fall nat- urally within our sphere. Of the former description, are Logic, and Ontology or Metaphysics Proper. Of the latter, are Psychol- ogy, or the Philosophy of Mind in its stricter signification, and Aisthetic. These subjects are, however, collectively too extensive to be overtaken in a single Course, and, at the same time, some of them are too abstract to afford the proper materials for the instruction of those only commencing the study of philosophy. In fact, the depart- ment allotted to this chair comprehends the two extremes of phi- losophy, — Logic, forming its appropriate introduction, — Meta- physics, its necessary consummation. I propose, therefore, in order fairly to exhaust the business of the chair, to divide its subjects between two Courses,—the one on Phenomenology, Psychology, or Mental Philosophy in general; the other, on Nomology, Logic, or the laws of the Cognitive Faculties in particular. Subjects appropri- ate to this Chair. Comprehension and order of the Course. 7 Tl éott (nrety Kal dpiCecSat, ral S07: kad —_ phy, strictly so called, with the science which mept Wuxijs évias Sewphaat Tov pvoixov, $on is conversant with the Manifestations of Mind, bn avev Tis bAns éoriv. — ED. — Phenomenology, or Psychology. I shall 1 From the following sentences, which ap- then proceed to Logic, the science which con- pear in the manuscript lecture as superseded , siders the Laws of Thought; and finally, to by the paragraph given in the text, itis obvi- Ontology, or Metaphysics proper, the philos- ous that the Author had originally designed ophy of Results. sthetic, or the theory of to discuss specifically, and with greater detail, the Pleasurable, I should consider subse- the three grand departments of Philosophy quently to Logic, and previously to Ontol- indicated in the distribution proposed by him: ogy.’”?—Cn the propriety of according to Psy- —‘* The plan which I propose to adopt inthe chology the first place in the order of the phil- distribution of the Course, or rather Courses, osophical sciences, see Cousin, Cours de I’ His- is the following: toire de la Philosophie, Deuxiéme Série, tom, ii. ‘TY shall commence with Mental Philoso- _p. 71-73 (ed. 1847). — Ep. v WAG LR Be Vie PSYCHOLOGY, ITS DEFINITION. EXPLICATION OF TERMS. I now pass to the First Division of my subject, which will occupy the present Course, and commence with a definition of Psycnor- ocy,— THe PuanomEnotoay or Mrnp. Psychology, or the Philosophy of the Human Mind, strictly so denominated, is the science conversant about the phenomena, or modifications, or states of the Mind, or Conscious-Subject, or Soul, or Spirit, or Self, or Ego. In this definition, you will observe that I have purposely accumn- lated a variety of expressions, in order that I might have the earliest opportunity of making you accurately acquainted with their meaning; for they are terms of vital importance and frequent use in philosophy. — Before, there- fore, proceeding further, I shall pause a moment in explanation of the terms in which this definition is expressed. Without restrict- ing myself to the following order, I shall consider the word Psy- chology ; the correlative terms subject and substance, phoenomenon, modification, state, etc., and, at the same time, take occasion to explain another correlative, the expression object, and, finally, the words mind, soul, spirit, self, and ego. Indeed, after considering these terms, it may not be improper to take up, in one series, the philosophical expressions of principal importance and most ordinary occurrence, in order to render less frequent the necessity of interrupting the course of our procedure, to afford the requisite verbal explanations. The term Psychology, is of Greek compound, its elements yyy, signifying soul or mind, and dédyos, signifying discourse or doctrine. Psychology, therefore, is the discourse or doctrine treating of the hu- man mind. But, though composed of Greek elements, it is, like the greater number of the compounds of Aoyos, of modern combi- nation. I may be asked, — why use an exotic, a technical name? Why not be contented with the more popular terms, Philosophy of Mind, or Mental Philosophy, — Science of Mind or Mental Definition of Psy- chology. Explication of terms. The term Psycholo- gy; its use vindicated. 92 METAPHYSICS. Lect. VII. Science ?— expressions by which this department of knowledge has been usually designated by those, who, in this country, have cultivated it with the most distinguished success. To this there are several answers. In the first place, philosophy itself, and all, or almost all, its branches, have, in our language, received Greek technical denominations; why not also the most important of all, the science of mind? In the second place, the term psychology is now, and has long been, the ordinary expression for the doctrine of mind in the philosophical language of every other European nation. Nay, in point of fact, it is now naturalized in English, psychology and psychological having of late years come into com- mon use; and their employment is warranted by the authority of the best English writers. It was familiarly employed by one of our best writers, and most acute metaphysicians, Principal Camp- bell of Aberdeen;! and Dr. Beattie, likewise, has entitled the first part of his Elements of Moral Science,—that which treats of the mental faculties, — Psychology. To say nothing of Coleridge, the late Sir James Mackintosh was also an advocate for its employ- ment, and justly censured Dr. Brown for not using it, in place of his very reprehensible expression, — Physiology of Mind, the title of his unfinished text-book.2 But these are reasons in themselves of comparatively little moment: they tend merely to show that, if otherwise expedient, the nomenclature is permissible; and that it is expedient, the following reasons will prove. For, in the third place, it is always of consequence for the sake of precision to be able to use one word instead of a plurality of words, — especially, where the frequent occurrence of a descriptive appellation might occasion tedium, distraction, and disgust; and this must necessarily occur in the treatment of any science, if the science be able to possess no single name vicarious of its definition. In this respect, therefore, Psychology is preferable to Philosophy of Mind. But, in the fourth place, even if the employment of the description for the name could, in this instance, be tolerated when used substan- tively, what are we to do when we require, (which we do unceas- ingly,) to use the denomination of the science adjectively? For example, I have occasion to say a psychological fact, a psychological law, a psychological curiosity, etc. How can we express these by the descriptive appellation? A psychological fact may indeed be styled a fact considered relatively to the philosophy of the human mind,—a psychological law may be called a law by which the 1 Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. i. p. 148, (ist Josophy,in the incyclopedia Britannica, vol. ed.); p. 128, (ed. 1816.) — Eb. i. p. 399., (7th ed.) —Ep. 2 Dissertation on the progress of Ethical Phi- Lror. VIII. METAPHYSICS. 93 mental phenomena are governed, —a psychological curiosity may be rendered —by what, I really do not know. But how miserably weak, awkward, tedious, and affected, is the commutation when it can be made; not only do the vivacity and precision of the original evaporate, the meaning itself is not even adequately conveyed. But this defect is still more manifestly shown when we wish to place in contrast the matters proper to this science, with the mat- ters proper to others. Thus, for example, to say,—this is a psy- chological, not a physiological, doctrine — this is a psychological observation, not a logical inference. How is. the contradistinction to be expressed by a periphrasis? It is impossible, — for the inten- sity of the contrast consists, first, in the two opposite terms being single words, and second, in their being both even technical and precise Greek. This necessity has, accordingly, compelled the adoption of the terms psychology and psychological into the phi- losophical nomenclature of every nation, even where the same necessity did not vindicate the employment of a non-vernacular expression. Thus in Germany, though the native language affords a facility of composition only inferior to the Greek, and though it possesses a word (Seelenlehre) exactly correspondent to ywxoroyia, yet because this substantive did not easily aliow of an adjective flexion, the Greek terms, substantive and adjective, were both adopted, and have been long in as familiar use in the Empire, as the terms geog- raphy and geographical, —physiology and physiological, are with us. What I have now said may suftice to show that, to supply neces- sity, we must introduce these words into our The terms Physiol: philosophical vocabulary. But the propriety of eee this is still further shown by the inauspicious phy of mind, inappro. “ttempts that have been recently made on the priate. name of the science. As I have mentioned be- fore, Dr. Brown, in the very title of the abridg- ment of his lectures on mental philosophy, has styled this philoso- phy, “ Zhe Physiology of the Human Mind;” and I have also seen two English publications of modern date,—one entitled the “Phys- ics of the Soul,” the other “Intellectual Physics.”1 Now, the term nature, (prow, natura,) though in common language of a more extensive meaning, has, in general, by philosophers, been applied appropriately to denote the laws which govern the appearances of the material universe. And the words Physiology and Physics have been specially limited to denote sciences conversant about 1 Intellectual Physics, an Essay concerning the concerning the Nature of Being. 1803. By Gov- Nature of Being and the Progression of existence. ernor Pownall, — Eb. London, 1795, Intellectual Physics, an. Essay OL METAPHYSICS. Lecr. VIII. these laws as regulating the phenomena of organic and inorganic bodies. The empire of nature is the empire of a mechanical neces- sity; the necessity of nature, in philosophy, stands opposed to the liberty of intelligence. Those, accordingly, who do not allow that mind is matter, —who hold that there is in man a principle of action superior to the determinations of a physical necessity, a brute or blind fate—must regard the application of the terms Physiology and Physics to the doctrine of the mind as either singularly map- propriate, or .as significant of a false hypothesis in regard to the character of the thinking principle. , Mr. Stewart objects! to the term Spirit, as seeming to imply an hypothesis concerning the nature and essence of the sentient or thinking principle, altogether tmconnected with our conclusions in regard to its phenomena, and their general laws; and, for the same reason, he is disposed to object to the words Pneumatology and Psychology; the former of which was introduced by the schoolmen. In regard to Spirit and Pneu- matology, Mr. Stewart’s criticism is perfectly just. They are un- necessary; aud, besides the etymological metaphor, they are asso- ciated with a certain theological limitation, which spoils them as expressions of philosophical generality.” But this is not the case with Psychology. For though, in its etymology, it is like almost all metaphysical terms, originally of physical application, still this had been long forgotten even by the Greeks; and, if we were to reject philosophical expressions on this account, we should be left without any terms for the mental phzenomena at all. The term soul, (and what I say of the term soul is true of the term spirit,) though in this country less employed than the term mind, may be regarded as another synonym for the unknown basis of the mental phenomena. Like nearly all the words significant of the internal world, there is here a metaphor borrowed from the external; and this is the case not merely in one, but, as far as we can trace the analogy, in all languages. You are aware that woxn, the Greek term for soul, comes from Wyo, I breathe or blow,—as avedpa in Greek, and spiritus in Latin, from verbs of the same signification. In like Spirit, Soul. Corresponding terms in other languages. 1 Philosophical Essays, Prelim. Dissert. ch. 1; Works, vol. v. p. 20. _ 2[The terms Psychology and Pneumatology, or Pneumatic, are not equivalents. The latter word was used for the doctrine of spirit in general, which was subdivided into three branches, as it treated of the three orders of spiritual substances, — God, —Angels, and Devils, —and Man. Thus— f 1. Theologia (Naturalis), Pneumatolo- d : 2. Angelographia, Damon- gia or Pneu- : } ologia. matica, | 3. Psychologia. —See Theoph. Gale, Gale Logica, p. 455. (1681).} Lecr. VIII. METAPHYSICS. 95 manner, anima and animus are words which, though in Latin they have lost their primary signification, and are only known in their secondary or metaphorical, yet, in their original physical meaning, are preserved in the Greek dvepos, wind or air. The English soul, and the German Seele, come from a Gothic root saivala; which signifies to storm. Ghost, the old English word for spirit in gen- eral, and so used in our English version of the Scriptures, is the same as the German Geist,? and is derived from Gas, or Gescht, which signifies air. In like manner the two words in Hebrew for soul or spirit, nephesh and ruach, are derivatives of a root which means to breathe; and in Sanscrit the word atmd (analogous to the Greek dzpés, vapor or air) signifies both mind and wind or air? Sapientia, in Latin, originally meant only the power of tasting; as sagacitas only the faculty of scenting. In French, penser comes from the Latin pendere, through pensare to weigh, and the terms, attentio, intentio, (entendement,) comprehensio, apprehensio, pene- tratio, understanding, etc., are just so many bodily actions trans- ferred to the expression of mental energies.4 There is, therefore, on this ground, no reason to reject such use- ful termsas psychology and psychological ; terms, too, now in such general acceptation in the phi- losophy of Europe. I may, however, add an historical notice of their introduction. Aristo- tle’s principal treatise on the philosophy of mind is entitled ITepi Wuxys; but the first author who gave a treatise on the subject under the title Psychologia, (which I have observed to you is a modern compound), is Otto Casmann, who, in the year 1594, published at Hanau his very curious work, “ Psychologia Anthropologica, sive Anime Humane Doctrina.” This was followed, in two years, by his “Anthropologie Pars IT, hoc est, de Jabrica Humani Cor- poris.” This author had the merit of first giving the name Anthro- pologia to the science of man in general, which he divided into two parts, — the first, Psychologia, the doctrine of the Human Mind ; the second, Somatologia, the doctrine of the Human Body; and these thus introduced and applied, still continue to be the usual ap- pellations of these branches of knowledge in Germany. I would not say, however, that Casmann was the true author of the term By whom the appel- lation Psychology first employed. 1See Grimm, Deutsche Grammatik, vol.ii. p. Gale, Philosophia Generalis, pp. 821, 322. Prich- 99. In Anglo-Saxon, Sawel, Sawal, Sawl, ard, Review of the Doctrine of a Vital Principle, Saul. — Ep. p. 5, 6.] 2 Scotch, Ghaist, Gastly. 4 [On this point see Leibnitz, Nouv. Ess. lib. 8 [See H. Schmid, Versuch einer Metaphysik ijii.c.i. § 5; Stewart, Phil. Essays — Works, vol. der inneren, Natur, p. 69, note. Scheidler’s Psy- vy. Essay v.; Brown, Human Understanding, chologie, pp. 299-801, 320, et seq. Cf. Theop. p. 888, et seq,] 96 METAPHYSICS. Lect. VII. psychology, for his master, the celebrated Rudolphus Goclenius of Marburg, published, also in 1594, a work entitled, “ WuxoAoyia, hoc est, de Hominis Perfectione, Anima, etc,” being a collection of dis- sertations on the subject; in 1596 another, entitled “De preecipuis Materiis Psychologicis;” and in 1597 a third, entitled “ Authores Variit de Psychologia,’? —so that I am inclined to attribute the origin of the name to Goclenius. * Subsequently, the term became the usual title of the science, and this chiefly through the authority of Wolf, whose two principal works on the subject are entitled « Psychologia Empirica,” and “ Psychologva Rationalis.” Charles Bonnet, in his “ Zssai de Psychologie,” ® familiarized the name in France; where, as well as in Italy,— indeed, in all the Continental countries, — it is now the common appellation. In the second place, I said that Psychology is conversant about the phenomena of the thinking subject, ete. and I now proceed to expound the import of the correlative terms phenomenon, subject, etc. But the meaning of these terms will be best illustrated by now stating and explaining the great axiom, that all human knowledge, consequently that all human philosophy, is only of the relative or phenomenal. In this proposition, the term relative is opposed to the term absolute ; and, therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, I virtually assert that we know nothing eta uty absolute, — nothing existing absolutely ; that is, ject, illustrated by re- in and for itself, and without relation to us and ferane to eet ee faculties. I shall illustrate this by its appli- xe human knowl = Gation. Our knowledge is either of matter or of mind. Now, what is matter? What do we know of matter? Matter, or body, is to us the name either of some- thing known, or of something unknown. In so far as matteris a name for something known, it means that which appears to us under the forms of extension, solidity, divisibility, figure, motion, rough- ness, smoothness, color, heat, cold, ete.; im short, it 1s a common name fora certain series, or aggregate, or complement, of appear- ances or phenomena manifested in coéxistence. But as the phenomena appear only in conjunction, we are com- pelled by the constitution of our nature to think them conjoined in and by something; and as they are phenomena, we cannot think them the phenomena of nothing, but must regard them as the pro- perties or qualities of something that is extended, solid, figured, ete. But this something, absolutely and in itself, —7.e. considered apart The correlative terms 1[The term psychology is, however, used by corum Communium, pretixed to his Ciceron- Joannes Thomas Freigius in the Catalogus Lo- tanus, 1575. See also Gale, Logica, p. 455.) 2 Published in 1755. — Ep. Lect. VIII. METAPHYSICS. 97 from its phenomena,—is to us as zero. It is only in its qualities, only in its effects, in its relative or phenomenal existence, that it is cognizable or conceivable; and it is only by a law of thought, which compels us to think something, absolute and unknown, as the basis or condition of the relative and known, that this something obtains a kind of incomprehensible reality to us. Now, that which mani- fests its qualities, —in other words, that in which the appearing causes inhere, that to which they belong, is called their subject, or substance, or substratum. 'To this subject of the phenomena of ex- tension, solidity, etc., the term matter or material substance is com- ‘monly given; and, therefore, as contradistinguished from these qualities, it is the name of something unknown and inconceivable. The same is true in regard to the term mind. In so far as mind is the common name for the states of knowing, willing, feeling, de- siring, ete., of which I am conscious, it is only the name for a certain series of connected phenomena or qualities, and, consequently, ex- presses only what is known. But in so far as it denotes that sub- ject or substance in which the phenomena of knowing, willing, ete., inhere,—something behind or under these phenomena, —it ex- presses what, in itself or in its absolute existence, is unknown. Thus, mind and matter, as known or knowable, are only two dif- ferent series of phenomena or qualities; mind and matter, as un- known and unknowable, are the two substances in which these two different series of phenomena or qualities, are supposed to inhere. The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make, from the existence of known phzenomena; and the distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one. Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is thus, as we have said, only relative; of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing; and we may say of man what Virgil says of Auneas, con- templating in the prophetic sculpture of his shield the future glories of Rome — “ Rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet.” 1 This is, indeed, a truth, in the admission of which philosophers, in general, have been singularly harmonious; and General harmony of — the praise that has been lavished on Dr. Reid hilosophers regard- : : : : mee ot ee for this observation, is wholly unmerited. In ing the relativity of : human knowledge. fact, I am hardly aware of the philosopher who has not proceeded on the supposition, and there are few who have not explicitly enounced the observation. It is 1 Eneid, viii. 730. — En, 13 a 98 METAPHYSICS. Lect. VIII. only since Reid’s death that certain speculators have arisen, who have obtained celebrity by their attempt to found philosophy on an immediate knowledge of the absolute or unconditioned. I shall quote to you a few examples of this general recognition, as they happen to occur to my recollection ; and, in order to manifest the better its universality, I purposely overlook the testimonies of a more modern philosophy. Aristotle, among many similar observations, remarks in regard to matter, that it is incognizable in itself;* while in regard to mind he says, “that the intellect does not know itself directly, but only in- directly, in knowing other things;”? and he defines the soul from its phenomena, “the principle by which we live, and move, and perceive, and understand.”* St. Augustin, the most philosophical of the Christian fathers, ad- mirably says of body, —“Materiam cognoscendo ignorari, et igno- rando cognosci ;”* and of mind, — “ Mens se cognoscit cognoscendo se vivere, se meminisse, se intelligere, se velle, cogitare, scire, judi- care.”> “Non ineurrunt,” says Melanchthon, “ipse substantiz in oculos, sed vestite et orn- ate: accidentibus ; hoc est, non possumus, in hae vita, acie oculorum perspicere ipsas substantias: sed utcunque, ex accidentibus que in sensus exteriores incurrunt, ratiocinamur, quomodo inter se differant substantiz.” ° It is needless to multiply authorities, but I cannot refrain from adducing one other evidence of the general con- sent of philosophers to the relative character of our knowledge, as affording a graphic specimen of the manner of its ingenious author. “Substantie non a nobis cognoscuntur,” says the elder Scaliger, “sed earum accidentia. Quis enim me doceat quid sit substantia, nisi miseris illis verbis, ves subsistens ? Scientiam ergo nostram constat esse umbram in sole. Et sicut vulpes, elusa a ciconia, lambendo vitreum vas pultem haud attingit : ita nos externa tantum accidentia percipiendo, formas internas non cognoscimus.” Testimonies, — of Aristotle. St. Augustin. Melanchthon. The elder Scaliger. mana cogitatio, conetur eam (materiam) vel nosse ignorando vel ignorare noscendo.” — Ep. 5 From the spurious treatise attributed to St. Austin, entitled De Spiritu et Anima, c. 1 Metaph. lib. vii. (vi.) c. 10: [7 8An &yrvwo- Tos KaY adthy. —ED.] 2 Metaph. xii. (xi.)7. Adtoy 5€ voet 6 vous KaTd peTadAntivy tov vonrov’ vontos yxp ylyvetat Svyydvwy Kal vody* Cf. De Anima, iii. 4. Kal avrdos 5¢ vontos éorw domep Ta vontd. — ED, 8 De Anima, Lib. ii. c.2. ‘H Wux} rovrors pirat, SpeTTUKS, algdynTix@e SiavonTing@, Kiwijoet. — ED. 4 Confess. xii. 5. ‘Dum sibi hee dicit hu- 82; but see De Trinitate, lib. x. § 16, tom. viii. p. 897, (ed. Ben.) 6 Erotemata Dialectices, lib. i. Pr. Substan- tia. [This is the text in the edition of Strige- lius. It varies considerably in different edi- tions. — Ep.] 7 De Subtilitate, Ex. cecvii. § 21. Lect. VIL. METAPHYSICS. 99 So far there is no difference of opinion among philosophers in gen- eral. We know mind and matter not in themselves, but in their accidents or phenomena." Thus our knowledge is of relative existence only, seeing that ex- istence in itself, or absolute existence, is no ob- All relative exist- — ject of knowledge.” But it does not follow that ence not comprised in : : : ° what is relative to us, 2 relative existence is relative to us ; that all that can be known, even by a limited intelli- gence, is actually cognizable by us. We must, therefore, more pre- cisely limit our sphere of knowledge, by adding, that all we know is _known only under the special conditions of our faculties. This is a truth likewise generally acknowledged. “Man,” says Pro- tagoras, “is the measure of the universe,” (zavrwy ypyudrwv pérpov dvIpwros), —a truth which Bacon has well expressed: “ Omnes per- ceptiones tam sensus quam mentis, sunt ex analogia hominis, non ex analogia universi : estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inzequalis ad radios rerum, qui suam naturam nature rerum immiscet, eamque distorquet et inficit.”* “Omne quod cognoscitur,” says Boethius, “non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius com- prehenditur facultatem ;” * and this is expressed almost in the same terms by the two very opposite philosophers, Kant and Condillac, —“Tn perception” (to quote only the former) “everything is known according to the constitution of our faculty of sense.” ?° | Now this principle,.in which philosophers of the most opposite opinions equally concur, divides itself into two branches. In the first place, it would be unphil- osophical to conclude that the properties of existence necessarily are, in number, only as the number of our faculties of apprehending them; or, in the second, that the proper- ties known, are known in their native purity, and without addition or modification from our organs of sense, or our capacities of intel- ligence. I shall illustrate these in their order. In regard to the first assertion, it is evident that nothing exists for us, except in so far as it is known to us, and that nothing is known to us, except certain properties or modes of existence, which are relative or analogous to our faculties. Beyond these modes we know, and can assert, the reality of no existence. But This principle has two branches. 1 For additional testimonies on this point, 38 Novum Organum, lib. i., Aph. xli.— Ep. see the Author's Discussions, p. 644. — ED. 4 De Consol. Phil. lib. v. Pr. 4. Quoted in 2 [Absolute in two senses: 1°, As opposed to Discussions, p. 645. — Ep. partial; 2°, As opposed to relative. Better if 5 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Vorrede zur zwei-e I had said that our knowledge not of absolute, ten Auflage. Quoted in Discussions, p. 646. and, therefore, only of the partial and rela- Cf. ibid. Transc. Hsth. § 8. —Ep. tive.]— Pencil Jotting on Blank Leaf of Lecture. 7 98 . 100 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. VII if, on the one hand, we are not entitled to assert as actually exist- ent except what we know; neither, on the other, 1. The number of | are We warranted in denying, as possibly exist- the properties of ex- ent, what we do not know. The universe may Se ert oe jc abe: eemeeiveds ass a polygon of a thousand, or a as the number of our — f powers of apprehen- hundred thousand, sides or facets,— and each of sion. these sides or facets may be conceived as rep- resenting one special mode of existence. Now, of these thousand sides or modes all may be equally essential, but three or four only may be turned towards us or be analogous to our organs. One side or facet of the universe, as holding a relation to she organ of sight, is the mode of luminous or visible existence; another, as proportional to the organ of hearing, is the mode of sonorous or audible existence; and so on. But if every eye to see, if every ear to hear, were annihilated, the modes of existence to which these organs now stand in relation, —that which could be seen, that which could be heard, would still remain ; and if the in- telligences, reduced to the three senses of touch, smell, and taste, were then to assert the impossibility of any modes of being except those to which these three senses were analogous, the procedure would not be more unwarranted, than if we now ventured to deny the possible reality of other modes of material existence than those to the perception of which our five senses are accommodated. I will illustrate this by an hypothetical parallel. Let us suppose a block of marble,’ on which there are four different inscriptions, — m Greek, in Latin, in Persic, and in Hebrew, and that four tray- ellers approach, each able to read only the inscription in his native tongue. The Greek is delighted with the information the marble affords him of the siege of Troy. The Roman finds interesting matter regarding the expulsion of the kings. The Persian deciphers an oracle of Priioitien And the Jew is surprised by a commemo- ration of the Exodus. Here, as each inscription exists or is signifi- cant only to him who possesses the corresponding language; so the several modes of existence are manifested only to those intelli- gences who possess the corresponding organs. And as each of the four readers would be rash if he maintained that the marble could be significant only as significant to him, so should we be rash, were we to hold that the universe had no other phases of being than the few that are turned towards our faculties, and which our five senses enable us to perceive. 1 This illustration is taken from F. Hemsterhuis, Sophyle ou de la ee ee Phil. osophiques, vol. i. p. 281, (ed. 1792.) — Ep. Lect. VII. METAPHYSICS. 101 Voltaire, (aliud agendo), has ingeniously expressed this truth in one of his philosophical romances. “Tell me,” says Micromegas, an inhabitant of one of the planets of the Dog-Star, to the secretary of the Academy of Sciences in the planet Saturn, at which he had re- cently arrived, in a journey through the heavens, — “ Tell me, how many senses have the men on your globe?” —“ We have seventy- two senses,” answered the academician, “and we are, every day, complaining of the smallness of the number. Our imagination goes far beyond our wants. What are seventy-two senses! and how pitiful a boundary, even for beings with such limited percep- tions, to be cooped up within our ring and our five moons. In spite of our curiosity, and in spite of as many passions as can result from six dozen of senses, we find our hours hang very heavily on our hands, and can always find time enough for yawning.” —“TI can very well believe it,” says Micromegas, “for, in our globe, we have very near one thousand senses; and yet, with all these, we feel con- tinually a sort of listless inquietude and vague desire, which are forever telling us that we are nothing, and that there are beings infinitely nearer perfection. I have travelled a good deal in the universe. I have seen many classes of mortals far beneath us, and many as much superior; but I have never had the good fortune to meet with any who had not always more desires than real necessi- ties to occupy their life. And pray, how long may you Saturnians live, with your few senses?” continued the Sirian. “Ah! but a very short time indeed !” said the little man of Saturn, with a sigh. “It is the same with us,” said the traveller; “we are forever com- plaining of the shortness of life. It must be an universal law of nature.” —“ Alas!” said the Saturnian, “we live only five hundred great revolutions of the sun, (which is pretty much about fifteen thousand years of our counting). You see well, that this is to die almost the moment one is born. Our existence is a point, — our duration an instant, — our globe an atom. Scarcely have we begun to pick up a little knowledge, when death rushes in upon us, before we can have acquired anything like experience. As for me, I can- not venture even to think of any project. I feel myself but like’a drop of water in the ocean; and, especially now, when I look to you and to myself, I really feel quite ashamed of the ridiculous appearance which I cut in the universe.” “Tf I did not know you to be a philosopher,” replied Microme- gas, “I should be afraid of distressing you, when I tell you, that our life is seven hundred times longer than yours. But what is even that? and, when we come to the last moment, to have lived a Illustrated from Vol- taire. 102 METAPHYSICS. LEey. VIE: single day, and to have lived a whole eternity, amount to the same thing. I have been in countries where they live a thousand times longer than with us; and I have always found them murmuring, just as we do ourselves. But you have seventy-two senses, and they must have told you something about your globe. How many properties has matter with you? »__ «Tf you mean essential prop- erties,” said the Saturnian, “without which our globe could not subsist, we count three hundred, — extension, impenetrability, mo- bility, gravity, divisibility, and so forth.” —“ That small number,” replied the gigantic traveller, “may be sufficient for the views which the Creator must have had with respect to your narrow hab- itation. Your globe is little; its inhabitants are so too. You have few senses; your matter has few qualities. In all this, Providence has suited you most happily to each other.” “The academician was more and more astonished with every- thing which the traveller told him. At length, after communicating to each other a little of what they knew, and a great deal of what | they knew not, and reasoning as well and as ill as philosophers usually do, they resolved to set out together on a little tour of the universe.” * be Before leaving this subject, it is perhaps proper to observe, that had we faculties equal in number to all the possible modes of exist- ence, whether of mind or matter, still would our knowledge of mind or matter be only relative. If material existence could ex- hibit ten thousand phenomena, and if we possessed ten thousand senses to apprehend these ten thousand phenomena of material existence, — of existence absolutely and in itself, we should be then as ignorant as we are at present. _ sage But the consideration that our actual faculties of knowledge are probably wholly inadequate in number to the possible modes of being, is of comparatively less importance than the other consideration to which we now proceed,—that whatever we know is not known as it is, but only as it seems to us to be; for it is of less importance that our knowledge should be limited than that our knowledge shouldbe pure. It is, therefore, of the highest moment that we should be aware that what we know is not a sim- ple relation apprehended between the object known and the subject knowing, — but that every knowledge is a sum made up of several elements, and that the great business of philosophy is to analyze and discriminate these elements, and to determine from whence these contributions have been derived. I shall explain what I 2. The properties of existence not known in their native purity. 1 Micromégas, chap. ii: — ED. Lect. VII. METAPHYSICS. 103 mean, by an example. In the perception of an external object, the mind does not know it in immediate relation to itself, but mediately in relation to the ma- terial organs of sense. If, therefore, we were to throw these organs out of consideration, and did not take into account what they contribute to, and how they modify, our knowl- edge of that object, it is evident, that our conclusion in regard to the nature of external perception would be erroneous. Again, an object of perception may not even stand in immediate relation to the organ of sense, but may make its impression on that organ through an intervening medium. Now, if this medium be thrown out of account, and if it be not considered that the real external object is the sum of all that externally contributes to affect the sense, we shall, in like manner, run into error. For example, I see a book, —I see that book through an external medium, (what that medium is, we do not now inquire,)—and I see it through my organ of sight, the eye. Now, as the full object presented to the mind (observe that I say the mind), in perception, is an object compounded of the external object emitting or reflecting light, 7. e. modifying the external medium, — of this external medium, — and of the living organ of sense, in their mutual relation, — let us sup- pose, in the example I have taken, that the full or adequate object perceived is equal to twelve, and that this amount is made up of three several parts, —of four, contributed by the book, — of four, contributed by all that intervenes between the book and the organ, and of four, contributed by the living organ itself. } I usé this illustration to show, that the phenomenon of the ex- ternal object is not presented immediately to the mind, but is known by it only as modified through certain intermediate agencies; and to show that sense itself may be a source of error, if we do not analyze and distinguish what elements, in an act of perception, belong to the outward reality, what to the outward medium, and. what to the action of sense itself. But this source of error is not limited to our perceptions; and we are liable to be deceived, not merely by not distinguishing in an act of knowledge what is con- tributed by sense, but by not distinguishing what is contributed by the mind itself. This is the most difficult and important function of philosophy ; and the greater number of its higher problems arise in the attempt to determine the shares to which the knowing subject, and the object known, may pretend in the total act of cognition. For according as we attribute a larger or a smaller proportion to Illustrated by the act of perception. 1This illustration is borrowed in an im- Sophyle ou de la Philosophie — CEuvres Philoso- proved form from F. Hemsterhuis. See his phiques, i. 279. — Ep. 104 METAPHYSICS. | Teor. VI each, we cither run into the extremes of Idealism and Materialism, or maintain an equilibrium between the two. But, on this subject, it would be out of place to say anything further at present. From what has been said, you will be able, I hope, to understand what is meant by the proposition, that all our knowledge is only relative. It is relative, 1°, Because existence is not cognizable, absolutely and in itself, but only in special modes; 2°, Because these modes can be known only if they stand in a certain relation to our faculties; and, 8°, Because the modes, thus relative to our faculties, are presented to, and known by, the mind only. under modifications determined by these faculties themselves. This general doctrine being premised, it will be proper now to take some special notice of the several terms significant of the relative nature of our knowledge. And here there are two opposite series of ex- pressions, — 1°, Those which denote the relative Eide AAA UE and the known; 2°, Those which denote the PPE Gtads.. absolute and the unknown. Of the former class, are the words phenomenon, mode, modifi- Cation, state, — words which are employed in the definition of Psy- chology ; and to these may be added the analogous terms, — quality, property, attribute, accident. Of the latter class, — that is, the abso- lute and the unknown, —is the word subject, which we have to explain as an element of the definition, and its analogous expres- sions, substance and substratum. These opposite classes cannot be explained apart; for, as each is correlative of the other, each can be comprehended only in and through its correlative, The term sudject (subjectum, imdctacis, troxeipevov) is used to denote the unknown basis which lies under the various phenomena or properties of which we become aware, whether in our internal or external experience. In the more recent philosophy, especially in that of Germany, it has, however, been principally employed to denote the basis of the various mental phenomena; but of this special signification we are hereafter more particularly to speak.!. The word substance (substantia) may be employed in two, but two kindred, meanings. It may be used either to denote that which exists absolutely and of itself; in this sense it may be viewed as derived from sudbsistendo, and as meaning ens per se subsistens; or it may be viewed as the basis of attributes, in which sense it may be regarded as derived from substando, and as meaning id quod In what senses hu- man knowledge is rel- ative. The term Subject. Substance. 1 For the history and various meanings of note, Reid’s Works, p. 806. See also Trendel- the terms Subject and Object, see the Author’s enburg. Elementa Logices Aristotelice, § 1.—ED. Lect. VIII. METAPHYSICS. 105 substat accidentibus, like the Greek tiadcracts, éroxe(pevoy. In either case it will, however, signify the same thing, viewed in a different aspect. In the former meaning, it is considered in contrast to, and independent of, its attributes; in the latter, as conjoined with these, and as affording them the condition of existence. In different rela- tions, a thing may be at once considered as a substance, and as an attribute, quality, or mode. This paper is a substance in relation to the attribute of white; but it is itself a mode in relation to the sub- stance, matter. Substance is thus a term for the substratum we are obliged to think to all that we variously denominate a mode, a state, a quality, an attribute, a property, an accident, a phoenomenon, an ap- pearance, etc. These, though expressions generically the same, are, however, used with specific distinctions. The terms mode, state, quality, attribute, property, accident, are employed in reference to a substance, as existing; the terms phenomenon, appearance, ete, in reference to it, as known. But each of these expressions has also its peculiar signification. A mode is the manner of the existence of a thing. Take, for example, a piece of wax. The wax may be round, or square, or of any other definite figure ; it may also be solid, or fluid. Its existence in any of these modes is not essential; it may change from one to the other without any substantial alteration. As the mode cannot exist without a substance, we can accord to it only a secondary or preca- rious existence in relation to the substance, to which we accord the privilege of existing by itself, per se extstere; but though the sub- stance be not astricted to any particular mode of existence, we must not suppose that it can exist, or, at least, be conceived by us to exist in none. All modes are, therefore, variable states; and though some mode is necessary for the existence of a thing, any individual mode is accidental. The word modi- __ fication is properly the bringing a thing into a certain mode of existence, but it is very commonly employed for the mode of existence itself. State is a term nearly synonymous with mode, but of a mean- ing more extensive, as not exclusively limited to the mutable and contingent. Quality is, likewise, a word of a wider signification, for there are essential and accidental qualities.!. The essential qualities of a thing are those aptitudes, those manners of existence and action, which it cannot lose without ceasing to be. For example, in man the faculties of sense and intelligence; in body, the dimensions of Mode. Modification, State. 1The term quality should, in strictness, be confined to accidental attributes. See the Author’s note, Reid’s Works p 836.— kp, 14 106 METAPHYSICS. Lect. VII. length, breadth, and thickness; in God, the attributes of eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, etc. By accidental qualities, are meant those aptitudes and manners of existence and action, which substances have at one time and not at another; or which they have always, but may lose without ceasing to be. For example, of the transitory class are the whiteness of a wall, the health which we enjoy, the fineness of the weather, etc. Of the permanent class are the grav- ity of bodies, the periodical movement of the planets, ete. The term attribute is a word properly convertible with quality, for every quality is an attribute, and every at- tribute is a quality; but, in our language, cus- tom has introduced a certain distinction in their application. Attri- bute is considered as a word of loftier significance, and is, there- fore, conventionally limited to qualities of a higher application. Thus, for example, it would be felt as deenrcnge to speak of the qualities of God, and as ridiculous to talk of the attributes of matter. Property is correctly a synonym for peculiar quality;! but it is frequently used as coéxtensive with quality in general. Accident, on the contrary, is an ab- breviated expression for accidental or contingent quality. Phenomenon is the Greek word for that which appears, and may therefore be translated by appearance. 'There is, however, a distinction to be noticed. In the first place, the employment of the Greek term shows that it is used in a strict and philosophical application. In the second place, the English name is associated with a certain secondary or implied meaning, which, in some degree, renders it inappropriate as a pre- cise and definite expression. For the term appearance is used to denote not only that which reveals itself to our observation, as existent, but also to signify that which only seems to be, in contrast to that which truly is. There is thus not merely a certain vague- ness in the word, but it even involves a kind of contradiction to the sense in which it is used when employed for phenomenon. In consequence of this, the term phenomenon has been naturalized in our language, as a philosophical substitute for the term appearance. Quality, Essential and accidental. Attribute. Property. Accident. Phenomenon. 1 In the older and Aristotelian sense of the the Jater Logicians, the term property was less term. See Topics.i.5: “Idiov 8 éorly 6 wh correctly used to denote a necessary quality, SyAot mev Td Th Fy elvan, wdvy 3 imdpxet whether peculiar or not. — Ep. kal ayTiKaTnyopeiTat Tod mpdyuaros. By LECTURE IX. EXPLICATION OF TERMS — RELATIVITY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. ArTER giving a definition of Psychology, or the Philosophy of Mind, in which I endeavored to comprise a variety of expressions, the explanation of which might smooth the way in our subsequent progress, I was engaged, during my last Lecture, in illustrating the principle, that all our knowledge of mind and matter is merely relative. We know, and can know, nothing absolutely and in itself: all that we know is existence in certain special forms or modes, and these, likewise, only in so far as they may be analogous to our faculties. We may suppose existence to have a thousand modes ;— but these thousand modes are all to us as zero, unless we possess faculties accommo- dated to their apprehension. But were the number of our facul- ties coéxtensive with the modes of being, — had we, for each of these thousand modes, a separate organ competent to make it known to us,—still would our whole knowledge be, as it is at present, only of the relative. Of existence, absolutely and in itself, we should then be as ignorant as we are now. We should still apprehend existence only in certain special modes, — only in cer- tain relations to our faculties of knowledge. These relative modes, whether belonging to the world without or to the world within, are, under different points of view and dif- ferent limitations, known under various names, as qualities, proper- ties, essence, accidents, phenomena, manifestations, appearances, and so forth;— whereas the unknown something of which they are the modes, — the unknown ground, which affords them support, is usually termed their sudstance or subject. Of the signification and differences of these expressions, I stated only what was neces- sary in order to afford a general notion of their philosophical appli- cation. Substance, (substantia, ) I noticed, is considered either in contrast to its accidents, as res per se subsistens, or in connection with them, as id quod substat accidentibus. It, therefore, compre- Recapitulation. 108 METAPHYSICS. Lect. IX, hends both the Greek terms oticia and troxeievov,— ovoia being equivalent to substantia in the meaning of ens per se subsistens ; — troxetwevov to it, as 7d quod substat accidentibus.. The term subject is used only for substance in its second meaning, and thus corres- ponds to troxefpevov; its literal signification is, as its etymology expresses, that which lies, or is placed, under the phenomena. So much for the terms substance and subject, significant of unknown or absolute existence. I then said a few words on the differences of the various terms expressive of known or relative existence, mode, modification, state, quality, attribute, property, phenomenon, appearance; but what I stated I do not think it necessary to recapitulate. I at present avoid entering into the metaphysics of substance and phenomenon. I shall only observe in gen- eral, that philosophers have frequently fallen into one or other of three different errors. Some have denied.the reality of any unknown ground of the known phenomena; and have maintained that mind and matter have no substantial existence, but are merely the two complements of two series of associated qualities. This doctrine is, however, altogether futile. It belies the veracity of our primary beliefs; it leaves unsatisfied the strongest necessities of our intellectual nature; it admits as a fact that the phenomena are connected, but allows no cause explanatory of the fact of their connection. Others, again, have fallen into an opposite error. They have attempted to speculate concerning the nature of the unknown grounds of the phenomena of mind and matter, apart from the phenomena, and have, accordingly, transcended the legiti- mate sphere of philosophy. A third party have taken some one, or more, of the plxenomena themselves as the basis or substratum of the others. Thus Descartes, at least as understood and followed by Mallebranche and others of his disciples, made thought or con- sciousness convertible with the substance of mind;*? and Bishops Brown and Law, with Dr. Watts, constituted solidity and extension Philosophers have fallen into three dif- ferent errors regard- ing Substance. 1'YmdorTao1s, here noted, by way of interpo- lation, as of theological appiication. [On this point see Melanchthon, Zot. Dial. (Strigelii) p. 145, et sez. ‘In philosophia, generaliter nomine Essentie utimur pro re per sese consi- derata, sive sit in predicamento substantiz, sive sit accidens. At trdoraots significat rem subsistentem, que opponitur accidentibus. Ecclesia vero cum cuodam discrimine his vo- cabulis utitur. Nam vocabulum Essentie sig- nificat id quod revera est, etiamsi est commu- nicatum. ‘Yrdoracis autem seu Persona est subsistens, vivum, individdum, intelligens, incommunicabile, non sustentatum’ in alio.” Compare the relative annotation by Strigel- — ius, and Hicker, Clavis Phil. Arist. p. 801. — Ep.] : 2 Principia, pars i. § 98, 51--58. On this point see Stewart, Works, vol. ii. p. 478, note A — Ep. Lecr. IX. METAPHYSICS. 109 into the substance of body. This theory is, however, liable to all the objections which may be alleged against the first. ‘ I defined Psychology, the science conversant about the phe- nomena of the mind, or conscious-subject, or self, or ego. The former parts of the definition have been explained; the terms mind, conscious-sub- Ject, self, and ego, come now to be considered. These are all only expressions for the unknown basis of the mental phenomena, viewed, however, in different relations. Of these the word mind is the first. In regard to the etymology of this term,’ it is obscure and doubtful; per- haps, indeed, none of the attempts to trace it to its origin are successful. It seems to hold an analogy with the Latin mens, and both are probably derived from the same common root. This root, which is lost in the European languages of Seytho- Indian origin, is probably preserved in the Sanscrit mena, to know or understand. The Greek vois, intelligence, is, in like manner, derived from a verb of precisely the same meaning (voéw). The word mind is of a more limited signification than the term sovd. In the Greek philosophy, the term yxy, soul, comprehends, besides the sensitive and rational principle in man, the principle of organic life, both in the animal and vegetable kingdoms; and, in Christian theology, it is likewise used, in contrast to zvedua or spirit, in a vaguer and more extensive signification. Since Descartes limited psychology to the domain of conscious- ness, the term mind has been rigidly employed for the self-knowing principle alone. Mind, therefore, is to be understood as the subject of the various internal phenomena of which we are conscious, or that subject of which consciousness is the general phenomenon. Consciousness is, in fact, to the mind what extension is to matter or body. Though both are phenomena, yet both are essential . qualities; for we can neither conceive mind without consciousness, nor body without extension. Mind ean be de- fined only a posterior’, — that is, only from its manifestations. What it is in itself that is, apart from its manifestations, — we, philosophically, know nothing, and, accordingly, what we mean by mind is simply that which per- ceives, thinks, feels, wills, desires, ete. Mind, with us, is thus nearly coéxtensive with the Rational and Animal gouls of Aris- totle; for the faculty of voluntary motion, which is a function of Explanation of terms — (contiaued.) Mind. Mind can be defined only a posteriori. 1 Encyclopedia Britannica, art. Metaphysics, 20n etymology of mind, etc. —see Scheid- Pp- 615, 646, (7th ed.) (Cf. Descartes, Principia _ler’s Psychologie, p. 325. pars i. § 58, pars ii. § 4. ~ Ep.) 110 METAPHYSICS. Lect. TX, the animal soul in the Peripatetic doctrine, ought not, as is gen- erally done, to be excluded from the phenomena of consciouness and mind. The definition of mind from its qualities is given by Aristotle; it forms the second definition in his Zreatise on the Soul, and after him, it is the one generally adopted by philosophers, and, among others, by Dr. Reid.2 That Reid, therefore, should have been praised for having thus defined the mind, shows only the ignorance of his encomiasts. He has no peculiar merit in this respect at all. The next term to be considered is conscious subject. And first, what is it to be conscious? Without anticipat- ing the discussion relative to consciousness, as the fundamental function of intelligence, I may, at present, simply indicate to you what an act of consciousness denotes. This act is of the most elementary character; it is the condition of all knowl- edge; I cannot, therefore, define it to you; but, as you are all familiar with the thing, it is easy to enable you to connect the thing with the word. I know,—lI desire,—TI feel. What is it that is common to all these? nowing and desiring and feeling are not the same, and may be distinguished. But they all agree in one fundamental condition. Can I know, without knowing that I know? Can I desire, without knowing that I desire? Can I feel, without knowing that I feel? This is impossible. Now this knowing that I know or desire or feel, —- this common condition of self-knowledge, is precisely what is denominated Consciousness.’ So much at present for the adjective of conscious —now for the substantive, subject,— conscious-subject. Though consciousness be the condition of all internal phenomena, still it is itself only a phenomenon; and, therefore, supposes a subject in which it in- heres ;—that is, supposes something that is conscious, — something that manifests itself as conscious. And, since consciousness com- prises within its sphere the whole phenomena of mind, the ex- pression conscious-subject is a brief, but comprehensive, definition of mind itself. I have already informed you of the general meaning of the word subject in its philosophical application,— viz. the unknown basis Conscious-Subject. a 1 De Anima, ii.2. ‘H ux} 5€ todro 6 CGuev kai atodavducda xat Siavoodueda mporws. Cf. Themistius. Ei 5& xph Aéyew Tais, kal tas Suvdues amd ToiTwy ém- vooduev. In lib. ii, De Anima, p. 76, (Ald. Fo].)— Ep. /@ , 3) / \ d wl Exaotov TovTwy, oloy TL TL vonTIKdY, 7) rl 7d aicSnrinov, mpdrepoy éemurxeTt cov, Th a > / Ps rd voeiv, kal Th 7d aicddverVar mpdtepat a as Poca yap Kal capeorepat mpds Nuds TaY Suvdueay . U siot ai évépyeia’ mpoevTvyxdvopney ‘yap av- 2 Intellectual Powers, Essay i. c. 2; Works, p. 229. ‘By the mind of a man, we understand that in him which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills.”” — Ep. 8 Compare Discussions, p. 47. — Ep. Leor. IX. METAPHYSICS. pha of phenomenal or manifested existence. It is thus, in its applica- tion, common equally to the external and to the internal worlds. But the philosophers of mind have, in a manner, usurped and appropriated this expression to themselves. Accordingly, in their hands, the phrases conscious or thinking subject, and subject simply, mean precisely the same thing; and custom has prevailed so far, that, in psychological discussions, the subject is a term now cur- rently employed, throughout Europe, for the mind or thinking principle. The question here occurs, what is the reason of this employment? If mind and subject are only convertible terms, why multiply synonyms? Why exchange a precise and proximate expression for a vague and abstract generality? The question is pertinent, and merits a reply; for unless it can be shown that the word is necessary, its introduction cannot possibly be vindicated. Now, the utility of this expression is founded on two circumstances, The first, that it affords an adjective; the second, that the terms subject and sub- jective have opposing relatives in the terms object and objective, so that the two pairs of words together, enable us to. designate the primary and most important analysis and antithesis of philosophy, in a more precise and emphatic manner than can be done by any other technical expressions. This will require some illustration. Subject, we have seen, is a term for that in which the phenomena revealed to our observation, inhere ;— what the a op aaa schoolmen have designated the materia in qua. origin and meaning. Limited to the mental phenomena, subject therefore, denotes the mind _ itself ; and sxub- jective, that which belongs to, or proceeds from, the thinking sub- ject. Object, on the other hand, is a term for that about which the knowing subject is conversant, what the schoolmen have styled the materia circa quam, while objective means that which belongs to, or proceeds from, the object known, and not from the subject knowing; and thus denotes what is real in Opposition to what is ideal, — what exists in nature, in contrast to what exists merely in the thought of the individual. Now, the great problem of philosophy is to analyze the contents of our acts of knowledge, or cognitions, — to distinguish what elements are contributed by the knowing subject, what elements by the object known. There must, therefore, be terms adequate to designate these correlative opposites, and to discriminate the Use of the term Subject vindicated. 1See the Author’s note, Reid’s Works, p. 806.—Ep. 112 METAPHYSICS. Lect. IX. share which each has in the total act of cognition. But, if we re- ject the terms subject and sudjective,— object and objective, there are no others competent to the purpose. At this stage of your progress, Gentlemen, it is not easy to make you aware of the paramount necessity of such a distinction, and of such terms,— or to show you how, from the want of words ex- pressive of this primary antithesis, the mental philosophy of this country has been checked in its development, and involved in the utmost perplexity and misconception. It 1s sufficient to remark at present, that to this defect in the language of his psychological analysis, is, in a great measure, to be attributed the confusion, not to say the errors of Reid, in the very cardinal point of his philosophy,—a confusion so great that the whole tendency of his doctrine was misconceived by Brown, who, in adopting a modification of the hypothesis of a representative per- ception, seems not even to have suspected, that he, and Reid, and modern philosophers in general, were not in this at one.” The terms subjective and objective denote the primary distinction in consciousness of seJf and not-sel/, and this distinction involves the whole science of mind; for this science is nothing more than a determination of the subjective and objective, in themselves and in their mutual relations. The distinction is of paramount im- portance, and of infinite application, not only in Philosophy proper, but in Grammar, Rhetoric, Criticism, Ethics, Politics, Jurisprudence, Theology. I will give you an example, —a philological example. Suppose a lexicographer had to distinguish the two meanings of the word certainty. Certainty expresses either the firm conviction which we have of the truth of a thing; or the character of the proof on which its reality rests. The former is the swdjective mean- ing; the latter the objective. By what other terms can they be distinguished and described ? The distinction of subject and object, as marking out the funda- mental and most thorough-going antithesis in philosophy, we owe, among many other impor- tant benefits, to the schoolmen, and from the schoolmen the terms passed, both in their substantive and adjective forms, into the scientific language of modern philosophers. De- prived of these terms, the Critical Philosophy, indeed the whole phi- losophy of Germany and France, would be a blank. In this country, though familiarly employed in scientific language, even subsequently Errors arising from want of the terms Sub- ject and Object. History of the terms Subject and Object. 1 See on this question the Author's Discus- _ sertations to Reid’s Works, notes B and C.— sions, p. 45, et seq., and his Supplementary Dis- Eb. Lecr. IX. METAPHYSICS. Lis to the time of Locke, the adjective forms seem at length to have dropt out of the English tongue. That these words waxed obso- lete, was, perhaps, caused by the ambiguity which had. gradually crept into the signification of the substantives. Odject, besides its proper signification, came to be abusively applied to denote motive, end, final cause, (a meaning, by the way, not recognized by John- son.) This innovation was probably borrowed from the French, in whose language the word had been similarly corrupted, after the commencement of the last century. Subject in English, as sewjet in French, had not been rightly distinguished from object, taken in its proper meaning, and had thus returned to the original ambiguity of the corresponding term (bzoxeipevov) in Greek. It is probable that the logical application of the word, (subject of predication), facili- tated, or occasioned this confusion. In using the terms, therefore, we think that an explanation, but no apology, is required. The dis- tinction is expressed by no other terms ; and if these did not already enjoy a prescriptive right as denizens of the language, it cannot be denied, that, as strictly analogical, they are well entitled to sue out their naturalization. We shall have frequent occasion to recur to this distinction, — and it is eminently worthy of your attention. The last parallel expressions are the terms sedf and ego. These we shall take together, as they are absolutely convertible, As the best preparative for a prop- er understanding of these terms, I shall trans- late to you a passage from the Hirst Alcibiades of Plato.1 The in- terlocutors are Socrates and Alcibiades. “ Socr. Hold, now, with whom do you at present converse? Is it not with me? — Alcid. Yes. Socr. And I also with you? — Alcib. Yes. Socr. It is Socrates then who speaks ?— Acid, Assuredly. Socr. And Alcibiades who listens ? — Alcid. Yes. Socr. Is it not with language that Socrates speaks? — Alcid. What now? of course. Socr. 'To converse, and to use language, are not these then the same? — Alcib. The very same. Socr. But he who uses a thing, and the thing used, — are these not different ?— Alcid. What do you mean ? Socr. A currier,— does he not use a cutting knife, and other in- struments? — Alcid. Yes. Self, Ego— illustra- ted from Plato. 1P.129. The genuineness, however, ofthis translation); Schleiermacher’s Introduction, Dialogue is questionable. See Ritter, Hist. translated by Dobson, p. 828; Brandis, Gesch, of Ancient Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 164, (English der Gr. Rom. Philosophie, yol. ii. p. 180. — Ep. 15 114 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. IX. Socr. And the man who uses the cutting knife, is he different from the instrument he uses? — Alcib. Most certainly. Socr. In like manner, the lyrist, is he not different from the lyre he plays on? — Alcib. Undoubtedly. Socr. This, then, was what I asked you just now, — does not he who uses a thing seem to you always different from the thing used ? — Alcib. Very different. Socr. But the currier, does he cut with his instruments alone, or also with his hands? — Alcib. Also with his hands. Soer. He then uses his hands? — Alcid. Yes. Socr. And in his work he uses also his eyes ? —Alcid. Yes. Socr. We are agreed, then, that he who uses a thing, and the thing used, are different ? — Alcib. We are. ; Socr. The currier and lyrist are, therefore, different from the hands and the eyes, with which they work ? — Alcib. So it seems. Socr. Now, then, does not a man use his whole body ? — Alecid. Unquestionably. Socr. But we are agreed that he who uses, and that which is used, are different? —Alcib. Yes. Socr. A man is, therefore, different from his body ? — Alcib. So I think. Socr. What then is the man? — Alcidb. I cannot say. Socr. You can at least say that the man is that which uses the body ?— Alcid. True. Socr. Now, does anything use the body but the mind ?— Alecib. Nothing. ’ Soer. The mind is, therefore, the man?— Alcidb. The mind alone.” To the same effect, Aristotle asserts that the mind contains the man, not the man the mind.! “ Thou art the soul,” says Hierocles, “put the body is thine.”? So Cicero —“ Mens cujusque 1s est quis- que, non ea figura que digito demonstrari potest ;”% and Macrobius — “Ergo qui videtur, non ipse verus homo est, sed verus ille est, a quo regitur quod videtur.” * No one has, however, more beautifully ex- Arbuthnot. t eg pressed this truth than Arbuthnot.’ “What am I, whence produced, and for what end? Whence drew I being, to what period tend? -1That the mind is the man, is maintained 3 Somnium Scipionis, § 8.—ED. by Aristotle in several places. Cf. Eth. Nic. 4Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis, lib. ii. ix. 8; x. 7; but these do not contain the ex- ¢ 12,—Ep. act words of the text. — Ep. 2In Aurea Pythagoreorum Carmina, 26: Sd yap el h Wuxh* 7d 5t caua ody. — Ep. 5 Know thyself. See Dodsley’s Collection, vol. i p. 180.—Ep. Lect. IX. METAPHYSICS. 115 Am I th’ abandon’d orphan of blind chance, Dropp’d by wild atoms in disordered dance? Or, from an endless chain of causes wrought, And of unthinking substance, born with thought. Am I but what I seem, mere flesh and blood, A branching channel with a mazy flood? The purple stream that through my vessels glides, Dull and unconscious flows, like common tides, The pipes, through which the circling juices stray, Are not that thinking I, no more than they: This frame, compacted with transcendent skill, Of moving joints, obedient to my will; Nursed from the fruitful glebe, like yonder tree, Waxes and wastes, — I call it mine, not me. New matter still the mould’ring mass sustains; The mansion chang’d, the tenant still remains; And, from the fleeting stream, repair’d by food, Distinct, as is the swimmer from the flood.” But let us come to a closer determination of the point ; let us ap- peal to our experience. “I turn my attention ee ee my being, and find that I have organs, and Yelation to bodily or- i gins, and thoughts. that I have thoughts. My body is the comple- | ment of my organs; am I then my body, or any part of my body? This I cannot be. The matter of my body, in all its points, is in a perpetual flux, in a perpetual process of renewal. I,—T do not pass away, I am not renewed. N one probably of the molecules which constituted my organs some years ago, form any part of the material system which I now call mine. It has been made up anew; but I am still what I was of old. These organs may be mutilated ; one, two, or any number of them may be re- moved; but not the less do I continue to be what I was, one and entire. It is even not impossible to conceive me existing, deprived of every organ, —I therefore, who have these organs, or this body, J am neither an organ nor a body. “ Neither am I identical with my thoughts, for they are manifold and various. JI, on the contrary, am one and the same. Each mo- ment they change and succeed each other; this change and succes- sion takes place in me, but I neither change nor succeed myself in myself. Each moment, I am aware or am conscious of the exist- ence and change of my thoughts: this change is sometimes deter- mined by me, sometimes by something different from me; but I al- ways can distinguish myself from them: I am a permanent being, an enduring subject, of whose existence these thoughts are only so 116 METAPHYSICS: Tver. IX: many modes, appearances, or phenomena ; —I who possess organs and thoughts am, therefore, neither these organs nor these thoughts. “I can conceive myself to exist apart from every organ. But if I try to conceive myself existent without a thought, — without some form of consciousness, —I am unable. This or that thought may not be perhaps necessary ; but of some thought it is necessary that I should be conscious, otherwise I can no longer conceive my- self to be. A suspension of thought is thus a suspension of my sntellectual existence; I am, therefore, essentially a thinking, — a conscious being; and my true character is that of an intelligence, — an intelligence served by organs.” * yt But this thought, this consciousness, is possible only in, and through, the consciousness of Self. The Self, the I, is recognized in every act of intelligence, as the subject to which that act belongs. It is I that perceive, I that imagine, I that remember, I that attend, I that compare, I that feel, I that desire, I that will, I that am con- scious. The I, indeed, is only manifested in one or other of these special modes; but it is manifested in them all; they are all only the phenomena of the I, and, therefore, the science conversant about the phenomena of mind is, most simply and unambiguously, said to be conversant about the phenomena of the Z or Higo. — This expression, as that which, in many relations, best marks and discriminates the conscious mind, has now become familiar in every country, with the exception of our own. Why it has not been nat- uralized with us is not unapparent. The French have two words for the Ego or 1—Je and Moi. The former of these is less appro- priate as an abstract term, being in sound ambiguous; but le mot admirably expresses what the Germans denote, but less felicitously, by their Das Ich. In English, the I could not be tolerated; be- cause, in sound, it would not be distinguished from the word signi- ficant of the organ of sight. We must, therefore, either renounce the term, or resort to the Latin Zyo ; and this is perhaps no disad- vantage, for, as the word is only employed in a strictly philosophical relation, it is better that this should be distinctly marked, by its being used in that relation alone. The term Self is more allow- able; yet still the expressions Hyo and Non-Ego are felt to be less awkward than those of Self and Not-Sel/. : So much in explanation of the terms involved in the definition which I gave you of Psychology. | 1 Gatien-Arnoult, [Doct. Phil., p. 34-386. — EpD.} LECTURE xX. EXPLICATION OF TERMS. I now proceed, as I proposed, to the consideration of a. few other words of frequent occurrence in philosophy, and which it is expedient to explain at once, before entering upon discussions in which they will continually recur. I take them up without order, except in so far as they may be grouped together by their meaning; and the first I shall consider, are the terms hypothesis and theory. When a phenomenon is presented to us which can be explained by no cause within the sphere of our experi- ence, we feel dissatisfied and uneasy. . It is not mentioned in the Com- Aéyouev. — Ep. mentary on the De Memoria. — ED. 2 [Psellus, De Omnifaria Doctrina, § 46:] 3 Compare Reid’s Coll. Works, p. 810.— Eb. 140 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XI. in itself, and are also said to know the past occurrence, as medi- ately knowing it through the mental modification which represents it. Now, we are conscious of the representation as immediately known, but we cannot be said to be conscious of the thing repre- sented, which, if known, is only known through its representation. If, therefore, mediate knowledge be in propriety a knowledge, con- sclousness is not coéxtensive with knowledge. This is, however, a problem we are hereafter specially to consider. I may here also observe, that, while all philosophers agree in making consciousness an immediate knowledge, some, as Reid and Stewart, do not admit that all immediate knowledge is consciousness. They hold that we have an immediate knowledge of external objects, but they hold that these objects are beyond the sphere of consciousness.t This is an opinion we are, likewise, soon to canvass. The third condition of consciousness, which may be held as uni- versally admitted, is, that it supposes a contrast, fe a ON ou ey discrimination; for we can be conscious only crimination of one ob- ‘ ° ° hudt incenr abiniaiatl Inasmuch as we are conscious of something; and we are conscious of something only inasmuch as we are conscious of what that something is, — that is, distinguish it from what it isnot. This discrimination is of different kinds and degrees, In the first place, there is the contrast between the two grand opposites, self and not-self, — ego and non-ego, Puy Cescrimingtion 3). in, a iid wind matter; (the contrast of subject of various kinds and ‘ ° : adbiohece! and object is more general.) We are conscious of self only in and by its contradistinction from not-self; and are conscious of not-self only in and by its contra- distinction from self. In the second place, there is the discrimina- tion of the. states or modifications of the internal subject or self from each other. We are conscious of one mental state only as we contradistinguish it from another; where two, three, or more such states are confounded, we are conscious of them as one; and. were we to note no difference in our mental modifications, we might be said to be absolutely unconscious. Hobbes has truly said, “Idem semper sentire, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt.? In the third place, there is the distinction between the parts and qualities of the outer world. We are conscious of an external object only as we are conscious of it as distinct from others, — where several 1 See Reid, Intellectual Powers, Essay vi. ch. 2 Elementa Philosophie, part iv. c. 25, § 6. 5,§ 1,5. Works, pp. 442, 445. Stewart, Out- Opera, ed. Molesworth, vol. i. p. 821. English . lines of Moral Philosophy, part i. §5 2s Cots Works, vol. i. p. 894.— Ep. - lected Works, vol. ii. p. 12.— Ep. Lecr. XL. METAPHYS\GCs. 141 distinguishable objects are confounded, we are conscious of them as one; where no object is discriminated, we are not conscious of any. Before leaving this condition, I may parenthetically state, that, while all philosophers admit that consciousness involves a dis- crimination, many do not allow it any cognizance of aught beyond the sphere of self. The great majority of philosophers do this be- cause they absolutely deny the possibility of an immediate knowl- edge of external things, and, consequently, hold that consciousness in distinguishing the non-ego from the ego, only distinguishes self from self; for they maintain, that what we are conscious of as something different from the perceiving mind, is only, in reality, a modification of that mind, which we are condemned to mistake for the material reality. Some philosophers, however, (as Reid and Stewart,) who hold, with mankind at large, that we do possess an immediate knowledge of something different from the knowing self, still limit consciousness to a cognizance of self; and, conse- quently, not only deprive it of the power of distinguishing external objects from each other, but even of the power of discriminating the ego and non-ego. These opinions we are afterwards to consider. With this qualification, all philosophers may be viewed as admit- ting that discrimination is an essential condition of consciousness. The fourth condition of consciousness, which may be assumed as very generally acknowledged, is, that it in- volves judgment. A judgment is the mental act by which one thing is affirmed or denied of another. This fourth condition is in truth only a necessary consequence of the third, — for it is impossible to discriminate without judging, — dis- crimination, or contradistinction, being in fact only the denying one thing of another. It may to some seem strange that con- sciousness, the simple and primary act of intelligence, should be a judgment,— which philosophers, in general, have viewed as a compound and derivative operation. This is, however, altogether a mistake. A judgment is, as I shall hereafter show you, a simple act of mind, for every act of mind implies a judgment. Do we perceive or imagine without affirming, in the act, the external or internal existence of the object? Now these fundamental affirma- tions are the affirmations, —in other words, the judgments, of con- sciousness. The fifth undeniable condition of consciousness is memory. This condition also is a corollary of the third. For without memory our mental states could not be held fh ust, compared, distinguished from each other, and referred to 4, Judgment. 5. eo 1 See Reid’s Works, pp. 248, 414, with the Editor’s Notes. — Ep. 142 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XI. self. Without memory, each indivisible, each infinitesimal, moment in the mental succession, would stand isolated from every other, — would constitute, in fact, a separate existence. The notion of the ego or self, arises from the recognized permanence and identity of the thinking subject in contrast to the recognized succession and variety of its modifications. But this recognition is possible only through memory. The notion of self is, therefore, the result of memory. But the notion of self is involved in consciousness, so consequently is memory. , LECTURE XII. CONSCIOUSNESS, —ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS: RELATION TO COGNITIVE FACULTIES IN GENERAL. So far as we have proceeded, our determination of the contents of consciousness may be viewed as that universally admitted; for though I could quote to you certain counter- doctrines, these are not of such importance as to warrant me in perplexing the discussion by their refutation, which would indeed be nothing more than the exposition of very palpable mistakes. Let us, therefore, sum up the points we have established. We have shown, in general, that consciousness is the self-recogni- tion that we know, or feel, or desire, etc. We have shown, in par- ticular, 1°, That consciousness is an actual or living, and not a potential or dormant, knowledge ; — 2°, That it is an immediate and not a mediate knowledge ; — 3°, That it supposes a discrimination; — 4°, That it involves a judgment ;— and, 5°, That it is possible only through memory. We are now about to enter on a more disputed territory ; and the first thesis I shall attempt to establish, in- Recapitulation. TI. Special condi: — volves several subordinate questions. tions of consciousness dl ne I state, then, as the first contested position not generally admit- } : ; : tad: which I am to maintain, that our consciousness is coéxtensive with our knowledge. But this assertion, that we have no knowledge of which we are not con- scious, is tantamount to the other that consciousness is coéxten- sive with our cognitive faculties,—and this again is convertible with the assertion, that consciousness is not a special faculty, but that our special faculties of knowledge are only modifications of consciousness. The question, therefore, may be thus stated, —Is consciousness the genus under which our several faculties of knowledge are contained as species, —or, is consci- ousness itself’ a special faculty coérdinate with, and not compre- hending, these ? 1. Our conscious- ness coéxtensive with our knowledge. Lit METAPHYSICS. Leet. XII. Before proceeding to canvass the reasonings of those who have reduced consciousness from the general condi- tion, to a particular variety, of knowledge, I may notice the error of Dr. Brown, in asserting that, “in the sys- tems of philosophy which have been most generally prevalent, especially in this part of the island, consciousness has always been classed as one of the intellectual powers of the mind, differing from its other powers, as these mutually differ from each other.”* This statement, in so far as it regards the opinion of philosophers in general, is not only not true, but the very reverse of truth. Tor, in place of consciousness being, “in the systems most generally pre- valent,” classed as a special faculty, it has, in all the greater schools of philosophy, been viewed as the universal attribute of the intel- lectual acts. Was consciousness degraded to a special faculty in the Platonic, in the Aristotelian, in the Cartesian, in the Lockian, in the Leibnitzian, in the Kantian philosophies? ‘These are the sys- tems which have obtained a more general authority than any others, and yet in none of these is the supremacy of consciousness denied ; in all of them it is either expressly or implicitly recognized. Dr. Brown’s assertion is so far true in relation to this country, that by Hutcheson, Reid, and Stewart,—to say nothing of inferior names, — consciousness has been considered as nothing higher than a special faculty. As I regard this opinion to be erroneous, and as the error is one affecting the very cardinal point of philosophy, — as it stands opposed to the peculiar and most important principles of the philosophy of Reid and Stewart themselves, and has even contributed to throw around their doctrine of perception an ob- scurity that has caused Dr. Brown absolutely to mistake it for its converse, and as I have never met with any competent refutation of the grounds on which it rests, —I shall endeavor to show you that, notwithstanding the high authority of its supporters, this opinion is altogether untenable. As I previously stated to you, neither Dr. Reid nor Mr. Stewart has given us any regular account of conscious- ness; their doctrine on this subject is to be found scattered in different parts of their works. The two following brief passages of Reid contain the principal posi- tions of that doctrine. The first is from the first chapter of the first Essay On the Intellectual Powers :* ‘ Consciousness is a word used by philosophers to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all . Error of Dr. Brown. Reid and Stewart on consciousness. 1 Philosophy of the Human Mind, lecture xi. vol. i. p. 225, 2d edit. — Ep, 2 Works, p. 222. Lecr. XII. METAPHYSICS. 145 the present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe that consciousness is only of things present. To apply consciousness to things past, which sometimes is done in popular discourse, is to con- found consciousness with memory; and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided in philosophical discourse. It is likewise to be observed, that consciousness is only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to say, I am conscious of the table which is before me. I perceive it, I see it; but do not say I am conscious of it. As that consciousness by which we have a knowledge of the operations of our own minds, is a different power from that by which we perceive external objects, and as these dif- ferent powers have different names in our language, and, I believe, in all languages, a philosopher ought carefully to preserve this dis- tinction, and never to confound things so different in their nature.” The second is from the fifth chapter of the sixth Essay On the In- tellectual Powers.’ “Consciousness is an operation of the under- standing of its own kind, and cannot be logically defined. The ob- jects of it are our present pains, our pleasures, our hopes, our fears, our desires, our doubts, our thoughts of every kind; in a word, all the passions and all the actions and operations of our own minds, while they are present. We may remember them when they are past; but we are conscious of them only while they are present.” Besides what is thus said in general of consciousness, in his treat- ment of the different special faculties, Reid contrasts consciousness with each. Thus in his essays on Perception, on Conception or Imagination, and on Memory, he specially contradistinguishes con- sciousness from each of these operations ;? and it is also incident- ally by Reid,* but more articulately by Rigi arts * discriminated from Attention and Reflection. According to the doctrine of these philosophers, consciousness is thus a special faculty, codrdinate with the other ee ee intellectual powers, having like them a par- id Welaahd stavart: ticular operation and a peculiar object. And what is the peculiar object which is proposed to consciousness? The peculiar objects of consciousness, says Dr. Reid, are all the present passions and operations of our minds, Consciousness thus has for its objects, among the other modifica- 1 Works, p. 442. 3 See Works, p 239. Compare pp. 240, 258, 847, 419-20, 443. — Ep. 2 See Intellectual Powers, Essay ii. Works, p. 4 Coll. Works, vol. ii. p. 184, and pp. 122, 128. 297, and Essay i. Works, p. 222; Essay iii. —Ep. Works, pp. 340, 851; Essay iv. Works, p. 368. 5 See the same argument in the Author’s ee ie Discussions, p. 47. — Ep. 19 - @ cognitive act, with- 146 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XII. tions of the mind, the acts of our cognitive faculties. Now here a doubt arises. If consciousness has for its object the cognitive opera- tions, it must know these operations, and, as it knows these opera- tions, it must know their objects: consequently, consciousness is either not a special faculty, but a faculty comprehending every cog- nitive act; or it must be held that there is a double knowledge of every object, — first, the knowledge of that object by its particular faculty, and second, a knowledge of it by consciousness as taking cognizance of every mental operation. But the former of these alternatives is a surrender of consciousness as a codrdinate and spe- cial faculty, and the latter is a supposition not only unphilosophical but absurd. Now, you will attend to the mode in which Reid escapes, or endeavors to escape, from this dilemma. This he does by assigning to consciousness, as its object, the various intellectual operations to the exclusion of their several objects. “I am con- scious,” he says, “of perception, but not of the object I perceive ; I am conscious of memory, but not of the object I remember.” By this limitation, if tenable, he certainly escapes the dilemma, for he would thus disprove the truth of the principle on which it proceeds —viz., that to be conscious of the operation of a faculty, is, in fact, to be conscious of the object of that operation. Reid's Hmitation of The whole question, therefore, turns upon the the sphere of consci- . 4 eins bs sige ie ee he aie proof or disproof of this principle,— for if it can be shown that the knowledge of an opera- tion necessarily involves the knowledge of its object, it follows that it is impossible to make consciousness conversant about the in- tellectual operations to the exclusion of their objects. And that this principle must be admitted, is what, I hope, it will require but little argument to demonstrate. Some things can be conceived by the mind each separate and alone; others only in connection with Noconsciousness of gomething else. The former are said to be out'a conseiduaness ce Ueungs ‘absolute;* the latter, to be things rela- Himopiect tive. Socrates, and Xanthippe, may be given as examples of the former; husband and wife, of the latter. Socrates, and Xanthippe, can each be represented to the mind without the other; and if they are associated in thought, it is only by an accidental connection. Husband and wife, on the contrary, cannot be conceived apart. As relative and correlative, the conception of husband involves the concep- tion of wife, and the conception of wife involves the conception of husband. Each is thought only in and through the other, and it is impossible to think of Socrates as the husband of Xan- Lect. XII. METAPHYSICS. 147 thippe, without thinking of Xanthippe as the wife of Socrates. We cannot, therefore, know what a husband is without also . knowing what is a wife, as, on the other hand, we. cannot know what a wife is without also knowing what is a husband. You will, therefore, understand from this example the meaning of the logical axiom, that the knowledge of relatives is one,—or that the knowledge of relatives is the same. This being premised, it is evident that if our intellectual oper- ations exist only in relation, it must be impossible that consci- ousness can take cognizance of one term of this relation without also taking cognizance of the other. Knowledge, in general, is a relation between a subject knowing and an object known, and each operation of our cognitive faculties only exists by relation to a par- ticular object, —this object at once calling it into existence, and specifying the quality of its existence. It is, therefore, palpably impossible that we can be conscious of an act without being con- scious of the object to which that act is relative. This, however, is what Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart maintain. They maintain that I can know that I know, without knowing what I know, — or that I can know the knowledge without knowing what the knowl- edge is about; for example, that I am conscious of perceiving a book without being conscious of the book perceived, — that I am conscious of remembering its contents without being conscious of these contents remembered, —and so forth. The unsoundness of this opinion must, however, be articulately shown by taking the different faculties in de- tail, which they have contradistinguished from consciousness, and by showing, in regard to each, that it is altogether impossible to propose the operation of that faculty to the consideration of consciousness, and to withhold from consciousness its object. I shall commence with the faculty of Imagination, to which Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart have chosen, under various limitations, to give the name of Concep- tion.’ This faculty is peculiarly suited to evince the error of hold- ing that consciousness is cognizant of acts, but not of the objects of these acts. “Conceiving, Imagining, and Apprehending,” says Dr. Reid, “are commonly used as synonymous in our language, and signify the same thing which the logicians call Simple Apprehension. This is an operation of the mind different from all those we have men- Shown in detail with , respect to the different cognitive faculties. Imagination. 1 Reid, Intellectual Powers, Essay iv. ch.1; Works, p. 860, Stewart, Elements, vol. i. ch. 8; Works, vol. ii. p. 145. — Ep. 148 | METAPHYSICS. Lect. XII. tioned [Perception, Memory, etc.] Whatever we perceive, what- ever we remember, whatever we are conscious of, we have a full persuasion or-conviction of its existence. What never had an existence cannot be remembered; what has no existence at pre- sent cannot be the object of perception or of consciousness; but — what never had, nor has any existence, may be conceived. Every man knows that it is as easy to conceive a winged horse or a cen- taur, as it is to conceive a horse or a man. Let it be observed, therefore, that to conceive, to imagine, to apprehend, when taken in the proper sense, signify an act of the mind which implies no be- lief or judgment at all. It is an act of the mind by which nothing is affirmed or denied, and which therefore can neither be true nor false.”* .And again: “Consciousness is employed solely about objects that do exist, or have existed. But conception is often employed about objects that neither do, nor did, nor will, exist. This is the very nature of this faculty, that its object, though distinctly conceived, may have no existence. Such an object we call a creature of imagination, but this creature never was created. “That we may not impose upon ourselves in this matter, we must distinguish between that act or operation of the mind, which we call conceiving an object, and the object which we conceive. When we conceive anything, there is a real act or oper- ation of the mind; of this we are conscious, and can have no doubt of its existence. But every such act must have an object; for he that conceives must conceive something. Suppose he conceives a centaur, he may have a distinct conception of this object, though no centaur ever existed.”? And again: “I conceive a centaur. This conception is an operation of the mind of which I am conscious, and to which I can attend. The sole object of it is a centaur, an animal which, I believe, never existed.” 3 Now, here it is admitted by Reid, that imagination has an object, and, in the example adduced, that this object has no existence out of the mind. The object of imagination is, therefore, in the mind, —is a modification of the mind. Now, can it be maintained that there can be a modification of mind, —a modification of which Wwe are aware, but of which we are not conscious? But let us regard the matter in another aspect. We are conscious, says Dr. Reid, of the imagination of a centaur, but not of the centaur imagined. Now, nothing can be more evident than that the ob- ject and the act of imagination, are identical. Thus, in the ex- ample alleged, the centaur imagined and the act of imagining it, 1 Works, p. 228. 2 Works, p. 886. 8 Works, p. 378. Lecr. XIL METAPHYSICS. ° 149 are one and indivisible. What is the act of imagining a centaur but the centaur imaged, or the image of the centaur; what is the image of the centaur but the act of imagining it? The cen- taur is both the object and the act of imagination: it is the same . thing viewed in different relations. It is called the object of imagi- nation, when considered as representing a possible existence, — for everything that can be construed to the mind, everything that does not violate the laws of thought, in other words, everything that does not involve a contradiction, may be conceived by the mind as possible. I say, therefore, that the centaur is called the object of imagination, when considered as representing a possible existence ; whereas the centaur is called the act of imagination, when con- sidered as the creation, work, or operation, of the mind itself. The centaur imagined and the imagination of the centaur, are thus as much the same indivisible modification of mind as a square is the same figure, whether we consider it as composed of four sides, or as composed of four angles, —or as paternity is the same relation whether we look from the son to the father, or from the father to the son. We cannot, therefore, be conscious of imagining an object without being conscious of the object imagined, and as regards imagination, Reid’s limitation of consciousness is, therefore, futile. I proceed next to Memory : — « It is by Memory,” says Dr. Reid, “that we have an immediate knowledge of things past. The senses give us information of things only as’they exist in the present moment ; and this infor- mation, if it were not preserved by memory, would vanish instantly, and leave us as ignorant at if it had never been. Memory must have an object. Every man who remembers must remember some- thing, and that which he remembers is called the object of his remembrance. In this, memory agrees with perception, but differs from sensation, which has no object but the feeling itself. Every man can distinguish the thing remembered from the remembrance of it. We may remember anything which we have seen, or heard, or known, or done, or suffered; but the remembrance of it is a par- ticular act of the mind which now exists, and of which we are con- scious. To confound these two is an absurdity which a thinking man could not be led into, but by some false hypothesis which hinders him from reflecting upon the thing which he would explain by it.”? “The object of memory, or thing remembered, must be something that is past; as the object of perception and of consci- ousness, must be something which is present. What now is, cannot be an object of memory; neither can that which is past and gone Memory. 1 Works, p. 889. 150 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XII. be an object of perception, or of consciousness.”* 'To these pas- sages, which are taken from the first chapter of the third Essay On the Intellectual Powers, I must add another from the sixth chapter of the same Essay,—the chapter in which he criticises Locke’s doctrine in regard to our Personal Identity. “ Leaving,” he says, “the consequences of this doctrine to those who have leisure to trace them, we may observe, with regard to the doctrine itself, first, that Mr. Locke attributes to consciousness the conviction we have — of our past actions, as if a man may now be conscious of what he did twenty years ago. It is impossible to understand the mean- ing of this, unless by consciousness be meant memory, the only fac- ulty by which we have an immediate knowledge of our past actions. Sometimes, in popular discourse, a man says he is conscious that he did such a thing, meaning that he distinctly remembers that he did it. It is unnecessary, in common discourse, to fix accurately the limits between consciousness and memory. This was formerly shown to be. the case with regard to sense and memory. And, therefore, distinct remembrance is sometimes called sense, some- times consciousness, without any inconvenience. But this ought to be avoided in philosophy, otherwise we confound the different powers of the mind, and ascribe to one what really belongs to another. If a man be conscious of what he did twenty years or twenty minutes ago, there is no use for memory, nor ought we to allow that there is any such faculty. The faculties of conscious- ness and memory are chiefly distinguished by this, that the first is | an immediate knowledge of the present, the second an immediate knowledge of the past.” ? From these quotations it appears that Reid distinguishes memory from consciousness in this, —that memory is an immediate knowl- edge of the past, consciousness an immediate knowledge of the present. We may, therefore, be conscious of the act of memory as present, but of the object of memory as past, consciousness is im- possible. Now, if memory and consciousness be, as Reid asserts, the one an immediate knowledge of the past, the other an immediate knowledge of the present, it is evident that memory is a faculty whose object lies beyond the sphere of consciousness ; and, conse- quently, that consciousness cannot be regarded as the general con- dition of every intellectual act. We have only, therefore, to exam- ine whether this attribution of repugnant qualities to consciousness and memory be correct, — whether there be not assigned to one or other a function which does not really belong to it. Now, in regard to what Dr. Reid says of consciousness, I admit 1 Works, p. 340. 2Works, p. 351. Lect. XII. METAPHYSICS. 151 that no exception can be taken. Consciousness is an immediate knowledge of the present. We have, indeed, already shown that consciousness is an immediate knowledge, and, therefore, only of the actual or now-existent. This being admitted, and professing, as we do, to prove that consciousness is the one generic faculty of knowl- edge, we, consequently, must maintain that all knowledge is imme- diate, and only of the actual or present, —in other words, that what is called mediate knowledge, knowledge of the past, knowledge of the absent, knowledge of the non-actual or possible, is either no knowledge at all, or only a knowledge contained in, and evolved out of, an immediate knowledge of what is now existent and actually present to the mind. This, at first sight, may appear like paradox; I trust you will soon admit that the counter doctrine is self-repug- nant. I proceed, therefore, to show that Dr. Reid’s assertion of memory being an immediate knowledge of the past, is Memory not an im- —_ not, only false, but that it involves a contradic- mediate knowledge of : s he past: tion in terms.’ Let us first determine what immediate knowl- edge is, and then see whether the knowledge we have of the past, through memory, can come under the conditions of immediate knowledge. Now nothing can be more evident than the following positions: 1°, An object to be known immediately must be known in itself, — that is, in those modifications, qualities, or phenomena, through which it manifests its existence, and not in those of something different from itself; for, if we suppose it known not in itself, but in some other thing, then this other thing is what is immediately known, and the object known through it is only an object mediately known. But 2°, If a thing can be immediately known only if known in itself, it is manifest that it can only be known in itself, if it be itself actuaily in existence, and actually in immediate relation to our faculties of knowledge. Such are the necessary conditions of immediate knowledge; and they disprove at once Dr. Reid’s assertion, that memory is an imme- diate knowledge of the past. An immediate knowledge is only con- ceivable of the now existent, as the now existent alone can be known in itself. But the past is only past, inasmuch as it is not now existent ; and as it is not now existent, it cannot be known in itself The immediate knowledge of the past is, therefore, impossible. We have, hitherto, been considering the conditions of immediate Conditions of imme- diate knowledge. 1 Compare Discussions, p. 50. — Ep. 152 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XII. knowledge in relation to the object; let us now consider them in relation to the cognitive act. Every act,and consequently every act of knowledge, exists only as it now exists; and as it exists only in the now, it can be cognizant only of a now-existent object. Mem- ory is an act, —an act of knowledge; it can, therefore, be cognizant only of anow-existent object. But the object known in memory is, ex hypothesi, past; consequently, we are reduced Application of these to the dilemma, either of refusing a past object conditions to the A Lyte: Sonic ee be known in memory at all, or of admitting in Memory. it to be only mediately known, in and through a present object. That the latter alternative is the true, it will require a very few explanatory words to convince you. What are the contents of an act of memory? An act of memory is merely a present state of mind, which we are conscious of, not as absolute, but as relative to, and representing, another state of mind, and accompanied with the belief that the state of mind, as now represented, has actually been. J remember an event I saw, —the landing of George IV. at Leith. This remembrance is only a consciousness of certain imaginations, involving the conviction that these imaginations now represent ideally what I formerly really experienced. All that is immediately known in the act of memory, is the present mental modification ; that is, the representation and concomitant belief. Beyond this mental modification, we know nothing; and this mental modification is not only known to con- sciousness, but only exists in and by consciousness. Of any past object, real or ideal, the mind knows and can know nothing, for ea hypothesi, no such object now exists; or if it be said to know such an object, it can only be said to know it mediately, as represented in the present mental modification. Properly speaking, however, we know only the actual and present, and all real knowledge is an im- mediate knowledge. What is said to be mediately known, is, in truth, not known to be, but only believed to be; for its existence is only an inference resting on the belief, that the mental modification truly represents what is in itself beyond the sphere of knowledge. What is immediately known must be; for what is immediately known is supposed to be known as existing. The denial of the existence, and of the existence within the sphere of consciousness, involves, therefore, a denial of the immediate knowledge of an object. We may, accordingly, doubt the reality of any object of mediate knowledge, without denying the reality of the immediate knowledge on which the mediate knowledge rests. In memory, for instance, | we cannot deny the existence of the present representation and belief, for their existence is the consciousness of their existence itself. METAPHYSICS. 153 Lect. XII. To doubt their existence, therefore, is for us to doubt the existence of our consciousness. But as this doubt itself exists only through consciousness, it would, consequently, annihilate itself. But, though in memory we must admit the reality of the representation and belief, as facts of consciousness, we may doubt, we may deny, that the representation and belief are true. We may assert that they represent what never was, and that all beyond their present mental existence is a delusion. This, however, could not be the case if our knowledge of the past were immediate. So far, therefore, is mem- ory from being an immediate knowledge of the past, that it 1s at best only a mediate knowledge of the past; while, in philosophical pro- priety, it is not a knowledge of the past at all, but a knowedge of the present and a belief of the past. But in whatever terms we may choose to designate the contents of memory, it is manifest that these contents are all within the sphere of consciousness.’ 1 What I have said in regard to Dr. Reid’s doctrine of memory as an immediate know]- edge of the past, applies equally to his doc- trine of conception or imagination, as an im- mediate knowledge of the distant,—a case which I deferred noticing, when I considered his contradistinction of that faculty from consciousness. ‘‘I can conceive,” he says, ‘Can individual object that really exists, such as St. Paul’s Church in London. I have an idea of it; that is, I conceive it. The imme- diate object of this conception is four hun- dred miles distant; and I have no reason to think that it acts upon me, or that I act upon it; but I can think of it notwithstanding.” This requires no comment. I shall, subse- quently, have occasion to show how Reid confused himself about the term object, — this being part and parcel of his grand error in confounding representative or mediate, and intuitive or immediate knowledge. 20 LECTURE XIII. CONSCIOUSNESS, —ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS: RELATION TO COGNITIVE FACULTIES IN GENERAL. WE now proceed to consider the third faculty which Dr. Reid specially contradistinguishes from Consciousness, Our consciousness —I mean Perception, or that faculty through coextensive with our which we obtain a knowledge of the external pa te world. Now, you will observe that Reid main- eid contradistin- guishes consciousness tains against the immense majority of all, and from perception. ~the entire multitude of modern philosophers, that we have a direct and immediate knowledge of the external world. He thus vindicates to mind not only an im- mediate knowledge of its own modifications, but also an immediate knowledge of what is essentially different from mind or self, — the modifications of matter. He did not, however, allow that these were known by any common faculty, but held that the qualities of mind were exclusively made known to us by Consciousness, the qualities of matter exclusively made known to us by Perception. Consciousness was, thus, the faculty of immediate knowledge urely objective. The Ego was choi iy oat aaa by another. “ Consciousness,” says Dr. Reid, “ig only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to say, I am con- scious of the table which is before me. I perceive it, I see it, but do not say I am conscious of it. As that consciousness by which we have a knowledge of the operations of our own minds, is a dif- ferent power from that by which we perceive external objects, and as these different powers have different names in our language, and, I believe, in all languages, a philosopher ought carefully to preserve this distinction, and never to confound things so different in , their nature.”! And in another place he observes : — “ Conscious- ness always goes along with perception; but they are different operations of the mind, and they have their different objects. 1 Intellectual Powers, Essay i., chap. i. Coll. Works, p. 228. Lect. XIII. METAPHYSICS. 155 Consciousness is not perception, nor is the object of consciousness the object of perception.” * Dr. Reid has many merits as a speculator, but the only merit which he arrogates to himself,—the principal merit accorded to him by others,—is, that he was the first philosopher, in more recent times, who dared, in his doctrine of immediate perception, to vindicate, against the unanimous authority of philosophers, the universal conviction of mankind. But this doctrine he has at best imperfectly developed, and, at the same time, has unfortunately obscured it, by errors of so singular a character, that some acute philosophers—for Dr. Brown does not stand alone —have never even suspected what his doctrine of perception actually is. One of these errors is the contradistinction of perception from con- sciousness. I may here notice, by anticipation, that philosophers, at least modern philosophers, before Reid, allowed to Modern philosophers the mind no immediate knowledge of the ex- before Reid held a ternal reality. They conceded to it only a rep- _ doctrine of represent = resentative or mediate knowledge of external ative perception, In x one or other of two things. Of these some, however, held that the forms. representative object —the object immediately known — was different from the mind knowing, as it was also different from the reality it represented ; while others, on a simpler hypothesis, maintained that there was no intermediate entity, no tertiwm quid, between the reality and the mind, but that the immediate or representative object was itself a mental modifi- cation.2 The latter thus granting to mind no immediate knowledge of aught beyond its own free ioaton could, consequently, only recognize a consciousness of self. The former, on the contrary, could, as they actually did, accord to consciousness a cognizance of not-self. Now, Reid, after asserting against the Reid exempts the philosophers the immediacy of our knowledge object of perception of external things, would almost appear to have from the sphere of : 4 acudhi ul eat been startled by his own boldness, and, instead of carrying his principle fairly to its issue, by according to consciousness on his doctrine that knowledge of the external world as existing, which, in the doctrine of the philoso- phers, it obtained of the external world as represented, he incon- sistently stopped short, split immediate knowledge into two parts, Principal merit ac- corded to Reid as a philosopher. 1 Ibid., Essay ii., chap. iii. Coll. Works, p. ries of knowledge and perception, see the Au- 297. thor’s supplementary dissertations to Reid’s 2 Fora full discussion of the various theo- Works, Notes B and C.—~ Ep. 156 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XIII. and bestowed the knowledge of material qualiti ion alone, allowing that of mental modifications to remain exclusively with. consciousness.. Be this, however, as it may, the exemption of the objects of perception from the sphere of consciousness, can be easily shown to be self-contradictory. What! say the partisans of Dr. Reid, are we not to distinguish, as the product of different faculties, the knowledge we obtain of objects in themselves the most opposite? Mind and matter are mutually separated by the whole diameter of being. Mind and matter are, in fact, nothing but words to express two series of pha- nomena known less in themselves, than in contradistinection from each other. The difference of the phenomena to be known, surely legitimates a difference of faculty to know them. In answer to this, we admit at once, that—were the question merely whether we should not distinguish, under consciousness, two special faculties, — whether we should not study apart, and bestow distinctive appella- tions on consciousness considered as more particularly cognizant of the external world, and on consciousness considered as more partic- ularly cognizant of the internal — this would be highly proper and expedient. But this is not the question. Dr. Reid distinguishes . consciousness as a special faculty from perception as a special fac- ulty, and he allows to the former the cognizance of the latter in its operation, to the exclusion of its object. He maintains that we are conscious of our perception of a rose, but not of the rose perceived. That we know the ego by one act of knowledge, the non-ego by: another. This doctrine I hold to be erroneous, and it is this doctrine I now proceed to refute. } . In the first place, it is not only a logical axiom, but a self-evident truth, that the knowledge of opposites is one. That in this Reid Thus, we cannot know what is tall without Bp orrong shown, 17, knowing what is short, —we know what is vir- From the principle, E . that the knowledge tue only as we know what is vice, — the science of opposites is one. of health is but another name for the science of disease. Nor do we know the opposites, the I and Thou, the ego and non-ego, the subject and object, mind and matter, by a different law. The act which affirms that this particu- lar phenomenon is a modification of Me, virtually affirms that the phenomenon is not a modification of anything different from Me, and, consequently, implies a common cognizance of self and not- self’; the act which affirms that this other phenomenon is a modifi- cation of something different from Me, virtually affirms that the phenomenon is not a modification of Me, and, consequently, im- plies a common cognizance of not-self and self. But unless we are Lect. XIII. METAPHYSICS. 157 \ prepared to maintain that the faculty cognizant of self and not-self is different from the faculty cognizant of not-self and self, we must allow that the ego and non-ego are known and discriminated in the same indivisible act of knowledge. What, then, is the faculty of which this act of knowledge is the energy? It cannot be Reid’s consciousness, for that is cognizant only of the ego or mind,— it cannot be Reid’s perception, for that is cognizant only of the non- ego or matter. But as the act cannot be denied, so the faculty must be admitted. It is not, however, to be found in Reid’s cata- logue. But though not recognized by Reid in his system, its neces- sity may, even on his hypothesis, be proved. For if with him we allow only a special faculty immediately cognizant of the ego, and a special faculty immediately cognizant of the non-ego, we are at once met with the question, By what faculty are the ego and non- ego discriminated? We cannot say by consciousness, for that knows nothing but mind,—we cannot say by perception, for that knows nothing but matter. But as mind and matter are never known apart and by themselves, but always in mutual correlation and contrast, this knowledge of them in connection must be the function of some faculty, not like Reid’s consciousness and percep- tion, severally limited to mind and to matter as exclusive objects, but cognizant of them as the ego and non-ego, —as the two terms of arelation. It is thus shown that an act and a faculty must, per- force, on Reid’s own hypothesis, be admitted, in which these two terms shall be comprehended together in the unity of knowledge, —1in short, a higher consciousness, embracing Reid’s consciousness and perception, and in which the two acts, severally cognitive of mind and of matter, shall be comprehended, and reduced to unity and correlation. But what is this but to admit at last, in an unphi- losophical complexity, the common consciousness of subject and object, of mind and matter, which we set out with denying in its philosophical simplicity ? But, in the second place, the attempt of Reid to make conscious- ness conversant about the various cognitive fac- 2°, Reid’s limitation ulties to the exclusion of their objects, is equally of consciousnessissui- impossible in regard to Perception, as we have Senaemate shown it to’ bein relatian to Umeoimationsand an immediate knowl- 5 edge of the external Memory; nay, the attempt, in the case of pers world. ception, would, if allowed, be even suicidal of his great doctrine of our immediate knowledge of the external world. Reid’s assertion, that we are conscious of the act of perception, but not of the object perceived, mvolves, first of all, a general 158 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XIII. absurdity. For it virtually asserts that we can know what we are : not conscious of knowing. An act of percep- tion is an act of knowledge; that we perceive, that we know. Now, if in perception there be an external reality known, but of which ex- ternal reality we are, on Reid’s hypothesis, not conscious, then is there an object known, of which we are not conscious. But as we know only inasmuch as we know that we know, —in other words, inasmuch ag we are conscious that we know,—we cannot know an object without being conscious of that object as known; conse- quently, we cannot perceive an object without being conscious of that object as perceived. But, again, how is it possible that we can be conscious of an operation of perception, unless consciousness be coéxtensive with that act; and how can it be coéxtensive with the act, and not also convers- ant with its object? An act of knowledge is only possible in relation to an object,—and it is an act of one kind or another only by special relation to a particular object. Thus the object at once determines the existence, and specifies the character of the existence, of the intellectual energy. An act of knowledge existing and being what it is only by relation to its object, it is manifest that the act can be known only through the object to which it is correlative; and Reid’s supposition that an operation can be known in consciousness to the exclusion of its object, is impossible. For example, I see the inkstand. How can I be conscious that my present modification exists, — that it is a perception, and not another mental state, —that it is a perception of sight to the exclusion of every other sense, — and, finally, that it is a perception of the inkstand and of the inkstand only, — unless my consciousness comprehend within its sphere the object, which at once determines the existence of the act, qualifies its kind, and distinguishes its individuality? Annihilate the inkstand, you anni- hilate the perception; annihilate the consciousness of the object, you annihilate the consciousness of the operation. It undoubtedly sounds strange to say, I am conscious of the inkstand, instead of saying, I am conscious of Whence theapparent the perception of the inkstand. This I admit, er ey, of theex- —_ but the admission can avail nothing to Dr. Reid, pression, ‘* Conscious- A : : ness of the object in for the apparent incongruity of the expression perception.” arises only from the prevalence of that doctrine. of perception in the schools of philosophy, which it is his principal merit to have so vigorously assailed. So long It first of all in- volves a general ab- surdity. And secondly, it de- stroys the distinction of consciousness itself. Lect. XIII. METAPHYSICS. 159 as it was universally assumed. by the learned, that the mind is cog- nizant of nothing beyond, either, on one theory, its own represent-, ative modifications, or, on another, the species, ideas, or represent- ative entities, different from itself, which it contains, and that all it knows of a material world is only an internal representation which, by the necessity of its nature, it mistakes for an external reality, — the supposition of an immediate knowledge of material phenomena was regarded only as a vulgar, an unphilosophical illusion, and the term consciousness, which was exclusively a learned or technical expression for all immediate knowledge, was, consequently, never employed to express an immediate knowledge of aught beyond the mind itself; and thus, when at length, by Reid’s own refutation of the prevailing doctrine, it becomes necessary to extend the term to the immediate knowledge of external objects, this exten- sion, so discordant with philosophic usage, is, by the force of asso- ciation and custom, felt at first as strange and even contradictory. A slight consideration, however, is sufficient to reconcile us to the expression, in showing, if we hold the doctrine of immediate per- ception, the necessity of not limiting consciousness to our sub- jective states. In fact, if we look beneath the surface, conscious- ness was not, in general, restricted, even in philosophical usage, to the modifications of the conscious self. That great majority of philosophers who held that, in perception, we know nothing of the external reality as existing, but that we are immediately cognizant only of a representative something, different both from the object represented, and from the percipient mind,—these philosophers, one and all, admitted that we are conscious of this tertiwm quid present to, but not a modification of, mind, —for, except Reid and his school, I am aware of no philosophers who denied that con- sciousness was coéxtensive or identical with immediate knowledge. But, in the third place, we have previously reserved a supposition on which we may possibly avoid some of the 3°, A supposition self-contradictions which emerge from Reid’s on which some of the proposing as the object of consciousness the self-contradictions of : : ° Reid’s doctrine may 2¢t, but excluding from its cognizance the ob- be avoided. ject, of perception; that is, the object of its own object. The supposition is, that Dr. Reid com- mitted the same error in regard to perception, which he did in regard to memory and imagination, and that in maintaining our immediate knowledge in perception, he meant nothing more than to maintain, that the mind is not, in that act, cognizant of any repre- sentative object different from its own modification, of any tertiwmn quid ministering between itself and the external reality; but that, 160 “METAPHYSICS. Lies’ Sea, in perception, the mind is determined itself to represent the un- known external reality, and that, on this self-representation, he abusively bestowed the name of immediate knowledge, in contrast to that more complex theory of perception, which holds that there intervenes between the percipient mind and the external existence an intermediate something, different from both, by which the former knows, and by which the latter is represented. On the supposition of this mistake, we may believe him guiltless of the others; and we can certainly, on this ground, more easily conceive how he could accord to consciousness a knowledge only of the percipient act, — meaning by that act the representation of the external reality; and how he could deny to consciousness a knowledge of the object of perception, — meaning by that object the unknown reality itself. This is the only opinion which Dr. Brown and others ever suspect him of maintaining; and a strong case might certainly be made out to prove that this view of his doctrine is correct. But if such were, in truth, Reid’s opinion, then has he accomplished nothing, — his whole philosophy is one mighty blunder. For, as I shall here- after show, idealism finds in this simpler hypothesis of representa- tion even a more secure foundation than on the other; and, in point of fact, on this hypothesis, the most philosophical scheme of idealism that exists, —the Egoistic or Fichtean, is established. Taking, however, the general analogy of Reid’s system, and a great number of unambiguous passages into ac- count, I am satisfied that this view of his doc- trine is erroneous; and I shall endeavor, when we come to treat of mediate and immediate knowledge, to explain how, from his never having formed to himself an adequate concep- tion of these under all their possible forms, and from his historical ignorance of them as actually held by philosophers,—he often appears to speak in contradiction of the vital doctrine which, in equity, he must be held to have steadily maintained. Besides the operations we have already considered, — Imagina- tion or Conception, Memory, and Perception, Reid and Stewart Which Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart have endeay- maintain, that Atten- ored to discriminate from Consciousness, there Mee ph are further to be considered Attention and Re- | nate to, or contained flection, which, in like manner, they have main- in, consciousness. tained to be an act or acts, not subordinate to, or contained in, Consciousness. But, before proceeding to show that their doctrine on this point is almost equally untenable as on the preceding, it is necessary to clear up some confusion, and to notice certain collateral errors. This supposition un- tenable. Lecr. XIII. METAPHYSICS. 161 In the first place, on this head, these philosophers are not at one; for Mr. Stewart seems inadvertently to have j 1 i . . . . . Certain coliateraler- misrepresented the opinion of Dr. Reid in re- rors noticed. Stewart ths 4 misrepresents Reid's gard to the meaning and difference of Atten- doctrine of the mean- _ tion and Reflection. Reid—eitheremploys these ing and aiference of terms as synonymous expressions, or he distin- Attention and Reflec- : : Wabi aime wl L dh gushes them only by making attention relative t S res- ent; reflection to the memory of the past. In the fifth chapter of the second Essay on the Intellectual Powers) he says, “In order, however, to our having a distinct notion of any of the operations of our own minds, it is not enough that we be conscious of them, for all men have this consciousness: it is farther necessary that we attend to them while they are exerted, and reflect upon them with care while they are recent and fresh in our memory. It is neces- sary that, by employing ourselves frequently in this way, we get the habit of this attention and reflection,’ ete. And in the first chapter of the sixth Essay, “Mr. Locke,” he says, “has restricted the word reflection to that which is employed about the operations of our minds, without any authority, as I think, from custom, the arbiter of language: for surely I may reflect upon what I have seen or heard, as well as upon what I have thought. The word, in its proper and common meaning, is equally applicable to objects of sense, and to objects of consciousness. He has likewise confounded reflection with consciousness, and seems not to have been aware that they are different powers, and appear at very different periods of life.”* In the first of these quotations, Reid might use attention in relation to the consciousness of the present, reflection, to the memory of the past; but in the second, in saying that reflection “is equally applicable to objects of sense and to objects of con- sciousness,” he distinctly indicates that the two terms are used by him as convertible. Reid (I may notice by the Reid wrong in his = way) is wholly wrong in his strictures on Locke censure | of Locke's for his restricted usage of the term reflection ; usage of the term Re- vd ? fection: for it was not until after his time that the term came, by Wolf, to be philosophically employed in a more extended signification than that in which Locke correctly applies it.2 Reid is likewise wrong, if we literally understand his 1 Coll. Works, p. 258. liquet quid sit facultas reflectendi, scilicet 2 Ibid., p. 420. quod sit facultas attentionem suam successive 3 [Wolf, Psychologia Empirica, § 257: “At- adeaqueinre percepta insunt, pro arbitrio di- tentionis successiva directio adea que in re rigendi.”] Reid is further criticized in the Au- percepta insunt dicitur Reflexio. Unde simul thor’s edition of his works, pp. 347,420. — Ep, 21 162 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XIII. words, in saying that reflection is employed in common language in relation to objects of sense. It is never em- ployed except upon the mind and its contents. We cannot be said to reflect upon any external object, except in so far as that object has been previously perceived, and its image become part and parcel of our intellectual furniture. We may be said to reflect upon it in memory, but not in perception. But to return. Reid, therefore, you will observe, identifies attention and reflec- tion. Now Mr. Stewart, in the chapter on Attention in the first volume of his Elements} says, “Some important observations on the subject of attention occur in different parts of Dr. Reid’s writ- ings; particularly in his Hssays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 62, and his Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p.78 et seq. is-Ingenious author we are indebted for the remark, that atten- Gh Gaui cesar See properly called observation; and attention to the subjects of our consciousness, ve ection.” i Gates hover paeibe deuce a of Mr. Ba 8 Stewart, and this it is the more requisite to do, as lis authority is worthy of high respect, not only on account of philosophical talent, but of historical accuracy. In various passages of his writings, Mr. Stewart states that Locke seems to have considered the employment of the term reflection, in its psychological acceptation, as original to himself; and he notices it as a curious circumstance that Sir John Davies, Attorney-General to Queen Elizabeth, should, in his poem on the Immortality of the Soul, have employed this term in the same signification. How Mr. Stewart could have fallen into this error, is wholly inconceivable. The word, as employed by Locke, was in common use in every school of philosophy for fifteen hundred years previous to the pub- lication of the Hssay on the Human Understanding. It was a term in the philosophy both of Descartes,’ and of Gassendi;* and it was borrowed by them from the schoolmen, with whom it was And in saying that Reflection is employed in relation to objects of sense. Locke not the first to use the term. Re- flection in its psycho- logical application. 1 Works, vol. ii. pp. 122, 128. 2 This distinction has been attempted by others. [See Keckermann, Opera, tom. i. p- 1612, where he distinguishes reflection, — intel- lectio reflexa, interna, per quam homo intelligit suum intellectum,— from the intellectio externa, qua intellectus alias res extra se positas per- cipit. See also Mazure. Cours de Philosophie, tom, i. p, 331. — Kp.) 3 [Descartes, Epist., P. ii., Ep. iv. (See Gru- - yer, Essais Philosophiques, tom. iy. p. 118.) De la Forge, De Mente Humana, Pref., p. 9.] 4 [Gassendi, Physica, § iii. Memb. Post., lib. ix.c.3. (Opera, Leyden, 1658; vol. ii. p. 451.) “Ad secundam vero operationem presertim spectat ipsa intellectus ad suam operationem attentio, reflexione illa supra actionem pro- priam, qua se intelligere intelligit, cogitatve se agitare.”’) Leer. XIII. METAPHYSICS. 163° a household word! From the schoolmen, indeed, Locke seems to have adopted the fundamental principle of his philosophy, the derivation of our knowledge through the double medium of sense and reflection, —at least, some of them had in terms articulately enounced this principle five centuries previous to the English phi- losopher, and enounced it also in a manner far more correct than was done by him;? for they did not, like Locke, regard reflection itself as a source of knowledge, — thus reducing all our knowledge to experience and its generalization, but viewed in reflection only the channel through which, along with the contingent phenomena of our internal experience, we discover the necessary judgments which are original or native to the mind. There is, likewise, another oversight of Mr. Stewart which I may notice. “Although,” he says, “the connection between attention and memory has been frequently remarked in general terms, I do not recollect that the power of attention has been mentioned by any of the writers on pneumatology in their enumeration of facul- ties of the mind ; nor has it been considered by any one, so far as I know, as of suflicient importance to deserve a particular examina- tion.”* So far is this from being the case that there are many pre- vious authors who have considered attention as a separate faculty, and treated of it even at greater length than Mr. Stewart himself. This is true not only of the celebrated Wolf,* but of the whole Wolfian school; and to these I may add Condillac,* Contzen,* Tie- demann,’ Irwing,* Malebranche’ and many others. But this by the way. . Taking, however, Attention and Reflection for acts of the same faculty, and supposing, with Mr. Stewart, that reflection is properly attention directed to the phenomena of mind; observation, atten- 1 [We have the scholastic brocard pointing to the difficulties of the study of self: ‘ Re- flexiva cogitatio facile fit deflexiva.” See Keckermann, Opera, tom. i. p. 466.] .2 [See Scotus, Super Universalibus Porphyrii, Qu. lii.: ‘Ad tertium dico quod illa propose itio Aristotelis, nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu, vera est de eo quod est primum intelligibile, quod est scilicet quod quid est rei materialis, non autem de omnibus per se intelligibilibus ; quia multa per se intel- liguntur, non quia speciem faciunt in sensu, sed per reflexionem intellectus.” (By the Scotists the act of intellect was regarded as threefold: Rectus, —Collativus,— Reflexus. See Constantius (a Sarnano), Tract. de Secundis Intentionibus ; Scoti Opera, p. 452.) See also Philip Mocenicus, Contemplationes (1581), pas- sim. Goclenius, Lexicon Philosophicum, v. Ree Jlexus. Weckermann, Opera, tom. i. pp. 1600, 1612. Conimbricenses in Arist. de Anima, pp. . 370, 373.] 3 Elements,i.c.2. Collected Works, vol. ii. p. 122.— Ep. 4 Psychologia Empirica, § 2384, et seg. —Ep. 5 Origine des Connoisances Humaines, part. i. § ii. ch. 2.— Ep. 6 Prelectiones Logice et Metaphysice auctore Adamo Contzen; Mechlin, 1830; vol. iii. p. 31. (Originally published in 1775-1780.) — Ep. 7 Handbuch der Pyschologie, p. 121.-- Ep. 8 Exfahrungen und Untersuchungen itber den Menschen yon karl Franz yon Irwing, Berlin, 1777, b. i. p. 411; b. ii. p. 209. — Ep. 9 Dela Recherche de la Verité, lib. iii. ch. 4; lib. vi. ch. 2. Traité de la Morale, ch. 5. — Ep. 164 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XII. tion directed to the phenomena of matter; the main question comes to be considered, Is attention a faculty different from consciousness, as Reid and Stewart maintain? As the latter of these philosophers has not argued the point himself, but merely refers to the arguments of the former in confirmation of their com- mon doctrine, it will be sufficient to adduce the following passage from Reid, in which his doctrine on this head ig contained. “I return,” he says, “to what I mentioned as the main source of information on this subject, — attentive reflection upon the operations of our own minds. 7 “ All the notions we have of mind and its operations, are, by Mr. Locke, called ideas of reflection. A man may have as distinct no- tions of remembrance, of judgment, of will, of desire, as he has of ‘any object whatever. Such notions, as Mr. Locke justly. observes, are got by the power of reflection. But what is this power of reflection? ‘It is, says the same author, ‘that power by which the mind turns its view inward, and observes its own actions and oper- ations.’ He observes elsewhere, ‘That the understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and that it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object.’ “This power of the understanding to make its own operations its object: to attend to them, and examine them on all sides, is the power of reflection, by which alone we can have any distinct notion, of the powers of our own or of other minds. vie “This reflection ought to be distinguished from consciousness, with which it is too often confounded, even by Mr. Locke, All men are conscious of the operations of their own minds, at all times while they are awake; but there are few who reflect upon them, or make them objects of thought.” } ) | 4A Dr. Reid has rightly said that attention is a voluntary act. This remark might have led him to the observation, that attention is not a separate faculty, or a fae- ulty of intelligence at all, but merely an act of will or desire, sub- ordinate to a certain law of intelligence. This law is, that the greater the number of objects to which our consciousness is sim- ultaneously extended, the smaller is the intensity with which it is. able to consider each, and consequently the less vivid and distinct Is Attention a fac- ulty different from consciousness ? Reid quoted in re- ference to this ques- tion. What Attention is. 1 Intellectual Powers, Essay i., chap.v. Coll. Works, p. 289. Leer. XII. METAPHYSICS. 165 will be the information it obtains of the several objects.!_ This law is expressed in the old adage, , “Pluribus intentus minor est ad singula sensus.”’ Such being the law, it follows that, when our interest in any par- ticular object is excited, and when we wish to obtain all the knowl- edge concerning it in our power, it behooves us to limit our consid- eration to that object, to the exclusion of others. This is done by¥ an act of volition or desire, which is called attention. But to view attention as a special act of intelligence, and to distinguish it from consciousness, is utterly inept. Consciousness may be compared to a telescope, attention to the pulling out or in of the tubes in accom- modating the focus to the object; and we might, with equal justice, distinguish in the eye, the adjustment of the pupil from the general organ of vision, as, in the mind, distinguish attention from consci- ousness as separate faculties. Not, however, that they are to be accounted the same. Attention is consciousness, and something more. It is consciousness voluntarily applied, under its law of limitations, to some determinate object; it is consciousness concen- trated. In this respect, attention is an interesting subject of con- sideration; and having now finished what I proposed in proof of the position, that consciousness is not a special faculty of knowl- edge, but coéxtensive with all our cognitions, sah eb sre ot - Shall proceed to consider it in its various Sri a eal : aspects and relations; and having just stated : the law of limitation, I shall go on to what I have to say in regard to attention as a general phenomenon of consciousness. And, here, I have first to consider a question in which I am again sorry to find myself opposed to many distinguished philosophers, and in particular, to one whose opinion on this, as on every other point of psychological observation, is justly entitled to the highest consideration. The philosopher I allude to is Mr. Stewart. The question is, Can we attend to more than a single object at once? For if attention be nothing but the concentration of consciousness on a smaller number of objects than constitute its widest compass of simultaneous knowledge, it is evi- dent that, unless this widest compass of consciousness be limited to only two objects, we do attend when we converge consciousness on any smaller number than that total complement of objects which it can embrace at once. For example, if we suppose that Can we attend to more than a single object at once ? 1 [Cf. Steeb. Uber den Menschen, ii. 673; and Fries, Anthropologie, i. 83.] “ 166 METAPHYSICS. © Lecr. XT the number of objects which consciousness can simultaneously ap- prehend be six, the limitation of consciousness to five, or four, or three, or two, or one, will all be acts of attention, different in de- gree, but absolutely identical in kind. Mr. Stewart’s doctrine is as follows: —“ Before,” he says, “we leave the subject of Attention, it is proper to take notice of a question which has been stated with respect to it; whether we have the. power of attending to more than one thing at one and the same instant; or, in other words, whether we can attend, at one and the same instant, to objects which we can attend to separately ? This question has, if I am not mistaken, been already decjded by several philosophers in the negative; and I acknowledge, for my own part, that although their opinion has not only been called in question by others, but even treated with some degree of con- tempt as altogether hypothetical, it appears to me to be the most reasonable and philosophical that we can form on the subject. “There is, indeed, a great variety of cases in which the mind apparently exerts different acts of attention at once; but from the instances which have already been mentioned, of the astonishing rapidity. of thought, it is obvious that all this may be explained without supposing those acts to be coéxistent; and I may even venture to add, it may all be explained in the most satisfactory manner, without ascribing to our intellectual operations a greater degree of rapidity than that with which we know, from the fact, that they are sometimes carried on. The effect of practice in in- creasing this capacity of apparently attending to different things at once, renders this explanation of the phenomenon in question more probable than any other. “The case of the equilibrist and rope-dancer already ‘mentioned, is particularly favorable to this explanation, as it affords direct evi- dence of the possibility of the mind’s exerting different successive acts in an interval of time so short, as to produce the same sensible effect as if they had been exerted at one and the same moment. In this case, indeed, the rapidity of thought is so remarkable, that if the different acts of the mind were not all necessarily accom- panied with different movements of the eye, there can be no reason for doubting that the philosophers whose doctrine I am now con- troverting, would have asserted that they are all mathematically coéxistent. “Upon a question, however, of this sort, which does not admit _ of a perfectly direct appeal to the fact, I would by no means be un- derstood to decide with confidence; and, therefore, I should wish Stewart quoted in reference to this ques- tion. Lecr. XI. METAPHYSICS. 167 the conclusions I am now to state, to be received as only condition- ally established. They are necessary and obvious consequences of the general principle, ‘that the mind can only attend to one thing at once ;’ but must stand or fall with the truth of that supposition. “Tt is commonly understood, I believe, that in a concert of music, a good ear can attend to the different parts of the music separately, or can attend to them all at once, and feel the full effect of the har- mony. If the doctrine, however, which I have endeavored to establish be admitted, it will follow that in the latter case the mind is constantly varying its attention from the one part of the music to the other, and that its operations are so rapid as to give us no per- ception of an interval of time. i “The same doctrine leads to some curious conclusions with re- spect to vision. Suppose the eye to be fixed in a particular position, and the picture of an object to be painted on the retina. Does the mind perceive the complete figure of the object at once, or is this perception the result of the various perceptions we have of the different points in the outline? With respect to this question, the principles already stated lead me to conclude that the mind does at one and the same time perceive every point in the outline of the object, (provided the whole of it be painted on the retina at the same instant,) for perception, like consciousness, is an involun- tary operation. As no two points, however, of the outline are in the same direction, every point by itself constitutes just as distinct an object of attention to the mind, as if it were separated by an interval of empty space from all the rest. If the doctrine, there- fore, formerly stated be just, it is impossible for the mind to attend to more than one of these points at once; and as the perception of the figure of the object implies a knowledge of the relative situ- ation of the different points with respect to each other, we must conclude that the perception of figure by the eye is the result of a number of different acts of attention. These acts of attention, however, are performed with such rapidity, that the effect, with respect to us, is the same as if the perception were instantaneous. “In farther confirmation of this reasoning, it may be remarked, that if the perception of visible figure were an immediate conse- quence of the picture on the retina, we should have, at the first glance, as distinct an idea of a figure of a thousand sides as of a triangle or a square. The truth is, that when the figure is very simple, the process of the mind is so rapid that the perception seems to be instantaneous; but when the sides are multiplied beyond a certain number, the interval of time necessary for these different acts of attention becomes perceptible. 168 . METAPHYSICS. Lror. XIIl. “It may, perhaps, be asked what I mean by a point in the outline of a figure, and what it is that constitutes this point one object of attention. The answer, I apprehend, is that this point is the mini- mum visibile. If the point be less, we cannot perceive it; if it be greater, it is not all seen in one direction. “If these observations be admitted, it will follow that, without the faculty of memory, we could have had no perception of visible figure.” ? On this point, Dr. Brown not only coincides with Mr. Stewart in regard to the special fact of attention, but asserts in general that the mind cannot exist at the same moment in two different states, that is, in two states in either of which it can exist separately. “If the mind of man,” he says, “and all the changes which take place in it, from the first feeling with which life commenced to the last with which it closes, could be made visible to any other thinking being, a certain series of feelings alone, — that is to say, a certain number of successive states of mind, would be distinguishable in it, form- ing indeed a variety of sensations, and thoughts, and passions, as momentary states of the mind, but all of them existing individu- ally, and successively to each other. To suppose the mind to exist in two different states,‘in the same moment, is a manifest absurdity.” ? I shall consider these statements in detail. Mr. Stewart’s first ulustration of his doctrine is drawn from a con- Criticism of Stew- cert of music, in which, he says, “a good ear ares, Hoctuing. Hie 1+. psy sittenditoathe different parts of the music first illustration from the phenomena of Separately, or can attend to them all at once, sound. | and feel the full effect of the harmony.” This example, however, appears to me to amount to a reduction of his opinion to the impossible. What are the facts in this example? In a musical concert, we have a multitude of different instruments and voices. emitting at once an infinity of different sounds. These all reach the ear at the same indivisible moment in which they perish, and, consequently, if heard at. all, much more if their mutual relation or harmony be perceived, they must be all heard simultaneously. This is evident. For if the mind can attend to each minimum of sound only successively, it, consequently, requires a minimum of time in which it is exclusively occupied with each minimum of: sound. Now, in this minimum of Brown coincides with Stewart. 1 Elements, vol. i. chap. 2. Works, vol. ii. p. 2 Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human 140 — 148. Mind, Lect. xi. p. 67, (ed. 1830). — Ep. Lect. XIII. METAPHYSICS. 169 time, there coéxist with it, and with it perish, many minima of sound which, ea hypothesi, are not perceived, are not heard, as not attended to. In a concert, therefore, on this doctrine, a small num- ber of sounds only could be perceived, and above this petty maxi- mum, all sounds would be to the ear as zero. But what is the fact? No concert, however numerous its instruments, has yet been found to have reached, far less to have surpassed, the capacity of mind and its organ. But it is even more impossible, on this hypothesis, to understand how we can perceive the relation of different Impossible, on Stew- _ sounds, that is, have any feeling of the harmony artis doctrine, to un- ~~ of a concert. In this respect, it is, indeed, fvlo derstand how we can : : d perceive the relation @¢ sé. It is maintained that we cannot attend of different sounds. at once to two sounds, we cannot perceive them as coéxistent, — consequently, the feeling of har- mony of which we are conscious, must proceed from the feeling of the relation of these sounds as successively perceived in different points of time. We must, therefore, compare the past sound, as retained in memory, with the present, as actually perceived. But this is impossible on the hypothesis itself. Eoriwwe must, in this case, attend to the past sound in memory, and to the present sound in sense at once, or they will not be perceived in mutual relation as harmonic. But one sound in memory and another sound in sense, are as much two different objects as two different sounds in sense. Therefore, one of two conclusions is inevitable,—either we can attend to two different objects at once, and the hypothesis is dis- proved, or we cannot, and all knowledge of relation and harmony is impossible, which is absurd. The consequences of this doctrine are equally startling, as taken from Mr. Stewart’s second illustration from the phenomena of vision. He holds that the per- ception of figure by the eye is the result of a number of separate acts of attention, and that each act of attention has for its object a point the least that can be seen, the minimum visibile. On this hypothesis, we must suppose that, at every instantaneous opening of the eyelids, the moment sufficient for us to take in the figure of the objects comprehended in the sphere of vision, is subdivided into almost infinitesimal parts, in each of which a separate act of attention is performed. This is, of itself, sufficiently inconceivable. But this being admitted, no difficulty is removed. The separate acts must be laid up in memory, in imagination. But how are they there to form a single whole, J 22 His second illustra- tion from the phex- nomena of vision. 170 METAPHYSICS. Leor. XIIL unless we can, in imagination, attend to all the minima visibilia together, which in perception we could only attend to severally? On this subject I shall, however, have a more appropriate occasion of speaking, when I consider Mr. Stewart’s doctrine of the relation of color to extension, LECTURE XIV. CONSCIOUSNESS,—ATTENTION IN GENERAL, In the former part of our last Lecture, I concluded the argu- ment against Reid’s analysis of Consciousness into a special faculty, and showed you that, even in relation to Perception, (the faculty by which we obtain a knowledge of the material universe,) Consciousness is still the common ground in which every cognitive operation has its root. I then proceeded to prove the same in regard to Attention. After some observations touching the confusion among philosophers, more or less extensive, in the meaning of the term reflection, as a sub- ordinate modification of attention, I endeavored to explain to you what attention properly is, and in what relation it stands to con- sciousness. I stated that attention _is consciousness applied to an act of will | or desire under_a particular law, n so far as attention is an act of the conative faculty, it is not a at all, for the mere will or desire of knowing is not_an_act_of cogni- tion. But the act of the conative faculty is exerted by relation to a certain law of consciousness, or knowledge, or intelligence. This law, which we call the Law of Limitation, is, that the intension of our_knowledge ig in the inverse ratio of its extension, —in other words, that the fewer objects we consider at once, the clearer_and more distinct will be our knowledge of them, Hence the more vividly we will or desire that a certain object should be clearly and distinctly known, the more do we concentrate consciousness through some special faculty upon it. I omitted, I find, to state that I think Reid and Stewart incorrect in asserting that i a ee will. I am far from ett ataiiaig. as Tesh ao dha i that all will is desire; but_still I am persuaded that we Attention possible are frequently determined to an act of atten- without an act of free- Re ee Ce hrs en eT a a act of will. on, _as_to—many other acts, independently our_free_and_ deliberate volition. Nor is it, I conceive, possible to hold that, though immediately determined to 172 ; - METAPHYSIGS. Lect. XIV. an act of attention by desire, it is only by the permission of our will that this is done; consequently, that every act of attention is still under the control of our volition. This I cannot maintain, Let us take an example : —— When occupied with other matters, a person may speak to us, or the clock may strike, without our hay- ing any consciousness of the sound ;? but it is wholly impossible for us to remain in this state of unconsciousness intentionally and with will. We cannot determinately refuse to hear by voluntarily withholding our attention; and we can no more open our eyes, and, by an act of will, avert our mind from all perception of sight, than we can, by an act of will, cease to live. We may close our ears or shut our eyes, as we may commit suicide; but we cannot, with our organs unobstructed, wholly refuse our attention at will. It, therefore, appears to me the more correct doctrine to hold that here is no consciousness without attention, — without concentra- tion, but that attention is of three degrees or kinds. The first, 4 meré Vital and irresistible act; the second, an act determined by desire, which, though invol- untary, may be resisted by our will; the third, an act determined by a deliberate volition, An act of attention, — that is, an act of concentration, — seems thus necessary to every exertion of consciousness, as 4 certain contraction of the pupil is requisite to every exercise of vision. We have formerly noticed, that discrimination is a condition of consciousness ; and a discrimi. nation is only possible by a concentrative act, or act of attention. This, however, which corresponds to the lowest degree, —to the mere vital or automatic act of attention, has been refused the name} and attention, in contradistinction to this mere automatié contrac- tion, given to the two other degrees, of which, however, Reid only recognizes the third. Attention, then, is to consciousness, what the contraction of the pupil is to sight; or to the eye of the mind, PDI: LEB PORt ai the microscope or telescope is to the bod- ily eye. The faculty of attention is not, there- fore, a special faculty, but merely consciousness acting under the law of limitation to ‘which it is subjected. But whatever be its rela- tions to the special faculties, attention doubles al] their efficiency, and affords them a power of which they would otherwise be des- titute. It is, in fact, as we are at present constituted, the primary condition of their activity. Having thus concluded the discussion of the question regarding the relation of consciousness to the other cognitive faculties, I Attention of three degrees or kinds. ance of attention. 1 See Reid, Active Powers, Essay ii. ch. 8. Works, p. 587.—Ep, | Lecr. XTV. METAPHYSICS. 173 praeded to consider various questions, which, as not peculiar to any of the special faculties, fall to be discussed under the head of consciousness, and I com- menced with the curious problem, Whether we can attend to more than a single object at once. Mr. Stewart maintains, though not without hesitation, the nega- tive. I endeavored to show you that his arguments are not con- clusive, and that they even involve suppositions which are so mon- strous as to reduce the thesis he supports ad impossibile. I have now only to say a word in answer to Dr. Brown’s Brown’s doctrine, assertion of the same proposition, though in dif- that the mind cannot = ferent terms. In the passage I adduced in our exist at the same mo- , ment in two different L2St Lecture, he commences by the assertion, states. that the mind cannot exist, at the same mo- ment, in two different states,—that is, in two states in either of which it can exist separately, and concludes with the averment that the contrary supposition is a manifest absurdity. I find the same doctrine maintained by Locke in that valuable, but neglected, treatise entitled An Examination of Pére Malebranche’s Opin- ion of Seeing all Things in God. In the thirty-ninth section he says: “Different sentiments are different modifications of the mind. The mind or the soul that perceives, is one immaterial, indivisible substance. Now, I see the white and black on this paper, I hear one singing in the next room, I feel the warmth of the fire I sit by, and I taste an apple I am eating, and all this at the same time. Now, I ask, take modification for what you please, can the same unextended, indivisible substance have different, nay, inconsistent and opposite, (as these of white and black must be,) modifications at the same time? Or must we suppose distinct parts in an indi- visible substance, one for black, another for white, and another for red ideas, and so of the rest of those infinite sensations which we have in sorts and degrees; all which we can distinctly perceive, and so are distinct ideas, some whereof are opposite as heat and cold, which yet a man may feel at the same time?” Leibnitz has not only given a refutation of Locke’s Hssay, but likewise of his Examination of Malebranche. In reference to the passage I have just quoted Leibnitz says: “Mr. Locke asks, ‘Can the same unextended, indivisible substance, have different, nay, inconsistent and opposite modifications, at the same time?’ I reply, it can. What is incon- sistent in the same object, is not inconsistent in the representation of different objects which we, conceive at the same moment. For Can we attend to more than a single ob- ject at once? This doctrine main- tained by Locke. Opposed by Leib- nitz. 174 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XIV. this there is no necessity that there should be different parts in the soul, as it is not necessary that there should be different parts in the point on which, however, different angles rest.” The same thing had, however, been even better said by Aristotle, whose doctrine I prefer translating to you, as more perspicuous, in the following pas- sage from Joannes Grammaticus, (better known. by the surname Philoponus,) —a Greek philoso- pher, who flourished towards the middle of the sixth century. It is taken from the Prologue to his valuable com- mentary on the De Anima of Aristotle; and, what is curious, the very supposition which on Locke’s doctrine would infer the cor- poreal nature of mind, is alleged, by the Aristotelians and Con- dillac, in proof of its immateriality. “Nothing bodily,” says Aris- totle, “can, at the same time, in the same part, receive contraries, The finger cannot at once be wholly participant of white and of black, nor can it, at once and in the same place, be both hot and cold. But the sense at the same moment apprehends contraries. Wherefore, it knows that this is first, and that second, and that it discriminates the black from the white. In what manner, there- fore, does sight simultaneously perceive contraries? Does it do so by the same? or does it by one part apprehend black, by another white? If it does so by the same, it must apprehend these with- out parts, and it is incorporeal. But if by one part it apprehends. this quality, and by another that, — this, he says, is the same as if I perceived this, and you that. But it is necessary that that. which judges should be one and the same, and that it should even apprehend by the same the objects which are judged. Body can- not, at the same moment and by the same part, apply itself to con- traries or, things absolutely different. But sense at once applies itself to black and to white; it, therefore, applies itself indivisibly. It is thus shown to be incorporeal. For if by one part it appre-. hended white, by another part apprehended black, it could not discern the one color from the other; for no one can distinguish that which is perceived by himself as different from that which is _ perceived by another.”? Sv far, Pkiloponus. : Aristotle opposed to foregoing doctrine. His view, as para- phrased by Philopo- nus. 1 Remarques sur le Sentiment du Pére Male- branche ; Opera Philosophica, edit. Erdmann, p. 451. — Ep. 2 The text of Aristotle here partially par- aphrased, (Procem, f. 35 ed. 1535), and more fully in Commentary on texts, 144. 149, is as follows; —*H kal dAov bri 4 oupt obk éort To @rxarov aicdnrhpiov dvdyen yap hy anrduevov abrod xplvew 7d Kpivoy. Otre 5h Kexwpiopevors evdexerar eplvew bre Ere- pov Td yAuKY TOU AcvKOd, GAAX Ser évl Tun &upw djra elvar. Olrw yey yap why ef roo \ > NX ~ s\ \ oy Q = vi, ef Hev eyw Tov d¢€ ob atodoio, djAov by ety Str Erepa GAATAwY? Act 58 7d ev Adyew Ori Ere- pov" erepoy yap Td yAuKY Tob AcvKOD. Aéyet &pa roaiTé: “Nore ds Adyet, obTw kad voet ) ¢g DBR lige) > > Kal aigSdvera. “Ort uty obv odx oldy re ke- Xewpiouevos Kplvew 7% Kexwpiopéva, dSfjAov Lecr. XIV. METAPHYSICS. TS Dr. Brown calls the sensation of sweet one mental state, the sen- sation of cold another; and as the one of these states may exist without the other, they are con- sequently different states. But will it be main- tained that we cannot, at one and the same moment, feel the sensations of sweet and cold, or that sensations forming apart differ- ent states, do, when coéxistent in the same subject, form only a single state ? The doctrine that the mind can attend to, or be conscious of, only a single object at a time, would, in fact, in- volve the conclusion that all comparison and discrimination are impossible; but comparison and discrimination being possible, this possibility disproves the truth of the counter proposition. An act of comparison or discrimination supposes that we are able to comprehend, in one indivisible con- sciousness, the different objects to be compared or discriminated. Were I only conscious of one object at one time, I could never possibly bring them into relation ; each could be apprehended only separately, and for itself. For in the moment in which I am con- scious of the object A, I am, ex hypothesi, unconscious of the object B; and in the moment I am conscious of the object B, I am uncon- scious of the object A. So far, in fact, from consciousness not being competent to the cognizance of two things at once, it is only possible under that cognizance as its condition. For without discrimination there could be no consciousness ; and discrimination necessarily supposes two terms to be discriminated. No judgment could be possible were not the subject and predicate of a proposition thought together by the hind, although expressed in language one after the other. Nay, as Aristotle has observed, a syllogism forms in thought one simultaneous act;* and it is only the necessity of retailing it piecemeal and by succession, in order to accommodate thought to the imperfection of its vehicle, language, that affords the appearance of a consecutive existence. Some languages, as the Sanscrit, the Latin, and the Greek, express the syntactical relations by flexion, and not by mere juxtaposition. Criticism of Brown’s doctrine. On this view com- parison impossible. S71 & 003’ ev nexwpicpevw xpdve, évtevSev, the relative commentary by Philoponus. — “Omoep yap Td add Aéyet St Erepoy, T Gya- ED. Sdv Kal 7d Kaxdv, obrw Kal Ste Sdtepov A€yer 1 This is said by Aristotle of the act of judg- bre Erepov kal Sdrepoy, ov kata guuBeBynKds ment; but the remark applies to that of rea- 7d bre? Adyw 8, olov viv Aéyw Srt Erepov, soning also. See De Anima, iii. 6: “Ey ois od wévror OTL viv Erepov. ’AAN oStwAéyet, 7d Wevdos Kal 7d dAnSés, cbvSeals Tis H5N kat viv, cal bri viv’ Gua pa. “Qore ayxd- vonudtwv domep ty byrwy. . . « + Td “piotov Kad ev axwplatw xpdvw. De Anima, 5¢€ &v moody, TodTO 6 voos Exagrov. —ED. lib. tii. c. 2,6 11. Cf. §§ 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, with 176 METAPHYSICS. ) Lecr. XIV. - Their sentences are thus bound up in one organic whole, the prece- ding parts remaining suspended in the mined till the meaning, like’ an ND spark, is flashed from the conclusion to the commence- ment. This is the reason of the greater rhetorical effect of termin- ating the Latin period by the verb. And to take a more elementary — example, —“How could the sian comprehend these words ~ Horace, ras ‘Bacchum in remotis carmina rupibus Vidi docentem,’ unless it could seize at once those images in which the er are separated from their substantives ? ”} : The modern philosophers who have agitated this question, are not, aware that it was once canvassed likewise in This question can- the gchools of the middle ages. It was there vassed in the schools 4 1 wile P f “iol ; of the middle ages. expressed by the proposition, Possitne intellectus noster plura simul intelligere.* Maintaining the negative, we find St. Thomas, Cajetanus, Ferrariensis, Capri- olus, Herveus, Alexander Alensis, Albertus Magnus, and Durandus; while the affirmative was asserted by Scotus, Occam, Gregorius Ariminensis, Lichetus, Marsilius, Biel, and others. _ Supposing that the mind is not limited to the simultaneous con- sideration of a single object, a question arises, Boy, many, objects |. Faw. many objects can it embrace at once? can the mind embrace at once ? which the attention of the mind is distributed, the feebler and less distinct will be its cognizance of each. ‘Pluribus intentus, minor est ad singula sensus.” Consciousness will thus be at its maximum of intensity when attention is concentrated on a single object ; and the question comes to be, how many several objects can the mind simultaneously survey, not with vivacity, but without absolute confusion? I find — this problem stated and differently answered, by different philoso- phers, and apparently without a knowledge of each other. By Charles Bonnet? the mind is allowed to have a distinct notion of i Cz a 1 [Bonstetten, Kiudes de ? Homme, tom. ii. i. c. 22, p. 184, fol. a (ed. Ald.) Nemesius, De p. 377, note. ] Natura Hominis, c. vii. p, 184—ed. Matthei.] 3 [Essai de Psychologie, ¢. xxxviii. p. 182. 2 [See Aquinas, Summa, pars i., Q. 85, art. Compare his Essai Analytique sur sinh tom. 4. Cf. Alex. Aphrodisiensis, De Anima, lib. i. ¢. xiii. p. 163 et seg:] You will recollect. that I formerly stated that the greater the number of objects among aE N yyy Lect. XIV. - . METAPIYSICS. 177 six objects at once; by Abraham Tucker? the number is limited to four; while Destutt-Tracy’ again amplifies it to six. The opinion of the first and last of these philosophers, appears to me correct. You can easily make the experiment for yourselves, but you must beware of grouping the objects into classes. If you throw a hand- ful of marbles on the floor, you will find it difficult to view at once more than six, or. seven at most, without confusion; but if you group them into twos, or threes, or fives, you can comprehend as many groups as you can units; because the mind considers these groups only as units, —it views them as wholes, and throws their parts out of consideration. You may perform the experiment also by an act of imagination. Before leaving this subject, I shall make some observations on the value of attention, considered in its highest degree as an act of will, and on the importance of forming betimes the habit of delib- erate concentration. . The ame toe capacity of continuous thinking that a man _pos- sesses, the longer and more fstondile: can he fol- ) Value of attention = low out the same train of thought,—the stronger Meek te) .isthia power of attention; and in proportion to est degree as an act ) of will. his power of attention will be the success with which his labor is rewarded. All commence- ment is difficult; and this is more especially true of intellectual effort. When we turn for the first time our view on any given object, a hundred other things still retain possession of our thoughts. Even when we are able, by an arduous exertion, to break loose from the matters which have previously engrossed us, or which every moment force themselves on our consideration,—even when a resolute determination, or the attraction of the new object, has smoothed the way on which we are to travel; still the mind is con- tinually perplexed by the glimmer of intrusive and distracting thoughts, which prevent it from placing that which should exclu- sively occupy its view, in the full clearness of an undivided light. How great soever may be the interest which we take in the new object, it will, however, only be fully established as a favorite when it has been fused into an integral part of the system of our previous knowledge, and of our established associations of thoughts, feelings, and desires. But this can only be accomplished by time and custom. Our imagination and our memory, to which we must 1 [Light of Nature, c. xiv. § 5.) bert, Mélanges, vol. iv. pp. 40, 151. Ancillon, 2 [Idéologie, tom. i. p. 453. Compare Deg- Nouveaux Mélanges, tom. ii. p. 185. Male- erando, Des Signes, i. 167, who allowsus to branche, Recherche, liy. iii. c. 2, tom. i. p. 191.] embrace, at one view, five unities. D’Alem- 23 178 METAPHYSICS. | Lecr. XIV. resort for materials with which to illustrate and enliven our new study, accord us their aid unwillingly, —indeed, only by compul- sion. But if we are vigorous enough to pursue our course in spite of obstacles, every step, as we advance, will be found easier; the mind becomes more animated and energetic; the distractions grad- ually diminish; the attention is more exclusively concentrated upon its object; the kindred ideas flow with greater freedom and abundance, and afford an easier selection of what is suitable for illustration. At length, our system, of thought harmonizes with our pursuit. The whole man becomes, as it may be, philosopher, or historian, or poet; he lives only in the trains of thought relating to this character. He now energizes freely, and, consequently, with pleasure; for pleasure is the reflex of unforced and unimpeded energy. All that is produced in this state of mind, bears the stamp of excellence and perfection. Helvetius justly observes, that the very feeblest intellect is capable of comprehending the inference of one mathematical position from another, and even of making such an inference itself? Now, the most difficult and complicate demonstrations in the works of a Newton or a Laplace, are all made up of such immediate inferences. They are like houses composed of single bricks. No greater exertion of intellect is required to make a thousand such inferences than is requisite to make one; as the effort of laying a single brick is the maximum of any individual effort in the construction of such a house. Thus, the difference between an ordinary mind and the mind of a Newton, consists more conti s attention than the other, —that a Newton is able without fatigue to connect inference With inference in one long series towards a determinate end; while the man of inferior capacity is soon obliged to break or let fall the thread which he had begun , to spin. This is, in fact, what Sir Isaac, with equal modesty and shrewdness, himself admit- ted. ‘To one who complimented him on his genius, he replied that. if he had made any discoveries, it was owing more to patient atten- tion than to any other talent.2 There is but little analogy between mathematics and play-acting; but I heard the great Mrs. Siddons, in nearly the same language, attribute the whole superiority of her unrivalled talent to the more intense study which she bestowed upon her parts. If what Alcibiades, in the Symposium® of Plato, narrates of Socrates were true, the father of Greek philosophy must have possessed this fac- ulty of meditation or continuous attention in the highest degree. Sir Isaac Newton. Socrates. 1 Del Esprit — Discours iii.c.iv.—Ep. 2 See Reid’s Works, p.587. 8 P. 220.—Ep. ry Lecr. XIV. METAPHYSICS. 179 The story, indeed, has some appearance of exaggeration; but it shows what Alcibiades, or rather Plato through him, deemed the _ requisite of a great thinker. According to this report, in a mili- tary expedition which Socrates made along with Alcibiades, the philosopher was seen by the Athenian army to stand for a whole day and a night, until the breaking of the second morning, motion- less, with a fixed gaze, — thus showing that he was uninterruptedly engrossed with the consideration of a single subject: “And thus,” says Alcibiades, “Socrates is ever wont to do when his mind is occupied with inquiries in which there are difficulties to be over- come. He then never interrupts his meditation, and forgets to eat, and drink, and sleep, — everything, in short, until his inquiry has reached its termination, or, at least, until he has seen some light in it.” In this history there may be, as I have said, exaggeration; but still the truth of the principle is undeniable. Like Newton, Descartes arrogated nothing to the force of his intellect. What he had accomplished more than other men, that he attributed to the superiority of his method;! and Bacon, in like manner, eulogizes his method, -—in that it places all men with equal attention upon a level, and leaves little or nothing to the prerogatives of genius. Nay, genius itself has been analyzed by the shrewdest observers into a higher capacity of attention. “Genius,” says Helvetius, whom we have al- ~ ready quoted, “is nothing but a continued attention,” (une atten- tion suivie).® “Genius,” says Buffon,‘ “is only a protracted patience,” (une longue patience). “In the exact sciences, at least,” says Cuvier, “it is the patience of a sound intellect, when invincible, which truly constitutes genius.” And Chesterfield has also Chesterfield. observed, that “the ower of applying an atten- tion, steady and undisipatel to © single object i the sors mack fasuprorgene’™ = = SOS*~*~=“‘“‘S; ;«COS*W These examples and authorities concur in establishing the impor- - tant truth, that he who would, with success, attempt discovery, either by inquiry into the works of nature, or by meditation on the phenomena of mind, must acquire the faculty of abstracting him- self, for a season, from the invasion of surrounding objects; must be Descartes. Bacon. Helvetius. Buffon. Cuvier. 1 Discours de la Méthode, p. 1. — Ev. 5 Eloge Historique de M. Haity, quoted by 2 Nov. Org., lib. i. aph. 61. — Ep. Toussaint, De la Pensées, p. 219.] Si ily ie , 6 Letters to his Son. Letter lxxxix. [Com- 3 Del Esprit, Discours iii. chap. iv.— Ep, pare Bonnet, Essat Analytique, tom. i., préface, 4 [Quoted by Ponelle, Manuel, p. 371.] p- 8.] 180 . METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XIV. able even, in a certain degree, to emancipate himself from the domin- ion of the body, and live; as it were, a pure intelligence, within the circle of his thoughts. This faculty has been manifested, more or less, by all whose names are associated with the progress of the intellectual sciences. In some, indeed, the power of abstraction almost degen- erated into a habit akin to disease, and the examples which now occur to me, would almost induce me to retract what I have said about the exaggeration of Plato’s history of Socrates. Archimedes,’ it is well known, was so absorbed in a geometrical meditation, that he was first aware of the storm. ing of Syracuse by his own death-wound, and his exclamation on the entrance of Roman soldiers was, — Voli turbare circulos meos. In like manner, Joseph Scaliger, the most learned of men, when a Protestant student in Paris, was so engrossed in the study of Homer, that he became aware of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and of his own escape, only on the day subsequent to the catastrophe. The philosopher Carneades* was habitually liable to fits of meditation, so profound, that, to prevent him from sinking from inanition, his maid found it necessary to feed him like a child. And it is reported of New- ton, that, while engaged in his mathematical researches, he sometimes forgot to dine. Cardan,’ one of the most illustrious of philosophers and mathematicians, was once, upon a journey, so lost in thought, that he forgot both his way and the object of his journey. To the ques- tions of his driver whither he should proceed, he made no answer; and when he came to himself at nightfall, he was surprised to find the carriage at a stand-still, and directly under a gallows. The mathematician Vieta was sometimes so buried in meditation, that for hours he bore more resemblance to a dead person than to a living, and was then wholly unconscious of everything going on around him. On the day of his marriage, the great Budzeus forgot every- thing in philological speculations, and he was only awakened to the affairs of the external world by a tardy embassy from the marriage-party, who found him absorbed in the composition of his Commentarii. It is beautifully observed by Malebranche, “that the discovery of Instances of the pow- er of Abstraction.. Archimedes. Joseph Scaliger. Carneades. Newton. Cardan. Vieta. Budezus. 1 See Valerius Maximus, lib. viii. ¢. 7.— Ep. 8 Ibid., lib. viii. c.7,— Ep. 2[Steeb, Uber den Menschen, ii. 671 ] Lect. XIV. METAPHYSICS. 181 truth can only be made by the labor of attention; because it is only the labor of attention which has light for its reward ;”! and in another place:? “The atten- tion of the intellect is a natural prayer by which we obtain the enlightenment of reason. But since the fall, the intellect frequently experiences appalling droughts; it cannot pray; the labor of attention fatigues and afflicts it. In fact, this labor is at first great, and the recompense scanty ; while, at the same time, we are unceasingly solicited, pressed, agi- tated by the imagination and the passions, whose inspiration and impulses it is always agreeable to obey. Nevertheless, it is a matter of necessity ; we must invoke reason to be enlightened ; there is no other way of obtaining light and intelligence but by the labor of attention. Faith is a gift of God which we earn not by our merits; but intelligence is a gift usually only conceded to desert. Faith is a pure grace in every sense; but the understanding of a truth isa grace of such a character that it must be merited by labor, or by the codperation of grace. Those, then, who are capable of this labor, and who are always attentive to the truth which ought to guide them, have a disposition which would undoubtedly deserve a name more magnificent than those bestowed on the most splendid virtues. But although this habit or this virtue be inseparable from the love of order, it is so little known among us that I do not know if we have done it the honor of a particular name. May I, therefore, be pardoned in calling it by the equivocal name of force of intellect. To acquire this true force by which the intellect supports the labor of attention, it is necessary to begin betimes to labor; for, in the course of nature, we can only acquire habits by acts, and can only strengthen them by exercise. But perhaps the only difficulty is to begin. We recollect that we began, and that we were obliged to leave off. Hence we get discouraged ; we think ourselves unfit for meditation; we renounce reason. If this be the case, whatever we may allege to justify our sloth and negligence, we renounce virtue, at least in part. For without the labor of attention, we shall never comprehend the grandeur of religion, the sanctity of morals, the littleness of all that is not God, the absurdity of the passions, and of all our internal miseries. Without this labor, the soul will live in blindness and in disorder; because there is naturally no other way to obtain the light that should conduct us; we shall be eternally under disquietude and in strange embarrassment; for we fear every- thing when we walk in darkness and surrounded by precipices. It is true that faith guides and supports; but it does so only as it Malebranche quoted on place and impor- tance of attention. 1 Traité de Morale, partie i. chap. vi. § 1. 2 Ibid., partie i. chap. v, § 4. — Ep. 182 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XIV. produces some light by the attention which it excites in us; for light alone is what can assure minds, like ours, which have so many enemies to fear.” Ihave translated a longer extract than I intended when I began ; but the truth and importance of the observations are so great, and they are so admirably expressed in Malebranche’s own inimitable style, that it was not easy to leave off. They are only a frag- ment of a very valuable chapter on the subject, to which I would earnestly refer you, — indeed, I may take this opportunity of saying, that there is no philosophical author who can be more profitably stud- ied than Malebranche. As a thinker, he is perhaps the most profound that France has ever produced, and as a writer on philosophical sub- jects, there is not another European author who can be placed before him. His style is a model at once of dignity and of natural ease ; and no metaphysician has been able to express himself so clearly and precisely without resorting to technical and scholastic terms. That he was the author of a celebrated, but exploded hypothesis, is, per- haps, the reason why he is far less studied than he otherwise deserves. His works are of principal value for the admirable observations on human nature which they embody; and were everything to be expunged from them connected with the Vision of all things in the Deity, and even with the Cartesian hypotheses in general, they would still remain an inestimable treasury of the acutest analyses, expressed in the most appropriate, and, therefore, the most admirable elo- quence. In the last respect, he is only approached, certainly not surpassed, by Hume and Mendelssohn. I have dwelt at greater length upon the practical bearings of Attention, not only because this principle constitutes the better half of all intellectual power, but because it is of consequence that you should be fully aware of the incalculable importance of acquiring, by early and continued exercise, the habit of attention. There are, however, many points of great moment on which I have not touched, and the dependence of Memory upon Attention might alone form an interesting matter of discussion. You will find some excellent observations on this subject in the first and third volumes of Mr. Stewart's Hlements.: Study of the writ- ings of Malebranche recommended. 