pays bY Aine AAU “os = 8 pest tases UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN BOOKSTACKS AMERICAN GUARANTEE OF CONQUERED _ EMPIRE IN AFRICA AND ASIA? SPEECH OF HON. MEDILL McCORMICK CF ILLINOIS IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES AUGUST 20, 1919 aa WASHINGTON 1919 135144—19814 AYO, es \ \ . Si? 37A SPEECH or HON. MEDILL McCORMICK. AMERICAN GUARANTEE OF CONQUERED EMPIRE IN AFRICA AND ASIA? Mr. McCORMICK. Mr. President, in order that I may present a review of the perfidy and aggression which has been the basis of the establishment of empire in Africa and Asia as intelli- gently and as briefly as possible, I must ask, and very earnestly, that Senators will not interrupt me during the course of this review. If by any chance anything which I may suggest should give rise to a question, I ask that that question may await the conclusion of what I have to say.’ The junior Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Norris] addressed the Senate a month ago on the treaty of peace, in so far as it touched the subject of Shantung. “A little later the Senator from Colorado submitted to Senators a consideration of the bases of an enduring peace in an address notable alike for its elevation of spirit and its calm candor. It was a deadly com- mentary upon the treaty before us. The influence of those speeches was felt in the country not less than in this Chamber. Senators turned to a renewed study, not only of the covenant of the league but of the terms of the treaty, to search for evi- dence of that enduring peace, for proof of that abiding justice, which certain supporters of the treaty have found in its text. We knew that China refused to be a party to the “world settlement” because of the wrongs she suffered under it. We could hear, in spite of the censor in France, the voice of reprobation, the audible remonstrances, of the French masses against the new imperialism which promises new wars. The cables brought us from England the indisputable evidence of bye-election after bye-election that the current of public opinion was moving irresistibly against the Lloyd-George Government. ' 135144—19814 4 4 British liberalism and British labor joined their protest to that of Jan Smuts against the terms of the treaty. Opinion in America began to change. Perhaps I ought to say more exactly that Americans began to study and to test by their own judg- ment and conscience the terms of the treaty, which had been withheld from them. At first some of us had not been concerned with the disputes or agreements between the four principal Asiatic powers, France, Japan, Britain, and China, or with the doubtful issues of an European settlement which did not seem to touch us. Such disagreement as arose among us was over our future con- tractual relations with Europe and with Asia rather than over the terms which might be imposed on the vanquished, or over the boundaries and economic privileges which might be established in central Europe or farther Asia. Then we were startled to realize that, acting in his own name and by his own proper authority, the President of the United States had put his name to an agreement, which betrayed an ally and friend who had come into the war at our instance; which kept from the Chinese that which was his, and of which he had been robbed with equal hypocrisy and violence. When the junior Senator from Nebraska spoke the amicable dismemberment of lower Asia Minor by Greece and Italy had not begun; we were not very well aware of differences between France and England and the Hedjaz over Syria; news of the bickering over Thrace had not reached us; the Anglo-Persian treaty had not animated our faint memories of the history of that Huropean conquest and empire in Asia which draws France and Britain to Japan, and which this treaty plans that we shall guarantee to the conquerors. Thus it was that we began to examine the ‘“ world settle- ment.” Ours was a peculiar position. Our continental domain had been extended, not over territories inhabited by old and dense populations, but over vast empty spaces which awaited the coming of civilization. From the beginning our institutions had been democratic, republican, and unmilitarist.. No pressure of population, no urge for economic expansion, had tempted us to 1385144—19814 5 bring ancient civilizations under our economic or political con- trol or to break our plighted word. I will not say that we were more virtuous than other peoples, but that, more happily cir- cumstanced than they, we have not been tempted in the past to do that which other powers have done and against which the enlightened conscience of to-day revolts. More than that, we had not had to battle for our very lives during the first years of the Great War. The Government of the United States, through the President, had announced to the world that “the United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men’s souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action; must put a curb upon our senti- ments.” As late as May, 1916, he had said, speaking of the war, “with its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which this stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore.” It was during these years that other powers made desperate bargains for help, and entered into sordid engagements with the Russian autocracy for the division of the spoils among the victors. mee Mr. President, while America, with increased anxiety, began to axamine the terms of the treaty, the echoes of the speech of the Senator from Nebraska were heard in Asia and in Europe. The Senator from Nebraska spoke on the floor of this Chamber. Aye, but he spoke, too, on the soil where “the embaftl’d farmers stood and fired the shot heard ’round the world.” The truth, the plain, the simple, the elemental truth, spoken out of the heart and conscience of America led exalted Japanese and a no less exalted American to explanations. Baron Uchida and Mr. Hara spoke of the conditions—the conditions, mark you—under which some certain Chinese rights would be re- stored to China. The restoration, after all, is not to be uncon- ditional. Nothing which Japan does in China is unconditional. The explanation in behalf of the American Government indi- cated that although we were ready to guarantee to Japan privi- leges of which Germany had robbed China, yet we refused to acknowledge the negotiations between China and Japan to that 1385144—19814 6 same end. In brief, the Government of the United States wishes to assent to the wrong done China in Shantung upon the verbal assurance of Baron Makino that presently the wrong will be undone. At the same time we virtuously eschew public acknowledgment of the collateral facts. Ostrichlike, our Gov- ernment has declined to recognize that the promises of the great Asiatic military power fronting our Pacifie coast are to be measured by her performances in the past. By that meas- urement the promises are worthless. ‘ THE HISTORY OF JAPANESE PERFIDY. Although “enlightened expediency ” may stop the ears of the American peace delegates, the Senate can not be deaf to the truth. For 35 years Japanese foreign policy in Asia has been one of eonsistent perfidy and aggression. I defy anyone to make eandid answer to that charge. The wonderful material advance of Japan was contemporaneous with that of modern Prussia, and in close imitation of it. Japanese society, the Japanese constitution, the Japanese junkerthum, the Japanese monarchy, the Japanese Army, all have been molded in Prus- sian lines. The diplomacy of Japan has been patterned after that of Frederick the Great in its disregard of truth, solemn pledges, and human rights. If anyone doubt this, let him re- view his own memory of Japan’s relations. with China and Korea, her secret and now discovered violation of the pledges exchanged with the Government of the United States. It was in 1884, after half a dozen years of covert intermeddling in Korea, that Japan landed troops in that. country on the score of certain. domestic disturbances. China, then the neminal suzerain-of Korea, did likewise. In 1885 the troops were with- drawn under a Sino-Japanese treaty, which, by implication at least, recognized the independent status of Korea. ‘Ten years later, in the spring of 1894, another uprising—that of the Tong- Chaks—led to renewed military intervention by Japan and China. The Japanese kidnapped the Empress, who opposed them, made a palace revolution, placed a regent of their own choice on the throne of the Emperor, and began war on China—began war to assert the independence of Korea. The Japanese victory was 135144—19814 7 complete. The Pescadores and Formosa were ceded to Japan. China agreed to pay a great indemnity and to cede to Japan the now famous Liao-Tung Peninsula “in perpetuity and full sovereignty.” Although