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Hs Aaatehiet ne trp: Oa nadaial Reauatied 1 bea ld aha Vhsibe bed foots hai? ye Insite ihaedha wea he 9)ta CENTRAL CIRCULATION BOOKSTACKS | The person charging this material is re- sponsible for its renewal or its return to the library from which it was borrowed on or before the Latest Date stamped below. The Minimum Fee for each Lost Book is $50.00. Theft, mutilation, and underlining of books are reasons for disciplinary action and may result in dismissal from the University. TO RENEW CALL TELEPHONE CENTER, 333-8400 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN AUG 0 4 1994 ia ira VV UL 3.1207 When renewing by phone, write new due date below previous due date. y As Hi . ve he may ry s THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND ITS CAMPAIGNS IN TURKKY 1877-1878. BY, F. V. GREENE, FIRST LIEUTENANT IN THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U. 8S. ARMY, AND LATELY MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE UNITED STATES LEGATION AT ST. PETERSBURG. ‘ LONDON: W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13 WATERLOO PLACE, PALL MALL, S.W. PUBLISHERS TO THE INDIA OFFICE. Pe EA Oo. Soon after the outbreak of the recent war between Russia — and Turkey, I had the honor to be selected by the War De- partment to go abroad for the purpose of observing the mili- tary operations from the Russian side, and for this purpose was assigned to duty as Military Attaché to the United States Lega- tion at St. Petersburg. I left New York on the 30th of June and reached St. Petersburg on the 18th of July, 1877, where the necessary formalities precedent to my joiming the army, including the granting of the Emperor’s permission, were speed- ily complied with, and I therefore proceeded without delay to the field, reaching the imperial headquarters on the 5th of Au- gust. I remained with the army continuously throughout the rest of the campaign—reaching Constantinople with it in the follow- ing month of February—and until the month of July, 1878, when a definite peace was assured by the meeting of the Con- gress of Berlin. I then returned to St. Petersburg, resumed my post at the legation, and remained there until January, 1879, engaged in collecting and digesting the official reports of the war, as well as the data for a study of the Russian military system. The following pages are a reprint, made with the permission vill PREFACE. of the War Department, of my official report to the Govern- ment upon the subjects which I was sent abroad to report upon. This report aims to give, first, a concise but accurate description of the Russian Army ; second, a narrative of the course of the campaignsin Europe and in Asia Minor ; “und third, a brief dis- cussion of the use of temporary field fortifications in connec- tion with the modern breech-loading musket. The description of the Russian Army includes its laws of military service, its organization and strength in time of peace, and the development of which it is capable in time of war, the armament and equipment of its troops in the field, a synopsis of its system of military administration or Army Regulations, and some notes on its tactics. It.is wholly based upon the data given in the following works : 1. “Spravotchnaia Kneeshka dlia Russkik Offizierof” (“Hand- Book of Information for Russian Officers”), by Major-General Makhotin, of the General Staff, 1875. 2. “Shtaty Russkik Regularnik Voisk,” ete. (“ Effective Strength of Russian Regular and Reserve Troops, Militia, and Military Departments and Establishments”), by Colonel Martianof, Russian General Staff, 1878. 3. “Zapisky Voiennoe Administratzie” (‘‘ Memoir on Russian Military Administration, for the use of Military Schools”), by Colonel Lobko, Russian General Staff, 1877. 4. “The New Law regulating Military Service in Russia,” translated in the Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster-Gen- eral’s Department, Horse Guards, London, 1875. 5. “The Armed Strength of Russia,” * translated at the Intel- ligence Branch of the Quartermaster-General’s Department, Horse Guards, from a report published by the Austrian Staff in 1871. The narrative of the campaign is based primarily upon the official reports of the Russian commanders, which were pub- lished in the Russian reviews and in the semi-official French paper at St. Petersburg. My own notes made during the cam- * So many changes have taken place since this report was drawn up, that it is now useful only for the condition of the army in 1871. PREFACE. 1x paign, including reports made from time to time of the prog- ress of events, were very numerous, and have been freely used. While with the troops at the front I usually received copies of the field orders for every movement, and these, combined with my observation of the actual results, afforded me a great many very valuable data. Personally I was present in the battles of Shipka, August 23d and 24th, 1877; Plevna, September 11, 1877; Taskossen, December 31, 1877; and Philippopolis, Janu- ary 15-17, 1878, besides a few minor combats and skirmishes. I was also at the headquarters of the Cesarevitch in October, ° and rode along the line of his outposts and positions between the Lom and Yantra. I passed the Balkans with Gourko’s column during the winter, and remained with it until it reached Adri- anople; I then joined General Skobeleff, who commanded the advance guard, and arrived in front of Constantinople with him. Of the operations which I thus personally witnessed, the official reports gave an extremely clear and faithful account, and I have therefore placed full reliance upon all the official reports. In the few rare cases where the statement of relative losses seemed exaggerated, an exception has been noted in the following pages. Besides the official reports, I have consulted more or less the following works : 1. “ Der Kampf um Plevna,” von Thilo von Trotha, Berlin, 1878. 2. “ Russisch-Titirkische Krieg im Jahre 1877,” von Carl Re- genspursky, Wien, 1878. 3. “ Riickblicke auf die Russische Taktik,” von Norbert Spaleny, Gras, 1878. 4, “Die Armee-Operationen im Balkan-Feldzug,” von Cardinal von Widdern, Berlin, 1878. 5. “Der Orientalische Krieg in den Jahren 1877 und 1878,” von W. Riistow, Ziirich, 1878. 6. “Der Russisch-Tiirkische Krieg 1877 bis 1878,” von Chris- tian von Sarauw, Leipzig, 1878. : | 7. “Guerre d’Orient en 1876-1877,” par Colonel Ferdinand Le- comte, Lausanne, 1878. . x PREFACE. 8. “La Fortification du Champ de Bataille,” par Lieutenant- General A. Brialmont, Bruxelles, 1878. 9. ‘‘ La Guerre d’Orient,” par Amédée Le Faure, Paris, 1878. — 10. War correspondence of the “ Daily News,” 1877-78. The “ Daily News ” Correspondence, as well as that of “ The Times,” is replete with the most interesting information on every subject connected with the war; and, in the absence of official Turkish reports, they form our principal source of infor- mation from that side. . On the Russian side about seventy-five correspondents began the campaign, but only three followed it — to its close. These three, viz., Messrs. J. A. MacGahan and F. D. Millet of the “ Daily News,” and Mr. E. M. Grant of “The Times,” were all men of fine abilities and education, and although all three were foreigners (Americans) they were unusually well qualified to speak on the subjects of which they wrote, from previous experience in other wars and from long familiarity with the Eastern Question, no less than from their literary skill. The correspondence of Mr. Archibald Forbes, which attained such celebrity, is most graphic, but unfortunately it terminates early in the campaign, with the battle at Plevna in September, and the conclusions which he formed on returning to England are therefore founded on somewhat incomplete data. Mr. MacGahan, as is well known, fell a victim at Constan- tinople to the typhus fever, which attacked his overworked brain and caused his death after a few days’ illness. In him that large portion of the public which derives its information from the daily papers rather than from books lost one of its most valuable and faithful contributors, and America lost a son who had carried a reputation for pluck, energy, and fair state- ments throughout Europe and into the heart of Central Asia. Of the political questions of the war no mention is made in the following pages except in so far as they had a direct imme- diate bearing upon the military operations. | My sympathies, like those of a majority of my countrymen, were originally on PREFACE. of the side of Russia, and my experience only served to confirm those sympathies; but this book only aims to give a strictly accu- rate account of the mzltary steps in the process by which Russia crushed Turkey as a military power, and it was written without having any political views or aims in consideration. Nor is there in the following pages anything referring to personal experiences, or to reminiscences of the principal com- manders. It is, therefore, proper to state here that the Russian authorities extended to all the foreign officers who came prop- erly accredited to them the most generous and open-hearted hospitality, and the most complete facilities for observing the course of events as they actually transpired. During the cam- paign there were present with the army military officers repre- senting Germany, Austria, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, and the United States, as well as special delegates from Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro. In all we numbered at one time 18 officers. We were all presented to the Emperor on our arrival, and remained at his headquarters for several days, during which we were always his guests at table. We were then attached (nominally) to the Staff of the Grand Duke Nicholas, commanding the army, and there received the same hospitality as at the Emperor’s. Those who desired to see the operations from a closer point of view than the general head- quarters were invariably granted full permission to join what- ever troops they chose, and there in turn, with one or two ex- ceptions, the same hearty reception was accorded to them by the generals in command, so far as they had the means. By thus passing from one detachment of the troops to another and then returning to the general headquarters, a full opportunity was afforded of following the course of affairs and of judging of them in their general aspect as well as in their details. At St. Petersburg the same official courtesy was extended to me by the Heads of Departments in the War Ministry, particu- larly the general staff, artillery, and engineers, in furnishing maps, plans, drawings, and information of every kind. I have xii PREFACE. endeavored to avoid any indiscretion in the use of this material, and in relation to the organization of the army have confined myself to extracts from Russian or other works already in print and which have long since found their way to the general staff of every army in Europe. The illustrations in the text and the maps composing the atlas are all based upon Russian informa- tion thus furnished, supplemented by a few sketches of my own. By eo WasHineton, April, 1879. CEC LeLEING Le Py, fot Wid BEG THE RUSSIAN ARMY. PAGE Onapter I.—The Laws of Recruiting and Military Service.......... 3 II.—Strength and Organization of the Land Forces ........ 19 eee ATMAMONG ANG LQUIPMCN hos. ce cic ssi see ewes tees 52 Pye Methods of Administration. 6.54062... . ck seca wtneces 82 ANAC Her 2. op eig siele atures cule Sue ee eN « Na aeimathne e tke 128 da ba a THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. IntTRopUcTORY.—Declaration of War—The Theatre of Operations— eR DADIS csi ote ties ee a ainda n'a 2 | wm io oh Gee et Ae | OOo dee RONG eo oa HE ck Sn RSS VT RE a a Dna A Wa (aay (Ale SRS VLRO (A 8 1 AMBAE 4 |16/16| 4 | 44] 24] 16 | 604 | 33 | 728/598 | 6 |141] 64] 16 The above strength is maintained, both in peace and war, except in the train, which is reduced to 15 horses and 9 wagons in time of peace. The Regiments of the Guard have each a band, composed of 1 leader and 24 musicians. 26 THE RUSSIAN ARMY. The Field and Staff consists of : 1 Regimental Commander (Major-General in the Guard, Colo- nel in the Line), 2 Field Officers, one as aid to the commander and the other charged with administration, ete., ” 1 Regimental Adjutant, 1 Regimental Quartermaster, 1 Regimental Paymaster, 1 Regimental Instructor in Arms, 1 ‘Officer commanding non-combatants, 1 Chief Trumpeter. Of non-combatants : 1 Surgeon, 1 Assistant Surgeon, 1 Veterinary Surgeon, 1 Secretary, 1 Riding-Master, below the rank of | Captain ; 1 Chaplain. The non-combatants below the grade of officer are as follows: 1 Sergeant Major of non-combatant company, - 1 Regimental Paymaster Sergeant, 1 Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant, 10 Clerks (writers) of different classes, 18 Medical N. C. officers of different classes, including vete- rinary surgeons, 1 Inspector of Sick, . 8 Hospital Attendants, 1 Leader of Choir, 5 Armorers of different classes, 1 Locksmith, 2 Gunstock-makers, 2 Carpenters, 1 Wheelwright, 5 Blacksmiths, 5 Saddlers, 22 Tailors and Bootmakers, 10 Teamsters, 47 Officers’ Servants. 141 ee —— STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF LAND FORCES. 927 Artillery. The 48 Artillery Brigades consist of 8 of the Guard, 4 of Grenadiers, and 41 of the Line. Each is commanded by a major-general, under the orders of the commander of the in- fantry division to which it is attached and of which it forms a part; it also has the same number as its division; e. g., “The 17th Artillery Brigade of the Line,” i. e., the eatery brigade belonging to the 17th infantry division of the Line. A Brigade of Foot Artillery consists of 6 batteries, the first three 9-pdrs., and the other three 4-pdrs. The horse batteries are attached to the Cavalry, 2 batteries to a division, under the orders of the Division Commander. The mountain batteries are attached to special corps for special ser- vice. The mitrailleuse batteries were formerly attached to the Artillery Brigades, the 6th Battery in each being composed of mitrailleuses; but this organization has now been superseded, and but few mitrailleuse batteries remain, and they are attached for special purposes to special corps. Strength of a Battery of Artillery. N.C TOTAL COM- | NON-COM- cece ete OFFICERS, Aerie BATANTS. BATANTS. to cS a ¥| L Hee Wade 1S) ay! a|§ Bails} [Si alS slain 8lé S| 4/4/90) 8) 8/2/ 4) 2/2S/8/S3/ 8) # : 3 : df ZIS(S|8iclagiasia |G)48/a| & [6] SiS] = SoS |Elx 3 ( War Footing...... 8)1/1/1)1!2]../1/2] 24 14) 8 |50) 190 | 6 | 279 |30) 189 38] 4/17 2.2 Inc. Peace Footing.|8/1/1)/1|)1, 2)../1;2] 19 |}4| 8 (40) 150) 6 | 224/15) 88 29| 4 |14 o* { Peace Footing..... 4/1}1/1/1/2)..)/1;2] 14 |4] 8 |80)180|}6/189| 5) 42)../29) 21 6 4; ( War Footing...... 8}1/1}1)1/1)/1/}1/2| 24 |4} 8 [40] 140] 6 | 219 |20) 135) ..|87) 4 |17 S. < Inc. Peace Footing.|8|1/1)1,/1)/1)1)1)/2| 19 |4| 8 /80)110/6|174/10) 71)../29) 4 \14 «* ( Peace Footing.....)4;1/1)1)1/1)1)1)2] 14,4] 8 20) 100) 6/149) 6 84)../29) 2) 6 = @ ( War Footing...... 8)/1/111}1}1,;1)1)2] 24 | 4] 8 (80) 110) 6 | 179 107 | ..|8T) 4 |17 £ 4 < Inc. Peace Footing.| 8, 1)/1)1/1}1/1)1)2)] 19 |4 8 |20} 90| 6) 144 T1 |..129) 4 |14 5 2 ( Peace Footing.....)4)1)/1)1,)1)1/1/1|/2); 14 |4) 8 |20) 80|6, 129 84)../29,/2| 6 x o ( War Footing...... 6)1)/1/2)1)1)1/1)2) 24/4) 8 50} 200 | 7 | 289 ]..: 289 |..|42 4/17 "S £ + Inc. Peace Footing.|6)1)1)2/1)1)1 1/2) 19 |4 8 (40) 160 ' 7 | 234)..; 214)../34 4/14 3 a " | | J CIPS | OLL'OT| FEES SLOT |L19°F9 |L19°6SF G6FL1 |6EE/066'LI [SILOS [B8s°S¢ [2221 | COs°COL | S6E TIS [OEL08 |GEE/"ANAV aTHIy TVLOY, 469 | 786% \908'y | FOT | “""" | “""** | Bah |gTs| ¥69 |786'% |gos'> | FOL | "°°" | "°°" [og |gTe|°°* °° “aavig IvLO], 283 8zC'T LeQ'T eee eae cee | we eeee eeeee I6L 288 RET Lec'T eee eerteee eeree eeere I6L soe -aTBIG epeslig I6L o6t 968 861 T $9 a Sane oe 661 $9 66. 968 86L‘T #9 het ears 261 F9 «|°°** BHBIG DOISLATT 9 a § 099 OFO T OF bees Se OSG 09 OZL 09S OF0'T OV ie nl SSeer. 096 09 |" **syBIg SdI0H 0B Sst | 91s “HOLT oy | "°° | 38oel | ser |°" | OFS [QTL |4F0'L | I OFS | 09261 | 419 |°* | ‘SHHaNIDNY TvIO], G21 sé | STST eB |": | SLeOr | 98m |°°* | os | ceo't | 662 Ly 0F8 OFGLT | TOF ie ia I are eR 8 at 86 3 "| BOL 88 ses es 09 FEL S pe OL eae Tre pocestre rss sestarpeuery 8 (al $6 S eeesee ZOL 8% eee SI 09 POL z eereee OL0'T 83 coe Bes ese esse tae se TRIE L¥9 | S86'T|GF9'6 | °° [694'LT | 489°99 |Sh6'T |"° | BEST |I6F'S |OLZ'ST! ** | TLL'99 | 2066 |SL6T |°° | AURIMLAY IVLOY, 09 Ost | 020°T ""* | ogs'g | 0189 =| OTE) =«[*** | «OBE | OTS 098'T "| 09's 020: Se eee cas es t --TSHO]] | Or 08 | OLT, “LS } 96. SPE (Ges a") 06 g8 | OT, 2S fee SPL OLET | G8 j°** [tito prep 86P 9LPT | P8lL 3 886 b19 TP QF T ‘* P86 (oh i C266 a 628 68 ¥96 19 QU: Le ene, to ae OLE 8P FPL 969 Se 316 990 PPL oe 96 807 006 ee 888'8 9164 laa’ “** | “STeTPVUELY ¢** “LOOT 96 80r G69 a #89 6h0S s0r ay oh 908 C19 aa 916% SSFP 80F oben, elena DL Ae 889 | 080'T 9806 | See sPs'9F| SOFFE [8Is'°s ZT | SoT'L|9T9'F j9LT'6 | S98 | Bea'Lh | ZaT'Ga |9ev's ZI |°°“AYIVAVD TVLOY, 98 09 F909, v3 =| 16S | B16 | set | | ¥9 93, | #99 v3 B16% =| GT6S | BBE it * |S (suseonep) ,, POP Ors 6069 996 | 8618 861 GF 089 T : 968 P8o 2069 996 SBE LE 86) 3h 089 sa eae ee OGL J 80T 08T 029 T 89 808 9 8698 90P 6L 66T 892 OrL'T 89 6CG"), GFP 6 PCV GT a eeees rey 96'S | 3166 |00L'FS | 809 | “"* | OFB‘99E |FOE‘ST |SI_|_SI9‘S |s48°CS |FSF'TS | FOBT | “"°"° | F80'099 |ZE9'AT ZI _|°* “AWINVANT ‘TVLOY, or 8h =| O9T, 4 ne ree "| Best | 99 pas ba 408 |: 008 ar erate me ON onan a "t* (snseoneD) 5, laa 886 800 T 8P ee rr IL 829 2s ¥86 OFF TL Pre'T 87 peters, 809 6T F29 Cel st SOC tape Ak aL 4B 8h | BLT. Che | eat RUta iS Se PR: 2) Ove 2 | 886 rat tes hy BOGE PUL tele a eee 80, | Shak | OFF'F BOE | '"""'' | sonop | geait |'°° | ga0'r | pony | pepo | BOT | “"""7: | 8001L6 | OZ6T [°°: |""'* 77: *"G@eusuonED) ,, 0F3G 0989 | 0OL FT $8 ct om Orcas | OOPS |°- OFL'S | 098FS | OFO'BT 0F8 ane OFL Eh | OFIOT | cy -, a oeedeaaeeie MESLOLES 89 803 | OFL, 86) "*"*"" | 8e9R. 1} OSB fot OLE PPL. | 06 8% "rts | gOsiok | O68. - | "=> | 77s Genevonep) =, Z6L 88g | 098'T. GL | °°" | 9890's | Osh "* | 86h | 8803 | se'r | BL "sreet | BeOS «| BIB | f° [Toi c2 ot T esetpeuerp 03 29 0263 ¥8 ee VPS 8S 891 or 86g 6866 OIL'S ¥8 aa POT 6P 8F6 4 ot a So a ee en 2) jo) Q Q “*SINVLV TNOO-NON “‘SLINVILVANOD “SINYV: LVANOO-NON *SLNVLVANOO ‘TAVLg sHoa -AVO AULNVANT 834 THE RUSSIAN ARMY. Military Establishments. Having now given the numbers of the troops who do the actual fighting, we come to that class who provide them with the means therefor, take part in special operations, or care for their wants in sickness and in health. A part of them might be classed as combatants and a part as non-combatants, but there is no great significance in this division ; they are all troops destined for special duties. They are as follows: . The Field Engineer Parks. The Siege Engineer Parks. The Field Telegraph Parks. The Field Ammunition Parks. Engineers. | , | 8. 4, | 5. The Siege Artillery Parks. 6. ie 8. Artillery (Ordnance). The Mobile Artillery Workshops. The Mobile Laboratory Workshops. The Ammunition Depots. 9. The Field Hospitals. Medical. fs The Mobile Division Hospitals. 11. The Mobile Dispensaries. Intendance.—The Intendance Transport. Engineer Parks. There are in all 5 Field Engineer Parks (order of January 27 _ [February 8], 1877), 2 Siege Engineer Parks, and 9 Field Tele- graph Parks (order of November 13 [25], 1876.) The first keep the Sapper Battalions supplied with the requisite tools for their special duties in the field; the second supply the engineer tools — required in a siege; the third supply the material and perform the service of the field telegraph, each park having 100 kilome- tres (62°14 miles) of wire. Strength of an Engineer Park. COM- = BATANTS.| COMBATANTS. TOTAL.| HORSES. | WAGONS. Oe ag — | 4 sie 2 Egle sl, >| 2 iied eel esleial . 648 O}-) S13 48/8 elalg|s a|;a =e] 2 ale e/elel/g) alalel4| 4 Fls| Gla |4 \elele) Spe eee ee fad el an kT Bk War Footing....../8 11/125} 8 | 19 169/18 17 281! 240| 16 | 54 | 4 Field Engineer Park... } Posse Rooting 10. | 8 a} 4211-475 (Ol 7) OlseO ied eee tl, | _ {War Footing.... .2| 5/220] 4 | 86 | 4:12/11/972/870| 17 [112 | 4 Siege Engineer Park ..| Doane Footing 21. 2} 2| 66) | 9 | 2] 6) 6] eB]....] 4]....].-.. STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF LAND FORCES. 35 Strength of an Engineer Park—Continued. TOTAL.) HORSES. | WAGONS. Bi/O]a/S/ee/S/ 4]. S|) s/B/OM| 218) 4) a sla ele R el gleizi a) 2) a)4)4 Blsiéisiz |oisiaio| es ' dla) él é ; War Footing...... 1] 7/24 6| 2955/7 (66 9/8/3867, 174| 14) 80 | 3 Field Telegraph Park... Doace Footing a i] 6je4j6} s7j4] 118) 7) 77] dt, Ammunition Parks. The Ammunition Parks are charged with keeping the troops (Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry) supplied with ammunition of all kinds. According to the new organization (March 22 [April 3], 1877,) there are: 17 Flying Parks for Cavalry Divisions, 7 Flying Parks for Rifle Brigades, 48 Flying Parks for Infantry Divisions (with 130 four-wheeled caissons, or 124 two-wheeled caissons), 48 Mobile Parks for Infantry Divisions, 8 Siege Artillery Parks. Strength of Ammunition Parks. COM- NON- WAG- BATANTS. | COMBATANTS, | TOTAL: | HORSES. | G4, 3 S|, Sal apeheel Bho ioe | Shale eh eet ele F g)S |B igss] a) elélelalalal4 Spe mish |e fe ley e aia | le ' :_,§ Cavalry.| 2} 10 | 180; 1| 9 6 | 8} 8| 158) 155) 14) 25] 4 Beanie de War Footing } Ring” 2} 10] 90/1; 9| 6] 8] 8) 118] 105) 14) 17 | 4 ying ‘: ( Peace Footing ........ Pa eae ee. Wipk Po Bele Bil eae del clare 180 cais- { War Footing./11; 51 | 700! 8) 56 | 14 | 20 | 19] 841] 841! 9311185 | 8 Division Fly- sons ) Peace Foot’g.| 8} 8/ 45/ 1,18] 2] 5] 4) 7).... ing Parks... ) 194 cais- fe eitite. 11] 51 | 480] 7] 51 | 14 | 19 | 18, 564) 412] 81/129 | s sons Peace Foot’g.| 8} 8| 45) 1'18| 2/ 5] 4) 7l.... Division Mobile Park—War Footing ..... 8| 10 | 200} 1) 15 | 10} 8] 8 288) 206; 18' 49 | 5 ;Oxen| Siege Artillery Park { War Footing...... 68/246 /2010/36 214 1540 |111 |104/3121\2766 1944.....).. (6 divisions)...... Peace Footing..... ieheociere( hoe GO laces) 21) Aoi waDlnawolaywatwaael ca Hospitals. There are in all 84 Field Hospitals and 64 Division Hospitals (one for each Division of Infantry and Cavalry). 36 THE RUSSIAN ARMY. Strength of a Hospital in Tume of War. ADMIN- COMPANY ACCOM- MEDI ISTRA- | ATTEND- OF MO- 3 coer vive | ants. | TRAIN: | oreron’r baie 3 DATION ay STAFF, BEARERS. FOR a 5 @ © ~ re a re 5 £8 ra = y : = ie | [8ls g1 | |g 5 Z a Se) oe | ate] ss RS eae cht ee ee : ; slelSle)4l2).|O/8 |B elo] 2 l2)/°| g\elg Slgl gl ¢ | B/S | s/o Bia lCla lEle\S| 8 lalS| 2 lelel alee) ele | 2 Ala|<||8|6iolz/a |a\Slz/e S| 4 |a \6je| = |4\F| a | 6 | 2 | Se PE SDF SETS SOS as See Field Hospital...... ol 494) 6| 2'12'11|138)86 ..| 9, 54]. ay |) 1; 38 20 185 63 |..| ..| ..|18/28]297'..'27/114) 80) 600 Division Hospital..|..| 8| 1[17! 3] 2| 2] 2| sol20] 1] s/108) 1] 9.200)..].. eect te nn | es | es | SS | 26 7 72 117 210 14/16 446 80,26 998) 6) 160 Mobile Dispensary.|..|..{ 8| 8!..|..| 9]..] ..[..]..[ 2] as}..| ..] ..[..[ sl aal..legiaas Intendance Transport. This has no existence in time of peace, and in time of war is provided for according to circumstances under the direction of the Chief Intendant of the Army. Ox carts or horse carts are usually hired for the service at so much a month. They are divided into divisions of 350 wagons each, and to each division are assigned a few subofficials, responsible for the property trans- ported, and a squad of Cossacks as an escort, greater or less in size according to circumstances. The Mobile Artillery Workshops, Ammunition Depots, etc., are formed in rear of the army, and have an organization and strength dependent upon the circumstances of the case. It is from them that the Parks receive their ammunition, implements, etc., etc. LOCAL TROOPS. Garrisons of Fortresses and Fortified Pots. The Garrison Troops consist in time of peace of, 24 Infantry Battalions, 55 Artillery Companies. In time of war each Battalion may be increased to a Regiment of 4 battalions. Although these troops are primarily intended for the defense of the fortified points, yet they may be used elsewhere in case of emergency. 37 STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF LAND FORCES. 849'9ST) 189°C | s1o'se | oor] 16 | ee9'z6 | es't | 96 | S6PIF| SOL'T| r60'0r | a6a) 6g | Fee's | 229] ¥2 SBT g eit ood Bod ett oe pice = || sor 8 ent go |p tees [ede ts 6 62% Gets sce: ies 686 bo ee Bhs Sar ; +e 0 Ae ee oe ee sit 4 earl satis 4 Slee ade 6 oe ee ee ee oak ee Z 622 ¢ eed eae 988 Glee Pees) SO ee tI S88 oT F890 isd Pd eee Ss 698 8 is © Set Ng a aang oat Baie | 6 8 623 ee ta ae 9 A By 6F3 8 Aces oe Be Name ante heiee Wee ieee Met 4 : 626 Oa see eet #08 6 sapere 1 ¢. {ole cP etl gos ce a ed eee sig sas 8oF Boe epee "sob tt 1) 88h a! Si OG Sat eae es P09, st 894 atte ee tt ot, POD si 89g Oa oof eae 6rr'G LOT | 998 | 0G) H | 100% | GL % || SFT | 68 sch | OL | B | HL6 | «TB | 1 S6L TL cI | 098 | 8F/8 | o's | scr | 8 || 108s | I8 9ST 1 | 03 | F | 820% | 2a] @ 6a0'S TP =| GBB | 08 | & | SFB 8 "* || OBE | Is 9ST | 03 | F | 8h3 | 8 |'2P GLL'P 16 819 | OL |S | Scr | 6h > || pest | 68 F36 Q | | FOL | 93] T 0813 88 POSE UCL ON oo Mall a oot. tl POO. 8I 89¢ OL Be Se ee eres” a OLZ | GOS | 8s) a | PLLZT | 186 | SE || 086 | TOL | 2G8 Ql | 8 | go's | 8h) 8 88F'6 WE | wet | ot} 8 | 9TTS | Sor | 8 || 1s9's | 99 g9g. | OF | B | 8403 =| Be] B 098*6T F908 =| 6698 | OF | 8 | Zes9T | OTS | OT || 96L'S | SE | POLT | 08| 9 | 990% | FOT) F LPP'G col | eS | or] 8 | Scor | 62 b || 06r | GF &o8 Gr | $ | PLOT | 98 | T 266% 16 868, | OL} 3 | scor | 6h % || 688 | 68 688 GS) US) POL 96 lek ee Pee cea rcan bv eet | 8.1) 8 eres a8 Qt) 8 | 820% | 29) 8 068 Z ries erlg fmt ot | ®t eee $c qly foes dee fee F169 IIE | O@T | 7B) H | Scop | 62 b || Lok | Tap OL) & | WOT | 93) T OF6 FT Ts | 0816 | 98) 9 | PLEZE | 18% | BI |] O86's | LOL | eB | Gt} 8 | srO's | 8L/ 8 6aT'8T OFE | GIGS | 82] SE | PLESE | 183 | St || F8S'9 | SPE | GLSS | OF| S | BOS | SL] B 9F6 08 016 TR Dk Cea ae Fee ein a Os 2 8I 89¢ 1 eg pemerns ER eaoa ee “TON *s190JO “Udy ‘WMO |*UI0D}| «= “ua *s1s0YO | *y¥_ “uel *s100TO ‘UI ("WO |*m0D| ‘ueyT “DO | ‘8g "TROL “ALOT TNAV Arpueyuy "TROL AT THAW “Aarpuvyuy “avVM NI “HOVHd NI S| GO 269 GD) GO HG 29'0 (G0 5 G0 'G0 C0 GOs, GO) GOH =H 6m) '6> vo >» a body of Turks about 3,000 strong, posted behind a little stream issuing from the mountains at the village of Uflani. With these he had a sharp fight, in which he lost 2 officers and about 60 men. There were 400 Turkish dead (according to the official report) left upon the field; the number of their wounded was not known. This affair consumed so much time that Gourko could go no farther that day than Maglis, 10 miles east of Ka- zanlyk. The next morning, July 17th, at daybreak, Gourko moved out with his troops in three columns; that on the right 170 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. (14 battalion) being ordered to follow the mountains and attack Kazanlyk from the northeast, that of the center (5 battalions and 10 guns) to attack the town from the east, and that on the left (all the cavalry and 6 guns) to follow the valley of the Tundja and turn the enemy’s right flank. But the Turks were found posted 5 miles in front of Kazanlyk, behind a little stream called Kara Dere; their strength was about 3 battalions and 3 guns, and another column was seen coming from Shipka with the intention of occupying the heights on the Russian right flank. The fight began at 7 o’clock in the morning, but it was a small affair, although it lasted for two or three hours. The 4 cavalry turned the right flank of the Turks, who thereupon be- gan to retreat upon Kazanlyk; the cavalry still outflanking them ~ cut off their retreat from Karlova and turned them toward Shipka, and then converted their. retreat into a rout in which they lost 400 prisoners and their 3 guns; the Russian loss was 14men. The village of Kazanlyk was in possession of the Rus- sians by noon, and Gourko wished to march immediately on to Shipka and attack the pass; but his men were so exhausted (the heat was very great) that he was obliged to give them sey- eral hours’ rest. Meanwhile with the cavalry he went on im person to Shipka village, where the infantry rejoined him about sunset ; it was then too late to attack. In this way it happened that Gourko was one day behindhand for the joint attack which he had ordered from the north and south of Shipka Pass for he 17th of July. The attack from the north was, however, made on this fe! in the following manner: General Darozhinsky, with his detachment (86th Infantry — | Regiment, 30th Don Cossacks, and 6 guns), left Tirnova on the 12th and arrived at Gabrova on the 13th. He immediately sent a portion of his Cossacks to Selvi, to drive out some bashi- bozouks that were there, and the rest of them into the mountains east of Shipka Pass to reconnoiter. The latter penetrated as far as the Berdek hill (about 3 miles east of the Shipka) without meeting any resistance; here, however, they came upon a batta- lion of Turks intrenched in a good position, before whom of course they were obliged to retire, sending back for infantry re- énforcements. Two companies were ne to them, and “i the next day, 16th. ae ADVANCE GUARD UNDER GOURKO. EEL Prince Mirsky (Lieutenant-General, commanding 9th Divi- sion) arrived at Gabrova on the evening of July 16th, and super- seded Major-General Darozhinsky in command of the troops there. From the vicinity of Gabrova it could plainly be seen that the Turks had several lines of trenches dug across the high- road leading over the Shipka Pass; their numbers were learned to be between 4,000 and 5,000 infantry, with some bashi-bozouks and 12 guns. To attack a mountain position thus defended, with one regiment numbering, perhaps, 2,400 men and 6 guns, would have been simply folly, except that another and stronger attack was to have been made simultaneously from the other side. But, as we have seen, the troops on the other side were one day behindhand ; and as a result the isolated attack on the north was a complete failure. It was made in four columns, VIZ. : On the right, four companies, with four guns which were to follow a mountain path through the village of Zeleno-Drevo and attack the Bald Mountain two miles west of the main Turkish position, which was at the hill of St. Nicholas on the main road. In the center, four companies, which were to follow a trail which would bring them in front of the advanced positions on the main road (i. e., near what is marked “ Fourth Position,” on the Map of Shipka, Plate 13). On the left, two companies, which were to take a path through the woods leading to the main position at St. Nicholas hill. On the extreme left, three companies, three sotnias of Cos- sacks, and two guns, which were to attack the hill of Berdek, three miles from St. Nicholas. The remaining two companies of the regiment were left to guard the baggage at Gabrova. The various columns, each conducted by guides, were in motion by 7 o’clock in the morning. The plan of attack shows a considerable ignorance of the Turkish position, for on the Bald Mountain there were no Turks at all, and the weakest col- umn was directed against the strongest position of the Turks (St. Nicholas). | The result of the attack was as follows: The column on the right, after marching all day, arrived at 172 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. 7 p.m. on the Bald Mountain without having met any Turks; its four guns were left en route at the village of Zeleno-Drevo, with orders to assist the attack of the center column, but they were found to be out of range. The column in the center arrived in front of the Turkish advanced trenches at 3 p. m, and opened fire upon them; but, the position being too strong to assault, it simply remained on its ground till sunset, keeping up a straggling fire with the enemy. : : The column on the left debouched from the woods at 2 p. m., and found itself only a few hundred yards from the in- trenched position of the Turks (at the point marked “ Third Position” on map of Shipka Pass); it was very warmly re- ceived, but managed to hold its ground till 4 p. m., when it began to retreat, the Turks pursuing till 6 p.m. This column lost 5 out of 6 officers and 115 out of 320 men. The column on the extreme left attacked at 3 o’clock in the ‘morning, and carried the intrenchments on the hill of Berdek, the Turks retreating to St. Nicholas. This was the only success of the day, and it availed nothing, for it was too far away and the column was too small in numbers to assist the little detachments in the center, one of which had been badly beaten, and in retreating had brought the Turks into a position to threaten the rear of the other. There were no reserves, and nothing had been heard from Gourko; during the night, therefore, all the columns fell back toward Gabrova. The total losses of the day were 6 officers and 205 men. Gourko meanwhile, as previously stated, had reached the village of Shipka that same evening (July 17th), and made preparations to attack the pass the next morning. Of this he sent word early in the morning by a note taken by a Bulgarian across the mountain to Prince Mirsky, asking him to support his attack by a diversion with the 36th Regiment; but this note did not reach its destination until noon, and then it was too late, so that Gourko’s attack from the south (July 18th) was isolated and unsuccessful—just as had been the one from the north the previous day. Gourko attacked with two battalions of the Rifle Brigade and a half battalion of plastounes. They climbed through the woods on either side of the main road and deployed against the ADVANCE GUARD UNDER GOURKO. 173 position at the hill of St. Nicholas. Just after the firing had begun the Turks sent out a flag of truce. “ Cease firing” was sounded, and a party of officers * advanced to meet the flag, when suddenly the Turkish officers turned and retired hastily to their lines, and at a signal the Turks opened fire upon the Russian party. J ortunately none of them were hit. Ex- cited by this treachery, the rifle battalions rushed forward and gained possession of some of the outer lines of trenches; but they were not strong enough to carry the main works on the St. Nicholas hill, and, hearing nothing of the attack from the north on which they had relied, they retired in good order down the mountain to the village of Shipka. The Turks fired at them with artillery, but did not leave their trenches; the Russian losses were something over 150 men. Two unconcerted and isolated attacks had therefore been made on the Turkish position in the Shipka Pass, and both had been repulsed. On the morning of the 19th both detachments prepared to renew the attack, but meanwhile the Turks evacu- ated their positions and dispersed in small bands through the mountains to the west, finally reuniting somewhere near Phil- ippopolis. In order to gain time for this manceuvre, they en- tered into negotiations with General Gourko looking to a sur- render. The Turkish Parlementare came to Gourko’s camp at 7 in the morning, bearing a letter from the Pasha offering to surrender, in answer to a summons to that effect sent by Gourko the previous day. It was agreed that the capitulation was to take place at noon, and the Turkish officer departed in order to get the Pasha’s answer concerning some details, promising to be back in two hours. Meanwhile Gourko sent some hospital attendants up to the scene of the previous day’s fight in order to bring in his wounded. The two hours passed, and finally noon passed, and nothing was seen of the Turkish officer. Then Gourko, suspecting some foul play, sent forward a recon- noitring party, and got two battalions in position to support them. But, before the reconnoitring party had gone far, some of the hospital attendants returned from St. Nicholas hill, say- ing that Major-General Skobeleff II. was there ; and soon after- * One of these officers was Major Liegnitz, the Military Attaché to the German Embassy in St. Petersburg, who made a very full report of the whole circumstance to his government. 174 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. ward arrived a note from that officer saying that he had oceu- pied St. Nicholas hill, and that the Turks had all fled. He had in fact taken nine companies of the 36th Regiment and four guns, and advanced early in the morning to attack the position by the same route as that taken the day before by the column of the center; but he had advanced successively from one line of trenches to another, and finally to the St. Nicholas hill, with- out finding any defenders. The hospital attendants found but little to do, as the Turks had mutilated all the Russian dead and wounded left on the field. On the road near the Nicholas hill was found one heap which alone contained over twenty human heads which had been cut from their bodies. The Turks left their tents standing, and abandoned their artillery (eight guns) and a large amount of ammunition and supplies, as well as their wounded (whom, in spite of the example set before their eyes, the Russians treated in their own hospitals). On the 19th of July, therefore, the Shipka Pass was in the hands of the Russians, and the principal objects of Gourko’s expedition were accomplished. In eight days from the time of leaving Tirnova, and sixteen days from the Danube, he had gained possession of three passes (Hainkioi, Travna, and Ship- ka), covering a length of thirty miles in the Balkans, and one of them the great high-road from Bulgaria to Roumelia; he had dispersed various Turkish detachments, numbering in all about. 10,000 men, had captured 11 guns and a large quantity of am- munition, clothing, and provisions, and had disarmed the Turk- ish population throughout a large part of the valley of the — Tundja; and all with a loss of less than 500 men. His men and horses had lived off the country and what they captured from the Turks, and on the 19th they still had three days’ rations of hard bread (out of the five they had taken with them) un- touched. By this time the whole of the VIII. Corps had arrived at Tirnova and been distributed as follows; Corps Headquarters and 14th Division at Tirnova, watching the road from Shumla; two regiments of the 9th Division in Hainkioi Pass, detach- ments of Cossacks in Travyna Pass, one regiment at Selvi, and of the remaining regiment (No. 36) one battalion at Gabrova and the other two in the Shipka Pass. Gourko’s detachment was about equally divided, one half in the village of Shipka and ADVANCE GUARD UNDER GOURKO. 175 the other half at Kazanlyk. They remained in these positions until the 22d. (See Plate 9.) It is now necessary to cast a glance at what was transpiring on the Turkish side. The political effect of the passage of the Danube, followed so quickly by the appearance of Gourko’s detachment on the south of the Balkans, was tremendous. A panic reigned at Adrianople and at all the larger towns in the valleys of the Tundja and Maritza, the Mohammedan population of which began fleeing toward Constantinople. In that city the panic was hardly less great. Daily councils were held at the palace, and the Sultan wavered between the projects of “ dis- playing the standard of the Prophet,” thereby proclaiming a religious war, and of transporting himself and his government to Brusa, in Asia Minor. Then his whole cabinet was over- thrown, and the Commander-in-Chief, Abdul-Kerim Pasha, was dismissed in disgrace and banished along with the War Minister to one of the islands in the Algean. Mehemet Ali Pasha was recalled from Montenegro and appointed Commander-in-Chief, and Suleiman Pasha commander of the troops between Adria- nople and the Balkans; and the greatest efforts were made to get together an army to oppose the Russians, who were supposed to be marching in force toward Adrianople. At the same time England sent her fleet to Besika Bay and made other warlike preparations. In order to follow the movements of the Turkish troops, a few topographical explanations are necessary. The Maritza River rises in the Balkans about 30 miles southeast of Sophia, and follows a course a little south of easterly for 170 miles, and then (at the city of Adrianople) turns and flows south for another 100 miles, emptying into the AXgean Sea near the town of Enos. On the south and west it receives the streams flowing from the Rhodope Mountains, the principal of which, called the Arda, empties at Adrianople; on the north it receives the drainage of a low range of hills known as the Little Balkans, which are parallel to the main range of that name and about 15 miles from it. Between these two is a very fertile valley, long famous for its culture of roses, from which “ ottar of roses” is distilled, through which flows the Tundja River past Kazanlyk to Slivno, where it turns south and empties into the Maritza at Adrianople. Between the Tundja and Maritza system and the waters of the 176 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. Black Sea there is a range of hills rising in places to the height of 2,000 feet, nearly parallel to the coast and about 12 miles from it. (See Plate 2.) In this section of the country is the principal railroad of Turkey, which, coming from Constantinople, unites near Adria- nople with a branch coming from Enos. From Adrianople the railroad follows the valley of the Maritza to about 30 miles above Philippopolis (the grading of the road is complete as far as Sophia). At the little station of Trnova (which must not be confounded with the large town of Tirnova north of the Balkans) a branch railroad turns off and follows the valley of a stream called Sasli to Yeni-Zagra, and thence turns east to the town of Yamboli in the valley of the Tundja. This road was intended to cross the Balkans and unite near Shumla with the Rustchuk railroad, but it has never been built beyond Yamboli. The principal high-roads are: 1. Shipka—Kazanlyk—Eski-Zagra—Trnova—A drianople. 2. Philippopolis—Haskioi—Hermanli (the great road from Sophia to Adrianople). 3. Kazanlyk—Slivno— Y amboli—A drianople. 4, Philippopolis—Karlova—Kazanlyk. 5. Philippopolis — Tchirpan — Eski-Zagra — Yeni-Zagra — Yamboli. 7 At the beginning of July the Turks had in the region from Philippopolis to Slivno about 10,000 men and 60 guns, which were then sent forward to the Balkans in the neighborhood of Shipka. Soon after (about July 5th—10th) 10,000 to 12,000 men with 40 guns, under command of Reouf Pasha, were sent from Adrianople by rail to Yamboli, and thence into the Balkan passes about Slivno. It was the western portion of this latter detachment that Gourko drove away in his skirmishes near Hainkioi; the first detachment he destroyed at Kazanlyk and Shipka. When the news of the passage of the Danube reached Con- stantinople it was decided to recall the greater part of Suleiman’s army from Montenegro, and a fleet of 20 transport ships was sent to bring it. On the 16th of July 49 battalions, 18 guns and 2,000 cavalry (about 30,000 men in all) were embarked at Antivari; they landed at Enos on the 19th, and proceeded by rail to Trnova, where they were assembled July 26th. (At this ADVANCE GUARD UNDER GOURKO. Lig, date the railroad between Trnova and Yeni-Zagra had been cut by Gourko’s cavalry.) By the last week in July, therefore, the Turks had brought together an army of about 50,000 men of regular troops for the defense of Roumelia. It was posted as follows: 35,000 men under Suleiman at Trnova, Karabuna and Gidsal—i. e., at the confluence of the Maritza and Sasli rivers and the junction of the two railways; 15,000 men under Reouf at Slivno, Yamboli, and Yeni-Zagra. We will now return to the subsequent movements of Gour- ko’s detachment, which was resting at Shipka and Kazanlyk on the 22d of July. On that date, at the request of a deputation of the inhabitants, the town of Eski-Zagra was occupied by the 9th Dragoons, a sotnia of Cossacks and two guns. On the 23d Gourko began to resume the offensive by sending two raiding parties as follows: 1. Detachment of Colonel Matsioulevitch (8th Dragoons, two sotnias 21st Don Cossacks, section of 16th mounted battery), which was ordered to proceed by Eski-Zagra to the station Karabuna on the Yamboli Railroad, destroy the railroad and telegraph near this point, and gather as much information as possible about the movements of the Turks. This detachment bivouacked for the night at Eski-Zagra, and early the next morn- ing (July 24th) moved forward in three parties, one of which was to strike the railroad above Karabuna, the other below it, while the third as a reserve moved directly on that point. The _ first party reached the road and destroyed it, the other two were held in check by a Turkish detachment of three or four battal- ions and several hundred Circassians, which they met before arriving at Karabuna. After skirmishing all day the three par- ties withdrew, and the united detachment retired to Eski-Zagra at night, having destroyed five bridges, three culverts, several way-stations, and the track and telegraph on a length of several miles. 2. Detachment of Colonel Korevo (9th Dragoons, one sotnia 26th Don Cossacks, section of 16th mounted battery), which was to proceed from Eski-Zagra (July 24th) to the station of Kaiadzik on the Philippopolis Railroad, and destroy the track in that vicinity, as well as gather information about the Turkish forces. They drove off some bashi-bozouks which they found 12 178 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. near the station, and then destroyed the building with all its contents, as well as the track and telegraph line for a considera- ble distance. These two detachments, besides destroying the track and telegraph both on the Yamboli and Philippopolis lines, gathered the following information about the Turks, viz.: that there were near Karabuna, on the Yamboli Railroad, from four to six battal- ions and some cavalry; that troops were beginning to concentrate near the junction of the railroads, and that they were being brought there by rail from Adrianople. The same day by a small reconnaissance in the direction of Yeni-Zagra it was learned that there were Turkish troops at that place, but it could not be discovered in what strength. Upon these data Gourko divided his detachment into two portions on July 25th, one of which, composed of the Bulgarian Legion (6 Battalions), the two regiments of Dragoons, the 9th Hussars, 3 sotnias of Cossacks (in all 15 squadrons), and 12 guns, he sent to Eski-Zagra under the orders of Duke Nicholas Leuch- tenberg; with the other (4th Rifle Brigade, 6 to 8 sotnias of Cossacks, and 22 guns) Gourko proceeded on the 27th eastward along the Tundja, with the intention of crossing the Little Balkans to Yeni-Zagra. Leuchtenberg’s detachment established itself at Eski-Zagra July 25th, with outposts about ten miles out on the roads lead- ing east, south, and west, and on the succeeding days continued to send reconnaissances toward Yeni-Zagra and toward the june- tion of the railroads. At this latter point the Turkish troops continued to arrive every day by trains, but they had not yet advanced beyond Karabuna, where they had about seven or eight battalions. At Yeni-Zagra was a somewhat larger force. Gourko then ordered that the Duke of Leuchtenberg with all his detachment should move eastward on July 29th from Eski-Zagra toward Yeni-Zagra (the two towns are twenty-five miles apart), while he himself with his detachment, increased by the 1st Brigade 9th Division from the Hainkioi Pass, would cross the Little Balkans on July 30th and join him, and then move against Yeni-Zagra. 3 Accordingly, Leuchtenberg moved out at 2 p.m. on the 29th, having sent in the morning of the same day two reconnaissance, one in advance of his own column toward Yeni-Zagra, and the ADVANCE GUARD UNDER GOURKO. 179 other toward Karabuna. The first of these soon met a column of Turks (6 battalions, 8 guns, and some Tcherkesses) which had advanced the previous day from Yeni-Zagra. The head of Leuchtenberg’s column (8th Dragoons and 2 guns) went forward at a trot to support the two squadrons of the reconnoitring party. Thus, the two columns, Leuchtenberg from Eski-Zagra and the Turks from Yeni-Zagra, met on the chaussée midway between these two places in the afternoon of July 29th. The Bulgarian Legion, which formed the infantry of Leuchtenberg’s column, did not come up until about 6 in the evening; but meanwhile he held the Turks in check by his cavalry (15 squadrons), one half of which he kept on the chaussée, and sent the other half by a détour to the right to threaten the Turkish left. At night- fall the Turks retired a mile or two to the village of Karabunar. Leuchtenberg bivouacked on the stream which comes out of the hill at Dalbok. During the evening the two squadrons which had been sent in the morning to reconnoitre toward Karabuna (on the railroad) returned, and reported that Suleiman’s army was advancing in force direct from Karabuna toward Eski-Zagra, and that it was only 8 miles southeast of the latter place. This disclosed the plan of the Turks. Suleiman with a large force was moving from the railroad toward Eski-Zagra (and thence probably toward Shipka), while a portion of Reouf’s troops were advancing from Yeni-Zagra to meet Suleiman at Eski-Zagra. The Russians, on the other hand, were moving in two columns, one from the valley of the Tundja south of Hain- kioi, and the other from Eski-Zagra, with the intention of at- tacking Yeni-Zagra. On the night of the 29th of July the _ troops stood as follows: Gourko, with the bulk of the infantry (4th Rifle Brigade and 1st Brigade 9th Division, 10 battalions, 8 squadrons of Cossacks, and 22 guns), was still on the north of the Little Balkans, near the village of Jasiriu. Leuchtenberg, with 4 battalions of the Bulgarian Legion, 14 squadrons, and 12 guns, was bivouacked near the village of Dalbok, facing east, and having in front of him a Turkish detachment of 6 battalions 8 guns, and some Tcherkesses. Suleiman’s head of column was 8 miles southeast of Eski-Zagra, at which place were 2 battalions of the Bulgarian Legion and 2 sotnias of Cossacks. The town of Eski-Zagra was of the greatest importance to the Russians, as it covered their retreat to Kazanlyk and the 180 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. Shipka Pass. Leuchtenberg therefore determined to fall back upon this town with his 4 battalions of Bulgarians and 6 guns, and try to hold it for a day against Suleiman, and to direct his cavalry to retreat slowly after him along the chaussée, delaying as much as possible the advance of the Turkish infantry in front of them, and keeping up the connection between Eski-Zagra and Gourko’s troops which would come over the Little Balkans dur- ing the day. The cavalry was disposed as follows: in the center, across the chaussée, 3 squadrons in line supported by 2 squadrons in reserve ; on the left, 2 squadrons near the foot of the hills; on the right, 3 squadrons in line, with 2 guns, facing southeast near the village of Tchavlikioi. ‘This left a general reserve of 4 squadrons and 4 guns. The Turks opened the attack about 7 o’clock in the morning (July 30th) by a demonstration against the Russian left, before which the 2 squadrons fell back slowly. Skirmishing continued until about noon without much.change in the relative positions; but then the Turks began massing their infantry against the Russian right, with the evident inten- tion of breaking past the Russians and effecting a junction with Suleiman. The Russian right was then reénforced by the 6 squadrons in reserve, making 9 in all, while 4 remained on the chaussée and 2 near the mountains. In this way, the Turks continually striving to turn their right flank, the Russians fell back, contesting every step, and about 5 p. m. they reached the village of Aidinli, 3 miles east of Eski-Zagra. Meanwhile, on the left flank several attempts had been made by the Cossacks to break through the line of Circassians and learn something of the whereabouts and movements of Gourko’s troops, but they had all been unsuccessful. Gourko had meanwhile crossed the Little Balkans during the morning (30th), and on the west and north of Yeni-Zagra had found a portion of Reouf’s detachment en route toward Eski-Zagra. He fought with this during the greater part of the day, and drove it to the east, thus preventing its junction with the troops near Eski-Zagra. Hearing then of the desperate sit- uation of Leuchtenberg’s cavalry, he prepared to return along the chaussée to Dalbok, reunite his detachment, and retreat toward Hainkioi. On this day (30th) Suleiman had concentrated his force in ADVANCE GUARD UNDER GOURKO. 181 front of Eski-Zagra, but he had made no attack. On the evening of that date, therefore, the relative positions were as follows : Suleoman, with about 40,000 men disposed in a circle of 5 miles radius around Eski-Zagra, from the Tchirpan road on the left to the village of Dzuranli on the right, his right flank being composed of the troops which had come from Yeni-Zagra. Leuchtenberg, in possession of the chaussée from Eski-Zagra for a distance of about 6 miles east, having the 6 Bulgarian battalions and some Cossacks on his right flank at Eski-Zagra, and the rest of his cavalry at Aidinli and Hirsta. Gourko, on the chaussée just west of Yeni-Zagra, with 10 battalions ready to march early in the morning to the relief of Leuchtenberg. On the morning of the 31st, between 6 and 7 o’clock, the Cossacks of Gourko’s advance-guard were discovered approach- ing on the chaussée from the east, but the road was completely under the fire of the Turks from their position at Dzuranli. To make a diversion in favor of these Cossacks, Leuchtenberg sent the 9th Hussars and 4 guns to demonstrate against the left flank of the Turks at Dzuranli; and soon afterward he sent the 8th Dragoons and 4 guns against the right flank of Suleiman’s main force south of Eski-Zagra. These two regiments were thus interposed between the Turks at Dzuranli and Suleiman’s main force on the south of Eski-Zagra, and prevented their june- tion for several hours. Suleiman began his attack about 8 in the morning along the two roads coming into Eski-Zagra from the south and west. There was nothing to oppose him but the 6 battalions of the Bulgarian Legion, which fell back slowly toward the town. About 11 o’clock the bulk of Gourko’s forces had arrived and engaged the Turks near Dzuranli. The 9th Dragoons were thereupon sent to Eski-Zagra to aid the Bulgarians, and the rest of Leuchtenberg’s cavalry (upon the order of Gourko) was marched along the chaussée under fire of the Turks at Dzuranli to rejoin Gourko’s right wing. During the afternoon Gourko succeeded in driving back the Turks in front of him; but by withdrawing his cavalry from Aidinli he had lost all communi- cation with his people at Eski-Zagra. If the Turks had had _ Plenty of good cavalry, they would probably have cut these lat- 182 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. ter to pieces. As it was, the Bulgarians fell back slowly and in good order, and upon the arrival of the 9th Dragoons to cover their retreat, they made good their escape over the Little Bal- kans to Kazanlyk. 3 The main body of Gourko’s force retreated that evening — (July 31st), in the opposite direction, to the bivouac near Dolbak, the cavalry covering their rear. The next day they crossed the Little Balkans to the neighborhood of Hainkioi. During the 30th and 31st of July Gourko’s detachment of 16,000 men had been fighting with the whole of the newly formed “Balkan Army” under Suleiman, numbering nearly 50,000 men inall. It was impossible, owing to the course of events on the other side of the Balkans, as will be subsequently explained, to send any substantial reénforcements to Gourko and continue the advance in face of this new army. Gourko was therefore ordered to retreat slowly before the Turks, post a portion of his troops in the passes, and bring the rest to the northern.side ot the mountains. The Bulgarian Legion retired to Shipka; the 9th Dragoons, which had covered its retreat, then made its way past the bashi-bozouks, who had swarmed into the valley of the Tundja, and rejoined Gourko at Hainkiol. On the 3d and 4th of August a small reconnaissance was made to Eski-Zagra, by which it was learned that Suleiman had reduced the entire town to ashes on account of the “treason ” of the inhabitants in asking the Russians to come there, and had then marched his army toward Yeni-Zagra. On the 5th of August all of Gourko’s cavalry retired through the Hainkioi Pass to Tirnova, and on the 8th arrived at the vil- lage of Nikup, 18 miles north of Tirnova ; there it refitted, cured — up lame and sore-backed horses, and generally repaired damages, and was subsequently distributed to the various divisions of which it formed parts. The 1st Brigade 9th Division was posted in the Hainkioi and Elena passes, the 4th Rifle Brigade at Tir- nova, and the Bulgarian Legion, as previously stated, in the Shipka Pass. Gourko himself proceeded to Russia to meet and resume his proper command (2d Cavalry Division of the Guard), which had meantime been mobilized and was en route to the seat of war. The losses of his detachment from the capture of Shipka Pass (July 19th) to their return to the Balkans (August 5th) ADVANCE GUARD UNDER GOURKO. 183 were about 500 men: their total losses from the time of leaving Tirnova (July 12th) to their return to the same place (August 6th) were as follows: Officers. Men. es he we eral ea dS) RLY yo ol det 5) er ell sue sf ouacs, oie! 10 181 TMI OD Ta A a ata ely. cel o:s ain eaten eee 24 709 SER Pele aals eta s csc Mafehea seule Sipe Swe els yx we 57 Me a. sce fel wns Geieeiscetee, OF 947 This expedition of Gourko’s was more than a mere cavalry raid: it was an admirably conducted movement of an advance- guard composed of all arms. With 8,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 32 guns, it had in less than a month gained possession of one of the principal passes of the Balkans, from which the Russians, though terribly attacked, never let go their hold, and which they finally used in January for the passage of a large portion of their army; it had carried a panic throughout the whole of Tur- key between the Balkans and Constantinople; and its scouting parties had penetrated to within 70 miles of Adrianople, the second city of the Empire, and had destroyed the railroad and telegraph on the two principal lines; finally, it had gathered accurate information concerning the strength and positions of the large Turkish force advancing toward the Balkans. In this expedition alone of the whole campaign was the cay- alry energetically handled. On several occasions it fought on foot; it was constantly on the move; it subsisted on the country ; on the 29th and 30th of July 14 squadrons of it (1,800 men) held their own against 4,000 infantry and several hundred bashi- bozouks and Tcherkesses; and it finally covered Gourko’s retreat before a force more than three times superior to his own. The irregular cavalry of the Turks never waited long enough to come to hand-to-hand blows; on one occasion (July 16th), while fight- ing on foot against infantry, the dragoons advanced with fixed bayonets, but the Turks retired without accepting a hand-to-hand struggle. The Russian Cavalry, it will be remembered, is armed with the short Berdan rifle, an arm much superior to the Win- chester and nearly equal to the Peabody-Martini. In artillery, however, the Turkish superiority was clearly proved, especially during the fight of July 29th on the chaussée near Karabunar ; in which the Turks covered the Russian cavalry with shell, while eRe ae aa Ab ae Sue heed) Me ee neal 184 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. the Russian guns (4-pdrs.), even with their reateee Joona n. could not reach the Turkish battery, the distance being som thing over 4,000 yards. During the fight of the 31st near Aidin one well-aimed shell killed and wounded 12 hussars and 10 horses, But the Russian inferiority in armament (as well as in numbers was more than counterbalanced by the skill and onerE with which their squadrons were handled. CHAPTER ITI. OPERATIONS OF THE RIGHT WING UNDER LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BARON KRUDENER. (See Plate 8.) As previously stated, the IX. Corps crossed the Danube by the Sistova bridge on the 10th of July, and immediately moved east- ward toward Nikopolis. Two of the Cavalry regiments (9th Hussars and 9th Dragoons) belonging to this Corps had been taken to form part of Gourko’s detachment. To replace them, the brigade of Caucasian Cossacks (12 squadrons), which origi- nally had also been detailed to Gourko’s detachment, was relieved from him and ordered to report to Kriidener. One of his infan- try regiments (No. 124) was left near Sistova, and another (No. 19) was sent forward toward Bulgareni, on the high-road (Iust- chuk-Plevna-Sophia). With the rest of his corps Kriidener ad- vanced along the direct road to Nikopolis. He arrived in front of the Turkish positions on the 18th, reconnoitred and made his dispositions on the 14th, attacked and carried the field works on the 15th, and on the 16th the fortress capitulated. Nikopolis is a town of some 8,000 or 10,000 inhabitants. Its fortifications consisted of an old masonry fortress situated on a bluff overhanging the river, much out of repair and completely commanded by the hills in rear; the greater part of the town lies outside of this fortress. Behind the town isa plateau, about 700 feet above the river, and from 3 to 8 miles in width, between the Osma River on the west of it and the marshes of the Danube on the east; deep wooded ravines descend abruptly from this plateau to the marshy valleys on either side. About 8 miles west of the Osma River is the Vid River, and between the two is a roll. ing country, the top of which is about 600 feet above the Danube 186 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. level. While the Russians had been demonstrating in front of Nikopolis previous to their passage of the river at Sistova, the Turks had placed several batteries in position for firing across the river and had also lined the Danube bank, as well as the bluffs of the Osma and the Ermenli ravine, with rifle-pits; but after the passage of the Danube they hastily began the construction of some work to defend the place in the rear (south). At the time of Kriidener’s arrival these works consisted of five redoubts—two of them west of the town on the plateau between the Niko- polis ravine and the Osma, one just south of the town, and two east of it near the Danube—and of three batteries in the form of lunettes on the south and southwest of the town, the most advanced being near the village of Voubla; in front of these bat- teries were lines of rifle-pits. In these works there were about ten field guns; and there were several siege guns in batteries facing the river. The Turkish forces consisted in all of 10,000 to 12,000 men, the greater part of which were posted in the works just described, and the rest, 3,000 or 4,000 men, were placed on the hills between the Osma and the Vid, in an intrenched po- sition extending from the village of Gradesti to Missilyeou. Kriidener divided his force for the attack into two portions, one of which, under his own orders, was to advance between the Osma and the Ermenli ravine directly against the Turkish works south of the town; and the other, under Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner, commanding 5th Division, was to move down the left bank of the Osma, assault the heights between that river and the Vid, cut off the Turks from Rahova and Plevna, drive them into Nikopolis, and then take the main po- sitions in flank. The troops were posted as follows at 3 a. m. July 15th: In the center, from Voubla to the Ermenli ravine, 5 batteries of 9-pdrs., supported by the 121st Regiment on their right and the 20th on their left; behind the center of this line was a reserve composed of the 122d Regiment, 3 batteries and 2 sot- nias. On the right, 8 sotnias of the 9th Don Cossacks observed the country between Ermenli and the Danube. On the left, Schilder-Schuldner’s column, composed of the 17th and 18th Regiments, 3 batteries, the 9th Lancers, and the Caucasian Brigade of Cossacks, was posted in the valley of the CAPTURE OF NIKOPOLIS. 187 Osma near the village of Debo; communication between them and the main body was kept up by the 123d Regiment, which _ was in the ravine of Slatina. At 4 a.m. the batteries near Voubla opened fire, and about the same time Schilder-Schuldner began to advance along the valley of the Osma against the heights on its left bank, having on his right the 18th Regiment, which was to attack these heights forming the right flank of the Turkish position, while the 17th Regiment and the 9th Lancers were to incline to the left toward Gradesti, and thus turn the Turkish right flank—the whole attack being based on the idea of driving the Turks znto their fortress and then compelling its surrender. The Caucasian Brigade was to cover the left and rear from any reénforcements which might arrive from Rahova or Plevna. At 7 A. m. the 18th Regiment arrived in front of the Turkish heights, and the artillery which accompanied it (one battery) opened fire, to which the Turks replied energetically ; not long afterward the regiment moved forward to the assault, and after a struggle gained pos- session of the heights, driving the Turks back across the Osma toward Nikopolis. Seeing this, the 123d Regiment moved for- ward toward the Osma, seized the bridge at Missilyeou, sent one battalion across to harass the Turks in retreat, and with the other two battalions moved forward along the road in the valley of the Osma toward the second bridge (at Djournevo). The Turks retreated in good order, delaying the advance of the Rus- sians as much as possible, crossed the Djournevo bridge, and retired to the heights on the right bank of the Osma, between it and the Nikopolis ravine. Two battalions of the 18th Regi- ment then crossed to the right bank (as also the battalion of the 123d Regiment), and joined the 123d Regiment. These five battalions then began to climb the heights north of Djournevo under a hot fire from the Turks. (See Plate 10.) Seeing them appear and reform on the top of these heights, and having learned of their success on the left bank of the Osma, Kriidener then (about 2 p.m.) gave the order for the 20th Regiment and the five batteries on its right to advance—two battalions against the battery nearest Voubla, and one battalion toward the principal redoubt (No. 3) east of the Nikopolis ravine. The battery was carried, though with heavy loss, about 4 p. m., the Turks losing one gun, but retiring with the other two to battery “6.” But the 188 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. battalion advancing against the redoubt was repulsed; the 122d Regiment was brought up to its support, but a second assault was repulsed; a part of the 121st Regiment was then brought up, and a third assault about 6 Pp. m. was successful, and the redoubt wascarried. The 20th and 122d Regiments then advanced along the east side of the ravine in which the town is situated, and arrived in front of the walls of the fortress. Meanwhile the 18th and 123d Regiments continued to advance along the Rahova road on the heights east of the Osma, and toward evening came in front of a large redoubt (marked No. 2 on the map) forming the principal defense from the diree- tion of the west. The Turks sortied from the redoubt against their left flank, but were repulsed. Soon afterward the 17th Regiment and the remaining battalion of the 18th, which had followed the valley of the Osma through the village of Tcher- kovitza, scaled the heights behind that village and opened fire on Redoubt No. 1, near the river. Darkness soon put an end to the fighting. During the night a portion of the Turkish troops tried to break through the Caucasian Brigade and escape toward Plevna, but they were repulsed. The results of the day were therefore the capture of two of the three principal positions of the Turks on the hills outside the fortress, and the investment of the place. Preparations were made for an open assault the next morning, supported by the 9-pdr. field batteries on the heights overlooking the town, and also by the siege batteries on the opposite bank of the Dan- Pal ube, which had kept up a very lively bombardment throughout | the previous day. The troops began to move forward at 4 a. M., but immediately afterward the Turks hoisted a white flag, and — during the morning concluded negotiations for an unconditional surrender. The Turkish losses are not known; 7,000 men, including 300 wounded, surrendered as prisoners of war, and the Russian trophies included 6 flags, 110 guns, over 10,000 small arms, 2 monitors, and a great quantity of ammunition and supplies. The Russian losses were: Officers. Men, BUH ed ie ec SS ad 3 2738 AY OUNCOG: j.'s si ois ale age ara iecae aad ie lah < tapeiw eieaneltne sane 28 921 LSE ETN GT EDA a aE A Pes OP RBARDENE ACNE ONE RNa 4,7 is\oie $4.00 pe taser a aa 84 —— a gi 2) Bares ane RB ENGR MMR nur os oe he 31 1,278 at FIRST BATTLE AT PLEVNA. 