1 See Works, ii.; Elements, i. p. 122 et seq., and p. 852.—Ep. LECTURE XV. CONSCIOUSNESS,—ITS EVIDENCE AND AUTHORITY. Havine now concluded the discussion in regard to what Con- sciousness is, and shown you that it constitutes the fundamental > form of every act of knowledge;—I now pro- Consciousness the eed to consider it as the source from whence source Of Philosophy. ; : i we must derive every fact in the Philosophy of Mind. And, in prosecution of this purpose, I shall, in the first place, endeavor to show you that it really is the principal, if not the only source, from which all knowledge of the mental phenomena must be obtained ;! in the second place, I shall consider the char- acter of its evidence, and what, under different relations, are the different degrees of its authority ; and, in the last place, I shall state what, and of what nature, are the more general phenomena which it reveals. Having terminated these, I shall then descend to the consideration of the special faculties of knowledge, that is, to the particular modifications of which consciousness is susceptible. We proceed to consider, in the first place, the authority, — the certainty of this instrument. Now, it is at once evident, that philosophy, as it affirms its own possibility, must affirm the veracity of consci- ousness; for, as philosophy is only a scientific development of the facts which consciousness reveals, it follows, that philosophy, in denying or doubting the tes- timony of consciousness, would deny or doubt its own existence. If, therefore, philosophy be not felo de se, it must not invalidate the The possibility of Philosophy implies the veracity of conscious- ness. 1 Under the head here specified, the Author the Nervous System, and that the doctrine, occasionally delivered from the Chair three lectures, which contained ‘‘ a summary view of the nervous system in the higher animals, more especially in man; and a statement of some of the results obtained [by him] from an extensive and accurate induction on the size of the Encephalus and its principal parts, both in man and the lower animals, —serv- ing to prove that no assistance is afforded to Mental Philosophy by the examination of or doctrines, which found upon the supposed parallelism of brain and mind, are, as far as observation extends, wholly groundless.” These lectures, as foreign in their details from the general subject of the Course, are omitted in the present publication. A general sum- mary of the principal conclusions to which the researches of the Author on this subject conducted him, will be found in Appendix II.— Ep. 184 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XV. integrity of that which is, as it were, the heart, the punctum saliens, of its being; and as it would actively maintain its own credit, it must be able positively to vindicate the truth of consciousness: for, as Lucretius! well observes,. : “, . . Ut in Fabrica, si prava est Regula prima, Normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit, Omnia mendose fieri, atque obstipa necessum est; Sic igitur Ratio tibi rerum prava necesse est, Falsaque sit, falsis quseecunque ab Sensibus orta est.’’ And Leibnitz? truly says,— “If our immediate internal experience could possibly deceive us, there could no longer be for us any truth of fact (vérité de fait), nay, nor any truth of reason (vérité de ratison).” So far there is, and can be, no dispute; if philosophy is possible, the evidence of consciousness is authentic. No philosopher denies its authority, and even the Skeptic can only attempt to show, on the hypothesis of the Dogmatist, that consciousness, as at variance with itself, is, therefore, on that hypothesis, mendacious. But if the testimony of consciousness be in itself confessedly above all suspicion, it follows, that we inquire into the conditions or laws which regulate the legitimacy of its applications. The con- scious mind being at once the source from which we must derive our knowledge of its phenomena, and the mean through which that knowledge is obtained, Psychology is only an evolution, by consci- ousness, of the facts which consciousness itself reveals. As every system of Mental Philosophy is thus only an exposition of these facts, every such system, consequently, is true and complete, as it fairly and fully exhibits what, and what only, consciousness ex- hibits. But, it may be objected, —if consciousness be the only revela- tion we possess of our intellectual nature, and Consciousness, as the jf’ consciousness be also the sole criterion by ne Ge, which we can interpret the meaning of what and unerring. ' this revelation contains, this revelation must be very obscure, — this criterion must be very uncertain, seeing that the various systems of philosophy all equally appeal to this revelation and to this criterion, in support of the most contradictory opinions. As to the fact of the variety and con- tradiction of philosophical systems, —this cannot be denied, and it is also true that all these systems either openly profess allegiance to 1 De Rerum Natura, lib. v. 516. 2 Nouveaux Essais, lib. ii. c. 27, § 18. — Ep. Lect. XY. METAPHYSICS. 185 consciousness, or silently confess its authority. But admitting all this, I am still bold enough to maintain, that consciousness affords not merely the only revelation, and only criterion of philosophy, but that this revelation is naturally clear, — this criterion, in itself, unerring. The history of philosophy, like the history of theology, is only, it is too true, the history of variations, and we must admit of the book of consciousness what a great Calvinist divine ! bitterly confessed of the book of Scripture, — “ Hic liber est in quo querit sua dogmata quisque; Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.” In regard, however, to either revelation, it can be shown that the source of this diversity is not in the book, but in the reader. If men will go to the Bible, not to ask of it what they shall believe, but to find in it what they believe already, the standard of unity and truth becomes in human hands only a Lesbian rule.? And if philoso- phers, in place of evolving their doctrines out of consciousness, resort to consciousness only when they are able to quote its authority in confirmation of their preconceived opinions, philosophical sys- tems, like the sandals of Theramenes,* may fit any feet, but can never pretend to represent the immutability of nature. And that philosophers have been, for the most part, guilty of this, it is not extremely difficult to show. They have seldom or never taken the facts of consciousness, the whole facts of consciousness, and nothing but the facts of consciousness. They have either overlooked, or rejected, or interpolated. Before we are entitled to accuse consciousness of being a false, or vacillating, or ill-informed witness,— we are Weare bound toin- bound, first of all, to see whether there be quire whether there be g f 4 any rules by which in: any rules by which, in employing the testi- employing the testi mony of consciousness, we must be governed ; mony of conscious: and whether philosophers have evolved their systems out of consciousness in obedience to these rules. For if there be rules under which alone the evidence of consciousness can be fairly and fully given, and, consequently, under which alone consciousness can serve as Cause of variation in philosophy. less, we must be gov- erned. 1 S. Werenfels, Dissertationes. Amstel. 1716, pds yap Td oxijma TOD AiSov peraxivetrat vol. ii. p. 891. — Ep. kal od wéver 6 Kavév. —Ep. 3 Onpauevys Sid 7d wh pdviwoy ArAAX Kat 2 Aristotle, Eth. Nic., v. 10: Tod yap dop- emauporepi(ov del 17 mpoaipérer THs TOA- forou adpioros Kal 6 Kavdv éotw, Samep Kar irelas, emexahdn Riddapvds: Plutarch, Ni- THS AeoBias oiodours 6 woAlB3wos Kavdv' cias, vol. i. p. 525 (ed. 1599). — Ep. 24 186 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XV. an infallible standard of certainty and truth, and if philosophers have despised or neglected these,—then, must we remove the reproach from the instrument, and affix it to those blundering work- men who have not known how to handle and apply it. In attempt- ing to vindicate the veracity and perspicuity of this, the natural, revelation of our mental being, I shall, therefore, first, endeavor to enumerate and explain the general rules by which we must be governed in applying consciousness as a mean of internal ob- servation, and thereafter show how the variations and contradic- tions of philosophy have all arisen from the violation of one or more of these laws. If I accomplish this at present but imper- fectly, I may at least plead in excuse, that the task I undertake is one that has not been previously attempted. JI, therefore, re- quest that you will view what I am to state to you on this subject rather as the outline of a course of reasoning, than as anything pretending to finished argument. In attempting a scientific deduction of the philosophy of mind Me RY vee from the data of consciousness, there are, in all, under which consci. i 1 generalize correctly, three laws which afford ousness can be legiti: the exclusive conditions of psychological legiti- mately applied to the macy. These laws, or regulative conditions, are consideration of is self-evident, and yet they seem never to have own phenomena. ‘ been clearly proposed to themselves by philoso- phers,—in philosophical speculation, they have certainly never been adequately obeyed. awe The First of these rules is, — That no fact be assumed as a fact of consciousness but what is ultimate and simple. This I would call the law of Parci- | mony. The Second, —that which I would style the law of Integrity, is— That the whole facts of consciousness be taken without reserve or hesitation, whether given as constituent, or as regulative data. The Third is,— That nothing but the facts of consciousness be taken, or, if inferences of reasoning be admitted, that these at least be recognized as legitimate only as deduced from, and in subordination to, the immediate data of consciousness, and every position rejected as illegitimate, which is contradictory of these. This I would call the law of Harmony. I shall consider these in their order. I. The first law, that of Parcimony, is,— That no fact be assumed 1. The law of Parci- mony. 2. The law of Integ- rity. 3. The law of Har- mony. Lect. XV. METAPHYSICS. 187 as a fact of consciousness but what is ultimate and simple. What is a fact of consciousness? This question of all I. The law of Parci- f : : others requires a precise and articulate answer, mony. Fact of conscious- but I have not found it adequately answered in me. any psychological author. In the first place, — every mental phenomenon may be called a fact of consciousness. But as we distinguish consciousness from the special faculties, though these are all only modifications of consciousness, —only branches of which consciousness is the trunk, so we distin- guish the special and derivative phenomena of mind from those that are primary and universal, and give to the latter the name of facts of consciousness, as more eminently worthy of that appellation. In an act of perception, for example, I distinguish the pen I hold in my hand, and my hand itself, from my mind perceiving them. This distinction is a particular fact,—the fact of a particular faculty, perception. But there is a general fact, a general distinction, of which this is only a special case. This general fact is the distinc- tica of the Ego and non-Ego, and it belongs to consciousness as the general faculty. Whenever, therefore, in our analysis of the intellectual phenomena, we arrive at an element which we cannot reduce to a generalization from experience, but which lies at the root of all experience, and which we cannot, therefore, resolve into any higher principle, — this we properly call a fact of consciousness. Looking to such a fact of consciousness as the last result of an analysis, we call it an wltimate principle ; looking from it as the first constituent of all intellectual combination, we call it a primary principle. A fact of consciousness is, thus, a simple, and, as we regard it, either an ultimate, or a primary, datum of intelligence. It obtains also various denominations; sometimes it is called an a priori principle, sometimes a fundamental law of mind, sometimes a transcendental condition of thought,} ete., ete. But, in the second place, this, its character of ultimate priority, supposes its character of necessity. It must be impossible not to think it. In fact, by its neces- sity alone can we recognize it as an original datum of intelligence, and distinguish it from any mere result of generalization and custom. In the third place, this fact, as ultimate, is also given to us with a mere belief of its reality; in other words, consciousness reveals that it is, but not why or how it is. This is evident. Were this 1. Primary and uni- versal. 2. Necessary. 1 See Reid’s Works, p. 755 et seq. — Ep. 188 METAPHYSIcs. Lect. XV. fact given us, not only with a belief, but with a knowledge of how or why it is, in that case it would be a derivative and not a primary datum. For that whereby we were thus enabled to comprehend its how and why, —in other words, the reason of its existence, — this would be relatively prior, and to it or to its antecedent must we ascend, until we arrive at that primary fact, in which we must at last believe, — which we must take upon trust, but which we could not compre- hend, that is, think under a higher notion. A fact of consciousness is thus,—that whose existence is given and guaranteed by an original and necessary belief. But there is an important distinction to be here made, which has not only been overlooked by all philosophers, but has led some of the most distinguished into no inconsiderable errors. The facts of consciousness are to be considered in two points of view ; either as evidencing their own ideal or The facts of con phenomenal existence, or as evidencing the sciousness to be con- z ; : ; sidered in two points Objective existence of something else beyond ‘of view; either as them.' . . . .. “Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the .perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propen- sities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.” * | The fact that consciousness does testify to an immediate knowl- edge by mind of an object different from any modification of its own, is thus admitted even by those philosophers who still do not hesitate to deny the truth of the testimony; for to say that all men do naturally believe in such a knowledge, is only, in other words, to say that they believe it upon the authority of consciousness. A fact of consciousness, and a fact of the common sense of mankind, are only various expressions of the same import. We may, therefore, lay it down as an undisputed truth, that consciousness gives, as an ultimate fact, a primitive duality ; a knowledge of the ego in rela- tion and contrast to the non-ego; and a knowledge of the non-ego in relation and contrast to the ego. The ego and non-ego are, thus, given in an original synthesis, as conjoined in the unity of knowl- 2 1 Essays, vol. ii. pp. 154, 155, 156, 157 (edit. the same thing is acknowledged by Kant, by 1788). Similar confessions aremade by Hume _ Fichte, by Schelling, by Tennemann, by Jac- in his Treatise of Human Nature, vol. i. pp. obi. Several of these testimonies you will $30, 838, 858, 358, 861, 369, (original edit.);— find extracted and translated in a note of my in a word, you may read from 880 to 870; and ~— Discussions on Philosophy, p. 92. METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVI. 203 edge, and, in an original antithesis, as opposed in the contrariety of existence. In other words, we are conscious of them in an indivisi- ble act of knowledge together and at once,—but we are conscious of them as, in themselves, different and exclusive of each other. Again, consciousness not only gives us a duality, but it gives its elements in equal counterpoise and indepen- dence. The ego and non-ego— mind and mat- ter—are not only given together, but in abso- lute coéquality. The one does not precede, the other does not follow; and, in their mutual relations, each is equally dependent, equally independent. Such is the fact as given in and by consciousness. Philosophers have not, however, been content to accept the fact in its integrity, but have been pleased to accept it only under such qualifida- tions as it suited their systems to devise. In truth, there are just as many different philosoph- ical systems originating in this fact, as it admits of various possible modifications. An enumera- tion of these modifications, accordingly, affords an enumeration of philosophical theories. — In the first place, there is the grand division of philosophers into those who do, and those who do not, accept the fact in its integrity... Of modern philosophers, almost all are comprehended under the latter category, while of the former, if we do not remount to the schoolmen and the ancients, — I am only aware of a single philosopher? before Reid, who did not reject, at least in part, the fact as consciousness affords it. As it is always expedient to possess a precise name for a precise distinction, I would be inclined to denominate those who The Ego and Non- Ego given by con- sciousness in equal counterpoise and inde- pendence. As many different philosophical systems originate in this fact, as it admits of vari- ous possible modifi- cations. I. Those who do, and those who do not, accept in its integrity the fact of the Dual- ity of Consciousness. The former called Naturalists or Natural Duailists. implicitly acquiesce in the primitive duality as given in consciousness, the Natural Realists or Natural Dualists, and their doctrine, Natural Realism or Natural Dualism. In the second place, the philosophers who do not accept the fact, The latter, variously subdivided. and the whole fact, may be divided and subdi- vided into various classes by various principles of distribution. The first subdivision will be taken from the total, or partial, 1 See the Author’s Suppl. Disser. to Reid’s Works, Note C.—Eb. 2 This philosopher is doubtless Peter Poiret. John Sergeant is subsequently referred to by Sir W. Hamilton, as holding a similar doctrine in a paradoxical form. See pp. 331, 353.— Ep. 204 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XVI. rejections of the import of the fact. I have previously shown you that to deny any fact of consciousness as an actual phenomenon is utterly impossible. But, though necessarily admitted as a present phenomenon, the import of this phenomenon, —all beyond our actual consciousness of its existence, may be denied. We are able, without self-contradiction, to suppose, and, consequently, to assert, that all to which the phenomenon of which we are conscious refers, is a deception, —that, for example,/the past to which an act of memory refers, is only an illusion involved in our consciousness of the present, —that the unknown subject to which every phenom- enon of which we are conscious involves a reference, has no reality beyond this reference itself,—in short, that all our knowledge of mind or matter, is only a consciousness of vari- ous bundles of baseless appearances. This doc- trine, as refusing a substantial reality to the phenomenal existence of which we are conscious, is called Nihil- ism; and, consequently, philosophers, as they affirm or deny the authority of consciousness in guaranteeing a substratum or sub- stance to the manifestations of the ego and non-ego, are divided into Realists or Substantialists, and into Nihilists or Non-Substan- tialists. Of positive or dogmatic Nihilism there is no example in modern philosophy, for Oken’s deduction of the universe from the original nothing,!— the nothing being equivalent to the Absolute or God, is only the paradoxical foundation of a system of realism; and, in ancient philosophy, we know too little of the book of Gor- gias the Sophist, entitled Iept rod pi ovros, 7) mept picews,?— Con- cerning Nature or the Non-Existent,— to be able to affirm whether it were maintained by him as a dogmatic and bona fide doctrine. But as a skeptical conclusion from the premises of previous philosophers we have an illustrious example of Nihilism in Hume; and the cele- brated Fichte admits that the speculative principles of his own ideal- ism would, unless corrected by his practical, terminate in this result. The Realists or Substantialists are again divided into Dualists, and into Unitarians or Monists, according as Realists divided im- they are, or are not, contented with the testi- to Hypothetical Du- x uy 4 ast alists’ and Monists. mony of consciousness to the ultimate duplicity of subject and object in perception. The Dual- ists, of whom we are now first speaking, are distinguished from the Natural Dualists of whom we formerly spoke, in this, —that the Into Realists and Nihilists. 1 See Oken’s Physiophilosophy, translated for 3 See a remarkable passage in the Bestim- the Ray Society by Tulk, § 31-48. — Ep. mung des Menschen, p. 174, ( Werke, vol. 1 aT 2 See Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii. 65. 245), translated by Sir W. Hamilton. Reid’s — ED. Works, p. 129.— Ep. METAPHYSICS. 205 Lect. XVI. latter establish the existence of the two worlds of mind and mat- ter on the immediate knowledge we possess of both series of pha- nomena,— a knowledge of which consciousness assures us; whereas the former, surrendering the veracity of consciousness to our Imme- diate knowledge of material phenomena, and, consequently, our immediate knowledge of the existence of matter, still endeavor, by various hypotheses and reasonings, to maintain the existence of an unknown external world. As we denominate those who maintain a dualism as involved in the fact of consciousness, Natural Dualists; so we may style those dualists who deny the evidence of consciousness to our immediate knowledge of aught beyond the sphere of mind, Hypothetical Dualists or Cosmothetic Idealists. To the class of Cosmothetic Idealists, the great majority of modern philosophers are to be referred. Deny- ing an immediate or intuitive knowledge of the external reality, whose existence they maintain, they, of course, hold a doctrine of mediate or | representative perception ; and, according to the various modifications of that doctrine, they are again subdivided into those who view, in the immediate object of perception, a representative entity present to the mind, but not a mere mental modification, and into those who hold that the immediate object is only a representa- tive modification of the mind itself. It is not always easy to deter- mine to which of these classes some philosophers belong. To the former, or class holding the cruder hypothesis of representation, certainly belong the followers of: Democritus and Epicurus, those Aristotelians who held the vulgar doctrine of species, (Aristotle himself was probably a natural dualist,)' and in recent times, among many others, Malebranche, Berkeley, Clarke, Newton, Abraham Tucker, etc. To these is also, but problematically, to be referred Locke. To the second, or class holding the finer hypothesis of representation, belong, without any doubt, many of the Platonists, Leibnitz, Arnauld, Crousaz, Condillac, Kant, etc., and to this class is also probably to be referred Descartes.’ The philosophical Unitarians or Monists, reject the testimony of consciousness to the ultimate duality of the sub- ject and object in perception, but they arrive at the unity of these in different ways. Some admit the testimony of The majority of modern philosophers belong to the former of these classes, and are subdivided accord- ing to their view of the representation in perception. Monists, subdivided, 1 Aristotle’s opinion is doubtful. In the the Author’s Notes, Reid’s Works, pp. 800, 886; De Anima, i. 5, he combats the theory of Em- pedocles, that like is known by like, and ap- pears as a natural realist. But in the Nicom- achean Ethics, vi. 1, he adopts the principle of similarity as the basis of all knowledge. See and M. St. Hilaire’s preface to his translation of the De Anima, p. 22.— Ep. 2 See the Author’s Discussions, p. 57 seq. —Ep. 206 a METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVI. consciousness to the equipoise of the mental and material phe- nomena, and do not attempt to reduce either mind to matter, or matter to mind. They reject, however, the evidence of conscious- ness to their antithesis in existence, and maintain that mind and matter are only phenomenal modifications of the same common substance. This is the doctrine of Absolute Identity, —a doctrine of which the most illus- trious representatives among recent philosophers are Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin. Others again deny the evidence of consciousness to the equipoise of the subject and object as coérdinate and codriginal elements; and as the bal- ance is inclined in favor of the one relative or the other, two oppo- site schemes of psychology are determined. If the subject be taken as the original and genetic, and the object evolved from it as its product, the theory of Idealism is established. On the other hand, if the object be as- sumed as the original and genetic, and the sub- ject evolved from it as its product, the theory of Materialism is established. In regard to these two opposite schemes of a one-sided philoso- phy, I would at present make an observation to How a philosophic: Which it may be afterwards necessary to recur al system is often pre-e iz, that a philosophical system is often pre- vented from falling vented from falling into absolute idealism or into absolute idealism 5 or absolute material. absolute materialism, and held in a kind of ism. vacillating equilibrium, not in consequence of being based on the fact of consciousness, but from the circumstance, that its materialistic tendency in one opinion happens to be counteracted by its idealistic tendency in another ;— two opposite errors, in short, codperating to the same result as one truth. On this ground is to be explained, why the philosophy of Locke and Condillac did not more easily slide into materialism. Deriving our whole knowledge, mediately or immediately, from the senses, this philosophy seemed destined to be fairly analyzed into a scheme of materialism; but from this it was for a long time preserved, in consequence of involving a doctrine, which, on the other hand, if not counteracted, would have naturally carried it over into idealism. This was the doctrine of a representative per- ception. The legitimate issue of such a doctrine is now admitted, on all hands, to be absolute idealism; and the only ground on which it has been latterly thought possible to avoid this conclusion, — an appeal to the natural belief of mankind in the existence of an external world, —is, as I showed you, incompetent to the hypo- Into, 1. Those who hold the doctrine of Absolute Identity ; 2. Idealists; 8. Materialists. Lect. XVI. METAPHYSICS. 207 thetical dualist or cosmothetic idealist. In his hands such an appeal is self-contradictory. For if this universal belief be fairly applied, it only proves the existence of an outer world by disproving the hypothesis of a representative perception. To recapitulate what I have now said:—The philosophical sys- tems concerning the relation of mind and mat- ter, are coéxtensive with the various possible modes in which the fact of the Duality of Con- sciousness may be accepted or refused. It may be accepted either wholly and without reserve, or it may not. The former alternative affords the class of Natural Realists or Natural Dualists. Those, again, who do not accept the fact in its absolute integrity, are subdivided in’ various manners. They are, first of all, distin- guished into Realists or Substantialists, and into Nihilists, as they do, or do not, admit a subject, or subjects, to the two opposite series of phenomena which consciousness reveals. The former class is again distributed into Hypothetical Dualists or Cosmothetic Ideal- ists, and into Unitarians or Monists. . The Hypothetical Dualists or Cosmothetic Idealists, are divided, according to their different theories of the representation in per- ception, into those who view in the object immediately perceived, a tertium quid different both from the external reality and from the conscious mind, and into those who identify this object with a modification of the mind itself. The Unitarians or Monists fall into two classes as they do, or do not, preserve the equilibrium of subject and object. If, admitting the equilibrium of these, they deny the reality of their opposition, the system of Absolute Identity emerges, which carries thought, and extension, mind and matter, up into modes of the same com- mon substance. It would be turning aside from my present purpose, were I to attempt any articulate refutation of these various systems. What I have now in view is to exhibit to you how, the moment that the fact of consciousness in its absolute integrity is surrendered, phi- losophy at once falls from unity and truth into variety and error. In reality, by the very act of refusing any one datum of conscious- ness, philosophy invalidates the whole credibility of consciousness, and consciousness ruined as an instrument, philosophy is extinct. Thus, the refusal of philosophers to accept the fact of the duality of consciousness, is virtually an act of philosophical suicide. Their various systems are now only so many empty spectres, —so many enchanted corpses, which the first exorcism of the skeptic reduces to their natural nothingness. The mutual polemic of these sys- Recapitulation of foregoing. 208 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVI tems is like the warfare of shadows; as the heroes in Valhalla, they hew each other into pieces, only in a twinkling to be retinited, and again to amuse themselves in other bloodless and indecisive con- tests. Having now given you a general view of the various systems of philosophy, in their mutual relations, as founded Hypotheses pro- on the great fact of the Duality of Conscious- posed in regard to the ~~ negs, T proceed, in subordination to this fact, to mode of intercourse : ; - * pion Mana” give’ yours brief account of certain famous hy- Body. _potheses which it is necessary for you to know, —hypotheses proposed in solution of the prob- — lem of how intercourse of substances so opposite as mind and body could be accomplished. These hypotheses, of course, belong exclu- sively to the doctrine of Dualism, for in the Unitarian system the difficulty is resolved by the annihilation of the opposition, and the reduction of the two substances to one. The hypotheses I allude to, are known under the names, 1°, Of the sys- tem of Assistance or of Occasional Causes; 2°, Of the Preéstablished Harmony; 3°, Of the Plastic Medium ; and, 4°, Of Physical Influence. The first belongs to Descartes, De la Forge, Malebranche, and the Cartesians in general; the second to Leibnitz and Wolf, though not universally adopted by their school; the third was an ancient opinion revived in todern times by Cudworth and Leclere;? the fourth is the common doctrine ‘of the Schoolmen, and, though not explicitly enounced, that generally prevalent at present;— among modern philosophers, it has been expounded with ereat perspicuity by Euler? We shall take these in their order. The hypothesis of Divine Assistance or of Occasional Causes, sets out from the apparent impossibility involved in Dualism of any actual communication between a spiritual and a material substance, — that is, between extended and non-extended existences; and it terminates in the assertion, that the Deity, on occasion of the affections of matter —of the motions in the bodily organism, excites in the mind correspondent thoughts and representations; and on occasion of thoughts or rep- resentations arising in the mind, that He, in like manner, produces the correspondent movements in the body. But more explicitly : — “God, according to the advocates of this scheme, governs the Four in number. 1. Occasional Causes. 1 This simile is taken from Kant, Kritik der Choisée, vol. ii. p. 107, et seg. See also Leib- reinen Vernunft, p. 784 (edit. 1799) — Ep. nitz, Considérations sur la Principe de Vie. Op- era, edit. Erdmann, p. 429. — Ep. 2 Cudworth, Intellectual System of the Uni- 3 Lettres d une Princesse d’ Allemagne, part werse, D. i. C. iii. § 87. Leclerc, Bibliotheque ii. let. 14, ed. Cournot. — ED.] Lect. XVI. METAPHYSICS. 209 universe, and its constituent existences, by the laws according to which He has created them; and as the world was originally called into being by a mere fiat of the divine will, so it owes the continu- ance of its existence from moment to moment only to the unre- mitted perseverance of the same volition. Let the sustaining energy of the divine will cease, but for an instant, and the universe lapses into nothingness. The existence of created things is thus exclusively maintained by a creation, as it were, incessantly re- newed. God is, thus, the necessary cause of every modification of body, and of every modification of mind; and his efliciency is ‘sufficient to afford an explanation of the union and intercourse of extended and unextended substances. “External objects determine certain movements in our bodily organs of sense, and these movements are, by the nerves and ani- mal spirits, propagated to the brain. The brain does not act imme- diately and really upon the soul; the soul has no direct cognizance of any modification of the brain; this is impossible. It is God himself who, by a law which he has established, when movements are determined in the brain, produces analogous modifications in the conscious mind. In like manner, suppose the mind has a voli- tion to move the arm; this volition is, of itself, inefticacious, but God, in virtue of the same law, causes the answering motion in our limb. The body is not, therefore, the real cause of the mental modifications ; nor the mind the real cause of the bodily movements. Nevertheless, as the soul would not be modified without the antece- dent changes in the body, nor the body moved without the antece- dent determination of the soul, — these changes and determinations are in a certain sort necessary. But this necessity is not absolute : it is only hypothetical or conditional. The organic changes, and the mental determinations, are nothing but simple conditions, and not real causes; in short, they are occasions or occasional causes.” This doctrine of occasional causes is called, likewise, the Hypothesis of Assistance, as supposing the immediate codperation or interven- tion of the. Deity. It is involved in the Cartesian theory, and, therefore, belongs to Descartes ; but it was fully evolved by De la Forge, Malebranche, and other followers of Descartes.? It may, however, be traced far higher. I find it first explicitly, and in all its extent, maintained in the commencement of the twelfth 1[Laromiguiére Legons de Philosophie, tom. la Forge, Traité de V Esprit de D Homme, c. ii. p. 255-6.] xvi. Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, lib. Vi. part ii. c. 8, Entretiens sur la Metaphysique, 2 See Descartes Principia, part ii. § 86. De Ent. vii.—Ep. 27 210 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVI. century by Algazel,* or Elgazali, of Bagdad, surnamed the Imaum of the world; — from him it passed to the schools of the West, and many of the most illustrious philosophers of the middle ages main- tained that God is the only real agent in the universe.” To this doctrine Dr. Reid inclines,*® and it is expressly maintained by Mr. Stewart. * This hypothesis did not satisfy Leibnitz. “ He reproaches the Cartesians with converting the universe into a perpetual miracle, and of explaining the natural, by a supernatural, order. This would annihi- late philosophy ; for philosophy consists in the investigation and discovery of the second causes which produce the various phzno- mena of the universe.> You degrade the Divinity, he subjoined ; — you make him act like a watchmaker, who, having constructed a timepiece, would still be obliged himself to turn the hands, to make +t mark the hours. A skilful mechanist would so frame his clock that it would go for a certain period without assistance or interposi- tion. So when God created man, he disposed his organs and facul- ties in such a manner that they are able of themselves to execute their functions and maintain their activity from birth to death.” ® Leibnitz thought he had devised a more philosophical scheme, in the hypothesis of the preéstablished or predetermined Har- mony, (Systema Harmonic Prestabilite vel Preedeterminate.) This hypothesis denies all real connection, not only between spir- itual and material substances, but between substances in general ; and explains their apparent communion from a previously de- creed coirrangement of the Supreme Being, in the following -man- ner:—“God, before creating souls and bodies, knew all these souls and bodies; he knew also all possible souls and bodies. * Now, in this infinite variety of possible souls and bodies, it was necessary that there should be souls whose series of per- 9. Preéstablished Harmony. 1 In his Destructio Philosophorum, now only known through the refutation of it by Aver- 8 See Works, pp. 257, 527. — Ep. 4 See Works, vol. ii. pp. 97, 476—479; vol. roes, called Destructio Destructionis, preserved in a barbarous Latin translation, in the ninth volume of Aristotle’s Works, Venice, 1550. A full account of this treatise is given in Ten- nemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. viii. p- 887 et seg. See also Degerando, Histoire Com- parée, vol. iv. p. 226.— Ep. 2 Averroes, 1. c. p. 56: ‘ Agens combus- tionis creavit nigredinem in stuppa et com- bustionem in partibus ejus, et posuif eam combustam et cinerem, et est Deus gloriosus mediantibus angelis, aut immediate.” See Tennemann, |. c. p. 405. — Ep. ii. pp. 230, 248, 889-391. — Ep. 5 Systéme Nouveau de la Nature, § 18, Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 127, Cf. Théodicée, § 61. Ibid., p. 520. — Ep. 6 [Laromiguiére, Legons, ii. 256-7] Trotstéme Eclaircissement. Opera, ed, Erdmann, p. 194. — Ep. 7 Systéme Nouveau dela Nature, § 14. Thé- odicée, § 62. . These passages contain the sub- stance of the remarks in the text, but not the words. — Ep. Lect. XVI. METAPHYSICS. 211 ceptions and determinations would correspond to the series of movements which some of these possible bodies would exe- cute; for in an infinite number of souls, and in an infinite num- ber of bodies, there would be found all possible combinations. Now, suppose that, out of a soul whose series of modifications corresponded exactly to the series of modifications which a certain body was destined to perform, and of this body whose successive movements were correspondent to the successive modifications of this soul, God should make a man,— it is evident, that be- tween the two substances which constitute this man, there would subsist the most perfect harmony. It is, thus, no longer neces- sary to devise theories to account for the reciprocal intercourse of the material and the spiritual substances. These have no com- munication, no mutual influence. The soul passes from one state, from one perception, to another by virtue of its own nature. The body executes the series of its movements without any participation or interference of the soul in these. The soul and body are like’ two clocks accurately regulated, which point to the same hour and minute, although the spring which gives motion to the one is not the spring which gives motion to the other.' Thus the harmony which appears to combine the soul and body is, however, indepen- dent of any reciprocal action. This harmony was established be- fore the creation of man; and hence it is called the preéstablished or predetermined harmony.” ? It is needless to attempt a refutation of this hypothesis, which its author himself probably regarded more as a specimen of ingenuity than as a serious doctrine. The third hypothesis is that of the Plastic Medium between the soul and body. “This medium participates of the two natures; it is partly material, partly spiritual. As material, it can be acted on by the body; and as spiritual, it can act upon the mind. It is the middle term of a con- tinuous proportion. It is a bridge thrown over the abyss which separates matter from spirit. This hypothesis is too absurd for refutation ; it annihilates itself. Between an extended and unex- tended substance, there can be no middle existence; [these being not simply different in degree, but contradictory.] If the medium be neither body nor soul, it is a chimera; if it is at once body and soul, it is contradictory; or if, to avoid the contradiction, it is said to be, like us, the union of soul and body, it is itself in want of a medium.” ® 8. Plastic Medium. 1 Trotsiéme Eclaircissement. Opera, edit. Erd- 2 [Laromiguiére Legons, tom. ii. p. 257-8.] mann, p. 135. — Ep. 8 [Laromiguiére, Legons, tom. ii. p. 253-4 ] 212 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVI. The fourth hypothesis is that of Physical Influence, (dnflucus Physicus.) “On this doctrine, external objects affect our senses, and the organic motion they determine is communicated to the brain. The brain acts upon the soul, and the soul has an idea, — a perception. The mind thus possessed of a perception or idea, is affected for good or ill. If it suffers, it seeks to be relieved of pain. It acts in its turn upon the brain, in which it causes a2 movement in the ner- vous system; the nervous system causes a muscular motion in the limbs, —a motion directed to remove or avoid the object which occasions the sensation of pain. “The brain is the seat of the soul, and, on this hypothesis, the soul has been compared to a spider seated in the centre of its web. The moment the least agitation is caused at the ex- tremity of this web, the insect is advertised and put upon the watch. In like manner, the mind situated in the brain has a point on which all the nervous filaments converge; it 1s informed of what passes at the different parts of the body; and forthwith it takes its measures accordingly. The body thus acts with a real efficiency on the mind, and the mind acts with a real efficiency upon the body. This action or influence being real, — physical, in the course of nature,—the body exerts a physical influence upon the soul, the soul a physical influence upon the body. “ This system is simple, but it affords us no help in explaining the mysterious union of an extended and an unextended substance. 4. Physical Influ- ence. ‘Tangere enim et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res.’ } Nothing can touch and be touched but what is extended ; and if the soul be unextended, it can have no connection by touch with the body, and the physical influence is inconceivable or contra- dictory.” ? If we consider these hypotheses in relation to their historical manifestation, — the doctrine of Physical In- Historical order fluence would stand first; for this doctrine, cs at At On which was only formally developed into sys- ae tem by the later Peripatetics, was that preva- lent. in the earlier schools of Greece. The Aristotelians, — who held that the soul was the substantial form, the vital principle, of the body, that the. soul was all in the whole and all in every part of the body, — naturally allowed a re- ciprocal influence of these. By influence, (in Latin influxus,) 1 Lucretius, i. 305.— Ep. 2 [Laromiguiére, Legons, tom. ii. p. 251—3.] METAPHYSICS. 213 Lect. XVI. you are to understand the relation of a cause to its effect, and the term, now adopted into every vulgar language of Europe, was brought into use principally by the authority of Suarez, a Spanish Jesuit, who flourished at the close of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries, and one of the most illus- trious metaphysicians of modern times. By him a cause is defined, Principium per se influens esse in aliud.* This definition, how- ever, and the use of the metaphysical term influence, (for it is noth- ing more,) are not, as is supposed, original with him. They are to be found in the pseudo-Aristotelic treatise De Causis. This is a translation from the Arabic, but a translation made many centuries before Suarez.? But this by the way. The second hypothesis in chronological order, is that of the Plas- tic Medium. It is to be traced to Plato. That philosopher, in illustrating the relation of the two constituents of man, says that the soul is in the body like a sailor ina ship; that the soul employs the body as its instrument; but that the energy, or life and sense of the body, is the manifestation of a different substance, — of a substance which holds a kind of intermediate existence between mind and matter. This conjecture, which Plato only obscurely hinted at, was elaborated with peculiar partiality by his followers of the Alexandrian school, and, in their psychology, the dxos, or vehicle of the soul, the medium through which it is united to the body, is a prominent element and distinctive principle? To this opinion St. Austin,* among other Plastic Medium, sec- ond. tales esse debere, ut virtute quidem semper separabiles sint, actu autem sint semper conjunctx, quia familiare corpus nan- 1 Disputationes Metaphysice, Disp. xii., § ii. 4.—Ep. 2 The Libellus de Causis is printed in a Latin version made from a Hebrew one, in the seventh volume of the Latin edition of Aris- totle’s Works, Venice, 1550, f. 144. It has been attributed to Aristotle, to Avempace, to Alfarabi, and to Proclus. The above defi- nition does not occur in it verbatim, though it may be gathered in substance from Prop. I.— Ep. 8 The passage referred to in Plato is prob- ably Timeus, p. 69: Of 5€ wimotmevor map- adaBovres apxhv wuxis &Sdvatov, Td meta TovTO Svntoy Tua avTh mepieTdpvevoay dxnud Te way TO cGya edoay K.T.A. This passage, as well as the simile of the chariot in the Phadrus, p. 246, were interpreted in this ‘sense by the later Platonists. See Ficinus, Theologia Platonica, lib. xviii. c. 4: ‘‘Ex quo sequitur rationales animas tanquam medias ciscuntur ex ethere, quod servant per immor- talitatem propriam immortale, quod Plato currum tum deorum tum animarum yocat in Phedro, vehiculum in Timzo.” The ship is more definitely expressed by Maximus Tyrius, Diss. xl. € (referred to by Stallbaum, on the Timeus,1.¢.): Odx dpas Kal Toy év TH Ba- Adttn TAovy, évda 6 wey KuBepyytns up- xEl, ws Puxh cdpuaros, } St vods UpxeTats &s trd Wux7s gaua. Cf. also Proclus, Inst. Theol. c. 206 et seg.; Cudworth, Intellectual Sys- tem, b. i. c. v.§ 8. Platner, Phil. Aphorismen, i. p. 627. — Ep. 4 St. Augustin seems to have adopted the ancient and Platonic dogma that matter (fAn) is incorporeal (4c@uatos.) He regarded mat- ter as ‘“‘quiddam inter formatum et nihil, nec formatum nec nihil, informe prope nihil.” Confessions, lib. xii. ¢. vi. — ED. 214 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVI. Christian fathers, was inclined, and, in modern times, it has been revived and modified by Gassendi,' Cudworth,’ and Le Clerc.’ Descartes agrees with the Platonists in opposition to the Aristote- lians, that the soul is not the substantial form of the body, but is connected with it only at a single point in the brain—viz., the pineal gland. The pineal gland, he supposes, is the central point at which the organic movements of the body terminate, when conveying to the mind the determinations to voluntary motion.*’ But Descartes did not allow, like the Platonists, any intermediate or connecting sub- stance. The nature of the connection he himself does not very explicitly state ;— but his disciples have evolved the hypothesis, already explained, of Occasional Causes, in which God is the con- necting principle, — an hypothesis at least implicitly contained in his philosophy * Finally, Leibnitz and Wolf agree with the Cartesians, that there is no real, but only an apparent intercourse between mind and body. To explain this apparent intercourse, they do not, however, resort to the continual assistance or interposition of the Deity, but have recourse to the supposition of a harmony between mind and body, established before the creation of either.® All these theories are unphilosophical, because they all attempt to establish something beyond the sphere of obser- vation, and, consequently, beyond the sphere of genuine philosophy ; and because they are either, like the Cartesian and Leibnitzian theories, contradictions of the fact of consciousness; or, like the two other hypotheses, at variance with the fact which they suppose. What St. Austin so admirably says of the substance, either of mind or of body, — “ Materiam spiritumque cognoscendo ignorari et ignorando cognosci,”* — I would exhort you to adopt as your opinion in regard to the union of these two existences. In short, in the words of Pascal,® “ Man is to himself the mightiest prodigy of nature ; for he is unable to conceive what is body, still less what is mind, but least of all is he able to conceive how a body can be united to a mind; yet this is his proper Occasional Causes, third. Preéstablished Har- mony, fourth. These hypotheses un- philosphical. 1 Gassendi, in his Physica, divides the hu- man soul into two parts, the one rational and incorporeal, the other corporeal, including the nutritive and sensitive faculties. The lat- ter he regards as the medium of connection between the rational soul and the body. See Opera, vol. ii. p. 256, 1658. — Ep. 2 See above, p. 208, note 1.— Ep. 3 See above p. 208, note 1. — Ep. 4 De Passtonibus Anime, art. 31, 82. De Hom- ine, art. 68. — Ep. 5 See above, p. 209, note 1.— Ep. 6 [On these hypotheses in general, see Zed- ler’s Lexicon, v. Seele, p. 98 et seq.] See ante, p. 98. — Ep. 8 Pensées, partie i. art. vi.. 26. Vol. ii. p. 74, edit. Faugére. — Ep. ss = 7 Confessions, xii. 5. Lect. XVI. METAPHYSICS. 215 being.” A contented ignorance is, indeed, wiser than a presump- tuous knowledge; but this is a lesson which seems the last that philosophers are willing to learn. In the words of one of the acutest of modern thinkers! — “ Magna immo maxima pars sapientiz est, quedam squo animo nescire velle.” ‘1 Julius Cesar Scaliger. The passage is quoted more correctly in the Author’s Discus- sions, p- 640. —ED. PECTUnRe. x vr CONSCIOUSNESS, — GENERAL PHANOMENA,— ARE WE ALWAYS : CONSCIOUSLY ACTIVE? Tum second General Fact of Consciousness which we shall con- sider, and out of which several questions of great _ Activityand Passiv- = interest arise, is the fact, or correlative facts, of ity of Mind. JAE a0 wh 3 the Activity and Passivity of Mind. There is no pure activity, no pure passivity increation. All things in the universe of nature are reciprocally in a No pure activity of state of continual action and counter-action ; passivity in creation. " k they are always active and passive at once. God alone must be thought of as a being active without any mixture of passivity, as his activity is subjected to no limitation. But precisely because it is unlimited, is it for us wholly incomprehensible, Activity and passivity are not, therefore, in the manifestations of mind, distinct and independent phznomena. Activity and Passiv- ‘This is a great, though a common error. ° They ity alwaysconjoinedin are always conjoined. There is no operation of | the manifestations of : fe” : : : as, mind which is purely active; no affection which is purely passive. In every mental modification action and passion are the two necessary elements or factors of which it is composed. But though both are always present, each is not, however, always present in equal quantity. Sometimes the one constituent preponderates, sometimes the other; and it is from the preponderance of the active element in some modifications, of the passive element in others, that we distinguish these modifica- tions by different names, and consider them as activities or passiv- ities according as they approximate to one or other of the two factors. Thus faculty, operation, energy, are words that we employ to designate the manifestations in which activity is predominant. Faculty denotes an active power; action, operation, energy, denote its present exertion. On the other hand, capacity expresses a pas- sive power; affection, passion, express a present suffering. The terms mode, modification, state, may be used indifferently to signify Lecr. XVII. METAPHYSICS. aa both phenomena; but it must be acknowledged that these, especially the word state, are now closely associated with the passivity of mind, which they, therefore, tend rather to suggest. The passivity of mind is expressed by another term, receptivity; for passivity is only the condition, the necessary antecedent of activity, only the property possessed by the mind of standing in relation to certain foreign causes, — of receiving from them impressions, determinations to act. It is to be observed, that we are never directly conscious of pas- sivity. Consciousness only commences with, is only cognizant of, the reaction consequent upon the foreign determination to act, and this reiic- tion is not itself passive. In so far, therefore, as we are conscious, we are active; whether there may be a mental activity of which we are not conscious, is another question." There are certain arduous problems connected with the activity of mind, which will be more appropriately considered in a subse- quent part of the course, when we come to speak of the: Inferences from the Phenomenology of Mind, or of Metaphysics Proper. At present, I shall only treat of those questions which are conversant about the immediate phenomena of activity. Of these, the first that I shall consider is one of considerable interest, and which, though variously determined by different philosophers, does not seem to lie beyond the sphere of obser- vation. I allude to the question, Whether we are always consciously active ? Iti is evident that this question is not convertible with the question, Have we always a memory of our conscious- ness ? —for the latter problem must be at once answered in the negative. It is also evident, that we must exclude the consideration of those states in which the mind is apparently without consciousness, but in regard to which, in reality, we can obtain no information from experiment. Concerning these we must be contented to remain in ignorance; at least only to extend to them the analogical conclusions which our observations on those within the sphere of experiment warrant us inferring. Our question, as one of possible solution, must, therefore, be limited to the states of sleep and somnambulism, to the exclusion of those states of insensibility which we cannot terminate suddenly at will. It is hardly necessary to observe, that with the nature of sleep and somnambulism as psychological phenomena, we have at present noth- ing to do; our consideration is now strictly limited to the inquiry, Weare never directly conscious of passivity. The question, Are we always consciously active? raised. Distinguished from other questions. 1 See below, Lect. xviii. p. 285.— Ep. 28 218 METAPHYSICS. Lect. X VIL. Whether the mind, in as far as we can make it matter of observa- tion, is always in a state of conscious activity. The general problem in regard to the ceaseless activity of the mind has been one agitated from very ancient times, but it has also been one on which philosophers have pronounced less on grounds of experience than of theory. Plato and the Platonists were unanimous in maintaining the continual energy of intellect. The opinion of Aristotle appears doubtful, and pas- sages may be quoted from his works in favor of either alternative. The Aristotelians, in general, were opposed, but a considerable number were favorable, to the Platonic doctrine. This doctrine was adopted by Cicero and St. Augustin. “Nunquam animus,” says the former, “ cogitatione et motu vacuus esse potest.”1 “Ad quid menti,” says the latter, «“ preceptum est, ut se ipsam cognoscat, nisi ut semper vivat, et sem- per sit-in actu.”? The question, however, obtained its principal importance in the philosophy of Descartes. That philosopher made the essence, the very existence, of the soul to consist in actual thought,? under which he included even the desires and feelings; and thought he defined all of which we are conscious The assertion, therefore, of Descartes, that the mind always thinks, is, in his employment of language, tantamount to the assertion that the mind is always conscious. That the mind is always conscious, though a fundamental position of the Cartesian doctrine, was rather assumed than proved by an appeal to fact and experience. All is theoretical in Descartes; all is theoretical in his disciples. _Even Malebranche assumes our con- sciousness in sleep, and explains our oblivion only by a mechanical hypothesis.’ It was, there- fore, easy for Locke to deny the truth of the Cartesian opinion, and to give a strong semblance of probability to his own doctrine by its apparent conformity with the phenomena. Omitting a good deal of what is either irrelevant Treatment of the question by philosoph- ers. Plato and Platonists. Aristotle and the Ar- istotelians. Cicero and St. Au- gustin. Descartes. Malebranche. Locke. 1 De Diwinatione, ii. 62: ‘Naturam eam dico, qua nunquam animus insistens agzta- tione, et motu esse vacuus potest.’ — ED. 2 Eugenios, Wuyodoyla, p. 29.—[Book iii. of his Sroixeia ris Metradvotrys, (edit. 1805). The reference in Eugenios is to De Trinitate, ]. x. €. v., where a passage occurs, resembling in words the one quoted in the text, but hardly supporting the doctrine in question. Itis as follows: ‘Ut quid ergo ei preceptum est, ut se ipsam cognoscat? Credo utse ipsam cogitet, et secundum naturam suam vivat.” But in the De Anima et ejus Origine, lib. iy. c. vi. § 7, t. x. p. 391, (edit. Ben.) occurs the following explicit state- ment: ‘“Sicut motus non cessat in corde, unde se pulsus diffundit usquequaque vena- rum, ita non quiescimus aliquid cogitando versare.” — ED.] 8 Principia, part i. § 53.— ED. 4 Principia, part i. § 9. — Eb. 5 Recherche de la Vérité, lib. iii. c. 2.— Ep. Lect. XVIL. METAPHYSICS. 219 to the general question, or what is now admitted to be false, as founded on his erroneous doctrine of personal identity, the follow- ing is the sum of Locke’s argument upon the point. “It is an opinion,” he says,! “that the soul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul, as actual extension is from the body; which if true, to inquire after the beginning of a man’s ideas, is the same as to inquire after the beginning of his soul. For by this account, soul and its ideas, as body and its extension, will begin to exist both at the same time. “But whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coéval with, or some time after, the first rudiments, or organization, or the beginnings of life in the body, I leave to be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter. I confess myself to have one of those dull souls that doth not perceive itself always to con- template ideas; nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think than for the body always to move: the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion is to the body; not its essence, but one of its operations. And, therefore, though thinking be supposed ever so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always think- ing, always in action. That perhaps is the privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of things, who never slumbers nor sleeps; but is not competent to any finite being, at least not to the soul of man. We know certainly by experience that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible consequence, that there is something in us that has a power to think: but whether that substance perpetu- ally thinks or no, we can be no further assured than experience informs us. For to say that actual thinking is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by reason; which is necessary to be done if it be not a self-evident proposition. But whether this, ‘that the soul always thinks,’ be a self-evident proposition, that everybody assents to at first hearing, I appeal to mankind. It is doubted whether I thought all last night or no; the question being about a matter of fact, it is begging it to bring as a proof for it an hypothesis which is the very thing in dispute; by which way one may prove anything; and it is but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think; and it is sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night. But he that would not deceive himself, ought to Locke’s argument for the negative. 1 Essay, book ii. chap. i., §§ 9, 10, 14 et seq. 220 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVI. build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact, because of his hypothesis; that is, because he supposes it to be so5 which way of proving amounts to this, that I must necessarily think all last night because another supposes I always think, though I myself cannot perceive that I always do so”... . “It will perhaps be said that ‘the soul thinks even in the soundest sleep, but the memory retains it not? That the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment busy a-thinking, and the next moment in a waking man not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better proof than bare assertion to make it be believed. For who can, without any more ado but being barely told so, imagine that the greatest part of men do, during all their lives for several hours every day, think of something which, if they were asked even in the middle of these thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of ? Most men, T think, pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a scholar and had no bad memory, who told me he had never dreamed in his life till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of, which was about the five or six and’ twentieth year of his age. I suppose the world affords more such instances; at least every one’s acquaintance will furnish him with examples enough of such as pass most of their nights without dreaming.” ... - And again, “If they say that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking; I ask how they know it? ‘Con- sciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind. Can another man perceive that I am conscious of anything, when I perceive it not myself?’ No man’s knowledge here can go beyond his experience. Wake a man out of a sound sleep, and ask him what he was that moment thinking on. If he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must be a notable diviner of thoughts that can assure him that he was thinking: may he not with more reason assure him he was not asleep ? This is something beyond philosophy; and it cannot be less than revelation that dis- covers to another thoughts in my mind when I can find none there myself; and they must needs have a penetrating sight who can certainly see what I think when I cannot perceive it myself, and when I declare that Ido not. This some may think to be a step beyond the Rosicrucians, it being easier to make one’s self invisible to others, than to make another’s thoughts visible to one which are not visible to himself. But it is but defining the soul to be ‘a substance that always thinks, and the business is done. If such definition be of any authority, I know not what it can serve for, but Lecr. XVIL METAPHYSICS. oot to make many men suspect that they have no souls at all, since they find a good part of their lives pass away without thinking. For no definitions that I know, no suppositions of any sect, are of force enough to destroy constant experience ; and perhaps it is the affec- tation of knowing beyond what we perceive that makes so much useless dispute and noise in the world.” This decision of Locke was rejected by Leibnitz in the New Fs- says on the Human Understanding,’ the great work in which he canvassed from beginning to end the Essay, under the same title, of the Eng- lish philosopher. He observes, in reply to the supposition that continual consciousness is an attribute of Him “who neither slum- bereth nor sleepeth,” ‘that this affords no inference that in sleep we are wholly without perception.’ To the remark, “that it is difti- cult to conceive, that a being can think and not be conscious of thought,” he replies, ‘that in this lies the whole knot and difficulty of the matter. But this is not insoluble” “We must observe,” he says, “that we think of a multitude of things at once, but take heed only of those thoughts that are the more prominent. Nor could it be otherwise.. For were we to take heed of everything, it would be necessary to attend to an infinity of matters at the same moment, all of which make an effectual impression on the senses. Nay, I assert that there remains always something of all our past thoughts, —that none is ever entirely effaced. Now, when we sleep without dreaming, and when stunned by a blow or other accident, there are formed in us an affinity of small confused perceptions.” And again he remarks: “That even when we sleep without dreaming, there is always some feeble perception. The act of awakening, indeed, shows this: and the more easily we are roused, the clearer is the perception we have of what passes without, although this percep- tion is not always strong enough to cause us to awake.” Now, in all this it will be observed, that Leibnitz does not pre- cisely answer the question we have mooted. He maintains that the mind is never without perceptions, but, as he holds that percep- tions exist without consciousness, he cannot, though he opposes Locke, be considered as affirming that the mind is never without consciousness during sleep,—2in short, does always dream. The doctrine of Wolf on this point is the same with that of his master,? though the Nouveaux Hssais of Leibnitz were not published till long after the death of Wolf. But if Leibnitz cannot be adduced as categorically asserting that Locke’s view op- posed by Leibnitz. Wolf. 1 Lib. ii. ch. 1.— Ep. 2 Psychologia Rationalis, § 59. — Ep. y his! METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XVIL there is no sleep without its dream, this cannot be said of Kant. That great thinker distinctly maintains that we always dream when asleep; that to cease to dream Wétila be to cease to live; and that those who fancy that they have not dreamt have only forgotten their dream. This is all that the manual of Anthropology, published by himself, contains upon the question; but in a manuscript in my possession, which bears to be a work of Kant, but is probably only a compilation from notes taken at his lectures on Anthropology, it is further stated that we can dream more in a minute than we can act during a day, and that the great rapidity of the train of thought in sleep, is one of the principal causes why we do not always recollect what we dream2 He elsewhere also observes that the cessation of a force to act, is tantamount to its cessation to be. | Though the determination of this question is one that seems not extremely difficult, we find it dealt with by phi- s haplegues vient losophers, on the one side and the other, rather Loa ee peer ee by hypothesis than by experiment; at least, we than by experiment. have, with one partial exception, which I am soon to quote to you, no observations sufficiently accurate and detailed to warrant us in establishing more than a very doubtful conclusion. I have myself at different times turned my attention to the point, and, as far as my observa- tions go, they certainly tend to prove that, dur- Kant. Conclusion from ex- periments made by He he ing sleep, the mind is never either inactive or ~ wholly unconscious of its activity. As to the objection of Locke and others, that, as we have often no recollec- tion of dreaming, we have, therefore, never "Spivipare tthe pple dreamt, it is sufficient to say that the assump- eS hn More! tron In bhIs argument — that consciousness, and consciousnessarecon- the recollection of consciousness, are converti- vertible, disproved by }]e jg disproved in the most emphatie man- the phenomena of 4 settles say ead ner by experience. You have all heard of the phenomenon of somnambulism. In this re- markable state, the various mental faculties are usually in a higher degree of power than in the natural. The patient has recollections of what he has wholly forgotten. He speaks languages of which, when awake, he remembers not a word. If he use a vulgar dialect when out of this state, in it he employs only a correct and elegant phraseology. The imagination, the sense of propriety, and the fac- Locke’s assumption, 1 Anthropologie, §§ 80, 36.— Ep. thropologie, edited by Starke in 1831, from 2 The substance of this passage is published Kant’s Lectures. See p. 164. —ED. in the Menschenkunde oder Philosophische An- Leen SX VIL . METAPHYSICS. a8 ulty of reasoning, are all in general exalted.’ The bodily powers are in high activity, and under the complete control of the will; and, it is well known, persons in this state have frequently performed feats, of which, when out of it, they would not even have imagined the possibility. And what is even more remarkable, the difference of the faculties in the two states, seems not &onfined merely to a differ- ence in degree. For it happens, for example, that a person who has no ear for music when awake, shall, in his somnambulic crisis, sing with the utmost correctness and with full enjoyment of his perform- ance. Under this affection persons sometimes live half their life- time, alternating between the normal and abnormal states, and per- forming the ordinary functions of life indifferently in both, with this distinction, that if the patient be dull and doltish when he is said to be awake, he is comparatively alert and intelligent when nominally asleep. I am in possession of three works, written dur- ing the crisis by three different somnambulists.* Now it is evident that consciousness, and an exalted consciousness, must be allowed in somnambulism. This cannot possibly be denied, — but mark what follows. Itis the peculiarity of somnambulism — Consciousness with- jt is the differential quality by which that state out memory, the char- is _contradistinguished from the state of dream- acteristic of somnam- bulism. ing—that we have no recollection, when we awake, of what has occurred during its continu- ance. Consciousness is thus cut in two; memory does not connect the train of consciousness in the one state with the train of consci- ousness in the other. When the patient again relapses into the state of somnambulism, he again remembers all that had occurred during every former alternative of that state; but he not only remembers this, he recalls also the events of his normal existence}; so that, whereas the patient in his somnambulic crisis, has a memory of his whole life, in his waking intervals he has a memory only of half his life. At the time of Locke, the phenomena of somnambulism had been very little studied; nay, so great is the ignorance that prevails in this country in regard to its nature even now, that you will find this, its distinctive character, wholly unnoticed in the best works upon the subject.* But this distinction, you observe, is incompetent always to discriminate the states of dreaming and somnambulism. Dreaming possible without memory. 1 For some interesting illustrations of this 8 This deficiency has been ably supplied by state, see Abercrombie On the Intel. Powers, Dr. Carpenter. See his Principles of Human pt. ii. § iv. 92.— Ep. Physiology, § 827.— Ep. 2 Of these works we have failed to discover any trace. — Eb. 224 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVIL It may be true that if we recollect our visions during sleep, this recollection excludes somnambulism, but the want of memory by no means proves that the visions we are known by others to have had, were not common dreams. The phenomena, indeed, do not always enable us to discriminate the two states. Somnambulism may exist in many different degrees; the sleep-walking from which it takes its name is only one of its higher phenomena, and one com- paratively rare. In general, the subject of this affection does not leave his bed, and it is then frequently impossible to say whether the manifestations exhibited, are the phenomena of somnambulism or of dreaming. Talking during sleep, for example, may be a symp- tom of either, and it is often only from our general knowledge of the habits and predispositions of the sleeper, that we are warranted in referring this effect to the one and not to the other class of phe- nomena. We have, however, abundant evidence to prove that for- getfulness is not a decisive criterion of somnambulism. Persons whom there is no reason to suspect of this affection, often manifest during sleep the strongest indications of dreaming, and yet, when they awaken in the morning, retain no memory of what they may have done or said during the night. Locke’s argument, that be- cause we do not always remember our consciousness during sleep, we have not, therefore, been always conscious, is thus, on the ground of fact and analogy, disproved. But this is not all. We can not only show that the fact of the mind remaining conscious during sleep is pos- That the mind re- gible, is even probable, we can also show, by an mains conscious dur- 4 ° Rio cattatigstind articulate experience, that this actually occurs. by experience. The following observations are the result of my personal experience, and similar experiments every one of you is competent to institute for himself. In the first place, when we compose ourselves to rest, we do not always fall at once asleep, but remain for a time LOWGae in a state of incipient slumber, —in a state in- Sie termediate between sleep and waking. Now, if we are gently roused from this transition-state, we find ourselves conscious of being in the commencement of a dream; we find ourselves occupied with a train of thought, and this train we are still able to follow out to a point when it connects itself with certain actual perceptions. We can still trace imagina- tion to sense, and show how, departing from the last sensible im- pressions of real objects, the fancy proceeds in its work of distort- ing, falsifying, and perplexing these, in order to construct out of their ruins its own grotesque edifices, Leot. XVII. METAPHYSICS. 995 In the second place, I have always observed, that when suddenly awakened during sleep (and to ascertain the fact I have caused myself to be roused at different seasons of the night), I have al. ways been able to observe that I was in the middle of a dream. The recollection of this dream was not always equally vivid. On some occasions, I was able to trace it back until the train was grad- ually lost at a remote distance; on others, I was hardly aware of more than one or two of the latter links of the chain; and, some- times, was’ scarcely certain of more than the fact, that I was not awakened from an unconscious state. Why we should not always be able to recollect our dreams, it is not difficult to explain. In our waking and our sleeping states, we are placed in two worlds of thought, not only different but contrasted, and contrasted both in the character and in the intensity of their representations. When snatched suddenly from the twilight of our sleeping imaginations, and placed in the meridian lustre of our waking perceptions, the necessary effect of the transition is at once to eclipse or obliterate the traces of our dreams. The act itself also of rousing us from sleep, by abruptly interrupting the current of our thoughts, throws us into confusion, disqualifies us for a time from recollection, and before we have recovered from our consternation, what we could at first have easily discerned is fled or flying. A sudden and violent is, however, in one respect, more favorable than a gradual and spontaneous wakening to the observation of the phenomena of sleep. For in the former case, the images presented are fresh and prominent; while in the latter, before our attention is applied, the objects of observation have withdrawn darkling into the background of the soul. We may, therefore, I think, assert, in general, that whether we recollect our dreams or not, we always dream. Something similar, indeed, to the rapid oblivion of our sleeping consciousness, happens to us occasionally even when awake. When our mind is not intently occupied with any subject, or more frequently when fatigued, a thought suggests itself. We turn it lazily over and fix our eyes in vacancy; interrupted by the question what we are thinking of, we attempt to answer, but the thought is gone; we cannot recall it, and say that we are thinking of nothing. The observations I have hitherto made tend only to establish the fact, that the mind is never wholly inactive, and that we are never wholly unconscious of its activity. Of the degree and character of that activity, I at present say nothing; this may form the subject of our future consideration. But in confirmation of the opinion I have 29 General conclusions from foregoing. 296 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVI now hazarded, and in proof of something more even than I have . ventured to maintain, I have great pleasure in quoting to you the substance of a remarkable essay on sleep by one of the most dis tinguished of the philosophers of France, — liv' Jouffroy quoted in a confirmation of the ig when the extract was made, but now unfor- ‘Author’s view, andin tunately lost to the science of mind, which he proof of sundry other cultivated with most distinguished success ; — spsiecininn I refer to M. Jouffroy, who, along with M. Royer Collard, was at the head of the pure school of Scottish Philosophy in France.’ «“T have never well understood those who admit that in sleep the mind is dormant. When we dream, we are Pome BSL A assuredly asleep, and assuredly also our mind is Pies s ava not asleep, because it thinks; it is, therefore, manifest, that the mind frequently wakes when the senses are in slumber. But this does not prove that it never sleeps along with them. To sleep is for the mind not to dream ; and it is impossible to establish the fact, that there are in sleep moments in which the mind does not dream. To have no recollec- tion of our dreams, does not prove that we have not dreamt; for it can be often proved that we have dreamt, although the dream has left no trace on our memory. “The fact, then, that the mind sometimes wakes while the senses are asleep, is thus established; whereas the fact, that it sometimes sleeps along with them is not; the probability, therefore, is, that it wakes always. It would require contradictory facts to destroy the force of this induction, which, on the contrary, every fact seems to confirm. I shall proceed to analyze some of these which appear to me curious and striking. They manifestly imply this conclusion, that the mind, during sleep, is not in a peculiar state, but that its activity is carried on precisely as when awake. “ When an inhabitant of the province comes to Paris, his sleep is at first disturbed, and continually broken, by the noise of the carriages passing under his in support of this con- é ee. window. He soon, however, becomes accus- tomed to the turmoil, and ends by sleeping at Paris as he slept in his village. “The noise, however, remains the same, and makes an equal impression on his senses; how comes it that this noise at first hinders, and then, at length, does not hinder him from sleeping ? “The state of waking presents analogous facts. Every one Probable that the mind is always awake. Induction of facts 1 Mélanges, p. 818, [p. 290, second edition. — EpD.] Lecr. XVIL METAPILYSICS. | 227 knows that it is difficult to fix our attention on a book, when sur- rounded by persons engaged in conversation; at length, however, we acquire this faculty. A man unaccustomed to the tumult of the streets of Paris is unable to think consecutively while walking through them; a Parisian finds no difficulty. He meditates as tran- quilly in the midst of the crowd and bustle of men and carriages, as he could in the centre of the forest. The analogy between these facts taken from the state of waking, and the fact which I men- tioned at the commencement, taken from the state of sleep, is so close, that the explanation of the former should throw some light upon the latter. We shall attempt this explanation. “ Attention is the voluntary application of the mind to an object. It is established, by experience, that we cannot Analysis and expla- give our attention to two different objects at Ee oe phe! the same time. Distraction (étre distrait) is the nomena. Attention Sat Distraction. removal of our attention from a matter with which we are engaged, and our bestowal of it on another which crosses us. In distraction, attention is only diverted because it is attracted by a new perception or idea, solicit- ing it more strongly than that with which it is occupied; and this diversion diminishes exactly in proportion as the solicitation is weaker on the part of the intrusive idea. All experience proves this. The more strongly attention is applied to a subject, the less susceptible is it of distraction ; thus it is, that a book which awakens a lively curiosity, retains the attention captive; a person occupied with a matter affecting his life, his reputation, or his fortune, is not easily distracted ; he sees nothing, he understands nothing, of what passes around him; we say that he is deeply preéccupied. In like manner, the greater our curiosity, or the more curious the things that are spoken of around us, the less able are we to rivet our attention on the book we read. In like manner, also, if we are waiting in expectation of any one, the slightest noises occasion distraction, as these noises may be the signal of the approach we anticipate. All these facts tend to prove that distraction results only when the intrusive idea solicits us more strongly than that with which we are occupied. “ Hence it is that the stranger in Paris cannot think in the bustle of the streets. The impressions which assail his eyes and ears on every side being for him the signs of things new or little known, when they reach his mind, interest him’ more strongly than the matter even to which he would apply his thoughts. Each of these impressions announces a cause which may be beautiful, rare, curi- ous, or terrific; the intellect cannot refrain from turning out to 928 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVII verify the fact. It turns out, however, no longer when experience has made it familiar with all that can strike the senses on the streets of Paris; it remains within, and no longer allows itself to be de- ranged. «The othér admits of a similar explanation. To read without distraction in the midst of an unknown company, would be impossi- ble. Curiosity would be too strong. This would also be the case if the subject of conversation were very interesting. But in a familiar circle, whose ordinary topics of conversation are well known, the ideas of the book make an easy conquest of our thoughts. «The will, likewise, is of some avail in resisting distraction. Not that it is able to retain the attention when disquieted and curious; but it can recall, and not indulge it in protracted absences, and, by constantly remitting it to the object of its volition, the interest of this object becomes at last predominant. Rational con- siderations, and the necessity of remaining attentive, likewise exert an influence; they come in aid of the idea, and lend it, so to speak, a helping hand in concentrating on it the attention. “But, howsoever it may be with all these petty influences, it remains evident that distraction and non-dis- traction are neither of them matters of sense, but both matters of intelligence. It is not the senses which become accustomed to hear the noises of the street and the sounds of conversation, and which end in being less affected by them; if we are at first vehemently affected by the noises of the street or drawing-room, and then little or not at all, it is because at first attention occupies itself with these impressions, and afterwards neglects them; when it neglects them it is not diverted from its object, and distraction does not take place; when, on the contrary, it accords them notice, it abandons its object, and is then distracted. “We may observe, in support of this conclusion, that the habit of hearing the same sounds renders us sometimes highly sensible to these, a8 occurs in savages and in the blind; sometimes, again, almost insensible to them, as exemplified in the apathy of the Pari- sian for the noise of carriages. If the effect were physical, —if . it depended on the body and not on the mind, there would be a contradiction, for the habit of hearing the same sounds either blunts the organ or sharpens it; it could not at once have two, and two contrary effects, —it could have only one. The fact is, it neither blunts nor sharpens; the organ remains the same; the same sensa- tions are determined; but when these sensations interest the mind, Distraction and Non- distraction matters of intelligence. Lect. XVII. METAPHYSICS. 229 it applies itself to them, and becomes accustomed to their discrim- ination; when they do not interest it, it becomes accustomed to neglect, and does not discriminate them. This is the whole mys- tery; the phenomenon is psychological, not physiological. “Let us now turn our attention to the state of sleep, and con- sider whether analogy does not demand a simi- Application of the Jar explanation of the fact which we stated at Sregoing analysis 0 the commencement. What takes place when the phxnomena of aleed. a noise hinders us from sleeping? The body fatigued begins to slumber; then, of a sudden, the senses are struck, and we awake; then fatigue regains the ascendant, we relapse into drowsiness, which is soon again inter- rupted; and so on for a certain continuance. When, on the con- trary, we are accustomed to noise, the impressions it makes no longer disturb our first sleep; the drowsiness is prolonged, and we fall asleep. That the senses are more torpid in sleep than in our waking state, is not a matter of doubt. But when I am once asleep, they are then equally torpid on the first night of my arrival in Paris as on the hundredth. The noise being the same, they receive the same impressions, which they transmit in equal vivacity to the mind. Whence comes it, then, that on the first night I am awakened, and not on the hundredth? The physical facts are identical; the difference can originate only in the mind, as in the ease of distraction and of non-distraction in the waking state. Let us suppose that the soul has fallen asleep along with the body; on this hypothesis, the slumber would be equally deep, in both cases, for the mind and for the senses, and we should be unable to see why, in the one case, it was aroused more than in the other. It remains, therefore, certain that it does not sleep like the body; and that, in the one case, disquieted by unusual impressions, it awakens the senses to inquire what is the matter; whilst in the other, know- ing by experience of what external fact these impressions are the sign, it remains tranquil, and does not disturb the senses to obtain a useless explanation. “For let us remark, that the mind has need of the senses to obtain a knowledge of external things. In sleep, the senses are some of them closed, as the eyes; the others half torpid, as touch and hearing. If the soul be disquieted by the impressions which reach it, it requires the senses to ascertain the cause, and to relieve its inquietude. This is the cause why we find ourselves in a dis- quieted state, when aroused by an extraordinary noise; and this could not have occurred had we not been occupied with this noise before we awoke. 230 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVIL “This is, also, the cause why we sometimes feel, during sleep, * the efforts we make to awaken our senses, when an unusual noise or any painful sensation disturbs our rest. If we are in a profound sleep, we are for a long time agitated before we have it in our power to awake, — we say to ourselves, we must awake in order to get out of pain; but the sleep of the senses resists, and it is only by little and little that we are able to rouse them from torpidity. Sometimes, when the noise ceases before the issue of the struggle, the awakening does not take place, and, in the morning, we have a confused recollection of having been disturbed during our sleep, __a recollection which becomes distinct only when we learn from others that such and such an occurrence has taken place while we were asleep. «J had given orders some time ago, that a parlor adjoining to my bedroom should be swept before I was called in the morning. For the first two days the noise awoke me; but, thereafter, | was not aware of it. Whence arose the difference? The noises are the same and at the same hour, I am in the same degree of slumber; the same sensations, consequently, take place. Whence comes it that I awoke, and do no longer awake? For this, it appears to me, there is but one explanation, — viz., that my mind which wakes, and which is now aware of the cause of these sensa- tions, is no longer disquieted, and no longer rouses my senses. It +s true that I do not retain the recollection of this reasoning; but this oblivion is not more extraordinary than that of so many others which cross our mind both when awake and when asleep. «JT add a single observation. The noise of the brush on the carpet of my parlor is as nothing compared with that of the heavy wagons which pass under my windows at the same hour, and which do not trouble my repose in the least. I was, therefore, awakened by a ‘gensation much feebler than a crowd of others, which I received at the same time. Can that hypothesis afford the reason, which sup- poses that the awakening is a necessary event; that the sensations rouse the senses, and that the senses rouse the mind? It is evident that my mind alone, and its activity, can explain why the fainter sensation awoke me; as these alone can explain why, when J am reading in my study, the small noise of a mouse playing in a corner can distract my attention, while the thundering noise of a passing wagon does not affect me at all. “The explanation fully accounts for what occurs with those who sleep in attendance on the sick. All noises foreign to the patient have no effect on them; but let the patient turn him on the bed, let Tllustrated by the personal experience of the writer. Lecr. XVII. METAPHYSICS. 