the treaty recognized the full and com- plete independence and autonomy of Korea, the Japanese re- sumed their policy of penetration. Japanese swarmed over the country interfering in its feeble administration and terrorizing its people. Finally their most resolute opponent, the Empress, was murdered by Japanese bravos. It is unnecessary to rehearse the circumstances under which the European powers in 1895 required the re-cession of the Liao- -Tung to China or of the history of its lease by Russia in 1898 for a period of 25 years. Russia began her railway building in Manchuria, and there followed the politico-economic rivalry between czaristic Russia and imperial Japan,: which led to the Anglo-Japanese treaty in 1902 and to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. - Now, mark the successive steps by which Japan seized upon the body of prostrate and defenseless Korea, and with what gratuitous. perfidy the Japanese Government, by treaty or through the utterancesiof her statesmen, disclaimed her sinister intentions almost at the moment when they were to be carried out. Japan had formally recognized Korean independence in 1895. . In February of 1904 Japan, again by treaty, recognized and guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Korea; in August of 1904 it was provided by treaty that Japan should appoint a financial adviser to the Korean Government ; provision was made by the agreement of April, 1905, that the administration of Korean posts and telegraphs be transferred to Japan. In June of that year the first open hint of a Japanese protectorate was heard. In November, 1905, Korea confided the control of her foreign relations to the Japanese Gvernment, which gave formal and public pledge that this control of foreign relations would be restored to Korea as soon as she might be able to resume the responsibility for their conduct. A Japanese protectorate now existed in fact; but it was not until July of -1907 that the protectorate over Korea was at last proclaimed. 135144—19814 8 In the following year Marquis Ito_categorically declared that Japan had no intention of annexing Korea. Two years. later— 15 years after Japan had fought China to assure Korean inde- pendence—in the year of our Lord 1910, there were published to the world the abdication.of the Korean. Emperor and the annexa- tion of Korea to Japan. It may be said in, extenuation of Japan's aggression upon Korea that she only followed the example of Great Britain, which went to war with China in order.to force her to permit the importation of opium, and, as an additional reward of vic- tory, wrung from her the cession of Hongkong. It may be said that in Korea, Japan did only that which France had done in Indo-China, and that subsequently she mended her ways. But not so. During the course of the Great War Japan twice broke her solemn understanding with the United States and, in de- liberate secret violation of her other international engagements, sought to reduce China to the state of vassalage in which Britain holds Egypt and into which she is drawing Persia. FORBIGN AGGRESSION UPON CHINA. I shall not tax Senators with a Jong review of Japanese aggressions upon China, or, indeed, of ‘the injuries done her by the great Christian powers subsequently allied in the war against Germany. I merely ask leave to print in this context a chronology of events which involves France and Britain, as well as Germany and Russia, in ‘the complicity of aggression against China. In March, 1898, there were signed the treaties under which China was compelled to part with sovereign rights in Shantung to Germany, and at Port Arthur and in the Liao- Tung to Russia—treaties by which China yielded up to foreign Governments the right to build and to guard with military police railroads, which struck at her very power of self-defense. France and Britain (which had joined Russia and Germany to compel Japan to re-cede the Liao-Tung in 1895) now seized Wei- hai-wei and Kwang Chow Wang. If the Russian and German autocrats were to rob China, the great European democracies must vindicate their power and Bree by becoming thieves too! 135144—19814 9 THE MENACE TO AMERICA, “It was in the following year that Mr. Secretary Hay vainly endeavored to establish a concert among the great powers to protect the sovereignty and integrity of China and to assure the open door. Then, during the year of 1900, the outraged Chinese made futile resistance against aggression in the Boxer uprising. You remember, sir, with what painful anxiety we waited for news of the missionaries and the diplomats besieged in the British Legation at Peking. That uprising, that siege, are ominous of the years to come, when either the 400,000,000 Chi- nese, once subjected -to- Japan, may be marshaled against the Republic which betrayed them, or, resisting subjugation, may rise to join the Koreans to drive the invaders from the eastern shores of continental Asia. Then, as the Senator from Mon- tana has boldly and honestly said, then under the terrible tenth article of the covenant of the league we shall be bound in honor to levy our legions, to send forth our young men by the million in defense of the Japanese dominions on the further shores of the Yellow Sea. But I am running ahead of the necessary review of the moral abasement which characterized the conduct of the great Chris- tian powers in Asia before and during the great war. In 1904 Japan took from Russia the very Liao-Tung which Russia and the rest of Europe had once denied her. Fifteen years ago the Mikado in Manchuria succeeded to the spoils of the brigand Czar as to-day in Shantung he has seized those of the brigand Kaiser, FRANCE AND BRITAIN, ASIATIC AUTOCRATS, Under the first Anglo-Japanese alliance Japan was able to fight Russia. Under the third and fourth articles of the second Anglo- Japanese alliance Japan exchanged the privilege to work her will upon Korea for the privilege accorded Britain to work her will upon China in those high plains which touch the Indian frontier. The two great Asiatic autocrats—the Emperor of India and the Emperor of Japan—had entered into mutual bonds for the defense of their domains and the expansion of their influence. Now there joined Japan a third Asiatic power— 135144—19814 10 France. Ah, yes; dauntless and democratic France; imperish- able and glorious France, whose sons under those almost leg- endary Kings, Merovius and Charles Martel, flung themselves into the bloody breach at Chalons and at Tours as they did under their citizen marshal at the Marne and Verdun; France, who thus thrice held..the field while laggard. civilization made ready in her own defense. France in Europe, sir, is a democ- racy, but in Asia she governs through oriental satrapies. In 1907 France and Japan entered into a convention for the secur- ing of their conquests upon the Continent of Asia. Was this an unnatural alliance? I will not say; but I will recall that at the foundation of French dominion over Indo-China lie the corpses of murdered Christians, sad and sardonic brothers ‘of those other lowly servants of the Crucified whose violent end was the signal for the violent beginning of German rule in Shantung. The martyrdom of Christian missionaries was the signal for conquest. The Root-Takahira agreement of 1908 was hailed as an omen of a better understanding, a more straightforward policy by all the powers in the Far East. It was pacific, unmilitary, and unselfish in its terms. But, as soon as Europe was securely locked in the death grapple and Kiaochow was in Japanese ' hands, the Imperial Japanese Government made the boldest and most perfidious attempt it had ever made upon the sovereignty of China. In January of 1915, secretly and with threats of re- prisal if they should be published or refused, Japan presented twenty-one demands to China. I shall not recite them here, but at the proper moment I shall ask that they be included, with other notes; treaties, public and secret, which I shall ask the consent of the Senate to have published in this connection. If China had acceded in full to the demands—the control of her mnilitary forces, her internal administration, and her revenues in good measure—all would have passed into Japanese hands.