THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY 15| SaIBe Return this book on or before the Latest Date stamped below. A charge is made on all overdue books. U. of I. Library ie ry ame “To st. ae 9324-S THE EDUCATION OF BEHAVIOUR A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY BY I. B. SAXBY, D.Sc. SENIOR ASSISTANT IN THE WOMEN’S EDUCATION DEPARTMENT OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF G.P. Putnam's Sons New York €& London The Rnickerbocker Press 1925 Copyright, 1925 by G. P. Putnam’s Sons Made in the United States of America f Fc ai PREFACE Tuis little book is an attempt to bring our present knowledge of psychology to bear on the problems of behaviour which have to be faced by those who are in charge of boys or girls during their adolescence. It is intended primarily for the student of education who wishes to teach young people between the ages of g and 17, but it is hoped that it will also appeal to parents as well as to foremen and social workers who are interested in the welfare of adolescents. It is always an open question how far a book of this nature should contain descriptions of educational experiments. These descriptions are undoubtedly use- ful as illustrations of the way in which psychological laws can be applied in practice. They would however have to be quoted at length, if they are to be of any real value to the reader and they are, moreover, given in books which are as a rule easily accessible to students of education. It has therefore seemed better to refer the student to these books and to leave him to draw his own conclusions from them. Perhaps the main purpose of the book is to make the educator realise that the behaviour of an individual ili iv Preface is governed by a highly complexed system of forces, and that these forces obey scientific laws which must be understood if the best results are to be obtained. In order to attain this I have emphasised the psycholog- ical side throughout. The reader who is acquainted with the literature of the subject will see how much my exposition owes to Professor McDougall’s Social Psychology, and to the standard books on analytical psychology. At the same time, I have not scrupled to give my own explanation of a psychological phenom- enon when [ could not find one which seemed to satisfy the conditions as I saw them. Since the book is in- tended for the beginner, I have, however, contented myself with stating where my view is not the one which is generally accepted, giving the reader at the same time such references as should enable him to make up his own mind on the subject. Lengthy dis- cussions of different points of view seem to me to be out of place in a book of this kind. In conclusion, J should like to thank Miss E. R. Murray for many helpful suggestions and to express my great obligation to Miss Alice Woods and to Dr. Stanley Watkins for reading the whole of the manu- script and for giving me much valuable criticism and advice. I. B. Saxsy. CARDIFF, WALES. CONTENTS CHAPTER I.—INTRODUCTION . : . : i : II.—IMPULSES AND REFLEXES . ; ; } IIJ.—Some ImMporTANT IMPULSES : ; ; IV.—SENTIMENTS AND COMPLEXES . P : V.—NOTES ON THE FUNCTION OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM . ‘ z : : A VI.—TuHE GrowTH AND CONTROL OF HABITS VII.—EmoTIoN AND SYMPATHY . ; : VIII—Tue PsycuoLtocy or CHARACTER a ‘ IX.—THE TRAINING OF CHARACTER . ; : X.—WorK AND PLAY ; ; ‘ - j XI.—CoNCLUSION : : : ; ; ; BIBLIOGRAPHY . p ; ‘ : ; INDEX . : P ‘ ; : “ : PAGE oe 4 ee | ‘ ‘ Was Ora By) EY (VN it Pere thy Wy The Education of Behaviour . uy Say Co the The Education of Behaviour CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Education as preparation for efficient citizenship. Citizenship as the joint product of natural power and environment. é STATED in its most general terms, education may be said to be preparation for adult life, and this in turn may be described as preparation for efficient citizen- ship. If we are now asked what exactly is involved in this, we cannot do better than turn to Herbert Spencer for an answer. In his book entitled Education: Intel- lectual, Moral and Physical, he points out that the ideal education of a citizen should include: (1) that which prepares for direct self-preservation; (2) that which prepares for indirect self-preservation; (3) that which prepares for parenthood; (4) that which prepares for citizenship in the narrower sense of the word; and (5) that which prepares for the miscel- laneous refinements of life. 3 4 The Education of Behaviour To put the same thing in different words, an effi- cient citizen should be able and willing: (1) to keep himself fit and in good condition; (2) to do his share of the world’s work; (3) to give his children the neces- sary care and training; (4) to do his duty by his neighbours; and (5) to occupy his leisure in such a way as to provide a desirable outlet for those of his longings which would otherwise remain unsatisfied. It is the object of this book to give the student some insight into the conditions under which he is likely to succeed in turning his pupils into efficient citizens in the sense just defined. At the outset it is important to determine how much responsibility rests on the child and how much on the educator, for our whole attitude towards the problem necessarily depends on our answer to this question. If the child’s mind is of the nature of a waxen tablet on which we can write what we like, then the environment must be entirely responsible for the result; if heredity practically settles the child’s future at the outset, then it is useless to attempt any sort of interference. As usual, the truth appears to lie somewhere between these two extremes. The natural endowments of the child present as it were the sum total of his possibilities, but it depends on the environment how they develop, and far more persons fail through lack of right environ- ment in youth than through lack of inborn ability. Introduction 5 In order to see how heredity and environment act and react on each other, we shall begin with a brief investigation into the origin of standards of conduct and attainments. Superficial observation may suggest that these two important “springs of action” have come into existence in absolutely different ways, for we can remember acquiring most of our attainments by con- scious efforts of our own, whereas many of our stand- ards of conduct seem so much part and parcel of ourselves that we are sometimes tempted to think we must have been born with them. However, further reflection soon shows that both are really the joint products of natural power and environment. I will consider attainments first. The knowledge which a child acquires at school depends partly on him- self, but much more on the school. He may, for in- stance, have only slight ability for mathematics, and yet learn more than another with greater natural talent, merely because he happens to have a better teacher. Even exceptional ability may never develop in an un- favourable environment, for we need opportunity to discover what we can do, and we may exhaust our- selves in overcoming real or imaginary obstacles when we have discovered it. In the sphere of conduct the conditions under which a child grows up are even more important, for the young child has no inborn ideas of right or wrong, 6 The Education of Behaviour and has therefore to acquire them through personal experience. It should be noted, too, that this “personal experience” is only his own in a very limited sense. He can be allowed to find out for himself that fire burns, but not that certain berries are poisonous. In this and many other cases his discovery is limited to the fact that we approve or disapprove of certain acts, and he has to take on trust that we know better than he, or that the reasons which we choose to give him are really correct. This is particularly the case with conventions. Why, for instance, should you say “Please” and “Thank you” at every turn? It would puzzle the average adult to give the child of three to five an answer that would really convince him; yet the child often shows by the tone of his voice that he is anything but satisfied. None the less, he usually acquiesces in the end, partly no doubt because he is so dependent on us, but perhaps mainly because he is continually being made conscious of the superior know- ledge and power of his elders, and is therefore inclined to assume that they probably know best in every case, however incomprehensible their demands seem to be. Thus he gradually adopts the standards of conduct which are accepted in his environment. } For most persons there comes, however, a time— usually during adolescence—when they begin to mix with others whose standards of conduct differ more or Introduction 7 less from their own, and whom they have yet every reason to respect. Then one of two things may hap- pen: they may learn to close their eyes to everything that threatens their peace of mind; but, failing that, they must modify their views sufficiently to enable them to fit into the old what they feel to be true in the new. Whichever path the adolescent chooses, he is now for the first time actively affecting his standards of conduct and his beliefs. It is, however, well to bear in mind that most of us would grow up without ever question- ing the absolute finality of what we were taught as children, if we did not come across others who have been taught to think differently, and are therefore not prepared to accept our point of view. Thus our stand- ards of conduct seem to be derived almost entirely from our environment. They are, however, not sufficient to decide behaviour alone, for right action involves a knowledge of what is right coupled with the desire to act in accordance with that knowledge, and it is pos- sible to approve of a certain course of action without experiencing the least desire to adopt it. We have there- fore still to consider how far this desire is dependent on the environment. This problem will be considered in detail at a later stage. Here it is sufficient to note that our desire to control anti-social wishes springs in the main from our desire to win the approval, or at least te avoid the 8 The Education of Behaviour disapproval, of those whose opinion we value for any reason. In adult life, we may ignore the wishes of such persons on occasion because we think that we know the facts of the case better than they do, because we imagine that we are sure not to be found out, or because our desire is so great that we cannot withstand it. During the early years of life the first of these is rarely a cause of disobedience, for a child is continually being made aware of his own weakness and ignorance, and is therefore not likely to question the opinion of his elders. It should therefore be a comparatively easy matter to teach children what is right and what is wrong and to make them want to do right. All that is needed is to win their love and respect, then the rest should follow almost automatically. Yet we fail again and again. What is the cause? ‘There is certainly no lack of goodwill on the part of the child, at any rate initially. Those of us who know children intimately know that they will try to do the most unreasonable things in order to please those they love. Here is a case in point. A little girl of five or six was travelling with her grandmother from Cardiff to London. The grandmother told the child to “‘sit nice and still,” and then got out a paper and began to read it. The little girl evidently tried to obey, but she had been provided with neither picture-book nor toy. Needless to say she began to fidget before long. The grandmother asked Introduction 9 her once more to keep quiet; then turned to her neigh- bour and said: “I am always telling her to sit still and she does try, but she finds it very hard to remember.” It was evident from the attitude of the child that it had never struck her to question the wisdom of her grandmother’s demands. She was merely trying to “remember,” and possibly rather vexed with herself for forgetting. It must be said for the grandmother that she was wiser than her words; for when the young fidget began again a few minutes later, she simply cast her neighbour a glance which said: ‘You see, she has forgotten again,’ and left the child to amuse herself in her own way until she went to sleep through sheer boredom. Here there was failure on the part of the child, but not rebellion. The grandmother had succeeded in inculcating the desire to sit still, the little girl was merely finding it difficult to obey. She was not defying her grandmother in any sense of the word. At other times we have to deal with true rebellion. The child disobeys us deliberately when he cannot pos- sibly have forgotten what we told him to do. We tell him to weed the garden, and he goes off to play with his companions; we tell him not to climb a certain tree and presently find him ensconced on its topmost branch. We may take it for granted that the young child who disobeys us in this fashion does not do so because 10 The Education of Behaviour he thinks that he is in the right and that we are in the wrong. He does not as yet question our right to lay down the law. His choice lies between obedience with a good conscience and disobedience with a bad conscience. Yet he may disobey us all the same, and that because the desire for approval is by no means the only desire with which he is equipped. Nature has pro- vided the child with a large number of impulses, or de- sires to act. There is the impulse to find out about something new, the impulse to try one’s powers, and so forth. All these impulses vary in strength, not only in different children, but in the same child at different times, and some chance occurrence may render any one of them so strong that the child is unable to resist it for the time being. The result is disobedience. Under wise guidance such disobedience will, however, only lead to a firm determination not to fail again. It is only when the adult demands too much, when failure succeeds failure, that the child presently decides that it is no good trying to be good, and that it is less trouble to be naughty and take the consequences. But even in such a case the young child does not, as a rule, reject the standards of his environment, for he is still convinced that he is in the wrong. He merely decides that these things are not for him, and thus loses all desire to try to be “good.” The same applies, of course, to the acquisition of Introduction II knowledge. The child who finds the work consist- ently too difficult, sooner or later gives up attempting to attend in class, with the result that he does not even learn the little that is within the range of his ability. Under suitable tuition such a child will often discover, to his own surprise and delight, that there are things which interest him and which he can do as well as another. Then lessons become worth while, inattention disappears, and he begins to work at least as hard as his more gifted fellows.? It follows from all this that the environment (in- cluding therein both the persons and the things with which the child comes into contact) is to a large extent responsible for the ideals and attainments of the child, but that it is not all-powerful. You can take the horse to water, but you cannot make it drink. So, too, you can give the child the opportunity to develop right ideals or to acquire necessary knowledge and skill, but you cannot force him to make the effort against his will, nor to learn more than his natural ability will allow him to learn. The environment of any child represents as it were the sum total of the possibilities that fate has provided for him. If it includes a wise educator, one who knows how to stimulate right desires in the child and to make him want to control undesira- *I have been definitely told by such a child: “I was always supposed to be hopelessly stupid.” 