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WIN athe veiea PTO trata rr Lebo obec She 4 rere, vy i teboMaahibe "she Cer ar a ee et ra a wal ieD AEM EL wt aries VA FSAT HULME . aeons 4 Ai, vin UH hh ike L) \ SMO IPLY ewig 4 4 ont “ eet eats Return unis DUO NA a awe ~~~ Latest Date stamped below. A charge is made on all overdue books. University of Illinois Library JAN 26 1948 gs jas NN - 7 AUG 1 7 1982 ARs t fo pom M” Lt) iy? : in vee ey er Seat APSO p Why SOCIAL DISCOVERY AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY eso ERBERT | (CRO BY EDUARD CGC. LINDEMAN NEW YORK | REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY 1925 Copyright, 1924, by REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, Inc. First Printing, May, 1924 Second Printing, January, 1925 Printed in the U.S.A. eee s & He D. W. S. yy i a is “5 ONT . : Pit, Me ny ; aly, a PREFACE An essay which is focused upon the problem of methodology in the social sciences must, perforce, draw its materials from wide and varied sources. An ade- quate preface should reveal the chief sources and geneses of the involved ideas, facts and illustrations. But who knows by what precise processes of stimula- tion and reénforcement ideas come into their fruition? I have earnestly endeavored to indicate by content and reference those individuals to whom I am chiefly in- debted for releasing responses—not overlooking the fact of my obligation to those with whose conclu- sions I find myself in disagreement. ‘To these hidden sources which lie buried in half-remembered pages and discussions, and to which I am equally beholden, I can refer only with this vague acknowledgment. If, as William James was wont to attest, certain minds act as triggers to other minds, I must be more than vague in my acknowledgments to Mary P. Follett. The New State came into my hands during that perplexing post-war period when J, like so many others who had hoped to bring a gift to life and were bafled with purposes out of harmony with prevailing force and coercion, sought expression in some creative channel. Miss Follett’s challenge to the atmosphere of fatigued futility of that period set off the “trigger” V which gave new direction and new hope to researches already partially conceived. A memorable week at Putney enlivened by the participation of Professor and Mrs. Alfred Dwight Sheffield, frequent conferences in Boston and New York, and a continuing exchange of materials have followed to bring our two approaches to similar problems into codperative relationship. How far these approaches have interpenetrated as the result of diverse methods will be apparent to all who read her latest work called Creative Experience. With characteristic self-effacement, Herbert Croly succeeds in his Introduction in concealing his contri- bution to my thought and effort. His mind, at once so fertile, so critical and so fair, has been my constant refuge throughout the preparation of this volume. Without his initial encouragement, the study could not have been undertaken, and without his unfailing support it could not have been brought to its present phase of completion. The usual division between the creative and the mechanical details of book-writing do not apply to the present undertaking; Martha Anderson, upon whom devolved the laborious task of copying, correcting and verifying, has brought to her efforts so fine a sense of understanding and participation as to make differen- tiations impossible. If further precursory remarks were proper, I should divide them equally between my undaunted faith in the possibilities of applying scientific methods to the study of human nature in its collective aspects and my recognition of the very slight contribution which I have been able to make in this direction after so much study and effort While engaged in the pleasant vl task of writing a report upon my tentative conclusions, I frequently felt that I was revealing new horizons for the social sciences. Now I know that I was merely clearing away obstructions; the horizon itself is only becoming visible. ELC, B. GREYSTONE, HicH Brincg, N. J. March, 1924. my ty ms . Meh Ny f oe de * , fe . ‘ i beh te . Rey: ea Wri aers OES at Chl YS . eS me ; who > <7 LA ators INTRODUCTION ~ In this book Mr. E. C. Lindeman advances a hazardous claim on behalf of his own results. They are, he says, more in the nature of science and, con- sequently, a nearer approximation to the truth than are the ventures of previous invaders of the disorderly realm of social theory. ‘The claim is as familiar as it is hazardous. For more than one hundred years phi- losophers have written books on human nature in its social and political manitestations which pretended, as compared with previous essays in the same region, to the virtue of being demonstrably scientific. Yet their successors have almost always denied the pretension. ‘The new social science persistently has condemned the formulas of its predecessors as mere pseudo-science. The Forum of the social sciences is encumbered with the débris of ambitious structures whose grandiose ruins fascinate the attention of innocent tourists, and whose value will consist thiefly in providing frag- mentary material out of which really human habita- tions can be built. Yet undeterred by the ill-success of their predecessors, subsequent social scientists bravely flourish the same pretension. ‘Their vision of the truth about society is alleged to be true in a sense and to an extent that the version of their predecessors was not true. Is Mr. Lindeman in advancing this claim treading on safer ground than that of his predecessors? I be- 1X lieve he is. Hazardous as the claim may be, it is in- separable from knowing as distinguished from merely believing something about social processes; but while he accepts the risk as part of his task, he adopts every reasonable precaution to diminish its amount. He is exploring, as he is well aware, a land in which remote and unattainable heights frequently wear a deceptive appearance of proximity and in which human hunger and thirst breed hallucinations which for the moment are almost indistinguishable from realities. He has, consequently, provided himself with a special equip- ment which consists primarily in taking little or noth- ing for granted and in being extremely wary. He may _ be more successful, because he is more disinterested, circumspect and modest. ‘The earlier social theory such as the “laws” of the first English economists, the economic determinism of Karl Marx and the arid mountain range of Herbert Spencer’s sociology consisted of magnificent generaliza- tions about the way in which man in society had to behave. Some of them enjoyed a considerable success as the theoretical spear-head of capitalist or revolu- tionary activities, but the more concrete their applica- tion and the more successful they were in winning converts, the more opposition they provoked. If they were comprehensive and non-contentious, as in the case of Herbert Spencer’s law of social development, they were sterile as a clue to particular social processes. If they were successful in accounting for particular processes of great importance, as in the case of Ricardo and Karl Marx, their failure in accounting for other processes which were different but also par- ticular and imposing was not less conspicuous. ‘There was something wrong about the assumptions and the x method on which these philosophers and social econo- mists were working. ‘They were setting themselves up as law-givers whose formulas determined the future behavior of man in society, but the formulas which pretended to express necessary human behavior really vindicated some important but special human activity which was itself steadily undergoing modification. These formulas were not, consequently, being satisfac- torily verified in experience. ‘The suspicion grew that they were being imposed upon credulous opinion as actual science, not because they were capable of veri- fication but in order to hide a dogma or an interest behind the screen of scientific authority. As soon as it became apparent that pretentious gen- eral formulations of the necessary conduct of man in society were thoroughly unscientific, social philosophers began to look in a different direction for an adequate account of what societies were and how they came into existence. ‘They now began to conceive the be- havior of man in society, not as determined by external forces in the same sense that the behavior of physical bodies are determined, but as an evolving process to which the purposes and the needs of individual human animals contributed essential sources of variation. They began to emphasize the freedom of man in society to determine his own destiny rather than the “laws” which circumscribed his behavior. “The science of society was concerned with values as well as with facts and processes, and society itself was the product fundamentally of human contrivance and volition. This general attitude has dominated American think- ing about social processes from the appearance of Lester Ward’s Dynamic Sociology until recently. It conceived the truth about society as something which X1 existed and would increase as the result of envisaging ideals, communicating them to others and inventing effective means to realize them. Its better future would derive from the beneficent ‘activities of expert social engineers who would bring to the service of social ideals all the technical resources which research could discover and ingenuity could devise. ‘This approach to the social science was a substantial improvement on its predecessors. Its authors conceived society not as an achieved mechanism operated accord- ing to a formula but as a group of developing human activities undertaken to accomplish definable but adaptable human purposes. They proposed, conse- quently, to do away with the arbitrary dogmatism and the raw determinism of their predecessors, and to substitute a sociology which described social conduct in terms of its resident human values. In spite, how- ever, of these improvements the new social dynamics still lacked the sceptical modesty of science. It ex- pressed a vision of the life of man under social con- ditions which for the first time comprehended most of the essential and the peculiar facts and processes, but it had not achieved a method of dealing with this material which safeguarded it against intellectual and moral presumption. Conscious though the social phi- losophers were of what social conduct meant, they were still insufficiently wary of the limits of their own function in explaining this conduct and what relation their explanation and valuations could and should bear to the future conduct of man in society. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish the generali- zations of the dynamic sociologists from the speculative guesses about what society is and should be which has always been a favorite pastime of the philosopher. X11 The new sociologists compared their guesses with a larger collection of facts than had the philosophers, but what they called their science still remained their reasoned and plausible guesses about what other people did. They collected facts in order to verify or not to verify their own theories. What they should have done was to collect facts in order to obtain light on the operation of those purposes which social agents were trying to realize. The values which these scien- tists read into the social process were not hypotheses which social behavior was actually verifying or failing to verify. “They were only more or less imaginative, disinterested and well-considered speculations about social behavior which in spite of necessarily inade- quate verification their authors still proposed as au- thoritative sign-posts. Thus the new sociology did not escape a remnant of the subjectivism and dogmatism of its predecessors. It still erected formulas which were usually deter- mined by the general social outlook and interests or environment of the thinker into orders which ought to determine social behavior. Its hero and factor, the social engineer, tended to become in practice a revised edition of the traditional law-giver who knew what was possible and good for other people and who pro- posed to mold them according to his ideas. ‘The engi- neer was, indeed, theoretically a democrat, but his democracy took the form of attempting by legislation or by expert direction to improve the conditions under which the less fortunate members of society lived. No doubt many social reforms have been and will be ‘accomplished in this way, but for the most part they redistribute social energy rather than economize it. The process of socialization comes thereafter to depend X11 chiefly upon placing at the disposal of social engineers a machinery of economic, social or legal coercion. These experts do not know enough and should not pretend to know enough to justify them in the assump- tion of a responsibility so grave and yet so vicarious. Even though they acted in the name of a state whose decisions were supposed to be made righteous by popu- lar consent, the consent would in the case of the great majority of the ordered individuals be fictitious. It would not be born of their active and intelligent par- ticipation. Mr. Lindeman has, I think, succeeded in avoiding this pitfall. He is not examining and reconstructing society in the light of his particular guesses about what social values are and how they get realized. His hypotheses about social conduct are capable of objec- tive verification because he confines them to an expla- nation of activities which human beings are actually carrying on. He does not propose to call the result science except in so far as the activities themselves are the product of understanding and are moving in the direction of order. His book contains little which measures up to his own standard of science. It is an anteroom rather than a room in which people will linger and live. Its value depends upon its success in explaining and illustrating a method. He sees the need of performing for the social sciences a task analogous to that which Francis Bacon proposed to perform for the physical sciences in publishing the Novum Organum. He tries to clear away some of the mythology and astrology which interfere with the ability of educated human beings to consider what the behavior of man in society really amounts to. He indicates as method that which will in his opinion X1V help them to penetrate a land which has proved to be so deceptive to so many previous travelers. He illus- trates that method by some investigations which he has recently made into cases of social conflict and social codperation. “The net result is not grandiose but, such as it is, it is trustworthy. It is not only trustworthy; it is, I think, exciting. Its consequences, if true, make it exciting. In so far as it is accepted it implies a re-survey of the great traditional types of human associations such as the church, the state, the industry, the guild and the family, in order to discover, if possible, what needs they satisfied, how well they did their work, under what conditions they did it well or ill, what conflicts they provoked and why, and what in the light of their past behavior can be said about their present condition and future survival. ‘These new surveys would form the indispensable background to a continuing study of their present operation and of the way in which the more experimental modern essays in social groupings, such as political parties, labor unions, industrial trusts and consumers’ or producers’ corporations also operate. The social scientist would help the people who par- ticipated in social activities to become conscious of what they were about, of what object or objects they sought to accomplish, of the nature and strength of the obstacles and how well their methods were adapted to their purpose. “The only way his science could be used to help them to better social achievement would be by stimulating them to a completer and more candid recognition of what they proposed to do. The com- pleter consciousness of what they were doing might result in more control over their behavior in so far as control was equivalent to self-control. XV The social science which would result from this conception would not consist of a group of specula- tions tied together by a logical bond and rendered more or less plausible by a comparison with facts. It would consist of a perpetual audit of social activities by participating agents who were also observers. It would consist of the method which these agents would use in order to discover the significance of social activi- ties and in the partial insights which the application of the method at any one time to the activity of the particular social groups would produce. ‘These re- sults would, so far as they went, be objectively scien- tific. “They would be scientific partly for the negative reason that they would not pretend to explain or pre- dict any more than they were entitled to explain and predict, and partly for the positive reasons that in so far as they were trustworthy they created states of mind which would lead to further achievements of the same kind. The trustworthy knowledge of social processes would never as the result of future growth assume a form which would justify the social scientist in calling himself a law-giver. He would remain an observer who imaginatively or actually participated in the ac- tivities which he observed. Social science would consist, that is, in a body ne recorded interpreted social practice which would be taught in the form of a method rather than in the form of a social encyclopedia. It would become the articulate and methodical conscience of individuals participating in a society—the reflection of the steady and discriminating attention which human beings had achieved with respect to their own social activities. The fruits of this attention would be gathered in part in historical or in statistical records, but indispensable , XV1 as such records would be, the authentic social science of any period would consist essentially in the whole collection of social projects which were then being undertaken and of the means which were being used to achieve their success but only in so far as human beings who shared these projects were conscious of what they were doing. It would be handed down from one generation to another rather as an art is handed down than a science. The ability of any one generation to possess the science would depend upon their ability to practice the art and to know how they practiced it. The opportunity to gain knowledge of this kind is inexhaustible. ‘The social projects in which the human beings of any one generation are actively interested are usually ill-defined and frequently headstrong and doubtful ventures. “They involve conflicts between smaller groups or within larger groups which for the most part cannot be waged successfully unless the indi- vidual is sacrificed to the group. ‘These conflicts form the subject matter which the social discoverer of any one generation must share, examine, understand and manipulate in order to improve the practice of his art. It is not his business merely to quiet the conflict. If it were, he would be engaged in the familiar job of imposing by persuasion, cajolery or coercion a way out of difficulties upon people who are incapable of finding a way out for themselves. He is not, that is, engaged in substituting codperation for conflict on the theory that cooperation is always liberation and conflict is always frustration. Codperation also means frustra- tion when it demands the abandonment by one of the conflicting groups of some important need of the lives of their participating individuals. Codperation XVi1 of that kind is merely the perpetuation of the conflict under some more or less comely exterior but with th certainty that eventually it will be resumed. ‘The pri- mary function of the social discoverer is to understand In relation to action it must always be expressed in alternatives rather than in some absolute objective. He is not engaged in doing any one thing. He i engaged in doing one thing or the other. But no matter what he does, he must know what the alter- natives are and what each of them is likely to cost. He is never seeking or expecting a consummation. H is always seeking additional discovery. For this reason it can be truthfully said that social science unlike other science has enemies to fight. Its enemy is any human being or collection of human beings who insist that human behavior in its individual or social aspect is something which can be consum- mated. If these people are right, there exists some- where in the world but presumably in their own minds. the knowledge of some final form into which indi- vidual and social behavior can and should fit, and it. is the business of the wise and the good whom they identify with themselves to find out what that form is and then fit inferior people into it. ‘This is the. conception of social science which, as I have already tried to explain, converts the scientist either into the accomplice of vested interests or into their dogmatic opponents. But it is a conception which will not disappear merely because its inadequacy is explained. It is the inevitable refuge of human beings who for reasons of their own seek to deprive other human beings of the opportunity for education and growth, Their social and psychological theories are arrogant and imperious because the people themselves are not XVIII t disinterested. They declare that human nature is necessarily corrupt or that socialization is the job of engineers who are chiefly policemen because, if these allegations were not true, they would have no reason- able excuse for apotheosizing the obstacle which their interest offers to increasing human liberation. ‘Their anthropological or social science is the rationalization of special interests or particular projects which seem likely to be modified or defeated whenever the life of the human beings who participate in these activities is released for fulfillment. If this conception of social science is true, human beings cannot learn much that is trustworthy about their own conduct or that of the society in which they live unless they come to envisage other human beings as personalities capable of realization and growth. The disinterested pursuit of truth, which is always the task of the scientist, brings with it in the case of the sciences of human conduct a paradoxical result. ‘The social psychologist cannot properly interfere with or dictate to the subject of his research. He cannot attribute truth to his own discoveries unless what he s discovering concerns the way in which human beings zet themselves fulfilled. The authenticity of his cnowledge of the conduct of other human beings de- sends chiefly upon their own knowledge of themselves; ind they cannot know themselves truly unless they mow themselves as engaged in activities which are naking for the fulfillment of a self. In so far as their ictivities are being frustrated or their personality is yeing disintegrated or the success of their projects de- nands the frustration of other human activities or ives, any knowledge which they think they have about these cases of human conduct is largely illusory. It X1X consists at best of fragments which ignore their own limitations, of members which look to themselves like a whole body. Life is such that even these ignorant and distorted ‘fragments continue to grow, but they grow more distorted and more ignorant. ‘They can- not grow more real or more completely themselves until they are consciously fitting themselves for a career of self-fulfillment in the light of the best. available knowleage. What we know about human conduct increases as human conduct moves in the direction of conscious self-unfolding. If not it is sheer and dangerous illusion—illusion which is the more dangerous because it cannot survive without the forced draught of headstrong conviction and it cannot be enlightened without the shock of suffering and re- pentance, HERBERT CROLY. 5 CONTENTS PREFACE , . ; ; . . . ° INTRODUCTION BY HERBERT CROLY , ° PART I A Brief Review of the Methods Employed in Social Discovery I. scIENCE AS METHOD Science and Experience Facts Tentative. . Ineffectiveness of Social Research Knowledge Increased by New Method Science, a Method of Solving Problems . The Sphere and the Problem of the Social Sciences The Scientist as Artist , Science a “‘Perpetual Tentativeness” ee te wipe ett ete, gos II. HISTORICAL AND ANALOGICAL METHODS 1. The Criteria of Science Me the Cree i: Philosophy The Historical Method 2. History as Past Experience; Scientifically Valid - ° b ° e ° a) XX1 31 8) - W ON OW on . Predictability; the Aim of Science . Historical Methodology a. Selection of Significant Events b. Accurate Description of Events c. Discovery of Cause-and-E ffect Rela- tions . ° d. Prediction of F uture Events History; Unreliable for Prediction The Analogical Method . The Effectiveness of Similes, Metaphors and Analogies . : Analogies ; Similes with Meaning ‘ . Analogy in the Aristotelian Sense . Analogy as Distinct Method . . The Fruitful Use of Analogy LOGICAL METHOD . ° ° ° . . Logic, Science and Jurisprudence . Why Logic Cannot Be an Independent Science . Logic as Rationalization of eeperience Logic Dependent upon the Habit Category . Possibility of Creativeness in Conclusions Logic and Social Analysis . More than One Conclusion Pusahle aea Interests Are at Stake P . Unreliability and Inertia of Universals . Logic as an Instrument for Group Discus- sion si y ¢ : i ‘ STATISTICAL METHOD . Uncritical Acceptance of Statistical ateth: od by Social Scientists . The Validity of the Average . Correspondences and Correlations XXxil Correspondences and Correlations as Anal- ogies Conclusions of Statistics Comparable to the Conclusions of Logic : Statistics; a Check upon Discovery, not Discovery 7. Important Distinctions Involved in Rela- tions Escape Statistical Method , 8. The Validity of Dispersion no Greater than the Validity of the Average . . Dy oS POSTSCRIPT: FOOTNOTE TO PARTI . ° Synthesis of Method. PART II A Proposed Step Toward the Improvement of Methods of Social Discovery VY. PSYCHOLOGY AND THE URGENCY OF NEW METHOD 1, The Social Group; Beeenon Possible Only in Psychological Terms 2. The Utility of Subjective and Tnerospee: tive Ideas . 3. Psychological Approaches to Social and Economic Problems 3 : The Social Group; a New Guat The Activity of the Group; Description Inadequate by Use of the Historical, Logical or Analogical Method ; 6. The Group as a New Series of Relations; Description Impossible unless New Cate- gories Are Invented 7, New Categories of Information, Not Fur- nished by Individual and Social Ber: ogy ° ° ° ° ° "xxiii ot PAGE 93 95 97 100 103 105 III 112 114 117 11g 122 125 128 VII. 4. 5. The Group a Means, Not anEnd . GROUP CONFLICT AS THE LABORA- TORY The Group; a Renresneation a eats Conflict and Co6peration; Parts of the Same Process of Adjustment . The Group Adjusting Itself to Other Groups . The Behavior of the Gioopae an Adjust- ment to the Total Environment . : ‘Theories of Conflict The Significant Aspects of ena Re havior; Revealed When the Group is in Conflict , Group Conflict; Not Necessarily a Form of Deacmton . ‘ : : THE NEW INFORMATIONAL CATE- GORIES The Language Dithenlty . The Categories of Social Psychology . : The Inadequacies of the Categories of So- cial Psychology Conventions, Customs, Leadership, Wins and Morals; Valid for Group ae How Does the Group Behave? . VIII. OBSERVATION AND THE PARTICI- ie 2. 3. PANT OBSERVER The Behavior of the Group as a Sette: Response Relation . The Fallacy of the “Yes-or-No” ‘Answer in Social Investigation . The Behaviorist’s Position on Asking Questions d ; : 2 ; ; XXIV PAGE 135 139 139 142 144 147 150 152 155 161 163 IX. NO Observation; a Form of Asking Questions The Study of Behavior Involves What the Person (or Group) Is Doing Plus What He (or It) Thinks He (or It) Is Doing The Answer to the Question: “What Is the Group Doing?” Must Come from Both the Inside and the Outside The Function of the Participant Observer Group Purpose Revealed ‘Through the Par- ticipant Observer Integrating the Conclusions of the Ob- server and the Participant Observer; a Logical and Psychological Process. . CATEGORIES AND TERMS RE-DE- FINED The Rules of Detinidon . Statement of Terms and Categories : Definitions of Terms in Category I . a. Method of Definition Illustrated: Defi- nition of the Term “Group” b. Leader Pawn c. Expert . : ‘ s d. i. Observer ii. Participant Orci Definitions of Terms in Categorv ray SPUD ODITATION fe. Sic ohh’ cay souk tae Group Stimuli ; CTA CSDOUSEE 0 Wiel) se tts Representation ye REBEL Ter ty reas athe Gs Carne Discussion . ; : : The Use of Facts . , : 2 Interests : ( , - é Point-of-View : ; : A ; ‘ene Use. of Languaget. Sy ice as -s xXXV TSN TP ao op PAGE 183 187 189 191 5 197 201 201 204. 207 207 pp 223 224 224 226 226 226 227 rap dy | 228 229 230 230 231 232 5. k. Power . , Definitions of Terms ii in n Category III Customs Mores Traditions ‘ Attitudes : . Me ‘ : : Ethics ane . H : : ‘ . The Law : : : : x < Public Opinion . SA puns sana Rime ao oP X. THE GROUP, THE LEADER, THE EX- RD XI. BY n PERT AND THE OBSERVERS Observations and Conclusions Regarding the Groups . Observations and Conclusions Regarding Leaders Conclusions Regarding the Expert Humanizing the Expert . Conclusions peea aie Observers and Ob- servation nati) fo) nthe GROUP SITUATIONS, GROUP STIM- ULI, GROUP RESPONSES, REPRE- SENTATION AND CONSENT ° . Group Stimuli Group Responses . Representation . Representation Psychological, Not Mathe- matical . ‘The Brouienn of aneene XII. DISCUSSION, USE OF FACTS, POINTS- OF-VIEW, USE OF LANGUAGE AND POWER . : . . : XXV1 PAGS 233 234 235 236 237 239 239 241 242 2d 248 257 262 267 27% 275 277 280 282 286 289 300 ee ee ee ee ee eee . Discussion as Joint or Group Deliberation The Use and the Misuse of Facts Points-of-View as Activities Influencing Group Responses The Use of Language as a Group Response . The Use of Power as a Group Response . Power Over versus Power With XIII. GROUP BEHAVIOR AND CUSTOM- ARY MODES OF RESPONSE Attitudes as Conditions to Customary Re- sponses. Ethical Norms as Customary Modes of Re- sponse. The Law as a Customary Mode of Re- sponse Public Opinion as a @uetomary Mode of Response . ; : : , ; XIV. EMPIRICAL SOCIAL THEORY I, The Direction of Social Research 2. Postulates of Empirical Social Theory 3. Social Ethics and Social Philosophy . INDEX OF REFERENCES . GENERAL INDEX XxVii PAGE 302 308 317 321 324 327 330 336 339 342 346 353 357 359 364 365 367 a Le “an é PUT Mb te OTE Wis! APLAR besa Be EN Wie ar ase ’ is 7 ne: 2 re Raed bh Wer 5 ‘ a)", ; a Hy iy . * ' i Pal tie ako Diane Lea tal NYS WP ON RR fe, AdIOM | “| Mew 4-¢ baty i ‘ ah FP . rs TROBE Gey i iv ; ped id Lag eno 4 é wes ee We a CL ATE ' phe te f “Tt may be that this seeking will leave you dark, puzzled, uncertain; but bet- ter the unrest of judgment suspended than the dream-like peace of faith un- founded.”—Edgar A. Singer in Mod- ern Thinkers and Present Problems. Me PART I A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE METHODS EMPLOYED | IN SOCIAL DISCOVERY CHAPTER I SCIENCE AS METHOD 1. Science and Experience THE various distinctions between so-called ‘pure’ science and applied science, theoretical science and practical science, are confusing. In a sense experience and science are identical. Propositions and hypotheses which cannot be acted upon or tested are insofar without value. The scientist and the practical man of action are at one in their skepticism of mere theory. To state that a theory is sound but will not work is paradoxical rhetoric. Unworkable theories are not theories at all, but mere suppositions. The essence of science is the assurance that its propositions may be acted upon. From this viewpoint science consists of hypotheses, prin- ciples, propositions, and theories whose conse- quences in activity may be foretold. This is, obviously, experience, and this viewpoint carried to extremes makes of science an explanation of concrete experiences. It is this but it is also much more. S A rational explanation of experience may at the same time be unscientific. Experiences may be explained only in terms of what is known, and that is dependent upon science, not as a body of known facts, but as a method. In other words, the validity of an explanation of experience depends entirely upon the method according to which the known factors in the explanation have been discovered. ‘The con- tention here is that the social sciences—politics, education, sociology, economics, social service —can give no fruitful explanations of the col- lective experiences of man for the reason that these sciences have no adequate method for dis- covering the pertinent facts; hence the so-called facts of these sciences have no scientific in- tegrity.* 2. Facts Tentative Science as a body of fact and science as a method of discovery are not opposing concepts, although much energy has been wasted in the attempt to make them appear in this light. Facts are merely tentative and rela- tively opportune stopping-places along the path- way of discovery. Human beings, who have 1“The social scientist will acquire his dignity and his strength when he has worked out his method.” Public Opinion, Walter Lippman, p. 373. 4 long lived under social systems of one or an- other form of authoritarianism, are prone to regard these tentative facts as abiding places. But none is so wary of facts as the scientist. He rejoices when the opportune moments of testing and experimentation arrive, but if he is a real scientist he will soon be driven back to his searching, frequently by the provoking na- ture of the facts themselves. Only the intel- lectually lazy place halos of eternity around facts. Both the finding out and the use of facts may be scientific, may become integral parts of the scientific process. ‘The social scientists pro- duce few valid facts because they have no valid method of locating facts, therefore emphasis must now be placed upon method. 3. Ineffectiveness of Social Research The statement that social research is inef- fective invariably precipitates debate. Those who insist that the social scientists are already leaning so heavily in the direction of investiga- tion that the community is unable to secure any practical applications of their researches have some justification for this viewpoint. Govern- mental departments, universities and colleges, foundations, social agencies and numerous in- dividuals are garnering continuously and in- creasingly the heavy fruits of minute social 5 studies. Surveys and studies and researches have come to be the order of the day.” The files of governmental offices at Washington are bursting with the accumulated reports of. inves- tigation commissions. What happens to these innumerable reports? The most palpable fact concerning most of them is that they are not only not used but that they are unusable. Those who are aware of this circumstance often attempt to account for the ineffectiveness of so- cial investigations on the basis of governmental lethargy; that is, they believe in the investiga- tions and their findings but they affirm that gov- _ ernmental machinery moves so slowly that by the time the discovered facts are collated and distributed, the particular situation has changed, public opinion can no longer be ar- rested by the facts, and hence the period for legislative action has passed. This is, no doubt, a difficulty incident to governmental fact-find- ing, but it does not account for the non-usability of social investigations in general. The real difficulty lies much deeper and must be traced in several directions, only one of which may be followed here. Much of the so-called social research of the present is analogous to the case of the house- wife who employed six successive maids to dust 2 It was recently reported that one rural county in — the South had been surveyed on seven different occa- sions and by seven different agencies. 6 a room. Each used the same method and in the end the room was in no way better dusted than it was after the first person had finished. They had all covered the same ground in iden- tically the same way and the dust which number one did not discover was still undiscovered after number six had passed by. The room was finally thoroughly dusted by the introduction of a new method, a joint method, the result of two processes: first, the housewife’s ability to de- termine that the room had not been thoroughly dusted; and second, the initiation of a new method which the seventh maid could utilize. This is slightly more than an analogy. There is, for example, the record of the sociological investigator who devised a method for studying certain aspects of local community life. He later rose to a position of power and influence and was able to employ other investigators to make similar studies. All went well until one youthful and creative investigator produced re- sults which were quite the opposite of those found in previous studies. He was not only placed in a doubtful position in relation to his employer but the members of the investigating ‘craft were unanimously prepared to discredit all ‘that he had done. They were complacent about having the “room dusted” in the traditional way. Nay, they were enraged at the thought of the possibility of the existence of another way. So sacrosanct may even science, or rather 7 what often goes by the name of science, become. The non-utility of most sociological investiga- tions is not due to untrained research specialists nor to an unwillingness on the part of the public to accept the social scientist’s findings, but to the method of investigation. ‘True, this is only one of a number of difficulties which lie in the path- way of fact-finding for public purposes, but it is the problem which is to occupy our attention in this volume. 4. Knowledge Increased by New Method Knowledge is pushed to a wider horizon by new method. ‘The aim of science is not merely to seek knowledge wherever it may be found but to discover new ways of searching. New social advances do not occur during the pe- riods of accumulating facts but in the periods of discovery of new methods which open the way for sets of new facts. These are the periods of creative social advance or of mental release— minds released to search for important and troubling facts hitherto concealed for lack of an adequate mode of detection. The accumu- lation of additional facts under the same method and the utilitarian application of these facts to the materials of the earth and of life mark periods of tremendous material and economic advance accompanied by in- 8 tellectual stagnation.* They are the periods of classified knowledge, mechanical inven- tions, rapid increase of productive proc- esses and abundant faith in science. If this description is too neatly accommodating to the latter part of the Nineteenth Century and the first part of the Twentieth, the reader may make his own historical allowances. Periods of enlightenment are those of mak- ing known through new methods. Periods of aggrandizement are those of making use of discovered facts. ‘The latter cycle is static in its inner life and dynamic in its outer life. The former cycle is creative, fluid, revolution- ary. Exploitation on the one hand, revelation on the other! 5. Science, a Method of Solving Problems This leads to a functional view of science, a pragmatic view, and it is difficult to see how the two aspects of science may have an even and concurrent flow under any other view. Science is a method of solving problems. It 8“Taking steps along old lines aids in perfecting principles and methods already established, but they never initiate the great steps in human _ progress. These always come by finding a new method of attack upon the problem.” John Dewey in The Christian Century for October 18, 1923. 9 is an orderly method, a time-saving method, and one which may be repeated by all other scientists dealing with the same general class of materials or phenomena. Science verifies experience but it also creates new experience. The search for facts and the use of facts are both scientific approaches to life. One is nei- ther more nor less scientific than the other, provided that neither method nor application become rooted in a form of traditionalism which impedes the development of new ways of making known. ‘The advocates and de- fenders of so-called ‘pure’ science are of- fended by this functional view. To connect science with problems is to them very much like asking a priest to dig ditches. Science, they insist, can be kept pure only by keeping it- self free from the raw and uncouth problem solvers; it must stand in disinterested aloof- ness, far from the influence of the crass utili- tarians. The most that can be said for this viewpoint is that such scientists are fortu- nately rare and that ditch-digging priests should cause no expressions of horror. Sci- ence and life, with all its conflicts and ensuing problems, must somehow get on together. Any form of separation leads to mischief and confusion. One need but analyse the scientific method- ology as it proceeds under actual conditions in order to see that science is fundamentally an 1g@) adjustment to problems. The very first step of a scientist’s investigation is to delirnit his field of inquiry.* The next step is to make a specific determination of the problem to be in- vestigated. (These two steps are frequently reversed in order and this procedure adds weight to the view of science as adjustment to problems.) ‘This is not to deny that numerous and noteworthy discoveries of scientific value have not been the result of accident. However, #A personal experience in this connection is the basis of the analysis. As a student of the noted botanist, Dr. W. J. Beal, the writer enrolled for a course in ecology; it happened that he was the only student pursuing this particular course. ‘The basic inquiry of ecology is to determine how and why cer- tain flora appear in definite areas of the earth’s surface. His first assignment was to study a vine which grew at the corner of a near-by barn. After six hours he returned to the professor’s office with a note-book filled with drawings and tabulated descriptions of the structural elements of the plant. He will never forget the smile of contempt which greeted him. He was sent back time after time to find out more about the plant, but none of his dis- coveries pleased the scientist. Obviously, the diff- culty was that he had delimited his field of inquiry but had not determined the problems to be studied. Like Micawber, he was “waiting for something to turn up,” and nothing of any importance turned up. Only when a real problem was stated did this study begin to reveal anything vital about the habitat and the habits of the vine. Ecology became really scien- tific when its aim was to solve a problem rather than to furnish description. II all accidental discoveries must ultimately be verified by the scientific process. Accidents, like other forms of fortune, may lead to posi- tive results, but science is not dependent upon accident. In fact, one of its by-products is a gradual delimitation of the accident concept. Scientists do not, Micawber-like, go about with microscopes, test-tubes and micrometers in the hope that some fortunate set of circumstances will furnish them with something to discover. On the contrary, the whole tendency of modern science is to delimit its sphere and devote its attention to specific problems which are parts of some larger ‘‘whole” situation. And a newer aspect of science is the spectacle of practical persons coming to the scientist with problems to be solved. Assuredly there can be nothing degrading about this process. All of life is ad- justment, and the failures or successes are rep- resentations of progressive or retrogressive ad- justments. Science, as a part of the adjusting process, is now the focusing lens which envis- ages the total situation, and again the magnify- ing lens which indicates the parts. It further becomes the symbol of faith in the possibility of understanding the relations of parts to parts, and of parts to the whole. Science is then the ally of the adjusting, evolving life. This is not an argument for the acceptance of this view of science; it is rather an attempt to indicate what is actually happening to science under the com- I2 pulsions of its modern environment. Science is being regarded and used as a part of adjust- ment, at times in the interest of the ill uses of warfare and at times in the interest of improy- ing human relations. If appeal there be in the foregoing, it is patently the appeal to extend this use of science to the social sphere.** 6. The Sphere and the Problem of the Social Sciences Numerous proposals have been put forth to explain the disparity between the evolution of the physical sciences and of the social sciences. Korzybski accounts for the fact (which he as- sumes) that the physical sciences proceed ac- cording to the laws of geometric progression and that the social sciences crawl onward ac- cording to the laws of arithmetic progression, on the grounds that we have been foolishly blind to the apparent knowledge that man dif- fers from other animals by reason of his unique “time-binding”’ capacity.© Others have attempted to explain the dynamic character of 48 A stimulating emphasis of the values involved in concentration upon method rather than upon laws is contained in the monograph entitled: “Scientific Method in Philosophy,’ Bertrand Russell. “It is not results, but methods that can be transferred with profit from the sphere of the special sciences to the sphere. of philosophy,” p. 4. © The Manhood of Humanity, Alfred Korzybski. 13 the physical sciences and the feeble slow-moving and at times cataclysmic nature of social sci- ence by indicating that the relations between things and things and between man and things are unmoral, i.e., do not involve the sense of — right. Time-binding and morality are thus held to be the unique traits of man which ren- der him a stubborn resister to science. Others take particular delight in pointing out that the human mind has always been at a very low ebb and that altogether too much is expected of human nature.’ Thus the historian collaborates — with the theologian in preaching the new doc-— trine of original sin and depravity! ‘“Time-— binding”’ is merely a fine-sounding substitute for memory, and it does not appear that the mere recognition by man of the fact that he can re- member past experiences and transmit them to future generations will be sufficient to give the social sciences a new birth. Morality is not a- unique attribute of man but merely a concept of exceedingly wide variability. It constitutes a rationalization of behavior in terms of certain accepted values. Insofar as these values emerge — from significant experience they are a part a the subject matter of the social sciences. But it is dificult to see how they can be treated as the differentiating factor, and whether or not man’s mind is at a very low ebb has no relation — ® Social Ethics, John M. Mecklin. 7 Mind in the Making, J. H. Robinson. 14. to the problem. Even the originator of this theory comes paradoxically to the perennial con- clusion of all who are baffled by the puzzle of human progress, namely, that education is the Way out. The hypothesis of ‘cultural lag,” as an- nounced by Professor Ogburn ° in the following terms remains also to be considered: “The thesis is that the various parts of modern cul- ture are not changing at the same rate, some parts are changing more rapidly than others; and that since there is a correlation and interde- pendence of parts, a rapid change in one part of our culture requires readjustments through other changes in the various correlated parts of culture. For instance, industry and education are correlated, hence a change in industry ° 8 Social Change, W. F. Ogburn, pp. 200-201. ® Professor Ogburn here makes an arbitrary sepa- ration of education and industry in which we must assume that he takes the position that education is a part of the culture-complex and that industry is not. This is, of course, an untenable position. Wissler, Man and Culture, even goes so far as to utilize eco- nomic factors, the cultivation of maize for example, as the radiating points for the other factors in the com- plex. This is probably also an arbitrary method of at- tempting to place particular factors in causal relation to other factors, but Wissler’s treatise contributes much to substantiate the theory that culture is a complex of variables which are interdependent and out of which no single factor, such as industry, may be arbitrarily extracted, i) makes adjustment necessary through changes in the educational system. Industry and educa- tion are two variables, and if the change in in- dustry occurs first and the adjustment through education follows, industry may be referred to as the independent variable and education as the dependent variable. ... The extent of this lag will vary according to the nature of the cultural material, but may exist for a considera- ble number of years, during which time there may be said to be a maladjustment.” This hy- — pothesis has much in common with the theories — of Korzybski and Robinson. Professor Og- — burn does follow up his hypothesis with illustrative material which demonstrates that — what he states as an hypothesis actually tran-— spires. In the end, it all amounts to saying © that life is a whole and that all parts are inter- dependent; one part is a stimulus and another © is a response, when viewed from either angle, © i.e., from the viewpoint of one aspect rather — than another. There can, obviously, be no in- — dependent variables in such an interdependent ~ whole, and when Professor Ogburn “refers”’ to dependent and independent variables, he prob- ably uses this term merely as a convenient mode of reference. This theory translated in terms — of group relations indicates that certain groups are more static than others and that if the more static groups remain too static, they bring about | an instance of maladjustment. That is, if one © 16 group is presumed to be in advance of, more progressive than, another group, and if the sec- ond group fails to respond quickly or ade- quately to the first group, this may be looked upon as a maladjustment. From this point of view maladjustment is reduced to the factor of time since the theory does imply interdepend- ence and correlation; ultimately there must be a response betwen correlated groups. Whether or not the time element may be utilized as an in- dex of maladjustment is open to. serious doubts.*° For purposes of illustration let us 10 Emphasis upon the time factor in adjustment fre- quently leads to erroneous historical cause-and-effect reasoning. It seems rational to state that the event which occurs first is a cause of the event which occurs next. Thus, in Motley’s Rise of the Dutch Republic, Vol. I, p. 30, this innocent phrase appears, “. . . the establishment of the community, of course, preceding the incorporation of the guilds.” Motley is here speak- ing of the medieval rise of the guild system and his purpose appears to be merely that of placing events properly in respect to time. Social theorists, however, “may utilize an apparently innocuous reference of this ‘sort to construct the most diverse arguments for par- ticularist forms of social organization. It is plain, of ‘course, that the mere legal recognition of the com- ‘munity and the granting of a charter to the guilds are ‘events after the fact. Which of these legalizing acts ‘occurred first or last is of very little significance to ‘social theory, although this fact may be of distinct im- portance to political theory. The communities were not causally related to the guilds because they were first to receive charters. 17 assume that education does respond to the changes in industry (as in fact it has). Does it necessarily follow that this response repre- sents a progressive adjustment? May not edu- cation respond to faulty elements in industry? And may not this response create in reality a greater maladjustment than if no response had taken place at all? It seems preferable to sub- stitute the term “lack of adjustment” for mal- adjustment, since maladjustment implies values, accepted means of evaluating what is called progress, et cetera. Under the heading ‘‘Sugges- tions for Better Adjustments,’ Professor Og- burn admits that his theory involves the prob-— lem of values, hence the term “‘better.”’ And i his suggestions for achieving the better adjust-_ ments are confined to (a) Attention to nervous — disorders, (b) Sublimation, (c) Attention to ‘ strain, (d) Attention directed to the obstacles to the use of our psychological equipment, (e) Substitution, (f) Recreation. ‘Sublimation os) substitution are doubtful concepts as is revealed when our author afirms: ‘‘What seems to be needed is some invention that will do for the mechanisms of instinct what the gymnasium does for the muscles.’’** But, where are the mechanisms of instinct? Is it to be assumed that the mechanisms of instincts are confined to the nervous system, and are we then to have 11 Social Change, p. 353. 18 neural exercises to supplement muscular ex- ercises? In what manner may the neuro-mus- cular system be thus particularized? Korzybski’s emphasis upon the lack of cul- tural continuity, Robinson’s realistic reminder of man’s unscientific rationalizations, and Og- burn’s analysis of social change are useful in- struments for puncturing the laissez faire con- cepts of social progress. Each analysis leads to recommendations looking toward social con- trol. A prior need exists, namely, a scientific method for determining the objective facts of social action. Social processes can be con- trolled only when they are understood, and they cannot be properly understood by generalized analyses of negative factors. Determination of how the way was lost is only the beginning of learning how to discover the right way. The task of blue-penciling must go forward but critical corrections should lead to new methods of creating. The various theories advanced to explain the hiatus between the development of the psychical sciences and that of the social sciences all con- verge at one point; they appear to be based upon the assumption that what man may know is conditioned by what he knows. A more valid, a more scientific assumption is that what man may know is conditioned, not by what he _ knows but by how he knows. Much of what he already presumes to know may not be known in 19 the true sense at all. Thus Comte’s ™” notion of society as a developing organism was not known but merely guessed. All deductive gen- eralizations about society belong to this cate- gory.* The essence of the study of man, as well as the clue to this study, is not what man knows but how man knows. To speak of ‘man’ in the generic sense is not sufficiently definitive. ‘The sphere of the social sciences is not man but rather man in as- sociation, men. How has man come to be what © he is? Why does man behave as he does? These are the generalized problems of all the — sciences dealing with human nature. But ef- — fective investigation must be conducted in the © presence of a specific problem. The objective © materials of the social sciences are human ~ groupings and the problem of the social sci- — ences is to understand the significance of these groupings. Sociologists have been for long periods en- — gaged upon the task of describing society, but — there is no society; there are only societies, and — these societies are somehow the sum total of © numerous constituent groups. The central ques- tion then becomes, what is man as a member — of a group, or groups? Man as an individual — is an abstraction to the social scientist. The 12 Positive Philosophy, Auguste Comte. 18 Spencer’s ‘ ‘cosmic evolution and social evolution” and Giddings’ “consciousness of kind.” 20 Se erm attributes of man which are the object of his study are those attributes which inhere in and express themselves through group relations. Man in relation to other men is the sphere of social science. he problem is to discover the nature and the meaning of this relationship. Human beings in relation are human beings behaving, or sociology is the science of collective behavior. Collective behavior is social process: the activities which transpire between individ- uals as members of groups and the activities which may be indicated as active relations be- tween groups. What then are the sources of collective behavior? This query leads directly into the sphere of psychology since it is the same question which the psychologists use as the central pivot of their science.** ‘The psy- chologists are spending their chief energies in the search for a method which will provide them with accurate knowledge of behavior. Account will be taken later of this evolving psychological method. But are there separate 14 “Fvery one agrees that man’s acts are determined by something, and that, whether he acts orderly or not, there are sufficient grounds for his acting as he does act, if only these grounds can be discovered... .” “As a science psychology puts before herself the task of unraveling the complex factors involved in the develop- ment of human behavior from infancy to old age, and of finding the laws for the regulation of behavior.” Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, John B. Watson, pp. 1, 8. 7 | spheres and separate problems of human be- havior which are sufficiently definitive and dif- ferentiated to justify two sciences: psychology and social psychology? *® We are not yet pre- pared to deal with this question in an adequate manner;** some postulate must, however, be roughly stated and it is that there is a valid dis- tinction between the behavior which the psy- chologist studies and the behavior which the so- cial psychologist studies; and further that each science must develop its own method of finding out and trying out. No one would deny that the behavior which the psychologist observes and the behavior which the social psychologist ob- serves are interrelated, but interrelation does not necessarily imply identity nor even similar- ity. Psychology studies ways of behavior; so- cial psychology studies conduct.2? Psychology may need to go beyond the in- dividual in order to discover certain stimuli, or seats of behavior, but the collective psychol- ogist always goes beyond the individual; his specific search is for that element in behavior 15 It becomes increasingly evident that sociology ap- proximates scientific proportions in ratio to its use of psychological data and methods. 10 See Chapter V. 17 “Conduct is always shared; this is the difference between it and a physiological process. It is not an ethical ‘ought’ that conduct should be social. It is so- cial, whether bad or good.” Human Nature and Con- duct, John Dewey, p. 17. 22 a which can be accounted for only by the fact that man lives and has his being in a social en- vironment. Collective psychology is not search- ing for a “group mind,” or the “mob mind,” or the “crowd mind,’’—those psychological will- o’-the-wisps which have led so many astray; rather it is searching for group interactions, their processes and their meaning. Its labora- tory is the complex of groups whose activities constitute the dominant aspect of the modern world. The foregoing constitutes a somewhat devi- ous and trying effort to clear the way for an analysis of the methods of social investigations. Unfortunately the pathway toward the social sciences is still cluttered with doubtful concepts which have long since lost what little scientific integrity they ever possessed but which are still being taught in classrooms and which cannot be ignored. Presumably the road toward truth is partly constructed by cutting away error. Much of what has been said above is by itself merely negative but as a part of the complete context of this essay contributes to a positive view- point. 7. The Scientist as Artist Science regarded as a method of solving problems and not as a body of laws constitutes a viewpoint which, because of its pragmatic im- 23 portance, deserves protracted attention. One may accept the first part of the statement—-sci- ence is a method—and still reject the theory that it is a method of solving problems. Mr. Havelock Ellis, in his brilliant though preju- diced and partial chapter on the Art of Think ing,’* interprets Vaihinger *° as a protagonist of the first part of the above statement. Ellis, however, uses Vaihinger to prove a point—the point being that there is a utility in fictions, and that science is a system of representative though fictional symbols. ‘“The business of sci- ence is to make the symbol ever more accurate, but it remains a symbol, a means of action, for action is the last end of thinking.” *° If science has a ‘‘business”’ then, it must be that of solving problems. And if its business is nothing more than the attempt to make symbols more ac- — curate,” this constitutes a problem. Mr. Ellis interprets the careers of Leonardo da Vinci, — Faraday, Galton, Darwin, Kepler and Einstein in terms of his preconceived assumption that all 18 The Dance of Life, Havelock Ellis, Chap. III. 19 Die Philosophie des Als Ob, Hans Vaihinger. 20 The Dance of Life, Havelock Ellis, p. 97. 21 Tt would be an interesting problem to request Mr. Ellis to state just what it is that the symbols are to be made more accurate to, i.e., with what are they to be compared in order to attain greater accuracy? ‘To the objective things for which they act as symbols? Or merely to some other fiction? 24. a i a es ee great scientists are at bottom artists. It is well that he begins this discussion by subscribing to the dictum of Leibnitz that “‘disinterest is a chimera.” His “interest” is to prove that the above-named scientists were really artists be- cause they made their chief discoveries by the use of imagination. ‘Yet Faraday had no prac- tical ends in view; it has been possible to say of him that he investigated Nature as a poet in- vestigates the emotions.” ** The criticism of Ellis’ statement and position is not that he wishes to ascribe artistic and imaginative at- tributes to scientists but that he finds it neces- sary therefore to eliminate the problem-nature of the scientists’ investigations. The analogy of the poet is also misleading. Poets do not inves- tigate emotions; they describe emotions. If in their descriptions they “hit” upon certain charac- teristics which may be regarded as new facts concerning emotions, such facts must be cor- roborated by science before they can achieve validity. If Faraday had contented himself with speculations and imaginary descriptions of the factors involved in magnetic electricity, he could never have been credited with real discov- eries. Science is something more than imagin- ing an explanation of phenomena; its real effec- tiveness lies in experimentation, not in imagina- tion. Einstein’s hypothesis of relativity may be 22 Same, p. 130, 25 perfectly sound, nevertheless scientists are at work securing corroborations and evidences. Darwin did not leap from his imaginary de- ductions upon the reading of Malthus to the statement of his theory of natural selection. On the contrary, he spent years in laborious observation and experimentation after which he ventured, reluctantly even then, to put forth his theory. As a matter of fact, it was his imaginary deduction from Malthus which set for Darwin the problem which henceforth oc- cupied his researches. To say that the scientist is an artist because he utilizes his imagination is merely to state that all human beings are ar- tists to a greater or lesser degree. This state- ment, however, does not necessarily carry the implication that scientists do not begin with problems. The chief deficiency of the sociologists and social psychologists of the past was that they were seeking for general laws to explain group behavior and they arrived at the statement of these laws without adequate study of group behavior in its particulars. They had not de- limited their problem. ‘Their researches were deductions, not inductions.”®> In this connection the influence of Professor Cooley’s theory of primary groups upon social investigation may 23 This cannot fairly be said of Cooley, whose first volume, Human Nature and the Social Order, was for the most part based upon inductive observations. 26 ' be noted.** Following the statement of this theory, researches were begun with the explicit intention of discovering the nature and func- tioning of groups; for example, families, groups of families and neighborhoods. 8. Science a “Perpetual Tentativeness” Is science, when regarded as a method, to es- cape all dogmatism? ‘This is plainly impossi- ble and under certain conditions the complete absence of dogma is as undesirable as it is im- possible. If science is to be regarded as a method, it is a method to be used for some- thing, and as interpreted above, this means that the use is to be that of solving some specific problem. If any discovered method results in a solution which ‘‘works,” i.e., succeeds in achieving a new adjustment, dogmatism will fol- low. The scientist may not be the person to insist upon dogmatising the solution but some person or some group is certain to be attached to the solution by emotional ties; dogmatism of one sort or another is then sure to be born. The uses of dogmatism are obscure and doubt- ful but it seems at least pertinent to our pres- ent problem to point to the fact that real criti- 24 See, for example, studies by J. H. Kolb, of the University of Wisconsin; Rural Primary Groups, Re- search Bulletin 51, 1921; and C. C. Zimmerman and C. C. Taylor of North Carolina State College; Rural Organization, Bulletin 245, 1922. 