- China would have become a mere subject and vassal State, like Egypt. But China, in part, rejected the twenty-one demands. Then in 1916 Japan, having failed to have her way in China, joined with Russia in a secret treaty aimed at the United States. Its text, first published by the Russian revolutionists, is 135144—19814 11 included among the papers which I shall append to this sorry review. Japan sought to keep China out of the war. After China broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, under the urging of the United States, Japan for six months delayed her joining the belligerents. Japan demanded of France and Britain—and Britain and France granted her, in their necessity—promises to support her claims to Shantung. It was in ignorance of these promises that Mr. Lansing joined in the Lansing-Ishii agree- ment. ~ The Russian minister at Tokyo sent his Government a confi- dential report on the Japanese view of the agreement. That was also published by the Russian revolutionaries, and in part is as follows: To my question whether he (the Japanese minister of foreign affairs) did not fear that in the future misunderstandings might arise from the different interpretations by Japan and the United States of the meaning of the terms, ‘‘ special position ”’ and ‘‘ special interests”? of Japan in China, Viscount Motono replied by saying that—[a gap in the original]. Nevertheless, I gain the impression from the words of the minister that he is conscious of the possibility of misunderstandings also in the future, but is of the opinion that in such a case Japan would have better means at her disposal for carrying into effect her interpretation than the United States. ; This is the Japan to whose easily spoken and easily broken word we are asked to confide the rights of millions of Chinamen. We are asked to remand the guardianship of Chinese rights, through the council of the league, to those other Governments whose records in Asia must shame thousands of Englishmen and Frenchmen, whose faith in democracy and whose stout hearts helped overthrow the Hohenzollern autocrat. Look at the map. Trace the boundaries and the history of the Huropean invasion of Africa and of Asia and see upon what exemplars Japan has patterned her policy. Mark the confines of the dominions, mark the extending spheres of influence of France, Britain, and Japan, the three imperial powers remaining in the world. Their do- minion now extends over a third of the habitable surface of the globe, and under their sway live well-nigh 500,000,000 sullen subject peoples, brought under this governance by force, and by force kept under its subjection. 185144—19814 12 The covenant. and. the treaty. which we are asked -.to approve * consolidates the interests,” as the diplomats say, and guaran- tees with our blood the territorial acquisitions of the three-prin- cizal powers holding dominion over subject peoples—Britain, Japan, and France, ' ee The method of acquisition differed, although the end was always.the same. International exigency, great. diplomatic occasions, the sudden necessities of defeated powers, the peril of those actually at war, all have been seized upon from time to time to regularize, to make respectable, to confirm legally, what by degrees had become established, as the long period of British penetration in Persia has become a protectorate de facto by the treaty just made. Algiers was conquered after 14 years of cruel warfare, begun when a punitive expedition was sent merely to chastise the insolent Bey of that country. _ In Madagascar French interest led to a French protectorate, and then to conquest by France—planned, unblushing, deliberate, calculated conquest. Thus it was in India, but upon a vast, an imperial, plan— India, where British rule rests upon the divisions among the Indian peoples, upon the presence of British troops, upon the bayonets of those native mercenaries with whom the French- man, Dupleix, taught the British to conquer native dynasties and tg overawe native populations. “ Mr. President, this is not the charge of an Indian miscreant, a rebel against the British imperial Raj, or of a wild Irish Sinn Feiner. It is not the testimony of a Tilak or a De Valera. It is not the view of an American theorist, but of Seeley, the English historian of the “ Expansion of England.’. In India— The Gavernwent does not rest— He says— as in England upon the consent of the people or upon some native ‘constituency * * *, The Government is in every respect—race, religion, habits—foreign to the people. There is only one body of per- sons of which we can positively affirm that without its support the Gevernment could not stand; this is the army. Of this army, one part is English * * *, -but it is less than a third part of the 1385144—19814 13 whole. ‘The other two-thirds are bound to us by nothing but their pay and the feeling of honor which impels a good soldier to be true to his flag. Lord Wellesley, as governor general in 1798, *-* * first laid flown the theory of intervention and annexation. Later again it was ‘adopted with a kind of fanaticism by the last of the governors gencrai who ruled in the time of the company, Lord Dalhousie. Lord Dalhousie in particular stands out in history as a ruler of the type of Frederick the Great, and did deeds which are almost as diffi- cult to justify as the seizure of Silesia or the partition of Poland. ~The Senator from Idaho and Joseph Folk, of Missouri, have made Senators familiar with the record of the British occupa- tion of Egypt.. That occupation began when an army was landed, nominally in support of the Turkish viceroy, the Khedive, and actually to insure the collection of the debt due British bondholders. The early years of its indefinite continu- ance were punctuated by promises of evacuation. There were deliberate undertakings that Britain would leave Hgypt, by Lord Granville and Lord Dufferin, and, most notably, by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Gladstone. In reply to a proposal made in the House of Lords that the British occupation should become permanent, Lord Salisbury said: My noble friend pays an insufficient regard to the sanctity of the obligations which the Government of the Queen have undertaken, and by which they are bound to abide. Mr. Gladstone, as prime minister, was no less explicit when, in the House of Commons, in 1883 he said: We are against it [annexation] on the ground of the specific and solemn pledges given to the world in the most solemn manner and under the most critical circumstances—pledges which have earned for us the confidence of Europe at large during the course of difficult and delicate operations, and which, if one pledge can be more sacred and solemn than another, special sacredness in this case binds us to observe. That was 35 years before the British Cabinet, in the name of His Britannic Majesty, deposed the Khedive who, in theory, reigned by the consent of the Egyptians and the firman of the Turk, and appointed in his stead, and as of right, a sultan. NEW BRITISH PROTECTORATE OVER PERSIA, Now we have news of a convention between Persia and Great Britain. It seems that the Persians, like the Egyptians, have been refused a hearing and help at the peace conference in Paris. As Disracli, who represented the British Empire at the 135144—19814 . id Congress of Berlin, secretly from the other conferees bartered the support of British armsfor the Grand Turk in exchange for Cyprus, now, so secretly that even the Persian delegation in Paris knew nothing of it, Britain has negotiated this far- reaching convention with Persia. I submit to Senators a statement embodied in a cable dispatch published this morning: The delegation— That is, the Persian delegation— had no knowledge of the agreement until it was published last week, although rumors that the British were attempting to bring it about reached Eere last March. -““ Whoever controls the finances, railroads, and army of a nation con- trols that nation, and Persia’s independence, therefore, is a thing of the past,’ said the secretary. “We saw President Wilson several times, and he told us Persia would be invited to join the league and that article 10 would guarantee its complete independence in the future. He also agreed to support our claims when the Ottoman question was taken up here. “Does the President intend to insist that the American Senate adopt article 10 without change and yet allow Great Britain to defy its most important principle in Persia’s case? If so, the league is a sham.” I have no comment to make upon that statement; it is com- plete in itself. With it the news comes that the cold embers of France’s age-old hate for England have flamed up in sudden indignation. The French press is bitter. The Socialist organ, Le Populaire, says: The Persians now understand why Lloyd George gave up China to Japan. A cable dispatch published yesterday in New York sum- marizes a long editorial in the leading conservative newspaper of france, in part, as follows: Le Temps declares the agreement with Britain is a distinct viola- tion of the league of nations: covenant. It asserts the presence of British troops makes it impossible for the people of Persia properly to express their views and wishes. To the newspaper, the Persian promise virtually to hand over the Persian Army to British officers and Persian finances to British spe- cialists means practically