12 The Education of Behaviour ble impulses, his chances of success will be by so much the greater. But in the end it is the child himself who must acquire the knowledge and the ideals which he will need if he is to become an efficient citizen. He must be active, not passive; an individual who uses his environment to develop his powers and organise the impulses with which he is born, not a mere phonograph that will reproduce faithfully whatever is said into it. PeHARTE RIL IMPULSES AND REFLEXES A. Definition of Impulse as an Inborn Tendency to Seek a Certain End in Certain Situations. B. The Effect of Blocking the Usual Outlets of an Impulse. C. The Relation of Emotion to Impulse. D. Definition of Reflex as an Inborn Tendency to React in one Specific Way to one Specific Stimulus. E. The Relative Survival Value of Reflex and Impulse :— (1) In a fixed environment, and (2) in a variable environment. WE saw in the last chapter that the student of human behaviour is primarily concerned with the origin and growth of desires. It will, however, be necessary to do some preliminary work before we can understand the problems connected with this subject. We shall, therefore, study impulses and reflexes in this chapter, and return to the psychology of desire at a later stage. A. The Definition of Impulse Impulses are many and varied in character. If we think we are in danger, we want to run away; 13 14 The Education of Behaviour if we see something strange, but not too strange, we like to examine it; if we are faced with an obsta- cle, we want to surmount it. All these desires are due to impulses, that is to say, to inborn tendencies to act in a certain way under certain conditions. It is characteristic of an impulse that it urges us to some mode of action which seems for the time being abso- lutely obvious, though we could often give no satis- factory reason for our behaviour. Further, the true impulsive act is always conscious. I may blink and breathe without knowing it, but I do not run away unless I am conscious of danger. It is convenient to use the word perceived for being aware of an object, no matter whether we hear it or see it, touch it or smell it, etc., and to call the thing that has been per- cewed in this way a percept. An impulse is, therefore, an inborn desire to attain a certain end in the presence of certain kinds of percepts. It should, moreover, be observed that the actual percept is not always neces- sary, at any rate in the case of human beings. Thus the candidate for an examination may be so afraid of failure that he decides not to sit for it: here it is not an accomplished fact, but the mere thought, “TI shall not pass,” which is responsible for his action. The actual percepts or ideas that are able to arouse a particular impulse vary greatly from person to person and from day to day, but it is none the less possible to classify Impulses and Reflexes 15 them. Thus the impulse to avoid danger is roused by every percept which suggests danger, but it depends on the previous experience and knowledge of the indi- vidual whether a particular percept does or does not have that effect on a particular occasion. For instance, the sound of an aeroplane normaliy causes no more alarm than that of a passing motor; during the air raids it was, however, impossible to hear it without experiencing at least a momentary pang of fear. Moreover, the means which are chosen to attain the end of the impulse are also liable to variation. It may be well to run away literally if we wish to escape from danger, but it may be safer to hide, or to tell a lie, or to ask for mercy. So, too, we may examine a strange object ourselves, or we may consult either a book or another individual about it: whichever course we adopt we are Satisfying our impulse to investigate. In general there are a large number of percepts that may arouse a given impulse and a large number of acts through which any one impulse may seek to attain its end. It will, however, always be found, both in regard to the different percepts and ideas and in re- gard to the resulting acts, that they belong to definite classes (e.g. things that are dangerous or methods of escape), and that they owe their connection with the impulse to the fact that they are, for the time being, members of the corresponding class. 1 The Education of Behaviour We may, therefore, define an impulse as follows: An impulse is an inborn tendency to seek a certain end in certain situations. (It makes us want to avoid dan- ger, to remove obstacles from our path, etc.) Jt is roused by all percepts and ideas which seem to the individual to suggest one of these situations, and tt may seek to attain its end by any of the means which he has learnt to use for that purpose. B. The Effect of Blocking the Usual Outlets of an Impulse When the usual outlets of an impulse are blocked, one of two things may happen: the individual in ques- tion may feel that it is hopeless for him to try to get what he wants, or he may think he can overcome the obstacle. In the first case the nervous energy that has been set free by the percept tends to be driven into some unhealthy channel, such as worry- ing, fussing or self-pity, all of which use up energy without producing results of any value. In the second case it is expended in attempts to attain the end of the impulse by removing the obstacle. It must not, of course, be imagined that the choice of one or other of these alternatives necessarily involves deliberation. Often circumstances make it obvious whether it is or is not worth while to assert oneself: a child of four will fight another child of his own age who tries to Impulses and Reflexes 17 spoil his game, but he will merely cry helplessly if a boy of twelve chooses to bully him. If there is actual danger to life and little chance of escape the individual will, however, often fight, even though he knows that his case is desperate. Thus the criminal who is caught red-handed will at times aggravate his offence by trying to kill his captors. The weapons we use in the fight necessarily depend on the obstacle we have to overcome. Sometimes mere physical strength is all that is required: we fight with the fist, the spear, or some more modern weapon. But these are often insufficient by themselves; they may even be useless. Suppose, for instance, that I want to solve some mystery and find I cannot do it. My curiosity may be too strong to leave me in peace, my pride may be involved as well, so that I am determined not to be beaten. In such a case I begin to cudgel my brains. I bring all my knowledge and all my power of synthesis and analysis to bear upon my problem. I work at it until I either solve the mystery or am forced to give it up as a task beyond my powers. It is worth while to notice the metaphors we use in this connection. “To be beaten,” and “to cudgel,” and to be “‘forced’’ to do a thing are evidently all taken from the act of fight- ing. resulting sensations > 2nd movement > resulting sensations > , , , > . . to the end of the series. It should be noticed that the intermediate sensa- tions only develop into percepts so long as there is a certain amount of resistance in the path which the nervous energy has to take. Afterwards we are only 116 The Education of Behaviour aware of the initial stimulus and of the final sensations, which mean that the task is completed, and are there- fore free to attend to other things once we have the machine in motion. The reader need only consider the number of mechanical tasks he has to accomplish day by day, in order to realise how little time he would have left for tackling new problems, if he were not endowed with the power of executing automatic move- ments without becoming aware of them.? There is still another way in which the tendency to form habits simplifies life. If my alarm clock wakes me at six o'clock on a cold winter morning, I am quite likely to decide that it is really too cold to get up so early and that the piece of work which seemed so urgent last night can well be left for another day. But if I have decided to form a habit of getting up at 6 A.M. and therefore force myself to obey the alarm day after day in spite of various good reasons to the con- trary, I find that these reasons gradually cease to obtrude themselves on my consciousness and that I * The physiological cause of this loss of awareness is not cer- tain. It has been suggested that the resistance which the nervous energy encounters is the physiological equivalent of consciousness and that every decrease in resistance is accompanied by a cor- responding loss of awarenss. There is, however, reason to believe that the motor centres which give us control over volun- tary movements cease to function when an act has become habitual and it is therefore possible that the loss of awareness is due to some change in the path taken by the nervous energy when the act has become automatic. Growth and Control of Habits 117 presently jump out of bed at the proper time without being aware of any choice in the matter. This is an instance of what it will be convenient to call a “habit of choice.”” Like all habits, it is formed by decreasing the resistance between a stimulus and a reaction and it only differs from a habit of action in that the reaction happens to be an idea instead of a movement or a series of movements. Our tendency to lose sight of possible alternatives as one course of action becomes habitual clearly results in much economy of effort, for it reduces both the number of problems we have to solve and the number of times we have to exert will- power in order to act according to our resolutions. To sum up, thanks to the Law of Habit, we drift into many useful forms of activity and are also able to acquire acts of skill and to learn to behave con- sistently without special conscious effort. Moreover, the separate elements of an act of skill and the dis- turbing alternatives in an act of choice cease to attract our attention as these acts become automatic. In short, habit makes easy what was at first difficult and thus enables us to adapt our actions to our needs with the least possible expenditure of energy. B. The Origin of Habits So far as we know, the only mental systems which make for consistency in acquired forms of behaviour 118 The Education of Behaviour are those centres of potential activity which we call “sentiments” when they are conscious, and “complexes” when they are unconscious. It is therefore to these that we must turn for the origin of habits. (1) Consciously Acquired Habits——Clearly every consciously acquired habit must have been formed in response to some conscious desire, and we know that conscious desires owe their existence to sentiments. We may therefore conclude that consciously acqured habits are formed in the service of sentiments. (2) Unconsciously Acquired Habits —Though most of the habits which are formed in the service of senti- ments are acquired consciously, some are, no doubt, developed without arousing the awareness of the con- scious self. These would be acts which facilitate the attainment of some conscious desire, but which involve no particular difficulty and can therefore be left to look after themselves. Under this heading might come such habits as that of looking right and left before crossing a busy thoroughfare. Any one who lives in a big city is likely to acquire this habit before long, but it is learnt with so little conscious effort that it is quite possible to take this precaution habitually, without being aware of the fact. Habits which have been formed under the influence of complexes are of greater interest to the educator and will therefore be considered at greater length. As Growth and Control of Habits 119 we know, complexes are centres of potential activity, and consequently set free energy whenever they are stimulated by suitable percepts or ideas. This energy must find an outlet of some kind. Moreover, the well- being of the individual as a whole demands that that outlet should be one which the conscious self can pass as meaningless or harmless, otherwise the resulting activity will only relieve pressure in the unconscious at the expense of shame in the conscious. When an outlet of the right kind has been found, it is therefore likely to become habitual through frequent use. The extent to which an individual acquires habits under the influence of unconscious complexes depends partly on himself and partly on the traditions of his environment. The greater the amount of self-control he has to exert, the more likely is he to take refuge in repression, and the more repressed complexes he has, the more meaningless habits is he likely to acquire. In fact the results of psycho-analysis seem to suggest that a very large number of our unconsciously formed habits owe their origin to repressed complexes.? An example may make the process clearer. Under favourable conditions the child who is just old *Consciously formed habits may owe their origin indirectly to complexes, for complexes can find relief through sentiments acquired for that purpose. To discuss these would, however, take us beyond the limits of this book. (Cf. account of little Anna’s interest in geography, pp. 84-85.) 120 The Education of Behaviour enough to begin to look after himself gradually learns to accept the joys of childish friendships, and of con- struction and discovery, as substitutes for the pleasure he derived from the undivided attention of his mother. But until he has learnt to “sublimate” his energy in these ways, he is likely to experience the desire to be once again a small and helpless baby. This desire can- not come to consciousness without being repressed, for it is contrary to his conscious wish to become big and strong. It has therefore to find outlets which are not recognised as such, and psycho-analysis has shown that these outlets are often thumb-sucking and _ nail- biting. As is well known, these bad habits usually disappear without much trouble as the child grows older, that is to say, as he finds other more satisfying uses for his energy. (When the habits persist into adolescence there is every reason to believe that the child has somehow failed to sublimate his energy and is therefore in need of special treatment. ) We turn next to the mannerisms and tricks of speech which we tend to learn from our environment without conscious effort. It can be shown that these, too, are habits formed in the service of unconscious complexes. Most of us can recall occasions on which we grew half aware of a quickly repressed wish that we could be content to act like, or live with, certain other people. If such a wish occurs just once, it may Growth and Control of Habits 121 only be the outcome of temporary conditions, but if it recurs at intervals there must be some permanent system behind it, and since that system is not in the conscious, we must look for it in the unconscious. Hence the revival of a wish of this kind, when we are fatigued or day-dreaming, may be taken as a proof for the existence of the corresponding complex. Given the complex, it must find a means of expression, and mannerisms and tricks of speech would serve its purpose admirably, just because they are likely to be passed as harmless and are yet such as to satisfy the unconscious desire to make some effort to resemble the members of the group in question. Thumb-suck- ing is a case in point, for there can be little doubt that it is a source of satisfaction to the unconscious of the child because sucking is a characteristic and highly pleasurable act of infancy. However, the child who habitually sucks his thumb is by no means aware of the origin of his habit; he would indignantly repudiate the suggestion that he was trying to behave like a baby. (It may be well to remind the reader that such facts as the origin of thumb-sucking are discovered by the method of Free Associations, and that they are not present in consciousness until this method has been applied. Cf. p. 82.) One further point needs consideration, that is the tendency to adopt local expressions or mannerisms, not 122 The Education of Behaviour without conscious effort, but definitely, in spite of strong resolutions to the contrary. In such cases the unconscious complexes are evidently so powerful that they find an outlet whenever the conscious self is not on the watch. So long as the act in question is un- familiar, it attracts attention to itself on account of the resistance which it has to overcome. But this resistance decreases with repetition until the act has become quite mechanical, and the conscious self is, therefore, no longer able to inhibit it. When this stage has been reached, the unconscious complex has secured for itself an outlet which it can use without hindrance, in spite of the fact that it is unpleasing to the conscious self. The success the complex has achieved in this way sug- gests that is must have been very powerful, for only a strong complex could have overcome the inhibition by the conscious self again and again until it finally succeeded in withdrawing its method of expression from conscious control by making it mechanical. Sum- marising the results of the last few paragraphs, we may say that most unconsciously acquired habits are formed in the service of complexes, but some are also formed in the service of sentiments. In conclusion, it should be observed that a habit can rarely be the product of some one isolated tendency. Long before the end of childhood a percept tends to stimulate more than one centre of potential activity, and the resulting act is, Growth and Control of Habits 123 therefore, due to a compromise between the forces that have been set free by it. Hence it is not strange to find that the habit which is formed in relation to any par- ticular set of circumstances can usually be shown to be the product of more than one sentiment or complex. At times it looks as though a particular habit must be due to “chance.” This applies to such acts as taking possession of a particular peg in a cloak-room, or crossing the road at one particular point on one’s daily walk to one’s work. Whenever the reader feels tempted to interpret one of his habits in this way, he should bear in mind that “chance” is “an extremely complex system of causes, of the general nature of which we are aware, but of the detailed operation of which we are ignorant” (Yule, Theory of Statistics, p. 30), and if he examines a fairly new habit of this kind, he will, I think, always find that it owes its origin to a number of circumstances, some of which he is still able to recall.? *The reader should note that we are here only concerned with the origin of habits. Thus, cycling is a consciously acquired habit, because we practise it until we can do it mechanically. If we analyse it, it involves a number of acts of skill, most of which are learnt most easily without conscious analysis. We are, however, not concerned with methods of learning. An act of skill, or any other habit, is acquired consciously if it is formed in response to a definite desire on the part of the conscious self. Whether this end is attained most easily by means of conscious analysis or by the “try, try again” method, makes no difference to its origin. 