27 cism arises only when dogmas come into con- flict. Not until science itself becomes the dogma do the gravest difficulties set in. There is some legitimacy in regarding the conclusions of science, especially those that have brought success, as dogmas, but there are no reasonable grounds for regarding science itself as dogma. Fortunately scientists rarely betray themselves in this fashion, but many of the dilettante ad- herents of science and many who have tasted the first fruits of surety which result from the use of scientific method are hastily and dog- matically assertive. The social sciences are, happily, just recovering from a rather severe attack of dogmatism and it should not be dif- ficult for the workers in this sphere to accept the view of science as a “perpetual tentative- ness.” This volume goes so far as to attri- bute this view to scientific method as well as to the conclusions of science. Pearson” cata- — logues three criteria of science: (1) exact and — impartial analysis of facts, (2) investigation of objects which represent a species, a type or a class of facts, (3) formulation of scientific laws. So far as method is concerned, this statement has been accepted and trans- mitted with the spirit of dogmatism. But these criteria include a number of doubtful terms. Is it to be inferred that statements are exact only when they are stated in mathe- — 25 The Grammar of Science, K. Pearson. 28 matical terms? Are all discoveries which are attained by means that are not im- partial to be excluded from science? What is a fact? What grounds are there for ex- cluding an analysis of facts which is an inte- gration of partial and impartial investigation? Is it humanly possible to conduct wholly im- partial analyses of human affairs? Once these questions are raised, it becomes necessary to regard scientific method as well as scientific law as a tentative procedure. 29 CHAPTER II HISTORICAL AND ANALOGICAL METHODS A THOROUGHGOING critique of the methods ~ now utilized by social scientists is sorely needed. Such analysis does not, however, fall within the compass of the present undertaking. © The traditional methods of the social sciences have been (1) reference to the past, (2) com- parison, (3) reasoning. History, analogy and logic are the tools which have been most fre- — quently used in the attempt to describe and — . predict collective behavior. Some may wish — to add a fourth, namely, speculation, and ~ there are reasons for regarding the specula- — tive approach as a method. It is, however, an © individual method which cannot be utilized by © others laboring in the same field. Insofar as © speculation is based upon observed facts, it be- — comes a part of one of the three methods men- — tioned above and may be regarded as an hy- — pothesis. Statistics as a method of the social © sciences can scarcely be called traditional since © 30 £ its technical application may be regarded as a contemporary development. 1. The Criteria of Science and the Criteria of Philosophy Even a partial critique of method must pro- ceed upon lines which are both scientific and philosophical. Scientists and philosophers alike base their inquiries upon essence, mode, causality, end, space, time, number and rela- tion. If Kant’s famous definition of philoso- phy * may be paraphrased, a critique of method must involve the three questions: What can the method reveal? What needs to be revealed? How may what is revealed be utilized? And the criteria of method are the same criteria of the scientist and the philosopher. In each case the conclusions must run the gamut of the same rigorous tests. Does the conclusion (the method) exclude other conclusions? Is it a consistent conclusion? Does it apply equally to the whole and to the parts? Is objective evidence available? If not, what is the validity of the subjective evidence? Will the conclusion be substantiated by the ‘“‘consensus of the com- petent’’? Is a consensus of the competent pos- sible? Does the conclusion close the door upon 1 “What can Lknow? What ought I to do? What may I hope for?” Critique of Pure Reason, Kant. Trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn. 31 experimentation? In view of these tests and criteria, which it is assumed must ultimately be applied to any form of method, it becomes nec- essary to take a frank position. As, obviously, no method has ever met all of these tests, all methods must be regarded as relative and none as ultimate. No other course is open to social science. ‘The materials which have thus far been gathered under its domain are too scant and too untrustworthy to permit the discussion of ultimate traits. These may very well be left to the philosophers for the present.? Until a more adequate method of discovery is devised, it will be the part of wisdom to leave both the method and the content of the social sciences in a state of ‘“‘experimental solution.” The dis- cussion of the deficiencies of method here at- tempted will revolve about the two questions: What can the particular method reveal? What needs to be revealed? ‘The second question, on its face, involves the selection of values and any determination of values is predicated upon the assumption that values are measurable. Such measuring, evaluating, is now a philosophical proceeding. Only the experimental attitude 2 When, for example, Professor Dewey says, “Con- flict and uncertainty are ultimate traits” (p. 12), he is philosophising; when he says, “Habits as organized ac- tivities are secondary and acquired, not native and ori- ginal,” he is making what either is or might be a scien- tific statement. Human Nature and Conduct, p. 81. 32 toward life and its problems will tend to bring such measuring of values within the scope of science. Although both scientific and philo- sophical approaches are to be made to the cri- tique of methods it is not assumed that there is a fundamental cleavage between these two viewpoints. On the contrary, the precise posi- tion herein hazarded is that these two. view- points tend to merge. Good science eventually becomes philosophical and good philosophy is scientific.® THE HISTORICAL METHOD 2. History as Past Experience; Scientifically Valid What capacity has history for revealing the significant facts incident to social process? His- tory as method includes every attempt to fur- nish a factual account or interpretation of a past event. Its answer to the query, ‘‘How has man come to be what he is?” may be succinctly stated as the dictum: Find out what man has been. ‘The assumption here is that once it is known what man has been, it becomes possible $It has frequently been remarked that most scien- tists turn to philosophy as old age approaches, i.e., they bezin to think about their problems in terms of values. This is a reversal of the genetic process; art and philos- ophy preceded science and technics. Unfortunately a long life is needed to rid many scientists of those pre- possessions which exclude the philosophic view. a5 to discover the causes and events which have led to his present state. Given this sequence of events (which constitutes a series of adjust- ments of man to his environment), one may in- duce a behavior-pattern of man which supplies the clue for predicting what man may become or what man may do when confronted with a new situation. ‘History repeats itself” is the colloquial summarization of the historical method. History is past experience and upon the basis of past experience all predictions are made.* The chemist and the physicist are here on com- mon ground with the anthropologist and the ethnologist. Science and history are at one in basing predictions upon past experience. This commonplace is noteworthy since it is always a time-saving process to keep in mind the unities and conformities of situations which also em- brace conflicts and variables. Insofar as the sciences and the arts which use the historical method base their prophecies of the future upon valid experiences of the past, they are 4 The process is aptly illustrated by the account of the revolutions of 1848 (Seventy-five Years Ago; a Memory of 1848 by Zuberkloss in Das Demokratische Deutschland; reprinted in The Living Age for May 12, 1923) in which the author points out that Munich has always been a step ahead of Berlin in all historical movements. He thereupon concludes by inference that modern Germany is to become reactionary and mon-— archistic since Munich is already in that frame of mind. OF ren scientific. ‘There is no other way of dealing with the future, unless it be by the uses of im- agination. Novelists may create characters whose responses to imagined situations are clearly foreseen, but man and life are not fic- tions. True, the writers of fiction and the poets frequently transcend the scientific method by prognosticating events which are ultimately ratified by experience. 3. Predictability; the Aim of Science The entire question of the predictability of human nature and human events is now raised. It is in essence a philosophical question. “Theo- retically, i.e., scientifically, there can be no ulti- mate limits to the scientific method, to the proc- ess of factualizing and refining experience as a mode of prediction. Philosophically, i.e., in view of the present limits of the human mind, there is an altogether valid justification for the statement that “conflict and uncertainty are ul- timate traits.” *> The question for science is not whether uncertainty is an ultimate trait or not, but how ultimate it is. If the area of uncer- tainty is being diminished by ever so small a degree, this is the only clue which the scientist needs. The philosopher who insists that “hu- man behavior may be predicted only if there can be produced an archangelic human being 5 Human Nature and Conduct, John Dewey, p. 12. 35 with a capacity for integrating problems of dif- ferential calculus at a speed of three hundred thousand per second”’ is merely juggling words and concepts. ‘The scientist need not be halted in his task by such scarifying formule. He need not interrupt his pursuit of dealing with ex- periential materials in order to speculate upon the validity of apocalypses and revelations. _ For all practical purposes he may be permitted to go forward in his attempt to shrink the area of uncertainty. ‘The questions of mind versus matter, relative uncertainty versus ultimate un- certainty, are provocative subjects of debate for the metaphysicians; the scientist is con- cerned with mind and matter, relative uncer- tainty and increasing certainty. 4. Historical Methodology In simplified form the historical method pro- ceeds by: Selection of significant events.° Accurate description of those events. c. Discovery of the causes and effects involved © in the events. : d. Prediction of future events in terms of the — cause-and-effect relationships discovered — in past events. | oe °’ The term “event” is here used to include move-— ments with certain tendencies as well as specific ac- tivities. Not all historians, to say nothing of the critics of the historical method, are agreed that the last two steps belong intrinsically to history. Obviously, the above simplification of the his- torical method is only germane to the history, at the most, of the last century. ‘The quest for the discovery of forces in history is wholly mod- ern and may be attributed to the impact of science upon the historian. Out of this move- ment have arisen the economic interpretation of history, which implies that the real forces which shape historical events are at bottom economic, and similar historical theories. When economic causes are interpreted in terms of laws whose functioning is not conditioned by human intelligence, the logical conclusion is that historical causes are at bottom materialistic. The historical method has in this illustration completed the cycle from observation of facts to speculation of origins and ends, from scien- tific approach to philosophic interpretation. The newer branches of history, as anthro- pology, ethnology and folk-lore, owe their rise ‘as well as their unusual recognition in the sphere of science to the use of (b) and (c); discovery of cause-and-effect relations and pre- diction. To enumerate the specific and the general contributions which history and _ historical method have made to the social sciences is not pertinent to the present inquiry. Nor is the 37 aim to delineate the progress made in the so- cial sciences by accoun tine for the involved his- torical sequences.’ The chief concern here is to bring to bear upon the historical method the tests which will reveal how the historical ap- proach may be utilized in discovering the na- ture and the processes of collective activity. (a) Selection of significant events. ‘The his- torian selects for research the events which may be described as social change.* The critics of history are prone to point to faulty selection of events, ignorance of certain events which were of significance but which do not interest the his- torian because of traditional predelictions of his craft and a tendency to rationalize events so- as to make them fit into sequential order. These are criticisms of the use of the method and not of the method itself. The historical method, then, begins with a selection of events and ac- tivities which represent problems. ‘This is a scientifically sound procedure. From the view- point of social science and its quest for an un- derstanding of social process, the chief criticism of the historical method is that it must deal 7 For a rather complete treatment of this subject, see the series of articles appearing in The American Jour- nal of Sociology, prepared by Dr. Albion W. Small, be- ginning with the issue of January 1923, and entitled, “Some Contributions to the History of Sociology.” 8 The conflicts and adjustments involved in the rise and decline of feudalism, for example, constitute sig- nificant events. f 4 38 OE ERE ae ae te ae with retroactive problems. Only the historian of contemporary events and movements can utilize the method of observation. But curi- ously the contemporary historian is invariably discredited. He is said to lack the correctives of perspective, to make of history nothing but high-grade reporting, journalism. In one sense, history is a perspective of events. It deals with social changes, not as problems to be solved but rather as problems already solved. ‘The his- torical method reveals and records adjustments to changing situations which the social group has either met successfully or has failed to meet. The so-called “‘rises’”’ of civilizations, nations or cultural groups are the records of successfully accelerating adjustments and the consequent “falls” are the records of failure to adjust. The historical method precludes observation of the adjusting process.® It can only take advan- tage of its fragmentary materials in construct- ing a picture of how the event may have tran- spired. The actual transpiring must ever es- cape the historian. To the extent that the his- torian’s picture conforms to the knowable facts, he contributes to an understanding of the na- ture of social change. Such pictures of past ® Hence the variety of ascribed causes for the fall of Rome are to be regarded as logical conclusions from selected events used as premises. “These so-called causes are not false but merely partial; some validity un- doubtedly resides in each historical syllogism. a0 events assist materially in directing the social scientist toward the sources of significant ma- terials for study. The method of the social scientist must therefore begin where that of the historian leaves off. (b) Accurate description of events. Omit- ting for the moment the inevitable partiality of historians, it must be granted that the his- torical method, in laying emphasis in these lat- ter years upon the necessity of laborious re- search for the purposes of discovering factual material, has acted in the interests of science. The process as actually utilized in historical re- search involves memory, the placing of events in point of time, the variability of terminology © and many other debatable factors. Much of the descriptive material of history is lamentably — defective but it is being constantly corrected, — and considering the multiplicity of fields of in-— quiry to which the historical method is applied, © there is cause for giving praise to this phase of © the method. However, no one can accurately de- scribe an event which he has not observed.” — The historical composite, which consists of the — conjoined observations of persons who lived in — the period selected for interpretation, is an im-_ provement over individual interpretation from — 2 The difficulties involved in providing accurate and - convincing descriptions of events observed are well-— known to jurists. See The Expert Witness, C. A, | Mitchell. wae i piee 40 b assumed causes. But historical composites are not to be fully trusted. The individuals who commented contemporaneously upon events of importance were probably so intimately related to those events as to make impartiality impos- sible. ‘These observers were also living in an environment of presumed cause-and-effect and their descriptions of current events were un- doubtedly colored by these presumptions.*° Improvements in this phase of historical method are probably to be tooked for when his- torians earnestly seek to resolve opposing de- scriptions. (c) Discovery of cause-and-effect relations. A phase of historical method has now been reached, the validity of which, in view of mod- ern science, is subject to grave doubts. What is a cause and what is an effect? Can the his- torian ever know? Palpably the cause-and-ef- fect relation has been oversimplified in all of history. ‘To rationalize is the temptation to which the human mind most easily succumbs and practically all historical cause-and-effect re- lations are either adroit or maladroit rationali- zations. The monarch and the mob—which is cause and which is effect? Education and 10 The subtle method of J. G. Frazer in the Golden Bough, by which he aims to state fairly the mystical cause-and-effect assumption and then translate it in terms of modern rationality, is an excellent example of one historical method for dealing with past events. 41 democracy—which is cause and which is effect? Which is means and which is end? Two and two are four if you are speaking of houses or potatoes, but two and two are not four if you are speaking of human beings in collective activity. Two and two ideas certainly do not result in four ideas. ‘The causes which the chemist isolates and upon which he predicts inevitable effects are not of the same kind as the causes which lie at the roots of human be- havior. One may always evade this issue as did the biologist who predicted numerous ef- fects of the behavior of a frog in response to definite causes or stimuli. When asked what | conclusions he arrived at when the frog refused to respond in the way he predicted, his reply was: ‘“‘Well, I must then conclude that the frog was right.” ‘This is an evasion. What the biologist might with profit have said was that he did not understand the cause-and-effect re- lation. In any case, this is precisely what the social scientists are obliged to say. Historians are still debating whether the Civil War was fought for the purpose of saving the union or of liberating the slaves. Modifications of these two viewpoints are represented by attributing the real cause of the conflict to economic or cul- tural differentiation or some similar more un- derlying factor. The debate over the exact cause which brought the United States into the recent world war bids fair to equal the above — 42 in spite of the fact that the events were closely observed.™ The more recent results of experimental psy- chology,’® interpretations of the stimulus-re- sponse process, and the realignments of thought in regard to means and ends as in- volved in activity ** are leading toward a re- vamping of the concept of psychological causa- tion. If, as now seems to be the fact, it is neces- sary to view the stimulus-response relation of an organism as a complex, it is wholly reasona- ble to assume that an even greater complexity will appear in the application of the stimulus- response formula to group behavior. ‘That causes and effects are not the sharply defined and separable entities which they were once thought to be becomes increasingly evident. What may at one time be isolated and labeled cause, may at another time and under other cir- cumstances be legitimately labeled effect. The historical method arbitrarily chops the social process into cycles of causes and effects. It sharpens and delineates the flow of historical events. This means that it is the method by which history may most easily be made to ap- 1 For a skillful effort to interpret these events psychologically, see ““American Withdrawal from Eu- rope—How and Why?” Herbert Croly; The New Re- public, September 12, 1923. 12 Especially the “conditioned reflex” of Pavlov. 18 By Holt particularly. 14 By Dewey and Holt. 43 pear rational. Life and the social process are not made up of bracketed situations of cause and effect, means and ends, stimulus and re- sponse. On the contrary, life is composed of related and interrelated. situations. Arbitrarily to isolate action and its reaction from the so- cial process provides only static concepts. Life is flow, process. The real search is not for ac- tion and reaction but interaction. What hap- pens between action and reaction, cause and ef- fect, means and ends, stimulus and response con- stitutes the search of the social scientist. The group is a plurality of individuals; but what the group does is not plural but singular. The difficulty of accurately describing a group is inherent largely in the persistency of viewing the group as a collection, a plurality, a thing, rather than as an activity. In attempting to describe significant events historians are fre- quently found to be describing significant per- sons or combinations of persons. Illustration: “Tf a man and a woman marry, the interrela- tion generates qualities in each; and these quali-. ties should be predicated of each, as the marital qualities of the man or the woman. There are certain characteristics, such for example, as be- ing an even number, or walking down the street arm in arm, that can only be attributed to the couple, and cannot be attributed either to the man or the woman without contradicting his or 44 her numerical or anatomical properties. But I venture to say that most of the interesting and significant facts of married life are of the first rather than of the second variety; and that it is more fruitful to study the history of the man and of the woman each in the environment of the other, than to study the history of the couple.” *° The description of a couple in terms of joint activity has nothing to do with numerical or anatomical properties. ‘he couple is not a new and mystical entity in need of description. The search is for the meaning of interactions of the couple with other couples or other individuals or the neighborhood. The history of each in- dividual will undoubtedly be of assistance in describing the couple’s interaction, but this in- teraction is the result of some previous resolu- tion or integration or interpenetration of the couple. There are occasions when the couple is thought of and reacted to as though the couple were a unity; for example in the question, “Shall we invite the Smiths?” ‘The presence of both Smiths means something entirely dif- ferent from the presence of either Smith. When the illustration is expanded to include a family group instead of a couple, the above distinctions are still further clarified. 15 “Ts There a Social Mind?” Ralph Barton Perry, American Journaleof Sociology, May 1922, pp. 735- 736. 45 (d) The prediction of future events is a function of the historical process only in a strictly limited sense. Even with restrictions, it remains debatable whether or not the his- torian may ever legitimately assume the role of prophet. Practically considered, however, those who use the historical method are forever making predictions. This utilization of histori- cal ‘‘backgrounds”’ has been responsible for the — existence of what may be termed historical fa- talism. For example, some students of history constantly remind us of a certain human futility. They rear specters, usually called “determi- nants,” complete span of historical sequence on the of many sorts. Karl Marx laid out a - basis of economic determinism in which he reck- oned almost not at all with the possibilities of changes in human nature.*® Anthropologists, © or the interpreters of anthropologists, occa- sionally allow their prophesying propensities to — go so far as to construct rhythmic cycles of in-— tegration and disintegration, presumably based — upon a sort of biological determinism.” Poli- — ticlans and publicists appear to take such proph- ecies seriously.** How often are we warned of | our impending decay by the ominous finger 16 Das Kapital, Kar] Marx. 17 Vodern Man and His Forerunners, H. G. Fj Spurrell. 18 Walled Towns, Ralph Adams Cram. 46 pointed at fallen Rome! Some who use the historical method complete the cycle, thereby producing an inverse prophecy of hope. The historical pessimists settle the future by saying: ‘What's the use? Everything is bound to go to the dogs anyway. It always has.” The his- torical optimists carry this hypothesis a bit far- ther and say: “What's the use? Everything is bound to come out all right anyway. It al- ways has.”’ And here stands revealed the di- lemma of historical prediction! 5. History; Unreliable for Prediction The past is merely a clue to the future, not a diagram, chart or compass. It is even mislead- ing as a clue, since attention focused on the past event and its correlations with the present may tend to produce “‘blind-spots” which shut out of view the new factors in the present situation. That there are new factors is as certain as the fact that to-day is not the same as yesterday. History does not repeat itself for the simple and obvious reason that this repetition is impossi- ble. There can no more be two identical his- torical situations than there can be two identical persons. If history repeating itself merely means that because of the habit-nature of man it is possible to discover similarities of response and adjustment in varying situations in time, 47 no objections can be made. But if the meaning is that there are causal interrelations between the fall of Rome and the impending fall of modern civilization, both the logic and the pre- diction may be challenged. ‘The formula “‘his- tory repeats itself” is an aphorism, not a dem- onstration. The above discourse has led directly to the discussion of reasoning from similarities, or analogy. Before this phase of method is ap- proached, however, it seems appropriate to state that there are evidences of evolution in historical method. The historians of the scien- tific, as distinguished from the literary, school are earnestly endeavoring to create for history a more fruitful mode.*® The social scientists of the future will need to become increasingly aware of this evolving historical method; this awareness will tend toward the greatly-desired unity of the social sciences in method with a corresponding diversity of content, THE ANALOGICAL METHOD 6. The Effectiveness of Similes, Metaphors — and Analogies Nothing appears to beguile the human mind more successfully than an apt analogy. If only something may be discovered which is like, simi- f 19 See The Processes of History, Francis J. Teggart. 48 _ on pe = we we Pres lar, parallel to the problem which vexes us, how amiably the difficulties evaporate.*° Similes and metaphors have their legitimate place in verse and fiction. They are, in a sense, logical means of rendering new ideas, feelings, sensations, emotions more clearly-defined by re- lating them (in comparison) to something known. “Feet as hot as an iron pump-handle on a July noon” is an effective method of describing a particular sensation. It goes beyond descrip- tion in the minds of those who have actually had the experience of grasping an iron pump- handle on a July noon. ‘The reference to a known experience intensifies the reader’s con- cept of the sensation and this is what the writer in this instance evidently sought. The success- ful simile is not merely a mode of comparison for the sake of clearness, it is a means of add- ing weight, color, intensity. All of this means that the simile is intended to make the author’s description appear to be more true. A well-se- lected simile does make for a more ready ac- ceptance of statement, and from the psychologi- cal point of view it is easy to see why this is so. Reason is one of the egoistic elements in per- 20 How far this process has proceeded in current thought may be indicated by the fact that an industrious literary collector now publishes annually for the de- lection of the devotees of belles-lettres a complete vol- ume of the year’s best similes. 49 sonality and when the well-chosen simile corre- sponds with some known past experience which the mind has recorded, the personality is by so much enhanced. The political orator knows this principle so well that he often takes the pains to discover the possible local bases for his similes in order to make sure that his state- ments will be “‘telling.”’ Because of the human mind’s susceptibility to similes, metaphors and analogies, these form the basis for much think- ing and acting; hence the necessity for further analysis. | 7. Analogies; Similes with Meaning Similes and analogies are alike only in a gen-_ eral sense, in the manner of their effects upon — the mind, i.e., psychologically. Technically, — there is a distinction, and a consciously under- stood distinction, between the use of a simile and the use of analogy. Analogy is frequently © used as a substitute for logic. Things and phe- nomena are assumed to be alike because they appear to be alike. ‘The likeness supplies an q easy conclusion. This is obviously a very loose f way of using mere similarity as analogy. A” t true analogy is much more than similarity; it is similarity with meaning. Thus when the social § psychologist compares certain manifestations of © crowd-behavior with specific mental aberrations (psychoses) of individuals, he is using an 50 analogy with meaning." His purpose is to ex- plain the nature of crowd-behavior in terms of an established or assumed explanation of in- dividual behavior. The earlier sociologists at- tempted to explain the nature of society by pointing to its analogy with the human body as a functioning organism. (Spencer and Comte.) One still hears the family alluded to as the molecule of society. These are analogies with the definite purpose of ascribing meaning to the object or phenomenon under consideration. This use of analogy needs fresh consideration. The analogical method is more widely used in the social sciences than in the physical sci- ences for the reason that objective experimen- tation has proceeded further in the latter case. The scientist who deals with chemical materials and processes need not stop to make guesses on the basis of likeness, similarity, resemblance or correspondence; he is able to produce situations in which such analogies may be tested. They then stand upon their own merits as demonstra- tions and not as analogies. The complexities of human nature and the social process make such simple verifications difficult and conse- quently they are for the most part left to in- trospection. The social sciences, if they are to be in fact sciences, must evolve a method which goes beyond analogy. However, the analogical method will probably continue to enjoy greater 21 The Behavior of Crowds, Everett Dean Martin. g1 use in the sphere of the social sciences than in other scientific fields. ‘This probability imposes the task of discovering in what manner analogy may be most fruitfully utilized. 8. Analogy in the Aristotelian Sense Analogy in the Aristotelian sense and used as part of the logical process, namely, as example, occurs commonly in ordinary discussions as well as in scientific exposition. The accustomed habit of most minds, particularly the minds of © so-called “thinkers,” is to proceed a certain dis- — tance on the basis of objective materials and ~ then to veer off to the tangents of abstraction. When this point in discussion is reached, it is — always fruitful to demand examples. If the © abstract idea is susceptible of illustration by the © use of a concrete example, an immediate return © to credibility follows. Examples cause ideas to — seem more real. They carry the weight of in-— duction. A fitting example is a form of evi- — dence—at least it is commonly accepted as one. | This use of analogy tends to develop the quality © which James was pleased to call ‘‘tough-minded- — ness,’ *? a penetrating synonym for empiricism. — The empirically-minded are those who have de- ' veloped the habit of thinking in terms of eX- amples. This use of analogy in the social sciences may 22 Pragmatism William James i 52 5 serve a most helpful purpose. The sociologists who base their conclusions upon the findings of anthropology are for the moment popular be- cause they have sought and discovered an abun- dance of examples, illustrations, parallels. ‘The findings in this field are largely the result of a combined use of the historical and the analogi- cal methods and it must be admitted that his- torical analogy lends itself to an exceedingly convincing expository form. Anthropology is by itself fascinating reading and when used as the basis for sociological inductions makes a very wide appeal. Happily the anthropologists have for the most part distinguished between true and false analogy. Therefore they have made and are making a most serviceable con- tribution to the other social sciences.2* How- ever, in evaluating this contribution, one must not lose sight of the inherent deficiencies of the historical as well as of the analogical method. 9. Analogy as Distinct Method But analogy as method is more than exam- ple. The interpretations of analogy provided by Kant,** Sir William Hamilton,”® and John Stuart Mill,?° justify the treatment of analogy 23 See Man and Culture, Clark Wissler. 4 Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant. 25 T ectures on Logic, Vol. II, Sir William Hamilton, 26 Yogic, Book III, John Stuart Mill. Nas as a distinct method, differentiated from for- mal logic although not entirely independent of it. Analogy as method has come to mean the discovery of resemblances in particulars. ‘The inductions of logic proceed by discovering the resemblances in the many which lead to the con- clusion of resemblances in all. The inferences of analogy, on the other hand, proceed by dis- covering the resemblances in particulars which lead to the conclusion of resemblance in wholes. In both cases the process is from known to un- — known points of agreement. Obviously, if the particulars which reveal resemblances are of — the same class, on the same level, there is every valid reason for believing that such resem- blances have meaning. The analogical method © has the capacity of discovering significant re- — semblances, but does it possess the capacity of — validating the meaning of such resemblances? Here lies the crux of the analogical method. Analogy which stops at the discovery of resem- — blances in particulars is not fully scientific. It — may disclose resemblances between particulars © of the same class or between particulars of dif- — ferent classes but in both cases the resemblances ~ can have scientific value only if verified by em- — pirical methods. In Mill’s words, the analogy — “is not an argument although it may imply that an argument exists.” The existence of the real — argument is still to be proved. And it must be — said at this point, although parenthetically, that 54 rie ia “ i , D AS > /@ ay . ee: the statistical method of creating a ‘“‘prepon- derance of evidence” by the accumulation of in- numerable resemblances does not change the sit- uation in the least. So far as analogy as method is concerned, one resemblance is just as significant as one thousand; the causal relation- ship between the resemblances is still to be proved. An illustration of the use of the analogical method in a modern treatise on social psychol- ogy may serve to clarify the issue: “Many of the characteristics of the uncon- scious will then appear and will be similar in some respects to those of neurosis. It is my contention that this is what happens in the crowd, and [ will now point out certain phases of crowd-behavior which are strikingly analo- gous to some of the phenomena which have been described above.” *” The assumption of this analogy, as in fact the total assumption of the entire volume, is as follows: having discovered certain manifesta- tions of individual behavior of neurotic per- sons which resemble certain manifestations of the behavior of crowds, the author concludes that crowd-behavior is neurotic behavior. The remainder of the volume (with the exception of the concluding chapter which suggests a cure 27 The Behavior of Crowds, Everett Dean Martin, pp. 71-72. 55 for the crowd-neurosis) is a brilliant analysis — of these strikingly analogous phases of crowd- | behavior. Laying aside for the moment the — doubtful concept of crowds, especially the nu- — merical concept, one has the scientific right to question the entire conclusion. Nothing has © been proved. The resemblances of particulars — are chosen from two levels, i.e., the level of in- dividual behavior and the level of crowd be- — havior. Neurosis is an empirical concept on the © plane of individual behavior; it is nothing more © than a striking resemblance on the social level, © a supposition. An analogy carried from one — level to another is nothing more than an anal- © ogy until it has been empirically and experi- mentally proved on the succeeding level. ‘Then ~ it becomes a scientific fact. But even if the re- © semblances were chosen from the same level, — the purely analogical method would still be limited to the discovery of the resemblance and ~ not the scientific meaning of the resemblance. ~ This criticism amounts, not to a discrediting — of the use of the analogical method, but rather to its delimitation to its prescribed sphere. — Again quoting Mill: “Where the resemblance is very great, the ascertained difference very small, — and our knowledge of the subject-matter very — extensive, the argument from analogy may ap- _ proach in strength very near to a valid induce tion.” From the pragmatic point of view noth- ing more is necessary; a conclusion reached by _ 56 such a method offers an excellent basis for ex- perimentation. If social principles derived in this manner actually work, it may be assumed that they have for all practical purposes the in- tegrity of true principles. 10. The Fruitful Use of Analogy The most fruitful use of analogy in the so- cial sciences appears to be its discovery-capa- city; it directs attention to the things which if proved might be extremely significant. The analogical method, instead of lulling the mind to sleep, should be the awakener, the stimulus to experimentation. Comparison instead of be- ing odious, may become the nucleus of creative experiment and thought. Some of the analo- gous reasoning of the social scientists may be _true, but the truth in it will remain undiscov- ered so long as it is allowed to go unchallenged. The analogical method may then become the ally of a healthy skepticism. Ethnology begins where anthropology leaves off. Its generalized foundations constitute an acceptance of the essential unity of the human species. Its particularized foundations rest upon the differences between various groups of the human family, the so-called ethnic groups. Ethnology may be thus useful to sociology (so- ciology being the science which deals with the associative processes within groups and between Sif groups) by pointing out the nature of the dif- ferences and the nature of the similarities. Analogical discoveries within the sphere of eth- nology may lead to the method of composing differences as well as to the social use of simi- larities. At present racial groups stand in awe or fear of each other because of the tacit recog- nition of difference. This act of giving atten- tion to difference may be one of the chief fac- tors in perpetuating unintegrated difference. It is entirely possible when we say that two ra- cial groups cannot get on with each other that what we really mean is that the differences and similarities of these two groups are not under- stood. ‘Consciousness of kind” ** as it now stands in theory is mere subjectivism. Empiri- ——— cal consciousness of kind can be discovered only ~ in terms of activity of kind. The use of anal- ogy as is suggested in the above is merely one 1 of the ways in which the analogical method may be utilized as one of the modes of social discov- ery. Ouspensky’s * recommendation of the use of analogy for the purpose of discovering new categories is based upon pure (or impure, de- pending upon the viewpoint) Kantian doctrine. His assumption is that if we can perceive and — conceive things or processes in new ways they are insofar new. All of reality is thus placed 28 Franklin Giddings. 29 Tertium Organum, P. D. Ouspensky. 58 within the perceiving and conceiving capacity of man and none is left to the things or proc- esses perceived or conceived. The underlying assumption of this volume is that reality of some sort resides in man as an individual (1.e., in his so-called consciousness) , in groups of men and in the perceived and conceived environ- ment. Whether or not these are independent forms of reality is a debatable point, but it ap- pears entirely tenable to assume that prag- matic reality—the only kind with which we can deal fruitfully—comes into being when two forms of hitherto independent reality become dependent or interdependent. When man comes to know reality outside himself, 1.e., to know in the sense of being able to utilize or in- terpret in a rational manner, the two forms of reality then become interdependent in a func- tional sense. Man does not perceive that the sun does not move about the earth daily, but he is able to conceive this phenomenon in such man- ner as to make it a part of his rational life. —. 59 CHAPTER III LOGICAL METHOD History and analogy are arbitrarily joined in this discussion, not because of any intrinsic relationship, but merely as a convenient mode of establishing what appears to be a useful se- quence. Men or groups do not behave by first taking the historical, then the comparative, then the reasonable and finally the mathemati-_ cal view. When men or groups are called upon to rationalize their behavior or to predict its” consequences, they are likely to make use of the first three views—not as separate methods but as a compound mode of interpretation. Since statistics is apparently always a backward or an historical view it can record only what has happened. ‘Thus when the stock market manip- ulator bases his calculations upon statistics, he is using the historical-statistical method. But insofar as he makes comparisons he is also using analogy. He would, in addition, be offended if told that he was not using logic. The rough and ready gambler heeds none of these methods of calculation but trusts to the blind fortunes 60 MAS; Pay _—— of chance. The stock market manipulator lives _and functions on the margin of probability and the gambler lives and functions always on the _margin of mere possibility. The science of pre- diction begins where gambling leaves off. At this point the sequence of method begins. Past experience, comparative experience and rational expectation (reasoning) are used either sepa- rately, jointly, or in combination from this step onward in all forms of prediction. The next step is risked because the person “‘thinks’’ he knows what is going to happen. The reasons he thinks he knows what will happen are his- torical, analogical and logical. Whether these processes actually precede or follow the overt action is immaterial for the present discussion. Logic is a formal method of reassuring thought of its effectiveness. “The competence of logic rests ultimately upon the ‘‘known-to- the-unknown” formula. Poetry and music, in- -asmuch as they appear to flow from uncon- trolled processes, are generally assumed to be -non-logical expressions of thought. The forms which poetry and music assume are not formal; | they are, it is true, guided by certain fundamen- tal rules of a mathematical nature, but poetry - and music are forever in conflict with such rules. _ New modes in these spheres of art are the re- ‘sult of new releases from rules. On the other hand reasoning, which is usually termed rigor- ous thinking, tends to approach the formalistic 61 in method. To have followed a line of thought from all of its known factors to some unknown conclusion is a method which lends sanction to the conclusion. Such thinking is called rigorous because it has a consciously understood method which is strictly followed. 1. Logic, Science and Jurisprudence Logic and science, as methods of arriving at conclusions, are still used indiscriminately. In the juristic realm, where decisions involving hu- man nature in its relations to justice and liberty are sought, logic as a method unquestionably holds a higher place than science. An increas- ing tendency to resort to scientific methods in — ee legal cases involving mental aberrations is to be © noted but even here the technical testimony is utilized as a means of strengthening a logical © sequence of events or acts... There are evi- © dences that the psychiatric clinic for delinquents is forcing certain aspects of jurisprudence into a scientific channel. Recognition of the same tendency in law-making is also due. But when all of these more recent applications of portions — of a scientific method in jurisprudence are ac- counted for, it still remains true that law-mak- — ing and law-execution follow the rules of logic © rather than those of science. 1See particularly Chapter XIX, Insanity and the Criminal Law, W. A. White. 62 The difficulties which arise as a result of this use of logic may be realized when the law is ob- served in relation to the newer problems inci- dent to industrial evolution. Industrial tech- nique developed its rules out of an impersonal, technological relation between machines and raw materials. Legal controls evolved rules of relations between employer and em- ployee based upon the logical precedents of the pre-machine age. Workmen’s compensa- tion legislation was forced upon unwilling em- ployers and was regarded by them as an entire- ly revolutionary departure from logic. It cre- ated or validated a new set of values, establish- ing rules of relation between workers and ma- chines, between industrial technique and an evolving social ethics. This illustration indi- cates that when life is approached from a scien- tific point of view, the logical presuppositions break down. They break down in fact as all logical presumptions break down when the premises are intermittently examined. 2. Why Logic Cannot Be an Independent Science Logic is not a science for the very obvious reason that it begins with known terms; it does nothing to make those terms known. ‘The premises of logic are assumptions. If the as- sumptions are true, they are true not because 63 they are used in logic but because they are em- pirically true, i.e., scientifically true. “Thus the scientist may always interrupt the logician by — challenging his premises. In comparison with scientific reasoning, the logical method is far less rigorous; it is in fact not rigorous at all. What causes the appearance of scrupulous and exact thinking is, of course, the strict adherence to rules. The implications and inferences be- © tween terms, objects or classes have value only © if science has preceded logic. A brief illustra- — tion should make this point clear: : Major Premise: The twelve-hour day in indus- — try is injurious to the health of workers. Minor Premise: The steel industry requires — workers to labor twelve hours per day. ‘ Conclusion: The health of workers is being in- — jured in the steel industry. In this example of logic lies one item of fact, namely, that the steel industry requires a © twelve-hour day. All else is implication and inference. The original generalization (major — premise) can have no scientific integrity until — proved by the empirical tests of science? — 2 In this particular case, the President of the United States requested the members of the American Steel and Iron Institute to test the major premise according to the methods of science. Curiously enough the re- — port of the special investigating committee negatived — 64 When science asks: How does one know that the twelve-hour day is injurious to the health of workers, the logician can have no answer. He can only appeal to the scientist to find out. Hereupon the scientist begins to find out, not by the use of logic, but by the more rigorous methods of analysis, observation and experi- mentation. All that has validity in the logical procedure is conditioned by science. Since the conclusions of logic are implied in the premises and the premises may always be doubted, there is nothing creative in the conclusions. To as- sume that the ‘unknown’ (new knowledge) may be derived from the ‘‘known”’ (old knowl- edge) is a scientific and not a logical assump- tion. Given sufficient scientific data, the logi- cian may be of inestimable value to the scientist and hence to all who are intent upon factual- izing events and activities. This point must be elaborated in defense of the logical method. the premise. A careful reading of this report is indic- ative of the misuse of science. “The attention of the investigators appeared to have been focused upon what seemed to them the technological necessities of the steel industry. ‘They applied engineering acumen to the problem of the welfare of the steel industry and not to the welfare of workers. In brief, their negation of the major premise was in fact an introduction of a new element. In their terms, the major premise was changed to: “The twelve-hour day is essential to a profitable conduct of the steel industry and so far as we can dis- cover has no ill-effects upon the health of workers.” 65 u 3. Logic as Rationalization of Experience The admission that logic discovers no new truth clarifies the atmosphere and makes room for a really constructive use of logic. The logical method in one form or another is con- stantly playing an important role in thinking and therefore in adjustments. When applied to human affairs without too great an effort at nicety it furnishes surprisingly accurate pre- dictions of behavior. In this form logic is of course a rationalization of experience, past or future. The devious and prolonged methods of logic utilized by a Sherlock Holmes are seldom found in actual life. A large part of the fascination which such narratives hold, even for scientists, may be attributed to the fact that the human mind seems to feel defi- nite satisfactions when its predictions material- — ize. Detectives whose lives are devoted to the © discovery and apprehension of criminals un- © doubtedly possess a full set of generalizations which, evolved out of the records of accumu- © lated experiences, form the basis of their logi- © cal method. Logic implies that the generaliza- — tions should furnish certain classifications of © human beings. Out of these classifications arise _ the predictions of human behavior. Journal-— ists, particularly those located in the center of | political activities, have also developed a simi- lar method which is on the whole superior to 66 t 4 i i that of detectives.* Teachers utilize a similar method of logic in their generalizations and clas- sifications of pupils. Such uses of logical method are so well-known that they demand no further description. A scientific approach to the problems of group behavior might profitably begin with the logical inductions based upon experience and utilized by practical persons of affairs. Logic of this. sort't .pplied to social affairs would never be guilty of the crass errors of the historical parallelists* Anthropology takes its place as a science largely through the use of this combined method. Some of its ‘premises are based upon detailed observation of the behavior of prehistoric man and are therefore the result of historical research. * The approximate accuracy of journalistic predic- tions 1s frequently vitiated by the fact that the journal- ‘Ast must adapt his predictions to a preconceived policy of his journal. This naturally gives journalistic logic a peculiar twist or bias. * An example of logic plus the historical method oc- curs in Modern Man and His Forerunners, H. G. F. Spurrell. He compares “cycles,” “phases,” and “waves” of various civilizations rather than the civilizations themselves. His method is summarized in the sentence: “If we narrow our attention from the great waves of civilization to the rise and fall of the little systems out of which they are piled up, we find firmer ground be- neath our feet and can lay down some sound generali- zations upon the reasons why civilizations decay.” P. 127. 67 With such materials in hand, the anthropolo- — gist breaks up his problem into comparable — parts; the correspondences thus revealed lay — the foundation for generalizations. Sociolo- © gists have also utilized this method but they have been handicapped by the breadth of their — inquiry and by the allurements of easy general- izations. 4. Logic Dependent upon the Habit Category The conclusions of logic, when applied to group behavior, approximate accuracy only to — the degree in which the premises are based ~ upon the habit nature of man. Predictions” of human events are logically valid only be- — cause the habit category is valid. This prob- — ably accounts for the close affiliation between — legalism and logic. -Laws are notoriously in- effective when they attempt to change habits. They can in fact be enforced effectively only when they conform to generalized habit sys- — tems. Laws are, in one sense, sanctions of changed habits. ‘The social sciences, on the : other hand, may become efiectively applied — sciences by accounting for the expediency and — | _ the value of creating new habits. If logic i is to” have its place in social thinking, and it is dif- ficult to see how such thinking can proceed in the common life without logic, its traditional — uses must be improved. Logic as ordinarily — we. a le Ae SF: used avoids new technique and new method, whereas science seeks new technique and new method. 5. Possibility of Creativeness in Conclusions The premises of sociological logic must be founded upon scientific research.” They must be as nearly factual as known methods of find- ing out allow. With such foundations we may look for creativeness in the conclusions. Con- clusions may be creative only if stated in the form of hypotheses. This implies that the same premises may provide the basis for nu- merous conclusions.© There may be some value in each of the conclusions and the im- aginative social scientist will be alert to dis- cover these values. Discovery, naturally, can proceed only upon the basis of experimenta- tion. ‘This discussion constitutes a pragmatic interpretation of logic.’ It suggests that the 5 See “evidences” of J. S. Mill. ® In the realm of the physical sciences such conclu- sions are called “laws,” and for long periods they were so regarded. ‘The modern scientist becomes increas- ingly suspicious of laws. ™“But as the sciences have developed farther, the notion has gained ground that most, perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations. ‘The laws themselves, moreover, have grown so numerous that there is no counting them; and so many rival formulations are proposed in all the branches of science that investigators 69 logical method may be utilized as a guide to new and fruitful experiences. The foregoing is an appeal to creative rea- soning—to free the spirit from the yoke of logic as well as of history. The method in social science is to be one whose tests are found in “the consciousness of the living gen- eration.” It must not be dominated by a stulti- fying discipline. Logic may have its universals and its determinates, but it must also take ac- count of the variables. ‘The present generation of social scientists is just emerging from the use of the concept of instinct as the determi- nant which accounts for all otherwise inex- plicable behavior. But the yoke of instincts is no sooner lifted than these self-same scien-— tists sell themselves into the bondage of hab- its. Man is a habit-made creature. There is no disgrace in this admission, nor is there any grace. ‘The hope of mankind lies in the fact that he is both a habit-making and a habit- breaking being. If the social sciences are to become something more than merely descrip- tive they must give attention to human be- havior variables—to the modes according to- which new habits are created. From this point — of view logic may regain its once honored have become accustomed to the notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of them tnay from some point of view be useful.” — Pragmatism, William James, p. 56. 70 place as a part of the scientific method.* The facts of human behavior are conditioned by their use and their use is ultimately dependent upon rational sanctions. ‘This is an experi- mental view and it is the only practicable view possible under our present limitations of psy- chological knowledge. The older logic may be stated thus: M is P—major premise S is M—minor premise S is P—conclusion The newer logic may be stated thus: M is P—major premise S is M—minor premise Diet ore or/Pior PP’ or PY ‘ep cetera: Stated in the form of logic applied to social process, the formula might be stated thus: M is a social group. 8 Since it deals only with abstractions there is an argument that the scientist need pay no attention to logic. This view does not appear to be tenable. So long as human beings need both conceptual and perceptual tools, we shall also have need of a communicating method and some form of logic will be utilized. ‘The difficulties in this connection arise from the confusion of logic with epistemology and with psychology. Logic becomes fruitful when it is viewed as a method of rea- soning with related and interrelated facts. Al P is a known behavior-quality of groups in this class. S is a new activity imposed upon M. P and P’ and P” et cetera are possible re- sults (hypotheses) of the new activity. M is a unit of related human beings and is derived by descriptive means. P is a behavior-pattern of this group and numerous similar groups and is de- rived by psychological observation. S is activity, process, venture, and is im- posed upon M by the activity of some other group, i.e., it represents an im- pelling adjustment of the group. ative imagination to bear on the problem. His logic compels him to describe the various ways in which this new activity will produce — certain specific results. He will know most of — the ways in which this and similar groups have — reacted in the past. Some of these ways have | produced negative and some positive results, none of which may be discarded. But the cre- ative scientist will not stop here. He will sug- gest numerous other ways, consonant with | what he knows about human nature, not alone as it has always behaved but as it has capacity — to behave, in which the group might react. — Logic may thus become something more than ~ an “elaboration of the obvious.” It may in- ~ deed become the discoverer of new experience, — 72 The social scientist may now bring his cre- — the revealer of new flows of value in the many- faceted life. 6. Logic and Social Analysis The suggested use of logic in the foregoing implies the use of the analytical method. The two premises take on real meaning only when they are separated into their constituent parts. “M”’ is a unit of related human beings and forms the subject of the major premise which must now be analysed. In its completed form the major premise might be stated in the form of the following syllogism: All trade unions utilize the strike. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers is a trade union. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers utilizes the strike. In this case the major premise is a universal, the minor premise is an affirmation and the conclusion is a particular. Or M—P S—M sS—P in which there are three objective elements for analysis, namely, trade unions in general (M), the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (S), and the strike (P). An analysis of the nature and function of trade unions in gen- 73 eral may turn out to be merely a proof of the major premise, i.e., the compulsions which necessitate the use of the strike. On the other hand, the analysis may materially modify the major premise. An analysis of the Amal- gamated Clothing Workers should reveal, not merely the afhrmation that it is a trade union but also the ways in which this particular trade union differs from all other trade unions. ‘The differences may not be sufficiently profound to alter the soundness of the minor premise and for all logical purposes we may assume that they are not. If, however, any valid differences are noted, they may serve as the clue to the cre- ative factor in the conclusion. From the strictly logical point of view the analytical process may be nothing more than a verification or proof of the two premises. From the viewpoint of cre- ative logic, the analysis may point the way to alternative conclusions, to new experience and to an altered interpretation. Something of this sort appears to have taken place in connection with the example above stated. The Amalga- mated Clothing Workers does not utilize the strike in order to achieve its ends. At any rate, it does not always do so and this is sufficient to make the conclusion a variable. In other words, the conclusion is logically true but not actually true. Whether or not this variable conclusion has been reached by formal reasoning matters little. The fact is that the Amalgamated Cloth- 74 ing Workers is a trade union, that trade unions utilize arbitration boards, impartial chairmen, joint investigating commissions, education, et cetera, in place of the strike. The validity of the variables rests not in logic but in activity, not in statics but in dynamics. If the various relations between groups could be subjected to rigorous analysis, it might be revealed that logic frequently stands in the way of new ex- perience. Analysis ° is the preliminary to scientific ex- perimentation. The breaking up of wholes ren- ders the parts susceptible to minute scrutiny and experiment. But analysis is more than this; the scientific investigator may be the last to note the possible variable relations between parts and the analyst may transcend the scientist in pointing to fruitful explanations. The infer- ence is not that the two processes are separate; the unique function of analysis is merely stated. Social analysis of this character is a prerequisite of social science. The chief social conflicts of our time, nations versus nations, racial groups versus racial groups, religious groups versus re- ligious groups, employers versus employees, rural populations versus urban populations, ® For an excellent illustration of the creative use of analysis see Pitkin’s analysis of ““The Adjustment of the Flatfish to Various Backgrounds” in The New Real- ism, p. 397. Also “A Defense of Analysis,” by Spaul- ding, in the same volume. 75 cannot be understood, to say nothing of being approached constructively, until the wholes are broken up into parts. Our sociological defini- tions themselves await this process.*° It may be possible to think in wholes but it is utterly impossible to act in wholes. ‘To “‘see in part now,” i.e., to act in part is the most effective method of making possible a future seeing of the whole. Analysis is the method of seeing and acting in part. 4. More Than One Conclusion Possible When Interests Are at Stake ‘You cannot take seriously the attempt to prove two different conclusions from the same 10 The writer, in attempting to arrive at a working concept of a local community in American life, studied numerous so-called community activities or projects. He soon found that these activities were generated within small groups. After continued observation of these small groups and the resulting activities, he ar- rived at the conclusion that a functional view of a modern community could be stated only in terms of these groups (vital interest groups). The totality of these group interactions was called the “community process” and the community process in group terms constitutes a working definition of the local community. It will be seen at once how this analysis (plus certain experiments) led to a definition of the community which radically departs from the views which interpret the community as the totality of the citizenship, the totality of families, et cetera. The Community, E. C. Linde- man. 76 ¥ “ iT set of facts,’’** says the logician. But this is precisely what is continuously happening in all significant controversy involving human con- duct. Illustration: A body of tax experts makes a preliminary study of taxation in order to base future legislation on facts. Two sets of facts are involved: the capacity of citizens to pay and the needs of the government. Logically only one conclusion and hence one legislative bill based upon this conclusion is possible. It so happens, however, that the party of opposition . desires to cater to the taxpayers by contending against all increased government expenditures; this party will invariably oppose whatever tax measure is proposed by the party in power. The result is never the one single logical con- clusion. In answer to the above, the logician will state that the alternative conclusion represents an evasion of facts or a misuse of facts. Perhaps, but the very point is that facts are always used to fortify an interest. The single logical con- clusion is valid only when an abstract question is under discussion. When the discussion turns upon questions involving human interests, pur- poses, motives and desires, the logic of the facts may be used to point toward a number of con- clusions, only one of which may be utilized in 11 The Application of Logic, Alfred Sidgwick, p. 18. AL view of the practical situation in which the con- tending parties find themselves.