189 While these operations had been going on about Nikopolis, Osman Pasha, with an army of 40,000 men of the best troops in Turkey—those that had defeated the Servians in their cam- paign of 1876—was on the march from Widdin toward the east ; and a force of perhaps 10,000 or 12,000 men had left Sophia and was advancing by the high-road which leads through Plevna (a portion of it having been sent to Lovtcha). The exact date when Osman left Widdin is not known; the order was given by the Commander-in-Chief, Abdul-Kerim Pasha, and probably just after the Russians had effected the crossing of the Danube. The head of Osman’s column was first heard of on the 17th of July, when the pickets of the Caucasian Brigade posted along the Vid reported that a strong force coming from the west was marching on the road to Plevna; but neither at the Grand Duke’s Headquarters (then at Tirnova) nor at General Kriidener’s does much importance appear to have been attached to this report. The Grand Duke simply telegraphed an order to Kriidener to “occupy Plevna as promptly as possible.” Kriidener had in fact learned from prisoners even before the capture of Nikopolis that reénforcements were expected from the direction of Rahova and Pleyna, but he put little confidence in the report; for other- wise he would immediately after the capture of Nikopolis (July 16th) have ordered the Caucasian Brigade, and if possible one other regiment of cavalry, to advance to Plevna (which is only 20 miles south of Nikopolis) and find out what force was there. But instead of this the Caucasian Brigade remained the 16th and 17th on the Vid, and on the 18th was sent off on the left flank to Bulgareni, where the road from Sistova to Plevna. comes into the high-road from Rustchuk. In short, Osman Pasha with a large army arrived upon the flank of the Russians with- out their knowing anything about it. There has been much controversy as to who was responsible for this ignorance, but no satisfactory solution has ever been made public. On the 18th of July, as just stated, the Grand Duke directed Kriidener to occupy Plevna; and immediately Kriidener ordered Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner, with the 1st Brigade 5th Division (17th and 18th Regiments), four batteries, and the 9th Don Cossacks, to proceed by Bryslan to Plevna and occupy that town; and he placed under his orders to assist him—1, the 19th Regiment, which with one battery and two sotnias was 190 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. already on the high-road from Rustchuk to Plevna (one battal- ion with the baggage at Bulgareni and the rest at Poradim); 2, the Caucasian Brigade of Cossacks and its mounted battery, which were also at Bulgareni. Schilder-Schuldner moved out the same day, and bivouacked about 10 miles from Nikopolis, sending word to the 19th Regi- ment to move forward to Zgalevitza, and the Caucasian Brigade to Tutchenitza (see map No. 8). On the 19th he continued his march, and about 2 p. m. arrived on the heights south of Ver- bitza, and was halted by the Turkish artillery from the heights of Grivitza. Schilder-Schuldner had no cavalry at all with has main column, and, so to speak, stumbled on the Turks. The 9th Don Cossacks were marching by a road about 5 miles to his right, and at this time (2 p. m. July 19th) were quietly cooking © their soup in their bivouac at Riben, 8 miles to the right and rear of Schilder-Schuldner. When they heard the noise of the latter’s guns they emptied their kettles, mounted, and rode for- ward at a trot toward Plevna. On the Bukova heights, about 24 miles north of Plevna, they came upon a detachment of Turkish infantry, with whom they skirmished till nightfall. On the other flank, the 19th Regiment had advanced as ordered to Zgalevitza and bivouacked there, sending meanwhile two sot- nias of Cossacks in reconnaissance as far as Grivitza, where they were met and driven back by the Turks. The Caucasian Brigade had marched to Tutchenitza without finding any enemy. On the night of July 19th, therefore, the little force of Schilder- Schuldner (9 battalions, 16 squadrons—6,500 men—and 46 guns) — was distributed over a distance of 17 miles, as follows: Near Bukova, 9th Don Cossacks; two miles southwest of Verbitza, 17th and 18th Regiments and 4 batteries; at Zgalevitza, 19th Regiment, 1 battery, and 2 sotnias; at Tutchenitza, Caucasian Brigade and. 1 horse battery. The first portion of Osman’s army had arrived a few days previously (the exact day is not known), and up to the present time they had constructed some trenches near Bukova, on the site of the Grivitza redoubt which subsequently became s0 famous, and on the hills just east and south of the high-road and commanding the approach by the latter. Schilder-Schuldner ordered an attack on all sides at daylight the next morning (July 20th). But already at 4 4. m. the Turks FIRST BATTLE AT PLEVNA. 191 came out of Plevna to attack the Don Cossacks on the extreme right near Bukova. Two companies, of the three which formed the guard of the baggage behind Verbitza, and a battery were sent to the aid of the Cossacks, and thus reénforced they held their ground until-ordered to retreat about noon. About 4.30 a.m. the other three batteries were brought into position opposite the Grivitza ridge and about 2,500 yards north of the intrenchments, and opened fire; the 17th Regiment was placed with one battalion on the left, and two battalions on the right of the batteries, in two lines of company columns; on their right the 18th Regiment in two lines of company columns. After an hour’s cannonade, at 5.30 a.m. the troops moved for- ward, crossed the ravine, and assaulted the Grivitza heights. The western extremity of the trenches was carried, and the 18th Regiment and a few companies of the 17th followed the Turks down the south side of the heights to the very outskirts of Plevna, where they were brought to a halt by a very hot fire from behind the hedges and ditches on the edge of the town. This was at 7 A.m., and they remained here till 11.20, when they received the order to retreat. Meanwhile the rest of the 17th Regiment and all the artillery were two miles behind them on their left rear, making unsuccessful efforts to get possession of the main Grivitza position. On the other flank the 19th Regiment had received at 3 A.M. its orders for the attack, and by 5 a.m. had reached Grivitza; here it brought its battery into action against the trenches south of the chaussée, and after a short cannonade moved forward to the assault in columns of companies ; it carried the first two lines of trenches without much difficulty, had a hard struggle for the third, but finally carried it, and followed the Turks to the edge of the town (on the east side), where they were brought to a stand-still by the heavy fire from the gardens and buildings; this was at 9 a. M. The Caucasian Brigade had moved from Tutchenitza to Radis- chevo, and thence on to the heights in front of that village. Here it opened fire with its little battery on the right flank of the Turks who were opposed to the 19th Regiment ; but finding its guns did not carry half of the distance, it limbered up and moved over toward the 19th Regiment, which it joined when the latter was already in retreat. 192 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. At 9 a.m., therefore, the Russian right and left flanks had carried everything before them and reached Plevna itself from the north and from the east; their center had failed to carry the main Grivitza position ; the two flanks were not in sight and not in communication except by a détour of about seven miles. Then the Turks formed their troops in the town and sallied forth in great numbers on both sides; the Russians were driven back with great loss, their right flank covered by the 9th Don Cossacks to Bryslan, their left covered by the Caucasian Brigade to Zgalevitza. The Turks pursued them only to their lines of trenches, and the fighting was all over by 5 in the afternoon. The Russians preserved their traditional firmness and did not take a panic, but they left on the field a great part of their dead and wounded, as well as 17 caissons, and all the baggage of the © 19th Regiment. Their losses were: 22 officers killed and 52 wounded, and 2,771 men killed and wounded. Nearly two thirds of the officers and over one third of the men were there- fore hors de combat; of the three Colonels commanding regi- ments, two were killed; the General commanding the Ist Brig- ade 5th Division was wounded ; of the six field officers present with the 19th Regiment, two were killed and two wounded. The Russians credit the Turks with a loss of 4,000 men in killed and wounded, but this is a mere estimate, and there is no reason to suppose that their loss was any greater than that of the Rus- sians. The almost criminal faults of this battle on the part of the Russian commander are so apparent that they hardly need to be pointed out. Without having learned anything about the ~ strength or position of the enemy, and without any reserves whatever of his own, his troops were led blindly to. the assault in company columns, along two lines which had no communica- tion with each other, and against an enemy which, as the official report says, was subsequently discovered to be more than four times their own strength! To crown all, the ammunition parks of the left wing had been left back at Bulgareni, 18 miles in rear of the field, and both the artillery and infantry ran short of cartridges during the retreat. Immediately after this defeat Kriidener was ordered to bring the 19th Regiment, which had been so roughly handled, to Nikopolis, and leave it there together with some Roumanian SECOND BATTLE AT PLEVNA. 193 troops that had just crossed the river as a garrison, and to pro- ceed at once with the rest of the IX. Corps to the vicinity of Plevna and take command of all the troops there; and to strengthen his command, a detachment was sent to him under the orders of Lieutenant-General Prince Shakofskoi, consisting of the Ist Brigade 32d Division (XI. Corps) the 1st Brigade 11th Cavalry Division from Tirnova, and the 30th Division (IV. Corps), which had just crossed the Danube. These troops were all on the ground by the 25th of July. The Turks meanwhile were working with the utmost dili- gence upon their fortifications, confident that they would be again attacked in the course of a few days. They strengthened the Grivitza redoubt and the lines between it and Bukova, and began the construction of the group of redoubts just east of the town. By the 30th of July the Grivitza redoubt and four of those of the “middle group” were more or less completed. (See map of Plevna, Plate 12.) Between the Lovtcha high-road and the Vid there were no fortifications at this date. Osman’s army on the 30th num- bered about 40,000 men. Kridener reconnoitred carefully the ground in his front, and, on account of the natural strength of the position and the force of the enemy (who was receiving reénforcements every day), he hesitated to assume the responsibility of an assault of which the issue was doubtful. He therefore telegraphed to the Grand Duke, whose Headquarters were at Tirnova, 80 miles off, asking for instructions. The Grand Duke telegraphed somewhat sharply in reply, on the 28th, that he could not un- derstand his hesitation in attacking as he had been previously ordered to do. Kriidener immediately gave orders for the as- sault, which was to take place on the 30th. On the 29th his troops stood as follows (see Plate 8): 9th Lancers and 9th Don Cossacks, with one horse battery (10 squadrons and 6 guns), at Bryslan; 31st Infantry Division, less 124th Regiment and 1 battery (9 battalions and 40 guns), at Koioulovtsy ; Sth Infantry Division, less 19th Regiment and 1 battery (9 battalions and 40 guns), at Tristenik ; 2d Brigade 30th Division, with 3 batteries (6 battalions and 24 guns), at Karagatch ; 13 194 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. 1st Brigade 30th Division, Ist Brigade 32d Division, 1st Bri- gade 11th Cavalry Division, 6 foot batteries and 1 horse battery (12 battalions, 8 squadrons, and 54 guns), at Poradim; Caucasian Brigade, with 2 horse batteries (12 squadrons and 12 guns), at Bogot. Total, 36 battalions, 30 squadrons, and 176 guns (80 9-pdrs., 72 4-pdrs., 18 horse 4- lee . 6 mountain guns)—say 30,000 men in all, the losses at Nikopolis and at Plevna on July 20th not yet Hee been replaced. The line from Bryslan through Tristenik to Poradim was about 15 miles long, and formed an arc of a circle whose radius was about 10 miles, and whose center was at Plevna. From Poradim to Bogot the distance is about 11 miles. Kridener’s orders for the 30th were as follows: 1. Cavalry on extreme right, under Major-General Losh- kareff, to move forward at 6 a. m., (obesity the enemy, and pro- tect the right flank. 2. Right flank (81st and 5th Divisions), under Lieutenant- General Wilhelminof,to attack the position north of the high- road (Grivitza redoubt) with the 31st Division followed by the 5th Division in reserve. 3. Left flank (1st Brigade 30th Division and 1st Brigade 32d Division), under Lieutenant-General Prince Shakofskoi, to leave Poradim at 5 a. m. and attack the position between Radischevo and Grivitza. 4, Cavalry on extreme left, under Major-General Skobeleff Il., to leave Bogot at 5 a.m. and take position on the Lovtcha high-road near Krishin, and prevent any reénforcements from arriving from Lovtcha. 5. Principal reserve (2d Brigade 30th Division), under direct orders of the Commanding General (Kriidener), to be under arms at Karagatch. 6. The two regiments of cavalry (11th Dragoons and 11th Lancers) were distributed as follows: 4 squadrons to keep up communication between the right and left flanks, and 4 squad- rons in the general reserve. The key of the position was the Grivitza redonbt, which commanded all the others, and against this the largest force was directed (18 battalions and 80 guns); the two flanks were s0 widely separated that there was no chance that they could lend pe ‘a ) in SECOND BATTLE AT PLEVNA. 195 each other any aid. Kriidener’s headquarters were to be on the. left of the right wing, on the heights about 14 mile east of Gri- vitza. (See Plate 12.) The troops were under way by 7 o’clock in the morning. The right wing advanced in two lines—the first line consisting of 6 battalions and 24 guns, the second of 3 battalions and 16 guns, followed by the 9 battalions and 40 guns of the 5th Divi- sion as a reserve, which came into position at 10 o’clock. Soon after 8 o’clock the first line came in range of the Turks, who opened fire. It halted and brought its batteries into position about 3,000 yards east of the Grivitza redoubt. The artillery duel opened about 8:30 a.m. and continued without interruption until 2:30 p.m., the infantry meanwhile not firing a shot. The left wing marched from Zgalevitza to Radischevo with- out finding any enemy, and thence to the heights in front of that village, from which the “ middle group” of redoubts is in easy range (1,500 to 2,500 yards). These heights were occupied by the 1st Brigade 32d Division, and 28 guns, and an artillery fight was begun which also lasted till 2:30 p.m. The results of this cannonade were about equal: two small Turkish batteries were silenced, and three Russian guns dismounted, causing the whole battery to be withdrawn and replaced. At half past two the infantry began to advance on both flanks. The right wing was divided into two columns for the assault, one from the north and one from the east. The first column consisted of the 121st Regiment (Penza) and the 2d and dd Battalions of the 123d (Kozloff), and was followed by the 17th and 18th Regiments asa reserve; the other column, of the Ist Battalion 123d and the 122d (Tamboff) Regiments, with the 20th Regiment (Galitz)inreserve. The 1st Battalion of the Penza Regiment, which had the lead, carried the first line of trenches, situated about 1,000 yards northeast of the redoubt, but was checked by the second line just behind it. This, however, was carried by the 2d Battalion, and they drove the Turks across the _ little ravine and began approaching the redoubt itself ; three com- panies, led by the Major Commanding the 2d Battalion, then - rushed for the redoubt, and actually reached the parapet, where the Major was cut down and most of his followers also perished. The rest of this regiment (Penza) tried to advance in face of the terrible fire, but failed, and it fell back to the ravine; in a few 196 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. minutes it had lost more than a third of its men and half its offi- cers (29 officers and 1,006 men). The Regiment of Kozloff then moved forward to the assault; as before, a few men reached the redoubt and met their death there, but the rest of them did not reach it. While they were still engaged, the 17th and 18th Regi- ments arrived somewhat on their right, but they were equally unsuccessful in their efforts to get into the redoubt. The fire which the Turks kept up from the redoubt and the trenches on either side of it was very severe. Meanwhile the other column (Regiment of Tamboff and 1 Battalion of Kozloff) had moved forward across the ravines just north of the village of Grivitza, with the Regiment of Galitz on its left. The Tamboff Regiment got no farther than a little — mound about 400 yards southeast of the redoubt; the Galitz Regiment was stopped abreast of the Tamboff by the fire from the trenches on the slope south of the redoubt. The two regi- ments remained in place and kept up a lively fusillade. It had now come to be about 6 o’clock. Of the general re- serve, one regiment had been sent to Shakofskoi, and the other was available. One battalion of this latter (No. 120) was then sent, with a squadron of Dragoons and two horse guns, to the right, where the 17th and 18th Regiments were being pressed back. With the aid of these fresh troops they managed to hold on a littlelonger. Finally, at sunset, Kriidener gave orders for another assault from all sides; it was made with desperation (a general officer being killed within 100 paces of the redoubt), but without success. Then Kriidener gave the order to retire, cov- ering his retreat by the two remaining battalions of the 120th Regiment, by the 20th, which had till then lost comparatively little, and by the 124th, which arrived from Sistova during the evening. The firing continued all night, during which the troops were gradually withdrawn; it was daylight before the last of them retired. At 11 a.m. (July 31) they were all assem- bled at Tristenik and Kargatch, and took up position there to receive the enemy if he advanced, which however he did not do. The attack of the right wing had been a total failure. On the left wing, at half past two the two regiments of the 32d Division (Nos. 125 and 126) began descending the Radis- chevo ridge; as they came out of the brush at the bottom of the SECOND BATTLE AT PLEYNA. basil ravine and began climbing the opposite slope, they were re- ceived by a murderous fire from the two redoubts marked Nos. 1 and 8 on the accompanying map, and from several lines of trenches in front of them. But, in spite of terrible losses, these two regiments kept pressing on, and carried one after another of the lines of trenches, and by 5 o’clock had gained possession of the two redoubts. From No. 1 the Turks withdrew 10 pieces, leaving 2 in the hands of the Russians; from No. 8 they suc- ceeded in withdrawing all their artillery. At 5 o'clock, therefore, Shakofskoi had gained possession of the two most southerly redoubts of the “middle group” (the other two remaining still in the hands of the Turks), his left flank had penetrated by a ravine to the edge of the town on the southeast, and his right flank was in Redoubt No. 1. Of the troops forming his second line (1st Brigade 30th Division), one regiment (No. 118) had already been brought into action (one battalion on the left flank and the other two on the right), so that he now had but one regiment in reserve ; of his artillery, 8 guns had been advanced to the knoll on which was subse- quently built Redoubt No. 10, and 16 guns to a position on the right of Redoubt No. 1. Four guns were with Skobeleff, 3 were disabled, and the remaining 21 were kept in reserve. It now became a question whether Shakofskoi could hold the ground he had taken. His right flank, in Redoubt No. 1, was separated from Kriidener’s troops in front of the Grivitza redoubt by a distance of about two miles in a straight line, and as the Turks occupied the intervening space, at least five miles as the troops must march. All hope of mutual support between the two wings was therefore out of the question. The Turks meanwhile were massing a large force in this interval, and pre- paring to advance beyond Shakofskoi’s right (his line of battle faced nearly north) against his line of retreat. At the same time, 5 p. m., Shakofskoi received word from Kriidener that, of the two regiments forming the general reserve, one (No. 119) was already on the road to him, while the other (No. 120) had been directed toward his own (Kriidener’s) position. This regi- ment (No. 119) never reached Shakofskoi’s position, for the fol- lowing reason: On the march between Grivitza and Radischevo it passed about 1,500 yards in front of the column of Turks which was already advancing through this interval. Seeing the 198 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. danger which menaced Shakofskoi’s right and rear if this col- umn continued its advance, the officer conducting this regiment, a captain on the staff at Kriidener’s headquarters, who was fa- miliar with the plan of battle, took the responsibility of halting the regiment and bringing it into action by the right flank against the advancing Turks. This partly filled up the wide interval separating the two wings, and, in conjunction with the firing from the troops near Redoubt No. 1, checked the Turkish advance. The troops in the ravine near the town (Shakofskoi’s left) were meanwhile very hard pressed by fresh Turkish reserves issuing from the town; to sustain them Shakofskoi sent in suc- cession two battalions of the 117th, his only fresh regiment. By 6 o’clock, therefore, every man was engaged, and all hopes of a farther advance were abandoned; and, as their present position was surrounded by the Turks on three sides, it was only a question of holding their ground until dark and then withdrawing back to the Radischevo ridge, which was done in good order. The next morning the troops were marched back to Poradim. Meanwhile, it will be remembered, there was a small force on the extreme left, under the orders of Major-General Skobe- leff II. It was hotly engaged during the whole day, and, al- though small in numbers, was handled with such skill as to establish beyond doubt the military genius of this brilliant young general. His operations were in brief as follows: With the Caucasian Brigade (12 sotnias and 12 small guns), reénforced by one battalion of the 125th Regiment, he left Bogot at 5 a. m. and moved out to the Lovtcha chaussée, and thence up to the village of Krishin. His orders were to prevent any reénforce- ments from arriving from Lovtcha, and in general to cover the left flank of the Russians; in case the Turks retreated, to cross the Vid and strike them in flank. At this date, the Turks had not yet built any fortifications between the Lovtcha road and the Vid. Arrived at Krishin, he left there the bulk of his force in a central position, and, taking 2 sotnias and 4 guns, rode forward to the heights about 300 yards southwest of the town of Plevna. From this point he had a complete view of the whole Turkish position, and noticed that besides the troops in the redoubts the Turks had an immense camp of at least 20,000 SECOND BATTLE AT PLEVNA. 199 men in the valley just north of Plevna, and a considerable force of cavalry behind them in the direction of the bridge over the Vid. When Shakofskoi’s guns opened fire about 10 a. mM. on the Radischevo ridge, Skobeleff also opened fire with his four pieces, and thus diverted about 4,000 Turkish infantry against himself. The Turks made a resolute attack, and Skobeleff with his handful of Cossacks fell back to his main force at Krishin. In this little reconnaissance Skobeleff had taken in at once the whole position of the Turks, and he saw that if they simply moved out about two miles from Plevna on the Lovtcha road, they could occupy a hill (the second knoll of the “ Green Hills,” on which Turkish Redoubt No. 20 was afterward built), from which at 2,500 yards’ range they could enfilade the whole of Shakofskoi’s line and take him in reverse as he advanced ; Shakofskoi could do nothing against this position, as it was sep- arated from his own by a rocky ravine with perpendicular bluffs. It was of vital consequence to keep the Turks away from this hill; and as the best means to accomplish this result, Skobeleff determined to attack energetically with his little detachment. But in order to carry out his instructions about covering the left flank of the whole force, he sent one little detachment of Cossacks to find a ford over the Vid, posted a sotnia between them and Krishin, another sotnia between Krishin and Sha- kofskoi’s position to keep up communication, several strong pickets in the direction of Lovtcha, and finally on the hill near Krishin 3 sotnias and 12 guns. This left him 4 sotnias, and the battalion of infantry with 4 guns; with these Skobeleff moved forward directly against the troops who had attacked him, and who remained on the height just southwest of the town. With them Skobeleff kept up a desperate fight all day and into the night. Until four o’clock he kept 8 companies and 2 sotnias in reserve, leaving the other 2 companies, 2 sot- nias (dismounted), and 4 guns to do the fighting; then, just as his men were beginning to give way, he sent in the other 3 companies ; and thus he managed to keep up the fight until dark, and also to remove all his wounded. After dark, covered by the remaining 2 sotnias, he made good his retreat to Kri- shin, and reassembled there the whole of his little force, or what was left of it, for the infantry had lost over 50 per cent. But Skobeleff had gained his object, and had kept the Turks 200 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. away trom this hill, from which, if they had occupied it, they would have cut Shakofskoi’s troops to pieces. During the night Skobeleff received orders to return to Bogot and thence to Pe- lishat. : Thus ended in complete failure the battle of July 30th, the second of the series of assaults upon Plevna. The Russian loss, out of 30,000 men engaged, was 169 offi- cers and 7,186 men. Of this number, 2,400 men had been killed and were left upon the field. The regiments which suffered the most were the 121st in Kriidener’s Corps, and the — 126th in Shakofskoi’s. These two regiments had led the as- saults; the latter lost 725 killed! besides some 1,200 or more wounded—a total loss of about 75 per cent. of its strength. The Turkish loss, as usual, is not accurately known, but it was estimated at between 5,000 and 6,000 men. On receiving the news of this defeat, the Grand Duke hastened from Tirnova to Karagatch, and on the 2d of July inspected the troops in the positions which they oceupied from Tristenik to Poradim ; they were in good spirits notwithstand- ing their recent rough handling. The trait which more than any other distinguishes the Russian soldier is his steadiness and solidity ; he never has taken a panic, and, though he was terribly defeated, there was none now. Some of the wounded carried exaggerated tales to Sistova, and a grand stampede took place among the inhabitants and camp-followers on both sides of the bridge. But there was nothing of this kind among the troops. Had Osman followed them, he would probably have met a very stubborn opposition ; the positions about Tristenik and Poradim are favorable to the defense, and the 16th Division, which had just crossed the Danube, was within one day’s march, besides the rest of the XI. Corps, which might have been brought from Tirnova (three days’ march) if necessary. It would appear at first sight as if Osman made a great mistake in not pursuing the force which he had so signally defeated, especially as he probably had a considerable force of fresh troops which had not been engaged at all, and as the Russians had retreated in two columns on divergent country roads totally independent of each other, leaving the great high-road midway between them per- fectly open. Yet itis a fact that every offensive movement of the Turks throughout the war came to naught, and it is more SECOND BATTLE AT PLEVNA. 201 than probable that Osman did exactly the wisest thing; he felt sure that the Russians would come at him again as soon as they got a few more men together, and he therefore kept his troops on their own ground, and set them to work as hard as they could with their spades. The failure of the Russians on this day gave rise to much hard feeling and recrimination. Shakofskoi complained that Kriidener had not supported him, while Kriidener complained that Shakofskoi had not obeyed his orders, which were to ad- vance to the hill midway between Radischevo and Grivitza, and due east of Plevna, and open fire with his artillery, but not to assault without further orders. Kriidener was the senior officer present, but Shakofskoi was also a Corps Commander, though he had only one brigade of his Corps with him. Finally, the Grand Duke had given orders from a distance to attack a posi- tion of which he knew nothing, and against a partial remon- strance of the General (Kriidener) in local command. It is none of our business to follow these controversies, or try to fix the responsibility of the failure. It is enough for us foreigners to notice the plain facts: 1. That a strongly fortified position was attacked by an in- ferior force. 2. That the attack was made by two columns not in sup- porting distance, but wholly independent of each other. 3. That against the Grivitza Redoubt the regiments were sent to the assault one after the other, not at the critical moment when the regiment already engaged was beginning to waver, but after it had been wholly driven back. 4. That the tactical formation of two lines of company columns was maintained long after the troops came under fire. This close formation partially accounts for the great losses, about 25 per cent. of all the troops on the field. The redeeming feature of the day was Skobeleff’s brilliant manoeuvres with a handful of troops on the left flank, whereby he saved Shakofskoi from being knocked to pieces. CELA ATi eve GENERAL CONDITION OF AFFAIRS AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST.— BATTLE OF SHIPKA PASS, AUGUST 21ST TO 26TH.—OPERATIONS ON THE LOM IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. (See Plate 11.) Tue decisive defeat at Plevna on the 30th of July brought the Russian advance to a standstill. The positions of the op- posing armies at that time were as follows: The Russians occu- pied a figure nearly elliptical in shape, and extending from Nikopolis, through Poradim, Selvi, Gabrova, Shipka, Elena, Cesarevo, Katselevo, and the line of the Lom, to the Danube near Rustchuk; from Sistova to the Shipka Pass, 1. e., along the major axis of the ellipse, the distance, following the high- road through Tirnova, is about 80 miles; from Poradim to Katselevo, the minor axis, the distance is about 90 miles by the road. The six Corps (IV., VIII., [X., XI., XII, and XIII.) occupying this space had lost about 15,000 men in killed and wounded since the beginning of the campaign. Their total strength was therefore probably about 120,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 648 guns of all kinds. There was also Zimmer- mann’s detachment off in the Dobrudja, numbering about 25,- 000 men (XIV. and part of VII. Corps), but this was necessarily limited to the defensive rdle of covering the communications of the army from any attack from the Dobrudja, and it could not be of any assistance to an offensive movement. The Turks were on the exterior of this ellipse, and occupied in force three points (Plevna, Yeni-Zagra, and Rasgrad) situated nearly at the angles of an equilateral triangle whose sides are CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN AUGUST. 203 from 70 to 90 miles long. Osman commanded at Plevna with 50,000 men, Suleiman at Yeni-Zagra with 40,000, Mehemet Ali at Rasgrad with 65,000. They also had strong detachments at Loytcha and at Osman Bazar, as well as in the Quadrilateral fortresses. ‘Their total force in the field numbered about 195,- 000 men of all arms. Two feasible plans were therefore open to the Russian Com- mander-in-Chief : 1. To leave small detachments at Shipka and on the Tirnova- Shumla and Biela-Rasgrad roads, and then transfer the VIIL., XI., and XIII. Corps with the utmost rapidity to Plevna, and unite them with the IV. and [X. Corps already there, and over- whelm Osman ; then move his army rapidly to Tirnova or Biela, according to the movements of the Turks meantime, and attack the other Turkish detachment; the united Russian army was larger than any one of the widely scattered detachments around it, and it had the advantage of short interior lines; or 2. To leave the troops on the defensive in their present posi- tions, and quietly await the arrival of reénforcements from Russia. All idea of carrying on the original plan of campaign with the troops actually in hand was out of the question; for the two wings posted to cover the flanks—IV. and IX. Corps on the line of the Vid, XII., XIII., and XI. Corps on the Lom—had each an enemy numerically superior in their fronts, and there was nothing left to cross the Balkans with except the VIII. Corps, which was obviously not sufficient in strength. More- over, the right flank was, properly speaking, not covered at all; for the two most important points along that line, Plevna and Lovtcha, were in the hands of the Turks and strongly occupied. The terrible error of underestimating the enemy and beginning the war with an inadequate force was apparent to every one, and was freely acknowledged. The singular part of it is, that the same mistake was committed in 1828, and again in 1829. To the first plan, independently of its military difficulties, requiring most active leadership and prompt movements, and resulting if unsuccessful in a retreat across the Danube, there were also the gravest political objections. It was a war which brought out the long pent-up hatreds engendered by difference of race, irreconcilable religions, and centuries of oppression and 204 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. misrule on one side and suffering on the other. The two classes of the population fled in turn before the approach of the oppos- ing armies, the Mohammédans before the Russians, the Bulga- rians Peo the Turks. Suleiman Pasha had already burned the large town of Eski-Zagra to the ground, and had begun in the valley of the Maritza a wholesale system of hanging at the street corners every Bulgarian who had assisted (as guide, etc.) Gourko’s troops during their stay south of the Balkans. As a result the Bulgarians, to the number of nearly 100,000 souls, were fleeing north over the Balkans. If the Russians now with- drew from any of the territory they had occupied, they left the Christian population to the chance of being massacred. In a war undertaken for their liberation, this was not to be thought of. The second plan was therefore decided upon, and on the 3d of August the Emperor signed the order for the mobilization of the Guard, the Grenadiers, and two divisions of the Line (24th and 26th). Two other divisions of the Line (2d and 3d) had been ordered mobilized just after the outbreak of the war. The strength of these troops was as follows: Battalions. | Squadrons. | Foot guns. | Horse guns, Corps.of the Guard oo. Seb eee bites eet eters 53 24 148 12 2d and 3d Divisions of Grenadiers................... 24 4: 96 a 24 Division of the Line;..: 25 0.6 cece ce els eee 12 ae 48 3d as oh St Ts Diese o Sante aie oistatnis ier atom tee iavete 12 a 48 24th “ é St ob Giee tele Maniceery na ee age ise 12 48 26th “ * dg Sic Sigtareve yeahs le oe oO EE nates 12 48 istCavairy Division .. js. .5.<- tse cp ete seers 18 < 12 otal | o.oo s5e sc accep eee eeeee apie aene 125 42 ; 486 24 or in all about 120,000 men and 460 guns. In addition to this, the Emperor had a few days previously (July 22d) issued a ukase calling out a portion of the first ban of the militia *—188,000 men—to replace the losses already in- curred in battle, and to be ready to replace those of the future. Of the Reserve, three Divisions (86,000 men) were ordered to be mobilized in addition to one division which had been previously mobilized; part of these were destined for garrison duty at home, and part to replace the regular troops on the line of the étapes in Russia and Roumania. * The difference between the Militia and the Reserve is explained at p. 19. CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN AUGUST. 205 The effect of these measures was to call out 120,000 men for service at the front, and 220,000 more to replace losses and do ordinary duty. They arrived on the Danube as follows: the 2d and 3d Divisions in August, the Guard and the 26th Divi- sion in September, the Grenadiers and the 24th Division in October. The 188,000 men of the Militia began to arrive in August, and continued arriving till long after the peace of San Stefano; they came as squads of recruits destined to this or that regiment, and were immediately incorporated with it. But as only a small portion of all these troops would be available in the course of the next few weeks, an appeal was made to the Prince of Roumania to put his army into the field, to which he promptly responded. The Roumanian Army consisted of 32,000 Infantry, 5,000 Cavalry, and 84 guns, or- ganized into 4 Divisions. They had all been mobilized and ready for active service since the month of May; a portion of the 4th Division had already crossed the Danube and gone into garrison at Nikopolis. Orders were immediately given for the passage of the remainder. Such were the measures taken by the Russians for carry- ing on the struggle, and until the arrival of at least a portion of these reénforcements they were restricted to a simply defen- sive réle in the positions which they had already gained. This was the moment therefore for the Turks to strike a vigorous blow. Mehemet Ali had arrived at Shumla on the 22d of July, and relieved the aged Pasha, Abdul Kerim, of the command of the Army of the Lom and the troops in the fortresses. Suleiman, after driving Gourko back into the Bal- kans, August Ist, had quietly encamped near Yeni-Zagra for the next 15 days. On his movements depended in a large degree the success of the Turkish offensive, and it is not too much to say that he adopted the very worst plan possible under the cir- cumstances. There was no Turkish Commander-in-Chief at this time, the three Commanders, Mehemet Ali, Suleiman, and Os- man, being independent of each other and equal in rank; and they were all directed by telegraph from Constantinople, where a “ War Council” was in constant session giving orders in the Sultan’s name—as bad a system as could possibly be conceived. Suleiman had the option of joining his army to either one of the other two (a ten days’ march), and then striking a vigor- 206 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. ous blow at the Russian flank and their communications by the Sistova bridge; or of trying to force his way over the Bal- kan passes directly in his front. The road to Plevna by the Trojan Pass was not a good one, and it led rather dangerously near the Russian positions at Selvi; moreover, even supposing they gained a victory at Plevna, the Turks could not advance against Sistova without recapturing the fortress of Nikopolis. On the other hand, the road toward Shumla led over the Slivno- Shumla Pass, which is one of the best high-roads over the Bal- kans, and was nowhere nearer than 30 miles to any of the Russian positions. By taking the garrisons of Shumla and Varna, the united forces of Mehemet Ali and Suleiman would have been more than 125,000 men. By throwing these upon the Russian left wing, they would have compelled the Russians to let go their hold of Shipka in order to get together even 90,000 men (VIIL., XI., XII., and XIII. Corps) to resist them ; and if they beat the Russians in a decisive battle, there was nothing to prevent their reaching the Sistova Bridge, while if they were beaten they simply fell back upon the fortresses. — Such was the plan which it is said Mehemet Ali urged, but Suleiman was determined to attack the Shipka Pass directly in front, and he was sustained by the War Council. Suleiman moved forward on the 16th, and began his attack on Shipka on the 21st of August, and kept it up with more or less energy for the next four months. Without gaining the least material advantage in so doing, he sacrificed the best part of the fine army he brought with him from Montenegro. | Osman, on the 31st of August, made a lame attempt at the offensive in front of Plevna, but it resulted in nothing; and ten — days later (September 11th) he was attacked by the Russians— the third and principal battle of Plevna, unsuccessful like its predecessors, but eventually followed by the investment of Osman’s army and its ultimate surrender. Mehemet Ali, after some preliminary skirmishing, began his attack on the Cesarevitch’s army (Russian left wing) on the 30th of August, and drove it back from the Lom to the Yantra. Then he suddenly stopped, and a few days later, toward the end of September, returned to his old positions. Such in brief was the result of the Turkish offensive. We will now follow these movements somewhat in detail. : BATTLE OF SHIPKA PASS. 207 SULEIMAN PASHA’S ATTACK ON SHIPKA PASS, AUGUST 20TH—26TH. (See Plate 18.) In the vicinity of Shipka the peaks of the Balkans are nearly 5,000 feet above sea-level. The valley of the Tundja, which is parallel to the chain and only a few miles from it on the south, has an altitude of about 1,300 feet; on the north the head waters of the Yantra near Gabrova are at about the same altitude. Near Shipka the chain throws out three long and nearly parallel spurs to the north, and these spurs, although shorter, are also distinguishable on the south; they are separated by deep wooded ravines, and are only united at the top by saddles in the main range of the mountains. The central one of these we may call the Shipka ridge, the easterly one the Berdek, the westerly the Bald Mountain ridge. It is a misnomer to speak of the Shipka Pass as a pass in the ordinary meaning of the word; for the road does not pass through a gorge or ravine between high peaks, but on the contrary it follows the whole length of the central spur and passes over its highest point. From Gabrova the road follows a small stream for about 5 miles to the south and then takes a sudden turn to the east, and in the course of a mile of very steep ascent climbs on to the ridge; it then follows the grad- ual slope of the ridge for about 3 miles to Mount St. Nicholas, the highest point; from here the road descends rapidly in steep zigzags to the village of Shipka. Near the summit of the cen- tral or Shipka spur are three sets of little hills or ridges about 200 feet high, running across the main ridge; the highest and most southerly of these is called Mount St. Nicholas, and for conve- nience we will call the other two the “Central” and “Northern” hills. The highest points of the western and eastern spurs are known respectively as the Berdek and the Bald Mountain. They dominate the whole position, and are reached by narrow paths along the mountain. The Russian position was on the three sets of little hills just mentioned. On St. Nicholas, the southern side of which is in part a perpendicular rock, the Russians had three batteries, which had originally been built by the Turks for the defense of the pass from the north, and which now, with slight alteration, served the same purpose in an opposite direc- tion; in these the Russians had 25 guns. On the left and rear of St. Nicholas (i. e., to the northeast of it) runs a little spur 208 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. about 250 yards long, at the end of which the Russians had 7 steel guns, previously captured from the Turks. Connecting this steel battery with Mount St. Nicholas were some trenches hastily thrown up in the rocky soil. On the central hill were the “central” battery and “round” battery, each armed with 4 guns, and some rude trenches. On the 15th of August the Russian troops in this neighbor- hood consisted of 34 battalions, or about 27,000 men, with their proportionate artillery and a small force of cavalry, and were posted as follows: At Tirnova, Headquarters of VIII. Corps and of 14th Divi- sion, 55th and 56th Regiments and 4th Rifle Brigade, and 40 guns; At Selvi, Headquarters 9th Division, 35th, 53d, and 54th Regiments, 3 sotnias of Cossacks, and 24 guns; In Shipka Pass, 36th Regiment, 5 battalions of Bulgarian Legion, 5 sotnias of Cossacks, and 29 guns; In Travna Pass, 1 battalion Bulgarian Legion ; In Hainkioi Pass, 33d Regiment, 2 sotnias, and 14 guns; In Elena Pass, 34th Regiment, 13th Dragoons, and 2 guns. Tirnova and Selvi are each two days’ march from Shipka. On the 16th of August Suleiman’s troops first made their appearance by a demonstration against the Hainkioi Pass, and on the 18th a detachment occupied Bebrova, on the Elena road, at the same time that the head of the main column appeared at Kazanlyk. General Radetzky, commanding the VIII. Corps, immediately ordered the 35th Regiment to proceed in all haste to Shipka, but he was sufficiently deceived by this demonstration against the Elena Pass to proceed thither in person with the 4th — Rifle Brigade and the 55th and 56th Regiments. Finding no enemy in force, he returned to Tirnova on the 21st, and there received word from Shipka that the Turks had attacked in great force. In spite of their fatigue, he started the 4th Rifle Brigade and the 55th and 56th Regiments toward Shipka at daylight the next morning, and also telegraphed to the 2d Division (which had just arrived and was in bivouac between Gorni-Studen and Selvi) to proceed to Selvi and relieve the 53d and 54th Regiments, which were then to proceed to Shipka. In other words, all available troops were ordered to Shipka except the two regiments guarding the Hainkioi and Elena Passes. Radet- BATTLE OF SHIPKA PASS. 209 zky himself arrived on the field in the afternoon of August 23d. Meanwhile Gen. Darozhinsky, who commanded the little force of about 5,000 men at Shipka Pass, and who, on account of the difficulty of procuring water on the mountain, had kept his men in bivouac in the village of Shipka, noticed the approach of the Turks on the 18th, retired to the pass on the 19th, and on the 20th saw the whole force of Suleiman deploy in the plain just below him, and counted 40 battalions, probably 26,000 to 28,000 men, besides a large number of Tcherkesses. He imme- diately disposed his little force as follows: 1 battalion behind St. Nicholas and the “Steel” battery; 14 battalion of Russians and 3 of Bulgarians along the Central Hill; and 14 battalion of Russians and 2 of Bulgarians, as a reserve, on the “isthmus,” between the Central and St. Nicholas Hills. On the morning of the 21st the Turks were visible on the Berdek Mountains, constructing a battery about 2,000 yards from St. Nicholas. In spite of the Russian shells, they finished the construction of it and placed 4 guns in position. After one or two minor attacks, the Turks moved forward about noon from the Sugar-Loaf Hill, and began an assaultwith 20 battalions against the “Steel” battery, on the left flank of Mount St. Nicholas. They attacked with the utmost desperation, but were as despe- rately received, and the struggle went on from a little afternoon till 8 o’clock at night. Again and again the Turks came on yell- ing “Allah,” and rushed up the slope to within a few yards of the battery; but they could go no farther. Their last attack was made by moonlight about 9 p. m., and being repulsed they tried no more for that day; but they remained in the positions they had taken—the most advanced of which was not over 100 yards from the Russian battery—and kept up a constant fire throughout the night. During the day the 35th Regiment had arrived from Selvi and taken position behind the “ Round” battery. The next morning, 22d, the Turks opened a very heavy fire from Berdek, where they now had 10 guns in position; from the Bald Mountain on the opposite flank, whither they had dragged during the night 6 guns; and from the “Woody Mountain,” where they had also placed 2 guns. In short, their batteries were in front, on both flanks, and in the rear of the Russian posi- 14 210 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. tion ; only by reason of intervening woods the battery at Woody Mountain could not reach St. Nicholas, but it completely com- manded the “Central” and “ Northern” Hills. Throughout this day (August 22d) a continuous fire of artillery and infantry was kept up, but the Turks made no serious attacks; a few guns were dismounted on both sides, but a far more serious danger was threatening the Russians in the lack of artillery ammunition, which was nearly exhausted. Both parties worked all day at repairing their batteries, and the Turks at covering their advanced positions by shelter-trenches. Meanwhile the Turks were withdrawing a portion of their troops in reserve behind Berdek and sending them over to the western spur (Woody Mountain), with the intention of attacking the right flank of the Russians at the Central Hill (held by the 35th Regiment), and thus cutting off their communications with Gabrova. At the same time a body of Tcherkesses descended the eastern spur and threatened the high-road from that side. On the morning of the 23d, in fact, the Russian position was well-nigh surrounded on all sides ; the narrow ridges, along which ran the high-road, connecting the little hills which formed the Russian position, were wholly exposed to a cross-fire of the Turks at 1,500 to 2,000 yards’ range. At 6 o’clock in the morning Suleiman began his attack, and it soon became general from all sides, one column rushing at the rocks on the south of St. Nicholas, another against the right flank of the Central Hill (where the Russian faced west), and a third against the round battery on the left flank of this hill (where > ayes shy xe 12 6 Brigade Caucasian Cossacks...........00-ceeccecccscsesececeeees He i 12 6 Regular Roumanian Cavalry Brigade... ........0..-eeeeeeeeeeeee | an Se WLS 8 6 Militia Roumanian Cavalry Brigade... ........... cece ees eeee cece Be ud 8 BR OEE eames cio aah Na clcla cree elt e's we. dislene a aibisiere Fleiss as 44 | 102 86 48 Or about 35,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and the usual propor- tion of artillery for each arm. On the 22d Gourko personally reconnoitered the positions at Telis and Gorni-Dubnik, and on the 23d issued the necessary orders for his advance the next day. The country on the west of the Vid differs completely from that on the east. As seen from the heights of Medevan, it appears to be a vast plain, but, on descending into it, is found to have long gradual slopes, rising perhaps to the height of 150 feet at the most above the level of the Vid. These slopes are cut through by occasional rivulets flowing to the Vid, and form- 272 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. ing what are known on our Western plains as coulées. The villages of Telis and Dolni-Dubnik are situated about 7 miles apart, in the same coulée which flows north to Gorni-Etropol, and thence east, emptying into the Vid about three miles north of the Plevna bridge. The village of Dolni-Dubnik is near the head of another similar coulée. The depth of these coulées varies from 60 to 100 feet, and their width from 200 to 1,000 yards. The high-road coming from Sophia passes through the village of Telis, and then keeps a straight course to Dolni-Dubnik (and thence to the Plevna bridge), leaving Gorni-Dubnik about half a mile on its left (north). On the plain around Dolni-Dubnik were six little redoubts, three north and three south of the village. At Telis was a large irregular line of breastwork, northeast of the village, divided in two by the road, and running down on either flank to the stream in the coulée. On the other (southwest) side of the village was a large redoubt. Near Gorni-Dubnik the fortifications were weakest of all. At the point (about a mile southwest of the village) where the road crosses the coulée was one of those ancient tumuli so fre- quently found in Turkey, about 40 feet in diameter at the base and 15 feet high. The Turks had leveled off a part of the top of this mound so as to make a cavalier holding four guns, and they had then surrounded this with a rudely constructed redoubt upon a polygonal figure about 300 yards in diameter. The parapet of this redoubt was only 4 feet high and 6 feet thick, and the ditch had _ about the same proportions. In order to partly cover what would otherwise have been a dead space at the bottom of the coulée, there were some trenches on the slope outside of the redoubt. At the edge of the road near the redoubt was a small stone post- road station, and just opposite it, on the southern side of the road, the Turks had built a three-sided lunette of about 50 yards front. Two thousand yards farther to the southeast, their pickets had a few rifle-pits, on a little eminence covered with thick brushwood. Gourko’s plan of attack was as follows: 1. 20 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 48 guns to attack the posi- tion at Gorni-Dubnik on three sides, viz., from the north, east, and south. BATTLE OF GORNI-DUBNIK. 273 9. 12 battalions, 11 squadrons, and 44 guns, to cover the attack on the side of Dolni-Dubnik. 8. 4 battalions, 17 squadrons, and 20 guns, to cover the attack on the side of Telis. 4, 7 battalions, 44 squadrons, and 34 guns, under General Arnoldi, to make a strong demonstration on the north of Dolni- Dubnik, in order to retain the garrison in that place; and at the same time a portion of these troops to operate on the west of Gorni-Dubnik, in order to cut off the retreat of the Turks, and another portion to reconnoiter in the valley of the Isker and toward Lukovitza. 1. Attack of Gorni-Dubnek. The troops designated for this purpose passed the Vid at the Cirakova ford between midnight and daylight of the 24th of October, and were divided into three columns (Plate 15), viz.: On the right, under Major-General Ellis, the Rifle Brigade (4 battalions), with 3 sotnias and 16 4-pdr. guns. In the center, under Major-General Zeddeler, the Moscow and Grenadier Regiments, and the Sapper battalion (8 battalions), with 1 sotnia and 16 9-pdr. guns. On the left, under Major-General Rosenbach, the Paul and Finland Regiments, 8 battalions, with 16 4-pdr. guns. These columns took up the march soon after 6 A. M., and at 8:30 a. m. they arrived in position: the center column on the little eminence southeast of the redoubt, the right column on the high road northeast of it, the left column on the high-road on the southwest, all at a distance of about 1,800 yards. They deployed their troops in two lines of company columns and a reserve, and placed their batteries in the center of the first line and opened fire. At the same time the brigade of Caucasian Cossacks (coming from the command of General Arnoldi) arrived on the hill northwest of the redoubt, and opened fire with six horse-guns. The redoubt was therefore at 9 a. m. surrounded with 56 guns, which kept up an incessant fire upon it, inflicting considerable losses on the Turks, whose means of shelter in their hastily constructed redoubt were not very good. A little after 10 a. wu. Colonel Lioubovitzky, commanding the Grenadier Regiment, led it forward to the assault. They earried the lunette on the southeast of the road, and then followed the 18 274: THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. retreating Turks and made a vigorous effort against the main work; but they were driven back by a murderous fire and took refuge behind the lunette, the post-house, and in the ditches on either side of the high-road. General Zeddeler then sent the Moscow Regiment and the two batteries to their support; the Regiment found shelter in the ditches of the road on the right of the Grenadiers. The batteries advanced to within 900 yards of the redoubt, but at this distance their horses and gunners were picked off by the Turks with such accuracy that they were obliged to return to their first position. General Zeddeler, Colonel Lioubovitsky, and Colonel Scalon (chief of staff of the division) were all wounded about this time; the troops remained in the ditches of the road, which (see sketch) was nearly parallel to one side of the redoubt and but 60 to 80 yards from it, and from there kept up a fire with the Turks. Meanwhile the column of the right, upon arriving on the high-road, had come under the fire of the artillery in the works near Dolni-Dubnik. Leaving one battalion to face these works, the other three had turned to the left and advanced to some small mounds about 1,900 yards from the redoubt, and had here opened fire with their artillery. When the Grenadier Regiment assaulted the redoubt from the east, their men remained so close to the redoubt that at that distance it was impossible to tell exactly where they were, and therefore the batteries were advanced to 900 yards and there commenced their fire, but were soon obliged to retire to a greater distance. The place of the battalion which had been left facing Dolni-Dubnik was now taken by the ist Brigade 1st Division, which arrived on the high-road, andthe __ other regiment (Izmailof) of this column, which was to protect the right flank, was sent to the support of the batteries, while the whole of the Rifle Brigade descended into the coulée near 3 the village, and crept along its slopes until they came under the fire of the trenches on the hillside, northwest of the redoubt. The column of the left had arrived about the same time as the others (8:30 to 9 a. m.) on the high-road between Gorni- Dubnik and Telis, and then, turning by the right flank, had advanced and opened fire with its batteries. "When they saw the Grenadier Regiment advancing to the assault, they also formed on both sides of the high-road, crossed the coulée, and began climbing the hill against the redoubt. But the fire was terribly BATTLE OF GORNI-DUBNIK. 275 hot, and they could not stand it; they fell back, the Finland Regiment to the dead angle at the bottom of the coulée, and the Paul Regiment behind a bend in the coulée on the left flank and in rear of the Grenadiers. General Rosenbach, commanding the column, and Colonel Rounoff, commanding the Paul Regiment, were both wounded in this assault. At noon, therefore, the condition of things was as follows: The Russians had made an assault on the north, east, and south- west, and had been repulsed; the Paul and Finland regiments were in the ravine southwest of the work; the Grenadier and Moscow regiments in the ditches of the high-road a few rods from the redoubt, on the southeast; the Izmailof Regiment between the high-road and the village of Gorni-Dubnik, on the northeast ; and the Rifle Brigade in the ravine, north and north- west of the redoubt; the artillery in nearly the same positions as during the morning, but its action much hindered by the fear of hitting their own troops, who were so close to the redoubt. The troops rested in these positions with desultory firing for the next three hours. At 2 p.m. Gourko, who had been during the morning with the column on the right, came in person to the little hill where were the batteries of the column of the center, and here he received word that the four battalions (Jager Regi- ment) sent against Telis had met with a terrible repulse, and had fallen back, leaving the road from Telis partly open to an attack by Turkish reénforcements coming from that direction. It was evidently necessary to strike hard and quickly, else his position became a very critical one. Gourko therefore deter- mined to attack from all sides at 3 p.m. For the result I will give his own words, translated literally from his report: “TI gave in person the necessary orders to General Brock, who had taken command of the First Brigade Second Di- vision of the Guard, and I sent a written order to General Ellis. “Tn order that the attack might be simultaneously made by all the troops, I decided that, when all the orders had been given, I would have three volleys fired by the batteries on the left; that three volleys should then be fired in succession by those on the center and on the right; and that after the last volley fired by these latter all the troops should rush forward to the assault. I calculated that a simultaneous attack made on 276 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. all points and at very short distances (100 to 400 paces) would be crowned with success. “ After having given these orders, I went to the column on the left and examined the position of all the troops; I then returned to the battery, where I gave in person the necessary orders to General Count Shouvaloff, commanding the Second Division of the Guard. But before Count Shouvaloff had had time to transmit his orders to the troops, three volleys were fired in succession by the batteries of the column on the right, and this column rushed forward to the assault. The signal agreed upon was thus not observed, and my calculations for a simultaneous attack were bafiled. “It was with a sinking heart (Ze cewr défaillant) that I fol- lowed what was about to take place; for in place of a simulta- neous assault on all points, there were going to be isolated assaults one after another, of which the success was more than doubtful. To remedy matters as far as possible, and to sustain the column on the right, which had already begun the assault, I sent orderly officers in all directions to give the troops the order not to wait any longer for the signal, but to support the attack of the column on the right. As was to be expected, a series of attacks one after another took place. Received by an extremely murderous fire, no one body of troops could reach the great redoubt. But, with the exception of the Finland Regiment, no one of them fell back; moving forward, they lay down behind shelter of one sort or another, and a few arrived within ' 40 paces of the redoubt. As for the Finland Regiment, not. finding any shelter in front of it, it was obliged to fall back, and establish itself again on the slope of the ridge in the dead space. In this assault Major-General Lavroff, commanding the Finland Regiment, who was marching at the head of his regi- ment with heroic intrepidity, fell, mortally wounded. “ After this series of assaults, which were over by 4 o’clock in the afternoon, all the batteries ceased firing, for the troops were so close to the redoubt that their fire reached our own troops. “As for withdrawing the troops in order to continue to can- nonade the redoubt, it was absolutely impossible to do it, on account of the losses which they would unquestionably have suffered in this movement, and especially on account of the bad acting BATTLE OF GORNI-DUBNIK. 