124 The Education of Behaviour C. The Growth and Control of Consciously Acquired Habits of Choice It should be noticed that many of our habits are in themselves complex. Thus, neatness in written home-work implies both a certain amount of skill in the control of pen and ink, and readiness to set aside sufficient time for the work. The former is a matter of skill, the latter a matter of choice, and both must be rendered mechanical, if a true habit is to be formed. Since we are mainly concerned with the growth of character, it will be convenient to omit the more detailed study of habits of skill and to confine ourselves to the study of habits of choice for the rest of this chapter. (1) Rules for Acquring Habits with the Minimum of Effort—It will be remembered that every habit is physiologically a path of weak resistance for nervous energy. Hence the growth of a habit is aided by every act which ensures the further weakening of the selected path, and it is hindered by any act which lays the foundation for a rival path. Moreover, the resistance is greatest the first time the energy is forced along a new path, and decreases every time that path is used. If we bear these points in mind, we shall have no difficulty in formulating the rules for acquiring a habit with the minimum of effort. These are four in number : Growth and Control of Habits 125 (i) Since the resistance is greatest at the begin- ning, it is well to use a moment of enthusiasm for the first effort whenever a difficult habit has to be acquired. (11) Since every act slightly decreases the resist- ance to it on the next occasion, it wastes both time and energy to allow an exception to occur until the desired habit has become firmly established. (iii) We have still to consider the treatment of undesirable habits. These may have been formed con- sciously or unconsciously, but once they have come into existence they only concern us as paths of weak resist- ance which we do not wish the nervous energy to use. Clearly, it is not sufficient to check ourselves in the act, for the nervous energy must find an outlet somewhere. The best thing to do is to adopt some one other line of action and to repeat this whenever we are aware of the stimulus, until it involves less resistance than the one to which we object. In other words, we can only cure an undesirable habit by associating another stronger habit with the same stimulus. (iv) Finally, the amount of resistance the new habit encounters depends in part on the extent to which it satisfies the same sentiments and complexes as the old. It is therefore always worth while to discover the cause which was mainly responsible for the undesirable habit before deciding how to replace it. In some cases, such as that of thumb-sucking, it may then be found 126 The Education of Behaviour wise to remove the cause, instead of, or as well as, tackling the habits. (2) The Effect of Indecision on the Growth of Habits.— Sometimes the difficulty which is experienced in forming a new habit is due to the fact that the indi- vidual has not clearly made up his mind what habit he actually wants to acquire. The way in which this lack of decision affects the development of habits of choice has been studied experimentally by Dr. Boyd Barrett in connection with the evolution of motivation. For a full description of this interesting investigation, the reader is referred to the book, Motive Force and Motivation Tracks. Here we shall only be able to give what is essential for the present purpose. The method of investigation was as follows :— Eight colourless liquids were prepared, such as to vary in taste from very unpleasant to very pleasant. Each of these was given a nonsense name (e.g. ziv), so as to avoid complications introduced by chance asso- ciations with this or that word. The first part of the experiment consisted in teaching the subjects (i.e. the men who did the experiment) to associate each name with the right taste. After this the main part of the work was begun. In this each subject had to choose the better of two given liquids, drink it, and imme- diately afterwards give a full description of all that had passed in his mind during the act of choice. This Growth and Control of Habits 127 introspection (as such a description is usually called) was taken down verbatim by the experimenter. Besides this, the time taken for each act of choice was measured by a special instrument, called the Vernier Chronoscope, which measures intervals of time correct to oor of a second. There were three subjects, all thoroughly experienced in introspection, and between them they were responsible for 574 experiments, in which the liquids were paired in different ways, each pair recurring at intervals. In this way habits of choice were gradually established for each pair of liquids. The evolution of such habits could therefore be studied in the introspections of the subjects. For a full account of these the reader is once again referred to Boyd Barrett’s book. Here only two cases will be given: (a) one in which the choice was easy and, (b) one in which the choice was difficult. (a) The results obtained in the first case are given in Table I. It represents experiments Nos. 28, 42, 63, 84 and 90. These took place on December 3, 7, 12, Ig and 20 respectively. Of the two liquids, “Jor” was pleasant, “Laix’” unpleasant. There was therefore no difficulty of choice. If we examine the table, we notice the following points :— (1) The reaction times decrease from approximately 1'2 seconds to ‘8 second and then again to ‘4 second. ‘xIey = J ‘i0of-= f, f Joo tes «, 29470 94} §,9],, ‘J #8 poxooT (Zz) qsay f[ weg (1) C6v. f[ yooy, (¥) = (€) I ¥# paxooy (Zz) qsiy f{ Meg (1) CP. [ yooy (%) { 38 ure3e poxoo7y (€) ‘J 78 pexooy (Z) qsay [ Meg (1) zLZ. [ yoo, (¢) + [ ye urese pexooT (£) é sé [To $3] 9 « 21GIssod s,4],, piom jo sousserg | ,,Joy}O 94} S,4],, ee uorjeusiseg | ,,Joq}0 04} SIT, ‘ "I ye payooy (z) qsay f[ meg (1) fol. { yooy (¥) «St S42 L,, ae [ ye urese paxooT (£) PFOA « SIY} FON ,, = “OphyII) ‘T 32 poxooT (2) le pue omseo[g qsig [ Meg (1) I9I.I *eLIBA *sjustus pn ‘ON[BA JO VDUASoIg *ssUloay ‘euomoUusyg [einjoniy4s9 shige “eusmousyg jeorqoAsg Ul OUI} UOTIOVOY (E11 ‘d ‘sysvsy uoyvayopy pun ar40g anyopy S,4yo11eg pAog wio1) ‘5S 40 SAOIOHD , I—f[ AAIY AHL ONIMOHS ‘J ATAV] Growth and Control of Habits 129 (2) The structural phenomena are reduced to a minimum. After the third experiment the subject only looks at each liquid once before he makes his choice. (3) The physical phenomena disappear with the exception of the one essential judgment, such as “It’s the other.” (4) Feelings of pleasure and the reverse disappear even more readily than other phenomena. In other words, automatic choice means economy both of time and of nervous energy. (b) Table II gives a case in which choice was dif- ficult, “Laix” and “Choux’’ being both so exceedingly unpleasant that neither was ever chosen unless pitted against the other. As will be seen from the table, the introspection shows all the signs of hesitation, with the annoyance and weariness that attend it. The hesita- tion begins in choice 3, develops through choices 4, 5 and 6, and is finally overcome in the course of the last three experiments. The main points to be noticed in the first six introspections are :-— (1) The irregularity in the reaction times, which show two increases, each followed by a decrease, in- stead of the regular decrease that was obtained when the choice was easy (cf. Table I). (2) The inconsistency in choice, i.e. the fact that “Laix” is taken twice, then ‘‘Choux’”’ seven times. 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Se iehex = jo s0uasalg ‘s8ulpeaq ‘spuosas ‘eusmoudyg [einjoniyg | ul owry UOT VOY ‘euswmousyg [eoIso[oyoAsg jo 93eq (‘Vor ‘d ‘sysv4 J uoynayopy pun ardog aayopy ‘yjo11eg pAog Aq sat suOTyedsoIjU] WoT poyonsysuo0D) ‘cS JO SADIOHD xO—T ANIN ONIMOHS ‘JJ ATAVYE, "XNOU.) ==) See remem SUOISEDDO SNOTA -o1d uo suorssno “SIP suo, Jo uor} “O9T[ODeI =. JBI sooroyo snorAoid JO UOTZDaT[OOSY | IoYy}O dy} 0} ouO qyusutese | Jojar 04 4du1044e ON -INOosIp Jo ysneT Asta St s010y9) ADMD ALOUL 347 S19 ulese ued -dey jou [yeys stuy qnq ‘e1ojeq 3[NoYFIp so10yo epeul J pued 4ayjag mouy J 91 YULIp ysnw | 31 YULIP 4,UeO J SUOISeO00 sno -IAoId UO poouors yULIp ysnul T -adxo sorlynoygip y Ystuy s,40'J JO UOTPOT[OOSY | SSoyIsN ST UOTSSNOSICT Ayyeoty eu104 -ne ‘Ayyomnb d yooy, O wey} “T Mes Aypeoryeur0y -ne ‘ATyomnb cd Yooy ‘J wou} ‘D weg JOY}O 94} 0} ouo WOT 03 03 Aouopuay, Appinb 9 xooy, ‘TT uo soo poxty ‘J voy} ‘D Meg +1 yuerIp Ajjeuyg ‘Aeme 4t yng wD AOO°L JT voy} ‘O que} uOOsICT | usyy “J ust} ‘g mes Ay[no . te eo ysnasiq | A[MO[S AoA Cd YOOL LS | | et | cements | eee Iv1.1 | of ‘uef to6.1 | bz ‘uef pop.109 quowmleseInoosiq |O wey] wey} ‘OQ Mes |-2130N |] gi ‘uel 132 The Education of Behaviour shown above, every action lays the foundation for the corresponding habit. Thus even to take “Laix” twice would be sufficient to form a slight tendency to choose it, and would therefore make it a little more difficult to form a habit of selecting “Choux.’”’ Thus inconsistency of choice causes delay and waste of energy. (3) The amount of oscillation from one to the other and the feelings of regret and annoyance that were recorded. These, too, would be responsible for much waste of energy. The way in which the tendency to hesitate was finally overcome will be evident from introspection 7. This shows that the subject: (1) consciously avoided oscilla- tion by fixing his eyes on “Laix,” and (2) strengthened his motive for choosing “Choux” by appealing to the general principle, “Take the more familiar.”’ Finally, the success of this method is evident from the fact that the choice was felt to be easy once it had been adopted. (See introspections for Feb. 1 and Feb. 8.) To sum up, the development of a habit of choice is hindered by: (1) careless, hurried or irresponsible acts of choice, and (2) regrets, annoyance, etc., over past choices. It is therefore well to formulate clear scales of value whenever this is at all possible, and to appeal to some general principle when it seems impossible to Growth and Control of Habits 133 decide between the different alternatives on any other ground. If we do this on the first occasion, we shall feel that we have a good motive behind our choice, and shall therefore not feel tempted to change our line of action after we have laid the foundation for a habit. In cases where choice is difficult, this will mean an appreciable saving both of time and of energy. (3) The So-called “Transference” of Habits.— When we train children at school in neatness, punctu- ality, etc., we do so partly in order to make school- work possible, but mainly in the hope of providing our pupils with a nucleus of habits which they will find useful throughout life. It is therefore very important for us to know under what conditions our efforts are likely to meet with success in this respect. It must be borne in mind that a habit is merely an acquired tendency to act in one particular way in response to one particular stimulus. If, then, we change the stimulus, we thereby cause the nervous energy to take a different path, and have consequently no right to expect that we can still obtain the habitual reaction. Thus punctuality at school is in itself no guarantee for punctuality out of school. If the habit has only been formed in relation to school, it should theoretically only function in relation to school. This theoretical conclusion is in agreement with the 134 The Education of Behaviour results obtained by Squire, in an experiment conducted to “determine whether the habit of producing neat papers in arithmetic will function with reference to neat written work in other subjects.’ She found that “the results were almost startling in their failure to show the slightest improvement in language and spelling papers, although the improvement in arithmetic papers was noticeable from the first.”” (See Bagley, Educative Process, 1905, Chapter XIII, p. 208.) Yet, in spite of theory and in spite of experiment, we know that this is not a correct statement of the case. It is true that many a habit carefully fostered at school is lost in adult life but many another survives, and though most persons are only neat in this or that, yet there are undoubtedly a certain number whom one could correctly describe as “neat all round.” There must therefore be some force at work which we have not yet considered. The problem will be made clearer by reference to an experiment of Ruediger, which forms the complement of that of Squire. Ruediger set out to discover whether “the ideal of neatness brought in connection with, and applied to one school subject functions in other school subjects.”” What exactly this is intended to imply becomes clear by referring to the first three of *The Indirect Improvement of Mental Functions through Ideals, Educational Review, November, 1908. Growth and Control of Habits ee the instructions he gave to the teachers who were responsible for the training. These are as follows :— “(1) In the written work of one school subject pay all the attention you can both to the nabit and to the ideal of neatness. Demand neat papers, have them re-written when necessary. “(2) Talk frequently with the class on the im- portance of neatness in dress, business, the home, hospitals, etc., connecting it as far as you can with the subject under experiment. “(3) Do not bring up the subject of neatness in connection with the other studies at school. If the pupils bring up these studies quietly substitute some- guing-elsey 4). .7 It is clear from this that Ruediger aimed at develop- ing a general desire for neatness as well as the habit of doing neat work in one particular subject. The result he obtained in this way is given by the following extract from the same paper :— “Fyidently neatness made conscious as an ideal or aim in connection with only one school subject does function in other school subjects. Directing our attention to groups 1 and 3” (the two classes in which the instructions were carried out accurately), “the most marked improvement of the papers occurred respec- tively in geography and arithmetic, the subjects in 136 The Education of Behaviour which neatness was emphasised, but there was un- questionable improvement on the average also in other subjects.” If we now compare Squire’s experiment with that of Ruediger, we see that the vital difference between them is the difference in the generality of the desire that was used by the two experiments. Clearly desire must have played its part in Squire’s experiment, though no special mention is made of the fact. Otherwise there could have been no improvement in the work of the children. The interesting point is that the training these children were given was calculated to make them want to improve in arithmetic alone, and that this was, in fact, the only subject in which their work did become neater. Similarly, the improvement was more general in Ruediger’s experiment, because the desire that was stimulated was more general in this case. In other words, the children responded in each case to the training that was given. The inculcation of a limited desire produced a limited improvement, that of a general desire a more general improvement. Hence, when we see what appears to be a general habit at work, we are really only observing the total effect of a number of particular habits, each one of which was acquired separately in order to satisfy the more or less general desire which acted as the common stimulus for all of them, Growth and Control of Habits 137 In any particular case, both the extent to which a habit spreads and its permanence, must, therefore, depend on the desire which acts as stimulus or motive force. A child may look upon, e.g., punctuality as a rather superfluous virtue which is for some reason exacted by school authorities. He may yet be punctual at school, because he desires the approval of his teachers or school-fellows. It is, however, very unlikely that such a child will “transfer” the habit to activities con- nected with his home life, or that he will be punctual of his own accord once the pressure of school opinion has been removed. In other words, new habits suited to a change in environment will only be formed in so far as the motive that was responsible for the original habit is felt to be applicable to that environment. Hence, the less a motive is bound up with any particular environment, the greater is the chance for so-called transference. Evidently the conviction that “this is worth doing for its own sake”’ is likely to produce the most widespread results, always assuming that it has real driving force behind it. How such a conviction develops will be discussed in the chapters on Character, CHAPTER VII EMOTION AND SYMPATHY | A. Emotion. — (1) The James-Lange Theory of Emotions. (2) The Biological Value of Pleasure-toned Emotions. (3) The Control of Emotions. B. Sympathy. (1) The Psychology of “Pure” Sympathy. (2) The Possible Effects of Tendencies which Check Imitation. (a) Indifference. (b) Expression in Emotion. (c) Desire to Help. (3) The Growth of Sympathy in Childhood and Adoles- cence. (a) The Importance of Personal Experience and Imagination. (b) Problems connected with the Self-absorption of the Adolescent. (c) Problems connected with the Awkwardness and Shyness of the Adolescent. A. Emotion (1) The James-Lange Theory of Emotions.—We saw in Chapter II that certain of the impulses may be accompanied by feeling tones so characteristic that 138 Emotion and Sympathy 139 popular usage has given them definite names. These are the emotions fear, anger, love, hate, etc. They are states of mind with which every one is familiar in greater or less degree. Every one can therefore form some idea of their constitution by examining emotional stages of his own immediately after they have run their course. If he does this, he will find that each characteristic feeling tone is accompanied by physio- logical changes within the body which are in some way very closely connected with it. In the case of acute fear, for instance, the victim of the emotion trembles violently, he. becomes covered with cold sweat, the hairs on the skin stand erect, his heart beats wildly -and his breathing is hurried and irregular. If the fear is less extreme, the symptoms are, of course, not so well marked, but even then we can often tell that a certain person is frightened by what we call his “‘ex- pression,” that is to say, by the external bodily changes which form part of the system of the impulse to avoid danger. Indeed, so closely is the emotion connected with the bodily and visceral changes that accompany it, that it has been suggested that what we call emo- tion is really only the effect these changes have upon the mind. This is the physiological theory of emo- tions. It was enunciated at about the same time by James and Lange, and is, therefore, usually called the James-Lange Theory of Emotions. James states it 140 The Education of Behaviour thus: “The bodily changes follow directly the per- ception of the exciting fact, and our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion” (Prin- ciples, p. 449). The main arguments in favour of this theory are the following :— (a) We may get widespread bodily effects before the emotion is aroused. “If we abruptly see a dark, moving form in the woods, our heart stops beating and we catch our breath instantly and before any articulate idea of danger can arise” (Principles, p. 451). (b) The bodily symptoms are so much part of the emotional state that there seems to be no emotion left, if we try to abstract from our consciousness all feel- ings of these symptoms. “Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing and a placid face? The present writer, for one, certainly cannot. The rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations, and the only thing that can possibly be supposed to take its place is some cold- blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons merit chastisement for their sins’ (Principles, II, p. 452). Emotion and Sympathy 141 The main argument against the theory is that it does not explain how different visceral processes can produce the same emotion. Why, for instance, do some people turn red, others white, with anger? It is, however, possible that the anger does, in fact, feel somewhat different in the two cases. Clearly the ques- tion can only be settled finally by means of experiments conducted for that purpose, but the results that have been obtained by different investigators are at present too contradictory to enable us to arrive at any con- clusion. We may assume, then, that emotions cannot exist without accompanying bodily changes, but whether they are interdependent, and, if so, in what way, are problems which still await solution (cf. p. UT): At the same time it is worth while to bear in mind that expression can, at any rate, initiate mild states of emotion and perpetuate strong ones. If we frown, we get a momentary feeling of anger, and if we can make ourselves ‘‘smooth the brow and smile,’ the anger seems thereby to become less, (2) The Biological Value of Pleasure-toned Emo- tions.—The biological value of pleasure-toned emotions is another problem which calls for solution. At first sight anything beyond a keen desire to attain the end of the impulse (e. g. to escape from danger) would appear to be a hindrance rather than a help, seeing that 142 The Education of Behaviour it uses up energy which might easily be expended more profitably. Every one knows how fatal it is to lose one’s head at a critical moment, and to “lose one’s head”’ is really neither more nor less than to let ‘one’s emotions gain the upper hand, that is to say, to dis- sipate energy in emotional expression instead of using it to select the best line of action. It should be noticed that it only depends on the strength of an emotion whether it is pleasant or un- pleasant. We rather enjoy feeling just a little afraid or just a little angry. We tend to prolong such ex- periences, instead of seeking to remove the cause of the emotion. As the student of biology knows, inborn tendencies which produce pleasure, when expressed in action, are, on the whole, of advantage to the individual. It is therefore not without good reason that a slight emotion is pleasurable. To understand what this reason may be, we need only recall that an emotion is produced when more energy is set free by the percept than is used in action, and that energy which is set free in this way normally seeks an outlet of some kind, so that an emotion is produced when there is surplus energy flowing through the nervous system. The fact that a slight emotion is pleasurable is, in short, Nature’s way of teaching us to “think before we leap,” for it makes the time between perception and _ reaction pleasurable, and thus tempts us to prolong it when the Emotion and Sympathy 143 need is not too urgent. We shall realise the value of this by considering what would happen if an individual always experienced acute discomfort in the period be- tween perception and reaction. Under such circum- stances he would naturally strive to react as quickly as possible. This would mean that he would always choose the most obvious form of reaction and would therefore find it very difficult to adapt himself to a changing environment. (3) The Control of Emotions.—While a slight emo- tional state has thus an important function to fulfil, the matter is very different when action is delayed so long, or when the amount of energy set free by the, percept is so great that the individual is overwhelmed by his emotions, In such a case the means by which he tries to relieve pressure may act as safety-valves for energy that would otherwise work harm, but they do not, as a rule, help him to attain the end of the impulse which was the cause of the trouble. We are thus led to con- sider the advisability of preventing this kind of over- flow by training children in self-control in the matter of emotions, | The first thing to realise in this connection is that an impulse cannot be killed. The nervous energy which is set free by the percept may be driven into desirable or into undesirable channels, but it cannot be annihi- lated. 144 The Education of Behaviour This may seem to be untrue at first sight, for every adult has learnt to be indifferent to experiences that would at one time have roused fear, anger or curiosity. It is, however, easy to show that this is due to a different cause. To take a concrete example: When moving staircases were first put into the stations of the London Underground Railways, it was a common oc- currence to see people show real fear in stepping on or off these staircases, whereas most persons do it quite mechanically to-day. Those of us who had occasion to use these staircases frequently, found that the fear quickly became slight enough to be nothing more than a little pleasurable excitement, and that it soon dis- appeared entirely. But this does not mean that we had cured ourselves of our fear of danger. What it means is that we had learnt from experience exactly what to do and how to do it. Thus the moving staircase ceased to be an unknown object which might prove dangerous, and in this way dropped out of the class of things that rouse the impulse to avoid pain and the accompanying emotion of fear. The next unknown thing that we have to face will undoubtedly again cause fear if it seems likely to threaten our safety. In other words, every increase in knowledge and power will remove certain experiences from the class of things that rouse this or that emotion, but when a percept or idea does fall within a certain class, then it is im- Emotion and Sympathy 145 possible to prevent ourselves from experiencing the corresponding impulse. It follows that we can never kill an emotion, even if it were desirable to do so. All we can do with an emotion which is liable to get out of hand is to learn to control it, or to repress it. Moreover, since the sur- plus nervous energy has to escape in some form, it is obviously wiser to guide it into useful, or at least harm- less, channels than merely to block the outlet Nature has provided and trust to luck that it will escape with- out doing us injury. Hence mere repression ought always to be discouraged. How much self-control is desirable in a particular case depends in the main on the traditions of the community in which the individual has to live. A person who is felt to be rather cold in one environment is quite likely to be considered too emotional in another. Yet, since self-control prevents dissipation of energy, a certain amount of it should undoubtedly be acquired by every person who is not - abnormally lacking in emotional life. What exactly is involved in self-control can be dis- covered partly through introspection, partly by study- ing the behaviour of others. If we follow these two lines of investigation, we shall, I think, find that it is really a complex result which is obtained by the co- operation of a number of factors. Fundamental to all is the conviction that self-control is desirable. But 146 The Education of Behaviour that alone is not sufficient. The individual has to learn both what to avoid and what to do before he is able to acquire the habits of choice which will give him the necessary command over himself. Usually he is left to find out these things for himself. Thus he discovers that a slight emotion tends to disappear, if it is not allowed expression. He may also learn that it is not safe to allow himself the luxury of dwelling on a strong desire, if he does not intend to satisfy it. Then, too, he is likely to make certain discoveries on the positive side, such as the importance of keeping himself fully occupied when he is trying to free him- self from something that is preying on his mind and the extent to which a really interesting task will help him in this connection. Besides this, he may learn consciously to divert superfluous energy into suitable channels, to “‘try, try again,” instead of brooding over failure. At any rate he probably acquires certain methods of side-tracking energy while the impulse is actually at work. Thus some yawn when afraid, others sing when angry. It is worth while to notice that people resort to devices of this nature without being aware of their purpose. Thus an individual may not realise that there is a connection between, say, his attempt to control his fear and his tendency to yawn, but this does not, of course, make the act any less effective as a safety-valve. Emotion and Sympathy 147 As devices of this nature are discovered they tend to be adopted, with the result that habits of choice grow up in relation to situations which the individual has to encounter with sufficient frequency. Thus self- control involves certain habits and certain knowledge, as well as the necessary desire. It should therefore not be expected from young children. The educator can, however, prepare the ground for it by finding suitable safety-valves when impulsive activity has to be checked, and by giving practical advice when the child is old enough to appreciate it. With preparatory training such as this the adolescent would find himself in pos- session of habits and knowledge which would make it comparatively easy for him to acquire true self-control —that is to say, power to divert surplus energy into useful or at least harmless channels. B. Sympathy If a boy comes upon a group of schoolmates who look frightened, he also experiences a pang of fear; if they seem curious, he begins to wonder what is hap- pening. But if that same boy is passing through the stage of despising girls, he will pass a group of girls who look angry or puzzled with a cursory glance and the conviction that it is no concern of his. The same is, of course, true of adults. We have all of us reason 148 The Education of Behaviour to know that it requires a definite effort not to become infected by the emotional state of any one who in any sense of the word “belongs” to us, even when we have no idea what is the cause of his excitement. Yet the behaviour of people outside our “group” leaves us in- different, or even arouses some contrary state of mind such as amusement or annoyance. The tendency to “feel with” other people is therefore closely bound up with gregariousness. The larger and the more numer- ous the groups to which we feel we belong, the more often will this tendency be called into play. Any individual who belongs to our group for the purpose in hand will inevitably rouse it, and one who does not will as certainly leave us unaffected. It will be con- venient to call this tendency to feel with others of our own group pure psychological sympathy, in order to distinguish it from sympathy in the popular sense of the word. (1) The Psychology of “Pure” Sympathy.