** The logician’s formula must be reversed. We must take seriously the attempt to prove two conclusions from the same set of facts. Ac- tivity, life, must go forward. ‘The facts are never completely available and if they were, what force is there to convince each of the con- tending parties that the facts possess integrity, that they are invariable and absolute? Who is so naive, for example, as to believe that the problem of the German reparations will ever be settled upon a pure fact basis? If either France or Germany accepts the report of an ex- . pert commission on the amount to be paid, such 11a A series of suggestive illustrations of this proposed use of logic is contained in Chapters X, XI, and XIII; Thinking, Fred Casey. ‘“To say that a thing is straight is like saying a thing is right, neither statement has any meaning unless we connect it with some purpose, for example we might say that a certain piece of wood is straight for the purpose of making a window-frame but not for testing a lathe bed,” p. 143. And, still more pertinent to the theme of this volume are the illustrations presented under “‘Logic Applied to Mental and Moral Problems” (Chapter XI) where Mr. Casey says at the very outset: “Since the understanding can- not operate without the senses, and the senses cannot function unless in contact with reality, it is clear that men, if they reason at all, must reason about things, and naturally they look upon things from the stand- point of whether or not they serve some need; man’s needs, therefore, lie at the bottom of man’s reason.” 78 a acceptance will not be based upon mutual recog- nition of the facts but rather upon helplessness or strategy. The complete temper and state of mind of the two peoples will need to change before fact-concurrence can be made possible. 8. Unreliability and Inertia of Universals The so-called universal rules of logic which are the foundation of most major premises do not exist in the sphere of human affairs, if in- deed they exist atall. All men are mortal—all trade unions use the strike—all religious bodies have creeds—all wholes are equal to the sum of their parts—such are the logical universals, but whither do they lead? If universals of this type have any integrity at all, it is because they tepresent the accumulated evidence, as induc- tions, of every case within the type. Identity, or rather, similarity in particulars can never be established by reasoning, but must, as Bacon long ago suggested, always appear as the result of scientific observation and experimentation. And what such scientific analysis invariably demonstrates is that there are variables rather than universals. To begin with universals is a wasteful, cramping process. ‘The proper use of universals is experimental application to par- ticular cases and the validity of such universals is always dependent upon the liberating process which begins with particulars. oh Illustration: | In Professor Perry’s essay, already alluded to, the attempt is made to apply logical reason- ing to the query: ‘“‘Is There a Social Mind?” Considerable space is devoted to the subordi- | nate question: “Is society a compound, in the sense of being a whole of the same kind as its human members?” The logical procedure be-— gins with the rule as formulated by Whitehead and Russell in Principia Mathematica which reads: ‘‘Whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection.’’ Or, ‘‘the whole cannot be a member of itself.’’ By the skillful use of analogies borrowed from other levels, Professor Perry then circumvents the — rule “without logical offense’ (sic) and proves (a) that the whole may duplicate its members, — (b) that a society is a member of the same class as its members, (c) that the principle of unity in society may vary qualitatively and quan- titatively, and (d) that the principle of the © unity of the whole may be lower than that of its members.” The last deduction contains the only signifi- © cant conclusion of the above reasoning and its — utility must now be considered. The conclusion — as stated in its analogical form leads Professor Perry to say: “An ant-colony, in other words, is” a less developed animal (sic) than an ant.” (Curiously enough, on the succeeding pages he argues that society is not a gigantic man.) What Professor Perry intends to convey is 72“Ts There a Social Mind?” Ralph Barton Perry. American Journal of Sociology, May, 1922. 80 en ee eee made clear later when he intimates that the study of groups is not likely to be of great value and “‘it is more fruitful to study the history”’ of the individual man and of the individual woman than to study the history of the couple. The essential question now is: Has anything been discovered by this process of logical rea- soning, and if so, what is its value? In the first place most of the questions which Professor Perry raises have already been aban- doned by most social scientists. “The conclusion that the whole is less perfect and less effective than the members is a partial statement and therefore incorrect when analysed in relation to particular cases. Some activities may be per- formed by the group which the individual mem- bers cannot perform at all after the group comes into existence. The raison d’étre of gov- ernment, corporations, armies, as well as of the numerous smaller groups is that these associa- tions of individuals are capable of performing functions for which individuals are inadequate. A crowd or a mob may engage in activities which represent a lower standard than that of any of the individual members, but a crowd or mob is a transient, unstable group. This argu- ‘Ment is in reality without meaning, however. The comparison between an individual human being and a group must remain an analogy. One cannot in one breath proclaim that a group is not a person and in the next attempt to prove St that the group is less than the individual person ~ as though the two entities were of the same class, type or level. The chief importance of this illustration lies in its demonstration of the — cramping, non-liberating force of logic when ap- plied to human and social phenomena. On the basis of Professor Perry’s logic there is no fur- ther need for studying the group or society. The entire problem has been dismissed by an ingenious method of logical maneuvering. Wholesale dismissal of vexing problems is un-— worthy of the scientist who must possess the patience to allow his generalizations to emerge in proportion to the evidence of his particulars. The scientific beginning of the study of groups must be the discovery of what groups do and not the logical description of what groups are pre- sumed to be. 9g. Logic as an Instrument for Group Discussion Thus far logical method has been discussed almost wholly from the viewpoint of its formal-_ istic bases and from the viewpoint of its capa- city to contribute to discovery in the social sci- ences. The revolt against this interpretation of logic may be said to have begun with Bacon.* He contended against the Aristotelian use of 18See The Reconstruction of Philosophy, John Dewey. 82 reasoning as a conquest over mind and substi- tuted the objective of aiming at a conquest over nature. The formal methods of logic persist, however, and unfortunately in such processes as jurisprudence, which directly affect the activi- ties of groups, and in the inductions from so- ciological investigation. Logic may also be regarded as an instrument ‘in the art of inquiry, considered as a joint process of ascertainment and invention.” ** Every group utilizes discussion in one form or another as a means of arriving at joint deci- sions or concurrences. ‘This use of logic consti- tutes an important consideration for the analy- sis of group activity. Further treatment of this phase of logic will be postponed to later chap- ters where discussion is regarded as one of the terms of the category which includes activities of groups.*® 14 Essays in Experimental Logic, John Dewey, p. 25. The introduction to this book furnishes an excellent foundation for a critique of logical method. 15 Tf the reader desires to pursue this thesis further at this point, it is recommended that reference be made to the following volumes: How We Think, John Dewey. The Application of Logic, Alfred Sidgwick. The Use of Words in Reasoning, Alfred Sidgwick. _ Essays in Experimental Logic, John Dewey. Chance, _ Love and Logic, Charles §. Peirce. Joining in Public | Discussion, Alfred Dwight Sheffield (a particularly use- ~ ' : ful and practical exposition). 83 CHAPTER IV STATISTICAL METHOD STATISTICS is a method of adding integrity to facts by stating them in numerical or graphic form. ‘The statistician gathers and collates facts, and induces principles from facts. His method not only tells what is and what is hap- pening (rather what has happened), but it as- sumes to tell what is likely or certain to hap- pen in the future. ‘He wishes to use his data, which record past events, in order to establish definite physical or psychological laws.” * And the human mind is peculiarly sensitive to this method. ‘There is something so finite, so pris- tine, so assuring about a numeral that it enters the mind with an air of finality. Once facts are neatly tabulated in trim columns with distin- guished-appearing totals, the common mortal has no escape. If perchance he does attempt escape he can be completely trapped by the in- troduction of a terrifying formula of which the purpose is to eliminate any possible error from the calculation. , 1 Klements of saab ethod, W. I. King, p. 18. | 4 4 1. Uncritical Acceptance of Statistical Method by Social Scientists The application of statistical method to vari- ous forms of research and investigation has proceeded with alarming rapidity and with only a slight amount of criticism.2 The social sci- ences appear to have adopted the method in toto. Even the older sociologists, reared on the generalizations of Spencer and Comte, have embraced the new method with surprising cor- diality. ‘In measuring anything, tangible or intangible, it is necessary to remember that the _measuring process begins with counting items or units and that all subsequent procedures are statistical operations.” * Although statements such as the foregoing are generally and read- ily accepted, this affirmation contains at least two assumptions which are open to challenge. The first is that the only method of measuring (evaluating) an object or a process is to count its units and the second is that none other than the statistical method is needed after the ele- mentary counting is completed. One need only scrutinize some of the conclu- ? Unfortunately many of the critics of the statistical methods appear to base their opposition on a personal dislike for mathematics. “This of course fortifies the statisticians. 8 “The Measurement of Social Forces,” Franklin H. Giddings, Journal of Social Forces, November, 1921. 85 sions and predictions based upon this type of statistical social science in order to be made aware of its dangers. Professor Giddings, in one of the concluding paragraphs of the article quoted above, goes on to say: “All social forces are generated in grades A and B. They carry the entire load of social work. All progress is their achievement. Intelligence tests indicate that grade A comprises only four and one-half per cent of our total population and grade B only nine and one-half per cent.” That “all social forces are created by fourteen per cent of the total population” is ambiguous rhetoric even though it be substantiated by the unlimited | statistical tables of so-called intelligence tests. The statement does not in point of fact make good sense. What can be meant by social forces created by fourteen per cent of the popu- lation? Surely not that social forces are not influenced by the remaining eighty-six per cent? The definition of social forces which Giddings himself acclaims (“‘all energies that both origi- nate in society and produce social results”) pre- cludes the statement that such forces are cre- ated by fourteen per cent of the population. Putting the two statements together simply means that society is composed of fourteen per cent of the population. Upon the basis of this definition it would be interesting to determine statistically how many social scientists could — find a place in society! 86 y ay ri But the statistical method deserves better treatment even from those who are not com- pletely under its spell. How does statistics ar- rive at its conclusions, its laws and its predic- tions? Its preliminary processes are counting and the use of instruments of precision which make counting accurate. After its counting is done, the statistical method computes results by means of averages, correspondences, corre- lations, calculations of chance, permutations and dispersions. In order to discuss statistics as a means of social discovery it will be neces- sary to consider several of these secondary methods. 2. The Validity of the Average What validity does the ‘‘average”’ possess? One might accurately weigh ten thousand farm- ers and ten thousand bankers for the purpose of determining the average weight of farmers and bankers. Would this average weight be capable of giving any accurate information re- garding the weight of any individual farmer or banker? Obviously it would not. Nor would it be able to give any accurate information re- garding the weight of any individual farmer or banker if every individual in the two groups were weighed. This, the so-called absolute average, would establish a minimum and a maximum weight for farmers and bankers and 87 so long as the groups measured remained stat- ic, these measurements of limits would have the value of facts. A law of averages for the i rd respective weights of children at varying ages — has been in use for some time and the estab- lished minimum and maximum weights have — been useful in directing physicians and dieti- tians to fruitful experiments. But even in this case, the results are valuable only after empiri- — cal verification. And the ensuing experimenta- tion frequently reveals the hazard assumed — when the averages are taken as accurate indices of the normal and the abnormal. The process of increasing the number of © units of any given class measured is based upon ~ an inference, and a correct one, that the result- — ing average will tend to approach the real meas- urement of any individual in the class. This point, however, needs further analysis. It has been frequently demonstrated that averages — change little or not at all after a certain point — is reached. ‘Thus the computation of the aver- age income of five thousand tenant farmers may — give the same result as the computation of eight thousand or ten thousand. In this case we are not dealing with errors which may be compen- sating in both directions and hence may not viti- ate the final results. Rather we are dealing — with a phenomenon of quantitative measure- — ments which appears to indicate that certain — permutations and combinations tend to cancel 88 each other out of the equation. If we accept this mathematical picture, it means that we are obliged to assume that variations are less in the greater number. The opposite is, of course, actually true. Experimental observation indi- cates that one may expect to find more varia- tions in twenty thousand blades of grass than in one hundred. And what is true of blades of grass is true of the entire scope of plant and animal life. The difficulties here involved be- come apparent when the statistical method is considered in terms of human life and the so- cial process, 3. Correspondences and Correlations The most fruitful as well as the most danger- ous use of statistics (in the social sciences) pro- ceeds from its discovery of correspondences and correlations.* The horticulturist, for example, in observing a certain variety of apples dis- covers that high quality of flavor in the fruit corresponds with medium size. He may use the statistical method to determine how gen- erally this fact holds true for the entire variety # Although these two terms are used in a rather loose sense as connoting likenesses of kind in differing cases it should be understood that there is a technical distinc- tion between a correspondence and a correlation. Cor- respondence means that the same thing is discovered in varying cases, but correlation implies that such cor- respondences possess a so-called causal relation, 89 and may then proceed to make observations upon other varieties until he has collected suf- ficient data to be conclusive proof that this cor- respondence is universal. If he hypothecates this correspondence as a correlation, 1.e., a causal relation between size and flavor, he is still within his scientific rights. However, it must be remembered that the statistical proc- ess has not demonstrated this casual relation; — it has simply given indication that such a causal relation is likely to exist. The precise causal relation is still to be discovered by the plant physiologist and cannot, by the nature of the case, be discovered by the statistician.» ‘The causal relation is involved with growth, with process; and it is process which eludes the sta- tistician. Next to averages, correspondences and corre- lations are most frequently employed in the so- cial sciences. In the earlier and more naive pe- riods, the search was for correlations of crime. Delinquency was proved to be correlated with poverty, with drunkenness, with disease, with malnutrition and with most of the ills and 5“, . The task of the statistician is not so much to find the causality himself as to help others to find it. The statistician must be content if he can show that certain groups of numbers have marked differences, leaving it to physiology, meterology, and other sciences to explain these differences.” Westergaard, American Statistical Association Journal, September, 1916, p. 259, quoted by Whipple, p. 404, Vital Statistics. gO a le ts iy Te a oe handicaps of the human organism. Sociology, with its powerful reform sentiment, was nat- urally susceptible to the lure of the correlate. If statistics could prove that crime and inebriety were causally related, the inference was that crime would be lessened, perhaps eliminated, if the use of alcoholic beverages were prohibited. That there is a relation between drunkenness and crime is obvious, for the intoxicated person is an irresponsible person, and all persons in ir- responsible moods are likely to perform acts contrary to the accepted laws of the group. But the inference that all crime or most crime will cease when alcoholic beverages can no longer be legally consumed is a very loose and unscientific assumption. It is, in fact, a very partial, inadequate and unwarranted interpre- tation of jurisprudence as well as of behavior. Assumptions based upon such use of statistics have done much to discredit the social sciences. The facetious critic, observing such conclusions, is not far from truth when he affirms that “‘any- thing may be proved by statistics.” The so- called “‘bath-tub” sociology which is so much derided in scientific circles is an implication that any one who has the patience and the curiosity to count all of the bath-tubs in the houses of a certain area and then to write a treatise on his discoveries may call himself a_ sociologist. “Lies, damned lies, and statistics’ is another of the colloquial though somewhat justified casti- gI gations from which statistical method suffers in the minds of the skeptical. When statistical methods are utilized by ex- perts without the least attempt to make their conclusions intelligible to ordinary non-mathe- matical human beings, the result is not merely a diminution of faith in scientific procedure of a statistical nature, but of scientific procedure of all sorts. ‘Thus, the editor of an agricultural journal, knowing his constituency far better than the experts, comments: ‘Ho! Hum! The daily press has been howling so much of late about wheat prices that many have come to take it seriously and believe something is wrong. We wondered about it ourselves until we saw the explanation of the whole situation given in the latest Bulletin of the X Experiment Station, in the form of a large chart with the legend as follows: ‘Consumption curve 1878-1922, 141.144 + 4.033x + 1.685x*. Production curve 483.003 — 71.956x + 6.799x”. There you are. Any farmer now knows something is wrong.” This editorial may be termed a righteous form of cynicism, and if it tends to widen the gulf between the expert and the people whom his figures concern, the expert can blame only himself and his methods. There is already a widespread skepticism of even the feeblest at- tempts to popularize statistical and graphical methods. ‘“‘Map-dotters,” the opprobious term 92 applied to those who desire to give numerical strength to arguments lacking other support, is indicative of the common good sense which penetrates beyond mere figures and charts. 4. Correspondences and Correlations as Analogies Correspondences and correlations are not far removed from analogies. All three are means of discovering and verifying likeness, sameness, similarity in things, attributes or functions. In fact (since the statistical correlation can do no more than the analogy in providing proof of the actual existence of causal interrelations), there is some justification for calling a correla- tion a mathematical analogy. When correla- tions are utilized in analyses of social phe- nomena, they point the way toward fruitful ex- perimentation and research. Insofar as such correlations emerge from observations of hu- man activities which are guided largely by cer- tain well-established habits of a particular group, they point the way toward relatively sound prediction. Rural populations are, for example, generally presumed to be conserva- tive in thought; in this case, conservative habits of thought and agricultural habitation and vo- cation appear to be correlated. ‘This correla- tion may be statistically established and upon 93 such a premise it is entirely possible to fore- cast the attitude of the agricultural population in regard to any new economic or political pro- posal of radical tendencies. Large sections of public life proceed upon the basis of such com- mon-sense correlations and within their limits they are wholly sound. But the important fact to keep in mind is that it has not been proved that life in the country is a direct cause of con- servative-mindedness. Life is not so simple. Some of the foremost leaders of urban life are also conservative in thought. ‘This hints at the possibility of searching for the causes of con- servatism in other directions. There can be no valid objection to increasing the use of statistics as a means of discovering correspondences and correlations in the social complex. The objections arise from the use and interpretation of the discoveries. Many statistical interpretations act as a stop-gap to real knowledge. The results ensue from the crass use of the statistics themselves or from the application of logical method to the discov- ered correlations. A high correlation between two variables is often assumed to be a repre- sentation of a real causal interrelation in spite of the fact that many statisticians continue to give warning against this process. On page 417, Whipple (Vital Statistics) says, “. . . It is not the function of correlations to demon- strate causality,’ and then proceeds on page 94 ee 419 to discuss how certain epidemiologists uti- lize correlations in arriving at explanations of causality, mentioning only in an incidental way that experimental evidence was employed. 5. Conclusions of Statistics Comparable to the Conclusions of Logic “The drawing of conclusions is the function of logic, a process of reasoning, and fallacious reasoning should not be charged against statis- tics.” ° This is the crux of the entire statistical prepossession. The drawing of conclusions is not the function of logic but rather that of sci- ence. And logic is not science. Mathematics and logic, and hence statistics, deal with con- cepts, but real experience is a flux of concept plus percept, plus experiment. ‘Things conceived are not wholly known, and conceptual knowledge is always partial knowledge. Until perceptions and experimentation are taken into account, all social statistics must remain as partial, inter- mittent, bracketed bits of the superficial and measurable facts of social process.’ Because 6 Vital Statistics, George C. Whipple, p. 9. 7“, . To assume, therefore, that the only possible philosophy (and science may legitimately be interpo- lated here for philosophy) must be mechanical and mathematical, and to disparage all inquiry into the other sorts of questions is to forget the extreme diversity of aspects under which reality undoubtedly exists.’ Some Problems of Philosophy, William James, p. 24. 95 of the conceptual ease of using numerals as rep- resentations of facts, scientists and near-scien- tists continue to deal with such representations as if they were in themselves possessed of real- ity. Things are pragmatically, i.e., usefully real when they can be both perceived and con- ceived. The anti-intellectualist movement of modern times constitutes a violent attack against this partial and inadequate conceptual manner of dealing with problems, but unfor- tunately the attack appears to have missed its chief mark; the great bulk of social science as it is written and taught is still an intellectualist or conceptualist attempt to explain what is hap- pening in the realm of the relations between human beings. Instead of stemming the tide of this intellectualist social science, statistics has — thus far served largely to substitute one mode of intellectualism for another. Where once the social scientist was content to stop with fine- sounding teleological explanations, he now stops with the equally alluring coefficients of cor- relation of the statistician. And this “jump” from philosophy to mathematics was made, tragically enough, just at a time when philos- ophy itself was emerging by new methods and new influences of science out of its teleological morass. Modern philosophy is asking ques- tions which are pertinent and penetrating while modern social science is giving doubtful answers to half-formed queries. And worst of all, it 96 a eet gives its answers in terms of the most ab- stract of all the allies of science, namely, math- ematics. 6. Statistics; a Check upon Discovery, not Discovery The above argument is not for the abandon- ment of statistical method in the social sciences; rather it is for its higher uses and a frank ad- mission of its limitations. “It is a common ob- servation that a science begins to be exact when it is quantitatively treated. What are called the exact sciences are no other than the mathe- matical ones.’’* ‘The illustration used to sub- stantiate the above statement is taken from the field of botany. Botany, the writer continues, begins to assume scientific proportions when stamens and pistils are counted and compared _and later used as the basis of classification. This is all very well if we are to assume that science ends with classifications. Numerical classifications are still in the region of the “what” and science must penetrate to the “how.” Moreover, the term ‘‘exact”’ ® calls for considerable modification even in the sphere of botanical classification. Phases of social science may be brought 8 Chance, Love and Logic, C. S. Peirce, p. 61. ® It has been left to an eminent mathematician, Ein- stein, to deflate at least a portion of so-called exactness. 97 within the sphere of statistics.°° This use of statistics may become an aid to discovery in two directions: (1) a certain amount of social sta- tics is essential when the point is reached for making broad generalizations in the field of so- cial dynamics, and statistics is the technical mode of recording such items; (2) discovered social processes may be checked statistically in order to determine their extent, providing the proc- ess can be adequately stated in numerical form. In each case the statistical method is not the means of discovery but rather a check on dis- coveries already made. Such checking, instead of leading to dogmatic conclusions should prove to be the spur to improving the other methods of research. In brief, statistics cannot be re- garded as an integral part of the method of social research but merely as the mathematical © check on its discoveries. This point is well stated in a current verse: | ‘He gathers data: The mathematics of a comet’s curve Or when the oriole nests, 10 “While I ascribe the utmost importance to pre- cision in preparing the data of social sciences, I do not think its true aim is to bring society within the sphere of arithmetic . . . Statistical uniformities do not show that it is possible to predict numerically the working — of intelligence in new situations, and of course that is the decisive test.’ Social Process, C. H. Cooley, pp. 398-399. 98 The tensile strength of steel Or the decline of cholera in the Philippines. “He does not formulate laws Or institute practical measures Or touch the kindling spark of imagination To facts observed; He counts and sifts and classifies. “He is no architect, inventor, poet; Yet on his faithfulness we build: A plumb line wrong, And all the bricks are tumbling round our heads. He bent the timbers of Columbus’ galleon and squared the stones of Chartres, He pounded Titian colors And chronicled events that Shakespeare sang. *“A slave, some call him. But is he not— This man who dares not lose himself in beauty For fear he miss a fact— The proofreader of God?” ™ No one would or should scoff at the proof- reader, nor does any one expect him to produce creative work. His is the task of discovering error, not truth. In the vast complex of life with its consequently increasing subdivision of abor, the proofreader has come to be indis- u“The Statistician,” Charles Wharton Stork, The Forum, September, 1923. 99 pensable. The statistician is capable of placing the correct numerals representing the right facts in the right columns, providing, and this is the important consideration, sufficient scientific. knowledge is available to make known when a numeral adequately represents a fact, and whether or not the facts bear any important re lation to each other, together with an explana- tion of the nature of that relation. | 7. Important Distinctions Involved in Rela- tions Escape Statistical Method Statistics is not a method of discovery; it is a method of tabulating discovered facts. The Census Bureau, for example, tabulates the num-. ber of white people and the number of colored. people residing within the borders of the United States, but the distinction between white and colored people is a biological, not a mathemati-. cal one. The Census Bureau does not make the distinction; it simply records facts which have emanated from the distinction. This illustra-. tion affords an opportunity for pointing out how dificult a matter it is to get social (in this case, bio-social) facts expressed by means of a nu- meral. Inthe United States some three to four million persons are recorded in the Census Re- port as negroes although they are partially white. At what point in the intermixture of 100 races does the colored person become white, and vice versa? Mathematically it may be cor- rect to classify a person who is 31/32 white as a negro, but biologically and sociologically such a classification is open to grave doubts. If in- dividual men or individual women are being counted, the numeral 1 or the numeral 999 serves the same purpose as the word ‘“‘man’”’ or the word “woman” repeated once or nine hun- dred and ninety-nine times. The same holds true for certain organized groups such as churches; the Census report on the number of Methodist congregations in the United States is undoubtedly as correct as counting canbe. The problem, however, appears when the attempt is made to state by means of a numeral what is happening between two or more persons, or be- tween the Methodist congregations and the Baptist congregations. When, for example, a statistical report states that out of 3,040 trade union strikes of a given period, the unions won 35 per cent and the em- ployers won 65 per cent, what inferences may legitimately be drawn? The logic of the statis- tics points unmistakably to such conclusions as (a) the employers are more powerful than the unions, (b) the unions were in the wrong 35 times out of each 100, (c) the strike as a ‘weapon is decreasing in effectiveness, et cetera, etcetera. But none of these inferences is valid. IOI Very few strikes are either won or lost. If the workers make ten demands as the basis of the strike and only one of these demands is granted, it cannot be said that they have lost the strike. The single demand granted may have been pre- cisely the one of greatest importance. Every social fact stated in statistical form is subject to error of this character. Statistical increase in divorce is assumed to be an index of the de- cay of the family. In reality it may be an indi- cation of the opposite tendency. A couple liv- ing together under conditions of continuous friction cannot be said to be one indicative of — higher family standards. Statistical evidence possesses integrity only when its inferences of causality are founded upon prior scientific experiment and observa- tion. Without these foundations, no form of — evidence is so susceptible of diverse interpreta-_ tion as that which emanates from statistical ta- ; bles.12. And when the tables are further re-— duced to charts, the burden of possible error becomes even greater. ‘The fine though impor-— tant lines of distinction which may still be dis- cerned in the numerals are entirely blurred over 12'The control of bacterial diseases may have in- creased the average length of life ten years in a decade. _ In the meantime, organic diseases of the vital organs may have increased so that the effective life span is in reality shorter. At least five plausible conclusions have — been drawn by authorities from this simple statistical — statement. a 102 or lost in the sharply-defined black on white of the chart. The social sciences must deal with relations and with correlations. The discovery of rela- tions and of the meaning of relations must pre- cede the tabulation of discoveries. Social sci- ence is chiefly concerned with precisely those facts which either escape the statistical method entirely or are injected too hastily, namely, the facts of relation. The symbolism (language) of these sciences will need to be greatly im- proved before the application of statistics is likely to prove helpful. 8. The Validity of Dispersion no Greater than the Validity of the Average The statistical method of computing disper- sion demands attention if for no other reason than its frequent application to social problems. “The dispersion of a group may be measured by the difference in size or characteristics of the most extreme items, in other words, the range, or it may be measured by the general deviation of the items from the type.” ** The most fa- miliar use of dispersion interpretations occurs in connection with the distribution of wealth, the standard of living, income, wages, diseases, deaths, births, et cetera. Interpretations with 18 Elements of Statistical Method, W. I. King, pp. 141 and 143. 103 social implications derived from so-called intel- ligence tests * are also based chiefly upon the statistical method of dispersion. It will be seen at once that a dispersion is merely an iny cted average and that the same objections which were stated for averages are equally applicable to dispersions. If the average income of ten per cent of the families of a given commi ity is $800 per year and the average income of an- other ten per cent is $8,000 per year, it may be said that the dispersion is great. On the other hand, if one extreme group has an income per family of $850 per year and the other extreme group has an average income of $875 per year, it may be said that the dispersion is small and negligible. Such calculations are, of course, amenable to diverse interpretations and n9 gross conclusions are permissible until consider - able knowledge is available regarding the rela- tion between income, value of services, standard of living, et cetera. And when the method of dispersion is applied to such debatable and quali- tative facts as are involved in intelligence and capacity to make social contributions the dif- ficulties are obvious. 14 Interpretations such as Professor Giddings gives on p. 85. 104 SYNTHESIS OF METHOD . A FOOTNOTE TO PART I ne Postscript 4 THE various methods of social discovery discussed in the foregoing chapters are, if prop- erly used, capable of revealing phases of objec- tive happenings within the social process. In any broad study leading to generalizations, each method will undoubtedly play its part. In fact, it>is doubtful whether these various methods are, strictly speaking, separable. Logic, analogy aid statistics flow into each other, and analysis of numerous modern social investigations indi- cates that the investigators are scarcely aware of the transition from one method to another. The line of demarcation between historical method and the other methods enumerated is more or less sharply defined. It has come to be the custom to introduce sociological studies with historical descriptions of the factors in- volved in the problem to be investigated; this is, of course, not exactly the use of the histori- cal method but the manner of these historical introductions indicates that there exists an ac- cepted and clearly-defined distinction between 105 historical methed and other methods. But even here the distinction tends to be blurred by modi- fications of historical method; there is, for ex- ample, one school of thought which insists that history itself can become scientific only when it has learned to utilize statistical methodology. The critical portions of the foregoing chap- ters may now be placed in the background while the attempt is made to summarize the ways ac- cording to which the positive uses of the meth- ods discussed may be synthetically utilized in social discovery: The Historical Method: (a) Assists in the selection of significant events of the past and hence provides clues in regard to the significant events of the present and future. (b) Leads toward the sifting of evidence in- volved in past events and hence aids a similar sifting of evidence in connec- tion with contemporary events. (c) Tends to correct hasty cause-and-effect arrangements in event sequences. (d) Helps the independent investigator at work on an isolated problem to view this problem in terms of larger social wholes. The Logical Method: (a) Suggests fruitful generalizations which lead toward further investigation, verifi- cation and experimentation. 106 (b) (d) Leads to the discovery of variables; the multiple conclusions of logic (granting that multiple conclusions are allowable) may become the starting-points for scientific inductions. Encourages rigorous thinking in connec- tion with all stages of the discovery process and may hence be utilized as a test for inductions otherwise reached. May be utilized as one of the means of breaking up ‘‘wholes,” i.e., separating a given problem into its constituent parts before the real process of investi- gation begins. (Analysis.) The Analogical Method: (a) (b) Leads to the discovery of similarities, differences, correspondences and proba- ble correlations. Furnishes examples and illustrations on various levels (animal behavior, indi- vidual behavior, group behavior, et cetera) which may lead to the discov- ery of significant unknown factors and significant relations. The Statistical Method (a) (b) (c) Provides a numerical record of social status. Furnishes a graph of the known and separable factors in social change. Leads to the discovery of averages, dis- persions, correspondences and probable correlations. 107 (d) Provides numerical verifications for dis- covered correspondences and correla- tions. (e) Makes possible the statement of meas- urable data in precise terms. History, logic, analogy and statistics are thus seen to be integral parts of the process of social discovery. Every important explanation of a social phenomenon includes what is known of similar phenomena in the past, what may be reasoned about the present phenomena, what may be inferred by comparison with similar phenomena, and what may be measured and calculated in the present phenomenon. A given investigator may not either consciously or un- consciously utilize all of these methods, but be- fore his conclusions have run the gamut of criticism of his fellow scientists they will be tested according to each method, with the pos- sible exception of the analogical. Synthesis of method may not always take place in the actual investigations but it will invariably be applied before conclusions are accorded scientific in- tegrity, 108 PART II A PROPOSED STEP TOWARD THE IMPROVEMENT OF METHODS OF SOCIAL DISCOVERY fi - ait ae poe Par Reds ae if dies \ i \ a ‘eine 5 14 tk y AN a CHAPTER V PSYCHOLOGY AND THE URGENCY OF NEW METHOD \Mopern life is group life. The individual of the modern world who has no vital adher- ence to and expression through a group is an individual who plays a diminishing role; he is in- significant and unimportant to the social proc- €ss in direct proportion to his lack of member- ship in a functioning group. ‘This is true of the banker, the employer, the laborer, the teacher, the student, the politician, the farmer, the preacher—true, in brief, in an increasing de- gree of all persons with the possible exception of the artist. But even the artist gains a pecu- liar significance by belonging to a particular “school.” “Indeed it seems as if the percep- tion of beauty as well as the creation of beauty in art is essentially social; because the great periods of art have been precisely those in which the social consciousness was highly de- veloped.” * 1 The Contact Between Minds, C. Delisle Burns, Macmillan, 1923, p. 101. pid gp) The group is one of the means wherewith the individual expresses and strives toward his dominant interests. ‘The task of social scien- tists is to discover the nature of these group- ings and their functional attributes. The meth- ods hitherto utilized by social scientists are in- adequate for the task. At any rate, these methods cannot attain their highest use until a better understanding of what is to be discov- ered is brought into existence. 1. The Social Group: Description Possible Only in Psychological Terms a) What is a social group? b) How does a social group behave in rela- tion to its total environment? The next step in the evolution of the social sciences is likely to be the development of a scientific method which is capable of illumi- nating the above questions.2, Whatever else a group may be, there is sufficient reason for view- ing it as any number of human personalities act- ing jointly to express and attain a common in- terest. “Chis common interest may be revealed — as purpose, desire, feeling, will, thought or ac- tion—depending upon the angle from which the © view is taken. The idealist may insist upon 2 They are in reality but one question, since the an- swer to (a) can only be revealed by answering (b). I1I2 pepe a seeing the group as the expression of common hopes, wishes, aspirations. Philosophers of a certain turn of mind will not be content until the group is described in terms of a common will. Some psychologists will insist upon a com- mon mind. The practical man of affairs will probably waive all of these in lieu of a common activity. Each of these viewpoints must be stated in psychological terms. Interests, pur- poses, desires, feelings, will, thought, hopes, wishes, aspirations and activities are terms which possess psychological content.® The necessity of viewing social or group be- havior from the psychological point of view has been repeatedly pointed cut, but very little has been accomplished to make such ‘‘viewing”’ scientifically possible. ‘That group behavior cannot be explained in terms of structural cate- gories 1s obvious, since no form of behavior can be thus interpreted. The group is a phenome- non which may be sociologically conceived; in activity it is a sociological phenomenon which can be studied and interpreted only psychologi- cally. This statement is not to be taken as an attempt to set psychology over against soci- ology, but rather to indicate their interdepend- ence. The psychologist who insists upon indi- vidualizing behavior is probably as far wrong 3 Activity is here used as a specific response and spe- cific responses constitute behavior; hence, activity may be legitimately used as a psychological symbol. 113 as the sociologist who insists upon viewing it only as a social phenomenon. ‘‘Now that we know that there is no such thing as a separate ego, that individuals are created by reciprocal interplay, our whole study of psychology is be- ing transformed.’ * ‘The whole study of so- ciology is destined to be transformed in like manner and for like reasons. 2. The Utility of Subjective and Introspective Ideas One need not be merely a confirmed ad- dict of the ‘“‘new”’ in order to understand why so much emphasis is being placed upon the psychological factors of life. (This emphasis, which may now seem to some undue, will undoubtedly diminish as method in the other social sciences improves.) One by one the vari- ous determinants which were presumed to act as unyielding and unfailing fates in marking the course of human behavior have dropped by the wayside. Manno longer believes himself to be the helpless victim of gods, fates or innate forces. Even economic determinism, the latest of the series of fates, has not retained its once convincing role. Gradually but inevitably man’s searchings have shorn him of his fond determ- inants, his exterior controls. ‘“The importance * The New State, Mary P. Follett, p. 19. 114 of the new psychology is that it acknowledges man as the centre and shaper of his universe. In his nature all institutions are latent and per- force must be adapted to this nature.” > ‘The one remaining determinant, if indeed it may be so called, that shapes the destinies of men, is what happens between the minds of men. (Mind is here used to include the total equipment with which man responds to his environment—all that enters into behavior from the side of hu- man nature.) ‘The idealist with Kantian lean- ings may interpret this statement as a vindica- tion of his assumption that ideas rule the world. In one sense the idealist is right; if he recog- nizes that ideas are not the products of an in- dividual mind, he can make out a plausible case. Considered from the practical viewpoint it mat- ters little whether time and space and move- ment have any reality outside of man’s percep- tions and conceptions if man may deal with these perceptions and conceptions in such man- ner as to produce results which are satisfactory to him. Perhaps the better statement would be: if man can deal with these percepts and con- cepts in such manner as to serve his ends and ‘not allow them to become his destroyers. ‘This 5 The New State, M. P. Follett, p. 19. See also p. 1103, The Dance of Life, Havelock Ellis: “We make our own world; when we have made it awry, we can remake it, approximately truer, though it cannot be ab- solutely true, to the facts.” LYS is, however, a totally different statement. The introduction of the term ‘‘destroyers’’ modifies the Kantian doctrine; it implies that the ante- cedents or referents of percepts and concepts have existential reality. They cannot be de- stroyers if they are nothing more than at- tributes of the mind of man. Man cannot de- stroy himself with his mind. Thus the idealist is right, provided he makes certain reservations; the realist is also right if he is permitted to ar- range his definition of mind, ideas, et cetera. But it must be repeated that it matters little which of these two viewpoints is utilized. An understanding of what happens when man be- © haves is the important point. For the social ” sciences to understand what happens when groups behave is what matters. A full under-— standing of what happens will perhaps forever escape the knowledge of man; regions of the et a — “mind” and its functioning in behavior may exist which subjective terms only can explain. But the area of subjectivism has been dimin-— ished in other spheres of life and there are no reasons to expect its diminution to stop. The assumption that science is the enemy of subjec-— tivism has beclouded many issues and retarded © the codperative intelligence of numerous think-— ers. Science is the absorber of subjectivism, not its antithesis. What was regarded as true ac- cording to subjective canons does not remain as — false after objective means have demonstrated 116 its subjectivity. It does not remain at all. Whatever of value was contained in the sub- jective idea is incorporated in the new objective idea; the rest is discarded. The tolerant scien- tist does not ridicule subjective ideas for he must know that these have provided him with motives for objective research. The intolerant scientist has created a new sort of scientific snobbery; he refers to persons who deal with mystical and subjective ideas as though they were made of inferior stuff. Subjective ideas are useful if for no other reason than that they confront the scientist with something against which to tilt his methodology. Most of the scientific problems of the present have emerged out of subjective generalizations of the past. This book and the studies upon which it is based could hardly have been undertaken except as a reaction to subjective interpretations of group behavior; in some respects it may justly be regarded as a “‘reflex”’ of those ideas. 3. Psychological Approaches to Social and Economic Problems There are numerous evidences that psy- chology has been responsible for certain newer ways of viewing social behavior and the social process. Carleton Parker,® Ordway Tead,‘ and 6 The Casual Laborer and ‘Instincts in Industry are, of course, outdated; II7 others have sought to interpret economic prob- lems from psychological points of view. The Acquisitive Society,® Incentives in the New In- dustrial Order,® and Economic Motives* are all psychological interpretations of economic and social facts. And the literature on social psychology has grown apace since Ross released his volume in 1917 with the prefatory baptism: “Perish the book, if only social psychology may go forward.’ Graham Wallas,* Walter Lipp- mann” and Herbert Croly ** have performed a similar service for political science. The lists might be extended to include philosophy, edu- cation, history and social work, for in all of these fields the characteristic note of the past decade reveals psychological quality and con- tent. The increased use of the psychological approach to social, political and economic prob- lems occurred during the period in which psy- chology as an independent science made its ‘greatest advances in method.** Such is always largely because their integrity depended upon a naive assumption of the predominating roéle of instinctive behavior. 8R. H. Tawney. 9 J. A. Hobson. 10-7, ‘Con Dickinson: 11 Human Nature and Politics. 12,4 Preface to Politics. 13 Federalism. 14’The fact that psychologists are themselves in- volved in a bitter controversy in which the behavior- 118 ' . the case: when one science improves its method so that its facts are accepted because its method is believed to be valid, this science exerts an in- creasing influence over all related sciences. (The influence of mathematics upon other sciences may be partly due to the fact that mathematics is nothing but method.) This is, of course, not the sole reason for the greatly in- creased psychological emphasis in the social sci- ences; more important is the discovery that the social process is a psychological phenomenon."® 4. The Social Group; a New Quality To go beyond the bounds of the present study is unnecessary in order to appreciate why it is essential that psychological approaches and tools should be employed in the task of social ists are pitted over against all the rest is exactly what might have been expected. When new methods evolve, certain devotees of old methods are always unable to make the necessary adjustment to the newer method. ‘These fall by the wayside. Rather they stand by the wayside and shout on behalf of the old! This does not mean that the behaviorists are all right and the others all wrong. .It simply means that the great advances in psychological method owe their ac- celeration to the behavioristic impact. 18 ‘This does not mean that the emphasis will always remain with psychology. Many reasons lead to the conclusion that the next emphasis may shift to the physiological level. The behaviorists are themselves largely responsible for this change. 119 discovery. The delimited problem of this study was to discover the modus vivendi and the modus operandi—the why and the how—of specific groups of farmers organized into asso- ciations for the purposes of marketing their crops cooperatively. No attempt at describing these groups proved to be fruitful unless the descriptions turned upon activities. In this con- nection, the social scientist’s task is similar to that of the biologist who is confronted with a new animal species. He cannot provide an ac- curate description of the animal until he has observed the animal in activity—until he knows how the animal will behave. The recognition of this fact constitutes the chief distinction between the older taxonomic or classificatory science and the modern science of function. Structural descriptions may appear first since they are simpler and more superficial, but the complete account of the animal cannot be given until it is known how the animal will act. In the same manner the social scientist may describe human groupings but he will not know the significance of these groups until he observes the groups behaving. At this point the analogy becomes more than a mere analogy. The human group cannot be described at all until at least a portion of its behavior is under- stood. From the purely descriptive point of view, the group remains a congeries of individ- uals. From the activity point of view, the I20 group becomes a new quality. New qualities are the resultant of new relations. The tones which result from chorus-singing may be designated by the same mathematical scale utilized for individual singing but the quality of these tones can never be repeated or reproduced by the individual. Voices in rela- tion, from a functional point of view, are so far modified that it may be said that a new quality has been created. ‘If I pull ona rope with another man, I can feel that the pull is different from what it is when I pull alone; but when we pull together I cannot distinguish one part or element in the pull which is mine and another part which is his. By some means I am aware of this joint pull; and it seems rea- sonable to say that I enjoy this joint pull, if I enjoy my pulling alone. Similarly when I put my suggestion together with another man’s and we agree to a common opinion, I can be aware that the opinion is different from what it is when I form my own opinion; but when we agree, I cannot distinguish one element in the opinion which is mine and another which is his.” @/} Farmers who were at one time simply in- dividuals growing and marketing their crops as individuals suddenly became parts of groups— organized groups with implied modes of be- 16 The Contact Between Minds, C. Delisle Burns, Macmillan, 1923, p. 15. I2I havior. These groups constituted the object of the investigator’s study. Five thousand in- dividual farmers growing and marketing their products as individuals mean nothing to the social scientist, but five thousand farmers or- ganized to market their crops codperatively— pooling their crops and hence their interests— mean everything to him. 5. The Activity of the Group: Description Inadequate by Use of the Atstorical, Logical or Analogical Method What history reveals: ‘That similar farmer groups have failed; that they lacked leadership ; that they lacked the services of honest experts; that the forces in opposition were always too powerful; et cetera. All of this, history tells, and it is all worth knowing. But this group differs from the previous groups which have failed. It possesses a new leadership, a new principle of marketing, a new principle of organization; it utilizes experts of the highest order. Moreover, it exists and functions in a new environment, or at least in an environment which has changed considerably since the failures. This movement appears to constitute an event of far greater significance than those of a similar kind recorded by history. What logic reveals: Logic may isolate the various principles (premises) upon which the 122 new cooperative movement is based and then proceed to reason toward either failure or suc- cess. This was done. ‘The reasons of the op- position gave eloquent proof of inevitable fail- ure. The reasons of the leaders of the co- operative movement gave equally eloquent proof of inevitable success. There are no more grounds for believing the one than the other; both sets of logic are based upon premises which are modified by opinion, and hence the conclu- sions carry along the color of.the opinionated premise. Logic can, however, Jead to a minute analysis of many series of possible results. It can proceed to multiply the question: If this happens, what is likely to happen? ‘This con- tinuous querying should lead to experimenta- tion. Only the experiments will tell whether the logic was fruitful. What analogy reveals: The farmers’ co- operative movement may be compared with numerous other codperative ventures. One of the leaders of the movement, for example, in a public address said, pointing to Judge Gary of the United States Steel Corporation: “Yes, Judge Gary, we have become prosperous by taking a leaf from your own note-book.” ** How much is such an analogy worth to the in- vestigator? Evidently it was of importance to the leader; he was comparing the farmers’ or- ganization with the United States Steel Cor- 17 American Magazine, April, 1923. 123 poration with the obvious motive of enhancing the prestige of the farmers’ organization. But there is no generally valid basis for the compari- son. [nits technique of organization the Steel Corporation is almost the antithesis of the farmers’ codperative organization. On the one hand are farmer-members who hold no stock and who receive no profits through the direct ministrations of the codperative, while on the other hand there are stock-holders who have invested funds with only one purpose, namely, to secure dividends. In the farmers’ codpera- tive there is the assumption that the producers control the organization; in the Steel Corpora- tion there is the assumption that the manage- ment controls the organization. ‘There are at least seven other distinct aspects of difference between a farmers’ coOperative organization and the Steel Corporation, any one of which would be sufficient to vitiate any comparison between the two organizations.1™ Would a more accurate specimen of analogy prove to be more fruitful? ‘The farmers of Denmark have, for example, conducted success- 172 Tt must be admitted, however, that the actual re- sults of some of the older codperative associations are not easily distinguishable from the results attained by capitalistic corporations. In terms of these results the two types of productive distribution are similar in technique, but codperatives of this character have eliminated a vital factor in codperative principles. 124 ful codperative marketing organizations for more than a half century. In proportion to the similarity of principles involved in these two cases, there would undoubtedly be considerable value in making comparative studies. This was also done. But it was found that the Danish situation contains many elements not included in the American situation, and vice versa. The Danish farmers all speak the same language, at- tend the same church, and participate in a com- mon culture. On the other hand, the American farmers adhere to numerous religious bodies and in addition are separated linguistically and culturally. When these and many other dif- ferences are taken into consideration it becomes evident that the analogy can only suggest cer- tain clues. A discussion of what statistics may reveal is premature since the utilization of statistics de- pends upon certain categories which are not yet available; there is no reason for counting until it is known what is to be counted. History, logic, and analogy point the direction toward the things to be counted, or rather studied. 6. The Group as a New Series of Relations: Description Impossible Unless New Cate- gories are Invented The investigator is forced to the analysis of new categories. ‘The following questions are 125 suggested to him as a result of his attempts to use history, logic and analogy: Why do farmers join a movement which has invariably failed in the past? What has been learned from past ex- periences ? What changes have taken place in the environment of the coOperative move- ment? Why are the leaders assured of success? Why is the opposition assured of failure? Are the motives of stock-holders in the Steel Corporation comparable to the mo- tives of the farmers? What is the relation between religion, language, culture, et cetera, and the co- operative movement? To what extent do the new leaders of the codperative movement express the mo- tives, desires, ideas, et cetera, of the farmers? We shall not begin to formulate new cate- gories of information here, but merely point to the pertinence of the above questions. Each question possesses psychological content. None can be answered without a knowledge of motives, purposes, desires, customs, mores, leadership, representation, consent, idea-sys- tems, power, et cetera—all psychological 126 ei Pers gy c2s ve terms or concepts. Psychology therefore fur- nishes the urgency of new sociological method. Man behaves. Psychology is a method for studying and interpreting his behavior. Groups behave. Collective psychology is a method for studying and interpreting group behavior."* May the social psychologist or the sociologist make use of the method used by the psy- chologist? He may not for the obvious reason that he is dealing with a relation of a different class. (If a group of twelve persons were twelve persons, i.e., a congeries of twelve individual persons, then the psychological method would suffice for the social scientist. But a group of twelve persons is not twelve persons; it is a new quality. The individuals behaving as a _part of the group do not behave as individuals. True, the mechanism which acts in the behavior of the individual also operates when the in- dividual is a part of a group, but it operates in conjunction with different means and pro- 18Tn Professor Goldenweiser’s stimulating essay called “History, Psychology and Culture: A Set of | Categories for an Introduction to Social Science,” a distinction is drawn between data which are objective, external and describable in terms of outward behavior and data which are psychological, referring to proc» esses which occur in minds. (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. XV., No. 21, p. 563. ) The investigator who attempts to observe | ond interpret group behavior will find it difficult if | not impossible to make such a differentiation. 127 duces different results. An accurate under- standing of the behavior-pattern of each in- dividual in the group would undoubtedly assist in arriving at conclusions regarding the group, but the sum total of these individual behavior- patterns would not constitute the behavior-pat- tern of the group. The psychological method is capable of revealing aspects of individual be- havior which bear a relation to group behavior. Thus a person with a distinct inferiority com- plex might find in group adherence a certain compensation. To know this would throw light upon the nature of the group and its func- tioning, but the study would still be that of the — individual and not of the group. ‘ 7. New Categories of Information not Fur- — nished by Individual and Social Psy- chology Introspective, reflective, speculative psy- chology deals with the problems of “mind” — from the angle of causes, nature, origin. Ex- © perimental psychology deals with the problems of “mind” from the angle of effects, conse- — quences, results, 1.e., from the angle of be- — havior. Neither approach necessarily excludes ~ the other. The speculative psychologist is — shortsighted if he insists that the experimental — psychologist is incapable of throwing light upon ~ the problems of mind as cause and the experi- 128 mental psychologist is equally shortsighted if he insists that his approach alone will reveal the whole truth. Instead of antagonizing each other, the two schools might supplement and complement each other in a codperative way if only they would recognize their approaches as methods and not as truths or laws. In order to discover the place, or rather the function of psychology in social science, it may prove profitable to reproduce the classifications of psychology as used by representatives of the two types or approaches to psychology men- tioned above: W atson’s Classification Individual psychology Vocational ‘ Child s Folk Educational ‘“ Legal Pathological Social McDougall’s Classification *° Psychology of the normal human adult Psychology of animals Psychology of children Individual psychology 19 Behavior, J. B. Watson, p. 18. 