277 impression which this movement in retreat would have pro- duced upon the morale of the troops. I decided then to leave the troops in the positions which they occupied, and to make a new assault at nightfall. After having given the necessary orders, I returned to the eminence opposite the village of Gorni- Dubnik to there await the twilight. “There was observable a terrible silence, a silence of death. When darkness came, several bodies of troops crept closer to the redoubt. Two battalions of the Izmailoff Regiment, Major- General Ellis II., of the suite of H. M. the Emperor, com- manding the regiment, at the head, advanced thus by crawling for about 150 paces, and thus came within 50 paces of the redoubt. Simultaneously the troops rushed forward, and almost from all sides they penetrated into the redoubt. The immense flame of a fire which burst forth in the center of the enemy’s work lit up the whole neighborhood, and announced the fall of the redoubt which the Turks had so long and so stubbornly defended.” The Russian trophies were 1 Pasha, 53 officers, and 2,235 men (not wounded) prisoners, 1 standard, 4 guns, and a large number of small arms and ammunition. The Turkish losses were about 1,500 men. Those of the Russians were as follows: 2 brigade commanders and the chief and 38 officers of the Division Staff, wounded ; 2 regiment commanders and 1 battal- ion commander killed; 1 regiment commander and 3 colonels wounded ; and the following: : KILLED. WOUNDED, Field | Company Men Field | Company | Men. Officers. | Officers, “| Officers. | Officers, BStAI a. s,.'e Pail ste sia aiciaidiele e,w et alee ealaieie So seas oe aie 1 4 1 MEMIMONO EE CBCOLU So rs Fe occ saed doighols vel bea boseccen il 1 1 4 Perigo ROPINENE soi: /s)anscalnasis.c savocsees 1 5T ai! 6 219 BemCOW ELCOIMODE. ek eed cece ee wases 3 95 1 12 421 rrenadior Regiment..........essc.cscacee ace 8 310 4 22 594 UE MCTGT TC Pail dine 1 a Ea a a 6 164 ) 11 500 mE SER EL OMATINOT a 5 occ: dear pont nin Worst ws 8 aioe.o 1 2 106 4 10 328 MEMEMEIGRUG?S cance oie Ad ave Piece vob Ge ticn ne 1 56 1 12 214 eter EGLAUOM Ds ce'e oy dein enka ves shies sees 6 5 1 ns 58 BEDE RHEE A co Tae hice esos sa tle kas os 1 7 2 1 49 LORI ee Matted Or ake cee ce asaaded 1 17 811 1T 19 2,884. Total, 116 officers and 3,195 men. 2. Attack of Telis. The column whose mission was to protect the Russian left flank against any attack from the direction of Telis, and if pos- 278 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. sible to gain possession of that place, was composed of the Jiger Regiment (4 battalions), the Ist and 2d Cavalry Brigades, 1 sotnia of the 4th Don Cossacks, and 20 guns. It crossed the river also at the Cirakova ford during the night, and at 6:15 A. m. took up its march toward Telis, leaving the greater part of the cavalry to cover its left flapk. The infantry arrived on the high-road in front of the Telis redoubt about 9 a. m., and its artillery (12 pieces) opened fire upon the Turkish work at 1,200 yards. At10 a.m. the Jager Regiment, formed in two lines, moved forward and drove the Turks out of some small rifle-pits which they had in front of the main work. But these shallow trenches being wholly open in the rear, i. e., toward the redoubt, and only about 200 yards from it, when the Russians had gained possession of them it was not possible to remain there under the fire of the Turks; it was necessary to retreat or assault the main work. They chose the latter, and rushed at it with great bravery, but without success. They found a little shelter in the irregularities of the ground about 100 paces in front of the parapet, and were lying there keeping up a hot fire with the Turks, when word was received from the cavalry off on the left that considerable Turkish reénforcements were approaching Telis from the South. As his force was evidently unequal to the task of gaining the redoubt, the Colonel of the Jager Regiment then sounded the retreat, and the regiment fell back about a mile and a half in the direction of Cirakova. The Turks, however, did not make an effort to follow them or to go past them to the relief of Gorni-Dubnik. In this short affair the Jager Regiment lost 26 officersand 907 men. The result of the 24th of October was therefore the capture of the position of Gorni-Dubnik, by which Gourko got a firm footing in the center of the Turkish line of fortifications along the Sophia road. He immediately set to work to fortify his position, facing both ways on the road. The 1st Division was placed in position in front of Dolni-Dubnik, the Rifle Brigade on its left joining hands with the 1st Brigade 3d Roumanian Division, which was on the north and west of that place; the 2d Division was placed in the works at Gorni-Dubnik, with one brigade in advance toward Telis, and the 1st Brigade 3d Division was brought from the vicinity of Medevan toward INVESTMENT OF PLEVNA. 2'79 Telis on the east. The Cavalry Division was sent in observation on the left (heights of Rahita), threatening the communications of the Turks by the high-road, while the Caucasian Brigade of Cossacks demonstrated from the west against the Turkish works on that side of Telis. On the 28th of October these troops were simply advanced to within 1,500 yards of the Turkish fortifications at Telis, and from there opened fire with 72 guns, firing principally shrapnel. This concentrated artillery fire was kept up from 11 a.m. to2 P.M, when Gourko sent one of his prisoners with a note summoning the Pasha to surrender, and threatening to attack on all sides if his answer was not received in half an hour. The Pasha (Izmail Hakki) surrendered, with 100 officers, 3,000 men, 4 guns, and an enormous quantity of small-arms ammunition destined for Plevna. As soon as this surrender took place, the cavalry of the Guard and the Cossacks joined hands on the south of the village, and attacked a large band of Tcherkesses supported by infantry who were posted about half way between Telis and Radomirtza. They drove back the Tcherkesses, but were naturally brought to a halt by the infantry, and after a loss of about 50 men they fell back a short distance toward Telis, establishing a picket-line in observation of the Turks. During the night the latter fell back upon Radomirtza, and, assembling his force there, Chefket Pasha abandoned all his fortifications and took up his retreat to the positions about Pravetz in the foot-hills of the Balkans. Meanwhile, on the other side of his position—i. e., toward Dolni-Dubnik—Gourko had posted the 1st Division across the high-road, and on its right a portion of the 9th Cavalry Division, keeping up communication with the 2d Brigade 38d Division (Guard), on the heights in front of Medevan, on the east bank of the Vid; on its left was the Rifle Brigade, then the Rouma- nian Brigade, and then a large force of cavalry near Etropol. The two divisions of the Grenadier Corps which were en route to Bulgaria had meanwhile partly arrived, and the first of them had been directed to the army of the Cesarevitch beyond Biela; but they were recalled by forced marches to Plevna, and, passing around the right flank of the Roumanians, were to cross the river at Riben. Gourko only awaited the arrival of these troops to fill up the space on the north, and then he intend- ed to repeat at Dolni-Dubnik the measures which had gained 280 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. Telis—i. e., surround it on three sides with a large force of artillery, supported by infantry four times as numerous as the defenders, then open a concentrated fire with shrapnel, and finally, if the Turks refused to surrender, make a simultaneous assault from all sides. The leading troops of the Grenadiers (2d Brigade 3d Division Grenadiers) arrived at Etropol late in the afternoon of October 31st. Gourko then wrote out his orders for the attack, fixing it at the 2d of November. But the next morning at daylight the Rifle Brigade noticed a lack of defenders in the Turkish work near it, and immediately sent a party of volunteers to reconnoiter, who found the redoubt empty. The Turks had in fact abandoned all their positions at Dolni-Dubnik, and during the night had retreated into Plevna; and as the day became more clear the last of the column could be distinguished just crossing the Plevna bridge. The troops immediately moved forward and took up a position just outside the range of the Turkish guns on the heights north of Mede- van. The investment of Plevna was complete. (See Plate 17.) CHAPTER VII. EVENTS ON OTHER PORTIONS OF THE THEATRE OF WAR FROM SEP- TEMBER TO DECEMBER, 187 {—SHIPKA—-THE LOM—THE LOWER DANUBE—GOURKO'S ADVANCE TO ORKHANIE. Ir is now necessary to refer briefly to the course of events at the other points of the theatre of war. SHIPKA PASS. (See Plate 13.) In a previous chapter we have seen that Suleiman Pasha made a succession of fierce, mad assaults upon the Russians at Shipka from the 21st to the 26th of August, and that, having caused great losses on both sides, but having gained no ground whatever, he was forced to desist and to reorganize his force and call for more reénforcements. The Russians on their side did what they could to repair losses and prepare for a new struggle ; they strengthened their own position by fortification, dug trench- es and covered ways along that part of the road commanded by the Turkish fire from the Bald Mountain, and brought a few mortars into position; but as they received no reénforcements (all those which arrived in Bulgaria at this time being directed toward Plevna for the great purpose of capturing or defeating Osman’s army), they had no troops available for undertaking any operations to dislodge the Turks from their commanding positions; and therefore they (the Russians) remained on the same ground, viz., the three hills on the high-road at the summit of the pass. Their daily losses were from 5 to 10 men. On the 13th of September the Turks increased their fire both in infantry and artillery, and the latter included four large mortars 282 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. concealed in the woods in front of Mount St. Nicholas, which did great damage to the Russians, whose losses increased to about 40 men per day. At the same time some demonstrations were made on either flank by Tcherkesses, resulting in some skir- mishes which accomplished nothing. | This cannonade continued for four days, and then, at 3 a. mu. on the 17th of September, Zuleiman sent forward his infantry to the assault on all sides, directing as previously his strongest efforts against Mount St. Nicholas. Here the Turks, under cover of the darkness, climbed up to within about 100 yards of the batteries and trenches on the summit, drove the Russians out of the advanced trenches, and established their own position by means of the gabions and fascines which they had brought with them. At daylight a fierce fight opened for the possession of this hill, and lasted till noon. Radetzky hastened thither in person, taking with him the 56th Regiment to reénforce the 53d, which held this portion of the line. The Turks made sey- eral desperate efforts to drive the Russians from the top of the hill, but without success ; and the Russians in turn were unable to drive the Turks back beyond the trenches they had taken and constructed before daylight. The struggle went on all the — morning, and the bayonet was very freely used on both sides. A part of the 35th and 55th Regiments was brought up to the hill during the morning, and finally about noon portions of the 53d and 56th rushed forward upon the Turks, and succeeded in driving them out. This assault cost the Russians dear, but nev- ertheless it accomplished the defeat of the Turks. Upon the Russian right flank (northern hill) the Turks had | begun their attack also at daylight ; the Russians allowed them — to approach within fifty yards, and then opened on them with volley-firing, under which the Turkish lines withered, and the men fell back. Twice more they tried it, and with the same result. At 9 o’clock they withdrew altogether in this quarter. The loss of the Russians on this day was 31 officers and some- - thing over 1,000 men. That of the Turks was naturally much larger, and was estimated by General Radetzky in his report at not less than 3,000 men. The south side of Mount St. Nicholas was a mass of corpses. Suleiman, having gained nothing by this assault, resumed the ordinary mortar and sharpshooter prac- tice, which continued for ten days; when he was nominated to OPERATIONS AT SHIPKA PASS. 283 the command of the Army in the Quadrilateral, and succeeded at Shipka by Reouf Pasha. Reouf found it necessary to reorganize the army which Suleiman had turned over to him. Soon afterward bad weather arrived, and, in this high altitude, a considerable quantity of snow. This impeded operations during the month of October, and in November Gourko began advancing toward Sophia, which caused a portion of Reouf’s troops to be moved in that direction. Reouf soon afterward was recalled to Constantinople and made Minister of War, and was succeeded by Vessil Pasha, whose force was then increased by troops brought from the Quadrilateral. But, although desultory firing was kept up during all these months, the Turks undertook no serious assault after the 17th of September ; and, on the other hand, the Russians never loos- ened their grip upon the position which they had captured on the 19th of July. In the first week of January, as will be sub- sequently explained, they turned the pass on both flanks and captured Vessil Pasha and his army im toto. — OPERATIONS ON THE LOM. (See Plate 14.) We have already followed in a previous chapter the advance of Mehemet Ali against the detachment of the Cesarevitch dur- ing the months of August and September, his successes in the battles of Karahassankoi and Katzelevo, his defeat at Cerkovna, and his subsequent retreat to the line of the White Lom, where on the 2d of October he was replaced by Suleiman. The detatchment of the Cesarevitch at this time counted, as before,the XII. and XIII. Corps; and the 26th Division on their right, keeping up communication with the XI. Corps on the west of Tirnova; but the dispersion of his force, which had so largely contributed to the necessity for his retreat before the force of Mehemet Ali in September, was now avoided, and his troops were well in hand, in fortified positions between the Danube near Metchka and the mouth of the Banitchka Lom—a distance of only about 18 miles. The country on his right, being most difficult of approach, was occupied only by detach- ments of the 26th Division in observation. The defense of the yoad from Osman-Bazar to Tirnova was intrusted to the XI. el ee 284 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. Corps under General Dellinghausen, who had replaced Prince — Shakofskoi, the latter being broken down by sickness. Although Suleiman took command of the Army in the Quadrilateral in the first week in October, it was not until the 26th of November that he undertook any serious operations. He first assembled a large force at the village of Kadikoi, eight miles south of Rustchuk, and apparently threatened the Cesare- vitch’s left flank, and at the same time began building a bridge from Silistria toward the Roumanian bank of the Danube. Against this the Russians simply diverted the 24th Division, which was en route through Bucharest. This demonstration against Roumania was made in conjunction with an intended descent of some Hungarians from the Carpathians upon the line of the Russian communications ; but this latter proved wholly abortive, and, the 24th Division being more than ample for the defense of the passage of the river at Silistria, the Turkish bridge was taken up and the whole movement amounted to nothing. Suleiman then moved the bulk of his force to Raz- grad, and began reconnoitering in front of that place, at the same time that bands of Tcherkesses and some infantry made demon- strations on the road from Osman-Bazar to Elena. Still, nothing serious was attempted. The troops of the Cesarevitch were kept constantly on the alert and made frequent reconnaisgances _ in order to keep themselves informed of Suleiman’s movements, The result was a constant series of skirmishes. Finally, in the latter part of November (Gourko’s troops being already in the foot-hills of the Balkans on the Sophia road), Suleiman rapidly assembled a large force near Rustchuk, and on the 19th drove the Russians, with a loss of about 200 men, from their advanced position near Pirgos to their principal position near Metchka ; but in the afternoon of the same day the Russians reénforced the point attacked, and drove the Turks out of Pirgos and back across the Lom. On the 26th Suleiman renewed his attack in greater force upon the position of the XII. Corps at Metchka and Tristenik. A very considerable affair took place, in which the whole of the XII. Corps was engaged; the Turks attacked with great energy, but were wholly unsuccessful, and in their retreat were followed by the XII. Corps and driven across the Lom. The Russian official report states that the Turks lost 1,200 men, and that their own losses were 28 officers and 738 men. OPERATIONS ON THE LOM. 285 On the same day demonstrations were made by the Turks in front of Katzelevo, as well as on the roads leading from Osman-Bazar. On the 4th of December a large force (reported at 30,000 men), which had advanced by the road leading from Osman- Bazar through Elena to Tirnova, fell upon the two regiments of the 9th Division (VIII. Corps) occupying a fortified position in the ravine of Mahren, two miles east of Elena. The attack was made at daylight, and the Russian commander, Prince Mirsky, seems to have been taken somewhat by surprise ; his position was surrounded on three sides, and his troops were driven back to Elena with a loss of 50 officers and 1,800 men, as well as 11 guns, 4 of which had been dismounted and the other 7 had all their horses killed. This affair was also remark- able as being almost the only one in the whole course of the campaign in which the Turks took any prisoners. They here captured about 500 men, who were taken to Constantinople and well cared for. The Russians fell back in disorder to their fortifications at Elena, and hastily brought up part of the XI. Corps from the vicinity of Tirnova to their aid. The Turks did not follow up their success, and on the 6th, the Russian reénforcements having arrived, Prince Mirsky advanced to his old positions, and the Turks retreated,.after some skirmishing, in the direction of Os- man-Dazar. At last, after this long series of indecisive combats, skir- mishes, and demonstrations upon both flanks of a line 75 miles long, Suleiman made an attack in force with about 35,000 men (60 battalions) upon the left flank of the Cesarevitch’s detach- ment, i. e., at Metchka and Tristenik, near the Danube. This was on the 12th of December, Plevna having fallen two days before. . At this time the position of the XII. Corps, forming the left of the Cesarevitch’s detachment, was as follows (see Plates 14 and 15): at Metchka, near the Danube, Ist Brigade 12th Division ; at Tristenik, 4 miles southeast of Metchka, 2d Brigade 12th Division—both in positions well fortified; in reserve to this line, the 2d Brigade 33d Division. The 129th Regiment of the same division was at Damogila, and the 130th at Tabashka, in observation of the Lom. On their right was the XIII. 286 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. Corps, of which the 2d Brigade 35th Division was nearest (and was brought into action on the 12th of December). The 12th Cavalry Division was on the right and left of Tristenik, and furnished the cavalry pickets on a line from the Danube to the Lom, about four miles in front of the infantry position. The total strength of these troops was therefore 30 battalions, about 25,000 men, with 16 squadrons and 120 guns. The XII. Corps was commanded by the Grand Duke Vladimir, second son of the Emperor. : The two villages of Tristenik and Metchka lie each in a deep ravine, flowing to the Danube, and the branches of these ravines make the country in front of Tristenik very broken and difficult for manceuvres. On the other side of the high-road are shorter but equally deep ravines flowing into the Lom, whose banks are precipitous, and the bed of its stream fully 350 feet below the level of the plateau between it and the Danube. The position of the Russians was a very favorable one, completely commanding, over an open plateau, the approaches from Rustchuk, either by the high-road which passes near Tristenik, or by the river road near Metchka. Behind their left flank, at the island of Batin, the Russians had a ponton bridge (built in the month of October) over the Danube, and on the Roumanian shore, near Giurgevo, were several siege batteries. On the afternoon of the 10th of December,the Turks drove in the Russian pickets, and appeared in considerable force in front of the Russian positions. The troops of the latter were on the alert, but the Turks retired at sunset without making an attack. The next day the Russians made preparations for an expected attack, and brought the 129th Regiment to Tristenik, replacing it at Damogila by the 2d Brigade 35th Division, and also moved the 130th Regiment a short distance down the Lom. On the morning of the 12th, the Russian batteries at Parapan (5 miles southwest of Giurgevo) signaled that the Turks were moving out of Rustchuk, and at the same time another force of them was discovered by the pickets crossing the Lom just below Kadikoi. Each column contained about 30 battalions and 25 guns. That from Rustchuk immediately advanced along the river road, and at 9 a.m. opened the battle by an attack upon the Russian position at Metchka. Soon afterward the other col- umn came into position on its left (southeast) against the interval OPERATIONS ON THE LOM. 287 between the works at Metchka and those at Tristenik. A strong line of skirmishers extended on its left all the way to the Lom. The 2d Brigade 33d Division was immediately moved forward to occupy the small trenches in this interval; but no other change was made in the position of the troops until the Turks should have developed their plan of attack. The Turks made several unsuccessful assaults upon the Russian redoubt at Metchka, and by noon it was evident that their plan was to throw their whole weight upon the left flank of the Russian position, gain possession of the works at Metchka, and then advance against the Batin bridge; the left flank of the Turks, between the high-road and the Lom, seemed to be very weak. As the most efficacious way of meeting this attack, the Russian commander determined to throw forward his right flank against this weak line and thus threaten the Turkish left and rear, and at the same time to attack in force with his center; and also to execute this movement before the enemy should have had time to concentrate too strong a force against Metchka. The 9d Brigade 12th Cavalry Division was therefore moved for- ward in the space between the high-road and the Lom, and, dismounting a part of its force, gained possession of the plateau about four miles in front of Tristenik; the 2d Brigade 35th Di- vision and the 47th Regiment at the same time followed on its left along the high-road, and coming on the plateau, sup- ported the cavalry, who were just beginning to be forced back. These three regiments then established themselves on this plateau, and, bringing five batteries into action, opened a ter- rible fire with shrapnel upon the flank of the Turkish reserves, which were still massed in the ravines. At the same time the 2d Brigade 33d Division began to advance through the inter- val between Metchka and Tristenik. The result of this double attack was not long in doubt; by 2 o’clock the Turks were in full retreat, and then the troops in the works at Metchka in their turn began to advance. The result was a complete rout of the Turks at every point, and a somewhat precipitate re- treat to Rustchuk and across the Lom at Krasnoe. They were followed by the Russian cavalry until darkness set in. Their losses were nearly 3,000 (as estimated in the Russian official report), among which were 800 dead left on the field. The Russian losses were 24 officers and 775 men. The Turk- 288 | THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. ish losses were caused in large part by the sabe oe of the Russian artillery. For more than five months the detachment of the Cesare- vitch—which, even counting the 26th Division, had never num- bered over 55,000 infantry—had guarded the left flank of the Russian Army and secured its communications against any attack — coming from the direction of the Turkish fortresses. During the latter part of August and the first of September, having stretched itself out over a line more than 60 miles in length, and having its right flank within a few miles of Razgrad, it was attacked by Mehemet Ali, who had at his disposal a force of more than 65,000 infantry. It was thus driven back and driven together, but it checked Mehemet Ali’s advance by the defeat it inflicted upon him at Cerkovna (September 21st); immediately after which Mehemet Ali returned to his old positions. It then took up a more compact position in front of Rustchuk, and here awaited the further attacks of the Turks. Suleiman, having at his disposal about the same force as Mehemet Ali, and having very thoroughly reconnoitered the whole Russian position, endea- vored on the 26th of November to break through the left flank of it near the Danube. Failing in this, he ordered the attack upon Elena (in which Prince Mirsky’s detachment of the VIII. Corps was so badly cut up), with the apparent object of divert- ing a portion of the Russian troops from the vicinity of the Danube to the neighborhood of Tirnova; and a week later Suleiman again attacked (December 12th), this time with the bulk of his force, in the vicinity of the Danube. But his troops were tactically badly handled, and before they were all engaged the Russians took advantage of this and fell upon his exposed flank at the same time that they engaged him in front. Sulei- man was badly defeated and driven back across the Lom. Plevna had already fallen, and Gourko was threatening the Balkan defenses near Sophia. Placing a portion of his troops within the fortifications of Rustchuk and Shumla, Suleiman hastened to the south of the Balkans with the remainder. Thus ended all active operations on the Lom. The achieve- ments of the Cesarevitch’s detachment have been somewhat obscured by the more bloody engagements around Plevna, and the subsequent brilliant advance over the Balkans; but it must not be forgotten that throughout the campaign it fulfilled to the OPERATIONS ON THE LOM. 289 letter, and without drawing reénforcements from the other parts of the army, the task which was assigned to it, viz., to assure the safety of the left flank of the Army and to mask the Quadri- lateral of Turkish fortresses. OPERATIONS IN THE DOBRUDJA AND ON THE LOWER DANUBE. (See Plate 2.) General Zimmermann, as we have already seen, had crossed the Danube at Galatz on the 22d of June and gained a footing on the south bank of the river, the Turks retreating up the Do- brudja. As soon as the water fell low enough to use his bridge at Braila, Zimmermann crossed the rest of his force at that point and advanced slowly up the Dobrudja. His force consisted of the XIV. Corps, with the 1st Don Cossack Division and part of the 7th Regular Cavalry Division. A portion of the infantry of the VII. Corps took up the line of observation on the lower Danube below Galatz. Zimmermann reached the line of Trajan’s Wall and occupied it without opposition on the 18th of July. His own communi- cations were maintained by the river, which was in possession of the Russians as far as Silistria, and also by the Dobrudja and the Braila bridge. His instructions were to hold the line of Trajan’s Wall, from Kustendje on the coast to Tchernavoda on the Danube, against any advance by the Turks, and to observe the Black Sea coast and prevent any landing there. He had about 22,000 infantry; at least half this force would necessarily have to be left to occupy the points above named, leaving him only little over 10,000 men for any offensive movements. The latter were therefore out of the question, as the Turks had about 25,000 men in his front, 10,000 at Bazardjik, and 15,000 at Silis- tria, besides small forces at Mangalia and Kavarna on the coast. The infantry of Zimmermann’s corps therefore remained on the line of Trajan’s Wall until after the passage of the Balkans in the following January; his cavalry were occupied with skir- mishes and reconnaissances in their front, by which they kept themselves informed of the position of the Turks—who on their part undertook no serious offensive movements. Zimmermann’s réle was purely defensive, and he accomplished the task assigned to him, viz., to cover the Russian line of communications in Roumania from any attacks from the direction of the Dobrudja. 19 290 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. In short, the detachment of the Cesarevitch on one side and that of Zimmermann on the other, with the aid of the Danube on the third, completely masked the fortifications of the Quad- rilateral. | On the Lower Danube nothing of consequence took place until the first week in October. The Turkish fleet of three ironclads and as many wooden ships of war remained all the time in the harbor of Sulina, and attempted nothing. On the 8th of October a combined force under Lieutenant-General Verevkine, consisting of one regiment of the VII. Corps on the land, and six small gunboats and six torpedo boats on the river, advanced toward Sulina. At 12 miles from the port they halted and placed a line of torpedoes across the Sulina arm; the Turks kept up a heavy fire from their gunboats; but did not succeed in interrupting the Russian works. During the night the Rus- sians advanced a short distance and placed a second line of torpedoes. | On the morning of the 9th, Commander Dikoff advanced in a gunboat of light draught toward the port of Sulina; the Turkish wooden ship Kartal came out and engaged him. Both of these crafts, having a light draught, passed over the line of torpedoes as Commander Dikoff retreated; but about 9 a. m. a large ship also came out to the attack, struck one of the torpe- does in the first line, and instantly sank with nearly all her crew. The ship was a three-masted, sea-going, broadside iron- clad, carrying 5 guns and a crew of about 225 men. After this affair the Russians erected batteries on the shore, and by means of them and their little flotilla defended their lines of torpedoes. The two Turkish ironclads remained at Sulina. They exchanged shots occasionally with the Russian batteries, but nothing of importance occurred until the follow- ing month of January. ' GOURKO’S ADVANCE TO ORKUANIE. With the arrival of the two divisions of Grenadiers at Plevna a few days after Gourko had completed the investment on the west side, the total force of Russians and Roumanians blockad- ing that place amounted to 191 battalions, 120 squadrons, and 650 guns, or about 160,000 men. This was much more than was absolutely necessary for the investment. At the same time GOURKO’S ADVANCE TO ORKHANIE, 291 it was known that Mehemet Ali Pasha had been sent to Sophia to relieve Chefket Pasha, and if possible to organize a force sufficient to march to the relief of Plevna and raise the siege. As the most efficacious means of preventing this lay in an offensive movement against Mehemet Ali, and as the troops could be spared, a detachment of about 36,000 men (Ist and 2d Infantry Divisions, Rifle Brigade, and 2d Cavalry Division of the Guard, and the Brigade of Caucasian Cossacks) was formed under the orders of General Gourko and sent south along the Sophia road toward the Balkans. About the same time, or in fact a little before, the 3d Divi- sion of the Line, which was posted at Lovtcha, had pushed for- ward toward the Balkans and occupied the town of Trojan, and then, moving west over the foot-hills, had captured, after a small fight on the 31st of October, the town of Tetevan. The small- ness of this force prevented its penetrating farther, and it was to operate in the district west of Tetevan, i.e., in the neigh- porhood of the high-road to Sophia, that Gourko was sent for- ward. Gourko began his march southward on November 15th, the ‘infantry of his command and 20 squadrons of cavalry following the high-road to Sophia, and 20 squadrons of cavalry on his right following up the valley of the Isker and thence over the foot-hills of the Balkans to Vratza—the principal town on the direct road from Sophia to Widdin—which they papanted after a skirmish on the 9th of November. The Cossacks had already occupied Yablonitza on the 5th, and the infantry of Gourko’s column arrived there on the 18th, and was joined by the 2d Brigade 3d Division (Regiments No. 11 and 12), coming from Lovtcha and Tetevan. The next two days were occupied in reconnaissances, in addition to those which had already been made by the cavalry. From these it was learned that all the roads leading over the Balkans in this vicinity were fortified and occupied by the Turks. The first of these positions was on the high-road near the village of Pra- vetz. Here the road, after leaving the village of Osikova, climbs over a high spur of mountain, and then suddenly de- scends into a narrow gorge through which flows a little stream called the Pravetz into the Isker River. The heights on either side of this gorge were fortified with batteries and trenches, so 202» THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. situated as to command the gorge and to enfilade the road along the portion of it which crossed the spur. On the eastern slope of this spur, and about five miles from Pravetz, was another defile, through which flowed a considerable stream known as the Little Isker, at the head of which lies the town of Etropol. Along the banks of this stream is a road to Etropol, and beyond (south) of that town there is a trail leading over the mountains, To defend this trail the Turks had several small works just in front of the town of Etropol. (See Plate 18.) After passing through the Pravetz gorge the high-road comes into a little valley and makes a sharp turn to the west, and follows this direction for about eight miles, when it reaches the town of Orkhanie, and then turning sharp to the southeast follows another narrow defile to the crest of the Balkans at Araba- Konak, and over them into the plain of Sophia. At Orkhanie, the entrance of this defile, was a very extensive series of forti- fications. On the left of this town and five miles from it were some fortifications covering a trail which led over the mountains past the village of Lutikova. The position of Pravetz, with Etropol on its right flank, was the first line of Turkish defense ; that of Orkhanie, with Lutikova on its left flank, their second line ; and Araba-Konak (the crest of the Balkans) their third line. The high-road was in good order, although its grades were often as steep as one in ten; the other roads were of the most primitive nature. In all their positions the Turks had about 25,000 men, of whom the greater part were at Orkhanie. ‘ Gourko’s plan of operations against this whole series of posi- tions was to make a strong attack upon the Pravetz position, at the same time that demonstrations were made against the two flanks—i. e., Lutikova and Etropol—in order to prevent the Turks from reénforcing Pravetz. The demonstration against — Etropol was to be made in considerable force, and might be con- verted into a serious attack at the discretion of the officer commanding the column. The tactical dispositions for the attack of the Pravetz position were to demonstrate against its front, which was nearly inaccessible, and turn its left flank from the north. In pursuance of this plan, Gourko’s field orders, dated Yablonitza, November 21st, prescribed the following move- ments for the next day : 1. Regiment No. 12, with 8 4-pdrs., and 8 sotnias, to follow GOURKO’S ADVANCE TO ORKHANIE. 293 the road leading from Tetevan to Etropol, and arrive in front of the latter place and open fire by 10 a. m. 2. Preobrazhensky Regiment, with 2 9-pdrs., and 2 mountain guns, and 3 sotnias, to follow the road through the gorge of the Little Isker toward Etropol. 3. Grenadier Regiment (of the Guard), 1 battalion of 11th Regiment, 12 field-guns, the 4th Dragoons, and 12 horse-guns, to be on the Tetevan-Etropol road in reserve to the first two columns. The above troops (12 battalions, 38 guns, and 10 squadrons) to be under command of Major-General Dandeville, who was to confine his movement to astrong demonstration against Etropol, unless the enemy showed signs of weakness; in which case, ac- cording to his own discretion, he was to convert it into a serious and energetic attack. 4. Moscow Regiment, 2d and 3d Rifle Battalions, 3 sotnias, and 14 guns, under command of Major-General Ellis, to follow the high-road and attack the front of the Pravetz position. 5. Simeonof Regiment, 1st and 4th Rifle Battalions, 3 sotnias of Cossacks, and 1 squadron of Hussars, and 8 guns, under Major-General Rauch, to follow the small road through Vedrara, Kalugerova, and Lakovitza, and attack the Pravetz position on its left flank, and if possible from its rear. 6. Izmailoff Regiment, 2 battalions of 11th Regiment, 2 squadrons of Hussars, and 8 guns, to remain as reserve to columns 4 and 6, and take position on the high-road near Osikova. The troops of Nos. 4, 5, and 6 (17 battalions, 9 squadrons, and 30 guns) to be under command of Lieutenant-General Count Shouvaloff. 7. Jager, Paul, and Finland Regiments, 2 squadrons and 12 guns, to form a general reserve for the whole force, and be posted on the high-road at the intersection of the road to Etropol. 8. Two Regiments of Cavalry to leave Vratza at such time as to arrive in front of Lutikova and open fire upon it with artillery by 10 a. M. The movement took place very much as ordered, barring a delay due to the impassability of the mountain paths which Rauch’s column had to follow. These troops started on the evening of the 21st, and marched the greater part of that night and the next two days, but did not arrive in range of the Turks 294 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. until the afternoon of the 23d. Meanwhile the troops of Gen- eral Ellis had advanced along the high-road, driven the Turkish advanced posts out of their trenches on the mountain sides east of the Pravetz defile, and dragged some artillery into position on the eastern side of this defile in range of the Turkish position, and opened fire with them across the deep gorge. Three bat- talions of the Moscow Regiment had also been sent down the mountain into the valley on the left near the village of Pravetz (their places being filled by the Izmailoff and 11th Regiments from the reserve), thus threatening the right flank of the Turks. Nothing decisive took place, however, until Rauch’s column, climbing an extremely steep mountain, appeared on the very back of the Turkish position, about 4 rp. m. November 23d. The Turks then made but a slight resistance, and hastily retreated down the other side of the mountain in the direction of Orkhanie. — Their retreat was effected under cover of a dense fog which settled in the valleys, and by the darkness of night which soon set in. The two detachments of the Etropol column arrived in front of the Turkish position near that town on the 22d, and an effort was made to seize the redoubts on either flank of the Turkish line by a coup-de-mam, but it was unsuccessful at both points. The Russians then concentrated their labors upon dragging artillery on to the high ridges flanking the Turkish line, which ridges the Turks had failed to occupy. During the 23d and the following night they then succeeded in quite reaching around both flanks of the Turks. The latter were greatly outnumbered, and when the Russians opened a vigorous fire about 3 P.M November 24th, they abandoned all their works and made a hasty retreat through the town of Etropol. There they divided, one portion following a trail leading over the mountains to Slatitza, and the other portion following a trail up to Mount Shandarnik, which formed the right flank of the Turkish position across the Araba-Konak Pass. The latter abandoned 3 Krupp guns, 2 cais- sons, and over 300 carts loaded with ammunition. The cavalry column, which, forming part of the general movement, was to threaten the Turkish position at Lutikova and Novatchin, met with misfortune. In the mountain-roads in that region, it got into a cul-de-sac, and came near being cut off. It was obliged to retreat, losing two guns, one of which was thrown GOURKO’S ADVANCE TO ORKHANIE. 295 down a precipice to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. In this unfortunate affair 10 officers and 69 men were killed or wounded. The detachment, however, may be said to have accomplished its object, since it diverted the attention of the Turks and caused them to send a considerable force toward Novatchin, and not toward Pravetz, the real point of attack. As soon as the Pravetz position had been carried, General Rauch crossed over (November 25th) by a mountain-road into the Etropol valley, taking with him the Simeonoff Regiment ; this united the whole of the 1st Division of the Guard and the two regiments (Nos. 11 and 12) of the 3d Division of the Line in the Etropol valley, leaving the 2d Division of the Guard and the Rifle Brigade in the Orkhanie-Pravetz valley. The advance guard of the latter, under General Ellis, composed of the Moscow and Finland Regiments and the Rifle Brigade, advanced about six miles west from Pravetz, and brought their artillery into position in front of two large redoubts which guarded the high- road a few miles east of the town of Orkhanie. During the night of the 26th the Turks evacuated these two redoubts, as well as their position at Novatchin and the town of Orkhanie, and fell back to their works near the village of Vratches, which guarded the entrance to the long defile of the Araba-Konak Pass. These works were very extensive and admirably constructed ; rising above one another in tiers on the mountain-side, they completely commanded every point of the plan in front of the mouth of the defile. They might fairly be considered as wnpregnable to a front assault. Ellis’s troops therefore simply halted in observa- tion in front of them. But meanwhile a portion of the troops in the Etropol valley, viz., the Izmailoff Regiment of the Guard and the 12th Regiment of the Line, under command of General Dandeville, had been climbing the mountain range which formed the eastern side of the Araba-Konak defile, and on the afternoon of November 28th they drove the Turkish outposts away from a mountain called Greote, in front of Shandarnik. A portion of the 12th Regi- ment even followed the retreating Turks into the Shandarnik redoubt, but there the Turks rallied in superior numbers and drove them out again. Nevertheless, Dandeville maintained his position on the Greote mountain. The western slope of this moun- tain is a ridge which has a gently sloping crest for a few miles, 296 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. when it is abruptly terminated by a steep descent terminating in the high-road at the bottom of the gorge. By simply moving to the western end of this ridge—as he would have done the next day—Dandeville could post his men on inaccessible heights com- pletely enfilading the high-road for a distance of nearly two miles. Inshort, the Vratches position at the northern entrance of the defile was completely turned, and during the night of the 28th the Turks evacuated it and retreated to the redoubts of Shandarnik. Their retreat was so hasty that, for lack of trans- portation, they abandoned 3,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammu- nition, several thousand rounds of artillery ammunition, a com- plete ponton train of 25 iron boats, about 2,000,000 rations in flour, rice, and hard bread, several thousand bushels of oats, and a large quantity of clothing. In fact, the bulk of the stock of the depot which had been formed at Orkhanie, to be sent to Plevna with the “Relief Army,” fell into the hands of the Russians; and very welcome it was in view of the bad weather which had just set in, the length of Gourko’s line of communi- cation (180 miles from the Danube at Sistova), and the bad con- dition of the roads. Gourko’s losses at Pravetz, Etropol, Shandarnik, and Novat- chin were in all less than 500 men. There was not much hard fighting, but an almost unprecedented amount of hard marching, climbing, and dragging of guns by hand. Several of the men had died from sheer exhaustion in hauling the guns up the mountains. Gourko’s force was not so very much superior to that of the enemy, the numbers being about 35,000 and 25,000; but by his manceuvres of demonstrating against the front of impregnable positions and turning their flanks, he succeeded in eight daysin _ dislodging the Turks from all their fortified points in the foot- hills, and forcing them back—with the loss of immense quanti- ties of supplies—to their main position on the erest of the Balkans. All hopes of relieving the beleaguered army of Pleyna van- ished from this time. For Mehemet Ali it was no longer a ques- tion of marching to the aid of Osman, but of defending the line of the Balkans. Gourko immediately sent the Grenadier Regiment (of the 1st Division of the Guard) to observe the enemy’s position at Slatitza, and disposed the rest of his troops in front of the Shan- GOURKO’S ADVANCE TO ORKHANIE. 297 darnik position. General Rauch, with the Preobrazhensky and Simeonoff Regiments, and the 11th in reserve, took position opposite the right flank (east) of the high Shandornik redoubt ; but being nearly 1,500 feet lower than it, his artillery could accomplish but little. General Dandeville, with the Izmailoff, Finland, and 12th Regiments, occupied the ridge extending from Mount Greote west to the high-road; while General Ellis, with the Moscow Regiment and the Rifle Brigade, took up a position on a height on the west of the road, and was here somewhat fiercely attacked (December 1st) by the Turks, but held his ground, after a loss of 150 men. The Turks therefore were on the Shandarnik ridge, i. e., the main crest of the Balkans, with six redoubts, containing 15 guns, forming a fortified position about 7,000 yards in length on both __ sides of the high-road. Gourko’s troops were on the Greote ridge, “nearly parallel to the other, and about 4,000 yards from it, and ona height on the other (western) side of the Araba-Konak gorge. Mount Greote is at an altitude of over 4,000 feet above the sea (and the ridge but little less), while the Araba-Konak and Etropol valleys are at an altitude of from 1,500 to 1,800 feet. There were no roads worthy the name leading up the mountain, but nevertheless Gourko’s men, assisted by a levy of 200 or 300 Bulgarians, succeeded in the course of four days in hauling up, by drag-ropes, 60 guns (of which half were 9-pdrs.), and placing them in position on these heights. Gourko was therefore greatly superior to the Turks in artillery, but its use was much hindered by the dense fogs and clouds which hung over the ravines sepa- rating the two lines; and moreover, it is impossible to destroy earthworks at 4,000 yards, or to render them uninhabitable, by shrapnel. The works were considered too strong for an open assault, and with the force then at Gourko’s disposal it was deemed imprudent to advance over the Balkans by a turning movement (such as was subsequently executed) and increase the length of his line of communication, which was already very great. Gourko therefore remained simply in observation, keep- ing up a desultory artillery fire, until the fall of Plevna should give him more troops. The main object of his advance, viZ., to prevent the possibility of a relief army coming to break the investment of Plevna, had been most completely accomplished. Meanwhile the Rouwmanians had brought a portion of their 298 ’ THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. reserve force, which had been in observation along the course of the upper Danube throughout the campaign, across the river above Nikopolis, and advancing along the south bank, had attacked the Turkish fortifications at Rahova and carried them by assault on the 19th of November. They then advanced to the next forti- fied point on the river, viz., the town of Lom-Palanka, which the Turks abandoned after sustaining a bombardment for six days. The large fortress of Widdin is only two days’ march from Lom-Palanka, but it was much too strong to be taken by this small force of Roumanians. The latter confined their atten- tion to occupying these points on the Danube, the whole course of which from Lom-Palanka to Rustchuk, a distance of 160 miles, was now in the hands of the Russians and Roumanians; and the entire country between the Danube and the Balkans over this width of 160 miles was cleared of bashi-bozouks and Tcherkesses, as well as of the small Turkish garrisons. We have now followed the course of events on the other points of the theatre of war up to the 10th of December, on which date Osman made his desperate effort to break through the circle of Russian investment, and in so doing lost his whole army. It is now necessary for us to return once more to Pleyna. CHAPTER VIII. THE FALL OF PLEVNA. (See Plate 19.) Arter a close investment of Plevna had been effected by the operations of General Gourko on the west bank of the Vid, beginning at Gorni-Dubnik, October 24th, but little had taken place beyond strengthening the lines of works on either side. On the 8th of November Skobeleff’s troops, having gradually worked their way with trenches up the slope of the first knoll of the Green Hills (1,000 yards northeast of the village of Brestovetz), made an assault during the night, and drove the Turks out of their trenches on top of the knoll. On the 10th, ith, 15th, and 19th of November, the Turks made obstinate and determined attacks upon Skobelefi’s new position, but in every case they were driven back. This new position of Sko- beleff shortened the line of investment by about a mile, and gave the Russians possession of a commanding point from which to observe the Turkish movements. The Roumanians meanwhile kept extending the right flank of their works in front of Bukova; and on the night of the 11th-12th of No- vember they advanced along the valley of the Vid from Riben, seized the heights in front of Bivolar, and began erecting works there facing those of the Turks on the heights of Opanetz. With these exceptions there was no fighting along the lines —except desultory artillery and picket firing—until the 10th of December. But on both sides the work of fortification con- tinued unabated up to the last minute. The final condition of the works, as they existed on the morning of the 10th of De- cember, is shown on the Plan of Plevna (Plate 19). 300 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. On the 18th of November the Grand Duke sent a flag of truce to Osman Pasha with a letter summoning him to gur- render in order to prevent the further effusion of blood, as it must be evident to him that his surrender was only a question of time, since he was completely surrounded with superior forces. Osman replied that he recognized the humane motives of the Grand Duke, but that as a soldier the Grand Duke would readily understand that his military honor forbade him to sur- render his army until all his means of defense were exhausted —which was not the case at present. | A few days later arrived the news of the brilliant assault of Kars, which fired the imaginations of that same portion of the Grand Duke’s staff which had advised a march over the Bal- kans, without taking Plevna, upon the arrival of the Guard. They now began counseling him to make an assault upon Os- man’s works; they cited the brilliant example of Kars, they referred to the sufferings of the men in the cold, and rain, and mud of the trenches (the weather had recently become very bad), and argued that if the siege were to last two months longer, more men would be lost by sickness and exposure than in an assault, which, from the positions now occupied by the Russians and their previous experience, could be success- fully made. But against any such proposition Todleben pro- tested with the whole weight of his influence, arguing that, although the date of Osman’s surrender could not be predicted, owing to lack of positive detailed information concerning the amount of his provisions, yet his ultimate surrender was a cer- | tanty, and against such a certainty it was most unwise to risk an uncertainty of a most hazardous nature, such as an open assault. Moreover, Todleben reasoned, though you may only lose 10,000 men hors de combat in an open assault, you de- moralize 50,000, and a considerable time must elapse before they can be reorganized for any ulterior operations; whereas, by pursuing the investment patiently till the end, the troops will then be in good condition for anything. Todleben’s advice prevailed, and the assaults were not made. Meanwhile Osman’s provisions had reached their last limit : one third of his army lay sick and wounded without proper medical attendance; alternating rain and snow for the last six weeks had rendered his trenches almost uninhabitable; and THE FALL OF PLEVNA. 301 desertions were increasing every day. He determined to make an effort to break through the Russian lines on the west of the Vid, either with the hope of reaching Widdin, or of reaching Sophia (since he knew nothing of Gourko’s operations), or, as is most probable, since neither of these plans had any chance of success, simply from a preference to surrender his army in the midst of battle rather than without having made any effort to break through the Russian lines. During the night of the 9th-10th of December he abandoned the Krishin and Second Grivitza redoubts and Redoubt No. 10, left about 6,000 men in the redoubts of Opanetz and Blasivatz, built two ponton bridges alongside of the high-road bridge over the Vid, assem- bled a train of about 1,000 ox-carts near these bridges loaded with ammunition and baggage and the effects of the Turkish inhabitants of the town, distributed what rations of bread and 7 rice he had (about six days’ supply) to his army, and then, with about 40,000 men, made a most impetuous attack upon the position held by the Grenadier Corps on the Widdin road. Although he carried the first line of Russian works, his army was by noon completely defeated and himself wounded. He surrendered at discretion. It is perhaps best to describe this affair by giving a literal translation of the whole of General Todleben’s report, ad- dressed, under date of January 9th, 1878, to the.\Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief, as follows: “The army of Osman Pasha occupied under the walls of Plevna an intrenched camp very easy to defend, and presenting several lines of formidable positions, which the enemy, during our long sojourn in front of Plevna since the end of July, had rendered still stronger by making good use of all the advantages of the ground, and in adapting his sapping operations skillfully to them. The strength of resistance of these works became all the greater, thanks to the violent fire of quick-loading guns and to the mass of cartridges which the enemy had at his disposal, which enabled him to cover the ground in front of his works as far as a distance of two versts * with a hail of lead. Besides this, the positions of the enemy, by their width and depth, enabled him to keep his reserves out of range of our artillery. Finally, all the ravines came together near the town itself, which allowed #* A mile and one third. 302 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. the Turkish reserves, in case of an attack on our part, to come im- mediately to the threatened point. These conditions, so disad- vantageous for us, explain in great part the insuccess of the assault of the 11th and 12th of September against the positions — of Plevna, and the decision taken, in order not to shed blood uselessly, to attempt no more to gain possession of them by open assault, but to await the arrival of reénforcements and proceed to the investment of the Turkish army. “ This investment of the intrenched camp of Plevna became complete with the arrival of the Guard, and the capture of Gorni- Dubnik on the Sophia high-road, on the 24th of October, by the troops of this corps. From that date the communications of Osman Pasha were definitely cut, and his army had no longer but to choose between an effort to break through the line of investment or to lay down its arms when all its provisions should be exhausted. | “The length of stay of the Turkish Army at Plevna after its investment depended directly, of course, upon the quantity of provisions which it had at its disposal. It was difficult to state exactly the quantity of provisions which Osman had, but we could conclude, from the information that we had, that the pro- visions of the Army of Plevna could not allow it to subsist more than about two months at the very utmost. From the moment that, in order to reduce Plevna and its army, we had chosen the method of investment, it only remained to follow strictly this line of action, without making any attempts at assault, which could lead to no definite result, and would only have increased | the number of our losses; it was necessary simply to endeavor to make the circle of investment as close as possible, and to take all the necessary measures to prevent the enemy from being able to force it at any point. These measures consisted in strength- ening the lines of investment by digging lines of rifle-pits and trenches, in erecting batteries, and in establishing lunettes and redoubts upon the most important points. It was above all necessary to concentrate the fire of our artillery upon the enemy’s fortifications, and to carry forward our trenches and ditches to a point near enough to those of the enemy to remove as far as possible from our batteries the fire of the enemy’s musketry. It was moreover necessary to build good roads connecting our own positions, and to provide them with sign-posts to facilitate the THE FALL OF PLEYVNA. 303 movements of the troops. It was necessary to construct bridges, establish telegraphic communication around the whole line of investment, and finally to take all the necessary measures to re- ~ ceive the enemy, in case of a sortie, with the greatest possible number of troops concentrated immediately upon the spot that he should choose as a point of attack. “ With this view the positions established around Plevna, and having an extent of 70 versts ” (46 miles), “were divided into six sectors,* the defense of which was confided to a number of troops corresponding to the relative extent and importance of each of them. Moreover each Chief of Sector received an approximate summary of the sorties which Osman Pasha might make, and a plan of the concentration of troops which he would have to make upon such or such a point threatened. Finally, a few days before the attempted sortie of Osman Pasha, Thad had some manceuvres executed under my own eyes, in the sectors of Generals Ganetzky and Kataley, in order to calculate the exact time necessary for the concentration of the troops in case of an energetic attack on the part of the invested army. * « First Sector, between Bivolar and the Grivitza redoubt ; the Roumanian troops, under the orders of General Cernat, Commandant of the Roumanian Corps. “ Second Sector, from the Grivitza to the Galitz redoubt; the 8lst Infantry Division with its artillery, and the 2d Brigade 5th Infantry Division with four batter- ies, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Baron Kriidener, Commandant of the IX. Corps. “ Third Sector, from the Galitz redoubt to the Tutchenitza ravine; 2d Infantry Division with the 30th Artillery Brigade and the 12th Rifle Battalion, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Zotof, Commandant of the IV. Corps. “ Fourth Sector, between the Tutchenitza ravine and the Kartushaven ravine; 16th Infantry Division with its artillery, 30th Infantry Division with the 2d Artillery Bri- gade, 9th, 10th, and 11th Rifle Battalions, and 9th Regiment of Cossacks, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Skobeleff, Commandant of the 16th Infantry Di- Vision. “ Fifth Sector, between the Kartushaven ravine and the right bank of the Vid at the village of Tyrnen; 3d Infantry Division of the Guard with its artillery, two squadrons of the Guard, and the 10th Don Cossack battery, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Kataley, Commandant of the 3d Infantry Division of the Guard. “ Sixth Sector, along the left bank of the Vid, including the positions of Bivolar on the right bank of that river; the Grenadier Corps, the 1st Brigade 5th Infantry Division with two batteries, the 2d Roumanian Division with its artillery, the 9th Dragoons of Kazan, the 9th Lancers of Bug, the 9th Hussars of Kieff, the 4th Cos- sacks of the Don, the 7th Horse battery, the 2d Don Cossack battery, and a regiment of Kalarash ” (Roumanian Militia Cavalry), “ under the orders of Lieutenant-General Ganetzky, Commandant of the Grenadiers Corps.” ; 304 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. “The eve of the 10th of December found us in the situation which I have just described. “We could conclude, from all the reports received by the Staff from all the sectors of investment, throughout the whole day of the 9th of December, that Osman Pasha was taking energetic measures to move out his army by seeking to break through our line of investment. Deserters informed us that rations of biscuits and foot-coverings had been distributed to the troops, and their arms had been inspected. A great deal of moving about was noticed near the town on the Sophia high- road, and a great concentration of troops and carts was seen in the camps. The Turks were beginning to construct a bridge over the Vid under the protection of the fortified works of Opanetz. All these indications tended to prove that the enemy was preparing to move out, and that his principal effort would probably be directed against the sector of General Ganetzky. _ “Tn consequence, after having made a report of all these facts to the Commandant of the Army of Investment, His Highness the Prince of Roumania, I gave the following orders by author- ity of His Highness: “1. One brigade of the 16th Infantry Division, with three batteries, and a brigade of the 3d Infantry Division of the Guard, will, under the command of Lieutenant-General Skobe- left, proceed, at daylight on the 10th of December, to the left bank of the Vid, and take post as follows: the brigade of the 16th Division, with three batteries, near Dolni-Dubnik, to be ready to support the troops of General Ganetzky; the brigade of the 3d Division of the Guard, until further orders, behind the two redoubts nearest the Vid and on the left bank, in order to be able to support in case of need the troops of General Ga- netzky or those of General Kataley. “2. The other brigade of the 16th Infantry Division, with three batteries, will remain at its post, but will hold itself in readiness to march. “3. The three battalions of the 3d Rifle Brigade, which used to form part of the garrison of the 4th Sector, will pro- ceed early on the 10th to the village of Grivitza to reénforce the garrison of the 2d Sector, commanded by Lieutenant-Gen- eral Baron Kriidener. “4, The advanced position on the Plevna-Lovtcha high-road, THE FALL OF PLEVNA. 305 between the Mirkovitch redoubt and the Tutchenitza ravine, will be occupied by one brigade of the 30th Infantry Division. Its other brigade will remain in the camp on the Red Hill, and hold itself in readiness to march. The command of the troops of the 4th Sector is confided to General Schnidnikoff. “5 Four Roumanian battalions, with three batteries, will be directed, at daylight of the 10th, from Verbitza toward De- mirkioi. Four Roumanian battalions and two batteries will be in readiness to march on Verbitza. “This disposition of the troops, reénforcing the corps of Lieutenant-General Ganetzky, allowed reénforcements to be sent at the same time to the other sectors of investment in case of an attack of the Turks in another direction, with the object of diverting our attention from the real point of attack. “ During the night of the 9th-10th a deserter informed the commandant of the corps on the Plevna-Lovtcha road that the Krishin redoubt had been evacuated by the Turks. General Skobeleff immediately sent a detachment of volunteers to satisfy themselves of the truth of this news. The volunteers found the redoubt deserted, and in consequence of this discovery the great and little Krishin redoubts, as well as the trenches on the Green Hills, were occupied by the troops of the 30th Infantry Division. “ At the same time that I received the news of the occupa- tion of the Krishin redoubts by our troops, I was informed, about 9 A. m., that the Turks had abandoned Redoubt No. 10, and that the redoubt in front of that of Grivitza had been oc- cupied by the Roumanian troops. In presence of these facts I gave orders for all the troops on the right bank of the Vid to move forward. As for the brigade of the 16th Infantry Divi- sion, with three batteries, and the 9th, 10th, and 11th Rifle bat- talions which had not yet reached the village of Grivitza, I sent them to the left bank of the Vid to be placed at the disposition of General Skobeleff, for the purpose of reénforcing the troops of General Ganetzky. “ At noon the Emperor arrived at the Imperial redoubt, be- tween the village of Radischevo and the Tutchenitza ravine, whence His Majesty could observe the forward movement of our troops, as well as the cannonade on the left bank of the Vid. 20 306 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. “ At daylight the struggle began between the army of Osman Pasha and the troops of General Ganetzky. “During the night of the 9th-10th of December, the detail of troops for duty in the positions occupied by the Grenadiers had been made in the 2d Division of Grenadiers by the 5th Regiment of Grenadiers of Kieff; in the 3d Division, by the 9th Grenadiers of Siberia. These troops occupied the trenches of the line of defense. Their nearest supports were the 6th Grenadiers of Taurida and the 10th Grenadiers of Little Rus- , sia. All the 9-pdr. guns of the two artillery brigades were in position in the first lines of defense, and the 4-pdrs. in the sec- ond line at Gorni-Etropol and Dolni-Dubnik. The trenches and lunette on the north of Gorni-Etropol, as well as the vil- lage itself, were occupied by the 17th Regiment of Archangel of the Ist Brigade 5th Infantry Division, and by two Rouma- nian batteries; the 18th Regiment of Vologda, of the same di- vision, served as reserve to the two batteries. “ During the night the cavalry patrols had already reported that a great concentration of Turkish troops was taking place along the Vid. The attack of the Turks began to show itself about half-past seven in the morning. Our outposts having fallen back before them, Major-General Daniloff, of the suite of the Emperor and Commandant of the 3d Division of Grena- diers, ordered the 2d Battery of the 3d Artillery Brigade of Grenadiers, which occupied the fixed battery No. 3, to open fire, and the 10th Regiment of Grenadiers of Little Russia to march in the direction of Kopany-Moguila. At the same time the 2d Brigade, with its 4-pdr. batteries, had been ordered up from Gorni-Etropol. “While these orders were being executed, it began to be clear enough to see the Turkish troops which had been concen- trated in front of us during the night, and which were followed by a long line of carts of every description. The Turks, hay- ing opened fire with their guns established on the heights near the bridge and along the Vid beyond the bridge, rapidly de- ployed their forces, taking advantage for this purpose of the fog which covered the plain on both sides of the river, and of a long undulation in the ground which exists in front of the bridge, and which afforded shelter for the numerous troops which had been brought there during the night. THE FALL OF PLEYVNA. 