—We have already seen that gregariousness (that is to say, fear of solitude with or without the desire for friends) tends to make us imitate the behaviour of others, and that this imitation extends to emotions as well as action. We know from our study of imitation that the reproduction of the actions of others is due to the interaction of one or other form of gregariousness with one or more sentiments or complexes. We have Emotion and Sympathy 149 now to account for the reproduction of emotional states. It seems probable that this is primarily due to our tendency to imitate the expression of our com- panions, since it is sufficient to assume the typical ex- pression of an emotion (e.g. the frown and the clenched fists of anger) in order to experience the same to a slight extent. But this does not explain whence we derive the energy to feel furiously angry as a member of an angry crowd when we do not even know the cause of the disturbance. Nor does it explain why or how we learn to notice so small a thing as the expres- sion of another.? The tendency to notice the expression of others is probably acquired during childhood under the pressure of the self-preservative impulses. A child is depend- ent on others for most of the good things of life and he usually finds out at a comparatively early age that it often only depends on the mood of his elders whether they give or withhold the necessary facilities for some exploit. Thus he soon discovers that the moods of others are worthy of consideration. It may be that experience would gradually teach him to connect certain expressions with certain moods, but as a matter of fact **We must become aware of an act before we can imitate it, but such awareness need not necessarily be conscious. It may be due to the activity of some unconscious complex (cf. Chap- ter IV, p. 98). Both these points are therefore in need of fur- ther consideration. 150 The Education of Behaviour he is rarely left to his own resources in this respect. “Don’t worry Father, can’t you see that he is tired?” makes him at least try to “see,” and ‘We can risk this ’ to-day, Mr. X is obviously in a good temper,” makes him anxious to acquire similar wisdom when the pre- diction turns out to be correct. Once the desire has been aroused, the rest is a matter of learning by trial and error. At first many mistakes are made, but there is no lack of practice and the child of seven or eight is often already quite expert in interpreting such forms of expression as come within his experience. The strength which an induced emotion can acquire in a crowd can be explained in the following way. As we know, we produce a slight feeling of anger in ourselves by assuming the characteristic expression of » anger, that is to say, we stimulate the system of im- pulse to fight by this means. If our expression is due to the fact that we are imitating the members of a crowd of which we form part, then our gregariousness is active and the resulting desire (conscious or un- conscious) to be like the others provides energy for the impulse to fight. Self-regard may be stimulated as well, if the persons whose anger induced ours hap- pen to belong to a group of which we are rather proud to be members, for it is then impossible to own that they are in the wrong without at the same time hurting our self-respect. Thus a number of powerful senti- Emotion and Sympathy 151 ments and complexes may reinforce the original feeling of anger. (2) Possible Effects of Tendencies which Check Imitation.—(a) Indifference. What happens there- after depends on circumstances. We may allow the energy to take its primitive path: then we imitate the behaviour of our companions without giving a thought to the why and wherefore. If they fight, we fight; if they run away, we run away. In such a case all the energy of the group will be expended in action, and there will then be little or no emotion. On the other hand, there may be no such outlet. Thus the crowd which is listening to an orator who is enflaming it with a desire to fight for some cause, has no outlet in action, because the enemy is not at hand. Hence the energy which is being set free takes the only path that is open for it, namely, that of anger and its expression. More- over, the anger of any individual is fed by the anger of his neighbours if he identifies himself with the crowd. Suppose, however, that some of the members of the audience feel superior to the rest of the crowd, that they have little belief in the orator, or enough know- ledge to be aware that some of his statements are not accurate. Clearly these will remain calm and critical throughout the harangue, or, if stirred at all, will only be aware of a desire to oppose the orator. They do 152. The Education of Behaviour not acknowledge him as their leader, and are therefore not influenced by him. They do not acknowledge the crowd as one of their “groups,” and are therefore not infected by its excitement. (b) Expression in Emotion—We may, however, “feel with” our companions and yet check the impulse to act like them. In that case there are two courses open to us: we may either decide to do nothing at all, or we may use our energy to help them in some way. If we do nothing, the energy which has been set free tends to escape by the channel of emotional ex- pression, since that is the only one which is open to it. As we shall see later, this provides us with a valuable source of recreation by enabling us to “live through” the emotions depicted in a work of fiction or engendered by the perception of beauty, without forcing us to express ourselves in action (cf. Passive Play, p. 233). On the other hand, it is not for the good of the community that an individual should get into the habit of finding relief in emotion, since such a course can only end in self-indulgence and senti- mentalism. (c) Desire to Help.—tlf we are conscious of a desire to help our companions, the energy which was set free by observing them must have been diverted to stimulate the protective impulse. In such a case we may be Emotion and Sympathy T53 stirred so deeply that we act first and think afterwards. As a rule there is, however, time for the self to wake up, and it then depends on the idea we have of our “self” whether we are willing to make the necessary sacrifice. If the cost is not too great, we allow the im- pulse to take its normal path, and consequently give help of some kind (cf. Protective Impulse, p. 43). Otherwise we check our desire to help and expend the energy that has been set free in various forms of emo- tional expression, such as assurances of what we would do, if we could. It should be noticed that the sympathy which ex- presses itself in a desire to help always implies a certain degree of superiority on the part of the giver. At that moment he is, at any rate, not in the sarhe diffi- culty; the fact that he would like to help is sufficient to prove that. Moreover, if he allows the impulse free play, he provides so much more food for his self- assertion. Hence, giving without receiving in return is likely to lead to patronage, if not to pity. True practical sympathy only exists between equals, that is to say, between persons who are able and willing to help each other. Within our own group we respect our superiors, sympathise with our equals and pity our inferiors. Outside our own group we are dealing with creatures we do not know, with beings with whom we have 154 The Education of Behaviour nothing in common. They do not stir our gregarious- ness and are therefore unable to awaken our sym- pathy. If they seem dangerous, we avoid them; if they seem weak and defenceless, we ignore them or use them to satisfy our love of power. When we are dealing with members of our own group sympathy often forces us to restrain ourselves. Here there is no such check. They are so different from us that we are unable to feel with them. If challenged, we should probably assert quite honestly, “Oh, they don’t mind,” or, “It does not hurt them as it would you or me.” This is the attitude of mind which accounts for much of the cruelty of young boys. It is true that an act of cruelty is occasionally a form of revenge. If a child is repressed on every side and feels in revolt against his environment, he may suddenly discover that he can find relief for his feelings by maltreating a cat oradog. Such a child may learn to enjoy watch- ing the fear and suffering of his victims. But these cases are fortunately rare. In most cases cruelty is simply due to thoughtlessness combined with self- assertion. The animal does not rouse the sympathy of the boy, because his groups are not yet wide enough to include it, and he can therefore ill-treat it without being checked by any feeling of remorse at the suf- fering he is causing. Obviously, cruelty of this kind can be prevented by awakening the boy’s power to Emotion and Sympathy 155 “feel with” the creature in question. In this way it is usually possible to turn the persecutor into quite an effective protector. In dealing with the inferior members of our own groups we are not likely to be guilty of intentional cruelty, in spite of our feeling of superiority, because psychological sympathy makes us “feel with’? them in their troubles. Moreover, self-assertion prevents us from imitating them and we must therefore either vent our energy in emotion or use it in giving help of some kind. Most people would, however, agree that serious harm is at times done by the help which is given in this way. This is due partly to self-assertion and partly to ignorance. As the recipients are our inferiors, we are prepared to find them different in some ways, and it is therefore easy for us to salve our conscience with the reflection that they ‘“‘will not mind’ when we are tempted to give help which will satisfy our love of power at the expense of their self-respect. Moreover, it is only in the wider groups, such as those comprised by humanity and nationality, that we acknowledge them as comrades. In other respects they belong to groups about which we know nothing and for which we have consequently no sympathy. We are there- fore unable to appreciate their needs as clearly as those of our equals and are consequently in danger of giving the wrong kind of help even when actuated by the best 156 The Education of Behaviour of motives. In short, the giver needs knowledge and self-control, if his help is to be of real use to the recipient. From the point of view of community life, it is therefore very important that young people should be trained to use their protective impulse to the best advantage. How far this is secured by encouraging them to contribute to public charities is at least open to question (cf. Protective Impulse, pp. 43-46). (3) The Growth of Sympathy in Childhood and Adolescence.—Before concluding, it will be worth while to study the factors on which the growth of sympathy depends. I shall begin with pure psychological sympathy. As we have just seen, this is the tendency to reproduce in ourselves the emotions which are being experienced by our companions. Thus the frequency with which an individual “feels with’ others depends primarily on the number of persons who are able to stimulate his gregariousness. This must in turn depend on the strength of the underlying sentiments and complexes, but the range of persons with whom he is able to sym- pathise can be greatly increased by providing him with suitable experience and by encouraging him to bring his imagination to bear on the problems which are raised by the conduct of others. (a) The Importance of Personal Experience and Imagination.—The need for personal experience be- Emotion and Sympathy 157 comes obvious when we reflect that we have to gather the mental states of others from their expression and their words. We can only see what we know. It is true that we tend to put some meaning into every act and word of our companions, but it is the meaning which is most 1n accord with our own experience and it may therefore be hopelessly incorrect. Children often give us an opportunity to realise. this. They do not “see” when the adult is worried or tired, they do not understand when he tries to explain his point of view to them: A harassed peasant farmer is driven by the need for sympathy to tell his little daughter of five that he is going to clear a piece of waste ground single-handed. The child is greatly flattered by her father’s confidence and vaguely aware that there is something wrong, but his hopes and wor- ries are quite beyond her. Anxious to show her interest, she finally asks: “And how about the bird- nests, father?’ (Bazin). In childhood we are only able to “feel with” persons whose lives are very similar to our own; but this is no longer the case as we grow older, for we gradually accumulate enough experience to be able to build from it or “imagine” the mental state of persons whose problems are somewhat different from any we have had to tackle. During adolescence the individual should therefore 158 The Education of Behaviour greatly extend the range of his sympathies. In prac- tice there are, however, great differences in the extent to which this is actually achieved. ‘For some a chance word or a headline in a newspaper is presently suf- ficient to rouse them, others need a detailed account, or even the outward signs of joy or suffering to awaken their sympathy, and a certain number never learn to “feel with’ any one whose life is at all unlike their own. No doubt this is partly due to inborn differences : the more gregarious a person is, the more imaginative he is, the easier does he find it to sympathise with them. All the same it is the environment which decides what use a particular adolescent learns to make of his powers, for he will check or indulge his natural interest in another according to the standards of behaviour of those he admires, and he will do his best to under- stand the point of view of an inferior or rest satisfied with unimaginative patronage according to the example they set him. The extent to which we experience “practical sym- pathy,” or a desire to help those in difficulty instead of merely “feeling with’ them, is clearly dependent on similar factors. Innate differences in the strength of the protective impulse must play their part, but the traditions absorbed from the environment are usually far more important. (b) The Self-absorption of the Adolescent—The Emotion and Sympathy 159 reader may have noticed that the sympathies of the adolescent usually develop by fits and starts. At times he is keenly interested in the doings of others, at times wholly self-absorbed and only able to see things from his own point of view. This is probably unavoidable. Self-preservation impels us to look after ourselves first of all. Hence the success or failure of a companion ap- peals to us primarily as something which might have happened to ourselves. It is true that we “feel with” the other, but we do not rest satisfied with that, if we are at all likely to be in the same position ourselves some day. In such a case our self-regard promptly makes us wonder how we should have acted under similar circumstances. Moreover, if we are compelled to admit to ourselves that we should have been unable to cope with the situation, it causes us to look upon the event as a personal warning, and thus impels us to do our utmost to acquire the qualities which we consider necessary. The adolescent is often in this position, for he is continually hearing or reading about things which might fall to his lot some day and which would certainly find him unprepared. Besides, he oc- casionally has unpleasant experiences of his own. Hence it is not strange to find that there are times when he needs all his energy for the solution of his own problems. When a youth is going through