20 Psychology, W. McDougall, p. 123. 129 OPN EON 3S pes ad CS WD 5. Psychology of men in abnormal and diseased states of mind 6. Social psychology Watson defines psychology as “that division of natural science which takes human activity and conduct as its subject matter.” ** McDougall defines psychology as ‘‘the positive science of the behavior of living things.” ?? Watson does not define his terms “folk” and “social” psy- chology, although he does give hints elsewhere which indicate that he intends to convey by the first term what Wundt and others have in- cluded under the search for the origins and functions of cultural forms; language, re- ligions, etc. In Chapter XI, Personality and Its Disturbances,** he approaches interpreta- tions of individual behavior from the stand- point of how that behavior is affected by social contacts. This is, obviously, what he under- stands social psychology to be; at least, this may be regarded as his gateway to social science. McDougall, on the other hand, is explicit in stating that social psychology is “‘the study of the mass-mind and of its influence upon the individual mind in both its development and i operation.” ** Neither Watson nor McDougall — 4D ae sold wpa CEN 28 Psychology, J. B. Watson, pp. 393-420. 24 In his Social Psychology, p. 18, McDougall says: “For social psychology has to show how, given the na- 130 is of great assistance in showing the place and the function of psychology in relation to social groups as the objects of study. Mc- Dougall’s “‘mass-mind’’ notion has been de- veloped in his later volume, The Group Mind, but this effort has done nothing to eliminate the inevitable and non-observable subjectivism which clings to the concept of mass or group mind. And if we turn to Tarde, LeBon, Ross or Martin we find only hypothetical descrip- tions of mobs and crowds—abnormal groups, not permanently functioning groups—or we find similar hypotheses regarding convention, fashions, et cetera. In short, the search for aid on this problem in the works of psychologists and sociologists alike leads only to confusion. Social psychology is used either as a term to describe the study of individual behavior in the light of its social relations or to describe some hypothetical group mind. ‘The search, how- ever, does reveal the existence of a general con- ‘sciousness and recognition of the fact that ‘group behavior must be reduced to psycho- _ tive propensities and capacities of the individual human | mind, all the complex mental life of societies is shaped by them and in turn reacts upon the course of their ieevelopment and operation in the individual . . . the fundamental problem of social psychology is the morali- _Zation of the individual by the society into which he is born as a creature in which the non-moral and purely _egoistic tendencies are so much stronger than any altru- _ istic tendencies.” 131 logical explanations. .Between the individual considered in relation to his social contacts and the picturesque movements of masses, crowds, and mobs lie the innumerable and increasing groups of persons organized and functioning on behalf of specific interests. This interwoven web of groups is the most striking feature in modern life. It is impossible to understand modern human activity without knowing what these groups are and how they behave. Our deliberative bodies function through committees which are groups; our business, professional, sociable, recreational and religious interests are vested in groups; our philanthropic expressions pass through the medium of groups. Doctors, lawyers, bakers, bankers, teachers, carpenters, paper-hangers, plumbers, printers, actors—all express their dominant, functional interests through groups. If social psychology is not to include the study of such groups, then some other name must be chosen. ‘Their study may not be neglected.*® ‘The field belongs to those who are capable of evolving a method of ob- jective group studies. It may become a part of the science of sociology although there are in- dications that this science has mapped out its field without recognition of the nature of the 25 Suggested titles for the study of groups: Collective Psychology, Collective Behavior, The Psychology of Collective Behavior, Psychology of Groups, Group Psychology, et cetera. See p. 168. 132 ) | problem with which this volume is concerned. The sociological field, according to the latest concurrence, includes: I. Personality: The Individual and the Person. II. The Family. III. Peoples and Cultural Groups. IV. Conflict and Accommodation Groups. V. Communities and Territorial Groups. VI. Social Institutions. VII. Social Science and the Social Process VIII. Social Pathology: Personal and So- cial Disorganization. IX. Methods of Investigation. X. General Sociology and Methodology of the Social Sciences.”° The first seven items of this classification con- tain the scope of sociology from the standpoint of the objects of its study. Numbers III, [IV and V mention groups, but the nearest this cate- gory comes to including the sort of groups dealt with in this book is IV, Conflict and Ac- ' commodation Groups, under which are named (1) Classes and the Class Struggle; Labor and Capital, (2) Nationalities and Races, (3) Poli- | tical Parties and Political Doctrines, (4) Re- 26 Scheme adopted by The American Journal of So- ciology for classifying the literature of sociology and the social sciences. 133 ligious Denominations and Sects. Labor can- — not be looked upon as a group unless one has in mind a specifically organized section of labor, — and the same is true of capital. Political parties and religious bodies may at times be groups but this is not necessary. We do not need a psychological label to — designate the study of groups. The science of education, if it may be said that the science © exists, is made up largely of psychological con-— tent but it does not therefore receive the name — of “education of psychology” or “psychology of education.” *7 In any case, the symbol chosen — to represent the study of group behavior is rela- tively unimportant. The main consideration at this point is to understand that if a method is to be devised for the study of such behavior, it will perforce need to be a method which deals with psychological objects of study. The term ‘‘behavior of groups”’ is adequate if it is understood that in this instance the word “behavior” is used psychologically. A bullet shot from a gun, a billiard ball shot from the end of a cue, a comet shooting through space, a ship plying the ocean—these are all examples of behavior, but they are not psy- chological behavior. They can be explained without reference to an integrated organism. A labor union striking for higher wages, a 27 “Psychology of education” is a recognized term but it is not synonymous for education. 134 group of politicians representing a nation in claims for reparations, a codperative associa- tion of farmers marketing crops—these are ex- amples of behavior which cannot be explained without reference to psychological factors. 8. The Group a Means, not an End The pathway toward a scientific study of groups is cluttered with numerous and confusing concepts, attitudes and beliefs. The most con- fusing of all the barriers is the belief that the group constitutes an end—that the ideal states of social organization symbolized by such terms as “‘the Kingdom,” ‘‘the Brotherhood of Man,”’ et cetera, are the goals of all effort. “Any ethics grounded in a hard-headed objective psychology will have to regard the individual as the only possible end.’ ** ‘The needs, pur- poses and aspirations of the individual or- ganism (which alone is capable of possessing needs, acquiring purposes and expressing as- pirations) are the ends of life and effort. But these needs, purposes and aspirations are condi- tioned by the relation which the individual or- ganism bears to all other individual organisms striving toward the same or kindred ends. The first form of human association bearing a relation to the modern group was conceiv- 28 Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method, A. B. Wolfe, p. 253. 135 ably the result of a conscious agreement not to attack, i.e., a recognition that certain needs could be satisfied and certain purposes fulfilled with greater adequacy by means of joint rather than individual striving. At any rate, a func- tional view of this sort is a more fruitful hypo- thesis than is supplied by those theoretical as- sumptions which account for society, communi- cation and association on the basis of congenital or instinctive sympathy. The individual and the group are both reali- ties. The individual may be viewed as an in- tegration of functioning organs, and the group merely an integration of functions. The rela- tion which an individual bears to a group is therefore not the same kind of relation which exists between an organ and the integrated or- ganism. ‘The individual organism utilizes nu- merous and varied means for the satisfaction of its changing needs and on the human plane an increasing number of needs may be satisfied only by joint or group action. There is a strong probability that man has developed social or group modes of response in so many directions that group adherence has itself come to be a need; the recognition of this fact may have led earlier sociologists to assume the hypo- thesis of an organic society. But there can be nothing organic about society or a group; there can only be series of relations, the results of specific responses to specific situations. ‘They 136 are means utilized by individuals in the effort to satisfy individual needs. \ The above point of view is repulsive to many idealists on the ground that it degrades and minimizes the state, the church, the trade union, the codperative association—in short, the group. To regard the individual as the center of ends is to them to embrace selfishness. It is perhaps superfluous to add that the terms “egotism,” ‘conceit,’ et cetera, which are Used to denote selfishness, carry an emotional over- tone which is socially favorable to the elimina- tion of the individual as anend. The idealists are not wholly in the wrong; they are merely confused, and the result of their confusion leads to the use of means which justify ends, or to stubborn insistence upon static and unrealizable ends. “When ends are regarded as literally ends to action rather than as directive stimuli to present choice they are frozen and _ iso- lated.” *° On the other hand, when the group is recognized as a means, both means and ends attain sufficient fluidity to come, using the ter- minology of James, to “speaking terms with the universe.” ‘‘Ends are, in fact, literally end- less, forever coming into existence as new ac- 29 Human Nature and Conduct, John Dewey, p. 227. ‘The entire chapter on “The Nature of Aims,” from which the above quotation is taken, should be dili- gently studied by all who are confused over means and ends. 137 tivities occasion new consequences.”’ *° Life pro- ceeds in the atmosphere of imperative means, the stuff out of which, in reality, life is made. The recognition of the group as a means im- parts new reality and new significance to every- thing that pertains to it as a relation and as a function, as a quality and as a form of activity. If the group is to be the chief means by which | individuals in the modern world are to attain their ends, it becomes highly important to learn both the mechanism and the performance of the group.” 80 Dewey, p. 232. 81 “The amount of opportunity available to the indi- vidual, and hence the amplitude of his life, depend very largely upon the efficiency of the social organization of which he is a part.” Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method, A. B. Wolfe, p. 261. 138 is CHAPTER VI GROUP CONFLICT AS THE LABORA- TORY A MAN’s interests have to do with his obliga- tory relations with other human beings, i.e., the - essence of a man’s behavior is revealed when his interests are at stake. ‘The most fruitful means of knowing a person is to have necessary relations with him which concern both you and him. “Parlor” conduct is a poor indicator of real behavior. 1. The Group; a Representation of Interests | A group is a representation of certain in- terests which all members share. An individual becomes part of a group in order to advance some particular interest. Exceptions to this rule are merely apparent. Individuals are sometimes urged to join a group for some altru- istic purpose and all outward circumstances ap- pear to indicate that the “‘joining’’ represents a sacrifice rather than a gain. Closer observation invariably reveals that such ‘“‘joining”’ is ar- tificial. It is usuallv not difficult to discover the 139 interest which is protected by this type of group adherence. ‘The test of membership in a group occurs when the group’s activities actually con- travene an individual’s interests. Nothing but fear of larger loss to some other interest will then suffice to hold the individual’s allegiance. Pseudo-patrotism is born of the stuff of such ad- herence. It can express loyalty only under the stress of danger. / Some iconoclastic observers of the social process, upon discerning the interest basis of group allegiance, hurry gleefully to the conclu- sion that life zs egoistic. Interests are to them the very essence of proof against all altruism. The waves of nominalistic philosophy are recur- rent tokens of man’s loss of faith in the social process. As all joint efforts fail ultimately, be- lief once more gravitates to the individual as the center of all reality. But the nominalist has the answer to his argument in his own experience. He cannot live the egoistic life. From birth until death his significant acts are those which bear a relation to other human beings. (Ex- treme altruism is probably as false on its side as radical egoism.) Civilization is the process of joining egos. The philosophers of egoism are usually ex- treme analogists. When proof of their posi- tion is lacking on the human or social level, they have no compunctions about grasping their conclusions from the sphere of zodlogy. Thus 140 the eminent late biologist of France, Félix Le Dantec, in his L’Egoisme,* concludes with pro- found assurance, since he finds it to be true in so-called animal societies, that egoism is the “basis of all society.”” This, of course, proves nothing but it has the flavor of realism and therefore carries considerable weight, particu- larly with those who are eager for “sole” ex- planations. Where the egoists err on the side of a faulty realism, the altruists fail equally in substituting wishes for facts. The words, ego- ism and altruism, are, in fact, too heavily over- laid with emotions and biases to permit of ex- tended scientific use. Professional dodging of the interest view of the life process leads nowhere. But this is never quite true; all ideas do lead somewhere. A psychology instructor, upon being pressed for an answer to the problem of egoism by a student with an extremely realistic tendency, disposed of the inquiry by saying: “Yes, of course we do some things egoistically because we have the self-preserving instinct, but we also do some things non-egoistically, i.e., altruistically, be- cause we have the gregarious instinct.” This is one result of dodging! The denial of the fact that we do act on behalf of our vital interests precludes discussion of the validity of 17T’Egoisme, Félix Le Dantec. Bibliotheque de Philosophie Scientifiae, Ernest Flammarion, Editor, Paris. I4I interests; it relegates ethics and the law, the evaluation of interests, to a non-motor level. The pursuance of certain interests in direct vio- lation to ethical concepts fervidly approved thus becomes possible. If attention is directed to the actual function- ing of a group, e.g., it soon becomes evident that the group stands to represent, advance, en- hance some very definite interest. Sooner or later this interest will clash with other interests protected by other groups or arising within the same group. Conflict is then inevitable. The eternal vigilance assumed to be expended on behalf of vague “rights” is seen to be a conflict to maintain specific interests. Rights may be mentioned only in connection with the process of evaluating interests. The economic inter- pretation of history recognizes this fact, but, alas, it leaves unrecognized so many factors that its total value is doubtful. 2. Conflict and Codperation: Parts of the Same Process of Adjustment Conflict as a term or symbol suffers from its emotional accretions. “Two modes of escape are open; one may substitute other terms which possess less objectionable connotations or one may attempt to refine the terms already in gen- eral use. An ingenious combination of the two processes is that used by the late Dr. Southard 142 in his volume entitled, The Kingdom of Evils.? This book is based upon a classification of five major forms of evil which are designated: Morbi: Diseases and Defects of Body and Mind. Errores: Educational Deficiencies and Misin- formation. Vitia: Vices and Bad Habits, Non-psycho- pathic. Litigia: Legal Entanglements In and Out of Court. Penuria: Poverty and Other Forms of Re- sourcelessness. Aside from the artificial nature of this classi- fication and its academic appearance, it presents other difficulties. It does nothing to refine terms already in common usage and there is no likelihood that the social workers for whom the volume was intended will take up the use of the terms: morbi, errores, et cetera. Vices will still be regarded as vices even though they be labeled vitia. In addition, the Latin terms do not tend to define the terms or forms for which they act as symbols. To call educational ‘deficiencies errores tends toward a compre- hensive rather than a definitive use of the term; ‘it places too heavy a strain upon the term ‘errores. Conflict is ordinarily set over against co- OT he Kingdom of Evils; Southard and Jarrett, Macmillan. 143 operation. The latter term carries good or positive, the former bad or negative connota- tions. From the scientific point of view “good” and “‘bad’’ connotations must be eliminated. | Certain forms of codperation may lead to nega- tive results and certain forms of conflict to posi- tive results. A scientific use of these two terms | will be served best by going beyond the words themselves to the processes which they aim to describe. ) 3. The Group Adjusting Itself to Other Groups / An active, functioning group is one which is making adjustments to its environment. “Be. havior is any process of release which is a func ' tion of factors external to the mechanism re- leased,” says Holt.* The definition needs only ° slight alteration to make it fit the group. | (Holt has shown clearly that the term behavior covers all objects as well as organisms, and therefore it must be equally applicable to groups.) The behavior of the group is a func. tion of its environment. If the environment. remains unchanged, no adjustments are called for. When the environment does change, an adjustment or accommodation is essential, and since a static environment is impossible, adjust-. 3 The Freudian Wish, E. B. Holt, Henry Holt & Company, p. 167. 144 ments of one sort or another are always in process. Behavior is then the adjusting process. The study of groups and group behavior begins with observation of adjustments. The adjustments which groups make are largely in relation to other groups. Thus, the farmers’ cooperative associations are in con- tinuous adjustment in relation to the middle- men, the bankers, the merchants, manufac- turers, exporters, consumers. Not all of these classifications represent organized groups, but the study of these adjustments soon reveals the fact that acute adjustments always occur in re- ‘lation to an organized group. Further, it be- comes evident that the adjustments of this na- / ture are always made in the face of implicit or | explicit opposition of an exterior group. The trade union which represents the anthracite coal miners is at the present writing attempting to make an adjustment to the coal operators. Two sets of interests are at stake and the argu- ment proceeds on the basis of antagonism of interests. At least one of the operators’ in- _terests is presumed to exclude one of the specific interests of the miners. Conflict is the symbol for this clash of interests. Group conflict implies that something im- -pedes the advancement of interests. It implies further that the validity of interests can never be tested until the interests are challenged. “When one group opposes the interests of an- 145 other group, the implication is that the chal- lenging group considers its interests to be of a higher order of validity than those of the group which it opposes.* Without such opposition no evaluation of interests can proceed. ‘To ad- monish the group for not “giving in,” for “selfishness,” is sheer misconception of the en- tire adjusting process. To “give in” when the group’s interests are wholly valid is the grossest sort of treachery, not merely to the group itself but to the total social process. It is an implica- tion that fear of conflict has caused the group to recant what the conflict itself might have re- vealed to be a perfectly valid interest. J The aim of this chapter is to indicate the reasons for the use of group conflict as the laboratory for studying group behavior. This end may be furthered by returning to the cate- gories of information which are to serve as the tentative symbols of the various aspects of group process. Our scientific objective is the discovery of the nature and function of leader- ship, the process of representation and consent, the use of experts and facts, et cetera, as parts of the process of group adjustment. 4 The interest concept of conflict from the point of — view of jurisprudence and political science is well set forth in The Modern Idea of the State, H. Krabbe. 146 | | | oe cee 4. The Behavior of the Group; an Adjust- ment of the Total Environment. “The behavior of the group is a function of its environment’ is a statement which calls for slight modification. Its rigid interpretation leads logically to an elimination of choice, will, purposes. In individual psychology, behavior appears as the total process which includes the environment as the stimulating agency plus the habits of the individual as the response. The possibilities of changing habits do not inhere in the environment but rather in the habit-chang- ing capacity of the individual; at any rate, no adequate explanation of a changed habit can be arrived at if exclusive attention is paid to the environment. The beginning of behavior is a function of environment. Total behavior is a change in both the organism and the environ- ment and hence must be a function of both. Adjustment is not to the environment but of the environment and of the organism. The case does not appear to be otherwise in regard to - group behavior. Illustration: In a certain community in the South there appeared to be a sudden conversion of the com- mercial interests of the community to the co- operative marketing movement among farmers. The event was of extreme importance to the community since its commercial enterprises were built upon the marketing of tobacco. At 147 the time of the initial organization of the farmers’ cooperative, the merchants’ associa- tion passed resolutions favoring the movement; they even placed placards in the windows of their shops making this declaration to the pub- lic. ‘The merchants were in this case acting in response to a changed environment. It may be said that they were making an adjustment to this changed environment in terms of what they conceived to be their interests. 4 But this action constituted not merely an ad- — justment to but also an adjustment of the total — environment. It was quickly reflected to other commercial interests back of and above the merchants, namely, the bankers, exporters, and tobacco buyers whose interests were also at stake. If the merchants proposed to give en- couragement to the farmers’ codperative and if the codperative carried out its stated objective of purchasing the tobacco formerly merchan- dised by private buyers, the ultimate result would of course be an elimination of these pri- vate buyers. The adjustment. which the mer- chants thought to be merely an adjustment to the farmers turned out to be an adjustment of the total community situation. It was a change of such proportions that it precipitated a bitter controversy. In the end, the merchants were obliged to rescind their favorable resolutions, the placards were removed from the shop win- — dows, and the community settled down to a pro- — tracted conflict.® 5 Problems of this nature will be discussed later un- der Multiple Response. 148 The above illustration contains three sig- nificant points: (1) group responses are exceed- ingly complex; (2) the behavior of a group is a complex of responses to its total environment, which in the end means an adjustment of the total environment; (3) the group responds to situations which appear to jeopardize its in- terests. ( “Life is interruptions and recoveries,” °® or, life for the group is an interruption of its pur- suit of interests by some other group or by some change in the total situation; recovery is the mode according to which the group meets this interruption. ‘The group in significant be- havior is the group attempting to establish itself and its interests. In essence this means the group in conflict. If then one wishes to dis- cover the nature of group behavior, it appears reasonable to expect that more of the real na- ture of that behavior will be revealed when con- flict is in process. If the group’s interests are not challenged, its behavior will run on orderly lines; its activities will be of the nature of cumulative habits, or rather customs. The study of these habitual or customary modes of group behavior is by itself an important field for investigation but it lacks opportunities for discovering the dynamic aspects of behavior. These are revealed only when there is present a sufficient stimulus to change the customary 6 Human Nature and Conduct, John Dewey, p. 179. 149 mode of behavior, i.e., when the group is in conflict. 5. Theories of Conflict The foregoing argument in favor of the use of group conflict as the most adequate and re- vealing laboratory for observing group be- havior must be distinguished from the historical and biological interpretations of conflict itself. It is merely one way of making use of conflict, not a glorification of social conflict as a Ding an sich. Hegel assumed the necessity of a negative element in life as a prerequisite of progress and Marx proceeded to embody this generaliza- tion in his theory of class conflict as the only means toward ultimate social harmony. Many evolutionists equipped with a simplified form of Darwinism likewise adduce all sorts of ana- logical supports for competition and war on the basis of the presumed ‘“‘good”’ results of con- flict.) Whether or not conflict or a negative ele- ment is essential to life, no thinking person can be so obtuse as to fail to see that conflict is wasteful and brutal; the harmonies which it is supposed to establish (as treaties of peace fol- lowing wars) are palpably not real harmonies at all... The above theories of conflict are, 7 The reader is urged to read Dewey’s discussion of this theme on pages 300 to 302 in Human Nature and Conduct. 150 when carried to their logical conclusions, jus- tifications for the use of force. If conflict pre- determines a good result, then any means of precipitating and carrying on conflict are, of course, justifiable. Marx and Nietzsche are in this respect logical and if the events of the past decade have taught any lessons at all, it is the fallacy of such logic. All theories of conflict- as-a-good-in-itself are examples of truncated thinking. ‘he problem is not whether or not conflict is a good, but rather what to do with it. And we shall never know what to do with it so long as it is deified on the one hand or abjectly feared on the other. The reality of conflict surrounds us on every side; we see that it pro- duces certain results, serves as “‘the gadfly of thought,”’ cruelly submerges some human be- ings, elevates other human beings to seats of great power, is wasteful. All of this we see about us on every hand. What we fail to see is the possibility of making use of conflict. One of the ways of approaching the problem of making use of conflict is to come to some under- standing of its processes. This, however, is merely the secondary implication of the chap- ter; the use of conflict as the place for studying group actions and interactions arose out of the compulsions of the present study itself. ISI 6. The Significant Aspects of Group Behavior; Revealed when the Group is in Conflict What are the tests of leadership? When is the real nature of leadership revealed? What is the significance of the contentious leader in group behavior? When does the relation be- tween the leader and the group become sharply delineated? ‘The answer to these queries is: when the group is in a militant mood; when the group is struggling to express its interests; when disharmony has arisen within the group; when the group is in danger of succumbing to its enemies; when the group is defending itself against its opposition; when the group is striv- ing for a public evaluation of its interests. Militant, struggle, disharmony, succumb, de- fend, strive—these are terms denoting conflict. When the group is struggling, succumbing, de- fending, striving—then its leaders will either solidify the group around an interest worth fighting for, or the leaders will be deposed and the group will disintegrate. Groups which have accommodated themselves to a non-militant, compromising mode of behavior may retain the same leadership for what seems like an inter- minable period; these are the groups which re- main outside the circle of real conflict and they are worthy of study because of the “lag’’ which they impose upon other groups. They owe their chief capacity to function at all to the fact 162 that habits are persistent and pleasant protec- tors against thought.* But if the dynamic quali- ties of group behavior are to be discovered, we must turn a portion of our attention at least to groups involved in social change. Such groups will be found to be engaged in the effort to vali- date certain specific interests and therefore they will be groups in conflict. When do the problems of representation and consent become pertinent problems? Observa- tion leads to the conclusion that these questions become problems only at the periods of initial group formation and when the group is involved in a conflict. (It should be remembered in this connection that groups are usually formed out of controversy; the period of initial group formation is almost invariably, for the members of the group at least, a period of conflict.) Labor unions function perfectly when no dispute is in the offing, but during these periods of calm, attendance at meetings dwindles to the point where only those come who possess a sense of ®8’The well-known psychological argument which reads: habits permit the individual to do things so much more quickly and effectively that greater time is thus provided for deliberation, creative thought, et cetera, is permissible only if stated as a wish. It can be demon- strated only when proof is submitted to the effect that persons whose lives proceed upon the basis of the larg- est number of habits are also the most creative thinkers, i.e., that they actually do utilize in creative effort the time which is saved by habitual behavior, 153 duty. Cases are known in which meetings have been dispensed with entirely and others where only the officers attended. Why should the membership be concerned about attendance, representation, consent, when there is nothing vital to be represented, nothing to which to con- sent, when there is no meaning in attendance? The only reason for going to meetings in such cases is that the habit of attending is tenacious and to break the habit may be painful. (Mem- bership in a religious group entails a different kind of attendance. Non-attendance may not be affected so much by habit as by the moral judgments of others which may bring a dif- ferent kind of pain.) Once the group is aroused to the point of defending what it con- siders to be a valid interest, all of this changes. Leaders are immediately placed in a new en- vironment of scrutiny. Shades of difference within the group become manifest; how shall the members who envisage these differences secure adequate representation? Shall the minorities give consent to the activities and pro- grams of the majority? Do the leaders actually represent the desires and wishes of the mem- bers? Or do they represent merely a portion of the members? How has consent been given to the representativeness of the leaders? ‘These all become pertinent questions the moment the group is engaged in conflict. Hence if the in- vestigator aims to discover the nature of these 154 i aspects of group behavior, he is presented with observable modes of behavior when group con- flicts are in process. 7. Group Conflict; not Necessarily a Form of Dissociation The above viewpoint is not one borrowed from the field of so-called abnormal psychology, although the analogy may have pointed the way. Since abnormal behavior is a form of dissocia- tion, to which all individuals are subject, within the personality, its study throws light upon nor- mal behavior. Conflict, as it is dealt with in this study, is not considered to be a form of dis- sociation or a form of abnormal behavior. Group conflicts may and do become forms of dissociation which embody many features simi- lar to abnormal behavior in the individual. Thus two nations may through conflict become so embittered against each other as groups that the dissociation becomes a permanent friction, an enduring antagonism.° Another theory of conflict or antagonism used by writers who are concerned with the ® The author is indebted to Professor Harry Over- street for an able presentation of social conflict as a form of dissociation; the arguments are based upon _psycho-pathological analogies involving the dissociated or “split” personality. The paper—d Psychological Approach to Conflict—is still unpublished and hence cannot be quoted. 155 problems of group behavior may be called “the law of mutually opposed stimuli” *° or the “uni- versal principle of antagonism.”’ The underly- ing assumption of this theory is that all motion is kept in balance by positive and negative forces. Like most ‘“‘universals’’ of the sort, this theory leads its devotees into fantastic emotional flights. Thus Mr. Page writes: ‘Through its operation (the law of mutually opposed stimuli) the stars are kept in their courses, and the Earth fitted for the habita- tion of man. And it governs as well the eco- nomic life by which vast populations are shel- tered and rendered progressively more efficient for human happiness.”’ Our author then passes on to make various applications of this theory to social and economic life as though the theory had been proved because stated. Nothing is done to discover the nature or the working of this formidable “law.” ‘The electronic theory may in time vindicate this generalization for physics, but a theory should lead to experimen- tation and not to dogmatism. It should raise innumerable subsidiary queries instead of be- ing used as a general solution for most vexing problems. For example, if motion results from mutually opposed stimuli, why is it not reasonable to suppose that equilibrium or rest may also be the result of mutually opposed 10 Used by E. D. Page in his book, Trade Morals, Yale University Press, p. 248. 156 stimuli? If the mutually opposed stimuli hap- pen to be equal, equilibrium would of course be the result. Then there is always the possi- bility that the causes which keep (or do not keep) the stars in their courses are not the same causes which are involved in, let us say, a labor controversy ! These various ambiguous theories of con- flict have so much analogical currency that so- cial investigators must be driven to a fresh approach to the problems of social conflict in particulars. “It would seem, too, that the world had experimented with the conflict method long enough to begin to arrive at a strong suspicion that the codperative, con- structive method will produce better results,” ™ says Professor Wolfe with a slight touch of plaintiveness in his tone. But, the point is that there has been no experimenting with conflict. The historical observation that mankind has known a long acquaintance with conflict is not a logical reason for attempting to dismiss it; rather is it an added reason for beginning to understand its processes.” 11 Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method, p. 276. 12 Tndications of a movement toward an understand- ing of social conflict are beginning to appear. See, for example, the subtitle to James Mickel Williams’ Prin- ciples of Social Psychology which reads, “‘as developed in a study of economic and social conflict.” 1$7 CuHapTer VII THE NEW INFORMATIONAL CATEGORIES 1. The Language Difficulty THE social sciences cannot proceed scientifi- cally until adequate categories of information are conceived. Social discovery as a scientific procedure or method must know what it is that is to be discovered. ‘The problem as stated heretofore is still a vague generalization. It is not sufficiently definite to say that the search is to be for the social group, its inner and outer relations. Precisely what is it that the investi- gator needs to know concerning the group and its active relations? The foregoing chapter has aimed to establish the principle that the unknown elements in groups and group rela- tions can be stated only in psychological terms. An analysis of those terms is now in order. The conceiving and arranging of knowledge categories is a perilous task. The language difficulty presents itself at the outset as one of the predominant obstacles. “Our concepts are limited by language. Our language is 158 eg a deeply dualistic. This is indeed a terrible ob- stacle. I showed previously how language re- tards our thought, making it impossible to ex- press the relations of a being universe. In our language only an eternal becoming universe ex- ists.” * ‘The difficulty herein described can be met only by continuous search for new concepts. But there are equally grave impediments in other directions. Concepts are overlaid with emotions which produce perplexing overtones and undertones. Ihe same word does not carry the same meaning to all persons; nor does it carry the same meaning to the same person under varying conditions and at varying times. Moreover, ‘‘there is no certainty whatever that the same word will call out exactly the same idea in the reader’s mind as it did in the re- porter’s,” ? i.e., the written word is far more likely to be misunderstood than the spoken word. Language is qualitative. Words, so far from being the vehicles of understanding, lend themselves readily to purposive misunderstand- ing. The essence of a complete controversy may be lost sight of by the mere use of a ques- tion-begging term or an epithet. Words are figurative, symbolic, and there is some justifi- cation for Jean Paul’s cryptic characterization of language as ‘‘a dictionary of faded meta- phors.”’ 1 Tertium Organum, Ouspensky, p. 189. 2 Public Opinion, Walter Lippman, p. 66. 159 But we must overcome these obstacles. A\l- though there is little indication that we shall all soon be able to converse in terms of exact mathematical symbols, a certain degree of pre- cision has already been achieved in the sphere of the so-called exact sciences. ‘here are evi- dencés that steps are being taken in a similar direction in the sphere of the social sciences. ° However difficult and imposing the task may appear, there is no visible alternative—con- cepts and symbols must be utilized and hence they must be defined, redefined and refined. If there is the slightest possibility of changing lan- guage from a “dictionary of faded metaphors’”’ to an evolving, living set of approximately ac- curate and universal concepts, the endeavor must be made. ‘True it is that by means of language we see as through a glass darkly, but we do see. Definition is not the first but rather the last step in scientific procedure. The scientists must first of all agree that they see the same thing 8 As, for example, the work of the Commission on Intellectual Codperation of the League of Nations, and the Committee on Terminology (joint) of the American Sociological Society and the National Com- munity Center Association. For an admirable treatment of one phase of the lan- guage difficulty, the reader is referred to Chapter V, “Speed, Words and Clearness,” in Mr. Lippmann’s Public Opinion, also Sidgwick’s The Use of Words in Reasoning. 160 before the concepts used to describe what they see can be defined. To begin an argument with definitions of terms is to assume that each per- son involved has accepted the same meaning of each term. Unhappily the social sciences are still far distant from the desired goal. The assumption of this essay is that terms, words, concepts will be cumulatively defined and re- fined as the investigating process proceeds and further that the present is a decidedly inap- propriate time for being dogmatic about def- nitions. 2. The Categories of Social Psychology A brief review of the categories of informa- tion employed by writers who have definitely aimed to illumine the problems of social psy- chology should prove helpful at this juncture. In studying the ensuing catalogues of categor- ies selected from various texts, the reader is warned to keep constantly in mind the fact that the authors have not been consulted; the cate- gories were selected from their works. Each author would undoubtedly claim the right to make amendments and corrections to the lists as they stand, 16r Categories * of Information as Selected from Six Works Dealing With the Problems of Social Psychology: Social Psychology; an Outline and Source Book, by E. A. Ross Suggestibility; the crowd; the mob mind; fashion; conventionality; imitation; customs; conflict; compromise; public opinion. Social Psychology, by Wm. McDougall Instincts (an elaborate list) ; emotions; in- nate tendencies; sentiments; volition; imitation; play; habit. Human Nature and the Social Order, by C. H. Cooley Suggestion; choice (will); sociability; sym- pathy; hostility; emulation; leadership; con- science; freedom. 4In The Psychology of Society, by Ginsberg, the fol- lowing concepts constitute the categories according to which the author views the problems of social psychol- ogy: Instincts, reason, will, group mind, general will, racial characteristics, national characteristics, tradition, community, associations, institutions, the crowd, public opinion, the public, democracy. Since the bulk of what he says about the above concepts is critical it is very difficult to know just which of these items the author might choose if he were himself asked to formulate a category for social psychology. 162 Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, by C. A. Ellwood Instincts; feelings; intellect; imitation; sym- pathy; the social mind (social consciousness) ; public opinion (the popular will). The Great Society, by Graham Wallas Instincts; intelligence; habit; disposition; en- vironment; fear; pleasure-pain; happiness; the crowd; love; hatred; thought; will. Human Nature and Conduct, by John Dewey Habits; will; customs; impulses; intelligence (thought, deliberation, calculation); aims; principles; desires; morals; freedom. 3. The Inadequacies of the Categories of Social Psychology This is an imposing and perplexing list of categories. If an investigator were requested to make a specific study of a social group with the aid of any one or all of them, he would find himself face to face with such questions as: How may the instincts of a group be studied? Or, are instincts individual attributes which manifest themselves in part in group relations? If so, how may they be isolated for study? If activities of the group are to be explained by accrediting each unknown cause-and-effect, 16% or stimulus-response relation to some instinct classification, where is this process to stop? What is the line of demarcation between an in- stinctive action and an impulse? Between senti- ments and emotions? Between intelligence and habits? How many of the terms in these categories are descriptive of purely group phenomena? How many of them are merely analogies lifted bodily from the field of psychology? How - many of them are the result of philosophical rationalizations of group behavior? As a matter of plain fact many of the terms of these categories are unadaptable to research. methods. They are largely terms used to explain group behavior—not terms whereby the process of that behavior is studied, observed, made known. ‘To attempt the use of many of them in the same specified study would be much like measuring milk by the yard. Freedom and imitation, for example, are not concepts of the same kind. The inadequacy of such categories of information was soon discovered by the au- thor in an earlier attempt to make a study of community process or the group relations and activities of a small urban community. He be- gan at that time the extension of categories. In the study (the farmers’ codperative market- 4 ing movement in its relation to the middleman, or the established machinery of marketing farm products) which lies at the background of much 164 MAb .., that is contained in the present volume, the ne- cessity of elaborating, extending and experi- menting with newer categories of information continued. The problem as a whole was con- tinuously broken up by the repeated raising of the question: ‘‘What is it that needs to be known about this group and its activities?” What is the group doing? Having abandoned the search for the mob- mind, the group-mind and similar non-obsery- able entities and phenomena, the investigator was obliged to proceed with the remaining cate- gories which occupy much space in the various works on social psychology. Instincts were given a fair opportunity, but alas, they led no- where. If a particular group is explained in terms of an imagined ‘‘gregarious”’ instinct, of what significance is the explanation? ‘The group may as well be explained in terms of “‘to- bacco,” for one of the codperatives studied was organized about tobacco. Moreover, farmers are not believed to be notoriously gregarious. To describe the sudden organization of more than a million of them into codperative groups on the basis of gregariousness would certainly involve numerous contradictions. No_ tech- nique exists for a study based upon such cate- gories. One might have written volumes on the “gregarious versus the self-assertive in- _stincts in modern farmers’ codperative organi- zations,” but this could have been done without 165 taking the trouble to study the groups involved. Do the individual farmers who became mem- bers of the codperative groups possess habits which have a bearing upon the groups’ conduct ? Obviously they do, since one’s individual habits come into play in conduct regardless of whether or not the conduct has social significance. But the sum of individual habits does not constitute a group habit. Instincts, habits, feelings, imi- tation, sympathy, intellect, emotions, senti- ments, will, desires, dispositions and thoughts are all attributes of the individual and are phe- nomena which can be studied only with the in- dividual as the object of study. One of the chief elements which distinguishes a specialist science is the object to which it devotes atten- tion. We term a scientist who studies insects an entomologist but he is in one sense a zoolo- gist. [he scientist who studies attributes and functions of an individual from the viewpoint of their relation to behavior is a psychologist. When he studies those attributes and functions of the individual which arise from his social re- lations he still belongs to this branch of science. Instinct, habits, emotions, et cetera, are influ- enced and modified by social contacts, but they are attributes and functions of the individual. Most social psychology is an interpretation of individual traits, attributes, functions, in terms of their social relations. Thus when Mr. Gins- berg calls his book The Psychology of Society, 166 the natural expectation would be a discussion of the attributes and functions of society. He does indeed devote some attention to this prob- lem in the latter sections of the volume, but the objective materials upon which his inductions are based are drawn from the field of individual psychology. Fully one-half of the entire book is a discussion of the psychology of individuals. Perhaps the use of the term “social psychol- ogy” to describe attributes and functions of in- dividuals in terms of their social relations has now become fixed in the literature of the social sciences. In Floyd H. Allport’s recent text on Social Psychology, he specifically utilizes the term “‘social psychology” as a “‘science of the individual” and thereupon devotes a great deal of attention to establishing this point of view. Since Mr. Allport’s book is by far the most scholarly and most adequately scientific of all of the various texts on social psychology, its in- fluence will undoubtedly tend to standardize both the name and the content of social psychol- ogy. James Mickel Williams, in his recent text entitled Principles of Social Psychology, begins by saying “‘social psychology may be definedasa science of the motives of people in social rela- tions,’ and later specifies that the word “‘peo- ple” is intended to mean individuals. It may thus be necessary to utilize another term to designate the specific study of groups. “‘Col- lective psychology” or ‘‘group psychology”’ sug- 167 gest themselves as possible substitutes, but in this very fluid and uncertain stage of psychol- ogy, there are also objections to these terms. “Collective behavior” appears to be the term most suitable and least objectionable. In any — case, the study of groups, if it is a valid separa- tion of social science, cannot base its observa- tions and experiments exclusively upon the cate- gories of individual psychology. 4. Conventions, Customs, Leadership, Aims — and Morals; Valid for Group Categories We may then return to the categories, listed on page 162, for the purpose of determining how many of these concepts are applicable to — the study of groups. Eliminating several of doubtful character, there remain: Conventional- ity, customs, leadership, aims, morals. Aconven- | tional mode of behavior is a group attribute, — although individuals within the same group may _ deviate from the rigid standard of the conven- — tion. ‘This deviation has definite limits, how- ever, and when the individual separates himself too widely from the conventions of his group, he automatically ceases to be an integral part of it. Customs are likewise group products and — attributes. In studying the modern codperative movement among farmers, one of the first phe- — nomena to attract the observer’s attention was — 168 leadership. It is a confusing term since it im- plies personal attributes and is inconceivable without a group. From the sociological point of view, leadership is an attribute of the group. The group may have a collective aim which is not merely the summation of the aims of the individuals composing the group. Further study may reveal that leadership is largely or entirely a function of the individual and hence must be discarded as a useful concept in collec- tive psychology. For the present, however, the term and the phenomenon behind it must be re- tained. No adequate study of the activity of a group is possible without consideration of the part which leadership plays in this activity. Morals, like conventions and customs, are evolved within a group and are effective as norms of behavior only under group sanction. Conventions, customs, leadership, aims and morals are expressed in terms of activities and hence should be observable. The immediate problem before us is to conceive categories of information which will be actual, although sym- bolic (not accurate) designations of group at- tributes and functions. Apparently the only rational manner of pro- ceeding to formulate categories of information is to find names (symbols) for observed phe- nomena. What happens when groups behave? If what happens may be observed, then it should | 169 be possible to find a name, to conceive of a sym- bol which will so describe what happens that others will recognize the same phenomenon. 5. How Does the Group Behave? The group is a phenomenon which has been generally accepted but little understood. At one time thousands of farmers produce cotton or tobacco and at another time these same thou- sands of farmers are joined in a different activ- ity, forming a new entity. What is it that has happened? It was formerly asserted that the chief significance of a group consisted in the fact that the individuals comprising it had sac- rificed certain individual prerogatives, rights, privileges, et cetera, in order to achieve the larger collective end. But it could not be dis- covered that the farmers who became members of the codperative associations had done any- thing of the sort. On the contrary, they were chiefly interested in enhancing their own indi- vidual interests; they desired a Jarger income from the sale of their products and the coépera- tive movement promised exactly this. Pur- poses, desires, aims and interests are involved in group behavior, but there is much to discover about the group itself before these attributes may be isolated for study. The chief search is not to know what purposes, desires, aims are, but how they get themselves expressed in the 170 ——- activity of the group. But much of this dis- cussion is premature. ‘The group cannot be a phenomenon of the group and hence cannot be regarded as one of the items of the category which it is our present purpose to formulate. One of the earliest observations necessitated by a study of a particular group is, however, closely related to the problem of the nature of the group itself. A group consists of individ- uals, or rather it is a representation of a rela- tion between individuals. How does the group represent its constituent individual members? Does it represent the total personality of each member or does it represent only a specific in- terest, a portion of the personality? How is the representing done? Representation is not a new item in social categories. Political scien- tists have devoted a large proportion of their study to the problem of representation. The state is conceived as a group which represents the individuals comprising it. Representative government implies that the citizens are so com- pletely represented in the functional depart- ments of the government that their “‘wills’’ are expressed. Political science has done very little to il- lumine the processes of voluntary groups.’ The 5 It should be added that the ferment which precedes emphasis upon method is at work among increasing numbers of political scientists. Professor Charles E. Merriam’s introduction to Boss Platt and His New 171 state is a component, not a constituent group. The only persons who voluntarily “join” or be- come members of the state are aliens who be- come citizens. Representation in voluntary groups has, it is true, followed the lead of poli- tics. Ina so-called democracy every voluntary group is tested according to its provisions of representation. ‘This is true theoretically even of business corporations, although here we wit- ness the curious spectacle of representation con- fined to stockholders; the technicians and em- ployees—the most vital parts of the industrial organization—are usually without representa- tion. So thorough-going has this divorcement of representation been in industry that the work- ers have in many instances themselves lost the desire for representation. The individual who is represented either by the group itself, by delegates of the group, or by experts chosen by the group, is obliged in some manner to give his consent to the activity. How does he give this consent? In the study of the farmers’ codperative movement, it was found that consent to the main activity of the group was secured by means of legal processes and that all other forms of consent were left to the general mode of representation. The in- York Machine, by H. F. Gosnell, sounds the new note. See also the report of the National Conference on the Science of Politics, American Political Science Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 1. 172 a ee dividual farmer who became a member of the codperative association was obliged to sign a legal contract binding him to sell all of his crop (tobacco and cotton in the cases studied) through the codperative marketing association. Such consent is analogous to the ‘“‘love, honor and obey”’ clause of a legalized marriage. Is this a valid form of consent? Wherein lies its validity? The test of this type of consent comes, of course, at the time of action, not at the time of its being given. The signed con- tracts are in the hands of the codperative as- sociation; it possesses the tokens of numerous individual consents which may now be regarded as a collective consent, and it is upon the valid- ity of this collective consent that the codpera- tive association enters upon the merchandising function. The strength or weakness of a group may in some measure be gauged by the nature of consent which is one of the guarantees of its function. The group now has leadership, a mode of representation and a mode of consent. In the case of commodity codperative marketing asso- ciations, the function of the group involved a technical understanding of the products to be marketed, a technical understanding of the markets, a technical understanding of finance, and in the end a technical understanding of so- cial organization. In brief, the group found it necessary to add unto itself the services of 173 experts. What relation does the expert bear to the group? The expert bases his function upon the use of facts. For example, he grades the tobacco crop which is brought to him by members of the cooperative association. ‘This grading is per- formed in relation to certain facts; the kinds of tobacco demanded by certain manufacturers, exporters, et cetera. he marketing experi bases his performance upon facts related to the current operation of the so-called law of supply and demand. ‘The financial expert acts in re- lation to the facts of terms of available credits, © acceptances, amounts of credits needed for or- derly supplying of the markets, payments needed by members in order to meet current expenses, et cetera. The essential problem for the social investigator is to determine the rela- tion between all of this fact-finding and the group itself. Is it the group which uses facts? Or, is it merely the expert who uses the facts on behalf of the group? Is the expert a func- tion of the group? Is the use of facts a func- tion of the group? The group functions; it acts. Are its acts independent functions of the group or are they — related to other groups? ‘The investigator of group processes soon comes to the sharp reali- zation that the activities of the group are ex- tremely complex. Situations are constantly changing and the group must make adjustments 174 to them. Are these adjustments simple activi- ties of the group? Illustration: One of the commodity codperatives under consideration began its career without any form of local organization. After one year of ex- perience, this association began to emphasize the importance of a strong local organization. At the end of the second year it had 1500 locals in operation. What changed the situation? The answer is complex, although the officials responsible for the changed activity appeared to regard the al- tered situation as a simple matter. Close study revealed that the group was in this instance making an adjustment to at least five factors in the changing situation. The group was re- sponding to its opponents, the middlemen, to its constructive critics, to its membership, to the fact that contracts were being violated, et cetera. The group does not ordinarily make a spe- cific response to a specific stimulus; it responds to multiple stimuli. Its process of adjustment to changing situations is one of multiple re- sponse. The remaining terms of the category which have been utilized and experimented with in the studies which underlie this volume are: the in- terest concept of group motivation, long and short-time points of view which influence the 175 groups’ activities and policies, the use of lan- guage-symbols in group activity, power as a concept of group function, customs, mores, tra- ditions, ethics as a mode of group evaluation, public opinion as an accretion of group norms, and the conflict concept of group adjustments. It is not to be expected that satisfying materials are available in connection with each of the above concepts. The usual experience of apply- ing new method to old phenomena is in effect the raising of numerous questions, rather than answers, and the presentment of unsuspected problems. The present study is no exception to this rule. Perhaps a sufficient amount of space has been | devoted to the description of the method ac- cording to which the newer categories of in- formation to be used in the study of groups have been conceived and derived. The method is indeed simple. The activities of the groups under observation were approached from va- rious angles until the observer was reasonably sure that he knew what was happening. He then proceeded to find a name for this phenom- | enon. ‘he attempt has been made to utilize terms which have already secured a familiar | usage. As observation of group behavior con- tinues it may be found expedient to change all of these terms; at least the refinement of ob- servation should be followed by a corresponding — refinement of terms and categories. 176 eh eT ee ee CuHaptTer VIII OBSERVATION AND THE PARTICI- PANT OBSERVER 1. The Behavior of the Group as a Stimulus- Response Relation THE behavior of groups is a complex of re- sponses to stimuli originating within and with- out the groups. Every individual who is a | member of a group may be the source of stimuli which cause responses of the group which in turn modify the total behavior of the group. _ Every individual outside the group whose ac- | tivities affect the interests of the group will | become a stimulus to that particular group, and every other group whose activities affect the interest of the group under consideration be- _comes a stimulus.’ If the above statements are 1'There are stimuli of other kinds as well. Indi- viduals and other groups may be designated as the primary stimuli, although this is an arbitrary classi- fication. Facts, events, et cetera, which may not be traceable to specific individuals or groups, are never- theless effective stimuli to a group. 177 based upon facts, and it is assumed that they are, it becomes evident that the method of in- vestigation designed to isolate stimuli, to study responses, and to describe the nature of the stimulus-response relation as affecting groups must be a method which takes these statements into consideration. The biologists who aim to illumine the so- cial sciences by analogies from the animal level are laboring under a misapprehension. Man- kind may have some lessons to learn from the ants and the bees, but the biologists cannot ap-— ply ant and bee methods of investigation and observation to human beings. It is possible to observe ants and bees without becoming a part of the ant-and-bee-environment—without be- | coming a stimulus to change the behavior of | the ants and bees. It is not possible to study human beings and human groups without be- coming a part of the human environment and hence a possible or potential stimulus. 2. The Fallacy of the “Yes-or-No” Answer in | Soctal Investigation Investigators conducting social surveys must | ee e ° . \ be naive indeed if they assume that their ob-| servations do not change situations. ‘That they do possess a naiveté of this sort is evident from the refinements of their technique which all tend to eliminate the personal factor, to 178 | make the observers increasingly impartial, neu- tral. The underlying assumption of this tech- nique is that the survey is intended to reveal an accurate and unbiased picture of the social milieu under attention; but it is no longer the same social situation after the observer begins to make contacts with the groups affected. This is particularly true of studies based upon schedules of questions for which the investi- gator finds answers by making inquiries of per- sons. Analysis of such schedules reveals that the questions all contain premises which imply simple conclusions. Thus the English statis- tician, Bowley,” has laid down certain general rules for schedules, among which are found the following: Questions should require an answer of “‘yes”’ or “no” or of a number. Questions should be such as will be answered without bias. Two important errors are always possible in this method: in the first place, the assump- tion that the investigator has fairly and ac- curately stated the premise in his question is ‘open to grave doubt; in the second place, the assumption that life is so simple as to allow of its interpretation by “‘yes’’ or “no” or arith- metical answers given in response to an un- known inquirer is wholly false. The assump- tion that the reply will be unbiased because an- 2 Elements of Statistics, Arthur L. Bowley. 