the elimination of Persia’s independence. L’Echo de Paris, which in the past has been reputed to be the mouthpiece of the French prime minister, says: ; If the above stipulations do not constitute a most complete protec- torate, then words have lost their meaning. Doubtless nowhere is a 135144—19814 15 formal protectorate mentioned, and doubtless a clause announces the independence and full integrity of Persia, but the substance of the agreement will fool no one. The British Manchester Guardian, one of the two principal organs of British liberalism, says: If these things had been done by any other power we should say that they amounted to a veiled protectorate. ‘The Tory London Post writes in the same vein. We learn that the statement has been made by Frank L. Polk, in charge of American interests at the peace conference, that the American Government knew nothing officially c2 the Persian negotiations. It would appear, Mr. President, that Mr. Polk’s lack of information is as abysmal as that of Mr. Lansing. - Nevertheless, the cables carry the statement of Cecil Harms- worth, under secretary for foreign affairs in the House of Com- mons, of which I read a part: The policy of His Majesty’s Government is to assist Persia to reestab- lish herself on a sound basis. There is not the slightest foundation for a suspicion that the Government proposed, or that the Persian Govern- ment would have consented, to create anything in the nature of a pre- tectorate. Mr. Harmsworth hardly will be surprised if we recall the circumstances under which Lord Beaconsfield “leased ” Cyprus from the Turk, secretly from his colleagues at the Congress of Berlin. The “lease” held until Britain asserted sovereignty and later transferred the island to Greece. Mr. Harmsworth will not be surprised if, contemplating what seems to some of us to be the ignorance and ineptitude of some of our repre- sentatives, we recall the asseverations of Lord Salisbury and Mr. Gladstone in regard to Egypt: Persicos odi, puer, apparatus. Roman Horace may have loathed the riches of Persia, but not so the British statesmen, who see in Mesopotamia the equal rivals of our cotton fields, and who have found in Persia one of the great oil basins of the world. The pax Britannica, which to see is to admire, is the hand- maiden of plenty. We may see written on yonder map the time when the looms of Leeds and the mills of Manchester will spin yarns and weave cloths without recourse to the cotton markets of Memphis or Charleston or New Orleans. 135144—19814 16 By the conquest of German Hast Africa the British Empire completed the “all-red” route from the Cape to Cairo. Now by the consummation of the Persian treaty and by the addition of two other newly subject or vassal States to her Empire, Britain has completed the “all-red” route from Cairo to Cal- cutta. I do not decry the service to civilization of the British Hm- pire. It has carried highways into the wilderness. It has made two blades to grow where one grew before. It has abolished suttee and slavery. It has brought peace to millions. But that has been a policeman’s peace. Through the long generations which have witnessed the growth of that splendid Empire in India, more splendid than any from that of Greek Alexander to that of Aurungzebe, there has been no broadening base of gov- ernment, no effort to bring schools to the people and the people to the schools. The generai illiteracy of Egypt to-day is as great as it was when, nearly 40 years ago, Arabi Pasha fell before the British armies. What is true of the British is true of the French and the Japanese dominions over subject peoples. They have brought material prosperity, but no democratic progress. Almost wher- ever you go among those myriad millions in Asia and Africa you find sedition’ and rebellion. You would have found, even this year and last, imprisonment without trial and summary deportation of political agitators. You would have found, in greater proportion to-day than for generations, British troops. You would have found, in India, British garrisons which had replaced Indian troops. : THE AMERICAN GUARANTEE OF CONQUERED EMPIRES. Look at the long borders of those subject peoples; count the thousands of miles they march with those of China and Russia. They touch upon the Russian Pamirs and the Russian Caucasus. If ever those subject peoples rise, and the Chinese or the Rus- sians strike hands with them for freedom, that will constitute “external aggression” under the covenant. Then our young men must march by thousands to drive the invader back from the Yalu, the Ganges, the Tigris, or the Euphrates. 185144—19814 17 Happily, Mr. President, there is no longer any difference among Senators over-the meaning of article 10. We owe very largely to the candor and courage of the senior Senator from Montana the agreement here; that. for each of the nations which may subscribe to it the obligation is one of honor and unqualified. If the United States become a party to it, although our frontiers require no guarantors, although there are no ‘possible enemies against whom we must summon help, America, the great reservoir of treasure and of man power, becomes the guarantor of all the frontiers of the world, including those of the far-flung autocracies of France and Britain. Surely the British statesmen who penned the text of the covenant knew when they wrote articles 4 and 11 that smolder- ing revolution among those subject millions must break out in the future. The council may deal * * * with any matter * * * affecting the peace of the world. (Art. 4.) Any threat of war * * * is declared a matter of concern to the whole league, and the league shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. (Art. 11.) It is also declared to be the fundamental right of each member of the league to bring to the attention of the assembly or of the council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb either the peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. (Art. 11.) Ponder these provisions in connection with a paragraph buried in the midst of the long fifteenth article of the covenant, and which did not appear in the first published draft. If the council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league reserve to them- selves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. . It is not a pleasant task to review the conquests, the pledges broken or forgotten, which are an inseparable part of the his- tory of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but unless it be done we can not understand how the European democracies are caught in the chains of the very peoples whom they hold in subjection. It is only thus that we can understand how the present terms of the covenant may call us to war to keep those subject peoples in bondage, 135144—19814 18 There was a time, Mr. President, when the language of France was as common to my ears and to my lips as that in which we speak. It was in her tongue that I was taught to ask for Guidance which we should implore to-day. As two natures struggle in the breast of man, so are there two in France. There is the France whose sons died for liberty with a hero- ism beyond compare, and a France whose conquering armies carried her eagles from Moscow almost to Gibraltar. In the lifetime of men in this chamber, she has followed the third Napoleon and Boulanger, as well as Thiers and Gambetta. Like forces are at work against one another in England— the England which has spoken through the lips of Hampdén and Gladstone, no less than through those of Lord North and Disraeli; Great England, stout of heart, reverent of the law, who -held out to the world the first example of representative -government! But the seat of the mother of parilaments is the capital of an empire over hundreds of subject millions. If we subscribe to the imperialist obligations and the reactionary purposes of the tenth and eleventh articles of the covenant—if we join in the spoil of China—we shall give new life to the spirit of imperialism-which has been born of the victory—we shall fail the men in Europe who have dared to protest against this treaty. Woe unto the world because of offenses; for it must be that offenses come; but woe unto that man by whom the offense cometh. Great powers, political and financial, are eager to frighten and to coerce, to drive Senators to subordinate judgment to expediency. During the long months which followed the armis- tice, was anything done to reduce the costs of living for the people of this land? They were heavy in January and Febru- ary, aS well as in July and August. No process was invoked and no appeal was made to lighten the burden then, but now we must haste, In our haste let us not forget that in the awakening Orient, in China, and in those conquered empires yonder, there are twice