307 “The attack of the enemy, directed against the trenches of the 3d Division of Grenadiers, was made with extraordinary impetuosity ; thick lines of skirmishers marched in front, fol- lowed by battalions deployed in line, behind which came the re- serves. The artillery followed the skirmishers, advancing rap- idly, only stopping to fire a shell, and hastening to rejoin the skirmishers. “In spite of the rapidity of the fire of our 9-pdrs., and in spite of the musketry fire of the infantry posted in our in- trenchments, the Turks crossed in less than three quarters of an hour the distance which separated them from our position and reached our line of defense, which was occupied near battery No. 3 by a part of the troops of the 8d Division of Grena- diers. The enemy penetrating into the intervals between the trenches, after having killed all those who defended them, found there only a few survivors, who, too weak for resistance, began to fall back. When the trenches of work No. 3 had been occu- pied by the enemy, and the greater part of the gunners of the 9d Battery had been killed or cut down, our artillerymen only succeeded in withdrawing from the work two guns, carrying off the breech-blocks of the six other pieces. “Thus at 8:30 a. m. the troops which occupied the center of the position, viz., the 2d battalion and the 2d and 3d Rifle com- panies of the 9th Grenadiers of Siberia, having lost a great number of men and many officers, began to fall back on Ko- pany-Maguila and on the lunette to the left. The 3d Battery of the 8d Artillery Brigade of Grenadiers, which occupied work No. 4, held its ground for a little while longer, firing shrapnel upon the Turks, but, seeing itself threatened with being turned on the right, abandoned its position, succeeding moreover in carrying off only six guns, the horses of the other two having been killed. “The 10th Regiment of Grenadiers of Little Russia, having arrived on the field of battle while the Siberian Regiment was struggling with the enemy, formed in companies and advanced through the interval between lunette No. 4 and Kopany-Moguila. Having rallied the Siberian Regiment, the Little Russians stopped the progress of the enemy, suffering great losses in so doing; in less than a few minutes three chiefs of battalions and half the chiefs of companies were out of the fight. 308 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. “The desperate attack of the enemy became more and more threatening. The 1st Brigade of the 3d Division of Grenadiers was exhausted by the efforts it was making to defend the lunettes; eight of our guns were in the hands of the enemy, and the 2d Brigade of the 8d Division of Grenadiers had not yet arrived to the support of the first. ‘Tt arrived about 10 a.m., and at the same moment word was received that the 8th Grenadiers of Moscow and the 7th Grena- diers of Samogitia, of the 2d Division of Grenadiers, were approaching the positions defended by the 3d Division. The arrival of these reénforcements assured us a favorable issue of the struggle, and made it impossible for the enemy to succeed ~ in his attempt to break through. A resounding hurrah which broke forth about 10:30 a. m. informed us that the 2d Brigade of the 3d Division of Grenadiers had just attacked our trenches, which were held by the Turks. Having dislodged the enemy from the two lunettes, the Grenadiers of Astrakhan and Phana- goria, supported by those of Siberia and Little Russia, continued to advance rapidly, and, without paying attention to the losses which the deadly fire of the Turks inflicted upon them, dis- lodged them from the trenches with the bayonet. Those of our guns which had remained in the hands of the enemy were retaken, and the Grenadiers of Astrakhan gained possession of seven guns and one flag in open fight. “Two battalions of the 18th Regiment of Vologda, which had some time before approached the lunette to the left and the trenches of the position of the Grenadiers, operated against the — flank of the Turks with the aid of a Roumanian battery. “ At the time of the attack of the 2d Brigade of the 3d — Division of Grenadiers, the 7th Regiment of Grenadiers of Samogitia, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Svetchin, commandant of the 2d Division of Grenadiers, came forward through the interval between Gorni and Dolni - Etropol. Attacking the enemy with the bayonet, the Grenadiers of Samogitia drove the Turks out of their trenches without firing a single shot, and, having put them to flight, gained possession of three guns. “ After having reoccupied their advanced lines, our troops halted for a while. It was about noon when the Turks began slowly to retreat toward the Vid, all the time keeping up a THE FALL OF PLEVNA. 309 strong fire against us. The guns taken from the Turks, not having been rendered unserviceable by their gunners, were turned against them and served by the soldiers of the infantry. At the same time all the batteries of the 3d Artillery Brigade of Grenadiers, having been moved forward and brought into action on the same line as our infantry, opened a terrible fire against the enemy and covered him with shrapnel, which gave the retreat of the Turks the character of a general helter-skelter. They came together in disorganized groups near the bridge over the Vid, pell-mell with the carts which were on the edge of the high-road in great numbers. “Tn presence of this complete disorganization of his army, and of the enormous losses which it had sustained, Osman Pasha could no longer think of renewing his attempt to break through our lines, especially since the troops of the other sectors of in- vestment had moved forward ; and the speedy arrival of the 16th Infantry Division and the 3d Infantry Division of the Guard guaranteed the complete defeat of the enemy. “Our troops soon moved forward to the attack along the whole line. General Danilofi’s Division took the lead, support- ed on his left flank from the direction of Gorni-Etropol, by the lst Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division, and on his right flank by the 2d Brigade of the 2d Division of Grenadiers. The Ist Brigade of the 2d Division of Grenadiers, moving out from its trenches, undertook to turn the left flank of the Turks. Moreover, the 2d Battalion of the 5th Grenadiers of Kieff and one battalion of the 6th Grenadiers of Taurida were directed toward the Vid, which they crossed by fording, in order to occupy the heights on the right bank. The Grenadiers, having crossed the river with the water up to their waists, scaled the heights of Blasivatz and rushed upon the Turkish redoubt which crowned them, and whose garrison surrendered without striking a blow. “The brigade of the 3d Division of the Guard and of the 16th Infantry Division of the Line, sent, in accordance with the orders I had given the night before, to serve as supports to the corps of General Ganetzky, took no part in the battle. It ap- pears from the report of Lieutenant-General Kataley, that at 7 a. w. on the 10th of December he had sent across to the left bank of the Vid, passing over a ponton bridge, six battalions 310 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. of the 3d Infantry Division of the Guard, under the orders of Major-General Kourloff. At10.., this detachment, at the re- quest of General Ganetzky, moved toward Dolni-Dubnik, where it received orders to move forward by the Sophia high-road to press the left flank of the enemy. While the detachment was executing this movement, it was joined by Lieutenant-General Skobeleff, who took command of it, ordered General Kourloft to halt his troops, to deploy them in reserve order, and to await the arrival of the brigade of the 16th Infantry Division. Hay- ing remained on the spot for two hours, and having received no further orders from General Skobeleff, General Kourloff again moved his detachment forward by the Sophia high-road, and ar- rived at the stone bridge over the Vid only when the battle was - over. “ While the 2d and 3d Divisions of Grenadiers were heroically repelling the attack of the whole Turkish Army, the other troops of the army of investment—under the orders of Lieutenant- Generals Zotof, Baron Kriidener, and Kataley, of Major-General Schnidnikoff, and of General Cernat, who commanded the Rou- manian Corps—were advancing against the Turkish fortifications on the east and south fronts. The greater part of these works had already been evacuated, and the troops occupied the town of Plevna in presence of Your Imperial Highness. After having entered the place, the troops, with Your Imperial Highness at the head, received orders to continue to advance in the direction of the Vid upon the rear of the enemy, and they concentrated little by little on the heights to the west of Plevna near the Sophia high-road. “ The Roumanian troops, with whom H. H. Prince Charles had been since the morning, met some resistance at the redoubts of Opanetz, which the enemy still occupied. Aftera struggle of short duration, the garrison of these works laid down their arms, and the Roumanians gained possession of 3 guns and 2,000 prisoners. “General Kataley, having remained on the right bank of the Vid with the rest of the 3d Infantry Division of the Guard, perceived the retreat of the Turks in the direction of the river, and resolved to gain possession of the redoubt fronting the Volhynia hill, in order to cut off every route of retreat for the enemy upon his fortified camp. At 11:30 a. m., the Red re- THE FALL OF PLEVNA. 311 doubt was occupied without striking a blow, and soon after- ward that of Fort Mahomet surrendered in its turn, after a short resistance. About 1 p. m., the Black redoubt and the Sugar-Loaf redoubt were also taken after a short musketry fire. In these redoubts* the soldiers of the Guard took prisoners, 1 Pasha, 120 officers, and 3,734 soldiers, and gained possession of four guns. They had on their side 3 men killed, and 15 wounded. ‘¢ Hemmed in by superior forces, the Turks could no longer continue the struggle; consequently they sent forward a flag of truce, and the chief of staff of the Turkish Army, who proceeded to General Ganetzky, announced to him that Osman Pasha was wounded, and that he desired to know the conditions of surrender. General Ganetzky demanded the unconditional surrender of the whole army. Osman Pasha consented thereto, and General Ga- netzky proceeded in person to his brave wounded adversary. “There were surrendered on the memorable 10th of Decem- ber, 10 Pashas, 130 field-officers, 2,000 company-officers, 40,000 foot-soldiers and gunners, and 1,200 horsemen. We took 77 guns, and immense quantities of ammunition, especially of small- arms cartridges. The enemy lost during the battle about 6,000 men. “On our side, the 2d and 3d Divisions of Grenadiers sus- tained the following losses: Killed, 2 field-officers, 7 company- officers, and 409 soldiers; wounded, 1 General, 3 field-ofticers, 47 company-oflicers, and 1,268 soldiers. “The 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division had 1 field- officer and 47 soldiers wounded. “Thus the system adopted under the walls of Plevna, and consisting in observing a complete investment without having recourse to open assault—a sanguinary and risky enterprise— brought about the end which was had in view. The result of this system was the capture of an army of 40,000 men, the best one of the enemy, and the possession of an important strategic point, which closes the principal roads of Western Bulgaria. And during the period of the investment our troops were not only protected, but were able to replace their losses, and now, strong as they are and with the spirit which animates them, * The redoubts here referred to are those lying along the ridge from Krishin to Blasivatz. i 312 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. they are ready to accomplish new exploits for the glory of our arms. “Tn conclusion, I feel it my duty to bring to the notice of your Imperial Highness the services of the chief of staff of the Army of Investment, Prince Imeretinsky, who has been for me a coadjutor whom it would be difficult to replace, throughout the whole period of time which was crowned by the brilliant success of the 10th of December; the former commandants of the sectors of investment, viz., Lieutenant-General Ganetzky, - to whom, with the Corps of Grenadiers, belongs the honor of the last day of the investment of Plevna; Lieutenant-Generals Zotof, Baron Kriidener, Kataley, and Skobeleff ; General Cernat, commandant of the Roumanian Corps; Major-General Moller, commanding the artillery line of battle; and Major-General Reitlinger, performing the duties of Chief of Engineers of the Army of Investment. 3 “ Having been a witness for two months of the conduct of the troops assembled under the walls of Plevna, of their firm- ness, their bravery, their self-denial in enduring fatigues and privations, I certify to Your Imperial Highness, with a senti- ment of profound respect for these troops, that the conduct of every man of the Army of Investment, from the general to the private soldier, has been above all praise. [Signed] “ Avde-de-Camp General Top.Epen. “9th January, 1878.” The Turkish defense of Plevna is the one thing which — relieves their whole campaign from a charge of complete incom- ce petency. Much high-sounding praise has been lavished upon it in English publications, and perhaps even more by the Russians themselves, who speak of it as the most brilliant defense of the century after Sevastopol. It is well to examine this subject with some care. It will be remembered that Osman Pasha, commanding an army at Widdin (which had very thoroughly beaten the Ser- vians in the late autumn of 1876), was ordered about the time that the Russians crossed the Danube (June 27, 1877) to march rapidly eastward to the defense of Bulgaria. Further than this the exact nature of his orders has never been made public. It has been supposed that he was ordered to occupy Nikopolis THE FALL OF PLEVNA. 313 and the line of the Danube in that vicinity. But he approached Nikopolis too late; it had already fallen (July 16th). Osman therefore kept his army at Plevpa,a central point 20 miles from Nikopolis and the junction of several roads, probably waiting for further instructions and developments; but he immediately set his men to work, according to the excellent Turkish habit — of fortifying every place where they remain forty-eight hours, to construct some trenches and redoubts on the east and north of the town. Hardly were these begun when the Russian brigade under Schilder-Schuldner came stumbling along with- out reconnoitering the ground in front of them, and attacked Osman’s whole army. The latter not only defeated them, but well-nigh annihilated one of the regiments. This was on July 90th. Osman did not need to wait for any further develop- ments; his course was now perfectly plain. He saw (and herein lies the genius of his whole defense) that so long as he could maintain himself with a large force at Plevna close to the flank of the Russians, he completely paralyzed their farther advance ; and in order to maintain himself there, he renewed work with the utmost energy upon his fortifications. While therefore the Russians had elaborately planned to mask the fortresses on their left flank during their advance, here was another set of fortifications springing up in the night on their right flank. They hastily concentrated a force (but a totally insufficient one) to dislodge Osman, and again attacked him, July 30th, only to be again repulsed with fearful losses, this time nearly 8,000 men. Osman did not follow up the Russians after their retreat, but devoted his whole energy to elaborating his works of defense. But as the Russians delayed renewing the attack, being obliged to wait for new reénforce- ments, Osman at last deviated from the controlling idea of his whole defense, viz., to always await an attack. On the 31st of August he assumed the offensive in connection with the advance of Mehemet Ali on the Lom and Suleiman’s attack at Shipka. But Osman’s attack on Zgalevitza came utterly to naught, and resulted in nothing but the loss of some 2,000 or 3,000 of his men. On the 11th of September the Russians, assisted by the Roumanians, again renewed the assault, and again (barring the capture of one of the Grivitza redoubts) they were everywhere beaten, and now with the appalling loss of 18,000 men. 314 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. Osman, while still keeping his men hard at work ever extending and strengthening his lines, now began to be anxious about his communications with Sophia, since he was wholly dependent on them for his supplies, and they were greatly threatened and slightly interrupted by bodies of Russian cay- alry. Chefket Pasha finally (September 22d) brought him some reénforcements and numerous supplies, and Osman im- mediately ordered the fortification of several points on the Sophia road in order to keep it open. But on the 24th of October the Russian Guard, which had just arrived, broke this line of defense completely to pieces, and a few days later Osman found himself tightly and closely invested. The Russians made no more assaults, and finally, when his provisions reached their last ebb, Osman found himself obliged to quietly surrender or to try to cut his way out. Unlike Bazaine, he chose the latter, and made a gallant effort, but it only resulted in defeat and the capture of his whole army. Certainly that must be called a brilliant defense whic arrested the Russian advance, and completely paralyzed their whole plan of campaign and all their movements for five months; which caused them to call forth vast reénforcements from Russia, and, pending their arrival, to supplicate the aid of a petty principality ; which killed and wounded and spread disease among nearly 40,000 of his enemies, and caused the affairs of a mighty empire to be directed during half a year from miserable huts in obscure villages of a foreign land. Yet Osman seems to have failed to comprehend the limita- tions of his system, and, by overstraining it, broke it, and thereby lost his whole army. Up till the middle of October there seems to be hardly anything in the conduct of his defense (excepting always the foolish attack on Zgalevitza) which is open to criticism. But at that time he knew very well, by the Eng- lish newspapers, that the whole of the Russian Guard and one or two fresh divisions of the Line had arrived in Bulgaria; he knew that there was a movement of some kind going on in the vicinity of the Vid on his right flank, and had he reconnoitered there he would have found about 35,000 men concentrated for the passage of the river. Although he may not have been familiar with the way in which Pemberton invited capture by shutting himself up in Vicksburg, and Lee postponed it for a THE FALL OF PLEVNA. 315 whole year by not letting himself be shut up in Richmond, yet it can be taken for granted that he knew something of the history of the siege of Metz, and of the inevitable result which must happen to any army which allows itself to be closely invested in an intrenched camp bya superior force. There- fore Osman should have abandoned Plevna and retreated to Radomirtza, instead of allowing the Guard to cross the Vid and attack Gorni-Dubnik. Radomirtza was only two long days’ march (about 45 miles) from Plevna; it was a position of far greater natural strength than Plevna itself, and already its for- tifications were further advanced than those at Plevna on the 30th of July. He could well have afforded to risk holding them against open assaults, and if obliged to give them up by a movement of the Russians to surround him, he could again retreat toward the Balkans; everywhere there were good po- sitions for defense, and at every step he came nearer his proper base and increased his strength by taking in small detachments. If he finally had to retreat behind the line of the Balkans, he still had his army intact. He could not, of course, have changed the final result of the war, but he could have deferred it, as Lee deferred the fate of the Confederacy; and he might possibly have saved his country from such an annihilating defeat as it finally received after the loss of his army. But Osman had no such thoughts in his mind, and his own explanation of his ideas is very interesting. While a prisoner at the Grand Duke’s headquarters a few days after his capture, he was called upon by General Todleben, and a long conversa- tion ensued upon the events of the siege. Todleben asked Os- man precisely this question, why he did not retreat to Radomirtza in October, when the Guard was concentrating on his right flank and threatening him with investment. Osman replied that he had then no thought of retreating— 1. Because he felt sure—at that date and up to the very day of his sortie—that the Russians, and especially the Roumanians near Grivitza, would renew their assaults, and he felt equally sure that he would be able to defeat them with great loss. He longed for these assaults from day to day. 2. Because at that time he had just received a fresh lot of provisions and reénforcements. He could not think of retreat- ing under those circumstances. 316 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. There was a third reason which he did not mention in this conversation, but which is abundantly attested from other sources, and which was more imperative than the two just given, viz., that the War Council at the Seraskierate in Constantinople had tele- graphed him positive and explicit orders not to retreat under any circumstances. In this conversation Osman also said that the system of in- trenched camps with modern breech-loaders is admirable so long as the enemy has not troops enough to surround them ; but it is their fate to be invested, and then they are doomed. If we compare the two parts of this conversation, we can only reconcile them by supposing Osman to have a contempt for his enemy’s tactics, which, as the result proved, was by no means warranted. There have been in the last twenty-five years six other sieges of a character similar to that of Plevna, viz., Sevastopol, Kars, Vicksburg, Richmond, Metz, and Paris. Of these Kars, Paris, and Metz were fortified places of the first order, consist- ing of a strong enceinte in masonry and detached forts, supple- mented slightly by earthworks built at the last moment. The other four, Sevastopol, Richmond, Vicksburg, and Plevna, were simply places which had been hastily fortified by a series of earthworks, redoubts, batteries, and trenches, constructed only just before the arrival of the enemy, and continually extended and strengthened during the progress of the siege. At Vicks- burg and at Plevna the defenders allowed the enemy to attack their rear and closely invest them. Both fell when their pro- visions were exhausted. At Sevastopol and Richmond, on the contrary, the defenders constantly and incessantly extended their flanks and prevented the enemy from surrounding them. The one place was finally evacuated by its garrison after a por- tion of the works had been carried in assault. At the other the defensive line became finally so extended that it was too long to be held by the force of the defenders; they were obliged to leave their fortifications in an effort to retreat, and were then almost instantly overwhelmed and destroyed. The following comparative tabular statement of some of the principal features of these great sieges may be interesting. 317 THE FALL OF PLEVNA. 000°62% 000°LF 000931 ed eerecseoores ee ee eect ere eseesreeoe sere eese ress reese eee eeer rere ees e esos E albta! S/aVNNG 66 wivubla Oats Ula aiU'S SS 6 S16 0.01076 0 6 9.8. UIE Cn 6 618)0) 5188/96 6 e 9 Sre s,s) a56 S059. 8 eee ec cece eee ee eee e seers seers ese seseseeerserreeorserese secs se eter eee stereo es eareeeee cece eee ee eer ees eres sees e esse ® wc cer eee eee eer es FeO eessesestt esos seessessees ‘jodoysvaag 1v9T 919M OOO'STT Gory Jo “OO0‘ORT 38 VAWLID 04} Ul suUvISSNY oy} pus ea ch eee te oe rete eeeeeoe ee “ss °STBIOTpIVg i “syIN JT, eee eee co eseeee ee eee c sere essesrereseereerseee oo) UST Sug ee oe PRR CEFN Bes F(a f Ae a ehera ab el8 dee <6 ee mele S Sik =,6 0-5 mle oF @ OF we, S'S 61m we ee) s Poe eees sere seseseesereesseeseseosesonsrers : SMOT[OF Sv ‘Gast ‘g soquiozdog uo 90403 pore ayy soats “(ZIP “A “TT 1OA) 99ND OP edITEN4 ,, ‘yassnoy “g "Soy TUL g ‘YapURxXd|Y WOT 0} YQ Suruseivy wos ‘suvissny oy} Jo yey} pus ‘soyrax y, Ajuo seam ‘Lug ounuerend 0} vieusoyoy, oy} Woy ‘epyeaed ysay oy Suope oury perye oy} Inq ‘GT ynoqe surissny oy} JO os0q} pus ‘q1Su9] UI SOTIO FE J9AO POINSVOU UOT}ENIBAD JO OUI} OY} 4B SOYOUI} polfe OL “% ‘gasT ‘g soquiaydog Jo y4S1u oY} UO payenovad sea oovyd oy} pus ‘PagT ‘g 19q0}0Q pouedo o10M Soyouod} OL, “T “odojspnagy *T ‘ATAV], TAOPY OL SALON 000‘000'ET | 00008 ooo'o00't |oo0'00z | 000‘08 | ooo‘oF | 12 | OoO'OF | 00¢} OOO‘OTT | FB | OF | SpE] TTT AST OL toqureoecT 09 0% Aine “VNATTE ale! @:0' ie isia| els.2 0], 5 sive 2 0) a6 0°06 0') 0 6)ale oe 80 ee , ee 000'¢% 000°¢T FP), 000‘00F gs) 000‘002 Fe ZG eel seer ese sorecooeesetygy “y GoIVAy 0} ‘OLST ‘03 coquieydag “slaved Pe ee a ns weer - 000°88 000'L% #69 000°8LT gc9 000'L61 cl CG aL ritteesesececscssrerssess Oey 4% 10G079O 0} OL ININY ZLAI CeO Mee ccevel eect oR Sere eel veeres eee ee ee 000°09 000'28 Q1Z 000'09 80P 000°LST. I¢ eC OFS aie lsievesiesiric “yee eclee eQOT ReT Lig tn OF FOST ‘pF AV ‘ANONHOIY Siva adie oie Bera elifele 1s @ a0: 6.6.0. hae Gan ee Pele] See gwen. 000 LT 000°6 OL 000°68 PhS 000'TL 8 val cg eco e tees teense ee egal ‘F Ang 0} ‘T Avy ‘SAxoasSHOTA ee es Fee 00001 O00 ET. | | OURS. 1S goooe | et Per foot) 7 me es acer. “ey SoquieseN 09 QL sunt eT oo0'000'es (2) 00‘000'T (2 | 090000'0¢ |o00'oge'T}| 000'FTT | 000'86 | 008] OO0'CTT| 128 | 00'6S|G | 2 | Fee] 7777 *" GEST “6 ZequIe;dag OF ‘FEST °6 1090900 “LOdOLEV ANG »Arqaeyuy “Aro WIV *Axquvyay | *Azeyay |*stepueyod ae ‘Aquvjoy jsuny| *Aapuryuy ‘sory «=| sAuq *Sannoat *SaNN0Oa “SHHANEAIG | *SLNV'IIVSSV ov oxaaae “SSANMOIS UNV “SUNIT | = : ‘SLNGNGUVE PNISOd | Bj "Su adNaIAd SINYV TIVSSV < Sb {Nod SLIOVS | ‘NIGNAYUNS LY STOUO ee aD a 3 *‘NOILINAWINY JO HUNLIGNGdXS Deincade 20: DLO Neos "2 318 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. He also (p. 468, Vol. II.) gives the total losses of the Crimean War, exclusive of the typhoid fever cases after November, 1855, as follows: French focgce uc corcmeteeuceen 80,000, of which 10,240 killed in battle. fa Fg 5-1 RN Me eV OG a) 22,000 *& 2,800 by a Dardinigng.. 00.) Sos ean cals eneOO, WOPES coca cheney Simeon tan enes 85,000 (?) otal s OCLC Rae ae 119,200 BUSsiAns 050 ace eran 110,000 Marshal Niel gives the total losses of the French during the siege at 44,497 killed, wounded, and missing, of which 7,627 were killed. The English reports do not give the total losses, but Sir H. Jones (p. 600) gives the killed and mortally wounded at 4,774. In the same proportion their total losses would be about 27,000. The English returns show about 12,000 constantly sick during the winter, and the sick among the allies at the evacuation may be estimated at 20,000. The total losses of the allies will then be as follows: French... i VP aeateke aU e vena tne 44,500 English...) ic) gis lanai ie salen atta 27,000 ~ Killed and wounded. Lurks and Italangicc gen ekaek. cao 6,500 Bick... |. «coi 'sem oh tame pcan Gee eee 20,000 98,000 The Russian losses during the siege, as given in Todleben’s “ Defense of Sevas- topol,” are as follows: HMO... . o'pis:e sin sidina Sn'eee pacientes ecules cen has cn eee an 15,553 Wounded. oii tes/bampieisad adic se Say an Uae ene ate 71,812 Missing o's 5:o.s)ois:tialsdlstewit sle'e ore!s-cteial sidte aisloretele Wimiate ee eae ap 2,277 Total... lsic'ciiese cavsere.4 6 seep neace neh ee bo ciereeieiate enn net 89,142 To which 25,000 may safely be added for sickness, making a grand total of about 114,000. 4, On September 8, 1855, the French batteries numbered 620 guns in position (Marshal Niel’s report), and the English 207 (Sir Henry Dacres’s report, p. 638). Marshal Niel gives the total amount of French artillery brought to the Crimea as 1,676 guns of all calibres. Sir Henry Dacres’s report (p. 209) gives the total num- ber of English guns in use during the siege as 401. Major Delafield, however (“Art of War in Europe,” p. 55), states that the English brought 911 guns to the Crimea. He also states (p. 56) that the total amount of artillery and ordnance brought to Sevastopol was 2,587 guns of all calibres, 2,881,042 shot and shells, and 11,484,804 pounds of powder. Marshal Niel’s report states that the French expen- diture of artillery ammunition was about 1,100,000 rounds. Sir Henry Dacres (p. 205) gives that of the English as 252,872 rounds. Marshal Niel gives the amount of small-arms ammunition supplied to the French troops at 70,000,000 rounds, but does not state the expenditure. Estimating it at 40,000,000, and that of the English at 10,000,000, we have 50,000,000 for the total. 2. Kars. After the repulse of the Russians in their assault on the west of Kars in Septem- ber, Mouravieff assembled his infantry on the Erzeroum road, 7 miles south of Kars, and the rest of the long line of investment was kept up by large bodies of cavalry. The losses are only approximate. THE FALL OF PLEVNA. 319 3. Vicksburg. The effective strength of General Grant’s command on June 30, 1863, is shown in the following table, compiled in the Adjutant-General’s office from the field returns of that date: INFANTRY, CAVALRY, ARTILLERY, DESIGNATION. een IN re ne Pe tr err GATE. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. MERON D Share <\stisieis\s oo, -.neis 960 874 | 6,632 bb oe 9 809 7,324 MERIOLD Areas s case arauieess cee %48 | 11,500 28 554 84 941 13,805 BPEDCHEOLDA, «5 occiccscticceccs dees 793 | 12,444 82 =| «= 481 23 668 14,411 BRPEIVOL DE Ga cittecderpiccic acc dees 836 14,318 68 936 21 TTT 16,956 BMEIOCD Sen cscs wistegiers cies sce TAL | 11,846 T 127 35 1,052 18,808 Herron’s Division.............. 240 | 4,286 ei ee 11 298 4,837 Total...... ae) ESE 8,782 | 61,028 135 2,068 | 133 4045 | 71,141 The other figures are taken from Badeau’s “ Life of Grant” (Chapters VII. and VIII.), which is unquestionably the best authority on the subject in print. Owing to the difficulty of separating the losses during the campaign from those during the siege proper, the figures given apply to the whole campaign from the crossing of the river to the surrender. The investment proper began on the 22d of May and lasted 35 days, during which the losses were between 4,000 and 5,000 on each side. The losses of the defenders include 7,000 prisoners captured in the various affairs pre- vious to the investment. ' 4, Richmond. The whole campaign of General Grant from the Wilderness to Appomatox is included in the “siege” of Richmond, in order to make the comparison uniform with the other sieges, which include all the battles immediately preceding the in- vestments. The siege of Petersburg proper lasted 290 days, from June 15, 1864, when Grant crossed the James, to April 2, 1865, when he began his retreat after the battle of Five Forks. The length of the lines is measured on the engineer map: Lee’s lines from the James River above the Iron Works, around Richmond and Petersburg to the end of his line on the White Oak road; Grant’s lines from the Topolopotomy across the Peninsula, past Bermuda Hundred, and around Petersburg to his extreme left in front of the White Oak road. The strength of the armies is taken from the field returns in the archives of the Adjutant-General’s office of the War Department. These show that on the 31st of March, 1865, Grant’s effective force present for duty numbered 5,288 officers and 115,759 men. Lee’s return of February 28, 1865, the last one in the archives, shows his effective force present for duty to be 3,519 officers and 55, 575 men. Grant’s losses are computed as follows: May 4 to June 10, 1864 (Mead’s report)........scceeseeecccersrerereneenccsen tres cceceees 54,500 May 4 to June 10, 1864, Oth Corps... ....... cece cee cree censccecceceeserccsesaceressensees 5,000 June 10, 1864, to March 81, 1865, including the attack on the Petersburg mine, on otha Wel- don road, and other battles and skirmishes........-.+.sseeeeeeeeereseee eee cece recess X BEUMEIMUOUADEIL GO LCG0,. pacr cc ccccccasvcessnsecceressasersnesecepeasravenscessrvrceer™ 8,000 320 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. Lee’s losses have never been compiled, and it is doubtful if the returns which have been preserved afford data for an accurate compilation. His return of Janu- ary $1, 1864, gives 74 officers and 1,374 men prisoners in the hands of the enemy; his return of February 28, 1865, gives 1,797 officers and 26,614 men similarly ac- counted for. This makes his loss in prisoners alone 26,963. His losses in killed and wounded in the same period may be stated, at the least estimate, as fully one third of those of Grant; this would give 27,000. Between Five Forks and the Appomatox he lost about 6,000. The total of his losses was therefore about 60,000. 5. Metz. The figures are taken from the “‘ German Staff History of the Franco-German War” (French translation, 2d part, pp. 257-297). At the time of the surrender there were 40,000 sick in the German hospitals, mostly light cases of fever arising from exposure in the wet. The French prisoners included 20,000 sick. These are not included in losses on either side in the above table. Only 5,500 of the above losses of the Germans were during the siege proper. The rest were incurred in the bloody battles at Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte in August, by which Bazaine’s army was shut up in Metz. The French had 876 guns on the walls of the place; these are not counted in the above table, which gives only the field-guns and mitrailleuses. 6. Paris. The figures are taken from the “ German Staff History.” Of the 400,000 men forming the garrison of Paris, only 100,000 (XIII. and XIV. Corps) were regular soldiers ; the rest were National Guard, Mobile Guard, and sailors. The field artillery of the French numbered 744 pieces (124 batteries), but there were in addition 1,889 guns of various calibres in the outer forts and 805 on the walls of the enceinte. The principal losses were incurred in the completion of the investment, Septem- ber 17th and 19th (French 5,000, Germans 4,200), and in the French sorties of No- vember 29th to December 8d (French 12,000, Germans 6,500). The Germans made no attempts to assault the place, but from the beginning endeavored to starve it out by a close blockade, Their inferiority in numbers was compensated by an admirable system of field works, constructed with great rapidity and with most numerous accessories, such as abattis, inundations, etc., etc., and by the superior quality of their troops. 7, Plevna. The authority for the number of troops, losses, etc., is found in the preceding pages. The expenditure of ammunition is an estimate based upon my own notes made from time to time during the siege. It is probably accurate within 20 to 30 per cent. The official figures have not yet been made public. ; CHAPTER IX. THE PASSAGE OF THE BALKANS NEAR SOPHIA, BY GOURKO’S COLUMN. AurnoveH the fall of Plevna was unquestionably a great disaster for the Turks, since it lost them the best of their armies and possibly the best of their generals, yet it is by no means true, as has been generally assumed, that it rendered the Turks incapable of further resistance to the Russian advance. The Turkish cause was as yet far from being hopeless. They had still 100,000 men in the region of the Quadrilateral, 30,000 at Shipka, 20,000 in the vicinity of Sophia and* the Araba-Konak pass, 15,000 at Constantinople, and a certain unknown quantity of reserves in Asia. Of small arms and ammunition they had abundance, although now, as at all times during the campaign, they were short of artillery; they were in a rich country, and the valley of the Maritza was teeming with provisions in spite of all the drains which the war had made uponit. The Turks had, it is true, an enemy in front of them of double their own numbers, and confident of victory ; but, on the other hand, that enemy had a line of communications 500 miles long from the Pruth to the Balkans, and this line absolutely cut in two now by the Danube, the ice of which had carried away all the bridges, and in front of him a rugged chain of mountains. It was the middle of December ; considerable snow had already fallen, and more was to be expected ; the winter climate of Bulgaria is one in which a temperature of 10° Fahr. is frequently encountered ; there were but two good roads (SistovaShipka and Plevna- Sophia) available for the Russians, and all the rest were now mere quagmires. These various natural difficulties were almost 21 O22 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. sufficient to neutralize the difference of force, had only the Turks had a leader, a man of the calibre of Amurath I., Moham- med the Conqueror, or Suleiman the Magnificent. But, unfor- tunately for them, such a man they had not, as they have not had since the 16th century. Their Commander-in-Chief was now that Suleiman who had knocked out the brains of some 15,000 men against the rocks at Shipka during the months of August and September, and who had lately achieved almost equally bad results on the Lom. He was hastily summoned to Constantinople, where he arrived on the 19th of December, and was intrusted by the Sultan with the chief command in Roume- lia, and especially the defense of the line of the Balkans. Of the Turkish Army on the Lom, a portion was placed in the for- tresses with outposts at Razgrad and Osman-Bazar, and the rest was rapidly withdrawn by Aidos and Slivno to the south side of the Balkans. Work upon the extensive fortifications of Adria- nople was pushed forward with great activity, and efforts were made to organize the recruits who were arriving in considerable numbers from Asia. It is generally conceded that a long line of defense, such asa chain of mountains or a large river, can not successfully be defend- ed by posting isolated bodies of troops, even large in numbers, at various points along it, since the enemy, by demonstrating at several places and concentrating his forces on one point, will overwhelm the defenders at that point before the others can come to his relief. All military writers are agreed that the proper means of defense of such a line is to post small bodies in ~ observation at the various points of passage, and keep the main — body of the defenders at some central point in rear, from which, as soon as the enemy’s veal attack is made clear, a force can bear down upon him and strike him before his troops have all crossed — the mountains or river. Such a point in this case was Adria- nople, in itself a naturally strong position, and now defended by — numerous half-finished earthworks, and from which high-roads — lead to Sophia, Shipka, Slivno, and Aidos, and railroads to within three days’ march of Sophia, two days’ of Shipka, and — one day’s of Slivno. But instead of posting the bulk of his troops there, Suleiman tried to do that very thing which all history condemns, viz., to defend the line of mountains by means of isolated detachments. Leaving only a very small foree PASSAGE OF THE BALKANS NEAR SOPHIA. 323 —less than 10,000 men—at Adrianople, he increased the Shipka garrison to 40,000, and that around Sophia also to 40,000, and divided the latter into two parts, 25,000 at the Araba-Konak pass and 15,000 at Sophia. With about 20,000 more he was moving to the relief of Sophia when he met the troops from Araba-Konak in full retreat near Philippopolis, where the united force was overwhelmed and driven across the Rhodope mountains to the Aigean. The mountain chain which separates the Sophia valley from that of the river Maritza is as high and difficult as the main chain of the Balkans; the broad valley of the Maritza is in fact completely shut in by mountains. Could the Turks have had a general capable of assembling the whole of their available force {about 150,000 men) in this valley, and using its interior lines of communication to strike against first one and then the other of the invading columns—which were widely separated—as Napoleon did in 1814, and then as a last resort have fallen back upon the strong fortifications of Adrianople and made a new Plevna of it, the war could at least have been prolonged till the next summer, and Turkey as a military power would not have collapsed in 1878. But such rapid movements require a good force of regular cavalry to keep the commander well informed of the enemy’s movements; and in this, as well as in generals and various other military essentials, the Turks were sadly deficient. Let us now turn to the Russian side. The fall of Plevna, set free 110,000 men. The 25,000 Roumanians forming part of this force were to remain near the Danube ; but on the other hand, Servia declared war against the Turks immediately after the fall of Plevna, and brought about an equal number of troops into the field. But without taking any account of their small allies, the Russians had 83 divisions—yviz., the IV., IX., and Grenadier Corps, 3d Division of the Guard, 2d Division of the Line, and 3d Rifle Brigade—immediately available for further Operations. What should be the plan of operations ? General Todleben, supposing, as was natural, that the Turks would concentrate near Adrianople, and that even after passing the Balkans the Russians would arrive before Adrianople in the dead of winter, with a chain of mountains at their back and a line of supplies impossible to maintain, advised the prudent military course, viz., to put the troops in winter quarters on the 324 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. main roads at the foot of the Balkans on the north, and to con- centrate a large force around Rustchuk and proceed to its regu- lar investment and siege. During the winter this place could be reduced, and then in the spring, the troops having refitted and having a railroad at their back, the army could advance over the Balkans and crush all resistance between it and Constanti- nople. But some time before the fall of Plevna the Grand. Duke Nicholas had made up his mind, although the idea met with the hearty approval of none of his generals except Gourko and Skobeleff, to cross the Balkans during the winter in spite of all the difficulties of ground, of season, of bad roads, and of insuffi- cient supplies. In this war, as in all others, purely military — reasons had to be subordinate to the higher political considera- tions; and there were the strongest political reasons for an im- mediate advance, since by postponing active operations until the spring the Turks would have time to reorganize and strengthen their armies, and—more important than all—the war would drift — into the hands of diplomacy with all its attendant complications, including the probability of England becoming an active ally of the Turks, in case a peace was not made. At all hazards, the Grand Duke determined to strike before the Turks had had time to recuperate. 3 Immediately after the fall of Plevna, therefore, he issued orders sending the IX. Corps and the 3d Division of the Guard to Orkhanie, the IV. Corps and 3d Rifle Brigade to Shipka, the 94 Division via Lovtcha and Tirnova to Rustchuk, and the Grenadier Corps in reserve behind Shipka. This gave Gourko 84 — battalions, say 65,000 men, of infantry, Radetzky at Shipka 74 battalions or 56,000 men, and the Cesarevitch 72 battalions or 55,000 men, besides the cavalry and artillery with each force. The 3d Division was to advance from Lovtcha over the Trojan pass in connection with Gourko’s advance 5 and in addition there was the XI. Corps in front of Tirnova, available as reserve, and the XIV. Corps under Zimmerman on the line of Trajan’s Wall in the Dobrudja. (See Plate 6.) Gourko’s task was to defeat the army in his front at the Araba-Konak Pass, capture Sophia, and then advance by the old Roman road leading from Sophia past Philippopolis to Adriano- ple; Radetzky was to defeat the Turks at Shipka, advance over PASSAGE OF THE BALKANS NEAR SOPHIA. 325 that pass, and join hands with Gourko in front of Adrianople ; while the Cesarevitch, commanding all the troops left on the north of the Balkans, was to protect the communications from any attack from the direction of the Quadrilateral and prosecute the siege of Rustchuk, with the assistance of Todleben as his Chief Engineer. The distribution of the troops at the begin- ning of the winter campaign is shown in the table on the fol- lowing page. GOURKO’S PASSAGE OF THE BALKANS. (See Plate 18.) Plevna fell on the 10th of December, and the troops destined to reénforce General Gourko’s detachment began their march as follows: the 3d Division of the Guard on the 14th, and the IX. Corps on the 16th. Up to this date the weather had been rainy with occasional snows, and the roads were in a very bad condition ; but on the 18th the veritable winter set in with no little severity. It began with a snow-storm, which continued with but little interruption for five days; and on the night of the 19th-20th the temperature fell to 8° Fahr. The roads then became an alternation of smooth ice and frozen masses of mud ten inches in diameter, and hard enough to resist even the artillery wheels. None of the horses were sharp-shod, and the little Steppe horses of the intendance wagons were not shod at all. The result was that at every hill the wagons had all to be hauled and pushed up by hand. | It was under these difficulties that the reénforcements made their march from Plevna to Orkhanie (75 miles), arriving at the latter place between the 20th and 23d of December. The force at Gourko’s disposal, given in a detail in the pre- vious tabular statement, was then about 65,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 280 guns of all kinds. The Turkish force opposed to him consisted in all of about 35,000 infantry, about 2,000 regular cavalry, large numbers of bashi-bozouks, and about 40 guns. It was thus distributed: 25,000 men and 15 guns on the Shandarnik and Araba-Konak positions (see pp. 295-297), where the high-road crossed the moun- tains; 5,000 men and 4 guns at Lutikova; the same at Slatitza ; and 10,000 men and 1,500 guns at Sophia. 326 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA, 3» 006'09 ‘sured Fp 118 Uy (OT OND) FotYour Jo Jey pus (6 ON) JuoUBeI CUD § ree ‘0g PUB FZ ‘SON SUOMNFey ‘opesiaq oud | -0q) 8d. 1eMoT ou wo pus soumlag an ur Spec Tshep WTA eee w peuonsis sum yor jo pred nee out Uae ase yy OT} poqnynsu09 q90Tgo sty} 7 puvuimos zepun sdooay oul bh “A[Wo opestiq euc t “syododel itch 38 PUBUIUIOD 9,0¥IN0X) [v1oue4y poutol puv ty FoOGoYG [stousy)-yuvusqnory jo puvaiuios Jopun ‘ssvg vydiqg Aq suvy[eg oy} 10A0 Juos Arenuve Jo o[pprul ey} Ur Sea ‘6g pus ‘1g ‘9g ‘Tg ‘SON syUeUMTZEY youssop Uo Jo SuNsTsuOO ‘uOISTATp stu, + » 60°08 » 006T =SUNS-o8s04 BT | », 0G =SUNZ-o810q 09 » 000'9 = SUNS-3003 GET | 1» O00'OI= SUNs-3005 0Zg 00's = suorpenbs gg » 000°0L[= suorpenbs 76 wou 000°0F= suolezzeq gp | USUI OYO'SG= suOl[EIEq £9) |'sop uoq—s eT ty or +1 : 6 IL L‘ON “809! 29 98 93 8 81 81 cI §$ IL S LI $€ TIA | ‘IX ‘Aorppueig “AIX | eyauneg *H0z Ivy “‘TaSsNBysUT[OT } ‘Ayzjouey ‘WUBUIOULOITZ » 009°LL » 00¢'T =suns-os10q 9g » 000°6 = 8UNS-3003 8gz 00¢'9 = suoipenbs 99 Uo OOS FG= suor[ez}eq GL +09 oe SI (4 Qs 68 6S T oL THX ‘TIX “YOLAVIVSID OTT, , ‘OL “ON JO uorfeyqeq $7 puv ‘Zp pus TT “SON sjuoUIY » » 000°99 » 00¢ =suns-oss0y ZT » 009" ‘) = suns-300J 073 - 000% = = suoipenbs gt TOU YNO'9G= suUOoI]e4eq FL 1 000°08 » 000'T =SuNs-as10y ¥Z ” 000°6 = suns-4ooy 9cz 000‘9 == suoipenbs F< woUT NOO'g= suoTTEIEG FFE Pea v "U01sorT ) g eee f 0€ ¥3 oT 5 “AI TIIA *AYZIOPBY, { \ $09) uoq "S09 “ONBO B P UE g 18 6 *S g 1 “XI “preny ‘oyINoyH | [ eer seee ““IVLOJ, J “SNOISIAIG AUIVAVD “““saavolag FTiWIy SNOISIAIG AYLNVAINT e@reree Sdi0Q ANAV seeees* SHHONVANHOSC “LIST GG laquecogy ‘piunbing we huey unrssnez oy fo wounguysryg PASSAGE OF THE BALKANS NEAR SOPHIA. 327 Gourko’s plan of operations—taking advantage of his supe- riority in numbers—was to leave a curtain of troops in front of each of these positions, and to send a strong column over the mountains to turn the left flank of the main Turkish position across the high-road. Smaller columns were to pass on either flank and protect the main column from attacks from Sophia, Lutikova, or Slatitza. For this purpose he divided his force of 814 battalions (8 battalions being at Vratza) into 9 detachments, and assigned 130 foot- and 20 horse-guns to them, leaving the rest of his artillery in reserve. The men were ordered to take rations of hard bread in haversacks, and beef and mutton on the hoof to last from the 25th to the 30th inclusive. The detach- ments were as follows: 1. Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner, with 9 battalions with 32 foot-guns, and seven squadrons with 6 horse-guns, on the Lutikova road. 9. Count Shouvaloff, with 12 battalions and 24 foot-guns, on the mountain heights west of the high-road. 3. Prince Oldenburg, with 8 battalions and 28 guns, east of the high-road. 4, Major-General Brock, with 53 battalions, 2 guns, and 2 sotnias, in front of Slatitza. These four detachments, something less than half the total force, were placed under the orders of General Kriidener, and were to remain in position, observe the Turks, bombard their positions, and pursue them in case of retyeat. | The main turning column was composed of three detach- ments following each other over the sappers’ road, viz. : 5. The advance guard, Major-General Rauch, consisting of 13 battalions with 16 foot-guns, and 11 sotnias with 4 horse- guns, which was to leave Vratches at 5 a.m. December 25th, pass over the mountains, and halt at Curiak until 4 a. m. De- cember 26th, when it was to debouch at Eleznitza and take position on the high-road at Malinne. 6. The “First Echelon,” 8 battalions with 16 guns, and 5 squadrons, which was to follow the Advance Guard and take position December 26th on its left at Razdanie. %. The “Second Echelon,” 10 battalions and 8 guns, to fol- low the First, and take position December 26th at Stolnik as reserve to the detachment in front of it. These two “Echelons” ee 328 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. constituted the 8d Division of the Guard under the command of Lieutenant-General Kataley. To protect the right flank— 8. Lieutenant-General Wilhelminof, with 6 battalions 16 squadrons, 8 foot-guns, and 8 horse-ptms, was to cross by an old trail over the Umargas Mountain, and debouch at Zilava on the 26th, whence he was immediately to take a defensive position against any troops coming either from Sophia or from the Luti- kova road; or in case the Advance Guard was checked at Elez- nitza ae. the Turks had one or two battalions), then to attack the Turks therein rear. Finally, 9. Major-General Dandeville, with 9 battalions with 8 guns, and 6 squadrons with 6 horse-guns, was to make his way from Etropol over the mountain named Baba, demonstrate on the right and rear of the Turkish position, and debouch into the plain of Kamarlee on the 26th. Once debouched into the plains of Sophia and Kamarlee, the cavalry of the various detachments was to push forward to the Philipoppolis and other roads, cut the telegraph, and recon- noiter. | The Order of the Day of December 23d, of which the above is the substance, therefore contemplated that the principal col- umn, 31 battalions, 16 squadrons, and 44 guns in all, should in 36 hours march 32 miles, passing over a mountain crest 1,800 feet above the valleys on either side; and these dispositions were made upon the report of the chief of the Sapper Battalion that — the road was practicable for artillery, which opinion was shared by the commanding general, who had passed over it in person. This opinion was somewhat sanguine, as the best parts of the road had a slope of one in six, and the worst as steep as one in three, with curves with a radius of 10 yards; and the whole was covered with half-frozen snow or frosted earth. | In the result the horses proved to be totally useless, and were unharnessed ; the pieces and caissons were then unlimbered, and ' the ammunition unloaded and carried by hand; drag-ropes were attached to each limber and each gun; from 100 to 150 men hauled on the ropes and pushed at the wheels and boxes. The first gun reached the summit on the morning of December 26th, and the last on the 30th. In order to descend the southern slope (where the snow PASSAGE OF THE BALKANS NEAR SOPHIA. 329 melted each afternoon and froze into smooth ice each night), two drag-ropes were fastened to each side of the carriage and one to the trail; with one rope on each side, a turn was then taken around a stump or bush, the other two ropes were then slacked up, and the piece was let slide the length of the first two ropes; then the operation was repeated. Some effort was made to guide by the trail-rope, but it amounted. to little; for on the steep icy slope the men could not stand on their feet without the aid of a stick ora bush. Occasionally the piece got loose, but was brought to a standstill by a stump. There was but one serious accident, caused by the parting of a cable, in which one man was killed and three were seriously injured. Not a carriage was lost or damaged. The patience and good humor of the men—hauling at the guns twelve hours of the day, sleeping on the snow without tent or blanket, and subsisting on two thirds of a ration of black hard biscuit and meat, which latter was not always on hand— were extraordinary. By examining the map (Plate 18), it will be seen that the sappers’ road descends into a valley whose head is not far from the left of the Turkish position at Araba- Konak; thence it follows this valley in a westerly direction to Curiak, where it turns south for two miles, and then, again turning west, passes Potop and arrives at Eleznitza, debouch- ing thence to the south into the plain of Sophia. The greater part of the road between the summit and the Curiak valley was in sight of the Turks along the Shandarnik position; they also had one or two battalions posted at Potop and Eleznitza, with their outposts on a mountain overlooking Curiak and Potop at the bend of the valley. The Preobrazhensky Regiment, the 1st Regiment of the Ist Division of the Guard, had the advance, and passed over to Curiak during the night of the 24th. On the night of the 25th the Caucasian Cossacks passed over, and on the morning of the 97th the Kozloff Regiment (No. 123) of Rauch’s column, with 4 guns. One battalion of this regiment was left in the valley above the point where the sappers’ road entered it, and the other two passed through Curiak and over the mountain be- tween it and Potop, at which latter place there was a slight skir- mish with the Turks, who retreated into the plain of Sophia. On the same day, about noon, the Preobrazhensky Regi- 330 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. — ment took possession of the mountain in front of Curiak, where the Turkish outposts had been, and then, advancing during the night, occupied and fortified a position to the left (east) of the village of Nyagesovo, facing the Turkish position at Taskosen. The Caucasian Cossacks descended into the valley of Taskosen, cut the telegraph to Sophia, and captured a provision train of over 200 wagons en route from Sophia to Araba-Konak. The next two days, the 28th and 29th, were occupied in hauling at the guns. Meanwhile the column on the right, General Wil- helminof, had found its route totally impracticable, and after two days of futile effort had discovered another, by which the guns were brought to Curiak, with labor equal to or greater than that of the main column. The column on the left, Gene- ral Dandeville, succeeded in getting over the summit of the mountains, but in its descent was overwhelmed by a terrible storm, causing the snow to pile up in great drifts and bury a considerable part of the artillery. All progress was impossible, and after great suffering, this column returned to Etropol, De- cember 29th, having lost 58 men frozen to death and 810 per- manently disabled by freezing. But the main turning column met with better success, and on the 30th all the guns were in the Ouriak valley, the pieces assembled and harnessed. On the same day the Turks aban- doned their position on the Lutikova road, leaving 4 guns, and escaped to Sophia, with a few losses in their rear guard, which was overtaken by the Caucasian Cossacks. The dispositions were then taken for attack on the 31st. The plain of Sophia is a shelving oval about 25 by 10 miles in extent, entirely surrounded by mountains from 1,500 to 2,500 feet higher than its own level. Sophia lies in the southwestern corner. As the Plevna high-road, after leaving Sophia, ap- proaches the eastern side of this plain, it meets and passes a spur of the Little Balkans projecting to the north through the villages of Malinne and Razdanie to Nyagesovo. Beyond this — spur is a little prairie three miles in diameter, the eastern boun- dary of which is formed by a spur of the Balkans projecting to the south ; over this the road passes near the village of Tasko- sen, and descends into a second prairie about five miles in di- ameter—the Kamarlee plain. Here were the principal camps of the Turkish reserves, their stores, munitions, ete. On the PASSAGE OF THE BALKANS NEAR SOPHIA. 331 north was their position at Araba-Konak, the main range rising abruptly from the plain; on the southeast was the road to Sla- titza, and to Petricevo and Ichtimann on the Philippopolis high- road. At Malinne and Razdanie the Turks had nothing but an outpost, which disappeared on the appearance of the Preobra- zhensky Regiment. At Taskosen, however, they seemed pre- pared to make a defense. They had there ten battalions (about 5,000 men), occupying intrenchments on either side of the high- road back of the village; and on the mountain north of it were three successive lines of earthworks with four guns. To take this position the following dispositions were made: 1. General Rauch, with 10 battalions and 8 guns, to demon- strate against its front and turn the mountain with his left. 2. Major-General Kourloff, with 10 battalions and 8 guns, to make a détour to the right through Cekansevo, and take the mountain behind Taskosen ; and two brigades of Cavalry to go still farther to the right and descend into Kamarlee plain. The reserve, 12 battalions and 20 guns, under General Kataley, was on the high-road about two miles in rear of Rauch. A small column of three battalions, under Colonel Vasmund, kept up the connection between Rauch and Shouvaloff through the village of Dauskioi. On the same date, the 30th, General Wilhelminof, with 5 battalions and 8 guns, debouched through Eleznitza to Jana, and the next day took position a few miles in advance in observation of Sophia; and the Caucasian Cossacks were placed under his orders. The columns were under way before daylight on the 31st, and took the routes above indicated. Rauch’s 8 guns got in position at 9 A.m., about 1,800 yards from the Turkish batteries, and an artillery duel opened with shrapnel, at the same time that the Preobrazhensky Regiment and two battalions of the Rifle Brigade began working their way through the deep snow round the mountain to his left. Kourloff’s column on the right met with a warm reception on leaving the village of Cekansevo, and lost over 200 men (in- cluding General Mirkovitch, commanding the Volhynia Regi- ment) in their skirmish line at a distance of fully 2,000 yards ab) 332 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. from the Turkish position. They were obliged to advance very slowly, the men running forward a few yards and then lying down in the snow, as they were entirely exposed in the open — plain to the fire of the Turks concealed behind rocks on the mountain. About 2 o’clock their skirmish line got within 500 yards of the Turks, and then the latter fled. The advance guard of the cavalry column on approach the Kamarlee plain encountered some infantry intrenchments, and was driven back by their fire; and the cavalry did nothing all day. : The Preobrazhensky Regiment and the Rifle Brigade mean- time kept crawling round the left of the mountain out of fire, and approached the Turkish battery from its right rear (north) about 8p.m. Under cover of heavy clouds which settled on — the mountain about this time, the Turks retired their guns to — the high-road and then abandoned the whole position. They took up, however, a second position of great natural strength, on a mountain crossing the high-road about a mile in rear. It was now about 4 o’clock, darkness was setting in, and the men were exhausted with the fatigues of the day. They were therefore ordered to bivouac on the heights in rear of Tasko- — sen. During the night the outposts were somewhat carelessly kept, the men having well-nigh reached the limit of endurance with the terribly fatiguing work of the past seven days; more- — over, a dense fog prevailed. On the next morning, January ist, the Turks could not be ~ found. The columns began advancing between 8 and 9 A.M, — Rauch by the high-road, and Kataley with the 8d Division of the Guard in two columns over the mountain on his right. | As Gourko reached the Kamarlee plain with the advance about 10 o’clock, he saw a column of about 10,000 men, the rear of the Turks, climbing the mountain behind Dolni- Kamarlee on the road to Petricevo. At the same time a recon- noitering party of cavalry advanced over the high-road at Araba- Konak, and met the advance of Kriidener’s corps coming from the north. The fortifications at Araba-Konak were all aban- doned, and the passage of the Balkans was complete. Kataley’s column came up with the Turks at Dolni-Kamarlee about noon, but the rear guard of 200 or 800 men made a stub- PASSAGE OF THE BALKANS NEAR SOPHIA. poo born defense from behind the fences and houses of the village, and the main force secured its retreat. In the Kamarlee plain the Turks abandoned their hospitals, with about 1,000 sick and wounded under care of the English Surgeons of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, about 600 tents, over five million rounds of small-arms cartridges, and a considerable quantity of hard biscuit. On Shandarnik they abandoned ten guns, being unable to withdraw them under the shrapnel fire of Prince Oldenburg’s batteries. The same day, January 1st, the Turks in Sophia made a sortie with about 5,000 men against the column of General Wilhelminof. The latter disposed his force of 3,500 men along the crest of a low bluff rising from the plain in front of the village of Gorni-Bugaroff, and while the Turks were approach- ing they constructed hastily a line of little trenches, each large enough for eight or ten men. With wonderful firmness the Russians let the Turks approach within about 100 paces, and then opened fire with well-aimed volleys, succeeded by a hand- to-hand attack with the bayonet. The Turks were completely staggered by the fierceness and suddenness of this attack, and after a few moments lost all cohesion and began to retreat in confusion to Sophia, leaving 800 dead on the field, but carrying off the 1,600 wounded to Sophia. The Russians lost 6 officers and 243 men. ‘The smallness of Wilhelminof’s force prevented his following up their retreat. On the evening of January 1st the following dispositions were ordered: Rauch, with 16 battalions and 26 guns, to leave Taskosen at 2 a.m. and advance by the high-road toward Sophia. Kataley, with the 3d Division of the Guard, 16 battalions and 16 guns, to continue the pursuit of the Turks, joining at Bunova the detachment of General Dandeville, which had succeeded on a second attempt in passing the mountains in that vicinity. The detachments of Shouvaloff and Oldenburg, to withdraw the guns from the mountain positions opposite Shandarnik, and then descend into the plain and bivouac near Malinne. The detach- ment of Schilder-Schuldner to pass into the plain of Kamarlee and bivouac there. Two brigades of the Guard Cavalry to move to Petricevo in order to take the Turks in flank, and the 3d Brigade to take position on the Philippopolis high-road five miles east of Sophia. 334 ‘THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. While the movements already described had been in pro- # gress, 70,000 pounds of hard bread had been packed across the — mountain by the sappers’ road on the horses of the artillery left — in reserve. This, with the biscuits left by the Turks, furnished the bread ration to the 4th of J anuary inclusive, when the wagons began arriving by the high-road. Rauch moved forward as ordered, and on the afternoon of the 2d, after a march of 25 miles, came to the Isker bridge, five miles east of Sophia. Here the Turks had posted three bat-- talions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry, which made a defense for about an hour, setting fire to the village of Raz dimme and attempting to burn the bridge; but before they could get the fire well under way the Preobrazhensky Regi- ment .crossed the Isker on the ice about a mile to the left, and threatened their rear, whereupon they retreated to the town. | | The next day a reconnaissance was made of the Turkish positions, showing that they had five large strong redoubts com- manding the approaches by the various roads, and several lines of trenches and batteries recently constructed, a garrison of about 12,000 men, and 15 to 90 guns (estimated). The 8 bat- talions of Prince Oldenburg and 16 guns were brought up from _Malinne, and all the dispositions were made to attack on the Sth. Wilhelminof, with 8 battalions and 12 guns, was to de- monstrate on the north, while Rauch, with 20 battalions and 49 guns, was to make the main attack along the Plevna high-road. With the previous experience of the campaign, the result of this assault would have been at least doubtful, and if successful it would have cost over 5,000 men and largely demoralized the whole force. Fortunately, the necessity for it was avoided, as the Turks evacuated the place during the night of the 3d, retreating in the direction of Dubnitza, and abandoning as usual all their tents, an immense quantity of ammunition, and about 1,600 sick and wounded. Here, in addition, they left about 8,000,000 complete rations of flour, hard bread, rice, sugar, coffee, salt, etc., besides oats and barley in great quantities. With this and the abundance of hay, sheep, and cattle in the Sophia Valley, the force under General Gourko’s orders was provisioned for over a month. | Gourko’s total losses in action during the eleven days of his PASSAGE OF THE BALKANS NEAR SOPHIA. 