231 him utter a groan or sigh, or let his breathing become painful or interrupted, forthwith the attendant awakes, however little inured to the vocation, or inter- ested in the welfare of the patient. Whence comes this discrimination between the noises which deserve the at- tention of the attendant, and those which do not, if; whilst the senses are asleep, the mind does not remain observant, — does not act the sentinel, does not consider the sensations which the senses convey, and does not awaken the senses as it finds these sensations disquiet- ingornot? It is by being strongly impressed, previous to going to sleep, with the duty of attending to the respiration, motions, complaints of the sufferer, that we come to awaken at all such noises, and at no others. The habitual repetition of such an impres- sion gives this faculty to professional sick-nurses ; a lively interest in the health of the patient gives it equally to the members of his family. “Tt isin precisely the same manner that we waken at the appointed hour, when before going to sleep we have made a firm resolution of sodoing. I have this power in perfection, but I notice that I lose it if I depend on any one calling me. In this latter case, my mind does not take the trouble of measuring the time or of listening to the clock. But in the former, it is necessary that it do so, otherwise the phzeno- menon is inexplicable. Every one has made, or can make, this experiment; when it fails it will be found, if I mistake not, either that we have not been sufficiently preédccupied with the intention, or were over-fatigued ; for when the senses are strongly benumbed, they convey to the mind, on the one hand, more obtuse sensations of the monitory sounds, and, on the other, they resist for a longer time the efforts the mind makes to awaken them, when these sounds have reached it. “ After a night passed in this effort, we have, in general, the recol- lection, in the morning, of having been constantly occupied during sleep with this thought. The mind, therefore, watched, and, full of its resolution, awaited the moment. It is thus that when we go to bed much interested with any subject, we remember, on wakening, that during sleep we have been continually haunted by it. On these occasions, the slumber is light, for, the mind being untranquil, its agitation is continually disturbing the torpor of the senses. When the mind is calm, it does not sleep more, but it is less restless. “Tt would be curious to ascertain, whether persons of a feeble memory, and of a volatile disposition, are not less capable than others of awakening at an appointed hour; for these two circum- ‘stances ought to produce this effect, if the notion I have formed of Experience of those attendant on the sick. Awaking at an ap- pointed hour. 232 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVII. the phenomenon be correct. A volatile disposition is unable strongly to preéccupy itself with the thought, and to form a determined reso- lution ; and, on the other hand, it is the memory which preserves a recollection of the resolution taken before falling asleep. I have not had an opportunity of making the experiment. “Tt appears to me, that from the previous ob- servations it inevitably follows: 1°, That in sleep the senses are torpid, but that the mind wakes. 2°, That certain of our senses continue to transmit to the mind the imperfect sensations they receive. 3°, That the mind judges these sensations, and that it is in virtue of its judgments that it awakens, or does not awaken, the senses. 4°, That the reason why the mind awakens the senses is, that sometimes the sensation disquiets it, being unusual or painful, that sometimes the sensation warns it to rouse the senses, as being an indication of the moment when it ought to do so. 5°, That the mind possesses the power of awakening the senses, but that it only accomplishes this by its own activity overcoming their torpor; that this torpor is an obstacle, —an obstacle greater or less as it is more or less profound. “Tf these inferences are just, it follows that we can waken our- selves at will and at appointed signals; that the instrument called an alarum (réveil-matin) does not act so much by the noise it makes as by the association we have established in going to bed between the noise and the thought of wakening; that, therefore, an instrument much less noisy, and emitting only a feeble sound, would probably produce the same effect. It follows, moreover, that we can inure ourselves to sleep profoundly in the midst of the loudest noises; that to accomplish this it is perhaps sufficient, on the first night, to impress it on our minds that these sounds do not deserve attention, and ought not to awaken us; and that by this mean, any one may probably sleep as well in the mill as the miller himself. It follows, in fine, that the sleep of the strong and courageous ought to be less easily disturbed, all things equal, than the sleep of the weak and timid. Some historical facts may he quoted in proof of this last conclusion.” ‘ I shail not quote to you the observations of M. Jouffroy on Rey- erie; which form a sequel, and a confirmation, of Jouffroy’stheory cor- those he has made upon sleep. Before termina- Me boinc et ting this subject, I may, however, notice a rather Halle. curious case which occurs to my recollection, and which tends to corroborate the theory of the French psychologist. I give it on the authority of Junker, a cele- General conclusions. 1 See Mélanges, p. 304 et seq. — Ep. Lect. XVII METAPHYSICS. 933 brated physician and professor of Halle, who flourished during the first half of last century, and he says that he took every pains to verify the facts by frequent personal observation. I regret that I am unable at the moment to find the book in which the case is recorded, but of all its relevant circumstances I have a vivid remem- brance. The object of observation was the postman between Halle and a town, I forget which, some eight miles distant. This distance the postman was in the habit of traversing daily. A considerable part of his way lay across a district of unenclosed champaign meadow-land, and in walking over this smooth surface the postman was generally asleep. But at the termination of this part of his road, there was a narrow foot-bridge over a stream, and to reach this bridge it was necessary to ascend some broken steps. Now, it was ascertained as completely as any fact of the kind could be,—the observers were shrewd, and the object of observation was a man of undoubted probity, —I say, it was completely ascertained :— 1°, That the postman was asleep in passing over this level course; 2°, That he held on his way in this state without deflection towards the bridge; and, 8°, That before arriving at the bridge, he awoke. But this case is not only deserving of all credit from the positive testi- mony by which it is vouched; it is also credible as only one of a class of analogous cases which it may be adduced as representing. This case, besides showing that the mind must be active though the body is asleep, shows also that certain* bodily functions may be dor- mant, while others are alert. The locomotive faculty was here in exercise, while the senses were in slumber. This suggests to me another example of the same phenomenon. It is found in a story told by Erasmus! in one of his letters, concern- ing his learned friend Oporinus, the celebrated professor and printer of Basle. Oporinus was on a journey with a bookseller ; and, on their road, they had fallen in with a manuscript. Tired with their day’s travelling, —travelling was then almost exclusively performed on horseback, —they came at nightfall to their inn. They were, however, curious to ascertain the contents of their manuscript, and Oporinus undertook the task of reading it aloud. This he continued for some time, when the bookseller found it necessary to put a question concerning a word which he had not rightly understood. It was now discovered that Oporinus was asleep, and being awakened by his companion, he found that he had no recollection of what for a considerable time he had been reading. Case of Oporinus. 1 This story is told by Felix Platerus(Ob- Thomas Platerus. See Bohn, Noctambulatio ; servationes, lib. i. p.i1). The personto whom (Haller, Disputationes ad Morborum Hist. eé Oporinus read, was the father ofthe narrator, Curat., t. vii. p. 448.) — Ep. 30 934 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVII. Most of you, I daresay, have known or heard of similar occurrences, and I do not quote the anecdote as anything remarkable. But, still, it is a case concurring with a thousand others to prove, 1°, That one bodily sense or function may be asleep while another is awake ; and, 2°, That the mind may be in a certain state of activity during sleep, and no memory of that activity remain after the sleep has ceased. The first is evident ; for Oporinus, while reading, must have had his eyes and the muscles of his tongue and fauces awake, though his ears and other senses were asleep; and the second is no less so, for the act of reading supposed a very complex series of mental energies. I may notice, by the way, that physiologists have observed, that our bodily senses and powers do not fall asleep simultaneously, but in a certain succession. We all know that the first symptom of slumber is the relaxation of the eyelids; whereas, hearing continues alert for a season after the power of vision has been dormant. In the case last alluded to, this order was, however, violated ; and the sight was forcibly kept awake while the hearing had lapsed into torpidity. In the case of sleep, therefore, so far is it from being proved that the mind is at any moment unconscious, that the result of observation would incline us to the opposite conclusion. LECTURE XVIII. CONSCIOUSNESS, — GENERAL PHANOMENA,—IS THE MIND EVER UNCONSCIOUSLY MODIFIED? I pass now to a question in some respects of still more proximate interest to the psychologist than that discussed in the preceding Lecture; for it is one which, according as it is decided, will determine the character of our explanation of many of the most important phe- nomena in the philosophy of mind, and, in particular, the great phenomena of Memory and Association. The question I refer to is, Whether the mind exerts energies, and is the subject of modifi- cations, of neither of which it is conscious. This is the most gen- eral expression of a problem which has hardly been mentioned, far less mooted, in this country; and when it has attracted a passing notice, the supposition of an unconscious action or passion of the mind, has been treated as something either unintelligible, or absurd. In Germany, on the contrary, it has not only been canvassed, but the alternative which the philosophers of this country have lightly considered as ridiculous, has been gravely established as a conclu- sion which the phenomena not only warrant, but enforce. The French philosophers, for a long time, viewed the question in the same light as the British. Condillac, indeed, set the latter the Wri le;? but of late a revolution is apparent, and two recent French psychologists” have marvellously propounded the doctrine, long and generally established in Germany, as something new and unheard of before their own assertion of the paradox. This question is one not only of importance, but of difficulty; I shall endeavor to make you understand its purport by arguing it upon broader grounds than has hitherto been done, and shall pre- pare you, by some preliminary information, for its discussion. I shall first of all adduce some proof of the fact, that the mind may, and does, contain far more latent furniture than consciousness informs us it possesses. To sim- plify the discussion, I shall HL ed three degrees of this mental latency. __Isthe mind ever un- consciously modified? Three degrees of mental aay ‘l Essai sur P Origine des Connoissances Hu- 2Cardaillac and Damiron. See below, p. maines. Sect. ii. ch. 1. § 4—18.— Ep. 252.— Ep. * 236 METAPIYSICS. Lect. X VIL In the first place, it is to be remembcred that the riches, the possessions of our mind, are not to be measured by its present momentary activities, but by the amount of its acquired habits. I know a science, or language, not merely while I make a temporary use of it, but inasmuch as I can apply it when and how I will. Thus the infinitely greater part of our spiritual treasures, lies always beyond the sphere of conscious- ness, hid in the obscure recesses of the mind. This is the first degree of latency. In regard to this, there is no difficulty, or dis- pute; and I only take it into account in order to obviate miscon- ception, and because it affords a transition towards the other two degrees which it conduces to illustrate. The second degree of latency exists when the mind contains cer- tain systems of knowledge, or certain habits of action, which it is wholly unconscious of pos- sessing in its ordinary state, but which are revealed to conscious- ness in certain extraordinary exaltations of its powers. The evi- dence on this point shows that the mind frequently contains whole systems of knowledge, which, though in our normal state they have faded into absolute oblivion, may, in certain abnormal states, as madness, febrile delirium, somnambulism, catalepsy, etc., flash out into luminous consciousness, and even throw into the shade of un- consciousness those other systems by which they had, for a long period, been eclipsed, and even extinguished. For example, there are cases in which the extinct memory of whole languages was sud- denly restored, and, what is even still more remarkable, in which the faculty was exhibited of accurately repeating, in known or un- known tongues, passages which were never within the grasp of conscious memory in the normal state. This degree, this phe- nomenon of latency, is one of the most marvellous in the whole compass of philosophy, and the proof of its reality will prepare us for an enlightened consideration of the third, of which the evi- dence, though not less certain, is not equally obtrusive. But, how- ever remarkable and important, this phenomenon has been almost wholly neglected by psychologists,’ and the cases which I adduce in illustration of its reality have never been previously collected and applied. That in madness, in fever, in somnambulism, and other abnormal states, the mind should betray capacities and extensive systems of knowledge, of which it was at other times wholly uncon- scious, is a fact so remarkable that it may well demand the highest evidence to establish its truth. But of such a character is the The first. The second. 1 These remarks were probably written be- Intellectual Powers. He collects some very curi- fore the publication o Abercrombie on the ous instances; see p. 814, 10th edition. — Ep. Lect. XVIII. METAPHYSICS. 287 evidence which I am now to give you. It consists of cases reported by the most intelligent and trustworthy observers, — by observers wholly ignorant of each other’s testimony; and the phenomena observed were of so palpable and unambiguous a nature that they could not possibly have been mistaken or misinterpreted. The first, and least interesting, evidence I shall adduce, is derived from cases of mad- ness; it is given by a celebrated American physician, Dr. Rush. | “The records of the wit and cunning of madmen,” says the Doc- tor, “are numerous in every country. Talents for eloquence, poetry, music, and painting, and uncommon ingenuity in several of the mechanical arts, are often evolved in this state of madness. A gentleman, whom I attended in an hospital in the year 1810, often delighted as well as astonished the patients and officers of our hospital by his displays of oratory, in preaching from a table in the hospital yard every Sunday. A female patient of mine who became insane, after parturition, in the year 1807, sang hymns and songs of her own composition during the latter stage of her illness, with a tone of voice so soft and pleasant that I hung upon it with delight every time I visited her. She had never discovered a talent for poetry or music, in any previous part of her life. _ Two instances of a talent for drawing, evolved by madness, have occurred within my knowledge. And where is the hospital for mad people, in which elegant and completely rigged ships, and curious pieces of machinery, have not been exhibited by persons who never discovered the least turn for a mechanical art, previously to their derangement? Some- times we observe in mad people an unexpected resuscitation of knowledge ; hence we hear them describe past events, and speak in ancient or modern languages, or repeat long and interesting pas- sages from books, none of which, we are sure, they were capable of recollecting in the natural and healthy state of their mind.”* The second class of cases are those of fever; and the first I shall adduce is given on the authority of the patient himself. This is Mr. Flint, a very intelligent American clergyman. I take it from his Recollections of the Valley of the Mississippi. He was travelling in the State of Illinois, and suffered the common lot of visitants from other climates, in being taken down with a bilious fever. “I am aware,” he remarks, “that every sufferer in this way is apt to think his own case extraordi- nary. My physicians agreed with all who saw me that my case Evidence from cases of madness. From cases of fever. 1 Beasley, On the Mind, p. 474. 238 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XVIII. was so. As very few live to record the issue of a sickness like mine, and as you have requested me, and as I have promised, to be par- ticular, I will relate some of the circumstances of this disease. And it is in my view desirable, in the bitter agony of such diseases, that more of the symptoms, sensations and sufferings, should have been recorded than have been; and that others in similar predicaments may know that some before them have had sufferings like theirs, and have survived them. I had had a fever before, and had risen, and been dressed every day. But in this, with the first day I was prostrated to infantine weakness, and felt, with its first attack, that it was a thing very different from what I had yet experienced. Par- oxysms of derangement occurred the third day, and this was to me a new state of mind. That state of disease in which partial de- rangement is mixed with a consciousness generally sound, and a sensibility preternaturally excited, I should suppose the most dis- tressing of all its forms. At the same time that I was unable to recognize my friends, I was informed that my memory was more than ordinarily exact and retentive, and that I repeated whole pas- sages in the different languages which I knew, with entire accuracy. I recited, without losing or misplacing a word, a passage of poetry which I could not so repeat after I recovered my health.” The following more curious case, is given by Lord Monboddo in his Antient Metaphysics. “It was communicated in a letter from the late Mr. Hans Stanley, a gentleman well known both to the learned and political world, who did me the honor to— correspond with me upon the subject of my first volume of meta- physics. I will give it in the words of that gentleman. He intro- duces it, by saying, that it is an extraordinary fact in the history of mind, which he believes stands single, and for which he does not pretend to account; then he goes on to narrate it: ‘About six-and-twenty years ago, when I was in France, I had an inti- | macy in the family of the late Maréchal de Montmorenci de Laval. His son, the Comte de Laval, was married to Mademoiselle de Maupeaux, the daughter of a Lieutenant-General of that name, and the niece of the late Chancellor. This gentleman was killed at the battle of Hastenbeck; his widow survived him some years, but is since dead. “ in Buffier,° in Genovesi,’ and in many other philosophers. It ‘3 curious that Malebranche’s distinction was apprehended neither by Locke nor by Leibnitz, in their counter examinations of the theory of that philosopher. Both totally mistake its import. Male- branche, however, was not the original author of the distinction. He himself professedly evolves it out of Des- cartes.8 But long previously to Descartes, it had been clearly established. It formed a part of that admirable doctrine of perception maintained by the party of the Schoolmen to whom I have already alluded I find it, however, long prior to them. It is, in particular, stated with great precision by Plotinus,” and even some inferences drawn from it, which are supposed to be the discoveries of modern philosophy. Reid anticipated in his distinction of Per- ception from Sensa- tion. Malebranche. Crousaz, Hutcheson, Le Clerc, Sinsart, Buf- fier. Descartes. Plotinus. 1 Intellectual Powers, Essay ii. ch. vii. Coll. Works, p. 265. 2 Recherche de la Vérité, lib. iii. part ii. ch. vi. and vii., with Eclaircissement on text. See Reid’s Works, pp. 834, 887. — ED. 8 Philosophical Essays, notes F and G. The passages from Hutcheson and Crousaz are given in Sir W. Hamilton’s edition of the Collected Works, vol. v. p. 420. — ED. 4 Pneumatologia, § i. chap. v. Opera Phi- losophica, tom. ij. p. 81 (edit. 1726). —Ep. 5 [Recueil des Pensées sur Immortalité de P Ame, 119.] 6 First Truths, part i. ch. xiv. §§ 109-10, Cf. Remarks on Crousaz, art. viii. p. 427 (Eng. Trans). — Ep. 7 [Elementa Metaphysice, pars ii. p. 12.] 8 See Reid’s Works, p. 881. — ED. 9 See above, 1. xxiii. p. 816, and Reid’s Works, p. 887. Eb. 10 Enn. iii. vi. 2. See Reid’s Works, p. 887. — ED. Lect. XXIV. METAPHYSICS. - Sah Before proceeding to state to you the great law which regulates | the mutual relation of these phenomena, — a The nature of the Jaw which has been wholly overlooked by our Be cites hen psychologists, —it is proper to say a few words, iliustrated. illustrative of the nature of the phenomena themselves; for what you will find in Reid, is by no means either complete or: definite. The opposition of Perception and Sensation is true, but it is not a statement adequate to the generality of the ivbatiwliiGenssitn; contrast. Perception is only a special Kind of the special manifes Knowledge, and sensation only a special kind tation of a contrast of feeling; and Anowledge and Feeling, you which universally di- will recollect, are two out of the three great vides Knowledge and . 4 : : at ticting: classes, into which we primarily divided the phenomena of mind. Conation was the third. Now, as perception is only a special mode of knowledge, and sensa- tion only a special mode of feeling, so the contrast of perception and sensation is only the special manifestation of a contrast, which universally divides the generic phenomena themselves. It ought, therefore, in the first place, to have been noticed, that the generic phenomena of knowledge and feeling are always found coéxistent, and yet always distinct; and the opposition of perception and sensa- tion should have been stated as an obtrusive, but still only a par- ticular example of the general law. But not Pereeption Proper only is the distinction of perception and sensa- ie pilidany Rie: tion not generalized, —not referred to its cate- guislied: gory, by our psychologists; it is not concisely and precisely stuted. A cognition is objective, that is, our consciousness is then relative to something different from the present state of the mind itself; a feeling, on re contrary, is subjective, that is, our consciousness is exclusively limited to the pleasure or pain experienced by the thinking subject. Cognition and feeling are always coéxistent. The purest act of knowledge is always colored by some feeling of pleasure or pain; for no energy is absolutely indifferent, and An grossest feeling exists only as it is known in consciousness. This being the case of cognition and feel- Ing in general, the same is true of perception and sensation in par- ticular. Perception proper is the consciousness, through the senses, of the qualities of an object known as different from self; recon proper is the consciousness of the subjective affection of pleasure or pain, which accompanies that act of knowledge. Perception is thus the objective element in the complex state, — the element of cog- hition ; ; Sensation is the subjective element, — the element of feeling. The contrast of Per- og 326 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXIV. The most remarkable defect, however, in the present doctrine upon this point, is the ignorance of our psycholo- ‘The grand law Py gists in regard to the law by which the phe- which the phenomena ait ; of Knowledge and omena of cognition and feeling, —of perception Feeling, — Perception and sensation, are governed, in their reciprocal and Sensation, are relation. This law is simple and universal ; and, governed in their re- : * 4 Go ocal slat once enounced, its proof is found in every men- tal manifestation. It is this: Knowledge and Feeling, — Perception and Sensation, though always coéxistent, are always in the inverse ratio of each other.’ That these two elements are always found in coéxistence, as it is an old and a notorious truth, it is not requisite for me to prove. But that these elements are always found to coéxist in an inverse proportion, —in support of this universal fact, it will be requisite to adduce proof and illus- tration. In doing this I shall, however, confine myself to the relation of Perception and Sensation. These afford the best examples of the generic relation of knowl- edge and feeling; and we must not now turn aside from the special faculty with which we are engaged. The first proof I shall take from a comparison of the several senses; and it will be found that, precisely as a sense has more of the one element, it has less of the other. Laying Touch aside for the mo- ment, as this requires a special explanation, the other four Senses divide themselves into two classes, according as perception, the objective element, or sensation, the subjective ele- ment, predominates. The two in which the former element prevails, are Sight and Hearing; the two in which the latter, are Taste and Smell. * ow, here, it will be at once admitted, that Sight, at the same instant, presents to us a greater number and a greater variety of objects and qualities, than any other of the senses. In this sense, therefore, perception, — the objective element, is at its maximum. But sensation, —the sub- jective element, is here at its minimum; for, in the eye, we experi- ence less organic pleasure or pain from the impressions of its appro- priate objects (colors), than we do in any other sense. Next to Sight, Hearing affords us, in the shortest interval, the Established and il- Justrated. 1. From a compari- son of the _ several senses. Sight. 1 This law is enunciated by Kant, Anthro- sie viel lehren sollen, miissen sie missig affici- pologie, § 20. Kant’s words are, ‘‘Jestarker ren.” Anthr.§ 20,( Werke, edit. Rosenkranzand die Sinne, bei eben demselben Grade des auf Schubert, vii. part 2, p. 51.) Sect. 20 of this sie geschehenen Einflusses, sich afficirt fihlen, edition corresponds to § 19, edit. 1800. — Ep, desto weniger lehren sie. Umgekehrt; wenn 2 Compare Kant, Anthropologie, § 15. — ED. Lect. XXIV. METAPHYSICS. 337 greatest variety and multitude of cognitions; and 8S sight divides space almost to infinity, through color, so hear- ing does the same to time, through sound. Hear- ing is, however, much less extehsive in its sphere of knowledge or Hearing. perception than sight; but in the same proportion is its capacity of feeling or sensation more intensive. We have greater pleasure and greater pain from single sounds than from single colors; and, in like manner, concords and discords, in the one sense, affect us more agree- ably or disagreeably, than any modifications of light in the other. In Taste and Smell, the degree of sensation, that is, of pleasure or pain, is great in proportion as the perception, that is, the information they afford, is small. In all these senses, therefore, — Sight, Hearing, Taste, Smell, it will be admitted that the principle holds good. The sense of Touch, or Feeling strictly so called, I have re- served, as this requires a word of comment, Some philosophers include under this name all our sensitive perceptions, not obtained through some of the four special organs of sense, that is, sight, hearing, taste, smell ; others, again, divide the sense into several. To us at present this differ- ence is of no interest: for it is sufficient for us to know, that in those parts of the body where sensation predominates, perception is feeble ; and in those where perception is lively, sensation is obtuse. Tn the finger points, tactile perception is at its height; but there is hardly another part of the body in which sensation is not more acute. Touch, or Feeling strictly so called, if viewed as a single sense, belongs, therefore, to both classes, — the objective and gsub- jective. But it is more correct, as we shall See, to regard it as a plurality of senses, in which case Touch, prop- erly so called, having a principal organ in the finger points, will belong to the first class, —the class of objective senses, — the perceptions, — that class in which philosophy proper predominates. The analogy, then, which we have thus scen to hold good in the several senses in relation to each other, prevails Re i etbise among the several impressions of the impressions of the : Z . Riis dense, same sense. Impressions in thé same sense, differ both in degree and in quality or kind. By impression you will observe that I mean no explanation of the Taste and Smell. Touch. Touch properly a plu- rality of Senses. 1 [In regard to the subjective and objective as, what is more subjective affords a much nature of the sensations of the several senses, less distinct remembrance. Thus, what we or rather the perceptions we have through perceive by the eye, is better remembered them, it may be observed, that what is more than what we hear.] — Oral Interpolation. objective is more easily remembered; where- 43 838 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XXIV. mode in which the external reality acts upon the sense (the met- aphor you must disregard), but simply the fact of the agency itself Taking, then, their difference in degree, and sup- posing that the degree of the impression deter- mines the degree of the sensation, it cannot certainly be said, that the minimum of sensation infers the maximum of perception; for perception always supposes a certain quantum of sensation: but this is undeniable, that, above a certain limit, perception declines, in proportion as sensation rises. Thus, in the sense of sight, if the impression be strong we are dazzled, blinded, and consciousness is limited to the pain or pleasure of the sensation, in the intensity of which, perception has been lost. Take now the difference, in kind, of impressions in the same sense. Of the senses, take again that of Sight. Sight, Difference in kind. ag will hereafter be shown, is cognizant of color, a atee mah) and, through color, of figure. But though figure ie pe" is known only through color, a very imperfect cognizance of color is necessary, as is shown in the case (and it is not a rare one) of those individuals who have not the faculty of discriminating colors. These persons, who prob- ably perceive only a certain difference of light and shade, have as clear and distinct a cognizance of figure, as others who enjoy the sense of sight in absolute perfection. This being understood, you will observe, that, in the vision of color, there is more of sensation; in that of figure, more of perception. Color affords our faculties of knowledge a far smaller number of differences and relations than figure; but, at the same time, yields our capacity of feeling a far more sensual enjoyment. But if the pleasure we derive from color be more gross and vivid, that from figure is more refined and per- manent. It is a law of our nature, that the more intense a pleasure, the shorter is its duration. The pleasures of sense are grosser and more intense than those of intellect ; but, while the former alternate speedily with disgust, with the latter we are never satiated. The same analogy holds among the senses themselves. Those in which sensation predominates, in which pleasure is most intense, soon pall upon us; whereas those in which perception predominates, and which hold more immediately of intelligence, afford us a less exclu- sive but a more enduring gratification. How soon are we cloyed with the pleasures of the palate, compared with those of the eye; and, among the objects of the former, the meats that please the most are soonest objects of disgust. This is too notorious in regard to taste to stand in need of proof. But it is no less certain in the — case of vision, In Painting, there is a pleasure derived from a vivid Difference in degree. Lecr. XXIV. METAPHYSICS. 339 and harmonious coloring, and a pleasure from the drawing and | grouping of the figures. The two pleasures are distinct, and even, to a certain extent, incompatible. For if we attempt to combine them, the grosser and more obtrusive gratification, which we find in the coloring, distracts us from the more refined and intellectual enjoyment we derived from the relation of figure ; while, at the same time, the disgust we soon experience from the one tends to render us insen- sible to the other. This is finely expressed by a modern Latin poet of high genius: 4 Joannes Secundus quoted. “‘Mensura rebus est sua dulcibus : Ut quodque mentes suavius afficit, Fastidium sic triste secum.. Limite proximiore ducit. 1 “ Est modus et dulci: nimis immoderata voluptas Teedia finitimo limite semper habet. Cerne novas tabulas; rident florente colore, Picta velut primo Vere coruscat humus. Cerne diu tamen has, hebetataque lumina flectes, Et tibi conspectus nausea mollis erit; Subque tuos oculos aliquid revocare libebit, Prisca quod inculta secla tulere manu.” 2 His learned commentator, Bosscha, has ndt, however, noticed that these are only paraphrases of a remarkable pas- sage of Cicero.’ Cicero and Secundus have not, however, expressed the principle more explicitly than Shakspeare: Paraphrases Cicero. Shakspeare. “These violent delights have violent ends, And in their triumph die. The sweetest honey Is loathsome in its own deliciousness, And in the taste confounds the appetite. Therefore, love moderately ; long love doth so. Too swift arrives as tardy as too slow.” 4 The result of what I have now stated, therefore, is, in the first place, that, as philosophers have observed, there is a distinction 1 Joannes Secundus, Basia, ix. Opera, p. 85, est, quenam causa sit, cur ea, que maxime (edit. 1631). — Ep. sensus, nostros impellunt voluptate, et specie 2Joannes Secundus, Epigrammata, iii. Aa Figs Bist: A pers ies * Siyrataieegae [Opera, p. 115. — Ep.] siidio quodam et satietate abalienemur, etc. — Ep. ~ 8 De Oratore, iii. 25: “ Difficile enim dictu 4 Romeo and Juliet, act. ii. scene 6. 240 METAPHYSICS. Exon. XXIV: between Knowledge and Feeling, — Perception and Sensation, as between the objective and the subjective ele- ment; and, in the second, that this distinction is, moreover, governed by the law, — That the two elements, though each necessarily supposes the other, are still always in a certain inverse proportion to each other.’ : Before leaving this subject, I may notice that the distinction of perception proper and sensation proper, though ‘The distinction of | recognized as phenomenal by philosophers who Perception from Sen- hold the doctrine of a representative perception, sation, of importance ‘ ° : : . only wthedocirins of pil are reality and importance only in the doc- Intuitive Perception. trine of an intuitive perception. In the former doctrine, perception is supposed to be only ap- parently objective ; being, in reality, no less subjective than sensa- tion proper, —the subjective element itself Both are nothing more than mere modes of the ego. The philosophers who hold the hypothesis of a representative perception, make the difference of the two to consist only in this ;— that in perception proper, there is reference to an unknown object, different from me; in sensation, there is no reference to aught beyond myself. Brown, on the sup- position that Reid held that doctrine in common with himself and philosophers at large, states sensation, as understood by Reid, to be “the simple feeling that immediately follows the action of an external body on any of our organs of sense, considered merely as a feeling of the mind; the corresponding perception being the ref- erence of this feeling to the external body as its cause.”? The dis- tinction he allows to be a convenient one, if the nature of the com- plex’ process which it expresses be rightly understood. “The only question,” he says, “that seems, philosophically, of importance, with respect to it, is whether the perception in this sense, — the reference of the sensation to its external corporeal cause,— implies, as Dr. Reid contends, a peculiar mental power, coéxtensive with sensation, to be distinguished by a peculiar name in the catalogue of our facul- ties; or be not merely one of the results of a more. general power, which is afterwards to be considered by us, — the power of associa- tion, — by which one feeling suggests, or induces, other feelings that have formerly coéxisted with it.” ° ; ae If Brown be correct in his interpretation of Reid’s general doc- trine of perception, his criticism is not only true but trite. In the hands of a cosmothetic idealist, the distinction is only superficial, Result in sum of foregoing discussion. 1 For historical notices of approximations, 2 Lecture xxvi. p. 1. second edition. — ED. . to this Law, see Reid’s Works, Note D*, p. 8 Ibid. —ED. 7 887. re Ep. Lzot. XXIV. METAPHYSICS. 341 and manifestly of no import; and the very fact, that Reid laid so great a stress on it, would tend to prove, inde- _ That Reid laid stress pendently of what we haye already alleged, that on re Le Brown’s interpretation of his doctrine is errone- eo. of his dogs) OUBe Yon will remark, likewise, that Brown (and trine of Perception. Brown only speaks the language of all philoso- phers who do not allow the mind a consciousness of aught beyond its own states) misstates the phenomenon, when he asserts that, in perception, there is a reference No reference from from the internal to ‘the external, from the | known to the unknown. That this is not the ternal in Perception, : 4 > Rinviein states, fact, an observation of hig phenomenon will at once convince you. In an act of perception, I am conscious of something as self, and of something as not-self ;— this is the simple fact. The philosophers, on the contrary, who will not accept this fact, misstate it. They say that we are there con- scious of nothing but a certain modification of mind; but this modi- fication involves a reference to, —in other words, a representation of, something external, as its object. Now this is untrue. We are conscious of no reference, — of no representation ; we believe that the object of which we are conscious ig the object which exists. Nor could there possibly be such reference or representation ; for reference or representation supposes a knowledge already possessed of the object referred to or represented ;. but perception is the faculty by which our first knowledge is acquired, and, therefore, Cannot suppose a previous knowledge as its condition. But this I notice only by the way; this matter will be regularly considered in the sequel. ie bg I may here notice the false analysis, which has endeavored to take perception out of the list of our faculties, as Perception taken out — heing only a compound and derivative power. sr a | A ees: Perception, say Brown and others, supposes false analysis. memory and comparison and judgment; there- | fore, it is not a primary faculty of mind. Noth- ing can be more erroneous than this reasoning. In the first place, I have formerly shown you that consciousness Supposes memory, and discrimination, and judgment; and, as perception does not pretend to be simpler than consciousness, but in fact only a modification of consciousness, that, therefore, the objection does not apply. But, in the second place, the objection is founded on a misapprehension of What a faculty properly is. It may be very true that an act of per ception cannot be realized simply and alone. I have often told you that the mental phenomena are never simple, and that as tissues 342 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXIV. are woven out of many threads, so a mental phenomenon is made up of many acts and affections, which we can only consider separately by abstraction, but can never even conceive as separately existing. In mathematics, we consider a triangle or a square, the sides and the angles apart from each other, though we are unable to conceive them existing independently of each other. But because the angles and sides exist only through each other, would it be correct to deny their reality as distinct mathematical elements? As in geometry, so is it in psychology. We admit that no faculty can exist itself alone; and that it is only by viewing the actual manifestations of mind in their different relations, that we are able by abstraction to analyze them into elements, which we refer to different faculties. Thus, for example, every judgment, every comparison, supposes two terms to be compared, and, therefore, supposes an act of representa- tive, or an act of acquisitive cognition. But go back to one or other of these acts, and you will find that each of them stipposes a judg- ment and amemory. If I represent in imagination the terms of comparison, there is involved a judgment; for the fact of their representation supposes the affirmation or judgment that they are called up, that they now ideally exist; and this judgment is only possible, as the result of a comparison of the present consciousness of their existence with a past consciousness of their non-existence, which comparison, again, is only possible through an act of memory. Connected with the preceding distinction of Perception and Sensation, is the distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of matter. This distine- tion cannot be omitted; but I shall not attempt to follow out the various difficult and doubtful problems which it presents.’ : It would only confuse you were I to attempt to determine, how far this distinction was known to the Atomic Physiologists, prior to Aristotle, and how far Aristotle himself was ‘aware of the principle on which it proceeds. —It is enough to notice, as the most remarkable é opinion of antiquity, that of Democritus, who, except the common qualities of body which are known by Touch, denied that the senses afforded us any informa tion concerning the real properties of matter. Among modern philosophers, Descartes was the first who res called attention to the distinction. According — to him, the primary qualities differ from the secondary in this,— The Primary and Secondary Qualities of matter. Historical notices of this distinction. Democritus. Descartes. 1 For a fuller and more accurate account of the history of this distinction, see Reid's Works, note D, — ED. ; Lecr. XXIV. METAPHYSICS. 843 that our knowledge of the former is more clear and distinct. than of the latter. “Longe alio modo cognoscimus quid sit in corpore magnitudo vel figura quam quid sit, in eodem corpore, color, vel odor, vel sapor. — Longe evidentius cognoscimus quid sit in corpore esse figuratum quam quid sit esse coloratum.”! “The qualities of external objects,” says Locke? “are of two sorts; first, Original or Primary; such are so- lidity, extension, motion or rest, number and figure. These are inseparable from body, and such as it constantly keeps in all its changes and alterations. Thus, take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, exten- sion, figure, mobility; divide it again, and it still retains the same qualities; and will do so still, though you divide it on till the parts become insensible. “Secondly, Secondary qualities, such as colors, smells, tastes, sounds, ete., which, whatever reality wé by mistake may attribute to them, are, in truth, nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us; and depend on the qualities before mentioned. “The ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them; and their patterns really exist in bodies themselves: but the ideas produced in us by secondary qualities, have no resem- blance of them at all: and what is sweet, blue, or warm in the idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call so.” Reid adopted the distinction of Descartes: he holds that our knowledge of the primary qualities is clear and distinct, whereas our knowledge of the second- ary qualities is obscure.’ “Eyery man,” he Says, “capable of reflection, may easily satisfy himself, that he has a perfectly clear and distinct notion of extension, divisibility, figure, and motion. The solidity of 1 body means no more, but that it excludes other bodies from occupying the same place at the same time. Hard- ness, softness, and fluidity, are different degrees of cohesion in the parts of a body. It is fluid, when it has no sensible cohesion ; soft when the cohesion is weak; and hard when it is strong: of the cause of this cohesion we are ignorant, but the thing itself we understand perfectly, being immediately informed of it by the Sense of touch. It is evident, therefore, that of the primary quali- ties we have a clear and distinct notion; we know what they are, . Locke. Reid. 1 Principia, i. § 69.— Ep. 3 Intellectual Powers, Essay ii. ch. xvii. _ 2 Essay ii. 8,9. The text isan abridgment Works, p. 314.— Ep. of Locke, not an exact quotation. — Ep. 4S METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXIV. though we may be ignorant of the causes.” But he did more, he endeavored to show that this difference arises from the circum- stance,-—that the perception, in the case of the primary qualities, is direct; in the case of the secondary, only relative. This he explains: “I observe, further, that the notion we have of primary qualities is direct and not relative only. A relative notion of a thing is, strictly speaking, no notion of the thing at all, but only of some relation which it bears to something else. “Thus gravity sometimes signifies the tendency of bodies towards the earth; sometimes it signifies the cause of that tendency; when it means the first, I have a direct and distinct notion of gravity; I sce it, and feel it, and know perfectly what it is; but this tend- ency must have a cause; we give the same name to the cause; and that cause has been an object of thought and of speculation. Now, what notion have we of this cause when we think and reason about it? It is evident we think of it as an unknown cause of a known effect. This is a relative notion, and it must be obscure, because it gives. us no conception of what the thing 1s, but of what relation it bears to something else. Every relation which a thing unknown bears to something that is known, may give a rela- tive notion of it; and there are many objects of thought, and of discourse, of ssittich our faculties can give no better than a relative notion. “ Waving premised these things to explain what is meant by a relative notion, it is evident, that our notion of Primary Qualities is not of this kind; we know what they are, and not barely what relation they bear to something else. «Tt is otherwise with Secondary Qualities. If you ask me, what is that quality or modification in a rose which I call its smell, [ am _at_ a loss what to answer directly. Upon reflection I find, that I have a distinct notion of the sensation which it produces in my ‘mind. But there can be nothing like to this sensation im the rose, because it is insentient. The quality in the rose is something which occasions the sensation in me; but what that something is, I know not. My senses give me no information upon this point. The only notion, therefore, my senses give is this, that smell in the rose is an unknown quality or Bete eadl which is the cause or ‘occasion of a sensation which I know well. The relation which this unknown quality bears to the sensation with which nature hath connected it, is all I learn from the sense of smelling; but this is evidently a relative notion. The same reasoning re apply, to eyery secondary quality. “Thus I think it appears, that mies is a real foundation for .— Extension and So- - Lect. XXIV. METAPHYSICS. 345 the distinction of primary from secondary qualities; and that they are distinguished by this, that of the primary we have by our senses a direct and distinct notion; but of the secondary only a relative notion, which must, because it is only relative, be obscure; they are conceived only as the unknown causes or occasions of certain sensations, with which we are well acquainted.” You will observe that the lists of the primary qualities given by Locke and Reid do not coincide. According The list of primary to Locke, these are Solidity, Extension, Motion, qualities given by VTardness, Softness, Roughness, Smoothness, and Locke, and that of 7 Pa Reid, do not coincide. Fluidity. Stewart. Mr. Stewart proposes another line of demar- cation. “I distinguish,” he says, “Extension eid Figure by the title of the Mathematical Affections of matter ; restricting the phrase, Primary Qualities, to Hardness and Soft- ness, Roughness and Smoothness, and other properties of the same description. ‘The line which I would draw between Primary and Secondary Qualities is this, that the former necessarily involve the notion of Hxtension, and consequently of, externality or out- ness; whereas the latter are only conceived as the unknown causes of known sensations; and when first apprehended by the mind, do not imply the existence of anything locally distinct from the sub- jects of its own consciousness.”? All these Primary Qualities, including Mr. Stewart’s Mathe- matical Affections of matter, may easily be re- The Primary Quali- duced to two,— Extension and Solidity. Thus: Hes reducible to two Figure, is a mere limitation of extension; Hard- lidity. ness, Softness, Fluidity, are only Solidity vari- ously modified,—only its different degrees ; while Roughness and Smoothness denote only the sensations con- nected with certain perceptions of Solidity. On the other hand, in regard to Divisibility (which is proper to Reid), and to Motion, —these can hardly be mere data of sense. Divisibility supposes division, and a body divided supposes memory; for if we did not remember that it had been one, we should not know that it is now two; we could not compare its present with its former state; and it is by this comparison alone that we learn the fact of division. As to Motion, this supposes the exercise of memory, and the notion ‘of time, and, therefore, we do not owe it exclusively to. sense. Finally, as to Number, which is peculiar to Locke, it is evident that this, far from being a quality of matter, is only an abstract 1 Phil, Essays, Works, vol. vy. pp. 116, 117. 44 346 METAPHYSICS. Lecr, XXIY¥. notion, —the fabrication of the intellect, and not a datum of sense.) Thus, then, we have reduced all primary qualities to Extension and Solidity, and we are, moreover, it would seem, beginning to see light, inasmuch as the primary qualities are those in which perception is dominant, the secondary those in which sensation prevails. But here we are again thrown back: for extension is only another name for space, and our notion of space is not one which we derive exclu- sively from sense, — not one which is generalized only from experi- ence; for it is one of our necessary notions, —-in fact, a fundamental condition of thought itself. The analysis of Kant, independently of all that has been done by other philosophers, has placed this truth beyond the possibility of doubt, to all those who understand the meaning and conditions of the problem. Jor us, however, this is not the time to discuss the subject. But, taking it for granted that the notion of space is native or @ priori, and not adventitious or a posteriori, are we not at once thrown back into idealism? For if extension itself be only a necessary mental mode, how can we make it a quality of external objects, known to us by sense; or how can we contrast the outer world, as the extended, with the inner, as the unextended world? ‘To this difficulty, I see only one possible answer. It is this: —It cannot be denied that space, as a necessary notion, is native to the mind; but does it follow, that, because there is an @ priori space, as a form of thought, we may not also have an empirical knowledge of extension, as an element of existence? The former, indeed, may be only the condition through which the latter is possible. It is true that, if we did not possess the general and necessary notion of space anterior to, or as the condition of, experience, from experience we should never obtain more than a generalized and contingent notion of space. But there seems to me no reason to deny, that because we have the one, we may not also have the other. If this be admitted, the whole difficulty is solved; and we may designate by the name of extension our empiti- cal knowledge of space, and reserve the term space for space con- This reduction in- volves a difficulty. What, solved. Space known a pri- and how ort; Extension a pos- teriori. sidered as a form or fundamental law of thought. 1 In this reduction of the primary qualities to Extension and Solidity, the author follows Royer-Collard, whose remarks will be found quoted in Reid’s Works, p. 844. From the notes appended to that quotation, it will be seen that Sir W. Hamilton’s final opinion differs in some respects from that expressed in the present text. — Ep. This matter 2 Here, on blank leaf of MS., are jotted the words, ‘‘So Causality.” [Causality de- pends, first, on thea priori necessity in the mind to think some cause; and, second, on experience, as revealing to us the particular cause of any effect.]— Oral Interpolation, Lut not at this passage. — Ep. Lrecor. XXIV. METAPHYSICS. 347 will, however, come appropriately to be considered, in treating of the Regulative Faculty. 7 The following is the result of what I think an accurate analysis would afford, though there are no doubt many General result.—In difficulties to be explained. — That our knowl- the Primary Qualities, ~~ edge of all the qualities of matter is merely Perception predomi- ‘ Sie nates; in the Second- relative. But though the qualities of matter _ ary, Sensation. are all known only in relation to our faculties, and the total or absolute cognition in perception is only matter in a certain relation to mind, and mind in a certain relation to matter; still, in different perceptions, one term of the relation may predominate, or the other. Where the objective ele- ment predominates, — where matter is known as principal in its relation to mind, and mind only known as subordinate in its corre- lation to matter,—-we have Perception Proper, rising superior to sensation; this is seen in the Primary Qualities. Where, on the contrary, the subjective element predominates,— where mind is known as principal in its relation to matter, and matter is only known as subordinate in its relation to mind, — we have Sensation Proper rising superior to perception; and this is seen in the Sec- ondary Qualities. The adequate illustration of this would, however, require both a longer, and a more abstruse, discussion than we can afford. 1 Cf. Reid’s Works, Notes D and D*.— Eb. * LECTURE XXV. THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY. I. — PERCEPTION. — OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL REALISM. From our previous discussions, you are now, in some measure, prepared for a consideration of the grounds on Pua Bane which philosophers have sO generally asserted the scientific necessity of repressing the testi- mony of consciousness to the fact of our imme- diate perception of external objects, and of allowing us only a mediate knowledge of the material world: a procedure by which they either admit, or cannot rationally deny, that Consciousness is 2 mendacious witness; that Philosophy and the Common Sense of mankind are placed in contradiction ; nay, that the only legitimate philosophy is an absolute and universal skepticism, That conscious- ) ness, in perception, affords us, as I have stated, The testimony of an assurance of an intuitive cognition of the Consciousness in per- = non-ego, is not only notorious to evefy one who ception, notorious, and Oat : acknowledged by phi. Will interrogate consciousness as to the fact, but losophersofallclasses. is, aS I have already shown you, acknowledged Hume quoted. not only by cosmothetic idealists, but even by absolute idealists and skeptics. “It seems evi- dent,” says Hume, who in this concession must be allowed to express the common acknowledgment of philosophers, “that when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always sup- pose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence, uniform and - entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who per- ceive or contemplate it. But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or Realism. Leor. XXV- METAPHYSICS: 8349 perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are received, without being ever able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object.”? In considering this subject, it is manifest that, before rejecting the testimony of consciousness to our immediate The discussion di- knowledge of the non-ego, the philosophers vided into two parts. were bound, in the first place, to evince the absolute necessity of their rejection; and, in the second place, in substituting an hypothesis in the room of the rejected fact, they were bound to substitute a legitimate hypothesis, —that is, one which does not violate the laws under which an hypothesis can be rationally proposed. I shall, therefore, divide the discussion into two sections. In the former,I shall state the rea- sons, as far as I have been able to discover them, on which philoso- phers have attempted to manifest the impossibility of acquiescing in the testimony of consciousness, and the general belief of man- kind; and, at the same time, endeavor to refute these reascns, by showing that they do not establish the necessity required. In the latter, I shall attempt to prove that the hypothesis proposed by the philosophers, in place of the fact of consciousness, does not fulfil the conditions of a legitimate hypothesis, — in fact, violates them almost all. In the first place, then, in regard to the reasons assigned by phi- losophers for their refusal of the fact of our I. Reasons for re- immediate perception of external things, — of Seba ara these I have been able to collect in all five. As perception, detailea .they cannot be very briefly stated, I shall not and criticized, first enumerate them together, and then con- sider each in detail; but shall consider them one after the other, without any general and preliminary statement. The first, and highest, ground on which it may be held, that the object immediately known in perception is a modification of the mind itself, is the following: Perception is a cognition or act of knowledge; 4 cognition is an immanent act of mind; but to suppose the cogni- tion of anything external to the mind, would be to suppose an act of the mind going out of itself, in other words, a transeunt act; but action supposes existence, and nothing can act where it is not; therefore, to act out of self is to exist out of self, which is absurd.? The first ground of rejection, 1 Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Behandlung der empirischen Psychologie, vol. i. § xii., Essays, ete. [Of the Academical or Skep- § 81, p.189. [Biunde refers to Fichte as hold- tical Philosophy, Essays, p. 367, edit.1758. Phil- ing the principle of this argument. — Ep.} osophical Works, vol. iv. p. 177. —ED.] Cf. Schulze, Anthropologie, § £8, p. 107, (edit: * See Biunde, Versuch einer systematischen 1826.) [Cicero, Acad. Quest., iv. 24.—Ep.} 350 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XXV. This argument, though I have never met with it explicitly announced, is still implicitly supposed in the ear arguments of those philosophers who hold, that 1. Our inability to y Z conceive how the fact the mind cannot be conscious of aught beyond of consciousness is its own modifications. It will not stand exami- possible, no ground nation. It is very true that we can neither for denying its possi- < ° ; bility. prove, nor even conceive, how the ego ¢an be conscious or immediately cognitive of the non- ego; but this, our ignorance, is no sufficient reason on which to deny the possibility of the fact. As a fact, anda primary fact, of consciousness, we must be ignorant of the why and how of its reality, for we have no higher notion through which to comprehend it, and, if it involve no contradiction, we are, philosophically, bound to accept it. But if we examine the argument a little closer, we shall find that it proves too much; for, on the same principle, we should establish the impossibility of any overt act of volition, — nay, even the impossibility of all agency and mutual causation. For if, on the ground that nothing can act out of itself, because nothing exists out of itself, we deny to mind the immediate knowledge of things external; on the same principle, we must deny to mind the power of determining any muscular movement of the body. And if the action of every existence were limited to the sphere of that existence: itself} then, no one thing could act upon any other thing, and all action and reiction, in the universe, would be impossible. This is a general absurdity, which follows from the principle in question. But there is a peculiar and proximate absurdity into which this theory runs, in the attempt it makes to escape the inex- plicable. It is this: — The cosmothetic idealists, who found their doctrine on the impossibility of mind acting out of itself, in relation to matter, are obliged to admit the still less conceivable possibility of matter acting out of itself, in relation to mind. They deny that mind is immediately conscious of matter; and, to save the phe- nomenon of perception, they assert that the non-ego, as given in that act, is only an illusive representation of the non-ego, in, and by, the ego. Well, admitting this, and allowing them to belie the testimony of consciousness to the reality of the non-ego as per- ceived, what do they gain by this? They surrender the simple datum of consciousness, — that the external object is immediately known ; and, in liew of that real object, they substitute a representa- tive object. But still they hold (at least those who do not fly to some hyperphysical hypothesis) that the mind is determined to this Refuted. 2. The reason ad- duced involves a gen- eral absurdity. 3. Involves a special absurdity. Lecr. XXV. METAPHYSICS. 851 representation by the material reality, to which material reality they must, therefore, accord the very transeunt efficiency which they deny to the immaterial principle. This first and highest ground, therefore, on which it is attempted to establish the necessity of a representative perception, is not only insuflicient, but. self-contra- dictory. | The second ground on which it has been attempted to establish the necessity of this hypothesis, is one which has been more generally and more openly founded on than the preceding. Mind and matter, it is said, are substances, not only of different, but of the most opposite, natures ; separated, as some philosophers express it, by the whole diameter of being: but what immediately knows must be of a nature correspondent, analogous, to that which is known ; mind cannot, therefore, be conscious or immediately cognizant of what is so disproportioned to its essence as matter. This principle is one whose influence is seen pervading the whole history of philosophy, and the tracing of this This principle has : k . : influenced the whole 22fluence would form the subject of a curious history of philosophy. treatise.’ To it we principally owe the doctrine of a representative perception, in one or other of - its forms; and in a higher or lower potence, according as the repre- sentative object was held to be, in relation to mind, of a nature either the same or similar. Derivative from the principle in its lower potence or degree (that is, the immediate object being sup- posed to be only something similar to the mind), we have, among other less celebrated and less definite theories, the intentional spe- cies of the schoolmen (at least as generally held), and the ideas of Malebranche and Berkeley. In its higher potence (that is, where the representative object is supposed to be of a nature not merely sim- ilar to, but identical with, mind, though it may be numerically differ- ent from individual minds), it affords us, among other modifications, the gnostic reasons (Adyou yrworixo’) of the Platonists, the preéaxist- ing species of Avicenna and other Arabian Aristotelians, the ideas of Descartes, Arnauld, Leibnitz, Buftier, and Condillac, the phe- nomena of Kant, and the external states of Dr. Brown. It is doubtful to which head we should refer Locke, and Newton, and Clarke, — nay, whether we should not refer them to the class of those who, like Democritus, Epicurus, and Digby, viewed the repre- sentative or immediate object, as a material efflux or propagation from the external reality to the brain. _ This principle also indirectly determined many celebrated theo- The second ground of rejection. 1 Cf. Reid’s Works, p. 300, note, and Discussions, p. 61 — Ep. 352 METAPHYSICS. Leor. XXYV. ries in philosophy, as the hierarchical gradation of souls or sub- stantial faculties, held by many followers of Aristotle, the dyou or vchicular media of the Platonists, the plastic medium of Cudworth and Le Clerc, the doctrine of the community, oneness, or identity of the human intellect in all men, maintained by the Aphrodisian, Themistius, Averroes, Cajetanus, and Zabarella, the vision of all things in the Deity of Malebranche, and the Cartesian and Leibnit- zian doctrine of assistance and preéstablished harmony. To tlie influence of the same principle, through the refusal of the testimony of consciousness to the duality of our knowledge, are also medi- ately to be traced the unitarian systems of absolute identity, mate- rialism, and idealism. : But, if no principle was ever more universal in its effects, none was ever more arbitrarily assumed. It not only can pretend to no necessity; it has absolutely no probability in its favor. Some philosophers, as Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Alemzon, have even held that the rela- tion of knowledge supposes, not a similarity or sameness between subject and object, but, in fact, a contrariety or opposition; and Aristotle himself is sometimes in favor of this opinion, though, sometimes, it would appear, in favor of the other. But, however this may be, each assertion is just as likely, and just as unphilosophical, as its converse. We know, and can know, nothing a@ priori of what is possible or impossible to mind, and it is only by observation and by generalization @ posteriori, that we can ever hope to attain any insight into the question. But the very first fact of our experience contradicts the assertion, that mind, as of an oe Naanart sf opposite nature, can have no immediate cog- de fenenes! nizance of matter; for the primary datum of consciousness is, that, in perception, we have an intuitive knowledge of the ego and of the non-ego, equally and at once. This second ground, therefore, affords us no stronger neces- sity than the first, for denying the possibility of the fact of which consciousness assures us. | But, 1. Is perfectly arbitrary. 2. Is unphilosophi- cal. The third ground on which the representative hypothesis of per- ception is founded, and that apparently alone contemplated by Reid and Stewart, is, that the mind can only know immediately that to which it is immediately present; but as external objects can neither them- selyes come into the mind, nor the mind go out to them, such presence is impossible; therefore, external objects can only be The third ground of rejection. 1 See above, p. 205, note. — Eb. 9 Lecr. XXV. METAPHYSICS: 358 mediately known, through some representative object, whether that object be a modification of mind, or something in immediate rela- tion to the mind. It was this difficulty of bringing the subject and object into proximate relation, that, in part, determined all the vari- ous schemes of a representative perception; but it seems to have been the one which solely determined the peculiar form of that doctrine in the philosophy of Democritus, Epicurus, Digby, and others, under which it is held, that the immediate or internal object is a representative emanation, propagated from the external reality to the sensorium. Now this objection to the immediate cognition of external objects, has, as far as I know, been redargued in three different ways. In the first place, it has been denied, that the external reality cannot itself come into the mind. In the second, it has been asserted, that a faculty of the mind itself does actually go out to the external reality ; and, in the third place, it has been maintained that, though the mind neither goes out, nor the reality comes in and Hough subject and object are, therefore, not present to each other, still that the mind, through the agency of God, has an imme- diate perception of the external object. The first mode of obviating the present objection to the possi- bility of an immediate perception, might be thought too absurd to have been ever attempted. But the observation of Varro, that there is nothing so absurd which has not been asserted by some philosopher, is not destined to be negatived in the present instance. In Opposi- tion to Locke’s thesis, “ that the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them,” and in opposition to the whole doctrine of representation, it is maintained, in terms, by Sergeant, that “I know the very thing; therefore, the very thing is in my act of knowledge; but my act ‘of knowledge is in my understanding; therefore, the thing which is in my Enowte edge, is also in my bind edataardai ge We may suspect that this is only a paradoxical way of stating his opinion; but though this author, the earliest and one of the most eloquent of Locke’s antag- onists, be destitute neither of learning nor of acuteness, I must Has been redargued in three different ways. The first by Ser- geant. 1In a fragment of his satire Ewmenides, jy Cicero; De Divinatione, ii. 58: “Sed, nescio preserved by Nonius Marcellus, De Proprietate quomodo, nihil tam absurde dici potest, quod Sermonis, ¢. i. n. 275, v. Infans: — non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum.”— Ep. “Postremo nemo egrotus quicquam somniat Tam infandum quod non aliquis dicat philosophus.” 2 Solid Philosophy p. 29 (i » Pp. 29. : [See above, lect. But the words in the text occur more exactly xxiy. p. 831.—Ep.] \ 45 254 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XXV. confess, that Locke and Molyneux cannot be blamed in pronouncing his doctrine unintelligible. The second mode of obviating the objection, — by allowing to the mind a power of sallying out to the external The second by Em- reality, has higher authority in its favor. That pedocles, the Platon- Ae : : c bike, bo. vision is effected by a perceptive emanation from the eye, was held by Empedocles, the Platonists, and Stoics, and was adopted also by Alexander the Aphrodisian, by | Euclid, Ptolemy, Galen, and Alchindus.!. This opinion, as held by these philosophers, was limited ; and, though erroneous, is not to be viewed as irrational. But in the hands of Lord Monboddo, it is carried to an absurdity which leaves even Sergeant far behind. “The mind,” says the learned author of Antient Metaphysics, “1s not where the body is, when it perceives what is distant from the body, either in time or place, because nothing can act but when and where it is. Now the mind acts when it perceives. The mind, therefore, of every animal who has memory or imagination, acts, and, by consequence, exists, when and where the body is not ; for it perceives objects distant from the body, both in time and place.” The third mode is apparently that adopted by Reid and Stewart, who hold, that the mind has an immediate knowledge of the external reality, though the subject and object may not be present to each other; and, though this be not explicitly or obtrusively stated, that the mind obtains this immediate knowledge through the agency of God. Dr. Reid’s doctrine of perception is thus summed up by Mr. Stewart: “To what then, it may be asked, does this statement amount? Merely to this: that the mind is so formed that certain impressions produced on our organs of sense by external objects, are followed by correspondent sensations and that these sensations, (which have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter than the words of a language have to the things they denote), are followed by a perception of the existence and qualities of the bodies, by which the impressions are made; that all the steps of this process are equally incomprehensible ; and that, for anything we can prove to the contrary, the connection between the sensation and the percep- tion, as well as that between the impression and the sensation, may be both arbitrary; that it is therefore by no means impossible, that our sensations may be merely the occasions on which the corres- pondent perceptions are excited; and that, at any rate, the consid- eration of these sensations, which are attributes of mind, can throw The third by Reid and Stewart. 1 See above, lect. xxi. p. 290. — Ep. 2 See Antient Metaphysics, vol. ii. p. 806, and above, lect. xxi. p. 291.— Ep. Lect. XXY. METAPHYSICS. 858 no light on the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the existence and qualities of body. From this view of the subject it follows, that it is the external objects themselves, and not any spe- cies or images of the objects, that the mind perceives; and that, although, by the constitution of our nature, certain sensations are rendered the constant antecedents of our perceptions, yet it is just as difficult to explain how our perceptions are obtained by their means, as it would be upon the supposition that the mind were all at once inspired with them, without any concomitant sensations whatever.” ! This statement, when illustrated by the doctrine of these philoso- phers in regard to the distinctions of Efficient their opinion almost — and Physical Causes, might be almost identified identical with the doc- ; : : : trine of Occasional) With the Cartesian doctrine of Occasional Cau- Causes. * " ses. According to Reid and Stewart,?-— and the opinion has been more explicitly asserted by the latter, — there is no really efficient cause in nature but one, viz., the Deity. What are called physical causes and effects being antece- dents and consequents, but not in virtue of any mutual and neces- sary dependence ; — the only efficient being God, who, on occasion of the antecedent, which is called the physical cause, produces the consequent, which is called the physical effect. So in the case of perception ; the cognition of the external object is not, or may not be, a consequence of the immediate and natural relation of that object to the mind, but of the agency of God, who, as it were, reveals the outer existence to our perception. A similar doctrine is held by a great German philosopher, Frederick Henry Jacobi.’ To this opinion many objections occur. In the first place, so far is it from being, as Mr. Stewart affirms, a plain And exposed to statement of the facts, apart from all hypothesis, eeeaaa it is manifestly hypothetical. In the second 2. Mystical. place, the hypothesis assumes an occult prin- 3. Hyperphysical. ciple ; — it is mystical. In the third place, the hypothesis is hyperphysical, — calling in the proximate assistance of the Deity, while the necessity of such inter- vention is not established. In the fourth place, me Pega it goes even far to frustrate the whole doctrine Perception. of the two philosophers in regard to perception, as a doctrine of intuition. For if God has be- stowed on me the faculty of immediately perceiving the external 1 Stewart’s Works, vol. ii. pp. 111, 112. 38 David Hume, iiber den Glauben, Werke, ii. 2 Reid, Intellectual Powers, Essay ii. c. vi; p. 165; Uber die Lehre des Spinoza, Werke, iy. Active Powers, Essay i. c. y. vi.: Essay iv.c.ii. p. 211. Quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's iii. Stewart, Elements, vol.i.c. i. § 2; vol. ii. Works, p. 793. —Ep. c. iy. § 1.—Ep. 356 METAPHYSICS. — Lect. XXV object, there is no need to suppose the necessity of an immediate intervention of the Deity to make that act effectual; and if, on the contrary, the perception I have of the reality is only excited by the agency of God, then I can hardly be held to know that reality, immediately and in itself, but only mediately, through the notion of it determined in my mind. Let us try, then, whether it be impossible, not to explain (for that it would be ridiculous to dream of attempting), The possibility ofan but to render intelligible the possibility of an immediate perception immediate perception of external objects ; with- of external objects in- “ F telligible. out assuming any of the three preceding hy- potheses, and without postulating aught that can fairly be refused. Now in the first place, there is no good ground to suppose, that the mind is situate solely in the brain, or ex- 1. Nogroundtosup- _clusively in any one part of the body. On the pose that the mind is Gontrary, the supposition that it is really present situated solely in any i : one part of the body. | Wherever we are conscious that it acts,—in a word, the Peripatetic aphorism, the soul is all. in the whole and all in every part,1—1is more philosophical, and, consequently, more probable than any other opinion. It has not been always noticed, even by those who deem themselves the chosen champions of the immateriality of mind, that we materialize mind when we attribute to it the relations of matter. Thus, we cannot attribute a local seat to the soul, without clothing it with the properties of extension and place, and those who suppose this seat to be but a point, only aggravate the difficulty. Admitting the spirituality of mind, all that we know of the relation of soul and body is, that the former is connected with the latter in a way of which we are wholly ignorant; and that it holds relations, different both in degree and kind, with different parts of the organism. We have no right, however, to say that it-is limited to any one part of the organism; for even if we admit that the nervous system is the part to which it is proximately united, still the nervous system 1S itself universally ramified throughout the body; and we have no more right to deny that the mind feels at the finger-points, as con- sciousness assures us, than to assert that it thinks exclusively in the brain. The sum of our knowledge of the connection of mind and body is, therefore, this, — that the mental modifications are depen- We materialize mind in attributing to it the relations of matter. 1 Arist. de Anima i. 5, 81; °Ev EKaT epw tov spatium loci, sed in unoquoque corpore et in poplwy &mavr’ éumdpxet Ta wdpia THs Wux7s. toto tota est, et in qualibet ejus parte tota Augustin, De Trinitate, vi. 6: ‘‘ [deo simplicior est.” See above, lect. xx. p. 271, note 11.— est corpore, quia non mole diffunditur per Ep. Lect. XXV. METAPHYSICS. SOT dent on certain corporeal conditions; but of the nature of these conditions we know nothing. For example, we know, by experience, that the mind perceives only through certain organs of sense, and that, through these different organs, it perceives in a different manner. But whether the senses be instruments, whether they“be media, or whether they be only partial outlets to the mind incarcerated in the body, —on all this we can only theorize and con- jecture. We have no reason whatever to believe, contrary to the testimony of consciousness, that there is an action or affection of the bodily sense previous to the mental perception; or that the mind only perceives in the head, in consequence of the impression on the organ. On the other hand, we have no reason whatever to doubt the report of consciousness, that we actu- ip Pah ta aacant hy. aily perceive at the external point of sensation, perceiving the material . ‘ ‘ ality? and that we perceive the material reality. But what is meant by perceiving the material reality ? In the first place, it does not mean that we perceive the material reality absolutely and in itself, that is, out of relation to our organs and faculties; on the contrary, the total'’and real object of percep- tion is the external object under relation to our sense and faculty of cognition. But though thus relative to us, the object is still no representation, —no modification of the ego. It is the non-ego,— the non-ego modified, and relative, it may be, but still the non-ego. I formerly illustrated this to you by a sup- position. Suppose that the total object of consciousness in percep- tion is == 12; and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, the material sense 3, and the mind 3;—this may enable you to form some rude conjecture of the nature of the object of percep- tion.! But, in the second place, what is meant by the external object perceived? Nothing can be conceived more ridiculous than the opinion of philosophers in regard to this. For example, it has been curi- ously held (and Reid is no exception), that in looking at the sun, moon, or any other object of sight, we are, on the one doctrine, actually conscious of these distant objects; or, on the other, that these distant objects are those really represented in the mind. Nothing can be more absurd: we perceive, through no sense, aught external but what is in immediate relation and in immediate contact with its organ; and that is true which Demo- Sum of our knowl- edge of the connection of mind and body. The total and real object of Perception, what. What is meant by the external object perceived? 1 See above, lect. viii. p. 108. —Ep. 358 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXV. critus of old asserted, that all our senses are only modifications of touch! Through the eye we perceive nothing but the rays of light in relation to, and in contact with, the retina; what we add to this perception must not be taken into account. The same is true of the other senses. Now, what is there Nothing especially monstrous or inconceivable in this doctrme of Sele ta an immediate perception? The objects are diate perception. neither carried into the mind, nor the mind - made to sally out to them; nor do we require a miracle to justify its possibility. In fact, the consciousness of external objects, on this doctrine, 1s not more inconceivable than the consciousness of species or ideas on the doctrine of the school- men, Malebranche, or Berkeley. In either case, there is a con- sciousness of the non-ego, and, in either case, the ego and non-ego are in intimate relation. There is, in fact, on this hypothesis, no greater marvel, that the mind should be cognizant of the external reality, than that it should be connected with a body at all. The latter being the case, the former is not even improbable; all inex- plicable as both equally remain. “ We are unable,” says Pascal, “to conceive what is mind; we are unable to conceive what 1s matter; still less are we able to conceive how these are united ; — yet this is our proper nature.”* So much in refutation of the third ground of difficulty to the doctrine of an immediate perception. The fourth ground of rejection is that of Hume. It is alleged by him in the sequel of the paragraph of which I have already quoted to you the commence- ment: “This universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest phi- losophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being ever able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table which exists independent of us suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted that the existences, which we consider, when we say this house, and that tree, are noth- ing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representa- tions of other existences, which remain uniform and independent.” The fourth ground of rejection. Hume quoted. 1 See below, lect. xxvii. p. 374. — ED. 3 Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 2 Pensées [partie i. art. vi. 26; vol ii p. 74, sect. xii. [Of the Academical or Skeptical Phi- edit. Faugére, — Ep.] losophy, p- 867, 868, edit. 1758. — Ep.] 59 sie) Lect. XXV. METAPHYSICS. This objection to the veracity of consciousness will not occasion us much trouble. Its refutation is, in fact, con- tained in the very statement of the real ex- ternal object of perception. The whole argu- ment consists in a mistake of what that object is. That a thing, viewed close to the eye, should appear larger and differently figured, than when scen at a distance, and that, at too great a distance, it should even become for us invisible altogether ; — this only shows that what changes the real object of sight,— the reflected rays in contact with the eye, —also changes, as it ought to change, our perception of such object. This ground of diffi- culty could be refuted through the whole senses ; but its weight is not sufficient to entitle it to any further consideration The fifth ground on which the necessity of substituting a repre- sentative for an intuitive perception has been maintained, is that of Fichte2 It asserts that the nature of the ego, as an intelligence en- dowed with will, makes it absolutely necessary, that, of all external objects of perception, there should be representative modifications in the mind. For as the ego itself is that which wills; therefore, in so far as the will tends toward objects, these must lie within the ego. An external reality cannot lie within the ego; there must, therefore, be supposed, within the mind, a representation of this reality different from the reality itself. This fifth argument involves sundry vices, and is not of greater value than the four preceding. Involves sundry In the first place, it proceeds on the assertion, vices. that the objects on which the will is directed, 1. Asserts that the : era's “14° ° objects on which the ™USt lie within the willing ego itself. But how will is directed must 18 this assertion proved? ‘That the will ean lie within the ego. only tend toward those things of which the ego has itself a knowledge, is undoubtedly true. But from this it does not follow, that the object to which the knowledge is relative, must, at the same time, be present with it in the ego; but if there be a perceptive cognition, that is, a con- sciousness of some object external to the ego, this perception is competent to excite, and to direct, the will, notwithstanding that its object lies without the ego. That, therefore, no immediate knowledge of external objects is possible, and that consciousness Proceeds on a mis- take of what the ob- ject in perception is. The fifth ground of rejection. 1 Vide Schulze, Anthropologie, ii. 49. 313 et seg. ; and his Bestimmung des Menochen. 2 See especially his Grundlage der gesammten Werke, ii. p. 217 et seg. —Ep. Wissenschafislehre, §§ 4, 10. Werke, i. pp. 134, 360 METAPHYSICS. _ Lect. XXV. is exclusively limited to the ego, is not evinced, by this argument of Fichte, but simply assumed. In the second place, this argument is faulty, in that it takes no account of the difference between those cogni- 2. Takes vo account” tions which lie at the root of the Gnergies/o: of the difference be- i : ce W copuiouN, will, and the other kinds of knowledge. ‘Thus, our will never tends to what is present, — to what we possess, and immediately cognize ; but is always directed on the future, and is concerned either with the continuance of those states of the ego, which are already in existence, or with the pro- duction of wholly novel states. But the future cannot be intui- tively, immediately, perceived, but only represented and mediately conceived, That a mediate cognition is necessary, as the condition of an act of will,— this does not prove, that every cognition must be mediate.’ We have thus found by an examination of the various grounds on which it has been attempted to establish _ These grounds ofre- the necessity of rejecting the testimony of con- jection are thus, one y s Sih 2 and all, incompetent. sciousness to the intuitive perception of the external world, that these grounds are, one and all, incompetent. I shall proceed in my next Lecture to the second section of the discussion, —to consider the nature of the hypothesis of Representation or Cosmothetic Idealism, by which it is proposed to replace the fact of consciousness, and the doctrine of Natural Realism ; and shall show you that this hypothesis, though, under various modifications, adopted in almost every system of philosophy, fulfils none of the conditions of a legitimate hypothesis. 1 Vide Schulze, Anthropologie, ii. p.52. [Cf. § 58, third edit. — Ep.] LECTURE XX VI. THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY. I. — PERCEPTION.— THE REPRESENTATIVE HYPOTHESIS. No opinion has perhaps been so universally adopted in the vari- ous schools of philosophy, and more especially of modern philosophy, as the doctrine of a Rep- resentative Perception ; and, in our last Lecture, I was engaged in considering the grounds on which this doctrine reposes. The order of the discussion was determined by the order of the subject. It is manifest, that, in rejecting the testimony of consciousness to our immediate knowledge of the non-ego, the philosophers were bound to evince the absolute necessity of their rejection; and, in the second place, in substituting an hypothesis in the room of the rejected fact, they were bound to substitute a legitimate hypothesis, that is, one which does not violate the laws under which an hypoth- esis can be rationally proposed. I stated, therefore, that I should divide the criticism of their doctrine into two sections: that, in the former, I should state the reasdns which have persuaded philoso- phers of the impossibility of acquiescing in the evidence of con- sciousness, endeavoring at the same time to show that these reasons afford no warrant to the conclusion which they are supposed even to necessitate ; and, in the latter, attempt to prove, that the hypoth- esis proposed by philosophers in lieu of the fact of consciousness, does not fulfil the conditions of a legitimate hypothesis, and is, therefore, not only unnecessary, but inadmissible. The first of these sections terminated the Lecture. I stated that there are in all five grounds, on which philosophers have deemed themselves compelled to reject the fact of our immediate consciousness . See of the non-ego in perception, and to place phi- Representative Per- | losophy in contradiction to the common sense of ception. It violates mankind. The grounds I considered in detail, all the conditions ofa == and gave you some of the more manifest rea- legitimate hypothesis. : tind : sons which went to prove their insufficiency. This discussion I shall not attempt to recapitulate ; and now proceed - | 46 Recapitulation. II. The nature of 862 METAPIIYSICS. Lect. XXVI to the second section of the subject, — to consider the hypothesis of a Representative Perception, by which it is proposed to replace the fact of consciousness which testifies to our immediate perception of the external world. On the hypothesis, the doctrine of Cosmo- thetic Idealism is established: on the fact, the doctrine of Natural Dualism. 