a phase of this kind he may become irritable and difficult, 160 The Education of Behaviour for the emotional strain can be very great and he is often only half aware of what is going on within him. In the right environment he is, however, all the better for his spell of egotism. Sooner or later he finds relief in hard intellectual work, in religious exercises, or in a combination of the two. Then his “self” gradually becomes less absorbing and he is once again able to — think of others. We may take it, then, that the periods of self- absorption to which the adolescent is liable are due to his efforts to prepare himself for adult life. The difficulties with which he is faced at such times make him peculiarly sensitive to the opinion of those he ad- mires; yet he rarely confides in them, for his thoughts are so vague and his fear of ridicule is so great that he usually finds it impossible to express himself in words. Hence it is often extremely difficult to know what kind of help to give. All the same, it is not wise to leave him entirely to his own resources when he is passing through one of these phases. The intelligent youth soon discovers that the pursuit of knowledge or art can be very attractive for its own sake. Asa rule he also finds that people rather respect him for his love of study, and that he can therefore always plead ‘‘work’”’ when he wants to escape from some tiresome social obligation. Hence he is liable to become excessively self-centred, if he is allowed to Emotion and Sympathy 161 think that no one has any claim on his time so long as he is doing his work properly. Moreover, it is not always love of study that renders a youth self-absorbed, often it is rather fear of life that makes him take to study as a way out of his difficulties. This fear may be due to the example set by some one he admires, or to some shock he has ex- perienced himself. In either case he is seldom aware of the bearing it has on his love of study. Often he does not even know that he is afraid, for he represses the unpleasant thoughts again and again under the in- fluence of shame, and usually ends by “forgetting” them so far as his conscious self is concerned. Unfor- tunately this does not mean that he has thereby con- quered his fear of life, since that can only be done by facing the unpleasant experience squarely (cf. Complexes, p. 88). As we have already seen, the fear is merely driven below the surface of consciousness and is able to affect his behaviour as much as ever. Still, he has gained a certain amount in personal com- fort. He has forgotten all about it, and can therefore honestly persuade himself that his dislike for social intercourse is merely a matter of “taste.” Usually he goes a step further and decides that those who differ from him in this matter are both frivolous and super- ficial. Once this stage has been reached he is quite safe from painful recollections, for the opinions of 162 The Education of Behaviour those others cease to be worthy of his notice. Hence- forth he can concentrate on his own development with- out a single qualm of conscience. Needless to say, the result is likely to be an individual who is both self- centred and narrow-minded. It is difficult to deal with a case of this kind in its later stages, because the individual is perfectly satisfied with the course he has mapped out for himself. Ideally the emotional shock should, of course, have been avoided. Failing that, its effect can be minimised by giving the adolescent an opportunity to “talk it out” with a sympathetic elder before he has begun to repress it. This, too, is often impossible, for pride usually impels a youth to keep his fears to himself. Thus he may have time to build up his defences fairly securely before we discover that there is anything amiss. In such a case a direct frontal attack is use- less, for he does not consider himself at fault. It may, however, be possible to influence him indirectly through his environment. If he finds himself among people whose efficiency in his chosen pursuits is greater than his own, and who yet consider it wrong to allow their work to absorb all their thoughts, he may begin to wonder whether he has planned his own life wisely and may thus be led to try to overcome his dislike for social intercourse. Whether he succeeds in this will then depend on the amount of hold his fear has Emotion and Sympathy 163 got over him. He may be able to conquer it. On the other hand, it may check him at every turn, making it impossible for him to “feel with’ any one whose tastes are at all unlike his own. If he fails, there is still one other way of helping him. The forgotten fear can be brought back to his consciousness in the way that was described in Chapter IV (see p. 79). He can then be made to see the bearing it has on his other difficulties, and can thus be taught the importance of fighting it in the open. He may even then need encouragement from some one he respects, to make him persist in his efforts, but with that he is almost certain to overcome his dislike in the end. (c) The Awkwardness and Shyness of the Adoles- cent.—Sometimes the development of the sympathy of an adolescent is checked in a different way. He does not consciously turn away from others, but he is practically driven from their presence by his awkwardness and shyness. He trembles and turns red in the presence of strangers, he may even begin to stammer—in fact, he shows all the signs of fear. It is easy enough to convince such a one that his fear of strangers is illogical, but that does not help him, for it does not touch the true cause of his difficulties. As analysis shows, that is always an experience which happened perhaps years ago and which was repressed at the time, instead of being faced openly. Thus Dr. Bruce gives 164 The Education of Behaviour us the following account of a young man who suffered from this extreme form of shyness: From among the half-forgotten memories of his boyhood there ap- peared the picture of his first employer—a stern, cold, hard man with piercing eyes. “Those eyes seemed to be on me everywhere I went. They seemed to be watch- ing for the least mistake I made. I began to wonder what would happen to me if I did make mistakes. Then I began to feel incompetent, and to fear that he would notice my incompetency. I grew nervous, awkward, timid. Whenever he spoke to me I jumped, I blushed, I trembled. After a time I did the same when anybody spoke to me... . I try not to think of him, but I know I do” (Handicaps of Childhood, p. 179). In this instance the individual was cured by per- suading him that the behaviour of his employer was the real cause of his difficulties, but that it need not affect him any longer and that he would therefore be able to conquer his shyness, if he made a serious at- tempt to do so. Whenever a case of this kind is analysed, similar results seem to be obtained. We may therefore con- clude that the extreme forms of shyness and self- absorption are usually, if not always, due to the re- pression of some painful incident which should have been tackled at the time of its occurrence. OP a VII THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHARACTER A. The Effect of Individual Differences in :— (1) Disposition and general Attitude towards Life. (2) Will-power. B. The Attainment of Strength of Character. (1) The Importance of Organisation and (2) of the Choice of a Suitable Master-Sentiment. (3) The Limitations of Will-power. C. The Meaning of a “Fine” Character. CHARACTER may be defined as the sum total of all the tendencies which make for consistency in behaviour. When we speak of a person as lacking in character, we mean that he is abnormally impulsive and unreliable. When we do something foolish in a moment of excite- ment, we seek an excuse in the fact that we were not “ourselves” at the time. Thus the character of an individual is seen most clearly in his deliberate acts of choice. As would be expected, the forces which determine his decision in such a case are partly innate and partly 165 166 The Education of Behaviour acquired. They may be enumerated as follows: (1) Such sentiments, complexes and habits of choice or action as are involved at the moment; (2) his know- ledge of the subject in hand and of his own limita- tions; (3) his intelligence or ability to make use of what knowledge he has; (4) his general attitude to- wards life; (5) his disposition, and, in cases where there are obstacles to overcome, (6) his will-power. The effect of sentiments and complexes has been considered at sufficient length in the preceding pages. The effect of differences in intelligence and the de- pendence of knowledge on intelligence and interest © are too obvious to need discussion. We have still to consider differences in disposition, in the general at- titude towards life and in will-power. The disposition of a person depends on the peculiar- ities of his impulses. It makes him irascible, timid or patient, as the case may be. As will be seen in the course of this chapter, there is reason to believe that the amount of will-power of an individual depends on his disposition, and that it can therefore only be af- fected within the limits within which it is possible to alter the latter. The general attitude towards life includes such quali- ties as optimism, contentedness and their opposites. These are usually said to show the temperament of a person. They are no doubt in part determined by The Psychology of Character 167 another quality which has an important bearing on the development of character, namely, the perseverative tendency of the individual. This is the tendency for ideas and images to recur in the mind when the in- dividual is making no conscious effort to recall them and when their recurrence is not due to the activity of some strong sentiment or complex. It is strong in some persons, weak in others, but there is reason to believe that no normal individual is entirely without it. Its effect on behaviour is more far-reaching than may appear at first sight. The individual in whom ideas of all kinds recur readily is likely to grow cautious and thoughtful, for experiences will tend to ‘“‘perse- verate’”’ for some time and will thus have more chance of becoming fixed in his conscious memory. Such a person will make a reliable leader when he has time to plan his course of action, but he may lose his head if he has to act on the spur of the moment. On the other hand, the individual who has only a slight ten- dency to perseverate is likely to forget past discom- fitures with greater ease. Hence he will tend to be brilliant rather than thorough, daring rather than wise. A. Individual Differences (1) Differences in Disposition and in the General Attitude towards Life —Our knowledge of the physio- 168 The Education of Behaviour logical basis of disposition and temperament is of comparatively recent date. Dr. Head has shown that differences in disposition depend in part on the way in which and on the extent to which the greater brain controls certain portions of the lesser (cf. Myer’s Te-t- book, p. 313). This, however, only explains certain kinds of dif- ferences. By far the larger number seem to be due to the activity of the endocrine glands. These organs are very varied in size and are distributed in different parts of the body. Their function is to provide the body with substances which are essential for its health and development. The best known of them is per- haps the thyroid. This is a small mass of cellular tissue, situated in the neck near the “Adam’s apple.” If it does not function properly, the patient may be reduced to a state of apathy bordering on idiocy, where- as too great activity on its part may throw him into a state of excitement verging on that of a maniac. That it is really a secretion of this gland which can be responsible for all this is shown by the fact that patients in whom the gland does not function properly can, as a rule, be restored to a normal state of mind by means of properly regulated doses of the thyroid gland of sheep. Another pair of glands which are to-day well known are the adrenal or suprarenal glands (cf. p. 111). In The Psychology of Character 169 man they consist of an outer portion, the cortex, and a central portion, the medulla. “It has been said with considerable truth that the secretion from the medulla or core makes for flight, whilst that from the cortex makes for fight. Certain it is that animals with a larger cortex are pugnacious and dangerous, whereas those with a narrow cortex and relatively large medulla are timorous and fugitive.’ The much-discussed “monkey glands” belong to the same category, but these two instances will be sufficient to show the extent to which endocrine glands affect the development of the individual. To quote once more from the same article: “According to the exact proportion in which their essences are mixed in your blood, you are tall or short, dark or fair, phlegmatic or choleric, saint or sinner’ (Leonard Williams, of. Cie peieGe }: Evidently the development and functioning of these glands is of first-rate importance to the educator. He cannot affect them directly because they are not under the conscious control of the individual (cf. p. 105), but he can aid their normal development by providing hygienic conditions of life. Fresh air, exercise, sleep, sunshine, and food rich in vitamins all have their part to play, the last two perhaps more than the rest. On *Leonard Williams, “The Constituents of the Unconscious,” British Journal of Psychology, Medical Section, 1922, p. 263. 170 The Education of Behaviour the other hand, disease and nervous strain, more particularly fear and worry, may affect the inborn balance in such a way that the whole character is changed. Thus the work of endocrine glands has once again demonstrated the truth of the old saying, ‘mens sana in corpore sano.” ‘The glands and the nervous system are, in fact, the physiological basis of charac- ter. If they are not in health, much of our educational effort is necessarily wasted. (2) Differences in Will-power.—Will-power may be defined as the power to strengthen a weak motive so as to make it predominate over its rival. If I and P stand for conflicting motives, of which I is the weaker, and E stands for the effort needed to make I predominate, then the relation between I, E and P can be represented symbolically as follows :— I per seP (James, Text-book of Psychology, p. 444). It has been suggested by several writers that the effort E comes from the self as a whole, and that the power to make this effort is fundamental to any con- sciousness of a “me’’ as an independent individual. _ Two important investigations into the psychology of will-power should be studied in this connection. These are those of (a) Dr. Ach and (0) Drs. Michotte and Prum. (a) The purpose of Dr. Ach’s experiment was to The Psychology of Character 171 study what goes on within us when we try to act on a decision which involves the conquest of a contrary tendency, such as a strong impulse or a well-established habit. He began by giving his subjects pairs of non- rhyming syllables to memorise, until strong associa- tions had been formed between the members of each pair. He then showed them the first of each pair separately and asked them to give a rhyme to each instead of giving the syllable associated with it. Thus the process was in every way similar to that gone through by a person who has made up his mind to break a certain habit by forming another definite habit and has now to act on his decision. By making the associations stronger in some cases than in others, Dr. Ach was, moreover, able to distinguish between the task of opposing a strong, and that of opposing a weak, tendency. (In case it should be suggested that the experiment did not produce a “real” obstacle to overcome, it may be well to state that success and failure were found to produce definite feelings of pleasure and unpleasure respectively. Moreover, each was accompanied by expressive movements, such as smiling, flushing, on the one hand, stamping and excla- mations of anger on the other.) For a full discussion of the results, the reader must be referred to Dr. Ach’s bock, Willensakt und Temperament. For the present purpose, only the following points need to be noted :-— 172 The Education of Behaviour (1) When the opposition was strong the introspec- tions showed :— (a) Feelings of strain, tension, etc. © (b) A definite consciousness of “I will, I really wish,” in the period immediately preced- ing the act. (c) A characteristic strengthening of the de- termination, which seemed to be only possible within certain limits, so that the subject failed, much to his own annoy- ance, when the opposition was too strong. (2) When the opposition was weak :— (a) All feelings of strain disappeared, and (b) The personal element dropped out and there was, instead, merely the conscious- ness of “this must or shall be done.” Hence it would seem that we have a fund of extra energy on which we can draw when we are trying to overcome resistance, but that there are definite limits to the amount which we can use in this way at a given moment. (b) The experiment of Drs. Michotte and Prum was intended to study the psychology of that other act in which we are conscious of an effort of will, the act of choice. In this case, two numbers were pre- sented to the subject which he might add or subtract, The Psychology of Character 173 but whichever he chose he had to have a “serious reason” for his choice. Here again it is impossible to give more than the main result of the experiment. This is, that the subjects had in this case a conscious- ness of personally turning towards one of the alterna- tives, a “consciousness of action” as the experimenters called it. This “consciousness of action’? was felt to be something quite different from the feelings of strain, etc., which these subjects also experienced in cases of difficulty. Like the “I really wish’ of Dr. Ach’s subjects, it seems to suggest that “the self’’ is involved in a peculiarly intimate way whenever true acts of will are performed. The form in which we become conscious of this appeal to the self was studied by Boyd Barrett in the course of the experiment which was described at some length in Chapter V. The introspections obtained by him in cases in which choice was difficult, showed that we either act on impulse (in which case the result is not a “willed” choice in our sense of the word) or appeal to a general principle, such as “Take the more familiar.”’ In other words, true acts of choice in which decision is difficult are characterised by an appeal to an idea which derives its energy more or less directly from the self-regarding sentiment. The “characteristic strengthening of the determina- tion” of Ach, the “consciousness of action” of Mi- 174 The Education of Behaviour chotte and Prum, the “appeal to a general principle” of Boyd Barrett, all therefore point to the same con- clusion, namely, that our will-power, 1.e. the energy that makes it possible for us to overcome resistance within ourselves, is in some way derived from our self-regarding sentiment. Dr. McDougall puts it thus: “We may, then, define volition as the supporting or re-enforcing of a desire or conation (7. e. attempt to act) by the co-operation of an impulse excited within the system of the self-regarding sentiment” (Social Psychology, p. 249). | B. The Attainment of Strength of Character (1) Organisation of Sentiments——Since character is that which makes for consistency in behaviour, a person cannot be said to have a character at all until he has learnt to be somewhat consistent in his actions: thus a child cannot be said to have a character in any useful sense of the word until he has acquired at least one fixed sentiment, such as love for his mother. As his sentiments develop, his desires tend to become more permanent, and as his consciousness of his own in- dividuality grows in clearness, he begins to exert his native will-power in service of these desires. But this is not sufficient to ensure ultimate strength of charac- ter, for it does not prevent the co-existence of incom- patible sentiments, such as love of truth and love of The Psychology of Character 175 popularity. The really “strong” man is the man who has a definite aim in life and who cares about this aim sufficiently to abstain from gratifying chance desires which would involve him in activities that are not in accordance with it. Needless to say, fine will- power, though essential, is not sufficient. The person who wishes to acquire a strong character must also make up his mind clearly what he wants most of all and which, of any two alternatives, he wants more than the other. In other words, he must organise his sentiments in relation to some clearly-defined master- sentiment, otherwise his very strength of will may lead him into inconsistencies owing to the temporary predominance of some sentiment which is incompatible with his general scheme of life. In order to attain strength of character with the minimum of effort, it is well to remember that we are so constituted that every act lays the foundation for a habit, every train of thought for an association, and that it depends entirely on the way in which we use this quality of the nervous system whether it proves a help or a hindrance in the attainment of the end. To quote from Mr. Shand (Foundations of Character, p. 70), “The laws of association tend to disorganise all systems of character, so far as they introduce into them constituents which are useless or harmful, and lead to the formation of bad habits; but they also sub- 176 The Education of Behaviour serve them by strengthening serviceable connections, which lead to the formation of good habits. The law of organisation, on its side, tends to exclude from these systems all constituents that owe their presence there to the action of association alone.” (2) The Choice of the Master Sentiment.—Quite as important as the organisation of the sentiments, is the choice of the aim. The whole structure is liable to fall to pieces if the “master sentiment” is destroyed. It is, therefore, vital that this should be one which is not at the mercy of every passing event. To ensure this, an attempt should be made to formulate as “gen- eral’ an aim as possible. The desire “‘to be successful” is more likely to make for strength than the desire “‘to be successful in a particular venture,” and “‘to be use- ful” has a greater element of permanence in it than “to be useful to a particular person’; since the failure of the venture or the death of the person may make the individual with the particularised aim lose all interest in life, whereas a similar check will leave the person with the more generalised aim with plenty of other things which are worth doing. Of course, even the person with a highly generalised aim may give up his efforts in despair if he meets with failure after failure. How soon this limit is reached in a particular case would seem to depend on the native pugnacity or “will-power”’ of the individual, on his general attitude towards life, — The Psychology of Character 177 and on the extent to which his master-ideal has become incorporated in his self-regarding sentiment. (3) The Limitations of Will-power.—One further point has to be considered in this connection, that is the difficulty which is sometimes experienced when it becomes necessary to act in accordance with a care- fully considered resolution. This is a common phe- nomenon. It is perhaps most readily understood by comparing the act of choice with the lifting of a weight by a number of ropes, each pulling it in a dif- ferent direction with a different amount of pull. In such a case one of three things may happen: usually the weight will move in a direction different from that of any of the ropes to which it is tied (a direction which represents, as it were, a compromise between their separate effects), but it may also move in the direction of one of the ropes, or it may not move at all. Even if it happens to move in the direction of one of the ropes, the effect of the others is not there- by lost, for they will either increase or decrease the rate of movement of the weight according to the amount and the direction of the pull on them. Each of these alternatives may occur in an act of choice. The ropes fixed in direction may be taken to repre- sent motives, the pull on them the driving force behind the motives, or motive force, as it is usually called, and the weight the problem which has to be solved. 178 The Education of Behaviour In the act of choice compromise is not always possible and selection of one course of action at the expense of the other alternative (7. e. movement along one of the ropes) is therefore more frequent, but here, too, the other desires play their part by affecting the ease with which the choice is made. Moreover, if we tie only one rope to a weight and pull that, we get the effect of the pull on that rope separately, but if we now add another, we can only observe the way its pull affects the result obtained by the first. We have to resort to calculation, if we wish to decide what the effect of the second would have been by itself without actually removing the first. Similarly, when we have two alternative lines of action at our disposal, we do not, as a rule, become aware of the absolute value of the second during the process of choice; we only judge it as better or worse than the first. But the absolute value of the alternative we have selected has an uncomfortable way of be- coming conscious when we have to express a decision in action. At times we may even fail in the attempt, for the energy which was sufficient to make us choose one of two alternatives when we were judging it in relation to the other, may be unequal to the strain when we are faced with the full amount of un- pleasure it involves at the moment of action.1 The *Cf. Table II and Boyd Barrett, op. cit., Chapter X. The Psychology of Character 179 extent to which a person is able to sacrifice immediate pleasure under such conditions is perhaps the best indication of his strength of character. C. The Meaning of a “Fine” Character In order to complete this sketch of the psycho- logy of character, it is necessary to consider what is involved in a “fine” character. Clearly strength is one of its constituents, but strength alone is not sufficient. We judge the quality of a person’s character at least as much by the nature of his master sentiment as by the consistency of his behaviour; in fact, of the two, many of us are more inclined to forgive weakness than what we consider a “poor” aim in life. By com- mon consent a really fine man must have plenty of “strength of mind’ and he must use his powers in service of a principle which we admire. Perhaps one other qualification should be added for members of a community such as ours, that is, a clear realisation of the personal prejudices for which he has to make allowance in all his decisions. As has been shown above, this means that he must, at least, realise that sentiments and complexes influence judgment at every turn. Ideally, he should also be aware of the most important of his complexes, so that he can allow for them in cases in which they are likely to affect his verdict. CHAPTER IX THE TRAINING OF CHARACTER A. “Lawful” and “Lawless” Obstacles. (1) Lessons Taught by “Lawful” Obstacles. (2) The Artificial Manipulation of the Environment. (3) Approval and Disapprovat as “Tawful” Obstacles. B. Pleasure and Unpleasure as Incentives to Right Behaviour. C. Intention and Execution. D. The Part Played by Suggestion. (1) Direct versus Indirect Suggestion. (2) Difficulties in the Use of Direct Suggestion. E. Problems Connected with Self-Government at School. A. “Lawful” and “Lawless” Obstacles One of the first discoveries a child makes when he is beginning to try his powers on his little world, is that he has to reckon with obstacles of two different kinds—those that seem to be no one’s fault, and those that seem to have been placed in his way by some one else, the “lawful” and the “lawless” as we may call 180 The Training of Character 181 them.1 He soon discovers that it is useless to get angry about lawful obstacles. But the “lawless” are on a different footing. They have been put in his way by some one else and it just depends on his attitude towards that some one else, whether he takes them in good part or resents them as an unwarranted inter- ference with his freedom of action. (1) Lessons Taught by “Lawful” Obstacles—At first the classification into “lawful” and “lawless” is necessarily very crude. The tiny child who knocks himself against a table hits that table in his anger, for he has yet to learn that the table cannot move out of his way. Similarly he eats the bright red berry without even wondering whether it may harm him. He must have time and experience to find out the forces which govern his little universe. Sooner or later he learns that he cannot transgress the laws of his own nature without paying the penalty, thus he cannot sit about in damp clothes without catching a cold. As his experience increases, he finds with our aid that all that surrounds him, all the “not me” as it were, is also governed by laws that cannot be infringed without paying the penalty. Thus his *The “law” in question may be a law of unconscious nature or of human nature, or it may be a mere convention. Lawful is to be taken to mean “in obedience to some fixed law,” what- ever the origin of that law, and “lawless” as the opposite of “lawful.” 182 The Education of Behaviour building-blocks refuse to stand in certain positions however often he tries; his seedlings die if he does not give them any water; his companions do not like him if he is too quarrelsome, etc., etc. In every such case the child begins by assuming that the undesired act was done on purpose to annoy him, just as the savage thinks that some evil spirit must have thrown down the stone which fell from the cliff and hurt him. Our knowledge of what is and what is not due to “law” is in fact the result of centuries of reflection on experience, and the child would acquire little or none of it without guidance from his elders. Whenever a lesson can be learnt through direct experience, without undue risk to the learner, it is a mistake to try to save the child from the consequences of his acts, and this for three reasons: (1) because there is nothing so convincing as personal experience, (2) because every such interference is liable to rouse resentment, and hence to defeat its own end, and (3) because it is essential for every one to learn the difficult art of interpreting his own experience correctly and it is therefore advisable to give a child every opportunity of acquiring the necessary skill. There are, however, many cases in which the “lawful” consequences are too ill-defined or too distant to appeal to a child. Thus it would, for instance, be very unfair to a child to allow him to form a habit, the undesirability of which he will The Training of Character 183 only be able to appreciate in years to come. In such cases we must, therefore, supplement the teaching of Nature and Man by means of artificial stimuli which are suited to the stage of development of the child. (2) The Artificial Mampulation of the Environ- ment.