30D movement between Orkhanie and Sophia were 382 officers (in- cluding 3 generals) and 1,003 men. The occupation of Sophia completed a military enterprise of no ordinary character, viz., the passage of a high mountain range in the middle of winter. The attacking force was nu- merically superior to the defenders in about the proportion of three to two; the latter were dispersed at several points, and nearly all their troops occupied positions on the mountain crests, with only a small reserve (at Sophia) in rear. Occupying the attention of each one of these detachments in front, the Russian commander threw a strong column over the mountains between the main mountain position (Araba-Konak) and the reserves (Sophia), and, completely turning the former, caused the hasty retreat of its defenders. Against the road by which they es- caped a second turning column had been sent ; but, overwhelmed with a snow storm in the mountains, it had been obliged to turn back, and thus the Turkish force escaped capture or complete destruction. The success of such a movement depends very largely upon the secrecy and celerity with which it isaccomplished. Secrecy had in this case been very well observed, since the Turks had no knowledge of the construction of the sappers’ road by which the main turning column passed; and its value was aug- mented by the confident belief of the Turkish commanders that to pass such a range of mountains covered with deep snow at this season of the year, by any but the;main road, was totally impossible. As for celerity, there was not so much success; for the sappers’ road proved so difficult for the passage of cannon that the arrival of the troops in the valleys of the southern slope, which had been fixed in Gourko’s orders for the 26th, did not take place until the 30th. For four days—days of no little anxiety—the movement hung fire, half the guns on one side and half on the other side of the mountains, the troops more or less dispersed, and a retreat in case of attack being im- possible. There was, moreover, a lateral valley of the moun- tains which, passing out of range of Shouvaloff’s right flank, led directly against the road which the main column was descend- ing. Here was a fine opportunity for the Turks to strike the left flank of Gourko’s column as it was descending the moun- tain, and before the men were well assembled. But the Turks 336 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. did not take advantage of this opportunity, and what would have happened had they done s0 it is idle to speculate. Having compelled the retreat of the Turks from Araba- Konak, Gourko sent one division of infantry and two brigades of cavalry to their pursuit; and without giving his troops any repose, he turned the rest of his force toward Sophia; which the Turks evacuated just as Gourko was preparing to assault it. In the other column the cavalry found such difficulty in travers- ing the mountains that all their efforts to head off the retreat- ing Turks and strike their flank came to naught; the cavalry — arrived too late each time. The infantry followed directly on the heels of the Turks, but in the narrow mountain passes the latter managed to cover their retreat by small bodies of men posted on the heights overlooking the road. They thus from time to time delayed the Russian advance long enough to gain time for their own retreat. In one of these skirmishes, the commander of the division, General Kataley, and one of his bri- gade commanders, who were riding imprudently in front of the column, were killed. The Russian troops entered Sophia on the 4th of January, and were granted the few days’ rest which was absolutely indis- pensable to them before undertaking a farther advance. The Turks had abandoned about 8,000,000 rations* of flour, rice, barley, salt, sugar, coffee, and a small quantity of hard bread and salt-beef. They also left all .their tents, over 4,000,000 rounds of cartridges, and a large quantity of forage. Sixteen hundred sick remained in the hospitals under care of the surgeons of the various English aid societies. There had been between 7,000 and 9,000 sick and wounded in the hospitals before the Turks abandoned the town, but all those who were capable of walking or crawling, as well as the Turkish population of the town, had been ordered to leave, and had fled in the direction of Dubnitza. But although a great quantity of supplies had fallen into the hands of the Russians, there was very little hard bread among them; and this article was indispensable to Gourko’s farther advance. A supply train loaded with it was brought over the Araba-Konak Pass, from the Russian supplies at Orkhanie. As * Of flour alone there was more than 30,000 tons, according to Gourko's report. PASSAGE OF THE BALKANS NEAR SOPHIA. 337 soon as it arrived Gourko distributed six days’ rations of it to his men, as well as beef and mutton on the hoof. He then issued orders for his advance toward Philippopolis, which began on the 9th of January. 22 CHAPTER X. GOURKO’S ADVANCE TO PHILIPPOPOLIS, AND THE BATTLES NEAR THAT POINT, JANUARY 15-17, 1878. (See Plates 2 and 6.) Berore describing Gourko’s advance from Sophia to Phi- lippopolis it is necessary to refer briefly to the topographical fea- tures of the intervening country. The plain of Sophia, although south of the main Balkan range, is yet properly a part of the basin of the Danube, for all its drainage is collected into the Isker, which cuts its way through the Balkans in a deep gorge due north of Sophia. The Isker rises near the town of Samakoff, about thirty miles south of Sophia, in a cluster of — peaks known as Mount Rilo, which attain an altitude of over 8,000 feet above sea level. From these peaks two ranges of mountains radiate to the northeast and northwest, joining the ~ main Balkans, and along these two ranges is the water-shed be- tween the basin of the Danube and that of the Algean Sea. A third range, known as the Rhodope Mountains, shoots off to the south of east from Mount Rilo, and between it and the Bal- kans lies the broad valley of the Maritza, the plains of ancient Thrace, beyond the eastern side of which lies Adrianople. The old Roman high-road, built by Trajan, passes through Sophia and over the water-shed on its east, winding through a deep gorge which still bears the name of Trajan’s Gate; descending into the plain of the Maritza above Tatar-Bazardjik, it follows the course of that river for 150 miles to Adrianople. Having crossed the Balkans to Sophia, Gourko’s problem was of course to advance along the direction of this road. By his movement on Taskosen he had separated the Turkish force ce GOURKO’S ADVANCE TO PHILIPPOPOLIS. 339 into two detachments, but they both made good their retreat— that which had defended the Araba-Konak Pass by crossing the divide to the town of Petricevo, which is situated on the Topol- nica river, an affluent of the Maritza, and that which had been at Sophia by making a wide détour to the southwest through the town of Radomir and thence east to Samakoff. The east- ern detachment numbered about 20,000 men, and the western about 15,000; and they were reénforced by 20,000 men with- drawn from the Quadrilateral and forwarded by rail. With them arrived Suleiman Pasha, who personally took command about the 5th of January. This force was then dis- tributed along the roads leading over the water-shed, the bulk of the newly arrived troops behind Ichtiman at Trajan’s Gate, the detachment of Shakir Pasha on the right at Otlukioi and Petricevo, and the garrison of Sophia at Samakoff on the lett. The distance between his extreme right and left flanks was nearly 40 miles, but the communications were good by means of intersecting valleys. This position at the entrance of the defile of Trajan’s Gate was one of great natural strength, but it could easily have been turned by either flank by means of the valleys winding in the rear of it. Such was Gourko’s plan of opera- tions, and for this purpose he divided his force into four detach- ments; exclusive of a portion of the 3d Division of the Line, which was sent along the base of the Balkans to Karlovo, there to join the rest of the division, which meanwhile was passing the Balkans through the Trajan Pass. | The four detachments were ordered as follows: On the right, Lieutenant-General Wilhelminof,, with 8 bat- talions of the IX. Corps, 12 sotnias of Cossacks, and 12 guns, was to leave Sophia January 7th by the direct Samakoff road, and endeavor, 1, to cut off the retreat of that Turkish detach- ment which was retreating by way of Radomir (in which he was not successful), and, 2, to advance through Banja against the left flank and rear of the position at Trajan’s Gate. | In the center, Lieutenant-General Count Shouvaloff, with 30 battalions, 12 squadrons, and 76 guns, all of the Guard, was to advance along the main high-road, and, arrived at Ichtiman, to act against the front of the position at Trajan’s Gate. On the left, Lieutenant-General Baron Kriidener, with the rest of the Guard and a portion of his own (IX.) corps, in all 24 340 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. battalions, 16 squadrons, and 58 guns, was to advance by Petri- cevo to Otlukioi, whence a good road descends to Tatar-Bazard- jik. He was to threaten the Turkish right, and in case of their retreat to endeavor to intercept them. Finally, the fourth column, a small detachment of 6 battal- ions and 8 guns under Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner, was to follow the valley of the Topolnica, keep up communica- tions between Shouvaloff and Kriidener, and endeavor to get in rear of the Turkish right. A detachment of 8 battalions, 8 squadrons, and 14 guns was left at Sophia to protect the rear of the advancing columns and guard the stores captured at that place. The various columns arrived in front of the Turkish posi- tions previously described on the morning of J anuary 11th. Then followed a curious misunderstanding, each of the Turkish detachments sending a Parlementaire through the pickets to say that orders had been received from the Minister of War at Con- stantinople to cease hostilities, as an armistice had been granted by the Russians. Telegrams soon arrived from the Grand Duke, however, saying that proposals for an armistice were expected, but had not been received, and that active operations must not in the least be retarded. This misunderstanting on the part of the Turks resulted in delaying the column of Wil- helminoff for twenty-four hours, but otherwise had no effect. On the 11th Wilhelminoff attacked Samakoff, and gained possession of it after a fight in which he lost 150 men. On the 10th the Turks received news of the capture of Shipka Pass and the whole army stationed there. This of course rendered a prompt retreat of Suleiman’s army imperatively necessary, and on the morning of the 11th his troops evacuated their whole line of defense along the mountains of which Tra- jan’s Gate was the center. Their right. flank anda portion of their center united at Tatar-Bazardjik, and at once continued their retreat to Philippopolis. With the Turkish left flank, however, which had been at Samakoff, the Russians at once began a race, in the hope that Shouvalof’s column, advancing by the high-road through Ichti- man, might first reach the Maritza valley and thus cut off this detachment. But the Turks reached the valley before the Rus- sians, the latter being delayed by their artillery, which again BATTLE OF PHILIPPOPOLIS. 341 had to be hauled up and down the icy slopes of the road by hand. As the advance guard of Count Shouvaloff debouched from the mountains on the main road at the village of Vet- renova on the afternoon of January 12th, the rear of the Turk- ish column was in sight a few miles in advance on a parallel road—that from Samakoff to Tatar-Bazardjik. The leading regiment was sent across to that road, but only overtook the baggage—300 ox-carts—which it captured. The next morning, January 13th, it followed on the heels of the Turks, but about five miles behind them, while twelve other battalions of Shouva- loff’s column advanced along the main road to about three miles from Tatar-Bazardjik. Here they found a portion of the cen- tral column, about 8,000 men, under Fuad Pasha, occupying a strong position behind the Topolnica River, and prepared to defend it in order to gain time for the other Turkish column to enter by the Samakoff road. The Russians were not strong enough as yet to warrant an attack, and therefore nothing was done beyond skirmishing with the outposts. During the after- noon the advance of Kriidener’s column was seen debouching from the mountains off on the left; and preparations were made to surround and attack the Turks the next day, provided they remained at Tatar-Bazardjik. But, as was expected, they aban- doned their positions during the night, and the pursuit therefore was recommenced early the next morning, January 14th. Fuad Pasha conducted the retreat of the 20,000 men now united under his orders as a rear guard with no little skill. In- stead of marching along the main high-road, where he could have been overtaken and detained by the cavalry long enough for the infantry to come up and overwhelm him, he at once crossed the Maritza, destroying the bridges, and followed the line of railroad with his infantry and the country roads with his artillery, and covered his rear with about 1,500 cavalry, who did excellent service. The Russians were on the march before day- light of January 14th, Shouvaloff on the high-road, Kriidener on a converging road on his left, Wilhelminoff and Schilder- Schuldner on the flanks somewhat in rear. About 5 p.™., after a march of 30 miles without halt, Shouvalofi’s advance guard got abreast of the rear of the Turks, about three miles off, on the railroad near the little village of Adakioi. (See Plate 20.) Here his troops forded the Maritza, a stream 200 yards wide and 342 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. 3 feet deep, and filled with floating ice, and passed through the village. But the Turks, on the run, had got about a mile ahead, and Shouvaloff, having only 8 battalions at hand, was obliged to be prudent, especially as it was already nearly dark. The same night the bulk of the cavalry (28 squadrons) bivouacked between the Karlovo high-road and the Maritza, about four miles from Philippopolis; Kriidener bivouacked at Celapitza on the right flank of the cavalry, with Schilder-Schuldner behind him on the same road; and Wilhelminoff was on the railroad about 12 miles in rear. ; The next morning, January 15th, Shouvaloff had 12 battal- ions in hand and 20 battalions marching toward him "by the high-road. He moved out of the village (Adakioi) at daylight, and at once found the Turks, who, overcome with fatigue, had been unable to continue their retreat during the night. They were posted in a good position behind a small but deep rivulet, the ice of which was not passable for artillery, extending from the village of Karatair on their left over a little hill behind Ka- dikioi toward the village of Airanly, their right resting on the swamps of extensive ice-fields. Shouvaloff at once deployed his troops and opened fire upon _ the Turks, and sent word to General Gourko, whose headquar- ters were on the other side of the Maritza nearly opposite Air- anly, that he hada force of about 15,000 men in his front posted in a good position, that he thought he could, if ordered to do s0, carry the position in his front, but with considerable loss; and asking for instructions. Gourko sent him back word about 10 A. M., not to attack the Turks, but to keep up a sufficient fire to hold them in place while he sent the rest of his troops around their right flank to cut them off from Philippopolis. For this purpose Gourko ordered: 1. Kriidener’s column, with the 3d Division of the Guard in the lead, to move forward at once to Philippopolis, nine miles in advance (or on the left as the line of battle stood), 2. The Finland Regiment, followed by Schilder-Schuldner’s Brigade (17th and 18th Regiments), to cross the Maritza at the village of Airanly, drive the Turks out of that village, and move around the Turkish right flank. 3. The Preobazhensky and Simeonoff Regiments to demon- strate against the center of the Turkish position at Kadikioi. iy BATTLE OF PHILIPPOPOLIS. 343 4, The Grenadier, Paul, and Moscow Regiments and the Rifle Brigade to keep up the fire against the left flank of the Turks, and if possible retain them in place. 5. The column of General Wilhelminoff to move along the railroad and come up on the right of Shouvaloff. As the Russian cavalry approached the Maritza on the east of Philippopolis early in the morning, the Turks saw that it would be useless to attempt to continue the retreat in that di- rection, and they were therefore forced to accept battle in the position where they then were, and thus cover their retreat over the Rhodope Mountains to the south. _ Suleiman’s whole force numbered 100 battalions, or between 50,000 and 60,000 men; but he personally escaped this morning with some 10,000 or 15,000 by Stanimaka and the road leading thence southeast over the mountains; but the rest of his force was cut off by the Russians before reaching Stanimaka, and thereafter formed the right flank of the force under Fuad Pasha, whose troops, with this addition, numbered in all about 35,000 men. Meanwhile Shouvaloff kept up a sharp fire with the Turks in front of him throughout the day. His right flank, however, was somewhat in the air, but gave him no great anxiety, as the column of Wilhelminoff was expected to arrive every minute along the railroad and join him; but about 4 Pp. m., Wilheminoff not yet having arrived, and a considerable force of Turkish cavalry having appeared between Karatair and Karadermen, Shouvaloff, not wishing to leave his flank unprotected during the night, resolved to attack the Turkish left at the village of Karatair and drive them out of that position. This attack was executed by the Paul Regiment, which crossed the stream in front of that village by fording, and after a short fight gained possession of the village. Darkness soon afterward set in, and soon arrived Wilhelminof?’s column. On the other flank the Finland Regiment was ferried over the Maritza on cavalry horses about 2 p.m., and drove the Turks out of the village of Airanly. But the column of Schilder- Schuldner did not come up till about 5 p. m.; it was then fer- ried over in the same manner at a ford about a mile east of the point where the Finland Regiment had crossed. It was unable to advance around the Turkish flank, however, for the country 344 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. in front of it was a mass of impassable rice-fields. The only fighting of the day was in Shouvaloff’s column, whose losses were in all about 300 men. The 3d Division of the Guard, forming part of Kriidener’s column, had meanwhile approached Philippopolis early in the afternoon, and had entered that part of the town on the north of the river; but they found the bridge wholly destroyed, the opposite bank occupied by infantry, and the river not fordable. Beyond preparing some bridge material, they were unable to accomplish anything on that day. A portion of the cavalry had moved around the town of Philippopolis and reached the Maritza at a point five miles east of the town, but had not crossed. The force against which Shouvaloff fought during the 15th of January was only the rear guard of the Turkish army, about 15,000 to 20,000 men, under Fuad Pasha. The rest of Sulei- man’s army, about 35,000 to 40,000 men, with Suleiman him- self, had already reached Philippopolis about the 12th or 18th. On the 14th, seeing the Russian cavalry already moving around the south of the town, Suleiman saw that it would be impossible to continue his retreat to Adrianople by the high-road, and he determined to try to escape by the roads on the south of the main road. For this purpose he sent a portion of his troops to the village of Markova (four miles south of Philippopolis), and with the rest he took the road leading to Stanimaka, and thence over the mountains either‘to Adrianople or due south to some port on the Aigean. This movement he began on the 15th, — while the fight was going on around Kadikioi. During the night of the 15th and 16th Fuad abandoned his position of the previous day, and, passing through the gap be- tween Schilder-Schuldner and the mountains, took up a position along the base of the mountains near the village of Dermen- dere. Wilhelminof followed him along the base of the moun- tains; Schilder-Schuldner moved along the railroad so as to get around his right flank ; and Shouvaloff followed along the rail- road across the rice-swamps, and then turning by the right flank deployed in his front. But Schilder-Schuldner, after arriving at the village of Komat, halted his troops on account of their fatigue, and did not close around the Turkish right flank. Fuad BATTLE OF PHILIPPOPOLIS. 345 meanwhile concentrated his troops near the village of Dermen- dere, and about 3 p.m. made a very savage attack upon Wil- helminof’s column, forming the extreme Russian right flank. These were the same troops which had repulsed the Turks so savagely at Gorni-Bugarof (near Sophia) on the 1st of January, and they repeated here the same tactics as on that day, and with almost equally good results—i. e., they lay down behind the rocks on a ridge of the foot-hills and let the Turks approach to within 100 yards, and then received them with carefully aimed volley-firing. The Turks made three attacks, and were each time repulsed, and finally retired, leaving 600 dead on the field, while the Russian loss was only about 60 in all. Fuad’s purpose in this attack was evidently to divert the at- tention of the Russians, and cause them to send troops to the aid of their right flank by weakening their left, and then to hasten to rejoin the rest of Suleiman’s army on the Stanimaka road. But he did not succeed. Two regiments were indeed sent by Shouvaloff to Wilhelminof’s aid, but Schilder-Schuld- ner’s column was not weakened, nor that of Kriidener. But Schilder-Schuldner did fail to get around Fuad’s right flank on the 16th, and therefore during the night Fuad again moved along the base of the mountains about four miles, taking up a new position near the village of Beleznitza. Meanwhile, on the morning of this same day (January 16th), Gourko having gone in person to Philippopolis, and finding that it would be impossible to construct quickly a bridge over the river in place of the one which had been burned by the Turks, immediately sent the 3d Division of the Guard down the river three or four miles to the nearest ford, and there had them ferried over the river on the cavalry horses of the 2d Brigade of the Cavalry Division of the Guard. From there this division advanced at once to the south toward the Stani- maka road, by which Suleiman had retreated the previous day. About 4 p.m. the 1st Brigade of this division approached this road near the village of Karagatch, five miles from Philip- popolis. This village was occupied by a considerable force of Turks, the rear of Suleiman’s force, with 18 guns. The Rus- sians immediately moved forward to the attack, and carried the village with a loss of about 260 men, capturing all of the 18 guns. The Turks in turn, reénforced in numbers, attacked the 346 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. Russians and tried to regain the position, but without success. The 2d Brigade of this division, however, had been delayed at the crossing of the Maritza, and did not arrive by nightfall. Owing to the weakness of his force and his exposed position (Suleiman’s main force being only a few miles farther ahead toward Stanimaka), the chief of this brigade thought it pru- dent to withdraw his troops and the 18 captured guns during the night a few miles back to the village of Ahlan, where he was rejoined by the 2d Brigade. Suleiman, however, continued his retreat, leaving Fuad to extricate himself the best way he could. By his retreat to Beleznitza during the night of the 15th and 16th, the latter had joined his troops to that portion of Suleiman’s rear guard which had been cut off at Karagatch. Sending his cavalry to follow Suleiman, Gourko prepared to close in his whole force round Fuad, Wilhelminof on the right near Markova, Shouvaloff and Schilder-Schuldner in the center near Beleznitza, and Dandeville (8d Division Guard) on the left near Karagatch. Fuad fought with his back to the mountains throughout the whole of this day, January 17th. In the morning he concen- trated his troops on the right in one final effort to drive back the Russians in that quarter, and open his way to the Stanimaka road; but his troops were repulsed, and, attacked in turn by the Russians, they lost more of their artillery. About 3 p.m. Schilder-Schuldner’s troops moved forward to the attack in front of Tchiftlik, at the same time that Wilhelminof’s column. advanced along the base of the mountains against the Turkish left flank at Markova. The Turks were incapable of further resistance, and, abandoning everything, they dispersed in small bands, climbing up the mountains through the snow. The Russians followed them till nightfall, and then gave up the pursuit on account of the impracticable nature of the country and the dispersion of the enemy. The next day Gourko reassembled his troops in the vicinity of Philippopolis, sending in pursuit of the enemy two cavalry columns: 1. The Caucasian Brigade of Cossacks, which fol- lowed Fuad’s detachment, cutting down more or less of the fugitives, and finally making its way through blind mountain paths to the other side of the mountains, and arriving at De- BATTLE OF PHILIPPOPOLIS. 347 motika (south of Adrianople) on the 27th; 2. The cavalry of the Guard and a brigade of Don Cossacks, which followed Suleiman’s detachment through Stanimaka, and on the 19th captured 40 guns which were halted at a very steep hill under escort of five battalions of infantry, which the cavalry dispersed after a short engagement. The result of Gourko’s movement from Sophia to Philip- popolis was the destruction of Suleiman Pasha’s army of 50,000 to 60,000 men. The Russians captured 114 guns in all (96 of them in open fight), about 2,000 prisoners, all the baggage, several thousand muskets, great quantities of ammunition, im- plements, ete., ete. The Turks lost in the series of engage- ments around Philippopolis very nearly 5,000 men, and retreated in scattered disorganized bands through the wild Rhodope Mountains, their numbers diminishing daily by desertions, freezing, starvation, etc. About the 28th of January this dis- organized force began to assemble on the shore of the Augean near Enos, where a fleet of transports was in waiting for them under command of Manthorpe Bey, an ex-officer of the British navy. About 40,000 men were transported in this fleet to Gal- lipoli and Constantinople. Suleiman was placed in arrest and ordered for trial by court martial.* Gourko’s losses between Sophia and Philippopolis were in all as follows : ee ne ch ile ie cigie, 4a pele sae b ¢ apis ow ee eae ) 220 TI ida ccc ces cco sessanseaes 384 989 SA re ee Se gk ae anata bald alSiena & 41 1209 We have now followed the first two stages of Gourko’s movements during the winter, viz., from Orkhanie to Sophia, and from Sophia to Philippopolis. Direct communications were now opened with the Headquarters and the troops at Shipka; and Gourko’s army became simply the right wing of the advancing Russian army, all the parts of which were within supporting distance. Before following this further advance, it is necessary to explain the passage of the Balkans by the other columns, which had meanwhile taken place. * The sentence of the court martial which tried Suleiman was delivered in December, 1878. It was.complete degradation and confinement in a fortress for fifteen years. CHAPTER XI. CAPTURE OF THE TURKISH ARMY AT SHIPKA PASS, GouRKo’s movement over the Balkans by way of Sophia merely formed part, as already explained, of the general plan of advance determined upon just after the fall of Plevna. The other portions of this plan were the forcing of the Shipka Pass and the passage of a small force over the Trojan Pass. The latter column, under General Kartzoff, consisted only of two regiments of the 3d Division, reénforced by one battalion of the 3d Rifle Brigade and two regiments of Don Cossacks (24th and 30th). The Balkans in the vicinity of the Trojan hill are higher than at almost any other part of them, and there is nothing but rude wood-roads leading over the moun- tains. The Turks had two or three small redoubts, and per- haps 2,000 men defending these roads—about the same force as at Slatitza. On the 4th of January Kartzoff began the ascent of the mountains, taking only eight guns with him; but each of these was dismounted and placed on a sledge, and required twenty-four yoke of buffaloes, a company of in- fantry, and a sotnia of Cossacks to draw it up the mountain. His troops were divided into three detachments of about 9 companies, or 1,500 men each. They reached the summit of the mountains on the afternoon of the 5th, and made a re- connaissance of the redoubt. The next two days were passed — in reconnoitering a route on the east of the redoubt by which it could be turned, and in hauling at the artillery. On the 7th the redoubt was bombarded in front, while a column of infantry passed around it on the east, and descended the mountain in its rear; at the same time another column of OAPTURE OF THE TURKISH ARMY AT SHIPKA PASS. 349 infantry attacked it in front. The Turks fled and dispersed in the Little Balkans. The Russian losses were less than 100 men. Two days later the other portion of this 8d Division, which had crossed the Balkans with Gourko, and had subsequently been sent by Slatitza to rejoin Kartzoff’s command, arrived at Slatitza. Finding the Turkish works there abandoned, it moved on and joined Kartzoff near Karlovo, and on the 14th the whole of the 3d Division moved down by the high-road toward Philip- popolis, and opened communication with the troops of Gourko, by whom it was directed along the roads north of the Maritza toward Haskioi. (See Plate 6.) Shipka. (See Plate 21.) At Shipka Pass, where the Russians had now for over five months been defending with such gallantry the positions cap- tured in the early part of the campaign, the passage was effected in a very brilliant manner. The arrival of General Skobeleff with the 16th and 30th Divisions and the 3d and 4th Rifle Brigades at Gabrova, in the first days of January, placed a force of 74 battalions, or about 56,000 infantry, besides artillery and cavalry, at Radetzky’s disposition ; but of these troops the 24th Division, which had arrived on the heights of Shipka during the latter part of No- vember to relieve for a short time the 14th Division, had in a subsequent snow-storm and cold snap lost a good many hundreds of men from freezing, and had in fact been wholly broken down by the cold. On the 25th of December this division had 6,013 men unfit for duty from frost-bites and sickness brought on by the terrible exposure. It had to be withdrawn to Gabrova to refit, and was for the moment practically hors de combat. The rest of his troops, however, were in good order. Radetzky’s plan for forcing the passage was to divide his troops into three columns, one of which, under his own orders, was to remain in the works at the summit of the pass, while the other two were to pass on either flank, cross the mountain, and attack .the pass from the rear (south), simultaneously with the attack from the north. Radetzky’s detachment consisted of the 14th Infantry Division and the 35th Regiment of the 9th Divi- 850 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. sion. The column of the right, under Skobeleff, consisted of the 16th Division, the 3d Rifle Brigade (8 battalions), 7 Bul- garian battalions, the 9th Don Cossacks, 6 mountain guns, and — 6 4-pdrs.—in all, 22 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 12 guns; it was to pass over the trail which leads from the village of Zelenodrevo to the top of the mountains (only about two miles and a half from the left flank of the Turks on the Bald Mountain), and thence descends to the village of Imetli in the Tundja valley; here the detachment was to turn to the left and attack the works defend- ing the village of Shipka. The column of the left, under Prince Mirsky, consisted of the 33d, 34th, and 36th Regiments of the 9th Division, the 80th Division, the 4th Rifle Brigade, one Bul- garian battalion, the 23d Don Cossack Regiment, 6 mountain guns, 8 4-pdrs., and 8 9-pdrs.—in all, 26 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 22 guns. It was to leave the village of Travna and follow the trail over the Selky hill, debouching in the Tundja valley at the village of Gusevo, then turn to the right, and, joining hands with Skobeleff, attack the works defending the village of Shipka. The movement was fixed to begin on the morning of the 5th of January, and it was calculated that the columns would arrive in the valley on the evening of the 7th, and attack on the morning of the 8th. In both columns the guns were unlimbered and — to be drawn on sledges; but it was soon found impossible to get them up the mountain even in this manner, and they were all left behind except the little mountain guns, one battery of which was with each column. The snow on the paths which the columns had to follow was in many places TEN FEET DEEP. From Mount St. Nicholas, where Radetzky posted himself, the villages where the two columns were to debouch into the valley could be plainly seen. The two columns began their march on the 5th, Mirsky in the morning and Skobeleff in the evening, the former having to pass nearly twice the distance of the latter. Mirsky met no opposition in the mountains, and on the 7th descended into the valley at Gusevo, driving the Turkish outposts away from that village, and sent one brigade of the 30th Division to occupy the village of Maglis, four miles east of Gusevo, to protect his left flank and rear. Skobeleff met with resistance in descend- CAPTURE OF THE TURKISH ARMY AT SHIPKA PASS. 351 ing the mountain on the 7th, the Turks having hastily occupied a line of trenches on a ridge commanding the trail which Sko- beleff was following. In order to dislodge the Turks from this place, he was considerably delayed, and was only able to occupy the village of Imetli with an advance guard on the 7th. On the morning of the 8th, the day calculated for the at- tacks, Radetzky watched eagerly on Mount St. Nicholas for the appearance of the other two columns in the valley. About 10 A. M. Mirsky’s troops were seen coming out of the mountains near Gusevo ; and deploying about noon, they moved forward to the attack in the direction of Shipka village. Skobeleff’s troops were not in sight, but a cannonade was heard in the mountains in his direction, where he was, in fact, still fighting with the Turks in the position half way down the slope. About noon also arrived a messenger from Skobeleff explaining the difficul- ties that he had met. Radetzky sent word back to him to con- centrate his column in the valley and attack Shipka from the rear on the morning of the 9th, and if possible to open commu- nications with Mirsky, and attack in conjunction with him. He also informed Skobeleff that the 1st Cavalry Division had been sent over his trail to assist him. Mirsky meanwhile heard the cannonade off on his left, but saw no Russian troops. Finally the cannonade died away, and still no troops were in sight, He was evidently in a bad position to attack alone, with his left flank out in the air; but during the previous night he had re- ceived a precise order from Radetzky to attack on this morning. He therefore moved forward with the 4th Rifle Brigade de- ployed as skirmishers, supported by the little mountain battery and the 33d Regiment. In his second line were the 34th, 36th, and 117th Regiments. The 120th remained with the baggage at, Gusevo, and the 118th and 119th, which had occupied Maglis on his left flank the previous night, were ordered to move for- ward to Kazanlyk. After a short but hot fight his troops carried the villages of Janina and Haskioi. But beyond Haskioi was a small range of hills stretching across the road, covered with several tiers of rifle-pits. Here Mirsky’s troops were brought to a halt by a very hot fire, and, the colonel of the 33d Regiment being se- verely wounded about this time, the line began to waver. The 36th Regiment was then sent forward to the support of 352 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. the 33d, which held the right of the line, and the 34th to the support of the Rifle Brigade, on its left. One battalion of the 117th was sent off in the direction of Kazanlyk to guard the left flank, and only the other two battalions of the regiment re- mained in reserve. The little mountain battery advanced to within about 700 yards of the Turkish position, and sent a lucky shot which exploded one of the Turkish caissons. The Russians then moved forward with a rush in spite of the fire of the Turks, and carried the line of trenches, capturing three guns and about 100 prisoners. They thus came in front of the last line of defense of the Turks, a series of redoubts on the hills just south of Shipka village; but darkness was coming on, the troops were tired out, and their ammunition was almost exhausted. It was impossible to try to carry these redoubts that night. The Turks, however, passed to the attack, and rushed forward upon the Russians with considerable impetuosity, but were driven back by the deliberate volley-firing of the latter. Although Mirsky was informed early in the evening that the 118th and 119th Regiments had entered Kazanlyk without finding any enemy, yet his position was anything but comfort- able. His left flank was in the air, at his back was a high range of mountains over which it would be almost impossible to retreat, and in his front, only 200 yards off, was the enemy in a position which he felt he could not carry. He sent a re- port to Radetzky explaining his critical situation, stating that he had fought all day with superior numbers, had sustained very great losses, was nearly at the end of his ammunition, and unless he could be reénforced he must begin to retreat. Ra-— detzky sent word back to him to hold on for another twenty- four hours; that Skobeleff would come to his relief on his left flank; and that he (Radetzky) would try to operate a diversion by attacking the Turks in front the next morning. The next morning, unfortunately, there was a tempest of wind, filling the air with blinding snow and a dense fog of particles of frozen mist. Radetzky could see nothing of what was going on in the valley, but through the fog came the sounds of heavy artillery and infantry fire, indicating that the Turks had begun to attack Mirsky. Radetzky at once made his preparations for attack, im the hope of relieving the pressure on Mirsky. He sent for- CAPTURE OF THE TURKISH ARMY AT SHIPKA PASS. 353 ward the 55th and 56th Regiments and part of the 35th along the high-road and on its right against the Turkish trenches in front of Mount St. Nicholas. The ground was extremely un- favorable for attack, and in the dense fog it was impossible to see what was going on at a distance of ten yards away. Still these troops, between noon and 2 p. o., carried the first two lines of Turkish trenches in open assault, but with enormous losses— over 1,700 men. Having gained these positions, the troops re- mained there, unable to advance, until news arrived from Sko- beleff during the afternoon announcing the surrender of the whole Turkish army. Meanwhile, in the valley the fog was not so dense. The Turks had early in the morning opened an attack on Mirsky’s right flank, but had not made any impression upon it. They then made an attack upon his left flank, without any better suc- cess. Mirsky then riposted with his left, and carried a second Turkish redoubt (capturing two guns in it), and also the village of Shipka. This cut off this portion of the Turks from the Kazanlyk road, but they still held a line of redoubts behind Shipka village. While Mirsky’s troops were halted in front of this and a lull had succeeded in the battle in their front, they heard loud cheering off on their left at the village of Shenovo. It was the attack of Skobeleff’s troops—the most brilliant assault of the whole war, deciding the day and the fate of the entire Turkish army of Shipka. Skobeleff’s column, as already remarked, had met with oppo- sition in descending the southern slope of the mountain, the Turks having hastily occupied on the 7th a ridge northeast of the village of Imetli, from which they took his line of march in flank. This completely stopped the march of his column late in the afternoon, and Skobeleff, arriving in person at its head, found the men lying down and receiving the fire of the enemy, but without replying to it. On asking an explanation, the men replied that it was of no use to fire, for their guns would not reach the position of the Turks—about 1,500 yards off across a ravine. While he was talking his chief of staff was very badly wounded in the shoulder. Skobeleff immediately ordered up a company of the 63d Regiment, which he had armed before leaving Plevna with the Peabody-Martini guns captured from the Turks. They had hardly opened fire before the Turks 23 354 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. ceased their fire and retired behind the crest of their ridge. Darkness, however, now set in, and stopped the fighting. The Russians remained in their positions scattered along the trail in the snow during the night. Karly the next morning the two regiments in the lead, the 63d and 64th, resumed their march, and by 9 a. m. had reached the village of Imetli, and found that the Turks had occupied a hill on the southeast of that village. The 64th Regiment at- tacked this hill and drove them out. | About 11 a. mu. Skobeleff received word from the pickets left in observation on the top of the mountain that Mirsky’s detachment was moving forward to the attack of Shipka vil- lage, and the firing was also heard from that direction; but Skobeleff did not credit the report, thinking that his men had mistaken a column of Turks for Russians, and as for the firing, it seemed to come from the direction of Mount St. Nicholas. Moreover, in reply to his report that he could not get his men together in the valley in time to attack on the 8th, Skobeleff — had received orders from Radetzky to attack on the 9th, and positwely not to attack before all his men were assembled in the valley. Having therefore no direct communication with Mirsky (who had only sent two sotnias of Cossacks to open communica- tion with him, and which had not penetrated beyond Kazanlyk), and having no certain information that Mirsky was actually engaged, Skobeleff stuck strictly to his orders, and kept his two regiments at Imetli until the rest of his troops could arrive. It thus happened that Mirsky had to sustain the fight of the 8th unsupported, as has already been described. During the afternoon the 61st Regiment got down the mountain to Imetli, and then Skobeleff sent forward the 63d — and 64th a short distance toward Shenovo. But all his troops not yet being over the mountains, they were not allowed to attack Shenovo. During the night the Rifle Brigade and the Bulgarian Legion were also assembled at Imetli, but word was received from the 62d Regiment that they could not drag the artillery up the hill. Skobeleff sent word to them to leave the guns behind and march on during the night, so as to be at Imetli at all hazards in the morning. Before daylight on the 9th his troops at Imetli were under arms, but Skobeleff waited still for the 62d Regiment. As it CAPTURE OF THE TURKISH ARMY AT SHIPKA PASS. 355 began to descend the mountain so that he was sure of having it as a reserve, about 10 A. m. Skobeleff sent forward a portion of the 63d Regiment to clear the Turks out of a hill on their right flank (west of Shenovo), which threatened his left; this they accomplished with considerable loss. At the same time Skobeleff sent a portion of his cavalry on his right, and they soon opened communication with Mirsky’s detachment. Everything being at last in readiness, Skobeleff formed his troops for the assault of the Shenovo redoubts. In his first line - were the 63d Regiment and the Bulgarian Legion; behind them the 61st and 64th and the Rifle Brigade. With all the bands playing, these troops moved forward to the assault without breaking their line or firing a shot. They lost heavily, even in the bands, but still they moved on, until, on nearing the re- doubts, they broke into a run with a wild hurrah and rushed at the Turkish works. There was then a little hesitation in the 63d Regiment, until its colonel arrived among the men in the very front line, and by his personal bravery carried the regi- ment forward with him. The Russians entered the redoubts, and then suddenly the hurrahing and noise of the firing were succeeded by a painful, deadly silence, lasting for some minutes, during which a fierce hand-to-hand fight with the bayonet took place. The Russians won, and six Turkish battalions lay down their arms in the redoubts, while the rest began fleeing toward Shipka. Just as Skobeleff was giving the orders for following them, arrived a Turkish officer seeking Skobeleff, and, in the name of Vessil Pasha, commanding the Turkish army at Shipka, surrendered the whole force. Twelve thousand men laid down their arms at Shenovo, and Skobeleff, while sending report of this to Radetzky, immediately set to work to disarm them, since the other half of the Turkish army was still in the positions on the mountains, and might refuse to obey the surrender of their chief, and, coming to the aid of that portion which was at Shipka village, might still make a very serious fight. It was not until midnight that this disarmament was completed and Skobelefi’s troops were allowed to rest. The Turkish army which thus surrendered numbered 41 battalions, containing 36,000 men in all, of whom about 6,000 were sick and wounded; and with it were captured 93 guns 356 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. (including 12 mortars) and 10 flags. But the Russian losses were not slight, being as follows: Officers. Men Killed 24 oe See ak SS, OES a 19 1,103 Wounded os. vo kuion ie Cie) osha see eee 116 4,246 Total ee era Sa a eee 135 5,349 Of this loss, 1,700 men were in Radetzky’s, 1,500 in Skobelefi’s, and 2,100 in Mirsky’s detachment. Only 37 battalions, or about 25,000 men, had been brought actually under fire; so that the proportion of losses was about 22 per cent. The capture of this Shipka army surpasses in boldness and brilliancy the advance of Gourko over the Balkans at Araba- Konak. Although Radetzky’s attack in front caused him ter- rible losses and apparently gained no result, yet without this it is possible that the Turks might have withdrawn from the mountains under cover of the fog, and, concentrating about Shipka village, have broken through between Mirsky and Sko- beleff, and escaped to the south; and, although Mirsky may be blamed for opening his attack before he had established com- munication with Skobeleff according to the plan of battle, yet it is possible that, had he remained idle at Gusevo during the 8th, the Turks might have discovered him and begun to retreat. Finally, Skobeleff’s energetic attack, as soon as he had got all his men together in the valley, was one of the most splendid assaults ever made, and renders more than doubtful the conclu- sion which has been hastily drawn from this war (from Plevna particularly), that successful assaults of earthworks defended by modern breech-loaders are impossible. | The Turks seem to have relied, here as at Araba-Konak, upon their conviction that the intense cold, the deep snow, and — the impassable nature of the mountains, except over the road which they held, would render any such movements on the part of the Russians wholly impossible. Skobelefi’s detachment passed over the Karadja Mountain, which is separated from the Bald Mountain (the left flank of the Turkish position) by a valley (or saddle) less than 1,000 yards wide. One would have supposed that the Turks would have had a picket out on this” Karadja Mountain, but such was not the case. Skobelefi’s trail - passed within two miles of the redoubt on the Woody Moun: — CAPTURE OF THE TURKISH ARMY AT SHIPKA PASS. 357 tain, but he was not molested in any way on his march. That the Turks must have seen some portion of his men is probable, since when Skobelefi’s advance guard approached Imetli on the 7th they found it strongly occupied by the Turks; but that the latter thought that the movement was anything more than a reconnaissance seems doubtful. The Russians had previously made reconnaissances in the same direction, and it was owing to these reconnaissances that the Turks had some time before con- structed the line of redoubts facing southwest and southeast at Shenovo and Shipka villages. The trenches near Haskioi, as well as those at Imetli, had been thrown up in the night after the Russian movement was discovered. One of the remarkable features of this battle is the fact that Mirsky and Skobeleff both had to leave all their artillery behind (except the little mountain guns, which amounted to nothing), and that both of them carried the enemy’s works without any “preparation of the attack by artillery.” CHAPTER XII. THE ADVANCE TO CONSTANTINOPLE—REMARKS ON THE WINTER CAMPAIGN. (See Plates 2 and 6.) In the preceding chapters we have seen that the whole Turkish defense of the Balkans had gone down with a crash; one army of 36,000 men being captured in bulk at Shipka, and the other army of 50,000 men routed at Philippopolis and dis- persed over the mountains toward the Aigean. As soon as the news of the capture of Shipka reached the Grand Duke’s headquarters he hastened forward to Gabrova, and, after crossing the mountains, established his headquarters at Kazanlyk. While the prisoners were being sent to the rear under guard of the 24th Division and the Bulgarian Legion, preparations were made for an immediate advance on Adria- nople, and orders to this effect were issued on the 13th of January, viz. : 1. Light Wing, under. General Gourko, consisting of the Guard, IX. Corps, 8d Division, and a special cavalry detach- ment of 5,000 men under General Skobeleff, Sr., to advance on Adrianople in two columns, the left following the high-road in the valley of the Maritza, and the right crossing the spur of the mountains south of Haskioi, so as to arrive at Demotika, on the south of Adrianople, and cut off the communications between the latter place and the sea. 2. The Center, consisting (a) of an advance guard under General Skobeleff, Jr., containing the 16th and 30th Divisions and the 3d and 4th Rifle Brigades, preceded (6) by the 1st Cay- alry Division, under General Stroukoff, and followed (¢) by the ADVANCE TO CONSTANTINOPLE. 359 Grenadier Corps under General Ganetzky. Stroukoff was to leave Kazanlyk January 13th, send one regiment to occupy Yeni-Zagra, and with the rest move forward with the greatest rapidity through Eski-Zagra to the railway junction and the Maritza bridge at Trnova, and occupy this most important point. (At the date of this order the battle of Philippopolis had not yet been fought, and it was still possible that Suleiman might be retreating on Adrianople or receive aid from that point.) Skobeleff was to follow Stroukoff as quickly as pos- sible, leaving Kazanlyk on the 15th, and after reaching Trnova to follow the Maritza directly to Adrianople. Ganetzky’s troops were to aid the artillery of the 16th and 30th Divisions and the VIII. Corps, as well as their own, in crossing the Shipka Pass, and then to concentrate around Ka- zanlyk preparatory to following Skobeleff. They were in fact the reserve of the center. 3. Left Wing, VIII. Corps, under General Radetzky, to ad- vance at once by Yeni-Zagra to Yamboli, and thence descend the valley of the Tundja to Adrianople, arriving on its north and east. The 8th Cavalry Division, which had been for some time detached in the army of the Cesarevitch, was to assemble at Tirnova, and, crossing by the Elena-Tvarditza pass, to rejoin its proper corps near Slivno. 4, The XI. Corps, under General Dellinghausen, to be as- sembled near Tirnova, and cross by the Elena-Tvarditza pass to Yamboli, and thence protect the left flank and rear of Radetz- ky’s column ; and also to send reconnaissances along the base of the mountains to Aidos, and there endeavor to join hands with the XIV. Corps under Zimmermann. One regiment of Ra- detzky’s corps to be left at Yamboli until the arrival of the XI. Corps. The 24th Division, as soon as it had returned from escorting the prisoners to the Danube, was to proceed to Yam- boli and form part of Dellinghausen’s detachment. 5. The Cesarevitch’s army, comprising all the troops north of the Balkans except those of General Zimmermann, to move forward against Rustchuk, Razgrad, and Osman-Bazar, to en- deavor to gain possession of these latter places, and establish itself on the line of the Rustchuk-Varna railroad. 6. The Dobrudja detachment of General Zimmermann to move forward and endeavor to gain possession of Bazardjik, cut 360 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. the railroad between Shumla and Varna at Pravady, and thence try to open communications over the Derbend Pass with Del- linghausen at Aidos. To cover his right flank Zimmermann — was to detach a portion of his force to observe Silistria. Such were the orders of January 13th for the advance; but the armistice of January 31st, for which the Turks were already suing, was signed before the greater part of the troops had made much progress in their movements. The columns of Gourko and Skobeleff, however, were moved forward with the greatest energy and celerity. The cavalry of the latter, under command of General Stroukoff, left Kazanlyk on the 18th and arrived in front of Trnova on the 14th. On the 15th he attacked the detachment guarding this village and the bridge, consisting of a battalion of infantry and about 5,000 armed inhabitants, dis- persed them, and gained possession of the bridge, the railway station, ete., and cut the wire and the track. He also captured six Krupp guns abandoned by the Turks in their flight. Skobeleft left Kazanlyk the same day (January 15th), and, pushing his men forward by forced marches, 55 miles in 40 hours, reached Trnova during the night of the 16th-17th. He immediately sent Stroukoff in advance down the valley of the Maritza as far as Hermanli, which was occupied after driving out some bashi-bozouks. On the 18th Skobeleff moved his in- fantry to Hermanli and his cavalry to Mustapha Pasha. On the 19th he learned of the approach from Haskioi to Hermanli of an immense train of fugitives escorted by several battalions of Turkish infantry, and he therefore sent the 63d Regiment and the 11th Rifle Battalion to cut them off on the west of Her- mani. This detachment on its approach was attacked by the - Turkish escort, as well as by the armed fugitives. A consider- able affair took place, causing a loss of over 50 men to the Rus- sians, and resulting in the defeat of the escort and their flight toward the mountains, followed by the able-bodied portion of the immense caravan (over 20,000 wagons, containing 200,000 people), who left the old, the sick, and the babes to perish in the snow. The train was so many miles in length that the Russians could not guard it, and the greater part of it was plundered by the Bulgarians of the neighboring villages, who also massacred the helpless Turks who had not strength enough to flee to the mountains. ADVANCE TO CONSTANTINOPLE. 361 On the same day (January 19th) Stroukoff was at Mustapha Pasha, and in the evening received word by Bulgarian messen- gers from Adrianople that the wildest panic prevailed in that city, and that the Turkish troops had abandoned it and retreated in the direction of Constantinople, after blowing up the powder magazines ; and that the Turkish population was also in flight from that city, and from all the surrounding villages. At day- light on the 20th Stroukoff moved forward with his cavalry division, occupied Adrianople, restored order, and installed a temporary government. On the 22d Skobeleff entered Adriano- ple with his infantry, and immediately sent Stroukoff forward in the direction of Constantinople. The ancient capital of Turkey and the second city in the empire thus fell without a blow. It was defended by a well- planned and extensive series of earthworks on the surrounding hills, which, however, were not fully completed. Its garrison was about 10,000 men under command of Achmed Eyoub Pasha. | Meanwhile the right wing, under Gourko, had remained at Philippopolis from the 18th to the 2ist of January, during which time the troops rested, partly repaired their clothing, and received a fresh supply of rations. On the 22d, leaving a bri- gade to occupy Philippopolis, Gourko began his march toward Adrianople. That town having been occupied on the same day by the troops of Skobeleff (of which Gourko received news on the 23d), there was no necessity for Gourko’s troops to go to Demotika. They therefore simply continued their march by the high-road to Adrianople, and were all concentrated there by the 27th, Gourko himself having entered on the 25th. The Grand Duke and his headquarters also arrived at Adrianople on the 26th. Negotiations were meanwhile going on for an armistice, but the Turks demurred to the terms, and all the preparations were therefore taken for marching forward at once upon Constan- tinople. For this purpose the following dispositions were made: 1. The advance guard, under Skobeleff, to advance along the line of the railroad, reconnoiter the line of Turkish defense at Buyuk-Tchekmedje, select its weakest point, and assault it with the utmost energy. 362 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. 2. The right wing, under Gourko, to advance to Rodosto on the sea-coast, whence it could be used against Gallipoli or Con- stantinople according to circumstances. The 3d Division to go to Enos, at the mouth of the Maritza, and prevent any landing at that point. 3. The left wing, under Radetzky, to follow the northern road to Constantinople, starting from Kirk-Kilissa, where it — already arrived on the 26th. 4. The Grenadier Corps, under Ganetzky, to remain in the vicinity of Adrianople as reserve until further developments. On the 31st of January this movement had so far progressed that Stroukoff, with the cavalry, forming the advance guard of Skobelefi’s olan was at Tchorlu, which place it had captured after a cavalry weeds (the last shot of the war) on the 29th. Skobeleff with the bulk of his troops was at Lule-Bourgas (30 miles in rear of Tchorlu), the 3d Division at Enos, Radetzky at Kirk-Kilissa, and Gourko’s troops just moving out from Adria- nople. Late that night (January 31st) the Turkish commis- sioners signed the armistice, having received authority for that purpose from Constantinople. The terms of this instrument are somewhat remarkable, and show that the Turks at last despaired of receiving active assis- tance from England, without the hope of which they would never have undertaken the war, and had determined to throw themselves wholly upon the mercy of the Russians. They ac- cepted definitely the preliminary conditions of peace, as fol- lows: 1. The erection of Bulgaria into “an autonomous tribu- tary principality, with a national Christian Government and a native militia”’ 2. The independence of Montenegro, with — an increase of territory. 3. The independence of Roumania and Servia, with a territorial indemnity. 4. The introduc- tion of administrative reforms into Bosnia and Herzegovina. 5. An indemnity in money to Russia for the Te of the war. The armistice then specified that the Turks should immedi- ately surrender the Danube fortresses of Widdin, Rustchuk, and Silistria, with the privilege of withdrawing then material of war, or selling it to the Russians; they should also evacuate Balopaau Razgrad, and Bazardjik. The fortifications of the line of Buyuk-Tchekmedje (the last line of defense of Constanti- ADVANCE TO CONSTANTINOPLE. 363 nople) should be evacuated by the Turks, but not occupied by the Russians; the Turks should retire behind the line of Kuyuk- Tchekmedje,* and the Russians advance to the line of Tchataldja, and the space between the two forces (about ten miles) should be a neutral zone. The Russians should occupy the towns of Bourgas and Midia on the Black Sea coast, and have the privi- lege of revictualing their army through these harbors. The Turks were to raise the blockade of the Black Sea ports. The position of Buyuk-Tchekmedje is as remarkable in nat- ural military strength as is Constantinople itself in geographical situation. The peninsula (between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora) is here but twenty miles wide, and twelve miles of this space is occupied by broad lakes extending up inland from either shore. Of the remaining eight miles, at least half is filled with impassable or difficult swamps, and the remaining half with almost impenetrable thickets. Behind this line of lakes, swamps, marshes, and thickets, runs a continuous ridge from sea to sea, from 400 to 700 feet in height; and on this ridge the Turks had in process of construction not less than thirty large redoubts, besides outlying trenches and rifle-pits, the greater part of them concentrated in the center of the line, and disposed irregularly according to the nature of the ground in three lines. These redoubts were only half finished, but they still afforded complete protection for infantry ; they would have mounted about 150 siege-guns and as many more field- guns, and their proper garrison would have been 60,000 to 15,000 men. With such a garrison—since the flanks of the line rested on the sea, and could not be turned or invested—these lines might fairly be called impregnable. The force actually in them consisted of about 30,000 men, made up of the wrecks of Suleiman’s army, which had been brought by sea from Enos, of Achmed Eyoub’s division, which had retreated from Adriano- ple, and of some reserves which had been at Constantinople during the war—the whole under command of Ghazi Moukhtar Pasha, who had lately returned from Asia, where he had lost his whole army. Yet such was the natural strength of this position, taking into account the shortness of the line, which * The two villages of Buyuk- and Kuyuk-Tchekmedje are at the mouths of small streams emptying into the Sea of Marmora, and respectively 25 and 10 miles from Constantinople. 364 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. allowed the men to be within easy supporting distance of each other, that 30,000 men here constituted a more formidable adversary than 60,000 in the line of works held by Osman at Plevna. But the armistice gave these away with a stroke of the pen to the Russians. Meanwhile railway communication had been established along the Constantinople-Adrianople railroad, and negotiations were immediately opened at the latter place for the conclusion of a treaty of peace. Skobeleff’s whole column was concentra- ted in front of Tchataldja, on the line marking the “ neutral zone” of the armistice; Gourko moved on to Tchorlu and Rodosto; Radetzky was just behind him and on his left flank; Ganetzky’s Grenadiers were at Adrianople and Demotika; Dellinghausen’s detachment went to occupy the Black Sea ports. .On the north of the Balkans, Todleben (who had succeeded the Cesarevitch in his command, the latter having departed for Russia upon the conclusion of the armistice) entered Rustchuk at the head of his troops on the 20th of February without having the trouble of besieging it. Zimmermann occupied Gilistria and Bazardjik, But on the 12th of February the British fleet in the Hgean passed through the Dardanelles and proceeded toward Constan- tinople, the British Government alleging that this step was nec- essary to protect the lives and property of their subjects at Constantinople. The British Ambassador had asked, in accord- ance with the Treaty of Paris, the permission of the Porte for this proceeding, but had been refused; the British then availed themselves of a permission granted under other circumstances some months previously, and their fleet passed through the Straits without regard to the Treaty of Paris. The Turkish Government remonstrated, but did not support their remon- strance by force ; which was a prudent proceeding, since the four large ironclads (Alexandra, Devastation, Sultan, and Achilles), forming the main strength of the British fleet, were quite strong enough to have lain alongside the Turkish batteries and demol- ished them. As soon as news of this movement on the part of the English was received at St. Petersburg, the Emperor telegraphed to the Grand Duke Nicholas, authorizing him to enter Constantinople with a part of his troops; and atthe same time Prince Gortcha- pene ADVANCE TO CONSTANTINOPLE. 365 koff addressed a note to the Powers explaining to them that the Russian troops entered Constantinople for the same purpose that the British fleet arrived there, viz., the protection of the lives and property of the Christians inhabiting that city. It was however a fact, notorious to every one in Constantinople, that no disturbance either existed or was threatened there, and that life and property were then no more insecure in that city of religious fanatics than at any other time. Upon the receipt of this telegram the Grand Duke imme- diately opened negotiations with the Sultan for occupying peace- fully a portion of the environs of Constantinople with his troops ; and in a few days a verbal agreement (with memorandum) was made, by which the armistice of January 31st was so far modi- fied as to permit the Russians to occupy the village of San Stefano, on the Sea of Marmora, about six miles from the walls of Constantinople, and also to station troops in certain villages on its left (north). The Turkish troops withdrew therefore to the immediate vicinity of Constantinople, and on the 23d of February the Grand Duke and Staff, accompanied by a regiment of Cossacks and his body-guard, left Adrianople by train and came down to San Stefano, where they arrived on the afternoon of the 24th. On the same day arrived the Preobrazhensky Regiment of the Guard, which had marched down from Rodosto. More troops soon arrived, and during the month of March the headquarters of the ist and 2d Divisions of the Guard were at San Stefano, of the 3d Division at Kuyuk-Tchekmedje. Skobeleff’s head- quarters were at St. George, twelve miles north of San Stefano, and Radetzky’s at Tchataldja. At this time (the middle of March) there were but about 30,000 Turks in front of the Russian army, which could have entered Constantinople without any difficulty, from their posi- tions at San Stefano and St. George. Such was, however, far from being the case at the latter part of May, when the Turks had succeeded in assembling an army of 100,000 men, and in erecting a series of strong earth-works around the city, from Makrikioi, on the Sea of Marmora, to the Belgrade forest, be- tween the Bosphorus and the Black Sea. On the 3d of March, at 5 p.m., was signed the Treaty of San Stefano, upon the basis of the terms of peace above stated. 