1In the first place, from the grounds on which the cosmothetic a idealist would vindicate the necessity of his Conditions of a le- E i zitimate hypothesis. ejection of the datum of consciousness, the First, —Thatit benec- hypothesis itself is unnecessary. The examina- essary. The hypothe- tion of these grounds proves, that the fact of SS oh question unnee- consciousness is not shown to be impossible. So far, therefore, there is no necessity made out for its rejection. But it is said the fact of consciousness is inexpli- cable; we cannot understand how the immediate perception of an external object is possible: whereas the hypothesis of representation enables us to comprehend and explain the phenomenon, and is, therefore, if not absolutely necessary, at least entitled to favor and preference. But even on this lower, —-this precarious ground, the hypothesis is absolutely unnecessary. That, on the incomprehensi- bility of the fact of consciousness, it is allowable to displace the fact by an hypothesis, is of all absurdities the greatest. As a fact, —an ultimate fact of consciousness, it must be incomprehensible; and were it comprehensible, that is, did we know it in its causes, — did we know it as contained in some higher notion, — it would not be a primary fact of consciousness, —it would not be an ultimate datum of intelligence. Every how (drt) rests ultimately on a that (drt), every demonstration is deduced from something given and indemonstrable; all that is comprehensible hangs from some revealed? fact, which we must believe as actual, but cannot construe to the reflective intellect in its possibility. In consciousness, in the original spontaneity of intelligence (vots, locus principiorum), are revealed the primordial facts of our intelligent nature. But the cosmothetic idealist has no right to ask the natural realist for an explanation of the fact of consciousness ; supposing even that his own hypothesis were in itself both clear and probable, — suppos- ing that the consciousness of self were intelligible, and the con- sciousness of the not-self the reverse. For, on this supposition, the intelligible consciousness of self could not be an ultimate fact, but essary. 1 See Discussions, p. 63. the fact; of the fact which must be believed, 2 [This expression is not meant to imply though it connot be understood, cannot be anything hyperphysical. Itis used todenote explained.] Discussions, p. 63, note. — ED. ‘the ultimate and incomprehensible nature of : Lect. XXVI. METAPHYSICS. 363 must be comprehended through a higher cognition, — a higher con- sciousness, which would again be itself either comprehensible or not. If comprehensible, this would of course require a still higher cognition, and so on till we arrive at some datum of intelligence, which, as highest, we could not understand through a higher; so that, at best, the hypothesis of representation, proposed in place of the fact of consciousness, only removes the difficulty by one or two steps. The end to be gained is thus of no value; and, for this end, as we have seen and shall see, there would be sacrificed the possi- bility of philosophy as a rational knowledge altogether; and, in the possibility of philosophy, of course, the possibility of the very hypothesis itself. But is the hypothesis really in itself a whit more intelligible than the fact which it displaces? The reverse The hypothesis not jg true. What does the hypothesis suppose? . he It supposes that the mind can represent that places. of which it knows nothing,—that of which it is ignorant. Is this more comprehensible than the simple fact, that the mind immediately knows what is different from itself, and what is really an affection of the bodily organism ? It seems, in truth, not only incomprehensible, but contradictory. The hypothesis of a representative perception thus violates the first condition of a legitimate hypothesis, —it is unnecessary ;— “hay, not only unnecessary, it cannot do what it professes, — it explains nothing, it renders nothing comprehensible. The second condition of a legitimate hypothesis is, that it shall } not subvert that which it is devised to explain; Second,—That the that it shall not explode the system of which ea een it forms a part. But this, the hypothesis in is devised to explain. Question does; it annihilates itself in the de- struction of the whole edifice of knowledge. Belying the testimony of consciousness to our immediate percep- tion of an outer world, it belies the veracity of consciousness alto- gether; and the truth of consciousness is the condition of the possibility of all knowledge. The third condition of a legitimate hypothesis, is, that the fact or facts, in explanation of which it is devised, Third,—That the be ascertained really to exist, and be not them- Le aogare i; selves hypothetical. But so far is the principal is devised, be not hy. 42ct which the hypothesis of a representative pothetical. perception is proposed to explain, from being certain, that its reality is even rendered prob- lematical by the proposed explanation itself. The facts which this 364 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXV¥ hypothesis supposes to be ascertained and established are two — first, the fact of an external world existing; sec- Two facts supposed ond, the fact of an internal world knowing. by the hypothesis in ‘These, the hypothesis take for granted. For it question, and their : 3 connection sought to 18 asked, How are these connected? — How can be explained by it. the internal world know the external world existing? And, in answer to this problem, the hypothesis of representation is advanced as explaining the mode of their correlation. This hypothesis denies the immediate connec- tion of the two facts; it denies that the mind, the internal world, can be immediately cognizant of matter, the external; and between the two worlds it interpolates a representation which is at once the object known by mind, and as known, an image vicarious or repre- sentative of matter, ex hypothesi, in itself unknown. But mark the vice of the procedure. We can only, 1°, Assert the existence of an external world, inasmuch as we know it to exist; and we can. only, 2°, Assert that one thing is representative of another, inasmuch as the thing represented is known, independently of the representation. But how does the hypothesis of a representative perception proceed? It actually converts the fact into an hypoth- esis; actually converts the hypothesis into a fact. On this theory, we do not know the existence of an external world, except on the | supposition that that which we do know, truly represents it as © existing. The hypothetical realist cannot, therefore, establish the fact of the external world, except upon the fact of its representa- tion. This is manifest. We have, therefore, next to ask him, how he knows the fact, that the external world is actually represented. A representation supposes something represented, and the repre- sentation of the external world supposes the existence of that world. Now, the hypothetical realist, when asked how he proves the reality of the outer world, which, ex hypothesi, he does not know, can only say that he infers its existence from the fact of its representation. But the fact of the representation of an external world supposes the existence of that world; therefore, he is again at the point from which he started. He has been arguing in a circle. There is thus a see-saw between the hypothesis and the fact; the fact is assumed as an hypothesis; the hypothesis ex- plained as a fact; each is established, each is expounded, by the other.. To account for the possibility of an unknown external world, the hypothesis of representation is devised; and to account for the possibility of representation, we imagine the Bee of an ee world. | | The procedure vi- cious. 65 se) Lect. XXVI. METAPHYSICS. The cosmothetic idealist thus begs the fact which he would explain. And, on the hypothesis of a representative perception, it is admitted by the philosophers themselves who hold it, that the descent to absolute idealism is a logical precipice, from which they can alone attempt to save themselves by appealing to the natural beliefs, — to the common-sense of mankind, that is to the testimony of that very consciousness to which their own hypothesis gives the lie. In the fourth place, a legitimate hypothesis must save the phe- nomena which it is invented to explain, that is, Pourth,—That it it must account for them adequately and with- en Ee ierecd out exclusion, distortion, or mutilation. But to explain. the hypothesis of a representative perception proposes to accomplish its end only by first destroying, and then attempting to recreate, the phenomena, for the fact of which it should, as a legitimate hypothesis, only afford a reason. The total, the entire phenomenon to be explained, is_ the phenomenon given in consciousness of the immediate knowl- edge by me, or mind, of an existence different from me, or mind. This phenomenon, however, the hypothesis in The hypothesis in question does not preserve entire. On the con- question sunders and : ais A é : BWverG'the'yhenom: ary; it hews it into two ;—into the immediate enon to be explained. knowledge by me, and into the existence of Something different from me;— or more briefly, into the intuition and the existence. It Separates, in its explana- tion, what is given it to explain as united. This procedure is, at best, monstrous; but this is not the worst. The entire phenome- non being cut in two, you will observe how the fragments are treated. The existence of the non-ego,—the one fragment, it admits; its intuition, its immediate cognition by the ego,—the other fragment, it disallows. Now mark what is the character of this proceeding. The former fragment of the phenomenon, —the fragment admitted, to us exists only through the other fragment which is rejected. The existence of an external world is only given us through its intuition, —we only believe it to exist because we believe that we immediately know it to exist, or are conscious of it as existing. The intuition is the ratio cognoscendi, and, therefore, to us the ratio essendi, of a material universe. Prove to me that I am wrong in regard to my intuition of an outer world, and I will grant at once, that I have no ground for suppos- ing I am right in regard to the existence of that world. To anni- hilate the intuition is to annihilate what is prior and constitutive in the phenomenon; and to annihilate what is prior and consti- c00 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXVi. tutive in the phenomenon, is to annihilate the phswnomenon alto- gether. The existence of a material world is no longer, therefore, even a truncated, even a fractional, fact of consciousness; for the — fact of the existence of a material world, given in consciousness, necessarily vanished with the fact of the intuition on which it rested. The absurdity is about the same as if we should attempt to explain the existence of color, on an hypothesis which denied the existence of extension. A representative perception is thus an hypothetical explanation of a supposititious fact ; it creates the nature it interprets." In the fifth place, the fact which a legitimate hypothesis explains, must be within the sphere of experience; but the fact of an external world, for which the cosmothetic idealist would account, transcends, ex. hypothest, all experience, being unknown in itself, and a mere hyperphysical assumption. In the sixth place, an hypothesis is probable in proportion as it works simply and naturally; that is, in propor- tion as it is dependent on no subsidiary hypothe- sis, — as it involves nothing petitory, occult, supernatural, as part and parcel of its explanation. In this respect, the doctrine of a representative perception is not less vicious than in others; to explain at all, it must not only postulate subsidiary hypotheses, but subsidiary miracles. The doctrine in question attempts to explain the knowledge of an unknown world, by the ratio of a representative perception: but it is impossible by any conceivable relation, to apply the ratio to the facts. The mental modification, of which, on, the doctrine of representation, we are exclusively conscious in perception, either represents a real external world, or it does not. The latter is a confession of absolute ideal- ism; we have, therefore, only to consider the former. The hypothesis of a representative perception supposes, that the mind does not know the external world, which it represents; for Fifth, —That the fact to be explained lie within the sphere of experience. Sixth, — The hypoth- esis must be single. 1 [With the hypothetical realist or cosmo- thetic idealist, it has been a puzzling problem to resolve how, on their doctrine of.a repre- sentative perception, the mind can attain thie notion of externality, or outness, far more be impressed with the ipvincible belief of the reality, and known reality, of an external world. Their attempts at this solution, are as unsatisfactory as they are operose. On the doctrine of an intuitive perception, all this is given in the fact of an immediate knowledge of the non ego. To us, therefore, the problem does not exist; and Mr. Stewart appears to me to have misunderstood the conditions of his own doctrine, or rather not to have formed avery clear conception of an intuitive perception, when he endeavors to explain, by inference and hypothesis, a knowledge and belief in the outness of the objects of sense, and when he denies the reality of our sensations at the points where we are conscious that they are ] [See Stewart, Phil. Essays, Works, v. 101 et sez. —ED.] Lrcr. XXVI. METAPHYSICS. 367 this hypothesis is expressly devised only on the supposed impos- sibility of an immediate knowledge of aught The hypothesis of different from, and external to, the mind. The Representation de-_percipient: mind must, therefore, be, somehow pendent on subsidi- : : Bh thy pothesds. or other, determined to represent the reality of which it is ignorant. Now, here one of two alternatives is necessary ;— either the mind blindly determines itself to this representation, or it is determined to it by some intelli- gent and knowing cause, different from itself. The former alterna- tive would be preferable, inasmuch as it is the more simple, and assumes nothing hyperphysical, were it not irrational, as wholly incompetent to account for the phenomenon. On this alternative, we should suppose, that the mind represented, and truly repre- sented, that of whose existence and qualities it knew nothing. A great effect is here assumed, absolutely without a cause; for we could as easily conceive the external world springing into existence without a creator, as mind representing that external world to itself, without a knowledge of that which it represented. The manifest absurdity of this first alternative has accordingly constrained the profoundest cosmothetic idealists to call in supernatural aid by embracing the second. To say nothing of less illustrious schemes, the systems of Divine Assistance, of a Preéstablished Harmony, and of the Vision of all things in the Deity, are only so many sub- sidiary hypotheses; — so many attempts to bridge, by supernatural machinery, the chasm between the representation and the reality, which all human ingenuity had found, by natural means, to be insu- perable. The hypothesis of a representative perception thus pre- Supposes a miracle to let it work. Dr. Brown and others, indeed, reject, as unphilosophical, these hyperphysical subsidiaries; but they only saw less clearly the necessity for their admission. The rejection, indeed, is another inconsequence added to their doctrine. Tt is undoubtedly true that, without necessity, it is unphilosophical to assume a miracle, but it is doubly unphilosophical first to origi- nate this necessity, and then not to submit to it. Itisa contemptible philosophy that eschews the Deus ex machina, and yet ties the knot which can only be loosed by his interposition. Nor will it here do for the cosmothetic idealist to pretend that the difficulty is of nature’s, not of his, creation. In fact, it only arises, because he has closed his eyes upon the light of nature, and refused the euid- ance of consciousness: but ‘having swamped himself in following the ignis fatuus of a theory, he has no right to refer its private absurdities to the imbecility of human reason, or to excuse his 368 | METAPHYSICS. Leer. X XVI. self-contracted ignorance by the narrow limits of our ip knowl- edge.! So much for the merits of the hypothesis of a Ravitehaiieanivis Perception, — an hypothesis which begins by denying the veracity of consciousness, and ends, when carried to its legitimate issue, in absolute idealism, in utter skepticism. This hypothesis has been, and is, one more universally prevalent among philosophers than any other; and I have given to its consideration a larger share of atten- tion than I should otherwise have done, in consequence of its being one great source of the dissensions in philosophy, and of the oppro- brium thrown on consciousness as the instrument of philosophical observation, and the standard of philosophical certainty and truth. With this terminates the most important of the discussions to which the Faculty of Perception gives rise: the Other questions con- — other questions are not, however, without inter- nected with the fac- ast, though their determination does not affect ulty of External Per- : f i contin, the vital interests of philosophy. Of these the 1. Whether we first first that I shall touch upon, is the problem ; — obtain a knowledge Whether, in Perception, do we first obtain a of the whole, or of Bees ok ihe ole general knowledge of the complex wholes pre- ject in Perception. sented to us by sense, and then, by analysis and limited attention, obtain a special knowledge of their several parts; or do we not first obtain a particular knowledge of the smallest parts to which sense is competent, and then, by synthesis, collect them into greater and greater wholes? | The second alternative in this question is adopted by Mr. Stewart; it is, indeed, involved in his doctrine in regard Second alternative 4 4 Attention, —in holding that we recollect satel dh roll nothing without attention, that we can attend only to a single object at once, which one object is the very smallest that is discernible through sense. _ “It is com- monly,” he says, “understood, I believe, that, in a concert of music, a good ear can attend to the different parts of the music separately, or can attend to them all at once, and feel the full effect of the harmony. If the doctrine, how- ever, which I have endeavored to establish, be admitted, it will follow, that in the latter case the mind is constantly varying its attention from the one part of the music to the other, and that its operations are so rapid, as to give us no perception of an interval of time. Stewart quoted. 1 See Discussions, pp. 67, 68. — Ep. Lect. XXVI. METAPHYSICS. 3869 “The same doctrine leads to some curious conclusions with respect to vision. Suppose the eye to be fixed in a particular posi- tion, and the picture of an object to be painted on the retina. Does the mind perceive the complete figure of the object at once, or is this perception the result of the various perceptions we have of the different points in the outline? With respect to this question, the principles already stated lead me to conclude, that the mind does at one and the same time perceive every point in the outline of the object (provided the whole of it be painted on the retina at the same instant) ; for perception, like consciousness, is 3n involuntary operation. As no two points, however, of the outline are in the same direction, every point by itself constitutes just as distinct an object of attention to the mind, as if it were separated by an inter- val of empty space from all the rest. If the doctrine, therefore, formerly stated be just, it is impossible for the mind to attend to more than one of these points at once; and as the perception of the figure of the object implies a knowledge of the relative situa- tion of the different points with respect to each other, we must conclude, that the perception of figure by the eye, is the result of a number of different acts of attention. These acts of attention, however, are performed with such rapidity, that the effect with respect to us, is the same as if the perception were instantaneous. x * *K *k * *K *K “It may perhaps be asked, what I mean by a point in the outline of a figure, and what it is that constitutes this point one object of attention. The answer, I apprehend, is, that this point is the minimum visibile. Ifthe point be less, we cannot perceive it; if it be greater, it is not all seen in one direction. | “Tf these observations be admitted, it will follow, that, without the faculty of memory, we could have had no perception of visible figure.” } The same conclusion is attained, through a somewhat different process, by Mr. James Mill, in his ingenious Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. This author, following Hartley and Priestley, has pushed the principle of Association to an extreme which refutes its own exaggeration, — analzying not only our belief in the relation of effect and cause into that principle, but even the primary logical laws. According to Mr. Mill, the necessity under which we lie of thinking that one contradictory excludes another, — that a thing cannot at once be and not be, is only the result of asso. The same view main- tained by James Mill. Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol, i, ¢. ii. Works, vol. ii. p. 141—148. 47 ¥ 310 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXVL ciation and custom.! It is not, therefore, to be marvelled at, that he should account for our knowledge of complex wholes in percep- tion, by the same universal principle; and this he accordingly does. ? “ Where two or more ideas have been often re- peated together, and the association has become very strong, they sometimes spring up in such close combination as not to be distinguishable. Some cases of sensation are analogous. For example; when a wheel, on the seven parts of which the seven prismatic colors are respectively painted, is made to revolve rap- idly, it appears’not of seven colors, but of one uniform color, white By the rapidity of the succession, the several sensations cease to be distinguishable; they run, as it were, together, and a new sensation, compounded ot all the seven, but apparently a simple one, is the result. Ideas, also, which have been so often conjoined, that whenever one exists in the mind, the others immediately exist along with it, seem to run into one another, to coalesce, as it were, and out of many to form one idea; which idea, however in reality complex, appears to be no less simple than any one of those of which it is compounded.” * + * + * * * Mill quoted. “Tt is to this great law of association that we trace the forma- tion of our ideas of what we call external objects; that is, the ideas of a certain number of sensations, received together so frequently that they coalesce as it were, and are spoken of under the idea of unity. Hence, what we call the idea of a tree, the idea of a Pte the idea of a horse, the idea of a man. : “Tn using the names, tree, horse, man, the names of what I call objects, I am referring, and can be referring, only to my own sensa- tions; in fact, therefore, only naming a certain number of sensations, regarded as in a particular state of combination; that is, concomi- tance. Particular sensations of sight, of touch, of the muscles, are the sensations, to the ideas of which, color, extension, roughness, hardness, smoothness, taste, smell, so coalescing as to appear one idea, I give the name, idea of a tree. * * * * * * * “Some ideas are by frequency and strength of association so closely combined, that they cannot be separated. If one exists, the other exists along with it, in spite of whatever effort we make to disjoin them. “For example; it is not in our power to think of color, without thinking of extension; or of solidity, without figure. We have 4 Chap. iii. p. 75. -- Ep. 2 Chap. iii. p. 68. — Ep, 3 Chap. ili. p. 70. — Ep. » Lecr. XXVI. METAPHYSICS. 371 seen color constantly in combination with extension; — spread, as it were, upon a surface. We have never seen it except in this con- nection. Color and extension have been invariably conjoined. The idea of color, therefore, uniformly comes into the mind, bringing that of extension along with it; and so close is the association, that it is not in our power to dissolve it. We cannot, if we will, think of color, but in combination with extension. The one idea calls up the other, and retains it, so long as the other is retained. “This great law of our nature is illustrated in a manner equally striking, by the connection between the ideas of solidity and figure. We never have the sensations from which the idea of solidity is derived, but in conjunction with the sensations whence the idea of figure is derived. If we handle anything solid, it is always either round, square, or of some other form. The ideas correspond with the sensations. If the idea of solidity rises, that of figure rises along with it. The idea of figure which rises, is, of course, more obscure than that of extension; because figures being innumerable, the general idea is exceedingly complex, and hence, of necessity, obscure. But, such as it is, the idea of figure is always present when that of solidity is present ; nor can we, by any effort, think of the one with- out thinking of the other at the same time.” Now, in opposition to this doctrine, nothing appears to me clearer than the first alternative,—and that, in place ia Dh an aah of ascending upwards from the minimum of per- against Stewart and Ception to its maxima, we descend from masses Mill. to details. If the opposite doctrine were cor- Medoctrine ofthese rect, what would it involve? It would involve lage ie aM as a primary inference, that, as we know the better than the whole. | Whole through the parts, we should know the parts better than the whole. Thus, for example, it is supposed that we know the face of a friend, through the multi- tude of perceptions which we have of the difforent points of which it is made up; in other words, that we should know the whole coun- tenance less vividly than we know the forehead and eyes, the nose and mouth, etc., and that we should know each of these more feebly than we know the various ultimate points, in fact, unconscious minima, of perceptions, which go to constitute them. According to the doctrine in question, we perceive only one of these ultimate points at the same instant, the others by memory incessantly renewed. Now let us take the face out of perception into memory altogether. Let us close our eyes, and let us represent in imagina- tion the countenance of our friend. This we can do with the utmost vivacity; or, if we see a picture of it, we can determine, AL he METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XXVI with a consciousness of the most perfect accuracy, that the portrait is like or unlike. It cannot, therefore, be denied that we have the fullest knowledge of the face as a whole, — that we are familiar with its expression, with the general result of its parts. On the hypothesis, then, of Stewart and Mill, how accurate should be our knowledge of these parts themselves. But make the experiment. You will find that, unless you have analyzed, — unless you have descended from a conspectus of the whole face to a detailed examination of its parts, — with the most vivid impression of the constituted whole, you are almost totally ignorant of the con- stituent parts. You may probably be unable to say what is the color of the eyes, and if you attempt to delineate the mouth or nose, you will inevitably fail. Or look at the portrait. You may find it unlike, but unless, as I said, you have analyzed the countenance, unless you have looked at it with the analytic scrutiny of a paint- er’s eye, you will assuredly be unable to say in what respect the artist has failed, — you will be unable to specify what constituent he has altered, though you are fully conscious of the fact and effect of the alteration. What we have shown from this example may equally be done from any other, —a house, a tree, a landscape, a concert of music, ete. But it is needless to multiply illustrations. In fact, on the doctrine of these philosophers, if the mind, as they maintain, were unable to comprehend more than one perceptible minimum at a time, the greatest of all inconceivable marvels would be, how it has contrived to realize the knowledge of wholes and masses which it has. Another refutation of this opinion might be drawn from the doctrine of latent modifications, — the obscure per- ceptions of Leibnitz,— of which we have recently treated. But this argument I think unnecessary. + This supposition shown to be errone- ous, 1 Show this also, 1°, By the millions of acts of the Hye, § iii. p. 574, edit. 1807.—Ep.] 29, of attention requisite in each of our percep- By imperfection of Touch,whichis a synthetic tions. [Cf Dr. T. Young’s Lectures on Natu- sense, as Sight is analytic. — Marginal Jotting. ral Philosophy, vol. ii. Ess. vy. The Mechanism oe ore eE eR NE TT THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY. I. PERCEPTION.—-GENERAL QUESTIONS IN RELATION TO THE SENSES. In my last Lecture, I was principally occupied in showing that the | hypothesis of a Representative Perception consid- ered in itself, and apart from the grounds on which philosophers have deemed themselves authorized to reject the fact of consciousness, which testifies to our immediate perception of external things, violates, in many various ways, the laws of a legitimate hy- pothesis; and having, in the previous Lecture, shown you that the grounds on which the possibility of an intuitive cognition of external objects had been superseded, are hollow, I thus, if my reasoning be not erroneous, was warranted in establishing the conclusion that there is nothing against, but everything in favor of, the truth of conscious: ness, and the doctrine of immediate perception. At the conclusion of the Lecture, I endeavored to prove, in opposition to Mr. Stewart and Mr. Mill, that we are not percipient, at the same instant, only of certain minima, our cognitions of which are afterwards, by memory or association, accumulated into masses; but that we are at once and primarily percipient of masses, and only require analysis to obtain a minute and more accurate knowledge of their parts, — that, in short, we can, within certain limits, make a single object out of many. For example, we can extend our attentive perception to a house, and to it as only one object; or we can contemplate its parts, and con- sider each of these as separate objects. Resuming consideration of the more important psychological ques- tions that have been agitated concerning the Senses, I proceed to take up those connected with the sense of Touch. Recapitulation. senses. As the Lecture devoted to this sub. ject mainly consists of a series of extracts from Young and Bostock, and is purely 1 Sir W. Hamilton here occasionally intro- duced an account of the mechanism of the organs of Sense; observing the following order, — Sight, Hearing, Taste, Smell, and Touch. This, he remarks, is the reverse of the order of nature, and is adopted by him because under Touch certain questions arise, the discussion of which requires some pre- liminary knowledge of the nature of the physiological, itis here omitted. See Young’s Lectures on Natural Philosophy, vol. i. pp- 387, 447 et seg.; vol. ii. p. 574, (4to edit.) Bostock’s Physiology, pp. 692 et seg., 723, 729—788. (8d edit.) — Ep. Bit METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXVIt, The problems which arise under this sense, may be reduced to two opposite questions. The first asks, May not all the Senses be analyzed into Touch? The second asks, Is not Touch or Feeling, considered as one of the five senses, itself’ only a bundle of various sense ? In regard to the first of these questions,— it is an opinion as old at least as Democritus, and one held by many of the ancient physiologists, that the four senses of Sight, Hearing, Taste, and Smell, are only modifi- cations of Touch. This opinion Aristotle records in the fourth chapter of his book On Sense and the Object of Sense (De Sensu et Sensili), and contents himself with refuting it by the assertion that its impossibility is manifest. So far, however, from being mani- festly impossible, and, therefore, manifestly ab- surd, it can now easily be shown to be correct, if by touch is un- derstood the contact of the external object of perception with the organ of sense. The opinion of Democritus was revived, in modern times, by Telesius,' an Italian philosopher of the sixteenth century, and who preceded Bacon and Descartes, as a reformer of philosophical methods. I say the opinion of Democritus can easily be shown to be correct ; for it is only a con- fusion of ideas, or of words, or of both together, to talk of the perception of a distant object, that is, of an object not in relation to our senses. An external object is only perceived inasmuch as it is in relation to our sense, and it is only in relation to our sense inasmuch as it is present to it. To say, for example, that we perceive by sight the sun or moon, is a false or an elliptical expression. We perceive nothing but certain modifications of light in immediate relation to our organ of vision ; and so far from Dr. Reid being philosophically correct, when he says that ‘when ten men look at the sun or moon, they all see the same indi- vidual object,” the truth is that each of these persons sees a different object, because each person sees a different complement of rays, in relation to his individual organ In fact, if we look alternately with Two problems under sense of Touch. 1. May all the Sen- ses be analyzed into Touch? Democritus. Aristotle. In what sense the af- firmative correct. Telesius. The proper object of Perception. 1 [De Rerum Natura, lib. vii. c. viii.] From this reduction Telesius excepts Hearing. With regard to the senses of Taste, Smell, and Sight, he says:—‘‘Non recte iidem . gustum olfactumque et visum a tactu diver- sum posuere, qui non tactus modo sunt om- nes, sed multo etiam quam qui tactus dicitur exquisitiores. Non scilicet ea modo, que universo in corpore percipiuntur, et que actilia (ut dictum est) dicuntur, propterea percipiuntur, quod eorum actio et vis sub- stantiaque spiritum contingit, sed magis que in lingua, et multo etiam magis que per nares, et que in oculis percipiuntur.” — Loc. cit. — ED. 2 On this point, see Adam Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects — Ancient Logics and Met- aphysics, p. 153. Cf. Of the External Senses, p- 289, (edit. 1800.) — ED. Lect. XXVIL METAPHYSICS. 375 each, we have a different object in our right, and a different object in our left, eye. It is not by perception, but by a process of reasoning, that we connect the objects of sense with existences beyond the sphere of immediate knowledge. It is enough that perception affords us the knowledge of the non-ego at the point of sense. To arrogate to it the power of immediately informing us of external things, which are only the causes of the object we immediately perceive, is either positively erroneous, or a confusion of language, arising from an inadequate dis- crimination of the phenomena. Such assumptions tend only to throw discredit on the doctrine of an intuitive perception ; and such assump- tions you will find scattered over the works both of Reid and Stewart. I would, therefore, establish as a fundamental position of the doctrine of an immediate perception, the opinion of Democritus, that all our senses are only modifications of touch ; in other words, that the exter- nal object of perception is always in contact with the organ of sense. This determination of the first problem does not interfere with the consideration of the second ; for, in the second, it is potas RG vickiits or only asked, Whether, considering Touch or Feel- BP). 5 lug as a special sense, there are not comprehended under it varieties of perception and sensation so different, that these varieties ought to be viewed as constituting so many special senses. This question, I think, ought to be answered in the affirmative ; for, though I hold that the cther senses are not to be discrim- inated from Touch, in so far as Touch signifies merely the contact of the organ and the object of perception, yet, considering Touch as a special sense distinguished from the other four by other and peculiar characters, it may easily, I think, be shown, that if Sight and Hear- ing, if Smell and Taste, are to be divided from each other and from Touch Proper, under Touch there must, on the same analogy, be distinguished a plurality of special senses, This problem, like the other, is of ancient date. It is mooted by Aristotle in the eleventh chapter of the second book De Anima, but his opinion is left doubtful. His followers were con- Affirmative main- tained. Historical notices of ay, ini sequently left doubtful upon the point.) Among T1StOotie. ; cis. {fa ge Tate ed Greek commentators. iS Greek interpreters, Themistius? adopts the opinion, that there is a plurality of senses under 1 See Conimbricenses, In Arist. de Anima, dtéws nad Bapéws, kal Trav betatu: Kal Thy [lib. ii. c. xi. p. 826.— Ep. 2 In De Anima, lib. ii. c. xi. fol. 82a, (edit. Ald., 1534.) Od ore ula ataSnos n adh onucioy by Tis voutCor, Td wh mas evayTid- Tews... . KpiTiKnY, TavTHY Thy aic&n- ow domep Thy byw AevKod Ka pedavos Mévov, kal tev Metatu Kal thy dKohy, yevow mKpod Kal yAuKéos: ev 5 ToIs, &r- TOis, ToAAat eiow evaytimoces Kal macau Euperot, peodtytos Kad’ éxdorny olxerds Sewpouuevns: otov Sepudv, Wuxpdvr Enpdy, vypdév- oKAnpoy, padarcdy: Bapb Kovdpov- Aciov, trax. Cf. Aristotle, texts 106, 107. — Eb. 376 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXVIL touch. Alexander? favors, but not decidedly, the opposite opinion, which was espoused by Simplicius? and Philoponus.2 The doctrine of Themistius was, however, under various modifications, adopted by Averroes and Avicenna among the Arabian, and by Apollinaris, Albertus Magnus, A‘gidius, Jan- dunus, Marcellus, and many others among the Latin, schoolmen.* These, however, and succeeding philosophers, were not at one in regard to the number of the senses, which they would distinguish. Themistius® and Avicenna® allowed as many senses as there were different qualities of tactile feeling; but the number of these they did not specify. Avicenna, however, appears to have dis- tinguished as one sense the feeling of pain from the lesion of a wound, and as another, the feeling of titillation.’ Others, as Aigidi- us,® gave two senses, one for the hot and cold, an- Arabian and Latin Schoolmen. Themistius and Avi- cenna. Egidius. : sae other for the dry and moist. Averroes? secerns a — Averroes. ae 3 4 balck sense of titillation and a sense of hunger and thirst. Cardan. Galen” also, I should observe, allowed a sense of heat and cold. Among modern philosophers, Cardan” distinguishes four senses of touch or feeling ; one of the four primary tactile qualities of Aristotle (that is, of cold and hot, and wet and dry); a second, of the light and heavy ; a third, of pleasure and pain; and a fourth, of titillation. His antagonist, the elder Scaliger,” distinguished as a sixth special sense the sexual appetite, in which he has been followed by Bacon” Voltaire and others, Bacon, Buffon, Voltaire, Locke. From these historical notices you will see how marvellously incorrect is the statement” that Locke was the first philosopher who originated this question, in al- 1 Problemata, ii. 62 (probably spurious. — Ep. 2 In De Anima, lib. ii. ¢. xi. text 106, fol. 44ab (edit. Ald. 1527). — Ep. 3 In De Anima, lib. ii. c. xi. texts 106, 107. —EbD. 4 See Conimbricenses, In De Anima, lib. ii. c. xi. p. 826. — Ep. 5 See preceding page, note 2, and Conimbri- censes, as above, p. 827. — Ep. 6 See Conimbricenses, as above, p. 327.— Ep. 7 See ibid. — Ep. 8 See ibid. [Cf. De Raei, Clavis Philosophie Naturalis, De Mentis Humane Facultatibus, § 76, p. 866. D’Alembert, Mélanges, t. v. p. 115. Cf. Scaliger, De Subtilitate, Ex. cix., where he observes that, in paralysis, heat is felt, after the power of apprehending gravity is gone.] 9 See Conimbricenses, In De Anima, lib. il. C. xi. p. 827. — Ep. 10 [Leidenfrost, De Mente Humana, ¢. ii. § 4, p. 16.] ll De Subtilitate, lib. xiii. See Reid’s Works, p- 867. — Ep. 12 De Subtilitate, Ex. cclxxxvi. § 3.— ED. 13 [Sylva Sylvarum, cent. vii. 693. Works, — edit. Montagu, iv. 361.] . 14 See Reid’s Works, p. 124; and Poor, Theo- ria Sensuum, pars i. § 34, p. 88. Voltaire, Dict. Philosophique, art. Sensation, reduces this sense to that of Touch. Cf. Traité de Meta- physique, ch. iv. Ciuvres Completes, tom. Vi. p- 651 (edit. 1817). — Eb. 15 See Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy, by John Young, LL. D., p. 80. Lecr. XXVII. METAPHYSICS. aun lowing hunger and thirst to be the sensations of a sense different from tactile feeling. Hutcheson, in his work on the Passions,’ says, “the division of our external senses into five common classes is ridiculously imperfect. Some sen- sations, such as hunger and thirst, weariness and sickness, can be re- duced to none of them; or if they are reduced to feelings, they are perceptions as different from the other ideas of touch, such as cold, heat, hardness, softness, as the ideas of taste or smell. Others have hinted at an external sense different from all of these.’ What that is, Hutcheson does not mention; and some of our Scotch philoso- phers have puzzled themselves to conceive the meaning of his allusion. There is no doubt that he referred to the sixth sense of Scaliger. Adam Smith, in his posthumous Zssays,? observes that hunger and thirst are objects of feeling, not of touch; and that heat and cold are felt not as pressing on the organ, but asin the organ. Kant?® divides the whole bodily senses into two,— into a Vital Sense (Sensus Vagus), and an Organic Sense (Sensus Fixus). To the former class belong the sensations of heat and cold, shuddering, quaking, etc. The latter is divided into the five senses, of Touch Proper, Sight, Hearing, Taste, and Smell. This division has now become general in Germany, the Vital Sense receiving from various authors various synonyms, as coenwsthesis, common feeling, vital feeling and sense of feeling, sensu latiori, etc.; and the sensa- tions attributed to it are heat and cold, shuddering, feeling of health, hunger and thirst, visceral sensations, etc. This division is, likewise, adopted by Dr. Brown. He divides our sensations into those which are less definite, and into those which are more definite; and these, his two classes, correspond pre- cisely to. the sensus vagus and sensus fiaus of the German philoso- phers.! The propriety of throwing out of the sense of Touch those sensa- tions which afford us indications only of the sub- Touch to be divided jective condition of the body, in other words, of ee Une. dividing touch from sensible feeling, is apparent. 1. . From the analogy 5? Rete of the special senses. In the first place, this is manifest on the analogy of the other special senses. These, as we have seen, are divided into two classes, according as perception proper or Hutcheson. Adam Smith. ' Kant. Kant’s division gen- eral in Germany. Brown. 1 Sect. i., third edition, p. 8, note. —Ep. (1798), c. ii. § 2, p. 14, distinguished the Vital 2 Of the External Senses, p.282(ed.1800)—Ep. Sense from the Organic Senses. See also 8 Anthropologie, § 15.—Ep. [Previously to Hiibner’s Dissertation (1794). Cf. Gruithuisen, Kant, whose Anthropologie was first published Anthropologie, § 475, p. 864 (edit. 1810).] in 1798, Leidenfrost, in his De Mente Humana, 4 Lectures xvii. xviii. — Ep. 378 METAPHYSICS. Lect’ XXVh! sensation proper predominates ; the sense of Sight and Hearing per- taining to the first, those of Smell and Taste to the second. Here each is decidedly either perceptive or sensitive. But in Touch, under. the vulgar attribution of qualities, perception and sensation both find their maximum. At the finger-points, this sense would give us ob- jective knowledge of the outer world, with the least possible alloy of subjective feeling; in hunger and thirst, ete. on the contrary it would afford us a subjective feeling of our cwn state, with the least possible addition of objective knowledge. On this ground, there- fore, we ought to attribute to different senses perceptions and sensa- tions so different in degree, But, in the second place, it is not merely in the opposite degree of these two counter elements that this distinction 2. From the different jg to be founded, but likewise on the different Aeanit scpuabieg quality of the groups of the perceptions and sen- menakelvien’ sations themselves. There is nothing similar be- tween these different groups, except the negative circumstance that there is no special organ to which positively to refer them; and, therefore, they are exclusively slumped together under that sense which is not obtrusively marked out and isolated by the mechanism of a peculiar instrument. Limiting, therefore, the special sense of Touch to that of objective information, it is sufficient to say that this sense has its seat at the extremity of the nerves which terminate in the skin; its principal organs are the finger-points, the toes, the lips, and the tongue. Of these, the first is the most perfect. At the tips of the fingers, a tender skin covers the nervous papille, and here the nail serves not only as a protecting shield to the organ, but, likewise, by affording an opposition to the body which makes an impression on the finger-ends, it renders more distinct our perception of the nature of its surface. Through the great mobility of the fingers, of the wrist, and of the shoulder-joint, we are able with one, and still more effectually, with both hands, to manipulate an object on all sides, and thereby to attain a knowledge of its figure. We likewise owe to the sense of Touch a perception of those conformations of a body, accord- ing to which we call it rough or smooth, hard or soft, sharp or blunt. The repose or motion of a body is also perceived through the touch, - To obviate misunderstanding, I should, however, notice that the proper organ of Touch—the nervous papillee —requires as the con- dition of its exercise, the movement of the voluntary muscles. This condition however, ought not to be viewed as a part of the organ itself. This being understood, the perception of the weight of a Special Sense of Touch,—its sphere and organic seat. Lxecr. XXVIL METAPHYSICS. 379 body will not fall under this sense, as the nerves lying under the epidermis or scurf skin have little or no share in MAR chance i this knowledge. We owe it almost exclusively condition of itsexer- to the consciousness we have of the exertion of cise, the movement of the muscles, requisite to lift with the hand a a voluntary mus- heavy body from the ground, or when it is laid _ on the shoulders or head, to keep our own body erect, and to carry the burthen from one place to another. I next proceed to consider two counter-questions, which are still agitated by philosophers. The first is, —Does Sight afford us an original knowledge of exten- sion, or do we not owe this exclusively to Touch ? The second is, — Does Touch afford us an original knowledge of extension, or do we not owe this exclusively to Sight ? Both questions are still undetermined ; and consequently, the vulgar belief is also unestablished, that we obtain a knowledge of extension originally both from sight and touch. Icommence, then, with the first, — Does Vision afford us a primary 1 Does Visionafforgd 4 KNOWledge of extension, or do we not owe this usa primary knowl | knowledge exclusively to Touch? But, before edge ofextension? or —_ entering on its discussion, it is proper to state to epwenotowethisex- you, by preamble, what kind of extension it is ee eo rent that those would vindicate to sight, who answer this question in the affirmative. The whole primary objects of sight, then, are colors, and extensions, and forms or figures of extension. And here you will observe, it is not all kind of extension and form that is attributed to sight. It is not figured extension in all the three dimensions, but only extension as involved in plane figures; that is, only length and breadth. It has generally been admitted by philosophers, after Aristotle, | that color is the proper object of sight, and that fe Se eis extension and figure, common to sight and touch, generally admitted. are only accidentally its objects, because supposed in the perception of color. The first philosopher, with whom I am acquainted, who doubted or denied that vision is conversant with extension, ay a Gin was Berkeley; but the clear expression of his object of Sight. opinion is contained in his Defence of the Theory of Vision, an extremely rare tract, which has escaped the knowledge of all his editors and biographers, and is con- sequently not to be found in any of the editions of his collected works. It was almost certainly, therefore, wholly unknown to Condillaec, who is the next philoso- Two counter ques- tions regarding sphere of Sight. Condillac. 580 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXVII. pher who maintained the same opinion. This, however, he did not do either very explicitly or without change; for the new doctrine which he hazards in his earlier work, in his later he again tacitly replaces by the old.) After its surrender by Condillac, the opinion was, however, supported, as I find, by Laboulinitre.” Mr. Stewart maintains that extension is not an object of sight. ‘I formerly,” he says, “had oc- casion to mention several instances of very intimate associations formed between two ideas which have no necessary connection with each other. One of the most remarkable is, that which exists in every person’s mind between the notions of color and extension. The former of these words expresses (at least in the sense in which we commonly employ it) a sensation in the mind, the latter denotes a quality of an external object; so that there is, in fact, no more con- nection between the two notions than between those of pain and of solidity; and yet in consequence of our always perceiving extension at the same time at which the sensation of color is excited in the mind, we find it impossible to think of that sensation without con- ceiving extension along with it.”* But before and after Stewart, a doctrine, virtually the same, is maintained by the Hartleian school; who assert, as a consequence of their universal principle of association, that the perception of color suggests the notion of extension.* Then comes Dr. Brown, who, in his Lectures, after having repeat- edly asserted, that it is, and always has been, the universal opinion of philosophers, that the superficial extension of length and breadth becomes: known to us- by sight originally, proceeds, as he says, for the first time, to con- trovert this opinion ;° though it is wholly impossible that he could Labouliniére. Stewart. Hartleian School. Brown. 1 The order of Condillac’s opinions is the space, do we, by means of that sensation, reverse of that stated in the text. In his acquire also the proper idea of extension, as earliest work, the Origine des Connoissances composed of parts exterior to each other? In Humaines, part i. sect. vi., he combats Berke- other words, does the sensation of different ley’s theory of vision, and maintains that colors, which is necessary to the distinction extension exterior to the eye is discernible by of parts at all, necessarily suggest different sight. Subsequently, in the Traité des Sensa- and contiguous localities? This question is tions, part i. ch. xi., part ii. ch. iv. v., he explicitly answered in the negative by Con- asserts that the eye is incapable of perceiving extension beyond itself, and that this idea is originally due solely to the sense of touch. This opinion he again repeats in 7’ Art de Pen- ser, part i. ch. xi. But neither Condillac nor Berkeley goes so far as to say that color, re- garded as an affection of the visual organism, is apprehended as absolutely unextended, as 'amathematical point. Nor is this the ques- tion in dispute. But granting, as Condillac in his later view expressly asserts, that color, as a visual sensation, necessarily occupies dillac, and in the affirmative by Sir W. Ham- ilton. Cf. The Theory of Vision vindicated and explained. London, 1733. See especially, §§ 41, 42, 44, 45, 46.— Ep. 2 See Reid’s Works, p. 868.— Ep. 3 Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i. chap. v. part ii.§ 1. Works, vol. ii. p. 306. [Cf. Idid., note P.— Ep_] 4 See Priestley, Hartley’s Theory, prop. 20. James Mill, Analysis of Human Mind, vol. 1. p. 73. — Ep. 5 Lecture xxviii.— Ep. Lect. XXVII. METAPHYSICS. 881 have been ignorant that the same had been done, at least by Con- dillac and Stewart. Brown himself, however, was to be treated somewhat in the fashion in which he treats his predecessors. Some twenty years ago, there were published the Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy, by the late John Young, LL. D., Professor of Philosophy in Belfast College; a work which certainly shows considerable shrewdness and ingenuity. This unfortunate speculator seems, however, to have been fated, in almost every instance, to be anticipated by Brown; and, as far as I have looked into these Lectures, I haye been amused with the never-failing preamble, — of the astonishment, the satisfaction, and so forth, which the author expresses on finding, on. the publication of Brown’s Lectures, that the opinions which he himself, as he says, had always held and taught, were those also which had obtained the countenance of so distinguished a philosopher. The coincidence is, however, too systematic and precise to be the effect of accident ; ‘and the identity of opinion between the two doctors can only (plagi- arism apart), be explained by borrowing from the hypothesis of a Preéstablished Harmony between their minds! Of course, they are both at one on the problem under consideration2 But to return to Brown, by whom the argument against the common doctrine is most fully stated. He says: “The universal opinion of philosophers is, that it is not color merely which it (the simple original sensation of vision) involves, but extension also, — that there ig a visible figure, as well as a tan- gible figure, —,and that the visible figure involves, in our instant original perception, superficial length and breadth, as the tangible figure, which we learn to see, involves length, breadth, and thickness. “That it is impossible for us, at present, to separate, in the sensa- tion of vision, the color from the extension, I admit; though not more completely impossible, than it is for us to look on the thou- sand feet of a meadow, and to perceive only the small inch of greenness on our retina; and the one impossibility, as much as the other, I conceive to arise only from intimate association, subsequent to the original sensations of sight. Nor do I deny, that a certain part of the retina — which, being limited, must therefore have figure — is affected by the rays of light that fall on it, as a certain breadth of nervous expanse is affected in all the other organs. I John Young. Brown quoted. 11 now find, and have elsewhere stated, ing, from the same source, — De Tracy. See that the similarity between these philosophers Dissertations on Reid, note D, p. 868. arises from their borrowing, I may say steal- 2 See Young, Lectures on Intellectual Philoso- phy, p. 116, 382 METAPHYSICS. Leer. XXVIL. contend only, that the perception of this limited figure of the por- tion of the retina affected, does not enter into the sensation itself, more than, in our sensations of any other species, there is a percep- tion of the nervous breadth affected. | “ The immediate perception of visible figure has been assumed as indisputable, rather than attempted to be proved, —as before the time of Berkeley, the immediate visual perception of distance, and of the three dimensions of matter, was supposed, in like manner, to be without any need of proof;—and it is, therefore, impossible to refer to arguments on the subject. I presume, however, that. the reasons which have led to this belief, of the immediate perception of a figure termed visible, as distinguished from that tangible figure, which we learn to see, are the following two,—the only reasons which I can even imagine, — that it is absolutely impossible, im our present sensations of sight, to separate, color from extension, — and that there are, in fact, a certain length and breadth of the retina, on which the light falls.”* He then goes on to argue, at a far greater length than can be quoted, that the mere circumstance of a certain definite space, viz., the extended retina, being affected by certain sensations, does not necessa- rily involve the notion of extension. Indeed, in all those cases in which it is supposed, that a certain diffusion of sensations excites the notion of extension, it seems to be taken for granted that the being knows already, that he has an extended body, over which these sensations are thus diffused. Nothing but the sense of touch, however, and nothing but those kinds of touch which imply the idea of continued resistance, can give us any notion of body at all. All mental affections which are regarded merely as feelings of the mind, and which do not give us a conception of their external causes, can never be known to arise from anything which 1s ex- tended or solid. So far, however, is the mere sensation of color from being able to produce this, that touch itself, as felt in many of its modifications, could give us no idea of it. That the sensation of color is quite unfit to give us any idea of extension, merely by its being diffused over a certain expanse of the retina, seems to be cor- roborated by what we experience in the other senses, even after we are perfectly acquainted with the notion of extension. In hearing, for instance, a certain quantity of the tympanum of the ear must be affected by the pulsations of the air; yet it gives us no idea of the dimensions of the part affected. The same may, in general, be said of taste and smell. Summary of Brown’s argument. 1 Lect. xxix. p. 185 (edit. 1880). — Ep. Lect. XXVII. METAPHYSICS. 883 Now, in all their elaborate argumentation on this subject, these philosophers seem never yet to have seen the Phe perception of real difficulty of their doctrine. It can easily be ein fe Serer shown that the perception of color involves the tion of colors. perception of extension. It is admitted that we have by sight a perception of colors, conse- quently, a perception of the difference of colors. Buta perception of the distinction of colors necessarily involves the perception of a discriminating line; for if one color be laid beside or upon another, we only distinguish them as different by perceiving that they limit each other, which limitation necessarily affords a breadthless line, —a line of demarcation. One color laid upon another, in fact, gives a line returning upon itself, that is, a figure. But a line and a figure are modifications of extension. The perception of exten- sion, therefore, is necessarily given in the perception of colors. CECTURE A XV THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY. J. PERCEPTION.— RELATIONS OF SIGHT AND TOUCH TO EXTENSION. In my last Lecture, after showing you that the vulgar distribu- tion of the Senses into five, stands in need of correction, and stating what that correction is, I proceeded to the consideration of some of the more important philosophical problems, which arise out of the relation of the senses to the elementary objects of Perception. I then stated to you two counter-problems in relation to the genealogy of our empirical knowledge of extension; and as, on the one hand, some philosophers maintain that we do not perceive extension by the eye, but obtain this notion through touch, so, on the other, there are philosophers who hold that we do not perceive extension through the touch, but exclusively by the eye. The con- sideration of these counter-questions will, it is evident, involve. a consideration of the common doctrine intermediate between these extreme opinions,—that we derive our knowledge of extension from both senses. I keep aloof from this discussion the opinion, that space, under which extension 1s included, is not an empirical or adventitious notion at all, but a native form of thought; for admitting this, still if space be also a necessary form of the external world, we shall also have an empirical perception of it by our senses, and the question, therefore, equally remains, — Through what sense, or senses, have we this perception? | In ¢elation to the first problem, I stated that the position which denies to visual perception all cognizance of extension, was main- tained by Condillac, by Labouliniere, by Stewart, by the followers of Hartley (Priestley, Belsham, Mill, etc.), and by Brown, —to say nothing of several recent authors in this country, and in America. I do not think it necessary to state to you the long process of rea- soning on which, especially by Brown, this paradox has been grounded. It is sufficient to say, that there is no reason whatso- Revapitulation. Lect, XXVIIL METAPHYSICS. . 885 ever adduced in its support, which carries with it the smallest weight. The whole argumentation in reply to the objections sup- posed by its defenders, is in reply to objections which no one, I conceive, who understood his case, would ever dream of advancing; while the only objection which it was incumbent on the advocates of the paradox to have answered, is passed over in total silence. This objection is stated in three words. All parties are, of | course, at one in regard to the fact that we see color. Those who hold that we see extension, admit that we see it only as colored; and those who deny us any vision of extension, make color the exclusive object of sight. In regard to this first position, all are, therefore, agreed. Nor are they less harmonious in reference to the second;—that the power of perceiving color involves the power of perceiving the differences of colors, By sight we, there- fore, perceive color, and discriminate one color, that is, one colored body, —one sensation of color, from another. This is admitted. A third position will also be denied by none, that the colors dis- criminated in vision, are, or may be, placed side by side in imme- diate juxtaposition; or, one may limit another by being superin- duced partially over it. A fourth position is equally indisputable, —that the contrasted colors, thus bounding each other, will form by their meeting a visible line, and that, if the superinduced color be surrounded by the other, this line will return upon itself, and thus constitute the outline of a visible figure. These four positions command a peremptory assent; they are all self-evident. But their admission at once explodes the paradox under discussion. And thus: ) unnecessary. in proximate reference to memory, it may be satisfactory to show, that this faculty does not stand in need of such crude modes of explanation. It must be allowed, that no faculty affords a more tempting subject for materialistic conjecture. No other mental power betrays a greater dependence on corporeal conditions than memory. Not only in general does its vigorous or feeble activity essentially depend on the health and indisposition of the body, more especially of the nervous systems; but there is manifested a connection between certain functions of memory and certain parts of the cerebral apparatus.” 'This connection, however, is such, as affords no coun- tenance to any particular hypotheses at present in vogue. For example, after certain diseases, or certain affections of the brain, some partial loss of memory takes place. Perhaps the patient loses the whole of his stock of knowledge previous to the disease; the faculty of acquiring and retaining new information remaining en- tire. Perhaps he loses the memory of words, and preserves that of things. Perhaps he may retain the memory of nouns, and lose that of verbs, or vice versa ; nay, what is still more marvellous, though it is not a very unfrequent occurrence, one language may be taken neatly out of his retention, without affecting his memory of others. “By such observations, the older psychologists were led to the various physiological hypotheses by which they hoped to Memory greatly de- pendent on corporeal conditions. 1H. Schmid, Versuch einer Metaphysik der inneren Natur [p. 231—285; translated with occa- sional brief interpolations. —ED.] 420 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXX. account for the phenomena of retention, — as, for example, the hypothesis of permanent material impressions Physiological hy- on the brain, or of permanent dispositions in Pothesis of the older ‘the nervous fibres to repeat the same oscillatory psychologists regard- ing memory. movements, — of particular organs for the differ- ent functions of memory, —of particular parts of the brain as the repositories of the various classes of ideas, — or even of a particular fibre, as the instrument of every several notion. But all these hypotheses betray only an ignorance of the proper object of philosophy, and of the true nature of the thinking princi- ple. They are at best but useless; for if the unity and self-activity of mind be not denied, it is manifest, that the mental activities, which have been once determined, must persist, and these corporeal explanations are superfluous. Nor can it be argued, that the limita- tions to which the Retentive, or rather the Reproductive, Faculty is subjected in its energies, in consequence of its bodily relations, prove the absolute depéndence of memory on organization, and legitimate the explanation of this faculty by corporeal agencies; for the incompetency of this inference can be shown from the contra- diction in which it stands to the general laws of mind, which, how- beit conditioned by bodily relations, still ever preserves its self- activity and independence.” ? There is perhaps no mental power in which such extreme dif- ferences appear, in different individuals, as in Two qualities requii_ ~=memory. To a good memory there are cer- Bahr ge eealnan tainly two qualities requisite,—1,° The capacity and Reproduction. of Retention, and 2°, The faculty of Reprodue- tion. But the former quality appears to be that by which these marvellous contrasts are principally determined. I should only fatigue you, were I to enumerate the prodigious feats of retention, which are proved to have been actually per- formed. Of these, I shall only select the,one which, upon the whole, appears to me the most extraordinary, both by reason of its own singularity, and because I am able to afford it some testi- mony, in confirmation of the veracity of the illustrious scholar by. whom it is narrated, and which has most groundlessly been sus- pected by his learned editor. The story I am about to detail to you is told by Muretus, in the first chapter of the third book of his incomparable work, the Varie Lectiones.? 1H. Schmid, Versuch einer Metaphysik, [p. lologers and critics of modern times; and 235, 236. — Ep.] from himse!f to Cicero, a period of sixteen 2 Opera, edit. Rubnken., tom. ii. p.65.—Ep. centuries, there is to be found no one who Muretus is one of the most distinguished phi- equalled him in getin eloquence. Besides ie Lect. XXX. METAPHYSICS. 421 After noticing the boast of Hippias, in Plato, that he could | repeat, upon hearing once, to the amount of five hundred words, he observes that this was noth- ing as compared with the power of retention possessed by Seneca the rhetorician. In his Declamations, Seneca, complaining of the inroads of old age upon his faculties of mind and body, mentions, in regard to the tenacity of his now failing memory, that he had been able to repeat two thousand names read to him, in the order in which they had been spoken; and that, on one occasion, when at his studies, two hun- dred unconnected verses having been pronounced by the different pupils of his preceptor, he repeated them in a reversed order, that is, proceeded from the last to the first uttered. After quoting the passage from Seneca, of which I have given you the substance, Muretus remarks, that this statement had always appeared to him marvellous, and almost incredible, until he himself had been wit- ness of a fact to which he never could otherwise have afforded eredit. The sum of this statement is, that at Padua there dwelt, in his neighborhood, a young man, a Corsican by birth, and of a good family in that island, who had come thither for the cultiva- tion of civil law, in which he was a diligent and distinguished student. He was a frequent visitor at the house and gardens of Muretus, who, having heard that he possessed a remarkable art, or faculty of memory, took occasion, though incredulous in regard to reports, of requesting from him a specimen of his power. He at once agreed; and having adjourned with a considerable party of distinguished auditors into a saloon, Murctus began to dictate words, Latin, Greek, barbarous, significant and non-significant, dis- joined and connected, until he wearied himself, the young man who wrote them down, and the audience who were present; — “we were all,” he says, “marvellously tired.” The Corsican alone was the one of the whole company alert and fresh, and continually desired Muretus for more words; who declared he would be more than satisfied, if he could repeat the half of what had been taken down, and at length he ceased. The young man, with his gaze fixed upon the ground, stood silent for a brief season, and then, says Muretus, “vidi facinus mirificissimum. Having begun to speak, he absolutely repeated the whole words, in the same order in which they had been delivered, without the slightest hesitation ; The remarkable case of retention narrated by Muretus. numerous editions of his several treatises, his course of publication, by Professor Frotscher works have been republished in a collected of Leipzig, was Ruhnkenius, perhaps the form six several times; and the editor of the greatest scholar of the eighteenth century. edition before the one at present [1887] in the 422, METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXX. then, commencing from the last, he repeated them backwards till he came to the first. Then again, so that he spoke the first, the third, the fifth, and so on; did this in any order that was asked, and all without the smallest error. Having subsequently become familiarly acquainted with him, I have had other and frequent experience of his power. He assured me (and he had nothing of the boaster in him) that he could recite, in the manner I have mentioned, to the amount of thirty-six thousand words. And what is more wonderful, they all so adhered to the mind that, after a year’s interval, he could repeat them without trouble. I know, from having tried him, he could do so after a considerable time (post multos dies). Nor was this all. Franciscus Molinus, a patrician of Venice, was resident with me, a young man ardently devoted to literature, who, as he had but a wretched memory, besought the Corsican to instruct him in the art. The hint of his desire was enough, and a daily course of instruction com- menced, and with such success that the pupil could, in about a week or ten days, easily repeat to the extent of five hundred words or more in any order that was prescribed.” “This,” adds Muretus, “I should hardly venture to record, fearing the suspicion of falsehood, had not the matter been very recent (for a year has not elapsed), and had I not as fellow-witnesses, Nicolaus the son of Petrus Lippomanus, Lazarus the son of Francis Mocenicus, Joannes the son of Nicolaus Malipetrus, George the son of Lau- rence Contarenus— all Venetian nobles, worthy and distinguished young men, besides other innumerable witnesses. The Corsican stated that he received the art from a Frenchman, who was his domestic tutor.’ Muretus terminates the narrative by alleging sundry examples of a similar faculty, possessed in antiquity by Cyrus, Simonides, and Apollonius Tyanzus. Now, on this history, Ruhnkenius has the following note, in reference to the silence of Muretus in regard Rubnkenius unduly tg the name of the Corsican: “Ego nomen skeptical in regard to slay 5s ie Ae Thine hominis tam mirabilis, citius quam patriam ; requisiissem. Idque pertinebat ad fidem nar-- rationi faciendam.” This skepticism is, I think, out of place. It would, perhaps, have been warranted, had Muretus not done far more than was necessary to establish the authenticity of the story; and, after the testimonies to whom he appeals, the omission of the Corsican’s name is a matter of little import. But I am surprised that one confirmatory circumstance has escaped so learned a scholar -as Ruhnkenius, seeing that it occurs in the works of a man with whose writings no one was more familiar. Muretus and Paulus Lect. XXX. METAPHYSICS. 423 Manutius were correspondents, and Manutius, you must know, was a Venetian. Now, in the letters of Manutius to Muretus, at the date of the occurrence in question, there is frequent mention made of Molino, in whom Manutius seems to have felt much interest ; and, on one occasion, there is an allusion (which I cannot at the moment recover so as to give you the precise expressions) to Molino’s cultivation of the Art of Memory, and to his instructor! This, if it were wanted, corroborates the narrative of Muretus whose trustworthiness, I admit, was not quite as transcendent as his genius.’ 1 See Pauli Manutii Epistola, vol. i. 1. iii. ep. xiii. p. 154 (edit. Krause, 1720): ‘Molino, parum abest, quin vehementer, invideam; quid ni? artem Memorie tenenti. Verumta- men impedit amor, a quo abesse solet invidia: etiam ea spes, quod ille, quo eum bono alienus homo impertivit, civi suo, homini amantis- simo, certe numquam denegabit.” Cf. vol. iii. Note ad Epistolas, p. 1188.— Ep. 2“ As Sophocles says that memory is the queen of things, and because the nurse of poetry herself is a daughter of Mnemosyne, I shall mention here another once world- renowned Corsican of Calvi— Giulio Guidi, in the year 1581, the wonder of Padua, on account of his unfortunate memory. He could repeat thirty-six thousand names after once hearing them. People called him Guidi della gran memoria. But he produced nothing; his memory had killed all his creative faculty. Pico yon Mirandola, who lived before him, produced; but he died young. It is with the precious gift of memory, as with all other gifts —they are a curse of the gods when they give too much.”— Gregorovius, Wanderings ix Corsica, vol. ii. book vi. chap. vi. p. 34 (Constable’s edition). [A case similar to that narrated by Muretus is given by Joseph Scal- iger in the Secunda Scaligerana, v. Memoire, t. ii. p. 450, 451, edit. 1740. — Ep.] LECTURE XXXII. THE REPRODUCTIVE FACULTY.— LAWS OF ASSOCIATION. In my last Lecture, I entered on the consideration of that faculty of mind by which we keep possession of the knowledge acquired by the two faculties of External Perception, and Self-consciousness; and I endeavored to explain to you a theory of the manner in which the fact of reten- tion may be accounted for, in conformity to the nature of mind, considered as a self-active and indivisible subject. At the conclu- sion of the Lecture, I gave you, instar omniwm, one memorable example of the prodigious differences which exist between mind and mind in the capacity of retention. Before passing from the faculty of Memory, considered simply as the Two opposite doc- power of conservation, I may notice two oppo- trines maintained in ite doctrines, that have been maintained, in sai opt a Yoeg regard to the relation of this faculty to the of Memory to the higher powers of higher powers of mind. One of these doctrines mind. holds, that a great development of memory is incompatible with a high degree of intelligence ; the other, that a high degree of intelligence supposes such a “aavel- opment of memory as its condition. The former of these opinions is one very extensively prevalent, serie icilglieas not only among philosophers, but among man- power of memory is Kind in general, and the words— Beati me- incompatible with a morta, expectantes judicium— have been ap- high degree of intelli- nlied to express the supposed incompatibility saa of great memory and sound judgment.’ There seems, however, no valid ground for this belief. If an extraor- dinary power of retention is frequently not accompanied with a corresponding power of intelligence, it is a natural, but not a very logical procedure, to jump to the conclusion, that a great memory Recapitulation. 1 [Niethammer, Der Streit des Philanthropin- Erfahrung (beati memoria exspectant judi- ismus und Humanismus, p. 294.] [Ausserdem cium), dass vorherrschende Geddchtnissfertig- sey es eine selbst Sprichwértlich gewordene eit der Urtheilshraft Abbruch thue.—ED.] . a 9 Lect. XXXI. . METAPHYSICS. 425 is inconsistent with a sound judgment. The opinion is refuted by the slightest induction; for we immediately This opinion refuted find, that many of the individuals who towered a e3 Berets above their fellows in intellectual superiority, and great memory. were almost equally distinguished for the capac- ity of their memory. I recently quoted to you a passage from the Scaligerana, in which Joseph Scaliger is made to say that he had not a good memory, but a good reminiscence; and he immediately adds, “never, or rarely, are judgment and a great memory found in con- junction.” Of this opinion Scaliger himself affords the most illus- trious refutation. During his lifetime, he was hailed as the Dic- tator of the Republic of Letters, and posterity has ratified the decision of his contemporaries, in crowning him as the prince of philologers and critics. But to elevate a man to such an eminence, it is evident, that the most consummate genius and ability were | conditions. And what were the powers of Scali- His great powers of — ger, let Isaac Casaubon,! among a hundred memory testified to by . : neg other witnesses, inform us; and Casaubon was ‘a scholar second only to Scaliger himself in erudition. “Nihil est quod discere quisquam vellet, quod ille (Scaliger) docere non posset: Nihil legerat (quid autem ille non legerat?), quod non statim meminisset; nihil tam obscurum aut abolitum in ullo vetere scriptore Graco, Latino, vel Hebreeo, de quo interrogatus non statim responderet. Historias omnium populorum, ' omnium tiquity, and whose philosophical opinions, were they collected, ar- ranged, and illustrated, would raise him to as high a rank among metaphysicians, as he already holds among theologians. “Among psychologists, those who have written on Memory and Reproduction with the greatest detail and pre- Defectintheanalysis cision, have still failed in giving more than a of Memory and Repro- meagre outline of these operations. "They have duction by psychol- . . ae eae taken account only of the notions which suggest ing only aconsecutive each other, with a distinct and palpable noto- order of association. riety. They have viewed the associations only in the order in which language is competent to express them; and as language, which renders them still more pal- pable and distinct, can only express them in a consecutive order, — can only express them one after another, they have been led to suppose that thoughts only awaken in succession. Thus, a series of ideas mutually associated, resembles, on the doctrine of philoso- phers, a chain in which every link draws up that which follows; and it is by means of these links that intelligence labors through, in the act of reminiscence, to the end which it proposes to attain.! “There are some, indeed, among them, who are ready to acknowl- edge, that every actual circumstance is associated to several funda- mental notions, and, consequently, to several chains, between which 1 Cf. Reid’s Works, p 906, note +.— Ep. 444 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXXII. the mind may choose; they admit even that every link is attached to several others, so that the whole forms a kind of trellis, —a kind of net-work; which the mind may traverse in every direction, but still always in a single direction at once, — always in a succession similar to that of speech. This manner of explaining reminiscence is founded solely on this, — that, content to have observed all that is distinctly manifest in the phenomenon, they have paid no attention to the under play of the latescent activities, — paid no attention to all that custom conceals, and conceals the more effectually in pro- — portion as it is more completely blended with the natural agencies of mind. “Thus their theory, true in itself, and departing from a well-estab- lished. principle, —the Association of Ideas, ex- Element inthe phe- Plains in a satisfactory manner a portion of the nomena, which the phenomena of Reminiscence; but it is incom- common theory fails plete, for it is unable to account for the prompt, to explain,—the move- : - . ment of thought from ©2SY, and varied operation of this faculty, or for one order of subjects all the marvels it performs. On the doctrine of " foanother. the philosophers, we can explain how a scholar repeats, without hesitation, a lesson he has learned, for all the words are associated in his mind according to - the order in which he has studied them; how he demonstrates a geometrical theorem, the parts of which are connected together in the same manner; these and similar reminiscences of simple succes- sions present no difficulties which the common doctrine cannot resolve. But it is impossible, on this doctrine, to explain the rapid and certain movement of thought, which, with a marvellous facility, - passes from one order of subjects to another, only to return again to the first ; which advances, retrogades, deviates, and reverts, sometimes marking all the points on its route, again clearing, as if in play, immense intervals; which runs over now in a manifest order, now in a seeming irregularity, all the notions relative to an object, often relative to several, between which no connection could be suspected ; and this without hesitation, without uncertainty, without error, as the hand of a skilful musician expatiates over the keys of the most complex organ. All this is inexplicable on the meagre and con- tracted theory on which the phenomena of reproduction have been thought explained.” + “To form a correct notion of the phenomena of Reminiscence, it is requisite, that we consider under what conditions it is determined to exertion. In the first place, it is to be noted that, at every crisis 1 Cardaillac, [Etudes Elémentaires de Philosophie, t. ii. c v. p. 124 et seg. —ED.] Lect. XXXII. METAPHYSICS. 445 of our existence, momentary circumstances are the causes which Conditions under which Reminiscence is determined to exer- tion. 1. Momentary cir- cumstances the causes of our mental activity. 2. The determin- ing circumstance must awaken our activity, and set our recollection at work to supply the necessaries of thought.? In the second place, it is as constituting a want (and by want I mean the result either of an act of de- sire or of volition), that the determining circum- stance tends principally to awaken the thoughts with which it is associated. This being the case, we should expect that each circumstance which constitute a want. constitutes a want should suggest, likewise, the notion of an object, or objects, proper to sat- isfy it; and this is what actually happens. It is, however, fur- ther to be observed, that it is not enough that the want suggests the idea of the object; for if that idea were alone, it would remain without effect, since it could not guide me in the procedure I should follow. It is necessary, at the same time, that to the idea of this object there should be associated the notion of the relation of this object to the want, of the place where I may find it, of the means by which I may procure it, and turn it to account, ete. For instance, I wish to make a quotation: —This want awakens in me the idea of the author in whom the passage is to be found, which I am desir- ous of citing; but this idea would be fruitless, unless there were conjoined, at the same time, the representation of the volume, of the place where I may obtain it, of the means I must employ, ete. Hence I infer, in the first place, that a want does not awaken an idea of its object alone, but that it awakens it accompanied with a number, more or less con- siderable, of accessory notions, which form, as it were, its train or attendance. This train may vary according to the nature of the want which Conditions under which a want is effec- tive to determine rem- iniscence. 1. Awakens the idea i j it . e . Be ee ong with suggests the notion of an object; but the train certain accessory no- , tions. can never fall wholly off, and it becomes more indissolubly attached to the object, in proportion as it has been more frequently called up in attendance. “T infer, in the second place, that this accompaniment of accessory notions, simultaneously suggested with the prin- pal idea, is far from being as vividly and dis- tinctly represented in consciousness as that idea itself; and when these accessories have once been completely blended with the habits of the mind, and its reproductive agency, they at length finally dis- 2. These accessory notions less vividly represented in con- sciousness than the idea itself. 1 [Szpe jam spatio obrutam Levis exoletam memoriam renovat nota. Seneca, Gidipus, v. 820.} 446 METAPHYSICS, Lect. XXXII. appear, becoming fused, as it were, in the consciousness of the idea to which they are attached. Experience proves this double effect of the habits of reminiscence. If we observe our opera- tions relative to the gratification of a want, we shall perceive that we are far from having a clear consciousness of the accessory notions; the consciousness of them is, as it were, obscured, and yet we cannot doubt that they are present to the mind, for it is they that direct our procedure in all its details. “We must, therefore, I think, admit that the thought of an object immediately suggested by a desire, is always accompanied by an escort more or less numerous of accessory thoughts, equally present to the mind, though, in general, unknown in The accessory no- themselves to consciousness; that these acces- tions, the more influ- gories are not without their influence in guiding cae capt 4G anes, he operations elicited by the principal notion; as they are further ? withdrawn from con- and, it may even be added, that they are so sciousness. much the more calculated to exert an effect in the conduct of our procedure, in proportion as, having become more part and parcel of our habits of reproduction, the influences they exert are further withdrawn, in ordinary, from the ken of consciousness.” The same thing may be illustrated by what happens to us in the case of reading. Originally each word, each letter, was a separate object of consciousness. At length, the knowledge of letters and words and lines being, as it were, fused into our habits, we no longer have any distinct consciousness of them, as severally concurring to the result, of which alone we are conscious. But that each word and letter has its effect, — an effect which can at any moment become an object of consciousness, is shown by the following experiment. If we look over a book for the occurrence of a particular name or word, we glance our eye over a page from top to bottom, and ascertain, almost in a moment, that it is or is not to be found therein. Here the mind is hardly conscious of a single word, but that of which it is in quest; but yet it is evident, that each other word and letter must have produced an obscure effect, and which effect the mind was ready to discrim- inate and strengthen, so as to call it into clear consciousness, when- ever the effect was found to be that which the letters of the word sought for could determine. But, if the mind be not unaffected by the multitude of letters and words which it surveys, if it be able to ascertain whether the combination of letters constituting the Tllustrated by the case of reading. 1 Cardaillac, [Etudes Elément, de Philos. t. il. c. v. p. 128 et seg. — ED.] —_— -— Lect. XXXII. METAPHYSICS. 447 word it seeks, be or be not actually among them, and all this with- out any distinct consciousness of all it tries and finds defective — why may we not suppose, — why are we not bound to suppose, that the mind may, in like manner, overlook its book of memory, and search among its magazines of latescent cognitions for the notions of which it is in want, awakening these into consciousness, and allowing the others to remain in their obscurity ? “A more attentive consideration of the subject will show, that we have not yet divined the faculty of Reminis- Grounds for infer- cence in its whole extent. Let us make a single ring that we have not yeflection. Continually struck by relations of yet compassed the fac- A é : ulty of Reminiscence Very kind, continually assailed by a crowd of in its whole extent. perceptions and sensations of every variety, and, at the same time, occupied with a complement of thoughts; we experience at once, and we are more or less dis- tinctly conscious of, a considerable number of wants, — wants some- times real, sometimes factitious or imaginary, — phenomena, how- ever, all stamped with the same characters, and all stimulating us to act with more or less of energy. And as we choose among the different wants which we would satisfy, as well as among the dif- ferent means of satisfying that want which we determine to prefer ; and as the motives of this preference are taken either from among the principal ideas relative to each of these several wants, or from among the accessory ideas which habit has established into their necessary escorts ;—Jin all these cases it is requisite, that all the circumstances should at once, and from the moment they have taken the character of wants, produce an effect, correspondent to that which, we have seen, is caused by each in particular. Hence we are compelled to conclude, that the complement of the circumstances by which we are thus affected, has the effect of rendering always present to us, and, consequently, of placing at our disposal, an im- mense number of thoughts; some of which certainly are distinctly recognized, being accompanied by a vivid consciousness, but the greater number of which, although remaining latent, are not the less effective in continually exercising their peculiar influence on our modes of judging and acting. } “We might say, that each of these momentary circumstances is a kind of electrie shock which is communicated to a certain portion, —to a certain limited sphere, of intelligence; and the sum of al] these circumstances is equal to so many shocks which, given at once 1 (Cf. Wolf, Psychologia Rationalis, §§ 96, 97. Sensili, partic. 