179 swered in simple “‘yes” or “‘no”’ form is, on its face, absurd. ‘This simplification of the reply may indeed be good reason for doubting the en- tire conclusion or it may merely account for the fact that so many social surveys disclose only what was already generally known before the investigation. Illustration: The student wishes to know what impelled a particular farmer to join the cooperative marketing association. If he asks the question according to the “yes” or ‘“‘no” formula, it will be stated in some such manner as this: Did you join the cooperative marketing association in order to increase your economic income? A ‘‘yes’’ to this query would be a true answer, but it would be only partially true. Yet it would be the response to be expected. A “ would at once be mistrusted, although it might be anticipated as a reply to a particular investi- gator. If the question were further refined by inserting the word “only” after ‘‘association,” the answer would be still further vitiated "a a “‘yes’’ or “‘no’’ response. The essence of this question is “interest.” We become members of groups in order to en- hance certain of our interests. In the case un- | der consideration, the farmer does join the co- operative in order to advance his economic in- terest, but there may be other interests in- volved. His leaders may have so impressed him with the economic values in cooperatia | 180 | marketing that he may see no other values for the moment. This does not mean that other values are not present or that they may not become active. Many farmers of the Southern States became members of codperative associ- ations at great out-of-door mass meetings. No observer of these mass tendencies to join could escape the conclusion that many became mem- bers under the duress of oratory, as a climax to an emotional appeal to “fight”? the middle- man, or under the fear of “‘being left out.” If some painstaking investigator should re- port that he had interviewed ten thousand members of a cooperative association and that 91.3 per cent of them were members only be- cause they believed that the codperative would enhance their economic interests, there would be every reason for believing that he had wasted a great deal of precious time, but there would be almost no valid reason for believing that he had obtained an accurate answer to the chief pertinence of his inquiry. The hypothesis of the social survey and the questionnaire involves two kinds of “knowing.” First, the investigator knows what he wishes to find out. Second, he assumes that the persons involved in his study know what he wishes to discover. The first part of this hypothesis is entirely valid providing the investigator works with adequate categories. If he merely wishes to know how many farms of a particular size 181 there are in a given area, how many people live in a single city block, et cetera, this information may be obtained. When he approaches the sec- ond part of his hypothesis, however, and at- tempts to secure information by asking ques- tions of persons, his method must be subjected to rigorous criticism. If he is still within the realm of the “what” of life, he may obtain satisfactory answers to his queries. If he enters upon the “why” and the “how” of life, which he must do if he is to learn anything about process as distinguished from status, he cannot rely upon simple answers to his cate- gorical questions. The ‘“‘yes-or-no,” ‘“‘black- or-white’”’ view of life is not only too much of a simplification but it is in reality a falsification. 3. The Behaviorist’s Position on Asking Questions One school of psychologists, the behaviorists, has gone so far as to eliminate almost entirely from its technique the method of finding out by asking questions.* Answers to inquiries are ra- tionalizations, introspections, and are not sub- ject to tests and measurements. If, say the be- haviorists, you wish to know what a person is doing, by all means refrain from asking him. His answer is sure to be wrong, not merely be- cause he does not know what he is doing but 5 See exceptions, pp. 38 to 42, Watson’s Psychology. 182 | i ) . | | | : precisely because he is answering a question and he will make the reply in terms of you and not in terms of the objective thing he really is doing.* Observation, in order to become the basis of a true induction, must be divorced from the unreliable influences of introspection. Thus, insist the behaviorists, if you wish to know what a person is really doing, watch him (don’t ask him). 4. Observation; a Form of Asking Questions The position of the behaviorists appears to be wholly sound within certain prescribed spheres. Thus the method of objective observa- tion in relation to all phenomena connected with behavior which are subject to measure- ment is superior to any other conceivable method of interpreting these phenomena; cer- tainly it is not to be compared with the unre- Curiously enough, the psycho-analysts, who are equally popular with the behaviorists and appear to get on amicably with them, function under a directly anti-behavioristic assumption. ‘They appear to hold that the product of their analyses belongs to the sub- ject’s mind. It appears wholly obvious that the product must of necessity be the joint product of the analyst and the subject. The main basis of error in this method is the common one of assuming that stimuli do not enter into and become a part of the final response. For a disagreement with the above, see The Freudian Wish, E. B. Holt. 183 liable results of mere introspection. If, for example, a person explains to an investigator what he is doing and his activities are then ob- served by six other investigators with the result that the six observers find an explanation of the person’s conduct which is in contradiction with the person’s own explanation, it is not difficult to determine which conclusion will find the most ready acceptance. A defendant in court may be ever so insistent upon his innocence but if a jury of twelve persons decides that he is guilty, this verdict will be approved. And if the de- fendant’s testimony can be refuted with the ob- servations of expert observers, alienists, psy- chiatrists, physicians, accountants, et cetera, the weight of evidence will inevitably fall against the defendant. The jury does not of course constitute an observing body, but is presumed to base its inductions upon the observations of others; when these others are experts, the as- sumption is that the inductions are handed to the jury ready-made. Returning to our case, the man whose ex- planation of his conduct does not conform to the explanation of the six expert observers, the problem here involved is not so simple as it was made to appear above. What happens when six expert observers disagree? Is there any reason for attaching greater integrity to any of the conflicting expert conclusions than to that of the person whose behavior is being ob- 184 served and whose introspections are being dis- credited? ‘This is not a purely hypothetical question, for juries do not invariably render their verdicts in conformity with expert testi- mony, and experts—when were they ever _known to agree? But the behaviorist is still right—within a certain prescribed sphere. If the conduct of the person under observation is susceptible of isolation in particulars, and if these particulars are objectively measurable, then the expert observer’s measurements must be accorded infinitely greater weight than any- thing which any one may say concerning them. But since behavior is the response of the total organism it cannot be explained in terms of par- ticulars. Watson not only clarifies this point but states the problem admirably when he says: “The behaviorist is interested in integrations and total activities of the individual. At one moment we ask the question: What is the in- dividual doing? We observe that he is type- writing, searching for a lost pocket-book or ‘reacting’ to an emotional stimulus. If the latter happens to be true and we are interested in the way his emotional life as a whole hangs together, we may go on to show why the in- dividual reacts in an emotional way to this particular stimulus. . . . Surely objective psy- chology can study brick laying, house building, playing games, marriage or emotional activity without being accused of reducing everything to 185 a muscle twitch or the secretion of a gland.” ® This is a fair-minded admission which many critics of behaviorism appear to have over- looked. It introduces essential factors of the study of behavior which are not now susceptible to objective tests and measurements. As Wat- son himself says, ‘‘Certain important psychologi- cal undertakings probably can never be brought under laboratory control.” * In such cases the behaviorist does what every other scientist does, namely, he conceives hypotheses, theories, postulates, by the methods of inference, and by means of these conclusions, he attempts to ex- plain (preferably after experimentation) the objectively commensurable factors. In doing this, the behaviorist of course uses the mental processes of the ordinary individual. Whether or not these processes involve consciousness, or the effectiveness of consciousness, or con- sciousness as a cause, appears to be a debate over words—albeit a debate which is accom- panied by considerable heat in the philosophical camp. If science and philosophy could tran- scend the propensity of making dogmatic classi- fications of ‘‘schools,” of using artificial labels — which serve chiefly as the symbols of partisan- ship, how greatly might the advances of knowl- edge be accelerated! All of this comes evi- 5 Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, J. B. Watson, p. 40. 6 Tbid., p. 28. 186 dently from the failure to regard science as a method, or rather from the opposite tendency of regarding science as a body of laws. Insofar as behaviorism is a method of dis- covery, it is scientific. “Those who would ex- tend its domain to the field of philosophy do in- jury to its possible effectiveness as method. Particular responses may be isolated (at least partially), observed, controlled and measured. For the present it is not possible to make purely objective observations, controls and measure- ments of the responses of the total personality. Hence objective psychology cannot give an ade- quate and complete account of behavior. “Two constructive paths lie before the investigator: one is to assist in perfecting the facilities of ob- jective observation and the other is to make the highest possible use of all other forms of ob- servation.™ 5. The Study of Behavior Involves What the Person (or Goup) is Doing Plus What He (orIt) Thinks He (or It) is Doing Asking questions of a person is a form of ob- servation. Even if the answers are false, they may serve to refine the ultimate conclusions. 62’The so-called Gestalt school of psychology (Kohler) appears to have made an excellent beginning in the development of a technique for observing be- havior as a total response. 187 In fact, the psychiatrist who makes inquiries of his subject does not anticipate true replies, but — he nevertheless makes use of such responses as he receives. The so-called intelligence tests (which might be more serviceable if regarded as attainment or achievement tests) are forms of — observation although they are also based upon — answers to questions. The query may demand — nothing more than a non-verbal response, but it is still a question and the response is an an- © swer. What is in a person’s “mind” may or may not be true but it is the sum total of his rationalizations upon which his life has pro- ceeded. If he acts upon the basis of these rationalizations, they are insofar significant in — explaining his behavior. If he “thinks” he is doing a particular thing for one reason and in reality is doing it on entirely different grounds, both reasons are important. The people of the © United States may be designated as materialistic — but they regard themselves as being idealistic — and sentimental. Is it not legitimate to conclude that they are both? At times they ~ act in response to what is represented by their © real interests, which may be economic, but at — other times they act as though they really be- lieved themselves to be idealistic. Both types — of acting are real, and both enter into the total — behavior-pattern. The individual responds as a whole. There- — fore if his behavior is to be understood, the ~ 188 whole must be observed as well as the parts. In like manner it may be said, although with less accuracy, that the group responds as a unit. There is thus placed upon the investigator the obligation of discovering means of observing the group as a whole. -6. The Answer to the Question: What is the Group Doing—Must Come from Both the Inside and the Outside We have now set out to discover certain definite things about two specific groups: a farmers’ cooperative association and the mid- dlemen whom it would displace. Our cate- gories of information have been derived by ob- serving the groups in action. ‘This observation has led us to the inquiry: What is the nature of the behavior of these groups? In attempting to study the behavior of the groups we have found it necessary to break up the whole into parts. Thus far we are quite willing to admit that much of the process of breaking up the whole is purely arbitrary procedure. It is of the same type as the arbitrary marks on a ther- mometer or a scale, although its initial purpose is not to measure units but to designate or con- ceive what is believed to be happening. Its secondary purpose is to attempt explanations of what is believed to be happening. We are now confronted with the questions: 189 a. The groups have leaders; what is the relation between the leaders and the groups? b. The groups represent interests; what interests? how are these interests represented? c. The groups give consent to cer- tain activities; what is this consent? How — is it given? d. The groups utilize the services of ex- perts; what is the function of the expert? how is this function interpreted to the group? e. The activities as well as the prin- ciples of the groups are assumed to be based upon facts: how are these facts obtained? how used? f. The groups under observation are seen to respond to other groups, to in- dividuals, to the Government, et cetera; what is the nature of this multiple re- sponse? Observation as used in this study is taken to © mean two things: (1) What is the group do- ing? (2) What does the group “think’’ it is doing?” Or, observation from the inside as well as observation from the outside. Ob- 7 Of equal importance is the question: What do oth- ers think the group is doing? How do they react in terms of what the group is doing, or thinks it is doing? These questions are left to the discussion of multiple response and public opinion. 190 viously no single investigator would be capable of carrying on this type of observation alone. The task makes an experiment in joint or co- operative (investigation) observation impera- tive. This is no slight demand. Much is said about the necessity for joint investigation but the scarcity of this sort of investigation (study) may be attributed to its difficulties. 47. The Function of the Participant Observer For experimental purposes the codperating observers have been called “participant ob- servers.’ The term implies, not that the ob- servers are participating in the study but that they are participating in the activities of the group being observed. Persons involved in the activities of a group who also understand the methods of observation are rare. In fact, there are few such persons available and those who are must be trained. Such training in- volves its own difficulties. Shall the participant observer be trained to look for exactly the same factors which are sought by the observer from the outside? This method would inevitably lead to error for the participant observer should be free to see many things which the outside observer can never see. If he merely sees what his mentor on the outside asks him to see, it is entirely likely that the sum of his ob- servations may turn out to be nothing but pre- IgI possessions. On the basis of the small amount of experience available it is somewhat hazard- ous to speak of the functions of the participant observer, but an attempt at such specification must be made in order to facilitate criticism. With this tentative end in view it may then be said that the participant observer is one who (1) Is a part of the group being studied (2) Has vital interests involved in the group’s activities (3) Provides the exterior or outside observer with the facts of the group’s ac- tivities (4) Provides the outside observer with facts bearing upon the categories utilized in the study (5) Presents criticisms of the cate- gories (6) Discovers new categories as emergencies of the group’s changing ac- tivities (7) Corrects conclusions of the out- side observer from the viewpoint of one whose interests are at stake At once it becomes apparent that the par-_ ticipant observer will furnish much biased in- — formation. He will be the informant of what the group “thinks” it is doing. Hence much of © what he contributes will be of a subjective and 192 introspective character.’ But his observations will still be tinctured with the prejudices of one who is a partisan member of a group. ‘This is precisely what is wanted. The real meaning of the group and its processes is presumed to be something which is affected by what the group actually does and its rationalizations of what it does. Emotions, prejudices, habits, customs, mores, sentiments—all of these enter into the rationalizations. ‘To assume that they are un- important parts of the group’s behavior-pattern is to eliminate some of the very mainsprings of human action and behavior. Many of the im- plications of this method of observation will be clarified under the discussion of ‘Social Conflict as the Laboratory,’ Chapter X. There it will be more clearly disclosed why the prejudicial aspects of group _ behavior cannot be neglected if we are to ascertain the real nature of the group and its processes. 8. Group Purpose Revealed Through the Par- ticipant Observer What the group ‘‘thinks”’ it is doing, i.e., its rationalizations of its activities—past, present and future—may be regarded roughly as the 8 Experience thus far discloses the fact, however, that such observers tend to become objective in their obser- vations. 193 group’s purpose. ‘This quality corresponds to that element in individual behavior which eludes objective observation. The minutest observa- tions of what a man is doing can never reveal the precise purpose or motive ® which accounts fully for his acts. His stated purpose may also be misleading, but at some point between the individual’s purpose and his activity there exists either an essential harmony or an essential dis- harmony. By discovering this point it becomes possible to arrive at certain workable inferences regarding the individual’s purpose. Psychiatric technique is able to arrive at such inferences and the applications of the inferences to be- havior problems often produce striking results. Psychiatrists do not rely upon objective observa- tions, nor do they accept the individual’s ra- tionalizations. ‘The use of the participant ob- server in attempting to illumine group purpose is analogous to the technique of the psychiatrist. The group does not, of course, think or ra- tionalize as individuals think and rationalize. These terms are used merely because of the analogical worth; they convey ideas which must — at this stage be stated in accustomed terms if collective psychology is to be made intelligible. The “thinking” and “rationalizing” of the group are always phenomena arising out of dis- ® The term “desire” is not used because its connota- tion appears to be included in the broad definition of “interest” employed in later chapters. 194 il ae fi f cussion or out of the acceptance of the dicta of the leaders, the officials or the experts. The group does not think, nor does it perform any function which may be adequately defined by the terms and within the categories of individual psychology. But thinking is done by members of the group and the product of such thinking may roughly be called ‘“‘group-thinking,”’ which does not mean that the group thinks but rather that the group accepts by some form of con- sent a concurrent result of individual thinking. What happens when individuals discuss, or rather what happens in the relation between minds, is a problem which has been almost wholly neglected by psychologists and social scientists..° If the observer is seated in the gallery and watches the group behave in a situa- tion of tension, is he likely to understand what is happening and why? We are confronted here with the double difficulty of having a gal- lery which undoubtedly affects the group’s be- havior and an observer who must view the ac- tivity objectively but who cannot ascertain the purposes and motives of activity without as- ‘suming integrity and knowledge on the part of informants. 10’This is the problem with which Miss Follett is concerned in the early chapters of The New State. There has recently appeared a commendable effort to ‘approach the question from the viewpoint of philosophy. See The Contact Between Minds, C. Delisle Burns. 195 Illustration: . A group discussion (Group A) took place. The subject was one of vital concern to the group. The outside observer was cordially in- vited but nothing happened. ‘Iwo weeks later a policy was inaugurated which affected the subject of this discussion. ‘The observer at once made the effort to learn whether this policy was precipitated by some new event or whether it had merely emerged after continued discussion. ‘To his surprise he learned that the policy was decided upon almost immediately after he had left the group discussion. In this case the observer acted as an inhibitor to the group’s discussion and nothing but inane and irreievant remarks were made. Once the ob- server was out of the way, discussion proce with despatch.” A certain tendency toward the concealment of purposes has arisen in social organization. Trade unions, chambers of commerce and farm organizations are all subject to this tendency. 11 Numerous experiments of this kind have been at- tempted. Continuous attendance of an outside ob- server at the meetings of a shop committee tended to" emasculate the discussion and in the end the meetings were discontinued. In another instance where the out-. side observer aligned himself with the interest of the group and changed his status from outside to partici- pant observer, the situation was entirely changed the moment he took part in the discussion as one with in- terests at stake. 4 196 It is not, however, confined to groups in open conflict with other groups where the technique resembles military strategy, but strangely, it is encountered in social service groups and in or- ganizations which have none but sociable func- tions. How this tendency affects the use of facts in group function will be shown later. It is sufficient here to indicate that this constitutes an added difficulty in the way of ascertaining what the group “‘thinks’”’ it is doing. The ex- perimental use of participant observers has, it is believed, served as an approach to the solu- tion of this difficulty. 9. Integrating the Conclusions of the Ob- server and the Participant Observer; a Logical and a Psychological Process The assumption already made is: what the group is really doing is an integration of what it objectively does and what it “thinks” it is doing. The total act of the group considered in relation to the group’s evolving function is a conjunction of activity and purpose. Ulti- mately the act comes to be more than a conjunc- tion. By “ultimately” is meant the time when the particular group becomes an accepted part of the totality of functioning groups in the com- munity. When this period has been reached, purpose and objective activity will necessarily transcend the conjoined state and become in- 197 tegrated total activity. But there is no end to the integrating process; conflicts from within and without will constantly recur and the func- tion of the group will eventuate in a continuing series of integrations of changing purpose with changing objective activity. From the viewpoint of research technique this hypothesis must be reduced to the process of integration between the conclusions of the observer and those of the participant observer. This process, as the following illustration will indicate, involves both logical and psychological methods. | Ttustration: One of the groups under observation pursued the policy of refusing to publish the amount of receipts at its warehouses. This came to be an acute situation in one area in which the op- position (middlemen’s organization) was par- ticularly effective. Observations of the Outside Observer: a. The fact of refusing to publish receipts. b. The purpose of this policy is to conceal weakness from the opposition. c. The state law states that such receipts must be published weekly. d. Technical evasion of the law will give moral advantage to the opposition. 198 | | _ Observations of the Participant Observer: a. Agreement on the fact. b. The purpose of this policy is to i. Conceal weakness from the member- ship. ii. Assist in control of the market. c. [he law covers purchases and not receipts; bs warehouses merely receive and do not sell. d. This may be offset by emphasizing the iniquities of the middlemen’s marketing system. Complete analysis of these two sets of ob- servations is not necessary for the purpose of indicating that whatever reasoning takes place must proceed from known facts to possible or probable conclusions. ‘This constitutes a logical process. But the mere use of logic might end in disclosing two opposed conclusions, as in fact it did in the above case. The conclusions of the participant observer led directly to a contin- uance of the stated policy and those of the ob- server pointed unmistakably to the necessity of changing the policy. Observations b, c and d were in reality opposing conclusions de- rived from the same premise. They were not, however, mutually contradictory. It is not difficult to see that the b of both observers is susceptible of consolidation; all three pur- 199 poses were in reality involved and possibly other — purposes which were not definable. Conclusions c and d gradually evolved into a joint ethical consideration involving the press and public opinion. The adjustment which was finally made involved the state, the middlemen, the press, public opinion, the membership and out- side critics of the group. The basis of this ad- justment was established as an integrated solu- tion in the minds of the observers long before it came to be an actual adjustment or activity on the part of the group. ‘The integration was achieved, obviously, by the use of both logical and psychological methods, 200 CHAPTER IX CATEGORIES AND TERMS RE-DEFINED 1. The Rules of Definition THE problem of language persists in all of what has been written above—much as a nettle adheres to and impedes the progress of a pedes- trian. The foregoing chapters on logic and analogy are almost entirely dependent upon what is understood by the use and meaning of words in communication. In Chapter IV the position is taken that numerals must be re- garded as symbols and that their utilization in social statistics is likely to lead to a neglect of investigation of the relation between numerals as symbols and their referents. In Chapter VII the problem of terms, words or categories is approached directly. Since this chapter was written a scholarly volume’? which marks the beginning of an inductive science of symbolism has appeared. If the above-mentioned chapters 1The Meaning of Meaning, Ogden and Richards. Harcourt, Brace and Company, International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method. 20I were to be rewritten in conformity with the dicta of this work numerous revisions and par- ticularly numerous substitutions of terms would be necessary. However, the general theory of words as symbols which bear no causal relation to their referents as set forth in The Meaning of Meaning so closely approximates the theory underlying the present essay that it has been decided to allow the previously written chapters to stand as they are. The reason for this de- cision is based chiefly upon the assumption that the necessary comparisons which the reader will thus be obliged to make may prove to be help- ful in advancing the science of symbolism in connection with the social sciences. At this juncture it will prove helpful to re- capitulate several of the conclusions, theorems and rules which constitute the general theory of language as set forth by Ogden and Richards: A. The relation between a thought or refer- ence and its language symbol may be re- garded as a causal relation. B. The relation between a thought or refer- ence and its referent (the object referred to) may be regarded as a causal relation. C. The relation between a symbol and its refer- ent must be regarded as an imputed and not as a causal relation.’ 2 This is excellently portrayed by means of a diagram on p. 14, The Meaning of Meaning. 202 Tilustration: If I think of a leader of a group and desig- nate him by the symbol leader, then my thought bears a causal relation to the symbol Jeader. My thought also bears a causal relation to the specific leader thought of, i.e., as an object of my thought. But the symbol “leader” bears no causal relation to its referent, the leader. D. Hence “there are three factors involved when any statement is made or interpreted. ‘‘t. Mental processes “2. The symbol ‘3. A referent—something which is thought ‘of.’ ‘The theoretical problem of Symbolism is— “How are these three related? “The practical problem, since we must use words in discussion, is— “How far is our discussion itself distorted by habitual attitudes towards words and lingering assumptions due to theories no longer openly held but still allowed to guide our practise?” E. “In all thinking we are interpreting signs. Our interpretation of any sign is our psy- chological reaction to it, as determined by our past experience in similar situations and by our present experience.”’ ® The interpretation of a sign (symbol) is then a sign-situation. F. “In any discussion or interpretation of * Pp. 382, 383, 384. 203 symbols we need a means of identifying referents. [he reply to the question, ‘What does a word or symbol refer to? consists in the substitution of a symbol or symbols which can be better under- stood. Such substitution is Definition. It involves the selection of known referents as starting points, and the identification of the definiendum by its connection with these.”’ * The importance of the above rules to the social sciences can scarcely be over-estimated. Words and terms are used less discriminatingly in this sphere probably than in any other phase of human thinking. Every student of the social sciences should pursue a preliminary study of symbolism before attempting to understand and interpret the terms to be utilized. ‘The lan- guage of these sciences may be refined only if the question, ‘What is it that I am referring to?’ is constantly reiterated. .2. Statement of Terms and Categories The point has now been reached in the present study to re-examine the categories of information to be utilized. As already in- dicated,° three categories are to be employed. * Pp. 386-387. 5 Chapter VII. 204 aga Category I includes terms used as symbols re- ferring to 1. Ihe Group 2. Leaders and leadership 3. Experts 4. Observers and participant observers The terms under this category are symbols whose referents are persons or combinations of persons. Category IT includes terms used as symbols re- ferring to Group situations Group stimuli Group responses Representation Consent Discussion Use of Facts Interests Points-of-view Use of language Power. HOO DI QAnAW WD 4 s+ The terms under this category are symbols whose referents are activities of the group or of individuals within or without the group and affecting its behavior. Category III includes terms used as symbols re- ferring to 1. Customs 2. Mores 205 Traditions Attitudes Ethics The Law Public Opinion. See The terms under this category are symbols whose referents are controls or modes of con- trol which modify and condition the group’s be- havior although they are descriptive of quali- ties more inclusive than the immediate member- ship of the group. Since the terms of these categories are sym- bols for the problems raised by this study, they cannot, obviously, be accurately defined. They are in fact at this juncture merely partial sym- bols. “Only occasionally will a symbolization be available which, without loss of its symbolic accuracy, is also suitable (to the author’s atti- tude to his public), appropriate (to his refer- ent), judicious (likely to produce the desired effects) and personal (indicative of the stability or instability of his references.’”’* ‘The author is aware of the ambiguity of some and the emo- tional flavor of other of the above terms. ‘Thus ‘expert’ is a term which carries its own nega- tive connotations and may be used scientifically only if intensively or extensively defined. The categories also include terms which unavoidably betray the author’s knowledge of the “‘insta- ®° The Meaning of Meaning, p. 371. 20 bility” of his references. The definitions then which follow are to be regarded merely as ten- tative efforts to designate certain symbols as bearing an imputed relation to the objects or phenomena (referents) for which they serve as signs. It is not presumed that professional sociologists and social psychologists will concur in these definitions; nor is such concurrence at this point desirable. Investigation along both lines—in the sphere of language symbols and in the sphere of the data which constitute the as- sumed basis of the social sciences—will need to go much further and deeper before anything like scientific concurrence may be expected. In the process of selection and elimination which accompanied the determination of categories, attention was directed toward terms which have already come into common usage in the field of one or another of the social sciences. Thus “consent” and ‘‘representation” are al- ready useful categories for political science, although carrying a different implication. 3. Definitions of Terms in Category I a. The Method of Definition Illustrated: Definition of the Term “Group” (1) Group: Two or more persons con- sciously acting together for the pur- pose of advancing a mutual interest. The terms in this definition which are 207 symbols of specific referents are: two or more, consciously, acting together, pur-— pose, advancing, mutual and interest. — Those which are likely to give trouble are: — consciously, purpose, mutual and interest. — It will not be difficult to secure concurrence for the statement that a group is more than one © person and that this congeries or aggregate © acts—does something—as a group. Nor will | support be lacking for the statement that the © group is conscious both of its existence—its — group-ness—and of its activity... What the group indicates as the nature of its activity may, of course, be something entirely different when viewed from outside the group. Example: The Ku Klux Klan indicates its activity as being of the nature of support to religion, pa- triotism, et cetera. Viewed as a result and from the outside, these activities may be seene as inimical to religion and patriotism. That all members of a group are conscious of “acting together’ and of the ‘‘mutual interest”’ involved is questionable. Many groups are formed by skillful methods of propaganda which secure membership in the group but do not se- 7 Whether or not a group really “‘acts” is also a de- batable question which will be dealt with later. 208 cure the consciousness of purposes and interests involved. But whether such marginal members of a functioning group can really be said to be actual members is doubtful; there will always be a small coterie within the group which is conscious of the “acting together” as well as of the interests concerned. Moreover it is highly doubtful if the ‘‘group”’ is capable of per- forming the functions which the definition ascribes to a group, without a certain degree of consciousness of activity and purpose. The chief implication of consciousness in the above definition is that members of a group are mentally affected by their group adherence. Be- ing a member of a group, e.g., is not merely a physiological phenomenon; it must sooner or later involve those aspects of behavior which are usually ascribed to consciousness or to mental activity. Mental activity is then the referent of the symbol “consciously.”’ Purpose and interest ought not under or- dinary conditions to be included in the same definition. Purpose * is here used as a synonym either for the reason which a person gives for his activity or the reason which may be dis- covered. The referent for which purpose is then the symbol is aim or intention. The raison d étre or the rationale of an individual’s mem- 8 This use of the term “purpose” should of course be carefully distinguished from its use as a purely teleo- logical or philosophical symbol. 209 bership in a group may be roughly called his purpose. ‘Advancing a mutual interest’? must first of all be considered as a single term. ‘Taken as a whole it is itself a referent of purpose. If it is desired to learn what a person’s real pur- pose in joining a group is, the particular or complex interest that the group advances for him must sooner or later be discovered. ‘The term “mutual” merely indicates that each group to which an individual belongs represents either the whole or some portion of what is to him an interest worth conserving or advancing (in groups which are more or less static the in- terest will be conserved and in dynamic groups the interest will be advanced or enhanced) and that this same interest is considered to be worth conserving or advancing by all members of the group. Whether or not the interest is consid- ered to be of equal value by all members of the group is unimportant for the purport of the definition. The means which an individual pur- sues in order to advance his interests may be the group. A brief definition of the group might therefore be: A means of advancing individual interests which involves joining with other in- dividuals who place value upon the same in- terests. We have still to deal with the term “‘in- terest.”’° As apart of the context of this study ® The definition of the term “interest” given in the 210 | the term has unusual significance. In fact the symbol “‘interest’’ is placed in such a pivotal position in the contextual arrangement of this volume that it deserves far more space than will be convenient and appropriate if the pres- ent study is to be kept within bounds. The use of the term will best be understood if considera- tion is given to the various ways in which it has been defined by others. A. Sociological Definitions: (a) “In general an interest is an un- satisfied capacity, corresponding to an un- Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (J. M. Bald- win) excludes the use of the term here suggested. “(Interest) loosely used for personal advantage or good; as in the phrase, ‘it is in his interest to do so.’ This meaning is not sufficiently exact to be technically useful,” p. 562, vol. 1. ‘This is regarded as a conserva- tive and hence intensive limitation of the term. ‘The term “interest”? should be looked upon apparently as a word with ambiguous possibilities. Once this is rec- ognized, it becomes a simple matter to distinguish be- tween psychological interest (meaning to be interested in), economic interest (meaning a payment for the use of capital), and sociological interest (meaning the ob- jectives for which the individual or the group exerts energy). If the method of limiting the term or refusing to recognize its diverse meaning as suggested above were followed, then all ambiguous words should be treated in the same manner; this would lead to a whole- sale pauperization of language since there are few terms which are not susceptible of ambiguous use. 2II re ——— realized condition, and it is pre-disposition — to such re-arrangement as would tend to realize the indicated condition. The whole life-process, so far as we know it, whether viewed in its individual or in its social phase, is at last the process of developing, adjusting and satisfying in- teréstsn 7. | (b) “By interest we mean any aim or object which stimulates activity towards its” attainment. . . . An interest involves, | therefore, some consciousness, however vague, of a satisfaction to be attained and some resultant activity towards its attain- ment. . °.''. ‘An interest 1s any objech of the will.’ ™ (c) “Every form of phenomena from heavenly body to atom, and every organ- ism is a part of the original force with an interest appropriate to its particular de- velopment. . . . This inborn interest is the prime factor in attention, association, — purpose and will. . [hese interests% become in a sense forces.!i i.e., an interest@ unsatisfied is a condition of maladapta- tion and gives rise to a feeling of unrest” and of discomfort.” ¥ (d) ‘‘Beliefs rest on interest. Bue 10 General Sociology, Albion W. Small, pp. 425-436. 11 The Elements of Social Science, R. M. Mclver, pp. 64-65. 12 Die Sociologische Erkenntnis, Gustav Ratzenhofer, pp. 28, 34, 252. 7m rd what is interest? It is feeling. World views grow out of feeling. They are the bulwarks of race safety. You cannot argue men out of them. They are the conditions to group as well as to individual salvation. All interest is essentially eco- nomic, and seen in their true light, re- ligious interests are as completely economic as the so-called material interests.” ** These four definitions appear to summarize the sociologists’ approach to the problem of in- terests. Schaflle speaks a great deal about the “struggle of interests’; Spencer’s classification of diverse interests of the species, the parent and the offspring is given considerable import- ance; Mackenzie says, ‘‘though diversity of in- terests leads to conflict, ultimately the good of the individual and society are identical”; LeBon, in the rhapsodic style of his earlier work, ex- claims, ‘‘social groupings so united by a common physiological and psychological heritage, so bound together by common interests and ideals, and responding so alike to a common stimulus that we may well speak of such groups as having a soul”; Carver sees only one escape from the dilemma of interests and suggests that, “Even under the conditions of economic scarcity there would be no antagonism of interests between man and man if human nature were to undergo 18 Applied Sociology, Lester F. Ward, pp. 45-46. 213 4 a change by which altruism were to replace egoism’’; et cetera. B. Definitions from Jurisprudence and Polit. ical Science: (a) “Natural rights mean simply in- terests which we think ought to be secured; _ demands which human beings make which > we think ought to be satisfied. It is per-— fectly true that neither law nor state creates them. But it is fatal to all sound © thinking to treat them as legal conceptions. A legal system attains its ends by recognizing certain interests, individ- ual, public and social; by defining the limits within which these interests shall be recog- nized legally and given effect through the force of the state, and by endeavoring to secure the interests so recognized within the defined limits.”’ ** (b) “The idea behind the concept of interest is that of participation in some property or benefit or advantage, i.e., in some value whether tangible or otherwise. , The thing in question calls out a peculiar sort of mental attitude in the mind of the person interested; it has a bearing upon his action or judgment, and he has a share in it in the sense that it is a matter of at least potential value for him. He con- *4 The Spirit of the Common Law, Roscoe Pound, p. 91-92. 214 cerns himself about it. . . . It will be readily seen, therefore, that the concep- tion of an interest is well designed to break down the exclusive character which at- tached historically to the conception of a pits)’. An (interest wew eds: a share and it carries with it the suggestion of other sharers. . . . A right is the attribute of a person, but an interest may be larger and more permanent than the person who possesses it. . . . An in- terest in some corporate group, like a polit- ical party or a church, means the accept- ance of the purpose of the group as a part of one’s own purposes.” *° The movement towards supplanting interests for rights in the field of jurisprudence and polit- ical science ** appears to have made consider- able headway among the thinkers but it is dif- ficult to believe that this is also true of the prac- titioners in these spheres. A comparison of the attempts at definition provided by the so- ciologists with those provided in the second 18 The Modern Idea of the State, H. Krabbe, Trans- lators’ Introduction (Sabine and Shepard), pp. lvii, Iviii, lix. See also Chapter V on Interests and the Sense of Right. 16 “We owe this way of thinking to Rudolph von Jhering who was the first to insist upon the interests which the legal order secures rather than the legal rights by which it secures them.” The Spirit of the Common Law, Pound, pp. 203-204. 215 group is convincingly unfavorable to the so- ciologists. ‘There is less subjectivism in the lat- ter group.” The thinkers in the field of juris- prudence evidently place great emphasis upon the objectivity of what they conceive to be an interest. For this reason their definitions prove helpful. Returning now to our task of defining “‘in- terest’ as a part of the context of our defini- tion of a group and keeping in mind the rules of symbolization as set forth by Ogden and Richards, we may make the statement: 4n in- terest symbolizes something which all the mem- bers of the group want, need, desire or wish for, and therefore strive to acquire. Illustration: One of the interests of a trade union may bé said to be the recognition of the union. ‘This is something which they consciously seek and for which they are willing to assume risks. (They is here used as a collective term for the mem- bership of the union. ) 17 Ross (Social Psychology), McDougall (Social Psychology), Ginsberg (The Psychology of Society) make no specific use of the symbol “interest.” Ross does, however, make extensive use of the term else- where, e.g., in his Social Control. See also his use of interest as a social force, Chapter V, Principles of So- clology. It is also suggested that the reader review Chapters XI and XII, entitled, “The Enlisting of In- terest” and “Self-Interest Reconsidered,” respectively, in Public Opinion by Walter Lippmann. 216 The referent is still partially concealed. Why do the members of a trade union want recognition of the union? Why do they want it sufficiently to make sacrifices for it? These questions necessitate an expansion of the above definition. Apparently the trade union wants recognition because it places value upon such recognition. But what sort of value? At this point the term “‘interest’”’ takes on the inclusive and comprehensive connotation imputed to it in this study. Ward intensifies the term by concluding that all interests represent ultimately economic or material values. This simplification of behavior renders the economic interpretation of history attractive as a generalized theory of life. If all interests are at bottom economic or material, then the trade union seeks recognition only because this recogntion will bring increases in wages, or economic income. Recognition of the union merely strengthens the union’s capacity for bargaining. There can be little doubt that this is precisely the reasoning which goes on in the minds of most trade union lead- ers; recognition of the union is to them merely a means toward power, and power is merely a means toward a larger share of the products of industry. It implies further that this separa- tion is to be one of perpetual conflict. If the workers want power merely in order to wrest material goods from their employers, then, of course, there can never be any integration of the 217 workers with the industry as a whole. Industry — will then be destined to remain a divisive rather than an integral affair. * Experience indicates that the valuation of in- — terests which proceeds as workers secure col- lective recognition is an evolving process in which the narrow circle of economic interests gradually enlarges to include other interests which cannot legitimately be called economic. In Great Britain, for example, where trade unions experience no difficulty in securing recog- nition, the workers frankly state that their ul- — timate goal is a share in the control of industry. _ (That there is no comparable tendency among ~ trade unionists in the United States is probably to be accounted for by the fact that the Amer- ican Federation of Labor is committed to an opposite philosophy; outside the Federation, there are evidences of a tendency which is strik- ingly parallel to the British movement.) A share in the control of industry implies some- thing more than mere economic returns. It in- volves responsibility of various sorts, e.g., the responsibility of being intelligent. The British Labor movement long ago recognized the utility of an educational strategy. To be intel- © ligent involves additional effort and the use of — intelligence brings as a consequence added re- © sponsibilities. What are to be the compensa- ~ tions of this added effort and responsibility? The argument that the anticipated compensa- — 218 tions are to be wholly economic would entail serious difficulties. It would need to explain why the British Labor Party insists that its pro- gram would bring a more equable income to all workers; why certain persons choose academic rather than business careers; why certain em- ployers cling to their power of control when their incomes have already passed far beyond any possible economic needs; why any sort of business honesty prevails, et cetera. In short, to substantiate the argument of economic gain as the single motif of life it would be necessary to reduce personality to a single element. Be- cause of its apparent simplicity this is an allur- ing temptation to many who are bafiled by the complexities of behavior. ‘This would, how- ever, result not ina real simplification but rather in further complication. Aésthetics, religion and ethics would have no place in such a scheme of life, and yet they exist to be explained. Per- sonalities such as Socrates, Jesus, Tolstoi and Lincoln must remain forever beyond the limits of scientific interpretation of behavior if only economic values and motives are valid. If be- havior is the response of the total personality (organism), there is every reason for assuming that such responses are not made to single or simple stimuli. If this is true on the individual level, it must be equally or more true on the group level. 219 Illustration: In Holt’s Freudian Wish, under the discus- sion of personality, the question is asked: ‘‘Why does a boy go fishing?’ The answer given is: Because the behavior of the growing organism is so far integrated as to respond specifically to such an environmental object as fish in the pond. It too, admits that the boy’s ‘thought’ (content) is the fish.” ?® Thus the exciting stimulus which causes the boy to go fishing is “‘fish,” or “fish in the pond.” But is there not some.reason to believe that this excit- ing stimulus may contain other facts? Fish, fish in the pond, the pond, relief from school re- sponsibilities, the companionship of other boys, solitude, the shade of a tree, the excitement of landing the fish—what is there in the boy’s be- havior that excludes any of these factors? Why is it not legitimate to say: The boy goes fishing because the growing organism is so far integrated as to respond specifically to such an environmental situation which includes every- thing that is associated with fishing? Returniag to the case of recognition of the union as one of the interests of a trade union, why is it not legitimate to infer that this in- terest involves the workers’ desire for control, their dignity and position in society, their per- sonal ambitions, their desire to put intelli- gence into use, et cetera? 18 The Freudian Wish, E. B. Holt, p. 202. 220 ~ An interest possesses value therefore because action on its behalf includes the total person- ality, and the total personality may be expressed in multiple ways, only one of which may be termed economic. The values inhering in an in- terest are such values as tend to elevate the personality. Hence the symbol interest used as the objective of group activity connotes any- thing that will enhance or elevate the person- alities of the members of the group under con- sideration. The group will react to anything in its environment which appears to conflict with its interests. Interests are then the ‘‘motor-sets” which precipitate the group into action. (Motor-sets, of course, belong to the individual and not the group, and the term is here used in a purely analogical sense. ‘The term ‘‘motor-set” can be used in describing group action only if it can be proved that every individual in the group is stimulated to make the same response at the same time. Crowd or mob behavior appears at times to be made up of such responses, but we are not here concerned with crowds but rather with organized, func- tional groups.) ‘The referent of the term “‘in- terest” is then any object or activity which causes the group to act or respond with the aim of enhancing or elevating the personalities of the members of the group. Our definition now stands: 221 Symbol Referent Group: More than one person Consciously : Mental activity Acting together: As a unit Purpose: Reason Advancing: Enhancing, elevating Mutual: Common to all members of the group Interests: Values relating to per- sonality Or, A group is more than one person acting mentally as a unit for the reason that values of personality common to all members of the group will thus be enhanced. Further effort might avail to eliminate some of the ambiguities which still remain in this definition, but it is not to be hoped that anything approaching absoluteness is possible. The term “group” has been utilized as an illustra- tion of the method of definition and now that the method has been amplified it will not be nec- essary to go into details with the succeeding definitions. It is suggested, however, that the critical reader test the ensuing definitions ac- cording to the rules of definition as set forth in the beginning of this chapter. Such criticism will be helpful in the impending task of refining the nomenclature of the social sciences in general. b. Leader: An individual whose rationaliza- 222 tions, judgments and feelings are accepled (re= sponded to) by the group as bases of belief and action. This definition extracts from the concept of leadership all subjective qualities such as the “seer,” the “prophet,” the ‘“‘visionary’’; it also places such qualitative terms as “‘initiative,”’ “loyalty,” “resourcefulness,” et cetera, in the background. The definition is double-barreled: it assumes that the leader acts as a stimulus to group action, and also that the group accepts, i.e., consciously acknowledges the rationaliza- tions, judgments and feelings of the leader as its own. The implication here is that these very rationalizations, judgments and feelings of the leader may have been stimulated by the group. The leader is a stimulus but he is also a response. Leadership resides in the individual who is capable of rationalizing, judging, feeling in terms of the group and its interests. c. Expert: An individual equipped with tech- nological information and capacities who serves the group on behalf of its interests. The leader utilizes feelings, rationalizations, judgments; the expert utilizes logic and facts. The group is an organ or agent of adjustment and the expert is merely a tool used in the ad- justing process. The relation between the ex- pert and the group is one of fact, not feeling. If machines were capable of furnishing the same kinds of results furnished by experts, ma- 223 chines would be used; but since machines cannot possibly possess the selective capacity neces- sary for the changing technological environ- ment, experts will always be needed. The group acts in response to the expert’s facts, not in response to the expert.’® It reacts to those ‘facts’ whether they are true or not. The ex- pert, considered in relation to the group is sui generis. d. 1. Observer: One who watches the be- havior (stimuli and responses) of the group from the viewpoint of scientific interest. il. Participant Observer: One who watches the behavior of the group from the viewpoint of a sharer of the group’s interests. Chapter VIII on Observation and the Par- ticipant Observer makes further elaboration of these definitions unnecessary. It should be kept in mind, however, that the distinction between the observer and the participant observer does not imply that the former has no influence upon the behavior of the group. The idea of a wholly exterior, ‘‘disinfected”’ observer is held to be unsound for the social sciences. What is implied in the foregoing distinction is that the observer is capable of watching certain aspects 19 The definition of the “expert” as here given will need to be modified if some of the conclusions of the latter part of this study are valid. As a matter of ob- servation, the group does react to the expert as well as to his facts, but the presumption upon which modern group life proceeds is in harmony with our definition. 224 of the behavior of the group and that the par- ticipant observer is capable of watching others, and that both aspects are important for an ade- quate explanation of the group’s behavior. A diagram may now be useful in clarifying the initial stage of group-study as indicated by the definitions of terms in Category Number J. G—Group under specific observation. G', G?, G’—Other groups related to G. E—Expert. L—Leader. O—Observer. P.O.—Participant observer. X—Specific environment of group under ob- servation. Y—Total environment. 225 4. Definitions of Terms in Category II a. Group situation: A relation which the group sustains to its environment which necessi- tates release of energy or action on the part of the group. In the study of group behavior it is apparent that there are periods during which the group as a group is quiescent. When something hap- pens in the environmment of the group which affects the group’s interests, the group is placed in a position or situation which demands ac- tivity. Group situations are occasions when the group is about to act or is acting. b. Group stimuli: Changes within or with- out the group which are capable of evoking a response from the group. When the group leaves its quiescent stage and is about to act, there is somewhere a cause for changed situation. ‘The cause is a stimulus. In individual psychology a stimulus is inter- preted as having the function of arousing a neural impulse. The group, however, has no nervous system and hence cannot be stimulated exactly in this manner. It is true that the group is often stimulated through an individ- ual (leader) who has been previously stimu- lated by having a neural impulse aroused. Fre- quently the group stimulation may be traced to several individuals thus stimulated; these indi- viduals in turn transfer their responses to other members of the group to whom these responses 226 ~~ ee become a stimulus. In an individual behavior is a function of some stimulus exterior to the in- dividual. Ina group the stimulus may be within the group. It may be correct to say in groups which utilize deliberative means of responding that there is never a direct or specific stimulus to action, but always a secondary stimulus. The event, activity, utterance, change which provokes the group to action—because of which it acts—may be regarded as the group stimulus. c. Group response: The activity by means of which the group responds to stimuli. The group seldom responds as a group and in direct causal relation to a stimulus. The stimulus incites the group to action and what- ever action results is a response of the group. ‘The action, however, is not an immediate re- sponse; it is usually preceded by discussion, by voting, et cetera. Group responses are second- ary just as group stimuli are secondary. The group may respond with an activity which is favored by only a majority of the members. This is, obviously, not a response of the total group, but if the group has previously agreed to regard majority votes as conclusive this action may be considered as a group response. All of the means according to which the group arrives at the point of action are included in the group’s response. Its means of acting are its responses. d. Representation: A means whereby in- dividuals may act on behalf of the group. 227 If a committee is appointed from the mem- bership of the group to act on a special prob- lem, the action of this committee is generally assumed to represent, stand for, the action of the group. Checks are usually placed upon such action, e.g., the committee is required to report its findings to the group in the form of recommendations for action. Frequently groups in conflict with other groups find it nec- essary to allow leaders, officials or other chosen representatives to act wholly on their behalf. The method according to which such repre- sentatives acquire their representativeness is also a part of the general problem of repre- sentation. When leaders fail to represent the interests, or what are regarded to be the in- terests, of the group, they are invariably de- posed.”® Delegates from the group to meet- ings of larger codrdinating groups are as- sumed to be representatives of the group, and their votes are usually considered to be binding upon the members of the group. e. Consent: The means whereby all of the members of a group give sanction to the group’s policies, interests and activities. Consent is a form of approval. A function- ing group finds it necessary to alter policies, to 20 "The group is a representation of its members’ in- terests. The problems of how many interests a single group can represent, how the representing is done, et cetera, are genuine problems but they must be ruled out under the intensive definition given to the term. 228 modify interests and to engage in activities through its officers, representatives, delegates, leaders, experts and committees. The validity of all of this activity is assumed to rest upon the sanction of the group. A group possesses integrity if the acts of its officials, representa- tives, et cetera, are approved by the group. Every act of representatives on behalf of a group cannot of course be submitted in advance to the group. Therefore methods are devised for securing what may be termed a priori con- sent. Frequently the terms of membership in a group—the conditions under which an in- dividual may become a member—include and prescribe the means of consent. f. Discussion: “The means by which the whole group is maneuvered into cooperative thinking, speaking and acting.” ** Discussion includes argumentation, debate, parliamentary rules, facts, opinions, feeling— all of the means by which an individual strives to express his personality (his interests) as a member of a group. The aim of discussion is not, of course, to get these individual personali- ties expressed but rather to get them expressed in terms of the whole—the group. The group stands to represent the common interests of all its constituent members, and only by means of concurrence upon the ‘‘common” element of "1 Joining in Public Discussion, A. D. Sheffield, p. vi, Introduction. 