366 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. REMARKS ON THE WINTER CAMPAIGN. The Russian Campaign of 1877-78, begun with the plan of crossing the Danube, masking the fortresses in the Quadri- lateral, crushing the Turkish force in the field, and marching over the Balkans to Adrianople, was brought to a sudden halt immediately after the first part of the plan—the crossing of the Danube—had been accomplished, by two causes: first, the total inadequacy of the forces with which the campaign was begun; and, second, the opportune arrival of Osman Pasha’s army on the right flank of the invaders. Until this obstacle could be removed no further advance was possible, and therefore for five months the campaign was paralyzed, and no forward progress was made. I have endeavored in the preceding pages to narrate these circumstances as faithfully and accurately as possible; and the mistakes which caused them—and which the Russians most freely acknowledged—are patent to any one who examines the. facts. The overweening confidence and contempt for their enemy which induced the Russians to open the campaign with half the force which was found necessary to conclude it; the lack of practical experience at the beginning of the war, which resulted in such ignorant attacks, without reconnaissances, as that of Schilder-Schuldner at Plevna on July 20th; the dispersion of the army into detachments scattered over an enormous extent of territory; the assault of intrenched camps with forces infe- rior to those of the defenders; the lack of tactical ensemble in the assaults—these are some of the faults which characterized the first two stages of the war, and brought delay in the progress of the struggle, and death to many a brave, willing man. But once this obstacle of Plevna removed by the capture of Osman’s army, the whole character of the campaign changed ; and among the wars of this century, since those of the great Napoleon, we will seek in vain an instance of a movement more bold in conception, more energetic in execution, more over- whelmingly successful in its results, than the passage of the Balkans during the succeeding winter; and Russia owes a last- ing debt of gratitude to the Grand Duke Nicholas, who deter- mined that there should be a winter campaign; to Generals Gourko, Radetzky, and Skobeleff, who conducted it; and, above REMARKS ON THE WINTER CAMPAIGN. 367 all, to the patience and willing endurance of the Russian soldier, which alone made it possible. Beginning with the fall of Plevna on the 10th of December, it ended with the conclusion of the Armistice of Adrianople on the 31st of January; and in these fifty-one days the Russian armies had marched over 400 miles; had crossed a lofty range of mountains, where the snow was from three to ten feet deep, and the temperature as low as —10° F.; had fought three series of battles, lasting from two to four days each, and result- ing in the complete capture of one Turkish army of nearly 40,000 men, and the dispersion of another of over 50,000; had captured 213 guns, and small arms, baggage, tents, and supplies of all kinds, including cartridges and rations by the millions; and, finally, had been able to dictate such terms of peace to the conquered as to remove them permanently from the list of ¢nde- pendent military nations. And this the Russians had accom- plished with the loss of less than 20,000 men, of whom about half fell in battle, and the other half succumbed to the rigors of the season and climate. Even after all criticism has been made upon the faults of the Russians at the beginning of the war and around Plevna, still the campaign as a whole must be judged to be the equal in brilliancy and the solidity of its results of any in recent history. In the Franco-German War of 1870—the military marvel of modern times—the Prussians were as superior in numbers to the French as were the Russians at the close of this to the Turks, and the individual courage of the Turks is not surpassed by that of the French. By their skillful operations the Germans shut up Bazaine in Metz, captured MacMahon at Sedan (the counterparts of Plevna and Shipka), and then marched on Paris, the capital; which surrendered on the 28th of January, 1871, six months and nine days after the declaration of war. In the Russo-Turkish Campaign the Armistice of Adrianople was signed on the 31st of January, nine months and seven days after the declaration of war. In both cases the conquered nation lay ab- solutely at the mercy of the conqueror. France, owing to her wonderful vitality; to her resources both in agriculture and manufactures; to the skill, frugality, and industry of the great mass of her people, has astonished the world by regaining in the course of a few years her position among the first nations of the 368 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. earth. Turkey, having none of these resources, and being a heterogeneous collection of conflicting nationalities and creeds, which the dominant race has never been able—if it has attempted —to assimilate, and having her national vitality destroyed by the degeneracy of the ruling class, seems destined never to rise again; but to be protected and propped up for a certain period by other nations having supposed interests in her maintenance, until this outside support shall have been proved wholly and incontestably to be ineffectual, when she will be succeeded by some other form of government for the countries now under her rule. As an mdependent Government, Turkey in Europe has ceased to exist, though the Sultan may yet live for many years on the European side of the Bosphorus. And this is the result of the campaign of 1877-78. Of other wars since the long peace, those of 1848 and 1859 are in no way remarkable in a military sense. The Orimean War was mainly a long siege—the most famous perhaps of authentic sieges—which certainly added little to the military fame of the assailants, though it resulted in political humiliation for a certain period to the nation of the defenders. In the Austrian war of 1866, one great battle sufficed to prove to the Austrians that their wisest course lay in making peace, and the short duration of the campaign prevents any comparison with those of 1870 and 1877~%78. Our own war from 1861 to 1865 is also difficult to compare with those in Europe, since the two combatants were of the same race, and their fighting qualities were so nearly equal, the — theatre of war was so enormously extended and so difficult in general for military operations, and there were at the outset no trained armies of any magnitude. Such rapid and conclusive military movements as those in France and Turkey were there- fore not to be expected. Grant’s Vicksburg campaign will take — its place in history alongside of Napoleon’s beautiful campaign of 1796, for its boldness and success; Sherman’s Atlanta cam- paign and march to the sea, and the combined movements of Grant and Sherman in the spring of 1865, will always stand out as magnificent examples of the skillful handling of large bodies of men; while, on the other hand, Lee’s long defense — of Richmond has placed his name for ever among the list of great soldiers. But it was a war of checkered successes and REMARKS ON THE WINTER CAMPAIGN. 369 reverses for both sides, and it was finished, not by one bold movement, but by the absolute crushing of the military strength of the weaker by the stronger party. It was the winter campaign of the Russians which destroyed the military strength of Turkey, and let us now turn to details and examine the means by which the Russians were able to overcome the difficulties which in this: season usually bring military operations to a standstill. The great and preéminent cause of their success lay in the almost boundless patience and endurance of the Russian soldier. From the time the movement was well under way the men never saw their knapsacks, which remained north of the Balkans, till some time after the armistice. They marched and fought and slept in snow and ice, and forded rivers with the thermometer at zero. They had no blankets, » and the frozen ground precluded all idea of tents; the half- worn-out shelter-tents which the men had used during the sum- mer were now cut up to tie around their boots, which were approaching dissolution; and, although an effort was made to shelter the men in the huts in the villages, yet always at least half of them had to sleep out in the open air without shelter. Their clothing at night was the same as in the day, and it dif- fered from that of the summer only in the addition of an over- coat, woolen jacket, and a “bashlik ” or woolen muffler for the head. Their food was a pound of hard bread and a pound and a half of tough stringy beef, driven along the road; they were forced to carry six and even eight days’ rations on their backs (in addition to an extra supply of cartridges in their pockets) ; there was more than one instance where the men fought, and fought well, not only without breakfast, but without having tasted food in twenty-four hours. Yet, in face of these unusual privations and hardships, there was not a single case of insub- ordination ; the men were usually in good spirits, and the num- ber of stragglers on the march was far less than during the heat of the preceding summer. The ordinary, and usually insurmountable, difficulties of a winter campaign may be classed under three heads: 1. The supply of food for men and animals ; 2. The supply and transportation of material—ammunition, clothing, camp equipage, ete. ; 24 370 THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. 3. The sickness and suffering among the men and animals. I will endeavor to explain how all these were overcome or done away in the present instance. : First, as to food. Northern Bulgaria was at the beginning of winter practically exhausted of its supplies of forage and breadstufis beyond the immediate wants of its inhabitants. Of cattle and sheep, however, there was still a certain quantity available. ‘These were bought by the various colonels from the regimental commissariat fund (“soup money’’) at whatever price they could bargain for; but the maximum price was fixed at 20 roubles gold ($15.60) per head for cattle of a weight of 300 to 350 Ibs., and 13 silver roubles ($1.10) per head for sheep weighing 30 to 40 Ibs. If the peasants refused to sell for less, the colonels were authorized to take by force at these prices, — which were from one quarter to one third greater than current prices before the war (many regiments in fact succeeded, espe- cially at first, in buying at much cheaper rates), and the cash was always paid down when the cattle were taken. _ This in- spired great confidence among the peasants, and instead of © attempting to conceal their flocks and herds, they brought them to the Russians for sale. Of hard bread and a certain kind of desiccated or “conserved” food for horses, a considerable sup- ply had been accumulated during the summer and autumn in the depot at Sistova. But the Danube bridges were all either carried away in the storm of December 18th—23d, or taken up on account of the ice, and there was then no communication across the river except by a few steam-tugs acting as ferry- boats. arly in January the river froze solid, and carts began to pass on the ice; but this was always more or less danger- ous, and it broke up in February. During the time of the active operations, therefore (December 15th to January 25th), it may be said that there was no communication across the Danube, and the only resource of the Russians in the way of base of provisions was therefore the depot at Sistova. But from this they drew their hard bread only; for the rest they lived on the country and on the supplies captured from the - Turks. By the celerity and boldness of their movements, war was in truth made to feed war. At Orkhanie was captured 1,000 tons of rations, at Sophia 4,000 tons, at Kazanlyk 1,000 tons. They consisted principally of flour, rice, barley, beans, REMARKS ON THE WINTER CAMPAIGN. 371 salt, oats, and a small amount of coffee, sugar, hard bread, and salt meat. But these articles were not portable, and they were enjoyed by the garrisons left behind to guard them; but the troops moving so rapidly in advance must have hard bread, and of this there was unfortunately but a small quantity in the Turkish depots, and it had to be brought, as just stated, from Sistova. For the other articles of the ration—such as tea, sugar, spirits of wine, vinegar, gruel, cabbage, etc.—the men simply had to do without them. The campaign was made on hard bread and the cattle driven along on the hoof—nothing more. Skobeleff’s men on the march between Adrianople and Tchataldja were for a part of the time without hard bread even ; they were only kept from starving by the extraordinary energy and administrative capacity shown by their young chief in organizing bakeries in every village along the line of his march, and making the peasants bake soft bread enough to last for a day or two days at a time; thus tiding over the difficulty until the armistice brought his march to a halt and enabled him to take other measures. The country south of the Balkans, particularly the valleys of Sophia and of the Maritza, is most abundantly rich in cattle and sheep, grains and rough forage. The Turks had need of this up to the last moment for themselves, and then it was too late to destroy it thoroughly. They set fire to nearly every village on the line of their retreat; but the houses and stacks were cov- ered with snow, and the Russians were so close upon their heels that they arrived in time to put out the fires before they had made much progress. What would have happened had the Turks laid waste their country as the Russians did theirs in 1812, is of course a mere matter of conjecture. The fact as it actually occurred is that the Russians in 1877—*78 overcame the difficulty of food supply by drawing their hard bread from depots pre- viously accumulated on the southern bank of the Danube, and for the rest lived on the country and the supplies captured from the Turks. Secondly, as to material. All efforts to supply tents or cloth- ing were abandoned, if indeed they were ever contemplated. The men wore the same clothing which they had brought into the campaign and had worn all through the summer and autumn. Their knapsacks were all left behind with the company wagons 372 « THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. on the north of the Balkans, and in fact there was not much in ~ them. A little clothing was captured from the Turks at Or- khanie, but not more than enough for one or two regiments, The Turkish dead after every fight were stripped of their cloth- — ing for immediate use, but this also afforded very little. When- ever a day’s halt was made the men did what they could to — patch up their clothing, but at the close of the campaign most of them presented a sorry appearance, with overcoats and trou- — sers burnt by bivouac fires, and gaping boots wrapped up in gunny-sacks and pieces of canvas. For ammunition the artillery was able to take care of itself ~ without other means of transport. The artillery park nearest the Danube received its ammunition (before the bridges were — destroyed) from the railroad which was built up to Zimnitza; ~ it transported this to the next park, and so on until it reached ~ the battery at the front. For Gourko’s column, for instance, there were parks at Sistova, Gorni-Dubnik, Orkhanie, and So- phia. Moreover, the artillery was very numerous, its normal strength being 4 guns to 1,000 men; and as the number of men _ was constantly diminishing, while the number of guns remained the same, it was practically between 6 and 7 pieces to 1,000 men. This was more than necessary; and in Gourko’s column half the artillery was left on the north of the Balkans, and did not rejoin the troops until long after they had reached San Stefano. Skobeleff and Mirsky, as we have seen, crossed the Balkans ~ at Shipka without any artillery, and Skobeleff began his forward ~ march with only about 2 pieces for 1,000 men, leaving the rest — to rejoin him when it could. The infantry ammunition consisted of 48 rounds for the ~ Krenk system, or 60 rounds for the Berdan, carried in two cartridge-boxes; in addition to this, the men carried about e 30 to 40 rounds in their pockets, and 100 rounds per man additional accompanied the troops on pack-horses. This gave nearly 200 rounds per man immediately disposable; this was not all used. To provide against emergencies, however, several trains of intendance wagons loaded with cartridges were on the road between Sistova and the Balkans, but the armistice came before they were needed. Many millions of cartridges were captured fram the Turks, but they were of caliber -45 (Peabody-Martini), whereas the REMARKS ON THE WINTER CAMPAIGN. 373 Russian Berdan was caliber ‘42 and the Krenk caliber ‘60. They were therefore of no use. Skobeleff got permission on the fall of Plevna to arm one of his regiments with captured Peabody- Martini guns, but there was no time in the midst of the cam- paign to make any extensive changes of armament of that nature, and it would have been imprudent, at least, to count upon the capture of Turkish ammunition as a certainty. Lastly, as to the health of the men and horses. Gourko lost about 2,000 men, hors de combat from freezing, during the storm of December 18th-23d, before his movement began. During the movement Dandeville’s column lost about 1,000 more. At Shipka the 24th Division lost over 6,000 men (80 per cent. of its strength) during the same storm, and was for the moment completely disorganized and useless. After the march was fairly begun there were several hundreds more or less who gave way under the cold or were frozen, but the num- ber was not very great—not so much greater than the sunstroke and diarrhoea cases in the terrible heat of summer, as to be par- ticularly noticeable. Once well in the valley of the Maritza, the climate was not so severe, though still cold enough and accompanied with plenty of snow. But for the moment there was not much sickness. In this march, however, bad food and the lack of change of clothing laid the seeds of the typhus and typhoid fevers which broke out at San Stefano in the following month of May, with such terrible malignity that at one time 50,000 men, 45 per cent. of the whole force stationed there- about, were in the hospitals. As for the animals, the cavalry, being always in advance, found plenty of forage, and managed to keep in pretty fair con- dition; but the artillery horses, than which I never saw a finer looking lot of animals as they passed in review at Gorni-Studen in October, were a sad-looking lot of skeletons when they arrived at San Stefano the next February, even although only the best horses had been selected for the march, the rest having been left with the guns which remained north of the Balkans. Their march had been a very hard one, the roads being almost every- where covered with smooth ice, on which they fell and hurt themselves a great deal; being always with the infantry, they nearly always found the forage in the various villages eaten up by the cavalry which had preceded them; and it was suspected 374. THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA. that no small portion of their desiccated food had found its way into the mouths of the hungry gunners. All the baggage-wag- © ons were left behind the Balkans, the officers’ baggage in very limited quantities being taken along on a few pack-horses. The men had no baggage except what they could stow away in the pockets of their overcoats; their rations they carried on their backs. | . The only vehicles which kept up with the troops were a few hospital ambulances, in which the wounded of each affair were carried to the nearest village and left there until they could be collected by the sanitary department and transported in country carts to the large hospitals at Sophia, Philippopolis, Adrianople, Kazanlyk, ete. In brief, then, it may be said that the natural difficulties of a winter campaign were overcome by the extraordinary patience and physical endurance of the men, by the untiring energy of their commanders, Gourko and Skobeleff, and by the fact that all impedimenta were left behind; and that, in spite of the inclement season, the men were deprived of everything but the very minimum of food necessary for life, and of arms and ammunition for warfare. ha ' hw q Avs Dike t) Pes ‘ ward Whi ag THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENTA. CHAPTER I. PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR TO THE BATTLE OF ALADJA DAGH, OCTOBER 15, 1877. Tux topography of the theatre of war in Asia Minor is of the most complicated nature. (See Plate 3.) The Armenian plateau, of which Erzeroum may be considered the center, is at an altitude of 6,000 feet and more above the sea; on the north- west and northeast it terminates somewhat abruptly in the Black Sea and the Georgian valley south of the Caucasus range; on the east it stretches away through Persia, and ends abruptly in the Caspian; to the southeast it sends off a long spur of moun- tains which stop only at the Indus; on its southern side are the wide plains of Mesopotamia and the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates; west of it are the confused mountains of Asia Minor. This plateau is drained to the Caspian by the Araxes, to the Black Sea by the Joruk, to the Persian Gulf by the Tigris and _ Euphrates. The head waters of the first two of these streams and of the two arms of the Euphrates are interlocked in the region about Erzeroum; they are separated by parallel chains running northeast and southwest, and attaining an altitude of between 9,000 and 10,000 feet above the sea. In addition to these mountain ranges there are peaks, such as Mount Ararat, 16,000 feet above sea, and minor ranges and groups of moun- tains, rising from 4,000 to 6,000 feet above the plateau; so that the whole country is a mass of mountains and gorges with only here and there an inclosed valley of 100 to 200 square miles of 378 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. cultivable ground. The principal of these valleys are those of Erzingan, Erzeroum, Kars, Bayazid, and Musch. The capital of Armenia is Erzeroum, and from here radiate all its principal routes of travel. These consist of one macada- mized high-road, or chaussée, 185 miles long, from Erzeroum to Trebizond, on the Black Sea; and of more or less passable roads to Ardahan, to Kars, to Bayazid (the principal caravan road to Persia), to Van, to Bitlis (in the direction of Mesopotamia), and to Erzingan (on the west). There is also a common road from — Batoum on the Black Sea to Ardahan, and a chaussée in process of construction to replace the old road. The ordinary means of transportation throughout the country are pack animals, with an occasional variety of ox-carts; the whole vilayet or province of Erzeroum counts but 600,000 inhabitants, and the want of good roads is not much felt ; Erzeroum has about 60,000 inhabitants, Kars 30,000; there are half a dozen other towns containing perhaps 10,000 inhabitants each; the rest of the population lives in small villages, and no inconsiderable portion of it is made up of the Kurds and other mounted vagabonds and brigands. The Russian frontier (as it existed in 1877) begins on the Black Sea between Poti and Batoum, and runs along the moun- tains in a southeast direction for about 150 miles until it reaches the Arpa Tchai (Arpa river), follows this for 100 miles until it empties into the Araxes, crosses this stream, and then runs east for another 100 miles to Mount Ararat, the corner-stone of the boundaries of Russia, Turkey, and Persia. | For the defense of this frontier the Turks had in 1877 four fortresses, Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, and Bayazid. The last, lying in the valley south of Mount Ararat, and separated from Russia by a high range of mountains, was in a very poor state of defense; the three former, however, had in the twenty years following the Crimean War been strengthened and extended under the direction of foreign engineers, and were formidable places; they consisted each of a stone citadel and a series of eight to twelve detached forts, partly in masonry and partly in earth. Kars mounted about 300 guns, and Ardahan 100. The principal fortress on the Russian side was at Alexandro- pol (formerly Gumri), where the road from Tiflis to Erzeroum crosses the Arpa Tchai. From Alexandropol to Kars there are STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN COLUMNS. 379 three roads in the Kars valley, and the distance is about 45 miles. From Kars to Erzeroum the distance is about 170 miles ; the road follows the Kars River to its source, crosses a range of _ mountains known as the Soganli, descends into the valley of the Araxes, follows up this stream for some distance, crosses another range called the Deve Boyum, and descends into the Erzeroum valley. In the valley of the Araxes this road is joined by the road from Bayazid, which lies on a branch of the Araxes, be- yond the head of the eastern branch of the Euphrates; the distance from Bayazid to Erzeroum is about 200 miles. Midway between Alexandropol and the Black Sea, the Rus- sians had another fortress at the town of Akhaltsik; from it to Ardahan is a distance of 70 miles by the road; thence there is aroad to the southward, winding over mountains and valleys, but parallel in its general course to the Kars Erzeroum road, and reaching after a distance of 120 miles the partially fortified town of Olti, whence one road leads to Erzeroum and the other to Baiburt, midway between Kirzeroum and Trebizond. During the autumn of 1876 and the succeeding winter the Russian troops in the Caucasus had been mobilized for war, under the orders of the Grand Duke Michael (eldest brother of the Emperor), Lord Lieutenant of the Caucasus. The plan of invasion was to advance in four columns, viz. : 1. The Rion Detachment, which was to guard the Black Sea coast and endeavor to take Batoum ; 9. The Akhaltstk Detachment, which was to advance against Ardahan ; 8. The Alexandropol Detachment, which was to advance against Kars ; 4, The Hrivan Detachment, which was to advance against Bayazid. Judging from the course of the campaign, their further plan was to gain possession of Ardahan and Bayazid, invest Kars, and with detachments Nos. 2 and 4 and a part of No. 3 to advance on converging roads toward Erzeroum. From the nature of the country, the Rion Detachment was from the very first wholly independent of the others. These various detachments were made up from five infantry divisions, a rifle brigade, and a horde of Cossacks, distributed as follows : 380 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENTA. Battal- | Foot- | Squad- | Horsee fons. | guns. | rons. | guns. 4lst Infantry Division................. | 16 48 19th Taina Reo Berleads G oa ms 8 24 Caucasian Rifle Brigade (part)......... 2 aut Ne a : = 2d Regiment Kuban Cossacks.......... We Be 6 12 tenant-Geltoret ORE Regiment Kutais Cossacks............ 4 ae 6 ’ Ota ars cose as aes eas Les 26 72 12 12 89th Infantry Division................. 16 48 ae “a . Regiment Kuban Cossacks............ oe iy 6 t 6 Akhaltsyk Detachment, Regiment Terek Cossacks............. 6 Hs 4) Lieutenant - General PS PSE reg VENA) Devel. pW) 721 pie LE tr Py gh 16 48 10 o4 4th (Caucasian) Grenadier Division..... 16 48 a a 19th Infantry oe (1st Brigade)... 8 24 a AS Division Caucasian Dragoons........... 2 Se 16 12 Division Caucasian Cossacks........... ue aa 22 12 Meme ee Regiment Daghestan Cossacks,.... elever | initere ae 6 BA Loris-Melikof. 2 regiments Volga Cossacks........... se af 8 6 ‘ f WC cs is PAPAL Ry a A CAR ET) gigs o a 24 72 52 80 88th Infantry) Division: oo)... 2 as see 16 48 We Si aa sau 8 regiments Kuban Cossacks........... oh me 18 6 ee Tanai Genoct eae Totals eee inc cane aes 16+|. 48) 48; 108 pneas! & Grand total wo: -..9sfescseceees 82 | 192 | 92 | 102 A sapper battalion accompanied each column; and there was in the Caucasus a siege train of 336 guns, of various calibres, of which one half was mobilized. Omitting the Rion Detachment, which had no connection with the main columns, the force with which the Russians began operations in Armenia was about 55,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 210 field-guns of all kinds. The Turkish forces in Armenia at the outbreak of the war, under command of Moukhtar Pasha, numbered in all something over 70,000 men and 108 field-guns, distributed as follows :* Battalions. Men. Batoumis sey ido 8 e's. wees o clewafelvclensteteee RNa amar 20,000 PARGB HAM co") eso SEND NE oS Wn ak (hols tle etalaheieakaietes Meese. 7,500 GTS ee oe su ake aia lets \arbta ve Roane eres dats 6. &juie a wie deat manatee ame 25,500 UPZOT OUI 2 Lhd HPN Macatee Cn LAGS obibcs ater ame Vis eee 8,250 At other points........... piel ger aeetec tees niola' acne! aig akan 12 9,000 TOGA ii see's etic c cae eee Me te nee ae ca ee 70,250 * The numbers of battalions and guns here given are taken from p. 4 of “The Armenian Campaign,” by Charles Williams, correspondent of “The Standard,” who states that they were taken from a report made by the British Military Agent (Gen- eral Kemball) in April, 1877. I have taken the battalions as having an average strength of 750 men. Mr. Williams thinks their strength was much less. On the other hand, the correspondent of the “Daily News” at Moukhtar’s headquarters STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN COLUMNS. 381 He was, however, lamentably deficient in cavalry, having less than 1,000 organized troops. On the 24th of April the troops of all four of the Russian columns crossed the frontier. Loris-Melikoff’s column advanced along the Kars road, cap- turing some Turkish pickets numbering in all about a hundred men; his cavalry reached that evening the Kars River, and on their approach the Turkish detachment of 5,000 or 6,000 men posted behind that stream retired to Kars. Loris-Melikoff con- tinued his march, and on the 28th established himself about 10 miles northwest of Kars, at the village of Zaim, on the road to Ardahan, thus cutting off all communication between those two places. (See Plate 22.) On the same day Moukhtar Pasha took 5,000 men and fell back tothe Soganli range, 40 miles from Kars, on the road to Erzeroum. He left 15,000 men or more as a garrison for Kars. Loris-Melikoff then began aseries of reconnaissances of the forts of Kars on all sides, and at the same time sent strong columns of cavalry to the south as far as Kagisman, which they occupied without resistance, and thence west to the road in rear of Kars, along which they destroyed the telegraph for a long distance. Moukhtar Pasha, supposing the Russian forces to be very much greater than they really were, fell back to Zevin. On the 8th of May, in one of the reconnaissances on the west of Kars, the Cossacks captured a Turkish messenger making his way along a by-road to Kars. From the dispatches captured on his person Loris Melikoff learned the weak condition of the garrison of Ardahan, and immediately resolved to detach a por- tion of his force from before Kars to proceed to Ardahan, and make an attack upon that place in conjunction with the column marching from Akhaltsik. This latter column had arrived in front of Ardahan on the 28th of April, and on the Ist _ of May had established communication by its Cossacks with the troops in front of Kars; the distance between the two places is 45 miles. It had since been engaged in reconnoitering the de- fenses of Ardahan, and in bringing up siege-guns, mortars, ete. The roads were in a terrible condition; the winter was not yet states in one of his letters that that Pasha told him he had at the beginning of the campaign 52,000 men under his orders, exclusive of the garrison of Batoum. (‘Daily News Correspondence,” Vol. I., pp. 102, 348.) 3882 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. over, snow and rain storms succeeded. each other, and the road between Akhaltsik and Ardahan, over which the siege material had to be brought, passed over an ascent of 7,000 feet. The difficulties of this column were not slight. The troops detached from the camp in front of Kars to march to Ardahan, consisting of the 13th and 15th Grenadiers, 24 guns, a regiment of Dragoons, and 8 sotnias of Cossacks— about 8,000 men in all, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Heimann—left Zaim on the 10th of May, and arrived in front of Ardahan on the 13th. Loris-Melikoff arrived in person on the same day, and on the 14th made a reconnaissance of the place, and gave the necessary orders for the attack. It was found that the town was surrounded with six casemated works of strong profile, and armed with heavy guns, but all of them commanded from heights two to three miles distant. Of these heights the two most important, called Gheliaverde and Ramazan, were occupied, and fortified with strong works. Gheliaverde was on the east, Ramazan on the west of the town; they were some miles apart, and were separated by the Kour River, on which the town is situated. Ramazan was the more difficult and inacces- sible of the two, but its fortifications were so constructed that they could only be used against the west. General Heimann’s troops were ordered to threaten the town on the south and bom- bard the heights of Gheliaverde, while those of General Devel were to assault these heights in front, i. e., from the east. On the 15th the siege artillery arrived, and during the night batteries were constructed, and the guns and mortars brought — into position. On the morning of the 16th the bombardment — was opened with 40 guns against the Gheliaverde height, besides — other batteries directed against the town and its defenses. The artillery appears to have been very well directed, and to have done great damage. It not only seriously injured the fortifica- tions upon this hill, but inflicted great losses upon the defenders. Meanwhile the troops of General Devel (153d and 156th Regi- ments) were climbing the hill of Gheliaverde on its eastern face, exposed to the fire of the Turks on the hill, and covered by the fire of their own batteries in rear as well as by those of General Heimann on their left flank. They reached the top of the hill about 10 o’clock, and immediately drove the Turks back to the fort (called Emir Ogli), about 600 paces in rear, and separated CAPTURE OF ARDAHAN. 383 from them by a deep ravine. After giving his troops a little rest, General Devel sent them forward to the attack of this work, which they finally carried about 1 p.m. It contained 10 guns, besides great quantities of ammunition and stores. The position thus acquired gave the Russians a foothold from which to conduct their further operations, and they worked all that night and part of the next day in getting their guns into position; the bombardment did not begin until 3 p.m. on the 17th. It had been intended to continue the bombardment dur- ing the 17th and 18th, but the effect of the artillery was so de- structive upon the enemy’s works and upon the enemy himself, who was seen to be withdrawing a portion of his men, that Loris- Melikoff determined to assault that same afternoon (17th) in spite of the lateness of the hour. The attack was made at 6 o’clock by the 13th and 16th Grenadiers and the 153d Regiment, advancing against the works on the southeast of the town. The Turks did not wait to receive them, but abandoned these works, fled through the town, and dispersed in the mountains to the west. They were pursued until after dark by the Cossacks. Fort Ramazan was not defended by them at all. The Russians occupied the whole place by 9 o’clock in the evening. Their losses were 4 officers and 114 men on the 16th, and 11 officers and 410 men on the 17th, or a total loss of less than 550 men. They captured about 1,000 prisoners, 92 guns (two of which were 8-inch, five 6-inch, and the majority of the rest 4-inch Krupp siege-guns), and great quantities of ammunition and stores. There were 1,750 Turkish bodies buried by the Rus- sians, and the total Turkish losses were estimated at 3,000. About half the garrison, therefore, were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, and the other half escaped into the mountains and disbanded. The losses of the Turks were occasioned almost wholly by the Russian artillery, which seems to have been ad- mirably served. Leaving a small garrison in Ardahan, Loris-Melikoff sent a detachment in the direction of Olti, and with General Heimann’s detachment returned to the vicinity of Kars, arriving there on the 25th of May. Olti was occupied without opposition on the Ist of June, the Turkish garrison retiring to Erzeroum. Meanwhile the Erivan column, under General Tergukassoff, had crossed the frontier on the 27th of April, and, although de- 384 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. layed somewhat by the difficulties of the road, had arrived in front of Bayazid on the 30th. The Turkish garrison, number- ing only 2,000 men, fled at their approach, and dispersed in the Ala Mountains on the south of the town. Leaving a garrison of between 2,000 and 3,000 men in Bayazid, Tergukassoff took up his march (May 8th) to the west, and, descending the valley of the Euphrates, arrived at the village of Kara-Kilissa, from which a detachment of some 3,000 or 4,000 Turks retreated on his approach. On the 10th of May Tergukassoff occupied the town of Alashkert, and advanced westward to the town of Daiar, only 15 miles from the junction of the Bayazid and Kars roads; but here he was obliged to come to a halt in face of large bodies of Turkish troops. He was also considerably worried about his rear, as he received information that the troops which had evacu- ated Bayazid had reformed in the Ala Mountains and the region of Lake Van, just south of them, and were collecting a large force of Kurds with whom they intended to attack Bayazid from the south. Tergukassoff detached a small portion of his troops to return and make reconnaissances to establish the truth of this report, and with the rest of his troops remained at Daiar, where he was attacked on the 21st of June by the Turks, but held his ground, with a loss of over 400 men. Loris-Melikoff, having returned to the vicinity of Kars on the 25th of May, immediately began establishing siege batteries on the north, west, and east of the place (about 60 guns and mortars were established by the 25th of June), and at the same time sent his cavalry on both sides of Kars to the south to en- deavor to establish communications with Tergukassofi’s column and to reconnoiter the position of Moukhtar Pasha at Zevin. : Qn the 15th of June the Turks made a sortie on the northwest of Kars, but were repulsed by the Grenadiers under General Heimann. They left 200 dead on the field, and the Russian losses were about 150 men in all. Meanwhile the bombardment of Kars continued, with slight losses on both sides. During the latter part of June Loris-Melikoff, leaving in front of Kars a portion of the Ardahan column and of the 19th Division, advanced west of Kars with the Grenadier Division under General Heimann to the Erzeroum road, and thence along that road over the Soganli range to the position of Moukhtar RELIEF OF BAYAZID. : 385 Pasha at Zevin. The latter had here 23 battalions (say 15,000 men) in a good position, selected in advance and well fortified. On the 25th of June Heimann assaulted this position, but met with a complete repulse and the loss of 900 men. Meanwhile the little garrison of Bayazid had in fact been completely surrounded by about 10,000 infantry and a horde of Kurds (said to have numbered over 20,000 men). On the 18th of June the Turkish troops under Faik Pasha and the Kurds entered the town, massacred the greater part of the population, and set fire to the houses. The Russian troops, too feeble in numbers to prevent this massacre, shut themselves up in the citadel and sustained a siege, refusing to surrender, since they knew that if they did so the same fate awaited them as had overtaken the inhabitants of the town. The besiegers had a certain amount of artillery, with which they bombarded the citadel and pretty well knocked it to pieces; but whenever they attempted an assault, the Russians defended themselves with such desperation that they were driven back. Learning this state of affairs, it became absolutely necessary for Tergukassoff to return to the relief of Bayazid ; and as it was impossible for his column and that of Heimann to unite and overcome Moukhtar in his position at Zevin, it was also necessary for Heimann to retreat to the neighborhood of Kars. The two Russian columns therefore returned on divergent roads, Heimann to Kars, and Tergukassoff through Alashkert, and across the Russian frontier to Igdyr, whence he had begun his movement in advance six weeks before. Reorganizing his troops here, and disembarrassing himself of a large number of refugees who had accompanied his retreat, Tergukassoff then moved rapidly by the same road as before from Igdyr to Bayazid, at- tacked the besieging forces, who made very little resistance—the brigands of Kurds in particular scattering in all directions on his approach—and on the 10th of July relieved the little garri- son of 1,600 men, which had sustained a siege of twenty-three days, marked by very great hardship and suffering. They had for several days been living on dead horses and a few spoonfuls of water per day; during the siege they had lost about 500 men in killed and wounded. After destroying what remained of the citadel, Tergukassoff returned with his troops across the frontier toIgdyr. The Turkish force under Ismail Pasha, which had 25 386 3 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENTA, been following Tergukassoff during his retreat, moved so slowly as to arrive at Bayazid too late to prevent the relief of the garrison. . Of the Rion detachment, charged with the defense of the coast and the capture if possible of Batoum, we need only say that it had made no farther progress than the town of Tehik- hidsiri, situated on the coast about four miles south of the fron- tier, and in arriving thus far had lost about 300 men in various combats. Here they attacked on the 23d of June the intrenched — camp of about 4,000 Turks under Dervish Pasha, but were re- pulsed with a loss of 500 men. They saw that they were not strong enough to carry this position, and it was impossible to turn it, for there was an inaccessible range of mountains on one side and the Black Sea on the other, and in the latter were two or three Turkish ironclads which shelled their flank. ‘Their re- treat was necessitated partly by these causes, and partly because the Turkish fleet had been bombarding various villages along the coast for a distance of 60 or 70 miles from Poti, and had also landed a force of 1,000 or more Tcherkesses, who had penetrated into the coast districts of Abkhasia and stirred up revolt among the mountain tribes of that locality. The Rion — detachment therefore retreated across the frontier into the val- ley, and was occupied for some months in watching the coast against possible further landings of Turks, and in putting down the insurrections. Before they were able to resume the offensive in proper force, winter had set in ; and, in short, Batoum was still in the hands of the Turks when the armistice of J anuary dist was concluded. It is not necessary, therefore, to refer any more to the Rion detachment; it had no influence whatever . upon the campaign. We thus see that at the beginning of July the offensive campaign of the Russians in Armenia had come to a halt, and for the same reason as in Bulgaria, i. e., lack of sufficient troops. Moukhtar Pasha had conducted his operations very prudently and very successfully. He had about 42,000 men at his dis- posal, but having no cavalry to keep him posted about the enemy, he believed their forces to be what they were repre- sented to be in the newspapers, i.e., 100,000, whereas in truth they were but very little superior to his own. Leaving a small garrison in Kars, he kept the bulk of his troops near the junc- RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS. 387 tion of the roads from Kars and Bayazid, prevented the two Russian columns which were advancing on these roads from uniting, selected a good position (Zevin) for defense, and invited an attack there—which the Russians made on the 25th of June. Meeting with a total repulse, the latter were obliged to retreat, to raise the siege of Kars, if it could be called a siege, and to retire to the line of the Kars River (ten miles in front of Alex- andropol), where they arrived about the middle of July. Arda- han was still in their possession, but otherwise the Russians were just where they were at the declaration of war, and minus about 10,000 men. Moukhtar meanwhile was constantly recruiting his forces, and arming and organizing them. He followed the Russians toward Kars, slowly and without attacking, and then took up a position across the plain of Kars, his left flank resting on the fortress and his right near the Arpa River, the boundary line. When the news of the retreat of Loris-Melikoff and the general failure of the campaign after the battle of Zevin (June 25th) reached the Emperor’s headquarters in Bulgaria, orders were given for the mobilization of the 1st Grenadier Division and the 40th Division of the Line, and their dispatch to the army in Armenia as reénforcements. The 20th and 21st Divi- sions, quartered in Daghestan and along the Terek, were also mobilized, but they were simply used to put down the insurrec- tions in their neighborhood, and they did not cross the Caucasus. The Grenadier Division had 1,400 miles of railroad travel, from Moscow to Vladikavkas, and nearly 200 miles of march, from the latter point to Alexandropol. The 40th Division, quartered in the neighborhood of Saratoff on the Volga, had 1,000 miles of boat and railroad travel, and also 200 miles of march. The latter began to arrive at Alexandropol about the middle of August, and the last of the Grenadiers reached the same point September 25th. Meanwhile Loris-Melikoff had the Caucasus Grenadier Di- vision, the 1st Brigade of the 39th Division (previously at Ar- dahan), the 2d Brigade of the 88th Division, and the 2d Brigade of the 19th Division—about 35,000 men (infantry) in all, besides 5,000 or more Cossacks. He occupied a position in front of the Kars River, facing southwest, his right at Kuruk- Dara, near the road from Alexandropol to Kars, his center at 388 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. Kizil Tepe, and his left at the ruins of Ani, on the river Arpa. (See Plate 22.) The length of his front was about 15 miles. In front of him were: 1. The garrison of Kars, 16,000 in- fantry, 80 field-guns, 1,000 cavalry, and over 300 siege-guns; 2. The field army of Moukhtar Pasha, 20,000 infantry, 54 field- and mountain-guns, and 6,000 cavalry. The latter was posted along the northern slope of the Aladja Mountains, with its right flank facing the Russian left at Ani and its left (including part of the Kars garrison) thrown out into the plain at the two hills — known as Great and Little Yahni, near the road from Kars to Alexandropol. The topography of the country in which the two armies were situated is somewhat peculiar. A few miles southeast of the town of Kars begin two ranges of mountains, which run in a southeasterly direction to the river Arpa. The more northern range is about 20 miles long, and is known as the Aladja Dagh * (God’s Mountain). In front of the mountain (i. e., north of it) lies the plain of Kars, about 2,000 feet below its summits, through which winds the Kars Tchai, emptying into the Arpa Tchai. This plain is studded with a number of hills, the two Yahni, Kizil Tepe, Uch Tepe, ete., with bluff sides rising from 400 to 600 feet above the plain. These hills had of course con- siderable tactical importance for the respective armies. The latter part of July and the early part of August were occupied in numerous reconnaissances on both sides, and the skirmishes resulting from them, but nothing serious occurred. On the 18th of August, Loris-Melikoff, having a few days previously sent one of his brigades to the assistance of Tergu- kassoff, who was confronted by a force of over 10,000 men under Ismail Pasha in the region of Erivan and Igdyr, and wishing to divert the attention of the Turks in his front from this movement, made an attack, or possibly a demonstration, against the Turkish left flank at the Yahni hills; he did not carry the hills, and at evening he retired, the losses being about 500 men on each side. For the next few days there was con- siderable skirmishing in front of both lines, and on the 24th * The following Turkish words are useful to remember in topographical nomen- clature : ; Dagh, mountain. Tchai, a large river. Tepe, hill. Su, a small river. TURKISH ATTACK. 389 the Russians appeared to be withdrawing from their left to strengthen their right flank, possibly with the intention of renew- ing the attack of the 18th. Moukhtar thought this a favorable opportunity to strike a blow, and during the night he concen- trated about 10,000 men on his right flank, and at daylight sent them forward to the assault of Kizil Tepe. The latter was held by only one or two Russian battalions, owing to their recent concentration on their right flank, and these were easily driven out. The Russians quickly brought up part of their troops from their right, and a severe fight took place, lasting all day, the principal struggle being around the front of the village of Subo- tan, to the west of Kizil Tepe. Neither side appears to have gained much advantage, and the fight ceased at dark, Kizil Tepe and Subotan, however, remaining in the hands of the Turks. The results of this day’s fighting were a loss of about 2,000 men on each side (perhaps more on the Russian), and the doubling up in a measure of their left flank. If Moukhtar ever had any serious intentions of carrying the war into the Russian territory, this was his opportunity; by energetically following up his attack the next day, he might possibly have cut off the Russians from Alexandropol, or have compelled their retreat in that direction. But he did not follow up his success. What were the reasons for his inaction is mere matter of specu- lation. For his victory on this day the Sultan conferred upon him the title of Ghazi (Victorious), which, in view of the total destruction of his army less than two months later, is somewhat devoid of meaning. During the month of September nothing whatever of con- sequence took place on either side of the opposing troops in the valley of Kars. Near Erivan there were some affairs of an un- important character between the detachment of Ismail Pasha and that of Tergukassoff, the former attacking the latter in the mountain defile southwest of Erivan, but accomplishing nothing except the loss of a few hundred men. Ismail Pasha had under his orders a force of 40 battalions (at least 20,000 men), made up largely of reénforcements recently arrived from Trebizond and from the districts of Mesopotamia, besides a large force of Kurds. Tergukassoff’s detachment had been reénforced by some troops sent to him under the orders of Lieutenant-General Devel, so that now he had three regiments of the 19th Divi- 390 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENTA. sion (Nos. 73, 74, and 76), two of the 38th (Nos. 149 and 150), and two of the 39th (Nos. 153 and 154); or in all 28 bata a numbering about 22,000 men. a Ismail Pasha ie no impression upon Tergukassoff ; and the latter made no serious movement against the Turks, since . he wished to retain them where they were and not drive them 4 back to effect a junction with Moukhtar. o By the latter part of September the whole of the reénforce- 4 ments (1st Division Grenadiers and 40th Division) had arrived, a and the Grand Duke Michael, who had personally assumed com- - ‘ mand of the army, was ready to resume the offensive. a The troops under his orders in the plain of Kars were as * follows: Battal G Squad-| Horse- ions. rons. | Guns, 1st Division Grenadiers, Lieutenant-General Roop..........-...22.0 12 48 a8 4th (Caucasian) Division Grenadiers, Lieutenant-General Heimann..| 16 48 19th Division (one Regiment, No. 15) . 22. sa:ssda cacao eles mamas 4 ie 88th Division (Regiments 151 and 152)..................... Riad «setae 8 24 89th Division (Regiments 153, 155, and 156) .... 0... cc ce ec eens cee 12 24 Caucasian Rifle Brigade (1st and 4th Battalions)....................- 2 ots AN Ch DE VISOR eka ase hcgetn oneal lope al ote es nein ctor tes eae eee 12 48 Division: Caucasian: Drag 00s: 2 0.52, Sade eee eee ee : 16 12 Various Cossack, Regiments (see p. 880). ...cc 605 1 cco eecccyewetesue 46 24 TORN. Veeco 3 seg occ Secs ly Ao 66 | 192 | 62 | 36 or about 55,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 228 guns. ie The iste army eypeeal to him (including the garrison. of Kars) numbered about 36,000 * infantry, a considerable force of cavalry (of very poor quality), and about 150 guns. They still occupied the position (see Plate 22) extending from the Yahni hills through Kizil Tepe to Uch Tepe, near the Arpa 4 Tchai. a The Russian plan was to overwhelm the Turkish left flank _ and cut them off from Kars. ‘a On the 2d of October the Russians attacked as follows: . _ * This number is ascertained as follows: Taken prisoners October 14th-15th ................ aa 7,000 S: ¥ in Kars November 18th’... 02: ........ 2 pee 17,000 Escaped with Moukhtar Pasha after defeat of October 15th...... 2,800 Sick and wounded in hospitals at Kars ..........0..cceceeecee 4,500 Killed and wounded in battles of October 8d and 14th, and Novem- DOE PIR ee isin’ 5 i's 05 vain py ajose's © sea pln ate aha a esla a eee 5,000 BATTLE OF ALADJA DAGH. 391 1st Grenadier Division against Little Yahni; 6, portions of 38th and 39th Divisions against Great Yahni; c, part of the 4th Grenadier Division against Subotan and Kizil Tepe. Great Yahni was carried, but the other two columns were repulsed. On the 3d Moukhtar riposted with an attack on the Russian left, from between Kizil Tepe and Uch Tepe. He gained no ground, but forced the Russians to strengthen their left and to evacuate Great Yahni, where their right flank was wholly in the air, and where besides it was very difficult to supply the troops with water. The Russian losses between the 2d and 4th of October were over 3,000 men (1,052 killed, 2,102 wounded). Those of the Turks are not known, but were probably about the same. Now follows an action upon the part of Moukhtar Pasha which it is difficult to explain. The newspaper correspondents at his headquarters say that he supposed this was to be the last attack of the Russians, and that the campaign would now close for the winter (snow had in fact already fallen). ‘Whatever may have been his reasons, on the night of the 8th-9th of October he abandoned Great Yahni, Kizil Tepe, and Uch Tepe, and concentrated his army in his fortified positions on the heights of Vizinkioi, Avliar, and Aladja Dagh, leaving only a small advance guard in front of his left flank at Little Yahni. He also gave orders to Ismail Pasha to retreat from the frontier near Erivan and join him near Kars. The Russians, however, had no thoughts of terminating the campaign on account of the winter, but were preparing a blow which resulted in the complete destruction of Moukhtar’s army. Their plan in brief was to demonstrate against the heights of Ayliar and Aladja Dagh, while a strong column should pass completely around the Turkish right flank and come up on their rear (thus preventing the arrival of Ismail’s troops), and, as soon as it should arrive behind the Aladja Dagh, a general attack was to be made on all sides. To this purpose the following dispositions of the Russian troops were made: 1. Right Wing, Major-General Count Grabbe—38d Grenadiers (3 battalions), 8 guns, and 15 squadrons, which was posted be- tween the Kars Tchai, near Zaim, and the high-road north of Little Yahni. 392 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. 2. Center, Lieutenant-General Heimann—4th Grenadier Di- vision, 2d Regiment 1st Grenadier Division, Regiment No. 151 (38th Division), 1 battalion of rifles, and 1 sapper battalion; in — all, 24 battalions, or 20,000 infantry, with 8 squadrons, and 104 guns of different calibres. This detachment was posted from Great Yahni to Hadji Veli. 3. Left Wing, Major-General Kouzminsky—Regiments No. 152 (88th Division) and 154 (39th Division); in all, 8 battalions, or 6,000 infantry, with 24 squadrons, and 24 guns. This detach- — ment was posted in front of Kizil Tepe. 4. Reserve, Major-General Dehn—Ist and 4th Regiments ist Grenadier Division, and a half battalion of sappers; in all, 63 battalions, or 5,000 infantry, with 8 squadrons and 40 guns. This detachment was posted in front of Kulveran. The detachments of Grabbe, Kouzminsky, and Dehn were placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Roop. 3 5. Turning Column, Lieutenant-General Lazareff—40th Di- vision, 75th Regiment (19th Division), one battalion of rifles, and a half battalion of sappers; in all, 174 battalions, or 15,000 infantry, with 22 squadrons and 70 guns. Lazareff left the camp at Karajal on the night of the 9th- 10th of October, and crossed the Arpa Tchai at the fords behind Uch Tepe; he then moved down the east bank of the river to the village of Kambinsk, where he was joined by the 153d Regiment (39th Division) and a regiment of Cossacks; recross- ing the river at this point, he turned westward and marched to Digour, on the rear of the Aladja Dagh, where he was reén- forced by the 154th Regiment (39th Division), a few Cossacks, : and some artillery, all of which had just arrived from Tergu- kassofi’s detachment in the district of Erivan. This carried the strength of Lazareff’s column to something over 20,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 78 guns. Tergukassoff’s main col- umn, about 15,000 men, was ordered to push forward reconnais- sances in the direction of Kagisman (about twenty miles on the left or south of Lazareff), and find out the whereabouts of Ismail’s troops and prevent their coming to the relief of Moukhtar. The whole of Lazareff’s march was conducted with great secrecy, mostly at night, and the Turks do not seem to have gained any very clear knowledge of it. He unrolled behind him a line of field telegraph—against which the Turks did a ae Ni Ot BATTLE OF ALADJA DAGH. 393 nothing—which kept him at all times in instant communication with the camp at Karajal, and contributed in no small degree to the final success of the whole movement. Meanwhile the troops of Heimann and Roop, who had oceu- pied on the 9th and 10th the positions previously mentioned, were to remain quiet until Lazareff should establish himself in the rear of the Turks near Bazardjik, and then Heimann was to throw his whole force upon the heights of Avliar and break through the Turkish center at that point, while Roop was to attack the heights of Aladja Dagh, and, in connection with Lazareff acting on their rear, completely surround the Turkish right wing. Giving a day’s rest to his men at Digour, on the 14th of October Lazareff continued his march in the rear of the Turk- ish army toward Orlok; but in the afternoon his advance guard found the Turks posted in a strong position to the southeast of the village of Bazardjik. Moukhtar Pasha had in fact on the previous day learned through his spies of Lazarefi’s presence in his rear, and had thrown back his left flank in order to meet it. For this purpose he had formed a detachment under Reshid Pasha, about 6,000 men strong (including a few battalions which had arrived from Ismail’s army), and had sent this detachment to take position between Orlok and Bazardjik and prevent the farther advance of this turning column of the Russians. Re- _ shid Pasha’s force, however, was too small for its work, and it was driven out of Bazardjik and forced to retire toward Vizin- kioi, leaving the Russians in possession of their positions. The losses on the 14th of October were not great, but the result of the day was to firmly establish General Lazarefi’s detachment in rear of the left flank of the Turks, after having made a com- plete circuit of their right. At 2:30 a.m. of the 15th, the Grand Duke Michael received at the camp at Karajal a long telegraphic report from General Lazareff, explaining his own position and the events of the day. The orders for the day were immediately given. Heimann, with the Caucasian Division of Grenadiers and 64 guns, was to storm the heights of Avliar; Roop, with portions of the Grena- dier and other Divisions, was to advance on Kerchane, and, if Heimann’s attack succeeded, to assault the Aladja Dagh; Laza- reff was to continue his movement in the direction of Vizinkioi 5 o94 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. and, finally, one brigade of Heimann’s detachment was moved forward from its station on Great Yahni to cover the road from Vizinkioi to Avliar with its artillery, in case the Turks made any movements along it. The Grand Duke Michael and General Loris-Melikoff arrived on the field near Hadji Veli between 5 and 6 a. m., and the bat- tle opened about daylight. Heimann’s 64 guns, which were at first only a short distance in front of Hadji Veli, gradually ad- vanced until they came within 1,500 yards of the Turkish works — on the lower slopes of the Avliar hill. From this point, accord- ing to all accounts (Russian, Turkish, and English), they did most terrible execution with shrapnel, which they planted on the lines of the Turkish trenches with great accuracy. The Turks had but six guns on this hill, which could accomplish nothing against the greater number of Russian guns. Mean- while the Grenadier Division lay in front and on both sides of this hill, slightly in advance of their batteries, under cover in the ravines, and waiting the order for the attack. One regi- ment on the right, between the foot of Avliar and Great Yahni, was so far advanced that Moukhtar sent a force from Vizinkioi to attack it about 10 a.m.; but this force was repulsed, partly by the infantry and partly by the fire of the long-range guns on Great Yahni. It was nearly noon, however, before this affair was wholly over, and then Heimann judged that the moment had come for the assault. The artillery ceased firing, and the columns began climbing the sides of the hill as rapidly as the ground permitted. They were received by a very hot fire from the Turkish trenches, to which they replied, while still moving forward in open order. The Turks did not wait for a hand-to- hand fight, but abandoned their trenches on the slope as the Rus- sians came close to them ; the Russians followed on, and then the Turks abandoned their artillery, ammunition, etc., in the posi- tion on the crest of the hill, and retreated to Vizinkioi. The whole position was in the had of the Russians by 1 o’clock. Just at this time Moukhtar Pasha left the western edge of the Aladja Dagh, where he had been viewing the battle, and, pass- ing behind Avliar and just in front of Lazareft’s column, ‘escaped to Vizinkioi. Meanwhile the troops of Reshid Pasha, which had been driven out of Bazardjik the previous day, fell back and took “a rege yaar: ee eae BATTLE OF ALADJA DAGH. 395 position at the foot of the Vizinkioi hill and northwest of Avliar. Lazareff’s leading regiments (Nos. 154 and 75) followed them up, and skirmished with them until about noon, when they moved forward to the assault. The Turks retreated to the crest of the Vizinkioi hill about the same time that those from Avliar began retreating to the village of Vizinkioi; the whole center and left wing of Moukhtar’s army then fled in a wild panic to Kars. They were pursued by the cavalry. Heimann’s and Lazarefi’s troops then joined hands near Avliar. Under these circumstances the Grand Duke Michael, about 2 p.m. gave the following orders: Heimann to occupy Vizinkioi and Avliar with a portion of his troops, and with the other portion to cross the deep ravine between Avliar and Aladja Dagh, and attack the latter from the northwest; Lazareff to direct a portion of his troops to the attack of Aladja Dagh from the southwest, and with the other portion to move back to the vicinity of Bazardjik, and occupy all the roads by which the Turks, who still held firm on the Aladja Dagh, might escape toward Digour or the south; Roop to move forward from Ker- chane to the assault of Aladja Dagh from the north. Three columns of superior numbers thus closed in around the right wing of Moukhtar’s army, of which the center and left were already in flight. The troops of General Roop had already occupied the ground in front of the Turkish positions on the northern slope of Aladja Dagh early in the morning, but, pending the result of General Heimann’s attack, had confined their efforts to some skirmishing and to the energetic employment of their artillery (24 pieces). But when the heights of Avliar were carried, General Roop noticed that the Turks were beginning to withdraw part of their artillery, and saw that it was necessary to act promptly. He immediately ordered his troops to advance in three columns, the 156th Regiment on the right, the 1st Grenadiers in the center, and the 152d Regiment on the left (i. e., against the extreme right flank of the Turks), the whole supported by 28 pieces of artillery at close range, besides several siege-guns which were established on some heights in their rear. The Turks at first received them warmly, firing in volleys; but, as the Rus- sians continued gradually to advance, their right finally gave way, and began retreating across the Aladja Dagh toward Vizin- 396 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENTA. kioi. But they were not able to escape, for, as they came down the western slopes of the mountain, they were met by the troops of General Lazareff; and, at the same time, Roop’s right and Heimann’s left compelled the Turks on the left of the Aladja Dagh to give way. The whole of the right wing of the Turkish army was thus, about dark, surrounded, and nothing remained for them but to surrender. Their commander, Omer Pasha, sent a flag of truce to the Grand Duke Michael, and capitulated without conditions. During the afternoon the small force posted on Little Yahni had profited by the fighting on the opposite flank to make good its escape to Kars, pursued by a few squadrons of Cossacks. The result of the 15th of October was the crushing defeat of Moukhtar Pasha’s army of 35,000 men—nearly half of it being destroyed, and the rest fleeing in a panic to the protection of the forts of Kars. By Omer Pasha’s capitulation 7,000 men were made prisoners ; 1,000 or 2,000 escaped in dispersed bands to the south of Aladja Dagh, and between 4,000 and 5,000 were killed and wounded in the battle, or cut down in their retreat. The greater part of the Turkish losses were caused by the ad- mirable employment of the Russian artillery with shrapnel. The Russian losses were very small in comparison with the decisive results of the day; they were as follows: BGO ooo sw cise vingioe sete ys els auc eer ee 7 223 Wounded’ oie ssc comes ca cee eee) ee eee 49 1,162 TOGAL, anc eein ceo ee es ee 56 1,385 They captured 35 guns, several thousand small arms, a vast amount of ammunition, and such quantities of provisions that for several weeks they were independent of their own supplies at Alexandropol. CHAPTER II. ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS TO ERZEROUM—THE STORM OF KARS, NOVEMBER 15TH, 1877. Movxutar Pasna reached Kars in the midst of the disorgan- ized panic-stricken fugitives during the night of the 15th-16th, and remained there one day; on the afternoon of the 16th he confided the defense of Kars to Hussein Pasha, and, taking 2,800 men who were in a reasonable state of organization, and a few guns, started west over the mountains to the Olti valley. Reaching this, he rapidly continued his retreat to Zevin, where he stopped and was joined by some 8,000 or 10,000 men whom he had ordered up from Erzeroum, and where he hoped to be joined by Ismail Pasha. But the latter, upon hearing of the defeat of Moukhtar’s army, immediately abandoned all his sick and wounded (about 4,500 men), and began a hasty retreat up the valley of the Araxes, pursued by Tergukassoff. The Kurds then deserted him in a body, and desertions also multiplied among his regular troops, so that he reached the vicinity of Erzeroum with only about 8,000 men. Ismail having thus fallen back behind him, and being threatened in front by Hei- mann and on his flank by Tergukassoff, Moukhtar had no choice but to continue his retreat in all haste. On the 28th of October he abandoned Zevin and Yenikioi, and during the night of the 29th-30th reached Erzeroum. His chief of staff, a Hungarian named Faizi Pasha, of long service in the Turkish army, had preceded him thither, and hastily selected the site for some for- tifications on the heights of Deve Boyum, about seven miles northeast ofthe town. Joining Ismail’s forces to his own—15,000 to 18,000 men altogether—Moukhtar occupied these works. 398 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. Meanwhile on the Russian side, immediately after the battle of October 15th, Lazareff was sent to Kagisman with the 40th Division, in the hope of cutting off Ismail’s troops; but the latter had received news of the defeat of the 15th by means of the scattered bands which had escaped from the Aladja Dagh, and had already passed Kagisman on the 19th; Lazareff arrived the next morning. Leaving Tergukassoff to follow Ismail, Lazareff was recalled to Kars. Heimann, with the Caucasian Division of Grenadiers, was then started in direct pursuit of Moukhtar along the main Kars-Erzeroum road. Leaving the vicinity of Kars on the 24th, he crossed the Soganli range, and, passing through Zevin almost on the heels of Moukhtar, came into the valley of the Araxes, arrived in front of the heights of Deve Boyum on the 30th, and began reconnoitering the Turkish position at that place. But before trying an assault he awaited the arrival of Tergu- kassoff’s column, which had not received the news of the defeat on the Aladja Dagh until some days after it had been received by Ismail, and was consequently somewhat behind the Turks. Tergukassoff reached Heimann’s camp on the 2d of November, and preparations were immediately made for an assault on the 4th. The united force under General Heimann consisted of the Caucasian Grenadier Division, the 73d, 150th, 153d, and 156th Regiments—about 24,000 men, with 120 guns—and 4 or 5 Regiments of Cossacks. Moukhtar had about 18,000 men under his orders, and 60 guns. His position was one of great — i natural strength, being on a high range of hills completely blocking the approach to Erzeroum by the road. Heimann began his attack early in the morning, and the fight lasted till after dark in the evening. Although at first unsuccessful on their right flank, the Russians finally carried the whole line, capturing 48 guns, a great quantity of cartridges, the whole Turkish camp, and 400 prisoners. Moukhtar Pasha retreated within the line of forts surrounding Erzeroum. The Turkish loss is not known, but from the newspaper accounts was much larger than that of the Russians. The latter lost, according to the official report, a little over 800 men. On the night of the 9th of November the Russian General intended to make a general assault of the works of Erzeroum; THE STORM OF KARS. 399 but several of his columns lost their way in the darkness, and the only result was the capture of Fort Azizieh on the east of the town, where the Russians took 500 prisoners. But when daylight came they were forced to retire (after spiking the 20 guns which they had captured), since the fort was completely commanded by a neighboring work, Fort Medjidieh, and wholly untenable. The Russians lost 400 men in this affair. On the night of the 12th they made another assault, but also without success. General Heimann then determined to await the arrival of reénforcements before making further efforts to carry the place; and in a very few days the winter set in with a terrible snow-storm, and brought all his operations to a standstill. We now come to the final act of the campaign in Armenia, one of the most remarkable exploits in military annals, viz., the storming of Kars. The town of Kars (see Plate 22) lies in the western side of the plain and on the river of the same name. Behind it, on the west and southwest, are volcanic spurs jutting out from the Soganli range; the river follows the base of these spurs to the town, but here cuts through a rent in the mountain and forms a precipitous ravine several hundred feet deep. On the west, north, and northeast of the town are therefore high, rocky, and almost inaccessible hills ; on the southeast is an open rocky plain. The fortifications, as they existed in 1877, had almost all been built since the Crimean war, under the direction, it is said, of Prussian engineers. They consisted of a citadel in masonry, built on a perpendicular rock overhanging the gorge just north of the town, and of twelve detached forts; there was no enceinte except the old Turkish wall built in the 16th century and now partly in ruins. The forts may be divided into four groups, as follows : 1. The defenses of Karadagh (Black Mountain), consisting of Forts Arab and Karadagh, on the high volcanic spur between the river and the Alexandropol road, on the northeast of the town ; | 2. The defenses of the plain on the southeast of the town, consisting of Forts Hafiz Pasha, Kanly, and Souvari; and of Fort Tchim in the southwestern suburbs of the town, enfilading the Kars River and the Erzeroum road alongside of it ; 400 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. 3. The defenses of Shorak Mountain, on the west of the town, consisting of Forts Tekmass, Tik Tepessi, and Laze Tepessi ; 4. The defenses of Tchanak Mountain, on the northwest of the town, consisting of Forts Veli Pasha, Inglis, and Mouklis. The length of the line of defense was about twelve miles. The forts on the right bank of the river were at an average distance of only 2,600 yards from the citadel; of those on the left bank, the most distant, Laze Tepessi, was 3,000 yards, and the nearest, Veli Pasha, but 1,000 yards from the citadel. The various forts presented different ¢racés and different — constructions. The two forts on the Karadagh were built on the bare rock, with epauiments of earth, which had been trans- ported thither, and were without ditches or traverses. They commanded the neighboring ground in all directions, including the forts on the slopes of Tchanak Mountain on their left. Fort Arab was an irregular hexagon in shape, and had the gorge (on the south) closed by a barrack built of masonry ; in advance of its right flank was a simple curtain. The development of the interior crest was 600 yards ; the curtain was 300 yards long. Fort Karadagh consisted of a bastion with a curtain on either side of it, and in the space thus inclosed a battery in the form of a cavalier, 21 feet above the crest of the work. It was in- tended to close the gorge by a stone barrack, but this was not finished at the outbreak of the war. The length of the line of fire was 1,500 yards. The two forts in the plain southeast of the town were the strongest in construction, and the weakest in situation, of the — : whole system. Fort Hafiz Pasha was a square redoubt, 400 yards on a side, with bastions at the angles, traverses on the parapet and on the covered way, ditch 12 x6 feet, and a case- mated barrack in three tiers closing the gorge (on the side of the town). In front of the southeast bastion was a little bon- net, 70 yards long on each face. Fort Kanly consisted of two small square redoubts about 150 yards on a side, and in rear of them a lunette with faces in the form of a bastioned front and closed at the gorge with a casemated barrack. The ditch was 12x6 feet. The development of the line of fire of the whole work was over 2,100 yards. The two works on the banks of the river, Forts Souvari and Tchim, were simple lunettes without ditches or traverses. THE STORM OF KARS. 401 The works on Shorak Mountain were at the altitude of those on Karadagh, or possibly even a little higher. Laze Tepessi was the commanding one of them all, and consisted of three batteries each of 80 yards front, and slightly in front of them an infantry parapet. Tik Tepessi was a square bastioned re- doubt of a little more than 100 yards on a side, without trav- erses, with a ditch 9 x 7 feet. In front of it was a battery 60 yards long. Fort Tekmass was like Fort Kanly on a small scale, but had no outer works, and only an earthen parapet in place of a barrack across the gorge. Of the works on Tchanak Mountain, Fort Mouklis was built on a sharp rock at the northern edge of a plateau, with the gorge open on the south; it was a simple lunette, with a line of fire of over 400 yards development. Fort Inglis was a small hexagonal work for infantry only; ditch, 21 x 7 feet; line of fire, 250 yards. Fort Veli Pasha was an irregular quadrilateral, with three sides bastioned and the fourth closed by a casemated barrack; ditch, 21 x 7 feet; line of fire, 330 yards. The counterscarp of all the works having ditches was arranged with a banquette for infantry fire over the glacis. This was the condition of the works at the beginning of the war. They were but little injured during the quasi investment of the Russians in the months of May and June. When this investment was raised by Loris-Melikoff’s retreat during the month of July, the Turks strengthened their works by slightly increasing the size of the ditches, and, under the direction of Hussein Bey, they also ran a line of trenches-and little lunettes from the Alexandropol road to Fort Hafiz Pasha, thence to Fort Kanly, and thence to the river near Fort Souvari. On the bare rocks surrounding the other works, trenches were not feasible. These works presented in general certain qualities advan- tageous to the defense; i.e., they were (partly) on commanding ground, they were so near together and so constructed that their artillery lent mutual support, and the rocky ground precluded all idea of mining against them. But on the other hand, if the place be considered a fortified place of the first order, they pre- sented many most serious difficulties for the defense and advan- tages for the attack, viz., 1, their being so near the town as to permit its bombardment; 2, the want of sufficient storehouses or magazines in the works, and of any provision for water, all 26 7 ; 402 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. of which had to be hauled up from the river; 3, the lack of ditches for several of the works; 4, the total lack of flanking defenses, such as caponniéres, for such ditches as there were; 5, the lack of traverses, which existed only in Forts Hafiz Pasha and Kanly; 6, the difficulty of repairing the parapets, owing to the lack of earth; 7, the small relief of the parapet, which left the casemated barracks exposed to the fire of the enemy’s artil- lery; 8, the lack of unity in the defense, the whole position being cut in two by the gorge of the Kars River, which was passable only at a few points on narrow paths, and thus pre- vented rapid movements of reserves from one side to another. The total armament of the place is about 200 guns (303 were captured at the assault, including a large proportion of field- guns). The total development of the line of fire for infantry is about 6,000 yards, 4,000 in the works on the right bank and 2,000 in those on the left. Allowing 2 men toa yard and 50 per cent. in reserve, the proper garrison would be 18,000 in- fantry, and, with 25 men toa gun, 5,000 artillery, or in all 23,- 000. ‘This was almost exactly the strength of the garrison at the time of the assault. After the defeat and dispersion of Moukhtar Pasha’s army in the battle of Aladja Dagh, October 15th, a portion of the Russian troops were sent, as already stated, in pursuit of the Turks toward Erzeroum; the rest of the troops, consisting of the Ist Grenadier Division, the 40th Division, and portions of the 19th, 38th, and 389th Divisions—in all (counting a small detachment which arrived a few days later from Ardahan) 41 battalions, or 30,000 infantry, with 53 squadrons and 144 guns —were constituted the army of investment of Kars, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Lazareff. They gradually dimin- ished the circle of investment to a diameter of about nine miles, and established their siege-guns in batteries as soon ds they ar- rived; 48 guns arrived on the 4th of November, and were estab- lished in 12 batteries on the east and southeast of the town, at a distance of about 3,000 yards from the Turkish works. The train of reasoning which induced the assault is thus explained in the Grand Duke Michael’s report : “ Careful reconnaissances of the ground and of the defenses of the place, and the information gathered concerning the effec- tive strength and morale of the garrison, and concerning its pro- THE STORM OF KARS. 403 visions, proved each day more clearly that, although the defeat of Moukhtar Pasha’s army may have had a certain demoralizing effect upon the defensive strength of Kars, yet the capture of this town was none the less an extremely difficult enterprise. Large quantities of provisions assured to the 32 battalions of the garrison the means of sustaining a blockade for six months, which during the winter, so rigorous in this locality, would have brought innumerable and inevitable sufferings upon the troops of investment. The excellent armament of the fortifica- tions of Kars, the resolution of the garrison to fight to the last extremity, the well-known firmness of Turkish troops in sieges, and the difficult conditions in which the troops of investment were placed, hardly permitted the idea of sitting down to a siege of which it would have been difficult to foresee the end. Nev- ertheless, the speedy capture of Kars was of great importance, partly in the light of a military success on this point of the theatre of war, and partly in order to facilitate and develop operations by securing their base against any eventuality, and thus permitting the detachment of a sufficient force in the direc- tion of Erzeroum and the distribution of the troops in a more comfortable manner on the approach of winter. “The only way to put an end to this state of affairs (sorter de cette situation) was to gain possession of Kars in open assault, preparing the assault as far as possible by the bombardment of several forts and of the town, and making the assault under con- ditions which would insure a certain success, although it might be a partial one, but capable of further development. The line of forts on the southeast, situated on the right bank of the Kars River, Hafiz, Kanly, and Souvari, and the town itself, where all the depots and provisions of the garrison were concentrated, were chosen as the principal objective, partly on account of the conformation of the ground, and partly on account of the situa- tion and relative strength of the defenses commanding the ap- proaches of the place. . . . An energetic sortie made by the garrison on the 5th of November, in order to prevent the con- struction of our batteries, gave a new proof of the resolution of the garrison, and confirmed the importance of an attack from the side chosen by us. . . . Constructed and armed in the space of six days, the siege batteries opened fire on the 11th of No- vember, and continued it day and night without interruption, 404 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. increasing their fire toward evening. . . . It was at first — thought that it might be possible to reduce the place by bom- — bardment alone, but this was soon seen to be an illusion; the — Turks began constructing new batteries. . .. It was all the more necessary to hasten the end; an assault was decided upon. It only remained to fix the time and the means. In front of the line of the forts, which was to be the principal objective of the attack, the ground afforded within musket range of the works hardly any shelter, and not a single favorable position — for field artillery. The enormous extent of the line of fire, flanked by several bodies of troops, successive rows of trenches — and artificial shelters, the almost incredible range and intensity — of the Turkish infantry fire on the defensive, threatened enor- — mous losses in case of an attack by daylight. Moreover, the — situation of the other forts upon the tops of mountains, thus — permitting the enemy to follow the movements of the columns directed against him, and to reconnoiter their strength and ob- ject, deprived a demonstration of all its importance, and made it possible for the Turks to concentrate their defense upon the real point of attack. On the other hand, an attack in the dark- ness of a night without a moon might lead to a catastrophe. It © was necessary to wait the time when the moon, remaining nearly — all night above the horizon, would light up the field so that there — would be no danger on the one hand of making a mistake in the © road, and on the other hand of revealing our movement to the ~ enemy from a distance, and thus giving him time to take his — own measures and to direct a murderous infantry fire upon us. “For these reasons the assault was fixed for the night of the 17th-18th.” | It had in fact been ordered for the night of the 15th (No- — vember), but postponed on account of a snowstorm and cloudy weather. The greatest secrecy was observed,* and the Turks — do not seem to have had the least suspicion of what was going on. They had in fact concentrated over 15,000 men—two thirds of their whole foree—in the forts on the Shorak Moun- _ tain, on the left bank of the river. This was naturally the — * Even as late as the afternoon of the 17th, officers did not hesitate to tell news- paper correspondents with whom they were on reasonably intimate terms that such a thing as an assault was not even thought of. See “‘ Daily News Correspondence,” Vol. I, p. 680. THE STORM OF KARS. 405 strongest and most commanding point of their line of works, and it was on this side that Mouravieff made his unsuccessful assault on the 21st of September, 1855; but the defenses were (artificially) not as strong on this side as on the other. The orders of the Grand Duke Michael, giving general directions for the assault, were as follows : “1. The troops investing Kars are to gain possession of Forts Souvari, Kanly, and Hafiz Pasha. “9. The attack must be made unexpectedly, and efforts must be made to take prisoner or else to destroy the garrisons of these forts, and to get possession of the guns in them. “3. At the same time as the attack of these forts, demon- strations will be made against other points of the enemy’s line of defense, in order to divert his attention and his troops from the real point of attack. “4, These demonstrations may be converted into real attacks, taking advantage of the enemy’s confusion or other favorable circumstances, but only by small bodies, as experiments (@ ttre @ essais), in order to avoid great losses. “5. Such attempts may be made also by the troops charged with the principal attack, after this latter has been executed ; Fort Tchim and the wall of the town are specially indicated as the objects of these attempts. Under entirely exceptional cir- cumstances, such for example as a case of complete panic on the part of the enemy, such an operation is authorized with refer- ence to Karadagh, but without losing sight of the difficulties of its execution. “6. After having gained possession of Forts Souvari, Kanly, and Hafiz, the first duty of the troops will be to establish them- selves solidly there; they will not evacuate these works except in case it should be absolutely impossible to maintain themselves in them; and in this case they will bring away the prisoners and trophies, and will destroy, as far as possible, all the enemy’s means of defense.” In order to carry out these general instructions, five separate columns of assault were formed and two columns of demonstra- tion; about 5,000 men being held in reserve. The artillery was not to follow the troops, but was to remain, ready for action, near the reserves, until daylight or the receipt of further orders. The cavalry was to be stationed at important points on 406 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENTA. the roads leading to Erzeroum and over the Soganli range, and await orders. ‘The concentration of the troops was to commence at dark, the forward movement at 8 p.m. Profound silence was to be everywhere observed, and no smoking allowed. The details of these columns were as follows: first Column, Major-General Komaroff, Regiments No. 151 and 2d Grenadiers, 6 battalions, and 16 guns, to assemble — at Tatildja, demonstrate against Fort Tekmass, but with the. bulk of his troops follow the Kars ravine and attack Fort Tchim. Second Column, Lieutenant-Colonel Prince Melikoff, 4th Rifle Battalion and two battalions of 76th Regiment, in all three battalions, to assemble at Kichikkioi, follow the right bank of the river, and attack Fort Souvari. Third me fourth Columns, Major-General Count Grabbe, Regiments No. 75, 157 (in part), 3d Grenadiers, and 1st Rifle Batu in all 10 battalions, and 16 guns, to assemble at Ka- radjuran, and attack Fort Kanly, in two columns, that on the oS left commanded by Count Grabbe in person, and that on the right by Colonel Vodjakin. Lifth Column, Major-General Alkhazoff, portions of 157th — and 158th Regiments, in all 5 battalions, and 8 guns, to assem- ble at the siege batteries east of the town, and attack Fort Hafiz Pasha. The general command of all the troops on the right bank of the Kars river was entrusted to Lieutenant-General Lazareff, who had also under his orders as reserve 2 battalions of the 152d Regiment and 8 guns. Srath Column, Colonel Tcheremissinoff, portions of the 76th Regiment and 4th Grenadiers, in all 5 battalions, and 24 9-pdr. guns, to assemble at Djavra and demonstrate against Forts Laze Tepessi and Mouklis. Seventh Column, Major-General Rydzevsky, 160th and part of 159th Regiment, in all 6 battalions, and 24 guns, to assemble at Matzra, and demonstrate against Forts Arab and Karadagh. Both of these columns were to convert their demonstrations into real attacks, in the discretion of their commanders, accord- ing to the general instructions previously quoted. General Reserve at Komatzur, consisting of 1st Grenadiers, 3 battalions and 16 guns. The Cavalry was stationed as follows: THE STORM OF KARS. 407 1. Column of Major-General Sheremetieff, 28 squadrons and 6 guns, at the village of T'chakmaour, to observe the roads lead- ing over the mountains, and to keep up communication between columns 6 and 7. 2. Column of Major-General Prince Sherbatoff, 34 squad- rons, between the village of Bozgala and the Erzeroum main road, to observe this road. 3. Column of Lieutenant-Colonel Prince Tchavchavadje, 18 squadrons and 6 guns, to move to the bridge at Kichikkioi, and there wait for orders. The 3d Engineer battalion was divided up into squads and distributed among the various columns, each squad carrying ladders, dynamite cartridges, and implements of various kinds. With each column was also a squad of artillerymen, with tools for spiking or dismounting the guns. To resume the Grand Duke Michael’s report : “ On the evening of the 17th all the troops assembled at the points indicated, and at 8:30 p.m. the columns moved forward. A perfectly clear sky and the full moon which had just risen gave promise of a clear and calm night; the temperature, which had fallen below zero (32° Fahr.) during the morning, was growing colder and colder. A solemn and cold silence reigned in the air, and the most attentive ear could not have distin- guished any noise in the least alarming. The dimly seen line of our skirmishers was advancing prudently, step by step, fol- lowed by the troops for the assault, which at first marched in compact columns, then, as they approached the line of attack, formed in deployed order in company column. “ About 9 o’clock some shots were heard at the Turkish out- posts, and then, as ours did not reply, they ceased. Only our batteries at Djavra, as a signal, opened a cannonade against the heights of Tekmass, attracting the attention and forces of the enemy toward this point. But not a half hour elapsed before a musketry fire of the Turks burst forth along the whole line of attack, and after a few minutes the works and the trenches of the forts which had been attacked began a continuous firing.” The little column of Prince Melikoff was the first to reach its destination. Advancing without firing a shot and capturing the Turkish pickets, it rushed into Fort Souvari about 9:30 P. M., almost before the Turks knew they were approaching; they 408 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENTA, then killed the Turkish garrison with the bayonet, spiked or dismounted the guns, and in less than half an hour left the work, broke through some Turkish cavalry which came to attack them, and rushed on to the bridge over the Kars River in order to attack Fort Tchim on its left flank and rear. Count Grabbe’s two columns, assaulting Fort Kanly, had more serious difficulties. They arrived in front of the work about 10 p.m., and crossed, with some difficulty and under a very heavy fire, the obstructions in the shape of pits (fossés @ doup) in front of the work. On the right (Colonel Vodjakin’s column) a few hundred volunteers from the 75th and 157th Regiments swarmed over the parapet of the eastern redoubt, and as quickly as possible killed all its defenders who remained in it; they then rushed on to the eastern flank of the main work, got possession of part of its parapet, and stayed there, awaiting the arrival of the rest of their column, but unable to get any farther forward in face of the superior forces of the garrison. The rest of the column, however, seeing the redoubt occupied, inclined to the right to attack the trenches and a little lunette with four guns situated between Kanly and Hafiz. In this mélée Colonel Vodjakin was wounded and turned over the command to Colonel Karasseff. Having gained possession of these trenches and the lunette, they then began to reform and advance to the relief of their comrades who still held on upon the parapet of the eastern face. Meanwhile, on the left, Count Grabbe led his eolumn in per- son and on horseback, and, with the 1st Rifle Battalion in the lead, passed around the flank of the western redoubt and at- tacked the main work, partly in front against its western face, and partly by turning its extreme western flank and endeavor- ing to enter the work in rear. Count Grabbe fell dead a few yards from the parapet, receiving two bullets simultaneously in the breast, and was succeeded by Colonel Belinsky. The troops with great difficulty gained possession of the covered way, reformed in the ditch, and at 11 o’clock portions of the 3d Grenadiers and the 75th Regiment rushed over the parapet, at the same time that a part of the Rifle Battalion entered the work from the rear. A fierce hand-to-hand fight then took place in this angle of the work, the traces of which were found in 500 Turkish dead which lay in a small space there the THE STORM OF KARS. 409 next day. But although a good portion of the garrison was thus exterminated, the rest took refuge in the stone barrack at the gorge, which had two tiers of musketry fire, and several small mortars in barbette on top, and did great damage to the Russians at such close quarters. Colonel Belinsky then took some volunteers, passed round to the rear of the barrack, and tried to break down its doors; but they were of iron, and he made no impression on them, and himself fell dead on the spot. This attempt having failed, it became impossible for the troops to remain in the work under the rain of bullets which the Turks showered on them from the loopholes of the barrack, and they were therefore obliged to return to the ditch, leaving, however, a line of men lying down on the crest of the para- pet, who gave the Turks a warm reception whenever they at- tempted a sortie from the barracks. Meanwhile the whole space between Kanly, Souvari, and the town was alive with fire, fresh Turkish troops with artillery having arrived from the town. General Lazareff was informed of the condition of affairs at Fort Kanly, and sent part of the reserve of the 152d Regiment to reénforce the troops there. Having no knowledge of what had become of Prince Melikoff’s little column after it had left Souvari, General Loris-Melikoff ordered Prince Tchavtchavadje, who was at Kichikkioi bridge with 17 squadrons of Cossacks, to try to clear the enemy out of the space between Kanly and the river, and to send some squad- rons to aid the troops at the former point. Loris-Melikoff also sent Colonel Bulmering of the Engineers to take command at Kanly, all the commanding officers there being killed or wound- ed. It was about midnight when the Cossacks arrived near Kanly. The Turks, encouraged by the lull in the attack, had sortied from the barrack, and were trying to drive the Rus- sians off from the top of the parapet, but without success. At this moment some 250 Cossacks arrived on foot, climbed on the parapet, and, reénforcing the men already there, drove the Turks back to the shelter of the barrack. The reserves having arrived, Colonel Bulmering formed his troops in two portions for the purpose of turning Kanly by both flanks. The column on the left, commanded by himself in per- son, and assisted by the Cossacks, drove the enemy out of their trenches between Kanly and Souvari, and, following on their 410 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. heels, came to the very edge of the town. The column on the right, under Colonel Karasseff, gained possession of the rest of the eastern face of the work. At 1 a.m. the whole of Fort Kanly was in undisputed possession of the Russians, except the barrack at the gorge. Having posted his troops so as to pre- vent the Turks from again coming out from the town, Colonel Bulmering returned to Kanly, placed his troops in the ditch behind shelter of one kind or another near the barrack, and then summoned the latter to surrender, threatening to knock the whole place to pieces with artillery. The Pasha defied him to do his worst, and said he would defend himself to the last. Alternate firing and negotiations succeeded each other for more than two hours. Finally Colonel Bulmering told the Pasha that if he did not surrender he would blow up his barrack with dynamite, and at the same time proved his ability to do so. To this argument the Pasha (Daoud Pasha) yielded, and at 4 a. mu. surrendered. But he had only 300 men! It was all that was left of the garrison of Fort Kanly. Meanwhile, at Fort Hafiz Pasha a struggle hardly less despe- rate, although shorter, had been going on. Here General Al- khazoff’s troops were also divided into two columns for the attack of the work on its two principal faces. The columns were discovered and fired upon about 9 p. m., not only from the fort itself, but from the trenches between it and the foot of Karadagh and the batteries recently constructed on the southern slope of that hill. It therefore became necessary for the column on the right to get possession of these trenches on their flank. Colonel Fadeyeff, with about 2,500 men in his column, set to work at this, and after a considerable struggle gained possession of some of these trenches; part of the defenders fled toward the town, part along the trenches toward Karadagh, and the rest were bayoneted. Following close upon those who retreated toward Karadagh, Colonel Fadeyeff took advantage of the Turkish confusion and gained possession of the batteries at the foot of this mountain, and immediately followed the Turks, now in considerable disorder and panic, up the paths of the Karadagh to the fort of the same name. While a portion of his men were arranging and placing some dynamite cartridges to blow up the tower at the angle of the outer work, others climbed up on each other’s shoulders and penetrated on to the THE STORM OF KARS. 411 platform from the rear; the defenders then rushed back into the inner work, but were hotly pursued by the Russians, and be- fore they had time to recover from their confusion and disorder about half the garrison had been bayoneted or knocked sense- less; the rest fled along the mountain toward Fort Arab. Here at last the Turks got their breath and had time to recover their senses a little before a party of Russian volunteers came on to their attack; this party was practically annihilated. The Turks then returned to the charge, and made several desperate efforts to regain Fort Karadagh. But Colonel Fadeyeff had got a firm footing there, had received the whole of the 158th Regiment as reénforcements (which he had asked for immediately upon reaching the base of the hill), and he held fast in the fort without yielding an inch. The Turkish attacks were all re- pulsed. The greater portion of the column assaulting Hafiz had therefore been wholly diverted from its original purpose, but still with most happy results. The rest of the column had meanwhile advanced to take the trenches on the south of Hafiz, in the direction of Kanly, at the same time that the column of Colonel Karasseff, as previously narrated, advanced against the same works from the direction of Kanly. As this attack began to succeed, General Alkhazoff himself took the remaining two battalions of his column and assaulted Fort Hafiz in front, and on the left. The troops poured over the parapet, and the Turks took refuge behind the barrack at the gorge; but this, unlike the one at Kanly, had been nearly demolished by the Russian artillery, and was little better than a heap of ruins. As the Turks retreated behind it the battalion which had gone round by the left appeared in the rear. In the language of the Grand Duke’s report, “the garrison was crushed to pieces and annihi- lated. Fort Hafiz was ours.” At this moment General Alkhazoff received word from Colonel Fadeyeff that he had taken Karadagh, and asking for reénforcements. He immediately sent him what he had of the 158th Regiment, which reached Fadeyeff, as we have seen, in time to repulse the Turkish attacks on Fort Karadagh. Healso sent one battalion of the 152d to reénforce the troops attacking Kanly, and with the remaining battalion and a half established himself at Hafiz and sent skirmishers forward toward the small 412, THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA, camp between Hafiz and the town, at whose approach the Turks, now pretty well demoralized, fled toward Kars. - It was now about 2 o’clock in the night. All the works on the right bank of the river, from Karadagh to Souvari, were in the possession of the Russians, excepting only the barrack of Fort Kanly, which evidently could not hold out, isolated, much longer. General Lazareff rode along the lines and saw the con- dition of things, and then united part of the troops of General Alkhazoff and Colonel Bulmering, and sent them forward to occupy the town, to find out what had become of Prince Meli- koff’s column, and to give it assistance. While the columns of assault had thus been gaining possession of the forts in front of them on the right bank of the river, the columns of demonstration had also been hotly engaged, with results as follows: It will be remembered that General Komaroff, having 6 battalions and 24 guns under his orders, was to demonstrate in front of Fort Tekmass, but send the bulk of his troops along the Kars River to attack Fort Tchim in front; while Prince Melikoff’s column, having gained possession of Fort Souvari, was immediately to cross the river and attack Fort Tchim in flank and rear. Komaroff detailed two battalions of the 8d Grenadiers to occupy Mount Moukha, 3,500 yards southwest of Fort Tekmass, and demonstrate against that fort; the other battalion of this regiment and all his artillery were left in reserve; while the three battalions of the 151st, under Colonel Boutchkief, were sent through the Kars ravine to the assault of Fort Tchim. They assembled at 8 o’clock at the Kichikkioi bridge, and as soon as they heard the firing at Souvari, about 9 p. m., moved forward along the ravine. But at the entrance of it the Turks had some outposts posted in trenches very difficult to reach, and the noise of their firing alarmed the camp concentrated between Tekmass and the town; they quickly came forward to the edge of the ravine and attacked Colonel Boutchkieff’s column in flank ; it was impossible for him to advance under this fire, and he promptly faced his men by the left flank and attacked the heights. In so doing he was exposed to the fire, at about 1,800 yards range, of Fort Tchim; but in spite of the difficulties of his position and of the ground, he continued his attack energet- THE STORM OF KARS. 413 ically, and drove the Turks from the heights of the ravine and back toward Fort Tekmass. Following the Turks closely in their retreat, his men arrived in front of this latter work. Retreat was impossible without great losses; a success promised great results. He led his little force forward to the assault ; they were received with the musketry fire of three tiers of trenches, with shrapnel, stones, and hand-grenades. Struck with one of the latter, Colonel Boutchkieff was instantly killed ; his men lost enormously, and fell back to the Kars ravine. It was about midnight, and these three battalions were so smashed up as to be practically of no further use during the night. The Turks nevertheless did not follow them. Not wishing, however, to give up all idea of an assault upon Fort Tchim, General Koma- roff (still leaving the two battalions to demonstrate in front of Tekmass) brought up the one battalion of the 2d Grenadiers which he had in reserve, and his 24 guns, and sent them for- ward along the river toward Fort Tchim. This little column advanced rapidly, and seized the suburbs on the southwest of the town and the cemetery in front of Fort Tchim, and there opened fire—their artillery at short range, and the infantry scattered about behind the grave-stones of the cemetery. But Fort Tchim gave them the warmest possible reception, and they were moreover exposed to the cross-fire of Forts Tekmass and Veli Pasha, the flashes of their own guns serving as a target. In short, their position was wholly untenable, and about 2 o’clock in the morning the retreat was sounded, and they fell back along the river to the Kichikkioi bridge. Meanwhile Prince Melikoff’s little force, after gaining pos- session of Fort Souvari early in the evening, as already narrated, had crossed the river partly by fording (the temperature was 10° Fahr. or more below freezing) and partly in boats, had passed through the suburbs of the town, and attacked Fort Tchim in rear. The Turks were completely surprised, and Prince Meli- koff thought he might in their confusion be able to carry the work. He led his little force to the assault, but was himself knocked over dangerously wounded, and his men were driven back. They took refuge in the cemetery; but no signs of Ko- marofi’s column appearing (they heard their firing, but knew nothing definite about it), they were obliged to retreat, and made their way back across the river. Just at this time (a little = 414. THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. after midnight) the little column sent by Komaroff along the ravine made their attack. They were repulsed, as already stated, but their attack contributed largely to cover the retreat of Meli- koff’s column and prevent its destruction. The latter fell back along the right bank of the river, and reached the Kichikkioi bridge just at daylight. The whole attack along the valley of the Kars River therefore failed; the Turks discovered the movement in time, and by at- tacking one column in flank from Tekmass caused the different assaults to be made one after another without success and with great loss. Nevertheless, the main object of Komaroft’s troops was to occupy the attention of the large body of troops concen- trated on the heights of Shorak, and thus prevent reénforce- ments being sent to the aid of Forts Kanly and Hafiz; and thig they fully accomplished. The two other columns, under Colonel Tcheremissinoff and General Ryzdevsky, made their demonstrations with no less vigor, beginning their operations when they heard the firing in the plain southeast of Kars, i. e., about 9 o’clock in the evening. The former attacked Fort Laze Tepessi, carried the trenches in front of the batteries, mounted on the parapet of the latter (al- though it was covered with a coating of ice), and kept up a fight at close quarters for several hours, until the Turks brought up enough reénforcements to drive them out; but they only retired to the trenches which they had captured, and kept up a fire from them till daylight. The latter opened with their artillery against Forts Arab and Karadagh, contributing largely to the confusion and bewilderment in which Colonel Fadeyeff found the defenders of the latter when he carried it, and sent forward volunteers up to the vicinity of the former work. When he heard of the capture of Fort Karadagh by Colonel Fadeyeff, General Rydzevsky reénforced the volunteers in front of Fort Arab by four battalions (160th Regiment), who made an ener- getic and successful assault upon the place just after the Turks had returned from their efforts to retake Fort Karadagh. Hav- ing entered the work, they killed part of the garrison and took some of them prisoners, and the rest fled along the paths of the ravine toward the town. As for the citadel, it was feebly gar- risoned, and surrendered to the 152d Regiment when the latter advanced against it from Fort Hafiz. THE STORM OF KARS. 415 As daylight dawned about 5 a. m., the whole series of forti- fications on the right bank of the Kars River was in possession of the Russians; but the commanding forts on the heights of Tchanak and Shorak yet held out, and the Turks had still between 12,000 and 15,000 men, somewhat demoralized, but still capable of fighting, on the left bank of the Kars. Massing these between Forts Tekmass and Laze Tepessi, the Pasha determined to make an effort to break through in the direc- tion of the villages of Samovat, Aravartan, and Bozgala, and thence winding through the mountains regain the Erzeroum road. As the day dawned this movement became clearly de- fined, and Lieutenant-General Roop, commanding on the left bank, took what measures he could to stop it, by disposing the cavalry, stationed near these villages, to take the columns in flank while his infantry retained them in front. The princi- pal column of the Turks, near Bozgala, seeing itself surrounded, laid down its arms; but at Samovat and at Aravartan they broke through the Russian infantry and continued their march toward the mountains. The Cossacks were sent after them with the utmost energy, and attacked them vigorously in flank, causing a loss of several hundreds of men among the Turks, and delaying them while another portion got on their road in front and headed them off. They surrendered here and there by battalions, until finally there remained but one detachment of about 150 mounted men, flying in the direction of the Olti road. The Cossacks put after them, sabred about a hundred of their number whose horses were exhausted, and chased the rest for about 15 miles. Then their own horses gave out, and they had to give it up. Among the 380 or 40 men who thus escaped, thanks to the quality of their horses, were the commandant of Kars, Hussein Pasha, and two or three other principal officers. Kars was wholly in possession of the Russians. The troops on the left bank returned with their prisoners, occupied the forts on that side, and about 10 or 11 A. m. entered the town, where their comrades from the right bank had already been since early morning. It was a good night’s work—a fortified place of the first order captured in open assault, with 17,000 prisoners, 303 guns of various calibres, 25,000 or more small arms, and an immense quantity of provisions and material of all kinds. Twenty-five 416 THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. hundred Turkish bodies were found dead on the field; there were 4,500 sick and wounded in the hospitals, and several hun- dreds more were picked up on the field. The Russian losses were: Killed cis Bee So aa we eh cle ieee eee ss ee eae 18 470 Wounded. 3. coos ss ek Da aa es ee 59 1726 Total cc dssu wool one ee ea "7 2,196 It will be noticed that the proportion of officers killed and wounded is about 1 to 28 men, whereas the proportion of offi- cers present was about 1 to 60 men; the commanding officers of Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 all fell within a few feet of the enemy. One general officer (Count Grabbe) was killed, and one wounded. After the capture of Kars, a portion of the Turkish prison- ers were escorted across the frontier to Tiflis, and a certain por- tion, about 4,000 in all, not in good health, were granted permis- sion to seek their homes and villages, of which they availed themselves. During the month of December a part of the garrison (40th Division) was dispatched to Erzeroum, but a severe winter and the difficult nature of the mountainous country hindered their march, delayed the arrival of siege material and provisions, and generally proved a most serious obstacle to General Heimann’s siege. It was only on the 12th of January that the Trebizond road was finally and permanently cut, and the investment com- pleted. The place was, however, well provisioned, and the frozen ground and deep snow delayed the establishment of bat- teries. So the time passed on, and the armistice of January 31st arrived with Erzeroum still in the hands of the Turks. But one of the conditions of that document was the evacuation of Erzeroum. This was accomplished about the 10th of Febru- ary, when some 15,000 to 20,000 troops marched out under Ismail Pasha, proceeded to Trebizond, and were embarked for Constantinople. Ghazi Moukhtar Pasha had been recalled thither about the end of December, just before the Trebizond road was closed. The campaign in Armenia, begun by the Russians with in- sufficient forces, and checked for a while, finally ended in their complete victory and the overwhelming defeat and destruction THE STORM OF KARS. 417 of the Turkish forces. Its fate was decided by the battle of Aladja Dagh and the storm of Kars, and these are among the most brilliant feats of arms in Russian military annals. The more the latter is studied, and the stubbornness of the defense is considered, the more certain it appears that those who lay down as a proved principle of modern tactical warfare that fortifications defended by breech-loaders can not be carried in open assault, have made a hasty judgment. Moukhtar Pasha, on the night after the battle at Aladja Dagh, attributed his defeat to the wonderful employment of the Russian artillery with shrapnel,* and the same opinion seems to have been shared by the Russian officers; in other words, “the, attack was well prepared with artillery.” But, on the other hand, Kars was stormed without any artillery preparation (in this sense) at all; its success was due to the skillful dispositions made beforehand, and to the individual courage and endurance of the men. In both cases hand-to-hand fights finally decided the battle. If troops are led to the assault of trenches and breech-loaders in successive, and not simultaneous assaults, in inferior numbers, over an open country, in a too compact formation, and without reference to the decisive or key points of the defense, then defeat and slaughter will be the result, as happened at Plevna, at Shipka (July 17th), in part at Gorni-Dubnik, at Zevin, at Little Yahni (October 2d), and in our own war at Cold Harbor. But if the points of attack are well chosen, the troops are prop- erly distributed, advance in reasonably open order in successive lines, and make their attacks simultaneously, and in superior numbers at the decisive points, then the assailants will reach the parapet in spite of the breech-loaders, and the strongest party will win—as they did at Nikopolis, at Shenovo, at Kars, and at Five Forks. Victory lies to-day, as it ever has and ever will, on the side of that general who takes the most skillful measures for the task he has in hand, and who has under him the most patient, brave, and willing soldiers; and though the defense has relatively gained greatly over the attack by the introduction of breech- loaders, yet that fact alone will not prevent, any more than a slight superiority in armament, such a general from carrying * See “ Daily News Correspondence,” Vol. I, p. 584. 27 418 ‘THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA. trenches in open assault. It is after all the hun general to think and the men to carry out his th sacrifice—and not alone their mere material ace which gain success in war, as well as in the other ¢ LA lee LV. SON ates ON Ss: THE DEFENSE AND ATTACK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS. CONOLUSIONS. CHAPTER I. GENERAL REMARKS—CONSTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH AND RUSSIAN FORTIFICATIONS, AND THEIR DEFENSE. Tuer campaign of 1877~78, like every campaign which was ever fought, furnishes its military lessons for the future—mis- takes to be avoided, successful manceuvres to be repeated under similar opportunities. But there is one feature, a question of tactics, in which this war finds no parallel in past history, and which is of the highest importance for the conduct of future wars, particularly to us in America. I refer to the great use which was made of hasty fortifications in connection with mod- ern fire-arms. Temporary field fortifications were constantly employed by the Romans on the field of battle; they have also been fre- quently employed and highly commended by all the great mas- ters of war; but it is only within the most recent times that they have attained their great importance, owing wholly to the long range, the precision, and the rapidity of fire of modern rifled muskets. Their first great use was at Sevastopol; in our civil war they attained a development hitherto unknown, not only important points like Washington, Richmond, Vicksburg, etc., being converted into great intrenched camps, capable of sustaining long sieges, but also every bivouac in the presence of the enemy being fortified by a shelter-trench of some kind; in the Prussian wars of 1866 and 1870 they were also used, though not to so great an extent; but in the late war in Turkey the combination of trench and breech-loader attained such a perfec- 429 CONCLUSIONS. tion, that the whole campaign may be said to have consisted— tactically—of the attack and defense of more or less hastily for- tified positions. The infantry arm has, in the present century, passed through four essential modifications, viz., from smooth bore to rifle, from flint-lock to percussion-cap, from muzzle-loader to breech-loader, from paper-cartridge to fixed ammunition; and the breech-load- ers, by reducing the calibre and increasing the relative length of the bullet, by increasing the twist of the rifling, and augmenting the charge, have doubled their range and general efficiency; so that the Peabody, the Springfield of 78, the Remington, the Berdan, are as much superior to the Needle-gun and Chassepot of 1870, as were these latter to the Enfield or Springfield muz- zle-loader of 1861. 7 A simple calculation will illustrate this point. Four hundred men, garrisoning a little redoubt of 100 yards on a side, and firing both from the parapet and the ditch, can now in twelve minutes easily deliver 24,000 shots, a veritable hail of lead, each pellet of which, if it strikes a vital part, is fatal, wp to a distance of a mile and a quarter; and if but one in twenty of these bullets find its billet, the defenders will have destroyed 1,200 men during the time that the assailants are passing over this mile and a quarter, i. e., three times their own number; whereas in 1863, the same number of men, in the same position, would have been armed with a gun which could only be fired, at most, three times in two minutes, and which carried but a third of a mile. This the assailants could have crossed in three minutes, and during this time the defenders could have delivered but 1,800 shots, and, if one in twenty of these hit, they would have accomplished a loss among the enemy of only 90 men—legs than one twelfth of the destruction possible in 1877. While, there- fore, we need not conclude that the attack of a field fortification is now twelve times as dangerous as it was during our civil war _ (and, in fact, such numerical comparisons have little real value), yet the above illustration is sufficient to call attention to the great fact of modern tactics, viz., that in the last few years the defense, behind fortifications, has enormously gained upon the attack, owing to the improvements in small-arms; or, in other words, that any attacking force is now at a very much greater disadvantage than it was fifteen years ago. DEFENSE OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS. 493 In the following pages I shall endeavor to state the more prominent facts of the recent war which had a bearing upon this important question. The subject is evidently divided into two parts, viz., the de- fense and the attack. DEFENSE. The Turkish defensive works were of three classes : 1. Large intrenched camps, such as those surrounding Plev- na, Rustchuk, Shumla, Sophia, Adrianople, and the Tchekmedje lines. 9. The works for the defense of mountain passes, such as Araba-Konak, Pravetz, Etropol, Trajan’s Gate, ete. 3. Hastily constructed trenches and batteries for the defense of a line of battle in open ground. The Russians, being the invaders, had only one intrenched camp, viz., their line of circumvallation at Plevna, and but one mountain pass, Shipka, to defend; and having failed to occupy in time the commanding ridges of the latter, its defenses were limited to the most meager character ; the Russian fortifications, therefore, consisted almost wholly of the third class. 1. INTRENCHED CAMPS. The general principles upon which the fortifications were located at Plevna, Adrianople, etc., were exactly the same as those upon which Washington and Richmond were fortified, i. e., a series of redoubts upon important points, connected by lines of trenches of more or less strong profile. Plevna. The only one of these camps which was assaulted or be- sieged was Plevna, and therefore this is the only one which needs to be described in detail. In the preceding chapters a full account has been given of the progress and results of the assaults and the siege, and it only remains to briefly describe the technical construction of the works. In their location (see Plates 12, 16, and 19) but two features are worthy of special mention. rst, a considerable portion of the works, viz., the “Middle Group,” Redoubts Nos. 3 to 10, were placed on low ground, completely commanded by the 494 CONCLUSIONS. neighboring ridges on the east and south in easy range; the necessity for this apparently bad location arose from the small- ness of the defending force, which did not permit the occupa- tion of these ridges without rendering the whole line too weak for energetic defense. And after all it did not prove so serious a disadvantage, for although the besiegers, in possession of these commanding ridges, were enabled to silence the defenders’ ar- tillery, to partially destroy the shape of their works, and to con- fine them to their bomb-proofs, nevertheless these same works resisted successfully every infantry assault. Second, the works were built from day to day in the inter- vals of the Russian attacks and during their siege, without any comprehensive plan and without any maps of the locality. On the 20th of July there were only some trenches along the Gri- vitza heights, and just east of the town; on the 30th of July the Grivitza redoubt and 4 redoubts of the middle group had been constructed ;*on the 11th of September there were 18 re- doubts (see Plate 16), including two on the key point of Krishin ; on the 10th of December (see Plate 19) there were 47 redoubts and batteries and more than 60,000 yards of trenches connecting them. The works thus grew from day to day under the necessities of the moment; yet, considering the strength of the defenders’ forces, it is impossible to criticize their location. Had they been planned after a careful topographical survey, and after weeks of deliberation by a commission of engineers, they could not have been better placed. Their construction was supervised = 4 and directed by Tefvik Bey, the Turkish chief of staff, who displayed remarkable skill therein. In plan the works presented great variety, but they were all of the simplest design possible, consistent with a proper adapta- tion to the nature of the ground. Not one of the works was | bastioned, and usually no measures were taken for a flanking defense of the ditch. There were no accessory means of de- fense, such as wire entanglements, abattis, fougasses, ete. The prevailing form of tracé was the square or rectangle, of about 75 yards on a side; next in general use-was the irregular hexa- gon, and lastly the pentagon; yet these forms were not rigor- ously adhered to, but were modified more or less whenever the nature of the ground demanded it. TURKISH FORTIFICATIONS AT PLEVNA. 495 In Plates 23 and 24 are given four sets of drawings repre- senting the types of these works. On Plate 23 is shown Re- ~ doubt No. 1, of the “ Middle Group,” which was almost identi- eal in shape with the Grivitza Redoubt and Redoubt No. 10; the former of which was carried by assault on September 11th and the latter repulsed its assailants on the same day. (See Chapter V., Part II., ante.) Plate 24 gives drawings of Re- doubt No. 7 of the middle group, of Redoubt No. 26 of the Blasivatz group, and of Redoubt No. 38 of the Opanetz group. The dimensions are given in detail in these drawings (the originals of which were given to me by the Russian Engineer Department), and they fully explain their construction. There are three peculiarities worth notice: rst, there were no flank- ing defenses for the ditch (as already stated), but, on the other hand, there were (except in No. 26, which is a rare exception in this respect) two tiers of fire and sometimes three. On the counterscarp of the ditch was arranged a shallow, rude sort of covered way, affording ample protection (against infantry) for a single line of men, and thus doubling the defensive strength of the work; in addition, there was often a small trench running in front of the principal side of the work (as in Redoubt No. 1, Plate 23), and affording a third line of infantry fire. Second, a very extensive use was made of traverses; in the square re- doubts there was usually a large traverse, or more properly a parados in the form of a square, 10 to 15 feet thick and 9 to 12 feet high, placed in the interior of the work, and its ends over- lapping in line the rear ends of several traverses of like dimen- sions placed along the parapet. In the hexagonal and pentag- onal redoubts the parados was sometimes straight and sometimes of most irregular form. Thard, a very extensive use was also made of rude bomb-proofs. These were placed on the unex- posed side of the parados, traverses, or parapet. Their shape and construction are shown in the drawings; they were of the same nature as those used during our civil war at Fort Wagner and elsewhere. The Turks employed them very extensively, not only within the redoubts but behind the trenches connecting them, whereas the Russians made no use of them at all. The ordinary dimensions of the Turkish trenches are shown in Pro- file No. 5, Plate 23; but along the Bukova ridge, which was ex- posed to fire longitudinally and in front and rear, there was a 496 CONCLUSIONS. trench over 5,000 yards long, with traverses at short intervals, E and large enough for two men on horseback to ride abreast — without exposure. Many of the traverses in the Turkish works — also contained rude bomb-proof magazines, but as a rule their — ammunition was kept in the caissons (they had nothing but field = pieces), and these were concealed and sheltered in the excava- £ tions shown by Profile No. 3, Plate 23, and No.1, Plate 24. On two or three occasions the Russian shells struck these cais- b sons and exploded them. { The steep batir given to their slopes will be noticed in all a these drawings. Occasionally (as at Redoubt No. 7) gabions were _ used to revet the traverses and embrasures, but usually there — was no revetment; the soil was a stiff, yellowish clay, admitting “4 a batir of 5 or 6 to 1. a Russian Fortifications at Plevna. The types of Russian fortifications at Plevna are shown on q Plate 25. Fig. 1 represents, a, a redoubt for three guns, and 3, a one for infantry alone. There were two tiers of infantry fire, and the ditches were flanked by caponniéres. There were two ditches, one in front of each line of fire, in the works represent- ed by Fig. A, which feature does not appear in any of the 4 Turkish works. There were two gorges, protected by a traverse, which at the same time served as a shelter for the reserve from : front fire. Fig. 2 shows a lunette, with traverse and trenches 4 | on either side for the reserve. Profile No. 7 shows the trench or covered way which ran continuously from the Grivitza works — to those on the Radischevo heights. In rear of this at interval 4 were works for the shelter of the reserve shown in Fig. deg These afforded no protection to plunging fire, and were in this respect inferior to those of the Turks constructed for a similar 4 purpose (Redoubt 38, Plate 24), The normal form of battery is 4 shown in Fig. 4. These batteries usually contained 8 or 12 guns, and were without traverses, the great superiority of the 4 Russian artillery in numbers and weight to that of their OPPS q nents rendering them almost unnecessary. | Adrianople. The fortified camp surrounding the city of Adrianople, 4 although it was abandoned without assault or siege, was one of FIELD FORTIFICATIONS. | 49/7 great strength. The terrain resembled that of Plevna in its general features, i. e., a town lying near the banks of a river and surrounded by hills from 300 to 400 feet in height and cov- ered with vineyards, trees, and brush; on the opposite side of the river a flat plain. The works consisted of 24 redoubts, with- out connecting trenches, of which 19 were on the hills and 5 on the plain; they were constructed comparatively at leisure, upon plans and under the supervision of Blum Pasha, formerly an officer of engineers in the Prussian service; in location they equaled those at Plevna, but were in no way better; but in construction they were far more solid, and the tracés showed great originality and an excellent adaptation to the site. The prevailing type was a circular redoubt (sometimes containing a cavalier or réduit), with traverses containing bomb-proof maga- zines between each pair of guns, surrounded with a polygonal ditch with banquette for infantry fire; the gorge was closed by an exterior traverse in the form of a semicircle, usually arranged for one gun and for infantry fire. The varieties of this type are shown, in plan and profile, on Plate 23. The soil was a clay, but not so stiff as that at Plevna, and revetments were used, of fascines, timber, and masonry. The finish and workmanship of these works at Adrianople was most excellent. As already stated, they were not brought into action, and a theoretical discussion of the relative value of these tracés and those at Plevna is not within the limits of this chapter. Buyuk Tchekmedje. The lines at Buyuk Tchekmedje were planned and construct- ed by the same engineer (Blum Pasha) who built those at Adria- nople, and the tracés and profiles are of the same character. These lines resemble the lines of Torres Vedras, but are far superior to them in natural strength. They are situated about twenty-five miles, by the road, from Constantinople; at. this point the peninsula between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea is only twenty-four miles wide, and of this space the four miles nearest the Black Sea are occupied by a broad lake (Lake Derkos), and the eight miles nearest the Sea of Marmora are occupied by an arm of that sea, reducing the actual width of the peninsula to twelve miles; and of this space one half is filled with marsh which is impassable for eight months in the 498 CONCLUSIONS. year, and the other half with a succession of broken hills coy- — ce ered with brush and interspersed with little valleys filled with ponds and marshes. Behind this line of lakes, swamps, and thickets runs a ridge almost continuous from sea to sea, about 700 feet high, open for the most part and sloping down to the marshes in a gentle glacis. Along this ridge there were at the close of the war thirty-three redoubts, disposed irregularly in three lines and connected by trenches. The works were incom- plete and the garrison, about 30,000 men, was insufficient, but — ¢ they constituted a place of vastly greater strength than Plevna. Skobeleff’s troops arrived in front of these lines just as the armistice was signed. Had it not been signed, his orders were to make an assault, and had it been made it would have furnished — : most valuable military lessons upon the attack and defense of field works; for on the one hand the position was not only the strongest in Turkey, but probably the strongest of its kind that was ever fortified, and on the other hand, it would have been stormed by that General among the Russians who had the most experience and the best appreciation of the nature of such as- saults, and by troops that were the veterans of Lovtcha, Plevna, — % and Shipka. The assault, however, was not made, and many thousand men who would have lost their lives therein still live; but the question of the impregnability of field works is still an open one. These works have been increased and completed and (proba- bly) armed by the Turks since the war, and constitute the first line of defense of Constantinople. No other capital in the world possesses such a line of defense, and when completed, armed, and garrisoned in sufficient strength (about 75,000 men) it may fairly be deemed impregnable—except to a nation pos- sessing a navy capable of controlling the Black Sea and Sea of Marmora, and a fleet of transports sufficient to land troops in rear of its flanks. Shumla and Rustchuk. The fortifications at Shumla and Rustchuk were not attacked during the war. They were both intrenched camps, one com- prising eighteen and the other twenty outlying redoubts, and an old masonry enceinte of very little use at present. The tracés were irregular polygons, the profiles of great strength, and the FIELD FORTIFICATIONS. 