78, pp- 155, 156 (Florence, 1555), Maynettus Maynetius, In Arist. De Sensu et and Simon Simonius, Ibid. p. 257.) 448 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXXIL at so many different points, produce a general agitation. We may form some rude conception of this phenomenon by an analogy. “We may compare it, in the former case, to those concentric circles which are presented to our observation on a smooth sheet of water, when its surface is agitated by throwing in a pebble; and, in the latter case, to the same surface when agitated by a number of peb- bles thrown simultaneously at different points. “To obtain a clearer notion of this phenomenon, I may add some 3 observations on the relation of our thoughts qs, Perth Snee among themselves, and with the determining from the relations of a our thoughts among Clrcumstances of the moment. themselves, and with “1°, Among the thoughts, notions, or ideas the determining cir. which belong to the different groups, attached cumstances of the mo- ge PAIN 5 aati to the principal representations simultaneously awakened, there are some reciprocally connected by relations proper to themselves; so that, in this whole comple- ment of coéxistent activities, these tend to excite each other to higher vigor, and, consequently, to obtain for themselves a kind of preéminence in the group or particular circle of activity to which they belong. “2°, There are sli neat associated, whether as principals or accessories, to a greater number of determining circumstances, or to circumstances which recur more frequently. Hence they present themselves oftener than the others, they enter more completely into our habits, and take, in a more absolute manner, the character of customary or habitual notions. It hence results, that they are less obtrusive, though more energetic, in their influence, enacting, as they do, a principal part in almost all our deliberations; and exer- cising a stronger influence on our determinations. « 3°, Among this great crowd of thoughts, simultaneously excited, those which are connected with circumstances which more vividly affect us, assume not only the ascendant over others of the same description with themselves, but likewise predominate over all those which are dependent on circumstances of a feebler determining influence. “From these three considerations we ought, therefore, to infer, that the thoughts connected with circumstances on which our attention is more specially concentrated, are those which prevail over the others; for the effect of attention is to render dominant and exclusive the object on which it is directed, and during the moment of attention, it is the circumstance to which we attend that necessarily obtains the ascendant. “Thus if we appreciate correctly the phenomena of Reproduc- Lect. XXXII. METAPHYSIGS.. 449 tion or Reminiscence, we shall recognize, as an incontestable fact, that our thoughts suggest each other, not one by General conclusions. one successively, as the order to which language Ch le Aree is astricted might lead us to infer; but that the aon ¥i simultane. COMplement of circumstances under which we at ously, every moment exist, awakens simultaneously a great number of thoughts; these it calls into the presence of the mind, either to place them at our disposal, if we find it requisite to employ them, or to make them coéperate in our deliberations by giving them, according to their nature and our habits, an influence, more or less active, on our judgments and con- sequent acts. “It is also to be observed, that in this great crowd of thoughts always present to the mind, there is only a small Of these some only — number of which we are distinctly conscious: become objects of clear . - Ros DLS and that in this small number we ought to dis- tinguish those which, being clothed in language, oral or mental, become the objects of a more fixed attention; those which hold a closer relation to circumstances more impressive than others; or which receive a predominant character by the more vig- orous attention we bestow on them. As to the others, although not the objects of clear consciousness, they are nevertheless present to the mind, there to perform a very important part as motive principles of determination ; and the influence which they exert in this capacity is even the more powerful in proportion as it is less apparent, being more disguised by habit.” } 1 Cardaillac, [Etudes Elément, de Philos., t. ii. c. Y. p. 184 et seg. —ED.] o7 LEOT URE (XX fT Id, THE REPRESENTATIVE FACULTY,— IMAGINATION. In my last Lecture, I concluded the special consideration of the elementary process of calling up or resuscitating out of unconsciousness the mental modifications which the mind, by its Retentive Faculty, preserves from absolute extinction; the process to which I gave the not unexceptionable name of the Reproductive, and which, as left to its spontaneous action, or as modified by the will, obtains the several denominations of Suggestion, or of Reminiscence. In the latter part of the Lec- ture, I was engaged in showing that the common doctrine in regard to Reproduction is altogether inadequate to the phenomena, — that it allows to the mind only the power of reproducing the minima of ' thought in succession, as in speech it can only enunciate these one after another; whereas, in the process of Suggestion and Reminis- cence, thoughts are awakened simultaneously in multitudes, in so far as to be brought into the immediate presence of the mind; in other words, they all, like the letters of a writing which we glance over, produce their effect, but those only upon which the mind con- centrates its attention are drawn out into the light and foreground of consciousness. Having thus terminated the separate consideration of the two first of the three correlative’ processes of Retention, Reproduction, and Representation, I proceed to the special discussion of the last, — the Representative Faculty. By the faculty of Representation, as I formerly mentioned, I mean strictly the power the mind has of hold- ing up vividly before itself the thoughts which, by the act of Reproduction, it has recalled into consciousness. Though the processes of Representation and Repro- duction cannot exist independently of each other, they are never- theless not more to be confounded into one than those of Repro- duction and Conservation. They are, indeed, discriminated by Recapitulation. The Faculty of Rep- resentation, — what, aaa 4 3 vad B. . + Oe ¥ Lect XXXIIIL METAPHYSICS. 451 differences sufiiciently decisive. Reproduction, as we have seen, operates, in part at least, out of consciousness. Representation, on the contrary, is only realized as it is realized in consciousness; the degree or vivacity of the representation being always in proportion to the degree or vivacity of our consciousness of its reality. Nor are the energies of Representation and Repro- Representation and = duction always exerted by the same individual ee tal in. equal intensity, any more than the energies ways exerted by the Zi > P : same individual in Of Reproduction and Retention. Some minds equal intensity; but are distinguished for a higher power of mani- all strong or weak infesting one of these phenomena; others, for OT ee a ifesting another; and as it is not al in reference to the antesting ¢ 3 ‘ Roo Shee same classes of objects. | the person who forgets nothing, who can most | promptly recall what he retains, so neither is it always the person who recollects most easily and correctly, who can exhibit what he remembers in the most vivid colors. It is to be recollected, however, that Retention, Reproduction, and Repre- ' sentation, though not in different persons of the same relative vigor, are, however, in the same individuals, all strong or weak in refer- ence to the same classes of objects. For example, if a man’s memory be more peculiarly retentive of words, his verbal reminis- cence and imagination will, in like manner, be more particularly energetic. I formerly observed, that philosophers not having carried their psychological analysis so far as the constituent or elementary pro- cesses, the faculties in their systems are only precarious unions of these processes, in binary or even trinary combination, — unions, consequently, in which hardly any two philosophers are at one. In common language, it is not of course to be expected that there should be found terms to express the result of an analysis, which had not even been performed by philosophers; and, accordingly, the term Imagination or Phantasy, which denotes most nearly, the representative process, does this, however, not without an admixture of other processes, which it is of consequence for scientific precision that we should consider apart. e Philosophers have divided Imagination into two,— what they call the Reproductive and the Productive. By Philosophershavedi- the former, they mean imagination considered ep pone eae as simply reéxhibiting, representing the objects ception,) and Produc. | Presented by perception, that is, exhibiting them tive. without addition, or retrenchment, or any change in the relations which they reciprocally held, when first made known to us through sense. This operation Mr. A? METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XXXIL Stewart! has discriminated as a separate faculty, and bestowed on it the name of Conception. This discrimina- This discrimination tion and nomenclature, I think unfortunate. unfortunate in itself The discrimination is unfortunate, because it is and in its nomencla- ; ‘ wpe 5 sepa unphilosophical to distinguish, as a separate faculty, what is evidently only a special appli- cation of a common power. The nomenclature is unfortunate, for the term’ Conception, which means a taking up in bundles, or grasping into unity,—this term, I say, ought to have been left to denote, what it previously was, and only properly could be, applied to express,—the notions we have of classes of objects, in other words, what have been called our general ideas. Be this, however, as it may, it is evident, that the Reproductive Imagination (or Con- ception, in the abusive language of the Scottish philosophers) is not a simple faculty. It comprises two processes : — first, an act of representation strictly so called; and, secondly, an act of reproduce- tion, arbitrarily limited by certain contingent circumstances ; and it is from the arbitrary limitation of this second constituent, that the faculty obtains the only title it can exhibit to an mdependent exist- ence. Nor can the Productive Imagination establish a better claim to the distinction of a separate faculty than the Reproductive. The Productive or Creative Imagination is that which is usually sig- nified by the term Jmagination or Fancy, in ordinary language. Now, in the first place, it is to be observed, that the terms produc- tive or creative are very improperly applied to Imagination, or the Representative Faculty of mind. It is admitted on all hands, that Imagination creates nothing, that is, produces nothing new; and the terms in question are, therefore, by the acknowledgment of those who employ them, only abusively applied to denote the operations of Fancy, in the new arrangement it makes of the old objects’ furnished to it by the senses. We have now, therefore, only to consider, whether, in this cor- rected meaning, Imagination, as a plastic energy, be a simple or a complex operation. And that it is a complex operation, I do not think it will be at all difficult to proves)? In the view I take of the fundamental processes, the act of representation is merely the energy of the mind in holding up to its own contemplation what it is determined to represent. I distinguish, as essentially different, the representation, and the determination to ' Imagination, as a plastic energy, is a. complex operation. The act of Repre- sentation, — what. rh Elements, vol. i. part i. c. 8 Works, vol. tion, see Sir W. Hamilton’s Edition of his ii. p. 144 On Reid’s use of the term Concep- Works, p 860, note t, and p. 407, note ¢.— ED. > Lreot. X XXIII. METAPHYSICS. 458 represent, I exclude from the faculty of Representation all: power of preference among the objects it holds up to view. This is the function of faculties wholly different from that of Representation, which, though active in representing, is wholly passive as to what it represents. What, then, it may be asked, are the powers by which the Repre- sentative Faculty is determined to represent, Two powers by and to represent this particular object, or this which the Representa- articular complement of objects, and not any tive Faculty is deter- : ICA dicey’ other? These are two., The first of these is 1, The Reproductive the Reproductive Faculty. This faculty is the Faculty. | great immediate source from which the Repre- sentative receives both the materials and the determination to represent; and the laws by which the Reproduc- tive Faculty is governed, govern also the Representative. Accord- ingly, if there were no other laws in the arrangement and combi- nation of thought than those of association, the Representative Faculty would be determined in its manifestations, and in the character of its manifestations, by the Reproductive Faculty alone; and, on this supposition, representation could no more be distin- guished from reproduction than reproduction from association. But there is another elementary process which we have not yet considered, — Comparison, or the Faculty of relations, to which the representative act is like- wise subject, and which plays a conspicuous part in determining in what combinations objects are represented. By the process of Comparison, the complex objects, — the congeries of phenomena called up by the Reproductive Faculty, undergo various operations. They are separated into parts, they are analyzed into elements; and these parts and elements are again compounded in every various fashion. In all this the Representative Faculty cooperates. It, first of all, exhibits the phenomena so called up by the laws of ordinary association. In this it acts as handmaid to the Reproductive Faculty. It then exhibits the phenomena, as variously elaborated by the analysis and synthesis of the Compara- tive Faculty, to which, in like manner, it performs the part of a subsidiary. This being understood, you will easily perceive, that the Imagi- nation of common language, —the Productive Imagination of phi- losophers, —is nothing but the Representative process plus the process to which I would give the name of the Comparative. In this compound operation, it is true that the representative act is the most conspicuous, perhaps the most essential, element. For, in 2. The Faculty of Relations. 454. METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XXXII the first place, it is a condition of the possibility of the act of comparison, — of the act of analytic synthesis, The Imagination of that the material on which it operates (that is, _ Codameaaa@aN the objects reproduced in their natural connec- cesses of Representa. t#0ns) should be held up to its observation in tion and Comparison. a Clear light, in order that it may take note of their various circumstances of relation; and, in the second, that the result of its own elaboration, that is, the new arrangements which it proposes, should be realized in a vivid act of representation. Thus it is, that, in the view both of the vulgar and of philosophers, the more obtrusive, though really the more subordinate, element in this compound process has been elevated into the principal constituent; whereas, the act of compar- ison, — the act of separation and reconstruction, has been regarded as identical with the act of representation. Thus Imagination, in the common acceptation of the term, is not a simple but a compound faculty, —a faculty, The process of Rep- however, in which representation, —the vivid resentation the prince ~— exhibition of an object, —forms the principal con Cas som: constituent. If, therefore, we were obliged to monly understood. find a common word for every elementary pro- cess of our analysis, — Imagination would be the term, which, with the least violence to its meaning, could:be accommodated to express the Representative Faculty. | By Imagination, thus limited, you are not to suppose that the faculty of representing mere objects of sense alone is meant. On the contrary, a vigorous power of representation is as indispensable a condition of success in the abstract sciences, as in the poetical and plastic arts; and it may, accordingly, be reason- ably doubted whether Aristotle or Homer were possessed of the more powerful imagination. “We may, indeed, affirm, that there are as many different kinds of imagination as there are different kinds of intellectual activity. There is the imagination of abstraction, which represents to us certain phases of an object to the exclusion of oth- ers, and, at the same time, the sign by which the phases are united; the imagination of wit, which represents differences and contrasts, and the resemblances by which these are again combined; the imagination of judgment, which represents the various qualities of an object, and binds them together under the relations of sub- stance, of attribute, of mode; the imagination of reason, which represents a principle in connection with its consequences, the effect in dependence on its cause; the imagination of feeling, which rep- pal constituent of Im- Imagination not limited to objects of sense. Lect. X XXIII. METAPHYSICS. 455 resents the accessory images, kindred to some particular, and which therefore confer on it greater compass, depth, and intensity; the imagination of volition, which represents all the cireumstances which concur to persuade or dissuade from a certain act of will; the im- agination of the passions, which, according to the nature of the affection, represents all that is homogeneous or analogous; finally, the imagination of the poet, which represents whatever is new, or beautiful, or sublime, — whatever, in a word, it is determined to represent by any interest of art.”! The term imagination, however, is less generally applied to the representations of the Comparative Faculty considered in the abstract, than to the representations of sensible objects, concretely modified by comparison. The two kinds of imagination are in fact not frequently combined. Accordingly, using the term in this its ordinary extent, that is, in its limitation to objects of sense, it is finely said by Mr. Hume: «“N othing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers. Men of bright fancies may, in this respect, be compared to those angels whom the Scriptures represent as covering their eyes with their wings.”? Considering the Representative Faculty in subordination to its two determinants, the faculty of Reproduction Three principal or- and the faculty of Comparison or Elaboration, ee ee ln re may distinguish three principal orders in agination represents 5 ; : : ideas, which Imagination represents ideas : — “1°, The Natural order; 2°, The Logical order; 3°, The Poetical order. The natural order is that in which we receive the impression of external objects, or the order ac- cording to which our thoughts spontaneously group themselves. The logical order consists in presenting what is universal, prior to what is contained under it as particular, or in presenting the particulars first, and then ascending to the universal which they constitute. The former is the order of deduction, the latter that of induction. These two orders have this in common, that they deliver to us notions in the dependence in which the antecedent explains the subsequent. The poetical order consists in seizing individual circumstances, and in grouping them in such a manner that the imagination shall represent them So as they might be offered by the sense. The natural order is in- voluntary ; it is established independently of our concurrence. The 1. The natural or- der. 2. The logical order. 8. The poetical or- der. 1 Ancillon, Essais Philosophiques, ii. 151. 2 Treatise of Human Nature, book i. part iv. § 7.—Ep. 456 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XX XIIz logical order is a child of art, it is the result of our will; but it is conformed to the laws of intelligence, which tend always to recall the particular to the general, or the general to the particular. The poetical order is exclusively calculated on effect. Pindar would not be a lyric poet, if his thoughts and images followed each other in the common order, or in the logical order. The state of mind in whigh thought and feeling clothe themselves in lyric forms, is a state in which thoughts and feelings are associated in an extraordinary manner, —in which they have, in fact, no other relation than that which groups and moves them around the dominant thought or feeling which forms the subject of the ode.” $e Thevehts which follow each other only in the natural or rder, or as they are associated in the minds of men in Associations tedious, general, form tedious conversations and tiresome PanaiAbe tales ais seaoks: Thoughts, on the other hand, whose connection is singular, capricious, extraordinary, are unpleasing; whether it be that they strike us as improbable, or that the effort which has been required to produce, supposes a cor- responding effort to comprehend. Thoughts whose association is at once simple and new, and which, though not previously witnessed - in conjunction, are yet approximated without a violent exertion, — such thoughts please universally, by affording the mind the pleasures of novelty and exercise at once.” “A peculiar kind of imagination, determined by a peculiar order . of association, is usually found in every period Peculiar kinds of of life, in every sex, in every country, in every Sebago me perme religion. A knowledge of men principally con- ed by peculiar orders of association. sists in a knowledge of the principles by which their thoughts are linked and represented. The study of this is of importance to the instructor, in order to direct the character and intellect of his pupils; to the statesman, that he may exert his influence on the public opinion and manners of a people; to the poet, that he may give truth and reality to his dra- matic situations; to the orator, in order to convince and persuade; to the man of the world, if he would give interest to his conversa- tion.” “ Authors who have made a successful study of this subject, skim over a multitude of circumstances under which Difference between an occurrence has taken place; because they are a cultivated and a vul- ae ° : Miata, aware that it is proper to reject what is only accessory to the object which they would present in prominence. A vulgar mind forgets and spares nothing; he is ignorant that conversation is always but a selection ; that every story Lect. XX XIII METAPHYSICS. | 457 Is subject to the laws of dramatic poetry, — festinat ad eventum: and that all which does not concur to the effect, destroys or weakens it. The involuntary associations of their thoughts are imperative on minds of this description; they are held in thraldom to the order and circumstances in which their perceptions were originally ob- tained.”* This has not, of course, escaped the notice of the greatest observer of human nature. Mrs. Quickly, in reminding Falstaff of his promise of marriage, supplies a good example of this peculiarity. “Thou didst swear to me upon a parcel-gilt goblet, sitting in my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a sea-coal fire, upon Wed- nesday.in Whitsun week, when the prince broke thy head for liken- ing his father to a singing man of Windsor,” —and so forth. In Martinus Seriblerus, the coachman thus describes a scene in the Bear Garden: “He saw two men fight a prize; one was a fair man, a sergeant in the guards; the other black, a butcher; the sergeant had red breeches, the butcher blue; they fought upon a stage, about four o’clock, and the sergeant wounded the butcher in the leg.” “Dreaming, Somnambulism, Reverie, are so many effects of im- agination, determined by association, — at least states of mind in which these have a decisive influence. If an impression on the sense often commences a dream, it is by imagination and suggestion that it is developed and accomplished. Dreams have frequently a degree of vivacity which enables them to compete with the reality; and if the events which they represent to us were in accordance with the circumstances of time and place in which we stand, it would be almost impossible to distinguish a vivid dream from a sensible perception.” “If” says Pascal,’ “we dreamt every night the same thing, it would perhaps affect us as powerfully as the objects which we perceive every day. And if an artisan were certain of dreaming every night for twelve hours that he was king, I am convinced that he would be almost as happy as a king, who dreamt for twelve hours that he was an artisan. If we dreamt every night that we were pursued by enemies and harassed by hor- rible phantoms, we should suffer almost as much as if that were Dreaming an effect of imagination, deter- mined by association. say, when we awake, that we have dreamt; for life is a dream a little less inconstant.” Now the case which Pascal here hypotheti- 1 Ancillon, Essais Philos. ii. 152—156.— Ep, 3 Pensées, partie i. art. vi. § 20. Vol. ii. p. 2 Ancillon, Ess. Phil. ii. 159. — Ep. 102, (edit. Faugére.)— Ep. 58 458° METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXXIIL cally supposes, has actually happened. In a very curious Ger- ' man work, by Abel, entitled A Collection of Remarkable Pheenomena from Human Life, ~ I find the following case, which I abridge: — A young man had a cataleptic attack, in consequence of which a singular effect was operated in his mental constitution. Some six minutes after falling asleep, he began to speak distinctly, and almost always of the same objects and concatenated events, so that he carried on from night to night the same history, or rather continued to play the same part. On wakening, he had no reminiscence whatever of his dreaming thoughts, —a circumstance, by the way, which distinguishes this as rather a case of somnambulism than of common dreaming. Be this, however, as it may, he played a double part in his existence. By day he was the poor apprentice of a mer- chant; by night he was a married man, the father of a family, a senator, and in affluent circumstances. If during his vision any- thing was said in regard to his waking state, he declared it unreal and adream. This case, which is established on the best evidence, is, as far as J am aware, unique. The influence of dreams upon our character is not without its interest. A particular tendency may be strengthened in a man- sclely by the repeated action of dreams. Dreams do not, however, as is commonly supposed, afford any appreciable indication of the character of individuals. It is not always the subjects that occupy us most, when awake, that form the matter of our dreams; and it is curious that the persons the dearest to us are precisely those about whom we dream most rarely. Somnambulism is a phenomenon still more astonishing. In this singular state, a person performs a regular series of rational actions, and those frequently of the most difficult and delicate nature, and, what is still more marvellous, with a talent to which he could make no pretension when awake." His memory and reminiscence supply him with recollections of words and things, which perhaps were never at his disposal in the ordinary state; he speaks more fluently a more refined language; and, if we are to credit what the evidence on which it rests hardly allows us to disbelieve, he has not only perceptions through other channels than the common organs of sense, but the sphere of his cognitions is amplified to an extent far beyond the limits to which sensible perception is confined. This subject is one of the most perplexing in the whole compass of philosophy; for, on the one. Case of dreaming mentioned by Abel. Somnambulism. 1 Cf. Ancillon, Essais Philos. ii. 161.— ED. Luét XX XIU: METAPHYSICS. 459 hand, the phenomena are so marvellous that they cannot be believed, and yet, on the other, they are of so unambiguous and palpable a character, and the witnesses to their reality are so numerous, so intelligent, and so high above every suspicion of deceit, that it is equally impossible to deny credit to what is attested by such ample and unexceptionable evidence. “The third state, that of Reverie or Castle-building, is a kind of waking dream, and does not differ from dream- ing, except by the consciousness which accom- panies it. In this state, the mind abandons itself without a choice of subject, without control over the mental train, to the involuntary associations of imagination. The mind is thus occupied without being properly active; it is active, at least, without effort. Young persons, women, the old, the unemployed, and the idle, are all dis- posed to reverie. There is a pleasure attached to its illusions, which render it as seductive as it is dangerous. The mind, by indulgence in this dissipation, becomes enervated, it acquires the habit of a pleasing idleness, loses its activity, and at length even the power and the desire of action.”! “The happiness and misery of every individual of mankind depends almost exclusively on the particular The happiness and character of his habitual associations, and the misery of the individ- relative kind and intensity of his imagination. ual dependent on the : character of his habit- | 1t is much less what we actually are, and what ual associations. we actually possess, than what we imagine our- selves to be and have, that is decisive of our existence and fortune.”? Apicius committed suicide to avoid star- vation, when his fortune was reduced to somewhere, in English money, about £100,000. The Roman epicure imagined that he could not subsist on what, to men in general, would seem more than affluence. . “Imagination, by the attractive or repulsive pictures with which, according to our habits and associations, it fills the influence of im- — the frame of our life, lends to reality a magical agination on human ; ae . life. charm, or despoils it of all its pleasantness. The imaginary happy and the imaginary miserable are common in the world, but their happiness and misery are not the less real; everything depends on the mode in which they feel and estimate their condition. Fear, hope, the recollection of past pleasures, the torments of absence and of desire, the secret and almost resistless tendency of the mind towards certain objects, are Reverie. 1 Ancillon, Essais Philos. ii. 162. — Ep. 2 Ancillon, Essais Philos. ii. 163, 164. — Ep. 460 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXXIIL the effects of association and imagination. At a distance, things seem to us radiant with a celestial beauty, or in the lurid aspect of deformity. Of a truth, in either case we are equally wrong. When the event which we dread, or which we desire, takes place, when we obtain, or when there is forced upon us, an object environed with a thousand hopes, or with a thousand fears, we soon discover that we have expected too much or too little; we thought it by anticipation infinite in good or evil, and we find it in reality not only finite, but contracted. ‘With the exception, says Rousseau, ‘of the self-existent Being, there is nothing beautiful, but that which is not” In the crisis whether of enjoyment or suffering, happiness is not so much happiness, nor misery so much misery, as — we had anticipated. In the past, thanks to a beneficent Creator, our joys reippear as purer and more brilliant than they had been actually experienced; and sorrow loses not only its bitterness, but is changed even into a source of pleasing recollection.”’ “Suavis laborum est preteritorum memoria,” says Cicero ;? while “hae olim meminisse juvabit,”® is, in the words of Virgil, the consolation of a present infliction. “In early youth, the present and the future are displayed in a factitious magnificence; for at this period of life imagination is in its spring and freshness, and a cruel experience has not yet exorcised its brilliant enchantments. Hence the fair picture of a golden age, which all nations concur in placing in the past; it is the dream of the youth of mankind.”* In old age, again, where the future is dark and short, imagination carries us back to the reénjoyment of a past existence. “The young,” says Aristotle,’ “live forwards in hope, the old live backwards in memory;” as Martial has well expressed it, Hoc est Vivere bis, vita posse priore frui. * i From all this, however, it appears that the present is the only time in which we never actually live; we live either in the future, or in the past. So long as we have a future to anticipate, we con- temn the present; and when we can no longer look forward to a future, we revert and spend our existence in the past. In the words of Manilius : “Victuros azimus semper, nec vivimus unquam.”’? ) 1 Ancillon, Ess. Phil. ii. 164-5.— Ep. 3 Zneid, i.208.—Ep. 2 De Finibus, ii. 82, translated from Euripi- 4 Ancillon, Essais Philos. ii. 166.—ED. des, (quoted by Macrobius, Sat. vii. 2):— 5 Rhet.ii, 12 and 13.—Eb. ‘Qs nv. Tor cwddyTa peuvjocsa mévwv. — 6 Lib. x. epigr. 23. — ED¢ Ep. 7 Astronomicon, iv. 4.— ED. eo Lror. XXXII. METAPHYSICS. . 461 In the words of Pope: ““Man never is, but always to be blest.’?1 I shall terminate the consideration of Imagination Proper by a speculation concerning the organ which it em- Imagination em- ploys in the representations of sensible objects. ploys the organs of ‘The organ which it thus employs seems to be sense in the represen- tations of sensible ob. | 20 Other than the organs themselves of Sense, jects. on which the original impressions were made, and through which they were originally per- ceived. Experience has shown, that Imagination depends on no one part of the cerebral apparatus exclusively. There is no portion of the brain which has not been destroyed by mollification, or indu- ration, or external lesion, without the general faculty of Representa- tion being injured. But experience equally proves, that the intra- cranial portion of any external organ of sense cannot be destroyed, without a certain partial abolition of the Imagination Proper. For example, there are many cases recorded by medical observers, of persons losing their sight, who have also lost the faculty of represent- ing the images of visible objects. They no longer call up such objects by reminiscence, they no longer dream of them. Now in these cases, it is found that not merely the external instrument of sight, — the eye, — has been disorganized, but that the disorganization has extended to those parts of the brain which constitute the internal instrument of this sense, that is, the optic nerves and thalami. If the latter, —the real organ of vision,—remain sound, the eye alone being destroyed, the imagination of colors and forms remains as vigorous as when vision was entire. Similar cases are recorded in regard to the deaf. These facts, added to the observation of the internal phenomena which take plate during our acts of representa- tion, make it, I think, more than probable that there are as many organs of Imagination as there are organs of Sense. Thus I have a distinct consciousness, that, in the internal representation of visi- ble objects, the same organs are at work which operate in the exter- nal perception of these; and the same holds good in an imagination of the objects of Hearing, Touch, Taste, and Smell. But not only sensible perceptions, voluntary motions likewise are imitated in and by the imagination. I can, in imagination, represent the action of speech, the play of the muscles of the countenance, the move- ment of the limbs; and, when I do this, I feel clearly that I awaken a kind of tension in the same nerves through Voluntary motions imitated in and by the imagination. 1 Essay on Man, i. 95.—Ep. 462 METAPHYSICS. eae which, by an act of will, I can determine an overt and voluntary — motion of the muscles; nay, when the play of imagination is very lively, this external movement is actually determined. Thus we frequently see the countenances of persons under the influence of — imagination undergo various changes; they gesticulate with their — hands, they talk to themselves, and all this is in consequence only of the imagined activity going out into real activity. I should, therefore, be disposed to conclude, that,.as in Perception the living | organs of sense are from without determined to energy, so in Imagi- — nation they are determined to a similar energy by an influence from — within. : OL .g erode aeanne 297 em hotel shclteineha 2 DRO: é EO RE ROR eV, THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY. — CLASSIFICATION. ABSTRACTION. Tx faculties with which we have been hitherto engaged, may be regarded as subsidiary to that which we are now about to consider. This, to which I gave the name of the Elaborative Faculty, — the Faculty of Relations, — or Comparison, — constitutes what is properly denominated Thought. It supposes always at least two terms, and its act results in a judgment, that is, an affirmation or negation of one of these terms of the other. You will recollect that, when treating of Consciousness in general, I stated to you, that consciousness necessarily involves a judgment; and as every act of mind is an act of consciousness, every act of mind, consequently, involves a judgment.! A consciousness is necessarily the consciousness of a determinate something; and we cannot be conscious of anything without virtually affirming its existence, that is, judging it to be. Consciousness is thus primarily a judgment or affirmation of existence. Again, consciousness is not merely the affirmation of naked existence, but the affirmation of a certain qualified or determinate existence. We are conscious that we exist only in and through our consciousness that we exist in this or that particular state, — that we are so or so affected, — so or so active 5 and we are only conscious of this or that particular state of exist- ence, inasmuch as we discriminate it as different from some other state of existence, of which we have been previously conscious and are now reminiscent; but such a discrimination supposes, in con- “sciousness, the affirmation of the existence of one state of a specific character, and the negation of another. On this ground it was that I maintained, that consciousness necessarily involves, besides recol- The Elaborative Fac- ulty, —what and how designated. Every act of mind involves a judgment. 1 See above, p. 410.—Ep. [Cf. Aristotle, ii.c. ult. Gatien-Arnoult, Programme, pp. 81, De Motione Animal.c. vi. [‘H gayracla xa 108, 105. Reid, Int. Powers, Ess. vi. [c. i. 4 eloSnots .. . KpiriKkd.—Ep.] Post An., Works, p. 414.—E.] 464 METAPHYSICS. Lreor. XXXIV. © lection, or rather a certain continuity of representation, also judg- ment or comparison ; and, consequently, that, so far from comparison or judgment being a process always subsequent to the acquisition of knowledge, through perception and self-consciousness, it is in- volved as a condition of the acquisitive process itself: In point of fact, the various processes of Acquisition (Apprehension), Repre- sentation, and Comparison, are all mutually dependent. Compari- son cannot judge without something to compare; we cannot origi- nally acquire,— apprehend, we cannot subsequently represent our knowledge, without in either act attributing existence, and a certain kind of existence, both to the object known and to the subject knowing, that is, without enouncing certain judgments and per- forming certain acts of comparison; I say without performing certain acts of comparison, for taking the mere affirmation that a thing is,—this is tantamount to a negation that it is not, and necessarily supposes a comparison, — a collation, between existence and non-existence. What I have now said may perhaps contribute to prepare you for what I am hereafter to say of the faculty or elementary process of Comparison, — a faculty which, in the analysis of philosophers, is exhib- ited only in part; and even that part is not pre- served in its integrity. They take into account only a fragment of the process, and that fragment they again break down into a plurality of faculties. In opposition to the views hitherto promul- gated in regard to Comparison, I will show that this faculty is at work in every, the simplest, act of mind; and that, from the primary affirmation of existence in an original act of consciousness to the judgment contained in the conclusion of an act of reasoning, every operation is only an evolution of the same elementary pro- cess, —that there is a difference in the complexity, none in the nature, of the act; in short, that the various products of Analysis and Synthesis, of Abstraction and Generalization, are all merely the results of Comparison, and that the operations of Conception or Simple Apprehenison, of Judgment, and of Reasoning, are all only acts of Comparison, in various applications and degrees. What I have, therefore, to prove is, in the first place, that Com- parison is supposed in every, the simplest, act of knowledge; in the second, shat our facti- tiously simple, our factitiously complex, our abstract, and our generalized notions, are all merely so many pro- ducts of Comparison; in the third, that Judgment, and, in the fourth, that Reasoning, is identical with Comparison. In doing Defect in the analy- sis of this faculty by philosophers. Positions to be estab- lished. Lucr. XXXIV. METAPHYSICS. AG5 this, I shall not formally distribute the discussion into these heads, but shall include the proof of what I have now advanced, whie tracing Comparison from its simplest to its most complex opera- tions. The first or most elementary act of Comparison, or of that men- tal process in which the relation of two terms is recognized and affirmed, is the judgment vir- tually pronounced, in an act of Perception, of the non-ego, or, in an act of Self-consciousness, of the ego. This is the primary affirmation of existence. The notion of existence is one native to the mind. It is the primary condition of thought. The first act of experi- ence awoke it, and the first act of consciousness was a subsumption of that of which we were conscious under this notion ; in other words, the first act of consciousness was an affirma- tion of the existence of something. The first or simplest act of comparison is thus the discrimination of existence from non-exist- ence; and the first or simplest judgment is the affirmation of exist- ence, in other words, the denial of non-existence. But the something of which we are conscious, and of which we predicate existence, in the primary judgment, is twofold, —the ego and the non-ego. We are conscious of both, and aftirm existence of both. But we do more; we do not merely affirm the existence of each out of relation to the other, but, in affirming their existence, we affirm their existence in duality, in difference, in mutual contrast ; that is, we not only affirm the ego to exist, but deny it existing as the non-ego; we not only affirm the non-ego to exist, but deny it existing as the ego. The second act of comparison is thus the discrimination of the ego and the non-ego; and the second judgment is the affirmation, that each is not the other. The third gradation in the act of comparison, is in the recogni- tion of the multiplicity of the coéxistent or suc- cessive phenomena, presented either to Percep- tion or Self-consciousness, and the judgment in regard to their resemblance or dissimilarity. The fourth is the comparison of the phenomena with the native notion of Substance, and the judgment is the grouping of these phenomena into different bundles, as the attributes of different subjects. In the external Comparison as deter- mined by objective conditions. The first act. Second. Third. Fourth. 1 [Cf. Troxler, Logik, ii. 20 et seg. Reinhold; Histoire de la Philosophie, (xviiie Siécle) 1. Theorie des Men. Erkennt. i. 290. Beneke, xxiii., xxiy. Garnier, Cours de Psychologie, p. Psych. Skizzen, i, 227 et seg. Cousin, Cours de 87.) 09 466 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXXIV. world, this relation constitutes the distinction of things; in the internal, the distinction of powers. The fifth act of comparison is the collation of successive phe- nomena under the native notion of Causality, and the affirmation or negation of their mutual relation as cause and effect. So far the process of comparison is determined merely by objec- tive conditions; hitherto it has followed only in the footsteps of nature. In those, again, we are as determined by the < . cane i necessities ofthethink. | NOW to consider, the procedure is, in a certain ing subject. sort, artificial, and determined by the necessities Classification shown = of the thinking subject itself. The mind is to be an act of Com- ° Shs : Aah: finite in its powers of comprehension ; the ob- , jects, on the contrary, which are presented to it are, in proportion to its limited capacities, infinite in number. How then is this disproportion to be equalized ? How can the infinity of nature be brought down to the finitude of man? This is done by means of Classification. Objects, though infinite in number, are not infinite in variety ; they are all, in a certain sort, repetitions of the same common qualities, and the mind, though lost in the multi- tude of particulars, — individuals, can easily grasp the classes into which their resembling attributes enable us to assort these. This whole process of Classification is a mere act of Comparison, as the following deduction will show. In the first place, this may be shown in regard to the formation of Complex notions, with which, as the simplest species of classification, we may commence. By Complex or Collective notions, I mean merely the notion of a class formed by the repetition of the same constituent notion.’ Such are the notions of an army, @ Jorest, a town, a number. These are names of classes, formed by the repetition of the notion of @ soldier, of a tree, of a house, of a unit. You are not to confound, as has sometimes been done, the notion of an army, a forest, a town, a number, with the notions of army, forest, town, and number, the former, as I have said, are complex or collective, the latter are general or universal notions. It is evident that a collective notion is the result of compar- ison. ‘The repetition of the same constituent notion supposes that these notions were compared, their identity or absolute similarity affirmed. | In the whole process of classification, the mind is in a great Fifth. Comparison viewed 1. In regard to Com- plex or Collective no- tions. 1 Cf. Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, b. ii. c. xii. § 5. —Ep. Degerando, Des Signes, vol. i. c. vii. p. 170. — Ep. Leor.. XXXIV. METAPHYSICS. 467 measure dependent upon language for its Success; and in this, the simplest of the acts of classification, it may be In this, the simplest == proper to show how language affords to mind a 5 mee the assistance it requires. Our complex no- on language. tions being formed by the repetition of the same notion, it is evident that the difficulty we can experience in forming an adequate conception of a class of identical constituents, will be determined by the difficulty we have in conceiving a multitude. “But the comprehension of the mind is feeble and limited; it can embrace at once but a small number of objects. It would thus seem that an obstacle is raised to the extension of our complex ideas at the very outset of our combina- tions. But here language interposes, and supplies the mind with the force of which it is naturally destitute.” We have formerly seen that the mind cannot in one act embrace more than five or six, at the utmost seven, several units? How then does it proceed ? “ When, by a first combination, we have obtained a complement of notions as complex as the mind can embrace, we give this comple- ment aname. ‘This being done, we regard the assemblage of units thus bound up under a collective name as itself a unit, and proceed, by a second combination, to accumulate these into a new comple- ment of the same extent. To this new complement we give another name; and then again proceed to perform, on this more complex unit, the same operation we had performed on the first ; and so we may go on rising from complement to complement to an indefinite extent. Thus, a merchant, having received a large unknown sum of money in crowns, counts out the pieces by fives, and haying done this till he has reached twenty, he lays them together in a heap; around these, he assembles similar piles of coin, till they amount, let us say, to twenty; and he then puts the whole four hundred into a bag. In this manner he proceeds until he fills a number of bags, and placing the whole in his coffers, he will have a complex or collective notion of the quantity of crowns which he has received.”? It is on this principle that arithmetic proceeds, — tens, hundreds, thousands, myriads, hundreds of thousands, millions, etc., are all so many factitious units which enable us to form notions, vague indeed, of what otherwise we could have obtained no con- ception at all. So much for complex or collective notions, formed without decomposition, —a process which I now go on to consider. Our thought, — that is, the sum total of the perceptions and representations which occupy us at any given moment, is always, as 1 Degerando, Des Signes, vol. . c. vii. p. 165. 3 Degerando, Des Signes, vol. i. ¢, vii, p. 2 See above, lect. xiv. p. 173. — Ep. 165, 165, [slightly abridged. — Ep.} 468 METAPHYSICS. Leer. XXXIV I have frequently observed, compound. The composite objects of thoughts may be decomposed in two ways, and Decomposition two- for the sake of two different interests. In the cae Hot Ne first place, we may decompose in order that Khewine Arts! we may recombine, influenced by the mere pleasure which this plastic operation affords us. This is poetical analysis and synthesis. On this. process it is need- less to dwell. It is evidently the work of comparison. For exam- ple, the minotaur, or chimera, or centaur, or gryphon (hippogryph), or any other poetical combination of different animals, could only have been effected by an act in which the representations of these animals were compared, and in which certain parts of one were affirmed, compatible with certain parts of another. How, again, is the imagination of all ideal beauty or perfection formed? Simply by comparing the various beauties or excellencies of which we have had actual experience, and thus being enabled to pronounce in regard to their common and essential quality. In the second place, we may decompose in the interest of science; and as the poetical decomposition was princi- pally accomplished by a separation of integral parts, so this is principally accomplished by an ee of constituent qualities. On this process it is necessary to be more particular. Suppose an unknown body is presented to my senses, and that it is capable of affecting each of these in a cer- tain manner. “ As furnished with five different organs, each of which serves to introduce a cer- tain class of perceptions and representations into the mind, we naturally distribute all sensible objects into five species of qualities. The human body, if we may.so speak, is thus itself a kind of abstractive machine. The senses cannot but abstract. If the eye did not abstract colors, it would see them confounded with odors and with tastes, and odors and tastes would necessarily become objects of sight.” “The abstraction of the senses is thus an operation the most natural; it is even impossible for us not to perform it. Let us now see whether abstraction by the mind be more arduous than that of the senses.” We have formerly found that the comprehension of the mind is extremely limited; that it can only take cognizance of one object at a time, if that be known with full intensity; and 2. In the interest of Science. Abstraction of the senses. 1 Laromiguiére, [Legons Philosophie, t. ii. p. Fonseca, Isagoge Philosophical], [c. iv. p. 742, ap- ii. 1. xi. p. 340. Ep.] Condillac,[L’Artde Pen- pended to his Institut. Dialect. (edit. 1604).] ser, p. i. ¢. Vili. Cours, t. iii. p. 295. Ep.] [Cf Ep.] Lect: XXXIV. METAPHYSICS. 469 that it can accord a simultaneous attention to a very small plurality of objects, and even that imperfectly. Thus it is that attention fixed on one object is tantamount to a withdrawal, — to an abstrac- tion, of consciousness from every other. Ab- straction is thus not a positive act of mind, as it is often erroneously described in philosophical treatises, —it is merely a negation to one or more objects, in consequence of its concentration on another. , This being the case, Abstraction is not only an easy and natural, but a necessary result. “In studying an object, Phe tos. we neither.exert, all our faculties at once, nor at ural and necessary pro- a : i once apply them to all the qualities of an object. | We know from experience that the effect of such a mode of procedure is confusion. On the contrary, we con- verge our attention on one alone of its qualities, — nay, contemplate this quality only in a single point of view, and retain it in that aspect until we have obtained a full and accurate conception of it. The human mind proceeds from the confused and complex to the distinct and constituent, always separating, always dividing, always simplifying ; and this is the only mode in which, from the weakness of our faculties, we are able to apprehend and to represent with correctness.” + “Tt is true, indeed, that after having decomposed everything, we must, as it were, return on our steps by recom- posing everything anew; for unless we do s0, our knowledge would not be conformable to the reality and relations of nature. The simple qualities of body have not each a proper and independent existence; the ultimate faculties of mind are not so many distinct and independent existences. On either side, there is a being one and the same; on that side, at once extended, solid, colored, etc.; on this, at once capable of thought, feeling, desire, etc.” “But although all, or the greater number of, our cognitions com- prehend different fasciculi of notions, it is necessary to commence by the acquisition of these notions one by one, through a successive application of our attention to the different attributes of objects. The abstraction of the intellect is thus as natural as that of the Senses. It is even imposed upon us by the very constitution of our mind.” ? “J am aware that the expression, abstraction of the senses, is incorrect; for it is the mind always which acts, be it through the Abstraction, — what. Synthesis necessary after analysis. 1 Laromiguiére, Legons, t. ii. p. 841. — Ep. 2 Laromiguiére, Legons, t. ii. p. 342. — Ep. 470 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXXIV. medium of the senses. The impropriety of the expression is not, | ~ however, one which is in danger of leading into error; and it serves to point out the important fact, that abstraction is not always performed in the same manner. In Perception,—in the presence of physical objects, the intellect abstracts colors by the eyes, sounds by the ear, etc. In Representation, and when the external object is absent, the mind operates on its reproduced Manus and looks at them suc- cessively in their different points of view.’ “However abstraction be performed, the result is notions which are simple, or which approximate to cia pH and if we apply it with consistency and order to the different qualities of objects, we shall attain at length to a knowledge of these qualities and of their mutual dependencies; that is, to a knowledge of objects as they really are. In this case, abstraction becomes analysis, aie ae is the - method to which we owe all our cognitions.”? The process of abstraction is familiar to the most uncultivated minds; and its uses are shown equally in the mechanical arts as in the philosophical sciences. “A carpenter,” says Kames,? speaking of the great utility of abstraction, “considers a log of wood with regard to hardness, firmness, color, and texture; a philosopher, neglecting these properties, makes the log undergo a chemical analysis, and examines its taste, its smell, and component principles; the geometrician confines his reasoning to the figure, the length, breadth, and thickness; in general, every artist, abstracting from all other properties, confines his observations to those which have a more immediate connection with his profession.” But is Abstraction, or rather, is exclusive attention, the work of Comparison? This is evident. The application of attention to a particular object, or quality of an object, supposes an act of will, —a choice or preference, and this again supposes comparison and judgment. But this may be made more manifest from a view of the act of Generali- zation, on which we are about to enter. The notion of the figure of the desk before me is an abstract idea, — an idea that makes part of the total Generalization, Idea notion of that body, and on which I have con- abstract and individ- ‘ al x é ey centrated my attention, in order to consider it exclusively. This idea is abstract, but it is at the same time individual; it represents the figure of this particular The expression, ab- straction of the senses. Abstraction the work of comparison. 1 Laromiguiére, Legons, t. ii. p. 844, slightly 8 Elements of Criticism, Appendix, § 40; vol. abridged. — Ep. ii. p. 593, ed. 1788. —Ep. 2 Laromiguieére, Legons, t. ii. p. 845. — Ep. ' formed. Lreotr. XXXIV. METAPHYSICS. 471 desk, and not the figure of any other body. But had we only indi- vidual abstract notions, what would be our knowledge? We should be cognizant only of qualities viewed apart from their subjects ; (and of separate phenomena there exists none in nature); and as these qualities are also separate from each other, we should have no knowledge of their mutual relations. It is necessary, therefore, that we should form Abstract General notions. This is done when, comparing a num- ber of objects, we seize on their resemblances ; when we concentrate our attention on these points of similarity, thus abstracting the mind from a consideration of their differences; and when we give a name to our notion of that circumstance in which they all agree. The general notion is thus one which makes us know a quality, property, _ power, action, relation; in short, any point of view, under which we recognize a plurality of objects as a unity. It makes us aware of a quality, a point of view, common to many things. It is a notion of resemblance; hence the reason why general names or terms, the signs of general notions, have been called terms of resem- blance (termini similitudinis). In this process of generalization, we do not stop short at a first generalization. By a first gen- eralization we have obtained a number of classes of resembling individuals. But these classes we can compare together, observe their similarities, abstract from their differences, and bestow on their common circumstance a common name. On these second classes we can again perform the same operation, and thus ascend- ing the scale of general notions, throwing out of view always a greater number of differences, and seizing always on fewer simi- larities in the formation of our classes, we arrive at length at the limit of our ascent in the notion of being or existence. Thus placed on the summit of the scale of classes, we descend by a process the reverse of that by which we have ascended; we divide and subdivide the classes, by introducing always more and more characters, and laying always fewer differences aside; the notions become more and more composite, until we at length arrive at the individual. I may here notice that there is a twofold kind of quantity to be considered in notions. It is evident, that in proportion as the class is high, it will, in the first place, contain under it a‘ greater num- ber of classes, and, in the second, will include the smallest complement of attributes. Thus being or existence Abstract General no- tions, — what and how Twofold quantity in notions, — Extension and Comprehension. 1 We should also be overwhelmed with their number. — Jotting. A4T2 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXXIV. contains under it every class; and yet when we say that a thing exists, we say the very least of it that is possible. On the other hand, an individual, though it contain nothing but itself} involves the largest amount of predication. For example, when I say,— this is Richard, I not only affirm of the subject every class from existence down to man, but likewise a number of circumstances proper to Richard as an individual. Now, the former of these quantities, the external, is called the Extension of a notion (quantitas ambitus) ; the latter, the internal quantity, is called its Comprehension or Intension (quan- titas conyplexus). The extension of a notion is, likewise, styled its circuit, region, domain, or sphere (spheera), also its breadth (aAaros). On the other hand, the comprehension of a notion is, likewise, called its depth (GéIos). These names we owe to the Greek logi- cians! The internal and external quantities are in the inverse ratio of each other. The greater the extension, the less the comprehension; the greater the compre- hension, the less the extension. Their designations. Their law. 1 [See Ammonius, In Categ., f. 88. Gr. f. 29. odctay kal Td coua Kad Td Eubuxov Kal rd Lat. Brandis, Scholia in Arist.,p. 45.] (‘Ac (ov Kal ofrws épetijs, wAdros 5¢, bray di€- xarnyoplat Kat wadros %xovor Kal Bddos, Ans Thy ovolay cis oGma Kal acduaroy.— BdSos pév thy eis TX pepixdrepa avtra@v 2 (Cf. Port Royal Logic, p. i. ¢. vi. p. 74 mpdodov, mAdros 5& thy eis Ta WAdYyIa weT- Eugenios (Aoyuch, b. i. c. iv. p. 194 et seq. — doracww, otov iva Bados wey AdBns obrw THY Ep.] PRCTURE XXX V. THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY. — GENERALIZATION. —NOMI- NALISM AND CONCEPTUALISM. I uNTERED, in my last Lecture, on the discussion of that great cognitive power which I called the Elaborative Faculty,—the Faculty of Relations,—the Dis- cursive Faculty,— Comparison, or Judgment; and which corre- sponds to what the Greek philosophers understood by S:dvoi, when opposed, as a special faculty, to vods. I showed you, that, though a comparison,—a judgment, involved the supposition of two relative terms, still it was an original operation, in fact in- volved in consciousness, and a condition of every energy of thought. But, besides the primary judgments of existence, — of the existence of the ego and non-ego, and of their existence in contrast to, and in exclusion of, each other,—I showed that this process is involved in perception, external and internal; inasmuch as the recognitions,—that the objects presented to us by the Ac- quisitive Faculty are many and complex, that one quality is differ- ent from another, and that different bundles of qualities are the properties of different things or subjects,—are all so many acts of Comparison or Judgment. This being done, I pointed out that a series of operations were to be referred to this faculty, which, by philosophers, had been made the functions of specific powers. Of these operations I enumerated :— 1°, Composition or Synthesis; 2°, Abstraction, De- composition or Analysis; 3°, Generalization; 4°, Judgment; and 5°, Reasoning. The first of these, — Composition or Synthesis, — which is shown in the formation of Complex or Collective notions, I stated to you was the result of an act of comparison. For a complex notion (I gave you_as examples an army, a forest, a town) being only the repetition of notions absolutely similar, this similarity could be ascertained only by comparison. In speaking of this process, I 60 Recapitulation. 474 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XXXV explained the support afforded in it to the mind by language. I then recalled to you what was meant by abstraction. Abstraction is no positive act; it is merely the negation of attention. We can fully attend only to a single thing at a time; and attention, there- fore, concentrated on one object or one quality of an object, neces- sarily more or less abstracts our consciousness from others. Ab- straction from,.and attention to, are thus correlative terms, the one being merely the negation of the other. I noticed the im- proper use of the term adstraction by many philosophers, in ap- plying it to that on which attention is converged.!. This we may indeed be said to prescind,’ but not to abstract. Thus let A, B, ©, be three qualities of an object. We prescind A, in abstracting it from B and C; but we cannot, without impropriety, simply say that we abstract A. Thus by attending to one object to the ab- straction from all others, we, in a certain sort, decompose or an- alyze the complex materials presented to us by Perception and Self-consciousness. ‘This analysis or decomposition is of two kinds. In the first place, by concentrating attention on one integrant part of an object, we, as it were, withdraw or abstract it from the | others. For example, we can consider the head of an animal to the exclusion of the other members. This may be called Partial or Concrete Abstraction. The process here noticed has, however, been overlooked by philosophers, insomuch that they have opposed _ the terms concrete and abstract as exclusive contraries. In the sec- ond place, we can rivet our attention on some particular mode of a thing, as its smell, its color, its figure, its motion, its size, ete., and abstract it from the others. This may be called Modal Abstraction. The abstraction we have been now speaking of is performed on individual objects, and is consequently particular. There is nothing necessarily connected with Generalization jn Abstraction. Generalization is indeed dependent on abstraction, which it sup- _ poses; but abstraction does not involve generalization. I remark this, because you will frequently find the terms abstract and gen- eral applied to notions, used as convertible. Nothing, however, can be more incorrect. “ 1 See above, p. 577. — Eb. 74 5&5 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XLUL “Every different power has its peculiar pleasure and its peculiar pain; and each power is as much corrupted by its appropriate pain as it is perfected by its appropriate pleasure. Pleasure is not some- thing that arises, — that comes into existence, part after part; it is, on the contrary, complete at every indivisible instant of its contin- uance. It is not, therefore, as Plato holds, a change, a motion, a generation (yéveow, xévyots), which exists piecemeal as it were, and successively in time, and only complete after a certain term of en- durance; but on the contrary something instantaneous, and, from moment to moment, perfect.”! Such were the two theories touching the law of pleasure and pain, propounded by the two principal thinkers Nothing added in of antiquity. To their doctrines on this point ane avi te the ntia jones slau nothing added, worthy of commemora- theories of Plato and i is yeahs, tion, by the succeeding philosophers of Greece and Rome; nay, we do not find that in antiquity these doctrines received any farther development or confirmation. Among the ancients, however, the Aristotelic theory seems to have Soon superseded the Platonic ; for, even among the lower Platonists themselves, there is no attempt to vindicate the doctrine of their master, in so far as to assert that all pleasure is only a relief from pain. Their sole endeavor is to reconcile Plato’s opinion with that of Aristotle, by showing that the former did not mean to extend the principle in question to pleasure in general, but applied it only to the pleasures of certain of the senses. And, in truth, various passa- ges in the Philebus and in the ninth book of the Republic, afford countenance to this interpretation? Be this, however, as it may, it was only in more recent times that the Platonic doctrine, in all its exclusive rigor, was again revived; and that too by philosophers who seem not to have been aware of the venerable authority in favor of the paradox which they proposed as new. I may add that the philosophers, who in modern times have speculated upon the conditions of the pleasurable, seem, in general, unaware of what had been attempted on this problem by the ancients; and it is indeed this circumstance alone that enables us to explain, why the modern theories on this subject, in principle the same with that of Aristotle, have remained so inferior to his in the great virtues of a theory, — comprehension and simplicity. L See Eth. Nic. x.4,5.— Ep. [On Aristotle’s both of Sense and Intellect, is, according to doctrine of the Pleasurable; see Tennemann, Pilato, accompanied with a sensation of Gesh. der Philosophie, iii. 200.] pleasure and pain. Republic, ix. 557. Phile- 2 [Plato, as well as Aristotle, seems to have bus, p. 211, edit. Bip. See Tennemann, Ge- made pleasure consist in a harmonious, pain schichte der Philosophie, ii. p. 290.] in a disharmonious, energy. Every energy, Lect. XLII. METAPHYSICS. 587 Before, however, proceeding to the consideration of subsequent opinions, it may be proper to observe that the The theoriesof Plato theories of Plato and Aristotle, however oppo- and Aristotle reduced 7 : 5 Nuukadrad d ‘unity. site In appearance, may easly be reauce to unity, and the theory of which I have given you the general expression, will be found to be the consummated com- plement of both. The two doctrines differ only essentially in this: that the one makes a previous pain the universal condition of pleasure ; while the other denies this condition as a general law, and holds that pleasure is a positive reality, and more than the mere alternative of pain. Now, in regard to this difference, it must be admitted, on the one hand, that in so far as the instances are con- cerned, on which Plato attempts to establish his principle, Aristotle is successful in showing, that these are only special cases, and do not warrant the unlimited conclusion in support of which they are adduced. But, on the other hand, it must be confessed that Aristotle has not shown the principle to be false, — that all pleasure is an escape from pain. He shows, indeed, that the analogy of hunger, thirst, and other bodily affections, cannot be extended In what sense the to the gratification we experience from the ener- Platonic dogma is . ey. bid, gies of intellect, — cannot be extended even to that which we experience in the exercise of the higher senses. It is true, that the pleasure I experience in this par- ticular act of vision, cannot be explained from the pain I had felt in another particular act of vision, immediately preceding; and if this example were enough, it would certainly be made out that pleasure is not merely the negation of a foregoing pain. But let us ascend a step higher and inquire, — would it not be painful if the faculty of vision (to take the same example) were wholly restrained from operation? Now it will not be denied, that the repression of any power in its natural nisws, — conatus, to action, is positively painful ; and, therefore, that the exertion of a power, if it afforded only a negation of that positive pain, and were, in its own nature, abso- lutely indifferent, would, by relation to the pain from which it yields us a relief, appear to us a real pleasure. We may, therefore, I think, maintain, with perfect truth, that as the holding back of any power from exercise is positively painful, so its passing into energy is, were it only the removal of that painful repression, negatively pleasurable; on this ground, consequently, and to this extent, we may rightly hold with Plato, — that every state of pleasure and free energy is, in fact, the escape from an alternative state of pain and compulsory inaction. 588 METAPHYSICS. Lect. XLII * So far we are warranted in going, But we should be wrong were we to constitute this partial truth into an unlimited, —an exclusive principle; that is, were we to maintain that the whole pleasure we The doctrine that the whole pleasure of activity arises from the uegation of the pain of forced iner- tion, — erroneous. derive from the exercise of our powers, is noth- ing more than a negation of the pain we expe- rience from their forced inertion. This I say would be an erroneous, because an absolute, con- clusion. For the pleasure we find in the free play of our faculties is, as we are most fully eon- scious, far more than simply a superseding of pain. That. philoso- phy, indeed, would only provoke all pleasure is in itself only a zero, —a nothing, which becomes a something only by relation to the reality of pain which it annuls, After compulsory in- ertion, pleasure high- er than in ordinary circumstances, — ex- plained. It is true, indeed, that after a compulsory iner- tion, our pleasure, in the first exertion of our faculties, is frequently far higher than that which we experience in their ordinary exercise, when left at liberty. But this does not, at least does not exclusively, arise from the contrast of the previous and gubse- quent states of pain and pleasure, but principally because the powers are In excessive vigor, — at least in excessive erethism or excitation, and have thus a greater complement of intenser energy suddenly to expend. On the principle, therefore, that the degree of pleasure is always in the ratio of the degree of spontaneous activity, the pleas- ure immediately consequent on the emancipation of a power front thraldom, would, if the power remain uninjured by the constraint, be naturally greater, because the energy would in that case be, for a Season, more intense. At the same time, the state of pleasure would in this case appear to be higher than what it absolutely is; because it would be set off by proximate contrast with a previous state of pain. Thus it is that a basin of water of ordinary blood heat, ap- pears hot, if we plunge in it a hand which had previously been dipped in snow; and cold, if we immerse in it another which had previously been placed in water of a still higher temperature. But it is unfair to apply this magnifying effect of contrast to the one Unfair to apply the magnifying effect of contrast to disprove the positive reality of pleasure more than of pain. relative and not to the other; and any argument drawn from it against the positive reality of pleasure, applies equally to disprove the positive reality of pain. The true doctrine I hold to be this: —that pain and pleasure are, as I have said, each to be considered both as Absolute and as Relative 3— absolute, that is, each is something real, and would exist were the other taken out of beinc: relative, that is, each is felt fo lP) a smile which would maintain, that CF Lect. XLIII. METAPHYSICS. 589 as greater or less by immediate contrast to the other. I may illus- trate this by the analogy of a scale. Let the state of indifference, —that is, the negation of both pain and pleasure, be marked as zero, let the degrees of pain be denoted by a descending series of numbers below zero, and the degrees of pleasure by an ascending series of numbers above zero. Now, suppose the degree of pain we feel from a certain state of hunger, to be six below zero; in this case our feeling, in the act of eating, will not merely rise to zero, that is, to the mere negation of pain, as the Platonic theory holds, but to some degree of positive pleasure, say six. And here I may observe, that, were the insufficiency of the Platonic theory shown by nothing else, this would be done by the absurd conse- quences it implies, in relation to the function of nutrition alone; for if its principles be true, then would our gratification from the appease- ment of hunger, be equally great by one kind of viand as by another. Thus, then, the counter theories of Plato and Aristotle are, as I have said, right in what they affirm, wrong in The counter theories. what they deny; each contains the truth, but ht ala not the whole truth. By supplying, therefore, Bee trac, to either that in which it was defective, we reduce their apparent discord to real harmony, and show that they are severally the partial expressions of a theory which comprehends and consummates them both. But to proceed in our historical survey. Passing over a host of commentators in the Lower Empire, and during the middle ages, who were content to repeat the doctrines of Aristotle and Plato; in modern times, the first original philosopher I am aware of, who seems to have turned his atten- tion upon the phenomena of pain and pleasure, is the celebrated Cardan; and the result of his observation was a Cardan, —held 2 theory identical with Plato’s, though of Plato’s theory. identical with 3 Plato's. speculation he does not seem to have been | aware. In the sixth chapter of his very curious autobiography, De Vita Propria Liber, he tells us, that it was his wont to anticipate the causes of disease, because he was of opinion that pleasure consisted in the appeasement of a preéxistent pain, (quod arbitrarer, voluptatem consistere in dolore precedenti, seda- to). But in the thirteenth book of his great work, De Subtilitate, this theory is formally propounded. This, however, was not done in the earlier editions of the work; and, the theory was, therefore, not canvassed by the ingenuity of his critic, the elder Scaliger, Pleasure and pain both Absolute and Relative. Historical notices of the theories of the Pleasurable, resumed. 590 METAPHYSICS. Leor. XLII. ™ whose Exercitationes contra Cardanum are totally silent on the subject. It is only in the editions of the De Subtilitate of Cardan, subsequent to the year 1560, that a statement of the theory in ques- tion is to be found. The following is a Summary of his reasoning: — “All pleasure has its root in a preceding pain. SN Re Ber oe it is that we find pleasure in test after trine. . hard labor; in meat and drink after hunger and thirst ; in the sweet after the bitter; in light after darkness; in har- mony after discord. Such are the facts in confirmation of this doc- trine, which simple experience affords. But philosophy supplies, likewise, a reason from the nature of things themselves. Pleasure and pain exist only as they are states of feeling ; but feeling is a change, and change always proceeds from one contrary to another; ‘consequently, either from the good to the bad, or from the bad to the good. The former of these alternatives is painful, and, there- fore, the other, when it takes its place, is pleasing ; a state of pain must thus always precede a state of pleasure.” Such are the grounds on which Cardan thinks himself entitled to reject the Aristotelic theory of pleasure, and to substitute in its place the Platonic, It does not, however, appear from anything he says, that he was aware of the relative speculations of these two philosophers. But the reasoning of Cardan is incompetent: for if it proves any- thing, it proves too much, seeing that it would follow from his premises, that a pleasurable feel- ing cannot gradually, continually, uninterruptedly, rise in intensity; for it behooves that every new degree of pleasure should be sepa- rated from the preceding by an intermediate state of higher pain; a conclusion which is contradicted by the most ordinary and mani- fest experience. This theory remained, therefore, in Cardan’s as in Plato’s hands, destitute of the necessary proof. The same doctrine — that pleasure is only the alternation and consequent of pain — was adopted, likewise, by Montaigne. In the famous twelfth chapter of the second book of his Essays, he says: — “Our states of pleasure are only the privation of our states of pain ;” but this universal inference he, like his predecessors, deduces only from the special phenomena given in certain of the senses, The philosopher next in order is Descartes ;! and hig opinion ig His theory criticized. Montaigne, — held a Similar doctrine. 1 Before Descartes, Vives held a positive tionis ratione aliqua inter facultatem et ob- theory of the pleasurable. His definition of jectum, ut quedam sit quasi similitudo inter pleasure and its illustration, are worthy of a lla; tum ne notabiliter sit majus, quod adfert passing notice :** Delectatio sita est in congru- delectationem; nec notabiliter minus, quam entia, quam invyenire non est sine propor- ea vis que recipit voluptatem, ea utique parte Lzcr. XLIII. ' METAPHYSICS. 591 deserving of attention, not so much from its intrinsic value, as from the influence it has exerted upon those who have subsequently speculated upon the causes of pleasure. These philosophers seem to have been totally ignorant of the far profounder theories of the ancients; and while the regular discussions of the subject by Aristotle and Plato were, for our modern psychologists, as if they had never been, the inci- dental allusion to the matter by Descartes, originated a series of speculations which is still in progress. Descartes’ philosophy of the pleasurable is promulgated in one short sentence of the sixth letter of the First Part of his /pistles, which is addressed to the Princess Elizabeth. It is as follows: —“ All our pleasure is nothing more than the consciousness of some one or other of our perfections.” — (“ Tota nostra voluptas posita est tan- tum in perfectionis alicujus nostree conscientia.”) It is curious to hear the praises that have been lavished upon this definition of the pleasurable. It has been lauded for its novelty ; 2 angered lauded it has been lauded for its importance. “Des- or its noyelty and im- : portance. cartes,” says Mendelssohn in his “etters on the ; Sensations (Briefe tiber die Eimypfindungen), “ was the first who made the attempt to give a real explanation of the pleasurable.”! The celebrated Kaestner thus opens his Léflea- ions sur 0 Origine du Plaisir? —“TI shall not pretend decidedly to assert. that no one before Descartes has said, that pleasure consisted in the feeling of some one of our perfections. I confess, hcewever, that I have not found this definition in any of the dissertations, some- times tiresome, and frequently uninstructive, of the ancient philoso- phers on the nature and effects of pleasure. Iam, therefore, disposed to attribute a discovery which has occasioned so many controversies, to that felicitous genius, which has disencumbered metaphysics of the confused chaos of disputes, as unintelligible as vain, in order to render it the solid and instructive science of God and of the human soul.” And M. Bertrand, another very intelligent philosopher, in his Hssai sur le Plaisir® says, “Descartes is probably the first who has enounced, that all pleasure consists in the inward feeling we Descartes. His doctrine of the pleasurable. quarecipitur. Ideo mediocris lux gratior est. appended to the Nowvelle Théorie des Plaisirs, oculis, quam ingens: et subobscura gratiora par M. Sulzer (1767). The Nouvelle Théorie is a sunt hebeti visui; eundem in modum de _ French version of Sulzer’s treatise, Untersu- sonis.”” De Anima, 1. iii. p. 202, edit. 1555.— chung ‘wtber den Ursprung der angenehmen und Ep. unangenehmen Empfindurgen. See above, p. 1 Anmerkung, 6.— ED. 416 — Ep. 2 The Reflexions sur V Origine du Plaisir, is 8 Sect. i. ch. i. p.3. Neuchatel. 1777.— Eb. 592 "METAPHYSICS. - Lecr. XLII. have of some of our perfections, and, in these few words, he has unfolded a series of great truths.” | N ow what is the originality, what is the importance, of this cele- brated definition? This is easily answered, — The doctrine of Des- in go far as it has any meaning, it is only a state- cartes, a vague version kj Bit at oe A distotls ment, in vague and general terms, of the truth which Aristotle had promulgated, in precise and proximate expressions. Descartes says, that pleasure is the con- sciousness of one or other of our perfections. This is not false; but it is not instructive. We are not conscious of any perfection of our nature, except in so far as this is the perfection of one or other of our powers; and we are not conscious of a power at all, far less of its perfection, except in so far as we are conscious of its operation. It, therefore, behooved Descartes to have brought down his definition of pleasure from the vague generality of a conscious- ness of perfection, to the precise and proximate declaration, that pleasure is a consciousness of the perfect energy of a power. But this improvement of his definition would have stripped it of all nov- elty. It would then have appeared to be, what it truly is, only a version, and an inadequate version, of Aristotle’s. ‘These are not the only objections that could be taken to the Cartesian definition 5 but for our present purpose it would be idle to advance them. Leibnitz is the next philosopher to whose opinion I shall refer; and this you will find stated in his Mouwveaus FEssais; and other works latterly published. Like Descartes, he defines pleasure the feeling of a perfection, pain the feeling of an imperfec- tion; and, in another part of the work,? he adopts the Platonic the- ory, that all pleasure is grounded in pain, which he ingeniously con- nects with his own doctrine of latent modifications, or, as he calls them, obscure perceptions. As this work, however, was not pub- lished till long after not only his own death, but that of his great disciple Wolf, the indication (for it is nothing more) of his opinion on this point had little influence on subsequent speculations ; indeed I do not remember to have seen the doctrine of Leibnitz Bs pleasure ever alluded to by any of his countrymen. Wolf, with whose doctrine that of Baumgarten® nearly coincides, defines pleasure, the intuitive cognition (that is, in our language, the perception or imagination) of any perfection whatever, either true or apparent. — “ Voluptas Leibnitz, — adopted both the counter theo- ries. Wolf. 1 Lib. ii. ch. xxi.§ 41. Opera, ed. Erdmann, 8 See his Metaphysik, § 482 et seg., p. 233, edit. p- 261. — Ep. 1788. Cf. Platner, Phil. Aphorismen, li. § 366, 2 Lib. ii.ch.xx.§ 6. Opera,ed. Erdmann, p 218.—ED. p. 248.— Eb. Lecr. XLII. METAPHYSICS. 593 est intuitus, seu cognitio intuitiva, perfectionis cujuscunque, sive vere sive apparentis.”' His doctrine you will find detailed in his Psychologia Empirica, and in his Hore Subse- cive. -It was manifestly the offspring, but the degenerate offspring, of the doctrine of Descar- tes, which, as we have seen, was itself only a corruption of that of Aristotle. Descartes rightly considered pleasure as a quality of the subject, in defining it a consciousness of some perfection in ourselves. Wolf, on the contrary, wrongly considers pleas- 1. Wrongly considers _yre more as an attribute of the object, in defin- pleasure as an _ attri- bute of the object. His doctrine criti- cized. ing it a cognition of any perfection whatever. Now in their definitions of pleasure, as Desear- tes was inferior to Aristotle, so Wolf fails far below Descartes, and in the same quality, —in want of precision and proximity. Pleasure is a feeling, and a feeling is a merely subjective state, that is, a state which has no reference to anything beyond itself, — which exists only as we are conscious of its existence. Now, then, the perfection or imperfection of an object, considered in itself, and as out of relation to our subjective states, is thought —is judged, but is not felt; and this judgment is not pleasure or pain, but appro- bation or disapprobation, that is, an act of the cognitive faculties, but not an affection of the capacities of feeling. In this point of view, therefore, the definition of pleasure, as the cognition of any sort of perfection, is erroneous. It may, indeed, be true that the perfection of an object can determine the cognitive faculty to a per- fect energy; and the concomitant of this perfect energy will be a feeling of pleasure. But, in this case, the objective perfection, as cognized, is not itself the pleasure; but the pleasure is the feeling which we have of the perfection, that is, of the state of vigorous and unimpeded energy of the cognitive faculty, as exercised on that perfection. Wolf ought, therefore, to have limited his definition, like Descartes, to the consciousness of subjective perfection; as Descartes should have explicated his consciousness of subjective perfection into the consciousness of full, spontaneous and unim- peded activity. But there is. another defect in the Wolfian definition : — it limits the pleasures from the cognition of perfection to the Intuitive Facul- ties, that is, to Sense and Imagination, denying it to the Under- standing, — the faculty of relations, — Thought Proper. This part of his theory was, accordingly, assailed by Moses Mendelssohn, — one of the best writers and most ingenious philosophers of the last 1 Psychologia Empirica, § 511, where he expressly refers to Descartes as the author of the definition. — Ep. 75 594 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XLUL century, — who, in other respects, however, remained faithful to the objective point of view, from whence Wolf had contemplated the phenomenon of pleasure. This was done in his Briefe iber die Himp- Jindungen, 1755.1 A rection was, however, inevitable ; and other German _ philosophers were soon found who returned to the subjec- tive point of view from which Wolf, Baumgar- ten, and Mendelssohn had departed. ° But before passing to these, it would be improper to overlook the | doctrine of two French philosophers, who had already explained pleasure in its subjective as- pect, and who prepared the way for the pro- founder theories of the German speculators, mean Du Bos and Pouilly. As their doctrines nearly coincide, I shall consider them as one. The former treats of this subject in his Réflexions Critiques sur la Peinture? etc.; the latter in his Théorie des Sentimens Agréables’ The following are the principal momenta of their inquiries : “1. Considering pleasure only in relation to the subject, the ques- tion they propose to answer is, What takes place | in the state which we call pleasurable? “2. The gratification of a want causes pleasure. If the want be natural, the result is a natural pleasure, and an unnatural pleasure if the want be unnatural. “3. The fundamental want —the want to which all others may. be reduced —is the occupation of the mind. All that we know of the mind is that it is a thinking, a knowing power. We desire ob- jects only for the sake of intellectual occupation. “The activity of mind is either occupied or occupies itself. The matters which afford the objects of our faculties of knowledge are either sensible impressions, which are delivered over to the under- © standing — this is the case in perception of sense; or this matter 2. Limits pleasure to the cognition of per- fection by the Intui- tive Faculties. This part of Wolf’s doctrine assailed by Mendelssohn. Du Bos and Pouilly, — considered pleasure in its subjective as- pect. Their theory stated. 