229 these interests can the group function. Discus- sion leads to new orientation of interests. Moreover, by means of discussion the group ~ comes to understand its specific interest and hence is better able to codperate on its behalf. The term “maneuver” in the above definition may give rise to serious questioning. Who does the maneuvering? ‘he chairman? ‘The — group itself? A clique within the group? No one who observes group discussions can doubt — that maneuvering of some sort takes place. Since this term precipitates so many pertinent ~ questions it may be left in the definition until a more accurate substitute symbol is discovered to describe what actually takes place. g. The use of facts: The means according to which the group attempts to supplant realities for opinions in its discussions and responses. To corroborate the validity of interests by the use of facts is always thought necessary. Not what the group ‘thinks’ but what the group “‘knows’’ is presumed to be the basis of its action. The methods according to which the group knows, the vicarious knowing of the group, and the ways in which the group uses: what it knows on behalf of its interests are all included under the use of facts. Technical knowing of the group refers to employed ex- perts. Therefore the expert must also be in- cluded under the use of facts. h. Interests: Any ‘object or achievement 230 which will enhance the personalities of the members of the group. The term ‘“‘interest’’ has already been dis- cussed under the definition of the group. It is only necessary at this place to emphasize the point that an interest is shared and that it is objective; it can be stated in terms of a specific desire, purpose, aim or wish. i. Point of view: The means according to which the group’s interests and activities are modified by perspective or the element of time. The term “point of view” as here used must be at once distinguished from its use asa method of stating bias or prejudice. Thus when a person says, “this is my opinion from the point of view of a banker,”’ he intends to convey the idea that his opinion has been modified by the fact that his interest is banking. On the other hand, when a person says, ‘“‘that repre- sents a shortsighted point of view,” he intends to convey the idea that a changing situation de- mands a point of view which will take into con- sideration the exigencies of the future. The railroad promoters of the last century, for ex- ample, are spoken of as men who possessed a far-sighted point of view; they took into con- sideration the situation, not as it then stood, but as they anticipated it might evolve. An indus- trial strike may be termed a short-time point of view since it succeeds in securing the immediate interest of the worker but it contributes nothing 231 toward an ultimate settlement of the essential conflict between the workers and the employers. In observing group behavior it becomes appar- ent that the short-time and the long-time points of view are always present and frequently in conflict. Groups in acute conflict invariably ap- peal to the public on the grounds of their long- time point of view. j. Use of language: The symbolic means with which the group communicates its interests — and activities. All interests and activities must ultimately be expressed by means of words and terms. As al- ready indicated, the words and terms used in group discussions and conflicts may become ef- fective barriers in submerging the real issues.” The use of language symbols in group be- havior performs other functions. Language expresses, or it vaguely expresses, or it mis- represents the real issues at stake. ‘The term is included in this category because it was dis- covered in the groups observed that a conscious 22 “The first rule in any controversy should be that we talk the same language as the other fellow. ... Oratory seems to be a method whereby a man learns to conceal publicly what he thinks he knows. Burke’s essay on the sublime and the ridiculous is declared to be a masterpiece. Burke was an orator. Just what does it mean? Nobody knows. If my neighbor is deaf and I am blind, it doesn’t do any good for me to use a megaphone or for him to use colored fire. . . . The great difficulty with all of us, of course, is that when 232 methodology of the use of language existed. The term will be further clarified in succeeding chapters. k. Power: All non-intellectual and non- ethical means used by the group in attempts to attain and secure its interests. Power, as here conceived, is not a synonym for force. When it is said that a trade union has power over the employers, this does not mean that power is actually manifested in terms of force. It does mean that the trade union stands in a position of advantage which makes it unnecessary to arbitrate, discuss or conciliate differences. When in this position of advantage, the group may state its raw interest, make de- mands upon the basis of this interest and trust to a capitulation on the part of its opponents. Power thus becomes a form of coercion, a means by which the opposing group surrenders —not because it has given recognition to the reasonableness or justness of the interest in- volved but only because it has no other recourse we try to express ourselves, we have only the tools that the mind provides.” “Thomas L. Masson, ‘“‘What’s It All About?” in the Christian Century for Septem- ber 20, 1923. “This was obviously written as a hu- morous castigation of the fundamentalist-evolutionist controversy but it indicates a theory of language held by many, the theory being that all of our conflicts are merely conflicts over words and that if we could once agree on words there would be an end of conflict, i.e., that there are no real issues. 233 except that of cessation of activity. In many cases power does eventually translate itself into terms of force. When for example an employ- ing group succeeds in securing a court injunc- tion which halts the opposing group’s prosecu- tion of its interests, force is implied; back of the court injunction stands the police and the army—representations of force. In interna- tional relations power over another nation may be said always to imply force. In proportion to the implications of force involved in power, reasonable (intellectual) and moral (ethical) bases of conduct diminish. In group relations power is often measured on the crude basis of numbers—the assumption being that the larger group possesses the greater power. 5. Definitions of Terms in Category III It will be remembered that Category III con- tains terms used as symbols whose referents are forms or modes of social control which modify and condition group behavior. ‘The anteced- ents of these forms of control lie in past ex- perience and are the accumulations of numerous changes and adaptations. Unfortunately many of the terms of this category have been viewed and explained as concatenations of instinctive or innate forces in behavior. Instinctive or innate forces hay- ing been abandoned in the present study, it be- 234 comes necessary to recast the interpretation of these terms. This unavoidably leads to a species of arbitrariness which may cause the whole or part of the category to be invalidated in the minds of many readers. ‘The experi- mental character—distinguished from the dog- matic—of the thesis set forth in this volume should, however, tend to prevent such whole- sale rejection. At any rate, the indiscriminate and often incongruous use of the terms of this category in the literature of sociology and social psychology is sufficient evidence of their sub- jective history. Any attempt to refine and de- fine such terms in objective situations should be welcomed. If the major implications of the present thesis are corroborated by further in- vestigation, it will be necessary to evolve new theories of social control for modern life. (a. Customs: Modes of conduct which have their antecedents in past group adaptations. When reference is made to a customary mode of conduct, the inference is that this mode does not arise out of the present situation, but is a response to the cultural heritage. Reflection and deliberation do not enter into a customary mode of conduct. The customary mode of be- havior is not challenged until there has occurred an abrupt change in the present environment. The tobacco farmers of the Southern states, for example, were accustomed to dispose of their crop on the basis of an individual bargain with 235 an individual buyer. The codperative market- ing movement constituted a change in the envi- ronment which challenged this custom. There is no moral element in customary behavior al- though an individual whose behavior runs counter to all or many of the customs of the community in which he lives will find himself thereby cut off from full participation in the community’s activities. Shaking hands as a form of greeting is a custom but no one is os- tracized from his social group if he merely fails to follow this custom. ‘The customs with which collective psychology is obliged to come to terms are those which are concerned with group interests. In such cases it is well to take the naive view of customs as modes of re- sponse which continue so long as the interests involved do not change so as to make a different response advantageous. b. Mores: Customary modes of behavior which possess moral content. Behavior is controlled by customs in a nega- tive sense. Adaptation to the customary modes of behavior of the group is merely a means of “getting on’’ with the group more amicably, with less friction. Violation of the mores on the other hand makes it impossible to get on with the group at all. ‘The individual who transgresses the mores is, in fact, no longer con- sidered to be a part of the group. In some communities, for example, monogamy may be 236 said to be one of the mores, and in such cases the person who openly practices polygamy is socially ostracized.** Customs may become mores, mores may become recognized ethical principles and ethical principles may in their turn become juristic mandates. The utility of the term “mores”’ lies chiefly in the fact that it represents forms of conduct which have moral implications which are not legally enforced, i.e., they represent forms of control which are not amenable to discussion. ‘To violate the mores may not be a crime but the person who does so is treated by the community as though he were a criminal. c. Traditions: Customary modes of be- havior which possess validity because of senti- mental reasons. Customs control behavior because they have been accepted by the community as being ‘good form’’; mores control behavior because they have been accepted by the community as being “right conduct”; traditions control be- havior because they have been accepted by the community as being respectful obeisance to the sentiments of the past. Shaking hands may be regarded as a custom; monogamy as one of the mores; a wedding ceremony as a tradition. 23 This illustration serves to indicate the ambiguity of the term “mores.” Monogamy, when enforced by legal measures, is a form of social control in the sec- ondary sense. 237 All three forms of control owe their validity to the past. [hey are obeyed, unconsciously for the most part, because they represent the ways in which things have always been done. For this reason these modes of response are frequently called “idea patterns,” “group habits.” The latter term, “group habits,” is a convenient symbol which embraces all three of the above terms. ‘The danger of its use, however, lies in the fact that habits in the individual are traceable to physiologi- cal adaptations; they represent the least pain- ful and most advantageous ways of perform- ing certain acts. Customs, mores and tradi- tions, on the other hand, may often be con- trary to the most advantageous way of per- forming an act. ‘The individual does not in- herit habits from his ancestors; the group does inherit customs, mores and traditions. Habits, strictly speaking, are physiological phenomena, and customs, mores and traditions are cultural phenomena. If these terms are viewed in this way it will be seen at once how futile it is to expect social control to become progressive by merely tracing back customary modes of re- sponse to their presumed historic origins. To end the search finally by accounting for these modes of behavior as responses to instincts or innate forces inherited by the species is equally misleading and fruitless. They are forms of be- havior which arose out of former situations 238 and they became culturally-inherited modes of response because some intrinsic value was at- tached to them in the adapting process. Many useless and contradictory customs, mores and traditions persist and exercise unusual social control for the simple reason that these modes of behavior have not been evaluated by succeed- ing generations. d. Attitudes: Predispositions guided by past experiences in which sentiments and feelings are so predominant as to modify the present re- sponse. (Fora fuller account of the use of this term as a group category see page 336, Chap- temic 1.) e. Ethics: Modes of behavior accepted by the group because they conform with the group’s “sense of right.” The phrase ‘‘sense of right’’ included in this definition should not lead to the conclusion that an innate or inborn sense of right is assumed. The sense of right here referred to implies those norms of behavior which have evolved and are evolving as a concomitant to activity. Each group does not press its claims to their ultimate limits because there is a sense or feel- ing that to do so would imperil or annihilate the interests of other groups. Some groups do press their claims to ultimate limits, but they seldom, if ever, achieve those claims. ‘Thus France may press her claims against Germany to certain ultimate limits but sooner or later a 239 point will be reached where such claims will vio- trol. The problems will then become, not how much can France get from Germany, but how much ought France to have? Ethics is one ~ late the sense of right of other nations. At — this point ethics will step in as a mode of con- © method of obviating the cruel necessity of — utilizing power in its crude manifestations. The term “‘ethics’? needs modification as a part _ of group categories. ‘he relations which in- volve the sense of right between individuals may be termed ethics; the relations which involve the sense of right between groups may be called © social ethics. This term also has its SbiccuoHaan since social ethics is already used as a term to denote the relations which involve the sense of right between an individual and a group. To trace the functioning of ethical principles in group relations is difficult, partly because of the place which ethics holds in religious con- cepts and partly because there are so few recog- nized means for evaluating ethical principles. 5 Another difficulty resides in the fact that there | is a wide gulf between ethical principles ac- cepted as right modes of conduct and the actual conduct of the same persons and groups who make the ethical professions. All of these dif- ficulties should lead toward an instrumental view of ethics as distinguished from a derived view. Ethics is one of the means according to which the group evaluates its interests and it 240 is an important means since it implies that the pursuance of the group’s interests must in gen- eralized manner conform to the sense of right of the inclusive social environment.”* f. The Law: A conscious means of evaluat- ing interests, assumed by the state in behalf of general justice. This definition assumes that all generaliza- tions concerning abstract justice have been aban- doned by thinkers and that justice can be dis- cerned only as a confronting of an actual situa- tion. The law no longer stands to protect cer- tain indefinite but cherished “rights” of in- dividuals or of groups. Its function has come to be an inductive method of evaluating in- terests. True, many laws are still in force which were originally stated as generalizations of abstract rights, but the actual cases which come under such laws are treated inductively. In addition, the last half-century has witnessed a remarkable accretion of new statutes whose im- port and purport are clearly derived from a conflict of interests. The assumption back of law is still the assumption of general justice, 1.e., equality for all individuals and groups before the law, but modern laws are written and inter- preted in the light of specific interests. A bet- 24’The various ethical codes formulated and sub- scribed to by such bodies as newspaper editors, adver- tising agencies, Rotary Clubs, et cetera, are evidences of the need of conscious means for evaluating interests. 241 ter way of stating this change might be: the law now seeks to arrive at the validity of specific interests but it does so upon the assump- tion that valid interests lead toward justice for all. The law controls group conduct as a means of establishing the means as well as the ends of justice. g. Public Opinion: A means of controlling group behavior on behalf of the totality of in- terests. In a strict sense there is no public opinion; there are only public opinions. The so-called public is a composite of the various functional groups within it. Insofar as an individual has no group relations, no medium of expressing his interests through a common group, he is un- influential in affecting public opinion. In indus- trial disputes it is commonly said that there are three sets of interests to be considered: the workers, the employers, and the public. ‘This is, of course, an anomaly; the workers and the employers are as much a part of the public as any other individuals. What is meant by this sort of reference is that the conflict of interests between workers and employers must be settled in terms of the interests of other eroups. All other groups are conveniently grouped by themselves as the public. The pub- lic is the totality of interests. Public opinion merely implies that the totality of interests must be considered whenever two specific 242 groups are in conflict over their specific in- terests. Groups in conflict utilize various means of enlisting the interests of other groups not immediately concerned with the specific con- flict. Such enlisting of interest takes place largely through the medium of the public press whose traditions are favorable to the expres- sion of the totality of interests. When public interest was centered largely on political issues, the differentiation of the press was one of polit- ical predilections. Now that interests shift more and more to the economic level, the differ- entiation of the press proceeds upon the basis of economic predilections. ‘The modern press is conservative, liberal or partisan, and these adjectives are derived from economic interests. The conservative press advocates the status quo in economic and industrial affairs; the liberal press advocates changes which will elevate the interests of the less-privileged classes; the par- tisan press frankly advocates changes which will elevate only the interests of its particular class. Thus an adequate source of so-called public opinion in the so-called public press no longer exists. Public opinion can emerge only out of clashes of group interests. As a result of this new situation in relation to public opinion such projects as the public forum, discussion groups, et cetera, have arisen, i.e., substitutes for ar- riving at an evaluation of interests in lieu of or supplementary to the press. 243 CHAPTER X THE GROUP, THE LEADER, THE EX: PERT AND THE OBSERVERS THE reader is urged to keep constantly in mind the various limitations of the study upon which this volume is based. The observations extended over a period of less than three years, a term far too short to warrant anything more than tentative conclusions. Fortunately the period covered by the study was one of unusual opportunities. The farmers of the United States had just emerged from an era of un- precedented prosperity and were, at the begin- ning of the study, suffering acutely from the sudden deflation and ensuing collapse of prices for farm products. The result of this reversal 1 Illustration: The burley tobacco growers of Ken- tucky received an average price of 46 cents per pound for the 1919 crop. On January 3, 1921, the markets opened to receive the 1920 crop, the price offered being ten cents per pound. ‘The cost of producing this crop was generally estimated to be about 30 cents per pound. The situation was similar in a lesser or greater degree with all other farm products. 244 was a general agrarian uprising. Farmers as- sumed a militant attitude. ‘Their anger was readily turned upon the traditional enemy, the “villainous middleman.” Experience pointed to two means of escape from the unbearable condition: one was to appeal to the govern- ment for aid and the other was violence. Both methods had been attempted in the past. Vio- lence in the form of the destruction of the crop and vengeance toward those who were as- sumed to be responsible for low prices had only resulted in suffering to the farmers themselves. Governmental aid was supported by many lead- ers but there appeared to be a general feeling that if agriculture could be successfully main- tained only by subsidies it was not worth main- taining. There was in addition a feeling against paternalism. In the end, neither of these methods was chosen.” A new leadership arose with new promises and a new program keeping alive the farmers’ resentment but di- recting it into new channels. In effect it said to the farmer: “You must lift yourself by your own boot-straps. You cannot be saved by others, but you can save yourself.” The new program centered about co- operative marketing according to a technique 2 Governmental aid was, however, sought and se- cured on another basis in conjunction with the method chosen. Also the advocates of direct governmental aid were not silenced by the step finally taken. 24.5 which had already passed through certain ex- perimental phases in Denmark, California, and elsewhere. With almost incredible alac- rity the farmers grasped at this new program. — Within one year the membership in coopera- tive marketing associations leaped from a few straggling and disintegrated groups num- bering in the thousands to over one million. A federal statute legalizing such associa- tions was already available but state statutes — were also needed. Within a year 26 states had complied with the legal requests and had | enacted suitable laws.* Giant associations con- trolling 60%, 70% and 80% of the totals of various crops with memberships reaching as high as 80,000 may be said to have literally sprung into existence.* The rapidity with which this movement went forward during the first year of its impetus was fairly startling. This speed of movement made it wholly impossible for a single observer to keep abreast of all that was happening. But here was a unique labora- tory for the social investigator. The movement toward codperative associa- tions for marketing farm products presented a cinematographic picture in which conflict was in- or, ecm 3 In Kentucky the legislature was convened in extra session and the law passed, all within six days. * For a factual account and partial interpretation of this movement, the reader is directed to Codperative Marketing by Herman Steen. 246 tense, leadership dramatic, joint action super- seded individual action—in which, in short, were combined all of the various factors which make life dynamic. The farmers’ interests were boldly pushed to the forefront of public recognition. The intrenched marketing system fought back, at first openly and fiercely, and then covertly, but none the less determinedly. Men unknown to the public were suddenly thrown into positions of great power. Modes of action which had become habitual and cus- tomary over long years of repetition were flung aside. Experts whose interests had been with the middlemen or the manufacturers trans- ferred their interests and their services to the cooperative association. ‘The stakes were enormous and the activities dynamic. Such.,was the situation which was chosen as the field of observation. The limits of the ob- servation and study must now be defined. The primary purpose of the study was not to in- vestigate the codperative movement as such, but rather to utilize this movement as the basis for evolving a technique for studying all forms of group behavior.’ The conclusions then should not be used as criteria for judging the cooperative movement. Many minute factors 5 The original plan was to make similar observations of other group movements but this had to be abandoned. It is still hoped, however, that these other studies may ' go forward in the future. 247 of the movement were left out of consideration since it was necessary to select such factors as came within the scope of the intention of the study. Some of these omitted factors would be entirely essential for a sound analysis of the cooperative movement and they were omitted only because it was thought that others were more important for the present undertaking. During the study four distinct codperative marketing associations were kept under ob- servation and for purposes of convenience they will hereafter be designated as Groups A, B, C and D. Other groups were also observed for particular forms of activity and for shorter periods; wherever these observations are re- corded they will be properly designated. Par- ticipant observers were of two kinds: those who were actually employed by the codperative asso- ciation as officials and those who were not so employed but who were considered as intimate advisers. 1. Observations and Conclusions Regarding the Groups In this instance we are dealing with groups which are larger than any group to be found within a local neighborhood or community. They may be compared with political parties, international or national trade unions, i.e., with groups more comprehensive than any local 248 area. A term which has now come into com- mon usage, namely, ‘“‘the commodity group,” is fairly definitive. It implies that the basis of the group is the commodity produced. In one case it may be tobacco, in another, cotton, and in another, milk. ‘The membership then of the group is conditioned by the commodity; the commodity is in turn conditioned by soil, cli- mate, markets, et cetera. The older codpera- tive movement was based upon local neighbor- hood or community boundaries. In this sense, the new commodity codperatives are analogous to the industrial union. If all workers in the steel industry were, for example, organized into a single union regardless of geographical boundaries, this organization might be called a commodity union as distinguished from a local trade union. The United Mine Workers may be said to be a commodity group. A commodity group secures its power by at- taining control of all or enough of a single product to dominate the market. In the case of an industrial union, the control is, of course, over a particular kind of labor adapted to a particular commodity; the mine workers do not control the coal market but rather the coal- labor market. In each case the conditioning factor is the commodity. In the codperatives under observation it was assumed that success would follow if each group could enroll a suf- ficient number of members to insure control of 249 from 60% to 75% of the total product. The strength of these groups was originally meas- ured by ‘‘acres’’ and not members. One mem- ber may be of more value to the association than ten members providing he produces more than ten times the amount of the commodity that the other ten produce. The commodity basis of group organization is a diversion from the usual technique. Without too much attempt at niceties of distinction, it may be said that group organization in modern economic life now proceeds upon two bases, (1) in which the individual member is the measure of power, and (2) in which the commodity under control is the measure of power.® At the outset the observer is compelled to recognize that the newer form of commod- ity group organization constitutes a diver- gence from so-called democracy. In order to achieve rigorous consistency the commodity group should of course distribute voting power in proportion to acreage or commodity. ‘This step, however, has not yet been taken. The 6 The reader with speculative inclinations might find it fruitful to expand this “commodity” view to such in- ternational conflicts as are involved in Upper Silesia, the Saar, and the Ruhr. It appears in each case that the situation is conditioned by a commodity or a group of commodities. In contrast is the apparently peaceful solution of the upper portion of Schleswig-Holstein, which was not an industrial but a mixed farming sec- tion. 250 traditional tenets of democracy are honored by the traditional one-member one-vote principle. An obvious discrepancy lies here. There are no logical grounds for the one-member one-vote principle in an organization which measures its power by commodity rather than by personality. But this is not the query which seems most per- tinent. ‘he more important problem for the present, from the sociological point of view, is: Can effective organization be maintained with- out recognition of multiple interests of the in- dividual member? Before any conclusions may be reached it is necessary to separate the above question into its constituent parts. ‘The multiple interests of the individual who becomes a member of a commodity cooperative group are for the most part expressed within his local neighborhood or community.” It is conceivable that this net- work of homely interests may at some time need to be evaluated in terms of the member’s allegiance to the commodity group. In fact, the commodity-group principle may be tested only when such an event has occurred. In one of the groups under observation the local com- munity has always been recognized; in the TIt is assumed that the groups under consideration conform up to this point to the definition of a group given on p. 207, Chapter IX. In fact, that definition emerged from the observation of these particular groups. 251 other three there were no local organizations in the beginning. (Representation on the executive committee was, however, arranged on a district basis.) Moreover, there were many leaders in the movement who denied the neces- sity and the utility of these local units. The technique of the movement did not include local organized units. One of these groups has now evolved a comprehensive scheme for local group organization, one has altered its policies so that local groups are partially recognized, and the third is at the threshold of a state- wide system of local community committees. In other words, each group has found it ex- pedient to develop local community cohesion. Observation was directed to determine why these steps were taken. Because of space limitations all of the ob- served reasons for the above-mentioned change of policy cannot be recorded. One illustration may suffice to indicate what happens in the functioning of these groups which sooner or later precipitates the demand for local organi- zation, Illustration: At an annual meeting of the executive com- mittee of Group C, the problem of contract vio- lations occupied the major share of attention. The discussion proceeded upon the basis of two mutually exclusive views. Some wanted every 252 member who had violated his contract sued under the law. Others desired the opposite, namely, no legal compulsion to hold members to their contracts. The deadlock caused con- siderable bitterness between the contending factions. It was finally brought out that the chief reasons for not desiring legal compulsions were involved with local community interests. Members objected to the sight of lawyers repre- senting the codperative coming into their com- munities for the purpose of summoning one of their neighbors. Among some of these were men who were members of the same church, the same lodge, et cetera. The decision ultimately agreed upon directed the association to sue no more violators for liquidated damages until the cases had been adequately reviewed by mem- bers living in the local community. Conse- quently it became necessary to establish local committees to do this reviewing. A new piece of social machinery with its center in the local community rather than at the headquarters of the commodity organization was thus set up. This problem will now be seen as one of com- plex bearings. The above illustration will again be referred to in connection with consent, responsibility, representation, et cetera. Here it is used merely to illustrate some of the reasons why large, centralized groups tend to decentral- ize. ‘This tendency may be stated in the form of a conclusion, or an inducted principle as fol- lows: 253 Principle: The group which represents an individual's specific interest must ultimately take cognizance of his diverse or inclusive in- terests. The psychological bearing of this principle lies in the theory that the individual behaves as a total personality. When he sells tobacco or cotton or milk he does not act merely with that portion of his personality which is related to tobacco, cotton or milk. When the individual becomes a member of a collective group through which one of his specific interests is to be repre- sented, he brings into that group his total per- sonality. Functionally this group may continue to represent the specific and solitary interest. To take cognizance of the inclusive interests does not mean that the group must function on behalf of all of these varied interests; it does mean that this function must not cut across or contravene any of the other interests. The corollary of this principle which is at once ap- parent is: Groups which represent specific interests must ultimately become integrated with other groups representing other interests. As an illustration of this corollary principle it should be noted that the commodity groups under observation, together with some eighty 254 or more other similar groups, have already formed a National Council of Farmers’ Co- operative Marketing Associations. This move constitutes an integration of groups represent- ing interests on the same level. A movement which appears to be leading toward integration with the American Farm Bureau Federation is now in process. The Grange, the oldest of the farm organizations, remains unintegrated, and, indeed, something more than a surface friction between the Grange and the commodity groups exists. he Grange is an organization which aims to represent the comprehensive and inclu- sive interests of the farmer. Group B of the groups under observation has gone so far in its attempt to take cognizance of other than economic interests as to employ a trained social worker in the field of child welfare. The sig- nificant aspect of all of this development is that it has taken place contrary to the earlier state- ments of the leaders. Indeed, many of these leaders are still emphasizing the fact that these commodity groups are purely commercial groups whose only business is to merchandise farm products. The above observations and conclusions have a distinct bearing upon the problems and the technique of social organization. Decentraliza- tion is seen to be a psychological phenomenon; at any rate, the psychological factors of be- havior bear a causal relation to the phenomenon 255 os i - of decentralization. In addition, this recogni- tion of behavior as response of the total per- sonality, when considered in connection with collective action, constitutes an important modi- fication of the definition of a group as stated on page 207, Chapter IX. A negative factor has been introduced: the group does not exist merely to advance a specific interest; it cannot permanently exist if its function contravenes other vital interests. There are groups admit- tedly which do not take this principle into con- sideration, i.e., groups of a highly centralized character which appear to function successfully. Unfortunately, sufficient data do not exist in re- gard to these groups. In several cases, how- ever, it has been noted that when decentraliza- tion is forced upon the groups, disintegration soon sets in. From the viewpoint of social organization the perennial question has been: should groups be organized from the “bottom up,” or from the “top down’? In less colloquial form, the question reads: Should social organization begin with local groups and gradually evolve overhead centralization, or should the over- head, centralized organization come first? In view of the principles discussed above, it ap- pears that this is not the essential question. Whether the centralized organization or the local group organization comes first or last is unimportant; what is important is the recogni- 256 « tion of the fact that the individual’s complex of interests must enter into the equation. 2. Observations and Conclusions Regarding Leaders Out of the mass of material gathered in con- nection with the leaders of the groups under observation only a few conclusions may be hazarded. This material, in fact, raises many more questions. than it answers. ‘The leader- ship in this movement was perhaps more dra- matic than is ordinarily the case. The technique of organization employed by these leaders in accomplishing the marvelous task of galvaniz- ing a million individual farmers into codpera- tive action affords the chief clue. The methods used included: (1) Crowd stimulation; large gatherings of farmers addressed by orators. (2) The Justice symbol; farmers were told that the present marketing system was an in- justice and invaded their rights. (3) The Fight symbol; farmers were told that they could secure justice by fighting the middleman. (4) The Imitation of Success symbol ; the fruit growers of California and the dairy farmers of Denmark were pointed to as the symbols of success. (5) The Fear symbol; farmers were told 257 ye that if they did not become members, dire re- sults would follow. (6) Rapid sign-up; “whirlwind” cam- paigns for memberships which created an at- mosphere of excitability. (7) Enlisting the support of financial in- terests; this was done in order to assure the farmers of the stability of the movement. (8) Enlisting the support of governmental agencies; for the same reasons as above. (9) The Expert symbol; farmers were told that the leaders were experts who knew the science of cooperative marketing. (10) ‘The Impossibility of Failure symbol; farmers were told that this organization could not fail because each member was obliged to sign a legal contract which bound him to sell his crop through the association for a definite number of years. Some of these methods were obviously more creditable than others. From a purely prag- matic point of view, however, they must be con- sidered together since it was their combined use which resulted in success. In the beginning of the movement, the opposition, consisting of middlemen and their business and social allies, used practically the same methods. There were, however, certain significant exceptions. Whereas the codperative leaders used methods arousing confidence, the middlemen employed those leading to suspicion. The latter were 258 naturally more adaptable for personal work with individuals than for mass appeals with crowds. The farmers did not furnish their own lead- ership. Out of a selection of seven of the fore- most leaders of the earlier stages of the move- ment, three were journalists (proprietors of farm journals and a newspaper), one was a lawyer, one a former educator with farming in- terests, one a former middleman and grower, and one a former state employee. The two of this group who were farmers were not con- sidered to have farming as their primary in- terest. Sociologically, this situation may be re- garded as an incongruity. The traditional theory of leadership, being a quality inhering in some member of a group, appears to be sound, but it is not adequately grounded. All of the evidence gathered in this study tends to sub- stantiate the theory that the leader is nothing more nor less than a symbol for what the group is not. Rather the leader symbolizes what the group wants—powers and forces which the group does not possess. Hence as a symbol the leader need not be integral to the group which he leads. The old question, does the leader create the group or does the group create the leader, is also pointless. The group merely responds to the rationalizations, judgments and feelings of the leader. When it fails to make these responses, the leader disappears. 259 The leader is not always of the group; his rela- tion may be fo the group.° This situation changes, however, when the group assimilates the leader, i.e., when the leader’s interests become identical with the group’s interests. There are various gradations of this relation. A leader may be employed by the group either as a full-time official or as a part-time expert. In each case the individual 8 The “of” and “to” relation as here described should be compared with the position of the leader in the dia- gram on page 225. Here the leader is given a posi- tion within the group. In view of what has been said above, it would be more accurate to place certain lead- ers outside the group. For a more intellectualistic interpretation of the leader and leadership see pp. 419 to 423, Social Psy- chology, by Floyd H. Allport. ‘Leadership produces social change.” “Leadership . . . means the direct, face-to-face contact between leader and follower.” ‘“The true leader also stands high in the group of traits de- scribed under sociality’—these and other phrases used by Mr. Allport offer the clue to his conception. Boss Platt and His New York Machine; a study of the political leadership of Thomas C. Platt, Theodore Roosevelt and others by Harold F. Gosnell represents a commendable effort to analyse the leader and leader- ship. In the illuminating introduction by Charles E. Merriam, this sentence appears: “‘Leadership is a func- tion of collective action and cannot be fully under- stood outside of its special setting.” See also Theodore Dreiser’s penetrating description of a political leader under the caption: The Michael J. Powers Association, p. 44, The Color of a Great City. 260 so placed automatically changes his strategy. In the dual capacity of leader and expert, his relation may be said to be still “to”? and not “of” the group. Inthe dual capacity of leader and official, his relation is partly ‘of’ and partly “to” the group. As an official, he can no longer rely upon maintaining his position as a symbol. His rationalizations and judgments must then become, not merely bases for belief, but intellectual integrations. In emphasizing the distinction between the to and of relation, it should not be overlooked that the stimulus-response operation works both ways; the leader stimulates the group, but the group also stimulates the leader. In the earlier stages of the movement under consideration practically the whole of the stimulation pro- ceeded from the leaders. When the actual functioning of the group began, the current shifted in the opposite direction and now the bulk of stimulation emanates from the groups. The majority of leaders ultimately accepted the decentralizing process described above. Nay, some of these leaders actually caused it to appear that they themselves had generated the process! ‘This simply indicates that when the groups’ activities lead to rationalizations which vary from those of the leaders, the leaders’ re- sponse must be a like rationalization if they are to maintain their leadership. Thus we come to see that the older sociological theory of leader- 261 ship is only partially justified. The group does not, to be sure, create the leader. But it ap- pears to be creating a leader when an individual is available who is able to epitomize the group’s rationalizations and feelings. Nor does the leader create the group. But conversely, the leader appears to be creating the group when he is merely synthesizing the group’s ra- tionalizations and feelings. [hese are merely surface appearances due to a lack of under- standing of the stimulus-response relation be- tween leaders and groups. As a theory of leadership this viewpoint clears away many of the difficulties which arise because of the failure to distinguish between the leader and the expert. A certain sort of expertness is required of the leader but it is the expertness of knowing what new activities de- mand new rationalizations. ‘The leader needs none of the refinements of technological knowl- edge. He may be uneducated (in the formal sense), apparently beneath the intellectual standard of many of the members of the group, and still maintain his position as leader. 3. Conclusions Regarding the Expert Three types of experts were originally em- ployed by the groups under consideration: (1) experts who were skilled in the technique of co- operative marketing, (2) experts who were 262 = a skilled in the technique of testing, grading and standardizing the commodities, (3) experts who were skilled in social organization. Later three other types of experts were added, namely, (4) experts who were skilled in finance, (5) experts who were skilled in publicity, and (6) experts who were skilled in social organiza- tion of a new kind; that of perfecting forms of organization leading toward integrations of the whole. (The original organizers had been per- sons who were successful in securing member- ships in the organizations. ) During the early stages of activity, leaders were frequently mistrusted. It was assumed that some of them had interests above and be- yond the cooperative movement and that they were merely using this opportunity to gain posi- tions of power. The suspicion was, apparently, not present in regard to experts. In fact, one of the most advertised experts of Group B was secured by the simple process of offering a higher salary than that which he had received from his former employers. ‘This strategy was successful in spite of the fact that the former employers were known to be opposed to the co- operative marketing movement.’ Indeed, most of the experts needed to deal with the problems of receiving, grading and handling the crops ® This opposition was later transformed into what ap- peared to be complete approval, but this conversion de- mands further observation and interpretation. 263 (tobacco and cotton) were recruited from the organizations of middlemen. In only one in- stance was a leader chosen from the camp of the enemy, and in this case, the leader soon became an official of the codperative organiza- tion. He has from the beginning been re- garded in the dual capacity of leader and expert. The experts under type (1) have thus far had little occasion to change either their strategy or their status; they are still regarded as experts who know the technical principles of codpera- tive marketing. The experts under type (2) have passed through a number of experiences which tend to throw light upon the whole problem of expert- ness. [hese experts were obliged to deal di- rectly with the members of the codperative as- sociations. [hey were stationed at local re- ceiving stations to which the farmers brought their products. For purposes of illustration, we may consider a group of experts—warehouse- men, graders, accountants—operating for Group A, a tobacco codperative. Before the organization of the codperative, the farmers were accustomed to bring their crops to a to- bacco center where there were numerous buyers prepared to bid on the value. The tobacco was presumably auctioned to the highest bidder. The auctioning process itself:-was of dramatic interest. In addition, the entire community 264 gave itself over to the tobacco market during the morning hours of auction. Street-hawkers established themselves on favored spots and sold dictionaries, patent medicines and other wares. Excitement pervaded the atmosphere— the sort of excitement which suspension en- genders in the drama. No one knew what the price for tobacco would be this morn- ing; no one knew how much his tobacco would bring, nor what grade it would average; no one knew who would be the “big’’ buyer on this particular day. And within an hour or two after sales, the growers stepped to a small window and received full payment for their product. Wagons could then be loaded with groceries and other necessities, as well as an oc- casional luxury, for the return journey. The day had provided excitement, thrills; there was something vital to talk about with all of the in- terest which can come only from uncertainty. Mixed with the various ingredients of the day’s occurrences was also a taste of awe; awe toward the “big” buyers who could with one gesture risk more money than was represented by an individual farmer’s total assets; awe toward the auctioneer who could without a second’s hesi- tation insert bits of wit between his reeling fig- ures; awe toward the banker who handed out sound currency in return for the buyer’s check. The above scene must now be contrasted with the same situation under codperative market- 265 ing. In this case the farmer brings his crop to — a warehouse where it is received, graded and — placed in position with other receipts of the . same grade; the farmer then takes from the ~ hand of an accountant or warehouse manager, neither of whom he knows, a slip of paper which guarantees future payment for his crop. Just what the price of his crop is to be, he does not know, nor can the experts tell him; this will be decided perhaps months later when the crop is finally sold. There is no excitement and there is no awe because these experts.are re- garded as employees of the farmers themselves. The uncertainty which comes from knowing that a race is soon to be run is absent, since the uncertainty now is one of postponed expectancy and hope. Questions of a disturbing nature soon arise in the minds of the farmers. Are these experts, after all, honest persons? Why are there so few grades when formerly there were somany? Is there any assurance that the farmer will receive more in the end for his crop than the man who has sold his crop outright at auction? Aided by the vigilant middlemen, the questions soon become suspicions. Hints spread about that certain experts are dishonest persons who were cast off by the middlemen. Disquiet- ing rumors begin to arise. Certain growers have already violated their contracts and are selling their crops either openly or covertly to the middlemen. 266 What has been described above as an actual happening affects the whole coéperative move- ment and not merely the place and function of the expert; these activities will, however, be used here only for the purpose of directing thought to the expert. The impact does even- tually fall upon the expert. A communication arrives at the headquarters of the cooperative demanding that a certain expert be removed from the warehouse in the community; the reso- lution has the signatures of 25 members. Now the situation begins to clarify; the officials stand in a representative relation to the members and the experts have simply a technical relation. When conflict between the expert and the mem- bers occurs, the members turn to their officials for relief. What action may be taken by the officials? 4. Humanizing the Expert The problem of specialism has now been pre- cipitated. Once more we are confronted with a psychological question. This is in essence the same problem which was raised in considering the group which advances a specific interest and its relation to the multiple interests of the mem- bers. In that case it was pointed out that the individual in significant behavior responds as a total personality. Because of this total re- sponse the group must take cognizance of the 267 totality of interests. “The same general rule, with important modifications, applies to the functioning of the expert. The group may recognize the validity and the value of other interests by merely integrating with other groups which represent these interests; or it may itself broaden its program in such manner as to include other interests. ‘The expert’s task is not so simple. Once he begins to deal with interests outside his specialty, he begins to lose caste as an expert. A tobacco buyer is a specialist, an expert, because he knows tobacco. The query is, does he also need to know people? Does his equipment need to include a knowledge of the complex interests of the total personality of his clients, or does he need to know only the tobacco side of this personality? The initial responsesof the officials favored the latter quali- fication. They admitted that their own posi- tions depended upon their ability to understand the complex of the members’ total personalities, but they denied this criterion when applied to their employed experts. The expert, they held, must be kept free from what they termed “po- litical influence.’’ By this was meant that the “hiring and firing’ of experts was a technolog- ical problem and not a representational one. Where, they asked, will the authority of the expert be if once we grant to the membership the privilege of criticising and deposing experts ? This position is, of course, the usual one. The 268 expert is universally regarded as the last de- fendant of the citadels of autocracy. All others must ultimately bow to the will of the people, but the expert may remain above and aloof from - the people so long as he is an acknowledged ex- pert. Once he steps from his pedestal his priestly robes of expertness must be relin- quished. There is no sound reason for believing that experts will be able to maintain this position. In fact, all or nearly all observation of the past half-decade points in the direction of a process which may be called ‘“‘humanizing the experts.” By this term is meant the tendency to force upon the expert the recognition of the fact that life is whole and that the human being responds as a whole; that specialism in research is a convenient form of division of labor, but that specialism in function must become an in- tegrated form of division of labor; that the expert who divorces himself from people will sooner or later find himself so far differen- tiated that his expertness will be rejected. In condensed form, the principle which is hinted at in the above is: the expert in function (in applying his expertness to life in its activities) may integrate his function with the total life process only if his function becomes one of in- terpreting his expertness in terms of the people’s total personalities. ‘This is precisely what appears to be happening in all of the co- 269 operative organizations under observation and the means utilized for this purpose will be further dealt with under the discussion of the © use of facts. The experts under type (3) may scarcely be called experts. hey were men who possessed — that peculiar skill which usually goes by the name of salesmanship. ‘Their task, in the ver- nacular, was to “‘sell the codperative marketing — association to the farmers.” In a national gathering one of the most successful of this group was asked to define his technique for se- curing members. His reply was: “Wait until the farmers are about starved; then put on a whirlwind campaign.” Perhaps the less said about these so-called professional organizers, the better. he entire technique which they em- ploy is of doubtful character. Fortunately the associations under consideration soon came to this realization. The result is that this type of expert is rapidly passing into oblivion. ‘The only conclusions that are available concerning them are negative. Only in a small number of instances were the organizers capable of mak- ing the adjustment from the organization stage to the functioning stage. In these cases the or- ganizers were persons who utilized superior methods,”° 10 Experts of type (4) have not been sufficiently studied to warrant conclusions. “Those of types 270 - 5. Conclusions Regarding Observers and Observation The point has already been made that two kinds of observation were utilized in this study, one representing the observer who has no in- terests involved in the groups being studied and one representing individuals with interests. In evaluating both types of observation it is as- sumed that bias is the important factor. All observation begins with some form of bias. The mere fact that one is sufficiently interested in a particular object or process to spend time and energy on its study is evidence of one kind of bias. No inquiry is ever begun with a blank mind. ‘There are even examples of the conclu- sions of scientists in which both the individual bias and the presumed scientific findings which are in opposition appear in the same volume. Félix Le Dantec, in his L’Egoisme, enumerates biological evidences for the justification of force and war, but continues to insist that his own predilections are against both. The sort of egoistic pessimism which he adduces is also counterbalanced by the statement that he is himself quite contented with life and that it has dealt fairly with him. The integrity of the scientific method revolves (5) and (6) will be dealt with under more appro- priate headings. 2a about distinctions. That Ais A, or all A is A, © is a logical statement. Science is capable of demonstrating that A is not A and that all A is not A, and this demonstration proceeds upon the basis of the scientist’s discovered distinc-— tions. Where objective measurements are pos- sible, these distinctions are leveled to the aver- age of general acceptance or concurrence. This does not mean that each scientist sees the same thing which is thus leveled. ‘The statistical average blurs distinctions; accurate scientific ob- servation increases distinctions. Where the method used is largely that of observation, the problem of making distinctions is the chief de- sideratum. ‘The assumption at the beginning of this study was that values might be discovered by comparing the distinctions occurring in ob- servations of the two kinds mentioned above. It was also assumed, naturally, that the two types of observers would of necessity see dif- ferent processes and not merely that they would see the same processes from different points of view. One of the earliest distinctions revealed in the two types of observation turned out to be of peculiar significance. One of the “‘inside’’ ob- servers of Group A was cumulatively impressed with the sinister and dishonest methods used by the opposition— the middlemen. This impres- sion grew until he found himself minimizing the strength of the opposition openly while he at 272 the same time gave it maximum importance se- cretly.* With this conflict raging in his own mind, he finally came to cast suspicion upon numerous officials and experts within his group. This conflict ultimately caused him to sever his connections with the organization. The ex- planation of this incident is so elementary and so simple that it might easily have been fore- told. The person who is fighting for a group and its interests will naturally exaggerate the importance of every one who is fighting against. This is undoubtedly what accounts for the fact that atrocity propaganda is easily distributed and receives ready acceptance during wars. The simplicity of the explanation should not, however, be a barrier to its practical applica- tion. Illusions of this sort play such an im- portant role in the conduct of groups that they must be interpreted if conduct like this is ever to approach the fact level. What groups think they are fighting for is probably of more im- portance than that for which they are really fighting. In fact, what they are really fighting for is scarcely ever an adequate justification for fighting. It is thus not mere verbalism to say that what groups think they are fighting fot is that for which they are fighting. The “‘outside”’ observer in his search for objective facts may minimize the tactics of the opposition. If he 11’The effect of this attitude on the use of facts and the use of language will be noted later. 273 were on the inside he could not easily scoff at the group’s anxiety. What appears as illusion ~ from the outside is reality when seen from the — inside.** And if the attempt is to'arrive at an interpretation of group behavior, the illusion is no less a fact than the so-called reality. 12 The United States is said to have entered the late war for the purpose of “making the world safe for democracy”; some people claim also that the purpose was merely self-protection. ‘The adherents of the for- mer view are called idealists; the latter, realists. But whe is to decide? The “inside” observers of our na- tional behavior, who scouted the ‘“‘making the world safe for democracy” idea, found it very difficult to be heard during the period when the nation thought it was fighting to “make the world safe for democracy,” 274 CHAPTER XI GROUP SITUATIONS, GROUP STIM- ULI, GROUP RESPONSES, REPRE- SENTATION AND CONSENT The term “Group Situations,” which appears first under Category II, was devised as a con- venient mode of expressing or defining occasions - when the group is about to act. Using the terminology of functional psychology, there were numerous occasions when the group ap- peared to be “‘set’’ for some particular action. In some cases the particular “‘set’’ was carried into overt action and in other cases it was not. In both instances the phenomenon observed was designated as a group situation. Illustration: Group C was at one period of its existence forced to meet the problem of contract viola- tions. The preconceived method of dealing with this problem had been provided in the contract itself and in the law validating it. Discussion, however, revealed that this precon- ceived method was not adequate, and the group was compelled to consider alternatives. ‘The 275 discussion terminated in a decision to try one of — the alternatives. A group situation was thus precipitated. A composite picture of the group’s status at any specific time is the totality of situations through which it has passed. Such situations are not isolated circumstances; on the contrary, each situation, whether it is carried into overt action or not, becomes a part of the total evolv- ing situation which is the group’s function. The preparation of the contract, the signing of the contract, the validating of the contract, and the activities covered by the contract are all ante- { cedent parts of the situation presented by the violation of the contract. ‘The only adequate means of evaluating the total situation is to ob- serve the separable situations as evolving parts of the whole. In this connection, the partici- pant observers proved to be of exceptional value. They were of course in better position to know when the group was in a situation which presaged action. The participant observers were, however, quite incapable of forecasting possible future situations. A constant compari- son of the observations of the participant ob- servers whose tendency was toward immediacy of situation with those of the outside observer whose tendency was largely toward situations further removed ensued. 276 Illustration: The outside observer at one period suggested that Group A would find itself in a situation which would necessitate an adjustment to the wives and families of its members. Several in- side observers derided this suggestion and only one entertained it as a remote possibility which could not become critical until the group was placed upon a sound financial footing. As a matter of fact the group did find itself in this situation within six months after the prediction. Observation must then be directed to both the situation and the evolving situation. Changes in the group are the reflections of changing sit- uations. What alters the situation and by what means situations are controlled are problems to be considered next. 1. Group Stimuli In attempting to discover what changes the situation for the group, the observer is obliged to use behavioristic approaches. In the illustra- tion given above, the group was called upon to meet a situation which involved contract viola- tions. It was assumed that this contingency had been provided for in advance but the actual situation indicated that the prearranged means were inadequate. The fact which caused the new situation is called a stimulus. An im- portant consideration has now arisen. In the 277 definition of group situations as set forth on page 226, Chapter IX, it was stated that the group situation is a relation which the group sustains to its environment. We now come to see, however, that the cause which precipitated the above situation came from within the group. Contracts were violated by members of the group in such numbers as to make some action imperative. The stimulus then which placed the group in a new situation was an activity of members of the group itself. Upon first im- pression this appears to mean that the group is its own environment. The paradox is not as difficult as it seems to be in this reduced form. The difficulty lies chiefly in the ambiguity of the term “stimulus.’’ A stimulus may be anything which evokes action on the part of the group. The situation plus the impending action is still a relation between the group and its environ- ment. ‘To what does the group react? The specific and immediate stimulus in this case may be termed “contract breaking on the part of its members.’ But when this whole is broken into parts, it becomes apparent that contract break- ing bears a definite relation to factors outside the group and the adjustment which the group finally makes is an adjustment to all of the af- fected factors whether within or without the group. The contract violators may have re- sponded to friendly middlemen, to the banker 278 pressing for payment upon a loan, or to the appeals of a non-member. ‘This response be- comes a stimulus to the group, but as stimulus, it carries along that portion of the outside en- vironment to which the response was made. In this sense, there is no incongruity in asserting that the group is at times its environment. The difficulties involved are those incident to the task of making ideas clear by the use of the language medium. That the term “stimulus” as used in the con- text of this essay is to be differentiated from its usual physiological connotation has already been pointed out. The chief distinction is that group stimuli are always complex (with the possible exception of those affecting crowd behavior) and physiological stimuli may be simple. In the latter case it is difficult to conceive of stimuli coming from within the behaving organism unless one is to consider, e.g., the activity of eating as a response to hunger rather than as a response to food. Very few, if any, forms of the stimulus-response relation as applied to groups may be stated in this simplified manner. The behavior of the group is a response to stimuli,” but at this point collective psychology 1 See p. 226, Chap. IX. 2 Certain introspective psychologists quarrel with this statement even when applied to individual behavior but the dispute is largely an academic form of verbalism. 