as many millions as there were in all the countries of Western Europe which were engaged in the war. If we shrink from our duty, if we consent to the guaranty of territories, 135144—19814 19 if we consent that America shall be an instrument to repress revolution, we shall not only consecrate the wrongs of the past, but by our act we shall pledge America against conscience and judgment to take part in the great war which this treaty promises. Our young men will go forth to defend cities of which they never heard. In the high places of Asia, the snow will cover the frozen bodies of Americans perhaps now unborn, and American mothers—little girls to-day, mayhap, playing in the summer air about the dooryards—will mourn their sons fallen in the desert wastes of Syria and Egypt. CHRONOLOGY OF JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN CHINA. Sino-German “lease” of Shantung, March 6, 1898. Sino-Russian “ lease”? of Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung, March 27, 1898. Hay ‘‘Open door” proposals, September 6, 1899. Boxer uprising, January to December, 1900. First Anglo-Japanese Alliance, January, 1902. Russo-Japanese War, 1904. Cession of the Liao-Tung and half of the Manchurian Railroad to Japan, 1905. “ Second Angilo-Japanese Alliance, August, 1905, Franco-Japanese Treaty, 1907. Root-Takahira agreement, 1908. Annexation of Korea, 1910. Third Anglo-Japanese alliance, 1911. Great war and surrender of Kiau-Chau to the Japanese, 1914. The twenty-one demands upon China, January to May, 1915. Russo-Japanese secret treaty, July 3, 1916. China breaks relations with Germany, February, 1917. British and French promises to support Japan in Shantung, Ieb- ruary, 1917. China declares war on Germany, August, 1917. Lansing-Ishii agreement, November 2, 1917. CONVENTION BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE AND JAPANESE TROOPS FROM KORHA, APRIL 18, 1885. It is hereby agreed that China shall withdraw her troops now stationed in Korea, and that Japan shall withdraw hers stationed therein for the protection of her legation. The specific term for effecting the same shall be four months, commencing from the date of the signing and sealing of this convention, within which term they shall respectively accomplish the withdrawal of the whole number of each of their troops, in order to avoid effectively any complications between the respective countries ; the Chinese troops shall embark from Masan-Po and the Japanese from the port of Ninsen. The said respective powers mutually agree to invite the King of Korea to instruct and drill a sufficient armed force, that she may herself assure her public security, and to invite him to engage into his service an officer or officers from amongst those of a third power, who shall be intrusted with the instruction of the said force. ‘The respective powers 135144—19814 20 also bind themselves, each to the other, henceforth not to send any of their own officers to Korea for the purpose of giving said instruction. In case of any disturbance of a grave nature occurring in Korea which necessitates the respective countries, or either of them, to send troops to Korea it is hereby understood that they shall give, each to the other, previous notice in writing of their intention so to do, and that after the matter is settled they shall withdraw their troops and not further station them there. TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, APRIL, 1895. ARTICLU 1. China recognizes definitely the full and complete inde- pendence and autonomy of Korea, and in consequence the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea, fn derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future. A THE “ OPEN-DOOR’” PROPOSALS OF SECRETARY OF STATE HAY. SEPTEMBER 6, 1899. To the AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY: At the time when the Government of the United States was in- formed by that of Germany that it had leased from His Majesty the Emperor of China. the port: of Kiaochow and the adjacent territory in the Province of Shantung assurances were given to the ambassador of the United States at Berlin by the imperial German minister for foreign affairs that the rights and privileges insured by treaties with China to citizens of the United States would not thereby suffer or be in any wise impaired within the area over which Germany had thus obtained control. More recently, however, the British Government recognized by a formal agreement with Germany the exclusive right of the latter country to enjoy in said leased area and the contiguous “sphere of influence or interest’’ certain privileges, more especially those relat- ing to railroads and mining enterprises, but as the exact nature and extent of the rights thus recognized have not beeen clearly defined it is possible that serious conflicts of interests may at any time arise not only between the British and German subjects within said area but that the interests of our citizens may also be jeopardized thereby. Earnestly desirous to remove any cause of irritation and to insure at the same time to the commerée of all nations in China the un- doubted benefits which should accrue from a formal recognition by the various powers claiming “spheres of interest” that they shall enjoy perfect equality of treatment for their commerce and navigation within Buch “ spheres,” the Government of the United States would be pleased to see His German Majesty’s Government give formal assurances and lend its cooperation in securing like assurances from the other interested powers, that each within its respective sphere of whatever influence— First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested Interest within any so-called ‘‘ sphere of interest ’”’ or leased territory it may have in China. Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all sueh ports as are within said ‘‘sphere of interest’’ (unless they be “free ports’’), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government, : 135144—19814 21 Third. That it will-levy. no higher harbor dues on -vessels- of «another nationality frequenting any port in such ‘‘sphere’’ than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its ‘‘ sphere” on mer- chandise belonging to citizens or subjects of.other nationalities trans- ported through such ‘ sphere” than shall be levied on similar merchan- dise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances. The liberal policy pursued by His Imperial German Majesty in de- claring Kiaochow a free port and in aiding the Chinese Government in the establishment there of a customhouse are so clearly in line with the propositions which this Government is anxious to see recognized that it entertains the strongest hope that Germany will give its acceptance and hearty support. The recent ukase of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia declaring the port of Ta-lien-wan open during the whole of the lease under which it is held from China to the merchant ships of all nations, coupled with the categorical assurances made to this Government by His Imperial Majesty’s representative at this capital at the time, and since repeated to me by the present Russian ambassador, seem to insure support of the Emperor to the proposed measure. Our ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg has in consequence been instructed to submit it to the Rus- sian Government and to request their early consideration of it. A copy of my instruction on the subject to Mr. Tower is herewith inclosed for ‘your confidential information. The commercial interests of Great Britain and Japan will be so clearly served by the desired declaration of intentions and the views of the Governments of these countries as to the desirability of the adop- tion of measures insuring the benefits of equality of treatment of all foreign trade throughout China are so similar to those entertained by the United States that their acceptance of the proposition herein out- lined and their cooperation in advocating their adoption by the other powers can be confidently expected. FIRST ANGLO-JAPANESH ALLIANCE, 1902, Article 1. The high contracting parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfiu- enced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, how- ever, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Korea, the high contracting parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indis- -pensable in order to safeguard these interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of cither of the high contracting parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjecis. ArT, 2, If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of their re- spective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another power the other high contracting power will maintain a strict neutrality, and-use its efforts to prevent others from joining in hostilities against its ally. ‘ArT. 3, If, in the above event, any other power or powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other high contracting party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with it, 1385144—19814 22 PROTOCOL BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA, FEBRUARY, 1904. ArT, 2. The Imperial Government of Japan shall in a spirit of firm friendship insure the safety and repose of the Imperial House of Korea, Art. 8. The Imperial Government of Japan unconditionally guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire. SECOND ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1905. ARTICLE 1. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will con- sider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests. Ant. 2. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other power or powers either con- tracting party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agree- ment, the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it. Art. 8. Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic inter- ests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such meas- ures of guidance, control, ard protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations. Art. 4. Great Britain having a special interest in all that con- cerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions. —— RUSSO-JAPANESH TREATY OF 1907. Art. 2. The two high contracting parties recognize the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal oppor- tunity in whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire and engage to sustain and defend the maintenance of the status quo and respect for this principle by all pacific means within their reach. — FRANCO-JAPANESH TREATY, 1907. The Governments of Japan and France, being agreed to respect the inde- pendence and integrity of China, as well as the principle of equal treatment in that country for the commerce and subjects or citizens of all nations, and haying a special interest to have the order and pacific state of things pre- served, especially in the regions of the Chinese Empire adjacent to the terri- tories where they have the rights of sovercigniy, protection, or occupation, engage to support each other for assuring the peace and security in those regions, with a view to maintain the respective situation and the territorial rights of the two high contracting parties in the Continent of Asia. ROOT-TAKAHIRA AGREEMENT, 1908. Art. 4. They (the United States and Japan) are also determined to pre- serve the common interests of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in the Empire. 185144—19814 ) 23 ArT. 5. Should any event occur threatening the status quo as above described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it re- mains for the two Governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take. DECLARATION OF ANNEXATION OF KORHA BY JAPAN, SIGNED ON AUGUST 22, 1910, AND PROMULGATED ON THE 29TH OF AUGUST, Article 1. His Majesty, the Emperor of Korea, makes complete and per- manent cession to His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, of all rights of soy- ercignty over the whole of Korea. Art. 2. His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, accepts the cession mentioned in the preceding article, and consents to the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan. ArT, 3. His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, will accord to their majesties the Emperor and ex-Emperor and his Imperial Highness, the Crown Prince of Korea, and their consorts and heirs such titles, dignity, and honor as are appropriate to their respective ranks, and sufficient annual grants will be made for the maintenance of such titles, dignity, and honor ArT. IV. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan will also accord appro- priate honor and treatment to the members of the Imperial House of Korea and their heirs, other than those mentioned in the preceding article, and the funds necessary for the maintenance of such honor and treatment will be granted. ArT. V. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan will confer peerages and monetary grants upon those Koreans who, on account of meritorious services, are regarded as deserving such special recognition. Art. VI. Im consequence of the aforesaid annexation, the Government of Japan assumes the entire government and administration of Korea and under- takes to afford full protection for the persons and property of Koreans obey- ing the laws there in force, and to promote the welfare of all such Koreans. ArT. VII. The Government of Japan will, so far as circumstances permit, employ in the public service of Japan in Korea those Koreans who accept the new régime loyally and in good faith and who are duly qualified for such service. © ‘Art. VIII. This treaty, having been approved by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of Korea, shall take effect from the date of its promulgation. — JAPAN’S ORIGINAL 21 DEMANDS, JANUARY 18, 1915. GROUP I. The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government being. desirous of maintaining the general peace in eastern Asia, and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood existing between the two nations, agree to the following articles: ARTICLE 1. The Chinese Government eneaeds to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which Germany, by virture of treaties, or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung. Art. 2. The Chinese Government engages that within the Province of Shan- tung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third power under any pretext. ArT. 3. The Chinese Government consents to Japan’s building a rail- way from Chefoo, or Lungkow, to join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, 1385144—19814 24 Art, 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as pos- sible certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung as commercial ports. What places are to be opened are to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement. GROUP II. The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, since the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position en- joyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles: ARTICLE 1. The two contracting powers mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to the period of 99 years. ArT. 2, Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Fastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming. Art. 8. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever. Art. 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Yateneen: eabiacts ‘ the right of opening mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon- golia. As regards what mines shall be opened they shall be decided upon jointly. Arr, 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese Government’s consent shall be first obtained before action is taken: (a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third power for the pur- pose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon- golia. (b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and Hastern Inner Mongolia as security. Art. 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese Govern- ment employs political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia the Japanese Government shall first be consulted. Art. 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the control and manage- ment of the Kirin-Changechun Railway shall be handed over to the Jap- anese Government for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this agreement. GROUP III. The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, seeing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Co. have close relations with each other at present, and desiring that the common interésts of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles: ARTICLH 1. The two contracting parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Co. shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and they further agree that without the previous consent of Japan China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said company nor cause the said company to dispose freely of the same. ART, 2., The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neigh- borhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Co. shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said company; and further agrees that if it is desired to 135144—-19814 25 carry out any undertaking which. it, is-apprehended may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the Bald: company the consent of. the said company shall first be obtained. ‘GROUP IV. The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China agree to the following special article: The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third power any harbor or bay or island along the coast of China. GROUP VY. Article 1. The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs. Art. 2. Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land. Art. 8. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police to settle, cases which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly ad- ministered by Japanese and Chinese, or that the police departments of these places shall employ naomerous Japanese, so that they may at the same timo help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese police service. Art. 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government) or there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased. Art, 5, China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another between Nanchang and Chaochou. ArT, 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build rail- ways, and construct harbor work (including dock yard) in the Province of Fukien, Japan shall first be consulted. Art. 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right to propa- gate Buddhism in China. SECRET RUSSO-JAPANESE TRHATY, JULY 3, 1916. ARTICLE 1. The two high contracting parties acknowledge that the vital interests of both require the safeguarding of China against ‘the political domination by any third power entertaining hostile designs toward Russia or Japan, and therefore mutually pledge themselves, each time when circumstances demand it, to enter into frank relations based on complete mutual trust with one another with a view to taking joint measures for the prevention of the possibility of the advent of such a state of affairs (in China). * * * x * * * ArT. 6. The present convention shall be kept in complete secreey from everybody except the two high contracting parties. NOTH FROM THE AMERICAN MINISTER AT PEKING TO THE CHINESH MIN- ; ISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. PEKING, February 4, ‘1917. I have the honor to advise your excellency that I have been in- structed by my Government to. make to tere the following Se ee in its behalf: ; This Government, in view of the recent announcement by the Ger- man Government of its intention to renew indiscriminate submarine 185144—19814 26 warfare, has no alternative but to pursue the course laid down in its note to the German Government on April 18, 1916. It will therefore recall the American ambassador and his suite at Berlin and will forth- with Geliver to the German ambassador in Washington passports ee himself and his suite. I am further instructed to say that the President is reluctant to be- lieve that Germany will actually carry out the threats made against neutral commerce, but, if it is done, the President will ask from Con- gress authority to use the national power to protect American citizens engaged in peaceful and lawful errands on the high seas. The course taken is, in the view of the President, in entire conformity with the principles enunciated by him in his address to the Senate on January 22, and he therefore believes that it will make for the peace of the world if the other neatral powers can find it possible to take action similar to that taken by the Government of the United States. APPENDIx C or “ THE SECRET TREATIDS.” [By F. Seymour Cocks. ] DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JAPAN. The following diplomatic documents from the archives of the Russian foreign office haye appeared in the Petrograd press. The translations were published in the Manchester Guardian on February 7 and 22, 1918. The first three relate to Japan’s territorial war aims, the last three to Japan’s relations with China and to the interpretation of the term “special interests’? in the Japanese-American agreement (Mr. Lausing’s note of Nov. 2, 1917), quoted on page 64: I. [From M. Krupensky, the former Russian ambassador at Tokyo. Dis- patch dated February 8, 1917.] ie . I neyer omit an opportunity for representing to the minister for foreign affairs the desirability, in the interests of Japan herself, of China’s intervention in the war, and only last week I had a conversa- tion with him on the subject. To-day I again pointed out to him that the present moment was particularly favorable, in view of the position taken up by the United States and the proposal made by them to the neutral powers to follow their example, and, more particularly, in view of the recent speeches of the American minister at Peking. Viscount Motono replied that he would be the first to welcome a rupture between China and Germany, and would not hesitate to take steps in this direc- tion at Peking if he were sure that the Chinese Government would go in that direction. So far, however, he had no such assurance, and he feared lest unsuccessful representations at Peking might do harm to the Allies. He promised me to sound the attitude of Peking without delay, and, in case of some hope of succa2ss, to propose to the cabinet to take a decision in the desired direction. On the other hand, the minister pointed out the necessity for him, in view of the attitude of Japanese public opinion on the subject, as well as with a view to safeguard Japan’s position at the future peace conference, if China should be admitted to it, of securing the support of the allied powers to the desires of Japan in respect of Shantung and the Pacific islands. 'These desires are for the succession to all the rights and privileges hitherto possessed by Germany in the Shantung Provinee and for the acquisition of the islands to the north of the Equator which are now occupied by the Japanese. Motono plainly told me that the Japanese Government would like to receive at once the promise of the Imperial (Russian): Government to support the above 135144—19814 20 desires of Japan. In order to give a push to the highly important question of a break between China and Germany, I regard it as very desirable that the Japanese should be given the promise they ask—this the more as, so far as can be seen here, the relations between Great Britain and Japan have of late been such as to justify a surmise that the Japanese aspirations would not meet with any objections on the part of the London cabinet. II. [Dispatch dated Mar. 1, 1917.] The minister for foreign affairs asked me to-day whether I had re- ceived a reply from the Imperial (Russian) Government relating to Japan’s desires on the question of Shantung and the Pacific islands, and told me that the Japanese Government would very much like to have at the earlist a promise from us on the subject. III. [Dispateh dated Mar. 21, 1917.] I communicated to-day to the minister for foreign affairs the con- tents of your high excellency’s telegram, and gave him a copy. Viscount Motono cenfined himself to the observation that he took note of my communication, and would report it to the council of ministers and the Emperor. The attitude of public opinion and the press here toward the revolution in Russia is, on the whole, sympathetic. It is regarded asa pledge of a successful prosecution of the war until complete victory has been obtained, and the end of the rule of the bureaucracy is wel- comed. While paying due tribute to the Emperor’s and the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch’s patriotic acts of abdication, public opinion here expresses the hope that the new Government and the popular repre- sentatives to be summoned would net be inclined toward extreme de- cisions. The same attitude toward the events in Russia could be per- ceived in the few general words which I heard in this connection from the minister of foreign affairs. LY. [Dispatch from the Russian ambassador at Tokyo, dated Oct. 16, 1917.] In reply to my question as to the credibility of the rumors alleging that Japan is prepared to sell to the Chinese Government a considerable quantity of arms and munitions, Viscount Motono confirmed them, and added that the Peking Government had promised not to use the arms against the southerners. It was evident from the minister’s words, however, that this promise possessed only the value of a formal justifi- eation of this sale, infringing as the latter does the principle of non- intervention in the internal Chinese feuds, proclaimed by Japan herself, and that the Japanese Government was in this instance deliberately assisting the Tuan-tse-shua cabinet in the hope of receiving from it in return substantial privileges. It is most likely that the Japanese are aiming principally at obtaining the privilege of rearming the entire Chinese Army, and at making China dependent in the future on Japa- nese arsenals and the supply of munitions from Japan. The arms to be supplied to China are estimated at 30,000,000 yen. At the same time Japan intends establishing an arsenal