1 See Anmerkung, 6; and Reinhold, User die bisherigen Begriffe vom Vergniigen, § 2. Ver- mischte Schriften i. p. 281 et seq. — Ep. 2 See tom. p. i. §§ 1, 2. First published in cipe, first appeared in 1746. This work, along with two relative treatises, was republished in 1774, under the title of Principes de la Littér- ature. All these authors consider pleasure, 1719, Paris. — Ep. 3 See chaps. i iii. iv. v. First published in 1748. To these should be added the valuable treatise of the Pere André, —the Essai sur le Beau, which was first published in 1741. There is also, previously to Sulzer, another French zsthetical writer of merit, — Batteux, whose treatise, Les Beaux Aris réduits ad un méme Prin- more or less, from the subjective point of view, and are, in principle, Aristotelic. For a collection of treatises, in whole and part, on pleasure in its psychological and moral aspects, see Le Temple du Bonheur ou Recueil des plus Excellens Traités sur le Bonheur; in 4 vols. New edition, 1770.— Ep. Lect. XLIII. METAPHYSICS. 595 is furnished by the cognitive faculty itself —as is the case in think- ing. “5, If this activity meets with impediments in its prosecution, —be this in the functions either of thought or sense, —there re- sults a feeling of restraint; and this of two kinds, positive and neg- ative. “6, When the activity, whether in perception or thinking, is pre- vented from being brought to its conclusion, there emerges the feel- ing of straining, — of effort, —the feeling of positive limitation of our powers. This is painful. “7, If the mind be occupied less than usual in all its functions, there arises a feeling of unsatisfied want ; this constitutes that state of negative restraint, — the state of ennui, of tedium. This is painful. “8, The stronger and at the same time the easier the activity of mind in any of its functions, the more agreeable.” This theory is evidently only that of Aristotle; to whom, how- ever, the French philosophers make no allusion. What they call occupation or exercise, he calls energy. The former expressions are, perhaps, preferable on this account, that they apply equally well to the mental processes, whether active or passive, whereas the terms energy, act, activity, operation, etc., only properly denote these pro- cesses as they are considered in the former character. Subsequently to the French philosophers, and as a reiiction against the partial views of the school of Wolf, there Sulzer, —his theory — gnpeared the theory of Sulzer, the Academician a reaction against the b z Bi hd vote of Berlin, —a theory which was first promul- gated in his Enquiry into the Origin of our Agreeable and Disagreeable Feelings, in 1752. This is one of the ablest discussions upon the question, and though partial, like the others, it concurs in establishing the truth of that doctrine of which Aristotle has left, in a short compass, the most complete and satisfac- tory exposition. The following are the leading principles of Sulzer’s theory : “1, We must penetrate to the essence of the soul, if we would discover the primary source of pleasure. “2. The essence of the soul consists in its natural activity, and this activity again consists in the production of ideas.” [By that he means the faculty in general of Cognition or Thought. I may 1 Abridged from Reinhold, Uber die bish- lished in the Memoirs of the Royal Academy erigen Begriffe vom Vergniigen, § 1. Verm. of Berlin for the years 1751, 1752. See Verm. Schrift. p. 275. — Ep. Phil. Schriften, yol. i. p.i., 1778. See above, 2 Untersuchung iiber den Ursprung der angeneh- yp. 560. — ED. men und unangenehmen Empfindungen. Pub- 596 METAPHYSICS. Leer. XT here observe, by the way, that he adopts the opinion that the faculty of thought or cognition is the one funda- mental power of mind; and in this he coincides with Wolf; whose theory of pleasure, however, he rejects. | “3. In this essential tendency to activity are grounded all our pleasurable and painful feelings. “4, If this natural activity of the soul, or this ceaseless tendency to think, encounters an impediment, pain is the result; whereas if it be excited to a lively activity, the result: is pleasure. “5. There are two conditions which regulate the degree of capac- ity and incapacity in the soul for pleasurable and painful feelings, the habitude of reflection, and the natural vivacity of thought; and both together constitute the perfect activity of mind. “6, Pleasurable feelings, consequently, can only be excited by objects which at once comprise a variety of constituent qualities or characters, and in which these characters are so connected that the mind recognizes in them materials for its essential activity. An object which presents to the mental activity no exercise, remains altogether indifferent. “7. No object which moves the mind in a pleasurable or in a pain- ful manner is simple;? it is necessarily composite or multiplex. The difference between agreeable and disagreeable objects can only lie in the connection of the parts of this multiplicity. Is there order in this connection, the object is agreeable; is there disorder, it is His theory stated. painful. “8, Beauty is the manifold, the various, recalled to unity. The mere multitude of parts does not constitute an object beautiful; for there is required that an object should have at once such multiplic- ity and connection as to form a whole. “9. This is the case in intellectual beauty; that is, in the beauty of those objects which the understanding contemplates in distinet notions. The beauty of geometrical theorems, of algebraic formule, of scientific principles, of comprehensive systems, consists, no less than the beauty of objects of Imagination and Sense, in the unity of the manifold, and rises in proportion to the quantity of the multi- plicity and the unity. “10. All these objects present a multitude of constituent charac- ters, — of elementary ideas, at once; and these are so connected, so bound together by a principle of unity, that the mind is, in conse- quence thereof, enabled to unfold and then to bring back the differ- ent parts to a common centre, that is, reduce them to unity, — to totality, — to system. 1 [But see Tiedemann’s Psychologie, p. 152.) Lect. XLIII. METAPHYSICS. 597 “11, From this it is evident, that the Beautiful only causes pleas- ure through the principle of activity. Unity, multiplicity, corre- _ spondence of parts, render an object agreeable to us, only inasmuch as they stand in a favorable relation to the active power of the mind. “12, The relation in which beauty stands to the mind is thus nec- essary, and, consequently, immutable. A single condition is alone required in order that what is in itself beautiful should operate on us; it is necessary that we should know it; and to know, it 1s nec- essary that, to a certain extent, we be conversant with the kind to which it belongs; for otherwise we should not be competent to apprehend the beauty of an object. (‘) “13. A difference of taste is found only among the ignorant, or the halflearned; and taste is a necessary consequence of knowl- edge.”? I shall not pursue this theory to the explanation it attempts of the pleasures of the Senses and of the Moral Powers, in which it is far less successful than in those of the Intellect. This was to be expected in consequence of the one-sided view Sulzer had taken of the mental phenomena, in assuming the Cognitive Faculty as the elementary power out of which the Feelings and Conations are evolved. The theory of Sulzer is manifestly only a one-sided modification of the Aristotelic; but it does not appear that he was himself aware how completely he had been anticipated by the Stagirite. “On the con- trary, he once and again denominates his explanation of the pleasur- able a discovery. This can, however, hardly be allowed him, even were the Aristotelic theory out of the question; for it required no mighty ingenuity for a philosopher who was well acquainted with the works of his immediate predecessors, in France and Germany, -by whom pleasure had been explained as the vigorous and easy exercise of the faculties, —as the feeling of perfection in ourselves, and as the apprehension of perfection in other things, that is, their unity in variety:—TI say, after these opinions of his precursors, it required no such uncommon effort of invention to hit upon the thought, —that pleasure is determined when the variety in the object calls forth the activity of the subject, and when this activity is rendered easy by the unity in which the variety is contained. His explanation is more explicit, but, except a change of expression, The theory of Sulzer criticized. 1 See Reinhold [Uber die bisherigen Begriffe 2 For Sulzer’s doctrines on these points see vom Vergnitgen, § 8 Verm. Schrift. p. 296 et Reinhold, as above, p. 801 et seq. — Ep. seq. ~ Ep. , 598. METAPHYSICS. Lect. XLII. it is not easy to see ap iet Sulzer added to Du Bos and Pouilly, te to say nothing of Wolf and Mendelssohn.” “The theory of Sulzer is summed up in the following result :— Every variety of pleasure may, subjectively con- sidered, be carried into the prompt and vigorous activity of the cognitive faculty; and, objec- tively considered, be explained as the product of objects which, in consequence of their variety in unity, intensely occupy the mind without fatiguing it. The peculiar merit of the theory of Sulzer, in Summary of the the- ory. ae is that it combines both the subjective and ob- jective points of view. In this respect, it is favorably contrasted with the opinion of Wolf and Mendelssohn. ._ But it takes a one- sided view of the character of the subject. In the first place, the essence of the mind in gen- eral, and the essence of the cognitive faculty in particular, does not consist of activity exclusively, but of activity and receptivity in cor- relation. But receptivity is a passive power, not an active, and thus the theory in its fundamental position is only half true. This one- sided view by Sulzer, in which regard is had to the active or intel- lectual element of our constitution to the exclusion of the passive or sensual, is precisely the opposite to that other, and equally one-sided, view which was taken by Helvetius! and the modern Epicureans and Materialists; but their theory of the pleasurable may be passed over as altogether without philosophical importance. In the second place, it is erroneous to assert that pleasure is nothing else than the consciousness of the unimpeded activity of mind. The activity of mind is manifested principally in thinking, whereas the state of Its defect. pleasure consists wholly of a consciousness of feeling. In the enjoy-— ment of pleasure we do not think, but feel; and in an intenser enjoyment there is almost a suspension of thought.” ? It is not necessary to say much of the speculations upon pleasure subsequent to Sulzer, and prior to Kant. In Genovesi and Verri Ttaly, I find that two philosophers of the last adopted the Platonic : miata thedey: century had adopted the Platonic opinion, — of pleasure being always an escape from pain, — Genovesi and Verri; the former in a chapter of his Metaphysics,* the latter in a chapter of his Dissertation on the Nature of Pleas- ure and Pain. 'This opinion, however, reaicquires importance from 1 Del Esprit, disc. i. ch. i. Cf. De ’Homme, 4 Discorso sull’ Indole del Piacere, e del Dolore, sect. ii ch. x.— Ep. §§ ill. iv. Opere Filosofiche, i. p. 20 et seq., edit. 2 See Reinhold, as above, pp. 808, 815, 317. 1784. This treatise is translated into German — Ep. by Meiners,— Gedanken iiber die Natur des 8 Cap. vi. t. ii. p. 218, edit. 1753. — Ep. Vergniigens. Leipsic, 1777. —Ep. contrast to those of his immediate predecessors, ° - Lecr. XLII. METAPHYSICS. 599 having been adopted from Verri by the philosopher of Kénisberg. In his Manual of Anthropology, Kant briefly and generally states his doctrine on this point; but in the notes which have been recently printed of his Lectures on this subject, we have a more detailed view of the character and grounds of his opinion. The Kantian doctrine is as follows: “ Pleasure is the feeling of the furtherance (Beférderung), pain of the hindrance of life. Under pleasure is not to be understood the feeling of life; for in pain we feel life no less than in pleasure, nay, even perhaps more strongly. In a state of pain, life appears long, in a state of pleasure, it seems brief; it is only, therefore, the feeling of promotion, — the further- ance, of life, which constitutes pleasure. On the other hand, it is not the mere hindrance of life which constitutes pain; the hin- drance must not only exist, it must be felt to exist.” (Before pro- ceeding further, I may observe, that these definitions of pleasure and pain are virtually identical with those of Aristotle, only far less clear and explicit.) But to proceed: “If pleasure be a feeling of the promotion of life, this presupposes a hindrance of life; for there can be no promotion, if there be no foregoing hindrance to overcome. Since, therefore, the hindrance of life is pain, pleasure must presuppose pain. .... “If we intend our vital powers above their ordinary degree, in order to go out of the state of indifference or equality, we induce an opposite state; and when we intend the vital powers above the suitable degree we occasion a hindrance, a pain. The vital force has a degree along with which a state exists, which is one neither of pleasure nor of pain, but of content, of comfort (das Wohlbe- finden). When this state is reduced to a lower pitch by any hin- drance, then, a promotion, a furtherance of life is useful in order to overcome this impediment. Pleasure is thus always a consequent of pain. When we cast our eyes on the progress of things, we dis- cover in ourselves a ceaseless tendency to escape from our present state. ‘To this we are compelled by a physical stimulus, which sets animals, and man, as an animal, into activity. But in the intellect- ual nature of*man, there is also a stimulus, which operates to the same end. In thought, man is always dissatisfied with the actual; he is ever looking forward from the present to the future; he is incessantly in a state of transition from one state to another, and is unable to continue in the same. But what is it that thus constrains us to be always passing from one state to another, but pain? And that it is not a pleasure which entices us to this, but a kind of dis- Kant adopted the Platonic theory. His doctrine stated. 600 METAPHYSICS. Lecr. XLII. content with present suffering, is shown by the fact that we are always seeking for some object of pleasure, without knowing what that object is, merely as an aid against the disquiet, —against the complement of petty pains, which in the moment irritate and annoy us. It is thus apparent that man is urged on by a necessity of his nature to go out of the present as a state of pain, in order to find in the future one less irksome. Man thus finds himself in a never-ceasing pain; and this is the spur for the activity of human nature. Our lot is so cast that there is nothing enduring for us but pain; some indeed have less, others more, but all, at all times, have their share; and our enjoyments at best are only slight alleviations of pain. Pleasure is nothing positive; it is only a liberation of pain, and, therefore, only something negative. Hence it follows, that we never begin with pleasure but always with pain; for while pleasure is only an emancipation from pain, it cannot precede that of which it is only a negation. Moreover, pleasure cannot endure in an unbroken continuity, but must be associated with pain, in order to be always suddenly breaking through this pain, —in order to realize itself. Pain, on the contrary, may subsist without inter- ruption in one pain, and be only removed through a gradual remis- sion; in this case, we have no consciousness of pleasure. It is the sudden, the instantaneous removal of pain, which determines all that we can call a veritable pleasure. We find ourselves constantly immersed, as it were, in an ocean of nameless pains, which we style disquietudes or desires, and the greater the vigor of life an individ- ual is endowed with, the more keenly is he sensible to the pain. Without being in a state of determinate corporeal suffering, the mind is harassed by a multitude of obscure uneasinesses, and it acts, without being compelled to act, for the mere sake of changing its condition. ‘Thus men run from solitude to society, and from society to solitude, without having much preference for either, in order merely, by the change of impressions, to obtain a suspension of their pain. It is from this cause that so many have become tired of their existence, and the greater number of such melancholic subjects have been urged to the act of suicide in consequence of the contin- ual goading of pain,—of pain from which they found no other means of escape. “It is certainly the intention of Providence that, by the alterna- tion of pain, we should be urged on to activity. No one can find pleasure in the continual enjoyment of delights; these soon pall upon us,— pall upon us in fact the sooner, the more intense was 1Cf. Anthropologie, § 60.— Ep. Lect. XLIII. METAPHYSICS. 601 their enjoyment. There is no permanent pleasure to be reaped except in labor alone. The pleasure of toil consists in a reiiction against the pain to which we should be a victim, did we not exert a force to resist it. Labor is irksome, labor has its annoyances, but these are fewer than those we should experience were we without labor. As man, therefore, must seek even his recreation in toil itself, his life is at best one of vexation and sorrow ; and as all his means of dissipation afford no alleviation, he is left always in a state of disquietude, which incessantly urges him to escape from the state in which he actually is.” [This is the doom of man, —to be born to sorrow as the sparks fly upwards, and to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow. ] “Men think that it is ungrateful to the Creator to say, that it is the design of Providence to keep us in a state of constant pain 5 but this is a wise provision in order to urge human nature on to exertion. Were our joys permanent, we should never leave the state in which we are, we should never undertake aught new. That life we may call happy, which is furnished with all the means by which pain can be overcome; we have in fact no other conception of human happiness. Contentment is when a man thinks of contin- uing in the state in which he is, and renounces all means of pleas- ure; but this disposition we find in no man.” * 1 Menschenkunde, p. 248 et seq.; published by 144. —Ep. [For further historical notices of Starke, 1831. This is not included in Kant’s theories of the Pleasurable, see Lossius, Lexi- collected works by Rosenkranz and Schubert. kon, v. Vergniigen.] Cf. Anthropologie, § 59. Werke, vii. part ii. p. 76 HE ed WF Ge Fn an THE FEELINGS.— APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF PLEASURE AND PAIN TO THE PHANOMENA. Tur Feelings being mere subjective states, involving no cogni- tion or thought, and, consequently, no reference to any object, it follows, that they cannot be classified by relation to aught beyond them- selves. The differences in which we must found all divisions of the Feelings into genera and species, must be wholly internal, and must be sought for and found exclusively in the states of Feeling themselves. Now, in considering these states, it appears - tome, that they admit of a classification in two Admit of a two- different points of view;— we may consider on Seee nets these states either: as-Causes.or as Effects. Cloquet,® Velpeau,!” — and, in a word, by every osteologist; for all represent these cavities as endless in their varieties, and extending not unfrequently to the outer angles of the eyebrow, and even to the parietal bones. To finish by a quotation from. one of thé last and best’ observers: “In relation,” says Voigtel,!8 “to their abnormal greatness or smallness, the differences, in this respect, whether in one subject as compared with another, or in one sinus in relation to the opposite of the same skull, are of so frequent occurrence that they vary almost in every cranium. They are found so small, that their depth, measured from before backwards, is hardly more than a line; in others, on the contrary, a space of from four, five, to six lines (i. e. half an inch), is found between the anterior and posterior wall. Still more remarkable are the variations of these cavities, in relation to their height, as they frequently rise from the trifling height of four lines to an inch at the glabella.” M. Velpeau, speaking of this great and indeterminable ex- tent of the sinus, adds: “this disposition must prevent us from being able to judge of the volume of the anterior parts of the brain by the exterior of the cranium ;”— an observation sufficiently obvious in relation to Phrenology, and previously made by the present Dr. Monro.!® | On the sinus and its extent, two anatomists only, as far as I am aware, have given an articulate account of their inductions — Schulze, and the present Dr. Monro. The former,” who wrote a distinct treatise On the Cavities or Sinuses of the Cranial Bones, examined only ten skulls, and does not detail the dimensions of each several sinus. After describing these cavities, which he says “ plerisque hominibus formantur,” he adds, that “when of a middling size they hardly extend towards the temples beyond the centre of the eye, where the orbital 1 De Fab. i. sec. 35. 11 Osteol. par. Sue, p. 54. 2 Osteol. par Sue, p. 54. 12 Elements. 3 Elements. 13 Anat. 4 Anat. Med. i. pp. 102, 238. 14 Anat. Descr. t. 1, sec. 158, edit. 3. 5 Abh. v, trokn. Kn., p. 188. 15 Traitté d’Anat. Chir. 6 Dict. des Sc. Med., t. 51, p. 372. 16 De Sin. Fr., p. 3. ? Anat. Dese., c. p. 102. W7 De Fab. ¢. ii. t. sec. 94. 8 Annot. Acad., lib. i. ¢. ii. (?) 18 Path. anat. i. p. 289. 9 Elem. v. p. 188. 19 Elem. p. 183. 10 Obs. Anat., sec. 8. 20 Loc. cit. 85 674 APPENDIX. vault is highest; and if you measure their height, from the insertion of the nasal bones, you will find it equal to an inch. Such is the condition of this cavity when moderate. That there are sinuses far greater, was taught me by another inspection of a cranium. Jn this case, the vacuity on the right did not pass the middle of the orbit, but that on the left stretched so far that it only ended over the external angle of the eyebrow, forming a cavity of at least two inches in breadth. Its depth was such as easily to admit the least joint of the middle finger. Its height, measured from the root of the nose on the left side, exceeded two inches, on the right it was a little less; the left sinus was, how- ever, shallower than the right. On the left side I have said the cavity termin- ated over the external angle of the orbit. From this place, a bony wall ran towards the middle of the crista Galli, and thus separated the sinus into a pos- terior and an antertor cavity. ‘The posterior extended so far towards the tem- ples, that it reached the place where the frontal and sincipetal bones and the processes of the sphenoidal meet. It covered the whole arch of the orbit, so that all was here seen hollow,” ete. . After describing sundry appearances which the sinuses exhibited in another skull, he observes: “It was my fortune to see and to obtain possession of one cranium in which of neither of the frontal nor the sphenoidal cavities was there any vestige whatsoever. In this specimen the bones in which these vacuities are situated were thicker than usual, and more cavernous ;” an observation, as we have seen, made by other anatomists. However subversive of the phre- nological statement, it will soon be seen that Schulze has understated the usual extent of the impediment. Dr. Monro,' after mentioning that there “ were forty-five crania of adults in the Anatomical Museum, cut with a view to exhibit the different sizes and forms of the frontal sinuses,” says: “I measured the breadth or distance across the forehead; the height or distance upwards from the transverse suture, where it divides the frontal bones and bones of the nose; and also the depth of the frontal sinuses; in nine different skulls in which these sinuses were large.” Omitting the table, it is sufficient to say, that in these crania the average is as follows: — Breadth, within a trifle of three inches ; height, one inch and five- tenths ; depth, above one inch. Here the depth seems not merely the distance between the external and internal tables, but the horizontal distance from the glabella to the posterior wall of the sinus. These nine crania thus yield an average, little larger than an indifferent induction ; and though the sinuses are stated to have been large, the skulls appear to have been selected by Dr. Monro, not so much in consequence of that circumstance, as because they were so cut as to afford the means of measuring the cavity in its three dimensions. By the kindness‘of Dr. Monro and Mr. Mackenzie, I was permitted to exam- ine all the crania in the public anatomical museum, and in the private collection of the Professor; many were, for the first time, laid open for my inspection, I was thus enabled to institute an impartial induction. A random measvre- ment of above thirty perfect crania (laying aside three skulls of old persons, in which the cavity of the sinus was almost entirely occupied by a pumicose deposit) gave the following average result: breadth, two inches four-tenths ; 1 Elements, i., p. 184. APPENDIX. 675 height, one inch and nearly five-tenths; depth (taken like Dr. Monro), rather more than eight-tenths of an inch. What in this induction was probably acci- dental, the sinuses of the female crania exhibited an average, in all the three dimensions, almost absolutely equal to that of the male. The relative size was consequently greater. | Before the sinuses of the fifty crania of Dr. Spurzheim’s collection (of which I am immediately to speak) were, with the sanction of Professor Jame- son, laid open upon one side, I had measured their three dimensions by the probe. This certainly could not ascertain their full extent, as, among other impediments, the probe is arrested by the septa, which so frequently subdivide each sinus into lesser chambers; but the labor was not to be undergone a sec- ond time, especially as the proportional extent of these cavities is by relation to the phrenological organs articulately exhibited in the table. As it was, the average obtained by the probe is as follows:—In the thirty-six male crania (one could not be measured by the probe), the breadth was two inches and nearly four-tenths; the height, one inch and nearly three-tenths; the depth, rather more than one inch. In the twelve female crania (here, also, one could not be measured by the probe), the breadth was one inch, and rather more than nine-tenths; the height, nearly one inch; the depth, within a trifle of nine-tenths. I should notice that in all these measurements, the thickness of the external plate is included in the depth. So true is the observation of Portal, that the “frontal sinuses are much more extensive than is generally believed.” The collection of fifty crania, of which the average size of the frontal sinuses has been given above, and of which a detailed table of the impediment inter- posed by these cavities to phrenological observation now follows, was sent by M. Royer, of the Jardin des Plantes (probably by mistake) to the Royal Mu- seum of Natural History in Edinburgh; the skulls, taken from the catacombs of Paris, having, under Dr. Spurzheim’s inspection, been selected to illustrate the development of the various phrenological organs, which development is diligently marked on the several crania. Thus, though I have it in my power to afford a greatly more extensive table, the table of these fifty crania is, for the present purpose, sufficient. For — 1°, They constitute a complete and definite collection ; 2°, A collection authoritative in all points against the phrenologists ; 3°, One to which it can be objected by none, that it affords only a selected or partial induction in a question touching the frontal sinus ; 4°, It is a collection patent to the examination of the whole world ; 5°, In all the skulls a sinus has on one side been laid open to its full extent ; the capacity of both is thus easily ascertained; and, at the same time with the size of the cavity, the thickness and salience of the external frontal table remains apparent. ; Table exhibiting the variable extent and unappreciable impediment, in a phrenological relation, of the Frontal Sinuses; in a collection of fifty crania, selected, and their development marked, under the direction of Dr. Spurzheim : 676 APPENDIX. ‘ re) Es a CE 3 FE o ao | 3 m4 5a =e s $ Extent of the Sinuses, as entirely or nearly covering (+), or as more or less affecting (*), 7 x a 3 o ° . . . % a ee & ant a the prétended phrenological organs, according to the late and latest numeration (1). 28) "8 gs ds?) 22] & = 5 weg | ER Z S a vo oe | ed stad Es re a 8 3 2s og o's s S wo uw ot 2 23 n 4 a me | me a | ne | He eel a as s 3 e n = j=" ; o ess A es #9 b=] 3M Al to) 9] XxX) | XxXiv xxv xX11 XXVil a Zz n < EE | es | ey | ee | ae | meee | ees | weenie | ces ff | 1 eo : A loblet Teale : xiii a * xvi 5 xxvi 2 i } { 1 } 4 ! ' ! 6 XXxiV s + + + 4 t + + * 7 XXxvi tH + + + + + * » * + 8 xxxyii ; + + + t * + * 9 xli + + + + * 10 XXXV t Tet tw ot t 5 ee ark hen bi 2 2 11 | xxxix zs > | ft agin =e 12 ii * * 13 | iv tr did pdt : M4 ¥ pe i LS ee a, et a I | 15 vi t t t t ig Tete t 16 vii t t t t oF ix pe ah es as Os a, f ae x 5 ph Be aly ER bk pe ae ale a, 3 19 xiv : + + + + * * 20 xvii and + ¢ + + + + * 21 xxi bp + t t t * * * 23 xxiii § + + | * + | * 23 XXV s t Pett pe x t 24 | xxvii 3 5 hs Mt is a is, a TS tl (ante eg a 25 XxViii 3 t t * + * 26 xxix t Sanden * | * t + | * Xil * 29 | xiii | ' t t ' ‘ ‘ 80 | xliv LAR cae PS Ne, NN AB KD t i 3L xlv * + + ; ¢ * 82 xlvii + + { + + * * 83 xviii t t t + ¢ t ¢ st * Be | She ese ! 36 xxxiii <3 ° t & 3 37 1 Ss Old. t 38 g XV a 89 | xxxii| 5 Young. ! fee ob 40 | xxxviii sba 5 t py Ae 41 i Male? cs} 42 xviii ad 8 { ! } i ; 43 EX $ ; t + t + 44 Xxiv a t t t Holune 45 xxxi a sR Fe aed bes as 46 xl ne t t t f na 47 xlvi a t + t + t 5 as | ease 49 a A gx j = a & 50 iii es Old. t (1) The organs denoted by these numbers: — ix. 7, Constructiveness; xx. 32, Mirthfulness or Wit; xxii. 19 (2), Individuality, Lower Individuality; xxiii. 20, Configuration, Figure; xxiv. 21, Size; xxv. 22, Weight, Resistance; xxvi. 285, Color; xxvii. 24, Lo- cality; xxviii. 26, Calculation, Number; xxix. 25, Order; xxx. 19, (1) Eventuality, Upper Individuality; xxxi. 26, Time; xxxii. 28, Melody, Tune; xxxviii. 29, Language — this organ Gall divides in two, to wit, into the organ of Language and the organ of Words; xxxiv. 30, Comparison; xxxv, 31, Causality. The order of the numbers in this table was taken from that of a more extensive and general table: so that whilst here xx. 32, has not been affected at all, there it was affected more frequently than ix. 7. APPENDIX. OTT In these circumstances it is to be observed — In the first place, that, as already noticed, while the developments of all the crania have been carefully marked, the presence of the frontal sinuses has been signalized only in one skull (the male No. 19, xiv.), in which they are, however, greatly below even the average. In the second place, that the extent of the sinus varies indeterminably from an affection of one to an affection of sixteen organs. In the third place, in this induction of thirty-seven male and thirteen female crania, the average proportional extent of the sinuses is somewhat less in the female than in the male skulls; the sinus in the former covering 4.4, and affect- ing 1.2 organs; in the latter covering 5, and affecting 2.1 organs. This induc- tion is, however, too limited, more especially in the female crania, to afford a determination of the point, even were it not at variance with other and more extensive observations. ; In the fourth place, the male crania exhibit at once the largest and the smallest sinuses. The largest male sinus covers 12, and affects 4; while the largest female sinus covers 7, and affects 3 organs; whereas, while the smallest male sinus affects only 1, the smallest female sinus covers 2 organs. In the fifth place, so. far from supporting the phrenological assertion that the sinuses are only found, or only found in size, in the crania of the old, this their collection tends to prove the very reverse; for here we find about the smallest sinuses in the oldest heads. Ill. PERCEPTION.—FRAGMENTS.— (See p. 286.) (Written in connection with proposed Memoir or Mr. Stewart. On Desk, May 1856; written Autumn 1855.—Ep.) There are three considerations which seem to have been principally effec- tive in promoting the theory of a Mediate or Representative Perception, and by perception is meant the apprehension, through sense, of external things. These might operate severally or together. The first is, that such a hypothesis is necessary to render possible the percep- tion of distant objects. It was taken as granted that certain material realities, (as asun, stars, etc.), not immediately present to sense, were cognized in a per- ceptive act. These realities could not be known immediately, or in themselves, unless known as they existed; and they existed only as they existed in their place in space. If, therefore, the perceptive mind did not sally out to them, (which, with the exception of one or two theorists, was scouted as an impos- sible hypothesis), an immediate perception behooved to be abandoned, and the sensitive cognition we have of them must be vicarious; that is, not of the real- ities themselves, as present to our organs, and presented to apprehension, but of something different from the realities eternally existing, through which, how- ever, they are mediately represented. Various theories in regard to the nature of this mediate or vicarious object may be entertained; but these may be over- 678 APPENDIX. passed. This first consideration alone was principally effectual among materi- alists: on them the second had no influence. A second consideration was the opposite and apparently inconsistent nature of the object and subject of cognition; for here the reality to be known is ma- terial, whereas the mind knowing is immaterial; while it was long generally believed, that what is known must be of an analogous essence (the same or similar) to what knows. In consequence of this persuasion, it was deemed impossible that the immaterial, unextended mind could apprehend in itself, as extended, a material reality. To explain the fact of sensitive perception, it was therefore supposed requisite to attenuate — to immaterialize the immediate object of perception, by dividing the object known from the reality existing. Perception thus became a vicarious or mediate cognition, in which the cor- poreal was said to be represented by the incorporeal. : PERCEPTION — POSITIVE RESULT. 1. We perceive only through the senses. 2. The senses are corporeal instruments, — parts of our bodily organism. 3. We are, therefore, percipient only through, or by means of, the body. In other words, material and external things are to us only not as zero, inasmuch as they are apprehended by the mind in their relation with the material organ which it animates, and with which it is united. 4, An external existence, and an organ of sense, as both material, can stand in relation only according to the laws of matter. According to these laws, things related, — connected, must act and be acted on; but a thing can act only where it is. Therefore the thing perceived, and the percipient organ, must meet in place, — must be contiguous. The consequence of this doctrine is a complete simplification of the theory of perception, and a return to the most ancient speculation on the point. All sensible cognition is, in a certain acceptation, reduced to Touch, and this is the very conclusion maintained by the venerable authority of Democritus. According to this doctrine, it is erroneous, in the first place, to affirm that we are percipient of distant, etc., objects. It is erroneous, in the second place, to say that we perceive external things in themselves, in the signification that we perceive them as existing in their own nature, and not in relation to the living organ. The real, the total, the only object perceived has, as a relative, two phases. Tt may be described either as the idiopathic affection of the sense (i. e. the sense in relation to an external reality), or as the quality of a thing actually determining such or such an affection of the sentient organ (i. e. an external reality in correlation to the » sense). | A corollary of the same doctrine is, that what have been denominated the Primary Qualities of body, are only perceived through the Secondary ; in fact, Perception Proper cannot be realized except through Sensation Proper. But synchronous. The object of perception is an affection, not of the mind as apart from body, APPENDIX. 679 not of the body as apart from mind, but of the composite formed by union of the two; that is, of the animated or living organism (Aristotle). In the process of perception there is required both an act of the conscious mind and a passion of the affected body; the one without the other is null. Galen has, therefore, well said, “‘ Sensitive perception is not a mere passive or affective change, but the discrimination of an affective change.” (Aristotle, — judgment.) Perception supposes Consciousness, and Consciousness supposes Memory and Judgment; for, abstract Consciousness, and there is no Perception; ab- stract Memory, or Judgment, and Consciousness is abolished. (Hobbes, — Memory; Aristotle, —Judgment of Sense.) Memory, Recollection; for change is necessary to Consciousness, and change is only to be apprehended through the faculty of Remembrance. Hobbes has, therefore, truly said of Perception, — “‘ Sentire semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem recident.”? But there could be no discriminative apprehension, supposing always memory with- out an act whereby difference was affirmed, or sameness denied; that is, without an act of Judgment. Aristotle is, therefore, right in making Per- ception a Judgment. IV. LAWS OF THOUGHT.—(See p. 527.) (Written in connection with proposed Memoir or Mr. Stewart. On Desk, May 1856; written Autumn, 1855.— Ep.) The doctrine of Contradiction, or of Contradictories (atlwua ris avripdcews), that Affirmation or Negation is a necessity of thought, whilst Affirmation and Negation are incompatible, is developed into three sides or phases, each of which implies both the others, — phases which may obtain, and actually have received, severally, the name of Law, Principle, or Axiom. Neglecting the historical order in which these were scientifically named and articulately developed, they are : 1°, The Law, Principle, or Axiom, of Identity, which, in regard to the same thing, immediately or directly enjoins the affirmation of it with itself, and medi- ately or indirectly prohibits its negation: (4 ts A.) 2°, The Law, etc., of Contradiction (properly Non-contradiction), which, in regard to contradictories, explicitly enjoining their reciprocal negation, implic- itly prohibits their reciprocal affirmation: (A is not Not-A.) In other words, contradictories are thought as existences incompatible at the same time, — as at once mutually exclusive. 3°, The Law, ete., of Excluded Middle or Third, which declares that, whilst contradictories are only two, everything, if explicitly thought, must be thought as of these either the one or the other: (A is either B or Not-B.) In different terms : — Affirmation and negation of the same thing, in the same respect, have no conceivable medium; whilst anything actually may, and virtually must, be ” 1 See Reid’s Works, p. 878. — Ep. 2 See Ibid. —Ep. 8 See Ibid. — Ep. 680 . APPENDIX. either affirmed or denied of anything. In other words :— Every predicate is true or false of every subject; or, contradictories are thought as incompossible, but, at the same time, the one or the other as necessary. ‘The argument from Contradiction is omnipotent within its sphere, but that sphere is narrow. It has the following limitations: 1°, It is negative, not positive; it may refute, but it is incompetent to estab- lish. It may show what is not, but never of itself, what is. It is exclusively, Logical or Formal, not Metaphysical or real; it proceeds on a sti of thought, but never issues in an Ontology or knowledge of existence. 2°, It is dependent; to act it presupposes a counter-proposition to act from. 3°, It is explicative, not ampliative; it analyzes what is given, but does not originate information, or add anything, through itself, to our stock of knowledge. 4°, But, what is its principal defect, it is partial, not thorough-going. It leaves many of the most important problems of our knowledge out of its deter- mination ; and is, therefore, all too narrow in its application as a universal criterion or instrument of judgment. For were we left, in our reasonings, to a dependence. on the principle of Contradiction, we should be unable compe- tently to attempt any argument with regard to some of the most interesting and important questions. For there are many problems in the philosophy of mind where the solution necessarily lies between what are, to us, the one or the other of two counter, and, therefore, incompatible alternatives, neither of which are we able to conceive as possible, but of which, by the very conditions of thought, we are compelled to acknowledge that the one or the other cannot but be; and it is as supplying this deficiency, that what has been called the argument from Common Sense becomes principally useful. The principle of Contradiction, or rather of Non-contradiction, appears in two forms, and each of these has a different application. In the first place (what may be called the Logical application), it declares that, of Contradictories, two only are possible in thought; and that of these alternatives the one or the other, exclusively, is thought as necessarily true. This phasis of the law is unilateral; for it is with a consciousness or cognition that the one contradictory is necessarily true, and the other contradictory nec- essarily false. This one logical phasis of the law is well known, and has been fully developed. In the second place (what may be called the Psychological application), while it necessarily declares that, of Contradictories, both cannot, but one must, be, still bilaterally admits that we may be unable positively to think the possibility of either alternative. This, the psychological phasis of the law, is comparatively unknown, and has been generally neglected. Thus, Existence we cannot but think, — cannot but attribute in thought; nevertheless we can actually conceive neither of these contradictory alternatives,—the absolute commencement, the infinite non-commencement, of being. As it is with Exist- ence, so is it- with Time. We cannot think time besianing we cannot think time not beginning. So also with Space. We are unable to conceive an exist- ence out of space; yet we are equally unable to compass the notion of illimit able or infinite space. Our capacity of thought is thus peremptorily proved APPENDIX. 681 incompetent to what we necessarily think about; for, whilst what we think about must be thought to Exist, — to exist in Time, — to exist in Space, — we are unable to realize the counter-notions of Existence commencing or not com- mencing, whether in Time or in Space. And thus, whilst Existence, Time, and Space, are the indispensable conditions, forms, or categories of actual thought, still are we unable to conceive either of the coupter-alternatives, in one or other of which we cannot but admit that they exist. These and such like impotencies of positive thought have, however, as I have stated, been strangely overlooked. V. THE CONDITIONED. ~(a.) Kant’s ANALYSIS OF JupamMents.— (See page 532.) (Fragment from Early Papers, probably before 1836.— Ep.) Kant analyzed judgments (a priori) into analytic or identical [or explicative], and synthetical, or [ampliative, non-identical]. Great fame from this. But he omitted a third kind, —those that the mind is compelled to form by a law of its nature, but which can neither be reduced to analytic judgments, because they cannot be subordinated to the law of Contradiction, nor to synthetical, because they do not seem to spring from a positive power of mind, but only arise from the inability of the mind to conceive the contrary. In Analytic judgments — (principle of contradiction) — we conceive the one alternative as necessary, and the other as impossible. In Synthetic judgments, we conceive the affirmative as necessary, but not [its negation as self-contra- dictory ]. ; Would it not be better to make the synthetic of two kinds —a positive and negative? Had Kant tried whether his synthetic judgments a priori were pos- itive or negative, he would have reached the law of the Conditioned, which would have given a totally new aspect to his Critique, — simplified, abolished the distinction of Verstand and Vernunft, which only positive and negative, (at least as a faculty conceiving the Unconditioned, and left it only, as with Jacobi, the Nois, the locus principiorum, — the faculty, —revelation, of the prim- itive facts or faiths of consciousness, —the Common Sense of Reid), the dis- tinction of Begriffe and Ideen, and have reduced his whole Categories and Ideas to the category of the Conditioned and its subordinates. # * # # * * * * * (1853, November).— There are three degrees or epochs which we must distinguish in philosophical speculation touching the Necessary. In the first, which we may call the Aristotelic or Platonico-Aristotelic, the Necessary was regarded, if not exclusively, principally and primarily, in an objective relation; —at least the objective and subjective were not discrimin- ated; and it was defined that of which the existence of the opposite, —con- trary, —is impossible — what could not but be. 86 682 APPENDIX. In the second, which we may call the Leibnitzian or Leibnitzio-Kantian, the Necessary was regarded primarily in a subjective respect, and it was defined that of which the thought of the opposite, — contrary, — is impossible — what we cannot but think. It was taken for granted, that what we cannot think cannot be, and what we must think, must be; and from hence there was also inferred, without qualification, that this subjective necessity affords the dis- criminating criterion of our native or a priori cognitions, — notions and judg- ments. But a third discrimination was requisite; for the necessity of thought’ be- hooved to be again distinguished into two kinds. — (See Discussions, 2d edit. Addenda.) (6) ConTRADICTIONS PROVING THE PsycnoLtogicaL THEORY OF THE COon- DITIONED. — (July 1852.) 1. Finite cannot comprehend, contain the Infinite. — Yet an inch or minute, say, are finites, and are divisible ad infinitum, that is, their terminated division incogitable. 2. Infinite cannot be terminated or begun. — Yet eternity ab ante ends now; and eternity a post begins now. — So apply to Space. 3. There cannot be two infinite maxima. — Yet eternity ab ante and a post are two infinite maxima of time. 4, Infinite maximum if cut into two, the halves cannot be each infinite, for nothing can be greater than infinite, and thus they could not be parts; nor finite, for thus two finite halves would make an infinite whole. quantities aeaEEEEEEEEEEEeaEnS 5. What contains infinite extensions, protensions, intensions, cannot be passed through,—come to an end. An inch, a minute, a degree contains these; ergo, etc. Take a minute. This contains an infinitude of protended quantities, which must follow one after another; but an infinite series’ of suc- cessive protensions can, ex termino, never be ended; ergo, ete. 6. An infinite maximum cannot but be all inclusive. Time ab ante and a post infinite and exclusive of each other; ergo. 7. An infinite number of quantities must make up either an infinite or a finite whole. I. The former.— But an inch, a minute, a degree, contain each an infinite number of quantities; therefore, an inch, a minute, a degree, are each infinite wholes; which is absurd. II. The latter.— An infinite number of quantities would thus make up a finite quantity ; which is equally absurd. 8. If we take a finite quantity (as an inch, a minute, a degree), it would appear equally that there are, and that there are not, an equal number of quantities between these and a greatest, and between these and a least. 9. An absolutely quickest motion is that which passes from one point to another in space in a minimum of time. But a quickest motion from one point to another, say a mile distance, arfd from one to another, say a million million of miles, is thought the same; which is absurd. 10. A wheel turned with quickest motion; if a spoke be prolonged, it will 1 See Boscovich on Stay, Philosophia Recentior, i. p. 284, edit. 1755. APPENDIX. 683 therefore be moved by a motion quicker than the quickest. ‘The same may be shown using the rim and the nave. . _ 11. Contradictory are Boscovich Points, which occupy space, and are inex- ‘tended Dynamism, therefore, inconceivable. contra, ‘12. Atomism also inconceivable ; for this supposes atoms, — minima extended but indivisible. 13. A quantity, say a foot, has an infinity of parts. Any part of this quan- tity, say an inch, has also an infinity. But one infinity is not larger than another. Therefore, an inch is equal to a foot.” 14. If two divaricating lines are produced ad infinitum from a point where they form an acute angle, like a pyramid, the base will be infinite and, at the same time, not infinite; 1°, Because terminated by two points; and, 2°, Be- cause shorter than the sides;3 3°, Base could not be drawn, because sides infinitely long.* 15. An atom, as existent, must be able to be turned round. But if turned round, it must have a right and left hand, etc., and these its signs must change their place; therefore, be extended.s (c.) PuitosopHy or ABsoLuTE — Distinctions OF MopE OF REACHING IT. I. Some carry the Absolute by assault, —by a single leap, — place them- selves at once in the absolute, —take it as a datum; others climb to it by degrees, — mount to the absolute from the conditioned, — as a result. Former — Plotinus, Schelling ; latter — Hegel, Cousin, are examples. II. Some place cognition of Absolute above, and in opposition to conscious- ness, — conception, — reflection, the conditions of which are difference, plu- rality, and, in a word, condition, limitation. (Plotinus, Schelling.) Others do not, but reach it through consciousness, etc.— the consciousness of difference, contrast, etc.; giving, when sifted, a cognition of identity (absolute). (Hegel, Cousin.) III. Some, to realize a cognition of Absolute, abolish the logical laws of Con- tradiction and Excluded Middle (as Cusa, Schelling, Hegel. Plotinus is not explicit.). Others do not (as Cousin). IV. Some explicitly hold, that, as the Absolute is absolutely one, cognition and existence must coincide ;— to know the absolute is to be the absolute, — to know the absolute is to be God. Others do not explicitly assert this, but only hold the impersonality of reason, — a certain union with God; in holding that we are conscious of eternal truths as in the divine mind. (Augustin, Malebranche, Price, Cousin.) J See Boscovich, i. p. 304. 4 See Carleton, [ Philosophia Universa, Auctoré 2 See Tellez, quoted by F. Bonz Spei,[Phys- Thoma Comptono Carleton, Antverpia, p. 392, ica, pars i. tract. iii. disp. i. dub. 4, p. 154,edit. 1649. — Ep.] 1652. — ED. ] 5 See Kant in Krug’s Metaphysik, p. 193. 3 See Bonz Spei, Physica, [pars. i. tract. iii. disp. i. dub. 2, p. 189. — Ep.] 684 APPENDIX. V. Some carry up man into the Deity (as Schelling). Others bring down the Deity to man; in whose philosophy the latter is the highest manifestation of the former, — man apex of Deity. I*. Some think Absolute can be known as an object of knowledge, —a no- tion of absolute competent; others that to know the absolute we must be the absolute (Schelling, Plotinus? ). * Some [hold] that unconditioned is to be believed, not known; others that it can be known. ! (d.) Sir W. Haminton to Mr. Henry CatpErwoop. CorDALE, 26th Sept., 1854. My Dear Sir: I received a few days ago your Philosophy of the Infinite, and beg leave to return you my best thanks, both for the present of the book itself, and for the courteous manner in which my opinions are therein contro- verted. The ingenuity with which your views are maintained, does great credit to your metaphysical ability; and, however I may differ from them, it gives me great satisfaction to recognize the independence of thought by which they are distinguished, and to acknowledge the candid spirit in which you have written. At the same time, I regret that my doctrines (briefly as they are promul- gated on this abstract subject) have been, now again, so much mistaken, more especially in their theological relations. In fact, it seems to me, that your admissions would, if adequately developed, result in establishing the very opinions which I maintain, and which you so earnestly set yourself to controvert. In general, I do not think that you have taken sufficiently into account the following circumstances : 1°, That the Infinite which I contemplate is considered only as in thought; the Infinite beyond thought being, it may be, an object of belief, but not of knowledge. This consideration obviates many of your objections. 2°, That the sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge; and, therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be, believed. This I have indeed anxiously evinced,’ both by reasoning and authority. When, therefore, you maintain, that in denying to man any positive cognizance of the Infinite, I virtually extenuate his belief in the infinitude of Deity, I must hold you to be wholly wrong, in respect both of my opinion, and of the theo- logical dogma itself. Assuredly, I maintain that an infinite God cannot be by us (positively) com- prehended. But the Scriptures, and all theologians worthy of the name, assert the same. Some indeed of the latter, and, among them, some of the most illus- trious Fathers, go the length of asserting, that ‘an understood God is no God at all,” and that, “if we maintain God to be as we can think that he is, we blas- pheme.” Hence the assertion of Augustin ; “Deum potius ignorantia quam scientia attingi.” 1 Cf. Discussions, p. 12 et seg. — Ep. APPENDIX: 685 3°, That there is a fundamental difference between The Infinite (1d°Ev nal Tav,) and a relation to which we may apply the term infinite. Thus, Time and Space must be excluded from the supposed notion of The Infinite ; for The Infinite, if postively thought it could be, must be thought as under neither Space nor Time. But I would remark specially on some essential points of your doctrine; and these I shall take up without order, as they present themselves to my recollection. You maintain (passim) that thought, conception, knowledge, is and must be finite, whilst the object of thought, ete., may be infinite. This appears to me to be erroneous, and even contradictory. An existence can only be an object of thought, conception, knowledge, inasmuch as it is an object thought, conceived, known; as such only does it form a constituent of the circle of thought, con- ception, knowledge. A thing may be partly known, conceived, thought, partly unknown, ete. But that part of it only which is thought, can be an object of thought, ete.; whereas the part of it not thought, etc., is, as far as thought, ete., is concerned, only tantamount to zero. The infinite, therefore, in this point of view, can be no object of thought, ete.; for nothing can be more self-repugnant than the assertion, that we know the infinite through a finite notion, or have a finite knowledge of an infinite object of knowledge. But you assert (passim) that we have a knowledge, a notion of the infinite ; at the same time asserting (passim) that this knowledge or notion is “ inad- equate,” — “ partial,” — “ imperfect,” — “ limited,” — “ not in all its extent,” — “incomplete,” —‘“ only to some extent,”— “in a certain sense,” — “ indis- tinct,” etc., ete. Now, in the first place, this assertion is in contradiction of what you also maintain, that “the infinite is one and indivisible” (pp. 25, 26, 226); that is that having no parts, it cannot be partially known. But, in the second place, this also subverts the possibility of conceiving, of knowing, the Infinite ; for as partial, inadequate, not in all its extent, etc., our conception includes some part only of the object supposed infinite, and does not include the rest. Our knowl- edge is, therefore, by your own account, limited and finite ; consequently, you implicitly admit that we have no knowledge, at least no positive knowledge, of the infinite. Neither can I surmise how we should ever come to know that the object thus partially conceived is in itself infinite; seeing that we are denied the power of knowing it as infinite, that is, not partially, not inadequately, not in some parts only of its extent, ete., but totally, adequately, in its whole extent, etc.; in other words, under the criteria compatible with the supposition of infinitude. For, as you truly observe, “everything short of the infinite is limited” (p. 223). Again, as stated, you describe the infinite to be “one and indivisible.”» But, to conceive as inseparable into parts, an entity which, not excluding, in fact includes, the worlds of mind and matter, is for the human intellect utterly improbable. And does not the infinite contain the finite? If it does, then it contains what has parts, and is divisible; if it does not, then is it exclusive: the finite is out of the infinite: and the infinite is conditioned, limited, restricted,— Jinite. + 686 APPENDIX. 4 You controvert (p. 233, alibi) my assertion, that to conceive a thing in rela tion, is, ipso facto, to conceive it as finite, and you maintain that the relative is not mcompatible with infinity, unless it be also restrictive. But restrictive I hold the relative always to be, and, therefore, incompatible with The Infinite in the more proper signification of the term, though infinity, in a looser signifi- cation, may be applied toit. My reasons for this are the following: A relation is always a particular point of view; consequently, the things thought as rel- ative and correlative are always thought restrictively, in so far as the thought of the one discriminates and excludes the other, and likewise all things not conceived in the same special or relative point of view. Thus, if we think of Socrates and Xanthippe under the matrimonial relation, not only do the thoughts of Socrates and Xanthippe exclude each other as separate existences, and, pro tanto, therefore are restrictive; but thinking of Socrates as husband, this excludes our conception of him as citizen, etc., etc. Or, to take an ex- ample from higher relatives: what is thought as the object excludes what is viewed as the subject, of thought; and hence the necessity which compelled Schelling and other absolutists to place The Absolute in the indifference of sub- ject and object, of knowledge and existence. Again: we conceive God in the relation of Creator, and in so far as we merely conceive Him as Creator, we do not conceive him as unconditioned, as infinite ; for there are many other rela- tions of the Deity under which we may conceive Him, but which are not included in the relation of Creator. In so far, therefore, as we conceive God only in this relation, our conception of Him is manifestly restrictive. Further, the created universe is, and you assert it to be (pp. 175, 180, 229), finite. The creation is, therefore, an act, of however great, of finite power; and the Creator is thus thought only in a finite capacity. God, in his own nature, is infinite ; but we do not positively think Him as infinite, in thinking Him under the relation of the Creator of a finite creation. Finally, let us suppose the created universe (which you do not) to be infinite; in that case we should be reduced to the dilemma of asserting ¢wo infinities, which is contradictory, or of asserting the supernal absurdity, that God the Creator is finite, and the uni- verse created by Him is infinite. In connection with this, you expressly deny Space and Time to be restric- tions, whilst you admit them to be necessary conditions of thought (p. 103— 117). I hold them both to be restrictive. In the first place, take Space, or Extension. Now what is conceived as extended, does it not exclude the unextended? Does it not include body, to the exclusion of mind? Pro tanto, therefore, space is a limitation, a restriction. In the same way Time, —is it not restrictive in excluding the Deity, who must be held to exist above or beyond the condition of time or succession ? This, His existence, we must believe as real, though we cannot positively think, conceive, understand its possibility. Time, like Space, thus involving limi- tation, both must be excluded, as has been done by Schelling, from the sphere, — from the supposed notion of the infinito-absolute, — ‘“‘ Whose kingdom is where Time and Space are not.” You ask, if we had not a positive notion of the thing, how such a name as APPENDIX. 687 Infinite could be introduced into language (p. 58). The answer to this is easy. In the first place, the word Infinite (infinitum, &meipoy) is negative, expressing the negation of limits; and I believe that this its negative character holds good in all languages. In the second place, the question is idle; for we have many words which, more directly and obtrusively expressing a negation of thought, are extant in every language, as incogitable, unthinkable, incomprehensible, in- conceivable, unimaginable, nonsense, ete., etc.; whilst the term infinite directly denotes only the negation of limits, and only indirectly a negation of thought. I may here notice what you animadvert on (p. 60, 76), the application of the term notion, etc., to what cannot be positively conceived. At best this is merely a verbal objection against an abuse of language; but I hardly think it valid. © The term notion can, I think, be not improperly applied to what we are unable positively to construe in thought, and which we understand only by a problematic supposition. A rownd square cannot certainly be represented ; but, understanding what is hypothetically required, the union of the attribute round with the attribute square, I may surely say, “the notion round-square is a representative impossibility.” You misrepresent, in truth reverse, my doctrine, in saying (p. 169) that I hold “ God cannot act as a cause, for the unconditioned cannot exist in rela- tion.” I never denied, or dreamed of denying, that the Deity, though infinite, though unconditioned, could act in a finite relation. I only denied, in oppo- sition to Cousin, that so He must. True it is, indeed, that in thinking God under relation, we do not then think Him, even negatively, as infinite; and in general, whilst always believing Him to be infinite, we are ever unable to con- strue to our minds, — positively to conceive, — His attribute itself of infinity. This is “ unsearchable.” This is “past finding out.” What I have said as to the infinite being (subjectively) inconceivable, does not at all derogate from our belief of its (objective) reality. In fact, the main scope of my speculation is to show articulately that we must believe, as actual, much that we are unable (positively) to conceive, as even possible. I should have wished to make some special observations on your seventh chapter, in relation to Causality; for I think your objections to my theory of causation might be easily obviated. Assuredly that theory applies equally to mind and matter. These, however, I must omit. But what can be more con- tradictory than your assertion “that creation is conceived, and is by us con- ceivable, only as the origin of existence, by the fiat of the Deity?” (p. 156.) Was the Deity not existent before the creation? or did the non-existent Deity at the creation originate existence? I do not dream of imputing to you such absurdities. But you must excuse me in saying, that there is infinitely less ground to wrest my language (as you seem to do) to the assertion of a material Pantheism, than to suppose you guilty of them. — Before concluding, I may notice your denial (p. 108) of my statement, that time present is conceivable only as a line in which the past and future limit each other. As a position of time (time is a protensive quantity), the present, if positively conceived, must have a certain duration, and that duration can be measured and stated. Now, does the present endure for an hour, a minute, a second, or for any part of a second? If you state what length of duration it contains, you are lost. So true is the observation of St. Augustin. 688 APPENDIX. These are but a few specimens of the mode in which I think your objections to my theory of the infinite may be met. But, however scanty and imperfect, I have tired myself in their dictation, and must, therefore, now leave them, without addition or improvement, to your candid consideration. — Believe me, my dear sir, very truly yours, (Signed) W. HAMILTON. ¥ (e.) Docrrinr or RELATION. (Written in connection with proposed Memoir or Mr. Stewart. On Desk, May 1856; written Autumn 1855. — Ep.) : I. Every Relation (Quod esse habet ad aliud,—unius accidens, — cxéo1s, — respectivoum, — ad aliquid, —ad aliud, — relatum, —comparatum, — sociale) sup-= poses at least two things, or, as they are called, terms thought as relative; that is, thought to exist only as thought to exist in reference to each other: in other words, Relatives (ra mpds 1 oxéow exovra, —relativa sunt, quorum esse est ad aliud) are, from the very notion of relativity, necessarily plural. Hence Aris- totle’s definition is not of Relation, but of things relative. Indeed, a relation of one term, —a relative not referred, —not related (pds ri od mpés 71), is an overt contradiction, —a proclaimed absurdity. The Absolute (the one, the not-relative, — not-plural) is diametrically opposed to the relative, — these mutual negatives. II. A relation is a unifying act, —a synthesis; but it is likewise an antithesis. For even when it results in denoting agreement, it necessarily proceeds through a thought of difference; and thus relatives, however they may in reality coin- cide, are always mentally contrasted. If it be allowed, even the relation of identity, — of the sameness of a thing to itself, in the formula A= A, involves the discrimination and opposition of the two terms. Accordingly, in the pro- cess of a relation, there is no conjunction of a plurality in the unity of a single notion, as in a process of generalization; for in the relation there is always a division, always an antithesis of the several connected and constituent notions. Ii. Thus relatives are severally discriminated ; inasmuch as the one is spe- cially what is referred, the other specially what is referred to. The former, opening the relation, retains the generic name of the Relative (and is sometimes called exclusively the Subject); whilst the latter, closing it, is denominated the Correlative (and to this the word Term is not unfrequently restricted). Ac- cordingly, even the relation of the thing to itself in the affirmation of identity, distinguishes a Relative and a Correlative. Thus in the judgment, “ God is just,” God is first posited as subject and Relative, and then enounced as pre- dicate and Correélative. IV. The Relative and the Correlative are mutually referred, and can always be reciprocated or converted (mpds auriatpéporra A€yerSat, reciproce, ad conver- ientiam dict); that is, we can view in thought the Relative as the Correlative, and the Coirelative as the Relative. ras if we think the Father as the Rel- ative of the Son as Correlative, we can also think the Son as Relative of the Father as Correlative. But, in point of fact, there are here always, more or less obtrusive, two different, though not independent, relations: for the relation, APPENDIX. 689 in which the Father is relative and the Son correlative, is that of Paternity ; while the relation, in which the Son is relative and the Father correlative, is that of Filiation ; relations, however, which mutually imply each other. Thus, also, Cause and Effect may be either Relative or Correlative. But where Cause is made the Relative, the relation is properly styled Causation ; whereas we ought to denominate it Hffectuation, when the Effect becomes the relative term. To speak of the relation of Knowledge; we have here Subject and Ob- ject, either of which we may consider as the Relative or as the Correlative. But, in rigid accuracy, under Knowledge, we ought to distinguish two reciprocal relations, — the relation of knowing, and the relation.of being known. In the former, the Subject (that known as knowing) is the Relative, the Object (that known as being known) is the Correlative; in the latter, the terms are just reversed. V. The Relatives (the things relative and correlative), as relative, always coéxist in nature (Gua 7H diet), and coéxist in thought (Ga 7H yvdoe). To speak now only of the latter simultaneity ;— we cannot conceive, we cannot know, we cannot define the one relative, without, pro tanto, conceiving, know- ing, defining also the other. Relative and Correlative are each thought through the other; so that in enouncing Relativity as a condition of the thinkable, in other words, that thought is only of the Relative ; this is tanta- mount to saying that we think one thing only as we think two things mutually and at once; which again is equivalent to a declaration that the Absolute (the non-Relative) is for ys incogitable, and even incognizable. In these conditions of Relativity, all philosophers are at one; so far there is among them no difference or dispute. Note.—No part of philosophy has been more fully and more accurately developed, or rather no part of philosophy is more determinately certain than the doctrine of Relation; insomuch that in this, so far as we are concerned, there is no discrepancy of opinion among philosophers. ‘The only variation among them is merely verbal; some giving a more or less extensive meaning to the words employed in the nomenclature. For whilst all agree in calling by the generic name of relative both what are specially denominated the Rel- ative and the Correlative; some limit the expression Term (terminus), to the latter, and others the expression, Subject (subjectum) to the former ; whilst the greater number of recent philosophers (and these I follow) apply these expres- sions indifferently to both Relative and Correlative. VIL CAUSATION.—LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. (See p. 558.) (a.) CAUSATION. {Written in connection with proposed Mrmorr or Mr. Stewart. On Desk, May 1856; written Autumn 1855, — Ep.) My doctrine of Causality is accused of neglecting the phenomenon of change, and of ignoring the attribute of power. This objection precisely reverses the 87 690 APPENDIX. fact. Causation is by me proclaimed to be identical with change, —change of power into act (“omnia mutantur”) ; change, however, only of appearance, — we being unable to realize in thought either existence (substance) apart from phenomena, or existence shaalaiele commencing, or absolutely terminating. And specially as to power; power is the property of an existent something (for it is thought only as the essential attribute of what is able so or so to exist) ; power is, consequently, the correlative of existence, and a necessary supposi- tion, in this theory, of causation. Here the cause, or rather the complement of causes, is nothing but powers capable of producing the effect; and the effect is only that now existing actually, which previously existed potentially, or in the - causes. We must, in truth, define: —a cause, the power of effectuating a change ; and an effect, achange actually caused. Let us make the experiment. And, first, of Causation at its highest extremity: Try to think creation. Now, all that we can here do is to think the existence of a creative power, — a Fiat; which creation (unextended or mental, extended or material) must be thought by us as the evolution, the incomprehensible evolution, by the exertion or putting forth of God’s attribute of productive power, into energy. This Di- vine power must always be supposed as preéxistent. Creation excludes the commencement of being: for it implies creative God as prior; and the exist- ence of God is the negation of nonentity.! We cannot, indeed, compass the thought of what has no commencement; we cannot, therefore, positively con- ceive (what, however, we firmly believe) the eternity of a Self-existent, — of God: but still less can we think, or tolerate the supposition, of something springing out of nothing, — of an absolute commencement of being. Again, to think Causation at its lowest extremity: As it is with Creation, so is it with Annihilation. The thought of both supposes a Deity and Divine power; for as the one is only the creative power of God exerted or put forth into act, so the other is only the withdrawal of that exerted energy into power. We are able to think no complete annihilation, — no absolute ending of exist- ence (“omnia mutantur, nihil interit”); as we cannot think a creation from nothing, in the sense of an origination of being without a previously existing Creator, —a prior creative power. geeeantan is, therefore, necessarily «within existence ; for we cannot think of a change either from non-existence to exist- ence, or from existence to non-existence. The thought of power, therefore, always precedes that of creation, and follows that of annihilation; and as the thought of power always involves the thought of existence, therefore, in so far as the thoughts of creation and annihilation go, the necessity of thinking a cause for these changes exemplifies the facts, —that change is only from one form of existence to another, and that causation is simply our inability to think an absolute commencement or an absolute termination of being. The sum of being (actual and potential) now extant in the mental and material worlds, together with that in their Creator, and the sum of being (actual and potential) in the Creator alone, before and after these ey existed, is necessarily 1 Thave seen an attempt at the correction — stultified by self-contradiction; or existence is of my theory of creation, in which the Deity created by a non-existent God, — an alterna- is made to originate or create existence. That tive, if deliberately held, at once absurd and is, either existence is created by an existent impious. Gad, on which alternative the definition is APPENDIX. 691 thought as precisely the same. Take the instance of a neutral salt. This is an effect, the product of various causes, —and all are necessarily powers. We have here, 1°, An acid involving its power (active or passive) of combining with the alkali; 2°, An alkali, involving its power (active or passive) of com- bining with the acid; 3° (Since, as the chemical brocard has it, “ corpora non agunt nisi soluta”), a fluid, say water, with its power of dissolving and holding in solution the acid and alkali; 4°, a translative power, say the human hand, capable of bringing the acid, the alkali, and the water, into correlation, or within the sphere of mutual affinity. These (and they might be subdivided) are all causes of the effect ; for, abstract any one, and the salt is not produced. It wants a coéflicient cause, and the concurrence of every cause is requisite for an effect.l But all the causes or coéfficient powers being brought into reciprocal rela- tion, the salt is the result; for an effect is nothing but the actual union of its constituent entities, — concauses or coéfficient powers. In thought, causes and effects are thus, pro tanto, tautological: an effect always preéxisted potentially in its causes; and causes always continue actually to exist in their effects. There is a change of form, but we are compelled to think an identity in the elements of existence: “Omnia mutantur; nihil interit.” And we might add, — “Nihil incipit;” for a creative power must always be conceived as preéxistent. Mutation, Causation, Effectuation, are only the same thought in different respects; they may, therefore, be regarded as virtually terms convertible. Every change is an effect; every effect is a change. An effect is in truth just a change of power into act; every effect being an actualizatian of the poten- tial. But what is now considered as the cause may at another time be viewed as the effect; and vice versé. Thus, we can extract the acid or the alkali, as effect, out of the salt, as principal concause; and the square which, as effect, is made up of two triangles in conjunction, may be viewed as cause when cut into these figures. In opposite views, Addition and Multiplication, Subtraction and Division, may be regarded as causes, or as effects. Power is an attribute or property of existence, but not coéxtensive with it: for we may supposes (negatively think) things to exist which have no capacity of change, no capacity of appearing. Creation is the existing subsequently in act of what previously existed in power; annihilation, on the contrary, is the subsequent existence in power of what previously existed in act. Except the first and last causal agencies (and these, as Divine operations, are by us incomprehensible), every other is conceived also as an effect ; there- fore, every event is, in different relations, a power and an act. Considered as 1 See above, lect. iii, p. 42. — Ep. 692 APPENDIX. a cause, it is a power, —a power to. codperate an effect. Considered as an effect, it is an act,— an act codperated by causes. Change (cause and effect) must be within existence ; it must be merely of phenomenal existence. Since change can be for us only as it appears to us, — only as it is known by us; and we cannot know, we cannot even think a change either from non-existence to existence, or from existence to non-exist- ence. The change must be from substance to substance ; but substances, apart from phzenomena, are (positively) inconceivable, as phenomena are (positive- ly) inconceivable apart from substances. For thought requires as its condition the correlatives both of au appearing and of something that appears. And here I must observe that we are unable to think the Divine Attributes as in themselves they are, we cannot think God without impiety, unless we also implicity confess our impotence to think Him worthily ; and if we should assert that God is as we think or can affirm Him to be, we actually blaspheme. For the Deity is adequately inconceivable, is adequately ineffable; since human thought and human language are equally incompetent to His Infinities. (0.) Tue Question or Liperty anp Necessiry AS VIEWED BY THE ScoTTisH ScHOOL. (Written in connection with proposed Memorr or Mr. Stewart. On Desk, May 1856; written Autumn 1855.— Ep.) The Scottish School of Philosophy has much merit in regard to the problem of the Morality of human actions; but its success in the polemic which it has waged in this respect, consists rather in having intrenched the position main- tained behind the common sense or natural convictions of mankind, than in having rendered the problem and the thesis adopted intelligible to the philoso- pher. ‘This, indeed, could not be accomplished. It would, therefore, have been better to show articulately that Liberty and Necessity are both incompre- hensible, as both beyond the limits of legitimate thought; but that though the Free-agency of Man cannot be speculatively proved, so neither can it be spec- ulatively disproved; while we may claim for it as a fact of real actuality though of inconceivable possibility, the testimony of consciousness, — that we are morally free, as we are morally accountable for our actions. In this man- ner, the whole question of free and bond-will is in theory abolished, leaving, however, practically our Liberty, and all the moral interests of man entire. Mr. Stewart seems, indeed, disposed to acknowledge, against Reid, that, in certain respects, the problem is beyond the capacity of human thought, and to admit that all reasoning for, as all reasoning against, our liberty, is on that account invalid. Thus in reference to the arguments against human free- agency, drawn from the prescience of the Deity, he says, “In reviewing the arguments that have been advanced on the opposite sides of this question, I have hitherto taken no notice of those which the Necessitarians have founded on the prescience of the Deity, because I do not think these fairly applicable to the subject; inasmuch as they draw an inference from what is altogether APPENDIX. 693 placed beyond the reach of our faculties, against a fact for which every man has the evidence of his own consciousness.” * (c.) Lrserty anp Necessity. (Written in connection with proposed Memorr or Mr. Stewart. On Desk, May 1856; written Autumn 1855.— Ep.) The question of Liberty and Necessity may be dealt with in two ways. I. The opposing parties may endeavor to show each that his thesis is distinct, intelligible, and consistent, whereas that the anti-thesis of his opponent is indis. tinct, unintelligible, and contradictory. Il. An opposing party may endeavor to show that the thesis of either side is unthinkable, and thus abolish logically the whole problem, as, on both alterna- tives, beyond the limits of human thought; it being, however, open to him to argue that, though unthinkable, his thesis is not annihilated, there being con- tradictory opposites, one of which must consequently be held as true, though we be unable to think the possibility of either opposite; whilst he may be able to appeal toa direct or indirect declaration of our conscious nature in favor of the alternative which he maintains. The former of these modes of arguing has been the one exclusively em- ployed in this controversy. The Libertarian, indeed, has often endeavored to strengthen his position by calling in a deliverance of consciousness ; the Neces- sitarian, on the contrary, has no such deliverance to appeal to, and he has only attempted, at best, to deprive his adversary of this ground of argumentation by denying the fact or extenuating the authority of the deliverance. The latter of these lines of argumentation, I may also observe, was, I be- lieve, for the first time employed, or, at least, for the first time legitimately employed, by myself: for Kant could not consistently defer to the authority of Reason in its practical relations, after having shown that Reason in its specu- lative operations resulted only in a complexus of antilogies. On the contrary, I have endeavored to show that Reason, —that Consciousness within its legit- imate limits, is always veracious, — that in generating its antinomies, Kant’s Reason transcended its limits, violated its laws, — that Consciousness, in fact, is never spontaneously false, and that Reason is only self-contradictory when driven beyond its legitimate bounds. We are, therefore, warranted to rely on a deliverance of Consciousness, when that deliverance is that a thing is, though we may be unable to think how it can be. 1 Active and Moral Powers, vol. i. Works, vol. vi. p. 896. Ae 3 hag an tHchetr DE ey a SAND Fas 1 gl D fol hg ABEL, case of dreaming mentioned by, 458. ABERCROMBIE (Dr. John), referred to on somnambulism, 228; on cases of mental la- tency, 236. ABERCROMBY, 518: ABSOLUTE, distinctions of mode of reaching it, 683-4, 684-8. See Regulative Faculty. ABSTRACTION, see Attention and Elaborative Faculty. ABSTRACTIVE knowledge, see Knowledge. ACADEMICAL honors, principles which should regulate, 6385 et seg. ACCIDENT, what, 106. Act, what, 124. See Energy. ACTIVE, its defects as a philosophical term, 79, 128. ACTIVITY, always conjoined with passivity in creation, 216. See Consciousness. ACTUAL, distinctions of from potential, 124. See Existence. ADDISON, quoted to the effect that the mental faculties are not independent existences, 268. ZESCHYLUS, quoted, 244. ZEGIDIUS, 292; on Touch, 376. AGRIPPA (Cornelius), 53. AtoSnots, ambiguous, 562. See Feeling. AKENSIDE, quoted on Fear, 607. ALBERTUS Magnus, 176, 292; on Touch, 3876. ALCHINDUS, 291. ALCM ON, 3852. ALENSIS, or Alesius, Alex., 176, 292, 387. ALEXANDRIA, school of, 75. ALFARABI, 213, ALGAZEL, first explicitly maintained the hy- pothesis of Assistance or Occasional Causes, 210, 542; his surname, 542. See Causality. ALIson, Rev. A., noticed on Association, 612. AMmMONIUS Hermiz, referred to on definition of philosophy, 36, 81; quoted on mental powers, 271; quoted on Breadth and Dept of notions, 472. ANALYSIS, what, 69; the necessary condition of philosophy, ib. ; see Philosophy ; relations of analysis and synthesis, 69, 70; nature of scientific, 70 et seg.; three rules of psycho- logical, 282; critical, its sphere, 403, see Crit- ical Method; in extension and comprehen- sion, the analysis of the one corresponds to the synthesis of the other, 510; confusion among philosophers from not having ob- served this, 511; synthesis in Greek logi- cians is equivalent to analysis of modern philosophers, 511; Platonic doctrine of di- vision called Analytical, 511. ANALYTIC judgment, what, 681. ANAMNESTIO, see Mnemonic. ANAXAGORAS, 352. ANCILLON (Frederick), 50, 177, 263; quoted on difficulty of psychological study, 265, 266, 428; quoted on Reminiscence, 442; quoted on Imagination, 455; on the same, 457; see Representative Faculty ; 459-60, see ibid. ANDRE, Pére, 442; his treatise Sur le Beau. 594. ANNIHILATION, as conceived by us, 552. APHRODISIENSIS, Alex. 81, 176; quoted on mental powers, 271, 291; quoted on Aristo- tle’s doctrine of species, 293; on Touch, 676; on contrariety and simultaneity, 434. APOLLINARIS, on Touch, 376. APPETENCY, term objectionable as common designation both of will and desire, 128. AQUINAS, 9, 48; maintained that the mind can attend to only a single object at once, 176; his doctrine of mental powers, 272, 292, 316. ARBUTHNOT, quoted, 115. ARCHIMEDES, 180. ARGENTINAS, 292. ARISTOTLE, 9, 14, 26, 82; quoted on definition of philosophy, 35, 37; referred to on the same, 36, 45; quoted on the questiones scibi- les, 89; see Empirical, 40; quoted on the end of philosophy, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52; quoted on Wonder as a cause of philosophy, 55, 59, 63, 66, 75, 79, 838; see Art; made the consideration of the soul part of the phil- osophy of nature, 89, 95, 98, 106, 110; dis- 696 tinction of active and passive power first formally enounced by, 128; his distinction of habit and disposition, 124, 125; quoted on will and desire, 128; had no special term for consciousness, 136; supposed intellect to be cognizant of its own operations, 187; his doctrine in regard to self-apprehension of sense, 188; opposed to the doctrine that the mind cannot exist in two different states at the same moment, 174, 185; whether a nat- ural realist, 205, 212, 218, 262, 293; on rela- tion of soul to body, 272, 356; his doctrine of species, division of opinions regarding, 291-2; passages quoted from in which e7Sos and Tv7os occur, 292, 874; problem regard- ing plurality of senses under Touch mooted by, 375, 412; see Conservative Faculty; 427, see Reproductive Faculty ; 480, see ibid. ; doubtful whether Aristotle or Homer were possessed of the more powerful imagination, 454, 460, 463; held that general names are only abbreviated definitions, 488, 500; see Language; his definition of the infinite, 531; held that sense has no perception of the causal nexus, 541, 573; his doctrine of the pleasurable, 585; see Feelings; the genuine- ness of the Magna Moralia and Eudemian Ethics attributed to, questionable, 585. ARISTOTELIANS, the, their doctrine of con- sciousness, 188; certain of, first held con- sciousness to be a special faculty, 189; held doctrine of Physical influence, 212; divided on question of continual energy of intellect, 218; doctrine of regarding the relation of the soul to the body, and of the soul to the different mental powers, 272, 356; certain of, disavowed the doctrine of species, 291-2; their division of the mental phenomena, 560. : ARNAULD, his doctrine of Perception, 302; only adopted by the few, 312. See Percep- tion. ARIMINENSIS, see Gregory of Rimini. ARRIAGA, 485. ASSOCIATION of Ideas, what in general, 244; a phenomenon of, seemingly ancmalous, 244, 254; explained by principle of mental latency, 254, 255; see Reproductive and Rep- resentative Faculties; as a general cause which contributes to raise energy, 611; see Feelings. ART and Science, history of the application of the terms, 81; definition of Art by Aris- totle, 83. ARTS, Fine, presuppose a knowledge of mind, 44. ATTENTION, act of the same faculty as reflec- tion, 164; not a faculty different from con- sciousness, 164 et seq.; what, 165; as a gen- eral phenomenon of consciousness, 165; whether we can attend to more than a sin- gle object at once, 165 ef seq., 178 et seq. ; this INDEX. question canvassed in the middle ages. 176 possible without an act of free will, 171: of three degrees or kinds, 172; nature and im- portance of, 7.; the question, how many objects can the mind attend to at once con- sidered, 176 et seg.; how answered by Bon- net, Tucker, Destutt-Tracy, Degerando, and by the author, 177; value of attention con- sidered in its highest degree as an act of will, 177; instances of the power of, 179 et seq. ; Malebranche quoted on place and im- portance of, 181 et seq.; Stewart commended on, 182. See Conservative Faculty. ATTRIBUTE, what, 106. AUGUSTIN, St., his analysis of pain. 49, 81, 98; his employment of conscius, and conscientia, 136; inclined to doctrine of Plastic Medinm, 213; his doctrine of matter, ib.; quoted on our ignorance of the substance of mind and body, 214; on continual energy of in- tellect, 218; quoted on mental powers, 270, 292; quoted on the doctrine that the soul is all in the whole and all in every part, 856, 387, 412: see Conservative Faculty; 480, see Reproductive Faculty; 442, see ibid., 518, quoted on energetic emotions, 608; on beau- ty, 625, see Feelings. AVEMPAOK, 218. AVERROES, 46, 79; held God to be the only real agent in the universe, 210; on Touch, 3876, 542. AVICENYA, on Touch, 376, 414. Bacon, 13, 41, 59, 63, 67, 76; his division of the sciences and of philosophy, 84, 99, 179; see Attention, 376, 6386. BALZAO, 518. BARBEYRAO, 513. BATTEUX, 594. BAUMGARTEN, first to apply the term Zsthetie to the philosophy of taste, 87; attempted to demonstrate the law of Sufficient Reason from that of Contradiction, 546. BEASLEY, his opinion of Reid’s polemic on Perception, 298, BEATTIE, 92; on laws of Association, 430. BEAUTY, see Feelings. BELIEF precedes knowledge, 82. BELLOVACENSIS, Vincentius, 887. BENEKE, 252, 465. BERKELEY, quoted on testimony of conscious- ness in Perception, 201, 205; his Defence of the Theory of Vision, referred to. 880, see Sight; quoted on Nominalism, 478, 488. BERNARDUS (J. Bap.), 290. BERTRAND, quoted on Descartes’ doctrine of pleasure, 591. BIEDERMANN, 546. BIEL, 176, 272, 542. BILFINGER, 4380; see Reproductive Faculty, 474. BIUNDE, 261; quoted on difficulty of psychol- t INDEX. ogical study, 263, 265, 849; quoted 565, 569; see Feelings. BorrTuius, 43, 99, 415. Boun, 233 BONAVENTURA, 292. Bonnet, Charles, 176, 579. BONSTETTEN, 176. Boscovicu, 683. Bostock, Dr., his Physiology referred to, 373, 661, Bovuoors, 513. BRALN, dccount of experiments on weight of, by the author, 659-60; remarks on Dr. Morton’s tables on the size of, 660—662. BRANDIS, 82, 33, 36, 38, 40, 113. BRODWISSENSCHAFTEN, the Bread and But- ter Sciences, 5, 15. Brown (Bishop), 93; his doctrine of Sub- stance, 108. Brown, Dr. Thomas, 92; defines conscious- ness by feeling, 128, 182; erroneously as- serts that consciousness has generally been classed as a special faculty, 144; holds that the mind cannot exist at the same moment in two different states, 168, 173; his doctrine on this point criticised, 175; it renders com- parison impossible, 175; and violates the integrity of consciousness, 193, 195; wrong in asserting that philosophers in general regard the mental powers as distinct and independent existences, 268; his general er- ror in regard to Reid's doctrine of Percep- tion, 288, see Perception; his criticism of Reid on theories of Perception, 288 et seq., 298; his errors in regard to Perception vital, 299; coincides with Priestley in censuring Reid’s view of Locke’s doctrine of Percep- tion, 305; his interpretation of Locke’s opinion explicitly contradicted by Locke himself, 806-7; adduces Hobbes as an in- stance of Reid’s historical inaccuracy in regard to theories of Perception, 308; his single argument in support of the view that Reid was a Cosmothetic Idealist re- futed, 317 et seg.; adopted division of senses corresponding to the Sensus Vagus and Sen- sus Fixus of the German philosophers, 377; controverted opinion that extension is an object of Sight, 880, 382 et seg.; on laws of Association, 430; quoted on Conceptualism, 481, see Elaborative Faculty; 493, see Lan- guage; 584, et seq., see Causality. Browne, Sir Thomas, quoted 18, see Mind, 513. BRUCKER, 51. BucHANAN (George), quoted, 280. Buppzvs, 180, Burrier, Pére, right in regard to degrees of evidence in consciousness, 191; distin- guished Perception from Sensation, 334. BuFrron, 179, 376. BURATELLUS, Gabriel, quoted on Platonic doctrine of vision, 290. 