—This can sometimes be done by providing an artificial environment which the pupil assumes to be “natural,’ and which puts him into a position in which he is able to learn from his own experience. We can, for instance, teach an only child that selfish- ness is undesirable by providing him with suitable companions, and we can stimulate an adolescent to greater effort by putting the right kind of biography in his way. So long as the child does not know why he has been provided with companions, and so long as the youth thinks that it is “chance” that he has come across the book, the desired lesson will seem to each a discovery of his own, and his self-regard will there- fore urge him to turn it to good account. When such manipulation of the environment is im- possible, we have to resort to methods in which the personal element is frankly avowed, that is, to expres- sions of approval or disapproval or to concrete rewards and punishments, The younger the child, the less will he be able to draw the right conclusions from his ex- perience, and the more often will it be necessary to 184 The Education of Behaviour resort to personal pressure. It should, however, be borne in mind that punishments and rewards, as well as praise and blame, are only temporary expedients, and are by no means ideal incentives to right behaviour. Punishments and rewards appeal primarily to the child’s love of personal comfort and are therefore likely to make him selfish and self-seeking, if used at all freely. Indiscriminate love of approval is not much better, for the desire to stand well with every one is not likely to produce a very valuable member of the community. Ultimately, it is the man’s ideals, not the opinion of his momentary environment, that should decide his line of action. As Dr. McDougall puts it, “the highest form of behaviour is that in which con- duct is regulated by an ideal of conduct that enables a man to act in the way that seems to him right, regard- less of the praise or blame of his immediate social en- vironment” (op. cit., p. 181). Such an attitude towards the problems of life is clearly impossible until the individual has acquired a strong, well-organised character. In the process of attaining this he has to pass through certain prelimi- nary stages, which Dr. McDougall enumerates as fol- lows :-— (1) The stage of purely impulsive behaviour, in which the feeling tone which accompanies the actual experience is the only effective teacher. The Training of Character 185 (2) The stage in which conduct is influenced by the expectation of rewards and punishments. (3) The stage in which the expectation of praise and blame is sufficient. The first of these stages is passed through during early infancy. A baby repeats pleasurable and avoids painful acts as far as he can, but threats of punish- ment and promises of rewards mean nothing to him. If a child is in danger of acquiring an undesirable habit at this stage, he can therefore only be checked by associating the act in question with physical pain, that is to say, by slapping him each time he does it; then he will gradually give it up on account of its unpleasant results. But once a child can understand what we say, and has realised himself, however vaguely, as a little individual with wants of his own, it becomes possible to control his behaviour to some extent by the threat of punishment or the promise of reward, and as soon as he has become sufficiently sensitive to the opinion of others, it is possible to dis- card these in their turn and to rely more and more completely on his love of approval. Arbitrary rewards and punishments probably become unnecessary at a much earlier age than is generally realised, for quite little children seem to be able to interpret them as expressions of opinion. Even a child of eighteen months will often take a fall on the hard 1836 The Education of Behaviour ground quite bravely, and yet scream at the top of his voice if his mother slaps him lightly but in anger. What little children need is a clear expression of our approval or disapproval, but words and manner are quite sufficient as soon as they are able to understand what we say. I have known a little girl of three and a half years stop in the midst of her play to ask: “I am not being naughty, am I?” when the adult who was playing with her, gave rather an impatient answer to one of her many questions. The way in which an arbitrary punishment that is felt to be arbitrary is interpreted by a child may be seen from the following case of a very passionate girl of twelve. This child was considered ‘almost un- manageable” at school, although all kinds of punish- ments had been tried, even the use of the cane did not make the least impression. Yet the mother, who undoubtedly exerted an excellent influence over her, assured me that she could only manage the girl by “thrashing” her every time she was in one of her bad moods. For the onlooker it was easy to see why the mother succeeded where the school failed. The child worshipped her mother, she hated the school and despised her form mistress. The “thrashing” was a thing to be feared because it was an expression of extreme disapproval on the part of a person whose good opinion she valued very highly. But at school The Training of Character 187 there was no such check on her actions; to disturb the work of the whole class and make the teacher lose her temper appealed to her love of power; the pleasure she derived from it was well worth the loss of play-time or an occasional caning. If any one imagines that this is an exceptional case he should work for a while at a children’s club and listen to the conversation. He will find that children invariably have most respect for the teacher who can manage his class without resorting to punishments and rewards, and that they interpret a system of frequent punishments as a sign of weakness on the part of the teacher. In short, rewards and punishments that are felt to be arbitrary are only effective in so far as they are taken to be expressions of opinion on the part of some one whom the child already respects. They are therefore quite unnecessary with normal children of school age, who have not been neglected too hopelessly at home. Even the little girl to whom reference has just been made managed to behave herself quite pass- ably during the last three months of the school year at the request of some one whom she wished to think well of her, although no stimulus other than her desire for approval was used, and in spite of the fact that she never got over her intense dislike for her form mis- tress—not a mean achievement for a passionate girl of twelve. 188 The Education of Behaviour It may be well to add that punishment may fail signally when the victim is an adolescent, even if the person who inflicts it is some one whom he greatly ad- mires, Girls particularly may learn to take pleasure in being hurt by those whom they love, if that is the only way in which they can attract sufficient attention, and once they have discovered this form of self-grati- fication they will often feel impelled to make themselves a nuisance to their heroes. At such times they may not even know why they are misbehaving, for their self-regard will make it impossible for them to become conscious of the true cause. (3) Approval and Disapproval as “Lawful” Obstacles—Expressions of approval and disapproval are on a different footing from concrete rewards and punishments. They are the normal signs of group opinion, and as such, perfectly “lawful” in the sense defined. If the group decides against the behaviour of an individual, he can either bow to its decision or ignore it, but he must be prepared to find himself ostra- cised if he dares to follow his own judgment in a matter of importance. The extent to which he is likely to mind this will depend on circumstances. If revolt against the opinion of his own group opens the membership of other groups to him, gregariousness and self-regard will both receive satisfaction. Yet the struggle may be severe enough, for he may know that his act is likely to The Training of Character 189 weaken or break highly valued personal ties, such as friendships. If he does not know of any group which would approve of his attitude, he has nothing to fall back upon except self-regard. Normally, the fear of loneliness is so strong that it is impossible for any one to maintain his position under these circumstances, but he can sometimes escape from his dilemma by inventing an imaginary group to which he would belong if it ex- isted. Needless to say, a revolt of this nature is usually the act of a ripe mind, it only occurs in childhood and adolescence if the individual finds it impossible to satisfy the requirements of his environment. Thus praise and blame can be made to play an im- portant part in the training of character. It should, however, be borne in mind that both must be used with discrimination to be effective. The true function of an appeal to love of approval is to strengthen a motive which is too weak to issue in action without such help. It must therefore be strong enough to pro- duce this effect. On the other hand, we must not give more praise or blame than the child feels he has earned, for both quickly lose their effect if administered too freely. Generally speaking, an act of choice soon becomes habitual under suitable conditions, but it should be remembered that a habit is always specialised, and that a small change in environment is often suf- ficient to destroy it. There is on record a case of a girl 190 The Education of Behaviour who managed to be at school punctually for a whole year, and who yet relapsed into her old habits of un- punctuality as soon as she was removed from the in- fluence of the form mistress for whose sake she had made the effort. This girl was obviously quite indif- ferent about punctuality as such and her temporary improvement was entirely due to her desire to please her form mistress. She was, therefore, in this respect, wholly at the mercy of her environment. There is thus a distinct element of danger in relying too much on love of approval as an instrument in the training of character. This does not mean, of course, that we should try to abstain from expressions of praise and blame. It means rather that we should grade them in accordance with the needs of our pupils. The younger the child, the more freely must they be used, but it is a mistake to resort to them in a question in which he is himself able to appreciate what is right and what is wrong. If the environment is favourable, the child of ten or eleven has usually begun to realise that there are certain things which he cannot do without hurting his self- respect. As soon as this stage has been reached, we should therefore appeal to his pride rather than to his love of approval. This will have two advantages: it will help him to enter on the final stage of conduct, and it will render our expressions of approval and The Training of Character 191 disapproval all the more effective just because they will not have to be used so often. B. The Relative Value of Pleasure and Unpleasure as Incentives to Right Behaviour The next point which we have to discuss is whether pleasurable or unpleasurable stimuli are on the whole more effective in the training of character. In the case of “natural” punishments and rewards one is probably as good as the other, simply because each is recognised to be the “natural” outcome of a definite act. The boy who has once made himself thoroughly ill by eating too many green gooseberries will be more careful in the future, and the boy who succeeds in solving a problem after a long struggle has all the reward he needs in the pleasure success brings with it. But, as stated above, praise and blame are used when the result of an action is not sufficiently obvious to serve as a guide for behaviour. Their purpose is, in fact, to turn the weaker motive into the stronger. If we use fear of disapproval, we are weakening the stronger motive; if we take the opposite course, we are strengthening the weaker one. Ob- viously the end can be attained in either way. The question is, whether there is anything to choose be- tween them, and if so, which is the more effective. In order to answer this question we have to turn to 192 The Education of Behaviour experiments that have been conducted to determine the physiological changes which accompany changes in feeling tone. Perhaps the most striking of these is one which measures the effect of pleasure, and unpleasure upon already contracted muscles. This may be done by means of a spring balance. The subject is blind- folded to avoid complications introduced by his own observation of his record, a spring balance is hung up at some convenient distance from him and he is then told to pull his hardest for, say, a minute. Under ordinary conditions his record shows a regular de- crease, so that it can be represented by an almost unbroken, obliquely descending line. If the subject is now given a pleasant stimulus (say a little raspberry juice) whilst he is in the act of pulling, there is a momentary drop, followed by a significant rise in his record, which then again falls gradually, but main- tains throughout a higher level than before. If a very unpleasant stimulus is given (say quinine) there is, on the contrary, a decided fall in the record, followed by a gradual fall, so that the general level maintained is lower than under ordinary conditions. It would appear from this that a pleasant stimulus increases the amount of energy at the disposal of the subject, where- as an unpleasant stimulus decreases it. The same con- clusion is suggested by certain other experiments. Moreover, everyday experience points to the same The Training of Character 193 conciusion : when we are happy, we usually move about, talk, sing, etc., when we are unhappy we tend to mope, without enough energy or interest in things to want to do anything. The way in which a pleasant surprise seems to renew our energy, however tired we were beforehand, is also worth noting in this connection. Similarly, appreciation from the right quarter acts as a spur to further effort, whereas lack of it may make one give up the struggle in disgust. (It is true that an unpleasant experience which rouses our “‘dis’’pleasure increases our activity by stimulating our pugnacity. This more complex state of mind was not tested by the experiments under discussion, nor does it affect our present problem.) We may, then, assume that pleasure in general in- creases the amount of vital energy at our disposal, whereas unpleasure decreases it. Hence the expression of disapproval is effective, if we merely wish to check the activity of an individual; but a pleasure stimulus is the better, if we wish to induce him to adopt a particu- lar line of action. As was shown in Chapter VI, the quickest way to break an undesirable habit is to form another in its stead. Since our business in this con- nection is usually that of helping our pupil to form useful habits of choice, it follows that we should em- phasise the pleasure that will accompany right choice rather than the unpleasure that will result from wrong 194 The Education of Behaviour choice. Thus, “I shall be so pieased, if you remember this,” is more likely to be successful than “I shall be 9 very angry, if you forget this,” whenever the act that has to be “remembered” involves the conquest of some relatively strong habit or sentiment. C. Intention versus Erecution In this connection it is important to bear in mind that it is not necessarily the child’s fault when he does “forget.” Even Ach’s subjects found it im- possible to give a rhyme to a syllable when its asso- ciation with a non-rhyming syllable exceeded a certain strength. Yet these were adults with a well-developed self-regarding sentiment and they were working under conditions in which they might be expected to know with some exactness the strength of the contrary ten- dency they had to overcome. The child who promises faithfully “never to forget again,” is often dealing with desires which he does not understand himself. To any one who has no knowledge of psychology, it may seem no more difficult to remember not to suck the thumb than not to give the associated syllable. Modern ana- lytical psychology has, however, taught us that thumb- sucking is anything but a meaningless habit, that it is, on the contrary, a symbolical expression of the re- pressed desire to return to the care-free life of infancy, and that this expression is allowed free play by the The Training of Character 195 growing self-regard of the child just because it seems meaningless. It is therefore an outlet for repressed vital energy, and as such far more difficult to conquer than a habit that has been acquired consciously. In cases of this kind a child has no idea what his promise “‘not to do it again” involves, and failure is undoubtedly quite as often due to lack of ability as to lack of good- will. Whether such failure is helpful, probably depends in part on the character of the person and in part on the kind of tendency that has to be overcome. Ach found that failure produced anger, which set free more energy for the next attempt; whereas success, when achieved with sufficient difficulty, produced a conscious- ness of power which helped to strengthen future acts in so far as it was reproduced on the next occasion. Both were therefore found to be helpful. There is, however, no reason to suppose that this would invari- ably be the case. Suppose a person A who dislikes paying calls makes up his mind that he must without fail call on certain people to-morrow. ‘To-morrow comes and a friend suggests that it 1s an ideal day for a long tramp.