in China for the manufacture of war material. Vv. [Dispatch dated Oct. 22, 1917.] Referring to Bakhmetyefi’s (Russian ambassador at Washington) N 598, if the United States thinks, as it appeared to our ambassador—from 135144—-19814 28 conversation with Lansing—that the recognition of Japan’s special position in China is of no praetical consequence, such a view will in- evitably lead in the future to serious misunderstandings between us and Japan. The Japanese are manifesting more and-more clearly a tend- ency to interpret the special position of Japan in China, inter alia, in the sense that other powers must not undertake in China any political steps without previously exchanging views with Japan on the subject, 2 con- dition that would to some extent establish a Japanese control over the foreign affairs of China. On the other hand, the Japanese Government does not attach great importance to its recognition of the principle of the open door and the integrity of China, regarding it as merely a repetition of the assurances repeatedly given by it earlier to other powers and implying no new restrictions for the Japanese policy in China. It is therefore quite possible that at some future time there may arise in this connection misunderstandings between the United States and Japan. The minister of foreign affairs again confirmed to-day in conversation with me that in the negotiations by Viscount Ishii the question at issue is not some special concession to Japan in these or other parts of China, but Japan’s special position in China as a whole. VI. [Dispatch dated Nov. 1, 1917.] The minister for foreign affairs asked me to call on him to-day and communicated to me confidentially, but quite officially, the text of the notes transmitted in my telegram N 2, which are to be exchanged at Washington on. November 2 or.3 between the American State Secretary and Viscount Ishii. A similar communication was made to-day to the British ambassador here. The French and Italian ambassadors will receive the text of the notes in a day or two, privately, for their infor- mation. The publication of the notes will probably take place on No- vember 7; until then the minister asks the powers to keep his com- munication secret. When handing me the above-mentioned text of the notes, Viscount Motono added that he had only received it in final form yesterday by wire from Washington, and since Viscount Ishii was to leave (Wash- ington) the night after next, the signature of the notes could not have been postponed, in spite of the Japanese Government’s desire to asScer- tain the views of the Russian Government on ‘the subject prior to it. The minister hoped that he would not be blamed for that at Petrograd, especially as the present agreement between America and Japan could not arouse any objection on our part, Viscount Motono mentioned that when concluding (gap in the original), one of the objects was to put an end to the German intrigues intended to sow discord between Japan and the United States and to prove thereby to the Chinese that there was between the two powers a complete agreement of view with regard to China, who, therefore, must not reckon on the possibility of extract- ing any profit from playing off one against the other. To my question whether he did not fear that in the future misunder- standings might arise from the different interpretations by Japan and the United States of the meaning of the terms “ special position ’’ and “special interests ’ of Japan in China, Viscount Motono replied by say- ing that (a gap in the original). Nevertheless, I gain the tmpression from the words of the minister that he is conscious of the possibility of misunderstandings also in the future, but is of the opinion that in such a case Japan would have better means at her disposal for carrying into effect her interpretation than the United States. 135144—19814 29 CORRESPONDENCE (IN PART) CONCLUDING THE AGREEMENT BY FRANCE AND GREAT ees TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN SHANTUNG. : ; ak: FEBRUARY 16, 1917, To the JAPANESH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: With reference to the subject of our conversation of the 27th ultimo, His Britannic Majesty’s Government accedes with pleasure to request of the Jepanese Government for an assurance that they will support Japan’s claims in regard to the disposal of Germany’s rights in Shantung and possession of the islands north of the Equator on the occasion of the peace conference, it being understood that the Japanese Government will in the eventual peace settlement treat in the same spirit Great Britain’ s claim to the German islands south of the Equator. CONYNGHAM GREENH; His Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador. Feprvary 21, 1917. To the BrivisH AMBASSADOR: | The Japanese Government is deeply appreciative of the friendly spirit in which your Government has given assurance, and happy to note it as fresh proof of the close ties that unite the two allied powers. I take pleasure in stating that the Japanese Government on its part is fully prepared to support in the same spirit the claims which may be put forward at the peace conference in regard to the German possessions in the islands south of the Equator. Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. To the FrmencH AMBASSADOR: The Imperial Japanese Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace negotiations the surrender of the territorial rights and special interests Germany possessed before the war in Shan- tung and the islands situated north of the Equator in the Pacific Ocean, The Imperial Japanese Government confidently hopes the Government of the French Republic, realizing the legitimacy of these demands, will give assurance that, her case being proved, Japan may count upon its full support in this question. > Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. To the JAPANHSE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the Japa- nese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the peace nego- tiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung and the German islands in the Pacific north of the Equator. It also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed before the war in this Chinese Province and these islands, a ae French Ambassador. THH LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT. NovemBer 2, 1917. To the AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN: I have the honor to communicate herein my understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the ques- 185144—-19814 30 tions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China. In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable. The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that ter- ritorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous, The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers. The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare, furthermore, that they always ad- here to the principle of the so-called ‘‘ open door ”’ or equal qupgstuaty for commerce and industry in China. Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the fa ae tion by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China. I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agreement reached by us. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consider- ation. (Signed) Rovertr LANSING. NOVEMBER 2, 1917. To the SECRETARY orf STATDT: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, communicating to me your understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China. I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorization of my Government, the understanding in question set forth in the follow- ing terms: In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time. to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Govern- ments with regard to China is advisable. The Governments of Japan and the United States recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous, The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unim- paired and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that 135144—19814 31 while geographical position gives Japan such special interests’ they ‘have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers. The Governments of Japan and the United States deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or terri- torial integrity of China and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called ‘‘ open door” or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China. Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acqui- sition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China. I take this opgortunity to convey to you, sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. 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