697 BURGERSDY CK, 83, 507. BURKE, quoted on value of reflective studies, 10, BuTLER (Bishop), referred to on our mental identity, 260. Byrkxon, quoted, 82. C&SALPINUS, Andreas, 501. CHSARINUS, Virginius, quoted on Painful Afiections, 606. CAJETAN, 176, 272, 317. CALDERWOOD, Henry, letter of author to, 684—688. CAMPANELLA, quoted on mental powers, 271, 496, see Language. CAMPBELL, Principal, 92; a nominalist, 476. CAMPBELL (Thomas), quoted, 35. CAPACITY, origin and meaning of, 123; ap- propriately applied to natural capabilities, 124; distinguished from faculty, 269. CAPREOLUS, 176, 272, 292. CARDAILLAG, referred to on doctrine of mental latency, 285, 251; quoted on diffi- culty of psychological study, 263, 265; quoted, 444 et seg. See Reproductive Fac- ulty. CARDAN, 180; on Touch, 376; on pleasure, 589, see Feelings. CARLETON, Thomas Compt., 683, CARNEADES, 180. CARPENTER (Dr.), referred to on somnambu- lism, 223. CARTESIANS, the, division of philosophy by, 84; fully evolved the hypothesis of assist- ance or occasional causes, 209; made con- sciousness thé essence of thought, 251. Carus (Fred. Aug.), 252, 429, 570, see Feel- ings. CASAUBON, Isaac, quoted on memory of Joseph Scaliger, 425. CASMANN, Otto, his use of the term psychol- ogy, 95. CAUSALITY, of second causes at least two necessary to the production of every effect, 408, 554; the First Cause cannot be by us apprehended, but must be believed in, 43; the law of, evolved from ‘the principle of the conditioned, 582 et seq. ; problem of, and attempts at solution, 532; phenomenon of, what, 532 et seq.; what appears to us to be- gin to be is necessarily thought by us as having previously existed under another form, 583; hence an absolute tautology be- tween the effect and its causes, i.; not necessary to the notion of, that we should know the particular causes of the particu- lar effect, 534; Brown’s account of the phx- nomenon of, 534, 585; Professor Wilson quoted on Brown’s doctrine of, 536; fun- damental defect in Brown’s theory, 538; classification of opinions on the nature and origin of the principle of, 588; these con- 88 ® & 693 sidered in detail, 539 et seg., I. Objectivo- Objective, 5389; refuted on two grounds, 540; that we have no perception of cause and ~ effect in the external world maintained by Hume, 541; and before him by many phi- losophers, 541; among whom Algazel prob- ably the first, 7b.; by the Mussulman Doc- tors, 542; the Schoolmen, 7b.; Malebranche, ib.; Il. Objectivo-Subjective, maintained by Locke, 542; M. de Biran, 7b.; shown to be untenable, 548; III. Objective— Induction or Generalization, 544; IV. Subjective — Association, 544; V. A Special Principle of Intelligence, 545; VI. Expectation of the Constancy of Nature, 545; fifth opinion criticised, 546; VII. The Principle of Non- Contradiction, 546; VIII. The Law of the Conditioned, 547; judgment of Causality, how deduced from this law, 548 et seq.; ex- istence conditioned in time affords the prin- ciple of, 548,549; see also 551 et seg. ; that the causal judgment is elicited only by objects | in uniform succession is erroneous, 555; the author’s doctrine of, to be preferred, 1°, from its simplicity, 555; 2°, averting skepti- cism, 556; 3°, avoiding the alternatives of fatalism or inconsistency, 556, 557; advan- tages of the author’s doctrine of, further shown, 557; defence by author of his doc- trine of, 689. CaAuvsE, see Causality. CELSUS, 39. CEREBELLUM, its function as alleged by phre- nologists, 651; its true function as ascer- tained by the author, 653. CHALCIDIUS, 291. CHANET, 518. CHARLETON, 518. CHARRON, 62. CHANCE, games of, 617, see Feelings. CHAUVIN, 48, 474. CHESELDEN, 880, see Sight. CHESTERFIELD (Lord), 179. CHEVY CHASE, ballad of, quoted, 564. CICERO, 21; on the assumption of the term plulosophy, 83; on definition of philosophy, 85; referred to on the same, 87, 81, 114; use of the term Conscius, 186; on continual en- ergy of intellect, 218, 339, 849, 353, 414, 636, see Conservative Faculty; quoted in illus- tration of the law of contiguity, 484, 460, 518. CLASSIFICATION, see Elaborative Faculty. CLAUBERG, 64; his division of philosophy 119. CLERC, Dan. le, 39. CLERC, John le, held Plastic Medium, 208, 214; quoted on perception, 309; distin- guished Perception from Sensation, 834. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS, referred to on definition of philosophy, 85; quoted, 46. CoGNITION, one grand division of the phe- ——-——- --erer—rrr INDEX. nomena of mind, 86; see Knowledge; the use of the term vindicated, 277. COLERIDGE, case of mental latency recorded by, 239. COLoR, see Sight. COMPREHENSION of notions, see Elaborative Faculty. CoMPLEX Notions, see Elaborative Faculty. ComMon Sense, its various meanings, 512; authorities for use of as equivalent to Novs, 518. Common Sense, see Vital Sense. Common Sensory, 512. CoMBE (George), quoted on difference of de- | velopment of phrenological organs, 665. COMPARISON, see Elaborative Faculty. | CONATIVE, used by Cudworth, 129. See Co- | nation. CONATION, One grand division of the phex- nomena of mind, 56; best term to denote | the phenomena both of Will and Desire, | 129; determined by the Feelings, 568; essen- | tial peculiarities of, 571 et seq. | CONCEPTION, used by Reid and Stewart as | synonymous with Imagination, 147; mean- ; | | ing and right application of the term, 452. See Representative faculty. CONCEPTUALISM, see Elaborative Faculty. CoNnDORCET, 497. CONDITIONED, the, 549. See Regulative Fac- - ulty. CoNnDILLAG, referred to on definition of phi- losophy, 35; quoted on love of unity as a source of error; 50, 51, 71, 99, 168, 285, 271; on extension as object of sight, 379, 468, 493, see Language. CONIMBRICENSES, 187, 272, 291, 414, 493, see Language. CONSCIENTIA, CoNScIUS, their various mean- ings, 186 et seg. See Consciousness. CONSCIOUS, see Subject and Consciousness, . CONSCIOUSNESS, what, 110, 188; the one essen- tial element of the mental phenomena, 126; affords three grand classes of phenomena — those of Knowledge, Feeling, and Cona- tion, 127 et seg.; their nomenclature, 127-8; this threefold distribution of the phenom- ena of, first made by Kant, 129; objection to the classification obviated, 129, 564; the phenomena of, not possible independently of each other, 130, 411; order of the three grand classes of the phenomena of, 180-1; no special account of, by Reid or Stewart, 131; cannot be defined, 182 et seg. ; admits of philosophical analysis, 182; what kind of act the word is employed to denote, and what the act involves, 188 et seg. ; conscious- ness and knowledge involve each other, 133; these, how distinguished, 184; history of the term, 185; first regularly used by Des- cartes in its modern sense, 186; a transla- tion of conscientia, ib. ; early senses of conscius i ae 5 and conscientia, ib.; as used by Augustin, %.; as used by Quintilian, Cicero, Tertullian, and other of the Latin fathers, ib.; how ex- pressed in Latin, French, Italian, and Ger- man, id.; no term for, in Greek until the decline of philosophy, 7.; terms tanta- mount to, adopted by the later Platon- ists and Aristotelians, 188; the most gen- eral characteristic of, 189; special condi- tions of, ib; those generally admitted, 7. et seq.; implies, 1. actual knowledge, 1b. ; 2. immediate knowledge, i. ; 8. contrast, 140, 141; 4. judgment, 502; 5. memory, 141; special conditions of, not generally admit- ted, 143 et seqg.; coextensive with our knowledge, 143 et seg.; a special faculty according to Reid and Stewart, 144 et seq. ; Reid’s limitation of the sphere of, unten- able, 146 et seg.; no consciousness of a cog- nitive act without a consciousness of its object, 146 et seg.; this shown in detail with regard to imagination, 147; Memory, 149 et seq.; External Perception, 154 et seq. ; At- tention and Reflection acts subordinate to and contained in consciousness, maintained against Reid and Stewart, 160 et seq. ; see Reid, evidence and authority of, 188 et seq. ; the source of philosophy, 73. et seg., 197; ver- acity of, implied in possibility of philoso- phy, 183; as the criterion of philosophy, naturally clear and unerring, 184; three grand laws under which its phenomena can be legitimately investigated, 186 et seq., 1. the law of Parcimony, ib.; fact of, what, 187; its facts to be considered in two points of view, 188; how far doubt is possible re- garding a fact of, 188; the two degrees of the evidence of, confounded by Stewart, 189 et seqg.; results of the law of Parcimony | as applied to, 191; the second and third | laws regulating the investigation of, — In- tegrity and Harmony, 191-2 et seg.; how skepticism arises out of the violation of the | integrity of, 192; the integrity of, violated by Dr. Thomas Brown, 193 et seq. ; the abso- lute and universal veracity of, must be maintained, 196; first general fact of, —its Duality what, and how violated, 200 et seq. ; the fact of the testimony of, in Perception allowed by those who deny its truth, 200 et seq.; 848; authors quoted to this effect, — Berkeley, 201; Hume, 7b.; the ego and non- ego given by, in equal counterpoise and in- dependence, 203; different philosophical systems originating in this fact of the dual- ity of, as accepted or rejected, — Natural Realism, 203; Substantialism and Nihilism, 204; Substantialism divided into Hypothet- ical Dualism or Cosmiothetic Idealism, and Monism or Unitarianism, 205; Monism, its subdivisions, 205-6; second general fact of, —the Activity and Passivity of mind, 216 699 et seq.; we are active in so far as we are con- scious, 217; Are we always consciously ac- tive? 217 et seq.; this question is confined to the phenomena of sleep and somnam- bulism, ib. ; not identical with the question, — Have we always a memory of our con- sciousness ? 1b.; opinions of philosophers on the former question, 218 et seqg.; dealt with by philosophers rather by hypothesis than by experiment, 222; conclusions from experiments made by the author, w. ; Locke’s objection, that consciousness and the recollection of consciousness are con- vertible, disproved by somnambulism, 2., and by the fact that dreaming is possible without memory, 223; that the mind re- mains conscious during sleep established by experience, 224; results of the author’s per- sonal experience, — that the mind is never wholly inactive, and that we are never wholly unconscious of its activity, 224-5; Jouffroy quoted in support of the author’s doctrine on this point, and of sundry other conclusions, 226 et seg.; cases adduced in support of affirmative of question, that we are always consciously active, 282-4 et seq. ; Is the mind ever unconsciously modified ? 235 et seq.; this question not mooted in this country, 285; how decided in Germany and France, 235, 251; the mind contains modifi- cations of which we are unconscious, 235 et seq.; three degrees of mental latency, 2. et seq.; the first and second degrees illus- trated by cases, 286 et seg.; cases of mad- ness, 287; of fever, 287; case of the Com- tesse de Laval, 288; case given by Coleridge, 239; the third degree of mental latency, 241; the problem in regard to the third degree — Are there, in ordinary, mental modifica- tions of which we are unconscious, but which manifest their existence by facts of which we are conscious? 241 et seq., 253 et seq.; this problem considered in itself and in its history, #.; the affirmative main- tained, 241 et seq. ; the mental modifications in question manifest their existence through their effects, 242; this established from the nature of consciousness itself, 2b.; the spe- cial evidence for the affirmative of the gen- eral problem adduced, 242 et seq. ; inI. Ex- ternal Perception, 2438-4, 253; IT. Associa tion of Ideas, 244 et seq., 254 et seq. ; II. On Acquired Dexterities and Habits, 247 et seq., 255 et seq.; history of the doctrine of un- conscious mental modifications, 250 e¢ seq. ; Leibnitz the first to proclaim the doctrine, 252; authors referred to on doctrine of la- tency, 251-2; consciousness and memory in the direct ratio of each other, 256; three principal facts to be noticed in connection with the general phenomena of, 258 et seq. ; 1. Self-Existence, 258; 2. Mental Unity or Individuality, 259; the truth of the testi- mony of, to our Mental Unity doubted, 7b. ; 8. Mental Identity, 260; Difficulties and Facilities in the study of the phenomena of, 260 et seg.; I. Difficulties, 1. The con- scious mind at once the observing subject and the object observed, 261; 2. Want of mutual codperation, 261; 3. No fact of con- sciousness can be accepted at second hand, 262; 4. Phenomena of consciousness only to be studied through memory, 263; 5. Nat- ‘urally blended-with each other, and pre- sented in complexity, 264, 284; 6. The act of reflection comparatively deficient in pleasure, 265; II. Facilities, 266. CONSERVATIVE Faculty, what, 274, 288; its relation to the faculties of Acquisition, Re- production, and Representation, 411; why: the phenomena of Conservation, Reproduc- ‘tion, and Representation have not been dis- tinguished in the analysis of philosophers, 412; ordinary use of the terms Memory and Recollection, 412 et seqg.; memory properly de- notes the power of retention, 7.; this use of memory acknowledged by Plato, Aris- totle, St. Augustin, Julius Cesar Scaliger, ib. ; Joseph Scaliger, 418; Suabedissen, Fries, H. Schmid, etc., 414; Memory what, 7d. ; the fact of retention admitted, 2b.; the hypoth- esis of Avicenna regarding retention, 7. ; retention admits of explanation, 7b. ; simil- itudes suggested in illustration of the fac- ulty of retention, by Cicero, Gassendi, 415; these resemblances of use simply as meta- phors, 7b.; H. Schmid quoted on, 415-20; the phenomenon of retention naturally arises from the self-energy of mind, 415; this specially shown, 416 ¢¢ seg.; the problem most difficult of solution is not how a men- tal activity endures, but how it ever van- ishes, 7b.; the difficulty removed by the principle of latent modifications, 7b.; for- getfulness, 417; distraction and attention, 418; two observations regarding memory — I. The law of retention extends over all the phenomena of mind alike, 418; 2, the vari- ous attempts to explain memory by phys- iological hypotheses unnecessary, 419 ; mem- ory greatly dependent on corporeal condi- tions, 7b.; physiological hypotheses of the older psychologists regarding memory, 420; two qualities requisite to a good memory, viz., Retention and Reproduction, 7b.; re- markable case of retention narrated by Muretus, 421-2; case of Giulio Guidi, 428; two opposite doctrines in regard to the rela- tions of memory to the higher powers of mind —1. That a great power of memory is incompatible with a high degree of intelli- gence, 424; this opinion refuted by facts, 425; examples of high intelligence and great memory, Joseph Scaliger, Grotius, INDEX. Pascal, ete , 425-6; 2. That a high degree of intelligence supposes great power of mem- ory, 426. CONSTANTIUS a Sarnano, 163. CONTEMPLATIVE Feelings, see Feelings. CONTRADICTION, law of, see Non-Contradic- tion and Thought. ConrTzEN, 163. Cops, referred to on the meaning of of codol, of copicral, 34. COTTUNIUS, 272. Cousin, 44, 90; referred to on Descartes’ cog- ito ergo sum, 259: vigorously assaulted the school of Condillac, 277, 307, 465, 542. COWLEY, quoted, 609. CRAMER, his Anecdota Greca, referred to, 36, 37, 81. CREATION, as conceived by us, 552. CRITICAL Method, what, 403; its sphere, 7. ; notice of its employment in philosophy, 7. CrousaZ, 808-9; distinguished Perception from Sensation, 334, 501; quoted on Judg- ment, 504-5. CupworTH, 28; held Plastic Medium, 208, 218, 348. CULLEN, 53. Custom, power of, 59; skeptical inference _ from the influence of, 60; testimonies to, 62. CUVIER, 179. CyRvs, his great memory, 426. D’ AILLY, 542. D’ALEMBERT, 177; on Touch, 376; 388, see Sight. DAMASCENUS, referred to, on definition of philosophy, 37, 292. DAmIRoN, referred to on doctrine of mental latency, 235, 252. DaviEs, Sir John, quoted, 52. DECOMPOSITION, see Elaborative Faculty. DEGERANDO, 177, 210; quoted on Classifica- tion, 466, 467. Deity, His existence an inference from a special class of effects, 19; these exclusively given in the phenomena of mind, 7. ; what kind of cause constitutes a Deity, 7. ; no- tion of God not contained in the notion of a mere First Cause, 19; to the notions of a Primary and Omnipotent Cause must be added those of Intelligence and Virtue, 20. ; conditions of the proof of the existence of a Deity, twofold, 20; proof of these condi- tions dependent on philosophy, 21. DrmocRITUS, his theory of Perception, 293, 851; his doctrine of the qualities of matter, 342; his doctrine that all the senses are only modifications of Touch, 374. DEMOSTHENES, 52. DENZINGER, referred to, on definition of Phi- losophy, 35,. 252. DE Razr, on Touch, 376, 518. DrERopoN, 474, 479, 485. INDEX. DESCARTES, referred to on definition of phi- losophy, 35, 51, 68, 76; his division of phi- losophy, 83; his doctrine of substance, 108 ; regarded faculty of knowledge as the fun- damental power of mind, 129; the first uniformly to use conscientia as =i SS to consciousness, 136; used reflection in its psychological application, 164, 179; see At- tention, 200; to him belongs the hypothesis of Occasional Causes, 208, 209, 214; held that the mind is always conscious, 218; his cogito ergo sum, 258, 644, 271; car dinal prin- ciple of his philosophy, 295; twofold use of the term idea by, 296; held the more com- plex hypothesis of Representative Percep- tion, 300 et seg.; distinguished Perception from Sensation, 834; recalled attention to the distinction of Primary and Secondary Qualities, 342, 515, see Regulative Faculty ; on pleasure, 591, see Feelings. DESIRE, see Conation and Will. DESTUTT-TRACY, 177. DEVILLEMANDY, referred to on Aristotle’s doctrine of species, 292. Dz Vries, 301. DEXTERITIES, acquired, see Habit. DIANOETIC, how to be employed, 574. See Logic. DieBy (Sir Kenelm), 357. DI0GENES, see Lacrtius. Discussions on Philosophy, the author’s re- ferred to, 9, 40, 43, 47, etc. DIsPosiTion, what, 124. DocMATISTS, a sect of physicians, noticed, 89; headed by Galen, 7b. DonELLUS, his great memory, 426. Dount, the first step to philosophy, 57, 63; on this philosophers unanimous, 2.; testimo- nies to need of, ib. See Philosophy. DREAMING, possible without memory, 223; an effect of imagination determined by as- sociation, 457; case of, mentioned by Abel, 458. Du Bos, on pleasure, 594; see Feelings. DURANDUS, 176; quoted on doctrine of spe- cies, 292; his doctrine of species concurred in by Occam, Gregory of Rimini, and Biel, ib.; quoted on distinction of intuitive and abstractive knowledge, 316. EBERHARD, 560. See Feelings. Epvucation, Liberal and Pfofessional, dis- criminated, 4; the true end of liberal edu- cation, 11; place and importance of the feelings in education, 12, 636; the great problem in, 637. Eco, or Self, meaning of, illustrated from Plato, 113; Aristotle, Hierocles, Cicero, Macrobius, Arbuthnot, Gatien-Arnoult, quoted in further illustration of, 114-15; the terms Ego and Non-Ego, preferable to Self and Not-Self, 116; how expressed TOL in German and French, ib.; the Ego and Non-Ego given by consciousness in equal counterpoise and independence, 208; see Consciousness. ELABORATIVE Faculty, what, 276, 284, 463; acts included under, ib-; how designated, 276, 463; defect in the dial Yeis of this fac- ulty by philosophers, 464; positions to be established regarding, ib.; comparison as determined by objective conditions, 465; as determined by the necessities of the think- ing subject, 466 et seq. ; Classification, Com- position, or Synthesis shown to be an act of comparison, 466, 474; in regard to com- plex or collective notions, 465; in the sim- plest act of classification, the mind depexd- ent on language, 467; Decomposition tw o- fold, 1. in the interest of the Fine Arts, 468; 2. in the interest of Science, t.; Abstrac- tion, ib. et seqg.; abstraction of Gs senses, — abstraction a natural and necessary processs, 469; the work of comparison, 470 ; Generalization: ib. et seq.; idea ab- stract and individual, 7b.; abstract general notions, what and how formed, 471; two- fold quantity in notions, — Extension and Comprehension, 7. ; their designations, 472; abstraction from, idk attention to, are correlative terms, 474; Partial or Con- crete Abstraction, ib.; Modal . Sentiments concomi- tant of Imagination, 618 et seq. ; the Beauti- ful, how constituted, 619, 624 et seq; condi- tions of the pleasurable as regards the Understanding, 620 et seq.; obscure and confused cognitions, how disagreeable, 1b. ; Wit, how pleasing ; Sentiment of Truth, how pleasing, 620-21; Generalization and Specification, how pleasurable, 621; Sci- ence, how pleasing, 622; Deduction from first principles, 7b. ; adaptation of Means to Ends, how pleasing, 1. ; Feelings that arise from the Imagination and understanding in conjunction, 619 et seq., 624; Beauty aid Sublimity, 624 et seq.; Beauty distinguished as absolute and Relative, 7d. ; this distine- tion unsound, 625; the Useful and the Leuu- 04 INDEX. tiful distinct, 7b ; St. Augustin’s doctrine on this point superior to the modern, 2. ; Relative Beauty, what, 626; the theory of Free or Absolute Beauty, 7b.; the theory explains the difference of individuals in the apprehension of the Beautiful, 7.; and affords the reason why our pleasure is lJess- ened when we analyze the object into its parts, 627; Relative Beauty from the con- rormity of Mean to End, ib.; judgments of Taste either Pure. or mixed, 628; the Beau- tiful defined, 7b.; the feeling of the Sublime partly pleasurable, partly painful, w., et seq; theory of the Sublime, 7b.; the Sublime di- vided into that of Extension, Protension, and Intension, 629 et seg.; Kant quoted in illustration of the Sublime in its three forms, 630; the Picturesque, wherein it con- sists, and how it differs from the Sublime and Beautiful, 681; the Practical Feelings, 7b. ; their divisions, 1. those relative to Self- Preservation, 632; 2. Enjoyment of Exist- ence, 7b.; 3. Preservation of Species, i.; 4. Tendency to Development, 683; 5. the Moral Law, 2b. Frra@uson (Adam), 61, 578; on love of action, 604. FERRARIENSIS, 176, 272, 816. FicuTe, referred to on @efinition of philoso- phy, 85; division of philosophy adopted by, 84, 202; issue of his Idealism, 204; his ob- jection to the doctrine of Natural Realism, 359. Ficrnus, Marsillius, 48, 176; quoted on a passage in Plato’s Timeus, 218, 271. Fuint, Rev. Mr., case of, 237. Forer, De la, 162; held hypothesis of Divine Assistance 209. Fonsrca, 468. FRACASTORIUS, quoted on Platonic philoso- phy, 289. FRANKLIN, 50. FRrIGIUs, Joannes Thomas, 96. FRIES, 252, 268, 414, 429, 481, 488. FRomonpvs, 270, 272. FUNCTION, what, 125. GATIEN-ARNOULT, 57, 58, 64; quoted on Ego, 116, 463. ; GALE, Theoph, 94. GALEN, 89, see Dogmatists; his doctrine of mental powers, 270, 291, 292; on Touch, 377. GALL, his mode of phrenological discovery, 656 et seg.; how he met the argument against phrenology from the existence and extent of the Frontal Sinuses, 654. See Phrenology and Sinuses. GARNIER, quoted, 50, 51. GASSENDI, his division of philosophy, 84; used reflection in its psychological applica- tion, 262; held Plastic Medium, 214, 650; referred to on Aristotle's doctrine of spe- Lo! cies, 292; fundamental error of Stewart in regard to the philosophy of, 407; though a Sensationalist he admitted Reflection as a source of knowledge, 408; and did not as- similate Reflection to Sense, ib.; his divis- ion of the cognitive phenomena. 7d. ; Intel- lect, according to him, has three functions, —1. Intellectual apprehension, 409; 2. Re- flection, 410; 3. Reasoning, 7b. ; 415. See Con- servative Faculty. GEFUHL, ambiguous, 562. See Feeling. GENERALIZATION, see Elaborative Faculty. GENERAL notions, see Elaborative Faculty. GENOVESI, 272, distinguished Perception from Sensation, 334, 513; on pleasure, 598. GERARD (Alexander), on laws of Association, 430. GERUZEZ, 56, 75. GLANDUL# Paccihoni, what, 656; argument against phrenology derived from, 7b. GLEI@ (Bishop), his opinion of Reid’s pole- mic on perception, 298. GNOSEOLOGIA, what, 86. GNOSTOLOGIA, see Gnoseologia. GOCLENIUS, Rudolphus, the first to apply the term psychology to a treatise relative to the human mind, 96, 163. GORGIAS, the sophist, 204. GOVEANUS, Antonius, 513. GRAMMAR, why usually designated an art, 81, 83; universal or philosophical, a nomo- logical science, 87. GRAMMARIAN, John the, see Philoponus. GRAY, quoted, 4383. GREEK language, example of its perfection, 123; expresses syntactical relations by flex- ion, 176. GREGORY (Dr. James), his great memory, 426. GREGORY, of Rimini, 176, 270, 316. Greaory, of Nazianzum, quoted, 433. Greoory, of Nyssa, quoted on mental pow- ers, 270. GREGOROVIUS, quoted on memory of Guidi, 423. GRIMM, 9. GROTIUS, his great memory, 425. GRUITHUISEN, 377. GUIDI, Giulio, his great memory, 425. GRUYER, 262. HABIT, what, 124; acquired habits, three the- ories of, viz.: the mechanical, theory of consciousness without memory, and the theory of latency, 247-9, 255-7; explained in accordance with analogy by theory of mental latency, 257. HALLE, postman of, case of, showing that the mind is active while body asleep, 283. HALLER, 288. HARTLEY, his theory of habit, mechanical, 247. HARTLEIAN School, 880. INDEX. s Havet, his edition of Pascal’s Pensées, re- ferred to, 387. HEGEL, referred to on definition of philoso- phy, 36, 45. ‘ HEINSIUS, 418. HELVETIUS, quoted on the influence of pre- coriceived opinions, 54, 178-9, see Attention. HEMSTERHUIS, 103,516; referred to on Beauty, 626. Henry, of Ghent, his doctrine of mental powers, 272. HERACLIDES Ponticus, 34. HERACLITUS, 68, 352. HerBart, 501, 570, see Feelings. HERML&, see Ammonius. LizRODOTUS, uses the verb qiAocopely, 34, 60. HeEerv avs, 176, 292. Herz, Marcus, 618. HESIOD, quoted, 636. H1ERocixEs, 114; his employment of ovvalo- nous, 176. HILAIRE, St., 415. HILLEBRAND, 570, see Feelings. Hip PocraTEs, alleged expression of, quoted, 34; writing in which it occurs spurious, 2d. HistoricaAL Knowledge, see Empirical and Knowledge. Hoxses, quoted on definition of philosophy, 85; a material idealist, 309; quoted on the train of thought, 428; a nominalist, 477, 546. Hocker, 108. HorFBAUER, maintained that great intelli- gence supposes great memory, 426. HomER, quoted, 37, 262. HoMMEL, 63. Horace, quoted, 125, 433, 513. HortTuNsivs, his great memory, 426. HusBNER, distinguished Vital Sense from Or- ganic Senses, 377, HuaGo a Sancto Victore, 316. Huss, 61. Hume, quoted on testimony of consciousness in Perception, 201, 848; his nihilism a skep- tical conclusion from the premises of pre- vious philosophers, 476; doubts the truth of the testimony of consciousness to our mental unity, 259; his skepticism, its mean- ing, use, and results, 642 et seq.; quoted as to ground of rejecting the testimony of consciousness in Perception, 358; on laws of Association, 430; quoted on Imagina- tion, 455; quoted on Nominalism, 477, 483, 522, see Regulative Faculty; 541, see ibid. ; refuted attempts to establish the principle of Causality on that of Contradiction, 546. WuUTCHESON, regarded Consciousness as a special faculty, 144; distinguished Percep- tion from Sensation, 834; quoted on divis- ion of senses into five, 877, 579; quoted and commended on Association, 612; on Abso- lute and Relative Beauty, 624. - 70 Hyporuesis, what, 117; first condition of a legitimate, ib.; second, 119; see also 362 et seq.; criteria of good and bad, 119. IAMBLICHUS, quoted on mental powers, 271. IDEALISM, Cosmothetic, what, 205; embraces the majority of modern philosophers, 7b. ; its subdivisions, ib., see Consciousness; ab- solute, how a philosophical system is often prevented from falling into, 206. IDENTITY, law of, 679. IMAGINATION, see Representative Faculty. IMMEDIATE Knowledge, see Knowledge. INCOMPRESSIBILITY, ultimate law of,-whence derived, 553. InDvUcTION, what, 72; a synthetic process, 73; inductive method, notice of its employment in philosophy, 403; inductive reasoning, 509. INFINITE, see Regulative Faculty. INFLUENCE, term brought into common use by Suarez, 213; influxus, first’ used in the pseudo-Aristotelic treatise De Causis, 1. INTUITIVE Knowledge, see Knowledge. Iontc School, 73, 74. IREN.£US, quoted on mental powers, 270. Irwina, 163. _ IstpoRrvs, quoted on mental powers, 270. Iraxic School, 74. * JACOBI, quoted, 27, 29, 202; holds a doctrine of Perception analogous to that of Reid, 285, 514. JANDUNUS, on Touch, 376. JARDINE, Professor, noticed, 638; quoted on the best method of determining merit in ab class of philosophy, 7b., et seq. JeFrrey (Francis), noticed on Association, 612. Jerome, of Prague, 61. Jounson, Samuel, quoted on love of action, 604. Jonson, Ben, his great memory, 426. Jourrroy, quoted in support of the author’s doctrine that the mind is never wholly in- active, and that we are never wholly un- conscious of its activity, and of sundry other conclusions, 226 et seqg.; holds that the mind is frequently awake when the senses are asleep, ib.; thinks it probable that the mind is always awake, 7 ; gives induction of facts in support of this con- clusion, 226 et seq.; gives analysis and ex- planation of the phenomena adduced, 2°7 et seq.; holds distraction and non-distrac- tion matters of intelligence, 228; applies foregoing analysis to phenomena of sleep, 229; his doctrine illustrated by personal experience, 230 et seq ; by experience of those attendant on the sick, 231; by awak- ening at an appointed hour, 2. ; his general conclusions, 282 ef seg.; his theory corrobo- rated by the case of the postman of Halle, 89 T06 ib., et seq.; belonged to the Scoto-Gallican School of Philosophy, 645. JUDGMENT, see Elaborative Faculty. JUVENAL, quoted, 513, 6386. K2&STNER, 560, see Feelings; quoted on Des- cartes’ doctrine of pleasure, 591. KAMEs, referred to on question of mental latency, 252; quoted on utility of Abstrac- tion, 470. KANT, quoted, 28; referred to on definition of philosophy, 35, 41, 48; his anticipation of the discovery of Uranus, 49; his division of philosophy, 84, 99; admits the fact of the testimony of consciousness in perception, 202, 208; maintains that we are always con- sciously active, 222, 252; doubts the truth of the testimony of consciousness to our Mental Unity, 259; and to our Mental Iden- tity, 260; a Scotchman by descent, 648; his philosophy originated in a recoil against the skepticism of Hume, 643-4; his doctrine of space and time, 647-8, 271; enunciated the law by which Perception and Sensation are governed in their reciprocal relations, 335; divides the senses into two,— Sensus Vagus and Sensus Fixus, 377, 402, see Neces- sity; quoted on proper application of term Abstraction, 474, 561, 569, 598; on Beauty, 625, see Feelings; quoted, 630; see ibid. ; his anal- ysis of judgments, 681. KECKERMANN, distinguished Reflexion from Observation, 262, 518. KEPLER, 53. Know thyself, 27. KNOWLEDGE, discriminated from intellectual cultivation, 5; whether knowledge or men- tal exercise the superior end, considered, 6; popular solution of this question, — that knowledge is the higher end,—and its re- sults, 6; knowledge either practical or spec- ulative, 7; the end of practical knowledge, ib.; the end of speculative knowledge, ib. ; the question resolved by philosophers in contradiction to the ordinary opinion, 8; this contradiction even involved in the term Philosophy, ib.; authorities adduced as to mental exercise being higher than knowl- edge,— Plato, Prior, Aristotle, Aquinas, Scotus, Malebranche, Lessing, Von Miiller, Jean Paul Richter, 9; knowledge philo- sophical, scientific or rational, and empiri- cal or historical discriminated, 88—40; em- pirical, the knowledge that a thing is,— 7d 871, 89; examples of, 40; this expression how rendered in Latin, %., see Empirical; philosophical, the knowledge why or how a thing is, 7.; man’s knowledge relative, 43, 96-104; the representation of multitude “in unity, 47, see Unity; faculties of, one grand division of powers of mind, 86; tes- timonies to relativity of,— Aristotle, Au- INDEX. gustin, Melanchthon, elder Scaliger, 98-9; all existence not comprised in what is relative to us, 99; this principle has two branches, 7.; the first, 100; the second, 102-8; three senses in which knowledge relative, 104; two opposite series of expres- sions applied to, ib.; faculty of, regarded by some philosophers as the fundamental power of mind, 129; distribution of the special faculties of, 267 et seg.; the special faculties of, evolved out of consciousness, 273; enumeration of the special faculties of, 1b, et seq , 283-4; a priori and a posteriori, 285; relation of to experience, how best ex- pressed, 7b.; special faculties of, considered in detail, 286 et seg.; the distinction of In- tuitive or Immediate, and Representative or Mediate Knowledge, 318 et seg., and 151; the contrasts between these two kinds of, 815; this distinction taken by certain of the schoolmen, 816; that the relation of knowl- — edge supposes a similarity, or sameness, between subject and object an influential principle in philosophy, 851; the opposite of this principle held by some, 852; refuted, ib., et seq.; the essential peculiarities of knowledge, 572 et seq. KNOWLEDGES, term used by Bacon and Ser- geant, 41. KRvuG, 34; on definition of philosophy, 35; attacked the Kantian division of the men- tal phenomena, 129, 564, see Feelings. - KUSTER, 138. LABOULINIERE, 3880. } LACTANTIUS, his doctrine of mental powers 270, 291; denied the necessity of visual spe- cies, id. LAERTIUS, Diogenes, 84, 81; uses cdvSecis for consciousness, 188. LANGUAGE, Does it originate in General Ap- pellatives or by Proper Names? 492 et seq.; this the question of the Primum Cognitum, 493; 1. That all terms, as at first employed, are expressive of individual objects, main- tained by Vives and others, ib.; Vives quoted to this effect, ib.; Locke quoted, ib.; Adam Smith quoted to same effect, 494; 2. An opposite doctrine maintained by many of the schoolmen, 496 et seq.; by Campanella, 496; Leibnitz quoted to this effect, 7+.; Turgot cited to same effect, 497; 3. A third or intermediate opinion, —that language at first expresses only the vague and confused, 7b., et seq.; Perception com- mences with masses, 498, see also 371; the mind in elaborating its knowledge pro- ceeds by analysis from the whole to the parts, 498, 501; Degerando, quoted to this effect, 499; thd intermediate opinion main- tained by Aristotle, 500; and by Julius Cesar Scaliger, 7. INDEX. LAROMIGUIERE, quoted dt hypothesis of Occasional Causes, 209 et seg.; on Pre- éstablished Harmony, 210 et seq.; on Plas- tic Medium, 211; on Physical Influence, 212 et seg.; quoted on abstraction, 468. LATENCY, mental, what, and its three de- grees, 285 et seg. See Consciousness. Latin language, expresses syntactical rela- tions by flexion, 176. LAVAL, Comtesse de, case of, 238. Law, Dishop, his doctrine of substance, 108. LE CLERG, see Clerc. Lex (Dr. Henry), referred to on Locke, 407. LereniTz, referred to on definition of phi- losophy, 35, 48, 95; first to limit the term capacity to passivity of mind, 123; regarded faculty of knowledge as the fundamental power of mind, 129; quoted on veracity of consciousness, 184, 208; held hypothesis of Preéstablished Harmony, 208, 210; opposed Locke’s doctrine that the mind is not al- ways conscious, 221; but does not precisely answer the question mooted, 7.; referred to on minima of sense, 244; the first to pro- claim the doctrine of mental latency, 251; unfortunate in the terms he employed to designate the latent modifications of mind, ib.; referred to on our mental identity, 260, 271, 280, 404, see Necessity ; 414, 496, see Lan- guage; 518, 515, see Regulative Faculty; 592, see Feelings. LxeIDENFROST, 876; the first to distinguish the Vital Sense from the Organic Senses, 377. Lro Hebreus, 290. LESSING, quoted, 9. See Knowledge. LEwD, its etymology, 53. Liserty of Will, 556 et seg. ; the question of, as viewed by the Scottish school, 692; may be dealt with in two ways, 693. LicuETUS, 176. Locke, 51; adopted Gassendi’s division of philosophy, 84; quoted on power, 121-2; his doctrine of Reflexion as a source of knowl- edge, 162; held that the mind cannot exist at the same moment in two different states, 173; his doctrine on this point refuted by Leibnitz, ib.; denied that the mind is al- ways conscious, 218-19; his assumption that consciousness and the recollection of con- sciousness are convertible, disproved by somnambulism, 222; erroneously attributed the doctrine of Jatent mental modifications to the Cartesians, 250; on mental identity, 260; his doctrine of Perception, 804; gen- eral character of his philosophical style, 805; quoted on the doctrine that the sec- ondary qualities of matter are merely men- tal states, 307; his distinction of primary and secondary qualities, 343; did not origi- nate the question regarding plurality of senses under Touch, 876, 391; neglected the Pe 107 Critical Method in philosophy, 403; has his philosophy been misrepresented by Con- dillac? 404 et seg.; Stewart, quoted in vin- dication of, 404-6; Stewart’s vindication of, unsatisfactory, 406; Condillac justified in his simplification of the doctrine of, 1. ; his Refiection compatible with Sensualism, ib., 466; quoted om Conceptualism, 477; 493, see Language; 542, see Causality ; 546. Loaic, defined, 31, 87; as initiative course of philosophy, 31, 90; class of, how to be con- ducted, 10, 11, see Philosophy; presupposes a certain knowledge of the operations of the mind, 44; controversy among the an- cients regarding its relation to philosophy, 81; why usually designated an art, 83; a nomological science, 87; Dianoetic best name of, id.; its place in philosophy, and in a course of philosophical instruction, 90. LomBaRrpD, Peter, 816. Lossius, Lexikon, 546, 573, 601. Lucan, quoted, 606. LUCRETIUS, quoted, 184, 212, 293, 609; on mixed feeling of the sublime, 630. LUDERS, 578. LUTHER, 61, 63. Lypvs, Priscianus, on unity of knowledge, 48; the Platonic doctrine of Perception as expounded by, 293. MAASS, 252. MACKINTOSH, Sir James, 92; his great mem- ory, 426 Macrosivs, referred to, on definition of phi- losophy, 37, 114. MaInx de Biran, 474, 542, see Causality. Masor, John, referred to, on Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge, 316 MALEBRANCHE, 9, 64, 108, 168; quoted on place and importance of attention, 180 et seq.; the study of his writings recom- mended, 182, 201; assumes our conscious- ness in sleep, 218, 271; his doctrine of Per- ception, 302; distinguished Perception from Sensation, 334, 513, 542, see Causality. Man, an end unto himself, 4; must in gen- eral reduce himself to an instrument, 4; perfection and happiness, the two absolute ends of man, 14; these ends coincide, ib. ; his distinctive characteristic, 21; a social animal, 59; men influence each other in times both of tranquillity and social con- vulsion, 61; relation of the individual to social crises, ib. MANILIvs, quoted, 120, 460 MANTUANUS, Bap., quoted, 636. MAnovtTtius, Paulus, quoted on memory of Molino, 423. Marce tvs, Nonius, 353. MARSILI1U8, (of Inghen), 176, 292. MARTIAL, quoted, 460. MARTINUS Scriblerus, quoted, 457. 708 MASTER of Sentences, see Lombard. MATERIALISM, absolute, how a philosophical system is often prevented from falling into, 206. MAYNETTUS Maynetius, 447. MAZuURE, 9, 35. MEDIATE Knowledge, see Knowledge. MEINERS, 34, 61, 560, 598. MELANCHTHON, 98, 108, 513; ‘cognitio omnis intuitiva est definitiva,”’ quoted by, 562. Memory, see Conservative Faculty. MENAGE, 383, 188. MENDELSSOHN, Moses, 561, see Feelings; quoted on Descartes’ doctrine of pleasure 591, 594, see Feelings; referred to on Beauty, 626. MENDOZA, 485. MENTAL phenomena, see Consciousness and Mind. MENTAL Exercise, higher than the mere knowledge of truth, 6—9. See Knowledge. METAPHYSICAL, sce Metaphysics. MrTAPHYSICS, science of, its sphere in widest sense, 85; comprehension and or- der of author’s course of, 85, 90; Meta- physics proper, Ontology or Inferential Psychology, what, 88; metaphysical terms originally of physical application, 93. See Psychology and Philosophy. METHOD, what, 68. See Critical Method. METHODISTS, the, a sect of physicians, no- ticed, 38. MILL, James, quoted to the effect that we first obtain a knowledge of the parts of the object in perception, 369 et seg. MILTON, quoted, 433. Minp, human, the noblest object of specula- tion, 17; Phavorinus, Pope, Sir Thomas Browne, quoted to this effect, 18; when the study of mind rises to its highest dig- nity, 7 ; its phenomena contrasted with those of matter, 20; this the philosophical study by preéminence, 44, see Philosophy and Psychology; its phenomena distrib- uted into three grand classes, 86, see Con- sciousness; etymology and application of, 109; can be defined only a@ posteriori, ib.; thus defined by Aristotle and Reid, 110; can exist in more than one state at the same time, 178 et seg.; hypotheses proposed in regard to mode of intercourse between mind and body, 208 et seg.; 1. Occasional Causes, tb.; 2. Preéstablished Harmony, 210; 3 Plastic Medium, 211; 4. Physical Influence, 212; historical order of these hypotheses, ib.; they are unphilosophical, 214; activity and passivity always con- joined in manifestations of mind, 216, see Consciousness; terms indicative of the pre- dcminance of these counter elements in, 216-17; opinions in regard to its relation to the bodily organism and parts of nervous it INDEX. ‘ system, 649-50 et seg.; its powers not really distinguishable from the thinking princi- ple, nor really different from each other, 267; what meant by powers of, and the rel- atative opinion of philosophers, 268—272; psychological division of the phenomena of what, 273; phenomena of, presented in complexity, 281; three rules of the analy- sis of the phenomena of, 282; these rules have not been observed by psychologists, 7b. ; no ground to suppose that the mind is situated solely in any one part of the body, 3856; we materialize mind in attributing to it the relations of matter, 2b.; sum of our knowledge of the connection of mind and body, 857; we are not warranted, accord- ing to Biunde, to ascribe to the powers of mind a direction either outwards or in- wards, 565. See Energy. MINIMUM visibile, what, 248; audibile, 7b. MNEMONIC, 86. Mocenicvs, 163. Mops, what, 106. MODIFICATION, what, 106. Mo.in avs, 68. Moxsa, quoted, 4384. Monsoppo, Lord, 128, 238; his doctrine of vision, 291, 354. MonisM, see Consciousness. Monro, Dr. (tertius), quoted and referred to in reference to Frontal Sinus, 670, 678, etc. MONTAIGNE, 46, 60, 68; on pleasure, 590, see Feelings. More, Dr. Henry, quoted, 23. Morton, Dr., remarks on his tables on the size of the brain, 660—662. . MULLER (Julius), 887. MULLER, Von, quoted, 9. See Knowledge. MURATORI, his great memory, 426. MureEtTus, 421. See Conservative Faculty. MUSSULMAN doctors, 542. See Causality. Natur, its meaning in German philosophy, 29. NATURAL Dualism, see Natural Realism. NECESSITY, all] necessity to us subjective, 403; Leibnitz the first to announce it as the cri- terion of truth native to the mind, 404; Kant the first who fully applied this crite- rion, 7b. See Regulative Faculty. S NEMESIUS, 176, 650. NEWTON, Sir Isaac, 178, 180. See Attention. NIETHAMMER, 424. NIHILISM, see Consciousness. NOETIO, how to be employed, 514. NOMINALISM, see Elaborative Faculty. NOMINALISTS, their doctrine of mental pow- ers, 272; rejected doctrine of species, 292. NomouoGy of mind, what, 86; its subdivis- ions, 2.; of the Cognitive faculties, i. ; of the Feelings, 87; of the Conative pow- ers, 2, INDEX. 709 Nooroey, 87. Non-ConTRADICTION, law of, 526, 680; limits of argument from, 680; has two applica- tions, a Logical and Psychological, 680. Novs, 514. 3 NUNNESIUS, 518. NuNNELEY, referred to for case of couching, 391. OxsEecT, meaning and history of the term, 112. See Subject. OBJECTIVE, see Subject. OccaM, 176; his doctrine of mental powers, 272. : OCCASIONAL Causes, hypothesis of, see Mind; by whom maintained, 208, 214. OKEN, his nihilism, 204. OLyMPiopoRUS, referred to, 46; referred to on mental powers, 271. ONTOLOGY, see Metaphysics. OPERATION, what, 124. - OPINION, see Custom. OprorINvS, case Of, showing that one sense may be asleep while others are awake, 233. OnecTIC, term objectionable as common des- ignation both of will and desire, 126. ORDER, what, 68. OrGanic Pleasure. See Feelings. Ormond, Duke of, 607. Ovip, quoted, 262, 533; on pleasure of grief, 606. d OVIEDO, on excitation of species, 428. Patn, theory of, see Feelings. PAINFUL Affections. See Feelings. PALEY, quoted on love of action, 405. PALUDANUS, 317. PASCAL, 46, 60, 62; quoted on man’s igno- rance of himself, 214; quoted, 377; his great memory, 425; quoted on dreaming, 457, 513, 528. Passions, their place in education, 12; sub- jugation of, practical condition of philoso- phy, 57, 66. See Philosophy. Pastimes, 617, See Feelings. PATRICIUS, quoted on mental powers, 271; his expression of the relation of our knowl- edge to experience, quoted, 285. PEMBROKE, Lord, 607. Prercertion, External, the doctrine of, a cardinal point in philosophy, 297; histori- cal survey of hypotheses in regard to, pro- posed, 286; principal point in regard to, on which philosophers differ, 7., and 205; two grand hypotheses of Mediate Perception, 287; each of these admits of various sub- ordinate hypotheses, i. ; Reid did not dis- tinguish the two forms of the Representa- tive Hypothesis, 288; Reid’s historical view of the theories of, criticised, 289 et seg., 298; wrong in regard to the Platonic theory of, 289-90; his account of the Aristotelic doc- trine of, 291-2; theory of Democritus and Epicurus, 293; the Cartesian doctrine of, 294 et sey., 299; Malebranche cited in regard to opiuion of Descartes on, 301; Reid’s ac- count of the opinion of Malebranche on, 302; of Arnauld, 802-8; of Locke, 304—3807, opinions of Newton, Clarke, Hook, Norris, 307; of Hobbes, 308; Le Clerc, 809; Crousaz; 310; ends proposed in the review of Reid’s account of opinions on, 811; Reid right in attributing to philosophers in general the cruder doctrine of Representative Percep- tion, 812; was Reid a Natural Realist, ib., et seg., see Reid and Knowledge; distinc: tion of Perception Proper from Sensation Proper, 832 et seg.; use of term perception previously to Reid, ib ; historical notice of the distinction of perception proper from sensation proper, 334; nature of the pha- nomena, — perception and sensation, illus trated, 335 et seg ; their contrast the special manifestation of a contrast which divides Knowledge and Feeling, %.; perception and sensation precisely distinguished, 7b. ; grand Jaw by which the phenomena of per- ception and sensation are governed in their reciprocal relations, 336; this law estab- lished and illustrated —1. From a compari- son of the several senses, ib. ; 2. From the several impressions of the same sense, 337; distinction of perception from sensation of importance only in the doctrine of Intui- tive Perception, 840; no reference from the internal to the external in, 341; taken out of the list of the primary faculties through a false analysis, ib,; the possibility of an immediate perception of external objects intelligible, 856 et seq.; what meant by per- ceiving the material reality, 357; the total and real object in, ib:; what meant by the external object perceived, tb., 374; nothing especially inconceivable in the doctrine of an immediate perception, 358; principal points of difference between the author’s doctrine of Perception and that of Reid and Stewart, 397 et seg.; 1. In regard to the relation of the external object to the senses, ib.; 2. In regard to the number and consecution of the elementary phenomena, 398 et seqg.; common doctrine of philoso- phers regarding the organic impression in, ib.; relation of sensation proper to percep- tion proper, 899, see also 678; Representa- tive Perception, hypothesis of, 361 e¢ seq.; violates all the conditions of a legitimate hypothesis, ib., e¢ seq.; 1. Unnecessary, 362; 2. Subverts that which it is devised to ex- plain, 363; 8. The fact in explanation of which it is devised is hypothetical, %.; 4, Sunders and subverts the phenomenon to be explained, 365; 5. The fact which it ‘ is devised to explain transcends experience, 710 366; 6. Dependent on subsidiary hypothe- ses, 867; Considerations effective in pro- moting the doctrine of, 677; questions connected with faculty of External Per- ception, 3868 et seg.; I. Whether we first ob- tain a knowledge of the whole or of the parts of the object in, 7 , et seg.; the sec- ond alternative adopted by Stewart, ib. ; and by James Mill, 369; the counter alter- native maintained by the author, 871 et seq., 497; II. Problems connected with Sense of Touch, 872 et seg. ; see Touch; III. Two coun- ter questions regarding sphere of Sight, 879 et seq. See Sight. TERFECT, the, what, 622. See Ends. PERIPATETICS, see Aristotelians. l’erron, Du, Cardinal, a patron of Scotch- men abroad, 641. TrEns1us, 583. PETRARCH, quoted, 606. lrHaprus, 518. PHAZNOMENON, meaning of, best illustrated by reference to the relativity of human knowledge, 98, 106, 108. PHANOMENOLOGY, of mind, what, 86. See Psychology. THAVORINUS, quoted, 17. See Mind. TuILoponus, 81; his doctrine of conscious- ness, 138; quoted in paraphrase of Aris- totle, 1/4; quoted on mental powers, 271; quoted on Aristotle’s doctrine of species, 293; on Touch, 376. PHILOSOPHER, see Philosophy. PHILOSOPHICAL, see Philosophy and Knowl- edge. PuiLosopuy, the exhibition of its benefits and pleasures, why peculiarly requisite, 1; its utility of two kinds— Absolute and Re- lative, 2; its absolute utility of two kinds— Subjective and Objective, 2, 16; its Subjec- tive utility, 16; best gymnastic of the mind, and therefore best entitled to the appella- tion useful, 9; principles on which a class of philosophy ought to be conducted, 10; use and importance of examinations in a class of philosophy, 12; intellectual in- structor must seek to influence the will of Lis pupils, 7b. ; and to excite their feelings, tb.; Objective utility of philosophy, 17 et seq.; its relation to theology, 18; the class of phenomena which imply the existence of God exclusively given by the mind, 19; what these phenomena are, 21; first con- dition of the proof of a Deity drawn from philosophy, 22; second condition also drawn from same source, 23; how philoso- phy operates in establishing an assurance of human liberty, 24; coincidence of au- thor’s views on this subject with those of previous philosophers, 27—9; philosophers adduced, — Plato, 27; Kant, 28; Jacobi, 29; objective utility of philosophy not super- INDEX. seded by the Christian Revelation, 7., Nature and Comprehension of philosophy, 3l et seg.; to be adequately comprehended only in the end of a course of philosophical instruction, ib.; meaning of the name, 82; the name philosopher said to have been first assumed and applied by Pythagoras, 7b. ; but on slender authority, 83; Socrates prob- ably the first to familiarize the name, 34; . in order to distinguish himself from the Sophists, 7. ; soon lost its Socratic signifi- cation, ib.; philosophy, the thing, 35; defi- nitions of, ib.; these criticised, 36; perhaps cannot adequately be defined, 7b , its defi- nitions in Greek antiquity, tb. ; philosophi- cal, and empirical or historical knowledge discriminated, 88, see Knowledge; philo- sophical or scientific knowledge, in its widest acceptation, the knowledge of ef- fects as dependent on their causes, 41; hence the aim of philosophy is to seek first causes, 7b.; as these can never be ac- tually reached, philosophy can never in reality be accomplished, 42; finally tends towards one Ultimate or First Cause, 43; all the sciences occupied in the research of causes may be viewed as so many branches of philosophy in its widest signification, ib.; but properly constituted by the science of mind with its suite of dependent sci- ences, ib, et seg. 85; its primary problem, 43, bound to make the mind its first and paramount object of consideration, 44; branches of the science of mind, ib.; mis- application of the term philosophy in Britain, 45; as defined by Aristotle, 46, see Aristotle; its Causes, 46 et seqg.; lie in the original elements of our constitution, 46; essential or complementary, 7b ; essen- tial apparently twofold, ib.; 1. Cause and effect, 47; 2. Love of unity, i., see Unity; dispositions with which it ought to be studied, 5j—67; first condition of philoso- phy, renunciation of prejudice, 57; in this Christianity and philosophy at one, 58; phi- losophers unanimous in making doubt the first step to, 63; philosophical doubt, what, 64; second condition of, subjugation of the passions, 66; its Method, 67—76; has but one possible method, 67—72; this shown in relation to the first end of philosophy, 67-8; analysis and synthesis the necessary condi- tions of its possibility, 69; these constitute a single method, 70; has only one possible method, shown in relation to its second end, 70, 71; its history manifests the more or less accurate fulfilment of the conditions of one method, 73—76; its earliest problem, 73; its sphere as assigned by Socrates, 75; its aberrations have arisen from violations of its method, 77; its Divisions, 78—85; ex- pediency of a division of philosophy, 78; Lee 711s the most ancient division into Theoretical | and Practical, 79; history of this distinction, 79-89; its unsounduess, 80; first explicitly enounced by Aristotle, 79; intimated by Plato, ib.; division of, into Logic, Physics, and Ethics, probably originated with Stoics, 81; universality of division into theoretical and practical, 84-5; author’s distribution of philosophy, 86-88 ; proposes three grand questions, 85; distribution of subjects in faculty of, in universities of Europe, 89, | true place and importance of system of, | 269-70; condition under which the employ- ment of new terms in, is allowable, 280; one great advantage resulting from the cultiva- tion of, 3826. TutvLosopny, the Scottish, the scientific rep- utation of Scotland principally founded on, 640; causes which have led to the culti- vation of speculative studies by Scotchmen, ib.; its origin, 642; at once the pride and the reproach of Scotland, 643; strong gen- eral analogy between, and that of Kant, ib.; account in which it is held in Germany and in France, 644; Jouffroy’s criticism of, 645; general characteristics of, 646. PHRENOLOGY, how only to be refuted, 650; the theory of, what 651; individual cases of alleged development and manifestation of little avail in proof of the doctrine, 651; its fundamental facts shown to be groundless, 652—55; the result of conjecture, 656; its variations, 657-58. Puysics, division of philosophy, 80; the term as applied to the philosophy of mind inap- propriate, 98. PuysicaL Influence, hypothesis of, by whom maintained, 212. see Mind. PuyYSICAL Science, twofold evil of exclusive study of, 25; in its infancy not material- izing, ib.; if all existence be but mechan- ism, philosophical interest extinguished, 26. PuysioLoay, the term as applied to the phi- losophy of mind inappropriate, 93. PiccoLomMInNI, referred to on Aristotle’s doc- trine of species, 292. PICTURESQUE, see Feelings. PINDAR, on Custom, 60. Piasric Medium, hypothesis of, by some as- cribed to Plato, 213; by whom maintained, 213. PLATERUS, Felix, narrates case of Oporinus, 233. See Oporinus PLATNER, regarded faculty of knowledge as the fundamental power of mind, 120, 214, 252, 389, see Sight 583; 545, 560, see Feelings. PLATO, 9, 21, 26, 84; quoted on definition of philosophy, 87, 48, 48, 55, 56, 75; dis- tinction of theoretical and practical phi- losophy intimated by, 79; had no special term for consciousness 136, 137; his doc- trine in regard to self-apprehension of Sense, 188; maintained the continual en- ergy of Intellect, 218, 262, 280; his theory of Perception, and principle of his philos- ophy, 290 ; maintained that a percipient power of the sensible soul sallies out to the object, 7b., 412, see Conservative Faculty, 415; Platonic Method of division called Analytical, 511, see Analysis; 581, see Feel- ings; seems to have held a doctrine of pleasure analogous to that of Aristotle, 586. PLATONISTS, 48, 79, 187; the Greek, their doc- trine of consciousness, 137; the later, attrib- uted to Plato the doctrine of Plastic Me- dium, 2138; maintained the continual energy of intellect, 218. PLEASURE, theory of, see Feelings. Puiny (the elder), 40. Puiny (the younger), quoted on pleasure of Grief, 606. Protinus, 49; his use of cvvaleSyois, 133; quoted on mental powers, 271; quoted on doctrine of species, 292 ; distinguished Per- ception from Sensation, 334. PLUTARCH, 55, 185. PLUTARCH, Pseudo, quoted on definition of philosophy, 35, 81. PNEUMATIC, see Pneumatology. PNEUMATOLOGY, term objectionable as ap- plied to science of mind, 93; wider than Psychology, 94. Tlofnors, see Practice. Poiret, Peter, referred to and quoted as ac- cepting the duality of consciousness in its integrity, 203, 331, 478. PoxiTics, science of, presupposes a knowl- edge of mind, 44; why usually designated a science, 88; a nomological science, 87. Poncrvs, on excitation of species, 428. PONELLE, 179. Pope, quoted, 18, 27. Poor, 376. Port Roya Logic, 472. PoTreENTIAL, distinctions of, from actual, 124 See Existence. POUILLY, on Pleasure, 594. See Feelings. Power, Reid’s criticism of Locke on, 121; active and passive, 122; this distinction in Greek Janguage, 123; as a psychological term appropriately applied to natural capa- bilities, 124. POWNALL, Governor, 93. PRACTICAL Feelings, see Feelings. PRACTICE, mpatis, use of the term in the Aristotelic philosophy, 83; TpakT ids and moinrtixds, how distinguished, ib. See The- ory. PRACTICAL philosophy, see Theoretical. PRACTICAL, see Practice. PRESCISION, what, 474. PREESTABLISHED Harmony, hypothesis of, sce Mind; by whom maintained, 210, #% Pr’ ¢ 712 PREDICATE, sce Elaborative Faculty. PREJUDICE, influence of, 52, see Unity; early prejudice the more dangerous because unob- trusive, 59 PRESENTATIVE Faculty, what, and its desig- nations, 278, 283; subdivided into Percep- tion and Self-Consciousness, 274. See Per- ception and Self-Consciousness. PRICHARD, 95. PRIDE, subjugation of, practical condition of philosophy, 66, 633. PRIESTLEY, regarded thought as only a movement of matter, 57; his opinion of Reid’s polemic on Perception, 298; quoted on Reid’s view of Locke’s doctrine of Per- ception, 304. PRIMARY Qualities of matter, historical no- tice of distinction from Secondary, 842, et seq.; primary reducible to two, — Extension and Solidity, 845; this reduction involves a difficulty, 346; what, and how solved, ib. ; 347; general result, —in the primary qual- ities, perception predominates, in the secon- dary, sensation, 347. Priuum Cognitum, see Language. PRIOR, 9. Troc vs, 48, 75; his employment of cuvata- Snes, 1388, 2138; quoted on mental powers, 271. PROPERTY, what, 106. PROPOSITION, see Elaborative Faculty. PROTAGORAS, 43. PRUDENTIUS, quoted, 631. TSELLUS, Michael, his doctrine of conscious- ness, 188; supposed to be the same with Michael Ephesius, 139. Psycuooey, defined, 31, 91; préminently a philosophical science, 92; its wider sphere as synonymous with Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, 85; its narrower sphere as synonymous with Phenomenology of Mind, Empirical Psychology, Inductive Philoso- phy of Mind, 86; as thus limited properly called Penomenal Psychology, ib.; its di- visions how determined, 7b. ; Nomological, ib., see Nomology; Inferential, 88, see Meta- physics; origin cf the term, 91; its use vindicated, 91-2; by whom first applied to science of mind, 95; difficulties and facili- ties of psychological study, 260 et seg., see Consciousness; psychological powers, what, 268 ; psychological divisions, what, 278; three rules of psychological analysis, 282; these rules have not been observed by psy- chologists, ib. PSYCHOLOGICAL analysis, see Psychology and Mind. PSYCHOLOGICAL divisions, see Psychology and Mind. PSYCHOLOGICAL powers, see Psychology and Mind. _ PTOLEMY, 291. INDEX. PURCHOT, 608. PYTHAGORAS, commonly said to have first assumed the name philosopher, 82; his view of the character of a philosopher, 82; where born, and when he flourished, 83; defini- tions of philosophy referred to, 87, see Phi- losophy, 56, 74. QUALITY, what, 106; essential and acciden.. tal, id. QUINTILIAN, 84, 83; uses the term conscious in the modern signification, 136. RALEIGH, Sir W., 63. RAmMsAy, Chevalier, 541. REALISM, Natural, or Natural Dualism, what, 203; that Natural Realism is the doctrine of Consciousness, acknowledged by philos- ophers of all classes, ib.; objections to the doctrine of, detailed and criticized, 8349—59; I. The cognition of aught external to the mind is equivalent to the mind acting, and, therefore, existing out of itself, 849; refuted, 850; Il. What immediately knows must be the same as or similar to that which is known, 850; influence of this principle on the history of philosophy, ib. ; refuted, 352; III. The mind can only know immediately that to which it is immediately present, 7b. - this objection has been redargued in three different ways; 1. by Sergeant, 853 ; 2. by Empedocles, etc., 354; 8. by Reid and Stew- art, 2.; refuted, 3855-6, see Perception; IV. The object of perception yariable, and, therefore, subjective, 358 ; proceeds on a mistake of what the object in perception is, 359; V. The nature of the Ego as an intel- ligence endowed with will, renders it nec- essary that there should be representative modifications in the mind of external ob- . jects, 359; this objection involves sundry vices, 7b.; these objections to the doctrine of, incompetent, 134; hypothesis of Rep- resentative Perception substituted in room of the doctrine of, 861 et seg. See Percep- tion. REASONING, see Elaborative Faculty. RECOLLECTION, see Conservative Faculty. REDINTEGRATION, law of, see Reproductive Faculty. REFLECTION, contained in consciousness, 160 et seg.; see Consciousness; Locke not the first to use the term in its psychological ap-- plication, 162 ; authors by whom the term thus used previously to Locke, 168; distin- guished from observation, 7b.; attention and reflection acts of the same faculty, 165, see Attention. Regis, Sylvain, his division of philosophy, 84. REGNIER, 63. REGULATIVE Faculty, what, 277, 285; the ow} INDEX. 718 term faculty not properly applicable to, 277, 512; designations of, 512-14; nomenclature of the cognitions due to, 514; importance of the distinction of native and adventitious knowledge, ib. ; criterion of necessity first enounced by Leibnitz, 405, 515; partially anticipated by Descartes, 515; and by Spin- oza, 516; the enouncement of this criterion a great step in the science of mind, %.; Leibnitz quoted on criterion of necessity, 516—20; Reid discriminated native from adventitious knowledge by the same crite- rion, independently of Leibnitz, 520; Reid quoted to this effect, 520-22; Hume appre- hended the distinction 522; Kant, the first who fully applied the criterion, 405, 522; philosophers divided in regard to what cog- nitions ought to be classed as ultimate, and what as modifications of the ultimate, 523; Reid and Stewart have been censured for their too easy admission of first principles, ib.; Reid quoted in self vindication, 7.; Stewart quoted fo the same effect, 76. ; that Reid and Stewart offer no systematic deduc- tion of the primary elements of human rea- son, is no valid ground for disparaging their labors, 524; philosophers have not yet es- tablished the principle on which our ulti- mate cognitions are to be classified and re- duced to system, 525; necessity, either Pos- itive or Negative, as it results from a power or from a powerlessness of mind, 525 et seq. ; positive necessity illustrated by the act of Perception, 525; by an arithmetical exam- ple, ib.; negative necessity not recognized by philosophers, 526; illustrated, 7. et seq. ; principles referred to in the discussion, 7b. et seg.;—1. The law of Non-Contradiction, ib.; 2. The law of Excluded Middle, 7d.; grand law of thought, — That the Conceiv- able lies between two contradictory ex- tremes, 527 et seg.; this called the law of the Conditioned, 580; established and illustra- ted by reference to Space, 1°, as a maxi- ‘mmum, 527; space either bounded or not bounded, ib. ; space as absolutely bounded inconceivable, 7b.; space as infinitely un- bounded inconceivable, 528 ; though both these contradictory alternatives are incon- ceivable, one or other is yet necessary, 7b. ; space, 2°, as a minimum, 7b., e¢ seg., an ab- solute minimum of space, and its infinite divisibility, alike inconceivable, 7b. ; further illustration by reference to Time, 1° as a maximum, 529 et seqg.; 1. time a parte ante, as an absolute whole, inconceivable, 7.; 2. time as an infinite regress, inconceivable, ib.; 3. time as an infinite progress, incon- ceivable, ib.; time, 2°, as a minimum, ib., et seq. ; the moment of time either divisible to infinity, or composed of certain abso- lutely smallest parts, — both alternatives in- conceivable, ib ; the counter opinion to the principle of the Conditioned, founded on vagueness and confusion, 5380; sum of the author’s doctrine, 7b.; the author’s doctrine both the one true and the only orthodox inference, 531; to assert that the infinite can . be thought, but only inadequately thought, is contradictory, 7b. ; law of the Conditioned in its applications, 5382 et seq., see Causality ; contradictions proving the psychological theory of the Conditioned, 529. REID, 51; defines mind a posteriori, 110; wrongly identities hypothesis and theory, 120; wrong in his criticism of Locke on power. 122 et sey.; gives no special account of Consciousness, 131, 189; does not allow that all immediate knowledge is conscious- ness, 140; quoted on consciousness, 144-5; holds consciousness to be a special faculty, 145, see Consciousness; quoted on Imagina- tion and Conception, 147-8; on Memory, 149-50; his doctrine, that memory is an im- mediate knowledge of the past, false and contradictory, 151—3; the same holds true of his doctrine of Conception as an imme- diate knowledge of the distant, 153; con- tradistinguished Consciousness from Per- ception, 154; principal merit accorded to, as a philosopher, 155; his doctrine of con- sciousness shown to be wrong 156 et seq. ; from the principle that the knowledge of opposites is one, 156-7; it is suicidal of his doctrine of an immediate knowledge of the external world, 157 et seq. ; it involves a gen- eral absurdity, 158; it destroys the distinc- tion of consciousness itself, ib. ; supposition on which some of the self-contradictions of Reid’s doctrine may be avoided, 159; but untenable, 160; maintains that Attention and Reflection are acts not contained in consciousness, 7b.; wrong in his censure of Locke’s use of the term Reflection, 161; and in saying that Reflection is employed in re- lation to objects of sense, 162 ; quoted on Attention, 164; inclines to the doctrine that God is the only real agent in the universe, 210; his theory of habit, mechanical, 247, refuted by Stewart, 248; referred to on our Mental Identity, 260; his doctrine of Per- ception adopted by Schulze, and opposed by him to the Hypothetical Realism of Kant, 643 ; his fundamental doctrine compared with that of Kant, 647; did not distinguish the two forms of the Representative Hypo- thesis in Perception, 288—99; his historical view of the theories of Perception criti- cised, 289 et seq., see Perception; place of the doctrine of Perception in his philoso- phy, 297; was Reid a Natural Realist? 312 et seq.; his view of the distinction of Intu- itive and Representative knowledge ob- scure, 813; and hence his philosophy in- 90 714 INDEX. = volved in confusion, 814, see Knowledge; order of the discussion, 816—1. Grounds on which Reid may be supposed not a Nat- ural Realist, 317—822; 2. Positive evidence that Reid was a Natural Realist, 828—5, 329, 340; the first champion of Natural Realism, in these latter times, 830; his account of Perception and Sensation, 338 et seq. ; antici- pated in his distinction of Perception from ' Sensation, 334 et seg.; quoted on primary and secondary qualities of matter, 3843 et seq.; his doctrine of Perception as summed up by Stewart, 354; his doctrine of Percep- tion involves that of Occasional Causes, 855; and is thus exposed to many objections, 7b.; his doctrine of Perception compared with that of the author, 397 et seq., see Per- ception, 463, 520, see Regulative Faculty. Rerp’s Works, author’s edition, referred to, 51, etc, REINHOLD, 252, 465, 560; quoted on the theory of pleasure of Du Bos and Pouilly, 595; on that of Sulzer, 597 et seq. RELATION, doctrine of, 688-9; Relative and Correlative, 7b. RELIGION, see Theology and Deity. REPRESENTATIVE Faculty, what, 275, 284, 449; representation and reproduction not always exerted by the same individual in equal in- tensity, but all strong or weak in the same individual with reference to the same class of objects, 451; the terms Imagination, Phan- tasy, denote most nearly the representative process, 7b.; philosophers have divided Im- agination into Reproductive (Conception) and Productive, 7b.; this discrimination unfortunate in itself and in its nomencla- ture, 452; Imagination, as a plastic energy, is « complex operation, 7b.; the act of rep- resentation, what, 7b. ; two powers by which the representative faculty is determined to energy; 1. The Reproductive Faculty, 453; 2. the faculty of Relations, — Elaborative, ib.; the Imagination of common language equivalent to the processes of Representa- tion and Comparison, 454; the process of Representation the principal constituent of Imagination as commonly understood, 7d, ; Imagination not limited to objects of sense, 7b.; Ancillon quoted, 455—7; three princi- pal orders in which Imagination represents ideas—1. Natural; 2. Logical; 3. Poetical, 455; associations tedious, unpleasing, and agreeable, 456; peculiar kinds of Imagina- tion determined by peculiar orders of. asso- ciation, 7b. ; difference between a cultivated and a vulgar mind, ib. ; dreaming, somnam- » bulism, and reverie, effects of Imagination, determined by association, 457 et seg.; An- cillon quoted, 459-60; the happiness and misery of the individual dependent on the character of his habitual associations, 459; influence of Imagination on human life, 459-60; Imagination employs the organs of sense in the representations of sensible ob- jects, 461, see also 386 ; voluntary motions imitated in and by the Imagination, 461; feelings concomitant of Imagination, 618, see Feelings; as Reproductive and as Plas- tic, ib.; an act of Imagination involves the comprehension of the manifold as a single whole, 619 ; office of the Plastic Imagina- tion, 7. | REPRESENTATIVE Perception, hypothesis of, see Perception. REPRODUCTIVE Faculty, what, 275, 283, 428; the name reproductive inappropriate, 427; limitation in which name employed, 7b. ; interest excited by the phenomenon of Re- production, 7b.; Aristotle’s analysis of the phenomenon nearly perfect, 7b. ; the train of thought subject to laws, 428; this illus- trated by Hobbes, 7b. ; the expression train of thought includes the phenomena of Cog- nition, Feeling, and Conation, 429; is there any law besides that of simple connection which regulates this train? 7b.; the point on which philosophers differ, and question to be considered, 7b. ; conditions of Repro- duction as generalized by philosophers, — in all seven, 7b.; notice of opinions of phi- losophers on laws of Association, 430; Aris- totle reduces the laws of Association to three, and implicitly to one, i.; St. Au- gustin explicitly reduces these laws to one, which the author calls the law of Redin- tegration, 7.; opinions of Malebranche, Wolf, Bilfinger, Hume, Gerard, Beattie, Stewart, Brown, noticed, 7b.; the laws enu- merated admit of reduction to two, and these two again to one grand law, 481; the influence of the special laws as associating principles illustrated, 482 et seq.; I. the law of Simultaneity, 7d. ; IJ. The law of Affinity, its subordinate applications, —1. Resem- blance, 7b.; 2 Contrariety, 433; 3. Contigu- ity, 434; 4. Whole and Parts, ib.; 5. Cause and Effect, 435; Simultaneity and Affinity resolvable into the one grand law of Redin- tegration, 435; no legitimate presumption against the truth of the law of Redintegra- tion if found inexplicable, 486; H. Schmid quoted, 488; attempted illustration of the ground on which this law reposes, from the unity of the subject of the mental energies, 487; the laws of Simultaneity and Affinity explicable on the same principle, 438; thoughts apparently unassociated seem to follow each other immediately, 439; two modes of explication adopted by philoso- phers, 440; to be explained on the principle of latent modifications, 7b.; the counter solution untenable, 7b., see also 244, 245-6, 253, 347; Reproductive Faculty divided into INDEX. two,— Spontaneous Suggestion and Remi- niscence, 275, 441; what Reminiscence in- volves, id. ; St. Augustin’s analysis of Remi- niscence,—its condition the law of Totality, 442; Cardaillac quoted, 443—49; defect in the analysis of Memory and Reproduction by psychologists, 443; element in the phx- nomena, which the common theory fails to explain, 444; conditions under which Remi- niscence is determined to exertion, 445; re- lations of our thoughts among themselves and with the determining circumstances of the moment, 448; general conclusions, —thoughts awakened not only in succes- sion but simultaneously, 449; of these some only become objects of clear conscicus- ness, 7b. RETENTION, see Conservative Faculty. REVERIE, an effect of Imagination deter- mined by Association, 457. RreToric, why usually designated an art, 83 A RIcHARDUS, 292. RicuTer, Jean Paul, 9. Ritter, 113. RIXNER, 538. RGELL, on Descartes’ doctrine of Perception, 301. Rose, Val., 36. RovussEAv, 493. RoyveER-COLLARD, recommended the Scottish Philosophy in France, 644. RUHNKENIUS, 420, 422. Rusu, Dr., case of mental latency given by, 237. SANSCRIT, expresses syntactical relations by flexion, 175. SCALIGER (Joseph Justus), 180, see Abstrac- tion; 413, see Conservative Faculty; his great memory, 1b. ScALIGER (Julius Cesar), 98, 215, 271; on Touch, 281, 876, 413, see Conservative Fac- * ulty; his curiosity regarding Reminiscence, 428, 500, see Language. ScHEIBLER, 35, 83. ScHEIDLER, 385, 45, 109, 570. ScHELLING, referred to, 5; on definition of philosophy, 36, 202. ScHILLER, quoted, 62. ScHLEIERMACHER, 113. Scumip, H_, 95, 252, 414, 429, 481; quoted, 439, see Reproductive Faculty. ScHOLASTIC philosophy, 76; great majority of schoolmen held doctrine of species, 292; certain of distinguished Perception from Sensation, 834; regarded excitation of the species with peculiar wonder, 427; ques- tion with, whether God the only efficient cause, 542. ScHuLzE (G. E.), 252, 849, 359, 860, 570. See Feelings. 715 ScHWAB, 546. ScIENCE, application of the term, 81. Art. ScoristTs, 272. Scotus (Duns), 9; see Knowledge; his doc- trine of reflection, 165, 176; his doctrine of mental powers, 271, 292, 316. SECONDARY Qualities of matter, see Primary. SEcuNDvUS, Joannes, quoted, 339. SELF, see Ego. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, faculty of, a branch of the Presentative Faculty, 400; philoso- phers less divided in opinion touching, than in regard to Perception, 7b.; con- trasted with Perception, their fundamen- tal forms, 401 et seg.; its sphere, 402; two modes of dealing with the phenomena given in, ib., et seg.; corresponds with the Reflection of Locke, 404; the mere admis- sion of a faculty of, of no import in deter- mining the anti-sensual character of a phi- losophy, 410. SELF-LovE, an enemy to philosophical pro- gress, 66. SENECA (L. A.), 85, 59; on division of philoso- phy, 78, 80, 291, 636; his tragedies quoted, 445, 606, 609. SENECA (M. A:), 426. SENSATION, see Perception. SENSATIONS, see Feelings. SENTIMENTS, see Feelings. SERGEANT, 41, 54; paradoxically accepted the duality of consciousness, 203, 331, 353; his view of Locke’s doctrine of Perception, 3807. *S GRAVESANDE, 3812, 546. SHAME, 632. SHAKSPEARE, quoted, 339; on Resemblance as principle of Association, 482, 457. SHENSTONE, quoted, 607. S1GHT, sense of, two counter questions re- garding sphere of, 379 et seg.;—1. Does vision afford us a primary knowledge of extension? ib., et seg.; color the proper ob- ject of, ib.; Berkeley the first to deny that extension object of, ib.; this also denied by others, 7b., et seg.; the perception of exten- sion necessarily given in the perception of colors, 888, 885; proof that Sight is cogni- zant of extension, 355; the sense by pre- éminence competent fo the perception of extension, 886; D’Alembert quoted in sup- port of foregoing view, 388; 2. Is Sight exclusively the sense which affords us a knowledge of extension, or does it afford this knowledge only in conjunction with Touch? 389 et seqg.; the former alternative maintained by Platner, ib., et seg.; phex- nomena that favor Platner’s doctrine, 391; supported also by Cheselden’s case of couch- ing, 892 et seg. : the author professes no de- cided opinion on the question, 393; 8. How See 716 do we obtain our knowledge of Visual Dis- tance? 7b., et seg.; visual distance, before Berkeley, regarded as an original percep- tion, 7b.; circumstances which assist us in forming our judgment respecting visual distance, on what dependent, 394; Berke- ley’s doctrine thrown into doubt by the analogy of the lower animals, 895; Adam Smith quoted to this effect, 7b. Srmpxicivs, his employment of suvaicd nots, 185-6; on Touch, 376. Simon Simonius, referred to on. Aristotle’s doctrine of species, 293, 447. S1MSs, his mistaken criticism of the author’s results of experiments on weight of the brain, 661. SINUSES, Frontal, their nature and relations, 654, 662; their bearing on the doctrines of Phrenology, 654-5, 662 et seq.; nature and effect of, 667-8; indication of, 668; frequency of, 669—671; extent of, 672; table exhibit- ing their variable extent and unapprecia- ble impediment in a phrenological relation, 675. SINSART, distinguished Perception from Sen- sation, 334. SKILL, games of, 617. See Feelings. SLOTH, subjugation of, practical condition of philosophy, 57, 66. Smitu, Adam, referred to on wonder as cause of philosophy, 56; on object of Perception, 874, 377, 398, 395, see Sight; quoted on nom- inalism, 477, 494, see Language. SOORATES, probably the first to familiarize the term philosopher, 34, see Philosophy; on conditions of self-knowledge, 57, 75, 178, see Attention. SOMNAMBULISM, consciousness without mem- ory the characteristic of, 223; the want of memory in our visions in sleep does not prove them to have been somnambulic, 224; an effect of imagination determined by as- sociation, 458, 460. Sopuists, the, noticed, 34, 75. SORBIERE, 808. SOSICRATES, referred to, 83. SPACE, known a priori, extension, @ posteriori, 846; a form of the faculty of Perception, 401; if space be a necessary form of thought, is the mind itself extended? 402, 525, see Regulative Faculty. SPECIES, opinions regarding, 291 et seq., see Aristotle and Aristotelians. SPINOZA, regarded faculty of knowledge as the fundamental power of mind, 129, 516, see Regulative Faculty. SPIRIT, term objectionable as applied to mind, 94; corresponding terms in other languages, 7b. SPURZHEIM, how he met the objections to Phrenology from the existence and extent of the Frontal Sinuses, 654. ‘ e INDEX. STALLBAUM, 218, 290. STATE, what, 106. STATIUS, quoted, 606. STEEB, 180. STEINBART, 493, see Language. STEWART (Dugald), 64, 94, 95; referred to on Descartes’ doctrine of Substance, 108; gives no special account of Consciousness, 181; does not allow that all immediate knowl- edge is consciousness, 140; holds conscious- ness to be a special faculty, 145, see Reid; maintains that Attention and Reflection are acts not contained in consciousness, 160; misrepresents Reid’s doctrine of the meaning and difference of Attention and Reflection, 161; his oversight in regard to discussion of Attention, 162; quoted on the question as to whether we can attend to more than a single object at once, 165—167; his doctrine on this subject criticised, 168; his excellent observations on the practical bearings of Attention, 182; confounds the two degrees of the evidence of conscious- ness, 189; maintained that God is the only real agent in the universe, 210; his expla- nation of an anomalous phznomena of Association, 245 et seq.; difficulties of his theory on this point, 246; quoted against the mechanical theory cf habit, 248 et seq. ; his own theory on this point refuted, 250; denies that the faculties of the mind are independent existences, 268; his distinction of the qualities of matter, 345; quoted to the effect that we first obtain a knowledge of the parts of the object in Perception, 866 et seq.; maintained that extension is not an object of Sight, 368; quoted, 404, see Locke; 408, see Gassendi; his great mem- ory, 426; his chapter on memory in Ele- ments recommended, 427, 429; on laws of Association, 480; quoted on law of Simul- taneity, 481; quoted on terms abstract and general, 474; a Nominalist, 476; quoted on Nominalism, 484, 494, see Language; 524, see Regulative Faculty, 541. : Stoics,, borrowed their division of philoso- phy from Seneca, 79. Sturm, J. C. 119, 541, 542. STRIGELIUS, Victorinus, 108, 518. SUABEDISSEN, 414, see Conservative Faculty. SUAREZ, brought into use the term influzus, 213; his definition of a cause, ib. SUBJECT, of a proposition, see Elaborative Faculty. SuBJxect, 2. Substratum, what, 96, 104; con- scious subject what, 110; use of the term subject vindicated, 111; terms subject and object, their origin and meaning, 111, 112; errors arising from want of these termg, 112. SUBJECTIVE, see Subject. SUBLIME, see Feelings. SUBSTANCE, the meaning of, 104, 107; philos- uaa S6A. 4 > INDEX. ophers have fallen into three errors regard- ing, 108; law of, 532. SUBSTANTIALISM, see Consciousness. SUBSTRATUM, see Subject. SuLzER, 252, 560; on pleasure, 595, see Feel- ings. SuvateSnors, used as equivalent to conscious- ness, 138; its proper meaning, ib. ; employed by Proclus, Plotinus, Simplicius, Hierocles, Sextus Empiricus, Michael Ephesius, Plu- tarch, 7. SuvelSnots, how employed, 138. Suver(yvwors, how employed, 1388. SYLLOGISM, in thought one simultaneous act, 175, see Elaborative Faculty. SYMPATHY, 632 SyNESIUS, quoted on mental powers, 270. SYNTHESIS, what, 69. See Analysis and Phi- losophy. SYNTHETICAL judgment, what, 681. SysTEM, see Philosophy. Tacitus, quoted, 636. TastTE, judgments of, what, 624; either Pure or Mixed, 628. See Feelings. Tep1uM or Ennui, see Feelings. TELESIUS, quoted on reduction of Senses to Touch, 374, TELLEZ, 316, 484. TENNEMANN, referred to on definition of phi- losophy, 35, 202, 210, 272, 586, 650. TERTULLIAN, his use of conscientia, 136 ; quoted on mental powers, 270, 513. TETENS, 418. THALES, 56, 74. THEMISTIUS, 110; referred to on Aristotle’s doctrine of species, 293; quoted on Touch, 376. : THEMISTOCLES, his great memory, 426. THEOLOGY, presupposes a knowledge of mind, 44. See Deity. THEOPHRASTUS, 40. THEORETICAL and Practical Philosophy, his- tory of the distinction, 79, 121; identical with division into Physical and Ethical, 80; unsound, ib.; universality of, 79 e¢ seg. See Philosophy. THEORETICAL, see Theory. TuEORY, abuse of the term by English writers, 120; theory and practice distinguished, 120. THOMAS, St., see Aquinas. Tuomasius, Christian, 513. TnouGut, Laws of, 679. See Regulative Fac- ulty. Tuoucut Proper, see Elaborative Faculty. THUROT, 266. TIEDEMANN (Dietrich), 163, 378. TrrpDEMANN (Friedrich), referred to in regard to weight of brain, 661. Time, a form of thought, 528, 548. See Reg- ulative Faculty. TITTEL, 493. See Language. te, T1T TOLAND, 513. TOLETUS, 272, 498. See Language. Toucn, sense of, two problems under, 874 et ség.;—1. May all the Senses be analyzed into Touch? ib., et seg.; in what respect the affirmative of this question correct, ib. ; does Touch comprehend a plurality of Senses? 875 et seq.; affirmative maintained by the author, ib.; historical notices of this prob- lem, ib., et seg.; Touch to be divided from sensible feeling, reasons;—1. From the analogy of the special senses, 877; 2. From the different quality of the perceptions and sensations themselves, 378; special sense of, its sphere and organ, ib.; its proper organ requires, as condition of its exercise, the movement of the voluntary muscles, 379. See Sight. ToussAInT, 179. TRALLES, 252. TRENDELENBERG, 104, 124. TRISMEGISTUS, Hermes (the mythical), quoted on mental powers, 271; his definition of the Deity, 387. TROXLER, 465. TucKER, Abraham, 177, 252, 307. TurGort, 497. See Language. Tyrius, Maximus, quoted on Plato’s doctrine of relation of mind to body, 218. TzETZES, referred to on definitions of philos- ophy, 36. ULTIMATE Cause, synonymous with First Cause, 42. Unity, love of, an efficient cause of philoso- phy, 47; perception, imagination, judgment, etc., unifying acts, 47-8; testimonies to, — ‘ Anaxagoras, the Platonists, Leibnitz, Kant, Plato, Plotinus, Aristotle, Augustin, 48-9; a guiding principle of philosophy, 49; a source of error, 50; influence of precon- ceived opinions reducible to, 52; all lan- guages express the mental operations by words which denote a reduction of the many to the one, 48. UNIVERSITIES, their principal and proper end, 10. ‘~ardaracis, 105,108. See Substance. USEFUL, see Utility and Ends. Uriztiry of two kinds,— Absolute and Rela- tive, 2,16; the useful, what, 8, 15, 522; util- ity higher and lower, 3; comparative utility of human sciences, how to be estimated, 4, 16; misapplication of the term useful, 5; true criterion of the utility of sciences, 15; utility of sciences differently estimated in ancient and modern times. 16. VALERIUS MAXIMUS, 180. VANITY, 682. VARRO, quoted, 353. VERRI, on pleasure, 598. wi ¥ ™ ® Ne 1 Le hi, , 1 ye 718—738 INDEX. ile Pac * Vico, 513. ‘ WOLF, referred to on definition of philoso- , ViETA, 180. phy, 35, 41; regarded faculty of knowledge VIRGIL, quoted, 47, 97, 460, 579. ‘i as the fundamental power of mind, 129; VisuaL Distance, see Sight. Vira Sense, Sensus Vagus, synonyms of, 377; sensations belonging to, 614. See Kant and Leidenfrost. Vives (Ludovicus), 498, see Language; on pleasure, 590. Vo.trairgE, his illustration of the relativity of human knowledge, 101; first recom- mended the doctrines of Locke to his coun- trymen, 376, 644. WALcH, 546. Warts (Dr.), his doctrine of substance, 108. WEISS, 35, 564. WENZEL, 35. WERENFELS (S.), quoted, 185. WHATELY (Archbishop), 82, 475. WHOLE, different kinds of, 509. WILL distinguished from Desire, 128. Conation and Liberty. WILLIS, his attribution of mental functions to different parts of the nervous system, 650. WILson (Prof. John), quoted on Brown’s doctrine of Causality, 587. WIT, 620. See Feelings. See quoted on Reflection, 161; held hypothesis of Preéstablished Harmony, 208; coincides with Leibnitz on the question of the con- tinual consciousness of the mind, 221, STi 430, see Reproductive Faculty; 447, 518; at- tempted to demonstrate the law of Suffi- cient Reason from that of Contradiction, 546, 592, see Feelings. é Wonpzs, an auxiliary cause of philosophy, 54; testimonies to its influence, — Plato, Artaroite: Plutarch, Bacon, Adam Smith, 55; affords an explanation of the order in which objects studied, 56. Youne (Dr. John), 876; his general coinci- dence with the doctrines of Dr. Thomas Brown, 381. Youne (Dr. Thomas), 372. ZABARELLA (Jacob), 68, 272; referred to, on Aristotle's doctrine of species, 292, 501, pu, ZEDLER'S Lexikon, 214, 546. ZENO, the Eleatic, arguments of against mo- tion, 530, ZWINGLI, 61. 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Lessons at the Cross; or, Spiritual Truths Familiarly Exhibited in thcir Relations to Christ. By Samuel Hopkins, author of * The Puritans.” - 16mo, cloth, The Still Hour; or. Communion with God. By brof. Austin Phelps, D. D. 16mo, cloth, £8 cts. A charming little work, of which thirty thousand copies have been sold the past year. Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Records, with Special Reterence to the Doubts and Discoveries of Modern ‘Times. . By Geo. Kawlinson, M. A., Ed. of Histories of 1.» rodotus. Copious Notes. 12mo, cloth, % Illustrations of Scripture. Suggested by a ‘Your through the Holy Land. With numerous il- lustrations, A New, Improved and Enlarged Edi- tion, By H.B. Hackett, D. D., Prof. of Biblical Lit, 12mo. cloth, a Christ In History. By Robert Tum nbull, D.D: A New and Enlarged Edition. 12mo, cloth, Works by Rev. NEHEMIAH ADAMS, D. D, Evenings with the Doctrines, By Rev. Ne- hemiah Adams, D. D. Royal 12mo, cloth, The Friends of Christ in the New, Testament. Seventh Edition. koyal 12mo, cloth, Christ .2 Friend, Fifth Edition. Royal 12ma cloth, : The communion abba Edition Royal 12mo, cloth, The Great Concern; or, Man’s Relation to God - and a Future State. Cloth, The above able and popular works by Dr. Adama need no commendation. published by others, which they supply at publishers’ Travelling Agents, Teachers, School Committees, (to whom.a liberal discount is uniformly made,) to their exten: S of Text-books for examination will be sent by mail or otherwise, to any one trans i> Orders from any part of the country promptly attended to. i eur Hd a4 eh My ‘ah. rh A 3 0112 12732