279 must part company with individual psychology. The behavior of the group cannot be reduced to isolated stimulus-response situations.* The group, because it is composed of individuals with numerous and varying interests, can re- spond only to complex stimuli. Moreover, the stimuli which cause the group to act are in- variably deferred stimuli. Immediate action on the part of the group is possible only when representative authority has been vested in some individual. Even in such instances, the stimulus which appears to be simple is made to appear so only by reason of the immediate re- sponse. A noteworthy fact in this connection is the increasing reluctance on the part of groups to vest complete representational capacity in an individual. The tendency of the group to make such reservations is an indication of its aware- ness of the complexity of stimuli. 2. Group Responses The group’s response is a changed attitude or a changed policy resulting eventually in a changed activity. Such responses represent a continuum of the group’s functioning. The evolving situation is a continuous series of stimu- lus-response situations. When a cooperative association changes its attitude toward contract 8 Many psychologists question this possibility even for individual behavior. 280 violators it has made a response to the stimulus, of which contract-violating is the major com- ponent. This response is an evolution of the previous situation and in turn affects the total situation. The mechanics of responding inhere in the group’s legal status, the authority vested in its officials, the authority vested in its experts, the use of discussion and the mode of represen- tation. Since the stimuli are complex, the re- sponses must also be complex. This may now be illustrated: Stimuli Responses Pressing creditor ....++.. Opposition of middlemen.. Suspicions engendered by | Contract violations. non-members ......006 Increase of marginal mem- Doubt regarding constitu- bers. tionality of law ....... Family meeds ...sscccee Contract violations ...... Increase of marginal mem- RR eS Pt Oe Changed policy and activ- Opposition of middlemen.. ity on part of group. Bad feeling over use of Legal OrCew. ., cae ee Changed policy involving Increased local responsi- dS) REE RS Lessening of contract vio- Organization of local com- Tanita: MILES. | i visie cu ds ees eas ear dis Acceleration of initial pay- Peoiaiaher, opp osition from GL.) AE Det te : Education to supplant co- MPOURUDe cede dsteeus It will be seen from a study of the above illustrations of stimulus-response situations that the evolving situation might be represented as a circle, or rather as a series of 281 interlocking circles in which the overlapping sectors might be regarded as the succeeding incidences of new situations, i.e., the points at which responses of the previous situation come to be stimuli for ensuing behavior. The distinction between separate and isolated stimuli and multiple stimuli with the corresponding responses might fur- ther be illustrated by the following method: Stimulus Response Behavior I eae 2 tek 2 yh 2xb 3 tie 3xC 4-5-6.. Ee RM ee ee ake gig 1-2+3 = a (1 + 2-+3)x(a) r+2+3 = a+b (1-2 -+ 3)x(a + b) r+-2+3 = a+b+ec (1+42-+43)x(a+b-+c), ete. The use of the sign (=) in the above does not indicate that a stimulus is equal to its response but merely that one activity or a group of activities has been isolated and re- garded for analytical purposes as the cause of succeeding activities. A stimulus calls forth a response and the stimulus regarded in relation to its response constitutes a situation; the situation in process is behavior. 3. Representation Group organization usually includes mechan- ical provisions for the representation of every individual. In the groups under observation this was accomplished by the ordinary method of allowing the members of a certain geograph- ical area (district) to elect members to the boards of directors. The individual thus elected is considered to be the representative of the members residing within his district. A marginal member of a group is one who pos- 282 sesses in some degree the feeling that the group or his representative does not adequately repre- sent him and his interests. “Two observations are to be recorded: (1) how representation is affected by changing situations of the group’s status and function and (2) how the modes of, representation change in proportion to in-. creased intelligence regarding the group’s ac- tivities. Illustration: (Group C) At one period of the existence of this group the marginal members constituted approximately 38% of the total. ‘That is, out of every one hundred members, thirty-eight had indicated either disapproval of the group or in- ability to conform to its contracts and had sold portions of their products in violation of the contract. (These figures do not, of course, in- dicate the total number of marginal members since a member may continue to abide by his legal obligations and still feel that his interests are inadequately represented by the group.) The discussion of the situation thus precipitated led to the conclusion that the distance between the individual member and the group was too great and that some more intimate means of establishing relations with marginal members was needed. The final result was the creation of local committees who were to function mid- way between the individual member and the or- ganization’s officials. 283 From the above illustration we see that after a group begins to function, its mode of repre- sentation is conditioned by the number of its marginal members. Representation may thus be loosely conceived at the beginning but its modes must ultimately conform to the satisfac- tion of the potential and actual marginal mem- bership. As was demonstrated in Group A fixed representational schemes lead to political man- euvering. Here in the second year methods ap- proaching coercion were employed in order to influence the elections. If such methods may be utilized by the officials who happen to be in power, they will consequently be used by those who seek ascendancy. As intelligence among the members of the group increases, a diminu- tion of blind faith in the officials and experts follows. Illustration: (Group A) No provisions were made in this group for the control of experts by the membership, the control being vested by as- sumption in the officials. In the case under ob- servation, an expert warehouseman was dis- liked by the members living in the district which he served. A group of these members pre- pared a resolution, secured twenty-five signa- tures, and delivered it to the officials with the demand that the expert be removed. ‘The ofhcials decided that this was not a representa- tional problem and that the experts were re- 284 sponsible to the officials and not to the mem- bers. At first glance this appeared to be merely a problem of personal friction, but further in- vestigation disclosed the fact that the real ob- jections of the members were based upon tech- nical points of knowledge rather than upon emotions. Their primary dissatisfaction grew out of the disposition of grades. The members claimed that the expert was not following a proper method of grading and that they were suffering as a consequence. ‘The emotional fac- tor entered into the equation but the original conflict arose from the level of intelligence. Under the older marketing system the individ- ual grower had nothing to say about grading; the grades were fixed arbitrarily by the buyers. The codperative marketing movement contains within its process the germs of an educational release. When the grower becomes his own intermediate buyer, he must either acquaint him- self with the technique of buying (which in- cludes grading), or he must delegate this func- tion completely to experts. And if he delegates this function to experts, he must either share in the control of these experts or find himself at the mercy of his representatives, the officials. The expert cannot remain sui generis in a truly cooperative association. ‘That he must remain outside the representational process is, however, 285 the contention of the leaders and officials of the groups under observation. Therefore what is said here and under the discussion of the expert in the previous chapter is a projection of theory and not a statement of practice. 4. Representation Psychological, not Mathematical Representation has hitherto been considered as a mathematical problem in which no shadings of representativeness are permissible. The principle of ‘‘one-member one-vote”’ is adhered to in theory in practically all forms of social organization * and is undoubtedly a survival of political egality, resulting from _ the French and American revolutions. Labor or- ganizations have found it expedient to introduce forms of representation which are virtually a recognition of the marginal member theory ad- vanced above. Thus the International Sea- men’s Union of America in its annual conven- tion call for 1924 quotes from its constitution: ‘Article IV, Section 2. Representation at the convention shall be based upon the per capita tax paid during the year. For the purpose of determining the number of members in a district or local union, the monthly rate of per capita tax shall be multiplied by twelve and the total amount paid during the year shall be 4 See pp. 250 and 251, Chapter X. 286 divided by the product of such multiplication. District or local unions shall be entitled to one delegate for 200 members or less, two dele- gates for 500 members or more, three delegates for 1000, and one delegate for each additional thousand members.” ° In this instance a member 1s considered to be a real member, i.e., deserving representation, only when his annual dues have been paid. ‘The marginal member is one whose dues are in arrears. ‘This is of course an arbitrary, mathe- matical means of determining the basis of repre- sentation. Psychologically the real member is one who actively contributes to the behavior of the group either through opposition or agree- ment. The marginal member has already sub- tracted all or a portion of his interests from the group and therefore cannot be represented by the group, its experts, officials or delegates. From the psychological point of view the “‘one- member one-vote”’ principle is valid only when there are no marginal members. When the group is viewed as a representation of interests, representation cannot be considered as a purely mathematical formula. Social organization in general will probably proceed upon the mathematical basis of repre- sentation but this should not deter those possess- ing the experimental point of view from at- 5 The Seaman’s Journal, November, 1923, p. 11. 287 tempting other modes. In the sphere of polit- ical representation this was approached in the so-called extra-governmental cabinet of the Czecho-Slovakian Government, when the agra- rian party received sufficient votes to assure a controlling majority of parliament in the 1921 elections. Under ordinary conditions all par- ties with representatives in parliament would have been considered as marginal groups; the function of these parties would have been those of a mere opposition. ‘There were, however, certain reforms, particularly those related to the division of the land, which it was thought could not be made effective without the support of some of the minority groups. All political parties, numbering thirteen, were requested to elect a representative to serve as their delegate on the extra-governmental cabinet. The body was given power to initiate legislation and to de- bate on the floor of parliament. ‘Thus the smallest political party with only one or two representatives in parliament was given an op- portunity to participate in the constructive and active work of government. ‘This constitutes an approach toward functional as distinguished from mere mathematical representation. From a psychological point of view the approach ap- pears to be wholly sound. The voice of the opposition does become a part of the equation which is usually designated as the majority de- cision in any case. To recognize this contribu- 288 tion of the opposition is merely to bring mar- ginal groups into active functional relation to the whole. 5. The Problem of Consent The group as a representation of interests acts on behalf of its members and their in- terests. [he individual who becomes a member of a group must in some manner give sanction to the activities of the group. The nature of this sanction is one of the most baffling problems involved in group studies. The dissatisfaction with political representatives and their ac- tivities became so intense a few decades ago that a distinct movement to alter the traditional modes of political consent arose. The promises of the candidate were unsafe; when the can- didate came to be an office-holder he invariably found himself in the control of forces which negatived his well-meant preélection promises. The assumption that the electorate had once and for all given its consent to any possible fu- ture activity of the office-holder was seen to be undependable. The behavior of the office- holder was a response to organized groups rep- resenting definite interests; these interests fre- quently contravened other interests held by other groups or held to be for the general wel- fare. Some means was sought whereby the electorate or any discontented portion of the 289 electorate might withhold consent to the activi- —= > =a ties of elected officials. The referendum and — the recall were the suggested means and in some | of the western states where these methods have | been in use for a number of years, an adequate body of fact upon which certain conclusions may ~ be formed is now available. Observers appear to agree that the actual use of the referendum and of the recall is not indicative of unusually fruitful results but they also agree that the mere existence of these powers has greatly in- creased the responsiveness of office-holders to — their respective constituencies. The referen- dum, for example, may be as easily manipulated as an election.® The same ‘“‘crowd’”’ methods are applicable to both and the organization which is capable of manipulating an election is equally capable of invoking its methods in a referendum. Political experience, however, does not greatly aid in the analysis of the prob- lem of consent as it has evolved in the multiple functional groups of modern civilization. The farmers’ codperative marketing associa- tions have invented a novel and formal method of securing the consent of members to the ac- tivities of their group. Each member is re- quired to sign a legal contract called a market- ing agreement which binds him to deliver all of 6 This is even more true of the initiative which was a political innovation belonging to the same category although involving a different form of consent. 290 the products of his farm to the association.” A sample wording follows: “The Association agrees to buy and the Grower agrees to sell and deliver to the Asso- ciation all of the cotton produced or acquired by or for him in North Carolina during the years 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925 and 1926.” Twenty-three special legislative acts in twenty- three respective states have legally validated such contracts. Each act contains a section dealing with contracts which is either a replica or a simple variation of Section 17 of An Act to Encourage the Cooperative Marketing of Farm Products and to Authorize the Incor- poration of Cooperative Marketing Associa- tions, Public Laws of North Carolina, Session of 1921, making the following provisions: “Section 17. Marketing contract. ‘““(a) The association and its members may make and execute marketing contracts, requir- ing the members to sell, for any period of time, not over ten years, all or any specified part of their agricultural products or specified commodi- 7 “All” is here intended to designate the total of the particular product commodity which the association proposes to market. If a single farmer is a member of more than one commodity association, he will of course be obliged to sign contracts for each commodity. 291 ties exclusively to or through the association or © any facilities to be created by the association. The contract may provide that the association may sell or resell the products of its members, with or without taking title thereto, and pay over to its members the resale price, after de- ducting all necessary selling, overhead, and other costs and expenses, including interest on preferred stock, not exceeding eight per cent per annum, and reserves for retiring the stock, if any; and other proper reserves; and interest not exceeding eight per cent per annum upon common stock. ‘““(b) The by-laws and the marketing con tract may fix, as liquidated damages, specific sums to be paid by the member or stockholder to the association upon the breach by him of any provisions of the marketing contract re- garding the sale or delivery or withholding of products; and may further provide that the member will pay all costs, premiums for bonds, expenses and fees in case any action is brought upon the contract by the association; and any such provisions shall be valid and enforceable in the courts of this State. ‘“(c) In the event of any such breach or threatened breach of such marketing contract by a member, the association shall be entitled to an injunction to prevent the further breach of the contract, and to a degree of specified per- formance thereof. Pending the adjudication 292 of such an action, and upon filing a verified complaint showing the breach or threatened breach, and upon filing a sufficient bond, the association shall be entitled to a temporary re- straining order and preliminary injunction against the member.” The leaders of the cooperative movement frequently referred to the contract and the law as instruments possessing “teeth, meaning thereby that the agreements were legally bind- ing and that it would therefore be difficult for the opponents of codperation to influence mem- bers to desert the associations. This form of consent, they affirmed, was lasting and sub- stantial with all of the force of the law as its support.* Groups A, B and C operate under five-year contracts similar to the one cited; Group D operates under a contract which is binding for one year and is renewable at the close of this period. In each case the form of consent is the same in that it is dependent upon the signature of a member to an enforceable contract. | The methods utilized in securing signers for contracts have already been alluded to ° under 8 The law above quoted has been declared constitu- tional by a decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Tobacco Growers’ Codperative Association versus W. T. Jones of Nash County, Spring Term, 1923, No. 62. ®°P. 257, Chapter X. 293 the discussion of leaders. It was noted that some of these methods were less creditable than others, and the reference now calls for further amplification. The so-called “psychology of getting signatures on the ‘dotted line’” with scant regard for the means employed was an inevitable consequence of two factors included in the initial campaigns. In the first place, the campaigns were conducted with great speed, and in the second place, persons were employed to secure contracts. The rapidity of the cam- paign in some areas counteracted the influences of the employed canvassers so that signed con- tracts were secured at an astonishingly low cost in most cases. The chief defect of the methods utilized in the campaigns was obviously the im- possibility of securing intellectual conviction. The cooperative movement presaged many sig- nificant changes in habits, customs and tradi- tions, and these changes demanded rationaliza- tion. But there was no time for rationalization. ‘The organization committees of (the names of two codperative associations inserted here) were given until January 8, 1922, to complete the sign-up of growers of 50% of the tobacco and growers of 2,000 bales of cotton in 1920 in order to make the contracts valid. The liv- ing history of these great campaigns waged by the farmers themselves in the face of the vicious opposition by certain of the speculative interests 294 will never be blurred in the minds of any who took part therein.” *° The paragraph quoted above was written, not in the midst of the excitement of the campaign, but almost one year later. Significance attaches to the following items: (a) the necessity of haste in securing contracts, (b) the emotional nature of the descriptive sentences in which such terms as “living history,” “great campaigns waged,” “‘in the face of vicious opposition” ap- pear. These two points of emphasis afford the clue to the methods utilized in securing farmer- consent to the process of codperative market- ing. Farmers were instructed that there was an evil to combat and that its dangers to them were imminent. They were exhorted to fight and to strike their blows without delay. The farmers were giving consent to something quite different from codperative marketing; they were in reality giving consent to battle. Significant consent probably always includes some aspect of combat or conflict. It is im- portant to recognize this factor of the con- sent-equation since it bears a definite relation to the latter stages of consent on the motor level. Complete consent, real consent must eventually be an expression whose components include emotional direction, intellectual correction and motor activity. [he order of this sequence is 10 Handbook on Cooperative Marketing, p. 9. 295 undoubtedly of importance, but in the cases under observation activity on the motor level succeeded emotional direction.** Contracts were signed in the spring and summer and © products were actually delivered to codperative — warehouses in the autumn and winter. ‘The character of agricultural production naturally imposed this cycle of events upon the situation. The activity of delivering the crop necessarily succeeded the promise of delivery implied in the signed contract. The nature of this form of consent, which, incidentally, appears to be gen- eral when groups are involved, may be further illumined by a brief classification of its stages: (a) Emotional consent was either given under the influence of public speakers at mass meetings or under the influence of canvassers employed to secure signed contracts. (b) Intellectual consent represented a series of rationalizations continuing under one form or another between the period of signing the contract and the period of delivering the prod- uct. (c) Motor consent was represented by the overt act of delivering the product to the co- operative warehouse. 11 Signing the contract is not considered to be a mo- tor activity although in a strict sense it obviously is; the chief components of this activity were emotional in character and therefore the term motor activity is re- served for the description of those activities which ac- tually involved codperative marketing. 296 Total consent may then be described as an in- tegration of emotion, reason, and activity. If each of these factors of the equation may be kept in a state of proportionate readiness, the result will be an unquestioned and reliable form of consent. The strategy of the leaders of the groups under observation was directed to this end with varying success. The test of real consent, total consent, occurs at the period of motor activity. If emotion and reason are in agreement, the resultant action in- volves no conflict. Numerous events occurring between the initial and the latter stages of con- sent serve to condition the final results. In Group A there were many contract violations, the total reaching as high as one hundred in a single county; in Groups D and B there were only a few violations; in Group C, the viola- tions at one period were so numerous as to en- danger the success of the entire movement. In another group, not under definite observa- tion, practically no violations occurred. Ac- tivities tending to produce these varying degrees of harmony will be discussed in the following chapter. The pertinent task at this point is to propose generalizations explanatory of the na- ture of consent. The discovery of generaliza- tions which direct attention to the complexities of the total equation of consent will advance the technique of group organization and group process. 297 The validity of the interests involved condi- tions the validity of consent.” If, at the time of marketing, the member of a codperative asso- ciation has the conviction that adherence to the contract is a contradiction of his interests, no valid consent may be expected of him. He may, of course, follow out the terms of the contract because of fear of the law but consent of this type is coercion and not true consent. True consent is possible only when emotions and rea- son are in harmony with activity. Neglecting to give recognition to this principle accounts for the numerous failures of quasi-legal forms of group organization. There is a higher form of consent than is implied in the placing of a sig- nature on a legal contract. Reliance upon legal consent too frequently acts as a barrier to the discovery and the creation of this higher con- sent. But what is this higher consent? No promising answer can be given to this query until added experimental data are available. Upon the basis of the meager material at hand, 12 Political scientists often complain of the seeming impossibility of constructing a scientific tariff law. ‘These complaints are founded upon the charge that all affected parties contend for their particular interests regardless of the interests of others. ‘This constitutes an assumption that real consent is possible even if the consequences contravene interests. What is needed, obviously, is not the cultivation of false consent run- ning counter to valid interests but rather a method for evaluating interests. 298 principles may be suggested only in the hope that they may be verified or discarded. Two considerations, however, which may be tenta- tively designated as facts, have emerged from the present study: (1) real consent is an in- tegration of emotion, reason and activity; (2) the integrity of real consent depends basically upon a balancing of interests. A candidly ex- perimental attitude toward these two principles might contribute toward the liberation of modern social organization from its shackles of propaganda and hypocrisy.** 18 A trivial although symptomatic illustration of the evils of sham consent is at hand. A county baseball league holds an annual meeting at which the various communities are represented. Every year they agree that only two professional players may be engaged by each team and that the maximum amount to be ex- pended upon such players is to be $50. And every year they go forth from the meeting with the full knowledge that they will spend much more than this amount if it is in the interest of winning the pennant. ‘The conse- quences of this hypocrisy have at last brought their penalties, not merely to the respective representatives but to the teams, the communities and to the game it- self. Thus far all attempts to base the agreements upon honest interests have failed and the league itself has reached the stage of disintegration. 299 CHAPTER XII DISCUSSION, USE OF FACTS, POINTS- OF-VIEW, USE OF LANGUAGE, AND POWER? AN individual’s response to a new situation is partially conditioned by the knowledge which he possesses of the factors involved in it. Scientific method may therefore be regarded as a recognition of the utility of knowledge or of deliberation. ‘That man rises in the scale of civilization in proportion to his increasing use of deliberation has been generally assumed. When the scientist isolates the new elements in his problem, he is, in a sense, deliberating over their qualities. Instruments of precision are merely aids to the process of deliberation. In ordinary behavior the individual draws upon the common stock of information which he has absorbed or in which he is immersed before con- ‘The term “interests” which logically belongs to this section of the Categories is not to be isolated for separate consideration since the implications of the term have been so fully revealed in conection with all of the other terms. 300 sidering his behavior a rational step. The con- sequences of the step are always rationalized. If, for example, a person is confronted with the opportunity of having $5,000 to invest, he will ordinarily deliberate before making the invest- ment. He may do this by means of knowledge which he possesses or he may accept the de- liberations of others whose judgments he val- ues. After the act he will find reasons to sup- port its rationality, irrespective of whether the investment resulted in gain or loss. An act of behavior begins with a bodily stim- ulus, is reinforced by habits and emotional complexes, and is either ratified or rejected by deliberative processes. Most psychologists have assumed that simple acts of behavior, re- flexes, are performed without completing this circuit. The term ‘“‘behavior,” however, is now applied more definitely to acts which include the possibility of deliberation or thinking. All psy- chologists, whether they adhere to a strict in- terpretation of the James-Lange theory or not, make room at some stage of behaving for a process which makes knowledge a desired pre- requisite for acting. Between stimulus and re- sponse a period of time elapses during which the act-in-process may be temporarily arrested. Overemphasis of the effectiveness of this de- liberating process has led to untenable theories of choice, the power of consciousness and free will. Analysis of the method by which the in- 301 dividual arrives at judgments preceding acts re- veals that these judgments are still circum- — scribed, conditioned and controlled by the stim- ulus itself and the bodily organism as a whole. The act-in-process is not brought to a standstill by deliberation and what transpires during de- liberation is confined within the sphere of stim- ulus, habits, emotions—all of which contribute to the knowledge which the deliberation is as- sumed to discover. “Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various compet- ing possible lines of action.” ? The complete act will be an integration or a partial integra- tion which has merely been temporarily sus- pended. Continued deliberation means inaction and consequently disintegration. 1. Discussion as Joint or Group Deliberation Groups must act and hence they must choose between conflicting lines of conduct. Activity is always a step into the unknown, a choice bes tween a line of conduct which has already been tried and one which is still to be ttied. When confronted with the necessity of adjustment to a new situation the group may (a) follow its leader, (b) consult experts, (c) imitate pre- vious action on the part of the group or some other group, or (d) resort to the attempt of ar- riving at a conclusion by means of joint delibera- 2 Human Nature and Conduct, John Dewey, p. 190. 302 tion. Frequently the resultant action of the group is a combination of all of the above fac- tors. The President of the United States reads a message to Congress which includes specific recommendations for legislation. Experts are consulted for the purpose of discovering the facts relevant to the proposal. The proposed legislation is evaluated in terms of its relation to the traditional aspects of governmental theory. And finally Congress attempts to ar- rive at a decision which will embody portions of the President’s stimulation as a leader, the bearings of the experts’ facts, traditional pro- cedure and the values created by debate. Farmers have been much-tutored by experts and leaders but unfortunately they have had slight experience in the methods of discussion. This condition may be accounted for by the facts incident to isolation, meager means of, communication, and the highly individual char- acter of farming as a vocation. The codpera- tive movement, in spite of its leisurely approach during the past half-century, finally enlisted farmer support with extreme suddenness. Col- lectivism arrived, but no collective means of dealing with collectivism accompanied its ar- rival. Many meetings were held but these were addressed by speakers who were themselves un- trained in discussion methods. Speakers always gave opportunities for questions but discussion implies much more than giving answers to ques- 393 tions. Viewing the codperative movement as a whole and limiting the view to the past three years, it is safe to say that it arose upon the fulcrum of leadership and expertness, emotional allegiance and credulity. Leadership has al- ways been the center of gravity of farmer or- ganizations but expertness was in this case a new factor which exercised a powerful influence in counteracting the customary suspicions of farmers. The absence of emphasis upon local units for discussion purposes, or of discus- sion in any form during the early days of organi- zation, was marked. ‘he expert, however, was never forgotten. ‘“The employment of experts of the best type for the handling, grading and marketing of the commodity, and for perform- ing every service necessary, is a final essen- tial to success in codperative marketing.” ° “We are big enough to hire experts to run our business and serve us.’ * ‘The leaders were aware of the farmer’s prejudice against high- salaried officials and experts and with this undoubtedly in mind they attempted to emo- tionalize the expert and his services. ‘‘Co- 8 Handbook on Commodity Cooperative Marketing, published by the American Cotton Growers’ Exchange, p. 8. Italics used by the author to indicate the inclu- sive concept of the expert. * Handbook on Cooperative Marketing, published jointly by the North Carolina Cotton Growers’ Co- operative Association and the Tobacco Growers’ Co- operative Association, p. 5. 304 operatives can afford to pay as much for ex- pert service as any other form of business or- ganization, based on the quantity handled, but so fascinating is the work of helping solve the problems of this remarkable economic move- ment that in many cases men of the broadest experience and the highest ability prefer to work with codperatives for less remuneration than they could obtain in purely private em- ployment.” ° The need for discussion among the members became apparent to the leaders only when the cooperatives commenced functioning. In fact the principle of deciding important questions by means of discussion has never been fully con- ceded. If the farmers can, in view of their lack of training and other obstacles, succeed in adjusting themselves and the codperative move- ment to a discussion technique they will have accomplished much to validate the theory of discussion as a mode of group deliberation. In all of the groups under consideration dis- cussion has appeared as one of the “tools” which the members propose to use in making themselves vitally important to their respect- ive organizations. In two of the groups, sit- uations have arisen which have caused the officials to make provisions for discussion pro- cedure. The fruits of codperative acting are 5 Handbook on Commodity Cooperative Marketing, pp. 8, 9. 305 codperative rationalizations which lead to the acceptance of principles and beliefs. ‘Thus far discussion among the members of cooperatives is largely of this rationalizing type. Illustration: When it was discovered by the officials of Group D that the loyalty of members depended in no small degree upon the support of their Wives, a new expert was employed for the pur- pose of generating discussion groups among farm women. ‘This project is designated as ‘morale’ work, or an effort to retain the loyalty of the men by securing the support of the women. The above is a fair illustration of the meth- ods by which discussion has been initiated in all of the groups. The motive is obviously to utilize discussion as a means of ratifying or ra- tionalizing what the group has already done. Evidently any form of collectivism based upon this formula will in the end become static and incapable of calling forth a spirited loyalty on the part of its members. The continuance of discussion on this plane will, in point of fact, lead inevitably toward a baulked constituency which will form the seed-bed for suspicion and dissension. If discussion is to be vital, something more than a series of ratification meetings, it must partake of creativeness. What happens to in- 306 spire the group must ultimately germinate in the nutritive capacities of the group. ‘‘A for- ward movement in the spiritual life of society may be sought in two ways. We may look to leadership, to great spokesmen of the spirit, who shall draw a people onward by the sheer power of championed ideals to compel assent; or we may look to a creative social process, to a lifting of many voices that take counsel to achieve in the common experience a winnowing of ideals and a reordered life. . . . For so- ciety to-day we shall probably rest our hopes chiefly in the second way of progress.” * The broader concept of progress may for present purposes be overlooked. ‘The present search is for an objective technique of group action which will insure the cohesion and continued functioning of the group without regard to whether or not the interests which are thereby enhanced are in accordance with a theory of societal progress. Can a collective group with a collective function evolve a sound technique of behavior which excludes creative participa- tion on the part of its constituents? No an- swer is possible to this query since the groups 6° The Way of Group Discussion, A. D. Sheffield. Pamphlet published by the Conference on the Chris- tian Way of Life. Professor Sheffield follows up this statement with excellent reasons for placing hope in the values of group discussion, but his are not the precise reasons which seem most pertinent to the above discus- sion. 397 under observation have existed too short a time to have been brought to an acuteness of situation capable of demonstrating the utility of discussion. Thus far discussion has been, as it so frequently is in business types of or- ganization, merely a form of maneuvering by | which the members are made to appear in har- mony with the activities and policies of the of- ficials and experts. ‘There are, however, nu- merous indications that periods of acuteness are soon to appear. Moreover, clear indica- tions exist that no adequate preparation is be- ing made for these situations. 2. The Use and the Misuse of Facts During the rise of the codperative groups under consideration a more or less general re- action against propaganda and its methods ap- peared. People everywhere were requesting facts, not opinions. ‘The rapidity with which the codperative movement advanced rendered accurateness of facts impossible. It was never- theless sought and claimed both by the codper- ative leaders and the leaders of the opposition. ‘Three queries were uppermost: (a) How many farmers have signed co- operative contracts? (b) What proportion of the crop is included by these contracts? (c) Has the price paid by the middlemen in in the past been unfair? 308 Claims and counterclaims were made by both sides with equal insistence upon accuracy. The claims of both parties to the controversy were, of course, inaccurate. In most cases this inaccuracy may be attributed to zeal and en- thusiasm rather than to malicious intent. Group A grossly overstated both its member- ship and its acreage in one area where the op- position was particularly effective. On the basis of strategy this group also made a pur- poseful understatement of its total member- ship at one point in the controversy. “he op- position maintained a rare consistency with one set of facts together with a pronounced incon- sistency and inaccuracy with another set of facts. Naturally the statistical method of sup- porting statements of fact was prominently utilized. Both the codperatives and the oppo- sition secured statistics published by the United States Department of Agriculture and by an ingenious method of rearranging year-period groupings arrived at contrary and conflicting results. An overzealous organizer in a public address stated that the United States Govern- ment, through its War Finance Corporation, had loaned the codperative association in whose interest he labored the sum of thirty million dollars. In spite of correction by other leaders this statement circulated and in at least one case produced an amusing result. A mem- ber of the Association wrote to the office of 399 its headquarters to request a loan of $400 for his personal needs—not an exorbitant demand in view of the amount which he believed the Association had procured from the Govern- ment.’ Facts are of greatest value when the group is about to act in relation to a situation for which the facts are relevant, i.e., when they enter into the behavior equation. The tempta- tion to misuse facts synchronizes with the period of greatest value. The tendency is al- ways to believe those purported facts which lend weight to an already preconceived preju- dice or mode of action. When conflict is most intense, both within the individual and between groups, facts become most important and most dangerous. The rise of experts and the inabil- ity of private citizens to control the sources of facts are consequently movements of great sig- nificance to modern social theory, social organi- zation and social control. The use of facts constitutes a mode of con- trol. This is readily discovered when the mo- tives for the use of facts are analysed. During the organization phase, facts were used (a) to encourage non-members to sign contracts, (b) to discourage the opposition, and (c) to 7 The War Finance Corporation as a matter of fact did assist in the financing of these codperatives with extended advances, but the advances were made upon products actually in the possession of the associations. 310 influence public opinion. Facts, then, were used as a means of controlling responses on the part of members of the group, opponents of the group, and the public. Considered in the larger sense, facts were used to control spe- cific situations. The relation between this use of facts and the process called group delibera- tion is obvious; facts are projected for the pur- pose of making deliberation unnecessary. ‘The logic of facts is self-evident. Illustration: Certain organizers employed for the pur- pose of securing signatures to contracts made statements to the effect that 80 per cent and 90 per cent of the growers of a particular area had already given their signatures. ‘The pal- pable conclusion to be drawn from this fact was that an insufficient quantity of the commodity would remain to warrant the existence of pri- vate buyers, and that therefore the grower who still refrained from signing a contract was depriving himself of a market. For present purposes it is not important to know whether the statements made in these cases were accurate or not, i.e., whether they were in reality facts; they performed the func- tion of facts, the function being to compel a conclusion without discussion or deliberation. A counterfeit coin serves exactly the same func- tion as a legal one. When its spurious charac- ter is discovered its function ceases. 207 effective use of facts and in order to lend scien- tific weight to their counter-facts, they con- ducted canvasses and surveys. The conclusions which might logically be drawn from these sets of facts were as self-evident as in the former case. But these conclusions were diametrically opposite. It is not safe to draw the easy in- ference that this illustration merely indicates willful and purposeful misuse of facts, or un- truth. On the contrary, both parties to the fact-battle were convinced that their respective facts represented the truth. The newspapers in many sections printed both sets of facts with the justification that with both sides before them the farmers and the public could arrive at log- ical and satisfactory judgments. The fallacy of this “both-sides’” argument is apparent. Facts are not discussable. If one person in- sists that there are ten apples in a basket and another is equally certain that there are eleven, no amount of argument or no refinement of logic can determine how many apples are really in the basket. “Che only method by which the exact number can be determined is by joint counting. From the viewpoint of social theory it must be admitted that contemporary group behavior is far removed from the possibility of a fruit- ful use of facts. The use of facts cannot be- come a wholesome aid to rational group re- 3r2 = | The opposition was quick to appreciate this | | : sponses until something has been accomplished by way of refining the methods of acquiring facts. [he present use of facts is not only analogous to headquarters’ communiqués issued by armies engaged in warfare; it is the same process. Facts are utilized in intergroup re- lations as weapons of coercion. The assump- tion that fact gatherers are scientists and hence neutral is of little assistance. If the use of facts is left to the groups in conflict, such use will be determined by protective impulses. Neu- tral fact-gathering does not appear to be the solution of the fact problem. The analogy of the apples in the basket is pertinent. Facts may be gathered by joint fact-gathering bodies, and from thence onward the use of facts be- comes amenable to discussion. If a codper- ative association and an association of middle- men together state that there are 500 growers in a certain area and that 400 of them have signed codperative marketing contracts, it is perfectly legitimate for each party to the con- troversy to arrive at its own conclusions. Logic and discussion may then begin to function. When the facts themselves are agreed upon, discussion may proceed to analyze the various possible meanings of these facts. Logic, with its modern empirical implications, may then be utilized. The same motives and incentives to interpret the facts in terms of interests will ex- ist, but in the realm of interpretation there are 313 no self-evident conclusions. Codperative fact- gathering does not in any sense lead to the inference that the codperating groups will thereby be induced to adopt a cooperative mode of action on behalf of the interests at stake. It does imply, however, that the futil- ity of discussing facts has been eliminated and that therefore time and energy may be devoted to a discussion of the meaning of facts. The way will have been opened for a rational and logical ventilation of interests. Claims and counterclaims, statements and _ counterstate- ments, facts and counter-facts leave the partici- pators of discussion in the quagmire of doubt and suspicion. Nothing can be discussed save the truth or untruth of the facts or the honesty or dishonesty of the groups utilizing the facts. If, on the other hand, the group may respond to facts by means of its own logical processes, both a motive and a beginning technique for group discussion will have been brought into existence. But this treatment of the use of facts has led into the perilous regions of prophecy. Nothing that was discovered in the fact-using methods employed by the groups under ob- servation warrants the prophecy of joint fact- gathering. ‘The essence of what was discov- ered merely points to the conclusion that facts have little importance in contemporary group interrelations. 314 After the codperative associations com- menced to receive commodities at their respec- tive receiving stations, facts again came into prominence. The pertinent query then was, not how many farmers have signed contracts, but the far more significant one: how many farmers who signed contracts are actually de- livering their products to the codperatives? The two contending groups (the codperatives and the middlemen) were then obliged to pro- ject their conflict to a new level, namely, the level of world markets and world influences. A new interest was involved. In the former illustration, the interest at stake was the con- trol of a definite proportion of the commodity by means of signed contracts in the hands of the cooperative associations. As the commodity began to flow to market, the interest at stake came to be the control of prices. ‘The control of prices, naturally, was conditioned by the con- trol of the commodity. Illustration: ‘The officials of Group A consistently refused to state the amount of products received at one of their important stations. A state statute required the publication of precisely this fact. The law was technically evaded; it required the publication of the amounts of the particular commodity received (bought) together with the average prices paid during each week. The co- operatives affirmed that they bought none of 315 the commodity but merely received it and in turn sold it on behalf of the members of the association and consequently did not feel them- selves bound by the provisions of the law. The officials of the codperative association insisted that their chief motive for withholding these facts was to baffle the middlemen. If the middlemen knew exactly how much of the com- modity was in the warehouses of the codpera- tive association, this information could be util- ized in influencing prices. The middlemen in- sisted publicly and by repeated appeals to the state authorities upon the publication of these facts. This insistence appeared to be genuine, but it was later discovered that the non-publi- cation of facts by the coGperative might be used profitably. The middlemen then pro- ceeded to disseminate statements upon their own responsibility. They naturally placed the amounts in control of the codperatives so low as to induce a general opinion that the codper- atives had failed and that their chief motive in withholding facts was to escape the admis- sion of weakness. The above illustration does not differ in es- sence from the previous one. Facts were used, not to assist any group in making rational re- sponses, but in reality to produce responses which would enhance the interests of one or the other of the contending groups. Facts were 316 used, not in the interest of facts, but in the interest of interests. 3. Points of View as Activities Influencing Group Responses A point of view is not a generalized attitude resulting from previous experiences and incor- porated as a behavior-pattern. The attitude of Gentiles toward Jews is not a point of view in the sense in which the term is employed in this study. The differentiating point in the present use of the term is that a point of view as util- ized in group relations carries a distinct conno- tation of time. An attitude, like a prejudice or bias, has nothing to do with time, with the exception that it is likely to be tempered in time by succeeding experiences and influences. A point of view specifically makes reference to the _ future, to perspective. It is utilized in group behavior as a means of inducing a response which includes values for the present as well as cumulative values for the future. Illustration: While the cooperative associations were be- ing organized, both the codperative leaders and the leaders of the middlemen’s group projected and emphasized the fact that they represented a long-time point of view. Thus the codpera- tive leaders said in effect: “Support the codp- 317 erative association because it proposes to build up the community by means of a scientific sys- tem of marketing.’”’ And the middleman said in effect: ‘‘Remain loyal to us; we have already demonstrated that we can build up the com- munity. ‘This cooperative venture may succeed temporarily but in the long run your interests will be better conserved by supporting us.”’ Both groups believed apparently in the long- time point of view as an argument for support. Psychologically considered, this emphasis upon time is comparable to the appeals which bank- ers make when urging their clients to save. Slow but sure interest on capital is better, they insist, than sudden investments in speculative ventures where the profits may be exceedingly large or where there may be a loss. The long- time point of view is put forth in the interests of security, safety. But the long-time point of view is based upon the assumption that indi- viduals respond more readily to an activity thus founded than to activities involving the short- time point of view, i.e., that the long look ahead is characteristic of human behavior. What is taken to be a look ahead is probably largely a conservative habit-pattern. Those who implore others to act in accordance with a long-time point of view are continually acting on the basis of a short-time point of view. Activities of the codperative groups which violated the empirical data of social theory and social or- 318 ganization illustrate the short-time point of view. Illustrations: The short-time point of view as illustrated in activities of the codperative groups may be discovered in the following instances: ° a. Ihe rapid campaign for securing signa- tures to contracts represents a short-time point of view since it secures a form of non-rational consent which receives its severest test when the time arrives for carrying out the terms of the contract. b. The erection of a comprehensive over- head administrative organization with- out adequate attention to the relations between this organization and members in isolated local communities represents a short-time point of view since the over- head organization can function perma- nently only when there exists a vital and wholesome interrelation between it and the members. ® The officials responsible for these activities argue, and with considerable logic, that these steps were es- sential and inevitable since they were the only terms upon which the organizations could begin to function. This, it will be recognized, was also the argument of the proponents of the Treaty of Versailles. The fal- lacy is obvious; activities which bear even slightly useful results are invariably rationalized later in terms of prin- ciples. The simplest trick in logic is to make a past act fit a generalized principle. “This is again the fallacy of confusion between means and ends. 319 c. The emphasis placed upon government loans and loans by wealthy individuals represents a short-time point of view since the associations can in the end be stabilized only by their own resources. ‘d. The emphasis placed upon the legal con- tract as a means for insuring the solidar- ity of the associations represents a short- time point of view since no legal sanction is adequate when psychological, sociolog- ical and ethical sanctions are absent. Whether or not these activities seemed nec- essary for the strategic situations in which the newly-organized groups found themselves is ir- relevant. The fact remains that people who urge a long-time point of view upon others en- gage in activities which represent a short-time point of view.® An abbreviated term for the short-time point of view might very well be “expediency.” The expedient activity must later be transformed into what may be termed the fundamental activity. Herein lies the chief difficulty. “The change from a short-time point of view (activities based upon the short-time ® []lustrations are available from the observations of the behavior of the middlemen groups. In fact, most of their activities violated the whole of what is accepted as sound social theory. Because of the author’s assump- tion that these middleman groups are largely protective organizations with few constructive functions and hence without continuity, they are not given the same promi- mence as the cooperative groups. 320 ee point of view) to the long-time point of view involves a double integration. The changed activities will not be fruitfully rationalized un- less these are accompanied by a changed atti- tude. A turn-over in personnel is frequently necessary before this integration can take place. 4. The Use of Language as a Group Response Words serve as symbols for ideas, emotions and activities. ‘Therefore new organizations bring into usage new terms. A new emphasis, weight or connotation is also added to old terms when these terms come to be used as slogans. Altogether too little attention has been given to this relation between words and group be- havior and it should be admitted that this prob- lem originally formed only a minor and inci- dental place in the present study. It was noted, however, that words exerted a marked influence over the behavior of not merely the groups whose immediate interests were at stake, but on the behavior of those vague groups usually included under the term “‘the public.” The im- portance of this phase of group behavior was revealed when one of the codperative groups took official cognizance of the use of language in one of its executive meetings. Illustration: In order to create a “fight image’’ in the } 321 y ) minds of members of the codperative associa- tions, such opprobrious terms as ‘‘auction- gang,” ‘‘auction-crowd,” ‘‘our enemies’ and “pin-hooker,” ‘‘pin-hooker’s paradise’’ were used to designate the middlemen. The time came when it appeared to the officials that nothing more could be gained by the continu- ance of this terminology, and the field workers and employees were instructed to modify their language. Analysis of the above illustration led to the conclusion that the officials were mainly con- cerned about the attitude which would be cre- ated in the minds of the so-called disinterested groups if these contemptuous terms were to create an overdrawn picture. Respectable people lived and had dealings with these mid- dlemen; if the language inference painted them too darkly, these disinterested persons would naturally tend to discount other statements of the cooperatives. Numerous illustrations are also available where the opposite, or favorable impression was sought by means of terms which carried the implications, or at least the overtones, of accepted values. Illustration: a. The middlemen consciously emphasized the use of the terms “independent mar- ket,’’ “open market,” and ‘‘auction-as- 322 usual” to designate the established mar- keting system.”° b. The officials of the codperatives con- sciously cultivated the use of the terms “our,” ““we,” and “us” when speaking of the cooperative association to indicate the collective nature of the organization. The three terms, ‘independent,’ ‘‘open,”’ and ‘‘as-usual’’ were of peculiar significance in the Southern states where all save one of the cooperatives under observation were organized. Each carried its pertinent implication of value. The opposite of an independent and an open market is, obviously, one in which the grower is in bondage, unfree. To market products ‘‘as- usual’”” means to avoid the risk of engaging upon a new and untried method. ‘The influence of such terms upon the behavior of individuals and groups is readily revealed when observa- tions are conducted on street corners and in homes as well as in public meetings and the press. In one locality, at least, it is apparent that the use of language has played an impor- tant if not the deciding role in defeating the cooperative movement. 10’They also followed the lead of the codperatives in using reproachful terms, such as “‘the higher-ups” to designate the politicians and citizens who were support- ing the codperative movement; the implication, obvi- ously, was that these “higher-ups” were merely using the codperative movement as a means of achieving some sinister end. 323 5. The Use of Power as a Group Response The very concept of power, used to indicate a relation between groups, produces a sense of futility. “The connotations of power are the antitheses of the most cherished political and ethical principles. “Might does not make right,” ‘“‘government by the consent of the gov- erned,” “‘turn thy left cheek also,’’—these are principles in opposition to power, but alas, when we speak of an international organization it is still called a “league to enforce peace.” Thus are principles divorced from activities and thus are we exposed to the ironical thrusts of a Nietzsche who says: “As a general rule, those who govern to-day only exercise power with a kind of inner remorse, to such an extent are the values of slave morality universally admit- ted. To defend ourselves from their bad conscience, they have recourse to hypocritical sophisms and endeavor to make their privileged situation harmonize with the precepts of the prevailing morality: they regard themselves as the executors of orders emanating from a higher power (tradition, law, God), as the ‘first servants of their country,’ or ‘the in- struments of the common weal.’”’** The only alternative for a frank and brutal execution of power which occurs to Nietzsche is a ‘“‘coming together of clever gregarious men,’’—a process 11 Beyond Good and Evil. Aphorism 199, 324 which he scorns. Yet a thorough-going analysis of the result of the ‘‘coming together of clever gregarious men’”’ leads to the distasteful con- clusion that this has merely resulted in an ex- change of the seats of power. Where once the common man was dominated by the power of a single individual, we are now all in the grip of the power of organized groups. ‘The transfer has provided us with no new insights into the nature of power and leaves us as helpless as before. Nor are we saved by subscribing to the Baconian dictum that ‘“‘knowledge is power”’ which under the terms of modern group life may merely mean that the group which can af- ford to employ the shrewdest experts will pos- sess the greatest power. Power, when considered as a factor in the stimulus-response equation between groups, may be reduced to the forms in which it is expressed. In connection with the groups under observation these may be enumerated as follows: Power over another group is expressed in terms of: a. Numbers i. Control over the commodity ii. Membership ill. Financial support et cetera Diese restice 7° 12 For historical illustrations of the prestige theory of power, see Social Psychology, E. A. Ross, Chapter X. 375 i. Prominent supporters ii. Government support iii. Prominent members (influential) et cetera c. A Superior Technique i. Cooperative marketing as a more economical and scientific system than auction-marketing 11. Co6dperative marketing as a_tech- nique which provides for the high- est use of experts et cetera Numerous other expressions of power were discernible in the interrelations of these groups but the above classification accounts for the ma- jor forms. The phrase ‘“‘power over” is ad- visedly used in the above for the purpose of conveying the attitude toward power manifested by the groups involved. This attitude may be stated in simple terms: the groups valued power as a means of causing other groups to act in a specific manner, i.e., a manner which would enhance the interests of the vower- group.’* Power in control of one group was Professor Ross’ assertion that “the direction of the cur- rent of imitation reveals the seat of power” (p. 167), although wholly inadequate as an explanation of the function of power, still marks the point of departure for a socia: theory of power. 13 Groups not directly concerned with the conflict between the two major groups frequently made at- tempts to neutralize power; as the conflict settled down 326 looked upon as the cause which might produce a disintegrating effect upon the opposing group. This appears to be the more or less generic concept of power in all of its manifestations, namely, power as a causal factor. The power of circumstances,’* the power of money, the power of heredity, the will to power, conscious- ness of power—these are phrases which have all been used in the cause-effect formula. Baldly stated, this concept implies ‘“That they should take who have the power, And they should keep who can.” *® 6. Power Over versus Power With The rise of the codperative movement was not without incidents which point to a higher concept of power. It was not always assumed that ‘power over” was the only means of reach- ing a desired end. Illustrations: a. In one community, the middlemen, the cooperators and a small group of interested citizens agreed to avoid the conflict and its con- into its more permanent phase these attempts were abandoned and the so-called disinterested groups were obliged to assume allegiance to either one side or the other. 14 As used by Lester F. Ward in Applied Sociology, pp. 267-276. 15 Wordsworth, Rob Roy’s Grave. 327 sequent disruption of the community by work- ing out a plan whereby some of the middlemen were taken over by the codperative, the ware- house control was equably determined, and the problem solved by conserving the essence of both conflicting interests.*® b. A manufacturing corporation using a large amount of the commodity covered by one of the codperatives decided, after a preliminary show of antagonism, to codperate fully with the codperative marketing association. One of its leading experts is now employed by the co- operative. Whether or not the above adjustments were ac- complished with understanding and therefore with permanent profit is an open question. At any rate, illustration (a) offers an example of the fruitful results of even a partial integration on the plane of activities. In this community, cooperation has resulted in codperation and not in a series of new conflicts. On the whole, however, the observations of this study do not warrant promise of an evolv- ing and creative mode of group accommodation. There appears to be as little difference between the use of power between interest-groups as be- tween nations. ‘Both parties to a fundamental conflict, just insofar as they possess power, tend 16 For a description of this event see ‘‘Codperation in Tobacco,” by E. C. Lindeman in The New Republic, September 6, 1922. 