429 revetments largely of masonry. These works, as well as those of Silistria and Varna, are all to be razed, according to the terms of Art. 11 of the treaty of Berlin. 2. DEFENSE OF MOUNTAIN PASSES. The best constructed works for the defense of the mountain passes were those erected by the Turks along the Balkans in the vicinity of Sophia. As already explained (Chapter VII., Part 2, ante) they had three positions or lines of defense along the high-road from Plevna to Sophia as it wound through the mountains, viz., Pravetz-Etropol, Orkhanie-Lukovitza, and Ara- ba Konak. These lines consisted of works of strong profile for artillery and for infantry, constructed on the sides of the mountain in such way as to enfilade the various windings of the road. Asarule, the works were batteries with straight epaul- ments and small flanks; the ditch being from 4 to 9 feet deep and the parapet 6 feet in relief and 10 feet in thickness, in places where the slope was sufficiently slight to give room for this construction ; but on steeper slopes there was no ditch, and the parapet was formed of the material dug out in rear in order to get space for a terreplein. In the Araba Konak position, however, there was a line of redoubts six in number, running along the main crest of the mountain and about 1,500 yards apart; the two flank redoubts, one of which was on the road, were the strongest, as it was in front of them only that any approach was possible, but all the redoubts could bring their long-range fire to bear along the road. The redoubt which blocked the road was of most solid and excellent construction. It mounted but two guns, one at the front angle of the work and one on a cavalier in the center ; in front of each gun the parapet was circular and pierced with three embrasures whose axes were radii of the circle—the advan- tage of this construction being that both guns had a wide circle of fire without weakening the parapet by giving too great a splay to the embrasures. A few hundred yards in front and lower down the mountain were trenches for infantry in several tiers. In the position near Orkhanie there was a work of somewhat novel construction, being a straight epaulment for infantry and artillery combined (see Fig. 14, Plate 26); it was about 250 yards long and was pierced for 6 guns, thus leaving a space of 430 CONCLUSIONS. over 40 yards between the guns, which space was occupied by the infantry; each gun was protected by a traverse on either side of it carried back about 3 yards from the interior crest, so that the gun fired, so to speak, from a hole protected on the three exposed sides. In general the characteristic features of all these works in the mountains were a succession of tiers of fire, both for infantry and artillery, rising to a height of 500 feet or more on the mountain side (the various works being connected with good roads), and an abundant use of traverses. There were but few bomb-proofs, and these wholly for ammunition; the other bomb- proots would probably have grown had the troops remained long in the works. As narrated in Chapters VII. and IX., all these works near the Sophia road were turned by the flank, causing their evacuation, and none of them were assaulted. They afford therefore very few practical lessons. The works at Shipka on the other hand were constructed during more than four months of almost incessant combat; but the site was so peculiar and the soil so difficult to work that they afford instances of military curiosity rather than lessons of wide and general application. The nature of the topography and the position of the batteries at Shipka have already been described in Chapter IV. (See Plate 13.) The Russians, as there stated, occupied a narrow cramped position along the ridge of the high-road, and the Turks nearly surrounded them in a semicircle on the neighboring ridges; the soil on both sides was rocky and there were woods on the ground held by the Turks. The Russians were thus exposed to fire from three ides and this, together with their contracted space, necessitated a most curious shape for their batteries. Fig. 1, Plate 26, represents the “Steel battery ” on Mount St. Nicholas; it faced in the direction of Little Berdek Moun- tain and was commanded from Sugar Loaf Hill and Woody Mountain, on both sides and in the rear; hence the traverses were supplemented by an L. in the rear, but, as the Turks gradu- ally extended their positions along Bald Mountain Ridge, and the fire in the rear became heavier, an additional longitudinal traverse was added. FORTIFICATIONS IN THE BALKANS. 431 Fig. 2 represents the “ Central Battery,” which was exposed to the fire of the Turkish batteries on both flanks; it consisted of two parallel epaulments connected by one’in the form of a semicircle. The piece in front fired in three directions through one of these embrasures; the other pieces fired in opposite di- rections by moving from one epaulment to the other. The “Round Battery ” (Fig. 3) differed from the “ Central” in hav- ing a longitudinal traverse between and parallel to the two epaulments confining each piece to one direction. Owing to the rocky nature of the soil, the Russians made their epaulments of gabions filled with stones, or of simple piles of stones, Fig. 6. Fig. 4 represents the “Storm Battery No. 1,” which was constructed wholly of gabions filled with stones. They also utilized large trees to construct bomb-proofs. Fig. 5 represents a rifle-pit, for two men, almost a full circle in shape, affording a protection to the height of 7 feet, and pierced with two holes, or embrasures, lined with stones. The Turkish works were much more extensive than those of the Russians, owing to the greater extent of position held by them. They displayed very great ingenuity in overcoming the natural obstacles of the soil, and in adapting their batteries to the site. Fig. 7 represents the mortar batteries on the summit of the Sugar Loaf Hill. Three mortars were there placed in two batteries, one above the other, and in front of them were infantry trenches. These batteries, consisting of an epaulment and two flanks, were excavated in solid rock (an argillaceous shale), and the height of the parapet was increased by a hurdle revetment fixed in the cracks of the rocks and filled with gravel (this latter was of more than doubtful utility), The infantry trenches (profiles 11 and 12) were formed in the same way of hurdles and gravel. Fig. 9 represents a battery for two guns on the “Crow’s Nest.” The battery was wholly excavated in the rocky soil, and as the natural slope was very gentle the sole of the embrasure had a length of 87 feet. Between the pieces were bomb-proofs, also excavated in the soil, and a large tree on the flank was ingeniously utilized by digging out a natural bomb-proof under its roots. Fig. 10 represents a battery of eight pieces on Little Berdek Mountain. Bomb-proofs were placed between the pieces, some- times horizontal and sometimes inclined, as shown in the pro- 439 CONCLUSIONS. files. The revetments were of hurdles and the filling was gravel. Figs. 11 and 12 represent the trenches connecting Woody Mountain and Bald Mountain. The trunks of trees were liberally used in these trenches, and occasionally they were disposed (Fig. 13) so as to form loopholes for the muskets. Fig. 8 represents a battery, in the midst of this line of trenches, constructed in an abnormal but most ingenious man- ner. It was for two guns which pointed directly on the open part of the road between the Russian works on the Northern Hills and Battery Potiagin. It was screened from the Russian batteries on the Central Hills by traverses on the right flank of each gun, these traverses and the epaulment being constructed of hurdles filled with sand; the embrasure was 8 feet long, but only 1 foot wide on the mterior and 2 feet on the exterior. The guns could therefore be traversed only a few degrees. But they were designed only to sweep this particular piece of road, on which there were no Russian batteries; and as the long nar- row embrasure could only be seen by some one exactly in the direction of the axis, and as the battery was surrounded by trees, it was never discovered by the Russians, who could have demolished its weak high traverses with a few shots. It was in fact a “masked: battery ”—of which we heard so much in 1861. The peculiar features of these Turkish works, as is ap- parent at once from an inspection of the drawings, are the ingenious methods by which the most was made of bad sites and a poor soil, the frequent use of rude but effectual bomb- — proofs, and the constant employment of hurdles—the poorest of all revetments—and a filling of gravel and broken stone. That they served their purpose so well is due to the fact that the Russians were weak in artillery, that they had hardly any positions proper for its establishment, and, being surrounded by the Turks, its fire was eccentric and therefore of little effect. 3. FORTIFICATIONS ON AN OPEN FIELD OF BATTLE. The Russians began the campaign relying on their bayonets and despising the spade. | The Turks, on the other hand, had an evident pride in their fortifications and a full appreciation, from the beginning, of their — value. The characteristic feature of the Turkish works was FORTIFICATIONS ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE. 433 their solidity and the neatness of their finish; those of the Rus- sians (always excepting those built at Plevna after Todleben’s arrival) were usually as slight as possible, and their general appearance was “slouchy,” as if constructed by men who looked - upon such work as servile drudgery. In the valuable report of General Kiou (referred to in the letter of transmittal) from which copious extracts have been made in this chapter, the following very just observation is made : “Tt is the nature of the Russian soldier, when he stops for a month, to instal himself, in the matter of fortifications, as if he would remain but a day; whereas the Turk, stopping for a day, instals himself as if for a month.” Both sides perhaps carried their natural tastes to an extreme ; for the Turks constructed more than thirty works which were abandoned without firing a shot to one that was properly de- fended, and the Russians refused to employ the spade until its lessons had been forced upon them by a very rude experience of the murderous fire of modern breech-loaders from behind trenches. One side erred by excessive prudence and its bad ef- fect upon the morale of the men, and the other by recklessness and its attendant slaughter. After the bloody repulse of the Russians at Plevna on the 30th of July, they fell back about twelve miles and took up a position extending from Tristenik to Poradim, with their left flank thrown forward to Zgalevitza and Pelishat (see Plate 17), and hastily fortified it. This position was attacked on its left flank by 25,000 men under Osman on the 31st of August (see pp. 226 and 227), and it sustained the attack, repelling the assail- ants with considerable loss. The character of these fortifications was very slight; the artillery was disposed on the crests of low hills commanding the valleys of approach, usually in batteries of 4, 8, or 12 guns behind a single epaulment without em- brasures, but as many as 30 guns being sometimes placed in one group. These epaulments were of a simple nature (see Fig. 17, Plate 26) and presented nothing remarkable. The employment of single guns behind a shelter trench with flanks and bonnets, in the manner laid down in the Austrian and French regulations, was never resorted to. The intervals between the batteries were occupied by lines of shelter trenches for infantry, and on 28 434 CONCLUSIONS. the brows of hills these rose one above another in tiers. The form of these trenches (Figs. 15 and 16) offered nothing remarkable. The detachment under the Cesarevitch, forming the left wing of the army, after its retreat in September took up a good de- fensive position behind the line of the Lom, extending from Metchka on the Danube to Tabashka on the Lom (see Plate 14), and in this position defeated all the attacks of Suleiman’s army. The position was fortified in the same way as the one just de- scribed, i. e., with shallow, sunken batteries, for 4, 8, or 12 pieces of artillery, and lines of shelter trenches for the infantry. The - plans and profiles of these trenches closely resembled those in Figs. 15, 16, and 17, Plate 26. There were here, however, two or three redoubts on points of commanding importance. The cases in which the Russian troops under General Wil- helminof received an attack of the Turks in hastily made trenches and repulsed it with volley firing, inflicting a loss ten times greater than their own, have been fully described in the narrative of the campaign in Bulgaria (Chapters IX. and X.). These trenches were mere scratchings, about a foot deep and twice as wide, the loose earth being thrown up in front; and they are striking examples of what steady troops, armed with breech-loaders, can accomplish behind a rude fortification. The Turks, in constructing their fortifications, aimed usually at works of a stronger character, and capable of a long defense. They would finish one large, strong redoubt and then begin the | construction of another, and then a third, according to the time they had available, rather than throw a thin line of shelter trench — over the whole position and then gradually strengthen all its parts. Their works, although admirable in construction, required a great deal of time, and the only instances where they fought behind trenches constructed in less than 48 hours were at Plevna, July 20th, and at Taskosen, December 31st. When they were forced to give battle at Philippopolis in the midst of a retreat, they fought for three days in the open field, taking advantage of rocks, ditches, and hedges, but without con- structing any trenches. The question of equipment of the infantry soldier with implements for fortification is one of the most important ones connected with this general subject, and may properly be con- sidered here. : INTRENCHING IMPLEMENTS. 435 Concerning the Turkish equipment I am unable to say any- thing definite. I never saw their soldiers (dead, wounded, or prisoners) provided with any portable spades, and my impres- sion is that the latter were furnished in the same manner as their rations and tents, i. e., by transportation in country wag- ons obtained by requisition, and like them they were abandoned in large quantities. In the Russian infantry, before the war, every company (numbering about 200 men) was provided with the following tools, viz., 16 axes, 10 shovels, 6 picks and spades, 1 crowbar. They were all carried in the company wagons. A company of sappers had the following tools, viz., 103 shovels, 30 picks, 16 crowbars, 71 axes, 8 scythes. These tools were ordinarily carried in the wagons, but were of such shape that they could be carried on the person if neces- sary. It is thus seen that there was almost no provision in the way of tools for hasty field fortification, and that there was also a great lack of instructed men to supervise the construction of trenches, since there were only 3,000 sappers with the army of 200,000 men which began the war (see p. 148). This want was felt more or less keenly throughout the whole campaign, espe- cially during the early days of the fighting at Shipka, and in the battles of Plevna. General Skobeleff, in his report of his attack on the two redoubts near the town of Plevna on Septem- ber 11th (see pp. 247-255), complains very much of the lack of intrenching tools. When the investment of Plevna was begun a large number of spades and shovels were of course sent for- ward from Russia and Roumania and distributed to the troops. After the surrender of Plevna General Skobeleff ordered the men in his division to keep these spades and shovels and carry them on their persons; every man carried an implement of some kind, about 85 per cent. being spades or shovels, 10 per cent. picks, and the rest axes, etc. His division marched with these on their backs from Plevna to Constantinople; they were slung over the back, the handle projecting above the left shoulder and the spade below the right hip, and were attached to the shoulder with a piece of string, a strap, a piece of old tent, or anything else that was available; they were heavy (weighing over 5 lbs.), they were uncomfortable, they were in every way inconvenient, 436 CONCLUSIONS. but each man had learned by hard experience to feel that his individual life depended upon his musket and his spade—and he took good care to lose neither the one nor the other. When the small “ Linneman” spade was issued to these men while they were camped in front of Constantinople, their officers asked them what they thought of it, and they replied laughingly that “it would make a very good soup spoon!” Other divisions equipped themselves with intrenching tools during the campaign in the same way as Skobelefi’s, to a greater or less extent, depending on the Division Commander. At the close of the campaign “the Linneman” spade was issued to the troops. The propriety of combining an intrenching tool of some kind with a bayonet has been quite as much discussed and ex- perimented upon in Europe as in America. Various devices, such as a trowel bayonet, saw bayonet, etc., as well as using the bayonet and its scabbard as a handle for a spade, which would at ordinary times be carried in a pouch slung from the belt, have all been tried and all uniformly rejected. The question of abandoning the bayonet is at present under discussion, especially in Germany, but no nation has yet made up its mind to it. Concerning this subject I can add nothing to what was con- tained in the report which I had the honor to make in May, 1878, in reply to a demand therefor from General Sherman, viz., that, although the bayonet may be rarely used, although the percentage of wounds from it to those from the bullet may be very small, although it adds a pound to the 50 lbs. or more which the soldier has to carry on the march, and something less than a dollar to the cost of the musket, yet an a well conducted assault vz still ts possible for the assailants to reach the defenders’ trench and come to hand-to-hand blows, and then the side which has the bayonet will win ¢f the other side has wt not ; and if one battle is won by its aid, the cost of a million bayonets and all the trouble entailed in transporting them have been more than repaid. With us the habitual and so to speak daily use of our army in Indian warfare prevents us from considering the equip- ment of the troops purely from the standpoint of its effective- ness in great battles. In Indian warfare there is a maximum of marching and a minimum of hard fighting; in a great war it is exactly the reverse. On the plains or in the mountains—in any INTRENCHING IMPLEMENTS. 437 unsettled country—a sort of universal tool, comprising a saw, a hatchet, etc.,is not only always handy, but almost indispensable ; the Indian method of warfare is one in which hand-to-hand fights are much more rare than in great battles, in fact they hardly ever occur. The result is that a compromise such as the trowel bayonet is popular with the great majority of officers. This compromise tool injures the bayonet and injures the gun, is most useful as a hatchet, but of no service as an intrenching tool except to throw up the very slightest shelter and that in soft ground. It may be taken for granted that not only our- selves but every other nation will, in considering this subject in time of peace, give more prominence to the inconvenience of a large long-handled spade, which inconvenience exists at all times, than to the necessity for a thoroughly efficient intrench- ing tool, which is only impressed upon the mind by actual indi- vidual experience in war itself. We may look then to see every nation adopting in time of peace some half measure, such as the ' short-handled small spade, the trowel bayonet, etc., but it is more than probable that the next great war on this continent, or in Europe, will bring about the same practical experience as the one in Turkey, viz., that all personal inconvenience must be sacrificed to the vital necessity of having the most efficient in- trenching tools, i.¢., a common pick and a big spade, and that, once convinced of their great value, the troops will carry them most cheerfully. At present the “Linneman” spade has been adopted for infantry troops either definitely or as an experiment by Ger- many, Austria, France, and Russia. This spade as adopted in the Russian service is shown in detail in Plate 26, and along- side of it the long-handled spade of the Russian sappers. The leather pouches in which they are carried are also shown; the Linneman spade hangs from the waist-belt behind the right hip, with the handle down; the long-handled spade has the handle _ up,the pouch hanging from the back of the waist-belt and the handle projecting above the shoulder and steadied by a strap fastened to a shoulder-belt. The Linneman spade has a blade 7 x 54 inches, and a handle 123 inches long; its weight is from 1.5 to 1.7 lbs. (.70 to .77 kilogramme) without the pouch, or 2.1 to 2.3 Ibs. with it. Two sides have a fine edge, and the third is a saw. | Its total 438 CONCLUSIONS. length, being about half a meter, forms a convenient unit for laying off measures in working. The sapper spade has a blade 10 x 7% inches, and a handle 34 inches long; its weight is 4 lbs. without the pouch and 4.86 lbs. with it. As General Brialmont* says: “The Linneman spade has many good qualities, but it has also all the defects of an imple- ment intended for several uses.” After weighing its merits and defects, however, he decides unqualifiedly in favor of it as against the long-handled spade, on account of the inconvenience attending the transportation of the latter by the men. The principal objections to the Linneman spade are that the blade is small; the saw and hatchet edges will be of no use after they have been used in the ground; the handle is so short that the men have to work in a cramped position on their knees and can not get a proper purchase upon it to develop their whole strength, and can only throw the earth a short distance. Great numbers of experiments have been made to determine the rela- tive amount of work which the two spades can accomplish in the same time, and the relative amount of time required to con- struct the same works; in these experiments the Austrians took the lead prior to their adoption of the Linneman spade in 1874, the Germans have followed, and the Russians also since the war, The result of the Russian experiments made in the summer of 1878 is shown in the following table: Cross section of ex- TIME. cavation in square {<< feet. Linneman spade. Sapper spade. Dyes h. (| m,. Shelter treme ee et eat elarsnecs cle slovalelers aiatetecelarsiels 1.5 0 8 0 10 WheElferitren cles ata lavas ciaetersl sph ertheteteterate lacs 4.5 0 30, 0 30 UMtREN Chinen bana sale cts cece cai cise saiaioiersrs wiorelets 9 0 54 0 46 TENOSUN NY Re Ais SA AM AIRES EEE SC ANSIA EA Halla BIAS aie 66.5 8 46 2 85 TESELOR Yate aiess sete) cars cis) aleca cola a elata aie etargudiniela'aie 74 219 1 56 For the shelter trenches and intrenchment the men were in one row, for the redoubt in three rows, and for the battery in five rows; in each row the men were one pace (28 inches) apart, and in all cases they were divided into two reliefs, changing every 20 minutes. * For a very full discussion of this subject see chapter 3 of “ La Fortification du Champ de Bataille,” by Lieutenant-General A. Brialmont, Chief of Engineers in the Belgian army, and author of several works on fortification. INTRENCHING IMPLEMENTS. 439 These experiments, which give the same general results as those made in Austria and elsewhere, show that for the shallow shelter trench the small spade is more convenient than the large one, and accomplishes the work in less time; but for larger works, where the earth needs to be broken up in as large shovelfuls as possible and thrown to some distance, the large spade is decidedly superior to the small one, and Pern the same work in two thirds of the time. In regard to the number of implements to be carried, the Austrians and Russians have adopted the principle that every file shall carry one spade (or 1 to every 2 men), the Germans every second file (or 1 to every 4 men), and that picks, in the proportion of about 10 per cent. and large spades in the proportion of 25 per cent. of the portable spades, and a certain number of axes, shall be carried in the company wagons. On the basis of the Austrian and Russian regulations, since the soldier occupies 22 inches in line and 28 inches when at work with the spade, three half platoons of each company would do the intrenching, the front and rear ranks relieving each other, and the fourth half platoon would be in reserve, guard the muskets, or be thrown forward as skirmishers. Each of the three nations above mentioned has also adopted a regulation prescribing that a certain number of picks, large spades, and axes shall be carried in the company wagons by the cavalry. But, during the campaign, in several Russian cavalry divisions there were formed detachments of mounted sappers and pioneers, which carried portable intrenching tools on their saddles, and it is probable that the same plan will be adopted in every future war. The utility of such detachments is beyond question in clearing roads, in destroying railroads, in seizing some commanding point and hastily fortifying it until the arrival of the infantry, etc., ete. To sum up this matter of equipment of infantry with in- trenching tools, it may be stated that, as the result of our civil war and of the European wars of 1866, 1870, and 1877, every great military nation on the Continent has now adopted the short-handled Linneman spade, to be constantly carried by a certain portion of the infantry, and a number of long-handled spades and picks, to be carried in reserve in the company wagons. CHAPTER ILI. ATTACK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS. Tue first essential to success in an assault upon a fortified position is, of course, a numerical superiority of forces on the part of the assailants. The rapidity of fire of breech-loaders has so increased the relative strength of troops defending a line of works, that this superiority must at least be 50 per cent., in order to warrant any hope of success. In every case in which the Russians were successful in their assaults, their superiority was as great or greater than this. If the weaker side wishes to gain a battle, it can only hope to do so by choosing a position favorable for defense, fortifying it, and compelling an attack by the enemy. The Russian regulations, as well as those of other countries, prescribe that the assault shall “be prepared by artillery,” i.e., that the defender’s position shall be bombarded for several hours, the duration of this cannonade to depend on cireum- stances. Its objects are—1l. To silence the defender’s artillery ; 2. To destroy or injure his works; 3. To inflict such a loss upon him as to demoralize his men. The first object can be attained sooner or later, depending on the defender’s strength in artillery; the second, as was abundantly proved in our civil war no less than in Turkey, can not be attained ; after months of bombardment, field-works will still afford ample protection for infantry fire, and the injury of a day can always be practically repaired in a night. The third object may or may not be possible of attainment, depending upon the extent of the defender’s works and the number of bomb-proofs with which they are provided. The old question, whether this bombardment accomplishes ATTACK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS. . 447 any good purpose, or whether it is preferable to make the attack during the night or at early dawn, without giving any warning by the use of artillery, has received very little elucida- tion in the recent war. At Plevna, after three days’ bombard- ment by artillery four times superior in number to that of the Turks, the Russians were defeated in an assault with terrible losses. On the other hand, at Lovtcha a nine hours’ bombard- ment of the Turkish lines (much weaker than those of Plevna, and without bomb-proofs) did greatly demoralize the defenders, and pave the way for a completely successful assault. Still, again, Kars, a place equal or superior to Plevna in natural and artificial strength, was carried by infantry in an open assault during the night—an assault as heroic as it is unusual in mili- tary annals. And at Shipka, Skobeleff’s troops stormed the Shenovo lines in daylight, without any artillery at all, and com- pelled the surrender of an army of nearly 40,000 men as the result of a single battle. It should be remembered, also, that at the assault of Plevna (September 11th), Skobeleff did carry the works in his front (Redoubts Nos. 11 and 12), and that he was driven out the next day because these works were open to the rear, and were commanded on every side by other Turkish works. His attack succeeded; but as it had not been directed upon a commanding point, he was obliged to relin- quish all the ground that he had acquired. (See pp. 247-255, ante.) The only conclusion to be drawn from these discordant results would seem to be that for weak lines without bomb- proofs, artillery may serve a very useful purpose in preparing the attack; for strong lines with bomb-proofs it is of very little if of any use; and that it may be possible for a skillful, ener- getic commander to make a successful assault without any artillery at all. Before speaking of the infantry formation for the assault it must be premised that the traditions of the Russians are for the tactics of the “shock ” followed by the bayonet; and such tra- ditions die hard. But the shock of heavy columns is powerless before the rain of bullets poured out by breech-loading mus- kets. A modification of the Russian tactics of the Crimean war was therefore made after the war of 1870. Although the lessons of our civil war have been but little regarded by Eu- 449 CONCLUSIONS. ropean armies (partly due to the lack of authoritative reports on the subject from our own War Department and partly due to other causes), yet the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 made a profound impression and induced a change in the tactics of every European nation. Fighting in dispersed lines became the order of the day, and the Prussian company column* was adopted as the formation previous to actual firing, in place of the deeper columns of battalions or regiments. The state of the Russian regulations on this subject, as they existed in 1875, has been given in the chapter on Tactics (see pp. 128 to 132, ante). These regulations prescribe that the attack shall be made in open order, the battalion being formed in two lines of company columns (the companies of the first line being deployed in line or formed in column by platoons, and those of the second line in column by platoons or half platoons); at the signal “deploy,” the companies of the first line send forward each a half platoon (one eighth of a company) as skirmishers, in groups or “swarms” of fours; the first line of companies follows the swarms at a distance of 300 paces, and if necessary sends forward additional sections to replace losses in the skirmish line; the second line of companies follows at a distance of 300 to 400 paces from the first line; the fifth or rifle company of each battalion remains in reserve, and at the proper moment is deployed around the flanks to follow up the retreat of the enemy, in case of success, or to receive his counter attack, in case of failure. The “swarms” in the skirmish line run forward with rushes of 50 paces at a time, then lie down under cover if possible, begin firing, regain their breath, and run forward again. This formation therefore prescribes three lines for the bat- talion, viz., the skirmish line, or “swarms,” the supports, con- sisting of the first line of companies, and the reserve, consisting of the second line of companies. The tactics also permitted another formation, viz., the battalion in simple line preceded by its rifle company deployed as skirmishers. These formations are shown in the following figures: *-For a thorough analysis of the Prussian company column, see an article on the subject by General Emory Upton in the “International Review” for May, 1875 (Vol. IL, p. 302); also his report on ‘The Armies of Asia and Europe,” p. 270, et seq. ATTACK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS. 443 oooo0o0o0o0.@©0000+0 C08 CGC 0OO0 BHF O0O 6A O60 8 6 Oo Fe a Dr MeeEn Bea easacard 16rd Oe) ob OeO OO a Of O ONO bo aoe aol LAAT S a@PBATT¥ 2? TATTN | | | = wo — Za aaa foes ——4 — acme — = ———— ad == a Ee REGIMENT FORMED IN TWO LINES OF CoMPANY COLUMNS, WITH SKIRMISHERS. 0°70 090 O10. 010.0, O100 ° ° Q Eada aL erar6. 6. oto O1O OF0* G0 O00. 6 Oo ATO GEOL OO: Cates REGIMENT FORMED IN LINE, WITH SKIRMISHEBS. When large bodies of troops are assembled in battle there are three main lines; the first composed of one or more bat- talions of each regiment disposed as just described; the second composed of the remaining battalions of the regiment in com- pact column, under shelter as near as possible to the troops engaged ; the third composed of the general reserve, one third to one fourth of the whole force, in compact battalion columns (usually double column on the center), at such points in rear of the line as the Commander-in-Chief may designate, and under his sole orders. For the manceuvres near St. Petersburg in the summer of 1876, a slight change was introduced in the tactics; the division of the company into 2 platoons, 4 half platoons, and 8 sections, was changed to 2 half companies, 4 platoons, and 16 sections. The battalion of 4 companies was formed for the attack in two 444 CONCLUSIONS. lines of company columns (with platoon front) at 300 yards distance. At the signal “deploy,” each company of the first line sent a half company forward 200 paces, and then the half company sent forward 2 sections (one fourth of its strength) as skirmishers, and reénforced the skirmishers by other sections as necessary. This formation was afterward adopted for all the 4-battalion regiments of the army ; it is a modification in detail only of the formation previously given, and it had but little bearing on the campaign in Europe, since nearly all the troops there engaged were 3-battalion regiments. Such were the regulations and the tactics in which the Rus- sian troops were drilled at the outbreak of the war. | At the first battle in which they were engaged, viz., the passage of the Danube at Sistova on the night of June 26th- 27th, a regular formation was not possible. General Dragomirof, commanding the 14th Division, which made the passage, makes the following remarks in his report : ‘ The characteristic feature of the combat of the 15th (27th) was that the first troops en-— gaged did not form whole battalions, nor companies, nor even platoons; on landing the troops formed themselves into impro- vised groups; ... each group observed attentively what its neighbors were doing, each regulating its movements by those of the others, and lending each other a mutual support. “It was not possible to think of forming a general reserve until after the passage of the last detachments of the 14th Divi- sion, 1. ¢., about 9:30 a. m., nearly eight hours after the beginning of the action.” It will be remembered that the passage of the Danube cost the Russians only about 800 men; and one of the chief causes of the smallness of the loss and of the success of the action may be found in the individuality displayed in the manner of fighting. At the next battle, viz., the assault of the works surrounding Nikopolis, and the capture of that place and its garrison by the IX. Corps under General Kriidener, on July 15th and 16th, a more compact order was observed. In General Kriidener’s re- port it is stated that the 18th Regiment, which attacked the Turks on the west side of the Osma, advanced with two bat- talions in line, two batteries being in the interval, and one battalion in reserve. The regiment moved forward to the as- ATTACK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS. 445 sault after a short fusillade, and drove the Turks from five suc- cessive positions, although covered on their front, and afterward on their right flank, by shells from the Turkish batteries. The troops which assaulted the works on the east bank of the Osma and near the town, moved forward approximately in the order prescribed by the regulations, i. e., a line of skirmishers followed by a line of companies, and finally by the reserve. ‘T'wo attacks were defeated, and only the third, in which nearly all the re- serve was engaged, was successful. The Turkish resistance in this instance, however, was not very stubborn. Among the 7,000 men who surrendered there were only 300 wounded ; the total losses of the Russians were about 1,300. In Gourko’s first expedition over the Balkans in July, there was no serious fighting until he was obliged to retreat before the army of Suleiman Pasha. Previous to that time his troops had been engaged mainly in cavalry raids for cutting the tele- graphs and railroads and in the skirmishes incident to that ser- vice; when this retreat began it was principally remarkable for the good use made of the cavalry in defending a position on foot, and then retreating rapidly to another position, and for the stubbornness shown by the Bulgarians in disputing the advance of the Turks. The defense of the Shipka position involved no tactical manceuvres; the Russians merely stood their ground on a line of rocky hills and tried to keep the Turks from gaining posses- sion of them. | At the first battle of Plevna, July 20th, the troops were formed in the prescribed manner, i. e., two lines of company columns—the first of which sent forward its skirmishers—and a reserve, the artillery being posted in the intervals. This battle, however, is not worth considering as an illustra- tion of tactical formations, for in it 7,500 men attacked 25,000 without reconnoitering their strength or position ; such an attack was doomed to utter failure and great loss, no matter in what formation the troops were placed. At the second battle of Plevna, July 30th, about 30,000 men attacked a force of over 40,000. The battle began with a bombardment lasting from 8:15 a. m. to 2:40 p.m. The troops were formed in the usual manner. There were two attacks against the Grivitza redoubt, one on the right, or north of the 4AG CONCLUSIONS. redoubt, and the other on the left, or southeast of it; in the first the skirmishers reached the parapet of the redoubt and engaged in a hand-to-hand fight; their supports, consisting of three bat- talions, marched forward, says the official account, deployed in line “in perfect order and singing.” But before they had had time to reach the redoubt they lost considerably over a third of their strength, and they stopped and fell back—what was left of the skirmishers joining in their retreat. A battalion was then sent forward from the reserve, and subsequently a second; this constituted an entirely new artack, having no direct relation to the first, which was wholly finished and defeated; the troops reached the ditch and kept up a fight with the defenders at a few paces distance until nightfall, when, being unsuccessful in their efforts to get over the parapet, thee were obliged to with- — draw. The troops attacking this redoubt on the left or south- east met “such a deadly fire that they could not reach the re- doubt; the men fell in such numbers that the bodies of the dead and wounded interfered with any movement.” The attack on the left flank against the redoubts of the mid- dle group was made in a similar manner, but with somewhat more of tactical unity; it succeeded in gaining possession of two redoubts, but there were no reénforcements available, and at nightfall the order was given to retreat. At the battle of Lovtcha, September 8d, 22,000 Russians attacked about 15,000 Turks. ‘The artillery cannonade lasted from 5 A. m. to 2:30 p.m. The assault was then made by the infantry, formed in two lines of company columns preceded by skirmishers; it was completely successful, and by nightfall it — | had destroyed one fourth of the defenders and put the rest to a disorderly flight. The following order of the day, given by General Skobeleff to his troops the evening before the battle, contains many useful hints: “Tn the first part of the action which is about to take place the preponderating rdle belongs to the artillery. The order of attack will be communicated to the chiefs of batteries, who are recommended not to scatter their artillery fire. When the infantry moves forward to the attack the artillery will support it with all its efforts. Special vigilance is then necessary; the fire will be accelerated if the enemy should unmask any reserves, and pushed to its utmost limit if the attacking column meets A BY ATTACK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS. 447 any unforeseen obstacles. When the distance permits, shrapnel will be used against the enemy’s trenches and troops. The infantry must avoid disorder in the struggle, and make a careful distinction between the forward movement and the attack. Do not forget the necessity of aiding your comrades at any sacri- fice. Do not waste your cartridges. Remember that the nature of the country renders it very difficult to supply ammunition. I mention once more to the infantry the necessity of order and silence in fighting. Do not ery ‘hurrah’ until you are close to the enemy and are preparing to charge him with the bayonet. I call the attention of all the soldiers to the fact that in an intrepid attack the losses are a minimum, and that a retreat, especially a retreat in disorder, results in great losses and in shame. “This order will be read in every company in so far as it concerns the infantry.” At the third battle of Plevna, September 11th, the Russians were at last numerically superior, the relative forces of infantry being about 74,000 to 56,000. The assault was preceded by an artillery cannonade of more than three days’ duration; it began at 6:30 a. m. September 8th, and was kept up without intermis- sion during daylight, and at intervals during the night, until 3 p. M. September 11th, when the assaults were made. The Rou- manians and part of the Russian IX. Corps, which assaulted the Grivitza redoubts from three sides, were formed in the same manner as on July 80th; the attack was made in the same dis- connected fashion as on that day, and met with nearly the same result, except that just at nightfall a simultaneous rush from two sides carried the assailants into one of the redoubts, where they got the best of the Turks in a hand-to-hand fight. The assault in the center against Redoubt No. 10 was made in two distinct efforts at intervals of more than three hours; the second one was made by six battalions, of which four were deployed in line, with skirmishers about two hundred paces in front, the fifth in company columns at the center cf the line, and the sixth in reserve under shelter at about 1,200 yards from the redoubt. When the line arrived within about 300 yards of the redoubt it halted and lay down to fire, the center battalion deploying into line; after a few minutes it got up and moved forward again in solid line and came very close to the redoubt, 448 CONCLUSIONS. | the skirmishers reaching the ditch. But the fire was too strong for such a line, and the men were obliged to fall back, one bat- talion halting and checking a counter attack of the Turks. The battalion in reserve was brought forward to their assistance, but was altogether too feeble to do anything but join in the retreat to its place of shelter. At the battle of Gorni-Dubnik, October 24th, 18,000 Rus- sians attacked 4,000 Turks occupying a redoubt of small profile with an outlying lunette and a few trenches. The artillery cannonade lasted only from 9 to 10 a.m. The infantry was formed on three sides of the redoubt, in two lines of company columns and a reserve. It moved forward to the assault in this order, preceded by a line of skirmishers. The lunette and trenches were carried, but the men could not reach the redoubt ; they lay down in the ditch of the road and under other slight shelter, at distances varying from only 100 to 400 paces from the redoubt, and remained there, keeping up their fire whenever the defenders were visible. During the afternoon a second dis- jointed attack was made without success (see p. 275, et seg.). Finally, about dark, a simultaneous rush was made from three sides, which gained possession of the work. The Turks had inflicted on the Russians a loss nearly equal to the total strength of their own force, and had themselves lost about 35 per cent. The instances which have been given are the principal as- saults in the first half of the war; they have been cited some- what at length, and in repetition of what has already been nar- rated in the accounts of the battles themselves, in order that the salient features of their tactics may be compared; and they present many points of resemblance. In nearly every case the troops were drawn up in two lines of company columns and a reserve. The skirmishers were sent forward, the first line fol- lowed at 150 or 200 paces distance, and then the second line. In no instance, however, does it appear that there was more than one line of skirmishers; behind them the troops marched with dogged bravery, in solid line of two ranks, shoulder to shoulder, or in company columns with platoon fronts, far inside the line of rapid effective fire; and they continued this march until the fire caused a break in their lines and a retreat, or until they reached the work after enormous losses, and held it as the result of a hand-to-hand fight. The skirmish line was so small in ATTACK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS. 449 comparison with the main force that it really amounted to no- thing, and the attack was in fact made in solid line. The attack and the forward movement were noé distinguished. This de- fective formation was the principal cause of the heavy losses. We next observe that, where attacks were made on two or more sides of a work, they were frequently made not simultane- ously, but one after the other; so that the defenders were able to move from one side of their work to another and repulse the attacks in detail. We also notice that the reserve was often sent forward, not just before the line began to waver, but after it was already in retreat. The effect of these dispositions was the same as if the attack had been made with only a portion of the force instead of the whole, since the new attack had to gain all over again what had been gained (and lost) in the first. In the latter part of the war (and also in Skobeleff’s attack at Plevna on September 11th) these faults, which experience had demonstrated, were not repeated. In all of Gourko’s opera- tions, during and after the passage of the Balkans, there was no instance in which a fortified position was assaulted in front ; having a superiority of force, he threatened the enemy’s front (occupying their attention with the fire of a skirmish line, with strong supports posted in the nearest shelter), and turned their flanks, compelling their retreat—the tactics, in short, of Sher- man’s Atlanta campaign. The counter attacks of the Turks were received with careful, cool volley-firing by half companies, delivered when the Turks were within 150 yards, and in every case attended with success. The two direct front assaults made by Skobeleff’s troops, at Plevna, September 11th, and in rear of Shipka, January 8th, were conducted in the following manner. The troops were formed under shelter, between 2,000 and 3,000 yards from the Turkish lines, in battalion masses (double column of half com- panies on the center). In beginning the action the rifle com- pany of each battalion was sent forward as a thin line of skir- mishers, half the company as skirmishers, and one platoon (quarter company) in column of half platoon behind the line, at a distance of not more than fifty paces, and constantly replacing its losses. About 200 paces behind the skirmishers came the first battalion, which moved forward in line, not touching elbows, but with intervals of about two paces (or less) between the men 29 * 450 CONCLUSIONS. —a strong skirmish line in fact—each company having three fourths of its strength in line and one fourth just behind it, in half platoon column, to replace its losses. ‘The men moved for- ward preserving a general alignment, but each man taking ad- vantage of any shelter that lay in his path, and firing from behind it, and then moving forward again. Another battalion followed in precisely the same order, at a distance of about 300 paces, so that the men could feel that there were supports coming behind them. The remaining battalion of the regiment was held in hand by the division commander until the fight developed itself, and it could be seen where the most resistance was met, whether the enemy was bringing any troops on the flank, etc.; the battalion was then directed on the point where it was most needed. The regiments on either side were sent forward in the same manner. | Meanwhile the reserve regiment of the division, always under the control of the division commander, was kept under shelter as near as possible to the line; as the troops already en- gaged, which had now merged into two lines (and at points where the resistance was greatest into one), began to move slowly, to halt, to waver, the reserve regiment or a portion of it was sent forward rapidly to the point where the fighting was hottest. In the course of a long conversation on this subject, General Skobeleff expressed himself as follows (I quote from the rough notes made at the time): “The only formation in which troops can successfully assault intrenched positions is in successive lines of skirmishers. The division general must be perfectly thought- less of his own comfort or safety, and put himself between the skirmishers and the reserves where he can feel the pulse of the battle and have his troops in his own hand, and judge himself of the moment when the successive battalions in reserve should be sent forward. There are in every command a small percent- age of cowards who will slink away at the first opportunity, a certain number of men of rash bravery who will go too far for- ward and get killed, and the great majority of men of ordinary courage, but liable to waver as the fight gets hot. The reserves must be sent in at the moment when the reasonably brave men have been long enough engaged and met with enough resist- ATTACK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS. 451 ance to begin to feel nervous, but before they have actually be- gun to retreat; and it is in deciding upon the opportune moment for sending forward his reserves that the art of a division com- mander consists.” Such are the opinions of the General who made more open assaults than any other in this war, and who never failed in any one of them to carry the works which he was ordered to attack. They are very different from the “shock” tactics of Suwarof and the deep columns of Napoleon at Wagram, but they suit the requirements and spirit of this age as those of Suwarof and Napoleon suited theirs. They only amplify but do not change in any way the lessons of our civil war; and had these lessons been more carefully studied in Russia there would have been far less slaughter around Plevna. Concerning the company column, which is the adopted formation for attack in every continental army, a few words may not be out of place. In all civilized armies the tactical unit is the battalion, num- bering about 1,000 men. The continental nations, having large armies in time of peace as well as in war, unite four (or some- times three) battalions into a regiment, for purposes of economy in administering their affairs in common ; from the same motive of economy the number of officers is reduced by dividing the battalion into as few companies as possible, viz., four (or some- times five). The companies thus number 250 or 200 men; and it is necessary to have a formation sufficiently compact for the whole company to be in reach of the captain and not so deep as to be cut to pieces by artillery fire; this necessity has given rise to the “company column,” i.e., the formation of the company in column of platoons (one fourth of its strength) at half distance. The front of the platoon (for a company of 250 men) is about 18 yards, and the depth of the column about 32 yards. The 4 companies formed in such column and placed with the heads of the columns in line and at deploying intervals, form the battalion in company column—a most convenient formation under the circumstances. If now we examine our own service, we find that none of these circumstances exist. Our army is so small in time of peace that 4,000 men never have been brought together, and it may be safely said that they never will. According to the re- ABO, CONCLUSIONS. turns of the Adjutant-General of February 28th, 1879, the army of 25,000 men was scattered at 140 garrisoned posts (exclusive of arsenals), which therefore averaged 178 men at each. The largest post (Fort Clark, Texas) had 18 companies, or about 1,000 men, being parts of one artillery, two cavalry, and two in- fantry regiments. Only one regiment in the whole service (5th Infantry) was united. The administration of our service in time of peace is by posts rather than by regiments, and the necessity of combining several battalions into one regiment for purposes of economy in administration has no existence whatever. The propriety of forming an organization of several battalions in one regiment— which organization will exist only on paper in time of peace, and in time of war will be as new as if it had never existed at all—is at least open to question. The large companies and small proportion of officers is also not in accordance with the necessities of our service. In time of peace, small detachments of ten or fifteen men are con- stantly being sent on scouts and other duty requiring the pres- ence of an officer; in time of war we have always relied upon calling out large numbers of volunteers, and these require a_ greater proportion of officers than regularly drilled troops. For actual use in battle, the tactical unit (whether called a regiment or a battalion is immaterial) is 1,000 men all over the world. This our present regimental organization gives. In battle, also, the smaller companies, numbering 100 men each, are easier to handle than the larger ones which all Kurope has copied from the economical Germans. The formation of each company into double column of fours on the center puts the regiment in a shape as convenient for handling as that of the battalion in company columns; from this the regiment can be developed into line and the number ones sent forward as the first line of skirmishers, to be reénforced by the number twos or threes; or, without deploying the column, the numbers one of odd companies and four of even companies (the outside men of each column) could be deployed as skirmishers. The com pany column and its method of forming skirmishers by one platoon followed by another, by which the men of different platoons and even of companies and battalions become mingled together in line, is at best a clumsy contrivance. Our present ene ATTACK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS. 453 tactics for skirmishing, in which one or more men of each set of fours are sent forward according to the strength of line required, is the simplest and most effective which has ever been devised; it admits a great variety of manceuvres ‘without com- plication, and it meets more fully than any other the conditions of attack imposed by the rapid fire and long range of the modern breech-loader ; it is the legitimate outgrowth of the tactics on this continent, where fighting in open order first originated and where the tactics of the “shock” and deep columns never had an existence, and have left no traditions to be overcome in order to meet modern requirements. Concerning the use and the tactics of artillery and cavalry, there is little to be said as the result of the war in Turkey. The cavalry never fought in any great battle. In Gourko’s first expedition over the Balkans it accomplished some purpose in cutting the railroads and telegraphs, and in covering Gourko’s retreat; during the latter it fought on foot on several occasions. After this the Russian cavalry accomplished but little, and even failed on several occasions in its essential duty of keeping a con- stant touch of the enemy and a knowledge of his whereabouts. The lamentable failure of the large cavalry force assembled be- hind Plevna, under General Kriloff, for the purpose of inter- cepting supplies en route to that place, has been fully explained in the previous pages (263-267). There were also fine oppor- tunities throughout the campaign for cutting the Varna-Rus- tchuk railroad, whereby great annoyance might have been caused to the Turks; but they were not utilized. The employment of large bodies of cavalry (mounted) on the field of battle belongs to the order of “shock” tactics, whose day is wholly past. There has been but one instance of it in the last twenty years, viz., at the battle of Gravelotte, where, under very peculiar cir- cumstances, the Prussians sacrificed a division of cavalry in order to obtain a result which could be gained in no other way, the infantry not yet having arrived on the field. The true use of cavalry in modern warfare was developed in our civil war, viz., in scouting and reconnaissances, in independent raids against lines of communication and supply, in following up a retreat, and in doing its heavy fighting always on foot. Since 1865 there has been nothing new on the subject. The Russian artillery was numerous, being in the propor- 454 CONCLUSIONS. tion of 4 guns to a battalion of 1,000 men; and as the battalions usually numbered from 500 to 750 men, its proportion was ac- tually from 6 to 8 guns per 1,000 men. During the winter campaign one half of the artillery was temporarily left behind on the northern slope of the Balkans and took no part in the movements. Unlike the war of 1870, where the superiority of the Prussian artillery contributed very materially to the success of the campaign, in the war in Turkey the Russian artillery, al- though greatly superior in numbers to that of the Turks, played but a minor part. At the battle of Telis, October 28th, its shrapnel compelled the surrender of a small redoubt and 3,000 men without the necessity of an infantry assault; at the battle of Lovtcha, September 3d, it so demoralized the enemy as to greatly assist the success of the subsequent assault. It also did good service at the battle of Aladja Dagh in Armenia. With these few exceptions, it contributed to no victory and averted no defeat. It consumed several thousand tons of ammunition, transported with enormous difficulty and expense, it hammered . away at earthworks for weeks at a time without producing any substantial result, and the total losses inflicted by it were prob- ably but little over 1 per cent. of those inflicted by the infantry, and these were nearly all by shrapnel. The breech-loading musket keeps the artillery at a distance of not less than 1,000 yards, otherwise its horses will all be picked off; at this or greater distances, the angle of fall of the projectile is so great (with the guns in use by the Russians during the war) that it buries itself in the ground before exploding, and often expends its whole force in throwing up a cloud of dirt while the pieces of the projectile remain in the crater. With the new form of double-walled shells (see p. 65) and a flat trajectory, different results may be obtained. The damage which shells can produce against earthworks is now well acknowledged to be very slight; and as the infantry fights in open order, shells can evidently do but little against it. But with shrapnel and a good time fuse, much can be accom- plished against troops even in dispersed order, and especially against a line of men in a shallow trench. There were many instances of the effective use of shrapnel in Turkey; and the result is shown in the new artillery regulations of the Russians, which prescribe the number of shrapnels at somewhat ‘greater sripepeetrets Sasi RS | Re EO en ee Meee et ag Fe a ee Ae ces ee = ee a ATTACK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS. 455 (about 6 per cent.) than the number of shells, whereas, before the war, the projectiles with time fuses were only one tenth the number of shells. The proper use of artillery at the present day is with shrapnel carrying to 3,000 yards and with the guns massed and their fire concentrated. Its employment with shells is likely soon to be almost as obsolete (in the field) as its employ- ment with solid shot. It is doubtful, however, if more than 3 guns to a battalion will be of useful service. But all other weapons are dwarfed before the breech-loading musket, firing easily 5 to 6 shots a minute and carrying to a range of a mile and a quarter. Therefore the infantry is now more than ever the arm of the service upon which all the hard fighting devolves, which inflicts and receives the greatest dam- age, and to which all other parts of an army are merely sub- sidiary. PAE aaa ¢ Wy Ne) «Hse. 5 PAGE Academies, Military.............. 122 Administration, Methods of.... 82, 125 Adrianople, Capture of............ 361 Fortifications at............0-+0 427 Aladja Dagh, Battle of............ 391 Alexander, Emperor of Russia, Com- mander-in-Chief of Russian eT nn ee Bes ae ie 82 Declares war.. . 189 Establishes Fea uekrtets bs Biela, 165 Orders reénforcements.......... 204 Arrival at Plevna.......... 2338, 258 Allowances in the Russian Army, 104, 109 Araba Konak Pass, Capture of. .295, 334 Portification? ati72's 0/0. ce. 429 Ardahan, Capture of............. 383 | Armenia, Campaign in....... 377-418 Armistice, Signature of........... 362 | Army, Administration in time of ACT Rr 97 Army Corps, Strength of.......... 31 Army of the South, Organization of. 147 Concentration in Roumania...... 150 Naval operations on the Danube. 152 Passage of the Danube......... 156 Plan of Campaign.............. 144 Artillery, Strength and Organization RTE etola ig sic cach seis 0: 27 RMEPEA Olio Sci piace a didee oss co OS Dimension, Range, etc.......... 61 BROJOOUIER ees ties wes coe eee 64 PRENIAGOR) s carat dalve's svc cae 68 Attack of Fortified Positions..440 e¢ seq. Ayazlar, Battle of............04.. 218 Bayazid, Defense of.............. 385 Berdan Musket....... Lae Bate 54, 58 PAGE Breech-loaders—Effect of their fire. 422 Bulgaria, Campaign in........ 137-374 Theatre of Operations in.... 142, 163 Buyuk Tchekmedje, Lines of...... 427 Cavalry, Strength and Organization OP Vite aaeefearhadeew nat 24 Armament Ol, 4.7/1) ee. ¥teelee 72 Cerkovna, Battle of............+. 222 Charles, Prince of Roumania, orders his troops to cross the Danube. 205, 224 Arrives at Plevna, and assigned to command of “* West Army”. 233 Circumscriptions, Military......... 88 Company, Methods of Administration TY cecal eiote oaigiateataeie.s s/ai4's'e.0-« 96 Company Column, Bor seen} ‘of TRO ire alent na disiete’ doa a Ba).at oh s'e © 451 Constantinople, Advance to... 358, 365 Defenses Of... 2... cscs eceenes 428 Cossacks, Strength and Organization 46, 49 Danube, Passage of the........... Dardanelles, Passage of, by the Eng- Lisl Blea s hr pa ersten eon Gres ob HS 864 Deve Boyum, Battle of. [MeN OE PE 398 Discipline, Methods of enforcing... 100 Dobrudja, Line of Advance.....156, 161 Operations in the.. .289, 324, 326, 359 Education, Military... . 118 Egyptian Troops at Battle ‘of ‘Can 228 Elena, Battle of..........+++: OLR 286 458 PAGE Engineers, Strength and Organization ORs eos bres ete kn ces bine eae Yulee eee 28 Equipments used in the Russian APMP ee are sem eise 74 Ersatz Troops, Organization of..... 40 Erzeroum, Operations near........ 397 Eski Zagra, Combat of..... Seeeharns 181 Etropol, Capture of............0. 294 Field Troops, Strength and Organiza- TON. OEE is ote Hoe Hele mre 20, 32 Fortifications, at Plevna.......... 423 ab phipka Wass. i ence cect ewe 430 At SOFKMAUICN cna ke ccm mnie se 429 at Adrianople. gack sk eae, hares 4247 at Buyuk Tchekmedje.......... 427 at Shumla and Rustchuk........ 428 Galatz, Passage of the Danube at... 156 Gorni Dubnik, Battle of........... 272 Gourko, General, First Expedition over the Balkans........ 163-184 Ordered to Plevna...... Peis eee! 267 Advance to Orkhanie........... 290 Passage of the Balkans near Sophia 321 Advance to Philippopolis........ 338 Advance to Constantinople...... 358 Grivitza Redoubt, Assault of, 195,244, 269 Infantry, Strength and Organization 6) 0a) Atos Oh DRIER SN core Na oat ad Armament/Of..(/). 5 2ciiemisis aie. 52 Intrenching Implements...... 434, 437 Irregular troops, Strength and Or- Panivebion Olsens, cee aes ste 46 Karahassankioi, Battle of......... 219 Kars, Assault of............ - 399-416 BIESe OL IM LBOOU. see ake ee 317 Katzelevo, Battle of............. 219 KrenkeyMisice tele ois io Se aryl alae 52, 58 Krilof, General, Cavalry Operation MOAT AP IEVNA. iss scsi ve acts «eens Kriidener, General, Capture of Niko- Attack at Plevna............. Land Forces of Russia, Summary of. 51 Linneman Spade................. 487 INDEX. PAGE Local Troops, Strength and Organi- zation Of... iy. 3s seas eee 36 Lom, Operations on the... 215, 288, 288 Lovtcha, Battle of..........0:80s . 229 Maritza, Valley of the............ 338 Mehemet Ali Pasha, Advance on the Lom... 50). 4 ee ee 215 Relieved from command........ 223 Ordered to Sophia....... ‘Sale eae 291 Metchka, Battle of. . 00s sce 286 Military Circumscriptions......... 88 Military Laws, Codification of...... 84 Military Schools, 5. cay eeeeee we 118 Military Service, Laws of.......... 3 Duration of. 5.0. 3. c0 0. 2 eee 6 Exemption from............ conten he, Militia, Laws of Service in......... 7 Minister of War, Duties of........ 82 Naval Operations on the Danube, 152, 290 Nicholas, Grand Duke, Commanding the Russian Army, crosses the frontiet..... u's 245 se ate ee Passage of the Danube.......... 157 Orders the Attack of Plevna, 189, 193 Commands in person at Plevna, 233, 257 Gives orders for the winter cam- Arrives at San Stefano.......... 365 Nikopolis, Capture of............. 186 Orkhanie, Capture of............. 295 Osman Pasha arrives at Plevna.... 190 Defeats the Russian Attacks, 191, 198, 235 Attacks the Russians....... 226, 301 Defeated and captured.......... 311 Remarks on the Siege of Plevna. 315 Paris, Siege of... ..