328 to be impatient, apprehensive and_head- strong.” *’ ‘That it is possible to devise a tech- nique of group relations which supplants ‘‘power _ over” by “power with’ must be the faith of the social scientist, else his science can have no significance for the ever-increasing group rela- tions which are destined to exercise control over so large a share of our lives. This technique must be reared upon the foundations of pro- longed empirical studies and in order to under- stand the nature of power it will be necessary to re-evaluate all that the biologists, the physi- ologists, and the psychologists are capable of revealing.** With this material digested, the social scientist may begin to rear his own foun- dations with the materials gathered from the social or group level. This will not be easy but unless social theory and social organization are to remain empty phrases the task cannot be long evaded. 17 The New Republic Idea, Herbert Croly. 18 Consider, e.g., the “lead’’ which is offered by Dr. Edward J. Kempf in his provoking monograph en- titled The Autonomic Functions and the Personality: “The healthy individual is a dynamic entity that has an elastic though limited quotient of energy, hence the tendency to attain a maximum influence upon the en- vironment with a minimum expenditure of his resources conserves the unused resources for further extension of power and influence. In commerce men are constantly striving to find methods of reducing the waste of power and of extending the control of power.” 329 CHAPTER XIII GROUP BEHAVIOR AND CUSTOMARY _ MODES OF RESPONSE Aut forms of social organization act as ir- ritants which disturb customary modes of be- havior. Organization is a conscious, rational effort to achieve. Attitudes, customs, traditions and mores are non-rational ways of conforming —the statics of group behavior. Social organi- zation therefore invariably sets up a conflict be- tween the way of life which has been accepted and the way which is to be learned. In essence this conflict is comparable to the struggle which takes place in individual behavior when a habit inhibits a new activity. The analogy has led many writers to designate customs as ‘“‘group habits.’’ Many individual habits are, of course, the by-products of group customs. Social psy- chology has been mainly concerned with the dis- covery of those ways of individual behavior which are impositions of the group, and al- though this process may enlighten the study of individual behavior, it contributes little to an understanding of the group. 339 The functional groups under observation ini- tiated ways of behavior which in one form or another came into conflict with generalized and specific customs, attitudes, traditions and mores. For purposes of convenience all of these ways of behaving are grouped under the title “cus- tomary modes of response.’ ‘The distinctions ordinarily drawn between customs, traditions and mores are distinctions of tone rather than of kind; these terms constitute concepts which aim to describe attributes of the group which are components of the group’s culture as de- rived from the past. The bases of conformity are the essential points of differentiation. It is commonly assumed that all of these customary ways of responding are founded upon some util- ity, some value cherished by the group. ‘Thus custom may be said to be of value merely be- cause it indicates adherence to the group; tradi- tion represents a value belonging to the group’s (individuals within the group) affective, feel- ing, sentimental concepts; and the mores possess a distinctly moral or ethical significance. At- titudes may be regarded as the idea-systems re- enforced by sentiments which form the mental background for customary modes of behavior. Taken together the customary modes of be- havior constitute the statics of group behavior and social organization represents the dynamics. Studied objectively, it is important to know what interactions take place between the static 331 and dynamic aspects of the group’s behavior when new stimuli call forth new responses.’ Illustration: Codperative marketing lends itself more readily to the merchandizing of localized prod- ucts. [his means that the farmer who pro- duces a single cash-crop is more likely to become a member of a codperative association than is the farmer of diversified commodities. The one-crop farmer is likewise more likely to be- come accustomed to certain stereotyped meth- ods of production, financing, and marketing, 1.e., © he is likely to move in the circle of a larger number of customary modes of behavior. This appears to be true of Groups A, B, and C, in each of which it has been observed that the codperative marketing of commodities has come into conflict with customary modes of be- havior. The nature of these custom-conflicts is more clearly revealed in the form of particular in- stances, some of which were: (a) In Group A members of the codpera- tive association found it difficult to accommo- date themselves to the personalities of new of- ficials and experts. This appeared at first to be ‘Tt is also important to study customary modes of response from the point of view of origins since the assumption underlying social control is based upon the objective of changing non-rational into rational ways of behaving; if the non-rationality of a particular cus- tomary mode of response may be revealed in its origins, the way toward progressive behavior becomes easier. 332 ——-—- merely the usual suspicion of the stranger, but upon further observation and as the result of numerous interviews it became apparent that the newer activities occasioned “‘pain’”’ of a pe- culiar sort. Under the older dispensation a form of companionship and good humor had evolved between farmers and middlemen which may be said to have constituted a marketing custom. Under the new order marketing be- came a simple and single operation; the farmer transported his products to the codperative re- ceiving station where he was brought into con- tact, not with his old and familiar group, but with officials or employees who relieved him of his products and presented him in return with a receipt. ‘hus it was that the farmer was asked to forego the old custom and nothing compara- ble to its amenities was substituted in the new activity. (b) Credit and financing customs; definite, although doubtful, modes of credit and financ- ing had developed among the one-crop farmers under consideration. These methods were ex- ceedingly simple; merchants advanced credit to their customers throughout the year, taking as security a legal lien upon the farmer’s crop. When the crop was sold, the initial proceeds were used to pay debts. Under cooperative marketing the member who delivered his prod- ucts received only a part-payment, the remain- der being distributed throughout the ensuing year and in ratio to continuing sales. It will be seen in this case that the abandonment of the older custom implied a new adjustment on the 333 part of merchants and bankers as well as farm-_ ers. The adjustment implies more than a mere © substitution of adequate credits since it is clear that this custom involved specific personal rela- tionships. | (c) Farm management customs; in some of © the older codperative organizations (particu- — larly in California) increase in production fol- lows regularly upon increase in prices. Since the chief aim of the codperative association is to secure advantageous prices the curves of pro- duction naturally follow the curves of prices with the result that over-production becomes periodic and prices consequently fall no matter how efficiently the marketing agency performs its functions. The implication of this procedure is that the codperative association must ulti- mately influence, if not control, production; but production has been and is influenced and con- trolled largely by customs. It is difficult to see how the codperative associations can fulfill their objectives and promises of providing an even flow to market and an average fair price unless production customs can be modified. Thus far the codperatives have sought mainly to change the customs of consumers by increasing con- sumption but this process has clearly very defi- nite limits imposed by the physiological food- consumption capacity of man and animals. In addition the proposal to control production runs counter to an accepted politico-economic prin- ple which has been incorporated into statute aw. 334 The above illustrations have been selected be- cause they represent types of custom-conflicts precipitated by this particular form of social or- ganization. A study of various forms of groups would, no doubt, reveal a wide range of types —all of which would need to be understood if social organization is to proceed upon rational lines. A considerable literature which is de- voted to the refinements of customary modes of behavior in which the observed responses are compartmentalized and differentiated is now available. How much of this literature is sound can be determined only if the assumptions are “put to work” on definite situations. In what way are the customs of a group affected by a new activity, a new form of social organiza- tion? Customary modes of behavior are or- dinarily presumed to be inhibitors of progress. Is the inhibition due to the custom or to the failure of leaders and technicians to take ac- count of its force? The types of customary behavior illustrated above may be roughly classified as follows: (a) Customary modes of behavior which when disturbed necessitate an adjust- ment on the part of a single group. (b) Customary modes of behavior which when disturbed necessitate adjustments on the part of several groups. (c) Customary modes of behavior which 335 bear a relation to the inclusive social process. This classification at once raises numerous ques- tions which give direction to future research. The task of the social scientist is to discover © how specific custom-conflicts may be utilized in — furthering a more adequate technique of social organization. Habits are no longer derided by the educational psychologist; on the contrary, they have been incorporated in the technique of education. A similar development may be an- ticipated in the sphere of social technique al- though this advance cannot be expected until students have made available an extensive body of materials sifted from objective studies. 1. Attitudes as Conditions to Customary Responses The term ‘‘attitude”’ as currently interpreted cannot be legitimately considered as appropri- ate to the group. “An attitude is the type of sentiment which the individual manifests upon the recurrence of a given situation. It is a be- havior-pattern with reference especially to the ‘feeling’ side of response.” ? When considered in relation to the individual, attitudes may not be said to condition the responses; they are 2 Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method, A. B. Wolfe, p. 9. 336 the responses. It does appear, however, that the effect which attitudes exert upon group responses may be considered as a conditioning factor. Illustration: It is generally presumed that farmers as a class possess attitudes which are consistently conservative. [he codperative movement ts po- tentially radical insofar as it aims to eliminate speculation from the marketing process. The leaders of the movement, evidently persuaded that the attitudes of large groups of farmers could not be changed, proceeded to enlist them for a radical activity while at the same time leaving their traditional attitudes undisturbed. More than that, the traditional attitudes were bolstered by repeated assurances from the lead- ers of the fact that there could be nothing radi- cal about the codperative movement. This illustration precipitates numerous im- portant questions. How far can a form of so- cial organization proceed upon the basis of radi- cal action plus conservative attitudes? Was the conservative attitude of the farmers in real- ity a conditioning factor of their response? Or was the whole matter merely a piece of strategy on the part of leaders? Is it essential for real progress that attitudes and activities be- come integrated? Does traditional attitude plus radical activity preclude education? From 337 the behavioristic point of view, these are im- portant queries, but they must be left unan- swered. The mere raising of the questions should lead to further intensive study in the re- stricted sphere of attitudes. In the foregoing discussion, attitudes have — been interpreted from the psychological point — of view, i.e., as attributes of individuals which — condition and modify group behavior. Atti- tudes are thus capable of subordinating social values. From the sociological point of view, © the social values are ordinate and the attitudes subordinate. A proposed resolution on this ap- parent conflict due to diverse approaches has been put forth by Professor William I. Thomas. ‘The attitude is thus the individual counterpart of the social value; activity, in whatever form, is the bond between them.” * This is an important suggestion for the study of functional groups. The constantly recurring emphasis upon distinctions between means and ends which underlies Professor Thomas’ Meth- odological Note tends to defer ready acceptance of his postulate. He appears to regard science 3’ The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, Wil- liam I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki. Methodo- logical Note, p. 22. In order to differentiate between the method of psychology and that of the social sci- ences, the author further states: “The psychological process remains always fundamentally a state of some- body; the attitude remains always fundamentally an attitude toward something.’ P. 23. 338 itself as an end and it is therefore reasonable to believe that his “bond’’ between attitudes and social values is viewed as a separable activity between the two. But means are always creat- ing ends, and social values expressed in group organization are always changing attitudes. 2. Ethical Norms as Customary Modes of Response A movement possessing wide-spread possi- bilities of affecting important phases of life, such as the codperative movement under consid- eration, is almost certain to exert pressure upon accepted norms of behavior. In one sense, eth- ics may be regarded as a continuing evaluation of changing activities; in quite another sense, ethics may be regarded as a static set of rules to which new activities must conform. In this latter sense ethics may be considered as a con- ditioning factor in response. When individual farmers become members of a coéperative as- sociation they automatically sever a customary relationship which involves the ‘“‘sense of right.” The private buyer has in the past befriended the farmer; he may even have been responsible for the credit arrangements which have made it possible for the farmer to become a successful producer. In this situation the middleman does not insist upon legal obligations but rather upon personal obligations. He asks: ‘Is it right that Sag ‘you should now desert me after the many favors — which have been extended in the past?’ The — usual reply of the farmer is also stated in ethical — terms. He counters: ‘Perhaps I am now vio- lating your sense of right, but in the past you have derived large profits from the sale of my products which is also a violation of my sense of — right. Your past series of wrongs is now com- pensated by my present wrong.’ Justification © of this sort is not always sufficiently strong to maintain loyalty to the codperative association. Leaders of the movement were, obviously, aware of the part which the “sense of right” was to play. Their chief weapon of justifica- tion was a vigorous insistence upon the past sins of the middlemen. ‘They were pictured so darkly that any slight aberration from the ethical code on the part of farmers appeared negligible. Ethics as applied to the behavior of the group became an important item soon after the groups began merchandizing. The relation then came to be one between codperative groups and large manufacturing institutions. The co- operatives possessed the products which the manufacturers needed. How was the price to be determined? Price-fixing was held to be not merely unethical but illegal. Nor was price-fix- ing entirely possible, since the codperatives con- trolled only a portion of the total product. In one case the price demanded by the cooperative 340 was considered unfair by the buyers. They de- murred and refused to buy. The price was again raised in order to determine the extent of the manufacturer’s needs. ‘This process was continued through three bargaining periods un- til the product was finally sold at a price which was almost fifty per cent higher than the initial offer. From this illustration it is plainly seen that the ethics of price is in reality nothing more nor less than the ethics of power. The abstract relation between supply and demand was altered into a relation between possession and need. New forms of ethical relations between vari- ous cooperative marketing associations are be- ing constantly revealed. The citrus growers of California and the citrus growers of Florida are cooperatively organized; they are also com- petitors for the same markets. One of the cardinal principles of commodity codperative marketing is to increase consumption by means of extensive advertising campaigns. If con- sumption of one edible product is increased ex- tensively, a decline in the consumption of some other product ensues.. Thus cooperative or- ganizations merchandizing different products come into competition with each other. Limita- tion of production is, obviously, the answer to over-production or under-consumption (as the cooperative leaders prefer to call it), but again the ethical assumption that control of produc- 341 tion is wrong appears. In this case the wrong is in relation to the ultimate consumer. This very brief consideration of ethics as a factor in group behavior leads unmistakably to — the conclusion that a traditional ethics tends to- — ward a reversion to power technique. In lieu of satisfactory ethical norms, groups naturally © turn to the use of power as a means of advanc- — ing their interests. 3. The Law as aCustomary Mode of Response — When power supplants the sense of right, either between individuals or groups, the ap- propriate situation for legal intervention is cre- ated. ‘The law aims to distribute power, to re- strict power or to interpret power in terms of the so-called public good. So profound were the ethical implications of the farmers’ codpera- tive marketing movement that a new and spe- cialized federal statute and more than thirty state statutes were enacted into law during its rise.* The new laws constitute a departure from customary modes of response. Changed eco- nomic processes have necessitated fresh sanc- tions, and these the law has supplied. The se- quence of the above procedure may be stated: * Both the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act give non-stock coéperative associations of agricultural and horticultural producers relief from unfair applica- tions of the anti-trust laws. 342 (1) a new form of social organization, (2) a new economic process, (3) anew legal sanction. The important fact in this total series is the manifest relation between social forms and the law. Without new laws the new social form could not have functioned; these forms would then have been conditioned by customary modes of response learned through existing law. In spite of the new statutes, responses were still conditioned by customary interpretations of the law. “If an organization purporting to be for the benefit of the farmers is to be permitted to enjoy these extraordinary privileges, we see no reason why they should not be extended to the textile workers, railroad employees, clerks, or any other class of our citizens.’’*> In this in- stance it appears that those whose interests were affected by the codperative association under- stood clearly how to utilize the appeal of tradi- tional and customary legal responses. A study of the legal proceedings growing out of the co- operative movement’s function presents abun- dant evidence of the above point of view. In another defendant’s brief, this statement of the argument appears: ‘‘(1) That the defendant was induced to sign the contract by fraud. (2) That the marketing contract upon which this 5 From Defendant’s Brief; Tobacco Growers’ Co- operative Association versus Mangum; Supreme Court of North Carolina, Seventh District. No. 250, p. 7. (Italics added.) 343 action is based creates a monopoly and is in re- straint of trade, and is, therefore, unenforce- able. (3) That trade in tobacco is a part of interstate commerce and the attempt of plain- tiff to monopolize such trade is a violation of the act of Congress, known as the Sherman Act. © (4) That the Codperative Marketing Act of | North Carolina is violative of the Fourteenth — Amendment of the United States Constitution in that it denies to persons, other than growers — of agricultural products, the equal protection of the laws.” ° None of these contentions of the defendant was upheld by the Court in the case under dis- cussion. There were localities, however, where adherence to the customary responses to law was so intense that clear cases were not even brought to trial. Thus, although the law may still be regarded as a customary mode of re- sponse, it is not always so interpreted. The law may give sanction to new ways of acting which are for the present in opposition to cus- tom and tradition, but in such instances public opinion is so unmistakably favorable to the new sanction as to constitute acceptance of a new law or its reinterpretation. Thus, the creative role of law, cannot be said to have gained sufficient ascendancy to remove jurisprudence from the category of customary modes of response. 6 Tobacco Growers’ Codperative Association versus W. J. Ball; Seventh District. No. 253, pp. 1 and 2. 344 An example of the relation between the law and modern social organization as represented by functional groups is presented in the case of the Sun-Maid Raisin Growers, a cooperative association of California. ‘The contract of this association aimed at complete control of the raisin crop; even the land of the member was bound to the association for a fifteen year pe- riod. At one time price-fixing was an accepted policy. The association, which was in reality a stock-company and not a true coéperative, came to be looked upon as a monopoly and its disso- lution was called for by the United States De- partment of Justice. The suit was dropped in lieu of a promise to sell 20,000 tons of raisins at a price of five dollars per ton below the market and to outside packers. ‘The offer was accepted but the results of this compromise are still in process. ‘The association was reorgan- ized in conformance with the new cooperative marketing law; a new contract was drawn up and substituted; officials of the organization were deposed; the industry suffered to the ex- tent that financial aid was sought, not merely through the local banks but through the large banking houses of the nation. This is but a partial list of activities which have resulted since the association and the law came into conflict, but it is already evident that a shift of power has occurred, a new technique of organization, a new responsibility to non-local financial agen- 345 cies, a demoralization of the market, a new orientation to the law, et cetera, et cetera.” ~ With all of these factors in mind, it would be — uy | absurd to insist that the law is merely an ap- i proved and customary mode of response; it is © both a customary mode of response and a stimu- © p lus leading to new responses. Those who stead- — fastly refuse to grant any validity to the group © as a reality might profit by a study of how the — law has itself been forced to deal with group © concepts since the rise of corporations. The above illustration is a case in point. 4. Public Opinion as a Customary Mode of Response The assumption which underlies this Chap- ter, namely, that what is usually called social control is, when analyzed, a customary mode of response either slightly or rigidly organized, is supported by a consideration of public opinion. The question: “Does public opinion control — group activities?” contains only a partial mean- ing. If the question aims to inquire whether or not the generalized attitudes of numbers of © people intellectualized into opinions affect the activities of individuals or groups, the meaning implied becomes apparent. Public opinion af- 7 For an account of this episode which is both short and impartial, see pp. 21-29, Cooperative Marketing, — Herman Steen 346 fects activity in much the same manner as ethics and the law affect activity. In the individual, the new activity must always come to terms with the older habit. With the group, each new activity must in like manner run the gamut of the accustomed modes of previous response. Those who lay stress upon the individual as distinguished from the group insist that ‘‘pub- lic opinion is merely the collection of individual opinions.” * The simplest experiments refute this naive conception. When discussion is taken seriously and when the interchange of opinions is observed, the term ‘collection of individual opinions’’ be- comes meaningless. A collection of individual opinions represents an impossible mathematical diversity; no action can proceed upon individual opinions collected. The common denominator of diverse opinions is not public opinion. ‘This is the fallacy of forcing agreement upon uni- versals as a pre-requisite to further agreement upon particulars. If all Christians could be brought to agreement upon the proposition that war is unchristian, would wars cease? ‘The question need only be raised in view of modern - doctrines of behavior to reveal the impotence of agreement upon universals. But public opin- ion is not a universality. Continued linking of public opinion with crowd-mindedness, or the so-called crowd psychology, is probably respon- 8 Social Psychology F. H. Allport, p. 396. 347 sible for this tendency to begin all discussions with mass words and universals.°® ) If public opinion is to be retained as a useful © category for the study of the behavior of — groups, it will be necessary to depart abruptly — from the older notions which cling to the term. Does public opinion create activity? Does ac- tivity create public opinion? Does the press control public opinion? Are groups influenced by public opinion? Those are still ambigu- ous questions which can be answered only with — conceptual fictions. The first step in analyzing public opinion is, obviously, to extract the mys- — tical and inclusive concepts which regard the © public as some unified over-whole, an irresistible — mass greater than the individuals who constitute its composition. ‘The group considered as a representation of interests is a useful implement — for this process of deflation. Effective public opinions, i.e., phases of collective opinion which are important in the functional relations be- tween groups, are functions of the groups. A cross-sectional view of public opinion, if this were possible, would reveal series of shadings and differences which are traceable to specific sroup interests. A generalized public opinion can come into being only when a technique for the relations between groups which aims at an See —— Se ® Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion is, of course, an exception. Also the greater portion of President Lowell’s Public Opinion in Peace and War. 348 evaluation of conflicting interests is made avyail- able. Illustration: In observing Group A in relation to its total environment, an opinion was discovered current among middlemen and merchants that certain officials of the codperative association were dis- honest. ‘The effort was made to generalize this opinion, i.e., to ‘create’? a general opinion in the community that codperative officials were dishonest. If this opinion could be sufficiently generalized, it would include, ultimately, mem- bers of the codperative association. Lack of confidence on the part of members would in turn lead to contract violations. So long as this opinion was circulated privately, it was cumu- latively effective. Once the opinion became a matter for public discussion, it was evaluated in terms of interest. The generalized opinion then became an attribute of the group in whose interest it was circulated. The initial attack of the codperatives was, of course, a counter-opin- ion which was again interpreted in terms of the interest involved. ‘This conflict of interests re- volving about generalized opinions compelled a revaluation of the opinion in terms of facts. If, in the above illustration, the generalized opinion of dishonesty had prevailed, it would have undoubtedly been said that “public opin- ion killed the codperative,’” when, as a matter of fact, what might have been said with fairness 349 was merely that one set of interests succeeded in securing a hearing and the opposing interests did not. In a larger and more inclusive sense, public opinion may be regarded as one of the controls affecting group functions whenever the interests of a group appear to negative or violate the legitimate interests of the totality of groups. Thus, if the codperatives attain too great a de- gree of power, they may exercise control over commodities which affect (more or less) the to- tal complex of groups which is the public. Does the group, in such instances, comply with the dictates of “‘public opinion,”’ i.e., does public opinion then represent a customary mode of response? Is the activity forced into compati- bility with this generalized interest of all groups? A cursory review of cases of this type leads to the conclusion that the equilibrium of interests between specific groups and the public is achieved only after the interests of the public (public opinion) have sufficiently crystallized to be expressed as law. The instability of even legal equilibrium is patent to all who have given attention to the evolution of anti-trust legisla- tion in its actual functioning. Equilibrium of interests founded upon a generalized public opinion is probably as undesirable as it is im- practical. The concept of equilibrium is non- creative; it fixes ends to activity when there are no ends. ‘The philosophy of ends is fit compan- 350 jon for the concept of equilibrium. Progressive revaluation of interests in terms of progres- sively integrating sequences of group opinions —this has been the process in jurisprudence and it offers an excellent clue to the social sciences. The doubts which lie scattered throughout the foregoing Chapter are perhaps sufficient evidence of the author’s skepticism regarding the validity of customary modes of response as adequate categories for the study of groups. The terms are still to be defined as symbols for objective referents. It is probable that these terms will be abandoned altogether because of the difficulties involved in giving them scientific definitiveness. This will not, however, mean that the search for adequate symbols used to describe those controls over group action which are more inclusive than the particular groups under observation will also be aban- doned. ‘The separation of the group from its total social environment is based purely upon functional grounds. The group cannot be fully understood unless it is observed in relation to its total environment. The aim of the circui- tous approach of this Chapter has been to bring the considered terms under fresh scrutiny. ‘The task of improving methods of social discovery is destined, unhappily, to a long labor whose main results will be the removal of verbal ob- structions. Language is not merely a tool which human beings manipulate; alas, it frequently 351 becomes an instrument which manipulates hu- man beings. How simple it is to answer per- © plexing questions by the time-saving process — of selecting a ready label! Customs, traditions, ethics, public opinion are “blanket-terms”’ which, as now used, impede thought and investigation. What do they mean in and for the social sci- © ences? : ' 352 CHAPTER XIV EMPIRICAL SOCIAL THEORY SOCIAL inventiveness is dependent upon work- able hypotheses and the summation of these hypotheses constitutes social theory. Within the range of its own variability such theory should be as reliable as the Mendelian theory of inheritance. The structure of social theory must likewise evolve as the result of objective observation correlated with experimentation. The factors constituting a genuine hypothesis in every sphere of science are objects and proc- esses. he sequence of hypothesis may be for- mulated as follows: (a) What is the object? (b) How does it behave? ((c) What are its capacities? (d) What will it do in a given situation? The objects of the social sciences are human beings in relation; when such relations become formally recognized, the resultant organization may be called a group. The term “group” may in the future be reserved for those relations be- tween individuals which are both recognized and functional and therefore organized. Be- 353 havior is social from early infancy onward, and in fact, it may be said that behavior is biologi- cally social in all species for which partheno- genesis is not the normal mode of reproduction. But not all social behavior is group behavior. All human beings are social. When the indi- vidual’s behavior is socially abstracted, he is’ regarded as abnormal, i.e., less human. From_ this point of view psychology may be regarded as a social science. An important distinction needs to be made if there are to be social sci- ences differentiated from psychology. In this volume, the distinction is based upon functional groups, as distinguished from genetic groups. All behavior has social implications; the beha- vior with which this volume is concerned is ex- plicit. The functional group (codperative as- sociation) exhibits explicit social behavior; the genetic group (family) exhibits implicit social behavior. Within the family, behavior is so- cial, whereas within the functional group, be- havior becomes social by virtue of interests and purposes. The older sociology regarded the social process as a relation between individuals and hence social theory revolved about this re- lation. The present thesis is that a pragmatic sociology must regard the social process as a relation between groups. Social theory which stops with the relation between individuals is inadequate for the conditions of modern life. Two tendencies have deterred social scientists So in their efforts to evolve a satisfactory body of social theory: (a) the tendency to describe the group in terms of mystical entities and (b) the tendency to utilize non-sociological categories in describing the group’s processes. ‘The for- mer tendency has led toward various forms of analogical reasoning, all of which have de- tracted from a rigorous investigation of the _ group on its own level. Analogical reasoning may also account for the attempts to describe the social process in terms of categories which designate non-observable activities. The nat- ural consequence of the above procedure has _ been a variegated and impractical social theory consisting of convenient labels and reflecting the _ individual caprice of particular thinkers. a. ee The generalizations which have resulted from this method (or lack of method) have occasion- ally led to fruitful investigations but all too fre- - quently such investigations have tended merely to substantiate prior generalizations. Mr. G. _D. Hz. Cole,* in his admirable attempt to for- -mulate a social theory, discriminates between three forms of social theory: (a) that which emanates from a study of institutions, (b) that which flows from a study of human motives and impulses as expressed in associative life, and _(c) that which is formulated a priori as uni- versal principle. Unfortunately he then pro- P ceeds to delimit the first method by ascribing to 1 Social Theory, G. D. H. Cole, pp. 17-20. - 355 it only historical significance. He is himself — ‘concerned principally with social theory as the ~ social complement of ethics, with “‘ought” rather than with “‘is,” with questions of right rather than of fact.” The frankness with which Mr. Cole assumes his position is disarming and his functional point of view is clearly in harmony with the more recent tendencies in all of the so- cial sciences. These agreements make it more necessary to apply critical discriminations to his methodology. The important deficiency of Mr. Cole’s method is his rejection of the objec- tive study of human groupings. He does not of course insist upon a complete rejection but he restricts such studies to the historical sphere, intimating that “more or less scientific princi- ples” may be based upon such historical re- searches.* The opposing contention is that the study of the behavior of human groupings is not necessarily confined to historical method; that, moreover, the very validity of the social sciences is dependent upon discovering a method which is capable of revealing the significant as- pects of group behavior. ‘The biologists have devised methods whereby they may 'study or- ganisms and their functions, not historically, but factually and contemporaneously. To assume that human organisms and their relations are not amenable to a similar method is to place di ok & i agelgd ee 356 human nature outside the circle of nature. Mr. Cole’s insistent emphasis upon the efficacy of the human “‘will” well-nigh achieves this sepa- ration. The psychologists and the social psycholo- gists (under their present discipline) must be looked to for a revelation of adequate method- ology for the study of human motives, purposes, interests, et cetera, as these are related to the group. The philosophers may well lay claim to the province of generalization and both deduc- tive and inductive principle.* Social scientists, if there is to be a social science, cannot escape the compulsions of a differentiation which clearly imposes upon them the obligation of furnishing factual and objective materials con- cerning human groups as functional realities. A satisfactory social theory will undoubtedly emerge from a synthesis of principles derived from the results of these differentiated ap- proaches. There can be no adequate synthesis, however, until the various results are validated by adequate methods of discovery. 1. The Direction of Social Research The tentative hypotheses of present social theory must be held in suspension until students _ *In this connection the reader is advised to read Scientific Method in Philosophy, Bertrand Russell; a monograph published by the University of Oxford Press. 357 have contributed a more satisfactory body of information regarding the behavior of groups. For purposes of convenience in investigation it may be expedient to commence by distinguish- ing between the various types of groups to which individuals give allegiance and through which they strive to secure their interests. It may be revealed that important distinctions be- tween groups may be correlated with cor- responding studies of personality. A distinctly functional group, such as a trade union or a co- operative association, enlists the individual’s participation for reasons which may have a meaning different from that implied in mem- bership in a partially symbolic group such as a church or a secret society. “The composite in- dividual which is constructed by cross-sectional analysis of his group adherences is apparently not the complete individual. His remaining, unfulfilled and unorganized interests may con- stitute the basis for future social organization. The potential revolutions in society may be revealed when it is more fully known how certain groups thwart legitimate human inter- ests and how other groups, through faulty function, leave important interests unrecog- nized. With information of this character at hand it should become possible to view human needs realistically. Invention will proceed when the vital needs are made manifest. The appeal is once more for a pragmatic and a unifying 358 social science—a science which frankly consents to be the handmaiden of all who earnestly search for practical solutions of the problems of social adjustment. Empirical social theory implies experience plus experiment. Not “‘plan- less empiricism’? but empiricism which gives validity to plans is the aim of social theory. 2. Postulates of Empirical Social Theory It is not to be expected that so meager and limited a study as that upon which this volume is based shall be adequate as the foundation for a statement of social theory. On the other hand, no investigator can devote years to a specialized study without being forced to aban- don many presuppositions and hypotheses; nor can he evade the impelling intellectual task of formulating new suppositions and hypotheses as the basis of further investigation. A candid avowal of these newer positions constitutes an invigorating challenge to the investigator, and it is to be hoped that their formulation will in turn serve to challenge others. In fact, most of the critical portions of this essay, to- gether with its occasional dogmatism, are in- tended to challenge, not to assert. The ensuing propositions represent the pres- ent status of the author’s comprehension of the preliminary hypotheses upon which (in his opin- 359 ion) a future social theory may be based. He therefore proposes or postulates: : iY Bt. Ill. That total behavior is an integration of © activity and thought, and that observa- tion of behavior, whether of individuals — or groups, should be based upon the formula: tie ENCUVICY Behavior = Thought Or, | Overt Acts Behavior — ) Rationalizations That objective observation of group be- havior should be supplemented by (in- tegrated with) the rationalizations of the group’s activities as revealed by participating observers whose interests are at stake. That the concepts utilized in observing the behavior of groups should consist of three categories: (1) Terms to serve as symbols for persons and groups. (2) Terms to serve as symbols for activities and thought processes. (3) Terms to serve as symbols for controls exterior to and more comprehensive than the group or groups under observation. 360 IV. VI. VII. VIII. IX. That the group is not a new entity but rather a new relation, and that re- latedness is an appropriate sphere for scientific investigation, especially in the realm of human affairs where related- ness may be accompanied by conscious- ness. That the group (all forms of associa- tion or communication) is a means and not an end, and that it is the important means utilized by the individual in achieving his ends. That the behavior of the group is an adjustment of as well as to the total en- vironment. That the behavior of the group is a function of its environment and that the environment as a stimulus must be in- terpreted in terms of human purposes. That the leader is a function of the group. (Important exceptions ap- parently impair the usefulness and in- tegrity of this postulate although it is the only one which appears to cover the majority of cases.) That the stimulus-response formula as applied to the study of group behavior should be regarded as a continuum and not as an accurate statement of a brack- eted situation; its chief utility lies in the fact that by its aid the observer may 361 XII. XIII. XIV. differentiate between a defined situation and the evolving situation. That the group is a relation between individuals which represents a vital in- terest common to all members. That the efhicacy of the group is condi- tioned by its marginal interests or by the proportion of its marginal mem- bers. That interests tend to increase in num- ber in proportion to their security; that is, new interests appear when old inter- ests are secured. The evolving person- ality may be regarded as a series of en- larging interests and since these interests may be secured only through collectivity, the area of social organization must be the limiting factor for personality. That opposing interests ultimately ap- pear in the form of group conflicts and that the group manifests its more com- plete behavior at these intersections of interest. (In order to make this postu- late fit the conditions for studies of in- stitutions, it must be added that when groups become institutions the conflict over primary interests often eventuates into a conflict to perpetuate the group —in this case the group itself becomes a vested interest. ) That the interests for which groups 362 stand as representations can never be adequately evaluated unless conflict is precipitated. XV. That public opinion, the law and ethics are means whereby the interests are evaluated in terms of values common to all persons likely to be affected by the activities of the contending groups. The above postulates and propositions con- stitute nothing more than an attempt to formu- late the beginnings of a redirected method in the social sciences. Agreement among social scientists regarding their integrity and value will probably be slight although there are evi- dences that at least five of the above postulates have already gained acceptance in certain cir- cles. Some will be thoroughly opposed and others will be regarded, it is hoped, with skep- ticism. Numerous criticisms are already at hand, and it was at one time considered ad- visable to include objections (those raised by critics and those which the application of the method itself revealed) either in the body of the text or as foot-notes. This plan would, how- ever, tend to lessen criticism by disarming the critics; in addition it would tend to diminish any elements of cohesion which the essay as a whole may possess. 363 3. Social Ethics and Social Philosophy The impact of the foregoing chapters con- sidered as a unit is unmistably critical, realistic, and perhaps without that element of inspiring impulse for which readers ordinarily and justi- fiably turn to the social sciences. The exclusion was inevitable. Truth is whatever is found to be general “within a clearly defined part of ex- istence’’; this essay purports to aid in the search for truth by directing thought and investigation toward a method which may help to define a highly important part of existence. The good life is irretrievably bound up with and condi- tioned by the modern complex of group organi- zations in which we live and have our being; it cannot be released until this complex is scien- tifically and intellectually unravelled. Whatever is potentially beautiful in the relations between human beings lies partially dormant because these relations remain as mystifying and falsify- ing barriers. Whatever capacities for freedom lie within the scope of human nature now lie inert, nay, are atrophied by increasing and blind obeisance to collectivism considered as an end. How may life generate expressions of the true, the good and the beautiful? ‘There is no answer in wishing, believing, exhorting. There is no answer save one: the truth is that which is understood and the good is that which has been tested in the light of understanding. 364 INDEX OF REFERENCES Allport, Floyd H., 167, 260, 347 Aristotle, 52, 82 Bacon, Francis, 82 Baldwin, J. M., 211 Beal, W. J., 11 Bowley, Arthur L., 179 Burns, C. Delisle, 111, 121, 195 Carver, Thomas Nixon, 213 Casey, Fred, 78 Cole, G. D. H., 355, 356, 357 Comte, Auguste, 19, 51, 85 Cooley, Charles H., 26, 98, 163 Cram, Ralph Adams, 46 Croly, Herbert, 43, 118, 329 Darwin, Charles, 24, 25, 26 Dewey, John, 9, 22, 32, 355 43, 82, 83, 137, 138, 149, 150; 163, 302 Dickinson, Z. C., 118 Dreiser, Theodore, 260 Einstein, Albert, 24, 97 Ellis, Havelock, 24, 25, 115 Ellwood, Charles A., 163 Faraday, Michael, 24, 25 Follett, Mary P., 114, 115, 195 Frazer, J. G., 41 Galton, Francis, 24 Giddings, Franklin H., 20, 58, 85, 86, 104 Ginsberg, Morris, 162, 167, 216 Goldenweiser, A. A., 127 Gosnell, H. F., 172, 260 Hamilton, Sir Wiliam, 53 Hegel, G. W. F., 150 Hobson, J. A., 118 Holt, E. B., 43, 144, 183, 220 James, William, 52, 70, 95, 137 Jarrett, Mary C., 142, 143 Jhering, Rudolph von, 215 Kant, J.,).3%) 83, 185, 216 Kempf, Edward J., 329 Kepler, Johann, 24 King, Wilford I., 84, 103 Kohler, Josef, 187 Kolb, ay rH 26 Korzybski, Alfred, 13, 16 Krabbe, H., 146, 215 LeBon, Gustave, 131, 213 Le Dantec, Félix, 141, 271 Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm von, 24 Leonardo da Vinci, 24 Lindeman, E. C., 76, 328 Lippmann, Walter, 4, 159, 160, 216, 347 Lowell, A. Lawrence, 348 118, Mackenzie, J. S., 213 Malthus, T. R., 25, 26 Martin, Everett Dean, 51, 55, 131 Marx, Karl, 46, 150, 151 365 Masson, T. L., 233 McDougall, William, 13I, 162, 216 Maclver, R. M., 212 Mecklin, John M., 14 Meiklejohn, J. M. D., 31 Merriam, Charles E., 129- 171, 260 Mill, John Stuart, 53, 54, 56, 6 9 Mitchell, C. A., 40 Motley, John Lothrop, 17 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 151, 324 Ogburn, William F., 18, 19 Ogden, C. K., 201-204, 206, 216 Ouspensky, P. D., 58, 159 Overstreet, Harry, 155 755126, Page, E. D., 156 Parker, Carlton, 117 Paul, Jean, 159 Pavlov, I. P., 43 Pearson, Karl, 28 Peirce, Charles S., 83, 97 Perry, R. B., 45, 80, 81, 82 Pitkin, Walter B., 75 Pound, Roscoe, 214, 215 Ratzenhover, Gustav, 212 Richards, I. A., 201-204, 206, 216 Robinson, James Harvey, 14, 16, 19 Ross, Edward Allsworth, 131, 162, 216, 325 Russell, Bertrand, 13, 80, 357 Sabine, George H., 215 Schaffle, Albert, 213 Sheffield, Alfred Dwight, 83, 229, 307 Shepard, Walter J., 215 Sidgwick, Alfred, 77, 83, 160. Small, Albion W., 38, 212 Southard, E. E., 142, 143 Spaulding, Edward G., 75 Spencer, Herbert, 20, 51, 213 Spurrell, H. G. F., 46, 67 Steen, Herman, 246, 346 Stock, Charles Wharton, 99 85, Tarde, Gabriel, 131 Tawney, R. H., 118 ML ay ts ©.» C., 920 Tead, Ordway, 117 Teggart, F. J., 48 Thomas, William I., 338 Vaihinger, Hans, 24 Wallas, Graham, 118, 163 Ward, Lester F., 213, 327 Watson, J. B., 21, 129, 130, 182, 186 Westergaard, Harald Lud- vig, 90 Whipple, George C., 90, 94, 95 White, W. A., 62 Whitehead, Alfred North, 80 Williams, James Mickel, 157, 167 Wiscler, Clark, 15, 53 Wolfe, A. B., 135, 138, 157, 336 Wordsworth, William, 327 Wundt, Wilhelm, 130 Zimmerman, C. C., 26 Zuberkloss, 34 Znaniecki, Florian, 338 366 GENERAL INDEX Acquisitive Society, 118 Activity, 113, 347, 348, 360 Objective, 197 Adjusting Process, 39, 145, 146 Adjustment, 12, 148, 200, 278, 335, 361 Group, 146 Aims, 163, 168, 170 Altruism, 140, 141, 214 Amalgamated Clothing Work- ers, 73, 74 American Farm Bureau Fed- eration, 255 American Federation of La- bor, 218 Analogical Method, 107 Methods, 51 Analogies, 50, 93, 140 Analogy, 48, 52, 54, 56, 57; §8, 108, 123, 125 Analysis, 74, 75, 107 Animal Societies, 141 Antagonism, Universal Prin- ciple of, 156 Anthropologists, 46 Anthropology, 53, 67, 68 Artists, Scientists as, 24 Association, 162 Attitude, 280, 317, 336 Generalized, 317 Attitudes, 206, 330, 331, 338, 339 Defined, 239 Traditional, 337 Average, 87, 88, 90, 104 Absolute, 87 Validity of the, 87 103, Baconian Dictum, 325 Behavior, 127, 130, 144, 145, 219, 331, 332, 335 Collective, 168 Group, 153, 164, 330, 338, 342, 354, 360 Progressive, 332 Significant, 267 Social, 354 Total, 147, 360 Behavior of the Group, 146, 361 Behavior-Pattern, 128, 317, 336 Behaviorism, 186, 187 Behaviorists, 182, 183, 185 Bias, 231, 317 Individual, 271 British Labor, 218 Party, 219 193, Movement, California, 246, 257, 334, 341, 345 Capper-Volstead Act, 342 Categories, 125, 126, 128, 158-176, 192, 201, 206 Of Social Psychology, 161- 168 Cause, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 164 Causes, 42 Characteristics, National, 162 Racial, 163 Class Conflict, 150 Classification, 143 Class Struggle, 133 Clayton Act, 342 Collective, Behavior, 21, 168 Group, 307 367 Collective Psychology, 22, 194 Collectivism, 303, 306 Commodity, 315 Coéperative Group, 251 Codperative Marketing, 341 Group, 249 Organization, 253 Communities, 133 Community, 76, 162, 248, 251, 328 Committees, 252 Interests, 253 Compromise, 162 Conceiving, 59 Consensus of the Competent, 31 Concept, 95 Empirical, 56 Conception, 115 Concepts, 158, 159 Accident, 12 Conceptual, 96 Conclusion, 64, 71 Conclusions, 69, 76, 78 Concurrence, 229 Conduct, 130 Conflict, 142, 143, 330, 363 Class, 150 Group, 139-157 Reality of, 151 Theories of, 150 Theory of, 155 Conflicts, Custom, 332, 335, 336 Group, 362 Consciousness, of Kind, 58 Social, 163 Consent, 126, 153, 154, 172, 173, 190, 205, 253, 289, 295 Defined, 228 Emotional, 296 Intellectual, 296 Legal, 298 Motor, 296 Real, 299 145, 162, Consent, Total, 297 Validity of, 298 Consumption, 341 Continuum, 361 Contract, 276, 293 Legal, 173, 290-292, 320 Marketing, 291 | Violations, 252, 275, 276, 278, 297, 349 7 Violators, 279 Contracts, 296, 308 Controversy, 153, 159 Conventionality, 162, 168 Conventions, 169 Cooperation, 144 Codperative, Acting, 305, 358 © Association, 332, 334, 339, 340, 342, 345 Association, Farmers’, 189 Commodity Group, 251 Groups, 165, 166 Codperative Marketing, 124, © 236, 245, 294, 295, 332, 335. Association, 173, 246 Commodity, 341 Law, 345 Codperative Movement, 123, 126, 170, 303, 337 Correlations, 89, 90, 93, 94 Correspondence, 89, 90, 93 Counting, 85 Crowd, 81, 162, 163 Behavior, 51 Methods, 290 Mind, 23 Mindedness, 347 Psychology, 347 Stimulation, 257 Crowds, 55, 56, 131 Cultural, Forms, 130 Groups, 133 Lag, 15 Culture, 126 Custom, 162 Conflicts, 332, 335, 336 Marketing, 333 —— 368 Customs, 126, 163, 168, 169, 193, 205, 235, 236, 330, 331, 332, 352 Defined, 235 Credit, 333 Farm-Management, 334 Financing, 333 Production, 334 Czecho-Slovakian ment, 288 Govern- Darwinism, 150 Definiendum, 203 Definition, 160, 204 Method of, 207 Deliberation, 163, 235, 300, 302 Group, 302 Denmark, 124, 246, 257 Description, 40 Desires, 77, 113, 170, 194 Determinants, 70, 114, 115 Determinism, 114 Biological, 46 Economic, 46 Discussion, 83, 203, 205, 230, 305, 306, 313 Defined, 229 Group, 196 Disinterestedness, 24 Dispersion, 103, 104 Disposition, 163 Dissociation, 155 Dogmatism, 27 Dynamics, 331 126, 163, Education, 17, 18, 134 Psychology of, 134 Effect, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 164 Egoism, 140, 141, 214 Egotism, 137 Emotional Complexes, 301 Emotions, 25, 162, 193 Empiricism, 52, 359 Ends, 44, 137, 338, 339, 36% Philosophy of, 350 Environment, 122, 144, 146, 147, 163, 36% Total, 351, 361 Equilibrium, 350, 351 Errors, 88 Ethical Codes, 241 Ethics, 135, 206, 219, 240, 339, 342, 352, 363 Defined, 239 Of Power, 341 Social, 240 Ethnology, 57, 58 Events, 36, 38 Examples, 52 Experience, 3, 10, 34, 61, 66, 72, 95 Expert, 77, 92, 206, 261-264, 266-270 Defined, 223 Integration of Function of, 269 Observers, 184 Symbol, 258 Expertness, 262 Experts, 122, 174, 185, 190, 247, 303 Control of, 284, 285 Humanizing the, 267 Fact, Concurrence, 79 Codperative Gathering, 314 Gathering, 313 Neutral, Gathering, 314 Facts, 4, 77, 78, 84, 100, 103, 174, 183, 186, 190, 229, 310-312, 316 Misuse of, 308 Opposing, 312 Use of, 308, 312-314 Use of, Defined, 230 Families, 27 Family, 45, 133 Fallacy of Yes-or-No An- swer, 178-180 Farmer, 111, 173 One-Crop, 332, 333 Farm Organization, 196 369 Farmers, 121, 124, 165, 166, 169, 170, 181, 244, 245, 259, 266, 295, 303, 337s 339, 340 Danish, 125 Coodperative 189 Fashion, 162 Fear, 163 Feeling, 113, 229 Feelings, 163, 259, 262 Florida, 341 France, 78, 239, 240 Freedom, 163 Function, 144, 146, 147, 361 Functions, Group, 174 Sociable, 197 Association, Gary, 123 Germany, 78, 239, 240 Grange, The, 255 Great Britain, 218 Group, 81, 82, 111, 127, 136- 139, 146, 152, 169-171, 205, 222, 331, 351, 353, 361, 362 Activities, 346 Adjustment, 146 As Means not End, 135 Behavior, 113, 131, 146, 153, 164, 170, 330, 338, 342, 354, 360 Behavior of, 361 Collective, 307 Commodity, 249 Conflict, 139-157 Conflicts, 362 Codperative 251 Defined, 207 Deliberation, 302 Discussion, 196 Formation, 153 Functional, 358 Functions, 174 Habits, 238 Interests, 348 Commodity, Group, Mind, 23, 131, 162, 164 Power, 326 Psychology, 168 Response, Defined, 227 Responses, 205 Situation, 205, 226, 275 Stimuli, 205, 277, 278 Stimuli, Defined, 226 Studies, 132 Symbolic, 358 The, as representation of interests, 289, 348 Thinking, 195 Groups, 132, 190 Accommodation, 133 Behavior, 134. Conflict, 133 Cooperative, 165, 166 Cultural, 133 Functional, 354 Functioning, 131 Genetic, 354 Interest, 328 Social, 131 Social Service, 197 Territorial, 133 Voluntary, 171, 172 Habit, 162, 163, 330 Category, 68 Habits, 70, 153, 163, 193, 238, 301, 336 Group, 238, 330 History, 30, 34, 37, 108, 122 Economic Interpretation of, 37 Historical Method, 106 Hostility, 163 Human Association, 135 | Hypothesis, Sequence of, 353 Idea Patterns, 238 Idea Systems, 126, 331 Ideas, 115 Introspective, 114 Objective, 117 379 ee pl ea a Ideas, Subjective, 114, 117 Illustrations, 52 Imagination, 26, 35, 72 Imitation, 162, 163 Impulse, Neural, 226 Impulses, 163 Individual, 20, 81, 128, 132 Industrial, Evolution, 63 Organization, 172 Technique, 63 Industry, 218 Innate, Tendencies, 162 Forces, 234 Instinct, 141 Gregarious, 141 Self-Assertive, 166 Self-Preserving, 141 Instinctive Forces, 234 Instincts, 162, 163, 164, 165 Gregarious, 165, 166 Institutions, 162, 362 Integrated Organism, 134 Integrating Process, 198 Integration, 197, 200, 360 Of Function of Expert, 269 Integration, Partial, 328 Integrations, Intellectual, 261 Intellect, 163 Intellectual Integrations, 261 Conviction, 294 Intellectualist, 96 Intelligence, 86, 163 Tests, 103, 188 Interaction, 44 Interest, 112, 113, 362 Groups, 328 Validity of, 230 Interests, 77, 139, 145, 149, 152, 205, 209, 211, 221, 243, 289, 362, 363 Balancing of, 299 Community, 253 Conflicting, 328 Conflict of, 221 302, 140, 179, 213, 349; 142, 190, 215, 350, Interests, Definition of, 211, 212, 216, 222, ,230, 231 Economic, 181, 218, 255 Equilibrum, 350 Financial, 258 Group as_ representation of, 289 Inclusive, 254 Leaders, 260 Marginal, 362 Multiple, 251 Mutual, 210 Revaluation of, 351 Specific, 254 Validity of, 298 Valuation of, 218 International Relations, 234 International Seamen’s Union, 286 Interpretation, 203 Introspection, 183, 184 James-Lange Theory, 301 Judgments, 259, 261 Jurisprudence, 62, 214 Justice, 62 Kantian, 115, 116 Knowing, Technical, 230 Vicarious, 230 Labor Unions, 134, 153 Language, 126, 130, 158, 160, 351 Problem, 2or Symbol, 202 Symbols, 176, 207 Use of, 205, 321-323 Use of, Defined, 232 Law, The, 206, 342, 343, 346, 363 Defined, 241 Laws, 68, 69 Leader, 361 Defined, 222, 223, 261, 263 Leaders, 154, 190, 257, 304, 305 Interests, 260 371 Leadership, 122, 126, 152, 163, 168, 169, 223, 259, 304, _ 307 Liberty, 62 Logic, 61, 63-66, 68, 69, 72, 73) 77, 82, 83, 95, 108, 122, 125, 313 Formal, 54 Logical, Method, 106 Presumptions, 63 Process, 199 Maladjustment, 17, 18 Marginal Members, 209, 283, 284, 287, 362 Mathematics, 95, 96, 119 Means, 44, 137, 338, 339, 36% Measuring, 85 Measurement, Quantitative, 88 Measurements, 182, 186 Memory, 40 Mendelian Theory, 353 Mental Processes, 186, 203 Metaphors, 49 Method, 119, 356, 363 Analogical, 56-58, 107, 108 Analytical, 73 Historical, 105, 106, 356 Historical-Statistical, 60 Logical, 64, 106 Psychological, 127, 128, 338 Social Science, 338 Sociological, 127 Statistical, 85, 87, 89, 100, 103, 107 Synthesis of, 105-108 Method of Social Research, 98 Middleman, 181, 189 Middlemen, 247, 256, 264, 266, 308, 315, 316, 318, _ 322, 328, 339, 340 Mind, 115, 116, 128 Group, 162, 164 Mob, 162, 164 Social, 163 Mob, 81, 131 Mind, 23, 162, 164 330, 331 ; Defined, 236 } Motives, 77, 126, 194, 313 National Council of Farmers’ — Coéperative Marketing © Associations, 255 Natural Selection, 25 Needs, 136 Economic, 219 Neighborhood, 248, 251 Neighborhoods, 27 North Carolina, Public Laws of, 291 Marketing Act of, 344 Supreme Court, 343 Neurosis, 55, 56 Nominalist, 140 Observation, 183, 187, 188, 190, 193, 199, 271 Objective, 187, 360 Observer, 205, 223 Outside, 198 Participant, 191, 192, 194, 197,199,205 Participant, Function of, 192 Participant, Defined, 223 Observers, 271 Opinions, 229, 308 Organization, Administra- tive, 319 Social, 330, 331, 335, 336, 362 Organizers, 263 Overt Acts, 360 Pain, 163, 333 Parallelists, Historical, 67 372 Observer, 197, 199, Participant 192, 194, 24 Defined, 223 Function of, 192 Perceiving, 59 Percept, 95 Perception, 115 Personality, 130, 133, 362 Total, 171, 187, 219, 267 Philosophy, 31, 96, 186 Social, 364 Physiologist, 90 Play, 162 Plurality, 44 Point-of-View, 205, 317 Defined, 231 Long-time, 318 Short-time, 318-320 Ig, 205, Power, 126, 205, 217, 219, 234, 240, 324-326, 328, 329, 342 Defined, 233 Ethics of, 341 Group, 326 Technique, 342 Predictability, 35 Prediction, 36, 46, 61 Prejudice, 231, 317 Prejudices, 193 Premise, Major, 64, 71, 74 Minor, 64, 71 Press, The, 348 Price-Fixing, 340, 341, 345 Principles, 163 Probability, 61 Process, Community, 76 Processes, Deliberative, 301 Thought, 360 Production, 334, 341 Progress, 150 Psychiatric Technique, 194 Psychiatrist, 188 Psycho-Analysts, 183 Psychological, Causation, 43 Content, 126 Emphasis, 119 % Psychological, Method, 182 Psychologist, 127, 357 Psychology, 21, 22, 111, 127, 130, 135 Abnormal, 155 As a Social Science, 354 Child, 129 Collective, 127, 168, 194 Crowd, 347 Educational, 129 Experimental, 43, 128 Folk, 129, 130 Gestalt, 187 Group, 168 Individual, 129 Legal, 129 Objective, 185, 187 Of Animals, 129 Of Education, 134 Pathological, 129 Social, 118, 129, 130, 167 Vocational, 129 Public Opinion, 162, 163, 206, 243, 346, 348, 349, 350, 352, 363 Defined, 242 Purpose, 194, 197, 209, 210 Purposes, 77, 113, 126, 170, 209 Concealment of, 196 Human, 361 Qualities, 121 Racial Groups, 58 Rationalization, 41, 66, 294 Rationalizations, 182, 193, 259, 261, 262, 360 Reality, 59 Of Conflict, 15x Reason, 162 Reasoning, 61 Creative, 70 Recall, 290 Reference, 202 Referent, 202, 203 Referents, 204 3 Referendum, 290 Relatedness, 361 Relation, 362 Relation, Causal, 202 Relations, 121 Religion, 126, 130, 219 Representation, 126, 153, 154, 172, 205, 252,° 253, 282- 284, 286, 287 Defined, 227 Mathematical, 287 Political, 288 Representative Government, 171 Representatives, 228, 229 Resemblance, 55 Resemblances, 54-56 Response, 43, 44, 164, 178, 279, 301, 336, 337, 361 Group, 205 Group, Defined, 227 Multiple, 148, 175, 190 Specific, 174 Stimulus-situation, 280 Responses, 281 Responsibilities, 218 Responsibility, 253 Rights, 142, 170, 215, 241 Science, 116, 119, 186, 272 Political, 214 Criteria of, 28 As Dogma, 27 Pragmatic, 358 Sense of Right, 339, 340, 342 Sentiments, 162, 193 Sherman Act, 344 Similes, 49, 50 Signs, 203 Situation, 278 Evolving, 280, 281, 362 Stimulus-Response, 280 Situations, Group, 275 Sociability, 163 Social, Analysis, 73 Behavior, 354 Conflicts, 75 Social Consciousness, 163 Control, 234, 238, 332, 346 Ethics, 240, 364 Forces, 86 Forms, 343 Groups, 71, 112, 119, 120, 131 , Institutions, 133 Mind, 45, 80, 163 Organization, 173, 256, 286, 287, 329, 330, 331, 335, 336, 362 Pathology, 133 Process, 133, 146, 354 Processes, 98 Psychologist, 127, 357 Psychology, 22, 118, 131, 132, 167, 235, 330 Research, 5 Science, 133, 354, 357 Survey, 181 Theory, 329, 353, 354, 355, 356, 359 Thinking, 68 Values, 338, 339 Social Sciences, 68, 70, 103, 112 Validity. of, 356 Society, 20 Sociologists, 68, 85, 127 Sociology, 56, 57, gt, 15, 235 General, 133 Speculation, 30 Statics, 331 Statistics, 84-104, 108, 125 Statistical Method, 107, 309 Stimulation, Crowd, 257 Stimuli, 177, 219, 281 Deferred, 280 IIt, Group, 205 [Def. 226], 277, 278 Law of, Mutually Opposed, 156 Stimulus, 43, 44, 149, 164, 178, 279, 280, 301, 361 314 — Stimulus, Specific, 174 Subjectivism, 116, 117 Sublimation, 18 Suggestion, 163 | Suggestibility, 162 Sun-Maid Raisin Growers, 345 Symbol, Expert, 258 Fear, 257 Fight, 257 Justice, 257 Language, 176, 202, 207 Psychological, 113 Symbolism, 203, 204 Symbols, 24, 160, 169, 201, 203, 204, 206, 351, 360 Sympathy, 163 Synthesis, 357 Of Method, 105 Terms, 203, 360 Thinking, Group, 195 Rigorous, 61, 62 Social, 68 Thought, 113, 163, 202, 360 Time-Binding, 13 Tobacco Growers’ Codpera- tive Association, 343, 344 Trade Unions, 73, 196, 217, 248, 358 Tradition, 206 Traditions, 162, 330, 331, 352 Defined, 237 Ultimate Traits, 32, 35 United Mine Workers, 249 United States, 42, 218 Dept. of Agri., 309 Dept. of Justice, 345 Steel Corp., 123, 124 Universals, 70, 79, 347 Validity, of the Average, 87 Of Consent, 298 Of Interests, 298 Valuation of Interests, 218 Value, 217, 221 Values, 32, 181, 272, 363 Economic, 180 Social, 338, 339 Variables, 70, 75, 94 Dependent and Independ- ent, 16 Volition, 162 War Finance Corporation, 309 Will, 113, 162 General, 162 Human, 357 Popular, 163 Wishes, 113 375 mk 4 ihe ges alt ee a hea oe ct es ae tw ) Mate Ny tat 1h ad . ee 1S : yn a 3 : iany Ane aus ‘eh a! dl v ; on 3 —— “ —— i, —< ie nt. + Y i) ~ ‘ ¥ 1 ; i ’ 4 venriep 4 | ; ; ; ' : pre ; “ ' ‘ +=" } Oa ‘ i f i ire oe oi UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA — rT ists " one Seen Hen toeate 00907 Nidal Mines bareva baie asueutiasti i 3 0112 0005 ot , hey ' ey ‘ je pe , ‘ : " i t Gti bite ms hay i Hit \ of F ‘ br eb » ‘ i \ hi j ber ’ i ‘ ' f { j ; j ‘ fini n ie) Hebe deve bf i fl i i} ‘ Oa bebe tie4 web i j het ’ ' 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